Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis (RoutledgeCurzon)

Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization This book raises interesting questions about the process of democratization in Ho...

Author: Ming Sing

112 downloads 1543 Views 878KB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization

This book raises interesting questions about the process of democratization in Hong Kong. It asks why democracy has been so long delayed when Hong Kong’s level of socio-economic development has become so high. It relates democratization in Hong Kong to wider studies of the democratization process elsewhere, and it supplements the received wisdom – that democracy was delayed because of colonial rule and by the opposition of China – with new thinking, for example, that Hong Kong’s quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian political structure vested power in bureaucrats who refused to allow top-down democratization; a politically weak civil society and a non-participant political culture that crippled bottom-up democratization; plus the division between pro-democratic civil society and political society. Ming Sing pursued his postgraduate study at Oxford and Yale University and is an Associate Professor at the City University of Hong Kong. He is the author of Hong Kong Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2003). His current research is on comparative democratization in Asia and elsewhere.

RoutledgeCurzon Contemporary China Series

1 Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China Leong Liew and Wang Shaoguang 2 Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization A comparative analysis Ming Sing

Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization A comparative analysis

Ming Sing

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada By RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 Ming Sing

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-18040-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67055-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-32054-2 (Print Edition)

Contents

List of figures List of tables Foreword Acknowledgments 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

vii viii xii xv

Studying Hong Kong from a comparative perspective: an anomaly for modernization theory (1980–mid-2002)

1

Hong Kong’s democratization: outcome of bargaining among multiple actors

19

Why was Hong Kong an anomaly before 1984? Lack of top-down and bottom-up democratization (1946–84)

31

Britain’s first retreat from rapid democratization and formation of the first pro-democratic alliance

65

Growing vibrancy of society-led democratic reform: polarization, compromise and decisions over Hong Kong’s democratization (late-1986–90)

94

Renewed British-led democratic reform from 1992 to 1994: ambivalence in public support for democratic reform

123

Decline in popular mobilization for democracy and emergence of PRC-initiated democratic reversal (1992–7)

143

vi

Contents

8

Further democratic reversal in the post-handover period (mid-1997–2002)

163

Hong Kong as a rare anomaly to modernization theory

191

Appendix 1 Different blueprints for the legislature of 1997

224

Appendix 2

227

9

Details of interviews undertaken

Appendix 3 Member organizations of Joint Association of People’s Organizations (JAPOD)

229

Appendix 4 Member organizations of Democracy 2000

231

Appendix 5

Members of JCPDG

232

Appendix 6

Sources for Table 8.10

235

Notes Bibliography Index

237 267 300

Figures

2.1 2.2 4.1 6.1 6.2 7.1

7.2

7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2

Bargaining model of democratization Timeline of Hong Kong’s democratic development (1982–2000) Spirals of mobilization and counter-mobilization between the democratic alliance and BPG Hong Kong people’s degree of support for Chris Patten’s reform proposals 1992–4 A synthetic model Capitalization value of leading companies with representatives in the PC, SC or PL: proportion of the total value of all shares listed in Hong Kong’s stock market Proportion of seats undertaken by different parties in the Preparatory Committee, Selection Committee and Provisional Legislature Extent of overlapping between Preparatory Committee (PC) and Selection Committee (SC) Party affiliations of the overlapping members of Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee Occupations of the overlapping members of Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee Small sizes of memberships of two pro-democracy parties Hong Kong people’s trust in HKSAR Government (mid-1997–mid-2002) Declining trend of Tung Chee-hwa’s ratings Public support ratings of best-known political parties Different phases of democratic development in Hong Kong (1982–2002) Factors that limited popular support for democratization (1986–April 1989)

25 29 85 126 128

154

155 156 157 157 174 182 183 184 192 203

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

Actual and planned proportion of seats in the legislature directly elected between 1991 and 2007 Summary of modernization theory research studies Regime status (2000) and per capita GNP (1998) Top twenty-six places of high human development (1990 and 1998) Economic shocks and regime change in the 1980s Interests of political forces and imposition of costs on those interests Effects of different factors on democratic development in Hong Kong in different phases (1970s–mid-2002) Comparative civil liberties in the 1970s and 1980s Percentage of representation of businessmen in the executive (E) and legislative (L) councils Average growth rates of GDP and GNP per capita, 1960–82 for four East Asian NICS and China Social indicators of four East Asian NICS and China in 1984 Life expectancy and infant mortality Level of unionization – union membership as a percentage of employed labor force in four East Asian NICS Unionization rates in Hong Kong, by industry (mid-1970s) Some major pressure groups and members of JCPDG 1984 Green Paper proposals for Legislative Council composition Political reform proposed in Green Paper, 1984 1984 White Paper on political reform – proposed legislature in 1985 The political opportunity structure in mid-1986 Nature of member organizations of the JCPDG Suggested timetable of democratization by core members of the democratic alliance in response to the Green Paper in 1984

2 4 6 9 11 26 27 38 41 47 48 48 51 53 58 75 75 76 79 80

81

List of tables ix 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.3

6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9

6.10

6.11

6.12

Past cooperation of democratic alliance members (1973–86) Timing of significant events (1986–7) Composition of the Grand Electoral College BPG’s arguments on the costs and benefits of democratization Public perceptions of the current political system and democratic reform in 1986 Survey results of two business chambers concerning direct elections in 1988 Activities launched by democratic alliance to promote direct elections in 1988 Reasons for favoring direct elections in 1988 General opinions about the Green Paper Surveys done by middle-class/professional organizations on attitudes towards direct election (DR) Seriousness of emigration of professionals (1987–8) How confident are you that the Basic Law will make sure the “One Country, Two Systems” promise will be kept? Three constitutional blueprints suggested by the JCPDG Spearman correlations coefficients on Patten’s reform factor Explaining public support for Patten’s reform: summary of multiple regression statistics Distribution of responses to the question: Do you agree that the following are the expected consequences of speeding up the pace of direct elections? Factor analysis of consequences of increasing directly elected seats Frequency distributions of the indicators of the two democratic values Factor analysis of political equality Factor analysis of freedoms Cohort experiences of different age groups (birth periods) Percentage of individuals in various age groups that agree/ very agree on expected consequences of speeding up the pace of direct elections Emigration potential of different classes: percentage of members of each class that agree/very agree/absolutely agree on the following question: If you have the chance to leave Hong Kong before 1997, will you do so? Distribution of the responses to the question: Among the following means, which is the most ideal one in producing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive? Which of the following items should Hong Kong care most about between now and 1997?

83 86 89 90 91 101 104 106 106 110 112 115 119 130 130

131 132 134 134 135 136

136

138

140 140

x

List of tables

6.13 6.14

7.1

7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5

Distribution of the responses to the question: Which of the following is the most important property of democracy? Distribution of political trust of Chinese Government, Hong Kong Government and directly elected members – Do you trust that what the Chinese Government/Hong Kong Government/directed elected members has/have done is, on the whole, beneficial for Hong Kong? Different stances among Hong Kong’s pro-democratic parties towards pace and extent of democratization proposed in 1994 Democratic reversal of Hong Kong after handover: political structure before and after handover Declining number of pro-democratic legislators’ seats in legislature (1995–2002) Real and hypothetical results for the 1998 legislature elections List of all motions demanding democratization rejected in post-handover legislature (1998–2001) Total number of motions rejected in post-handover legislature (1998–2001) under split voting method that would have been passed under the pre-handover simple plurality voting method Estimated financial loss in party revenue due to the scrapping of Municipal Councils Membership of six major political parties in Hong Kong Comparing membership/electorate ratios among Hong Kong and twenty European countries Comparison of District Board election result between DP and DAB Number of constituent organizations in three prodemocracy alliances Declining trend of media attention for democracy movements (1980s–2000) Public support for democracy Hong Kong people’s evaluation of various aspects of Hong Kong since the handover (with June, 1997 as the base) What do you think is the most important problem that the HK/HKSAR Government should tackle next year? Bargaining strengths of actors and outcome of democratization (1984–mid-2002) Decline in pressure for democratization brings worse bargaining outcome in democratization (1986–2000) Levels of public support for political institutions Chinese Government’s co-option strategy (1984–97) Chinese Government’s co-option of local capitalists (1984–97)

141

142

147 158 166 168 169

170 172 173 174 175 177 180 182 186 188 196 199 201 205 206

List of tables xi 9.6

9.7

A non-synchronic comparison of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea: effects of four factors on their democratic development Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

218 219

Foreword

Scholars have found it difficult to incorporate Hong Kong’s experience into theories of comparative politics. According to some influential arguments, a society with Hong Kong’s high per capita GDP, large middle class, and modernistic culture should develop a citizenry that is politically aware and engaged, mobilized, and assertive. This is not to deny that Hong Kong’s political system has been dominated by outside rulers – London before 1997 and Beijing since – so that its citizens lack the ultimate power of choice over their own politics. But even taking this into account, Hong Kong citizens’ lack of assertiveness has been striking. It is in posing the problem this way that Ming Sing’s book makes its first contribution. According to Professor Sing, it is fallacious, if tempting, to argue that Hong Kong’s failure to democratize presents no puzzle just because the territory is not sovereign and the key decisions on its political evolution were made elsewhere. This is true, but it is not the whole story: decisions in London and Beijing interacted with events in the territory. Had citizens organized more widely, spoken more loudly, pushed more energetically – as did happen, for example, around the time of the 1989 Tiananmen Square events – then decision-makers in the metropolitan capitals would have acted differently, Sing persuasively argues. Thus, what Sing calls the tortuous process of Hong Kong’s democratization – now, indeed, as far as we can tell, actually moving in reverse – is the product of dual causation, reflecting the interaction of forces outside the territory and those within. This insight opens the way to analyzing the domestic determinants of Hong Kong’s fate. Sing probes deeply into the mechanisms of Hong Kong’s domestic politics, through interviews, surveys, and historical narrative. He explores several lines of causation that explain Hong Kong citizens’ political apathy and fatalism. He shows that civil society in Hong Kong is weak because the British colonial government discouraged its growth, partly for its own convenience and partly to avoid developments that it

Foreword xiii believed Beijing would object to. How it did so should interest social scientists because of the subtlety of Sing’s analysis. He argues that Britain discouraged civil society in Hong Kong not through repression but by creating efficient bureaucratic service delivery and establishing mechanisms of co-optation that brought the middle-class and capitalist elites over to the side of the government. The colonial regime in Hong Kong created the kind of orderly, non-participant political system characteristic of successful authoritarian regimes, but with little use of authoritarian measures of repression. Another fruitful comparison with authoritarianism emerges in the area of legitimation. Hong Kong’s spectacular record of economic growth, combined with civil liberties and public amenities, enabled the regime to gain public acceptance without democratic consultation. Thus, Hong Kong never encountered the kind of legitimacy crisis that in other societies had sparked pressure for democratization. Hong Kong’s labor movement and the Christian Churches also played weaker roles than sibling organizations in societies elsewhere that have undergone democratization. Sing shows that unionization rates in Hong Kong are relatively low, and that the social service work of the churches is financially dependent on the government and on contributions from the anti-democratic wealthy. All this and much more emerge from Sing’s in-depth analysis of Hong Kong’s political history, social structure, and political landscape. A native of Hong Kong and 1993 sociology DPhil from Oxford, Professor Sing has been researching and publishing on Hong Kong for over a decade. For this book he interviewed scores of party, movement, and civil society leaders, gathered data on Hong Kong’s economy and society, traced its political history before and after 1997, and has produced an analysis of Hong Kong politics that is both true to local realities and animated by questions of comparative democratization. Besides its scientific value, Ming Sing’s book is timely in at least two ways. First, there is much debate over how far the Tung Chee Hua administration in Hong Kong will go in reversing the modest democratic reforms that were undertaken by the outgoing British colonial regime. Second, scholars speculate over how much influence Hong Kong’s model of civil liberties and its modest experiences in elections and division of powers will have on the Chinese mainland. Sing’s book is required reading for a knowledgeable discussion of both these issues, since the necessary starting point in discussing either is an understanding of Hong Kong’s democratization path and its determinants. This book places the Hong Kong case firmly in the context of the literature on comparative democratization. We no longer need to explain the anomaly of Hong Kong’s failure to democratize by a theoretic resort to the dei ex machina of London and Beijing. Now Hong Kong as a regime

xiv

Foreword

comes into focus, with its own mechanisms of state–society interaction, legitimation, conflict resolution, and institutional evolution that have played important roles along with outside actors in determining the territory’s evolution. Andrew J. Nathan Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science Columbia University June 2003

Acknowledgments

This book has had a lengthy gestation. I started writing a few initial chapters when I conducted my D.Phil thesis at Oxford University between 1988 and 1993. On returning to Hong Kong from Britain in 1993, I found the tortuous democratization in Hong Kong had reached a new phase. The wrangles, mobilizations, and counter-mobilizations over democratization attained a new height at that point and in the rest of the last few years of British rule over Hong Kong under the governorship of Chris Patten. Following that, the reversal of Hong Kong’s limited democracy immediately after its return to China soon unfolded still another new page in Hong Kong’s winding democratic development. I thus decided to extend the coverage of the book again to cover Hong Kong’s post-handover period up until mid-2002, i.e., five years after the handover. Writing this, the most arduous academic work of my life to date, has been both a demanding and rewarding job. I owe thanks to a great many people whose help and encouragement, advice, and support have been crucial to the completion of this multi-year project. Thanks must go to Professor Andrew Nathan and Professor Alvin So, who have offered me perceptive and encouraging comments on my long draft. I would also like to thank my former university supervisor Laurence Whitehead. His perceptive remarks and prompt reading of my work have been most helpful. My sincere thanks must also be extended to Professor Juan J. Linz. His awesome stock of knowledge about democratization and vigorous criticisms always forced me to be more critical of what I had written. His advice made my exchange program at Yale University in 1990 an unforgettable one. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the following people who gave me useful comments on my work at various stages: C.Y. Cheung, Dr. Paul Hart, and Professor Robert Scalapino. I am very grateful to the following friends for their timely help at various stages: M.Y. Kan, Debby Chan, Jethro Chiu, Carol Hau, Ruby Chan, Jason Tomes, K.M. Kwan, C.Y. Cheung, S.M. Mok, Jerome Chiu, Freddy Mang, Kennis Wong, Annie Wu, Elaine Chan, P. Domingo,

xvi

Acknowledgments

S. Zaidi, A. Thomson, G. Magee, Joseph Chan, and my numerous student helpers. I am especially grateful to the continued support of Helena Wong. I am also very thankful to the City University of Hong Kong for funding my various research projects, with some of their findings appearing in various sections of this book. Finally, without the help and dedicated care of my wife Lai-cheung Wong and my mother Shu-chun Kwai, this book could never have been written. I owe my greatest gratitude to them.

1

Studying Hong Kong from a comparative perspective An anomaly for modernization theory (1980–mid-2002)

Problem-setting: the Chinese Government’s opposition is not a sufficient reason for the absence of democracy in Hong Kong Three years before the twentieth century drew to an end, Britain withdrew from Hong Kong, the most glowing colony it has ever governed throughout its colonial history. Hong Kong, a place where East meets West, where robust Chinese entrepreneurship prospers under a British legal system, is an invaluable “asset” and an economic powerhouse.1 However, Hong Kong’s political development has been dwarfed in comparison with those splendid economic achievements. The handover of the most prosperous British colony in 1997 to China, the most powerful post-totalitarian regime that still remains (Linz and Stepan, 1996), has sparked international concern since the 1980s. The international community is worried whether Hong Kong can maintain its prosperity, freedom, and stability after reverting its sovereignty. There are two research problems to be explored in this book. First, why has Hong Kong constituted a rare anomaly to the popular modernization theory, i.e., achieved a high degree of socio-economic development without attaining a high degree of democracy? Second, what have been the constraints on Hong Kong’s democratization, especially between 1980 and mid-2002, i.e., when Hong Kong’s sovereignty reverted to China for five years? Given that the pre-handover Hong Kong and British Governments have attempted to democratize Hong Kong since 1984, and that for a long time Hong Kong has had a very favorable level of socio-economic development suitable for developing democracy, why was democracy, as defined by Dahl,2 so lacking in Hong Kong between the mid-1980s and mid-2002, and why has full democracy been and will be precluded with at least until 2007 (Table 1.1)?3 In face of the well-publicized Chinese Government’s opposition to Hong Kong’s democratization since the mid-1980s, one is tempted to argue that the opposition from the Chinese Government was a sufficient cause to explain the absence of a high degree of democracy in Hong Kong.

2

Hong Kong from a comparative perspective

Table 1.1 Actual and planned proportion of seats in the legislature directly elected between 1991 and 2007 (%) Before 1991

1991

1998

2000

2004

2007

0

30

33.3

40

50

50 or more

Source: Basic Law (1990).

On closer scrutiny, it can be observed that such a claim, however, is built on shaky ground. Between 1982 and 1984, Hong Kong’s planned return to China posed a problem to the colony. To preserve Hong Kong’s economic value for China, and to persuade Taiwan to eventually reunify, the Chinese Government promised the Hong Kong people “One Country, Two Systems,” and a high degree of autonomy after 1997. But, as Hong Kong increasingly demanded Western-style democracy, the Chinese Government was forced to face up to its contradictory interests by either imposing more blatant obstructions or granting more concessions. It was also these contradictions in its interests that allowed Britain and local pro-democracy forces some limited room to maneuver. In 1990, when the Chinese Government promulgated the Basic Law – the mini-constitution stipulated by the Chinese Government for post-1997 Hong Kong – in face of the ardent and vocal demands for faster and greater democratization from Britain and domestic pro-democracy forces, it allowed the direct elections of legislators in 1991 to increase phenomenally from ten to eighteen seats. In addition, a directly elected Chief Executive and a fully directly elected legislature will become possible in 2007, rather than 2011. The Chinese Government also stated that a steady progression of democratization between 1997 and 2007 would be allowed, despite its earlier warning in late 1989 that the democratization after 1997 would subsequently halt for ten years. Those concessions entailed contradictions in the Chinese Government’s interests with respect to Hong Kong, which made room for bargaining between China, Britain, and domestic pro-democracy forces. However, the moderate instead of major concessions to the local pro-democracy movement implied the limited bargaining power of the pro-democracy forces. This study will thus explore what other constraints, in addition to the Chinese Government’s opposition, have restricted the bargaining power of the pro-democracy forces. Hence, although the Chinese Government’s opposition during the 1980s and 1990s is important in explaining the actual and the scheduled slow pace of democratization between 1986 and 2007 (Table 1.1), other constraints need to be admitted. Theoretically speaking, examination of the case of Hong Kong also makes good sense. The absence of full democracy and the expected and actual slow pace of democratization in Hong Kong between 1986 and 2007


3

render Hong Kong a rare and inexplicable anomaly to modernization theory. According to modernization theory, countries with a medium to high level of socio-economic development are likely to see the emergence and consolidation of a democratic system. However, from 1987 onwards, while Hong Kong has already been a “high-income economy” (World Bank, 1988–2001), it still remains an undemocratic city–state. Thus, Hong Kong has posed an anomaly to modernization theory and this research aims to draw theoretical implications for the theory from the case study of Hong Kong. The next few sections will argue that, despite some misgivings, modernization theory has been significant in explaining global democratization, and that Hong Kong has been a rare anomaly.

Global democratization and modernization theory Since 1974, a global wave of democratization has swept over different parts of the world. Between 1974 and 2001, the number of new electoral democracies rapidly increased from 39 in 1974 to 121 in 2001 (Freedom House, 2002). In 2001, the 121 electoral democracies already represented more than 62.5 percent of the world’s population (Lipset et al., 2000). Although the numbers of electoral democracies have flattened out since the mid-1990s, and the prospect of democratic consolidation in different countries remains unclear, the third wave of global democratization has fundamentally altered the political contours of the world with the increase of over eighty-one new electoral democracies since 1974 (Diamond, 2000: 15; Lipset et al., 2000). Causes of democratization and modernization theory While many causes, including crises, education, urbanization, cultural values, religious beliefs, institutional arrangements, economic dependency, and economic development have all been cited as important for democratization (Huntington, 1991: 37–8; Shin, 1994: 135–70; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 19–60), the dominant approach has been modernization theory. This theory has two forms: in its weaker version, it asserts the existence of a general positive association, though not strictly linear, between the level of socio-economic development and the existence of “democracy” (Dahl, 1971: 20–1, 65; 1989; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 29). In its stronger version, it maintains that the level of socio-economic development is an important and, at times, the most important causal factor in determining the existence or level of democracy. The theory has received overwhelming support from cross-national research, adopting diverse research samples and research designs over the past four decades (Table 1.2) (Barro, 1999; Bollen, 1979; 1980; Casper, 2000: 1–19; Cnudde and McCrone, 1967: 75; Coulter, 1975; Cutright, 1963: 255–8; Cutright and Wiley, 1969; Diamond, 1992: 93–139; 1999; Geddes, 1999: 118–19; Huntington, 1984: 199; 1991: 69; Inglehart, 1997; 1999; Lipset, 1959: 32–9;

4


Table 1.2 Summary of modernization theory research studies Author

Sample size of countries

Year

Statistical method

Lipset (1959)

50

1940s and 50s simple association

Cutright (1963)

77

1940–60

multiple regressions

Cnudde and McCrone (1967)

77

1940–60

path analysis

Neubauer (1967)

23

1940–60


Smith (1969)

110

1946–65


Cutright and Wiley (1969)

40

1927–66

cross-legged correlations

Dahl (1971)

114

DV: 1969

simple association

Coulter (1975)

85

1950–70


Huntington (1984)

125

1981

simple association

Bollen and Jackman (1985)

110 (in 1960) 1960, 65 100 (in 1965)

with panel analysis

Huntington (1991)

124

DV: 1989

simple association

Diamond (1992)

152

1989, 90


Lipset et al. (1993)

93

1960–85


Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) 131

1972–89

OLS

Inglehart (1997)

43

1990–5

OLS

Barro (1999)

76–103

1972–95

SUR

Casper (2000)

120

1951–92

OLS

Welzel and Inglehart (2001)

52

1990; 1995–7

WLS

IVs: vary

IV: 1976

Notes DV: Dependent variable. IV: Independent variable.

1981; 1994: 1–22; Lipset et al. 1993: 155–75; Neubauer, 1967; Vanhanen, 1997; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001).4 Such a relationship was first underlined by Lipset in 1959, and continued to receive support among virtually dozens of cross-national research. Huntington, as a major champion of the theory, considers that higher levels of socio-economic development lead to a larger middle class, and a


5

more educated populace, which then make changes in the intervening variable of political culture. These changes include rising political efficacy, and increasing interpersonal trust. These changes in political culture will allegedly trigger an escalating support and opportunities for democratization (1991: 69). He argued that while newly democratized countries in the new wave varied greatly in their level of economic development in 1976, it is the middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank, that have the greater chance of becoming democracies.5 Presence in the middle-income range, however, did not always ensure the existence of democracy (1984: 199–201). Many of the top one-third middle-income countries in 1981 were undemocratic.6 Nevertheless, by 1990, most of these anomalous cases had vanished. This was because, Huntington (1991: 61) alleged, with the passage of time, the effects of socio-economic development had pushed such formerly undemocratic regimes as Spain, Portugal, Greece, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay into the transition zone and onto the path of democratization (Diamond, 1992: 461). Since national GNP can be much more unequally distributed than years of life expectancy, or schooling, per capita figures for GNP are less reliable indicators of average human development index than are national averages for the latter nonmonetary types of measures (ibid.: 458). Correlating the combined scores of political freedom of 152 countries with the Human Development Index (HDI)7 – an indicator designed by the United Nations that fares better than the average GNP in showing the real level of average human development – an even higher correlation of 0.71 was found (ibid.: 459).8 Few anomalies of modernization theory in the world and the Asia-Pacific region My analyses of recent data have given additional confirmation to the theory. From 1987 to 1999, all members of the prosperous “higher-income economies,” as defined by the World Bank, have been the most democratic regimes, except Hong Kong, Singapore, and Middle East oilexporting countries such as Brunei, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (Freedom House, 2001–2; World Bank, 1985–2001). In addition, the cross-tabulation of GNP per capita of 1999 and the level of democracy in 2001 also reveals that there exists more or less a stepwise relation between economic development and the level of democracy (Table 1.3).9 Moreover, cross-tabulating the Human Development Index (HDI) of 1999 and the level of democracy in 2001 has also confirmed the theory.10 In Asia, Hong Kong, Brunei, and Singapore were the only exceptions to modernization theory within the high-income group (Freedom House, 2001; World Bank, 2000).

6


Table 1.3 Regime status (2000) and per capita GNP (1998) Regime type

Per-capita GNP High income

State hegemonic, closed (13–14)

Upper-middle income

Lower-middle income

Low income

Bahrain Saudi Arabia Libya

Cuba Equatorial Guinea Iraq Syria Uzbekistan

Afghanistan Bhutan Burma1 Burundi Cameroon China Congo (Kinshasa)2 Laos North Korea Rwanda Somalia Sudan Turkmenistan Vietnam

State hegemonic, partially open (11–12)

Brunei Qatar United Arab Emirates

Lebanon Oman

Algeria Belarus Egypt Iran Kazakhstan Maldives Swaziland Tunisia Yugoslavia

Angola Burundi Cambodia Chad Congo (Brazzaville)3 Eritrea The Gambia Guinea Kenya Mauritania Pakistan Tajikistan Yemen Zimbabwe

Noncompetitive, partially pluralist (10)

Singapore

Malaysia

Bosnia Herzegovina Yugoslavia

Azerbaijan Comoros Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia Haiti Indonesia Kyrgyz Republic Niger Togo Uganda

Semi-competitive, partially pluralist (7–9)

Hong Kong Kuwait

Antigua and Barbuda Brazil Croatia Gabon Mexico

Albania Columbia Georgia Guatemala Jordan Morocco

Armenia Bangladesh Burkina Faso Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau


7

Table 1.3 continued Regime type


Competitive, partially illiberal (5–6)

Upper-middle income

Lower-middle income

Low income

Turkey Venezuela

Paraguay Peru Russia Sri Lanka Tonga Ukraine

Lesotho Liberia Mozambique Nepal Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Tanzania Zambia

Argentina

Bulgaria Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Fiji Macedonia Namibia Papua New Guinea Philippines Suriname Thailand

Benin Ghana Honduras India Madagascar Malawi Mali Moldova Mongolia Nicaragua

São Tome and Principe Soloman Islands

Competitive, pluralist, partially institutionalized (3–4)

Belgium France Germany Greece Israel Italy Japan Monaco Spain Slovenia Taiwan United Kingdom

Botswana Chile Czech Republic Estonia Grenda Hungary Mauritius Palau Panama Poland Seychelles St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia Slovakia South Korea Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay

Bolivia Cape Verde Costa Rica Guyana Jamaica Latvia Lithuania Micronesia Romania South Africa St. Vincent and the Grenadines Vanuatu

Liberal democracy (2)

Andorra Australia Austria Bahamas Canada

Barbados

Belize Dominica Kiribati Marshall Islands

continued

8


Table 1.3 continued Regime type


Upper-middle income

Lower-middle income

Low income

Cyprus Denmark Finland Iceland Ireland Liechtenstein Luxembourg Malta Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Sweden Switzerland United States Sources: Freedom House (2001)4 and World Bank (2000). Notes 1 Freedom House (1999–2000) uses “Burma,” whereas World Bank (1999–2000) uses “Myanmar.” 2 Or Democratic Republic of Congo. 3 Or Republic of Congo. 4 The regime status has been based on the typology of Diamond (1992).

Hong Kong: an anomaly to modernization theory The anomalous situation of Hong Kong, based on the scheduled democratization by the Chinese Government set out in the Basic Law, will remain at least until 2007. Judging by the levels of economic development or the HDI, Hong Kong has been in the transition zone for a long time. Achieving one of the highest economic growth rates in the world in the past three decades, Hong Kong steadily increased its overall wealth without any chronic economic crisis before 1997.11 Authoritative crossnational indicators, published by the World Bank, consistently ranked Hong Kong as a middle-income place from 1976 to 1982 (World Bank, 1978; 1979: 126–7; 1980: 110–11; 1981: 134–5; 1982: 110–11: 1983: 148–9; 1984: 218–19). From 1982 to 1986, after the World Bank subdivided the middle-income economies into “lower-middle-income” and “highermiddle-income,” Hong Kong was classified as a “higher-middle-income” place (World Bank, 1985: 174–5; 1986: 180–1; 1987: 202–3; 1988: 222–3). By 1987, Hong Kong had developed into a “higher-income economy” (World Bank, 1989: 164–5; 1990: 178–98; 1991: 204–5). The chances of a “higherincome economy” being a stable democracy are so high (Huntington,


9

1984; 1991) that the anomalous character of Hong Kong in respect of modernization theory has intensified from 1987 onwards. Measuring social and economic development in terms of the HDI in 1990, i.e., the first time that such data was compiled, Hong Kong’s HDI warrants inclusion in the high “Human Development” group, in 24th place from the top. Most strikingly, all “countries” with HDI from the top to the 26th place are democracies except Hong Kong (Table 1.4). In 2000, Hong Kong’s HDI was ranked as 23rd from the top, and all countries with their HDI above that of Hong Kong were democracies. The anomalous nature of Hong Kong is further shown by comparison with South Korea and Taiwan, with the latter two already embarking on democratic transitions since 1987. Comparing Hong Kong with Taiwan and South Korea Hong Kong has long been richer than Taiwan and South Korea. In 1962, Hong Kong’s GNP per capita was more than 2.5 and 4 times that of Table 1.4 Top twenty-six places of high human development (1990 and 1998) Ranking (1990)

Places (1990)

HDI score (1990)

Ranking (1998)

Places (1998)

HDI score (1998)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Canada Japan Norway Switzerland Sweden USA Australia France Netherlands United Kingdom Iceland Germany Denmark Finland Austria Belgium New Zealand Israel Luxembourg Barbados Italy Ireland Spain Hong Kong Cyprus Greece

0.982 0.981 0.978 0.977 0.976 0.976 0.971 0.969 0.968 0.962 0.958 0.955 0.953 0.953 0.950 0.950 0.947 0.939 0.929 0.927 0.922 0.921 0.916 0.913 0.912 0.901

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Canada Norway United States Australia Iceland Sweden Belgium Netherlands Japan United Kingdom Finland France Switzerland Germany Denmark Austria Luxembourg Ireland Italy New Zealand Spain Cyprus Israel Singapore Greece Hong Kong

0.935 0.934 0.929 0.929 0.927 0.926 0.925 0.925 0.924 0.918 0.917 0.917 0.915 0.911 0.911 0.908 0.908 0.907 0.903 0.903 0.899 0.886 0.883 0.881 0.875 0.872

Source: United Nations (1992, 2000).

10


Taiwan and South Korea respectively. In 1986, immediately before Taiwan and South Korea embarked on their democratic breakthrough, Hong Kong’s GNP per capita was still about 2 and 3 times that of Taiwan and South Korea respectively (Wade, 1990: 34–5). In 1990, the year in which the Basic Law that dictated Hong Kong’s pace of democratization was announced, Hong Kong and South Korea took 24th place and the 34th position in HDI (United Nations, 1992: 127). No HDI data were provided for Taiwan, yet, given some preliminary comparison of key ingredients, indices of HDI show it is beyond doubt that Hong Kong stands higher than Taiwan (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook, 1987: 6–7; Wade, 1990: 35). Despite Hong Kong’s consistently higher level of socio-economic development, contrary to the predictions of modernization theory, South Korea and Taiwan have gathered a greater momentum for democratization since the late 1980s than Hong Kong has. Five possible explanations for Hong Kong’s anomalous experience What factors account for Hong Kong being an anomaly to modernization theory? First, of high-income places in 1998, to reiterate, only Singapore, Brunei, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates were undemocratic (Table 1.3). Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Brunei, are wealthy oil-exporting “rentier” states that derive their wealth mainly from the sale of oil. Since they have accrued income not through traditional domestic taxation and economic programs, such states have been under less pressure to become democratic (Ross, 2001: 356–7). The ability of these states to fulfill societal needs in terms of social services and welfare has also lessened the aspirations of the public to form trade unions, political parties, or any other political organizations. Also, Islam has influenced those rentier states. Islam is regarded as an obstacle to the establishment of democracy mainly because of the incompatibility between the absolute rule of God (Allah) and secular forms of political expression that are based on representation and accountability. However, given the absence of oil, similar natural resources or Islamic influences in Hong Kong, this explanation cannot apply to Hong Kong. Second, as Confucian culture has stressed consensus and collective welfare, democracy was regarded as “either undemocratic or antidemocratic” (Solomon, 1971: 140). In East Asia – a region infused with Confucianism – only Japan and the Philippines had much experience of democracy before 1990, and both owed it more to American imposition than to indigenous demand. Given the alleged spread of Confucianism in Hong Kong, modernization theorists might regard it as the reason for its anomalous condition.12 Hong Kong, however, has been a British colony for over 150 years, and British officials have spread ideas of the “rule of law” and “procedural


11

justice.” Among the developing countries, those with the most successful democratic experiences since independence are by and large former British colonies. A cross-national study has shown that British governmental practices have generally helped nurture a democratic culture (Bollen and Jackman, 1985: 28–9, 38–43). By contrast, Taiwan was a Japanese colony for fifty years, and then was ruled by an authoritarian government. There is reason to believe that the political culture in Taiwan can only be more Confucian and undemocratic than that of Hong Kong. Given that Taiwan has taken bolder and faster steps than Hong Kong towards democratization since the late 1980s, the argument of a “Confucian political culture” does not by itself explain the anomaly. Third, some may argue the positive and high economic growth rate of Hong Kong has by itself adequately relieved the intense political pressure for institutional reform as witnessed elsewhere. For instance, in some Third World countries, recent research has demonstrated that chronic and low economic growth has lent public support to revolutionary movements and ushered in a degree of political chaos.13 Other comparative evidence has revealed that poor economic growth, especially when coupled with inter-elite rivalry and military defection, has accounted for landmark changes of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Asia towards democratic ones (Table 1.5).14 However, comparatively speaking, Table 1.5 indicates that institutional transformations of authoritarian regimes can be spurred by causes other Table 1.5 Economic shocks and regime change in the 1980s Initial regime type (1980) Democratic

Authoritarian

Regime change owed in part to economic crisis

Turkey (1980) Ghana Nigeria (1983)

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Philippines Nigeria (1985) Nigeria (1987) Korea (1980)

Regime endures or undergoes change not owed to economic crisis

Costa Rica Colombia Jamaica Peru Venezuela Thailand Dominican Republic

Chile Mexico Korea (1987) Taiwan Zaire Zambia Kenya Indonesia Turkey (1983)

Source: Adapted from Haggard and Kaufman (1992).

12


than economic crises. Besides, it is precisely economic growth, many have argued, that triggers the expansion of the middle class, the flourishing of mass media, the expansion of pro-reform social forces in authoritarian regimes, and their final transition into democratic institutions (Huntington, 1984; 1991). The swift economic growth of Taiwan and South Korea since the 1950s, and their subsequent democratic turns since 1987, are cases in point. Given that both low and high rates of economic growth can accompany changes in authoritarian institutions, any naïve conclusion that asserts a simple relation between economic growth and institutional changes of authoritarian states is contradicted by the facts. Fourth, modernization theorists may contend that, as Hong Kong is a colonial, non-sovereign city–state, and not an independent country, modernization theory is not applicable. This contention is untenable, for the non-sovereign status of Hong Kong is not relevant. Modernization theory stresses that economic growth usually spells increasing urbanization, flourishing mass communication, escalating educational opportunities, and a wider dispersion of political resources. These changing social structures shape values towards creating greater pressure for democratization. In the burgeoning economy of Hong Kong, the increased levels in urbanization, educational opportunities, and mass communication have followed the prediction of the theory (World Bank, 1976; 1983; 1990), but Hong Kong has not achieved the high level of democracy that the theory forecasts. Finally, modernization theorists can argue that a powerful external force can sometimes overwhelm the enhancing social effects of socioeconomic development on democratization. As Hong Kong has been a non-sovereign city–state, the well-publicized opposition by the Chinese Government to the democratization of Hong Kong during the 1980s is a sufficient explanation for its slow democratization. However, the claim does not stand up to close scrutiny. The moderate concessions to the local pro-democracy movement mentioned earlier implied the willingness of the Chinese Government to concede somewhat and the presence of the limited bargaining power of the pro-democracy forces. This work will argue that some domestic factors, in addition to the Chinese Government’s opposition in the 1980s, have restricted the bargaining power of the pro-democracy forces. Although the Chinese Government’s opposition during the 1980s is most significant in explaining the actual and scheduled sluggish pace of democratization between 1986 and 2007 (Table 1.1), other domestic and external constraints have played a role too. Opposition from the Chinese Government is not a sufficient explanation for the anomaly On closer inspection, the suggestion of the opposition from the Chinese Government as the only significant constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization raises more questions than it answers:

Hong Kong from a comparative perspective •

•

•

13

The Chinese Government is not a purely negative factor in Hong Kong’s democratization. From 1986 onwards, a large pro-democracy movement emerged in Hong Kong. It will be shown in later chapters that the Chinese Government’s potential threats to the enshrined values of Hong Kong were a major factor contributing to this development. The Chinese Government’s presence and threats unintentionally triggered the clamor for democracy in Hong Kong. The Chinese Government, an external factor, is not the only constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization. The Chinese Government’s strong opposition was crucial to the continuing lack of democracy in Hong Kong between 1986 and 1990,15 and the scheduled slow pace of democratization from 1991 to 2007.16 Nevertheless, the contradictions in the Chinese Government’s objectives towards Hong Kong allowed some room to maneuver for faster democratization between 1986 and 1990. To fully explain the slow pace of democratization from 1986 to 2007, two domestic Hong Kong constraints, the opposition of the bourgeoisie and the frail support by the public for democratization, have to be taken into consideration. Room for maneuver was narrowed by Britain’s concessionary stance to the Chinese Government, at least before the Tiananmen Square event of 1989. Using the opposition from Chinese Government to account for Hong Kong’s failure to democratize raises other historical and contemporary questions. Why did Britain not democratize Hong Kong long before the 1980s? Why did strategic elites in Hong Kong such as the middle and the capitalist classes not push for democratization before the 1980s, so as to entrench the control of the Hong Kong people over the city–state to lessen potential Chinese influence from 1997 onwards?

The assertion that Chinese Government was the only constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization is too simplistic. The Chinese Government’s opposition, though the most significant constraint, does not by itself fully answer why Hong Kong’s development has contradicted modernization theory. Can we answer the anomaly with reference to other local researchers’ findings?

Contribution of existing research and their problems In the past two decades, a number of research papers on Hong Kong’s democratization have been written and they have profoundly enhanced our understanding of Hong Kong’s democratic development (Brown and Foot, 1997; Burns, 1994: 55–63; Kuan and Lau, 1995: 87; 1997; Lau and Kuan, 1995; Lo, 1997; Scott, 1989; 199; Tsang, 1997: 183–208; Yahuda, 1996: 62–1268). I would like to focus on some of the major ones.

14


Lau and Kuan’s structural dependency approach: the Chinese Government’s opposition to democracy as the crucial constraint Lau and Kuan have conducted a number of vigorous research studies over the years. Their research has contributed tremendously to our understanding of Hong Kong’s political development. Besides the Chinese Government, they also ascribed other factors such as an unfavorable political culture, a weak democratic movement, the lack of political leaders, and the disunity of local elites as causes for Hong Kong’s non-democratic polity (Kuan and Lau, 1997; 1995; Lau, 1999; 1998; 1996; Lau and Kuan, 1995; 1988). However, they have laid overall emphasis on the Chinese Government’s opposition and the political and economic dependence of Hong Kong on China as the crucial structural constraints. Therefore, their approach has been depicted as a structural and dependency approach, and been attacked as having excessively emphasized the Beijing factor at the expense of the domestic social forces (So, 1999). My comments on their works are as follows. First, they have underemphasized and not sufficiently investigated the strengths and limitations of the local pro-democracy movement. The fact that the local prodemocracy movement did manage to get some moderate concessions from the Chinese Government in 1990 was ignored and unexplained. Though they briefly mentioned the role played by the democracy movement, and underscored the lack of trustworthy political leaders in Hong Kong as crucial ingredients in explaining the low public support for the movement, their observations on the movement in the 1980s and 1990s have been entirely based on secondary sources and interpretations. The lack of in-depth interviews, among other problems, has yielded a mistaken classification of factions in the movement, and led to the role of the movement in shaping Hong Kong’s democratization being ignored (Kuan, 1991).17 Second, the Chinese Government’s moderate concessions highlighted the need to provide a more sophisticated model to explain the many decisions made by the Chinese and the former Hong Kong Governments concerning Hong Kong’s democratization between the 1980s and the 1990s. Yet, their work has failed to provide such a model. Third, Lau and Kuan did not entirely dismiss the role of the public in shaping democratization, and conducted many political culture surveys. However, many of their research studies have tapped respondents’ political orientations towards democracy in an out-of-context, abstract manner by asking them about their general attitudes towards it (Kuan and Lau, 1995: 87; Lau, 1996: 158–80; Lau and Kuan, 1988). Given the positive connotation of “democracy” in most parts of the world including Hong Kong, there is a danger that respondents have only given nominal support to that high-sounding ideal and reflected socially desirable answers when asked in a general manner.18


15

Fourth, they did not address the anomalous nature of Hong Kong’s democratic development in relation to the modernization theory head-on, nor have they compared Hong Kong with other places to draw any theoretical implications. In reaction to some of Lau’s and Kuan’s problems, So’s new works (1999) have emerged to try to rectify the situation. So’s societal approach to explain Hong Kong’s democratic development So (1999: 13–14), first of all, rightly recognized the anomalous status of Hong Kong for modernization theory. He has also correctly attacked Lau’s and Kuan’s dependency approach as over-emphasizing the Beijing and London factor and neglecting domestic social forces. He calls his approach a societal one, stressing the crucial role of internal social forces and their shifting alliances in shaping Hong Kong’s democratic development throughout the 1980s and 1990s (So, 1999: 14–15; 2000). His work identifies six important political actors for Hong Kong’s democratization: (a) the British and the Hong Kong Governments; (b) the Chinese Government and the pro-Beijing forces; (c) big businessmen; (d) corporate professionals; (e) service professionals; and (f) grassroots. Those actors, he claimed, formed into different alliances with varied strengths at different times as the democracy project unfolded: for instance, in the 1970s, colonial officials formed an alliance with pro-British big businessmen (So, 1999: 17). In the early 1980s, he argues, a temporary patriotic alliance between Beijing and service professionals appeared during the negotiations over the future of Hong Kong. In the late 1980s, he makes an observation about the formation of an unholy alliance forged between Beijing and service professionals. Finally, in the early 1990s, he contends that a populist alliance between service professionals and the grassroots population was formed, campaigning for the 1991 and 1995 elections. So also classified and conceptualized the democratic development of Hong Kong into different phases: Under British colonial rule before the mid-1980s, he calls the system in Hong Kong a nondemocracy. By the mid1980s, however, the Hong Kong Government began to be transformed into a “quasi-democracy or a restricted democracy.” In the 1990s, as the democrats began to gain some power, they pushed for a “populist democracy,” in which all the positions of real power would be open to meaningful competition through direct elections by Hong Kong’s citizens. Also, as Governor Patten stirred up a row over the shape of political institution, “a contested democracy” was evolving in Hong Kong, owing to the failure of the key political actors to reach a consensus on the rules of electoral competition. In short, So has explained the conversion of the state of Hong Kong from a nondemocracy before the 1980s to a restricted democracy in the

16


late 1980s, then to a contested democracy in the early 1990s, then back to a restricted democracy in the late 1990s (So, 1999). Strengths and weaknesses of So’s arguments The greatest strength of So’s work lies in his insightful assignment of greater importance to domestic social forces in explaining Hong Kong’s democratic development. His use of a longitudinal delineation of the interaction between the domestic social forces and the two external sovereign powers to explain the anomaly also helps us understand the intricate and crucial dynamics concerning democratization. His perspective can thus complement Lau and Kuan’s works, which have inappropriately played down the importance of the domestic social forces, on the one hand, and the interaction between the external governing elites and the domestic forces, on the other. Needless to say, his awareness of the anomalous nature of Hong Kong for modernization theory and his attempt to resolve it, whether successful or not, are commendable from the perspective of theoretical development. However, So’s works can also be criticized on conceptual, empirical, and theoretical grounds. Conceptually, some of his characterizations of various types of democracy in Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s are seldom used in works of comparative politics, for instance, “contested democracy.”19 Those concepts compound the difficulty of conducting a meaningful comparison between Hong Kong and other places, and that of theoretical improvement. More seriously, given the vagueness in the extent of many of his concepts, they may not be mutually exclusive. For instance, he described the political system of Hong Kong in the mid- to late 1990s as a “contested democracy,” given the many political controversies over the democratic reform introduced by the former Governor of Hong Kong (So, 1999: 18). Given that the political conflicts or contests over democratic reform have been intense since 1984, So owes his readers an explanation as to why he reserves the term of “contested democracy” only for the 1990s. Similarly, he labeled the political system of Hong Kong in the late 1980s a “restricted democracy” without defining what it means (ibid.: 7, 8, 18). According to Freedom House’s data about Hong Kong and Larry Diamond’s operationalized definition of democracy, Hong Kong never attained a highly democratic status throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (Freedom House, 2001). Hence, if we take “restricted democracy” as a label for those systems that have not attained a highly democratic level, we can argue that Hong Kong was a restricted democracy from 1985 to 2000. Empirically speaking, So divided the new middle class into the “service professionals” and “corporate professionals,” with the former consisting of social workers, teachers, journalists, lawyers, and the like, who allegedly support faster democratization in Hong Kong. Corporate professionals, in


17

his view, comprise managers, accountants, engineers, architects, etc., who, he argues, tend to ally themselves with big business to slow democratization (So, 1999: 81). He contends, “only service professionals have been key promoters of democratization, who owe their influence to their symbolic power to shape public opinion through the mass media” (ibid.). While it is true that the leaders of some key pro-democracy groups have been mainly service professionals, we have only very limited reliable data about the political attitudes of the anonymous service professionals throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, except some survey material in 1987 (see Chapter 5). He has thus tended to over-generalize from the backgrounds of the leaders of the democratic camp to other service professionals in the community without much solid empirical evidence. More importantly, while he properly allotted an important role to the local pro-democracy forces in shaping Hong Kong’s democratic development, he predicated his arguments mainly on secondary materials. Without resort to the primary data gathered by in-depth interviews or participant observations, So has ignored the tensions and disunity of the prodemocracy alliances and political parties in flux, and thus missed a fundamentally important ingredient in explaining the power of the local alliances. As evidenced by the subsequent chapters in this book, the unity within and across several key pro-democracy parties and alliances has drastically shaped their mobilization and bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese Government over Hong Kong’s democratization, as well as the final outcome of democracy. So has also not offered a theoretical model that takes into account the roles of different actors and political dynamics to explain Hong Kong’s democratization over time. The lack of such a model can easily lead to some post-factual descriptions of history instead of a theory-driven and coherent explanation. The delineation of such a model is especially important, given the moderate concessions by the Chinese Government in 1990 on democratization, and its tough stance throughout other critical phases. In particular, the model needs to illuminate how the vicissitudes of the mobilization power of the pro-democracy forces, interspersed by their internal disunity, have impacted their bargaining power at various critical junctures from the early 1980s to mid-2002.

Overview of the book Drawing insights from some recent cross-national research, Chapter 2 describes a comprehensive and systematic “bargaining perspective” that stresses the explanation of democratization as the outcome of political bargaining of multiple actors. Through a historical-comparative analysis of several important phases since 1980, I demonstrate that Hong Kong’s democratization has consistently been a product of implicit or explicit bargaining of different state and societal actors. It underscores that attention

18


should not be given just to the two actors – the Chinese and British Governments – but also to societal factors, including civil society, political society, and the political culture of the public. The varied unity and mobilization power of pro-democracy civil society and political society, as well as changing public support for democratization from 1984 to mid-2002, I argue, have been crucial and yet neglected factors in shaping their bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese Government and the subsequent final outcome over democratization. To capture as much useful data as possible and shed light on the research problems, I propose the adoption of multiple research methods – qualitative and quantitative, historical and comparative – towards the end of Chapter 2. After delineating the theoretical perspective in Chapter 2, I will elaborate in Chapter 3 on six important historical factors that inhibited the implementation of democracy in Hong Kong between 1946 and 1984. These six structural and cultural factors, I contend, not only constrained democratic development before but also after 1984. Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 examine different phases from 1984 to mid-2002. In particular, I investigate the changing bargaining power of different actors, focusing particularly on the mobilization strength of civil society and political society, as well as support among the public for democratization. Finally, in Chapter 9, I put forth the empirical and theoretical significance of the entire project, with some theoretical reflections. The Appendices provide useful data.

2

Hong Kong’s democratization Outcome of bargaining among multiple actors

Another dominant approach: an elite-centered transition perspective The failure of modernization theory to explain Hong Kong’s anomalous experience suggests the need to learn from an alternative approach: the elite-centered transition theory. Since the 1980s, hundreds of studies have explained democratization using this alternative approach, making it another dominant perspective in the field (Anderson, 1999: 1–13; Di Palma, 1990; Geddes, 1999: 119; Higley and Gunther, 1992; Shin, 1994). Champions of the elite-centered transition approach contend that structural factors including socio-economic development do not determine whether democratic transition will occur. Before and during democratic transitions, complex interaction between different groups and individuals with different and changing preferences creates an indeterminacy, which no simple and fixed structural variables can explain (Przeworski, 1986). Among the multiple actors involved, the governing elites’ choices count most. Their choices during the turbulent transition process and the macro, historical-structural variables, are taken respectively as the short-run and long-run conditions for the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of democracy. Different scholars have paid different emphasis to the short-run and long-run conditions. In O’Donnell and his collaborators’ project (Pt IV, 1986: 3–5), which has been taken as the hallmark work of the approach, they argued that because of the breakdowns of norms, “insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about motives and interest, plasticity, and even indefinition of political identities,” there is a high degree of indeterminacy during the transitions. Hence, they paid closer attention to the short-run political factors of the calculations and choices of governing elites (ibid.: 4–5). Their project has also developed two widely embraced generalizations in the transition approach: 1

There is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 19).

20

Bargaining among multiple actors

2

Governing elites were regarded as the initiators of democratic transition. Popular mobilization did not cause the initiation of the transition process, though it could have pushed democratization farther and faster than governing elites originally intended (Collier, 1999: 6).

These generalizations of the transition approach have, however, been challenged by more recent findings. First, many recent case studies in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America have forcefully demonstrated that elite divisions were not necessary for the initiation of democratic transition (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 83; Collier, 1999: 110–14; Geddes, 1999: 120; Kim, 2000: 137–50). Second, popular protests in Spain, Peru, Argentina, South Korea, Eastern Europe, and in the bulk of forty-two African countries have not only facilitated democratization after the initiation of the process, but also directly contributed to the initiation of the entire process (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; 1997: 83; Collier, 1999: 110–14; Geddes, 1999: 120; Kim, 2000: 137–50). These recent research studies underscore popular mobilizations of different classes, especially the working class, in bringing about democratization in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Adler and Webster, 1995: 75–106; Bellin, 2000: 175–205; Collier, 1999: 110–14; Kim, 2000: 93–5; Manuel, 1998: 133). Some of them accuse the transition approach of being excessively state-centered, at the expense of the social forces, as a valid explanation for democratization at various stages. They thus advocate a more society-centric approach to explain democratization. Third, while the working class and their mobilization have rightly been ascribed by Collier (1999: 166–98) and Bellin (2000: 175–205) in their recently published research as important for democratization in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, hundreds of case and regional studies conducted under the conceptual framework of “civil society” have, however, pointed to much broader social forces as crucial in shaping democratization (Diamond, 1999). Organized social movement organizations, including not just labor unions, but also religious organizations, woman’s associations, students unions, and other intermediate groups in civil society, ranging from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe, through Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand in Asia, to those in Latin America and Southern Europe, have undermined the authoritarian states and enhanced democratization (Neher, 1991; Stepan, 1990; White, 1994). In the recent literature on democratic transition and consolidation in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America, political society or political parties have also been treated as pivotal to shaping democratic development (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 272–3; Collier, 1999; Diamond, 1999: 188–93; Kim, 2000: 137–50; Linz and Stepan, 1996).


21

A synthetic theoretical model In light of the above lessons, a new synthetic framework that integrates the insights of both the state-centric transition approach and the recent society-centric approach should develop as follows. The first lesson we can draw from the above is that multiple actors instead of just governing elites should be considered when explaining democratization. Two actors, i.e., civil society and political society, are especially worth consideration.

Two social factors: civil society and political society The concept of civil society has gained much currency in the literature of democratization (Alvarez, 1990; Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell et al., 1986; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 6; Stepan, 1989). It is usually defined as the “pluralistic structure of economic, social, and political organizations outside the state” (Diamond et al., 1989a: 22). Most recent literature contends that a vibrant civil society, which includes organized workers, journalists, professionals, church and community workers, and so on, favors and promotes greater freedom and democracy. Civil society can advance democracy by destabilizing authoritarianism and fostering divisions among authoritarian regimes, pressing them to initiate democratic reform (Diamond, 1999: 234), as found in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Chou and Nathan, 1987; Chung, 1990; Diamond, 1990: 234; 1992: 483–4; Kamrava and Frank, 1998: 893–4; Manuel, 1998: 133). That said, one caveat is that social groups in civil society are not necessarily pro-democracy. The political intolerance and skepticism of some social groups towards democracy can turn those groups into bystanders, if not outright enemies, of democratization (Berman, 1997; Brysk, 2000: 151–65; Diamond, 1994: 5–17; Foley and Edwards, 1996: 44; Kim, 2000). Therefore, a distinction needs to be drawn between those prodemocracy and anti-democracy social forces. As well as civil society, another kind of organized social group, the political society, has also been regarded as crucial in shaping the democratic development across the globe (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 272–3; Collier, 1999: 188–93; Kim, 2000: 137–50; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Political society consists of political parties, their affiliated networks, organizations and campaigns that are intent on controlling the state (Diamond, 1999: 7). As democratic transitions evolve, political parties may either cooperate with or displace the voluntary organizations of civil society in the course of advancing the democratic development (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 273). Given that the unity of civil society and political society may shape the overall strength of pro-democracy opposition, the relationship between the civil society and political society needs to be carefully analyzed, as argued in studies of Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America (Alvarez and Escobar, 1992: 317–30; Bratton and Van de

22


Walle, 1997: 272–3; Collier, 1999: 188–93; Kim, 2000: 137–50; Linz and Stepan, 1996). In particular, a potentially important cleavage between civil society and political society has been the division along the arena of action. The arena of action, as argued in a cross-national study of the paths of democratic transitions of twenty European and Latin American countries, ranges from deliberation/negotiation to mobilization/protest (Collier, 1999: 19). Because of the greater propensity of civil society to reject “compromise,” “interest-based” actions, and participation in routinized institutions than political society, civil groups campaigning for democratization are also more likely than the latter to demand a greater and faster pace of democratization. Additionally, they also try to monitor not just the authoritarian state but also “political society” in the democratization campaign.1 The different roles, strategies, and interests of civil society and political society, as shown in comparative studies in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, have engendered their clashes and decreased their mobilization for democratization (Collier, 1999; Dryzek and Holmes, 2000; Encarnacion, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stepan, 2001: 174). Nonetheless, there is no a priori ground in denying the cooperation between civil society and political society in promoting democratization. Such collaboration has been found in many places such as Argentina, Spain, Taiwan, and South Korea (Encarnacion, 2001; Kim, 2000; Levitsky, 2001: 17). They have especially arisen when the ruling authoritarian regimes have monopolized the political space and dwarfed the power of parties in “political society.” Civil societies in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Chile (Gomez, 1999; Kim, 1996; Peruzzotti, 2001) for instances, cooperated with parties and took up the dominant role, demanding democratic reform under those harsh conditions. In short, it is important to assess the actual relationship between civil society and political society in Hong Kong, by addressing the following points: •

•

the positions and strategies of the major social groups of civil society and political parties in political society with respect to democratization; the degree of cooperation or conflict between civil society and political society in promoting democratization.2

The strength of mobilization of pro-democracy forces partly rests on the public attitudes towards democratic and/or authoritarian institutions. The next element that needs to be integrated into the synthetic model is thus political culture, particularly the public attitudes towards democracy and authoritarianism.


23

The third factor: the general public and their political culture The political orientation of the people can affect democratic transitions and this has been pointed out by much literature in different places and times (Diamond, 1999; 2001; Inglehart, 1997; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Lipset, 1994; Norris, 1999; Rose, 1998; Shin, 1999; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001). As argued in a multitude of comparative research, consistent public opposition to authoritarian rule can emasculate the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. As a result, the ability of authoritarian leaders to resist political relaxation would decrease, particularly in the long run. Public pressure is thus pivotal to inducing recalcitrant authoritarian regimes to initiate democratic transitions and to adhere to them. To maintain popular pressure for transitions, it is crucial that the authoritarian regime does not govern by consent or hegemony (Stepan, 1990). When the public cast doubt on the legitimacy of authoritarianism, or harbor a belief in the value of democratic institutions, authoritarian rule by consent or hegemony becomes much harder. Hence, among different political attitudes or cultures, we will in particular focus on the political legitimacy that the public ascribes to authoritarian vs democratic regimes. Cross-national studies of various regions have suggested the supreme importance of this attitude for democratization. It should be analyzed in order to gain a more accurate assessment of the social base of support for democratization and the strength of mobilization of pro-democracy groups (Diamond, 1999; 2001). Two international actors Theorists in both the modernization paradigm and the transition approach have recognized the potent impact of international forces on democratization (Lipset and Turner, 1986: 12–13; Neubauer, 1967; Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Synder, 1998: 58–61; Whitehead, 1991; 1996). Among the sixty-one democracies listed by Freedom House during the 1980s, with the exception of six, all the rest could trace the origins of democracy to decolonization, or to the allied victories in the Second World War, or to Gorbachev’s recent approval of democratization in Eastern Europe at the dawn of the Cold War (Whitehead, 1991). Given that Hong Kong had been a colony of Britain for over 150 years, and that it was scheduled in 1984 to be returned to China in 1997, how the international factors of the British and Chinese Governments have impinged upon the democratization of Hong Kong obviously warrant attention. Strategic bargaining of multiple actors: interests and cleavages Many democratic transitions in the “third wave” arise from “transaction” or “bargaining” among different political forces.3 An important insight derived from the transition approach is that that leading authoritarian

24


elites are compelled to make concessions and unleash democratization during their interaction or bargaining with various forces, when the benefits attached to political relaxation outweigh those attached to suppression (O’Donnell, 1986: 3–18; Share, 1987). For instance, authoritarian regimes including Brazil, Spain, and Taiwan, started the transition by negotiations between oppositional forces and authoritarian elites. They were said to have undergone “transition through transaction” (Share et al., 1986: 175).4 They negotiated with the democratic elites, erected some limits to political changes and remained an important electoral force during the transition. Pro-democracy forces can promote democratization by increasing the costs of continuing authoritarian rule by discrediting its legitimacy and changing the calculus of authoritarian leaders.5 Treating democratic transition as a process of bargaining, three elements are found to be crucial to the conceptual edifice in an integrated approach: interests, cleavages, and political opportunities. Bargaining power depends on the ability to threaten the opponents’ interests To repeat, recent empirical literature on democratic transition (Cheng, 1989a: 487–95; Huntington, 1991: 165–74; O’Donnell, 1986; Przeworski, 1991: 24) has stressed the significance of bargaining and pact making among the forces for democratic transition. The prevalence of “bargaining” lies in the “partial” rather than “all-out” nature of many conflicts during the democratic transition. Put differently, different actors may usually share some, though not all, interests. Avoidance of mutual extermination, for instance, is often a common interest shared by different participants. In this perspective, the bargaining power of different actors rests on their ability to threaten the interests of their opponents. The opposition of relatively constant interests becomes the underlying conflict on cleavages. Analysis of the cleavage-related conflict should thus be the centerpiece of democratic transition (Collier, 1999: 187–9). In light of the conflict during democratic transitions in various places, there have been two common cleavages (McDonough, 1981): • •

stability vs democracy economic growth vs social equity (economic redistribution).

Summing up, the integrated theoretical perspective, i.e., the “bargaining approach,” can be assessed as shown in Figure 2.1. The Chinese Government harbored the following interests with respect to Hong Kong: (a) to maintain Hong Kong’s pragmatic value for China; (b) to achieve national unity by regaining Hong Kong and using it to lure Taiwan into unity; and (c) to preclude Hong Kong from a rapid democratization which would undermine the Chinese Government’s control over it

Bargaining among multiple actors Anti-Democracy Groups Governing elites (Chinese govt.)

25

Pro-Democracy Groups Governing elites (UK govt.)1

Domestic forces: Groups in civil society and political society

Political culture of public

Public support for democratization

Ability to threaten the interests of Chinese government and willingness of the Chinese Government to concede on democratization

Speed and extent of democratization Note:

Causal effects

Figure 2.1 Bargaining model of democratization. Note Britain has been at times ambivalent towards Hong Kong’s democracy. The gestures will be argued as tactical moves (see Chapters 3 to 7), and that speeding up Hong Kong’s democratization in a politically feasible way was the consistent policy of the British Government between 1984 and 1997.

and its hegemony in China. The pro-democracy forces can then enhance their bargaining power by threatening those interests. The more the civil society and political society could marshal support from the grassroots, the middle class, businesspersons and the British Government for democratization, and the more they could assure China of the innocuous nature of Hong Kong’s democratization regarding the hegemony of the Chinese

26


Communist Party in mainland China, the greater would be their bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese Government. The anti-democratic groups have also been keen to mobilize domestic forces and the general public against democratization. Similarly, the domestic pro-democratic forces were eager to press the British Government by mass mobilization to democratize Hong Kong as a token of its “graceful departure” from Hong Kong. Thus, the “bargaining perspective” reminds us that a seemingly much “weaker” force can successfully obtain concessions from a “stronger” one, as long as the former can pose an effective threat to the interests of the latter (Table 2.1). To conclude, the bargaining model can help us better explain Hong Kong’s democratization in different phases. The delineation of different components of the model is important in explaining the moderate concessions made by the Chinese Government in 1990, and its intransigence both before and after 1990. I will argue in Chapters 4 to 8 that the vicissitudes of the mobilization power of the pro-democracy opposition in civil society and political society have been a crucial and yet neglected reason for Hong Kong’s democratization from 1984 to 2002. The power of mobilization of the pro-democracy opposition, mediated by their level of internal unity and ability to capitalize on changing political opportunities, has been vital in influencing public support and the subsequent overall bargaining power visà-vis the Chinese Government over democratization in the different phases. As shown in Table 2.2, from 1974 to mid-2002, i.e., up to the five years after the handover, there were three critical phases. Between 1974 and late 1985, when direct and indirect elections for legislature were absent, it was, as discussed in Chapter 3, hallmarked as a quasi-bureaucratic Table 2.1 Interests of political forces and imposition of costs on those interests Actors

Interests

Pro-democratic groups’ threats to those interests

Chinese Government

Ensure hegemony of Communist Party, and prevent China from being democratized.

Accuse China of betraying “One Country, Two Systems” by inhibiting HK’s democratization.

Maintain HK’s prosperity for China’s modernization.

Legitimize the democratic institutions via persuasions.

To court Taiwan’s reunification with China. UK Government

Withdraw gracefully from the colony by successful democratization and maintaining Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.

Accuse UK Government of being a “lame duck” in yielding to China’s objections to faster and fuller democratization.

UK climbed down twice in face of rejection of Chinese Government and local anti-democratic civil society; little progress in democratization

Moderate* support; very limited threat to Chinese Government interests

Relatively weak*

Relatively low* – division between civil society and political society emerged

Relatively weak*

Weakest*

Lowest* – division between civil society and political society continued; Division in political society intensified

Chinese Government Chinese Government Reversal of limited made moderate made no concessions democracy concessions in face of huge mobilizations of civil society and the general public

Explosive in midand late 1989; greatest threats to Chinese Government interests

Strongest*

Strongest*

Reversal of democratization 1997–mid-2002

Reversal of limited democracy

Note *The strength of the movement or unity, etc. is assessed relative to other movements at other phases. Quantitative evidence is provided for those assessments in Chapters 7 to 9.

Ambiguous principles drawn in Joint Declaration

Outcome of democratization

Moderate*

Relatively weak before May 1989

Nil

Mobilization power of pro-democratic alliance for democratization

Relatively strong*

Public support for Weakest more democratization/ ability to threaten Chinese Government interests

Non-existent

Initial UK-initiated democratization (late 1984–8)

Quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system (1946–late 1985)

Struggles over Second UK-initiated political constitution democratization (Basic Law) (1992–4) (mid-1989–late 1989)

Limited democracy before 1997

No democracy

Unity of prodemocratic opposition for Hong Kong’s democratization

Factors

Table 2.2 Effects of different factors on democratic development in Hong Kong in different phases (1970s–mid-2002)

28


authoritarian system. This period was marked by the dearth of organized democratic opposition, little public support for democracy and the absence of political democratization. From 1984 to 1997 was a critical transition period. During this period, indirect and direct elections were introduced for an increasing number of seats in the legislature in late 1985, resulting in what I conceptualized as “limited democracy,” with their total sum of scores of “civil liberties” and “political rights” ranging from six to nine from late 1985 to 1997 (Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/) as defined by Freedom House. This phase included both the peaks and troughs of mass mobilizations for democratization. It also demonstrated that the Chinese Government’s readiness to concede on democratization was greatest, when the mobilization strength of the democratic alliance and the public support for democracy reached their peak in 1989 (Chapters 4 to 7). From 1997 to mid-2002 was a period of democratic reversal, facilitated by a fragmented democratic opposition, weak mobilization strength, and the aloofness of the public towards democratization (Chapter 8). While focusing on the democratic development of Hong Kong from 1980 to mid-2002, this study covers the period from 1946 to mid-2002, a much longer period than any major published books to date. Reviewing the pre-1980s’ period not only enriches our interpretation of more contemporary events with historical insights, but also provides answers to the absence of democracy in Hong Kong before the 1980s. Above all, going beyond 1997 up to mid-2002 reveals the glaring and fundamental shifts in both the political institutions and the ethos of the former colony since mid-1997. Those shifts have mirrored the outcomes of underlying strategic bargaining and the relative bargaining power of actors involved in the struggles over democratization since 1997. Figure 2.2 shows the important phases that will be examined in the subsequent chapters.

Research method: a case study with multiple sources of data This book employs the case study of Hong Kong to achieve its theoretical objectives. Case studies have been argued to be a powerful stimulant to the theoretical imagination: [O]ne reason it is good is precisely that, unlike wide-ranging comparative studies, case studies permit intensive analysis that does not commit the researcher to a highly limited set of variables, and thus increases the probability that critical variables and relations will be found. The possibility of less superficiality in research, of course, also plays a role here. (Eckstein, 1977: 106) Debate about the value of the case study in theorizing has continued throughout the past few decades (Collier, 1991: 8–12, 23–4),6 and there is a

Sino-British talks on Hong Kong’s future began

1982

1984

1988

1989

1990

1992

Stronger unity and mobilization power of prodemocracy oppositions (1986–1990)

Tiananmen Square event triggered overwhelming public support for Top-down faster and greater democratic 1st democratization: reform democratic Chinese unfolded by alliance Government Patten formed made moderate concessions Chinese Government made moderate concessions and UK’s 2nd UK’s 1st Hong Kong climb-down in climb-down became a in democratic democratic semicompetitive, reform reform partially pluralist system

1985

Bargaining of different forces limited democratization before handover

Figure 2.2 Timeline of Hong Kong’s democratic development (1982–2000).

1945

Authoritarian period

Reversal of Hong Kong’s limited democracy

mid 1997

mid-2002

Weaker unity and mobilization power of pro-democracy oppositions (1992–mid-2002)

Patten’s reform passed in legislature

1994

Reversal of limited democracy since handover

30


general consensus about its contributions to theory building. First, case studies can test theories, either confirming or weakening them. Though the confirming or weakening effects of a single case study may be marginal for a theory, “the theoretical value of . . . case studies is enhanced, however, if the cases are, or turn out to be, extreme on one of the variables: such studies can also be labeled “crucial experiments” or crucial tests of the propositions” (Lijphart, 1971: 692). In Hong Kong, despite an extremely high level of income per capita, abundant educational opportunities, a high degree of urbanization and flourishing mass communications, full democracy is expected still to be absent by 2007. This case study will examine how and why modernization theory has been contradicted in Hong Kong, and try to infer theoretical implications. Second, case studies work as heuristic devices (Eckstein, 1975: 104–6), and generate hypotheses (George, 1979: 51–2). In this case study, an initial hypothesis will be developed to explain anomalous places like Hong Kong and Singapore, which have a high level of socio-economic development and yet do not have a high level of democracy. Multiple research methods with several sources of data Information at different levels of analysis needs to be gathered in order to answer the above two research problems. Many kinds of qualitative and quantitative data are required. Documents ranging from newspapers and magazines to government publications are used in this case study to assess official views in particular. Primary and secondary statistical analysis of previous surveys was conducted, usually to draw out the pattern of public opinion pertinent to this research. Minutes of all meetings of all four prodemocratic alliances from 1986–2000 were examined. They helped formulate interview questions and cross-check the answers of the interviewees. More importantly, sixty-one in-depth interviews were conducted with thirty-six leading members of the four pro-democratic alliances. Each interviewee was interviewed for an average of two and a half hours.7 Last but not least, the author attended over twenty meetings of the four alliances that have helped him tremendously in setting questions for interviews. To recapitulate, in Chapters 4 to 8, I will outline the political dynamics leading to the vicissitudes in bargaining power of the pro-democracy forces vis-à-vis the Chinese Government and other anti-democracy forces from 1984 to mid-2002. What follows will be a full elaboration of the six factors that not only affected democratization in Hong Kong before 1984, but also restricted democratic development after 1984. Those factors could explain why Hong Kong was an anomaly to modernization theory before 1984.

3

Why was Hong Kong an anomaly before 1984? Lack of top-down and bottom-up democratization (1946–84)

In this chapter, an explanation will be offered on how the factors of state and society outlined in Chapter 2, together with a few others, constrained the top-down and bottom-up democratization in Hong Kong between 1946 and 1985, before the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong’s future ended and the indirect elections unprecedentedly introduced to Hong Kong’s legislature. Since the democratic transition in Hong Kong during the 1980s was a “planned” and relatively “stable” one, there was no dramatic collapse of institutions as found elsewhere. The causal impacts of those structural factors are therefore particularly important. Not only could they partially explain the lack of both regime-led and bottom-up democratization in Hong Kong during that period, more importantly, they have restricted the democracy movement and democratization (1986–90). These factors could then first answer why Hong Kong was an anomaly to modernization theory before 1984. Among these factors, the positions of the Chinese and British Governments with respect to the status of Hong Kong were the most crucial constraints shaping Hong Kong’s democratization. It will be shown that, as Communist China insisted on its claim to Hong Kong’s sovereignty, and rejected Western democracy, the British Government perceived a serious threat from China to the continued viability of Hong Kong if democracy were to be implemented. Consequently, no top-down democratization took place between 1946 and late 1985. Britain’s perception of the Chinese Government’s objection also frustrated bottom-up democratization by encouraging internal constraints to democratization, i.e., the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian institutions, a politically weak civil society, and the apolitical culture of the people. Attention is also given to the domestic environmental factors because, as shown in Chapter 2, they were important in shaping democratization elsewhere. They all created internal hurdles to bottom-up democratization one way or another during the period. Given the status of Hong Kong as a British colony and partly leased from China, we shall look first at how China placed constraints on Britain’s democratization of Hong Kong before 1984.

32

Why was Hong Kong an anomaly before 1984?

First environmental factor: China’s interests and calculations regarding Hong Kong’s development 1949–78 To understand the major constraints that China exerted on Hong Kong’s democratization from the late 1940s to 1984, the two major interests of the Communist Party, which dictated its policy towards Hong Kong during this period, need to be charted. As new considerations were evinced during the Sino-British negotiations of 1982–4, focus will be mainly on China’s attitude to Hong Kong before Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1979.

First interest: to uphold sovereignty and national unity Hong Kong, consisting of Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, was acquired by Britain in the nineteenth century in three stages. Hong Kong Island was ceded to Britain “in perpetuity” in 1842, after China lost the First Opium War. In 1860, after the Second Opium War, China ceded Kowloon and Stonecutters Island to Britain. Finally, in 1898, Britain compelled China to grant a 99-year lease over the much larger New Territories, so as to balance Chinese concessions to France (Lane, 1990: 3–4; Overholt, 1984: 471). Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the PRC has adopted a tolerant and pragmatic attitude towards Hong Kong. Communist China, led by a Leninist Party that detested the “decadence” of capitalism and plunder of imperialism, co-existed peacefully with capitalist and colonial Hong Kong for over four decades. Not only did the PRC never try to take back Hong Kong by force from “imperialist” Britain, it even offered the resources and protection that Hong Kong needed to prosper and survive.1 This is all the more puzzling since the PRC consistently claimed that Hong Kong was within its sovereignty, and would take it back in due course. National unity and the maintenance of sovereignty have been enshrined by the Chinese as important values in the twentieth century. Historical and cultural factors explain this. Historically, during the second half of the nineteenth century, China was invaded by different imperialist forces, suffered humiliating defeats in war, and ceded many tracts of its territories under compulsion: The consequence was a rapid development of nationalism amongst Chinese who feared the dismemberment of their country and loss of their independent identity. The retrieval and defense of Chinese sovereignty became the common goal of all classes and political groups . . . The most important component of that nationalism was exhibited in the campaign for the recovery of sovereign rights and the termination of unequal treaties. (Wesley-Smith, 1984: 148)


33

Against this historical background, the Chinese Communist Party, portrayed as the “liberator” of China, is known for its antagonism towards Western imperialism. The first quasi-constitution of the PRC stressed the importance of upholding the sovereignty of China. Furthermore, it denounced treaties signed by former Chinese Governments with “imperialist” countries as invalid, and subject to abrogation, revision, and re-negotiation. Anti-imperialism and national sovereignty became the legitimating ideology of the PRC. Culturally speaking, national unity has been a long-standing Chinese value: The fundamental concept that government is analogous to the family produced the prime imperative of Chinese statecraft, the preservation of the unity of China. Chinese leaders of all ideological persuasions have agreed that the supreme goal should be to keep China as one entity, to unite all the historic territories, and to treat ethnic Chinese as having natural ties to the homeland (Pye and Pye, 1985: 64) The PRC launched virulent official attacks on the presence of Britain in Hong Kong, especially when pressed or embarrassed. For instance, China repeatedly denied in 1963, 1964, and 1972, the right of the United Nations to discuss the future of Hong Kong, on the grounds that it was a violation of sovereignty. The three treaties that ceded Hong Kong to Britain were declared invalid, but most of the time, the PRC in practice adopted a tolerant and cooperative approach to Hong Kong. As long as the colonial government guaranteed to prevent Hong Kong from becoming a rallying point for anti-Communist forces, formed notably by Taiwanese and American agents (Lane, 1990: 80), the PRC not only acquiesced in the existence of the colonial and capitalist enclave, but also supported its economy with the provision of water, basic foodstuffs and other merchandise (Lane, 1990; Lau, 1986: 235–67). What accounted for the PRC’s accommodating policy? Second interest: to maintain Hong Kong’s pragmatic benefits for the PRC Several pragmatic reasons accounted for the tolerant stance that the PRC took towards Hong Kong. First, China gained very significant economic benefits from the capitalist enclave. Looking at China’s overall trade balance between 1950 and 1980: 12 out of 31 were deficit years. Except for 1974, 1976 and 1979, however, both deficits and surpluses were relatively small . . . But if Hong Kong had been excluded, China’s overall trade balance would

34

Why was Hong Kong an anomaly before 1984? have seriously deteriorated, resulting in substantial deficits in no fewer than 24 years . . . Broadly speaking, China is using its trade surplus with Hong Kong to finance its deficits with other countries. (Jao, 1983b: 39)

In addition to visible trade, remittances, and mailing of parcels of clothes and foodstuffs by Hong Kong Chinese to relatives and friends in mainland China between 1950 and 1976 have been estimated to be worth US$2.4 billion.2 Hong Kong visitors to China spent another US$973 million between 1961 and 1976.3 Second, with its cosmopolitan nature and excellent communications, Hong Kong provided China with a convenient base for intelligence gathering, informal diplomatic contacts, and external propaganda (Lane, 1990: 80). Third, save for the extreme radicalism of 1967, the PRC took care to maintain the Sino-British relationship, in order to avoid confrontation with its major “enemy,” the American anti-communist stance (Dong, 1991: 145). “Chinese leaders have . . . recognized that any disruptive actions toward the colony taken for the sake of asserting Chinese sovereignty would only bring condemnation from the West and damage more important foreign policy goals.”4 In short, given the practical benefits that the PRC could derive from a stable and prosperous capitalist and colonial Hong Kong, pragmatism prevailed over ideological factors. While in principle China strictly claimed sovereignty over Hong Kong, in practice, “the dominant trend in the PRC’s relations with the colony, however, has been the establishment of broad-based, friendly ties and de facto recognition of British sovereignty” (ibid.: 68). Nevertheless, given that the PRC constantly attacked Western imperialism, regarded Hong Kong as the product of unequal treaties (Lane, 1990: 4, 62), and subscribed to “socialist democracy” (Ogden, 1989: 150–1) – in effect, the vesting of supreme power in the CCP – threats to Hong Kong’s democratization and decolonization were “perceived” by the British.

Second environmental factor: Hong Kong as a “special” British colony: neither decolonized nor democratized (1946–84) The usual pattern of British decolonization: democratization with quasi-Westminster model Colonialism affected most of the world from the eighteenth century until the Second World War. As many as 90 percent of contemporary sovereign states lying outside Western Europe were subject to the external governance of the colonial powers of Europe, the United States or Japan at one time or another (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1991: 169). The era of decol-


35

onization began when the nationalist movement in Egypt successfully forced Britain to relinquish sovereignty in 1922, but it was not until after the Second World War that decolonization dramatically accelerated (ibid.: 173).5 After the end of the Second World War, following Britain’s decolonization experiences in Ceylon after 1910, and in the Gold Coast 1948–57, a staged model of decolonization emerged (Munslow, 1983: 224). In transferring power from Britain to the natives of the colonies, four stages have been argued to be essential for introducing a Westminster model of democracy.6 Hong Kong: an exception to decolonization and democratization from 1946 to 1984 By the late 1960s Britain had largely completed decolonization. Retaining colonial rule was costly and an international embarrassment. To all intents, it was impossible to deny independence to any colonial territory that asked for it . . . the British were anxious to terminate colonial rule in their remaining dependencies and, where necessary, were prepared to nudge reluctant colonial politicians into asserting the demand for a full and final transfer of power. (Darwin, 1988: 307–8) However, in a separate class of cases, British rule persisted and decolonization seemed very difficult. This included Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and Hong Kong. They all shared the characteristics of being “proximate” and “national enclaves” (Hong Kong to China; Falklands to Argentina; Gibraltar to Spain) lost to Britain during time of war or political weakness.7 With modern conceptions of territorial integrity and nationalism, China, Argentina, and Spain have all felt a sense of unjust deprivation and have endeavored to recover these enclaves. In this class of cases, the core question involves the transfer of sovereignty from one state to another, rather than the granting of sovereign independence (Lancaster and Taulbee, 1985: 251). It was against Britain’s general policy to return these three colonies to the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes which demanded them (Lancaster and Taulbee, 1985: 263; Lee, 1967: 195–6; de Winton, 1979: 186). Britain did not decolonize them by full democratization, possibly to avoid provoking the national claimants into drastic action for their recovery. Until 1984, Hong Kong remained neither decolonized nor fully democratized. Consequently, the “deviant case” of Hong Kong may highlight the significance of some favorable external preconditions necessary for Britain’s democratization of its colonies. To probe deeper into the specific causes of Hong Kong’s lack of regime-led democratization, Britain’s general position

36


towards Hong Kong after the Second World War, and the reason why the attempt at democratizing Hong Kong from 1946 to 1952 crumbled need to be examined. The shelving of regime-led democratization in Hong Kong after the Second World War Hong Kong was originally acquired by Britain mainly as a trading post (Endacott, 1964: v–vi). After the Second World War, the continued attraction of Hong Kong as a trading and shipping outpost (Shai, 1984: 125) led Britain to recover it despite opposition from the USA and Nationalist China (ibid.: 123).8 Once the Cold War began, Hong Kong served as a strategic bastion and a symbol of Britain’s determination to preserve South-East Asia from communist intrusion (Porter and Stockwell, 1989: 171).9 Handing over millions of people to China, mostly refugees from the communist regime was unthinkable in terms of Britain’s prestige and humanitarian principles (ibid.: 183).10 In more than 140 years of Hong Kong’s colonial history up to 1990, no real democratization had ever been implemented to modify its anachronistic political structure. No single member of the Legislative and Executive Councils had been directly elected; they were all either officials or Unofficials nominated by Governors (Miners, 1986b: 463). However, proposals were made between 1946 and 1952 to democratize Hong Kong gradually. Five proposals for injecting elective elements into the undemocratic governmental structure were made by the British Government, two Governors and some Unofficials of the Legislative Council (ibid.: 482). These could be interpreted as the advent of regime-led democratization. Nevertheless, the proposed reforms were all shelved in 1952. Between 1948 and 1952, fearing that political reform would invite bitter attacks from Communist China and provoke disruptive activities, the Unofficials of the Legislative and Executive Councils, backed by the Governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, strongly advised the British Government to abandon any plans for democratization (Miners, 1986b; Tsang, 1988).11 With 98 percent of Hong Kong’s population being Chinese, predominantly governed by British colonial officials, in an international climate of anti-colonialism, and with its overwhelming dependence on the supply of food, water, and many raw materials from China,12 plus their adjoining geographical relationship, a risk-averse, survival-oriented approach was extremely noticeable in Hong Kong (Wong, 1980: 64). To survive, the Hong Kong Government had always to be alert to the views of China, as stated by the former Governor, Sir David Trench: Every single policy – social, political or economic – is colored by China’s nearness, China’s attitudes, and the consequent difficulty of being certain of an assured future . . . The situation demands great


37

realism in all our thinking . . . Hong Kong cannot afford the luxury of making mistakes, and particularly of well-meant mistakes, in any of its policies. (ibid.: 64) Stark geo-political reality reminded the Hong Kong Government that it could hardly risk provoking China to adopt serious retaliatory measures. Such measures were envisaged as likely by at least some Hong Kong Governors and Unofficials if they implemented the proposed blueprints of gradual democratization. For instance, Peter Blaker, a former Minister of State at the Foreign Office stated in a debate in the House of Commons: “There are very good reasons why we have not developed representative institutions in Hong Kong: Peking would have viewed such a development with alarm” (Miners, 1986a: 30). Thus, the perceived threat from the external factor of China was probably crucial in stifling the Hong Kong Government’s attempts to democratize. Consequently, the proposed democratic reform – the only obvious and major one suggested between 1946 and 1983 offering a more promising prospect for democratization – was eventually aborted. The above discussion of the two external environmental conditions partly explains the lack of British (regime)-led democratization from 1946 to 1984. Next, an examination of how the four domestic macroenvironmental factors evolved (1946–84) which affected democratization (1986–90) and impeded public demands for bottom-up democratization (1946–84), is made. A close assessment of domestic factors is particularly significant as the colony of Hong Kong has enjoyed nearly all de facto sovereign powers (Miners, 1986a; Harris, 1988).

Third environmental factor: colonial political institutions in Hong Kong – a quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure The first domestic environmental factor explored here is Hong Kong’s political institutions, which were quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian. Awareness of China’s objections to democratization in Hong Kong directly contributed to the maintenance of the anachronistic political institutions in Hong Kong. These political institutions were distinguished by a powerful bureaucracy that ruled by co-option of local Unofficial elites, especially the bourgeoisie, together with political consultation at grassroots level. The bureaucracy was committed to low levels of social and economic intervention and allowed a high level of civil liberties. A high degree of civil liberties Unlike the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of Latin America (O’Donnell, 1979; Kaufman, 1979: 187) and most of the regimes in Asia – which have been mostly authoritarian (Scalapino, 1986)13 – Hong Kong has long

38


enjoyed a high level of civil liberties.14 The strong liberal tradition of Britain, and the ultimate political responsibility of Hong Kong Governors to the British Government for any scandal arising from abuses of human rights, have ensured this. The absence of elections for high-powered institutions, and limits on freedom of peaceful assembly and political discussion in schools15 nevertheless lower the score of Hong Kong16 in the ranking of political rights, based on comparative records. The scale for measuring civil liberties (C) ranks from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the enjoyment of the greatest liberties (see Table 3.1). Given the significant degree of civil liberties, Hong Kong was a liberalized but not democratized city–state before 1985. A powerful bureaucracy In British colonies, while the Governor is delegated authority to rule, governance is chiefly undertaken by powerful colonial bureaucrats (Lee, 1967). In essence, decolonization involved the transfer of power from the Table 3.1 Comparative civil liberties in the 1970s and 1980s Year

1978

1983

1986

Hong Kong China

2 6

2 6

2 6

Asian NICs Singapore Taiwan South Korea

5 4⫹ 5

5 5 6⫺

5 5 5

Other Asian states Afghanistan Burma India Indonesia Japan Laos Malaysia North Korea Pakistan Philippines

6 6 2⫹ 5 1 7 4 7 4⫹ 5

7 7 3 5 1 7 4 7 5 5⫺

7 7 3 6 1 7 5 7 5 2

Four bureaucratic authoritarian states in Latin America Argentina 6⫺ 3⫹ Brazil 5 3 Chile 5 5 Uruguay 6 4 Source: Gastil (1979: 10–13; 1984; 1987: 40–1). Notes ⫹: improving since the last year. ⫺: worsening since the last year.

1 2 5 2


39

Governor and the bureaucracy to locally elected representatives and quasi-cabinets as embodied in the quasi-Westminster model. As decolonization by democratization was stymied, political institutions of Hong Kong have remained anachronistic, with the bureaucratic government enjoying great power. In Western democracies, despite some blurring of the roles of bureaucrats and politicians (Aberbach et al., 1981), we can still draw a distinction between them. In Hong Kong, the two roles have been merged from the outset of colonial history. The final powers of policy-making and implementation, law-making, and law implementation have been exercised by bureaucrats. Hong Kong became financially more independent from Britain as time went by after the Second World War, and could negotiate trading agreements on its own (Rabushka, 1976: 3). The British Government seldom intervened (Miners, 1986a). So the bureaucratic government in Hong Kong in practice enjoyed the bulk of the powers of a sovereign state (Harris, 1988: 13). As the changes made in the formal political structure of Hong Kong over the past few decades had been only “of scale rather than substance, of shape rather than content” (Hook, 1983: 496), the administrative structure, and the policy-making and policy-implementation processes in 1983 still epitomized the enormous power of the bureaucrats. While the head of the bureaucracy in Hong Kong has always been the Governor, in 1983, the executive of the government is organized in branches, departments and agencies. There are currently 14 branches, each headed by an official of the rank of secretary, 11 of which are policy branches, and 55 departments and agencies. The chief executive of the government is the chief secretary. Collectively, the branches constitute the Government Secretariat which formulates and transmits government policy. (ibid.: 494–5) In short, the secretaries of the fourteen branches were responsible for policy initiation and policy-making,17 while the various departments were charged with policy execution. Bureaucratic involvement in the policymaking process included formulating policy and tendering legal advice and public relations advice. Though Unofficials the Executive Council were involved in the process, they only played an advisory role. The final decision on policy was the preserve of the head of the bureaucracy – the Governor. Though the Governor could in principle veto the majority view of the Executive Council, it was the convention of the Governor to respect them (Miners, 1986a: 88). Nonetheless, since only full-time officials on the Executive Council were fully involved in policy formulation, they had the implicit power of controlling information and the agenda passed to the

40


part-time Unofficials (England and Rear, 1975). As they had less time, information and sometimes expertise than the officials, the Unofficials seldom rejected the bureaucrats’ suggested policies outright, raised new policy questions or asked for policy investigations (Miners, 1991: 86).18 In the sphere of legislation, the bureaucrats were equally powerful. Nearly all bills were drafted in the Secretariat and introduced by official members for discussion in the Legislative Council. The bureaucrats often consulted the different interests involved, and made the necessary adjustments before open meetings (Hook, 1983: 496; Miners, 1986a: 126). Given the enormous potential influence that could be exercised by the bureaucracy, both internal organizational arrangements and self-imposed external mechanisms were devised by the government to reduce abuses of power and enhance “political accountability.” First, the civil service in Hong Kong became a highly centralized and monitored team, coordinated by the Government Secretariat. All the suggestions for changes in policy and major expenditure had to be referred to the appropriate branch of the Government Secretariat for assessment in the light of general policies and priorities and the resources available (Miners, 1986a: 90–1). A second self-imposed mechanism was the “co-option of economic and social elites” and political consultation at the grassroots level. In an age when anti-colonialism and democracy were widely accepted, the British Government legitimated its rule in Hong Kong by the co-option of elites. Rule by co-option of elites – mostly the bourgeoisie – and political consultation Co-option of business elites In Hong Kong, the government never tried to achieve balanced representation in terms of class or occupation when appointing Unofficial members to the two high-powered councils. Before the Second World War, the Unofficials of the Executive and Legislative Councils were predominantly from the British business sector (Endacott, 1964). Of the 29 Unofficials on the Executive Council (1896–1941), 24 were businessmen. In the Legislative Council, at least 74 of the 102 Unofficials were businessmen. After the Second World War, the dominant presence of business interests in the two councils remained, though slightly less so in the Legislative Council from the 1970s.19 In the Executive Council, even as late as 1982, business interests still dominated20 (Table 3.2). The labor sector has been under-represented in the councils throughout the period, with only a slight improvement in the 1980s. Why were business elites so heavily over-represented in the government’s highest policy-making and legislating chambers? It can be regarded as a result of the British Government’s attempt to adjust to the constraints imposed on Hong Kong by its delicate geo-political setting.


41

Table 3.2 Percentage of representation of businessmen in the executive (E) and legislative (L) councils Category

Business Civil Service Professionals Caring professional Labor Others

1965

1975

1982

E

L

E

L

E

L

37 47 17 0 0 0

39 50 8 0 0 4

40 47 13 0 0 0

30 50 13 7 0 0

38 44 19 0 0 0

22 46 14 12 6 0

Source: Adapted from Davies (1989: 47–55).

In British colonies, it was common to appoint some British and local elites as Unofficials on the Executive and Legislative Councils (Wight, 1946) to smooth rule over colonial subjects.21 At times, Britain also delegated limited power to selected natives to ease its governance (Diamond, 1988; Munslow, 1983: 221; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Therborn, 1990). Cooption of local elites can reduce resistance to colonial rule by legitimizing government and dividing and defusing local opposition. Because the political future of Hong Kong is contingent upon its continued economic value to China, the business elites have exerted great pressure on the government to create and sustain a thriving economy with minimum political instability (England and Rear, 1975). In maintaining a thriving economy, the business sector obviously has a strategic role to play. By “absorbing” business elites into the two councils with closed meetings, their voices and interests can be heeded, and inter-elite conflicts can be resolved with the minimum agitation to society. When elite consensus or compromise has been reached, the resulting policies and legislation are likely to be accepted by the business community at large, thus promoting the legitimacy of an alien colonial government (King, 1973: 4). It therefore appears that the strength of the Colonial Government rests on a tacit alliance between the British officials and the Chinese business community. Its foundation is a very strong common selfinterest in public order and the economic stability which goes with it . . . The alliance is strengthened by the support given to both sides by the British community which has . . . financial interest in the preservation of the colonial system. (Rear, 1971: 78–9) Given the absence of oppositional party politics, and the stress on elitist consensus, acrimonious debates in the Legislative Council during open meetings were exceptional.

42


Finally, besides co-opting elites into the two central institutions, the government also absorbed economic elites, professionals and experts, in a few hundred advisory committees on various policies and legislation (Hook, 1983; King, 1973; Miners, 1986a). The predominance of business interests in the Executive and Legislative Councils led skeptics to claim that Hong Kong was ruled by the wealthy for the wealthy (England and Rear, 1975; Rear, 1971). Given the secrecy of government bodies, and the lack of prior research,22 it is impossible to pinpoint definitely the actual decision power of the bureaucracy and its autonomy from the social and economic forces. However, it can reasonably be argued that the bureaucracy in Hong Kong was more autonomous from economic and social forces from 1946 to 1984 than most Western democratic governments were. To start with, it was a long-standing policy of the government to have low taxation, low intervention in the market, low levels of social welfare and, in a word, a laissez-faire policy (Rabushka, 1976: 3–4).23 To argue that low tax and low levels of social welfare were the result of business manipulation in the two councils (England and Rear, 1975) is to ignore the possibility that the interests of the government and the business sector might converge on these issues (Cheng and Haggard, 1987; Haggard, 1990). The low-taxed, low-welfare, and free-trading nature of Hong Kong does not in itself prove the lack of autonomy of the bureaucracy, unless we assume that even economic philosophy is a product of businessmen’s manipulation. Businessmen themselves have asked for government intervention, only to be turned down. Repeated and prolonged rejection of appeals by Hong Kong industrialists for economic assistance testifies to the autonomy of the bureaucracy (Haggard, 1990).24 Additionally, the government’s selective appointment of Unofficials to the two councils, the relatively unorganized nature of business representation, and the Unofficials’ usual lack of resources and data, have altogether diminished the ability of the Unofficials, including business interests, to check the government and propose alternative policies (Endacott, 1964; Miners, 1986a; Rabushka, 1976).25 Political consultation of grassroots The bureaucracy was carefully respectful of traditional Chinese custom to ease its rule (Rear, 1971). After riots in 1966 and 1967,26 with the former caused by the government’s failure to gauge public needs, which created large-scale chaos rarely seen before in Hong Kong’s history, and the latter largely instigated by China, the Hong Kong Government set up new grassroot-oriented institutions to tap public opinion more directly.27 These institutions included the City District Offices, Area Committees, Mutual Aid Committees, and District Boards. They were mainly charged with the duties of liaising between the government and the public, providing policy


43

inputs for the government, forging greater mutual understanding and encouraging public acceptance of government measures (King, 1984: 127–46; Lau, 1982). Apart from the eighteen District Boards – community councils responsible for minor local affairs – which were in part directly elected since 1982, none of the other institutions allowed popular election of their members. Thus, these political institutions did not represent any bold step towards democratization and accountability to the public (Hook, 1983: 507–8). To gain public support for its policies, the bureaucracy at least needs to “appear” to listen to public opinion. Though the bureaucratic government stresses its governance by consultation, it does not mean that the government was under institutionalized pressure to listen to public opinion. Without an elected governmental structure, “if the Government strongly believes a measure to be necessary it can push it through regardless of public opinion. The Government is secure as long as public opinion is not provoked to the point that it reacts violently, physically” (Rear, 1971). Up to 1971 the only public offices directly elected by the public were 33.3 percent of the seats on the Urban Council. As only those who could speak English were allowed to vote, most Chinese were even excluded from having the right to choose councilors with only limited power over municipal affairs. In 1971, less than 0.4 percent of the total population actually voted. Given that the system did not encourage Chinese to be politically active (Shively, 1972: 2–3) and that there was an obvious lack of accountability by the government, the sense of powerlessness among the public was very prevalent. “Finding the elections without much relevance to their lives, and finding the political system in general out of their control, the majority of the population come to be separated from the political process altogether” (Wong, 1972: 14). We will show later that many mass-based pressure groups used confrontational tactics in an attempt to force the government to redistribute resources in favor of the less wealthy. Given the absence of electoral pressures and the meager resources of pressure groups,28 pressure on the bureaucracy was limited. It was thus common for the government to reject the social programs suggested by the pressure groups despite their popularity, especially when the basic economic philosophy was at stake.29 In short, “the administration is not an inert mass of plasticine shaped by the pummeling inflicted on it by the blows of each group in turn” (Miners, 1986a: 203). Instead, it sought political stability and economic prosperity as the long-term goals of governance. While making necessary short-run adjustments and concessions to political pressures from different interest groups, the Hong Kong Government stood very firm on the center-pieces of its economic policies. Summing up this section, the absence of powerful political “opposition” both in the councils and in society, and the lack of electoral pressure, have shielded the Hong Kong’s bureaucratic government from the greater

44


public pressure witnessed in Western democracies. The bureaucratic government has had more room to perform its “paternalistic” role (Lau, 1982). The presence of a strong, less than accountable bureaucratic government, from which no officials could be forced to resign by even the Unofficials of the two high-powered institutions (Miners, 1986a), contributed to the sense of political powerlessness felt by the public in Hong Kong (Rear, 1971). Hong Kong – a quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian political structure Given the British perceptions of China’s opposition to any top-down democratization, Hong Kong’s political institutions underwent little change and remained quasi-bureaucratic and authoritarian from 1946 to late 1985. The dominance of government by bureaucrats, the inclusion of mainly business elites in the high power echelon, the political exclusion of the popular sector, and the depoliticization of its civil society: these features of Hong Kong were paralleled by those of the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America (Collier, 1979b; O’Donnell, 1979; So, 1990: 144). What differentiated Hong Kong was a relatively lower level of social and economic intervention, a conspicuously higher level of civil liberties and political rights, and the absence of military involvement in government. How did this quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure contribute to a lack of bottom-up democratization? Non-elected, paternalistic bureaucrats, whose conception of “societal interests” sometimes conflicted with public opinion, wielded large discretionary power. That explained why in the limited surveys done during that period, the general public did not regard the government as “responsive” enough to public opinion. When the wishes of the public could be brushed aside, the ensuing political powerlessness could restrict interest in politics, foster political detachment, cripple political participation, and reduce critical mass support for any bottom-up democratization attempt. The disproportionate dominance of business interests among Unofficials in the Legislative and Executive Councils, especially before the 1980s, also carried implications for democratization after 1984. As I will argue in later chapters, the preoccupation of the business sector with their access to the power center of government spurred the local bourgeoisie to oppose faster and fuller democratization from 1986 to 1990.


45

Fourth environmental factor: spectacular socio-economic growth, stability, and civil liberties legitimated Hong Kong’s political system The legitimacy problem for authoritarian regimes Legitimacy has been a wooly concept, with different meanings for developed, developing, and communist regimes (Dahl, 1984: 53–4; Denitch, 1979: 10–22; Habermas, 1984: 144–54; 1984: 207–17; Lane, 1979: 55–75; Lipset, 1981; Rothschild, 1979: 39–53). It usually means “a well defined group of people’s evaluations of political objects – which can be political leaders, policies, or the system.” These evaluations can be based on intrinsic values or on the performance of the system, its leaders, and their policies. The problem of legitimacy we are interested in here pertains to the “general public’s political support for the political system attitudinally” (O’Donnell, Pt IV, 1986: 15). The issue of legitimacy in the case of Hong Kong becomes thornier when viewed from a comparative perspective. In Latin America and Southern Europe, the problem of legitimation bedeviled authoritarian regimes and constituted both a general context and a remote cause of democratic transition. Authoritarian regimes could rarely legitimize themselves by their own regime characteristics, which included monopoly of power by bureaucratic elites or narrow parties, and the restraint of basic civil and political liberties. They thus have to legitimize themselves by arguing that they are essential for attaining some other important ends – economic growth, socialism, communism, Islamic society, or other utopias (Diamond, 1990: 235; Schmitter, 1986). When the regime obviously fails to accomplish its ends,30 political support for it can vanish very swiftly (Linz, 1982: 15, 18). Hong Kong, as a quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system, gained a moderate level of legitimacy during the 1970s and the early 1980s by its ability to satisfy public demands for three elements: prosperity, stability, and civil liberties. The first two elements were inextricably intertwined for Hong Kong: without stability, socio-economic performance would falter, and without economic growth, both mainland China and the large number of “transient” economic migrants could jeopardize stability.

The great imperative for economic growth and stability in Hong Kong Both external and internal causes have given rise to the tremendous imperative of Hong Kong’s bureaucratic government to secure economic growth and political stability.31 The external cause is Communist China whose forbearance regarding Hong Kong was largely due to the economic benefits which it derived from the colony. The internal cause is the fact

46


that the immediate post-war population of Hong Kong consisted mainly of economic and political refugees from mainland China. After 1949 over a million Chinese refugees fled to Hong Kong (Lau, 1982). Various cultural and historical reasons have led the Hong Kong people to take “stability” and “prosperity” as the benchmarks of “legitimacy.” Legitimacy involves human normative evaluations, and people’s values do not arise in a vacuum. People in “transitional” societies acquired values through socialization before the transition. Light can be shed on the Hong Kong Chinese conception of legitimacy by referring to their cultural traditions. In traditional China, the ultimate values of government rested on its offering of stability, continuity, and harmonious relations among all member (Pye, 1985: 56–7). Put simply, the legitimacy that the Chinese conferred on the state depended on the state’s ability to maintain stability. Besides this cultural inheritance (Solomon, 1971: 140), the historical turmoil of rebellion, and war in China in the past two centuries no doubt reinforced the traumatized Chinese refugees’ desire for stability after their influx into Hong Kong (Lau, 1982: 71). The tremendous importance of stability was corroborated by a survey done in 1977 on some adult Hong Kong Chinese. When asked, 57.3% of them regarded the major responsibility of the government as the performance of this duty [preserving stability], in comparison to the 10.5% who would place the construction of a democratic and egalitarian society on the top priority list of government responsibilities. (ibid.: 103) Besides social and political stability, material advancement constituted another significant value for Hong Kong people. A rare study of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong showed that 24.6–40 percent of Chinese refugees came during 1949 to 1952 for economic reasons (Hambro, 1955: 152). The significance of “civil liberties” is also related to Hong Kong’s history. Refugees from China accounted for the biggest rise in the population between the late 1940s and the 1950s.32 A survey conducted in the mid-1950s found that 37–69 percent of heads of households who arrived between 1949 and 1952 cited avoidance of real or potential political persecution and, as a corollary, loss of civil liberties, as major reason for leaving China (ibid.). More direct evidence of the importance of civil liberty for Hong Kong people was found in a survey conducted in 1982: 82 percent and 86 percent regarded “freedom of speech” and “freedom of choice” as important, which outranked other choices (Cheng, 1984: 101). In short, stability, prosperity, and civil liberties have been the underlying pivotal values of the majority of the post-war population of Hong Kong. A political system that reflected these values could enjoy a measure of legitimacy.


47

Enjoyment of rapid socio-economic growth and a rise in living standards From 1947 to 1952, the excellent port, an experienced international trade sector, and extensive shipping links led Hong Kong to seek post-war recovery by relying on entrepot trade and services, especially as the gateway between China and the rest of the world. The historic inflows of labor, capital, and entrepreneurs after the communist take-over of the mainland, and the international embargo of China after the outbreak of the Korean War rapidly spurred the government and businessmen of Hong Kong to embark on labor-intensive industrialization, concentrating on manufactured goods, textiles, clothing, consumer electronics, and plastics (Sung, 1985: 117–21). After 1970, Hong Kong engaged in more diversified consumer manufacturing, and developed into the third largest financial center in the world. A small internal market and lack of natural resources led Hong Kong to base its economy on exports. Hong Kong and three other East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) achieved the highest average growth rate in GNP per capita 1960–82 in the world, except for Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia (Table 3.3). The remarkably high economic growth rate elevated Hong Kong’s living standard dramatically, to a point at which Hong Kong was second only to Japan in Asia (International Marketing Data and Statistics, 1981: 227; Wong, 1988: 9) (Table 3.4). Another measure of living conditions is the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), composed of infant mortality, life expectancy, and basic literacy rate. By the early 1970s, the East Asian NICs had already approached the levels of the advanced industrial states (Haggard, 1990: 231). Hong Kong’s total PQLI (ibid.) has in general been ahead of the other three NICs. The same is true when comparing the components of PQLI (Table 3.5), apart from Hong Kong’s provision of secondary and higher education (Holbrooke et al., 1988: 62). The big rise in “physical quality of Table 3.3 Average growth rates of GDP and GNP per capita, 1960–82 for four East Asian NICs and China Country

GNP per capita 1982 (US)

Average annual growth in per capita GNP 1960–82

Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Singapore China Low-income economies Middle-income Industrial market economies

5,340 2,500 1,910 5,910 0,310 0,280 1,520 11,070

7.0 6.6 6.6 7.4 5.0 3.0 3.6 3.3

Source: World Bank (1984: 218); Deyo (1989: 26).

48


Table 3.4 Social indicators of four East Asian NICs and China in 1984

Hospital beds per 1,000 TV receivers per person Radios per person Televisions per person

China

Hong Kong

South Korea

Singapore

Taiwan

2.07 N.A. N.A. N.A.

4.3 0.22 0.31 0.35

2.1 0.17 N.A. 0.11

3.9 0.18 0.23 0.37

3.1 0.15 N.A. 0.25

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook (1985: 6). Note N.A.: Not available.

Table 3.5 Life expectancy and infant mortality Life expectancy at birth (years) Male

Hong Kong Singapore South Korea Taiwan China Industrial market economies

Infant mortality rate (aged under 1)

Female

1965

1984

1965

1984

1965

1984

64 63 55 65 55 68

73 70 65 721 68 73

71 68 58 70 59 74

79 75 72 721 70 79

28 28 64 24 90 24

10 10 28 9.1 36 9

Source: The World Bank (1986: 232–3); Holbrooke et al. (1988: 62); Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook (1985: 6). Note 1 Average figures for the male and female.

life” in Hong Kong between 1964 and 1984 is an unmistakable sign of the economic miracle. The improvement in living standards has in part been brought about by public policies. From the 1960s onwards, and especially in the aftermath of the riots in 1966–7, social policies were designed to enhance the welfare of ordinary people (Chow, 1986b: 404–7). When Sir Murray MacLehose became Governor in 1971, he gave a big boost to education, medical care, housing, social welfare, and labor welfare. Most notable were plans for public housing for 1.5 million people within ten years,33 nine years’ compulsory free education from 1978, a public assistance scheme guaranteeing a living standard at subsistence level, and paid holidays and redundancy payments for workers (ibid.: Jones, 1990). As a result, the proportion of public expenditure spent on social services increased, enhancing living standards on the one hand, and enlarging dependence on the government, on the other (Jones, 1990: 194; Chow, 1986).


49

Hong Kong’s development: legitimating the political system by performance The quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian regime in Hong Kong epitomized the case of establishing legitimacy by performance (Lipset, 1981), i.e., fulfilling public needs for prosperity, political stability, and civil liberties. I will now survey the past limited data measuring public support for the political system, and describe how Hong Kong’s performance averted the delegitimating crises commonly found in Third World countries. A moderate level of legitimacy from 1970s to 1980s The general level of legitimacy was lower, though rising, in the 1950s and 1960s because of greater racial discrimination, greater economic hardship, and lingering expectations among refugees of a return to mainland China.34 As improved living standards became more tangible in the 1970s, and more economic and political hardships in China, a major reference point for Hong Kong people, were exposed, the degree of legitimacy rose. Two surveys, conducted in 1967 and 1977, indicate the rising level of legitimacy that the political system enjoyed. In 1967, 21 percent of respondents hoped that Hong Kong’s political system would remain unchanged. In 1977, the figure was 81.6 percent (Hoadley, 1970: 212–13; Lau, 1977: 199). Admittedly, the tumultuous riots probably lowered the level of political support registered in 1967, but the fruits of economic take-off were certainly becoming more tangible in 1977. This explained a higher level of support for the political system than before. In 1982, a slightly different question was asked of residents living in four districts. When asked if they agreed with the statement that “under the existing circumstances, the political system of Hong Kong, while far from perfect, is the best we can get,” 48.6–57.5 percent agreed while only 12.4–18.3 percent disagreed (Lau and Kuan, 1985: 15). These figures at least bear testimony to a moderate level of public support for the political system.35 Legitimacy-boosting performance To recapitulate, political stability, civil liberties, and economic prosperity have been the yardsticks by which the citizens of Hong Kong measure the legitimacy of Hong Kong’s political institutions. Given only three serious riots since the Second World War, the political stability of Hong Kong has been conspicuous. The government’s depoliticization of civil society and co-option of elites probably defused and weakened potentially disruptive political forces. Besides, the relatively greater extent of civil liberties enjoyable in Hong Kong led traumatized Chinese refugees and their children to relish their greater personal freedom. Cultural and kinship ties

50


ensured that mainland China remained a significant reference point. Thus, suppression of liberties in Communist China can only have boosted the legitimacy of the political system of Hong Kong. The astonishing economic growth of Hong Kong, which transformed it from a sordid Third World city to a highly industrialized, commercial, and financial metropolis, brought better public services and a sharp rise in living standards. It is not surprising that, since the early 1970s, more people in Hong Kong (over 60 percent of the overwhelmingly young respondents) perceived Hong Kong as a land of opportunities, and thus reduced class tension (Chaney and Podmore, 1973: 60; Lau, 1982: 95–102).36 The thriving economy disposed people to perceive Hong Kong as an expanding “pie” for all, a perception strong enough to reduce disappointment at the relatively severe inequality of wealth in the four East Asian NICs.37 With ordinary people happy with their prosperous and largely free lives in a stable society, and with businessmen content with sustained profit growth, traces of “legitimacy crises”38 and pressure for transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, as found in Latin America, can barely be detected in Hong Kong. The level of political support for the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian regime from the late 1970s to the early 1980s could partially account for status quo inertia. It constitutes a very important obstacle to successful mobilization of bottom-up democratization during that period.

Fifth environmental factor: a politically weak civil society and a depoliticizing government According to Samuel Valenzuela, labor movements always occupy a special place among the forces of civil society. He argues that “the labor movement has a greater capacity for extensive and effective mobilization at critical moments than any other social group.” This special role and capacity of the labor movements come from the fact that: (a) “it has an organized network through its more or less permanently established unions;” (b) “the labor movement can disrupt the economy directly through work stoppages;” and (c) “Labor’s demands cannot be lightly ignored” (Valenzuela, 1989: 447). One defining characteristic of bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America was the exclusion of the popular sector, primarily labor, from the ruling bloc (Kaufman, 1979: 187). Through penetration, co-optive “corporatist” labor laws, police surveillance and arrests, those regimes tried to depoliticize civil society, i.e., to weaken the political influence of organized social forces (Collier, 1979b: 39). The quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian government in Hong Kong, though far from inflicting such severe repression on local labor and other “popular” sectors, depoliticized civil society through less offensive measures. Pluralistic, autonomous professional associations, labor unions, church


51

and other intermediate groups, that comprise civil society, can promote the political participation of the public, its sense of powerfulness and commitment to democracy (Diamond and Linz, 1989: 36; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Civil society thus has a direct and crucial effect on the strength of public support for democracy (Diamond and Linz, 1989: 35; O’Donnell et al., 1986). In Hong Kong, the absence of political parties increased the potential political significance of civil society for political change. As two types of social organization, i.e., labor unions as well as the Protestant and Catholic Churches have the largest nominal membership in Hong Kong, we will describe and explain their weakness. This is followed by a general portrayal of the frailty of Hong Kong’s civil society by a brief introduction to pressure groups. Weakness of the labor sector: frustrated bottom-up democratization Labor participation in unions has been low in Hong Kong. First, let us compare low union density in Hong Kong (1961–84) with the other three East Asian NICs (Table 3.6). Table 3.6 reveals that there was no significant increase in the strength of the unions as measured in terms of union density between 1960 and 1984.39 Given the high degree of industrialization, union density in Hong Kong has been startlingly low. In Australia, which attained a similar degree of industrialization during the 1970s, at least 80 percent of employees were union members (Turner, 1980: 18). Even when contrasting Hong Kong with the three other East Asian NICs, Table 3.6 Level of unionization – union membership as a percentage of employed labor force in four East Asian NICs Government total expenditure (%) Year

Hong Kong

Taiwan

South Korea

Singapore

1961 1966 1969 1974 1975 1976 1979 1982 1983 1984

15 15 15 22 24 25 20.7 16.4 16.1 16.1

N.A. 20 18 24 24 25 25 28 29 29

N.A. 11.7 12.5 14.6 15.6 16.3 16.7 14.3 14.1 13.2

N.A. N.A. N.A. 30.1 30.5 31.1 28.9 22.2 21.8 19.4

Source: Deyo (1987: 70–3); Ng (1986: 276–7). Note N.A.: Not available.

52


which have all been marked by state-monitored “demobilized” labor (Cheng and Haggard, 1987; Deyo, 1987: 183–6), the union density of Hong Kong is still lower than all but that of South Korea (Deyo, 1989: 70–3). The following features further highlight the weakness of the labor sector in Hong Kong. There has been significant degree of “dual membership,” which was more acceptable in Hong Kong than in most other countries. Dual or triple memberships could allow union members to enjoy different facilities and welfare benefits (Turner, 1980: 24). In Hong Kong, the absence of political parties increased the potential political significance of civil society for political change. The unions in Hong Kong were fragmented, which undermined their strength. The unions could be divided into politically “neutral” unions, a pro-Taiwan Trade Union Council (TUC) and a large pro-PRC Federation of Trade Union (FTU). The antagonistic stances of the two major blocs of labor unions hampered cooperation in the cause of general labor welfare (England, 1989: 12). Fragmentation also resulted from the extreme proliferation of small unions since 1969, along lines of craft, industry, occupation, working area, and nationality of employers (England and Rear, 1975), “at the end of 1977, over half the unions had less than 250 members and nearly forty had less than fifty members apiece” (Turner, 1980: 29–30). A direct implication of this multiplication of unions has been the concentration on specific employees’ interests rather than on broader labor policies and concerns.40 There were no strong unions to influence labor policies, legislation, and other class-based social and political concerns. Except for a few political strikes during 1946–9 and 1967, the FTU and TUC were mainly engaged in the provision of social welfare and services for their members, so as to recruit and consolidate more members (England, 1989: 137; Ng, 1986: 270–5). Both unions avoided acting as agents for collective bargaining and launching industrial action. The FTU’s and the TUC’s lack of concern for labor policies and broader social issues contributed to feeble labor participation in unions. The FTU was a symbol of mainland China’s influence. Partly because of the fear of damaging Hong Kong’s ability to supply foreign exchange for China, and partly because of weak leadership, the FTU has by and large stuck to its traditional role of providing education and welfare for its members. For the “right-wing” TUC, the adoption of a robust industrial posture has been “inhibited by its substantial dependence on anti-Communist employers, and its potential attraction has been constrained by the declining appeal of its Kuomingtang links” (Turner, 1980: 156–7). Since the 1970s, new politically non-aligned white-collar unions, especially in the public sector, have orchestrated militant strikes that forced the government to yield.41 Nevertheless, they were largely directed towards small occupational and short-run interests, rather than long-run overall labor policies or legislation (Ng, 1986: 272; Turner, 1980: 156).


53

Contributory factors to a weak labor sector The weakness of the labor sector is due to the unions’ problems and to government policy. The above unions’ lack of concern for labor policies and broader social issues weakened labor participation. In addition, the government sought to depoliticize the labor sector by various measures. In 1961, the use of union funds for political activities was prohibited (Haggard, 1990: 120). No representatives of the labor sector were appointed to the Legislative Council until the late 1970s. The government also refused to grant legal status to a federation of unions that might increase their political power. It helped fragment unions by requiring that union officials work in the occupation, trade, or industry that their union represented, and allowing dual membership (Turner, 1980: 109–10). Finally, the government skillfully defused labor conflicts, and improved labor legislation and welfare, especially after the riots of 1966 and 1967 (Ng, 1986: 268–99).42 These improvements in legislations also rendered union participation less relevant for workers. Implications of a weak labor sector Low union density, and the failure of the larger unions to mobilize to advance workers’ interests via collective bargaining and improvements in labor legislation, have fed back on each other and crippled most labor unions as organized social forces.43 Their reluctance to address broader social and political concerns precluded them from acting as the social vanguard of democratization. Historical-comparative studies show the working class to be a vital vanguard of democratization.44 In Hong Kong, the manufacturing sector has the majority of its members in the working class, and is the biggest employer yet it is the least unionized sector of the economy (Turner, 1980: 25) (Table 3.7). This constitutes a major obstacle to the mobilization of the working class for democratization. Table 3.7 Unionization rates in Hong Kong, by industry (mid-1970s) Industry

Percentage of unionization

Primary activities Public utilities Transport and communications Community and public services Manufacturing Construction Commerce

40 47 63 37 11 16 18

Source: Turner (1980: 25).

54


The Protestant and Catholic Churches The predominant influences of the Protestant and Catholic Churches in Hong Kong In late 1987, there were about 500,000 Protestants and Catholics in Hong Kong, making up about 8 to 9 percent of the total Hong Kong population (Butenhoff, 1999: 77). However, the potential political significance of these groups did not merely rest on their absolute numbers, but more importantly, on the pre-eminent importance of social functions they have discharged over the years. Both before and after 1984, local Protestant and Catholic churches have played a crucial role in education and social services. Before the Second World War, the Catholic Church, and the Anglican Church ran most schools in Hong Kong (Ko, 1998: 43). Graduates of those schools, regarded as cream of the society, took up important leading positions in government (Smith, 1985: 192–3). After the war, the Protestant and Catholic Church organizations continued to play important roles in Hong Kong. “The number of Catholic schools increased from 22 in 1953 to 55 in 1963. From 1953 to 1963, the number of students added to Catholic schools increased from 3,909 to 28,029” (Hong Kong Catholic Diocesan Archive Office, HK-DA S.6–01, F/03, in Leung, 2000: 232). In the 1950s, churches or church organizations ran twenty-five out of the thirty most prestigious secondary schools. “Until the 1960s, these schools monopolized almost entirely the admissions into the University of Hong Kong” (Kwok, 1997: 4). The partnership between the government and the Church in education could be explained by their shared goal of opposing communism. The Hong Kong Government regarded the Catholic Church as an ideal partner to help guard against the spread of communist ideology in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Government, “under instructions from London, adopted a strategic plan to prevent the spread of communism at the grassroot level” (Leung, 2000: 230, 244 fn. 1). Indeed, three church leaders (two Catholics and one Protestant) were among the seventeen appointed members on the government’s all-powerful Educational Board. The Board advised the government on Hong Kong’s education policy after the Second World War (Hong Kong Public Records Office, HKRS 147 2[2], in Leung, 2000: 229). In terms of social services, the Christian Church was also the predominant source of relief work and charity in the community (Brown, 1993: 199). Christian organizations supplied relief to the refugees in Hong Kong after the Second World War. During the Cold War, the Hong Kong Government saw the Church as an ideal partner in charity work (Leung, 2000: 230). Besides charity work, the Church has also transplanted the Western ideas of community development, elderly and family services, children and youth work as well as counselling services (Ko, 1998: 44).


55

Indeed, in the late 1980s, the “Church still runs the largest social service system outside the government; together with other non-governmental organizations, it supplies almost two-thirds of Hong Kong’s social service, excluding social security” (ibid.). Around the mid-1990s, the institutional Church was the second biggest local employer. Also, church leaders continue to sit on school boards and management committees (Kwok, 1997: 11). The constraints on the contribution of the Church to democratization Similar to the labor movements, the pro-democracy participation of the local church has been in the main confined to some non-church Christian organizations or a small section of the Catholic Church after 1984. The absence of the large-scale and sustained mobilization by the local established Protestant and Catholic Churches for democratization is due to a number of factors. First, the Protestant and Catholic Churches suffer from a dependency syndrome. The syndrome refers to the dependence of local churches and church organizations on, previously, missionary societies, and now, the government and the wealthy. Local churches heralded “the movement of indigenization” in the 1960s as they decided to support themselves to remove the dependence on missionary societies. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, they came to rely on government subsidies and contributions from the wealthy as they started their social service enterprise in Hong Kong. For the large number of voluntary educational and social service programs run by Protestants and Catholics in Hong Kong, the Protestant and Catholic Churches remain susceptible to the sway of the government. The government has also sold land to the Catholic and Protestant Churches either at nil or very low premium for worship or other purposes (Kwok, 1997: 9–10; Leung, 2000: 232). The mainstream churches have thus been financially dependent on the Hong Kong Government and have an interest in preserving the status quo. As argued by Brown (1996: 115–16): about 40 per cent of Hong Kong’s schools, 60 per cent of its social service programs and 20 per cent of its hospital beds are managed by Christian churches . . . most of the cost of these programs, including virtually all ongoing operating expenses, are government-funded. Consequently, the government has arguably silenced through financial control some prominent pro-democracy leaders (Ko, 1998). The financial control of the Church, plus the lack of vision among the major Church leaders, who were preoccupied with running their business empires (Brown, 1996: 115) has resulted in their being absorbed into the establishment (Kwok, 1997: 13; Leung, 2000: 120).

56


Second, the established churches “lack a history of political activism” particularly in face of the political pressures from the state, and the Anglican Church in Hong Kong was a good example of this (Brown, 1996: 116). Rev. Kwong, Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau, resisted the idea that the Church should adopt a clear political standpoint. He discouraged members of the church from engaging in pro-democracy activism and clamped down pro-democracy forces within the Hong Kong Christian Council (ibid.: 117–18). Similarly, under pressure from Beijing, the local bishop of the Catholic Church instructed Father Louis Ha to withdraw from a high-profile organization demanding democracy in China in 1989 (Brown, 1996). He was also unexpectedly ordered by the Church to leave the directorship of the Catholic Social Communication Center (Leung, 2000: 238). This reflected the reluctance of the Catholic Church to confront Beijing on politically sensitive matters. The accommodation of the Church to the Chinese Government has directly triggered the clashes between the traditional and nontraditional factions and spawned some pro-democracy non-church Protestant bodies in the 1980s and 1990s. To conclude, though the politicization of Hong Kong in the 1980s and the Tiananmen Square incident revitalized or triggered the emergence of such Christian activist groups as the Hong Kong Christian Student Movement, the Hong Kong Christian Institute, and the Hong Kong Christian Workers Association, their relatively small-scale and limited resources relative to the pro-establishment Church have failed to mobilize a sizable proportion of the Christian community into taking pro-democracy actions. Political opposition: reformist “pressure groups” During the late 1960s and 1970s, the opportunity for reformist political oppositions to gain access to the high-powered formal political institutions was minimal. In the absence of any top-down democratization and the lack of popular support for bottom-up democratization, any political opposition had to be informal and appear in the form of protest activities outside those high-powered institutions. However, the protest activities of the political opposition were supported by the public if they attempted to improve the lot of the lower class, given the increasing discontent with public services and the growing inequalities in the distribution of wealth. Under the above-mentioned social bases of grievances and political opportunity structure, many informal political oppositional forces emerged to campaign for improved labor welfare, housing services, educational policies, and medical services in the late 1960s and 1970s (Cheung and Louie, 1990). These informal political opposition groups consisted of a few active autonomous organizations in civil society and they began to adopt relatively confrontational strategies (e.g., sit-ins, petitions, protests, mass rallies) to shape the government’s decisions during the late 1960s and the 1970s. The goals of those pressure groups were not revolutionary, but


57

reformist. Many leaders of the major pressure groups were participants in former student movements. Exposure to the totalitarian nature of Chinese politics in the late 1970s and encounters with Western liberal democratic thought and practices, led some of them to a commitment to the principles of human rights, confronting the government and demanding a more equitable redistribution of wealth while upholding the competitive, capitalist economy that existed in Hong Kong. They pressed for changes in policies, instead of seeking new political institutions. Poor financial resources, small membership, exclusion from the two high-powered political institutions, and ad hoc, issue-oriented mobilization often limited their political strength vis-à-vis the bureaucratic government (Lau, 1982; Miners, 1986a). Table 3.8 shows the pressure groups that were the prominent ones that later became the mainstay of the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government (JCPDG). The involvement of the pressure groups in formal political institutions became more prominent when the Hong Kong Government introduced direct elections to District Boards in 1982. Eighteen District Boards were established throughout Hong Kong then, with the major objective of relaying feedback from the public to the government so that it could improve local services. The importance of District Boards in Hong Kong’s constitutional history arose from the fact that one-third of the eighteen members would be directly elected by universal suffrage. Some pressure group members rallied support for their representatives to stand in the elections, held in 1982 and 1985, in order to avoid being excluded from direct influence on policy. With an enfeebled labor sector, weak community organizations and “pressure groups,” an absence of political parties, and an apolitical religious community,45 Hong Kong from 1946 to 1984 lacked strong, autonomous, mass-based organizations that could launch powerful mass mobilization for political actions against the government.

Sixth environmental factor: political attitudes/culture of Hong Kong: political powerlessness and low commitment to democracy In this section, I will describe the changing pattern of Hong Kong’s political attitudes or culture in the post-war period.46 Short of rigorous earlier research, I will focus on changing political attitudes from late 1960s to the early 1980s. Importance of political attitudes/culture Subjective beliefs, including cognitive, evaluative, and affective orientations, which color human interpretations, are significant for explaining behavior (Almond and Verba, 1965; Latin and Wildavsky, 1988). “Political

58


Table 3.8 Some major pressure groups and members of JCPDG Name

Concerns

No. of members

Hong Kong Christian Industrial Council

Labor welfare and policy; monitor public services

N.A.

Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union

Educational policy; welfare of teachers and administrators in education sector; monitor public services

32,062 (85–6)

Hong Kong Federation of Students Union

Social justice and monitor Government

10,000 (1985)

Hong Kong Social Workers’ General Union

Social services; welfare of social workers

902 (1985)

Federation of Civil Service Unions (FCSU)

Unite civil servants, promote unionism and social justice

16,000

Hong Kong Christian Council (HKCC)

(Its public policy committee.) Dozens Critically monitor public policies and development of political institution

People’s Council on Public Housing Policy interests (PCPHP)

Mobilize and organize public housing residents to defend their interests

N.A.

Society for Social Research

Conduct research and have social actions to air for the lower and middle-class interests

22 (1981)

Society for Community Organization (SOCO)

Organize community social N.A. actions and encourage assertiveness of lower classes

Sources: Adapted from Sing (1996); Annual Reports of the Hong Kong Christian Council; Quarterly of the Hong Kong Federation of Social Services (1981, 1982); Lo (1988: 619). Note N.A.: Not available.

culture” has been a dominant concept that integrates actors’ subjective beliefs, with its usual definition as follows: “political culture becomes the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor” (Almond and Verba, 1965: 17).47 While subjective beliefs are shaped by antecedent historical and structural factors as well as individual lived experiences, they have been found to be not just epiphenomena, wholly determined or dependent on other variables.48 Instead, subjective beliefs can figure as independent variables,


59

exerting effects on behavior and persisting for quite some time despite social structural change (Dahl, 1971: 186–8; 1989). In a recent study of ten Asian full or semi-democracies, Diamond argued that: While the concept of political culture has been a controversial one in comparative politics and sociology, our Asian cases demonstrate its utility and salience for the study of democratic experiences and outcomes. In each of the countries examined here, one can discern certain distinctive ways of thinking and feeling about politics, power, authority, and legitimacy as they relate to the modern political system, and the role of the individual citizen in it. These beliefs, ideals, attitudes, values, evaluations, and behavioral orientations have sometimes been heavily influenced by foreign rule and international contact, but typically spring even more profoundly from the political and cultural traditions of each country. (Diamond et al., 1989: 14–15) However, as political culture can be modified by political structures and ongoing experiences a dynamic and historical perspective is called for in order to better understand changes in political culture and the corresponding effects on regimes (ibid.: 15). Hong Kong from the late 1960s to the early 1970s: parochial political attitudes/culture A survey done in 1966–7 suggested that the public in Hong Kong were either suspicious of or indifferent to political inputs, outputs, and the system. Given their general political detachment,49 they were described as having a parochial political culture (Hoadley, 1970: 212–13). In 1971, a representative survey was conducted in a newly established self-contained industrial community in Hong Kong, which could arguably more or less reflect the general population (King, 1984: 150).50 First, with regard to political cognition, the Hong Kong citizens were marked by a fairly low degree of interest in political affairs (Almond and Verba, 1965: 54; King, 1984: 152).51 At the affective level, the “amount of consideration that local leaders would expect from Government officials for their opinions and suggestions,” compared with the ordinary citizens of Western democracies, was relatively low.52 Since only 11 percent of local leaders thought that the government took their views seriously, they probably harbored a low affective expectation of the output objects of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1965: 72; King, 1984: 158). Finally, along the evaluative dimension, the Hong Kong public had a great sense of political powerlessness, judging from the fact that 82 percent

60


said they could do nothing about an unjust government regulation (ibid.: 161). The powerlessness of the Hong Kong public was also comparatively higher than that of Westerners (Almond and Verba, 1965: 142; King, 1984: 141). Reasons for a parochial political culture from the late 1960s to the early 1970s Three elements in the history of Hong Kong can be singled out to account for the prevalence of parochial political culture during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. First, bound up with the social milieu of Hong Kong, the political culture of the Hong Kong Chinese has been shaped by a less than accountable power structure and the government’s depoliticizing measures. The bureaucratic government enjoyed dominant power, and pursued most policies as it saw fit. When public opposition to unwelcome policies proved futile, the political detachment and powerlessness of the public were obvious and strengthened (Wong, 1972: 1–3; Rear, 1971: 63).53 In addition, given that more than 97 percent of Hong Kong’s population were Chinese, and a significant proportion of them had emigrated from China after the Second World War as refugees, the traditional Chinese political culture had left its imprint on the Hong Kong public, especially the older generation. Traditional Chinese culture contains a paternalistic conception of an unchecked and moral state (Pye and Pye, 1985: 27–8), and the subjugation of individual rights to collective welfare, consensus, harmony and stability instead of political competition (Solomon, 1971: 140; Pye and Pye, 1985: 56–7). By and large, it discouraged the formation of a participant political culture and facilitated the growth of a strong sense of political powerlessness. Third, the historical mayhem of riots, rebellion, civil war, and Japanese attacks on China in the past two centuries stimulated a strong inner yearning among the Hong Kong Chinese for political stability. The Chinese migrants treated Hong Kong as a lifeboat affording relative stability, disinterested justice, and a good economic prospect in the rough sea of China. Those who had got into the lifeboat did not want to rock it. Political activities were frowned upon and could hardly flourish in such a context (Hoadley, 1970: 210). From a parochial political culture to one favoring more political participation, the 1970s to the 1980s To recapitulate, political attitudes/culture can be shaped by the changing social milieu. Early signs of emergence of a more active political culture were already apparent in research conducted in late 1960s and early 1970s. While finding a parochial culture among the general public, this research pointed out the heterogeneous nature of Hong Kong’s political culture,


61

and the presence of a subject-participant political culture among the better educated qualified voters of municipal councils (Urban Councils), some students, and local leaders (Hoadley, 1970: 217; King, 1984: 165). A survey conducted in 1978 on Hong Kong workers’ attitudes suggested that, at least attitudinally, they were seemingly more ready than ever to take action to sway government policies, if they were adversely affected.54 On being asked what kinds of action they would prefer, 56 percent did not offer any answer, indicating either their unpreparedness or unawareness of ways to exert influence. Among those who answered, “personal contact with officials” or “seeking help from governmentrelated agencies” constituted about 49 percent. In a 1982 survey of residents in four districts (Lau and Kuan, 1985: 15), respondents did not experience much disapproval from families, friends or officials for adopting confrontational and collective measures to change government policies. Alongside the conventional methods of “personal contact” or “filing complaints to government departments,” collective and possibly confrontational ploys were also considered by respondents as being “most effective ways to alter government policies” (ibid.: 14–15).55 However, less than 1.8 percent of respondents in the four districts had really taken part in any confrontational collective action. A strong sense of political powerlessness was still present (ibid.: 12, 17). In short, there had been a shift in awareness and evaluation, creating greater certainty about the social acceptance and effectiveness of collective confrontational measures in pressing the government to change policies. Nevertheless, the lingering habit of using traditional “personal contacts” to influence policy, and the lack of a clear pattern of actual political participation, suggested that the ability to influence government policies was still in a formative stage. The increasing provision of education and the growing incidence of “pressure group” confrontations with the government conduced to a shift in political culture towards approval of more public action to shape government decision-making. Most research on Hong Kong’s political culture has demonstrated that “education” is the most significant factor in accounting for less political passivity and a more positive political orientation (Hoadley, 1970: 214–51; King, 1984: 164–5; Shively, 1972: 28). Also, the expansion of the public sector has meant more government impact on and greater potential dissatisfaction among the public. Such expansion, coupled with growing labor disputes, and a surge of “pressure group” activity in the 1970s, encouraged increased acceptance of collective and confrontational tactics as means to shape government behavior (Lau and Kuan, 1985: 2, 13–14).

62


Implications of political attitudes/culture for the democracy movement in the late 1980s What implications can we draw from political attitudes/culture for the democracy movement after 1984? Notwithstanding the budding of some capability among the public to exert more influence on government policy, the consistently widespread and prolonged presence of political powerlessness at least partially curbed the effect of that capability on real political behavior.56 It was a crippling hindrance to political movements, including the bottom-up pro-democracy movement, 1946–84. What is more, unless triggered by dramatic events or swift and fundamental structural changes, political attitudes/culture seldom change overnight. The immobilizing effects of political powerlessness on the democracy movement were also present (1986–90), when the short-term, tangible, and personal interests of the public were not at stake, and the opposition was China, a most threatening force which had demonstrated strong antipathy towards the movement. The debilitating effects of political powerlessness co-existed with a lack among the Hong Kong public of “knowledge of and commitment to democracy” before the mid-1980s. Without a pervasive “democratic rearing style” in the family (Wong, 1972), any formal education in “democracy” or discussion of “politics” in schools, and while living in a depoliticized prosperous and stable environment, the Hong Kong public displayed a predictably low “knowledge and commitment” to democracy. Hong Kong adolescents surveyed in 1982 displayed far more concern with personal goals than with the creation of a democratic government57 (Lau, 1984: 272). All in all, a strong sense of “political powerlessness,” and a visible lack of commitment to democracy, plus an ambivalence towards participation in shaping government policies in the early 1980s had shaped political attitudes/culture. With a government not accountable to the public via elections, which was trying to weaken the political power of civil society, was Hong Kong’s political structure subject to a legitimacy problem and pressure to change?

Conclusion At the beginning of this chapter, I set out to highlight six environmental factors embedded in Hong Kong’s historical development, 1946–84, which shaped the democracy movement and democratization during the midand late 1980s. These factors have also been the constraints thwarting both top-down and bottom-up democratization 1946–84, turning Hong Kong into an anomaly to modernization theory despite the fact that it had been in the top twenty percentile of the middle-income group since 1976. The first two environmental factors pertained to external forces – the Chinese and British Governments. Communist China’s prolonged denun-


63

ciation of “colonialism,” “Western democracy,” and “independence” for Hong Kong and Taiwan was perceived by Britain as a “threat” alarming enough for Britain to shelve plans to democratize Hong Kong. While Britain thought decolonizing Hong Kong through reversion to Communist China ethically unacceptable, declaring Hong Kong independent or democratizing it were also ruled out as unrealistic, given China’s opposition. Hence, regime-led democratization, though attempted, was aborted in 1952. The abortion of a British-led democratization during this period contributed to the presence of first three of the following four domestic factors that in turn discouraged bottom-up democratization. The four domestic factors were: (a) Hong Kong’s powerful and depoliticizing bureaucratic government under a quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian, political structure; (b) a politically feeble civil society; (c) a political culture with strong political powerlessness and a lack of commitment to democracy; as well as (d) a moderate level of political support for the existing political institutions. In the absence of any promising prospects for democratization, anachronistic, quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian political institutions have remained intact in Hong Kong, vesting supreme power in a bureaucratic government. With China’s tolerance of Hong Kong’s continued existence depending on its pragmatic and economic value, the bureaucratic government was always under immense pressure to maintain and boost Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity. The government therefore took measures to weaken civil society, in addition to co-opting economic and social elites into governmental bodies. The presence of a strong bureaucratic government and an enfeebled civil society probably exerted mutually reinforcing effects on the apolitical attitudes prevalent in the late 1960s. Despite a change in political culture inclining towards more political acts to influence government decisionmaking, the immobilizing sense of political powerlessness, plus a lack of commitment to democracy, was still predominant, and this drained off vital popular support for bottom-up democratization during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The opportunity and energy to launch bottom-up democratization were further sapped when the public gave a moderate level of political support to Hong Kong’s political institutions, earned by their performance. Unlike authoritarian states in Latin America, where pressure for democratization substantially stemmed from economic failures (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Huntington, 1991; Lipset and Turner, 1986: 16–17), continued economic prosperity and political stability in Hong Kong legitimized political institutions. In South Korea and Taiwan, whose post-war economic growth rates had been as spectacular as Hong Kong’s, harsh repression of political opposition and deprivation of political and civil liberties eventually triggered off mounting pressure for democratization (Chung, 1990: 232). In Hong Kong a better record on civil liberties compared with most Asian

64


countries (Scalapino, 1986: 15–16) removed another major potential impetus for bottom-up democratization. Summing up, the British Government’s perception of the CCP’s rejection of any move to democratize Hong Kong during this period induced some significant socio-political features that weaken the democratic development not just before 1984, but also, to be unfolded soon, after 1984. In the next few chapters, the effects of these six long-term environmental factors on the democracy movement and democratization will be examined, in conjunction with Hong Kong’s rapidly changing political opportunity structures since 1982. In Chapter 4, it will be seen that the proposed reversion to China posed a crisis to Hong Kong in 1982–4. In order to reduce the crisis and preserve Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, a Sino-British Agreement was signed in 1984. As the agreement apparently offered a chance of regime-led democratization, it triggered the formation of the first pro-democracy alliance of the 1980s and 1990s. It will be shown that the shift towards a more favorable political opportunity structure for forming democratic alliance laid the seeds of strengthening a pro-democracy civil society and, eventually, a pro-democracy political society. The latter two factors have been important elements engaging in implicit bargaining by the British and Chinese Governments over Hong Kong’s democratization.

4

Britain’s first retreat from rapid democratization and formation of the first pro-democratic alliance

Background and formative phase of the pro-democracy movement alliance (mid-1982–late 1986) In the last chapter, I showed how six long-term macro-environmental conditions constrained top-down and bottom-up democratization between 1946 and 1984. From 1982 and 1987 onwards, Hong Kong was an increasing anomaly to modernization theory as it became a “higher-middleincome” place and a “high-income economy” respectively. Where a structural approach, such as modernization theory, fails to explain the anomaly completely, a synthetic perspective stressing bargaining as well as constraints and opportunities produced in the political process is useful. In this chapter, it will discuss how external and internal constraints, which inhibit Hong Kong’s democratization and explain the anomaly, made themselves apparent during the formation of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. I will show how the Chinese Government began to thwart Hong Kong’s democratic development in the early 1980s. Despite the Chinese Government’s opposition to democratization, however, it did have some positive effect on the latter’s democratization through triggering the formation of the largest pro-democracy alliance since 1945 in Hong Kong. The leaders of the alliance also later became the leaders of the largest pro-democracy party in Hong Kong, i.e., the Democratic Party. In addition, as well as the Chinese Government, this chapter will reveal the presence of two domestic constraints, i.e., the fragile public support for the rapid democratic transition of Hong Kong and the rise of the antidemocracy capitalist alliance formed mainly by local capitalists. The reasons for opposition to speedy democratization in Hong Kong by both the Chinese Government and the capitalist alliance will also be discussed. After that there will be a discussion of the dual interests and calculations of China about Hong Kong that led to the decision to take it back in 1997. This decision triggered an externally induced crisis for Hong Kong. After a series of Sino-British negotiations, a Joint Declaration on Hong Kong’s future was drawn up, which presented an apparent political opportunity for democratization. The Joint Declaration, signed in 1984,

66

The first pro-democratic alliance

stipulated an elected legislature, and possibly an elected Chief Executive in Hong Kong from 1997 onwards. As will be demonstrated later, contradictions in the interests of the Chinese Government with respect to Hong Kong gave room, however limited, to Britain and the domestic prodemocracy forces to maneuver for democratization. In other words, the China factor, and its interaction with Britain, played a crucial role in shaping democratization by expanding political opportunities for it in 1984. “Political opportunity structure” is a concept used in social movement theories to explain the activism of collective behavior and movements in terms of political environment.1 It refers to the opportunities and constraints within the political environment that can shape the emergence and activities of social movements and consists of a cluster of variables (Tarrow, 1989: 38). The two most commonly identified political aims are:2 first, the availability of powerful positions within formal political institutions (Brockett, 1991: 254; Tarrow, 1989), and second, the distribution of support and opposition to the given social movement (Brockett, 1991: 253–74; Eisinger, 1973: 11–28; McAdam, 1982; McAdam et al., 1988; Tarrow, 1989). For the availability of powerful positions within formal political institutions, it will be seen that pro-democracy activists were largely excluded from the two most powerful political institutions in Hong Kong in the 1980s, and only allowed some small influence in the legislature after 1990. The second element, the distribution of support and opposition to a given social movement, begs the question of which social or political groups are usually taken into consideration by pro-democracy activists. The governing elite, the military, the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the public are usually identified as political forces liable to influence democratization (O’Donnell et al., 1986). As Hong Kong is a British colony with a clearly demarcated civil– military relationship, the few troops stationed there have not figured as key players in contests over democratization. The colonial status of Hong Kong and its scheduled return to an anti-democratic China implied that democratization would be highly circumscribed by the external forces of Britain and China. In addition, we will examine how internal forces – the different classes, civil society, and political society, promoted or hindered the efforts of the pro-democracy movement. In short, the “positions on democratization” of these two external forces and two internal forces constituted the political opportunity structure for the pro-democracy alliance in Hong Kong. For this research, the concept can highlight how the political environment has favored and frustrated the emergence and activities of political opposition. In addition, as the political opportunity structure varies over time with modifications in strategies, resources, and mobilization of the political opposition and the antagonistic groups, the concept can well capture the dynamic and longitudinal nature of the political opposition (Tarrow, 1989: 23). In particular, according to the democratization and

The first pro-democratic alliance 67 social movement literature, “crisis” has been identified as contributing to the rise of social and political movements (McAdam, 1988: 129). It affects the political opportunity structure and thus the constraints on and opportunities for the emergence and growth of a social movement. Therefore, particular attention will be devoted to crises and the ensuing effects on political opportunity structure.3 The changing political opportunity structure engendered the emergence of a prototype pro-democracy alliance and communication network between 1984 and mid-1986. This created apprehension among some businessmen and prompted the birth of a conservative business alliance. The anti-democracy stance of the business alliance catalysed the formation of the pro-democracy movement alliance, whose leaders shared some basic cementing, political beliefs. The perceptions and calculations of the pro-democracy leaders, who tried to seize the changing political opportunity, were important reasons leading to the formation of Hong Kong’s most conspicuous pro-democracy alliance, the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government (JCPDG). In short, the formation of the movement was a calculated response to changing political opportunities for democratization, in an attempt to increase the pro-democracy activists’ bargaining power. The democratic alliance was the largest and leading pro-democracy alliance, with more than ninety-five organizations4 of various kinds (see Appendix 5) as constituent members, all campaigning for democracy in Hong Kong, 1986–90. As the JCPDG, i.e., the democratic alliance, organized the greatest number of pro-democracy social movement organizations, it became the most prominent target of attacks by anti-democracy forces. In 1990, most of the leaders of the democratic alliance joined in forming a pro-democracy political party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), which later coalesced into the Democratic Party, i.e., the pro-democracy flagship party in Hong Kong since 1994. The UDHK won a sweeping victory in the first direct elections to Hong Kong’s legislature in 1991. Thus, the leaders of the democratic alliance studied here are continuing to take the lead in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. Given the crucial part played by the democratic alliance, explanation is sought for its coming into existence in November 1986. Before discussing the crisis and changing political opportunities between 1982 and 1986, we need to know China’s interests and calculations when it decided to take back Hong Kong.

China’s interests and calculations (1979–84): achieve modernization and national reunification Hong Kong’s value for China’s modernization When Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the PRC in 1978, he designated modernization and national reunification as two of the three pivotal

68


goals for China in the 1980s (Deng, 1984). Hong Kong could be of great service to the modernization of China for the following reasons. First, economic efficiency, geographical proximity, and cultural similarity made Hong Kong appear an ideal gateway through which China could contact, trade with, and learn from the rest of the world. In this respect, Hong Kong was unsurpassed by any other Chinese city.5 In the late 1970s, Hong Kong became the fourth largest financial center in the world, and the largest financial metropolis in Asia. It could provide China with a wide array of financial, legal, accounting, and other professional services (Jacobs, 1986: 72).6 Second, with the availability of sophisticated financial, transportation, and communication services, trade between Hong Kong and China increased dramatically after China adopted an “open door” policy in 1979. The value of total exports from Hong Kong to China increased fivefold between 1979 and 1981, while the value of imports from China to Hong Kong nearly doubled (Chen and Chin, 1984: 89). Comparative economic advantages on both sides have further boosted the trading relationship.7 Third, with a growing trade surplus, remittances, tourism (Lau, 1986: 261), and investment profits, China has earned an increasing amount of foreign exchange from Hong Kong. This could meet its pressing need for international currency for trade with the West. In 1984, Hong Kong was already estimated to contribute over one-third of China’s total foreign exchange (Johnson, 1984: 887–909).8 Fourth, Hong Kong’s use of workers in Canton and other Southern provinces has dramatically increased since the early 1980s. By 1988, Hong Kong business owned 10,000 factories employing over 1 million workers in Southern China (Ledic, 1989: 161–2; Vogel, 1989). National reunification As well as modernization, Deng put the interests of national reunification at least on a par with the short-term economic and other pragmatic advantages that Hong Kong could bring to China. There are two main reasons for this. First, re-unifying the nation and upholding sovereignty have been key goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for ideological, cultural, and historical reasons. The importance that the Chinese attach to national unity, pride, and patriotism, placed an enormous constraint on Chinese leaders’ pragmatism (Johnson, 1984: 904; Pye, 1983: 464–5).9 Second, it would be to the great glory of Deng and his colleagues if they could lay at least the groundwork of reunification not just with Hong Kong, but with Taiwan and Macao too. Deng openly admitted that by regaining Hong Kong and preserving its prosperity, stability, institutions, and lifestyle, he hoped to tempt Taiwan into becoming part of the PRC as well. To sum up, Deng sought to regain Hong Kong’s sovereignty and

The first pro-democratic alliance 69 achieve national reunification even at the sacrifice of Hong Kong’s shortrun economic benefits for China. Yet, in order to maintain Hong Kong’s pragmatic value to China’s modernization, in the longer run, the PRC offered the package of “One Country, Two Systems” that promised that most of Hong Kong institutions and life-styles would remain unchanged. China hoped that this big “concession” would win the trust and confidence of both Hong Kong and the international community. End of uncertainty over Hong Kong’s future by the joint declaration (1984) The approaching expiry of the lease of the New Territories, and signs of hesitancy to invest in the business community, pressurized the British and Chinese Governments to engage in talks on Hong Kong’s future between 1982 and 1984. The talks can be divided into three stages (Johnson, 1984; Scott, 1989: 337–42). The final stage of the talks took place between October/November 1983 and September 1984, and ended with the British Government agreeing to relinquish administration of Hong Kong in 1997. Details of pre- and post-1997 arrangements were set out in a draft SinoBritish Agreement on September 26, 1984. It stated that the sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong would revert to China on July 1, 1997. From then on, under the precept of “One Country, Two Systems,” Hong Kong would become a highly autonomous Special Administrative Region vested with its own executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, except for foreign affairs and defense. The laws currently in force would in general remain valid after 1997. The capitalist economic system and lifestyle, as well as freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, and of movement would remain unchanged.10 This section has shown that China had dual interests in respect of Hong Kong: recovering Hong Kong’s de facto sovereignty as a step towards national reunification and maintaining Hong Kong’s pragmatic value for China’s modernization. To realize those dual interests, it promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy under the precept of “One Country, Two Systems.” Any demand for Hong Kong’s independence was ruled out by China (Cheng, 1986a: 8–9). Despite the eventual agreement, the tortuous Sino-British negotiations and the prospect of reverting to Communist China triggered off a “crisis” for the people of Hong Kong between 1982 and 1984, which created opportunities for bottom-up democratization later. Shifting cleavage from redistribution to building a representative government In the early 1980s, the serious political crisis over Hong Kong’s future began to take shape. It sparked hopes and fears, and forged a new political

70


cleavage in Hong Kong revolving around the pace and extent of setting up a representative government. It also activated the civil society, cemented the various movement groups together into an alliance to campaign for “democratization.”

The formation of the pro-democracy movement: a processual analysis Crisis: external threat The possible reversion of Hong Kong to China produced a crisis. The crisis was an initial factor in the process leading to the formation of the democratic alliance. It first contributed to the drafting of a Joint Declaration, that promised a “high degree of autonomy” and an “elected legislature” for the future. In a representative survey of Hong Kong’s citizens conducted in 1982, 86 percent preferred to live in Hong Kong, while only 2 percent preferred to live in China (Cheng, 1984: 87). Among those who preferred to live in Hong Kong, the three most important grounds for preference were: “used to Hong Kong’s life-style” (39 percent), “Hong Kong has freer life” (36 percent), and “Hong Kong has higher standard of living” (13 percent). When asked what they disliked about living in China, lack of freedom (22 percent), low standards of living (13 percent), and “not enough food for everyone” (12 percent) were the most important reasons given. In another scientific general survey undertaken in May–June 1982, 22 percent of respondents said that they would “try every means to leave” if Hong Kong were returned to China (Emmons, 1985: 53–72). These answers suggested the existence of a pervasive specter among Hong Kong citizens of having their cherished freedom, prosperity, and life-style undermined after the reversion of sovereignty. The potential Chinese take-over clearly posed a crisis for Hong Kong. Chinese leaders’ awareness that their demands had engendered a potentially damaging crisis led them to adopt certain policies regarding democratization in Hong Kong. These shaped the second explanatory factor, the “political opportunity structure” in Hong Kong. The changing political opportunity structure: external and internal forces on Hong Kong’s democratization The pro-democracy reformers did not make their plans entirely without regard to other political forces. Chapter 2 argues that “political opportunity structure” shaped the emergence and strategies of social movements. The distribution of support and opposition to the political aims of a given social movement was the most important ingredient of political oppor-

The first pro-democratic alliance 71 tunity structure (Brockett, 1991; Eisinger, 1973; McAdam, 1982, 1988; Tarrow, 1989). We need to identify the positions of various forces on democracy, in order to explain the formation of the pro-democracy opposition (Stepan, 1990: 42). The following four other political forces merit close inspection. External forces are: 1 2

the Chinese Government – the sovereign power from July 1, 1997; the British Government – the sovereign power until July 1, 1997.

The internal forces are: 1 2

conservative business elites – an important anti-democracy force; the general public – a mobilizable political force.

To allay the fear of the Hong Kong citizens, besides offering the promise of “One Country, Two Systems,” China also endorsed the following three main provisions contained in the Sino-British Agreement.11 Those provisions apparently indicated the CCP’s position on Hong Kong’s post-1997 political institutions: iii The chief executive shall be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. iii The legislature shall be constituted by elections. iii The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature. The precise meaning of such terms as “election” and “accountability” later became the focus of struggle between different political forces. Yet, in 1984, when the agreement was signed, given China’s repeated assurances that it would allow Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, these provisions created an impression, at least among many Hong Kong citizens, of a regime-led democratization. The Deputy Director of China’s de facto embassy in Hong Kong, Li Chuwen, encouraged this view when he was interviewed by Newsweek on January 23, 1984: Question: Peking says it will allow Hong Kong’s people to rule Hong Kong. What does that mean? Answer: The demand of democracy on the part of Hong Kong’s people is fully justified and should win the sympathy of all those with democratic aspirations – including the Chinese. If Hong Kong prefers direct elections to determine its officials, then it should strive for that, and it will have the support of the Chinese people. (Cheng, 1984: 72)

72


In reality, the PRC opposed fast and full democratization in Hong Kong as it opposed democratization anywhere in China.

Interests and calculations of the PRC: against rapid and full democratization in Hong Kong A fully and rapidly democratized Hong Kong, timed to become a subpolity of China, could let Hong Kong slip from of the Chinese Communist Party’s control and, even worse, rekindle mainland Chinese pursuit of democracy. Already in the early 1980s, some hard-liners warned of the “Hongkongization” of China’s culture, with growing individualism, consumerism, and respect for human rights (Harding, 1987: 82; Vogel, 1989). Therefore, as the Chinese Government wanted to use Hong Kong’s return to enhance national reunification and China’s modernization, it had to preclude a fully democratic Hong Kong from being rapidly installed. Also, in a democratic system with an independent judiciary and free elections, China would find it much harder to contain anti-Communist forces in Hong Kong. Pro-Taiwan forces and liberal pressure group leaders who advocated democratization in both Hong Kong and China were regarded as probable “anti-Communists.” Third, after 1997, the mainland Chinese would treat the Hong Kong Chinese more as “insiders” than “outsiders.” Invidious distinctions would be made between prosperous and freer Hong Kong and the wretched and unfree mainland China. This would increase discontent. A fully democratic Hong Kong that guaranteed human rights and checks-and-balances would very likely “dangerously” inflame demands for Western democracy in China. Summing up, three primary interests of China with regard to Hong Kong have so far been revealed: first, maintain Hong Kong’s pragmatic value; second, achieve national unity, and use Hong Kong to lure Taiwan into unity; third, preclude Hong Kong from having rapid and full democracy that might undermine the CCP’s hegemony in China. To realize its first and second interests, i.e., to achieve national reunification and maintain Hong Kong’s pragmatic value, China needed to engineer its obstruction of democratization in Hong Kong as inconspicuously as possible. Strategies against Hong Kong’s democratization After the signing of the Sino-British Agreement in September 1984, China’s resistance to the democratization of Hong Kong became gradually more apparent, as exemplified by its adoption of the following strategies between 1984 and November 1986.

The first pro-democratic alliance 73 Strategy I: Give China’s own interpretation to key concepts in the Joint Declaration The Sino-British Agreement stipulated: The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government . . . The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.12 (emphasis added) On the surface, the Joint Declaration seemed to suggest Western democracy for Hong Kong’s future political structure. However, China’s representatives stressed that “election” meant indirect election, instead of direct election with universal suffrage, and interpreted the “accountability” of the executive to the legislature merely as the former “informing, explaining and consulting” the latter.13 Indirect election meant a reduction of popular control over the legislature. Furthermore, as the executive monopolized policy-making, and could be produced by mere “consultation” instead of by popular election, “accountability” would mean that the executive would have superior power. In effect, the executive would be appointed and controlled by the Chinese Government.

Strategy II: Seize the initiative over political reform – demand convergence with the Basic Law The Sino-British Agreement stipulated that China would be responsible for working out the mini-constitution, called the Basic Law, that would govern post-1997 Hong Kong. As the Basic Law was scheduled to be promulgated in 1990, the British and Hong Kong Governments could only take the initiative over democratization by announcing their blueprints before then, if a stark clash with China was to be avoided. China repeatedly warned the British and Hong Kong Governments that no fundamental political reform would be undertaken before 1990,14 and threatened “dire” consequences if the Hong Kong Government’s introduced reforms did not conform to the Basic Law.15 China also engineered appointments to the Basic Law Drafting and Consultative Bodies. An overwhelming number of conservative capitalists, businessmen, and professionals were appointed to tip the balance against rapid and full democratization (see Table 9.4).

74


Strategy III: Warn against setting up political parties China’s representatives repeatedly argued that forming political parties would undermine Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. In addition, they raised the threat that Communist Party members stationed in Hong Kong might be forced to operate openly if other political parties were formed.16 Strategy IV: Exploit divisions of opinion among leaders to slow down democratization The Basic Law Drafting and Consultative Committees were deliberately structured by China to include elites with radically different attitudes towards democratization. Hence, China could always refer to the purported cleavages in “public opinion,” and opt for slower and lesser democratization. In the face of Chinese opposition, how did the other major external power, Britain, react?

Position of the British and Hong Kong Government Two fundamental interests As Hong Kong would be decolonized without independence, and revert to a huge socialist regime, the British Government was under pressure to indemnify itself against attack by opposition parties at home and against international condemnation. The condemnation could be especially great, given that over 3 million British Dependent Territories passport holders in Hong Kong were not allowed the right of abode in Britain, when they were consigned to a new sovereign, communist power without their consent. Britain’s foremost interest was to leave the colony as gracefully as possible. This meant securing China’s cooperation during the run-up to 1997 in order to guarantee British administration over Hong Kong up to then. It also implied maintaining the continuity of Hong Kong’s prosperity, stability, and basic free life-style. Second, democratization of Hong Kong could make the British public and international community feel that Hong Kong would be better protected from future adverse interference from China. However, neither foreign countries nor the British public would praise the British Government if democratization in Hong Kong caused the colony grave instability and economic crisis. Hence, the British Government would only push for democratization while it presented no real threat to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. To avert the above threats to Hong Kong’s economy and stability, the Hong Kong Government took a cautious and incremental “testing” approach. Reform had to be gradual to prevent conflict with China. Being

The first pro-democratic alliance 75 cautious and risk-averse did not mean surrendering the initiative over political reform. Britain produced a consultative Green Paper on democratization in July 1984, two months before the announcement of the Joint Declaration.17 The major objective stated in the Green Paper was: to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong.18 The Green Paper suggested the introduction of the indirect elections to the Legislative Council. A substantial number of Unofficial members were to be indirectly elected (a) by an electoral college composed of all members of the Urban Council, the New Regional Council, and the District Boards;19 and (b) by specified functional constituencies.20 The composition of the Legislative Council in 1985 and 1988 proposed in the Green Paper was as shown in Table 4.1.21 Changes were also suggested in the more high-powered policy-making body, i.e., the Executive Council. To promote better links between the legislature and the Executive Council, an increasing number of Unofficial members of the Executive Council were to be elected by the Unofficial members of the Legislative Council. The proposed change in its future composition was as shown in Table 4.2. Finally, the Green Paper also proposed that some changes in both the

Table 4.1 1984 Green Paper proposals for Legislative Council composition 1985

1988

(a) Elected by electoral college (b) Elected by functional constituencies (c) Appointed by the Governor (d) Official members

6 6 23 13

12 12 16 10

Total

48

50

Source: Green Paper (1984) (Chinese version).

Table 4.2 Political reform proposed in Green Paper, 1984 1984

1988

1991

Elected by Legislative Council Appointed by Governor Ex-officio officials

0 12 4

4 8 4

8 2 4

Total

16

16

14

Source: Green Paper (1984) (Chinese version).

76


selection and the power of the Governor should be considered, after the reforms of the two councils were fully implemented. The Governor might be selected by an electoral college consisting of all the Unofficial members of the two councils after consultation. The power of the Governor to reject the views of the Executive Council and to determine its agenda might be rescinded.22 Why had the proposed reforms fallen short of the Westminster model commonly found during British decolonization? The Green Paper and senior officials explained the constraints that prevented the government from presenting a bolder vision of democracy. First and foremost, there was the need to avoid provoking Chinese opposition. Second, direct election of legislators in 1985 was rejected partly because of a purported lack of acceptance by the general public, and partly because of worries that it could trigger adversarial politics that would injure prosperity and stability. Third, the ministerial system, whereby elected Unofficials would take over policy-making, was unacceptable to some civil servants,23 and thus not recommended for implementation in 1985. Finally, the government stressed the continuing need to solicit the opinions of representatives in various functional sectors and districts, to obtain consensus and to take proper account of the interests of elites in the business, financial, and other professional sectors deemed crucial to Hong Kong’s prosperity. Consequently, the “indirect election” of legislators through functional constituencies and regional councils was proposed.24 As the Hong Kong Government did not rule out having at least some Legislative Councilors directly elected in future, the proposed changes, if fully implemented, would at least erect a quasi-Westminster system on or before the Chinese take-over. Nevertheless, as the Green Paper was condemned by China,25 the Hong Kong and British Governments reduced the scale of reform, as became clear in the subsequent White Paper published in November 1984 – an official document that expounded the government’s actual policy. The finalized major changes in Hong Kong’s political structure lie only in the introduction of twenty-four indirectly elected legislators, which doubled the number proposed in the Green Paper, see Table 4.3. The White Paper indicated that some of the major power changes suggested in the Green Paper were to be shelved. Changes in the composition Table 4.3 1984 White Paper on political reform – proposed legislature in 1985 (a) Elected by Electoral College (b) Elected by Functional Constituencies (c) Appointed by the Governor (d) Official members

12 12 22 10

Total

56

Source: White Paper (1984).

The first pro-democratic alliance 77 and power of the Executive Council, and the ministerial system, were the subjects only of vague promises to be addressed in future. Nor was there any further concrete discussion about the position of the Governor. On the contrary, the White Paper stressed overtly the imperative to heed Beijing’s views on the issue: Since the Green Paper was published the Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong has been initialled in Peking. Any proposals for change in the position and role of the Governor will need to take into account the provisions of the Joint Declaration and these important issues will be considered at a later stage.26 Nevertheless, in the White Paper, the government generally endorsed a legislature with limited direct election in 1988: there was little evidence of support in public comment on the Green Paper for any move towards direct elections in 1985. With few exceptions the bulk of public response from all sources suggested a cautious approach with a gradual start by introducing a very small number of directly elected members in 1988 and building up to a significant number of directly elected members by 1997. Proposals that the Legislative Council’s Unofficial members should all be returned by direct elections were in the minority. There was considerable general public concern that too rapid progress towards direct elections could place the future stability and prosperity of Hong Kong in jeopardy.27 Though the Hong Kong Government did persist with plans for direct election and an elected Executive Council in early 1985, i.e., after the publication of the White Paper,28 such persistence began to dissipate in late 1985, when the de facto Chinese Ambassador in Hong Kong ferociously accused the British Government of being in breach of the Joint Declaration and hinted at dire consequences in future. This alarmed the Hong Kong citizens, and the stock and share index plunged sharply. Soon after this, the British Government made more obvious concessions. In breach of the Joint Declaration, China was allowed to discuss the political reforms in the Joint Liaison Group and the Hong Kong Government declared that it would not consider the role or mode of election of future Executive Councilors and the Governor (Lau, 1987: 25). Also, both the Governor and the British Government emphasized the imperative to maintain a smooth transfer of power. This implied a more conciliatory stand towards China’s calls for convergence to the Basic Law. Britain adopted a low-risk, nonconfrontational approach to democratize Hong Kong, in a way that China could accept, in order to ensure both China’s cooperation during the transitional period, and Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity. They regarded “public opinion” as only a “reference” in their decision on political

78


reforms, rather than as an important basis of political reform. In January 1986, Timothy Kenton, the Minister of State with special responsibility for Hong Kong, returned from Beijing, denying any moral commitment to the introduction of the Westminster system in Hong Kong (Scott, 1989: 287). It was clear that Britain had begun to drastically moderate its plan for Hong Kong’s democratization under Chinese pressure. Next, attention is turned to two domestic forces, namely, the bourgeoisie and the general public.

The emergence of the influential Business and Professional Group (BPG) China was not alone in opposing Hong Kong’s rapid and full democratization. The conservative Business and Professional Group (BPG) was composed of fifty-seven conservative businessmen and professionals, and formed in October 1986. They belonged to the Basic Law Consultative Committee and opposed democratization. After signing the Joint Declaration in October 1984, the Chinese Government was to construct the Basic Law as the constitution for post1997 Hong Kong. China set up the Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) in 1985, and appointed 160 members, mainly local notables and businessmen, as a body to consult and reflect the public wishes of Hong Kong. The potential power of the BPG was shown by its rapid expansion into a group with eighty-nine members in the BLCC, i.e., over half the total seats. The BPG warned the public of the dangers of full democratization and approved direct election of only 25 percent of the seats in the legislature in 1997. It advocated an elitist political design using indirect election and functional constituencies to elect another 75 percent of the seats, as a way to safeguard the predominant roles of businessmen and professionals in the future political structure. As will be shown later, the formation of the BPG accelerated the formation of the democratic alliance.

Position of the general public A general representative survey taken in the summer of 1986, immediately before the formation of the democratic alliance, revealed that the public tendered moderately strong, though qualified support for the then political system. They were not only divided on the merits of an elected government, but also extremely wary of the pace of any democratic reform. To conclude this section, the political positions regarding democracy of the four political forces in 1986 are shown in Table 4.4. It has been stated that the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty posed a crisis for the people of Hong Kong. It put civil liberties, prosperity, and stability at risk. In response, China had promised to give Hong Kong a

The first pro-democratic alliance 79 Table 4.4 The political opportunity structure in mid-1986 Actors

Positions on democratization

PRC

Against Westminster model, formation of political parties, and legislature-led political structure Demand that British political reform measures converge to the Basic Law; Stress “gradual” political reform

UK/HK Government

Stress democratization in the beginning, but retract ambitious promises in face of Chinese pressure

Conservative businessmen and professionals

Approve direct election of 25 percent of the legislature in 1997; Political design was elitist: use indirect election and functional constituencies to enhance businessmen’s and professionals’ interests

Public

Feeble support for a quicker pace of direct election

high degree of autonomy, and stipulated in the Joint Declaration that the future legislature of Hong Kong would be “elected.” This aspect of the transition to 1997 implied a need to modernize the political structure of the colony, and created an opportunity to democratize Hong Kong. The prospect of a top-down, regime-led democratization was enhanced by the reform measures of the British and Hong Kong Governments, when they introduced indirect election into the legislature in 1985, and recommended direct election of legislators as feasible in 1988. Now, the political opportunity structure for democratization in mid-1986 has been clarified. How did the pro-democracy activists respond? To avert the above threats to Hong Kong’s economy and stability, the British and Hong Kong Governments took a cautious and incremental “testing” approach. The Hong Kong Government did persist with plans for indirect election into the legislature in 1985, and recommended in that year that direct election of legislators would be feasible in 1988. There were thus increased political opportunities for bottom-up democratization, 1984–5. Capturing the opportunity of an apparently “top-down” democratization, ninety-five member organizations (Appendix 5) consisting of three quasi-parties,29 dozens of social movement organizations in educational, religious, social welfare, housing and labor sectors, and some district bodies coalesced into a pro-democracy alliance in late 1986 (JCPDG), (see Table 4.5). The alliance championed a colony-wide democratic movement to promote democratization. Those activists shared the common goal of initiating and attaining a bottom-up democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 9–10) through a pro-democracy social movement. Therefore, various prodemocracy social movement organizations finally agreed to form the prodemocracy alliance, while maintaining their original organizations intact.

80


Table 4.5 Nature of member organizations of the JCPDG Nature of member organizations Educational bodies Labor organizations Student bodies Social services Community organizations Political groups Religious bodies Total

(%) 4.2 7.3 7.3 4.3 58.9 11.6 4.2 100

Source: Minutes of the JCPDG collected by the author.

As will be seen in the next section, the existence of pre-existing networks and common beliefs among pro-democracy leaders and organizations, coupled with some catalysing events, were reinforcing factors in the process of formation of the democratic alliance.

Initial response of pro-democracy activists to changing political opportunity 1984–mid-1986: forming a prototype alliance and a communication network The democratic alliance mainly consisted of some major pressure groups and three quasi-parties, i.e., Meeting Point, the Hong Kong Affairs Society, as well as the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (HKADPL). They had cooperated previously for political reform and social justice in the 1980s. Cooperation for political reform In Chapter 3, it was seen that “pressure groups” in Hong Kong cooperated over many issues to cater for the interests of the lower and middle classes. Changes in Hong Kong’s political opportunity structure since the early 1980s invited corresponding changes in the arena of cooperation between pro-democracy pressure groups. Their mutual support transcended mere ad hoc alliances. The perceived expanded opportunity for democratization disposed some pressure group leaders to shift their concern from social policies to political reforms. The Green Paper issued by the Hong Kong Government in 1984, and the Sino-British Agreement, both seemingly held out the promise of opening up the political structure in Hong Kong. Some pressure group leaders became the core leaders that formed the three quasi-parties. Also, when the Hong Kong Government invited opinions on its Green Paper of 1984, various pressure groups and quasi-parties demanded a much faster timetable of democratization than the one suggested in the Green Paper (see Table 4.6). It should be noted that the

The first pro-democratic alliance 81 Table 4.6 Suggested timetable of democratization by core members of the democratic alliance in response to the Green Paper in 1984 Name

Suggested democratization Other suggestions on in 1988 democratization

Hong Kong Christian Industrial Council (HKCIC)

N.A.

Leg and DR: 100% before 1997

Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (HKPTU)

Leg and DR increase from 1988 to 1994 – replace all appointed and functional constituencies seats; has some policymaking power

Leg and DR: 100%

Hong Kong Federation of Students Union (HKFSU)

Leg and DR: 1/3 in 1986. Ex – elected from Leg

Leg and DR: at least 50% in 1990; at least 2/3 in 1993; Ex-ministerial system

Federation of Civil Service Unions (FCSU)

Leg and DR: 12 seats Ex – elected from Leg and evolve into ministerial system

Leg and DR: 50 in 1994; 60 in 1997 (assume 60 seats in total)

Hong Kong Christian Council (HKCC)

Leg and DR: 15 seats Ex – elected from Leg

Leg and DR: 100% in 1997; Ex – 100% elected from Leg

HK Social Work General Union (HKSWGU)

Leg and DR: 10; evolves into highest-power body

Leg and DR: 19 in 1991; 38 in 1994; 50 (100%) in 1997 Ex-elected by public when ripe

Meeting Point

Leg and DR: 20 seats and evolve gradually

Source: Adapted from Sing (2000); HKPTU News, Sept. 22, 1984; Wah Kiu Daily News, Sept. 4, 12, 1984; Aug. 13, 1984, p. 2; Wen Wei Po, July 14, 1984; Aug. 6, 1984; Sun Po, Sept. 22, 1984. Note Leg: Legislature; Ex: Chief Executive; DR: Direct Election; N.A.: Not available.

government suggested there should be forty-eight and fifty seats in the legislature in 1985 and 1988 respectively. The demands of various pressure groups, quasi-parties, and civic groups for a directly elected legislature culminated in a joint conference of over fifty organizations, and subsequently, the launching of a mass assembly in September 1984. Some eighty-nine civic groups, including a quasi-party, i.e., the Hong Kong Affairs Society, registered their support for a joint announcement. The announcement demanded that “no less than one-fifth of the seats in the legislature of 1988 be directly elected.” The legislature, they asserted, should be the body with the highest power in future. It was

82


their belief that only through direct election could the ideal of “Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong” be realized. A communication network was set up between these groups to facilitate the continuation of an ad hoc organization that arranged joint conferences on the political structures of Hong Kong between 1984 and 1986. Also, past cooperation and communication between different social movement organizations or individuals can have a filtering effect. Dissenting groups and individuals opt out during the process, leaving the like-minded to stick together more closely: In 1984, a group of democratic activists gathered together during the consultation period of political reform initiated by the Hong Kong Government. They launched the campaign for greater democratization in late 1984. After that, many organizations and individuals who discussed the political platforms since 1984 came together under an ad hoc organization for a series of forums exchanging views on Hong Kong’s future political structures. Having met for 3 to 4 times, they elected 4 representatives to the Basic Law Consultative Committee. Since they failed to hammer out a common model acceptable to all, it was finally dissolved. Yet, the similar dialogues among the likeminded democratic organizations and activists did not come to a halt. Such democratic organizations later formed the backbone and erected the democratic alliance (Interview, No. 11) Many democratic alliance’s members have been the constituent organizations of the alliance that launched the Daya Bay30 protest. The two alliances have similar resources base, organizations and leaders. The democratic alliance excluded some uncooperative organizations, as learned from the protests about Daya Bay. We did have a sense of mutual trust after one or many similar incidents of cooperation over various social and political issues. (Interview, No. 25)

Previous cooperation Since the 1970s, the afore-mentioned pressure groups have on many occasions cooperated in campaigns concerning social issues (see Table 4.7). Several inferences can be drawn from Table 4.7. First, there has been an increasing number of pressure groups cooperating on different issues. Second, as the quasi-parties did not emerge till 1983 and 1984, they were not involved in earlier campaigns. Third, Table 4.7 highlights that the groups involved shared three kinds of goals: (a) nationalist sentiments; (b) concern for the welfare of the lower and middle classes; and (c) emphasis on human rights. Nationalist sentiments were expressed by cultural identi-

The first pro-democratic alliance 83 Table 4.7 Past cooperation of democratic alliance members (1973–86) Campaign

Social movement organizations

1 Campaign for Chinese as an official language (early 1970s and 1980s)

HKPTU, HKFSU

2 Improve life of people living in sampans (1978–9)

HKFSU, HKSWGU, HKCIC, Society for Community Organization

3 Anti bus-fare rise campaign (1980–1)

HKPTU, FCSU, HKFSU, HKCIC, HKSWGU, HKCC

4 Against Japan’s revising its textbook about invading China in the Second World War

HKPTU, FCSU, HKFSU, HKCIC, HKSWGU

5 Campaign for curbing general rises in prices of public utilities (1983) on Public Housing Policy

HKPTU, FCSU, HKFSU, HKCIC, HKSWGU, HKCC, People’s Council

6 Power and Privilege Ordinance (1985)

Meeting Point, HK Affairs Society, HKPTU, FCSU, HKFSU, HKCIC, HKSWGU, HKCC

7 Shelve the construction of Daya Bay Nuclear Plant (1986)

HKPTU, FCSU, HKFSU, HKCIC, HKSWGU, People’s Council On Public Housing Policy, Meeting Point

Source: Interviews by author and documentary survey. Adapted from Sing (2000). Note For full names of the above social movement organizations, see Table 4.6.

fication with Chinese: the “Campaign for Chinese as an Official Language” reflected the desire of the pressure groups to uphold the dignity of being Chinese. The campaign accusing Japan of omitting its invasion of China from textbooks also testified to an emotional attachment to being Chinese. Also, the major beneficiaries of the third, fourth and fifth issues in Table 4.7 were the lower and middle classes. Such issues registered the pressure groups’ concerns for the welfare of that particular target group. The seventh issue was unique in two ways: as most of the Hong Kong people opposed China’s building a nuclear plant in Daya Bay very close to Hong Kong, the pressure groups and quasi-parties were fighting for the welfare of all classes. It also marked the first head-on conflict between Hong Kong’s liberal pressure groups and quasi-parties with China. The sixth issue concerned the pressure groups’ perceived indignation at the infringement of human rights following the expanded power and privileges of the legislature. In this section, it has been shown that most of the key leaders and organizations of the democratic alliance, which was formally established in October 1986, had cooperated since the 1970s. Their cooperation on various social and political issues signified their sharing similar goals of

84


striving to improve human rights, for democracy and the welfare of the lower and lower-middle classes. Such common goals formed the bond between them that enhanced their coalescence into the democratic alliance in 1986. Also, the ad hoc joint conference that organized the mass assembly for democracy in 1984 lasted from 1984 to 1986. It provided an institutional forum for sharing and probing the political stands of the various organizations, and thus constituted a communication network that facilitated the eventual formation of the democratic alliance in 1986. The obvious presence of the pro-democracy ad hoc joint conference threatened some anti-democracy bourgeoisie.

The presence of two reinforcing factors The preparatory steps towards forming a more organized pro-democracy alliance became known to some conservative businessmen and professionals in the Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) (Cheung et al., 1991: 113), who reacted by coalescing into a group of fifty-seven members, called the Business and Professional Group (BPG). The pro-democracy activists made them apprehensive about increasing instability and welfarism once full democracy was installed. They published their own conservative blueprint for democracy on August 21, 1986, suggesting that 25 percent of the legislature in 1997 be directly elected. The stance of the BPG forced the prototype alliance, formed by the democratic activists in 1984, to become more organized. In other words, the formation of the democratic alliance and the BPG were reinforcing each other in a spiral of mobilization and polarization (see Figure 4.1).31 During late 1986, the BPG was less equivocal than China in denouncing the installation of full democracy at a faster rate. It designed an elitist model of the political structure and embarked on publicity drives to legitimate their blueprint in the eyes of the public, so as to prompt the two governments to implement it. The emergence of an aggressive BPG and the publication of their conservative blueprint directly expedited the formation of the democratic alliance and affected the shape of its first constitutional blueprint. In short, mutually reinforcing feedback loops were formed between the alliance making of the pro-democracy activists and the conservative bourgeoisie. Another catalysing factor was the appointment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) by China to elaborate the mini-constitution for post-1997 Hong Kong. The Committee decided in July 1987 that only a few political models need be included for intensive discussion. In addition, the Hong Kong Government announced that it would publish a Green Paper in April or May 1987 to review the political structure. The White Paper which finalized arrangements, including the decision on whether direct election should be held in 1988, was to be

The first pro-democratic alliance 85 Democratic activists’ attempt to organize and to shape democratization (mid-1986)

Formation of BPG and release of their blueprint (Aug. 21, 1986)

Release of an initial platform by 19 pro-democracy Basic Law Consultative Committee members (Aug. 22, 1986)

Formation of the democratic alliance (Oct. 27, 1986) and mobilization for the Ko San Meeting (Nov. 2, 1986)

Press conference of BPG on the following day (Nov. 3, 1986)

Debates and mobilizations with inreasingly sharp-worded recriminations Note:

Time sequence

Figure 4.1 Spirals of mobilization and counter-mobilization between the democratic alliance and BPG. Source: Adapted from Sing (2000).

released in November 1987. Since the political reviews undertaken by the Hong Kong Government could constrain the development of the Basic Law, the pro-democracy activists only had a few months to influence the Green Paper and the BLDC’s selection of models for discussion. They had to compete against time in order to make their political influence felt (see Table 4.8).32 In this section, the presence of the BPG and the urgency of the situation have been shown to have speeded up the formation of the democratic alliance. Next, as found in the pro-democracy movement of Brazil (Alvarez, 1990), it will be seen how the sharing of political beliefs among the democratic alliance’s leaders constituted another important background factor in the formation of the pro-democracy alliance.

86


Table 4.8 Timing of significant events (1986–7) Year 1986 August 21 August 22 Between August 22 and October 27 October 27 November 29 1987 April–May July November

Event Formation of the 57 Conservative BLCC Alliance (BPG) and unveiling of their conservative platform 19 democrats in the BLCC unveiled their more democratic blueprint Organizing process for the new democratic alliance Formation of the democratic alliance Democratic alliance advertised the Old 190 Model1 Hong Kong Government released the Green Paper reviewing the political structure Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) selected political models for further discussion Hong Kong Government released the White Paper for reviewing the political structure

Note “190” was the number of organizations that publicly endorsed the first political platform proposed by the democratic alliance in October 1986. “Old” was added to “190” because in July 1989, the second platform was pronounced by the democratic alliance, called “New-190.”

Sharing of similar political beliefs If new members are to be co-opted successfully and swiftly into a social movement alliance, they should be like-minded people (Freeman, 1983b: 9–11). Unless core goals are shared, alliance creates internal conflicts, drains off resources and backfires (Klandermans, 1989: 301). In this study, I interviewed33 the core members of the democratic alliance, to ascertain their political beliefs on liberty, equality, democracy, and developmental priorities.34 It was found that the core members of the democratic alliance shared many political beliefs. While sharing convictions about political equality and freedom at an abstract level, they also agreed, faced with the PRC’s potential inroads, on the value of democracy as a means of maintaining human rights and ensuring a “high degree of autonomy” in Hong Kong. In addition, they agreed to use democracy to redistribute wealth moderately in favour of the lower class. Last but not least, they all accepted that Hong Kong had already possessed the necessary social conditions for developing stable democracy since the early 1980s, and that democratic development would square well with economic development. The core members’ common assent to these beliefs enhanced their coalescence in the democratic alliance and facilitated rapid decision-making. In short, according to the leaders’ answers in interviews, they took the Joint Declaration which clearly stipulated the elective element of the legis-

The first pro-democratic alliance 87 lature in 1997, and the political reform launched by the Hong Kong Government in 1984, as the precious opportunity to pressurize the two governments to democratize Hong Kong. Hence, they decided to shape the political opportunity structure by coalescing into an alliance, with the perceived opportunities for bottom-up democratization arising from the Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Government’s reforms. Against the backdrop of these perceptions, the organizing activities for building up the democratic alliance gathered pace. First, nineteen liberal BLCC members held a press conference to criticize the BPG’s model on August 22, 1986, and called for faster democratization. Second, some of the nineteen liberals put forward the idea of forming a democratic alliance composed of various pro-democracy organizations and individuals, and started some organizing work. Third, during the short period of erecting the democratic alliance, from August to October 27, 1986, different prodemocracy organizations and individuals hastily debated political blueprints and agreed on one (for its organizational structure, see Appendix 5). After its formation, what were the problems it faced?

Problems for the democracy movement (1984–6): rise of the conservative BPG and feeble public support Besides the China factor as a problem for the democratic movement, the local Business and Professional Group (BPG) and the public were also significant in limiting the influence of the democratic alliance. The emergence and arguments of the conservative Business and Professional Group (BPG) or the capitalists alliance The emergence of the Business and Professional Group (BPG) in August 1986, characterized by organized large capitalists in Hong Kong, marked the beginning of the internal, polarized conflict over democratization. Some of the BPG’s members were leading tycoons or representatives of big business interests in Hong Kong, and others occupied important positions in the four influential business chambers of Hong Kong. For instance, five members of the BPG were either directors or general managers of six companies, which were among the top ten in terms of their total share value in Hong Kong between 1984 and 1986.35 The Hong Kong bourgeoisie, in so far as it was organized and vocal, by and large acted as an internal constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization. Its attitude towards democracy, similar to other places, was determined by calculations about the chances of maintaining their business interests under democratic or non-democratic alternatives, which were conditioned by a contingent factor and some macro-structural factors in Hong Kong’s development. The bourgeoisie opposition to democratization between 1986 and April 1989 was caused by the following:

88


1

Long-term macro-features of Hong Kong’s development. These included low levels of social welfare, labor militancy, economic intervention by the government, and income tax and profit tax, which in general favored business interests. Two macro-structural factors of “power structure” and “class conflict”: in and before 1986, the predominant influence of business interests in Hong Kong’s two most powerful political institutions was ensured by the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure. There was a conflict of class interests between the prominent bourgeoisie and many pro-democracy social movement activists, who had advocated redistributing wealth in favor of the lower class to attain a more equitable society. Two contingent factors: the bourgeoisie feared that there would be increasingly destabilizing political conflicts between China and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy forces if democracy were installed fully and quickly.

2

3

Also, the opening-up of a potentially highly lucrative market in China since 1979 and the intensifying economic nexus between Hong Kong and China was most tempting to the pragmatic capitalists to make them fall in line with the anti-democratic stance of the Chinese Government. Thus, the organized bourgeoisie worried that their interests would suffer as a result of democratization. They had little confidence in their own ability to retain control, and were against the opposing group, i.e., the pro-democracy activists. Trusting neither the pro-democracy activists nor China, they feared rapid and full democratization, on the one hand, and direct Chinese control of Hong Kong’s political institutions, on the other. Therefore, the BPG endorsed a quasi-bureaucratic, authoritarian, political structure similar to the existing one. In effect, the bourgeoisie was allying itself with China to obstruct Hong Kong’s democratization. It should be noted that the “China factor” limited the demand of the bourgeoisie for democratization significantly in at least two aspects. First, China’s assertion of sovereignty over Hong Kong and ideological hostility towards Western democracy had disposed the British Government to maintain a non-democratic, quasi-bureaucratic, political structure. The easy access of the bourgeoisie to Hong Kon’s institutions, and their predominant influence there did not encourage them to support democracy. Second, the capitalists’ fear of intensifying conflicts between local prodemocracy groups and China in a more democratic polity of Hong Kong also diminished their support. Enjoying a strong position in the Basic Law Consultative Committee, the capitalists alliance became the most organized, vocal, and powerful internal opposition to faster and fuller democratization in Hong Kong. The capitalists alliance revealed its elitist model of political structure in August 1986, suggesting that only 25 percent of the seats in legislature be

The first pro-democratic alliance 89 directly elected, and that 50 percent of the seats be produced via more elitist electoral arrangements.36 Though it was suggested that 25 percent of seats in the legislature be directly elected, the conservatives proposed that candidates for direct election be nominated by members from the legislature, the Urban Councils, the Regional Councils, or District Boards. In addition, it recommended forming a powerful “Grand Electoral College,” in which business-related interests were to hold at least 40 percent of seats in the Grand Electoral College (Table 4.9). The body, as proposed, would not only elect 25 percent of legislators, but the Chief Executive as well. As the BPG suggested that the enormous power of the Chief Executive would remain largely unchanged, the Grand Electoral College was thus an elitist structure favouring the ultimate control of business interests over candidates for the high-powered Chief Executive. To raise its bargaining strength and attenuate that of the democratic alliance, the BPG launched publicity campaigns in the mass media to emphasize the “benefits” of its model, and warned the public of the “costs” of democratization (Table 4.10). Public ambivalence about democratization Another critical element in the political opportunity structure that limited the influence of the democratic alliance in the mid-1980s was the public attitude to democracy. For the pro-democracy activists, designing their democratic blueprints without heeding the public attitude was political suicide. A representative sample survey done in the summer of 1986 (Table 4.11) provided a well-timed portrayal of public perceptions. This Table 4.9 Composition of the Grand Electoral College Sectors Industrial community Professionals Commercial community Financial community Legislative Council Social, charitable and sports organizations Statutory bodies and permanent non-statutory bodies Urban Council, Regional Council and District Boards Civil service Labour Religious/educational community Total

No. 80 60 50 50 80 60 50 50 30 60 30 600

Source: The Business and Professional Group of Members of the Basic Law Consultative Committee (1987).

90


Table 4.10 BPG’s arguments on the costs and benefits of democratization Benefits of its conservative platform

Costs of democratization

1 Chief Executive (CE) elected by 600 strong grand electoral college, subjecting Hong Kong (HK) to less control from China.

Democratization triggers formation of political parties, adversarial politics and the open participation of the Chinese Communist Party in HK. The resulting instability and crumbling prosperity would invite China to take back HK’s autonomy.

2 Keeping HK’s prosperity is the only effective way to prompt China to grant autonomy to HK in future. This means keeping the existing executiveled political structure and vesting the policy-making power in politically neutral civil servants. Strict limits to be put on the power of the legislature to shape policies and check the Chief Executive.

Welfarism, that would destroy HK’s prosperity and stability, would be unleashed by “pro-democracy” demagogues. Democracy in HK would bring increasing personal salary tax and corporate profit tax. These taxes were far higher in democracies than in Hong Kong.

3 Indirect election saves time and cost. The elections of socio-economic elites would be conducive to prosperity.

Though democracy was idolized by democratic activists as entrenchment against Chinese interference, it could by no means save HK from interference, if China saw fit.

4 HK has enjoyed much liberty, dramatic economic growth and a rise in living standard without democracy or politics. It was essential to keep at bay the demagogues and mass politics that could arise under the guise of democracy. Source: Wen Wei Po, July 24, Aug. 25–6, Oct. 27, 29, 1986. Nov. 14, 17–18, 1986; Ming Pao Daily News, Dec. 8–10, 1986; Ming Pao Daily News, Nov. 6, 1986; Wen Wei Po, Oct. 29, 1986; Ming Pao Daily News, Nov. 25, Dec. 16, 1986; Pai Shing Semi-Monthly, 1986: 13–15, 18–19; Cheung et al. (1991: 113).

survey was conducted in the summer of 1986, i.e., just few months before the formation of the BPG and the democratic alliance. It could thus effectively reflect the public attitude towards the political system and reform before those two groups launched the mobilizations and counter-mobilizations. The survey was based upon interviews with twenty-six key members of the democratic alliance between 1989 and 1990. The public tendered generally strong, though not uncomplaining, support for the existing limited democracy. They were divided over elected government and extremely wary of “hasty” democratic reform (Table 4.11, Question 5). The answer to Question 1 distinctly revealed the obvious public acceptance of the then political system. As elaborated in Chapter 3, the quasi-

The first pro-democratic alliance 91 Table 4.11 Public perceptions of the current political system and democratic reform in 1986 Statement

Agree very much

Agree Disagree Disagree very much

1 Although the political system of Hong Kong is not perfect, it is the best we can have under existing circumstances.

2.6

71.7

16.6

0

2 I think the existing political system is good enough. If there is any problem, it is mainly because of the faults of some government officials.

1.3

51.0

31.4

0.7

15.6

3 Political leaders elected by the people will perform better than the incumbent Hong Kong Government officials.

3.4

45.6

24.0

0.5

26.5

4 The emergence of political parties will make the political system of Hong Kong better.

0.5

34.3

27.5

0.8

36.9

5 Whichever kind of 4.2 government is immaterial, provided a minimum standard of living can be safeguarded for myself.

56.6

31.2

2.6

5.5

6 It will be better for Hong Kong to be governed by a few capable men than to talk about political reform.

54.2

24.4

1.0

15.6

4.7

Don’t know/no answer 9.1

Source: Lau and Kuan, 1988: 74–6.

bureaucratic, authoritarian political system had been legitimated by its enhancement of prosperity, stability, and civil liberties in Hong Kong. The system became a limited democracy with the introduction of indirect elections into Hong Kong’s legislature in 1985. The then political system, a limited democracy, on the whole received strong support, as 71.7 percent of respondents agreed that the political system was the best under the existing circumstances (Question 1). Yet, a pent-up dissatisfaction with the system surfaced, as 32.1 percent of the public disagreed with the statement that only government officials were to blame for problems (Question 2). The answer to Question 3 confirmed what I suspected. As many as 45.6 percent of respondents thought that an elected government would outperform the incumbent one. A large sector of the public was thus seemingly in support of democratization, but nearly a quarter of people disagreed, and

92


another 26.5 percent offered no definite answer. The public was thus divided on the desirability of using direct elections to produce their political leaders. Greater misgivings about Western democracy were evident from the answers to Question 4. Though political parties were a cornerstone of Western democracy (Dahl, 1971), only one-third of respondents believed that political parties would improve Hong Kong’s political system. Given the public’s ambivalence and divided stance, how likely was it that they could be mobilized in support of faster democratization towards full democracy? As more than 80 percent of respondents agreed that political reform had to be “gradual,” widespread support for rapid democratization would be difficult to arouse. Moreover, the instrumental mentality and acceptance of “strong man” politics found in answers to Question 5 and 6 augured ill for the pro-democracy movement. Question 5 highlighted that over 60 percent of the public did not have any commitment to a specific type of political system. They cared more about preserving a minimum standard of living than about a certain political system. Whereas for Question 6, close to 60 percent of them stressed the “rule of person” rather than reforming the political system. Thus, the public’s ambivalence towards democracy and lack of ideological commitment to any political system indicated fragile support for the incipient democratic movement.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have shown how the ending of the Sino-British negotiations led to the UK-initiated top-down democratization efforts in 1984. However, the regime-led democratization started by the British Government began to be severely toned down, in face of the rising opposition from the Chinese Government. Though the Chinese Government began to feature as a mighty constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization, this chapter has revealed that it also unintentionally contributed positively to Hong Kong’s democratization by activating the formation of the largest pro-democracy alliance, the JCPDG in 1986. The significance of the democratic alliance could hardly be overestimated, given that it was the precedent of the largest pro-democracy party in Hong Kong formed in 1994, i.e., the Democratic Party. In addition, the chapter has underscored the presence of two domestic obstacles to the movement, i.e., the feeble public support for speedy transition towards full democracy and the coalescence of local capitalists into a high-profile anti-democracy alliance. I have explained the formation of the most significant pro-democracy social movement alliance, the democratic alliance, by focusing on shortterm political dynamics and process in Hong Kong between 1982 and 1986, in the context of two short-term macro-environmental factors, i.e., a crisis and a changing political opportunity structure. China’s scheduled recovery

The first pro-democratic alliance 93 of Hong Kong posed a crisis to the colony between 1982 and 1984. To maintain Hong Kong’s economic value for China, and to lure Taiwan into eventual reunification, China promised the Hong Kong people “One Country, Two Systems” and a high degree of autonomy after 1997. But, as Hong Kong increasingly demanded Western-style democracy, China was forced to face up to its contradictory interests by either imposing more blatant obstructions or giving more concessions. It was also these contradictions in its interests that allowed some limited room for Britain and local pro-democracy forces to maneuver. The room for maneuver was limited because China had unequivocally demonstrated its strong opposition to democracy through different strategies, including the co-option of local elites especially from Hong Kong’s business and professional sectors. The co-option could help legitimize the decisions maneuvered by the Chinese Government with the “divide-andrule” strategy. The installation of full democracy in Hong Kong by 1997 was considered unworkable by Britain because China could dismantle such a structure in 1997. Thus, China’s increasingly visible rejection of democracy forced the British Government to scale down its scheme for democratization. On the other hand, the formation of a local pro-democracy alliance, that had managed to exploit the expanding political opportunities unfolded in the crisis, highlighted the efforts to capture the limited room to maneuver for more democratization. The next chapter will highlight further the increasing vibrancy and significance of the society-led movement orchestrated by the democratic alliance between 1986 and 1989. Its significance was underscored by the fact that during this period, the topdown-led democratization initiated by the British Government continued to be severely toned down, when it was overwhelmed by pressure from the Chinese Government. It will also show how the vibrant movement managed to win some concessions from the Chinese Government on democratization, an important feature that has been ignored in the vast amount of existing empirical literature.

5

Growing vibrancy of society-led democratic reform Polarization, compromise and decisions over Hong Kong’s democratization (late 1986–90)

Political context and the two research problems After the formation of the democratic alliance and capitalist alliance in late 1986 came a phase of emerging political conflict and polarization between the democratic alliance, the capitalist alliance, and China. During this period, the drafting of Hong Kong’s post-1997 constitution, i.e., the Basic Law, continued. In addition, the British and Hong Kong Governments were considering whether some seats in the legislature should be directly elected in 1988. The contending forces engaged in serious political conflict when they tried to shape the post-handover constitution. Indeed, constitution making has been in many countries the major arena of political struggle during democratic transition (Bonime-Blanc, 1987). It reveals the stands of different forces on democratization, illuminates the major social and political cleavages, and reflects the relative power and strategies of contesting forces. China had the contradictory aims of, on the one hand, relying upon Hong Kong’s pragmatic benefits and luring Taiwan into reunification, and on the other, of thwarting demands for democratization. This chapter will show how the democracy movement, led by the democratic alliance, increased its mobilization strength and thus bargaining power between 1986 and 1989. The movement finally achieved some concessions from the Chinese Government on Hong Kong’s democratization. During the same period, the British Government, in the face of mounting pressures from the Chinese Government’, toned down its top-down efforts to democratize Hong Kong. The contribution of the society-led or bottom-up democratic movement shepherded by the democratic alliance thus became more prominent. That said, the minor scale of those concessions is explained by the absence of strong, unified, and sustained social support in Hong Kong. In particular, the stiff resistance to democracy by the organized capitalists, the fragile public support for the same cause, and the fragmented middle class attitude towards a more rapid democratization throughout most of the 1986 and 1989 period will be discussed to highlight the absence of societal support.

Growing society-led democratic reform 95 The last chapter has shown how various political forces began competing for power over democratization between late 1984 and mid-1986. The British and Hong Kong Governments had tried to seize the initiative by proposing the development of a more representative government. To reduce the power and bargaining strength of the British and Hong Kong Governments, China threatened to dismantle Hong Kong’s political institutions in 1997 if they were deemed to diverge from the Basic Law. By demanding the convergence of the Hong Kong Government’s political reforms to the Basic Law presided over by China, China could increase its leverage over pre-1997 democratization. Under unrelenting pressure from China, the British and Hong Kong Governments abandoned the idea of directly electing the Governor and the Executive Council, and stressed convergence. As well as international forces, to reiterate, the local Business and Professional Group (the capitalist alliance) and the public were also significant in limiting the influences of the democratic alliance. The emergence of the capitalist alliance marked the beginning of the internal, polarized conflict over democratization. Some of the capitalist alliance’s members were leading tycoons or representatives of big business interests in Hong Kong, and others occupied important positions in the four influential business chambers of Hong Kong. Also, the democratic alliance found less support from the public, given the public’s general endorsement of the quasibureaucratic, authoritarian, political system, ambivalence towards democracy, and lack of ideological commitment to any political system, including a democratic one. Given the above constraints, the democratic alliance put forward its first constitutional platform in November 1986, suggesting only that 50 percent of the seats in the legislature and the Chief Executive be directly elected in 1997. To keep the option of having its blueprint accepted by the Chinese Government and the capitalist alliance open, the democratic alliance had already moderated their first blueprint when designing it.1 Both the external and domestic obstacles to Hong Kong’s democratization and the mobilization of the democratic alliance would be vividly vindicated in the struggle to decide whether direct elections were to be held in 1988.

Increasing polarization: conflicts over the desirability of holding direct elections in 1988 The significance of holding direct elections in 1988 for political blueprints and reform After setting out the first platform in late 1986, the democratic alliance needed to increase its relative power and bargaining strength if that model was to be adopted. Its opponents set out to prevent its adoption, and a

96

Growing society-led democratic reform

contest for power between these forces emerged between 1987 and early 1988. The debate on whether some seats in the legislature should be directly elected in 1988 triggered popular mobilization for and against democratization. The pro-democracy democratic alliance, and the antidemocracy Chinese Government and the capitalist alliance, all drummed up public support to buttress and dispute the holding of direct elections. How was the issue of direct elections in 1988 related to the contests over political models for 1997? In 1984, the Hong Kong Government promised to review Hong Kong’s political structure and consider political reform in 1987. Its White Paper augured well for limited direct elections to the legislature in 1988.2 The political review launched by the Hong Kong Government in 1987 preceded publication of even the first draft of the Basic Law.3 Since Britain and China wished to achieve a smooth convergence between the political structures outlined in the political review and those in the Basic Law, the British Government could influence Hong Kong’s pre- and post-1997 political structures by introducing a partially directly elected legislature in 1988. However, given China’s threats to dismantle “overly” democratic political structures in 1997, any imposition by Britain of rapid democratization, including direct elections in 1988, might backfire. As a way out, Britain emphasized that public opinion would weigh heavily in its decision. In this context, the democratic alliance worked to mobilize public support to press for direct elections in 1988 on several grounds. First, the suggestion of “convergence” meant that the result of the Hong Kong Government’s political review in 1987 could limit the political structure for years to come. Hence, the democratic alliance sought public support for direct elections by pushing for democratic reform. Once the first draft of the Basic Law was announced in 1988, China could exercise more control over Hong Kong’s future political structure. Second, given its proposal to have 50 percent of the legislators directly elected by 1997, the democratic alliance could smooth the democratic transition from the late 1980s to 1997 by demanding that 25 percent of legislators be directly elected in 1988. Third, the democratic alliance’s highly visible mobilization for direct elections in 1988 could show its genuineness about the democratic model to its opponents. It could galvanize opponents into treating the model as its authentic baseline. Vibrant and interactive competition for public support Given the implications of direct elections in 1988, winning public backing was crucial in order to gain the upper hand in bargaining over democratization. The more the democratic alliance could marshal public support, including the middle class, for democratizing Hong Kong, and the more they could assure China about the innocuous nature of Hong Kong’s

Growing society-led democratic reform 97 democratization regarding the hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party, the greater would be the bargaining power of the democratic alliance vis-à-vis China. To counter the democratic alliance, the capitalist alliance and China had to discredit the value of democratization. As a result, between 1986 and 1990, the democratic alliance figured as a “social movement alliance” (SMI), mobilizing public support for faster democratization, whereas the capitalist alliance and China acted as “counter-social movement groups” (CSM) (Zald and Useem, 1987: 247–72), launching counter-mobilizations to stall speedy and full democratization. Following is an exposition of the strategic interactions, mobilizations, and countermobilizations of those competing blocs. The Chinese Government’s interests, calculations and strategies For most of 1987, senior Chinese officials continually and publicly censured holding direct elections for even a small number of seats in the legislature.4 The Secretary-General of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, a Chinese official, stressed China’s preference for direct elections in 1991, rather than 1988, because views on the issue were divided. Another justification China cited was that the first draft of the Basic Law would be announced a few months after the Hong Kong Government’s political review. Should the Hong Kong Government approve direct elections in 1988, and the Basic Law Drafting Committee oppose them, the political structure of Hong Kong would risk being dismantled by China after its resumption of sovereignty. In other words, China capitalized on the need for smooth convergence between the Basic Law and the political review to emasculate the Hong Kong Government’s leverage over democratization. China was anxious that the holding of direct elections in 1988 might open the floodgate to greater pressure for faster democratization in 1997. When the leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, met the Basic Law Drafting Committee in 1987, he emphasized his worries about Hong Kong’s democratization. He stressed that China’s fundamental interest was to remain a socialist state. Therefore, China would not allow any activities, which, under the guise of democracy, would turn Hong Kong into a base for opposing China or transforming it into a Western democracy after 1997. At the same time, he vowed that those who managed Hong Kong in future would “love Hong Kong and China.” As people enjoying universal suffrage might not meet this criterion, he thereby cast further doubt on direct elections in Hong Kong.5 Deng stressed again the passionate wish of the “entire nation” that the Basic Law would prove to be an enticing model to Taiwan and Macau in achieving complete national reunification. Putting Deng’s words into context reveals the deeper meaning of his speech. During late 1986 and early 1987, student protests in Shanghai and other Chinese cities had provoked an “anti-bourgeois liberalization” backlash from the Communist Party (Nathan, 1990). Deng showed his

98


determination to quash liberalization movements. Two mainstays of the democratic alliance, namely Meeting Point and the HKADPL, reacted by openly calling for civil liberties and democratization in China, these being stated goals of their founding constitutions. To prevent subversive effects on its foremost interest – the hegemony of the Communist Party – China had to wield greater control over Hong Kong and rule out full democratization. To reconcile this with its interest in attracting Taiwan and maintaining investors’ confidence, China needed to persuade the elites and public in Hong Kong to accept a less democratic arrangement. As the existing executive-led political structure was more amenable to China’s remote control, and its successful efficiency had the support of the business sector, China wanted as little change as possible in Hong Kong. It tried to sway public opinion and use divided public opinion as the justification for slow political change between 1986 and 1997. Consequently, large-scale mobilization by pro-China organizations against direct elections in 1988 was witnessed. Based upon the survey report of the governmental office in charge of gauging the public opinions on the controversy,6 the business corporations and pro-China labor unions were most active in opposing direct elections being held in 1988. In 1987, the largest trade union in Hong Kong, the ProChina Hong Kong Federation of Trades Union had seventy-eight constituent unions with 168,550 members (Wong, 1989: 15). At least sixty-six of them opposed direct elections being held in 1988.7 In general, they toed the line of the Chinese Government by supporting the convergence of the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Government’s political reforms (Ta Kung Pao, June 22, 1987). Similarly, 10,000 staff of the Bank of China were pressurized into signing forms opposing direct elections and told to submit them to the personnel department (SCMP, September 7, 16, 1987). In addition, China also mobilized some traditional pro-China secondary schools, kinship associations, kai-fong associations, and women’s clubs to object to the holding of direct elections in 1988. It also attempted to divide Hong Kong’s Christian community in their support for direct elections (Wong, 1989: 16–18). The Business and Professional Group’s strategies, interests and calculations against the implementation of direct elections in 1988 China’s opposition to direct elections in 1988 was loudly echoed by the Business and Professional Group. Its interests, calculations, and representativeness are examined here. Four types of strategies were adopted by the capitalist alliance: 1

Coalition building: The fifty-seven conservatives within the Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) expanded their influence by recruiting thirty-two more BLCC members. As eighty-nine was over half the

Growing society-led democratic reform 99

2

3

4

total membership of the BLCC, the capitalist alliance could veto by a simple majority any motion raised in the BLCC. Persuading the public: The capitalist alliance, like the Chinese Government, tried to legitimize an elitist political system to counteract the power of the democratic alliance. It appealed to the public by claiming that the implementation of direct elections in 1988 would impair the continued enjoyment of three enshrined values of Hong Kong, namely, prosperity, stability, and civil liberties. They pointed out the lack of civic education, participant culture, and good political leadership and suggested that democracy be developed gradually in the fifty years after 1997, although they agreed on having 25 percent of the legislature directly elected in 1997. In addition, they argued that while the Basic Law had not yet defined the jurisdiction of the legislature, direct elections in 1988 would spell political chaos.8 Moreover, they alleged that the introduction of direct elections in 1988 could result in adversarial politics and threaten prosperity. Without prosperity, Hong Kong would lose its most effective claim to special treatment from China.9 Modifying perception of costs: Being the most organized local countersocial group of capitalists and professionals, the capitalist alliance repeatedly issued threats of withdrawing capital from Hong Kong if democratization was speedily implemented and created an unfavorable business environment. As the legitimacy of Hong Kong’s political structure was based on “stability and prosperity,” they thus attempted to change public perception of the costs of rapid democratization. Role of signals and symbols: Unlike the democratic activists, the capitalist alliance was neither able nor inclined to launch mass sit-ins or demonstrations to display its power. It mainly relayed its message to the public through the mass media, while continuing to use private discussions in the BLCC, BLDC, and other channels to lobby Chinese officials. The primary interest of the businessmen and professionals was to see Hong Kong continue to be a stable source of business profits. Those who identified Hong Kong as their home also wanted to keep it as a safe place to live. In the past, as shown in Chapter 3, the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure of Hong Kong had favored the business sector by guaranteeing their predominant share in the two most powerful political institutions in Hong Kong. Also, the Hong Kong Government had for a long time exalted the free market economy, which dignified Hong Kong internationally as an exemplar of non-interventional economy with a notable legacy of comparatively low taxes, low levels of social welfare, and minimum bureaucratic restrictions for investments. Above all, interference from China was also kept at bay by continued British administration and Hong Kong’s prosperity.

100

Growing society-led democratic reform When the Joint Declaration stipulated election of the post-1997 legislature and/maybe the Chief Executive, business interests were threatened. The worst nightmare of the businessmen was a highly politicized and volatile public supporting a directly elected legislature, dominated by “democratic” demagogues advocating adversarial politics and welfarist policies. Therefore, they suggested an elitist executive-led political structure, with significant advantages for them.

It may be noted from the capitalist alliance’s proposal that the business sector is over-represented in both the functional constituencies and the grand electoral college, which are mainstays for electing the legislature and the Chief Executive. In so doing, the business sector could sustain easy access to power and protect its collective economic interests.10 Conscious of being a social “elite,” the businessmen of the capitalist alliance had much greater confidence in their own wits than in the “plebeian” mass electorate.11 They believed that their sharp acumen in choosing legislators and a political structure which vested policy-making power in a carefully indirectly elected Chief Executive and some competent and neutral civil servants, together would retain the merits of the previous political system. The capitalist alliance hoped that its proposed system would successfully ward off dangerous “democratic demagogues” and, consequently, ward off interference from China. The capitalist alliance’s determined opposition to direct elections in 1988 squared well with its interests. As the democratic activists had a higher level and longer history of organization, plus a credible show of popularity in recent district-level direct elections (Cheng, J.Y.S., 1989), the capitalist alliance knew that any electoral contest for the legislature in 1988 would militate against the pro-business representatives.12 Moreover, the introduction of limited direct elections in 1988 might lead to “snowballing” demands for faster and greater democratization well before 1997. Relative power of the capitalist alliance and Hong Kong’s capitalists in respect of democratization To assess the power exerted by the capitalist alliance on China’s decisions to stall Hong Kong’s democratization, we need to know how representative the views of the conservative capitalist alliance were of the business sector in general. There is not enough data to support a definite answer, but many visible figures in the capitalist alliance also occupied important positions in the four main business chambers which all registered opposition to direct elections held in 1988.13 The four chambers had long played an important role in promoting Hong Kong’s trade, commerce, and industries and the government had granted recognition to two, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Hong Kong’s Industries, by appointing their representatives to the Legislative Council

Growing society-led democratic reform 101 even before the introduction of functional constituencies. After the establishment of functional constituencies in 1985, each of them was granted a seat as a functional constituency in the local legislature, and therefore given formal and institutionalized power. The introduction of direct elections, and the proposed gradual replacement of indirectly elected representatives suggested by the democratic alliance, posed a clear threat to their easy access to the legislature. Two of the business chambers opposed direct elections after taking a survey of their members’ views, as shown in Table 5.1. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association had consistently opposed having a partially directly elected legislature since 1986. The director of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce articulated the common wish of the four chambers to keep Hong Kong’s depoliticized society intact so that prosperity, stability, and freedom could be maintained. Not only were his opinions congruent with those of the capitalist alliance, but they also reflected the common belief among capitalist alliance members that the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian political structure should remain unchanged. The extremely low response rates to the surveys render them unrepresentative.14 Though this casts doubt on the actual proportion of Hong Kong’s capitalists who rejected the direct election in 1988, at least the most organized and articulate capitalists, such as the core leaders of the business chambers, were against faster democratization. The overlap of leaders in three of the four business chambers, and similar overlaps among their representatives in various government bodies, plus slow rotation of leadership, accentuated the influence of the capitalists on political issues (Leung, 1989: 56–8).15 As the organized opposition of this limited number of capitalists was not countered by other capitalists (who remained silent), the “outspoken” capitalist alliance and the leaders of the business chambers were more able to oppose democratization. As well as the four chambers, senior staff of the two most important Table 5.1 Survey results of two business chambers concerning direct elections in 1988 Organization

Sample size

Replied

Response rate (%)

Yes to 88 direct election (%)

No to 88 direct election (%)

Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce

2,650

497

19

43

57

Federation of Hong Kong’s Industries

1,500

104

7

28

63

102


banks in Hong Kong, i.e., the Hong Kong Standard Chartered Bank and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, also abhorred the prospect of demagogy arising from direct elections.16 The fact that the General Manager of the largest bank, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, was a member of the capitalist alliance, added to the power and representativeness of the group. The basis of conflict between the capitalist alliance and the democratic alliance Fear of conflict, uncertainty, and re-distributive measures has long caused capitalists and the middle class to oppose democracy in some parts of the world (Dahl, 1966: 360–7; Elster, 1987: 13–15; Kaufman, 1986, Pt III: 85–107; O’Donnell et al., 1986, Pt III: 24). In Hong Kong, many leaders of the democratic alliance were prominent in pressure groups that used confrontational tactics and advocated the re-distribution of wealth. Thus, the conflict between the local conservatives and the democratic activists, as perceived by the former, was a slightly modified “classic” conflict: order versus democracy, and economic growth versus social equity.17 The conservatives favored the continuation of “order” (or stability) and “economic growth,” both for their own interests and for the survival of Hong Kong in the face of communism. The democratic activists opted for faster democratization, to ensure greater political liberty and, as a hidden agenda, to bring about a fairer distribution of wealth.18 The democratic alliance’s interests, strategies, and calculations for the implementation of direct elections in 1988 Given the challenge posed by China and the capitalist alliance, how did the democratic alliance respond? The democratic alliance demanded that 25 percent of seats in the legislature be directly elected in 1988. If its demand was met, the transition to 50 percent in 1997, as suggested in its first constitutional platform, would be smoothed. Consequently, the democratic alliance used various tactics to campaign for direct elections. The most important weapon on which the pro-democracy activists could rely was the strategy to sway public opinion towards their own viewpoint. Successful mobilization of mass support for democracy could threaten the interests of the Chinese and British Governments by destroying the credibility of “One Country, Two Systems,” thwarting China’s appeal to Taiwan for reunification, and preventing Britain’s graceful departure. But the reality posed major obstacles to successful mass mobilization: Only a few percent of the grassroots have an interest in politics. Democracy has never been taught in school, nor has it been much debated in public. Hence, public opinion in support of speedier

Growing society-led democratic reform 103 democratization in 1986 was, as we knew it, flimsy. But, we had to explain to them about the importance of implanting democracy in Hong Kong. And we have to shape and lead public opinion so as to maximize our power in demanding the realization of direct election in 1988 and our democratic platform in 1997. (Interview, No. 1) Next, the strategies used by the democratic alliance are explored: 1

Exploit political opportunities and promote the agenda of political transition by democratization: The democratic alliance first of all made use of the political opportunities open to it by publicizing the substantial agenda of transition initiated by the Joint Declaration. The Joint Declaration stipulated that the post-1997 legislature should be elected and composed of local inhabitants, whereas the Chief Executive “shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government.”19 Given that senior Chinese officials in 1984 had at least twice endorsed direct elections and “democracy” in Hong Kong, and promised Hong Kong people a “high degree of autonomy” with “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,” and given that the Hong Kong Government stressed in its 1984 political review the possibility of direct elections in future, the democratic alliance attempted to whip up public support for democratization by referring to these promises: We knew that the key Clauses in the Joint Declaration were nebulous. The terms like “election,” and “high” degree of “autonomy,” for instance, were vague enough to be open to multiple interpretations. But, we had to seize the chance by shaping the public interpretations of those terms and to demand democratizing Hong Kong in order to realize the ethos of “One Country, Two Systems.” (Interview, No. 25)

2

3

Many times, activists accused China of reneging on its promises in the Joint Declaration by thwarting direct elections in Hong Kong. Interactive mobilization of public opinions: In addition to sending two delegations to lobby the British and Chinese Governments,20 the democratic alliance invested most of their resources in many activities consisting of talks, debates, and forums. It tried to capture media attention in a bid to shape public opinions. Their activities triggered counter-activities from the business alliance, ushering in a long series of dynamic mobilizations and counter-mobilizations (Sing, 2000: 33). Appeal to public antipathy towards the Chinese Government: The democratic alliance attempted to alleviate the fears among the public regarding the handover of Hong Kong to Communist China by

104

Growing society-led democratic reform emphasizing “democracy.” As direct elections were integral to democracy, they called for public support on the following grounds. First, direct elections were a means to political equality, liberty, and democracy, and the only means that could effectively coordinate the interests of different social groups.21 Direct elections could better represent the interests of the lower class, and of small and medium-sized firms, the mainstays of Hong Kong’s economy.22 Second, direct elections were the best means to realize the “high degree of autonomy” and “One Country, Two Systems” promised by the Chinese Government. Without direct elections and democracy, the confidence of the Hong Kong people would plummet for fear of Chinese interference, and this would exacerbate the “brain drain.” Third, they demanded gradual democratization, starting with 25 percent of seats being directly elected. Hong Kong’s socio-economic development was mature enough to introduce democracy gradually without endangering prosperity and stability. Moreover, the alliance always underscored the values of “political equality,” “human rights,” and their compatibility with democracy through the implementation of direct elections. The activists expected to appeal to ordinary people by emphasizing the equal and inalienable political rights of every human being.

Summing up, the pro-democracy activists tried to legitimate democracy23 and persuade the public by arguing that direct elections, which were integral to democracy, could safeguard the continued enjoyment of stability, prosperity, and civil liberties. Use of different sites and campaign strategies to rally support The pro-democracy activists mainly ran their campaigns in public locations. They launched exhibitions and forums and distributed pamphlets (Table 5.2). Second, it launched a signature campaign and managed to get 230,000 signatures on two Sundays in support of the “1988 direct election.” The signature campaign culminated in a mass rally to display their political strength. Table 5.2 Activities launched by democratic alliance to promote direct elections in 1988 Dates

Activities

2 Nov. 1986 18–20 Apr. 1987 4 July 1987 27 Sept. 1987

Ko San Rally: around 1,000 participants. Cartoon-exhibitions in the New World Center (shopping mall). A political forum and distribution of pamphlets. Victoria Park Rally: 5,000 participants.

Source: Sing (1993).

Growing society-led democratic reform 105 Third, they established their own independent unit to assess the actual level of public support for holding direct elections in 1988. The unit served to closely monitor the quality of the Hong Kong Government’s public consultation and imposed a heavier cost on any potential government’s act of manipulating public opinion with misleading survey reports. Notwithstanding the fervent campaigns of the alliance, there was a lack of pervasive popular mobilization for pro-democracy activities including protests, sit-ins, and mass gatherings. For instance, only about 5,000 people attended its most important public rally. With a fragile public support, the alliance’s bargaining power with both the British and the Chinese Governments was small. What contributed to the low level of public support for holding direct elections in 1988? Limited public support for direct elections in 1988 The sense of political powerlessness, and the lack of knowledge and commitment to democracy meant that public support for implementing direct elections in 1988 was limited. A longitudinal survey was conducted at four points24 during the heated debates of 1987. General endorsement of direct elections in 1988 was measured at 54 percent, 54 percent, 49 percent, and 46 percent in the four phases. These four figures were more than double the percentage of people who disagreed with direct elections i.e., 16 percent, 17 percent, 23 percent, and 21 percent. Hence, on the surface, there were more who supported holding direct elections in 1988 than those who opposed it. Yet a decline in popular support for the direct elections can be noted. The overt opposition to it by China, the capitalist alliance, and such proChina organizations as the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) probably caused this slight dwindling of support. In addition, China’s opposition increased the powerlessness of the public and, finally, eroded their backing as well for direct elections. Among the 46 percent of respondents who endorsed direct election, the major reasons tendered for favoring it were as shown in Table 5.3. It should be noted that the total of the figures is not 100 percent but 46 percent, representing those that supported direct elections in the fourth phase of the representative survey only. Public support for direct elections in 1988 appears less substantial on closer scrutiny. The overall feelings about the Green Paper among respondents were indifference and unfamiliarity. When the respondents were asked to give a general comment on the Green Paper, the answers were as shown in Table 5.4. Living in a quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure before 1985 and a limited democracy since 1985, with both stressing depoliticization and a benign government, the sense of political powerlessness of the people of Hong Kong has been repeatedly corroborated by research. From 1987 to early 1988, the PRC’s opposition to holding direct elections in 1988, and

106


Table 5.3 Reasons for favoring direct elections in 1988 Reason

Total (%)

Represent public opinion People can select councilors more directly People have more opportunities to participate/contribute Gradually converge with transfer towards 1997 Greater fairness Increase political/civil consciousness Follow the crowd

26 7 6 3 2 1 1

Source: Public opinion surveys on Green Paper: the 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government Survey 4.

Table 5.4 General opinions about the Green Paper Opinions

Total (%)

Not familiar with the Green Paper Not concerned with the government Don’t understand the Green Paper Government should honor and execute public opinions Satisfied with government’s efforts/encouragement of public opinion Should reinforce civil education/promotion campaigns Hope citizens’ rights and privileges are taken into consideration Not favor direct election in 1988/too radical Maintain status quo The review is not comprehensive/too superficial Others

69 13 2 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 1

Source: Public opinion surveys on Green Paper.

threats of dismantling overly democratic structures in 1997, had only intensified this sense of powerlessness. The Hong Kong and British Governments’ stress on considering China’s views and the convergence with the Basic Law underlined the dominant political power of China. Against this backdrop, it is not wholly surprising that a conspicuous proportion of respondents doubted the usefulness of public opinion in shaping the development of Hong Kong’s representative government. Feelings of political powerlessness about reforms in part explained public indifference and unfamiliarity with the political review, as only 37 percent of the public believed the government would take public opinion seriously in decided the pace of democracy (Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd., 1987: Table 126–7). Lack of knowledge also diminished public support for direct elections in 1988. A survey conducted in 1986 found that only a small proportion of the public regarded direct elections as a necessary condition for democracy, despite its popular appeal. As many as 43.9 percent of the public regarded “a government that consults” as a democracy, while only 23.2

Growing society-led democratic reform 107 percent considered an “elective government” a democratic one (Lau and Kuan, 1988: 75).25 Finally, widespread public support for the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system and a limited democracy and great caution about the pace of democratization also reduced support for democracy. All in all, large-scale popular participation in the campaign for direct elections in 1988 was lacking. Nevertheless, public support appears more significant when the declared views of Hong Kong’s middle class are examined. Middle class divided over the holding of direct elections in 1988 The significance of middle-class support for democratization has been demonstrated in a recent work (Huntington, 1991: 66–9). In East Asia, the middle class, including professional, administrative, and managerial employees whose market situations and work situations keep them distinct from other employees, has been argued to be pivotal in buttressing Taiwan’s (Cheng, 1989b), and South Korea’s democratization (Koo, 1991: 485–500). In Hong Kong, the middle class was found in a representative sample survey to be more supportive than others of having a directly elected legislature in 1988. Those with more education, higher income, and whitecollar positions were more likely to support direct elections. In the fourth phase of the survey mentioned earlier, 55 percent and 51 percent of those with secondary and post-secondary education respectively agreed on implementing direct elections in 1988, as compared with only 35 percent among those with primary education or less. The percentage supporting direct elections also rose directly with monthly income, from 28 percent among those with less than $4,000, to 58 percent with $10,000 or more. Professionals and those working in the trading or property sectors were 68 percent and 59 percent in favor of direct elections, compared with 50 percent of blue-collar workers, 45 percent of students (aged over 18), 40 percent of housewives, and 20 percent of the retired and unemployed (Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd, 1987: Table 52–3). Professionals were more likely to have a higher education and more political awareness than the blue-collar workers, housewives, the retired, and the unemployed. Better education and political exposure allowed the professionals to recognize the significance of democratic institutions in safeguarding Hong Kong’s capitalist system, life-style, and civil liberties. People working in the trading or property sectors of Hong Kong, probably due to their recognition of the notorious business corruption of Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong and on the mainland, were also more supportive of direct elections than workers, housewives, the retired, and the unemployed. In addition, large-scale mobilization by the pro-China Federation of Trade Unions, under direct or indirect pressure from China, could also have accounted for the relatively low support of workers for direct

108


elections. The lack of civic and political education in Hong Kong could at least in part account for the moderately low level of support for direct elections by students. The support, however, was far from overwhelming or distinct even in an attitudinal sense. While it is common for sociologists to use the term “middle class” to indicate all non-manual workers (Mann, 1983: 238), many have pointed out the big differences in life-style, life chances and work situations between clerks and professionals (Abercrombie et al., 1984: 135). When contrasted with the routine white-collar workers, [T]he upper sections of the middle class, especially higher professionals and higher managers, have high levels of pay with well-defined career expectations, shorter hours of work, and better pension and sick pay arrangements. Their work situation is also more favorable, allowing much greater independence, a measure of control over others, and opportunities to use their skills. (ibid.: 135) Given the usual higher autonomy and control over work, plus their sense of competence, professionals are likely to demonstrate more support for democracy than the lower class or clerks and other low-skilled middleclass workers. During the debate over direct elections, many professional organizations conducted surveys or held special meetings to tap their members’ views about it. The strategic importance of those professional organizations was testified to by the fact that most of them had been offered functional seats in the legislature since 1985, or 1988,26 and represented the key professions in any modern society. The results of these surveys and meetings were telling about general support among Hong Kong’s professionals for faster democratization (Table 5.5). Table 5.5 gives a hazy picture of the views of Hong Kong’s middle-class professionals on early direct elections. Of the fourteen middle-class, professional organizations surveyed, only five had a response rate of more than 50 percent for the surveys or meetings. Of those five surveys or meetings, only two had a sample size of more than 300, affording reliable results. The low response rates may have been caused by cumbersome questionnaires, or inconvenient methods of returning questionnaires. Two other possible reasons may yet explain the phenomenon. Given their greater political awareness, the middle class27 was more keenly aware of China’s insistent attempts to prevent direct elections.28 China’s efforts may have dampened their aspirations for democratization and their readiness to return questionnaires. Surveys have repeatedly indicated that even among highly educated people in Hong Kong, there was a strong sense of political powerlessness, to which China was a major contributory factor.29 Another plausible reason was that many members of the middle class

Growing society-led democratic reform 109 were actively considering emigration. At least, they seriously contemplated finding an “escape route” by gaining a foreign passport before returning to Hong Kong (Emmons, 1988; Kwong, 1991). The seriousness of the “brain drain” can be glimpsed in research that examined the outflow of the new middle class (Kwong, 1991: 303–16): “Half of the emigrants in 1987 and 1988 were economically active, and among them, the two largest occupational groups in 1988 were professionals (33.6%) and administrative/ managerial staff (16.12%). Together, they comprised one half of all economically active persons.” Altogether, middle-class emigration accounted for a loss of 2.7 percent of total professionals and administrators in Hong Kong in 1987 alone. The figure rose to 3.6 percent in 1988. The severity of the brain drain among professionals was too palpable to ignore when the “depletion ratio” was considered, i.e., the number of professionals who emigrated during 1987 and 1988 divided by the total estimated number of people in Hong Kong with that skill in 1986 (ibid.: 307–8), (Table 5.6). The great possibility of “exit” for Hong Kong’s middle class, enhanced by the relaxation of immigration policies by Canada and Australia to attract Hong Kong’s capital and professionals (Emmons, 1988; Kwong, 1991), reduced the pool of the pro-democracy middle class. It could also have attenuated their commitment to direct elections and democratization. Among the above surveys, eleven out of fourteen middle-class organizations had more than half of their members in favor of having direct elections in 1988. Contrasting such responses with those of the four business chambers mentioned earlier, which represented wide-ranging and dominant capitalist interests, a stark divide is apparent between Hong Kong’s professionals and the capitalists on the issue of early democratization. It should be noted that most of the aforementioned professional, middleclass organizations endorsed in principle the holding of direct elections.30 Such endorsement was lacking among the four leading business chambers. Moreover, as already discussed, setting aside the problem of representativeness, the surveys quoted above pointed to the fact that eleven of those fourteen professional, middle-class organizations had over half of their members supporting the holding of direct elections in 1988. Furthermore, the statistics suggest that the “caring” professional middle class – including journalists, lawyers, social workers, teachers, doctors, town planners, and nurses, were more likely to back up earlier democratization than those more practical and business-oriented professionals, such as surveyors, engineers, accountants, and computer workers. In short, the relatively larger but less than overwhelming attitudinal support of the public for direct elections, the political powerlessness of the grassroots and the middle class, the lack of knowledge and commitment to a democratic system, and the possibility of exit for local professionals, all limited support for direct elections in 1988. The democratic alliance,

Members: 33,549 Sample size: 334

Members: 4,231 Sample size: 100

Association of Government Nursing Staff

0,216

Hong Kong Institute of Planners

Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union

5,148 (all registered doctors)

HK Medical Association

3

N.A.

1,500

Government’s1 School Nondegree Teachers Union

University2 Graduates Association

0,355

0,204

HK Council of Social Services

0,340 (all members)

Hong Kong Journalists’ Association

HK Bar Association

Sample size/ membership claimed

Organization

70.9

85

44

8.5

70

50

68.6

30

18

Response rate (%)

66

66.75

70

70

N.A.

81.7

82.2

84

90

Yes to 88 direct election (DR) (%)

N.A.

25.58

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

No to 88 DR (%)

87

99.3

N.A.

89.1

N.A.

90

N.A.

95.2

N.A.

Yes to DR in principle (%)

Table 5.5 Surveys done by middle-class/professional organizations on attitudes towards direct election (DR)

34

25.4

10

26.7

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Support for DR after 1991 (%)

7,350

Hong Kong Institute of Engineers

1,700

Hong Kong Computer Society

9

14

26

12.3 13.7

21.4

20

40

45.5

1st: 39 2nd: 52

65

50

N.A.

N.A.

N.A. N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

73

43.4

N.A. 88.6

93

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A. N.A.

N.A.

Notes 1 90% endorsed in principle having direct elections in future (Ming Pao Daily News, Sept. 31, 1987). 2 89% supported direct election in principle (SCMP, Oct. 2, 1987). 3 SCMP, June 28, 1987. 4 75% agreed to direct elections in future in principle; 92% endorsed the establishment of the “functional constituency.” It should be noted that the Hong Kong Certified Accountants Association was given one seat in the legislature through indirect election by a functional constituency (Wah Kiu Daily News, Oct. 1, 1987). 5 See Sun Po, Nov. 1, 1987; also, see the associations’ survey reports (Leung, 1989: 120–3). N.A.: Not available.

3,686

HK Certified Accountants Association

5

1st: 857 2nd: 900

1,600

Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors

Law Society4 of Hong Kong

112


Table 5.6 Seriousness of emigration of professionals (1987–8) Profession

Total number of emigrating professionals in 1987 and 1988 divided by total professionals in 1986 (%)

Programmers and system analysts Accountants and auditors Lawyers and judges Doctors, nurses and midwifes Engineers

35 22 13 13 10

Source: Adapted from Kwong (1991: 307–8).

despite great efforts, thus failed to rally massive public support for earlier democratization. Faced with China’s and the local conservatives’ opposition to faster democratization since 1985, the British and Hong Kong Governments had abandoned its ambitious plan of installing the quasi-Westminster system in Hong Kong. The Green Paper on Representative Government released in 1987 did not mention the “ministerial system,” which had been suggested in the 1984 Green Paper as a possible candidate for the future political structure. The Deputy Chief Secretary of the Hong Kong Government frankly admitted China’s influence on the drafting of the Green Paper during 1987.31 The Governor openly refused to promise that Hong Kong’s public opinion would be the single most important criterion in the political review. Instead, he stressed that the “quality” of that opinion and “convergence” to the Basic Law were at least as important.32 These statements were evidence of the heavy pressure that the British Government had experienced. The threats by the Chinese Government to dismantle any “overly democratic” structures after the reversion of sovereignty were taken seriously. For national honor and possibly economic reasons, Britain preferred to witness the survival of a prosperous and stable Hong Kong before and after 1997. It should be noticed that though the public support for holding direct elections in 1988 had not reached an overwhelming proportion over two-thirds, all polls indicated that “at least a plurality . . . were in favor of direct elections in 1988 on a percentage range between 41 and 61 per cent over the period May to October 1987” (Scott, 1989: 292). How then could the Hong Kong Government refuse to institutionalize a partially directly elected legislature in 1988? Citing a flawed questionnaire survey conducted by a designated polling agency, the Hong Kong Government argued that those who wanted direct elections in 1988 were in a minority. As a result, it decided against introducing direct elections to the legislature in 1988, and proposed that ten seats be directly elected in 1991 (ibid.: 294–7). The less than overwhelming public support for the 1988 direct elections, and the staunch antagonism of organized business had not encouraged a

Growing society-led democratic reform 113 tough British stance towards China. Perceiving a rising tide of public support for the direct elections in 1991, the British and Hong Kong Governments saw that as a way out of the predicament.33 Conclusion of increasing polarization: conflicts over the desirability of holding direct elections in 1988 After the “formative phase” of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy alliance in 1986, a “conflictual phase” soon appeared. It was marked by increasing conflict and polarization between pro- and anti-democracy forces in Hong Kong. When the democracy movement led by the democratic alliance and the counter-movement led by the capitalist alliance promulgated their rival constitutional models, political conflict over democratization became polarized. The political review about whether direct elections should be held in 1988 provided a locus for the conflict. China’s fervent mobilization against the holding of the direct elections had probably accounted, in part, for the decline of public support for it. In addition to China, two new domestic constraints on Hong Kong’s democratization, i.e., the organized capitalists led by the capitalist alliance, and to a certain extent the public, came to the fore. The long-term and short-term environmental conditions of Hong Kong, plus other short-term dynamics, could explain why these capitalists and the public had figured as constraints on speedier democratization. Though 1997 raised fears among Hong Kong’s public, and the democratic alliance’s propaganda probably played on some of them, the public’s ignorance of the relationship between “election” and “democracy,” and its long-term political powerlessness, fuelled by China’s increasingly blatant obstruction to faster democratization, impeded the formation of an overwhelming majority clamoring for direct elections in 1988. The division within the middle class into the caring professionals and “practical” professionals, and the ability of the middle class to resort to emigration to weather the crisis of 1997 was another contextual factor that reduced public support for faster democratization. Failure to form a unified Hong Kong-wide coalition to press for democracy decreased the bargaining power of the democratic alliance at this stage. In the midst of conflicts among domestic forces in Hong Kong, China had exploited them, especially those between the democratic alliance and the capitalist alliance, to exert more pressure on the democratic alliance to compromise. This pressure was heightened by the British and Hong Kong Governments’ obvious “climb-down.” The decision not to hold direct elections in 1988, which went against the public wishes, signaled the predominant concern of the British Government with a smooth transfer of sovereignty rather than democratization. Britain’s submission to China on this matter and the postponement of direct elections till 1991 marked a watershed in the balance of power between Britain and China

114


over Hong Kong’s democratization. This revealed that the gradual transition of Hong Kong into a Special Administrative Region under Chinese sovereignty in 1997 had reached a phase when China gained dominant control over changes in Hong Kong’s political structure. It also showed that China was the main deterrent to democracy in Hong Kong from 1986 to 1988. In the next phase, from April 1988 onwards, when the first draft of the Basic Law was promulgated, China displayed its hostility to democracy more outrightly and staunchly, in face of an unexpected flood of public support for democratization.

Growing vibrancy of the democratic alliance amid upsurge of Hong Kong-wide support for democracy This section examines the continuing dynamic conflict over Hong Kong’s democratization from 1989 to April 1990. During this period, the Chinese Government distinctly revealed its hostility to democratization, which was, until the suppression of student protests in mainland China in mid-1989, shared by the capitalist alliance. In the wake of the harsh suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China, an unprecedented high level of public support for democratizing Hong Kong appeared during this period. The upsurge in public support, in conjunction with other factors, contributed to the forging of a compromise constitutional blueprint jointly adopted by the JCPDG and the major wing of the split BPG. The compromise package will be shown to have exerted pressure to the Chinese Government and won some minor concessions from it in democratization. To capture the dynamic process, two phases will be examined: 1

2

Phase of rising support for democratization and compromise among domestic forces (May 1989–October 1989): in the wake of the harsh suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China, an unprecedented high level of public support for democratizing Hong Kong appeared during this period. After a few months of implicit and explicit bargaining, the JCPDG, the Moderate Alliance, and the major wing of the split BPG jointly adopted a compromised constitutional blueprint. Conflictual and decisional phase (November 1989–April 1990): mobilization and counter-mobilization continued, till the eventual promulgation by the PRC of the Basic Law in April 1990. The Basic Law, to reiterate, is the mini-constitution for Hong Kong effective from July 1, 1997.

Phase of rising support for democratization and compromise among domestic forces (May 1989–October 1989) During May and June 1989, the violent suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China created an external “crisis” in Hong Kong. Hong

Growing society-led democratic reform 115 Kong’s confidence in “One Country, Two Systems” collapsed in the face of political instability in China. To brace themselves against a bleak future, almost all political forces in Hong Kong started to clamor for greater and faster democratization. In reaction to the expanding political opportunities for bottom-up democratization, the JCPDG replaced their old constitutional blueprint with a new one demanding much faster democratization. What follows will be an analysis of the crisis and the rapidly changing political opportunity structure that faced the JCPDG in late 1989. China in tumult, 1989: a new crisis for Hong Kong During May and June 1989, the suppression of the democracy movement in China rattled the Hong Kong people and their confidence in the successful implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” collapsed.34 It drove the Hong Kong citizens to frenetically seek safety by obtaining foreign passports.35 Only a few Hong Kong people could afford to get foreign passports especially from the rich Western countries during the summer of 1989. With hopes of emigration dashed and the handover fixed, demands for faster and greater democratization then skyrocketed. The fall in public confidence in “One Country, Two Systems” was clear, shown by the following Hong Kong-wide representative sample surveys done in September 1988, late May 1989, and October 1989 (Table 5.7). In another longitudinal survey assessing Hong Kong people’s political confidence, the index recorded an all-time low in June 1989.36 Another strong indicator of “crisis” was that. Hong Kong citizens frantically sought safety by obtaining foreign passports; 43.6 percent of Hong Kong citizens wanted to emigrate during the third quarter of 1989. Numbers of those who did not embrace emigration fell below half the population for the first time. With emigration unfeasible for the bulk of the Hong Kong citizens, who could no longer pin their hope on any paper document signed between China and Britain, they turned to democracy as their hope of salvation. Table 5.7 How confident are you that the Basic Law will make sure the “One Country, Two Systems” promise will be kept? (%)

Confident Not confident

September 1988

May 1989

October 1989

44 36

33.6 55.1

25 69

Source: See Ming Pao Daily News, Sept. 29, 1988, for the 1988 Survey. For the other two, refer to the survey reports conducted by Inrasia Pacific Ltd. (IPL) (H-03 May 1989; OP 19 Oct. 29, 1988).

116


Upsurge in public support for faster democratization Public demands for faster and greater democratization had begun to skyrocket since May 1989. On May 20, about 50,000 people supported a mass rally organized by the JCPDG to support the pro-democracy movement in Beijing. Then on May 21, the democratic alliance managed to mobilize a peaceful march with a record of over 1 million citizens for the same cause.37 On the surface, both campaigns were gestures of support for the democracy movement in China. However, many joined those events with the same view of promoting democracy in Hong Kong. For instance, during the march on May 21, 92.1 percent of the participants answered in the affirmative that “thinking about the events in China, I agree the next draft of the Basic Law for Hong Kong should contain more provisions for democracy after 1997.”38 More precisely, 74 percent of respondents preferred to have Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive after 1997 directly elected by the public, rather than by a more narrowly based electoral college.39 When the public saw on television the peaceful march by Beijing students being suppressed by the Chinese Government, accusations of corruption ignored by the Chinese Government, and hunger-strikes countered by military suppressions, feelings ranged from disillusionment and outrage with the Beijing Government, to a strong urge to protect the mainland Chinese and the people of Hong Kong from arbitrary rule. This generated vociferous demands for democracy. In 1988, the Hong Kong Government suggested in its White Paper that ten out of a total of fifty-six seats in the legislature be directly elected.40 In July 1989, having witnessed the surge in public demand for democracy, the Unofficials of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council endorsed a model (the OMELCO model) that out of a total of sixty seats in the legislature, at least twenty and no less than thirty seats be directly elected in 1991 and 1995 respectively. Though the OMELCO model had already doubled the scheduled proportion of directly elected legislators announced in 1988 by the Hong Kong Government for the legislature of 1991, a poll conducted between July 28 and August 1 registered public desire to have democracy accelerated even more. Respondents wanted twenty-four seats in 1991 in the legislature to be directly elected, i.e., four more than what was recommended in the OMELCO model. For 1995, most of the public agreed that half of the legislature seats should be directly elected. Based on the same survey, an overwhelming majority of respondents (81 percent) favored the OMELCO model if asked to choose between it and the original less democratic government plan. The latter only gained 13 percent of public support. It should be noted that those with a higher income and higher education were more likely to support the OMELCO model. Given that nine Hong Kong-wide professional organizations called for the speeding up of democratization on June 10, it could be inferred

Growing society-led democratic reform 117 that the middle class in Hong Kong was more anxious than ever to reduce China’s interference with democracy.41 Moreover, the alarmed public of Hong Kong underlined their support for faster democratization with a resolute attitude even in the face of Chinese opposition:42 Should the Chinese Government oppose the plan, 73% would favor a referendum on the subject . . . 18% would press on with the plan despite the Chinese opposition, 4% would modify the plan to have less than half directly elected in 1995, and 5% had no opinion. If a referendum could not be held, then 79% would support the Government applying the Councilors’ plan despite the Chinese Government’s opposition.43 The rapidly expanding political structure for faster democratization was also helped by the escalating support from the Hong Kong Government. Unofficial members of Hong Kong’s Executive and Legislative Council (OMELCO) and the Hong Kong Government: demand for faster and full democracy Against the backdrop of the events of Tiananmen Square, the Executive and Legislative Council became more united on democratization, and wanted to rebuild public confidence by demanding faster democratization. After internal debates, the OMELCO model was thrashed out, which stipulated that one third, not less than one half, and 100 percent of the legislators be directly elected in 1991, 1995, and 2003 respectively (Appendix 1). They also pressed for the direct election of the Chief Executive by 2003. Though failing to give a firm commitment, the top Hong Kong Government officials publicly supported the OMELCO model.44 Of no less importance for the expanding political opportunity structure was the unexpected switch by the major wing of the BPG, i.e., the organized capitalist alliance for greater support for Hong Kong’s democratization. The BPG broke up and its major wing suggested the “4–4–2” model The major wing of the BPG, probably dismayed by Chinese leaders’ draconian suppression,45 also supported a faster and greater democracy. The dominant wing of the BPG, led by Lo Hon Shui, insisted on speeding up democratization and tendered a “4–4–2” model (Appendix 1). They suggested that 40 percent and 60 percent of seats in the legislature be directly elected in 1997 and 2001 respectively, followed by the possibility of having a fully directly elected legislature in 2005 if the post-handover Special Administrative Region supported it. They also proposed that the Chief Executive

118


be directly elected in 2005. Their radical departure from their previous conservative stance stemmed from three grounds. First, they attempted to rebuild consensus with other local political forces so as to weather the crisis of confidence and rescue Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.46 In addition, they were reportedly satisfied with Hong Kong’s moderation and restraint during mass rallies and demonstrations. Pro-democracy activists were praised by leading members of the BPG for behaving maturely at the two mass rallies and other demonstrations in May.47 How did China react? China cautioned against Hong Kong’s subversion and rejected Hong Kong’s speedier democratization In early May, the JCPDG organized a new alliance, called the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democracy Movement (ASPDM), to support the pro-democracy movement in China.48 The two alliances shared predominantly similar leaders.49 Thus, immediately after the Chinese Communist Party had regained its control over China, it warned against Hong Kong becoming a subversive base against China.50 Consequently, China repeatedly called for the British and Hong Kong Governments to outlaw and dissolve the leading democracy organization, ASPDM.51 China also expelled two pro-democracy leaders from the Basic Law Drafting Committee, as they had also been leaders of the ASPDM. It criticized the British Government’s appeal to internationalize the issue of Hong Kong as dangerous,52 and its granting of rights of abode as divisive. Instead of placating opinion in Hong Kong, China insisted on promulgating the Basic Law as scheduled without delay, stationing the People’s Liberation Army in post1997 Hong Kong to realize sovereignty, and imposing further limits on the proportion of foreign nationals permitted in the post-1997 legislature. As expected, China also refused to consider the OMELCO model in the drafting of the Basic Law.53 Above all, the Chinese leaders actively and openly threw their weight behind a conservative model called the “Bicameral Model.” Against this new backdrop, the democratic alliance of JCPDG replaced its first constitutional model with a new one. Perceived political opportunity and calculations of the democratic alliance Faced with an expanding political opportunity, efforts will be made to explain why the democratic alliance proposed a second and third constitutional blueprint in July and October 1989 respectively (Table 5.8). To be more specific, two interrelated empirical issues will be addressed: first, why did it embrace a radically faster programme for democratization in July 1989, immediately after the political disorder in China? Second, why did it enter into explicit bargaining with the BPG in late 1989, and agree to settle on a compromise constitutional blueprint in October 1989?

Growing society-led democratic reform 119 Table 5.8 Three constitutional blueprints suggested by the JCPDG “Old 190” (Nov. 1986) “New 190” (July 1989) “4–4–2” (Oct. 1989) 1991

Leg – DR: 50%

1995

Leg – DR: 100% Ex – directly elected

1997

Leg – DR: 50% Ex – directly elected

Leg – DR: 40% – FC: 40% – EC: 20% Ex – elected by Election Com.

2001

Leg – DR: 60% – FC: 40% Ex – elected by Election Com.

2005

Ex – directly elected*

Source: Minutes of JCPDG. Notes Leg: Legislative Council; Ex: Chief Executive. DR: Direct Election; FC: Functional Constituencies. EC: Electoral College; Election Com: Election Committee. *: See conditions in Appendix 5.

In the light of a severe crisis in confidence in Hong Kong, and a sharply escalating demand for more and faster democratization, the JCPDG seized the expanding political opportunities with a new constitutional blueprint. The majority of Secretariat members favored much faster democratization, chiefly because they wished to respond to the extraordinary surge of public support for it.54 They tried to increase the JCPDG’s power by responding to the upsurge of popular support for democracy by constructing a more “radical” constitutional model. Failing that, many of them feared that the JCPDG would lose its power, as its “symbolic” status as the leading organization for democracy would be lost. Most JCPDG Secretariat members were not optimistic about China’s reaction to their new constitutional blueprint. They were more concerned to keep their original power, than to increase it. In face of China’s mounting attacks, the JCPDG eventually entered into explicit bargaining with its opponents and reached a compromise model (“4–4–2”) in September. Of the three constitutional models endorsed by the JCPDG, the last one, i.e., the “4–4–2” model, aroused most internal controversy. It should be noted that the “4–4–2” model stipulated that only 40 percent of the seats in the 1997 legislature be directly elected. The JCPDG thus abandoned their two earlier faster-paced blueprints and made genuine compromises (see Table 5.8). The “4–4–2” model was first suggested by the BPG in July 1989 and

120


endorsed later by the JCPDG and some “moderate organizations” after explicit bargaining from August to October.55 Why did the JCPDG enter into explicit bargaining, and compromise on the “4–4–2” model? When bargaining is expected to be repeated, and to end at a fixed time, “a negotiator might want to establish a reputation for toughness that is designed for long-term rather than short-term rewards” (Raiffa, 1982: 13). As the consultation period drew to an end in late 1989, however, the JCPDG could only maintain “a tough reputation” at the expense of failing to reach a compromise with domestic forces to maximize pressure on China. Since “public support” alone was too weak a force to compel China to give way, the JCPDG was motivated to ally itself with other local capitalists, a crucial domestic social force, to increase its own power over the final schedule of democratization, before the consultative period of the final draft of the Basic Law ended in October.56 Has the compromised package had any substantial effect on Hong Kong’s democratization?

Conclusion: conflictual and decisional phase (November 1989 to February 1990) Widespread domestic support for the “4–4–2” model We have seen how the quashing of the pro-democracy movement in China in May and June 1989 brought about a severe crisis in confidence in Hong Kong and a drastic expansion in the political opportunities for democratization. After the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, despair, fear, and indignation among ordinary people helped sustain demands for fuller and faster democratization in Hong Kong. With most of them having no right of abode elsewhere, and facing involuntary reversion to a totalitarian regime, democracy became their last hope of saving themselves from Chinese interference. The major wing of the capitalist alliance, to reiterate, also supported a faster and greater democracy. They designed the “4–4–2” constitutional model, and invited the JCPDG and the Moderate Alliance to agree to it. They hoped that a unification of political forces behind the “4–4–2” model would make it more difficult for China to reject. Based upon a representative sample survey,57 the public in Hong Kong tendered enormous support for the “4–4–2” compromise model in late September. When the total number disagreeing with each plan was subtracted from the total number in agreement, the “compromise 4–4–2” model received the highest score of 62 percent, followed by 58 percent for the OMELCO model.58 It showed that the compromise model agreed upon by the JCPDG, the BPG, and the Moderate Alliance, was popular with the general public.

Growing society-led democratic reform 121 Britain’s and China’s calculations and their effects on the Basic Law From November 1989 to February 1990, members of the major wing of the BPG were engaged in back-door lobbying with the Chinese officials for the “4–4–2” model. In addition, the Chinese and British Governments were bargaining behind the scenes. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, the British Government was well aware of the crisis in confidence that plagued Hong Kong. As well as supporting the Bill of Rights to be legislated in Hong Kong, and granting 225,000 members of strategic elites and their families the right of abode in Britain, it also pushed for a faster democratization in order to meet the sharply rising aspirations of the Hong Kong community. With the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997 inevitable, the British Government, as revealed during the parliamentary debates, had to balance three factors in its attempts to accelerate Hong Kong’s democratization: the popular wish for quickening democratization, the desire of some Hong Kong people to avoid confrontation with China, and the desirability of the continuity of the pre-1997 political structure into the future.59 In view of China’s obvious opposition to quickened democratization in Hong Kong, the British Government thus presented a political programme of moderate pace to China. Recently disclosed correspondence between the British and Chinese Governments60 reveals that the former demanded that 33.3 percent and 40 percent of total seats, i.e., twenty and twenty-four out of sixty, in the legislature be directly elected in 1991 and 1995. The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, stressed that his demand was made in accordance with the aspirations of Hong Kong’s business community and people with moderate views. The British Government was clearly pressing the PRC to accept, at least partially, the “4–4–2” model, given that the model had won the support of the JCPDG, Hong Kong’s public and the major wing of the BPG, and that it stipulated 40 percent of the legislators be directly elected in 1995 and 1997.61 The British Government tried to entice China to accept its proposal by promising to persuade Hong Kong and the British Parliament to accept a blueprint where 40 percent and 50 percent of seats in the legislature would be directly elected in 1997 and 2003 respectively. On the Chinese side, it had to reconcile the contradictory objectives of winning local confidence in the future of Hong Kong, maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity, and subduing demands for accelerated democratization. In face of the potentially catastrophic brain drain, and the persistent popular upsurge for faster democratization,62 China was under enormous pressure to placate Hong Kong with at least a little faster democratization, in order to contain the damage to Hong Kong’s prosperity. Above all, British support for a smooth transition and relieving the crisis was also badly needed at that critical juncture.

122


Consequently, the Chinese Government suggested that it would allow Britain to increase the number of directly elected seats in the legislature from ten to eighteen in 1991, if the British agreed that 33.3 percent and 40 percent of seats be directly elected in 1997 and 1999 respectively. The proportions were incorporated in the final version of the Basic Law (Appendix 1). Since the Hong Kong Government before the June 4 event planned that only ten seats63 in the legislature be directly elected, China has made obvious and moderate concession in the pre-1997 political arrangement, by allowing the number to jump to eighteen, i.e. an 80 percent increase.64 Furthermore, the “4–4–2” model, OMELCO model, and the public all demanded a steady progression to full democracy. In December 1989 China still suggested that democratization be frozen for ten years between 1997 and 2007. Yet, in the final draft of the Basic Law published in April of the following year, China granted that a steady progression of democratization would be allowed. Moreover, it permitted the possibility of full democracy in 2007, four years before the suggested one in the second draft of the Basic Law. Thus, China had probably responded to pressures from the implicit alliance of the British Government, the JCPDG, and the BPG, by slightly increasing the pace of democratization.65 In short, the JCPDG and its compromise on the “4–4–2” model had partially shaped the bargains suggested by Britain during its exchange of correspondence with China. As a result of China’s partial concessions, the JCPDG had contributed to a gradual democratization.66 Summing up, China’s opposition to Hong Kong’s democratization became more obvious between 1988 and 1990. The aforementioned partial concessions made by China in early 1990 suggested that while China’s opposition had been the greatest constraint in explaining the slow pace of the actual and scheduled democratization between 1986 and 2007, it was not an adequate explanation. To ensure that Hong Kong’s vitality and pragmatic benefits be maintained, China did make concessions in face of demands for democracy from Hong Kong’s more unified public, the democratic alliance, and the capitalist alliance. The people of Hong Kong and pro-democracy forces had posed a glaring threat to the hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party in 1989, but China still made those concessions in early 1990. Hence, the lack of an early, continuous and broad-based backing from the public, the middle class and the capitalists for democratization before June 1989 constituted an internal constraint on Hong Kong’s democratic development between 1986 and 2007, though China was still the primary constraint. Against the backdrop of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the next chapter will show a renewed and last-ditch democratic reform undertaken by the British Government. It exposes how the lukewarm public support for that reform laid the seeds for the China-initiated reversal of Hong Kong’s limited democracy towards and beyond 1997.

6

Renewed British-led democratic reform from 1992 to 1994 Ambivalence in public support for democratic reform

The last British-led democratic reform: new stage of bargaining for Hong Kong’s democratic transition (1992 to 1994) Comparative studies of countries in Asia, Southern Europe, and Latin America have confirmed that elites’ consensus on the rules of the game of a democratic polity is crucial for a democratic transition and consolidation (Mainwaring et al., 1992). In Hong Kong, democratization progressed slowly beginning in the mid-1980s, and resulted in a limited democracy in mid1997. Moreover, within few months after the widely publicized handover of the territory from Britain to China, the process was drastically reversed. Indeed, Hong Kong’s pattern of democratic transition is uncommon. As a British colony destined to be decolonized not by becoming independent, but by reversion to mainland China, democratic transition in Hong Kong was dependent on two external regimes. Given that the ruling elites of the two external regimes failed to reach a consensus on Hong Kong’s democratization, the process was under severe strain. This strained relationship can be traced back to October 1992, following a change in British policy and the arrival of a new Governor, Chris Patten. These changes triggered political struggles over democratization. The Chinese Government, like other authoritarian regimes, attempted to undo any democratic reform including that of Patten for Hong Kong both before and after the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty This chapter has the following aims: first, in the light of the bargaining perspective set out in Chapter 2, it will highlight how and why the key political actors in Hong Kong played out their roles as they were with respect to the reform. We will start first with the firm positions of the British and Chinese Governments, explaining in particular why the former switched to a hard-line stance towards the latter in pushing for Hong Kong’s democratization. Second, I will explain why both the public and organized pro-democracy groups failed to exert strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese Government on the issue, that has increased the likelihood for the reform to be nullified by the Chinese after 1997.

124

Ambivalence in public support for reform

Historical context of the last British-led democratic reform from 1992 to 1994 To achieve a graceful retreat, the British Government continuously and proactively effected various democratic reforms in Hong Kong, in particular introducing elective elements to its legislature in an incremental manner between 1984 and 1987. However, those testing gestures invited open rejection from the Chinese Government from late 1985. Keen on managing a relatively smooth transition and a “through-train” for the post-handover government, the British Government scaled down democratic reform in the late 1980s. Its decision to delay the first direct elections for Hong Kong’s legislature in 1988 till 1991 was a notable example of this. However, the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing brought the soft-line British policy of democratizing Hong Kong to an abrupt end. Stunned by the unforeseen horror of the events in Tiananmen Square, the British Government strengthened its resolve to push for further democratization, in order to honor its obligation to millions of Hong Kong citizens and gracefully retreat from the colony.1 The growing interference of China in Hong Kong after 1989, the endurance of the stalemate over Hong Kong’s new airport project despite the British Prime Minister’s trip to Beijing, and the seemingly widening popular support for greater democracy after 1989, all enhanced the British resolve to further democratize Hong Kong. Against that context, the coming of Chris Patten as Hong Kong’s Governor in late 1992 and his unveiling of a package of democratic reform in October 1992 marked a new phase in Hong Kong’s democratic transition. He shepherded a renewed determination by the British Government to launch a high-profile and last-ditch top-down campaign demanding greater democratization from China before the imminent change-over of sovereignty. The reform endeavored to boost Hong Kong’s democratization, without violating the future mini-constitution dictated by the Chinese Government by exploiting the gray area that the latter embodied.2 Patten’s reforms, that widened the scope of political participation among the public, and rendered political opposition more meaningful, were democratic in nature. They included reducing the voting age from 21 to 18; employing a single-constituency, single-vote system for the legislature and municipal councils instead of a multiple-constituency, singlevote system; enfranchising nearly half of Hong Kong’s population by establishing nine new functional constituencies with 2.7 million workers as qualified voters; and, finally, allowing directly elected members of local councils, i.e. of District Boards, to elect ten representatives among themselves to join the legislature via the Election Committee (Patten, 1993: 33–141). As a result, in 1995, all sixty seats in its legislature were elected by various means. The reforms, therefore, injected very marked changes into Hong Kong’s political landscape where no seat in the legislature had

Ambivalence in public support for reform 125 been directly elected before 1985, and where direct elections, confined to one-third of its seats, were not introduced for the legislature until 1991.3 How did the various political forces in the government react to the reforms? In the light of the bargaining model mentioned in Chapter 2, the positions of the Chinese Government, the local public, the capitalists and the pro-democracy groups on the issue will be analyzed to understand the constraints on Hong Kong’s democratization at this stage. First, how did the Chinese Government react? Hostile stance of the People’s Republic of China towards Hong Kong’s democratization The Chinese Government treated the unanticipated Patten’s top-down reforms as a tactic by Western countries to subvert its political system incrementally. Also, any significant expansion of the electoral base would render Hong Kong less controllable after 1997. Such control had already declined after the Tiananmen Square incident. The event strengthened an “anti-China” syndrome, that eventually lent much crucial public support to the pro-democracy activists during the maiden direct elections for the legislature held in 1991.4 The sweeping electoral victory for the three prodemocracy parties in the direct elections of 1991, and the renewed British efforts at democratization, simply deepened the “siege mentality” among the hard-liners in the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the Chinese Government not only condemned Chris Patten as the “guilty party” in Chinese history, but also vowed vehemently and repeatedly that it would tear down the limited democracy erected by Patten immediately after the change-over of Hong Kong’s sovereignty in the mid-1997. It also unambiguously threatened to establish a second power center before 1997, if Britain failed to withdraw the reforms. China also categorically vowed that the financial obligations of large-scale public projects that straddled 1997 would not be recognized by the future sovereign power if no previous consent was sought from the Chinese. Amid the Chinese Government’s threats, public support for Patten’s reform declined intermittently and a polarized public emerged.5

Lack of strong public commitment to Patten’s democratic reforms All through the 20-month period of acrimonious controversy on Patten’s reforms, in the face of the Chinese Government’s waves of threats, public support for Patten’s reforms rose and declined sporadically and a polarized public emerged. In the face of the Chinese Government’s incessant and boisterous attacks, those who still supported the reforms immediately before their passage in the legislature in June 1994 manifested a more genuine commitment to democracy. Research conducted then showed that

126


Jun. 94

Oct. 93

Jun. 93

May. 93

Mar. 93

Feb. 93

Jan. 93

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Dec. 92

Percentage

those who supported the reforms (39.7 percent) only marginally outnumbered those who rejected it (32.7 percent), with the remaining 37.6 percent largely undecided.6 In fact, throughout the prolonged twenty-one months of wrangles, the reforms received weak rather than overwhelming backing from the local public (Figure 6.1). As political attitudes rarely change overnight, and as they can shape behavior and persist for quite some time despite structural changes, it is worth examining the past political orientations in order to better understand the present. This research study has two major aims. First, it explains the variations in the public support for the British-led democratic reform in late June 1994. Second, it attempts to account for why the reform received only weak rather than overwhelming backing from the local public. This research is significant since various comparative studies have demonstrated that public attitudes do shape democratic prospects. When the public consistently and strongly reject authoritarian rule, the bargaining power of authoritarian leaders declines, and the political relaxation of power then becomes more likely (Stepan, 1990: 41–9). Over the past fifteen years, a number of research reports on Hong Kong’s democratization in general, and on the political orientations of the Hong Kong Chinese related to democracy in particular, have been written. They have no doubt profoundly enhanced our understanding of Hong Kong’s democratic development (Brown and Foot, 1997; Burns, 1994: 55–63; Kuan and Lau, 1995: 87; 1997; Lau and Kuan, 1988; 1995; Lo, 1997; Scott, 1989; 1998; Tsang, 1997: 183–208; Yahuda, 1996: 62–126). This chapter does not follow their argument and makes a unique contribution in the following ways. First, most previous research has tapped the respondents’ political orientations towards democracy in a point-blank, abstract manner by asking

month/year

Figure 6.1 Hong Kong people’s degree of support for Chris Patten’s reform proposals 1992–4.

Ambivalence in public support for reform 127 them about their general attitudes towards it (Kuan and Lau, 1995: 87; Lau, 1996: 158–80; Lau and Kuan, 1988). Given the positive connotation of “democracy” in most parts of the world, including Hong Kong, there is a danger that respondents have only given nominal support to that highsounding ideal and, thus, socially desirable answers.7 In sharp contrast, this research probes the public support for democratic reform in a real, conflicting, and historical context. It assesses the level of public support for the highly controversial UK-led democratic reform launched by its last Governor Chris Patten, and explains variations in the support. Ever since he publicly unveiled the blueprint in October 1992, the reforms and Patten himself have been under incessant attack from the Chinese for twenty months. Given the Chinese Government’s continuous stormy attacks and warnings, those who still supported the reforms immediately before its passing in the legislature showed a more genuine commitment to democracy than those who just gave nominal support to general questions about democracy.8 The fact that our research was conducted immediately before the passing of the reforms in the legislature can thus more effectively help us gauge and explain a more genuine public support, at least attitudinally, for democracy than the previous research on local political culture. Second, some past studies of local political orientations of democracy lack theoretical foci for explanation. In contrast, this research employs multiple regression analysis grounded explicitly in two competing theories as an explanation. Theories of political culture and rational choice have been employed to shed light on those variations. In terms of practical significance, since public support for democracy did influence Britain’s bargaining power with China over the issue, and would become even more so after 1997, it is of paramount significance to know who still supported Chris Patten’s reforms when the row came to an end in late June 1994 as they showed a more genuine commitment to democracy, and such data will help us predict who would be the core supporters for greater democracy after 1997. Explanation of the variations in support for Patten’s reforms will be done by cultural, rational choice, and socio-demographic variables.

A synthetic explanatory model: cultural, rational choice, and structural variables A great deal of past research argues that political culture can act as an independent variable exerting effects on behavior and can continue for quite some time despite social structural changes. The political culture, which includes cognitive, evaluative, and affective attitudes, can shape human interpretations, behavior, and democratic development (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Diamond, 1994; Lipset, 1994: 1–22; Muller and Seligson, 1994: 635–52). “Political culture” as used here is not as broadly defined as that

128


suggested by Almond and Verba. Their definition encompasses all kinds of attitudes without differentiating various components of political culture. Political culture here specifically means evaluative beliefs, and four beliefs in particular:9 the mainstream definition of “democracy” invariably comprises freedoms, political equality, and political opposition. A great deal of recent research on former authoritarian and communist regimes has uncovered those values as significant in explaining public support for democratization.10 These three values will be treated as key elements of the political cultural model and their explanatory power will be subject to empirical test as Hong Kong has been a Westernized city enjoying a relatively high standard of freedom in Asia for a long time. Since the mid1980s, it has experienced the rise of opposition parties and intensive debate on political equality in the electoral system, so the testing of the three values seems to be particularly advisable.11 In addition to those three beliefs, the perception of political efficacy is the fourth one. As argued by modernization theory, a higher level of political efficacy among the public conduces to mounting support for democratization, and we will put this to the test as well (Figure 6.2).12 As well as the evaluative beliefs, another set of variables to be included relates to rational choice. Advocates of the rational choice perspective maintain that no simple and fixed attitudinal or structural variables can explain the complex, indeterminate interactions between different groups Political equality Civil liberty Political opposition

Expected consequences of speeding up pace of direct elections

Support for Patten’s reform

Expected scenes in Hong Kong after 1997 Education

Middle class

Note: Causal effect:

Figure 6.2 A synthetic model.

Age

Ambivalence in public support for reform 129 and individuals with divergent and shifting preferences. This view downplayed cultural beliefs as well. “Many of the actors involved in the transition did not wish such a democratic outcome, nor did they have what one could call a democratic set of attitudes.”13 Advocates of the rational choice approach stress whether democracies can emerge depending on the strategic interactions between different political forces and the subsequent choices of governing elites. The costbenefit calculations among the different political forces involved in the consequences of democratic reform directly impact their strategic interactions and the contest over democracy. The cost-benefit calculations exist among both ruling elites and the general public.14 Two variables are employed to depict the cost-and-benefit calculations over democratic reform. The first is the “expected consequence of speeding up the pace of direct elections.” The variable is used not only because it is an integral component of rational calculations but also it has been found in another local research study to be a powerful factor in explaining democratic attitude. The other is how far the people of Hong Kong feel they can influence the Chinese Government’s policy towards Hong Kong. The less politically efficient they feel, the more likely they will support democratic change to enhance their own influence over their future. Finally, whether those cultural or rational choice factors are connected with specific social structural bases, such as education, income, and age will also be investigated. Summing up, when we add the aforementioned variables of evaluative beliefs, rational choice, and socio-demographic features together, we put eight independent variables to the test. However, as explained later, the variables of “political efficacy” and “civil liberty” and “expected consequence of democratization” are found to be composed of two, two and three dimensions after doing factor analysis. Therefore, the total number of independent variables expands to twelve.

Results of statistical tests First, the correlation coefficients of the twelve independent variables with Patten’s democratic reforms are shown in Table 6.1. This shows that eleven are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with the “middle class” excluded. However, when we submit the eleven variables to regression analysis, only six of them remain statistically significant (Table 6.2). This model that contains evaluative beliefs, rational choice variables, and sociodemographic variables, explained 33.2 percent of the overall variance of our dependent variable.15 The causally most powerful one was a factor of a rational choice variable, i.e., the “expected consequences of speeding up the pace of direct elections.” The frequency distributions of the rational choice variable show that

130


Table 6.1 Spearman correlations coefficients on Patten’s reform factor

Middle class Educational level Age Political party factor Political efficacy factor 1 Political efficacy factor 2 Political equality factor Civil liberty factor 1 Civil liberty factor 2 Consequence of democratization factor 1 Consequence of democratization factor 2 Consequence of democratization factor 3 What happens after 97 factor Personal income

Correlation

N

⫺0.10 ⫺0.15*** ⫺0.10*** ⫺0.29*** ⫺0.09*** ⫺0.04 ⫺0.20*** ⫺0.28*** ⫺0.07* ⫺0.55*** ⫺0.25*** ⫺0.20*** ⫺0.24*** ⫺0.16***

273 842 881 817 875 875 871 876 876 850 850 850 865 681

Notes ***Correlation is significant at the 1 percent level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level (2-tailed). N defined as the number of observations.

Table 6.2 Explaining public support for Patten’s reform: summary of multiple regression statistics

(Constant) Consequence of democratization factor 1 Political equality factor Civil liberty factor 1 Age 2 Consequence of democratization factor 3 Consequence of democratization factor 2

Unstandardized coefficients

Standard error

Significant level

Standardized coefficients

⫺2.42 ⫺0.35

1.04 0.03

0.02 0.00

⫺0.49

⫺0.27 ⫺0.11 ⫺0.03 ⫺0.21

0.06 0.03 0.01 0.07

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

⫺0.19 ⫺0.16 ⫺0.15 ⫺0.15

⫺0.13

0.06

0.02

⫺0.10

the majority of the public hold rather positive views about the impact of speeding up direct elections or democratization (Table 6.3). For instance, 75.7 percent agree or more than agree that the legislature can better reflect the public views as a result, while only 9.3 percent disagree or more than disagree. Some 74.1 percent agree or more than agree that human rights and freedom would be promoted, while only 11.4 percent disagree or more than disagree. In addition, 52.5 percent agree or more than agree that speeding up direct elections can help foster political stability, while 22.2 percent disagree or more than disagree. On the question of improving government services, 73.4 percent agree or more than agree

Ambivalence in public support for reform 131 Table 6.3 Distribution of responses to the question: Do you agree that the following are the expected consequences of speeding up the pace of direct elections? (%) Very/ Disagree Neutral Agree Very/ absolutely absolutely disagree agree 1 Legislative Council can reflect more citizens’ opinions on livelihood and social policies (N ⫽ 801) 2 Intensify conflicts between China and HK (N ⫽ 806) 3 Encourage development of political parties (N ⫽ 746) 4 Enhance human rights and freedom in HK (N ⫽ 819) 5 Maintain political stability (N ⫽ 789) 6 Excessive social welfare (N ⫽ 765) 7 Frustration of economic growth (N ⫽ 767) 8 Improvement of government services. (N ⫽ 810) 9 Citizens can check the government through Legislative Council (N ⫽ 783) 10 Decrease Chinese Government’s intervention on HK affairs (N ⫽ 746) 11 Intervene China’s sovereignty (N ⫽ 743)

0.90

8.40

15.00

64.40

11.30

3.10

31.10

15.40

40.70

9.70

0.90

11.50

14.50

62.70

10.30

1.10

10.30

14.50

62.90

11.20

2.00

20.20

25.30

43.70

8.80

7.60

47.70

14.90

24.70

5.10

7.10

55.50

15.50

18.00

3.80

1.90

8.80

15.90

61.20

12.20

1.70

8.40

16.60

61.70

11.40

5.60

36.20

16.80

32.00

9.40

15.20

55.90

11.60

13.90

3.50

that they would be better, while only 10.7 percent disagree or more than disagree. Factor analysis demonstrates that the concept of “perceived consequences of speeding up direct elections” is a multi-dimensional one that consists of three factors (Table 6.4). The variable with the strongest explanatory power for democratic reforms is Factor 1, conceptualized as “political well-being.” Factor 1 is the variable with the strongest causal strength to explain public support of reform in terms of the beta value. It is the strongest factor of the variable of “expected consequences of speeding up direct elections” as well, explaining 27.36 percent of the variance of the latter. The factor comprises items relating to political well-being, i.e., the advancement of human rights and freedom, checking of government through the legislature, lowering the Chinese Government’s intervention in Hong Kong affairs, relaying opinions to the government, and better upholding of political stability. The results indicate that the anticipated

132


Table 6.4 Factor analysis of consequences of increasing directly elected seats Factor 1 (Political well-being) 1 Legislative Council can better reflect citizens’ opinions on livelihood and social policies 2 Enhance human rights and freedom in HK 3 Maintain political stability 4 Improvement of government services 5 Citizens can check the government through Legislative Council 6 Decrease Chinese Government’s intervention in HK affairs 7 Excessive social welfare 8 Frustration of economic growth 9 Intervene China’s sovereignty 10 Intensify conflicts between China and HK 11 Encourage development of political parties Eigenvalue Percentage of variation

Factor 2 (Hazards of democracy)

Factor 3 (Increase in politicization)

0.70

0.72 0.65 0.68 0.74 0.54 0.68 0.71 0.62 0.75 0.58 3.04 27.36

1.65 14.02

1.23 12.34

Note Varimax rotation is used, and missing values are deleted pairwise.

positive upshot of having a democratic city–state encapsulated by “political well-being” has been the most powerful driving force behind those adherents of democratic reform. The predominant reason for espousing democratic reform is the maintenance of political well-being, and not the upholding of material well-being argued by another research study (Kuan and Lau, 1995: 263). Much research has revealed that the people of Hong Kong highly cherish human rights and freedom. The gradual progress of Hong Kong’s democracy has led to a rising expectation among its people that its government should be accountable. The public support Patten’s reforms, as indicated by Factor 1, because they consider it to be fitting for their political well-being through the promotion of freedom, the emasculation of intervention by China, and the increasing check on government by its legislature. Upholding political well-being had a heightened significance for the

Ambivalence in public support for reform 133 Hong Kong people, given the imminence of Hong Kong’s sovereignty reverting to China. Implementation of the democratic reform, they hoped, would favor political stability as well. The second factor of the variable of “expected consequences of speeding up direct elections,” conceptualized as “hazards of democracy,” comprised variables that underscore the detrimental effects of hastening direct elections or democratization, i.e., too much welfare, a decline in economic growth, and more violation of China’s sovereignty. This factor has been ranked the least strongest cause among the six statistically significant independent variables. The negative beta value of this factor indicates non-believers in this factor tend to support democratic reform, though the strength of causation is not strong. The last factor of the variable of “expected consequence of speeding up direct elections” or democratization includes variables demonstrating mounting politicization, i.e., development of political parties and escalation of Sino-Hong Kong conflict. According to Table 6.2, 51.4 percent of the respondents respectively agree or more than agree that speeding up direct elections would raise the Sino-Hong Kong conflict and advance the development of parties. The factor is conceptualized as “Increased politicization,” and was the fifth strongest in the overall model. Next, the two political beliefs of political equality and political opposition have exerted statistically significant causal effects. Those beliefs have been produced by factor analysis. Political beliefs: political equality and freedom Why has “political equality” been ranked as high as second in terms of causal strength? The Hong Kong Chinese were gradually enfranchised at district, municipal, and colony-wide levels from the early 1980s onwards. Professionals of some occupational sectors were able to cast votes via both functional constituencies and geographical constituencies, while nonprofessionals could only cast votes via the latter. Such an unequal political arrangement invited bitter attacks by local pro-democracy leaders since the mid-1980s, and they may have reinforced the public identification with political equality (Sing, 1996b). Indeed, 84.5 percent and 90.6 percent of the public agree or more than agree that the “illiterate should also have the right to vote,” and “every citizen should have an equal opportunity to influence Government’s policy making” (Table 6.5) respectively. While Patten’s reforms would induce more political equality through the expansion of the franchise, the single factor of Political Equality generated from the three indicators (Table 6.6) becomes the second most powerful variable among the twelve independent variables in explaining public support. Belief in “freedoms” is ranked third in terms of relative causal importance. After running factor analysis, six items of the freedoms that tap the dimensions of freedom of press, of speech, and right of due process, with

134


Table 6.5 Frequency distributions of the indicators of the two democratic values (%) Indicators of political equality

Very/ absolutely disagree

Disagree Neutral Agree Very/ absolutely agree

1 The illiterate should also have the right to vote (N ⫽ 896) 2 Every citizen should have an equal opportunity to influence government policy making (N ⫽ 877) 3 Professionals should have the privilege of casting more votes than ordinary citizens in elections for legislators (N ⫽ 859)

2.10

7.40

6.00

59.80

24.70

1.50

3.40

4.60

63.50

27.10

5.00

17.50

6.60

52.70

18.20

Table 6.6 Factor analysis of political equality Factor 1 1 Every citizen should have equal opportunity to influence government’s policy making 2 The illiterate should also have the right to vote 3 Professionals should have the right to have more votes than ordinary citizens in elections Eigenvalue Percentage of variation

0.84 0.85 0.14 1.46 48.49

their frequency distribution shown in Table 6.5, cluster around two factors called “Freedoms” (Factor 1) and “Freedom of Demonstration” (Factor 2) (Table 6.6). The “Freedoms” (Factor 1) were the third strongest statistically significant independent variable among the twelve independent variables, while Factor 2 is not statistically significant. The people of Hong Kong have attached great importance to freedoms. Under the protection of Britain’s liberal traditions, Hong Kong has long enjoyed a relatively much higher level of freedoms than most authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Asia (see Chapter 3). The enviable levels of freedoms, however, have been under dire threat from the Chinese Government that has suppressed human rights on the mainland and threatened adamantly to amend the Bill of Rights introduced in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen Square incident. The fact that the higher the value of freedoms (Factor 1), the higher the public support for Patten’s reforms, reinforces the interpretation that the people of Hong Kong have supported democracy partly to safeguard their treasured freedoms.

Ambivalence in public support for reform 135 Table 6.7 Factor analysis of freedoms Factor 1 (Freedom) 1 In Hong Kong, those who discriminated against the “yellow-skins” have their right to organize an assembly and propagate those opinions 2 Those books that are anti-government should be allowed to be on sale in public 3 Homosexuals can say that homosexuality is normal in public 4 Government should help suspected murderers to have lawyers for legal defense 5 University lecturers have the right to express their opinions that violate moral standards 6 Government should keep lists of the names of protesters Eigenvalue Percentage of variation

Factor 2 (Freedom of demonstration)

0.57

0.70

0.63 0.72 0.77 36.25 33.56

17.94 20.63

In addition to the statistical significance of the two cultural variables, education, middle class and age were included to act as control variables. Of them, only the variable of age was statically significant, and its causal strength is ranked fourth among the six statistically significant variables. Unlike research findings elsewhere, older instead of younger people are more likely to support democratic reform. Research from overseas contends that younger people are more liberal and keen to champion democracy than older ones (Diamond, 1994; Gibson, 1992; Park, 1989: 232–59; Weil and Gautier, 1994). Falling in line with a local research study, my survey corroborates that when democracy means an institutional arrangement, older people are more enthusiastic about democratic reform than younger ones (Kuan and Lau, 1995). Hong Kong has been a sanctuary for many Chinese refugees in the past. A sizable proportion of middle-aged and old people in Hong Kong were refugees escaping from mainland China to Hong Kong to embrace more freedom, prosperity and political stability (Chapter 3). Anxious because of their dramatic experience of Communist Chinese rule, they have far more poignant fears than the younger generation about the forthcoming reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China. Therefore, the two older groups manifest more backing for democratic reform than the younger ones in order to safeguard their freedom, stability, and prosperity. Against the aforementioned backdrop, it is found that the older people in Hong Kong, i.e., those aged between 42 and 55 and those over 55, were more

136


optimistic than the younger ones that increasing directly elected seats in the legislature would promote human rights and political stability, decreasing the Chinese Government’s meddling in Hong Kong, and enhance the monitoring of the government through the legislature (Table 6.8). Such optimism is translated into greater support for the reform among the older generation. Since the survey was conducted in 1994, the four age groups were born respectively in four periods of 1969–74, 1953–68, 1940–52 and 1939 or earlier. Those periods mirror the following cohort experiences, which have shaped their divergent attitudes towards democratic reform (Table 6.9).

Table 6.8 Cohort experiences of different age groups (birth periods) Age groups

Specific cohort experiences

(I) Age 20–25 (born between 1969–74)

Runaway economic growth and visible improvement in living standard since the late 1970s

(II) Age 26–41 (born between 1953–68)

(I) ⫹ Only hear remote stories of political repressions and economic disorder in China before and during Cultural Revolution

(III) Age 42–55 (born between 1940–52)

(I) ⫹ (II) ⫹ Have more direct experiences with sufferings in China among refugees/emigrants to Hong Kong.

(IV) Age above 55 (born in 1939 or before) (I) ⫹ (II) ⫹ (III) Experience the Second World War and its economic and social dislocations Table 6.9 Percentage of individuals in various age groups that agree/very agree on expected consequences of speeding up the pace of direct elections (%) Age 20–25 Age 26–41 Age 42–55 Age above 55 1 Enhance human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong (N ⫽ 788) 2 Maintain political stability (N ⫽ 771) 3 Decrease Chinese Government’s interference with Hong Kong (N ⫽ 724) 4 Through Legislative Council,public can more effectively monitor government. (N ⫽ 754)

66.00

72.30

79.30

72.70

35.10

48.70

58.00

67.40

37.00

38.80

40.90

44.20

68.80

72.00

77.20

68.50

Ambivalence in public support for reform 137 Findings of public support for democratic reform Rational choice variable is the most powerful explanatory variable The superiority of the rational choice variable in accounting for public support for reform implies that, in Hong Kong, individuals’ instrumental calculations are pivotal to their stance on democratic reform in a genuine and conflicting setting. The Chinese Government has continuously stressed the huge political costs to the public in implementing the Patten’s reforms during the extended controversy. Against that backdrop, the general public tended to compare the costs and benefits of implementing or abandoning the reforms. As the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty neared, many Hong Kong people feared the loss of political well-being. Therefore, the expectation that democratic reform can help promote political well-being – a key ingredient in the rational choice model – has been the most powerful explanatory factor. In short, the backing for Hong Kong’s democratic reform has primarily arisen from a collective desire to defend Hong Kong from any undesirable meddling by the Chinese Government. While those who reckon that democratic reform can promote “political well-being” would likely support Patten’s reforms, one moot point that remains is whether the public envisages democratic reform as indispensable in all circumstances, rather than just smoothing the attainment of political well-being. If democratic reform is regarded as enhancing rather than as necessary for political well-being, the strength of public support for democratic reform may decline if and when any threat to the “political well-being” is perceived to have waned. Is there any social basis for democratic reform? Faced with China’s incessant attacks and dire warnings, those who persisted in their support for Patten’s reform immediately before its passing in the legislature displayed a deeper commitment to democracy, and can be regarded as the staunch supporters of greater democracy both before and after 1997. In terms of social category, “age” has been identified as statistically significant in differentiating those supporters and non-supporters of the reform. This result is in line with a previous local research study done in the late 1980s, in which older citizens demonstrated greater support for democratic reform.16 Such steadiness predicts a potential stable mass base for democratic reform. Yet, if democratic commitment among the middle-aged or younger people cannot be raised in time, the continuity of public support for democratic reform in the medium and the long term will be in doubt. That was especially the case, given that both education and the middle class have failed to be the social bases for democratic reform. Why has the middle class in Hong Kong failed to support democratic reform?

138


Why has the middle class not been a social basis for democratic reform? To recapitulate, a number of research studies have generalized from the middle-class background of the pro-democracy leaders, and concluded that the middle class in general have been also more or less prodemocracy.17 This research vindicates that the correlation between the middle class and support for Patten’s reforms has not been statistically significant, thus proving the over-generalization of those research studies. How can we explain the statistical relationship? One possible explanation for the relatively weaker support from the middle class, when compared with the working class, lies in their different abilities and tendency to emigrate to other countries. Surveys conducted in Hong Kong since the late 1980s have already pointed out that the middle class has been keenly aware of China’s insistent attempts to prevent the development of democratization in the colony.18 They have also repeatedly indicated that even among highly educated people in Hong Kong, there was a strong sense of political powerlessness, to which China was a contributory factor.19 The lingering strong sense of political powerlessness and worry about the uncertain political future since the late 1980s have driven many members of the middle class to obtain an “escape route” by gaining a foreign passport before returning to Hong Kong (Emmons, 1988, Kwong; 1991, 297–337). The great possibility of “exit” for Hong Kong’s middle class, enhanced by the relaxation of immigration policies by Canada and Australia to attract Hong Kong’s capital and professionals, reduced the pool of pro-democracy middle class. This has reduced the commitment of the middle class to supporting democratic reform. Though other scholars have proposed such an interpretation before, they have not provided evidence to back it up. My data have lent credence to such an argument (Table 6.10). When asked about their orientation towards emi-

Table 6.10 Emigration potential of different classes (%): percentage of members of each class that agree/very agree/absolutely agree on the following question: If you have the chance to leave Hong Kong before 1997, will you do so? Emigration potential

Capitalist class (%)

Middle class (%)

Working class (%)

Yes Undecided No N ⫽ 4401

18.80 12.80 68.40

24.00 13.70 62.40

17.60 8.10 74.20

Note 1 Noticeably, the association between class and emigration potential is not great, standing at 0.09413 with significance level test of 0.04853.

Ambivalence in public support for reform 139 gration before 1997 if given a chance, middle-class respondents are the most eager among the three to do so. Based upon comparative evidence, the contention that the middle class has always been a faithful supporter of democracy is not tenable. The middle class, from South Korea and Thailand in Asia, to those of Latin America, have at times been neutral towards, if not squarely opposed to, democratization (Bunbongkarten, 1994; Koo 1991: 485–500; O’Donnell et al., 1986). Their reservations about democracy usually arise when their own interests are threatened by any contingency in the midst of democratic transition (Przeworski, 1991; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). In the light of this comparative evidence, a plausible account for the lack of statistically significant association between middle-class status and support for democratic reform is that as the local middle class are far more able, if they have not already done so, to obtain a foreign passport than the working class, the former will be more indifferent to the reform vis-àvis the working class. Finally, we need to achieve our second research objective, i.e., discover why the reform has only received weak backing from the public, as 39.7 percent agree or more than agree on the reform, while 32.7 percent disagree or more than disagree, with the remaining 37.6 percent largely undecided, when the reform bill was passed in the legislature in June 1994.

Limited backing for the reform – ambivalent idea of democracy held by the Hong Kong Chinese The absence of overwhelming support for the reform can be shown by conflicting evidence about public commitment to democracy. On the one hand, as shown in Table 6.2, a visible majority of the local public held positive views about the various political consequences of further democratic reform, indicated by increasing directly elected seats in legislature. Also, a relative majority of Hong Kong Chinese, i.e., 41.6 percent preferred to use direct elections as the best method of selecting the Chief Executive (Table 6.11). On the other hand, evidence that indicates low support for democracy also abounds. First, concerning the best method of selecting the future Chief Executive, 58.4 percent of respondents preferred a means other than direct elections (Table 6.11) and slightly more than one-third treated the “form of government” as irrelevant. Also, to recapitulate, when pressed to pick the most treasured item out of nine that mirrored their ranking of social, economic, and political values (Table 6.12), the “direct elections of Chief Executive” and “monitoring of government by different groups” received little support, 2.6 percent and 2.1 percent respectively, ranked as the two least important. Among those nine items, while individual freedoms came at the top, others that gained higher rankings were mostly related to the improvement of personal material livelihood.

140


Table 6.11 Distribution of the responses to the question: Among the following means, which is the most ideal one in producing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive? (%) Means One-Person-One-Vote Form of government is irrelevant, rule by capable person that counts most Functional constituency Appointment by Chinese Government Form of government irrelevant, as long as the Governor is a civil servant Other forms of electoral methods Missing Total (N ⫽ 923)

(%) 41.60 33.80 5.30 2.30 1.80 3.30 15.20 100.00

Table 6.12 Which of the following items should Hong Kong care about most between now and 1997? Item Secure individual freedom Lower inflation rate Improve living conditions Increase personal income Ensure security after retirement Lower crime rate Continue economic growth Elect Hong Kong’s Chief Executive by one-person-one-vote Monitor government by different groups Missing Total (N ⫽ 903)

(%) 19.30 18.90 14.90 14.00 9.40 8.80 8.10 2.60 2.10 1.90 100.00

How can we interpret the low ranking of the “democratic institutions,” and the overall public ambivalence towards democracy? One relevant study argues that the people of Hong Kong have had only a “partial vision of democracy,” having no more than just a desire to improve on the workings of the existing government in the direction of more consultation with the public (Kuan and Lau, 1995: 255). This study substantiated the “partial vision” by stating that the most popular conception of democracy in Hong Kong was the “consultative government,” an image conceptually compatible with the long-practiced elitist and bureaucratic rule in Hong Kong (ibid.). Their observation does not wholly reflect reality. Our survey shows that the most popular conceptions of democracy as arranged in descending order, unlike previous research, are freedoms (27 percent), rule of law (17.4 percent), and consultative government (17.1 percent) (Table 6.13).20 The first item has been so treasured in the hearts and minds of the people of Hong Kong that it has been part and parcel of the legitimating bases of the former quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian political system for a long time.

Ambivalence in public support for reform 141 Table 6.13 Distribution of the responses to the question: Which of the following is the most important property of democracy? (%) Value label Freedoms Rule of law Consultative government Political equality A government that can be removed by its people One-Person-One-Vote Government subject to monitor by social forces Others Missing Total (N ⫽ 923)

(%) 27.00 17.40 17.10 14.30 5.10 4.30 3.00 0.70 11.10 100.00

Limited public support for democratic reform – legitimacy and support for democracy Though the people of Hong Kong have long treasured freedoms, stability, and prosperity, their enjoyment of those values under its non-democratic system for a long time has reinforced the popular belief that democratic systems are not indispensable to the enjoyment of those values. The brevity of Hong Kong citizens’ experience of a limited democracy, which precluded a pervasive and deep habituation to democratic institutions, has further lessened public commitment to democracy. The weak support for democratic reform found in Hong Kong diverged enormously from those in some former authoritarian and ex-communist regimes during their democratic transitions in the early 1990s. The rapid democratic transition of those regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America has been driven by long-term economic failure, state-led repression, rampant corruption, and the ensuing ideological collapse. Such collective hardships have solicited far greater public support for democracy in those countries than can be found among the Hong Kong Chinese.21 Hong Kong’s transition to a limited democracy, dissimilar to those former authoritarian or communist regimes, did not originate from any widespread, bottom-up, collective reaction to any legitimacy problem associated with a repressive political regime or collapsing economic structure. The major force for Hong Kong’s democratization during the bulk of the 1980s up to 1997 was its departing colonial master, followed by a small pool of home-grown democratic activists, and not its ordinary colonial subjects. Given the general satisfaction among the public with their prosperity, freedoms, and stability, there was little trace of a legitimacy problem. Public demands for democratization thus remained weak in Hong Kong throughout most of the post-1970s.22 In mid-1989, the Tiananmen Square massacre emerged as an external

142


crisis for the people of Hong Kong. It induced an unexpected flare-up of public outcry for much faster democratization in the colony, in order to guard their future freedoms, prosperity, and stability. As the political repression of Tiananmen Square was external in nature, and not triggered by the system of limited democracy in Hong Kong, the system did not suffer any overall delegitimation.23 The lack of fundamental delegitimation of Hong Kong’s former limited democracy, as seen from the experiences in Southern Europe, has helped maintain the legitimacy of the former system and undercut the legitimacy of rapid democratization.24 It was thus no surprise to see that over 60 percent of respondents shied away from backing Patten’s reforms in late June 1994, and that the public has given less political trust to the directly elected legislators, the symbolic icon of democratic institutions, than the Hong Kong Government, the pivotal emblem of the limited democracy (Table 6.14). In short, unless the people of Hong Kong witness some serious, delegitimating scenes, such as large-scale political repression or long and unrelenting economic doldrums within a non-democratic system, public backing for faster democratization will remain weak. Against the backdrop of a less than enthusiastic pro-democratic culture, the next chapter will show that the lukewarm public support for democratic reform between 1994 and 1997, paralleled by the decline in the pro-democratic mass mobilization after 1990, have emboldened the Chinese Government to prepare for dismantling the limited democracy erected by Patten before the handover. Table 6.14 Distribution of political trust of Chinese Government, Hong Kong Government and directly elected members – Do you trust that what the Chinese Government/Hong Kong Government/directed elected members has/have done is, on the whole, beneficial for Hong Kong? (%) Chinese Government Distrust Neutral Trust Missing Total

Hong Kong Government

Directly elected members

29.50 29.00 28.00 13.50

15.60 26.70 52.20 5.50

13.10 26.80 48.20 11.90

100.00

100.00

100.00

7

Decline in popular mobilization for democracy and emergence of PRC-initiated democratic reversal (1992–7)

Chinese Government set to reverse Hong Kong’s limited democracy Comparative research in Asia, Southern Europe, and Latin America has shown that agreement by the elite on the “rules of the game” of a democratic system is indispensable to democratic transition and consolidation (Mainwaring et al., 1992). The lack of elite agreement can trigger a split among the elite and strengthen clashes between pro-democratic and antidemocratic forces. Such split can destabilize democratic institutions and turn them into unconsolidated democracies, pseudo-democracies, or even authoritarian regimes (Higley and Gunther, 1992: 23; Mainwaring et al., 1992).1 For the Chinese Government, with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the risk of “peaceful evolution” following the Western spiritual pollution has arisen. Worse still, the likelihood of Hong Kong becoming a subversive base against the Chinese Communist Party has also been heightened as evidenced by the enthusiastic support displayed by the people of Hong Kong to the Tiananmen Square incident. Consequently, the Chinese Government, like other authoritarian regimes, attempted to roll back Hong Kong’s democratization by various means both before and after the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty. In Hong Kong, democratization evolved sluggishly from the mid-1980s, and resulted in a limited democracy in mid-1997. The democratization was, however, drastically reversed within a few months after the handover of the territory from Britain to China. Many plans to prepare the reversal of democracy were laid before the handover. This chapter will show how the Chinese Government and its indirectly appointed new Chief Executive for post-handover Hong Kong, Chee-hwa Tung, have endeavored to reverse the democratic development erected by Chris Patten through the following measures before mid-1997: 1

Setting up the powerful Preparatory Committee and abolishing the elected legislature.

144 2 3

Decline in mobilization for democracy Revising the electoral system and narrowing the franchise for May 1998 elections for the legislature. Stifling the pro-democracy opposition with a pro-Beijing new Chief Executive and Discounting the importance of democracy.

Before detailing the democratic reversal, the next few sections show the less than enthusiastic public support for Patten’s reform, plus the decline in the pro-democratic mass mobilization after 1990, have emboldened the Chinese Government to dismantle the limited democracy erected before the handover.

The Tiananmen Square crisis and renewal of Britain’s top-down democratization Immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the people of Hong Kong vociferously strove for protection for their own future by reducing future potential interference from China with demands for faster democratization. Against such a backdrop, the two pro-democracy quasiparties, Meeting Point and the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, converted themselves into parties, and contested seats during the first direct elections for the legislature in 1991. Furthermore, another party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) led by Martin Lee, was formed in 1990. The UDHK was formed partly in reaction to the increasing threat from the Chinese Communist Party to Hong Kong’s freedom. It attracted the greatest number of pro-democracy leaders and activists – with over 600 members, including some from the former flagship of democratic movement for the 1980s, the JCPDG. The formation of those parties, and the dissolution of the JCPDG in 1991, ushered in a surprising decline in the strength of pro-democracy opposition in civil society. On the surface, Chris Patten’s reforms and the sweeping electoral victory for the three prodemocracy parties seemingly encouraged strong, unified pro-democracy opposition, beginning in late 1992. Yet, surprisingly, since 1992, this opposition has been weaker and less unified than that headed by the JCPDG in the 1980s.

Nature of the opposition: poor popular mobilization and divided political opposition in organizations and goals (1992–4) After 1992, pro-democracy political opposition has existed under five banners – two alliances mainly formed of social movement organizations in civil society, and the three pro-democracy parties mentioned above. Considering the importance of pro-democracy opposition, the following sections indicate the formation and running of two new pro-democratic

Decline in mobilization for democracy 145 alliances between 1992 and 1994. Despite their presence, there was division not only among pro-democracy political parties in their stance towards Patten’s reform, but also among those parties and the prodemocracy groups in civil society. Such divisions have diminished their collective mobilization power and the weight of those groups with respect to Hong Kong’s democratic reform. Consequently, from 1992 to 1994, there was a decline in the strength of pro-democracy opposition relative to the earlier period, which led to the eventual toughening of the Chinese Government’s stance towards Patten’s reform, and the reversal of it immediately after Britain’s departure. Division among pro-democracy political parties over the pace and extent of democratization Heated debates arose over Patten’s reform among the three local prodemocratic parties. Though they unanimously endorsed Patten’s reform, they have offered their own plans for democratizing Hong Kong as well. Among those plans, the differences have been too obvious to ignore. First, in terms of the number of directly elected seats for Hong Kong’s legislature in 1995, the United Democrats of Hong Kong suggested that thirty seats, i.e., a half of the total seats be formed by direct elections, while the other two parties did not ask for any increase above the twenty directly elected seats suggested under the Basic Law. One major concern of the latter two parties has been that to ensure political stability during Hong Kong’s handover, any infringement of the Basic Law would enrage the Chinese Government and result in dismantling of the installed political structure as well as instability. The heated nature of the conflicts became more apparent on another motion. When the leader of the pro-democratic alliance, Democracy 1995, put forward a motion demanding a fully directly elected legislature in 1995, Meeting Point abstained from casting their vote, while the two other pro-democratic parties supported it. As discussed below, the preoccupation of Meeting Point with not deviating excessively from the Basic Law has sparked severe conflict between itself and the more progressive prodemocratic Alliance (Hansard, June 29, 1994: 5037). Also, though they did not find Patten’s reform a perfect one, they found it acceptable (ibid.). Meeting Point would like to see more democracy in Hong Kong but did not want to antagonize the Chinese Government unduly (South China Morning Post, June 5, 1993). The disappearance of the middle ground in the Sino–British confrontation over Patten’s reform made the party and its Chairman feel marginalized and upset (ibid.). Another sharp difference was about the number of votes that each citizen could cast for the functional constituencies and Election Committee. Meeting Point and the UDHK suggested that citizens should cast one vote for the Election Committee and one for the functional constituencies,

146

Decline in mobilization for democracy

while the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood suggested that each citizen should only cast one vote for either the functional constituencies or the Election Committee. The UDHK argued that permitting only one vote for electorate would violate the citizens’ fundamental right to vote (Hansard, June 30, 1994). Last but not the least, the three parties only obviously differed on their stance on the composition of functional constituencies. Taking all the aforementioned discrepancies altogether, inter-party solidarity in launching a collective effort for democratization is difficult to envisage (Table 7.1). While the split among the parties has prevented a joint effort for democracy, the parties’ cynicism regarding the efficiency of the tactic and the desire to avoid a clash with the Chinese Government had also discouraged them. Parties’ limited use of mass mobilizations To recapitulate, a potentially important cleavage between civil society and political society has been the division along the arena of action. As argued in a cross-national study on the paths of democratic transitions of twenty European and Latin American countries, political parties are more likely than civil society to resort to negotiations rather than mass mobilizations (Collier, 1999: 19). In Hong Kong, Meeting Point has more or less followed the pattern of parties elsewhere, and refrained from adopting mass mobilization as their tactic. Since the Chinese Communist Party would be the de facto power governing Hong Kong, Meeting Point did not want to provoke it. Moreover, the party’s dominant goal of securing Hong Kong’s political stability also stopped it from using collective mobilization as a tactic to strive for democratization: Since 1990, Meeting Point has concentrated its efforts on politics in formal assemblies including the legislature, and stayed away from social movement mobilization. Hong Kong will only be a local government within China. As democrats cannot manage to persuade the Chinese Government or local capitalists to embrace democracy completely overnight, and since the Chinese Communist Party is and will be the de facto power ruling China, we do not want to be always at odds with it. We indeed treat our group as a Fabian society, and engage in neither revolution nor street mobilization. (Interview with a Meeting Point active member, August 4, 1994) Members of the UDHK allotted a low priority to collective mobilization between 1992 and 1994. The reason for this has been partly low by their overloaded involvement with legislative activities and district participations:

Yes, but mainly support the abolition of 10 seats of the Election Committee and direct election of 30 legislators

Abstaining from voting for it in legislature

Yes

United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK)

Meeting Point (MP)

Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (ADPL)

Each qualified voter cast one vote each to choose (a) a directly elected Leg. member or (b) a Leg. member via indirect election of electors

Citizens should have two votes: one for geographically based direct elections, and the other for functional constituencies

Citizens should have two votes: one for geographically based direct elections, and the other for functional constituencies

Should citizens be given one or two votes for choosing representatives from functional constituencies and election committee?

Nine new seats be given to: Labor (4 seats); Women (1 seat); Aged and Handicapped (1); Fishery and Agriculture (1)

One for each sector: Imports and Exports; textiles and clothing; manufacturing; retailing; Hotel and Catering; Transport and Communication; Business Services; Household members; finance, insurance and Property; Public and Social Services; Agriculture, fishery, electricity and building.1

Expand the franchise to cover nonworking women, students and retired persons.

Composition of nine new seats in functional constituencies

Note 1 Published in a Meeting Point document, May 1993.

Sources: Hansard, June 29, 1994; Document issued by Constitutional Affairs Branch on Patten’s Reform, 1993.

Should the legislature be fully and directly elected in 1995?

Party

Table 7.1 Different stances among Hong Kong’s pro-democratic parties towards pace and extent of democratization proposed in 1994

148

Decline in mobilization for democracy After getting elected in 1991, we needed to devote enormous resources to get adjusted to the legislature activities. The UDHK lacked adequate manpower. We were at that time very preoccupied with district affairs, and had two to three meetings very week in constituencies. We were kept so busy that our attendance rates at the legislature have been already low. Besides, to get re-elected, party members have to pay more attention to district affairs. (Interview with Yeung Sum, former vice-chairman of UDHK, October 21, 1994)

Another key player has further elucidated his views: Chris Patten has taken the initiative with his democratic reform, and we tend to be reactive. Everybody knows that the main actors in the struggle are the British and Chinese Governments. Eventually, the legislature voting will seal the destiny of the reform. What we should do is ensure that enough votes would be garnered in the legislature. In addition, judging from the track records of mass mobilizations, the chance of launching a large-scale mass mobilization for Hong Kong’s democracy remained flimsy, and that has also dampened our efforts in that direction. (Interview with Lee Wing-tat, vice-chairman of Democratic Party, August 3, 2001) In short, the overloaded legislature works and pessimism with successful bottom-up mass mobilization have precluded the UDHK from resorting to using that strategy. Mass mobilization not only suffered as a result of those parties’ calculations, but also because of the sharp division between prodemocracy social groups in the civil society and the parties in the political society. The absence of mass mobilization has eventually depressed the bargaining power of local pro-democratic opposition in resisting democratic reversal.

Division between pro-democracy social groups in civil society and in political society Since the unfolding of Patten’s reform, two alliances of pro-democracy social groups of civil society have been formed. They were the Joint Association of People’s Organizations (JAPOD) and Full Democracy in 1995 (FD), mainly composed of urban social movement groups. JAPOD was established in late 1992, immediately after Patten unveiled his political reforms.2 It was composed of thirty-six small organizations from civil society. JAPOD pressed for the direct elections of half of the seats in the legislature in 1995 and 1997 (Appendix 7), and openly supported Patten’s package.

Decline in mobilization for democracy 149 The FD was formed in the middle of 1993. It consisted of twenty organizations from civil society (Appendix 4). It campaigned for the relatively more progressive blueprint of having a fully directly elected legislature installed in 1995. Why did the democratic opposition become more divided? Bodies in civil society were worried about the potential dominance of political parties over the democratic alliances. The setting up of parties, especially the relatively powerful United Democrats of Hong Kong, startled some vigilant campaigners in the two opposition alliances of civil society into warding off any domination from political parties.3 Moved by a calling to hold not just the government but also political parties accountable, the two opposition alliances barred members of parties from participating in the alliances as party representatives, thus lessening the motive for party participation in the alliance.4 A key member of the alliance can vividly vindicate the reservation of JAPOD over those parties: The Democratic Party has a very hierarchical system with big brothers dictating decisions. Szeto Wah is a dictator of the party, who has had no greater internal value guiding him to pursue human rights and democracy. They tend to think that the struggle for democracy should be subordinate to political considerations or contingencies. If that is the case, then you should do nothing at all. As for the Meeting Point, they defend the politically retrogressive Basic Law in justifying their conservative stance over Hong Kong’s democratization. They don’t mention human rights in their platforms, and just become the supporters of some draconian laws that transgress the freedoms of Hong Kong. (Interview with Law Yuk Kai, August 14, 1994) The dearth of consensus between parties and civil groups in the two alliances on the pacing of democratization has forged more schism between them. The two pro-democracy alliances have vociferously demanded a speedy pace of democratization, without the fervent desire for long-term growth in their membership and resources that such parties needed. The FD and JAPOD demanded respectively 100 percent and “no less than 50 percent” of the seats in the legislature of 1995 be directly elected by all adult citizens.5 Intent on securing long-term viability and averting presenting any radical image to the potential electorate, Meeting Point and the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood raised relatively conservative platforms compared to those of civil groups. Both of those parties have been more polite to China than the UDHK, and had amiable meetings with the Chinese Government in the early 1990s. Even the UDHK has presented a more conciliatory stance in face of the mammoth potential pressure from the Chinese Government:

150

Decline in mobilization for democracy UDHK doesn’t want to look like “too confrontational” towards the Chinese Government. Afterwards, we have to deal with it after the handover. In particular, as we have so many pro-democracy leaders in our Party, having too many confrontations with the Chinese Government may not bode well for the prospect of Hong Kong’s democracy. (Interview with Ho Chun Yan, former vice-chairman, July 21, 1994)

Another active UDHK member explained their move with an elated sense of pragmatism: China was afraid of subjecting itself to increasing international influences, therefore, it was against the [reform] platform and condemned it. It would therefore be very unrealistic to suggest another, which is even more radical than Patten’s. Besides, the UDHK demanded thirty seats of half of the total seats in the legislature be elected; in reality, it is difficult to attain and to mobilize the people. If it demanded full democracy, it would deviate from reality even further. Even the UDHK couldn’t field sixty people to run in elections. Nor can the local capitalists and pro-China groups mobilize that many to run elections either. (Mak Ho Wah, July 5, 1993) Thus, the institutionalization of the parties has contributed to their moderation, set them further apart from the informal political opposition, and compounded the difficulty of cooperating with pro-democracy alliances in civil society. What impact has the division in the pro-democracy opposition had on the two alliances in civil society?

Weak pro-democracy mobilization in the early 1990s Given the aforementioned divisions between the parties and civil society, though the UDHK has at times joined some meetings of JAPOD, the political party has maintained a low profile to avoid the charge of being manipulative and tainting the representativeness of JADOP. The low profile of the UDHK, plus the fact that the two other parties did not join the alliance, has reduced the overall influence of the opposition groups in civil society. Consequently, the latter could not borrow resources from the three parties. Worse still, the poor media coverage of pro-democratic mobilization has aggravated the weakness of the two pro-democracy alliances. In Hong Kong, given a politically fragile civil society, the pro-democratic opposition has long been haunted by the lack of famous leaders. Most of the well-known leaders and activists of the dissolved JCPDG have joined the various political parties, especially the UDHK.6 The corollary has been a

Decline in mobilization for democracy 151 lack of celebrated and veteran leaders within the two opposition alliances. The lack of leadership, mobilization skills, and networks of the two alliances has caused a decline in media reports and in their political mobilization (see Table 8.10). Consequently, in terms of the number of constituent organizations and strength of mobilization (see Table 8.9), the two pro-democracy alliances that were formed after 1992 have been dwarfed by their predecessor, the JCPDG of the 1980s, despite a higher level of economic development in Hong Kong in the ensuing decade. In the prolonged row between the British and Chinese Governments over the Governor’s political reform, the Hong Kong public remained on the sidelines. Opinion surveys revealed that public support for Chris Patten was stifled by China’s persistent threats to demolish Hong Kong’s political structure in 1997 if the reforms were implemented (Chung, 1993b), despite the fact that the majority of the public supported the reform. Lacking consistent and robust backing from the public and the middle class, the already frail JAPOD and the FD found it difficult to push their cause strongly. JAPOD produced a number of street dramas and distributed printed caricatures, mocking the opponents of the reform. The FD organized forums in various districts to muster community support and attract media coverage for their campaigns. However, the small-scale public participation in those events depressed the media coverage, sparking off a general decline in the political opposition of civil society.7 Moreover, the acrimonious conflicts between some members of JAPOD and a pro-democratic party, i.e., Meeting Point, have further undermined the collective mobilization power of the entire pro-democracy camp. The United Ants, a member organization of the FD and JAPOD, urged legislators of Meeting Point to resign because they abstained in a vote on their colleague Emily Lau Wai-hing’s bill seeking a fully directly elected legislature (South China Morning Post, August 8, 1994).8 The United Ants also sponsored a newspaper advertisement attacking the party as limited democrats (ibid.). Finally, it also distributed flyers in various constituencies condemning the representatives of Meeting Point standing as candidates in local elections. These attacks have provoked both the UDHK and Meeting Point to reprimand the Ants for leading a destructive campaign (South China Morning Post, July 28, 1994).

Tension between civil society and political society has induced decline in pro-democratic mobilization (1992–4) Comparative studies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe show that the different roles, strategies, and interests of civil society and political society have set off clashes and diminished their collective mobilization power for democratization (Collier, 1999; Dryzek and Holmes, 2000; Encarnacion, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stepan, 2001: 174). Likewise, in Hong Kong,

152


the previous sections have highlighted that the divided opposition of political parties and pro-democracy alliances in civil society between 1992 and 1994 has replaced the earlier unified and vibrant alliance that operated between 1984 and 1990. Our study reveals that soon after the opposition groups in civil society helped to establish some practically democratic institutions and political parties in the 1990s, the opposition groups began to be ousted by the parties. The parties have since then stolen the spotlight, and undermined the mobilization as well as the vitality of the pro-democratic alliances in civil society. Such a move generally happened in countries with historically strong states, weak civil society, and an effective party system, like Chile and Uruguay (Alvarez and Escobar, 1992: 317–30). In Hong Kong, with the protracted supremacy of a strong bureaucratic state over a politically weak civil society, the opposition forces in civil society have suffered from the lack of adroit leaders and activists. Though party-building is still in its infancy in Hong Kong, the emergence of parties amid democratization has switched the scarce resources of leadership and activists to the parties and, accordingly, caused the shift of media coverage from the opposition of civil society to political parties. In the case of Hong Kong during this period, the tension between civil society and political society has weakened the pro-democratic mobilization, and thus their bargaining power vis-à-vis the anti-democratic forces. Considering the weakness in prodemocratic alliances and public support for Patten’s reform, it was particularly tempting for the Chinese Government to reverse the limited democracy set up by Patten.

Weak support for democracy enhanced the Chinese Government’s reversal of democratization in Hong Kong before mid-1997 Confronted with economic and political crises, Leninist states like the former Soviet Union and North Korea responded by political liberalization and total isolation respectively. By contrast, the Chinese Government adopted a “third way” of development. It wanted economic liberalization without political liberalization as China embarked on economic growth.9 A fully and speedily democratized Hong Kong, which was scheduled to be reverted to China, could free Hong Kong from China’s control or even stir up mainland China’s desire for democracy. Given that Patten’s reform would make Hong Kong more democratic, enlarging its electoral base and rendering Hong Kong less controllable after 1997, the Chinese Government was resolved to dismantle the limited democracy set up by Patten. To dampen pro-democratic crusades initiated by the British Government and local pro-democracy forces, the Chinese Government, together with the post-handover new Chief Executive of Hong Kong, adopted three tactics to reverse Hong Kong’s limited democracy.

Decline in mobilization for democracy 153

The Chinese Government’s three major strategies to reverse Hong Kong’s limited democracy First strategy: appointing the powerful Preparatory Committee and scrapping the elected legislature To block the legislature set up by Patten from straddling 1997, the Beijing Government resolved to demolish it under the pretext that the composition of the legislature contravened the legal documents signed between Beijing and London.10 To ensure the smooth reversion of sovereignty, Beijing set up an interim legislature called the Provisional Legislature before the handover, which presumably immediately would replace the legislature set up by Patten after the handover. By appointing a proBeijing Chief Executive for the post-handover Hong Kong and controlling the composition of the Provisional Legislature, Beijing could effectively reverse the limited democracy in Hong Kong. How were the Provisional Legislature and Chief Executive chosen? In 1995 the Chinese Government selected 150 members for the Preparatory Committee (PC), of which 94 were capitalists and politicians from Hong Kong, and the rest were mainland Chinese experts or officials. The Preparatory Committee had the exclusive power to elect members for the 400-member body of the Selection Committee (SC), which would then select the post-handover Chief Executive of Hong Kong and the 60member Provisional Legislature (PL). To guarantee that mainly those toeing the Beijing line would be “selected” to join the Provisional Legislature and become the first post-handover Chief Executive, Beijing appointed predominantly pro-Beijing capitalists to the Preparatory Committee. Most organized and politically vocal capitalists in Hong Kong have aligned with Beijing in impeding Hong Kong’s democratic transition.11 These capitalists understood that speedier democratization would mean an end to their easy access to the upper political echelons, an escalation in political conflicts between the pro-democratic camp and Beijing, and the introduction of new redistributive policies against the rich. Last but not least, the captivating investment opportunities of China, amid the deepening economic integration between Hong Kong and China since the early 1980s, provided the powerful inducement to capitalists to refrain from publicly espousing democracy.12 Considering the importance of local capitalists in advancing Hong Kong’s economy, and their antipathy towards speedier democratization in Hong Kong, the Chinese Government was enthusiastic about co-opting them, particularly from the prime corporations, into the Preparatory Committee. The Preparatory Committee has subsequently widened the impact of capitalists by infusing the Selection Committee and Provisional Legislature with a highly visible proportion of capitalists. Consequently, in the

154


Preparatory Committee, capitalists made up 64.9 percent of the ninetyfour Hong Kong members.13 In the Selection Committee and Provisional Legislature, capitalists once more were the most visible groups, taking up 61.5 percent and 61.7 percent of their total members respectively.14 Moreover, a sizable proportion of capitalists in the three bodies were local economic heavyweights, attached to one or more of the thirty-three leading companies whose share values constitute the key local stock index – the Hang Seng Index. Specifically, capitalists in the Preparatory Committee, the Selection Committee, and the Provisional Legislature represented respectively 18, 23 and 7 of those 33 leading companies, correspondingly accounting for 44.88 percent (US$132.35 billion), 60.2 percent (US$242.46 billion), and 12.2 percent (US$49.08 billion), of the total capitalization value of all shares formally listed on the Hong Kong stock market (Figure 7.1).15 Notably, except for a representative from the British firm of Inchcape Pacific Ltd., all the other major British conglomerates, including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Swire, and Jardines were deliberately excluded from the Preparatory Committee by the PRC. The exclusion highlights the Chinese Government’s resolve to preclude any possible British interference with its exercise of political control over Hong Kong’s long-term political structure.16 The pro-Beijing nature of the Preparatory Committee, the Selection Committee, and the Provisional Legislature was further corroborated by the political affiliation of their members. Among the Hong Kong members of the Preparatory Committee with local party affiliations, members of four local pro-China parties took up 78 percent of the seats in the Prepara-

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 PC

SC

PL

Figure 7.1 Capitalization value of leading companies with representatives in the PC, SC or PL: proportion of the total value of all shares listed in Hong Kong’s stock market. Source: Calculations based on data from the Hong Kong Economic Journal, (December 1996), pp. 126–32; (December 1995), 126–32 and Ming Pao Daily, 2 November, 1996.

Decline in mobilization for democracy 155 tory Committee, 88 percent of the Selection Committee and 59 percent in the Provisional Legislature (Figure 7.2). The figures would have been higher if the Liberal Party had been included. While we do not view the Liberal Party as an all-out pro-Beijing party, it has been a faithful ally to China in terms of forestalling Hong Kong’s democratic development. The Chinese Government preferred to exercise water-tight control over the membership of the high-powered Preparatory Committee. Beijing thus did not appoint anyone belonging to the pro-democratic parties of the Democratic Party or the Frontier to the Preparatory Committee.17 Nor could any member of the Democratic Party or the Frontier be found in the Selection Committee or Provisional Legislature. Instead, the Chinese Government and the Selection Committee only absorbed a token number of members from a more moderate pro-democracy party, the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood into the Preparatory Committee (two) and the Provisional Legislature (four). Though the PRC invited the Democratic Party to stand for the alleged “election” for the Provisional Legislature, the latter chose not to participate in tokenism. Insisting on the illegality of the Provisional Legislature, and believing that only a disproportionately small number of members of the Democratic Party would be chosen by the pro-Beijing Selection Committee even if they were to join the race, the Democratic Party leaders were convinced that its moral basis and political support would dwindle once it participated in the Provisional Legislature.18 As a result, the interim legislature contained no members of the Democratic Party. The dominance of pro-Beijing figures in the Preparatory Committee, the Selection Committee, and the Provisional Legislature is reflected by

100% 90% 80% 59%

70% 60%

78%

88%

50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% PC Pro-China

ADPL

SC

PL

LP

Figure 7.2 Proportion of seats undertaken by different parties in the Preparatory Committee, Selection Committee and Provisional Legislature.

156


the fact that a high proportion of them were granted prior appointments by the Chinese Government into bodies under its control, such as the National People’s Congress (NPC), the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or Hong Kong Affairs Advisors (HKAA). Eighty-three out of the ninety-four Hong Kong members of the Preparatory Committee, or 88 percent, had been granted positions in at least one of those bodies by the PRC before they joined the former. Likewise, in the Provisional Legislature, thirty-six out of sixty members, i.e., 60 percent of it, held similar titles before joining it. Their prior appointments into China-controlled bodies have again corroborated their pro-Beijing standing. Finally, owing to the fact that members of the Preparatory Committee can vote themselves into the SC and the PL, and due to the limited number of eligible voters for each body, the process of “self-selection” led to an extensive overlapping of membership in those bodies. Thus, these bodies are subject to the dominance of a unified, pro-Beijing political force composed of leading capitalists and pro-Beijing parties. As the Selection Committee was empowered to “elect” the post-handover Provisional Legislature and Chief Executive, whether there was a unitary force on the Selection Committee and its “parent body,” the Preparatory Committee should be investigated. Figure 7.3 shows that among the ninety-four Hong Kong members of the Preparatory Committee (PC), as many as seventyeight also belonged to the 400-member-strong Selection Committee. The overlapping members tend to have a common political stand against democratization in Hong Kong, given that 81 percent of them are from pro-Beijing parties (Figure 7.4), and 68 percent of them are capitalists (Figure 7.5). Among the fifty-three capitalists sitting on both the PC and the SC, nine represent the sixteen leading companies in Hong Kong, which constitute the Hang Seng stock index.19 Though the Chinese Government claimed that the Provisional Legislature was an interim body that would last for only about one year after the handover of sovereignty, it has

PC members (16)

Overlapping members of PC and SC(78)

SC members (322)

Figure 7.3 Extent of overlapping between Preparatory Committee (PC) and Selection Committee (SC).

Decline in mobilization for democracy 157 ADPL 4%

Liberal Party 15%

Pro-China parties 81%

Figure 7.4 Party affiliations of the overlapping members of Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee.

Caring professionals 17%

Practical professionals 1%

Labor 6%

Others 8%

Capitalist 68%

Figure 7.5 Occupations of the overlapping members of Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee. Note: “Caring professionals” include journalists, lawyers, social workers, teachers, doctors, town planners and nurses, and social workers. “Labor” refer to those labor union organizers or representatives. “Practical professionals” include surveyors, engineers, accountants, and computer analysts.

performed an important function in rolling back Hong Kong’s democratic development by doing the following: 1

2

It passed a few important bills initiated by the new post-handover Hong Kong Government, which curbed to a certain extent civil liberties in Hong Kong immediately after its formal inception on July 1, 1997. It has also passed the bills that endorse a new electoral system, which drastically emasculated the inclusiveness of electorates and systematically sidelined the pro-democracy opposition for the elections to the legislature in 1998.

158


Second strategy: reverse democratic development by electoral arrangement for the 1998 legislature According to the Basic Law, in the first elected legislature for the posthandover Hong Kong, all of its sixty seats would be elected. Among them, twenty would be produced by geographical constituencies through direct elections, and the other forty seats via indirect elections. For the forty indirectly elected seats, ten would be produced by the Election Committee, and the remaining thirty by functional constituencies. The Chinese Government has prevented Hong Kong’s democratic development via its influence in the pro-Beijing Preparatory Committee by restricting the choices of electoral arrangements for the first elected legislature. Despite the promise of a high degree of autonomy for the post-1997 government, the Preparatory Committee has been empowered by the Chinese Government to lay out the parameters before 1997 for the elections of Hong Kong’s legislature for 1998. The Preparatory Committee stipulated that (a) the nine new functional constituencies introduced in the 1995 elections under Patten’s reform be produced mainly by corporate votes, rather than individual votes in 1998; and (b) the twenty directly elected seats be generated by either proportional representation or multiple-seats-multipleconstituencies. As seen in Table 7.2, there would be glaring reduction in terms of political inclusion and representation between Patten’s democratic electoral arrangement for 1995–7 and that planned for 1998. Table 7.2 Democratic reversal of Hong Kong after handover: political structure before and after handover Patten’s reform before handover (1994–mid 1997)

After handover

Broaden the franchises of nine new functional constituencies to include 2.7 million new voters’ individual votes

Chief Executive Office has proposed to narrow franchise of the nine new functional constituencies to about 20,000, mostly of corporate votes

The Election Committee that elects ten seats in the legislature is formed by the directly elected District Board members

The Election Committee is formed by functional constituencies with a much narrower franchise

Apply single-constituency-single-vote plurality voting system to the twenty directly elected seats

Propose to use proportional representation with largest remainders method: would further erode the seats of pro-democracy forces in legislature

Abolish appointed members to Municipal Councils and District Boards; all members directly elected

New Chief Executive has appointed 25 percent of new members into Municipal Councils and District Boards. None of them belong to pro-democracy groups while a sizable proportion of them belong to pro-Beijing political forces

Decline in mobilization for democracy 159 First, concerning functional constituencies, according to the Basic Law, at least for ten years after the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty, thirty or one half of the seats in its legislature would be produced through functional constituencies, that comprise separate constituencies for various professional, business, and labor groups. Each specified constituency would elect its own representatives to the legislature. In 1995, under Patten’s reform package, nine new seats were added to the original twenty-one seats of functional constituencies. The eligible electors of the nine new functional seats, unlike the traditional twenty-one, comprised a broad base of virtually the entire working population in Hong Kong other than those working in the twenty-one narrow functional sectors. As a result, Patten dramatically added 2.7 million new eligible electors under his reform. In 1998, however, under the Preparatory Committee’s decision, the franchise for the nine new functional seats would be drastically reduced, leaving the total eligible voters for the entire thirty functional seats less than 200,000 (Bjornlund et al., 1997: 12). What’s more, for many sectors, the right to vote would also be shifted from individuals working in different occupational sectors to various corporate heads among those sectors. Such a new arrangement would not only sharply reduce the political inclusion and representation of the legislature in 1988, but also, owing to the use of corporate voting, the candidates are more likely to be pro-business and anti-democratic employers or managing executives.20 Next, for the ten seats produced through the indirect elections of the Election Committee, under Patten’s reform package, they were formed by the votes of 283 directly elected local councilors, i.e., District Board members. The fact that all the eligible voters were themselves directly elected in 1995 could ensure a measurable degree of political accountability and representativeness. For 1998, however, according to the Basic Law, they would be generated by elections among 800 members of the Committee, with 200 coming from each of the following four sectors: (a) industrial, commercial and financial sectors; (b) professionals; (c) labor, social services, religious and other sectors; and (d) members of the Legislative Council, representatives of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. For the first three sectors mentioned above, corporate voting by heads of various local corporations similar to those used for most functional constituencies would be adopted as the dominant method to produce the 600 members. Because of the small numbers of the electorates and their backgrounds as corporate heads, the 800-strong members of the Election Committee would be more amenable to pressures from Beijing than the past arrangement. Hence, the final ten members “elected” via the Election Committee would very likely be probusiness and politically conservative. This is especially the case since the

160


executive authorities led by Tung proposed the use of winner-take-all method in the elections involving the Election Committee. Under the new method, each member of the 800-strong Election Committee would produce a list of ten preferred members, and the ten that received the most votes would win. Given the pro-business nature of members of the Election Committee, it is likely they would form coalitions and win a crushing victory over candidates from the pro-democracy camp in the Election Committee. Regarding the twenty directly elected seats, the high-powered and policy-making Executive Council led by the Chief Executive recommended that the post-handover Hong Kong adopt proportional representation in its forthcoming election for the new legislature in 1998, to replace the first-past-the-post, single-seat-single-vote method of 1995. Candidates would run on party lists, despite the fact that the new electoral system would allow independent candidates to form “single-candidate” lists. More precisely, of the varieties of proportional representation, the “largest remainders method” was proposed by the Chief Executive Office to be adopted for the 1998 elections. Under the new electoral system, the total number of votes cast is divided by the total number of seats in a constituency. This produces a quota, and each party list gets a seat for each quota of votes it wins. The remaining seats are granted to the list(s) with the largest number of remaining votes (Bjornlund et al., 1997: 10). Cross-national studies have proved the close association between proportional representation and the multi-party system.21 Why did Tung and the new Hong Kong Government back up the method? As Tung made clear when commenting on his design for the electoral system for 1998, he has always tried to secure a so-called strong Executive-led government. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the post-handover government under his leadership would like to see a legislature fragmented by multiparties or coalitions in which no single force, especially the democratic camp, is dominant enough to pose a substantial challenge to the executive authorities. The presence of multi-parties under such a proposed electoral system renders a legislature dominated by a pro-democracy coalition virtually impossible in 1998. It also means that even the less popular pro-Beijing parties would virtually be guaranteed a number of seats in the future legislature, dampening the chance for initiating or passing a democratic reform package in future. Given that the Democratic Party was the most popular pro-democracy party in the past two direct elections and remained so in the opinion surveys after the handover, the suggested method would further weaken the largest and most popular pro-democracy force in Hong Kong.22 When all the above-mentioned electoral arrangements are in place, the democratic camp including the Democratic Party is expected to be reduced to a more insignificant role than before. The chance for any party

Decline in mobilization for democracy 161 to dominate the legislature and hence to effectively monitor the executive branch would simply be greatly reduced, leaving Chee-hwa Tung and the executive authorities, and in turn, the Chinese Government a lot of leeway to put Hong Kong under its control. As expected, the above-mentioned electoral arrangement has only resulted in a small number of pro-democracy groups or individuals winning in the elections, despite their obvious popularity in 1998 (see Table 8.1). Third strategy: the post-handover Chief Executive handpicked by Beijing has curbed democratization Among the four well-known candidates competing for the position of the first post-handover Chief Executive, Chee-hwa Tung, the heir to an international shipping business, has earned the greatest support from Beijing. The Chinese Government sent a clear signal to the extent that he was widely believed to have been handpicked by Beijing as Chief Executive for Hong Kong (International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1996). Tung’s international business stature and his conservative political views made him attractive to Beijing.23 Moreover, given that Tung’s business assets were dwarfed by one of his competitors, K.C. Ng., handpicking Tung instead of Ng can reduce the threats to other key business corporations in Hong Kong. Retrospectively, Tung’s biggest attraction lay in his loyalty to Beijing’s interests, including his resolve to roll back Hong Kong’s democracy. Immediately before he came to his power as the Chief Executive, Tung had already lashed out at the democratization process as divisive and over-depoliticizing Hong Kong society. Also, he criticized political parties, including the Democratic Party, and various prodemocratic pressure groups, calling them myopic and detrimental to the long-term interests of Hong Kong. Accordingly, he promoted a strong Executive-led government led by him and governed by consensus-building (Hong Kong Economic Journal, October 28, 1996). More importantly, Tung backed up his verbal attacks on limited democracy with policies to roll back the partially democratic institutions. Tung has also reduced the power of the pro-democracy opposition in Hong Kong by discriminatory appointments against the pro-democratic forces. First, he appointed to Hong Kong’s powerful cabinet-like Executive Council mostly some unwavering opponents of democracy in Hong Kong.24 Next, immediately after the handover, Tung disbanded not just the former legislature, but also the local district council, i.e., the District Board, and the two municipal councils in charge of municipal affairs. He erected the Provisional Legislature, the Provisional District Councils and two provisional municipal councils to take over the functions of their predecessors. Pro-democratic opposition suffered another grave setback as Tung appointed one quarter of the new and largely pro-Beijing members

162


to those new Provisional District Councils, as well as to the two provisional municipal councils, i.e., the Provisional Regional Council and the Provisional Urban Council. Of the ninety-six members of the Provisional District Boards newly appointed by Tung, 23 percent of them belonged to two pro-China political parties.25 Regarding the Provisional Urban Council and the Provisional Regional Council, Tung, appointed nine and eleven new members respectively, with many of them closely connected to Beijing.26 On the contrary, not a single member of local pro-democracy groups was appointed.27 This chapter has shown how the Chinese Government and its handpicked new Chief Executive for post-handover Hong Kong, Chee-hwa Tung, have made plans and taken steps to reverse the limited democracy erected by Chris Patten before the handover. The next chapter will elaborate the further steps that the Chinese Government has taken to reverse Hong Kong’s limited democracy after the handover.

8

Further democratic reversal in the post-handover period (mid-1997–2002)

With the unfolding of the third and fourth wave of global democratization, the total number of electoral democracies has jumped from 39 from 1974 to 120 in 2000 (Lipset et al., 2000) globally. Even in mid-2002, however, Hong Kong has not successfully finished its democratic transition. Chapter 7 reveals the new master of the post-handover Hong Kong was determined to change the limited democracy of Hong Kong by 1997 back to a more authoritarian one. Though democratization in Hong Kong has progressed slowly since the mid-1980s, it was drastically reversed within a few months after the handover of the territory from Britain to China. This chapter demonstrates how the Chinese Government and the posthandover Special Administrative Region (SAR) government have continued to undo the democratic structures prescribed by Patten by the following tactics after the handover: 1 2 3

marginalizing the legislature and curbing its power to oversee the executive branch; reinstating of appointed seats for District Councils; abolition of Municipal Councils and curtailment of meaningfulness of political opposition.

The latter part of the chapter discusses how those measures and other factors have further weakened public support for the pro-democratic opposition in general and the pro-democratic parties in particular. Taken as a whole, this chapter reveals the political handover of Hong Kong amid the agonizing economic crisis has not only brought about the dismantling of democratic structures, but also the ascribing of a low public priority to democratization.

164

Further democratic reversal, mid-1997–2002

A marginalized legislature with less power to oversee government Before the handover, the legislature in Hong Kong had long been characterized as having little power vis-à-vis its counterpart in Western democracies. Norton (1990) generates a three-fold classification of legislatures in terms of their impact on policy: 1

2

3

Policy-making legislatures: they can not only change or discard measures brought by the executive but can formulate and replace legislation of their own. The US Congress is the prime illustration of this type. Policy-influencing legislatures: they can modify and sometimes reject executive proposals but cannot formulate or replace policy of its own. The German Bundestag and the British Parliament were the major examples. Legislatures with poor or no policy effect: they can neither amend nor reject what the executive prefer to formulate, as found in the former Communist bloc.

The legislature in Hong Kong before the handover could at best be categorized as the policy-influencing one. When legislators were united, they could influence policies and legislations via motion debates, private member bills, and rejecting or threatening to reject government’s requests for expenditure. Its monitoring power, though limited, has faced obvious curtailment after the handover. Before the handover, the passing of motions and bills in the legislature only required a simple majority of members present. Since the handover, under the prescription of the Basic Law: The passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual members of the Legislative Council shall require a simple majority vote of each of the two groups of members present: members returned by functional constituencies and those returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections and by the Election Committee. (Annex II, Basic Law) The enforcement of Annex II of the Basic Law has severely diluted the supervisory role of the legislature. How likely is it for the post-handover legislature to pass motions and initiate private member bills with the simple majority vote of both groups of members present since the handover? The answer depends on the political orientations of legislators. Between 1998 and 2002, under the direct influence of Hong Kong’s posthandover electoral system engineered by the Chinese and post-handover


165

SAR government, the pro-democratic and anti-democratic members have never occupied a simple majority number of seats for both groups (Table 8.1). The limited franchise and the “winners-take-all” method of producing members by the functional constituencies and Election Committee, plus the practice of proportional representation to produce the directly elected members, have altogether discouraged the entry of prodemocratic members into the legislature. For instance, Table 8.2 shows clearly that if the sixty seats in the legislature were entirely produced through direct elections, the pro-democratic forces composed of the Democratic Party, Frontier, the Citizens Party and the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood would have gained thirty-nine seats instead of eighteen seats. With the new electoral system in place since 1998, the pro-democratic forces as a whole, that include the Frontier, the Democratic Party, the Citizens Party, the Confederation of Trade Unions, and the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, have as a whole experienced a declining trend in terms of the proportion of seats in the legislature, while the anti-democratic DAB and the anti-democratic camp have enjoyed an upward trend. Between 1998 and 2000, twenty-five anti-democratic members belonging mainly to the Liberal Party, the DAB, the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, or the New Century Forum were produced in the group of functional constituencies. Their sheer number has enabled them to reject any pro-democratic motions with ease. The post-handover government has therefore secured the votes to nullify democratic legislators’ attempts to pass motions demanding democratization. Table 8.3 shows the democratic groups have failed completely to pass any motion demanding the speeding up of democratization between 1998 and 2001. Though motions would not be binding upon the government, passage of motions could discredit the government and put political pressure on the non-elected government battered with a string of social and economic crises. Consequently, the legislature has been reduced to a much weaker body with truncated monitoring power. Table 8.4 corroborates the detrimental effects of the newly introduced split voting for the legislature between 1998 and 2001. In total, sixty-nine motions of different nature were rejected in the legislature that would have witnessed their passage were it to operate under a simple majority voting method as implemented before the handover. In terms of initiating private member bills, the legislators’ power has also been attenuated since the handover, Article 74 of the Basic Law states unequivocally that: Members of the legislative council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may introduce bills in accordance with the provision of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which do not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government

15 (30)

Sub-total

15 (30)

Sub-total

9

7 (DAB) 1 (LP) 3 (HKPA) 4 (Independent)

Anti-democratic legislators 4 (DAB) 1 (LP) 1 (LDF) 1 (HKPA) 1 (Civil Force) 1 (Independent)

21

9 (DP) 3 (The Frontier) 1 (NWSC)# 1 (CP) 1 (Independent)

Pro-democratic legislators 14 (DP) 3 (ADPL) 1 (123) 3 (Independent)

13 (30)

7 (DAB) 3 (HKPA) 1 (NCF) 2 (Independent)

17 (30)

9 (DP) 2 (The Frontier) 1 (ADPL) 2 (CTU)* 1 (NWSC) 2 (Independent)

00–2

20

2 (DAB) 9 (LP) 1 (FTU) 1 (FLU) 7 (Independent)

10

25 (30)

2 (DAB) 9 (LP) 2 (HKPA) 1 (FTU) 1 (FLU) 10 (Independent)

5 (30)

25 (30)

3 (DAB) 8 (LP) 1 (HKPA) 1 (FTU) 1 (FLU) 11 (Independent)

5 (30)

5 (DP) 4 (DP) 3 (DP) 1 (ADPL) 1 (Independent) 2 (Independent) 1 (CTU) 1 (NWSC) 2 (Independent)

98–00

95–7

00–04

95–7

98–00

From functional constituencies

From geographical constituencies and election committee

Table 8.1 Declining number of pro-democratic legislators’ seats in legislature (1995–2002)

Note I define pro-democracy legislators as those who have voted for the bills proposed by the Democratic Party, the Frontier or the Confederation of Trade Union who demand rapid democratization. Table 8.1 has been constructed with the classification of legislators’ stances as follows. For the term 2000–4, pro-democratic legislators (geographical constituencies and election committee): Andrew Wong Wang-fat and Audrey Eu Yuet-mee (Independent); (functional constituencies): Margaret Ng and Michael Mak Kwok-fung; Anti-democratic legislators (geographical constituencies and election committee): Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai and Ng Leung-sing; legislators (functional constituencies): Raymond Ho Chung-tai, Eric Li Ka-cheung, David Li Kwok Po, Lui Ming-wah, Bernard Chan, Philip Wong Yu-hong, Timothy Fok Tsun-ting, Abraham Shek Lai-him, Henry Wu King-cheong and Lau Ping Cheung. For the term 1998–2000, Pro-democratic legislators include (geographical constituencies and election committee): Andrew Wong Wang-fat; (functional constituencies): Margaret Ng; Conservative legislators (geographical constituencies and election committee): Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai, Ng Leung-sing, Ma Fungkwok and Ng Ching-fai. For anti-democratic legislators (functional constituencies): Raymond Ho Chung-tai, Eric Li Ka-cheung, David Li Kwok Po, Lui Ming-wah, Bernard Chan, Philip Wong Yu-hong, Timothy Fok Tsun-ting and Fung Chi-kin; (functional constituencies): Leong Che-hung and Ambrose Cheung Wing-sum. For the term 1995–7, pro-democratic legislators (geographical constituencies and election committee): Andrew Wong Wang-fat, Emily Lau Wai-hing and Christine Loh Kung-wai; (functional constituencies): Margaret Ng, Leong Che-hung and Elizabeth Wong Chien Chi-lien; Anti-democratic legislators (geographical constituencies and election committee): Lo Suk-ching.

Sources: Ming Pao, September 19, 1995; Hong Kong Economic Times, May 26, 1998; Ming Pao, September 11, 2000; *Lee Cheuk-yan also member of the Frontier; #Leung Yiu-chung also member of the Frontier. DPHK the Democratic Party of Hong Kong; DAB Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong; LP Liberal Party; ADPL Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood; CTU Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions; NWSC the Neighbourhood and Workers’ Service Centre; HKPA the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance; FTU Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions; FLU the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions; LDF the Liberal Democratic Federation; NCF New Century Forum.

168


Table 8.2 Real and hypothetical results for the 1998 legislature elections Party

Real results (no. of seats)

Hypothetical results for fully direct elections to legislature based on vote totals from the 1998 direct elections

Democratic Party Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong Liberal Party Hong Kong Progressive Alliance The Frontier Citizens Party Independents Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood New Territories Alliance

13 10

26 17

10 5 4 1 17 0

1 N.A. 8 2 2 3

0

1

Source: Adapted from Bjornlund et al. (1997).

may be introduced individually or jointly by members of the Council. The written consent of the Chief Executive shall be required before bills relating to government policies are introduced. (Article 74, Basic Law) After the handover, the successful tabling of private member bills for discussion and voting is subject to the approval of the legislature’s president. The enforcement of Article 74 for the post-handover legislature has compounded the difficulty of passing private member bills. Consequently, the number of private member bills initiated and accepted in the legislature plunged between 1998 and 2001, in comparison to the term of 1995–7. Between 1995 and 1997, fifty-three private member bills, i.e., 23.2 percent of total bills in the same period, were tabled, twenty-six of them passed, which suggests a success rate of 49.1 percent (Ma, 2002: 355–6). Between July 1998 and July 2001, however, legislators proposed twenty-two such bills, and the President of the legislature only permitted four of them to be tabled (ibid.). In short, the legislators could hardly use private member bills to press the government since the handover. Other than emasculating the legislature’s power, the Chinese and posthandover SAR Government have also adopted other measures to reverse Hong Kong’s limited democracy.

Members of the Second Legislative Council of the HKSAR be directly elected in 2000, and that the Chief Executive for the second term of office be directly elected in 2002

Members of the Second Legislative Council of the HKSAR be directly elected in 2000, and that the Chief Executive for the second term of office be directly elected in 2002, and to this end, this Council urges the Chief Executive to set up forthwith a constitutional convention in which relevant constitutional issues can be discussed expeditiously and in an open and organized manner.

Urges the government not to reduce the existing powers and functions of district organizations and returning all seats by equal and universal suffrage

Amend Basic Law to have the Chief Executive and all Legislators be elected by universal suffrage to make both the executive authorities and the legislature accountable to the HK public

Abolish appointed and ex-officio membership in District Councils

Urges government to conduct a referendum on the retention or abolition of the two Municipal Councils

. . . if Hong Kong is to be developed into a first-class cosmopolitan city . . . this Council calls upon the Government to urgently take effective measures to establish a political system based on universal suffrage, a tradition of respect for human rights and the rule of law, and a social system that upholds social justice and the dignity of the individual . . .

Cheng Kar-foo (Democratic Party); July 15, 1998

Christian Loh (Citizens’ Party); July 15, 1998

Cyd Ho Sau Lan (Frontier); July 29, 1998

Lee Cheuk-yan (Confederation of Trade Union); Sept. 23, 1998

Lee Wing-tat (Democratic Party); Mar. 10, 1999

Fred Li (Democratic Party); Oct. 13, 1999

Martin Lee (Democratic Party); July 12, 2001

Sources: Minutes of legislature (Hansard) 19982001; http: //www.legco.gov.hk/english/.

Subject

Legislator who initiated the motion (affiliation)/date

Table 8.3 List of all motions demanding democratization rejected in post-handover legislature (1998–2001)

170


Table 8.4 Total number of motions rejected in post-handover legislature (1998–2001) under split voting method that would have been passed under the pre-handover simple plurality voting method Year

98–9 99–2000 2000–1 Sub-total

Types of motions Economy and social services

Political system and rule-oflaw

Others

16 18 23 57

4 2 3 9

3 – – 3

Source: Catholic Monitors on Legislative Councilors http://www.geocities.com/legco_ catholic_monitors/.

Further government-initiated democratic reversal in the post-handover period (mid-1997–2002) Reinstatement of appointed seats for District Councils Before the handover, the representative organizations in Hong Kong were composed of three-tiered bodies. At the top was the legislature, followed by the mid-tier Urban and Regional Councils responsible for municipal affairs, and the lowest-tiered District Councils taking care of district concerns in eighteen districts. Since the handover, the SAR’s Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has further reversed the limited democracy in Hong Kong by reinstating the appointment system for the eighteen District Councils in 1999. The District Councils, comprising 468 members, advise the government on matters affecting: (1) the well-being of district residents; (2) the provision and use of public facilities; and (3) the use of public funds allocated for local public works and community activities. The government announced in December 1998 to boost its total membership by 102 by increasing the same number of appointed seats (US Department of State, 1999). Among the first batch of appointed members announced for the District Councils, the pro-Beijing parties of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, and the Liberal Party were respectively given 12, 12 and 9 seats by the government, while pro-democratic parties were denied any appointed seats. The appointment turned the DAB into a bigger force than the Democratic Party by nine seats (South China Morning Post, Dec. 31, 1999) at the district level. Such discriminatory measure has further skewed the political balance of power against the pro-democracy forces, which were already excluded from the Provisional Legislature. As some District Council members would join the Election Committee in 2002 to elect the second Chief Executive, the selective appointment has also appointed anti-


171

democratic supporters to select the second post-handover Chief Executive, and provoked the rumor of a political exchange between Tung and the anti-democratic District Council members (SCMP, Dec. 31, 1999). Such an accusation has in part been borne out by the wide-ranging support from District Council members and their eighteen chairpersons during Tung’s re-election bid (SCMP, Dec. 9, 2001). Abolition of municipal councils and curtailment of meaningfulness of political opposition Another sign of democratic reversal has been the abolition of two other representative, municipal organs, the Urban Council and the Regional Council. They offered municipal services to urban areas and the New Territories respectively. In December 1999, against ferocious criticisms, the government led by Tung marshaled a bill through the legislature to eliminate the Municipal Councils at the end 2000 (Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 1999). The government has disparaged the councilors for their poor handling of the avian flu, the red tide, and other public health problems. The government also stressed the new government bodies in lieu of the two councils would save more money and achieve greater effectiveness. While the cost-effectiveness of the two new government departments have never been proven to be superior to the two abolished councils, the abolition has unequivocally diminished the meaningfulness of political opposition in Hong Kong, i.e., a defining dimension of democracy. The curtailment of political opposition can be vindicated by the fact that before the abolition, the two councils enabled various parties, especially the pro-democratic ones, to monitor the government and to groom party activists. Two leaders of the Democratic Party, for instance, Lee Wing-tat and Li Wah-ming, were trained by those bodies before entering the legislature (Hong Kong Economic Journal, Oct. 14, 1998). The abolition has not only sapped political platforms and training grounds, but also adversely affected the finances of pro-democratic parties. For those parties, a sizable proportion of their incomes was derived from members affiliated to the three-tiered governmental structure. Those members provided the much needed political finance for the pro-democratic parties. Given that the two Municipal Councils have had the largest proportion of directly elected members among the three-tiered structure, the scrapping of the councils has dealt a heavy blow to pro-democratic parties and the significance of political opposition. In absolute size, the Democratic Party has suffered the largest financial loss. In terms of the percentage of parties’ revenue accounted for by the contribution of Municipal Council members, the Democratic Party has been ranked the second highest, topped by another pro-democratic party, the Association of Democracy and People’s Livelihood (Table 8.5). On the contrary, nearly 90 percent of the total revenue of the influential

172


Table 8.5 Estimated financial loss in party revenue due to the scrapping of Municipal Councils Political parties

No. of Members

Monthly salary Urban Regional submission Council Council (in thousands)

Democratic Party 13 DAB 8 Liberal Party 4 ADPL 4 Hong Kong Progressive 2 Alliance

11 9 1 1 3

$6.11 $4.33 $0 $2.03 –

Yearly loss in party revenue (in thousands)

Loss in party revenue (%)

$732.6 $519.6 $0 $243.1 –

16.91 2.12 0 47.63 –4

Source: Hong Kong Economic Times, Oct. 14, 1998. Notes 1 According to the given information from DP, the total revenue from Sept. 1998 to March 1999 was $2,534,539.3. The calculation is ($732,600/12*7)/$2,534,538.3*100% ⫽ 16.9. 2 According to the DAB financial report, the total revenue from April 1997 to March 1998 was $24,435,733.14. The calculation is ($519,600/$24,435,733.14)*100% ⫽ 2.1. 3 The figure was based on the submission of the staff at ADPL. 4 Due to the reason of confidentiality, HKPA was not willing to reveal either the submission percentage or the amount of members’ contribution.

pro-China party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong has come from donations. The dismantling of the councils has thus caused much less serious loss in its financial resources. The contracting financial resources of the pro-democratic parties have been accompanied by sagging public support for the pro-democratic parties, which further undermined their power of collective mobilization.

Declining public support for pro-democracy parties The weakened support for the pro-democratic parties over the years has further curtailed their mobilization strength for speedier democratization. Comparative studies in Latin America have shown that when political parties are well rooted in society, they can better coordinate the activities of dissidents, and give them a greater sense of security that, in turn, increases incentives for governing elites to agree to the rules of competition and cooperation.1 Strong and competitive parties can promote the political capacity of civil society to undermine authoritarianism and advance political liberalization (Corrales, 2001: 83). In Hong Kong, however, parties have remained weak and failed to establish their roots in society both before and after the handover. In terms of the size of members of major parties in Hong Kong, they are extremely small. In 2000, among six major local parties, only one of them, the anti-democratic Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), had more than 2,000 members (Table 8.6). When


173

Table 8.6 Membership of six major political parties in Hong Kong Year DPHK DAB Liberal Party 1998 495 2000 621

Frontier HKADPL HKPA New Century Forum

400⫹* 148 2007* 271 Sept.** 98

N.A. 90***

N.A. 250⫹*

Not yet formed 70****

Sources: Democratic Party, correspondence, 10 Aug., 2001; *Shing Tao Yat Po, Jan. 15, 2000; # Sept., 2001, Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, http: //www.dab.org.hk; *HK Economic Daily, Dec. 27, 1998; The Frontier, personal correspondence, Nov., 2001; Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, personal correspondence, Nov., 2001 and http: //www.adpl.org.hk/main.htm; **: Correspondence with Liberal Party, Sept. 2001; ***: Telephone interview with a representative of ADPL, Dec. 3, 2001; ****: Telephone interview with a representative of New Century Forum, Feb. 15, 2002. Note N.A.: Not available.

adding up the number of members of three pro-democratic parties, i.e., the Frontier, the Democratic Party of Hong Kong (DPHK), and the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (HKADPL) for the same year, they totaled less than one thousand (Table 8.6). The sharp contrasts in the proportions of total membership among the total electorates between Hong Kong and those of twenty European countries in 2000 bespeak the dismally minuscule public participation in parties (Table 8.7). The figure of 0.11 percent attained by Hong Kong in 2000 was less than one-tenth of Poland, a relatively young democracy and a country with the smallest ratio among twenty European countries. The corresponding figures for those European countries’ ratios ranged from 1.15 to 17.66 in 2000, far outnumbering that of Hong Kong. In particular, the two major pro-democratic parties, i.e., the Frontier and the Democratic Party, have failed to penetrate society. The failure of penetration has not only been vindicated by their meager memberships, but also by their lack of significant growth of party members (Figure 8.1) as well as a decline in public support. Different causes have contributed to the small membership of the major pro-democratic parties. For the Democratic Party, it has deliberately refrained from including new members in order to counteract any infiltration of anti-democratic members on the eve of the handover of Hong Kong.2 That said, the small size of the membership of the prodemocracy parties has still frustrated their mobilization power in both electoral and non-electoral struggles, when compared with their major rivals the anti-democratic FTU and DAB. With larger memberships and more successful community penetration, the FTU and DAB could have mobilized over a thousand activists during elections (Choy, 1999), something that could not be done by pro-democracy forces. The lesser degree of penetration into society of the Democratic Party than its major rival, DAB, has also been clearly mirrored in the relative

174


Table 8.7 Comparing membership/electorate ratios among Hong Kong and twenty European countries Country

Electorate

Total party membership

Membership/ electorate (M/E) (%)

Hong Kong (2000) Austria (1999) Belgium (1999) Czech Republic (1999) Denmark (1998) Finland (1998) France (1999) Germany (1999) Greece (1998) Hungary (1999) Ireland (1998) Italy (1998) The Netherlands (2000) Norway (1997) Poland (2000) Portugal (2000) Slovakia (2000) Spain (2000) Sweden (1998) Switzerland (1997) United Kingdom (1998)

3,055,371 5,838,373 7,343,464 8,116,836 3,993,099 4,152,430 39,215,743 60,762,751 8,862,014 8,062,708 2,741,262 48,744,846 11,755,132 3,311,190 28,409,054 8,673,822 4,023,191 33,045,318 6,601,766 4,593,772 43,818,324

0, 3,337 1,031,052 0,480,804 0,319,800 0,205,382 0,400,615 0,615,219 1,780,173 0,600,000 0,173,600 0,086,000 1,974,040 0,294,469 0,242,022 0,326,500 0,346,504 0,165,277 1,131,250 0,365,588 0,293,000 0,840,000

0.111 17.66 6.55 3.94 5.14 9.65 1.57 2.93 6.77 2.15 3.14 4.05 2.51 7.31 1.15 3.99 4.11 3.42 5.54 6.38 1.92

Sources: Mair and van Biezen (2001: 5–21); Interviews with local parties. Note 1 They have been calculated based on the total sum of members of the Frontier, Liberal Party, Democratic Party of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, i.e., the six parties of the legislature in Hong Kong. Members of the Democratic Party and Frontier 700 No.of members

549

500 400

621

563

600

578

592

593

586

458

300 200

148

123

100

98

68

0 1994

1995

1996

1997 1998 Year

1999

2000

2001

Democratic Party Frontier

Figure 8.1 Small sizes of memberships of two pro-democracy parties.


175

gain in vote shares and number of seats in the District Board elections. DAB made the enormous gain of 99 percent in both vote shares and number of seats in District Board elections between 1994 and 1999, outshining the single-digit growth of the Democratic Party (Table 8.8). As the electoral outcomes of the District Boards rest enormously on the voters’ expectations of the chance of getting pragmatic help from parties’ “resources networks” at community level, the Democratic Party has obviously paled in that connection vis-à-vis DAB. For the legislature elections, likewise, the Democratic Party has experienced a declining trend from 1995 to 2000 in terms of the proportion of vote shares and winning proportion in geographical constituencies elections, while DAB has enjoyed an upward trend in both.3 When the total winning proportions of pro-democracy groups in directly elected elections are considered, it has also suffered a continuous decline from 80 percent in 1995 to 62.51 percent in 2000. On the contrary, the anti-democratic groups and parties, including DAB, have experienced an upward trend of electoral support from 15 percent in 1995 to 33.33 percent in 2000 in terms of the total winning proportions (Li, 2000: 189–90; DeGloyer, 2000; the HKSAR Government’s homepage, http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/ result_c.htm). The drop in electoral support for the pro-democracy camp in general, and the DP in particular, is due to at least three factors. First, the “antiChina syndrome” that emerged after June 4, 1989 and promoted electoral support for pro-democracy forces has subsided with the passage of time. This reduction in anti-China feeling has especially been strongly reinforced by the absence of large-scale, draconian suppression of human rights by the Chinese Government after 1997. Therefore, a former major pillar of the electoral support for the pro-democracy forces has become a shaky one since the handover. Second, with the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong witnessed a rising public concern over socio-economic issues after the handover. With the Table 8.8 Comparison of District Board election result between DP and DAB Percentage of votes won in geographical constituencies elections

1994 1999 1999 divided by 1994

DP

DAB

⫹22.8 ⫹24.7 ⫹8%

⫹11.8 ⫹23.5 ⫹99%

■

Winning percentage in geographical constituencies elections DP

DAB

⫹21.7 ⫹22.1 ⫹2%

⫹10.7 ⫹21.3 ⫹99%

Sources: Louisie and Kwok-cheung (1995); the HKSAR Government’s official homepage for the 1999 District Councils Elections (http: //www.info.gov.hk/dcelect99/) on 30 November 1999.

176


enfeebled power of the local political parties and legislature especially, the public has in general been disenchanted with the incapacity of the parties to offer practical solutions or help regardless socio-economic issues, as indicated in the longitudinal surveys of party support to be analyzed in the later section of this chapter.4 Last but not least, the serious split within the Democratic Party regarding street mobilization, among other issues, has intensified the decline in popularity of the party. Compounding the pressure of the heavy workload of the legislature, the split has decreased the readiness of the party to resort to collective mobilization to press for more democracy. The split has also weakened public support for the Democratic Party that has further curtailed the mobilization strength of the political society.5 While the post-handover government’s active measures have significantly reversed the limited democracy in Hong Kong, the increasing decline in mobilization power of pro-democratic alliance has further dimmed the hope of making a bottom-up democratic breakthrough.

Further decline of pro-democracy opposition in civil society (1998–2000): Pro-democracy forces in civil society and political society This section reveals that a new pro-democratic alliance, i.e., “Democracy 2000,” composed of organizations from civil society and political parties, was formed in 1998 and existed till 2000. It shows that the persistence of division between pro-democratic parties and social groups in civil society has adversely affected the collective mobilization power of a new prodemocratic alliance called Democracy 2000. The division has reduced the political influences of the alliance regarding democratization. Consequently, from 1998 to 2000, the continuous decline in the strength of pro-democracy opposition that emerged in the early 1990s continued unabated from 1998 to 2000, dashing any hope of bringing more democracy to Hong Kong via a resurgence of bottom-up collective mobilization. Context of the formation of “Democracy 2000” – the prodemocratic alliance (1998–2000) In 1997, witnessing the democratic reversal of Hong Kong’s limited democracy, the Frontier, a pro-democratic party led by Emily Lau, side by side with a number of other civil groups, were keen to re-kindle the birth of a new democracy movement. They were eager to organize a Constitutional Forum discussing the future democratic development for Hong Kong, on the one hand, and have full democracy implemented in 2000 on the other. Therefore, the Frontier initiated the formation of a new pro-democratic alliance, called Democracy 2000 in late 1998. The new alliance has been formed with the general understanding that different bodies, though


177

sharing the common aim of striving for a fully democratically elected government in Hong Kong, differed on ways of achieving it.6 How many groups have actually joined the new alliance and what have been their mobilization powers? Constraints on Democracy 2000: limited commitment and mutual trust of members Vague membership, feeble organization, and common misgivings, and poor involvement of members have undermined the mobilization power of the Democracy 2000. Some organizations that participated in the alliance have not paid their membership fees, signaling the low level of identification with the alliance. The non-payment of those fees has made it difficult to define which bodies should be counted formally as its members. Assuming that those who attended any of its meetings were its members, there were in total twenty-three constituent organizations that could be considered members. Noticeably, the Frontier and the Democratic Party were also its members. When compared with other previous democratic alliances, Democracy 2000 was the smallest one in the number of constituent organizations (Table 8.9). Furthermore, the Alliance has been disturbed by the poor involvement of its members, hallmarked by a lack of distinct leadership. As no individuals or groups have been responsible for leading the movement, a small group of activists have been landed with the burden of the work: Table 8.9 Number of constituent organizations in three pro-democracy alliances Name of alliances

No. of constituent organizations

Maximum no. of people mobilized

JCPDG (1986–90)

95

JAPOD (1992–4) FD 95 (1992–4) Democracy 2000 (1999–2000)

33 15 23

Over 1 million (indirectly);1 5,000 (directly) 400 400 Few dozens, less than 100

Sources: Minutes of alliances, interviews transcripts, and various newspaper reports. Note 1 The JCPDG was the predecessor of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, which was formed on May 21, 1989. They shared more or less the same leaders in 1989. Since some leaders of the JCPDG including Martin Lee and Szeto Wah have become well known for their struggles for democratic reform, the similar leaders of the two bodies had lent credibility to the alliance and significantly enhanced the mobilization power of the alliance. The alliance has latterly exercised immense mobilization power as it managed to twice prompt over a million Hong Kong people to take to the streets to demand not just democratic reform for China in 1989, but also for Hong Kong (SCMP, May 25, 1989). Therefore, the JCPDG has indeed significantly contributed to the two unprecedentedly large-scale events demanding democratic reform in Hong Kong.

178

Further democratic reversal, mid-1997–2002 At first, we naively hope that different groups would take turns to set agendas and record minutes. As time passed, the actual onus of the tedious work of communication and mobilization have fallen on a few alliance members, stretching them to breakdown levels. Though some members said that they would like to do many tasks, but when called upon to do such things, they said that they were too busy and they left everything to you. I have therefore become very disillusioned! (Chan Siu Ping, July 18, 2000)

Another member of the alliance, who was a veteran organizing such activities in the past, was frustrated by the lack of organization and mutual trust among the members: The “Democracy 2000” was a very loosely organized body. There was not a clear division of labor, nor clear line of responsibility. I have proposed the setting up of a five-member Secretariat to help promote our work. But many constituent bodies rejected the suggestion. (Interview with Rev. Fung Chi Wood on July 30, 2000) Their mutual distrust was well reflected in the interpretation of one of its veteran members about the body: The alliance’s constituent bodies were self-interested. Those bodies may have different views on political reforms. Therefore, they were apprehensive of having their names borrowed by the Secretariat or spokespersons of the alliance without their prior consent. Besides, the Democratic Party did not join the alliance at the formative stage of the alliance. As a member of the party, I suspected that different selfinterested motives could lie behind the late joining of the party in the alliance: the party could not gain much benefit from the alliance, and did not want to be bound by it. Also, the party didn’t want to see the blossoming of a strong organization. (Interview with Fung Chi Wood, July 30, 2000)” Others also echoed Fung’s view: The alliance concurred on having the Chief Executive and legislature directly elected, but differed on many other issues, including the details of the democratic reform. It is difficult to yield some representatives to whom other member organizations can entrust entirely to represent their views in the pro-democracy campaigns. (Chan Siu Ping, 18 July 2000) Indeed, some members were particularly on guard against the predominant influence of the Democratic Party. The mutual lack of trust has been


179

aired by an veteran in organizing democracy movement, who happened to be a member of the Democratic Party: There has been a lack of mutual trust among the members. Therefore, at one stage, they have elected a relatively young and neutral student representative from the Hong Kong Federation Tertiary Students to be its Secretary. Indeed, many members insisted that the organization of the new alliance should be a loose one. I guess they, including the representatives from the Frontier, were afraid that people like me, a member of the Democratic Party, would dominate the alliance on behalf of the Democratic Party. (Chan Hung, 24 July 2000) Even the initiator of the alliance, the Frontier, was not ready to delegate power to the new alliance: The Frontier originally was eager to wage an international forum on Hong Kong’s Constitutional Development. Frustrated by the sluggish development of the movement, it maintained a wait-and-see attitude and wondered whether the alliance could realize their goals. (Chan Siu Ping, 18 July 2000) Indeed, the Frontier, led by Emily Lau, who happened to be the same leader of the Full Democracy 1995, has had a long track record of pushing for a faster implementation of full democracy in Hong Kong than the leaders of the Democratic Party. The difference in the pacing of the democratic reform and the readiness to confront the Chinese Government among the two parties have thus frustrated the cultivation of trust between them in the alliance, dooming it to repeat the same history for their predecessors between 1992 and 1994.7 The presence of a constellation of external constraints has intensified the difficulties facing the movement since the handover. External constraints for pro-democratic opposition after the handover The onslaught of the Asian financial crisis soon after the handover has led the public to be preoccupied with socio-economic issues. Simultaneously, the legislature and the pro-democratic political parties have been increasingly enfeebled under the new electoral system and legislative arrangements. The lack of public commitment to democracy as an intrinsic value, and the absence of widespread transgression of liberties after the handover, have further depressed public backing for the alliance. Faced with a crippled legislature, the public has become disenchanted with the prodemocratic parties’ incapacity to address burning socio-economic issues.

180


The disenchantment has brought a loss of public and electoral support for pro-democratic parties, exacerbating the difficulty for those parties to mobilize pro-democratic opposition for the Democracy 2000 since the handover.8 Worse still, the self-censorship in the mass media remained unabated after the handover. Since the 1990s, an increasing number of local media conglomerates have been taken over by pro-China tycoons. To appease the Chinese Government, self-censorship among media has been widely exercised in the Hong Kong press (Lee and Chiu, 1998; Young, 2002). The dependence of the local media on the lucrative Chinese market and on the Chinese Government as a source of information for China’s news has turned the media to increasingly portray the Chinese Government in a positive light. The dependence has partly caused a generally decreasing trend of media coverage of events organized by pro-democratic alliances (Table 8.10). The decrease has drastically aggravated the problems of mobilizing support for pro-democracy movements. Last but not least, the internal bickering of the Democratic Party has also largely distracted its attention from mass mobilization campaigns for democracy. One factor engendering the serious split centers on the appropriateness of resorting to street mobilization in fighting for democracy (Democratic Party Report, 2001; Ma, 2001). The rift has enervated the readiness of the party to resort to collective mobilization to press for more democracy, and has further curtailed the mobilization strength not just of the political society but also of Democracy 2000.9 Given the poor media coverage of the alliance’s activities, and its extremely poor mobilization power, the coalition has epitomized the weak democratic movement of the 1990s, and given a free hand to the posthandover Hong Kong and Chinese Government to reverse the limited democracy installed in Hong Kong since the handover. This has been the Table 8.10 Declining trend of media attention for democracy movements (1980s–2000) Political alliance

Total number of campaigns

Percentage reported by Ming Pao

Percentage reported by SCMP

JCPDG (Oct. 86–Mar. 90) JAPOD (Nov. 92–Oct. 94) Democracy 2000 (Dec. 98–Jul. 00)

58 58 19

47 33 16

44 12 21

Sources: Minutes of alliances, Ming Pao and South China Morning Post.1 Note 1 Ming Pao and South China Morning Post have been chosen to trace the vicissitudes of newspaper coverage of democracy movement not just for their availability, but also for their relatively wider circulation among local middle class relative to others. As middle class theoretically has been argued as a major group campaigning for democracy, the changes in media coverage may impact the mobilization potential of middle class.


181

case despite some activities organized by the alliance between its birth in late 1998 and its demise in mid-2000. Limited collective mobilization of Democracy 2000 and impact on halting democratic reversal Given the aforementioned fragile organization of the alliance, a decline in pro-democracy opposition measured in terms of both the number of constituent organizations and the maximum number of people mobilized in collective mobilization has been registered (Table 8.9). Behind those figures was a dismally low participation in mobilizations. For instance, they launched a parade against the reinstatement of appointed seats in Hong Kong’s legislature. Only about ninety participants took part, with about thirty from the Frontier and thirty from the Democratic Party held on February 7, 1999.10 In short, despite the assorted strategies adopted by the alliance, the campaign failed to capture much media attention. What is more, the internal tensions among members of the Alliance can be epitomized by a classic case of internal discord of organizing an important event: the campaign against Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive, in July, 2000. Despite the implicit and explicit agreement on launching such an event, the Democratic Party members, when interviewed by journalists, refused to ally themselves with the alliance in backing the campaign. This not only projected an image of internal division to the public, but also left a deep sense of betrayal among some enthusiastic members of the Alliance who supported the campaign.11 Finally, still another pivotal factor shaping Hong Kong ‘s democratic development is the public support for democratization during the posthandover period.

Post-handover economic and confidence crises: a low public priority attached to democratization of Hong Kong Economic crises have been widely quoted as an important catalyst in sparking off democratic transitions for many former authoritarian countries (Gasiorowski, 1995; Geddes, 1999; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, 34–114; Huntington, 1991). As Hong Kong was besieged by a grave economic crisis since the late 1997, has the public pressure for speedier democratization been witnessed? On the surface, there was large support among the Hong Kong public for directly electing the future Chief Executive, a crucial indicator of democratizing Hong Kong. In October 2000, 75 percent of the respondents in a representative survey supported that the Chief Executive be direct elected (Table 8.11), with 57 percent out of those supporters agreeing that it should be held in 2002. Also, 68 percent among respondents would like to see the abolition of functional constituencies

182


Other data seem to point to the same conclusion that there was strong popular backing for speedy democratization after the handover. Soon after mid-1997, amid the worst economic recession faced by Hong Kong since 1945, public satisfaction with the post-handover Hong Kong Government’s overall performance had unequivocally plunged (Figure 8.2). Has the sagging satisfaction induced greater support for democratization? Table 8.11 Public support for democracy Oct. 2000 (N ⫽ 710)

Structures Functional constituencies

Percentage wanted them abolished Percentage wanted them to remain

68 14

Direct election of the CE

Percentage “support” Percentage “oppose”

75 14

Date implementing directelection of the CE

2002

57 (out of those supporters) 12 (out of those supporters)

2007

Source: Hong Kong Transition Project, DeGolyer (2000: 8–9).

Hong Kong People’s trust in HKSAR Government Satisfaction with HKSAR Government’s overall performance Trust in the Hong Kong Government Satisfaction with HKSAR Government Secretaries 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15

1997 2nd half average

1998 1st half average









Figure 8.2 Hong Kong people’s trust in HKSAR Government (mid-1997–mid2002).


183

Decline in trust and confidence in the post-handover Hong Kong Government The extensively reported Asian financial mayhem that broke out in Thailand in August 1997 set off a landslide plummet in the value of Hong Kong’s stock and property market in October 1997. Between October 1997 and September 1998, many stocks decreased in face value by no less than 50 percent. Side by side with the unforeseen economic meltdown has been the escalating and astounding unemployment rates, which rose to the staggering rate of 5 percent in September 1998. This rate had not been seen in the incredibly bustling economy of Hong Kong in the last few decades. In the context of the merciless economic nightmare, it was predictable to see in December, 1997, that 68.9 percent of Hong Kong citizens alleged a decline in living standard in 1997 compared to 1996, leaving a small number of 3.7 percent feeling the opposite.12 Adding to the economic nightmare have been many striking social crises that have become headline news. The viral infection of chickens and the subsequent bloody slaughtering of over a million of them, the speedy and unexpected governmental imposition of the mother tongue as the major language of instruction for most middle schools, the notorious breakdown of facilities and services of the multi-million dollar new airport, the intervention in the property market and the constantly wavering housing policies, the decision not to prosecute a media tycoon on the grounds that it might cost the jobs of many employees, have damaged public support for the first post-handover SAR government and Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (Figure 8.3). The political trust in civil servants and Mr Tung have dropped to such critically low levels that when comparing the trust in the post-handover Hong Kong Government and that of Chris Patten, the latter have conspicuously enjoyed a higher level.13 Given the aforementioned dismally low

Rating of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, October 1996–June 2002 (quarterly) 70

66

65.8

56

63.7 60.1

61.5

60 55 50

58.1

58.3

56.7

58.5 56.7

54.9

56.4

54.8

54.4

55 52.3

53.1 50.7

53.4 52.2

53.1 51

50.8

O

ct . Ja – D n. ec Ap – M . 96 r. a Ju – Ju r. 97 l. n O –S . 9 ct ep 7 . Ja – D . 97 n. ec Ap – M . 97 r. a Ju – Ju r. 98 l.– n O S .9 ct ep 8 . Ja – D . 98 n. ec Ap – M . 98 r. a Ju – Ju r. 99 l.– n O S .9 ct ep 9 . Ja – D . 99 n. ec Ap – M . 99 r. a Ju – Ju r. 00 l.– n O S . 00 ct ep . Ja – S . 00 n. ep Ap – M . 00 r. a Ju – Ju r. 01 l.– n O S .0 ct ep 1 . Ja – D . 01 n. ec Ap – M . 0 r.– ar. 1 Ju 02 n. 02

45

Figure 8.3 Declining trend of Tung Chee-hwa’s ratings.

184


levels of distrust, is there a “legitimation problem” in the quasibureaucratic authoritarian system? If so, has strong pressure been built up to democratize Hong Kong? Public support of pro-democratic parties or bodies also dropped On closer scrutiny, the public support for the government and the Chief Executive has dropped, and the same applies to various political parties and especially the pro-democratic ones. The perceived inability of the prodemocratic parties to alleviate the economic recession has partially caused the decline in satisfaction (DeGolyer et al., 2001: 15). What is more, alongside the sharp decline in trust for Tung and the Hong Kong Government has been the relegation of “democracy” to the lowest social priority among the general public, lessening the chance of widespread public support for democracy (Figure 8.4). Absence of strong pressure for democratization: contraction in freedom not perceived by the public The political support for governments indicated in terms of “political trust” can rest on intrinsic values or on the systemic performance, and can be directed towards its leaders, policies or the entire political system (Easton, 1965). Authoritarian regimes rarely legitimize themselves by their own systemic characteristics, considering their monopoly of power by bureaucratic elites or narrow parties. Authoritarian regimes thus invariably legitimize themselves by claiming their importance in attaining some other goals, for examples, economic growth, socialism, communism, or other utopias (Diamond, 1990: 235; O’Donnell et al., Pt III, 1986). When those regimes fail to attain their goals, the resultant lack of political trust towards policies or political leaders of authoritarian countries can mount

DP DAB LP Frontier ADPL Oct. 96 Jan. 97 Apr. 97 Jul. 97 Oct. 97 Jan. 98 Apr. 98 Jul. 98 Oct. 98 Jan. 99 Apr. 99 Jul. 99 Oct. 99 Jan. 00 Apr. 00 Jul. 00 Oct. 00 Jan. 01 Apr. 01 Jul. 01 Oct. 01

Support %

Ratings on best-known political parties 64 62 60 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44

Figure 8.4 Public support ratings of best-known political parties.


185

up. Once the distrust deepens beyond a certain threshold, it can trigger a fundamental repudiation of the whole political system (Diamond, 1989; Easton, 1965). Has such a legitimacy problem arisen in the post-handover Hong Kong? Confronted with the most serious and sustained recession since 1945, when the public were asked about their perceived changes in social conditions since the handover, the biggest perceived change has been the “decline in prosperity.” Between June 1997 and October 2001, the perceived decline in prosperity stood at 31.43 percent, the biggest causality of all nine during the period (Table 8.12). During the same period, the perceived decline in freedom and democracy has suffered to a far lesser extent of 7.06 percent and 9.1 percent respectively (Table 8.12). Since July 1997, different types of subjective enjoyments of freedoms have been measured. Among those measures, four types of freedoms stood consistently above others, including freedom of religious belief, of movement, of academic research, and of artistic and literary creation. They have earned the scores of above 8 or close to 8 out of 10. The other three, i.e., freedom of publication, of press and of speech also stood comfortably above 7. The lowest have been those of association, procession, demonstration, and freedom to strike. The individual scores of those different types of freedoms also remained relative stable between July 1997 and June 1998. Given the mild drop in the overall index from June 1997 to June 1998, it can be deduced that the subjectively perceived reduction in freedoms have not contributed that much to the overall decline in the trust of the post-handover Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government. Immediately before the handover, the Chinese Government engaged in heated conflicts with the colonial Hong Kong Government over various issues of human rights, in particular over the right of demonstrations and of forming associations. Astounded by the unexpected, horrendous support by the people of Hong Kong for the Chinese democratic movement during the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Beijing authorities were upset at the likelihood that Hong Kong would become an insurgent base against Chinese communist rule after its reversion. Accordingly, the Chinese Government has inserted Article 23 into the Basic Law, i.e., the mini-constitution for the post-handover, Hong Kong. The article pronounces that the post-handover Hong Kong Government is obliged to enact laws to prohibit acts of subversion, secession, sedition and treason against the Central People’s Government. Well conscious of the profound significance the Chinese Government attaches to the provision, Tung Chee-hwa proposed in early 1997 as the Chief-Executive-designate that alterations be made to the then Public Order Ordinance and Societies Ordinance.14 The suggested revisions were formally approved by the largely pro-Beijing Provisional Legislature instantaneously after the handover. The changes have enabled the police to lawfully ban any public procession and gathering whenever a vaguely

7.65 7.63 7.17 7.02 6.70 6.53 7.33 6.42 8.05 548 46.7

Nov. 98 (%) ⫺2.88 ⫺6.68 ⫺5.44 ⫺3.85 ⫺6.12 ⫺3.52 ⫺10.23 ⫺3.74 ⫺18.39 511 48.1

Nov. 97 (%)

⫺8.50 ⫺6.68 ⫺6.83 ⫺3.99 ⫺12.39 ⫺4.44 ⫺8.73 ⫺7.63 ⫺13.54 523 47.3

⫺4.97 – – – ⫺12.24 – ⫺15.28 – ⫺23.11 543 51.7

Nov. 99 (%) ⫺12.03 – – – ⫺12.99 ⫺14.73 ⫺23.35 1067 59.8

Oct. 00 (%)

Sources: HKU POP EXPRESS, No. 20, 22, 30, 36; HKU POP SITE, POP Polls: Social Indicators, http: //hkupop.hku.hk/.

Freedom Efficiency Rule of law Corruption-free practices Democracy Equality Stability Fairness Prosperity Successful cases Response rate

Jun. 97 (%)

⫺7.06 – – – ⫺9.10 – ⫺17.46 – ⫺31.43 1051 63.5

Oct. 01 (%)

Apr. 02 (%) ⫺2.48 – – – ⫺5.82 – ⫺13.78 – ⫺26.96 1017 63.5

Table 8.12 Hong Kong people‘s evaluation of various aspects of Hong Kong since the handover (with June, 1997 as the base)


187

defined notion of “national security” is regarded to be under “threat,” even in the absence of any threat of violence on the part of demonstrators. Those changes have also allowed the police to refuse registration to new societies or to cancel the registration of existing ones if they are regarded as causing threats to “national security,” or as political bodies with “links” to foreign political organizations.15 The stiff opposition to those amendments among local groups in civil society since their introduction has aroused much public concern about their continuous enjoyment of freedom of procession, demonstration, and association. Consequently, the subjective ratings of those scores have been relatively low. In actual practice since the handover, however, neither the SAR government nor the Chinese Government has ostensibly tried to smother local people’s enjoyment of those freedoms at large in a high-profile and large-scale manner, despite some widely reported occasional scuffles with activists. Therefore, the overall rating of enjoyment of freedoms recorded above did not suffer any severe contraction between June 1997 and October 2001 (Table 8.12). Despite the aforementioned social and economic crises since the handover, longitudinal data about the priorities of Hong Kong citizens indicate neither enormous pressure for democratization nor a legitimacy problem for the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system. In late May 1997, alongside some public dissatisfaction with the SAR officials in dealing with human rights issues, only 7.6 percent of the public gave “democratization” as the top priority. Instead, the public treated housing, economic development and education as the top, second, and third priority that the government should handle for Hong Kong in the next ten years.16 The low priority for promoting democracy remains unchanged after the initial eruption of a host of economic and social crises. In December, 1998, when the property bubble began to burst and unemployment figures started to climb, an even smaller figure of 5.9 percent of the public assigned “democratization” the top priority. The public continued to think the SAR government should give the top, second and third priority to housing, economic development and education respectively for the next ten years (Table 8.13).17 As unemployment rose and the economy continued to deteriorate beyond 2000, an overwhelmingly majority of 70.1 percent of the Hong Kong public treated economic matters in December 2001 as the most important problem the government should tackle, far outweighing the meager figure of 3.1 percent assigned to “constitutional development” (Table 8.13). Those figures indicate that even when the public trust and confidence in the new SAR government plummeted to low levels, the public has not changed their distrust of leaders towards the political system as a whole. There has been little trace of a legitimation problem for the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system, and a patent lack of strong public pressure demanding rapid democratization.

11.8 9.6 1.6 0.7 1.2 6.1 0.7 6.3 0.9 12.8 3.3 24 6.5 14.4

7.3 5.4 0.4 0.2 N.A. 1.2 0.2 2.4 0.8 50.8 1.5 4.6 16.7 8.5

Dec. 95 21 6.9 2 0.7 N.A. 6.2 1.3 0.6 0.7 19.3 1.4 12.3 7.3 20.1

Dec. 96 25.9 7 3.1 1.3 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.4 N.A. 37.6 0.4 0.9 11.4 10.8

Dec. 97 7.6 5.5 1.6 1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0 0 67.9 0.4 1.2 11.6 2.4

Dec. 98 4.9 4.5 2.7 2.5 2 2.5 0 0.2 1.1 62.1 0.3 1.9 3.7 11.5

Dec. 99

5.5 5.3 4.9 0.9 2.2 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 56 0.3 3.1 9.6 10.2

Dec. 00

1.3 1.9 2.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.7 70.1 0.0 3.1 8.9 9.9

Dec. 01

Sources: HKU POP EXPRESS, No. 29; HKU POP SITE, POP Polls: Review and Forward Looking at the End of Year 2001, http: //hkupop.hku.hk//.

Housing Welfare Education Medical/Health Environment Law and order Corruption Traffic Community facilities Economics related Inflation Constitutional development Others Don’t know/hard to say

Dec. 94

Table 8.13 What do you think is the most important problem that the HK/HKSAR Government should tackle next year?


189

Indeed, democratization was seldom treated as the most important personal concern before 1997, except in 1994 when the row over Patten’s reform was brought to a tentative end. After the handover, while social or economic issues have topped the personal concerns for most people, only 3.1 percent of them picked up constitutional change as the most effective means to restore confidence (Table 8.13). Why has the deepening political distrust towards the government officials and the Chief Executive failed to be transformed into that towards the political system as a whole, and set off widespread support for democracy? Chapter 6 reveals the local support for democratic reform has not stemmed from any conception of a “right to democracy” or the intrinsic value of democracy, but primarily from the desire to fend off the Chinese Government’s interference in Hong Kong’s freedoms (Sing and Lee, 1997). When the public did not perceive any major decline in freedoms since the reversion of sovereignty, a major motivation for supporting democratization was simply absent. With Hong Kong besieged by a sweeping economic crisis, economic issues have dominated the public minds. The rising economic competitiveness of China, the inexorable moving of industry and factories into China, and the urgent imperative to restructure Hong Kong’s economy when its direction and success are still anybody’s guess, have intensified the misgivings and pessimism of Hong Kong people towards their economic future. Second, though economic crises have been widely quoted as an important catalyst in sparking off democratic transitions for many former authoritarian countries (Gasiorowski, 1995; Geddes, 1999; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 34–114; Huntington, 1991), sustained economic crises have been unknown for most Hong Kong people who have been used to miraculously continuous economic growth for most of the past four decades. Though the economic pains ensued from the post-handover economic crisis have been real and substantial for many, the crises have been too short for the public to fundamentally reject the long-standing successful formula of development, under which civil servants have steered the polity under a quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system. Third, public espousal of democracy through political participation has never been a bandwagon that Hong Kong people would like to jump on, given the vigorous objections from the Hong Kong and Chinese Government. The repeated demonstration of the Hong Kong and Chinese Government’s aversion to speedy implementation of full democracy in Hong Kong has left many citizens with a strong sense of powerlessness to demand speedy democratic changes. The sense of futility has only been reinforced by Tung’s persistent rejections to review the pace of democratization. The SAR government led by him has simply refused to promise any systematic review to accelerating democratization in future.18

190


Fourth, the democratic reversal has effected politically marginalized political parties. With the capacity of local parties to address socioeconomic concerns further debilitated after the handover, together with the high-profile exposure of the inner bickering of the Democratic Party, the public’s enthusiasm for speedier democratization may have also dropped accordingly.

9

Hong Kong as a rare anomaly to modernization theory

Two research problems and the chronology of democratization in Hong Kong (1946–mid-2002) This study sets out to answer two related research problems. First, the primacy of the “China factor” as the overriding constraint for Hong Kong’s democratic development has been well recognized. However, I have shown that the granting of moderate concessions by the Chinese Government for Hong Kong-wide support for democratization in 1990 when exposed to massive pressure implied that the Chinese Government’s position towards Hong Kong’s democratization was negotiable. This position depends upon the bargaining power of the pro-democratic forces. Therefore, the China factor has not entirely explained what happened in Hong Kong. We would have to look at a variety of internal factors and analyze how they have interacted with the China factor and produced the eventual outcome in relation to Hong Kong’s democratic development. I have thus explored what the other domestic and external constraints have been, which have delimited the bargaining power of pro-democratic forces and the subsequent scope of concessions from the Chinese Government throughout the period of 1984 to mid-2002. Second, given that Hong Kong was a rare non oil-exporting anomaly to modernization theory, I endeavor to account for the anomaly with a historical-comparative perspective. In particular, according to many crossnational research studies, economic crises have been most favorable to the political opposition when pressing for democratic transition (Geddes, 1999: 119; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Przeworski et al., 2000). Since late 1997, Hong Kong has been beset by the most serious economic recession in a generation. The stagnant support for democratic opposition after 1997 has only made the anomaly all the more puzzling. Before solving the first problem, the trajectory of Hong Kong’s democratic struggles from 1982 to mid-2002 (Figure 9.1) can clarify the picture. It can be seen that the Chinese Government dictated the pace and extent of democratization after 1997 via the Basic Law. That said, other domestic

Phase Background phase (Mid-1982 – 1986): Crisis and top-down democratization

Events/Political Dynamics Crisis of reversion of HK’s sovereignty

HK Govt. initiated political refrom

Joint declaration promised elections in 1997

China demanded convergence between Basic Law and HK Govt.’s reforms

Formative phase (1986): forming of pro-democracy alliance and 1st constitutional platform

Formation of Pro-democracy alliance and business group emerging polarization over constitutional platforms

Conflictual phase (late 1986 – Apr. 1989): tacit and explicit bargaining – increasing power to issue effective threats

Intensified conflicts between 1st pro-democracy alliance with China over: – Direct elections in 1988 – Post-1997 HK’s schedule of democratization

1st alliance resisted pressure to compromise

Compromise, conflictual, and decisional phase (May 1989 – Apr. 1990): tacit and explicit bargaining

New crisis in China (Tiananmen Square incident)

Popular pressure for faster democratization intensified

Pact-making (“4-4-2”) among pro-democracy, business and moderate alliances

Hong Kong as an anomaly to modernization theory

193

Renewed negotiations between UK and China: Chinese Govt. made moderate concessions

Finalized constitutional blueprint in Basic Law: gradual transition to a limited democracy

A new background phase for democratic struggles 1991

Dissolution of 1st pro-democracy alliance; formation of pro-democracy and anti-democracy (quasi-) political parties – overwhelming electoral victory for the former

A renewed conflicting phase (renewed top-down Democratization from the UK) 1992 – mid-1997

Passing of Chris Patten’s reform in legislature; Formation and dissolution of two prodemocracy alliances

A reversal phase of limited democracy mid-1997 – mid-2002

Abolish two democratically constituted Municipal Councils; Re-introduction of appointed seats in District Councils; Decrease the powers of legislature; Amend electoral system for legislature

Notes: * HK: Hong Kong : Sequence of events

Figure 9.1 Different phases (1982–2002).

of

democratic

development

in

Hong

Kong

forces in Hong Kong, however, were also active participants impacting Hong Kong’s democratization.

Phases and dynamic process of struggle over democratization (1982–mid-2002) The above summary of Hong Kong’s incomplete democratic transition indicates how international and domestic forces interacted to shape the process. The previous chapters have demonstrated the overwhelming

194


constraining force of the Chinese Government on Hong Kong’s democratization. However, in late 1989 after the Tiananmen Square incident, with the collapse in confidence of Hong Kong people towards “One Country, Two Systems,” the British Government was hard-pressed to win more democracy for Hong Kong, by keeping a balance between those who asked for a radically faster democratization, and those who pleaded for an avoidance of confrontation with China from the community of Hong Kong.1 In particular, it had to seek China’s acceptance of any program of democratization so that its continuity after 1997 could be ensured.2 The Chinese Government’s contradictory objectives with regard to Hong Kong at least gave some room to maneuver to pro-democracy forces. Besides maintaining its hegemony, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wanted to win local and international investors’ confidence in Hong Kong, and to use Hong Kong to persuade Taiwan of the benefits of reunification. Consequently, the more the Hong Kong public, including the middle class and capitalists, supported democratizing Hong Kong, and the more they could assure China of the innocuous nature of this democratization for the hegemony of the CCP, the more likely was the Chinese Government to approve faster and fuller democratization. Also, the greater the domestic demand for democracy, the greater would be the pressure on the British Government to press China to agree to it. The argument was supported by the concessions by China between late 1989 and early 1990. Hence, while ferocious opposition from China had been the decisive factor in explaining the sluggishness of the actual and scheduled democratization between 1986 and 2007,3 it was not the sufficient one.4 What were the other constraints? To highlight other important factors, Table 9.1 encapsulates the positions and bargaining strengths of different political actors at different crucial junctures, and the eventual political outcomes of democracy. Table 9.1 indicates that as well as the Chinese Government’s opposition to democratization throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the mobilization power of the pro-democratic alliances played a crucial role in shaping the outcome of democratization. What factors impact the mobilization of prodemocratic alliances? The previous empirical analyses indicate we should focus on the civil society, political society and political culture of the public to reveal the problems with mobilization power.

First domestic constraint for Hong Kong’s democratization: limited and declining collective mobilization power of civil society and political society Concerning civil society and political society, there are at least three important reasons for the limited and dropping collective mobilization power. The conflicts between pro-democratic civil society and political society over the goals and strategies will be argued as the first explanatory factor. The second has been the weakened support for the pro-democratic


195

parties in the 1990s that has further curtailed the mobilization strength of the political society. The final factor has been the presence of antidemocratic civil associations in civil society, notably those organized major business interests and the pro-China federation of labor unions. Divisions between the pro-democratic civil society and political society The first crucial domestic constraint for Hong Kong’s democratization was the weak pro-democracy mobilization by pro-democracy civil society and pro-democracy political society for most of the time between 1986 and 2000. My previous analyses have identified four pro-democracy alliances composed of civil organizations and pro-democracy (quasi-) parties. Those alliances have exhibited a steady decline in strength as indicated by their decrease in at least three important aspects: 1 2 3

number of constituent organizations in pro-democracy alliances from 1986 to 2000 (Table 8.10); maximum number of people the alliances could have mobilized (Table 8.10); media coverage of the alliance activities (Table 8.11).5

What caused the declines in the mobilization power of the pro-democratic alliances? Comparative studies in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe reveal that the different roles, strategies, and interests of civil society and political society set off clashes and diminish their collective mobilization power for democratization (Collier, 1999; Dryzek and Holmes, 2000; Encarnacion, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stepan, 2001: 174). The common practice of civil groups in civil society to monitor political parties and to use collective mobilization, rather than negotiations and compromise as usually employed by the political society (Collier, 1999: 19) in striving for democratization, has created tensions between them in various regions. For Hong Kong, as in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, an important reason explaining the declining strength of pro-democracy alliance has been the conflicting roles of political and civil society. The establishment of some pro-democratic political parties, especially the relatively powerful United Democrats of Hong Kong and the Democratic Party in the early 1990s, alarmed cautious activists in civil society to guard against the dominance of political parties in those democratic alliances.6 As for prodemocratic parties in political society, they have endeavored to expand their power and ultimately govern Hong Kong. They resisted being dominated by other much smaller NGOs in any formal meetings within those democratic alliances. Given their relative superiority in resources, parties have refused to be treated as an equal partner with an equal voting right, nor were they willing to be bound by decisions made in those alliances.7

Obvious concession to Chinese Government’s pressures

Middle-class divided; overall public support only moderate; organized capitalists oppose it

Tiananmen Square incident plus democratic alliance mobilization spur very large-scale HKwide support

1987–8: Debate over the holding of direct elections for legislature

1989–90: Pace and speed in democratization for post-1997 contained in the Basic Law

HKG and UKG support speeding up of democratization; capitalize on rising public support to strengthen its negotiation power with China

Softened soon in face with China’s hard-lined stance

Public views towards HK Government/ democracy UK Government

Oct. 1984–late 1985: Apathetic and not HKG initial top-down supportive democratization

Junctures

Successful Grant moderate mobilization of concessions in dramatic public democratization support; seal a deal with the capitalist alliance to strengthen their bargaining power with China

Limited mobilization Large-scale counterpower mobilization against it

Very loose protocol Initiate strong of an alliance; very resistance to weak in mobilization democratization power

Speeding up of both pre-1997 and post1997 democratization

Postponement of holding direct elections till 1991

UKG conceded; initiation of very limited democratization

Mobilization power Chinese Government Outcome of of democratic alliance democratization

Table 9.1 Bargaining strengths of actors and outcome of democratization (1984–mid-2002)

General public including middle class: lay extremely low priority to democracy; organized capitalists rejected democracy

July 1997–mid-2002: Reversal of limited democracy in Hong Kong continued; dominance of proBeijing Chief Executive over partially elected legislature

HKG ⫽ Hong Kong Government. UKG ⫽ UK Government.

Mild public rejection Strong mobilization and strong sense of for greater powerlessness; democratization capitalists cooperate with China by joining China-orchestrated alliances

1995–June 97: eve of handover – China initiated a reversal of Hong Kong’s limited democracy

Post-handover HKG implemented the reversal of democratization orchestrated by Beijing

Ambivalent public Strong mobilization support; feeble for greater middle class backing; democratization opposition from capitalists

1992–4: Struggle over a renewed UK-led (Patten) democratization

Division between pro-democracy civil society and political society continued; serious internal rift in the Democratic Party; very weak mass mobilization

Division between pro-democracy civil society and political society continued; drastic decline in collective mobilization

Division between pro-democracy civil society and political society; drastic decline in scale of collective mobilization

A reversal of limited democracy in Hong Kong was planned immediately before the handover

Passing a compromised version of Patten’s reform in legislature

Back up its indirectly Reversal of limited appointed Chief democracy deepened Executive to roll further back limited democracy

Strong mobilization and increasing cooption of local elites for legitimating Chinese Government’s policies

Strong countermobilization against the reform

198


Worse still, the tendency of the pro-democratic parties to take the lead in community affairs, and to take care of not just working-class interests, but also middle-class interests, has created tensions with an assortment of civil groups, such as pro-democracy labor federations, concerned groups for public housing, grassroots social welfare bodies, and other community or Hong Kong-wide organizations (Kwok, 1992; Wu, 1997).8 The mutually suspicious, competitive relationship and the concomitant strain between civil society and political society thus drastically lowered the incentive for party participation in the alliances.9 The strain has been aggravated further by the demands for relatively faster democratization among civil groups in those alliances than those of parties. Worse still, the more uncompromising stance of the pro-democracy civil groups vis-à-vis political parties has also led to escalated tensions in Hong Kong. Faced with these tensions the major parties have played a passive role in most alliances after 1990. Such poor involvement has resulted in poor media attention and availability of resources for pro-democracy mobilizations. The subsequent steady decline in mobilization strength of prodemocracy alliances has ushered in a decrease in their bargaining power with the Chinese Government (Table 9.2).10 Anti-democratic components in civil society As well as the increasing weakness of the pro-democracy alliance, the presence of an anti-democracy capitalist alliance has also been an important domestic constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization. The position of the bourgeoisie on democratization, as found in Latin America, Southern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, depends on calculations of whether democracy would favor their material interests (Bellin, 2000: 175–205; Conaghan, 1990: 74; Przeworski, 1991). According to cross-international studies in various parts of the world, their views have been very important in shaping the governing elites’ calculations regarding the issue of democratization (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). In Hong Kong, leaders of various democratic alliances were activists in local pressure groups, using confrontational tactics to advocate the redistribution of wealth and democracy. Business leaders consistently accused them of being excessively confrontational towards the CCP, and thus liable to bring political instability to Hong Kong. The local capitalists’ incentives to cooperate with China to thwart Hong Kong’s democratization were further boosted by the alluring investment opportunities of China, given the rapidly deepening economic integration between Hong Kong and China since the early 1980s. The harsh economic punishment the Chinese Government gave to the conglomerate Jardines for its manifest pro-Patten reform posture is the last thing the local organized bourgeoisie want. To protect their material interests, therefore, in so far as Hong Kong’s organized capitalists were concerned, they were overwhelmingly opposed to faster democratization, with

No concession from Chinese Government

Chinese Government made moderate concessions for pre-and post-1997 democratization

20 organizations: loosest Marginal participation No concession from cooperation; weakest of the DP; HKADPL did Chinese Government mobilization (100 participants) not join; mutual suspicion between civil society and political society

Democracy 2000

Marginal participation of UDHK; MP and HKADPL did not join; growing tension between the civil groups and the MP

Political parties not yet formed

Bargain outcome

1999–2000: Campaign for full democracy in 2000

95 organizations; relatively better cooperation; strongest mobilization (indirectly, over 1 million participants for two times)

Relationship with political society

36 organizations (JAPOD); 20 organizations (FD); loose cooperation; weak mobilization (400 participants)

JCPDG

1986–2000: Contest over the design of political system for post-1997 in the Basic Law

Intra-alliance cooperation; cooperation; maximum no. of members and mobilized

1992–4: Struggle over a JAPOD; FD renewed UK-led (Patten) democratization

Democratic alliance

Juncture and issue

Table 9.2 Decline in pressure for democratization brings worse bargaining outcome in democratization (1986–2000)

200


the exception of the brief period immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident. Between 1984 and 1990, political society did not emerge and civil society remained the only major bottom-up force pressing for democratization. Since the emergence of political parties, the leadership, material resources, manpower, and media attention have drained off to the incipient parties. Coupled with the announcement of the post-1997 constitution in 1990, the once unified and relatively strong pro-democracy civil society fragmented and was demobilized in 1990. After 1990, the pro-democratic civil society engaged in new alliances and new cycles of mobilization to strive for faster democratization. However, the divisions between civil society and political society in the alliances, the subsequent limited participation of political society in those alliances, and their meager resources have crippled the three pro-democracy alliances. As the success of collective mobilization hinges on not only the unity and resources it mobilizes, but also on public support, we next examine the importance of political culture as an additional domestic constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization.

Another domestic constraint for Hong Kong’s democratization: political culture (1986–mid-2002) Comparative studies of different regions have increasingly supported the powerful causal effect of political culture on democratization (Diamond, 1999; Mainwaring, 1999; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001). Table 9.1 reveals that the strength of public support directly impacts the willingness of the Chinese Government to concede concerning Hong Kong’s democratization. The strongest level of public support was found in mid-1989, amid the brain drain and capital flight, and did exert enough pressure on the Chinese Government to make moderate concessions. Nevertheless, the massive public support during that time was an exception rather than the norm. Table 9.3 that contains the longitudinal data on public support for the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system and the limited democracy. When asked whether the general public supported its political institutions, surveys conducted in 1977, 1985 and 1988 revealed that 81.6 percent, 74.5 percent, and 75 percent answered affirmatively. They have conferred a moderate to high level of legitimacy on the benign softauthoritarian institutions since the 1970s. Moving into the 1990s, despite a slight decline in those levels of support, moderate degrees of public support for the soft-authoritarian system can still be discerned. The corresponding figures for 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1997 were respectively 59 percent, 72 percent, 56.3 percent, 62.1 percent and 63 percent, and 49.2 percent. The wordings for the questions were more or less the same, where the respondents were asked whether they agreed “Hong Kong’s political system, though imperfect, was still the best under existent


201

Table 9.3 Levels of public support for political institutions (%) Year

%

1985 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1997

74.5 75.0 59.0 72.0 56.3 62.1 63.0 49.2

Sources: Lau (1982, 1992: 132; 1996: 175; 1998; 2000); Lau and Kuan (1995).

circumstances.” For data before 1990s, see Lau (1982, 1992: 132). Regarding data in the 1990s, see Lau and Kuan (1995); Lau (1996: 175); Lau (1998) and Lau (2000). Though the components of the political system have changed over times, it can be argued that the basic features of the soft-authoritarian system have remained largely intact. How can the prolonged weakness in public support for democratization be explained? The answer needs to be divided into different periods. Period I: from 1986 to May 1989 In Hong Kong, the public only gave limited support to democratization before June 1989. China’s increasingly ferocious opposition to Hong Kong’s democratization since 1985, as discussed already, forced the British Government to pull back from a more progressive democratization of Hong Kong. The British Government’s scaling down of democratic reform in the White Paper of 1984, and its rejection of direct elections in 1988 contributed to the political powerlessness of the public. The strong sense of powerlessness drained off the much-needed public backing for greater democratization. Before this period, some long-term macro-structural factors also weakened the case for democratization. The perceived opposition from China to Hong Kong’s democratization between the late 1940s and 1952 compelled the British Government to refrain from democratizing Hong Kong. To keep Hong Kong’s undemocratic political structure from societal challenges, the Hong Kong Government depoliticized civil society. As a result, a sense of political powerlessness was fostered among the public, which was reinforced by the discouraging attitude of the Chinese Government to democratization. Accordingly, people were not enthusiastic about expressing their views on Hong Kong’s democratization. Compared with most authoritarian regimes in Latin American, Hong Kong’s much faster socio-economic growth after the Second World War dramatically improved the living standard of its average citizens. It also

202


induced a subjective perception of abundant chances for upward social mobility, and defused class tension. In addition, a higher level of civil liberties deprived Hong Kong of an important source of support for democratization, which was the impetus for reform in Taiwan and South Korea.11 Relatively high levels of socio-economic development and civil liberties, when taken together, have contributed to political stability in Hong Kong, and in turn to a moderate level of legitimacy for its quasibureaucratic political structure. The depoliticization of society, moderate acceptance of the quasibureaucratic authoritarian political system, and a lack of democratic experience together resulted in a low level of public belief in and knowledge of democracy. The influence of these factors limited public support for democratization during this period (Figure 9.2). The middle class in Hong Kong, though divided, contained a section showing a higher level of attitudinal support for democratization than the lower class. However, the possibility of emigration reduced the incentive of the middle class to actively engage in the campaign for democratization. Period II: from May 1989 to 1990 As China’s opposition to democratization grew increasingly apparent, the confidence of the people of Hong Kong in the Chinese Government declined in early 1989. The Tiananmen Square crisis in China that summer and the subsequent repression awakened the public to the Chinese Government’s continued willingness to infringe human rights, despite a decade of opening-up. With no other means of protecting themselves at a systemic level, the public threw sharply increased support behind democratization. Period III: 1991 to June 1997 During this period, with the subsiding of the fear over the Tiananmen Square event, and the public consciousness of the potential costs of confronting the forthcoming sovereign master of China, Hong Kong people’s commitment to democracy dwindled in comparison with the previous era. Notably, during this period, even the middle class did not demonstrate strong support for the Patten reform or the pro-democracy collective movement, as discussed in Chapter 6. Period IV: July 1997 to mid-2002 This post-transition period has been marked by the absence of a glaring transgression of human rights on a large scale, and the onslaught of the most serious economic recession brought on by the Asian financial crisis. Why has the economic crisis failed to ignite popular demands for faster


203

UK/HKG’s Shelving of democratizing Hong Hong in 1952

High socioeconomic development

Relatively high level of civil liberties

UK/HKG’s pullback from democratization

China’s opposition to democracy

Politically weak civil society

HK Govt’s depoliticization

Lack of belief in and understanding of democracy

Political powerlessness of public

Moderate level of legitimacy of quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system

Limited public support for faster democratization Note:

Causal Influence

Figure 9.2 Factors that limited popular support for democratization (1986–April 1989).

democratization, as found in many third wave democracies (Geddes, 1999; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). In the light of the findings of Chapter 6, public support for democratization has primarily arisen from their desire to fend off the Chinese Government’s high-handed meddling with Hong Kong’s freedoms. After the handover, as the public did not perceive a serious erosion of freedoms, the major impetus for replacing the

204


quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure with a fully democratized one has evaporated. With Hong Kong beleaguered with the most severe economic crisis since the war, economic concerns have topped the public concerns. The growing disillusionment with the Democratic Party, a token embodiment of democracy in Hong Kong, has also further intensified the public’s assigning an extremely low priority to “democratization” in Hong Kong in comparison to other social and economic goals. The repeated demonstration by the Chinese Government of its aversion to speedy implementation of full democracy in Hong Kong has reinforced many Hong Kong citizens’ strong sense of powerlessness in striving for speedy democratic changes. Tung’s unrelenting rejections to review the pace of democratization have only increased the sense of futility.12 The risk of antagonizing Beijing, and thus inflicting possible damage on Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, have again encouraged the Hong Kong public to accord a lower preference to democratic development.

The Chinese Government as the primary constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization Analyses in this book have shown that throughout the period covered, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was the major force opposing Hong Kong’s democratization. The CCP’s obstructive policy squared well with its interests. While other Leninist states, like the former USSR and North Korea, resorted respectively to political liberalization and total isolation in reaction to national challenges, China adopted the “third way” of development. The CCP wanted economic liberalization without political liberalization (Kim, 1992: 27) in order to “modernize” China and, at the same time, maintain its hegemony. A fully and rapidly democratized Hong Kong, timed to become a sub-polity of China, could threaten the CCP’s interest, and, therefore, had to be stopped. To achieve its purpose, besides discouraging the formation of parties in Hong Kong, the Chinese Government in the main focused on opinion mobilization against the speedy democratization of Hong Kong Government. For instance, before the Tiananmen Square incident, China opposed Hong Kong’s democratization through the support of the conservative Business and Professional Group, as well as the pro-China labor Federation of Trade Unions, pro-China secondary schools, kinship associations, kaifong associations and women’s clubs (Wong, 1989: 15–18).13 In 1990, the CCP tried to preclude Hong Kong’s domestic forces from forging a compromise platform on Hong Kong’s democratization and from exerting collective pressure on China. China had probably exerted pressure on the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) not to support the compromise model forged between pro-democratic forces and the business sector.14 Finally, the FTU refrained from supporting the model, despite the close resemblance of the model to those they earlier put forth.15


205

Moving into the post-1990 era, the CCP stepped up its united-front strategy, by co-opting more social elites with great wealth and professional skills into various bodies. The CCP has invariably used those bodies to legitimize its attacks on democratization in Hong Kong. With the approach of 1997, the realism of Hong Kong social elites were, as expected, on the rise. In fact, since the early 1980s, the Chinese Government has co-opted local elites as members of eight organizations (Table 9.4). This co-option served a number of political functions: (1) it formed pools of experts to guide the Chinese Government’s policies regarding Hong Kong and smooth the transition; (2) it united a strong political force to legitimize the Chinese Government’s stands on democracy and other issues; (3) it created a reserve army to combat the Chinese Government’s political opponents; (4) it forged a forum to groom local elites for ruling Hong Kong; and (5) it used them to implement the democratic reversal in Hong Kong immediately after the handover. Table 9.4 shows its continued co-option has deepened its penetration into Hong Kong society. The Chinese Government has managed to enlist Table 9.4 Chinese Government’s co-option strategy (1984–97) Name and year of establishment

Declared goal

Basic Law Drafting Draft Basic Law (mini-constitution) Committee (BLDC) 1984 for post-handover Hong Kong

No. of members from Hong Kong 23

Basic Law Consultative Representatives for HK to feedback 180 Committee (BLCC) 1984 views to help draft Basic Law (miniconstitution) for post-handover Hong Kong Hong Kong Affairs Advisors

Provide feedback to CCP on late transition of HK

187

Preliminary Working Committee

Provide feedback to CCP on late transition of HK

30 out of 57

Hong Kong District Advisors

Provide feedback to CCP on late transition of HK at district level

670

Preparatory Committee 1996–7

Elect members of Selection Committee

94/150

Selection Committee 1996–7

Select First Chief Executive and Provisional Legislators

400

Provisional Legislature mid-1997–8

Members for interim legislature established immediately after handover

60

Sources: Sinclair (1988); SCMP, 23/6/93; Sing Tao Daily, Mar. 5, 1994; Wat Kiu Yat Po, Jan. 10, 1995; Ming Pao Daily News, Nov. 3, 1996; Wen Wei Po, July 1, 1997; The Sun, July 13, 1995

206


the backing of the richest tycoons and their conglomerates against democratization. The huge capital represented by those enlisted tycoons and their glaring proportions of the total market value of listed stocks have testified to the enormous success of the Chinese Government’s policy of co-option (Table 9.5). However, the CCP’s contradictory objectives with regard to Hong Kong at least gave some room to pro-democracy forces to maneuver. The argument was supported by the concessions of China between late 1989 and early 1990. That said, with the waning of public support for speedier democratization after 1990, the Chinese Government tried hard to obstruct any further development in democracy during the twilight years of British governance. Therefore, it acted strongly against the Patten’s reform. Of no less importance, in the late 1990s, the Chinese Government and the post-handover Hong Kong Government tightened the laws and modified the political system of Hong Kong in the direction of inverting its democratic development. To ensure its final political control over the city–state, immediately before and after the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese Government employed various measures to reverse Hong Kong’s democratic development. In short, “although Chinese officials generally remain distant from Hong Kong . . . their need to visibly control Hong Kong is belied by their reliance on a hand-picked Chief Executive and a

Table 9.5 Chinese Government’s co-option of local capitalists (1984–97) Name and year of establishment

Proportion of capitalization value of co-opted members’ companies in size and in proportion of the total value of all stocks listed in Hong Kong (%)

Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) 1984 Preparatory Committee 1996–7 Selection Committee 1996–7 Provisional Legislature 1996–7

43.151 44.882 60.202 12.202

Sources: Sinclair (1988); SCMP, 23/6/93; Sing Tao Daily, Mar. 5, 1994; Wat Kiu Yat Po, Jan. 10, 1995; Ming Pao Daily News, Nov. 3, 1996; Wen Wei Po, July 1, 1997; The Sun, July 13, 1995; various issues of Hong Kong Economic Monthly Journal. Notes 1 The proportion was calculated by dividing the capitalization value of stocks of companies represented by one or more member of the body by the capitalization value of all stocks listed in the Hong Kong stock market. 2 There were thirty-three leading companies whose stock values constitute the key local stock index, the Hang Seng Index. The capitalists in the Preparatory Committee, Selection Committee and Provisional Legislature were representing respectively 18, 23 and 7 of those thirty-three leading companies, that correspondingly account for 44.88 percent, 60.2 percent and 12.2 percent of the total capitalization value of all stocks formally listed in Hong Kong’s stock market.


207

political system that is said to be increasingly democratic but in fact stifles liberal political tendencies” (Brown et al., 2000). To sum up, the prescribed return of Hong Kong to China meant that the Chinese Government predominantly circumscribed Hong Kong’s democratization. To fully explain the sluggish pace, the British depoliticization of Hong Kong and its lateness to democratize have also played a part.

The British Government and Hong Kong’s democratization Our previous review in Chapter 3 shows that the British Government had a tradition of attempting to erecting a Westminster type of government during decolonization, and had been relatively more successful than other colonizers in providing democratic stability to independent states after their decolonization (Barro, 1999; Huntington, 1984: 206; Ledgister, 1998: 1–25; Weiner, 1987: 19). Given that Hong Kong was to remain a British colony until 1997, British policy towards its democratization was obviously material. Yet, the perceived opposition from China to Hong Kong’s democratization during the late 1940s and the early 1950s forced the British Government to shelve its plan, and to thwart bottom-up democratization and depoliticize the Hong Kong society. The depoliticization in short has contributed to Hong Kong’s weak civil society, fostering some long-term structural constraints on post-1984 democratization in Hong Kong. The signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 heralded a special feature of Hong Kong’s decolonization: it would be decolonized without independence by being returned to an anti-democratic China. During the countdown to 1997, Britain’s paramount interest was to achieve an honorable retreat, by exercising effective rule over Hong Kong, and maintaining its stability and prosperity up to 1997. It was particularly so, given that among the few remaining British colonies, Hong Kong was a most renowned and international city (Segal, 1993: 98),16 and Britain’s economic stake in China was small.17 Under the sway of the sinologists in the British Foreign Office, including Sir Percy Cradock, the former British ambassador in Beijing and Foreign Affairs Adviser to the British Government, soft negotiations rather than confrontation with China were largely used to.18 Consequently, in the face of China’s opposition to the full and speedy democratization of Hong Kong and its repeated threats to dismantle any “excessively democratic” system in 1997, which would destabilize Hong Kong and defeat Britain’s interest, Britain retreated from active promotion of democratization between 1987 and mid-1989. Such yielding not only thwarted the erection of semi-democratic institutions before 1991, but also increased the political powerlessness of the public and weakened their support for greater democratization. However, after the Tiananmen Square incident, when the confidence of

208


the people of Hong Kong in “One Country, Two Systems” collapsed, the British Government was hard-pressed to win more democracy for Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the British Government had to balance between those who asked for a radically faster democratization, and those who pleaded for avoidance of confrontation with China in the community of Hong Kong.19 In particular, it had to seek China’s acceptance of any program of democratization so that its continuity after 1997 could be ensured.20 With these constraints, the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd did not present the OMELCO model, a radically fast one for democratization, to China. Instead, a program similar to the more moderate compromise “4–4–2” model – agreed upon by the pro-democracy movement, the BPG and Moderates – was adopted as the basic offer during bargaining with China. In other words, the pro-democracy movement had influenced Britain’s bargaining with China, and the subsequent outcome of bargaining for the final shape of the Basic Law. Finally, in the 1990s, shaken at the unanticipated horror of the Tiananmen Square event in 1989, the British Government gained heightened determination to push for further democratization in due course (Thatcher, 1993). The unveiling of Chris Patten’s political reform in late 1992 epitomized the British Government’s final efforts at top-down democratic reform for the colony before its impending withdrawal in 1997. The reform also gave Hong Kong politicians and people the taste of the greatest level of democracy ever achieved institutionally in pre-handover Hong Kong’s history. The long-term effect of Patten’s aborted reform is difficult to judge. However, obviously, the short-lived public experience with the semidemocracy constrained their commitment and demand for democracy. The constraint has been compounded by the absence of widely feared large-scale suppression of freedoms in Hong Kong by China after the handover, and the eruption of the bitter internal struggles of the Democratic Party. Consequently, in face of the very low priority the public has accorded to democracy after 1997, the benefits of the last-ditch British democratic reform have yet to be proved.

Theoretical significance of this study: why has Hong Kong been a rare anomaly to modernization theory? To recapitulate, despite various criticisms, modernization theory has stood dozens of stringent cross-national statistical tests both in the past and the present (Barro, 1997; 1999; Diamond, 1992; Inglehart, 1997; Lipset, 1994; Lipset et al., 1993; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001). That said, Singapore and Hong Kong have remained the only two non-oil-exporting exceptions to the theory in the high-income group as defined by World Bank and the Freedom House data for over a decade.21 After analyzing the constraints for Hong Kong’s democratic development in the last few decades, what light can be thrown on the anomalous status of Hong Kong?


209

Leading protagonists of modernization theory have admitted that though (Dahl, 1989; Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1994; Lipset et al., 1993) the level of socio-economic development was the most important causal variable shaping levels of democracy, there are other causes too. From this case study, four other important causes for democratization have been derived: 1 2 3 4

Strength of rejection of democracy by authoritarian states’ elites. Relative strength of pro-democratic and anti-democratic civil society. Relationship between political and civil society and the resultant prodemocratic mobilization power. Public support for authoritarian and democratic rule.

Our analysis of Hong Kong shows that along with the high level of economic development, it has experienced a strong rejection of democracy from China, a politically weak civil society; a weakly institutionalized party system with some small “cadre” parties; a mutually suspicious relationship between pro-democratic political society and civil society, and the absence of strong and sustained public support for democracy among the populace. Comparing Hong Kong with Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea can corroborate the importance of those four factors further. As the three East Asian tigers, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan share some important structural and contextual features but differ in the levels of democracy; they furnish interesting cases for comparison that may illuminate modernization theory. The small features include a similar geographical area, a broadly defined Confucian culture, the common status of “middle-income” place defined by the World Bank for a long time before rapid democratization in Taiwan and Korea of the late 1980s, and fast economic development under an export-led growth developmental strategy before 1997. The strategy is marked by the presence of effective bureaucrats, suppression of political participation in society, benign and close cooperation between capitalists and government, as well as a docile labor force. The aforementioned similar preconditions of the three tigers before the dramatic democratic transitions of South Korea and Taiwan in late 1980s qualify the non-synchronic comparison along the following four constraints shaping their democratization:

A non-synchronic comparison between Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea Strength of state’s opposition to democratization In Taiwan, democracy was postponed to achieve political stability in the 1950s and economic growth in the 1960s. By the late 1970s, democratic development was regarded as essential for both continued socio-political

210


stability and economic growth. Hence, in the late 1980s, a top-down process of political liberalization was implemented to synchronize the authoritarian system with the socio-economic setting (Shyu, 1990: iii, 349). Why has the authoritarian regime in Taiwan introduced political liberalization, i.e., the prelude to democratization? The single most remarkable feature for the cases of Taiwan and South Korea is that they both belonged to part of the divided nationhood. The divided nationhood augments the international component of legitimacy of those authoritarian regimes. In Taiwan an important part of the legitimacy of the Kuomingtang (KMT) regime and the justification of the long political dominance of the mainland elites have rested on the principle that the Republic of China government was the sole legitimate government of China (Chu et al., 1997: 273–5). However, the increasing diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China, paralleled by the concomitantly and rapidly deteriorating diplomatic isolation of Taiwanese regime, have dealt grave blows to the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule of the KMT regime.22 To restore its legitimacy, the KMT regime resolved to embark on democratic transitions in the late 1980s. Lifting martial law and the emergency regulations, legalizing political opposition, together with the improvement of the human rights, can raise the international reputation of Taiwan in the world, including the United States. Further democratic reform could give the Taiwanese government more leverage over the issue of national reunification. The reform could also unify the interests of the mainlanders and the indigenous Taiwanese on Taiwan, enabling Taipei to present to the PRC a much stronger united front in any possible discussions over the future of Taiwan and the issue of reunification. Similar to Taiwan, the declining threat of military invasion in the second half of the 1980s from the North for South Korea has diluted the latter’s national-security concerns and undermined its justification for authoritarian rule. South Korea’s strategic parity with the North, its continuing security commitment from the United States, and North Korea’s growing isolation and economic stagnation shaped a security environment favorable to South Korea’s democratic transition. The ruling regime and the military could no longer override popular demand for democratic reform on the grounds of national security (Chu et al., 1998: 276–7). In addition, the United States has also redirected its position to exerting more pressure for the authoritarian government to take a democratic turn.23 Concomitant with those factors has been a transient and yet important element: South Korea’s hosting of the Olympic Games in 1988 have further dampened the hard-liners initiating an all-out repressive campaign against pro-democratic forces (Johnson, 1993: 104–6).


211

Compared with Taiwan, where democratization has only been delayed but not denied, Hong Kong faced a powerful regime much more resistant to democratization as early as the late 1940s (Shyu, 1990). The Chinese Communist Party has insisted on its claim to Hong Kong’s sovereignty, and rejected Western democracy for a long time (Lane, 1990; Suzanne, 1989: 150–1). Thus, the British Government harbored a long-standing worry about the viability of democracy in Hong. Consequently, no topdown democratization took place 1946–84. Between 1984 and 1990, China’s strong opposition to democratization also contrasted sharply with the KMT’s policy of political liberalization especially since 1987. Greater opposition from civil society – bourgeoisie The position of the bourgeoisie on democratization, as found in Latin America, Southern Europe, and East Asia, depends on calculations of whether democracy would favor their business interests (Conaghan, 1990: 74; Di Palma, 1990; Przeworski, 1991). The Taiwanese society was torn by an ethnic cleavage between mainland and indigenous Taiwanese. As the mainlanders monopolized state power, the indigenous Taiwanese were diverted to business sector to pursue upward mobility. The Kuomingtang deliberately discouraged big capital and empowerment of business associations in order to attenuate the bargaining power of business. Consequently, small and medium enterprises dominated industrial production and exports (Cheng, 1993: 203). In face of the ethnic cleavage between the mainlanders and locals, the medium-sized businesses dominated by locals had been said to provide financial support for pro-democracy activists in Taiwan via various social ties (Cheng, 1989a: 481). In South Korea, past literature has suggested that the authoritarian state, sometimes termed the capitalists’ developmental state, has managed to put capitalists under its economic and political control for a long time. The state has the capacity to allocate and control the flow of capital, credit and business licenses, which crucially impacted the scope of activities of business firms (Johnson, 1993: 98–9). Indeed, before the 1980s, during the Park regime, a “developmentalist” coalition which absorbed and mobilized big business was formed in an attempt to speed up economic growth, heavy industrialization, and export expansion. The coalition harmonized the state and business and steered the economic miracle through consensus and coordination. During the 1980s, under the Chun regime, he endeavored to break down the developmental state through “aggressive pursuit of neo-liberal reforms. The previously symbiotic state-business relationship became uneasy and even conflictual” (Moon, 1994: 142–3). A neo-liberal reform was undertaken by Chun in order to restore the high economic growth rate, and to solve the economic and political crisis besieged by the fledgling, military-backed and undemocratically constituted regime. Side by

212


side with the mounting pro-democratic opposition and the economic liberalization, the strict control of the authoritarian state over the chaebols underwent a fundamental change. Business began to recognize that further repression of the already politicized working class would threaten political stability, and that democratization would enhance privatization of economy, circulation of business information and know-how. Those cognitive breakthroughs weakened their support for the authoritarian rule (Mah, 1991: 270–6). By contrast, in Hong Kong, its robust private economy, existence and the political absorption of the richest bourgeoisie of big businesses into China’s bodies, and the absence of ethnic cleavages akin to Taiwan’s, weakened the local bourgeoisie’s support for democratization unlike their Taiwanese and Korean counterparts. The quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure, that had safeguarded access for the pro-business representatives, had entrenched the long-term legacy of low levels of social welfare, labor militancy, government economic intervention, and income and profit tax favorable to business interests. In addition, the long-term structural factor of class conflict between pro-democracy activists and bourgeoisie further suppressed the support of the bourgeoisie for democratization during the 1980s. A short-term political factor that evolved during the 1980s also prompted them to oppose democratization: the increasing destabilizing political conflicts between China and the pro-democracy movement. Fearful of both democratization and China’s direct control of Hong Kong’s political institutions, the organized bourgeoisie spearheaded by the BPG thus actively campaigned for the maintenance of the quasibureaucratic, authoritarian, political structure. The unorganized bourgeoisie, like their counterparts in Latin America who feared tyranny both from above and below, shored up the same political structure by default.24 Last but not least, the sharply increasing economic dependence of Hong Kong on China and the lucrative economic prospects of the huge China market unfolded since the 1980s have also resulted in powerful local capitalists adopting an anti-democratic stand to please the Chinese Government and secure their own economic interests. This is especially so, given that many conglomerates in Hong Kong have embarked on ambitious investments in China. At least, those capitalists need to mask their democratic stance, if any, to avert possible political and economic retaliation from the Chinese Government. Pro-democracy forces in civil society and political society Taiwan In Taiwan, the post-war generation, bred under the meritocratic educational system, began to question the legitimacy of an external, powerful


213

and authoritarian regime, including the privileged status of the legislators and members of the national assembly (Cheng, 1993: 200). To some extent, the pro-democratic opposition in Taiwan, which later organized themselves into the formal opposition party of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has been caused by the resentment of some Taiwanese for the mainlanders’ domination in political and administrative fields (Lu, 1992: 132). The predecessors of the DPP, called tangwai, have orchestrated electoral campaigns in various regions and managed to expand their proportion of seats despite the mobilizations of the much resourceful KMT (Tien, 1996: 16). The successful expansion of the tangwai, side by side with the exposure of the corruption and political scandals of the KMT in the early 1980s and the social mobilization effects of socio-economic development, have ushered in a huge surge of protests from various sectors of civil society on an unprecedentedly large and increasing scale. While from 1947 to 1962, the KMT regime was in absolute command of the social forces in civil society, a radically different picture has emerged since 1983 in the state–society relationship. During the 1980s, industrial development mobilized various popular movements demanding for democracy. The enormous implication of the new civil society was not only manifest by their cross-ethnic and cross-class nature, but also, more stunningly and radically different from the past, each of the at least eighteen social movements that have appeared in Taiwan in the 1980s pressed for reforms by the KMT in the fundamental nature of state–society relations so as to grant more autonomy to civil society (Hsiao, 1992: 132). The burgeoning popular movements of different sectors in civil society in turn reinforced the opposition movement in obtaining tolerance for a newly founded oppositional party. The rising street protests tied to various social and political issues have exerted much pressure on the KMT to embark on democratization during the 1980s. Though not sufficient for democratization, the positively and mutually reinforcing effects between oppositional movement in political and civil society have demystified the authority of the regime, and raised the alternative of democracy to the authoritarian rule in the public agenda (Chu, 1992: 114). South Korea In South Korea, various crucial pro-democracy bodies in civil society have striven to improve the civil and political rights prevalent under Chun Doohwan’s military rule. The militancy and intensity among the student groups in civil society to campaign for democratization have been particularly intensified by the bloody massacre of civilians by the military in Kwangju in 1980. Since then, the university student activists increased the pro-democratic power of civil society by forging new links with the labor movement (Choi, 1993). In addition, the center of the workers’ movement also moved from labor-intensive, light industry, where women formed the

214


majority to heavy industry made up overwhelmingly of male workers (Koo, 1993). Of no less importance has been that Stephen Cardinal Kim, who led the three-million-strong Korean Catholics, also gave his support to the constitutional change (Han and Park, 1993: 177). Finally, there began the rise of the middle class, which comprised intellectuals, technicians, urban professionals, white-collar workers, independent business people, low-rank public servants, and the self-employed, mid-echelon functionaries in the state and private sectors, against the authoritarian rule. The middle class seemed unwilling to legitimize the authoritarian simply because of prosperity, and aspired for political liberalization. A Seoul National University survey in May 1987 reported that 52.1 percent of the middle class preferred political freedom to economic development, and that 85.7 percent of them wanted to protect human rights even at the cost of economic growth. When thousands of students poured into the streets of Seoul, they were often cheered and joined by middle-class citizens (Kim, 1996). In the aftermath of a series of events, consisting both of the death of a student due to police torture, and Chun’s public announcement rejecting the constitutional amendment, the general sentiment of the middle class clearly turned against the authoritarian regime (Choi, 1993). In face of huge, sustained and often anti-government demonstrations from both oppositional parties and civil society, the Chun regime could opt for either an all-out military crack-down, running the risk of provoking larger-scale violence and possibly civil war, or giving in to the popular pressure for democratic transitions and thus the loss of their power. Finally, and dramatically, President Chun’s colleagues and the presidential candidate of the ruling party, Roh Tae Woo, declared on June 29 a wholesale acceptance of the initiation of democratic transition (Han and Park, 1993: 180–1). It should be noted that during 1987: civil society and political society collaborated not only through joint statements and declarations, but also through, a common, unified, coherent organizational entity . . . The cooperation and alignment between civil society and political society became significantly organized, systematized, and institutionalized through these common political entities. (Kim, 2000: 101) Hong Kong In South Korea, the Church was pivotal in pushing for democratization (Kim, 1996: 91). In Hong Kong, though 8 percent to 9 percent of the total population of six million, i.e., about 480,000, are Protestants or Catholics, the emphasis on evangelism for the former in Hong Kong has cultivated an apolitical climate among Christians. The Christian community in Hong


215

Kong has mainly been preoccupied with social services and preaching the gospel, acting as the government’s partner rather than its critic (Nai, 1991; Tsui, 1991). The financial dependence of the mainline Protestant churches and the Catholic Church has further undermined their readiness to confront the government. Hong Kong also lacked militant labor unions, and student bodies – the crucial impelling forces from civil society for bottom-up democratization in South Korea during the 1980s – to challenge the bureaucrat government (Han, 1989: 267–304; Wang, 1988: 241). Local labor unions have been fragmented by political ideologies and the proliferation of small unions (England, 1989; Turner, 1980). The government’s skillful defusing of labor conflicts, improved labor legislation and welfare, and depoliticizing measures of the labor sector, further contributed to low labor participation in Hong Kong. Low union density, improvements in labor legislation and the failure of the larger unions to advance worker’s interests have fed back on each other and crippled labor unions as political forces.25 Above all, in Hong Kong, the presence of weak political parties and the mutual mistrust between pro-democratic political society and civil society contrasted sharply with their counterparts in Taiwan and South Korea. With a politically weak civil society and political society, plus their poor cooperative relationship, the mobilization power of pro-democratic forces has thus been severely curtailed. Political culture and public support for democracy Taiwan Side by side with the ongoing socio-economic development, there has been an expansion of university students in Taiwan in the post-war period. As university students tend to be one of the most liberal segments in society, it was not surprising to find that among a rarely conducted survey performed in the 1970s, 81 percent agreed that democratic political system is the best political system (Kan, 1999: 67). In the 1980s before the democratic breakthroughs of 1987, two more surveys tapping the public views on elections provide more evidence of rising political support for democracy in terms of attitudes. You (1992: 252–65) carried out two surveys in 1983 and 1985, and found that while 58.4 percent of the respondents in 1983 possessed democratic values, the figure increased to 74.5 percent in 1986 (Kan, 1999: 87–8). Additionally, the surveys done by Yuan and Chen, and Hu also reported that the political culture of Taiwanese changed from a traditional to a democratic one (Shyu, 1990: 299; Kan, 1999: 88). Above all, those who had stronger democratic values were more likely to support the tangwai, the opposition movement. It was found that 70.1 percent of the voters who voted for the tangwai in 1983 had democratic

216


values. The figure increased to 93.0 percent in 1986, testifying that democratic values did affect voters’ choice in elections (Kan, 1999: 88; Lin, 1988: 163). In brief, despite the lack of Taiwan-wide surveys before the breakthroughs in democratic transition of 1987, the available evidence have pointed to an increasingly pro-democratic political culture, which has been translated into electoral support for pro-democratic opposition before 1987. South Korea Concrete data on political attitudes in South Korea towards democracy have, as expected, been scarce during authoritarian rule. Among those rare researches, an earlier one was conducted in 1974. It pointed out that less than half of “the adult population exhibited some commitment to fundamental democratic values and beliefs, while a majority still remained predominantly under the old influence of authoritarian Confucian values” (Lee, 1984: 102). Another survey conducted in 1987 has, however, shown the changing attitudes brought about by the fundamental social mobilization. Socio-economic development and the subsequent social mobilization have led to increasing provision of education, greater circulation of political information, and a decreasing level of paternalism. All those changes have been proven to be conducive to less support for authoritarian rule in South Korea (Park, 1989: 265–302).26 The political culture can also be partially inferred from their political participation with regard to democratization. The intellectuals’ and university students’ pro-democratic orientations have been in part prompted by the wishes to advance the civil and political rights prevalent under Chun Doo-hwan’s military rule. As the Chun government continued many oppressive policies of the Park regime, the social bases for a larger prodemocratic public support has expanded. For instance, under the Chun government, labor unions were placed under even more draconian control. The growth of the working class caused by dynamic capitalist development has expanded the political bargaining power of the working class. The working class demanded democratization at the workplace (Potter, 1997: 236). The press and schools were purged of dissenters. As a result, opposition to the oppressive state increased and spread from the students, who numbered over 1 million in higher education in late 1980s, compared to 100,000 during the 1961 military coup, to the middle classes – which had vastly expanded – and to the urban population. South Koreans found the repressive state controls more and more infuriating (Steinberg, 1995: 383–8). Eventually, university students, intellectuals, the Church, workers and a much enlarged middle class of white-collar workers became increasingly more favorable of liberal democracy attitudinally.


217

Hong Kong In Hong Kong, though the vibrant democracy movement of the 1980s has intensified public awareness and support for democracy, the massive public backing for speeding up democracy after the Tiananmen Square incident proved to be short-lived. For most of the time, Hong Kong people have conferred a medium to high level of legitimacy to the non-democratic political system of Hong Kong, because of its continuous capacity to deliver economic prosperity, political stability, and civil liberties. While civil liberties, stability, prosperity, and rule of law have been enormously cherished by Hong Kong people, their prolonged presence under its former non-democratic system have fostered a popular belief that democratic institutions are only enhancing, rather than necessary, for their continued enjoyment of those values. Owing to the limited extent of the experience of democracy of the people of Hong Kong commitment to democratic institutions has been far from overwhelming and intensive. Such lukewarm support for democratic reform is in sharp contrast to those in former communist states in the early 1990s. The rapid democratic transition of many former authoritarian and communist states in Europe and Latin America has been prompted by prolonged economic ineffectiveness, state-sanctioned brutality, large-scale corruption, and ideological bankruptcy. Those collective experiences have attracted relatively more solid public support for the democratic institutions than that of Hong Kong Chinese.27 Unlike many other former authoritarian or communist regimes, Hong Kong’s democratic transition did not come as a response to an internal legitimacy crisis embedded in a rotten, repressive and despicable political or economic structure. Much of the thrust for Hong Kong’s democratic transition in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from its departing colonial master, and not its colonial average subjects. With ordinary people happy with their prosperous and largely free lives in a stable society supported by the rule of law, traces of “legitimacy crises” and pressure for democratization, as found in Latin America and Southern Europe could barely be detected in Hong Kong throughout most of the post-1970s period. On the contrary, Hong Kong Chinese conferred a moderate level of legitimacy on its quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system from the 1970s to late 1985, and on its limited democracy from 1985 to mid-2002. Summing up, the cases of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea when analyzed in the light of the aforementioned framework are shown in Table 9.6. Table 9.6 confirms that as well as the level of socio-economic development, the opposition to democracy from authoritarian elites, the political strength of pro-democratic civil society and political society, and public support for democracy do matter for the level of democracy attainable. A simple determinate relationship between the level of socio-economic

218


Table 9.6 A non-synchronic comparison of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea: effects of four factors on their democratic development Factors

Taiwan (during democratic transition in 1987)

South Korea (during democratic transition in 1987)

Hong Kong (mid2002 and before)

Strength of authoritarian elites’ opposition to democracy by authoritarian state

Medium

Medium

High

Strength of prodemocratic civil society

Medium

Strong

Weak (for most of the period)

Relationship between civil society and political society immediately before the democratic transitions

Implicit cooperation in opposition against authoritarianism (Chu, 1992: 100)

Open and strong cooperation (Kim, 2000: 101)

Weak

Bourgeoisie’s rejection of democracy

Medium-sized capitalists supported democracy

Supportive of democracy

Strong rejection

Public support for democracy

Medium

Strong

Weak

development and that of democracy has not been found for the three tigers, given the higher level of economic development of Hong Kong visà-vis the other two cases. Moreover, two theoretical implications can now be drawn from this research project. First, though the level of socio-economic development has been found to be the causally most powerful independent variable to explain the level of democracy, the interpretation of the causal mechanism has still confounded students in the field (Londregan and Poole, 1996; Barro, 1997; 1999). On examining most cross-national research in this area, including the latest ones (Barro, 1999; Diamond, 1992; Inglehart, 1997; Lipset, 1994; Lipset et al., 1993; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001), the authors have not included variables such as the political strength of civil society, political society, and authoritarian elites with respect to advancing or suppressing democracy. The absence of those variables may be the missing link to enable us to better interpret the strong causation exerted by the level of socio-economic development on the level of democracy.28 Second, a “deviant case” study can debilitate and refine a theory. The


219

bourgeoisie antipathy and weak to moderate public support for democratization embedded in Hong Kong society have contributed to the anomalous character of Hong Kong for modernization theory, and both weaken the theory and suggest an alternative hypothesis. The theory implicitly but unjustifiably assumes that undemocratic places are repressive, corrupt and lacking legitimacy, and thus under enormous internal pressure to democratize especially in places with moderate and high level of socio-economic development. Indeed, there has been compelling evidence from various authoritarian countries testifying that brutal acts and corruption under authoritarian rule reinforce people’s determination to democratize in order to safeguard their human rights (Cardoso, 1986: 149–50; Chung, 1990: 232; Malloy and Seligson, 1987). Unlike the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America and most of the authoritarian regimes in Asia, which were mostly authoritarian in the pre-1984 era, Hong Kong has long enjoyed a relatively high level of civil liberties and political rights (Table 3.1). Relatively higher levels of civil liberties and political rights, ensured by the liberal tradition of Britain, removed an important impetus for democratization in Hong Kong. They also emasculate bottom-up efforts at democratization via civil society. In terms of corruption, Hong Kong also performed better than Taiwan and South Korea immediately before the democratic transitions in the late 1980s and afterwards, based upon the cross-national corruption perceptions index (Table 9.7). The consistently smaller degrees of perceived corruption in Hong Kong vis-à-vis the Taiwan and South Korea before and after 1997 would have also lessened public support to change the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian system in Hong Kong that since the 1960s has managed to deliver superior economic performance. The relatively free and uncorrupt nature of Hong Kong society, coupled with its freedoms and stability, sustained economic growth most of the time during the last few decades and conferred a moderate level of Table 9.7 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)1 Place

1980–5

1988–92

1996

1998

2000

2002

Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan Singapore

7.35 3.93 5.95 8.41

6.87 3.50 5.14 9.16

7.01 5.02 4.98 8.8

7.8 4.2 5.3 9.1

7.7 4.0 5.5 9.1

8.2 4.5 5.6 9.3

Source: http: //www.gwdg.de/~uwvw. Note 1 The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by businesspeople, risk analysts and the general public. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

220


legitimacy on Hong Kong’s undemocratic political institutions. Given the previous analysis of Hong Kong’s internal constraints on democratization, a hypothesis can be advanced: fairly stable and affluent undemocratic (city-) state with continuous socio-economic growth, plentiful perceived chances of upward social mobility and relatively corruption-free administration, can maintain a moderate level of legitimacy and be free from significant internal pressure for democratization for a long time. The hypothesis is reinforced by some parallels shared between Hong Kong and Singapore, the only two remaining non oil-exporting anomalies among the upper-income category registered by the World Bank: 1 2

3

4

spectacular and sustained economic growth and phenomenal rise in standard of living over the last few decades; a relatively corruption- and scandal-free non-democratic government that can enjoy legitimacy over its capacity to maintain the long-term performance of admirable prosperity and stability; small size of city–states that subjected most political aspirants, activist professionals and intelligentsia to co-opt, leaving few dissidents in a feeble political opposition; presence of a belligerent neighboring state, which left the preservation of domestic stability and prosperity of supreme importance.29

Authoritarian regimes that have enjoyed high economic growth rates but been devoid of check-and-balance instruments were often tainted by corruption and abuse of power. The ensuing fall in their legitimacy, together with values and structural changes arising from their socio-economic growth, finally sparked off their transitions towards democracy. The rare prolonged enjoyment of the revered rule-of-law and corruption-free governments in both Hong Kong and Singapore, were largely due to the colonial heritage of Britain. The overwhelming difficulty of finding cases sharing conditions similar to Hong Kong and Singapore, largely explains the impossibility of finding any other “high-income places” which invalidate modernization theory on the same grounds. Hence, in countries like China that have been plagued by rampant corruption, inefficient bureaucrats, growing ethnic and regional tensions, a non-institutionalized legal system, and the prolonged deprivation of human rights, even sustained economic development may fail to confer the sorely needed long-term legitimacy for its political system, and keep the political pressure for democratization off indefinitely. The “third way” of development or “new authoritarianism,” therefore, remains an untenable model for development.30 Having analyzed the constraints for Hong Kong’s democratization and the causes of its anomalous nature for modernization theory, what implications can be drawn for the prospects of Hong Kong’s democratic development?


221

Prospects for democratic development In late October 1997, four months after the return of Hong Kong to China, many observers said that there were no remarkable changes in Hong Kong’s way of life. Nevertheless, the abolition of the elected legislature, the enacting of new, stringent laws, the imposition of new electoral arrangements, and the display of a conservative stance by the new Chief Executive all bode ill for Hong Kong’s democratic prospects. These phenomena effectively raise a fence around Hong Kong people and prodemocracy activists, apparently reducing the “high degree of autonomy” promised to the people of Hong Kong. Such measures reinforce in clear terms the Chinese Government’s bottom line with respect to its governance of Hong Kong: acts perceived as inimical to the ultimate control of China over Hong Kong by the Chinese Government. The following legal and other social parameters cast long shadows over the democratic prospects of Hong Kong. First, legal and political constraints weaken the chances for the pro-democracy camp to amend the Basic Law or other draconian laws and speed up democratization in the near term. According to Article 74 of the Basic Law, individual legislators cannot initiate bills concerning political structure without the consent of the Chief Executive. Since early 1997, Tung has repeatedly rejected requests to speed up Hong Kong’s democratization and stressed conformity to the slow schedule of democratization set out in the Basic Law.31 Indeed, as any suggestion of speeding up democratization will irritate the Chinese Government, and pose threats to the capitalists’ interests, the chance for a successful legislature-led democratic breakthrough in the near term is virtually zero. This is particularly so because the predemocracy camp did not take up a majority of the seats in the legislature in the 1998 and 2000 elections. The electoral system amended since the handover has spiked the pro-democratic camp to the extent that it would be impossible for them to acquire the necessary majority votes to pass the motions and bills they favored. Second, the lack of long experience in democratization, the absence of a legitimacy crisis within the quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure, and the perceived importance of stability dampen popular support for democratization. Authoritarian regimes in Asia and Latin America, including South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippines, that have recently followed the current wave of democratization have in fact undergone the process of “re-democratization.” The initial public support or legitimacy of those re-democratized regimes can at least be partially based upon some collective, long and positive experiences with full-blown democratic institutions entrenched in the past, which spanned a relatively longer period.32 Unlike those countries, Hong Kong in the 1990s has not redemocratized but only begun to experience democratization for the first time after more than 150 years of colonial rule. It has been more difficult

222


for the legitimacy of the semi-democratic political structure in Hong Kong to rest upon a similar experience. Before 1997, the legitimacy of democracy in Hong Kong could not be predicated upon any legitimacy problem with Hong Kong’s quasibureaucratic authoritarian political structure either. Unlike many former authoritarian regimes, Hong Kong’s democratic transition did not come as a response to an “internal” legitimacy crisis characterized by a rotten, repressive and despicable political or economic structure. Much of the thrust for Hong Kong’s democratic transition between 1984 and 1997 can be credited to its departing colonial master, not to its colonial citizens. With ordinary people satisfied with their prosperous and largely free lives in a stable society run according to the rule-of-law, traces of “legitimacy crises” and pressure for democratization as found in Latin America and Southern Europe were barely detectable in Hong Kong before 1997. On the contrary, Hong Kong Chinese conferred a moderate level of legitimacy on its benign, quasi-bureaucratic-authoritarian system from the 1970s to late 1985, and on its limited democracy from late 1985 to 1997.33 In the 1990s, the local population placed a low priority on “elected government” with regard to prosperity, stability, and civil liberties. A recent survey also highlights that while 41.8 percent of the local public regard the electoral arrangements for 1998 as a retrogression in democratic development, as many as 34.2 percent of the public still treat it as being in line with the long-term interests of Hong Kong, and only 26.5 percent think otherwise.34 Hong Kong people seem to believe that avoidance of conflict with the Chinese Government and the preservation of stability are of greater importance than an elected government. In particular, Hong Kong people do not believe that confronting China can help them attain their goals.35 After the handover, on the back of the Asian financial crisis, not only did the Hong Kong Government and the Chief Executive suffer a patent decline in trust and satisfaction, but also the various political parties, especially the pro-democratic ones. The decline has probably been caused by the general perceived powerlessness of the pro-democratic parties to help assuage the economic recession and pains. The fall in popular support for pro-democratic parties, who are deemed as part and parcel of Hong Kong’s democracy, has been paralleled by a low level of priority of “democracy” among an array of social, economic and political goals. Obviously, alongside with sharp tumble of trust for Tung and Hong Kong Government, the pro-democratic parties have failed to act as an effective alternative home for those disgruntled with the former (DeGolyer et al., 2001: 15). Third, Hong Kong has met greater opposition to democratization from local capitalists than in such East Asian countries as Taiwan and South Korea. Hong Kong has encountered greater opposition by capitalists to democratization during the past decade than Taiwan or South Korea.


223

Taiwan society is torn by an ethnic cleavage between mainland Chinese and the indigenous Taiwanese. Since Taiwanese capitalists run mostly small and medium-sized businesses and have indigenous ethnic backgrounds, it is not surprising to find them lending support to the prodemocracy opposition party in Taiwan (Cheng, 1989a). In South Korea during the 1980s, the chaebols’ recognition that further repression of the already politicized working class would threaten political stability, and that democratization would enhance the privatization of the economy as well as the circulation of business information and know-how, resulted in their redirecting support from authoritarianism towards democracy (Mah, 1991). By contrast, Hong Kong’s renowned free economy with regard to external trading, and the privileged access of big business to its legislature and policy-making Executive Council under the former undemocratic political structure, provided strong incentives for local capitalists to maintain the status quo. In addition, the huge market potential of China discourages most prominent capitalists from making known their pro-democracy stance, if any, to avoid retaliation from the Chinese Government. That, together with an absence of ethnic conflict as that in Taiwan, has resulted in local capitalists offering less support for democratization than their Taiwanese and Korean counterparts. The Chinese Government has thus secured a powerful ally in its efforts to restrain Hong Kong’s democratic development. Consequently, unless Hong Kong experiences a severe and large-scale suppression of civil liberties or sustained economic hardship, public support for greater democratization will be inadequate to produce a successful democratic breakthrough in Hong Kong in the short and medium term.

Appendix 1 Different blueprints for the legislature of 1997

L: 27% DR L: 38% D 73% FC 62% FC E: elected by an Election Com. composed of 400 members L: 33.33% DR L: 40% DR 50% FC 50% FC 16.66% Election Com. E: recommended by a Selection Committee composed of 400 members

Basic Law Apr., 1990

1999

2nd Draft in Basic Law Feb., 1989

1997 L: Functional Chamber: 100% FC District Chamber: 50% DR 50% EC E: elected by Election Com.

1995

Bicameral model

1991

2003

E: elected by an L: 50% DR Election Com. 50% FC composed of 800 members

E: elected by an L: 50% DR Election Com. 50% FC composed of 800 members

2001

continued

E: elected by an election committee composed of 800 members

E: elected by an election committee composed of 800 members

L: to be reviewed E: directly elected**

2005

L: ⬎ or ⫽ 50% DR

2nd model of JCPDG (New 190)

L: 40% DR; 40% FC 20% EC E: elected by an Election Com.

1997

1999

L: ⬎ or ⫽ L: 75% DR 50% DR 25% FC ⬍ or ⫽ 50% FC L: ⬎ or ⫽ L: ⬎ or ⫽ 50% DR 50% DR ⬍ or ⫽ 25% FC ⬍ or ⫽ 25% FC ⬍ or ⫽ 25% EC ⬍ or ⫽ 25% EC L: 100% DR E: elected by an EC, democratically constituted L: 100% DR E: directly elected

L: 33.3% DR 66.7% FC

1995

25% FC

L: 75% DR

L: 60% DR 40% FC E: elected by an Election Com.

2001

L: 100% DR

2003 L: to be decided by the 2nd term Legislature E: directly elected* E: directly elected

2005

L: Legislative Council E: Chief Executive DR: Direct Election FC: Functional Constituencies EC: Electoral College Election Com.: Election Committee *Candidates should be nominated by a Nomination Committee; **Candidates should be nominated by a Nomination Committee. Table to be read from top to bottom.

Notes: Abbreviations:

L: 50% DR

FAC’s model

1st model of JCPDG (Old 190)

OMELCO model

“4–4–2” model

1991

Appendix 2 Details of interviews undertaken

Interviewing sample In-depth interviews were conducted to gauge the personal views of twenty-five leading members of the JCPDG in 1990 and 1991. Of the leaders who belonged to the Secretariat and who frequently attended its meetings, only two were not interviewed. (The Secretariat was a “cabinet”-like leading sub-unit of the JCPDG.) Each was interviewed for an average of three hours during two rounds. The above-mentioned interviewing schedules were for the face-to-face, first round interviews. The second round was conducted on the telephone. Confidentiality was assured before conducting the interviews, which were all done in quiet settings. Between 1993 and 2001, eleven more interviews were conducted to monitor the development of democracy movements of JAPOD, Democracy 2000, Democracy 95 and some party representatives. Some of their names are quoted with their explicit permission.

Procedures for analyzing data from interviews All the interviews were tape-recorded, with the approval of interviewees, and fully transcribed by the author alone. Relevant data have been extracted and included in the thesis in the light of framework of the thesis. Interview schedule No. 1: 3: 04–5: 22 p.m., Aug. 21, 1990. No. 2: 10: 00–11: 33 a.m., Aug. 26, 1990. No. 3: 11: 00–1: 00 p.m., Sept. 3, 1990. No. 4: 3: 00–4: 45 p.m., Sept. 13, 1990. No. 5: 3: 14–5: 25 p.m., Oct. 10, 1990. No. 6: 7: 50–9: 54 p.m., Nov. 1, 1990. No. 7: 8: 00–9: 24 p.m., Nov. 17, 1990. No. 9: 4: 13–6: 33 p.m., Nov. 25, 1990.

228

Appendix 2

No. 10: 5: 14–6: 45 p.m., Nov. 29, 1990. No. 11: 2: 00–4: 33 p.m., Dec. 1, 1990. No. 12: 3: 00–5: 03 p.m., Dec. 3, 1990. No. 13: 8: 00–10: 00 p.m., Dec. 3, 1990. No. 14: 10: 23–12: 21 a.m., Dec. 5, 1990. No. 15: 9: 45–11: 09 a.m., Dec. 11, 1990. No. 16: 10: 23–12: 00 a.m., Dec. 15, 1990. No. 17: 12: 55–2: 22 p.m., Jan. 3, 1991. No. 18: 3: 22–5: 44 p.m., Jan. 5, 1991. No. 19: 12: 45–2: 56 p.m., Jan. 19, 1991. No. 20: 4: 20–6: 03 p.m., Jan. 23, 1991. No. 21: 6: 34–8: 44 p.m., Jan. 30, 1991. No. 22: 12: 34–2: 21 p.m., Feb. 4, 1991. No. 23: 2: 30–3: 54 p.m., Feb. 9, 1991. No. 24: 2: 34–4: 34 p.m., Feb. 10, 1991. No. 25: 10: 00–12: 00 p.m., Feb. 12, 1991. Other interviews (1993–2001) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Mak Ho Wah, activist of UDHK, July 5, 1993. Ho Chun Yan, former Vice-chairman of UDHK, July 21, 1994. Interview with a Meeting Point active member, Aug. 4, 1994. Law Yuk Kai, United Ants, Aug. 14, 1994. Yeung Sum, former vice-chairman of UDHK, Oct. 21, 1994. Chan Siu Ping, activist of Democracy 2000, July 18, 2000. Chan Hung, activist of JAPOD, 24 July, 2000. Rev. Fung Chi Wood, participant of Democracy 2000, July 30, 2000. Interview with Lee Wing-tat, vice-chairman of Democratic Party, Aug. 3, 2001. 10 Telephone interview with a representative of ADPL, Dec. 3, 2001. 11 Telephone interview with a representative of New Century Forum, Feb. 15, 2002.

Appendix 3 Member organizations of Joint Association of People’s Organizations (JAPOD)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Democracy Forum Min Feng She University of Democracy Si Lin Xue She Sha Tian Guo Lian The Hong Kong Affairs Society Shi Yin Guan Zhu Zu (Shek Yam Concern Group) Civil Rights Education Center Hong Kong Policy Review Hong Kong Christian Institute Student Union of Min Zhu Da Xue Shi Li Min Sheng Guan Zhu Zu (Shek Li People’s Livelihood Concern Group) China Youth Service and Relation Recreation Center The Neighborhood and Workers’ Service Center Ju Shi She Hui Fu Wu Tuan (Ju Shi Social Services Center) Da Xing Qu Ju Min Fu Wu She (Tai Hing Residents Services Center) Dong Bei Kui Yong Ju min Xie Hu (Northeast Kwai Chung Residents’ Association) Hu Die Wan An Ju Xie Jin Hui (Association for Better Living in Butterfly Bay) Shen Shui Po Fa Zhan Fu Wu Zhong Xin (Shamshuipo Development and Service Centre) Christians For Hong Kong Society Xi Kui Yong Ju Min Fu Wu Zhong Xin (West Kwai Chung Residents Services Centre) Xiang Gang Min Zhu Zi Zhi Cu Jin Hui (Hong Kong Association for Advancement of Democracy and Autonomy) Student Christians Movement of Hong Kong Xinag Gang Shi Min Guan Zhu Min Sheng Xiao Zu (Hong Kong Citizens’ Livelihood Concern Group) Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee

230

Appendix 3

27 Hong Kong Social Workers’ General Union 28 Hong Kong People’s Council on Public Housing Policy 29 Guan Tang Min Zhu Zheng Zhi Cu Jin Lian Wei Hui (Kwun Tong Federation of Democratic Institution) 30 Tu Po Qing Shao Nian Fa Zhan Zhong Xin She Guan Zu (Social Concern Committee, Breakthrough Youth Development Centre) 31 Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese 32 Sha Tian Ju Min Guan Zhu Xuan Ju Shi Yi Guan Zhu Zu (Sha Tin Residents’ Concern Group on Election Issue) 33 Guan Tang Xun Dao Fu Wu Zhong Xin Shi Qing Tong Xue Hui (Current Affairs Student Society, Kwun Tong Methodist Community Centre) 34 Association of Government Technical and Survey Officers 35 Zhong Hua Ji Du Jiao Hui Shen Ai Tang She Guan Tuan Qi (Social Concern Christian Fellowship, Shum Oi Church of The Church of Christ in China) 36 Unions Social Affairs Committee, Hong Kong Confederation of Trade

Appendix 4 Member organizations of Democracy 2000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Christians for Hong Kong Society Hong Kong Christian Institute China Youth Service and Relation Recreation Center Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor Student Union of Min Zhu Da Xue The Frontier Church Workers Association The Neighborhood and Workers’ Service Center People’s Constitution Society April Fifth Action Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions Hong Kong Social Workers’ General Union Hong Kong Women Christian Council Urban Council Member’s Office, Lai Chi Keong District Board Member’s Office, Lam Wing Yin Zhong Gang Min Zhu Cu Jin She (China-Hong Kong Association for Advancement of Democracy) Democratic Party Citizens Party Pioneer Hong Kong Voice of Democracy

Appendix 5

Members of JCPDG

Total number: 95 in November 1986 Political Groups (11) Association for Democracy and Justice Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood China – Hong Kong Society Christian Communist Critics Hong Kong Affairs Society Hong Kong Policy Viewers Hong Kong Society for the Advancement of Justice Meeting Point New Hong Kong Society Pei Shum Society Sam Fong Society

Educational Bodies (4) Education Action Group Hong Kong Association of Professional Teachers Hong Kong Education Research Group Technical Institute Teachers’ Association

Unions and Labor Organizations (7) Association of Government Land and Engineering Surveying Officers Association for Accident Victims Federation of Civil Service Unions Government Construction Technology and Survey Government Cookers’ Association Government Surveyor Association Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee

Appendix 5 Religious Bodies (4) Hong Kong Christian Sentinels Kowloon West Community Church Kwun Tong Community Church Public Policy Committee., H.K. Christian Council Student Bodies (7) Current Affairs Committee, Students Union, CUHK Current Affairs Committee, Students Union, HKP Current Affairs Committee, Students Union, HKU Hong Kong Federation of Students Hong Kong Students Christian Movement Social Services Group, Student Union, She Yan Col. Students Union, HKBC Social Services and Social Workers’ Unions (6) Hong Kong Social Workers General Union Kwun Tong Methodist Community Centre Methodist Epworth Village Community Centre On Wing Social Services Centre Salvation Army Employees’ Association Workers Association, HK Federation of Youth Groups Community Organizations (56) Association for Better Living in Butterfly Bay Cha Kwoa Lane THA Resident’s Association Choi Hung Estate Residents Association Concern Group for Development of Southern District DB* Member’s Office, Chan Chi Keung DB Member’s Office, Chan Yuen Sum DB Member’s Office, Cheng Kam Wah DB Member’s Office, Cheung Ka Man DB Member’s Office, Choi Cheung Yuet Lan DB Member’s Office, Choi Wai Sek DB Member’s Office, Hung Wing Tat DB Member’s Office, Lai Kwok Hung DB Member’s Office, Lee Chi Fai DB Member’s Office, Lee Wah Ming DB Member’s Office, Lee Yuk Wah DB Member’s Office, Liu Shing Lei DB Member’s Office, Luk King Shing

233

234

Appendix 5

DB Member’s Office, Luk Shun Tim DB Member’s Office, Mok Ying Fan DB Member’s Office, Ng Kin Sang DB Member’s Office, Ng Wai Jo DB Member’s Office, Shin Chung Kai DB Member’s Office, Tang Sun Wah DB Member’s Office, Tse Man Kai DB Member’s Office, Tsui Kim Ling DB Member’s Office, Wong Chi Kwan DB Member’s Office, Wong Chung Chuen DB Member’s Office, Wong Yiu Chung DB Member’s Office, Yeung Mei Kwong DB Member’s Office, Yin Tin Sang DB Member’s Office, Chan Mo Pau and Yeung Shuk Chuen DB Member’s Office, Chu Wai Bun and Ng Ming Yan Hong Kong Society of Community Organization Joint Comm. of Com. Org. on Concerning Basic Law Kowloon City Development Council Lai King Estate Residents Association People’s Council of Public Housing Policy RC* Member’s Office, Tsang Kwong Yuen RC Member’s Office, Wong Man Tai RC, DB Member’s Office, Chan Wai Yi RC, DB Members’ Office, Lai Kam Cheung and Lee Ho Fai RC, DB Members’ Office, Lai On kwok and Lee Wing Tat Research Centre on the Development of C&W District Shamshuipo Development and Service Centre Shamshuipo People’s Livelihood Concern Group Shatin Concern Group Society for the Rights of Butterfly Bay’s Residents Tsing Yi Concern Group Tuen Mun People’s Livelihood Concern Association Tuen Mun Tsuen Wai Voluntary Society UC* Member’s Office, Fok Pui Yee UC Member’s Office, Lam Chak Pil UC Member’s Office, Lee Chik Yuet UC Member’s Office, Tong Kam Bill UC, DB Members’ Office, KK Fung, KT Leung, KK Tam Yamatei Community Research Group (*) DB: District Board RC: Regional Council UC: Urban Council

Appendix 6

Sources for Table 8.10

(1) Ming Pao, 28th Oct. 1986, 3rd Nov. 1986, 30th Nov. 1986, 9th Feb. 1987, 19th Apr. 1987, 25th May 1987, 5th July 1987, 29th June 1987, 16th July 1987, 5th Sept. 1987, 7th Sept. 1987, 14th Sept. 1987, 28th Sept. 1987, 16th Nov. 1987, 19th Nov. 1987, 7 Dec. 1987, 8th Dec. 1987, 14th Jan. 1998, 28th Jan. 1988, 15th Feb. 1988, 17th Mar. 1988, 22nd May 1988, 14th June 1988, 5th Sept. 1988, 12th Sept. 1988, 19th Sept. 1988, 27th Sept. 1988, 13th Oct. 1988, 4th Dec. 1988, 5th Dec. 1988, 1st Jan. 1989, 2nd Jan. 1989, 7th Jan. 1989, 8th Jan. 1989, 9th Jan. 1989, 29th Jan. 1989, 17th May 1989, 21st May 1989, 22nd May 1989, 17th Aug. 1989, 28th Sept. 1989, 30th Sept. 1989, 7th Jan. 1990, 9th Jan. 1990, 10th Jan. 1990, 11th Jan. 1990, 14th Jan. 1990, 15th Jan. 1990, 11th Feb. 1990, 19th Feb. 1990, 26th Mar. 1990, 30th Oct. 1992, 6th Nov. 1992, 13th Nov. 1992, 20th Nov. 1992, 11th Dec. 1992, 24th Dec. 1992, 6th Jan. 1993, 3rd Feb. 1993, 19th Feb. 1993, 19th Mar. 1993, 2nd Apr. 1993, 30th Apr. 1993, 28th May 1993, 11th June 1993, 9th July 1993, 23rd July 1993, 15th Sept. 1993, 8th Oct. 1993, 29th Oct. 1993, 12th Nov. 1993, 19th Nov. 1993, 3rd Dec. 1993, 7th Jan. 1994, 14th Jan. 1994, 4th Feb. 1994, 4th Mar. 1994, 18th Mar. 1994, 8th Apr. 1994, 6th May 1994, 27th May 1994, 17th June 1994, 21st Oct. 1994, 18th Nov. 1994, 16th Dec. 1998, 17th Dec. 1998, 28th Dec. 1998, 11th Jan. 1999, 12th Jan. 1999, 15th Jan. 1999, 19th Jan. 1999, 25th Jan. 1999, 8th Feb. 1999, 1st Feb. 1999, 29th Feb. 1999, 10th Mar. 1999, 12 Apr. 1999, 13th June 1999, 28th June 1999, 1st July 1999, 2nd July 1999, 15th July 1999, 1st Jan. 2000. (2) Minutes of Democracy 2000, 18th Sept. 1998, 10th Dec. 1998, 21st Dec. 1998, 7th Jan. 1999, 14th Jan. 1999, 4th Feb. 1999, 25th Feb. 1999, 5th Mar. 1999, 17th Mar. 1999, 23rd Apr. 1999, 7th May 1999, 25th May 1999, 16th June 1999, 7th July 1999, 21st July 1999. (3) Minutes of the Joint Association of People’s Organizations for Democracy, 29th Oct. 1992, 5th Nov. 1992, 12th Nov. 1992, 19th Nov. 1992, 10th Dec. 1992, 23rd Dec. 1992, 5th Jan. 1993, 2nd Feb. 1993, 18th Feb. 1993, 18th Mar. 1993, 1st Apr. 1993, 29th Apr. 1993, 27th May 1993, 10th June 1993, 8th July 1993, 22nd July 1993, 14th Sept. 1993,

236

Appendix 6

7th Oct. 1993, 28th Oct. 1993, 11th Nov. 1993, 18th Nov. 1993, 2nd Dec. 1993, 6th Jan. 1994, 13th Jan. 1994, 3rd Feb. 1994, 3rd Mar. 1994, 17th Mar. 1994, 7th Apr. 1994, 5th May 1994, 26th May 1994, 16th June 1994, 20th Oct. 1994, 17th Nov. 1994. (4) South China Morning Post, 28th Oct. 1986, 3rd Nov. 1986, 30th Nov. 1986, 9th Feb. 1987, 19th Apr. 1987, 25th May 1987, 5th June 1987, 29th June 1987, 16th July 1987, 5th Sept. 1987, 7th Sept. 1987, 14th Sept. 1987, 28th Sept. 1987, 16th Nov. 1987, 19th Nov. 1987, 7 Dec. 1987, 8th Dec. 1987, 14th Jan. 1998, 28th Jan. 1988, 15th Feb. 1988, 17th Mar. 1988, 22nd May 1988, 14th June 1988, 5th Sept. 1988, 12th Sept. 1988, 19th Sept. 1988, 27th Sept. 1988, 13th Oct. 1988, 4th Dec. 1988, 5th Dec. 1988, 1st Jan. 1989, 2nd Jan. 1989, 7th Jan. 1989, 8th Jan. 1989, 9th Jan. 1989, 29th Jan. 1989, 17th May 1989, 21st May 1989, 22nd May 1989, 17th Aug. 1989, 28th Sept. 1989, 30th Sept. 1989, 7th Jan. 1990, 9th Jan. 1990, 10th Jan. 1990, 11th Jan. 1990, 14th Jan. 1990, 15th Jan. 1990, 11th Feb. 1990, 19th Feb. 1990, 26th Mar. 1990, 30th Oct. 1992, 6th Nov. 1992, 13th Nov. 1992, 20th Nov. 1992, 11th Dec. 1992, 24th Dec. 1992, 6th Jan. 1993, 3rd Feb. 1993, 19th Feb. 1993, 19th Mar. 1993, 2nd Apr. 1993, 30th Apr. 1993, 28th May 1993, 11th June 1993, 9th July 1993, 23rd July 1993, 15th Sept. 1993, 8th Oct. 1993, 29th Oct. 1993, 12th Nov. 1993, 19th Nov. 1993, 3rd Dec. 1993, 7th Jan. 1994, 14th Jan. 1994, 4th Feb. 1994, 4th Mar. 1994, 18th Mar. 1994, 8th Apr. 1994, 6th May 1994, 27th May 1994, 17th June 1994, 21st Oct. 1994, 18th Nov. 1994, 16th Dec. 1998, 17th Dec. 1998, 28th Dec. 1998, 11th Jan. 1999, 12th Jan. 1999, 15th Jan. 1999, 19th Jan. 1999, 25th Jan. 1999, 8th Feb. 1999, 1st Feb. 1999, 29th Feb. 1999, 10th Mar. 1999, 12 Apr. 1999, 13th June 1999, 28th June 1999, 1st July 1999, 2nd July 1999, 15th July 1999, 1st Jan. 2000. (5) JCPDG summary of minutes.

Notes

1 Studying Hong Kong from a comparative perspective 1 In 1995, Hong Kong’s GDP per capita measured in parity purchasing power already stood as the third highest one globally. The giant dynamism of the city–state has equally been reflected by the spectacular annual growth rates of 9.2 percent and 6.7 percent in GDP, scored during 1970–80 and 1980–92 respectively (World Bank, 1994: 163). 2 What is “democracy”? Definitions of it abound (Held, 1987; O’Donnell et al., Pt. IV, 1986: 13; Putnam, 1973: 159–69; Sartori, 1987). Dahl has enumerated eight necessary conditions for democracy (Dahl, 1971: 3) and many subsequent works of political science and sociology adopt his definition. Throughout this book, I will also use it. An abstract of the eight conditions suggests that democracy can be defined as a system of government fulfilling three conditions: (a) Political competition: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for political leadership roles, conducted regularly and peacefully. (b) Political participation: a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded. (c) Civil and political liberties: freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (Diamond et al., 1988, 89a: xvi). Freedom House has incorporated much of Dahlsian’s definition into its twocategory scores, i.e., political rights and civil liberties, to measure the level of freedom. Many cross-national researchers adopt the influential Freedom House data as a proxy to measure the level of democracy and regime status. I follow Diamond’s definition (1999: 32–4) of “liberal democracy” – those regimes with the sum of scores of civil liberties and political rights no more than 5, and treating those with their total scores of no more than 5 as “full democracy.” As Hong Kong has never achieved 5 or less between 1972 and 2001, I therefore stated that Hong Kong has never been a full democracy. Owing to the influences of Westernization on Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement leaders have conceived of “democracy” as defined by Dahl. They demanded a directly elected government, the setting-up of political parties, and the improvement of civil liberties and political rights. As political parties were allowed to operate since 1990, and as Hong Kong’s records in civil liberties and political rights were in general better than many authoritarian countries, Hong Kong’s battle of democratization has focused on the speed and extent of increasing directly elected seats for its legislature, and the timing for directly electing its Governor or Chief Executive. Finally, as the largest

238

3 4

5

6

7

8

Notes stumbling block to Hong Kong’s democratic development, the Chinese Government, has never advocated an “Asian version” of democracy for Hong Kong to replace the Western one in campaigns, the issue of an “Asian version of democracy” did not come up in Hong Kong’s campaigns for or against democratization. It was based on the Basic Law, i.e., the mini-constitution governing Hong Kong. For example, in Casper’s (2000) testing of 120 countries from 1951 to 1992, income has been found to be a most robust and significant explanatory variable, much stronger than the institutional factor of parliamentarism. The influences of such an interpretation of the effects of economic development on democratic development have been far and wide. Many researchers engaged in single-country case studies in different parts of the world have accordingly understood the democratic development of their own situations, including Taiwan (Cheng, 1989a: 471–99; Tien, 1989), South Korea (Steinberg, 1995), and Bulgaria (Vassilev, 1999). Of the thirty-one countries democratized or strongly liberalized between 1974 and 1989, twenty-seven were in the middle-income range. In addition, half of the new wave countries had per capita GNP between $1,000 and $3,000 in 1976 (Huntington, 1991: 62). Huntington’s conclusion has been confirmed in a recent comparative survey using different indicators. In 1986, Lipset and Turner correlated the GNP per capita of 1982 as recorded by the World Bank with the combined index of civil and political freedom published by Freedom House (Gastil, 1985: 4–6). The correlation between GNP per capita and levels of freedom was appreciably high. All upper income industrial nations were classified as “free.” The proportion of countries with “partly free” political systems also rises significantly from category to category as levels of national income increase (Lipset and Turner, 1986: 11). Of the twenty-one countries presumed to be in the transition zone, only seven were democracies in 1981. The rest were all undemocratic: four were the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay); four were the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong); two were Communist regimes (Romania and Yugoslavia); and the remaining four (Algeria, Mexico, Iran, and South Africa) were “resourceful, ideologically diverse, and politically undemocratic” (Huntington, 1984: 201). The United Nations designed the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990. It represents the unweighted average of three (standardized) measures of “adult literacy,” “life expectancy,” and (the log of) per capita GDP (United Nations, 1992: 3, 12–25). Diamond (1992: 458) emphasized that after classifying the countries into five levels of development with the better indicator of HDI, and correlating them with seven types of regime with increasing level of democracy: some of the most glaring anomalies fade or disappear . . . More significantly, in comparison with the cross-tabulation for per capita GNP, the HDI shows a more perfect step pattern of association with regime democraticness through the middle levels of development. The mediumhigh (of HDI) countries have a higher proportion of democracies, and especially of more fully democratic democracies, than do the medium countries. Why did the HDI correlate more closely with the freedom index than the average GNP? One possible reason is that

Notes

239

because many democracies in the developing world rank significantly higher on the HDI than they do on per capita GNP . . . the physical quality of life for their citizens (in life expectancy, literacy, and so on) is significantly beyond what would be predicted purely by their level of economic development. (ibid.: 460) 9 The conceptualization of the regimes based upon the sum of scores of civil liberties and political rights of different countries in Table 1.3 and other similar ones is based on Diamond’s earlier work (Diamond, 1992). 10 Thus far, among the recent attacks on the modernization theory, the most robust one has been the multi-year project conducted by Przeworski’s team (Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 155–83). They threw the challenge that modernization only makes democracy more likely to persist if it comes into being for some reason, and does not make democratization more probable (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 155–83). However, the validity of their challenge has been seriously biased by the “prevalence in their samples of rich dictatorships” (Diamond, 1999: 350). Besides, their controversial treatment of democracy and dictatorship as a dichotomous variable, instead of treating them as ordinal variables, can also distort the results (Feng, 2001: 171; Brown, 2001: 577). Finally, the inadequate attention to and controlling of the influences of international factors may have also contributed to their findings that deviate from the norm of the cross-national research (Brown, 2001: 578). 11 According to Huntington (1991: 72), rapid economic growth inevitably produced challenges for authoritarian leaders. It induced highly destabilizing stresses in the authoritarian system, aggravated inequities, and triggered increasing demands on the government. 12 For the alleged spread, see Wong (1986: 306–25). 13 The Philippines is a case in point, see Schutz and Slater (1990: 249). 14 Scholars studying communist regimes have also found that their economic failures have contributed to the erosion of their political support from the public. See Pei (1994: 16). 15 In accordance with Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy, a partial democracy entails a partial enfranchisement of adults in electing their legislature and/or executive branch of government. Between 1986 and 1990, there was no direct election at all of legislators or the Chief Executive in Hong Kong. 16 In 1991, eighteen out of the sixty seats in the legislature were directly elected. Twenty out of the sixty seats were directly elected in 1995. For the post-1997 political arrangement prescribed by the Basic Law, see Appendix 5. 17 For instance, Kuan and Lau have not based their estimates of the priorities of actors in the democratic struggle on solid empirical ground. Also, the classification of the factions within the democratic alliance of the Joint Committee of Promoting a Democratic Government have been problematic (Kuan, 1990: 23). 18 Sai-wing Leung emphasized that the problem was especially acute when the public was asked some general political attitudes, something that they may not hold in their daily life. See Leung (1993: 282). 19 For example, in Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s three-volume works on comparative democratization, they use “semi-democracy” and “democracy” to denote democratic regimes with different level of democracy (Diamond et al., 1988; 1989). In Diamond’s more recent work on democratic consolidation, he uses “liberal democracy” and “electoral democracy” to signify various types of democracy (Diamond, 1999: 8–13). In Higley and Gunther’s works on democratic settlement and consolidation, they use terms like pseudo-democracy, consolidated democracy and unconsolidated democracy (Higley and Gunther,

240

Notes 1992). Finally, the Freedom House survey of the democratic development of the twentieth century uses “democracy,” “restricted democratic practices” and other terms to denote different political systems (Lipset et al., 2000). While “restricted democratic practices” looks akin to So’s term, the former cannot be applied to Hong Kong, as it was defined as “ regimes in which a dominant ruling party controls the levers of power, including access to the media, and the electoral process in ways that preclude a meaningful challenge to its political hegemony.”

2 Hong Kong’s democratization: outcome of bargaining among multiple actors 1

2

Democratization in South Korea in late 1980s and the early 1990s has been a case in point (Kim, 1996). Disappointed with the performance of political society in pushing for democracy, civil society actively participated in the democracy campaign and closely monitored the performance of the political society. It is not rare to witness the conflict between civil society and political society, for instance, in Latin America. See Alvarez and Escobar (1992: 317–30) and Collier (1999). See Cheng (1989a: 487–95); O’Donnell (1986: 3–18); Przeworski (1991: 24); and Huntington (1991: 165–74). During the so-called “third wave” of democratization up to the late 1980s, many governing elites of twenty-two authoritarian countries embarked on democratic changes more or less because of some concessions in “transactions” after their calculations (Huntington, 1991: 113). “Transition through transaction” typified most of the countries in the earlier batch among third-wave democratizations. Collier’s article gives an excellent overview of debates on the merits and faults of different research methods for theory building in comparative politics (Collier, 1991: 7–31). In addition, precautionary steps were taken to minimize possible interview bias. Promises of anonymity were repeatedly delivered to respondents during the contact and interview processes. For 24 out of 25 respondents, interviews were conducted in a quiet indoor environment. In the case of the outdoor interview no disturbance was present, as it was conducted in a quiet, large open area. Thus, the concentration of respondents was secured and the validity of their answers promoted.

3 4

5 6 7

3 Why was Hong Kong an anomaly before 1984? 1 Even during the Cultural Revolution, China continued to provide water and other necessities to Hong Kong. See Domes (1986: 31–51). 2 Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook (1967). 3 Kelvin Lane argued that in addition to economic benefits, keeping Hong Kong intact before 1979 avoided an unnecessary and potentially damaging international dispute. See Lane (1990: 81). 4 Besides the pragmatic reasons, the factor of “timing” also mattered, at least during the 1940s and 1950s when other internal and foreign concerns overshadowed the issue of Hong Kong in the political agenda of the PRC. In the 1950s, China was more keen on reuniting with Taiwan than with Hong Kong. In addition, China was embroiled in the Korean War. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, said in 1961, “We must first resolve the most important problem, Taiwan. And then, at the opportune moment, we will claim Macau and Hong Kong” (Lane, 1990: 79).

Notes

241

5 While seven countries were decolonized between 1920 and 1945, ninety-seven countries were decolonized between 1946 and 1985. Of those 104 decolonized countries, Britain was the colonial power in 56.4 percent of them. 6 The first consists of a division of legislative and executive councils and a nomination of Unofficial members to the legislative council, leading to election of some Unofficial members, as in Ceylon in 1910. In the second or “representative” stage, the Unofficial members are a majority, as in Ceylon in the nineteen-twenties . . . The third semi-responsible stage ensues when the majority of the executive council comes from or is related to the majority of the legislative council . . . In the fourth stage, nominated officials disappear from the legislative council as in Ceylon in 1947. (Schaffer, 1965: 47–8) 7 Similar cases have been: Ceuta and Melilla (Morocco), the Canal Zone (Panama), Belize (Guatemala), and Guantanamo (Cuba) (Lancaster and Taulbee, 1985: 251). 8 After the Second World War, under the spurs of restoring the authority of the Nationalist Government and the consternation to ward off any Western colonial encroachment, the leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Government had once been quite keen on recovering Hong Kong, and perturbed by British possible intrusions. 9 From “British Overseas Obligations,” Cabinet Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1952, CAB 129/53. 10 From “The Defence Programme: Report by the Chiefs of Staff,” 31 October 1952, CAB 131/12. 11 It has been suggested the inherent elitism and conservatism of senior servants also significantly reduced the chance of democratization in post-war Hong Kong (Cottrell, 1993: 178). In addition, the documented opposition among some senior servants to devolving power to the Urban Council and some local authorities during the late 1960s has been cited as a manifestation of “bureaucratic centralism” and an obstacle to political reform (Lau, 1982: 38–9). However, a detailed study of local senior servants as a constraint on Hong Kong’s democratization in the post-1945 period is simply lacking. In particular, the delicate and crucial power relationship between Whitehall, Hong Kong’s Governors and local senior servants with respect to Hong Kong’s political reform, is also still shrouded in secrecy. Thus, more studies are needed to gauge the role played by civil servants with regard to democratization before a more definitive view can be made. 12 For instance, the proportion of the value of the imported foodstuffs out of the total imports, and the volume of the water supplied from China out of the total consumption for Hong Kong were: Year

Imports of foodstuff (%)

Water supply (%)

1955 1960a 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984

47.10 30.60 56.00 45.43 51.57 46.61 44.94

N.A. 9.426 27.56 22.48 25.50 33.78 45.52

242

Notes Source: Commerce and Industry Department, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade. Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong. (From 1964 to 1984) Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Statistics 1947–67. Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong, p.106, 110, 116–17: Hong Kong Report. Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong. (1959–85). Note a from 1960 to 1975, the volume of water was calculated from April of one year to March of another year. N.A. ⫽ not available.

13 Scalapino’s study covered ten Asian countries up to the mid-1980s. 14 In Gastil’s works (1987), civil liberties were classified from 1 to 7, with 1 the highest level of civil liberties. In countries rated (1), publications are not closed, especially when the intent of the expression is to effect the legitimate political process; no major media are simply conduits for government propaganda; the courts protect the individual; people are not imprisoned for their opinions; private rights and wishes with regard to education, occupation, religion, and residence are generally respected; and law-abiding persons do not fear for their lives because of their rational political activities. Compared to (1), the police and courts of states at (2) have more authoritarian traditions. In some cases they may simply have a less institutionalized or secure set of liberties. Those rated (3) or below may have political prisoners and censorship. Their security services often practice torture. States rated (6) almost always have political prisoners; usually the legitimate media are completely under government supervision; there is no right of assembly; and, often, travel, residence, and occupation are narrowly restricted. Yet, at (6) there still may be relative freedom in private conversation,; illegal demonstrations do take place; and underground literature is published. At (7) there is pervading fear; little independent expression takes place even in private, almost no public expressions of opposition emerge in the police-state environment, and imprisonment or execution is often swift and sure. 15 For a wider discussion of general violation of civil liberties in Hong Kong, see Chan (1988: 208–42); Jayawickrama (1989: 148–63). 16 Concerning political rights (Gastil, 1987: 29–39), states rated (1) have a fully competitive electoral process, and those elected clearly rule. For those free states with score (2), although the electoral process works and the elected rule, there are factors, like extreme economic inequality, illiteracy, or intimidating violence, weakening of effective competition, that lower the rating of the effective equality of the process. Political ratings of (3) through to (4) represent successively less effective implementation of democratic processes. Governments of states rated (5) sometimes have no effective voting processes at all, but strive for consensus among a variety of groups in ways weakly similar to those of the democracies. States at (6) do not permit competitive electoral processes that allow people a chance to voice their desire for a new ruling party or for a change in policy. The rulers assume that one person or a small group has the right to decide what is best for the nation, and that no one should be allowed to challenge that right. Such rulers, however, do respond to popular desires in some areas, or respect belief systems (like Islam) that are the property of the society. At (7), the political despots appear by their actions to feel little constraint from either public opinion or popular tradition. 17 The fourteen Secretaries were concerned with economic, financial, monetary services, trade and industry, education and power, home affairs, housing, land and works, district administration, security, health and welfare, transport, civil service, and general administration (Hook, 1983: 492–3).

Notes

243

18 Based on inspection of the Minutes of the Executive Council up to 1960, which constituted the most up-to-date material open to study in 1991 (Miners, 1991: 84). 19 Two reasons have been advanced to explain the dwindling representation of business interests in the Legislative Council. First, a new reformist Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose came to the helm in 1971. Second, the rising proportion of middle-class professionals in Hong Kong as a consequence of economic development in the 1960s and 1970s spurred the government to assign more professionals to the Legislative Council to reflect the rising importance of that social group (Davies, 1989: 50, 57–8). 20 After the Second World War, co-option of business elites into the two Councils was increasingly extended to incorporate Chinese business interests, including some industrialists, whose rising wealth, social, and potentially political influence had become too prominent to be ignored (King, 1973: 5–7). 21 In Africa, “colonial Governors frequently applied divide and rule tactics of promoting one ‘tribe’ against another to weaken the opposition to colonialism in general” (Munslow, 1983: 221). 22 Claims about the power of the bureaucratic government made by earlier students of Hong Kong, like Miners (1986a), Lau (1982) and Harris (1988) were without the backing of rigorous research. 23 In Rabushka’s examination of Hong Kong’s economic policies, he noticed a consistent economic philosophy with the following characteristics: (1) policy of balanced budget; (2) keeping fiscal reserves, historically ranging from one-half to one year’s expenditure; (3) almost complete avoidance of public debt; (4) under-spending by government departments; (5) conservative revenue estimating; (6) a widespread economy ethic; (7) absence of inflated requests in the budgetary processes; (8) a general aversion to central planning; and (9) average ten-year tenure of office for each Financial Secretary – a climate of stability. 24 Of course, skeptics can argue that the rejection has been prompted by business elites in other sectors. Yet, as there is no prima facie evidence, the burden of proof rests with the skeptics. 25 Past researchers have commented that the government tended to appoint meek Unofficials as a “rubber-stamp” on the political institutions (Endacott, 1964; Rabushka, 1976). 26 The first riot of 1966 was sparked off when the government allowed a ferry company to raise its fares despite the opposition of public opinion. The second was agitated by extremists in mainland China during the climax of the Cultural Revolution (Jarvie, 1969: 361–70; Lau, 1982). 27 The approach of establishing a political safety-valve by erecting new political institutions so as to narrow the communication gap between the government and the people was in line with Huntington’s analysis of political instabilities in the Third World: instabilities ensued from the political gap created by the social mobilization effects during socio-economic development, and the lack of adequate political institutions to address the new grievances and the needs of the new interests (Huntington, 1968: 77). 28 Pressure groups advancing the interests of the poor have been faced with such difficulties as a lack of material resources, and an inability to master English, the official language (Miners, 1986a: 202). 29 The failure of the pressure groups to nudge the government into setting up a compulsory social security scheme is a noted example. 30 Linz (1982: 15) observed that authoritarian regimes, pressurized by the need to win “legitimacy by performance” may pitch their targets too high and therefore fail to live up to their promises:

244

Notes Sometimes they are likely, as other regimes, to create problems for themselves by setting up goals that cannot be achieved, by creating unsolvable problems, partly due to their rigidity in the commitment to policies and the lack of flexibility in changing leaders and with them policies.

31 In the long term, a certain level of stability and prosperity is the pillar of legitimacy for virtually all kinds of political systems. My analysis here just shows that a greater degree, especially of “political stability,” is needed for the Hong Kong Chinese, vis-à-vis other countries. 32 In 1945, Hong Kong’s population was slightly over 500,000, which jumped sharply to 1.8 and 2.4 million in 1947 and 1953 respectively owing to the influx of Chinese refugees (Lau, 1982: 3). 33 Starting from 1954, the Hong Kong Government started to provide low-cost public housing units to accommodate the lower class to ease dire need of housing in that extremely dense city–state. Within thirty years, it provided housing for about 40 percent of Hong Kong’s population, or more than 2 million people (Fung, 1986: 341). 34 Strictly speaking, the level of legitimacy, i.e., political support hinges on (a) time period; (b) the perceived performance of Hong Kong and Chinese political systems and their perceived differences; and (c) cohort group. Yet, without adequate data at hand, only a very general portrayal for discussion can be put forward. 35 A legitimate query here is why does the level of support appear lower in 1982 than in 1977, given that the standard of living had risen? Two possible answers can be tendered: first, the questions raised in 1977 and 1982 were different, and different sample size and socio-economic composition may play a part. Second, and more importantly, “legitimacy” or “political support” is an evaluation not simply varying with performance of the system or government alone, but also with the gap between the actual performance of the system and the aspirations of the public. Fast economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, plus increasing provision of public services, may have raised these aspirations. 36 In a survey of Hong Kong’s young adults published in 1973, 62.7 percent of respondents agreed that “Hong Kong is truly a land of opportunity and people get pretty much what they deserve here” (Chaney and Podmore, 1973: 60). In another survey of Hong Kong’s workers in 1977, 60 percent of respondents believed that there existed opportunities in Hong Kong for the upward mobility of common people. This optimistic view was repeated in another survey done in 1986. 37 Hong Kong’s income distribution, as measured in Gini coefficient, was more unequal than those of Taiwan and South Korea (Haggard, 1990: 226) but still much more equal than that in many Latin American countries (Haggard, 1990: 226, 229; Diamond and Linz, 1989: 40). Besides objective inequality, the “perceived” rate of social mobility, as found in some Latin American countries, matters for the consolidation of democracy. The greater the perceived upward social mobility in a fledgling democracy, the greater its legitimacy (Diamond and Linz, 1989: 41). Similarly, I would argue that the greater the upward social mobility perceived by Hong Kong people, the greater their support for existing political institutions, ceteris paribus. Relatively less inequality and high “perceived” chances of social mobility have thus saved Hong Kong from the political instability endemic to some Third World countries. In Huntington’s analyses, developing countries (Huntington and Nelson, 1976: 23–6) modernized themselves by suppressing political participation to promote economic development, resulting in at least temporary increases in income inequality with political instability being the result.

Notes

245

38 Before ending this discussion, two intricate points about “subjects” and timing should be noted. First, economic prosperity could legitimize the political system for the post-war born generation only if they more or less valued material benefits as their refugee parents did. This has been partially supported by some research (Lau, 1982). Young people’s materialistic values can be explained by family socialization and the forces of modernization and capitalist development (Fromm, 1956: 88, Inkeles and Smith, 1974). Second, considering that (a) the industrialization of Hong Kong took off in the late 1950s, and there are always time-lags in effects; (b) the period 1968–73 saw accelerated economic growth, and (c) social welfare increased in the early 1970s, the improved standard of living only became really palpable in the 1970s. Hence, the explanatory power of economic prosperity for legitimacy became stronger from the 1970s onwards. 39 Lack of government statistics made the estimate of union density for earlier years very difficult (Turner, 1980: 22). 40 The proliferation of small-sized unions is shown in the figures for 1983: Employees’ trade unions by size of membership, December 1983 Size of union by declared membership

Number of employee unions

Declared membership

Under 50 50–250 251–1,000 1,001–5,000 5,001 and over Total

50 157 107 55 13 382

1,586 18,019 53,914 110,937 167,850 352,306

Source: Registrar of Trade Unions, Annual Departmental Report, 1983–4 (Ng in Cheng, 1986: 280).

41 Between 1974 and 1981, twenty-three incidents of industrial action occurred among civil servants alone (Leung and Chiu, 1991: 62). 42 This partially explains the virtually negligible rate of strikes in Hong Kong (Leung and Chiu, 1991: 8). Summary of total strike activity, annual averages by period Year

No. of strikes

No. of workers involved

1946–9 1950–9 1960–6 1968–73 1974–81 1982–9

12 6 12 38 33 12

75 27 37 100 58 25

Source: Leung and Chiu (1991: 11).

43 The Christian Industrial Committee and the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union have been exceptions. They have both been active in the democracy movement. 44 In a study of the democratic transition of seventeen industrialized countries,

246

Notes the working class represented by trade unions and socialist parties was found to be the single most important force in the majority of countries during the final push for universal male suffrage and responsible government (Therborn, 1977: 28–37). The same conclusion was reached by another study which covered over two dozen countries: The organized working class appeared as a key actor in the development of full democracy almost everywhere, the only exception being the few cases of agrarian democracy in some of the small-holding countries. In most cases, organized workers played an important role in the development of restricted democracy as well. (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 270)

45 The dominance of evangelicalism in Hong Kong has partly contributed to the apolitical climate among Christians. 46 The term “political culture” is used for the sake of convenience, as it appears in much previous research on Hong Kong. It does not imply that beliefs are resistant to change under all circumstances. 47 Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture (1965: 10–16) classified any political system into four objects: (1) system as a general object, for example, the regime; (2) input objects, including structures, incumbents, or decisions engaged in transmitting flows of demands from society to polity; (3) output objects, including structures, incumbents, or decisions engaged in the production, application and enforcing of authoritative policies; and (4) self as an object, meaning personal norms and performance with regard to the political system. Also, they categorized political orientations into cognitive, affective, and evaluative. When the frequencies of those orientations towards the four kinds of political objects were zero, they conceptualized the mix as “parochial political culture,” meaning total political detachment or alienation. When the positive orientations were projected towards the system as a whole and the political outputs only, it was conceptualized as “subject political culture,” signifying a lack of sense of the self as an active participant and ignorance of ways of influencing politics. When the positive orientations were directed to all four objects, the mix was couched as “participant political culture,” indicating active awareness, positive effects and evaluations towards different aspects of the self and the political system. 48 For instance, the subjective beliefs of elites have not been determined by their class background, as indicated by past research (Dahl, 1971: 165; Putnam, 1973: 129–36, 213–20; Aberbach et al., 1981: 162–3). 49 When asked whether they were satisfied with the form of government Hong Kong had at present, or they would prefer an elected assembly, only 22 percent opted for the latter, evincing a low positive orientation towards “self” as a political input. Also, the high percentage of 51 percent saying “don’t know” bespoke their indifference or worry about making their views known. When asked about their preferred future for Hong Kong, 29 percent wished to remain linked to Britain, and 52 percent expressed no opinion, indicating both low attachment to the present system and political indifference or suspicion. 50 Shively (1972: 11) argued that the community under study tended to have more lower-class people than other districts, so the political culture of the community of Kwun Tong may have over-represented the political attitudes of the lower class. 51 Another research paper using roughly the same data set reinforced the conclusion about the low ranking of politics in people’s minds. Politics, couched as

Notes

247

“public affairs” to encourage responses, was only ranked 26th in importance. The first ten items being 1 health, 2 filial piety, 3 family socialization, 4 employment, 5 transportation, 6 formal school education, 7 crime and vice, 8 dirt and noise, 9 morality and 10 working conditions (Shively, 1972: 20). 52 Local leaders were those of various local community organizations (King, 1984). 53 Rear and Wong stressed the futility of public opposition to government measures. Wong, mentioned that the Government abandoned plans for democratic reform in the early 1950s, although “in July 1949, 142 Chinese organizations representing 142,000 people presented a petition to the Governor requesting more thorough-going-reform” (1972: 5). Rear (1971: 63) observed that the consequences of having policy decided by the Government officials who are not elected is that they may either ignore public opinion altogether, or they may tend to give excessive weight to a particular section of opinion . . . the abolition of capital punishment for murder in 1965… may be taken as a random example. 54 46.9 percent vowed to take action in future if they were adversely affected by government policies. 55 In the four districts, 8.8–17.4 percent, of respondents picked “elected representatives” as “the most effective way to change government policies” among ten methods available. Likewise, “through community organizations” was chosen by 11.8–21.2 percent (Lau and Kuan, 1985: 14). 56 In the survey done during 1982, the authors highlighted that: one salient component of the old political culture of the Hong Kong Chinese still manages to linger on with only slight modification. The paralysing sense of political powerlessness has not been much allayed. People still feel that they do not really count in the decision-making structure of their society . . . Most of the respondents (73.3 percent in KT, 75 percent in TM, 78 percent in THT, 77.9 percent in SYP) thus believe that they can have little influence on the government’s local policies. (Lau and Kuan, 1985: 12) 57 This representative survey with sample size 1,403 was done between midDecember 1982 and January 1983. When the adolescents were asked to choose the most important object in life, a “democratic government” was only chosen by 26.0 percent as “very important,” and ranked 9th in importance. The other most important eight objects, were: 1 Intimate friends (60.4 percent); 2 Family (59.7 percent); 3 Personal freedom (55.5 percent); 4 Life ideals (53.8 percent); 5 Career (47.6 percent); 6 Harmony with others (41.7 percent); 7 Narrowing the rich–poor gap (30.1 percent); 8 Love and marriage (29.4 percent). Whereas in 1984, only 49 percent of the public during a opinion poll endorsed that “Hong Kong should move speedily towards an autonomous Government by direct elections” (Ming Pao Daily News, August 13, 1984). The survey was done by a professional company called Survey Research Company, through more than one thousand telephone interviews. It was conducted two weeks after the release of a consultation (Green) paper on the development of representative government prepared by the Hong Kong Government. Noticeably, a similar proportion of 50 percent of respondents agreed on that “Hong Kong should move forward gradually by indirect elections towards an autonomous Government.” The figures probably revealed the divided views and misgivings among the public towards the repercussions of direct elections on Hong Kong.

248

Notes

4 Britain’s first retreat from rapid democratization and formation of the first pro-democratic alliance 1 For its various applications, see Eisinger (1973: 11–28); Tarrow (1989); Brockett (1991: 253–74); McAdam (1982); Kitschelt (1986: 57–85). 2 These two variables have been included in this study not just because of their common currency in various empirical works. Some others have been excluded because of their weak relevance to Hong Kong. For instance, the variable of “absence of repression” was included in the political opportunity structure by both McAdam (1982; 1988) and Brockett (1991) but suppression of social movements by the Hong Kong Government has been negligible compared to other authoritarian regimes. Besides, differences in the level of repression between the 1970s and the 1980s, have been very small. Therefore, this variable is excluded from the definition here. 3 In the democratization literature, “crisis” has been deemed important for democratic transition. In this context, three kinds of crisis have been noted. First, while bad economic performance alone is not a sufficient condition for liberalization or democratization (O’Donnell et al., Pt IV, 1986: 20), low cooption of elites, poor ability to control elite conflict, and the defection of “key political, military, and business supporters of the regime,” are very likely to trigger a transition to democracy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992: 324–6). A second kind of crisis for an authoritarian regime springs from growing social pressure for greater civil liberties. Compelling evidence from various authoritarian countries testifies that brutal acts performed under authoritarian rule reinforce people’s aspirations and determination to fight for democracy in order to safeguard their human rights (Cardoso, 1986: 149–50; Kaufman, 1986: 95; Malloy and Seligson, 1987: 253; O’Donnell, 1986: 95). A third and no less important source of crisis is military defeat in international conflict: “the factor which most probabilistically assured a democratic outcome to the transition was occupation by a foreign power which was itself a political democracy” (O’Donnell et al., Pt IV, 1986: 18). Finally, crisis can be defined as “threats or challenges posed to a political system or basic social life-style that can, as subjectively perceived, likely lead to some changes of the defining characteristics of those objects.” This definition is mainly based on that of Svensson (1986: 134–5). 4 The number of its constituent organizations increased as time went by. As shown in Appendix 5, the democratic alliance already had ninety-five constituent members when it was formed in November 1986. 5 The largest commercial city and port in China, Shanghai, compared badly with Hong Kong in infrastructure (Scobell, 1988). 6 Many mainland Chinese were sent to Hong Kong to learn both management skills and technology. As many as 20,000 mainlanders were receiving on-thejob training in Hong Kong in November 1984 (Scobell, 1988: 603). 7 In 1984, Hong Kong took nearly 30 percent of China’s total exports, an increase of 7 percent since 1982. Also, “Hong Kong supplied 23.8 percent of China’s imports in 1984, a huge increase over the 12.2 percent of 1983” (Hicks, 1989: 41). Besides, Hong Kong already accounted for 27 percent of China’s total trade, while 18 percent of Hong Kong’s total trade was with China. Mutual economic dependence increased further in the mid- and late 1980s and made Hong Kong’s continued prosperity and stability extremely important, if not indispensable, for the modernization of China. In 1988, China replaced the United States as Hong Kong’s largest trading partner. Conversely, “Hong Kong is China’s largest export market, with some 35 per cent of China’s total exports going to Hong Kong in 1987. Hong Kong is China’s

Notes

8 9

10

11 12 13 14

15 16 17

18 19

20 21 22 23

24

249

largest source of direct foreign investment and joint venture investment” (Ledic, 1989: 157). The exact calculations of the foreign exchange that Hong Kong could earn for China have proved controversial and differing (Pye, 1983: 461). “If I agree to prolong the lease,” said Deng in June 1983, “I will become the second Li Hongzhang” (Johnson, 1984: 889–90). As Li Hongzhang was the Chinese statesman who leased the New Territories of Hong Kong to Britain in the nineteenth century, Deng was avowing his determination to avoid further national humiliation. A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 11–13. Ibid.: 14–15. Ibid. Hong Kong Economic Journal, Oct. 13, 1986. China’s Foreign Ministry said in response to Hong Kong’s Green Paper for political reform in 1984 that: China would not shoulder the responsibility for a reform which was the brain-child of the British Government. See Wah Kiu Daily News, July 20, 1984. See also Hong Kong Economic Journal, October 9, 1985. China reportedly accused the British and Hong Kong Governments of creating a fait accompli for China by democratic reforms. See South China Morning Post, Nov. 22, 1985. For similar remarks, see Ji Pengfei, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Offices, Ming Pao Daily News, Oct. 21, 1985. See also Lu Ping, Wen Wei Po, July 3, 1986. See Li Hou, the Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Offices, in Pai Shing Semi-Monthly, Issue 122, June 16, 1986. The Hong Kong Government’s political reviews have repeatedly run a step ahead of the Joint Declaration and the first draft of the Basic Law. China had accused the British and Hong Kong Governments of creating a fait accompli for China to accept. Green Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong. July, 1984, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 4. The Urban Council, Regional Council, and District Boards were all official bodies with some directly elected seats. The first two bodies mainly catered for the provision of municipal services like street cleaning, refuse collection, environmental hygiene, the provision and running of public sporting facilities, museums, public libraries, and major cultural venues. The District Boards were mainly concerned with feeding policy inputs to the government on district issues in the eighteen districts of Hong Kong. The Green Paper suggested the following sectors as important: business, legal, medical, financial, educational, and labour unions. See White Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, November, 1984. Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 8. See Green Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, July, 1984, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 16–17 (Chinese version). The Secretary of Home Affairs warned of disturbance by civil servants if policy-making was quickly shifted to Unofficials under the new ministerial system. See Wah Kiu Daily News, July 22, 1984. Such a quick transfer of power clearly contradicted the “elitism” harbored by some civil servants, as admitted by the District Officer of Shatin. See Ming Pao Daily News, March 3, 1984. See Green Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in

250

25

26 27

28 29

30 31 32 33 34

35

36

Notes

Hong Kong. July, 1984, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 7–8 (Chinese version). The day after the release of the Green Paper, China’s Foreign Ministry displayed its dissatisfaction by stressing that the Green Paper was produced by Britain only, and China would have no duty whatsoever to shoulder any responsibility for it. See Wah Kiu Daily News, July 20, 1984. See White Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, November, 1984, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 10–11 Ibid.: 8. This paragraph clearly rebuts the assertion that the British Government has already smothered enthusiasm for direct election before the White Paper was released, as asserted by Lau (1987). My analysis in this section coincides with his. See the Chief Secretary, Wah Kiu Daily News, January 10, 1985. See also the Governor, SCMP, Feb. 27, 1985. The three quasi-political parties – Meeting Point, the Hong Kong Affairs Society, as well as the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood – were all established in the early 1980s in the midst of the talks over returning Hong Kong to China. This was a large-scale social campaign against the setting up of a nuclear power plant in mainland China close to Hong Kong during the summer of 1986. Spirals of mobilization, counter-mobilization and rising polarization have been discussed in the literature of social movements (Zald and Useem, 1987: 257–60). Many works have documented timing as important for strategic decisionmaking and democratic transition. See Di Palma (1990: 9, 76, 165–6); Diamond (1990); Almond et al. (1973); O’Donnell 1986. All the interviews for the JCPDG members were conducted between August 21, 1990 and February 12, 1991. For details, see Appendix 5. Respondents were asked to remember their political beliefs one month before the inauguration of the democratic alliance. If they expressed memory difficulties, or had major inconsistencies in their statements, they were exempted from such questions or excluded from analysis. The five members were Tak Shing Lo (Swire Pacific, China Light); Fook Shiu Li (Hongkong & Kowloon Wharf & Godown Co.); Helmat Sohmen (Hongkong & Kowloon Wharf & Godown Company); Wrangham (Hang Seng Bank; Hutchison Whampoa Ltd); and Chu Kuen Yung (Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd). Wen Wei Po, Aug. 26, 1986.

Notes

251

5 Growing vibrancy of society-led democratic reform 1 The following member organizations of the democratic alliances, for instance, proposed even greater proportions of seats to be directly elected for the legislature in 1997: Organizations

Proportion of directly elected seats in the legislature in 1997 (%)

Hong Kong Federation of Tertiary Students; Christian Industrial Committee Hong Kong Association for Democracy and Justice Meeting Point Hong Kong Affairs Society; Commission on Public Policy of the HKCC JCPDG

100 75 66.6 60% 50

Source: The last report of the Basic Law Consultative Committee on the means of producing the legislature (CCBL-SG/POS-WG01/02–FR02–8J70525).

2 See White Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, November, 1984, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984: 8. 3 The Green Paper and White Paper for the political reform were published in May 1987 and February 1988 respectively. The first draft of the Basic Law was released in April 1988. 4 See SCMP, Feb. 14, 1987; Wah Kiu Daily News, Feb. 15, 1987; June 19, 1987; Sept. 1, 1987, 5 SCMP, Apr. 17, 1987. 6 The report was called Public Response to Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government, Report of the Survey Office. 7 Three possible reasons have been proposed to explain why some constituent organizations of the Federation of Trade Unions did not register their names in the survey report opposing the direct elections: first, some of them may have been defunct; second, some of them might have requested their names be kept confidential in the report released by the Survey Office; third, some unions may have found it difficult to launch large-scale mobilization within a short time-span (Wong, 1989: 16). 8 See the views of two active members of the capitalist alliance: Veronica Cha, Ta Kung Pao, July 14, 1987; Leung C.Y., Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, 1987, 11(4): 18–19. 9 For the view of members of the capitalist alliance, see Ta Kung Pao, April 28, 1987; May 30, 1987; SCMP, Nov. 6, 1986. On June 23, 1987, they released a new blueprint that stated that in 1992, 25 percent of the legislature should be directly elected (Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 24, 1987). 10 Business interests were of course heterogeneous and could often clash. Yet, low corporate tax, a relatively low level of social welfare and constraints on militant unionism, for instances, constitute common interests of the business sector. 11 See the comments of the capitalist alliance’s representatives in Pai-Shing SemiMonthly. The public was portrayed as easily inflamed by demagogues. One member, Lord Kadoorie, argued that only elites and rich people should have the right to vote. He said politics was dangerous for common people. 12 An active member of the capitalist alliance had aired such worries.

252

Notes

13 They were the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, and the Federation of Hong Kong’s Industries. 14 The Chinese Manufactures’ Association also conducted a survey of its 3,600 members. Only 3.5 percent of its members mailed back the questionnaire. We could not find the results in newspapers (SCMP, Sept. 8, 1987). 15 For example, nineteen out of twenty-five Executive Committee members of the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) in 1988 had been serving on the Committee since 1984. Ten of them had been Committee members for ten years. Turning to the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, of thirty-four General Committee members in 1988, nineteen had been in the Committee since 1984, and nine had been there from 1978. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce had a faster circulation rate of leaders. Of its twentyone General Committee members in 1988, seven had served in it since 1984, and two had been there since 1974 (Leung, 1989: 56–7). 16 The general manager of the Hong Kong Standard Chartered Bank expressed his worries as early as 1984 (Ming Pao Daily News, Feb. 13, 1984). 17 Conflicts between “equity” and “economic growth,” and between “liberty” and “order,” have been discussed by Williamson (1979: 231). They were found to be the dividing line among the Brazilian elites (McDonough, 1981: 131–66). 18 The fact that in 1992, many of the directly elected pro-democracy activists in the legislature demanded a rise in profit-tax testifies to this claim. 19 A Draft Agreement, 1984: 14–15. 20 Ming Pao Daily News, Nov. 27, 1987. 21 Lee C.M.: Ming Pao Daily News, May 5, 1986. 22 Szeto Wah and Lee Wing Tat: Ta Kung Pao, Jan. 6, 1986, Szeto Wah, Wen Wei Po, Feb. 8, 1986. 23 It mattered for the democratic alliance to dispute the legitimacy of the authoritarian political system and establish the legitimacy of the democratic system partly because “the more a regime rules by hegemony, the less it needs to rely on coercion. The greater the degree of hegemony or tacit consent an authoritarian regime can acquire, the less pressure will be felt by its coercive elite” (Stepan, 1990: 44–5). Once the public accepted the legitimacy of democracy, the democratic alliance could drum up more public feeling against China. In other words, the successful legitimation of democracy could win the democratic alliance greater power to threaten China’s pivotal interests, and might procure more concessions from China during the implicit or explicit bargaining. 24 See Public opinion surveys on green paper: the 1987 review of developments in representative Government Survey 4. Its sample size was 1,009, and the sample population were all the Hong Kong people aged eighteen or above. The four periods of the representative surveys were: July 6–12, July 21–7, Aug. 8–16 and Aug. 27–Sept. 3. 25 The sum of the four figures did not add up to 100 percent. The author gave no explanations. Probably, the remaining respondents chose “others” as their answers. This survey was based on a representative sampled survey done in the summer and autumn of 1986, immediately before heated debates on direct elections were launched. 26 See Legislative Council (Electoral Provisions) (Registrations of Electors and Appointments of Authorized Representatives) Regulations (1988). 27 A survey done in the summer of 1988 indicated that people with higher education in Hong Kong demonstrated the largest growth in political interest over the period 1986 to 1988. Other research on Hong Kong’s middle class corroborated the common-sense view that the middle class had a higher level of education than the lower class (Lui, 1990: 30).

Notes

253

28 In the fourth phase of the representative sampled survey mentioned earlier, those with higher income, higher education, and white-collar jobs were found to be more likely to believe in the futility of the political review (Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd., 1987, Table 126–7). 29 In a Hong Kong-wide survey done in the summer of 1986, 83.0 percent of highly educated respondents answered “No” to their self-perceived “political powerfulness” in influencing governmental actions (Lau and Wan, 1987: 101). Also, 54.3 percent of them found it increasingly difficult to influence the decisions of the Hong Kong Government at a time when Hong Kong was effectively governed by the Chinese, Hong Kong and British Governments all at once (Lau and Kuan, 1988: 95). 30 Responses with regard to the direct elections in principle, from the “Hong Kong Journalists’ Association, HK Council of Social Services and Hong Kong Institute of Planners” are not available. But from their support for holding direct elections in 1988, it can be deduced that they also endorsed the direct elections in principle. In any case, the other eleven middle-class organizations supported direct elections in principle. However, the response rates of some of them were quite low. 31 SCMP, May 28, 1987. 32 Hong Kong Economic Journal, May 30, 1987. 33 Britain still tried to add minor democratic elements to Hong Kong’s government, as long as direct and serious conflicts with China could be avoided. As China had displayed a strong preference for using appointment rather than direct election to select the Chief Executive, the Hong Kong Government tried to increase the power of the legislature by institutionalizing more appointments of legislators to various consultative committees. 34 In May 1989, 55.1 percent were not confident of the implementation, a sharp rise from 39 percent in September 1988 (Ming Pao Daily News, Sept. 29, 1988). 35 Ming Pao Daily News, Aug. 29, 1989. In the third quarter of 1989, 43.6 percent of Hong Kong people hoped to emigrate, while those who did not fell short of half the population for the first time. 36 Ming Pao Daily News, July 28, 1989. 37 See SCMP, May 21, 1989 and May 28, 1989. 38 See SCMP, May 25, 1989. 39 Survey Report done by Inrasia Pacific Ltd (OP 6a, Aug. 1989). 40 See the White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, 1988. 41 In early June 1989, the Hong Kong Bar Association called on the British Government to have thirty out of sixty seats in the legislature in 1991 directly elected. They also demanded that the entire legislature be directly elected in 1995. Eight other professional organizations also appealed to the British Government to speed up democratization, to enact the human right bills and grant right of abode to 3.25 million British Hong Kong passport holders. These bodies were the Hong Kong Institute of Engineers, the Hong Kong Dentists’ Association, the Hong Kong Medical Association, the Law Society of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Institute of Planners, the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors, the Hong Kong Certified Accountants Association and the Hong Kong Institute of Architects (Sun Po, June 10). 42 Even the pro-China Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (HKFTU) urged faster democratization than the draft Basic Law. It proposed that 40 percent of the seats in the legislature be directly elected in 1997 on July 5, 1989. 43 Ibid. 44 See SCMP, Nov. 16, 1989 for the interview with the Chief Secretary of Hong Kong.

254

Notes

45 A member of the BPG said that the business community, after June 4, found “totalitarian” rule more frightening than democracy (Fung, 1990). 46 See Ming Pao Daily News, Oct. 13, 1989, an interview with a member of the BPG, Chan Wing Kee (Fung, 1990: 124–7). 47 Members of the BPG had praised the political moderation and maturity of the pro-democracy leaders after the mass rallies. Besides keeping the crowds in good order, these pro-democracy leaders were commended for not exploiting the mass rallies to assail the BPG (see interview with No. 4). The minority wing of the BPG, led by Tak Shing Lo, formed a new organization called the New Hong Kong Alliance. It proposed a conservative political structure called the Bicameral Model, in which only 25 percent of legislators would be directly elected before 2005 (Appendix 5), Each chamber in the bicameral structure would have the veto power vis-à-vis the other. The Chief Executive would not be directly elected before 2005. 48 On May 16, 1989, the JCPDG formally passed a motion to support the democracy movement in China. It appealed to the public to use every possible means to support the mainland Chinese students who were involved in the prodemocracy struggle. It stressed the inter-dependent fates of China and Hong Kong. “When China has no democracy, Hong Kong would also have no hope of democracy” (Minutes of the 38th General Meeting). 49 Of twenty-two of ASPDM’s Executive Committee, no less than thirteen belonged to the JCPDG (document of ASPDM) 50 For the second time in three days, China condemned Hong Kong for supporting the democracy movement in China, and branded them “counter-revolutionaries” (SCMP, June 16, 1989). A few days later, a senior Chinese official warned against Hong Kong people interfering with China’s political institutions (Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 22, 1989). On July 11, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin said that Hong Kong people should not transplant capitalism and democracy into China (SCMP, July 12, 1989). 51 See Hong Kong Economic Journal, Aug. 4, 1989; and Aug. 20, 1989. 52 SCMP, Oct. 22, 1989; Ming Pao Daily News, Nov. 19, 1989. 53 SCMP, Sept. 7, 1989. 54 On May 21, about a million Hong Kong people poured on to the streets of Hong Kong, supporting the democracy movement in both China and Hong Kong. The unprecedented amount of support for democracy meant that the Hong Kong people not only wanted democracy, but also were ready for democracy. By then, even the relatively conservative members of the Legislative and Executive Councils also vociferously called for speeding up democratization. What was more, the Foreign Affairs Committee’s (FAC) report recommended that the legislature be fully directly elected by 1997. I was convinced that even if Hong Kong became fully democratized before 1997, its stability could still be maintained. Therefore, I had to capitalize on the external rising tides of demands by forging a much faster constitutional blueprint. (No. 1) 55 Only five of the ten members of the Moderate Alliance agreed on the “4–4–2” model, but as the JCPDG regarded the BPG as more powerful than the Moderate Alliance, it still settled on the “4–4–2” model. 56 Based upon interviews with the key leaders of the democratic alliance. 57 The survey was conducted by the Inrasia Pacific on September 27–29. People aged 18 and over in a representative sample of 618 homes were asked by telephone their opinions on the models.

Notes

255

58 The net scores after subtraction for other models were 39, 35 and 23 for the Bicameral Model, the “New 190” Model and the one listed in the second draft of the Basic Law respectively. 59 For example, see Douglas Hurd’s speech in the Parliamentary Debate on February 7, 1990: in the interests of the continuity which we believe is what most Hong Kong people want, the Hong Kong Government will make arrangements to introduce 18 directly elected seats in 1991. There would thus be a continuous upward slope of development from 1991 to 2003, with the possibility that full direct elections could be introduced in 2007 . . . We have tried to find an answer to respond to the two feelings that were expressed to me so often when I was in Hong Kong . . . The first is a feeling among a growing number of politically conscious people, who want a faster pace of democracy. The second stresses the damage done by constant collisions with the Chinese Government during the interim period. It has not been easy, and it will not be easy, to reconcile those messages that are coming from Hong Kong all the time. (Parliamentary Information, Debate) 60 These letters were revealed in late 1992 simultaneously by the two governments, in the midst of the argument between them over Hong Kong’s democratization (source: Hong Kong Government Office, London). 61 As stated by the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Government needed to consider the views of the Chinese Government when deciding on the political structure in 1991 (Sun Po, Dec. 20, 1989). That explained why Douglas Hurd did not ask China to accept, for instance, the OMELCO model, which had been repeatedly rejected by China as a product of the British Government. This interpretation has also been reported to be the dominant idea of the Hong Kong Government (SCMP, Jan. 18, 1990). 62 As mentioned earlier, the popular support for accelerated democratization was not that much dampened by China’s warnings during late 1989. 63 See White Paper: The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward, Hong Kong: Government Printer, February 1988. 64 One can argue that as the proportion of seats in legislature in 1991 directly elected was within the jurisdiction of Britain, China did not make much of a concession. However, China could at least try to pre-empt the electoral arrangements it found unsatisfactory with the threat of dismantling any “overly democratic” structure in 1997. 65 Many of Hong Kong’s representatives in the Basic Law Drafting Committee also demanded faster democratization in the plenary session of the BLDC in 1990. 66 The major debate during this period was focused on the composition of the legislature and the convergence of the political structure before and after 1997. 6 Renewed British-led democratic reform from 1992 to 1994 1 In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher mentioned the British Government’s resolve to further democratize Hong Kong after the Tiananmen Square incident, though not immediately in 1989 to avoid provoking China. Her successor, John Major, had pledged a moral duty to the Hong Kong people on the part of the British Government during his visit to Hong Kong in the early 1990s. See Thatcher (1993).

256

Notes

2 See the speech by the then Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd in the House of Commons, Hansard, Official Report of the House of Commons, March 15, 1993, p. 24. The Foreign Secretary argued fiercely that the reform package had in no way violated the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law or the understanding reached in the context of the last Legislative Council elections. Therefore, he asked the Chinese Government to use Patten’s reform package as a basis for discussion between the Chinese and British Governments. 3 Obviously, the hard-line stance adopted by the British Government and Chris Patten represents a turn-around from the former British Cabinet’s soft-line policy towards China. The former government’s key architect for Hong Kong’s issues, Sir Percy Cradock, while having made an spirited defense of the softline approach during his testimony in the British Parliament, substantiated the calculations behind the soft-line approach. He argued that the Chinese Government had greater bargaining power over Hong Kong’s transition than the British Government. Besides, democracy, he contended, was not the only good. It could even cease to be a virtue if greater democracy would cause a backlash from China and damage the long-term prospects of democracy, as well as undermine other freedoms and stability for Hong Kong. For more details on his handling of Hong Kong issues during the transitional period, see his memoirs: Cradock (1994). 4 For the effect of the anti-China syndrome on the election, see Leung (1993: 187–235). During the 1991 and 1995 elections, the pro-democracy parties won fifteen out of eighteen, and sixteen out of twenty directly elected seats in the legislature respectively. By contrast, in 1991, none of the four candidates of a local pro-China party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, could win any seat. In 1995, only two out of seven could finally win after fighting tough battles in direct elections in seven geographical constituencies 5 Public backing for the reform suffered a noticeable decline in late 1992, in the aftermath of China’s new round of harsh warnings over the possible fall-outs of the reform. A simple longitudinal survey indicated that in early 1993, if mobilized by a referendum, 45 percent and 25 percent of Hong Kong Chinese would respectively support and oppose the Britain-led democratic reform. See Chung (1993b). 6 This is based on a survey research conducted in late June 1994, immediately before the final debate on Chris Patten’s reforms in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. I am most grateful to the generous funding support of the City University of Hong Kong. I must also thank Lee K.M., who has provided most technical support and some theoretical input throughout the process. The sample used in the survey was basically a multistage design. The target population of the survey is the Hong Kong Chinese inhabitants who are qualified to vote, i.e. 18 years old or more. The sampling frame was drawn from the list of the permanent and residential areas in the computerized Sub-Frame of Living Quarters, maintained by Hong Kong’s Census and Statistics Department. Under the kind assistance of the Department, a systematic random sample was generated from the sampling frame. After excluding irrelevant addresses, such as those vacant, demolished, addresses with no Chinese inhabitants, and addresses eventually unused, the actual sample size was slightly reduced. Faceto-face interviews with structured questionnaires were undertaken by students of local tertiary students after serious training. Slightly over 1,000 successful interviews were made. Students have to visit a site no less than three times before declaring the case a failure. Also, full checking was made by an independent group of trained student helpers to check the validity of the returned questionnaires by follow-up phone survey, weighting was made with the successfully done questionnaires along the dimension of gender and age. In

Notes

7 8

9

10 11 12

13

14 15 16 17

257

the end, the sample can better reflect those socio-demographic characteristics of the overall local population as reflected in the local Census data. Eventually, 927 questionnaires were considered appropriate for use, producing a response rate of close to 50 percent. The response rate is an acceptable one given the immense difficulty of gaining the cooperation from local residents in Hong Kong. Sai-wing Leung underscored that the problem has been especially acute when the public was asked some general political attitudes, something that they may not hold in daily life. See Leung (1995: 282). Definitions of democracy abound. Robert Dahl’s definition has been the most popular one, that can be crystallized into high meaningful levels of political opposition, equal political participation in selecting leaders, and enjoyment of basic civil and political liberties. See Dahl (1971: 3). Based upon the orthodox definition of democracy offered by Dahl, Patten’s reform, that widens the scope of political participation among public, and render the political opposition more meaningful, has been a democratic one. In the main, it consisted of lowering the voting age from 21 to 18; using a single constituency-single vote system for the legislature and municipal councils in lieu of multiple constituency-single vote; enfranchising nearly half of Hong Kong’s population by establishing nine new functional constituencies with 2.7 million working population as qualified voters; and finally, allowing members of local councils, i.e. of District Boards to elect people for seats in the legislature via an election committee. Almond and Verba (1965) defined political culture as “the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor.” For similar works in former communist countries and developing countries, see Gibson (1992: 329–71) and Weil and Gautier (1993; 1994). Between 1978 and 1986, for instance, the freedom in Hong Kong according to a cross-national study, has been secondary to Japan only in Asia. See Gastil (1978–87). Most past research on modernization theory has left the relationship between structural variables and public support for democracy unexamined. They mainly focus on the relationship between levels of socio-economic development and that of democracy. This research puts the usually neglected portion under scrutiny. They claim that their arguments are applicable to all cases of non-revolutionary regime transition in countries that have a more than “minimally activated” popular sector and a reasonably complex capitalist economy (O’Donnell et al., Pt II, 1986: 5; Przeworski, 1986). Recent research covering both Southern Europe and Latin America shows that the calculations of the public do matter for their democratic development. See Gunther et al. (1995). The F value is 34.19, significant at 0.000 level for the regression of six independent variables on the dependent variable. A similar finding was found in the late 1980s. See Lau and Kuan (1988), Lau and Wan (1987). The pro-democratic orientation among middle class has been assumed by Anthony Cheung “Xin zhongchan jieji de mouqi yu zhengzhi yingxiang” (The emergence of the new middle class and its political implications), and also his “Xin zhongchan jieji zaitan (The new middle class revisited) in Cheung et al. (1989: 9–26, 57–76); So (1993: 67–86). There have been many definitions of the middle class. In this chapter, we adopt a rather common one, that consists of

258

18

19

20 21

22

Notes

professionals, routine white-collar workers, and petit bourgeoisie (see Goldthrope, 1978; Bilton et al., 1987). The support of reform by the working class and the middle class are dummy variables. They are relative to the support from the capitalist class. In the fourth phase of the representative sampled survey mentioned earlier, those with higher income, and education, and white-collar jobs were found to be more likely to believe in the futility of the political review (Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd. 1987, Table 126-7). In a Hong Kong-wide survey done in the summer of 1986, 83.0 percent of highly educated respondents displayed self-perceived “political powerfulness” in influencing governmental actions. For details, see Lau and Wan (1987: 101). Also, 54.3 percent of them found it increasingly difficult to influence the decision of the Hong Kong Government at a time when Hong Kong was effectively controlled by the Chinese, Hong Kong, and British Governments all at once. For details, see Lau and Kuan (1988: 95). Though Kuan and Lau (1995) and Kwok and Chan (1998) revealed that “consultative government” as the most important trait of democracy, they did not include “freedom” and “rule of law” as options for respondents. For example, a survey shows that the public in former authoritarian regimes of Europe and the communist regime of USSR have surprisingly high levels of political support for “rights” and democracy. Citizens in the new democracies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece have virtually held relatively higher aggregate levels of rights consciousness than their counterparts in Western democracies. See Gibson and Duch (1994: 252–6). Besides the palpable improvements in their rights after the advent of democracy, the vigilance of those once oppressed people has been argued as a reason for their rights consciousness. When asked whether the local general public supported its political institutions, surveys conducted in 1977, 1985 and 1988 unveiled that, 81.6 percent, 74.5 percent, and 75 percent answered affirmatively. They have conferred a moderate to high level of legitimacy on the benign soft-authoritarian institutions since the 1970s. Stepping into the 1990s, despite a slight decline in those levels of support, moderate degrees of public support for the soft-authoritarian system can still be discerned. The corresponding figures for 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1995 were respectively 59 percent, 72 percent, 56.3 percent, 62.1 percent and 63 percent. The wordings for the questions were more or less the same, where the respondents were asked whether they agreed that “Hong Kong’s political system, though imperfect, was still the best under existent circumstances.” For data before 1990s, see Lau (1982; 1992: 132). Regarding data for the 1990s, see Lau and Kuan (1995: 81); Lau (1996: 175; 1998). Though the components of the political system has changed over times, it can be argued that the basic features of the soft-authoritarian system have remained largely intact. Noticeably, their definition of legitimacy is the one used by Juan Linz in the latter’s cross-national study of legitimacy. His definition “would implicitly involve comparison among alternatives (real or imaginary)” (Linz, 1986: 65). The definition has arguably had at least the following advantages: first, the subjective definition of it can help us grasp how people living under the system conceive and feel, and better explain their behavior and political consequences. Second, unlike many others, Linz’s one can easily subject itself to empirical measurements and cross-national comparisons. For definition involving more complicated problems for measurement, for example, see the one proposed by Muthiah Alagappa. He defines the concept as the “belief in the moral right to rule.” The definition is a dubious one given that for many nonWesterners, the conception of “moral right to rule” has been alien to them, and that complicates the measurement. See Alagappa (1995).

Notes

259

23 In South Korea and Taiwan, whose post-war economic growth rates had been as spectacular as Hong Kong’s, their “internal” harsh repression of political opposition and deprivation of freedoms have triggered off mounting pressure for democratization. See for instance, Chung (1990: 232). 24 The fundamental delegitimation of former authoritarian systems in Southern Europe has been found to be the central ingredient contributing to the legitimacy of the newly installed democratic institutions of Spain, Portugal and Italy. See Gunther et al. (1995). 7 Decline in popular mobilization for democracy and emergence of PRC-initiated democratic reversal 1 For a comprehensive and updated discussion on how the leadership base of elites in prior non-democratic regimes affect democratic consolidation, see Linz and Stepan (1996: 67–71). 2 When JAPOD was formally inaugurated on Nov. 8, 1992, only thirty organizations were its members (see Express News, Nov. 9, 1992). 3 JAPOD rejected the right of various party members with positions in the legislature, municipal councils or District Boards to join the alliance as individual members. It feared that once those position-bearers were allowed to join, their primary loyalty to the parties would subjugate the JAPOD to the control of various parties (see minutes of JAPOD, Nov. 19, 1992). 4 The exclusion of political parties from JAPOD was formally stated in its drafted constitution (see minutes of JAPOD, Nov. 26, 1992). The exclusion of parties from pro-democracy groups of civil society was also found in other democratizing states in Latin America and Southern Europe, such as Mexico and Spain. See Foweraker (1994: 227). 5 For the JAPOD platform, see its minutes on Jan. 9, 1993. 6 Martin Lee, Szeto Wah and Lau Chin-shek are such examples. The lack of experienced leaders and adequate support from various social movement groups after the rise of political parties was recognized by a core member of the JAPOD as a major weakness of the latter (see minutes of JAPOD, July 8, 1993). 7 For some details of the activities run by the JAPOD, see the minutes on 14 Sept. 1993; 28 Oct. 1993; 6 Jan. 1994. 8 The United Ants withdrew from JAPOD later for demanding all sixty seats in the legislature be directly elected in 1995. The demand was resisted by the former for fear of alienating the public with the idealistic demand. 9 See Kim (1992: 27). 10 Those documents include the Basic Law, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and the seven letters exchanged between the diplomats of the British and Chinese Governments between late 1989 and early 1990. 11 Capitalists are defined as sole proprietors, or major shareholders sitting on the boards of directors, or those working at the vice-general manager level or above. 12 The increasing economic dependence of Hong Kong on China can be gleaned from the following facts: by the early 1990s, 80 percent of Hong Kong manufacturing firms had relocated to China. Hong Kong has been by far the largest source of foreign capital to China. In 1995, Hong Kong firms invested US$20.2 billion in China, which accounted for around 53 percent of China’s total capital inflow in that year (Huang, 1997: 97–8). In the sixteen years after China’s opening up to the world in 1979, Hong Kong’s utilized foreign direct investment (FDI) in China amounted to US$78.6 billion, which was 59 percent of cumulative FDI in China, or over 90 percent of Hong Kong’s total outward

260

13 14 15 16 17

18 19

20 21 22

23 24

Notes

FDI (Sung, 1997: 711). In 1997, Hong Kong not only remained the foremost investor in China, its share of FDI increased to 55 percent of the cumulative FDI between 1979 and 1997 (Sung, 2000: 11). Likewise, China’s investment in Hong Kong has increased in size and importance (Sung, 1997: 712–13). Since 1992–3, China has been the foremost source of FDI in Hong Kong among developing countries. Since 1994, China has been the number two source overall (after Taiwan), and Hong Kong is the destination for 80 percent of China’s outward FDI. At the end of 1995, China became the largest external investor in Hong Kong, with 1,800 approved mainland companies with about US$43 billion in assets (Allen, 1997: 204). Its FDI share was 20 percent (US$13.9 billion), second to the UK (27 percent) but ahead of Japan (16 percent) and the USA (13 percent) (Sung, 1997: 712–13). Also, China is clearly leading in this respect in terms of the flow of FDI and increase in the share of FDI. Of no less importance, the Chinese Government has repeatedly stepped in to stabilize Hong Kong’s economy by asking the Bank of China in Hong Kong to help friendly Hong Kong magnates in financial crisis, such as the cases that included Fung King Hey of the Bank of East Asia and that of Tung Cheehwa’s father. Calculations were based upon raw data from the Hong Kong Standard, 29 Dec. 1995; Lo and Ho (1994). Calculations were based upon raw data from Ming Pao, 22 Dec. 1996; Lo and Ho (1997). The fixed exchange rate of HK$7.8 ⫽ US$1 adopted by the Hong Kong Government is used in these calculations. For the original source of share values, see the source for Figure 7.2. Ming Pao Daily, 29 Dec. 1995. The Frontier, a pressure group formed on August 26, 1996, was dedicated to supporting human rights and democratization in Hong Kong. Many of its leaders were democratic activists well known for demanding the fastest pace of democratization within the entire pro-democracy camp. Those leaders included Emily Lau Wai-hing, Lau Chin-shek, Lee Cheuk-yan, and Leung Yiuchung. See Cheng (1998). Interview with a core member of the Democratic Party, Cheung Man Kwong on 16 April 1996. Those sixteen leading companies are: Bank of East Asia, Hong Kong Telecom, Hong Kong and China Gas, South China Morning Post Holdings, Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels, Cathay Pacific Air, Henderson Land, Henderson Investment, Cheung Kong, Hutchison, Hong Kong Electric, TVB, SHK Properties, New World Infrastructure, Wheelock and Co., China Light & Power Co. Among the thirty functional seats, as many as seventeen sectors involved votes of corporate heads. See Riker (1986: 71). For an excellent review of proportional representation, see Blais and Massicotte (1996: 49–82). The major political parties in the Provisional Legislature, which were predominantly pro-Beijing, displayed unanimous support for the proportional representation system, which, for obvious reasons, will favor their future chance of winning in elections. The popularity of the Democratic Party, according to the latest poll, topped all parties in late 1997 in that 49.1 percent of respondents in a random sampled survey have backed the party. The total backing for the entire pro-democracy camp, stands as high as 70 percent. See South China Morning Post, 7 Sept. 1997. See Time, 23 June 1997, p. 28. The Executive Council consists of Tung, three ex-officio civil servants and

Notes

261

eleven appointed members. Among the appointed members, as many as six have a track record of expressing grave reservations about, or outright rejection of, democratization in Hong Kong. They include Chun-ying Leung, Henry Ying-yen Tang, S.Y. Chung, Yiu-chung Tam, Raymond Chien and Nellie Kutman Fong Wong. Among the remaining five appointed members, only two, Y.M. Wong and former Chief Justice Sir Ti-liang Yang have publicly aired relatively more pro-democracy views. 25 Sixteen percent of the newly appointed members belonged to the Democratic Association for the Betterment of Hong Kong, while 7 percent belong to the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance. See Hong Kong Economic Journal, 17 June 1997. 26 Six of the nine newly appointed members of the Provisional Urban Council belonged to at least one of the following pro-Beijing bodies: the Preparatory Committee, Selection Committee, National People’s Congress of China, and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Other two of the nine were members of the politically conservative parties, i.e., Liberal Party and the Democratic Association for the Betterment of Hong Kong. Among the eleven new members of the Provisional Regional Council, two were members of the Selection Committee while other two belonged to the Heung Yee Kuk, the powerful conservative Hong Kong’s rural areas. Source: ibid. 27 The democratic camp includes the Democratic Party, Frontier and the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood. Source: ibid. 8 Further democratic reversal in the post-handover period (mid1997–2002) 1 It is argued that competitive parties offer institutionalized means, rather than disorganized violence, to challenge the state. They can aggregate different interests and moderate the extremist or narrow preferences of aggrieved dissidents. Besides, they can produce incentives for dominant and non-dominant elites to regard contestation as in line with their interests, or at least to decide that the cost of noncompliance with rules of contestation as being too high (Corrales, 2001: 100). 2 Based on my interview with the Vice-chairman of the Democratic Party, Lee Wing-tat, 4 Aug., 2001. 3 The two columns in Table 8.8 are defined as follows: Percentage of votes won in geographical constituencies elections ⫽ total no. of votes won by A party in geographical constituencies ᎏᎏᎏᎏᎏᎏᎏ ⫻ 100% total no. of votes in the election Winning percentage in geographical constituencies elections ⫽ total seats won by A party in the geographical constituencies ᎏᎏᎏᎏᎏᎏᎏ ⫻ 100% total no. of seats in the geographical constituencies 4 Even before the handover, when the then legislature was subject to less political restrictions, as much as 54.35 of the public agreed or strongly agreed that the “Legislature Council has no real power to defend Hong Kong people’s interest” (Fung, 1995: 10). 5 One major faction of the Democratic Party has stressed negotiations rather than collective mobilization and protests to interact with the Chinese

262

6 7

8

9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16

17

18

Notes

Government creating a major contrast with another more militant faction that has called for more collective protests to elevate bargaining power of the Party. Based upon interview with Chan Siu Ping, an activist of the “Democracy 2000,” conducted on July 18, 2000. Emily Lau had already demanded that a full democracy in early 1990s be implemented in 1995 during the debate on Chris Patten’s reform, when she was a leader of the “Full Democracy 1995.” The predecessor of the Democratic Party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong, only demanded the implementation of full democracy in 2003. The low priority for promoting democracy remains unchanged after the initial unfolding of a number of economic and social crises in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. In December 1998, when the property bubble began to burst and unemployment figures began to escalate, only 5.9 percent of the public treated “democratization” as the top priority. The public thought the SAR government should ascribe the top, second and third priorities to housing, economic development and education respectively for the next ten years. See Public Opinion Program Express, vol. 17, Social Sciences Research Center, the University of Hong Kong. It is based upon my interview with the vice-chairman of the Democratic Party, Lee Wing-tat, on 3 August 2001. Another leader, Ho Chun-yan, said the same during another interview on 18 July 2001. The figures are based on the participant observation, and interviews with Chan Siu Ping and Chan Hung conducted in July, 2000. See also the 8th minutes of Democracy 2000, p. 2. Based upon interviews with Chan Siu-ping on July 18, 2000, and Rev. Fung Chi-wood on July 30, 2000. See Public Opinion Program Express, Jan. 1998, Social Sciences Research Center, the University of Hong Kong, p.16. The sample size was 517, and the response rate was 48.6 percent. The survey was conducted between Dec. 22 and 23, 1997. See Public Opinion Program Express, Special Release of 26 June 1997, Social Sciences Research Center, the University of Hong Kong. The original consultation was made in April 1997, where a document was released by the Chief Executive-designate’s office, called Civil Liberties and Social Order – Consultation Document (HKSAR, 1997). South China Morning Post, 19 May, 1997. See Public Opinion Program Express, Special Release of 26 June 1997, Social Sciences Research Center, the University of Hong Kong. The sample size was 1021, and the response rate was 43.5 percent. The survey was conducted between May 29 and 30, 1997. See Public Opinion Program Express, Vol. 17, Social Sciences Research Center, the University of Hong Kong. The sample size was 1096, and the response rate was 47.5 percent. The survey was conducted between December 10 and 14, 1997. A senior civil servant, Michael Suen Ming-yeung, brought up the rejection of acceleration of democratic change during the debate in the legislature on July 15, 1998. See Hong Kong Economic Journal, July 16, 1998.

9 Hong Kong as a rare anomaly to modernization theory 1 See the speech by Douglas Hurd delivered in the British Parliament on Feb. 7, 1990. 2 Ibid.

Notes

263

3 Barriers to the direct election of the Chief Executive are still tremendous as stated in the final version of the Basic Law. A selection committee composed of 400 members of various sectors will “recommend the candidate for the first Chief Executive through local consultations or through nomination and election after consultations, and report the recommended candidate to the Central People’s Government for appointment.” (Basic Law, 1990). Since the selection committee will be prepared by a Preparatory Committee in 1996, with the latter appointed by China, the Chief Executive would not be democratically chosen. After 2007, although direct election could be introduced for the future Chief Executive, this has to be approved by the then Chief Executive, and twothirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council, and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China. 4 Side by side with those concessions, China also tightened its ultimate control over Hong Kong in the final draft of the Basic Law. It stipulated that the Chief Executive and members of the Executive Council shall be Chinese citizens without right of abode in foreign countries; that the final right of interpreting the Basic Law rests with the National People’s Congress of China; that no more than 20 percent of legislators in the legislature shall be foreign nationals; that the passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual legislator shall require a simple majority vote of each of the two groups of members present – those returned by functional constituencies and those returned by geographical constituencies through direct election and by the Election Committee (Basic Law, 1990). 5 The two newspapers are South China Morning Post and Ming Pao Daily, with the former the major local English newspaper and the latter the key Chinese one read by local middle class. They were chosen for their popularity among middle-class readers, who are expected to demonstrate higher interest in political news. Therefore, these two newspapers should have had a higher chance than many others of reporting the news. 6 JAPOD rejected the various political party representatives serving in three-tier political institutions as its members. JAPOD believed that their joining would jeopardize the independence of JAPOD from parties’ influence, and its further absorption of non-parties bodies as members (see minutes of JAPOD, Nov. 19, 1992). 7 Personal interview with Chan Hung, July 28, 2000. 8 Those tensions arise from, first, the competition between the pro-democratic parties and community workers for manpower in community mobilization. The easier access of party activists to power echelons and their subsequent easier claim to credit under the media spotlight for community services have produced grievances and distanced them from community workers who may have done more work for the residents. Also, party activists’ pursuit of quick solutions to community problems clash with the social workers’ goal of empowerment of community residents. Finally, social workers, if ever sided with parties, are more likely to be affiliated with the Association of Democracy and People’s Livelihood, the more populist one than the Democratic Party (Yip in Ming Pao, April 20, 1999; interview with Mak Hon Wah, Aug. 1, 2001, and Lee Wing-tat, Aug. 4, 2001). 9 The exclusion of political parties from JAPOD was formally stated in its drafted constitution (see minutes of JAPOD, Nov. 26, 1992). The exclusion of parties from pro-democracy groups of civil society was also found in other democratizing states in Latin America and Southern Europe, such as Mexico and Spain. See Foweraker (1994: 27). 10 Ming Pao and South China Morning Post have been selected for tracing the

264

11 12 13 14 15

16

17 18

19 20 21

22

Notes

problems of newspaper coverage of democracy movement not just for their availability, but also for their relatively wider circulation among local middle class relative to others. As the middle class theoretically has been argued to be a major group campaigning for democracy, the changes in media coverage may impact the mobilization potential of the middle class. The human right violations have been argued as a reason prompting mass support for democratization in South Korea (Chung, 1990: 232). See Hong Kong Economic Journal, July 16, 1998. Those pro-China bodies strenuously opposed the introduction of direct elections to the legislature in 1988. For details, see Chapter 5. In a detailed scrutiny of the structure of Communist Party control in Hong Kong, one author has estimated that the FTU was structurally linked to the party (Burns, 1990: 760). For the details of the close resemblance, see Ming Pao Daily News, Sept. 29, 1989. China’s top representative in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun, also played down the model accord of the “4–4–2” immediately after it was proposed (SCMP, Sept. 29, 1989). As argued by Gerald Segal (1993: 98–9), the successful running of the international and robust city of Hong Kong has earned Britain prestige. It would be in the interest of Britain to ensure itself not to be embarrassed by the transition of Hong Kong to China. Britain’s determination to achieve a honorable retreat was underlined by Richard Luce, the Minister of State in a Parliamentary debate as early as 1984. He stressed that “the administration of Hong Kong until 1997 should remain firmly a United Kingdom responsibility. We are committed to carrying out this responsibility in full.” (Parliamentary Information, June 5, 1984, No. 82/84) Similarly, in a debate about granting the rights of abode for Hong Kong people, the Foreign Secretary appealed by saying that: “This is just about the last main chapter in the story of this country’s empire. I am rather keen, and I am sure that . . . last chapter should not end in a shabby way” (see Parliamentary Information, January 18, 1990, No. 25/90). See Gerald Segal (1993: 98): “In 1989 China accounted for 6 per cent of all British trade with Asia and 0.4 per cent of total British trade.” In Sir Cradock’s view, confronting China would only bring less democracy and more instability for Hong Kong. See the article by Sir Percy Cradock, South China Morning Post, April 25, 1993; see also the interview, Ming Pao Daily, May 25, 1993. See the speech by Douglas Hurd delivered in the British Parliament on February 7, 1990. Ibid. A weakness of the theory is that the cross-national data have not convincingly shown exactly how the socio-economic development across the globe has shaped political culture and middle-class orientations, which are alleged to be intervening causes on democratic development. Case studies in Asia have also thrown doubts on the claims about the roles played by those purported intervening variables (Morley, 1999). However, recent cross-national data extracted from the world values survey that cover fifty countries have provided a confirmation of the allegations (Welzel and Inglehart, 2001). As argued by Tien (1996), “In 1971–3 alone, twenty-seven nations switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to mainland China. By 1988 a total of fiftyfive countries, or 88 percent of the sixty-eight nations having diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1971, had severed formal relations with Taiwan. These events seriously undermined the legitimacy of Taiwan’s government.” Of course, the loss of its seat in the United Nations to the PRC and the expulsion

Notes

23

24 25 26 27

28

29 30

31

32

33 34

265

from major international organizations has only aggravated the legitimacy problem. Despite the usual ambivalent stand of the US towards South Korea’s authoritarian rule before 1987, the foreign policy of the US has undergone an obvious shift towards greater support for Korean democratic reform for two possible reasons: first, backing up democratic reform could effectively neutralize the widespread anti-American sentiments caused by the confluence of the Kwangju Incident, the American endorsement of the Chun regime, and the bilateral trade friction. Second, the demise of the Marcos regime in the Philippines has suggested to the American government that supporting corrupted and authoritarian regimes would not serve the long-term American interests. (Chu et al., 1997). For the bourgeoisie in Latin America, see McDonough (1981). Hong Kong’s level of unionization was the second smallest one among the four East Asian ICs. In 1984, it stood at 16.1 percent only. See Deyo (1987). The data for this survey was based on a random survey interview of 740 adults of age over 19, with samples confined to Seoul and two rural provinces, South Cholla and North Kyongsang (Park, 1989: 304). For example, a survey shows that the public in former authoritarian regimes of Europe and the communist regime of USSR received surprisingly high levels of political support for “rights” and democracy. Even more, citizens in the former authoritarian regimes of Spain, Portugal, and Greece have virtually held relatively higher aggregate levels of rights consciousness than their counterparts in Western democracies. See Gibson and Duch (1993–4: 252–6). As well as the palpable improvements in their rights after the advent of democracy, the vigilance of those once oppressed people has been argued as a cause of their rights consciousness. Of course, operationalizing those concepts can be a laborious and difficult task. The difficulty would be compounded by the absence of such data for many former or existing authoritarian countries both cross-sectionally or longitudinally. These characteristics of Singapore were discussed in Yen (1990). Under this model, the CCP wanted economic liberalization without political liberalization, i.e., to “modernize” China and maintaining its hegemony. See Kim (1992: 27). See also the discussion of new authoritarianism in Halpern (1991). My contention has been echoed by Zakaria (1997: 29). He argues that Hong Kong has been a rare contemporary version of liberal autocracy, with its government epitomized by constitutional liberalism, protection of its citizens’ basic rights and administering a fair court system and bureaucracy. He implies that a liberal autocracy with constitutional liberalism can also enjoy legitimacy. For instance, despite the record-breaking voting turnout rate for the 1998 elections, Tung argued that it only indicated public support for the scheduled pace of democratization contained in the Basic Law (The Financial Times, June 30, 1998). Legitimacy here means the public support for the political structure. Lack of legitimacy or public support for authoritarian political institutions is one of the causes for their collapse or transition to democracies. For examples in the third world, see Schutz and Slater (1990). For a similar argument concerning former communist regimes, see Pei (1994). See Table 9.3. See the results of the public opinion survey conducted by the Asian-Pacific Research Center, Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, published in Apple Daily, 30 September 1997.

266

Notes

35 For example, in a study conducted in 1995, only 10.3 percent of the respondents believed that an organized confrontation of Hong Kong people with the Chinese Government would force the latter to satisfy their demands, while 64.2 percent thought otherwise (Kuan and Lau, 1997). Such a hierarchy of values and sense of futility will probably continue to reduce public support for greater democratization.

Bibliography

Newspapers Asian Wall Street Journal Express News The Financial Times Hong Kong Economic Journal Hong Kong Standard Hong Kong Standard International Herald Tribune Ming Pao Daily News Oriental Daily South China Morning Post Ta Kung Pao Wah Kiu Daily News Wen Wei Po

Documents/serials Asia Yearbook (1980–91) various issues, Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review. Assessment Office (1984) Submissions made by Organizations to the Assessment Office, Vols I and II, Hong Kong: Government Printer. Basic Law Consultative Committee (1987) Final Report on Residual Power, Hong Kong, mimeo. Basic Law Consultative Committee (1988) The Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (for Solicitation of Opinions), Hong Kong: Basic Law Consultative Committee. The Business and Professional Group of Members of the Basic Law Consultative Committee (1987) A Proposal for the Future Structure of the Hong Kong SAR Government, Hong Kong, mimeo. A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong (1984) Hong Kong: Government Printer. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade. Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong.

268

Bibliography

Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Statistics 1947–1967. Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong, pp. 106, 110, 116–17. The Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1990) The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing: Fa Lu Chu Ban She. Far Eastern Economic Review (1967) Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review. Far Eastern Economic Review (1980–90) various issues, Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review. Freedom House (1972–2001) Freedom in the World Country Ratings, various years. Available online HTTP: . Freedom House (2000) “Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the Twentieth Century,” Freedom House Report. Available online HTTP: . Gastil, R.D. (1978–87) Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, various issues, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Green Paper: The Future Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong (1984) Hong Kong: Government Printer. Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government (1987) Hong Kong: Government Printer. Hansard, various issues. Hong Kong Legislative Council, Hong Kong: Government Printer. Hong Kong (China) Chief Executive’s Office (1997) Civil Liberties and Social Order: Consultation Document, Hong Kong: Chief Executive’s Office, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong Constitutional Affairs Branch (1993) Electoral Arrangements for 1994–95: Compendium of Proposals, Hong Kong: Constitutional Affairs Branch, Hong Kong Government. Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly (1980–90) various issues, Hong Kong: Xin Bao You Xian Gong Si. Hong Kong Report (1959–85) Hong Kong: Government of Hong Kong. House of Commons, The United Kingdom Parliament (1982–91) Parliamentary Information, various issues, Hong Kong: Government Information Services. Hurd, D. (1993) Hansard, Official Report of the House of Commons, London: House of Commons. Inrasia Pacific Ltd. (1988–9) various Representative Sampled Surveys. Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government (1986–90) Minutes of General and Secretariat Meetings. Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government (1988) Proposals Relating to the Political System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (trans.), Hong Kong, mimeo. Ming Pao Monthly (1980–90) various issues, Hong Kong: Ming Pao Magazines Co. Ltd. The Nineties (1980–90) various issues, Hong Kong: Going Fine Ltd. Pai Shing Semi-monthly (1980–90) various issues, Hong Kong: Pai Shing Cultural Enterprise Co. Ltd. Parliamentary Information (UK), The United Kingdom Parliament (1982–91) Parliamentary Information, various issues.

Bibliography

269

Public Opinion Poll, various issues, Hong Kong: Social Science Research Centre, University of Hong Kong. Report of Listening to Public Opinions of Democratic Party, Hong Kong, accessed in 2001. Survey Office (1987) Public Response to Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government: Report of the Survey Office. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd (1987–8) various representative sampled surveys. Time magazine, various issues. United Nations Development Programme (1990–2, 2002) Human Development Report, various issues, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. US Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1999) United States: Hong Kong Policy Act Report, as of April 1, 1999, Washington, DC: US Department of State. White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong (1984) Hong Kong: Government Printer. White Paper: The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward (1988) Hong Kong: Government Printer. World Bank (1976–2001) World Development Report, various issues, New York: Oxford University Press.

Books and articles Abente, D. (1988) “Constraints and Opportunities: Prospects for Democratization in Paraguay,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30: 73–104. Aberbach, J.D., Putnam, R.D. and Rockman, B.A. (1981) Bureaucrats & Politicians in Western Democracies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. (1984) The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology, London: Penguin Books. Abramson, P.R. and Inglehart, R. (1995) Value Change in Global Perspective, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Adler, G. and Webster, E. (1995) “Challenging Transition Theory: The Labor Movement, Radical Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa,” Politics and Society, 23: 75–106. Alagappa, M. (1995) “The Bases of Legitimacy,” in M. Alagppa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Aldrich, H.E. and Pfeffer, J. (1976) “Environment of Organizations,” Annual Review of Sociology, 2: 79–105. Allen, J. (1997) Seeing Red: China’s Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong, Singapore: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia. Allison, G.T. (1971) Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Almond, G.A. (1966) Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Almond, G.A. (1973) “Approaches to Developmental Causation,” in G.A. Almond, S.C. Flanagan and R.J. Mundt (eds) Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Almond, G.A. (1983) “Communism and Political Culture Theory,” in F. Eidlin (ed.) Constitutional Democracy: Essays in Comparative Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

270

Bibliography

Almond, G.A., Flanagan, S.C. and Mundt, R.J. (eds) (1973) Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1965) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations: An Analytic Study, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (eds) (1980) The Civic Culture Revisited, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Alvarez, S.E. (1990) Engendering Democracy in Brazil, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Alvarez, S.E. and Escobar, A. (1992) “Conclusion: Theoretical and Horizons of Change in Contemporary Latin American Social Movements,” in A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez (eds) The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Anderson, L. (1999) Transitions to Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press. Bailey, K.D. (1982) Methods of Social Research, 2nd edn, New York: Free Press. Baloyra, E.A. (1987) Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the South Cone, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Barro, R. (1997) Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Barro, R. (1999) “Determinants of Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy, 107: S158–S183. Bellin, E. (2000) “Contingent Democrats: Industrialist, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries,” World Politics, 52: 175–205. Benton, G. (1983) The Hong Kong Crisis, London: Pluto Press. Berger, P.L. (1992) “The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism,” Journal of Democracy, 3: 7–16. Berman, S. (1997) “Civil Society and Political Institutionalization,” The American Behavioral Scientist, 40: 562–74. Bermeo, N. (1992) Liberalization and Democratization, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bernhard, M. (1993) The Origins of Democratization in Poland, New York: Columbia University Press. Bialer, S. (1986) “The Question of Legitimacy,” in D. Held, J. Anderson, B. Gieben, S. Hall, L. Harris, P. Lewis, N. Parker and B. Turok (eds) States and Societies, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bilton, T., Bonnett, K., Jones, P., Stanworth, M., Sheard, K. and Webster, A. (eds) (1987) Introductory Sociology, 2nd edn, London: Macmillan. Binder, L., Coleman, J.S., Pye, L.W., Weiner, M. and Lapalombara, J. (eds) (1971) Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bjornlund, E., Richardson, S. and Fuys, A. (1997) The Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong: The New Election Framework, Hong Kong Report no. 2, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute. Blais, A. and Massicotte, L. (1996) “Electoral Systems,” in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi and P. Norris (eds) Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, London: Sage. Bogdanor, V. (1987) The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bibliography

271

Bollen, K.A. (1979) “Political Democracy and the Timing of Development,” American Sociological Review, 44: 572–87. Bollen, K.A. (1980) “Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy,” American Sociological Review, 45: 370–90. Bollen, K.A. and Jackman, R.W. (1985) “Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s,” Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 1, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc. Bonavia, D. (1985) Hong Kong 1997: The Final Settlement, Hong Kong: South China Morning Post. Bonime-Blanc, A. (1987) Spain’s Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution-Making, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Booth, J.A. and Seligson, M.A. (1993) “Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua,” in L. Diamond (ed.) Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Brams, S.J. (1990) Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration, New York: Routledge. Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1992) “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa,” Comparative Politics, 24: 419–42. Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1997) Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brockett, C.D. (1991) “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America,” Comparative Politics, 23: 253–74. Brown, A. (ed.) (1984) Political Culture and Communist Studies, Oxford: Macmillan. Brown, A. and Gray, J. (eds) (1977) Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers. Brown, D. (1996) “The Role of Religion in Promoting Democracy in the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong,” in B. Leung (ed.) Church and State Relations in 21st Century Asia, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Brown, D.A. (1993) Turmoil in Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Rule: The Fate of the Territory and its Anglican Church, San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press. Brown, D.A., Robinson, J.A. and Lam, J.T.M. (2000) “Democracy in Hong Kong: Reality or Myth?,” Asia Online Times. Available online HTTP: . Brown, D.S. (2001) “Book Review on Democracy and Development,” Comparative Political Studies, 34: 575–9. Brown, J.M. and Foot, R. (eds) (1997) Hong Kong’s Transition, 1842–1997, London: Macmillan Press. Brysk, A. (2000) “Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy, 11: 151–65. Bunbongkarten, S. (1994) Democratization in Thailand: The Role of Economic Development and Political Liberalization, Berlin: Berlin World Congress, International Political Science Association. Burns, J. (1990) “The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong,” Asian Survey, 30: 748–65. Burns, J. (1993) “Hong Kong in 1992: Struggle for Authority,” Asian Survey, 33: 22–31.

272

Bibliography

Burns, J. (1994) “Hong Kong in 1993,” Asian Survey, 34: 55–63. Burkhart, R.E. and Lewis-Beck, M. (1994) “Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis,” American Political Science Review, 88: 903–10. Butenhoff, L. (1999) Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong, Westport, CT: Praeger. Cammack, P. (1990) “The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: An Historical-Structural Analysis,” paper submitted to the Session on Transitions to Democracy in the Contemporary World, Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles. Cardoso, F.H. (1979) “On the Characterisation of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” in D. Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cardoso, F.H. (1986) “Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process: The Brazilian Case,” in G.A. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds) Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Casper, G. (2000) “Explaining the Installation and Survival of Democracy,” paper for 96th American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington, DC, August 31–September 3. Chan, E.Y.M. and Chan, J.C.W. (1988) “Pragmatism in a Changing Political Era – The Ambivalence of Hong Kong College Students,” unpublished monograph. Chan, E.Y.M. and Kwok, R.Y.F. (1998) “Political Culture and the Prospects of Democratization,” in I. Scott (ed.) Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong Kong, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Chan, J.M.M. (1988) “Freedom of Expression: Censorship and Obscenity,” in R. Wacks (ed.) Civil Liberties in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Chan, K.W. (1997) “Hong Kong’s Protestant Social Movement,” Hong Kong’s Social Movements: Forces from the Margin, Hong Kong: July 1 Link: Hong Kong Women Christian. Chan, M.K. (2000) “Across the 1997 Divide: Retrospective on Labor and Legislative Elections in Hong Kong, 1985–2000,” paper presented at the Conference on the 2000 Legislative Council Elections, organized by the Political Development of Hong Kong Research Programme and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, December. Chan, M.K. and Clark, D.J. (1991) The Hong Kong Basic Law, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Chaney, D.C. and Podmore, D. (1974) “Family Norms in a Rapidly Industrializing Society: Hong Kong,” Journal of Marriage and the Family, 36: 400–7. Chaney, D.C., Podmore, D. and Lu, A. (1971) “Young Adults in Hong Kong,” unpublished paper, University of Hong Kong. Chaney, D.C. and Podmore, D. (1973) Young Adults in Hong Kong: Attitudes in a Modernizing Society, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Chau, L.C. (1988) “Public Housing,” in L.C. Chau (ed.) Economic System of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, Department of Economics, University of Hong Kong. Cheek-Milby, K. and Mushkat, M. (1989) Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Bibliography

273

Chehabi, H.E. and Linz, J.J. (eds) (1998) Sultanistic Regimes, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chen, E.K.Y. (1989) “Export-Led Economic Development in Chinese Societies: The Existence and Transferability of the NIC Model,” in Y.C. Jao, V. Mok and L.S. Ho (eds) Economic Development in Chinese Societies: Models and Experiences, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Chen, Kwan-yiu, E. and Chin, S. (1984) The Markets of Asia/Pacific: People’s Republic of China, Aldershot: Gower. Chen, S. and Zhang, H.S. (eds) (1981) Faxue Jichu Lilun, Beijing: Beijing DaXue ChuBanShe (in Chinese). Cheng, J.Y.S. (ed.) (1986a) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Cheng, J.Y.S. (1986b) “The 1985 District Board Elections in Hong Kong,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Cheng, J.Y.S. (ed.) (1984) Hong Kong: In Search of a Future, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Cheng, J.Y.S. (ed.) (1997) The Other Hong Kong Report 1997, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Cheng, J.Y.S. (1989) “The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong: Difficulties and Prospects,” paper presented at the conference on Hong Kong: Towards 1997 and Beyond, Hawaii. Cheng, T.J. (1989a) “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regimes in Taiwan,” World Politics, 42: 471–99. Cheng, T.J. (1989b) “Is the Dog Barking? The Middle Class and Democratic Movements in the East Asian NICs,” unpublished paper, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California. Cheng, T.J. (1993) “Taiwan in Democratic Transition,” in J.W. Morley (ed.) Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Cheng, T.J. and Haggard, S. (1987) Newly Industrializing Asia in Transition, Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California. Cheng, T.J. and Haggard, S. (1990) “Taiwan in Transition,” Journal of Democracy 1: 62–74. Cheung, A. (1988) “Xin Zhongchan Jieji De Mouqi Yu Zhenzhi Yingxiang” (The Emergence of the New Middle Class and Its Political Implications), in G.M. Ma (ed.) Jie Ji Fen Xi Yu Xianggang (The New Class Revisited), Hong Kong: Ching Man Books (in Chinese). Cheung, A.B.L. and Louie, K.S. (1990) “Research Reports on Social Conflicts in Hong Kong During 1975–1986,” unpublished paper, Department of Public and Social Administration, City Polytechnic of Hong Kong. Cheung, C.Y. (1986) “From Mobilization to Solidarity: A Study of the Role of Non-union Labour Organization in Labour Movement, with Special Reference to the Hong Kong Case,” MPhil thesis, Sociology Department, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Cheung, C.Y. (1997) “Legitimacy, Legitimacy Crisis, and Transitional Politics in Hong Kong,” in B. Leung and J. Cheng (eds) Hong Kong SAR: In Pursuit of Domestic and International Order, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Cheung, K.F., Lo, W.H., Yeung, K.H. and Chan, L. (eds) (1991) Bu Bian, Wu Shi

274

Bibliography

Nian? (No Change for Fifty Years? The Wrestle among China, Britain and Hong Kong for the Basic Law), Hong Kong: Wave Publishers (in Chinese). Chiu, H.D. (1987a) “Background to the Negotiations Preceding the Sino-British Joint Declaration,” in H.D. Chiu and Y.C. Jao (eds) The Future of Hong Kong, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Chiu, H.D. (1987b) “Introduction,” in H.D. Chiu and Y.C. Jao (eds) The Future of Hong Kong, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Chiu, L.L. (1982) “Hong Kong Christian Industrial Council,” Quarterly of the Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 81: 30. Chiu, S.W.K. and Levin, D.A. (2000) “Contestatory Unionism: Trade Unions in the Private Sector,” in S.W.K. Chiu and T.L. Lui (eds) The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Choi, J.J. (1993) “Political Cleavages in South Korea,” in H. Koo (ed.) State and Society in Contemporary Korea, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chou, B., Clark, C. and Clark, J. (1990) Women in Taiwan Politics, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Chou, Y.S. and Nathan, A.J. (1987) “Democratizing Transition in Taiwan,” Asian Survey, 27: 277–99. Chow, N.W.C. (1985) “Welfare Development in Hong Kong: The Politics of Social Choice,” in Y.C. Jao, C.K. Leung, P., Wesley-Smith and S.L. Wong (eds) Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Chow, N.W.S. (1986a) “A Review of Social Policies in Hong Kong,” in A.Y.H. Kwan and D.K.K. Chan (eds) Hong Kong Society: A Reader, Hong Kong: Writers’ and Publishers’ Cooperative. Chow, N.W.S. (1986b) “The Past and Future Development of Social Welfare in Hong Kong,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chow, N.W.S. (1987) “Western and Chinese Ideas of Social Welfare,” International Social Work, 30: 31–41. Chow, S.C.M. (1977) “The Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Hong Kong,” PhD thesis, Boston University. Choy, I.C.K. (1999) “Political Parties and Political Participation in Hong Kong,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press. Chu, Y.H. (1992) Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research. Chu, Y.H., Fu, H. and Moon, C.I. (1997) “South Korea and Taiwan: The International Context,” in L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, Y.H. Chu, and H.M. Tien (eds) Consolidating The Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chung, E.S. (1990) “Transition to Democracy in an Authoritarian Regime: A Case Study of South Korea,” PhD thesis, City University of New York. Chung, R.T.Y. (1993a) “Public Opinion,” in P.K. Choi and L.S. Ho (eds) The Other Hong Kong Report 1993, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Chung, R.T.Y. (1993b) Political Reforms? What The People Said, Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Center, the University of Hong Kong. Clark, A.T. (1980) “Decolonisation: Three Fields of View,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 18: 127–44.

Bibliography

275

Cnudde, C.F. and McCrone, D.J. (1967) “Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model,” American Political Science Review, 61: 72–9. Collier, D. (ed.) (1979a) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Collier, D. (1979b) “Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model,” in D. Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Collier, D. (1991) “New Perspectives on the Comparative Method,” in D.A. Rustow and K.P. Erickson (eds) Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, New York: HarperCollins. Collier, D. and Norden, D.L. (1992) “Strategic Choice Models of Political Change in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, 24: 229–43. Collier, R.B. (1999) Paths Towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Conaghan, C.M. (1990) “Retreat to Democracy: Business and Political Transition in Bolivia and Ecuador,” in D. Ethier (ed.) Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia, London: Macmillan. Connolly, W. (ed.) (1984) Legitimacy and the State, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Corrales, J. (2001) “Strong Societies, Weak Parties: Regime Change in Cuba and Venezuela in the 1950s and Today,” Latin American Politics and Society, 43: 81–113. Cottrell, R. (1993) The End of Hong Kong, London: John Murray Ltd. Coulter, P. (1975) Social Mobilization and Liberal Democracy, Toronto: Lexington Books. Covin, D.L. (1970) “Political Culture as an Analytical Instrument: An Examination of Refugees in Hong Kong,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington State University. Cradock, P. (1994) Experiences of China, London: John Murray. Cutright, P. (1963) “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis,” American Sociological Review, 28: 253–64. Cutright, P. and Wiley, J.A. (1969) “Modernization and Political Representation: 1927–1966,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 5: 23–44. Dahl, R.A. (ed.) (1966) Political Oppositions In Western Democracies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dahl, R.A. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dahl, R.A. (1984) Modern Political Analysis, 4th edn, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Dahl, R.A. (1989) Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Darwin, J. (1988) Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat From Empire in the Post-War World, London: Macmillan. Davies, S.N.G. (1977) “One Brand of Politics Rekindled,” Hong Kong Law Journal, 7: 44–83. Davies, S.N.G. (1989) “The Changing Nature of Representation in Hong Kong Politics,” in K. Cheek-Milby and M. Mushkat (eds) Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Davies, S.N.G. and Roberts, E. (1990) Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Macmillan Publishers (HK) Ltd.

276

Bibliography

de Winton, M.G. (1979) “Decolonisation and the Westminster Model,” in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed.) The Transfer of Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DeGolyer, M.E. (2000) “The Hong Kong SAR Legislative Council Elections of 2000,” paper presented at the Conference on the 2000 Legislative Council Elections, organized by the Political Development of Hong Kong Research Programme and the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, December. DeGolyer, M.E., Lo, S.H., Scott, J.L., Hu, A.K.W., Chan, K.K.L., Lam, N.M.K., Yu, E.W.Y. and Chueng, P.K. (2001) “Winter of Despair: Confidence and Legitimacy in Crisis in the Hong Kong SAR,” Hong Kong Transition Project. Available online HTTP: . Deng, X.P. (1983) Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Deng, X.P. (1984) “The Concept of One Country, Two Systems,” Beijing Review, 27. Denitch, B. (ed.) (1979) Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis, London: Sage. Derbyshire, J.D. and Derbyshire, I. (1991) Spotlight on World Political System, Edinburgh: Chambers. Deyo, F.C. (ed.) (1987) The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Deyo, F.C. (1989) Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, Berkeley: University of California Press. Diamond, L. (1988) “Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope,” in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Diamond, L. (1989) “Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal,” in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Diamond, L. (1990) “Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization,” in B. Roberts (ed.) The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy, London: MIT Press. Diamond, L. (1992) “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioural Scientist, 35: 450–99. Diamond, L. (1994a) “Rethinking Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy, 5: 5–17. Diamond, L. (ed.) (1994b) Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Diamond, L. (2000) “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” in M.F. Plattner and J.C. Espada (eds) The Democratic Invention, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Diamond, L. (2001) “How People View Democracy: Findings from Public Opinion Surveys in Four Regions,” paper presented to the Stanford Seminar on Democratization, Stanford, January. Diamond, L. and Linz, J.J. (1989) “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America,” in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Bibliography

277

Diamond, L., Linz, J.J. and Lipset, S.M. (eds) (1988) Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, vol. 2, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Diamond, L., Linz, J.J. and Lipset, S.M. (1989) Democracy in Asia, New Delhi: Publications. Diamond, L., Plattner, M.F., Chu, Y.H. and Tien, H.M. (1997) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Di Palma, G. (1990) To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Domes, J. (1986) “The Impact of the Hong Kong Problem and the Hong Kong Agreement on PRC Domestic Politics,” Issues and Studies, 22: 31–51. Dong, M. (1991) “The Principles and Flexibility in China’s External Relations: The Case of Hong Kong,” PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. Dryzek, J.S. and Holmes, L. (2000) “The Real World of Civil Republicanism: Making Democracy Work in Poland and the Czech Republic,” Europe-Asia Studies, 52: 1043–68. Duncanson, D. (1988) “The Anglo-Chinese Negotiations,” in J. Domes and Y.M. Shaw (eds) Hong Kong: A Chinese and International Concern, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Easton, D. (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Eckstein, H. (1975) “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in F. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry, vol. 7, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Eckstein, S. (1989) “Power and Popular Protest in Latin America,” in S. Eckstein (ed.) Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. The Economist (1989) China, North Korea: Country Report, No. 1, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. The Economist (1990) China, North Korea: Country Report, No. 2, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Eisinger, P.K. (1973) “The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities,” American Political Science Review, 67: 11–28. Elkins, D.J. and Simeon, R.E.B. (1979) “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?,” Comparative Politics, 11: 127–45. Emmons, C.F. (1985) “Public Opinion and Political Participation in Pre-1997 Hong Kong,” in Y.C. Jao, C.K. Leung, P. Wesley-Smith and S.L. Wong (eds) Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Emmons, C.F. (1988) Hong Kong Prepares for 1991, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Encarnacion, O.G. (2001) “Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain,” Political Science Quarterly, 116: 53–79. Endacott, G.B. (1964) Government and People in Hong Kong 1841–1962: A Constitutional History, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. England, J. (1989) Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. England, J. and Rear, J. (1975) Chinese Labour under British Rule: A Critical

278

Bibliography

Study of Labour Relations and Law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. England, J. and Rear, J. (1981) Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong, 2nd edn, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Escobar, A. and Alvarez, S.E. (eds) (1992) The Making of Social Movement in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Evans, P. (1979) Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Evans, P. and Stephens, J.D. (1988) “Studying Development Since the Sixties: The Emergence of a New Comparative Political Economy,” Theory and Society, 17: 713–45. Feng, Y. (2001) “Politics and Development: Book Review of Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950–1990,” Journal of Democracy, 12: 170–4. Fishman, R.M. (1990) Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Foley, M.W. and Edwards, B. (1996) “The Paradox of Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy, 7: 38–52. Foweraker, J. (1994) “Popular Political Organization and Democratization: A Comparison of Spain and Mexico,” in I. Budge and D. McKay (eds) Developing Democracy, London: Sage. Freeman, J. (1973) “The Origin of the Woman’s Liberation Movement,” American Journal of Sociology, 78: 792–811. Freeman, J. (ed.) (1983a) Social Movements in the Sixties and Seventies, New York: Longman. Freeman, J. (1983b) “On the Origins of Social Movements,” in J. Freeman (ed.) Social Movements in the Sixties and Seventies, New York: Longman. Fromm, E. (1956) The Sane Society, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Fung, Y.L. (1990) Approaching 1997, Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd. Fung, Y.W. (1986) “Education,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1988) “Economic Dependence and Political Democracy: A Cross-National Study,” Comparative Political Studies, 20: 489–515. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1995) “Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 89(4): 882–97. Gautier, M.I. (1998) “Church Elites and the Restoration of Civil Society in the Communist Societies of Central Europe,” Journal of Church and State, 40: 289–318. Geddes, B. (1991) “A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies,” American Political Science Review, 85: 371–92. Geddes, B. (1999) “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 115–44. George, A.L. (1979) “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in P.G. Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, New York: Free Press. Geschwender, J.A. (1983) “The Social Context of Strategic Success: A Land-Use Struggle in Hawaii,” in J. Freeman (ed.) Social Movements in the Sixties and Seventies, New York: Longman.

Bibliography

279

Gibson, J.L. (1992) “Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Politics, 54: 329–71. Gibson, J.L. and Duch, R.M. (1993) “Support for Rights in Western Europe and the Soviet Union: An Analysis of the Beliefs of Mass Publics,” in F.D.W. Greenwich (ed.) Research on Democracy and Society, Democratization in Eastern and Western Europe, vol. 1, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc. Gibson, J.L. and Duch, R.M. (1994) “Support for Rights,” in F.D. Weil and M. Gautier (eds) Research on Democracy and Society, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Gill, A. (2001) “Religion and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, 4: 117–38. Gold, T.B. (1984) “Just in Time!: China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984,” Asian Survey, 24: 947–74. Goldsmith, A.A. (1986) “Democracy, Political Stability, and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” Comparative Political Studies, 18: 517–31. Goldsworthy, D. (1991) “British and the International Critics of British Colonialism, 1951–56,” The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 29: 1–24. Goldthrope, J. (1978) “Comments,” British Journal of Sociology, 29: 436–8. Gomez, J. (1999) “Civil and Political Society in Singapore and Southeast Asia: Emerging Trends and Definitions.” Available online HTTP: (accessed 26 Feb. 2002). Goodman, D. and Segal, G. (eds) (1989) China at Forty, New York: Oxford University Press. Grimal, H. (1965) Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires 1919–1963, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, N.P. and Puhle, H.J. (eds) (1995) The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Habermas, J. (1975) Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1984) “What does a Legitimation Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism,” in W. Connolly (ed.) Legitimacy and the State, New York: New York University Press. Haggard, S. (1990) Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R.R. (1992) “The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Middle Income Countries,” in S. Haggard and R.R. Kaufman (eds) The Politics of Economic Adjustment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R.R. (1995) The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Halpern, N. (1991) “Economic Reform, Social Mobilisation, and Democratisation in Post-Mao China,” in R. Baum (ed.) Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China: The Road to Tiananmen, New York: Routledge. Hambro, E.I. (1955) The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Hamilton, R.F. and Wright, J.D. (1986) The State of the Masses, New York: Aldine. Han, S.J. (1989) “South Korea: Politics in Transition,” in L. Diamond, Linz, J.J.

280

Bibliography

and Lipset, S.M. (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Han, S.J. and Park, Y.C. (1993)”South Korea: Democratization at Last,” in J. Morely (ed.) Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Harding, H. (1987) China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Harris, P. (1988) Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics, Hong Kong: Macmillan. Harrison, M.I. and Phillips, B. (1991) “Strategic Decision Making: An Integrative Explanation,” in S.B. Bacharach (ed.) Research in the Sociology of Organizations, vol. 9, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Held, D. (1987) Models of Democracy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Held, D., Anderson, J., Gieben, B., Hall, S., Harris, L., Lewis, P., Parker, N. and Turok, B. (eds) (1985) States and Societies, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Henton, D. (1989) SRI International Project Team, Hong Kong. Hicks, G.L. (1989) Hong Kong Countdown, Hong Kong: Writers and Publishers Cooperative. Higley, J. and Burton, M.G. (1989) “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns,” American Sociological Review, 54: 17–32. Higley, J. and Gunther R. (eds) (1992) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hirschman, A.O. (1965) Journeys toward Progress: Studies of Economic PolicyMaking in Latin America, Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Hirschman, A.O. (1970) “The Search for Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding,” World Politics, 22: 329–43. Hirschman, A.O. (1979) “The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants,” in D. Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ho, H.C.Y. (1988) “Public Finance,” Economic System in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Ho, S.Y. (1986) “Public Housing,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Hoadley, S. (1970) “Hong Kong is the Lifeboat: Notes on Political Culture and Socialization,” Journal of Oriental Studies, 8: 206–18. Hoadley, S. (1973) “Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and Trends,” Asian Survey, 13: 604–16. Hochschild, J.L. (1981) What’s Fair?, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Holbrooke, R., MacFarquhar, R. and Nukazawa, K. (eds) (1988) East Asia in Transit: Challenges for the Trilateral Countries, New York: The Trilateral Commission. Hook, B. (1983) “The Government of Hong Kong: Change within Tradition,” China Quarterly, 94: 491–511. Hook, B. (1997) “National and International Interests in the Decolonization of Hong Kong, 1946–97,” in J.M. Brown and R. Foot (eds) Hong Kong’s Transitions, 1842–1997, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Hopkins, K. (ed.) (1971) Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony: A Political, Social and Economic Survey, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Hsiao, H.H. (1992) “The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests,” in T.J.

Bibliography

281

Cheng and S. Haggard (eds) Political Change in Taiwan, London: Lynne Reinner. Hsiao, F.S.T. and Sullivan, L.R. (1980) “The Politics of Reunification: Beijing’s Initiative on Taiwan,” Asian Survey, 20: 789–802. Huang, Y. (1997) “The Economic and Political Integration of Hong Kong: Implications for Government-Business Relations,” in W.I. Cohen and L. Zhao (eds) Hong Kong under Chinese Rule: The Economic and Political Implications of Reversion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hughes, R. (1976) Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time, 2nd edn, London: André Deutsch Ltd. Huntington, S.P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Huntington, S.P. (1984) “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” Political Science Quarterly, 99: 193–218. Huntington, S.P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, S.P. (1992) “Foreword,” in T.J. Cheng and S. Haggard (eds) Political Change in Taiwan, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc. Huntington, S.P. and Nelson, J.M. (1976) No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hyman, H. (1975) The Enduring Effects of Education, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Inglehart, R. (1988) “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” American Political Science Review, 82: 1203–30. Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1999) “Trust, Well-being and Democracy,” in M. Warren (ed.) Democracy and Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inkeles, A. and Smith, D.H. (1974) Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jacobs, P. (1986) “Hong Kong and the Modernization of China,” Journal of International Affairs, 39: 62–75. Jao, Y.C. (1983a) “Dependence Is a Two-Way Street,” Far Eastern Economic Review January 20. Jao, Y.C. (1983b) “Hong Kong’s Role in Financing China’s Modernization,” in A.J. Youngson (ed.) China and Hong Kong: The Economic Nexus, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Jao, Y.C., Leung, C.K., Wesley-Smith, P. and Wong, S.L. (eds) (1985) Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Jao, Y.C., Levin, D.A., Ng, S.H. and Sinn, E. (eds) (1988) Labour Movement in a Changing Society: The Experience of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Jao, Y.C., Mok, V. and Ho, L.S. (1989) Economic Development in Chinese Societies: Models and Experiences, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Jarvie, I.C. (1969) Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Jayawickrama, N. (1989) “Protecting Civil Liberties,” in R. Wacks (ed.) The Future of the Law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

282

Bibliography

Johnson, C. (1984) “The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong: A Game in which Nobody Wins,” Asian Survey, 34: 887–909. Johnson, C. (1985) “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” in R.A. Scalapino, S. Sato and J. Wanandi (eds) Asian Economic Development Present and Future, Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. Johnson, C. (1993) “South Korean Democratisation: The Role of Economic Development,” in J. Cotton (ed.) Korea under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin. Johnson, G.E. (1986) “1997 and After: Will Hong Kong Survive? A Personal View,” Pacific Affairs, 59: 237–54. Jones, C. (1990) Promoting Prosperity: The Hong Kong Way of Social Policy, Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. Kamrava, M. and Mora, F. (1998) “Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: Latin America and the Middle East,” Third World Quarterly, 19: 893–915. Kan, M.Y. (1999) “Taiwan’s Democratic Transition: A Critical Examination of its Open-up,” MPhil thesis, Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong. Karl, T.L. (1991) “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” in D.A. Rustow and K.P. Erickson (eds) Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, New York: HarperCollins. Kaufman, R.R. (1979) “Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model,” in D. Collier (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kaufman, R.R. (1986) “Liberalization and Democratization in South America: Perspectives from the 1970s,” in G.A. O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Part III, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Keck, M.E. (1992) The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kenny, D.A. (1979) Correlation and Causality, New York: Wiley Interscience Public. Kidder, L.H. and Judd, C.M. (1986) Research Methods in Social Relations, 5th edn, New York: CBS College Publishing. Kim, K.W. (1992) “Marx, Schumpeter, and the East Asian Experience,” Journal of Democracy, 3: 17–31. Kim, S. (1996) “Civil Societies in South Korea: From Grand Democracy Movements to Petty Interest Groups?,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 15: 81–97. Kim, S. (2000) The Politics of Democratization in Korea: the Role of Civil Society, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. King, A.Y.C. (1973) The Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong, with Special Emphasis on the City District Officer Scheme, Hong Kong: Social Science Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. King, A.Y.C. (1981)”Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level,” Asian Survey, 15: 422–39.

Bibliography

283

King, A.Y.C. (1984) “The Political Culture of Kwun Tong: A Chinese Community in Hong Kong,” in A.Y.C. King and R.P.L. Lee (eds) Social Life and Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. King, A.Y.C. and Lee, R.P.L. (eds) (1981) Social Life and Development in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Kitschelt, H.P. (1986) “Political Opportunity Structure and Political Protest: AntiNuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science, 16: 57–85. Klandermans, B. (1989) “Introduction,” in B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi and S. Tarrow (eds) International Social Movement Research: Organizing for Change: Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, 2: 301–9. Klingemann, H.D. and Fuchs, D. (1995) Citizens and the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ko, T.M. (1998) “The Sacred Citizens and the Secular City: A Study of the Political Participation of Protestant Ministers in Hong Kong,” PhD thesis, Department of Applied Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong. Koo, H. (1991) “Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea,” Theory and Society, 20: 485–500. Koo, H. (1993) State and Society in Contemporary Korea, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kriesi, H. (1988) “The Interdependence of Structure and Action,” International Social Movement Research, 1: 349–68. Krischke, P.J. (1991) “Church Bas Communities and Democratic Change in Brazil,” Comparative Politics Studies, 24: 186–210. Kuan, H.C. (1988) “Chinese Constitutional Practice,” in P. Wesley-Smith and A.H.Y. Chen (eds) The Basic Law and Hong Kong’s Future, Hong Kong: Butterworths. Kuan, H.C. (1990) “Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong,” unpublished paper. Kuan, H.C. (1991) “Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong,” The China Quarterly, 128: 775–93. Kuan, H.C. (1999) “Election without Political Clout,” in H.C. Kuan, S.K. Lau, K.S. Louie and T.K.Y. Wong (eds) Power Transfer and Electoral Politics: The First Legislative Election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Kuan, H.C. and Lau, S.K. (1987) “Hong Kong’s Search for a Consensus: Barriers and Prospects,” in H.D. Chiu and Y.C. Jao (eds) The Future of Hong Kong, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Kuan, H.C. and Lau, S.K. (1989) “The Civic Self in a Changing Polity: The Case of Hong Kong,” in K. Cheek-Milby and M. Mushkat (eds) Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Kuan, H.C. and Lau, S.K. (1995) “The Partial Vision of Democracy in Hong Kong: A Survey of Popular Opinion,” The China Journal, 34: 239–64. Kuan, H.C. and Lau, S.K. (1997) Political Attitudes in a Changing Context: The Case of Hong Kong, occasional paper no. 64, Hong Kong: Institute of AsiaPacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Kuan, H.C. and Lau, S.K. (2002a) “Between Liberal Autocracy and Democracy: Democratic Legitimacy in Hong Kong,” Democratization, 9: 58–76.

284

Bibliography

Kuan, H.C. and Lau, S.K. (2002b) “Cognitive Mobilization and Electoral Support for The Democratic Party in Hong Kong,” Electoral Studies, 21: 561–82. Kuan, H.C., Lau, S.K. and Ho, K.F. (1983) Organizing Participatory Urban Services: The Mutual Aid Committees in Hong Kong, occasional paper no. 2, Hong Kong: Institute of Social Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Kwok, N.K. (1992) “The Development of the Political Parties and The Impact on Community Organizing,” in Community Development Resource Book, 1992–1993, Hong Kong: Community Development Division, The Hong Kong Council of Social Service. Kwok, N.W. (1991) Hong Kong 1997: A Christian Perspective, Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia, Urban Rural Mission. Kwok, N.W. (1997) A Church in Transition, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Christian Institute. Kwok, R. and Chan, E. (1998) “Political Culture and the Prospects of Democratization in Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong Kong,” in S. Ian (ed.) Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong Kong, New York: St Martin’s Press. Kwong, P.C.K. (1991) “Emigration and Manpower Shortage,” in Y.C. Wong and J.Y.S. Cheng (eds) The Other Hong Kong Report 1990, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, pp. 297–337. Lancaster, T.D. and Taulbee, J.L. (1985) “Britain, Spain and the Gibraltar Question,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 23: 251–66. Lane, C. (1984) “Legitimacy and Power in the Soviet Union through Socialist Ritual,” British Journal of Political Science, 14: 207–17. Lane, K.P. (1990) Sovereignty and the Status Quo, Oxford: Westview Press. Lane, R.E. (1962) Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does, New York: Free Press of Glencoe. Lane, R.E. (1979) “The Legitimacy Bias: Conservative Man in Market and State,” in B. Denitch (ed.) Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis, London: Sage. Lange, P. and Tsebelis, G. (1988) Wage Negotiations and Strikes: An Equilibrium Analysis, working paper no. 51, Durham, NC: Duke University Program in Political Economy. Larry, D. (1994) “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, 5: 4–17. Latin, D.D. and Wildavsky, A. (1988) “Political Culture and Political Preferences,” American Political Science Review, 82: 589–604. Lau, P.K. (1986) “Economic Relations between Hong Kong and China,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Lau, S.K. (1977) Utilitarianistic Familism: An Inquiry into the Basis of Political Stability in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Lau, S.K. (1982) Society and Politics in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K. (1984) “Perception of Authority by Chinese Adolescents: The Case of Hong Kong,” Youth and Society, 15: 259–84. Lau, S.K. (1987) Decolonization Without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms of the Hong Kong Government, occasional paper no. 19, Hong Kong:

Bibliography

285

Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Institute of Social Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Lau, S.K. (1992) Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K. (1996) “Democratization and Decline of Trust in Public Institutions in Hong Kong,” Democratization, 3: 158–80. Lau, S.K. (1998) Democratization, Poverty of Political Leaders and Political Inefficiency in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Lau, S.K. (1999) “The Rise and Decline of Political Support for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,” Government and Opposition, 34: 352–71. Lau, S.K. and Ho, K.F. (1982) Social Accommodation of Politics: The Case of the Young Hong Kong Workers, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K. and Kuan, H.C. (1985) The Changing Political Culture of the Hong Kong Chinese, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K. and Kuan, H.C. (1988) The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K. and Kuan, H.C. (1995) “Public Attitudes toward Political Authorities and Colonial Legitimacy in Hong Kong,” The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 33: 79–103. Lau, S.K., Kuan, H.C. and Ho, K.F. (1983) Organizing Participatory Urban Services: The Mutual Aid Committees in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K., Lee, M.K., Wan, P.S. and Wong, S.L. (eds) (1991) Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1988, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K., Lee, M.K., Wan, P.S. and Wong, S.L. (eds) (1992) Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Lau, S.K. and Wan, P.S. (1987) Xiang Gang She Hui Zhi Biao Yan Jiu De Chu Bu Bao Gao (Hong Kong Social Indicators – A Preliminary Report), Hong Kong: Chinese University Press (in Chinese). Ledgister, F.S.J. (1998) Class Alliances and the Liberal Authoritarian State: The Roots of Post-Colonial Democracy in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Surinam, Trenton: Africa World Press. Ledic, M. (1989) “Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence,” in D. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China at Forty, New York: Oxford University Press. Lee, A.R. (1989) “Value Cleavages and Political Attitudes: The Case of Korea,” PhD thesis, The Florida State University. Lee, J.M. (1967) Colonial Development and Good Government, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lee, N.Y. (1984) “The Democratic Belief System: A Study of the Political Culture in South Korea,” PhD thesis, University of Lowa. Lerner, D. (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Lee, P. and Chu, L. (1998) “Inherent Dependence on Power: The Hong Kong Press in Political Transition,” Media, Culture and Society, 20(10): 59–77. Leung, B. (2000) “Church-State Relations in the Transition: A Historical Perspective,” in R. Ash (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition: The Handover Years, London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

286

Bibliography

Leung, B. (2001) “The HKSAR Catholic Church at the Crossroads,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Political Development in the HKSAR, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong. Leung, B. and Chiu, S. (1991) “A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946–1989,” occasional paper no. 3, Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Centre, Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong. Leung, B.K.P. (1985) “Democratization: Some Problems And Proposed Strategies,” in Y.C. Jao, C.K. Leung, P. Wesley-Smith and S.L. Wong (eds) Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong. Leung, C.B. (1982a) “Community Participation: From Kai Fong Association, Mutual Aid Committee to District Board,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in the 1980s, Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern Publishers Ltd. Leung, C.B. (1982b) “Community Participation: The Decline of Residents’ Organization,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Leung, C.K., Cushman, J.W. and Wang, G.W. (eds) (1980) Hong Kong: Dilemma of Growth, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. Leung, H.C. (1986) “Political Action in Compressing Sauce: A Study of Political Activist Groups in Hong Kong,” MPhil thesis, Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Leung, J.Y.H. (1989) “Corporatist Trends in Public Policy-Making in Hong Kong,” unpublished MPA thesis, University of Hong Kong. Leung, J.Y.H. (1990) “Functional Representation in Hong Kong: Institutionalization and Legitimization of the Business and Professional Elites,” Asian Journal of Public Administration, 12: 143–75. Leung, S.W. (1986) “Perception of Political Authority,” occasional paper no. 17, Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Leung, S.W. (1993) “The ‘China Factor’ in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: The June 4th Incident and Anti-Communist China Syndrome,” in S.K. Lau and K.S. Louie (eds) Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Leung, S.W. (1995) “Attitudes towards Party Politics,” in S.K. Lau, M.K. Lee, P.S. Wan and S.L. Wong (eds) Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993, Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Levine, D.H. (1989) “Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy,” World Politics, 16: 377–94. Levitsky, S. (2001) “The Paradox of Menemism: Parties, Civil Society, and the Relative Success of Argentine Democracy in the 1990s,” paper presented at Kellogg Institute for International Affairs, Notre Dame University, for the Conference on Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America, Notre Dame, April. Lewis, P.G. (1986) “Legitimacy and the Polish Communist State,” in D. Held, J. Anderson, B. Gieben, S. Hall, L. Harris, P. Lewis, N. Parker and B. Turok (eds) States and Societies, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lijphart, A. (1971) “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, 65: 682–93.

Bibliography

287

Lijphart, A. (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lin, C.L. (1988) “The Mass Basis of the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party: A Comparative Analysis of the Party Support from the Voters in Taiwan (1983–1986),” Master’s dissertation, National Taiwan University (in Chinese). Linz, J.J. (1982) “Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective,” a research paper prepared for the International Political Science Association Roundtable, Tokyo, March 29– April 1. Linz, J.J. (1986) “Legitimacy of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System,” Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy, Oxford: Westview. Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (eds) (1978) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Li Pang-Kong (2000) Hong Kong from Britain to China: Political Cleavages, Electoral Dynamics and Institutional Changes, Aldershot: Gower. Lipset, S.M. (1959) “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, 53: 69–105. Lipset, S.M. (1981) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lipset, S.M. (1994) “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review, 59: 1–22. Lipset, S.M. (ed.) (1995) The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Lipset, S.M., Seong, K.R. and Torries, J.C. (1993) “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal, 45: 155–75. Lipset, S.M. and Turner, F.C. “Economic Growth and Democratization: The Continuing Search for Theory,” paper presented at the Seminario sobre Cultura Politíca en las Nuevas Democracias, Madrid, April 1986. Lipset, S.M. et al. (2000) Democracy Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the Twentieth Century, New York: Freedom House. Lipsky, M. (1968) “Protest as a Political Resource,” American Political Science Review, 62: 1144–58. Liu, S.L. and Lee, K.M. (1989) The Road on Participating in Politics, Hong Kong: Wide Angle Press Ltd (in Chinese). Lo, C.K. and Ho, O.T. (eds) (1994) Xianggang Renming Lu (Who’s Who in Hong Kong), Hong Kong: Tien De (in Chinese). Lo, S.H. (1988) “Decolonization and Political Development in Hong Kong,” Asian Survey, 28: 613–29. Lo, S.H. (1990) “Democratization in Hong Kong: Reasons, Phases, and Limits,” Issues and Studies, 26: 100–17. Lo, S.H. (1997) The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong, New York: St Martin’s Press. Londregan, J.B. and Poole, K.T. (1996) “Does High Income Promote Democracy?,” World Politics, 49: 1–30.

288

Bibliography

Louie, K.S. (1996) “Elections and Parties,” in M.K. Nyaw and S.M. Li (eds) The Other Hong Kong Report 1996, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Louisie, K.S. and Kwok-cheung, S. (1995) Xiang gang xuan ju zi Piao hui bian, 1982 nian-1994 nian (The Election Data of Hong Kong, 1982–1994). Lu, A.Y.L. (1992) “Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party,” in T.J. Cheng and S. Haggard (eds) Political Change in Taiwan, London: Lynne Reinner. Lui, T.L. (1999) “Two Logics of Community Politics,” in S.K. Lau and K.S. Louie (eds) Hong Kong Tried Democracy, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of AsiaPacific Studies. Lui, T.L. (1990) “Hong Kong’s New Middle Class: Its Formation and Politics,” paper presented in the Workshop on the Middle Classes and East Asian Development, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, June. Ma, N. (2001) “The Decline of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong,” Asian Survey, 41: 564–83. Ma, N. (2002) “Executive-Legislative Relations: Assessing Legislative Influence in an Executive-Dominant System,” in Lau Suit-kais (ed.) The First Tong Cheephaw Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 349–74. McAdam, D. (1982) The Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, D. (1988) “Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism,” in B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi and S. Tarrow (eds) From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement across Cultures, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (1988) “Social Movements,” in N. Smelser (ed.) Handbook of Sociology, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. McAuley, M. (1984) “Political Culture and Communist Studies: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” in A. Brown (ed.) Political Culture and Communist Studies, Oxford: Macmillan. McClosky, H. (1968) “Political Participation,” in D.L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: Free Press. McClosky, H. and Zaller, J. (1984) The American Ethos, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McCoy, J.L. (1988) “Concertation in Latin America: The Limits of the Social Pacts in Venezuela,” paper presented at the Conference on the Micro-Foundations of Democracy, University of Chicago, Chicago, April 29–May 1. McDonough, P. (1981) Power and Ideology in Brazil, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McDonough, P. (1995) “Identities, Ideologies, and Interests: Democratization and the Culture of Mass Politics in Spain and Eastern Europe,” Journal of Politics, 57: 649–76. McDonough, P., Barnes, S.H. and Pina, A.L. (1998) The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mah, I.S. (1991) “Capital Development and Democratization in South Korea: A Study in Socioeconomic Structure and Political Process,” PhD thesis, Northwestern University. Mainwaring, S. (1999) Democratic Survivability in Latin America, working paper 267, Notre Dame, IN: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame.

Bibliography

289

Mainwaring, S., O’Donnell, G.A. and Valenzuela, J.S. (1992) Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, Notre Dame, IN: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University Press. Mair, P. and van Biezen, I. (2001) “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000,” Party Politics, 7: 5–21. Malloy, J.M and Seligson, M.A. (eds) (1987) Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin American, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Mann, M. (1983) The Macmillan Student Encyclopedia of Sociology, London: Macmillan Press. Manuel, P.C. (1998) “Civil Society and Democratization in Europe: Comparative Perspectives: Introduction,” Perspectives on Political Science, 27: 133–4. Maravall, J. (1982) The Transition to Democracy in Spain, London: Croom Helm. Miners, N. (1988) “The Normal Pattern of Decolonisation of British Dependent Territories,” in P. Wesley-Smith and A.H.Y. Chen (eds) The Basic Law and Hong Kong’s Future, Hong Kong: Butterworths. Miners, N.J. (1986a) The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 4th edn, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Miners, N.J. (1986b) “Plans for Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1946–1952,” China Quarterly, 107: 463–82. Miners, N.J. (1991) The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 5th edn, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Monroe, K.R. (1991) The Economic Approaches to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action, New York: HarperCollins. Moon, C.I. (1994) “Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea,” in A. MacIntyre (ed.) Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Moore, B. (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Moore, B. (1977) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, London: Allen Lane. Morley, J.W. (1999) Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, New York: M.E. Sharpe. Morris-Jones, W.H. and Fischer, G. (eds) (1980) Decolonisation and After: The British and French Experience, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. Muller, E.N. and Seligson, M.A. (1994) “Civil Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships,” American Political Science Review, 88: 635–52. Munslow, B. (1983) “Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa?,” Parliamentary Affairs, 36: 218–28. Mushkat, R. (1988) “Freedom of Association and Assembly,” in R. Wacks (ed.) Civil Liberties in Hong Kong, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nai, W.K. (1991) Hong Kong 1997: A Christian Perspective, Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia, Urban Rural Mission. Nathan, A. (1986) Chinese Democracy, London: Tauris. Nathan, A. (1990) China’s Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press. Neher, C.D. (1991) Southeast Asia in the New International Era, Oxford: Westview Press.

290

Bibliography

Neubauer, D.E. (1967) “Some Conditions of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, 61: 1002–9. Newman, D. (1996) Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 December. Ng, S.H. (1986) “Labour,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Norris, P. (ed.) (1999) Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norton, P. (ed.) (1990) Legislatures, Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Donnell, G.A. (1979) Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California. O’Donnell, G.A. (1986) “Introduction to the Latin American Cases,” in G.A. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds) The Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. O’Donnell, G.A. and Schmitter, P.C. (1986) “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in G.A. O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. O’Donnell, G.A., Schmitter, P.C. and Whitehead, L. (eds) (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ogden, S. (1989) China’s Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development and Culture, New York: Prentice-Hall. Oksenberg, M. and Dickson, B. (1991) “The Origins, Processes, and Outcomes of Great Political Reform: A Framework of Analysis,” in D.A. Rustow and K.P. Erickson (eds) Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, New York: HarperCollins. Overholt, W.H. (1984) “Hong Kong and the Crisis of Sovereignty,” Asian Survey, 34: 471–84. Park, C.M. (1989) “Political Support under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of South Korea,” PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley. Patrick, G.M. (1984) “Political Culture,” in G. Sartori (ed.) Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, London: Sage. Patten, C. (1993) Our Next Five Years: The Agenda for Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Government Printer. Pei, M. (1994) From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Peruzzotti, E. (2001) “The Nature of the New Argentine Democracy The Delegative Democracy Argument Revisited,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 33: 133–55. Pfeffer, J. (1982) Organizations and Organization Theory, London: Pitman Books Ltd. Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1974) Organizational Decision Making as a Political Processes: The Case of a University Budget, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Phiri, I. (2000) “Proclaiming Peace and Love: A New Role for Churches in African Politics,” Journal of Church and State, 42: 781–803. Porter, A.N. and Stockwell, A.J. (1989) British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938–64, London: Macmillan Press. Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M. and Lewis, P. (eds) Democratization, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bibliography

291

Powell, G.B. (1982) Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pridham, G. (1984) “Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?,” in G. Pridham (ed.) The New Mediterranean Democracies, London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd. Pridham, G. (1991) Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, London: Leicester University Press. Pridham, G., Herring, E. and Sanford, G. (eds) (1994) Building Democracy?: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pridham, G. and Vanhanen, T. (1994) Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives, London: Routledge. Przeworski, A. (1986) “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in G.A. O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Przeworski, A. (1987) “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds) Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A. (1988) “Capitalism, Democracy, Pacts: Revisited,” paper presented at the conference on the Micro-Foundations of Democracy, University of Chicago, Chicago, April 29–May 1. Przeworski, A. (1990) “The Game of Transition,” paper presented at the Center for Social History and Comparative History, UCLA, Los Angeles. Przeworski, A. (1991) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2000) Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997) “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics, 49: 155–83. Putnam, R.D. (1973) The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Putnam, R.D. (1976) The Comparative Study of Political Elites, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. Putnam, R.D. (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, 42: 427–60. Pye, L.W. (1968) The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pye, L.W. (1971) “The Legitimacy Crisis,” in L. Binder, J.S. Coleman, L.W. Pye, M. Weiner and J. Lapalombara (eds) Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pye, L.W. (1983) “The International Position of Hong Kong,” China Quarterly, 95: 456–68. Pye, L.W. and Pye, M.W. (1985) Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Rabushka, A. (1976) Value for Money: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.

292

Bibliography

Rabushka, A. (1979) Hong Kong: A Study of Economic Freedom, Chicago: Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago. Raiffa, H. (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rear, J. (1971) “One Brand of Politics,” in K. Hopkins (ed.) Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Riker, W. (1986) “Duverger’s Law Revisited,” in B. Grofman and A. Lijphart (eds) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press. Robinson, J. (1968) “Crisis,” in D.L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, London: Macmillan. Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (1998) Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ross, M.L. (2001) “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,” World Politics, 53: 325–61. Rothschild, J. (1979) “Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe,” in B. Denitch (ed.) Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis, London: Sage. Roxborough, I. (1988) “The Dilemmas of Redemocratization,” Government and Opposition, 23: 354–67. Rucht, D. (1990) “The Strategies and Action Repertoires of New Movements,” in R.J. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds) Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies, Cambridge: Polity Press. Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E.H. and Stephens, J.D. (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Rustow, D.A. (1970) “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, 2: 337–63. Sartori, G. (1987) The Theory of Democracy Revisited, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers. Scalapino, R.A. (1986) “Legitimacy and Institutionalization in Asian Socialist Societies,” in R.A. Scalapino, S. Sato and J. Wanandi (eds) Asian Political Institutionalization, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Scalapino, R.A. (1989) The Politics of Development: Perspectives on TwentiethCentury Asia, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Scalapino, R.A., Sato, S. and Wanandi, J. (eds) (1985) Asian Economic Development: Present and Future, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Schaar, J.H. (1984) “Legitimacy in the Modern State,” in W. Connolly (ed.) Legitimacy and the State, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Schaffer, B.B. (1965) “The Concept of Preparation: Some Questions about the Transfer of Systems of Government,” World Politics, 18: 42–65. Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schuman, H. and Johnson, M.P. (1976) “Attitudes and Behaviour,” Annual Review of Sociology, 2: 161–207. Schutz, B.M. and Slater, R.O. (1990) Revolution and Political Change in the Third World, Boulder, CO: L. Reinner. Scobell, A. (1988) “Hong Kong’s Influence on China: The Tail that Wags the Dogs?,” Asian Survey, 28: 599–607.

Bibliography

293

Scott, I. (1986) The Sino-British Agreement and Political Power in Hong Kong, working paper no. 44, Toronto: York Centre for Asian Research, York University. Scott, I. (1989) Political Change and The Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Scott, I. (ed.) (1998) Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong Kong, New York: St Martin’s Press. Scott, I. and Burns, J.P. (1984) The Hong Kong Civil Service: Personnel Policies and Practices, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Scott, I. and Burns, J.P. (1988) The Hong Kong Civil Service and its Future, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Scott, J.C. (1968) Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Scott, R. (1987) Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Segal, G. (1993) The Fate of Hong Kong, London: Simon & Schuster. Seidman, G. (1994) Manufacturing Militance: Workers’ Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970–1985, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Seymour, J.D. (1989) “Taiwan in 1988: No More Bandit,” Asian Survey, 29: 54–63. Shai, A. (1984) Britain and China, 1941–1947, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Shapiro, T.M. (1985) “Structure and Process in Social Movement Strategy: The Movement Against Sterilization Abuse,” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 8: 87–108. Share, D. (1987) “Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction,” Comparative Political Studies, 19: 552–48. Share, D. and Mainwaring, S. (1986) “Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain,” in W.A. Selcher (ed.) Political Liberalization in Brazil, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Shin, D.C. (1994) “On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research,” World Politics, 47: 135–70. Shin, D.C. (1999) Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shively, A.M. and Shively, S. (1972) Value Changes During a Period of Modernization: The Case of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Shively, S. (1972) “Political Orientations in Hong Kong: A Socio-Psychological Approach,” Hong Kong: Social Science Research Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Shyu, H.Y. (1990) “Exploring Democratic Transition in Taiwan: An Analysis of Macro and Micro Political Changes,” PhD thesis, Florida State University. Sinclair, K. (1988) Who’s Who in Hong Kong, 4th edition, Hong Kong: Who’s Who in Hong Kong Ltd. Sing, M. (1987) “Political Activism of University Students in Hong Kong,” MPhil thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Sing, M. (1993) “The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong,” DPhil thesis, Oxford University. Sing, M. (1996a) “Civil Society, Economic Development and Democratization in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 26: 482–504.

294

Bibliography

Sing, M. (1996b) “Democratization and Economic Development: The Anomalous Case of Hong Kong,” Democratization, 3: 343–59. Sing, M. (1997a) “A Critical Review of Theories of Democratization,” in Y.S. Cheng and K.Y. Law (eds) A New Overview of Political Science, Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong. Sing, M. (1997b) “Economic Development, Legitimacy, and Stability of Hong Kong’s Political Institutions,” China Information, 12: 215–240. Sing, M. (1998) “Comparing Democratic Transition in Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong,” paper presented at the Tri-ennial World Congress organized by the International Sociological Association, Montreal, July. Sing, M. (1999) “A Changing Political Culture and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong,” in Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Political Participation in Hong Kong: Theoretical Issues and Historical Legacy, Hong Kong: City University Press. Sing, M. (2000) “Mobilization for Political Change: The Pro-Democracy Movement in Hong Kong (1980–1994),” in T.L. Lui and W.K. Chiu (eds) Social Movements and Popular Mobilization in Hong Kong Toward 1997, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Sing, M. (2001) “Problem of Legitimacy for the New Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government,” International Journal of Public Administration, 24: 847–67. Sing, M. and Lee, K.M. (1997) “The Ambivalent Idea of Democracy of Hong Kong Chinese: Political Attitudes and Democratic Reform,” unpublished paper. Sing, M. and Lee, K.M. (1999) “The Support of Hong Kong Chinese for Democratic Reform,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 17: 47–80. Sklar, R.L. (1979) “The Nature of Class Domination in Africa,” Journal of Modern Africa Studies, 17: 531–52. Sklar, R.L. (1987) “Developmental Democracy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29: 686–714. Sklar, R.L. (1991) “Democracy and Development,” in R.L. Sklar and C.S. Whitaker, African Politics and Problems in Development, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Sklar, R.L. and Whitaker, C.S. (1991) African Politics and Problems in Development, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Smith, A.K. (1969) “Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13: 95–125. Smith, C.T. (1985) Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Smith, T. (1978) “A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20: 70–102. Snyder, R. (1998) “Path out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives,” in H. Chehabi and J.J. Linz (eds) Sultanistic Regimes, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. So, A.Y. (1990) Social Change and Development, London: Sage. So, A.Y. (1993) “Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong! The Rise of the New Middle Class in Negotiation Politics, 1982–1984,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 20: 67–86. So, A.Y. (1999) Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. So, A.Y. (2000) “Hong Kong’s Problematic Democratic Transition: Power Dependence or Business Hegemony?,” Journal for Asian Studies, 59: 359–81.

Bibliography

295

So, A.Y. and May, S.H. (1993) “Democratization in East Asia in the late 1980s: Taiwan Breakthrough, Hong Kong Frustration,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 28: 60–79. Solomon, R.H. (1971) Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Steinberg, D.I. (1995) “The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics,” in L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds) Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 2nd edn, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Stepan, A.C. (ed.) (1989) Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation. New York: Oxford University Press. Stepan, A.C. (1990) “On the Tasks of a Democratic Opposition,” Journal of Democracy 1: 41–9. Stepan, A.C. (2001) Arguing Comparative Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stephens, E.H. (1989) Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America, working paper no. 122, Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame. Stephens, J.D. (1989) “Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870–1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis,” American Journal of Sociology, 94: 1019–77. Sung, Y.W. (1997) “The Hong Kong Economy through the 1997 Barrier,” Asian Survey, 37: 705–19. Sung, Y.W. (2000) “Redefining Hong Kong’s Strategy of Growth and Development,” paper presented at the 10th anniversary conference on Into the 21st Century: Challenges for Hong Kong and the Asia-Pacific Region, organized by Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, co-sponsored by Hong Kong APEC Study Centre, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, April. Sung, Y.W. (1982) “Public Finance and Economic Policies in Hong Kong,” in J.Y.S. Cheng, Hong Kong in the 1980s, Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern Publishers Ltd. Sung, Y.W. (1985) “Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Small Open Economy of Hong Kong,” in V. Corbo, A.O. Krueger and F.Ossa (eds) ExportOriented Development Strategies, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sung, Y.W. (1986) “Fiscal and Economic Policies in Hong Kong,” in J.Y.S. Cheng (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Sunhyuk, K. (1996) “Civil Society in South Korea: From Grand Democracy Movements to Petty Interest Groups?,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 15: 81–97. Suzanne, O. (1989) China’s Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development and Culture, New York: Prentice-Hall. Svensson, P. (1986) “Stability, Crisis and Breakdown: Some Notes on the Concept of Crisis in Political Analysis,” Scandinavian Political Studies, 9: 129–39. Tang, E. and Apo, L. (1997) “The Worst of Both Worlds: 1997 and the Hong Kong Labor Movement,” 1997: Building a Global Civil Society, Hong Kong: July 1 Link. Tang, S.H. (1989) “The Hong Kong Basic Law (Draft): The Political Economy of the Articles on Economy,” paper presented at the conference Hong Kong: Towards 1997 and Beyond, organized by the Department of Business and Economic Development University of Hawaii, Hong Kong.

296

Bibliography

Tang, T.H. (1997) “Hong Kong’s Transition to Chinese Rule: The Fate of the Joint Declaration,” in J.M. Brown and R. Foot (eds) Hong Kong’s Transitions, 1842–1997, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Tarrow, S. (1989) Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–1975, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Tarrow, S. (1995) “Mass Mobilization and Regime Change: Pacts, Reform, and Popular Power in Italy (1918–1922) and Spain (1975–1978),” in R. Gunther, P.N. Diamandouros and H.J. Puhle (eds) The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years, New York: HarperCollins. Therborn, G. (1977) “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy,” New Left Review 103: 3–40. Therborn, G. (1990) “Suffrage and the Rise of Political Modernity: A Global Perspective on Trajectories and Contexts,” paper presented at Center for Social Theory and Comparative History Colloquium Series 1990 at UCLA, Los Angeles, April. Tien, H.M. (1989) The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Tien, H.M. (1996) Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Tsang, S. (1988) Democracy Shelved, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tsang, S. (1997) Hong Kong: Appointment with China, London: I.B. Tauris. Tsebelis, G. (1990) Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, Los Angeles: University of California Press. Tsim, T.L. (1991) “China–Hong Kong Relations,” in H.C. Kuan and M. Brosseau (eds) China Review, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Tsui, J. (1991) “Ji Du Tu Dui Jiu Qi de Hui Ying (The Response of the Hong Kong Christian Community to 1997),” unpublished BTh thesis, Dong Nan Ya Shen Xue Yan Jiu Suo (The South-East Asia Theological Seminary) (in Chinese). Turner, H.A. (1980) The Last Colony: But Whose?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turner, H.A. (1988) “The Prospect for Trade Unions in Hong Kong,” in Y.C. Yao, D.A. Levin, S.H. Ng and E. Sinn (eds) Labour Movement in a Changing Society, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. Turner, H.A., Fosh, P. and Ng, S.H. (1991) Between Two Societies: Hong Kong Labour in Transition, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Valenzuela, J.S. (1989) “Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” Comparative Politics, 21: 445–72. Vanhanen, T. (1997) Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, London: Routledge. Vassilev, R. (1999) “Modernization Theory Revisited: The Case of Bulgaria,” East European Politics and Societies, 13: 566–99. Verba, S. (1965) “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture,” in L.W. Pye and S. Verba (eds) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Verba, S., Kelman, S., Orren, G.R., Miyake, I., Watanuki, J., Kabashima, I. and Ferrce, G.D. (1987) Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States, London: Harvard University Press.

Bibliography

297

Verney, D. (1987) “Westminster Model,” in V. Bogdanor (ed.) The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Vidich, A.J. and Glassman, R.M. (eds) (1979) Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments, London: Sage Publications. Viola, E. and Mainwaring, S. (1985) “Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s,” Journal of International Affairs, 38: 193–219. Vogel, E.F. (with Kamm, J.) (1989) One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wacks, R. (ed.) (1988) Civil Liberties in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Wacks, R. (1989) The Future of the Law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wade, R. (1992) “East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence,” World Politics, 44: 270–320. Wang, J. (1988) “Political Movements Against the State: The Transition of Taiwan’s Authoritarian Rule,” PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles. Weede, E. (1984) “Democracy, Creeping Socialism, and Ideological Socialism in Rent-Seeking Societies,” Public Choice, 44: 349–66. Weil, F.D. and Gautier, M. (eds) (1993) Research on Democracy and Society, vol. 1, Greenwich, CT.: JAI Press. Weil, F.D. and Gautier, M. (eds) (1994) Research on Democracy and Society, vol. 2, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Weiner, M. (1987a) “Empirical Democratic Theory,” in M. Weiner and E. Ozbudun (eds) Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Weiner, M. (1987b) “Political Change: Africa, Asia and the Middle East,” in M. Weiner and S. Huntington (eds) Understanding Political Development, Boston: Little Brown and Company. Welzel, C. and Inglehart, R. (2001) “Human Development and the ‘Explosion’ of Democracy: Variations of Regime Change across 60 Societies,” unpublished conference paper presented at Berlin, April. Wesley-Smith, P. (1984) Unequal Treaty 1898–1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong’s New Territories, 2nd edn, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. White, G. (1994) “Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground,” Democratization, 1: 375–82. White, S. (1984) “Political Culture in Communist States,” Comparative Politics 16: 351–65. Whitehead, L. (1986) “International Aspects of Democratization,” in G.A. O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Whitehead, L. (1991) “The International Dimension of Democratization: A Survey of the Alternatives,” paper presented at the 15th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July. Whitehead, L. (ed.) (1996) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, New York: Oxford University Press. Wight, M. (1946) The Development of the Legislative Council, London: Faber & Faber Ltd.

298

Bibliography

Wight, M. (1952) British Colonial Constitutions 1947, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wildavsky, A. (1987) “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” American Political Science Review, 81: 3–21. Williams, M. (1988) “Political Development and Growth in East Asia,” in The Economic Intelligence Unit (ed.) China, Japan and the Asian Nics: Hong Kong and Macau, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan: Economic Structure and Analysis, London: EIU. Williamson, J.G. (1979) “Inequality, Accumulation and Technological Imbalance: A Growth-Equity Conflict in American History?,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 27: 231–53. Winckler, E.A. (1984) “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?,” China Quarterly, 99: 481–99. Wong, A.K. (1971) “Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong Kong,” United College Journal, 8: 1–20. Wong, A.K. (1972) The Kaifong Associations and The Society of Hong Kong, Taipei: The Orient Cultural Service. Wong, A.W.F. (1980) “Non-Purpose Adaptation and Administrative Change in Hong Kong,” in C.K. Leung, J.W. Cuhman and G.W. Wang (eds) Hong Kong: Dilemmas of Growth, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. Wong, C.L. (1988) “Economic Growth and Political Participation: The Case of Hong Kong,” unpublished paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Wong, F.M. (1972) “Modern Ideology, Industrialization and Conjugalism: The Hong Kong Case,” International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 2: 139–52. Wong, F.M. (1975) “Industrialization and Family Structure in Hong Kong,” Journal of Marriage and the Family, 37: 958–1000. Wong, P.W. (1989) “The Intervention of China Factor and Hong Kong’s Democratization,” unpublished paper presented at a conference about Hong Kong, Taiwan and China at the University of Hong Kong. Wong, R.Y.C. and Cheng, J.Y.S. (1990) The Other Hong Kong Report 1990, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Wong, S.L. (1986) “Modernization and Chinese Culture in Hong Kong,” China Quarterly, 106: 306–25. Wu, J.J. (1989) “Toward Another Miracle? Impetuses and Obstacles in Taiwan’s Democratization,” PhD thesis, The Ohio State University. Wu, W.M. (1997) “Public Housing Movement within the Democratized Context,” MPhil thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Xianggang Ren Ming Lu Bian Zuan Wei Yuan Hui (Editing Committee, Who’s Who in Hong Kong) (ed.) (1997) Xianggang Renming Lu (Who’s Who in Hong Kong), Haikou Shi: Hainan Chubanshe (in Chinese). Xiao, W.Y. (1988a) “A Study of the Political System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Basic Law,” Journal of Chinese Law, 2: 95–113. Xiao, W.Y. (1988b) Framework for Designing the Future Political Structure of Hong Kong, Consultative Committee of the Basic Law, CCBL-SECRRM08–880819 (in Chinese) XXXIII, no. 1. Yahuda, M. (1996) Hong Kong: China’s Challenge, London: Routledge. Yen, C.S.J. (1990) “Consequences of Socioeconomic Development in Taiwan, Sin-

Bibliography

299

gapore, and South Korea: Democracy or a Continuation of Authoritarianism?,” PhD thesis, Purdue University. You, Y.L. (1992) “Mass Politics in the Process of Taiwan’s Regime Change: Attitudes, Values, and Partisan Preferences (1980–1986),” Soochow Journal of Political Science, 1: 237–302. Young, C. (2002) “Hong Kong Media in the Changing Political Landscape,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, 1 January. Youngson, A.J. (1982) Hong Kong: Economic Growth and Policy, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,. Youngson, A.J. (ed.) (1983) China and Hong Kong: The Economic Nexus, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Zakaria, F. (1997) “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, 76: 22–43. Zald, M.N. (1980) “Issues in the Theory Social Movements,” Current Perspectives in Social Theory, 1: 61–72. Zald, M.N. and Useem, B. (1987) “Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement,” in M.N. Zald and J.D. McCarthy (eds) Social Movements in an Organizational Society, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Zhang, Y. (1988) “The Reasons for and Basic Principles in Formulating the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law, and its Essential Contents and Mode of Expression,” Journal of Chinese Law, 2: 5–19.

Index

age-related attitudes to democratization 135–7 Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democracy Movement 118 Almond, G.A. 58, 127–8 Asian financial crisis 175, 179, 202, 222 Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood 146, 155, 171 authoritarian rule 23–4, 44–5, 50, 63, 126, 128, 163, 172, 184, 189, 210, 219–21 Bank of China 98 bargaining power 24–8, 94, 127, 148, 152, 191, 196–7 Basic Law (1990) 2, 8, 10, 73–4, 94–8, 106, 112–16, 145, 158–9, 164–8, 185, 191, 208, 221 Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) 78, 84, 88, 98–9 Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) 84–5, 97, 99, 118 Bellin, E. 20 Bicameral Model 118 Bill of Rights 134 Blaker, Peter 37 bourgeoisie, the 87–8, 198, 211–12 British influence on Hong Kong 10–11, 31, 34–9, 124, 154, 201, 207–8, 219–20 bureaucratic structures 38–45, 49–50, 60, 63, 99, 105, 107 business community 40–4, 87–8, 109, 195, 198, 211–12 Business and Professional Group (BPG) 78, 84–9, 95, 98–102, 114, 117–22, 204, 208, 212 Campaign for Chinese as an Official Language 83

case studies 28–30 Chan Siu Ping 178–9 Chang Hung 179 Chief Executive of Hong Kong, post of 71, 73, 89, 100–3, 116–18, 139–40, 153, 168–71, 181, 206; see also Tung Cheehwa Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 204–6, 211 Chinese Government: attitude to Hong Kong 24–6, 31–4, 45, 67–72, 125, 145, 191, 194, 200–2; impact on Hong Kong’s democratization 65–6, 71–4, 92–4, 97, 112–14, 118, 122–3, 143–4, 152–62, 189, 203–7 Chinese Manufacturers’ Association 101 Chu, Y.H. 210 Chun Doo-hwan 211–16 passim church organizations 54–6, 214–15 civil liberties 37–8, 44–6, 49, 63–4, 98, 157, 202, 219, 223 civil society 20–2, 44, 49–52, 56, 62–4, 70, 144–52, 172, 176, 187, 198–200, 207–9, 213–19; collective mobilization power of 194–5 Collier, R.B. 20 colonialism and decolonization 34–5, 38–41, 66, 123, 207, 222 communism, resistance to 54 Confucianism 10–11, 209, 216 corruption 219–20 cost-benefit calculations 129 counter-social movement groups 97 Cradock, Sir Percy 207 cultural traditions 46 Darwin, J. 35 Democracy 2000 176–81 Democratic Alliance for Betterment

Index 301 (DAB) of Hong Kong 165, 170–2, 175 Democratic Party 65, 67, 92, 155, 160–1, 171, 173, 176–8, 180–1, 190, 195, 204, 208 democratization: bottom-up processes of 79, 176, 200, 207, 215, 219; causes of 209; in China 72, 98, 118; constraints on 63–5, 114, 195, 198; costs and benefits of 89–90; phases seen in Hong Kong 2–3, 26–9, 36–7, 63, 74–6, 92, 122, 124, 163–72, 192–4, 201, 204; prospects for 221–2; public support for 172–6, 187–9, 201–3, 215–20, 223; top-down processes of 208, 210; worldwide 3–5, 23, 163, 181, 198 Deng Xiaoping 67–9, 97–8 depoliticisation of society 201–2, 207, 215 Diamond, L. 3–5, 16, 20–1, 23, 41, 45, 51, 59, 127, 135, 184–5, 200, 208, 218 direct elections to the Hong Kong legislature 2, 28, 36, 65–7, 77–89, 94–112, 119–22, 124–5, 130–3, 136, 145, 151, 201, 224–6 District Boards 43, 57, 124, 159–62, 175 divided nationhood 210 Eckstein, H. 28 economic crises 183, 189, 191; see also Asian financial crisis economic growth 45, 47, 50, 152, 201–2 education 54–5, 61, 107–8, 137, 183 Election Committee 145–6, 158–60, 164–5, 170 elites: co-option into government 40–4, 49, 63, 93, 205–6; role in transition 19–20, 24, 84, 88–9, 100, 123, 143 emigration from Hong Kong 109, 112–15, 138–9, 200, 202 Executive Council 39–44, 75–7, 95, 116–17, 160–1, 223 factor analysis 131–5 Federation of Hong Kong’s Industries 100–1 Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) 52, 98, 105, 107, 195, 204 4–4–2 model 117–22, 208 freedoms, protection of 134–5, 185–7 Frontier, the 155, 173, 176–81 passim Full Democracy (FD) 148–51, 179 functional constituencies 158–9, 164–5, 181

Gorbachev, Mikhail 23 Governor of Hong Kong: powers of 39, 75–6; proposed election of 95 Grantham, Sir Alexander 36 Ha, Louis 56 Ho Chun Yan 150 Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (HKADPL) 98, 144, 149 Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce 100–1 Hong Kong Progressive Alliance 170 Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 102, 154 Hong Kong Standard Chartered Bank 102 Hook, B. 39 Human Development Index (HDI) 5, 9–10 human rights 185, 202 Huntington, S.P. 4–5 Hurd, Douglas 121, 208 Islam 10, 45 Jao, Y.C. 33–4 Jardines (conglomerate) 198 Joint Association of People’s Organizations (JAPOD) 148–51 Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government (JCPDG) 57–8, 67, 80, 92, 114–22, 144, 150–1 Joint Declaration (1984) 64–5, 69–73, 77–80, 86–7, 100, 103, 207 Joint Liaison Group 77 Kenton, Timothy 78 Kim, Stephen 214 Kuan, H.C. 13, 14–16, 49, 61, 91, 107, 126–7, 132, 135, 140, 201 Kuomintang (KMT) regime 210–11, 213 Kwong, Bishop 56 labor movement 50–3 Lau, Emily 151, 176, 179 Lau, S.K. 13, 14–16, 33, 43, 46, 49–50, 57, 61–2, 77, 91, 107, 126–7, 132, 135, 140, 201 Law Yuk Kai 149 leadership, political 150–2, 177 Lee, Martin 144 Lee Wing-tat 148, 171 Legislative Council 40–4, 53, 75–7, 100, 116–17, 159

302

Index

legislatures, impact on policy of 164–5 legitimacy 45–6, 49–50, 91, 141–2, 184–7, 202, 210, 217–22 Li Chuwen 71 Li Wah-ming 171 Liberal Party 155, 170 liberalization, economic and political 152, 204 Linz, J. 1, 3, 20–2, 45, 51, 151, 195 living standards 47–50 Lo Hon Shui 117 MacLehose, Sir Murray 48 Mak Ho Wah 150 Meeting Point 98, 144–6, 149–51 middle-class attitudes to democratization 107–10, 116–17, 137–9, 202, 214 Miners, N.J. 43 Moderate Alliance 114, 120 modernization of China 67–9, 72, 204 modernization theory 3, 128; Hong Kong as an anomaly to 10–13, 30–1, 62, 65, 191, 208–9, 219 Moon, C.I. 211 Ng, K.C. 161 Norton, P. 164 O’Donnell, G.A. 19, 45 OMELCO model 116–18, 120, 122, 208 “One country, two systems” doctrine 2, 69, 93, 102, 104, 114–15, 194, 207–8 “open door” policy 68 Park Chung Hee 211, 216 Patten, Chris 15–16, 123–7, 137–8, 142–5, 151–2, 158–9, 183, 189, 202, 206–8 People’s Liberation Army 118 Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) 47–8 political culture 57–62, 127–8, 194, 200 political institutions 37–9, 44, 49, 57, 63–4, 66, 200–1, 215–16 political opportunity structure 66–7, 70–1, 79–80, 89, 92, 117, 121 political parties 74, 144–52, 172–6, 184, 190, 195, 198, 200, 209, 215 political society 20–2, 146, 148, 151–2, 198, 209, 214, 217–18; mobilization by 194–5 Preparatory Committee 153–9

pressure groups 43, 56–61, 72, 80–3, 161, 198 private member bills 165–8, 221 professional groups 108–10, 113, 116, 133; see also Business and Professional Group proportional representation 160, 165 Provisional Legislature 153–7, 161, 170, 185 public opinion 22–8, 42–9, 59–63, 70, 74, 77–8, 89–92, 96–9, 102–8, 112–27, 151, 180–5, 200–3, 215–20, 223; on prodemocracy parties 172–6; statistical analysis of 129–42 Pye, L.W. and M.W. 33 Raiffa, H. 120 rational choice theory 128–30, 137 Rear, J. 41, 43 regression analysis 129–30 reunification of China 68–9, 72; see also Taiwan Roh Tae Woo 214 security threats 185–7 self-censorship by the media 180 Sing, Ming 58, 81, 83, 103–4, 133 Singapore 30, 208–9, 220 Sino-British Agreement (1984) see Joint Declaration So, A.Y. 15–17 social movement alliance 97 South Korea 9–12, 63, 107, 202, 209–18, 223 sovereignty 32–5, 68–9, 78, 88, 113–14 stability, social and political 45–6, 49, 60, 202 Stepan, A. 1, 3, 20–3, 126, 151, 195 Taiwan 2, 9–12, 33, 63, 68, 93–4, 97–8, 102, 107, 194, 202, 209–18, 223 “third way” of development 204, 220 Tiananmen Square incident (1989) 114–17, 120–2, 125, 141–4, 185, 194, 198–202, 207–8, 217 Trade Union Council (TUC) 52 trade unions 51–3, 98, 215–16 Trench, Sir David 36–7 trust: in the Chinese Government 142, 202; in the Hong Kong SAR Government 182–9, 222 Tung Chee-hwa 143–4, 160–2, 170–1, 181–5, 189, 204, 221–2 Turner, H.A. 52

Index 303 United Ants 151 United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) 67, 144–51, 195 United Kingdom see British influence on Hong Kong United Nations 33 United States 210 Valenzuela, Samuel 50

Verba, S. 58, 127–8 Wesley-Smith, P. 32 Wong, F.M. 43 Wood, Fu Ching 178 World Bank 3, 5, 8, 12, 47–8 Yeung Sum 148 You, Y.L. 215

Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis (RoutledgeCurzon)

Democratization: a comparative analysis of 170 countries

Democratization in Southern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Italy, Spain, and Turkey (Democratization Studies)

Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis

Tortuous Dualism

Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis

Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis

International Neurolaw: A Comparative Analysis

King Kongs Rivalen

King Kongs Rivalen

Democratization: A Critical Introduction

Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction

Sport, Policy and Politics: A Comparative Analysis

Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis

Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis

National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis

Electronic Voting and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis

National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis

Japanese Agriculture: A Comparative Economic Analysis

Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis: A Comparative and Critical Introduction

Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective

A coffin from Hong Kong

Korea's Democratization

A Coffin From Hong Kong

New Challenges to Democratization (Democratization Studies)

Democratization in Eastern Europe

Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford Studies in Democratization)

Hong Kong

Hong Kong

Hong Kong

Trust in Food: A Comparative and Institutional Analysis

Hong Kong's Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis (RoutledgeCurzon)

Democratization: a comparative analysis of 170 countries

Democratization in Southern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Italy, Spain, and Turkey (Democratization Studies)

Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis

Tortuous Dualism

Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis

Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis

International Neurolaw: A Comparative Analysis

King Kongs Rivalen

King Kongs Rivalen

Democratization: A Critical Introduction

Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction

Sport, Policy and Politics: A Comparative Analysis

Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis

Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis

National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis

Electronic Voting and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis

National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis

Japanese Agriculture: A Comparative Economic Analysis

Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis: A Comparative and Critical Introduction

Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective

A coffin from Hong Kong

Korea's Democratization

A Coffin From Hong Kong

New Challenges to Democratization (Democratization Studies)

Democratization in Eastern Europe

Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford Studies in Democratization)

Hong Kong

Hong Kong

Hong Kong

Trust in Food: A Comparative and Institutional Analysis

Recommend Documents