Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness

Interpreting China’s Military Power

Although inter-state tensions have generally been easing after the Cold War, military power remains a dominant factor in Asian regional politics. As China, operating the world’s largest army, grows stronger, there are ongoing debates over the implications for Asian regional security. This book argues that it is imperative to look beyond the empirical observations and conventional materialist reading of Chinese military development to understand its dynamics and directions in doctrinal terms and put it in a readiness context for evaluation. Military doctrine has long been under-researched and is often treated as a subject separate from force development. But, as this study contends, this factor is necessary for interpreting the making and purposes of China’s military power because it forms the intellectual foundation of military structural and hardware development. Without being loaded with political rhetoric, it also communicates to us for what military power is intended. The role of doctrine is reinforced in the context of military readiness, which defines what the army is getting ready for, and how. Force development is evaluated in structural and operational terms. The importance of this analytical framework based on military doctrine and readiness is demonstrated in a survey of the evolution of Chinese military doctrine and force development. As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has continued to adjust its military structure and operation to follow the doctrinal lead, its switches between local war and total war doctrines have seen corresponding changing emphasis between operational and structural readiness. The current high-technology local war doctrine dictates that China has to focus more on operational readiness. In the information age, this means that, though geographically localised, military conflicts in fact see an expanding battlespace and, buttressed by information technology, operation has to be efficient as well as precise. Ka Po Ng is an associate professor at Aichi Bunkyo University, Japan.

Interpreting China’s Military Power Doctrine makes readiness

Ka Po Ng

First published 2005 by Frank Cass, an imprint of Taylor & Francis 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Ka Po Ng All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-32590-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-714-65548-1 (Print Edition)

In memory of my father, Tim, and for my mother, Kam

Contents

Preface and acknowledgements

vii

1

Introduction

1

2

Military doctrine, military readiness and military power

15

3

The genesis of the Chinese local war doctrine

38

4

Towards a local war doctrine

62

5

The advent of local war

83

6

‘High-technology local wars’ and beyond

105

7

Conclusion

151

Appendix 1 The military readiness conceptual framework

156

Appendix 2 The Chinese structure of military science

157

Appendix 3 Chinese military actions, 1949–2002

158

Appendix 4 Major events in PLA doctrinal development

165

Notes Select bibliography Index

172 223 245

Preface and acknowledgements

This book is the result of my interest in the political science programme of international relations and an utterly under-researched field, China military studies. The debate over ideational factors in international relations has produced many seminal books related to military and strategic studies; to name a few, Elizabeth Kier’s Imagining War and Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism. On another front, although no one would dispute the importance of understanding China’s military, especially in view of its growing power, few would undertake this research. As David Shambaugh observes, the ‘dearth of university-based PLA specialists’ is obvious; the hardly encouraging job prospect, lack of appropriate supervisors to train students, and limited fieldwork and publication opportunities have deterred dedicated research in China military studies.1 Still, it has been served well, albeit small in quantity, with such classics as William Whitson and Huang Chen-Hsia’s The Chinese High Command, Allen Whiting’s Chinese Calculus of Deterrence and Ellis Joffe’s The Chinese Army after Mao. The recent Modernizing China’s Military authored by David Shambaugh is likely to become a set reference for its comprehensive study of the PLA. However, despite the publications surveyed in Chapter 1 of this work, little book-length research has been done on China’s military doctrine. Even fewer go further to integrate it into force development analysis. This project is not to make a paradigmatic shift in this overlapping field of international relations and China military studies. Rather, it tries to undertake a research that is simply overdue and to offer an analytical tool. When we see China modernising its military force and being more assertive in the exercise of its military power, we have to ask why this happens, how and why in this direction. My work, on the theoretical side, wishes to use the ideational factor of military doctrine to interpret China’s military power in the context of ‘readiness’. Empirically, this book aims to fill a gap in academic literature on the PLA’s doctrinal evolution from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China to the present day. In fact, past decades have seen the Chinese army evolving from a peasant guerrilla force to a regular army trained on the Soviet model. Then the revolutionary fervour and emphasis on

viii

Preface and acknowledgements

Chinese characteristics returned to form the backbone of a total war doctrine. It was only in the 1980s, when a local war doctrine was adopted, that the PLA began to adapt itself to fighting modern conventional warfare. This doctrine was soon added to the ‘high technology’ predicate, showing an intention to apply the revolution in military affairs to China. It is likely that, as the Chinese army enters the information age, it has to continue modifying its military doctrine in order to direct its structural and operational reforms. These dramatic doctrinal changes in the past decades should not escape our attention because they shape force development and communicate to us its direction and military intentions. This research has benefited from the support of many people and institutions. Above all, I must thank William Tow, C.L. Chiou, Ellis Joffe, Chi-kong Lai and three anonymous reviewers who read earlier versions of this manuscript and gave me very helpful comments. Their insights into international relations, China military studies and history have showed me directions for improvement. Bill Tow, in particular, has constantly reminded me of applying results of international relations theoretical debates to empirical analysis. Chiou has offered me alternative perspectives of looking at China and, no less important, his humour was cherished. They, along with other teachers and students at the University of Queensland, have given me many academic benefits and fond moments. I am also grateful to Greg Austin, Stuart Harris and other scholars in the Department of International Relations of the Australian National University for their advice and exchanges when I was on a National Visiting Scholarship in 1997. Although this took place at an early stage of my research and there have been personnel changes in the department, that visit left me with a wealth of expert opinions and documentary sources. Arthur Ding of the Institute of International Relations at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University and Su Hao of the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing have helped arrange my interviews at various stages. Andrew Yang of Taipei’s Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies has been supportive and willing to share information. I owe a special debt to a number of military specialists who through the years helped me understand key concepts and the process of military policy-making, and alerted me to important developments in Chinese military affairs. Although they requested anonymity, their contribution must be acknowledged. Since documentary searches constitute an important part of this research, working at research centres and libraries has been part of my life. I wish to extend my gratitude to staff at the Queensland University Library, Australian National University’s Menzies Library, the National Library of Australia, the University of Hong Kong Library and, in particular, to those at the Universities Service Centre for China Studies in the Chinese University of Hong Kong not only for their professional support

Preface and acknowledgements

ix

and their dedication to maintaining one of the world’s best contemporary China collections but also for their hospitality and readiness to help. At my present Aichi Bunkyo University, I am fortunate to have helpful colleagues. Their logistics support is indispensable. Still, despite the assistance of all the above-mentioned people and institutions, this book would be impossible without the help of Andrew Humphrys, senior book editor at Frank Cass. He has been professional and considerate. I would like to also thank Miss Gail Welsh, production editor at Wearset, for her dedication to help make this book a better project. It is indeed a pleasure to cooperate with them. Academic research can hardly leave one’s life unaffected. Understanding and encouragement from family are the necessary force to keep a researcher moving. My parents have given all this to me. My wife, Serena, has been always ready to translate her support into deeds. When I decided to begin my research as a Ph.D. student in Australia, she gave up her career in Hong Kong and stayed with me to give me all practical assistance. But the most important of all was her sharing a plain life with me. As I continued my research in Japan, her supportive attitude and willingness to sacrifice did not diminish. Finally, I wish to imitate a practice by J.S. Bach, whose music has given me much inspiration, by finishing with this acknowledgement: Soli Deo Gloria.

1

Introduction

The collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 signified the end of the Cold War and, at the same time, the gradual emergence of a new international security order. In Asia, however, the direction of strategic change and the implications are far from clear. The region remains a hot-bed of conflicts – rife with age-old fault lines left by the Cold War and new rivalries based on economic interests and competition for greater power. A Commander-inChief of the US Pacific Command once described Asia as a ‘tough neighbourhood’.1 Against such security background, few would dispute that China, given its booming economy, improving military capability and the sheer size of its territory and population, is a critical factor even though one may be wary of the fallacy of linear projection. ‘The way in which China views the use of force and, conversely, its willingness to seek peaceful resolution of other territorial and resource disputes’ is crucial to regional stability.2 Heated debates have been going on in both the academic and policy circles on whether this country will contribute to or disrupt regional stability and how other countries should respond to its growing power.3 This is not surprising, since there seem to be conflicting signals. On the one hand, there has been an obvious trend of Chinese integration into the global and regional economies which was manifested in their accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and their attempts to follow the international practice of increasing transparency by publishing documents on major policies. China has also actively participated in international institutions and has been increasingly willing to work through multilateral security regimes. In 1996 it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and in 2001 ratified the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. After the ‘September 11’ terror attack in New York, China was quick to join the international community in combating terrorism by acceding to a series of conventions. In 2002, China promulgated and revised legislation to regulate the export of chemical products and technologies and arms, and signed a code of conduct in the South China Sea. On its own initiative, China instituted the

2

Introduction

Shanghai Cooperative Organisation (formerly the ‘Shanghai Five’) to promote regional cooperation. No less prominent is its continuous effort to mend relations with former adversaries and to maintain cordial relations with neighbouring countries.4 On the other hand, China’s military buildup is unmistakable and its record of using force disturbing. The modernisation of military hardware, acquisition of advanced weaponry from Russia and the double-digit increase in Chinese defence spending since the late 1980s are among the most oft-cited examples in polemics warning against a restless China.5 Indeed, even after the confrontational Cold War years, the Chinese PLA troops were deployed in 1992 and 1995 to occupy the Johnson Patch and Mischief Reef which were claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, respectively. Beijing has also threatened Taipei with a series of military actions ranging from ‘missile testing’ in the Taiwan Strait to large-scale offshore military exercises and continuous military buildup on its east coast. Obviously, taken individually, these events generate only conflicting signals and reinforce both those arguing for and against the possible emergence of the so-called ‘China threat’. Unless more consistent, longrange behaviour patterns as reflected in Chinese policy are examined, any understanding of China’s future role in regional security will remain elusive.

Objectives and arguments Among International Relations theories, the realist school better describes post-Cold War Asian security, and identifies correctly and justifies military power as the main variable in inter-state relations. Moreover, military power is clearly an important factor in analysing China’s strategic behaviour in an anarchical international system. However, this book argues, because of the realist’s materialist bias, the concept of military power, by itself, is not self-evident nor sufficient to understand the implications of China’s growing military power for Asian regional security. A central issue is the meaning underlying that material power – military power requires an ideational interpretation and context. This study aims to make sense of China’s military modernisation by applying two concepts to examine the purposes and development of its military power; namely, military doctrine and military readiness. Military doctrine is particularly useful when one considers that China has not fought any major wars since 1979 and thus offers few cases for study. Besides, the centralised nature of the Chinese regime suggests that an official military doctrine affords glimpses of China’s military plans.6 Being the intellectual foundation of defence policies, doctrine provides guidance to the development of Chinese military structure and operations in such ways as to determine the forms which military power may be used as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of that power. While there are ample

Introduction

3

studies on the content of Chinese military doctrine both from theoretical and comparative perspectives,7 the question of how it affects the making and use of military power has received insufficient attention. Military doctrine, as this book will demonstrate later, is constitutive of military power and guides its making. At the same time, it is informative. Military doctrine communicates to others the purposes of the buildup and what this military power is ready for. Here, we have to bring in the concept of military readiness to contextualise this power. When Dennis Blasko reviews literature on PLA force structure, he cautions that analysis must be put in context and must take into consideration doctrine and tactics.8 Substantively, the concept of military readiness deals with the force structure (mainly organisation and military hardware) and operations (mainly military training and command and control) of the Chinese army. Conceptually, this restores the relational aspect of the concept of power; that is, an actor exercises power in relation to an object. This analysis is particularly important as China continues to modernise its army and assert its political interests and objectives. This study aims to address these questions: How does this country plan to use its increasing power? What is China’s military power getting ready for? Is it targeted at any specific states or groups of states or non-state forces? Is it ready? Based on this conceptual framework, this study finds that Chinese force development has oscillated between emphases on structural readiness and operational readiness as the army moves between total war and local war doctrines. The current doctrine of local war under high-technology conditions dictates that operational readiness dominates in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planning and development. Finally, I add a caveat on this book’s argument. By accentuating the critical role of military doctrine, this book has no intention of getting itself embroiled in the debate of technology-push or doctrine-push military modernisation, nor does it intend to deny separate sets of dynamics of technological progress. It advocates that doctrine is an integral and leading component of China’s military power and is key to making sense of its force development and military training programmes. Doctrine is not a dependent variable of technology. Rather, for any technologies to produce something ‘meaningful’ and ‘usable’ on the battlefield, their development must be guided by military concepts.

Sources, methods and approaches Any attempts to understand China’s military power must confront the problem of the lack of transparency of its military policy. Despite more than two decades of economic reform and opening up, the same attitude is slow to spread to military affairs. Interviews with active PLA officers and researchers without official escorts are virtually impossible unless personal networks have been diligently cultivated. Their increasing exchanges with

4

Introduction

foreign specialists and scholars at conferences and other programmes mainly benefit US-based analysts. This study acknowledges the weakness of limited opportunities of interviewing these Chinese sources. After all, it is important to bear in mind the issue of the quality of interviews. Thus verifying and cross-checking with other sources are necessary. Interviewing scholars and analysts outside China certainly helps build up a bigger and more objective picture. But perhaps a no less rewarding exercise is traditional documentary research. As the Chinese army becomes more ‘intellectual’ and allows more lively debates, its views are disseminated by a thriving publishing industry, including army publishers. A wealth of books, including those for ‘domestic distribution’ (neibu faxing) and ‘army distribution’ (junnei faxing), is readily available, as are army newspapers and periodicals. But their supply to readers outside China depends very much on the flexibility of individual booksellers and is thus unstable. Due to possibilities of error and disinformation, it is imperative to compare the documentary sources. Matching books and essays on doctrinal debates and ideas with developments covered in the news is particularly useful. This requires continuous reading. Of course, military doctrine must be distinguished from official rhetoric and propaganda. Such statements as those put in the Chinese national defence policy White Papers need to be scrutinised. These empirical data serve little purpose if they are not organised and put into perspective. This research finds the realist school of International Relations theory useful in establishing the working environment and identifying the subject of Chinese military power as a key factor in Asian regional security. Realists see states engaged in constant struggle for power because only power is effective to check power.9 According to Kenneth Waltz, a main proponent of neo-realism, ‘among states, the state of nature is a state of war’.10 In addition, the first sentence on page 1 of a book by two prominent realists reads as follows: ‘Military power plays a crucial role in international politics because states coexist in a condition of anarchy’.11 For realists, the threat of violence is inherent in the anarchical international system. Even though there are international laws and norms, the lack of a supra-national government and enforcing agencies leaves states little option but to help themselves by pursuing power.12 It is this power relationship that locks states in a power–security dilemma: ‘In seeking power and security for themselves, states can easily threaten the power and security aspirations of other states’.13 This theoretical perspective describes the Asian regional security environment. While Asia is currently preoccupied with trade and robust economic activities, institutional building, especially on security affairs, still seems remote in this region and the effect of interdependence is uncertain. First, concomitant with increasing economic contacts are additional dimensions of conflicts, such as trade disputes and border control.

Introduction

5

These are particularly serious for China as its development of commercial legislation lags behind the pace of its economic growth, and its new partnership still fails to dispel inherent suspicion. Second, interdependence can be simply a facade for ‘unevenly balanced mutual dependence’. States may use economic resources as a substitute for military power to impose their will on others by depriving and threatening to deprive others of economic goods. Third, interdependence is supposed to preclude aggressive behaviour because it raises the cost of such actions and any measures to change the existing rules of the game; but, by placing states in a web of interlocking interests, interdependence also expands their security concerns and thus precipitates a wider range of military capabilities and responses.14 The forces underwriting institutionalism and multilateralism that have worked for decades in Europe thus hardly apply to Asia. There, bilateral alliances and their antithesis – non-alignment – have been the dominant mode of security arrangements. The optimism in Europe may not be reflected as reality in Asia.15 Regional multilateral security dialogues began recently in Asia with such arrangements as the ASEAN post-ministerial conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum. But the ASEAN member states have diverse interests and harbour mutual suspicion towards each other. They do not have a shared identity nor do they have a common threat perception; as towards China, their divergent approaches bring them only to a loose consensus: to avoid provoking the region’s great powers. These factors have imposed severe limitations on achieving any effective and cohesive multilateral initiatives. It is unlikely that a NATOstyle alliance may appear in post-Cold War Asia.16 ASEAN states recognise that institutionalism can only complement traditional bilateralism, which remains dominant in Asia. They also realise that the support and participation of the major powers, even outside the ASEAN network,17 is essential for multilateral institutions to work and function properly, and that any such framework must be underwritten by a balance of power.18 Fundamentally, regional security regimes simply reflect the distribution of power and remain a product of national interests. Power Having reiterated the importance of the balance of power in understanding Asian security, it is now appropriate to discuss the concept of power itself as employed in this research. First, it is power relative to various units of analysis, not absolute power, that constitutes the main concern of this study. Power is understood here in relational terms. Second, power is also discussed in terms of attributes; for example, military power, economic power and so on. Since the concept of power is used here to analyse China’s strategic behaviour and its relations with other countries, power is discussed as a relationship.

6

Introduction

While power as a relationship is generally abstract, it becomes less so when it is conceptualised with reference to its attributes.19 In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau lists geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government as attributes of national power.20 Beyond doubt, as national interests become diverse in the contemporary world, states wield more instruments of power and build up a wide array of national attributes. However, since war remains a deadly threat to the survival of states, the military element, among other resources of power, is ‘not only the ultima ratio, but indeed the first and constant one’ in international politics.21 A major interest of this study is about how China applies its military power relative to other states as international politics undergoes radical structural changes. Military power Despite recognition of the special significance of military power in a conflict-prone international system, military ‘power’ is often confused with military ‘force’. Military power is not tantamount to the number of soldiers or the size of an arsenal; nor is it the quality of an army or the technological level of military hardware. These are components of military force, constituting only the resources of military power. They can be exercised with the use and non-use of the military force but they can only be converted into ‘power’ by the state.22 Military power thus cannot be understood without reference to relational terms: it ‘emphasises a political relationship between potential adversaries rather than a catalogue of military capabilities’.23 Jablonsky also points out the relational aspect of military power: ‘A nation may appear powerful because it possesses many military assets, but assets may be inadequate against those of a potential enemy or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict’.24 Here is why military doctrine is so important. On the one hand, military doctrine is shaped by threat perceptions of the state and an array of domestic factors; on the other, it converts military force into military power because it guides the overall development and employment of the force. Since military doctrine is the focus of this study, it will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. Suffice it to point out here that military doctrine is an integral part of military power.

Studying the Chinese military China, on many counts, deserves special attention. Economically, its rapid growth has continued for more than a decade. Although whether China can sustain its spectacular economic development and turn itself into a global power during the twenty-first century remains in dispute, analysts can hardly dismiss the economic vigour of the PRC when they factor it

Introduction

7

into their projections of regional security;25 there are various studies on expectations of a rising China.26 China’s growing economic power, moreover, is being translated into military might. Militarily, it has not only increased its spending since the late 1980s but it has re-allocated its limited resources in more efficient ways to improve its antiquated army structure and equipment.27 To reiterate the obvious, it owns and deploys nuclear weapons and maintains the largest armed forces in Asia. In the international arena, China is the only Asian state to have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and has a history of regional dominance which had spanned hundreds of years. Amidst the fluidity in the transition to a new international order, how this ‘candidate state for hegemony’ will behave is a matter of major regional and international concern. In the West, and particularly in the USA, there has been heated debate over whether a strategy of containment or engagement should be adopted towards China.28 When assessing and making forecasts about China’s future behaviour in regional security, some scholars tend to look at where China intends to go and whether China is a status quo or a revisionist power.29 A ‘status quo’ state is one that has interests in preserving the existing distribution of power and its advantages; whereas a ‘revisionist’ power wishes to improve its position in the international system and may even challenge the very structure of that system.30 Some analyses focus on the above-cited themes. They examine whether it is in China’s interest to be a status quo or revisionist power, and what China intends to do in the international arena. The following subsection evaluates whether these approaches help understand the meaning of Chinese military power in the context of regional security. Cultural explanations Perhaps one of the most important works to analyse Chinese military affairs by cultural theories is Alastair Johnston’s Cultural Realism. In this book, he attempts to derive explanations of Chinese strategic culture from a study of China’s Seven Military Classics (wujing qishu)31 and from an empirical examination of the Ming dynasty’s defence decision-making. He argues that China has a conflict-prone strategic culture which shares ‘many of the same assumptions’ as in Western Realpolitik. This discrepancy with the accommodationist heritage of the Confucian-Mencian tradition is bridged by a concept of ‘quan bian’, which emphasises flexibility in making strategic choices. China thus tends to favour offensive military solutions in dealing with security threats from adversaries.32 Johnston’s work highlights an important factor that shapes China’s strategic behaviour. As is often the case with other cultural studies in international relations, however, it is hard to differentiate strategic culture from other variables and to substantiate it as an ‘independent, explanatory

8

Introduction

variable’.33 Moreover, identifying a ‘culture’ can be highly contentious because the very concept implies social stratification and domination of one particular strand over other ‘subcultures’. Another question that invites reservation about cultural analysis is ‘sharedness’ – to what extent and among whom that culture is shared.34 Finally, the application of cultural analysis to China is flawed by cultural reasons themselves. Different cultures may have different understandings of a particular concept. The key point is the increase in Chinese power relative to other states, especially the United States, the only surviving superpower. Suffice it to reiterate here that states tend to maximise power and that the rise of one state implies the decline of the other. Thus what is at issue is not simply whether China wants to be a hegemon, but whether it can be. This condition obviously elicits a debate about the importance of intentions in international politics. The following is an examination of how much or how little the study of intentions may contribute to a better understanding in China’s use and development of military power. Gauging Chinese intentions Every Party member should know this truth: ‘political power grows out of the barrel of the gun’. . . . Some people ridiculed us for upholding ‘a theory of the omnipotence of war’, yes, we are subscribers to the theory of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; this is not bad but good, and is Marxist. So concluded Mao Zedong at the sixth plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in 1938.35 This teaching is highly familiar to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The use of force has been an important policy instrument for the Party from its struggle for power in the 1920s to the preservation of the regime today. In the some forty years of the People’s Republic, the CCP has attempted to unify the country by force and has fought wars with foreign armies. China’s military exercise off its east coast in March 1996 to intimidate Taiwan was a reminder of this. So too is its forceful occupation of Tibet. Another oft-cited factor for a possible ‘China threat’ in Asia is China’s resurgent nationalism. Nationalism espoused by the Chinese communists has been characterised by a very strong anti-imperialist fervour. The reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 was treated in a very high-profile way because the concession of that part of the territory in 1848 marked the beginning of a page of humiliation in Chinese history. Besides, when international socialism is taken into account, China is always projected in a besieged state. In other words, Chinese nationalism, which is integrated with the international socialist movement, is premised on a conflictual weltanschauung. In 1949, Mao Zedong declared:

Introduction

9

From now on, the Chinese people, which account for one quarter of the human population, stand up. The Chinese have been a great, courageous and hard-working people but became backward only in the modern age. The backwardness is entirely the result of repression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and the reactionary government at home. In the past one hundred years, our fore-runners unyieldingly and incessantly struggled against these internal and external oppressors. . . . The imperialists and the reactionaries at home never accept failure, they will make a last effort to struggle. After the country is pacific, they will continue to sabotage and create disturbances.36 This is a traditional Chinese view of national insecurity – the country being attacked by both internal and external enemies (neiyou waihuan). Forty-one years later, Deng Xiaoping, a ‘second generation’ communist leader, emphasised the point: ‘The People’s Republic of China was established only after twenty-two years of war, and has grown up amidst blockade, economic sanctions and isolation . . . I am a Chinese, I know the history of foreign invasions to China. . . . [We] must know some Chinese history, this is an impetus for China’s development’.37 He did not feel more secure either in the contemporary world: ‘Perhaps a Cold War is over, [but] another two Cold Wars just begin. One is against the South and the Third World; and the other against socialism. Western countries are now waging a Third World War without the smoke of gunpowder. Without the smoke of gunpowder because [it is aimed at] the peaceful evolution of socialist countries’.38 When a ‘third generation’ leadership ascended to power, this notion of insecurity was still evident. An official Chinese Communist Party periodical, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), published an editorial in 1996: ‘The “Westernisation” and “splintering” directed at China by Western countries led by the United States will not change and the powerful, united conspirators will not relinquish their plot to contain China’s development. . . . They are plotting to destroy China as a fortress of socialism and subjugate China in an inferior position’.39 But these anxieties about insecurity are growing and are not limited to the leaders.40 China’s rapid economic development and population increase add a new dimension to insecurity – its existing resources will not be able to sustain such remarkable growth and feed all its people. An acute sense of awareness has been growing among Chinese policy-makers regarding their territorial claims or, in their own words, ‘actual occupation by foreign countries’. They give particular attention to maritime territories where, they believe, rich resources lie idle and already ‘plundered’ by foreigners. Thriving international trade also hints at the necessity for a secure sea lane.41 All this is entirely consistent with the realist argument that as a state’s international interests grow, it will expand and build up its capability to defend them. Throughout history, such great powers as Britain, the United States and Germany have adopted this pattern.42

10

Introduction

If not intentions, what counts? Much has been said about China’s intentions. But many scholars, while prescribing policy recommendations for engagement, defer definite assessment and point to mixed signals and domestic uncertainties.43 These reservations are not surprising because we can hardly comprehend Chinese intentions from reading official polemics or assimilating wellcrafted government propaganda. As one famous Western international relations theorist has observed, ‘Intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable’.44 Analysts may perceive the intentions and mindsets of those in Zhongnanhai, the seat of power in Beijing, in certain ways; yet reality may actually work otherwise. The intentions of the Chinese leadership may be altered overnight as a result of a change of government or simply a change of mind. We have seen many historical precedents of states in open hostility or even armed conflicts with former allies; to cite but a few examples, Americans held hostage in Iran in 1979 and Chinese fighting their former Vietnamese comrades in the same year.45 The exercise to fathom intentions does not work not only because its object of enquiry (intentions) is capricious but the process of communicating and understanding intentions is affected by ‘noise’. According to communications theory, noise is defined as any distortion of a specific message, any signal which is not transmitted by the sender and anything that hinders the recipient to decode the message.46 Many historical events in international relations show that reading intentions may be only misleading. Some historians argue that Japan’s military modernisation and eventually expansion, from the nineteenth century up until the end of the Second World War, was due to a sense of extreme vulnerability – first, sovereignty under threat; later, the danger of being denied access to the Chinese and Western market and resources. In the years between the two world wars, a disarmed and humiliated Germany, which had to face a coalition of adversaries, could hardly feel secure.47 However, their subsequent occupation of foreign territories in Europe and Asia was unquestionably aggression. Their intentions cannot explain away their behaviour in international affairs. But can the concepts of status quo and revisionism help in assessing a state’s behaviour? Hans Morgenthau cautions us to differentiate between a status quo and revisionist power and warns of the grave consequences in mistaking them: ‘While it would be fatal to counter imperialistic designs with measures appropriate to a policy of status quo, it would be only a little less risky to deal with a policy seeking adjustments within the status quo as though it were imperialistic’.48 Concomitant is a tendency to link a status quo state with defensiveness and a revisionist state with aggressiveness. In general, there is a deep-seated bias towards the status quo.49 We may be able to give the status quo and revisionism acceptable definitions in theory; however,

Introduction

11

when it comes to the question of measuring actual behaviour, these may not really apply. Morgenthau’s exhortation is, in fact, a recognition of ambiguity in behaviour. ‘Revisionist’ states may seek only partial changes in the existing pattern of international relations and may ally temporarily with status quo powers. They may also hide their intentions to change the organising principle of the international system and the current distribution of power simply because they do not have the capability at that moment. Hitler confused the British with his creeping expansionism because the latter could not substantiate whether he had a local or a global agenda. After splitting with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China did not continue to push for a resolution of the territorial dispute and later did not hesitate to join the United States in containing the USSR only because it was incapable of opposing that Soviet adversary on its own.50 A further question is: Can a ‘revisionist’ power become satisfied? It is arguable that the Soviet Union may have planned only to preserve the status quo when it sent troops to Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 1960s. On the other hand, status quo states can behave aggressively. In light of armed intervention during the Cold War, the United States had a comparable record with the Soviet Union.51 Thus, the exercise to verify intentions is elusive, at least. What members in the international community should care about is whether their security is jeopardised by the actions and behaviour of others. What is relevant to regional stability is not how Beijing thinks but what it thinks; what worries its neighbours is not its intentions, but its power.52 In the end, it is the relative power of states that counts. The distribution of power determines whether or not a state can pursue aggressive designs or defend itself against threats.53 In other words, the military power of an individual state can affect the course of international politics, and power is the link between domestic and international systems. As Kenneth Waltz argues, ‘structural change begins in a system’s unit, and then unit-level and structural causes interact’.54 Having reasserted the importance of military power in international politics, the next question is: How should we understand the implications of China’s growing military power? As noted in the introduction of this chapter, military power per se in fact does not tell how much and in what ways China can and will act. It needs military doctrine to show its purpose and direction of development and military readiness to give it a context. Chapter 2 will examine these two concepts and establish an explanatory model for the study of China’s military power.

Plan of the book In this chapter, we first examined the strategic environment in which China promotes military modernisation and makes its military plans. We

12

Introduction

briefly discussed how competitive perspectives may see the setting of Asian regional security and established that military power remains the most important variable in inter-state relations in the region. Given China’s increasing military power, it deserves an in-depth analysis. We also examined various approaches that may be used to study the Chinese military and concluded that we need to employ the concepts of military doctrine and military readiness to make sense of the development of China’s military power. The second chapter is devoted to building the analytical framework of this study which is built upon two key concepts – military readiness and military doctrine. Having asserted the importance of power and clarified the meaning, Chapter 2 takes a further step to put military power in the context of military readiness in order to evaluate China’s military power. But some important questions remain unanswered: What is its military power ready for? How far is it ready to achieve its purposes and implement its tasks? The key lies in military doctrine. Although Chinese taxonomy and conception of military doctrine differ from the two major AngloAmerican and Marxist-Leninist models and their army poorly documents its doctrine, Chapter 2 explains that, from a functional perspective, a military doctrine does exist. Chapters 3 to 6 will demonstrate how doctrine has performed its functions with the support of empirical evidence. Being the foundation of military development, it informs the purposes and shapes the buildup of power. A military readiness analysis model focused on military doctrine is necessary to study the development of Chinese military power. Chapter 3 starts the empirical investigations of this book by applying this doctrine-based military readiness model to examine how the evolution of China’s military doctrine has affected the exercise of its military power from 1949 to the late 1970s. It traces the origin of the concept of local/limited war which had made and is making a great impact on Chinese military thinking. However, an abrupt termination of local war study mandated by political factors in China deprived the PLA of an opportunity to research this new type of war in the nuclear age. Instead, Chinese military thinking and planning became dominated by the total war doctrine of Maoist People’s War. This approach sacrificed operational readiness for structural readiness. It emphasised mass and defence in depth. As a first step to explicate the argument, this chapter examines the various perspectives on the operating environment which forms the Chinese military doctrine. Chapter 4 continues the empirical analysis by reviewing the gradual return of local war doctrine during the post-Mao interlude until the mid1980s and its implications for rebuilding the Chinese army. It contends that the poor military performance by the PLA in the Sino–Vietnamese conflict in 1979 was a catalyst for regenerating Chinese military doctrine on local war as the Chinese army had prepared for a ‘wrong’ war. The

Introduction

13

1980s thus witnessed an attempt to revise Mao’s military dictum by stipulating the concept of a ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and a theory of an ‘initial phase of war’. Although the ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ served mainly as a transition from the Maoist People’s War, it represented a doctrinal breakthrough that reoriented the direction of military development from building up the mass itself to restructuring to enhance operational efficiency. Chapter 5 analyses the beginning of a new era which is characterised by the official adoption of a local war doctrine in the mid-1980s and deals with the key question of how China understands ‘local war’ as opposed to ‘limited war’. This period saw a renewed interest in the operational level of war, not only for the whole army but also for individual services, including the Second Artillery, which began to expand its uses from strategic to operational and tactical levels. To adapt to this shift from total war to local war, the Chinese high command initiated a massive force reduction and restructuring in order to rationalise the PLA’s force mix and improve operational readiness. Rapid response and command and control reforms became major landmarks of this period. The local war doctrine was quickly rendered too vague by the kind of warfare demonstrated by the Gulf War of 1991. Chapter 6 focuses on the post-Gulf War period which is characterised by the military doctrine of ‘local war under high-technology conditions’ and intensifying research on campaigning. This development, coinciding with global interests in the ‘revolution in military affairs’, accentuates the application of technology to force building and its importance in the exercise of military power. In particular, information technology has been regarded as the catalyst for the emergence of this revolution and a new form of warfare – informationised warfare. All this logically prompts the Chinese military leadership’s advocacy for ‘strengthening the army with science and technology’ (keji qiangjun) to enhance the army’s combat effectiveness and operational efficiency. Paradoxically, as the PLA watches the world trend of RMA and learns the experiences of other armies in making use of scientific and technological means, it becomes more interested in developing asymmetric capability. When it weighs itself against its possible adversaries in the technological equation, it sees little prospect of catching up in every aspect. Sheer imitation is regarded as not feasible. Moreover, some analysts anticipate that science and technology, especially information technology, may revive the People’s War with new substance and give rise to a new form of operation – systemic joint integrated operation (yitihua lianhe zuozhan). But the PLA’s doctrinal focus on science and technology also leads to a highly questionable belief in the controllability of war. It is sliding close to a literal and dangerous understanding of ‘limited war’. The Conclusion (Chapter 7) sums up the arguments and findings. It reviews how the evolution of China’s military doctrine has caused shifts between emphasis on structural readiness and operational readiness, and

14

Introduction

how this has determined the direction of both aspects of force-building. It also demonstrates that military doctrine is a useful concept in understanding China’s buildup and exercise of its military power.

Conclusion The collapse of the Cold War bipolar system has led to a reconfiguration of power in international politics and profound changes in the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific. To understand the dynamics of current and future developments in that region, realism describes the situation better than does the liberal-institutionalist theory because it reflects the emerging power structure and finds the right focus – power. The transition period implies not only strategic uncertainty but also opportunities for aggression by applying military power. Since war still threatens states’ survival, military power remains the ultimate element among other attributes in the formula of national power. Military doctrine, which guides the development of military power, is the most important variable in studying Chinese strategic behaviour because it tells us what China can and probably will do. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. The beginning of a transition to a new security landscape in Asia opens the question of which contemporary great powers there will emerge as the stronger. It is against such a background that China is alleged to be a threat in the region. According to realist theories, China, in view of its differential growth rates, has overtaken many states in the accumulation of power resources and automatically becomes a candidate state for hegemony. In the international anarchical structure, states are bound to selfhelp and tend to maximise power; those that ‘fail to attain great power status are predictably punished’.55 While some scholars analyse and forecast Chinese behaviour in regional security matters by reading their intentions, this approach may prove to be questionable. Historical precedents in international politics show also that it is equally misleading to base one’s judgement on whether a country favours the status quo or revision of the existing international order. The subject for study is power and the key to its understanding is doctrinal ideas. An assessment of China’s role in regional stability – positive or disruptive – should hinge on whether it can sustain the growth of its power and how it uses that power. China’s military doctrine will show in which direction its military is heading and whether it is ready to reap the fruits of its growing power.

2

Military doctrine, military readiness and military power

Chapter 1, having considered various approaches to studying Asian security, argued that distribution of power remains a significant factor in Asia’s regional conflicts. It also identified China’s military power as the subject of analysis. This chapter attempts to build a model on the two concepts of military doctrine and military readiness to carry out this enquiry. It first examines the concept of military doctrine, assessing how and why it is the key ideational instrument for interpreting China’s military power. In other words, military power is treated as a dependent variable of military doctrine. Initially, a definition of military doctrine will be offered. It is a term often used but is subject to diverse interpretation and understanding. Why is doctrine so important? What makes up a doctrine and how is it derived? What functions does it have in explaining international security behaviour? Why and how does it matter for military power? These questions will be assessed in this chapter. Next we will turn our attention to another component of our analytical framework, the concept of military readiness, which is derived from Richard Betts’ book, Military Readiness.1 Although his work concentrates on US military policies, Betts’ generic definition and concept of military readiness may be usefully applied to other militaries. Military readiness, Betts asserts, is based on the building blocks of mass, speed and efficiency (‘effectiveness’, he notes, is a function of mass and efficiency). It has three aspects: structural, operational and mobilisation readiness.2 Since these concepts place military power in context by describing how resources are converted into military power in spatial and temporal terms, it is the ideational factor, military doctrine, that shows the direction. Military doctrine guides the development of force structure, the training of the force and even resource allocation in support of that force. In other words, military readiness is seen as the buildup and application of the mass of military force at a certain speed and in a specific direction. The analytical framework based on the concepts of military doctrine and military readiness is the focus of this chapter. It will be used to study Chinese military power in Asian regional security environment.

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Military doctrine, readiness, power

Military doctrine: the languages of war Defining military doctrine ‘Military doctrine’ is often associated with how soldiers fight in combat, dealing with the means and ways to be employed in war-fighting.3 But doctrine means more than just defeating hypothetical enemy on the battlefield and is not restricted to human and material concerns. It subsides in the mind of those planning, implementing and fighting wars: Doctrine is at the heart of military activity. As the central body of beliefs about the conduct of war it provides the guiding force for action, structure, organisation and development. Its influence should be evident to some extent in all practical activities. More than that, however, doctrine represents the highest expression of a defence force’s intellectual foundation.4 This approach to defining military doctrine points to an often-neglected intellectual dimension of doctrine and relevance of that enterprise. As conceived here, military doctrine goes beyond the mere purview of combat arms to encompass the whole military establishment of a state. It must be officially sanctioned in the sense that it is widely accepted among a state’s military leaders (though, in the process of dissemination, a doctrine may start from a relatively small circle). In this context, military doctrine is dynamic, reflecting what the current political and military leaders think. There are two common biases that tend to impede our understanding of military doctrine. First, doctrine is easily confused with dogma or ‘fundamental principles’. Doctrine is not necessarily ‘a sort of manual for action’ as understood by Clausewitz in his time.5 The fact that US military doctrine is always referred to an operational level of war requires its doctrinal documents to present a clear road map of action. To caution against rigidity in ‘following the books’, the US high command has repeatedly to remind its constituents of the importance of judgement in application. Second, doctrine is not a single document. A published manual is not the only method or, necessarily, the most effective way to convey doctrinal postulates.6 The Chinese PLA, among the major armies of the world, has poorly documented its doctrine. In fact, doctrine may exist in a variety of forms. Alfred Mahan, a nineteenth-century American naval thinker, observes that, ‘In military operations doctrine, if not given the name, has always existed’.7 It may be highly articulated, carefully structured and widely disseminated in a military, or ‘little more than ideas’ shared by the high command.8 Having said the ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’ about military doctrine, we still have some hurdles to cross before we integrate the definition of military doctrine into an analytical framework for empirical study of the Chinese military. What is the substance of the Chinese con-

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17

ception of military doctrine? Why is military doctrine important? How can it contribute to the making of military power? Two major doctrinal models The Cold War divided the world into two military camps and, despite its demise, it leaves strategic studies with two main models of constructing military doctrine. According to the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of the United States Department of Defence, doctrine is: ‘fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application’.9 The above is clearly a lexicon explanation of ‘doctrine’; it tells us little about how the US military sees the concept itself. A more heuristic conceptual interpretation is found in the US army field manuals. The 1993 edition of FM 100–5 Operations defines doctrine as ‘the statement of how America’s Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war . . . [and] the condensed expression of the Army’s fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interests’.10 The 2001 field manual emphasises the cornerstone role: ‘Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army’.11 A similar orientation is posited by the Australian air force, in the third edition of its doctrinal document, The Air Power Manual. It defines doctrine as ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in its application’.12 When it discusses the strategic air power doctrine, it describes doctrine as ‘the central body of knowledge which . . . influences the way all members of the air force think and act in meeting their individual and collective responsibilities for the promotion of Australia’s security through air power’.13 Both the American and Australian versions of military doctrine, then, emphasise flexibility of doctrinal application in accordance with different combat environments. For the Soviet Union, military doctrine was ‘a nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and the armed forces being made ready for war’.14 Doctrine was shaped by the political nature of the government and the level of material development, especially economics, science and technology. Its two components, socio-political and military-technical, dealt with the nature and objectives of war as well as changes in military affairs and the conduct of war.15 Because war was viewed as part of a global struggle between two rival socio-economic systems, Soviet doctrine tended to emphasise more the socio-political component than was the case in the West.

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Military doctrine, readiness, power

While, given their historical and military alliance relationships, the resemblance between the United States’ and Australia’s doctrines is not surprising, the Soviet example illustrates that different militaries can have very divergent understandings of even one single term, which is, however, crucial. Indeed, in the heat of the Cold War, American strategists allegedly often neglected the differences in the ‘language of war’ between themselves and their Soviet counterparts.16 They often took it for granted that their rivals shared their taxonomy. Greg Austin, in his study of Soviet military doctrine, focuses in particular on how Western analysts have simply ‘mirror-imaged’ Soviet conceptions.17 This discrepancy is understandable. First, militaries of various models have different political-social-economic systems and experiences in the history of war and foreign relations. The Cold War underscored this phenomenon. Leading powers with proven records of success in international relations are always sources of aspiration and models for emulation. The USA and the former Soviet Union served that role and became models on which their respective allies built their own doctrines.18 Second, there is a problem of levels of war and structure of military science.19 The lineage of the concepts of strategy and tactics can probably be traced back to the Greek city-states but the evolution of warfare, technology and army organisation in the nineteenth century created a gap between the strategic and tactical levels of war. The German answer to this development was the introduction of a new level of war – operativ, which was borrowed by the Russians in the 1930s as operativnyi; that is, the operational level of war. This three-level concept of war was officially endorsed in the United States only in the 1982 edition of its army field manual.20 The doctrine for one level of war is sometimes confused with that applicable to other levels. At times, the term ‘doctrine’ is commonly applied to a particular level of war in one military organisation’s frame of reference but it may fall into a different framework when applied by other militaries. These two problems occur when we try to fit the concept of doctrine to Chinese military taxonomy. ‘Marxist-Leninist’ tradition with Chinese characteristics The Chinese understanding of American concepts of military doctrine may be seen in their translation of the term. Doctrine, when referring to the US military, is translated by researchers in the PLA as zuozhan tiaoling, zuozhan lilun, and NATO as jiben zuozhan yuanze.21 The common thread that brings these three translations together is the Chinese perceived emphasis on zuozhan which means ‘operational’ or ‘military operations’. The PLA has continued to study and plan for war according to an adapted military conceptual framework of Marxist-Leninist tradition. When Chen Zhou, a PLA researcher specialised in local war theories,

Military doctrine, readiness, power

19

attempts to define local war, he also follows the tradition by defining it in both socio-political and military-technical components.22 However, obviously, the structure of the Chinese framework is less well organised and less precisely delineated than that employed by the Soviet Red Army. Chinese doctrines are also poorly documented. But the main problem in comparing the concept of doctrine of the Chinese and Soviet militaries is that the PLA does not have an exact conceptual equivalent of Soviet ‘military doctrine’ (which is translated as junshi xueshuo in Chinese military literature). An early study of PLA doctrine by Georges Tan Eng Bok does include junshi xueshuo in China’s system of military thinking. According to PLA publications, however, the Chinese do not use such terms. ‘People’s War’ is too narrow and incomplete to be ‘military doctrine’, and is somehow misrepresented in Tan’s chart of hierarchy of Chinese military concepts.23 Junshi sixiang, commonly known as ‘military thought’ in the West, is a close equivalent of Soviet military doctrine but still remains more elaborate and complex. The Chinese definition of military thought reads: It is based on different political and philosophical values and reflects the values of different classes, countries, periods and people about war. It shows the nature of war and its law of development, establishes guiding thoughts and fundamental principles for the building and employment of armed forces. It has salient class colour.24 Official Chinese military thought is termed ‘Mao Zedong Military Thought’. Despite its namesake, the theoretical construct is not the sole work of Mao but is attributed to the collective wisdom of generations of Chinese communist military leaders.25 The label ‘Mao Zedong’ is more a matter of symbolism than of substance. After a process of evolution and refinement, Chinese military thought has been expanded from its traditional triadic structure of ‘People’s Army’, ‘People’s War’, ‘Strategy and Tactics of People’s War’ to include two more elements, ‘Methodology and Perspective on the Nature of War’ and ‘National Defence Building Theory’.26 Chinese military thought thus differs from Soviet military doctrine in its inclusion of a philosophical foundation which is to explain socio-political and military-technical elements. Significantly, the emphasis on the relationship between the elements seems to be interactive rather than hierarchical. In the Marxist-Leninist tradition, China’s military leaders believe they can discover the laws of war and military affairs by using the right methodology, that is, dialectic materialism. They also believe that how one fights a war depends on how one sees a war. It is thus imperative to ascertain the nature of war itself. Politically, war is not only, as Clausewitz points out, an extension of politics but, to be precise, of class politics; the class nature determines whether the war is just or unjust. Militarily, war is a matter of survival and enemy destruction.27

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Military doctrine, readiness, power

Requirements for armed forces in future warfare, as reflected in the Soviet definition of military doctrine, is ‘national defence-building thought’. For the PLA, this stipulation maps out principles of force development. Deng Xiaoping is credited with making a major contribution to refining this component to Chinese standards in light of his ‘army-building thoughts’ and ‘military reform thoughts’.28 The ‘People’s Army’ component of army-building thought is limited to discussions about the nature and general mission of the armed forces: serving the people and absolute allegiance to the Communist Party.29 The concepts of People’s War and the Strategy and Tactics of People’s War are probably the most controversial components in Maoist military thought. Individual PLA researchers argue that the ‘strategy and tactics of People’s War’ should be positioned as a lower level component under People’s War. This view is echoed by Lieutenant-General Jiang Siyi, former Deputy Commandant of the Academy of Military Science. Although Chinese military literature continues to treat them as two separate but parallel elements, the contention over their priorities is not unreasonable.30 Indeed, the title of ‘strategy and tactics of People’s War’ is inherently deceiving. It is not meant to be strategy and tactics as understood in either the Western or even Marxist (i.e. Soviet) model of military doctrine. Nor is it squared with the definitions commonly held in military literature. It is not an operational concept. The evolution of warfare has rendered it to be virtually defunct as strategy and tactics in any practical sense. The concept has instead become a dependent variable of People’s War and has been practically reduced to ‘strategy and tactics to be employed in fighting a People’s War’. Yet People’s War is being equally challenged. It has a dual character, carrying socio-political as well as military-technical meanings. When the Chinese insist on establishing continuous theoretical validity, they point largely to the socio-political tenets: moral and material support and actual participation of the people in the war effort, the justness of Chinese wars, the decisiveness of the ‘human factor’ and leadership of the Communist Party. Having faced the tests of time, People’s War, it is now claimed, provides ‘guidance’ and is not about the actual conduct of war. Recent PLA studies have referred to ‘fundamental principles’ (jiben yuanli) of People’s War. Yet its military-technical component has to be constantly revised and updated to respond to the challenges of perceived threats and types of warfare. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping marked the twentieth anniversary of the Academy of Military Science, he urged his comrades to inherit the Mao Zedong military thought, to study ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and develop China’s military science. This was a call for injection of new military-technical substance into People’s War. But the picture of ‘modern conditions’ and the type of war that the Chinese army should prepare for remain unclear. It was only in the 1980s, as will be discussed in

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later chapters, that ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ evolved towards operationalisation with the introduction of ‘Local War’, and later, ‘Local War under High-Technology Conditions’ (gaojishu tiaojian xia de jubu zhanzheng). Entering the twenty-first century, the Chinese high command became more specific about these high-technology conditions, calling for studying ‘People’s War under Informationisation Conditions’.31 In sum, it may be said, what the PLA is prepared to fight is a People’s War in the form of a ‘Local War under High-Technology Conditions’ with increasing attention to the application of information technology.32 Although it may not have a written manual, this concept is officially sanctioned to direct military preparation. Subordinate are a series of published combat regulations and a training programme. PLA force structure is also reformed to adapt to its requirements. Thus, ‘Local War under High-Technology Conditions’, similar to the doctrine of other militaries, serves as the intellectual foundation of military affairs and conveys the dynamic relevance of a changing international security environment. It is also the focus of this study.

The importance of military doctrine Since there has been a wealth of studies on the sources and formulation of military doctrine,33 we will not dwell on this aspect here but focus on factors related to the two functions of military doctrine outlined above; namely, communication and constitution. Military doctrine differs from ‘intention’ as an indicator of state behaviour. While the latter’s weaknesses and malleability are self-evident as discussed in the previous chapter, the former, guiding force of development and strategy is relatively stable and provides concrete material for examination. The communicative function of military doctrine lies in its value as a distillation of strategic culture, military organisational culture, the plans and perceptions of political-military leaders and national interests. It communicates to the outside world, given the resources and constraints of the country, how one’s own military high command is going to organise and apply military power. Political-military leadership and institutions certainly stand out as agents in the formulation of military doctrine. Civil–military relations and decision-making processes are among the foremost factors.34 Historically, some cases of military reform (such as the creation of the Royal Air Force and its strategic bombing doctrine) are attributed to civilian intervention. Others, such as the organisation of British air defence during the Second World War, result from the genius of military leadership.35 But doctrinal ideational factors are also apparent when the views of civilian and military planners converge. Illustrative was the development of the ‘cult of offensive’ on the eve of the First World War. The military organisations in Europe were biased towards offensive strategy because of

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Military doctrine, readiness, power

their institutional interests in self-image and expansion as well as their need to reduce uncertainty in future warfare. Civilian and military leadership both perceived opportunities to achieve a quick and decisive victory by seizing the offensive. The prevalence of this strategic bias throughout Europe contributed to the outbreak of war.36 Another ideational factor attracting attention in international relations and security studies is culture. Some scholars attend to the ‘strategic culture’ of the state while others care more about the military organisational culture which is based on ‘the collectively held beliefs within a particular military organisation’. It is advanced as an independent capable of explaining choice of military doctrine and defence policies.37 Besides, military doctrine is not articulated in a vacuum; it is defined by material constraints and the limits of other elements of national power (i.e. leadership, politics, economics, technology and population). It communicates the limit of a state’s strategic capabilities. A key factor, for example, is geography. Being sandwiched between strong neighbours, Prussia-Germany and Israel understandably have favoured doctrines promulgating for quick and decisive military solutions. In the tradition of Mackinder’s geopolitics, moreover, a state’s choice to be a land or sea power is very much determined by geography.38 Geography also determines the availability of a state’s resources. The quest for water and oil, among other factors, has contributed to the outbreak of crisis and wars. Recent competition for offshore resources in Asia has prompted many countries in the region to modernise their naval assets.39 A related environmental factor is the size of a country’s population. The supply of manpower in the armed forces and in the country as a whole largely confines what a state may deploy. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson have both observed that, with the population of Australia or Canada, the United States could not have been a superpower.40 In fact, the small population of Australia determines that it has to exploit its geographical depth to a maximum extent.41 Economics certainly enters into the equation of military doctrinal formulation. Many examples exist of how a state’s level of economic selfsufficiency, industrial capacity and financing capability translate into military power. A recent example was the demise of the Soviet Red Army. In its last days, when the USSR could no longer afford huge and offensive armed forces, Soviet military doctrine was bound to change to one of ‘military sufficiency’. The Soviet armed forces were pruned to the ‘lowest necessary numerical level’.42 Technology is another materialist factor that substantially shapes military doctrine. Again, the USSR’s Red Army is a case in point. The Russians are among those who pioneered the concept of Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) with a focus on the technological advances. When Khrushchev declared the advent of RMA in 1960, the path for subsequent development seemed bright. Marshall Malinovsky, then Minister of

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Defence, attributed RMA in the Soviet Union to its material foundation in terms of economic, scientific and technological levels.43 Other proponents of RMA, though more moderate about the potential of such military technologies, agreed that they would play a critical role.44 But military doctrine has additional value as a subject of enquiry. As the US army field manual 3–0 suggests, doctrine ‘facilitates communication among soldiers . . . contributes to a shared professional culture, and serves as the basis for curricula in the Army Education System. Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations’.45 Military doctrine thus shapes the thinking of those who play a major role in planning the development and applying of military power. This is where the constitutive function should be brought into our discussion. Military doctrine affects the making of military power. When Martin van Creveld analyses why the wehrmacht had fought so effectively in the Second World War, he lists doctrine as one of the factors contributing to Germany’s ‘fighting power’.46 Harry Summers, in analysing the Vietnam War, attributes the problems the US armed forces suffered in that conflict to doctrinal deficiency.47 Doctrine is such a critical element in military affairs that an United States Air Force thinker, John A. Warden III, asserts, ‘[W]ar through the ages has been a battle of doctrines. The really decisive successes have come to those who adopted a new doctrinal concept to which their enemies were unable to respond’.48 In sum, military doctrine is not a mere ‘wish list’ but results from compromises reached between various interested parties and from the interactions of many inputs and constraints. It is also the product of the peculiarities of a particular state and a particular army. The weight of each factor in the doctrinal formulation process may vary among different militaries. The following sections, instead of recapturing the influence of those general factors in the Chinese context, will focus on experiences, threat perceptions, and institutional processes peculiar to China and which help shape Chinese military doctrine.

Sources of military doctrine in China Chinese experiences and threat perception A quick review of the first few decades after the establishment of the PRC easily leads one to the impression of the country’s engaging in chronic wars and armed conflicts of varying intensity. The Cold War was not that cold for China. Soon after its founding, the Korean War broke out. China was threatened by the use of nuclear weapons and the prospect of having a pro-US state on its northeast border.49 But the worst was not to come until the 1960s. China’s relations with its allies and friends began to collapse. It first fought a border war with its former non-alignment movement comrade

24

Military doctrine, readiness, power

India, then saw the USA escalating its military operations in Indo-China, and later clashed openly with its former ally Russia. All this seemed to put China in a deadly encirclement by two nuclear-armed superpowers and their allies and to solicit its preparations for an enemy general invasion. As analysed in Chapter 3, the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong resorted to a People’s War doctrine that focused on the imminence of a full-scale nuclear war. In reply, China combined in-depth defence and deterrence by denial, counting on a rudimentary nuclear deterrence capability and numerical superiority of its army and territorial expanse. This exclusive concern for national security and survival did not begin to relax until Kissinger’s and Nixon’s respective visits to China in 1971 and 1972. This defrosting of Sino–American relations proved to pave the way to a change of perception by the leadership succeeding Mao. Throughout the 1980s, China was actively seeking rapport with the superpowers. Sino–Soviet confrontation was mitigated amid a series of peace overtures by both sides which bore fruit in later years. China was ready to abandon its ‘single-thread’ strategy (yitiaoxian) to counter-contain the Russians.50 On the other hand, following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the USA in 1979, the relationship was further stabilised by the signing in 1982 of the Shanghai Communiqué, continual reciprocal visits between Chinese and American officials, augmentation of military cooperation, and easing of the conventional weapons transfer policy until the 1989 military suppression in Beijing.51 Despite limited rapprochement with the Americans, China emphasised a ‘coalition-style’ relationship with the USA over outright alliance relations lest it be relegated to the status of a superpower ‘card’. Beijing learned from its ‘one-sided tilt’ policy towards the Soviets in the 1950s and was instead determined to play the role of a mix of ‘balancer’ and ‘free-rider’ in a loose bipolar international system. Apart from emphasising its independence, China chose to identify itself with smaller powers and with the Third World. But this was a delicate brand of diplomacy. The PRC was not content to be only an equal among Third World countries in a united front against the two ‘hegemons’; it tried to ensure its ‘outstanding’ status by refraining from joining multilateral coalitions in favour of concentrating on bilateral diplomacy.52 Such Chinese thinking has been reflective of ongoing security trends in the Asia Pacific. As noted in Chapter 1, multilateralism has not yet taken root in the region. Henry Kissinger once argued that the relations between the major powers in Asia resemble the European balance of power system in the nineteenth century – characterised by an emphasis on competition and distinctiveness.53 Only converging national interests may bind Asia-Pacific states into security cooperation.54 Again, Chinese security policy should not be regarded as simply responsive to changes of threat perception. In fact, Beijing’s new policy course was undertaken even prior to Gorbachev’s perestroika and Russia’s military

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‘entrenchment’.55 In international security affairs, Chinese realist thinking logically leads to a focus on enhancing self-help capability. Although the intensity of threat has been diminishing on all fronts, China has not hesitated to strengthen its power and jealously guards its ‘independence and autonomy’ (duli zizhu).56 The four modernisations drive is illustrative. Chinese realism, since Deng Xiaoping returned to power in the late 1970s, prompted a reconceptualisation of Chinese security interests. The new concept had been liberated from the exclusive concern about state survival to embrace ‘national interests’, which, in the context of Chinese politics, are essentially extensions of concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity. The ‘state’, for the Chinese, remains at the centre of international affairs. As a confirmed realist state, China is wary of changes in relative power and of others’ relative gains. Its leadership believes that China will be penalised if it refrains from being assertive – in line with what neo-realists contend.57 China has systematically built up its military power because its leaders believe in the utility of indigenous military capabilities, not in staking one’s survival on alliance affiliation.58 A statement by Deng Xiaoping clearly makes this point: the stronger China becomes, the more stable the world would be and the less likely major wars would break out.59 To summarise, China’s military buildup has been premised on and consistent with realist thinking on national interests. In other words, the ‘Dengist’ approach to national security distinguishes itself from its Maoist predecessor by adopting a more assertive pursuit of national interests, rather than being obsessed with state survival and security. National interest The concept of ‘national interest’ is actually a recent development in China’s strategic thinking. It received attention only in the 1980s.60 However, in Chinese communist tradition, conceptual continuity is important when justifying policy changes. Deng Xiaoping, for example, had to characterise his defence modernisation programme as ‘Maoist’.61 Applying the concept of national interest is no exception. Chinese policymakers had to ensure that it was sanctified by Mao and other revered ‘first-generation’ PRC figures so that it appeared to be consistent with orthodox ideological discourse.62 Although China is a multi-nation state, the concept of national interest is based on a notion of unitary nationalism. ‘National interest’ in the lexicon of China’s political-military leadership is not as sophisticated as that normally applied by academic researchers. Rather than taking care to differentiate between ‘state interests’ and ‘national interests’,63 they simply use the terminology interchangeably. First, the concept of national interests is used as if China is a unified nation-state. The single one ‘nation’ is the ‘Chinese nation’ (zhonghua minzu). Second, the concept is built on an

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appeal to nationalism, which is an easy and convenient term. The ‘national’ dimension is its ‘antithetical’ implications of globalism, especially imperialism.64 Being a communist country, China has to deal with an extra dimension of the concept of national interests – class interests. According to Marxism, the state is no different from the social structure and is only the executive arm of a ruling class that oppresses another class in the pursuit of its own interests.65 But the Chinese do not regard themselves as having any conceptual problems with this, as no line is really drawn between national interests and class. In their conception, Chinese national interests are congruent with state interests which, in turn, are equal to class interests.66 Chinese national interests are, for all practical purposes, state-centric and focused primarily on the institutions and physical base of the state.67 In terms of substance, the most fundamental ‘national interest’, for China, is the preservation of sovereignty and the pursuit of sovereigntyrelated interests.68 This thinking was especially dominant when the political and physical survival of the People’s Republic was thought to be at stake during the height of the Cold War. Sovereignty was equated to independence from foreign interference in the governance of the Chinese state.69 Even during the high tide of ‘internationalism’ in the 1950s, Beijing’s orientation towards sovereignty was explicitly state-centric. As Zhou Enlai emphasised at the time: ‘Our internationalism is independence and equality among all nations’.70 The sovereignty issue has not diminished in importance some forty years later. In fact, it has become a political weapon to defend China against Western human rights diplomacy.71 China insists that sovereignty is above human rights because it is about the preservation of territorial integrity and protection of the population and their property from foreign aggression. Without these, Beijing insists, human rights are not practical.72 At the same time, the concept of ‘national interest’ has undergone some significant changes in China on the assumption that external threats to state survival have been modified. First, the concept has been more clearly defined; second, it has been expanded; and third, it has become more important in security policies. Now the scope of national interest goes beyond China’s national boundaries. A stable international order, an equal footing in foreign affairs, expansion of export markets, and overseas resources are just some of its components. As China’s economic development is the overarching goal of the four modernisations policy, the safeguarding of Chinese economic interests clearly occupies a paramount position in the list of national interests. Industrial and agricultural programmes assure that China will remain a primary energy and natural resources consumer. Depleting resources and diminishing return of resources excavation are identified as bottlenecks of sustained Chinese economic growth. Increasing dependence on trade and

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resources outside the mainland have made open sea lanes and secure offshore energy resources critical dimensions of Chinese economic interests; at the same time, China’s political claims to offshore sectors of the East and South China Seas and its concern about Taiwan going independent have reinforced the traditional dimension of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Perhaps the most significant development is the introduction in China’s political lexicon of the concept of maritime territory (haiyang guotu) and maritime interests (haiyang quanyi).73 Therefore, the Director of the PLA Navy’s Military Art Research Institute, Jiang Zhijun, observes, China’s security challenges come mainly from the sea.74 Reconciling its growing interdependence with its sovereign prerogative will posit one of the greatest challenges to Chinese national security policy-making. Amid excitement from the general public, the PLA has been vigilant as to the impact of Chinese accession to the WTO, studying its security challenges and possible solutions.75 A more externally oriented national strategy demands a more assertive security posture. By the late 1980s, strategists at China’s Army Command Academy identified two tiers of national defence: (1) preservation of existing national interests; and (2) protection of future national interests. The former included preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity, accruing natural resources on land and sea, developing national economic and industrial and trade systems, as well as protecting the people and their properties. The latter criterion was operationalised on the need to cultivate national development; thus resources that would enhance China’s national power fell into this category.76 This reinterpreted concept of ‘national interest’ was more encompassing both in spatial and temporal terms and thus more demanding for China’s military than the objective of ensuring survival. Since the end of the Cold War period, the concept of national interest has continued to expand. A study published by a PLA think-tank, the AMS Strategic Studies Department, defines national interests in six aspects: (1) territory: a nation’s living space and all natural resources in this space; (2) national security; (3) national sovereignty; (4) national development; (5) national stability; and (6) national dignity.77 Interestingly, globalisation, instead of diluting the weight of sovereignty in the Chinese conception of national interests, actually reinforces it. As it brings as much inter-penetration as expansion of national interests, it is the responsibility of a sovereign state to protect its ‘core interests’ border while expanding the peripheral.78 Such a view of the fluid border of national interests requires more versatile power. So far, the general content and specific Chinese definition of national interests have been discussed. While national interest is an important concept and an ideational factor at the higher level of grand strategy, this study is more directly concerned with military doctrine. The structure and discourse of the national interest concept in the context of international

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relations theory are considered in-depth by other studies. Suffice it to say here that this concept elicits a more assertive military doctrine to protect and enhance national interests in a dynamically changing world. Of course, the discussion of the role of experiences and threat perception in Chinese military doctrinal formulation must be complemented by an analysis of institutional factors. It is mainly the institutions mentioned below that articulate these abstract ideas into coherent military ones. The institutions Admittedly, due to the lack of transparency, we know very little about the precise process of how China forges its military doctrine, who are involved, and to what extent. Although China has recently been moving closer to international norms in foreign relations by publishing defence policy papers first in 1992 and, from 1998 onwards, seemingly at a twoyear interval, the fog shrouding the Chinese process of doctrine formulation has not been totally dispelled. There is, at best, scant literature and information on the subject. In view of the receding influence of army elders, the Central Military Commission is able to exercise its power as the highest military policymaking institution. The importance of this institution is accentuated by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s managing to hold on to its chairmanship even after they retired from other powerful posts. Members of this organ and other senior defence planners are fed with analytical briefings, think-tank reports and advice channelled through the CMC General Office.79 The General Staff Department (GSD) is regarded as the first among equals, standing out from other general departments because it is the agent through which the CMC exercises operational command of the military regions, navy and air force (except for the Second Artillery which is under the CMC’s direct control) and sends down policies. Its subordinate units play key roles in strategic and analytical support. Among them are the Second and Third Departments which are responsible for military and signals intelligence respectively, while the Fourth Department is responsible for electronic counter-measures and communication.80 Military-related intelligence support is delivered by several army thinktanks. One is the China Institute for International Strategic Studies under the GSD Second Department (Intelligence) mainly for international security analysis. Related to the same GSD Department is another institute responsible, the Foundation for International Strategic Studies. Apart from research duties, it has an important role in establishing exchanges between the PLA and foreign defence organs and personnel. Military think-tanks of lesser importance include the Centre for Peace and Development under the General Political Department’s Liaison Department, which reportedly has particular strength in Hong Kong and Macau-related

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intelligence. As for weapons technological intelligence, this is the purview of the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre which was transferred from the control of the former Commission for Science and Technology of National Defence to the General Armament Department created in 1998.81 It is believed that some civilian institutions also provide research and intelligence support in the formulation of Chinese military policy. They include the State Council, the Ministries of State Security and Foreign Affairs (and their research institutes), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, especially its area studies institutes, and the New China News Agency. Most often, these units submit their advice through regularly published internal briefings and personal contacts. But they reportedly play virtually no part in determining actual military doctrine. This remains the exclusive domain of uniformed personnel.82 On doctrinal research and writing, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) seems to play the most important role. The AMS was created in 1958 to fill a void in PLA field regulations. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, it completed the first generation of a series of PLA combat regulations on combined arms troops. When the AMS gradually recovered from that political turmoil, it quickly re-established and expanded its research arms, and updated the field services regulations. It operates a military operations analysis research institute and produces various combat simulation software to evaluate its military theories.83 In particular, the Second Research Office of its Strategy and Campaigning Research Department was responsible for the writing of the fourth generation of PLA Combat Regulations and other regulations released in 1999 as well as Military Tactics.84 Another major institutional contributor to doctrinal development is the National Defence University. The University was established in 1985 by merging the Military Academy, Political Academy and Logistics Academy, with a focus on both research and teaching. It is the highest institute of professional military education in the Chinese army, and is charged with the mission to train commanding officers at army corps level and related personnel in provincial governments. With its simulation systems, the University trains its students in strategic decision-making, campaign-level command and conduct of joint operations. It also provides consultation services to the CMC and general departments.85 Of course, service doctrines may require special institutional inputs. Senior service arm and branch academies, especially the command academies, actively participate in the publication of seminal works and course textbooks on operations involving the PLA’s respective service arms. The establishment of military art research institutes at service arms headquarters strongly suggests that the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery contribute regularly to doctrine formulation.86 Doctrinal development is also promoted by forming ad hoc research

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task forces on specific topics for each Five-Year Plan period. Recent important doctrinal research projects include an updated edition of The Science of Military Strategy and ‘The Employment of Mao Zedong Military Thought in Local Wars’ led by the AMS in the ninth Five-Year Plan period and the Joint Operations Series Research by the National Defence University in the tenth Plan with the participation of numerous service arms command academies. The service arms headquarters are also known to have organised task forces to develop combat regulations.87 Given the strong participation of political and military institutions and the centralised character of Chinese governance, military doctrine in China should have great significance in conveying the intentions and visions of the leadership. Moreover, as mentioned above, army building is closely integrated into the military-technical element, and doctrinal changes logically guide and cause adjustments in force development. While military doctrine helps to understand the making and planning of Chinese military power, a context of readiness is needed to create a framework so that we may evaluate this power against its purpose. Next, the concept of military readiness will be discussed and a model constructed.

Military readiness: contextualising military power The American high technology applied to the Gulf War in 1991 shocked PLA commanders into prioritising military readiness as a key issue for study and reform. China, of course, is not the first major power to be caught short in correctly assessing evolving strategic conditions. Germany’s poor performance in the Battle of Britain, as Barry Posen observes, was based on its failure to make a breakthrough from its successful blitzkrieg tactics that worked for it against France in 1940. Thus, ‘Germany won the war for which it had prepared and lost the one for which it had not’.88 When American strategists recall the Korea War, they dwell upon the spectre of a hollow and unprepared army as seen in the fate of Task Force Smith.89 The PLA, of course, realises how insufficient military readiness can be on the battlefield. The 1949 Jinmen (Quemoy) invasion setback is still a stigma in PLA war history.90 What exactly is ‘military readiness’? While strategists and generals virtually agree on the disastrous results of being caught unprepared, they focus their attention on different factors when they fathom what constitutes military readiness. Some understand ‘readiness’ as the business of training; others emphasise logistics, combat support, resource management and force structure.91 After surveying most definitions of military readiness, Richard Betts finds them to be generally too broad or too narrow.92 Given the importance of this concept, it may be that a single definition is insufficient. What is needed is a conceptual model.

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Military readiness: a function of speed and effectiveness For Betts, readiness has two main concerns: (1) ‘the relative military power needed to fight successfully’; (2) ‘conversion: the difference between forces available to fight immediately and those that can be made available after preparation at full throttle’.93 He thus proposes a three-part ‘generic’ definition of military readiness:94 1 2

3

Military readiness pertains to the relation between available time and needed capability. A country is militarily ready as long as the time needed to convert potential capability into actual capability needed is not longer than the time between the decision to convert and the onset of war. A country proves not to be ready when a gap between its actual and potential capability causes a gap between the supply of and the demand for capability.

Military readiness is defined as a function of speed and effectiveness while effectiveness is the product of mass times efficiency. Betts proposes three stages of readiness after unreadiness – mobilisation, structural and operational consecutively. Assuming a discrepancy between potential and actual capability, operational readiness is about how soon a military unit can close that gap and reach full capability. Structural readiness focuses on mass. It imposes a ceiling on the capability of existing forces and asks ‘how soon a force of the size necessary to deal with the enemy can be available’. Central to achieving both operational and structural readiness is time. Operational and structural readiness are functions of speed, mass and combat efficiency. But Betts departs from these important building blocks and enters a new conceptual venue when he assesses mobilisation readiness. This is defined in terms of the conversion of national demographic and economic resources and the mobilisation of a military organisational base. Still, efficiency and speed matter, since civilian and military bases are to be converted constituting a critical ‘mass’.95 The military readiness model, as stipulated by Betts, claims to find a balance between overcoming military unpreparedness and striving for high mobilisation. The former causes losses on the battlefield, the latter may undermine a national economy. But maintaining a maximum-sized force or putting the forces on maximum alert does not necessarily achieve security. Costs and trade-offs are involved. These are explained by the two images of readiness. In the linear image, one type of readiness may be built up at the expense of the other, given the scarcity of resources and opportunity costs. Time is a positive factor here; the longer one prepares, the better one can convert potential capabilities into actual capabilities. In the cyclical image, however, time is not necessarily proportional to the

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level of military readiness. High military readiness today may imply lower military readiness in the future.96 However, a few points must be addressed before applying Betts’ military readiness model. First, according to his definitions, there should be no time conflicts between structural readiness, operational readiness and mobilisation readiness. Mobilisation readiness, in fact, is dependent on both structural and operational readiness because mobilisation is made up of both elements of force structure and operation. The three terms should not be conceptualised in time sequence or as stages. Second and related is that when this study applies the military readiness concepts to the Chinese military, it has to focus on only structural readiness and operational readiness for two main reasons: (1) mobilisation readiness, as stated above, can be explained by the concepts of operational readiness and structural readiness; (2) it is beyond the scope of this book to study the whole Chinese national defence mobilisation system. Third, there is too much emphasis on the size of mass when discussing structural readiness.97 Discussions about mass should entail concerns about ‘force mix’ or its composition. Having the right ‘mix’ is seen in terms of the types, technological level and uses of military equipment, the composition of service arms and human resources, and a judicious balance between equipment and manpower. For mobilisation readiness, this mix has a wider composition. For example, how many industries should engage in defence-related research and development as opposed to those devoted to consumer goods production for export? When the demand comes, the mass of a right mix is there. This relates to Betts’ question, ‘readiness of what?’ Fourth, efficiency is about the degree of ‘realising’ potential capability.98 But how to measure ‘degree’? The answer lies in gauging potential. It implies the execution of a plan to convert the mass from one form to another. There is an ‘envisaged’ capability that a state’s existing military forces are designed to reach. Operational readiness is realised when the discrepancy between the target and current strength in a specific time frame is closed. Mobilisation readiness also depends on the implementation of plans that bring a peacetime economy and national resources together to meet a planned level of wartime requirements. A strategic goal is even more important for the concept of effectiveness and is closely related to the question, ‘readiness for what?’ We may visualise military readiness as an internal transformation of an army and national resources in response to a security demand. Here, we have speed and mass operating in two tiers: the military and the state. Practically, they are about the physics of war. But something is missing. It is direction. Military readiness cannot be complete with only efficient conversion of the mass. This requirement for identifying proper direction falls into the doctrinal sector. Doctrine sets the pathway and target for movement and changes of the mass. In short, three elements of military power are closely:

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(1) structural on mass – force structure (size and mix); (2) operational on speed (training proficiency and command and control); and (3) ideas (doctrine and concepts). Doctrine and military readiness Doctrine forms the basis on which operational, structural and mobilisation readiness is built. As discussed above, military doctrine reconciles the demands for national security and limitations of resource inputs. It also identifies threats and contingencies. In his discussion about post-Cold War readiness, Betts examines the relationship between strategy and military forces. It is reasonable to point out the time lag between the time when decisions are made and the use of available forces, when there is a discrepancy between aims and assessments. Betts argues, ‘strategy, therefore, has to change to accommodate the means that happen to be available, rather than the other way round’.99 If strategy is about the conduct of war, this claim makes sense. But military doctrine is not just a wartime expedient. It is relatively stable and affects defence policies even in peacetime. Although it is possible that the doctrine which has shaped the forces may have been changed when the forces are actually applied in conflicts, the doctrinal imprint is still there. Moreover, the existing doctrine may well be replaced by a revised one. When the US military recovered from the trauma of the Vietnam War by successfully implementing Operation Desert Storm, much attention was paid to the pinpoint accuracy of smart bombs and cruise missiles, and the prowess of the soldiers. But what went largely unnoticed were the ideational aspects that unfolded during the nearly two decades preceding the latter military campaign. A study traces the origin of the 1991 victory to a doctrinal rethinking process which began in the 1970s. The engine of change was doctrinal reformulation. This does not mean that doctrine was the sole explanation of US military performance in the Gulf War but that it did comprise an integral part of the United States’ enhancement of its military capability.100 Technology, beyond doubt, is a critical factor in military affairs, but it requires doctrine to give it direction for development. In fact, it is hard to imagine that modern weapons result from mere random research and development, with military planners simply deciding to spend money to produce and procure whatever technology offers to them. A case which demonstrates the directional role of doctrine is the US development of armour during the Cold War. Identifying the Soviet Union as the most possible enemy, the US army envisaged that its armour divisions would bear the main thrust of a Soviet ground invasion in Europe; but the problem was their numerical inferiority. They could only endeavour to defeat the Red Army by gaining the technological edge. The equipment deployed, such as the M41 and M48 tanks, were designed to increase the

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capability of long-range shooting and first-round kill. The M48s ‘fulfilled their intended role by providing the Army with a tank able to hold its own against all but the heaviest of contemporary Soviet tanks’.101 However, technology requires doctrine to transform it into applicable military power. A good example is the development of tanks. The British in the First World War were the first to put the tanks into the battlefield. More important, they had the experience of how armoured forces could break through enemy fronts in the Battle of Cambrai of 1917, which was hailed as the ‘greatest British victory in the war’.102 On the eve of the Second World War, the British and French enjoyed qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Germans. But it was the German panzer forces, organised on the basis of a blitzkrieg combined arms doctrine, that overran the Allies in 1940. In fact, the British doctrine of using tanks for infantry support affected their design and performance. As of 1940, even the latest product suffered from slow speed and poor firepower. A recent study by a professor at the Royal Military College of Science on using tanks in urban warfare also points to the necessity of adapting the weapons to the way of their use. Obviously, the mere existence of a technology and its products does not guarantee capability improvement or military innovation. They need doctrine to organise, use and develop them.103 The argument about the impact of doctrine on force structure and training may be progressed further in the Japanese case. During the Second World War, when the Imperial Army was planning invasions of the Soviet Union, what it got were 370,000 horses with only 6,000 trucks and sedans. Certainly, this may be partly explained by the relatively low industrial productivity in wartime but a more important factor is ‘the correlation between doctrine and manufacture’.104 The time lag, instead of showing the irrelevance of ideational factors, shows the opposite. Doctrine demonstrates how it makes the forces structurally unfit and the national mobilisation bases unprepared for the war they are supposed to fight. Since the 1990s, technology has dominated military debates in the form of speculating about a ‘revolution in military affairs (RMA)’. As already noted in Chapter 1, this is not just a Western military phenomenon. The PLA has also participated in the heat of discussions about the importance of RMA technology.105 While Chinese commanders realise that the application of such technology definitely changes how combat is waged, this is not the sole element of consideration. Even as far back as the 1960s, a contemporary of Russian Marshall Malinovsky, General Sbitov, believed that, apart from economic and technological developments, political leadership and acquiring the military personnel needed to master the advanced equipment should constitute necessary preconditions for a RMA.106 RMA, then, should be built upon the interaction between technology, concepts and organisation to such a degree that the nature of warfare is changed to one’s own advantage.107 In his survey of RMAs, Williamson Murray, a military historian, finds that the crucial element in

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most of them has been conceptual in nature.108 This observation has a very practical meaning. The technological aspect of RMA is to be adapted by countries according to their specific security needs and technological limitations. Not all countries should seek to develop the whole range of high-technology equipment.109 This partly explains why Chinese RMA is concept-driven.110 Applicability to the Chinese military The doctrine-based concept of military readiness is relevant to China not only in light of RMA, as discussed above, but in its view on military affairs in general. In one of his most important speeches delivered in 1975 on military reforms, Deng Xiaoping, who was representing the CMC, made it clear that the PLA had two tasks: (1) rectification; (2) preparation for war.111 The first task was obvious. Deng pinpointed the five deficiencies of the Chinese army as they were in the 1970s – bloated, lax, arrogant, extravagant and slothful – and called for a more rational structure. Development and acquisition of military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons to the personal gear of individual soldiers, needed to be studied carefully. All this was to be ‘rectified’. The second task identified by Deng was about how to fight future wars. It was a matter of improving the art of war-fighting and command, and training. Of most concern were the size and ‘mix’ of the force structure, training and strategies. These two tasks were not and are not separate; they are interrelated. For example, modern commanders can no longer simply call for charges as they had done in the age of Mauser guns. The deployment of tanks and artillery as organic parts of military units now requires officers to be trained for combined arms warfare. According to Deng, ‘If we do not pay attention to military training, we would, at least, face setbacks at the early stage of war.’ In a study on Deng Xiaoping’s plans for war preparation, the analyst names five major elements: (1) an elite standing army with a rational structure; (2) advanced weapons and equipment; (3) strengthening of reserve forces; (4) training; and (5) advanced military theories.112 These factors essentially correspond to the three building blocks of our model – military doctrine, structural readiness and operational readiness. This view has already had its adherents. As early as the 1950s, Senior General Su Yu had asserted that a national military strategy and war planning must be first set down to provide a basis for national defence construction programmes.113 It is commonly held in the CMC that the development of military theories must be planned ahead of that of military training and hardware modernisation in order to ensure success in the latter two tasks.114 In the contemporary age when technology gains increasing attention, PLA researchers do not discount the importance of ideational factors but regard them as continuing to direct force development.115 In order to prepare for future warfare, force structure should be

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based on a rethinking of the complementary relationship between quantity and quality as well as the ‘dialectical relationship’ between human factors and hardware of the armed forces in order to work out a better balance. The methods and facilities of military training must also be reformed. This view, as demonstrated in later chapters, has been particularly prominent in military policies since the late 1970s. During Deng Xiaoping’s era, the objective of military reforms has been proclaimed as enhancing combat capability by building a strong ‘modernised and regularised revolutionary army’ (xiandaihua, zhengguihua gemin jundui). While being revolutionary is mainly a matter of civil–military relations, modernisation and regularisation are focused on the acquisition of advanced equipment, a rational force structure and proper management. Military education and training are regarded as in a ‘strategic position’. When Jiang Zemin was at the helm, he determined that the PLA, in order to prepare for the future war, must undertake simultaneous mechanisation and informatisation in both structural and operational aspects. But what steers these changes are military theories. Indeed, there have been plenty of discussions in the Chinese army that innovative military theories must precede China’s own RMA.116 In a conceptual paper to supplement the PLA’s military encyclopaedia, a group of army researchers assert that military theories set the direction, scale and structure of force development, and the way to conduct operations and reform the professional military education system.117

Conclusion On the premise that power shapes international security behaviour, this chapter has pursued the question of using the two concepts of military doctrine and military readiness to study and evaluate Chinese military power. The first imperative was to define military doctrine. After clarifying the various understandings of the concept and relating it to China’s system of military thinking, military doctrine emerges as an intellectual foundation for army building and national defence resources allocations. This ideational factor functions in international relations by communicating to other actors the intent and ways of the state to develop and use power. Doctrine makes an impact on a state’s security behaviour because it constitutes military power, but this power has to be put in the context of military readiness for evaluation. The question of how military power relates to international security is linked in particular to the concept of military readiness. Richard Betts assesses this by focusing on three aspects: structural, operational and mobilisation. While these aspects deal with the essential properties and physics of military affairs – mass, speed and efficiency – direction must also be addressed. It is where the concepts of military doctrine and mili-

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tary readiness meet. This exercise is not only useful conceptually but is critical in practical terms because the variations in resources among nations mean that adaptation in force development is necessary. While structural readiness is largely a function of force structure, and operational readiness depends upon training and command and control, military doctrine, as the intellectual foundation of a state’s army, shapes its structure and operation. It is the key to determining the level of the other two components – structural and operational readiness. Having built an analytical framework on military doctrine and military readiness, it will be applied in the following chapters to examine the evolution of China’s military doctrine and how it impacts on the development of Chinese military power.

3

The genesis of the Chinese local war doctrine

At the end of the Second World War, the Iron Curtain fell and divided the world into two camps headed by rival superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. When communist North Korea under Kim Il Sung ventured south in June 1950 for national unification, a new hot war commenced. It eventually involved, on the one side, a United Nations coalition force led by the United States and, on the other, communist forces of North Korea and China with the backing of the USSR. But the first large-scale postwar conflict between the world’s two rival ideological camps on the Korean peninsula turned out to be different from what had been anticipated.1 In the course of the three-year conflict, both sides had tried to limit the scope of the conflict instead of seeking total annihilation of the enemy. On the eve of the Korean War, the United States observed a policy endorsing nothing short of total victory in conflict.2 But the Korean War changed this posture. American scholars and analysts began to articulate an outcome short of a complete military triumph. A growing and flourishing literature on limited wars emerged. The names and works of such civilian proponents as William Kaufmann, Robert Osgood, Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger became predominant in the field of strategic studies.3 Limited war even became the Kennedy administration’s official military doctrine, only to be called into question during the Vietnam fiasco.4 The Russians at first devoted little attention to limited wars which they preferred to call ‘local wars’. As reflected in their choice of terminology, they initially viewed limited wars differently from the Americans. By the 1960s, however, they had followed the United States and began to explore the concept more systematically. Beginning with a study on foreign military research dealing with local wars, the Russian military gradually developed its own work on the subject and such efforts received the official blessing of the Soviet government. Over time, its publications showed increasing interest and demonstrated greater sophistication on the subject.5 Despite their participation in the Korean War and their support for

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pro-Chinese communist factions in Southeast Asian insurgencies, the Chinese lagged far behind the two superpowers in developing limited war concepts. In fact, China viewed its very national survival to be at stake with Cold War politics and thus focused on resisting full-scale superpower aggression. Initially under Soviet influence and protected by the USSR’s nuclear umbrella, Beijing adopted a doctrine which was based on a theory of the ‘initial phase of war’ (zhanzheng chuqi).6 The Chinese army was thus able to concentrate on fighting a conventional war, in which operational readiness was the key to repelling possible enemy invasion. When the Sino–Russian alliance broke down and the Americans intensified their military intervention in Indo-China in the 1960s, the Chinese military under Mao Zedong decided to purge foreign influence and fall back to a revolutionary People’s War doctrine. Mass, as emphasised in structural readiness, became more important for China to survive a nuclear war and overwhelm enemy troops on the ground. It was not until Deng Xiaoping took over China’s leadership in the late 1970s that the PLA began to review its military doctrine. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese army began to take a keen interest in local wars (jubu zhanzheng)7 and to incorporate its views on that subject into its own military doctrine. In retrospect, China may well have followed the Russian lead in developing a local war doctrine if not for the breakdown of the Sino–Soviet alliance and the Chinese leaders’ intensified fear for a nuclear war following that development. Thus, for over three decades, China had not prepared for local wars, which were at the opposite end to ‘total war’ in the spectrum of conflict. Most studies on the PLA characterise evolution of China’s military doctrine in a four-phase process – the People’s War, People’s War under modern conditions, local/limited war and local/limited war under hightechnology conditions. What is always overlooked is an important, albeit short-lived, period immediately after the establishment of the Korean War until the return of the reinforced dominance of Maoist military tradition in the late 1950s. Under Soviet doctrinal influence and the protection of a superpower, the PLA almost adopted a path that would have made itself a very different force. In fact, even though Maoist thinking had moulded the Chinese army for nearly twenty years, traces of the Soviet legacy embedded in individual military leaders were still visible when the doctrinal shambles was removed in the late 1970s. This chapter will initially review the development of limited/local war doctrines in the West and the Soviet Union to illustrate different experiences in China formulating its own doctrine and, as importantly, the intellectual origins of Chinese local war doctrine. An overview of the historical context of Chinese doctrinal development of the local war outlook will then be followed by an examination of the communicative and constitutive functions of Chinese military doctrine. The conceptual framework will be predicated upon the postulates discussed in Chapter 2. Of central

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importance are the ramifications for China’s military readiness when it reversed the early postwar trend towards the local war doctrine in the late 1950s to favour an emphasis on total war.

Doctrinal development of the limited/local war United States limited wars: the beginning of modern limited/local war studies The Chinese winter offensive in 1950 rolled back the UN forces in Korea. To reverse this trend, General MacArthur asked President Truman for permission to spread the war beyond the Yalu River to Chinese territory and to bring in Chinese Nationalist (Kuomingtang or KMT) reinforcements from Taiwan. He even favoured the use of American nuclear weapons. However, his requests were refused by President Truman because the latter believed the introduction of a nuclear element would escalate the war to an unacceptable threshold. As a result, the level of force and geographical scope of the Korean conflict remained limited. As the war dragged on, the USA began to settle on an outcome short of a unified pro-Western Korea and of North Korea’s unconditional surrender. Washington also imposed geographical limits on United Nations troop advances in accordance with this revised, more limited strategic objective. In 1953, the conflict was concluded by the signing of an armistice at Panmunjom.8 The Korean War was obviously an important precedent for limited war. It not only prompted the Americans to rethink their ‘all-or-nothing’ attitude to the use of force but also demonstrated limited war in its modern form which distinguished itself from pre-world war experiences.9 But this conflict alone could not explain the rapid development of the limited war concept in the USA. What really mattered was the contemporary international security landscape that underscored the Cold War. Set in the context of East–West confrontation, US containment strategy was designed to thwart communist expansion by preventing and punishing communist aggression. Any local aggression was interpreted as a direct challenge to American security, since it might trigger further conflict escalation even to the scale of a global conflict.10 But this policy also highlighted a growing gap in Western and Soviet military power. Due to downsizing policies adopted by Western governments and various demographic reasons, Western armies were increasingly outnumbered by communist bloc forces. The Korean conflict reminded the West of the danger of overstretching its resources in its quest to implement strategic containment against the USSR. In fact, the Korean War was, at times, read in Washington to be a diversionary move by the communist camp to lure the USA and its allies to go east as Moscow prepared for a real blow in Europe.11

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At this juncture, the atomic bomb, which represented unprecedented destructive power, looked very attractive in solving the strategic resource dilemma posed by the containment strategy. A solution was put forward by John Foster Dulles who in 1952 had advocated ‘instant massive retaliation’: ‘the free world [is] to develop the will and organise the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing’.12 Appointed as Secretary of State by President Eisenhower in 1953, the pair came to a consensus on lifting the ‘taboo’ on the use of atomic weapons. Their policy also found support in the US capacity to develop a range of bombs, from ‘tactical’ to ‘strategic’.13 One year later, Dulles, speaking at the Council of Foreign Affairs in New York, clarified the ‘massive retaliation’ posture: ‘Local defence must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power’.14 To fend off political criticism, the US Secretary of State subsequently modified this rhetoric but the spectre of an automatic and rigid nuclear response to future communist adventures remained a key point in American nuclear strategy during the height of the Cold War. Of course, massive retaliation would have looked more credible had the Americans maintained a monopoly of, or, at least, a lead over, the production and delivery of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie in a 1957 RAND research memorandum observed, ‘This [American] insistence on using nuclear weapons appears partly to reflect an unconscious assumption that we are still in a monopoly position, and that our use of them will be unilateral. The moment we start visualizing them as being used reciprocally, the use of them ceases to look overwhelmingly advantageous to us’.15 There was never an American renunciation of applying nuclear forces in conflicts in Brodie’s work. Rather than ruling them out, he emphasised ‘restraints’ on the employment of the bombs. Indeed, restraint was important because the Russians had demonstrated their own reprisal capability by exploding their first atomic bomb in August 1949. Since total war in such a context would be unthinkable, limited war began to appear as a more attractive alternative. It may be said that the American limited war debate was triggered as a reaction to massive retaliation.16 To sum up, American limited war doctrine was a product of fear of nuclear war, a growing belief in the necessity of conflict limitation and a logical outcome of America’s containment foreign policy.17 The end of the United States’ nuclear monopoly meant that there were limits to what the USA could do to contain communist aggression. It had to impose ‘deliberate restraints’ on the use of force in order to avoid triggering nuclear exchanges. This self-imposed restraint was viewed by US policy planners as the key that differentiated limited wars in the nuclear era from those prior to its advent. Thus the US definition of limited war tended to include only wars involving a superpower; small wars between states without nuclear weapons were viewed as ‘local wars’.18

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Origin of Soviet local wars The Russians started from a different premise to study limited wars in the 1950s. They did not have the firsthand experience in a limited war with a nuclear option, as did the Americans in the Korean War. They also had a different understanding about this type of war. Their early interest in small wars was seen in their analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905; of the Spanish Civil War, the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War itself.19 At the time when American strategists were debating how to conduct and win limited conventional and nuclear wars, the Soviet Union, as reflected in its military literature, was observing and studying local wars in the context of foreign military experiences. It was only during the 1960s that the Red Army began to look at the implications of limited war for its own military planning.20 The timing was not coincidental. As a result of Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet military theorists gradually discarded the straitjacket of military doctrine forged by Stalinism and proceeded to re-examine traditional doctrinal approaches. There began an era of so-called ‘Zhukov reforms’, with the Red Army embarking upon a force restructuring to achieve greater mobility and survivability in a nuclear environment.21 This was essentially a response to the US introduction of weapons of mass destruction to the battlefield. Although the Soviets enjoyed a clear quantitative superiority in conventional weaponry, Western tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and American weapons deployed in Asia posed a new dilemma – the Soviet Union’s concentration of force, a classic operational principle in the conduct of conventional warfare, would only be suicidal.22 With the support of Marshall Zhukov and the military, Nikita Khrushchev ascended to power in the USSR during 1955/56. The new Russian leader was convinced that nuclear weapons had been increasingly important in modern warfare. A simultaneous debate was occurring over the utility of missiles versus ground forces and this discussion received Khrushchev’s blessing. The final prevalence of missile forces over the conventional ground forces was induced by positive results in the Soviet space programme. Previous problems related to the limited availability of nuclear weapons, and virtual dependence on a single delivery platform – strategic bombers – were gradually solved. The successful launch of the Sputnik I in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s space flight four years later signalled major breakthroughs in developing alternative nuclear delivery systems to manned bombers.23 Speaking to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, Khrushchev concluded that sizeable conventional forces were obsolete and acknowledged that a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) had taken place with the invention of nuclear weapons.24 For the Russians, the technological breakthrough had revolutionised the conduct of war. Military organisations and views on warfare were adapted accordingly. In the same year, a new

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command, the Strategic Rocket Forces, was established.25 The General Secretary also declared a three-tier categorisation of wars: world wars, local wars and national liberation wars.26 Despite his eventual political demise in 1964, Khrushchev’s legacy on Soviet limited nuclear war strategy endured. It was against a background of RMA that Soviet military doctrinal debates took on a new look and literature on local wars boomed. Among the most representative of such publications was Military Strategy, edited by Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, a former Chief of General Staff.27 The book continued Soviet scepticism on the possibilities of limitation in war but warned that local wars could be sponsored by the USA in the form of proxy wars and would be aimed at a ‘quick victory’. Conventional arms would remain dominant in the battlefield. The use of tactical nuclear weapons as advocated by Western strategists, the book warned, would escalate into a nuclear world war.28 The Soviet perspective on local wars, discussed in Chapter 2, bears the imprint of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This is particularly obvious in the political aspect of its doctrine. Not surprisingly, some Kremlinologists have doubts about Russian publications and declaratory doctrine; they tend to regard them largely as propaganda and attempts to deceive and misinform the West; but an indiscriminate disregard is not warranted. What is required is careful reading to separate rhetoric from the militarytechnical elements. These Russian works remain useful for understanding Soviet strategic intentions and how the USSR planned to use its forces.29 The Russian case is particularly relevant to the study of Chinese military doctrinal development. First, Russian military concepts, together with American limited war theories, had formed the basis of Chinese research which underlined the PRC’s own local war doctrine in later years. Second, Russian military theories have the same structure as those later developed by the Chinese. Also in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, China’s military doctrine is composed of both socio-political and military-technical elements, similar to the Soviet version. While the socio-political component has remained relatively stable, the military-technical component has undergone tremendous changes over the past half century. This doctrinal evolution will be analysed below in the military readiness framework advanced by this study. The communicative function of military doctrine tells how the Chinese leaders’ security concerns and their intentions as to the use of force during Mao Zedong’s rule had changed from stopping enemy aggression in the ‘initial phase of war’ to fighting a protracted war. The constitutive function brings the actual military power to the potential in the ways and directions set by the doctrine, and ideas, through an educating process of the military officers, are put into practice. Before proceeding to examine empirically the implications of Chinese doctrinal changes on their military readiness in the Maoist era, an overview of the key characteristics in China’s military history as it relates to the country’s military doctrine will be presented.

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Overview of Chinese military history The advent of the local war concept in China went through a long dialectical process of evolution as it followed the tortuous track of Chinese politics. The period immediately following the Korean War was a ‘golden age’ of Chinese military intellectual development. As shown below, the concept articulated in the late 1950s bore stark similarities with that advanced in the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping was reinstated. But this was ephemeral. The development of a doctrine based on regular/conventional warfare (zhenggui zhan) and defence at the doorway was almost aborted in its infancy as the general direction of military modernisation turned inward and ‘backward’. Despite weighing the possible uses of force in local wars and low intensity conflicts, the Chinese high command was more interested in the PLA’s own historical legacy and thus adhered to a doctrine of general total war which envisioned the Chinese people in arms. The benchmark for change emerged when Deng Xiaoping put the PLA to test in a local war in 1979. The Chinese army received a baptism of fire, and suffered humiliating setbacks from a smaller but more modernised Vietnamese force. It was only through a subsequent reassessment of security threats that the development of local war picked up again from where it had left off in the late 1950s and proceeded to operationalisation. Historical context and army-building models Official Chinese accounts adopt two perspectives to classify the history of the PLA. The first classifies military affairs after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China into four stages: (1) transition to peaceful period (1949–53); (2) socialist construction (1954–65); (3) the Cultural Revolution (1966–76); and (4) rectification of past mistakes and socialist modernisation (post 1977).30 The second view argues that there were four ‘strategic changes’; three prior to 1949 and one during the Korean War.31 The first change (1930–35) was from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare; the second (1935–circa 1945), from domestic conventional warfare to anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare; the third (circa 1945–49), from anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare to domestic conventional warfare; the fourth (1950–53), from domestic to international conventional warfare. These two accounts have both their strengths and weaknesses. The first shows mainly the impact of political changes on military affairs. While they provide helpful information about the political context, the classifications fail to capture the essence of Chinese military thinking and operations. The second is informative about overall Chinese strategic thinking, but it is still inadequate to demonstrate the sharp contrast in military doctrinal changes before and after 1949. It fails also to point out the dynamics of doctrinal evolution.

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As pointed out in the previous chapter, the formulation of doctrine is affected by an array of demands and constraints. William Whitson and Chen-Hsia Huang, in their seminal work The Chinese High Command, interpret Chinese ‘military style’ or the ‘organisation of military power’ as assuming three different models – warlord, Russian and peasantry.32 Whitson and Huang contend that, while the warlord and Russian models are rooted in Western military theory, the peasant army model is ‘legitimately’ Chinese.33 In a post-Korean War study Alexander George finds the ‘Chinese Reds’, though conforming to the Marxist tradition, differ from their Soviet counterparts in light of organisation and doctrine.34 That is, the peasantry influence has always been with the PLA even when it has borrowed from foreign experiences. These models are intrinsically linked to two modes of warfare – guerrilla and conventional warfare (although it is arguable whether guerrilla characteristics or ‘guerrillaism’ [youji zhuyi] have ever disappeared from Chinese military thinking). In operational terms, guerrilla warfare is an integral part of Mao Zedong’s version of People’s War in the conduct of total war. The People’s War as espoused by Mao during the revolutionary and anti-Japanese war years is, by and large, a doctrine for putting people to arms.35 It is based on recognition of China’s inferior military capability to potential adversaries.36 It counts primarily on the quantitative superiority of China’s armed forces, which are predominantly peasantry, and improvisation of primitive equipment. To increase the Chinese army’s numerical strength, People’s War relies heavily on the political mobilisation of the masses to deliver military might – to provide logistics, intelligence and manpower for both the guerrillas and ‘regulars’ in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Emotion, in the form of revolutionary spirit, ideology and nationalism, also constitutes a crucial driving force. It is comradeship and personal respect, rather than bureaucratic procedures and rules, that command the army. Guerrilla warfare is also characterised by small unit organisations, attacks on soft targets and reliance on indigenous resources and strategic depth.37 The Maoist principles – ‘retreat when enemies advance; harass when halt; strike when tired; pursue when retreat’ and ‘lure enemy into the deep’ – are essentially products of in-depth defence and strategic interior line operations.38 For guerrilla strategists, the key to success lies in cumulative effects to change military balance to their favour before launching counter-offensives. As a result, the conduct of war is usually made up of ‘lesser actions’ and an ‘accumulation of more or less random individual victories’.39 In temporal terms, it must be a protracted war.40 In contrast, modern conventional warfare requires defence against enemies before they enter one’s own territory and, to accomplish this task, a professional standing army capable of responding quickly. Leaders cannot afford to sacrifice territories and cities of political-economic importance for the sake of interior line operations. Military actions usually

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involve larger military formations. They are ‘sequential’ in the sense that they form ‘a series of discrete steps or actions, with each one of this series of actions growing naturally out of, and dependent on, the one that preceded it’.41 In communist China’s case, conventional warfare concepts were derived largely from Russian postulates until the end of the 1950s. It was the interplay of peasantry-guerrilla and Soviet-conventional models that characterised the doctrinal evolution in China during the entire Maoist period. This stage ended with China’s adherence to a total war doctrine of People’s War. Ideas without practice China’s doctrinal development posed a sharp contrast to its post-1949 war experiences. As shown in Appendix 3, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been engaged in conflicts of varying scales and intensity – from the show of force across the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s to the more intense Korean conflict. These military actions were completely different from those prior to the establishment of the PRC. Although spanning over a time frame of decades, they share some notable common characteristics: (1) none of them call for total mobilisation; (2) except for the ‘national liberation wars’, none aim at unconditional surrender of adversaries; and (3) all are conducted at the peripheries of Chinese territories or traditional ‘buffer’ areas. In Chinese terminology, these are ‘local wars’.42 The Korean War, in particular, was a watershed. It called the attention of the Chinese high command to the concept of ‘compellence’ – making an adversary do something that it otherwise would not do.43 Compellence was demonstrated by American threats to introduce nuclear weapons into the conflict (after General MacArthur was dismissed and President Eisenhower assumed office) unless the PRC and North Korea observed a truce and negotiated an armistice. The American use of force was wedded to limited strategic objectives – a ceasefire – which saw war terminated in a state short of total victory. Obviously, the wars in which China was involved after 1949 were completely different from the Sino–Japanese War and China’s Civil War which had been fought by the Chinese for survival and with mobilisation of all their national resources. In those years, Chinese communist leaders were determined to achieve a total victory and military security was a real concern. Thus, Chinese military doctrine developed further and further away from the type of wars the PLA had actually fought. Although the PLA has since had numerous experiences in local wars, it was slow in developing a doctrine to explain them. The study of local war was further inhibited by the prioritisation of Maoist People’s War. Local war theory largely disappeared from Chinese military literature until the 1980s. The problem was complicated by the rigidity of the People’s War doc-

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trine. China was too focused on one point in the spectrum of war, namely total war. This inflexibility proved to be militarily costly in the post-Mao years. The following subsections trace how this inflexibility evolved.

Ready for a war that was not fought Challenges to Chinese guerrilla warfare Even before the KMT and communists parted company, the Russians had left an indelible mark on the Chinese military. The Whampoa Military Academy was founded in 1924 with Soviet financial and personnel assistance. A training centre for KMT generals as well as for communist political-military leaders, it became an important channel of Soviet political-military influence in China. Future PLA marshals, including Liu Bocheng, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen and Chen Yi, were instructors there while Lin Biao was one of 7,000-plus graduates.44 Some of these individuals went to the Soviet Union to study military affairs. For example, Liu Bocheng studied at an advanced infantry school and later at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow from 1927 to 1930; while the first PLA Navy (PLAN) commander, Xiao Jingguang, was a student at the Leningrad Political-Military Academy in the late 1920s.45 General Blücher (alias ‘Galin’) was another key source for introducing Russian military theories to China in the 1920s. He was appointed by Frunze to head the delegation of Russian military advisers to Whampoa and continued to exercise influence among the communists even after the 1926 KMT–CCP split.46 On the eve of the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, when the Red Army, the PLA’s precursor, was formed, Blücher was still advising the Chinese communists on military decisions.47 After the general’s departure that year, the only foreign military adviser to make his name was Otto Braun (known as Li De in China), a German Communist International agent who had been trained with military skills in Russia and was sent to the underground military advisory committee in Shanghai. Having failed to defend against the fifth ‘extermination campaign’ by KMT troops in 1933, he and other ‘Russian returned students’48 were disgraced at the Zunyi Conference two years later. Mao Zedong was given chairmanship of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and began his predominant role in Chinese communist military and political affairs.49 Yet important tenets of ‘conventional warfare’ and ‘mobile warfare’ doctrine had been spread to China even before Mao Zedong came to power in the Zunyi Conference. This was contrary to Mao’s insistence that his own edicts regarding guerrilla warfare should prevail.50 His scepticism about the application of the Soviet military doctrinal model to China was demonstrated by his landmark essay in 1936, ‘Strategic Problems about China’s Revolutionary War’. He contended that the Chinese revolutionary war had a ‘law’ of its own. His Red Army could not copy outright the

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Soviet model and needed its own strategy and tactics. Mobile warfare, he insisted, should not abandon the ‘guerrilla characteristics’.51 On the eve of the final showdown with KMT troops during China’s Civil War in the late 1940s, the Red Army had very little experience in fighting conventional warfare. However, the Civil War prompted Mao Zedong and his Red Army to make the so-called third ‘strategic change’ to ‘domestic conventional warfare’ in which the Red Army returned to mobile warfare tactics. The Korean War closely followed and witnessed a fourth change – towards ‘external conventional warfare’. After waging five campaigns of mobile warfare, the Chinese People’s Volunteers decided positional warfare best fitted the times and their needs.52 While Mao and other leaders perceived the type of war confronting them to be different from the guerrilla, protracted warfare they had known so well, their army was slow to change. In fact, questions arose in Beijing about how much the PLA was actually fighting a conventional war. Mao had already complained in 1948 that there were remnants of guerrilla characteristics in the PLA main force.53 A US marine corps account of the Korean War described the United States’ Chinese adversaries as using ‘semi-guerrilla tactics’.54 Then US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, also testified to the Congress that his army had been ‘up against one type of warfare which we never had before, and that is the guerrilla type’.55 New experience in conventional local wars While the guerrilla war characteristics of the PLA lingered on, ongoing changes in the type of warfare and the nature of potential adversaries had prompted its senior commanders to adapt their military thinking. The Civil War gave the army a taste of how to fight in formations as large as an army group and to launch exterior line strategic operations. The PLA also had to learn the conduct of positional warfare.56 The Korean War was an experience even more at variance with the Sino–Japanese War and antiKMT operations in the 1930s. It particularly exposed the Chinese weaknesses in C3 (command, control and communications). Tactics which had previously focused on the infantry and had brought the communists to victory in the Civil War thus proved to be deficient in the face of highly mobile enemies who were adept at joint operations. These turned out to be also suicidal in Korea amidst the PLA’s unprecedented exposure to destructive firepower and air power. Even organising logistical supplies was no longer a matter of interior line movement. By contrast, the UN forces’ strategic logistics was mainly seaborne and thus stayed out of reach of Chinese military power.57 Ultimately, the Korean War did instigate some fundamental changes in Chinese military doctrine. The PLA had aimed to destroy totally KMT military forces. The strategic objective was total victory.58 It was only their setback in Jinmen (Quemoy) that prevented the extinction of KMT forces.

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The communist army was thus fighting a war of annihilation. The type of war fought on the Korean peninsula was new for the PLA. Mainland Chinese leaders now ‘carefully limited in [the] scope, intensity and duration’ of their military actions fought a conventional limited war.59 When Mao Zedong commented on the ‘victory’ in the war and its implications, he did not mention expelling the United States and its allies from the Korean peninsula. Instead, he hailed the importance of rolling China’s enemies back to the 38th Parallel and stabilising the strategic balance there.60 Mao and Marshal Peng Dehuai, the commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in Korea, claimed success in compelling the United States to agree to peace.61 In this case, force complemented diplomacy to reach limited Chinese strategic objectives. The Korean War thus began a new page in the PLA’s doctrinal history. In a condensed time frame of about ten years, it changed from a total war posture which allowed for guerrilla operations in an in-depth defence environment to a conventional limited war outlook which demanded the ability to conduct positional and manoeuvrable warfare as well as to operate in a combined arms mode. While it is unfair to assert that the PLA made no effort to articulate war experiences before 1949, serious and productive attempts at doctrinal revision were not really made until the mid1950s. The interlude was filled by limited war efforts against the West in Korea, giving the Chinese army no real time to develop its own doctrines. Despite winning decisive military victories over its rival Nationalist regime, the PLA in its early years remained preoccupied with preventing any possible Nationalist counter-attack. In China’s south and southwest, the PLA carried on campaigns involving forces of over tens of thousands of troops (see Appendix 3). In the meantime, the Chinese air force was established almost overnight in November 1949; and the navy in April 1950. Without exception, they bore a Soviet imprint. Institutionalising Soviet doctrinal influence: educating the people In the pre-1949 period, military doctrinal development could only take the form of some rudimentary military studies. A military editorial committee and mobile libraries were formed to disseminate military knowledge. ‘Military schools’, as they were called, were formed during the revolutionary years and were best suited for drilling and officer education. Curricula were often prepared in haste. Although there were attempts to organise lessons learned from combat and to import foreign military thought – from Japanese war-fighting guidelines and French field regulations as well as Russian drilling regulations – military theory remained essentially underdeveloped.62 Mao Zedong thought and specifically his army-building theory were mentioned in communist literature, but indigenous doctrinal development was so rudimentary that the PLA had to turn to foreign sources as an alternative for intellectual guidance.63

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Given this context and the overall time frame, the Soviet model was bound to be the logical choice. Due to his training in Moscow, Liu Bocheng played a key role in consolidating Soviet influence in Chinese military thinking. When the Red Army Military-Political Academy was founded in Ruijin in 1931, it remained a ‘guerrilla warfare training class’.64 But Liu, in his capacity as the president of the school, began systematically to translate Russian documents and these soon became the PLA’s first operational regulations (zuozhan tiaoling). He also brought in other Soviet-trained comrades, including Wu Xiuquan and Zuo Quan, to help with translation and revision.65 Three times, in 1942, 1946 and 1967, the Soviet Red Army’s Combined Arms Tactics were translated and published. In 1948, a translated work, On Soviet Army Pincer Offensives, was also disseminated. Throughout its formulating years, the PLA did not articulate its combat experiences into coherent military doctrine. It had to rely mainly on the Russian Combined Arms Tactics and Army Group Tactics for developing its own military theories.66 Following the establishment of the communist republic, military schools mushroomed. In 1950 there were already ninety-six such academies, including those of newly formed service arms.67 The first senior institution charged with some indigenous research responsibilities was the PLA Military Academy in Nanjing which began classes in 1951. On the one hand it was a breeding ground for instructors of junior schools. It was also responsible, however, for organising combined arms and joint operations exercises and drawing upon these lessons to investigate military art. Liu’s emphasis on military theories could hardly be exaggerated; a research conference and a research office on military art were formed even prior to the opening of the Academy itself.68 The influence of Soviet naval thinking was also institutionalised in the PLAN. The Soviet-trained Xiao Jingguang was appointed not only as its first commander but also as head of its first surface warfare school, Dalian Naval School, which later became the cradle of many senior navy officers. Another key person was Zhang Xueshi, who had been sent to learn at the naval schools in Moscow and Leningrad in 1949, when the Central Military Commission (CMC) conceived of building the school. He was subsequently appointed deputy head of the school. Soon after he had finished his study at the Russian Voroshilov Naval Academy in 1958, he was appointed the PLAN Chief of Staff. As a matter of fact, by 1953, there were already 500 to 2,000 Soviet advisers in China to help build the navy.69 Interestingly, the Sino–Soviet split did not drastically reverse the direction of Chinese naval planning largely because the Soviet model of building a small navy for coastal defence (jin’an fangyu) fitted in well with the Maoist guerrilla warfare thinking. As the next chapter will discuss, this changed only after the Maoist doctrine was jettisoned in the 1980s. But Soviet influence was even more remarkable in China’s rush to build its air force. In August 1949, the Chinese leadership reached an

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agreement with the Soviet Union, by which they would help build six aviation schools, sold to China 434 aircraft, and supplied 878 advisers. Similarly, the first PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commander, Liu Yalou, and many other senior officers had Soviet connections. Liu was trained at the Frunze Military Academy in 1939. Among them, a deputy commander, Chang Qiankun, who had been sent twice to study at different Soviet air force academies and served at a Soviet aviation unit, played a key role in setting up PLAAF schools and planning education. Against such a background it is not surprising that Chinese air force doctrinal documents in the early 1950s were little more than Soviet copies.70 The Soviet model continued its dominance in the Chinese military education system long after 1949. As of 1956 there were 592 Russian military advisers and specialists in China, preaching on topics from atomic protection to territorial air defence principles.71 The pervasiveness of Soviet influence was exemplified in virtually all aspects of PLA development, from concepts and institutions to hardware. The USSR was the primary source of technological support for China’s infant national defence industry and weaponry supply and imitation production. According to the Sino–Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950, Moscow was to equip sixty Chinese infantry divisions. Military organisations, including the establishment of PLA headquarters, were ‘Sovietised’. The first generation of PLA Common Regulations produced by the Training Department of the CMC reflected this practice. Field regulations for the infantry, air force and navy were translated from Russian.72 Special emphasis was placed on learning from the advanced military science and experiences of the Soviet Red Army.73 In an address to the General Senior Infantry School in January 1953, Mao argued: In order to protect the motherland from imperialist aggressions, it is not good enough to rely on the equipment and tactics that we have employed to fight the relatively backward internal enemies. We must grasp firmly latest equipment and tactics. We must learn from the military science of the Soviet Union in order to raise our army to a level sufficient to win in modern warfare.74 The Yijiangshan Islands invasion of 1955 is arguably regarded by the PLA to be its first joint operations. Its success seemed to vindicate the type of warfare envisaged in the Soviet model. In November of the same year, the Chinese army conducted in Liaoning a front army-level joint service exercise to simulate an anti-amphibious attack with the enemy using atomic and chemical weapons. In 1957, the PLA joined the Soviet and North Korean armies in a command post exercise on joint operations.75 Early postwar Chinese doctrinal evolution culminated in a CMC enlarged conference in 1956 during which the high command resolved to adopt ‘a strategy of active defence (jiji fangyu) at the initial phase in future

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anti-aggression wars’ and postulated the forms of operations (zuozhan xingshi) in accordance with this strategy. The strategy was elaborated in a speech by Marshal Peng Dehuai one year later,76 and was based on a combination of positional and manoeuvrable offence:77 Strong defensive constructions must be built along key coastal areas, plans to defeat enemy strategic and operational level airborne made operation, reconnaissance means strengthened. [We] should endeavour to detect in advance any signs of enemy waging war and use of weapons of mass destruction in order to minimise the damages and losses caused by enemy surprise attack, to make sure that our troops in the frontline and in depth are combat ready timely and to cover the country for transition from peacetime to wartime setting. We must strategically deploy massive and strong manoeuvre troops so that we can organise in time counter-offensives and attacks, destroy and wear down enemies in coordination with coastal garrison units and destroy enemy airborne troops. Then we accomplish the task of strategic active defence. Marshal Peng’s remarks painted a picture which had negligible, if any, connotations for guerrilla warfare. There was no mention of ‘luring the enemy into the deep’. The PLA was to stop enemy advances in pre-designated areas at the initial phase of war in order to stabilise the battlefront and provide cover for national transition to a wartime state. The strategy was also focused on thwarting any enemy surprise attack and strengthening combat capabilities at short notice.78 All this mirrored the strong influence of the Soviet Red Army style of conventional warfare. By the mid-1950s, Mao began to be sceptical of Khrushchev’s ideological orthodoxy and Russian military policies, since they went too far in revising his version of People’s War. The conceptual conflict between the two notions was vividly illustrated in a conversation between Mao and his Soviet comrades. When Mao met Khrushchev in 1957 during a visit to Moscow, he disagreed with Marshal Zhukov’s argument for counter-strike in case the communist bloc was attacked by the West. He instead contended that the Soviet Union should instead ‘fall back’ – retreat and hold out for years.79 Towards strategic ‘guerrillaism’ The Mao–Khrushchev disagreements were only the tip of an iceberg of fundamental tensions between Maoist doctrine of People’s War and the Soviet model. Other strains included: (1) the arguments about whether technology or human factor was decisive in war; (2) whether conventional or guerrilla warfare should be dominant in the conduct of war; (3) whether regular forces or the masses/militia formed the decisive military

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force; and (4) whether bureaucratisation and institutionalisation or revolutionary spirit should be the avenue to proper army building.80 Indeed, the same clashes between the Chinese and Russian leaders took place in the larger context of China’s nation building. These were given full reign economically in the Great Leap Forward and politically the Cultural Revolution.81 China’s tilt towards the Soviet model, it will be recalled, had been initially sanctioned by the leadership and by Mao himself. Speaking in 1949, the Chairman saw only two options for China’s future: imperialism or socialism. He emphatically ruled out the possibility of a third path. The outcome was not surprisingly ‘leaning to one side’ (yibiandao) – the Russian-led socialist side.82 A CMC publication also urged the PLA to learn not only Soviet military theory and military science but also to assimilate its military technology and organisation.83 But Mao began to rethink this policy in the mid-1950s. If he had followed the Russians because of ideological affinity, ideological revulsion turned him away from it. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation campaign in 1956 drove home the question about ideological leadership and solidarity. Later in the same year, the CCP Central Committee cautioned all Party members against ‘dogmatism’ (jiaotiao zhuyi) in learning from foreign experiences.84 The Soviet refusal to risk a nuclear war with the United States in the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis as well as Moscow’s reluctance to provide China with nuclear weapons deepened the Sino–Soviet rift. Mao became increasingly suspicious of Russian foreign policy; Moscow was, he concluded, losing its revolutionary zeal and turning into a status quo power.85 Although allegedly instigated by Lin Biao, China’s Anti-Dogmatism Campaign became inevitable. At an enlarged CMC meeting in 1958, the intellectual foundation of the PLA was challenged. Senior officers, with ties to the Soviets and responsibility for military training and education, including Xiao Ke, Liu Bocheng and Song Shilun, were attacked and reprimanded for departing from the basic tenets of the People’s Army and People’s War. At the same time, Mao deplored the absence of indigenous field regulations and declared that the Chinese army must gather ‘comrades with ample working and combat experiences’ to work out its own regulations.86 This ‘China-centred’ (yiwo weizhu) approach was put forward with an emphasis on the importance of China’s experience in the direction of military modernisation. The Lushan Conference in July 1959 completed the final assault on the dominance of the Soviet model in the PLA. This time, even the Minister of National Defence, Marshal Peng Dehuai, and Chief of General Staff, Senior General Huang Kesheng, were disgraced for following ‘bourgeois military lines’.87 From 1959 onwards, Lin Biao took charge of the CMC’s daily operations. With the purge of Soviet influence, Maoist military thought was systematically introduced to the army and eventually assumed an absolute position in Chinese military doctrine.

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The ‘China-centred’ approach and the emphasis on ‘indigenousness’ should not have conflicted with PLA professionalisation. Under the aegis of Marshall Ye Jianying and with the support of the Academy of Military Science which was founded in 1958 and which he controlled, the Chinese military was able to produce its own doctrinal documents. In 1963, for example, the CMC promulgated the General Principles of Combined Arms Army Combat Regulations, Infantry Combat Regulations, Combined Arms Army Corps and Divisions Combat Regulations, Combined Arms Regiments and Battalions Combat Regulations, and Headquarters Works Regulations and other regulations.88 The major problem was restriction of doctrinal progress due to political reasons. The army became indoctrinated with Maoist writings. In conjunction with the publication of Volume 4 of Mao Zedong Xuanji (The Selected Works of Mao Zedong), the General Political Department urged every soldier to push the study of Mao’s writings to new heights. Senior military academies even jointly compiled and published Mao Zedong Tongzhi Lun Renmin Zhanzheng yu Renmin Jundui (Comrade Mao Zedong on the People’s Army and People’s War). The reading campaigns were intensified with the election of model students on Mao’s works. The high point came naturally after the two releases of the ‘Little Red Book’ – Mao Zhuxi Yulu (Quotations from Chairman Mao).89 These changes, however, should not be regarded simply as a matter of ‘red vs. expert’. Doctrinally, Mao was bringing his country back to the days of ‘guerrillaism’ – defence in depth and destruction of enemy, rather than holding territories – but with modern weapons. This ‘new’ path may also be seen as an important counter-measure to external threats which China and international communism encountered at the time. Mao Zedong is so often remembered as a nationalist that it is easy to forget his internationalist side. As seen in Appendix 3, immediately following the Korean War, China continued to support international communist and Third World insurgencies. One of the most illustrative examples was Beijing’s military assistance programmes to anti-French forces in Vietnam. In response to the United States’ initiatives to create the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) for containing communist and national liberation movements and signing of a mutual defence treaty with Taiwan in 1954, China shelled Jinmen and invaded Yijiangshan Island.90 These incidents precipitated the first Taiwan Strait Crisis and brought the world to the brink of war. The confrontation was ‘more than a contest for the offshore islands remaining in Nationalist hands or even for Taiwan itself. It constituted a direct test of strength between the People’s Republic of China and the United States’.91 Structural readiness for total war The crisis again reminded Mao of the changes in warfare brought about by the introduction of the atomic bomb. The obsolescence of his army’s

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strategies and equipment had become increasingly self-evident.92 Soon after the Korean War armistice, the CMC Training Department, upon receipt from the Soviet Union of some equipment for protection from atomic radiation, produced China’s first atomic defence instruction manual and instructors. Anti-chemical warfare units which had been formed in 1950 were placed in the central command. In 1955, a headquarters for anti-chemical warfare was formed. In the same year, the PLA also began to install facilities to shield Chinese forces from atomic, chemical and bacterial contamination in national defence construction projects.93 By 1959, the CMC decreed that the PLA should study how to wage combat and training under enemy atomic and missile attacks.94 Yet the Chinese leaders were not content with these measures. When the government decided to develop a nuclear industry in 1955, the first priority was its military applications.95 Despite his ‘strategic contempt’ for his American enemies, Mao remained ‘tactically’ vigilant.96 He was determined to defeat future US ‘nuclear blackmail’ by possessing his own atomic bomb. As of 1956–57, the Chinese seemed to anticipate Russian help in atomic weapons development and entered into a series of agreements with them for technology transfer.97 During his 1957 visit, Mao was no less jubilant over the launch of Sputnik than his Moscow hosts and declared that the ‘East wind’ now prevailed over the ‘West wind’. In his eyes, there occurred a decisive swing of military advantages to the cause of communism. Mao precipitated another Taiwan Strait Crisis during the following year. He was prepared to gamble on fighting a ‘local war’ with the United States over Taiwan, and to involve the Russians in case of escalation into a general war and nuclear showdown.98 Mao’s enthusiasm for Soviet nuclear and missile advances, however, soon gave way to abject disappointment. The Russians initially helped the Chinese to develop nuclear and missile programmes by providing personnel training, exporting technology and supplying weapon prototypes. But they never actually supplied a ‘finished’ atomic bomb and they turned lukewarm in 1959 amidst a general souring of Sino–Soviet relations. The Soviets finally broke off military aid in 1960 by recalling all specialists and technicians. The Chinese decided to end their dual policy of exploiting Russian aid and pursuing ‘self-reliance’, settling instead on the latter as the dominant national security strategy. In October 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb; three years later, it tested a hydrogen bomb.99 Parallel to the research on nuclear weapons was the development of delivery platforms to launch them. Like their Soviet comrades, the Chinese accorded special importance to ballistic missiles.100 The first Chinese missile agency was the Fifth Research Institute under the Ministry of National Defence. This was established in October 1956, following the formation of a coordinating body, the Aviation Industry Commission, six months earlier. According to the GSD’s Ten-Year (1958–67) Plan Outline for National Defence Science and Technology Research in 1957, development priority

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was given to intermediate-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (SSM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and electronic technology. Another area that received attention was unmanned aircraft.101 In December 1957, China’s very first missile units were formed; and two years later, the first SSM battalion.102 In 1960, China recorded its first successful missile launch. But the missile was a copy of the Soviet R-2 rocket (known as model 1059 and later renamed DF-1) which had a very limited range of 600 km and poor accuracy. Only a limited number of DF-1s were produced for experimental and educational purposes. In 1964, China’s first operational intermediate-range ballistic missile, DF-2, with a range of 1,450 km, made its debut test flight.103 In fact, one year after the Russian launch of Sputnik in 1957, Mao declared that China should also have its own satellite. But this was not a mere scientific quest. It was made clear in a State Council report that the research was to make Chinese missile delivery systems operational.104 As in nuclear energy development, military applications came first. China’s nuclear weapons development programme should recall earlier discussions in this chapter about Soviet influence in the Chinese political-military realm – the study and translation of Russian military literature, doctrinal documents, joint military drills and exercises and personnel training.105 The priority of missiles over other forms of nuclear weapons delivery was confirmed in a 1963 decision by the Central Special Commission:106 ‘Missiles should be the main research direction of nuclear weapons; air drop only auxiliary’.107 The duality of the People’s War doctrine: deterrence and defence Even with the development of more advanced military hardware and more sophisticated organisations, there seemed to be a lack of doctrine to operate these in war. Yet it is problematic for Lewis and Xue to assert that no ‘overarching strategic doctrine informed Chairman Mao’s decision to proceed with the strategic missile program in the mid-1950s’ (emphasis added). The development of China’s nuclear forces in the early years, they argue, was technologically driven and doctrines for missile forces only began to emerge in the early 1980s.108 The problem lies in the failure of Lewis and Xue to distinguish strategic from operational doctrines. Admittedly, military theoretical studies of the Second Artillery began only in the late 1970s (with the formation of a military art research department in November 1978). The focus of such studies was on force development and combat.109 That is, the units and weapons had been developed without an operational doctrine for the strategic missile forces. The interruption in operational doctrinal development, however, was not unique to this service arm. Mao’s disdain for military professionalism certainly aggravated the problem. PLA military theoretical studies, as a whole, came to almost a complete halt during the political turmoil of the

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Cultural Revolution. The number of army academies and research institutes was drastically slashed and eventually discontinued.110 However, this lack of theoretical studies on the operational use of nuclear weapons and missiles should not be construed as if their development were without strategic doctrinal guidance and were decided by available technology. Earlier analysis in this chapter of Soviet influence in Chinese military policies in the mid-1950s underscores that the decisions to develop nuclear bombs and missiles (not other delivery systems) were not made in a doctrinal vacuum. Beijing asked Moscow for the nuclearrelated technology transfers. When China made an about-turn to Maoist People’s War, it was prepared to use its limited nuclear capability to reply in kind to Western nuclear attacks. Even Lewis and Xue themselves agree that each model of China’s Dongfeng missiles had ‘a different range based on a specific imaginary target’.111 There was indeed a strategic doctrine for nuclear weapons development, though not an operational doctrine for their employment in war. It may thus be argued convincingly that China’s initial development of nuclear weapons was political-military. Mao Zedong argued in 1958 that, without nuclear weapons, the international community would not take China seriously.112 The day following China’s first nuclear explosion, Zhou Enlai pledged a ‘no-first-use’ policy in an open letter to all heads of government in the world. He explained the Chinese move as a defensive act against nuclear threats from the United States.113 The Chinese thus claimed to develop nuclear capability to break nuclear monopoly and defeat ‘nuclear blackmail’ by the two superpowers.114 A second component of Chinese nuclear weapons development complementing their political utility was related to deterrence. Initially, the Chinese government despised the concept of deterrence which was derided as ‘nuclear blackmail’. But the evolution of the Dongfeng strategic missiles programme underscored the concept of deterrence by punishment which emphasised retaliation.115 China’s small nuclear arsenal was mainly aimed at an enemy’s ‘soft targets’ (i.e. cities and industrial centres). In order to ensure a Chinese second strike capability, nuclear force survivability became the overarching concern.116 As revealed by Marshall Nie Rongzhen, then a member of the Central Special Commission, China’s primary interest in developing the missile programme was to deploy medium-range and long-range missiles directed towards regional targets.117 These would be able to reach US bases in Asia. Only later would intercontinental ballistic missiles be deployed capable of hitting the United States homeland.118 The third idea that shapes China’s nuclear programme was deterrence by denial. This, however, works in a different context from usual deterrence posture. While deterrence by punishment is usually associated with nuclear retaliation; deterrence by denial with conventional forces is denying enemies the chance of ‘winning’ a nuclear war.119

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Deterrence by denial was underscored by China’s total war doctrine – Maoist People’s War – which links deterrence to battlefield defence. Conventional war-fighting, Mao believed, and not nuclear weapons, would decide the result of war. Although the Chinese political-military leaders of the 1960s envisioned that an ‘imminent, all-out nuclear war’ (zaoda, dada, da hezhanzheng) would be the most likely scenario, and even a local war would inadvertently escalate into a nuclear total war, the decisive factor in battle would not be nuclear weapons. A nuclear preventive strike would only be a prelude to full-scale ground invasion.120 Mao Zedong later endorsed this version of People’s War.121 In fact, this doctrinal approach was given full reign in the mid-1960s when China’s strategic principles were confirmed as ‘luring enemy into the deep, fighting People’s War and wars of annihilation’. The core idea was ‘luring enemy into the deep’.122 The Chinese military was confident of surviving enemy preventive nuclear attacks and retaliating in kind. Thus, as noted above, the focus of war would be in the conventional battlefield. China would be organised into three lines of defence. The troops deployed at the first line were for scouting, and would disperse to conduct guerrilla warfare when it was clear where enemy penetration was taking place. But ‘garrison units’ in the second line would resist initial enemy assaults. In this war of attrition, the enemy would find its lines of supply and communications exposed and overextended. China’s adversaries would be harassed by the guerrillas and worn down by the garrison troops even before they reached the third line of defence. China’s field armies deployed at the third line of defence would generate strong resistance to the invader and would not easily give up an inch of land. The regular Chinese army, in conjunction with guerrilla forces and masses of Chinese citizens, would eventually overwhelm and annihilate the enemy inside Chinese territory.123 In this scenario, People’s War would deny the enemy any chance of success and, if properly conveyed in advance, might even deter it from attacking. In short, the Chinese concept of deterrence was a combination of punishment and denial.124 Sacrificing operational readiness As noted above, while the ‘Anti-Dogmatism Campaign’ represented a departure from the Soviet model, the 1959 CMC enlarged meeting completed the change and announced a return to People’s War with guerrilla characteristics – a ‘nation-in-arms’ doctrine. Among the main features of the Maoist concept were the superiority of political enthusiasm over military professionalism and the ‘human factor’ over military hardware.125 While political education was in full swing, military training was nevertheless compromised. By 1971, China had thirteen army corps in strategic reserve, seventeen specialised services divisions, and some military region divisions were put in ‘combat ready’ category.

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But none of these divisions were fully trained. The yearly flight hours of interceptor pilots, for example, averaged only thirty-eight from 1966 onwards. This situation was somewhat mitigated with Lin Biao’s demise in September 1971, but China’s standing army remained seriously underequipped. Even by 1973, 70 per cent of Second Artillery missile regiments were underequipped, and one-third of China’s tank regiments were deploying only forty to fifty operable tanks. According to statistics released in 1975, only 40 per cent of the vessels in the navy and 60 per cent of aircraft in the air force were operational.126 The lack of operational readiness of the PLA was disastrous. Apart from military subordination to political ideology, a second byproduct of the Maoist doctrine was building up the militia. Following the CCPCC resolution to intensify militia work and Mao Zedong’s urgings to ‘[make] a great effort to develop militia divisions’ to counter imperialism, almost 35 per cent of the Chinese population formed militias and the number of militiamen exploded from 40 million to 220 million within a few months. The strategic importance of militias in future nuclear and missile wars was also defined in a 1959 CMC report. It mandated that the militias should make up the bulk of China’s military forces in future wars.127 A third policy that exemplified Mao’s People’s War was the ‘Third Line’128 (sanxian) construction programme. Since the CMC perceived the United States and the KMT in Taiwan as the main threat to communist China’s existence, it created a ‘strategic readiness system’ of frontline troops deployed to China’s southeast coast.129 The bulk of China’s national defence science and technology infrastructure and industrial establishment, however, was retrenched to China’s strategic hinterland – subsequently known as the ‘third line’ area. US military intervention in Vietnam seemed to confirm Chinese suspicion about the aggression of US forces deployed proximate to China’s southern borders. As Sino–Soviet relations deteriorated and culminated in the Zhenbao (Damansky) Island skirmish, China turned its attention northward. The main defence perimeter was in the three ‘norths’ – northwest, north China, northeast.130 The ‘third front’ was viewed by Mao and other Chinese military planners as the ultimate line of defence, allowing the infrastructures of both the Chinese state and the CCP to survive even if China were to be invaded on two different fronts by the USSR and USA respectively. Mao’s People’s War doctrine extracted serious costs to China’s military readiness. Among other liabilities, it sowed the seeds of China’s Vietnam disaster in 1979 when the PLA prepared so poorly against its Hanoi adversary. The militia, the institutional icon of Maoist People’s War, was elevated to a position even higher than the PLA.131 It became the so-called ‘second armed force’ and was regarded as more politically ‘reliable’ than the regular, if not yet professional, army.132 Its numerical superiority and political zeal gave the militia a higher priority than the regular forces. Its

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demand for resources compromised the quality of the standing army, including the PLA’s strategic forces. Development in operational doctrine, organisation, training and hardware was likewise impeded. Interestingly, Deng Xiaoping, when referring to the Second Artillery in 1978, proposed the concept of ‘fighting guerrilla warfare with modern equipment’.133 Even this late in the PRC’s existence, its leadership generally viewed a high-technology arm of the regular army as only capable of guerrilla warfare.

Conclusion The evolution of Chinese local war doctrine has followed a track very different from the military doctrinal development that occurred in the United States and the Soviet Union. Practical war experience was overshadowed by ideological reasons and political leadership perception. China’s ‘golden age’ of military doctrinal development commenced in the years immediately following the Korean War. The Chinese high command had firsthand experience of modern warfare in that conflict, and access to institutional resources that it had not enjoyed during the revolutionary years. A doctrine evolved which focused on Soviet-modelled conventional warfare and which combined positional defence with manoeuvre offensive. Those years also saw the professionalisation of the standing army, research and development and acquisition of modern weaponry, and rapid growth in military education and research institutes. Emphasis was placed on operational readiness to deal with threats from the US-led ‘imperialist’ forces. But the issue of how to fight a nuclear war – a war of mass destruction – proved to be the catalyst which transformed China’s limited war outlook and doctrine. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Mao Zedong had perceived the nuclear-armed American imperialists as China’s arch-enemy. He planned to answer the threat by nuclear balancing – with China possessing its own nuclear force. The United States would, he reasoned, then be deterred by China’s retaliatory capability. But this only created a new security dilemma for China: its nuclear arms could well invite pre-emptive American attacks. The ‘nuclear blackmail’ prospect was further complicated by the ambitious KMT forces, who had long waited to roll back communism on the mainland by launching a ground invasion. The Sino–Soviet split in the 1960s posed an even greater danger. The long, common Sino–Soviet border on land put China in a vulnerable condition against a militarily superior foe. Thus, ‘deterrence by punishment’ had to be supplemented with ‘deterrence by denial’. The nuclear weapons programme was only part of the continental-oriented Maoist People’s War – a total war of annihilation, conducted by ‘luring enemy into the deep’ and then wearing it down through protracted warfare. Obviously, the PLA’s high command favoured structural readiness that emphasised the

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mass of force. Mass was regarded as important, in the first stage of nuclear exchanges, to survive possible enemy nuclear strikes and, in the second stage of conventional war, to overrun enemy invasive forces on the ground. While a general war with nuclear exchanges continued to preoccupy the two superpowers during the Cold War years, both the Soviet Union and the United States developed limited/local war theories as an alternative means of violence to resolve conflicts. China, however, placed undue emphasis on total nuclear war fighting despite frequent trouble along the borders which was inapplicable to nuclear escalation. By doing so, it lost an opportunity to develop a more flexible army during the Cold War. The PLA was not ready for the challenges of modern localised conflicts when it faced one against Vietnam in 1979. As will be discussed in the next chapter, that conflict was used by Deng Xiaoping to test the war-fighting capability of his army, which had been built on Maoist People’s War. The PLA’s poor performance during the Sino–Vietnamese border conflicts illustrated the inadequacy of this doctrine. It was left to Deng and his generals to revise the doctrine and to modernise the PLA in accordance with changing strategic requirements.

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As discussed in the previous chapter, China’s leaders during the Cultural Revolution perceived the security landscape as capable of fostering wars that would threaten the very survival of the state. Its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was intended to fight ‘imminent, all-out nuclear war’ – total war, or local war which would quickly escalate into a total war against a major power and its allies in a nuclear environment. The Chinese answer was People’s War. This was a doctrine of Maoist guerrilla warfare which was characterised by emphasis on political enthusiasm, the ‘human factor’ and comradeship; military training and hardware and the formal chain of command were relegated to secondary status. The army had expected to fight protracted wars of attrition rather than relatively short campaigns, and to conduct defensive rather than offensive operations. All this seemed to justify an infantry-centred military structure, and combined arms warfare appeared less important. The application of this doctrine sowed the seeds of the 1979 Vietnam disaster – China launched a punitive attack against Vietnam. The PLA had been built for a different type of war and was not ready to confront the modern tools supplied to the Vietnamese by the Russians.1 Yet even the Sino–Vietnamese conflict was not the reason for China ultimately effecting doctrinal change. Rather, it should be viewed as a testing ground to demonstrate force readiness and to justify the need for reforms when that readiness proved not to be sufficient. The call for new doctrinal innovation within the PLA had, in fact, preceded that war. People’s War had failed to answer the challenges posited by new security threats and to help achieve national military-political objectives. It had instead resulted in the PLA becoming an obsolescent force. Military doctrinal change in China during the late 1970s in many ways resembled that country’s experience in the 1950s. Both time frames should be read in a larger context of nation-building and political-military leadership. The experiment to build a ‘new China’ immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic was Soviet inspired. If the Cultural Revolution symbolised a protest against foreign influence and a radical return to China’s past (especially during the revolutionary years) the mili-

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tary modernisation programmes undertaken in the 1970s represented a search for a middle ground in China’s continuing quest for power and security. National defence, together with agriculture, industry, and science and technology, formed the four modernisations launched by then Premier Zhou Enlai in 1975. The programme was soon aborted when he died one year later. But China’s new leadership under Deng Xiaoping decided to pick it up again in 1978. This meant expanding and ‘upgrading’ Deng’s military reforms originally proposed in 1975. These were largely about force restructuring and were too piecemeal to achieve really fundamental reforms.2 A new direction in military planning was clearly needed. A ‘doctrinal spring’, resembling that of the 1950s, re-emerged. Both periods focused on the ‘initial phase of war’ (zhanzheng chuqi) and both promoted ‘active defence’. The concept of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ of the late 1970s was only a remedy to the defunct Maoist People’s War which operated with ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’. This concept, moreover, was only ‘reactionary’ and transitional. While the socio-political meaning of People’s War was retained in the 1970s version, the military-technical element of the new doctrine underwent substantial revisions – it was gradually replaced by an updated version of local war. This ‘new doctrine under an old label’ was not established, however, until China’s new leadership made a reassessment of threats to national security in 1985. At that time, the PLA underwent one of the most substantial overhauls in its history. This chapter will commence with a discussion about how the Maoist People’s War lost touch with modern warfare as demonstrated in the Sino–Vietnamese border clash. In order to redress China’s military readiness problem, the PLA’s high command had to push for doctrinal reform. The doctrinal evolution from ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ to local war will be examined closely. The concept of local war itself and how it has impacted on Chinese military power will also be assessed.

The 1979 border war: catalyst for Chinese doctrinal reform The ‘self-defence counter-offensive’ On the eve of the Sino–Vietnamese conflict, the PLA had successfully exploded nuclear devices and launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as well as satellites. It had also demonstrated an indigenous military industrial capacity for producing conventional weaponry. However, the possession of these ‘characteristics of a great power’ did not mean China was ready for a bloody war with Vietnam, a Third World state, when Chinese leaders decided to put their country’s army to the test. That is, absolute military power is not equal to military readiness. Even though the Chinese claimed ‘victory’, the price tag comprised huge PLA casualties.

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Indeed, the PLA continued to have clashes, albeit less intense, with the Vietnamese over the Sino–Vietnamese land border well beyond 1979, and more substantial skirmishes occurred in 1981 and 1984 to 1987. Except in 1984 when division-level contingents took part, these other episodes involved mainly regiments/battalions or smaller units.3 According to the Xinhua News Agency (China’s official mouthpiece), PLA border defence troops decided in early 1979 to confront rather than to appease Vietnamese provocations and armed harassment which had intensified since 1977.4 But if the two years of ‘bullying’ was intolerable, the forging of a formal security alliance between the Soviet Union and Vietnam in November 1978 was even more unacceptable. So too was Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, a Chinese ally, and its eventual occupation of the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, in January 1979. These developments were perceived by the Chinese leadership as associated with a threatening Soviet move to sandwich it from both the north and south.5 On the eve of the war, about thirty Chinese divisions had been deployed along the Sino–Vietnamese border. On 17 February 1979, the PLA executed an order issued by the CMC five days earlier. Some 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers, under the respective command of Yang Dezhi in the western sector and Xu Shiyou in the east, crossed the border and attacked the Vietnamese enemy. Their strategic targets were Lao Cai, Cao Bang and Lang Son. After 27 February, intensive fighting was also carried out in the Lang Son area, which was about 16 km from the Friendship Pass and over 135 km from Hanoi.6 On 5 March, Beijing announced it would withdraw its troops. This was accomplished a week later to conclude the PLA’s twenty-eight-day expedition into Vietnam.7 In its official media, the Chinese government propagandised stories of valour instead of discussing the ‘lessons’ learned from the conflict or even disclosing facts about it. The Chinese high command only admitted casualties of approximately 20,000 on the Chinese side as compared to 50,000 Vietnamese casualties. In contrast, Hanoi claimed a much lower figure for its own army vis-à-vis its Chinese adversary. Foreign analysts estimated that over 26,000 Chinese soldiers were killed, another 37,000 wounded and 260 taken prisoner. On top of that, the PLA suffered considerable damage to its equipment and weaponry. Chinese ground forces were barely mechanised and motorised in the Sino–Vietnam war. The PLA’s four million-plus soldiers possessed only some 2,000 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as of 1980. Moreover, the PLA had deployed about 1,200 tanks on the border but only in regimental-size units during the Vietnam conflict. Indeed, about 420 tanks and armoured vehicles were lost. This was the result of poor coordination between the PLA’s infantry and the armour, both in terms of force structure and operations.8

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Sounding the alarm of doctrinal failure A brief review of the PLA’s performance reveals that it was operationally and structurally not ready. Its soldiers’ lack of professional education and training had made the supply of qualified and experienced officers an acute problem. In fact, some of them were engaged in agricultural activities when the mobilisation call reached them. The specialised arms were barely proficient in their trade. A smooth chain of command became a serious issue when the war took a heavy toll on junior officers. But the Maoist legacy, which sacrificed the military ranking system for the sake of comradeship, caused the most fundamental problem. Officers not only lacked the professional pride of their Western counterparts but were confused in giving and receiving orders. There were even reports of fratricide within PLA units due to a failure to identify friend or foe amidst the heat of battle.9 Weaknesses in the PLA’s C3 (command, control and communications) were also a matter of concern. Equipment was outdated and susceptible to both jamming and terrain blocking. In fact, the Chinese army was barely equipped to wage any type of electronic warfare.10 According to some reports, army corps had to receive engineering units from military region headquarters to construct camouflaged command posts and bridges.11 Overall, the Chinese were unable to bring the PLA’s full military power to bear on their Vietnamese enemy. The root of failure was in doctrinal shortcomings. China’s expedition into Vietnam was mainly an infantry operation. There was little trace, if any, of combined arms and joint operations because their doctrinal postulates had long been buried in deference to an infantry-focused People’s War, reflecting Mao’s revolutionary war tradition. PLA foot soldiers had the experience of fighting with artillery in their early days and gradually became proficient during the Civil War. However, by 1979, they knew little about modern armour. Not surprisingly, even at small unit operations, infantry and armour did not coordinate well, resulting in significant tank casualties.12 At the joint level, the PLA navy (PLAN) was largely irrelevant in the Vietnam conflict. The PLA air force (PLAAF) was important but failed to score any kills. Although the air force assets were controlled by air force commanders in the Guangzhou military region and Kunming military region, joint services command posts were formed on the basis of key airfields in each operational direction (zuozhan fangxian). Thus, the PLAAF played no real combat role. It reportedly flew 8,500 sorties in 3,131 groupings to ‘patrol’ Chinese air space, mainly for ‘air cover’, reconnaissance and early warning. Even these tasks were not completed satisfactorily. More importantly, the air force lacked the capacity to provide the PLA ground forces in Vietnam with fire support. Perhaps the most active PLAAF units in the Vietnam campaign were

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transport units which delivered materiel and personnel to the frontline and implemented medical evacuation. Outdated equipment partly explained the PLAAF’s poor performance. In contrast, with Russian aid, Vietnam’s comparatively modern arsenal of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) proved decisive as a force multiplier; China had to hurriedly transfer J-7 fighters to the border area to compensate for the obvious qualitative inferiority of its invasion force. The self-imposed geographical limit of how far that force could advance coincided with Chinese SAM ranges.13 But there was a more important doctrinal consideration. The dominance concern for air superiority over the actual combat area was no more clearly illustrated than by the type of Chinese aircraft sent to the war theatre and the air-to-air missiles under their wing pylons.14 The service doctrine of the PLAAF had been ‘defensive’ and focused on air supremacy over its own territory for fear of enemy surveillance and strikes. However, it lacked a close-air support doctrine and received little training and hardware for any such mission. PLAAF research actually revealed that there were too many interceptors in China’s force structure and this was reflected in its inability to initiate offensive action against Vietnamese forces.15

The impact of modern conditions These Chinese force deficiencies were not difficult to understand when we consider the basic tenets of Maoist People’s War. Even the militia, it will be recalled, had been regarded as a sacred cow in Maoist People’s War but this generated inherent limitations in offensive action. According to Chinese accounts, the militia’s roles ranged from actual combat to services support in the Vietnam conflict. Militiamen also helped in the repair of roads, vehicles and tanks, as well as in medical evacuation and logistical supplies. Their actual combat support role included diffusing mines, demolishing enemy obstacles, reconnaissance and guiding, but their actual combat operations were essentially defensive, such as security screening and repulsing enemy assaults. These were mainly inside Chinese territory or in a short depth adjacent to China.16 Thus, as noted earlier, the Chinese military action against Vietnam served mainly as a test for the PLA rank-and-file to gain combat experience. Troops involved included the PLA’s main forces17 from the Kunming and Guangzhou military regions as well as from other military regions. They were not mere border defence forces as reported by the Chinese press.18 The exercise was a step towards understanding how much Chinese military power needed to be re-invigorated. The need for reforms was not only derived from the Vietnam experience but also from other military conflicts assessed by Chinese observers.19 In 1982, two battles, one in the Middle East and the other in

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the South Atlantic, caught the attention of PLA analysts by demonstrating how modern warfare was evolving. The Israeli forces, with a declared aim of protecting the Galilean settlements from terrorist artillery fire, stormed across the Lebanese border on 6 June 1982. After five days, the Israelis were able to advance 90 km deep into Lebanon, wipe out Syrian air defence missile bases in Bekaa Valley and encircle West Beirut where the headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were situated. Israel’s immediate military objectives were quickly achieved. On the other side of the world, a small British task force was able to overrun an Argentine force of over 10,000 soldiers and recapture South Georgia, short of one month after it was seized by Argentina. The British reoccupied the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) less than two months after initiating combat. The British displayed substantial acumen in the art of electronic warfare and in joint force operations and blockading. They also established unquestionable air and sea control over the combat area and carried out highly efficient mobilisation.20 The fast tempo, huge costs and high intensity of these wars, combined with the lethal nature of the weapons used, alerted the PLA to just how different modern warfare was from that envisaged by Mao. The discrepancy was so wide that the Chinese army even published a special supplement to Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), a PLA internal publication, to analyse these two wars.21 In a concluding essay, Yu Qifen22 took into consideration the two above-cited conflicts along with two additional ‘local wars’ – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq War – to highlight four points: 1 2 3 4

The speed of response to attack: this is critical to modern wars which are characterised by sudden strikes. Strategic assessment: this is critical to minimise losses and absorb shocks in the initial phase of war. Protracted war: political and military preparation for a long conflict may defeat the blitzkrieg of an aggressor. Logistics: in view of the huge consumption of materiel in these skirmishes, the production, storage and supply of war materiel would become more important.

The Chinese army’s interest in and awareness of modern warfare was not in question. What was needed was someone to kick-start the process of doctrinal revision and steer the course of modernisation down the right path. As happened in the 1950s, the direction of change had to come from the top. Deng Xiaoping was the key player in bringing the PLA back to the track of modernisation. He initially reassessed China’s security environment and revised these threat perceptions that had originally justified Maoist

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People’s War. Speaking at a CMC general meeting in December 1977, Deng reiterated a view that he had made at a larger meeting of the same establishment two years earlier.23 While not totally dismissing the possibility of fighting an ‘early and all-out war’, he argued that ‘major wars could surely be postponed’. For him, speaking in his capacity as the PLA’s Chief of General Staff, ‘sudden and localised incidents’ which could hardly be predicted were more threatening.24 Attention was thus shifted to scenarios other than those which had preoccupied Mao’s defence planners in the 1960s. Moreover, Deng sanctioned doctrinal debates within the PLA. His remarks at the twentieth anniversary of the Academy of Military Science in March 1978 called openly for studying ‘the People’s War under Modern Conditions’.25 Nor was he alone. His determination to bring the military-technical component of the People’s War doctrine up to date with modern warfare was shared by his contemporaries. Another CMC vice-chairman, Marshall Ye Jianying, pointed to the necessity of studying ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’. The socio-political environment, threat and form of future warfare, he asserted, were different from the vision that had shaped Maoist military thought.26 A consensus was gradually building up in the PLA’s high command. Senior General Su Yu, giving words of encouragement to graduates of the Military Academy in January 1979, went beyond signalling general change to urge reforms in actual details of operational methods, including the initial phase of war. It is noteworthy that this senior officer had been the first to publicise the concept of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ in August 1977. He also emphasised conventional warfare in the nuclear age and the building of a modern air force.27 Of course, the PLA’s high command recognised that the ‘modern conditions’ which demanded a new doctrine were not limited to international security considerations. China’s domestic political-economic environment would not allow it – now an established sovereign state with permanent territory and a huge population – to trade its economic centres for tactical mobility or space for time. Cities became strongpoints to be defended. National ‘rebuilding’ processes envisioned by Deng and others to redistribute scarce resources rationally would not support an economy based on planning for imminent war. Accordingly, such concepts as the ‘third line’ became outdated and expendable. Military technology developments – the advent of more advanced nuclear arms, missiles and electronic devices in particular – were reshaping future battlefields.28 It was in recognition of the changing environment that the Chinese leadership began its search for new military answers. The above-cited debates soon bore their first fruits in a CMC enlarged meeting in 1980. The military leaders concentrated their attention on research relating to the initial phase of war. They resolved that the ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’ strategy which had been enshrined

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by Maoist People’s War was to be scrapped. In its place, they retained only ‘active defence’ but gave it a new context. It was to be integrated with a ‘theory of the initial phase of war’.29 This development was monumental and was an important step away from total war doctrine. It must be emphasised that back in 1977 (the first post-Mao year), the Chinese military still insisted on an ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’ strategy to deal with a possible Soviet general invasion. It calculated that it must take advantage of interior operations and fight a war of annihilation in its own territory.30 Entering the 1980s, the concept of the ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ was given added content by a more systematic integration of active defence strategy with ‘initial phase of war’ theory. According to this new, integrated doctrine, a Soviet adversary, with superiority in manoeuvre capability and firepower, could easily control the air space in any invasion of China; Soviet forces would start a blitzkrieg with a joint services attack on a wide front and in depth. In order to stop Soviet advances and to stabilise the situation, the Chinese PLA, in the initial phase of war, was to take advantage of preselected strongholds to wage positional warfare against an enemy intent upon achieving a quick and decisive victory. ‘Luring enemy into the deep’ was replaced by ‘standing up to the enemy’ (dingzhu diren).31 Similar to the thinking which emerged in the 1950s, this doctrine anticipated that PLA would provide strategic cover for China to shift into a wartime mobilisation. Positional warfare had other advantages. Defence of cities of strategic importance could ambush and wear down enemy forces, and a Battle of Stalingrad-type scenario could change the momentum against a Soviet invader. Chinese forces were not to concentrate on strongpoints but were to maintain a huge reserve for counter-strokes and small mobile warfare.32 Learning also from their enemies, the Chinese studied Moscow’s painful experience during the early part of the Second World War. They understood the importance of organising strongpoints in strategic depth to prevent enemy advances after breakthroughs in the first line of defence.33 Where such breakthroughs did occur, mobile warfare would no longer mean one had to retreat to the rear but could outflank enemy troops to disrupt their logistical supply.34 These tasks were as much a matter of conducting successful guerrilla warfare as of the use of special operations even on enemy soil.35 ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ attempted to integrate the old with the new to the PLA’s maximum advantage. For the regular army, Beijing’s military leaders realised that future warfare would be combined arms and joint operations.36 While there was obvious interest among PLA strategists in conventional warfare and little had been actually written by Chinese strategic analysts about nuclear war scenarios, the spectre of nuclear war was never too far away in the PLA’s collective mindset. If the enemy blasted its way through to China’s interior by using nuclear weapons, the PLA would respond by

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applying firepower judiciously to fill the gaps.37 Indications suggested that the Chinese were still preparing to fight protracted wars of attrition to wear down their enemies, but they would do so by applying revised operational concepts and methods emphasising the application of massive firepower.38 More profound changes were evident in Chinese views on the concept of ‘defence’. The active defence strategy was reinterpreted so that it squared more closely with emerging offensive strategies and with Chinese military operations that might be conducted beyond the nation’s border. This approach was politically appealing because it could justify China’s recent ‘punitive’ attacks against Vietnam.39 The three defining stages of active defence – (1) strategic defensive; (2) strategic stalemate; and (3) strategic counter-offensive – thus assumed additional meaning. According to PLA strategists, the ‘strategic defensive’ has special importance. An enemy would try every way to break through and advance deep into Chinese territory. Planning would thus need to be consummated with the initial phase of war, namely the period extending from the start of war to the completion of the mission of strategic cover. As noted above, however, the strategic defensive is also interpreted in a political context. A claim to be on the defensive against enemy disruption on the border is regarded by the Chinese as justification for future offensives. Assuming the attack momentum is broken, the war would enter the stage of ‘strategic stalemate’. This is the point where the balance of military forces would change to favour the defensive side (i.e. China) as the invasive enemy became weaker. During this period, the Chinese leadership would rally the people behind it to form a staunch political front, reinvigorate its army and win international support. Political and diplomatic pressure would thus be combined with military efforts in war prosecution. Seizing upon changed circumstance in the balance of forces, Chinese commanders would then begin a strategic counter-offensive. At this stage, the PLA would hurl enemy troops out of Chinese territory or, if necessary, chase them beyond the border and hit their home bases to seek decisive victory. Although the operations are militarily offensive, they are regarded politically as counter-offensives.40 This is in line with the Marxist-Leninist tradition which emphasises the political nature of armed conflicts, and with the Chinese practice of claiming the moral high ground in war. The active defence strategy, in this context, explains China’s 1979 ‘punitive’ adventure against Vietnam. War, for the Chinese, had started when the Vietnamese allegedly harassed China’s border areas. China was thus ‘on the defensive’. Since the ‘soldiers and people’ (junmin) refused to surrender an inch of soil, they brought the confrontation to a stalemate. During this time, Beijing on the one hand mobilised international support and on the other planned for military operations. When it saw an appropriate moment, it ‘counter-attacked’.

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This military-technical component of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ – ‘active defence’ and the theory of the initial phase of war – bridged the gap between China’s national security objectives and its military doctrine. It revised the premises on which Maoist People’s War had been formulated and recognised that future warfare would be executed in different ways. But even this doctrinal approach was bound to be transitional. Although the speculation about preparing for an ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’ has been modified, the overall concept of war remains vague. The revised doctrinal theory only retained a focus on protracted, general war and national mobilisation. It seemed to emphasise only wars’ operational aspects.41 The problem of maintaining large armed forces on high alert during peacetime was yet to be solved. This will be assessed more fully later in this chapter. Perhaps the most significant Chinese doctrinal change at the turn of the 1980s was to break from the past and pave the way for military reform, both in structural and operational terms. Before the consequences of this trend are explored, it may be useful to summarise the doctrinal tenets of the military-technical component of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’. They are: • • • • • • • •

sudden attacks with ensuing large-scale ground invasion perceived as the main threat; ‘stand up to the enemy’ (dingzhu diren), instead of ‘luring the enemy into the deep’; the concentration of force at strongpoints to foil enemy attempts at a quick and decisive victory; maintaining a huge army reserve to sustain defence; the primacy of positional warfare, with supporting mobile and guerrilla operations; the importance of stabilising the situation in the initial phase of war in order to provide cover for mobilisation; protracted war; an emphasis on the offensive at operational and tactical levels with an allegedly strategic defensive stance.

Military readiness under modern conditions Structural readiness I: The force mix One of the most notable benchmarks of Chinese military policy in the years immediately following Deng Xiaoping’s return to power was the streamlining and restructuring of the PLA. The national economy had been overstretched to support a large war machine commensurate with preparing for an ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’. It was made clear by

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Deng at an enlarged meeting of the CMC standing committee in 1980 that the PLA’s high command was to reallocate the money saved from manpower downsizing of the army to upgrade equipment and reduce military expenditure.42 In 1985, the PLA underwent a major demobilisation, transferring its internal security troops and railway corps to the Public Security Ministry and Railway Ministry respectively. Capital construction units were simply abolished. Headquarters of the artillery, armour and engineering corps were consolidated under the GSD.43 These force reductions were complemented by reforms in the PLA’s force mix. The revised concept of active defence underscored the importance of strengthening the PLA’s offensive capabilities and its potential for force projection operations. In the late 1960s, as Sino–Soviet hostility intensified, motorised infantry corps and divisions were created.44 However, their enhanced mobility still did not measure up to modern warfare standards. Under Deng’s new doctrine espoused in the late 1970s, the PLA was directed to improve its firepower and survivability. In December 1983, it formed its first mechanised infantry divisions which received armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as well as more tanks and SP (self-propelled) guns to enhance assault capability.45 Depending on the type of climate, geography and terrain in which they were operating, and the specific nature of combat missions, these units were divided into two sections – south and north – so that they were better equipped to deal with conflicts in a wide array of environments and situations.46 However, such mechanised infantry divisions were too small to conduct independent military campaigns. Deng Xiaoping had already emphasised in 1980 the necessity to form combined arms group armies (jituanjun)47 which should have organic specialised arms.48 The border clash with Vietnam in 1979 had underscored the limitations of old-style PLA formations in fighting modern combined arms battles. In September 1982, two army corps (lujunjun) were converted into pilot group armies for the Beijing military region and Shenyang military region but it took another three years for the army-wide reorganisation to be completed.49 The primacy of positional warfare in the initial phase of war determined that a high concentration of forces and firepower was necessary to conduct frontal engagements. The perceived enemy preference for sudden attacks would ensure a very fast tempo of operations in future conflicts. In theory, the guerrilla forces of the militia and masses would be caught off-guard and their uses in war would be marginalised. The ‘people’ would no longer be expected to provide direct support to their regular forces which would have to conduct exterior operations.50 Another aspect of People’s War was thus relegated to history by the PLA’s doctrinal transformation to a new form of active defence. Indeed, if the militia was to keep itself ‘combat effective’ in rear opera-

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tions, it needed to be overhauled. Militia organisations which had proliferated substantially during the Maoist years were slashed and scaled down. By the end of 1982, the militia was reduced by 60 per cent to about 100 million soldiers. China’s traditionally extensive network of militia organisations as well as PLA’s bloated chain of command were effectively consolidated.51 Despite experiencing these force reductions, the militia was still a potent military force due to its sheer size. Expected high attrition rates in future warfare meant that the standing army, in any case, would need a large pool of manpower replenishment.52 The PLA, after all, remained qualitatively inferior to its most likely foe. Yet the militia would only be useful after being integrated into a reserve system. China’s reserve forces had been organised initially in 1955 but were abolished two years later. They were reinstated in 1983. The more capable ‘basic militia’ (jigan minbing) formed the bulk of Category A reserve forces, the ‘ordinary militia’ (putong minbing), Category B, which would be mobilised in wartime to reinforce the regular army and make new formations.53 The People’s Armed Police (PAP) were situated between the PLA and the reservists to replace the local forces in China’s three-tier armed force structure. Former PLA internal security units were not simply disbanded; some were transferred to the new police contingent which formed its headquarters in 1983 by virtue of a CCPCC decree the previous year. The PAP was established as a prolific organisation: it fielded units responsible for internal security, border defence, guard security as well as some specialising in fire-fighting, hydro-electric power, gold prospecting, traffic and forestry. It also comprised special police forces and training academies. In line with its primary duty of internal security, however, the internal security units formed the bulk of the PAP. Border defence troops were created for border control and combating cross-border crimes, not for fighting with foreign armed forces. Although the PAP was charged with wartime duties, it was mainly to ensure security in rear areas. Since the Armed Police had been restored for the maintenance of internal order, this should have contributed to professionalisation of the regular army for external defence. It was only because the PAP failed its important test in quelling protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989 that regular PLA units were called upon for suppression. Since the PLA, officially blessed as a ‘People’s Army’, got its hands dirty killing the people, Chinese military leaders were eager to remedy strained civil–military relations and bring it back to professional training. Thus, despite performing badly, the PAP was strengthened so that it would be capable of internal security tasks.54 Structural readiness II: The hardware Advances in military hardware and technology are probably the most visible indicator of military modernisation. Extensive analysis of China’s

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massive equipment and weapons upgrade programmes will not be offered here. A broad overview will be presented, however, on the research and development (R&D) component that allows such programmes to materialise. Between the immediate post-Mao years and the ‘strategic changes’ in 1985, Beijing had stipulated short- and medium-term plans for the R&D of military hardware. When Deng Xiaoping was reinstated in 1977, the CMC leadership moved to enact the Sixth Five-Year Plan for national science and technology. It also decided that the focus of weapons R&D should be on antitank and anti-air equipment, interceptor aircraft, submarines, computers and electronic counter-measures. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and satellite communications were demarcated as the three key strategic weapons projects. A full-scale Soviet invasion continued to dominate China’s strategic planning, but there were subtle changes. While the Chinese high command was determined to complete the testing and R&D of these three programmes, it began to shift its attention to conventional arms.55 This signalled a gradual departure from the ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’ scenario. Entering the 1980s, according to the 1983 CMC documentation now available for review, ground forces equipment was assigned greater priority, although strategic nuclear weapons were still to be improved.56 The conventional weapons projects immediately following Mao’s rule were understandably oriented towards the ground forces. Both threat assessments of clashes with the Russians and experience in fighting the Vietnamese seemed to confirm the central importance of land warfare. Insufficient mobility and firepower had placed the Chinese army in a disadvantageous position against their adversaries. To mitigate these and to facilitate coordination between the infantry and tanks, China has increased its R&D of both APCs and AIFVs. Most of the prototypes for these systems were vintage in the early 1980s.57 Another important advance was in self-propelled (SP) weaponry. The 152 mm Type-83 SP cannon-howitzer was China’s first such system. This plus other SP systems definitely enhanced the suppressive firepower of the PLA’s mobile forces.58 The air force made only incremental improvements. It had four key projects – the J-7 II, J-8 day model, J-8 I all-weather model and Q-5. They were essentially upgraded rather than new series R&D. Even the J-8 was, in fact, a product of the 1960s technology and concept. From 1979 to 1986, there was an unprecedented number of prototypes finalised and models improved in China’s aviation industry; but these materialised only from the revival of previously suspended projects.59 It should be noted that the hardware development during the early 1980s reflected a dominant Chinese concern for defensive air operations and air superiority.60 Even when the CMC pushed for doctrinal revisions of Maoist People’s War, the air force was slow to change and articulate

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doctrine. China’s air doctrine was thus still very much a legacy of the 1960s. Emphasis remained in neutralising enemy invasions through counter air attack, especially strategic air attacks, air defence and air superiority, and by the employment of the interceptor and air defence units. While limited resources impelled a conservative use of air assets, deficient command and control rendered other tasks such as air interdiction and close air support almost impossible. The only major changes were found in the appreciation of time factor – the initial phase of war.61 Operational readiness tended to be addressed, rather than structural issues. This imbalance in the force structure of the air arm continued to frustrate most Chinese military planners in the late 1980s who argued for more offensive capability.62 The PLAN in the late 1970s concentrated on the refitting and remodelling of its first-generation vessels, especially with electronic warfare capability and automation. Five components were at the core of the programme: (1) attack nuclear-powered submarines; (2) guided missile destroyers; (3) conventional attack submarines; (4) missile patrol boats; and (5) submarine chasers. Upon completion of these projects, the PLAN began to conceive of the procurement of new attack submarines, destroyers, guided missile frigates, corvettes, missile boats and anti-submarine torpedoes. This time, Chinese leaders, having learned from the mistakes in the 1960s, made sure that these platforms were given corresponding weapons systems.63 Due to financial constraints, the upgrading of the naval armaments programmes was mainly to right past wrongs, and they indicated a confirmation of changes from land-based coastal defence (jin’an fangyu) to a green water offshore defence (jinhai fangyu).64 During the Maoist period, in line with the People’s War doctrine and reflecting the influence of Soviet naval strategy, coastal defence had to exhibit a strong continental outlook and clear guerrilla characteristics – dependence on cumulative effects of small victories, targeting isolated forces, emphasis on surprise assaults and camouflage, and short-duration combat. The idea was to turn islands and the coast into command, observation, berth and logistical posts for a small naval force.65 Marine militias and fishermen occupied an important position within the force structure to implement this doctrine. Regular naval forces, moreover, were to rely upon a naval air arm to provide cover, submarines for assault and small torpedo boats in groups to fight (the so-called ‘trio’ of kong-qian-kuai).66 This doctrine of ‘maritime assault guerrilla warfare’ (haishang poxi youji zhan) was confirmed and refined in 1957 by Xiao Jingguang, then commander of the PLA navy, who himself was Soviet-trained.67 The position of the above-mentioned ‘force trio’ became further consolidated when it was deemed suitable for various mission requirements related to achieving mobility, stealth and surprise.68 As national development strategy and threat perceptions evolved in the

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late 1970s, the guerrilla coastal defence doctrine began to give way to offshore defence. This may be attributed to the direction of Deng Xiaoping and the PLAN’s then commander, Liu Huaqing. Subordinated to the active defence strategy, naval forces were now to launch operational and tactical offensives – despite being on the defensive strategically. The objective was to attack the depth of intruding enemies by organising operations in the outer waters.69 Not surprisingly, the focus of hardware was gradually shifted from small patrol craft to medium and large ships. In 1976, the first destroyer zhidui (a division-level formation) equipped with domesticmade guided missiles was formed.70 Operational readiness The doctrine of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ not only deals with the problem of operational mass but also with combat timing. China’s armed forces are required to execute combat orders proficiently and rapidly to accomplish their missions. Two factors are critical: training, and command and control. The focus on sudden attacks and the requirement to ‘stand up to the enemy’ in the initial phase of war demanded high operational readiness of the army. For PLA soldiers, this meant proficiency through training. The function of doctrine was to guide the direction of training – a factor long emphasised by the PLA.71 With his return to power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the ‘strategic importance’ of military education and training.72 The first effect of this translated into a CMC decree that, starting from 1978, two-thirds of army divisions plus all combat-ready troops, artillery, tank, air force, navy and Second Artillery units would be fully trained every year.73 Although the GSD handed down a new military training programme in February 1981, the years between 1980 and 1983 were barely more than a period for ‘putting things back to order’. Anti-tank, anti-air and anti-airdrop operations and combined arms training continued to be the focus of combat. The threat of sudden Soviet attacks and in-depth strikes with armour and airborne forces remained uppermost in the minds of the Chinese leaders at the time. The ‘five war-fighting capabilities’ (wuzhong zuozhan nengli) in joint services and combined arms combat, rapid response, electronic warfare, logistical support and field survivability therefore remained at the top of the agenda.74 The North China confrontational war-game held in August to September 1981 proved to be a ‘showcase’ of doctrine-driven training reform.75 With over 1,300 tanks and armoured vehicles, some 1,500 artillery pieces and almost 300 aircraft, about 110,000 personnel from the army and air force as well as combat services support units participated. The event was unprecedented both in terms of the scale and number of service arms involved. While the ‘blue forces’ simulated mass tank breakthroughs and

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airdrop assaults, the ‘red forces’ implemented anti-airdrop combat and their infantry divisions waged a staunch positional defence. The red forces’ strategic reserves, in coordination with the air force and militia, ‘destroyed’ blue forces inserted into the defence perimeter.76 In sum, the main objectives of this front army-level defensive campaign were: • • • • • • •

defend against enemy sudden attack; conduct operations in campaign covered areas; defend against attacks of enemy tank formations and prevent breakthroughs; defend against enemy assaults; defend against envelopment; defend against airborne operations; conduct mobile warfare under favourable conditions.77

This exercise represented a demonstration of a new Chinese blueprint for its military operational readiness. At a troop inspection following the war-game, Deng Xiaoping summarised the general objective of this army building: to succinctly build a ‘modernised and regularised revolutionary army’ (xiandaihua zhengguihua de geming jundui).78 This dictum captured the main features of ensuing Chinese defence policy that eventually made a huge impact on PLA readiness. The meaning of ‘revolutionisation’ (geminhua) is self-evident and its mandate is clearly applicable to the PLA, a communist army. The concept of ‘modernisation’ (xiandaihua) was implemented with equipment and weapons primarily in mind, which was dealt with earlier in this chapter under force structure. It is ‘regularisation’ (zhengguihua), however, that may have had the most widespread effect on PLA readiness. This postulates that standardisation of operational procedures and training as well as re-establishment of institutions and rules are paramount.79 For China in the early 1980s, this meant standardising training according to evolving doctrinal documents and regulations as well as reinstatement of the officer corps. Continuities in PLA training were sustained but, increasingly, reforms and changes became prevalent. Innovations were effected in the method, form, content and target of training. They were stipulated in various documents but were especially apparent in the new 1981 training programme. This trend towards regularisation was confirmed after a conference on training reform in 1983.80 Perhaps the most notable development in the method of training was an increased use of simulation. In Chinese terminology, there are basically two types of simulation: tactical and technical. Given its late start in applying simulation, the PLA’s training in this technique was very primitive and was hardly popular in the 1980s; it could only move slowly from technical to tactical level. Shooting simulation facilities were constructed only in the

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early years of that decade; the first simulated confrontational forces and atomic bomb explosion simulation devices were in training fields only after the mid-1980s. As of 1985, the navy and air force had released projectors only to division-level units; it was common for PLA troops to raise funds themselves to procure simulation facilities. Despite these constraints, it was obvious that simulation training was promoted increasingly on an army-wide basis, from armour to engineers. The equipment produced was mainly laser and electronic simulation systems for confrontational exercises in the field and command headquarters operations. In 1984, hardware procurement was facilitated when the CMC set aside 650 million yuan (about US$ 78.5 million) to sanction its five-year plan for simulation facilities.81 The design of simulation equipment showed that military training had moved from staged war-games to confrontational exercises. One of the most important milestones was the creation of China’s first specialised simulated foreign army unit in Nanjing military region. Other troops also began to operate their own simulated detachments for confrontational exercises. But the most important development was the rejection of staged exercises, in which a ‘red force’ was only to execute pre-set procedures to defeat its ‘blue’ opponents. Instead, the two opposing forces would no longer exchange their plans prior to the exercises in order to impart more ‘realism’. In the PLAAF since 1982, the military region air force had distributed equipment to its ‘blue forces’ which was close in quality to that used by simulated ‘red’ (i.e. Chinese) forces.82 With regard to the content of training reforms, emphases were shifted from techniques to tactics, single service arms to combined arms, from mobile warfare to positional warfare. The PLA’s high command decided that, following the Nanjing military region experiment, each operational area (zhanqu) should have its own combined arms tactical training field.83 Combined arms tactical training coordination zones were set up where troops of different arms were deployed.84 The Second Artillery also moved to revise its programme and began to focus on the ‘operationalisation’ of strategic weapons. In August 1983, under the guidance of a doctrine of ‘limited nuclear retaliation’, it conducted an operational-level exercise in northwest China with over 2,600 troops. This involved the commanders of arms branches, bases and zhidui and culminated in the successful launching of four IRBMs. One year later, launching battalions became the core unit in combined arms training and received priority in hardware procurement.85 There were also increasing studies in the PLAN on coordinating its surface fleet and its aviation arm. Between 1979 and 1984, the navy had organised combined arms exercises (some with real troops) in striking enemy surface warship formations, blockade, air defence, bombing and counter-bombing, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance. Soviet capabilities and combat methods were simulated. For example, in air

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defence training, Chinese sailors were to practise manoeuvres, and the tracking and shooting of low-flying enemy aircraft both by radar and the naked eye. At the joint level, war-games were also conducted with other service arms in affiliated military regions. Another major development in naval training was traversing distant sea lanes. In 1976, submarine 252 was the first to cross the first island chain.86 Later, another submarine, 256, crossed the second island chain.87 Surface fleets soon followed suit. Chinese attempts to extend their reach at sea were amply demonstrated by the naval air force’s first air patrol over the Spratlys in 1979 and a voyage of two ships to the southern tip of the same island group four years later.88 Following the example of the Nanjing and Beijing military regions in 1985, air force units in other regions formed their own ‘tactical coordination zones’. Service arms under different chains of command in an area were brought together for combined arms confrontational training.89 The officer corps had long been identified by Deng and his CMC colleagues as a main target for improvement in command and control and training reform. This was nothing new but, again, a continuation of the 1950s experience when officers were, in the Soviet tradition, the main targets of training. In the post-Mao years, however, there were additional reasons for emphasising it. The officers were deemed to be unfit to command in modern warfare, especially combined arms and joint operations.90 In 1981 alone, the PLA’s ground forces participated in over 1,000 combined arms command post exercises, and exercises with real troops involving officers of regiment level and above. The navy also organised campaign training for its corps-level cadres. New doctrine, foreign military experiences and operational art were all reviewed.91 However, such training would not automatically make the officers more ready for operating in modern warfare unless the institution of officer corps itself was rebuilt for the execution of combat orders. The above sections have intimated how a poor officer corps could cost military operational performance. The ranking system, which is a matter of honour and command relationship to all militaries, was abolished in 1965 in the PLA as a sacrifice to comradeship, a component of Maoist People’s War. By 1981, however, Yang Dezhi acknowledged that China was considering restoring the military ranking system. The system was finally restored in 1988 through legislation. As a result, the professionalism of PLA officers was enhanced by recognition of individual competence and the chain of command became more efficient.92 Interdependence of operational and structural readiness Operational and structural readiness are two distinct analytical concepts but not completely separate. They are interdependent in regard to their effect on military readiness. In line with the CMC’s decision in 1977 to

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prioritise the automation of C3I systems, territorial air defence radar systems, field command systems and military computers were among the key aspects of PLA’s force structure development during the first half of the 1980s. By the middle of that decade, automated systems to process radar intelligence and to direct aviation corps were deployed in Hebei and Guangxi.93 This was a clear example of how hardware can contribute to operational efficiency. Yet hardware alone was proved to be not enough to achieve operational proficiency. Combined arms training and unit reorganisation were also vital components in the overall modernisation process. Like the process of doctrinal revision and force structure adjustments, its C2 chain and training in modern warfare were far from complete by the mid-1980s. The PLA spent the post-Mao years initially eliminating traces of guerrilla war doctrine and, later, searching for a successor that could facilitate army building. But political resistance and logistical obstacles remained substantial. Deng Xiaoping and his contemporaries were proven correct to target the cadres in the lists of reforms. They systematically pushed for a ‘revolutionary (geminghua), rejuvenated (nianqinghua), intellectual (zhishihua) and professional (zhuanyehua)’ officer corps.94 Many units, however, remained tied to the old ways. The army was criticised for ‘three too much, three too little’ (sanduo, sanshao) – too much training on exterior line offensives for quick and decisive battle but too little on defensives to ‘stand up’ to enemy attacks; too much on mobile warfare with advances and fall-backs in big strides, too little on a combination of positional defence, mobile and guerrilla warfare; too much on single service arms training, too little on joint services and combined arms training.95 No wonder an all-army training conference in November 1983 still called for a ‘deepening’ of training reform, even though the new programme had been promulgated two years before.96 A thorough reform to eradicate the Maoist ways would certainly involve the weeding out of the Cultural Revolution’s influence through the sacking of some officers promoted under its guidelines and the promotion of other more deserving cadres. Inevitably, these measures met resistance in the PLA.97 The intensification of political indoctrination to correct the influence of the Gang of Four in the PLA was a convenient diversion of attention and resources from genuine military reform. Such campaigns did not end until the Twelfth CCP Congress in 1982.98 But even more destabilising and disturbing were the consequent purges. When coupled with a series of downsizing measures, ‘job security’ was definitely a concern among PLA cadres. In 1979 and 1980 alone, almost 400,000 cadres left the PLA.99 However, the officer corps was not to take the blame alone. The high command itself did not have a clear vision in responding to modern warfare. The strategists were keen to pick up and learn from foreign military experiences but were unable to formulate a new doctrine for their

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own army based on those experiences. ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’, as argued earlier, was at best a signal of a departure from the Maoist legacy and a return to something resembling PLA orientations in the 1950s. There were indeed signs of interest and research in local war – and an obvious break from the guerrilla warfare model. However, it was not until 1985 when the CMC announced a complete reassessment of the security environment that the studies of this military-technical component of military doctrine fully intensified.100 Speaking at an all-army working conference on training in late 1984, Han Huaizhi, then assistant to the Chief of General Staff, demarcated several key problems: (1) a narrow knowledge base; (2) training which still fell short of the requirements of combined arms and joint operations; and (3) modern operational art and tactics not practised actually in training.101 Learning was a critical problem which could not be solved by simple streamlining and personnel changes. PLA officers, after years of neglecting professional military education and research, were, not surprisingly, out of step with the development of modern warfare and combined arms operations. Even though they were keen to carry out training according to the book, their limited knowledge prevented them from doing a proper job. For example, the navy adopted an offshore doctrine in place of coastal defence to reflect a different view and interest in ‘maritime security’. The term was used but may not have been understood, even among China’s rank-and-file strategists.102 Reforms driven by ideational factors can be successfully implemented only when an idea is grasped and digested before being translated into actions and policies.

Conclusion Because of Mao’s tendencies to aggrandise ‘guerrillaism’, human factors were placed above hardware, masses above regular forces, comradeship above formal command and control, mobile warfare above positional defence, protracted war above quick, decisive battles, strategic interior line operations above interior line, and in-depth defence above offensive. The ideational factor had marred the PLA’s readiness for tasks other than fighting a total war. Despite China’s breakthroughs in strategic weapons development, military hardware was relegated to a secondary position. ‘Deterrence’ was a vague concept, leaving military outcomes to a protracted defensive war of numbers, but this model soon became outdated as modern warfare evolved. Deng Xiaoping’s generation of leaders was keen to consolidate and boost China’s position as a major power in the international security system.103 ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ was given substance by China’s adoption of an active defence strategy which comprised the military-technical component of that doctrine. This set the terms for which

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the PLA was to make ready. Structurally, the army had to change not only its hardware but also its mix of forces. Operationally, it had to upgrade and emphasise training while streamlining its chain of command. But an incomplete doctrine led to incomplete reform. By the mid1980s the Chinese leadership was still preoccupied with fighting a total war. Campaigning was addressed but never conceived of as a separate issue; it was always viewed as part of an all-out war. Operational offensive and force projection capabilities were still compromised by emphasis on strategic defence. Although the theory of an initial phase of war addressed the time dimension of warfare, the Chinese focus on positional defence and protracted war inevitably gave structural readiness preference over operational readiness. Only when the CMC bestowed upon the local war doctrine its official blessing in 1985 did the PLA become more flexible and versatile in the preparation for fighting modern wars which are characterised by spatial and temporal uncertainty, and by the quest for quick and decisive victories.

5

The advent of local war

If the doctrine in the first decade after Mao resembled that put into effect during the early 1950s, this proved not to be true after 1985. Instead of sustaining the Maoist People’s War, Chinese military thinking evolved into generating a new doctrine of local war. The People’s War reflected thinking about war and security as a matter of survival; local war was a matter of power. This is not to say that the communist regime in mainland China after 1985 regards the problem of national survival as solved, but that it no longer views an external security threat to China as ‘imminent’. At an enlarged Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in 1985, the PLA’s high command announced a force reduction of one million servicemen and other streamlining measures. Thereafter, China entered a stage of ‘army building in peacetime’, anticipating that any conflict would not be general invasion by an external adversary but localised clashes over contending national interest. While this change in threat perception was, beyond doubt, significant enough to precipitate doctrinal change, the most important reason was the post-Mao leadership’s – and especially Deng Xiaoping’s – new approach to improving China’s military power. In Deng’s own words, ‘even though the international situation deteriorates, this force reduction would remain necessary and more necessary’, because it was a way to enhance military capability.1 According to state-centric realism, this decision to improve self-help capability is simply logical in an anarchic international system. This change has proven to be critical. The PLA shifted its objective and mission from an initial defensive-building posture designed to fight a total war of survival to one more offensive in nature in order to enhance power and assert national interests. During its early years, China could only resort to a strategy of the weak – protracted war. Mass was important to overcome initial damage as well as to eventually overwhelm the enemy. Local war, by contrast, emphasises time and efficiency. It calls for a quick response to seize or regain the initiative because conflicts could erupt at short notice and last for only a short time. With this doctrine, operational readiness tops the priority list. However, it should be noted that the 1985 doctrinal change signified

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only the first phase of a longer doctrinal evolution. It was a clear departure from the Maoist way of warfare but it did not yet offer a crystallised vision: the intensity, duration and form of localised wars. The Gulf War served to confirm to the Chinese that technology had reshaped the battlefield. Not surprisingly, when debates on military technology and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) were revived in the West in the 1990s, they captured the attention of the PLA. But these debates also shocked PLA commanders into the realisation that they had not yet applied RMA to the Chinese situation in a systematic way. This chapter will examine PLA structural and operational readiness as a result of doctrinal changes after the mid-1980s. It will assess how the PLA has adapted its force mix and size as well as training and command and control (C2) to execute such changes. It will examine the actual operationalisation of this new doctrine, particularly at the operational and tactical level. Ambition, of course, should not be confused with capability. This is precisely where doctrine relates to the question of what constitutes military power. The Chinese military has tried very hard to close the gap between potential and actual military capability as envisioned by the local war doctrine. However, the limitation of the doctrine itself in dealing with a spectrum of conflicts and escalation scenarios has restricted Chinese military readiness to a range of contingencies.

The local war doctrine As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1979 conflict with Vietnam shocked the Chinese military as to how deficient PLA capabilities were in relation to modern warfare. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Falkland/Malvinas War in 1982 further demonstrated how future wars would be fought by modern armies more prepared than the PLA to embrace these complexities. These episodes of local war aroused keen interest among PLA strategists. In fact, the PRC never lacked experience in fighting local wars. According to a list compiled by a Chinese researcher, the PLA fought thirteen local wars between 1945 and 1985, including the civil wars against the Nationalists and counter-insurgency operations in Tibet.2 Beyond that period, the most significant incident is probably the Chinese naval clash with Vietnam in 1988 over the Spratlys. A cursory review would show that Chinese local wars had varied substantially in their intensity. The civil wars of 1946 to 1949 and the Korean War of 1950 to 1953 were at the high-intensity end of the spectrum. Low-intensity conflicts included skirmishes with the Soviets in the 1960s. Although the forces employed by the PLA have been predominantly infantry, recent experience reveals a trend moving away from land skirmishes to maritime clashes and from the north to the east and south. This tendency is manifested in the evolution of China’s concept of the local war.

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The return to the operational level of war One recent and important study by Chinese military analysts argues that the root of the local war concept may be found in the thinking of such early leaders as Mao Zedong and Ye Jianying. Local wars were products of bipolarity and mutual assured destruction.3 However, while these leaders had some ‘understanding’ of local wars, it was far from precise and substantial. Their contributions were limited in general terms and there was nothing operational in their military thinking. Serious and systematic studies on local wars came only in the 1980s.4 The 1980 edition of the PLA Military Glossary (junyu) defined local wars as ‘wars limited to a certain area’.5 The inadequacies of this definition are evident because it deals with only a geographical dimension. However, fighting at a level short of a total war was already capturing the attention of the PLA’s high command. War planning was no longer locked in at only the strategic level. In the last chapter, the implications of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and the theory of the ‘initial phase of war’ were assessed. Despite China’s ultimate concern that it may be subject to a general invasion, the PLA concentrated upon establishing and sustaining positional defence against surprise attacks in order to allow time for national mobilisation. Combat units were expected to fight independently and the organisation of war-fighting would be at the operational level.6 The return to the operational level of war was clearly demonstrated in the renaissance of campaigning studies and eventual Chinese adoption of a comprehensive local war doctrine. ‘Campaign’ is defined in the 1980s by China’s Encyclopaedia of Military Affairs as: ‘a sum of a series of combats conducted by the army in a particular zone or direction in war and in particular time, as defined in an overall war plan, to achieve part of the war objectives or the general objectives in accordance with the tasks entrusted under strategic considerations’.7 Other Chinese publications broaden this notion by citing additional dimensions. Some specifically mention the conduct of campaigns with the group army as a basic combat unit; some emphasise an intermediate level of fighting between war and combat (zhandou); some underscore the importance of manoeuvre alongside combat.8 While the concept of campaigning is expanding, the study of it is becoming more sophisticated. Because campaigning is a central component of local war, early Chinese treatises on this subject written in the 1950s have recently been dusted off. As early as 1952, the Military Academy under Marshal Liu Bocheng offered China’s first course on campaigning. When the Academy of Military Science was founded in 1957, campaigning was one of its four research departments, alongside those dealing with war history, the theory of war and tactics. The Academy introduced the science of campaigning (zhanyixue) as a component in Chinese military studies (junshi xueshu) and

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revised ten campaigning principles into twelve new ones, which were still regarded as valid in the late 1980s.9 The specific twelve principles are: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Know yourself and your enemy, match subjective guidance with objective reality. Annihilate the enemy, protect yourself. Decide your operational method on the basis of objective assessment. Be agile and flexible, and seize and preserve campaign initiatives. Make war planning and campaigning preparation careful and efficient. Camouflage concentrated forces on a timely basis, and strive for advantageous campaigning deployment. Achieve precise and uninterrupted campaigning coordination. Ensure surprise, and pay special attention to close combat and night combat. Strive for centralised, uninterrupted and efficient campaigning command. Strengthen political work and amplify good combat style. Make efficient use of manpower and materiel in the rear. Grasp every opportunity to rest and replenish the army.10

While these principles may be somewhat abstract, the PLA nevertheless applied them to produce a set reference for conducting campaigns – a text prepared by the Advanced Military Academy, Operational Art (zhanyifa). On the basis of the first 1960 edition, the Academy published a second edition three years later. The latter, instead of focusing on general principles, was obviously more sophisticated in discussing operations in various types of campaigns. The content of the two editions is listed in Table 5.1. Although we cannot review the texts themselves, this table of respective works at least indicates the interests and concerns of the authors. The 1963 edition moved beyond the previous edition which focused more on typologies, principles and other basic concepts in campaigning. Instead, it offered separate chapters on methods of executing campaigns. It was interested in the operational level of war. Another major work produced by the PLA in the 1960s was a draft of The Science of Campaigning (zhanyixue). This draft was never published in final form. Its production was abruptly halted as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Only in 1981 was a revised edition completed. In the mid1980s, yet a third version was prepared for CMC approval. The content includes: • •

Overview: Concepts, characteristics, categorisation and brief history of campaigning Fundamental principles of campaigning

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Table 5.1 A comparison of two editions of Operational Art 1960 Edition

1963 Edition

Chapter 1 Major characteristics and fundamental principles of future national defence wars (weiguo zhanzheng)

Chapter 1 General principles: Major characteristics of campaigns in future national defence wars Fundamentals of campaigning Command in campaigning

Chapter 2 Categorisation of campaigns

Chapter 2 Political work in campaigning

Chapter 3 Roles and tasks of operational army groups

Chapter 3 Offensive campaigning: Mobile campaigns Offensives against enemies in positional defence

Chapter 4 Functions and employment principles of atomic missile weapons in campaigns

Chapter 4 Defensive campaigning: Positional defence Mobile defence Anti-landing

Chapter 5 Command in campaigning Chapter 6 Fundamental issues in political work in campaigning Chapter 7 Comprehensive campaigning support

– –

–

Source: Sun 1990, pp. 191–2.

• • • • • • • •

Operational army group actions in sudden counter-attacks Defensive campaigns Offensive campaigns Campaigning in special terrain and climate Marching and transportation Campaign support Campaign rear works Structure and system of campaign political work.11

Despite their significance in Chinese doctrinal development, these writings were marred by a major drawback: they dealt almost exclusively with campaigning on land and ground forces operations. The air force, navy and Second Artillery are left to develop their own campaigning theories.12 The PLAN development of campaigning theories was not exempt from such disruptions. Given the still strong Russian influence on Chinese naval thinking, the process was stymied by the Anti-Dogmatism movement in

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1958 and was stopped in 1964. However, by and large, ‘coastal defence’ (jin’an fangyu) remained to dominate Chinese naval planning. In the postMao era, the PLAN was able to resume conducting doctrinal studies only under the guidance of a new concept, ‘offshore defence’ (jinhai fangyu). During the early 1980s, the PLAN command, with the apparent blessing of its commander, Liu Huaqing, began to investigate the operational level of naval warfare and linked it to campaigning. A Campaign Theory Research Team was established in the Third Research Office at the Naval Academy Research Department. Publications on campaigning theory by this group and other research institutes also flourished. These included Naval Campaigning Principles (haijun zhanyi gaize), the Science of Naval Campaigning (haijun zhanyixue) and Course Text on Naval Campaigning (haijun zhanyixue jiaocheng).13 As discussed in the previous chapter, the PLAAF doctrinal research had been conducted at a slow pace due to its traditional emphasis on territorial air defence and the entrenched dominance of ground forces within the Chinese military. In its draft on combat operations (zhandou tiaoling) in 1962, for example, the PLAAF was instructed to ‘take the victory of the ground and naval forces as its victory and take these forces as the dominant consideration for coordination’. This posture of apparent PLAAF inferiority was rectified only in the document entitled Air Campaigning (kongjun zhanyixue), produced in 1988. It envisioned the PLAAF as serving ‘general objectives’ (daju) in joint operations and defined its quest for military victory in terms of the achievement of those objectives.14 Little is known about campaigning and doctrinal development in the Second Artillery. Before the researchers in that service arm could produce anything official, their efforts were terminated. Doctrinal research was not resumed until the late 1970s with the establishment of a military art research department. Several documents were published in ensuing years, including the Second Artillery Combat Principles (dier paobing zuozhan gaizhe). Continuous research soon culminated in the publication of Combat Regulations (zuozhan tiaoling) and a work on campaigning in 1984 and 1985 respectively.15 Here, obviously, the course of Chinese doctrinal development in relation to campaigning theory can only be charted in general terms. This brief historical survey has been offered to demonstrate how China has returned (rather than moved forward) from a strategic level of war planning to an operational level. Smaller scale military operations began to receive attention in the immediate post-Mao years despite the crudeness and rudimentary framework of such discussions. No more imminent world wars The studies on campaigning have bridged the conceptual gap, as it previously existed in China, between the conduct of a total war and local war.

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Although the Chinese had inherited an interest in the operational level of war from the Russians, Maoist People’s War doctrine overshadowed it. Wars were regarded by the Chairman and his cohorts as life-and-death struggles. However, the resurrection of campaigning helped Chinese military leaders to use the PLA in dealing with threats not necessarily involving state survival but conflicts over national interest which required more assertive military action. Campaigning, however, provides only operational-level doctrinal guidance and lacks the overall directional status. It also drives home a concern for the deficiency of the stop-gap doctrine of the ‘initial phase of war’ which still embraced total war as its focus. The emergence of the ‘national interest’ in Chinese grand strategy and the return of campaigning doctrine, with its emphasis on the operational level, rendered the ‘initial phase of war’ too defensive and its emphasis on resolute positional defence impractical.16 With accelerated national economic development and intensified threat reassessment, the outlook of total war inevitably became obsolete and was gradually replaced by one emphasising local wars. Before local wars were treated as a separate conceptual entity, they were labelled ‘small wars’ or ‘sudden incidents’. Open reference to these types of conflict had been rare prior to 1985. An oft-quoted example was Deng Xiaoping’s speech at a CMC meeting in December 1977 when he was justifying his proposed military reforms: ‘All-out wars could of course be postponed but certain sudden and localised incidents could hardly be predicted’.17 Another occasion was General Yang Dezhi’s explanatory note to the revised draft of the 1984 Military Service Law: ‘The superpowers, in their struggles for world hegemony, have been expanding and committing aggression everywhere. In general, after the World War II, small wars have never stopped’.18 But such statements retained China’s ultimate concern about total wars and failed to make a clear break from Mao’s old concepts – Deng argued that China should prepare for ‘imminent and all-out strikes by the enemy’, and Yang cautioned that the future anti-aggression war would be in the form of large-scale modern warfare.19 The formal doctrinal transition was made at an enlarged CMC meeting in May/June 1985.20 The high command in effect communicated to the world that China had renounced the Maoist doctrine of People’s War and no longer regarded a full-blown world war as an imminent danger. Encoded also in this message was that different military planning and doctrinal formulation would be employed to build up military power. However, the leaders refused to openly acknowledge what the ‘replacements’ would be. It should be noted that Deng and his marshals and generals had referred to ‘large-scale world war’ (daguimo de shijie zhanzheng). This use of terminology, as will be discussed below, hinted at the infancy of the Chinese concept of local war and its differences from Western theories about limited war.

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Local wars? Limited wars? Immediately following the 1985 CMC meeting, lively discussions ensued over local wars in both Chinese open and internal sources. The first booklength publication in the debate was on limited wars by An Tian, an army researcher in the Chengdu military region. The author ascertained differences between local wars (jubu zhanzheng) and limited wars (youxian zhanzheng). But he argued that viewing a ‘local war’ as conflict short of a world war was too loose and vague conceptually, and that the existing Chinese definition of a local war as one ‘limited in a given geographical region’ was insufficient. He treated local war as a category of limited war and devoted most of his study to the ‘limitations’ in war.21 An Tian’s study was heavily influenced by American theories of limited war. His characterisation thus reflected the late development and primitive conceptualisation of the local war in China. Surprisingly, the AMS, in its 1987 internal edition of Encyclopaedia Sinica military affairs volume, implied that there was an equivalent between local war and limited war.22 This definition was not accepted readily by other PLA analysts who preferred to regard it as a separate concept, but there was a common frame of reference – a departure from a world war focus. This is crucial because the spectrum of war is exactly where the concepts of limited war and local war part company. While US strategists prefer one type of two-tier model, namely limited war–total/world war, the Chinese adopt a different two-tier concept: local war–world war.23 First, for the PLA, ‘local total war’ (jubu quanmian zhanzheng) is a legitimate concept but a ‘limited total war’ would be contradictory in the American version of limited war. The logic is that the USA looks from the perspective of its war effort, and any war that requires mobilisation of US total resources would be on a global scale. By contrast, China is more concerned about power asymmetry in war – a limited war for a great power or superpower can be a total war for its weaker adversary. Thus, for example, American intervention in Vietnam is regarded by the USA as a limited war but it is, in Chinese definitions, a local total war for North Vietnam. Second, limited war according to the Chinese conception is subsumed into local war; that is, apart from local total war, there is local limited war (jubu youxian zhanzheng). Local limited war is conducted with ‘control’ as a primary military objective, taking into account means, geographical space and time. Chinese wars with India and Vietnam fall into this category. Third, local war includes ‘armed conflicts’ (wuzhuang chongtu) and ‘sudden incidents’24 (tufa shijian) which constitute local wars of the lowest intensity. The Chinese occupation in 1995 of the Mischief Reef in the South China Sea, which has been claimed by the Philippines, is a good example.25 In sum, Chinese local war consists of three levels of ‘war’: local total war, local limited war and armed conflicts/sudden incidents. The PLA concept of local war is too broad and inclusive. But this

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problem is more administrative than conceptual; it is due to the absence of a declared Chinese military doctrine. It is also due to the relatively loose Chinese use of military terminology. But as the subsequent discourse in Chinese military doctrine illustrates, the PLA has focused on less intense local limited wars and sudden conflicts that are most likely to erupt on China’s border. When the term ‘local war’ is used, it refers to these two levels of local wars.26 Thus, local war in this context remains separate from total war. This is consistent with Deng’s observation cited earlier that China feels less threatened by external invaders than it did during the height of the Cold War. If the local war concept is to provide any doctrinal guidance it has to be more precise, especially in terms of the characteristics and form of operations (zuozhan xingshi).27 In an effort to meet these imperatives, a vicepresident of the AMS, General Mi Zhenyu, identified the following characteristics of Chinese local wars: • • • • •

A threat to China is most likely to be from neighbouring countries and regions. ‘Military struggles’ would be integrated with ‘political and diplomatic struggles’; military operations would be under severe limitation. Border conventional warfare would be the major type of war. The length and scale of war would vary greatly. The war would mainly employ common conventional technologies with little new/high technologies; a nuclear threat would be minimal but cannot be ruled out.28

Most PLA analysts in the late 1980s painted a more or less similar picture. They had no quibbles about the ‘limitations’ in objective, time, geographical space and means, nor did they have any major disagreements over the sources of local wars. However, there was often dissent on this approach to local wars.29 The debate in the late 1980s centred largely on several issues: (1) scale of war; (2) duration of war; (3) the means employed, especially at the technological level; and (4) the continuing validity of traditional forms of operations and, particularly, guerrilla warfare. While there was consensus in China on the meaning of local wars as ‘limited’ wars and sudden incidents, there was none on the exact scale of war. Some PLA analysts focused on small wars, particularly border wars and conflicts.30 Others were more cautious. They argued that wars could follow the pattern of such ‘regional’ interstate conflicts as the Iran–Iraq War of 1980 to 1988 and Afghan resistance to Soviet aggression.31 These two contending groups were therefore hovering on a dividing line between local total wars and local limited wars. In this context, differing views on the scale of war would logically engender different conclusions on the temporal dimension of local wars. The duration of war was probably the most sensitive and important topic

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in the debate. The ‘quick-and-decisive’ school of thought was challenging the traditional three-stage view of war – strategic offensive, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive. Local wars would be of such short duration that the division into stages would have less meaning.32 Those adhering to this view posed the most radical departure from the Maoist People’s War and ‘initial phase of war’ theory. It must be recalled that even the doctrinal revisions sparked off by Su Yu and Ye Jianying in the late 1970s did not dismiss a protracted war scenario. More conservative analysts, still expecting larger wars, emphasised preparations for protracted war and retained the three-phase-of-war concept.33 Two issues – nuclear weapons and technology – constituted the primary basis of contention with regard to the means in local wars. Certainly, no strategist would go so far as to rule out the employment of nuclear arms by enemies, but the argument focused on the degree of probability. Some Chinese theorists were still influenced by the prospect of a Soviet invasion. General Mi Zhenyu, for example, pointed out the possibility of the Russians using tactical nuclear weapons to exploit Chinese weaknesses – China without such weapons would not be able to reply in kind.34 However, other strategists virtually marginalised nuclear warfare. They chose to emphasise the scenarios of conventional war-fighting which, they believed, would dominate future wars.35 Conflicts without nuclear weapons were not tantamount to less intensive warfare because they would still be prosecuted with the extensive use of high-technology weapons. Such advanced technology platforms as guided weapons, artificial intelligence weapons, directed energy weapons and those deployed in space would shape future battlefields.36 A small school of thought, however, dissented from this premise. It expected the predominant weapons systems in future wars to be in the ‘ordinary’ range with only a small number of high-technology capabilities involved.37 Underlying the debate over technology was an even more fundamental question: Would China fight from an inferior or superior strategic position? Again, the dividing line was demarcated on the basis of threat scenarios. Those who expected that China’s future wars would be fought against superpowers insisted that the traditional policy of defeating a superior enemy with inferior equipment (yilie shengyou) would remain valid.38 On the contrary, if China faced a weaker neighbouring country, the PLA would be in a superior position and should exploit this advantage to defeat its adversary. It should consider possibilities of launching offensives in the ‘initial phase of war’ and be prepared for ‘strategic exterior line’ operations.39 Also under challenge was the traditional three ‘forms of operations’: positional warfare, mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. Some hinted at the need to modify those forms or to develop new ones.40 Those who were focused more on major wars continued to voice their assumptions that the three forms of operation remained valid.41

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In such debates, some adopted more cautious approaches and refused to predict the exact mode in the conduct of local wars, preferring to restrict themselves to the listing of variables. The time frame of conflict, the issue of superiority or inferiority, would all be dependent upon the adversary.42 Still others took the approach of ‘yes . . . but’. While accepting medium and small wars would be major threats to Chinese security, one such strategist urged the PLA to prepare for total war. Even though predicting conventional warfare as a more likely contingency, he insisted that possibilities of using nuclear weapons should be considered. His conclusion was that China needed to build a ‘dual-track’ defence system which was bound to conflict with China’s national strategy and resources allocation priorities.43 Yet, other theorists chose to present both scenarios of local total wars and local limited wars, assessing issues of time frame, and means and forms of operation in their respective contexts.44 The abovecited arguments and divergent views along some critical strategic issues are summarised in Table 5.2. A majority Chinese view gradually emerged out of this doctrinal debate. China should prepare for local limited wars and sudden incidents. The conflicts would be of such short duration that there might not be distinguishable phases of war. Despite nuclear threats being remote, fighting would remain intense due to the employment of weapons of advanced technology. If war did break out, the PLA should strive for quick and decisive solutions by adjusting traditional forms of operation and developing new ones. These views were embodied in the third generation of PLA-combined arms combat regulations of 1988. Operations would not be a roll-back from front to rear but a simultaneous attack at both the front and rear. The previous limited form of infantry–artillery arms combination would

Table 5.2 The PLA debate on the nature of local wars Issues

Views

Duration of war

Great variation Predominantly quick and decisive Prepared for protracted war Interstate regional wars Small wars and sudden incidents Border wars Reminder of possible use of nuclear weapons Emphasis on the use of conventional arms Rare Extensive use of high technologies Inferior to enemy Possibly superior to enemy Dependent on the enemy

Scale of war Means Technological level General position

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expand to include new and more service arms, such as army aviation corps, electronic warfare and air defence units. Under serious challenge were the traditional forms of operations and tactics. The PLA would now aim to achieve quick and decisive victory by emphasising and improving offensive operations, waging in-depth strikes with division-level strength and implementing three-dimensional blockades.45 If the PLA was emancipated from its traditional war-fighting thinking, so was it from concepts of the use of force short of combat. Despite the possession of limited nuclear retaliatory capability, the Chinese army has lagged far behind in developing a deterrence theory and its uses in international relations. The study on deterrence began to pick up only in the 1980s and successfully expanded from strategic nuclear to conventional deterrence. Deterrence During the Cold War, the Second Artillery, given its relative quantitative and qualitative inferiority to commensurate Soviet and US nuclear forces, was assigned very limited functions. As noted in the previous chapter, the use of this service arm was also handicapped by a lack of doctrine. Vague concepts at that time constrained Chinese ballistic missile systems to nominal strategic deterrence and limited nuclear retaliation. When Deng Xiaoping began to reform the military in the late 1970s, he could only put forward an idea of ‘fighting guerrilla warfare with strategic weapons’. Deng adapted Second Artillery operations to Chinese guerrilla warfare experiences – survival and counter-attack.46 This approach did not contribute very much to PLA operations. Possibilities of Soviet employment of tactical nuclear weapons had long been studied by the Chinese, and the PRC’s inability to ‘retaliate in kind’ was also noted. Courses on ‘the use of ballistic missiles at the operational and tactical levels of war’ were organised at the PLA’s National Defence University in the mid-1980s.47 In a 1984 report, the US Defence Intelligence Agency had claimed that China had accrued the capability to produce tactical nuclear weapons.48 It was hardly coincidental that such courses and the undertaking of tactical missile projects of M-9/DF-15 and M-11/DF-11 were started at about the same time.49 Both the doctrinal projects and construction of these missile systems soon proved to be valuable, both for strengthening deterrence (due to retaliatory capability) and implementing defensive and offensive actions. Deterrence in China started initially as a vague concept when thermonuclear devices were included in Chinese arsenals.50 Its appropriate doctrinal position remains controversial. One Chinese study on deterrence records a major debate in 1988 about the applicability of the concept of deterrence for the PRC. Chinese opponents of deterrence reject the concept for three reasons: (1) origin: deterrence had been the core idea of

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the two hegemons’ military strategy; (2) usage (closely related to (1)): it is an instrument by which the two superpowers pursue hegemony; and (3) it conflicts with China’s own foreign policy. But supporters argue that the concept is conducive to preserving peace, and it has Chinese origin in Sun Zi’s thinking of ‘winning a war without fighting’ (buzhan ersheng) and in Maoist nuclear arms programme. Deterrence is thus characterised as a ‘logical product of military force development’ and is independent of subjective disapproval.51 However, the CMC was ready to give its verdict on the concept of deterrence by endorsing it in a document in 1988. As the concept of deterrence was consolidated in China during the late 1980s, it gradually moved beyond the nuclear realm to embrace conventional deterrence, especially air deterrence.52 The first operational use of tactical missiles across the Taiwan Strait in 1995 was intended as a deterrence exercise.

Is the PLA ready? Richard Betts in his book Military Readiness argues cogently that structural and operational readiness may, at times, be at odds. Sustaining constant military alertness and operational proficiency incurs costs and resources that may otherwise be used in weapons procurement. By contrast, structural readiness means resources are concentrated on building and equipping a sizeable force at the expense of operational efficiency.53 This problem was particularly acute in China in the 1970s because Mao and Marshal Lin Biao had attempted an impossible task of maintaining a high level of structural readiness. A solution to this dilemma became clear to post-Mao military leaders when the concept of local war began to prevail in debates about military affairs. This new doctrine required a high level of operational readiness, which emphasised the time factor in war. In consequence, mass-oriented structural readiness which had guided Chinese defence policy during the Maoist years began to fade out. Structural reforms The Chinese answer to the structural-operational readiness dilemma was streamlining and restructuring. The exercise had begun in 1980 and came to a climax in the CMC enlarged meeting in May/June 1985. The key points were summarised in an article by the Campaigning Training Branch of the GSD Military Training Department, ‘Make a Good Effort to Write a History of Our Army’s Brilliant Future’. The essay argues that victory in war for China will be determined by quality, not quantity; defence science and research and industrial development should occupy primary positions in the modernisation agenda; an effective war mobilisation system is necessary for high-intensity warfare in the future; and the development of military art is the key to modernisation.54

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This structural reform programme was reportedly completed by 1987. Its main points of emphasis are summarised as follows: • • • • • •

• • • •

• •

The headquarters of artillery, armour and engineering corps which had been directly under the CMC were placed under the GSD. The GSD Fourth Department was restored to oversee the strengthening of electronic warfare command and capability. New service arms, including the army air corps and electronic warfare units, were created. The eleven military regions were reduced to seven. The Military Academy, Political Academy and Logistics Academy were merged into the National Defence University. Army corps (lujunjun) were reorganised into combined arms group armies (hecheng jituanjun), some of which were reinforced with electronic warfare units. About 4,054 regimental/division-level units and thirty-one army corpslevel units were removed. One million servicemen were scheduled to be demobilised. County-level People’s Armed Forces Departments (in 2,592 units) were transferred to the civilian sector. As a result of the introduction of the non-commissioned officer system, seventy-six officer positions were filled by rank-and-file soldiers; the ratio of officer to soldiers was reduced from 1:2.45 to 1.33; and that in the army was reduced from 1:4 to 1:6.4. Troops responsible for internal security were transferred to the Ministry of Public Security to reinforce the People’s Armed Police. As a result of integration of civil air defence with city planning, a quarter of civil air defence projects were transferred to peacetime use.55

In the following years, the word ‘streamlining’ continued to be heard everywhere within the PLA. According to 1990 statistics, the PLA strength stood at 3,199,100.56 In 1992, another series of force reductions started, though it was not as massive as reported by a pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong. Some twenty military academies and schools were closed down and PLA administrative units were slashed by 50 per cent. The armour, artillery, engineering corps and anti-chemical warfare headquarters were also consolidated into a Service Arms Department which was placed under the GSD.57 At first glance, structural readiness was undermined seriously because the PLA’s loss of manpower was unmistakable. However, it was doctrinal change that engendered the most comprehensive long-term ramifications. As noted in Chapter 4, structural readiness is not simply a matter of size but also of ‘force mix’. Two factors – organisation and hardware – are integral to ‘force mix’ and merit more detailed examination.

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Structural readiness I: Capable army ( Jingbing) China’s ‘capable army’ policy is not restricted to the PLA’s regular army but includes all three tiers of China’s total military force. The revival of the PAP in 1983 to receive redundant PLA personnel and the expansion of the PAP’s mobile units since the mid-1990s were illustrative of trading manpower for selective force strengthening. Paradoxically, PAP weaknesses on the eve of the Tiananmen suppression in 1989 turned out to be a reason for its continued expansion. It was designated as the forces for ‘preserving national security and social stability’. Another component of China’s total force, the militia/reserve system,58 has also experienced dramatic development. One of the Chinese high command’s plans for local war was to ‘supplement a leaner, capable standing army with strong reserve forces’. Following the formation of the first reserve unit in Jinzhou, Liaoning, in 1983, reserve troops officially joined the order of battle three years later. This step of reserve augmentation was justified by the necessity of streamlining the regular army. The reserves would be mobilised in war to reinforce regular units, resupply manpower for war-torn troops, form new units and conduct guerrilla warfare. In peacetime, they were to engage in economic activities, surveillance and ‘social stability’ patrols. The reserve system, in the Chinese traditional way of ‘soldiers residing in civilian communities’ (yujun yumin), was thus a cost-saving approach to conserve war materials and resources.59 Fu Quanyou, then Chengdu military region commander, even suggested that the ratio between the number of standing army and reserve forces should be about 1:5. This calculation was based on a major war scenario.60 But such thinking soon became obsolete on double counts. To begin with, the doctrine of high-technology local wars soon relegated guerrilla warfare to a secondary status vis-à-vis the PLA’s emphasis on offensives and force projection. In fact, the very feasibility of militias conducting this form of operations was questioned.61 Undeniably, the militia/reserve forces have been undergoing reforms and strengthening in terms of management, equipment and training,62 but they remained too far away from achieving truly modern standards. Their poor training and equipment meant that their contribution to future battlefield operations would be very limited. As will be discussed in the next chapter, an interesting turn has taken place since the mid-1990s as the doctrine further evolved. This time, the militia/reserve force was given a new role, though the concern for quality still dominated quantity. The reinforced PAP and militia/reserve force make it possible to maintain a ‘leaner standing army’ for local wars. Despite its smaller size, the PLA’s war-fighting capability has improved due to a more rational structure. The group armies have more specialised troops,63 better firepower and mobility than their predecessors. They are now configured to be an

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elementary unit for campaigning. The reduction in the number of military regions also increases the depth of future war areas.64 Another view of the PLA’s force mix is to emphasise its flexible and versatile force structure. Infantries are losing appeal to military commanders but specialised arms units are gaining popularity. The latter’s proportion in the PLA’s total ground force composition continued to grow, from 60 per cent in 1992 to over 70 per cent four years later.65 Indeed, on a closer look, organisational reforms since the PLA’s initially substantial demobilisation in 1985 have been remarkable: the establishment of the first army aviation group, mountain infantry brigade, meteorology units, the PLAAF’s mixed air defence unit (combining AAA with SAM units) and the PLAN’s nuclear submarine unit and shipborne aviation unit.66 Firepower is also better organised. One of the most consequential force developments is probably the formation of the so-called ‘fist units’ (quantou budui). This concept harnesses mass and striking power as central objectives. ‘Fist unit’ was later replaced by another concept that emphasises mobility and military efficiency – ‘rapid reaction’. Troops with such capabilities to respond efficiently to sudden incidents were designated as ‘rapid reaction units’ (RRUs) (kuaisu fanying budui).67 The Chinese have acknowledged that they borrowed the concept of RRUs from the West. Such troops were created to ‘deal with local wars and sudden incidents’ with subsidiary ‘anti-hijacking, anti-terrorism and anti-riot’ missions.68 Apart from the oft-reported stories about commandotype assaults, reconnaissance and disruptive attacks, they would form the main force for winning small wars and would spearhead PLA efforts in larger conflicts to seize the military initiative. According to Chinese documentation, RRUs correspond to the three levels of war and are linked to the reintroduction of the concept of the war zone (zhanqu).69 Another study argues that the RRUs should constitute about a quarter or one-fifth of standing army in war readiness (zhanbei zhiban) status. Being exempt from economic production obligations that are common to PLA units, their duty is strictly to train and fight.70 Following the formation of a pilot unit, ‘quick operation battalion’, in Lanzhou military region in 1985, the RRU experiment quickly multiplied. In the late 1980s, airborne troops, the marines, Tianjin Garrison Command, Guangzhou, Nanjing and Jinan military regions already had their RRUs.71 Structural readiness II: Effective equipment (liqi) Throughout most of the postwar years, maintenance of old equipment and feeding a large number of soldiers had consumed a huge share of the PLA’s limited funding and left little for new hardware acquisition. To break this vicious cycle, the high command could only resort to downsiz-

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ing. A study in 1990 estimated that the one-million men streamlining would save the government 2.14 billion yuan of living expenses; another in 1996 argued that a cut by 500,000 soldiers plus a proportional decrease in the arsenal would save 45 billion yuan in living, fuel and equipment costs over five years.72 The economic calculation is clear enough, although demobilisation is not cost-free and is far from being a panacea.73 Despite manpower streamlining, the PLA’s procurement of equipment in the 1980s was slow and was mainly characterised by ‘window shopping’.74 This process was further hampered by Western arms transfer embargoes after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. Even though China has gradually mended its relations with the West, human rights and related issues (such as Taiwan and Tibet) remain too heated to allow uninhibited military ties to evolve.75 Paradoxically, it was not until China formally repaired relations with its former adversary, the Soviet Union, in the late 1980s and witnessed the latters’ eventual collapse that a window of opportunity was opened for the PLA to import modern military hardware to support its ‘capable army’ ambition with ‘effective equipment’. Before imports narrowed the gap between China’s weapons inventory and those of advanced countries, China was forced to be ‘self-reliant’. There were no major breakthroughs in R&D other than those discussed in Chapter 4. Continuing military modernisation has not brought about substantial expansion of China’s arsenal; on the contrary, the quantity of Chinese arms has been diminishing. The quality of Chinese armaments is the proper focus of analysis. For example, the PLAN lost about 290 vessels while acquiring thirty-five in 1989 to 1993; this trend continued in the demobilisation plan of 1997, by which the number of aircraft in the air force was slashed from 4,500 to 1,000. But the new weapons have enhanced the PLA’s mobility and power projection capability and extended its combat range, since improved quality is expected to compensate for lost quantity. Obsolete equipment is either mothballed, transferred to paramilitary forces or written off.76 The PLA’s force mix has been restructured to remedy many chronic weaknesses which, without importing foreign technology, the Chinese themselves would take a long time to resolve. The hardware programmes have been driven by a local war doctrine that stresses the importance of quick and decisive military victory.77 The PLA is closer to realising that doctrinal objective but the major hurdle remains how to make these newly acquired weapons operational in the context of doctrinal mandate.78 Operational readiness I: Training Immediately following the jettison of ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’ thinking by the aforementioned 1985 CMC enlarged meeting, PLA training embarked upon the task of integrating local wars with the operational level of war. An all-army conference on campaigning and the opening of

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the PLA’s first combined arms tactical training centre in the Nanjing military region in 1988 signalled the start of this process. Pilot units and experimental programmes were quickly set up.79 By the late 1980s, all three service arms had shifted the emphasis of training from the skills of individuals and single branch combat to combined arms campaigning.80 This training reform came to a climax in 1988, coinciding with a landmark in PLA doctrinal development – the publication of the third generation of its combat regulations. A series of campaigning exercises were organised in most of the military regions and service arms. West-88 was conducted in Lanzhou military region, Advance-88 Shenyang military region, Guangzi-15 Guangzhou military region and Severe Cold-88 Beijing military region. These exercises aimed to test the PLA’s capability of conducting combined arms operations and to respond swiftly to local wars and ‘sudden accidents’ on the border.81 The PLA’s training fervour was abruptly dampened by the Tiananmen Incident in June 1989. The impact of this event on military proficiency was important but should not be exaggerated. Although political indoctrination was indeed rekindled and intensified, the focus was really on political control – reasserting Party control over the PLA. This was the unmistakable message from political work conferences and the CMC enlarged meeting shortly after the Incident. The issue at stake was more a matter of civil–military relations than ideological education per se.82 After Jiang Zemin took over the CMC chairmanship in November 1989, his guidance for PLA political work – disseminated in his ‘five statements’ in 199083 and his speech at the Fifth Plenum of the CCPCC in 1995 on ‘studying politics’ – focused on securing army loyalty to its Party boss.84 Chinese leaders also reiterated that the threat to China’s survival was political – ‘Westernisation’ and peaceful evolution (heping yanbian). Arguments that the PLA’s ‘internal tasks’ (duinei zhineng) included quelling social unrest proved polemical because the militia and, in particular, the PAP were strengthened mainly for such ‘tasks’. The only significance of duinei zhineng was to accentuate the army’s role in preserving state sovereignty.85 Military training was brought back on track when the PLA was relieved of martial law tasks in Beijing in January 1990 and a new generation of military training guidelines was published the following month.86 If the ‘Tiananmen interlude’ still cast any shadow over PLA development, these were dispelled in 1991. The training programme of 1989 soon came under re-examination when the Gulf War demonstrated a new pattern of modern warfare, for which China was largely unprepared. In 1993, the same year when the CMC reportedly decided on the objective of ‘winning local war under high-technology conditions’, the PLA launched a three-year training reform programme.87 This was intensified two years later when the military reforms were concluded with extensive live-munitions exercises rarely seen on such a large scale and the issuing of a new Military Training Programme.88

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As Blasko, Klapakis and Corbett aptly point out,89 pilot schemes and units formed the foundation for most of the PLA’s contemporary training reforms.90 All this has been closely related to the operational methods debate. Units were selected to test a particular method in particular warfighting situations, such as anti-reconnaissance, anti-air attack, anti-airborne and manoeuvre operations. Some of the units participated directly in the drafting of the new training programme. When these reforms were successfully implemented, the units sent out demonstration detachments to standardise training throughout the PLA.91 Joint and combined arms operations are bound to be the main component of PLA training in order to meet the challenges of modern local wars. The 1989 Training Programme, despite its recognition of the importance of combined arms operations, allowed individual training to occupy 54.8 per cent of the training time and emphasised basic combat skills. On the contrary, regimental/divisional-level combined arms training took up only 11 per cent of the time. The rationale was: while combined arms operations were the ‘guiding thought’, basic training established firm foundations. But all this was subsequently changed when the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the obvious potency of combined arms and joint operations and the urgency to imitate. The next Military Training Programme of 1995 indicated the PLA’s determination to catch up. ‘Jointness’ was emphasised as the key to winning wars. The training of the army, navy, air force, Second Artillery, the then COSTIND and the PAP was unified under an all-army training system. Combined arms tactics were now a major requirement for even basic units. Joint training was facilitated by infrastructural support. A joint service training centre for the army, navy and air force began operating in 1993 on an island in the Yellow Sea.92 Even more remarkable changes were to be found in the PLA’s emphasis on confrontational training. This echoes its leadership’s call for more realism and ‘training for war’ (lian wei zhan). In the late 1980s, the PLA had only one permanent ‘blue forces’93 unit for confrontational exercises at the Combined Arms Tactical Training Centre in Nanjing military region, but this later became common practice. For example, the Shenyang military region organised its first ‘blue’ division in 1994 and eventually formed one such division for every group army. The Beijing military region also formed its ‘blue forces’ for simulation.94 But, before the PLA could redress its bias for the ‘red forces’ and abandon its practice of staged exercises, confrontational training would not be realistic enough to give it any benefits. The same may be said about another development training method, which, despite these problems, should be of great value to PLA training. As China developed its computer technology, training began to be blessed by the applications of cost-effective simulation software and

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facilities. Worth particular mention is the CMC’s approval in 1992 of a combined arms army campaigning simulation system. A product of six years’ research, it incorporates computer simulation and artificial intelligence technology for the training of operational art principles for both offensive and defensive campaigns. It simulates the balance of forces, use of service arms and branches, terrain restrictions, meteorological factors, equipment and munitions technicalities and consumption, casualty, and logistics support. The CMC also mandated that, by the year 2000, all operations commands were to be supported by simulators.95 As of 1997, the PLA’s simulation equipment reportedly covered all service arms, ranging from the bridge of Type 053H2G destroyer to anti-tank shooting systems. Simulation training has also expanded from techniques to tactical and operational levels.96 Although the PLA has made tremendous efforts to improve proficiency by an overhaul of its training, problems continue. One of the biggest concerns is the management and standardisation of training. Although regularisation has been a main component of military reform since the late 1970s and the high command was determined enough to promulgate the PLA’s Military Training Regulations (xunlian tiaoling) in 1990, the quality of training still varied greatly. Some deliberately lowered the standard while others simply failed to understand the training requirements.97 Another problem is associated with the Chinese system of combining conscription and voluntary military services.98 After serving their terms conscripts would be discharged or would apply for transfer to the status of volunteers. Given the number of conscripts, the army is always kept busy with recruits and personnel of mixed proficiency. Some units began to experiment with the method of ‘mixed formation, separate training’: firstyear soldiers learn skills in operating weapons; second-year soldiers, tactical skills; third-year soldiers, section-level command.99 It is still unknown to what extent this experiment succeeded and how widely it was applied. This raises yet another chronic dilemma in training – basic training versus tactics. The PLA has long been plagued by low-level training. Constantly coping with new recruits is one reason, regularly adjusting to new equipment another. It takes time for officers and soldiers alike simply to learn how to operate incoming hardware properly. The 1990 Training Programme did not correct the PLA’s traditional bias towards basic and technical training. Less time was allocated to more advanced level training – combined arms training. The PLA had to wait for the next generation of the military training programme to address these deficiencies.100 Operational readiness II: Command and control At a meeting in early 1982, the CMC resolved to reintroduce military ranks. In 1988, the PLA’s high command tabled to the National People’s Congress regulations for a new ranking system and military services of

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active duty soldiers, and these were approved.101 This was a major step towards restoring a smooth chain of command in the Chinese army. But a no less important development had taken place two years before when the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps was established. In the same year, two NCO schools were founded and classes were organised in forty-two military academies; seventy-six occupations, formerly at commissioned officers rank, were to be filled by NCOs.102 The NCO corps has been a demobilisation measure to relieve redundant personnel, but it turns out to have facilitated better implementation of the local war doctrine by providing efficient command and control at the lower echelons. This is particularly important in modern warfare which requires initiative and flexibility in the fast-changing battlefield. Technologically, the PLA reportedly began command automation in the late 1970s and the programme has been within the purview of the GSD’s Command Automation Bureau. However, progress was made only in the 1980s. The first all-army command automation work station began operations only in 1986 and, in the same year, the second phase which introduced the PLA to the automation of text and combat graphics transmissions and intelligence data searches went to trial. In general, the Chinese army was still at a preliminary stage of automation. Its programmes included mainly computerisation of statistics, word processing and communication, automation in the storage management and materiel reception and delivery of logistical support, military transport planning and related data processing. Command automation applications to combat were even less remarkable. When the 1991 Gulf War, which was regarded by the PLA as the first major war in the information age, broke out, an artillery battery of the Beijing military region was holding automated firing demonstrative drills. In the following year, the PLA’s first generation of field air defence C3I system was only ready for trial use.103 China’s backward military command and control capacity was set to hamper the effectiveness of applying military power in the battlefield.

Conclusion This chapter has expanded the readiness model established in Chapter 2 to analyse the implications of China’s local war doctrine for its readiness for modern wars. Chinese military doctrine, as an ideational factor, serves as a constant to guide the development of two major variables: army structure and operations. The 1990s witnessed the fruition of a long and arduous process of Chinese military doctrinal evolution. The adoption of a local war doctrine has been a watershed in the process of development on at least two counts. One is that China has been liberated from the minimal security concern of survival to adopt a more assertive posture based on national interests. Chinese military doctrine is thus now more outward-looking.

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The other relates to the pattern of war as perceived by the Chinese military. It is not simply a local war doctrine but one that anticipates unpredictable, intense and short conflicts. To execute this doctrine, the PLA has revamped its structure and operations to harness its offensive capability to conduct military actions outside the Chinese mainland.104 The restructuring of its force mix is producing a mass of higher density. Operational reforms in training and C2 are facilitating movement with higher speed and over greater distances. These are the requirements to be met by any modern army for achieving greater offensive capabilities. However, despite the Chinese effort, doctrinal development in the 1990s has far outpaced structural and operational reforms. However, continuous doctrinal breakthroughs would be necessary. As many PLA analysts noted, the battle space has been expanding in the information age. The frontiers of the battlefield are also no longer clear. While the Chinese army is making sense of these changes and managing to modify its doctrine accordingly, there is an inherent danger and dilemma of how to keep its material part matching the ideational lead. A conventional option is copying. As Kenneth Waltz observes, successful precedents in the application of military doctrine are naturally emulated by others.105 Of course, the PLA’s experience was no exception. However, it eventually realised that emulation would keep itself behind advanced countries and, at best, close the gaps with the latter. To ensure victory in future wars, the Chinese military should manage some sorts of counter-measures. The ideas of asymmetric warfare, developing some ‘trump card weapons’ (sashoujian),106 and leapfrog force development thus began to gain attention as the wars fought since 1991 have demonstrated convincingly the defenceless of inferior armies in front of their technologically superior adversaries. In Chapter 6, we will examine how China is building its military power ready for the information age.

6

‘High-technology local wars’ and beyond

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Falkland/Malvinas War in 1982 and the US air strike against Libya in 1986 are regarded by the Chinese military as prime examples of applying high technology in war and are studied assiduously. But, in their eyes, the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the potency of high-technology weapons and ushered in still another generation of warfare. The war signalled the increasing salience of RMA and inevitably triggered yet another round of debate within the PLA. It was not until the ramifications of the Gulf conflict were assessed and understood that a consensus again emerged within the Chinese military leadership. Then, in 1993, the period of the new doctrine of ‘high-technology local wars’ officially began. It is not simply ‘local wars’ that pose challenges to the Chinese military, but those fought with ‘high-technology’ means. Technology becomes the niche with which all aspects of military affairs are linked. In line with the trend of military reforms since the 1980s, the PLA continues to shed numbers and reform its force mix, favouring the so-called specialised technical components. It continues to take structural reform measures to enhance its operational efficiency. Command automation and ‘training with scientific and technological means’ (keji lianbing) and other operational reforms become the landmark of the era. During this period, the Kosovo War of 1999 and the Iraq War of 2003 have added more classical examples of warfare in the information age and provided the PLA with more lessons to be learned.1 Paradoxically, as the doctrine of ‘high-technology local wars’ evolves, it begins to take a different look at the People’s War which it superseded. As the following analysis will show, the high demands for knowledge and material support as well as the fast pace and expanding dimensions, scopes, and means of modern warfare expose the deficiency of the standing army. In light of specific scenarios, especially Taiwan Strait conflict scenarios, the capability gap is even more obvious. As a result, the ‘People’s War’ begins to attract fresh interest and to assume new meaning. Reforms of the militia and reserve forces and the mobilisation system also regain the attention of defence policy planners. At the operational level of war, the military leaders also see a new form

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emerging. Joint operation, which not long ago replaced combined arms operation as the main form of operation, is about to be taken over by its own refined version – systemic integrated joint operation (yitihua lianhe zuozhan) – to reflect the increasing informationisation of warfare. Accordingly, PLA military training and structure are set to begin reforms.

‘Local wars under modern conditions, especially hightechnology conditions’ The PLA viewed the Gulf War of 1991 – one of largest multinational military operations since the Korean and Vietnam conflicts – with great alarm.2 This conflict was between armies prepared to fight two different wars. The Iraqis planned to fight a typical industrial-age, or the so-called Second Wave, war which relied on mass and aimed at physical destruction (a combat approach not far removed from the PLA’s own traditional posture). However, the US-led coalition forces waged an information-age, or Third Wave, war, which centred on knowledge. It was information, not so much firepower, that made the weapons do their jobs.3 For the Chinese army, that meant more. As Harlan Jencks has since observed, the Iraqi military anticipated a People’s War under modern conditions. It was a land power, boasting a quantitative superiority over coalition forces and an advantage in the ‘human factor’. Iraqi planning had a lot in common with traditional PLA thinking.4 The Iraqis counted on an in-depth positional defence and, seemingly, a protracted war that would deter and, if necessary, wear down the enemy. They had never renounced the use of chemical weapons and had the advantage of threatening to escalate the conflict by drawing the Israelis into the war.5 They calculated that they could ‘defeat their superior adversary with inferior equipment’ but they were finally routed. The quick collapse of Iraqi defence was unexpected and galvanised the PLA into fervently studying the latest developments in the West’s airpower and air defence that were critical to its success in defeating the Iraqi ‘People’s War’ in the Gulf. Towards an official doctrine A survey of PLA writings shortly after the 1991 War reveals great interest in the use of and defence against airpower. One article defended the ‘godfather of airpower’, Giulio Douhet, against allegations of ‘airpower decisiveness’ by ‘clarifying’ his command of the air theory. Others have looked at the implications of the massive use of air assets, the concept of air deterrence, beyond-visual-range and in-depth strike capability, the changing force ‘mix’ and the versatility of airpower.6 Some Chinese strategists focused on the limitations of existing air defence systems, the strategic importance of defence against air raids and the concept of territorial

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air defence. Two major points distinguished this line of analysis from that of the 1980s. First, it accentuated the necessity for defence against not only aircraft but also missiles and electronic warfare. Second, it enthusiastically took on the concept of what was termed the ‘system effect’, advocating the establishment of an air defence system that would integrate airborne early warning, command and control, weapons, air bases networking and combat support subsystems.7 These changes testified how high technologies have reshaped the battlefield. At the same time, heated debates were conducted through the publishing of a series of books by China’s National Defence University Press on high-technology warfare. The chairman of the editorial board was the then President of the National Defence University, General Zhu Dunfa. Writers included both army academics and field officers.8 In eighteen volumes, the series covered topics from army building to hardware, campaigning and stratagem to camouflage and logistics. Other think-tanks made their contribution by organising research projects or by publishing papers of their analysts.9 Among other major topics that have dominated Chinese military writing since the Gulf conflict is the defence of Mao Zedong military thought. The challenges of high-technology warfare are real; they inevitably cast doubts on the continuing relevance of traditional military precepts. Yet the Chinese high command’s immediate response was to run courses and saturate the press with articles affirming the paramount position of Mao’s military dictums.10 Despite these political considerations, calls for further reforms have begun to emerge. One of the important essays was written by General Mi Zhenyu, then deputy commandant of the Academy of Military Science. He quoted Deng Xiaoping, arguing that science and technology were the key to national defence modernisation, and that weapons and equipment are the focus. The general also urged a flexible application of strategic principles, distinguishing, with the yardstick of historical materialism, those relevant doctrinal maxims from those which were not.11 On other occasions, the top PLA brass have encouraged study of the ‘modern conditions’ of local wars and the creation of new operational methods on the basis of traditional war-fighting experience. The emphasis has been on the evolution of military thinking and the new characteristics of modern warfare.12 All of these developments may be attributed to the immense impact the Gulf War had on Chinese doctrinal perceptions. Such ‘brainstorming’ has culminated in an official response by sanctioned doctrine. In a CMC meeting chaired by Jiang Zemin in early 1993, the leadership decided that the PLA should be prepared to win ‘local wars under modern conditions, especially high-technology conditions’ (xiandai jishu tebeshi gaojishu tiaojian xia de jubu zhanzheng).13 The ‘high-technology local war’ was defined by an esteemed group of PLA researchers as ‘armed contests between high-technology battle

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systems which control weapons systems of modern production technological level and are capable of conducting war with commensurate operational methods. Such elements as war objectives, targets, war-fighting capability, space and time are limited’.14 Local wars may be classified by the units involved: inter-coalitions (e.g. the Korean War, 1950 to 1953), inter-state (e.g. the Iran–Iraq War, 1980 to 1988), regional inter-state (e.g. Indo– Pakistan conflicts over Kashmir), and intra-state (e.g. the China Civil War).15 Many conferences were held shortly afterwards. One of these was organised in mid-1993 by the JFJB ‘Military Forum’ column, Junshi Zhanwang (Military Outlook) and a group army in Lanzhou military region. The participants more or less agreed upon the following principles: (1) electronic warfare has become an independent campaign; (2) air raid and anti-air raid has become the dominant operational form; (3) C3I is the key to military victory; and (4) armed helicopters have replaced tanks as the main targets in land warfare.16 In studying the impact of high technology on war, the PLA tried to make sense of all these changes and to project what lay ahead. Its researchers eventually came to realise that a RMA had begun. Revolution in military affairs Another topic emanating from the Gulf conflict that has caught the attention of the Chinese army is the implications of technology for future wars. Chinese analysts have since then followed closely the ongoing debate over RMA in the West. In late 1996, the Military Science Publishing House, the publishing arm of the AMS, launched a new series of books, Junshi Xinshiye (New Military Horizons). This was devoted to assessing RMA, its causes, characteristics and impact on operations, technology, C3I and army structure as well as offering more general perspectives on post-Cold War security.17 Similar to how they have treated new topics in the past, Chinese military researchers have adopted a detached stance in such discussions. There is little reference to China’s own situation. These books do little more than introduce new ideas and initiate debates. While there may be dissension over the origin and periodisation of RMA, it is generally agreed that the 1991 Gulf War reveals a fundamentally different pattern of war and operational form and thus calls attention to the current RMA. Most analysts focus on the impact of technology. In a book project that claims to have received the blessing of many senior field officers and major professional military educational institutes, a group of AMS researchers define RMA as ‘special social activities, following the generational development of weapons and equipment, that initiate fundamental changes in military organisation, methods of operations, and military theories and eventually cause qualitative changes in the state of military affairs’. RMA, being a process, is yet to reveal its complete form and nature and would accomplish its mission only when this state

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becomes dominant in the world. However, they contend, RMA has its dynamics in the contests of power. The new international security environment, economic globalisation and the integration of war-fighting and nonwar-fighting actions have placed new demands on military affairs while modern technologies provide facilitating conditions.18 Thus RMA is not all about technology. As General Fu Quanyou, the then PLA Chief of General Staff from 1995 to 2002 (during which time RMA research began to flourish in China), argues, military theoretical innovation is the precursor and spirit of RMA and directs RMA development.19 RMA is understood to have systemic effects, raising the importance of information, knowledge and intelligence in the whole military system. In light of weapons and equipment, the most striking change is in its increasing ‘intelligence’. RMA anticipates more extensive use of informationised and more ‘intelligent’ platforms, precision-guided munitions, and command automation systems in digitalised battlefields and multi-dimensional battle space, and further development of electronic equipment. It equally seeks more intelligent and knowledgeable military personnel in smaller and modular modes of military organisation. Services and arms are expected to be more integrated and new ones to emerge. Military command will be joint and move towards a flat network style. As with the conduct of war, information operations, joint operations and beyondvisual-range strikes will become basic operational methods. These should be guided by innovative theories which will be based upon a reappraisal of the forces applied in the battlefield and increasing compression of the three levels of war. While these concern war-fighting, it is realised in the PLA that military operations will need intensive logistics support.20 In response to these challenges, the Chinese high command began to adopt a series of reforms and measures to apply RMA to its own army under the rubric of Jiang Zemin’s call for ‘strengthening the army with science and technology’ (keji qiangbing). These will be analysed in the following sections. But one element – information – stands out; information technology is identified as the driving force behind this RMA. Some PLA analysts appropriately label this RMA as ‘informationised military revolution’.21 Again, the CMC under Jiang Zemin managed to show direction. In December 2000 it adopted a leapfrog development strategy – ‘accelerating military informationisation while undergoing mechanisation’ – known as the ‘double historical mission’ (shuangchong lishi renwu) to the PLA.22 This immediately acknowledges increasing importance of information in future warfare and demonstrates a will to catch up by devising an ‘unconventional’ army-building model. While it admits the PLA’s technological weaknesses, it suggests a strategy of developing pockets of excellence in key aspects, hoping to boost the overall military capability.23 As the following discussion shows, battlefield informationisation, though exposing Chinese military weaknesses, is deemed by the high command and PLA analysts as compatible with an asymmetric strategy.

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Information(ised) warfare As the PLA learns more from the war examples and its own drills and studies, it begins to accumulate a better understanding of what constitutes a high-technology local war. The Chinese military researchers are keenly aware of the potency of technology when it is applied to the battlefield, especially in temporal and spatial terms. After years of research, the definition of ‘high-technology local war’ basically holds only with some refinements. Among these are the expansion from electronic warfare to information warfare and the emphasis on the impact of information technology on military affairs. Information warfare is so attractive to the Chinese because it gives them hope of projecting power that their hardware fails to reach and promises opportunities of enjoying asymmetric advantages, especially in targeting an informationising US army, which is a major potential adversary. In addition, asymmetric capability is regarded as the key to prevail in future wars.24 Even though PLA analysts identify the importance of information and ‘controlling’ the electromagnetic field, they fail to articulate the interactions between the means and ends of information, or to integrate information warfare into local war. Instead, information warfare is treated almost as a separate topic. There is no consensus over how to position information warfare as a new generation or category of warfare or, in Chinese terminology, a new ‘pattern of war’ (zhanzheng xingtai). This probably shows their uncertainty over the execution and implications of information warfare. Confusion over the concept of information warfare lingers on even more than ten years after the 1991 Gulf War was fought.25 This ‘information warfare’ controversy is not surprising for two main reasons, apart from the lack of standardised conception down to units of all levels. First, the Chinese army seems to anticipate ‘informationised warfare’ (xinxihua zhanzheng), instead of ‘information warfare’ (xinxi zhanzheng). In Chinese conception, informationised warfare acknowledges the increasing importance of information and related technology in war. It is characterised by enhanced weapons capability and effectiveness by information technology, extensive use of information technology in the battlefield, especially concerning C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), a redefinition of battle space and form of war participation, especially the use of non-professional combat personnel. While information technology dominates in the conduct of war and information is critical to effective execution of war, information warfare is still short of replacing high-technology warfare and is only one of the patterns of war, such as mechanised warfare. As is understood by the PLA, a pattern of war is based on contemporary socio-economic means of production and reflects a society’s level of productivity. Future warfare may simply be a mix of

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several patterns of war, depending on the socio-economic and technological level of the society and military involved.26 Second, and no less important, the PLA and civilian researchers in related expertise are obviously more interested in information operations (xinxi zuozhan or xinxi zhan) because, as some analysts argue, this form of operations (zuozhan yangshi) occurs at the early stage of informationisation.27 When the Academy of Military Science Strategic Studies Department updates its text on strategic studies and the National Defence University writing team publishes a revised edition on campaigning, they give information operations, not information warfare, special attention.28 It may be said that the Chinese military may regard information as an essential but not a sufficient element to describe the type of warfare that may confront China in future.29 Moreover, information operations are thought to permeate all three levels of war and there have been studies in information operations at individual levels. This is only natural, since the PLA is moving steadily towards operationalisation of doctrinal concepts. Information operations Strategic information operation is defined by the AMS Strategic Studies Department as strategic moves using information warfare weapons to protect one’s information and information system while denying another’s in order to achieve information superiority. It aims to use ‘information flow’ to control the ‘flow’ of energy and materials. By preserving information dominance while denying this to the adversary, one may seize the control of information in the battlefield.30 According to the same group, strategic information operations have five types. First, intelligence operations include intelligence reconnaissance and protection. Second, command and control operations disrupt enemy information flow and weaken its C2 capability by attacking its systems while preserving one’s own. It can be offensive and defensive. Third, electronic warfare aims to seize electromagnetic initiatives by destroying enemy electronic equipment or disabling their performance while ensuring the proper functioning of one’s own. This includes electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support. Fourth, computer network operation targets enemy computer systems and networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored. Again, this includes both attack and defence. Fifth, destruction of information sources using firepower to destroy enemy information sources, which comprise enemy information infrastructure such as C4ISR systems.31 At the operational level, a team of PLA National Defence University researchers define information operation in their authoritative Science of Campaigning as ‘comprehensive operations targeting enemy information detective resources, information channels, and information processing

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decision making systems with the aim of seizing and maintaining information superiority, destroying enemy information control capability and preserving one’s own’.32 They reckon that information operations, which are implemented throughout the war, are not an end in itself but a means to achieve information dominance. While there is consensus over information operation as a key form of operations, PLA analysts are debating the exact content and scope and means to conduct this operation. However, according to a study prepared by the National Defence University, information offensive at the operational level consists of: (1) electromagnetic attack targeting enemy electronic equipment implemented through electronic reconnaissance, electromagnetic suppression, and disruption and electromagnetic deception; (2) logic attack targeting enemy computer and logicbased information systems, to include computer viral attack and hacking; (3) psychological attack which includes attack on enemy cognitions and beliefs; and (4) physical destruction which includes attacks by armed personnel, firepower and high-energy output weapons. On the other hand, information defensive adds one more type of action – intelligence protection – to the four mentioned in the offensive.33 Apart from these official researches, individual projects share similar views when they come to explain the concepts and identify the types of operations and operational methods.34 It must be noted, however, that while these may reflect the ability of researchers and senior officers to think ahead of their capability and to appreciate the potency of the information revolution, this may not be the case among middle-level and junior officers. As Major General Hao Yuqing, director of the Chinese National Defence University’s Army Building Research Institute, once commented, PLA military theoretical research, especially at the operational and tactical levels, essentially stay at the ‘mechanical warfare’ stage. Research on information warfare is neither systematic nor in-depth. Some concepts are simply wild ideas which are not applicable or practical.35 PLA concepts thus far bear a startling resemblance to US army concepts. In fact, many open discussions have cited American authorities and researches.36 Information operations, as defined by both, cover almost the same types of action despite slightly different names. Information operations may be conducted in non-combat situations. A PLA colonel emphasises that these may be conducted both in wartime and peacetime to achieve information dominance and preserve national security respectively. Besides, both attend to the importance of both offensive and defensive actions.37 However, as a scholar argues, we must caution against mirror imaging in analysing Chinese debates on information warfare and operations.38 Information denial, psychological surprise and strategic deception have been part of the Chinese doctrinal tradition.39 Moreover, given the

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Marxist-Leninist tradition, PLA analysts are aware of the socio-economic constraints of its capability to conduct information operations. Despite their enthusiasm for foreign, especially US, concepts, they generally acknowledge their inferior position. It is due to this perception that Chinese writers, as mentioned above, often show an interest in asymmetric warfare.40 In recognition of the PLA’s inferior capability in executing information operations, they argue for combining conventional with unconventional means and foreign with indigenous methods; the ultimate aim is to ‘defeat high technology by unconventional methods’ (yiqi zhigao). In Mao Zedong’s terminology, ‘You fight the war your ways and I my own ways’ (nida nide, woda wode). This is deemed possible. Their conviction is that every strong player must have weaknesses while a weak player must have some strong points. Since information systems have many interconnecting points and nodes and are reliant on a variety of support, the Chinese army may use its pockets of excellence to exploit and hit these weaknesses to achieve local information dominance. The US campaign against Iraq in 2003 teaches the PLA another valuable lesson. It finds information disruption a viable option for the weaker party to defeat the precision-guided munitions attacks from a technologically superior enemy. Deception coupled with disruption of GPS signals can be effective counter-measures.41 However, asymmetric warfare is not necessarily monopolised by the weaker power in conflicts; nor is the concept of asymmetry new in military operations. It is simply a strategy to avoid an adversary’s strength while exploiting his weaknesses.42 While this is obviously an ideal course of action for the weak, this works equally well for the superior adversary if it knows how to apply its asymmetric advantages in war.43 The Chinese political military leaders understand this also. Despite their common rhetoric of depicting themselves as the underdog, they know they may be superior to certain opponents. In such cases, they are ready to use their asymmetric advantages to overwhelm their inferior adversaries. This thinking is a cornerstone of their insistence on ‘fighting no war until victory is sure’ and is in line with their preference for the offensive. At an all-army conference on information operations in joint campaigning in late 2002, despite dissension over some details, participants seem to suggest a preference for offence over defence and emphasise seizing localised or partial information initiatives. Similar views are found in the case of applying information operations to specific forms of operations, ranging from joint landing and anti-air raid campaigns to counter-terrorism campaigns. Paradoxically, in daily operations, the protective side is the dominant concern. The Liberation Army Daily frequently carries reports and essays alerting army comrades to cases of information security failures and the grave consequences and possible solutions. The conceptual tensions of a technologically backward yet ambitious military are abundantly manifest.44

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While the PLA correctly identifies the emerging importance of information operations and enthusiastically studies the concept and related theories, it fails to take a critical look at information itself. There has been a lack of discussion on screening, using and acting upon information. Even though information flow is ensured in war, effective execution of war is dependent on extracting accurate and useful information from the huge volume available and making the correct decisions. Thus judgement and sound decision-making are doctrinal gaps to be filled. Moreover, as the Chinese information operations concept evolves, its discrepancy with military structural and operational elements is widening. As will be discussed in later sections, some PLA officers and analysts are already pointing out this danger. Reforms and solutions are urgently needed to enable the army to oversee information operations and to conduct wars effectively in the information age. The advent of information warfare and operation brings with it a cluster of concepts, asymmetric warfare, non-engagement and so on. Yet these concepts are also found in other concepts of operations and, in fact, their combinations have created an even more fluid battlefield and posed greater challenges to the PLA. Although some concepts of operations are essentially at a soul-searching stage and are far from being operational, they, given their potential in future warfare, are going to affect Chinese military doctrinal development. Below we will discuss two major concepts that, albeit rudimentary for the time being, may play a bigger part in future doctrine. Counter-terrorism and ‘decapitation’ Shortly after the PLA had entered the twenty-first century, it was given a new training task. The terrorist attack in New York in September 2001 not only shocked the public worldwide but, more profoundly, the military. The USA responded by waging a counter-terrorism campaign against the Taliban and terrorist forces in Afghanistan in the following year. Both provide the Chinese army with lots to ponder upon. In the eyes of Chinese analysts, these operations are examples of asymmetric warfare, showing how a small force can inflict great damage to a superpower and how a superior army or coalition may crush a non-state actor. The US campaign further demonstrates the potency of combining non-engagement operation with special operation. This is understood as the reason for their ability to avoid repeating the Soviet failure in Afghanistan.45 It seems that Chinese analysts are able to learn extensively from foreign experiences. They see the importance of: (1) rapid reaction and a highly efficient crisis response mechanism; (2) intelligence support with extensive use of reconnaissance and surveillance means; (3) organising firepower attacks, especially using airpower and long-range precision-guided

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munitions to target terrorist training and operating bases and bunkers (this is evident in the ‘Joint-2003’ counter-terrorism drill that involved China and other Shanghai Cooperative Organisation member states); (4) an efficient national defence mobilisation system; and (5) in China’s case, tightening border controls and stabilising operation in border areas.46 Now, counter-terrorism is made a PLA mission.47 In the 2003 training guidelines handed down by the General Staff Department, the army and People’s Armed Police, for the first time, were required to begin pilot schemes to conduct counter-terrorism theory researches and explore relevant training methods.48 As the following analysis shows, counter-terrorism has become an integral part of the target-specific training programme. If the USA demonstrated how to fight unconventional forces in the Afghanistan expedition, it showed how to execute war against a traditional enemy – the army of a state – in the campaign against Iraq in 2003. According to a PLA Academy of Military Science researcher and prolific military writer, Peng Guangqian, this war is as much a testing ground for US new weapons as it is one for its new methods of operations. The US military continues to try out combining strategic psychological warfare with sustaining high-intensity firepower attacks, long-range precision strikes from the air with ground attacks, conventional warfare with special operations, centrifugal with centripetal attacks, and ‘decapitation’ and ‘capturing-the-king’ with instigating desertion among the lower echelons.49 Among these, the latter deserves particular attention. Although the USA had targeted the ringleaders of the al-Qaeda and Taliban regime during the punitive war in 2002, it had not explicitly made this part of the campaigning plan. But in the 2003 war in Iraq, the USA began with a ‘decapitation’ operation aiming at Saddam Hussain and his cohorts. Already in 2002, US actions had caught the attention of a PLA analyst who calls it the ‘capture-the-king’ (qinwang) operation. He reasons that advanced reconnaissance, surveillance and precision-strike capability make this method of operation a viable combat and deterrence option. It has the advantages of directly hitting the Achilles heel of the enemy, preempting international opinion pressure, and being cost-effective.50 These perceived strengths are exactly what the PLA wants to achieve – a quick and decisive victory and minimising chance of foreign intervention and war escalation. This form of operation also fits the general direction of army building as the PLA strengthens its special operations forces (SOFs) and long-range strike capability. Thus, although there has not been much open discussion as yet, it would not be a surprise if the ‘capture-the-king’ operation is incorporated into PLA military doctrine in the future. Indeed, innovative military theories assume top priority because they are to lead PLA structural and operational readiness. Already the General Staff Department’s 2003 annual training plan has urged for research in non-engagement operation, information operation and special operation,

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even though the Chinese army has not yet achieved the capability to implement these operations.51 While these new concepts may take time to become operational, more than a decade of local war doctrinal development has come to the stage of operationalisation. High-technology local wars: operating in the battlefield Continuing the revival of studying the operational level of war and campaigning that commenced during the previous decade, the PLA in the 1990s began to direct its attention towards operational art and combat support as related to high-technology local wars. A PLA textbook on campaigning prepared for Masters students of military science attaches great importance to campaigning. A high-technology local war may be simply a campaign, and its significance in the execution of war is raised due to the increasing ‘limitedness’ of modern local wars.52 As the PLA deepens its studies on the operational level of war, it begins to reorder the forms of operation. Among the ‘traditional trio’ of positional warfare, mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare, only positional warfare remains relevant. In the mid-1990s, mobile warfare was modified and renamed ‘manoeuvre warfare’ (which is better known and understood in the West).53 Guerrilla warfare has been relegated to secondary status. This means that the Maoist doctrinal straitjacket has been removed. The new basic forms are: (1) manoeuvre warfare, (2) positional warfare; and (3) firepower warfare (huolizhan). Secondary and auxiliary forms are guerrilla warfare, electronic warfare and information warfare. The third and special forms are special operations and psychological warfare.54 In its revised textbook on campaigning published in 2000, when the National Defence University writing team classified campaigns according to the operational form, it listed manoeuvre warfare, positional warfare and guerrilla warfare.55 The 1990s also saw a deepening of doctrinal debates that moved from merely identifying forms and types of operation to increasing emphasis on operational art and methods. On New Year’s Day 1993, the editors of Jiefangjun Bao’s ‘Military Forum’ page announced the coming of a ‘spring in the study of military art’.56 In the same year the army newspaper began a new column on ‘Operational Methods Research’ (zhanfa yanjiu) with an essay explaining its commencement.57 Over the next month, another essay by Major-General Zhang Shuyun, then deputy chief of staff at Chengdu Military Region, called for further exploration of innovative operations methods relative to changing military doctrine.58 In a collection of papers from a symposium on ‘operational art in hightechnology local wars’ organised by the National Defence University in late 1992, one analyst argued that the Chinese would execute defensive operations in four stages: (1) advance strikes before enemy projecting

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forces; (2) defence against enemy attacks and capability preservation; (3) engage (pan) an enemy until changes in the balance of force occur; and (4) counter-attack. Some participants more or less concurred, especially on ‘engaging’ the enemy. One of them even accentuated the importance of defence, attrition and protraction at the operational level and argued that offensive, quick and decisive actions could only be ‘tactical’.59 This view bears an unmistakable imprint of military thought of the 1980s’ coming of age. The four-stage argument is reminiscent of the three-stage concept of the active defence strategy with minor modifications. The purpose of ‘engaging’ enemies seems only an operational term to describe strategic stalemate. Not surprisingly, this approach is bound to become gradually marginalised. Some researchers have already broken the traditions and prejudices governing military thought of the 1980s, putting forward alternative arguments that emphasise defence in-depth and counter-attack in defensive operations. The adversary would not be simply weakened by layers of staunch defence but overwhelmed by synchronised attacks at its rear.60 This ‘offensive spirit’ is destined to be embraced enthusiastically by the PLA.61 If past conflict scenarios are recalled, it would not be difficult to see why this is the case. The Chinese army would endeavour to ‘recover’ territories and defend those national interests at stake. It would fight offensively – strategically as well as operationally. A series of four books (restricted for military circulation) highlights, in particular, the operational methods underlying four particular forms of operation: landing, airborne, mountain and urban. The significance of these volumes is that they are among the rare ones which relate theory to actual Chinese military capability and are masterminded by the Army Staff Academy, which was an intermediate command institution focused on the conduct of war. (It was merged into the Shijiazhuang Army Command Academy during professional military reform in 1999.) The cult of the offensive is the unifying and dominant theme.62 On the defensive side, these studies consider defensive operations in scenarios such as coastal cities and mountainous areas in case of foreign invasions, but invariably they argue for offensive actions to repel and deter aggression. PLA analysts take care to examine enemy defences and to suggest solutions. What they emphasise in implementing offensives are multi-directional and multi-dimensional assaults to create gaps in enemy fronts, concentration of force, agility and mobility, synchronisation, and in-depth strikes. These operational methods certainly resemble those of a modern Western army rather than of a PLA which began reforms only in the late 1970s. A gap between doctrine and army structure and operational efficiency, however, is still highly visible. Chinese officers are aware of their military’s limitations. The way they have managed to close the gap between doctrine and structural and operational readiness will be discussed below.

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Indeed, since the 1990s, discussions on operational art and methods have dominated Chinese military publications and symposia. Individual units also promoted their own researches. They managed to work out new methods to counter the new challenges of high-technology local wars, centring upon the so-called ‘New Three Strikes, Three Defences’ (xinanda sanfang) – strike enemy stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and armed helicopters; defence against enemy precision strikes, electronic jamming and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance. Since the CMC promulgated the revised editions of the Military Training and Examination Programme and Military Training Regulations in 2001, more emphasis has been put on applying research results to training. Regulations on military science research released in 2001 helped standardise the researches.63 PLA operational methods research also received new guidance, now under the concept of ‘integrated operations, focused strikes’ (zhengti zuozhan, zhongdian daji). This was said to be first proposed by General Zhang Zhen at an all-army campaigning theory conference in 1988 and won majority approval. After refinement and introduction in ‘The Chinese PLA’s General Principles of the Science of Campaigning’ (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanyixue zongze) promulgated by the General Staff Department in 1997, it was formally endorsed by the high command two years later in The Chinese PLA’s Joint Services Campaigning Programme (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lianhe zhanyi gangyao). The ‘integration’ part has four aspects: (1) integrating civilian and military resources, from socio-economic to political and diplomatic clouts; (2) integrating all armed forces, including all services and arms and the armed police and the reserve; (3) integrating battlefields of all dimensions; and (4) integrating all means and methods of operation. ‘Focused strikes’ also has four aspects: (1) focused use of force in key directions for critical tasks; (2) focus on particular battle space and concentrate combat effects on key battlefields; (3) focus on initial battles and seek decisive battles in critical moments to influence campaigning outcome; and (4) focus on key targets. As war is executed, the Chinese army, under the new campaigning guiding thought, emphasises operating on one’s own terms (yiwo weizhu) and ‘striking the opponent’s weakness with one’s own strength’ (yiji zhichang, jidi zhiduan) – a Chinese version of asymmetry. Although the army should seek to paralyse the enemy before achieving eventual annihilation, the overriding concern is to strive for quick and decisive resolution and achieve campaign objectives in the shortest possible time.64 Subordinate are ten fundamental principles (see Table 6.1). Despite slightly different wordings, the two principles compiled by two writing teams from the PLA National Defence University and the Academy of Military Science respectively basically head in the same direction. The only main difference is the latter’s willingness to accentuate their preference to offence. Instead, there are stark contrasts between the current and previous principles. Compared with the old principles as discussed in Chapter 5, several

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Table 6.1 PLA Campaigning Principles circa 2000 Zhanyixue

Zhanyixue Jiaocheng

Know yourself and your enemy Full preparation Initiative

Know yourself and your enemy Full preparation Concentration of war assets and focused use of force Integration of offence and defence, with emphasis on offence Avoid strength, target weakness Agility and surprise Initiative, in-depth strike Coordination and sychronisation Comprehensive support, sustained combat Cohesion, demoralise enemy

Concentration of war assets and focused use of force In-depth strike Surprise and agility Coordination and sychronisation Sustained combat Comprehensive support Take advantage of political superiority

Source: Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (chief eds) Zhanyixue (The Science of Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2000), pp. 101–14; He Diqing (chief ed.), Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (Course Text on Campaigning) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 145–54.

points stand out. First, continuing the trend in the 1990s, it places greater emphasis on the offensive. Interestingly, when a PLA analyst compared Chinese and American campaigning principles, the US principle of offensive was contrasted with the traditional PLA precept of ‘preserve oneself, annihilate your enemy’.65 Now, being offensive is the key to seizing war initiatives. Second, psychological operation becomes a component of information warfare. Although it is unclear whether an all-army doctrinal document on this subject has yet been issued, some units already have their own.66 The PLA’s 2001 edition of the Military Training and Examination Programme also laid down principles on the content and methods of psychological warfare training. Psychological training programmes, psychological health services and psychological training facilities began to find their places in the Chinese army. The PLAN had its first psychological behaviour training ground operational in late 2003 and expected to build three more in the next year.67 However, since the PLA did not resume studying military applications of psychology until the 1980s, the concept of psychological operation is still developing, a process dominated by political officers. While some tend to uphold the primacy of propaganda work and regard ‘psychological operations’ as everybody’s task, some are more willing to consider new content and means, including both offensive and defensive propaganda works, decision-making psychology, and the use of electromagnetic and computer platforms. US experiences in handling the mass media in war are also closely studied,68 but some are ready to take the concept even further.

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In a book, a spin-off of a key research project at the PLA National Defence University, a team of writers led by the director of the University’s Political Work Teaching and Research Office and an instructor, criticise those views that hold political work to demoralise enemy troops as the whole of psychological operation. They propose psychological operation theories be divided into three components: military psychology, methods of operation and training result assessment. Operational methods should focus on three types of psychological operations: stratagem, propaganda and deterrence (limited nuclear deterrence should only supplement diplomatic and economic deterrence). The most urgent task for the PLA, they argue, is to strengthen the organisation of psychological attack tasks. That is, the establishment of a unified psychological operation command and decision-making agency, and the installation of specialised psychological operation fenduis (squad or battalion equivalent) to elite combat units and emergency manoeuvre operational units (EMOUs). It was noted that a PLA psychological operation company (under a Jinan military region motorised infantry division) participated for the first time in a real-troop exercise in June 2004. Tactics used, except for computer network attacks, were mainly traditional ways of putting up posters, spreading leaflets, and broadcasting with modern technological means. Even the messages verged on being anachronistic. However, the political work system is still important. In 2003, its purview of psychological warfare was finally codified in the amended ‘Political Work Regulations’ of 2003 as part of a drive to accentuate the ‘combat functions’ of political work. Psychological warfare, together with public opinion warfare (yulun zhan) and legal warfare (falü zhan), are known as the ‘three warfares’ (sanzhan). Public opinion warfare aims to mobilise and shape domestic and international opinions and legal warfare is to use domestic and international laws to defend the legality of China’s actions and attack that of its enemy. All three however serve the same purpose: targeting the psychology and morale of its own army and people and those of the enemy’s to support war or even to facilitate victory without war.69 Third is the emphasis on sustaining operations. This means preserving the war initiative and maintaining a steady level of war-fighting capability in order to exert pressure continuously on the enemy and deny it chances of reconstitution. Therefore, it is argued, careful planning and coordination of the use of forces, a strong reserve force, regulating war potentials and political work are important.70 As analysed below, the militia and reserve forces have been undergoing reforms although the extent of success is questionable. The concept and mechanism of mobilisation are also being reviewed to expand its scope, target more specific socio-economic resources and enhance its efficiency. This is closely linked to the fourth point – integration of combat, logistics and armament support into combat power planning. The PLA now pays serious attention to civil–military integration to compensate for its own deficiency. A so-called socially based logistics system

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(shehuihua houqin zhidu) began full-scale operation in 2000 to tap civilian resources, mainly in such areas as food, quartermaster, petrol, oil and lubricant (POL), machine repairs, business and medical services, and transportation. In the same year, the PLA itself, after years of experimenting, decided to adopt a joint logistics system for the whole army to facilitate cost-effectiveness and efficiency in the administration of common use materiel and services between the three service arms.71 It also manages to improve its support capability by emphasising field survivability, mobile support and armament repairs. As reported in the Liberation Army Daily, the priority of logistics support has been reversed from emphasis on living to war readiness.72 Fifth, in-depth strikes. The Chinese army has begun the study on indepth strikes in the 1980s when it was both learning from and preparing itself for the perceived threat of a Soviet invasion. Major differences today are the selection of targets and method. According to The Science of Campaigning, weak but critical objects that support the whole enemy combat system should make primary targets, and the in-depth attack, concentrating on the shallow depth, should be conducted simultaneously with frontal attacks. However, the National Defence University team remains wedded to the traditional tactics of outflanking, raiding and penetrating. The Second Artillery is only included in their discussions on in-depth strikes in single service and joint campaigning.73 While this National Defence University campaigning research project may mean more to senior officers, PLA doctrinal evolution took the whole army to a new milestone in early 1999 when the CMC issued a new, ‘fourth generation’ of combat regulations. This set of combat regulations not only sums up in documents more than a decade of debates on the high-technology local war concept but also points the way to how the PLA should fight in the future and prepare for combat, both structurally and operationally. It indicates that this doctrinal concept has been moving steadily towards operationalisation. A JFJB editorial claims that ‘these new combat regulations, on the basis of the characteristics of high-technology local wars, unify our army’s basic guiding thoughts on joint campaigning and combined arms combat’. Reportedly, the 1999 regulations have 45 per cent more content than the earlier regulations. Given the lack of transparency, we can only rely on piecemeal reports. It is known that this set of thirteen doctrinal documents consists of two series: campaigning and battle (zhandou). The former is subdivided into the two tiers of joint campaigning and single service campaigning while the latter is subdivided into the three tiers of principles, combined arms battle in individual services, and service arms and specialised branches battle. The whole package deals with the forms of operation, operational methods, command systems, logistical support, armament support and political work. What distinguishes this set of doctrinal documents from previous ones is its coverage of command systems in joint and combined arms

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operations, the methods of and requirements for organising logistical support, armament support and political work. It manages to respond to the challenges of high-technology local wars by addressing the conduct of information operations, electronic counter-measures, anti-air raid operations, and the means and methods of countering enemy hightechnology weapons.74 But no less important is that the whole set of combat regulations comes under the umbrella of the Chinese PLA Joint Services Campaigning Programme. This suggests that joint campaigning and operations have been elevated to a new position in Chinese military doctrine. Joint operations Even before the publication of the new combat generations, change had fermented in every respect of PLA thinking. The Army Staff Academy envisaged war to be conducted mainly in ten types of joint operation: (1) landing operations; (2) urban offensives; (3) mountain operations; (4) airborne operations; (5) anti-landing operations; (6) air defence operations; (7) island defensives; (8) sea and islands blockade; (9) anti-sea blockade; and (10) border counter-attacks.75 To implement these operations, seven principles were to be observed: 1

2

3 4 5 6

7

Subordination: first, operations are subordinate to national strategic plans and general war situations; second, the actions of all service arms are subordinate to the general situation of joint operations. Unifying: all service arms should be integrated as one under unified command with a unified operational concept, and should act together under a unified plan. Initiative: seize and preserve initiatives. Resolution: resolute implementation of operational objectives. Concentration of superior forces: the best forces and equipment should be concentrated in use to achieve absolute or local superiority. Coordination: an important principle in war command; macro-control by commanders and headquarters over the forces and actions according to general operational concepts and plans. Quick decision: achievement of war objectives in the shortest possible time.76

In 2000, a National Defence University writing team published its course text on campaigning, in which it highlighted six types of joint campaign: (1) blockading; (2) landing operations; (3) anti-air raid operations; (4) border counter-attack operations; (5) airborne operations; and (6) anti-landing operations. It mapped out the characteristics, tasks, requirements and major actions in these operations. Without exception, information is the dominant concern, and information, air and sea superiorities,

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altogether known in the PLA as the ‘three superiorities’ (sanquan), are regarded as the prerequisite of the effective execution of war. In line with the campaigning principle of offensive, all operations, including such defensive ones as anti-landing and anti-air raid, integrate offensive actions into their plans.77 However, the Chinese joint operational capability has a long way to go. According to a Liberation Army Daily editor, the PLA is conceptually backward; the concept of joint operations is not clear or innovative enough. The discussions on the force building, command, battlefield deployment of joint operations and the relationship between joint service logistics, informationised battlefield, weapon systems integration, and joint training lag far behind the requirements of joint campaigning. Coordination is a starting point for effective and efficient joint operations but both theoretical research on coordination and hardware availability, such as communication for inter-services coordination, are not satisfactory. Organisationally, since the PLA does not have a permanent joint campaigning command agency even in peacetime, it can only rely on ad hoc command agencies when several war zones participate in the operation. Perhaps the most fundamental weakness to be addressed is the traditional dominance of the ground force which still plagues the command and methods to conduct joint operations. Other services are often reduced to subordinate positions.78 The PLA is, however, determined to pursue joint operations. At the start of the twenty-first century, it organised, as a major research project for the ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan period’ (i.e. 2000 to 2005), a ‘Joint Operations Series Research Task Force’ which placed twenty-three units under the leadership of the National Defence University. The full scope of the research is unknown but piecemeal information shows that the major topics under study include: force composition, force projection, coordination of air assets, the use of conventional guided missile forces and the army air corps, blockading and border counter-attacks. The task force studies how to plan, organise, train, deliver and use the forces for joint operations. It appropriately attends to command and coordination.79 These researches, on the one hand, confirm what types of operation concern the PLA most and, on the other, give some clues of force planning. The Second Artillery is logically a favourite choice. In line with the principle of in-depth strikes, it is expected to deliver the much needed long-range firepower. Moreover, as the psychological element weighs in, it provides the additional value of deterrence. The Second Artillery in high-technology local wars A look back at what the PLA officers have regarded as characteristics and operational methods in modern local wars reveals why tactical ballistic missiles interest them. Such considerations as in-depth strike capability,

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concentration of firepower and so-called ‘extraordinary reinforcement’ all coincide with the logic of developing and using tactical missiles. No matter that it is in relation to the forms of operation listed by the Army Staff Academy, the National Defence University writing team of The Science of Campaigning, or the joint operations research task force, almost all anticipate Second Artillery firepower support. In fact, this service arm, like the three services, is considered capable of conducting independent campaigns. It is conceived as suitable for greater roles in the use of force because ballistic missiles are integrated consistently into conventional warfare operations.80 Given its advantage as a delivery platform of long-range firepower, tactical missiles (the DF-11 is cited in particular) are mainly invested with the task of striking enemy targets in depth. To deliver preparatory and counter-preparatory fire in offensive actions, the conventional missile units of the Second Artillery are charged with the tasks of targeting enemy political-military command agencies, electronic warfare centres, air, naval and missile bases, air defence systems, troops assembly areas, and field storages and logistics systems. Among them, command and control centres are particularly mentioned. In the combat stage, they are to drive a wedge in enemy defence and hit in-depth targets by providing longrange firepower. It seems that the PLA is more interested in using the Second Artillery in removing targets in shallow depth and targets that pose immediate threats. In defensive anti-air raid operations, tactical missile units in coordination with other service arms may be used to attack enemy airfields, missile bases, C2 facilities and aircraft carriers; in defensive anti-landing operations, enemy troops assembly areas, materiel loading areas and carrier groups are to be targeted.81 Between 21 and 26 July 1995, the PLA Second Artillery made its debut in the Taiwan Strait. Five tactical missiles, believed to be M-9s, splashed down in the vicinity of Keelung, Taiwan’s key harbour in the north (a sixth missile reportedly strayed from the target area). A live-fire drill with guided missiles and artillery followed in August. On the eve of Taiwan’s presidential election in March 1996, PLA missiles were fired again into the Strait. One missile impacted in the waters just 19 nm east of Keelung; three other missiles fell into the seas 30 nm southwest of Kaohsiung. This marked only the first wave of the PLA’s military action. The second wave was a nine-day (12–20 March) live-fire air-naval drill off Fujian; the third, a joint landing exercise from 18–25 March.82 These exercises indicate that the use of the Second Artillery has been evolving and expanding from a role in war-fighting to blockading and conventional deterrence. The PLA has been studying three-dimensional blockading against large islands (blockading against small islands is mainly within the purview of the navy). Its blockade is to be integrated with firepower destruction in order to achieve quick and decisive results. Due to the Second Artillery’s capability to deliver long-range firepower, it

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performs a key role in covering the whole blockaded area within its strike range, focusing in particular on the 30 nm maritime zone adjacent to the blockaded island.83 But firepower attacks constitute only part of the blockading plan, which is expected to achieve deterrence effects also. The Chinese concept of conventional deterrence is deemed to be a practical option because, researchers are right to point out, the credibility of nuclear deterrence is low in local wars.84 But deterrence is not tantamount to the use of force short of war. In fact, the PLA places great emphasis on actual destructive capability. Such capability serves as much to inflict damage as to demonstrate possible consequences of noncompliance because, it is argued, a small war is a deterrent against the enemy waging a larger war or escalating conflict.85 Although the Chinese army defines deterrence in terms of such passive measures as ‘deterring’ and ‘containing’ conflicts, its application to the Taiwan Strait seems at odds with this thinking. Yes, it aims to prevent Taiwan from going independent but, more important, also to bring the other side to the negotiation table. The Chinese thinking and practice of ‘deterrence’ are in fact closer to ‘coercion’ and ‘compellance’. That is, the military actions are taken to threaten the target with the options of compliance and changing behaviour or punishment.86 In the Chinese arsenal, in order to execute what they deem to be conventional deterrence, the Second Artillery is definitely a key component, but it has many areas to improve. While the development of solid fuel and modified transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) may shorten the preparatory time and enhance its mobility, and thus field survivability and capability to achieve surprise, these advantages may be neutralised by more sophisticated enemy reconnaissance and early warning capability. Moreover, the PLA has been studying the use of GPS and differential GPS systems and inertial guidance systems to improve accuracy and lethality. At the same time, China began to build its own navigation positioning system, the ‘Big Dipper’ (beidou) constellation, by launching two experimental satellites in late 2000. It is now considering several options to develop its second generation system, which would start as a regional system with potential to expand into a global one. These include a geo-stationary earth orbit (GEO) satellite system and inclined geosynchronous orbit system.87 Again, this progress should not be received with overenthusiasm in view of the development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems and technologies. China is particularly adamant about any suggestions of including Taiwan in the US theatre missile defence (TMD) system. In addition to its indigenously developed Skybow I and II surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), Taiwan has already acquired batteries of US-made Patriot SAMs (to be upgraded to PAC-3 standard) and E2T airborne early-warning aircraft to improve its air defence system (even though the older HAWK SAMs are discounted). China vehemently opposed the sale of the Aegis combat

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system to Taiwan because, it believed, this might form the basis of a BMD system.88 Wary of the potential of BMD to neutralise China’s long-range firepower advantage and limited nuclear deterrence capability, it is only natural for Chinese analysts to follow closely the development of the programme and to examine methods to defeat the system. One article in the Journal of the National Defence University suggests deception and pretence, coordinated electronic counter-measures and firepower attacks, attack from multiple directions and wide angles, the use of a range of missiles firing in different ballistics, and intensive and sustaining attack in waves.89 While the PLA shows an acute awareness of its weaknesses and is studying ways to address them, its conceptual innovation remains to be matched by structural and operational readiness. Indeed, it has continued its modernisation since the late 1970s and adopted similar approaches. However, under the high-technology local war doctrine, structural reforms serve larger purposes than reallocating resources and improving the force mix. The following analysis shows that these measures also become means to facilitate operational efficiency and effectiveness as demanded by military doctrine.

Structural readiness Streamlining As the PLA manages to close the gap, it has essentially followed the trend started from the late 1970s – reducing the size while improving the force mix by restructuring. The first climax came in 1985 when the first major streamlining exercise was promoted under the Deng Xiaoping leadership and a policy slogan was subsequently adopted at an enlarged CMC meeting in 1988 which established that China should embark on ‘a path of building a capable army with Chinese characteristics’ (zou you zhongguo teze de jingbing zhilu). The ‘capable army’ model immediately assimilated both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of army building. In terms of quantity, it was linked to national economic capacity; in terms of quality, specific objectives of building an agile, efficient and capable military were established.90 After the Gulf War, the high command decided to respond to the challenges of high-technology local wars by actively propagandising its reform policy under the label of ‘qualitative building of the army’ (zhiliang jianjun). It must be emphasised that this was essentially a continuation, elaboration and specifying of the already established ‘capable army’ policy. As usual, the army newspaper devoted a special series of essays to promote the new policy. The debates pinpointed in particular the relationship between quantity and quality.91 However, as the reform went on, army building scaled new heights. The importance of applying technologies to army building was explicitly stated

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in the CMC’s policy of ‘strengthening the army with science and technology’ (keji qiangjun). In 1995, the hitherto qualitative army-building model was interpreted in terms of the ‘two basic changes’ (liangge genbenxing zhuanbian): (1) change from a model of quantity and scale to one of quality and effectiveness; and (2) change from a labour-intensive to a technology-intensive model.92 In its first 1997 Military Forum page the Jiefangjun Bao began a series on the ‘two basic changes’ to expound this CMC directive.93 This policy’s burgeoning publicity coincided with another climax of force reduction. On top of the 1985 demobilisation, in September 1997 Jiang Zemin announced a further reduction of 500,000 servicemen in three years. Reportedly, this had begun in 1996; as part of these moves, fourteen less capable Category B PLA divisions were transferred to form mobile units of the People’s Armed Police. As expected, PLA ground forces were to be reduced by 19 per cent – the biggest reduction among the service arms – while the PLAAF and PLAN would be slashed by 11 per cent and 11.6 per cent respectively. In September 2003, the CMC announced a further reduction of 200,000 troops, which was to be completed by 2005.94 These changes further underscore how the local war doctrine and the reconceptualisation of ‘national interest’ which solicits a more assertive military doctrine have shaped the direction of force development and modified the traditional land-power posture. Besides, what distinguished this round of streamlining exercises was that downsizing had no less significance in enhancing operational efficiency than saving money. In this regard, smaller units are thought to be more adaptable to information-age warfare.95 As the following discussions will show, streamlined units are expected to enable greater mobility and more efficient command and control. The quest for rapid responsive capability Entering the age of high-technology local wars in the 1990s, a concept of ‘emergency manoeuvre operations’ (yingji jidong zuozhan) began to appear alongside rapid reaction. The first emergency EMOU was created in 1992 and was believed to be under direct CMC control.96 There are conflicting views on whether EMOUs are reorganised and upgraded rapid reaction units (RRUs) or part of the RRUs.97 However, these EMOUs are prime examples of how the PLA has been trying to enhance operational effectiveness and efficiency through structural reforms. According to scattered information, the formation of EMOUs is closely associated with the incorporation of manoeuvre warfare as a primary form of operations and the Chinese focus on campaigning. The EMOUs continue to conduct special operations and assaults but in combined arms small groups. Joint and combined arms operations are the norm.

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They are trained according to the peculiarities of pre-designated war zones and enemies and, to narrow the gap between war and training, they emphasise live ammunition drills. The EMOUs are supposed to be at the highest level of operational readiness and would be committed to combat at very short notice and be deployed to the battlefield in twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Their rapid response capability, however, is seriously constrained by the lack of transportation support. The small air transportation fleet means that most of the units have to rely on ground mobility.98 Although the number of these units is uncertain and varies in different studies, they do play an important role in strategic and operational levels of war.99 Another category of elite PLA formations developed recently is the special operations forces (SOF). According to the campaigning principles of surprise and in-depth strike, SOFs are regarded as part of the in-depth strike forces and have been built extensively to compensate for insufficient long-range firepower. Under the current doctrine of high-technology local wars, these units are better integrated into various types of defensive and offensive joint campaigns.100 Looking into the future, the SOFs will be a mainstay not only for conventional combat and combat support but also for future information and psychological operations. An article in the Liberation Army Daily argues that special operations are going to play the main role in certain battlefields and the scale of these operations is moving from tactical and operational to strategic level. It attributes US success in the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002 to the SOFs, and its interest in these units will certainly intensify in view of the extensive employment of SOFs in the war against Iraq in 2003.101 After Chengdu military region formed the PLA’s first SO dadui (regiment equivalent), every military region eventually had its own. Even the airborne 15th army, which is itself an EMOU, has one. These units, despite their rapid reaction capability, are charged with tasks different from EMOUs. The SOFs are mainly trained in special reconnaissance, sabotage assaults, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, psychological operations and information operations. As seen in reports about their training activities, they would be employed in war to conduct reconnaissance and battle damage assessment, guide air and missile strikes, attack enemy C4ISR centres and air defence systems, seize key air- and seaports, and implement information operations.102 Each dadui comprises more than ten service arm branches and specialities and operates in formations of battalion-equivalent fenduis and platoon-equivalent assault groups (tujidui). Apart from such common skills as parachuting, helicopter air landing and demolition, individual fenduis and small units may be trained in certain special skills. Members of the special reconnaissance fendui of the Nanjing Military Region dadui can reportedly operate satellite positioning instruments, acoustic vibration detectors and thermal imaging devices. Chinese SOFs are equipped with

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both light and heavy equipment, including powered hang-gliders, guided missiles, artillery pieces, rockets, flame-throwers and infantry fighting vehicles. The Chengdu military region dadui is even given helmet reconnaissance systems.103 Certainly, these elite forces are given the best from the PLA arsenal. Capable forces should be supported by effective equipment. Effective equipment (liqi) Given the wealth of information and sources on Chinese arms acquisitions, including arms transfer from foreign countries and indigenous production, I am not going to explore this area.104 Instead, I will try to show how these procurement projects are related to doctrinal changes. In contrast to its ice-cold military interactions with the USA and the West after the Tiananmen suppression in 1989, China’s relations with the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, have been warming up. (So far, even with the support of France, China has failed to convince the EU to lift its arms embargo.) The Russian need for cash provides an amicable environment for Chinese arms purchasing. Sino–Russian military cooperation ranges from sales and licensed production of advanced fighter aircraft to training arrangements. It is believed that Chinese procurement of Russian weaponry from the early to late 1990s amounted to over US$10 billion, with that of Israel coming next.105 At the same time, the Chinese military continues indigenous and licensed R&D and productions because the leaders well understand that neither can they buy nor afford to buy military modernisation. This is not simply a matter of the slogan ‘selfreliance’ (zili gengsheng), but is a practical concern. While, as discussed in Chapter 1, suspicions remain about Sino–Russian relations, the Israeli government has been under US pressure to scale down its arms trade with China.106 Thus the PLA’s road to modernise its arsenal is long and tortuous. To fulfil the doctrinal requirements of deterrence and in-depth strike, China continues to improve its strategic and tactical missile arsenal with such projects as DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs coupled with the space navigation and positioning programmes discussed above. China has also scored successes in its space programme, known as ‘Project 921’. Having launched four unmanned spaceships between November 1999 and December 2002, China finally sent its first astronaut (or, Sinicised as ‘Taikonaut’) on spaceship Shenzhou-5 to the outer space for a 21-hour trip in October 2003.107 However, the military implications of this project remain uncertain – it may be simply a pursuit for prestige or the first step towards developing space-based weapons or combat support platforms. In actual combat, achieving the ‘three superiorities’ is the top priority. Thus the Chinese high command is wary of the proper use of information equipment and information security of military equipment. Apart from laying down a series of rules and regulations, the PLA Secrecy

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Commission took an important step in setting up in 1999 an authoritative agency to evaluate and certify information security products for military use.108 The defence production and procurement are geared also to improving information security. The PLA is keenly aware of its deficiency in information operation and technologies, and has long complained about the reliance on foreign-made computer chipsets and operating systems. These hardware and software open windows of vulnerability to attack by adversaries and compromise information security. To counter these threats, China has devoted great efforts in developing firewall technologies indigenously and with foreign cooperation. It also produced its own secure operating system, Hongqi (Red Flag) 2.0 and, with the cooperation of Intel, an open source code compilation system, IA-64. Perhaps the most encouraging boost for China was the Chinese Academy of Science’s success in developing a general-use chipset, ‘Longxin (Dragon Heart) No. 1’ in late 2002, which reportedly had already started mass production.109 However, whether these developments represent a real solution to information security problems depends on their performance when compared with foreign-made ones; otherwise, the Chinese are only trading one evil for another. Information superiority is defined by the US army as the capability to ‘see first, understand first, and act first’.110 This resonates in Beijing. Its army has consistently managed to improve its reconnaissance and intelligence collection capacity. Apart from the acquisitions of and continuous interests in such airborne early-warning (AEW) aircraft as the Y-8AEW and Russian Il-76 and A-50, the Chinese military is building up its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) inventory. Following the production of ASN104/105 and Chang Hong 1, the programme has since gained momentum. As pointed out by an analyst from the PLA National Defence University, the US campaign in Afghanistan demonstrated the great potential of UAVs not only as a reconnaissance but also as an attack platform. The Fourth Airshow China in 2002 in Zhuhai showed that that country had several ongoing projects, including the W-50 which, prototyped in 2001, was said to incorporate advanced datalink control technologies with GPS guidance. The exhibition also highlighted some Chinese special interests. It displayed a model of WZ-2000 which tapped stealth technologies and three models of unnamed micro-aerial vehicles (MAV), ranging in size from a mere 220 mm to 600 mm with a control range of 10–15 km. Successful test-flights of MAVs were claimed. Besides, at China’s first national MAV conference at the Nanjing University of Aerospace and Aviation in 2001, it was disclosed that the hosting university had produced a MAV with ‘certain image surveillance capability’ after having begun research in 1997 and established a research institute the following year.111 To assure air superiority, although the Chinese military campaigning theories emphasise joint forces and information operations, the PLAAF continues to play the biggest role. It understands that numerical advan-

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tage no longer provides any guarantee. Thus, while retiring obsolete models, it has been producing and acquiring new ones. The majority are air superiority aircraft with secondary ground attack capability. The most notable is of course the procurement and licensing production of the Russian Su-27 which will be supplemented by China’s own J-8II, FC-1 and the ongoing project of J-10. However, as the PLAAF is moving from territorial air defence to a stance of emphasising both offence and defence, it is determined to build up attack capability. With the support of more capable combat aircraft to achieve air superiority beyond China’s territorial airspace, the newly purchased Su-30MKK, which is to be equipped with Kh-35 ASM, and JH-7 (FB-7) are to suppress enemy air defence (SEAD) and perform ground attacks.112 These are in line with the PLA’s doctrinal focus of attacking the enemy’s shallow depth. It can do little in the deep depth with its meagre and backward long-range bomber fleet. For the command of the sea, the Chinese acquisition of the Kilo attack submarines and Sovremenny destroyers have aroused concern in the region. The former is known for its capabilities in quiet operations in narrow sea lanes and shallow waters, and its standard armament of wakehoming torpedo while the latter, equipped with the SS-N-22 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), is said to be very effective against surface combatants. As the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) programmes (the overhaul of the Xia class and the ongoing Type 094) are slowly progressing, these imported weapons are complemented by the domestic production and development of existing conventional Ming class and Song class attack submarines and the Han class and Type 093 nuclearpowered attack submarines. Looking into the future, the Chinese attack submarines with the capability of quieter operations, mine-laying and submerged-launching encapsulated ASCMs will make for a more formidable force in blockading.113 On the ground, the army air corps is a service arm that is given priority. It is now more integrated into joint operations planning, but, with a modest size of about 300 and mixed models of helicopters, these units contribute only limited mobility. Predominantly for transportation purposes, the helicopters are mainly carrying platforms for the SOFs and infantries. It was only recently that the army air corps units began to develop attack capabilities. A Chengdu military region army air corps regiment, according to the requirements of the new training programme, has endeavoured to expand from its role in transportation to harness its attack capability and to shift the focus of training from techniques to tactics. Armed helicopters are also noted in the army air corps units in other military regions, but, so far, the Chinese lack dedicated attack helicopters. The Z series is by far the most important line, and China has also been cooperating with France and Singapore to develop a light helicopter, the EC 120.114 As the weapons are getting more sophisticated, they give the PLA enhanced capability as well as additional challenges. Without voicing the

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obvious problem of system integration and manning, their maintenance, testing and repairs expose the inadequacies of logistics support. Then, in 1998, the General Armament Department (GAD) was formed to become the fourth general headquarters department along with the General Staff, General Political and General Logistics Departments. It took over some former duties of the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry of National Defence which was itself reorganised and civilianised at the same time. The GAD is the highest authority supervising weapons procurement, defence research and development institutes, weapons-testing facilities and the military industrial complex. It also leads a system of military representatives who are assigned to factories engaged in military production to ensure that the products measure up to military specifications. Below the GAD are armament departments of all service arms and field units which are to provide armament support, especially maintenance and repairs. However, the most important task for the armament departments is to convert new equipment into war-fighting capability as soon as the troops are equipped. Since after-sale services are often not satisfactory, compatibility with existing equipment may cause problems, and as the technical knowledge of PLA officers is generally inadequate, new military hardware simply puts them in a dilemma – they desire advanced weapons but fear to use them.115 But this only exposes questions in peacetime; a larger and real problem is armament support in the field and in wartime. Thus the CMC also promulgated a ‘Campaigning Armament Support Programme’ in October 2002 to regulate the armament support actions of campaign units in wartime. It covers topics from the principles, command, force composition of armament support to the methods of support in various forms of campaigns. Some PLA units have also reportedly begun training in rapid reaction and field repairs.116 The Chinese weapons procurement certainly exhibits a catch-up manner, but the PLA is equally clear that it is not going to match the advanced weapons systems of other armies one by one.117 Instead, it is willing to settle on a more realistic weapons development strategy that builds a mixed arsenal with weapons of different technological levels. More important, in line with the leapfrog army-building policy and the quest for asymmetric capability, it adopts a selective policy (yousuowei, yousuobuwei) focusing on developing some ‘trump card’ (sashoujian) weapons to counter a superior adversary’s technological edge. The ‘two bombs and one star’ (liangdan yixing) – the atomic bomb, ballistic missile and satellite – developed during the Cold War are regarded as prime examples of successfully deterring superior adversaries. In the information age, the Chinese military continues to study and target the enemy’s weaknesses. As he studies the Iraq War of 2003, a specialist from the PLA Academy of Military Science calls attention to both positive and negative performances of such advanced systems as the space-based support system to develop ‘trump card’ weapons.118 Admittedly, we have very little know-

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ledge on this as the Chinese military has a tradition of strategic deception and surprise. However, in view of the doctrinal emphasis on achieving the ‘three superiorities’ and being target-specific, the PLA may well develop weapons to deal with its specific adversaries at different levels of war. Perhaps key Chinese research projects, such as the state 863 Plan and the PLA’s Project 2110, may shed some light on their research directions. It remains to be seen whether and how laser, electromagnetic and microwave, space positioning, military cartography, and a range of information technologies may be incorporated into various platforms.119 However, effective weapons must be used with operational proficiency in the information age. The PLA is thus stepping up its efforts to reform its training and command and control systems to ensure its operational readiness to execute the doctrine of high-technology local wars.

Operational readiness Training Operational proficiency depends to a great extent on adequate training. Chinese military training in the 1990s continued and deepened the significant changes which had been initiated during the previous decade. The Military Training Programme of 1995 managed to bring the PLA to a new level to meet the challenges of high-technology local wars by emphasising combined arms and confrontational training. Indeed, the so-called Donghai (East Sea) exercises in 1995 and 1996 demonstrated that the Chinese military had improved on combined arms and joint operations and had better integrated its Second Artillery into conventional warfare. However, the 1995 document was soon found to be inadequate. Conventional training methods could hardly improve the army’s capability to fight in high-technology local wars and the weaknesses in assessment methods proved to be an obstacle in implementing training according to the Programme. As reported in the PLA newspaper, the training instructors’ attitude remained in favour of individual skills. The GSD, years after its promulgation, was still obliged to urge for a ‘breakthrough in the integration of techniques and tactics’.120 To reform military training methods, in late 1998 the GSD organised forums in Liaoyang of Liaoning province for senior officers to study how they might apply scientific and technological research results to military training. This so-called ‘Liaoyang Intensive Training’ (Liaoyang jixun) became a landmark in the movement of conducting ‘military training with scientific and technological means, methods, and content’ (keji lianbing).121 Keji lianbing came to a climax when the Chinese command held the ‘Lijian 2000’ (Sharpen the Blade) exercise in October 2000 to review achievements of the movement. The list of units represented and demonstration subjects was impressive, although the drills were not large scale.

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Service arms units from all military regions, rapid reaction units, amphibious armoured units, mechanised troops, digitalised artillery, SOF, the marines, airborne troops and the aviation units of the three services assembled in the countryside of Beijing to demonstrate anti-reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-electronic jamming, and anti-precision munitions strikes, mine-laying, helicopter dogfights, airborne and anti-airborne as well as amphibious landing and anti-amphibious landing operations, and combined arms and joint operations. Drills by air defence units were simultaneously held to demonstrate shooting down a stealth aircraft and armed helicopter drones in Inner Mongolia, a unit in Jilin test-fired two conventional missiles, and a warship in Bohai off Liaoning province destroying two cruise missile drones. These drills also included online confrontations, demonstrating the effective use of networking in military training.122 The drilling showcased how the PLA integrated the operational requirements of the ‘New Three Strikes, Three Defences’ into military training. Obviously, the result of keji lianbing was endorsed by the CMC and thus became the basis of the PLA’s new generation of training programme released in July 2001. But what made this document special was that it now highlighted the importance of evaluation, since it was known as a ‘Military Training and Examination Programme’. The use of demonstration units was extensive in the Chinese army to disseminate the high command’s ideas of training and to exemplify training methods and content.123 The so-called examination drills are usually held to evaluate how far individual units, service arms or military commands have implemented the training programme. ‘Lijian 2000’ was one of these. However, it is obvious that the proficiency demonstrated in the training grounds does not represent the overall standard. In fact, one of the major weaknesses embedded in PLA training is its lack of evaluation standards. In 1997, the CMC passed down the ‘Tentative Rules on Military Training Grading Assessment’. The Chinese realise that reforming the content of the PLA’s training is not sufficient to prepare the army to execute the doctrine in war. The only way to ensure quality is to standardise training’s content, schedule and evaluation.124 This document proved to be transitional. It had to wait until the Military Training and Examination Programme was published in 2001 to make assessments an integral part of training and to address the weaknesses of evaluation methods. Apart from efforts to standardise assessment, a major reform was undertaken in the grading system. The grading of some subjects was reduced from four to two to avoid blind pursuit for excellence in physique and skill without regard for tactical and combat applications.125 While this document is able to change the rules and letters, it is powerless in the face of drilling ground culture and human inadequacies. There continue to be complaints against human bias and favouritism (renqing), over-emphasis on training for demonstrative purposes, and deliberate attempts to avoid difficult and dangerous training

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subjects. These problems are complicated by the increasing importance of joint training which demands extensive inter-service and joint operations knowledge. No wonder an article in the Journal of National Defence University suggests reforms of the composition of assessment institutions and quantification and regulation of assessment standards.126 Certainly, the 2001 Programme was meant to be more than an assessment. It is hailed as summarising the experiences and achievements of three years of keji lianbing. One of its main themes is the use of scientific and technological means. It is mainly implemented in terms of promoting the use of training bases to improve capabilities to carry out individual combat missions, simulation facilities to facilitate learning to operate new equipment, and computer networks to enhance the leading organs’ command capability and operational methods and to support professional military education (PME). This was affirmed by the revised Military Training Regulations and the annual training guideline of 2002, which also added the importance of training resources sharing and the promotion of distance learning. An all-army conference held in the same year reported that the PLA had built up a training base system which could cater for different strategic directions, combat missions and forms of operations.127 Many studies on PLA training since the late 1990s have focused on landing operations training, including amphibious and three-dimensional training. While this reflects a dominant theme, it should not mask the real impetus. The emphasis of training according to the combat missions and strategic direction was in fact known as ‘target-specific training’ (zhenduixing xunlian) and ‘adaptation training’ (shiyingxing xunlian) in the 2001 Military Training and Examination Programme.128 This was explained succinctly by General Guo Boxiong, then commander of the Lanzhou military region, in an article contributed to the Journal of National Defence University during the keji lianbing years to share his experiences in joint campaigning training. He encouraged the planning of training according to the anticipated force, weapons, order of battle, intentions, forms of operations, and action characteristics of target troops as well as the natural and social conditions of combat areas.129 Sea training, which has been preoccupying units in most military regions, should be viewed in the context of target-specific and adaptation training. Nanjing military region, as a frontline command, is a natural choice for running a sailors’ training regiment to train army sailors to navigate ships and operate the equipment on board. It is responsible for training sailors for the whole army. However, other commands and units, such as the Guangzhou military region built sea training ground and units in Jinan military region, had their own sea training ground mainly for training to operate equipment and to adapt to combat at sea. In fact, artillery shooting onboard has been a major topic, since this is the PLA’s key means to deliver suppressive and indirect fire in landing operations.

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The PME institutions (for example, the Dalian Army Academy) also offer courses and instruction facilities for sea training.130 However, a Liberation Army Daily article has pointed out several weaknesses in PLA sea training, urging for a strengthening of the knowledge of leading cadres in maritime geography and meteorology as well as command and communication at sea, the training ability of backbone cadres, and focusing on difficult and key subjects. Other reports have it that some units, in their single-minded rushes to make ‘scientific and technological means’, simply neglect the actual usage in training and leave their ‘innovations’ idle after research.131 Indeed, there are units training to fight in other terrains, climates and enemies. Units of the Shenyang military region train for operations in cold climates and frozen river crossings, whereas some divisions in Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions train specifically to operate in severe cold high-altitude mountainous areas and some in desert. After the ‘September 11’ terrorist attack, these trainings assumed new meanings. Since Xinjiang is regarded by the Chinese leaders as the hot spot of terrorist attack, two motorised infantry divisions are reportedly trained to operate in highland and desert terrains to fight terrorists who might adopt hit-and-run tactics. Besides, counter-terrorism has been incorporated into the Military Training and Examination Programme of 2001 to make this an all-army task and was reportedly introduced for the first time to a major landing exercise in mid-2002.132 For the training of individual service arms, the 2001 programme has made several major changes. Single soldier (danbing) training for the infantry is compressed from the ratio of 2:1 to 2:1:43 to give way to fendui (team) training to reflect the emphasis on tactical applications. Given the capability difference between the two generations of tanks, armoured units are given training tasks commensurate with their tanks’ equipment and combat missions. Night training continues to account for 25 per cent of training time. The artillery is to increase the technological content of training by using UAVs and helicopters to adjust shooting; its coastal units are to step up training in shooting objects at sea and blockading sea passages and offshore islands. While the artillery has added the subjects of ‘three new defences’, the air defence units are given the ‘three new strikes’. Reconnaissance and surveillance, precision strikes, beyond-visualrange strikes and electronic warfare are also integrated into the new training tasks of air defence units. Since landing is an important form of operations, the training of the engineering corps is geared to that end. On the defensive, it takes on a new subject in camouflage; on the offensive, it strengthens training to facilitate smooth landing operations, especially obstacle removal, loading and offloading of heavy equipment, constructing helicopter landing pads, and building low-altitude obstacles. Anti-chemical units are to intensify training to enhance their capacity to handle sudden incidents and detect chemical and radiation conditions. The compatibility of various specialities is emphasised.133

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Joint training is, however, made the main focus of the programme in order to comply with the doctrinal requirements of joint operations. At the early stage, some PLA units entered into ad hoc or sometimes impromptu-style cooperation with sister services deployed in proximity to conduct joint training. In fact, as Guo Boxiong complained in the aforementioned article, since the knowledge of other services among officers is deficient, there are problems of failure, reluctance and inability to conduct joint training.134 The war zone (zhanqu) concept introduced in the 1990s turned out to provide a basis for joint training. There have been suggestions to establish joint and combined arms training agencies at the general headquarters and military region level, regional joint training coordination centres, and civil–military joint training mechanisms. Some units actually experimented with more institutionalised forms of joint training by organising joint training coordination committees and other working committees. The scope of joint training also gradually expanded by including more subjects and service arms and even the reserve forces, and extending the period of cooperation.135 However, this more institutionalised form of joint training has not yet been officially endorsed by the high command; a survey of PLA news reports also shows that this is unlikely to be representative. Other attempts to promote joint operations training are implemented in larger scale. Since the late 1990s service arms units in coastal war zones have taken initiatives to organise swapping offices between service arms officers to familiarise them with the mission and duties of their sister services. Besides, endorsed by the high command, joint training may be facilitated by exchanging officers and tapping the resources of the PME system. Under the scheme coordinated by general headquarters, it was to take several years from 2001 onward for all senior and middle-level officers to undertake cross-service arms training at the service arms command academies.136 Simulation, following the keji lianbing tradition, is another major aspect of the 2001 programme. Most simulation facilities, however, seem to focus on operating skills of individual equipment, such as artillery gun shooting, guided missiles shooting, vessels navigation and tank driving.137 Only a few can support tactical training and combat in formations. Major systems include the ‘strategic and campaigning simulation system’ developed by the National Defence University, the ‘leading cadres and organs command training simulation system’ by the then Shijianzhuang Army Command Academy, and the ‘tactical logistics command training simulation system’ by the Logistics Command Academy. At a North Sea Fleet training centre, the systems reportedly could simulate tactical environments for war command confrontations and weapons use, single ship and formation confrontations, and independent and combined training of various specialities. Most important of all, it could facilitate tactical command and joint service training.138

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Related to simulation is training through computer networking or the so-called ‘online military drilling’ (wangshang lianbing). Being part of the Lijian 2000 demonstration, this represented success in developing an operational-level combat command operation simulation system that built upon a decade of research. The PLA had gone through stages when combat simulation systems developed by individual units failed to work together to share resources and data. After the PLA Polytechnic University had produced a tactical command simulation system and the technology had matured, the use of ‘online military drilling’ began to become popular among field units in the late 1990s.139 Although this is undoubtedly scientific means, its usage is not necessarily scientific. Some PLA officers have complained about misusing online training systems for fun and arbitrary data-setting in war-gaming. As a result, the ‘blue forces’ and ‘red forces’ may have unrealistic and inflated capabilities in so-called ‘online military drilling’.140 Instead of bringing training closer to real combat, computer networking only takes it further away from reality. But Chinese progress on simulation, virtual reality and computer technologies is unmistakable. They began to show keen interest in the potential of battle laboratories and studied US experiences assiduously. They saw it as a promising means to evaluate and test military theories and capabilities because China lacked experience in joint operation and had few opportunities to practise its doctrine in real combat. More important, a General Staff Department researcher regarded battle laboratories as a key instrument for military innovations and in establishing forward-looking military theories. Indeed, the research of China’s first post-doctoral fellow in military science was in battle laboratory and the PLA Polytechnic University is working in that direction. As a step towards building a battle laboratory, the PLA has set up combat training virtual reality laboratories and the above-mentioned simulation systems.141 These efforts mark another major reform in military training; and in improving the knowledge and skills of the officer corps. The emphasis on the officers is logical. They are key to implementing and directing joint operations training. More important, they will exercise the command and control in wartime. Modern warfare, given its fluidity and emphasis on small unit actions, requires timely command and execution of orders. This has two implications. One, it places heavy demands on the initiatives of officers and their ability to understand and implement combat orders. Thus an efficient and knowledgeable officer corps is necessary. Two, it solicits a more agile command structure, both in terms of organisation and means. We will deal with the PLA officers first. Command and control: the officers That leading officers and organs are the focus of training is only too obvious when the annual training guidelines laid down by the GSD are surveyed.142 They are trained to be flexible, to respond quickly and innova-

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tively to all kinds of emergencies and contingencies. Command post exercises (CPX) are becoming widely used to provide officers with ample training for achieving such proficiency at low cost. Increasing combined arms exercises (despite lack of live fire experiences) still allow officers to practise command and operational planning.143 The 2001 Military Training and Examination Programme takes one step further towards promoting ‘separate training for officers and soldiers’ (guanbing fenxun) so that officers may receive more specific training, especially in command. Obviously, the Programme only lays down principles and leaves the implementation to individual units. At a Shenyang military region division, the training of non-commissioned officers is divided into military command and technical specialities, depending on their duties; fendui officers are trained in combat theories, employment of weapons and command at their own levels, organising joint operations, troop management and organising training; and headquarters staff are trained in planning, analysis and coordination. This method reportedly achieves satisfactory results in improving the abilities of the officers. However, it must be cautioned that the lack of standard methods does not guarantee similar successes in other units. In fact, many, including the PLA division, have to take the trial-and-error approach and thus waste resources.144 Apart from actual battlefield exercises and drillings in the training ground, PME is another means to create a more formidable officer corps. In a report marking the PLA’s seventieth anniversary, the Jiefangjun Bao boasts of spectacular achievements of the PME system. The quality of PME teaching staff has been improved with a twelvefold increase in the number of Ph.D.s teaching during 1989 to 1996. The number of research results has multiplied and the course systems have become more elaborate.145 Since it is important to ensure the interface between the officer’s knowledge and PLA doctrinal requirements, courses in military academies have been redesigned to increase knowledge in high technology. In 1997, the GSD handed down a ‘Three-Year Plan on Studying High Technology for All-Army Cadres’ in response to the ‘two basic changes’. The objectives are summed up as ‘Three 100 per cent’: 100 per cent of cadres complete assigned studies; 100 per cent of officers above regiment level and command headquarters cadres undertake short-term intensive classes or correspondence courses; and 100 per cent of basic unit cadres who do not have academy education undertake rotation training at instruction institutions. The first two years of PME are devoted to basic knowledge, the third to application to real situations.146 PME reforms received fresh impetus when the Chinese military leaders introduced a series of reforms in 1999. First, they decided to rationalise the organisation of military academies through merging and restructuring. Apart from strengthening the existing National University of Defence Technology, they set up four new universities by merging institutions – the Information Engineering University, Polytechnic University, Navy

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Engineering University and Air Force Engineering University. Second, they set goals in hardware building. Virtual reality laboratories, digitalised library systems and information networking were made the three pillars of PME reform. Third, course design was changed. To produce the so-called ‘composite able personnel’ (fuheshi rencai), the CMC introduced a ‘4  1’ system, by which junior command officer cadets have to spend four years studying general courses and basic military training at comprehensive military academies and one year at specialised academies to study military command.147 At the postgraduate level, the CMC decided during the ninth ‘Five-Year Plan’ period (1995 to 2000) to promote some selected PME institutions, disciplines and laboratories. On this basis, it was refined into ‘Project 2010’ at the turn of the century, by which selected disciplines and institutions would be given priorities and emphasis in the first ten years of the twentyfirst century. It was expected, with the development of information highways, that research achievements might radiate out to the whole army. Thus network building and distance learning became important. In 2001, the PLA Polytechnic University formed a Distance Learning Institute. With the support of two virtual reality laboratories, it was able to deliver fortythree subjects on the Net and thus facilitated knowledge dissemination.148 Without a doubt, PLA officers are much more theoretically and technically adept than their predecessors in operations in modern wars.149 But the PME system alone can have a limited effect in creating a knowledgebased army. Moreover, a more fundamental issue to officer training is China’s overall national educational system. Being a modern PLA officer is not sufficient to be a proficient technician or expert in the contemporary trade of military arts. The ideal candidate would be someone with a broad education who is capable of imaginative and innovative thinking.150 The comprehensive quality of personnel is probably the most meaningful interpretation of China’s traditional formula of ‘human factor above weapons’.151 The military leaders thus decided to tap the resources of civilian education. After all, this is also regarded as a way to save army resources. At a meeting in 1999, Jiang Zemin called for taking advantage of the state education system to train military cadres.152 The plan has been implemented mainly in two ways. One is sending cadres to civilian universities. Under the ‘Strengthen the army with highlevel capable personnel’ (gaochengci rencai qiangjun jihua) scheme, twentyseven key civilian universities, such as Beijing University and Qinghua University, began in 2002 to train in their Master’s research programmes the first lot of 1,600 army specialised technical officers and PME instructors. The General Staff Department, on a smaller scale, set up scholarship training relations with Nanjing University to train officers at Master’s and Doctoral level. Individual units also take initiatives to cooperate with local universities to train their commanding officers into composite-type personnel.153 The other scheme is to recruit civilian university graduates.

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From 1997 to 2001, more than 30,000 graduates had reportedly joined the PLA and were allocated to combat units and specialised and technical occupations. The army also takes active measures to recruit them. The most important of all is the ‘National defence students (guofang sheng) scheme’ which, set up in 1999, is administered by the PLA’s Reserve Officers Training and Selection Office stationed at individual civilian institutions. In return for an army scholarship which amounted to 5,000 yuan per annum in 2003, these students sign agreements with civilian institutions and the PLA to study both civilian courses and military-political courses and will be assigned to military service upon graduation. As of mid-2002, there were 5,200 ‘national defence students’ with a new intake of over 3,000 in the same year. In 2003, sixty-five participating civilian universities and colleges planned to admit some 4,000 more.154 However, the recruitment of civilian graduates has caused no little commotion in PLA barracks and training grounds. Experience and practice are unnecessarily pitted against academic training. Some soldiers and officers from traditional training backgrounds are sceptical of the capability of these graduates to conduct military training and endure hardship; still others detest working with them and find them a ‘nuisance’ instead of an asset. These graduates then feel rejected and lose interest in their profession.155 A new military culture that goes beyond physical fitness and operating skills to really respect and understand knowledge has not yet taken shape. Indeed, the PLA boasts that 71.8 per cent of its officers achieve tertiary education level and, in detailed breakdowns, 88, 90 and 75 per cent of group army, division and regiment officers respectively have gained tertiary educational qualifications. Over 26,000 Master’s degree and Ph.D. holders are serving in the army.156 Whether these statistics can be translated into capability depends on the buildup of a new culture and the Chinese military’s capacity to develop and assimilate these knowledgeable personnel. Indeed, following Jiang Zemin’s call for building a ‘learning society’, some PLA analysts have begun to talk about ‘learning army’ and ‘learning barracks’, which is characterised by the extensive use of computer equipment and networks and office automation, and a learning atmosphere. Some even call for building ‘learning army headquarters’, which is to lead adaptations to the RMA and reforms.157 Command and control: the structure and means As the execution of high-technology local war requires a high level of operational readiness, knowledgeable officers must be supported with efficient command and control systems. Among the major reforms the PLA is experimenting with is reducing some divisions to brigades to simplify the force structure. It is estimated that the number of divisions decreased from ninety to fifty-nine between 1996 and 2000 while that of brigades increased from seven to forty-five.158 But this seems to be only part of the

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story. The Chinese high command reportedly started a pilot scheme, by which brigades follow a four-level (brigade–regiment–battalion–company) structure, instead of the conventional three-level (brigade–battalion– company) structure.159 Concomitant with this new force structure is the proposal to reform the current vertical chain of command to a network style in order to facilitate flexible and agile command.160 As discussed in Chapter 5, the PLA was able to make real progress in this direction only in the mid-1980s. At present it has set up an ‘All-Army 310 Command Automation System’ (also known as the ‘310 Office Net’), which serves as a hub connecting the joint operations command automation centres of the military regions. Below the all-army structure, individual military regions have their own command automation networks; for example, the Guangzhou military region operates its ‘943’ Command Net, and the Nanjing Military Region Command Automation Station has below it a Networking Information Centre, which conducts research on network security and is credited with developing command automation network mobile terminal and information operations training software.161 According to scattered information, field units, from group armies down to at least regiments, have their own command automation systems though it is difficult to substantiate the extent. They may start with automation at such fixed positions as command headquarters and barracks, and gradually develop networks for field operations. Most often, their field mobile command automation systems are integrated with intelligence and reconnaissance networks, field operations networks, data transmission networks and mobile communication systems. However, it is likely that these developments began only at the turn of the twenty-first century.162 In fact, a Chengdu military region division began to build its field command centre in 2001 and reported its first success in transmitting text and image data from a remote command post to a frontline terminal in only around early 2003. China’s first sturdy steel computer for field use was developed by the PLA Polytechnic University in late 2001.163 Command automation may appear to be progressing prosperously in the PLA, but these individual systems and networks may bring disastrous results. A report in Zhanshi Bao, a Guangzhou military region newspaper, reflects upon the early years of automation and points out that, due to the lack of macro-level coordination in their vying to catch up with the tide, certain units merely spent their limited funds on expensive ‘electronic junk’ because the micro-computers were not compatible.164 While the PLA may have learned lessons from its early experiences, equipment standardisation and systems integration remain critical. In response, in May 2000 the CMC promulgated the ‘Command Automation Development Programme’, and the ‘Command Automation Regulations’ in August 2001 to regulate automation work.165 Besides, networking brings the PLA closer to the threat of information warfare. Apart from building the networks and ensuring their smooth working, it demands the Chinese researchers step

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up efforts in improving information technologies and establishing an information security regime. One of the important measures in this respect is a set of regulations for the management of communication and command automation promulgated by the General Staff Department in 2001.166 More are expected to protect the chain of command. All this is to prepare the ready for operations in high-technology local wars. At the same time, it is clear to the military leaders that information technology is overtaking mechanical technology as the dominant feature of high technology. Their army, technologically backward though it is, is confounded by the dilemma in dealing with demands of information-age warfare and is facing a crisis of falling further behind in building up its resources. The PLA must get ready for the next challenges.

Beyond high-technology local wars: the return of the People’s War? As shown in the above discussion, the Chinese army remains cautious about evolution of war in the information age. Analysts see the forces of war in terms of a trio: material, energy and information.167 It is likely that the PLA will not rule out the relevance of mechanised warfare in the next ten years or so but it expects increasing application of information technology and importance of information in war. While perceiving their backward information technologies and reliance upon Western support, some Chinese analysts cannot hide their worries about information security and being put in a passive position in informationised warfare; others see it as an opportunity to ‘defeat a superior enemy from an inferior position’ and, in fact, to reverse their inferior position.168 The Chinese hope hinges on a weak party’s concept of asymmetric warfare that was discussed in a previous section; but, more interestingly, some anticipate a rebirth of People’s War, not politically but militarily. ‘People’s War’ is regarded as a concept that is alien to conventional Western military doctrine because it looks beyond the professionally trained armed personnel to the paramilitary and the common people. Some Chinese military thinkers have gone so far as to suggest a war that knows no distinction between combatants and non-combatants as well as between military and non-military targets.169 However, most seem to take the perspective of building up military power by integrating civilian resources into military planning. The Chinese military is adept at the mobilisation of armed personnel. Despite the generally poor training and equipment of the militia and reserve, it still finds using these forces feasible in future wars. There have been efforts to improve the quality of the reserve component by promulgating a training programme, giving priority to key personnel, and introducing a so-called hooked-up training (guagou xunlian) system, by which reserve units are to take advantage of local PLA troops for training

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instructions and facilities. Registration of discharged soldiers and officers is strengthened to ensure better-quality personnel.170 Indeed, during the USled war against Iraq in 2003, Chinese analysts and official media have shown enthusiastic interest in incidents of knocking out advanced weapons with inferior weapons and the use of the Fedayeen Saddam paramilitary units. They had also expected urban warfare in the style of people-in-arms and the execution of guerrilla warfare.171 The outcome was definitely discouraging and disappointing to the PLA. When Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of general staff, spoke about the impact of the war on RMA days after the fall of Baghdad, he denied that Iraq had waged a ‘People’s War’, despite the use of unconventional tactics. He only reaffirmed the importance of the human factor even in high-technology warfare.172 But this firm belief must be supported by the reappraisal and reconstitution of an old concept. Moreover, if the ‘people’ are to make a difference to the execution of war, this depends to a great extent on an effective mobilisation system. While the Chinese military has a traditional and extensive network of national defence mobilisation, it finds implementing mobilisation in this information age a daunting task. The National Defence Mobilisation Committee set up in 1994 under the joint leadership of the State Council and CMC is the highest authority to coordinate between the civilian and military sectors on mobilisation with subordinate committees at each level of civilian administrations down to the counties. However, the purview of these committees is limited to the mobilisation of armed personnel, economics, civil air defence, and transportation and national defence education. Moreover, these committees mainly function as ‘deliberating and coordinating’ agencies without any management functions or wartime command authorities. The mobilisation of reservists is the responsibility of the General Staff Department’s Mobilisation Department and its subordinate agencies at lower command headquarters, and the management of reserve officers that of the political department’s cadre department. Thus there have been vocal demands for upgrading the committees or, alternatively, setting up an authoritative institution that may command and direct the mobilisation of civilian resources.173 Since landing operations conducted under high-technology conditions are the main form of operation, mobilisation and reserve force training are logically planned in that direction. PLA officers and analysts find that civilian vessels, after refitting, may support a range of tasks, from transporting troops, reconnaissance and rescue to even minesweeping. Some thus urge the setting up of databases and a registration system of technical personnel and sailors and civilian vessels in areas under respective commands, improving their training, and laying down plans for organising, refitting and requisitioning civilian vessels. This is particularly urgent for coastal military authorities. Shantou Naval Garrison, for one, claimed to have built up such a database.174 But the problem is that though China’s

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civilian vessels’ deadweight tonnage is impressive, not many of these vessels can be mobilised at short notice and very few are fit for beach landing. The ships are also virtually defenceless against enemy attacks. Moreover, the sailors must be trained to operate in formations and under a combat environment lest the Jinmen (Quemoy) invasion fiasco repeats itself.175 On the defensive side, militia and reserve units are expected to continue their traditional role in air defence. This is based on the PLA’s belief in a layered active and passive air defence system and the utility of knocking down cruise missiles and stealth warplanes with anti-air artillery. Apart from contributing to post-strike repairs and remedies, the militia and reserve forces are to implement such passive measures as lighting control, making smoke-screens and erecting mid-air obstacles. Taking more active action, they may work with the active forces to form a full-altitude and in-depth interception network. Some units have reportedly included these theories in their training.176 Again, the sudden collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime raises questions. But when a Guilin Air Force Academy professor reflects on the failure of Iraqi air defence against US cruise missile attacks in 2003, he attributes it to reasons peculiar to Iraq: (1) Western embargoes have led to poor weapons maintenance; (2) radar sites in the ‘No-Fly-Zones’ have been wiped out; (3) the wrong decision to withdraw air defence assets in the vicinity of Baghdad. Instead, he insists, the former Yugoslav army has proven the effectiveness of anti-air artillery if used properly.177 While civilian transportation support and air defence show the continuity of People’s War, the information age is taking this concept to a new twist. The informationisation of the battlefield is provoking the PLA to reform its mobilisation system to accommodate a new subject: information mobilisation. It should be noted that ‘information mobilisation’ is a concept under formulation but it is generally understood in the PLA as the regulation, employment and control of social information assets, ranging from information networks, human resources, facilities, and technology to meet national security and war needs.178 Information mobilisation is attractive because some PLA analysts are convinced that, in the information age, computer networks have given new room for People’s War because support-the-front (zhiqian) activities may shift from delivering food and munitions to providing information support, such as intelligence processing and analysis. But some take this further not only because many information technologies and facilities are of dual use but because, they deem, the computer-literate population, once organised and placed under unified command, should make a formidable netwar force. Moreover, this force can strike at any time from any location or situation.179 This certainly paints a picture of guerrilla warfare on the net. Despite this attractive prospect, Chinese information mobilisation remains at a very primitive stage. As a Chinese researcher points out, it

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remains to be sorted out, even at the theoretical level, the ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ of information mobilisation. Some suggest upgrading fibreoptic cable construction in main combat directions and communication facilities, especially civil–military integration, highlighting the importance of making requisition plans and plans for converting civilian production lines for military products in wartime, setting up an information equipment stockpiling system, and recruiting personnel from information technology backgrounds in schools and research institutes. There are even suggestions to form communication, electronic countermeasures, information offensive and defensive, and network management fenduis (squad to battalion equivalent). At the Tenth National People’s Congress in 2003, a PLA deputy proposed to establish an information mobilisation office under the State National Defence Mobilisation Committee.180 This contrasted with the fact that such frontline cities and provinces opposing Taiwan as Shanghai, Zhejiang and Anhui had reportedly set up information mobilisation offices in 2002.181 It is probable that these are not yet national policy. The same may apply to the formation of information warfare units. There have been only sporadic reports about such units in Chengdu city and a county in Liaoning province. The Chengdu fendui was reportedly capable of waging network offensive and defensive actions.182 Despite their great potential and possible contribution to future wars, there are too many uncertainties to substantiate whether an ‘Informationised People’s War’ is feasible – it is unknown when the information mobilisation office and netwar units will become standard establishments; nor is it clear about their efficiency and capability. Systemic integrated joint operation: concept in the making At the operational level of war, the PLA doctrine is decidedly moving from coordinated joint operation (which is regarded as a product of mechanised warfare) towards a new concept, ‘systemic integrated joint operation’, which represents information age warfare. The latter concept differs from its predecessor because, with the support of seamless information linkages, combat systems, instead of individual service arms, would fight under unified and computer-networked command as organic wholes in all dimensions. This is the latest Chinese military response, at the operational level of war, to the challenges of information-age warfare, and is evolving.183 Systemic integration (yitihua) was already clearly spelt out in the Course Text on Campaigning prepared by a National Defence University writing team which, as compared with the later refined version, discussed ‘systemic integrations’ with a heavy emphasis on the combat forces of the standing army. However, as the concept evolves, information remains central. Information networks are the niche that achieves the integration

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of land, sea, air, space, and electro-magnetic combat units (zuozhan danyuan); of combat elements (zuozhan yaosu) which are comprised of intelligence, command and control, firepower attack, and comprehensive support; and of combat forces (zuozhan liliang) which include the standing army, reserve forces and even civilian support forces. The extensive use of information technology would enable real-time command and control and battlefield information sharing. Its application to reconnaissance and surveillance is increasing the transparency of the battlefield. Since combat forces, with information support, would be organised in modular ways, such versatile and flexible forces would bring the convergence of the three levels of war and allow the state to use minimal force to achieve its objectives. Noteworthy is the inclusion of a combat support force into the war force and the recognition of intelligence and command and control as ‘basic combat entities’. As information technology facilitates the horizontal integration of real-time intelligence sharing with firepower strike platforms, all these components and individual systems become a seamless combat force that can strike targets at specified times and rapidly regroup for changing tasks by actively synchronising combat actions.184 In accordance with the spirit of linking war-fighting (zhang zenmeda) with army building (budui zenmejian) and military training (bing zenmelian), the concept of systemic integrated joint operation is making an impact on PLA structure and operation. Some PLA analyses anticipate the gradual replacement of service arms by combat functions as the basis of organising forces and the eventual merging of reserve army and militia units into the regular army. Even the priority of equipment supply should be given to whoever goes to war first, not necessarily the regular army alone. Following experiments on systemic integrated training in selected units, the GSD in 2004 called on the whole army to study systemic integrated training, which is regarded as the next logical step after keji lianbing. In general, most PLA commentators responded with a cautious note, dividing training into several stages. Training may begin from information system integration, then the integration of individual combat platforms, combat units, and combat elements (horizontal integration); or, it may progress from coordination to tactical training. In terms of content, systemic integrated training may be organised on the basis of the four combat elements of intelligence, command and control, joint attack, and comprehensive support. While the PLA is to continue the tradition of keji lianbing by harnessing computer networks, simulation facilities, and training bases, it strives to upgrade the information capacities of training bases as it now pays more attention to the management of training and training support.185 A series of reports in the Guangzhou military region newspaper, Zhanshi Bao, about a real-troop exercise in July 2004 conducted by a pilot unit may give us a glimpse of what the PLA has achieved at the preliminary stage of systemic integrated training. A division in the military region was able to send orders through its integrated field command automation

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systems and rapidly transmitted relevant information to fire control system terminals, facilitating main weapons to deliver precision strikes on targets. As put in the reports, the division had followed the steps of basic integration, combat unit integration, system integration, and organic integration, with focus on command integration. Having built up a field command and control system that integrated command and control with situation intelligence, fire coordination and logistics support, the division was able to achieve real-time command and control, vertical information integration, information sharing within each combat subsystem, and seamless linkage between integrated networks and main weapons. The logistics system was also able to deliver responsive and accompanying support. Scattered news about other units in systemic integrated training also mentioned the integration of the combat elements. The emphasis on field command was remarkable. For instance, a Chengdu military region division reported integration of reconnaissance and field command posts with combat weapon platforms; and a Shenyang military region artillery regiment, success in relaying real-time reconnaissance intelligence to the field command via wireless field local area network (LAN).186 Lively discussions have now begun. Since the PLA is far from proficient in joint operation, it is a long way off from being able to put this new doctrinal concept into practice. As a matter of fact, conceptual clarity is far from certain, even among officers of pilot units.187 A scholar on Chinese military affairs, David Shambaugh, observes, What we know of PLA training suggests that much more innovation has occurred theoretically in the Academy of Military Sciences and other research organs than has actually taken place in units on the ground. In any military, it takes a long time to assimilate and operationalise new doctrinal innovations, especially if they call for wholesale overhaul of existing tactics and practices . . .188

Conclusion This chapter has reviewed the evolution of China’s military doctrine from local war to local war under modern conditions and pointed out that it is set to meet the challenges of the information age. It has also analysed how doctrinal changes have caused structural and operational reforms in the PLA to get ready for the war envisaged by the doctrine. If the local war doctrine announces China’s complete departure from the total war line of thinking, the current high-technology local war doctrine indicates to us how China is going to build up its military and exercise its military power in future wars. The PLA needs more technological input to improve its structural and operational readiness; but since the current doctrine envisages high-intensity war, operational efficiency and effectiveness become a top priority.

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Structurally, the focus of the mass of force has shifted further away from size to force mix or density. Not surprisingly, another round of major streamlining and restructuring was implemented in the 1990s and even the structure of individual units has become smaller also. Moreover, the doctrinal needs for the ‘three controls’ and in-depth strike capability are manifest in force building, which ranges from the acquisition of aircraft with extended combat radius and development of theatre ballistic missiles to the extensive formation of SOFs. Since the doctrine visualises an informationised battlefield and identifies information technology as a force multiplier, the Chinese army has devoted great efforts to enhance its information gathering, transmission and analysing capability by emphasising such projects as early warning equipment and UAVs. But information does more than enhance the performance of mechanical and conventional weapons; it is also instrumental in getting the force components and systems more closely connected, thus facilitating joint operation which is regarded as the primary form of operation. More importantly, information is the key to answer the need for timely command and control, and the need to execute the will of the leaders accurately. Information assumes an important position in the high-technology local war doctrine because the concept anticipates future wars to break out at short notice, to be conducted in high-intensity conditions but to finish in a relatively short time frame. Thus a high degree of operational efficiency and effectiveness is important. This is evident in the Chinese developing the ‘systemic integrated joint operation’ concept. To match doctrinal requirements, command and control are benefited by a more flexible and smaller force structure and command automation. The officer corps, who are to command the force, are strengthened by improving their knowledge level and structure and training. Certainly, operational readiness cannot be achieved by an elite officer corps alone. Revision and updating of military training programmes, especially with the new emphasis on training evaluation, have brought the PLA closer to implementing its doctrine. The target-specific and adaptation trainings ensure that China is able to bring its military power to bear upon not a single but various and individual adversaries. Concomitant is the idea of building an asymmetric capability – targeting the enemy’s weakness with one’s own strength. While this asymmetric concept is often held by analysts to reflect China’s traditional thinking of ‘defeating a superior enemy from an inferior position’, we should not forget that China considers itself the superior vis-à-vis some adversaries and will, under such circumstances, apply overwhelming power to beat the inferior force. Asymmetry favours no particular player. The ultimate aim of the Chinese leaders remains the same – to achieve quick and decisive victory. But a fatal and dangerous flaw in this Chinese approach and doctrine is their continued adherence to a questionable view of ‘limitation’. Most

150

‘High-tech local wars’ and beyond

analyses have focused on the ‘high technology’ and ‘war’ in China’s military doctrine with little attention to the question of ‘local/limited’. Indeed, the latest doctrinal literature shows that Chinese military theorists have addressed their earlier negligence of war termination and should thus offer a more complete concept about war. They discuss postconflict settlements and ways to terminate conflicts. They also agree that the conduct and termination of high-technology local wars will be ‘limited’ by political, economic and diplomatic strategies, and they recognise the value of diplomacy and other non-violent means of achieving national interest.189 But these analysts seem to have confused wars which are subjectively controlled with those that are objectively limited. This factor was carefully distinguished by American scholars in the early days of postwar discussion of limited wars.190 Chinese analysts are almost exclusively interested in subjective limitation of wars. That is, Chinese ‘local war’ is sliding very close to ‘limited war’; it is represented in their writings as if wars can be controlled rationally at their outset, discussing about how they are conducted (scale and pace), and how they end. The Chinese response to the Gulf War is a case in point. When the Strategic Studies Department of the Academy of Military Science updated its definitive text in 2001 on military strategy, the first characteristic it mentioned about high-technology local wars was ‘the increasing trend of controllability’ due to limited war objectives and hightechnological means of waging war. The high command espouses the same view.191 Just like the European strategists in the late nineteenth century, PLA theorists seem to expect a repeat of short, sharp, controlled and decisive warfare, which the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 seem to reflect. This would, of course, allow planners to entertain ‘rational’ cost–benefit calculations and would lead them to conclude that war may be worth the risks.192 Allowance for escalation, no matter how controlled or how inadvertent, is conspicuously absent in contemporary Chinese military thinking.193 It is imperative for the military leaders to emphasise that, while the means and forms of military operations have changed, the nature of war as a costly statecraft has not.

7

Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War, the transition to a new power structure has commenced. Unconventional security threats, such as the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, terrorism and the SARS outbreak in 2003, also emerge and deserve increasing attention. In the Asia-Pacific, however, all this hardly means that traditional security problems have waned or may be shelved. Although there have been notable developments in the forging of international institutions and multilateral dialogues as well as increasing interdependence among states, they by themselves fail to provide real and lasting security solutions. States need not only venues to discuss security but also arrangements to ensure their survival. Military power remains the ultimate instrument to preserve and, paradoxically, to threaten national security. Within the contemporary international balance of power, China’s growing military strength invites suspicion, but analyses of its implications easily fall between two extremes. ‘China threat’ advocates would inflate Beijing’s image to an aggressive and powerful state with hidden intentions, and associate every bit of military modernisation with a plot for expansion. At the other end of the spectrum, some analysts compare China with such great military powers as the USA, Russia and Japan, simply dismissing the PLA as an antiquated war machine in the information age. While alert to these conceptual pitfalls, it must be surmised that the significance of the Chinese military in regional security is unmistakable. As Ralph Cossa argues, ‘the PLA can make sure that any nation who attempts to ignore the PRC will be doing so at great peril’.1 It is thus instructive to conclude this study by reviewing the significance of the PLA’s military doctrine and the applicability of that doctrine to China’s military capabilities in the context of a doctrine-based model of ‘military readiness’. The key to understanding rising Chinese military power is to explore its military doctrine. First, that doctrine serves a communicative function to tell us the intentions of the PLA’s force buildup and its envisioned conduct of future conflicts. Second, it has a constitutive function to shape the making of military power, since it is to guide the military modernisation programme by influencing the people who plan force development and to

152

Conclusion

provide the intellectual basis upon which an army is developed and a blueprint for its use. That is, doctrine is the thread that ties force structure and operations together to form a coherent framework of military readiness. Force structure is a matter of the size and ‘mix’ of mass. In substantial terms, it is also about hardware and organisation. Operations are a matter of speed and efficiency, achieved mainly by proficient command and control and training. Military power has to be interpreted. It does little good only to know how big or how advanced an army is unless we know what it is for, how it is to be used and, more importantly, how ready it is to implement what is intended. Militaries, that embraced the advantages of offensives but were unready for them, paid heavily in the First World War.2 The possession of a huge army and nuclear weapons does not guarantee readiness for any conflict in the spectrum of war. This doctrine-based ‘military readiness’ model is also prescriptive. It is particularly useful for studying China’s military because conceptual and ideational guidance has been a sine qua non of its postwar strategic outlook. Moreover, ongoing resource constraints do not allow the Chinese the luxury of trial and error in military force planning. They must be ruthlessly selective and highly efficient to compensate for a lack of assets found in the more technologically advanced infrastructure of Western states. Although China is lagging far behind in the technological competition, it is too misleading to assert that the PLA develops whatever technologies are on hand for military use. Chinese military doctrine has directed that research and development programmes be augmented to achieve specific force capabilities, and this process has remained a major factor in shaping the PLA’s organisation and training. Although this does not necessarily push to the extreme the idea that the PLA acts only after it has articulated a suitable doctrine, doctrine makes the specific trajectory and uses of weapons development, organisational and operational reforms.

Local war versus total war Since 1949, China’s military doctrine has been characterised by a swing between two opposite ends in the conflict spectrum – total war and local war. Despite this fluctuation, throughout the PRC’s fifty years of history, military doctrine has continued to provide the essential reference point for its exercise of military power to deal with threats to national security and to enhance its national interests at both levels of conflict. An alliance with the Soviet Union allowed China to concentrate on building its conventional force in the 1950s. China was then prone to define its security problems in the global context, playing a part in a struggle between two armed camps. Yet the PLA, under the influence of the Russians and affected by its Korean War experience, was also close to adopting a local war doctrine. Its force structure and training were designed accordingly.

Conclusion

153

Cracks in Sino–Soviet friendship, however, signalled a beginning in China to purge the PLA of Russian influence and to revive its revolutionary warfare tradition. On the other hand, the military launched its indigenous nuclear programme. As tensions with the Russians continued to mount and the Americans intensified their military activities in Vietnam, the Chinese felt the threat to their country’s survival intensify as the global balance of power came under increased strain. In the mid1960s, Maoist People’s War doctrine prepared the country for an ‘early allout nuclear war’.3 This period of total war was characterised by a rush to develop nuclear weapons and delivery platforms with a vague understanding of deterrence. To deny the enemy any chance to win an aggressive war, China counted on the sheer size of its population and territory to survive. Mass dominated over speed and defence over offence in war planning. The change in the international security environment and domestic political leadership in the late 1970s led China once more to reassess its external threats and to rethink its nation-building policies. The blunders in the 1979 ‘punitive war’ against Vietnam convinced the PLA’s high command that the Maoist People’s War doctrine no longer provided the guidance for modern warfare. The emergence of the concept of national interest also demanded a more assertive and outward-looking Chinese military posture. In transition, ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and the theory of an ‘initial phase of war’ offered a stop-gap solution. ‘Luring enemy into the deep’, as a traditional PLA military precept, was abandoned, leaving only ‘active defence’ to be redefined. In order to put up a resolute defence against enemy penetration, Chinese military commanders began to underscore the importance of speed and tempo. As a result, a series of measures were initiated to reduce the size of the army. The money saved was to be allocated to the upgrading of military hardware. Greater emphasis was also placed on rigorous military training.

Local war prevails When the Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping decided in 1985 that the immediate military threat to China’s national survival was over, it simultaneously marked the ascent of local war predominance in Chinese military planning. After years of debate, the PLA eventually derived a military doctrinal concept that was focused on ‘sudden incidents’ and conventional conflicts along the Chinese border. Speed, as facilitated by smooth command and control and training proficiency, became crucial. Illustrative was the creation of rapid reaction units within the PLA. The whole army, moreover, was consolidated to allow flexible command and control. Succinctly, quantity gave way to quality. Deterrence, of course, was still important (even more so than before) to deal with hostilities short of open armed clashes, and it was

154

Conclusion

operationalised by nuclear and conventional forces. Yet the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated to the PLA high command that a major change in military planning and technology was underway. Studying local wars was not enough. Modern high-technology warfare required both planning and execution of war with completely new military concepts. The Chinese military thus had to intensify its study and implementation of local war doctrine. By 1993, the PLA’s high command determined that the PLA needed to be prepared for ‘local wars under modern conditions, especially high technology’. Its sensitivity to the impact of high technology on war-fighting was sharpened by the growing debates over a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) which gradually spread to China from the West. To put these concepts into practice, the army started a three-year training reform programme and investigating weapons acquisition and deployment strategies. The fruits of this labour were first manifested in the live-fire exercises off the Taiwan Strait in 1995 to 1996. They carried as much political significance as military purport. The PLA implemented its revised concept of conventional deterrence and demonstrated what sort of local wars it planned to prepare for. The intention to progress from combined arms to joint operations was obvious. However, equally salient was the discrepancy between doctrine and capability. Thus keji lianbing and, subsequently, ‘systemic integrated training’ became the new military training direction to focus the army’s attention on how to integrate science and technology into its training.

War without borders? Among the technologies, the PLA singles out information technology as the real force behind the current RMA and one that is causing ‘informationisation’ of warfare and introducing a new type of operation – information operation. It is then facing the prospect of falling further behind in a relative balance of capability. The high command responded by calling for a leapfrog model of army building. This echoes a Chinese perception that new technology, while sounding yet another alarm of technological inferiority, provides a new opportunity to defeat a superior opponent. They find hope in developing asymmetric capability and achieving localised superiority by concentrating this strength, no matter how limited, to attack an opponent’s weak points, and probably with the aid of their ‘trump card’ weapons. The information technology and other technologies even rekindle interest among analysts to conceptualise a reborn People’s War, in which the regular army is supported and reinforced by the paramilitary forces and, more important, the civilian cyber warriors may attack enemy systems from all directions. Of course, China understands well that it is preparing to fight not one but different adversaries, as seen in the target-specific trainings. This

Conclusion

155

means that the PLA is not necessarily inferior to its opponents but possibly superior. Asymmetry then still works. It is going to apply overwhelming capability to defeat its opponent. All this is to achieve one objective – a quick and decisive victory. The current doctrine that is designed to make this objective attainable reflects a penchant for the offensive and a belief in war controllability. Although China’s record of military action shows that it had waged offensive operations outside its national borders, these had been limited by a defensive doctrine and a force posture that was shaped accordingly. Now, its military leaders embrace the merit of and, in their eyes, the necessity for taking the offensive. Scientific and technological developments reinforce their conviction that war is increasingly controllable. Their enthusiasm in building battle laboratories may breed a kind of military rationalism. Paradoxically, the trends of informationisation and globalisation (especially the emergence of non-traditional threats) point out that war will not be defined in territorial terms. Perhaps they should be reminded of a comment by Clausewitz on war: ‘absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry’.4 This issue of linking doctrine with war victory brings us back to the basic premise of this study. This book does not pretend to discover the ‘law’ of ‘winning wars’. ‘Military readiness’, here, is an instrumental concept to analyse what, when and how China gets its military ready for. By itself, however, ‘military readiness’ is no guarantee for victory. Apart from the planning and execution of war and the ability to successfully improvise in combat conditions, one’s ability to grasp opportunities in a conflict environment and to adjust to the ‘fog of war’ in a timely fashion and, no less important, luck, are just as important. To understand the implications of China’s increasing military power for regional security, one must do more than merely assess hard data and engage in scenario analysis. Chinese military power has to be interpreted. It is hoped that the doctrine-based concept of military readiness advanced in this book has offered an analytical tool to study this rising power.

Appendix 1 The military readiness conceptual framework

Demands Political-military intentions Threat perception National interests

Military readiness Structure Operations Mobilisation Doctrine

Military power

Security behaviour

Supply / constraints Socio-economic capabilities Military capabilities Other national power elements

Appendix 2 The Chinese structure of military science

Military science

Military thought

Military dialectics, Ancient military thought, Bourgeois military thought, Proletarian military thought

Military art

Strategy, Operational art,Tactics, Army command

Armed forces building

Military institutions, Military education and training, Military management, Army political work, Army logistics

Military history

War history, Military history, History of military science, Military literature compilation, Military historiography

Military geography

Military geography, Military meteorology

Military technology

Weaponry, Marksmanship, Munitions, Ballistics, Navy technology, Air force technology, Armour technology, Ballistic missile technology, Nuclear physics, Astronautics, Military electronics, Military chemistry

Peripheral disciplines

Military operations analysis, War mobilisation, Military economics, Military legal studies, Military futurology

Sources: Zhang Lifa, Junshi Kexue Yanjiu Gaishu (An Introduction to the Research on Military Science) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1991), p. 28. Zheng Wenhan (chief ed.), Junshi Kexue Gailun (An Introduction to Military Science) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1994), p. 33.

Appendix 3 Chinese military actions, 1949–20021

19 Sep 1949–17 Oct 1949

Zhangxia Campaign

24 Oct 1949–27 Oct 1949

Jinmen Invasion

West Hubei Campaign 28 Oct 1949–8 Nov 1949

Xinjiang

10 Oct 1949–Mar 1950

‘March’ to Xinjiang

Hubei province

Jinmen Islands, Fujian

Guangdong province

Guangdong Campaign 2 Oct 1949–26 Oct 1949

Fujian province

Hunan province

13 Sep 1949–14 Oct 1949

Wanshan Islands

Hengbao Campaign

25 May 1950–3 Aug 1950

Wanshan Is. Invasion

Hainan Island

Zhoushan Islands, Zhejiang province

5 Mar 1950–1 Apr 1950

Hainan Invasion

Location

Zhoushan Is. Invasion Jul 1949–May 1950

Time

Military operations

1 KMT army group

40,000 KMT troops

70,000 KMT troops (surrendered)

10 KMT army corps, security forces (150,000 troops)

2 KMT army groups (80,000 troops)

11 KMT army corps (200,000 troops)

Remarks

10,000 troops incl. artillery, gunboats and landing craft

3 army corps, 1 independent div

1 army corps w/ boats

2 army corps, w/ motor vehicles and aircraft

5 army corps, 2 columns (220,000 troops)

1 army group (3 army corps)

11 army corps (400,000 troops)

Territorial occupation/ enemy annihilation

Territorial occupation/ enemy annihilation/ PLA defeat

Territorial occupation

Territorial occupation/enemy annihilation

Territorial occupation/enemy annihilation

Territorial occupation/enemy annihilation

Territorial occupation/enemy annihilation

Territorial occupation/enemy annihilation

1 guerrilla column, Territorial 2 army corps w/ artillery, occupation/enemy eng corps units, 2,130 annihilation boats

Force level

60,000 KMT troops, 4 div (40,000 w/ 50–60 naval vessels, troops), incl. some aircraft artillery

3,000 KMT troops, incl. 1 marine regiment, 30 naval vessels

100,000 KMT troops, incl. 42 aircraft, 50 naval vessels

Adversary

6 Nov 1949–14 Dec 1949

Jan 1950–Dec 1951

Mar 1950–Jul 1954

Oct 1950–Jul 1953

3 and 22 Sep 1954

18 Jan 1955–26 Feb 1955

Aug 1958–Oct 1958

20 Mar 1959–autumn 1961 Tibet

Guangxi Campaign

‘March’ to Tibet

Assist Vietnam, resist France

Korean War

Jinmen Shelling I#

Yijiangshan Is. Invasion

Jinmen Shelling 2a

Tibet Suppression

Jinmen Islands, Fujian

Yijiangshan Island, Zhejiang province

Jinmen Islands, Fujian

Korean Peninsula

Vietnam

Tibet

Guangxi province

Sichuan, Yunan, Guizhou, Xikang (now part of Sichuan), Tibet

1 Nov 1949–Feb 1950

Southwest Campaign

Location

Time

Military operations

7,000 Tibetan troops

KMT garrisons

1,100 KMT troops

KMT garrisons

Territorial occupation/ enemy annihilation

Territorial occupation/ enemy annihilation

Remarks

Military advisers

Tibet military district

Artillery, air force, patrol boats

4 infantry battalions, 9 artillery battalions, 188 naval vessels, 22 air force and navy air force groups

Artillery forces

Enemy destruction/ counter-insurgency

Blockade/deterrence

Territorial occupation/ enemy annihilation

Blockade/deterrence

Foreign military assistance/ intervention/armistice

Enemy destruction/ foreign military assistance

6 reg (200,000 troops), Territorial occupation w/ eng corps and aircraft support, 2 cavalry div

9 army corps (400,000 troops)

600,000 troops

Force level

South Korean 27 army corps, 1 troops, US-led United patrol boat group, Nations forces 10 air div, 10 artillery div, 5 AAA div, 3 tank div, 15 eng reg, 10 railway corps div

French army

8,000 Tibetan troops

12 KMT army corps (150,000 troops)

900,000 KMT troops

Adversary

Time

25 Aug 1959

21–22 Oct 1959

1962–1978

20 Oct 1962–21 Nov 1962

Oct 1965–Jul 1970

2 Mar 1969–17 Mar 1969

13 Aug 1969

28 May 1972–27 Aug 1973

19 Jan 1974–20 Jan 1974

Military operations

Longju Incident

Kongka Incident

Assist Laos resist US

Sino–Indian War

Assist Vietnam resist US

Zhenbao (Damansky) Is. clash

Xinjiang border clash

Minesweeping operations

Paracel Is. Invasion

Disputed maritime border territory in South China Sea

Vietnam waters

Xinjiang border

Disputed border territory

Vietnam

Disputed border territory

Laos

Sino–Indian borders (Kongka Pass)

Sino–Indian borders (Langjiu region/ McMahon Line)

Location

South Vietnam navy: 3 destroyers, 1 frigate

Mines laid by US forces

Soviet army

Soviet army

Army, South Sea Fleet (6 warships), navy air force, militia

12 minesweepers, 4 support vessels, incl. a 318-man team

Border patrol, militia

Border defence troops

320,000 troops, incl. air defence, eng corps, railway corps, logistics

2–3 divb

Indian armyb

South Vietnam, US-led UN troops

110,000 troops, incl. eng corps, military advisers, air defence, logistics

Unknown

Unknown

Force level

US air force (in air defence operations)

Indian ground and air forces

Indian army

Adversary

Territorial occupation/ ejection of occupants/ sovereignty/border dispute

Foreign military assistance

Sovereignty/border dispute

Sovereignty/border dispute

Foreign military assistance/enemy destruction

Sovereignty/border dispute/enemy destruction/deterrence/ ceasefire

Enemy destruction/ foreign military assistance

Enemy destruction/ sovereignty/border dispute

Enemy destruction/ sovereignty/border dispute

Remarks

Time

Mar 1976–14 Jun 1976

17 Feb 1979–16 Mar 1979

Apr 1984–Jul 1984

Feb 1988

Jul 1992

Aug 1994

Jan 1995

21 Jul 1995–25 Jul 1995

15 Aug 1995–25 Aug 1995

23–25 Nov 1995

Military operations

Minesweeping operations

Sino–Vietnam Conflict 1

Sino–Vietnam Conflict 2

Spratly Is. Invasion

Occupation of Da Lac Reef in the Spratlys

‘Donghai’ No. 4 joint service exercise

Occupation of Mischeef Reef in the Spratlys

‘Missile test’

‘Missile test’ and artillery exercise

Dongshan landing exercise

Dongshan Island

East China Sea

Taiwan Strait

Disputed maritime territory in South China Sea

Nanjing military region

Disputed maritime territory in South China Sea

Disputed maritime border territory in South China Sea

Laoshan/Zheyinshan

Disputed border territory/Vietnam

Cambodian waters

Location

Taiwan

Taiwan

Taiwan

Philippines

Taiwan

Vietnam

Vietnam

Vietnam

Vietnam

Mines previously laid by Chinese to blockade

Adversary

Three services, the PAP and militia

Second Artillery, naval missile firing, artillery

6 tactical missiles fired by Second Artillery

A GA with air and naval forces

Unknown

6 warships

2 div (not full strength)

Troops from 7 military regions in rotation, little air support

4 South Sea Fleet torpedo boats

Force level

Sovereignty/show of force/deterrence

Simulated blockade/ deterrence/sovereignty

Simulated blockade/ deterrence/sovereignty

Territorial occupation/ ejection of occupants/ sovereignty/border dispute

Deterrence/training review

Territorial occupation/ ejection of occupants/ sovereignty/border dispute

Territorial occupation/ ejection of occupants/ sovereignty/border dispute

Sovereignty/border dispute

Sovereignty/border dispute

Foreign military assistance

Remarks

Dongshan Island

Nanjing and Guangzhou war zones

Oct 2000

Lijian (sharpen the sword) 2000

Jiefang (Liberation) Aug 2001 No. 1 three-dimensional landing exercise

Joint landing exercise

Aug–Sep 2002

Beijing, Jilin, Shenyang, Inner Mongolia, Bohai

Jul–Aug 2000

Amphibious landing/ combined arms exercise

Nanjing military region

Guangzhou and Nanjing war zones

Yellow Sea

Taiwan Strait/Pingtan Island, Fujian

Aug 1996

18 Mar 1996–25 Mar 1996

Tri-service landing exercise

Taiwan

Adversary

Taiwan

Taiwan Fujian/Taiwan Strait

N/A

Taiwan?

Taiwan

Taiwan

Taiwan

Taiwan Strait off Fujian Taiwan

Sep 1999

12 Mar 1996–20 Mar 1996

Air-navy exercise

Taiwan Strait

Joint services sea-crossing landing exercise

8 Mar 1996–15 Mar 1996

‘Missile test’

Location

Joint services exercise

Time

Military operations

Sovereignty/deterrence Artillery, SLBM launch,

Review of keji lianbing achievements

Training review/ deterrence

Sovereignty/deterrence

Sovereignty/deterrence

Civilian vessels mobilisation/ sovereignty/deterrence

Simulated blockade/ joint-service operations/ sovereignty/deterrence

Simulated blockade/ deterrence/sovereignty

Remarks

Forces from Beijing, Sovereignty/ Shenyang, Jinan, deterrence/ Nanjing and Guangzhou counter-terrorism operational zones, militia

recon satellite(s), ECCM

Three services, Second

Online confrontation; three services, Second Artillery, PAP

100,000 troops, incl. AAA and air defence unit, amphibious unit, army aviation

Three services

Three services

20,000 troops, incl. marine, 2 airborne reg, w/ militia

1 group army, 3 airborne reg surface warships, submarines, air force, Second Artillery

Second Artillery fires 4 tactical missiles

Force level

1 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. It includes only planned organised military actions, not responsive fires, such as air defence against KMT and US reconnaissance flights. The purpose is to plot a trend of PLA military operations since 1949 in terms of space, duration and force level of conflicts. For a detailed list of PLA exercises at group army and fleet level and joint exercises between 1990 and 1995, see Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John F. Corbett, Jr., ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks’, The China Quarterly, June 146 (1996), pp. 500–15. a The shelling of Jinmen continued intermittently with varying intensity after the first operation in 1954 until 1979. Here we list only two major offensives. b An Indian military study puts the Indian strength in the war at two and half divisions and the Chinese at four or five divisions. See P.B. Sinha and A.A. Athale, History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, 1992), p. 412. div  division(s); eng  engineering; reg  regiment(s); SLBM  Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile; w/  with.

Note:

Sources: This table is based on information from a wide range of publications, especially newspapers. Among the major sources are: AMS Military History Research Department. Zhongguo Renmin Zhiyuanjun Kangmei Yuanzhao Zhanshi (A History of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in Korean War) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1990); Greg D. Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1998); Deng Lifeng, Jianguohou Junshi Xingdong Quanlu (A Complete Account of Military Operations after the Establishment of the Republic) (Taiyuan: Shanxi Renmin Publishing House, 1992); Li Junting and Yang Jinhe (chief eds), Zhongguo Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan (A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces) (Beijing: The People’s Publishing House, 1992); General Staff Department Military Training Department. Laoshan Zheyinshan Duiyüe Ziwei Huanji Zuozhan Jingyan Xuanbian (Selected Experience Discussions on Punitive War Against Vietnam in Laoshan, Zheyinshan (1984, no details); Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Contemporary Chinese Army Military Work), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1989); Yearbook on Chinese Communism (in Chinese) (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, various years); Zhang Lianzhong et al., Haijun Shi (A History of the Navy) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1989).

Appendix 4 Major events in PLA doctrinal development

1942 Russian Combined Arms Tactics was translated and published. 1947 Second and revised translation of Combined Arms Tactics was published. 1948 On Soviet Army Pincer Offensives was translated and published. 1949 October to November: The seven aviation schools of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) were formed. November: The Chinese navy’s first surface warfare school, the People’s Liberation Army Naval School, was formed in Dalian. 1950 November: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Aviation School was formed in Qingdao. 1951 The PLA Military Academy in Nanjing was established. 1952 The CMC convened a joint meeting for chiefs of staff and directors of political departments of military regions and service arms in December. It was decided that, from June 1953, the PLA should have ‘standardised equipment, standardised organisation, standardised training, standardised system and institutions’ in order to build a ‘modernised revolutionary army’. 1953 (circa) The Soviet Army’s Infantry Combat Regulations, Cavalry Combat Regulations, Anti-Air Artillery Combat Regulations, Air Force Combat Regulations and Navy Combat Regulations were translated and issued for trial in the PLA. August: the PLAN Submarine School was formed in Qingdao. 1955 The PLA’s first Warfighting Training Programme (zhandou xunlian dagang) was published and later revised three times between 1957 and 1980. Its Modern Combined Arms Combat Principles (xiandai zhubingzhong hetong zhandou yuanze), China’s first combined arms tactics treatise, was also published that year.

166

Appendix 4

Front army-level military exercise in East Liaoning Peninsula was directed by the General Staff Department simulating an anti-landing campaign under nuclear and chemical conditions. The war game involved 48,000 men from all three services, including one army group, four army corps and one mechanised division. 1956 An active defence strategy at the initial phase of war was adopted at an enlarged CMC meeting in March. From 1956 to 1958, the PLAN translated and published 111 titles of Soviet navy regulations and programmes. 1957 The PLA Advanced Military Academy began operating. The Navy Department of the PLA Military Academy was expanded and reorganised to form the PLA Naval Academy in Nanjing. 1958 March: The Academy of Military Science was established. September: The PLA Air Force Academy was established. 1959 A live ammunition military exercise was orchestrated by the Nanjing military region in Chuanshan peninsula simulating landing operations of a reinforced infantry division against fortified enemies. 1961 Principles of Combined Arms Army Combat Regulations (hecheng jundui zhandou tiaoling gaizhe) and Infantry Combat Regulations (bubing zhandou tiaoling) were issued for implementation. 1962 The Chinese PLAAF Combat Regulations (Draft) (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun kongjun zhandou tiaoling [cao’an]) was issued. 1963 Combined Arms Army Corps and Divisions Combat Regulations (hecheng jundui junshi zhandou tiaoling), Combined Arms Regiments and Battalions Combat Regulations (hecheng jundui tuanying zhandou tiaoling) and Headquarters Working Regulations (silingbu gongzuo tiaoling) were issued. 1967 Third translation of the Soviet Union’s Combined Arms Tactics was published. 1971 After the ‘September 13 Incident’ (Lin Biao’s death when fleeing after an allegedly aborted coup) the CMC decided on a strategy of ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’ (jiji fangyu, youdi shenru), which made mobile warfare the main form of combat. 1973 Military exercise was directed by the Beijing military region, as entrusted by the General Staff Department, simulating defence against enemy largescale invasion from the north which was spearheaded by strategic air assault and armour and mechanised forces on the ground.

Appendix 4

167

1975 Deng Xiaoping made a speech at the CMC enlarged meeting to criticise the ‘bloated, lax, conceited, extravagant and lazy’. 1977 CMC passed a number of resolutions on reforms, from military services to military training and education. 1978 The Second Artillery formed its own Military Art Research Department. As a result, it published a number of doctrinal documents, including Combat Principles of the Second Artillery (dier paobing zuozhan gaize) and Issues Regarding the Operational Use of the Second Artillery (dier paobing zuozhan yunyong de jige wenti). 1979 Offshore defence (jinhai fangyu) concept was decided when Deng received participants of the standing committee members of the Navy Party committee meeting. 1980 The PLAAF command issued a training programme for air force commanders and headquarters. The CMC abandoned the concept of ‘lure enemy into the deep’ but retained and revised that of ‘active defence’. The strategy of ‘active defence’ was integrated with the theory of the ‘initial phase of war’ to form the military-technical element of ‘ People’s War under Modern Conditions’. 1981 A front army-level military exercise was conducted in north China simulating defence against sudden enemy attack, in which ground offensive was preceded by nuclear and air in-depth strikes. The Second Artillery established the operational principles of ‘Tight Defence and Protection, Focused Counter-Strike’ (yanmi fanghu, zhongdian daji). The new Military Training Programme was issued. 1982 The GSD issued The Chinese PLAAF Military Training Programme, Volume One: Commanders and Headquarters Training. 1983 The Second Artillery conducted an operational-level exercise of nuclear retaliation of unprecedented scale in northwest China. 1984 Second Artillery Combat Regulations (dier paobing zuozhan tiaoling), Second Artillery Command Headquarters Work Regulations (dier paobing gezhi silingbu gongzuo tiaoling), Guided Missile Launching Combat Regulations (daodan zhidui fashe dadui zuozhan tiaoling), Second Artillery Military Glossary (dier paobing junyu) were issued. 1985 The Military Academy, Political Academy and Logistics Academy merged to form the National Defence University.

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The Science of Campaigning for Second Artillery (dier paobing zhanyixue) was published. The PLA’s first combined arms tactical training ground by the Nanjing military region at Sanjia, Anhui, was created. 1987 August: Chinese PLA Campaigning Programme was published. The all-army campaigning debate began, paving the way to develop from combined arms campaigning to joint operations in the late 1990s. 1988 The third generation of Combined Arms Army Combat Principles (hecheng jundui zhandou gaizhe), Combined Arms Divisions Combat Regulations (hecheng jundui shi zhandou tiaoling), Combined Arms Regiments Combat Regulations (hecheng jundui tuan zhandou tiaoling), Combined Arms Battalions Combat Regulations (hecheng jundui ying zhandou tiaoling) were issued. The Science of Air Campaigning (kongjun zhanyixue) was published. 1989 The PLA released a new generation of the Military Training Programme which was divided into subsidiary programmes for the service arms: army, air force, navy and the Second Artillery. 1990 April: The PLA’s first set of Military Training Regulations was issued. The Science of Naval Campaigning (haijun zhanyixue) was published. June: New Common Regulations: Drill Regulations, Discipline Regulations and Internal Duties Regulations (gongtong tiaoling: duilie tiaoling, jilü tiaoling and neiwu tiaoling) were issued. 1991 February: The Reserve Forces Military Training Programme (yubeiyi xunnian dagang) in four parts – general principles, leading cadres and organs training, fendui (battalion-equivalent) training – and appendix, was issued. 1993 The CMC decided at an enlarged meeting that the PLA should aim at winning ‘local wars of modern conditions, especially high-technology conditions’. The PLA began a three-year training reform. 1995 July: The PLA conducted its first ‘missile tests’ in the Taiwan Strait. August: The PLA conducted live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait. December: 1 At a CMC enlarged meeting, Jiang Zemin advocated a new army building model: (1) change from a model of quantity and scale to one of quality and effectiveness; and (2) change from a labour-intensive to a technology-intensive model. This was later summarised as ‘the two basic changes’ (liangge genbenxing gaibian). 2 The GSD approved the release of a new generation of Military Training Programme which aimed to produce high-quality combat quality

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personnel for local wars under high-technology conditions. The Programme was made up of six sets of training programmes for the army, navy, air force, Second Artillery, Commission for Science, Technology and Industry of National Defence, and People’s Armed Police. 1996 The PLA conducted three waves of live-fire exercises off Taiwan. 1997 The PLA began its three-year plan for studying high technology for allarmy cadres. The GSD promulgated ‘The Chinese PLA’s General Principles of the Science of Campaigning’ (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanyixue zongze). 1998 The all-army ‘Liaoyang Concentrated Training’ was organised by the GSD to introduce leading cadres and organs to ‘military training with scientific and technological knowledge, content, and means’ (keji lianbing). 1999 January: Jiang Zemin, in his capacity as CMC Chairman, signed to release the fourth generation of combat regulations, The Chinese PLA’s Joint Services Campaigning Programme (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lianhe zhanyi gangyao), which was designed to ‘win local wars under modern conditions, especially high-technology conditions’. It came with twelve related documents, including campaigning programmes for the army, navy, air force, the Second Artillery, logistical support and combat regulations for combined arms operations. April: At a conference on professional military education, the four general departments decided to organise five comprehensive universities, namely the National University of Defence Technology, Information Engineering University, Polytechnic University, Navy Engineering University and Air Force Engineering University. (Note: The National University of Defence Technology had been founded in 1978 by relocating and restructuring the Harbin Military Technology Academy. The reform in 1999 added the Changsha Artillery Academy, Changsha Engineering Corps Academy and Changsha Political Academy.) November: Study on Joint Service Campaigning under High-Technology Conditions (gaojishu tiaojianxia lianhe zhanyi wenti yanjiu) and Study on Army Campaigning under High-Technology Conditions (gaojishu tiaojianxia lujun zhanyi wenti yanjiu) were published. 2000 May: The CMC promulgated the ‘Command Automation Development Programme’. October: ‘Achievements of Military Training with Science and Technology Means’ Demonstrative Drill, code-named Lijian 2000 (‘Sharpen the Blade 2000’) was held in the Yanshan area near Beijing, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Shenyang and Bohai.

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Appendix 3

December: Jiang Zemin advocated a ‘double mission’ for the PLA: the army, while striving to accomplish mechanisation, should achieve informationisation; with the latter promoting the former, the army should be able to make a leapfrog development. 2001 January: The CMC promulgated the ‘Regulations on Military Science Research’, the first of its kind in the PLA. July: Promulgation of a new generation of Military Training and Examination Programme. August: 1 The CMC promulgated the ‘Command Automation Regulations’. 2 Joint services real-ammunition drills, known as Jiefang (Liberation) No. 1, were held off Dongshan Island. 2002 September: Promulgation of revised edition of Military Training Regulations. October: Promulgation of the PLA’s first Campaigning Equipment Support Regulations. 2003 May: Promulgation of PLA Military Training Grading Regulation. December: Promulgation of the amended Political Work Regulations, calling for developing the concepts of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare as part of the effort to harness the combat function of political work. 2004 Following experiments in ‘systemic integrated’ (yitihua) military training in selected PLA units in 2003, the GSD officially promoted this new form of training, which is based on the requirements of conducting ‘systemic integrated joint operation’ (yitihua lianhe zuozhan). September: All-Army Headquarters Conference convened to accentuate the role of command headquarters in informationised warfare. Sources This list is compiled by the author from the information in a multitude of books and newspapers, especially the Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily). Major sources are: Academy of Military Science, Military Historical Research Department, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun de Qishinian (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Past Seventy Years 1927–1997) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1997); Hua Renjie, Cao Yifeng and Chen Huixiu (chief eds), Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang Shi (A History of Air Force Military Art) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992); Li Junting and Yang Jinhe (chief eds), Zhongguo Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan (A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces) (Beijing: The People’s Publishing House, 1992); Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989); Wang Wenxian and Peng

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Zhishan (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work), 2 vols (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989); Yu Hao (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 2 vols (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994); Yuan Wei and Zhang Zhuo (chief eds), Zhongguo Junxiao Fazhanshi (A History of China’s Military Academies) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2001); Zhang Lianzhong et al., Haijun Shi (A History of the Navy) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1989).

Notes

Preface and acknowledgements 1

David Shambaugh, ‘PLA Studies Today: A Maturing Field’, in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), pp. 9–10.

1 Introduction 1 Richard C. Macke, ‘A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia’, Joint Force Quarterly, 7 (1995), p. 8. 2 Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, ‘Asia-Pacific Challenges’, Joint Force Quarterly, 7 (1995), p. 7. 3 For a description of the debate, see David Shambaugh, ‘Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s Responses’, International Security, 21, 2 (1996), pp. 180–209; Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, ‘China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions’ in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds), Engaging China (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 235–72; Richard J. Newman and Kevin Whitelaw, ‘China: How Big a Threat?’, US News & World Report, 131, 3 (23 July 2001), pp. 30–3. On divergent views, see Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘A New China Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 74, 6 (1995), pp. 35–49; Gerald Segal, ‘East Asia and the “Constrainment” of China’, International Security, 20, 4 (1996), pp. 107–35; Gideon Rachman, ‘Containing China’, Washington Quarterly, 19, 1 (1996), pp. 129–40; Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1998), US-China Commission, Report to Congress of the US-China Security Review Commission (July 2002) (www.uscc.gov). 4 Samuel S. Kim, ‘China’s International Organizational Behaviour’ in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 405–7; Qin Yongchun, ‘The Developing China–ASEAN Relationship’, Heping yu Fazhan (Peace and Development), 2 (1996), p. 11; Jusuf Wanandi, ‘ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement’, Survival, 38, 3 (1996), pp. 122–3; Chu Shulong, ‘PostCold War Development of China’s Security Strategic Thinking’, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengji (World Economics and Politics), 9 (1999), pp. 12–13; Avery Goldstein, ‘The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice’, China Quarterly, 168 (2001), pp. 842–5; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Research Office, Zhongguo Waijiao (China’s Diplomacy) 2002 (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, 2002), p. 614; ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, 4 November 2002, ASEAN offi-

Notes

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8 9 10 11 12

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cial homepage (www.aseansec.org/13165.htm). Since the 1990s China has published a number of White Papers on major, controversial issues, such as national defence, governance and development in ethnic minority regions, and human rights. These documents may be found in the Xinhua News Agency Internet page: news3.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/22/content_ 638035.htm. Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Evaluating Chinese Military Procurement from Russia’, Joint Force Quarterly, 17 (1997/98), p. 91; US-China Commission, Report to Congress of the US-China Security Review Commission (July 2002). David M. Finkelstein, ‘Commentary on Doctrine’ in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (eds), Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 151. Paul H.B. Godwin is one of the most well-known and probably the most productive analyst on China’s doctrine. See e.g. his The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press); ‘Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War’, Annals, AAPSS, 519 (January 1992), pp. 191–201; ‘From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Toward 2000’, The China Quarterly, 146 (June 1996), pp. 464–87; ‘The PLA Faces the Twenty-First Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations’ in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds), China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 39–63; ‘Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949–1999’ in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein and Michael A. McDevitt (eds), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 23–55. This book, as the title suggests, draws lessons from PLA war history to map out patterns of how this army fights. Other major contributions to the Chinese doctrinal literature include Nan Li, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese Perspective’, The China Quarterly, 146 (1996), pp. 443–63; Nan Li, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies’ in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), p. 174; Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997); Michael Pillsbury (ed.), China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000); Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Dennis J. Blasko, ‘PLA Force Structure: A 20-Year Retrospective’ in Mulvenon and Yang (eds), Seeking Truth from Facts, pp. 51–2. John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 37, 47–8. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 102. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (6th edn) (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 1. John J. Weltman, World Politics and the Evolution of War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 10; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’ in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 85; Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th edn) (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 31, 311–13; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 3.

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13 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (2nd edn) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 295. 14 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), pp. 138 and 439; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, 80 (1990), p. 158; John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 164; Yevgeny Afanasiev and Grigory Logvinov, ‘Russia and China: Girding for the Third Millennium’, International Affairs (Moscow), 41, 11–12 (1995), pp. 50–1; V. Portyakov, ‘Are the Chinese Coming? Migration Processes in Russia’s Far East’, International Affairs (Moscow), 42, 1 (1996), pp. 135–7; Jiang Yi, ‘The Security Dilemma and Sino–Russian Relations’, Dongou Zhongya Yanjiu (Eastern European, Russian and Central Asian Studies), 5 (2002), pp. 28–9; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (2nd edn) (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 172–82; Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 121; Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict’, The Journal of Politics, 66, 1 (2004), pp. 261 and 263. 15 William T. Tow, ‘Contending Security Approaches in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Security Studies, 3, 1 (1993), pp. 75–116; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, ‘Rethinking East Asian Security’, Survival, 36, 2 (1994), pp. 3 and 18; Bernard Cole, ‘Asia at Sea’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 123, 3 (1997), p. 36; Paul Dibb, ‘Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads’, Naval War College Review, 54, 1 (2001) (www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review); Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Introduction’ in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (eds), Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose (Seattle, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), pp. 10–11. 16 Leszek Buszynski, ‘ASEAN Security Dilemmas’, Survival, 34, 4 (1992/93), pp. 96 and 101–2; Ralph A. Cossa, ‘Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on TwoTracks’, Joint Force Quarterly, 7 (1995), p. 35; Segal, ‘East Asia and the “Constrainment” of China’, pp. 128–32; Cole, ‘Asia at Sea’, p. 36; IISS, ‘ASEAN: In Need of a New Approach?’, Strategic Comments, 4, 1 (1998), pp. 1–2; Tobias Nischchalke, ‘Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community’, The Pacific Review, 15, 1 (2002), pp. 110–12; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 158; John S. Duffield, ‘Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective’ in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 243–4. 17 A prime example of the participation of ‘outside’ powers is the ASEAN postministerial conference and dialogue systems. Members include Australia, Canada, China, the European Community, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States and the United Nations Development Programme. 18 Cossa, ‘Asian Multilateralism’, p. 36; Wanandi, ‘ASEAN’s China Strategy’, pp. 120 and 124–5. 19 Rothgeb, Defining Power, pp. 19–20; Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, p. 51; David Jablonsky, ‘National Power’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, 27, 1 (1997), p. 34. 20 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, pp. 127–69. 21 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 113; Jablonsky, ‘National Power’, p. 35. 22 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, p. 52.

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23 John Garnett, ‘The Role of Military Power’ in John Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 84. 24 Jablonsky, ‘National Power’, p. 35. 25 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. 148. For a prime example of literature forecasting the eventual downturn of China see Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). 26 See Shambaugh, ‘Containment or Engagement of China?’, p. 183; Karl W. Eikenberry, ‘Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?’ Parameters, 25, 1 (1995), pp. 88–9; Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 826. 27 Ka Po Ng, ‘China Defence Budgeting: Structure and Dynamics’ in C.K. Lo, S. Pepper and K.Y. Tsui (eds), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), pp. 9.4–9.5; China State Council Press Office, 2002 Nian de Zhongguo Guofang (China’s National Defence in 2002), JFJB, 10 December 2002. 28 Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, ‘The Realistic Engagement of China’, The Washington Quarterly, 19, 1 (1995), pp. 141–69; Lieberthal, ‘A New China Strategy’, pp. 35–49; Rachman, ‘Containing China’, pp. 129–39; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘The Case for Deep Engagement’, Foreign Affairs, 74, 4 (1995), pp. 91–114; Segal, ‘East Asia and the “Constrainment” of China’, pp. 107–35. 29 Robert A. Manning, ‘Clinton and China: Beyond Human Rights’, Orbis, 38, 2 (1994), p. 200; Cronin and Cronin, ‘Realistic Engagement of China’, pp. 151–3; Denoon and Frieman, ‘China’s Security Strategy’, p. 423; Segal, ‘East Africa and the “Constrainment” of China’, p. 108. 30 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, p. 105; Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 216 and 299–311. 31 The Seven Military Classics are: (1) Sun Zi Bingfa (Sun Zi’s Military Art); (2) Wu Zi Bingfa (Wu Zi’s Military Art); (3) Sima Fa (Sima’s Ways); (4) Wei Liao Zi (Mr Wei Liao Zi); (5) Taigong Liutao (Jiang Taigong’s Six Stratagems); (6) Huangshigong Sanlüe (Huang Shigong’s Three Strategies); and (7) Tang Taizhong Li Weigong Wendui (Dialogues Between Tang Taizhong and Li Weigong). 32 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 30, 145 and 153. 33 Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay’, The Washington Quarterly, 19, 2 (1996), p. 188; William T. Tow, ‘Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective’ in Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 336. 34 Neil J. Smelser, ‘Culture: Coherent or Incoherent’ in Richard Münch and Neil J. Smelser (eds), Theory of Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 4, 9 and 13–16. 35 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji (A Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings), 6 vols (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House and CCPCC Archive Publishing House, 1993), pp. 421–2. 36 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji, p. 3. 37 Deng, Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 357–8. 38 Deng, Selected Works, p. 344. 39 Trans. and cited in Bernstein and Ross, Coming Conflict with China, pp. 37–8. 40 See e.g. Wang Weixu and Zeng Qiugeng, Jingti Meiguo de Dierci Yinmou (Guard Against the Second Conspiracy of America) (Beijing: The People’s Daily Publishing House, 2003); Fang Ning, Xin Diguozhuyi Shidai yu Zhongguo Zhanlüe (The Era of New Imperialism and China’s Strategy) (Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, 2003). 41 Yang Jinsen, Liang Xixin and Huang Minglu, Zhongguo Haiyang Kaifa Zhanlüe (China’s Maritime Development Strategy) (Hubei: Central China Polytechnic University Publishing House, 1990), pp. 36–41; RMRB, 6 June 1994, p. 4.

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42 Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, p. 151. 43 Cronin and Cronin, ‘The Realistic Engagement of China’, p. 164; Lieberthal, ‘A New China Strategy’, pp. 37 and 45–7. 44 Stephen Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’ in Perils of Anarchy, p. 220. 45 Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 (4th rev. edn) (New York: Penguin, 1985), pp. 313–18; Harold C. Hinton, ‘China as an Asian Power’ in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 369. 46 John Fiske, Introduction to Communication Studies (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 8–9. 47 Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, pp. 153–6; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 183 and 193; Roy, ‘Assessing the AsiaPacific “Power Vacuum” ’, p. 47. 48 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, p. 77. 49 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 299. 50 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 305 and 310. 51 Jack Snyder, ‘Introduction’ in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds), Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 4; Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, p. 44. 52 Rachman, ‘Containing China’, p. 133; Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, pp. 138–9. 53 Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future’, p. 86. 54 Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, p. 47. 55 Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, p. 134.

2 Military doctrine, military readiness and military power 1 Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995). 2 Betts, Military Readiness, p. 40. 3 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 13 and 245. 4 Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, p. 1. 5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 141. 6 I.B. Holley, Jr., ‘Fifty Questions for Doctrine Writers: Means Are As Important As Ends’, Airpower Journal, 51, 3 (1997), p. 30. 7 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, introduced by John B. Hattendorf (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1991), p. 348. 8 Austin, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 17. 9 US Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1–02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002). 10 US Army Headquarters, FM 100–5: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 1–1. 11 US Army Headquarters, FM 3–0: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 1–14. 12 Australia Air Power Studies Centre, Royal Australian Air Force, AAP 1000: The Air Power Manual (3rd edn) (Canberra: AGPS, 1998), p. 2. 13 AAP 1000, p. 4.

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14 David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 2. 15 William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 397; D.T. Yazov, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine’, translated by K.A. Bishop, RUSI & Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1990 (London: Brassey’s, 1990), p. 31. 16 Robert Bathurst, ‘Two Languages of War’ in Derek Leebaert (ed.), Soviet Military Thinking (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 28–31. 17 Austin, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 38. 18 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 118; Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problem (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1983), p. 308. 19 Lider, Military Theory, pp. 264 and 309–10. 20 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-first Century Warfare (London: Brassey’s, 1985), p. 14; William R. Richardson, ‘FM 100–5: The AirLand Battle in 1986’, Military Review, 77, 1 (1997), p. 174; Military Review Editor, ‘Editor’s Foreword: The Operational Art’, Military Review, 77, 1 (1997), p. 102. 21 AMS Foreign Military Studies Department, Yinghan Shuangjie Junyu Cidian (English–Chinese Bilingual Military Terms Dictionary) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1995), p. 321. 22 Chen Zhou, Xiandai Jubu Zhanzheng Lilun Yanjiu (A Study of Modern Local War Theories) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), pp. 114–15. 23 Georges Eng Bok Tan, ‘Strategic Doctrine’ in Gerald Segal and William Tow (eds), Chinese Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 6; Chen Liheng and Wang Jingjie (chief eds), Junshi Zhishi Cidian (Dictionary of Military Knowledge) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988); Gao Qiang and Qin Wenxian (eds), Hanying Junshi Shuyu Shouce (A Handbook of Chinese–English Military Glossary) (Beijing: Beijing Polytechnic University Publishing House, 1992). Chen and Wang’s dictionary was a project under the auspices of China’s National Defence University. Gao and Qin were faculty members of the PLA’s Xuanhua Artillery Academy. 24 Chen Liheng and Wang Jingjie, Junshi, p. 311. 25 Jia Ruoyu (chief ed.), Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang (Mao Zedong Military Thought) (Jinan: Shandong Publishing House, 1993), pp. 8–11. 26 Wang Feixiang et al., ‘Perspectives on the Nature of War and Methodology are Important Components of Mao Zedong Military Thought’ in JFJB Military Work Propaganda Department and JSXS (eds), A Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1984), pp. 92–102; Qi Zhenjun (chief ed.), Xinshiqi Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang de Fazhan (Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking in the New Period) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1991), p. 6; Liao Guoliang et al., Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang Fazhanshi (History of Mao Zedong Military Thought Development) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1991), p. 29; Jiang Siyi, Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang Lun (On Mao Zedong Military Thought) (Beijing: CCPCC Party School Publishing House, 1994), p. 242; Yao Youzhi and Fu Liqun, ‘The Historical Significance and Scientific Value of Mao Zedong Military Thought’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 8/9 (1997), p. 10. 27 Jia Shude (chief ed.), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng zhong Shandi Jingong Zhandou (Mountainous Offensive Combat in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994), pp. 133–92; Lin Boye et al., Mao Zedong Junshi Bianzhengfa Xintan (A New Study of Mao Zedong’s Military Dialectics) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1987), p. 5.

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28 Dai Yifang, ‘Views on Study of Deng Xiaoping’s Thinking in Military Reform’, China Military Science, 1 (1997), p. 84; Zhao Nanqi, ‘On Deng Xiaoping Thinking of Military Reform’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1996), p. 13; Qin Yaoqi (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Xinshiqi Jundui Jianshe Sixiang Gailun (An Introduction to Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Army Building in the New Era) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994), pp. 6 and 55–8. 29 Jia Shude, Mountainous Offensive Combat in High-technology Local Wars, pp. 193–241. 30 Jiang Siyi, On Mao Zedong Military Thought, p. 242; Li Jijun, Junshi Lilun yu Zhanzhen Shijian (Military Theory and War Practices) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1994), p. 43; Wang Xianzhi (chief ed.), Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang (Mao Zedong Military Thought) (Beijing: Haichao Publishing House, 1992), pp. 26–7; Zhang Jiayu, ‘A New Study on the Structure of Mao Zedong Military Thought’, in AMS (ed.), Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1988), pp. 86–7. 31 Guo Weitao, Renmin Zhanzheng Lun (On People’s War) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992), pp. 173–92; Cheng Xiulong (chief ed.), Jiang Zhuxi ‘Wujuhua’ Yaodian Changjie (An Exposition on the ‘Five Statements’ by Chairman Jiang) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1994), p. 165; Guo Chunying (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Xiandai Tiaojianxia Renmin Zhanzheng Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study of Deng Xiaoping’s People’s War under Modern Conditions Doctrine) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), p. 1; ‘The General Staff Department Plans for a New Year’s Military Work’, Jiefangjun Bao, 1 February 2004. 32 Zhang Wannian (chief ed.), Dangdai Shijie Junshi yu Zhongguo Guofang (Contemporary World Military Affairs and China’s National Defence) (Beijing: CCPCC Party School Publishing House, 2003), pp. 77–87. 33 To cite book-length examples, Greg D. Austin, The Sources of Military Doctrine – A Lesson From the Cold War, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994); James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921–1991 (Canberra: AGPS, 1992). 34 Kier, Imagining War, p. 21; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 233–5. 35 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 173 and 225; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 10. 36 George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 103–5; Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, pp. 24–32. 37 Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay’, The Washington Quarterly, 19, 2 (1996), p. 177; Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine’, pp. 67–71. 38 Colin S. Gray, ‘Seapower and Landpower’ in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (eds), Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 4 and 9; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 50.

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39 David G. Hansen, ‘The Immutable Importance of Geography’, Parameters, 27, 1 (1997), pp. 56 and 59; Kent Hughes Butts, ‘The Strategic Importance of Water’, Parameters, 27, 1 (1997), pp. 65–8; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Energy and Insecurity in Asia’, Survival, 39, 3 (1997), pp. 92–8. 40 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th edn) (New York: Knopf, 1985), p. 43. 41 Australian Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: AGPS, 2000), p. 23; John Harvey, ‘Air Power in the Defence of Australia’ in Mark Lax (compiler), Air Power Presentation 1995 (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Fairbairn, 1995), p. 6. 42 US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change 1989 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 59; Yazov, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine’, pp. 33. 43 Cited in Kintner and Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, p. 19; Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, p. 178. 44 Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, 75, 2 (1996), p. 39; James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, 4 (1994), pp. 25–6. 45 FM 3–0: Operations, pp. 1–14. 46 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1949 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 164. 47 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Books, 1984), pp. 97–8. 48 John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, introduction by Charles L. Donnelly, Jr. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 59. 49 Qi Dexue, Juren de Jiaoliang: Kangmei Yuanzhao Gaocheng Juece he Zhidao (The Contest between Giants: High-level Decision Making and Guidance in the Korean War) (Beijing: CCPCC Party School Publishing House, 1999), pp. 59–60. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 94 and 143–4. 50 Wu Xinbo, ‘China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power’ in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 122; Tian Zengpei (chief ed.), Gaige Kaifang Yilai de Zhongguo Waijiao (China’s Foreign Relations since the Reforms and Opening) (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, 1993), pp. 291–306; Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘China and the Global Strategic Balance’ in Harry Harding (ed.), China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 166–7. 51 Zhang Jingyi, ‘The Security Factor in Sino–American Relations: Review and Prospect’ in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) American Institute and China American Society (eds), Zhongmei Guanxi Shinian (Ten Years of Sino–American Relations) (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1989), pp. 42–4; Tian Zengpei, China’s Foreign Relations since the Reforms and Opening, pp. 390–1 and 394–7; David Shambaugh, ‘Patterns of Interaction in Sino–American Relations’ in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 203. 52 Deng Xiaoping, ‘Preserve World Peace, Improve Nation Building’ in AMS and CCPCC Archive Research Office (eds), Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1992), pp. 120–1; Tian Zengpei, China’s Foreign Relations since the Reforms and Opening, p. 5; Steven I. Levin, ‘China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power’ in China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s, pp. 117–18; Pollack, ‘China and the Global

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55 56

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58 59 60 61

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Notes Strategic Balance’, pp. 159–64; William T. Tow, ‘China and the International Strategic System’ in Chinese Foreign Policy, pp. 122 and 132. Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 826. Koro Bessho, ‘Identities and Security in East Asia’, Adelphi Paper 325 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 66–7; Kim Kyung-Won, ‘Maintaining Asia’s Current Peace’, Survival, 39, 4 (1997/98), pp. 53–4. Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War’, Annals, AAPSS, January 519 (1992), p. 193. Gu Dexin (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Guoji Zhanlüe Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts)(Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), pp. 129–30; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy’ in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 79. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 105–6, 126; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’ in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 85; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 152; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (2nd edn) (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 54–5; Huan Xiang, ‘The Future International Environment and Our National Defence Building’ in Yang Dezhi and Huan Xiang et al., pp. 15 and 23; Guo Jing’an, ‘China Will Never Be a Hegemon, China is Always with Developing Countries – A Basic Premise and Standing Point of Deng Xiaoping’s Diplomatic Thoughts’ in Taipang Wang (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Sixiang Lunwenji (A Collection of Essays on Deng Xiaoping’s Diplomatic Thoughts) (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, 1996), pp. 276–80; Deng Yong, ‘The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations’, The China Quarterly, 154 (June 1998), pp. 311–12. Xu Chengfang, Heping Fanlüe – Zhongguo Waijiao Celüe Yanjiu (A Strategy of Peace – Study on China’s Foreign Relations Strategy) (Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing House, 2001), pp. 215–16. Deng Xiaoping, ‘Peace and Development are the Two Major Issues for the Contemporary World’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, pp. 137–8. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi (Analysis of China’s National Interest) (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1996), p. 19. Deng Xiaoping, ‘Implementation of People’s War Does Not Mean Rejection of Military Modernisation’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 60; Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 77. Gu Dexin, Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts, p. 146. ‘State’ and ‘nation’ are different objects and concepts. While the former, in the Weberian tradition, is more concerned with physical and organisational features, the latter is said to have five dimensions: psychological, cultural, territorial, political and historical (see Montserrat Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), p. 47). The author of one of China’s major works on ‘national interests’, Yan Xuetong, argues that ‘interests’ of the nation and those of the state overlap in China. In his typology, national interests are about the interests of

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68 69 70 71 72

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a nation-state. He objects to the mix of national interests with interests of the ruling class, which represents only ‘regime interests’ (zhengquan liyi), though he does admit the probability of ‘overlapping’ (Yan Xuetong, Analysis of China’s National Interest, pp. 4 and 6–10). Zhou Enlai, ‘Our Diplomatic Directions and Tasks’ in China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and CCPCC Archive Research Office (eds), Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: CCPCC Archive Publishing House, 1990), p. 55; Deng Xiaoping, ‘Carry Through the Adjusted Directions, Ensure Stability and Unity’ in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2 (2nd edn) (Beijing: The People’s Publishing House, 1994), p. 369; Gu Dexin, Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts, pp. 145–6. Karl Marx, ‘Article 1, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Section 1, Volume 3’ in Bottomore and Maxmilien Rubel (eds), Tom Bottomore (trans), Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (2nd edn) (Middlesex: Penguin, 1961), p. 222; R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (5th and rev. edn) (Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1963), p. 94. Gao Jintian (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Guoji Zhanglüe Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), pp. 576–7 and 581; Niu Li and Ni Qisheng (chief eds), Shihui Zhuyi Zhongguo Buke Zhansheng – Deng Xiaoping Guojia Anquan Zhidao Yishu (Socialist China is Invincible – The Art of Deng Xiaoping’s National Security Guidance) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1995), p. 19; Xu Wenquan, ‘The Nature of National Interest’, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 12 (2000), p. 36. Buzan defines a state as a triadic concept: idea, institution and physical base. Although he disputes the proper location of sovereignty, its close relations to governance make it a feature of state institution (see Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (2nd edn) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 65–107). Gu Dexin, Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts, p. 150; Deng Xiaoping, ‘National Sovereignty and Security Must Be Always the First Priority’ in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, pp. 347–9. Bo Guili, Guojia Zhanlüe Lun (On National Strategy) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Publishing House, 1994), p. 279. Zhou Enlai, ‘Our Diplomatic Directions and Tasks’ in Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai, p. 55. Deng Yong, ‘Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations’, p. 311. Gao Jintian (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Guoji Zhanglüe Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), p. 582; Gu Dexin, Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts, p. 146; Bo Guili, On National Strategy, p. 279; Zhang Yuliang (chief ed.), Mianxiang Ershiyi Shiji de Guoji Zhanlüe Mouhua – Xuexi Jiang Zemin Tongzhi Guanyu Guoji Zhanlüe de Lunshu (International Strategy for the Twenty-first Century – A Study on Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Speeches on International Strategy) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1998), pp. 115–16. Valencia, ‘Energy and Insecurity in Asia’, p. 86; Yan Xuetong, Analysis of China’s National Interest, p. 37; Gao Jintian, Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts, pp. 584–5; ‘China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy: Part 1: Restructuring Begins’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 8, 3 (1996), p. 130; Gan Yanping, Zhongguo de Haiyang Guotu (China’s Maritime Territory) (Beijing:

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76 77 78 79

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81

82

83

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Notes Maritime Publishing House, 1998); Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘China’s Military Posture and the New Economic Geopolitics’, Survival, 41, 2 (1999), pp. 71–3; ‘6,000 Uninhabited Islands Weave a Dream of Ocean’, JFJB, 8 November 2003. ‘Director of the Chinese Navy’s Military Art Research Institute Comments on Threats from the Sea’, JFJB, 2 January 2004. See e.g. Wang Junqin, ‘Problems of National Defence Building and Its Countermeasures After China’s Joining the WTO’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 5 (2002), pp. 17–19; Chen Zhangyuan, Ou Jianping and Pan Rixuan, ‘Respond Actively to the Impact of China’s Accession to the WTO on Secrecy Work’, ibid., 7 (2002), pp. 56–9. Wang Kefu et al., ‘On the Concept of National Defence in the New Era’ in Yizhi Shen (chief ed.), Lilun Zhongheng: Junshi Pian (Theoretical Forum: Military) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin Publishing House, 1988), p. 116. AMS Strategic Studies Department, Zhanlüe Xue (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 41–5. Yang Cheng, ‘Interests Border: The Developing Substance of National Sovereignty’, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 11 (2003), pp. 19, 21–2. Michael Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), p. 44; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Military-related Think Tanks and Research Institutions’, The China Quarterly, 171 (2002), p. 618. Swaine, Role of the Chinese Military, pp. 46 and 64–5; Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 76 and 94; AMS, ‘World Military Affairs Yearbook’ Editorial, Shijie Junshi Nianjian (World Military Affairs Yearbook) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2001), pp. 130–1; David Finkelstein, ‘The General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, and Missions’ in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (eds), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), pp. 129, 146–60, 167–70. Swaine, Role of the Chinese Military, pp. 64–8; Gill and Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Military-related Think Tanks and Research Institutions’, pp. 619–22; Li Nan, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese Perspective’, The China Quarterly, 146 (1996), p. 445; Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, pp. 46 and 75; David Shambaugh, ‘China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process’, The China Quarterly, 171 (2002), pp. 586–8. Swaine, Role of the Chinese Military, pp. 60–4; Bonnie S. Glaser and Philip C. Saunders, ‘Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Evolving Process and Increasing Influence’, The China Quarterly, 171 (2002), pp. 599–600; Shambaugh, ‘China’s International Relations Think Tanks’, pp. 582–4 and 588–90. Hau Zizhou and Peng Yanmei, ‘Characteristics of a New Edition of Infantry Combat Regulations’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department (ed.), Zhanyi zhanshu yu Xiandai Zuozhan: Junshi Kexueyuan 1986 nian bufen lunwen xuanji (Operational Art and Modern Combat: 1986 Selection of Essays at the Academy of Military Science), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), p. 87; Wang Xinsheng and Bao Guojun, ‘A Sketch of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Academy of Military Science’, Guofang (National Defence), 3 (1998), p. 5; RMRB, 23 February 1998; JFJB, 5 December 2001. JFJB, 25 October 2002. Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work), Vol. 2 (Beijing:

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88 89 90 91

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

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China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), p. 346; Xiao Ban, ‘An Introduction to the PLA National Defence University’, Guofang (National Defence), 7 (1997), p. 43; Gill and Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Military-related Think Tanks and Research Institutions’, p. 623; JFJB, 5 December 2002, 12 May 2003, 26 March 2004. Examples of the works include Dai Jinyu (chief ed.), Kongjun Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (Course Text on Air Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991); Hua Renjie et al., Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang Shi (A History of Air Force Military Art) (Beijing: Liberation Army Publishing House, 1992). The navy’s think-tank is the Military Art Research Institute, and the air force has a research office at its own headquarters. Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), p. 266; Cui Yafeng et al., ‘Selected Speeches at the Symposium on Joint Operations Series Research’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 9 (2002), pp. 97–104; RMRB, 1 August 2002. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 102. Marcus A. Kuiper, ‘Return of the Hollow Army?’, Military Review, 73, 8 (1993), p. 3; Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Papermac, 1987), p. 6. Xiao Feng, ‘Reminiscences of Jinmen Invasion’ in Litian Cong et al., Huigu Jinmen Dengluzhan (Review of the Jinmen Landing Operations) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1994), p. 48. Michael Rich et al., Improving U.S. Air Force Readiness and Sustainability R3113/1-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1984), p. 1; Michael Rich et al., Recent Progress in Assessing the Readiness and Sustainability of Combat Forces R-3475-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987), pp. 1–3; Jonny J. Johnston, ‘Budgeting for Readiness’, Military Review, 73, 4 (1993), p. 29; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, p. 234. Betts, Military Readiness, pp. 25–6. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., pp. 27–8. Ibid., pp. 40–2. Ibid., pp. 35, 62–4. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 197. Michael Evans, The Primacy of Doctrine: The United States Army and Military Innovation and Reform, 1945–1995 (Canberra: The Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, 1996), pp. 12 and 23. Robert Cameron, ‘American Tank Development During the Cold War: Maintaining the Edge Or Just Getting By?’, Armor, July–August, 107, 4 (1998), pp. 30–3. Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 122; J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789–1961 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992), pp. 175–6. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, p. 46; Randall G. Bowdish, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth Generation’, Military Review, 75, 6 (1995), p. 26; Terry J. Gander, Collins/Jane’s Tanks of World War II (Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 18; Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, ‘Armor and Future Urban Warfare’, Armor, March–April, 113, 2 (2004), pp. 22–5. Alvin D. Coox, ‘Military Effectiveness of Armed Forces in the Interwar Period, 1918–1941: A Review’ in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. 2: The Interwar Period (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 263.

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105 There have been a lot of publications and forums on RMA in the Chinese military. See e.g. Gao Chunxiang (chief ed.), Xin Junshi Geming Lun (New Military Revolution) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1996); Su Zhirong, Kuashiji de Junshi Xinguandian (New Military Perspectives Across the Centuries) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1997); Zhu Xiaoli, Junshi Geming Wenti de Yanjiu (A Study on the Revolution in Military Affairs) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2000). There was also a special forum on RMA in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), No. 1, 1996, a quarterly published by the Chinese Academy of Military Science. 106 Cited in Kintner and Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, pp. 24–5. 107 Steven Metz, ‘Racing Toward the Future: The Revolution in Military Affairs’, Current History (April 1997), pp. 184–5. 108 Williamson Murray, ‘Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, 16 (1997), p. 70. 109 Paul Dibb, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security’, Survival, 39, 4 (1997/98), pp. 94–5. 110 Bates Gill, ‘Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army: A Book Review’, Joint Force Quarterly, 17 (1997/98), p. 138. 111 Academy of Military Science (AMS) and Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) Archive Research Office (eds), Deng Xiaoping Lun Guofang yu Jundui Jianshe (Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1992), p. 10. 112 Yu Huating, ‘A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s Military Strategic Thoughts’ in Huang Yuzhang (ed.), Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts, Vol. 3 (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), pp. 770–85. 113 Chinese PLA NDU Scientific Research Department (ed.), Lun Su Yu de Junshi Lilun yu Shijian (The Military Theory and Practice of Su Yu) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991), p. 721. 114 Zheng Wenhan, ‘Promotion of Military Theoretical Research Does Not Allow Delays’, Zai Shenhua Jundui Gaige zhong Fazhan Junshi Lilun (Develop Military Theories Amidst Deepening of Military Reforms) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1992), p. 1. 115 Bi Wenbo et al., ‘Explaining Some Military Philosophical Concepts’, Junshi Lishi Yanjiu (Military History Research), 2 (2001), p. 126. 116 Qin Yaoqi, Introduction to Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Army Building, pp. 24–31; Liu Longguang et al., Gaojishu Junshi Shijie (The High-technology Military World) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), pp. 95–6, 307–14; Zhang Wannian (chief ed.), Contemporary World Military Affairs and China’s National Defence, p. 63; JFJB, 4 November 2002, 2 September 2003, 1 January 2004. 117 Bi Wenbo et al., ‘Explaining Some Military Philosophical Concepts’, pp. 126–7.

3 The genesis of the Chinese local war doctrine 1 Michael W. Cannon, ‘The Development of the American Theory of Limited War, 1945–1963’, Armed Forces and Society, 19, 1 (1992), p. 76. 2 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 15; Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 8. 3 Important works published at the time include William Kaufmann (ed.), Mili-

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5 6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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tary Policy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956); Bernard Brodie, The Meaning of Limited War. Research Memorandum RM-2224. ASTIA Document Number AD 156027 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1958); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958); Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1957); Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper/Herman Kahn, 1957); Henry Kissinger, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). Robert Endicott Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’ in International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), Problems of Modern Strategy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 93; Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, p. 9; Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Books, 1984), pp. 103–5. Grey D. Austin, The Sources of Military Doctrine: A Lesson from the Cold War, Ph.D. dissertation (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994), pp. 186–214. The Chinese term, zhanzheng chuqi, is sometimes translated as ‘early stage’ or ‘initial stage’. Here, we follow, throughout the study, the usage in Gao Qiang and Qin Wenxian (eds), Hanying Junshi Shuyu Shouce (A Handbook of ChineseEnglish Military Glossary) (Beijing: Beijing Polytechnic University Publishing House, 1992). ‘Local war’ is used extensively in Chinese military literature as translation of jubu zhanzheng. For example, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), a quarterly published by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science; Zhongguo Dabaike Chuanshu: Junshi: Zhanzheng, Zhanlüe, Zhanyi Fence (The Encyclopedia Sinicia: Military: Volume II: War, Strategy, Campaigning) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987). This usage is followed throughout this research. Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Papermac, 1987), p. 221; Michael Carver, War since 1945 (rev. and updated edn) (London: The Ashfield Press, 1990), pp. 162–3; Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 9. Brodie, Meaning of Limited War, pp. 1 and 11; Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 307. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th edn) (New York: Knopf, 1985), p. 82; Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’, pp. 97–8. Brodie, Meaning of Limited War, p. 12. Cited in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (2nd edn) (London: Macmillan for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 84. Foot, A Substitute for Victory, p. 162; Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 (4th rev. edn) (New York: Penguin, 1985), pp. 138–9. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 84–5; Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 248. Brodie, Meaning of Limited War, p. 16. Cannon, ‘Development of the American Theory of Limited War’, p. 76. Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’, p. 94. Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation, p. 9; Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problem (Aldershot, Hants: Gower Press, 1983), p. 77; James Cable, ‘Limited War’, International Relations, 11, 6 (1993), pp. 555–6.

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19 Austin, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 172–3. 20 Ibid., pp. 174–86. 21 David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 177. 22 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 169–71. 23 Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, p. 183; Lionel Kochan and Richard Abraham, The Making of Modern Russia (2nd edn) (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 456. 24 The understanding of RMA varies among scholars and militaries. The core idea is about innovation in technologies, doctrines and organisations that has caused paradigmatic changes in the conduct of war. For details, see James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, 4 (1994), pp. 25–6; Ralph Peters, ‘After the Revolution’, Parameters, 25, 2 (1995), p. 7; Murray Williamson, ‘Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, 16 (1997), pp. 70–2; Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, pp. 177–8; and Gao Chunxiang (chief ed.), Xin Junshi Geming Lun (On The New Military Revolution) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1996), p. 6 and Chapter 1. 25 David Lane, State and Politics in the USSR (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 117–18; Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, pp. 177–9 and 182. 26 Cannon, ‘Development of the American Theory of Limited War’, p. 89. 27 Austin, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 186–93; William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 15. 28 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 112–13; Austin, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 187–9. 29 John van Oudenaren, Deterrence, War-fighting and Soviet Military Doctrine. Adelphi Papers No. 210 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), pp. 14–15; Kintner and Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, pp. 10–11; Austin, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 113. 30 See Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work), 2 vols (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989); Yu Hao (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 2 vols (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994); AMS Military History Research Department (MHRD), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Liushinian Dashiji (A Chronicle of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Past 60 Years, 1927–1987) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1988). There are only minor differences among this literature in characterising the periods. 31 Pan Rixuan and Zhang Yong, ‘The Three Military Strategic Changes in Our Army’s Warring Era and Their Implications’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of the National Defence University), 8–9 (1997), pp. 29–30 and 32–3; Zhou Xiaopeng, ‘Historical Development of Our Army’s Campaigning Theories and Questions about Its Periodisation’ in Chinese PLA NDU Graduate Class (ed.), Selected Military Essays from the National Defence University I: Military Theories (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988), p. 216; Jia Ruoyu (chief ed.), Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang (Mao Zedong Military Thought) (Jinan: Shandong Publishing House, 1993), pp. 321–3. 32 William Whitson and Chen-Hsia Huang, in their seminal work, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71 (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 7–23. 33 Ibid., p. 23.

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34 George, Chinese Communist Army in Action, pp. 25–55. 35 Guo Chunying (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Xiandai Tiaojianxia Renmin Zhanzheng Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study of Deng Xiaoping’s People’s War under Modern Conditions Doctrine) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), p. 19; Gu Dexin (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Guoji Zhanlüe Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s International Strategic Thoughts) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), p. 19. 36 Paul H.B. Godwin, The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), p. 15. 37 Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1990), pp. 9 and 113; Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (rev. and expanded edn) (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 300; Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare From Breitenfeld to Waterloo (London: Pimlico, 1991), pp. 230 and 485. 38 Guo Weitao, Renmin Zhanzheng Lun (On People’s War) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992), pp. 174–85; Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji (A Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House and CCPCC Archive Publishing House, 1993), pp. 234; Vol. 1, p. 725; Zhang Youming, ‘The Emergence, Development and Enlightenment of the PLA Operational Guiding Principle Before the Eighties (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1996), p. 82. 39 J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, introduction by John B. Hattendorf, postscript by J.C. Wylie (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 23. 40 Jiang Runguan (chief ed.), Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu – Junshi: Zhangzheng, Zhanlüe, Zhanyi Fence: Zhanzheng, Zhanlüe (Encyclopaedia Sinica – Military Affairs: War, Strategy, Campaign: War, Strategy) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), p. 74. 41 Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 22. 42 The characterisation of the military exercises and missile tests in the 1990s with an aim to deter Taiwan is disputable and will be discussed in following passages. See Liu Sheng’e and Miao Lin (chief eds), Xiandai Jubu Zhanzheng Tiaojian xia de Renmin Zhanzheng (People’s War under Modern Local War Conditions) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1996), p. 1. 43 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 195. 44 James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1972 (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 56. 45 Li Junting and Yang Jinhe (chief eds), Zhongguo Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan (A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces) (Beijing: Renmin Publishing House, 1992), pp. 479 and 565. 46 Whitson and Chen, Chinese High Command, p. 15; Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (rev. and enlarged edn) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 89 and 512. 47 Harrison, Long March to Power, p. 121. 48 This term includes the so-called ‘28 Bolsheviks’. They were Chinese students who had been trained in the 1920s mainly at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow with the support of Pavel Mif, a Communist International (Comintern) agent and Soviet Eastern expert, and his colleagues. The group included such leaders as Qin Bangxian (alias Bo Gu) and Wang Ming. 49 Harrison, Long March to Power, pp. 227 and 245–6; Wang and Peng, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 5.

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50 See e.g. Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 1, pp. 269 and 288. 51 Ibid., pp. 690–2, 706–7, 715 and 751. 52 Jia Ruoyu, Mao Zedong Military Thought, p. 322. 53 Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 5, p. 466. 54 Cited in George, Chinese Communist Army in Action, p. 3. 55 Cited in Summers, On Strategy, p. 112. 56 Zhu De, Zhu De Xuanji (Selected Works of Zhu De) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1983), pp. 196, 229–30 and 236. 57 Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: CCPCC Archive Publishing House, 1988), pp. 424 and 427; Carver, War since 1945, p. 164; Jia Ruoyu, Mao Zedong Military Thought, p. 322. 58 Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 5, pp. 549; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 48. 59 Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘China as a Military Power’ in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack (eds), Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 62–3. 60 Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, p. 355. 61 Ibid.; Peng Dehuai, Selected Military Works, pp. 442–4. 62 For a comprehensive survey of pre-1949 development of Chinese communist military schools, see Su Shijia and Kang Jinghai, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Yuanxiao Fazhanshi (A History of the Development of PLA Academies and Schools) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991). 63 Peng Dehuai, Selected Military Works, pp. 284–5. 64 Su Shijia and Kang Jinghai, History of the Development of PLA Academies and Schools, p. 32. 65 Ibid., pp. 33–4. 66 Zhou Xiaopeng, ‘Historical Development of Our Army’s Campaigning Theories and Questions about Its Periodisation’, p. 227; Zhu De, Selected Works, p. 234; Chen Feiqin and Yang Yuanfu, Liu Bocheng Junshi Lilun Tansuo (An Investigation into Liu Bocheng’s Military Theories) (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Publishing House, 1991), p. 10. 67 Su Shijia and Kang Jinghai, History of the Development of PLA Academies and Schools, p. 511. 68 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 142 and 558; Su Shijia and Kang Jinghai, ibid., pp. 532–3 and 536–7; AMS Military History Research Department, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Past 60 Years, pp. 503–4; Chen Feiqin and Yang Yuanfu, Liu Bocheng’s Military Theories, pp. 194–5. 69 Yang Guoyu (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Contemporary Chinese Navy) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1987), pp. 105–6; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 162; Xinghuo Liaoyuan Editorial, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiangshuai Minglu (Directory of PRC Marshalls and Generals), Vol. 3 (Beijing: Liberation Army Publishing House, 1991), p. 73. 70 Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), pp. 40–1, 57–8 and 265; Xinghuo Liaoyuan Editorial, Directory of PRC Marshalls and Generals, Vol. 2, p. 68; Hua Renjie, Cao Yifeng and Chen Huixiu (chief eds), Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang Shi (A History of Air Force Military Art) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992), pp. 309 and 315. 71 Xiong Cheng and Zhou Fengyi (chief eds), Junshi Jiaoyuxue Jiaocheng (Military Education Curriculum) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1990), p. 46; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military

Notes

72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

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Work, Vol. 1, p. 44; Shen Zhihua, Sulian Zhuanjia zai Zhongguo 1948–1960 (Soviet Specialists in China, 1948–1960) (Beijing: China International Broadcast Publishing House, 2003), pp. 197 and 212–13. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 151 and 160; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army, pp. 36, 38 and 43; Peng Dehuai, Selected Military Works, pp. 469 and 471. Zhu De, Selected Works, p. 326; Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, pp. 402–4; Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 6. Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, p. 337. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 254–71. Peng Dehuai, Selected Military Works, pp. 589–90. Jiang Runguan, Encyclopaedia Sinica – Military Affairs, p. 310. Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 405; AMS Military Historical Research Department, Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Past 60 Years, p. 557; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 187. Cited in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 67. Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, pp. 10–11; Godwin, Chinese Communist Armed Forces, pp. 16–17. Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan’an Leadership, 1958–65’ in Roderick MacFarqhar (ed.), The Politics of China, 1949–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 101. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 4 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1969), p. 1362; Zhou Enlai, ‘Our Diplomatic Directions and Tasks’ in China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and CCPCC Archive Research Office (eds), Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: CCPCC Archive Publishing House, 1990), p. 50. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 441. Ibid., p. 165. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 250–1; Godwin, Chinese Communist Armed Forces, p. 19; Vendulka Kubálková and Albert Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 124; Harrison, Long March to Power, pp. 480–1. Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, p. 376. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 167–70 and 415; Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, pp. 406–9. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 51; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, pp. 89–90. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 175–7. Xie Yixian (chief ed.), Zhongguo Waijiao Shi: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shiqi (A Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1979) (Henan: Henan People’s Publishing House, 1994), pp. 134–9. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, p. 12. Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, p. 358. Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 54; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 264. Yu Hao, ibid., Vol. 1, p. 415. Li Jue et al., Dangdai Zhongguo de Hegongye (Contemporary China’s Nuclear Industry) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Publishing House, 1987), pp. 13 and 21. Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, p. 371.

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97 Li Jue, Contemporary China’s Nuclear Industry, pp. 21 and 257. 98 Mao’s order to attack only KMT vessels but to avoid US ships seemed a modification of his original objectives after Soviet refusal to pledge unreserved nuclear support in case of US nuclear attack. See Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, p. 68; Gaddis, Rethinking Cold War History, pp. 249–51; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 192–7. 99 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 516 and 521; Peng Jichao, ‘A True Story of the Research and Development of China’s Nuclear Shield’, Shenjian (The Awesome Sword, a PLA Second Artillery publication), 1 (1994), p. 5; Li Jue, Contemporary China’s Nuclear Industry, pp. 20–1; Lewis and Xue Litai, ibid., pp. 41 and 71. 100 Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, pp. 182 and 198. 101 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 52; Zhang Jun (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Hangtian Gongye (Contemporary China’s Space Undertakings) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1986), pp. 8–10. 102 The training dadui (group) was first called ‘special artillery unit’ (tezong paobing budui) and placed under the command of artillery headquarters. After years of expansion and establishment of its own command headquarters, Zhou Enlai gave the SSM troops the name ‘Second Artillery’ (dier paobing) in 1966. See Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, pp. 109–11; Jiang Hui, ‘The Early Development of China’s Tactical Missiles’, Junshi Shilin (Military Annals), 1/2 (1997), p. 23. 103 Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, Wenhua Dageming zhong de Renmin Jiefangjun (The People’s Liberation Army in the ‘Cultural Revolution’) (Beijing: CCPCC Party History Information Publishing House, 1989), p. 310; Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, p. 212. 104 Zhang Jun, Contemporary China’s Space Undertakings, p. 27. 105 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 442–3. 106 The Central Special Commission, subordinate to the CCPCC, was established in 1962 to supervise the research and testing of atomic energy and weapons. In 1965, it was also responsible for the research and development of missiles, satellites and nuclear-powered submarines. The first Commission consisted of fifteen members: Zhou Enlai (Chairman), He Long, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Lu Dingyi, Nie Rongzhen, Luo Ruiqing, Zhao Erlu, Zhang Aiping, Wang Heshou, Liu Jie, Sun Zhiyuan, Duan Junyi and Gao Yang. Next in the hierarchy was an office for daily operations with Luo Ruiqing as head and Zhao Erlu, Zhang Aiping, Liu Jie and Zheng Hantao as deputies. See Li Jue, Contemporary China’s Nuclear Industry, p. 47 and Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 510–11; Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 131–2. 107 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 521; Li Jue, Contemporary China’s Nuclear Industry, p. 49. 108 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 3 and 7; cited also in John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon, ‘China’s Nuclear Modernization Program’, Strategic Review, 23, 4 (1995), p. 31. 109 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 121. 110 Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army in the ‘Cultural Revolution’, p. 266; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 562; Yuan Wei and Zhang Zhuo (chief eds), Zhongguo Junxiao Fazhanshi (A History of China’s Military Academies) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2001), pp. 755–61. 111 According to Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (p. 212), the imagi-

Notes

112 113 114

115 116

117 118 119 120

121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128

129 130

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nary targets as laid down in 1964 were Japan (DF-2), the Philippines (DF-3), Guam (DF-4) and the continental United States (DF-5). Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, pp. 365 and 374; Guo Weitao, On People’s War, p. 164. Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai Xuanji (Selected Writings of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984), p. 431. Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, p. 151; Xi Qixin, ‘The Birth of the First Nuclear Missile: Major Events in China’s Defence Science and Technology’, Liaowang (Outlook) (overseas edn), 28 (1989), p. 18. George H. Quester, ‘Some Thoughts on “Deterrence Failures” ’ in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and Roy Radner (eds), Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 53. Li Jijun, Junshi Lilun yu Zhanzhen Shijian (Military Theory and War Practices) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1994), pp. 103–4; Henry Gelber, Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy, Adelphi Papers 99 (London: Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 21. Nie Rongzhen, ‘How China Develops Its Nuclear Weapons’, Beijing Review, 28, 17 (1985), p. 18; see also Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 511. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 15–17. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, p. 15. Gaddis, Rethinking Cold War History, pp. 250–1; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 573; Xu Xianqian, Xu Xianqian Junshi Wenxuan (Selected Military Writings of Xu Xianqian) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1993), p. 49; Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, p. 73. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 274–7; Godwin, Chinese Communist Armed Forces, p. 24. Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army in the ‘Cultural Revolution’, p. 251; Jiang Runguan, Encyclopaedia Sinica – Military Affairs, p. 310. Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army, p. 251; Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, p. 216. Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, p. 84; Liu Sheng’e and Miao Lin, People’s War under Modern Local War Conditions, p. 45. Liu Jixian, Junshi Lilun yu Weilai Zuozhan (Military Theories and Future Warfare) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1992), p. 88; Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, p. 73. Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army in the ‘Cultural Revolution’, pp. 267–9 and 282. Mao, Compilation of Mao Zedong Military Writings, Vol. 6, pp. 381 and 390; Han Huaizhi (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo Minbing (Contemporary China’s Militia) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), pp. 32–4 and 37. China was geographically divided into three economic sectors or ‘fronts’. The first comprised China’s more industrialised coastal provinces and cities; the third included inland areas such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Gansu as well as the west of Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The second front was situated between the two (Zhang Jun, Contemporary China’s Space Undertakings, p. 37). Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 54. Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 573; Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, The People’s Liberation Army in the ‘Cultural Revolution’, p. 251; Jiang Baoqi (chief ed.), Zhongguo Guofang Jingji Fazhan Zhanlüe Yanjiu (A Study on China’s Defence Economic Development Strategy) (Beijing: National Defence

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University Publishing House, 1990), p. 124; Barry Naughton, ‘The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior’, The China Quarterly, 115 (1988), pp. 351–6. 131 Thomas C. Roberts, The Chinese People’s Militia and the Doctrine of People’s War (National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83–4) (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 2. 132 Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, p. 76; Han Huaizhi, Contemporary China’s Militia, p. 58. 133 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 118.

4 Towards a local war doctrine 1 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 95. 2 Xu Xianqian, ‘Speech at a Central Military Commission Conference (Excerpt)’ in Xu Xiangqian, Selected Military Writings (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1993), p. 263. 3 Yu Hao (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994), pp. 331–3; Li Junting and Yang Jinhe (chief eds), Zhongguo Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan (A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1992), pp. 141–6. 4 RMRB (Renmin Ribao), 17 February 1979 in Renmin Shouce 1979 (The People’s Handbook) (Beijing: The People’s Daily Publishing House, 1980), pp. 450–1. 5 RMRB, 7 March 1979 in People’s Handbook, p. 453. 6 Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 90; King C. Chen, ‘China’s War Against Vietnam, 1979: A Military Analysis’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3, 1 (1983), pp. 243 and 246; Larry A. Niksch, ‘Southeast Asia’ in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (eds), Chinese Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 238; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, p. 331; Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 142. 7 RMRB, 17 March 1979 in People’s Handbook, pp, 452–3. 8 Lin Changsheng, Modern Weapons and Equipment of People’s Liberation Army (sic) (Chinese) (Ontario: Canada Mirror Books, 1996), p. 59; Allen et al., China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, p. 90; Guangzhou Military Region Frontline Command-Political Department-Cadre Department, Zhongyue Bianjing Ziwei Huanji Zuozhan Ganbu Gongzuo Ziliao Huibian (A Compilation of Cadre Works Information During the Sino–Vietnam Self-Defensive Counter-Offence at the Border) (no details), 1979, p. 231; cited in Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, p. 95; Chen, ‘China’s War Against Vietnam’, p. 257. 9 Zhang Weiming, Tongshuaibu: Zhongguo Zuida Junshi Yanxi Milu (The High Command: A Secret Account of China’s Biggest Military Exercise) (Beijing: Beiyue Arts and Culture Publishing House, 1993), p. 296; Guangzhou Military Region Frontline, Compilation of Cadre Works Information, pp. 59, 120, 135, 145, 147 and 152. 10 Lee Ngok, China’s Defence Modernisation and Military Leadership (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1989), pp. 20 and 34; Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, Wenhua Dageming zhong de Renmin Jiefangjun (The People’s Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: CCPCC Party History Information Publishing House, 1989), pp. 307–8. 11 Guangzhou Military Region Frontline, Compilation of Cadre Works Information, pp. 116–18.

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12 Hu Wenlong and Cha Jinlu (chief eds), Xiandai Junbingzhong Zhanshu (Modern Military Arms and Services Tactics) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1991), pp. 59–60; Guangzhou Military Region Frontline, Compilation of Cadre Works Information, pp. 229–30. 13 Allen et al., China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, p. 93; Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), pp. 637–8; Lin Hu (chief ed.), Kongjun Shi (A History of the Air Force) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1989), p. 302; Niksch, ‘Southeast Asia’, p. 238. 14 Zhang Weiming et al., Zhongyue Zhanzheng Milu (A Secret Account of the Sino–Vietnam War) (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1995), p. 27. 15 Zhang Changzhi, ‘On the Air Force’s Change from Defensive to a Combination of Offensive-Defensive’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department (ed.), Standing Army Building in the New Era (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1990), pp. 239 and 244. 16 Han Huaizhi (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo Minbing (Contemporary China’s Militia) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), pp. 310–22; Thomas C. Roberts, The Chinese People’s Militia and the Doctrine of People’s War (National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83–4) (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 102; Liu Bingwen, Renmin Wuzhuang Gongzuo he Minbing Zhishi Shouce (A Handbook of People’s Armed Forces Work and Militia Information) (Changsha, Hunan: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1987), pp. 332–40. 17 The categorisation of ‘main forces’ (zhuli budui) and ‘regional forces’ (difang budui) is commonly used in both Western and Chinese literature; e.g. Roberts, Chinese People’s Militia and the Doctrine of People’s War, pp. 13–14; Harlan Jencks, ‘Ground Forces’ in Chinese Defence Policy, p. 53; Paul H.B. Godwin, The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), pp. 86–8; and Xiao Bing and Qing Bo, Zhongguo Jundui Nengfou Daying Xiaoyichang Zhanzheng (Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?) (Chongqing, Sichuan: Southwest Normal University Publishing House, 1993), p. 13. But PLA publications often use a three-tier categorisation of field troops (yezhanjun), regional troops (difangjun) and militia (minbing). A more formal and sophisticated demarcation, for the standing army itself, includes field troops (yezhanjun) or field forces (yezhan budui), regional forces (difang budui), capital garrison troops (weishu budui), border defence troops (bianfang budui) and garrison troops (shoubei budui). See AMS Military System Department, Guojia Junzhixue (National Military System Studies) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), p. 54; Tang Yan (chief ed.), Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu – Junshi: Junshi Fence (Encyclopedia Sinica – Military Affairs: Military Systems) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), pp. 51–3 and 91. 18 Guangzhou Military Region Frontline, Compilation of Cadre Works Information, p. 59; Chen, ‘China’s War Against Vietnam’, p. 259. 19 Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 97. 20 Michael Carver, War since 1945 (rev. and updated edn) (London: The Ashfield Press, 1990), Chapter 13; R.G. Funnell, ‘It Was a Bit of a Close Call: Some Thoughts on the South Atlantic War’ in Alan Stephens (ed.), The War in the Air 1914–1994 (The proceedings of a conference held by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra) (RAAF Base Fairbairn, ACT: Air Power Studies Centre, 1994), pp. 212 and 218; Lawerence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 10–11.

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21 The supplement was for issue No. 6 of Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 1982. See in particular chapters by the Department of Foreign Military Studies, Chen Xiaozhang, Dai Yifang, Wang Yang and Gao Qiqian. 22 It is unclear what post Yu Qifen held when he authored the essay in 1982. However, since he was identified in 1995 as a major-general and director of the Strategic Studies Department at the AMS, he was probably a researcher at the same institution in the early 1980s, given typical Chinese military career patterns (see Yu Qifen, ‘Some Issues in Military Thinking as Reflected in the Recent Four Local Wars’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), supplement 6 (1982), pp. 40–4). 23 Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution, p. 148. 24 Deng Xiaoping, ‘A Speech at a Central Military Commission General Meeting’ in AMS and CCPCC Archive Research Office (eds), Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1992), p. 31. 25 Guo Chunying (chief ed.), Deng Xiaoping Xiandai Tiaojianxia Renmin Zhanzheng Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study of Deng Xiaoping’s People’s War under Modern Conditions Doctrine) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), p. 1. 26 Wu Qinwen, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of the Characteristics of the People’s War under Modern Conditions in Our Country’ in JFJB Military Work Propaganda Department and JSXS (eds), A Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1984), p. 256; Yao Yanjin, ‘A Probe to the Development of Mao Zedong Military Thought under New Historical Conditions’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, p. 53. 27 Zhang Zhen, ‘An Example of the Creative Use of Mao Zedong Military Thought to Guide the Conduct of War’ in Chinese PLA NDU Scientific Research Department (ed.), The Military Theory and Practice of Su Yu (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991), p. 23; Zhu Ying, ‘A Brief Discussion on Su Yu’s National Defence Strategic Thoughts’ in Military Theory and Practice of Su Yu, pp. 704–11; Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, pp. 77–8. 28 Yuan Zhe, ‘Positional Defence and Active Defence – Reflections on Studying the Active Defence Strategy’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 2 (1982), p. 18; Xie Guoliang and Fu Liqun, ‘Important Developments in Our Country’s National Defence Theories (1): In Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee’, Junshi Lishi (Military History), 6 (1988), p. 10; Zhu Ying, ‘A Brief Discussion’, p. 701; Xu Xiangqian, cited in Georges Eng Bok Tan in Chinese Defence Policy, p. 9; Xiang Shouzhi, ‘Some Points about Stabilising the Situation at the Initial Phase of War’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, p. 289. 29 Qi Zhenjun (chief ed.), Xinshiqi Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang de Fazhan (Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking in the New Period) (sic) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1991), p. 4; Gurtov and Hwang, China’s Security, p. 96. 30 Liu Jixian, ‘The Employment and Development of Mao Zedong’s Active Defence Strategic Thought’ in Military Theories and Future Warfare (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1992), p. 89. 31 Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, p. 81; Georges Eng Bok Tan, ‘Strategic Doctrine’ in Chinese Defence Policy, p. 11; Yin Dichun, ‘A Few Key Issues About the Operational Guiding Thoughts on Positional Defence’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 7 (1982), p. 26; Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Jiji Fangyu Zhanlüe Qianshuo (A Preliminary Discussion on Active Defence) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1985), p. 135; Li Desheng, ‘Stop Enemy Operational-level Breakthrough’,

Notes

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39

40 41 42 43 44

45

46 47

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Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 1 (1982), p. 3; Jiang Kejun, ‘A Preliminary Discussion on the Characteristics of Our Army’s Strategic Changes’ in Huigu, Zhanwang, Tantao: Chengdu Junqu Jinian Jianjun Liushi Zhounian Xueshu Lunwenji (Retrospect, Prospect, Discussions: A Collection of Academic Essays by the Chengdu Military Region in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Army Founding) (Chengdu: Sichuan Province Social Sciences Publishing House, 1987), p. 310. Li Desheng, ‘Stop Enemy Operational-level Breakthrough’, pp. 2–3; Yuan Zhe, ‘Positional Defence and Active Defence’, pp. 18–19. Li Desheng, ibid., p. 2; Zheng Weishan, ‘Some Issues about Implementing the Active Defence Strategy’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, pp. 303 and 305. Wei Wei et al., Nie Rongzhen Zhuan (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994), p. 697. Li Desheng, ‘Stop Enemy Operational-level Breakthrough’, p. 5. Xue Lianbi, ‘Develop Mao Zedong Military Thought in the Practice of Training and Education’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, p, 81. Zhang Guangyin, Hui Ye and Xi Baisong, ‘Make Effective Use of Manoeuvre in Defence’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 2 (1982), p. 21. Chen Chaoxian, ‘[We Must] First Focus on the Objectives, Missions and Characteristics of Defensive Operations’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art) 7 (1982), p. 27; Wang Sen, ‘[We] Should Show the Nature and Characteristics of Positional Defensive Operations’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 7 (1982), p. 28. Chen Zhou, ‘Differences between Chinese Theory of Modern Local War and American Theory of Limited War’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 33, 4 (1995), p. 46; Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Preliminary Discussion on Active Defence, p. 137; Deng Xiaoping, ‘Our Strategic Directive is Active Defence’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 98. Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Preliminary Discussion on Active Defence, pp. 133–6. Li Nan, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese Perspective’, The China Quarterly, 146 (1996), p. 444. AMS and CCPCC, Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 92. Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work), Vol. 1 (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), p. 77. A standard PLA motorised infantry corps is made up of three motorised infantry divisions: one artillery regiment, one rocket regiment, one AAA regiment plus combat support and services detachments. A standard infantry division comprises three motorised infantry regiments: one tank regiment, one artillery regiment, one AAA regiment plus combat support and services detachments (see Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution, p. 366). A standard PLA mechanised infantry division is made up of mechanised infantry regiment, tank regiment, artillery regiment, AAA regiment, engineering battalion, signals battalion, chemical defence company and combat services detachments (see Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 47; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 133). Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, pp. 46–7; Li Ke and Hau Shengzhang, People’s Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution, pp. 365–6; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 133. A standard PLA group army is made up of an infantry division, a tank division (brigade), artillery brigade, AAA brigade, engineering regiment, signals

196

48 49 50 51 52 53

54

55 56 57

58

59

60

Notes regiment, chemical defence battalion, and combat support units such as those for electronic warfare and meteorology plus combat services support detachments. A mechanised group army may have an aviation (helicopter) group (see Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 47). AMS and CCPCC Archive Research Office, Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 99. Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 47. Liu Zhongxin and An Tian, ‘Some Strategic Problems about Modern People’s War’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, pp. 247–9. Han Huaizhi, Contemporary China’s Militia, pp. 80–1. Roberts, Chinese People’s Militia and the Doctrine of People’s War, p. 97. Liu Bingwen, Handbook of People’s Armed Forces Work and Militia Information, pp. 240–1; Liu Hongji et al., Guofang Fazhan Zhanlüexue Jiaocheng (A Course on National Defence Development Strategy) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1990), pp. 171–6. Cheung, Tai Ming, ‘Guarding China’s Domestic Front Line: The People’s Armed Police and China’s Stability’, The China Quarterly, 146 (1996), pp. 527 and 529–32; Zhou Yushu and Xu Shouzeng, ‘Amplify the Glorious Revolutionary Tradition, Maintain the Characteristics of a Loyal Guard, Build an Armed Police with Good Military and Political Quality’ in Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 49; Lu Ying and Pan Chen (chief eds), Wujing Changyong Zhishi Shouce (A Handbook of Common Information for the People’s Armed Police) (Beijing: China Youth Publishing House, 1993), pp. 65–74. Xie Guang (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Guofang Keji Shiye (Contemporary China’s Defence Science and Technology Undertakings), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1992), pp. 131–2 and 148. Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 80. APC and AIFV R&D programmes which began in the 1980s included YW 531C, YW 531H, YW 309, 534–1, 534–2, WZ 501, WZ 523 and WZ 551. There were also models designed specifically for export: NVH-1, NFV-1 and NGV; see Liu Puhua (chief ed.) Zhongguo Changgui Wuqi Huicui-Lujun Bufen (A Selection of China’s Conventional Arms – Army) (Beijing: Ordnance Industry Publishing House, 1991), pp. 145, 161, 169, 171 and 180; Li Yuling et al., Xiandai Zhonggong Junbei (Communist China’s Modern Military Equipment) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Press, 1994), p. 168; Li Ligang, ‘Contemporary China’s Armoured Vehicles’, Junshi Shilin (Military Historical Chronicle), 1/2 (1997), pp. 94–6. Self-propelled weaponry R&D programmes which began in the 1980s included YW 304 82mm SP mortar, YW 381 120mm SP mortar, Type-83 SP cannon-howitzer and Type-88 SP AAA (see Li Yuling, Communist China’s Modern Military Equipment, pp. 164 and 166; Liu Puhua (chief ed.), China’s Conventional Arms – Army, pp. 151–2; Xie Guang, Contemporary China’s Defence Science and Technology Undertakings, Vol. 1, pp. 150–1; Li Ligang, ‘Contemporary China’s Armoured Vehicles’). Xie Guang, Contemporary China’s Defence Science and Technology Undertakings, Vol. 1, p. 152; Allen et al., China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, p. 150; Duan Zijun (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Hangkong Gongye (Contemporary China’s Aviation Industry) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1988), pp. 102 and 155. For PLAAF doctrine, see Teng Lianfu and Jiang Fusheng, Kongjun Zuozhan Yanjiu (Air Force Operations Research) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1990); Dai Jinyu and Wang Guoqiang (chief eds), Kongjun Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (Course Text on Air Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991); Hua Renjie, Cao Yifeng and Chen Huixiu

Notes

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62

63

64

65

66

67

68 69

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(chief eds), Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang Shi (A History of Air Force Military Art) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992). See also the seminal study by Allen et al., China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Chapter 6. Xin Ming (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junguan Shouce: Kongjun Fence (Handbook for Chinese PLA Officers: Air Force) (Shandong: Qingdao Publishing House, 1991), p. 163; Yu Zhen, ‘A Few Points about How the Air Force is to Implement the Active Defence Strategy’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 1 (1982), p. 26; Lin Jigui, ‘A Few Issues about Air Support for Ground Forces in Positional Warfare’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 1 (1982), p. 14; Lee Ngok, China’s Defence Modernisation, p. 56. Zhang Changzhi, ‘On the Air Force’s Change’, in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 239; Dong Wenxian, ‘A Model of Modern Air Force and Chinese Characteristics’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 231; Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu, Contemporary Chinese Air Force, p. 518. Yang Guoyu (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Contemporary Chinese Navy) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1987), p. 438; Xie Guang, Contemporary China’s Defence Science and Technology Undertakings, Vol. 1, pp. 153–4; Zhang Lianzhong et al., Haijun Shi (A History of the Navy) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1989), p. 219. The Chinese definition of jinhai is areas 200 nautical miles from the coast (Chen Liheng and Wang Jingjie (chief eds), Junshi Zhishi Cidian (Dictionary of Military Knowledge) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988), p. 427). Song Shanting and Li Ling, ‘Study the Problems of Sea Combat According to Facts’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, pp. 319–21; Zhou Lingui, ‘A Preliminary Study on the Warfighting Doctrine of the People’s Navy in its Early Days’, Junshi Lishi (Military History), 4 (1996), p. 24; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 162. Kong means kongjun (the air arm); qian, qianting (submarine) and kuai, yulei kuaiting (torpedo fast boat) (see Zhang Lianzhong, History of the Navy, p. 31; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 220; Liao Wen-Chung, China’s Blue Waters Strategy in the 21st Century: From the First Islands Chain Toward the Second Islands Chain, Occasional Paper Series (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1995), p. 5). Chen Fangyou and Lu Jianxiu (chief eds), Haijun Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (A Curriculum on Naval Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991), p. 12; Zhou Lingui, ‘A Preliminary Study on the Warfighting Doctrine of the People’s Navy in its Early Days’, Junshi Lishi (Military History), 4 (1996), p. 24. Zhu Yida (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junguan Shouce: Haijun Fence (Handbook for Chinese PLA Officers: Navy) (Shandong: Qingdao Publishing House, 1991), p. 380. Deng Xiaoping, ‘The Navy Must Strive for Real Combat Capability’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 63; Li Tiemin, Deng Xiaoping Haijun Jianshe Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Navy Building) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), pp. 20–4 and 26; Tang Fuquan, Du Zuoyi and Zhan Xiaowu, ‘A Study on Deng Xiaoping’s Maritime Strategic Thoughts in the New Era’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2 (1997), p. 76; John Downing, ‘China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy: Part 1: Restructuring Begins’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 8, 3 (1996), p. 129; Zhang Lianzhong, A History of the Navy, p. 247.

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70 Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, p. 67. 71 Fang Yan (chief ed.), Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu: Junshi: Junshi Xunlian Fence (Encyclopedia Sinica: Military Affairs: Military Training) (internal edn) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1985), p. 10; Li Pengqing and Lu Ping, Junshi Xunlianxue Gailun (An Introduction to Military Training Studies) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988), pp. 53–5; Xiang Xu (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junguan Shouce: Lujun Fence (Handbook for Chinese PLA Officers: Army) (Shandong: Qingdao Publishing House, 1991), p. 352. 72 AMS and CCPCC Archive Research Office, Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 19. 73 Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 232; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 73. 74 Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, pp. 62 and 79. 75 Chinese confrontational training and manoeuvres are designed to put two opposing forces into the position of practising countervailing tactics. They may be conducted with or without pre-set procedures and methods (see Hau Zhihui, Deng Xiaoping Junshi Shenya (Deng Xiaoping’s Military Career) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1996), p. 241). 76 Li Junting and Yang Jinhe, Survey of Chinese Armed Forces, p. 237. 77 Zhang Weiming, High Command, p. 37. 78 Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 76. 79 Wang An, Jundui Zhengguihua Jianshe (The Development of Army Regularisation) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1996), p. 11. 80 Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 79. 81 Li Pengqing and Lu Ping, Introduction to Military Training Studies, pp. 223 and 239; Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu, Contemporary Chinese Air Force, p. 507; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, pp. 243–4, 270 and 277; Han Huaizhi, ‘Concluding Remarks at an All-army Working Conference on Military Training by Han Huaizhi, Assistant to the Chief of General Staff (October 27, 1984)’, Junxun Tongxing (Military Training Gazette), 1 (1985), pp. 4 and 8. 82 Yang Guoyu, Contemporary Chinese Navy, pp. 474–5; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, p. 243; Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu, Contemporary Chinese Air Force, p. 505. 83 Fang Yan, Encyclopedia Sinica: Military Affairs, p. 11; Han Huaizhi, ‘Concluding Remarks at an All-Army Working Conference’, p. 8. 84 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 147. 85 Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, pp. 326 and 362; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, pp. 118–19. 86 The first islands chain comprises the Aleutian Islands, Kurile Islands, Japan, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. The Chinese military attributes this term to US post-Second World War strategy (see Yang Guoyu, Contemporary Chinese Navy, p. 477; Zhu Rongchang, ‘The Functions and Roles of Airpower in Modern Warfare’, Zhongguo Kongjun (China Air Force), 5 (1991), pp. 41–2). 87 The second islands chain is made up of another arch of islands east of the first chain, stretching roughly from Bonin Island, Mariana Island, Guam to

Notes

88

89 90 91 92

93 94

95 96 97 98

99 100

199

Solomon Islands and east of Australia (but west of New Zealand) (see Yang Guoyu, Contemporary Chinese Navy, p. 477; Liao Wen-Chung, China’s Blue Waters Strategy in the 21st Century, Appendix 1; Zhu Rongchang, ‘Functions and Roles of Empire’, p. 42). Yan Daozhang, ‘Methods to Organise Training Reforms in Surface Warships Air Defence’, Junxun Tongxin (Military Training), 1 (1985), p. 52; Yang Guoyu, Contemporary Chinese Navy, pp. 472–3 and 476–7; Zhang Lianzhong, History of the Navy, pp. 239–41 and 244–5; Liao Wen-Chung, China’s Blue Waters Strategy in the 21st Century, p. 17; Greg D. Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 81. Wang Dinglie and Lin Hu, Contemporary Chinese Air Force, p. 506. Deng Xiaoping, ‘The Tasks of Army Rectification’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, pp. 10 and 33; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 45. Yang Guoyu, Contemporary Chinese Navy, p. 472; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, p. 242. Zhang Weiming, High Command, p. 295; Central Military Commission (CMC) Legal System Bureau, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Junshi Fagui Xuanbian (A Compilation of Selected Military Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1995), pp. 299–308; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 8 and 11–14. Xie Guang, Contemporary China’s Defence Science and Technology Undertakings, Vol. 1, pp. 154–6. General Political Department (GPD) Cadre Department and AMS Military Systems Studies Department, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Ganbu Zhidu Gaiyao (An Overview of the Chinese PLA Cadre System) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1988), pp. 51–2. JFJB, ‘On training Reforms in Accordance with the Strategic Directives’ in Le Ying, ‘Comments on the Chinese Communist Army’s “Training Reforms” ’, Zhonggong Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism) 20, 2 (1986), p. 106. Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 79. Joffe, Chinese Army After Mao, pp. 128–9. For more details of the political indoctrination and campaigns to discredit the Gang of Four, see Party History and Party Building Political Work Research Office, NDU, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhengzhi Gongzuo Shi (A History of the Chinese PLA Political Work) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1989), Chapters 25 and 26; Zhou Keyu, Yu Yongbo and Xu Caihou (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Zhengzhi Gongzuo (The Contemporary Chinese Army’s Political Work), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994), Chapter 12. Ng Ka Po, ‘China Defence Budgeting: Structure and Dynamics’ in C.K. Lo, S. Pepper and K.Y. Tsui (eds), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), p. 9.11. I am grateful to a Chinese military specialist, who requested anonymity, for pointing out this episode of doctrinal development during an interview in 1997. There were scant references to small wars in the writings of the 1980s; one of the most important examples was Yang Dezhi’s remarks in his presentation of the Military Service Law to the National People’s Congress (CMC Legal System Bureau, Compilation of Selected Military Laws and Regulations, p. 157).

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101 Han Huaizhi, ‘Concluding Remarks at an All-Army Working Conference’, p. 5. 102 For example, the Song and Li essay still showed a strong guerrilla and continental flavour despite the use of the term jinhai (offshore) (see Song Shanting and Li Ling, ‘Study the Problems of Sea Combat According to Facts’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, pp. 319–27). 103 Deng Xiaoping, ‘The Three Big Things that We Must Accomplish in the 1980s’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, pp. 69–70; Xu Xiangqian, ‘Strive Hard for the Accomplishment of the Four Modernisations’ in Selected Military Writings, p. 275.

5 The advent of local war 1 Deng Xiaoping, ‘Speech at an Enlarged Central Military Commission Meeting’ in Academy of Military Science (AMS) and Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) Archive Research Office (eds), Deng Xiaoping Lun Guofang yu Jundui Jianshe (Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1992), p. 144. 2 Xu Xikang (chief ed.), Jubu Zhanzheng yu Haijun (Local Wars and the Navy) (Beijing: Navy Publishing House, 1988), pp. 388–9. 3 Chen Zhou and Hu Changshui, ‘On Veteran Proletarian Revolutionaries’ View of Modern Local War (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1996), pp. 119–20 and 123. 4 Chen Zhou, Xiandai Jubu Zhanzheng Lilun Yanjiu (A Study of Modern Local War Theories) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1997), p. 59. 5 In Zhang Lifa et al., Jubu Zhanzhen Gailan (Survey of Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1988), p. 14. 6 Liu Xuewen and Wang Jing, ‘A Casual Discussion on the Problems of Seizing Initiatives in Positional Defensives in the Initial Phase of War’ in JFJB Military Work Propaganda Department and JSXS (eds), A Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1984), pp. 309–10; Zheng Weishan, ‘Some Issues about Implementing the Active Defence Strategy’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought, pp. 304–5; Li Desheng, ‘Stop Enemy Operational-level Breakthrough’, Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), 1 (1982), p. 2. 7 Zhang Jingbo (chief ed.), Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu: Junshi: Zhanzheng, Zhanlüe, Zhanyi Fence: Zhanyi (Encyclopedia Sinica: Military Affairs: War, Strategy, Campaign: Campaign) (internal edn) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), p. 1. 8 An Lan, ‘Some Points About the Differences between Campaign and Combat’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 3 (1994), p. 115; Li Dalun, ‘Some Academic Problems of the Current Campaigning Research’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department (ed.), Junshi Kexueyuan Yijiu Baliu nian Bufen Lunwen Xuanji II: Zhanyi Zhanshu yu Xiandai Zuozhan (Selected Essays from the AMS in 1986 II: Operational Art and Modern Warfare) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), pp. 33–4; Guan Jixian, Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng Zhanyi (Local War Campaigns Under High-technology Conditions) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), p. 6. For a comparison with other armies, see US and Soviet definitions of campaign and operational art in US Army Headquarters, FM 100–5: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 6–2; David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 10 and 207, n. 7. 9 The Advanced Military Academy first laid down twelve principles in 1960 which

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12 13

14

15 16

17 18

19

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were eventually criticised for too dogmatically emulating the Soviet versions and for being too detached from actual Chinese military capabilities and missions. Three years later, these principles were revised and reduced to ten. The AMS later refined them and increased them again to twelve. They are regarded by the PLA as comparable to the Principles of War as published in the US Army Field Manual 100–5 (see Sun Jizhang, Zhangyixue Jichu (Fundamentals of the Science of Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1990), pp. 188–93; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan (chief eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work), Vol. 2 (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1989), p. 89). Sun Jizhang, Fundamentals of the Science of Campaigning, pp. 266–7; Gao Rui, ‘The Historical Development and Future Trend of Our Army’s Campaigning Theory’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1986 II, p. 7. Zhou Xiaopeng, ‘Historical Development of Our Army’s Campaigning Theories and Questions about Its Periodisation’ in Chinese PLA NDU Graduate Class (ed.), Selected Military Essays from the National Defence University I: Military Theories (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988), p. 217; Gao Rui, ‘Historical Development’, pp. 8–9; Sun Jizhang, Fundamentals., p. 192. Sun Jizhang, Fundamentals, p. 192. Chen Fangyou (chief ed.), Haijun Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (A Text on Naval Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991), p. 12; Yang Guoyu (chief ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Contemporary Chinese Navy) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1987), pp. 523–4; Zhang Lianzhong et al., Haijun Shi (A History of the Navy) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1989), p. 260. Hua Renjie, Cao Yifeng and Chen Huixiu (chief eds), Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang Shi (A History of Air Force Military Art) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992), p. 317; Dai Jinyu and Wang Guoqiang (chief eds), Kongjun Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (Course Text on Air Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1991), chs 12–14; Teng Lianfu and Jiang Fusheng, Kongjun Zuozhan Yanjiu (Air Force Operations Research) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1990), p. 155; Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 103. Yu Hao (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army) (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994), Vol. 2, pp. 121–2. Zhang Qinsheng, Liang Hunan and Yan Xiaoyin, ‘Local Wars: The Major Threat At Present and In the Future’ in Yang Dezhi and Huan Xiang et al., Guofang Fazhan Zhanlüe Sikao (Reflections on National Defence Development Strategies) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1987), p. 201. Deng Xiaoping, ‘A Speech at a Central Military Commission General Meeting’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 31. Yang Dezhi, ‘Explanation by Yang Dezhi on the Military Service Law (revised draft) of the People’s Republic of China’ in Central Military Commission (CMC) Legal System Bureau, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Junshi Fagui Xuanbian (A Compilation of Selected Military Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1995), p. 157. Deng Xiaoping, ‘A Speech at a Central Military Commission General Meeting’ in Deng Xiaoping on National Defence and Army Building, p. 31; Yang Dezhi, ‘Explanation’, p. 157.

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20 RMRB (Renmin Ribao), 11 and 12 June 1985. 21 An Tian, Xiandai Youxian Zhengzheng de Lilun yu Zhanlüe (The Theory and Strategy of Modern Limited War) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1987), ch. 7. 22 Jiang Runguan (chief ed.), Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu – Junshi: Zhangzheng, Zhanlüe, Zhanyi Fence: Zhanzheng, Zhanlüe (Encyclopaedia Sinica – Military Affairs: War, Strategy, Campaign: War, Strategy) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), p. 24. 23 I am grateful to a China military specialist, who requests anonymity, for pointing out these Chinese and American differences, and for explaining the Chinese concept in an interview in 1997. For the Chinese two-tier view, see Zhang Lifa et al., Jubu Zhanzhen Gailan (Survey of Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1988), p. 1; Zhang Qinsheng, Liang Hunan and Yan Xiaoyin, ‘Research and Investigation into Local War Theories’, Liaowang (Outlook), overseas edition, 37, (15 September 1986), p. 15. Classics of the American concept are Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1957) (esp. pp. 2–4), and Brodie Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965) (esp. pp. 98–100 and 309–16). US civilian and military strategists, since then, have of course constantly updated and revised the spectrum of conflict and have refined new concepts. For example, see US Army Headquarters, FM 100–5: Operations, section 2–1; Robert J. Bunker, ‘Rethinking OOTW’, Military Review, 75, 6 (1995), pp. 34–41; Michael McCormick, ‘The New FM 100–5: A Return to Operational Art’, Military Review, 77, 5 (1997); David Fastabend, ‘The Categorization of Conflict’, Parameters, 27, 2 (1997), pp. 75–87. However, the broad categorisation of war seems to remain there. 24 Chen Youyi argues that the differences between a local limited war and sudden incident/conflict lie in the time of preparation and declaration of war. The second criterion is an obvious mistake. After the Second World War there have been statements of prosecuting war but virtually no declaration of war. A noteworthy example was the US Vietnam War (see Chen Youyi, ‘Investigate into and Establish A Local War Theoretical System with Our Army’s Characteristics’ in Selected Military Essays from the National Defence University I: Military Theories, p. 172). 25 Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars and their Implications for Army Building’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, pp. 38–9; Chen Youyi, ‘Investigate into and Establish a Local War Theoretical System’, pp. 169–73; Chen Zhou, ‘Differences between Chinese Theory of Modern Local War and American Theory of Limited War’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 33, 4 (1995), pp. 44–6. 26 Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Toward 2000’, The China Quarterly, June, 146 (1996), p. 467; Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, pp. 39–43; Zhong Zhanxing, ‘ Winning Border Local Wars Should be a Short-term Goal of Standing Army Building’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department (ed.), Xinshqi Changbeijun Jianshe Yanjiu (A Study on Standing Army Building in the New Era) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1990), p. 152; Liu Jixian, ‘Characteristics and Guiding Principles of Future Local Wars’ in Military Theories and Future Warfare (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1992), p. 405; Liu Jixian, Wang Tangying and Huang Shuofeng, Guofang Fazhan Zhanlüe Gailun (A General Discussion on National Defence Development Strategy) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1989), pp. 153–4; Zhang Lifa, Survey of Local Wars, p. 4; Zhang Jingbo,

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28 29 30

31

32

33 34 35 36

37 38

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Encyclopedia Sinica: Military Affairs, p. 192; Qi Zhenjun (chief ed.), Xinshiqi Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang de Fazhan (Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking in the New Period) (sic) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1991), p. 178. Forms of operations are defined by the PLA as forms showing the ‘content’ of operations (Chen Liheng and Wang Jingjie (chief eds), Junshi Zhishi Cidian (Dictionary of Military Knowledge) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988), p. 423). Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, pp. 46–8. Yao Yunzhu, ‘The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 1985 to 1995’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 7, 2 (1995), p. 71. Mao Zhenfa, ‘Border Disputes Are Major Causes for Local Wars’, JFJB, 2 February 1990, p. 3; Peng Guangqian and Wang Guangxu et al., Junshi Zhanlüe Jianlun (A Brief Discussion on Military Strategy) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1989), p. 96; Guo Shufang, ‘Study on Local War Campaigning Theories’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, p. 337; Chen Youyi, ‘Investigate into and Establish A Local War Theoretical System’, p. 173; Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, p. 49; Qi Zhenjun, Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking, p. 178. Zhu Jun, ‘We Should be Vigilant about Possible Protraction of Local Wars’, JFJB, 2 February 1990, p. 3; Shang Jinshuo, Lüelun Yilie Shengyou (A Brief Discussion on Defeating a Superior Enemy with Inferior Capability) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1990), p. 224. Zhang Qinsheng, Liang Hunan and Yan Xiaoyin, ‘Local Wars’, pp. 197–8; Wang Shilin, ‘We Must Intensify Research on Logistical Support in Local Wars’ in Encyclopaedia Editorial Office, Chengdu Military Region (ed.), Huigu, Zhanwang, Tantao: Chengdu Junqu Jinian Jianjun Liushi Zhounian Xueshu Lunwenji (Retrospect, Prospect, Contemplations: A Collection of Academic Essays by the Chengdu Military Region to Mark the 60th Anniversary of the Army) (Chongqing: Sichuansheng Shihui Kexueyuan Publishing House, 1987), p. 44; Guo Shufang, ‘Study on Local War Campaigning Theories’, p. 337; Chen Youyi, ‘Investigate into and Establish A Local War Theoretical System’, pp. 173–4; Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, p. 50; Liu Jixian, ‘Characteristics and Guiding Principles of Future Local Wars’, p. 407. Zhu Jun, ‘We Should be Vigilant about Possible Protraction of Local Wars’, p. 3; Shang Jinshuo, Brief Discussion on Defeating a Superior Enemy with Inferior Capability, p. 225. Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, pp. 48–9. Wang Pufeng, ‘Get Prepared to Fight a Conventional War Dominated by Weapons of Advanced Technology’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, Military Theories, pp. 322–3. Liang Xiaoqiu and Huang Liangce, ‘The Impact of Technology on Operations Guidance as Seen in Modern Local Wars’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, Military Theories, pp. 334–5; Liu Jixian, ‘Characteristics and Guiding Principles of Future Local Wars’, p. 407; Wang Pufeng, ‘Get Prepared to Fight a Conventional War’, pp. 322–3; Peng Guangqian and Wang Guangxu, Brief Discussion on Military Strategy, p. 96; Mi Zhenyu and Liu Jixian, ‘Preliminary Study on Establishing the Theoretical System of Local War Campaigning’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1986 II: Operational Art and Modern Warfare, p. 27. Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, p. 48; Guo Shufang, ‘Study on Local War Campaigning Theories’, p. 337. Wang Qingkui, ‘Study on Our Army’s Operations Characteristics in Future Anti-aggression War’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, Military Theories, p. 359.

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39 Qi Zhenjun, Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking, pp. 175–6; Shou Xiaosong and Liang Xiaoqiu, ‘Several Different Opinions on the Strategic Guidance in Local Wars’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, Military Theories, pp. 330–1. 40 Zhang Qinsheng, Liang Hunan and Yan Xiaoyin, ‘Local Wars’, p. 198; Mi Zhenyu and Liu Jixian, ‘Preliminary Study on Establishing the Theoretical System of Local War Campaigning’, p. 25. 41 Shang Jinshuo, Brief Discussion on Defeating a Superior Enemy with Inferior Capability, pp. 224–5. 42 Shou Xiaosong and Liang Xiaoqiu, ‘Several Different Opinions on the Strategic Guidance in Local Wars’, pp. 330–1. 43 Shang Jinshuo, Brief Discussion on Defeating a Superior Enemy with Inferior Capability, pp. 199–200; Yao Yunzhu, ‘The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese PLA’, p. 70. 44 Qi Zhenjun, Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking, pp. 171–9. 45 Wu Zhenghong and Zou Baoyi, ‘Major Characteristics of Our Army’s New Generation of Combined Arms Army Operational Regulations’ in Selected Essays from the AMS in 1987, Vol. 1, Military Theories, pp. 451–6. 46 Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 118; Huo Jianping, ‘Preliminary Discussions on the Operational Employment of Strategic Guided Missile Troops’ in Collection of Academic Essays on Mao Zedong’s Military Thought (Beijing: PLA Publishing House), p. 345. 47 Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, pp. 48–9; Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 85–7; JFJB, 24 December 1997. 48 Already in a 1984 report, the US Defence Intelligence Agency had claimed that China had the capability to produce tactical nuclear weapons (cited in Lee Ngok, China’s Defence Modernisation and Military Leadership (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1989), p. 54). 49 John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, ‘China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals’, International Security, 17, 2 (1992), p. 11. 50 One of the best surveys of the Chinese concept of nuclear deterrence is Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China’s New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence’, International Security, 20, 3 (1995/96), pp. 5–42. 51 An Tian and Yue Yanxia, Weishe yu Heping (Deterrence and Peace) (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan Jiaoyu Publishing House, 1992), pp. 318–20. 52 Zhang Changzhi, ‘On the Air Force’s Change from Defensive to a Combination of Offensive-Defensive’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 240; Guan Jixian, Local War Campaigns Under High-technology Conditions, pp. 21 and 37; Qi Zhenjun, Development of Mao Zedong’s Military Thinking, pp. 176 and 178–9; Chinese PLA NDU Service Arms Teaching/Research Office Second Artillery Group, ‘The Iron Fist in the Army Overwhelms Enemy’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University) 8/9 (1997), pp. 46 and 51; Wu Qiong, ‘Military Deterrence Thinking in the New Era’, Junshi Lishi Yanjiu (Military History Research), 2 (2002), p. 14. 53 Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 43. 54 In Yang Dezhi and Huan Xiang, National Defence Development Strategies, pp. 32–7; GSD Military Training Department Campaigning Training Branch and Jiefangjun Bao (JFJB) ‘Military Art’ Editorial, ‘Make a Good Effort to Write a History of Our Army’s Brilliant Future’ in National Defence Development Strategies, Book Editorial, p. 13. 55 Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work,

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60 61

62

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65 66

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Vol. 2, pp. 16–17; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 311–12; Hau Zhihui, Deng Xiaoping Junshi Shenya (Deng Xiaoping’s Military Career) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1996), p. 253. ‘Bulletin No. 2 of the PRC State Statistical Bureau on Major Figures of the 1990 Census’, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao (Gazette of the PRC State Council), 28 (1990), p. 1062. Wen Wei Po, 25 April 1992; Cheung Tai Ming, ‘The People’s Liberation Army in 1992: Political Power Plays and Power Projection’ in Joseph Y.S. Cheng and Maurice Brosseau (eds), China Review 1993 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), p. 6.20; Ai Xuan, ‘Communist China’s Military Affairs in 1992’, Zhonggong Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), 27, 1 (1993), pp. 72–3; Huang Caihong and Xiao Pu, ‘Advance to the New Century – A True Story of 20 Years of PLA Reforms and Opening’, RMRB (Internet edn) (www.peopledaily.com), 17 December 1998. See Chapter 4 for discussion about the functions and organisations of the militias (basic and ordinary) and reserves (Category A and Category B). For more details, see Lei Shanqing (chief ed.), Guofang Houbeijun Gailun (General Study of the Reserve Forces) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1989), pp. 130–40 and 183–92. Lei Shanqing, General Study of the Reserve Forces, p. 177; Li Qing, ‘National Defence Modernisation Must Take the Road of Integrating a Lean but Elite Standing Army with Strong Reserve Forces’ in GSD Mobilisation Department and AMS Military System Research Department (eds), On the Building of National Defence Reserve Forces, Vol. 1 (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1988), p. 56. Fu Quanyou, ‘On the Integration of the Standing Army with Reserve Forces’ in Building of National Defence Reserve Forces, Vol. 1, p. 35. Guan Jixian, ‘Characteristics of Campaigning under High-technology Conditions and Some Major Impacts on Campaigning’ in NDU Scientific Research Department (ed.), High-technology Local Wars and Operational Art (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), p. 40. See various issues of Guofang (National Defence), an AMS monthly devoted to the militia/reserve system, and Zhongguo Minbing (China Militia), a CMC People’s Armed Forces Commission monthly (run by the GPD) and other periodicals on militias in each military region. The so-called ‘specialised troops’ or ‘specialised arms’ (tezhong bing) include mainly units, what Western militaries would call ‘branches’ – armour, artillery, signals, engineering, anti-chemical warfare units. The only exception is the inclusion of the Second Artillery, which should be at service level, but Chinese practices put it below the three services though it is under direct CMC command. Gu Boliang and Liu Guohua, ‘Determined to Reform, Enhance Combat Power: Remarkable Achievements of Our Army’s Campaigning Training’, JFJB, 26 December 1988, p. 1; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 2, p. 17. Jia Yong and Ma Xiaochun, ‘The People’s Army Advances in Reforms’, Liaowang (Outlook), 30 (1992), p. 4; Xin Jun, ‘PLA Training Crack Troops’, Beijing Review, 39, 31 (1996), p. 11. Li Junting and Yang Jinhe (chief eds), Zhongguo Wuzhuang Liliang Tonglan (A Survey of Chinese Armed Forces) (Beijing: The People’s Publishing House, 1992), pp. 26 and 48; Qiu Jingping and Zhou Zhifang, ‘The Historical Strides of the People’s Army’, Liaowang (Outlook), 31 (1994), p. 4; Wang Wenxian and Peng Zhishan, Contemporary Chinese Army’s Military Work, Vol. 1, p. 77; Xin Jun, ‘PLA Training Crack Troops’; JFJB, 17 April 1992.

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67 Xue Lianbi, Zhang Qingzhi and Hou Qingxian, ‘Unswervingly Take the Path of [Building an] Elite Army, Build a People’s Army with Chinese Characteristics’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 121; Zhou Cun, ‘Take the Road of a Capable Army and Efficient Equipment, Build a Capable and Slim Standing Army’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 94; Andrew N.D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (ret.), ‘PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Preliminary Assessment’ in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), pp. 49–50. 68 Ge Xiangxian and Wu Dongfeng, ‘Portentous Troops of the Republic – Interviewing One of Our Rapid Reaction Units’, Liaowang (Outlook), 49 (1990), p. 16. 69 Mi Zhenyu, ‘Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars’, p. 52; Harlan W. Jencks, ‘China’s Defense Buildup: A Threat to the Region?’ in Richard H. Yang (chief ed.), China’s Military: The PLA in 1992/93 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 98. 70 Zhong Zhanxing, ‘ Winning Border Local Wars’, pp. 155 and 159. 71 JFJB, 14 June 1988, 14 September 1990, 21 September 1990 and 5 December 1990; Chen Mingzhi, ‘Latest Developments of the Organisation and Training of Communist China’s “Quick Strike” Units’, Zhonggong Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), 23, 4 (1989), p. 112; Rong Guang, ‘Communist Chinese Military Affairs in 1985’, Zhonggong Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), 20, 1 (1986), p. 72. 72 Ng Ka Po, ‘China Defence Budgeting: Structure and Dynamics’ in C.K. Lo, S. Pepper and K.Y. Tsui (eds), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), p. 9.10; Zhou Cun, ‘Take the Road of an Elite Army and Efficient Equipment’, p. 100; Wang Qinming and Wang Wenhua, ‘On Jiang Zemin’s Remarks of Total Government Support to the Armed Forces (sic)’, Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economics Studies), 10 (1996), p. 60. 73 Jörn Brömmelhörster and Ng Ka Po, ‘Changed Priorities in China’s Military Expenditures’ in Jörn Brömmelhörster (ed.), Demystifying the Peace Dividend (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), pp. 153–85; Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Demobilization: Dialectics of PLA Troop Reduction’, The China Quarterly, June (1996), pp. 347–53. 74 Lin Chong-pin, ‘The Power Projection Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army’ in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization (London and New York: Kegan Paul, and Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996), p. 102; Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao, pp. 68 and 103–4; Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, ‘Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection’, The China Quarterly, June (1982), pp. 258–9. 75 Steven I. Levin, ‘Sino–American Relations: Practicing Damage Control’ in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (4th edn) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 96, 101 and 107; Donald W. Klein, ‘Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations’ in China and the World, p. 134. 76 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘More Cuts Planned for Lean, Mean PLA’, South China Morning Post, Internet edition (www.scmp.com), 25 June 1998; Lin Chong-pin, ‘The Power Projection Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army’, p. 102; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998), p. 179. 77 Godwin, ‘From Continent to Periphery’, p. 459; Wendy Frieman, ‘China’s Military R&D System: Reform and Reorientation’ in Denis Fred Simon and

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81 82 83

84

85

86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93

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Merle Goldman (eds), Science and Technology in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 274. Richard Fisher, ‘Defense Policy and Posture I’ in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto (eds), Strategic Trends in China (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 1998), pp. 60 and 63. Gu Boliang and Liu Guohua, ‘Determined to Reform, Enhance Combat Power’, p. 1; Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 2, p. 147. Li Pengqing and Lu Ping, Junshi Xunlianxue Gailun (An Introduction to Military Training Studies) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1988), pp. 104–9; RMRB (overseas edn), 22 September 1984; Cao Guoqiang, ‘Brilliant Achievements in National Defence Modernisation’, Liaowang (Outlook), 12 (1991), p. 13. Gu Boliang and Liu Guohua, ‘Determined to Reform, Enhance Combat Power’, p. 1; Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War’, Annals, AAPSS, January (1992), pp. 195–6. RMRB (overseas edn), 18 December 1989; Chi Haotian, ‘Strive Hard to Improve Party Committee Leadership, Ensure the Party’s Absolute Leadership over the Army’, Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 2 (1990), pp. 2–5. The ‘five statements’ were made at a GSD working conference in December 1990 about political reliability, military proficiency, strict discipline, good work style and strong logistics support (see Tan Daobo, ‘Chinese Army Strengthens Military Training’, Liaowang (Outlook), 15 (1991), p. 11). Tan Daobo, ‘Chinese Army Strengthens Military Training’, p. 11; Su Zhirong, ‘Preliminary Discussions on Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Strategic Guidance on Army and National Defence Building Towards the Next Century’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 1 (1997), p. 8; Cheng Xiulong (chief ed.), Jiang Zhuxi ‘Wujuhua’ Yaodian Changjie (An Exposition on the ‘Five Statements’ by Chairman Jiang) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1994), pp. 6–7; JFJB, 18 January and 15 February 1996. Zhang Rukai, Guo Changle and Yu Linqi, ‘Study on Some Problems about Our Army’s Internal Tasks’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 396; ‘The Army: A New Stage in the “Fish-and-Water” Relationship’, China News Analysis, 1423 (1 December 1990), p. 8; JFJB, 29 May 1990; Cheung Tai Ming, ‘Guarding China’s Domestic Front Line: The People’s Armed Police and China’s Stability’, The China Quarterly, 146 (1996), p. 531. JFJB, 11 January and 15 February 1990. JFJB, 28 February 1994. That year saw the first tactical missile tests launched across the Taiwan Strait in July and August, and the Donghai (East Sea) Exercise conducted in November. These had a dual purpose: to review the fruits of the three-year training reform programme and to deter Taiwan from separatism. Detailed analysis appears in the next chapter. Blasko et al.’s 1996 essay remains, to date, the definitive work on PLA training despite its modest size. Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John F. Corbett, Jr., ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks’, The China Quarterly, 146 (1996), pp. 490–1. JFJB, 23 December 1991, 26 January 1995, 14 February 1996 and 21 February 1996. Blasko et al., ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA’, p. 491; JFJB, 20 March 1990, 9 July 1993, 12 December 1995 and 14 February 1996. Contrary to the practice in the West, blue forces in China are adversaries, red forces friendly.

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94 JFJB, 26 January 1995, 12 December 1995, 14 February 1996 and 3 February 1997; Huang Taoyi, ‘Confrontational Training Should be Confronted with Realism’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 6 (1997), pp. 44–5. 95 Dong Xeubin, ‘The National Defence University Proactively Implement Decrees by CMC Leaders to Accelerate the R&D of “Joint Service Campaigning Command Training Simulation System” ’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 30 (1997), p. 113. 96 Liu Shihua, ‘Survey of the All-army Expo of Simulation Training Equipment’, Jiefangjun Shenhuo (PLA Life), 5 (1997), pp. 28–9; Luo Jianjun, ‘Our Army Successfully Developed a Piece of Advanced Simulation Equipment’, Xiandai Junshi (Contemporary Military), 10–11 (October 1996), pp. 30–1; Zhang Lanxun, ‘Short Remarks on Simulation Training’, JFJB, 3 May 1991; JFJB 28 June 1992. 97 Chu Xiangdong and Jiang Li, ‘On Training Supervision’, JFJB, 3 May 1991, p. 3; Tan Daobo, ‘Chinese Army Strengthens Military Training’, p. 12. 98 Blasko et al., ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA’, p. 493. 99 JFJB, 2 August 1993. 100 Blasko et al., ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA’, p. 492; JFJB, 26 January 1995, 3 February 1997 and 17 January 1998. 101 According to the 1988 regulations, there were three categories and eleven grades of officers: (1) Full General (Grade I), Full General, Lieutenant General, Major General; (2) Senior Colonel, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major; (3) Captain, First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant. As of 1 October 1988, China had 1,452 generals (seventeen colonel generals), 180,000 field officers, 405,000 junior officers (from Second Lieutenant to Captain) (see Yu Hao, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 1, pp. 313–14; Yang Dezhi, ‘Explanation by Yang Dezhi on the Military Service Law (revised draft) of the People’s Republic of China’ in Compilation of Selected Military Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1995, p. 160). 102 RMRB, 5 July 1986; RMRB (overseas edn), 11 June 1986. 103 RMRB (overseas edn), 11 May 1986; JFJB, 12 and 24 April 1991; Li Fuyuan, ‘Our Country’s Field Air Defence C3I System’, Zhongguo Minbing (China’s Militia), 5 (1992), p. 28. 104 Alastair Iain Johnston in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (4th edn) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 29. 105 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 118. 106 ‘Sashoujian’ is sometimes mistaken by some analysts for ‘shashoujian’ (usually translated as ‘the assassin’s mace’). Sashoujian may be understood as an unexpected means or weapons that would trump the enemy.

6 ‘High-technology local wars’ and beyond 1 Liu Longguang et al., Gaojishu Junshi Shijie (The High-technology Military World) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), pp. 1 and 36. Wu Xiulin, Gaojishu Zhanzheng yu Guofang Xiandaihua (High-technology Warfare and National Defence Modernisation) (Bejing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2001), pp. 114–26. The JFJB, an official PLA daily, has started a special feature online to cover news and analysis since the 2003 Gulf War broke out. 2 For example, the Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), a PLA daily, gave special coverage, including a daily special section, on the conflict from 18 January, the

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7

8

9

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first day of the war, to 6 February. This enthusiasm for Gulf War coverage gradually subsided until 10 February when the daily feature was extracted. Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos (London: Warner Books, 1993), ch. 9. Harlan W. Jencks, ‘Chinese Evaluations of Desert Storm: Implications for PRC Security’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, 6, 2 (1992), pp. 447–9. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 276, 278 and 288. Dong Wenxian, ‘The 70th Anniversary of the Command of the Air Theory’, JFJB, 8 March 1991; Sun Hongwei, ‘New Developments in the Use of Air Power’, JFJB, 22 March 1991; Zhu Yida (chief ed.), Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junguan Shouce: Haijun Fence (Handbook for Chinese PLA Officers: Navy) (Shandong: Qingdao Publishing House, 1991), pp. 40–1; Zhang Changzhi, ‘Characteristics of the Use of Modern Airpower and Its Impact on Air Force Building’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 3 (1992), pp. 73–7; Zhang Changzhi, ‘Changes of the Strategic Importance of Airpower’, JFJB, 21 August 1992. Dong Wenxian., ‘Preliminary Study on Modern Territorial Air Defence’, JFJB, 9 June 1991; Qin Jiangchang, ‘The Challenges by the Development of Modern Air Raid Weapons to Air Defence Operations’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1992), pp. 77–9; Cen Hua, ‘Preliminary Opinion on Future Anti-Air Raid Operations’, Jiefangjun Bao (JFJB), 27 March 1991; Chen Hongyoun, ‘A Brief Discussion on the Role, Characteristics and Building of Modern Territorial Air Defence’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 1 (1992), pp. 63–6; Liao Zhiyong, ‘The High-technology Challenges to People’s Air Defence’, JFJB, 25 October 1991. The series is ‘High-technology and Military Affairs’. The eighteen volumes are: (1) High-technology Warfare; (2) The High-technology Military World; (3) High-technology Warfare and Army Qualitative Building; (4) High-technology Local War and Operational Art; (5) High-technology Local War Campaigning; (6) Who Dominates the Future Battlefield? Service Arms in High-technology Warfare; (7) Hightechnology Warfare Stratagems; (8) Collection of Papers on the High-technology Weapons and Equipment of the Ground, Naval and Air Forces and their Employment in War; (9) Tempest in the New Century – Military and Political Dignitaries in the World on High-technology and War; (10) Explosive Hub of Military Affairs – The Best of Contemporary High-technology Local War; (11) Missile Warfare in Hightechnology Warfare; (12) High-technology and World Situation; (13) Focus of Military Affairs – A Survey of High-technology Local Wars; (14) Modern Army Command; (15) A Study on Ground, Naval and Air Forces Command in Hightechnology Warfare; (16) High-technology and Camouflage; (17) US Army Warfighting Theories and Operational Art in High-technology Warfare; and (18) High-technology Warfare and Logistics. See e.g. Liu Senshan (chief ed.), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng Tiaojian xia de Zuozhan (High-technology Local War Operations Under Modern Conditions) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1994); Luo Youli, Zhu Kuiyu and Hou Luliang, Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng Zhanfa Tansuo (An Investigation into the Operational Methods of High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1994). These two sources were marked as for ‘army circulation only’. JFJB, 10 and 14 June 1991 and 3 July 1991; Shaanxi Ribao, 10 November 1991; Jiang Siyi, ‘Make a Serious Effort to Study Mao Zedong Military Thought’, JFJB, 3 July 1991.

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11 Mi Zhenyu, ‘On the Application and Development of Mao Zedong Military Thought in the New Era’, JFJB, 16 August 1991. 12 JFJB, 3 July 1991; Wang Houqin, ‘Integration of Subjective Guidance with Objective Reality – Reflections on Studying Mao Zedong Military Thought’, JFJB, 13 September 1991; Chen Tiangui, Li Yinnian and Lan Zheng, ‘Characteristics of People’s War under Modern Conditions’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1992), p. 29. 13 Zhao Picong, ‘China’s National Defence: Facing Challenges from the Next Century’, Xi’nan Junshi Wenxue (Southwest Military Literature), 5 (1995), p. 85; AMS Military Historical Research Department, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun de Qishinian (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Past Seventy Years 1927–1997) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1997), p. 620; JFJB, 4 November 2002. 14 Su Yanrong (chief ed.), Junjie Redian Jujiao – Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng Gailun (Focus of Military Affairs – Survey of High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), p. 13. 15 Guan Jixian, Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng Zhanyi (Local War Campaigns Under Hightechnology Conditions) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), p. 3. 16 JFJB, 8 July 1993. 17 This series comprises nine volumes: (1) International Politics and Quantitative Analysis in Military Affairs; (2) Information Warfare and Military Revolution; (3) Clinton’s Military Strategy and Forecast of the Second Korean War; (4) World Opinions on Gulf War and Post-Cold War Security; (5) New Military Revolution in the US and Russia; (6) Foreign Armies Building Towards the 21st Century; (7) Thorough Analysis of Contemporary Flash-points; (8) New Military Perspectives Towards the Next Century; and (9) On New Military Revolution. 18 Liang Biqin (chief ed.), Junshi Geming Lun (On Military Revolution) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 7, 211–50 and 418–23. 19 Fu Quanyou, ‘The World-wide Revolution in Military Affairs (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2 (2002), pp. 2–11; Bi Wenbo, ‘Historical Consideration on Revolution in Military Affairs (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2 (2002), pp. 75–82; Zhu Xiaoli, Junshi Geming Wenti de Yanjiu (A Study on the Revolution in Military Affairs) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2000), p. 136. 20 Liang Biqin, On Military Revolution, pp. 251–98; Fu Quanyou, ‘The World-wide Revolution in Military Affairs’, pp. 5–7; Zhu Xiaoli, Revolution in Military Affairs, pp. 16 and 148–68; Li Qinggong, ‘The Path to RMA’, JFJB, 1 April 2003. 21 Bi Wenbo, ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, pp. 4 and 78; Zhu Xiaoli, Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 5; Zhou Fangyin, ‘The Impact of Information Revolution upon Military Affairs and Security’, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 7 (2001), p. 28; Li Deyi, ‘Development in Military Hightech and Update of Military Strategic Thinking (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2 (2002), p. 89. 22 JFJB, 31 July 2002. 23 Fu Quanyou, ‘The World-wide Revolution in Military Affairs’, p. 9. 24 Yu Guohua, Xiandai Jingong Zhanyi Zhuyao Wenti Yanjiu (A Study on Major Issues about Modern Offensive Operations) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1998), pp. 180–92; AMS Strategic Studies Department, Zhanlüe Xue (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 423 and 435; Wang Baocun, ‘From Mechanized Military Affaires to Informationized Military Affairs (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 1 (2002), pp. 102 and 106; Wu Xiulin, High-

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technology Warfare and National Defence Modernisation, p. 97; James Mulvenon, ‘The PLA and Information Warfare’, in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 176; Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 2001), pp. 6–7; US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 31. Wang Pufeng, Xinxi Zhanzheng yu Junshi Geming (Information Warfare and Military Revolution) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1995), p. 39; Su Zhirong, Kua Shiji de Junshi Xin Guandian (New Military Perspectives Towards the Next Century) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1997), p. 31; Zhang Zhanjun, ‘Elaboration on the Theory of Information Warfare (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 5 (2002), pp. 118–24. Li Xianyao and Zhou Bisong, Xinxi Zhanzheng (Information Warfare) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1998), pp. 81–2; Wang Pufeng, Mingtian de Zhanzheng yu Zhanfa (Tomorrow’s War and Operational Methods) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), pp. 75–6. Zhang Tianping, Zhanlüe Xinxizhan Yanjiu (On Strategic Information Operations) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2001); Zeng Zhengyuan and Huang Liang, ‘The “Five Faces” of Information Operations’, JFJB, 5 December 2001; Wang Yunxian, ‘Several Problems on Implementing and Organising Joint Campaigning Information Operations Command’, JFJB, 27 January 2003; Hou Dandan, ‘Status and Tendency of Information Warfare and Our Countermeasure (sic)’, Daodang yu Hangtian Jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), 1 (2000), pp. 55–61; Guo Zhenming et al., ‘Future Information Operations and Countermeasures’, Xiandai Dianzi Jishu (Modern Electronic Technology), 3 (2000), pp. 100–2. AMS Strategic Studies Department, The Science of Military Strategy, ch. 16; Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (chief eds), Zhanyixue (The Science of Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2000). Li Xianyao and Zhou Bisong, Information Warfare, pp. 79–80. AMS Strategic Studies Department, The Science of Military Strategy, pp. 356–7; Zhang Tianping, On Strategic Information Operations, pp. 34–5. AMS Strategic Studies Department, The Science of Military Strategy, pp. 361–5. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, p. 168. Ibid., pp. 169 and 172–7. Zhang Tianping, On Strategic Information Operations, pp. 120–38; Li Xianyao and Zhou Bisong, Information Warfare, pp. 95–238; Zeng Zhengyuan and Huang Liang, ‘Information Operations’; Yu Lan, ‘Electronic Warfare: Key Battles to Win Wars – Interview with Cai Xiaoming, a Naval Unit Leader’, JFJB, 10 April 2003. Hau Yuqing in Journal of National Defence University, 6 (2001), p. 46. See Zhang Tianping, On Strategic Information Operations, pp. 29–33; Li Xianyao and Zhou Bisong, Information Warfare, pp. 76–9; Liu Wei, ‘Affirm the Concept of Information Dominance’, JFJB, 29 October 2002. US Army Headquarters, FM 3–0: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), pp. 11–16; US Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), pp. 28–9; Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare, pp. 4–5; Zhang Tianping, On Strategic Information Operations, p. 35; Sun Ruling and Liu Zhijun, ‘The Organisation and Coordination of Joint Campaigning Information Operations’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 12 (2002), p. 99.

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38 Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare, pp. 19–23. 39 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 1999), pp. v and 58. 40 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 143; Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1998), p. 11. 41 Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi, ‘How Does China Face Twenty-first Century Warfare?’ Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), 2 (10 January 2000), p. 28; He Ziyi, ‘The “Asymmetric Contests” in Information Operations’, JFJB, 25 December 2001; Sha Ziping, ‘Swap Inferior and Superior Positions on the Information Battlefield’, JFJB, 29 January 2002; Li Lianshan, ‘Study Information Disruption Methods’, JFJB, 22 April 2003; Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare, p. 6. 42 Kristin S. Kolet, ‘Asymmetric Threats to the United States’, Comparative Strategy, 20 (2001), p. 277; Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., ‘Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare’, Parameters, 4, 30 (2000–01), p. 21. 43 US Army Headquarters, FM 3–0: Operations, pp. 4–31; Commander R.V. Gusentine, ‘Asymmetric Warfare – On Our Terms’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, 128 (August 2002), pp. 58–9. 44 Yuan Wenxian, Zhang Jian and Liu Huiming, ‘Summary of Viewpoints at the “All-Army Conference on Information Operations in Joint Campaigning” ’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 1 (2003), pp. 92–5. For reports and essays on information security, see JFJB, 23 November 2001, 28 November 2002 and 21 March 2003. 45 Jia Fengshan, ‘Special Operations: From the Back Stage to the Front’, JFJB, 21 October 2002; Wang Baofu, ‘The Impact of [US] Counter-terrorism War on Military Strategic Theory Development’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 1 (2003), pp. 49–51. 46 Wang Baofu, ‘The Inpact of [US] Counter-terrorism’, pp. 51–2; Pan Shiliang, ‘Group Army Stabilising Operation in Border Areas’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 12 (2003), pp. 41–3; Lai Mingchuan, ‘Characteristics of the Use of Counter-terrorism Military Force by Foreign Countries’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao, 12 (2003), pp. 34–5; Shan Shaoli and Zhang Guohui, ‘Firepower Strikes and Counter-terrorism Struggle’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao, 1 (2004), p. 25. 47 Shan Shaoli and Zhang Guohui, ‘Firepower Strikes and Counter-terrorism Struggle’, p. 24. 48 JFJB, 17 January 2003. 49 Peng Guangqian, ‘Iraq: The US’s New Test Ground in the New Century’, JFJB, 24 March 2003. 50 Li Qingshan, ‘Capture-the-King Strikes’, JFJB, 21 May 2003. 51 JFJB, 17 January 2003. 52 He Diqing, Zhanyixue Jiaocheng (Course Text on Campaigning) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), p. 239. 53 There is no lack of debate on the similarities and differences between mobile warfare and manoeuvre warfare. Some think that they are the same; the only difference is that one is Chinese, the other Western. Some argue that manoeuvre warfare is only further development of mobile warfare; others contend that manoeuvre warfare is a completely new concept. See Deng Guishan of 54862 unit cited in China Military Science editorial, ‘A Glimpse of Research on “Forms of Operations in High-technology Local Wars” ’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1995), pp. 102–3; Deng Lianfang,

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‘Reflections on Some Academic Problems about Manoeuvre Warfare’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 5, (1996), pp. 78–80. Li Yinnian, Wang Xiangsheng and Gao Zheng, ‘Classification of Forms of Operations under High-technology Conditions’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2 (1995), p. 104; China Military Science editorial, p. 100. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, p. 13. JFJB, 1 January 1993. Ding Xiangrong, ‘Place the Study of Operational Methods in an Important Position’, JFJB, 5 May 1993. Zhang Shuyun, ‘Further Explore the Study of Operational Methods’, JFJB, 16 April 1993. Liang Minglun and Zhao Youzhi, ‘General Plan for Our Army’s Future Combined Arms Campaigning Operations’ in Chinese PLA NDU Scientific Research Department (ed.), High-technology Local Wars and Operational Art (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1993), pp. 79 and 86; Yang Guoquan, ‘The Defensive, Protraction and Attrition Nature of Hightechnology Local War Operations’ in High-technology Local Wars and Operational Art, p. 92; Deng Lianfang, ‘Our Army Should Adopt the Basic Operational Method of “Engage before Annihilation” in High-technology Local Wars’ in High-technology Local Wars and Operational Art, pp. 102–13. Zhang Mingyou. ‘Strengthen In-depth Defence, Emphasise Counter-attack – Formulation and Employment of Anti-landing Campaigns Guiding Thoughts in High-technology Local Wars’ in Chinese PLA NDU Scientific Research Department (ed.), High-technology Local Wars and Operational Art, p. 18; Sun Maojie and Kan Hui, ‘Study on Operational Guidance for Counterencirclement in Urban Defensive Campaigns under High-technology Conditions’, ibid., pp. 186 and 192. Shang Shuguo and Cheng Xueliang, ‘Brief Discussions on Defining Manoeuvre Warfare’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1994), p. 91. See Li Feng (chief ed.), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng zhong Chengshi Jingong Zhandou (Urban Offensive Combat in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994); Jia Shude (chief ed.), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng zhong Shandi Jingong Zhandou (Mountainous Offensive Combat in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994); Wang Deyan (chief ed.), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng zhong Denglu Zuozhan (Landing Operations in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994); Cui Yafeng (chief ed.), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng zhong Kongjiang Zhandou (Airborne Combat in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994). There are plenty of examples of operational methods discussions; to cite two: Gao Houping, ‘Issues to be Handled in Current Deepening of the Study of Operational Methods’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 10 (1997), pp. 42–3; Wang Chaoqun, ‘Improve Promotion of Operational Methods Research Results’, JFJB, 20 February 2003; JFJB, 18 March 2003. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, p. 89; He Diqing, Course Text on Campaigning, pp. 138–9. Sun Jizhang, Zhangyixue Jichu (Fundamentals of the Science of Campaigning) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1990), p. 266. A ‘Psychological Operation Handbook for High-altitude and Cold Mountainous Region’ was circulated among a brigade deployed in Tibet. It was a pilot unit set up to experiment with psychological operation in such terrains. See JFJB, 20 November 2003.

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67 JFJB, 16 November 2003, 24 November 2003 and 1 January 2004. 68 Chen Kemin and Wu Jieming (chief eds), Gaojishu Tiaojianxia Jubu Zhanzheng Zuozhan Xinli Yanjiu (Combat Psychology in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2000), p. 194; Wang Yudong, Xiandai Zhanzheng Xinzhan Xuanchuan Yanjiu (Psychological Operation Propaganda in Modern Warfare) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 2002), chs 6–9; Ma Zhong, ‘Psychology Science and Perfect Our Army’s Work on Disintegrating Enemy Troops’, Xi’an Zhengji Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Xi’an Politics Institute), 2 (2000), pp. 30–1; Zhang Luzheng, ‘Reflections on Enhancing Psychological Operations Capability’, Jundui Zhenggong Lilun Yanjiu (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work), 6 (2001), pp. 59–61; Han Qiufeng, ‘On Strategy of Psychological Warfare’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 2 (2002), 95–8; JFJB, 16 July 2002; Li Xiaoxing, ‘Problems of Psychological Warfare Training and their Solutions’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 1 (2003), p. 97. 69 Chen Kemin and Wu Jieming (chief eds), Combat Psychology in High-technology Local Wars, pp. 194–5 and 199. Stephen E. Pease, Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), Chapter 6; Wu Jieming and Xu Fengyuan, ‘Make Use of the Combat Functions of Political Work’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University) 5 (2004), pp. 58–60; Wang Mei, ‘Few Points about Legal Warfare’, ibid., 6 (2004), pp. 66–8; Yang Hongzhang, ‘Basic Problems of Modern Public Opinion Warfare’, ibid., 7 (2004), pp. 68–9; Qianwei Bao, 9 July 2004. 70 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, pp. 111–12. 71 JFJB, 14 May 2002 and 30 September 2002. 72 JFJB, 23 July 2002. 73 Huang Qingyi, ‘In-depth Attacks in Offensive Battles’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department (ed.), Junshi Kexueyuan Yijiu Baliu nian Bufen Lunwen Xuanji II: Zhanyi Zhanshu yu Xiandai Zuozhan (Selected Essays from the AMS in 1986 II: Operational Art and Modern Warfare) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1987), pp. 82–6; Yang Shihua, ‘Strengthen Research on the Soviet Army’s In-depth Raids’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department, ibid., pp. 209–16; Hou Luliang and Zhu Kuiyu, Lun Zhongsheng Daji (On Indepth Strike) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1989); Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, pp. 430, 458 and 470. 74 JFJB, ‘Editorial: The Basis of Our Army’s Warfighting Operations and Training in the New Era – To Mark the Issuance of a New Generation of Combat Regulations’, JFJB, 25 January 1999; Ren Xiangdong, ‘China’s Three Services Implement a New Generation of Combat Regulations’, Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), 23 (7 June 1999), pp. 32–3. 75 Yan Muxian and Li Menghe (chief eds), Gaojishu Jubu Zhanzheng zhong Lianhe Zuozhan (Joint Operations in High-technology Local Wars) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1996), pp. 130–5. 76 Ibid., pp. 37–50; Tang Xuqi and Han Lin, ‘Some Basic Points about Establishing Our Army’s Campaigning Theoretical System’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 11 (1996), p. 49. 77 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, chs 15–21. 78 Wang Hewen, ‘Deepen the Research in Joint Operations Theories’, JFJB, 3 April 2001; Wang Lingjiang, ‘Four Areas to be Strengthened in Organising Coordination in Joint Campaigning’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 12 (2002), p. 95; Wang Denghua, ‘Establishment of Campaigning Command Institutions for Border Counterattack Operations of

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Multiple War Zones’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 11 (2002), p. 60. Cui Yafeng et al., ‘Selected Speeches at the Symposium on Joint Operations Series Research’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 9 (2002), pp. 97–104. Huang Jielun and Wang Linsen cited in China Military Science editorial, ‘A Glimpse of Research on “Forms of Operations in High-technology Local Wars” ’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 4 (1995), pp. 105–6; Liu Senshan (chief ed.), High-technology Local War Operations Under Modern Conditions, pp. 21–2; Chinese PLA NDU Service Arms Teaching/Research Office Second Artillery Group, ‘The Iron Fist in the Army Overwhelms Enemy’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 8/9 (1997), pp. 46 and 51; Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 79. Guan Jixian, Local War Campaigns Under High-technology Conditions, p. 36; Li Feng, Urban Offensive Combat in High-technology Local Wars, p. 40; Jia Shude, Mountainous Offensive Combat in High-technology Local Wars, p. 43; Wang Deyan, Landing Operations in High-technology Local Wars, pp. 38–9; Cui Yafeng, Airborne Combat in High-technology Local Wars, p. 29; Yan Muxian and Li Menghe, Joint Operations in High-technology Local Wars, pp. 130–5; Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, pp. 429, 432, 465 and 493–4; Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 97. Richard Fisher, ‘China’s Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military Assessment’, Paper presented at the Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (Coolfront Conference Center, West Virginia, 6–8 September 1996), pp. 3–7; ‘Analysis of Developments after Communist China’s Military Exercises in the Taiwan Strait’, Dalu Qingshi Zhoubao (Mainland China Weekly Briefing, Taipei), 1221 (1996), p. 3; Centre of Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), Lancaster University (1999), ‘National Briefings: China’. Online http://www.cdiss.org/chinab.htm; JFJB, 11 August 1995, 16, 21 and 26 March 1996. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, pp. 407–8 and 415. Wu Qiong, ‘Military Deterrence Thinking in the New Era’, Junshi Lishi Yanjiu (Military History Research), 2 (2002), p. 16; Simon P. Worden and Martin E.B. France, ‘Towards an Evolving Deterrence Strategy: Space and Information Dominance’, Comparative Strategy, 20 (2001), p. 454. AMS Strategic Studies Department, The Science of Military Strategy, pp. 230–45; Wu Qiong, ‘Military Deterrence Thinking in the New Era’, pp. 15 and 21; Yuan Zhengling, ‘The Ideas and Practice of Conventional Deterrence after the Establishment of the PRC’, Junshi Lishi (Military History), 1 (2002), p. 24. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 70; Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 4. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., ‘Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization’ in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds), China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 90–1; Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 97; Tong Kai, ‘Developments of China’s Navigation Positioning Satellite Systems’, Zhongguo Hangtian (Aerospace China) (August 2002), pp. 7–9; Wu Qiong, ‘Military Deterrence Thinking in the New Era’, p. 16. Evan S. Medeiros (Rapporteur), Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views From Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo (Muscatine, IO: The Stanley Foundation, and Monterey, CA: Center for Nonoproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001), pp. 5, 11 and 15;

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Notes Anthony H. Cordesman, China and the US: National Missile Defenses and Chinese Nuclear Modernization (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 September 2000), p. 5; The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2002–2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002), pp. 164, 306–7; ‘US Navy study “Backs Taiwan Arms Upgrade” ’, CNN (www.cnn.com), 1 April 2001; ‘Bush Defers Taiwan’s Request for High-tech Destroyers’, CNN (www.cnn.com), 23 April 2001. Zheng Yannong, ‘The Current Situation and Future of Theatre Missile Defence System’, Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of the University of International Relations), 2 (2002), pp. 29–31 and 43; Yan Yuchuan, ‘Five Methods of Conventional Guided Missiles to Breach Defence’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 1 (2001), pp. 42–3. Fu Liqun, ‘Study of Some Issues About Our Army Building Since the Founding of the Republic’ in AMS Planning and Organisation Department (ed.), A Study on Standing Army Building in the New Era (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1990), p. 134; Zhou Cun, ‘Take the Road of an Elite Army and Efficient Equipment, Build a Capable and Slim Standing Army’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 90; Xue Lianbi, Zhang Qingzhi and Hou Qingxian, ‘Unswervingly Take the Path of [Building an] Elite Army, Build a People’s Army with Chinese Characteristics’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, p. 121; Qin Yaoqi, Li Tiemin and Zhao Keshun, Zhongguo Tese de Jingbing Zhilu (The Path of Elite Army with Chinese Characteristics) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1994), pp. 40 and 45–6. JFJB, ‘Editorial: Intensify Qualitative Building, Take the Path of Elite Army with Chinese Characteristics’, JFJB, 1 January 1992; Zhang Qinsheng and Zeng Guangjun, ‘Quality: The Life of an Army – Intensify Army Qualitative Building (I)’, JFJB, 3 January 1992; Yao Youzhi and Gai Yuyun, ‘Clarifying the Relationship between “Quantity” and “Quality” ’, JFJB, 17 January 1992; Zuo Quandian, ‘The Complementary and Contradictory Relationship between Quality and Quantity in Military Modernisation’ in Standing Army Building in the New Era, pp. 113–20. Xiao Yusheng, ‘Comprehensive Report: Army and National Defence Building Since the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress’, Xinhua News Agency (www.xinhua.org), 7 August 2002; Su Zhirong, ‘Preliminary Discussions on Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Strategic Guidance on Army and National Defence Building Towards the Next Century’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 1 (1997), pp. 6–7; Yang Huaiqing, ‘Break Wave and Advance under Party Guidance’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 8/9 (1997), p. 38; Xi Jirong and Qiu Zhifang, ‘Jiang Zemin’s Strategic Thought of Strengthening the Army with Science and Technology’, Jundui Zhenggong Lilun Yanjiu (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work), 4, 2 (2001), pp. 28–31. JFJB, 7 January 1997. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘More Cuts Planned for Lean, Mean PLA’, South China Morning Post, Internet edn (www.scmp.com), 25 June 1998; Guan Chajia, ‘Why Is There No Military Personnel in the Politburo – New Reform Blueprint of Communist China’s Military Commission’, Kuang Chao Ching (Wide Angle), October 301 (1997), pp. 14–15 and 9.77 JFJB, 2 September 2003 and 27 September 2004. Wang Baocun, ‘From Mechanized Military Affaires to Informationized Military Affairs (sic)’, p. 107. Andrew N.D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (ret.), ‘PLA Rapid

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105 106

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Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Preliminary Assessment’ in Mulvenon and Yang, The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, p. 49. Kenneth W. Allen, ‘The PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization’ in Susan M. Puska (ed.), The People’s Liberation Army After Next (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2000), p. 238. IISS, The Military Balance 2002–2003, p. 145; US-China Security Review Commission, Report to Congress: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relations between the United States and China (July 2002), ch. 10 (www.uscc.gov/ch10_02.htm); David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 157–8; Sun Xiaohe and Chen Mengqiang, ‘Reflections on Strengthening the Service Arms Training of EMOUs’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 10 (1996), p. 49; Qi Dongran and Zhang Shuangping, ‘A Few Points about Rapid Reaction Training of Key Units’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 6 (1996), p. 55; Wu Yuezhang et al., ‘Mobile Logistic Deployment at the Division Level (sic)’, Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economic Studies), 4 (1997), p. 64; Zhao Yuming, ‘Setting Up Quartermaster Support Teams in Emergency Mobile Combat Unit’, Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economic Studies), 7 (1997), p. 74. Michael Swaine identifies 3–5 RRUs in the ground forces but does not report any in other services (Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese Modernization: Motives, Objectives, and Requirements’ in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, China’s Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 330); ‘Communist Chinese Army Building and Development’, Zhonggong Nianbao (Yearbook on Chinese Communism) (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1997), p. 9.70, claims the first batch of 100,000 soldiers was formed into EMOUs in 1994, another 300,000 in 1997; Ronald Montaperto, ‘China’ in Hans A. Binnendijk and Patrick L. Clawson (eds), Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 50) estimates eighteen to twenty divisions in the twenty-four group armies plus another 5,000 marines. IISS, The Military Balance 2002–2003, p. 145 puts the figure at three national-level RRU divisions and nine at regional level. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigning, chs 15–21. Jia Fengshan, ‘Special Operations: From the Back Stage to the Front’, JFJB, 21 October 2002; Fan Gaoyue, ‘The Five Operational Methods of Special Operations Force’, JFJB, 24 March 2003; Peng Guangqian, ‘Iraq: the US’s New Test Ground’, JFJB, 24 March 2003. Jiefangjun Huabao (PLA Pictorial), November 2000; JFJB, 6 March 2002; US Department of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 24. Andrew N.D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (ret.), ‘PLA Rapid Reaction Forces’, p. 51; Qianjin Bao, 3 April 2000; JFJB, 1 May 2000, 6 March 2002; Beijing Ribao (Beijing Daily), 1 October 2001. See in particular The Military Balance and SIPRI Yearbook prepared annually by the IISS and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute respectively. In ‘Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization’, Richard D. Fisher, Jr. gives a very detailed analysis of the type and performance of Chinese arms acquired in the 1990s. The Federation of American Scientists is also a good source for China’s existing weaponry and their specifications. US-China Security Review Commission, Report to Congress (July 2002), ch. 9 (http://www.uscc.gov/ch9_02.htm). ‘Israel Questions Phalcon Trade-off’, BBC (news.bbc.co.uk), 13 July 2000; ‘Israel “Freezes Arms Export to China” ’, BBC, 2 January 2003.

218

Notes

107 JFJB, 30 December 2002. 108 Huang Cihui, ‘[We] Should Attend to Information Security Evaluation and Certification’, JFJB, 19 June 2002. 109 Dai Er, ‘Making the Information “Shield” ’, JFJB, 27 March 2002; Wang Yao and Yang Lü, ‘Reflections upon “Firewalls” ’, JFJB, 28 May 2002; JFJB 12 October 2002. 110 US Army Headquarters, FM 3–0: Operations, pp. 11–12. 111 ‘The First National MAC Technologies Conference Convened at Nanjing University of Aerospace and Aviation’, Xiaoyuan Kuaixin (Nanjing University of Aerospace and Aviation Campus News), 13 August 2001 (www.nuaa.edu.cn); Yu Fan, ‘Air Warfare: Increasing Potency of UAVs’, Zhongguo Guofang Bao (China National Defence News), 5 November 2002 (as in JFJB site: www.pladaily.com.cn); JFJB, 7 October 2002; IISS, The Military Balance 2002–2003, pp. 146 and 148; Lu Bingguang et al., ‘What Weapons Did China Reveal to the World?’, Zhongguo Kongjun (China Air Force), 1 (2003), pp. 6–7. 112 IISS, The Military Balance, pp. 147 and 302–3; US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC, pp. 16–17. 113 Fisher, ‘Foreign Arms Acquisition’, pp. 164–8; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 97–9; US Department of Defense, Annual Report, pp. 19 and 21–2. 114 People’s Daily, English (www.peopledaily.com.cn/English), 29 November 1999; US Department of Defense, Annual Report, p. 24; ‘A Sketch of an Elite Unit’, Xinhua News Agency (www.xinhua.org), 24 July 2002; JFJB, 19 August 2002, 22 and 26 January 2003. 115 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 145–7; Huang Jinyuan, ‘Converting New Equipment into Warfighting Capability’, JFJB, 18 April 2001; Chen Qiyin, ‘Reflecting Upon Why Korea Didn’t Buy the Sukhois’, JFJB, 28 May 2002; JFJB 20 February 2002. 116 JFJB, 17 February 2002, 16 and 22 October 2002. 117 Mark A. Stokes, ‘China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait’ in Susan M. Puska (ed.), The People’s Liberation Army After Next, p. 107; US Department of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 49. 118 Xun Zhenjiang and Geng Haijun, ‘Exploring the Chinese Way to Develop Military Weaponry (sic)’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 3 (2002), pp. 51–3; Zhanshi Bao (Guangzhou military region newspaper), 20 February 2003; ‘Military Expert on the Implications of the Iraq War for the New Military Revolution’, Xinhua News Agency, 29 April 2003. 119 Su Enze, ‘Observer: The “863” and Military Modernisation’, JFJB, 28 February 2001. There have been suggestions about possible ‘trump card’ weapons: some believe the use of ballistic and land attack cruise missiles in conjunction with space-based support systems against Taiwan; some, the use of Kilo submarines and Sovremenny destroyers against US aircraft carriers. See Stokes, ‘China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development’, p. 107; Thomas Woodrow, ‘China’s “Tsushima” Anticarrier Strategy (sic)’, China Brief, 1, 3 (14 January 2003) (www.jamestown.org/pubs). 120 JFJB, 26 January 1995, 3 February 1997 and 17 January 1998. 121 ‘Keji Lianbing is the Basic Direction of Military Training for the Next Century – Interview Major General Gao Zhongxing, a Group Army Commander’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 3 (1999), pp. 32–3. 122 JFJB, 10, 14 and 15 October 2000.

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219

123 JFJB, 14 January 2002. 124 Wang An, Jundui Zhengguihua Jianshe (The Development of Army Regularisation) (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1996), pp. 54–5, 107 and 158; JFJB, 18 November 1997. 125 JFJB, 1 February 2002; Su Wei et al., ‘Deepen Target-specific Training’, JFJB, 26 March 2002. 126 JFJB, 21 August 2002 and 22 April 2003; Pan Guili, ‘Assessing Joint Campaigning Training Quality’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 20 (2002), pp. 53–4. 127 JFJB, 11 January 2002, 17 September 2002 and 23 October 2002. 128 Su Wei et al., ‘Deepen Target-specific Training’. 129 Guo Boxiong, ‘Strive Hard to Improve the Quality of Joint Campaigning Training’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 11 (1999), p. 96. 130 JFJB, 9 December 2001, 30 January 2002, 19 February 2002, 10 May 2002, 25 July 2002, 27 December 2002 and 15 February 2003; Guangming Daily, 30 April 2002. 131 Lin Qianrong, ‘Sea Training Should Sharpen the Awareness of Enhancing “Combat Capability” ’, JFJB, 24 December 2002; JFJB 30 January 2002. 132 Renmin Jundui (People’s Army), a Lanzhou military region newspaper, 18 and 27 October 2001; Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, 27 December 2001; JFJB, 25 July 2002; 5 January 2003, 19 January 2003 and 26 January 2003; Nanfang Ribao, 24 September 2002. 133 Renmin Qianxian (The People’s Front), a Nanjing military region newspaper, 28 December 2001. 134 Guo Boxiong, ‘Strive Hard to Improve the Quality of Joint Campaigning Training’, p. 97. 135 Shi Xiangyuan, ‘Insist on the Principle of “Combining Unification with Separation” in Joint Operations Training’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 12 (2002), p. 84; JFJB, 31 January 2002, 21 January 2003 and 14 February 2003. 136 JFJB, 20 January 2001 and 20 March 2002. 137 See e.g. JFJB, 23 January 2002, 10 February 2002, 26 March 2002, 31 July 2002 and 15 February 2003. 138 JFJB, 1 March 2002 and 23 January 2002. 139 JFJB, 22 November 2002. 140 Lü Junjie and Cheng Baogeng, ‘Online Confrontation Is Not Collective Gaming’, JFJB, 29 January 2002; JFJB 9 February 2003. 141 Su Enze, ‘Losing No Time to Strengthen Battle Laboratory Building’, JFJB, 1 August 2001; Zhao Guifu, ‘Battle Laboratory – The Fertile Soil for Command Theoretical Innovation’, JFJB, 13 November 2001; Kang Hengzhen, ‘The Innovation System of Combat Effectiveness Based on Battle Labs’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 1 (2002), pp. 99–101; Zhanshi Bao, 20 February 2003; Liu Guangzi, ‘Let the “Battlefield” be Built in Laboratories’, JFJB, 13 May 2003. 142 See JFJB, 23 January 1991, 12 February 1992, 1 February 1993, 28 February 1994, 8 February 1995, 10 January 1996, 3 February 1997, 17 January 1998, 4 January 2000, 12 January 2001, 11 January 2002 and 17 January 2003. 143 Wang Jianghuai and Zhu Guolin (chief eds), Gaojishu Tiaojianxia Hetong Zhanyi Honglan Liangjun Shouzhang Jiguan Duikang Yanxi Jiaocheng (Course Text on Blue and Red Forces Combined Arms Confrontational Command Post Exercises under Hightechnology Conditions), Vol. 1 (Beijing: National Defence University Publishing House, 1994), p. 1; Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John Corbett,

220

144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170

171

Notes ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks’, The China Quarterly, June, 146 (1996), pp. 494–5; Li Bing, ‘Surpassing the Goal of the Century – Summary of Training Reforms’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University), 7 (1996), p. 69. JFJB, 10 August 2001, 21 February 2003, 23 March 2003 and 1 April 2003. JFJB, 21 July 1997. JFJB, 6 February 1997. JFJB, 29 November 2001 and 20 June 2002. JFJB, 1 March 2001 and 6 November 2002. James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), p. 73. Toffler and Toffler, War and Anti-war, p. 150. Wu Qingli and Fang Ling, ‘The Human Factor and Quality in Modern Warfare’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 3 (1994), pp. 106–10. JFJB, 17 December 2001. JFJB, 26 October 2001, 8 December 2002 and 16 September 2002. JFJB, 20 December 2001, 11 June 2002, 10 July 2002 and 21 April 2003. JFJB, 17 February 2003. JFJB, 26 July 2002. Si Jiushui and Zhu Xiaoning, ‘Quiet Changes of the Headquarters’, JFJB, 19 November 2002; JFJB, 15 March 2003 and 6 May 2003. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 157. Qianjin Bao (Shenyang Military Region newspaper), 20 January 2003; Qianwei Bao (Jinan Military Region newspaper), 17 January 2003. Yuan Wenxian, Zhang Jian and Liu Huiming, ‘Summary of Viewpoints’, p. 93; ‘Electronic Warfare: The Key to Winning War – Interview with a Navy Unit Commander, Cai Xiaoming’, JFJB, 10 April 2003. Qianwei Bao, 20 June 2001; Zhanshi Bao, 15 January 2002; JFJB, 7 February 2003. JFJB, 10 February 2002, 27 July 2002 and 20 March 2003. JFJB, 13 January 2002 and 24 January 2003. Zhanshi Bao, 20 February 2003. JFJB, 13 August 2001. JFJB, 23 November 2001. Liang Biqin, On Military Revolution, pp. 485–8. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 143. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chaoxian Zhan (War Beyond Limits) (Beijing: PLA Literature Publishing House, 1999). Fan Xiaoguang, ‘Promote the Deepening of Hooked-up Training to Enhance Our Army’s Overall Combat Capability’, Guofang (National Defence), 10 (2002), pp. 4–7. Major-General Fan Xiaoguang was concurrently Chairman of the Comprehensive Office under the State National Defence Mobilisation Committee and Director of the Mobilisation Department of the General Staff Department. Qian Guoliang, ‘Set High Standards in Building Up the Combat Capability of the Reserve Force’, Guofang (National Defence), 11 (2002), p. 5. General Qian was Commander of Shenyang Military Region and concurrently Chairman of the Military Region’s National Defence Mobilisation Committee; Fu Huijun, ‘Improve Preparation for Converting War Potentials’, JFJB, 18 February 2003. ‘Destruction of an M1A2 Tank in Baghdad’, Xinhua News Agency (www.xinhua.org), 7 April 2003; Huang Dafu, ‘The Iraqi Army’s Moves of City Defence’, JFJB, 8 April 2003; Huang Bin, ‘Who Enjoys An Advantage in the Urban Operations in Baghdad?’, JFJB, 8 April 2003; Zhang Yuliang, ‘The Battle for Baghdad as a Life-and-Death Struggle’, JFJB, 8 April 2003.

Notes

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172 ‘Xiong Guangkai Speaks on the Iraq War’, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily) (www.bjyouth.com), 17 April 2003. 173 Su Qiyun, ‘Perfecting the National Defence Mobilisation Mechanism’, Guofang (National Defence), 4 (2003), p. 12; Wang Enhui, ‘Strengthen the “Four Mechanisms” in order to Enhance the Rapid Mobilisation Capability of the Reserve Units’, Guofang (National Defence), 3 (2003), pp. 42–3; China State Council Press Office, ‘China’s National Defence, 2002’, JFJB, 10 December 2002; Zhang Yinwu, ‘Meeting Battle Needs, Strive for the “Two Enhancements” ’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2002), pp. 19–20. 174 Cao Yin and Meng Yongjun, ‘A Civilian Vessels Reserve System Integrating Sailors with their Ships Should be Established’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2002), pp. 57–9; Chen Huaide, ‘Based on Coastal Areas Characteristics, Improve Preparation for Civilian Vessels Requisitioning’, Guofang (National Defence), 4 (2002), p. 35; Zhang Nianjin and Zhu Yunzhong, ‘Preparing Civilian Vessels Mobilisation for Landing Operations’, Guofang (National Defence), 4 (2002), pp. 32–3; Sun Rongzheng, ‘A Preliminary Study on Requisitioning Civilian Ships for Minesweeping’, Guofang (National Defence), 8 (2002), pp. 49–50. 175 Yuan Zhao, ‘Prepare Military Transportation Support for Landing Operations’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), pp. 30–1; Chen Huaide, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), p. 36. 176 Qi Zeqiang, ‘Deployment of Militia and Reserve Anti-air Artillery Units in Urban Air Defence Operations’, Guofang (National Defence), 10 (2002), pp. 41–2; Major-General Guo Kehai, ‘Militia and Reserve Units in Urban Air Defence Operations’, Guofang (National Defence), 10 (2002), pp. 42–3. For examples of militia and reserve training in intercepting cruise missiles, see JFJB, 9 January 2003 and 3 May 2003. 177 Gao Shanrui, ‘A Chinese Air Defence Expert Claims: Anti-air Artillery is Effective Against Cruise Missiles’, JFJB, 26 March 2003. 178 Zhang Yiyin, ‘Clarify the Major Tasks of Information Mobilisation Work’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), p. 34; Li Yazhou, ‘Four Problems to be Solved in Information Mobilisation’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), p. 35. 179 Zhu Xiaoning and Wang Donglin, ‘Computer Networks: New Room for the People’s War’, JFJB, 4 March 2003; Shi Qiming and Huang Yuliang, ‘Insist on Fighting Informationised Warfare on the Basis of the People’s War’, JFJB, 15 April 2003; US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2003 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), p. 35. 180 Zhongguo Guofang Bao, 14 June 2001; Liu Yongcai, ‘Some Thoughts on War Zone Information Mobilisation Construction’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), p. 33; Zhang Yiyin, ‘Information Mobilisation Work’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), p. 34; Li Yazhou, ‘Information Mobilisation’, Guofang (National Defence), 2 (2003), p. 35; JFJB, 13 March 2003. 181 JFJB, 19 April 2002; Zhejiang Ribao (Zhejiang Daily) (www.zjdaily.com.cn), 30 July 2002; Renmin Youdian Bao (People’s Post and Telecommunication News) (rmyd.cnii.com.cn), 27 September 2002. 182 JFJB, 13 April 2002 and 28 June 2002. 183 Zhanqi Bao, 24 February 2004. Wang Yan and Zhao Tongsheng, ‘Compare Systemic Integrated Joint Operation with Coordinated Joint Operation’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University) 7 (2004), pp. 31–3; Li Mingliang, ‘Definition and Characteristics of Our Army’s Systemic Integrated Joint Operation’, ibid., pp. 33–5. 184 Zhang Youxia and Wang Xixin, ‘Systemic Integrated Military Training Brings

222

185

186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193

Notes About Historical Change of Training Modes’, JFJB, 20 January 2004; Chen Yong and Yang Yeli, ‘Strive Hard to Build a Systemic Integrated Training System’, JFJB, 30 March 2004; Che Xianming, ‘Rapid and Precision Attack at Nodes and Joints – Brief Discussion on Systemic Integrated Joint Strikes Training’, JFJB, 30 March 2004; Wang Shenghuai, ‘Theory and Practice of the Systemic Interaction of Warfighting, Army Building, and Training’, JFJB, 6 April 2004. He Diqing (chief ed.), Course Text on Campaigning), pp. 138–9; Li Mingliang, ‘Our Army’s Systemic Integrated Joint Operation’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University) 7 (2004), pp. 33–4; Wang Xixin, ‘The Concept and Characteristics of Systemic Integrated Joint Operation’, ibid., p. 36; JFJB, 10 August 2004. JFJB, 1 February 2004; Chen Yong and Yang Yeli, JFJB, 30 March 2004. Zhu Xiaodong, ‘Build up Theories and Practice of Systemic Integrated Training’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University) 6 (2004), pp. 82–3; Yuan Dongwei, ‘Grasp the Substance of Systemic Integrated Training, Study Its Training Methods’, ibid., p. 89; Li Mingliang, ‘Our Army’s Systemic Integrated Joint Operation’, p. 34; Sun Hanbo, ‘Adapt to the Requirements of Informationised Warfare, Build a Systemic Integrated Armed Force’, Guofang (National Defence) 8 (2004), p. 20; JFJB, 14 September 2004. JFJB, 14 June and 9 July 2004; Zhanshi Bao, 13, 16, 17 and 19 August 2004. Zhang Xiaonan and Li Yuejian, ‘A Motorised Infantry Division Develops New Ways of Systemic Integrated Training’, Guofang Daxue Xuebao (Journal of National Defence University) 6 (2004), p. 98; Zhanshi Bao, 16 August 2004. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 94. AMS Strategic Studies Department, The Science of Military Strategy, ch. 19. James Cable, ‘Limited War’, International Relations, 11, 6 (1993), pp. 555–6. Fu Quanyou, ‘The World-wide Revolution in Military Affairs’, p. 8; AMS Strategic Studies Department, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 435. John J. Weltman, World Politics and the Evolution of War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 90, 188 and 204. In contrast, there have been ample seminal studies in the West about escalation. To cite but a few examples: Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (rev. edn) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968); Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

7 Conclusion 1 2 3 4

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 86. John J. Weltman, World Politics and the Evolution of War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 90–1. MHRD, AMS (1997), pp. 572–3. Ralph A. Cossa, ‘The PRC’s National Security Objectives in the Post-Cold War Era and the Role of the PLA’, Issues and Studies, September (1994), p. 25.

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Index

Note: References to annotated text are indicated as ‘25 (n21)’; references to Notes as ‘263 n21.’ Academy of Military Science (AMS) 20, 29–30, 54, 68, 85, 107, 115, 118, 132, 150, 166 active defence 51, 63, 68–9, 70–1 Afghanistan 67, 91, 114–15, 128, 130 air defence 51, 75, 78, 80, 94, 98, 103, 106–7, 122, 124–5, 128, 131, 134, 136, 144–5 airpower 106, 114, airborne operations 52, 77, 107, 117, 122, 134 airborne troops 52, 76, 98, 128, 134, 163 An Tian 90 anti-chemical warfare 55, 96, 136, 205 n63 Anti-Dogmatism Campaign 53, 87–8 armour 33–4, 64, 65, 72, 76, 96 arms acquisition 2, 35, 36, 75, 78, 95, 98, 99, 129–32, 149, 154 army-building theory 20, 30, 44–6, 49, 83, 107, 109, 115, 126–7, 132, 147, 154, 168 Army Staff Academy 117, 122, 124 Art, Robert J. 4 (n11) artillery 35, 65, 66, 72, 76, 93, 96, 103, 124, 129, 134–7, 145; see also Second Artillery ASEAN 5, 174 n17 asymmetric warfare 104, 109, 110, 113, 114, 143, 149, 154 Austin, Greg D. 16 (n8), 18 Australia 17, 22 automation 75, 80, 103, 105, 109, 141–3 ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems 125–6

Betts, Richard K. 15, 30–2, 33, 95 bilateralism 5, 24 Binneendijk, Hans 1 (n2) Blasko, Dennis J. 3, 101 Blücher, General ‘Galin’ 47 border control 59, 73 Bradley, Omar 48 Braun, Otto (Li De) 47 Brodie, Bernard 38, 41 Cambodia 64 campaigning 85–9, 100, 102, 107, 111, 113, 115, 116, 118–19, 121–3, 127–8, 130, 132, 135, 200–1 n9 ‘capable army’ policy 97, 126 ‘capture-the-king’ operation 115 CCP see Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission (CMC) 28, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 64, 68, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 90, 95–6, 100, 102, 107, 109, 118, 121, 126–7, 132, 134, 140, 142 Central Special Commission 56, 57, 190 n106 Chang Qiankun 51 Chen Liheng 19 (n24) Chen Youyi 202 n24 Chen Zhou 18–19 China’s Civil War 42, 46, 48, 65, 84, 108 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 8, 20, 53, 59 Chinese military actions 2, 46, 159–64 Chinese military history: army-building models 44–6; local wars 46–7; guerrilla warfare 47–8; conventional local wars 48–9; Soviet doctrinal influence 47, 49–53, 55; strategic

246

Index

Chinese military history – cont. ‘guerrillaism’ 54; ‘China-centred’ approach 53–4, 55; structural readiness for total war 54–6; deterrence and defence 56–8; sacrificing operational readiness 58–60 Chinese People’s Volunteers 48, 49 cities 68, 69 civil-military relations 21–2, 36, 73, 100 class 19, 26 Clausewitz, Carl von 16, 19, 155 CMC see Central Military Commission coastal defence 50, 75–6, 81, 88 Cold War 9, 11, 17, 18, 23–4, 26, 39, 40–1, 94, 132, 190–1 n111 combined arms 29, 35, 49, 50, 62, 69, 72, 76, 78–80, 81, 96, 100–1, 102, 121, 127, 133, 134, 154, 163 compellence 46, 49, 125, conscription 102 Cossa, Ralph A. 151 counter-terrorism 1, 113–15, 136 Creveld, Martin van 23 Cronin, Patrick M. 1 (n2) Cultural Revolution 29, 53, 57, 62, 80, 86 culture 7–8, 22 defence policies 2, 7, 28, 55, 57, 77, 93; see also active defence; initial phase of war theory; military readiness Deng Xiaoping 9, 20, 25, 28, 35, 39, 60, 63, 67–8, 71–2, 76, 77, 80, 83, 89, 94, 107 deterrence 24, 41, 56–8, 60, 94–5, 106, 120, 125, 153–4; conventional 124–5, 154; nuclear 24, 120, 125, 126 documentary sources 4 Donghai (East Sea) exercises 133, 162 ‘double historical mission’ 109 Douhet, Giulio 106 Dulles, John Foster 41 early warning 65, 107, 125, 130, 149 economic development 6–7, 9, 22, 26, 89 education 139–41; see also professional military education Eisenhower, Dwight D. 41, 46 emergency manoeuvre operations (EMOU) 120, 127–8 Encyclopaedia of Military Affairs 85, 90

Falklands War 67, 84, 105 firepower warfare 116 ‘fist units’ 98 ‘five statements’ 100, 207 n83 force development 1, 2, 3, 15, 20 force reduction 13, 72, 83, 96, 127; see also streamlining four modernisations 25, 26, 63 Fu Quanyou 97, 109 General Armament Department (GAD) 29, 132 General Logistics Department 132 General Political Department 28, 54 General Staff Department (GSD) 28, 72, 76, 95, 96, 115, 118, 132, 138, 140, 143, 144 geography 22, 59, 191 n128 George, Alexander 45 Germany 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, 30, 34 Glantz, David M. 17 (n14) Global Positioning System (GPS) 113, 125, 130 globalisation 26, 27 guerrilla warfare 45, 48, 58, 60, 62, 69, 80, 92, 97, 116, 128, 144, 145 Gulf Wars 30, 33, 84, 100, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 126, 150 Guo Boxiong 135, 137 Han Huaizhi 81 Hao Yuqing 112 hardware 54–6, 73–6, 98–9, 102, 110, 130, 132, 140, 153; aircraft 51, 56, 66, 74, 76, 99, 107, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 149; destroyers 75, 76, 102, 131; helicopters 108, 128, 131, 136; submarines 74–5, 79, 131, 190 n106, 197 n66, 218 n119; tanks 33–4, 35, 59, 64, 66, 72, 74, 76, 108, 136; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 130, 136, 149; see also missiles high-technology local wars 105–7, 147–8, 154; battlefield operations 116–21; counter-terrorism 113–15; definition 106–8, 110; information operations 111–14, 122, 128, 130, 154; information(ised) warfare 13, 110–11, 119; joint operations 106, 118, 121, 122–3, 127, 133, 137, 146, 148; official doctrine 106–8; operational readiness 99, 102, 133–143; Revolution in

Index Military Affairs 108–9; Second Artillery 121, 123–5, 133; structural readiness 126–33 Hong Kong 8, 28–9 Huang Chen-Hsia 45 Huang Kesheng 53 human rights 26, 99 independence and autonomy 25, 26 India see Sino–Indian border wars infantry 47, 48, 51, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74, 77, 84, 93, 98, 120, 129, 136 information mobilisation 145–6 information operations 111–14, 128, 130 information technology 109, 110, 129–30, 133, 140, 143, 146, 154–5 information(ised) warfare 110–12, 119, 146 initial phase of war theory 39, 69–71, 76, 89 institutions 28–30 intelligence 28–9, 45, 103, 109, 111, 112, 114, 130, 145, 147–8 intentions 8–11 interdependence 1–2, 4–5, 27 international socialism 8 internationalism 26, 54 Iran–Iraq War 67, 91, 108 Iraq 106, 113, 115, 128, 132, 144–5 Israel 22, 67, 105, 129 Jablonsky, David 6 Japan 10, 34, 42, 46, 191 n111 Jencks, Harlan W. 106 Jiang Siyi 20 Jiang Zemin 28, 36, 100, 107, 109, 127, 140, 141 Jiang Zhijun 27 Jiefangjun Bao 116, 127, 139 Jinmen 30, 48, 54, 145, 159, 160 Joffe, Ellis vii Johnston, Alastair 7 joint operations 30, 50, 51, 79, 81, 88, 101, 106, 113, 118, 121–3, 127, 131, 137, 142, 146–7, 149, 162–3 Journal of the National Defence University 126, 135 keji lianbing (scientific and technological means) 105, 133, 134, 135, 147 Khrushchev, Nikita 22, 42–3, 52, 53

247

KMT (Kuomintang ) 40, 47, 60 Korean War 23, 30, 38–9, 40, 42, 46, 48–9, 84, 108, 160 Kosovo War 105 landing operations 113, 117, 122, 124, 134, 135, 136, 144, 145, 162, 163 law and regulations 29, 50, 51, 53, 88, 89, 93, 94, 100, 102, 118, 120–2, 135, 142, 143 Lebanon 67, 84, 105 legal warfare 120 Lewis, John Wilson 56, 57 Liberation Army Daily 113, 121, 123, 128, 136 Libya 105 Lijian 2000 exercise 133, 134, 138, 163 limited war 38, 39, 40–1, 90–1, 150, 202 n24 Lin Biao 47, 53, 59, 95 Liu Bocheng 47, 50, 53 Liu Huaqing 76, 88 Liu Yalou 51 local war: Chinese concept 3, 39, 44, 46, 85, 89, 90–4, 93t, 153–4, 185 n7; defining 18–19, 38, 41, 108; operational level of war 85–9, 87t, 92, 95, 116; Soviet local wars 38, 42–3; vs. limited war 90–1, 150, 202 n24; vs. total war 89, 90, 152–3; see also campaigning; high-technology local wars; Sino–Vietnamese conflict logistics 30, 45, 48, 67, 102, 107, 109, 120, 122, 123, 124, 132, 148 MacArthur, General Douglas 40, 46 Macke, Richard C. 1 (n1) Mahan, Alfred Thayer 16 Malinovsky, Marshal 22–3 manoeuvre warfare 60, 101, 116, 127, 212 n53 Mao Zedong 8–9, 25, 45, 47–8, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 95, 113 Mao Zedong Military Thought 18, 19, 20, 30, 49, 53–4, 107 marine forces 75, 98, 134 maritime interests 27 Marxism/Leninism 18–20, 26, 43, 70 mass media 29, 64, 119 Mazarr, Michael J. 7–8 (n33) Mi Zhenyu 91, 92, 107 military academies 27, 29, 47, 50, 88,

248

Index

military academies – cont. 117, 136, 137, 139, 145; see also National Defence University military doctrine 2–3, 6, 151–2; Chinese development 16, 18–19, 20–1, 29–30, 39, 43, 45, 54, 56–7, 59, 62–3, 71, 165–70; Chinese experiences and threat perception 23–5, 26, 89, 92; communicative function 21, 22, 23, 43; constitutive function 23, 43; defining 16–17; institutions 28–30; ‘Marxist-Leninist’ tradition 18–20, 43; and military readiness 33–5, 152; PLA terminology 18–19, 20–1; Soviet model 17–18, 19, 22, 49–52; US model 16, 17, 18, 23, 33; see also national interest military force 6, 8 military power 2, 6, 7–9, 10, 11, 15, 152 military readiness 3, 152; China 35–6, 98, 156; definitions 15, 30–1; interdependence of operational and structural readiness 79–81, 95; and military doctrine 33–5, 152; speed and effectiveness 31–3; see also operational readiness; structural readiness military schools 49, 50 military science: Chinese structure 157 Military Science Publishing House 108 Military Service Law 89 military thought (junshi sixiang) 18; see also Mao Zedong Military Thought Military Training and Examination Programme 118, 119, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139 Military Training Programme 100, 101, 102, 133 Military Training Regulations 102, 118, 135 militia 59–60, 66, 73, 75, 97, 100, 143, 145, 147 Mischief Reef occupation 2, 90, 162 missiles 42, 55–6, 76, 94; cruise missiles 33, 118, 131, 134, 145; ICBMs 74, 129; IRBMs 63, 78; SAMs 56, 66, 98, 125; SLBM 74; tactical missiles 95, 124, 129; tests 1, 2, 56, 63, 78, 134, 162, 163, 207 n88 mobile warfare 47, 48, 69, 92, 116, 212 n53 mobilisation 15, 31, 32, 143, 144–5 Morgenthau, Hans 6, 10–11, 22

Murray, Williamson 34–5 ‘nation’ 180 n63 national defence 19, 27, 63, 144, 146 National Defence Science and Technology Research 55–6 National Defence University 29, 30, 94, 107, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 137, 146 national interest 25–8, 89, 180–9 n63 national security 9, 24, 26, 27, 70, 73, 81, 112–14, 130, 145, 151 nationalism 8–9, 25–6 natural resources 22, 26–7, 27 netwar 145–6 Nie Rongzhen 47, 57, 190 n106 non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps 103 North Korea 51; see also Korean War nuclear weapons: China 24, 53, 55, 56–7, 60, 69–70, 74, 92, 94; Soviet Union 41, 42, 43, 55, 92, 94; United States 40, 41, 46, 60; see also missiles offensive strategy 7, 21–2, 66, 70, 71, 80, 92, 112, 113, 117–18, 119 officer corps 79, 80, 102–3, 138–41, 208 n101; see also professional military education offshore defence 75, 88 operational art 79, 81, 86, 87t, 102, 117, 119, 123, 146, 152, 155 operational level of war 18, 85–9, 87t, 92, 95, 111–12, 116–18, 146 operational readiness 3, 15, 31, 32, 58–9; command and control 79, 102–3, 138–43, 208 n101; see also campaigning; training patterns of war 110–11 Peng Dehuai 49, 52, 53 Peng Guangqian 115 People’s Armed Forces Departments 96 People’s Armed Police (PAP) 73, 96, 97, 100, 115, 118, 127 People’s Army 19, 20 People’s War 19–20, 39, 45, 66, 143–6; deterrence and defence 24, 56–8; guerrilla warfare 45, 58, 62; under informationisation conditions 21, 36; under Modern Conditions 20–1,

Index 68–71, 76; operational doctrine 46–7, 56–7, 58–60 PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 29, 49, 50–1, 65–6, 88; operational readiness 59, 76, 78, 88; structural readiness 74–5, 98, 99, 127, 131 PLA Navy (PLAN) 29, 49, 50, 65, 88, 119, 124; operational readiness 59, 78–9, 81, 87–8; structural readiness 75–6, 98, 99, 127, 131 PLA (People’s Liberation Army): army air corps 96, 131; doctrinal development 16, 18–19, 20–1, 39, 43, 62, 65, 165–70; see also Chinese military history; force structure 21, 66, 72, 97–8, 141, 193 n17, 105–6 n47, 195 nn44–5; military actions 2, 46, 159–64; regulations 29, 50, 51, 53, 88, 93, 94, 100, 120–2; structural reforms 35, 67, 71–3, 95–6; see also guerrilla warfare; joint operations; officer corps; Sino–Vietnamese conflict; special operations forces; streamlining PLA Polytechnic University 138, 139, 140, 142 political education 54, 58, 80, 100 political work 86, 87, 100, 120, 121, 122 Pollack, Jonathan D. 49 (n59) population 9, 22 Posen, Barry 30 positional warfare 92, 116 power 1, 4, 5–6; see also military power professional military education (PME) 135, 136, 137, 139–40 Project 2010 140 psychological warfare/psychological operation 112, 115, 116, 119–20, 119, n66 public opinion warfare 120, 170 Public Security Ministry 72, 96 Railway Ministry 72 rapid reaction units (RRUs) 98, 127–9 realism 2, 4, 9, 25, 83 Red Army 47, 48, 50 regional security 2, 4–5, 24, 151 regional stability 1, 11 reserve forces 73, 97, 143, 144, 145 ‘revisionist’ powers 7, 10–11 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 22–3, 34–5, 36, 42, 84, 105, 108–9, 141, 144, 154

249

RRUs see rapid reaction units Russia see Sino–Soviet relations Russo–Japanese War 42 sashoujian’ (trump card weapons’) 103, 132, 154, 218 n119 satellite communications 63, 74, 125 Sbitov, General 34 Science of Campaigning 86, 87, 111–12, 121 scientific and technological means (keji lianbing) 105, 133, 135, 136 Second Artillery 13, 28, 29, 56, 59, 60, 76, 78, 87–8, 94, 101, 121, 123–6, 205 n63 security see national security; regional security Seeking Truth 9 self-reliance 55, 129 September 11 2001 114, 136 Shambaugh, David vii, 148 Shanghai Communiqué 24 Shanghai Cooperative Organisation 2, 115 simulation 29, 77–8, 101–2, 135, 137 Sino–Indian border wars 22–3, 90, 161 Sino–Japanese War 46 Sino–Soviet relations 11, 24, 39, 51, 59, 99, 129 Sino–Vietnamese conflict 59, 62, 63–4, 65–6, 70, 72, 84, 90, 162 SOFs see special operations forces Sokolovsky, Marshal V.D. 43 Southeast Asia 39 Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 54 sovereignty 26, 27, 100 Soviet Union: border clashes 24; influence on Chinese military 11, 39, 47, 49–53, 55; local wars 38, 42–3; Marxism-Leninism 18–20, 26, 43, 70; military doctrine 17–18, 19, 22, 49–52; nuclear capability 41, 42, 43, 55, 92, 94; Red Army 22, 51, 52; Revolution of Military Affairs 22–3; space programme 42, 55; see also Cold War; Russo–Japanese War; Sino–Soviet relations Soviet–Vietnamese alliance 64 space programmes 42, 55, 129 Spanish Civil War 42 special operations forces (SOFs) 114, 115, 116, 127–8, 149

250

Index

‘specialised troops’ 97–8, 205 n63 Spratly Islands 79, 84, 162 ‘state’ 180 n63 State Council 29, 56 state interests 25, 26, 180–1 n63 ‘status quo’ powers 7, 10–11 Strategy and Tactics of People’s War 19, 20 streamlining 80, 83, 96, 99, 126–7 structural readiness 3, 15, 31, 32; force mix 71–3, 96, 97–8, 99; hardware 54–6, 73–6, 98–9, 129–33; rapid response capability 98, 128–9; see also streamlining Su Yu 35, 68, 92 Summers, Harry 23 Sun Jizhang 87t Sun Zi 95 systemic integrated joint operation 106, 146–8, 149 Taiwan 8, 27, 40, 54, 99, 124, 125, 207 n88 Taiwan Strait 105; crises 53, 54, 55, 190 n98; missile tests 2, 124, 162, 163, 207 n88 Tan, Georges Eng Bok 19 technology: China 65, 68, 73–6, 80, 92, 101–2, 103; and military doctrine 3, 22–3, 33–5; Soviet Union 42–3; United States 33–4, 105, 125; see also Gulf Wars; high-technology local wars; information technology territorial air defence 51, 80 Third Line 59, 68 Third World 9, 24 Thompson, Kenneth W. 22 threat perception 23–5, 26, 89, 92 Tiananmen Incident 73, 97, 99, 100 Tibet 8, 84, 99, 160, 213 n66 total war 46, 58, 89, 90, 152–3 trade 9, 26–7 training 35, 36, 58, 76–9, 80, 99–102, 105, 114–15, 133–8, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 147–8 transparency 1, 3, 28 Truman, Harry S. 40 ‘trump card weapons’ (sashoujian) 104, 132, 154, 218 n119 United Nations 7, 38, 40, 48 United States: China policy 7, 24; counter-terrorism 114; information

operations 112, 130; limited war doctrine 38, 40–1, 90, 119; military doctrine 16, 17, 18, 23, 33; nuclear strategy 40, 41, 46, 60; technology 33–4, 105, 125; see also Afghanistan; Cold War; Gulf Wars; Iraq; Korean War; Libya; Taiwan Strait crises; Vietnam War universities 130, 139, 140; see also National Defence University USSR see Soviet Union Vietnam 2, 54, 64, 84, 160, 161; see also Sino–Vietnamese conflict Vietnam War 23, 24, 38, 39, 59, 90, 202 n24 voluntary military service 102 Walt, Stephen 10 (n44) Waltz, Kenneth N. 4, 6 (n21), 11, 104 Wang Jingjie 19 (n24) war: asymmetric 104, 110, 113, 114, 132, 143, 155; categorisation 43; conventional 45–6, 47–8; forms of operation 92, 115, 116; information(ised) 110–11, 116, 119; levels of war 18; nature of war 19; patterns of war 110–11; political nature 70; three warfares 120 war-games 76–7, 79, 198 n75 war zone 98, 123, 128, 137 Warden, John A., III 23 weaponry 51, 74, 75, 92, 104, 129, 131–3; see also missiles; nuclear weapons; technology Weltman, John J. 4 (n13) Whitson, William 45 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 1, 27 World War II 21, 23, 30, 34, 69 Xiao Jingguang 47, 50, 75 Xinhua News Agency 64 Xinjiang 136, 159, 161 Xiong Guangkai 144 Xu Shiyou 64 Xue Litai 56, 57 Yan Xuetong 180–1 n63 Yang Dezhi 64, 79, 89, 199 n100 Ye Jianying 47, 54, 68, 92 Yijiangshan Islands 51, 54, 160 Yu Huating 35 (n112)

Index Yu Qifen 67, 194 n22 Zhang Shuyun 116 Zhang Xueshi 50 Zhang Zhen 118

251

Zhanshi Bao 142 Zhenbao (Damansky) Island 59, 161 Zhou Enlai 26, 57, 63, 190 n106 Zhu Dunfa 107 Zhukov, Marshal 42, 52