Greek and Roman Military Writers: Selected Readings (Routledge Classical Translations)

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY WRITERS From the men who fought hand to hand to defend their communities, to the significant e...

Author: Brian Campbell

451 downloads 1629 Views 2MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY WRITERS

From the men who fought hand to hand to defend their communities, to the significant economic impact of organizing a large fighting force, war was a central influence at every level of existence in ancient Greek and Rome. The ancient writers who tell us about technical aspects of military practice and the management of armies shed much light on the murky area of the conduct of war, and convey the importance given to the subject in the ancient world. For this volume Brian Campbell has selected and translated more than 250 key pieces from the ancient military writers. They cover a fascinating range of topics – battle formations and manoeuvres, different types of troops, the art of generalship, methods for conducting and resisting a siege, the construction of artillery and fortifications, and every kind of ploy and trick used by generals to defeat their opponents. Some works are highly technical, while others survey the history of warfare and the reasons why past generals had been victorious or came to grief. The book also includes extracts from other ancient historians who comment on warfare and society. Each piece is annotated with further explanation, making this an essential resource for everyone studying the army and warfare in the classical age. Brian Campbell is Professor of Roman History at The Queen’s University of Belfast. He has written several books on the Roman army including The Roman Army 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook (Routledge 1994) and War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC–AD 284 (Routledge 2002).

Routledge Classical Translations

This series offers translations, usually in selection, of important literary and historical works from Greece and Rome that provide background and context for the best-known writers. It concentrates on writings in fields that are receiving increased study at present. The books, all of which contain an introduction and annotation, will be useful to students at all levels but especially on more advanced courses. Greek and Roman Military Writers Selected readings Brian Campbell Letters from Ancient Greece Patricia Rosenmeyer The History of Zonaras From Alexander Severus to the death of Theodosius the Great Thomas Banchich and Eugene Lane The Story of Athens Selections from the Atthidographers Phillip Harding Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes Guides to Stoic living Keith Seddon The Roman Book of Gardening John Henderson

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY WRITERS Selected readings

Brian Campbell

First published 2004 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2004 Brian Campbell All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-64208-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67444-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–28546–1 (hbk) ISBN 0–415–28547–x (pbk)

FOR MY MOTHER AND IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER

CONTENTS

List of readings List of figures Preface and acknowledgements Abbreviations and notes Introduction: warfare in the Greek and Roman world

viii xix xxi xxiii

1

1

Organization, training, and discipline

21

2

The general’s role

53

3

Battle: military formations, tactics, and stratagems

88

4

Attacking and defending cities

145

5

Military engineering: bridges, camps, fortifications, siege engines, and siege works

179

Select bibliography Index of translated passages Index of names and subjects

212 218 227

vii

READINGS

1 Organization, training, and discipline 1 Xenophon, On Hunting 12.1–4 (value of hunting) 2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.1–4 (importance of physical fitness) 3 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 1.5–6 (training the cavalry) 4 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 2.7–9 (knowing your position) 5 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.3–4 (use of mercenary cavalry) 6 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.10–11 (cavalry practice) 7 Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons) 8 Polybius, Histories 6.34.7–12 (passing round the watchword) 9 Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline) 10 Polybius, Histories 6.39.1–3; 5–11 (rewards for valour) 11 Polybius, Histories 10.20.1–5 (Scipio Africanus trains the infantry) 12 Polybius, Histories 18.29–32 (comparison of Greek phalanx and Roman legion) 13 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies) 14 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.5–6 (drawing up the battle line) 15 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.1–2 (weaponry of phalanx) 16 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants) 17 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.1–2; 10–11 (commands) 18 Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish sword) 19 Josephus, Jewish War 3.71–6; 85–8 (training the Roman army) 20 Josephus, Jewish War 3.102–7 (Roman discipline) 21 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipio’s discipline) 22 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius’ mules) 23 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus’ discipline) viii

READINGS

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulo’s discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Piso’s discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius’ discipline) Arrian, Tactica 3.1–4; 4.1–2 (infantry and cavalry weaponry) Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals) Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command) Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.1–7; 43.2–4; 44 (cavalry training) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of military training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.5–6 (choosing suitable recruits) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.9–10 (Roman military training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.11–12 (weapons training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.14–16; 18–19 (throwing missiles; other military skills) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.26–7 (training in battle manoeuvres)

2 The general’s role 38 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.1.5–6 (qualities required in a general) 39 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.1–2 (skills of a cavalry commander) 40 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 6.1–4 (the commander’s relations with his troops) 41 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 8.21–2 (choosing the right man for the job) 42 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.1–2 (role of commander) 43 Xenophon, Anabasis 2.6.1–15 (qualities of a Greek general) 44 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.47–9 (leading by personal example) 45 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.3.10–11 (the approachable general) 46 Xenophon, Anabasis 5.8.12–15 (the general and discipline) 47 Xenophon, Anabasis 6.5.14–17 (military psychology) 48 Xenophon, Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas) 49 Polybius, Histories 9.12.1–4; 14.1–5 (varied skills of a general) 50 Caesar, Gallic War 1.24–6 (battle against the Helvetii) 51 Caesar, Gallic War 2.19–21 (Caesar’s role in a battlefield crisis) ix

READINGS

52 Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Roman commander) 53 Caesar, Gallic War 7.85–8 (role of general in directing the battle) 54 Onasander, The General Preface 4–6 (importance of competent generals) 55 Onasander, The General 2.1–3 (moral qualities of generalship) 56 Onasander, The General 6.5–7; 10–13 (the general and his army on the march) 57 Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory) 58 Onasander, The General 10.1–2 (preparing an army for battle) 59 Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley) 60 Onasander, The General 10.25–6 (making religious observances) 61 Onasander, The General 13.1–3 (military psychology) 62 Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop dispositions) 63 Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology) 64 Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best appearance) 65 Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks) 66 Onasander, The General 33.1–2 (the general and personal combat) 67 Onasander, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and honouring soldiers) 68 Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead) 69 Onasander, The General 38.1–2 (dealing with surrenders) 70 Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and conduct in victory) 71 Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders before battle) 72 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny) 73 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius’ leadership) 74 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men) 75 Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems) 76 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership) 77 Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges) 78 Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the army) 79 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus’ leadership) 80 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an example) x

READINGS

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander) Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexander’s way of giving orders) Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commander’s role in battle) Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.1–3 (endurance and example of Alexander) Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.2–6 (qualities of generalship) Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1, Preface 1–3 (generals and stratagems) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example) Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, Preface (a general’s need for military skill) Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 11; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62 (Iphicrates’ skill as a general) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from stratagems) Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle) Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard against enemy tricks) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipio’s tough leadership) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for action) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesar’s rapport with his troops) Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.2; 12–13; 18 (role of general in securing his army’s welfare)

3 Battle: military formations, tactics, and stratagems 102 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 3.97.3–98.2 (skill of light-armed troops) 103 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32.3–4; 33.2; 34 (Spartan hoplites defeated at Sphacteria) 104 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 5.70–1 (the drift to the right in hoplite battles) 105 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5 (skill and inspirational leadership of Gylippus) 106 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44 (night battle at Syracuse) xi

READINGS

107 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80 (Athenian retreat at Syracuse) 108 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse in attack) 109 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.5–6; 9–11 (importance of deception) 110 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.17–21 (start of the battle of Cunaxa) 111 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.3.12–16 (difficulties of commanding the rearguard) 112 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.19–20 (difficulties of the hoplite marching formation) 113 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.8.10–12 (changes to the traditional formation) 114 Xenophon, Anabasis 7.3.37–9 (Greek practice in night marches) 115 Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites) 116 Xenophon, Hellenica 4.5.11–18 (peltasts defeat Spartan hoplites) 117 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.3.5–7 (peltasts and cavalry combine) 118 Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.8–15 (battle of Leuctra) 119 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation) 120 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops) 121 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.1–2 (cavalry formations) 122 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres) 123 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.2–6 (defending against elephant attack) 124 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.27–31 (battle of Paraetacene) 125 Livy, History of Rome 22.47–8 (battle of Cannae) 126 Livy, History of Rome 26.4.4–10 (creation of the velites) 127 Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed troops) 128 Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations) 129 Onasander, The General 21.5–9 (crescent formation; counter-attacks) 130 Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves) 131 Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear) 132 Onasander, The General 29.1–2 (intimidating the enemy) 133 Josephus, Jewish War 3.98–101 (value of careful preparations in war) 134 Josephus, Jewish War 3.115–26 (Roman marching order) 135 Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages) xii

READINGS

136 Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 1–7 (importance of writing about tactics) 137 Tacitus, Agricola 36–7 (battle of Mons Graupius) 138 Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle) 139 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans) 140 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemy’s plans) 141 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy) 142 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics) 143 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difficult position) 144 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deficiencies) 145 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemy’s attention) 146 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to fight) 147 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to fight) 148 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to fight) 149 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to fight) 150 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics) 151 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy) 152 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush) 153 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to fight to the end) 154 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback) 155 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy) 156 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties) 157 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support) 158 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry) 159 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat) 160 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers) 161 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion) 162 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms and stratagems) 163 Plutarch, Flamininus 8.2–4 (battle of Cynoscephalae) 164 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1–11 (Roman marching order) 165 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 11–31 (battle formation against the Alani) 166 Arrian, Tactica 5.2–3 (importance of orderly formation) 167 Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation) 168 Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers) 169 Arrian, Tactica 16.6–7 (Scythian cavalry formation) 170 Arrian, Tactica 33.1–2 (Roman willingness to adopt the practices of other peoples) 171 Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.8–10 (Alexander’s stratagem against carts) xiii

READINGS

172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196

Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.4–5 (Alexander uses combined tactics) Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.4–5 (Alexander’s tactical skill) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms in the army) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the Spartans) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal operations) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush) Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexander’s ingenuity) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split his forces) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy) Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice to encourage valour) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics) Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting information) Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation against cavalry) Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in AD 194) Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an inexperienced army) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms)

4 Attacking and defending cities 197 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.3–4 (Theban attack on Plataea) 198 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.75–6 (siege of Plataea) 199 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26 (Athenian blockade of Pylos) xiv

READINGS

200 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.1–2 (protecting those parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection) 201 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.1–2 (choosing men to guard city gates) 202 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.1–3 (choosing day scouts) 203 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keeping watch on potential traitors) 204 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the gate) 205 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.4–5 (organizing guard shifts) 206 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.21–3 (setting up lanterns at guard posts) 207 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.1–5 (organizing sorties) 208 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.16–19 (arranging suitable passwords) 209 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.1–5 (organizing patrols) 210 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.1–3 (dealing with panics) 211 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.1–2 (dealing with arms smuggling) 212 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.1–2 (sending secret messages) 213 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.1–2 (protection against siege engines) 214 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.1–2 (how to counter-attack siege engines) 215 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.1–2 (how to put out fires) 216 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.1–2 (preventing the placing of siege ladders) 217 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.1–3; 6–7 (dealing with tunnels) 218 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.1–6 (how to deal with enemy incursions) 219 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers are small) 220 Philon, (Siegecraft) A32–3 (positioning of catapults and postern gates) 221 Philon, (Siegecraft) B1–2 (keeping reserve stocks of food) 222 Philon, (Siegecraft) B49–50 (preparing ammunition and supplies) 223 Philon, (Siegecraft) C3–5 (defensive precautions against siege engines) 224 Philon, (Siegecraft) C32–6 (defensive ditches, guards, passwords, and signals) xv

READINGS

225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258

Philon, (Siegecraft) D 59–60 (psychology of siege warfare) Philon, (Siegecraft) D71–2 (capturing the vital parts of a town) Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply) Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack) Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.11–12 (defence of Marseilles) Onasander, The General 39.4–5; 40 (how to capture a city) Josephus, The Jewish War 3.166–75; 271–5 (siege of Jotapata) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemy’s attention) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected quarter) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilance among the defenders) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about supplies) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege) Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.8–9; 21.3–22 (siege of Halicarnassus) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders’ attention) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a mine) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city) Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices used by besiegers and besieged) Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel) Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city) Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.10–12 (siege of Byzantium)

xvi

READINGS

5 Military engineering: bridges, camps, fortifications, siege engines, and siege works 259 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100 (use of fire machine) 260 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.5.8–12 (method of crossing a river) 261 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 43–4 (military value of catapults) 262 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 44–7 (construction of a stone-thrower) 263 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 65–8 (construction of the mountain belly-bow) 264 Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 56–8 (problems with artillery engines) 265 Philon, Construction of War Engines 76–7 (repeating and air-spring catapults) 266 Philon, (Siegecraft) A20–1 (construction of fortifications) 267 Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine) 268 Caesar, Gallic War 7.72–3 (siege works at Alesia) 269 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 12.12–14.3 (tortoise and battering ram) 270 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.2–26.5 (Hegetor’s tortoise) 271 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.1–2 (tensioning a catapult) 272 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.1–2 (history of battering rams) 273 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1–3; 7 (offensive and defensive mechanisms) 274 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 73–4 (nature of artillery engines) 275 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 81–5 (construction of a torsion catapult) 276 Josephus, Jewish War 3.76–84 (the Roman military camp) 277 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14 (building a military camp) 278 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 49–50; 57–8 (camp fortifications) 279 Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.3–5 (Roman method of bridging a river) 280 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 137.1–138.17 (importance of siegecraft) 281 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7–156.1 (how to set fire to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises) 282 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the Danube) xvii

READINGS

283 Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.4–7 (construction of the onager) 284 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.22–4 (building a military camp) 285 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista) 286 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning ballista)

xviii

FIGURES

1.1 1.2 3.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7

Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 36–7) Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 40.1–7) The three phases of the battle of Cannae Biton’s stone-thrower Biton’s mountain belly-bow Hegetor’s tortoise Heron’s torsion catapult Catapult pull-back system Catapult pull-back system with pulleys Roman military camp (Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14) 5.8 The onager

xix

44 45 109 182 184 193 198 199 199 201 207

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My original intention was to offer a selection of readings specifically from Greek and Roman writers of military handbooks and compendia of stratagems. However, it soon became clear that it would be odd to exclude accomplished historians who wrote about military practices and battles in the course of their work. Indeed historians like Thucydides and Xenophon and Polybius had held military command with varying degrees of success. Similarly, although Caesar’s accounts of his campaigns in Gaul and during the civil war cannot be described as military textbooks, they are central to our understanding of Roman generalship and military practice. Other writers were then admitted because of particular interest, and here I make no claim for consistency in my selections. Josephus, for example, who commanded Jewish forces in the Galilee and saw at first hand the violence of a Roman military campaign, offers an incomparable picture of the Roman army in action. On the other hand, Suetonius, who has little interest in military affairs, happens to preserve the thoughts of the emperor Augustus on what made a good general. The chapter headings indicate the main themes in the works of the military writers and are intended to give some structure to the book, though some passages are potentially relevant to several chapters. Within each chapter passages are cited in chronological order according to the author, and there is a short biographical note on the first occasion when each author is cited. It is clear that writers on stratagems and other collectors of uplifting anecdotes like Valerius Maximus had a pool of well-known precepts to draw from, which then underwent expansion and elaboration. While drawing the reader’s attention to this feature of such writings, I have tried to avoid citing repetitive extracts. I am very grateful to my colleague Professor David Whitehead for allowing me to see a draft version of his translations of Athenaeus xxi

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mechanicus and Apollodorus of Damascus in advance of publication. In preparing the text I owe thanks to Dr Richard Stoneman and to Routledge’s anonymous readers for wise advice.

Figure acknowledgements Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.4–5.6 and figure 5.8, E.W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery. Technical Treatises (Oxford, 1971), opposite p. 80 figure 1 (a) and (b); p. 102 figure 6 (a) and (c); pp. 49–50, figures 7–9; p. 259, figure 12, reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. Figure 5.3, I.D. Rowland and T.N. Howe, Vitruvius. Ten Books on Architecture (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 314, figure 137, reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.

xxii

ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

Abbreviations AFLS AJA ANRW ClasAnt CQ CTh Digest GRBS HSCPh JHS JRS PBSR Pritchett, GSW

Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’ Università di Siena (Florence) American Journal of Archaeology (New York) H. Temporini et al. (eds), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Berlin, 1972– ) Classical Antiquity (Berkeley) Classical Quarterly (Oxford) Th. Mommsen (ed.), Codex Theodosianus (Berlin, 1905) Th. Mommsen (ed.), Digesta; Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. I (Berlin, 1872) Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies (Durham, North Carolina) Harvard Studies in Classical Philology (Cambridge, Mass.) Journal of Hellenic Studies (London) Journal of Roman Studies (London) Papers of the British School at Rome (London) W.K. Pritchett (1971–91) The Greek State at War Parts I–V, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California

Notes [ ]

enclose letters that no longer exist in the surviving text but have been restored by modern scholars [- - -] indicate a lacuna where no restoration has been attempted ( ) indicate explanatory supplements by this translator ... indicate words or passages omitted by this translator xxiii

ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

Modern equivalents of ancient units of measurement

Greek 1 dactyl 1 palm 1 span 1 foot 1 cubit

= = = = =

19.3 mm (0.76 in) 77.1 mm (3.04 in) 231.2 mm (9.12 in) 308.3 mm (12.16 in) 462.4 mm (18.21 in)

Roman 1 foot 1 inch 1 palm 1 digit

= = = =

296 mm (11.64 in) 24.6 mm (0.97 in) 73.9 mm (2.91 in) 18.5 mm (0.73 in)

All references to measurements in feet in the translated passages are to Greek or Roman feet.

xxiv

INTRODUCTION Warfare in the Greek and Roman world

Greek warfare In early Greece around 1200 BC battles were probably decided by a relatively small number of aristocratic warriors using heavy thrusting spears. Chariots are also recorded in the Linear B tablets from the palace centres at Pylos and Cnossus, but seemingly these were normally used for transport to and from battle. The mountainous terrain of mainland Greece with its small plains is unsuitable for large-scale chariot manoeuvring. The Homeric poems shed further light and perhaps indicate the situation in the ninth to eighth centuries BC. Then aristocratic warriors fought individually as infantry, using throwing spears and swords, supported by groups of the less well off, who were poorly armed and equipped. The aristocrats fought for their honour and prestige, but also served their communities, and by doing so confirmed and enhanced their political and economic domination of society, since apart from fighting they ran the government, conducted diplomacy, and acted as priests. In this kind of warfare, which was virtually arranged between aristocratic élites, casualties could be kept to a minimum. One significant development in the course of this period was the adoption of iron instead of bronze, certainly no later than the eleventh century, especially in the manufacture of swords and spears, though bronze was later to reappear. After c. 750 BC as the Greek world was progressively opened up to outside influences, new ideas and opportunities in turn influenced the nature of warfare. Communities in Greece developed as independent city-states, each with its individual system of government, fiercely loyal to its own identity and traditions. So there was no Greek army as such. However, these communities often fought against one another, and consequently warfare was a constant factor in Greek society. The citizens of each city-state were part-time soldiers and therefore armies 1

INTRODUCTION: GREEK AND ROMAN WARFARE

tended to be small and warfare seasonal since the crops had to be planted and the harvest brought in. Now, in this period there were important political, social, and economic changes and it is tempting to associate these with significant alterations in the style of fighting adopted eventually by all Greek communities. The increase in trade and the gradual rise in disposable wealth meant that more people had access to arms and armour of better quality, and therefore more citizens could potentially contribute to the defence of the city-state. Eventually the hoplite became established as the principal instrument of war in the Greek city-states. He was an infantryman who took his name from his arms and armour,1 and when he was fully equipped this consisted of body armour, helmet, sometimes greaves, a large round shield, and a heavy thrusting spear about two or three metres in length. The Greeks also adopted the phalanx formation, in which hoplites fought side by side in close array eight to sixteen ranks deep. When the front lines engaged the ranks behind pushed forward to add weight to the charge. It was important that the phalanx retained its formation and a flute player helped to keep the hoplites in step. The phalanx continued the Greek tendency to rely on heavy infantry and in a way suited Greek terrain by confining the battle to a small area. When one side gave way the soldiers tended to throw away their shields in order to retreat more rapidly. It was unusual for the victors to pursue them for any distance since without cavalry they had little chance of catching them. Hoplite battle though bloody, with the possibility of terrible wounds especially to the throat (from a downwards thrust over the opponent’s shield) or to the groin (from a thrust under the shield), restricted the number of casualties and this was important since, as the army was simply the citizen population under arms, manpower was limited.2 The exact origins and nature of these military developments are much debated. For example, it may be that the hoplite weaponry was adopted piecemeal and that the phalanx emerged subsequently when the full potential of the new weapons had been realized. On the other hand, as more men became available for military service it perhaps made sense to make use of the bigger numbers by establishing a formation that allowed them to fight in a large group. That in turn could have encouraged the development of the large round shield that made fighting in formation far more effective.3 It was convex in shape and rimmed or sometimes entirely covered with bronze. The soldier held it by means of a strap through which he passed the left arm as far as the elbow, and also grasped a leather thong at the edge of the shield. This made it easier to carry the shield but more difficult to move it 2


across to protect the right-hand side. Therefore the soldier needed to stand close to the man on his right to ensure protection from his overlapping shield. And so it could be said that the shield was ‘for the sake of the entire line’.4 Furthermore, it is also worth considering that in the longer run possession of a hoplite shield reduced the need for heavy body armour and increased the opportunity for those who could afford only light armour or none at all to fight in the phalanx. In general, it is unclear how far these military changes influenced political developments. Since more citizens now could join in the state’s military initiatives and there was a greater sense of community involvement, it is plausible to suggest that in time the dominating role of the aristocrats would be reduced, and that there might be a corresponding increase in the role of relatively well-off citizens in government and the decision-making process, as those with grievances now had a greater opportunity to do something about them. It is also interesting that the Greek city-states made little use of cavalry or light-armed troops in warfare. Of course the terrain of Greece was not suitable for rearing horses or for the widespread deployment of cavalry. Furthermore, horses were expensive to maintain, which meant that they tended to be the preserve of the rich. On the other hand, the absence of light-armed troops may reflect social conditions, in that the citizen army was built round relatively well-off farmers who could equip themselves as hoplites. Those who controlled the government might at a pinch accept them, but be reluctant to make use of men at the margins who could afford only light equipment.5 Naturally the city-states differed in the organization and training of their military forces, and their skill and application of tactics.6 In fact formal training in weapons drill and unit formations seems to have been limited, and many citizens may have had only some kind of athletics training.7 The Spartans, however, were famous for their outstanding prowess in hoplite warfare.8 The unique social and political conditions in Sparta contributed to this, apart from any predilection of the Spartans for the military life. A large subject population, the helots (descendants of the original defeated inhabitants of Laconia) worked the land, leaving Spartan citizens free to devote their time to military training and exercise. The organization of the state also provided for the careful preparation of young men for a future military role. Other Greeks believed that the skill and discipline and training of the Spartan hoplite army were such as to render it virtually invincible in normal conditions. In respect of army command, even among the Spartans, generals had no specialist training and were not dedicated military men, at least until the later fourth century with the 3


emergence of mercenary leaders. Indeed, in the case of a traditional Greek hoplite battle, once the two phalanxes were set on course arguably the commander could do little to influence the outcome except inspire confidence by his presence and perhaps engage in combat himself.9 The defeat of the Persian invasion of 480–479 BC, when unusually a number of city-states co-operated in a common military strategy, seemed to confirm the superiority of Greek methods of heavy infantry fighting. The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) fought between Athens and Sparta and their respective groups of allies ended in the complete defeat of Athens and apparently demonstrated again the dominance of the Spartan way of war. Nevertheless, the length of the war was unprecedented and involved at times virtually year-round military activity. One reason for the length of the war was that Athens had built up a strong navy that was able to inflict damage on the Peloponnese and disrupt Spartan interests. Athens, protected by her fortification and the long walls that connected the city to its harbour, the Piraeus, could accept the occupation or ravaging of its territory and still carry on the war relying on supplies imported by sea. Furthermore, the Athenians developed other forms of fighting on land, using mercenaries and light-armed troops. The shock reverberated round the Greek world when a force of Spartans surrendered to a mixed force of Athenian hoplites and light-armed troops on the island of Sphacteria in 424 BC.10 Nevertheless, the predominance of Sparta after 404 meant that for the moment the emphasis on hoplites continued. Indeed the reputation of the hoplite phalanx was demonstrated by the recruitment of ten thousand Greek hoplites by Cyrus to assist his rebellion against his elder brother, the Persian king. He was defeated and killed at the battle of Cunaxa in 401 BC, but the Greeks acquitted themselves with distinction and later successfully marched back to the coast.11 The one striking development in hoplite tactics emerged when the Thebans under their leader Epaminondas challenged the Spartan hegemony. The Spartans had previously exploited a tendency of the hoplite battle line, which inclined to drift towards the right as each man tried to move closer to the protection offered by the shield on the left arm of the man next to him. Accordingly, Spartan commanders used the discipline and training of their men to outflank the enemy left wing. However, at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC Epaminondas created a wedge formation by making the left wing of his phalanx exceptionally deep and holding back the centre and the right wing. As the Spartans tried their outflanking manoeuvre he attacked through his left wing and won a decisive victory.12 4


This brought the end to Spartan domination of Greek military practices and opened the way for further developments. The most notable of these was the increasing use of light-armed troops, in particular the peltasts, who were equipped with the Thracian shield (pelte) and javelins, and could be used as skirmishers or to seize vantage points. They could also keep hoplites at bay by throwing their javelins, and in certain circumstances could even break down a hoplite formation. This famously happened in 390 BC when 600 Spartan hoplites were caught in an isolated position at Lechaeum (the western port of Corinth) and outmanoeuvred by peltasts under the command of the Athenian Iphicrates, who built up a distinguished reputation as a commander of this kind of force.13 He illustrates another feature of this age, in that he served virtually as a mercenary commander. Mercenaries played a more prominent part in the fourth century as military service gradually became separated from the role and duties of a citizen.14 This in turn placed greater pressure on states to find the necessary money. These developments required a more flexible tactical approach by commanders, though cavalry still played a minor part in campaigns. Under Philip II the kingdom of Macedon rose to prominence and at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC Philip defeated the forces of the Greek coalition organized against him by Athens and Thebes, and from then on directed Greek affairs as suited him. A major part of his success depended on his reorganization of the Macedonian army. He modified the phalanx, discarding the cuirass and equipping the soldiers with a small shield attached to the shoulder by a strap, which left their hands free to hold a pike (the sarisa) up to five metres long. The phalanx was deeper, containing at least sixteen and as many as thirtytwo ranks, and there were élite units of cavalry and infantry known as the ‘Companions’ that attended the king. The phalanx was carefully trained and drilled in a number of manoeuvres. Philip’s son and successor Alexander the Great exploited this army to confirm his mastery of the Greek world and to overthrow the Persian empire. He was adept in making effective use of cavalry, which now assumed a crucial offensive role for the first time in Greek history, and in developing a combined tactical deployment in which slingers, archers, and light-armed troops all had their part to play. From his eastern opponents Alexander also adopted the use of elephants.15 After Alexander’s death in 323 BC his empire became the centre of a series of civil wars waged by his generals, and eventually the more successful established personal domains and adopted the royal title. From this emerged the characteristic dynastic monarchies of the 5


Hellenistic period (Seleucid, Ptolemaic, Antigonid, Attalid), which needed large and enormously expensive armies including large contingents of mercenaries to compete against their rivals for territory. Warfare in the Hellenistic period was not particularly innovative. The kings relied on the heavy infantry phalanx used by Philip and Alexander, and maintained, even if they did not significantly develop, the use of cavalry in an offensive role. However, on occasion Hellenistic generalship and tactical skill in the deployment of large composite forces were impressive.16 In the fifth century Greek communities traditionally defended their territory from attack and the destruction of crops and olive trees. Attackers who fought their way through to the city relied on blockade or betrayal from within. They could build an encircling wall with the aim of reducing the besieged to famine and making better use of their own forces. A further refinement was the epiteichismos, a strongpoint built in enemy territory from which the attackers could ravage the land all year round. But Pericles, when he had to defend Athens against annual invasions by the Peloponnesians, devised a new strategy of evacuating the territory and concentrating on the defence of the city itself and the long walls. He advised the people to think of themselves as islanders, who could rely on supplies from the sea. By the fourth century Greek communities tended to resort to a defensive strategy in which they combined defence of the principal city with an attempt to outmanoeuvre the enemy using their superior knowledge of the terrain. These developments meant that the attackers faced the need for an all-out assault on cities. Now, Pericles had allegedly been the first to use siege engines, including rams, at the siege of Samos in 440– 439 BC,17 and siege warfare was certainly one area where significant developments occurred in the fourth century. There were now more mercenaries available, which might reduce the losses among the citizen hoplite soldiers, who were a precious commodity and who were in any case not well suited to assaulting walls. The balance was with the defenders until the second half of the fourth century,18 when there were important developments in the mechanisms of assault. Greeks may have borrowed some ideas for siege towers and rams from the east and from Carthage. But the development of the arrow-firing catapult or ‘belly-bow’ was ascribed to Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, who employed siege towers and catapults at the siege of Motya in 398 BC.19 The ‘belly-bow’ was a large composite bow equipped with a pipe in which the dart was inserted; it was cocked by the artilleryman using his stomach to press forward on a groove until the bow was fully 6


extended.20 In his treatise on siege warfare Aeneas Tacticus (mid-fourth century BC) mentions an array of siege devices including wheeled towers, rams protected by screens, drills, tortoises, scaling ladders, mining techniques, and catapults.21 Philip and Alexander deployed a formidable siege capacity in their campaigns and a wide range of catapults and devices. Alexander’s bombardment of Halicarnassus in 334 used stone-throwing catapults, and it is likely that the invention of the torsion catapult had taken place in Philip’s reign. Here springs of hair or sinew provided the propulsive power, and they overcame the technical limitations of the belly-bow by using a base, which a winch to tighten the firing mechanism. These developments increased the velocity of missiles and improved range and accuracy.22 The besieged were now under greater threat since walls could be demolished, even though the design of fortifications had also improved, with the building of flanking towers, the deployment of catapults by the defenders, and the development of tunnelling techniques to undermine siegeworks.23 Among the Hellenistic kings who succeeded Alexander, Demetrius son of Antigonus (336–283 BC) was famous for his ingenious conduct of sieges and won his nickname, Poliorcetes (‘The Besieger’), from the year-long though ultimately unsuccessful siege of Rhodes (305–304 BC).24 Nevertheless, technology did not always have the upper hand. When Aeneas Tacticus offered advice on how to survive under siege he devoted much of his attention to the problem of dealing with internal revolutions and rebellions. It seems Greek disunity and internal dissension continued to be a potent weapon in sieges.25

Roman warfare In the early period the king, his retainers, and the nobles constituted Rome’s army. As the need for more soldiers grew a levy was conducted among larger groups of citizens, effectively creating a kind of citizen militia, which was probably equipped as heavy infantry and operated like the Greek hoplite phalanx. King Servius Tullius (c. 580–530 BC) according to tradition divided Roman citizens into six wealth classes that determined not only their political rights but also their military duties. The lowest group (the capite censi, i.e. ‘registered by a head count’) had no property and were excluded from military service. The richest group was that of the equites, who made up the cavalry. Therefore, from early times an obligation was placed upon Roman citizens to serve in the Roman army, but this was also a kind of privilege that identified a man’s social standing and contribution to the state. 7


Probably by the mid fourth century the phalanx formation had been modified with the introduction of maniples, subgroups that could be formed into three battle lines, making a more flexible formation. Soldiers were equipped with a thrusting spear or a throwing spear, the two-edged Spanish sword, and a long shield. The word ‘legion’ (from legio – a levy) began to be used to describe a division of troops. The Punic Wars (264–146 BC) had a dramatic impact on Roman military organization, since many more troops were needed and they were required to serve for longer. However, although the war against Hannibal inflicted serious casualties, the hard-fought campaigns will in the end have made the Romans more resilient and increased their self-confidence in their military establishment. Polybius’ famous description of the Roman army probably refers to the army as it was after the final defeat of Hannibal at Zama in 202 BC.26 The legion numbered between 4,200 and 5,000 men and was recruited from those aged 17–46 who met the property qualification. Each man was expected to be available for service for sixteen years and might be required for up to six years’ continuous service. Soldiers received a daily allowance. The legion continued to operate in a triple battle line, with each line containing ten maniples drawn up with gaps between them, though these were perhaps closed as the armies engaged. The hastati and the principes made up the first two ranks and the triarii, the most experienced soldiers, the last. The first two ranks were equipped with the pilum (throwing spear) and Spanish sword, the last rank with the hasta (thrusting spear). All soldiers had an oval shield and, when fully equipped, helmet, body armour, and greaves. In addition a screen of light-armed troops (velites) engaged the enemy first before retreating through the ranks. The hastati and principes threw their spears and then engaged with swords at close quarters. If they were unsuccessful the triarii came forward for a final assault. Rome required her Italian allies to provide additional troops as part of their treaty obligations. Indeed Rome’s cavalry was largely supplied by these allies and was normally deployed on the wings. There were also 300 cavalry attached to each legion. In the early period the Romans had engaged in limited, seasonal warfare, but as they developed a territorial empire the legions came to have virtually a permanent station in certain provinces, and there was increasing pressure on reserves of manpower. Gaius Marius was elected consul in 107 BC largely through popular support since he had promised to end the long war in Africa against Jugurtha. The recent trend had been to reduce the property qualification for service in the army, and Marius took this further by enlisting volunteers from those 8


with no property and had them equipped at the state’s expense. Marius is usually credited with the introduction of a new tactical deployment, the replacement of the maniple with the cohort. The legion was now divided into ten uniformly equipped cohorts of 480 men, though the first cohort may have had a larger complement. However this may have been a more gradual development to which Marius added the finishing touches, and since the maniple did not immediately disappear it is possible that for a time both formations existed as alternatives. But by the time of Caesar the cohort was clearly the tactical sub-division of the legion, although later writers sometimes anachronistically use manipulares meaning ‘soldiers’. Marius also improved the design of the pilum by introducing wooden pegs to hold the iron tip to the shaft. These broke on impact and made the spear difficult for the enemy to extract from a shield and throw back. The use of the thrusting spear was now discontinued. It was probably from this time that the eagle (aquila) was adopted as the symbol of each legion, indicating its permanent identity. The soldiers of the legions were expected to carry in their packs all the gear needed to make them virtually selfsufficient in the field and were nicknamed ‘Marius’ mules’.27 The legions equipped in this way and organized tactically in cohorts outmanoeuvred and outfought the Macedonian phalanx at the battles of Cynoscephalae (197 BC) and Pydna (168 BC). The legionary formation could be adapted quickly to suit circumstances and terrain and also permitted the use of reserves. Doubtless the phalanx if combined with cavalry and other troops as Alexander had done could still have been a valuable instrument of war. But the Romans had superior resources, determination, and resilience, and above all a political unity that the Greeks lacked. The rival monarchies that dominated the city-states were defeated individually by the Romans. In the Social War (91–87 BC) Rome fought her recalcitrant Italian allies, and although victorious in the campaign granted Roman citizenship to the allied communities in Italy. This confirmed a substantial reservoir of manpower, which became increasingly necessary as Rome’s overseas responsibilities increased, with more provinces requiring a permanent military presence. Furthermore, the army had acquired a political dimension, which accidentally arose from Marius’ changes. Soldiers tended to be loyal to the commander who had recruited them, and since many had few resources, they expected a reward in cash or land when they left military service. Since the senate refused to accept that the state should be responsible for this, it was often left to individual generals to secure it for their men, who could be expected to be suitably grateful. So, the personal association between general and 9


soldiers was enhanced, and instead of one Roman army, we find a series of armies personally loyal to their commanders. As political instability increased, leading figures exploited popular support to acquire important army commands, which they then used to enhance their wealth and reputation and to build up military support. Caesar when governor of Gaul increased his original force from four to twelve legions and by a series of wars turned it into a highly experienced army, which he then led against his rival Pompey in 49 BC after doubling legionary pay. Caesar became dictator, but was murdered in 44 BC and from the long civil wars that followed his death his grandnephew Octavian emerged as master of the Roman world in 31 BC and four years later was granted the name Augustus by the senate and people.28 Augustus reorganized the Roman army, combining traditional practices with substantial innovations. He confirmed the idea of a professional, standing army with legions permanently stationed in certain provinces. He also established terms of service, which were finalized by AD 5. Legionaries, who had to be Roman citizens, served for twenty years (and probably five in the reserves) on an annual salary of 900 sesterces; they also received a gratuity on discharge, in either land or money, to the value of more than thirteen times a year’s salary. This formed the basis of the army’s organization for the next 250 years, with length of service eventually being set at twenty-five years. Rome had from time to time used non-Roman troops in specialist roles, and Augustus incorporated into the formal structure of the army such units of auxiliaries (auxilia); they were originally ethnic groups of non-citizens and served in units of cavalry (alae) or infantry (cohorts). In time the ethnic character was diluted and already by the end of Augustus’ reign they were as numerous as the legions. Augustus also established the praetorians as a personal bodyguard, nine cohorts strong with either 500 or 1,000 men in each. The annual cost of the army was in the vicinity of 450 million sesterces and was an enormous drain on the empire’s resources. Such was the cost of Augustus’ desire for security, prestige, and glory. He presented himself to the Roman people as a successful military commander and to the army he became an object of personal loyalty, a model invariably followed by his successors. The army’s size and cost steadily increased and by the third century AD it numbered around 450,000 men.29 Roman warfare continued to be based on the heavy infantry of the legions, with the tactical deployment of cavalry, auxiliaries and archers where appropriate, and the use of reserves. Yet military practice was not static, and the Romans experimented with new formations to counter the heavy cavalry and mounted archers of the Parthians and 10


Sarmatians. For example, Arrian used an innovative deployment based on the traditional Greek phalanx formation to repel the invasion of Cappadocia by the Alani.30 By the second century AD the Romans had established their own armoured cavalry units. Roman armies had a strong siege capacity, leaving the enemy nowhere to hide. Nothing they did was particularly innovative, but from the early third century BC the Romans had understood the potential value of artillery, and the imperial period was the time of greatest development. They used Greek designs and probably Greek artificers and Romans who had been trained in Greek techniques. The legions could deploy arrowshooting and stone-firing engines, and also carroballistae that were used in open battlefield conditions. By AD 100 they had the most powerful arrow-shooting engines ever used in the ancient world. The final addition to their armoury was the onager, a large, one-armed stonethrower, probably in use from the third century AD.31 The centurions were central to the command structure of the Roman army. They commanded centuries of 80 men, six of these making up a cohort. Since there were only five centurions in the first cohort, which, however, was probably double in size, there were 59 centurions in each legion. Often they were very experienced and presumably an excellent source of advice. There were also six military tribunes in each legion, one of senatorial and five of equestrian rank. The legion was commanded by a senator of praetorian rank. The provincial governor had overall command of the army in his province and he was usually a senator of consular rank. Although these men sometimes had only limited experience, it is not clear that this significantly inhibited tactical developments or innovations. Furthermore, there continued to be a strong interest in Roman society in warfare and military practice, as we can see to some extent in the range of writings about stratagems and military formations. What discretion did a commander have? What did he actually have to do in an ancient battle? In terms of Roman warfare, if we judge from ancient writings on battle tactics, a responsible commander would conduct careful scouting and assessment of enemy forces, take proper precautions for fortifying a suitable camp in hostile territory, know how to draw up his battle line, deploy reserves, be aware of relevant stratagems for particular situations, including ambush, and make speeches of encouragement to his troops. He must also be skilled in battle psychology and be capable of dealing with the aftermath of battle, that is conducting a retreat or bringing the campaign to a close by finishing off the enemy in the most appropriate way. The commander therefore controlled the battle, and rarely would become involved in the fighting. 11


From the late third century onwards the Romans had to adapt to a changing balance of power and assaults on the empire from diverse quarters by swiftly moving raiding parties. We find in the third century moves to increase cavalry provision, and the emperor Gallienus established an independent cavalry unit that could be sent to repel incursions. In a development that was originally piecemeal, Gallienus began to replace senatorial army commanders with equestrians; these men tended to have more military experience than senators, and often indeed had been promoted from experienced centurions and senior centurions. Diocletian (AD 284–305) provided a period of stability and military regeneration for the empire and greatly increased the number of legions; indeed the number of soldiers will have been doubled if the legions were kept at their normal complement, though this is unclear. He also began to establish the field army, a number of units of infantry and cavalry drawn from the rest of the army, independent of any provincial location, and capable of moving relatively speedily to deal with the empire’s strategic requirements. Diocletian ensured all-round defence of imperial territory by continuing the practice of stationing troops in individual provinces. These reforms were consolidated by Constantine (AD 306–37), who enhanced the size and status of the field army (Comitatenses), though troops continued to be stationed permanently in the provinces as a static covering force (Limitanei).32 The Romans had no inherent physical superiority over their opponents and no overwhelming numerical superiority. The tribes on the Rhine and Danube had far larger reserves of manpower to draw on. Although the army was large it was never concentrated in one place, and by the second century there were no more than three legions in any one province, and then in only a few cases. Furthermore, whereas the Romans were well equipped they had no decisive superiority in armaments. However, the essential qualities of Roman warfare contributed to the army’s consistent success through four centuries of warfare. The Romans had a professional standing army, which was well disciplined and competently organized and led, with a sound framework of financial support for most of the imperial period. The ordnance, supplies, and medical treatment in the army were of a high order. The Romans ruthlessly applied relatively simple battle tactics and the follow-up was equally aggressive as they inspired terror with their siegecraft and the sacking of cities. Roman soldiers had the psychological advantage of being on the attack, since that was how their generals operated, and the ruling class had no political or moral doubts about the desirability of preserving the empire. 12


Ancient writers on warfare33 Many of the authors whose work is translated in this book claim that they are writing to educate their audience in the skills of army command, with the expectation that their work will be interesting and useful. Aeneas Tacticus in his work How to Survive under Siege pointed out that defending your polis and everything that you held dear – temples, native land, parents, and children – was not like fighting in a foreign country. ‘Therefore those who are to fight for these beloved things must not fail in readiness or effort but must work out many different actions so that if they fail it should not seem that they are to blame.’34 The implication is that they should start by reading his work. Asclepiodotus sums up the benefits of sound tactical principles: ‘They mean safety for those who observe them and danger for those who ignore them.’35 Among writers of the Roman period, Frontinus says specifically of the skilful operations of commanders that he has recorded: For in this way army commanders will be equipped with examples of good planning and foresight, and this will develop their own ability to think out and carry into effect similar operations. An added benefit will be that the commander will not be worried about the outcome of his own stratagem when he compares it with innovations already tested in practice.36 Onasander was confident that generals could learn from his writings: Finally I may say confidently that my work will be a training school for good generals and a memorial to retired generals in this period of imperial peace . . . I shall make clear why some generals have suffered mishap, and why others have been successful and become glorious.37 What is more, in seeking the good will or patronage of emperors, authors often claimed to be offering advice that was congenial and helpful. So, Vitruvius could introduce to Augustus his work on architecture by saying that the emperor built on a grand scale and that guidance was appropriate: ‘I have provided a detailed survey so that by referring to it you can teach yourself how to evaluate the works that have been completed and those about to be started.’38 Vitruvius also included in his work a section on the construction of catapults and he 13


notes his special expertise in this respect, since Augustus had appointed him to survey the construction and repair of engines of war. The building of catapults protected against danger and provided security.39 Aelian had taken the trouble of sounding out Frontinus about his proposal to write about Greek military tactics, and his address to Trajan singled out the emperor’s military prowess and the Romans’ experience of warfare. The implication is that his work will find a responsive audience, and he even inserted headings for each section so that the emperor would not waste time in finding what he wanted.40 Polyaenus was more direct when he addressed his treatise to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus as they prepared to fight the Parthians. He was sure that his collection of stratagems would help the emperors in their wars, and he produced an elaborate justification of his Macedonian ancestry and inherited superiority over eastern peoples, almost certainly making up for his total lack of military experience.41 We have in these examples explicit statements of purpose and claims of usefulness. Yet many of these works to our eyes seem formulaic and remote from reality. Should we take it at face value when our writers claim a didactic purpose? Second, even if the works were genuinely intended to be didactic, were they of value and did generals read them? It was of course conventional for writers to claim relevance for their work and attempt to interest their addressee or sponsor. On the other hand, in the context of ancient culture and society there was an interest in the past among both Greeks and Romans, and often a desire to identify with their cultural heritage, as well as respect for prominent individuals who had won honour by their actions. Polybius said in the introduction to his history, ‘Man possesses no better corrective to conduct than knowledge of the past’, and went on to point out that all historians claimed that their writing was an education and a training for a political career.42 Similarly, Sallust claimed that among pursuits of the mind, writing the history of past events was most useful.43 In the reign of Tiberius, Valerius Maximus published in nine books the memorable deeds and saying of Romans and non-Romans as an example to all. As he put it, referring to the emperor: ‘The virtues about which I am going to speak are benevolently fostered, while faults are severely punished.’44 Traditionally Romans claimed to have great respect for exempla, that is, guides on how to behave in certain circumstances. This related not merely to practical experience but could involve reading about the deeds of famous people and trying to emulate them, or consulting manuals.45 In a farming context we can see this in the advice offered by Columella to the aspiring farmer who wants to increase his fortune by tilling his fields: 14


He should take special care to consult about everything the most knowledgeable farmers of his own day. He should also carefully examine manuals written in the past and evaluate the views and teachings of their authors, to see if all the information passed down by older writers is relevant to contemporary agriculture or out of step in some way.46 Now, we can imagine that at least down to the fifth century military know-how and experience were traditionally passed on by word of mouth among friends and family. By the end of the Peloponnesian War, the military detail of which was meticulously recorded by Thucydides, the military arts had become a subject for the lecture hall as a branch of technical knowledge. As such it could be taught by academics with little if any experience of battle. Xenophon, who was very experienced in military service and army command, brought a new realism and personal expertise to writing about military affairs, especially in his work The Cavalry Commander. He clearly did not mean this to be a collection of trivial anecdotes. Aeneas Tacticus shared the same kind of approach and may indeed be seen as one of the pioneers of this kind of writing, since he wrote several other works as well as On Siegecraft.47 Aeneas writes like a man who personally knew his subject and, if he can indeed be identified with Aeneas of Stymphalus,48 was a genuine soldier who knew all about the realities of warfare and sieges. He presumably aimed to provide a guide for the authorities in a city and for any individual who aspired to be a competent leader. From the third century BC onwards treatises continued to be written both by experts and by laymen with varied interests. So, Xenophon was to find his emulator in the experienced Arrian,49 and there was also a tradition of precisely detailed technical works on the construction of war engines, which persisted into the Roman period. Yet the mathematical precision and geometric shapes that accompanied phalanx manoeuvres continued to attract writers like Asclepiodotus who had no military experience. Julius Caesar’s Commentaries on the war he fought in Gaul are unique in ancient literature. They are not just a retrospective justification for his determination to protect his dignitas in political life, but also a demonstration of his skill in the detailed requirements of military leadership and battle management that could serve as an example to others. Indeed many of his exploits were picked up by later writers and incorporated into the tradition of military ingenuity. The theme of the general’s skill and use of stratagems is represented in the surviving collections of stratagems compiled by Frontinus and Polyaenus, BC

15


and in a treatise on the art of generalship by Onasander. Of these authors only Frontinus had experience of commanding an army. The description of the manoeuvres of the phalanx was still regarded as a worthwhile theme by Aelian, and is discussed by Arrian in his Tactica, which also dealt with cavalry-training exercises. Arrian had held a military command and, as noted above, also wrote a description on his marching and battle formations against a predicted attack from the Alani. This is unique in our military literature, and he presumably expected it to be taken seriously. The complicating factor in the imperial period is that in seeking examples both Greeks and Romans tended to look backwards, Greeks because that was when their great deeds had been accomplished, and Romans because it was usually safer to review past military conduct rather than that of the ruling emperor. In the social and cultural context in the ancient world most army commanders were not professional soldiers, and in many cases not particularly experienced in commanding men. In the Roman republic aristocratic generals, who were expected to serve the state in whatever capacity it asked, thought that entitlement to command came from winning the support of the assembly that voted them into office. They doubtless expected to take advice passed down by family and friends. But manuals could also play a part, though genuine experience was always preferable.50 In the imperial period emperors had direct control over their appointees to military command and could, if they so chose, impose rules of suitable experience. There is little sign that they did so, and there was no military academy, formal training, or high command of senior officers. Much was left to the initiative and conscience of individuals. Naturally a general would be guided by whatever experience he had, would take advice from others including junior officers and centurions, and would learn from actually carrying out his duties. What was the value of military handbooks in this? Some surviving works could have been helpful in preparing a city for a siege, in practising phalanx manoeuvres, in training the cavalry, in building war engines, and we can surmise that lost works on tactics and military deployment in the Roman period might have given specific technical details of direct relevance to officers. Indeed, even knowledge of how the Greek phalanx operated turned out to be useful for Arrian.51 It is also reasonable to suppose that a textbook on how to build war engines could be useful in the artillery workshops, even though the artificers who kept the legion’s catapults in working order probably had a common understanding of what needed to be done, without reading Vitruvius or other writers on catapult design. 16


However, what is perhaps more important is that the nature of many of the surviving works from the Roman imperial period suggests that they were concerned with how a man could prepare himself for the task of commanding men in battle, get into the right frame of mind, and recognize the range of his responsibilities. Frontinus and Polyaenus on stratagems and Onasander on the art of generalship are greatly interested in the moral qualities of the commander and the psychology of warfare. He needed to be alert, full of ingenuity and resourcefulness, ready to do and prepare for the unexpected, exploit fear and appearances, and use deception where necessary. He must also learn how to maintain discipline and enthusiasm in the army and, in short, display a range of characteristics that could be used to good effect in other areas of life. Indeed there is something of this theme in Aeneas Tacticus’ On Siegecraft, where the advice and instructions are to be carried out by a man of talent and resolution, capable of organizing an effective resistance and controlling his fellow-citizens. If by reading these works a general could get into the spirit of military command, he could also put some stratagems to practical use. Technological development in weaponry was slow, the technical demands of controlling and manoeuvring infantry and cavalry did not change much, and ploys used by previous generals could be repeated, not least because commanders seemed prone to fall for old tricks.52 To sum up, Greek and Roman writers of military handbooks do not fit easily into a single category. These works were partly historical, offered general guidance of moral value and some potentially useful practical and technical information, but also were intended to amuse and delight the upper classes. An enthusiastic readership suggests a continuing interest in a culture of warfare and violence. Military books also provided a platform on which the authors could display literary skill, erudition, and mastery of a technical subject. These writers ranged from accomplished military men to those with a dilettante interest in the military arts. Greek writers of the Roman period may indeed have hoped to demonstrate that the Greeks too had been no insignificant warriors. The important point is perhaps not that generals actually read military handbooks just as they went into battle, but that the whole genre is typical of a mindset in society about the role of a commander, his responsibilities in battle, and perhaps also the qualities of character essential for dealing with matters of life and death.

17


Notes 1 See Lazenby and Whitehead (1996). 2 For weapons, see Snodgrass (1964); partial reintroduction of bronze weapons – ibid., 133–4; early warfare – Greenhalgh (1973); development of hoplites – Cartledge (1977); Osborne (1996), 162–4; 170–6; van Wees (2000a); nature of hoplite battle – Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 134–54; Holladay (1982); Krentz (1985a); Hanson (1989); Lazenby, in Hanson (1991); casualties and care of wounded – ibid., 101–2; Krentz (1985b). 3 Hanson, in Hanson (1991) argues that the emergence of hoplite arms and armour c. 700 BC was a response aimed at improving the combat efficiency of men who were already fighting in some kind of massed array. 4 In contrast to body armour, which could only protect individuals (Plutarch, Sayings of the Spartans, Moralia 220A). 5 Snodgrass (1965) doubted that the hoplite reform had immediate political consequences, while Salmon (1977) argued that the hoplite reform supplied the weapon for political reform though not necessarily the will for it. For the continuing debate, see Raaflaub, in Raaflaub and Rosenstein (1999), 132–41, arguing that the farmer-hoplites were brought into egalitarian polis structures not primarily because of their contribution to the phalanx; van Wees, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), doubts the connection between political regimes and citizen militias; however see the comments of Gabrielsen, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), 89–92. For cavalry in Greek warfare, see Spence (1993); for a useful general survey of Greek warfare – Ducrey (1985); Sage (1996), xiv–xxviii; van Wees (2000b). 6 See the survey in Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 208–31. 7 Argued by van Wees, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), 70–2. 8 Cartledge (1977); Lazenby (1985) 9 For the role of the hoplite general, see Wheeler, in Hanson (1991), especially 147–52, who doubts that the general normally stationed himself in the first rank of battle; the death and wounding of commanders may often have occurred in the second stage, as the hoplite battle broke up. 10 See below, no. 103. 11 Under Xenophon’s leadership, see below, p. 21. 12 The exact nature of the manoeuvre is much debated; see Anderson (1970), 165–220; Buckler (1985); Lazenby (1985), 155–62; Tuplin (1987); Hanson (1988). 13 Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 117–25; Best (1969) argues that peltasts were operating before the end of the fifth century. They were of two types: those who carried two javelins and fought at long distance, and those who carried a long thrusting spear and fought at close range. Iphicrates may not have made any significant reform of the fighting practices of peltasts; his skill was in deploying them to the best advantage. For the battle at Lechaeum, see no. 116.

18


14 Parke (1933); Griffith (1935). 15 Adcock (1957); Brunt (1963); Anderson (1970); Schullard (1974); Milns, in Bosworth (1976); Engels (1978); Markle (1978); Bosworth (1988), 259–77. 16 See no. 124, battle of Paraetacene; Bar-Kochva (1976); Hamilton, in Raaflaub and Rosenstein (1999). 17 Diodorus Siculus 12.28.2–3. 18 See Whitehead (1990), 25. 19 Garlan (1974), 164. 20 Marsden (1969), 5–12. 21 Sections 32–3; 36–7; see also Garlan (1974), 173; Whitehead (1990). 22 Marsden, op. cit., 14–41; 56; he believes that torsion artillery was first introduced between 353 and 341 BC. There was presumably a long series of practical experiments down to the mid-third century BC to establish the best dimensions for the catapult and work out a suitable formula for calibration; see Marsden, op. cit., 62. Ctesibius worked on air-spring and bronze-spring catapults, though these were not a notable advance on existing forms of propulsion. Subsequent development work aimed at increasing the amount of spring-cord that the tightening winches could take. See also below, Chapter 5. 23 For fortifications see Winter (1971); Garlan (1974), 244–69; Lawrence (1979). Leriche and Tréziny (1986). 24 Garlan (1974), 202–44 describes Hellenistic techniques, noting that assault was the norm rather than investiture. 25 For this idea see Garlan (1974), 179; Whitehead (1990), 25–33; also below, pp. 149–52. 26 6.19–26. 27 For a general survey of the army of the republic, see Smith (1958); Harmand (1967); Keppie (1984); Rosenstein, in Raaflaub and Rosenstein (1999). 28 Brunt (1988) is essential for the role of the army in this period. 29 Development and history of imperial army – Keppie (1984), 132–98; Webster (1985); Le Bohec (1989); Campbell (1994), and in Raaflaub and Rosenstein (1999); (2002); warfare and tactics – Goldsworthy (1996); Sabin (2000); recruiting and veterans – Mann (1983); the auxilia – Cheesman (1914); Saddington (1975); Holder (1980); M.P. Speidel (1994); praetorians – Durry (1938); Passerini (1939); Kennedy (1978); size of army – MacMullen (1980); Roth (1994); pay and conditions – M.A. Speidel (1992); Alston (1994); logistics – Roth (1999); arms – Bishop and Coulston (1993). For the impact of the army on the society and culture and life of the eastern part of the empire see the excellent study of Isaac (1992); the army in Egypt – Alston (1995). 30 See below, no. 165. 31 See Marsden (1969), 174–98; also below, Chapter 5. 32 For the later Roman army see Jones (1964), 607–86; Williams (1985), 91–101; Southern and Dixon (1996).

19


33 For descriptions of pitched battles in Greek historians, see Pritchett, GSW IV (1985), 44–93. 34 Preface 3. 35 12.11. 36 Bk 1, preface. 37 Preface 4. 38 1, preface 3. 39 1, preface 2; 10.10.1. 40 Preface 3–4; 7. 41 5, preface; see below, nos 89, 91, 94, 96. 42 1.1–2; cf. Vegetius (no. 32). 43 War with Jugurtha 4. 44 1, preface. 45 Campbell (1987), 20–1. 46 On Agriculture 1.1.3–4. 47 See Whitehead (1990), 36 speculating on the possible links between Xenophon and Aeneas. 48 See p. 149. 49 See below, p. 40. Arrian in his writings sometimes identifies himself with Xenophon. 50 Campbell (1987), 21–3. 51 See no. 165. 52 For the effectiveness of surprise attacks and ambushes and all kinds of trickery, see Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 156–89; Wheeler (1988); see also below, no. 109.

20

1 ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE

1 Xenophon, On Hunting 12.1–4 (value of hunting) Those who enthusiastically follow the pursuit of hunting will reap great advantages, for it makes the body healthy and improves sight and hearing. It also slows down the process of growing old, and is especially useful as training for the art of war. First, men experienced in hunting will not tire when they are marching over difficult roads under arms. They will endure hardships like this because they are accustomed to carrying arms in the capture of wild beasts. They will also be capable of sleeping on a hard bed and of effectively guarding the position assigned to them. In attacks on the enemy they will be able to fall upon him and simultaneously carry out orders passed along the line because they do the same things on their own initiative when hunting game. If positioned in the front line they will not desert the ranks, because they possess endurance. If the enemy flees, they will be able to pursue him directly and safely in any type of terrain because of their experience. Xenophon was born c. 430 BC into a wealthy Athenian family. He probably served in the Athenian cavalry in his youth, but is likely to have been out of sympathy with the democratic government of Athens and was an enthusiastic admirer of Spartan practices. During the rule of the Thirty Tyrants he fought against the democrats in the civil war (404–403), and although protected by the subsequent amnesty, may have thought it wise to leave Athens for a time. He took mercenary service with Cyrus, who was staging a rebellion against the Persian king. Xenophon was one of ten thousand Greek mercenaries who fought in the campaign, which ended in Cyrus’ defeat at Cunaxa. After the murder of the Greek generals Xenophon became one of the leaders who guided the army from Mesopotamia to Byzantium. Subsequently he commanded the survivors of these troops in the interests of Sparta, and after fighting on the Spartan side at the battle of Coronea in 394 was exiled from Athens. There was some reconciliation with Athens, and his son, Gryllus, was killed fighting with the Athenian cavalry at the battle of Mantinea in 362.

21

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE Xenophon wrote a variety of disparate works, ranging from the a survey of the upbringing and career of the Persian king Cyrus the Great to accounts of Greek history, most notably the Hellenica, in which he took up Thucydides’ narrative, which ended in 411 BC. He also wrote about technical aspects of hunting, and horsemanship, in which he offered advice on choosing and looking after horses and explained good practice in training and all aspects of riding. His advice seems broadly in line with modern instruction in horse riding. Two other works reflect Xenophon’s military experience. In the Cavalry Commander he looks at the organization of the Athenian cavalry and concentrates on the duties of the cavalry commander, battle tactics, and the importance of good leadership. In the Anabasis he describes his role in leading the Greek mercenaries after the defeat of Cyrus. The work is partly historical record, but also could serve a didactic purpose, as it demonstrates the importance of stratagems, military psychology, good leadership, and discipline. It also shows some aspects of good practice in hoplite warfare of the fourth century, though there is much self-justification of Xenophon’s role (at least one other mercenary leader had written about the campaign) and the description of the battle of Cunaxa is insufficiently detailed to be really helpful; see Anderson (1974). In this extract Xenophon is referring to the hunting of hares and other animals on foot.

2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.1–4 (importance of physical fitness) Socrates, noticing that one of his companions, although young, was in poor physical condition, said, ‘Epigenes, you seem to be neglecting your physical training’. The young man replied, ‘I am merely an ordinary citizen, Socrates’. Socrates answered, ‘You need physical training just as much as those intending to compete at Olympia; or does the life and death struggle with their enemies which the Athenians will undertake someday seem of small importance to you? Indeed, many men die amid the dangers of war or are saved in some disreputable fashion because of their bad physical condition. Many are captured alive for this very reason, and if this happens to them spend the rest of their lives in the harshest slavery, or are reduced to the most miserable condition and pay a ransom beyond their means and spend the rest of their lives lacking the basic essentials and in desperate straits. Furthermore, many gain a disgraceful reputation because of their physical weakness because they seem to be cowards. Do you despise the penalties of the poor physical condition of these men and think that you could put up with something similar? I think that the lot of the man who pays proper attention to his physical condition is much easier and more pleasant.’ The Memorabilia comprise a series of conversations designed to illustrate Socrates’ method of debate and incidentally reveal useful details about Athenian life and attitudes.

22

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE

3 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 1.5–6 (training the cavalry) When you have ensured that the horses are in suitable condition the next task is to train the cavalrymen, firstly so that they can leap up onto their horses, since many before now owe their lives to this. Secondly, they must learn to ride over all types of terrain, since wars occur in all sorts of location. As soon as they have obtained a good seat the next task is to make sure that as many as possible can throw their javelins from horseback, and that they become accomplished in all the skills of horsemanship.

4 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 2.7–9 (knowing your position) If this formation has been adopted it is essential that through word of mouth passed on by the unit commander every file-leader knows where he has to go, just as the unit commanders have their position in the attack explained to them by the commander-in-chief. If commands are given in this way the army will be better disciplined than if the men get in each other’s way like a crowd leaving the theatre. Furthermore, if there is a frontal attack, the men in the first ranks are much more willing to fight if they know that this is their position. And those in the rear ranks, if there is a sudden attack from the rear, understand that it is disgraceful to leave their position. But if the soldiers are disorderly, they bring confusion to each other on narrow roads and at river crossings, and on the battlefield no one willingly takes his position in the fighting line.

5 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.3–4 (use of mercenary cavalry) I believe that the full cavalry complement of one thousand men would be reached far more easily and with less trouble to the citizens if we hire two hundred mercenary cavalry. I think that the addition of these men would make the whole cavalry force more obedient and would foster rivalry among its members in displays of courage. I know that the Lacedaemonian cavalry acquired its reputation when they introduced mercenary cavalry. In other communities everywhere I can see that mercenary cavalry have an excellent reputation. For need helps to produce great enthusiasm. 23

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE Xenophon emphasized the importance of cavalry and its proper training, and had been impressed with a squadron of mercenary cavalry sent by Dionysius I of Syracuse in 369/8 BC to assist the Spartans against the Thebans.

6 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.10–11 (cavalry practice) Since it is necessary that the rider should have a firm seat when riding at top speed over all kinds of country and should be able to use his weapons properly on horseback, training in horsemanship by hunting is to be commended where the country is suitable and big game is to be found. When these conditions do not exist, it is a good method of training for two riders to work together in the following way. One charges away on his horse over all kinds of ground and retreats, turning his spear round so that it points backwards. The other pursues, having buttons on his javelins and with his spear fixed in the same way, and when he gets within javelin shot, tries to hit the fugitive with the blunt weapon, and if he gets within spear range, strikes his victim with it.

7 Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons) Those who are next in seniority (hastati) are ordered to bear the full set of armour and weapons. Roman armour and weapons consist firstly of a shield, whose convex surface is two and a half feet wide and four feet long. At the rim it is a quarter of a foot thick. It is made with two planks glued together and the outer surface is covered with canvas and then with calf-skin. It has an iron edge on the upper and lower rims to protect it from downward thrusts from swords and from damage when set on the ground. An iron boss is also attached to it and this deflects the weighty impact of stones, pikes, and all kinds of heavy missiles. Besides the shield, soldiers also carry a sword, which hangs on the right thigh and is called a Spanish sword. This has an excellent point and two splendid cutting edges, because its blade is strong and durable. In addition they have two throwing spears (pila), a bronze helmet, and greaves. One of these spears is thick, the other slender. Of the thicker ones, some are round and a palm’s length (7.7 cm) in diameter, others a palm square. The slender spears, which they carry along with the thick ones, resemble moderately sized hunting spears, and for all of them the length of the shaft is three cubits (1.40 m). A barbed iron head is fitted to each spear and this is the same length as the shaft. They attach the head very securely to the shaft, letting half 24


its length into the shaft and fixing it with many rivets. Consequently in battle the iron head will break before it becomes detached, although at the bottom where it meets the wood it is only about a finger’s breadth and a half (2.8 cm). This shows how much care they take in attaching it firmly. In addition to this equipment they wear an ornamental circlet of feathers consisting of three upright purple or black feathers about one and a half feet in height. When the soldier, equipped with the other weaponry, adds this to his head he appears to be twice his height, and is an awesome sight, which strikes terror into the enemy. The soldiers also wear a bronze breastplate about a span (nine inches) square, which they place in front of their heart and call the ‘heart-protector’. This completes their equipment. But those who are assessed at more than ten thousand drachmae wear instead of the breastplate a coat of chain-mail. The principes and triarii use the same weaponry, except that the triarii carry long spears instead of the pila. Polybius (c. 200–118 BC) came from Megalopolis, part of the Achaean Federation, which had become dominant in the Peloponnese by the second century BC, and provided a counterweight to Roman influence. In 170/169 Polybius served as cavalry commander (hipparch) of the Federation. But after 167 tension and hostility arose between Rome and the Confederacy and Polybius was among the one thousand leading Achaeans transported to Italy and detained in Italian towns. However, Polybius was befriended by P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and was able to observe many important events in Roman history at first hand, including the military campaigns in Spain and Africa against Carthage. Indeed, Polybius may possibly have been at the siege of Numantia in 133 BC. His works on military tactics and on the Numantine war have been lost, but a significant amount survives of his Histories, in which he explains the rise of Rome to supremacy in the Mediterranean area and beyond, her government, customs, and practices. Naturally, in his explanation of how Rome defeated all her enemies the role of the army was of vital importance and Polybius explains in detail Roman military practice. This is particularly important because Polybius had some military expertise, had seen Roman warfare at first hand, and generally exercised clear and sober historical judgement; see Walbank (1972); text and commentary in three volumes (1957–79). The description in this extract probably applies at least in part to the end of the Second Punic War, although there may also be aspects that belong to the time in which Polybius was writing in mid-second century. The Spanish cutting and thrusting sword and also the pilum may have been adopted from Spanish mercenaries fighting for the Carthaginians in the First Punic War. The heavy pilum described by Polybius with a shaft 1.40 m long, 7.7 cm wide, and with an iron head of the same length, 2.8 cm wide would weigh 8.5 kg, and be too heavy to throw. But on Walbank’s view (1957), 704–5, it is likely that the pilum was thinner except where the shaft fitted into the head. Since half the iron head was let into the shaft the total length would be about 2.10 m, and the weight about 4.68 kg.

25


8 Polybius, Histories 6.34.7–12 (passing round the watchword) They secure the passing round of the watchword for the night in the following way. From the tenth maniple of each type of cavalry and infantry, that is the maniple camped at the lower end of the street, a man is chosen and he is relieved of guard duty. Every day at sunset he comes to the tent of the tribune, and receiving the watchword, which is written on a wooden board, he goes away again. On returning to his maniple he passes on in front of witnesses the watchword and the wooden tablet to the commander of the next maniple, and he in turn passes it on to the commander of the next maniple. All the commanders do the same until the password arrives at the first maniples, which are encamped next to the tribunes. These must bring the password to the tribunes before dark. Therefore, if all the tablets issued are returned, the tribune knows that the watchword has been passed to all the maniples and has passed through all of them back to him. But if anyone of them is missing, he enquires at once into what has happened, and from the record knows from what section the tablet has not returned. The person responsible for the delay suffers suitable punishment.

9 Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline) If the same thing ever happens to large groups of soldiers, and maniples when desperately hard pressed desert their post, the Romans refrain from inflicting the fustuarium (beating to death with sticks) or the death penalty on all of them, but instead find a resolution that is both expedient and also strikes fear. The military tribune assembles the legion, brings out into the middle all those who deserted their post, and denounces them vigorously. Finally, from all those guilty of cowardice he chooses by lot sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimes twenty men, always calculating the proportion in respect of the total number of men in the unit so as far as possible to get one tenth of the guilty. Those selected by lot suffer the fustuarium without mercy in the way described above. To the remainder he gives a ration of barley instead of wheat and orders them to encamp outside the safety of the rampart. Therefore, the danger and the fear of the lot hang over everyone equally since it is unclear on whom the lot will fall. And since the public humiliation of the allocation of barley rations comes to everyone equally, this custom is the best directed to inspire terror and cure the fault. 26


10 Polybius, Histories 6.39.1–3; 5–11 (rewards for valour) They also have a splendid way of inspiring young soldiers to face danger. After a battle where some of them have distinguished themselves, the commander summons a meeting of the entire army, and bringing forward those whom he thinks have performed outstanding acts of courage, he first delivers a speech in praise of each man celebrating his valour and anything else from his past record that is worthy of commendation. He then distributes rewards as follows: to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has killed and stripped an enemy, a cup if he is in the infantry, and horse trappings if he is in the cavalry, although the reward here was originally only a spear. . . . (5) To the man who is first to climb the wall during the assault on a city, he gives a gold crown. Similarly, the consul distinguishes with special gifts those who have protected and saved some of their fellow-citizens or allies. And the men they saved crown them, either willingly, or if not, under the direction of the tribunes who judge the case. The man who has been saved reveres his rescuer as a father throughout his life and must treat him in every respect as a parent. Through this kind of encouragement they inspire to emulation and rivalry not only those who are present and listen to the ceremony but also those who stay at home. For the men who receive this kind of gift, apart from their fame in the army and their immediate reputation at home, after their return to Rome have special honours in religious processions, since no one is allowed to wear decorations except those on whom such honours for valour have been conferred by the consul. Furthermore, they hang up their war spoils in the most conspicuous place in their houses, regarding them as signs and evidence of their courage. When we reflect on the concern and enthusiasm for rewards and punishments in military affairs it is easy to understand how the Romans bring to a successful and brilliant conclusion the wars in which they fight.

11 Polybius, Histories 10.20.1–5 (Scipio Africanus trains the infantry) He himself (Scipio) spent some time at Carthage assiduously training the naval forces and instructed the military tribunes in the following method for training the infantry forces. On the first day he ordered them to run for thirty stades (about three and a half miles) in armour, and on the second all were to attend to, polish, and inspect all their 27


weapons in full view; on the next they were to rest and take their ease, and on the day after some were to fight with wooden swords covered with leather and fitted with buttons, while others were to throw spears with a button on the point; on the fifth day they were to return to the running exercises and begin the cycle again. He took the greatest care with the workmen so that there should be no deficiency in arms drill or real combat. He placed suitable men in charge of this essential task by rotation, as I explained above. He went out himself every day and through his own example prepared all the material for each group. This refers to the siege of New Carthage in 209 BC. Livy (26.51.4), describing the same events, assigns the third day to practice with swords and spears, and the fourth day to rest. It seems better to have the day spent cleaning weapons between running and fighting, and a transposition of Polybius’ text has been suggested (see Walbank (1967), 219).

12 Polybius, Histories 18.29–32 (comparison of Greek phalanx and Roman legion) There are many reasons that make it easy to understand that as long as the phalanx retains its usual order and strength nothing can meet it face to face or resist its charge. For when the phalanx has closed ranks for action each soldier with his weapons occupies a space of three feet. The sarisa was originally intended to be sixteen cubits (7.3 m) long but was changed to fourteen cubits (6.47 m) to fit in with current practice, and from this we must subtract the space of four cubits (1.8 m) between the hands and the counter-weight behind the projecting part. Therefore it is clear that the sarisa must project ten cubits (4.6 m) in front of the body of each soldier when he advances towards the enemy holding it with both hands. It follows from this that while the sarisas of the men in the second, third, and fourth ranks project further (than those of the fifth rank), even the sarisas of the fifth rank project three feet in front of the men in the first rank, as long as the phalanx keeps its usual order and compact formation in respect of depth and breadth . . . (30) From this it is easy to imagine the appearance and power of the attack of the entire phalanx sixteen ranks deep with levelled sarisas. Of the sixteen ranks those stationed further back than the fifth cannot use their pikes to take a fighting role in the battle. Therefore they do not level their sarisas at an opponent, but hold them with the points tilted upwards over the shoulders of the men in front of them. By doing this they protect the entire phalanx from above, since the sarisas are packed so closely together that they intercept any missiles that might pass over the heads of the first ranks and hit those standing behind 28


them. Furthermore, once the attack has begun they use the weight of their bodies to press on those in front and increase the impetus of the charge, and also make it impossible for the ranks in front to turn back. I have explained both the general principles and detailed operation of the phalanx, and now in order to make a comparison I must describe the characteristics of Roman equipment and tactical formation and the differences between the two. The Roman soldier with his weapons also occupies a space of three feet. However, during the battle each soldier moves independently, defending his body with a long shield and moving it constantly to meet an anticipated blow; he also uses a sword to cut and thrust. Clearly this method of fighting requires an open order and a gap between the soldiers; indeed each man requires at least three feet from those beside him and from those behind him if he is to do what is required efficiently. The result of this is that one Roman soldier has to face two members of the phalanx and so must encounter and fight against ten pikes. It is impossible for one man to cut through these when the battle is joined, nor is it easy to force them aside. Furthermore, the rear ranks do not support those in front, either in forcing aside the spears or in using the sword. Therefore we can readily understand how nothing can stand up to the frontal assault of the phalanx, as long as it retains its usual order and strength, as I said before. (31) What then is the factor that enables the Romans to win and causes those using the phalanx to lose? The answer is that warfare is conducted as the situation demands without limit on opportunities and places. The phalanx, however, has one opportunity and one type of terrain in which it can bring about its best effect. If the enemy were compelled to fall in with the opportunities and places that suited the phalanx when a battle was about to take place, then on the argument I have just put forward those using the phalanx would always win. But if it is possible or indeed easy to avoid the charge of the phalanx, how can the formation I have described still be formidable? Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the phalanx needs flat and level ground free of obstacles like ditches, ravines, depressions, ridges, and watercourses. For all these obstacles are sufficient to disturb or break this kind of formation. People generally agree that it is virtually impossible or at least very rare to find a location of two or three miles or even more that does not have obstacles of this kind. Then, even if such a location is found, if the enemy does not come to it but circles round sacking the cities and the territory of our allies, what is the use of the phalanx formation? By remaining in the location that suits it best, it would not 29


only be unable to help its friends but even incapable of saving itself since the enemy can easily prevent the transport of supplies because they have undisputed control of open country. If it leaves the terrain that suits it and undertakes an action, it will easily be overcome by the enemy. On the other hand, if the enemy does descend to the level ground but does not deploy its entire force at the moment when the phalanx has its one opportunity to charge, but keeps back even a small part at the time when the main clash occurs, the outcome can be easily seen from the tactics that the Romans are employing now. (32) My viewpoint no longer needs to be justified by argument; I can refer to what has already happened. The Romans do not make their battle line numerically equal or face the phalanx head on with all their troops. Instead they keep some of the troops in reserve while the rest engage the enemy. Then, when the phalanx drives back those attacking it or is driven back by them, its distinctive formation is broken. For either in pursuing troops in retreat or fleeing those attacking it, the phalanx leaves behind the remaining parts of the rest of its army. When this happens the enemy troops held in reserve have the chance to occupy the space previously occupied by the phalanx and no longer have to attack head on, but can fall upon the soldiers of the phalanx from the flank and from the rear. Since it is simple to deny the phalanx its opportunities and advantages and impossible to prevent action against it, surely it is reasonable that there is an enormous difference between these two methods (of fighting). Furthermore, those using the phalanx must march through and encamp in all kinds of terrain; they must occupy favourable positions in advance, besiege other people and be besieged themselves, and cope with unexpected appearances of the enemy. These are all part of war and have an important or decisive influence in winning a victory. In all these circumstances the Macedonian phalanx is of small value and sometimes of no value at all because the soldier of the phalanx cannot make a useful contribution either in detachments or individually. By contrast the Roman formation is very flexible. For every Roman soldier, once he is armed and moves into battle, is equally suited for every type of terrain and eventuality and unexpected attack. He is ready and is equally well prepared if he has to fight with the entire army or with part of it or with his detachment or individually. Therefore, since the Romans are so superior in the effective use of the parts of their army, they are far more likely than others to bring their plans to a successful outcome. I thought it essential to treat this subject at some length because many of the Greeks on those occasions when the Macedonians were defeated thought that it was incredible, and many 30


will still be unable to understand why and how the phalanx formation is inferior to the Roman military establishment. Polybius here explains to his fellow-Greeks how in his view Roman legionary organization was superior to the Macedonian phalanx. For the battle of Cynoscephalae, see no. 163. In his description of the Roman legion, Polybius means that the legionary needed three feet (a Greek foot = 308.3 mm) between him and the next man in close formation, and also three feet in which to manoeuvre in sword fighting; see Walbank (1967), 588–90. Polybius is here referring to the manipular formation, which consisted of three ranks, some of which could be held back from immediate engagement (see above, p. 8).

13 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies) The infantry is divided into a corps of hoplites, a corps of peltasts, and a corps of the so-called lightly armed men. The corps of hoplites because it fights at close range uses very heavy equipment, for the soldiers are protected by enormous shields, body armour, and greaves, and use long spears of the type that I shall call ‘Macedonian’. On the other hand the corps of light infantry uses the lightest equipment because they shoot from a distance and are not equipped with either greaves or body armour, but with javelins and slings and missiles that are generally described as ‘long distance’. The corps of peltasts in a way stands between these two, for the pelte is a kind of small, light shield, and their spears are much smaller than those used by the hoplites. In the same way there are three subdivisions of the mounted force. The first is cavalry, the second is equipped with chariots, and the third with elephants. However let us postpone until a later time discussion of chariots and elephants since they are not naturally suited for battle. I shall now discuss cavalry since it is widely used and on many occasions has been more useful in battle. There are three branches of the cavalry, one that fights at close quarters, one that fights at a distance, and one that is between these two. The cavalry that fights at close quarters just like the infantry uses the heaviest equipment, entirely protecting both horses and men with defensive armour, and also like the hoplites using long spears. Consequently this branch is called spear-bearing or lance-bearing or even shield-bearing, whenever some of them carry exceptionally long shields so as to protect the horse as well as the rider. The branch that fights at long range is called both the archer-cavalry and the Scythian cavalry. The intermediate branch is called the skirmishers. They are stationed on the flanks and some fight with bows 31


while others use javelins, the former employing the gear of light cavalry, the latter that of the heavy cavalry. Asclepiodotus lived in the first century BC and wrote an account of technical aspects of the formation and organization of the Greek phalanx and other branches of the army. After Aeneas Tacticus, this is the earliest surviving example of a military treatise, though it is much different in character, lacking in historical examples or any kind of personal experience. There is no sign that Asclepiodotus had any military training, but the material he uses must to some extent represent military thinking, preserved in earlier textbooks, of best practice in operating the phalanx. In discussing cavalry fighting, he preserves the information that the Thessalian cavalry first employed the rhomboid formation (no. 121); text and translation in W.A. Oldfather (1928). For peltasts see below, nos 115–16.

14 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.5–6 (drawing up the battle line) We shall not, however, draw up the file in this way, but we shall position the strongest men in the first rank and behind them the most intelligent. And of the former we shall make the file-leaders the men who stand out in size, strength, and skill. For the line of the fileleaders binds the phalanx together and resembles the cutting edge of a sword, and therefore the ranks that are held together on both flanks by file-leaders are called two-edged. The second line should also not be significantly inferior to the first, so that if a file-leader falls the man stationed behind can step forward and hold the line together. The file-closers, both those in the files and those in larger units, should surpass everyone else in intelligence, the former so as to keep their own files in order, the latter to keep the regiments in formation and step with one another. They must also bring back into line those who abandon their position because of fear and compel them to close ranks for fighting in close order. Asclepiodotus’ version of the Greek phalanx probably was based on late Hellenistic practice, though the basic structure was similar to the Macedonian unit used by Philip and Alexander. In Asclepiodotus’ description the basic building block of the phalanx is the syntagma, consisting of 16 files of 16 men (256). The ideal phalanx according to Asclepiodotus consisted of 64 syntagmata (16,384 men). The files were drawn up side by side and the file-leaders were the front-rank men, while the file-closers came at the rear.

32


15 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.1–2 (weaponry of phalanx) The best shield for use in the phalanx is the bronze Macedonian, about eight palms in diameter (61.68 cm), and not excessively concave. The spear is at least ten cubits (4.6 m) long, so that the projecting part should be at least eight cubits (3.7 m). However, in no circumstances is it longer than twelve cubits (5.5 m) so that it projects ten cubits. When the Macedonian phalanx used this spear in a close-order formation it seemed irresistible to the enemy. For it is clear that the spears of the first five ranks project beyond the front. . . . The Macedonians, as people say, not only terrify the enemy with the sight of this row of spears, but also encourage each of the file-leaders, who is protected by the strength of five men. The men behind the fifth rank, although they cannot extend their spears beyond the first rank, nevertheless shove forward with their bodies and make sure that the soldiers in the front ranks have no hope of flight. Some, however, who want to make all the spears project equally in front of the line increase the length of the spears of the rear ranks. The idea of increasing the length of the spears of the rear ranks seems impracticable.

16 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants) In respect of elephants, the leader of a single elephant is called an animalcommander (zoarchos), the commander of two a beast-commander (therarchos) and his command a beast-unit. A commander of four elephants is a senior beast-commander (epitherarchos) and his command a senior beast-unit. The commander of eight is a troop-commander (ilarches), of sixteen an elephant-commander (elephantarches), of thirtytwo a wing-commander (kerarches), and of sixty-four a phalanxcommander (phalangarches). And each unit will receive a corresponding name. This is the only surviving passage from military writers concerning the organization of elephant units. The names may owe more to Asclepiodotus’ love of definitions than to practical reality.

17 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.1–2; 10–11 (commands) This being the number and nature of the manoeuvres, it would follow that we should discuss the commands used in them, through which we 33


can direct and move the soldiers and bring them back to their original position. For this was the one aspect that remains to be done. When, therefore, we want the regiments to perform a quarter turn to the right, we should command the right file to hold its position and each soldier in the other files to face right, to advance to the right, and then to face front. Next, we should order the rear ranks to advance, and when in this way a compact formation has been achieved, to quarter turn to the right, and the regiment will be turned round in this fashion. (10) [We shall train the army to understand clearly the commands], which are given sometimes by the voice, sometimes by visible signals, and sometimes by the trumpet. The clearest commands are those given by the voice, but they may not always be audible because of the clash of arms or strong gusts of wind. Commands given by signals are more secure against uproar. But sometimes there can be problems even with these, because of the sun’s glare, thick mist and dust, or heavy rain. Therefore it is not easy to find suitable signals, to which the phalanx has been accustomed, for every situation that might arise, and sometimes it is necessary to find a new method to suit the circumstances. For it is unlikely that all eventualities will happen at once, so that a command will be unclear either by trumpet, voice, or signal. Commands given by voice must be short and unambiguous. This can be achieved if we give specific before general commands, since general commands are ambiguous. For example we would not say, ‘Face right!’ but ‘Right face!’, to ensure that in their eagerness some do not turn to the right and some to the left when the order to turn has been given first, but rather all do the same thing at the same time. Similarly, we do not say, ‘Face about right!’, but ‘Right about face!’, nor ‘Countermarch Laconian!’, but ‘Laconian counter-march!’, and . . . In the Laconian counter-march each rank about-faced to the rear and then marched through to the rear taking up position in front of the rank of file-closers, which held its position (10.15); see also no. 122.

18 Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish sword) Perhaps what I have said seems incredible to you, as indeed it has to many others. They claim that it is impossible for plates, once bent and then straightened by the force of the arm, to return to the bend they had before, instead of remaining straight for good. This is of course the natural quality of horn and some types of wood, and bows are made from material like this. Bronze on the other hand is strong by nature 34


and has toughness and resilience, just like iron, but when it is bent by some force it keeps the bend afterwards and cannot straighten itself back again. Therefore they should be excused for being induced into holding this view since they have not made detailed enquiries in advance. For the workmanship needed for the plates I mentioned before has been noted in the swords called variously Celtic and Spanish. When they wish to test how good these are, they take the hilt in the right hand and the end of the blade in the left and place it horizontally across the head. They then bend it down from both sides until the ends touch the shoulders. Next they suddenly let it go, taking both hands away. The blade when released straightens itself out again and returns to its original shape, so that it has no hint of any bend. Even though they repeat this process frequently, the sword remains straight. Philon of Byzantium lived c. 230 BC and produced a collection of technological works in nine books, including the construction of artillery (Belopoeica), and the offensive and defensive conduct of sieges. When he visited Alexandria he met people who had worked with the great inventor Ctesibius, and it is likely that his account of bronzespring and air-spring catapults was influenced by Ctesibius’ Commentaries and by current practice in Alexandrian workshops. He also claims to have met personally technical experts in Rhodes and to have observed their engineering workshops (Bel. 51.10–14). However, Philon criticizes some aspects of the design of catapults and tells us that the wedge-shaped catapult was his own design (Bel. 56.12–13). Both Philon and Heron (see p. 196) probably used some common Alexandrian sources since there is a close correspondence in their phraseology in some respects; see Marsden (1971), 6–9. For the use of the Spanish sword see below, no. 35.

19 Josephus, Jewish War 3.71–6; 85–8 (training the Roman army) If we examine the rest of their military organization we will see that they hold their empire as a prize of courage not as a gift of fortune. (72) For they do not wait until war breaks out before beginning weapons training, nor do they go idly through peace time, moving their hands to action only during a crisis. Indeed, as if they had been born fully armed they never take a holiday from training and do not wait for crises to appear. (73) Their training manoeuvres lack none of the rigour of genuine warfare and each soldier practises battle drill every day with great enthusiasm just as if he were in battle. Therefore they sustain the shock of combat very easily. (74) For their customary well-ordered ranks are not disrupted by any confusion, or numbed by fear, or exhausted by toil; so, certain victory inevitably follows since the enemy cannot match this. (75) Indeed one would not be wrong in saying that 35


their training manoeuvres are battles without bloodshed, and their battles manoeuvres with bloodshed. (76) They never leave themselves vulnerable to surprise enemy attack. Whatever enemy territory they invade they do not engage in battle until they have fortified a camp. (85) Once the camp has been fortified the soldiers take up their quarters according to unit in a quiet and orderly fashion. All their duties are carried out with discipline and security; each unit has its appointed responsibility, for collecting firewood and food-supplies, if they are required, and water. (86) They do not take supper and breakfast when it suits individuals, but all at the same time. Trumpet blasts announce the time for sleep, guard duty, and rising, and nothing is done without a word of command. (87) At dawn the soldiers report to the appropriate centurion, the centurions go to greet the military tribunes, with whom the senior officers attend upon the commanding officer. (88) He customarily gives them the password and other orders for distribution to the rank and file. They respond to orders in the same way on the battlefield and moving as one man they wheel round quickly as required, either to make an attack or in retreat. Josephus was a Jewish priest of aristocratic background and one of the political leaders in Jerusalem before the revolt of AD 66. Though devoted to Jewish religious and cultural traditions he was not in full accord with the aims of the leaders of the revolt from Rome. Nevertheless, he was put in charge of the defence of the Galilee, directing operations during the siege of Jotapata conducted by the Roman commander and future emperor Vespasian. Josephus was captured after the fall of the city, but ignoring a suicide pact he managed to win the favour of Vespasian and his son Titus. He wrote an account of the war in Aramaic (now lost) and later in Greek. This was based on his own experiences in the war, eyewitness accounts from others, and the commentaries of Vespasian and Titus. He had encountered the Roman army at first hand and knew how it had dealt with Jewish fighting methods. This makes his long digression on the structure of the army and its disciplined organization especially valuable, even though it is rather pro-Roman ( Jewish War 3.70–109); for the career and character of Josephus, see Rajak (1983).

20 Josephus, Jewish War 3.102–7 (Roman discipline) Through their military exercises the Romans give their soldiers not only strong bodies but also mental courage, and fear also plays a part in training. (103) For they have laws that inflict the death penalty not only for desertion of the ranks but even for a minor neglect of duty. The generals inspire even greater fear than the laws, since by rewarding the brave they avoid appearing cruel to those whom they punish. (104) So great is the army’s obedience to its leaders that in peacetime it is an 36


adornment to Rome and in wartime the whole force acts as a single body. (105) This is because the ranks are so well knit together, their manoeuvres so well organized, their ears so sharp for orders and their eyes for signals, and their hands for the task that needs to be done. (106) Therefore they are always prompt in action and correspondingly very slow to surrender to suffering, and have never been defeated in any situation by numbers, trickery, unfavourable terrain, or even by bad luck. For the Romans, conquering is a stronger force than luck. (107) Since planning precedes action and this effective army carries out the plans, it is no surprise that in the east the Euphrates, in the west the ocean, in the south the most fertile parts of Libya, and in the north the Danube and the Rhine form the limits of the empire. It can be truly said that this conquering people are greater than their conquests.

21 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipio’s discipline) When the Roman army at Numantia had been demoralized by the laxness of previous commanders, Publius Scipio restored its morale by dismissing a large number of camp followers and conditioning the soldiers to their duties by daily exercise. During the marches that he frequently instructed them to undertake he ordered them to carry several days’ rations. Consequently the soldiers became accustomed to enduring cold and rain and to fording rivers on foot, while the general denounced cowardice and indolence and smashed containers that were for mere self-indulgence and not essential for military campaigns. A particularly memorable example of his toughness occurred with the tribune Gaius Memmius, to whom Scipio is said to have commented: ‘To me you will be useless for only a short time, but to yourself and the state for ever!’ Sextus Julius Frontinus was a Roman senator prominent in government and society. He was consul three times (72 or 73, 98, 100) and had a distinguished military reputation, taking part in 70 in the suppression of the revolt of Julius Civilis in Gaul, and as governor of Britain (73/4–77) leading campaigns against the Silures in south Wales. He served as head of the water supply in Rome (Curator Aquarum) and wrote a book about the responsibilities of this post. He also wrote a guide to aspects of land survey, a treatise on the art of war (now lost), and four books of Strategemata, in which the collected about 580 examples of military anecdotes, mainly about past Greek and Roman commanders, though he mentions four exploits of the emperor Domitian. He drew widely from other writers for his material, including Sallust, Julius Caesar, and Valerius Maximus. There is no strong reason for doubting that Frontinus also wrote the fourth book. The Strategemata are divided by general themes: before battle, during the battle itself, the siege and defence of towns, and military science in general,

37

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE especially discipline and military psychology. There are numerous sub-headings under these themes. He covered the full range of military activities, including how to deal with defeats. Frontinus writes in the tradition of offering guidance through the successful deeds of others whose ploys could be emulated. In terms of military command he set out to demonstrate and confirm the important principle that part of the skill of commanding lay in the ability to be inventive and alert and think out clever stratagems to deal with the immediate situation. Career and standing – Eck (1982); text and translation – Bennett and McElwain (1925). This extract refers to the siege of Numantia in 134–133 BC by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus. A slightly different version of this story appears in Polyaenus 8.16.2; according to Livy, Scipio threw two thousand prostitutes out of the camp (Periochae 57); see also Appian, Spanish Wars 85.

22 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius’ mules) Gaius Marius, in order to reduce the number of pack animals with which the army’s march was particularly hampered, arranged for the soldiers’ utensils and food to be wrapped up in bundles and fastened to forked sticks, so that the troops could readily carry them and easily take a rest. From this came the famous expression: ‘Marius’ mules’. For Marius, see pp. 8–9.

23 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus’ discipline) The Spartan general Clearchus used to say to his army that they should fear their general more than the enemy, meaning that while the death they feared in battle was uncertain, they would certainly be executed if they deserted. Clearchus held various commands as a Spartan officer after 411 BC, but made himself tyrant of Byzantium in 403 and subsequently joined Cyrus as commander of his Greek mercenaries in his attempt to make himself Persian king. Later Clearchus was arrested with most of the other senior officers and executed by the Persians. See no. 43 for Xenophon’s estimate of his qualities.

24 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulo’s discipline) When Domitius Corbulo was campaigning in Armenia he ordered two squadrons and three cohorts, which had given way before the enemy at the fortress of Initia, to camp outside the rampart until they had redeemed their disgrace with hard work and successful sorties. 38


(28) When Domitius Corbulo was campaigning in Armenia, a cavalry commander named Aemilius Rufus gave way before the enemy and also kept his cavalry squadron improperly armed. Corbulo had his lictor to cut his clothes off and ordered him to stand in the headquarters as he was in this appalling plight until he should be released. Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo was appointed by Nero in AD 55 as governor of Cappadocia and Galatia and given the command for the war against Parthia for control over Armenia. Corbulo was a strict disciplinarian and trained the legions assiduously (Tacitus, Annals 13.35–6). A Roman nominee was installed as king of Armenia and Corbulo became governor of Syria. But in 62 war was renewed and after a number of setbacks Corbulo assumed command and brought about a lasting settlement without fighting any major battles. In 66 the emperor forced him to commit suicide.

25 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Piso’s discipline) Since Gaius Titius, prefect of a cohort, had given way before some fugitive slaves, Lucius Piso ordered him to stand barefoot everyday in the camp headquarters, with the belt of his toga cut and his tunic undone until the night guards came, and to abstain from banquets and bathing. Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi as consul in 133 BC fought in Sicily against the slaves; cf. Valerius Maximus 2.7.9.

26 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius’ discipline) Marcus Antonius, when the enemy set fire to his rampart, decimated the soldiers of the two cohorts that had been engaged on the work and punished the centurions of each cohort. In addition he cashiered in disgrace the officer commanding and ordered the rest of the legion to be given barley rations. This incident occurred during Antony’s invasion of Parthia in 36 Antony 39).

BC

(cf. Plutarch,

27 Arrian, Tactica 3.1–4; 4.1–2 (infantry and cavalry weaponry) Infantry and cavalry formations and weaponry are of many different types. First, the weaponry of the infantry, if we look at the most important categories, is divided into three, namely the hoplite, the lightarmed, and the peltast. The hoplites are the most heavily armed, having 39


body armour, shields, either round or oblong in shape, swords and spears (as carried by the Greeks) or sarisas (as carried by the Macedonians). Light-armed troops are equipped in a way that is the exact opposite of the hoplites, since they do not have body armour, shields, greaves, or helmets. They always use missile weapons, either bows, or javelins, or slings, or stones thrown by hand. The peltasts are armed more lightly than the hoplites. For their shield (pelte) is smaller and lighter than the hoplite shield, and their javelins are lighter than the spears and sarisas of the hoplites, though heavier than the javelins of the light-armed. (4) As regards the weaponry of cavalry, some cavalry is armoured and some without armour. Armoured cavalry has both the horses and riders protected by armour. The cavalrymen have body armour made of metal plates, or linen, and armour made of horn for the thighs, the horses have covers for their sides and frontlets. Cavalry without armour has none of this equipment. Of these cavalrymen some are equipped with spears, others only with javelins. Arrian c. AD 86–160 was a Greek from Nicomedia in Bithynia and also a Roman senator. Hadrian appointed him as governor of Cappadocia (131–7). He was a prolific writer who styled himself as the second Xenophon, and among his works are a history of Alexander, Periplus of the Black Sea, Tactica, and Order of Battle against the Alani, in which he describes his military dispositions as governor of Cappadocia against an expected invasion of the Alani c. 135. He therefore had some experience of drawing up a Roman legionary army, yet his Tactica is largely devoted to a study of Greek phalanx formations and manoeuvres. However, arguably there is a contemporary relevance in that during the campaign against the Alani, Arrian employed distinctive defensive tactics by deploying the first ranks of the legionaries with long thrusting spears instead of the usual pila. Furthermore, the second part of the Tactica contains a valuable survey of Roman cavalry tactics and training manoeuvres. For the career of Arrian see Stadter (1980). In the Tactica Arrian is mainly interested in the Greek armies of the Hellenistic period, but here seems to present the usual Greek analysis of the organization of infantry troops; cf. no. 13.

28 Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals) It is essential to accustom the army to receive commands clearly, both vocal commands, and visible signals, and trumpet calls. Commands relayed by the voice are the clearest since in this way your entire intention becomes clear, and not just some symbol of it which is merely seen or heard. But since there are many circumstances in a battle likely to prevent verbal communication, such as the din of weapons, shouts of mutual encouragement, the screams of the wounded, the galloping past of a squadron of cavalry, the clash of arms, the neighing of horses, and the noise of the sutlers passing by, all this means that the 40


army must be accustomed to visible signals. Nevertheless, even these sometimes are ineffective because for example there is a mist or a cloud of dust rising up, or because the sun is shining in the soldiers’ faces, or there is a sudden snow shower or downpour of rain, or because the area is heavily wooded or hilly. In these circumstances the entire army would not be able to see the signals. Whenever hills interrupt the line of sight, we must improve our visible signals. The trumpet is useful in dealing with any aerial obstacles (to the line of sight).

29 Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command) The words of command should be as follows: To arms. Armour-bearers leave the battle line. Quiet, and pay attention to the word of command. Raise spears. Lower spears. The rearguard commander will straighten the ranks. Watch the gaps. Move to the right (spear side). Move to the left (shield side). Straight ahead. Steady as you go. Move away to the right. Double the depth (of the ranks). As you were. Deploy in the Laconian manoeuvre. As you were. Wheel to the right. As you were. See also above, no. 17.

30 Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.1–7; 43.2–4; 44 (cavalry training) After riding into the arena to the left of the tribunal the cavalry halt in close formation. They turn the horses’ heads away and with their shields cover their own backs and the backs of the horses. This formation is called a tortoise (testudo) just like the equivalent infantry formation using shields. Two cavalrymen come forward a sufficient distance to allow the main group to charge, and are positioned in front of the right wing of the tortoise in order to receive the javelin fire of the men riding directly past. Therefore half of the cavalry stand ready to defend themselves against the charge. When the trumpet gives the signal half the cavalry take up the attack, keeping up a constant barrage of javelins, the first being the most courageous trooper, then the second, and the rest following in order. The most impressive performer is the one who, while effectively controlling his horse, throws the most spears most rapidly at the two horsemen standing out in front of the tortoise, and most often hits the target with his weapons. They (the attackers) charge on straight past and then swing to the side 41


so as to complete a circle. This movement takes them to the right. So there is no obstacle to the attack with spears, and the shields are carried in front of those throwing the spears during the attack. (37) They (the targets) must receive all these javelins, since throughout the exercise those riding past are keeping up a barrage. The barrage is continuous and the noise deafening, so that it seems a terrifying experience. Between the right wing of the formation and the forward position of the two horsemen, the cavalry charge out unexpectedly, riding out in front from their own formation, and throw javelins at those riding past. But as they wheel round to the left they ride past showing their unprotected side. It is here that good horsemanship is especially required, so as to be able simultaneously to throw a javelin at those riding past and to use the shield to protect the right side. When the cavalryman rides parallel to the target he must swivel to the right in order to throw the javelin. And in making a complete aboutturn he must perform what is called the petrinos in the Gallic language, which is the most difficult of all. For he must turn right round, as far as the tender nature of his sides will allow, to face the horse’s tail in order to throw backwards as accurately as possible. When he has done this he has to turn quickly forward again and bring his shield to cover his back, since if he turns without this protection he will expose his unprotected back to the enemy. (40) In addition to this there is a gallop known as the ‘Cantabrian’. In my opinion it gets its name from the Iberian people, the Cantabrii, because the Romans adapted it from them for their own purposes. It is done in the following way. The defensive formation of cavalry, as described before, protected by their armour is stationed on the left of the tribunal, except for the two horsemen who receive the direct attack with javelins. They charge from the right, as before, and wheel to the right. While they are making their charge, another charge begins on the left of the tribunal and wheels into a circle. These horsemen no longer use light javelins, but full-length spears without metal tips, but sufficiently heavy to be awkward for the throwers and not without danger for the men at whom they are aimed. For this reason they are ordered not to aim at the helmets of the men riding past, and not to throw the spear at the horse, but before he wheels and exposes any part of his side or reveals his back as he turns, they are to aim for his shield and hit it as hard as possible with the spear. The precision of this training rests on the point that the man in the Cantabrian circle should get as close as possible to those riding past and score a direct hit in the middle of the shield with his spear, which should thud on it or pierce it right through. The second man gets to grips with the second in the 42


other group, the third with the third, and so on through the formation in the same way. The noise is tremendous, and in this exercise the counter movement appears elegant. One group gets practice in accuracy and vehemence in throwing javelins, the other in safe defence against an attack. (43) The exercises do not end at this point. They advance holding their spears projecting straight out in front, and then as though they are pursuing an enemy in flight. Others, as if acting against another enemy, wheel their horses round and swing their shields over their heads so that they are behind them and manoeuvre their spears as though to deal with another enemy’s attack. The Celts call their manoeuvre the toloutegon. Furthermore, they draw their swords and make different kinds of strokes, whatever is best suited to bring down a fleeing enemy, or kill a man already lying on the ground, or to do anything involving attack from the flanks. What is more, they practise all kinds of ways of jumping onto their horses, all the different forms and methods by which a man can get on his horse. They end by demonstrating how a man in full armour can leap on his horse when it is galloping, a practice that some describe as the ‘traveller’. (44) All these exercises have been understood by the Roman cavalry and have long been practised. The emperor indeed seeks out foreign practices with which to train them, for example the manoeuvres of the horse-archers of the Parthians and Armenians, the wheeling and evolutions practised by the lance-bearing cavalry of the Sarmatians and the Celts as the horses charge in formation, including the many, varied methods of skirmishing that are very useful in battle, and the native war cries that each race has, namely Celtic war cries for the Celtic cavalry, Getic for the Getic cavalry, and Raetian for cavalry from Raetia. Furthermore, their cavalry practises jumping across ditches and leaping over small walls. To sum up, of the ancient exercises there is none that the Roman have omitted and not practised from the beginning. Of the other exercises that the emperor has discovered, some contribute beauty, some speed, some inspire terror, and some provide whatever is needed for the job in hand. Therefore today in the twentieth year of the reign of the emperor Hadrian, I think that the words that were applied to Sparta in ancient times are much more appropriate now: ‘There the spear points of the young men flourish and clear melodies, and far-reaching justice, which encourages fine deeds.’ In the Tactica Arrian also includes a description of Roman cavalry training manoeuvres in the second century AD. Arrian’s description is rather allusive since he takes for granted that the reader knows some of the basic guidelines of horse training. In the testudo the horses stand side by side in echelon with their head turned slightly to the

43

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE right. The shield of the rider on the right would partly cover the head of the horse on his left, making a defensive tortoise. In the exercise the cavalrymen were split into two teams (A and B). From team B two men rode out as targets and then team A wheeled left and charged past the targets throwing the specially adapted spears at them. At the same time the rest of team B moved off and aimed to attack team A riders as they wheeled towards the targets. In this manoeuvre the right side of team B riders would be vulnerable and hence each rider had to bring his shield over the horse’s head to protect his right side before throwing his javelin; he must also be able to throw while facing backwards over the horse’s rear. Then he had to face front and immediately swing his shield up and over to protect his back (see Figure 1.1). There was also a more complex version of the same exercise. Tribunal

Targets x y

Team B

Team A

Figure 1.1 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 36–7). Rider x of team B twists round in his saddle to throw his javelin at rider y of team A In the Cantabrian gallop there were also two teams (A and B) lined up as in the previous manoeuvre. They wheeled right and went on to gallop round in two circles on the right rein with both teams riding clockwise; as the horsemen passed each other the attacker aimed to hit the middle of his opponent’s shield with his spears (see Figure 1.2 opposite). For discussion, see Hyland (1993), 115–41; Dixon and Southern (1992), 126–34; see also Davies (1989), 93–124.

31 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military training) Philip trained the Macedonians before they encountered danger by having them take their weapons and often march for three hundred stades (about 34.5 miles), carrying helmets, shields, greaves, sarisas, and in addition to these weapons the food and equipment needed for daily life. 44


Tribunal

x

y

Team A Team B

Figure 1.2 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 40.1–7). Riders x and y from teams A and B act as attacker and defender as they pass Polyaenus was a rhetorician of Macedonian extraction from Bithynia who dedicated his collection of military stratagems (Strategemata) in eight books to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. In AD 161 the governor of Cappadocia M. Sedatius Severianus had been defeated and killed by the Parthians with the loss of a legion. Rome responded vigorously and Lucius Verus set out to take up command in the war (AD 162–6). Polyaenus says that he is too old to take part in person, but will make a contribution by sending the emperors his stratagems, book by book, so that they can learn from the success of past commanders. There are about 900 stratagems and the content is extremely varied, ranging from the legendary exploits of gods and heroes to the ploys of historical Greek and Roman commanders up to the time of Augustus, although Roman examples make up only a small proportion of the work. The material is arranged not by topic as in Frontinus’ Strategemata, but by name of the person concerned, loosely based on themes or chronological periods. Polyaenus seems to have used a wide variety of sources and other collections of stratagems and exempla including Frontinus, although he does not specifically refer to him. The reliability of Polyaenus will of course depend on the quality of his sources, but in terms of his own objectives he probably did not aim for strict historical accuracy in every detail. He set out to use interesting material to illustrate the importance in military thinking of being clever, alert, inventive, and willing to take the initiative. Polyaenus may also have written a subsequent work called Tactica. Discussion and translation in Krentz and Wheeler (1994).

45


32 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of military training) In ancient times it was the practice to commit to writing studies in the liberal arts, compile them in the form of books and present them to emperors. For no project is correctly begun unless after God the emperor supports it, and it is not appropriate for anyone to have better or more extensive knowledge than the emperor, whose learning can benefit all his subjects. It is clear from many examples that Octavian Augustus and the good emperors that followed him enthusiastically believed this. And so, with the support of rulers, eloquence flourished and boldness was not criticized. I was moved to emulate this when I considered that Your Clemency was better able than others to pardon boldness in literature, and I scarcely felt my great inferiority to the writers of ancient times. However, in this little book neither elegance of expression nor intellectual precision was required, but merely hard work and accuracy, in order to publish for the benefit of Rome material that was scattered and concealed in the works of different historians and writers on military science. Therefore I am trying to set out by a number of sections and headings the ancient methods of levying and training recruits. Needless to say, Invincible Emperor, these matters are not unknown to you, but I intend that you should see that the arrangements you make on your own initiative for the safety of the state were once adhered to by the founders of the Roman empire, and that in this little book you can find whatever you need to know concerning affairs of state, which are always crucial. We see that the Roman people conquered the world by no other means than training in the military arts, discipline in the camp, and practice in warfare. How else could small numbers of Romans have succeeded against hordes of Gauls? How could they with their small stature have dared to face the tall Germans? It is clear that the Spanish were superior to our men not only in numbers but also in bodily strength. Often we were no match for the Africans in treachery or money. No one doubts that the Greeks surpass us in the arts and wisdom. But against all of them we triumphed by selecting recruits carefully, by teaching them the principles, so to speak, of war, by toughening them by daily exercise, by teaching them in advance through manoeuvres in the field everything that can happen on the march and in battle, and by punishing severely the indolent. For knowledge of military science fosters courage in battle. No one is afraid to perform what he is confident that he has learned well. Indeed a small force that has been well trained in the clash of battle is more 46


likely to be victorious than a large force, which raw and untrained, is exposed to slaughter. Vegetius was not a soldier, but served in the imperial administration. His Epitome of Military Science was addressed to an emperor, possibly Theodosius the Great (AD 383–95), and is designed to suggest remedies for contemporary failures in military organization. The emperor had instructed him to abridge ancient authors and despite his own military prowess was willing to learn from others. The work has limited coverage of certain aspects, including cavalry and the Limitanei. He aimed to select suitable passages from earlier writers on warfare such as Cato and Frontinus and supplemented these with his own ideas. He did not intend to write a history of the Roman army and so he does not clearly differentiate chronological periods precisely. This does not seriously undermine the value of the work, which set out to use old military practices as a guide for improving the army of Vegetius’ own day. The Epitome was enormously popular in the Middle Ages. Translation and notes in Milner (1993).

33 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.5–6 (choosing suitable recruits) I know that the height of recruits was always kept up to the mark (incomma), so that men of six feet or at least five feet ten inches were recruited for the cavalry and for the leading cohorts of the legions. But in earlier times the population was larger and more men pursued a military career, and the civil administration had not taken away the fittest young men. Therefore, if needs must, we should take into account not so much physical size as strength. (6) The recruiting officer should diligently ensure that through a careful examination of their face, eyes, and general physical constitution, he chooses men who are likely to prove good soldiers. For many indications reveal the qualities not only of a man but also of horses and dogs. . . . The potential young recruit therefore ought to have alert eyes, should carry his head erect, have a broad chest, muscular shoulders, strong arms, long fingers, a small waist, slim buttocks, and legs and feet that are not fleshy but sinewy and strong. When you find all these qualities in a recruit you need not pay too much attention to his height, for brave soldiers are more valuable than tall ones. Since the Roman foot was 295.7 mm (= 11.64 inches), whereas the modern imperial foot is 301 mm, six Roman feet amount to 5ft 104⁄5 inches, and Roman 5ft 10 inches amount to 5ft 8 5⁄6 inches. In AD 367 the minimum height requirement for the entry of Italians into some units was reduced from 5 ft 10 to 5 ft 7 inches (= 5ft 57⁄8 inches) (CTh. 7.13.3). For the examination of a potential recruit, see Acts of Maximilianus 1.1–5 (Musurillo (1972), 17; translation in Campbell (1994), 12).

47


34 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.9–10 (Roman military training) Right at the start of their training, therefore, recruits should be taught the military step. For on the march and in the battle line nothing should be maintained more carefully than that all the troops should keep in step as they move. This can be achieved only if through repeated practice they learn to manoeuvre quickly and in formation. An army that is split up and in disorder is always in grave danger from the enemy. So, twenty miles should be completed with the military step in five hours, at least in summer. With the fuller step, which is quicker, twenty-four miles should be completed in the same time. If you add anything to this it amounts to running, for which a distance cannot be defined. But recruits should especially be accustomed to running too, so that they can charge the enemy with greater force, occupy important positions quickly when the need arises, or get there first when the enemy aims to do the same, travel fast on scouting missions and return even faster, and more easily catch a fleeing enemy. The soldiers should also be trained in jumping so that they can leap over ditches and surmount any height blocking the way, and consequently when difficulties of this kind appear, they can cross them without trouble. . . . (10) All recruits without exception should during the summer months learn how to swim. For rivers cannot always be crossed on bridges, but during a retreat or pursuit armies are frequently forced to swim. Often rivers burst their banks because of sudden storms or melting snows and through their ignorance (of swimming) the men come into danger not only from the enemy but even from the water. Therefore in ancient times the Romans, who had been schooled in every form of military skill by frequent warfare and endless danger, chose the Field of Mars next to the Tiber, in which the young men after arms training cleaned off the sweat and dust and laid aside the fatigue from their running by swimming vigorously. Indeed it is very useful to train in swimming not only the infantry but also the cavalry and their horses and grooms, who are called galearii, in case they should be found to be ineffective when an emergency occurs. One Roman mile amounted to about 1,665 yards. Milner (1993), 10, calculates that the soldiers were marching at 2.84 and 3.40 mph respectively on these route marches.

48


35 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.11–12 (weapons training) The ancients, as is found in books, trained recruits in the following way. They wove shields from withies in the form of hurdles and round in shape, so that the hurdle was twice as heavy as the official shield usually was. They also gave the recruits wooden foils, which were also double weight, instead of swords. Equipped in this way they exercised against posts not only in the morning but also in the afternoon. The use of training posts is of great benefit not only to soldiers but even to gladiators. Neither the arena nor the training area ever made a man unbeatable in battle, unless he was carefully instructed and trained at the post. Each recruit used to plant an individual post in the earth so that it could not move around and projected by six feet. The recruit trained himself against the post as if he was fighting an enemy, using the foil and the hurdle just like a sword and shield. Now he attacked the equivalent of the head and face, now threatened the sides, now tried to cut the knee-joints and the legs; he would draw back, move forward, and spring as if he were attacking a real enemy. So, they tried out on the pole every kind of assault and military skill. In this exercise they took special care that the recruit in leaping forward to inflict a wound did not expose any part of his body to a blow. (12) In particular, recruits learned to strike with the point not with the edge. For the Romans not only defeated easily those who used the edge but indeed despised them. A cut, with whatever strength it is delivered, rarely kills since the vital organs are protected by armour and by bones. By contrast, a stab wound driven in only two inches is fatal, since it is inevitable that anything driven in will pierce the vital organs. Furthermore, when a cut is being delivered the right arm and side are exposed. But a stab is delivered with the body protected and the enemy is wounded before he notices. It is accepted that this is why the Romans principally use this method of fighting. The recruit was given the hurdles and foils of double weight so that when he lifted real weapons, which were lighter, he fought more confidently and energetically as being liberated from the greater weight. This kind of training was carried out by Scipio Africanus at New Carthage in 209 BC (Polybius, 10.20; Livy, 26.51.3). The next stage in the training, not mentioned by Vegetius, was fencing with a live opponent. Note that Valerius Maximus (2.3.2) thought that P. Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 BC, was the first to introduce gladiatorial methods of training to the army, but Cato, writing in the first part of the second century BC, refers to gladiatorial training (De Re Militari fragment 14). For Roman military training grounds, see Davies (1974b). The Spanish sword could be used for cutting and thrusting; see above, no. 18.

49


36 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.14–16; 18–19 (throwing missiles; other military skills) But I return to my subject. The recruit who is training with a foil against the post is also instructed to throw spear-shafts that are heavier than the real javelins will be at this post as if at a real man. In this exercise the arms instructor makes sure that the recruit throws the spear-shaft with great force so that the missile strikes the target or close to it with good aim. Through this exercise the arms grow stronger and the recruit acquires skill and experience in throwing. (15) About a third or quarter of recruits who are found to have better aptitude should be trained constantly by shooting at the post with wooden bows and mock arrows. Experienced instructors should be chosen for this task and they should devote all their skill to ensuring that the recruits hold the bow properly, string it forcefully, keep the left hand steady, draw the right back carefully, so that the eye and mind concentrate on the target that is to be hit, and learn to shoot straight whether on horseback or on foot. . . . (16) It is right that recruits should be trained diligently in throwing stones by hand or with slings. The inhabitants of the Balearic Isles are said to have invented the use of slings and to have practised with such skill that mothers would not allow their small sons to touch any food unless they had hit it with a stone fired from a sling. Often, against soldiers equipped with helmets, scale-armour, and coats of mail, smooth stones shot with a sling or a sling-stick are more effective than any arrow, since while leaving the limbs untouched they nevertheless inflict a fatal wound and the enemy dies from the impact of the stone without the shedding of blood. No one is unaware that slingers fought in all ancient battles. This method of fighting should be learned by all recruits through frequent practice, because it is no effort to carry a sling. Furthermore, it sometimes happens that battles take place in stony places, or some mountain or hill has to be defended, or barbarians have to be prevented by stones and slings from storming forts or towns. (18) It has always been a rigorous requirement that both recruits and also experienced soldiers should vault onto horses. It is clear that this practice has survived until the present day, admittedly now with some decline. Wooden horses were set up, indoors in winter, on the training ground in summer. Recruits were ordered to jump onto these, at first without weapons, while they gained experience, and then armed. Such attention was given to this that they learned to jump on and off both from the right-hand and the left sides, even holding drawn swords and spears. They did this too with constant practice, 50


and because they had trained so diligently in peacetime, in the tumult of battle they speedily mounted their horses. (19) Recruits were very frequently compelled to carry a weight of up to sixty pounds and march at the military step, since in difficult campaigns they must carry their provisions and weapons. This should not be thought difficult once the practice has been established, for there is nothing that constant practice does not make easier. . . . Archers – in the imperial period the Romans usually relied on specialist archers often recruited from Syria. There were also horse archers, such as the Ala I Augusta Ituraeorum; see Cheesman (1914), 181–2. Slingers – see Griffiths (1989) for use of slingers in Roman imperial army. Mounting horses – see above, no. 30. One Roman pound is the equivalent of 0.721 lb. avoirdupois; cf. Milner (1993), 17, nn. 6–7. For Marius’ mules, see above, no. 22.

37 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.26–7 (training in battle manoeuvres) It is accepted that nothing is more helpful in battle than that through constant training soldiers keep their assigned positions in the line and do not bunch together or thin out the line inappropriately. For if they are compressed together they lose the space needed for fighting and get in each other’s way, and if they are too widely separated and showing the light between them, they give the enemy a way of breaking through. Inevitably everything will be thrown into complete panic if the line is cut and the enemy gets to the rear of the fighting men. Therefore the recruits must constantly be brought out to the exerciseground and drawn up in the battle line according to the order of the roll, so that at first the line should be single and extended without bends or curves, and so that soldier is separated from soldier by an equal and approved interval. Then the command should be given that they are immediately to double the length of the line, so that this pattern to which they are accustomed to conform can be maintained in the actual assault. Thirdly, the command should be given that they should suddenly form a square formation, and after that has been done the line should be changed into a three-sided formation, which they call a wedge. This formation is usually of great benefit in warfare. Next the command is given to form circles, which trained soldiers normally use to mount a defence when the enemy has broken through the line, in order to prevent the whole force from being scattered in flight and imminent catastrophe. If recruits have learned these manoeuvres through constant practice they will keep to them more easily in the actual battle. 51


(27) Furthermore, the ancient practice has remained and the regulations of the Divine Augustus and Hadrian laid down that three times every month both the cavalry and the infantry should be led out on manoeuvres (ambulatum). They used this word to designate the following kind of exercise. The infantry in full armour and equipped with all their weapons were ordered to advance for ten miles at the military pace and then return to camp, performing some part of the march at a quicker pace. The cavalry too, fully armed and divided into troops, covered a similar distance carrying out cavalry exercises, at one moment pursuing, then retreating, and then rallying in some way to renew the attack. Both battle lines had to operate not only in level areas, but also to descend and ascend in hilly and steep places, so that nothing, not even entirely by chance, could happen in the fighting which good soldiers had not learned before through constant training. Milner (1993), 25, n. 2 cites evidence from the Historia Augusta (Life of Avidius Cassius 6.3; Life of Maximinus 6.2) that military manoeuvres were to take place every five or seven days. But the evidence of this unreliable source cannot be trusted on points of detail. Augustus had the reputation of a strict disciplinarian (Suetonius, Augustus 24, 1–2). In his rules of discipline he laid down that soldiers should be removed as little as possible from normal military duties (Digest 49.16.12.1), a principle that was endorsed by Trajan (Pliny, Letters 10.20.2). Hadrian too had a formidable reputation based on his inspection and training of the troops and his preservation of strict discipline (Dio, 69.9.4–5). For cavalry exercises, see above no. 30.

52

2 THE GENERAL’S ROLE

38 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.1.5–6 (qualities required in a general) Socrates said: ‘Tell us at what stage he began to teach you about generalship, so that, if one of us happens to serve as a unit or company commander, we may have a better grasp of military matters.’ The boy replied: ‘We started and ended at the same stage. He taught me tactics and nothing else.’ Socrates said: ‘But this is the smallest part of the art of generalship. For a general must be ready to provide military gear and arrange supplies for his troops and he must be resourceful, hardworking, and vigilant, and also be tough and shrewd. What is more, he must be benevolent and harsh, frank and dissimulating, cautious, but also ready to plunder another’s property, generous and rapacious. Indeed, he must be bountiful and greedy, sound in defence and aggressive in attack. The man who is set to become a good general must also have many other qualities, both naturally or acquired by training. But of course tactical skill is a fine thing.’ Here Socrates is advising a friend who intends to stand for public office. It is interesting that in fourth-century Athens there was some form of instruction in the art of generalship and the use of tactics, though Socrates chooses to emphasize the moral qualities required in a commander.

39 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.1–2 (skills of a cavalry commander) A cavalry commander must also be able to recognize terrain where infantry will be superior to cavalry and where cavalry will be superior to infantry. He must also be resourceful enough to make a small number of cavalry look large, and by contrast to make a large number look small; to seem to be absent when present, and present when 53

THE GENERAL’S ROLE

absent; and to know not only how to steal the enemy’s possessions but also how to conceal his own cavalry and attack the enemy unexpectedly.

40 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 6.1–4 (the commander’s relations with his troops) No one can shape anything as he wishes unless the material he is intending to work with is ready to be moulded by the craftsman’s will. In the same way you can make nothing of soldiers if they are not ready with God’s help to display goodwill towards their commander and believe that he is better equipped than they are in leading military operations against the enemy. It is natural that soldiers should have friendly feelings about their commander when he treats them in a kindly way and clearly takes pains to ensure that they have food, are secure during a retreat and well protected when resting. In garrisons he must display a concern about fodder, tents, water, firewood, and all other supplies, and he must think ahead and be alert for the sake of his men. Furthermore, when the commander is successful, it is sound policy for him to give them a share. To sum up, a commander is least likely to be despised by his men if he shows himself to be better than them at doing whatever tasks he instructs them to do.

41 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 8.21–2 (choosing the right man for the job) It is not difficult to make these dispositions. But it is the mark of a competent cavalry commander to discover men who display intelligence, reliability, enthusiasm, and boldness in wheeling against the enemy. For the commander must be able both in word and action to convince the men under his command that it is good to obey, follow their leader, and charge the enemy, and make them eager to hear some word of praise, and enable them to persevere in their undertakings.

42 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.1–2 (role of commander) It is enough to read these points a few times, but the commander must always work out what the circumstances require and look at the existing situation and carry out whatever is beneficial. It is no more possible to write out everything that he has to do than to know every54


thing that is going to happen. I think that the most important part of all my advice is to make sure that whatever he thinks is advantageous is accomplished.

43 Xenophon, Anabasis 2.6.1–15 (qualities of a Greek general) Of the generals everyone who could give a knowledgeable opinion of him agreed that Clearchus was a real soldier and a man who exceptionally loved war. . . . This in my opinion is the record of a man who loved war. He could have lived in peace without shame or injury, but he chose to make war. He could have taken his ease but he preferred hard work and fighting. He could have been wealthy without any risk to himself, but he chose to reduce his fortune by making war. Indeed he chose to spend his money on war just as if he were spending it on love affairs or any other pleasures of this kind. All this indicates how devoted to war he was. In respect of his soldierly qualities, these are seen in his love of danger as he led attacks on the enemy day and night, and in his ability to keep his head in difficult circumstances, as everyone who was present with him anywhere agrees. People said that he had all the qualities of leadership that it was possible for a man of his kind to have. He was exceptionally clever at working out how his army could get supplies and ensuring that they actually turned up, and he was very effective in making sure that those around him knew that Clearchus was a man to be obeyed. He achieved this by being tough. For he had a forbidding expression and a rough voice. He imposed tough penalties, and sometimes acted in anger, so that he repented of what he had done. Indeed he inflicted punishment on principle, for he thought that an undisciplined army was useless. People claimed that he said that a soldier should fear his commander more than the enemy, if he was going to keep a good watch, or avoid doing any damage to his own side, or advance on the enemy without hesitation. Therefore in difficult circumstances the soldiers had particular confidence in him and did not want anyone else. It was then, so it was said, that his forbidding expression seemed to shine out and his toughness appeared to be strength in the face of the enemy, so that it seemed not toughness but a source of protection. But when they had escaped the danger and there was an opportunity of going away to take up service under another leader, many abandoned him. For he was not pleasant, but indeed was always tough and ferocious, so that the soldiers had a relationship with him like pupils and a schoolteacher. Therefore he never bound his followers to him by friendship or good will. However, 55


he enforced total obedience among all those who had been placed under his command by their city or who were forced to serve with him because of poverty or some other pressing need. When they started to win victories with him against the enemy it was obvious how important were the factors that made his followers good soldiers. They had a confidence in the face of the enemy, and fear of punishment from him made them well disciplined. This was the kind of commander he was. But he was said not to like being under the command of others. He was about fifty years old when he died. For the Anabasis, see p. 22; for Clearchus see also above, no. 23.

44 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.47–9 (leading by personal example) Soteridas, a man from Sicyon, said: ‘We are not equal, Xenophon. For you are on horseback while I am struggling with great difficulty to carry my shield.’ When Xenophon heard this he jumped from his horse, pushed Soteridas out of the ranks and taking his shield away from him marched on as quickly as he could carrying the shield. He happened to be wearing a cavalry breastplate and found the going difficult. He kept on urging those in front to keep going and those behind to catch up, though he himself could scarcely keep up with them. But the other soldiers beat Soteridas, threw stones at him and shouted abuse until they forced him to take back his shield and march on. Xenophon mounted his horse and while the road was passable led on horseback, but when it was impassable he left his horse behind and hurried forward on foot. And so they reached the summit before the enemy. The context is the retreat of the ten thousand from the pursuit of Tissaphernes, the Persian king’s general and satrap of Sardis. Xenophon’s task was to occupy a strategic hill.

45 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.3.10–11 (the approachable general) While Xenophon was having his breakfast two young men ran up. For everyone knew that it was permissible to approach him when he was having breakfast or dinner and even to wake him if he were asleep and talk to him if they had any information about the military situation. For the approachable general, see also no. 55.

56


46 Xenophon, Anabasis 5.8.12–15 (the general and discipline) Xenophon then asked any other soldier to say why he had been beaten. But when no one stood up, he carried on speaking himself: ‘I admit, soldiers, that I have struck men because of indiscipline. These are the kind of men who expected to have their lives preserved by you marching in good order and fighting wherever you must, while they abandoned the ranks and charged forward aiming to get more than their fair share of plunder. If we had all done this we would all have perished. Again, if someone began to weaken, refused to stand up, and began to give himself up to the enemy, I struck him and forced him to carry on marching. This was because I myself on one occasion during a period of intense cold sat down for a long time while waiting for some men who were packing their equipment, and then realized that I could hardly stand up and stretch my legs. Therefore as a result of my personal experience whenever I saw anyone sitting down and being lazy I drove him onwards. The context is a complaint directed at Xenophon by a soldier who claimed to have been struck by him and that he had acted in an overbearing manner. Xenophon pointed out that he had forced the man to carry a wounded comrade and then found him preparing to bury the man, who turned out to be still alive. When the soldier still refused to carry him Xenophon beat him. The soldiers approved of his action.

47 Xenophon, Anabasis 6.5.14–17 (military psychology) Xenophon eagerly joined in the discussion and spoke as follows: ‘Comrades, you know that I have never willingly introduced you to any danger. For I see that you do not want a glorious reputation for bravery but rather to stay alive. But the current situation is as follows. It is not possible for us to get away from here without fighting. For if we do not attack the enemy they will follow us and fall upon us as we withdraw. You should therefore consider whether it is better to advance against the enemy with your weapons at the ready or to turn tail and see the enemy following us from the rear. You know however that retreat in the face of the enemy is no honourable move while pursuit brings confidence even to the cowardly. Indeed I should be happier to conduct a pursuit with half the number of soldiers than to retreat with double the number. For the importance of military psychology, see also nos 59; 61; 63.

57


48 Xenophon, Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas) I could not say that his campaign proved a success. Nevertheless, in my opinion Epaminondas did not omit any single action of foresight or daring. For first of all I praise him because he pitched camp within the wall of Tegea where he was in a safer position than if he had encamped outside and where it was harder for the enemy to see what he was doing. Second, it was easier for him, being in the city, to prepare whatever he needed. On the other hand, since the enemy was encamped outside he could see whether they were acting wisely or making mistakes. Finally, while he thought that he was stronger than the enemy he could not be persuaded to attack them whenever he saw that they were holding an advantageous position. Xenophon is here describing the manoeuvring during the campaign of Mantinea, 362 BC.

49 Polybius, Histories 9.12.1–4; 14.1–5 (varied skills of a general) Unforeseen events that occur during military operations require great vigilance. But it is possible to achieve success in any of these if a man carries out his plan intelligently. It is easy for anyone who wishes to learn from past events that fewer military operations are accomplished openly by force than by stealth and exploitation of opportunity. What is more, it is not difficult to work out from experience that in those actions that occur through opportunity there are more failures than successes. No one should be ignorant of the fact that most of these failures have occurred because of the ignorance or indifference of the commander. (14) Of the skills (of generalship) mentioned above, some are acquired by practice, some by enquiry, and some by the meticulous acquisition of experience. It is best for the commander himself to know the roads and the locality to which he has to travel and the nature of the topography, and additionally the people through whom and with whom he is to conduct operations. The second option is for the commander to make careful enquiries and not to trust chance informants. It is essential that the pledges given by guides should always remain with those whom they are leading. Commanders can learn these and similar points through routine soldierly experience, partly by practice and partly by enquiry. However those matters concerning scientific matters need an education in the arts and sciences, and especially in astronomy and geometry. The work involved in this is 58


not great, at least for this requirement, and the study itself is important and can bring significant assistance to the activities mentioned above. This discussion of generalship does not have a clear context but was probably related to a fuller discussion of this theme in Polybius’ lost work on Tactics. We may note the importance of intellectual qualities in the commander and the value of a sound education.

50 Caesar, Gallic War 1.24–6 (battle against the Helvetii) When Caesar noticed this he led his forces to a nearby hill and sent the cavalry to meet the enemy’s attack. Meanwhile half-way up the hill he drew up his four veteran legions in a triple battle line and stationed on the summit of the hill the two legions that he had recently recruited in Italy and all the auxiliaries, so that the whole hill was filled with troops. He also ordered the baggage packs to be collected in one place and defensive works to be constructed round it by the soldiers stationed in the upper line. The Helvetii following with all their carts placed their baggage in one place and, after driving back our cavalry with a battle line in very close order, formed themselves in a phalanx and attacked uphill against our front line. (25) Caesar first sent his own horse away out of sight and then the horses of everyone else so that all should stand in equal danger and no one should have any chance of running away. Then he roused his men to action and joined battle. The soldiers, throwing their spears from the higher ground, easily broke the enemy phalanx, and then drew their swords and charged. The Gauls were greatly impeded in fighting because in many cases their overlapping shields were pierced and pinned together by the impact of one spear, which bent and could not be pulled out. With their left arm hampered they could not fight properly, and many having repeatedly tried to jerk their arm about (to free the shield), preferred to throw the shield down and fight unprotected. Finally, worn out with wounds they retreated and began to move towards a hill situated about a mile away. They occupied the hill and our men were following them when fifteen thousand Boii and Tulingi, who guarded the rear of the enemy column, marched up, attacked our men on their right flank and surrounded them. When the Helvetii who had retreated to the hill saw this they pressed forward again and renewed the battle. The Romans changed direction and advanced on two fronts, the first and second line to repulse the Helvetii who had already been defeated and driven back, the third to face the troops who were just arriving. 59


(26) This double battle continued for a long time and was fiercely contested. When they could no longer withstand our troops’ assault, one group as they had begun to do retreated to the hill, the other retired to the baggage and carts. Now, during this entire battle, which lasted from midday to evening, no one saw a single one of the enemy running away. Julius Caesar (100–44 BC) came from a patrician family and followed an ambitious political career in which he combined political skill, diplomatic dexterity, and a flair for bribery. After his consulship in 59 BC, he became governor of Transalpine Gaul and launched a ten-year military campaign in which he annexed all of Gaul, vastly increased his personal wealth, and created an army of battle-hardened legionaries bound in personal loyalty to him. Disagreement with his erstwhile ally Pompey led to the outbreak of civil war in 49, and in a series of campaigns in Spain, Greece, and Africa Caesar defeated all his opponents and eventually in 44 BC became perpetual dictator. In the same year he was murdered by disgruntled senators who resented his personal domination. He wrote an account of the wars he fought in Gaul (seven books, with an eighth added by Aulus Hirtius) and the civil war campaigns (three books). These are the only extant war commentaries written by an ancient commander. They explain and defend his policies and campaigns and have some vivid descriptions of battles and sieges. They combine information on the general sweep of his strategy and the tactical skill with which he manoeuvred his forces into advantageous positions and lured the enemy away from their strengths. In this way Caesar became a fruitful source of military exploits, as we see from Frontinus’ collection of stratagems. I have placed Caesar’s battle descriptions in this chapter rather than in Chapter 3 because they help to emphasize the role of the commander. For Caesar’s career see Gelzer (1969); text and translation of the Gallic War in Edwards (1917). Caesar here offers a general’s view of troop dispositions before a battle with native forces, and his response to the changing circumstances of the battle. Naturally he aimed to give the best impression of the Roman victory. For some of the problems of using ancient accounts of battles, see Campbell (2002), 47–8; see also below nos 51–3.

51 Caesar, Gallic War 2.19–21 (Caesar’s role in a battlefield crisis) In accordance with his usual practice when approaching the enemy, Caesar marched at the head of the column with six legions not burdened with any heavy baggage. Next he stationed the baggage train of the entire army, and then two legions that had been recently recruited formed the rearguard and protected the baggage. Our cavalry with the slingers and archers crossed the river and joined battle with the enemy cavalry. The enemy repeatedly withdrew into the woods to their comrades and then charged out of the wood again to attack our men, who did not dare to pursue them further than the end of the open ground. Meanwhile the six legions that had first arrived measured out the ground and began to fortify a camp. As soon as the Gauls who were 60


hidden in the wood spotted the head of our army’s baggage train, which they had agreed among themselves as the moment to join battle, and since they had drawn up their battle line under cover of the trees and were brimming with confidence, they suddenly sprang forward with all their forces and attacked our cavalry. The cavalry was easily routed and driven back, and with incredible speed the enemy charged up to the river so that they seemed in virtually one moment to be at the edge of the trees, in the water, and right on top of us. With equal speed they charged uphill to attack our camp and the men working on its fortifications. (20) Caesar had to do everything at once – hoist the flag, which was the usual signal for running to arms, sound the trumpet signal, call the soldiers back from their work, summon those who had gone further away to get material for the defences, draw up the battle line, encourage the soldiers, give the signal for battle. Many of these tasks could not be done because the enemy’s swift attack left no time. Two factors helped in this crisis; first, the knowledge and experience of the soldiers, since through their training in earlier battles they were able to work out for themselves what needed to be done rather than be told by someone else. Second, Caesar had issued an order forbidding the commanders of individual legions to leave the work until the camp fortifications had been completed. Because enemy were so close and coming on so quickly, these officers did not wait for further commands from Caesar but on their own responsibility carried out whatever they thought best. (21) After giving only essential orders rushed off to give words of encouragement to the troops Caesar happened to meet and came upon the tenth legion. He encouraged the soldiers in a brief address to remember their previous courage, to keep their nerve, and resist the enemy attack bravely. When the enemy was only a spear-cast away he gave the signal for battle. He moved off to another part of the battlefield to encourage the troops there and found them already fighting. Time was so brief and the enemy was so eager for action that they had no time even to don their helmets or remove the covering from their shields, never mind put on their decorations. As each man came down from his work on the camp he took up position in the first place he came to under the first standard he saw, in case in searching for his own unit he wasted time for fighting. The battle line was formed according to the nature of the terrain and the sloping hillside and the requirements of the circumstances rather than military theory and procedure. For different legions were fighting on several fronts in separate actions, and thick hedges impeded the view, as I pointed out 61


before. Therefore Caesar could not decide with certainty where to place reserves or foresee what assistance might be needed at what point in the battlefield, and a unified command was out of the question. In these very adverse circumstances there were of course many changes of fortune. Caesar describes the defeat of the Nervii in 57 BC.

52 Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Roman commander) As I said above, there was no regular force, no town, and no garrison that could put up armed resistance, but instead the bulk of the population was dispersed in all directions. Individuals had hidden themselves in any remote valley or wooded glade or impenetrable marsh that offered a hope of safety or escape. These places were known to the locals, and the situation required great care, not in safeguarding the entire army (for no harm could come to the force from a scattered and terrified enemy), but in protecting individual soldiers. Now, what happened to individuals could affect the welfare of the army, for many were lured away over longer distances by a desire for booty, and the woods with their faint and concealed pathways did not allow advance in close formation. If he wanted to finish the business and exterminate the whole criminal tribe he would have to deploy the troops by sending out a large number of individual detachments. But if he wished to keep the troops in regular formation, as established wisdom and Roman military practice required, then the terrain protected the barbarians. Furthermore, some of them were courageous enough to arrange surprise ambushes and surround scattered soldiers. In this difficult situation the most thorough precautions possible were taken, and Caesar decided that it was preferable to let go a chance of damaging the enemy, even though everyone was ferociously intent on vengeance, rather than damage them severely and risk harming his own troops. Therefore he sent messengers to the neighbouring tribes summoning them all to him in the expectation of gaining booty by plundering the Eburones. He preferred Gallic lives to be at risk in the forests rather than the lives of Roman legionaries, and he also intended to surround the Eburones with a huge multitude, so that the very existence and name of this tribe, which was guilty of such an outrageous crime, should be exterminated. From all directions an enormous number of men rapidly assembled. In 54 BC the Eburones under Ambiorix had defeated and killed Caesar’s lieutenant, Quintus Titurius Sabinus.

62


53 Caesar, Gallic War 7.85–8 (role of general in directing the battle) Caesar found a suitable spot from which he could observe what was going on in every part of the field and sent help where the soldiers were in trouble. Both sides realized that this was the crucial moment for a superlative effort. The Gauls knew that unless they broke through the fortifications they had no chance; the Romans knew that if they held out they could expect the end of all their toils. The greatest danger was at the fortifications on the hill where Vercassivellaunus had been sent, as I pointed out before. The unfavourable downward slope of the ground was very damaging to the Romans. Some of the Gauls hurled spears while others linked their shields over their heads and attacked the wall; when they tired fresh men replaced them. They all threw earth on the fortifications and this allowed them to climb the wall and also filled in the traps that the Romans had hidden. Our men were running out of weapons and strength. (86) When Caesar saw this he sent Labienus to help with six cohorts. He gave orders that if the attack could not be repulsed he should withdraw some of the cohorts and make a counter-attack, but that this should be done only as a last resort. Caesar himself visited the troops elsewhere in the line and urged them not to succumb to their exhaustion, pointing out that all the fruits of their earlier battles depended on that very day and hour. The besieged Gauls, giving up hope of storming the enormous fortifications on the plain, tried an attack on one of the steep ascents and brought there all the implements they had collected. They drove the defenders from the towers with showers of missiles, filled in the ditches with earth and faggots, and pulled down the rampart and breastwork with their hooks. (87) Caesar first sent young Brutus to help with some cohorts, and then more under the senior officer Gaius Fabius. Finally, as the battle raged more fiercely he himself led fresh troops to the rescue. He restored the situation, drove the enemy back, and then hastened off to the spot to which he had sent Labienus. He took four cohorts from the nearest fort and ordered part of the cavalry to follow him and the rest to circle round the outside of the fortifications and attack the enemy in the rear. Since neither the ramparts nor the ditches had succeeded in breaking the force of the enemy assault, Labienus collected together eleven cohorts, which fortunately he had brought from nearby forts, and sent messengers to tell Caesar what he thought should be done. Caesar put on speed in order to join in the fighting. (88) Everyone could see him coming because of the conspicuous colour of his cloak, which he always wore in battle to show his identity, and when the enemy saw the cavalry 63


squadrons and cohorts that he had ordered to follow him, since from their lofty position they could see the sloping lower ground, they joined battle. Both sides raised a war cry and this was answered by the shouts of the men on the ramparts and all the fortifications. Our men put down their spears and used their swords. Suddenly the cavalry was spotted in the rear and other cohorts were approaching. The enemy fled, but the cavalry caught the fugitives and a great slaughter ensued. Sedulius, chieftain and leader of the Lemovici was killed. Vercassivellaunus the Avernian was captured alive as he tried to flee. Seventy-four military standards were brought to Caesar and only a few men from the enemy’s large force got back safely to their camp. When the Gauls in the town saw the flight and slaughter of their companions they abandoned hope of rescue and withdrew their forces from the fortifications. When the news got out the Gauls immediately fled from their camp, and if the Roman soldiers had not been exhausted by bringing support to their colleagues and an entire day of toil, all the enemy forces could have been destroyed. The cavalry was sent out and caught up with the rearguard around midnight, capturing or killing a great number of them. The survivors of the rout dispersed to their homes. Caesar is here describing the final defeat of the Gauls at the siege of Alesia in 52 BC. This is a useful account of the role of the commander in assessing the battle and committing reserves, the importance of counter-attack, a decisive cavalry attack in the rear, and personal leadership and encouragement by the commander; cf. no. 268.

54 Onasander, The General Preface 4–6 (importance of competent generals) It remains for me to say confidently that my book will be a guide for good generals and a memorial to retired generals during this age of imperial peace. And we shall know, if nothing else, why some generals have tripped and fallen and why some have been successful and have become famous. In particular, we shall examine the valour of the Romans, how neither king, nor city, nor nation ever established a bigger empire or even equalled them in setting up secure control for so many years. For in my view it is not merely by chance that they have overrun all the land of Italy and extended their dominion to the ends of the earth, but by good generalship. We should pray to Fortune to do her share but not think that she has absolute control over everything. It is stupid people who attribute setbacks to Fortune alone rather than to the carelessness of generals, and who attribute success to her rather than to the skill of commanders. 64

THE GENERAL’S ROLE Onasander as far as is known had no military experience. In fact traditionally he is supposed to have written a commentary on Plato’s Republic. His treatise on generalship is dedicated to Quintus Veranius, pretty certainly the consul of AD 49 who was governor of Britain in 57–8, where he conducted military operations in Wales. Although Onasander claims to have studied the exploits and practices of the men ‘from whom has come the entire supremacy of the Romans in race and courage right down to the present day’ (Proem. 7), he does not cite any illustrative material from Roman history. In fact, much of his material is rather bland, lacking a specific context, and could refer to most armies in the field, since he is principally interested in general principles of command and the character and demeanour of the commander. The ethical framework blends in with the performance of the general in the field. The interesting point is that despite this background Onasander still feels that his work was not merely of antiquarian interest but would be of direct relevance (see above p. 13). Text and translation in W.A. Oldfather (1928); for the character of the work see discussion in Ambaglio (1981), Smith (1998).

55 Onasander, The General 2.1–3 (moral qualities of generalship) We should admire the general who is good, well-born, and rich, but we should not reject the man who is poor but talented even if he is not from a distinguished family. The chosen general should be honest, approachable, active, calm, not so tolerant as to be despised nor so tough as to be hated, so that he does not undermine the army by indulgence or alienate it through fear. Onasander here emphasizes the moral qualities of generalship. It is also assumed that a general will normally be from the upper classes; see also no. 70.

56 Onasander, The General 6.5–7; 10–13 (the general and his army on the march) A marching formation that is compact and rectangular (indeed virtually square-shaped) is secure and easy to handle for every eventuality. . . . The general should place the medical equipment, draught animals, and all the baggage in the middle of the formation and not outside. If he thinks that the rear (of the army) is not entirely safe and secure, he should choose the rearguard from the strongest and bravest soldiers, believing that in the light of events the rear is of no less value than the front of the army. The general should send cavalry on ahead to scout the roads, especially when he is advancing through wooded country or a deserted landscape interrupted by ridges. For the enemy frequently set up ambushes, which, if they escape detection, can bring complete disaster to the other side. But if they are detected through a little foresight 65


they show to the enemy general outstanding competence on the part of his opponent. . . . (10) When passing through an ally’s land the general should order his soldiers not to touch the countryside and not to seize property or destroy anything. For a large force under arms shows no mercy when it has the power of exercising control, and the sight of riches nearby entices the stupid to greed. But small incidents alienate allies or make them relentlessly hostile. On the other hand, he should destroy, burn, and ravage the enemy’s country. For a loss of resources and a shortage of crops impede warfare, while a surplus encourages it. However first he should let the enemy know what he intends to do, for often the expectation of suffering to come has compelled those in danger, before they suffered anything, to come to agreement on terms that they had previously not wanted to accept. But when they have suffered just one setback, thinking that nothing can be worse they despise future dangers. If the general intends to encamp for a long time in enemy territory he should destroy only those kinds of things in the country that he himself will not need; he should not touch items that if preserved will be useful to his friends. When the army has been brought up to full strength he should not delay and spend time in his own country, or that of a subject or an ally. For he will use up his own crops and will harm his friends more than his enemies. He should lead his army over the border as soon as possible if affairs are secure at home. For he will obtain generous provisions from the enemy country if it is rich and fertile, but if it is not, at least he will not be damaging friendly territory and he will gain great benefit from the pain of the hostile country. This analysis applies particularly to wars between Greek city-states.

57 Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory) The general, when he is encamping in the territory of the enemy should protect his camp with a stockade and ditch even if he is intending to pitch camp for just one day. A fortified camp of this kind will never be regretted, because of sudden and unforeseen attacks. He should station guards as if the enemy are nearby, even if he thinks that they are far distant. If the enemy are not advancing to attack and the general intends to encamp for some time, either to ravage the land or wait for a more suitable time for battle, he should chose a location that is not marshy or damp. For places like this by their effluence and bad air 66


bring disease and infection to the soldiers, damage the health of many and kill many, so that the army is left not only smaller but weaker.

58 Onasander, The General 10.1–2 (preparing an army for battle) Therefore it is the role of a good general to prepare whatever is useful for warfare at a time when there is no immediate threat of a pitched battle, and to assign trivial tasks in order to keep the soldiers in good physical condition. For it is good enough relaxation for the soldiers even if they are extremely tired to train without the dangers associated with a real conflict. The general should train his men in a way such as follows. First he should arm the soldiers and then draw them up in formation so that they become experienced in holding their position in the ranks and become familiar with each other’s faces and names, and so that each soldier knows beside whom he takes his position and where and after how many. Therefore on one clear command they all form ranks. Onasander goes on to describe the need to practise drawing up formations, staging mock battles, and also training the cavalry.

59 Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley) If the general, while keeping his troops in the same spot, goes to meet the enemy commander for a conference, because he wishes to make or hear a proposal, he should choose (as his escort) the most powerful and most impressive of the younger soldiers, strong, handsome, and tall men; he should equip them with splendid armour and taking them with him go to meet the enemy commander. For on many occasions the whole of something is judged on the sight of only a part of it, and the general makes his decision on what he should do not on the basis of what he has heard but because he has been frightened by what he has seen.

60 Onasander, The General 10.25–6 (making religious observances) The general should not lead the army out on a journey or draw it up for battle without first making a sacrifice. Indeed officials responsible for sacrifices and diviners should accompany him. It is best if the 67


general himself can examine the omens knowledgeably, for it is easy to learn quickly and therefore he can become a good adviser to himself. He should begin every undertaking only when the omens are favourable and he should call all the officers to inspect the offerings, so that after having seen them they can tell the men under them to be of good heart since the gods are ordering them to fight. For soldiers are much more courageous whenever they think that they are going forward into danger with the support of the gods. . . . But if the omens are unfavourable, he must remain in the same spot, even if he is under some severe pressure to act quickly, and put up with every discomfort (for he can suffer nothing worse than what the divine Power prophesies), since if things are going to get better he must have favourable indications in the sacrifice and he must offer sacrifice several times on the same day. Onasander is probably thinking more of Greek practice than of the Romans of the imperial period. For sacrifice before battle, see Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 109–26; he also collects evidence for religion and war in Part III (1979); Jameson, in Hanson (1991).

61 Onasander, The General 13.1–3 (military psychology) Whenever despondency and fear have infected an army because the enemy has received reinforcements or gained an advantage, then above all the general should show himself to the soldiers as genial, cheerful, and resolute. For the appearance of the commanders brings a reciprocal change in the minds of the soldiers, and if the general is confident and looks cheerful the army also takes courage in the belief that there is no danger. But if the general is downcast and anxious, then the soldiers’ spirits drop in the belief that a great disaster is imminent. Therefore the general must inspire the confidence of the army more by the expression on his face than by his words. For many people distrust speeches because they have been put together to suit the occasion, but thinking that a confident appearance is sincere trust in his fearlessness. But it is good to understand both these ideas and to say the appropriate words and have the appropriate expression. For military psychology, see also nos 47; 59; 63. For the general’s speech, see Lazenby, in Hanson (1991), 90; in the Roman army – Campbell (1984), 69–88.

68


62 Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop dispositions) A shrewd general, seeing that the enemy has many troops while he is about to engage in battle with fewer, will choose or get in the habit of finding places where he can prevent the enemy’s encircling movement by drawing up his army beside the bank of a river. Or, by choosing a mountainous district he can use the mountains themselves to block those who aim to outflank him, stationing a few men on the summits to prevent the enemy from climbing above the army. It is not knowledge of military procedure alone that contributes to this, but also luck. For you must have luck to find these localities; you cannot prepare the ground to suit yourself. It is, however, the mark of an intelligent general to choose the best of the localities available and to know the ones that will help.

63 Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology) The general should sometimes ride alongside the battle lines and call out to his solders if he happens to be on the right wing, ‘Our soldiers on the left wing are defeating the enemy’s right wing’. If he is on the left wing he should say that the right wing is victorious whether this is true or not, for deception is necessary when ‘a great strife has arisen’. For example, when the leader of the enemy is far distant or on the other wing or holding the centre of the phalanx, he (the general) should call out, ‘The enemy leader has been killed’, or ‘the king’, or whoever it may be. And the general should shout this out in such a way that the enemy also hears it. For his own soldiers, hearing that their comrades are more successful, take courage and become doubly keen to fight, while the enemy, learning that their side is being defeated, lose heart and indeed sometimes run away as soon as they hear such a report. The reference ‘a great strife has arisen’ is to Homer, Iliad 13.122.

64 Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best appearance) The general should make a point of drawing up his battle line in shining armour. This is an easy matter and needs only an order to sharpen swords and clean helmets and breastplates. For advancing groups of soldiers have a more fearsome appearance through the gleam from their weapons, and the terrible sight immediately strikes fear and consternation into the hearts of the enemy. 69


65 Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks) I am not entirely able to praise or censure generals who destroy their own defences or cross rivers or draw up their army with cliffs or deep gulfs behind them so that the soldiers stay and win the victory or be killed while aiming to escape. For everything involving excessive risk displays more daring than common sense and has more in common with luck than good judgement. In circumstances where a man must either conquer and triumph or be defeated and lose everything, how then can anyone believe that victory came about by deliberate plan or defeat by choice? However I do think that certain soldiers from the army should be allowed to run exceptional risks, for if they succeed they will bring great benefits and if they fail will not do equal damage. But I do not think that he (the general) should gamble on an uncertain outcome with the entire army. In my opinion the generals most at fault are those who employ stratagems that will do little damage to the enemy in the event of victory but in defeat will do great harm to their own soldiers. Cf. no. 88.

66 Onasander, The General 33.1–2 (the general and personal combat) The general should himself fight cautiously rather than daringly, or indeed keep entirely out of a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. For even if in battle he shows unsurpassable courage, by fighting he cannot bring a benefit to the army comparable to the loss if he is killed. For the knowledge of a general is of greater value than his strength. Even an ordinary soldier can perform some great deed through his physical bravery, but no one except the general can through his knowledge plan a greater one. If the captain of a ship abandoning the helm himself took on the duties of ordinary sailors he would endanger the ship. Similarly, if a general should abandon the skilful direction of operations and descend to the tasks of ordinary soldiers, his aimless neglect of the entire situation will make pointless the routine work of the soldiers. In Greek phalanx warfare, once the general had made his dispositions and the troops were on the move, arguably he could best influence the outcome by fighting or leading by example. In any case, death in battle was held to be honourable. However, a general might want to hold himself ready to take charge at some crisis or turning point of the battle; see above, p. 4, n. 9. By the fourth century warfare had become more complicated, with the greater use of light-armed troops and cavalry and the opportunity to deploy reserves. The general needed a more detached position, though

70

THE GENERAL’S ROLE individuals developed their own style, and Alexander was famous for leading the Macedonian cavalry charge that was decisive in so many of his battles. In the developed Roman army the general needed to direct the battle and self-sacrifice could endanger the army. Yet generals would still enter the battle in a crisis and in a rout the general might be unable to avoid the chaos. After Cannae the senate treated Terentius Varro the surviving consul with respect, thanking him ‘for not despairing of the Republic’. In the imperial period the emperor was commander-in-chief, and when on campaign made sure to identify with his ‘fellow-soldiers’ and even sometimes share their food. But he did not fight in person, instead directing the battle with the advice of his senior commanders; see Campbell (1984), 65–9; also Goldsworthy (1996), 156–63; no. 95.

67 Onasander, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and honouring soldiers) The general on his return from battle should first offer to the gods those sacrifices and celebrations that circumstances permit, promising to make the usual thank-offerings after complete victory in the war. Then he should honour with the customary gifts and rewards those soldiers who have distinguished themselves in the face of danger, and punish those who proved themselves to be cowards. In Greece special gifts from the booty could be given to soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle (Diodorus Siculus 11.25.1); see in general Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 53–100; V (1991), 68–203; 363–438. In the Roman imperial period there was a highly developed system of military decorations – Maxfield (1981).

68 Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead) The general should make provision for the burial of the dead and should not make a pretext for delay either circumstance, or time, or place, or fear, whether he happens to have been victorious or defeated. This is both a holy act of piety towards the dead and an essential demonstration for the living. For each soldier (if the dead are unburied) thinks that his body will not be cared for if he happens to fall in battle, as he sees what happens with his own eyes and imagines the future; he feels that if he should die he also will be left unburied and becomes very annoyed at this insolent neglect of burial rights. For the burial of the fallen, see Pritchett, GSW IV (1985), 94–259; Vaughn, in Hanson (1991); Sage (1996), 98–100; Campbell (2002), 69.

71


69 Onasander, The General 38.1–2 (dealing with surrenders) The general should treat kindly and benevolently any cities that open their gates and surrender at the start of the war, for in this way he will persuade others to do the same. The alluring expectation of similar treatment persuades the majority to surrender voluntarily. But the general who acts in a severe and aggressive manner when he has become master of a city, plundering, killing, and wrecking, makes other cities hostile, with the result that the war becomes burdensome for him and victory difficult to achieve. Since they realize that the punishment of the vanquished by the vanquisher is pitiless, they will do and suffer anything rather than surrender their cities.

70 Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and conduct in victory) If the general is hurrying to complete some project in hand, he should not hesitate to be seen to be the first to join in the work. For soldiers are not moved to carry out their duties so much by the threats of their immediate officers as by the example of their commanders. For when a soldier sees that his commander is the first to join in the work he not only understands the need for speed but is also ashamed not to work and fears to disobey. Furthermore, the ordinary soldiers no longer think that they are like slaves receiving orders but are exhorted as if encouraged by someone on equal footing. (14) Perhaps someone may ask if the general himself has been made of adamant or iron so as to stand alone without sleep through every task. The answer is no, but during the time when he is asleep, and this must be brief and restricted, he should hand over his command to one of his most reliable and courageous officers, from those second only to him in military rank. (24) If it should happen that everything turns out as the general wishes and the war is brought to a complete end, he should not be overbearing in his good fortune but even-handed, displaying not stupidity and harshness, but kindly good will. For the former excites envy, the latter imitation. . . . Therefore a good man will be not only an excellent leader of his fatherland and the army, but also an intelligent strategist for the permanent safeguarding of his own reputation.

72


71 Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders before battle) Since I alone of those learned in the field of military science have undertaken to expound it systematically and seem to have succeeded in that enterprise as far as my diligence permitted, I think that I should now complete the task I have begun by setting out with short descriptions the clever ploys of commanders, which the Greeks summarize in one term, strategemata. For through this commanders will be equipped with examples of wisdom and foresight, which will nourish their ability to devise and carry out similar actions. There is the added advantage that a commander who compares his own stratagem against proven experiments will not be worried about how it will turn out. These are the types of stratagems that guide a commander in whatever that needs to be done before a battle: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII

On concealing your plans On discovering the enemy’s plans On establishing the character of the war On leading an army through places infested with the enemy On getting away from a very difficult position On setting up an ambush on the march How to conceal a deficiency in those things that you lack or to supply substitutes for them On distracting the enemy’s attention On quelling a mutiny of the soldiers How to restrain an inappropriate demand for battle How to rouse an army to battle On dispelling fear that has infected soldiers because of adverse omens

For the following extracts, which overlap with Chapter 3, I have selected examples where the commander gives a strong personal lead. The lists of headings (see also below nos 75; 77; 78) give a good indication of the military operations with which a commander was expected to be competent to deal.

72 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny) When some legions of Julius Caesar mutinied to the point that they seemed to threaten even the commander’s life, he concealed his fear, confronted the soldiers, and with a grim expression voluntarily granted discharge to those asking for it. But regret for what they had 73


done compelled those who had been discharged to apologize to their commander and to promise greater obedience in future operations. This incident occurred in 47 BC with Caesar’s famous tenth legion; cf. Suetonius, Caesar 70; Appian, Civil Wars 2.92–4.

73 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius’ leadership) When the same Sertorius saw that his troops were incautiously demanding the signal for battle and thought that they were going to ignore his commands if they did not get to grips with the enemy, he allowed a squadron of cavalry to advance to harass their opponents. When they got into difficulties he sent other troops to rescue them and in this way brought them all back safely. Therefore safely and without risk he demonstrated what the result of the battle they had demanded would have been. From then on he found them most obedient to his orders. Cf. Plutarch, Sertorius 16. Quintus Sertorius, an eques with distinguished military service, assisted Cinna in the capture of Rome in 87 BC during the civil war against Sulla. He took command in Spain and after being driven out returned to lead a renegade group of those who opposed the government in Rome after the death of Sulla. Eventually he controlled most of Roman Spain, winning numerous victories including a defeat of Pompey at Lauro in 77. He was assassinated by one of his own supporters in 73.

74 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men) When Epaminondas, commander of the Thebans, was about to fight against the Spartans, to make his soldiers not only physically but also emotionally stronger, he announced in a speech that the Spartans had resolved if victorious to kill all males, lead their wives and children away into slavery, and destroy Thebes utterly. The Thebans were stirred up by this announcement and broke through the Spartans on the first attack. Frontinus is presumably referring to the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC (see p. 4).

74


75 Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems) These are the types (of stratagem) that concern the battle itself: I II III IV V VI

On choosing the time for battle On choosing the place for battle On drawing up the battle line On disrupting the enemy’s battle line On ambushes On letting the enemy escape in case, being penned in, he renews the battle in desperation VII On concealing reverses VIII On restoring morale by fearlessness I think that these are the types of stratagem that relate to what must be done after the battle: IX X XI XII

On ending the war after a successful battle On repairing losses after a defeat On keeping the loyalty of untrustworthy elements On what must be done for the defence of the camp if you have insufficient confidence in your existing forces XIII On retreating

76 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership) When Marcus Furius Camillus met his army in retreat, he said that he would not take back into the camp anyone who was not victorious, and leading them back into the battle won the victory. (12) When his legionaries were giving way before the army of Mithridates under the command of Archelaus, Lucius Sulla drew his sword and ran into the front line and addressing his men said that if anyone enquired where they had abandoned their general they should reply: ‘Fighting in Boeotia.’ Shamed by these words all of them followed him. Camillus was fighting the Volscians in 381 BC (Livy, 6.24). Sulla was commanding the Roman army at the battle of Orchomenus in 85 BC. Cf. Plutarch, Sulla 21; Appian, Mithridatic Wars 49; Polyaenus 8.9.2.

75


77 Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges) Omitting all siegeworks and siege engines, the invention of which has long since reached its limit and for which I see no further improvement through the application of the arts, I have compiled the following types of stratagem concerning sieges: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI

On surprise attacks On deceiving the besieged On encouraging treachery On the means by which the enemy can be reduced to need How to persuade the enemy that you will persist with the siege On distracting the attention of hostile garrisons On diverting rivers and contaminating water On instilling panic into the besieged On breaking in from an unexpected quarter On setting ambushes to lure out the besieged On pretending to retire On the other hand these are stratagems concerning the protection of the besieged:

XII XIII XIV XV

On encouraging the vigilance of your own troops On sending and receiving messages On bringing in reinforcements and supplying provisions How to make it seem that there is an abundance of what is lacking XVI How to deal with traitors and deserters XVII On sorties XVIII On pertinacity among the besieged

78 Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the army) (Frontinus turns to stratagems that do not fall under the previous specific headings.) Naturally this material that has been left over needs to be explained and in doing that I shall try to keep to the following categories: I On discipline II On the effects of discipline III On restraint 76


IV V VI VII

On justice On determination On good will and moderation On various maxims

79 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus’ leadership) Pyrrhus is said to have commented to his recruiting officer: ‘You choose the big men. I shall make them brave!’ Pyrrhus (319–272 BC) was king of Epirus and, responding to an appeal from the people of Tarentum for help against the Romans, landed in southern Italy with 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 20 elephants. He won several hard-fought battles but withdrew in 275 leaving a garrison in Tarentum and having lost more than two-thirds of his army. He was killed while intervening in Argos in 272 and in that year the Romans captured Tarentum.

80 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an example) The same general (Hannibal), when serving under Hasdrubal as commander, usually slept on the bare ground covered only by his military cloak. (9) It is said that Scipio Aemilianus used to eat bread that had been handed to him as he walked along on the march with his friends. (14) In the war conducted under the auspices of Emperor Caesar Domitian Augustus Germanicus, which Julius Civilis had begun in Gaul, the extremely wealthy city of the Lingones, which had defected to Civilis, feared that the approaching army of the emperor would plunder it. But because contrary to expectations the people were left untouched and lost none of their property they returned to their loyalty and handed over to me seventy thousand armed men. For Hannibal as a commander see Lazenby (1978). For the tradition of the frugal commander who shared the privations of his men, to which Roman emperors aspired, see Campbell (1984), 32–59. Frontinus was perhaps commanding a legion during the revolt of Civilis in AD 70. Domitian was formally in control because Vespasian and Titus were still absent from Rome.

81 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander) When Camillus was besieging the Faliscians, a school teacher took the children of the Faliscians outside the walls on the pretext of going for 77


a walk and then handed them over, saying that if they were kept as hostages the community would be forced to do whatever he commanded. But Camillus not only disdained the school teacher’s treachery but tying his hands behind his back he handed him over to his pupils to be driven back to their parents with sticks. Through his kindness he obtained the success that he had declined to win by treachery since the Faliscians voluntarily surrendered to him because of this act of justice. Camillus secured the surrender of Falerii in 394 BC (cf. Livy, 5.27; Plutarch, Camillus 10; Polyaenus, 8.7). Again we see the importance of the moral aspects of generalship.

82 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander) Lucius Paullus, after losing his army at Cannae, when Lentulus offered him a horse on which to escape, refused to survive the disaster although he had not been responsible for it. Instead he remained seated on the rock on which he had leaned when he had been wounded, until he was overwhelmed and pierced through by the enemy. The other consul, Terentius Varro, survived the defeat at Cannae in 216 BC; see above no. 66, and also no. 125.

83 Frontinus Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander) When Alexander was marching at the head of his troops during a winter’s day, he sat down beside a fire and began to review the soldiers as they passed by. Since he noticed that one soldier was nearly dead with cold he ordered him to sit in his place, saying: ‘If you had been born in Persia it would be a capital offence to sit on the king’s chair; but since you were born in Macedonia it is granted to you.’ The incident is described by Curtius Rufus (8.4.15–17), who has Alexander say: ‘For a Persian, sitting on the king’s throne would have meant death, for you it meant life.’

84 Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexander’s way of giving orders) He (Alexander) stationed Ptolemy son of Lagus there, giving him three chiliarchies of hypaspists, all the Agrianians, and one company of archers, and he made clear the place where he expected that the 78


tribesman would probably try to break through. He said: ‘When you see the tribesmen breaking through here you yourself with your army prevent them from going any further and order the bugler to sound the signal. And you, officers, when this signal is given will each with his assigned forces go in the direction of the uproar, wherever the bugler summons you. I shall be present personally at the action.’ If the source of this passage is Ptolemy himself, then we have a good indication of how Alexander issued orders.

85 Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commander’s role in battle) Nearchus recounts that he (Alexander) was upset because some of his friends had blamed him for taking personal risks in the forefront of his army. They said that this was the duty not of a commander but of a common soldier. In my view Alexander was annoyed with these comments because he knew that they were true and that he had left himself exposed to this criticism. However, because of his passion in battle and his love of glory he was not resolute enough to keep away from danger, just like men who are overcome by any other kind of pleasure.

86 Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.1–3 (endurance and example of Alexander) At this stage a noble action, as noble as any other carried out by Alexander, should in my opinion not be left in obscurity, whether it was done in this country or earlier in the land of the Parapamisadae, as some others have written. The army was marching through sand in heat that was already blazing, since they had to complete their journey by reaching a water supply, which was further along the road. Alexander himself was very thirsty but despite great difficulty persisted in leading the march on foot, so that the rest of the troops should (as usually happens in these circumstances) endure their tasks more easily when the distress was being shared equally. Meanwhile some light-armed soldiers made a sortie from the army looking for water, and found some collected in a shallow gully, a small and miserable spring. They easily collected the water and hurried to Alexander thinking that they were bringing something very valuable. When they came near they put the water in a helmet and offered it to the king. He took it and thanked them for bringing it, but then poured it out in the full view of everyone. The entire army was so inspired by this action that it looked 79


as if everyone had drunk the water that Alexander had poured away. I particularly praise this action of Alexander as an indication of his endurance and also of his generalship. Quintus Curtius places this incident in Sogdiana (7.5.10).

87 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.2–6 (qualities of generalship) They (the Macedonians) thought that in appearance and speed and movement he resembled Alexander, and also observed some shadow and imitation of Alexander in his dashing conduct and violence in battle. Whereas other kings recalled Alexander by their purple robes, bodyguards, the angle at which they held their head, and a loud voice, Pyrrhus alone did so by weapons and the deeds of his hands. It is possible to find examples of his skill in military dispositions, generalship, and shrewdness in the writings that he left concerning these matters. It is said that Antigonus when asked who was the best general replied, ‘Pyrrhus if he grows old’. He was, however, referring only to commanders in his own age. But Hannibal declared that of all generals Pyrrhus was first in skill and shrewdness, Scipio second, and himself third, as I described in my life of Scipio. Indeed Pyrrhus seems to have spent his time practising and thinking about this (generalship), since he considered it the most kingly aspect of learning, while the rest merely provided a smooth veneer and were of no account. Plutarch (c. AD 50–120) was a Greek from Chaeronea and also a Roman citizen. He was a philosopher and biographer who was deeply attached to Greek traditions and religious practices. He served as a priest at Delphi and also had influence among the élite in Rome, believing that Greeks and Romans could profit from one another. He was a prolific writer and his most famous work is the Parallel Lives, in which he set out to portray individual virtues or vices through a comparison of the careers of great men. His biographies therefore are slanted towards events and actions that reveal a man’s character rather than an examination of historical trends or detailed analysis. Furthermore, he had no military experience. However, occasionally he has useful descriptions of battles and the qualities of a general. For Plutarch’s career and works see Russell (1972). For Pyrrhus, see above, no. 79.

88 Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general) He (Augustus) thought nothing less suitable in an accomplished commander than haste and rashness. Consequently frequent sayings of 80


his were: ‘More haste, less speed’; ‘a cautious general is better than a bold one’; and ‘anything is done quickly enough that is done well enough’. He used to say that a war or a battle should not be undertaken at all unless it was obvious that there was greater expectation of success than fear of loss. For he said that those who pursued small gains at no small risk were like men fishing with a golden hook, the loss of which if it were broken off could not be compensated by any catch. Suetonius (born c. AD 70) was of equestrian rank and under Hadrian served as the emperor’s correspondence secretary. However, c. 122 he was dismissed for unknown reasons. He wrote biographies of famous Roman literary men and twelve imperial biographies from Julius Caesar to Domitian. In his position as secretary he had access to imperial archives and probably used some of this material in his biographies. He quotes verbatim important documents, which gives his work a unique flavour. He genuinely tried to illustrate the personalities of emperors as they attempted to cope with the demands and privileges of absolute power. See in general, Wallace-Hadrill (1983).

89 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1, Preface 1–3 (generals and stratagems) Most revered Emperors Antoninus (Marcus Aurelius) and Verus (Lucius Verus), you will win victory over the Persians and Parthians with the help of the gods, your own valour and the courage of the Romans, by means of which both in the past and now you have habitually triumphed in all wars and battles. I am a Macedonian and have a native ability to defeat Persians in battle and I wish to offer advice to you at this crucial time. If I were young enough I would eagerly serve as a soldier using my Macedonian vigour. But although you see that I am of advanced years I shall not even now be left entirely outside military service. Therefore I offer the following material on military knowledge, stratagems of commanders in the past, both to you as a substantial account of past deeds, and to those sent out by you, army commanders, governors, legionary legates, military tribunes, cohort commanders, and all other officers, who can develop their talents and skills from past successes. For it is an act of courage when someone uses his strength to overcome an enemy in battle, but it is an act of good sense to triumph through skill and ingenuity without fighting a battle. It is the highest wisdom of a shrewd commander to bring about a victory without risk. See also nos 91; 94; 96.

81


90 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example) When Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese the enemy moved forward and encamped at Oneum. A thunderstorm occurred, spreading fear among the soldiers, and the soothsayer urged him to hold back. But Epaminondas replied: ‘Not at all’, for the enemy camped in such a place were thunderstruck. The general’s reply instilled courage into the soldiers and they eagerly followed him.

91 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, Preface (a general’s need for military skill) Most revered Emperors Antoninus and Verus, I offer you this third book of Stratagems. The general’s understanding and skill demonstrated in these can benefit you, both as you wage war and preserve the peace. For all rulers need political generalship and foresight in order to guide communities into doing what is necessary. You who exercise imperial rule and are in charge of everything are always using a general’s understanding to work out what is best for your subjects. So, in peace you must exercise your mind with a general’s considerations, and in war – why do I need to write this? For it is obvious.

92 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 11; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62 (Iphicrates’ skill as a general) After he had routed the enemy Iphicrates used to follow them, leading the phalanx carefully and giving orders as follows: ‘You light-armed troops watch out for ambushes and harass the enemy stragglers. At river crossings, narrow places, or ditches you must certainly not encircle the fugitives, so that they are not compelled to fight in sheer desperation. It is not wise to pursue close to city walls, for many have come within missile range without noticing and retreated after suffering serious losses.’ (11) When Iphicrates was about to pitch camp he sent some men to seize a strong point some considerable distance from the camp. The people who were present asked in astonishment, ‘Why are you occupying that place?’ Iphicrates replied: ‘Who could have expected that this would happen?’ By this he showed them that in war it is necessary to guard against the unexpected. (14) Iphicrates routed the enemy and drove them into an enclosed space. Seeing that they had no avenue of retreat except for the absolute 82


need to conquer, he said, ‘We must not compel the enemy to be courageous’, and gave them the opportunity and space to escape so that he could keep his victory without risk. (17) Even when he was in friendly territory Iphicrates used to erect a palisade, saying ‘it is not the mark of a good general to say, “I did not think”’. (22) Iphicrates compared the ranks of an army to the human body. He said that the infantry phalanx was the trunk, light-armed troops the hands, cavalry the feet, and the general the head. ‘When the other parts are missing, the army is lame and disabled, but when the general is killed then the entire army is worthless.’ (46) After marching to Thrace with eight thousand soldiers Iphicrates encamped. Learning that the Thracians were intending to attack during the night he led his soldiers during the evening in a retreat of around 3 stades (about 600 yards) to a gully that could hide them. The Thracians attacked and sacked the empty camp in general disorder, laughing at the Greeks for running away. Iphicrates charging forward from hiding killed many of them and made many captives. (62) In Thrace Iphicrates took many of the Odrysians captive. The Odrysians then attacked him vigorously using slings and spears. But he placed beside each man in the front ranks a naked prisoner with his hands tied behind his back with thongs. The Odrysians, not wanting to wound their relatives, stopped slinging stones and hurling spears. For the career of Iphicrates, see p. 5. These excerpts from Polyaenus’ very long entry on Iphicrates give an impression of his style of leadership.

93 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander) In the first formal battle against the Persians, seeing that the Macedonians were already giving way, Alexander rode past shouting, ‘Let us charge once again, Macedonians, let us charge once more nobly’. And when they made a strong attack the Persians were routed. It is said that the victory was achieved by such a narrow margin. For the sources used by Polyaneus to illustrate Alexander’s leadership and stratagems, see Hammond (1996), who reckons that he was possibly using material from six authors including contemporary sources like Cleitarchus and Ptolemy, as well as Curtius Rufus and Arrian. Polyaenus probably chose the most striking version of a stratagem.

83


94 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from stratagems) Most revered Emperors Antoninus and Verus, I offer this fifth book of Stratagems to you, believing that I am not so deserving of praise for writing it as you are for your eagerness to read material of this kind when you are in charge of such a large empire. Now especially, when you are in charge not only of justice in peacetime but also administer the business of war, you consider that it is a stratagem for victory if you learn the ways in which the ancient commanders won their victories. For you realize that emperors waging war should understand great deeds. An enthusiasm for literature is useful for those who are at leisure, but for those in charge of armies knowledge of great deeds is the best teacher of what needs to be done to emulate those who have conquered in past times. These stratagems will show you how you may emulate the talent and victories of ancient commanders.

95 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle) Philopoemen did not think that it was right for a good general to lead the phalanx. Instead by riding round, now among the front ranks, now among the rear, and often in the middle, he oversaw everyone and corrected any faults. Philopoemen (c. 253–182 BC) served as a mercenary leader in Crete before becoming a general of the Achaean Confederacy; he fought to preserve Achaean independence against the Spartans and subsequently against interference from Rome.

96 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard against enemy tricks) Most revered Emperors Antoninus and Verus, I offer to you this seventh book of Stratagems in which you can learn that the barbarians are not entirely incapable of generalship. For they also are interested in devices, deceit, and trickery. Therefore you would do well to encourage yourselves and the commanders whom you send out not to despise the barbarians as being stupid and without craftiness, but on the contrary to be on guard above all against their deceit, untrustworthiness, and treachery, in which the barbarian race takes more pleasure than fighting. Distrust should be the best and impregnable guard against them, and along with this we shall have strength in military technique and shall practise a sharper skill against them since we have worked out beforehand the thinking behind their stratagems. 84


97 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipio’s tough leadership) When Scipio saw a soldier carrying a palisade stake he said, ‘You seem to be heavily laden, fellow-soldier’. When the soldier replied that he certainly was, Scipio said, ‘Probably you place your hope of safety in wood, not in your sword’. See also above, no. 21.

98 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for action) Julius Caesar ordered his soldiers to be continually at the ready, as if he was intending to lead out the army unexpectedly by day or night, during a festival, or in a storm. In this way he did not let slip an opportunity or a single day. Cf. Suetonius, Caesar 65.

99 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesar’s rapport with his troops) When Caesar learnt that several legions of soldiers had been cut down in Gaul he swore that he would not cut his hair before he attacked and took vengeance on those who had killed them. Therefore he won enormous good will for himself from everyone. (33) When a victim was found to have no heart Caesar said, ‘And what is odd if a dumb creature has no heart?’ When they heard this the soldiers took courage. Cf. Suetonius, Caesar 67; 77. For the defeat in Gaul, see above no. 52.

100 Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship) On essential and urgent campaigns, however, he (Caracalla) was unaffected and frugal, and enthusiastically carried out routine tasks on equal terms with everyone else. Indeed he used to march and run with the soldiers, did not wash or change his clothes, joined in every task, and took the same food as the rest of the soldiers. Often he would send a message to enemy leaders challenging them to single combat. But he made a very poor showing in the skills of a commander, in 85


which he should have been extremely well versed, as if he thought that victory lay in the performance of menial duties rather than in competent generalship. Cassius Dio (c. AD 164 until after 229) was a Greek from Bithynia and Roman senator. He was consul c. 204 and then, among other duties, served as governor of Africa, of Dalmatia, and finally of Upper Pannonia, where he commanded two legions. He was consul for the second time, with the emperor Severus Alexander in 229, and had been a friend of Septimius Severus the founder of the Severan dynasty. Dio was therefore well connected and experienced in holding administrative posts. He wrote a history of Rome in 80 books from the foundation to AD 229. This is an immensely valuable record, especially his account of events in his own lifetime, many of which he had witnessed. Despite his time in command of an army Dio had no special military expertise, but, depending on the sources he used, occasionally has valuable battle descriptions and reflections on the conduct of emperors on campaign. For Dio’s career and history see Millar (1964). Severus’ elder son Caracalla liked to pose as one of his soldiers and urged them to call him ‘fellow-soldier’; see Campbell (1984), 52–3. Dio tends to be highly critical of him.

101 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.2; 12–13; 18 (role of general in securing his army’s welfare) Now I shall describe a matter that requires the greatest care, namely, the means by which the good health of the army can be safeguarded, that is by site, water supply, climate, medical care, and exercise. In respect of site, do not let the soldiers spend time in an unhealthy region close to pestilential marshes, or on arid plains or hills without the shade of trees, or without tents in summer. They should not march out too late in the day in case they fall ill through sunstroke and the exertion of the march. Instead they should start before dawn and reach their objective in the heat of the day. In the depths of winter they should not make a night march through snow and frost, or endure a shortage of firewood or have an insufficient supply of clothing. For a soldier who is compelled to be cold will not be healthy or capable of an expedition. Nor should an army use contaminated or marsh water, for a drink of bad water is similar to poison and produces illness in those who drink it. Indeed it is the continual responsibility of the officers and tribunes and the senior commander to ensure that soldiers who fall ill for this reason are nursed back to health by appropriate foods and receive medical care. It is extremely difficult for those who are fighting both a war and disease. (12) The general should find out carefully what the soldiers are thinking on the very day on which they are going to fight. For 86


confidence or fear can be recognized from their expression, words, movement, and gestures. Do not be entirely confident if it is the recruits who want battle, for battle is sweet to the inexperienced. You will understand that you must postpone battle if experienced soldiers are afraid to fight. However, soldiers’ courage and fighting spirit grow through the advice and encouragement of their commander, especially if they receive such an account of the coming battle that they expect to obtain an easy victory. Then the general should point out the cowardice or blunders of the enemy, and remind the army if they have ever been beaten by us before. He should also say things calculated to inspire hatred of the enemy in the minds of the soldiers by stirring up their fury and indignation. . . . (13) A good commander should know that a good part of winning a victory concerns the place where the battle is to be fought. Make sure, therefore, that when you are about to join battle you first seek help from the place; it is generally held to be more useful, the higher the ground occupied. For weapons fall with greater velocity from above on those standing below, and soldiers on higher ground force back with greater impetus those opposing them. But the soldier who struggles up a slope has a twofold contest, with the ground and the enemy. However, there is the distinction that if you are hoping to win a victory with your infantry against the enemy cavalry, you should choose rough, uneven, and mountainous country. But if you are hoping to defeat the enemy infantry with your cavalry, you ought to seek positions that are on rather higher ground, but flat and open, and not blocked by woods and marshes. (18) The commander-in-chief normally takes up position between the cavalry and infantry on the right flank. In this place he can control the entire battle line and has a clear and uninterrupted advance. He stands between both groups so that he can control through his advice and use his authority to encourage to battle both cavalry and infantry. He must arrange for soldiers from the cavalry reserve mixed with lightarmed infantry to circle round the enemy’s left wing, which is located opposite him, and attack repeatedly from the rear. Not much is known about the treatment of the wounded in Greek battles, though medical writers discuss how to deal with penetrating wounds; see Anderson, in Hanson (1991), 32–4; Sage (1996), 95. For medical care in Roman army, see Davies (1970); Webster (1985), 248–54. For the position of the general in the battle line, see above no. 66.

87

3 BATTLE Military formations, tactics, and stratagems

102 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 3.97.3–98.2 (skill of light-armed troops) The Aetolians, who had already come as far as Aigitium in support, attacked the Athenians and their allies by charging down from the hills from all directions and throwing their javelins; they retreated whenever the Athenian army advanced and attacked again when it retired. The battle went on like this for a long time with alternate advances and withdrawals in both of which the Athenians came off worse. (98) As long as the archers had arrows and were able to use them the Athenians held out, since the light-armed Aetolians retreated in the face of showers of arrows. But the archers scattered on the death of their commander, and the soldiers had become worn out through carrying out the same exhausting manoeuvre for so long; when the Aetolians attacked with volleys of javelins they were routed and fled. Since they blundered into gullies from which there was no way out and into unfamiliar areas they were destroyed, for Chromon, their Messenian guide, had been killed in the fighting. The Aetolians, who were fast-moving and lightly equipped, keeping up the barrage of javelins, caught and killed many on the spot where the rout occurred. Most of the Athenians, however, lost their way and entered a wood from which there was no way out, and which the enemy set on fire so that it burned all around them. Thucydides the Athenian was born around 455 BC. He wrote a history of the war between Athens and Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies (431–404 BC). But he was also active in Athenian life and was elected one of the ten strategoi (chief magistrates). Part of his role involved commanding a fleet in the region of Thrace during the war. This area, and in particular the city of Amphipolis on the river Strymon, were crucial to Athenian interests, as a strategically important centre of communications, a source of minerals, and a centre for shipbuilding timber. Thucydides was caught unawares

88

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS by a surprise attack on the city launched by the Spartan commander Brasidas, which led to its capture. Thucydides led his ships from his base at Thasos and saved Eïon the port of Amphipolis (4.107–8), but nevertheless he was dismissed from his command (5.26.5), subsequently put on trial, and sent into exile. Thucydides seemingly took a genuine pride in Athens’ military strength. Referring to the force that Pericles led against Megara in 431, he says, ‘this was clearly the biggest Athenian force that had yet taken the field; the city was at the height of its power and had not yet suffered the effects of the plague; there were no fewer than ten thousand hoplites drawn from Athenian citizens (apart from the three thousand at Potidaea), and as many as three thousand hoplites from the resident aliens accompanied the invasion, not to mention a large crowd of light-armed troops’ (2.31.2). He was interested in the military strategy of the war and the tactics of individual campaigns, and could exploit his own experience of the demands, responsibilities, and vicissitudes of military command; he gives detailed and thoughtful accounts of warfare, e.g., the siege of Plataea (nos 197–8) and is aware of technical aspects, e.g. the fire machine at Delium (no. 259). It is useful therefore to include some of these passages from Thucydides’ account of the war that he himself described as the greatest of all time (1.1). For the most recent commentary and bibliography, see Hornblower (1991; 1996); general survey (1987). The campaign described in this extract took place during the Peloponnesian War in the summer of 426 BC, as the Athenian commander Demosthenes, acting on the advice of his Messenian allies, attacked the Aetolians, who lived in unfortified villages. However, the Athenian hoplite force was unable to deal effectively with fast-moving, lightly equipped opponents who exploited the terrain. Demosthenes did not wait for his Locrian allies, who were similarly equipped to the Aetolians.

103 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32.3–4; 33.2; 34 (Spartan hoplites defeated at Sphacteria) On the orders of Demosthenes this force was divided into groups of about two hundred men, some bigger some smaller, and they occupied the higher ground so that the enemy, surrounded on all sides and having no one place against which to launch a counter-attack, should be utterly frustrated. For they were exposed to superior numbers on all sides, and if they attacked those in front they would be shot at by those behind, if they attacked those on one flank they would be shot at by those on the other flank. Wherever they went enemy soldiers would always be behind them, lightly armed and very difficult to deal with, since they used arrows, spears, stones, and slings that were effective at long range, and it was impossible to get to grips with them. For in retreat they were faster and when the enemy retired they advanced again. (33) This was the original plan devised by Demosthenes for the landing and he now put it into effect for this operation. . . . But the Spartans were not able to come to close quarters with the (Athenian) hoplites or use their experience, for the light-armed soldiers on both 89

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS

flanks kept them back with volleys of weapons while the Athenians did not move but remained in their positions. The Spartans drove off the light-armed troops when they advanced too close to them, but they defended themselves as they retreated, since they were lightly armed and easily outpaced their pursuers over ground, which, because the area had been previously uninhabited, was difficult and rough. The Spartans could not pursue them here because of the weight of their armour. (34) This long-range fighting continued for a short time. But when the Spartans were no longer able to counter-attack speedily where they were attacked, the light-armed soldiers gained confidence as they realized that they were slower in defending themselves. They could also see that they were far more numerous and had got accustomed to thinking that the Spartans no longer seemed so formidable, since their first encounter with them had been not as bad as they expected when they first disembarked. They had been bound to the idea that they were going to attack Spartans. But now they started to despise them and, yelling out, charged them in a massed group, shooting at them with arrows, spears, and stones, whatever weapons each one had to hand. The Spartans, who were not used to this kind of fighting, were filled with alarm at the shouts that accompanied the attacks. An enormous cloud of dust rose from the wood that had recently been burned and made it difficult for them to see in front, with so many arrows and stones being fired through the dust cloud. The battle now started to go against the Spartans. For their helmets did not keep out the arrows, and when they were hit the broken spear-shafts stuck in their body armour. They had no way of fighting back since they could not see what was in front; they could not hear words of command because they were drowned out by the louder shouting of the enemy; danger was all around them and they could see no way of defending themselves and escaping. An Athenian fleet on its way to Sicily in 425 BC under the command of Demosthenes had stopped to fortify the promontory of Pylos in Messenia. Sparta considered this as a threat to her territory and landed soldiers in the adjacent island of Sphacteria. When the Athenian fleet returned the Spartans were cut off on the island. Cleon was sent out as general after complaining about the slowness of the siege operation. Demosthenese perhaps had learnt something from his disastrous experience in Aetolia (no. 102). The passage illustrates the effectiveness of light-armed troops against hoplites in the right conditions, and also the value of using a combination of light-armed troops with hoplites, which was to be important in the fourth century.

90


104 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 5.70–1 (the drift to the right in hoplite battles) After this the armies came together, the Argives and their allies violently and angrily, the Spartans slowly to the sound of many fluteplayers positioned in the ranks. This practice is not because of religious feeling, but to enable the soldiers to advance steadily in step without breaking their ranks, as usually happens when large armies are moving forward to join battle. (71) King Agis decided on the following manoeuvre as the armies came together. Now, it is true in the case of all armies joining battle that the right wing tends to extend excessively and the right wing of every army outflanks the left wing of the enemy. The reason for this is that through fear each soldier tries his best to find shelter for his unprotected side under the shield of the man drawn up next to him on the right, and thinks that the denseness of the formation offers the best protection. The originator of this fault is the soldier stationed on the far right of the front line, who is always eager to keep his unprotected side away from the enemy, and then the others follow because of the same fear. Thucydides is here describing the battle of Mantinea in the summer of 418 BC when the Spartans and their allies defeated an alliance of Argives, Athenians, and Mantineans. As both armies edged to the right so the right wing prevailed on each side, but the Spartans under the command of king Agis broke off the pursuit of the enemy’s defeated left wing and moved across the battlefield to rescue his left wing and win the victory. See also below, no. 128.

105 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5 (skill and inspirational leadership of Gylippus) During this time Gylippus was building the wall across Epipolae using the stones that the Athenians had earlier put down side by side for their own use. At the same time he always led out the Syracusans and their allies and drew them up in front of the wall, and the Athenians drew up their force opposite. When Gylippus thought the time was right he led the attack and they fought a hand-to-hand battle between the fortifications where no use could be made of the Syracusan cavalry. The Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up the bodies under a truce while the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus called the army together and said that it was not their fault but his own, since by confining the battle line too much between the fortifications he had deprived them of the assistance of the cavalry and the javelin throwers; but now he would lead them out again. And he told them to remember 91


that they were at no disadvantage in terms of equipment, and in terms of morale it would be intolerable if men who were Peloponnesian and Dorian did not think that they could beat Ionians, islanders, and the other rabble and drive them from the country. Thucydides is here describing the Athenian siege of Syracuse in 414 BC. A crucial factor in their final defeat was the arrival of the Spartan Gylippus, who organized the defence. Here we see first his ability to adjust his tactics in the light of experience and also his tact and leadership qualities.

106 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44 (night battle at Syracuse) From this moment the Athenians fell into great confusion and distress. Indeed it was not easy to find out from either side precisely how things had happened. For in daylight people involved in the action have a clearer knowledge, but nevertheless they do not know everything and indeed an individual tends to know only what happens round himself. In a night battle, and this was the only such battle involving large forces in this war, how can anyone know anything clearly? There was bright moonlight, but as might be expected for visibility in moonlight they could see the outline of people in front of them but could not be sure whose side they were on. For many hoplites from both sides were fighting in a narrow space. And on the Athenian side some had already been defeated while others were coming up fresh and making their first attack. A large part of the remainder of their army had only just arrived or was still on its way up, so that they did not know where they had to go. After the defeat that had taken place everything in front of them was totally confused and it was difficult to recognize who was who because of the uproar. For the Syracusans and their allies were cheering one another on in their victory with loud shouting, which was the only way to communicate in the darkness, and at the same time were meeting attacks on them. The Athenians were trying to find each other and took as enemies all those coming toward them, even if they were friends who were in retreat. By repeatedly asking for the watchword, because there was no other way of recognizing each other, they brought a great deal of confusion on themselves since everyone was asking for it at once, and they also revealed it to the enemy. It was more difficult for the Athenians to learn the enemy’s watchword because they were victorious and, being in a more coherent formation, recognized one another more easily. Therefore, if the Athenians met a weaker group of the enemy, it got away because it knew their watchword, but if they failed to reply they were massacred. 92

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS Thucydides here describes the decisive Athenian defeat at Syracuse in 413. Night battles were comparatively rare in Greek warfare.

107 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80 (Athenian retreat at Syracuse) During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, noting that the army was in a bad way since it was already short of all kinds of supplies and since many had been wounded in the frequent enemy attacks, decided to light as many fires as possible and lead the army away. They did not follow the road they had intended, but took the opposite route to the one watched by the Syracusans, and marched towards the sea. . . . They therefore lit a large number of fires and set out during the night. But the army fell into confusion, as usually happens with all armies, especially very large ones, when fear and panic set in, especially during the night if they are marching through enemy territory with the enemy not far away. The force commanded by Nicias, as it was in the lead, kept together and advanced a long distance ahead, while that commanded by Demosthenes, which made up more than half the numbers, became broken up and marched in a disorderly way. Thucydides makes an interesting generalization on the difficulty of conducting a retreat with a large army; cf. no. 114. The Syracusans pursued the retreating Athenians and defeated them in detail; virtually the entire force was killed or captured and Nicias and Demosthenes were executed.

108 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse in attack) If there is a cavalry engagement when the enemy camp is situated right in front, and one side presses the pursuit up to the enemy’s battle line and then retreats to its own infantry, it is important to understand that as long as you are with your friends it is right and safe for you to be among the first to wheel round and attack at full gallop. But when you get close to the enemy you should keep your horse under strict control. For by doing this you have the best chance of inflicting harm on the enemy without being harmed yourself.

109 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.5–6; 9–11 (importance of deception) Whenever you intend to make the numbers of your cavalry seem larger, first accept one point of principle – if possible do not attempt to deceive 93


the enemy when you are near by; for the deception is safer and more effective when practised at a distance. Next, you should know that when grouped together horses seem numerous because of the size of the animals, but when they are scattered they are easily counted. Another way to make your cavalry seem larger is to place the grooms between the horses and if possible arm them with spears, and if not, with imitation spears, whether you display the cavalry at halt or wheel it into line. For it is inevitable that the size of the force will look bigger and denser. (9) For there is nothing more profitable in war than deception. Even children are capable deceivers when they play the game guess the number. They hold up a few counters and make them seem more numerous or hold up a large number and make them seem smaller. If men apply their mind to deception surely they can achieve something similar. Indeed if you considered successes gained in war you would discover that most of them and the greatest had been achieved by deception.

110 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.17–21 (start of the battle of Cunaxa) Now the two armies were no more than six or eight hundred yards apart and the Greeks sang the paean and began to advance towards the enemy. As they moved forward part of the phalanx surged forward in advance of the rest, and the section left behind began to advance at the run. In unison they all shouted out, like the war cry of ‘Eleleu’ that soldiers make to the God of War, and then all ran forward. Some claim that they clanged their spears against their shields in order to frighten the horses. Before they got within bow range the Persians turned and fled, and then the Greeks launched a fierce pursuit, but shouted at one another not to advance at the run but to pursue the enemy while keeping ranks. The chariots charged about, some going through their own ranks, some with no drivers through the Greek ranks. When the Greeks saw them coming they opened ranks. But one man was rooted to the spot, just as if he was at a horse race, and was knocked over. But even this man suffered no injury, so they said. Indeed no other Greek suffered any injury in this battle except for one man on the left wing who was said to have been shot by an arrow. This passage gives a flavour of the start of a battle, the fearsome impression made by the phalanx, and the Greek war cry. For the context of the battle of Cunaxa, see p. 4.

94


111 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.3.12–16 (difficulties of commanding the rearguard) Hearing this Xenophon said that they were right to blame him and that what had happened supported their view. ‘But’, he said, ‘I had to pursue them since I saw that by staying put we were suffering badly and unable to retaliate. When we started the pursuit your comments are true. For we were no more effective in inflicting any harm on the enemy and our own withdrawal was very difficult. We should therefore be grateful to the gods that they attacked not with a large force but in small numbers, so that without inflicting great harm they have made clear what we need. For at the moment the enemy archers can shoot further than the Cretans in our army can shoot in reply, and the slingers have a better range than our javelin-throwers. Whenever we begin a pursuit we cannot pursue them far from the main army, and over a short distance an infantryman, however fast he is, cannot catch another infantryman who has had a bow-shot’s start. Therefore if we are to stop them from harming us on the march we must get slingers and cavalry as quickly as possible.’ The context here is that Xenophon in command of the rearguard had led a counter attack, in which he had been unable to catch a single enemy soldier because the Greeks had no cavalry.

112 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.19–20 (difficulties of the hoplite marching formation) On this occasion the Greeks realized that the square was an unsuitable formation when the enemy was in pursuit. When the two flanks of the square were pushed together because the road became narrower, or because of a mountain pass or a bridge, the hoplites inevitably were pushed out of position and found it difficult to march since they were shoved about and disrupted; consequently in this state of disorder they could not be used. Then, when the flanks separate again the soldiers who were pushed out of position are scattered and the space between the wings is left empty, and the soldiers experiencing this become dispirited as the enemy press on from the rear. In response to these problems the Greek generals formed six companies with one hundred men in each; when the flanks were compressed these companies dropped behind and when they diverged again the companies came up to offer protection and filled up any gaps between the flanks; they were always ready for immediate action. See also no. 113.

95


113 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.8.10–12 (changes to the traditional formation) Then Xenophon voiced his opinion that they should break up the phalanx formation and advance with the companies in columns. ‘The phalanx’, he said, ‘will immediately lose its cohesion. For we will find that parts of the mountain are easy going while other parts are very difficult. This will at once make the men dispirited when having been drawn up in a phalanx they see the formation being broken up. But if we advance in a formation many ranks deep the enemy will outflank us and will use their superior numbers in whatever way they wish. But, if we advance in a formation only a few ranks deep, it would not be surprising if our line was cut by a huge number of missiles and men falling on us together. And if this occurs at a single spot, things will go badly with the entire formation. Therefore I suggest that we should form up the companies in columns leaving enough space between them so that the furthest companies extend beyond the two wings of the enemy.’ This shows how traditional formations were adapted in the light of experience by Xenophon and the other generals. The plan was to outflank the enemy, to have the bravest soldiers at the head of the columns, with each column providing support for its neighbours and preventing infiltration between them.

114 Xenophon, Anabasis 7.3.37–9 (Greek practice in night marches) Xenophon said, ‘If we are going to march during the night I think that you should consider if the Greek practice is not better. For during daylight marches the part of the army that is best suited to the terrain takes the lead, either the infantry or the light-armed troops or the cavalry. But during the night the Greek practice is for the slowest part of the army to take the lead, since in this way there is least chance that the army will be scattered and that they will lose contact as they stray off from one another. When an army loses cohesion parts of it often encounter one another and, not recognizing their comrades, inflict and suffer damage.’

115 Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites) Then the Bithynians retreated wherever the Greeks charged forward and, being peltasts against hoplites, easily got away from them; they 96


also threw spears at them from one side and the other and killed many of them at each attack. In the end the Greeks were shot down like cattle closed up in a pen. In this incident about 200 Greek hoplites were guarding the camp of some Odrysian allies of the Spartan commander Dercylidas (operating against the Persians in 399 BC), when they were attacked by local Bithynian peltasts. Again we see how peltasts exploited the hoplites’ lack of manoeuvrability; see also nos 102, 103, 116.

116 Xenophon, Hellenica 4.5.11–18 (peltasts defeat Spartan hoplites) The garrison commander there (Lechaeum) ordered the garrison troops of the allies to guard the wall while he with a regiment of hoplites and a regiment of cavalry conducted the Amyclaeans past the city of Corinth. When they were about three or four miles away from Sicyon the commander began to return to Lechaeum with the hoplites, who numbered about six hundred, and ordered the cavalry commander with the regiment of horse to follow him after escorting the Amyclaeans as far as they required him to go. Now, they were well aware that there were many peltasts and hoplites in Corinth, but because of their previous success they despised them and thought that no one would attack them. But those in Corinth, both Callias, son of Hipponicus, commander of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, commander of the peltasts, seeing that the Spartans were not numerous and unaccompanied by peltasts and cavalry, thought that it was safe to attack them with their peltasts. For if they marched on along the road they could be attacked with javelins on their unprotected side and killed. But if the Spartans tried to pursue they could easily escape the hoplites with their peltasts, the most agile of all troops. When they had worked this out the commanders led out their troops. Callias drew up his hoplites not far from the city while Iphicrates with the peltasts attacked the Spartan regiment. Now, when the Spartans came under attack with javelins and several had been wounded and several killed, they ordered the shield-carriers to lift the wounded and bring them back to Lechaeum. And these were the only men of the regiment who were truly saved. The commander ordered the men between the age of twenty and thirty to drive off the attackers. But when they launched a pursuit they caught no one since they were hoplites against peltasts at the distance of a javelin-throw. For Iphicrates had ordered his men to withdraw before the hoplites got close to them. Furthermore, when the Spartans withdrew they were scattered since each one had pursued as quickly as possible, and Iphicrates’ troops turned round and while 97


some attacked head on with their javelins others ran along the flank to attack their unprotected sides. Indeed in the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of them with their javelins. Immediately this happened they pressed their attacks much more confidently. When the Spartans continued to suffer losses the commander again ordered a pursuit, this time by men between the ages of twenty and thirtyfive. But when they were withdrawing even more were killed than the first time. After their best men had already been killed the cavalry joined them and with their help they again launched a pursuit. However, when the peltasts gave way the cavalry did not press home their attack effectively. For they did not pursue the enemy until they had killed some of them, but kept in line with the hoplites, both when they advanced and when they withdrew. Since they were fighting and enduring the same process over and over again they became fewer and feebler while the enemy became bolder and those joining in the attack were more numerous. In desperation they finally rallied together on a small hill about a third of a mile from the sea and three miles from Lechaeum. When the men in Lechaeum saw them they embarked in small boasts and sailed along until they were opposite the hill. Now the soldiers on the hill were at a complete loss since they were suffering badly and dying but could do nothing in retaliation. On top of all this when they saw the (Athenian) hoplites coming they took to their heels. Indeed some of them charged into the sea while a few got away safely to Lechaeum with the cavalry. But in all the battles and the flight about two hundred and fifty perished. Sparta’s war against Corinth and her allies had led to the capture in 391 BC of Corinth’s port of Lechaeum on the Corinthain Gulf. The Amyclaeans were Spartan allies who were returning to take part in a religious festival. The Spartan commander’s plan was to use younger hoplites first to try to catch the peltasts. However, this engagement confirmed the growing belief that a well-led force of peltasts in the right conditions could resist and wear down hoplites, and did much to enhance the reputation of peltasts. For Iphicrates, see p. 5; no. 92.

117 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.3.5–7 (peltasts and cavalry combine) But, in a fury when he saw what was happening Teleutias seized his weapons and led the hoplites quickly forwards, ordering the peltasts and the cavalry to pursue and not to stop the pursuit. Of course on many other occasions those who have carried on a pursuit too close to the city walls have suffered badly in withdrawing, and on this occasion too, when they were bombarded with missiles from the towers they 98


were forced to retreat in confusion and protect themselves against the missiles. At this moment the Olynthians sent the cavalry to attack with peltasts in support. Finally the hoplites charged out and fell on the Spartan phalanx, which was already in confusion. Here Teleutias fell fighting, and when this happened the soldiers with him turned tail, no one stood his ground, but they all fled. . . . As a result of disasters like this I believe that men are taught a lesson, especially that . . . in fighting your enemies it is a complete mistake to attack in a rage and not through sound judgement. For anger takes no thought beforehand while judgement is just as much concerned with escaping harm as with inflicting damage on the enemy. The context here is an attack on Olynthus by the Spartan commander Teleutias in 381 BC. The leader of the peltasts with the Spartans had been killed in an injudicious pursuit of the Olynthian cavalry.

118 Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.8–15 (battle of Leuctra) In the battle everything went against the Spartans while for the Boeotians everything went well, including even good luck. After breakfast Cleombrotus held his last council about the battle, and at midday the Spartans drank a little saying that wine acted as a stimulant to them. When both sides were arming themselves and it was clear that there was going to be a battle, those who had provided the market, some baggage-carriers, and those who did not wish to fight set out to leave the Boeotian camp. The (Spartan) mercenaries under Hieron, the Phocian peltasts, and the Heracleots and Phliasians from the cavalry, circled round and attacked them as they were leaving, turned them round and pursued them back to the Boeotian camp. Because of this they made the Boeotian army much bigger and more densely packed than before. Furthermore, since there was a plain between the armies the Spartans drew up their cavalry in front of their phalanx and the Thebans drew theirs up opposite them. Now, the Theban cavalry was well trained because of the wars against the Orchomenians and the Thespians, while the Spartan cavalry at that time was very poor. For the richest men kept the horses, but it was only when call-up took place that the appointed cavalryman appeared. Then, getting his horse and whatever weapons were given to him, he would take the field immediately. Among the soldiers, men who were least physically fit and least ambitious served in the cavalry. This was the condition of the cavalry on either side. In respect of the infantry, the Spartans, so it was said, drew up their companies three abreast so that they were no more 99


than twelve ranks deep. But the Thebans were drawn up not less than fifty shields deep, since they reckoned that if they defeated the troops round the king all the rest would be easy. When Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, at first even before his own soldiers realized that he was on the move, the cavalry had indeed already joined battle and the Spartans had been speedily defeated. In their flight they became mixed up with their own infantry and then the Theban companies attacked. Nevertheless, Cleombrotus and the soldiers around him were at first victorious, as can be seen from one unambiguous piece of evidence. They would not have been able to pick him up and carry him back still alive if those fighting in front of him had not been victorious at that time. But then Deinon the polemarch, and Sphodrias, one of those who attended on the king’s tent, and his son Cleonymus were killed, while the knights, the so-called companions of the polemarch, and the others were forced to fall back under the pressure of numbers. When those on the Spartan left wing saw that the right wing was being pushed back, they gave way. However, although they had been defeated with the loss of many men, when they crossed the ditch that happened to be round their camp, they grounded their arms at the place from which they had set out. Now, the camp was not on a level surface but on a slight slope. Some of the Spartans, thinking that the defeat was unendurable, said that they must prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy and that they should take up the bodies, not under truce, but by fighting. But when the polemarchs saw that of the whole Lacedaemonian force nearly one thousand men had been killed, and of the seven hundred Spartans present nearly four hundred had been killed, and perceived that all the allies had no spirit for fighting and that indeed some were not displeased by what had happened, they collected together the most important people to discuss what they should do. Since they all thought it best to recover the bodies under truce they sent a herald to arrange a truce. After this the Thebans set up a trophy and returned the bodies under truce. In 371 BC the Spartans and their allies invaded Boeotia to force Epaminondas and the Thebans to accept the terms of the peace treaty agreed with the other Greek states (see Sage (1996), 137–9). Xenophon’s account of the battle is the only contemporary one, but although he mentions the unusual depth of the Theban line he does not mention Epaminondas or his tactics. In fact Epaminondas developed the Theban practice of using a deep phalanx formation and aimed his attack at a particular point of the Spartan line (see above, p. 4). Again we see the importance of recovering the bodies and setting up a trophy in the symbolism of victory. See Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 246–75; III (1979), 240–76; also Jackson, in Hanson (1991).

100


119 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation) It is necessary first to all to split the phalanx, that is, divide it into files. A file is a number of men dividing the phalanx into symmetrical units. ‘Symmetrical’ means that these units do not impede the phalanx’s readiness for battle. Therefore some have made the file number eight men, some ten, and some twelve and other sixteen. This is to allow the phalanx to be symmetrical both for doubling its numbers to thirty-two men to meet requirements that I shall describe later, and also for reducing it by one-half to eight men. Therefore it will not get in the way of the light-armed troops fighting in the rear with javelins, slings, or bows. For they will be able to fire their missiles over a phalanx of this depth. The file was the smallest unit of the phalanx and dictated its depth (Asclepiodotus believed that sixteen was the ideal depth for the phalanx). There was a file-leader (lochagos) and a file-closer (ouragos); for the discipline exercised by these soldiers in maintaining the formation, see above, no. 14.

120 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops) The light infantry and the peltasts will be positioned by the general as the circumstances demand, sometimes in front of the phalanx, sometimes behind it, and sometimes on the right or left flank. The first is called front-station (protaxis), the second rear-station (hypotaxis), and the third flank-station (prosentaxis). On occasion they are entwined with the phalanx and positioned one beside each man. This is called insert-station (parentaxis) because there is an insertion of different types of soldier, light-armed and hoplites. This passage shows the increasing importance of light-armed soldiers; no longer mere skirmishers, they could become part of an integrated battle plan.

121 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.1–2 (cavalry formations) The cavalry, just like the light infantry, take up their position according to the circumstances of the battle, especially the cavalry skirmishers. For these are the most useful at inflicting the first wounds, provoking battle, breaking up their ranks, driving away the cavalry, being first to seize good positions or capturing positions already occupied by the enemy, scouting suspicious areas, preparing ambushes, and in general 101


opening and sustaining the battle. For because of their speed they can achieve great things in battle. Some draw up the ranks of the cavalry in a square, other in a rectangle, others in a rhomboid, and still others in a wedge or pointed formation. Nevertheless, everyone agrees in describing the entire formation as a squadron. Apparently the Thessalians, who were very strong in cavalry, were the first to use the rhomboid formation in their squadrons both for retreating and attacking, ensuring, through their ability to wheel in every direction, that they were not thrown into disorder. For they placed the best cavalrymen on the flanks and the most outstanding of these at the angles.

122 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres) It is a quarter-turn when we close up the entire unit by file and rank in a tight formation and move it like the body of a single man so that the entire force turns on the first file-leader like a pivot, if to the right on the right file-leader and if to the left on the left file-leader. At the same time it takes a position in front and faces ‘by spear’ if moving right and ‘by shield’ if moving left. This is an extract from the complicated rules for manoeuvring the phalanx; see Oldfather (Loeb, 1928), 300–1. For the commands used by the officers, see above, no. 17.

123 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.2–6 (defending against elephant attack) On the next day Polyperchon cleared the breach and made it passable for the elephants with the intention of using their strength to capture the city. The people of Megalopolis were under the command of Damis, who had been in Asia with Alexander and knew all about the character and military value of elephants, and they were outstandingly successful. For Damis pitted his natural intelligence against the power of the beasts and made the strength of their bodies useless. He first had a large number of huge doors studded with sharp nails and then laid them in shallow trenches with the sharp points covered over. He left clear a passage through these to the city and placed no soldiers in front of them, but on the flanks positioned a force of javelin-men, archers, and catapults. When Polyperchon had entirely cleared the area of the breach the elephants made an attack in force by this route. But something strange 102


happened to the elephants. Since there was no opposition in front of them the Indian mahouts forced the elephants to attack the city directly and, charging on with their usual vigour, they fell onto the nail-studded doors. Their feet were wounded by the nails on which they were impaled by their own weight and they could not move further forwards or turn round because of the pain whenever they moved. Simultaneously they were pelted from the flanks with all kinds of missiles and some of the mahouts were killed and others were wounded and lost any control they had. Because of the showers of missiles and the peculiar nature of the pain inflicted by the nails, the elephants turned round through their own troops and trampled many of them. At last the bravest of the elephants, which inspired the greatest terror, collapsed. Of the remainder most were made entirely useless while many brought death to their own side. Diodorus Siculus from Agyrium in Sicily probably settled in Rome around 56 BC and completed there his universal history dating from earliest times down to 60 BC. Diodorus devoted much attention to Greek history and particularly that of Sicily, and is particularly important for the reign of Philip II, Alexander, and the wars of the Successors down to 306. He had no military experience but his description of the battle of Paraetacene in 317 is justly celebrated for its vigour and accuracy (no. 124). Text and translation in C.H. Oldfather (1933–67). Polyperchon was one of Alexander’s commanders and after the king’s death was involved in a war against Cassander, his rival for power in Greece. In 317 BC he tried to capture Megalopolis, which had declared for Cassander. Although elephants are used here to attack a city, the ploy to defeat them takes place in open ground.

124 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.27–31 (battle of Paraetacene) Antigonus had more than 28,000 infantry including the reinforcements brought by Pithon and Seleucus, 8,500 cavalry, and 65 elephants. The generals on either side employed different troop formations and also vied with each other in their tactical skill in using these. On the left wing Eumenes stationed Eudaemon, who had brought the elephants back from India and commanded a squadron of 150 cavalry, and an advance guard of two ilae of picked lancers, numbering fifty men. He placed them next to the high ground and next to them the general Stasander with his personal cavalry force of 950 men. Next he stationed Amphimachus the satrap of Mesopotamia with 600 cavalry, and then 600 men from Arachosia who had previously been under the command of Sibyrtius, but who after his flight were commanded by Cephalon. Immediately after them were 500 men from Paropanisadae and the same number of Thracians from colonies in the upper satrapies. 103


In front of all these he drew up forty-five elephants at an angle, and filled up the spaces between them with a sufficient number of archers and slingers. When he had strengthened the left wing in this way he stationed the phalanx next to it. The mercenaries, more than 6,000 in total, occupied the extreme left of the phalanx, and next to them 5,000 men from all ethnic groups, armed in the Macedonian way. (28) Next to these he placed the Macedonian Silver Shields, numbering more than 3,000, who were undefeated and inspired great fear among the enemy because of their courage. Finally he drew up his hypaspists who numbered more than 3,000. Antigenes and Teutamus commanded both these units. He stationed forty elephants in front of the entire phalanx and filled up the spaces between them with light-armed soldiers. On the right wing he drew up the cavalry. Next to the phalanx were 800 Carmenians under the command of their satrap Tlepolemus, the 900 so-called companions and the squadron (agema) of Peucestes and Antigenes, comprising 300 cavalry in one ila. On the far right came the squadron of Eumenes’ own guards, also with 300 cavalry, and their advance guard of two ilae of Eumenes’ own slaves, each unit having fifty cavalry, and a flank guard of four ilae with 200 picked cavalry. In a separate formation he stationed behind his guards 300 cavalry chosen from all the units for their speed and strength. In front of the entire right wing he stationed forty elephants. His entire army amounted to 35,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 114 elephants. (29) After Antigonus had looked down from a vantage point on the enemy formation, he drew up his own army in a way that matched theirs. Since he noticed that the enemy right wing had been strengthened by elephants and the strongest cavalry, he therefore positioned opposite them his light cavalry, which was drawn up in open order, with orders to avoid close combat. Instead, they were to fight by wheeling and in this way to disrupt that part of the enemy force in which they placed greatest trust. Antigonus also stationed on this wing horse-archers and lancers from Media and Parthia, numbering 1,000 and well suited to combat involving manoeuvring. Next to them he stationed 2,200 Tarentines, who had come up by sea to assist and were specially picked for their skill in ambush and loyalty to him, and then 1,000 cavalry from Phrygia and Lydia, 1,500 under the command of Pithon and 400 lancers with Lysander. On the far left he drew up the so-called two-horse men and 800 cavalry from the upper (Thracian) colonies. This made up the complement of cavalry on the left wing, and the whole group was under the command of Pithon. The first of the infantry formation were the mercenaries, numbering more than 6,000, then 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians. After these 104


came more than 8,000 soldiers of differing ethnic origins armed in the Macedonian style, and on the far right of the phalanx he stationed almost 8,000 Macedonians whom Antipater had given to him when he became regent of the kingdom. On the right wing the first of the cavalry consisted of a mixed group of 500 mercenaries next to the phalanx, and then 1,000 Thracians, and next 500 allies, then the socalled Companions, numbering about 1,000, under the command of his son Demetrius, who was then for the first time to go into battle alongside his father. On the far right of the wing was the Royal squadron (agema), numbering 300 cavalry with whom he himself would share the danger. As an advance guard for these forces he stationed three ilae of his own slaves and parallel to them an equal number of units supported by 100 Tarentines. In front of the entire battle line he placed the thirty strongest elephants at an angle and filled up the gaps between them with picked light-armed men. Of the remaining elephants most were stationed in front of the phalanx and a few with the cavalry on the left. With his army drawn up in this way Antigonus descended to meet the enemy, advancing in oblique formation with his right wing, in which he placed the greatest trust, pushed forward. He held back the left wing since he had resolved to avoid battle with one wing while fighting with the other. (30) When the armies were close to one another and the signals for battle had been given, each army uttered its war cry alternately with the other many times, and the trumpeters blew the signal for battle. The cavalry of Pithon advanced first, and although it was not in firm order and lacked an advance guard worthy of the name, it was superior to the force opposing them in numbers and speed, and they tried to exploit their advantages. They did not think that it would be safe to attack the elephants directly, but rode round their flanks, pelted their sides with showers of missiles, and so began to inflict wounds on them. They suffered no harm because they were fast, but severely damaged the elephants, which because of their weight could neither pursue nor retreat whenever an opportunity offered. When Eumenes saw that the wing was suffering from the mass of horse-archers, he sent for Eudamus who was in command of the lightest of the cavalry on the left wing. He led out his entire force on this wing and attacked the enemy with his light-armed men and the light cavalry. The elephants followed on behind him and he easily routed the force under Pithon and pursued them to the high ground. While this was going on the infantry on both sides had been engaged in battle and finally after many had fallen on both sides Eumenes’ troops were victorious because of the courage of the Macedonian Silver Shields. For although these men were fairly 105


old, because of their experience of battle they excelled in daring and skill so that no one could stand up to them face to face. Therefore, although they numbered only three thousand they were the sharp edge of the entire army. Although Antigonus saw that his left wing was in flight and the entire phalanx had been thrown into disarray, he paid no attention to those advising him to retreat towards the high ground, round up those who had escaped the rout, and keep intact the section of the army stationed round him. Instead he cleverly seized an opportunity fortuitously given to him, rescued his own men who had fled and grabbed the victory. For as soon as the Silver Shields of Eumenes and the rest of the infantry had routed their opponents, they pursued them up to the high ground close by. But a gap opened up in their ranks and Antigonus, riding through it with part of his cavalry, attacked in the flank the troops drawn up with Eudamus on the left wing. Taking the enemy by surprise he routed them and killed many. He then sent forward the lightest cavalry to round up his own routed forces and formed them up again in ranks on the high ground. His reasoning was that Eumenes and his commanders, when they realized that their own forces had been routed, summoned the pursuing troops back with trumpet calls in their eagerness to help those with Eudamus. (31) Although it was already growing dark, both sides rallied their fleeing soldiers and once again drew up their full armies, such was the desire for victory that filled not only the commanders but also the rank and file soldiers. Since the night was clear with a full moon, and the armies were marching parallel with one another about a quarter of a mile apart, the noise of the weapons and the snorting of the horses seemed very close to the opposing soldiers. When they were deploying from column into line about three and a half a miles’ march from the fallen, the midnight hour came on them. Since both sides were in bad way because of the difficulties of the march and the damage they had suffered in battle and lack of food, they were forced to break off the battle and encamp. Eumenes wanted to march back to the dead, being eager to get control of the recovery of these and thus claim an undisputed victory. But his soldiers did not agree and shouted out that they wanted to march to their baggage, which was a long distance away. He was forced to give way to them because he was unable to treat his soldiers harshly, since there were many contenders for the leadership and he did not think that it was a suitable moment to punish them for disobedience. Antigonus was in the opposite position, in that he had firm control without the need to court popular support, and made his soldiers encamp beside the bodies. Being in control of the burial of the 106


bodies he claimed the victory, making it clear that the person who had control of the disposal of the fallen was victor. In the battle Antigonus suffered the following casualties: 3,700 infantry and 54 cavalry killed, with more than 4,000 wounded. Eumenes suffered 5,400 infantry killed and a small number of cavalry, with more than 900 wounded. This battle between two of Alexander’s successors and most competent generals took place in 317 at Paraetacene in Susiana in southwest Iran. The account in Diodorus is thought to be based on a good contemporary source that accurately described the dispositions and manoeuvres. The large forces involved contained a tactical combination of all the elements of Hellenistic armies – heavy infantry, light troops, archers, cavalry, and elephants; see Devine (1985).

125 Livy, History of Rome 22.47–8 (battle of Cannae) When the battle cry was raised the auxiliaries charged and the lightarmed troops began the battle. Then the Gallic and Spanish cavalry on the left wing closed with the Roman right wing. This did not at all resemble a cavalry battle. They had to meet directly head on because there was no room to make an outflanking manoeuvre, since the river on one side and the lines of infantry on the other hemmed them in. Therefore both sides went straight ahead but the horses were finally forced to stop, being pressed together in a crowd, and the cavalrymen tried to wrestle the enemy out of the saddle. To a large extent it turned into an infantry battle, which was fiercer than long lasting, and the Romans were defeated and fled. Towards the end of the cavalry engagement the infantry battle began. At first both sides in this struggle were well matched in strength and spirit, as long as the Gauls and the Spanish maintained good order. In the end the Romans persevered with their forward thrusts in close formation across a broad front and broke through the enemy, who were in wedge formation projecting from the rest of the battle line, and too thin and weak to resist the charge. They were defeated and hastily withdrew. The Romans charged straight through the line of soldiers who were in panic-stricken retreat until they came to the Carthaginian centre, and finally with little resistance they reached the position of the African auxiliaries, who held both wings, which had been drawn back a little. When the projecting wedge (of Gallic and Spanish troops) was forced back it first levelled the Carthaginian front and then as the troops were forced to retreat still further, the centre assumed a concave shape and the Africans formed two outer wings (in a crescent shape). As the Romans charged rashly into the middle of this the Africans closed in around them; then by 107


extending the wings they closed the trap behind the Romans. At this point the Romans having completed one battle fruitlessly left the Gauls and Spanish whom they had cut down as they fled and began a fresh struggle against the Africans. This was an unequal fight not only because they were completely surrounded but also because they were tired men fighting a fresh and energetic enemy. (48) Meanwhile on the Roman left wing where the allied cavalry faced the Numidians battle had been joined. This went slowly at first and began with some Punic trickery. Nearly five hundred Numidians, who besides their regular weapons had swords concealed under their tunics, pretended to desert by riding away from their own side with their shields behind their backs. Suddenly dismounting, they threw down their shields and spears at the feet of the Romans, were brought into the line and then taken to the rear where they were instructed to remain. When the general engagement began they remained quiet, but when the struggle occupied everyone’s attention, snatching up shields that lay everywhere among the heaps of bodies, they attacked the Roman line; by striking the soldiers in the back and hamstringing them, they caused havoc and created an enormous panic and uproar. At this moment when in one part of the battlefield the Romans were in panic-stricken flight while in another they fought tenaciously although hope was almost gone, Hasdrubal, who was in command in that part of the line, withdrew the Numidians from the centre. They were not actively involved in the battle and he sent them to pursue the scattered fugitives, while also bringing up the Spanish and Gallic infantry to support the Africans, who were exhausted by what was a slaughter rather than a battle. Livy (probably 59 BC–AD 17) came from Patavium in northern Italy and wrote a history of Rome from the foundation to 9 BC in 142 books. He set out to describe how Rome from small beginnings conquered Italy and then the entire Mediterranean world. The virtues of the early Romans could serve as a model for the present. Naturally his history has a strong military theme. But Livy had to rely on earlier written accounts, and his ignorance of military practice means that his battle descriptions can be rather stereotyped, with no clear picture of topography or the direction of the battle. He did, however, aim for clarity and often a dramatic recreation of the psychology of those involved. He offers a good view of what a non-specialist audience thought of battles. For Livy’s historical methods, see Walsh (1961). Livy’s description of the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BC does seem to give a clear picture of his tactics; see Keppie (1984), 26–8; see also Figure 3.1. It is important to understand why the Romans thought that this defeat came about; it was not just Hannibal’s clever tactics, and the superiority of his cavalry, but the careless and uncontrolled pursuit of a retreating enemy by the Romans, and of course Punic treachery.

108


1

Legions

Cavalry

Cavalry

Celts

Celtic Cavalry

Africans

Numidian Cavalry

Africans

2 Cavalry

Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry Africans

Africans

Legions

Celts

3

Cavalry Cavalry

Africans Africans Legions

Celts

Figure 3.1 The three phases of the battle of Cannae

109


126 Livy, History of Rome 26.4.4–10 (creation of the velites) At last they found a way to make up in guile for what they lacked in strength. From the entire legionary force they chose young men who were outstandingly vigorous, lightly built, and nimble-footed. They equipped them with smaller shields than the cavalrymen and seven javelins for each man, four feet long with iron tips like the spears of the light infantry. Every cavalryman took one of them on his horse and trained them to ride behind him and leap down rapidly when the signal was given. After daily practice demonstrated that this could be done promptly, the Romans advanced into the plain that lay between the camp and the city wall against the Campanian cavalry drawn up there. When they were within javelin range the velites jumped down at a signal. Then the cavalry suddenly became an infantry battle line and it advanced against the enemy cavalry, throwing volley after volley of javelins with great force. By throwing such large numbers of these at both horses and men all along the line they wounded many of them. But they spread greater panic by the unusual and unexpected means of attack, and when the enemy was in disarray the cavalry attacked and routed them, driving them to the city gates with enormous slaughter. From that point the Romans were superior in cavalry as well, and the practice began of including light-armed soldiers with the legions. The story is that the centurion Quintus Navius suggested including infantry with the cavalry and was honoured for that reason by the commander-in-chief. The context is the Roman siege of Capua in 211 BC during the war with Hannibal. The local Campanian forces had proved superior to the Romans in cavalry engagements. Velites had no defensive armour. Subsequently there were 1,200 velites with each legion, and they remained until the changes introduced by Marius.

127 Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed troops) The general should position his light-armed troops, javelin-throwers, archers, and slingers, in front of the phalanx. For if they are positioned in the rear they will do more harm to their own side than to the enemy, and if in the middle of the phalanx they will find it impossible to display their particular expertise, since they will be unable to take a step backwards to throw their spears or to throw them at the run, since other soldiers are in front of and behind them. Similarly the slingers cannot whirl their slings in a circle when their fellow soldiers 110


are standing beside them, and they also stumble as they try to avoid the whirling motion. If the archers are positioned in front of the army they shoot their arrows straight at the bodies of the enemy just like at a target. But if they are positioned behind the other ranks or in the middle, they will shoot upwards, so that the arrows have impetus only for their flight upwards, and afterwards have spent their force so that even if they fall directly in the heads of the enemy they cause little damage. For slingers in Greek warfare see Pritchett, GSW V (1991), 1–67.

128 Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations) The general who wishes to guard against an encircling manoeuvre should not extend his line lengthways so as to make his entire phalanx weak and lacking in depth. For it could happen that the enemy quickly forces a way through, and no longer trying an encircling manoeuvre on the flanks, breaks through the centre and attacks in their opponents’ rear. Indeed the general should not only take precautions to avoid this manoeuvre but also try to execute it, if he sees that the enemy phalanx is feeble and thin. Furthermore, he should not contract his phalanx too much by extending it to the rear in order to produce great depth, with the result that the enemy could easily outflank and surround it.

129 Onasander, The General 21.5–9 (crescent formation; counter-attacks) Generals in command of a powerful and numerous force are often in the habit of advancing to battle in a crescent formation, thinking that the enemy also wish to engage at close quarters and that they will provoke them to battle. Then at the edges of the semicircle the enemy will be forced back into the road and cut off by the enveloping folds as he joins together his two wings to make a complete circle. Against troops in a crescent formation a general should not adopt a similar formation. Instead, he should divide his army into three parts, and send two of them against the enemy, one against each of the wings, while the third, drawn up opposite the hollow in the centre of the crescent formation, should stand still and not engage. For while the enemy remains in a crescent formation the troops drawn up in the centre will stand with nothing to do and will be useless. But if they wish to advance in a group and move forwards, as they change from a 111


crescent shape to a straight line, they will be crushed together and lose their formation. For while the wings remain in the same position and carry on fighting, it is impossible for a crescent formation to move to a straight line. Then, when they are in confusion and have broken ranks, the general should send the third part of his army posted in support against the troops who are advancing in disorder from the centre of the curve. But if the enemy maintain their crescent formation, the general should draw up his light-armed troops and archers opposite them, since by shooting at them they will cause a lot of harm. However, if the general attacks obliquely with his entire force against one wing of the enemy, he will be right in using this offensive manoeuvre against the encircling movement of the crescent formation. For he will for a long time prevent the enemy from coming to close quarters with his entire force, and little by little will throw him into turmoil since only the troops on one wing will be in action, namely the first ones forced to join battle by the oblique attack. From time to time it is a valuable stratagem for an army facing the enemy to retreat gradually, as if in terror, or to turn in its tracks and retreat as if in flight, but in good order, and then to turn suddenly and attack their pursuers. For sometimes the enemy, delightedly thinking that their opponents are in retreat, break ranks and charge forward, rushing ahead of one another. It is safe to turn and attack these men, for those who have been pursuing for some time are terrified by the unexpectedly bold stand and run away in turn. For the crescent battle formation in action at Cannae, see above, no. 125.

130 Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves) Somewhere the general should have picked soldiers positioned separately from the phalanx as a military reserve, so that he can keep them ready to assist parts of the army that are weary. Indeed fresh troops are a great advantage in attacking tired men. For first they bring relief to their exhausted comrades, but also being full of energy they attack a now weary enemy.

131 Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear) The sudden attack against the rear of the enemy is the most terrifying and indeed effective of all manoeuvres. If it is at all possible the general 112


should send a detachment of soldiers ahead by night with orders to march round the enemy and approach their rear. Next morning, therefore, they can move out from their ambush after the battle has begun, and appear suddenly in the enemy’s rear. For the enemy would have no hope of escaping by running away, and would be unable to turn back because of the force ranged against him, or to advance because of those attacking his rear.

132 Onasander, The General 29.1–2 (intimidating the enemy) The general should lead his troops into battle with war cries, and sometimes at the run, because their appearance, and yelling and clang of arms, can destroy the spirit of the enemy. Closely packed groups of soldiers should spread out in the attack before they engage at close quarters, holding their swords aloft above their heads inclined towards the sun. For the polished spear points and flashing swords, glittering in close formation and reflecting the light of the sun, send out an awesome lightning bolt of war.

133 Josephus, Jewish War 3.98–101 (value of careful preparations in war) In battle the Romans do not act without thinking and leave nothing to chance. On the contrary, deliberation precedes every action and action follows the decision reached. (99) Therefore they rarely make mistakes, and if they do they can easily correct what has gone wrong. (100) They think that a well-discussed plan, even if it ends in failure, is better than a fortuitous success, because accidental success entices men into acting without proper consideration, whereas forethought, though sometimes followed by misfortune, is a good instructor of how to avoid the same mistake. (101) They also believe that the man who profits by accidental good fortune cannot take the credit for it, while setbacks that occur contrary to all deliberation at least bring the consolation that proper procedures were followed.

134 Josephus, Jewish War 3.115–26 (Roman marching order) But eager to invade the Galilee himself, Vespasian marched out from Ptolemais after drawing up his army in the usual Roman marching order. (116) He ordered the auxiliary light-armed troops and the 113


archers to go on ahead to cut off any sudden attacks by the enemy and to investigate woodland which was suspicious because of its suitability for ambushes. Next followed a detachment of heavily armed Roman soldiers, both infantry and cavalry. (117) After them marched ten men from each century carrying their own equipment and implements for measuring out the camp. (118) Next came the engineers, whose task was to straighten bends in the road, level rough areas, and cut down woodland that was blocking the way, so that the army should not be exhausted by a difficult march. (119) Behind these men Vespasian placed his personal equipment and that belonging to his subordinate commanders with a strong cavalry guard to protect it. (120) He himself rode behind these with picked infantry and cavalry and his personal bodyguards. Next followed the legionary cavalry, for one hundred and twenty cavalry are attached to each legion. (121) After these came the mules carrying the siege towers and the remaining siege engines. (122) After them came the legionary commanders, the commanders of the cohorts, and the military tribunes, surrounded by picked soldiers. (123) Next came the standards surrounding the eagle, which goes at the head of every Roman legion, since it is the king and the most courageous of all birds. The Romans think of it as the symbol of empire and a portent of victory no matter who their opponents may be. (124) The trumpeters followed these holy objects, and behind them the packed marching column, six abreast. According to the usual procedure a centurion accompanied them to supervise the marching ranks. (125) Behind the infantry the servants attached to each legion followed in a group, bringing the soldiers’ equipment on mules and other beasts. (126) Behind all the legionaries came a mixed group of auxiliaries, and finally for security a rearguard consisting of light and heavy infantry and a large force of cavalry. For the Roman marching order see also below, no. 164.

135 Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages) The bark of the beech, lime, fir, and spruce is of great use in the countryside. . . . Military scouts write to their commander by cutting the letters on a piece of fresh bark still full of sap. Pliny the Elder (AD 23/4–79) had a distinguished equestrian career including a cavalry command in Germany with the future emperor Titus. After holding a number of important procuratorships he became Prefect of the Fleet at Misenum, in command of which he met his death while investigating the eruption of Vesuvius in 79. He

114

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS wrote a treatise on the use of the throwing spear by cavalrymen and a history of the wars fought by Rome against the Germans, both of which have been lost. His main work is the Natural History, an encyclopaedia of contemporary information on the natural world, which contains a vast assortment of material, animal, vegetable, and mineral, into which readers have dipped throughout the ages. For a survey of Pliny’s writing, see Beagon (1992). Austin and Rankov (1995), 65, argue that as the bark dried out the incisions would have opened up and perhaps darkened through oxidization and so become legible.

136 Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 1–7 (importance of writing about tactics) Emperor Caesar Trajan Augustus, son of a God, analysis of military tactics among the Greeks dates from the time of Homer, but many earlier writers on the topic did not have the skill that I believe I have acquired in my studies. I persuaded myself that I wanted to prepare this analysis so that those who come after me may take note of my writings rather than those of earlier authors. Since I am not acquainted with the strength and skill of the Romans in this area – I have to admit the truth – I hesitated about writing and publishing this account, because it might be obscure and perhaps of no use in practical terms after you had developed instruction in military training. But in the reign of your divine father, Nerva, I spent a few days at Formiae with Frontinus, the distinguished consular, who has acquired a glorious reputation for skill in military matters. In meeting with him I found that he was equally enthusiastic about Greek learning and speculation (on military science). Therefore I set aside my doubts about writing on (Greek) military tactics, believing that Frontinus would not be enthusiastic if he thought that it had less to offer than Roman practice. Aelian Tacticus in the preface of his Tactica addresses Trajan directly as someone who has surpassed all previous commanders in military expertise, and pays homage to the power and experience of the Romans in military affairs. His description of a visit to Frontinus at his villa at Formiae to discuss military science provides an interesting glimpse of social and intellectual life in Rome. Aelian was apparently encouraged to publish his work in which he explained the technicalities of the tactics of the Hellenistic phalanx. He describes the different types and roles of soldiers, the value and nature of organized formations and the technical terms relevant to them, cavalry formations, battlefield manoeuvres, the size of units, and the role of officers. It is of course reasonable to hold that this kind of information had little relevance in the second century AD except as part of the history of warfare; see above, pp. 13–17. Text in Köchly and Rüstow (1853–5).

115


137 Tacitus, Agricola 36–7 (battle of Mons Graupius) The battle began with an exchange of missiles, and the Britons displayed both valour and skill in parrying our soldiers’ javelins with their enormous swords or deflecting them with their little shields, while they themselves poured volleys on us. Then Agricola ordered the four cohorts of Batavians and the two of Tungrians to come to close quarters and fight it out at sword point. This was a well-practised manoeuvre for those veteran soldiers, but very difficult for the enemy, who were armed with their small shields and large swords. British swords lack a thrusting point, and are therefore unsuited to swordplay in fighting at close quarters. The Batavians began to rain blow after blow, shove with the bosses of their shields, and stab at the faces of their enemies. They annihilated the soldiers on the plain and began to advance up the hill. This provoked the rest of our units to smash into their nearest opponents and massacre them. Many Britons were left behind half-dead or even unwounded, because of the speed of our victorious advance. Meanwhile our cavalry squadrons, after the rout of the war chariots, now plunged right into the infantry battle. By their attack they brought new terror, but the closely packed enemy ranks and the uneven ground soon brought them to a halt. The battle now looked anything but a cavalry engagement, while our infantry struggling for a foothold on the slope was jostled by the flanks of the horses. And stray chariots, with their horses panic-stricken without a driver, often went plunging into the flanks or front. (37) The Britons who had taken up position on the hilltops had so far taken no part in the battle, and being unengaged, contemptuously noted the smallness of our numbers. They now began to descend slowly and surround the rear of our victorious troops. But Agricola had been concerned about precisely this move, and placed in the path of their advance the four alae of cavalry, which he was keeping back for emergencies. He therefore crushed and scattered them in a rout as severe as their assault had been spirited. So, the tactics of the Britons were turned against themselves. The Roman cavalry squadrons, on the orders of the general, rode round from the front of the battle and fell on the enemy in the rear. Then followed an awe-inspiring and terrible spectacle over the open country. Our troops pursued, took prisoners and then killed them when more of the enemy appeared. Among the enemy each man now followed his own inclination. Some groups, though fully armed, fled before smaller numbers, while some men, though unarmed, charged forward and met their deaths. Weapons, bodies, and severed limbs were scattered everywhere and the earth was stained with blood. 116

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS Cornelius Tacitus (born c. AD 56) was a Roman senator, becoming consul in 97 and governor of Asia in 112–13. He probably held a number of other government posts, though it is not clear if he exercised any military responsibilities. His major works were the Histories, originally intended to cover the period AD 69–96, and the Annales, dealing with AD 14–68. Among his shorter works is the Agricola, a biography of his father-in-law, Julius Agricola, who as governor of Britain (77 or 78–84) led a series of campaigns in northern Scotland, winning the battle of Mons Graupius. Tacitus has incurred criticism for his indifference to detailed analysis of the overall setting, direction, and logistics of battles. However, his skill is rather in depicting the rapid passage of events, the reaction of important men to them, and the emotions and psychology of military campaigns. In any case his description of the battle of Mons Graupius is not only exceptionally vivid but clearly explains Agricola’s tactics and the disposition of his troops. For the career and writings of Tacitus, see Syme (1958); Mellor (1993). The exact location in the Scottish Highlands of the battle of Mons Graupius cannot be identified.

138 Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle) Antonius strengthened the wavering battle line by bringing up the praetorians, and when they entered the battle they drove back the enemy, only to be driven back themselves. This was because the Vitellians had concentrated their artillery on the raised embankment of the road so that they had an uninterrupted field of fire over the open ground. At first their fire had been sporadic and hit the vine poles without harming their opponents. The Fifteenth Legion had an exceptionally large catapult, which pounded the enemy line with enormous stones. It would have inflicted carnage far and wide if two soldiers had not carried out an act of conspicuous heroism. They concealed their true identity by taking shields from fallen soldiers and cut the ropes and gear by which the catapult was operated. They were immediately killed and so their names have perished, but there is no doubt about what they did. This incident occurred in the second battle of Bedriacum in AD 69, as Antonius Primus commanding the army of Vespasian attacked the forces of the emperor Vitellius. For the (rare) use of artillery in open battle, see Campbell (2002), 53–4.

139 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans) When the emperor Caesar Domitian Augustus Conqueror of the Germans wished to suppress the Germans, who were under arms, he realized that they would make even greater preparations for war if 117


they had any inkling of the arrival of so distinguished a commander. Therefore, he concealed his own departure under the pretext of taking a census in Gaul. In this way by an unexpected attack he smashed these ferociously savage tribes and looked after the interests of the provinces. This episode may belong to Domitian’s campaign against the Chatti on the middle Rhine in AD 82/83.

140 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemy’s plans) Scipio Africanus, seizing the opportunity of sending envoys to Syphax, ordered specially selected tribunes and centurions disguised as slaves to go with Laelius, with the job of spying out the king’s resources. These men, so that they could inspect more freely the layout of the camp, deliberately let loose a horse and then pretending that it was running away pursued it round most of the fortifications. When they had reported their findings, the camp was set ablaze and the war was brought to an end. This refers to Scipio’s campaign in Africa in 203 BC against the Carthaginians and their ally Syphax.

141 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy) Fabius Maximus, when fighting Hannibal, who was arrogant because of his success in battle, decided to stay clear of any dangerous ventures and concentrate entirely on protecting Italy. By this policy he earned the nickname ‘Delayer’ (Cunctator) and the reputation of an outstanding commander. (10) When the Germans were as usual making repeated attacks against our soldiers from woods and hidden lairs and retreating safely into the depths of the forests, the emperor Caesar Domitian Augustus moved the zone of Roman control forward over a stretch of one hundred and twenty miles (about 113.5 miles in imperial measures). Therefore he not only changed the character of the war but also brought the enemy under his control by uncovering their hiding places. Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, while holding the office of dictator after the Roman defeat at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC (see no. 152), pursued a policy of attrition against Hannibal by avoiding battle and trying to contain him in the Campanian plain. After the Romans returned to the policy of offering battle and suffered defeat at Cannae (see no. 125), Fabius’ policy was followed with some success. Domitian brought the Taunus area under Roman control in AD 83.

118


142 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics) The same Alexander because he was prevented by the enemy from crossing the river Indus, arranged to send horsemen into the river at different points and threaten to cross. Then, when he had the Indians on edge with expectation he occupied an island a little further away, first with a small force and then with a larger one, and from there got his troops across to the opposite bank. When all the enemy force charged off to destroy this band, he made a safe crossing by an unguarded ford and united all his forces. This must refer to the crossing of the river Hydaspes against king Porus in 326 BC. However at 1.4.9 Frontinus describes a much simpler ploy for that event. It seems that he was confused by several different versions of the story; see Polyaenus 4.3.9; Plutarch, Alexander 60; Quintus Curtius 8.13.

143 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difficult position) The same Spartacus, when hemmed in by the commander Publius Varinius, set up stakes at regular intervals outside the gate of the camp. He then tied dead bodies upright to the stakes, dressed in clothing and armed with weapons, so that they looked like sentries to anyone viewing from a distance. He also lit fires throughout the entire camp. Deceiving the enemy with this misleading show he silently led his forces out by night. Spartacus was a Thracian gladiator who led a revolt in the gladiatorial school at Capua in 73 BC. He raised an army of some 70,000 from slaves and the destitute and had some success against the Roman forces sent against him. He was eventually defeated and killed by Marcus Crassus in 71.

144 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deficiencies) Lucius Caecilius Metellus because of a shortage of ships in which to transport his elephants fastened together large earthenware jars, covered them with planking, and loading the elephants on these transported them across the Sicilian straits. This refers to a campaign in which the Carthaginians were defeated at Panormus in 250 BC.

119


145 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemy’s attention) Julius Caesar on one occasion captured a soldier who was collecting water, and learned from him that Afranius and Petreius were planning to strike camp during the night. In order to block the enemy plans without disturbing his own men he ordered that in the early evening the signal for striking camp should be given and that mules should be driven past the enemy camp with a great deal of noise and shouting. His opponents, thinking that Caesar was striking camp, remained where they were, just as Caesar wanted. This refers to Caesar’s civil war campaign in Spain in 49 generals (cf. Caesar, Civil War 1.66).

BC

against the Pompeian

146 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to fight) In the war against the Pannonians, when the enemy in savage mood formed up for battle as soon as day broke, Tiberius Nero kept his men back and allowed the enemy to be afflicted with the fog and showers, which happened to be frequent on that day. Finally when he observed that they were exhausted from standing and were losing heart both from exposure to the rain and from tiredness, he gave the signal, attacked, and routed them. Tiberius Nero is the future emperor Tiberius (AD 14–37). The battle probably took place during the Pannonian revolt of AD 6–9.

147 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to fight) The divine Vespasian Augustus attacked the Jews on their Sabbath, a day on which it is sinful for them to carry on any serious business, and consequently defeated them. The context is the suppression of the Jewish revolt in AD 66–70.

148 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to fight) When Lucullus was going to do battle against Mithridates and Tigranes in Greater Armenia at Tigranocerta, he suddenly seized the level summit of the nearest hill with part of his forces, charged down 120


on the enemy spread out below, and attacked their cavalry from the flank. When the cavalry fled and immediately spread panic among the infantry, Lucullus followed them and won a distinguished victory. Lucius Licinius Lucullus (consul 74 BC) used this brilliant tactical ploy during campaigns against Rome’s dangerous enemy Mithridates VI of Pontus and his ally Tigranes of Armenia in 69 BC; see Plutarch, Lucullus 28; Appian, Mithridatic Wars 85.

149 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to fight) Ventidius, when at war with the Parthians, did not lead his men out until the Parthians were less than half a mile away. Then he made a sudden advance and came so close to them that by meeting them face to face he avoided the arrows, which they usually fired from a distance. Therefore by this stratagem, because he made some show of confidence, he rapidly defeated the barbarians. Publius Ventidius (consul 43 BC) had served with Caesar and later supported M. Antonius. He was sent to recover Asia and Syria from the Parthians and in 39 and 38 BC won three distinguished victories.

150 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics) When Marcus Antonius was fighting the Parthians, who were bombarding his army with an enormous number of arrows, he ordered his men to crouch down and form a tortoise (testudo). The arrows passed over this without harming the soldiers and the enemy was soon exhausted. (23) When the Chatti repeatedly interrupted a cavalry battle by retreating into woodland, the emperor Caesar Augustus Conqueror of the Germans (Domitian) ordered his cavalrymen, as soon as they reached impassable ground, to jump from their horses and fight on foot; by this ploy he ensured that his victory should not be denied by difficulties of terrain. Antony’s campaign against the Parthians was in 36 BC (Dio 49.29–30; Plutarch, Antonius 45). Domitian’s ploy against the Chatti probably belongs to AD 83.

121


151 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy) Since Marius at Aquae Sextiae intended to fight a battle on the next day against the Teutones, he sent Marcellus during the night with a small force of cavalry and infantry to the enemy’s rear. In order to give the impression of a large force he ordered armed grooms and camp followers to go with them and also most of the pack animals equipped with saddle blankets to make them look like cavalry. He ordered these men to attack the enemy in the rear as soon as they saw that the battle had begun. This stratagem inspired such terror in the enemy that despite their savage nature they turned tail and fled. This battle occurred in 102 BC; see Plutarch, Marius 20; Polyaenus 8.10.2.

152 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush) At Trasimenus, where a narrow road between the lake and the foothills of the mountains led out to the open plains, Hannibal while pretending to flee made his way through the narrow defile and pitched camp in the open ground. During the night he stationed soldiers on the high ground of the neighbouring hill and along the sides of the defile. At dawn, under cover of a mist, he drew up his battle line. Flaminius, pursuing what he thought was a retreating enemy, entered the defile and did not see the ambush until he was surrounded to the front, the sides, and the rear, and was cut down along with his army. (33) Pompey when fighting in Armenia against Mithridates, whose cavalry was superior in number and quality, during the night stationed three thousand light-armed soldiers and five hundred cavalry concealed in the undergrowth in the valley that lay between the two camps. Then at dawn he sent his cavalry against the enemy position with the plan that, when all the enemy cavalry forces and their entire army had joined battle, they should, while keeping their formation, give ground gradually so as to provide an opportunity for an attack in the rear by those stationed for this purpose. When this turned out as planned, and soldiers who were apparently in flight turned about, Pompey cut down the panic-stricken enemy who were now caught between two lines. The Roman infantry also joined in hand-to-hand battle and stabbed the horses of the enemy. This battle destroyed the king’s faith in his cavalry. The battle of Lake Trasimene took place in 217 BC (Livy 22.4; Polybius 3.83–5). The exact site of the battle is disputed (Walbank (1957), 415–18). Pompey defeated Mithridates in 66 BC (Appian, Mithridatic Wars 98; Dio, 36.47.3–4; see also above, no. 148).

122


153 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to fight to the end) Julius Caesar, when some Germans whom he had hemmed in fought more fiercely in their desperation, ordered them to be let through and attacked them as they fled.

154 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback) When one of Lucius Sulla’s officers deserted to the enemy taking a substantial force of cavalry with him just as battle was being joined, Sulla announced that this had been done on his orders. By this ploy he not only prevented his soldiers from being reduced to panic but also encouraged them in the expectation that some good would come from the plan.

155 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy) When Domitius Corbulo was besieging Tigranocerta and the Armenians seemed likely to resist the siege obstinately, he executed Vadandus, one of the nobles he had captured, and fired his head from a catapult, sending it flying inside the enemy fortifications. By chance the head fell in the middle of a council meeting which the barbarians were holding just at that moment; the sight of it, just like a portent, filled them with panic and hastened their surrender. Domitius Corbulo was appointed by Nero to take command of the war (which began in AD 58) against the Parthians for the control of Armenia.

156 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties) Titus Didius fought a ferocious battle in Spain that was ended by nightfall with a large number slain on both sides. He ordered that during the night many of the bodies of his own men should be buried. On the next day the Spanish came out to perform a similar function, and because they found that many more of their men had been killed than those of the Romans, reckoned on that calculation that they had been defeated and agreed to the terms of the Roman commander. Titus Didius had won a triumph for campaigns in Thrace. After holding the consulship in 98 BC he took command in Spain and won a second triumph in 93 BC.

123


157 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support) When Scipio Africanus was fighting in Spain, there was brought to him among the captive women a noble young girl of exceptional beauty who attracted the attention of everyone. Scipio kept her under close protection and returned her to her betrothed, who was called Alicius, and also handed over to him as a wedding gift the amount of gold that her parents had brought to Scipio to ransom her. The entire tribe, overwhelmed by this extensive generosity, linked itself with the Roman people. This occurred in 210 BC during Scipio’s campaign to capture New Carthage; for other versions of the anecdote see Livy 26.50.1–12; Polybius 10.19; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 7.8.5; Valerius Maximus, 4.3.1.

158 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry) Quintus Sertorius in Spain was entirely outclassed by the enemy’s cavalry, which arrogantly rode right up to the fortifications. Therefore during the night he dug trenches and drew up his forces in front of them. When the cavalry squadrons arrived as usual he withdrew his line of battle. The cavalry pursued him closely, fell into the ditches, and in this way were defeated. For Sertorius, see above, no. 73.

159 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat) When M. Antonius was retreating with the Parthians hard on his heels, every time he broke camp at daybreak his retreating line was bombarded with showers of arrows from the barbarians. Therefore he kept his men in camp until close to noon and gave the impression that it was a permanent camp. As soon as the Parthians were convinced by this and withdrew, he completed his regular march during the rest of the day without interference. For methods of retreating safely, see Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.22.

124


160 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers) Hirtius kept pigeons shut up in the dark and starved them. He then attached letters to their neck with a hair and released them from as close to the city walls as he could. The pigeons, longing for light and food, made for the highest buildings and were caught by Brutus, who by this means was informed about everything, especially after he left out food in different places and trained the pigeons to alight there. During the civil wars after the murder of Caesar in 44 BC, Decimus Brutus was besieged in Mutina by M. Antonius. The siege was raised by the consul of 43, Aulus Hirtius.

161 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion) Hamilcar the Carthaginian commander, since his Gallic allies were habitually deserting to the Romans and were regularly welcomed by them as allies, instructed his most loyal soldiers to pretend to desert. They then killed the Romans who came out to welcome them. This ploy not only brought immediate success to Hamilcar, but also meant that in the future genuine deserters came to be suspected by the Romans.

162 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms and stratagems) Julius Caesar used to say that he followed the same policy against the enemy as doctors did against bodily ailments, namely that they should be conquered by hunger rather than steel. (2) Domitius Corbulo used to say that the enemy should be conquered by the pick. (16) Scipio Africanus used to say that not only should a road be made available to the enemy for their flight, but that indeed it ought to be paved. (20) When Ptolemy, who had a weak force, was fighting against Perdiccas’ mighty army he arranged for a few cavalrymen to drive along all kinds of animals which had brush attached to their backs so that it was dragged along behind them. Ptolemy himself went on ahead with the troops he had, so that the dust the animals produced gave the impression of a large army following, and he then defeated the enemy, who were terrified by the prospect. 125


(42) When Quintus Metellus was about to strike camp in Spain and wanted to keep his soldiers in line, he announced that he had discovered that an ambush had been set up by the enemy, and that therefore they should not stray from the standards or break ranks. Although he had done this to preserve discipline, he happened to encounter a real ambush, and because he had predicted it found that his soldiers were undeterred. For Corbulo’s reputation as a cautious commander and strong disciplinarian, see Tacitus, Annals 13.35–6. Scipio’s view was obviously a well-known maxim; see above no. 153; Vegetius expands this idea (Epitome of Military Science 3.21) – ‘When a way out is revealed, they all agree in turning their backs and are slaughtered like sheep without danger of reprisal.’ Perdiccas was the senior Macedonian commander after the death of Alexander in 323 BC who tried to hold the empire together. In 321 he invaded Egypt suspecting that Ptolemy was intending to establish an independent kingdom. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus had held a triumph when only of praetorian rank for his success in Macedonia. Consul in 143 BC he was sent to Spain to suppress a revolt of the Celtiberians.

163 Plutarch, Flamininus 8.2–4 (battle of Cynoscephalae) Philip was victorious on the right wing. From high ground he launched his entire phalanx against the Romans, who could not stand up to the weight of the locked shields and the sharp points of the sarisae. However, on his left wing the phalanx was dispersed over the hilly terrain and was pulled out of formation. Therefore Flamininus, abandoning hope for his defeated wing quickly rode to the other and attacked the Macedonians, who were prevented by the uneven and rough terrain from forming the phalanx and establishing the depth of ranks that is the strength of their formation. Furthermore, in individual fighting the soldiers’ weaponry was heavy and difficult to use. For the phalanx resembles an invincible animal in its strength as long as it preserves its unity and keeps its single locked-shields formation. But when this unity has been broken, then each individual soldier loses his strength because of the type of weapons he uses and because his strength comes from the mutual support of the parts of the phalanx rather than from his individual ability. This wing was routed and some of the Romans pursued them while the others, attacking from the flank, slaughtered the Macedonians who were still fighting. This meant that the victorious Macedonians on the right wing swung round and fled, throwing away their weapons. No fewer than 8,000 men fell in the battle, with 5,000 captured. 126

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS Plutarch here refers to the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC when the Romans under Titus Quinctius Flamininus defeated the Macedonian army of king Philip V. Plutarch provides a good summary of the possible weakness of the phalanx formation, especially in unfavourable, hilly terrain. See above, no. 12 for Polybius’ comparison of the qualities of the phalanx and the Roman legions.

164 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1–11 (Roman marching order) At the head of the entire army are to be stationed the mounted scouts divided into two sections with their own commander. After these should come the Petraean mounted archers also divided into two sections, and under the command of their decurions. After these should be stationed the men drawn from the ala of the Aurianians. Drawn up with them should be the men of the fourth cohort of Raetians under the command of Daphne the Corinthian. Next to them should come the men from the ala of Colonists. Drawn up with them should be the Ituraeans and Cyrenaicans and then men from the first cohort of Raetians. Demetrius should be commander of all these men. (2) After these should come the German cavalry, also divided into two sections, under the command of the centurion in charge of the camp. (3) After these the infantry should be drawn up, holding their standards in front of them, the Italians, and the Cyrenaicans who are present. Pulcher, who commands the Italians, should be in command of them all. After these should come the Bosporan infantry under their commander Lamprocles, and after these the Numidians under their commander Verus. (4) They should be drawn up with four infantrymen abreast. The attached archers should be at the head of this group. Their own cavalry should protect both flanks of the marching column. After these should come the mounted guards (of the legionary legate) and after these the legionary cavalry, and then the catapults. (5) Next should come the standard of the fifteenth legion (Apollinaris) with Valens the commander of the legion, the second in command, the military tribunes who have been assigned to the expedition, and centurions of the first cohort. In front of the standard of the infantrymen should be drawn up the spearmen; the infantrymen should march drawn up four abreast. (6) After the fifteenth legion the standard of the twelfth legion (Fulminata) should be positioned, with the military tribunes and centurions around it; this phalanx (the legion) should also march drawn up four abreast. (7) After the heavy infantry the allied force should be drawn up, heavy infantry from Lesser Armenia and Trapezus, and spearmen from Colchis and Rhizion. After them should be drawn up the infantry of 127


the [Apulians]. Secundinus, commander of the [Apulians] should be commander of the allied force. (8) After this should come the baggage train. The ala of the Dacians and its prefect should form the rearguard. (9) Centurions who have been appointed for this purpose should keep the flanks of the infantry in order; to provide protection the ala of Gauls should ride along both flanks in a single column, and also the Italian cavalry. Their commander should patrol along the flanks. (10) The commander of the entire force, Xenophon (i.e. Arrian), should generally take up position in advance of the infantry standards, but should also make the rounds of the whole army; he should ensure that they march according to their formation, bring to order those who have got into disorder, and praise those who are in proper formation. (11) This should be the marching formation. Arrian’s Ectaxis is an account of the military dispositions and tactical preparation he made during his governorship of Cappadocia for repelling the invasion c. AD 135 of the Alani, a nomadic people living north of the Caucasus. It is interesting that he refers to himself as Xenophon, the famous Greek commander (see p. 40). ‘Apulians’ (known from another source) have been substituted in the translation for ‘Aplanoi’ in the original manuscript, since the Aplanoi are not known as a military unit in Cappadocia. This is the only detailed record we have of a Roman marching order written by a commander. See also above, no. 134.

165 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 11–31 (battle formation against the Alani) When the army has arrived at the appointed place, all the cavalry by wheeling in a circular movement is to adopt a square formation; scouts should be sent to high ground to watch for the enemy. Next, at a signal the men will prepare their arms in silence and when this has been done take their place in formation. (12) Battle formation should be as follows. Each wing of the infantry (auxiliary) should hold the high ground, since that will be its formation in terrain like this. The Armenians under the command of Vasakes and Arbelos should be drawn up on the right wing, holding the highest point on that wing, because they are all archers. (13) The men of the Italian cohort should be drawn up in front of them, and they will all be under the command of Pulcher who commands the Italian cohort. And Vasakes and Arbelos and their cavalry and infantry should be positioned in support of him. (14) The allied force from Lesser Armenia, the light-armed troops from Trapezus, and the Rhizionian spearmen should be drawn up on the left wing and hold the highest ground on this wing. The two hundred [Apulians] should be drawn up in front of them and one hundred of the Cyrenaicans so that their heavily armed men can be a 128


protection for the spearmen, who can shoot over their heads from the high ground. (15) The heavy infantry of the fifteenth legion should occupy all the central area of the right, beyond the mid-point of the entire area, because these troops are by far the most numerous. The infantry of the twelfth legion should occupy the remaining area on the left side, right up to the outer limit of the left wing. The infantry should be drawn up eight ranks deep, in a closely packed formation. (16) The first four ranks shall consist of pike-bearers, whose pikes will end in long, slender iron points. The men in the first rank should hold their pikes at the ready, so that if the enemy comes near, they can thrust the iron tip of their pike especially at the breasts of the horses. (17) The men of the second, third, and fourth ranks should hold their pikes forward to jab and wound the horses where they can, and kill the riders. When the pike has been lodged into the heavy body armour, because of the softness of the metal it will bend and make the horseman ineffective. (18) The remaining ranks behind them should be of spearmen. Behind them should be a ninth rank of infantry archers from the Numidians, Cyrenaicans, Bosporans, and Ituraeans. (19) The artillery should be positioned on each wing so that it can fire its missiles at the advancing enemy from the longest possible range, and behind the whole infantry formation. (20) All the cavalry drawn up in alae and squadrons, which will be eight in number, should be positioned beside the infantry on both wings, with the infantry and archers in front of them as a defensive screen, two companies of them, while in the middle of the infantry formation, six companies [- - -]. (21) The mounted archers among these troops should be stationed close to the infantry formation, in order to shoot over it. Spearmen, pikemen, knifemen, and battleaxemen should keep watch over both flanks and wait for the signal. (22) The mounted bodyguards should be stationed around Xenophon himself (i.e. Arrian), and also up to two hundred bodyguards from the infantry phalanx, and the centurions assigned to the mounted guards, and the commanders of the bodyguards, and the decurions of the mounted guards. (23) They should take up position round him [- - -] one hundred light-armed spearmen, so that as he tours the entire formation, where he sees anything lacking, he should take note of it and correct it. (24) Valens, commander of the fifteenth legion, should take command of the entire right wing along with the cavalry. The tribunes of the twelfth legion should take command of the left wing. (25) When the troops have been drawn up like this there should be silence until the enemy come within weapon range. When they have come within range, everyone should utter a huge and ferocious warcry; 129


missiles and stones should be discharged from catapults, arrows from bows, and the spearmen should throw their spears, both the lightarmed troops and those carrying shields. Stones should be thrown at the enemy by the allied forces on the high ground; there should be a general bombardment from all sides, so concentrated as to throw the horses into confusion and bring destruction to the enemy cavalry. (26) Because of the incredible weight of missiles we may hope that the advancing Scythians (i.e. Alani) will not get very close to our infantry formation. But if they do get close, then the first three ranks should lock their shields together, and, standing shoulder to shoulder, withstand the charge with all possible strength in the most concentrated formation, joined together in the strongest possible way. The fourth rank [shall hold up their pikes, so that they can kill any enemy horsemen, but not hold them straight up, so that the spearmen overshoot with their spears], while the first rank should wound and stab the horses and their riders ceaselessly with their pikes. (27) When the enemy has been repulsed, if there is an obvious rout, the infantry formation should open up and the cavalry should advance, though not all the squadrons, only half of them. The vanguard of this formation should consist of those who are first to advance. (28) The other half should follow those who have advanced first, but in good order and not in full-blooded pursuit, so that if the rout becomes complete, the first pursuit can be sustained by fresh horses, and if there is a sudden enemy counter-attack, they can be attacked as they turn. (29) Simultaneously the Armenian archers should advance and shoot, to prevent the retreating forces from turning, and the light-armed spearmen should attack at the run. The infantry formation should not remain in the same spot but should advance more quickly than a walking pace, so that if any stronger resistance is encountered from the enemy it can again provide a protective screen in front of the cavalry. (30) This is what should happen if the enemy is routed at the first attack. But if they wheel about and aim at an encirclement of our wings, the wings of our light-armed archers should extend their position onto the higher ground. I do not think that the enemy, noting that our wings were weaker as a result of this extension, would thrust their way through them and break up the infantry. (31) But if the enemy should overcome one wing or both of them, it is absolutely inevitable that their cavalry will expose their flank to us and their pikes will be at right angles to us. Then our cavalry should attack them not with a bombardment of missiles, but with swords and battleaxes. The Scythians (Alani) being unprotected and with their horses unprotected (the text breaks off here). 130

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS The brackets at section 26 indicate the restoration of Bosworth (1977), 240, for a damaged part of the text. Arrian’s tactics were designed to deal with the expected massed cavalry attack from the Alani. The legions adopted a defensive formation, which owed something to the model of the classical Greek phalanx, and were to be supported by a barrage of missiles and strong cavalry action.

166 Arrian, Tactica 5.2–3 (importance of orderly formation) The foremost and most important task of the general is to take a disorderly crowd of men and establish them in orderly ranks. I mean that he should assemble and arrange the men in proper ranks and give the multitude a balanced order suitable for battle. For a well-organized army is easier to handle on the march, more secure in camps, and more useful in battle. Indeed we know that in times past, large wellarmed armies have been destroyed through lack of order by smaller and less well-equipped forces. For the weaker and less well-armed force conquered the larger by superior discipline.

167 Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation) The phalanx is sometimes drawn up on a wide front with shallow depth, or sometimes in a deeper formation if the terrain permits and it is more advantageous, if it is necessary to crush the enemy with the depth and the impetus of the charge. For example, Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra drew up the Thebans and at Mantineia all the Boeotians in a wedge formation and led it against the Spartans. On the other hand, it might be necessary to repel attackers, as in the formations adopted against the Sarmatians and Scythians. A deepening of the phalanx occurs when there is a contraction of the ranks from a shallower to a deeper formation, through the movement of the men standing beside and behind one another, which takes place in respect of the length and depth of the formation. When in this way you produce a deeper formation of the phalanx the shields are held close together, so that because of the unbroken line of shields there is no scope for the ranks to wheel to one side or the other. By bringing their shields together in this way the Romans make the tortoise (testudo), usually in the shape of a square, though it can be round or rectangular or however it turns out. For the Theban battle order at Leuctra, see p. 4. The Roman legionaries formed a tortoise (testudo) by linking their shields over their heads; this formation could be used

131

BATTLE: FORMATIONS AND STRATAGEMS to approach the wall of a city or in open battle as a defence against arrows. In this case the first rank of soldiers would kneel down.

168 Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers) Archers and javelin-throwers and slingers and all those who employ different types of missiles are useful in battle. For they are capable of breaking up the enemy, especially those who fire stones over long distances and inflict wounds at long range; indeed a severe wound can be fatal. They are also useful for luring the enemy from strong points, because by shooting at them from long range they cause them to hope that they could not withstand their charge. Again, they are useful for breaking up the formation of a phalanx or repulsing a cavalry attack or seizing high ground because of their speed since they are lightly equipped. But if the enemy comes to grips with them they keep up a continuous bombardment and do not allow them to get near without suffering many wounds. They are also useful in dislodging from a strong point the men who seized it, since they are unable to stand the wounds they inflict. They are ideal for scouting suspicious places and can in addition be used to set up an ambush. For the use of light-armed soldiers, see also nos 102, 103, 116, 120, 127.

169 Arrian, Tactica 16.6–7 (Scythian cavalry formation) We hear that the Scythians in particular used the wedge formation, and also the Thracians, who learned it from the Scythians. Philip of Macedon trained the Macedonians to use this formation, which is especially effective because the leaders are drawn up in a circle and the front of the wedge tapers away to a point. This makes it easy for it to cut its way through any enemy formation and allows it to wheel swiftly round or back.

170 Arrian, Tactica 33.1–2 (Roman willingness to adopt the practices of other peoples) And yet I am not unaware that it will be difficult to make clear every technical term since even the Romans do not have an expression for them in their native tongue. Instead there are terms in the language of the Spanish and the Celts, since the Romans took over practices that had originated with the Celts because the Celtic cavalry distinguished 132


itself on their behalf in battle. The Romans deserve praise above all in this respect, namely that the pleasure they take in their own native practices does not prevent them from choosing the best practices from everywhere and making them into their own.

171 Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.8–10 (Alexander’s stratagem against carts) Alexander considered the safest way in which to cross the ridge. Now, since he decided that he would have to take the risk as there was no other way round, he issued orders to the hoplites that when the carts rolled down the slope those on the level ground who were able to break ranks should move away to both sides so that the carts could run between them. Those who were hemmed in should push close together and some should even lie on the ground and join their shields closely together, so that when the carts ran at them they were likely to bounce over them by their own impetus and leave them unharmed. Events turned out as Alexander had indicated and guessed. For part of the phalanx divided, while the carts rolled over the shields of the other soldiers but did little harm. Not a single man died beneath the carts. Alexander had succeeded his father as king of Macedon in 336 BC and in 335 led an expedition against the Triballi and the Illyrians in Thrace. He planned to invade the Persian empire and wished to secure his Macedonian base by humbling these tribes. See also below, nos 172–3.

172 Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.4–5 (Alexander uses combined tactics) When he heard about their move Alexander himself turned back to lead the attack on the Triballians and caught them when they were in the act of making camp. Since they were caught they drew up their line in a grove beside the river. Alexander drew up his phalanx in a deep formation and led it forward in person, ordering the archers and slingers to run ahead and fire their arrows and stones at the barbarians, to see if they could lure them out of the grove into the open. When the enemy came into range and began to be hit, they charged the archers in order to get to grips with them, since archers are unarmed. But Alexander, when he had lured them out of the glen, ordered Philotas to take the cavalry of upper Macedonia and charge their right wing, where their charge had taken them the farthest. He also ordered Heracleides and Sopolis to lead the cavalry from Bottiaea and Amphipolis against the left wing. He led the infantry phalanx and the 133


remaining cavalry, which he stationed in front of the phalanx, against the centre.

173 Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.4–5 (Alexander’s tactical skill) When the hides had been prepared for the crossing and the army was in position fully armed on the bank of the river, the catapults on a signal bombarded the Scythians riding past on the opposite bank. Some were wounded by the missiles and one man was pierced right through his shield and body armour and fell from his horse. The Scythians were shocked by the long-range missiles and the death of a brave comrade, and retreated a little from the bank. Alexander, seeing that they were in disarray because of the missiles, sounded the trumpets and took personal leadership of the crossing of the river. The rest of the army followed him. He disembarked the archers and slingers first of all, ordering them to fire their arrows and stones at the Scythians so that they could not approach the infantry phalanx as it was disembarking, before all his cavalry had crossed. When they were all collected on the bank he first sent against the Scythians a hipparchy of mercenaries and four squadrons of lancers. The Scythians received this attack by riding round in circles and shooting at them. Since they were many fighting a smaller force they evaded the attack without difficulty. However, Alexander positioned his archers, the Agrianians, and the other light-armed troops commanded by Balacrus, among the cavalry and led them against the Scythians. When they came close he ordered three hipparchies of the Companions and all the mounted javelin-men to charge them. Alexander himself led the remainder of the cavalry at top speed and attacked with the squadrons in column formation. Consequently the Scythian cavalrymen were no longer able to wheel round in circles, as they had done up to this point. For the cavalry was now on top of them and simultaneously the light-armed men mixed with the cavalry prevented them from wheeling round safely. From this moment the Scythians were in open flight. This engagement in 329 BC shows Alexander’s tactical acumen and ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Originally there were eight squadrons (ilai) of Companion cavalry, numbering probably 1,800 men in total and including the Royal Squadron. After 330 the cavalry was reorganized into hipparchies, possibly eight in total. For the organization of the Macedonian army under Alexander, see Bosworth (1988), 259–77.

134


174 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy) Cleomenes, king of the Spartans, when engaging in war with the Argives, encamped opposite them. Now, the Argives kept a close watch on what their enemy was doing, and since Cleomenes issued orders to the army through a herald for everything he wanted done, they hastened to do exactly the same. When the Spartans armed, they armed, when they marched out, they marched out against them, and when they withdrew, they withdrew. Cleomenes issued a secret command that when the herald announced that they were to prepare breakfast they were in fact to arm. The herald made the announcement and the Argives prepared their breakfast. But Cleomenes led his fully armed troops to the attack and easily slaughtered the Argives, who were defenceless without their weapons. Herodotus relates this incident to the battle of Sepeia c. 494 BC. The following selection of passages from Polyaenus illustrates some of the themes common in collections of stratagems, such as the importance of alertness, knowing the enemy and the terrain, deceiving the opposition, and concealing your own strengths and weaknesses.

175 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers) Thrasyllus, wishing to make the enemy think that he had few ships, ordered the helmsmen to draw the triremes up side by side and raise the sails of one while securing the other with ropes to the middle bank of oars. This allowed it to move side by side with the first ship and its sails could not be seen out at sea. In this way he concealed half his ships. During the oligarchic coup in Athens in 411 BC Thrasyllus organized the democrats in the fleet stationed in Samos and was elected general. He contributed to the Athenian naval victory at Cynossema (411) and carried on other successful military operations for Athens. He was executed after the Athenian victory over the Spartans at Arginusae (406) for failure to pick up survivors and the dead.

176 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms in the army) When Clearchus was in Thrace his army was gripped by night-time panics. He therefore ordered that if an alarm occurred during the night no one should stand up. Anyone who stood up was to be killed as an enemy. This order taught the soldiers to despise night-time panics and they stopped jumping up and becoming disturbed. For Clearchus, see no. 43.

135


177 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the Spartans) Epaminondas wanted to attack the Spartans, but since there was a Spartan guard at mount Oneion he pretended that he was going to march through the pass during the night. In fact he allowed his army to sleep at the foot of the mountain. The Spartans guarding the pass were exhausted after staying awake all night under arms. When dawn broke Epaminondas roused his army, attacked the guards, who had gone to sleep, and routing them easily made his way through the pass. This refers to events in 369 BC during the invasion of the Peloponnese by Thebes and her allies.

178 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal operations) When Epaminondas was confronted by the Thessalians at the bridge over the river Sperchius, he saw that an extensive, thick mist rose from the river at dawn. Therefore he ordered each unit to collect two piles of wood, one green, the other dry, and to place the dry wood below and the green wood on top and light them in the middle of the night. The darkness and mist and smoke mingled together. The enemy could not see through this atmosphere and Epaminondas got his soldiers across the bridge. They were in the middle of the plain when the smoke and the mist cleared and the Thessalians realized that their opponents had crossed the bridge.

179 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush) Tisamenus while leading his army saw a large number of birds flying over a particular spot but not settling on the ground. He suspected that they were reluctant to settle because they feared men who had taken up position there. When he had scouted the place he attacked and destroyed the Ionians who were lying in ambush. In mythology Tisamenus was the son of Orestes; the same story is in Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.8.

136


180 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies) Chares, suspecting that there were spies in his camp, placed guards outside the palisade and ordered each soldier to seize the man standing next to him and not to let him go until he said who he was and named his unit. Consequently the spies were captured since they could not identify their unit, file, mess, or the password. Chares was a distinguished Athenian soldier and often held the position of general in the fourth century BC. At times he operated virtually as a mercenary commander; see Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 77–85.

181 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea) Philip when facing the Athenians at Chaeronea gave way and moved back a little. Stratocles, the Athenian general, shouted out, ‘We must not stop the pursuit until we have shut the enemy up in Macedonia’, and did not desist from the pursuit. Philip said, ‘The Athenians do not know how to win.’ He continued the gradual withdrawal, keeping his phalanx in good order and well protected behind their shields. A short time later he seized high ground on the right wing, and spurring on his soldiers turned about and launched a strong attack on the Athenians. Fighting splendidly he routed them. The battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC fought by Philip against Thebes, Athens and their allies confirmed Macedonian dominance in Greece.

182 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexander’s ingenuity) Since the Thessalians were holding the pass of Tempe, Alexander dug out regularly shaped rocks on Mount Ossa and formed them into small steps, and climbing up by means of these both he and the Macedonians scaled the crests. Once they had crossed Mount Ossa they were in possession of Thessaly. For the Thessalians were guarding the narrow pass of Tempe. People travelling through the pass even now can see the rocks of Ossa built up like a stepladder. Indeed they call them ‘Alexander’s ladder’.

137


183 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river) Demetrius was trying to get across the swift-flowing river Lycus, which was fordable for horses but not for infantry. Taking the biggest horses with the strongest chests he placed them upstream in a formation of four columns. These horses broke the force of the current and made it easier for the infantry to cross. Demetrius I Poliorcetes (‘City-Besieger’) supported his father Antigonus, who had been Alexander’s governor of Phrygia, in his attempts to establish himself as an independent ruler. Demetrius eventually became king of Macedonia (294–287). See above p. 7.

184 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy) When Demetrius had pitched camp in the foothills of Taurus, Seleucus, fearing that he would slip away secretly into Syria, sent Lysias with a large contingent of Macedonians to the hills dominating the Amanus Gates, which was the route Demetrius was intending to take, with orders to light many fires. When Demetrius saw that these places had been seized in advance he stopped his march. After Alexander’s death Seleucus became governor of Babylonia and eventually succeeded in establishing an independent kingship and dynasty.

185 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split his forces) When the Carthaginians invaded with 300,000 men, Dionysius set up many forts and guard posts scattered throughout the country with orders that they were to make terms with the Carthaginians and accept their garrisons. The Carthaginians gladly seized these places without a fight and left many of their soldiers as guards and garrisons in each of them. When most of their army had been split up and scattered as guards and garrisons Dionysius then attacked the remainder and defeated them. Dionysius of Syracuse, born c. 430 BC, eventually obtained domination over most of Sicily and attempted to drive the Carthaginians out of the island.

138


186 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush) Diotimus, after sailing during the night to enemy territory, disembarked a few men from each ship and hid them in an ambush. At daybreak he kept the ships at anchor near the men who lay in ambush, and ordered those on deck to prepare for battle and the rowers to take turns with the thalaminian, zeugite, and thranite oars. He then tried to bring some of the ships to the shore. The enemy ran forward to prevent them from landing, but when he hoisted the prearranged signal the men lying in ambush suddenly appeared and butchered many of the enemy and routed the rest. Diotimus made his landing safely. Of the three banks of oars in an Athenian trireme the thranite was top, the thalaminian at the bottom, and the zeugite in between.

187 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy) Since the enemy occupied a fortified position and did not come down to offer battle, Memnon withdrew some distance away from the strong point and drew up his army in two parts in opposition to one another as if one part had mutinied against him. He also sent a deserter to the enemy with orders to say that there was a mutiny and that they were about to fight one another, and this was the reason he had moved further away, fearing that you would attack from above, since you were already armed and ready for a full-scale battle. When the men in the city saw that the deserter’s words fitted in with what was happening, they came down from the fortified position against them. Memnon’s forces, when they saw the enemy on the level ground, did not attack one another but combined to attack the enemy and made them all captives. Memnon of Rhodes was a military commander who took service under the Persians and fought against the Macedonian invasion force. His advice that the Persians should follow a scorched-earth policy and avoid pitched battles was rejected with disastrous consequences at the river Granicus. Memnon subsequently co-ordinated Persian resistance in the Aegean, but was killed at the siege of Mytilene in 333 BC.

188 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice to encourage valour) The Taurians, a Scythian people, when they are about to engage in battle, always dig up the roads behind them and make them 139


impassable. They fight in this fashion so that, not being able to escape, they will either conquer or die.

189 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour) When M. Atilius Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians he swore an oath to them that if set free he would persuade the senate to put an end to the war, and if he failed to persuade it he would return to them. But when he arrived in Rome he put to the senate the contrary view that now was the time to intensify the war with the Carthaginians since their strength was failing. He also announced in public their secret weaknesses and how they would be defeated. Although the senate urged him to remain and to consider that an oath sworn under duress was invalid, and his children, wife, friends, and relatives hugged him, he refused to break his oath, and sailing to the Carthaginians he told them his own ploy and the decision of the Romans. They shut him in a cage, and after humiliating and torturing him for a long time they killed him. Regulus was consul in 267 and 256 BC. He fought several successful battles against the Carthaginians and took the war into Africa. He was defeated in 255 and probably died in captivity. The story of his honourable return (Appian, Punic Wars 4; Dio, 11.15) seems to be later elaboration, but helps to illustrate the theme that the art of command has a moral dimension.

190 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics) During the war with Hannibal Fabius was criticized in the senate for not deploying his troops for battle. When his son called on him to defend this slander, he showed him each part of the legion. Since some parts were not strong, he said, ‘You see that it is not wise for these men to join battle and run the risk of a decisive engagement. For on many occasions the entire legion has not been involved in the hazards of battle, and the experienced commander does not fail to recognize that he can be defeated in one part. Therefore my advice is not to engage in battle but to pursue, following the high ground and encouraging cities to revolt.’ For recommending and carrying out this policy he was at the time regarded as a coward. But later, when other commanders had lost many armies, the Romans turned back to Fabius and his strategy, so that he was declared Dictator and was given the name Maximus. This means ‘the Greatest’. For Quintus Fabius Maximus, see no. 141.

140


191 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting information) When Trajan was campaigning in Dacia and was drawing close to Tapae, where the barbarians were encamped, a large mushroom was brought to him inscribed with Latin letters saying that the Buri and other allies of Trajan urged him to turn back and maintain the peace. This was apparently a well-known incident and was represented on Trajan’s column (see Austin and Rankov (1995), 65, and plate 3).

192 Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation against cavalry) Round this time the Romans defeated the Iazyges on land and later on the river. I do not mean that a naval battle took place but that the Romans chased them as they fled across the frozen river Danube and fought them there as if on dry land. When the Iazyges realized that they were being pursued they waited the Romans’ charge, thinking that they would defeat them easily since they were not used to the ice. Therefore some of the Iazyges charged straight at the Romans while others rode round the flanks, for their horses had been trained to gallop safely over a surface like this. The Romans did not panic when they saw this but formed into a compact mass so that they faced all the enemy at once, and most of them placed their shields on the ground and put one foot on them so that they did not slip so much. Supporting themselves like this they received the enemy charge, and some grabbed the bridles, others the shields and spears of the attackers, dragging the men towards them. Locked in close combat they pulled down both men and horses, since carried on by their momentum the barbarians could no longer stop themselves slipping. Of course the Romans also slipped, but if one of them fell on his back he pulled his opponent down on top of him and then threw him backward with his feet, just as in wrestling, and so got on top of him. If one fell on his front he would grab his enemy, who had fallen first, with his teeth. The barbarians were not used to battle of this kind and were more lightly equipped, with the result that only few escaped out of a large force. This battle occurred during the campaigns conducted on the Danube by Marcus Aurelius, in the winter of AD 173 or 174.

141


193 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in AD 194) In this battle (Issus) Valerianus and Anullinus commanded the army of Septimius Severus, while Pescennius Niger himself was present with his forces and drew them up for battle. This pass, the ‘Cilician Gates’, has this name because of its narrowness. On one side steep mountains loom above, while on the other high cliffs sweep down to the sea. Now, Niger pitched his camp on a strongly fortified hill and stationed the heavy infantry in the front of the line, then the spear-men and slingers, then behind all the rest the archers. The intention was that the front ranks should hold off their opponents while the archers at a distance used their strength to fire over the heads of those in front. He was protected on the left and right flank respectively by the cliffs on the side of the sea and by an impenetrable forest. He drew up his army like this and placed the baggage-carriers behind it so that none of his soldiers would be able to flee even if they wanted. When Anullinus saw this he drew up his heavily armed soldiers in front, and behind them all his light troops, so that they could fire at long range over the heads of the other soldiers and hold back the enemy, while the soldiers in front could make the advance up the slope safe for them. He sent the cavalry with Valerianus, ordering them to find some way round the forest and suddenly attack Niger’s soldiers in the rear. When they came to close quarters some of Severus’ soldiers raised their shields in front of them while others put them over their heads to form a tortoise (testudo), and in this way advanced on the enemy. Septimius Severus, governor of Upper Pannonia, seized power in Rome in AD 193. His immediate rival was the governor of Syria, Pescennius Niger, and Issus was the decisive battle in a campaign fought largely in the eastern provinces. Niger’s forces were at first victorious but a sudden rainstorm blowing in their faces disconcerted them, and they were caught in a trap when Valerianus’ cavalry appeared in their rear. Niger’s army was destroyed with the loss of 20,000 men.

194 Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence) I discovered something that is disbelieved by many and about which I am doubtful, but because it is unusual I have put it forward. Some people claim that the Mauretanians, having dug a small hole and lain down in it, place their neck against a piece of wood pressed to the ground, and with their ears pick up sound unhindered. The story is that bandits among the Gallic peoples do the same thing. There is a similar, improvised way of picking up information. If someone with a large army wants to discover the intentions of his own soldiers or those of 142


the enemy, he should dig a deep hole as if he intends to get down into it. Then he should cover it over with his cloak in case anyone happens to come by. Nothing will escape the notice of the man who is positioned there, and he will reveal to you like a prophet what is said and what sounds are made. Julius Africanus was a Christian philosopher from Aelia Capitolina (Jerusalem) who was active in the early third century. He wrote the Chronographies, a combination of religious and profane history, and also the Cesti, a compilation of miscellaneous information including material on tactics, some of it rather fanciful. Text in Migne (ed. Hopfner, 1928–36).

195 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an inexperienced army) The general should arrange ambushes in total secrecy at river crossings, mountain passes, forest defiles, marshes, or other difficult routes. He should organize his march so that while being fully prepared himself he can attack the enemy while they are eating or sleeping or at least taking their rest, when they are relaxed, unarmed and without their boots, with their horse unsaddled. In an attack of this kind his soldiers can build up their confidence. For men who have not for a long time, or indeed who have never, seen men being wounded or killed are horrified and confused by terror when they first set eyes on it, and begin to think more about fleeing than fighting. What is more, if the enemy are on the march, the general should attack when they are worn out after a long journey; he should attack the rearguard and he certainly must launch surprise attacks. He should also attack with picked troops any who have wandered far from their army in search of fodder or booty. These should be the first operations he undertakes, which if they turn out badly will do less damage, and if they are successful will bring maximum benefit. Vegetius discusses various ways to engage in a pitched battle (3.20).

196 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms) A soldier should never be led into battle unless you have tried him out first. It is better to overcome the enemy by famine, raids, and terror tactics than by battle, in which luck has more influence than courage. It is better to keep extra reserves behind the battle line than to spread the soldiers out too widely. 143


Courage is of greater value than numbers. Terrain is often of greater value than courage. The unexpected terrifies the enemy, while the familiar generates contempt. The general who carries out a pursuit carelessly with scattered forces is prepared to offer his opponent the victory that he has won. Good generals never engage in a set battle unless an opportunity offers or under great pressure. These are extracts from a long section on the principles of war, which was very popular in the Middle Ages.

144

4 ATTACKING AND DEFENDING CITIES

197 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.3–4 (Theban attack on Plataea) When the Plataeans realized that the Thebans were inside and that the city had been captured by surprise, because they were in a panic and believed that far more had entered than was the case (they could not see what had happened in the dark), they came to terms. They accepted the proposals and remained inactive, especially since the Thebans took no offensive action against anyone. But while they were negotiating they realized that there were not many Thebans and thought that if they attacked they would defeat them easily. For a majority of the people of Plataea did not wish to leave their alliance with Athens. Therefore they decided that they should make the attempt and they assembled together by digging through the party walls of their houses in order to avoid being seen going about in the streets. They also dragged wagons without their draught animals into the streets to act as barricades and got other things ready in the way that seemed most likely to help in their current predicament. When they had got everything ready as best they could they waited until the time just before dawn when it was still dark and then came out of their houses and attacked the Thebans. They thought that if they attacked in daylight the Thebans would be more confident and could meet them on equal terms, while during the night they would be less certain of themselves and would also suffer from not knowing the city as well as the Plataeans did. They attacked at once and speedily engaged in handto-hand fighting. (4) When the Thebans realized that they had been tricked they closed up their ranks and resisted the attacks wherever they occurred. They forced them back two or three times, and all the while there was a tremendous uproar from the men who launched attacks on them and also from the women and slaves, who were screaming and shouting and hurling down stones and tiles from the 145

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING CITIES

rooftops; at the same time there was a severe rain storm during the night. In the end the Thebans, overcome by fear, turned round and fled through the city. But in the darkness and mud most of them did not know the route they needed to take to escape, and since these events occurred at the end of the month there was no moon. Their pursuers, however, knew how to prevent their escape, with the result that most of them perished. The gate by which they had entered was the only one still open, but one of the Plataeans closed it by using a spear spike instead of a pin and driving it into the bar, so that there was no longer any way out even by this route. As they were pursued though the city some of them climbed onto the wall and threw themselves down on the other side; most were killed in doing so. Some found an unguarded gate and since a woman gave them an axe they cut through the bolt without being seen. But then they were quickly spotted and only a few got away. Others were killed here and there in different parts of the city. The largest group, which had kept itself in a tighter formation, rushed into a large building, which was part of the wall and had its doors lying open. They thought that the doors were city gates and would lead through to the outside. When the Plataeans saw that they were trapped they debated whether to set fire to the building and burn them as they were or try some other plan. Finally these men and all the other Theban survivors wandering about in the city came to an agreement with the Plataeans to hand over their weapons and surrender unconditionally. This surprise attack on Plataea occurred in 431 BC at the start of the Peloponnesian War; see also below, no. 198.

198 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.75–6 (siege of Plataea) When he had made this appeal to the gods Archidamas brought the army into action, and first using the trees that they had cut down they built a palisade round the city (Plataea) to prevent anyone breaking out. Then they built a mound up against the wall of the city, expecting to take it quickly since such a large force was working on the task. They cut down trees from Mount Cithaeron and built a framework on both sides of the mound, laying the logs in a criss-cross formation instead of walls to prevent the mound from coming apart. They made the mound out of wood, and stones, and earth, and anything else that could be added to accomplish the task. They worked on the mound continuously for seventy (?) days and nights, being divided in relays 146


so that while one group was carrying material the other was sleeping and eating. The Spartan officers who were in command of the contingents from each allied city stood over them and made sure that they got on with the work. The Plataeans, however, seeing the mound growing bigger, built a wooden wall and attached it to the top of their own wall where the mound was being erected. Inside this framework they built a wall of bricks, which they took from neighbouring houses. The wood bound the construction together and prevented it from weakening as it was built higher. They also used skins and hides as protective coverings so that both the men working on it and the woodwork would be protected from attack by fire arrows. Therefore the wall soon rose to a great height and the mound opposite did not lag behind it. The Plataeans also had the idea of dismantling their wall against which the mound was being built and carrying away the earth. (76) When the Peloponnesians realized this they packed clay closely into reed baskets and placed these into the gap to prevent the structure from breaking up and stop them from being removed as the earth had been removed. The Plataeans, finding themselves frustrated in this direction, stopped the work. But they then dug a tunnel from the city, having calculated the distance underneath the mound, and then dragged the earth from which the mound was built back with them. For along time the besiegers did not notice this, and despite their piling more earth on top the work made less progress because the earth was being taken out from underneath the mound and it was always settling down into the empty space. Despite this the Plataeans were worried in case their small numbers could not hold out against a larger force. They therefore tried another defensive ploy. They stopped working on the enormous construction opposite the mound, and starting from either side of this building, at the ends of the low city wall, they built an inner wall in the shape of a crescent curving back towards the city. So, if the high wall were captured they could still use the second wall for protection and the enemy would have to start again building another mound against it, and as they moved inside to have all the labour for a second time and in a much more dangerous position. Now, while they were building the mound the Peloponnesians brought up siege engines against the city. One of these was directed at the huge construction opposite the mound and knocked down a large part of it, spreading consternation among the Plataeans. Other siege engines were deployed against other parts of the wall, and the Plataeans looped ropes over them and fended them off. They also lowered large beams on long iron chains attached to the ends of two poles that projected at right angles from the top of the wall. Whenever a siege engine was 147


being brought into position, they hauled the beam up at an oblique angle and then dropped it by slackening the chains, so that it came crashing down and broke off the head of the battering ram. The Peloponnesian army began the siege of Plataea in the summer 429 BC. The besiegers next tried to burn the city down, but this failed because the wind did not blow in the right direction. Part of the besieging army then settled down to starve out the Plataeans. The engines here are battering rams. The figure of seventy days for building the mound seems too great in the context of other siege operations. Some wish to emend the text, suggesting seventeen days, but no certainty is possible.

199 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26 (Athenian blockade of Pylos) Meanwhile at Pylos the Athenians were still carrying on the siege of the Spartans on the island while the Spartan army on the mainland remained in its position. The Athenians were finding the blockade troublesome because of shortage of food and water. For there was no spring except one on the acropolis of Pylos, and that was not large. Most had to dig about in the shingle on the beach to find what water they could to drink. Furthermore there was a shortage of room since they were encamped close together, and since the ships had no anchorage the crews took it in turns to have their meals on land while the rest anchored at sea. But the greatest despondency was caused by the unexpectedly long time spent on the siege, since they had expected that they would take only a few days to overcome an enemy who were on a desolate island with only brackish water to drink. The reason was that the Spartans had appealed for volunteers to bring to the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other type of food that could help in a siege. They promised large cash rewards, and freedom for any helot who actually brought in food. Many men took the risk and brought in food, and especially helots, who set out from wherever they could on the coast of the Peloponnese, and sailing during the night put in at the part of the island facing the open sea. Most of all they waited for a wind to bring them in. For it was easy for them to evade the guard kept by the triremes when the wind blew from the sea since it was impossible for them to anchor all round the island. The helots made their approach to the shore recklessly since the boats that they ran aground had been insured and the Spartan hoplites were on the lookout at the landing places. But all those who made the attempt in calm weather were captured. Underwater swimmers also made their way in from the harbour dragging behind them by a rope skins filled with honeyed poppy seed and crushed linseed. At first the swimmers avoided 148


detection, but later guards were posted. Therefore both sides used every kind of device, one to get food in, the other to detect and intercept them. For the battle on Sphacteria, see above, no. 103.

200 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.1–2 (protecting those parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection) So that you do not need soldiers to guard them, it is best to block off unused open spaces in the city, by digging ditches and making them as inaccessible as possible for those wishing to start a revolt who might seize them as a first move. For example, when the Thebans were breaking into Sparta, the Spartans in different places throughout the city ripped apart the houses closest to them and filled baskets with earth and stones taken from them and also from fences and walls. The story has it that they even used many enormous bronze tripods from the temples and with these managed to block the city’s entrances, thoroughfares, and open spaces before the Thebans arrived, and stopped their attempts to break into the city proper. Aeneas Tacticus was probably Aeneas of Stymphalus, general of the Arcadian League in 367 BC, who helped to depose Euphron, the tyrant of Sicyon. Aeneas is the earliest of the ancient technical military writers any of whose work has survived. On the basis of the examples he cites his treatise on Siegecraft was probably written in the midfourth century. In it he is mainly concerned with the methods to be used in preparing and defending a city against a siege. Several other of his works on military science are now lost and among them he may have treated the role of the besieger. He gives a particularly vivid picture of the resourceful and skilful defence of relatively small Greek cities, especially when some of the citizens were subversive. The work falls into three general headings: dealing with preparations under threat of siege before an enemy presence is clearly established, preparations when the arrival of the enemy army is imminent, and measures to deal with an actual siege. Of course a Greek city would have considered its sovereignty violated as soon as its territory was invaded, and Aeneas believed that as well as securing the city the authorities must also try to prevent the enemy from invading the city’s territory or at least from advancing on the city. Text and translation in W.A. Oldfather (1928); translation and commentary in Whitehead (1990). Aeneas’ identity has been much debated. I here follow Whitehead’s assessment, op. cit., 12. In this extract Aeneas refers to the Theban attack on Sparta in the summer of 362 BC.

149


201 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.1–2 (choosing men to guard city gates) Next, the appointment of men to watch over the gates must not be done casually. You should choose sensible and shrewd men who are always capable of feeling suspicious about anything brought into the city. They should also be prosperous men with an interest in the city, by which I mean a wife and children, but not men who, because of poverty or the pressure of some contract or some other need, could be persuaded by someone to revolt, or could themselves instigate revolt. Leucon, tyrant of the Bosporus, used to discharge even from his own guard men who owed money because of dice games or some other excess. Leucon of the Spartokid dynasty ruled the Cimmerian Bosporus in the eastern Crimea c. 389/8–349/8 BC. For Aeneas the gatekeepers are very important figures because of his concern about treachery within the city. To Aeneas this is part of the same defensive operation because the internal malcontents are likely to be in collusion with the besiegers; see Whitehead (1990), 20–1; 25–33.

202 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.1–3 (choosing day scouts) It is essential to station day scouts in front of the city in a lofty position, visible over as long a distance as possible. At least three scouts should be stationed at each location, and they should not be chosen casually. They should be men experienced in warfare in order to prevent a single scout, having formed an opinion in ignorance, from signalling or announcing it to the city and needlessly disturbing the citizens. This happens to men who are inexperienced in military formations and the practice of warfare, since they do not understand whether enemy movements and activities are deliberate or merely accidental. But the experienced man, knowing enemy preparations, numbers, and direction of march, and other movements made by the army, will convey the truth. For scouting in Greek warfare, see Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 127–34.

203 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keeping watch on potential traitors) You must keep under observation those citizens who are antagonistic and not naïvely accept their advice. 150


(3) Just before Chios was betrayed, one of the officials who was involved in the treason deceitfully persuaded his colleagues that, since it was a time of peace, they should raise the harbour barrier up onto the land for drying and caulking, sell the ships’ old rigging, and repair the leaking roofs of the ship sheds, the adjoining stoa, and the tower next to it, in which the magistrates took their meals. This was a pretext to ensure that ladders would be in place for those who intended to seize the ship sheds, the stoa, and the tower. He also advised that the majority of men who were on guard duty throughout the city should be paid off so that, as he claimed, the expense incurred by the city should be as low as possible. By this and similar arguments he persuaded his colleagues to accept everything that would assist the traitors when they made their attempt to seize the city. So, you must always watch out for men who are enthusiastic to bring about things like this. At the same time he fastened to the wall and hung out, as if he was trying to dry them, nets for deer and boars, and in another place sails with ropes attached. It was by these that soldiers climbed up during the night. This incident at Chios cannot be firmly dated. The stoa was perhaps used as a store or arsenal. Again we see Aeneas’ concern with the possibility of betrayal from within the city and the need to take precautionary measures well in advance of any threat.

204 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the gate) To prevent mischief of this kind, the general’s first duty before he takes his dinner must be to supervise personally the locking of the gate and not carelessly entrust the task to someone else. In precarious situations he must give his full attention to this matter. This is part of Aeneas’ long set of instructions about securing the gates and again reflects his concern about betrayal of the besieged from within; see also below, no. 205.

205 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.4–5 (organizing guard shifts) Furthermore, the guards stationed on the wall, in the market place, at the civic buildings, at the approaches to the market place, at the theatre, and other occupied locations should keep watch for short spells. The guards should be changed frequently and there should be many men involved in each shift. For if a man is on duty for a short spell he 151


will not have enough time to have any contact with the enemy and to get ahead with starting a revolution. What is more, if men keep guard for short spells they are less likely to be overcome by sleep. And if many men keep guard together it is more probable that some word of any treachery will leak out.

206 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.21–3 (setting up lanterns at guard posts) In a city where there is unanimity and no one holds any suspicions, lights should be kept burning in lanterns throughout the night at the guard posts on the wall, so that if any hostile activity is directed against them they can raise the lantern as a signal to the general. If the nature of the terrain prevents the lantern from being seen by the general, another guard acting as relay should signal the general with his lantern. The general, using a bugler or dispatch-bearers, as seems best, should pass on to the other guards the signal he has received. On these occasions when the guards are on duty in the way described, the rest of the population should be informed that no one is to go out after a signal has been given. And if someone goes out on some essential task he should carry a lantern with him so that he is visible from a distance to the patrols. No workman or craftsman is to carry on his work in case noises made by any of them reach the guards. ‘Unanimity’ is a translation of the Greek word homonoia, which refers to political harmony. Other possible translations are ‘concord’ or ‘of one mind’; see Whitehead (1990), 27.

207 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.1–5 (organizing sorties) Whoever is making secret sorties during the night against a besieging enemy should take the following precautions. First he should ensure that no one deserts, and then that no light is burning outside, in case the air above the city, being brighter than the rest, reveals the plan. He must also prevent dogs from barking and cocks from crowing by making them mute for the moment by cauterising a part of their mouth. For the noise made by these animals before daybreak will reveal the plan. Some have used the following ploy in making sorties. They staged a pretended internal revolt on a plausible pretext, waited for their chance and then making a sortie unexpectedly attacked the enemy with great success. Others who were besieged have made a secret sortie 152


in the following way. They walled up the gates in full view of the enemy, but where the enemy were most vulnerable to attack they let down a small sail and raised it again after a time. At first the enemy were astonished by this, but after it had happened several times they paid no attention. Then the people in the city pulled down as much of the wall as they wanted during the night, built a false wall in its place, and let down the sail over it. Next, watching for their chance they made a sudden sortie and attacked the enemy. When they were doing this they took care that no one deserted. Therefore it is essential not to overlook any of these matters. For the textual problem in respect of cauterising part of the mouth (or body), see Whitehead (1990), 163.

208 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.16–19 (arranging suitable passwords) Iphicrates indeed issued orders that men on patrol and men on guard duty should not have the same password, but that a different one should be given to each group. Therefore the one questioned first might reply, ‘Zeus the Saviour’, if he happened to have this password, while another would reply, ‘Poseidon’. By doing this they were least likely to be deceived by the enemy and the password betrayed by deserters. If the guards should become separated from one another, they must communicate using a whistle that has been agreed beforehand. Apart from the person who knows it, this will not be recognized by anyone whether they are Greeks or barbarians. However, you must make sure that the whistling does not make the dogs cause trouble. They used this method at Thebes during the capture of the Cadmeia, when the (attacking) forces were scattered in the darkness and could not recognize one another but were gathered together by whistling. The men on patrol and the guards in the outposts must ask each other for the password. There is no point in only one person asking, since an enemy pretending to be a patrol could do that. For Iphicrates see p. 5. The Cadmeia was the Acropolis at Thebes and this passage refers either to its capture by Sparta in 382 BC or (more likely) to its subsequent liberation in 379; see Whitehead (1990), 171. If the patrol alone gave the password the system could be undermined by a courageous enemy who bluffed his way and got the password from the sentries. This problem could be overcome if both patrol and sentries had different passwords or had an additional sign of recognition (On Siegecraft 25).

153


209 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.1–5 (organizing patrols) In times of crisis the first thing to do is to arrange for two of the companies assembled in the market place to take their turn in patrolling the base of the city wall. They must be supplied with the available weapons and tokens of recognition so that they can clearly recognize each other from a substantial distance. The men who take the first watch must make their patrol before they have had their dinner. For men on the first watch who have already eaten tend to be more indolent and undisciplined. Furthermore, they should patrol without a light, unless it is very dark and stormy. But if they have a light it must not shine upwards, but must be covered with something, and should shine only on the ground in front of their feet. In a city that keeps horses and if the ground is suitable for horses, mounted patrols can take place in the winter, for in the cold and mud and the long nights the patrol can be accomplished more speedily in this way.

210 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.1–3 (dealing with panics) The terrors and fears that suddenly strike a city or military camp by night or day are called ‘panics’ by some. This is a Peloponnesian word, found particularly in Arcadia. Therefore, in dealing with these panics some wishing to prevent them say that signals should be arranged in advance for people in the city, which they will recognize when they see. They will then realize that there is a panic since they will observe the previously arranged fire-signal at a place easily visible as far as possible to everyone in the city. It is best to announce in advance that whenever a feeling of fear comes over the soldiers they must remain in their places and sing the paean, or say that it is only a panic and everyone who hears it should pass the word along the line to his neighbour. If part of the army does not respond to the singing of the paean you can tell that the really frightened men are here. This passage refers to an irrational fear and takes its name from the god Pan (see Borgeaud (1988), 88–116). The paean was originally a ritual cry in honour of Paen, an ancient god of healing, often identified with Apollo and Asclepius. Later the paean described a song sung in certain situations, such as before entering battle; see Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 105–8.

154


211 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.1–2 (dealing with arms smuggling) I shall now discuss the question of smuggling into a city jars and bundles, in which something may be hidden by means of which the city and the acropolis have in past examples been captured. It is essential to pay attention to this issue and not treat it carelessly, and this applies particularly to the gatekeeper during times when there is a threat from outside or within the city. He must carefully give his attention to everything brought in.

212 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.1–2 (sending secret messages) In respect of secret messages, there are all kinds of ways of sending them, but it is essential that the sender and the recipient have made a private arrangement in advance. The following methods are the most likely to avoid detection. In one case a message was sent as follows. A book or other document of any size and age was placed in with a load or other baggage. The message was written on it by marking the first, second and third lines with tiny dots, which were visible only to the recipient. When the book arrived with the intended recipient, he wrote out and placed in order the marked letters from the first and second line and similarly from all the others, and worked out the message. For the importance of cryptography in Aeneas, see Whitehead (1990), 183. For secret messages in Roman times, see above, no. 135.

213 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.1–2 (protection against siege engines) Against the assaults of the enemy using either engines or troops you can offer resistance in the following way. First of all, sails can protect against anything raised higher than the wall from towers, or masts, or similar things; they should be stretched tight by ropes and covered with an impenetrable material, and the missiles will have to overshoot them. It is especially important to produce a great deal of smoke and light fires to create the biggest blaze possible, and build as a defence large wooden towers made from baskets filled with sand, or from stones or bricks. Indeed even wickerwork woven from reeds in a criss-cross pattern can stop missiles. You should prepare a defence against engines used to attack the battlements, such as rams or similar things, by 155


hanging in front of them sacks of chaff, bags of wool, or fresh hides that have been inflated or stuffed with something, and other devices like this. For towers and masts see Garlan (1974) 171; 225–34. Masts would support a leather or wicker cradle that could hold one or more men. See also Whitehead (1990), 194–5.

214 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.1–2 (how to counter-attack siege engines) You must pour pitch and throw tow and sulphur on the shelters that have been brought up, and then throw down on them a blazing bundle of sticks attached to a rope. Devices of this type, suspended out from the walls, can be fired at the engines as they are being moved into position. You can destroy these machines by fire in the following way. Wooden sticks should be prepared shaped like pestles, though much larger. Then sharp pieces of iron, both long and short, should be driven into the end of the sticks, and strong combustible material should be attached to the rest of the stick, both top and bottom. It should resemble an artist’s depiction of a thunderbolt. This should be dropped onto the engine as it is being moved into position, and its design will ensure that it sticks to the engine and while it remains in position the fire will last. The iron spikes were driven into both ends of the sticks. For the appearance of the thunderbolt on coins, see Jenkins (1972), nos 81, 175, 180, 240, 451, 516, 631.

215 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.1–2 (how to put out fires) If the enemy try to set fire to anything with powerful incendiary material, you must put it out with vinegar, since that makes it difficult to start again. It is preferable, though, to smear it first with [birdlime] since this is not combustible. The men who extinguish fires from a height should have protection for their faces so that they will be less troubled if the flames jump up at them. Polyaenus 6.3 (below, no. 255), in a passage that has some echoes of Aeneas, notes that vinegar is not combustible. In the second sentence a word is missing from Aeneas’ text and Oldfather (1928), 183, argues that birdlime was meant, partly because vinegar has already been mentioned, and Aeneas talks of ‘smearing’ it on, and also because it too was well known for its non-combustible qualities.

156


216 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.1–2 (preventing the placing of siege ladders) The placing of siege ladders can be prevented in the following way. If the ladder when set against the wall overtops it, then when the man climbing up is at the top push him or his ladder away with a forked pole, if you are not able to stop him in any other way because arrows are being fired from below. If, however, the ladder is level with the top of the wall, you will not be able to push the ladder away and instead you must push off the man climbing over the wall. However, if this is apparently impossible you should use a kind of door-frame made of wooden planks, and when the ladder is being brought forward the frame should be inserted first underneath it. When the ladder begins to touch the frame, which has had a roller fitted underneath, the frame moves away from underneath and the ladder is unable to get a firm position and inevitably falls. For the device with the roller, see Garlan (1974), 173–6, and figure 2. The panel was controlled by ropes attached to both sides; when pulled it moved laterally along the wall on its rollers in the required direction and by this movement dislodged the siege ladder.

217 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.1–3; 6–7 (dealing with tunnels) Those who are building tunnels should be prevented in the following way. If you think that a tunnel is being constructed you should dig a ditch as deep as possible outside the wall, so that the tunnel opens into the ditch and those digging it are exposed to view. If you have the opportunity you should build a wall in the trench made from the toughest and biggest stones. If you cannot build it from stones, bring up wood shavings. . . . And if at any point the tunnel comes into the ditch, throw the wood and the shavings there and set fire to them. Then cover the rest of the ditch so that the smoke penetrates the tunnel and injures those inside. Indeed it is possible that the smoke will kill many. Some have even released wasps and bees into the opening and caused distress to those in the tunnel. (6) There is an old story . . . about Amasis besieging Barca, when he was trying to dig a tunnel. The people of Barca, who knew that Amasis was making the attempt, were worried in case he avoided detection or beat them to it. But then a coppersmith worked out a ploy. He carried a bronze shield round inside the wall and in several places held it against the ground. Normally there was no sound at most places where 157


the shield was set down. But where the digging was going on the shield produced a resonance. Therefore the people of Barca dug a countertunnel at this point and killed many of the enemy who were digging the tunnel. As a result of this up to this very day men use this device to discover where a tunnel is being dug. For tunnelling see Garlan (1974) 143–5; 176–7; 235–6. Use of smoke – Polybius 21.28.11–17. Wasps and bees – Appian, Mithridatic Wars 78. The Persian general Amasis besieged Barca in north Africa in 512 BC (Herodotus, 4.200).

218 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.1–6 (how to deal with enemy incursions) It is essential that those who are under siege should employ devices such as the following. At the city gates and just inside them they should dig a ditch, leaving a passage on either side of it. Then some of them should make a sortie and skirmish with the enemy, luring them on so that they charge into the city with them. Naturally as the men from the city retreat into it they must run in along the passages left on either side. But it is reasonable that the enemy who run in with them, because they do not know about the ditch, especially since it is also concealed, will fall in and be immediately killed by those inside the city. Some of these men should be stationed in the passageways and at the ditch near the gate. Furthermore, if larger numbers of the enemy infiltrate the city after the first group and you wish to contain them, you must prepare above the centre of the gate a portcullis made of very heavy timber and sheathed in iron. Then, when you want to cut off the enemy who have rushed in, drop this straight down. Now, the portcullis as it falls will kill some of the enemy and will prevent the rest from entering, while simultaneously men on the walls are bombarding the enemy at the gates. It is essential that you arrange things in advance with your own men, in case the enemy charges in with them, so that they know where to rendezvous in the city and the friendly forces can therefore be distinguished by their location. For it is not easy to distinguish between friends and enemies in the uproar of a confused mass of armed men all charging in together. In some cases when the enemy were over-confident and came closer than was wise to the city wall either by night or by day, the besieged prepared nooses (brochoi), secretly during the day, but quite openly at night. They then lured the enemy on by skirmishing and hauled up those caught in the nooses. For the portcullis, see Garlan (1974), 197–8. Brochoi elsewhere in Aeneas refer to loops or nooses rather than nets – 18.5, 9, 16, 32.4; see Whitehead (1990), 203.

158


219 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers are small) If the city is large and the men in it are insufficiently numerous to defend the walls all the way round, but you wish to guard it securely with the forces available, it is essential, using material to hand, to build up high all the parts of the city wall that can be attacked. Therefore if some of the enemy climb the walls by stealth or by force they will be unable to jump down from these heights, being unused to this, and will have no way at all of getting down. On either side of the areas that have been built up men from the available forces should keep guard and kill those who do leap down from the high points. (4) Indeed the people of Sinope, during their war against Datamas when they were under threat and needed men, disguised the most physically imposing of their women and armed them as far as possible to look like men. Instead of shields and helmets they gave them jars and similar bronze objects and led them round the walls where the enemy was particularly likely to see them. But they forbade them to throw missiles, for even from far off a woman can be recognized when she tries to throw. While they were engaged on this they made sure that deserters did not reveal the ploy. Datamas was Persian governor of Cappodocia who launched a rebellion against king Artaxerxes in the 360s BC. The war against Sinope, a colony of Miletus on the southern Black Sea, should probably be dated c. 370 BC.

220 Philon, (Siegecraft) A32–3 (positioning of catapults and postern gates) At the bottom of the walls and the outworks batteries are set up consisting of the biggest and most numerous catapults. Some are situated on level ground, others underground in order to have plenty of room and to avoid wounding the operators. Without being seen themselves they can inflict damage on the enemy, and when the enemy come close the catapult operators will not become ineffective through inability to lower the angle of fire. (33) Furthermore, numerous postern gates should be left on the flanks so that sorties can be made easily, and the soldiers when returning and making an about turn on the shield side do not leave themselves exposed. So, the detachment that leaves through one postern gate will be able to return through a second, and similarly for all the others who are making a withdrawal. For Philon of Byzantium see above, p. 35. The untitled text here described as (Siegecraft) has a heterogeneous character, though it is generally concerned with aspects of siege

159

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING CITIES warfare. Text, translation and commentary in Garlan (1974), 279–404. Garlan, in common with earlier editors has divided the text into four sections. Well-positioned postern gates would allow the troops on the sortie to retreat without exposing their right sides to the enemy.

221 Philon, (Siegecraft) B1–2 (keeping reserve stocks of food) It is right to keep in reserve in public keeping and in private houses other foodstuffs that will not decay, such as pearl barley, wheat in sheaves, chick peas, lupines, hippace, lentils, sesame, poppy seeds for the preparation of medicines, and also millet; in addition to this there should be bread made from dates. (2) The rich citizens should keep meat that has been dried or conserved in wine sediment, or other salted meat. For they make no small contribution to nourishment and strength, and are entirely sufficient by themselves and do not need dressing or salt. And there should also be legumes, thoroughly grilled, but if not, in their natural state; others should be marinated in olive lees, for in this way they do not decay. Pliny (Natural History 25.83) attributed to the plant hippace the same properties as a cheese made from mares’ milk by the Scythians.

222 Philon, (Siegecraft) B 49–50 (preparing ammunition and supplies) It is essential in dealing with sieges to prepare weapons, iron, bronze, bricks, and stones suitable for building, ammunition for catapults, stone-throwers, dart-firing catapults, an engineer to build catapults, men to look after the machines, baskets, mattocks, shovels, carts, axes, and digging tools. (50) All things should be tested during time of peace when there is no emergency, so that you do not discover during wartime in a sudden emergency that they are worn out and ineffective.

223 Philon, (Siegecraft) C3–5 (defensive precautions against siege engines) Then, to deal with catapults, it is right to suspend in front of the wall covers made from palm leaves that have been tied together; for they are tough and difficult to set on fire. Next, cushioning material should be put in front of them at the point where they overlap so that their joints are not cut apart by the missiles, (4) and nets woven from cords and filled with seaweed should be dropped down. (5) Up above, chains 160


are fastened from projecting pieces of wood to carry the covers and the cushions. But it is essential to suspend hides in front of them so that the chains are not cut by the missiles. See also above, no. 213.

224 Philon, (Siegecraft) C32–6 (defensive ditches, guards, passwords, and signals) It is right to dig defensive ditches in some places inside the walls and conceal them, so that if a breach is made in the wall the enemy will charge in and many will perish because they do not know about the ditches. (33) But it is also essential, where it is expected that a breach will be made in the wall, to set up a palisade as quickly as possible and also baskets packed with earth to serve as an advancewall. (34) It is right to change the night watches and guard duties of those soldiers and citizens whom you distrust and not allow them to know what part of the wall they will be guarding, so that they cannot betray the city to the enemy. (35) It is sometimes necessary to change the passwords, so that if some traitor inside the city betrays the password to the enemy, or if the enemy creeps up the wall during the night and finds it out, it is of no use to him because it has been changed. (36) In addition to the password secret signals are given, so that even if the enemy hears the password, those who have climbed stealthily onto the wall can easily be recognized. For ditches, see above, no. 218. Note again the concern about betrayal from within.

225 Philon, (Siegecraft) D59–60 (psychology of siege warfare) If you are intending to besiege a city for a considerable period of time, you should give the impression to the enemy that you are planning a short siege so that they carelessly consume all their provisions, make no preparations for the coming assault, and do not send for help. (60) However, if you are planning a direct assault you should threaten that you will persist with a long siege, so that the enemy fearing what may happen quickly agrees to the terms that you want.

161


226 Philon, (Siegecraft) D71–2 (capturing the vital parts of a town) During the capture of a city it is absolutely essential to get possession of the walls and the acropolis and the market place and the military headquarters and any other strong point. If your army is not strong enough for this, occupy the towers and the strategically most important place, in case you are driven from the city again. (72) If you are unable to carry on the siege so as to storm the city by force because it is strongly defended on all sides, then you should try to capture it by stealth or treachery or hunger. The wisdom of Philon’s advice is borne out by events, e.g., at Plataea in 431 BC the Thebans who broke into the city grounded their weapons in the market place (Thucydides 2.2.4); in 223 BC king Cleomenes of Sparta in his assault on Megalopolis had ‘seized the commanding positions beforehand’ (Polybius 2.55.6). Aeneas Tacticus states that the general in command of the defence forces should take up position at the government offices and market place if they are defensible; but if not, at the strongest and most conspicuous places (22.2.)

227 Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply) Then all the multitude of the townspeople converged on a single water source at a spot right underneath the city wall, where an abundant spring gushed out in the area where for a distance of three hundred feet there was a gap in the circuit of the river. Everyone wanted to find a way to keep the townspeople away from this spring, but only Caesar saw how it could be done. Opposite the spring he began to erect mantlets up the hillside and to construct a terrace. This involved a lot of work and constant fighting. For the townspeople charged down from their lofty position and threw missiles from a distance without incurring any risk, and by tenaciously keeping up the attack wounded many soldiers. However, our men were not prevented from pushing on with the mantlets and overcame the difficulties of terrain by hard work and effort. Simultaneously they dug hidden mines towards the watercourses and the source of the spring. They carried on this kind of work without any danger to themselves since they could work without the enemy’s suspecting it. They constructed a terrace sixty feet high and placed on it a ten-storey tower. This was not intended to reach the height of the walls (no amount of work could achieve that), but to allow them to dominate the spring. When engines fired missiles from the tower at the approaches to the spring, the townspeople could not collect water 162


without risk, and not only cattle and pack animals but also a great crowd of the enemy were tormented by thirst. This refers to the siege of Uxellodunum, a town of the Cadurci, in 51 BC. This was the last serious resistance to the Roman conquest of Gaul. Its exact location is disputed.

228 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack) At Chios also, when the enemy had built storming ladders (sambucae) on board their ships, the Chians during the night threw earth, sand, and stones into the sea in front of the wall. So, on the following day when the enemy wanted to approach the wall the ships grounded on the material that had been heaped up under the surface. They could neither approach the wall nor make their way back, but were pierced by fire-missiles and burned up on the spot. Vitruvius was an architect and military engineer who wrote a treatise De Architectura in ten books, addressed to Augustus in 27 BC. Book 10 deals with the construction of machines for both civil and military purposes. At 10.11.2 he tells us that in respect of the calibrations for stone-throwers he had personal experience of what worked in practice and had also received guidance from his instructors. It seems also that along with his contemporary, Athenaeus Mechanicus, he was greatly indebted to the work of Agesistratus (see below, p. 191), and his work on catapults certainly seems to be up to date, incorporating modifications and improvements in the design of catapults after Philon. Translation and commentary – Rowland and Howe (1999). For the sambuca, see Polybius 8.6. It was a kind of scaling ladder attached to the mast of a ship, and its name came from the stringed harp, which it resembled. The chronological context of the siege is not clear. See Rowland and Howe, op. cit., 315, figure 138.

229 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.11–12 (defence of Marseilles) Again, when Marseilles (Massilia) was under siege and the attackers built more than thirty tunnels, the people of Marseilles becoming suspicious deepened the entire ditch that ran round the city wall by excavating it more deeply. So, all the tunnels came out into this ditch. In those places where a ditch could not be constructed, they dug inside the wall a pit of enormous length and depth, just like a swimming pool, opposite the spot where the tunnel was being built, and filled it from wells and the water in the harbour. Therefore, when the tunnel’s passage was suddenly opened up, a huge rush of water surged in and flattened the props. The troops who were inside were killed by the huge quantity of water and the collapse of the tunnel. 163


Furthermore, when a mound was heaped up against the walls and the site was raised higher still by cutting down trees and piling them there, the besieged made the entire construction catch fire by firing redhot iron bars into it from their catapults. Then when the ram-tortoise had been brought up to pound the wall, they let down a rope and looped it round the head of the ram. Next they used a capstan to wind the rope round a drum and by keeping the head of the ram suspended they did not allow it to touch the wall. Finally they destroyed the machine with fire-missiles and shots from the catapult. So, these victorious cities were liberated not by military engines, but by the skill of architects working against the deployment of engines. The siege of Marseilles in 49 BC was conducted by D. Brutus and C. Trebonius on Caesar’s behalf during the civil war against Pompey (see Caesar, Civil Wars 2.1–2).

230 Onasander, The General 39.4–5; 40 (how to capture a city) If the general is setting out by day to lead his army to capture at an agreed time cities that are to be betrayed, he should send cavalrymen on ahead to arrest everyone they meet on the road, in case one of the local inhabitants runs on ahead and gives warning of their opponents’ advance. The army ought to appear suddenly while the enemy is off his guard. The general must arrive unexpectedly on an unsuspecting enemy even if he is not intending to capture the city by treachery but by force of arms after declaration of war. He must not hesitate but must try in every way to attack outpost, camp, or city before his advance becomes known, especially if he is aware that his army is small and inferior to the enemy’s. (40) A siege requires valour on the part of the soldiers, military science on the part of the general, and armament consisting of war engines. The general must be careful and just as wary as the besieged. For when an army comes under attack, it is especially watchful of the attacking force when it knows exactly what the danger is. The army that thinks it is not in danger carries out its tasks when it pleases, while the army that is in danger tries to anticipate the enemy in its actions whenever it gets the chance. Therefore it is essential for the besieging general to secure his own camp with ditch, rampart, and guards. For whatever the besiegers intend to do can be seen from the walls, while the besieged have the wall as a shield and often without being seen burst out through the gates and set fire to the engines or butcher the soldiers or do whatever mischief they can manage. 164


231 Josephus, The Jewish War 3.166–75; 271–5 (siege of Jotapata) Vespasian placed his artillery engines, which all together numbered one hundred and sixty, in a circular formation and ordered them to fire at the defenders on the walls. (167) In one great barrage the catapults fired bolts, the stone-throwers hurled stones weighing nearly a talent (26 kg), there were fire-brands and showers of arrows, making it impossible for the Jews to man the ramparts or the interior area, which was within range of the missiles. (168) For a throng of Arab archers and all the javelin men and slingers joined in the bombardment with the artillery. (169) Nevertheless the Jews despite being prevented from defending the ramparts did not remain inactive. They made sorties in small groups in guerrilla style, pulled away the shelters from the men working, and when they were exposed attacked them. Wherever the Romans retired, the Jews demolished the earthworks and set fire to the palisade and wicker screens. (170) Finally Vespasian, realizing that the reason for the damage was a gap between the earthworks, as the space allowed the Jews a place to attack, brought together the shelters and at the same time concentrated his troops, preventing any more incursions by the Jews. (171) The siege mound was now getting higher and was almost level with the battlements when Josephus, thinking that it would be outrageous if he could not work out some counter-stratagem to save the city, summoned the stonemasons and ordered them to make the wall higher. (172) But they said that it was impossible to build the wall when they were being bombarded with missiles. So, he devised the following protection for them. (173) He ordered that a wooden railing should be attached to the wall and hides of recently flayed oxen hung over it, in order to catch in their folds the stones hurled by the engines; other missiles would glance off the hides and their moisture would put out fire-missiles. (174) This screen was placed before the masons and working under it in safety day and night they raised the wall to a height of thirty feet, built many towers, and completed the work with strong battlements. (175) This made the Romans very disheartened since they thought that they were already inside the town, and they were amazed by Josephus’ cleverness and the courage of the inhabitants. (271) In this crisis Josephus, taking necessity as his guide (for when she is provoked by despair she is very ingenious), ordered that boiling oil should be poured over the formation of interlocking shields. (272) The Jews had it ready and immediately poured enormous quantities over the Romans on all sides and threw down after it the jars, which 165


were still scalding hot. (273) This broke the Romans’ formation as they were burned and rolled off the wall in appalling agony. (274) For the oil easily flowed over their entire bodies from their head to their feet under their armour, and consumed their flesh no less fiercely than a flame; oil because of its fatty properties is naturally quick to heat and slow to cool. (275) For the Romans burdened with their helmets and body armour there was no escape from the burning liquid, and jumping and twisting in agony they fell off the scaling ladders. Those who turned to flee encountered their own men forcing their way forward and were an easy target for the Jews attacking from the rear. These extracts describe the siege of Jotapata in the Jewish revolt of AD 66.

232 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack) Marcus Cato in Spain saw that he could capture a certain town if he could attack the enemy unexpectedly. Therefore he completed in two days a four-day march through a rough and infertile area and destroyed the enemy, who were not expecting anything like this. When his men enquired about the reason for such an easy success, he replied that they had won the victory at the moment when they had completed the four-day march in two. Marcus Cato commanded in Spain after his consulship of 195 BC and suppressed a rebellion. See above, no. 77 for a general list of the general’s responsibilities during sieges.

233 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack) When Domitius Calvinus was besieging Lueria, a town of the Ligurians, which was protected not only by its site and fortifications, but also by the excellence of the defenders, he established the practice of frequently marching round the town with all his forces and then leading them back to camp. This routine lured the people in the town into thinking that the Romans were doing this as part of their drill and therefore they took no precautions against his action. But he switched from this parade into a sudden attack and when he had seized the walls he forced the townspeople to surrender.

166


234 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor) Marcus Marcellus had lured a Syracusan named Sosistratus to turn traitor, and learned from him that the guard would be less strict on a festival day when Epicydes was going to make a distribution of wine and food. Therefore Marcellus, taking advantage of the festive spirit and the lack of discipline that went with it, scaled the walls, killed the guards, and opened up to the Roman army a city already famous as the location of splendid victories. This occurred in 212 BC during the war with Hannibal; there were variations in the story, and Livy (25.23), Plutarch (Marcellus 18), and Polyaenus (8.11) mention the informant as Damippus from Sparta.

235 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged) When Alexander was preparing to besiege Leucadia, which had an abundance of supplies, he first captured the forts on the borders and allowed all the people from these to flee to Leucadia so that their supplies would be used up more quickly because of the increased numbers. This refers to Alexander, son of king Pyrrhus of Epirus.

236 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander) When the Lusitanians told Tiberius Gracchus that they had supplies for ten years and therefore did not fear a siege, he said, ‘I shall capture you in the eleventh year’. The Lusitanians were terrified by what he said, and although well provisioned immediately surrendered. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, father of the tribune, served as praetor and proconsul in Spain (180–178 BC) and defeated the Celtiberians.

237 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemy’s attention) King Pyrrhus of Epirus during his war against the Illyrians wanted to capture the town that was their capital, but giving up hope of achieving this began to attack other towns. Therefore he brought it about that the enemy, trusting that the defences of the capital were sufficient, 167


slipped away to defend the other towns. Then he immediately recalled all his troops and captured the town, which had been denuded of defenders. For Pyrrhus, see above no. 79.

238 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river) Lucius Metellus, when operating in Nearer Spain, diverted the course of a river and directed it from high ground against the enemy camp, which was situated on lower ground. The enemy were terrified by the sudden flood and he massacred them by men placed in ambush for this very purpose. For Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus in Spain, see above no. 162.

239 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply) Cleisthenes of Sicyon cut the water-pipes leading into the town of Kirra, and when the inhabitants were affected with thirst he restored the supply contaminated with hellebore. When they used the water they were so enfeebled by diarrhoea that Cleisthenes captured them. This occurred c. 595 BC. Polyaenus (6.13) attributed the stratagem to Eurylochus, Pausanias (10.37.5) to Solon.

240 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected quarter) Fabius Maximus, son of the ‘Delayer’, on coming to Arpi, which was garrisoned by Hannibal’s troops, first inspected the site of the city and then sent six hundred troops on a dark night to climb the walls with scaling ladders at the part of the city that was fortified and therefore had fewest defenders, and break down the gates. These soldiers were helped by the noise of falling rain, which muffled the sounds of their activities, and carried out their orders. Fabius himself on a given signal attacked from another direction and captured Arpi. This occurred in 213 BC; cf. Livy 24.46–7.

168


241 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged) Himilco the Carthaginian, when campaigning at Agrigentum, stationed part of his army in ambush near the town with instructions to set fire to some damp wood when the townspeople marched out. Then moving forward at dawn with the rest of his army in order to lure the enemy out, he pretended to flee and by continuing his retreat he made the enemy follow him further and further away. The soldiers in ambush close to the walls followed their orders and lit a fire with torches. When the Agrigentines saw the smoke rising up they thought that their city was on fire and charged back in a panic to defend it. Caught between the men in ambush near the walls who waylaid them and the troops pressing on from behind whom they had recently been pursuing, they were butchered. Himilco commanded the Carthaginian forces in Sicily in the war against Dionysius I of Syracuse in 406 BC; cf. Polyaenus 5.10.4.

242 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire) The Spartan leader Agesilaus, when he was besieging the Phocaeans and realized that the allies acting as a garrison were already worn down with the toils of war, withdrew a short distance as though on other business, and gave them an easy opportunity to leave the city. Soon after, he led his troops back and conquered the Phocaeans, who had been left on their own. The Spartan king Agesilaus II (c. 445–359 BC) campaigned in 395–394 against a coalition of Sparta’s enemies in Greece; cf. Polyaenus 2.1.16.

243 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilance among the defenders) Alcibiades the Athenian leader, when his own city was under siege by the Spartans, fearing that the guards might be careless, told those on duty to watch out for a light that he would show from the citadel during the night, and to raise their own lights when they saw it. Anyone who failed in this duty would be punished. While they were anxiously waiting their leader’s signal everyone remained vigilant and the danger of this hazardous night was averted. 169

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING CITIES Alcibiades (451/0–404/3 BC) was an Athenian politician and general. Elected general by the Athenian fleet at Samos he fought a successful naval campaign against the Spartans. He was appointed to a special command, but after a minor defeat suffered by his subordinate at Notium in 406 he left Athens; cf. Polyaenus 1.40.3.

244 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message) When the people of Cyzicus were besieged by Mithridrates, Lucius Lucullus wanted to let them know that he had arrived. There was a single, narrow entrance to the city, linking the island to the mainland by a small bridge, and this was in the hands of enemy soldiers. Therefore Lucullus sewed letters inside two inflated skins and ordered one of his soldiers who was a competent swimmer and boatman to lie on the skins, which he had tied together at the bottom with two strips some distance apart, and make the crossing of seven miles. The soldier did this so skilfully, by angling his legs like a rudder to control direction, that he deceived the guards on duty, who were watching from a distance, into thinking that he was some kind of marine animal. For the campaigns of Lucullus, see above no. 148; cf. Florus 1.40.15–16.

245 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies) When Hannibal was besieging Casilinum, the Romans sent jars of wheat downstream on the river Volturnus to be picked up by the besieged. When Hannibal stopped this by stretching a chain across the river they scattered nuts on the water. These floated down to the town on the current and this food sustained the allies in their time of need. This is part of Hannibal’s campaign in Italy in 216 BC. Cf. Livy 23.19; the garrison eventually surrendered on terms.

246 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about supplies) Thrasybulus the leader of the Milesians, when his soldiers were suffering in a long siege conducted by Alyattes, who was hoping to starve them into surrender, ordered that all the grain should be collected in the market place in preparation for the arrival of envoys from Alyattes. He also arranged banquets at the same time and provided luxurious feasts 170


throughout the city. In this way he convinced the enemy that they had an abundance of supplies with which to hold out against a long siege. Thrasybulus was ruler of Miletus, which was involved in a long struggle with the Lydians under king Alyattes c. 610 BC; cf. Herodotus 1.21–2; Polyaenus 6.47.

247 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie) When the people of Numantia were besieged they did not even draw up their battle line in front of the rampart but kept themselves so carefully inside the town that Popillius Laenas became confident enough to attack it with scaling ladders. Laenas, suspecting an ambush because they did not offer any resistance even then, recalled his forces. But at this point the Numantines made a sortie and attacked the Romans in the rear as they were climbing down. Marcus Popillius Laenas (consul 139 Numantia in Spain.

BC)

continued the long-running siege of

248 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege) When the Romans were besieged by Hannibal and were themselves besieging Capua, they issued a decree that they would not recall their army from there until it had been captured. This occurred in 211 BC; cf. Livy 26.1.2–4.

249 Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.8–9; 21.3–22 (siege of Halicarnassus) First he began to fill in the ditch they had dug in front of the city, about forty-five feet broad and twenty-two deep, to make the approach of the siege towers easier, from which he intended to bombard the defenders on the city walls, and the other engines, with which he planned to batter down the wall. Alexander filled in the ditch with no difficulty and soon the towers were brought up. However, the defenders of Halicarnassus made a sortie during the night intending to set fire to the towers and any other engines that had been brought up or were almost in position. But they were easily shut up again inside the walls 171


by the Macedonian guards and others who were alerted by the action and charged up to help. (21) Once again the troops making the sortie were driven back inside the walls by the Macedonians and the city came close to being captured. For the walls at that time were not vigilantly guarded and two towers and the curtain wall had collapsed to their foundations. The approach to the wall would not have been difficult for the army if they had all joined in the task. Furthermore, the third tower had been badly shaken and if it had been undermined it could easily have been brought down. But the defenders anticipated this by building on the inner side a crescent-shaped brick wall in place of the one that had collapsed. Since there were many engaged in the work, it was easily accomplished. Next day Alexander moved up the engines against this wall, and again the defenders launched a sortie in order to burn them. Part of the line of mantlets near the wall and part of one of the wooden towers were burnt down. Philotas and Hellanicus and their men, who had been entrusted with guarding them, saved the rest. But when Alexander himself appeared in the sortie, they dropped the torches they had brought with them when they charged out to attack, and many threw away their weapons as they fled inside the walls. And yet at first the defenders from their advantageous position came off the better, as they were firing at those defending the engines not only from the front but also from the towers which had remained standing on either side of the breach in the wall and allowed fire from the flanks and indeed virtually at the rear of those attacking the replacement wall. (22) A few days later Alexander again brought up the engines against the inner brick wall and took charge of the work himself. There was a sortie from the city in full force, and some of the enemy attacked near the breach in the wall where Alexander himself was positioned, others near the triple gate where the Macedonians least expected it. Some threw torches on the engines and anything else that could start a fire and make a conflagration. But the men with Alexander launched a strong counter-attack, and the engines on the towers hurled enormous stones while volleys of missiles rained down. The besieged were easily routed and fled to the city. Here there was a massacre, in proportion to the number in the sortie and their greater boldness. For some perished in hand-to-hand fighting with the Macedonians, others at the collapsed wall, where the space was too small for the mass of men and the fallen sections of the wall made it difficult to get over them. Ptolemaeus, the royal bodyguard, met those making a sortie by the triple gate, bringing up the units commanded by Adaeus and Timander 172


and some of the light-armed troops. These forces easily routed the troops from the city, who indeed also suffered during the retreat in crossing the narrow bridge constructed over the ditch. This gave way under their weight and many of them fell into the ditch and were trampled to death by their own side while others were shot by the Macedonians above. The greatest carnage occurred round the gates themselves because in the panic they were closed too early, as the besieged feared that the Macedonians would get into the city following on the heels of the fugitives. Consequently many friends were shut outside the city and massacred by the Macedonians under the walls. Indeed the city came close to being captured if Alexander had not called his army back, since he still wanted to save Halicarnassus if the citizens would surrender peacefully. Arrian here describes Alexander’s siege of Halicarnassus in 334 BC during his campaign against the Persians in Asia Minor.

250 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege) Cleon handed Sestos over to the people of Abydos not by means of open warfare but by underhand cunning. Theodorus, who commanded the guard at Sestos and was a friend of Cleon, was having sex with a woman in the suburbs. He went out at night by taking one stone out of a narrow watercourse that led out through the wall and putting it back when he returned. This was how he avoided detection, and he told Cleon about what he was doing as if it were a kind of game. But Cleon told the secret to the people of Abydos, and watching by the watercourse for a moonless night, when Theodotus had removed the stone and was busy having sex, he led in the soldiers. They killed the guards, opened the gates from the inside for the entire force, and easily took control of Sestos. Cleon was an Athenian politician who had contributed to the Spartan defeat at Sphacteria (see above, no. 103). Subsequently as general in 422 BC he led a campaign to defend Athenian interests in Thrace. He was defeated and killed at the battle of Amphipolis in 421.

251 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders’ attention) Philip was besieging Pharcedon, a Thessalian city. The inhabitants surrendered the city, but when Philip’s mercenaries were entering they 173


fell into an ambush, for many pelted them with stones and javelins from the roofs and the towers. Philip quickly thought up a ploy to deal with the ambush. The rear part of the city was deserted since the citizens had assembled for the ambush, and Philip ordered the Macedonians to attack this part and put up scaling ladders. When they climbed up on top of the wall the Pharcedonians stopped bombarding the mercenaries and hurried off to deal with the soldiers who had seized the city wall. But the Macedonians had already taken control of the city before it came to hand-to-hand fighting. By 352 BC Philip had virtually annexed Thessaly and was appointed to its traditional headship (archon).

252 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery) When Corinth was being betrayed to Demetrius, he arrived during the night, before the traitors had opened the gates in the citadel. Fearing that the inhabitants might attack him when they found out what was happening, Demetrius encircled them with a large force and attacked the Lechaeum gate. These soldiers raised a tremendous shout, and all the Corinthians ran together towards the uproar. Meanwhile the traitors opened the gates at the citadel and welcomed the enemy. And so Demetrius captured Corinth while the Corinthians guarded the Lechaeum gate. For Demetrius Poliorcetes, see above, nos 183–4; cf. Diodorus Siculus 20.103.1.

253 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a mine) Philip was besieging Prinassus, a Rhodian city in Peraea. Since it had strong walls he tried to undermine them. But in the dig they encountered hard rock that would not yield to their digging tools. Philip ordered his men to go into the mine during the day as if they were going to work and to erect screens as if he wanted to avoid detection. This activity was visible to the enemy, who were watching from the walls. He ordered the soldiers during the night to bring earth from a deep pit about a mile away and pile it in front of the mouth of the mine. When a large amount of earth had been piled up in heaps and every day the men on the wall saw this, they came to believe that the city was being undermined. This fear induced them to surrender the 174


city to Philip. Later, when they realized how they had been deceived, they deplored their own stupidity. This refers to the campaigns of Philip V of Macedon in 201 BC against the Rhodians and their allies; cf. Polybius 16.11; Frontinus, Stratagems 3.8.1.

254 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city) When Aenetus, general of Demetrius, was in control of Ephesus and was using pirates to attack his neighbours, Lycus, general of Lysimachus, captured Ephesus by bribing Andron, the pirate leader. Andron brought into the city soldiers of Lycus, unarmed, in cloaks and old clothes, and with their hands bound, as if he had taken them prisoner. When he came near the acropolis he ordered them to use their daggers, which they carried concealed under their arms. When the gatekeepers and guards on the acropolis had been butchered, a signal was raised to the soldiers with Lycus. They attacked, captured Aenetus, and occupied Ephesus. They gave the pirates their reward but immediately expelled them from the city, thinking that those who betrayed their first friends were not reliable. See also Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.7. Lysimachus had been one of Alexander’s bodyguards, and after becoming governor of Thrace established himself for a time as king of Macedon.

255 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices uses by besiegers and besieged) When Athenocles was besieged, to protect against attack by rams and borers he constructed lead bars and stretched them lengthways along the battlements with the result that the enemy’s engines broke when they hit them. But the enemy devised and brought up another engine, which struck the end of the lead bar and forced it to fall straight down from the battlements so that it injured none of those standing on the ground below. Then the enemy brought up ‘tortoises’ and started to batter the walls. The defenders thrust out from the walls bronze containers full of molten lead and poured it down, thereby destroying the ‘tortoise’. But the enemy brought up siege towers and poured vinegar down from them onto the ‘tortoise’ and quenched the lead and all the other firebrands thrown from the walls. For vinegar is apparently excellent at putting out fire. Indeed the best protection against fire is to rub on vinegar (for vinegar will not catch fire at all) and to attach a 175


sponge soaked in water. As a defence against the pouring down of lead, some men placed caps on the engines, consisting of an application of earth and clay mixed with hair. For putting out fires, see also above, no. 215.

256 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel) After many Romans had been wounded or killed during the siege of the Ambracians, they built a narrow tunnel underneath the city in the hope of bringing the siege to an end. For a long time they avoided detection by the enemy, but when a large amount of earth had been heaped up the Ambracians realized what the Romans were up to and built a counter-tunnel from inside the city. At the end of the tunnel they dug a ditch at right angles and set up thin bronze sheets in a row so that when the Romans came upon these there would be a noise. Indeed when the noise came they met the Romans underground and drove them back with sarisas. But in the narrow, dark tunnel they did not have much success, and they therefore got ready a jar, which fitted exactly into the tunnel. They bored holes in the bottom, fitted a metal pipe, filled it with fine feathers and then lit a small fire. Then they placed a lid full of holes on it and angled it towards the enemy tunnel. They then fixed blacksmith’s bellows to the rear of the jar, blew into the tube which had been fitted, and kindled the fire. The result was that the tunnel was filled with a lot of acrid smoke and since the Romans could not bear it they abandoned their underground siege works. Ambracia was besieged in 189 BC by Marcus Fulvius Nobilior during campaigns against the Aetolian Confederacy (Livy 38.7).

257 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city) Although Darius had been besieging Babylon for a long time he was unable to take the city. Zopyrus, Darius’ satrap, mutilated his face and came as a deserter saying that he had suffered this at the hands of Darius. The Babylonians put their faith in the sight of what had been inflicted on him and entrusted the city to Zopyrus. But he opened the gates during the night, and Darius after taking possession of Babylon made that famous statement: ‘I would not want to capture twenty Babylons in return for seeing Zopyrus suffering mutilation like this.’ 176

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING CITIES 518 BC; cf. Herodotus 3.153–60; Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.4 makes Cyrus the Persian king and claims that he mutilated Zopyrus.

258 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.10–12 (siege of Byzantium) Their city (Byzantium) is very favourably located both in respect of the two continents and the sea that lies between them and has strong defences because of the topography of the site and the character of the Bosporus. For the city is built on high ground and sticks out into the sea, which surges down from the Euxine just like a mountain torrent and crashes against the headland, where part of it is deflected to the right and makes the bay and the harbours. But the greater part goes towards the Propontis, rushing past the city at tremendous speed. In addition Byzantium had very strong fortifications. For the breastwork of the walls was constructed using enormous squared stones, bound together with bronze plates, and inside they were reinforced with mounds and buildings, so that the whole construction resembled one very thick wall with a covered walkway on top that could be easily defended. There were many huge towers built on the outside (of the wall) and they had windows positioned close together on all sides, so that anyone attacking the wall would be entrapped between them. Since they were constructed at short intervals, not following a straight line but with some here and some there on a rather crooked circuit, they offered a line of fire at any group making an assault. The walls on the landside were built to a great height so as to repel any chance attack from that side, while those facing the sea are of a lesser height. For the rocks on which the walls were built and the perilous nature of the Bosporus were splendid allies for the Byzantines. The harbours inside the walls were both closed with chains, and their breakwaters had towers that jutted out a long way on both sides so that it was impossible for an enemy to make an approach by sea. To sum up, the Bosporus is a tremendous help to the Byzantines. For it is entirely inevitable that as soon as anyone is swept into the current, then willing or not he is bound to be washed up on the land. This situation is welcome for the citizens but disastrous for enemies. (11) These were the fortifications of Byzantium and in addition many different types of engine were positioned along the entire wall. Now, some threw stones and beams against the enemy at short range, others fired stones, missiles, and darts at long range so that no one could safely come near over a substantial area. Others had hooks and they let these down suddenly and snatched up ships or engines over the short 177


intervening distance. A fellow citizen of mine called Priscus designed most of them and was consequently both condemned to death and reprieved. For Septimius Severus, hearing about his skill, forbade his execution and from then on used his services for various operations, particularly in the siege of Hatra, where engines built by Priscus were the only ones not burnt by the barbarians. (12) The achievements and sufferings of the Byzantines were on a large scale since they were under siege for three whole years by the weaponry of virtually the entire world. I shall mention a few incidents that were particularly noteworthy. They used to capture ships that were sailing past by making well-judged attacks, but they also seized triremes in the enemy anchorage. For they used divers to cut the anchors and hammer into the sides of the ships nails that were attached by ropes to the friendly shore. Then they pulled on the ropes so that it looked as if the ships were sailing by themselves with no impetus from oarsmen or wind. Indeed, some traders deliberately allowed themselves to be captured by the Byzantines while pretending that this was against their will, sold their merchandise for a huge profit, and escaped by sea. Dio here describes the siege of Byzantium, AD 193–5 during the civil war between Septimius Severus and Pescennius Niger, governor of Syria.

178

5 MILITARY ENGINEERING Bridges, camps, fortifications, siege engines, and siege works

259 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100 (use of fire machine) The Boeotians . . . marched on Delium and attacked the fortifications. They used various means of attack and in the end captured it by bringing up an engine that had been constructed as follows. They sawed an enormous wooden beam into two parts, hollowed out both of them, and then carefully fitted them back together, just like a pipe. They attached a cauldron to one end with chains, and an iron tube was inclined through the hollowed-out beam down into the cauldron. They also covered most of the rest of the wooden beam with iron plates. Using carts they brought the engine from a considerable distance up to the part of the wall that was built mainly of vines and wood. When it was close to the wall they attached large bellows to their end of the beam and blew through them. The draught of air, confined inside the tube, went into the cauldron, which contained lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch. It created an enormous fire that caught hold of the wall, so that no one could remain on it. The defenders leaving their positions took to their heels and the wall was captured in this way. Athenian forces were besieged in Delium in 424/3 BC by the Boeotian forces. The Spartans had used a primitive fire machine against Plataea (Thucydides 2.77.3–6), and later Brasidas was preparing a fire machine against the defenders at Lecythus (4.115.2–3). These machines were of some value, at least in small-scale operations against wooden walls; see Garlan (1974), 140–1.

260 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.5.8–12 (method of crossing a river) When the generals were at a loss what to do a man from Rhodes came up to them and said: ‘I am ready to bring you across in groups of four 179

BRIDGES, CAMPS, SIEGE ENGINES AND WORKS

thousand hoplites at a time if you supply me with what I need and give me one talent in payment. When they asked what he needed, he replied: ‘I will need two thousand bags made from skin. I see that there are many sheep, goats, cattle, and asses here. Once they have been skinned and the skins inflated they will make the crossing easy. I shall also need the ropes that you use for the baggage animals. With these I shall bind the bags to one another and fix each bag in place by tying stones to it and letting them down into the water like anchors. Then I shall stretch the bags across the river and attach them to each bank, and finally place a layer of wood and spread earth on top of it. You can easily appreciate that there is no danger that they will sink. For one bag will prevent two men from sinking and the wood and the earth will prevent them from slipping off the skin.’ When the generals heard this they thought that it was a good idea, but impossible in practice. For there were large numbers of cavalry on the other bank to prevent the crossing, and they would not allow the first across to accomplish any of this. The Greeks were trying to cross the Tigris, which was so deep that even spears did not stand out above the water.

261 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 43–4 (military value of catapults) I have undertaken, King Attalus, to explain the construction of a stonethrowing engine, and please do not mock me if some engines happen to belong to a different category from this. (44) It is my firm opinion that with the help of these you will easily overcome the engines employed in the assaults of your enemies, if you counter-attack using the methods that I describe below. You should try to use technical knowledge, for it is essential to use both the measurements and indeed the proportions of the engines set out here. You should also try, in respect of all wooden parts, to prepare them for hard wear and in particular (to use) the wood of the ash tree. For these parts would be especially suitable. Biton’s treatise on siege engines is addressed to a king Attalus. This is probably Attalus I of Pergamum (269–197 BC), rather than one of the later Attalid kings, because Biton discusses only non-torsion engines (see above, p. 7), which were probably no longer in common use from c. 250 BC onwards. A technical work discussing such engines might conceivably have some relevance around 240 BC but not in the second century. On the other hand, it is the case that among military writers there is sometimes a liking for an antiquarian theme, and a willingness to discuss tactics and practices no

180

BRIDGES, CAMPS, SIEGE ENGINES AND WORKS longer in use. The only datable person to whom Biton refers is one Posidonius, who constructed a siege tower for Alexander the Great. Text, translation, and commentary in Marsden (1971), 5–6; 61–103; for the character of his work see also Cuomo (2001), 86–8.

262 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 44–7 (construction of a stone-thrower) I shall therefore begin by setting out first the construction of the stonethrower described below. (45) I request you to look carefully at the list of measurements. Charon of Magnesia designed this stone-thrower in Rhodes. Now, it has straight beams AB. These should have a length of six feet, and a breadth and height of half a foot. Next, two more parallel beams ΓΓ, three and one half feet long and one foot broad, should be fastened to the first (beams). The ends of the beams should be fitted with iron or bronze for not less that two feet of their length so that they do not break under the strain. Next the beams ΓΓ should have iron serrated teeth of not less than two dactyls (38.6 mm). The strips of toothed metal should have appropriate thickness and breadth. (46) Then there should be two more beams, ∆E, similar to the first ones, ΓΓ, and of similar thickness. These should not stand in a fixed position but should run in small grooves so that during operations they can run backwards and forwards. And these beams should have teeth similar to the first in thickness, shape, and size. They should be parallel, so that when the engine is tightened during the pull-back operation, the teeth on the beams intermesh and a conjunction is achieved between the two upper beams and between the two lower beams. For the beams should rest evenly against one another, and the size of the gap between the grooves should be the same for the front and rear ends of the beams. (47) On the upper beam ∆ there should be a sling, which is half a foot distant from the beams AB on either side. The sling should be made of hair, capable of supporting the stone placed on it. Its perimeter should be ten dactyls (193 mm). Then, at one corner of the sling there should be an iron ring plaited into the sling. Next, one and a half feet away from A, a bow should be fitted that is stretched towards the beam Γ, if the man intending to fire the stone pulls it back using the beams ZH on the stanchions KΘ. The end of beam Γ should have iron crossbars so that it is sufficiently strong to withstand the firing process. In this construction the serrated teeth operate as a ratchet. The beams ∆E make the slider and the upper part (∆) contained the channel in which the projectile was placed. Marsden (1971), 79 calculates that the weight of the projectile was about 5.164 lb.

181

BRIDGES, CAMPS, SIEGE ENGINES AND WORKS The beams ZH on Marsden’s interpretation constitute a windlass for pulling back the slider. Note also Landels (1978), 100–6. See Figure 5.1. For measurement equivalents, see p. xxiv.

A

A

∆

Γ

Γ x

y

Θ

Z

B

K

B

(a) Plan

∆ E

Z

Γ

A

Θ

B H

(b) Side-elevation

Figure 5.1 Biton’s stone-thrower

263 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 65–8 (construction of the mountain belly-bow) After this I shall describe for you the mountain belly-bow. The construction of this is as follows. I shall expound for you the one built by Zopyrus of Tarentum at Cumae in Italy. There is a base, A, which is five feet in length, three and a half feet in breadth, and one foot in height. Above it are trestles, XX, of which one is smaller while the 182


other is larger. The smaller is I, the larger Θ. The smaller one is three feet in height, the larger five feet. Then, on top there is a beam, M, like the one described for the belly-bow, which is five feet in length, one foot in height, three feet broad, and hollow inside. The trestles should be fitted to the beam, which should be well balanced in every direction. Next, measure out four feet from the front and provide a space for a bracket at M. Then, put through the aperture a bow seven feet in length with a perimeter of nine dactyls (173.7 mm); a bowstring should be attached with a perimeter of three dactyls (57.9 mm). (66) Next, measure out three feet from the front and attach to the underside at Θ a bracket like a cup extending in length to the curvature of the bow. Then, set up a pole three and a half feet away from the bow, which has the role of an axle, and when it is in position it will check everything on top of it. Let this column be designated Φ. After this, two feet away, there should be a beam four feet in length, [four dactyls] (7.2 mm) broad, and one foot in height. At the rear end, opposite the smaller trestle, I, there should be a wheel fitted to an axle, as is the normal practice with other catapults. Next, a cord should be extended between this and the beam T, both above and below, as is shown in the diagram, . . . (67) so that the missile can be fired more violently and over a longer distance. The nature of the design is illustrated below. I have now explained the engines that I considered especially suitable for you. I am sure that by means of these you will discover similar types. Do not be disturbed by the idea that because I have used definite measurements it will be necessary for you to use the same measurements. If you wish to build a bigger or smaller model, go ahead; just try to keep the proportions. (68) The designs and the measurements have been set out above. Zopyrus, if he can be identified with the Pythagorean of that name, probably lived around the middle of the fourth century BC. The construction of the mountain bow was supposed to enable the crew to dismantle it and carry the components over difficult ground to a new firing position. The ‘cup-bracket’ refers to a component resembling a universal joint. The column Φ is the central pillar of the trestle, and T is the slider. Biton does not describe the trigger mechanism of his engines. See Figure 5.2.

264 Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 56–8 (problems with artillery engines) The purpose of artillery construction is to fire a missile at long range and strike the target powerfully. It is for this objective that most experiments and enquiries have taken place. I shall therefore explain to you exactly what I discovered in Alexandria, through substantial 183


4´ 312´ 3´

2´

M

φ

X1 XΘ

A

(a) Side-elevation

T

M

0

20

40 dactyls

(b) Plan from above

Figure 5.2 Biton’s mountain belly-bow

dealings with the craftsmen engaged in such matters, and through meetings with many master craftsmen in Rhodes. I learnt from these men that the most effective engines to a large extent conformed to the method (of construction) that I am going to describe. (56) You will recognize during the description of their construction and the demonstrations put on in relation to them not only the excellence of the engines but also many of the features that are most useful. First then, the engine stretched by a wedge performs well in the aspect that men appreciate most and for which they would exchange anything. I mean that it has a long range. Second, it remains strong and vigorous during operations. Furthermore, it is easy to construct and does not need much careful adjustment. Then, it is easily strung 184


and put together, but equally easy to dismantle when necessary. Finally, in appearance it is no less imposing than the others, and in all respects is less expensive. These are the main points. But I think that it is essential, since I am about to give an account of the nature and construction of individual engines, to begin by pointing out weaknesses and problems in old engines. These cause particular trouble in the building process and great difficulty in stringing, and consequently construction of the engines becomes troublesome and expensive. Furthermore, with repeated use the engines seem to be of little value because they cannot sustain the constant movement of the spring. In my view this does not happen without a reason. (57) If you want to fire over long range you must try to add as much spring-cord as possible; of course I am not alone in thinking that the power lies in this aspect; everyone else does too. However, since the spring passes through the holes of the hole-carrier the man who intends to add more spring-cord must make the holes in the holecarrier bigger (otherwise the greater amount of spring-cord will not fit). Consequently the surrounding edges are left very thin and naturally become weak. It is not possible to make the hole-carrier broader, for it will then exceed the scale of the dimensions (of the engine). Therefore they try to place small metal plates underneath. But since these small plates are thin and weak because of their position, when the springs are tightened by being continually pulled back, they bend and rub hard up against the section of the hole-carrier above them. . . . (58) There follows another aspect that is entirely inconvenient, unprofessional, and harmful to the range of shooting. For in the firing and frequent pulling back the spring becomes slack and needs to be tightened again. The range of fire deteriorates because of the slackening. Now, it generally happens that those wanting to tighten the spring cannot do so vertically and in a straight line, but do it by resorting to extra twisting, giving an additional twist unnaturally greater than is proper. They think that they are improving the spring, but I argue that they are doing great harm to the tension and are reducing the firing velocity and the force of impact. The engine loses the force of the spring because the strands are twisted into a thick plait, and the spring, because it is out of alignment, is robbed of its natural force and vibrancy due to the excessive additional twisting. A spring in this state is hard to move and stiff when it is being pulled back, but is weak and lacking vigour in shooting, since the excessive twisting reverts to a similar loose position. . . . This is a brief summary of the faults that one could ascribe to existing engines. The best way to demonstrate them is visually, bit by bit. 185


However, we should praise the men who in the first place invented the construction of these engines. They were the originators of this invention and its established form. They discovered something that excelled all other weapons in range of fire and force of impact, I mean weapons like the bow, or spear, or sling. For to devise an original idea and to give it practical application is a work of greater genius. It seems much easier to improve or correct an existing idea. Although many years have passed since the blueprint (of catapults) was invented, and there have of course been many makers of machines and artillery, no one has dared to move on from the established procedure. For a text and translation and commentary of the Construction of War Engines, see Marsden (1971), 106–84; also above, no. 18. Philon is here referring to torsion catapults. The propulsion was provided by a bundle of strands of sinew or hair, which were stretched by a lever inserted in the middle and turned in a plane perpendicular to them. When the lever was released the strands contracted and the lever returned rapidly to its original position. Most torsion catapults had two vertically mounted springs, with the levers moving out in a horizontal direction; the bowstring was attached to the tips of the arms; see Landels (1978), 106–23. Marsden (1971), 163 thinks that some of Philon’s criticisms of the weakness of the hole-carrier are exaggerated. He also points out (op. cit., 164) that in the problem of tightening the spring Philon had not grasped the properties of elasticity. Extra twisting should at least restore the power of the spring until the hair or sinews lost their resilience with use; at this point there would be no point in removing it for restringing. So the wedgesprung engine would not be any more durable because it avoided twisting the sinews; see also Landels (1978), 126, for the wedge catapult.

265 Philon, Construction of War Engines 76–7 (repeating and air-spring catapults) Therefore this is the design for the repeating catapult, comprising a technically accomplished and complicated scheme. However, it has not found a worthwhile use. As I have often pointed out, we must turn most of our research towards the achievement of long range and the discovery of the factors in engines that create power. In the procedure that I have just described I think that nothing has been achieved in this respect; it is merely that a lot of missiles are loaded simultaneously and then fired individually in rapid succession. This is more likely to lead to inefficiency than efficiency and I do not need to make a long criticism. First, the target does not stand still but is capable of moving around. Who then would want to fire a series of missiles purposelessly? Perhaps the claim that it is valuable for firing at a crowd would persuade many people. But this too clearly has no weight. For the missiles will not fan out since the sights have been set on one target and produce a line of fire virtually along one segment of a circle. Furthermore, the 186


fall of the missiles will not be spread out over a long distance. (77) In the case of engines that fire single missiles, we shall pull the trigger at the moment when we think that we have got the target accurately in our sights, and we shall therefore make efficient use of most missiles. If, however, we fire many missiles pointlessly and to no effect, we ourselves will be providing the enemy with them. Of course someone may say that they will be useless to the enemy because they are without notches; to put notches on them is I suppose a large job needing a lot of work. I shall now describe summarily in a few words the air-spring catapult, which is in fact a stone-thrower, and then go on to another aspect of mechanics. Now, this engine was invented by Ctesibius, and had a very clever and scientific design. He noted in what have been called the pneumatic demonstrations (and which I shall treat later on) that air is exceptionally strong, vigorous, and compressible. In particular, when it is enclosed inside a strong jar it can be compressed, and by contrast will expand rapidly again to fill the entire space of the jar. Because he was experienced in engineering he well understood that this movement could produce tremendous power and extreme velocity for the arms (of a catapult). He therefore constructed cylinders similar in shape to a doctor’s pill-boxes, with no lids. He made them from beaten bronze to maintain strength and durability; but they had previously been made pliable and smelted to obtain thickness. The inside of them had been bored out by a machine with a surface made level, straight (measured by a ruler), and smooth. And so, when the bronze piston was inserted it could run through and press against the circumference since that was also constructed to be level and smooth. Consequently the join between them was such that air could not force its way past even when under maximum pressure. The repeater catapult had a number of missiles loaded into the magazine; when the slider was pulled back holding the bowstring one of the missiles fell into the firing slot and was fired automatically as the slider was pulled further back. This would continue until all the missiles were fired in rapid succession; for detailed discussion, see Marsden (1971), 177–83; Landels (1978), 123–6. Philon gives no measurements for the air-spring catapult. As the arms of the catapult were drawn back projections on their ends pushed the pistons into the cylinders and compressed the air. When the bowstring was released the pistons were shot forward by the expanding air and moved the arms forward, so firing the missile (Landels (1978), 129–30). Modern investigation suggests that the compressed air cylinders and pistons were unlikely to work efficiently without an air pump (Marsden, op. cit., 184).

187


266 Philon, (Siegecraft) A20–1 (construction of fortifications) In the same way we shall also build the towers with the kind of stones that I have described, fitting them together upright in lime and giving the wall a width of not less than fifteen feet. In the flanking walls we should also keep windows with embrasures, which are narrow on the outside and wide on the inside, or narrow in the middle and with a sloping sill underneath. In this way those inside will not be wounded, and in setting up their war engines can fire catapults and stonethrowers where they choose. (21) It is also essential that there are embrasures in the walls of the towers for the firing of catapults and stone-throwers, where the batteries can be established on a firing platform. Therefore if the enemy brings up engines directly against any of the curtain walls or if they attack any of the projecting walls, the towers can work together in defending one another, since the stonethrowers can launch a bombardment from the flanking towers, into which the embrasures have been built as I described. For Greek practices in fortification, see Garlan (1974), 148–53; 348–50; Philon refers to windows with an interior embrasure and those with a double embrasure; Lawrence (1979); for the placing of artillery on fortifications, see Marsden (1969), 116–17; see also above, no. 220.

267 Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine) For the reasons that I have mentioned, Caesar decided to cross the Rhine but thought that it was too risky to cross by ship and also not in keeping with his own dignity or that of the Roman people. Therefore, although the building of a bridge presented enormous difficulties because of the breadth, speed, and depth of the river, nevertheless he thought that he should attempt it or not take the army across. He adopted the following method of building the bridge. He took two wooden piles, each one and a half feet thick and sharpened close to its end and with a length measured to suit the river depth, and joined them at intervals of two feet. He used machinery to lower these into the river and then fixed them in position with pile-drivers; these supports were not set upright but angled so as to provide a sloping surface to fit in with the direction of the current. Opposite these, forty feet lower down the river he then set up two piles constructed in the same way, but this time set against the direction of the 188


current. The two pairs were then kept apart by the insertion into their tops of beams two feet thick, which were the same length as the gaps between the two piles, and they were secured by two iron braces at the outer side (of each pile). Since the pairs of piles were both kept apart and secured together, the construction was so sturdy and such was its nature that the greater the force of the current the more tightly the bridge supports were held fastened together. These piles were connected with cross-beams and these were then covered over with poles and bundles of sticks. None the less, more wooden supports were added obliquely on the downstream side, which jutted out like a buttress and joined with the whole structure in resisting the force of the water. Other supports were positioned a short distance above the bridge, so that if tree trunks or ships were floated down by the barbarians to break down the bridge, their force would be reduced by these defences and the bridge protected from harm. Ten days after the collection of timber had begun, all the work was completed and the army was brought across. This was Caesar’s first crossing of the Rhine in 55 BC. For Roman bridge-building, see also below, no. 282.

268 Caesar, Gallic War 7.72–3 (siege works at Alesia) When Caesar heard about this from deserters and prisoners he set about building the following type of siege work. He dug a ditch twenty feet wide with perpendicular sides, so that the width at the bottom equalled that at the top. He kept all the remaining siege works 400 paces (c. 591 m) behind this ditch, in order to protect them from surprise attacks, for a huge amount of space had to be enclosed and only with difficulty could the entire construction be manned by soldiers. There was therefore a danger that a crowd of the enemy could descend suddenly by night or throw missiles during the day at our soldiers when they were engaged on their work. And so at this distance Caesar dug two ditches fifteen feet wide and of equal depth, and filled the inner one, where it crossed a low-lying plain, with water diverted from a stream. Behind these ditches he constructed a rampart and palisade twelve feet high. To this he added a breastwork and battlements with large forked stakes projecting from the juncture of the breastwork and the rampart in order to impede enemy soldiers who tried to climb over. He also constructed towers eighty feet apart from one another round the entire line of fortifications. 189


(73) At the same time, since men had to be sent out to collect timber and corn and they were going further away from the camp, this reduced the forces available for the construction of the enormous fortifications. Furthermore the Gauls made frequent attempts to attack our works by launching sorties in full force simultaneously from many gates of the town. Therefore Caesar thought that these works should be strengthened even more so that they could be defended by a smaller number of soldiers. Consequently, tree trunks or at least very strong branches were cut down, their tops were stripped of bark and sharpened into points, and they were set in long ditches five feet deep. When these stakes had been set in the ditches they were tied together at the bottom so that they could not be pulled up, projecting from the branches. There were five rows, connected and intertwined with each other, so that anyone who came on them would impale himself on the sharp points. The soldiers used to call them boundary posts. In front of these in diagonal rows in a quincunx formation he dug pits three feet deep, which gradually became narrower towards the bottom. Into these were lowered rounded logs as thick as a man’s thigh, sharpened and charred at the top, so that they projected no more than three inches above ground. In order to keep the logs firmly in position, earth was thrown in and trampled down to a depth of one foot. The rest of the pit was camouflaged with branches and scrub to conceal the trap. In this system eight rows were laid out, three feet apart, and they were called lilies because of their similarity to that flower. In front of them logs one foot long with iron spikes embedded in them were completely buried in the ground and spread round all over the place with only short gaps between them. The soldiers called them goads. For the conclusion of the siege of Alesia in 52 BC see above, no. 53; see also Keppie (1984), 89–94.

269 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 12.12–14.3 (tortoise and battering ram) The tortoise that bears the battering ram was constructed in the same way whether it was small or large. (13) The biggest had a breadth of 30 cubits (13.87 m), a length of 40 cubits (18.50 m), and a height of 13 cubits (6.01 m), apart from the gable, which was added later. The height of the gable itself from the base to the ridge was 16 cubits (7.40 m). But the gable exceeded the middle part of the roof by at least two cubits (0. 92 m), and sloped down the roofing to the beams on it, so that there was a circular walkway. He constructed a three-storey 190


tower from the centre of the roof and placed catapults on the top two storeys and a reservoir of water on the lower. Upright pillars were attached to the tortoise so that it also had a circular walkway. Then, in the tortoise he built the framework for the ram (14) and fitted a roller on it. The ram is pulled forward by ropes along this and so does its job. They placed ox skins over this construction, as with the towers. Athenaeus Mechanicus dedicated his treatise on siege engines to ‘most revered Marcellus’, and it is possible that this is Augustus’ nephew Marcellus, son of his sister Octavia and married to his daughter Julia. This would place Athenaeus firmly in the orbit of the imperial court. It is interesting that Vitruvius dedicated his work On Architecture to Augustus and also mentioned that whereas Augustus had appointed him to supervise the construction and repair of war engines, he had retained that position ‘through the recommendation of your sister’ (1, preface, 2). Now, it is generally agreed that there is a close similarity between Vitruvius, De Architectura 10.13–15 and parts of Athenaeus’ work (9–26), to the extent that one might be a translation of the other. In fact, it is possible that both authors were using the same source, Agesistratus, who wrote a treatise on artillery probably towards the middle of the first century BC, and who is specifically mentioned by Athenaeus as a source. Marsden (1971), 5 speculates that Octavia was a patroness of both Vitruvius and Athenaeus. For text, commentary and translation into German see Schneider (1912). See now Whitehead and Blyth (2004). The tortoise was designed to protect the men working the battering ram by deflecting off its steeply sloping roof weapons, rocks, and liquids dropped by the defenders. Oxhides would also reduce the risk of fire spreading. Cf. Vitruvius 10.13.6; Whitehead and Blyth (2004), 48–50. See also below, no. 270.

270 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.2–26.5 (Hegetor’s tortoise) In the tortoise invented by Hegetor of Byzantium the platform is 42 cubits (19.42 m) long and 28 cubits (12.95 m) wide. Four legs are attached to the platform, each one made from two wooden beams fastened together, with a length of 24 cubits (11.09 m), a thickness of five palms (38.55 cm), and a breadth of one cubit (46.24 cm). It has eight wheels on which the entire construction moves. The wheels are four and a half cubits (2.08 m) in height, and two cubits (92.48 cm) thick. They are built by breadth (22) and depth alternately, and are bound together with cold-hammered plates; they revolve in axle-sockets. They fix posts on the platform, each 12 cubits (5.55 m) high, three palms (23.13 cm) wide, and 10 dactyls (19.3 cm) thick. Each post is seven palms (53.97 cm) distant from the next one, and architraves join them together at the top all round, with a breadth of four palms (30.84 cm) and a thickness of three palms (23.13 cm). They attach 191


rafters to the architraves, each eight cubits (3.70 m) high, and to them a transverse beam is fitted, to which all the tops of the rafters are attached; therefore there are two sloping sides. Finally, the entire structure is covered with planks and protected rather like filler tortoises. It also has a middle storey sitting on the architraves and this is to serve as a platform for weapons. Behind the framework for the battering ram two composite legs (23) stand upright in the middle of the tortoise, 30 cubits (13.87 m) long. They are one cubit (46.24 cm) thick, and three palms (22.13 cm) broad. A <dovetailed> headpiece joins the legs at the top and another crossbeam in the middle between the legs . And between the middle of the headpiece and the crossbeam is fitted an upright beam. Then, onto either side of the wooden beam, when it has been fitted, and the legs go lathe-turned windlasses. To these they attach ropes, from which the battering ram is suspended. A parapet is built onto the headpiece and the framework for the ram, so that can stand in complete safely on it to watch for missiles being fired from the enemy against the ram. In total the battering ram is 120 cubits (55.49 m) long, two feet thick (61.66 cm) at the butt-end, and five palms (38.55 cm) broad. Towards the point (24) it narrows to one foot (30.83 cm) thick and three palms (22.13 cm) broad. It has an iron mouth resembling a ship’s ram, a body shaped like a tube, and four iron hoops extend from it, which are nailed to the ram, over a distance of ten cubits (4.62 m). The entire battering ram is secured underneath with three ropes, each eight dactyls (15.44 cm) thick, and it is fastened at the middle by three windings with thick chains. The binding that holds the battering ram in the middle is wound round the ram for five palms (38.55 cm). When it has been closed up it is covered in leather all round, with raw hide. The ropes, which are made taut by the windlasses on the frame of the battering ram and hold up the ram, are spliced at their front-ends (25) to four iron chains. Also, the chains are covered all over with hides so that they cannot be seen. There is an assault-bridge made of planks nailed onto the front of the battering ram, and to this is fixed a net made from strong ropes <whose roughness prevents the feet from slipping> with a mesh one palm (7.71 cm) wide to allow easy ascent of the wall. The battering ram has in addition extensions from each side, since. . . . The engine performs (26) six movements: forwards, backwards, sideways in both directions, upwards, and downwards. It brings 192


Figure 5.3 Hegetor’s tortoise

destruction from a height of 70 cubits (32.37 m), and it swings to the sides for a distance of 70 cubits. It is operated by 100 men and has a total weight of four thousand talents (c. 157 tonnes). Words marked < > are taken from the parallel passage of Vitruvius 10.15.2. Nothing is known of Hegetor. For discussion and diagrams, see Schneider (1912), 61–6 and tafel V; Irby-Massie and Keyser (2002), 164–6; Whitehead and Blyth (2004), 53–6; see also Figure 5.3. It is doubtful if this enormous machine was a practical proposition in a siege.

271 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.1–2 (tensioning a catapult) You should take very long beams and on top of them fix brackets, in which windlasses are positioned. In the middle section of the beams forms are cut and hollowed out, and in these hollows are fitted the uprights of the catapults. These are held apart by wedges to prevent their moving around when tensioning takes place. Then bronze washers are inserted into the uprights and in them are positioned small iron rods, which the Greeks call epizygides. Next the ends of the ropes are passed through the holes in the uprights and brought across to the other side. Then they are attached to the windlasses and wound round them, so that when the ropes are stretched over them by levers and are struck by hand they give off 193


a matching tone on each side. Next they are secured by wedges at the spring holes so that they cannot work themselves loose. So, the ropes, carried across to the other side of the upright, are extended in the same way by levers round the windlasses until they give off an equal tone. Therefore, by using wedges catapults are tuned to the appropriate note by a musical ear. See Rowland and Howe (1999), 310, figure 133.

272 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.1–2 (history of battering rams) First of all, the battering ram for assaults is said to have been invented in the following manner. The Carthaginians pitched their camp for the siege of Cadiz and tried to demolish a fort that they had previously captured. Because they did not have the iron tools for demolishing it, they took a wooden beam and supporting it with their hands continually battered one end of it against the top of the city wall and knocked down the top layers of stones. In this way they gradually smashed down the entire wall, course by course. Later, a Tyrian engineer called Pephrasmenos, inspired by the principle of this invention, set up a pole and from it suspended another cross-beam, just like the beam in a balance, and by pushing and pulling it backwards and forwards he demolished the walls of Cadiz with violent blows. Ceras the Carthaginian first constructed a wooden base, with wheels underneath, and on this he built a frame of uprights and cross-beams from which he suspended a ram. He covered the frame with oxhides to give greater protection to the men stationed in the machine to batter down the wall. Because its movements were slow, he began to call it ‘tortoise for a ram’. Chapter 13 is closely similar to Athenaeus Mechanicus 9.4–10.3 (see above, p. 191). The Carthaginians developed siege warfare during their conquest of Sicily in the fifth century BC.

273 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1–3; 7 (offensive and defensive mechanisms) In the case of scorpions, catapults, and ballistae, and also tortoises and towers, I have explained the ones that seemed to me most valuable, and also by whom they were invented and how they ought to be constructed. However I did not think it necessary to write about ladders, cranes, and similar things whose principles (of construction) are easier. 194


Indeed soldiers normally construct these by themselves. Furthermore, these devices cannot be effective in all places or use the same methods, since fortifications are different from other fortifications and also the fighting spirit of peoples. And so military engines should be prepared in a different way depending on whether you are fighting a courageous and bold enemy, or a careful enemy, or a cowardly one. Consequently if anyone wishes to follow these instructions and choose from their varied types to make one construction, he will not lack assistance. He will be able to set out without hesitation whatever material the situation or topography requires. On the other hand defensive measures cannot be set out in writing. For an enemy does not prepare siege materials in line with our writings, and their siege engines are more often destroyed by speed and clever tactics devised on the spur of the moment without engines. Indeed it is recorded that this actually happened to the Rhodians. Diognetus was an architect of Rhodes and he received an honorary fixed annual wage from the state because of his professional expertise. At this time an architect from Aradus called Callias came to Rhodes and gave a public lecture, in which he showed a model of a defensive wall; he placed a machine above it with a revolving derrick by which he snatched up a siege engine approaching the wall and moved it inside the city. When the Rhodians saw this model, in their admiration they deprived Diognetus of his annual salary and transferred the distinction to Callias. (7) (In desperation during a siege the Rhodians implore Diognetus to resume his duties). At first he declined. Later, girls and young men of noble birth came along with the priests to beg him, and he promised to help on the condition that if he captured the war engine it should be his. When this had been agreed he made a breach in the wall where the engine was to approach, and ordered everyone by proclamation and private appeal to pour whatever water, sewage, and mud they had through this opening along channels running in front of the wall. After they had poured down a great quantity of water, mud, and sewage during the night, on the next day the siege engine came up, but before it came close to the wall it stuck in the mass of mud that it had churned up and could not move forwards or back. Therefore when Demetrius saw that he had been outmanoeuvred by the skill of Diognetus, he retreated with his fleet. Demetrius Poliorcetes besieged Rhodes in 305–304 BC. His engineer Epimachus devised an enormous siege engine and Callias realized that his proposed crane would be unable to lift it.

195


274 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 73–4 (nature of artillery engines) Now, men before me have written a great number of works on artillery, covering measurements and designs, but not one of them has expounded the building of the engines in proper sequence nor what they are used for, but apparently write only for an audience of experts. Therefore I think that it is appropriate for me to extend these works and to give a clear description of artillery engines, including those now out of date, so that everyone can easily follow my treatise. Therefore I shall describe (74) the building of entire engines and their individual components, their names, their assembly, the fitting of cord, and in addition the use and measurements of each engine. But first I shall speak about the differences between the engines and how each one of them developed from the beginning. Of the engines described, some are straight springs (euthytones), others are called V-springs (palintones). Some refer to straight springs as scorpions, because of the similarity in shape. Engines with straight springs fire only arrows. Some engines with V-springs are called stonethrowers because they fire stones. But they fire either arrows or stones or both. The purpose of artillery construction is to fire a missile at a given target over a long distance with powerful impact. For the engines described it is essential to direct all your attention to this objective. Heron of Alexandria lived probably in the second half of the first century AD. He was known as ‘the engineer’ and wrote a series of treatises on various aspects of mensuration, mathematics, and mechanics. He also wrote the Belopoeica (On the Construction of Artillery). Although his works contain a theoretical element he was interested in building machines that worked, and his discussion of the earliest non-torsion, arrowfiring engine and the subsequent development of torsion catapults was intended to be a clear and readable account of how they were constructed. In the Belopoeica he relied heavily on the earlier writings of Ctesibius, and it must be said that in technical terms the work is rather out of date and does not incorporate the improvements in catapult technology introduced after Ctesibius. But it would have been useful for conveying the basic principles of construction. In the Cheiroballistra he gives a detailed technical description of a new catapult with measurements. Text, translation and commentary in Marsden (1971), 18–60. Marsden, op. cit., 44 argues that the construction of war engines involved at least five processes: (1) calculating the size of the components; (2) shaping and aligning these components; (3) assembling the components; (4) arming with spring-cord; (5) imparting an additional twist to the spring-cord. Euthytone catapults and palintone stone-throwers are both torsion engines; the palintone was the more powerful because of the construction of the spring (Marsden, op. cit., 45); for a general assessment of the range and effect of artillery, see Marsden (1969), 86–98.

196


275 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 81–5 (construction of a torsion catapult) By using the engine described above it is possible to fire a larger missile over a longer distance. But they wished to increase both the size of the missile and the power of projection, but they were unable to realize their intention of making the arms of the bow more powerful through the use of composite bows. Therefore, they constructed everything else as described before, but made the arms of more resilient wood and on a larger scale than in an ordinary bow. The constructed a frame (let it be ABΓ∆) from four strong wooden beams, with sockets on the upright beams AB and Γ∆. Around the horizontal beams A∆, BΓ they wound cord, which was plaited on a machine for twisting cords, making a sufficient coil. (82) Next they wound on the first turn, forcing it to stretch very tightly. Then they wound on another turn next to the first, and beat the layers of cord with a small wedge so that they fitted closely together. They continued to make other turns until they had used up the entire coil, and then tucked its end in under all the layers. Next they slid one of the arms through the middle of the cords, and placed iron bars under the cords on top of the cross-beams A∆ and BΓ. Twisting these by force they stretched the cords, and when the twisting occurred the arm was gripped forcefully by the cords. Let the arm that has been described be EZ, the cord HΘ, and the bars KΛ and MN. They built another similar frame and fastened the two together under one casing by using boards, so that the arms recoiled and expended their force outwards. They then fastened a bowstring to the ends (83) by making loops and secured these to the arms using the pins ΞO and ΠP, so that the bowstring did not slip off. They constructed the rest of it in the way I have described previously. The cords holding the arms they called the spring; but some call it single-spring, others, halfspring. The bars for twisting the spring they call the levers; they made them of iron. During the method of construction described it happened that the twisting and stretching of the cords could not move very far because the cross-pieces A∆ and BΓ were not capable of taking the spring-cord. Therefore they placed the levers over the holes, but in other respects built everything as I have already described. However the twisting of the lever was difficult because it could not be turned because it was resting on the cross-piece and touched it everywhere. For this reason they were compelled to fit what are called washers, as I shall describe in due course. (84) Since the strength of the arms has now become so powerful, it is essential that the pull-back mechanism must also be made power197


ful since it must have an equal strength for pulling back the arms. Therefore, instead of what was called the withdrawal-rest in the method outlined earlier, they added a horizontal, freely turning axle to the rear end of the case, and they turned it by attaching square handles to its ends. When this was turned the slider, which held the bowstring, was pulled back in the following way. They fastened ropes to the end of the slider by the frame and attached them to the axle mentioned above. When these were wound up the pulling back took place. But on the larger engines the pulling back of the arms was still troublesome. Therefore they pulled them back using pulleys. They attached one pulley of the system to the frame, and the other to the end of the casing at the axle or windlass; they then fastened the end of the pulley system, after it had been fed through, to the axle and turned it. (85) In this way the pulling back was accomplished more easily, though more slowly because the pulling back involved several parts of the pulley system over the one operation and was therefore slowed down. The pulley system can be set up differently, as for example when several pulleys are located in one pulley-block in the frame, and several in the other pulley-block in the casing at the back, near the axle. H

Λ

K

A

∆

Π

Ξ E

Z O

P

(a) Rear-elevation

Γ

B

M

N

Θ

Z

(b) Plan from above Π

Ξ E

Figure 5.4 Heron’s torsion catapult See Marsden (1971), 47–50; also Figures 5.4 to 5.6.

198


(a) Side-elevation

(b) Plan

Figure 5.5 Catapult pull-back system

(a) Side-elevation

(b) Plan

Figure 5.6 Catapult pull-back system with pulleys

276 Josephus, Jewish War 3.76–84 (the Roman military camp) The Romans are never subject to surprise attack from their enemies. For whenever they invade any hostile territory, before they join battle they fortify a camp. (77) Now, they do not build the camp at random or in an irregular way, and they do not work all at once or in a disorderly fashion. If the ground happens to be uneven, they level it; then they measure out the camp in the shape of a square. (78) The army has a large number of workmen with it and also tools for building. (79) They divide the inside of the camp into rows of tents, while the exterior circuit has the appearance of a wall, decked out with towers at equal intervals. (80) In the spaces between the towers they set up ‘quick-firers’, catapults, stone-throwers, and every kind of artillery engine, all ready to fire. (81) They build four gates, one in each wall of the circuit, and they are large enough to allow draught animals to enter easily and wide enough to allow the solders to make a sortie 199


in an emergency. (82) The camp is intersected by streets laid out in a regimented way, and the officers’ tents are located in the centre, and right in the middle of these is the general’s headquarters, like a small temple. (83) It is as if a town has appeared on the spur of the moment, with a market place, a quarter for workmen, areas where the tribunes and centurions can hold court, if there are differences to be settled. (84) The circuit of the walls and the buildings inside are completed quicker than thought because of the number and skill of the men who work on them. In case there is an attack an outer ditch is built round the camp, six feet deep and of equal breadth. Polybius also admired the Roman practice of entrenching and camp building (6.27–32); cf. Keppie (1984), 36; see also below, nos 277–8.

277 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14 (building a military camp) At the entrance to the general’s headquarters, and in the middle of it near the via principalis, is the place called groma, because the soldiers assemble here, or because when the measurements were being fixed the metal base was set up here, on which the groma was placed. The result was that the gates of the camp observed directly from this spot make a star. And the exponents of that skill, for the reason mentioned above, are called gromatici. (13) They build lesser roads close to the via sagularis that run through the camp, to allow the soldiers to move out quickly on a sortie. (14) I shall now explain the layout of the front part of the camp (praetentura). The via principalis, which lies between the right-hand gate and the left-hand gate, takes its name from the headquarters (principia) and should be sixty feet wide, which is the same distance as that between the rampart (vallum) and the quarters of the legions. For this reason some people have called it the intervallum. Similarly, the road that leads to the praetorian gate is called the via praetoria, without doubt after the general’s quarters (praetorium). It should be sixty feet wide, as in the case above. Pseudo-Hyginus is so called because a text on the laying out of military camps, the measurement of quarters for hypothetical army units, and the building of fortifications was mistakenly attributed to Hyginus Gromaticus who wrote on land surveying probably in the second century AD. The text, named On Camp Fortifications in the sixteenth century, may have been written in the second or third century, though some have argued more specifically for the reign of Trajan. See Grillone (1977); text, translation into French, and commentary – Lenoir (1979); for the basic camp layout, see Figure 5.7; also below, no. 284.

200


Intervallum

Praetentura

Via Praetoria

Praetorium

Quaestorium

Porta Praetoriana

Porta Decumana Praetentura

Intervallum

= groma = via principalis = via sagularis

Figure 5.7 Roman military camp (Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14) The groma or ferramentum was a surveying implement for sighting and plotting straight lines and right angles, and was used in dividing up land for new settlements. This process involved a regimented layout of lines intersecting at right angles producing units of regular dimensions. Land division had similarities to the layout of military camps, and the two probably influenced one another. Military surveyors were responsible for laying out the camp, with its orderly blocks of accommodation and a regulated amount of space for each unit; see Sherk (1974).

278 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 49–50; 57–8 (camp fortifications) A ditch, located in a secure position, [is] associated with discipline, and its shape is either ‘sloping’ or ‘punic’. ‘Sloping’ is the name given to a ditch where the sides slope inwards, starting out wide apart at the top and meeting together at the bottom. ‘Punic’ is the name given to a ditch when the outer bank is perpendicular; the opposite bank is inclined, as in the sloping ditch. These ditches should have a minimum width of five feet and a height of three feet. At a distance of sixty feet in front of the gates a ditch should be constructed of similar dimensions to the width of the gates, which because of its shortness is called titulum. (50) It is essential to erect in any vulnerable position a rampart made from turf, stones, rocks, or rubble. It should be eight feet wide, six feet 201


high, and have a small breastwork. Similarly it is necessary to erect a rampart in front of the gates along the titulum, just as along the ditch. It is called ‘sacred’ in order to inspire discipline among the soldiers. (57) It is particularly necessary to watch out for the road that runs along the sides of the camp. Furthermore, whatever position the camp has, it will need a river or a source of water on one side or other. Unsuitable locations, which earlier writers called ‘stepmothers’, should entirely be avoided. So, a mountain should not loom over the camp, by which the enemy might get into a superior position or spy from a distance on what is going on in the camp. A wood that might conceal the enemy should not be close, or a ditch or a valley by means of which they might secretly creep up on the camp. Also, it is essential that the camp should not be flooded and destroyed by a neighbouring river, in flood because of a sudden storm. (58) In hostile territory it is essential to take care to arrange access to the ramparts that is double and linked, and to construct platforms for the catapults at the gates, in the angles (of the rampart), and at the towers. It is of paramount importance to protect the rampart with catapults on that side where there are ‘stepmothers’, if they cannot be avoided. The ‘punic’ ditch, which was considered to be more difficult for an attacker to cross, may have been so named from Carthaginian use of it. The dimensions suggested are probably the minimum desirable in a secure location; cf. Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.8. The titulum was intended to break up an enemy rush at the gates. The fort gates were sometimes protected by a clavicula, which was a curving stretch of rampart, which either projected outwards from the left-hand side of the gateway as seen by the attacker or inwards from the right-hand side. The intention was to force the attacking forces to move to the left as they passed through the gate and so expose his unprotected right side to the defenders (Lepper and Frere (1988), 263; Lenoir (1979), figure 9). Lenoir, op. cit., 84 argues that the rampart (described as sanctum) was of particular significance in the camp community; indeed soldiers who crossed it without permission could be subject to the death penalty. It was part of the soldiers’ training and discipline to respect it. ‘Stepmothers’ here probably refers to drainage channels that might conceal an enemy approach. The double, linked access presumably refers to a circular walkway running round the inside of the rampart.

279 Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.3–5 (Roman method of bridging a river) The quickest way to bridge a river that I know is the Roman method of using ships, and I shall explain it now, for it is worth describing. On a signal their ships are floated downstream, not with bows forward, but as if backing. The current naturally carries them down, but a rowing boat holds them back until it manoeuvres them into the 202


arranged place. Then wickerwork boxes shaped like pyramids, full of uncut stones, are let down from the prow of each ship, to hold it in place against the current. As soon as one ship has been secured, another is moored, at a distance sufficient to support the superstructure, with the prow facing the current. Next, from both ships timbers are speedily and carefully laid, with transverse planks to secure them together. The work goes on for all the ships required to bridge the river. On either side of the bridge gangways are set down and secured to make the passage safer for horses and draught animals, and also to act as a fastening for the bridge. In a short time the task is finished amid great commotion, though good planning is present in the work. The cheers that might be raised on each ship and censure of those who shirk their duty do not stop the men from hearing their orders or carrying on the work quickly. Cassius Dio (71.3) describes a similar method for bridging rivers by boats moored side by side.

280 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 137.1–138.17 (importance of siegecraft) My lord, I read your letter about siege engines and was delighted that you thought me worthy to share your thoughts on this. Therefore I have collected and written down some designs that would be useful for a siege and sent them to you. I have discussed them all, and I have released an assistant, having first demonstrated everything to him and worked it out in his presence, so that he too, if required, can work to the designs. Since I do not know the topography (where siege engines might be deployed), I have recorded many different types and have explained their purpose. In the case of each I have added information in respect of its effectiveness, protection, and safety, aiming as far as possible that everything is easily procured, light, easy to work, and speedily completed by whatever workforce is available. (138) My lord, I have furnished you with this material to demonstrate that you and your officers can not only study these matters theoretically, but also give them a practical application following my instructions. It is an entirely different situation when a man is besieging a town with full military equipment, an abundance of wood, and plenty of time, and when he is dealing with peoples and lands where revolution is easily brought about by setbacks. Therefore, because I was examining and analysing these matters, I have taken my time in replying to you, since I have not been able to get any help from previous writers due to the novelty of the subject matter and because of the shortage of time. I have also 203


sent you some local technicians and men who can work and labour in other ways. For I know from being with you on campaign, when I was fortunate to have a good supply of soldiers well prepared through experience and skill for excellent workmanship, how unexpected crises in warfare need both soldiers and engines that are versatile. Forgive me, my lord, if my account is a little unclear in the description of each construction. The technical terms will be unfamiliar in common parlance and the subject matter has a complicated theoretical aspect, and I myself am a rather feeble exponent of it. But perhaps your noble spirit will set it right and your goodwill grant it pardon. Apollodorus of Damascus was an outstanding architect and engineer who is said to have designed Trajan’s forum and baths in Rome; he also built the emperor’s bridge across the Danube (below, no. 282). He quarrelled with Hadrian on a matter of architectural design and was banished and later executed. Apollodorus’ chief interest perhaps lay in military engineering and his treatise on the tactics of conducting a siege (Poliorcetica) deals with the protection of the attackers from missiles, the undermining of walls, battering rams, assault towers, and the construction and use of assault ladders. His work has a practical ring to it, though it is not clear what sources he used. Text and commentary with translation into German – Schneider (1908). The addressee of this extract is presumably Trajan.

281 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7–156.1 (how to set fire to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises) If the wall is made of stone blocks the usual practice is to pile wood round it, and when this is set on fire it will crack the wall. But this task is difficult during a war, and water poured from above puts the fire out; the sideways impact on a wall is feeble as the fire drifts upwards, and the men involved in this cannot take shelter under a tortoise, for it also will be set on fire. Therefore pottery jars are prepared bound in iron plates, which open at the (153) bottom in a hole of about one dactyl (1.9 cm) in width. The jars are filled with fine charcoal and have an iron pipe, into which another pipe is fitted equipped with bellows. When fire is applied to it, the charcoal catches fire, and as it is blown on by the bellows it spreads a strong flame that engulfs the stone and smashes it, when vinegar or some other kind of piercing liquid is poured on. The design of this construction is as illustrated. Lead workers use it all the time. If we wish to batter a tower, or a gate, or a wall, we must construct tall ram-bearing tortoises, with wheels underneath. They bear the framework on which the ram hangs so that it has a forceful impact. Because this suspension framework is high the ram swings over a longer 204


distance and when moved further (154) its long travel has a more jarring impact. Therefore in design the tortoise should just be tall but not large, so that it can be moved easily. It should be twice as high as it is broad so that it has a sharply defined ridge and very steeply sloping roofs, with the result that any heavy object thrown onto it will not only slide off but also be sharply deflected. Furthermore, the tortoise has a protective covering sloping towards the wall to catch heavy objects thrown down on the ram and deflect them to either side. For the defenders throw down stones pierced through like cylinders or horizontal beams dropped together like a yoke, so that they can deal with every eventuality and anticipate the attack on the wall by breaking the ram. Either the ram is broken in pieces or the soldiers operating it are scattered and killed. The construction of the tortoise is as follows. You place two wooden beams not less that twelve feet (3.7 m) apart from one another on the ground, and between these beams you place four wooden beams, twelve dactyls (23 cm) thick, and one foot broad, and not less than twentyfour feet (7.3 m) high. These (155) meet each other at a ridge, where they are connected to a piece of wood, which is the ridge of the tortoise; this should be longer than the original beams on the part where we wish to incline the tortoise forward. When the main beams have been placed upright, other supporting beams should be attached to the middle of them, and on the inside additional beams are pushed up supporting the central beams and the ridge. On the outside the tortoise should be covered with wooden boards four dactyls (7.7 cm) thick, which are attached to the upright beams. This completes the construction of the casing. Then, from the base of the inner beams you should support the outer ones with beams arranged vertically. The space between the lower beams should have small wheels to support the tortoise. So that the beams underneath do not spring apart crossties will be fitted. The beams should not be cut on the outside, but they (the cross-ties) will be attached to the tortoise by brackets; they serve as the flooring of the tortoise. Now, the tortoise as described carries the ram. A second one behind for the soldiers operating it is of lesser height, and two smaller ones behind this are essential to protect the approach. I recommend that the tortoises should be many and small, for ease of movement and construction, and that they should always be built from shorter pieces of wood, and not one large piece, because that will bring (156) disadvantages in contrast to the advantages mentioned above. For construction of the tortoise see also above, no. 269. It must be doubtful if the instructions given by Apollodorus would have been sufficient for the construction of

205

BRIDGES, CAMPS, SIEGE ENGINES AND WORKS a tortoise by inexperienced engineers. However the passage is good evidence for Roman methods of building with timber.

282 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the Danube) Trajan built a stone bridge over the Danube for which I cannot sufficiently praise him. For although his other achievements were outstanding this surpasses them. For it has twenty piers of squared stone, one hundred and fifty feet (44.4 m) high above the foundations, and sixty feet (17.76 m) broad. The piers are one hundred and seventy feet (50.3 m) apart from one another and are joined by arches. How could anyone avoid being amazed at the money spent in building them, or the method by which each of them was built in a mighty river with swirling eddies and a muddy bed? For it was indeed impossible to divert the river anywhere. What I said about the width of the river should not be taken to imply that it is uniformly of this width, and indeed in some locations it is twice as broad and floods to three times that distance. I merely meant that this was the narrowest and most suitable place in the area for building a bridge. However, the fact that in its descent the river is here forced into a narrow channel from a broad expanse, after which it spreads out again in a broader expanse, makes it correspondingly stronger and deeper. So this too added to the difficulty of building the bridge. Therefore we can judge the grandeur of Trajan’s ideas from this construction. However, the bridge is of no use to us, since only the piers remain standing and do not offer a way of crossing, as if they had been constructed solely to demonstrate that there is nothing that human ingenuity cannot accomplish. Hadrian dismantled the superstructure to prevent hostile tribes from crossing into the province of Moesia. Apollodorus’ bridge was between Pontes on the south bank and Drobeta on the north, where the width of the river is about 1,097 metres; the date was probably AD 105/6; see Lepper and Frere (1988), 147–51.

283 Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.4–7 (construction of the onager) The scorpion, which is now called the wild ass (onager), is designed in the following way. Two posts of oak or holm-oak are hewn into shape, with a slight curve, so that they seem to project like humps. These posts are connected to one another like a frame-saw, and have a fairly large hole drilled through them on either side. Strong ropes, passing 206


Arm

Triggermechanism

Trigger

Pawl Handspike Drum

winch

Drum

Ratchet

3

Spring – diameters 0 Rear-elevation, rear cross-beam removed

Arm

Handspike

Trigger-mechanism Lever Spring washer Drum

Pawl

Side-elevation, left handspike – drum removed 0

Ratchet

3 Spring – diameters

Figure 5.8 The onager: firing arm, winch, and trigger mechanism

through the holes, are bound between them and hold the structure together so that it does not disintegrate. From the middle of these ropes a wooden arm is raised at an angle, pointing upwards, like the pole of a chariot (unhitched). It is bound up with the twists of the rope so that it can be raised higher or depressed. Iron hooks are fitted to the top of the pole and from these hangs a sling made from hemp or iron. Then in front of the pole is fitted a large goat-hair cushion, stuffed with fine chaff, and tied on with strong cords. The engine is placed on heaps of turf or a platform of bricks. For if a heavy machine of this kind is placed on a stone wall it smashes everything underneath, not by 207


its weight but by its violent recoil. Now, in combat a round stone is placed in the sling, and four young men on each side pull back the bars (of the windlass), to which the ropes are attached, and bend back the pole until it is almost horizontal. Finally, the artillery officer, standing close by, with a strong blow of a hammer knocks out the bolt that keeps the whole rope mechanism in position. This swift blow frees the arm, which strikes the soft cushion and flings the stone, which will smash whatever it hits. The machine is called a tormentum because the release of power is created by twisting (torquere), and a scorpion because it has an upright stinger. Recent times have given it the name of wild ass because when wild asses (onagri) are attacked by hunters they kick stones behind them over a long distance, so that they can penetrate the chest of those following or break and crush the bones of their skulls. Ammianus Marcellinus (c. AD 330–95) during the reign of Constantius II was attached to the staff of the imperial general Ursicinus, under whom he saw extensive military service. After the capture of Amida by the Persians in 359 Ursicinus was dismissed from office. Ammianus subsequently accompanied the unsuccessful military campaign of Julian against the Persians and travelled widely in the empire. He wrote a history of Rome from AD 96, with particular emphasis on the invasion of the Goths (376–8) and the battle of Adrianople in 378, in which the emperor Valens was killed. He produces a very vivid and detailed narrative especially for events in which he himself participated, and wrote as someone active and experienced in the imperial service. See Matthews (1989). Ammianus does not explain that the ropes holding the arm are twisted to provide the tension necessary for firing, or how the firing mechanism works. The one-armed stone-throwing engine is mentioned briefly by Philon c. 200 BC and then by Apollodorus of Damascus, who describes a device similar to the one-armed catapult, which was attached to the front of a battering ram (188.2–9). It is not clear how widely this kind of engine was used before Ammianus’ description in the fourth century AD; see Marsden (1971), 249–65, and plate 14; also Figure 5.8. It was easier to construct than the two-armed engines, but would have been hard to aim and very difficult to transport because of its weight. Text and translation – Marsden (1971), 250–4.

284 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.22–4 (building a military camp) Camps should always be pitched in a secure spot, especially when the enemy is nearby, with a ready supply of wood, fodder, and water. If the camp is to be long term, a healthy spot should be chosen. Care must be taken that no mountain or lofty hill is close to the camp in case it is captured by the enemy and becomes a threat. It should be a concern that the site is not subject to flooding from rivers and that the army does not come to grief for this reason. The camp should be built precisely to accommodate the number of soldiers and equipment, in case 208


a large number is crushed together in inadequate space, or a small force is compelled to spread itself more thinly than is right because the space is too large. (23) Camps should be made sometimes quadrangular, sometimes triangular, or sometimes semicircular, depending on the nature and requirements of the site. The gate that is called praetorian should face east, or that area that faces the enemy. But if the army is on the march it should face in the direction in which the army is about to move. Within this space the first centuries, that is, the cohorts, pitch their tents and set up the dragons and standards. The gate called decumana is behind the general’s headquarters, and through it soldiers who have committed an offence are led out for punishment. (24) There are three different types of fortification of a camp. If there is no immediate danger, pieces of turf are cut from the earth and heaped up to serve as a wall, three feet high; there should be a ditch in front, from which the turf was taken. Then there is a makeshift ditch, nine feet wide and seven feet deep. However, when a strong force of the enemy is threatening, then it is right to fortify the circuit of the camp with a proper ditch, twelve feet broad and nine feet deep below the line (ground level), as it is called. Above it is heaped (i.e. on the inner side of the ditch) the earth that was removed from the ditch, rising eventually to a height of four feet, and revetments are constructed on both sides. The outcome is that the ditch is thirteen feet deep and twelve feet broad, and on top of it are fixed stakes made from very strong wood, which the soldiers normally carry with them. For this task it is important to have at the ready mattocks, rakes, baskets, and other kinds of tools. See also above, nos 277–8. For Vegetius’ summary of siege methodologies, see 4.1–30.

285 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista) Let us look at the design of a ballista, whose construction, set out before your eyes, is illustrated by a detailed diagram. Its smoothly running frame set on four wheels, to which two armoured horses are harnessed, drags it to its military tasks. Its usefulness, which matches its clever design, is so great that it fires missiles at the enemy from all sides, copying the manual freedom of movement of the archer. It has holes in four locations, by means of which it is moved and turned round to suit the circumstances, and is very easily got ready to meet all attacks. 209


By using a roller mechanism at the front it can be depressed more quickly and also raised and elevated. Its stock can be speedily and easily traversed and raised in whatever direction is required. It should be recognized, however, that this type of ballista, operated by two men, fires bolts, not after being wound up with ropes like other engines, but with rods. De Rebus Bellicis is an anonymous treatise which suggests various reforms in the imperial administration and military affairs and is addressed to unknown emperors, probably Valentinian I and Valens (AD 364–75/8). The author describes several inventions of military machines, including a catapult, designed to improve the efficiency of the army and reduce manpower. Some of his inventions are bizarrely impractical, and it is possible that the treatise was mainly a plea for reduced expenditure on the army. Text – Hassall (1979); Ireland (1984); text translation and commentary – Marsden (1971), 240–3, who thinks that the author’s chief claim to originality was a new firing device, which used a winch connected to the slider not by ropes but by rods. The stock is the central block of the catapult with the slider as its upper part; nature and background of the work – Thompson (1952); Astin (1983).

286 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning ballista) It has been discovered by practical experience that this type of ballista, which is necessary for the defence of city walls, is superior to others in power and range. When an iron arch has been attached above the groove from which the bolt is fired, a powerful sinew-rope (bowstring) is drawn back by an iron hook and when released fires the bolt with tremendous force at the enemy. The engine is too big to allow this rope to be pulled back manually by the strength of soldiers. Instead two men, one at each of two wheels, pull the rope backwards by pushing against the spokes of the wheels in a rearward direction; mechanical power has therefore been obtained to match the difficulty of the task. A roller mechanism now raises and now depresses the engine as required so as to fire the missiles with a higher or lower trajectory. This exceptionally clever design, which combines many different elements, is controlled calmly by one man, if I can describe it this way; his only task is to load the missile ready to be fired. The point is presumably that if many men were involved on this task the cleverness of the invention would be reduced. Therefore a missile fired from this engine, enhanced by so many great and ingenious devices, has such a long range that it could reach across the Danube, a river famous for its width. It is called the lightning ballista, and by its name indicates the effect of its power. 210

BRIDGES, CAMPS, SIEGE ENGINES AND WORKS See Thompson (1952), 63–4; Marsden (1971), 244–6. It is unlikely that this machine could have offered any significant improvements on existing catapults. Since the width of the Danube varies so much, the indication of the catapult’s range is unclear.

211

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 The writers Ambaglio, D. (1981) ‘Il trattato “Sul Commandante” di Onasandro’, Athenaeum 59: 353–77. Anderson, J.K. (1974) Xenophon, London: Duckworth. Astin, A.E. (1983) ‘Observations on the De Rebus Bellicis’, Collections Latomus 180, Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History III, Brussels: Latomus, 388–439. Beagon, M. (1992) Roman Nature. The Thought of Pliny the Elder, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bennett, C.E. and McElwain, M.B. (1925) Frontinus: Stratagems and Aqueducts, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. Cuomo, S. (2001) Ancient Mathematics, London and New York: Routledge. Eck, W. (1982) ‘Die Gestalt Frontins in ihrer politischen und sozialen Umwelt’, in Sextus Iulius Frontinus. Wasserversorgung im antiken Rom, Munich: R. Oldenbourg: 47–62. Edwards, H.J. (1917) Caesar. The Gallic War, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. Gelzer, M. (1969) Caesar: Politician and Statesman, Oxford: Blackwell. Grillone, A. (ed.) (1977) De munitionibus castrorum, Leipzig: Teubner. Hammond, N.G.L. (1996) ‘Some passages in Polyaenus Stratagems concerning Alexander’, GRBS 37.1: 23–53. Hassall, M.W.C. (1979) Aspects of the De Rebus Bellicis. Part 1, Collected Papers; Part 2, the Text (ed. Ireland, R.), BAR International Series 63, Oxford: Oxbow. Hornblower, S. (1987) Thucydides, London: Duckworth. —— (1991) A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1 bks 1–3, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1996) A Commentary on Thucydides vol. 2 bks 4–5.24, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Humphrey, J.W., Oleson, J.P. and Sherwood, A.N. (1998) Greek and Roman Technology: A Sourcebook, London and New York: Routledge. Irby-Massie, G.L. and Keyser, P.T. (2002) Greek Science of the Hellenistic Era: A Sourcebook, London and New York: Routledge. Ireland, R. (ed.) (1984) Anonymi Auctoris De Rebus Bellicis, Leipzig: Teubner. Jones, C.P. (1971) Plutarch and Rome, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Köchly, H. and Rüstow, W. (1853–5) Griechische Kriegschriftsteller, Leipzig: W. Engelmann. Krentz, P. and Wheeler, E.L. (1994) Polyaenus. Stratagems of War, 2 vols, Chicago: Ares. Lenoir, M. (1979) Pseudo-Hygin Des fortifications du camp, Paris: Budé.

212

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Marsden, E.W. (1971) Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mathews, J.F. (1989) The Roman Empire of Ammianus, London: Duckworth. Mellor, R. (1993) Tacitus, London and New York: Routledge. Migne, J.-P. (1928–36) Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca (ed. Hopfner, T.), Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner. Millar, F. (1964) A Study of Cassius Dio, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Milner, N.P. (1993) Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Ogilvie, R.M. and Richmond, I.A. (1967) Cornelii Taciti De Vita Agricolae, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oldfather, C.H. et al. (1933–67) Diodorus Siculus, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. Oldfather, W.A. et al. (1928) Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. Rajak, T. (1983; 2nd edn 2002) Josephus, London: Duckworth. Rowland, I.D. and Howe, T.N. (1999) Vitruvius: Ten Books on Architecture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russell, D.A. (1972) Plutarch, London: Duckworth. Schneider, R. (ed.) (1908) Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Phil.-Hist. Klas.) NF 10, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung: 1–65 (Apollodorus of Damascus). —— (1912) Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Phil.-Hist. Klas.) NF 12, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung: 1–87 (Athenaeus Mechanicus). Smith, C.J. (1998) ‘Onasander on how to be a general’, in Austin, M., Harries, J. and Smith, C.J. (eds), Modus Operandi. Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Rickman, London: Institute of Classical Studies: 151–66. Stadter, P.A. (1980) Arrian of Nicomedia, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Syme, R. (1958) Tacitus, 2 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thompson, E.A. (1952) A Roman Reformer and Inventor, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walbank, F.W. (1957, vol. 1); (1967, vol. 2); (1979, vol. 3) Commentary on Polybius, 3 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1972) Polybius, Berkeley and London: University of California Press. Wallace-Hadrill, A. (1983) Suetonius, the Scholar and his Caesars, London: Duckworth. Walsh, P.G. (1961) Livy, his Historical Aims and Methods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whitehead, D. (1990) Aineias the Tactician. How to Survive under Siege; a Historical Commentary with Translation and Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitehead, D. and Blyth, P.H. (2004) Athenaeus Mechanicus, On machines, translated with introduction and commentary, Historia Einzelschriften 182, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

2 Greek and Roman warfare Adcock, F.E. (1957) The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Alston, R. (1994) ‘Roman military pay from Caesar to Diocletian’, JRS 84: 113–23. —— (1995) Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt. A Social History, London and New York: Routledge.

213

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, J.K. (1961) Ancient Greek Horsemanship, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. —— (1970) Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. —— (1991) ‘Hoplite weapons and offensive arms’, in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 15–37. Austin, N.J.E. and Rankov, N.B. (1995) Exploratio. Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople, London and New York: Routledge. Bar-Kochva, B. (1976) The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bekker-Nielsen, T. and Hannestad, L. (eds) (2001) War as a Cultural and Social Force, Copenhagen: Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Best, J.G.P. (1969) Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff. Betalli, M. (1986) ‘Enea Tattico e l’insegnamento dell’arte militare’, AFLS 7: 73–89. Bishop, M.C. and Coulston, J.C.N. (1993) Roman Military Equipment, London: Batsford. Borgeaud, P. (1988) The Cult of Pan in Ancient Greece, translated by Atlass, K. and Redfield, J., Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Bosworth, A.B. (1977) ‘Arrian and the Alani’, HSCPh 81: 217–55. —— (1988) Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brunt, P.A. (1963) ‘Alexander’s Macedonian cavalry’, JHS 83: 27–46. —— (1988) ‘The army and the land in the Roman revolution’, revised as ‘Army and land in the Roman Republic’ in Brunt, P.A., The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 240–80. Buckler, J. (1980) The Theban Hegemony 371–362 BC, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. —— (1985) ‘Epameinondas and the EMBOΛON, Phoenix 39: 134–43. Campbell, J.B. (1984) The Emperor and the Roman Army 31BC–AD 235, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1987) ‘Teach yourself how to be a general’, JRS 77: 13–29. —— (1994) The Roman Army, 31 BC–AD 337. A Sourcebook, London and New York: Routledge. —— (1999) ‘The Roman Empire’, in Raaflaub, K. and Rosenstein, N., War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: 217–40. —— (2002) War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC–AD 284, London and New York: Routledge. Cartledge, P. (1977) ‘Hoplites and heroes: Sparta’s contribution to the technique of ancient warfare’, JHS 97: 11–27. Chaniotis, A. and Ducrey, P. (eds) (2002) Army and Power in the Ancient World, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Cheesman, G.L. (1914; repr. 1971) The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Connolly, P. (1981) Greece and Rome at War, London: MacDonald. Cornell, T.J. (1995) The Beginnings of Rome. Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), London and New York: Routledge. Crawford, M. (1992) The Roman Republic (2nd edn), London: Fontana. Davies, R. (1970) ‘The Roman military medical service’, Saalburg Jahrbuch 27: 84–104. —— (1974a) ‘The daily life of the Roman soldiers under the principate’, in ANRW II.1: 299–338 = Service in the Roman Army: 33–70. —— (1974b) ‘Roman military training grounds’, in Birley, E., Dobson, B. and Jarett, M.G. (eds), Roman Frontier Studies 1969. Eighth International Congress of Limesforschung, Cardiff: University of Wales Press: 20–6.

214

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY —— (1989) Service in the Roman Army (Breeze, D. and Maxwell, V., eds), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Devine, A.M. (1985) ‘Diodorus’ account of the battle Paraitacene (317 BC) and of the battle of Gabiene’, Ancient World 12: 75–96. Dixon, K.R. and Southern, P. (1992) The Roman Cavalry, London: Batsford. Ducrey, P. (1985) Guerre et guerriers dans la Grèce antique, Paris: Payot; translated by Lloyd, J. (1986) as Warfare in Ancient Greece, New York: Schocken. Durry, M. (1938) Les cohortes prétoriennes, Paris: De Boccard. Engels, D. (1978) Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Gabrielsen, V. (2002) ‘The impact of armed forces on government and politics in archaic and classical Greek poleis; a response to Hans van Wees’, in Chaniotis, A. and Ducrey, P., Army and Power in the Ancient World: 83–98. Garlan, Y. (1972) La Guerre dans l’Antiquité, Paris: F. Nathan; translated by Lloyd, J. (1975) as War in the Ancient World: A Social History: London: Chatto and Windus. —— (1974) Recherches de Poliorcétique Grecque, Paris: French School at Athens. Goldsworthy, A.K. (1996) The Roman Army at War 100 BC–AD 200, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greenhalgh, P. (1973) Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Griffith, G.T. (1935) Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Griffiths, W.B. (1989) ‘The sling and its place in the Roman imperial army’, in van Driel-Murray, C. (ed.), 5th Roman Military Equipment Conference BAR S476, Oxford: Oxbow: 255–80. Hamilton, C.D. (1979) Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. —— (1999) ‘The Hellenistic world’, in Raaflaub, K. and Rosenstein, N., War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: 163–91. Hammond, N.G.L. (1988) ‘The campaign and battle of Cynoscephalae’, JHS 108: 60–82. Hanson, V.D. (1988) ‘Epameinondas, the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.) and the “revolution” in Greek battle tactics’, ClasAnt 7: 190–207. —— (1989) The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, New York: Knopf. —— (1991) ‘Hoplite technology in phalanx battle’ in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 63–84. —— (ed.) (1991) Hoplites. The Classical Greek Battle Experience, London and New York: Routledge. Harmand, J. (1967) L’Armée et le soldat à Rome de 107 à 50 avant notre ère, Paris: A.J. Picard et Cie. Helgeland, J. (1978) ‘Roman army religion’, ANRW 2.16.2: 1470–1505. Holder, P.A. (1980) Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan. BAR S70, Oxford: Oxbow. Holladay, A.J. (1982) ‘Hoplites and heresies’, JHS 102: 94–103. Hornblower, S. (2002) The Greek World 479–323 BC, London and New York: Routledge. Hyland, A. (1993) Training the Roman Cavalry. From Arrian’s Ars Tactica, Stroud: Sutton. Isaac, B. (1992) The Limits of Empire. The Roman Army in the East, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackson, A.H. (1991) ‘Hoplites and the gods: the dedication of captured arms and armour’, in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 228–49. Jameson, M.H. (1991) ‘Sacrifice before battle’, in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 197–227.

215

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Jenkins, G.K. (1972) Ancient Greek Coins, London: Barrie and Jenkins; 2nd rev. edn (1990), London: Seaby. Jones, A.H.M. (1964) The Later Roman Empire 284–602, Oxford: Blackwell. Kennedy, D.L. (1978) ‘Some observations on the praetorian guard’, Ancient Society 9: 275–301. Keppie, L. (1984) The Making of the Roman Army, London: Batsford; updated edn (1998), University of Oklahoma Press. —— (1996) ‘The army and the navy’, in Bowman, A.K., Champlin, E. and Lintott A.W. (eds), Cambridge Ancient History vol. X (2nd edn), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 371–96. —— (1997) ‘The changing face of the Roman legions (49 BC–AD 69)’, PBSR 65: 89–102. Krentz, P. (1985a) ‘The nature of hoplite battle’, ClasAnt 4: 50–61. —— (1985b) ‘Casualties in hoplite battles’, GRBS 26: 13–20. Landels, J.G. (1978) Engineering in the Ancient World, London: Chatto and Windus. Lawrence, A.W. (1979) Greek Aims in Fortification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lazenby, J.F. (1978) Hannibal’s War, Warminster: Aris and Phillips. —— (1985) The Spartan Army (1985), Warminster: Aris and Phillips. —— (1991) ‘The killing zone’, in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 87–109. Lazenby, J.F. and Whitehead, D. (1996) ‘The myth of the hoplite’s hoplon’, CQ 46.1: 27–33. Le Bohec, Y. (1989) L’Armée romaine, Paris: Picard. Lepper, F. and Frere, S. (1988) Trajan’s Column, Gloucester: Sutton. Leriche, P. and Tréziny, H. (eds) (1986) La Fortification dans l’histoire du monde grec. Actes du Colloque International, ‘La Fortification et sa place dans l’histoire politique, culturelle et sociale du monde grec’, Valbonne 1982, Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la Recherche scientifique. MacMullen, R. (1963) Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. —— (1980) ‘How big was the Roman army?’, Klio 62: 451–60. Mann, J. (1983) Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement during the Principate, London: University of London Press. Markle III, M.M. (1978) ‘Use of the sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon’, AJA 82: 483–97. Marsden, E.W. (1969) Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1977) ‘Macedonian military machinery and its designers under Philip and Alexander’, Archaia Makedonika 2: 211–23. Maxfield, V.A. (1981) The Military Decorations of the Roman Army, London: Batsford. Milns, R.D. (1976) ‘The army of Alexander the Great’, in Bosworth, A.B. (ed.), Alexandre le grand: image et réalité, Geneva: Vandoeuvres: 87–129. Musurillo, H.A. (1972) The Acts of the Christian Martyrs, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Osborne, R. (1996) Greece in the Making 1200–479 BC, London and New York: Routledge. Parke, H.W. (1933) Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Passerini, A. (1939) Le coorti pretorie, Rome: A. Signorelli. Patterson, J. (1993) ‘Military organization and social change in the later Roman Republic’, in Rich, J. and Shipley, G. War and Society in the Roman World: 92–112. Pritchett, W.K. (1971–91) The Greek State at War, Parts I–V, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. Raaflaub, K. (1999) ‘Archaic and Classical Greece’, in Raaflaub, K. and Rosenstein, N., War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: 129–61.

216

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Raaflaub, K. and Rosenstein, N. (eds) (1999) War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. Rich, J. and Shipley, G. (eds) (1993) War and Society in the Roman World, London and New York: Routledge. Rosenstein, N. (1999) ‘Republican Rome’, in Raaflaub, K. and Rosenstein, N., War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: 193–216. Roth, J. (1994) ‘The size and organization of the Roman imperial legion’, Historia 43: 346–62. —— (1999) The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235), Leiden: Brill. Sabin, P. (2000) ‘The Face of Roman battle’, JRS 90: 1–17. Saddington, D.B. (1975) ‘The development of the Roman auxiliary forces from Augustus to Trajan’, ANRW II.3: 176–201. Sage, M.M. (1996) Warfare in Ancient Greece. A Sourcebook, London and New York: Routledge. Salmon, J. (1977) ‘Political hoplites?’, JHS 97: 84–101. Schullard, H.H. (1974) The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, London: Thames and Hudson. Sherk, R.K. (1974) ‘Roman geographical exploration and military maps’, ANRW II.1: 534–62. Smith, R.E. (1958) Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Snodgrass, A.M. (1964) Early Greek Armour and Weapons, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. —— (1965) ‘The hoplite reform and history’, JHS 85: 110–22. Southern, P. and Dixon, K.R. (1996) The Late Roman Army, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Speidel, M.A. (1992) ‘Roman army pay scales’, JRS 82: 87–106. Speidel, M.P. (1994) Riding for Caesar. The Roman Emperors’ Horse Guards, London: Batsford. Spence, I. (1993) The Cavalry of Classical Greece. A Social and Military History with Particular Reference to Athens, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tuplin, C.J. (1987) ‘The Leuctra campaign: some outstanding problems’, Klio 69: 72–107. Vaughn, P. (1991) ‘The identification and retrieval of the hoplite battle dead’, in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 38–62. Walbank, F.W. (1992; revised edn) The Hellenistic World, London: Fontana. Watson, G.R. (1969) The Roman Soldier, London: Thames and Hudson. Webster, G. (1985) The Roman Imperial Army (3rd edn), London: Black. Wees, H. van (1992) Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History, Amsterdam: Gieben. —— (2000a) ‘The development of the hoplite phalanx’, in idem, War and Violence in Ancient Greece: 125–66. —— (ed.) (2000b) War and Violence in Ancient Greece, London: Duckworth and the Classical Press of Wales. —— (2002) ‘Tyrants, oligarchs and citizen militias’, in Chaniotis, A. and Ducrey, P., Army and Power in the Ancient World: 61–82. Wheeler, E.L. (1988) Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery. Mnemosyne suppl. 108, Leiden: Brill. —— (1991) ‘The general as hoplite’, in Hanson, V.D., Hoplites: 121–70. Whitehead, D. (1991) ‘Who equipped mercenary troops?’, Historia 40: 105–12. Williams, S. (1985) Diocletian and the Roman Recovery, London: Batsford. Winter, F.E. (1971) Greek Fortifications, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

217

INDEX OF TRANSLATED PASSAGES

Passage number Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 1–7 (importance of writing about tactics) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.1–2 (protecting those parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.1–2 (choosing men to guard city gates) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.1–3 (choosing day scouts) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keeping watch on potential traitors) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the gate) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.4–5 (organizing guard shifts) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.21–3 (setting up lanterns at guard posts) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.1–5 (organizing sorties) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.16–19 (arranging suitable passwords) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.1–5 (organizing patrols) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.1–3 (dealing with panics) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.1–2 (dealing with arms smuggling) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.1–2 (sending secret messages) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.1–2 (protection against siege engines) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.1–2 (how to counter-attack siege engines) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.1–2 (how to put out fires) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.1–2 (preventing the placing of siege ladders) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.1–3; 6–7 (dealing with tunnels)

218

136 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217


Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.1–6 (how to deal with enemy incursions) Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers are small)

218 219

Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence)

194

Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.4–7 (construction of the onager)

283

Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 137.1–138.17 (importance of siegecraft) Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7–156.1 (how to set fire to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises)

280 281

Arrian, Tactica 3.1–4; 4.1–2 (infantry and cavalry weaponry) Arrian, Tactica 5.2–3 (importance of orderly formation) Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation) Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers) Arrian, Tactica 16.6–7 (Scythian cavalry formation) Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals) Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command) Arrian, Tactica 33.1–2 (Roman willingness to adopt the practices of other peoples) Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.1–7; 43.2–4; 44 (cavalry training) Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1–11 (Roman marching order) Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 11–31 (battle formation against the Alani) Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.8–10 (Alexander’s stratagem against carts) Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.4–5 (Alexander uses combined tactics) Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.8–9; 21.3–22 (siege of Halicarnassus) Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.4–5 (Alexander’s tactical skill) Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.3–5 (Roman method of bridging a river) Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexander’s way of giving orders) Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commander’s role in battle) Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.1–3 (endurance and example of Alexander)

165 171 172 249 173 279 84 85 86

Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.5–6 (drawing up the battle line) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.1–2 (weaponry of phalanx) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.1–2 (cavalry formations) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants) Asclepiodotus, Tactics10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres) Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.1–2; 10–11 (commands)

13 119 14 15 120 121 16 122 17

219

27 166 167 168 169 28 29 170 30 164


Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 12.12–14.3 (tortoise and battering ram) Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.2–26.5 (Hegetor’s tortoise)

269 270

Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 43–4 (military value of catapults) Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 44–7 (construction of a stone-thrower) Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 65–8 (construction of the mountain belly-bow)

263

Caesar, Gallic War 1.24–6 (battle against the Helvetii) Caesar, Gallic War 2.19–21 (Caesar’s role in a battlefield crisis) Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine) Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Roman commander) Caesar, Gallic War 7.72–73 (siege works at Alesia) Caesar, Gallic War 7.85–8 (role of general in directing the battle) Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply)

50 51 267 52 268 53 227

Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting information) Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the Danube) Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation against cavalry) Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in AD 194) Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.10–12 (siege of Byzantium) Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship)

261 262

191 282 192 193 258 100

De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista) De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning ballista)

285 286

Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.2–6 (defending against elephant attack) Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.27–31 (battle of Paraetacene)

123 124

Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders before battle) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemy’s plans) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difficult position) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deficiencies) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemy’s attention)

71 139 140 141 142 143 144 145

220


Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius’ leadership) Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men) Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to fight) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to fight) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to fight) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to fight) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to fight to the end) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry) Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat) Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemy’s attention) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected quarter) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilance among the defenders) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about supplies) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie) Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege) Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the army) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipio’s discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus’ leadership) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius’ mules)

221

72 73 74 75 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 76 155 156 157 158 159 77 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 160 245 246 161 247 248 78 21 79 22


Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus’ discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulo’s discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Piso’s discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius’ discipline) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an example) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander) Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms and stratagems) Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 73–4 (nature of artillery engines) Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 81–5 (construction of a torsion catapult)

23 24 25 26 80 81 82 83 162 274 275

Josephus, Jewish War 3.71–6; 85–8 (training the Roman army) Josephus, Jewish War 3.76–84 (the Roman military camp) Josephus, Jewish War 3.98–101 (value of careful preparations in war) Josephus, Jewish War 3.102–9 (Roman discipline) Josephus, Jewish War 3.115–26 (Roman marching order) Josephus, Jewish War 3.166–75; 271–5 (siege of Jotapata)

133 20 134 231

Livy, History of Rome 22.47–8 (battle of Cannae) Livy, History of Rome 26.4.4–10 (creation of the velites)

125 126

Onasander, The General Preface 4–6 (importance of competent generals) Onasander, The General 2.1–3 (moral qualities of generalship) Onasander, The General 6.5–7; 10–13 (the general and his army on the march) Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory) Onasander, The General 10.1–2 (preparing an army for battle) Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley) Onasander, The General 10.25–6 (making religious observances) Onasander, The General 13.1–3 (military psychology) Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed troops) Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations) Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop dispositions) Onasander, The General 21.5–9 (crescent formation; counter-attacks) Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves) Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear) Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology) Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best appearance)

222

19 276

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 127 128 62 129 130 131 63 64


Onasander, The General 29.1–2 (intimidating the enemy) Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks) Onasander, The General 33.1–2 (the general and personal combat) Onasnader, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and honouring soldiers) Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead) Onasander, The General 38.1–2 (dealing with surrenders) Onasander, The General 39.4–5; 40 (how to capture a city) Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and conduct in victory)

132 65 66 67 68 69 230 70

Philon, (Siegecraft) A20–1 (construction of fortifications) 266 Philon, (Siegecraft) A32–3 (positioning of catapults and postern gates) 220 Philon, (Siegecraft) B1–2 (keeping reserve stocks of food) 221 Philon, (Siegecraft) B49–50 (preparing ammunition and supplies) 222 Philon, (Siegecraft) C3–5 (defensive precautions against siege engines) 223 Philon, (Siegecraft) C32–6 (defensive ditches, guards, passwords, and signals) 224 Philon, (Siegecraft) D 59–60 (psychology of siege warfare) 225 Philon, (Siegecraft) D71–2 (capturing the vital parts of a town) 226 Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 56–8 (problems with artillery engines) 264 Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish sword) 18 Philon, Construction of War Engines 76–77 (repeating and air-spring catapults) 265 Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages)

135

Plutarch, Flamininus 8.2–4 (battle of Cynoscephalae) Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.2–6 (qualities of generalship)

163 87

Polyaenus, Stratagems 1 Preface 1–3 (generals and stratagems) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege) Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms in an army) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the Spartans) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal operations) Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush) Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, preface (a general’s need for military skill) Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62 (Iphicrates’ skill as a general)

89 174 250 175

223

176 90 177 178 179 91 92


Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military training) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders’ attention) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexander’s ingenuity) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy) Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a mine) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from stratagems) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split up his forces) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush) Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy) Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices used by besiegers and besieged) Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle) Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel) Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard against enemy tricks) Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city) Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice to encourage valour) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipio’s tough leadership) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for action) Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesar’s rapport with his troops) Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons) Polybius, Histories 6.34.7–12 (passing round the watchword) Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline) Polybius, Histories 6.39.1–3; 5–11 (rewards for valour) Polybius, Histories 9.12.1–4; 14.1–5 (varied skills of a general) Polybius, Histories 10.20.1–5 (Scipio Africanus trains the infantry) Polybius, Histories 18.29–32 (comparison of Greek phalanx and Roman legion) Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14 (building a military camp) Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 49–50; 57–8 (camp fortifications)

224

180 181 31 251 93 182 252 183 184 253 94 185 254 186 187 255 95 256 96 257 188 189 190 97 98 99 7 8 9 10 49 11 12 277 278


Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general) Tacitus, Agricola 36–7 (battle of Mons Graupius) Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.3–4 (Theban attack on Plataea) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.75–6 (siege of Plataea) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 3.97.3–98.2 (skill of light-armed troops) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26 (Athenian blockade of Pylos) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32.3–4; 33.2; 34 (Spartan hoplites defeated at Sphacteria) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100 (use of fire machine) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 5.70–1 (the drift to the right in hoplite battles) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5 (skill and inspirational leadership of Gylippus) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44 (night battle at Syracuse) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80 (Athenian retreat at Syracuse)

88 137 138 197 198 102 199 103 259 104 105 106 107

Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of military training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.5–6 (choosing suitable recruits) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.9–10 (Roman military training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.11–12 (weapons training) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.14–16; 18–19 (throwing missiles; other military skills) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.22–4 (building a military camp) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.26–7 (training in battle manoeuvres) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.2; 12–13; 18 (role of general in securing his army’s welfare) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an inexperienced army) Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms)

195 196

Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.1–2 (tensioning a catapult) Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.1–2 (history of battering rams)

271 272

225

32 33 34 35 36 284 37 101


Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1–3; 7 (offensive and defensive mechanisms) Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack) Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.11–12 (defence of Marseilles) Xenophon On Hunting 12.1–4 (value of hunting) Xenophon Memorabilia 3.1.5–6 (qualities required in a general) Xenophon Memorabilia 3.12.1–4 (importance of physical fitness) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 1.5–6 (training the cavalry) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 2.7–9 (knowing your position) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 5.1–2 (skills of a cavalry commander) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 5.5–6; 9–11 (importance of deception) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 6.1–4 (the commander’s relations with his troops) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 8.21–2 (choosing the right man for the job) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 9.1–2 (role of commander) Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 9.3–4 (use of mercenary cavalry) Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.10–11 (cavalry practice) Xenophon On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse in attack) Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.17–21 (start of the battle of Cunaxa) Xenophon Anabasis 2.6.1–15 (qualities of a Greek general) Xenophon Anabasis 3.3.12–16 (difficulties of commanding the rearguard) Xenophon Anabasis 3.4.19–20 (difficulties of the hoplite marching formation) Xenophon Anabasis 3.4.47–9 (leading by personal example) Xenophon Anabasis 3.5.8–12 (method of crossing a river) Xenophon Anabasis 4.3.10–11 (the approachable general) Xenophon Anabasis 4.8.10–12 (changes to the traditional formation) Xenophon Anabasis 5.8.12–15 (the general and discipline) Xenophon Anabasis 6.5.14–17 (military psychology) Xenophon Anabasis 7.3.37–9 (Greek practice in night marches) Xenophon Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites) Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.11–18 (peltasts defeat Spartan hoplites) Xenophon Hellenica 5.3.5–7 (peltasts and cavalry combine) Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.8–15 (battle of Leuctra) Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas)

226

273 228 229 1 38 2 3 4 39 109 40 41 42 5 6 108 110 43 111 112 44 260 45 113 46 47 114 115 116 117 118 48

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

Aelian Tacticus, addresses work to Trajan 14 Aemilius Paullus, L., defeated at Cannae 78 Aeneas Tacticus, career and writings of 149 Africanus, Julius, writings of 143 Agesilaus (Spartan king), stratagem of 169 Alcibiades, stratagem of 169 Alexander the Great, army of 5; besieges Halicarnassus 171; crosses the Hydaspes 119; personal leadership of 78–9, 83; stratagems of 133, 137; tactics of 78, 133–4 ambushes, setting of 65, 112, 122, 136, 139, 143 Ammianus Marcellinus, career and writings of 208 Antigonus directs his army at battle of Paraetacene 103 Antonius M., discipline of 39; tactics of in Parthia 121, 124 Apollodorus of Damascus, career and writings of 204 Aquae Sextiae, battle of 122 archers, role of 51, 60, 78, 88, 95, 102, 104ff., 110, 114, 127, 128–30, 132, 133, 142, 165; training of 50 army (in Greece), development and role of 1–7; see also hoplites;

light-armed troops; peltasts; phalanx army (in Rome), development of 7–12; discipline of 36; marching order of 113, 127; political importance of 9–10; tactics of 8–11; training of 35, 46–52; weapons of 8–9, 24 Arrian (Flavius Arrianus), career of 40; prepares to fight Alani 128 artillery, Greek 6–7; Roman 11 Asclepiodotus, writings of 32 Athenaeus Mechanicus, career and writings of 191 Atilius Regulus, M., noble behaviour of 140 Augustus (emperor 31 BC–AD 14), advice of to generals 80; military regulations of 52; reorganizes the Roman army 10 auxilia, development of 10 Barca, siege of 157 Bedriacum, battle of 117 belly-bow, design of 6 Biton, writings of 180 bridging a river, Roman methods of 188, 202, 206 burial, of battle dead 71 Byzantium, siege of 177 Caecilius Metellus, L., fights the Carthaginians 119

227


Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q., stratagems of 126, 168 Calpurnius Piso Frugi, L., discipline of 39 camps, design of 199–202 Cannae, battle of 78, 107 Cantabrian gallop, cavalry manoeuvre 42 Caracalla (emperor AD 198–217), failings of as general 85 Casilinum, siege of 170 Cassius Dio, career and writings of 86 cavalry (Greek), deployment and role of 3, 5, 103ff.; role of commander of 53–5; training of 23–4 cavalry (Roman), deployment and role of 8, 10, 116, 129; training of 41–4, 50; weapons of 40 centurions, in Roman army 11 Chaeronea, battle of 137 Chares, stratagem of 137 Claudius Marcellus, M., and siege of Syracuse 167 Clearchus, qualities of as a general 55, 135; discipline of 38 Cleombrotus (Spartan king), defeated at Leuctra 99 Cleomenes (Spartan king), deceives the Argives 135 Cleon, employs treachery 173 cohort, development of in Roman army 9 command, words of 34 commander, skills and role of 3–4, 11 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P., befriends Polybius 25; discipline of 37 Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P., generous conduct of 124; spies on the enemy 118; stratagems of 125; trains the army in Spain 27 Cornelius Sulla, L., defeats

Mithridates 75; stratagem of 123 Cunaxa, battle of 94 Cynoscephalae, battle of 126 Darius (Persian king), and the siege of Babylon 176 deception, importance of in war 93, 138, 139, 170 decorations, in Roman army 71 Delium, siege of 179 Demetrius Poliorcetes, besieges Corinth 174; crosses river Lycus 138; military career of 7; stratagem of 174 Demosthenes, defeated by Aetolians 88; defeats Spartans at Sphacteria 89; killed at Syracuse 93 De Rebus Bellicis, nature of 210 Didius, T., stratagem of 123 Diodorus Siculus, writings of 103 Diognetus, stratagem of 195 Dionysius, stratagem of 138 Diotimus, stratagem of 139 discipline, maintenance of 26, 36, 37–9 Domitian (emperor AD 81–96), strategy of 118; tactics of in Germany 117, 121 Domitius Calvinus, uses surprise attack 166 Domitius Corbulo, C., intimidates the enemy 123; tough discipline of 38, 125 elephants, in battle 5; repulsed at Megalopolis 102 Epaminondas, stratagems of 58, 74, 82, 136; tactics of 99, 131 Eumenes, directs his army at battle of Paraetacene 103 Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, Q., strategy of against Hannibal 118, 140

228


Fabius Maximus, Q., attacks Arpi 168 Fulvius Nobilior, M., besieges the Ambracians 176 Furius Camillus, M., stratagem of 75

Julius Frontinus, Sextus, career and writings of 37, 115

Gylippus, defeats Athenians at Syracuse 91–2 Hadrian (emperor AD 117–38), military regulations of 52 Halicarnassus, siege of 171 Hamilcar, stratagem of 125 Hannibal, leadership of 77; stratagem of 122 Heron, career and writings of 196 Himilco, captures Agrigentum 169 Hirtius, A., uses pigeons as messengers 125 hoplites, arms of 2–3; problems of against peltasts 88–9, 97; see also phalanx hunting, value of 21 Iphicrates, skill of as general and stratagems of 82, 97 Issus (AD 194), battle of 142 Josephus, career and writings of 36; defends Jotapata 165 Jotapata, siege of 165 Julius Agricola, Cn., campaigns of in Scotland 116 Julius Caesar, C. career and writings of 60; conducts siege of Alesia 63, 189; crosses the Rhine 188; cuts off water supply at Uxellodunum 162; deals with mutiny 73; distracts the enemy 120; fights the Eburones 62, the Helvetii 59, the Nervii 60; rapport of with troops 85; stratagems of 123, 125; trains army 85

ladders, use of in siege 157, 166, 168, 171, 174 Lechaeum, battle of 97 legion, see army (in Rome) Leuctra, battle of 99 Licinius Lucullus, L., fights Mithridates 120; sends secret message 170 light-armed troops, role of 5; value of 88–90; see also peltasts Lucius Verus (emperor AD 161–69), campaigns of 45, 81 Lysimachus, captures Ephesus by treachery 175 maniple, role of 8 Mantinea, battle of 91 Marcus Aurelius (emperor AD 161–80), campaigns of 141 Marius, C., reforms of in Roman army 8–9; tactics of at Aquae Sextiae 122 Massilia, siege of 163 Memnon, deceives the enemy 139 mercenaries, use of 5 messages, sending of in secret 114, 141, 155 military psychology, importance of 57, 68, 69 Mons Graupius, battle of 116 mountain belly-bow, construction of 182 Numantia, siege of 171 onager, construction of 206 Onasander, career and writings of 65 Paraetacene, battle of 103 peltasts, equipment and role of 5, 96–9

229


Pescennius Niger, C., at battle of Issus 142 petrinos, cavalry manoeuvre 41–2 phalanx, comparison of with Roman legions 28; organization and deployment of 2–5, 32, 33, 91, 96 Philip II (of Macedon), career of 5; stratagems and tactics of 132, 137, 173 Philip V (of Macedon), besieges Prinassus, 174; defeated at Cynoscephalae, 126 Philon, career and writings of 35 Philopoemen, general of Achaean Confederacy 84 Plataea, attack on 145; siege of 146 Pliny the Elder, career and writings of 114 Plutarch, career and writings of 80 Polyaenus, career and writings of 45 Polybius, career and writings of 25 Pompeius Magnus, Cn., fights Mithridates 122 Popillius Laenas, M., and the siege of Numantia 171 Porcius Cato, M., campaigns in Spain 166 Pseudo-Hyginus, on building a camp 200–2 Ptolemy (ruler of Egypt), stratagem of 125 Pyrrhus (of Epirus), generalship of 77, 80 Quinctius Flamininus, T., wins battle of Cynoscephalae 126 ram, construction of 190 Scythians, cavalry formation of 132 Sempronius Gracchus, T., defeats the Lusitanians 167 Septimius Severus (Roman emperor AD 193–211), and battle of Issus 142; and siege of Byzantium 177

Sertorius, Quintus, career and leadership of 74; stratagem of 124 siege warfare, 6–7, 145–211 signals, use of 34, 40 slingers, use of in battle 50, 95, 110, 132 Socrates, comments of on physical training 22; on the qualities of a general 53 soldiers, see army Sparta, defeats Argives 135; defeat of at Lechaeum 97, at Leuctra 99, at Sphacteria 89; military reputation of 3–4 Spartacus, stratagem of 119 Sphacteria, battle of 89 speeches, by commanders 68 stone-thrower, construction of 181 Suetonius, career and writings of 81 Tacitus, career and writings of 117 Teleutias, defeated at Olynthus 98 Terentius Varro, C., defeated at Cannae 71 Thrasybulus (tyrant of Miletus), stratagem of 170 Thrasyllus, stratagem of 135 Thucydides, career and writings of 88 Tiberius (emperor AD 14–37), fights the Pannonians 120 tortoise, in cavalry formations 41; in infantry formations 121, 131, 142; in siege engines 190–3 training, see army Trajan (emperor AD 98–117), builds bridge over the Danube 206 Trasimene (lake), battle of 122 tunnels, use of in sieges 147, 157, 163, 176 Valerius Maximus, writings of, 14 Vegetius, career and writings of 47 velites, role of 110

230


Ventidius, P., fights the Parthians 121 Vespasian (emperor AD 69–79), campaigns of in Judaea 36, 113, 120, 165 Vitruvius, career and writings of 163

watchword, use of 26, 153 writers on art of war, nature and purpose of 13–17 Xenophon, career and writings of 21; role of as general 56–7, 95–6

231

Greek and Roman Military Writers: Selected Readings (Routledge Classical Translations)

Ancient Greek Literary Letters: Selections in Translation (Routledge Classical Translations)

Selected Translations

East Greek Pottery (Routledge Readings in Classical Archaeology Series)

Greek and Roman Necromancy

Greek and Roman Slavery

Greek and Roman Necromancy

Stochastic Volatility: Selected Readings

Stochastic Volatility: Selected Readings

Welsh Phonology: Selected Readings

Stochastic volatility: selected readings

Readings from Classical Rhetoric

Transport Economics: Selected Readings

Equality: Selected Readings

The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature

Greek History (Classical Foundations)

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Roman Military Dress

Roman military equipment

Problem Of Evil: Selected Readings

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Philosophy of mathematics. Selected readings

Software Radio Technologies: Selected Readings

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy

Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources

Chronological Syllabus and Selected Books Readings

Selected Readings on Database Technologies and Applications

Greek Mythography in the Roman World (American Classical Studies)

Selected Readings on Database Technologies and Applications

Greek and Roman Military Writers: Selected Readings (Routledge Classical Translations)

Ancient Greek Literary Letters: Selections in Translation (Routledge Classical Translations)

Selected Translations

East Greek Pottery (Routledge Readings in Classical Archaeology Series)

Greek and Roman Necromancy

Greek and Roman Slavery

Greek and Roman Necromancy

Stochastic Volatility: Selected Readings

Stochastic Volatility: Selected Readings

Welsh Phonology: Selected Readings

Stochastic volatility: selected readings

Readings from Classical Rhetoric

Transport Economics: Selected Readings

Equality: Selected Readings

The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature

Greek History (Classical Foundations)

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Roman Military Dress

Roman military equipment

Problem Of Evil: Selected Readings

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Philosophy of mathematics. Selected readings

Software Radio Technologies: Selected Readings

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings

Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy

Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources

Chronological Syllabus and Selected Books Readings

Selected Readings on Database Technologies and Applications

Greek Mythography in the Roman World (American Classical Studies)

Selected Readings on Database Technologies and Applications

Recommend Documents