God and the future: Wolfhardt Pannenberg's eschatological doctrine of God

GOD AND THE FUTURE This page intentionally left blank GOD AND THE FUTURE Wolfhart Pannenberg's Eschatological Doc...

Author: Christiaan Mostert

237 downloads 1785 Views 13MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

GOD AND THE

FUTURE

This page intentionally left blank

GOD AND THE

FUTURE Wolfhart Pannenberg's Eschatological Doctrine of God

CHRISTIAAN MOSTERT

T8.T C L A R K

A Continuum imprint LONDON

•

NEW YORK

T&T CLARK LTD A Continuum imprint 59 George Street Edinburgh EHi iLQ Scotland

370 Lexington Avenue New York 10017-6503 USA

www.tandtclark.co.uk

www.continuumbooks.com

Copyright © T&T Clark Ltd, 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of T&T Clark Ltd. First published 2002 ISBNo 56708821 9 HB ISBNo 56708850 2 P B British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Typeset by Fakenham Photosetting Ltd Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books, Bodmin

In memoriam Marijke Mostert 1944-1993


Contents Foreword Preface Abbreviations

ix xi xv

1. Eschatology in twentieth-century theology Introduction A shocking discovery Eschatology in non-historical form Eschatology in the key of promise Pannenberg's comprehensive eschatology

i 6 9 14 19

2. The appeal of apocalyptic Theology and apocalyptic The emerging picture of apocalyptic The kingdom of God in the message of Jesus The resurrection of Jesus from the dead Conclusion

27 32 38 43 53

3. An ontology of the whole Introduction The inter-disciplinary responsibility of theology Ontology - common province of theology and philosophy Reality as temporality Can there be a universal history?

55 58 62 69 79

4. The ontological priority of the future Introduction Being and appearance Contingency and connection Time and eternity The present as anticipation of the future

89 93 97 104 112

GOD AND THE FUTURE

5. The God of the future Introduction Early ideas about God God's futurity and eternity God and time Creation from the future An all-determining or determinist God?

127 129 141 152 161 175

6. The reign of the triune God Introduction A decisive turn to the Trinity The triune God The economic and the immanent Trinity The seal of God's futurity

183 187 201 213 225

Postscript

237

Bibliography

239

Index of Subjects

257

Index of Authors

261

Vlll

Foreword Concerning oneself with Christian doctrine, with its history and its conceptual ramifications, is one of the most fascinating intellectual adventures, not to speak of its profound spiritual depth. It is the satisfaction of teaching theology and of publishing on Christian doctrine to convey this enthusiasm to others. I hope that this book may succeed in achieving such an appreciation of studying Christian doctrine, as I experienced it myself through decades. It is a document of such an experience. The book describes impressively how basic issues of biblical exegesis like Jesus' teaching on the kingdom of God and the proclamation of his resurrection suggest the idea of God's kingdom, power and life to be future as well as eternal. It shows how this had to be elaborated with the help of hermeneutical and philosophical reflection. It also shows how the idea of God in terms of the power of the future requires for its explication a reinterpretation of the trinitarian doctrine of the church. I feel particularly satisfied to see this connection being highlighted as it is done in this book, and I am grateful for this contribution of the author. Wolfhart Pannenberg

IX


Preface The eschatological theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg has excited me and baffled me for over three decades. I have learnt important things from a wide range of theologians, but no influence has been greater than that of Pannenberg. I have only met him once, during a visit to Miinchen in January 1995, when, together with Philip Clayton, we had what Pannenberg described as 'eine intensive theologische Unterhaltung' in his study and over lunch in a restaurant. However, I do remember vividly the thrill I experienced when first reading his work on Christology, Jesus - God and Man, in Cambridge in the summer of 1971. Over the years, back in Australia and while teaching in Korea, I read other works by Pannenberg, mainly the volumes of essays. The three volumes of Systematic Theology were eagerly awaited and, though not the easiest to read and understand, they continue to illuminate many a theological problem. I have attempted to understand Pannenberg's theology, both in its development through four decades and in its most carefully formulated systematic form. Two things struck me particularly about it: the fact that the whole range of Christian doctrine must be understood as an expanded doctrine of God and that eschatology shapes the structure of every doctrine. The consequence of this is that eschatology must also have a decisive influence on the doctrine of God in the narrower sense. It is no accident that the idea of the reign (kingdom) of God and the understanding of God as Holy Trinity coincide exactly in Pannenberg's theology. Methodologically, I am drawn to Pannenberg's approach. Despite his recognition that all theological work is historically and geographically (as well as culturally and ecclesially) contextual, he does not abandon the question of the truth-claims inherent in theological statements. The question about the truth of Christian XI

GOD AND THE FUTURE

claims is assuredly not the only important question, but it is, in my view, the first question to ask. Pannenberg's theology exemplifies the way this question can become a significant part of constructive (systematic) theology. I am also drawn to his engagement with philosophy and the natural sciences, though these are never invested with the authority of establishing or refuting truth-claims in the province of theology. However, there are philosophical (ontological) implications in making theological assertions, and some of Pannenberg's most interesting work is in the clarification of his ontological ideas, notably the priority of the future over the other modes of time. I have questions about some of Pannenberg's ideas, but I find them powerful and persuasive. Part of the reason for seeking to make this work more widely available in published form is to offer students who want to learn from Pannenberg a key that may give access to some major currents in his thought. It is also intended as a modest contribution to the serious discussion of issues raised by his theology for those already familiar with it. It had been my intention to bring Pannenberg's theology into relation with the concerns of postmodernism (in its varying forms). This would certainly have made for either a much longer work or a very different work. However, the pressure to do so was substantially lessened by the recent appearance of F. L. Shults's book, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality. He argues that Pannenberg may be regarded - contrary to popular perception of him - as an ally in the postfoundationalist task of theology, without turning him (impossibly) into a postfoundationalist. This is a welcome and important contribution to the discussion of Pannenberg's theology. A note about language: I have tried to avoid the use of the third person masculine pronoun to refer to God, even though this sometimes results in clumsy and repetitive constructions. To me this is preferable to using gender-specific language for God. However, if the decision is made to speak of the Trinity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, it is impossible to avoid the use of pronouns and artificial to avoid 'he', 'him' and 'his', at least for the Father and the Son. Until an acceptable convention establishes itself in theology, none of the available options is problem-free. I owe a debt of gratitude to many people for their support and xii

PREFACE

encouragement over the years. In Sydney I could not fail to mention Gordon Dicker, Stephen Pickard, Allan Loy, James Tulip, Paul Crittenden, Graham Hughes and Doug Purnell, as well as the staff of the Camden Library. In Melbourne I have received invaluable support from Dorothy Lee, Peter Matheson, Rufus Black, Harry Wardlaw, Eric Osborn, and from the staff of the Joint Theological Library. Help and encouragement in one form or another have also come from overseas scholars: Philip Clayton (USA), Colin Gunton (UK), Martien Brinkman and Bram van de Beek (The Netherlands). I owe my assistant, Lisa Stewart, a debt of gratitude for her help with the proofs and indices. I am most grateful to the publishers for their helpful approach and their meticulous attention to detail. My children are not theologians in the normal sense of the word, and have not helped directly with the writing of this book. However, in indirect ways, too numerous to mention, they have given me 'heaps' of inspiration and helped me more than they know. I cannot exaggerate the debt of gratitude to my late wife, Marijke, who lived with this work in most of its first stage but did not live to see its completion. Her encouragement to 'get on with it' has stayed with me throughout the second stage. In so many ways she was a tower of strength and an example of faith expressed more in deed than in word. I cannot think of God and the future without also thinking of her, and it is to her memory that I dedicate this work. CHRISTIAAN MOSTERT Melbourne Advent 2001

xin


Abbreviations for works by Wolfhart Pannenberg ATP

Anthropology in Theological Perspective

BQTi Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. i BQTz Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 2, BQTj

Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 3

GSTz

Grundfragen systematischer Theologie, Bd 2

1ST

An Introduction to Systematic Theology

JGM

Jesus - God and Man

MIG

Metaphysics and the Idea of God

RAH

Revelation as History

STi

Systematic Theology, Vol. i

STz

Systematic Theology, Vol. 2

STj

Systematic Theology, Vol. 3

TKG

Theology and the Kingdom of God

TPS

Theology and the Philosophy of Science

TTN

Toward a Theology of Nature

WM

What Is Man?

xv


I

Eschatology in twentieth-century theology

Introduction olfhart Pannenberg is widely regarded as one of the foremost systematic theologians in the world, with a readership in W many countries. His publications number in excess of six hundred

works. Until his retirement in 1994 he was Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Munich, having been appointed to the newly formed Protestant faculty there in 1968. Through his writings, culminating in his magnum opus, the three-volume Systematic Theology', he has gained a reputation for wide learning and deep insight, sharp powers of analysis and unusual capacity to relate Christian theology to other fields of enquiry. He is a consummate Systematiker, an original thinker, a theologians' theologian. His ecclesiastical roots are Lutheran, but his theological engagement is with the full breadth of the Christian tradition. For many years he was engaged in theological work on behalf of the World Council of Churches (Faith and Order) aimed at promoting the unity in faith of all Christians. He writes, of course, as a European, but does not set out to write a European theology. In the face of sometimes stridently 'contextual' theologies, Pannenberg's concern is with 'the truth of Christian doctrine and the Christian confession',1 for the doctrines of Christianity, in his view, make truth-claims about objective states of affairs, essentially about God and God's activity in the world. 1 W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. i (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), xiii; hereafter STi.

I

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Theology is essentially a Gotteswissenschaft, a doctrine of God; it is fundamentally about God and all things in their relation to God. This book is about Pannenberg's elaboration of the Christian doctrine of God, which is as formidable as any in recent theology. In Christian theology no other concern could displace the concern with God. This does not imply a narrow view of the subject, however. If the Christian claim about God is true, everything that exists has some relation to God, which makes theology the most all-encompassing of fields of enquiry. This also makes theology a very concrete discipline, for it is concerned with things in the (socalled) 'real' world. However, our concern here is with the way Pannenberg thinks about the God of Christian faith, which - and here lies its novelty - does rather more with the notion of the future than most other theologies. Hence the title of this book, God and the Future. Putting it more technically, this way of thinking about God gives more prominence to eschatology than has usually been the case in theology. Indeed, I call Pannenberg's doctrine of God eschatological. The whole of this book is an explanation of what this means and the difference it makes to thinking about God. Not everyone thinks that theology is primarily about God. It can easily be argued that Christian theology is about the Christian religion or about Christian beliefs. It can also be construed as an explanation (or exploration) of Christian life and faith, both in its individual and socio-political aspects. But Pannenberg argues against such views, claiming that theology - any theology - must be about God, whether God is named as such or not. In his view, the Christian doctrine of God must be an unfolding of the divine 'economy' of creation and redemption. It is an elaboration of the biblical statement that God is love, an idea that includes both the relations between the three Persons of the Trinity and the relationship between the triune God and created reality. The cosmos has its origin in the divine love; all the works of God are an expression of the love of God. In fact, God has determined not to be God without a creaturely counterpart. The sending of the Son and the Spirit are also the manifestation of the love of God. This divine love is expected finally to reach its fulfilment in the eschatological consummation of this finite, temporal creation and its participation in God's eternal (trinitarian) life. This consummation 2

ESCHATOLOGY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY THEOLOGY

will mean at the same time the glorification of God by created beings and their glorification by God.2 Pannenberg is by no means alone in his insistence that the Christian doctrine of God, both narrowly and broadly conceived, must be a doctrine of the Trinity. His three-volume Systematic Theology is one of the strongest and most nuanced examples of a trinitarian doctrine of God. However, he is also acutely aware that the word 'God' has become highly problematic and in need of rational explanation in a culture which has marginalised it or is unable to rise above the scepticism or agnosticism sown by modern atheism.3 One of the tasks taken up in the first volume of Systematic Theology is that of investigating the ground on which God-talk might gain at least a preliminary plausibility; certainly no 'proofs' are available. This is an unavoidably rational task, for which fervent appeal to faith and commitment is no substitute. In the wake of the breakdown of classical metaphysical assumptions, speaking plausibly about God is far from simple. In Pannenberg's view, nothing less than a new understanding of reality - a new metaphysics - is required for this task. Pannenberg's early writing on the subject of God largely served this purpose. His search for a new metaphysics, a new ontology, converged with the growing conviction that Jesus' proclamation of the coming of God's kingdom had to occupy a central place in Christian theology. More likely, this new conviction, and especially Pannenberg's acceptance of the view that Jesus' understanding of the kingdom of God was radically eschatological, provided the stimulus for the new ontological explorations. Although Earth and Bultmann had, in their very different ways, given a certain prominence to eschatology, Pannenberg regarded this as inadequate. His own approach was ground-breaking: the starting point for theology had to be 'the Kingdom of God understood as the eschatological future brought about by God himself'.4 The imminent kingdom of God, the central idea in the message of Jesus, had to become the key to Christian theology as a whole. The 2 W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 625; hereafter ST3. 3 STi, 6 3 f. 4 W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, ed. Richard J. Neuhaus (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), 53; hereafter TKG.

3

GOD AND THE FUTURE

important place which the idea of the future came early to occupy in both Pannenberg's theological work and his ontological ideas can be traced back to the central place he gave to the eschatological message of Jesus about the kingdom of God. Closely connected with this was his view of the resurrection of Jesus from the dead as an eschatological reality that had proleptically made its appearance within time and space.5 Clearly, the idea of the future was fundamental, fundamental for Jesus' own message and fundamental for the understanding of time.6 The prominence of eschatology in Pannenberg's thought gave rise to the impression of a certain convergence between his work and that of Jiirgen Moltmann. Almost exact contemporaries, they were briefly colleagues at the Kirchliche Hochschule in Wuppertal in the late 19505. However, their intellectual background and their personal history differed considerably and they found their theological and philosophical inspiration in very different figures. Although it is likely that there was some cross-fertilisation of ideas, the directions their work took were, in the main, divergent. Although Earth remained one of Pannenberg's principal sources of influence, Pannenberg moved further away from him in his theological method than did Moltmann. Moltmann's work is predominantly a theology of hope - as the title of his first major published work suggests7 - though his later work culminates in a theological discussion of the future for which Christians hope.8 Pannenberg's work is much more a theology of the future, although he has written about hope.9 They are in strong agreement about the central importance of eschatology in Christian faith and theology; for neither is it merely the last item on the theological agenda. On the contrary, for each of them Christian theology as a whole and in all its parts acquires its shape from eschatology. However, despite some points of similarity 5

See Pannenberg's discussion of the resurrection in Jesus - God and Man (London: SCM Press, 1968), ch. 3, esp. 74-88; hereafter/GM. 6 The priority of the eschatological future which determines our present demands a reversal also in our ontological conceptions.' TKG, 54. 7 J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope (London: SCM Press, 1967). 8 J. Moltmann, The Coming of God (London: SCM Press, 1996). 9 See e.g. The God of Hope' Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 2. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press; London: SCM Press, 1971), ch. 8; hereafter BQTi. See also the discussion of hope in STj, 173-81.

4


between them formally speaking, materially their theologies differ significantly. In Pannenberg's view, we cannot think of God's being apart from God's rule (kingdom). God's being is God's rule; 'the deity of God is his rule'.10 God's rule is an expression of God's power, and the idea of power is implicit in the very idea of deity. If the kingdom of God does not come, God cannot be God! But how is God powerful? How does God rule in and over the cosmos? Obviously, in a Christian frame of reference we have to speak about God's power in close connection with God's love, for God is love as much as God is power. Another strong element in the discussion of God's power and rule is its trinitarian form. God works (rules) in the cosmos in a trinitarian way because God is the Holy Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It cannot be otherwise if God's being and God's rule are one and the same. The other major characteristic of God's being and rule that will be highlighted in this discussion of Pannenberg's theology is its eschatological form. God is associated primarily with the future, even when God's action in the past or the present is under consideration. Indeed, God is the power of the future. What this means will require detailed discussion. Eschatology and Trinity belong together, and Pannenberg's promise of a strongly eschatological doctrine of God is eventually materialised in the articulation of a very strong doctrine of the Trinity, orthodox in its basic structure, yet full of new variations on the old themes. Ultimately the theology of the eschatological kingdom of God and the doctrine of the Trinity coincide. The present work begins with a focus on eschatology and ends with a discussion of Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity. It also reflects the indissoluble unity of theological and ontological ideas which is characteristic of Pannenberg's work. We begin with the theological, move to the ontological, and return to the theological. There is a certain artificiality about this structure, for the trinitarian theology fully articulated at the end is already more than hinted at in Pannenberg's early writing. We begin, then, with a focus on the eschatological shape of Pannenberg's theology, and this itself must be put in its historical context. 10

TKG, 55.

5

GOD AND THE FUTURE

A shocking discovery Pannenberg has a positive view of the adoption of the categories of Greek philosophy in early Christian theology, but acknowledges that a price was paid for this, notably the loss from view of the eschatological character of the Christ event.11 The finality of the Christ event - the message that Jesus Christ was the eschatological revelation of God and thus one with the very 'essence' of God was expressed in terms of the doctrine of the incarnation.12 Although this form of the fundamental Christian claim was persuasive in a culture which found apocalyptic ideas alien, it rests, in Pannenberg's view, on essentially eschatological ideas about God's self-revelation. The loss of truly eschatological thinking in the theological mainstream - as distinct from ideas about the life of the soul after death - is beyond dispute. It was not until the development of modern historiography in the nineteenth century, with its sharp focus on the history of Jesus, including his message of the kingdom of God, that there was a rediscovery of its eschatological character. A huge step in modern biblical scholarship was taken by Johannes Weiss in 1892. In Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes^ Weiss broke decisively with the prevailing thinking about Jesus' understanding of the kingdom of God. When we bracket out our modern understandings of the kingdom of God, Weiss argued, we end up with the view that Jesus understood it as wholly future. During the nineteenth century the kingdom of God was understood as a spiritual community of people joined together by obedience to the will of God. As Albert Schweitzer puts it, for Weiss, there could be 'no question of a founding and development of the Kingdom within the hearts of men'.14 Schweitzer provided a ringing endorsement of Weiss's conclusions in his survey of the 'lives' of Jesus during the nineteenth century. Along with a sweeping condemnation of all attempts to 11 W. Pannenberg, The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of God as a Dogmatic Problem of Early Christian Theology', BQT2, ch. 5. IZ See Pannenberg's sixth thesis on revelation in Revelation as History (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 149-52; hereafter RAH. 13 Leander Keck (ed.), Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971). 14 A. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical ]esus (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 240.

6


picture Jesus in terms of the prevailing ideal of human personhood, Schweitzer declared, 'Jesus of Nazareth will not suffer Himself to be modernised'.15 It could no longer be maintained that the kingdom was something Jesus founded; there could be no doubt that for Jesus the kingdom of God was an eschatological reality. But this was a discovery hardly to be welcomed! For 'the historical Jesus will be to our time a stranger and an enigma'.16 Theology in the modern world could do little with the 'historical Jesus'. Not as an eschatological prophet but only as the source of a mighty spiritual force was Jesus significant for the modern world. Great scholar though he was, Schweitzer had 'no eschatological sense at all'.17 A desire for 'eschatological sense' was not high on the agenda of Protestant culture-Christianity and its theology. Harnack, whose confidence in the relevance of 'scientific' history and theology exceeded that of Schweitzer, had no trouble putting aside Jesus' eschatological ideas; he saw the kingdom of God as 'a still and mighty power in the hearts of men'.18 The principle of selection was the priority of what was original to Jesus over what he shared with his contemporaries. Harnack was a true son of the Ritschlian theology which saw Christianity as the perfect practical (moral) religion. The kingdom of God, of which Jesus is the founder, is to be understood as the moral society of nations. For Harnack, as for Ritschl, Christianity authenticated itself by its moral insights and ideals. Ritschl can be excused for not seeing that this understanding of the kingdom bore no relation to Jesus' view of the kingdom,19 but Harnack cannot. His view of the history of Jesus was clouded by his convictions about Christianity's place in Western civilisation and its universal importance. Another issue with some bearing on the discussion is the relation between historical knowledge and faith. Ritschl had no reason to doubt that his view of Jesus was based on solid historical 15

Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, 312. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, 399. 17 The phrase is Moltmann's: Theology of Hope, 38. 18 A. Harnack, What Is Christianity?, 2nd edn. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1901), 54. 19 He died in 1889, and Johannes Weiss, who was his son-in-law, did not publish Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes until 1892. 16

7

GOD AND THE FUTURE

fact.20 Weiss showed that the evidence of the New Testament forced a very different judgment. But this raised the broader question of the relation between historically ascertainable facts about Jesus and what might be accepted in faith. We should briefly consider the view of another contemporary, Wilhelm Herrmann, if only because of their influence on his most influential pupils, Earth and Bultmann. Herrmann accepted a solid core of facts, known from the New Testament, including the inner ideas of Jesus and his work of establishing the kingdom of God. But faith is not interested in a historical figure; it is the living Christ who is central for faith. The historian may not determine what a person can believe. Faith needs a surer foundation than historical research can provide, namely, one's own experience. Herrmann, as well as Martin Kahler (whose views were close to Herrmann's),21 did not want faith to be vulnerable to the changing verdicts of scientific (historical) investigation. Pannenberg is highly critical of this 'flight' from history. For him it is axiomatic that if Christian faith lives from a real past event, it follows that the object of faith cannot be immune to the results of historical research.21 The fatal problem with the views of Herrmann and Kahler was that they made faith rest upon itself instead of being built upon a historical foundation. With Herrmann and Kahler one cannot quite speak of a 'loss of history', but in the theology of their successors, Earth and Bultmann, there is a severance of the Gospel from its foundation in history. For Pannenberg this renders the Kerygma 'autonomous over against its historical correlate'.23

20

Ritschl had 'still upheld' the historical truth of the ground of faith, i.e. the historical Jesus; see 'Redemptive Event and History', Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. i (Philadelphia: Westminster Press; London: SCM Press, 1970), 57; hereafter BQTi. 21 It was Kahler who said, 'the real Christ is the Christ who is preached'; The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ, ed. Carl E. Braaten (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), 66. Zi Faith is not a second way to knowledge of the past. 'In no case is theology ... in the position of being able to say what was actually the case regarding contents which remain opaque to the historian'; BQTi, 50. 2 3 BQTi, 8 5 f. 8


Eschatology in non-historical form The development of Pannenberg's view of the relation between history and faith was influenced to a significant extent by his rejection of the approaches of Bultmann and Earth to this issue. Both were theologians of the Word of God: Earth with his concept of the threefold form of the Word of God, and Bultmann with his focus on the kerygma as it addresses people in the present moment. For Pannenberg the Word must be understood as witnessing to the acts of God; 'the Word alone with its sheer claim to truth, taken abstractly by itself, is not yet sufficient ground for faith'.24 It is the events which the Word proclaims that have to be examined for their inherent meaning as redemptive. Troeltsch's failure to find the final revelation of God in the relative events of history dissuaded Earth and Bultmann from repeating the attempt. The only ways left open were to abandon the claim of an absolute revelation of God in Jesus Christ or to retain it but ground it in something other than what can be historically investigated. Pannenberg criticises Bultmann and Earth for taking the latter course: Bultmann by dissolving history into the historicity of existence and Earth by holding that the real content of faith is supra-historical.25 Arguably, no-one exercised a greater influence on Bultmann's view of history than R. G. Collingwood, from whom Bultmann learnt that 'historical knowledge is "existential" knowledge'; history is '/or human self-knowledge'.26 History is no objective study of self-contained events in the past, which explains why Bultmann had no interest in trying to recover the details of Jesus' life. Jesus Christ addresses people only through the church's kerygma. From Karl Jaspers, on the other hand, Bultmann took the point that history serves the human task of being 'responsible for the future'.27 This complements Heidegger's insistence that 'man, if he is willing to exist in a full personal sense, must be open to the future'.28 The study of history serves the responsibility of actualising our historicity. So Bultmann goes to the New 2 2

« BQTi, 85.

5 BQTi, i 5 f. R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957), 133, 134. 27 Bultmann, History and Eschatology', 130. 28 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (London: SCM Press, 1960), 77. 26

9

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Testament asking what it has to say about possibilities for our existence. Pannenberg criticises this as too narrow a concern. Bultmann strips 'what happened then [das DamaligeY of its thenness [Damaligkeit], and fails to let the New Testament speak about 'God and his works in the events of the world and its history', which is its first concern.19 These views about history have implications for Bultmann's understanding of eschatology. He accepts that eschatological expectation and hope is the core of New Testament preaching, but he does not think that there will actually be an 'end of history'.30 With the non-arrival of the eschaton and the continuation of history, the church's eschatological hope experienced a crisis, resulting in a shift of emphasis to the way Jesus had already effected the transition from the old age to the new. For those who are in Christ 'the decisive event has already happened'. Christians must become what they already are. Pannenberg agrees that the eschatological decision takes place already in the encounter with Jesus (or as he is preached in the kerygma), so that in a sense the end of history is already here. However, this end is provisional; within history it is only 'anticipated'. It can be understood only within the framework of an apocalyptic view of history.31 Moreover, if Paul speaks of the gift of the Spirit as a first instalment (i Cor. 1:22), the question of the remainder cannot be bypassed. At the very least, Bultmann is selective in what he includes in his eschatology; it may be more accurate to say that what he excludes seriously distorts biblical eschatology.32 Bultmann's eschatology is the prisoner of his existentialist philosophy. This puts his eschatology in the same situation as every other doctrine of God. Any objective talk about God, salvation, eschatology or whatever is ruled out. Theology is not a set of general truths. We can speak of God only from the situation of knowing our existence to be 'determined' by God. Likewise, we Z

9 BQTi, nof.

3° See H. Ott, 'Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History', in C. W. Kegley (ed.), The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (London: SCM Press, 1966), 58. Bultmann's reply is on p. 264 of the same work. 3* BQTi, 36. 32 As Paul S. Minear argues on the grounds of the absence of any cosmological considerations; 'Rudolf Bultmann's Interpretation of New Testament Eschatology', in Kegley (ed.), The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, 82,. IO


can speak about the end of the world only from the situation of having come to the end of our life on our own terms. This is the situation of faith, which is 'the affirmation of God's action upon us, the answer to his Word directed to us'.33 Pannenberg is dissatisfied with the 'formalism' of Bultmann's existentialist interpretation, which 'reduces the rich content of tradition to the thinness of [the] single fundamental act of existence'.34 It is the result of making humankind the bearer of history instead of God. Strangely, as it seems to him, we now have history grounded in the historicity of humankind instead of the converse. Pannenberg is less strident, though nonetheless serious, in his criticism of Karl Earth, who is a constant discussion-partner. He sees Earth as extending Kahler's view that the content of faith is supra-historical rather than historical. Ordinary history is more or less avoided. What he finds in Earth is a 'theology of redemptive history [which] fled into a harbor supposedly safe from the critical-historical flood-tide, the harbor of a suprahistory - or with Earth, of pre-history'.35 Earth is a theologian of the Word of God; his starting-point is the great fact of Deus dixit. God's great Word - and act - is the incarnation of the Logos, which is the self-revelation of God. How does this relate to history? In the Romerbrief we find the classic sentences responsible for the charge that, for Earth, self-revelation is not truly or consistently historical. Here we find the great phrases about the meeting of two worlds, the Gospel and human history; but they meet only on the point of intersection. The name 'Jesus' defines an historical occurrence, but in so far as our world is touched by the other world, it can no longer be directly observed as history.36 Who and what Jesus is is beyond historical definition. The divine and human worlds touch 'as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it'. Similarly, the resurrection is both 'an occurrence in history' and 'not an event in history at all'. 11 R. Bultmann, 'What Does it Mean to Speak of God?', Faith and Understanding, Vol. i, ed. R. W. Funk (London: SCM Press, 1969), 61-3. 34 W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 172; hereafter TPS. 35 BQTi, 15, 16. 36 K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, ed. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933 & 1972), 29. The next several quotations are from the same and the following page. II

GOD AND THE FUTURE

In a section of the Romerbrief entitled 'Concerning the Value of History', Earth speaks of 'the Primal History which conditions all history', namely, 'the light of the LOGOS of all history and of all life', and of the incapacity of history to give any assurance at all of the non-historical.37 The history of Jesus, as the self-revelation of God, is 'not a point among other points'.38 It cannot be understood on the analogy of other events, for here our normal judgments meet their judgment (krisis). Jesus appeared as the Christ within the same flux of time as that in which we live, but that aspect is of no interest to us.39 Elsewhere Earth says that 'the history of Deus dixit has, as qualified history, no ... links with the rest of history'.40 If it is not understood in its own terms, it will not be understood at all. Earth is, as so often, elusive, wanting to utter both a yes and a wo; there is continuity', but there is an even more important discontinuity. That the Logos was made flesh in a particular time and place is certainly of the greatest importance. But in themselves the details are not of any great interest. Thus the investigation of this particular piece of history with the tools of historical-critical scholarship is, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, misleading, bound to miss the true identity of Jesus. This may not quite be a repudiation of ordinary history, but one can agree with Pannenberg's criticism that it amounts to a depreciation of real history. The sphere of the historically ascertainable and the sphere of revelation touch without really touching.41 What accounts for this? The reason for Earth's ambiguous attitude toward ordinary history is his doctrine of the hiddenness of God. God is utterly different from finite beings, and can never be the object of their cognitive grasp, except in so far as God creates this possibility. Revelation is always God's revelation, and Earth emphasises that 'precisely in his revelation God is the hidden God'.41 This is because God is the living, utterly free God. Earth will not allow us to think even for a moment that, armed with historical skills and 37

Earth, The Epistle to the Romans, 140, 144. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 91. 3 9 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 498. 40 K. Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Vol. i, ed. Hannelotte Reiffen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 6of. 4' BQTi, 16, 58. ^ Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics, 135. 38

12


careful attention to Jesus' life, we can penetrate what God keeps in concealment. Yet he insists that Jesus' space and time were of the same kind as ours. Pannenberg's criticism of Earth, similar to his criticism of Bultmann, is equally justified. The overshadowing of ordinary history by the non-historical radiance of a primal history is no less a withdrawal from history than is Bultmann's concentration on the historicity of personal existence. Pannenberg does not discuss in detail the implications for eschatology of Earth's ambiguous concern with history. Earth certainly saw the importance of eschatology, as indicated by the celebrated remark in the Romerbrief that 'if Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing eschatology, there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ'.43 But everything hinges on what Earth meant by 'thoroughgoing eschatology'. Doubtless, he meant something more substantial than liberal Protestantism's understanding of it. Nevertheless, the impression is strong that Earth pressed eschatology into the service of his theology of revelation, with the result that it becomes a way of bearing witness to the transcendence of God. Earth speaks of a 'timeless age to which all men belong', a life that is final and non-historical,44 in which we shall live. But it is doubtful that this is a real future. The eschatological reality is more like a boundary between the finite and the infinite. For the power and deity of God, having entered our world, has 'set a boundary against everything in our world', and manifests itself at that boundary.45 Earth speaks also of a 'Moment', the eternal Moment, which is the 'now' of revelation, which 'always is, and yet is not'. It is the parousia, but it is no temporal event. It is simply not clear from Earth's early work whether the 'Moment' can be any 'Now' in which the eternal is present in time - between the past and the future - or whether it is truly ('thoroughly') eschatological. The suspicion is that eschatology, for Earth, is another form of the eternity, the transcendence, the timelessness of God, which meets us as a 43

Earth, The Epistle to the Romans, 314. Earth, The Epistle to the Romans, 249. 4 5 Earth, The Epistle to the Romans, 314. Gerhard Sauter endorses the idea that for dialectical theology 'eschatology' became 'a boundary marker (Grenzbegriff)'; What Dare We Hope? Reconsidering Eschatology (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1999), 68. Eschatology points to the limitation or the boundary of all human speech about God; ySf. 44

13

GOD AND THE FUTURE

boundary to our existence.46 In effect, this means the collapse of eschatology into the doctrine of revelation. If there is no eschatological 'end', and the revelatory 'moment' can be any moment, Earth's eschatology is less than thoroughgoing, no matter how strong and rich his doctrine of God in relation to time may have been. Is the kingdom of God merely 'above' or also 'before' us? The young Earth was as elusive as ever on this point. Later he admits that his view of eternity was not adequate. Referring to his earlier interpretation of a passage such as Rom. 13:1 if., he says that he saw it as referring 'only to the moment which confronts all moments in time as the eternal "transcendental meaning" of all moments in time'.47 As early as 1967 Pannenberg expressed strong criticism of such an eschatology: for Bultmann and for the young Earth, Jesus' eschatology is timeless and deprived of its temporal meaning. Dialectical theology disregarded Jesus' message about the Kingdom of God as an expectation regarding the concrete future ... And where Jesus' words about the future have a clearly temporal meaning, these were modified by means of Christological or anthropological interpretations.48

Eschatology in the key of promise In his excellent survey and analysis of types of eschatology in the last couple of centuries, Gerhard Sauter speaks of 'the third "eschatological storm" ', which broke out in the 19605 in Europe and North America.49 This 'storm' was a new movement in theology which related the Christian hope not to the details of the 'last things', the eschata, which will follow this world and this age, but to the whole process of the history of the world, especially its future. It was - as the title of Jiirgen Moltmann's theological classic symbolises50 - a theology of hope, but a hope which is 46 This is the view of Moltmann, who thinks that for Barth, no less than Bultmann, 'revelation and the eschaton coincide'; Theology of Hope, 46. If the eschaton is the transcendental boundary between time and eternity, the end is always near. ^ K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/i (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), 716. Barth remarks that he was serious about 'the far-sidedness of the coming kingdom of God' but was not confident to discuss its actual coming. 48 TKG, 52.. 4 ? Sauter, What Dare We Hope?, 119. 50 Moltmann, Theology of Hope.

14


related very concretely to the social, economic and political conditions in which the majority of people in the world live. This makes it - at least in Moltmann's version of it - a political theology, which in turn played some part in the development of 'liberation' theologies in various parts of the 'two thirds' world. Hope should lead to (hopeful) action for the transformation of socio-economic conditions that are contrary to the will of the God who takes up especially the cause of the poor and the marginalised. Pannenberg and Moltmann were the leading figures in the articulation of an eschatological theology of history. In this section we will briefly consider the main features of Moltmann's theology, in order to help us to see where Pannenberg's thought both converges with it and diverges from it. For Moltmann, as we shall see, the key idea is that of 'promise',51 the promise of God, for the historical realisation of which we hope. In a brief autobiographical piece Moltmann speaks about the importance of hope in the period of internment in a British POW camp, a hope which 'rubbed itself raw on the barbed wire'.52 Clearly, it had to be a hope that could conquer the awful experience of personal despair as well as the cultural collapse which World War II symbolised to a devastating degree. It was a hope at once grounded in the cross and the resurrection. Christian faith must know the basis on which it can have something to say - and something to hope in - in the face of the incalculable suffering that has resulted in 'protest atheism'.53 Like Pannenberg, Moltmann was a student of Gerhard von Rad, who showed that the understanding of revelation found in the traditions of the Old Testament connected it closely with historical events. Against Bultmann's existentialist view of revelation, both Moltmann and Pannenberg saw that revelation requires a theology of history. However, they did so with different 51

Sauter remarks that 'promise is the basic category of eschatology ... , the category for perceiving God's faithfulness in God's sayings and doings'; What Dare We Hope?, 219. 52 J. Moltmann, 'Foreword' in M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), x. 53 J. Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, 1974), ch. 6, esp. 2.19-27, 249-56. 15

GOD AND THE FUTURE

emphases. For Pannenberg, God is revealed in history, but this revelation will be complete only at the end of history, when God will be seen unambiguously to be the unifying power of all finite reality. Revelation is a predicate of history. Moltmann, on the other hand, saw history as a predicate of revelation.54 History is the fulfilment of the word of promise which God has spoken. The Bible is 'the history book of God's promises', 'the story of the anticipations of God's future in the past'.55 It is a dangerous book, especially on account of the subversive memory of the cross. The hope it generates is not one that turns people away from the problems of their time, but a hope from which to challenge things that fall short of God's promises. Those who live in this hope 'can no longer put up with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it',56 and to initiate change. Moltmann's view of history is closely connected with the concept of promise, and is premised on the distinction between 'epiphany' religion and the religion of promise.57 Epiphany religion focuses on the times and places where the deity manifests itself, which then become sacred. For Israel God's appearing is connected with the uttering of a word of promise, but the promise points away from the appearances to the yet unrealised future which it announces.58 This is how the sense of history arises in human experience. 'Beneath the star of the promise of God it becomes possible to experience reality as history.'59 The stories of the past are interpreted as stories of the promises of God, which have a future fulfilment in view. The past matters because it becomes the basis of the call for on-going confidence in the God of the promises. The future matters because the fulfilment of the promises is a future reality. The present, the time between the promises and their fulfilment, matters as the time of orientation 54

For a clear comparison see Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 67-73. Moltmann says, 'it is not that consummated history reveals God, but God's universal revelation in the coming of the fulness of his glory brings history to its consummation'; Theology of Hope, 115. 55 J. Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, ed. M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press, 1975), 45. 56 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 2.1. 57 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, ch. 2. 58 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, yyL 59 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 106.

16


toward the fulfilment. Historical events point forward and receive their truth 'from the goal that has been promised by God and is to be expected from him'.60 This makes history the creation of the promises of God. In Moltmann's view, God is revealed in the fulfilment of the ancient promises. Here an important area of disagreement with Pannenberg comes into view. For Moltmann the context of the doctrine of revelation is not the problem of God's non-provability: that is a philosophical issue. God reveals Godself in order that humankind might be able to identify God, know who God is, not merely that God is. God is identifiable where God identifies Godself with historical acts of faithfulness. With Pannenberg in mind, Moltmann says, 'In proving his faithfulness in history, [God] reveals himself. For the essence and the identity of the God of promise lies not in his absoluteness over and beyond history, but in the constancy of his freely chosen relation to his creatures, in the constancy of his electing mercy and faithfulness.'61 It is not history as such which reveals God, but only the history initiated by promise and expected as a result of it. Moltmann is critical of Pannenberg's theology of history, especially the idea of 'universal history'. The main problem with it, for Moltmann, is that revelation is too much a predicate of history as a whole. Pannenberg's argument proceeds from a view of history in its totality to God as the ground of its unity. Although this is understood eschatologically, it is an attempt to demonstrate God's existence from the world, albeit in its future totality. Moltmann sees this as a form of the old cosmological argument, in which God's existence is inferred empirically from the existence of the world. This is essentially an attempt to improve on Greek cosmic theology, and is not significantly different from the 'epiphany' religion from which he strongly distinguishes his own theology of promissory history.62 This history begins with Abraham and the patriarchs and is both validated and set off in a new direction in Jesus Christ. For Moltmann the cross and the resurrection - the resurrection of the crucified one - have to be given their due already now, in giving humankind knowledge of 60 61 6z

Moltmann, Theology of Hope', 108. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 116. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 79. 17

GOD AND THE FUTURE

God. In his view, Pannenberg puts too much emphasis on the finality and completeness of revelation at the end of history and reduces the significance of what can be known about God in the midst of history. This knowledge 'moves within the horizon of remembrance and expectation opened up by the promise5.63 It is an anticipatory knowledge, as Moltmann and Pannenberg both say. The difference between them is that for Pannenberg the notion of anticipatory knowledge is part of a rich, theoretical epistemology, in which the issue of (eschatological) confirmation is an important element, while for Moltmann it is a knowledge of the future of God, in the sense of a knowledge of what God will do in the world, a knowledge gained on the basis of the past faithfulness of God. This is not the knowledge about which theories of knowledge are written, but the knowledge of pilgrims on the way. How does eschatology arise in Moltmann's view of history? The promises of God can be termed eschatological when they are directed 'towards a historic future in the sense of the ultimate horizon'.64 Thus eschatology arose in the context of promise; the novum of promise became eventually the novum ultimum^ when expectations of salvation within the course of history no longer seemed capable of fulfilment and a new decisive action of God beyond the present age was envisaged. This implied a radical universalising of the action of God, which Moltmann expresses brilliantly: On its political deathbed Israel brings the nations, as it were, into the hands of its God and into his future. By this very means Yahweh's threats and promises for the future are set free from their restriction to the one specific people and its particular future in history, and become eschatological.65

This is the Day of Yahweh, when God's faithfulness to the divine promises reaches its fullest expression. In the light of the resurrection of Jesus, this promised future is unthinkable apart from Jesus Christ. He is the validation of the promise of God and thus of the God of promise. But hope for the future cannot go around the cross. The cross is a standing challenge to 'fulfilment ecstasy', 63

Moltmann, Theology of Hope', 118. 4 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 12.5. 65 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 12.9.

6

18


a warning not to look away from the pain and suffering of the world as it exists now. Nevertheless, from the resurrection of Jesus we know that God has begun a history 'whose goal is the annihilation of death in the victory of the life of the resurrection, and which ends in the righteousness in which God receives in all things his due and the creature thereby finds its salvation'.66 It is clear that in the theology of hope eschatology has been vigorously put back into the centre of systematic theology. It is an eschatology in the key of promise, for God is the giver and the fulfiller of the promise of life and salvation. From the promises of God history is created, as human beings respond in hope to the promises and reach out for the fulfilment. The promises of God can be expressed in different metaphors, but the overarching one is that of the kingdom of God; here is the heart of eschatology. Here the universal horizon of promise and hope is connected with the theology of the lordship of God; God will be 'all in all' (i Cor. 15:28). The world and everything in it will become God's. To speak of the kingdom of God is to bring out 'the all-embracing eschatological breadth of [God's] future', to which people are already related through promise and hope.67 Despite some notable differences between the theologies of Moltmann and Pannenberg, they are nowhere closer than at this point. Pannenberg's comprehensive eschatology If Moltmann's theology is best described as a theology of hope, Pannenberg's is more accurately characterised as theology of the future, though this is an ambiguous phrase.68 Moltmann's theology has ontological implications, but he does not pursue these in detail.69 Pannenberg has devoted many years to working out a detailed onto-theological account of the eschatological world-view of the Old and New Testaments, and Jesus' view of the kingdom of God. He spoke early of the 'priority of the eschatological 66

Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 163. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 2.2.0. 68 See P. Hefner, Theological Reflections (4): Questions for Moltmann and Pannenberg', Una Sancta, 2,5.3, 1968, 38. 69 Moltmann speaks of the need for an 'ontology of the future' (or the 'notyet') as a counterpart to the 'anthropology of hope'; cf. 'Where There Is Hope, There Is Religion', The Experiment Hope, 20, 2,5^ But he himself does not go into such matters. 67

19

GOD AND THE FUTURE

future', a fundamental feature of Jesus' message of God's kingdom, which demands a reversal in our ontological conceptions.70 Among other things, the doctrine of God, the concept of history (time), anthropology and epistemological issues need to be reshaped in the light of the priority of the future. His approach to eschatology is nothing if not comprehensive. Pannenberg was not the first to undertake a detailed treatment of the theme of the future in contemporary theology. There were others whose work is significant.71 But Pannenberg's retrieval of eschatology into the centre of the theological agenda is unmatched in contemporary theology. There are six main reasons for this. First, it is demanded by the Christian faith itself. The originating events and traditions cannot be properly understood in a noneschatological way. Second, the Christian understanding of salvation requires it. Without such an eschatological understanding the old objection that the world looks too unredeemed to believe that the Messiah has come could not be met. Third, the importance of the theme of futurity in modern European thought requires it. Whether the focus is on the problem of history or on individual existence - thus whether Hegel, Marx and Bloch or Kierkegaard and Heidegger are held to raise the critical issues - the theme of the future cannot be avoided.72 Fourth, Pannenberg's interest in anthropology also adds impetus to his exploration of the idea of the future. Human existence is not conceivable apart from an 'unending movement into the open'.73 Our identity is not given 70

TKG, 54, and BQTi, xv, xvi. Mention should especially be made of Gerhard Sauter, Zukunft und Verheissung: Das Problem der Zukunft in der gegenwdrtigen theologischen und philosophischen Diskussion (Zurich: Zwingli Verlag, 1965). Sauter has been a critic of both Pannenberg's and Moltmann's understanding of eschatology. He doubts that a theology of history can really grasp the reason for Christian hope; What Dare We Hope?, xiif. and Eschatological Rationality: Theological Issues in Focus (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996), esp. 149. 7Z John Macquarrie suggests that the theology of hope as a whole is indebted to the Hegel-Feuerbach-Marxist line in philosophy, as opposed to the Kierkegaard-Heidegger-Bultmann line; see Theologies of Hope: A Critical Examination', Expository Times 81, 1970-71, 100-5. In Pannenberg's case, this is an over-simplification. 73 W. Pannenberg, What Is Man? Contemporary Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 54; hereafter WM 71

2,0


to us by the past but from the future, an idea that certainly requires ontological clarification. A fifth reason is the need for a contemporary articulation of the doctrines of Christianity. Pannenberg early saw the potential of an eschatological understanding of the doctrine of God, and an eschatological framework has progressively proved fruitful in expressing the meaning of other doctrines. Sixth, there is a political reason, called such because it concerns a person's basic stance in the public world. An eschatological understanding of the kingdom of God encourages realism in what can be achieved in political, social and economic change. We shall briefly consider these six factors in Pannenberg's development of an eschatological theology. First, the restoration of eschatology is demanded by a proper understanding of the Christian faith. It is no longer possible to doubt that the idea of the kingdom of God, central in the ministry of Jesus, is an eschatological notion. Theology cannot ignore eschatology, for eschatology is 'no longer a marginal problem of theology, which one could leave to the last chapter of dogmatics, but the basis upon which everything in Christian tradition is built'.74 If this is ignored, or if eschatology is reduced to a nontemporal phenomenon, violence is done to the core of the faith-tradition. Furthermore, the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, understood in terms of Jewish eschatological expectation, is the sine qua non of Christian faith: The basis of the knowledge of Jesus' significance remains bound to the original apocalyptic horizon of Jesus' history ... If this horizon is eliminated, the basis of faith is lost; then Christology becomes mythology and no longer has true continuity with Jesus himself and with the witness of the apostles.75

In other words, if the resurrection is central to Christianity, an axiomatic point, the same must be said about eschatology. It is not possible to understand Christian faith properly without it. Second, the doctrines of reconciliation and salvation also demand an eschatological understanding. These cannot be 74

W. Pannenberg, 'Can Christianity Do Without an Eschatology?', in G.B. Caird et al., The Christian Hope (London: SPCK, 1970), 31. 75 /GM, 83. 21

GOD AND THE FUTURE

understood adequately in terms of the forgiveness of sins but require much fuller articulation. To say without qualification that reconciliation between God and the world is already established in Christ is to lose the crucial 'already-not yet' tension inherent in Christian existence. It ignores the fact that the world is not yet fully redeemed. The modern preoccupation with the concept of alienation implies that Christian talk of reconciliation must include the eschatological proviso. The reconciliation of the world, accomplished proleptically, does not yet characterise the empirical course of events in history. As Pannenberg puts it, the decisive reason why Christianity cannot do without an eschatology is that the reconciliation of the world, the presence of God, and his kingdom through Christ, have taken place only in the form of an anticipation of a future which in its fullness has not yet materialized. Therefore, the belief in the reconciliation of the world in Christ is itself based upon eschatology while at the same time it corroborates the Christian trust and hope in the future of God.76

Christian claims about reconciliation must be abandoned if they are not understood in an eschatological sense. The 'already-not yet' tension in every aspect of Christian existence can only be articulated in eschatological terms. The third set of reasons is philosophical. In Pannenberg's view the Gospel has its foundation in history, and God's relation to the creation must be understood in terms of 'history'. This requires a view of history in its totality, not a special stream of 'salvationhistory'; nothing else would be adequate to the universality of God.77 Pannenberg believes that the idea of a single history is meaningful; that everything in history must be understood in terms of continuities which, in principle, have no limit. Of course, history, not yet complete, requires the idea of an open future. This has been made the theme of philosophical inquiry, particularly by Ernst Bloch. Bloch has 'recovered the biblical tradition's eschatological mode of thought as a theme for philosophical reflection'.78 Bloch has done much to explore 'the ontological priority of the future' in relation to the mystery of the human being. Pannenberg believes Bloch has not really succeeded in finding an ontological 76 77 78

Pannenberg, 'Can Christianity Do Without an Eschatology?', 30. BQTi, 67. BQT2, 2.38. 2,2,


ground for the primacy of the future, and that his non-theistic eschatology needs a theological dimension. Heidegger, too, explored the importance of the future for human existence, though very differently. Dilthey had asserted that the meaning of any individual event (or life) could be determined only in the light of what still lies in the future. To understand the parts one must know the whole. Heidegger developed this not in relation to the whole of history but individual existence; yet here too the idea of the future plays a major role.79 Pannenberg is critical of Heidegger's restriction of this to the sphere of human existence - in which form it was taken up by Bultmann - but it has potential for much broader application. Pannenberg's interest in the broader ontological implications is an important factor in developing an eschatological theology. The fourth factor is Pannenberg's anthropological interest. Developments in modern anthropological thought were a strong stimulus toward modern atheism, and Pannenberg believes that the most promising way of creating space today for the Godhypothesis must take place 'on the terrain of the interpretation of human existence'.80 The human person is characterised by the quality of self-transcendence or 'exocentricity',81 but this must be seen in relation to the question of an ultimate destiny, in which an individual's identity is first truly established, and an ultimate fulfilment in which all the ambiguities of human existence within history are overcome. This is to set out in an eschatological direction in anthropological thought. A decisive impetus comes from the New Testament, where Paul re-orients the concept of the human person in an eschatological direction.82 A historical understanding of the human being first emerged in Christian thought, but such an understanding has to include openness to the future, for the meaning of anything includes its outcome, which, at the time of its happening, is 'still hidden in the womb of the future'. 83 79

BQTi, 166. ('Historicness' is not a very attractive word.) W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), 15; hereafter ATP. 81 ATP, 62-6. On exocentricity see also 37. ^ ATP, 497. 8 3 ATP, 506. 80

23

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Thus theological anthropology is a further fruitful field for the development of an eschatological theology. Fifth, the need to find the most persuasive articulation of Christian doctrine is a factor in Pannenberg's pursuit of an eschatological theology, especially the doctrine of God; this is at the heart of his entire theological work. In the message of Jesus, God is a God of the coming kingdom. This is the basis for developing both an eschatological ontology and an eschatological doctrine of God. Without this, an eschatological form of other doctrines would be of little interest, since their foundation lies in the concept of God.84 The biblical God is God 'only in the execution of [God's] lordship', and this can be fully accomplished only in the future.85 In an early essay Pannenberg said that the question of God must now be 'concerned exclusively with the possibility of a God "with futurity as a quality of being" '.86 The completion of the Systematic Theology gives this understanding of God its most developed expression. Working out an understanding of God consistent with Jesus' proclamation of the 'God of the coming kingdom' has been the major factor in constructing a consistent and comprehensive eschatological theology. Finally, Pannenberg also argued for a critical and constructive function of eschatology in the public realm.87 Although eschatology has at times taken 'other-worldly' forms, resulting in a 'world-denying' stance, there is a positive element in this 'otherworldliness' that is of some political relevance. Eschatology provides a challenge to the self-sufficiency of an entirely secular view of the world. The consummation of human existence lies beyond death, and eschatology challenges the illusory hopes of secular world-views - political and cultural - about the attainability of unambiguous happiness in this world. 'Eschatology exposes secular man's illusions about the possibilities of self-realisation in this world, and therefore eschatology is at the heart of a Christian realism in appraising the conditions of human existence in the present world.'88 This is not an excuse for a negative attitude 8 4 8 5 86 87

BQTi, xvi. BQT2,140. BQT2, 241.

W. Pannenberg, 'Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology', Harvard Theological Review 77.2., 1984, 119-39. 88 Pannenberg, 'Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology', 124. 24


toward the affairs of the world. Rather, it makes possible a realistic involvement in the world's struggles, since one can operate with hope but without illusions. There is a positive counterpart to this critical function of eschatology, for it can reinforce the sense of the dignity and meaning of human experience, by relating it to an eternal and transcendent source of meaning. 'Hope in a transcendent completion of human existence in communion with God illumines the present existence in spite of its shortcomings.'89 To accept this is not to diminish the significance of life in the world now. On the contrary, this life is enriched and deepened when it is understood as an 'anticipation' of that fuller existence that in part is already known and in part is still awaited from the future. To show the relevance of an eschatological theology is not yet to establish its truth; that requires a detailed examination of Pannenberg's theology. So far we have traced in outline the fluctuating fortunes of eschatology in modern theology, and given an indication of the nature and extent of Pannenberg's commitment to eschatological theology. We now begin the task of investigating major elements in Pannenberg's recovery of eschatology for the Christian doctrine of God.

89 Pannenberg, 'Constructive and Eschatology', 124.

2-5

Critical Functions of Christian


2,

The appeal of apocalyptic Theology and apocalyptic

T

he shape of Pannenberg's theology is determined by the message and resurrection of Jesus, by 'the peculiar, eschatological character of [his] history'.1 He understands Jesus' message of the kingdom of God and his resurrection from the dead in the closest relation to second Temple Jewish apocalyptic thought. The question is whether he is on solid ground here. This is an important exegetical question. However, in view of his appeal to some key ideas in apocalyptic literature, it is also important to ask whether these ideas are significant within the world of apocalyptic and whether they can bear the weight of the theological system Pannenberg builds on them. It is - as he recognises - a world that is strange to us,2 and whilst the ideas of apocalyptic literature have fascinated many people they have not played a very prominent role in contemporary theology. That Pannenberg - rather against the stream - should find these ideas challenging and illuminating bears investigation.3 In April 1960 Ernst Kasemann made the now famous remark that apocalyptic was 'the mother of all Christian theology'.4 Jesus 1

W. Pannenberg, 'On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic', BQTi,

175.

2

BQTi, 144^; cf. also 146. A. D. Galloway says that Pannenberg (and Moltmann) take 'this unwanted child of faith unhesitatingly into the bosom of their theology'; The New Hegelians', review article, Religious Studies 8, 1972, 369. 4 E. Kasemann, 'The Beginnings of Christian Theology', in Robert W. Funk (ed.), Apocalypticism, Journal for Theology and the Church 6 (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), 40. 3

2-7

GOD AND THE FUTURE

himself, in Kasemann's view, preached a message of the kingdom of God which was not constitutively stamped by apocalyptic, his emphasis being on the nearness of God. But Easter and Pentecost caused primitive Christianity to 'resort again to apocalyptic terms as a means of responding to, and in a certain sense supplanting, Jesus5 preaching of the nearness of God9.5 Pannenberg agrees that the origins of Christianity cannot be understood in isolation from the eschatological expectations of Judaism. In his view, Jesus' message too 'can only be understood within the horizon of apocalyptic expectations', which is not to say that Jesus can be described as simply an apocalyptic figure.6 Various members of the so-called 'Pannenberg circle' that met in Heidelberg and published Revelation as History in 1961 discussed the influence of apocalyptic on Jesus and on early Christianity. Ulrich Wilckens saw apocalyptic thought as 'the native soil for the proclamation of Jesus',7 and Dietrich Rossler had earlier written about 'history in its entirety' or 'the unity of history' as a basic theme of Jewish apocalyptic,8 a theme that Pannenberg would make central in his theology of history. In the last fifty years the question of the influence of apocalyptic ideas on Jesus has been vigorously debated. Kasemann's essay was criticised by Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, which prompted an even stronger essay on the theme from Kasemann.9 If Jesus was not an apocalyptic figure, what would need to be explained is the double discontinuity between Jesus and John the Baptist and between Jesus and the early church. When Jesus is confessed as the Son of Man, the bringer of the last judgment, we are in the realm of apocalyptic, though a modified apocalyptic. Kasemann speculated why early Christianity may only have found it possible to respond to Jesus in apocalyptic terms. 'In Jesus the world is confronted by ultimate promise', the promise of 'the kingdom of freedom', which cannot have been qualitatively ultimate without 5

Kasemann, The Beginnings of Christian Theology', 40. /GM, 32, 2,17. 7 U. Wilckens, The Understanding of Revelation Within the History of Primitive Christianity', RAH, 71. 8 D. Rossler, Gesetz und Geschichte: Untersuchungen zur Theologie der judischen Apokalyptik und der pharisdischen Orthodoxie (Neukirchener Verlag, 1960). 9 See the contributions of Kasemann, Ebeling and Fuchs in Funk (ed.), Apocalypticism. 6

2,8

THE APPEAL OF APOCALYPTIC

also being temporally ultimate. By breaking the power of death and bringing in a new age of freedom Jesus had abiding and universal significance.10 However, by way of contrast, Marcus Borg, a member of the Jesus Seminar, writing more than forty years after Kasemann, argues that 'Jesus' message and mission were non-eschatological' and that the eschatological expectations of the early church were not central to its life and belief.11 The matter is clearly still contentious. Stimulated more by developments in Old Testament studies (notably von Rad's work on the connection between faith and history in the Old Testament), Pannenberg and his friends discovered something like a total view of history in the literature of apocalyptic, particularly in the period between 200 BCE and 100 CE. Their own work led them to conclude that history is the most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology. All theological questions and answers are meaningful only within the framework of the history which God has with humanity and through humanity with his whole creation - the history moving toward a future still hidden from the world but already revealed in Jesus Christ.12

Jewish apocalyptic had a view of history that covered the whole course of the world from its beginning to its end. Pannenberg found in Jewish apocalyptic the continuation of a strong historical consciousness and a view of the cosmos as a whole. It is unnecessary and artificial to separate the cosmological and the historical, although, as we shall see, there are different streams within apocalypticism. What is most striking for Pannenberg about apocalyptic is its universal scope. The history of all the nations is included within its compass. This is the necessary correlate to his idea that the deity of God (God's reality and power) can establish itself only with reference to the whole of reality. 'Speaking about God and speaking about the whole of reality are not two entirely different matters, but mutually condition each other.' J 3 10 E. Kasemann, 'On the Topic of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic', in Funk (ed.), Apocalypticism, 118. 11 Marcus J. Borg, Jesus in Contemporary Scholarship (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994), 89.

" BQTi, 15. '3 3QTi, 156.

29

GOD AND THE FUTURE

The legitimacy and relevance of apocalyptic thought for theology lies, in Pannenberg's view, in its contribution to a theology of revelation, since revelation is not to be understood primarily in terms of the concept of the Word of God, but in relation to history. For Israel the evidence of Yahweh's power and deity lies in what God does in history. God's self-revelation takes place as a reflex of this activity in history.14 Pannenberg means God's action in its totality, for a series of unrelated revelatory events is incompatible with revelation understood as God's selfrevelation. It is the totality of God's action that is revelatory, and it is this that requires a notion of history in its totality. Only the last event will finally and fully disclose the power and glory of God. This finds its exact parallel in the theme of salvation. In the great future act of judgment and salvation God's self-disclosure will be final and complete.15 The hidden meaning of the present will be disclosed and God's vindication will be clear for all to see. God's power over all things will be confirmed, and God's glory will be revealed. In taking key apocalyptic ideas into the centre of his theology, Pannenberg is not without his critics. Moltmann contrasts apocalyptic thought unfavourably with the prophetic outlook on the future. There is insufficient basis for hope and promise, and in place of the faithfulness of God there is only the plan of God which has been fixed from the beginning of time.16 Moltmann is struck more by the differences between prophetic, historical thinking and apocalyptic ideas than by the similarities. While he sees much that is theologically important in apocalyptic thought 'the New Testament did not close the window which apocalyptic had opened for it towards the wide vistas of the cosmos'17 - his interest is in the political implications of the theology of hope rather than, as Pannenberg, in the potential of apocalyptic thought to throw new light on ontological questions. Gerhard Sauter also makes less than enthusiastic reference to apocalyptic. What interests him is not apocalyptic ideas about the future, but the capacity of apocalyptic thought to challenge every world-view that *4 RAH, 13. 15 16 17

See Pannenberg's second thesis on revelation; RAH, 131-5. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 135. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 138. 30


is self-contained. Preoccupation with the details of the future can be a form of escape from the troubles of the present. Theology should focus on the ground of our hope rather than the end of all things. Sauter calls for a clear distinction between eschatology and adjacent concepts such as apocalyptic: The concept of eschatology must be pointed up as talk of God which is determined by God's coming. God's coming means adventus and futurum, God's coming to be present both today and in what still lies ahead. Eschatology would then be extricated from the almost explosive profusion of reflections on the nature of time, conceptions of history ..., hermeneutical questions of the interpretation of biblical expectations and linguistic aporia. It would concentrate on the eschatos rather than on the eschata: on Jesus Christ... as 'the first and the last and the living one'.18

Sauter, in explicit opposition to Pannenberg, does not think that theology has any obligation to determine what the end of history is or means.19 The sharpest critique of Pannenberg's appeal to Jewish apocalyptic has come from William R. Murdock and Hans Dieter Betz. Betz disputes the contention that in apocalyptic writings history is understood as a universal process, proceeding according to a kind of divine master plan.20 Not only do some apocalyptic writings make no reference to history, but universal history is not the central theme in apocalyptic. Apocalyptic is not the climax of a theology of salvation-history, but contradicts it. Most serious is the criticism that one cannot look to apocalyptic for a view of universal history. It is supported by Murdock, who says that the apocalyptic schemata often do not even cover the whole of history. They do not intend to present a theology of history.21 If there is an implicit understanding of history, it is dualistic; history is not only the working out of the divine plan, but also, in part, of the demonic will. The eschaton means the termination of the process of history, not its culmination, 18

Sauter, Eschatological Rationality, 145f.; Sauter's emphasis. Sauter, Eschatological Rationality, 149. 20 See H. D. Betz, The Concept of Apocalyptic in the Theology of the Pannenberg Group', in Funk (ed.), Apocalypticism, 192-207, esp. 195-7, 20 if. 21 William R. Murdock, 'History and Revelation in Jewish Apocalypticism', Interpretation 21.2, April 1967, 167-87. 19

31

GOD AND THE FUTURE

and the alleged eschatological revelation cannot be interpreted as 'the final brilliant burst of light ... at the end of a history-long candlelighting service'. In Murdock's view, Pannenberg's claim of continuity between history and the eschaton cannot be supported. Rather, his scheme is a form of German idealism.22 It remains to consider whether these criticisms hit their mark. Pannenberg continues to think that apocalyptic eschatology provides an important foundation for his systematic theology.13 In an essay on the relation between concepts and truth he refers again to the significance of the biblical experience of reality, especially Jewish apocalyptic, for philosophical reflection.24 However, while remaining convinced of the validity of his position, he is open to the possibility of a more differentiated view of apocalyptic.25 Although he himself has not pursued this task in detail, the last few decades have seen the appearance of important work on apocalyptic, which must be briefly considered. The emerging picture of apocalyptic The word 'apocalyptic' is used to mean a variety of distinct (though related) things. It is not clear whether the word is a noun or an adjective; it is used as both. In the recent study of apocalyptic terminological clarity and understanding both increased. In popular speech 'apocalyptic' can simply mean 'violent' or 'cataclysmic'. It also suggests speculation about the future of the world. It is also associated with 'fanatical millenarian expectation', and the apocalypse of Daniel has often been used by millenarian groups.26 Since the term comes from apokalypsis, meaning 'revelation' or 'disclosure', it denotes for some the 'revelation of the divine mysteries through visions or some other form of immediate disclosure of heavenly truths'.27 22

Murdock, 'History and Revelation in Jewish Apocalypticism', 187. 3 See the 'Postscript to the Second Edition' of RAH, 192. See also STi, 207-11, 227. 24 W. Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 109; hereafter MIG. 25 /GM, znd edn., 1977, 401. 26 John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Matrix of Christianity (New York: Crossroad, 1984), i. 27 Christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven: A Study of Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 70. 2

32,


Paul Hanson suggests that the term should be understood at three distinct levels.28 First, it refers to a particular genre of literature, through which apocalyptic writers typically conveyed their messages. Second, it can refer to apocalyptic eschatology as a religious perspective, a way of viewing divine plans in relation to events in the world. Third, the term can also refer to 'the symbolic universe in which an apocalyptic movement codifies its identity and interpretation of reality'. Apocalyptic is not systematic or uniform; it includes ideas, symbols and themes, all 'highly eclectic in nature and characterized by the esoteric, the bizarre, and the arcane'. An apocalypse is a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world.29

This is the core of the genre, describing works like i Enoch, Daniel, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, Apocalypse of Abraham, 3 Baruch, 2 Enoch, Testament of Levi 2-5, the Apocalypse of Zephaniah and, in part, Jubilees and the Testament of Abraham. In the New Testament the book of Revelation (an 'apocalypse of Jesus Christ', 1:1) is the clearest example of apocalyptic literature. In some apocalypses ('historical') there is a review or summary of history. In others there are details of other-worldly regions. Collins differentiates between two streams of Jewish apocalypses: one is characterised by visions and has an interest in the development of history; the other is marked by other-worldly journeys and has an interest in cosmological speculation.30 Common to both streams, however, is a view of the world as mysterious. Therefore, as Collins puts it, revelation must be transmitted from a supernatural source, through the mediation of angels; there is a hidden world of angels and demons z8

Paul D. Hanson, 'Apocalypticism', The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Supplementary Volume (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), 18-34, esp. 2,9-30. Z9 Collins reports some of the findings in The Apocalyptic Imagination, ch. i. The quotation and some of the material that follows is on ^L 30 Rowland, The Open Heaven, 5.

33

GOD AND THE FUTURE

that is directly relevant to human destiny; and this destiny is finally determined by a definitive eschatological judgment. In short, human life is bounded in the present by the supernatural world of angels and demons and in the future by the inevitability of a final judgment.31

This view of the world is not restricted to works that are technically 'apocalypses'. Other types of literature are related to this genre. It is important to distinguish apocalyptic from eschatological material, though there is overlap. Apocalyptic literature is not just a sub-group of eschatology; it deals in the categories of space as well as time. On the other hand, there are eschatological writings which do not belong to the genre of apocalyptic. Rowland restricts the term 'apocalyptic' to works which 'purport to offer disclosures of the heavenly mysteries, whether as the result of vision, heavenly ascent or verbal revelation5.32 There is no consistent eschatology in apocalyptic literature. Scenarios of the end of history are typical of historical apocalypses, such as Daniel. However, the fact that such scenarios do not feature in other types of apocalypse does not imply that there is no recognisable apocalyptic eschatology.33 In some there is a focus on the judgment of individuals after their death; Collins concludes that there is a clear hope of transcending death in late post-exilic Judaism.34 Belief in two spheres of life, not necessarily in temporal succession as two aeons but also as two storeys in the universe, is common to many apocalypses. In Collins's view, the idea of a transition from one sphere of life to another was more prominent in second-century Judaism than ideas such as the resurrection of the body or the transformation of the earth.35 However, the details of the heavenly sphere, which are prominent in the nonhistorical apocalypses, would be of great interest to those who believed that the transition from this sphere of life to the heavenly 31

Rowland, The Open Heaven, 7. Rowland, The Open Heaven, yof. 33 Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 9. 34 J. J. Collins, 'Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death', in Paul D. Hanson (ed.), Visionaries and Their Apocalypses (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; London: SPCK, 1983), 78. 3 5 Collins, 'Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death', 73. He says that the idea of a resurrection of the body, although clearly in view in Daniel 12:2, 'was hardly envisaged at the time.' Note that Collins is here restricting himself to material from the znd century BCE: see p. 69. 32

34


one would occur at the end of the present age. Thus even in the different types of apocalyptic there are probably common elements. The picture that emerges from recent study of apocalyptic is one of considerable heterogeneity; it has become much less monochrome.36 Boundaries are fluid; there is some continuity between the post-exilic prophetic movement - perhaps 'the dawn of apocalyptic' - and the apocalyptic movement as such. Isaiah 56-66 already sees the need of divine intervention, in the form of a new heaven and a new earth. What is not found in these prophetic writings is interest in the heavenly world and the eschatological judgment. Yet post-exilic prophecy provided some of the raw materials for later apocalypses.37 One can also no longer speak of the apocalyptic movement, for there were various movements. Some texts appear to belong to a common tradition; others reveal very different theological traditions. The situations which were being addressed also varied greatly. In view of these differences, generalisations are risky. Nonetheless, Collins ventures the following summary of a distinctive apocalyptic perspective, from which any problem is viewed. It is framed spatially by the supernatural world and temporally by the eschatological judgment. The problem is not viewed simply in terms of the historical factors available to any observer. Rather it is viewed in the light of a transcendent reality disclosed by the apocalypse. The transcendent world may be expressed through mythological symbolism or celestial geography or both. It puts the problem in perspective and projects a definitive resolution to come.38

This perspective governs both of the basic types of apocalyptic referred to earlier, despite the differences between them. If caution is necessary in making general statements about apocalyptic, criticisms also require an awareness of its pluriform nature. Pannenberg's early critics of his understanding of apocalyptic can now be seen as standing on less solid ground in their criticisms. Murdock's criticism that Pannenberg fails to see the antithetical relation between history and eschatology and that he sees the 36 P. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979, revised edn.). 37 Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 2.0. 38 Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 32.

35

GOD AND THE FUTURE

eschaton as a telos rather than a terminus is not substantiated by the research of recent decades. Whether there is a new age or a new space, apocalyptic views God as inaugurating a new sphere of existence. On the more difficult issue of basing a concept of universal history on apocalyptic, there is a balance of opinion. Some writers discern a strong interest in history in apocalyptic; others see a rejection of history. Hanson regards an abdication of responsibility to the historical realm as a feature of Jewish apocalyptic, but he does not see this as the collapse of the notion of the historical.39 Does this leave Pannenberg's claim that history is seen as a universal process in Jewish apocalyptic secure? The claim really requires more detailed substantiation. On the other hand, it has not been convincingly refuted. Perhaps the idea of universal history as an explicit theme is less prevalent in apocalyptic thought than Pannenberg supposed, but it does not need to be explicitly thematised on a major scale. David Polk, who does not see this as a major theme in apocalyptic thought, makes the decisive point: 'history as a whole is embraced for the first time when an envisioning of its anticipated consummation arises'.40 On this basis Pannenberg might well think he can 'rest his case'. We should consider the place of the concept of God's kingdom or rule in apocalyptic thought. The term 'kingdom of God' is uncommon outside the Synoptic Gospels. It occurs in the Old Testament only once (i Chron. 28:5). There are several references to 'his' or 'your' kingdom, where the meaning must be God's kingdom. In Daniel it is said that God will set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed; it will 'crush all these kingdoms and bring them to an end' (1:44). God will not set up a kingdom like other kingdoms; God's kingdom is God's kingship, God's kingly rule. The idea of God as king is not uncommon in the Old Testament. Sometimes God's kingship is seen as present, especially in the Psalms. In the prophets, a day is envisaged when God will establish God's rule, not merely in Israel but over the whole world.41 39 P. Hanson, 'Old Testament Apocalyptic Reexamined', in Hanson (ed.), Visionaries and Their Apocalypses, 57 (note 19) & 59!:. 4° D. Polk, On the Way to God (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), 169. 41 See G. E. Ladd, The Presence of the Future: The Eschatology of Biblical Realism (London: SPCK, 1974), 46-59.

36


In the course of time God's rule is thought of in eschatological terms. The Gentiles will be included in those who live under God's kingship. There will be peace and justice for all people, and evil will be overcome. As king, God is judge of all the earth, but the end result will be God's salvific presence in the world. As the political fortunes of Israel sank to their lowest ebb, the expression of God's kingly power is more and more awaited in a final act of judgment, beyond what is generally envisaged by the postexilic prophets. This is on the way to an apocalyptic view of the future. There are few explicit references to the kingdom of God in the literature of the inter-testamental period. Its use in Dan. 2:44 has been noted. The clearest use of the term occurs in the Wisdom of Solomon (10:10) and the Psalms of Solomon (17:3). In other passages the rule of God is referred to. In the Apocalypse of Baruch there is a vision about the consummation of all things in a messianic kingdom through which God's reign on earth will be established (53-77). This is the culmination of history, which will open up a glorious future in the form of a resurrection.42 There are other passages from inter-testamental literature in which the idea of God's kingdom occurs in connection with God's decisive intervention in history and the final state of the redeemed.43 However, the relative paucity of explicit references to the kingdom or rule of God in intertestamental literature is an insufficient basis for a judgment that God's sovereign rule is a matter of indifference to the apocalyptic writers.44 Whilst their focus may be on particular themes or images, such as details of the heavenly world, there is an overarching concern with God's victory over all that resists God's will. As Rowland says, 'the dominion of the barbarian power will only be temporary and the vindication of the righteous [is] assured'.45 To speak of this expectation is to voice the hope of the victory of the kingly rule of God. If the idea of God's rule or kingship were rare in the expression 4Z

This was probably written in the first century BCE, and may thus be influenced by Christian usage. 43 See N. Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus (London: SCM Press, 1963), 168-85. 44 Pannenberg acknowledges that the idea of the divine rule is 'relatively rare' in apocalyptic; STz, 326. 45 Rowland, The Open Heaven, 179.

37

GOD AND THE FUTURE

of eschatological hope in the inter-testamental period, especially in apocalyptic movements or groups of that time, the centrality of the kingdom of God in the message of the Baptist and Jesus would require explanation. The Baptist was certainly an apocalyptic figure. In his preaching the imminence and consequences of the conflict between those who were faithful to God and those who were not, were sounded forth in the wilderness of Judea; this conflict was but the visible aspect of a truly cosmic battle between 'the sons of light' and 'the sons of darkness'.46 However, the argument cannot be settled by counting the number of occurrences of the term 'kingdom of God'. The paucity of explicit references to the 'kingdom of God' in apocalyptic literature is not easily explained. However, the confident expectation of God's decisive intervention and judgment cannot be separated from the confidence that God's rule will be decisively established. When we turn to the preaching of John the Baptist and Jesus we find no paucity of reference to the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God in the message of Jesus The kingdom of God is central in Pannenberg's theology. We must now examine Pannenberg's understanding of Jesus' message of the kingdom of God, looking in particular for points of continuity and discontinuity between Jesus' understanding of it and that of apocalyptic thought. As the integrating theme of Jesus' preaching, the kingdom of God has been the subject of close scrutiny by New Testament scholars. In Pannenberg's view, the proclamation of the imminent kingdom of God was at the centre of Jesus' message; he announced its dawning in his own activity.47 This is not controversial. What is a matter of dispute is how Jesus understood the rule of God. Pannenberg regards Jesus' view of the kingdom of God as eschatological, and much closer to the apocalyptic expectation of God's decisive intervention in the world than to rabbinic views. The rabbinic view did not lack eschatological content, for a sense of the eschatological future was part of all the streams of Jewish religious thought. However, for rabbinic Judaism 'the eschaton 46 See the Dead Sea Scroll, The War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness'. 47 STi, 2.59; 5T2, 311.

38


cannot give more than the Law is able to give'.48 The revelation of God in the Torah will not be surpassed. In apocalyptic the focus is on the final act of salvation and judgment in which God will demonstrate conclusively God's kingly power and rule. The apocalyptic world of ideas was the environment in which Jesus lived. His attitude toward the Torah sets him apart from a rabbinic way of thinking. But it would be saying too much to describe Jesus as an apocalyptic visionary. Jesus' message can only be understood within the horizon of apocalyptic expectations - a view for which Pannenberg had plenty of support49 but Jesus is profoundly different from apocalyptic visionaries; he was 'not an apocalyptic seer nor a collector of apocalyptic traditions'.50 The crucial difference, apart from the scarcity of apocalyptic visions in his preaching, is that he understood the kingdom's coming as imminent and as the work of a 'fatherly' God, whilst apocalyptic thought typically emphasises the judgment of God and details of the heavenly world. The contrast should not be overdrawn, for Jesus cannot be understood in isolation from apocalyptic ideas. What, then, is new in Jesus' understanding of the kingdom of God? Some light is thrown on this by the fact that Jesus, having been in the circle of John the Baptist, goes his own way. The Baptist is more typical of the movement of apocalyptic expectation, notably in his emphasis on the imminent judgment of God. This is not absent from Jesus' preaching, as Mark 1:15 shows; the present is a time for receiving good news, but also a time for repentance. But the message of Jesus and the message of the Baptist are very different. Kasemann says that the Baptist's message of the distant God who is coming as judge recedes strangely into the background, and the legal rigorism of the Pharisees and the people of Qumran ... is broken through, while 48

Wilckens, The Understanding of Revelation Within the History of Primitive Christianity', RAH, 61. 49 See e.g. G. Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth (London: Hodder &: Stoughton, 1960), 66. E. P. Sanders describes the world-view of first-century Judaism as 'eschatological (or apocalyptic)', and adds that 'Jesus obviously shared it'; Jesus and Judaism (London: SCM Press, 1985), 124, 375^, note 3. 50 /GM, 61; The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', in J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb (eds.), Theology as History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 112. 39

GOD AND THE FUTURE

the latter's apocalyptic dreams of a holy war inevitably appear as sheer absurdity. Jesus ... speaks of the coming of the basileia in a different sense from the Baptist and contemporary Judaism, namely, not exclusively, or even only primarily, in relation to a chronologically datable end of the world.51

Pannenberg bluntly says, 'Jesus not only issued a call to repentance, but with full authority he granted to the [people] he met the salvation expected in the future.'52 This was a clear departure from apocalyptic thought; it also implies much about the messenger. For Pannenberg, Jesus' message of the kingdom of God is closely connected with his view of God as the 'Father' in heaven. Jesus' addressing God as abba expresses a unique sense of God's immediacy, but the nearness to God that is expressed in this form of address is identical with the eschatological nearness of God's kingdom.53 God is to be trusted as one trusts a parent, both in respect of the necessities of every day and in relation to God's kingdom, for which people must strive but which it is also the Father's pleasure to give to his 'little flock' (Luke 12:31-32). The Father knows what his people need (Luke 11:30). As Wilckens says, 'In the view of Jesus, to entrust oneself to God's everyday care and to direct oneself totally with intense expectation toward the approaching Kingdom of God coincide.'54 The point of connection is the immediacy or nearness of God. Pannenberg sees here the most striking modification of the apocalyptic tradition which forms the general framework of Jesus' thinking. The nearness of God's kingdom is the basis for knowing God's nearness in the events of ordinary life. The nearness of God raises the question of the relation between God's kingdom as present in the ministry of Jesus and as a still future reality. This question, as Sanders shows, is not easily settled.55 51 E. Kasemann, 'On the Topic of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic', in Funk (ed.), Apocalypticism, 104. 5 Z /GM, 2,17; see also STz, 317. U. Wilckens says, 'the radical nearness of the eschatological judgment, as it was presupposed in the preaching and conduct of the Baptist, was transformed by Jesus into the message of the radical nearness of salvation in the inbreaking reign of God'; RAH, 7i53 /GM, 2.Z9-32. 54 /GM, 2.30; cf. Wilckens, RAH, 117, note 35. 55 Jesus and Judaism, 133-6.

40


There are six clear types of 'kingdom' sayings attributed to Jesus.56 Complete clarity about whether the kingdom of God in Jesus' message is mainly future or mainly present is impossible. However, if forced to choose between a future and a present meaning, Sanders will say that it is 'immediately future'. 57 Jesus indeed believed the power of God to be working in his own ministry, that is, in the present, but the kingdom of God as such is a future reality. Jesus teaches his disciples to pray for its coming (Matt. 6:10). Clearly, Jesus did not speak of the kingdom of God with the conceptual precision of a philosopher. But the problem is perhaps not linguistic as much as ontological. We do not understand how something can be both future and present at the same time. As we shall see, it is the notion of time that is under challenge here. Given this problem, we must be content with a series of cameos when thinking about the kingdom of God.58 This should come as no surprise, given that Jesus spoke of the kingdom in parables, enacting it as much as proclaiming it. Only a very nuanced statement is likely to come near the truth. B. Chilton and J. McDonald suggest that if Jesus' initial proclamation is of the 'imminence' of the Kingdom, the performance of the message, both in his preaching and teaching, effects the present 'crisis' in time, the 'moment of truth', the encounter with the Kingdom. The language of imminent approach subtly shades into that of present invitation. The Kingdom that intersects time is 'at hand' in the sense that it may be entered.59

R. Funk thinks that we have to transcend our normal understanding of temporality; if we have to ask 'When?' we have already misunderstood. 'The kingdom arrives as both the "out of which" and the "into which" of existence that is caught up in the transition from man's present to God's future.'60 The present and 56 Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 141-50. The difficulty is knowing where the emphasis should be placed; cf. 156. 57 Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 152. 58 B. Chilton and J. McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom (London: SPCK, 1987), 61. 59 Chilton and McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom, 61. 60 R. W. Funk, 'Apocalyptic as an Historical and Theological Problem in Current New Testament Scholarship', Apocalypticism, 182.

41

GOD AND THE FUTURE

the future cannot be separated; 'authentic temporality means the coincidence of the horizons of time5. For Pannenberg, too, language has to be stretched to express the kingdom's presence and its futurity. But the fact remains that in Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God future and present are 'inextricably interwoven'.61 Jesus' sense of God's immediacy is beyond question. For those who 'have no other hope than God's future' and 'who long for the nearness of God proclaimed by Jesus', salvation is already present.62- But the kingdom of God is present as the coming kingdom. The futurity of the kingdom of God is primary. In an early essay Pannenberg makes this finely nuanced statement: in the ministry of Jesus the futurity of the Reign of God became a power determining the present. For Jesus, the traditional Jewish expectation of the coming Reign of God on earth became the decisive and all-encompassing content of one's relation to God, since the coming Reign of God had to do with the coming of God himself. Thus, obedience to God ... became turning to the future of the Reign of God. But wherever that occurs, there God already reigns unconditionally in the present, and such presence of the Reign of God does not conflict with its futurity but is derived from it and is itself only the anticipatory glimmer of its coming. Accordingly, in Jesus' ministry, in his call to seek the Kingdom of God, the coming Reign of God has already appeared, without ceasing to be differentiated from the presentness of such an appearance.63

As we have seen, Pannenberg's view of the ministry and message of Jesus is not so unusual. What is new about his theology is the key role played by the theme of the kingdom of God, and especially its eschatological character. This is what Pannenberg makes foundational for Christian doctrine, and what necessitates a 'reversal' in our ontological conceptions.64 However, it is not only Jesus' message of the presence of the coming kingdom of God that turns our thinking about everything else upside down. The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is also understood by Pannenberg in a way that brings a future (eschatological) reality 61 6i

TKG, 53. /GM, 2,2,8.

W. Pannenberg, 'Appearance as the Arrival of the Future', TKG, 133. * TKG, 53-5.

63

42-


into the present of human experience. It is important, therefore, to look closely at Pannenberg's discussion of the resurrection, which is the bridge between the ministry of Jesus and the proclamation of the church. The resurrection of Jesus from the dead Jesus' sense of the immediacy of God in ordinary experience was grounded in his belief in the eschatological nearness of God. However, it cannot be overlooked that Jesus' expectation of the kingdom's imminent arrival was not fulfilled; not as Jesus envisaged it. This problem of the non-appearance of the eschatological events that would end this age cannot be minimised. But it was not a problem for long; Pannenberg claims that the resurrection of Jesus was understood by the earliest Christians in relation to the coming of God's kingdom. The question is whether Jesus' resurrection can be taken as a fulfilment of his expectation about the kingdom's coming, as Pannenberg holds.65 The resurrection of Jesus is of fundamental importance in Pannenberg's theology. Its foundational role in his Christology is clear from the structure of Jesus - God and Man. For other doctrines too, especially the doctrine of the Trinity, everything depends on establishing Jesus' unity with God, and this can be done only through the resurrection. The most striking aspect of Pannenberg's discussion of the resurrection is his defence of its historical facticity, which he has maintained in the face of much criticism.66 It is a position not compromised, he argues, by the fact that the resurrection is an eschatological reality - and thus different from the reality of this world - for the overcoming of death implied in this idea has nonetheless taken place in this world and in our history.67 Although the historicity of the resurrection is basic for Pannenberg, we need not consider it further here. We do need to examine Pannenberg's interpretation of the resurrection, in particular his claim that it was understood in relation to the general resurrection. Only in this way can it be shown that the resurrection of Jesus was the fulfilment of Jesus' 65 Pannenberg, The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History', 114. 66 /GM, ch. 3, esp. 98-106; STz, 359-63. 67 STz, 36of.

43

GOD AND THE FUTURE

expectation of the imminent arrival of the kingdom of God. Was the resurrection of Jesus the arrival of the rule of God? This is a big claim to make, as Pannenberg acknowledges, since the resurrection of an individual was not part of the apocalyptic tradition.68 There are three parts to the problem. First, we consider Pannenberg's claim that the resurrection of Jesus was the beginning of the end of the world. Second, we examine whether the expectation of a general resurrection was a significant part of apocalyptic expectation. Finally, we look at Pannenberg's response to the problem of the delay of the parousia. i. The beginning of the end of the world? Those who accepted that Jesus had been raised from the dead would have had a particular understanding of that extraordinary 'event'. This understanding was shaped in part by the nature of the event and in part by the cultural and theological horizon of the first believers, which included apocalyptic eschatology. Pannenberg argues that for Jesus' Jewish contemporaries, insofar as they shared the apocalyptic expectation, the occurrence of the resurrection did not first need to be interpreted, but for them it spoke meaningfully in itself: If such a thing had happened, one could no longer doubt what it meant.69

If Jesus had indeed been raised from death it would have meant the beginning of the end of the world.70 Jesus' resurrection was taken as the beginning of the resurrection of others, at least those for whom he was the Christ. Paul declared him the first of many brothers, the first fruits of those who have died (Rom. 8:19; i Cor. 15:10). As long as the time-gap between Jesus' resurrection and that of others was not felt to be a problem, the resurrection of Jesus was understood as the beginning of the (eschatological) end of the world. The resurrection of Jesus would also have meant the beginning 68 Pannenberg, The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, ii4f. 69 /GM, 67. Pannenberg's claim here is feasible. However, strictly speaking, intrinsic meaning and the act of interpretation belong together. Even when the meaning of an event is clearly determined by the event itself, the element of interpretation is never absent. 7° /GM, 67.

44


of eschatological salvation. For Pannenberg 'the resurrection as such already has saving character'.71 The first Christians saw salvation as restricted to those who were Christian. In Israel resurrection was sometimes thought of as the reward of the righteous, especially the martyrs (Isa. 26:19). For some the resurrection would mean everlasting shame, while for the obedient it would be the beginning of salvation (Dan. 12:1-3 and 2 Enoch 22). Furthermore, if the resurrection of Jesus meant the beginning of the eschatological end of the world, it also meant the confirmation of the pre-Easter activity of Jesus.71 This is a key point for Pannenberg, for it means that the problem of Jesus' claim to authority, which the crucifixion had thrown wide open, is resolved.73 Implied in this is the endorsement of Jesus' views on the Torah, as against those of the recognised authorities. This is not to say that everything Jesus had said and done receives explicit confirmation, but it means that he is vindicated in the things for which he was accused of blasphemy, mainly in respect of his role in God's dealings with humankind (e.g. Mark 2:7). Most significant, this confirmation of what Jesus had said and done also implies God's endorsement of Jesus' understanding of the imminent reign of God, in particular his claim that it was already dawning in his own ministry. So Pannenberg concludes that the resurrection fulfilled Jesus' expectation of the kingdom of God: Without the resurrection of Jesus his message would have turned out to be a fanatical audacity. But ... the resurrection did justify Jesus' expectation of the near End. It was in himself that it was fulfilled. Admittedly, this happened otherwise than Jesus and his disciples probably had imagined the announced future. But it is true of every 'fulfilment' that it only rarely corresponds to the announcement prior to it. Nevertheless, in view of the resurrection of Jesus and the eschatological quality of that event, we cannot be satisfied with the simple judgment that Jesus' expectation of the near End remained unfulfilled.74

71

/GM, 78. /GM, 67f. 7 3 /GM, 53-66. 74 Pannenberg, The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 116; cf. STz, 345. 72

45

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Nothing has been said yet about the meaning of the phrase 'the end of the world'. Pannenberg sees it mainly in terms of the resurrection of the dead, understood as the transformation from an old life to a new life. He recognises the problem of speaking about an event that ends history in language applicable to events within history. The end of the world (or of history75) is something in which the meaning of every event is finally established, the destiny of every creature is attained, and the hypothesis of God's reality is established beyond doubt. It must also mean the final establishment of God's kingdom. Can anything concrete be said about what 'the end' means for the world and its history. What is the relation between the old world and the new reality of God's kingdom? Pannenberg has discussed the problem of the idea of the end of history in more detail in later writings.76 Does the end of the world mean the end of everything? If not, is the idea of something taking place after the end of history not self-contradictory? At issue here is the problem of time. Suffice it for now to say that 'the end of history' is an expression of the finite nature of time. Time borders on eternity, which is not the abolition of time but the overcoming of its finitude, the overcoming of the separation of temporal moments from those before and after.77 To say that time borders on eternity is to say that God is the end of time and the final future of created reality is in the kingdom of God. When time ends, temporal history is brought into the eternal presence of God, where creaturely separation from God - but not the distinction of Creator and creature - is overcome.78 Notwithstanding the difficulty of the idea of the end of the age, 75 J. J. Collins warns against a simple equation of the idea of the end of the world (a cosmological idea) and the idea of the end of history (a temporal, historical idea); see 'Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death', 64f. 76 W. Pannenberg, 'Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology', Harvard Theological Review 77.1, 1984, 119-39, esp. 136-9. In 5X3 there is a discussion of the end of time and the end of history. The chapter is entitled The Consummation of Creation in the Kingdom of God'. Pannenberg has in mind both the sense of 'end' and 'completion'; STj, 586. 77 Pannenberg, 'Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology', 137. 78 STj, 580-607, esp. 586-95. We shall return to this theme in later chapters.

46


it is not difficult to see that the resurrection would have been understood as the end of the aeon, at least as the beginning of the end. It presupposes the inseparability of Jesus' resurrection from the general resurrection. It could not have been otherwise. Paul understood it in this way. Without the language of the eschatological resurrection of the dead, the earliest believers would not have known how to speak of Jesus' making himself known to them after his death.79 It was only for the second generation of New Testament witnesses that the resurrection of Jesus was 'not yet the beginning of the immediately continuous sequence of the eschatological events but was a special event that happened to Jesus alone'.80 We will consider shortly the problem of the delay of the general resurrection of the dead. However, it is clear that for the first Christians the resurrection of Jesus would have meant the beginning of the end of the age. 2. The resurrection in apocalyptic expectation The resurrection of Jesus could not have been understood as such if the idea of resurrection had not had a certain currency at the time. But how much currency, and how prominent was the expectation of a resurrection of the dead within the general climate of ideas? Pannenberg argues that the resurrection of Jesus did not occur in a vacuum; prior to Paul there was already 'a tradition in which the expectation of the resurrection of the dead was cultivated'.81 Belief in some form of existence beyond death was certainly current several centuries before the time of Jesus, even if it was not of ancient provenance in Israel.82 C. F. Evans says that Christians 'did not invent the idea of resurrection'; it arises only within apocalyptic eschatology, and cannot be understood apart from that context.83 Was the idea of the resurrection of the dead as prominent in the period up to the life of Jesus as is usually assumed? It is not the only way in which the idea of a life beyond death was expressed. 79

ST2. 349. /GM, 66. 81 /GM, 78. 8z C. Rowland, Christian Origins: From Messianic Movement to Christian Religion (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985), 188. 83 C. F. Evans, Resurrection and the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1970), 2,0. 80

47

GOD AND THE FUTURE

But it was a significant way, as Pannenberg shows from references in the Old Testament and apocalyptic literature.84 There can be little doubt that the idea of the resurrection of the dead was cin the air', for the resurrection of Jesus could not have been understood as such at all if the idea of resurrection had not been around. Pannenberg argues that 'if the message of the resurrection of Jesus arose against the background of such an expectation, we [can] assume a priori a connection between this message and that expectation'.85 However, if the idea of the resurrection of the dead enjoyed a reasonable currency, Pannenberg's case becomes stronger. Yet the extent of the expectation of the resurrection of the dead in the time of Jesus is difficult to determine; scholarly opinion varies considerably. Some scholars do not regard the idea of the resurrection of the dead as particularly prevalent in apocalyptic Judaism. Collins sees it as only one idea among others. He says that the physical resurrection of the body was 'hardly envisaged at the time'. The most significant aspect of the future hope of second-century Judaism was the transition from one sphere of life to another.86 Was this envisaged without reference to death? His judgment does seem particularly cautious. However, he has support from C. F. Evans, who thinks Pannenberg may be claiming too much. For Evans the general resurrection from the dead was not a 'sufficiently fixed theologoumenon in Jewish tradition ... to provide the necessary context from which the resurrection of Jesus would be immediately read off',87 though he thinks it may lie behind the original Easter faith. Other scholars see belief in the resurrection of the dead as more prominent in late Jewish apocalyptic. L. J. Greenspoon claims that a belief in the resurrection arose early in Israel. By the time of Jesus there was a division over the issue between Sadducees and Pharisees. He thinks it probable that, from at least the second century BCE, the majority of Jews held the Pharisaic view.88 He 8

< /GM, 74f. 5 RAH, Postscript to ind edn., 191. 86 Collins, 'Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death', in Hanson (ed.), Visionaries and their Apocalypses, 73. 87 Evans, Resurrection and the New Testament, 180. 88 Leonard J. Greenspoon, The Origin of the Idea of Resurrection', in Baruch Halpern and Jon D. Levenson (eds.), Traditions in Transformation: Turning Points in Biblical Faith (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1981), 247. 8

48


regards Daniel 11:2, often regarded as the single undisputed evidence that the resurrection of the dead is known in the Old Testament, as 'the end product of countless generations of speculation concerning man's place in the afterlife'.89 He does qualify the point: belief in resurrection first received 'more than isolated expression' only in the inter-testamental period.90 George W. E. Nickelsburg looks at a smaller range of texts, beginning with Daniel 12:1-3 and concluding with material from the Qumran scrolls, and shows that belief in resurrection, together with belief in immortality and eternal life, is well established in inter-testamental Jewish theology.91 The context of belief in the resurrection is typically that of religious persecution and the need of the righteous to be vindicated. There are many variations in detail in the stories and in the kind of resurrection that is envisaged. Where the situation addressed does not include people being put to death for their faith, there is no need to mention resurrection; 'The malady is not present. The remedy is not necessary.'9Z The different situations from which these eschatological ideas originate explains the prominence or absence of the idea of resurrection in different texts. There are other ways of describing people's share in the eschatological life. Although the matter is to some extent controversial, Pannenberg's claim that there was in the time of Jesus a general expectation of the resurrection of the dead at the end of the age has good support. It does not seem to have been merely marginally there, in the background. Clearly, sense could be made of the resurrection of Jesus from the expectation of the resurrection of the dead in general. However, 89 Greenspoon, The Origin of the Idea of Resurrection', 249. See also part 5 of the essay, 2.81-318. 'A concept of the bodily resurrection of the dead is expressed in Biblical material that ranges in date of composition from the ninth to the second centuries BCE'; 319. 90 Greenspoon, The Origin of the Idea of Resurrection', 3 20. 91 George W. E. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 92 Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism, 151. Gerhard Hasel, looking at Old Testament apocalyptic material, confirms the view that the idea of a physical resurrection of the dead is a constituent part of apocalyptic eschatology; G. F. Hasel, 'Resurrection in the Theology of Old Testament Apocalytic', Zeitschrift fur die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 92.2, 1980, 267-84.

49

GOD AND THE FUTURE

with time apocalyptic ideas had to be recast in the light of the resurrection of Jesus.93 3. The delay of the parousia Jesus' resurrection was not at first understood as separate from the general resurrection at the end of the age. Several decades after Jesus' death Paul still expected the imminent, ultimate arrival of the resurrected Jesus for judgment, accompanied by the universal resurrection of the dead, possibly within his life-time.94 Only when the expected 'day of the Lord Jesus' did not arrive did the resurrection of Jesus take on a more independent meaning. With the parousia of Christ and the general resurrection of the dead still outstanding, does the increasing distance from the resurrection of Jesus adversely affect our interpretation of Jesus' resurrection as integrally related to the general resurrection? Does the delay of the parousia jeopardise the apocalyptic framework of the resurrection, and can the resurrection of Jesus still mean the end of the age? Does Pannenberg's view of the resurrection remain tenable in the light of the parousia's delay? At one level, the question may be answered simply. The church has never, in fact, allowed the increasing length of time between Jesus' resurrection and his eschatological return to cause it to abandon its belief in his coming again 'in glory to judge the living and the dead'. The tension between the 'already' of his life, death and resurrection and the 'not yet' of his coming in glory remains, although it is always at risk of being broken, either through indifference to the future expectation or through excessive preoccupation with it. Pannenberg is right in his observation that 'it no longer presses itself upon us so irresistibly that the resurrected Jesus is the eschatological judge'.95 We have only the witness of the early church to keep this before us. But will the problem of the delay of the parousia become sharper if an interval of two thousand years should become two or three times as long? Pannenberg's view is that it should not; the length of the interval between Jesus' resurrection and the eschatological end of the world is irrelevant. What counts is 'the material analogy of 93 RAH, postscript to znd edn., 192. See also STz, 349-51. 94 /GM, 66. 95 /GM, 107. 50


what has already happened in and with Jesus and that for which the apocalyptic expectation hopes from the ultimate future'.96 If they are essentially the same, the length of time between them cannot change their qualitative identity. The difference between the resurrection of Jesus and the general resurrection of the dead is quantitative, not qualitative.97 Thus if Jesus really was raised from death it can be said that 'the general human destiny has occurred in Jesus'.98 Then he is truly 'the first of many'. If the decisive point is indeed the material identity of Jesus' resurrection and the general resurrection - and it is hard to see how Pannenberg's point can be refuted - the delay of the parousia presents no insurmountable problem for Christian faith. This, in turn, underscores the eschatological interpretation of Jesus' resurrection. However, an account must be given of this 'material identity' across this large (and potentially much larger) temporal gap. Pannenberg expresses the material identity of Jesus' resurrection and the eventual resurrection of others by the term 'anticipation' or 'prolepsis', which are equivalent.99 Pannenberg sees prolepsis as 'a new systematic category', to describe the place of Jesus' history and especially his resurrection within the framework of the philosophy of history.100 He is as emphatic about the proleptic character of the resurrection as about its historical facticity. For the resurrection is at once an event in history and the eschatological salvation-event, a past event and one that remains before us as our ultimate future.101 The resurrection of Jesus is an anticipation, 'a pre-realization of the future'.102 Only in this sense can 96

JGM, 107. 97 BQTi, 17998 Pannenberg, The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 114. 99 Pannenberg tends to use prolepsis in connection with the eschaton. Thus the resurrection of Jesus is a prolepsis of the general eschatological resurrection; see STi, 56. The term anticipation generally has a wider use, including the discussion of language, concepts and meaning. However, statements about God are also said to have a proleptic character; see BQTi, 204$. 100 w. Pannenberg, 'God's Presence in History', The Christian Century, n March 1981, 262. 101 Pannenberg, RAH, Postscript to znd edn., 193-5. 102 Pannenberg, The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 113.

51

GOD AND THE FUTURE

the final self-revelation of God, which can only occur at the end of history, have already taken place in the history of Jesus. The delay of the parousia does not jeopardise the Christian understanding of Jesus' resurrection because it is the proleptic occurrence of the final eschatological event, namely, the resurrection of the dead. Of course, the whole idea remains disputable until then, for 'the ultimate divine confirmation of Jesus will take place only in the occurrence of his return'.103 The idea of the return of Christ keeps alive the tension between the resurrection of Jesus and the general resurrection. It is the necessary counterpart to the present hiddenness of Christ in the world.104 Only then will the presence of the kingdom of God in him be finally disclosed, just as the coming of God's kingdom in its fulness also depends on that event. Christians await both as one and the same occurrence; the return of Christ brings with it the completion of God's rule.105 From what has been said in this section it appears that the resurrection of Jesus (as the proleptic occurrence of the eschatological event) is closely connected with the reality of the rule of God. The final coming of God's kingdom and its presence in Jesus' ministry and resurrection are ultimately indistinguishable. Moreover, neither can be understood - in both their meaning and their connection - apart from the general apocalyptic framework of late Judaism, which Jesus shared but modified in some significant ways, and which Pannenberg has made central in his theology. With the concept of prolepsis or anticipation Pannenberg has linked Jesus' resurrection with the eschatological events which will establish God's rule in its fulness. God's kingdom, which will come in its fulness with the 'return' of Jesus, has already come proleptically in the ministry of Jesus and in his resurrection. Differently from the way he may have expected, Jesus' message of the coming kingdom of God received its confirmation in his resurrection, inasmuch as the eschatological rule of God made its appearance there in a definitive and unsurpassable way. 10

3 /GM, 108. 104 w. Pannenberg, 'Die Auferstehung Jesu und die Zukunft des Menschen', Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie, Bd ^ (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &c Ruprecht, 1980), 117; hereafter GSTz. This essay has not, as far as I know, been translated into English. The return of Jesus Christ is also dealt with in STj, ch. 15, part 4, 608-30. 10 5 GSTi, 117.

52-


Conclusion We have now looked at Pannenberg's understanding of the history of Jesus, notably his message of the kingdom of God and his resurrection from the dead, in which he finds the basis for his eschatological theology. This message of the coming rule of God is inseparable from the ideas of Jewish apocalyptic which, though strange to our ears, are important for our understanding of existence in the world. No other major theologian has made this as central and fruitful for theology as Pannenberg. His understanding of the eschatology of Jewish apocalyptic, although in need of further differentiation, is substantially accurate. Recent research vindicates his position against some of his earlier critics. It is clear that the idea of the kingdom of God, as proclaimed by Jesus, with its interweaving of presence and futurity, is foundational for Pannenberg's theology. God is God only in the execution of God's lordship, the full expression of which lies in the future. God's being and God's kingdom cannot be separated, 'since the being of God is his lordship'.106 Jesus' references to the kingdom of God are not easily reduced to a systematic formulation, but Pannenberg holds in dynamic tension the contrasting elements implicit in Jesus' own view. The resurrection of Jesus is the basis for all Pannenberg's Christological claims and it clearly has an enormously important role in his theology. The critical question is the relation between it and the kingdom of God. This depends on the relation between Jesus' resurrection and the general resurrection at the end of the age, which has been shown to be inseparable from the final establishment of the kingdom of God. Pannenberg is clearly justified in his view that a sufficient tradition of belief in the resurrection of the dead existed around the time of Jesus to provide the interpretative framework for his followers' experience of Jesus as alive and present after his death. Jesus' resurrection was therefore understood in connection with the end of the age, and thus with the kingdom of God. The eschatological kingdom, which Jesus also proclaimed as elusively but truly present in his ministry, can thus be seen as proleptically present in Jesus' resurrection. On this basis, but obliquely, Jesus' resurrection can be understood as the fulfilment of his expectation of the imminence of the kingdom of God. 106

BQTz, 240. 53

GOD AND THE FUTURE

It may be concluded, then, that Pannenberg has laid the foundations for his system of eschatological theology in his analysis of the ministry and message of Jesus and his resurrection from the dead. With the publication of the three volumes of Systematic Theology it is abundantly clear what a substantial and internally consistent theological system it is. On the whole, the exegetical and theological foundations are solid, although here and there they might be strengthened in the light of new findings in the field of apocalyptic. Pannenberg has been so preoccupied with the detailed laying out of his theological system - the writing of his magnum opus - that there was in all likelihood no time to carry out the modifications to the foundations which he himself hinted might be desirable or necessary.107 In the next two chapters we shall see how Pannenberg applies the principle of future-oriented thinking to the areas of ontology and history, giving particular attention to the idea of the priority of the future.

107

/GM, and edn., 401. 54

3

An ontology of the whole Introduction

I

n this chapter we shall look at Pannenberg's discussion of ontological questions, in particular noting the effect of his eschatological grounding principles. It goes without saying that Pannenberg is emphatically a theological thinker, but he also wants to relate his theology to philosophical reflection on the nature of that which 'is' in its totality (alles Seiende). Theologically, the doctrine of creation demands that the relation of God to all created reality be considered. But Pannenberg also thinks it important to interact with philosophical thought about God; this was influential in the formative period of Christian theology. Early in his career he wrote a good deal about the relation between philosophy and theology, and more recently he returned to some important metaphysical themes.1 In 1965 Pannenberg offered a lecture-course on 'Ontology and Eschatology'. In the programmatic essay, 'Theology and the Kingdom of God', he said that the eschatological understanding of the kingdom of God has ontological implications which cannot be left unexplored; indeed, they are such that the 'priority of the eschatological future which determines our present demands a reversal ... in our ontological conceptions'.2- In a later edition of his Christology, he postulated an 'eschatological ontology' based on the 'eschatological logic' of the history of Jesus, which would 1 TPS and M/G. Pannenberg remarks on this in 'An Autobiographical Sketch', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 17.

> TKG, 54.

55

GOD AND THE FUTURE

be a distinctively Christian contribution to the understanding of reality and call for a revision of prevailing philosophical presuppositions.3 The notion of an 'eschatological ontology' is unusual but it accurately describes what Pannenberg sets out to achieve.4 Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God, seen in the light of his resurrection, shapes Pannenberg's view of the structure and nature of the whole of finite reality. The heart of this ontological vision is this: just as in Jesus' preaching the future kingdom of God already determines the present, without ceasing to be a future reality, so the future is ontologically prior to the present and is in some sense determinative of the present - and thus of the past. What Pannenberg means by this bold proposal will occupy us in this and the following chapter. For some years - despite a strong intention to work out the ontological implications of his theological programme - he gave priority to the more strictly theological (or 'dogmatic') task, leading to the detailed working out of his theological 'system'. In his 1973 work, Theology and the Philosophy of Science,5 he did set out his view of the relation of theology to philosophy and other fields of knowledge. But a decade later the systematic presentation of the alternative ontology implied in Pannenberg's theology was still outstanding.6 Only with the publication of Metaphysics and the Idea of God,7 which appeared the same year as Volume i of the Systematic Theology, has Pannenberg gone some way in offering an account of his alternative ontology, at least in essay form. Pannenberg's ontology is indeed an eschatological ontology, in /GM, znd edn., 1976, 410. B. J. Walsh locates such an ontology on the side of 'geneticist' rather than 'structuralist' ontology; Christian Scholar's Review 11.3, 1982, 2.2.9-49, esp. 134-75 Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976; a translation of Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973). In English this title is misleading. 'Theology and Theories of Knowledge' would have been a more accurate title. 6 P. Clayton, 'The God of History and the Presence of the Future', Journal of Religion 65.1, January 1985, 106. 7 Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991; a translation of Metaphysik und Gottesgedanke (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988). 3 4

56

AN ONTOLOGY OF THE WHOLE

which the future has ontological priority. But there is a more fundamental feature of his thought, which should be discussed first. This is his determination to think about reality as a whole. This phrase, against the stream of much recent philosophy, immediately identifies the background of Pannenberg's philosophy. It suggests speculation on the grandest possible scale. But Pannenberg endorses D. Henrich's call for a 'counter-move to the empirical consciousness'.8 Philosophy cannot consistently avoid considering the idea of the totality of reality, since it is presupposed by any particular experience; and theology cannot avoid the same idea as the correlate of understanding God as 'the alldetermining reality'.9 Theology and metaphysics should not, in Pannenberg's view, be done in isolation from each other: More than anything else, theological discourse about God requires a relationship to metaphysical reflection if its claim to truth is to be valid. For talk of God is dependent on a concept of the world, which can be established only through metaphysical reflection.10

It is important for both philosophers and theologians to understand 'the world', by which Pannenberg means not simply the world in its 'finite givenness' but 'the whole within which each individual object receives its place'.11 For theologians to speak of God implies a view of the world. For philosophers to speak of the world requires, in Pannenberg's view, a critical view of 'every form of consciousness that limits itself to perceptions of finite objects'.12 Despite the differences between them, both disciplines should rise above an everyday understanding of the world and press toward the One or the whole which is the ground both of the unity of everything that exists and of its differentiation into the multiplicity of finite things. There is no easy way from this quest for broader horizons to a plausible case for God, but Pannenberg sees in this quest a point of convergence between philosophy and theology. Whilst unable to prove the existence of God, metaphysical thought 8

M/G, 5, 15. Pannenberg is not unaware of the difficulty of the idea of 'reality as a whole', but regards it as necessary; cf. TPS, 304-10. ^ TPS, 305, 3o9f. 10 M/G, 6. Pannenberg takes heart from the signs that philosophy is again taking 'its great metaphysical tradition' seriously. 11 M/G, i6. IZ M/G, i4f.; Pannenberg's italics. 57

GOD AND THE FUTURE

can achieve significant results; negatively, it can provide a corrective to theological ideas and religious images of God, and positively, it can build useful bridges between philosophical concepts such as 'the absolute' or 'the infinite' and theological understandings of God. Pannenberg's agenda, in part, is the age-old problem of the one and the many. When philosophy wrestles with the question of what is common to all existing things, which found its classical form in Aristotle, no area of experience can in principle be excluded. When propositions of extreme generality are advanced about what it is to 'be', assumptions about reality as a whole are unavoidable. Pannenberg believes that every kind of philosophy has, at least implicitly, a theory of reality in general. Philosophy may decline to deal with this problem explicitly, just as it may ignore the question of that which unifies all existing things. But if it wishes to be consistent, philosophy must not shirk the question of reality as a whole.13 This implies a holistic approach to addressing this question. So we begin with Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between theology, philosophy and science. The inter-disciplinary responsibility of theology Pannenberg emphasises the public character of theology. Theology may not seek to occupy some privileged ground, away from the scrutiny of those who investigate other areas of human experience or study the nature of the cosmos. Nor may theology concern itself only with religious or moral experience. In so far as theology makes claims about the world, it is accountable before other sciences; it has to make good its assertions before the court of reason as it functions in the community of 'scientific' discussion. 'Every theological statement must prove itself on the field of reason, and can no longer be argued on the basis of unquestioned presuppositions of faith.'14 This view marks a break with two major positions in modern Protestant theology on the relation between theological truth and other truth. As one observer remarks: With Troeltsch, over against Earth and Bultmann, Pannenberg sees the necessity of relating the Christian faith to the whole of reality. But over '3 TPS, 304. 14 Pannenberg, 'Faith and Reason', BQTz, 54, note 15.

58


against Troeltsch, he does not interpret Christianity in subjection to the prevailing world-view of modern man, but rather interprets the whole of reality theologically, submitting his argumentation before the bar of human judgement, being convinced that a Christian interpretation of the whole of reality is more rational than any other.15

This is a position which transcends the division in contemporary theology between 'post-liberal' (Yale) and 'revisionist' (Chicago) views of theological method.16 Pannenberg has often been accused of being too 'rationalist', even 'foundationalist', in his theology, but these criticisms have been shown to be superficial, most recently in a monograph by F. L. Shults.17 Shults makes a persuasive case for regarding Pannenberg as a 'postfoundationalist' thinker, defining postfoundationalism as a model of theological rationality that 'charts a course ... between the Scylla of foundationalist dogmatism and the Charybdis of nonfoundationalist relativism'.18 If foundationalism is the search for certain knowledge, based on self-evident foundational experiences or a priori propositions, and nonfoundationalism is the denial of this possibility and is the strategy of justifying belief in terms of coherence with other beliefs in one's particular context or web,19 postfoundationalism involves two major commitments, outlined by van Huyssteen: First, it fully acknowledges contextuality, the epistemologically crucial role of interpreted experience, and the way that tradition shapes the epistemic and nonepistemic values that inform our reflection about God ... At the same time, however, a postfoundationalist notion of rationality in theological reflection claims to point creatively beyond the confines of the local community, group or culture towards a plausible form of interdisciplinary conversation.20 15 Richard Rhem, 'A Theological Conception of Reality as History - Some Aspects of the Thinking of Wolfhart Pannenberg', Reformed Review 26, Autumn 1972., esp. 181. 16 For an account of these terms see J. Webster and G. P. Schner (eds.), theology after Liberalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2.000), especially the essays by Webster, D. Tracey and G. A. Lindbeck. 17 F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999). See also J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), ch. 3. 18 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 26. 19 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 31. zo van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 4.

59

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Pannenberg has not directly entered into the discussion of those issues in theological methodology that have recently become prominent; he has not argued a case directly for foundationalism, nonfoundationalism or postfoundationalism. For some this would count as a regrettable gap in his theological system. Nevertheless, he has certainly not identified himself with a strict foundationalist or nonfoundationalist position. Shults regards his theological method as 'consonant with the postfoundationalist model', not least by showing a way of bringing the Christian concept of God into relation with the interdisciplinary dialogue about rationality.11 We shall briefly consider the terms in which Pannenberg has sought to do so. In Pannenberg's view, the task of systematic theology cannot be reduced to the exposition of Scripture, although this will always be a significant element in Christian theology. There can be no retreat to the 'authority of the Bible' as an unquestionable authority guaranteeing the truth of its message. If the task of theology includes the necessary particularity of its relation to a given religious tradition, it also includes the necessary universality of engaging with truth in its totality. Both tasks have to be taken up, difficult though it may be to reconcile them: Systematic theology always takes place within the tension between two tendencies. On the one hand, it is concerned about the faithfulness of theology itself ... to its origin, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as this is attested in Scripture. On the other hand, however, the task of theology goes beyond its special theme and includes all truth whatever.2Z

Theology has nothing to lose and everything to gain from the decision to bring theological truth and other truth into relation. The question of the truth of Christianity is 'concerned ... with truth itself, which in essence can only be one',Z3 This conviction has two roots: the Greek idea of the unity of truth and the Hebrew idea that the truth of God embraces all other truth. Faith cannot be its own foundation. 'My truth cannot be mine alone. If I cannot in principle declare it to be truth for all ... then it pitilessly ceases to be truth for me also.'24 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 2.39-43. " BQTi, i. Z 3 W. Pannenberg, 'What is Truth?', BQTz, i. *4 STi, sof.

ZI

60


The claim that the truth of the Christian message is a universal truth can only be advanced by open, cogent argumentation. Pannenberg is confident that the truth of the Gospel can speak for itself, without needing 'preceding guarantees', even though the question of the truth of the Christian message is nothing less than the question of the reality of God.25 His theological work is driven by the desire to show that the hypothesis that God exists as the power determining all things offers the most cogent account of the nature of reality as a whole. Statements about God are not verifiable by inspection of their subject matter. However, 'statements about divine reality and actions are testable by reference to their implications for the understanding of finite reality insofar as God is maintained to be the all-determining reality'/6 Theology, in Pannenberg's view, proceeds by a constant dialectic of the particular and the universal. For Christian theology, universal meaning requires grounding in the historical particularity of Jesus of Nazareth himself, but this particularity is not rightly understood until its universal meaning is articulated. This can only be done by speaking of the Christ-event as an act of God. Moreover, 'statements about God refer essentially to the totality of reality and imply an understanding of this whole'.27 This is consistent with Pannenberg's understanding of theology as being essentially about God and all things in their relation to God. 'It belongs to the task of theology to understand all being ... in relation to God, so that without God [it] simply could not be understood. That is what constitutes theology's universality.'28 This gives theology no option but to be open to the contributions of other disciplines of knowledge. A brief look at the range of Pannenberg's theological and philosophical concerns shows the scope of his theological vision. The desire to engage with the concerns of contemporary culture places him, in Louis Dupre's view, in the same 'integralist' movement as Bultmann, Earth and Tillich earlier in the twentieth century.29 Z

5 STi, 52, 60.

26

W. Pannenberg, The Nature of a Theological Statement', Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 7.1, 1972,, 12. 27 BQTi, 200. 28 BQTi, i. 29 L. Dupre, The Dissolution of the Union of Nature and Grace at the Dawn of the Modern Age', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg, $6L

61

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Before finding the confidence to develop the doctrine of God, he felt obliged to 'acquire a systematic account of every other field, not only theology, but also philosophy and the dialogue with the natural and social sciences'.30 Philip Hefner analyses Pannenberg's interaction with the natural sciences; the 'secular5 description of natural phenomena is taken as merely a provisional version of the matter in question, the theologian having the further task of making explicit a theological dimension which is already implicit in it.31 The attempt to span the worlds of science and theology is significant, given the history of suspicion. There is a good number of scientists who have taken a deep interest in theology. It is rarer to find a theologian of note who also has a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the sciences for fruitful dialogue, but Pannenberg is one such. He wants to overcome all dualistic thinking between the sciences and theology or philosophy and biblical thought. The idea of God cannot, in principle, tolerate a division between segments of reality. For the same reason, Pannenberg has constantly fought against the privatisation of theology and the subjectivisation of truth. Theology, philosophy and the sciences cannot ultimately operate in isolation from each other. Despite the particularity of their focus, there is a fundamental convergence in their concern not with isolated bodies of truths but with the truth, understood comprehensively and in its unity. Pannenberg 'asks how theology might become more scientific and how science might become more theological'.3Z However, theology's traditional relationship is with philosophy, and it is to Pannenberg's view of that relationship that we now turn. Ontology - common province of theology and philosophy Theologians and philosophers have been discussion partners for many centuries. The relationship has almost always been close. 3° W. Pannenberg, 'An Autobiographical Sketch', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 16. 31 P. Hefner, The Role of Science in Pannenberg's Theological Thinking', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 166-86. 32 - W. Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Nature, ed. Ted Peters (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), editor's introduction, 6. 62,


From its earliest beginnings, philosophy has stood in a critical relation to religious traditions. Pannenberg says: The origin of philosophy seems to be associated with a discontent at the fact that religious conceptions did not provide what they claimed to provide with regard to the understanding of existence as a whole ... Philosophy, with its conjectures, steps into the gaps in religious tradition and rejects its assertions as inadequate to the nature of the divine, and therefore as failing to do justice to its function.33

The critical task of philosophy in relation to religious traditions has been carried out with great effect, particularly in the modern world, in which the idea of a divine origin of the world has been rejected in much philosophical thought as sheer projection. In Pannenberg's view, theology should welcome the critical function of philosophy. It is not the task of philosophy to generate a sense that the universe is a coherent and meaningful whole; that is part of a religious apprehension of reality.34 The contribution of philosophy is first to submit such a view of the world to critical scrutiny. If it is the nature of religion to assert 'totalities of meaning', philosophy has rightly assumed the task of evaluating such claims against experiences in which wholeness of meaning is yet far from realised.35 Philosophy tests for 'reality'. It has also been critical of theological appeal to authority, insisting that the question of the truth of what is held to be revealed must be an open question.36 But philosophy can also adopt a constructive role in relation to theology. Philosophy can help with 'the thinkability of God'.37 It can help theology to be clearer about its use of language, its forms of argument, its use of concepts shared with other areas of enquiry, and the criteria for determining what is true and untrue.38 One area in which theology particularly relies on philosophical support is in the provision of a philosophy of religion. Pannenberg 33 W. Pannenberg, 'Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism', BQT3, i 33 f. 34 Pannenberg, 'Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism', 142. Here Pannenberg acknowledges indebtedness to the young Schleiermacher, author of the Speeches on Religion. ^ BQT3, i42,f, 133. 36 See also STi, ch. i, esp. §5. 37 J. O'Donnell, review of STi, Gregorianum 72/1, 1991, 77. 38 BQT3, izif.

63

GOD AND THE FUTURE

argues that the theology of revelation 'implicitly assumes an understanding of revelation and religion, that is, a philosophy of religion. At this point theological thinking which is self-critical has no alternative but to deal explicitly with philosophical problems.'39 The clarification of the phenomenon of religion is of great importance for theology, but it is fundamentally a philosophical problem, helped in the modern period by the 'sciences' of religion. Pannenberg intends to lay such theological claim to the categories of the philosophy of religion as is consistent with his own theological vision. In the discussion of religion Pannenberg's philosophical and theological interests coincide. Influenced by T. Luckmann and others, Pannenberg describes religion in terms of comprehensive, integrating systems of meaning or 'specific historical institutionalisations of symbolic universes'.40 Such systems of meaning need not be religious in the normal sense, but where the ground of meaning or unifying structure of meaning becomes a matter of explicit concern we are in the realm of religion or the religions. Their essence is the higher or deeper perception of the actual reality of things and states of affairs. Religions are concerned with the most comprehensive framework of meaning, 'a final, allembracing totality of meaning in which all individual meanings are linked to form a semantic whole'.41 In theological terms, this is inseparable from the postulate of a divine reality, which is believed to ground and complete 'the meaning totality of the natural and social world'.42 The task of theology is to offer a justification of such a belief, tested by reference to the world as it is experienced. In Christian terms, God is the ground and guarantor of meaning in the cosmos; this is implied in the doctrines of creation and redemption. The idea of God is 'an answer to the question of the meaning of reality as a whole. Whoever wishes to 39

BQT3, in. See also the early essay, Toward a Theology of the History of Religions', especially part 2, dealing with the phenomenology of religion, BQT2, 71-80. In STi, ch. 3 Pannenberg incorporates a discussion of religion into the structure of his discussion of God. 4° The quotation is from T. Luckman; cf. TPS, 31 if, note 616. On the concept of 'meaning' see Pannenberg's important discussions in TPS, 206-24 and in MIG, ch. 8, 153-70. 41 TPS, 216. 4Z M/G, 167. 64


exclude this question must also forbid that religious consciousness through which we honor God as the creator of ourselves and the world.'43 Thus, in religion an ultimate, all-embracing totality of meaning is affirmed. In the great monotheistic religions the reality of God is accepted as a form of the same conviction. Pannenberg rejects the modern secular reduction of religion to a purely anthropological phenomenon. Religion is two-sided: it 'embraces deity and humanity, but in such a way that in the relation deity emerges as preeminent, awe-inspiring, absolutely valid, inviolable'.44 Rejecting Heidegger's view that the idea of God has (wrongly) been imported into philosophy, Pannenberg takes 'God' to have been a theme within philosophy from the beginning, in the question of the ultimate beginning, the prote arche.45 In any case, philosophy's character as unrestricted reflection will drive it toward the articulation of a comprehensive ground of being and meaning. For most of its history philosophy has produced models of meaning. Pannenberg sees the fundamental concern of philosophy as being with 'reality in general, the ti en einai of things',46 the essence of a thing, what in truth it is and what it means. To look at the semantic context of every phenomenon, philosophy must concern itself with the total context of human experience, the whole of reality. His view is that the ultimate truth or meaning of anything can only be seen in this total context. This sounds impossibly ambitious, but Pannenberg says that this totality is accessible to us only in anticipation. Philosophy can provide models of this totality which are like hypotheses, and these can be 'tested for coherence ..., the efficiency of their interpretative components ... and the degree of simplicity and subtlety they achieve in their interpretations of reality'.47 In this way the many areas of human experience can be integrated. This may now seem an unusual use of the term 'philosophy', but mostly when Pannenberg uses it he means 'metaphysics'; he 43 M/G, 170. 44 STi, 142. 45 W. Pannenberg, The End of Metaphysics and the Idea of God', M/G, 12. 46 TPS, 68-70. 47 TPS, 6

65

GOD AND THE FUTURE

uses the two terms more or less interchangeably. Even philosophies that deny a place to metaphysics imply some theory of reality. His meaning is clear from the following: Philosophical enquiry is not concerned with this or that being in its particularity, or with one area of reality which can be separated from others; it is concerned with the being of beings, or in other words with reality in general. This is clearest in the traditional fundamental philosophy of ontological metaphysics, which received its classical form from Aristotle.48

In recent writing Pannenberg speaks not just about the relation of theology to philosophy, but about the need for theological discourse to have 'a relationship to metaphysical reflection', that is, if its claim to truth is to be made good.49 When Pannenberg describes philosophy as 'an inquiry into what exists as such', he has in mind metaphysics; others might use 'ontology', but Pannenberg uses this noun infrequently. Theology and philosophy share a common ontological concern inasmuch as each intends to probe below the surface of what we experience in the world. Pannenberg describes the philosopher's approach as a 'requalifying of the objects that we encounter in our consciousness of the world, rethinking them from the perspective that is achieved by going beyond the finite givenness of the world'.50 What he really wants philosophers to do is to speak of the absolute or the infinite, as a condition of the finite itself. Appealing to Hegel, Schleiermacher and Descartes, Pannenberg argues that the very idea of the finite (implying an ending in space and time and differentiation from other things) logically implies something beyond the finite. It is another matter, of course, to establish that reality actually is what we suppose it to be.51 The concept of the infinite (the actual infinite rather than the mathematical infinite) has played an important part in theology as well as in philosophy. The religious consciousness equates the idea of the infinite with the concept of God. This is easier for the theologian than for the philosopher. There is a gap between 48

TPS, 303. ? M/G, 6; my italics. 5° M/G, 16. 51 This is the problem Pannenberg addresses in The Problem of the Absolute', M/G, ch. z. 4

66


philosophical discussion of the infinite and theological discourse about God. For one who believes in God, infinity and absoluteness suggest transcendence, self-sufficiency and ontological priority, and are thus easily associated with God. If the idea of God is already accepted, especially the idea of the one God, it necessarily implies the elements of infinity, absoluteness, perfection and necessary existence. Thus, as Pannenberg says, the concept of the infinite, rather than being a synonym for the divine, functions as a criterion for making theological statements about God.52- For philosophy it is less easy to slide between the concepts of God and the infinite. There is a difference between the philosophical idea of the infinite, which is essentially negative, and the (positive) theological idea of 'an existing being [Wesen] that possesses infinity, absolute perfection, and necessary existence'.53 However, despite the differences between theology and philosophy, there is also continuity between them. For theology the divine must stand at the centre. We do not expect this in philosophy. But philosophical discussion of the infinite, which is presupposed by the existence of finite things, can create a space in which the idea of God can be discussed. There cannot be an unbridgeable gap between someone who looks into a starry sky and is overawed by a sense of the infinite and one who looks at the heavens and sees the work of God's fingers. Is there not in common the sense that the multiplicity of finite things is somehow held together by a unifying power and that, no matter how difficult it is to conceptualise it, each thread of meaning is part of an immeasurably vast and complex fabric of meaning? This is indeed a religious sense, but it is precisely this that was a stimulus in ancient times for the emergence of philosophy.54 Philosophers generally prefer to investigate things that are more manageable. But the larger questions have always been fascinating, and Pannenberg believes that many other philosophical issues depend greatly on how one views the larger ones. Pannenberg regards philosophy as 'an endless process of * M/G, 34. " M/G, 37.

54 Michael Hollis says, 'Wonder is as old as the sight of the stars from the mouth of the cave - wonder about what there is and how it moves and why the gods have ordered it so'; Invitation to Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 2. 67

GOD AND THE FUTURE

examining the unexpressed semantic context of experiences .. ,'.55 Its results are never beyond criticism and thus never final. It is concerned with the essence and meaning of experiences and phenomena, assuming that they have an 'unexpressed semantic context'. Whether they do or do not is part of the exploration. The hunch that there may be such a semantic context is not peculiar to theologians. Theology must go further, in Pannenberg's view, than philosophy. In seeking to articulate the 'unexpressed semantic context' of what exists and what happens, theology reaches the question of God, and must speak of God. For God is the 'determiner' of all things in the universe and must therefore be the final 'determiner' of their meaning. The 'semantic whole' which gives meaning to the tiniest things in the cosmos cannot be separated from God. Everything in the world must be seen in relation to God (sub ratione Dei).56 Philosophy does not have this responsibility. It does have the task, Pannenberg thinks, of seeking to understand reality as a whole. This means wrestling with 'the double question of what the unity of existing things consists of, i.e. what is common to all existing things, and what it is that makes all that exists a unity as a single reality'.57 But this is the question of God; it is the question about the power that ultimately determines all things. This is an ultimate question which philosophy may avoid without ceasing to be philosophy, although it is always there in the background. But the foreground of philosophy is occupied by questions which do not absolutely require the idea of God.58 It is clear that Pannenberg regards theology and philosophy as close partners. He has made his case for this with considerable force and clarity, and many will find his argument persuasive on the ground of the unity of truth. There is a field of ultimate questions, ontological and metaphysical, which are the common province of theology and philosophy. Many - both in theology and philosophy - will see these questions as being in the 55 TPS, 2,2,2,. 5 6 M/G, 12,. 57 TPS, 58

303.

TPS, 304. Pannenberg cannot suppress the opinion that philosophy, while free to refuse to address the question of God explicitly, involves itself in a certain contradiction if it refuses to do so. Pannenberg shows that metaphysics is more resilient than was thought in various philosophical movements in the twentieth century. 68


background of their respective discipline; they are regarded as too difficult or abstract to engage us concretely. However, in so far as philosophers seek to engage these questions, they are closer to the question about God's existence than perhaps they know. Where philosophers and theologians diverge is on the optional or obligatory nature of explicit speech about God. However, since the concern of this chapter is primarily ontological, we now turn to consider Pannenberg's understanding of the idea of 'reality as a whole' or 'the unity of everything that exists'. Reality as temporality The idea of 'reality as a whole' plays a major role in Pannenberg's philosophical and theological work. It is, of course, an extremely general and imprecise idea, which many would not find philosophically usable or theologically interesting. Pannenberg is well aware of its problematic nature. Perhaps the major problem with the idea of 'reality as a whole' lies in its implied completeness and closedness. Related to this is the problem of the knowledge of this 'reality as a whole'. It is no longer possible, Pannenberg argues, to think of the unity of that which is as 'a totality existent here and now' and to think of the unity which unites this totality as likewise 'existent here and now'.59 It is no longer possible to think of anything that exists here and now as the totality of what exists, for this would contradict the inconclusiveness of reality. Reality is a process, not a fixed structure; the element of time cannot be left out of it. Using the phrase which Heidegger used for his famous title, Pannenberg says that being and time must be considered in their intimate relationship to one another, and the processes which belong to everything that is are never definitively concluded ... When what exists here and now is represented as a totality complete in itself, the points in which changes in it originate are neglected and disguised ... The gaps and absurdities in what now exists, which call for change in the direction of some other possible totality, are concealed or at least passed over by the illusion of a world which is whole and sound. What exists here and now, taken as a totality ... can only be untruth.60

This is an important passage, on which three comments may be 59 BQT3,i3i. BQT3, 131.

60

69

GOD AND THE FUTURE

made. First, there is a recognition that the philosophy of time is an indispensable part of a metaphysics of 'reality as a whole5. The 'historically' of reality is a basic element in Pannenberg's ontology of the whole.61 'Being' cannot be discussed in isolation from 'time'. Pannenberg recognises the importance of Heidegger's insights about the historicity of existence. It is important in this connection also to look at the basic contrast between Greek metaphysical thought and the biblical understanding of reality. Second, Pannenberg underscores the importance of the category of 'process'. Everything that is is in process, and the processes that comprise finite reality are 'never definitively concluded'. The term 'process' raises the question of Pannenberg's view of 'process theology'. In fact, no European theologian has given the philosophy of Whitehead and process thought such detailed consideration as Pannenberg.6z Third, the passage reveals an aspect of Pannenberg's theology which is often not noticed. His refusal to understand 'reality as a whole' merely in terms of the here and now, and his view of 'gaps and absurdities in what now exists, which call for change in the direction of some other possible totality', point to a 'practical' agenda, not only a theoretical one. His concern is not only to understand the world but also to change it. His ethics is an ethics of change or transformation.63 Jesus' message was about the power of God's future on the present. Christianity's concern is not with a 'counter-world of faith' but with the real world, which is the world God creates and reconciles.64 God intends the transformation of this world. 61

Pannenberg says, 'History is reality in its totality'; BQTi, n. MIG, 4. In ch. 6 Pannenberg discusses his major disagreement with process thought: 'Atomism, Duration, Form: Difficulties with Process Philosophy', 113-2.9. See also some of the contributions to Braaten and Clayton, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, esp. that of John B. Cobb, 'Pannenberg and Process Theology', 54-74, and Pannenberg's response, 32,1-3. There has been an important dialogue between Lewis S. Ford and Pannenberg. Ford's essay, The Nature of the Power of the Future' in the same volume (see esp. 89-94), is a reply to Pannenberg's essay referred to above. Pannenberg's disagreement with process theology will be commented on further in ch. 5. 6 3 W. Pannenberg, 'Sanctification and Polities', in Christian Spirituality and Sacramental Community (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984), ch.643 . W. Pannenberg, Christianity in a Secularized World (London: SCM Press, 1989), 57. 6z

70


Two points are especially in need of clarification. The first is the historical understanding of 'reality as a whole'. This point marks a fundamental division between the classical tradition of metaphysics and contemporary ontological proposals. It is also a point of great difference between the biblical view of reality and Greek philosophy. The second point is the coincidence of 'reality as a whole' and the unity of meaning which incorporates but also transcends that which exists now. This point takes up the incompleteness of the process of reality and its openness to the future, and brings together the concepts of the totality of being and the totality of meaning. i. The historical understanding of reality It is a truism that human life takes concrete form in history, but the implications of this were not seen until comparatively recently.65 For many centuries the human being was thought to have a universal and essential nature, which remains constant throughout human history and throughout the course of an individual life. Christian theology associated this with the imago Dei. Only within the horizon of modern historical thought did the essence of the human being come to be seen as a destiny to be attained in the course of time. Human essence is not above time; it is historical. History does not illustrate a constant human essence, but determines, even constitutes it. Pannenberg writes that the Christian view of the human race as a history that runs from the first Adam to the new and final Adam replaced the philosophical concept of an essential human nature that is independent of time with a concept of the human being as historical or, rather, as caught up in the movement of that concrete history.66

It is largely to Herder that Western thought owes this insight.67 Dilthey and Heidegger also radically influenced the consciousness 6

5 ATP, ch. 9,485-532.

66

ATP, 499. One may ask, exactly what is 'caught up in the movement of [its] concrete history'. P. Clayton argues that Pannenberg is committed to having 'some trans-historical things to say as a theologian' about the human person. Structures implicit in human being 'do not disappear in Pannenberg's view, as they do under a fully temporalized ontology' (in private correspondence to me, June 1994). 67 ATP, ch. 2, esp. 47-60. 71

GOD AND THE FUTURE

of historical reality and the historicity of the human being in Western thought. Pannenberg disagrees with Heidegger's idea that the historicity of the human being precedes all historical experience. He argues for an inversion of Heidegger's thesis; our historicity is grounded in the experience of reality as history.68 What is at stake here is not just a new kind of anthropology, but a new way of perceiving the world. The experience of reality as history led to a new model of reality in which the static ontological categories of antiquity and medieval Europe were displaced. R. G. Collingwood remarks that since the time of Descartes and Kant humankind has 'acquired a new habit of thinking historically', with a technique of its own, 'no less definite in its character and certain of its results than its elder sister, the technique of natural science'. This change has transformed every area of thought.69 The historical nature of reality includes the historical character of reason. Pannenberg regards this as the most important direction taken in the understanding of reason after Kant.70 Rather than being seen as having a fixed structure (Kant), reason came to be seen as a process which moves from one stage to the next (Fichte and Hegel). It was Dilthey who wrestled most productively with the historical character of reason. Everything, from institutions to ideas and the interpretation of experience, is the product of historical growth and thus historically conditioned. For Dilthey, historical understanding is not a quest for understanding cause and effect, but for understanding facts and events in terms of 'structures, systems, connections, and coherences - in short ... Zusammenh'dnge\7* Where Hegel saw everything in history in terms of a purposeful and rational process, Dilthey located the meaning of events by reference to their context, immediate and wider. Every event has its meaning in connection with other events, and ultimately with the totality of events. The flow of time will always give rise to new understanding. Historical meaning is ATP, 491, note 18, and BQTi, 35. R. G. Collingwood, The Historical Imagination', The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946, 131-49; reprinted in H. Meyerhoff (ed.), The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 66-7. 7° W. Pannenberg, Taith and Reason', BQT2, 59. 71 T. Plantinga, Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 130. 68

69

72,


therefore always provisional. Understanding reality as history implies openness to the future. As a paradigm for thinking about the world, this historical approach was new, but Pannenberg sees strong continuities between this way of understanding reality and the historical mode of thought in the literature of Israel. He sees biblical faith not as the 'temporary, accidental presupposition of the Western consciousness of historical reality, but the origin to which this consciousness remains essentially bound'.72 His fear that the loss of any sense of God as the agent of history would result in the loss of the sense of the unity of history and its replacement by a multiplicity of cultural and individual perspectives73 has proved to be justified. Pannenberg sees three distinct views of reality at work in the ancient world, together with corresponding views of truth. First, there is the mythological orientation to primordial time.74 Myth is to be distinguished from saga and fairy tale; 'its subject is the events of the primal age, that is, those things which happened at the "beginning" of the present ordering of life, which constitute this ordering of life and manifest their continuing power in it'.75 The real and the true are identified by reference to the mythical beginning. There is a good deal of mythical material in the Old Testament, but its view of reality is not mythical. Second, there is the historical view of reality, which is found in the Bible. On the whole, biblical thought does not expect the future to be a return to the 'first things', but expects the future to surpass everything that has been experienced till now.76 This is the difference between the mythical and biblical views of reality. The biblical view of reality is inseparable from belief in God. For Israel, the reality of God is not exhausted by causing the world to come into being at the beginning. Rather, this God can 'break into the course of his 7* BQTi, 33W. Pannenberg, The Biblical Understanding of Reality', Faith and Reality, 16; also BQTi, 33. 74 Pannenberg discusses myth in The Later Dimensions of Myth in Biblical and Christian Tradition', ch. i in BQTj, 1-79, and in a later essay, 'Zeit und Ewigkeit in der religiosen Erfahrung Israels und des Christentums', GSTz, 188-206, esp. 190-4. 75 BQT3, 3. * BQT3, 61. 73

73

GOD AND THE FUTURE

creation and initiate new events in it in an unpredictable way'.77 Israel understands the world in terms of a linear history which moves toward a goal. The real and the true are associated with the future which God is believed to have in store for the creation; the truth and essential nature of things will appear conclusively at the end of the historical process. The third view of reality is the philosophical view of the Graeco-Roman world. Here being and time, truth and history, belong to different realms. The truth and essence of things are grasped by cognitive effort behind the historical appearance of things. Truth is timeless; it 'underlies the fleeting succession of phenomena', as in Plato's doctrine of the forms.78 Reality and appearance never coincide. The truly real was not that which came at the beginning but that which is everlasting and underlies the fleeting succession of things. Pannenberg comments that philosophical thinking shared with mythical thought a reserve toward history. Historical change was regarded as unimportant, identifying the essential with the abiding.79 The biblical view of reality as history has been significant in Christian history. But its radical implications, especially in the importance it gives to the future, were not seen until the flourishing of historical thinking in the nineteenth century. It was expressed by some theologians and philosophers in the form of a concept of universal history, either in a theistic or non-theistic form. Israel 'not only discovered history as a particular sphere of reality; it finally drew the whole of creation into history. History is reality in its totality.'80 It is striking that this biblical approach to reality should have found new prominence precisely at the time when the notion of divine providence as the determining force of history came under challenge. Clearly, in a significant sense human beings are the makers of history. Nevertheless, the loss of a sense that history is also God's has resulted in the fragmented sense of history that Pannenberg described, namely, as a collection of many histories, with little or no connection between them. Pannenberg has a strong sense of the unity of history, and we shall explore in 77

W. Pannenberg, 'Redemptive Event and History', BQTi, 18. See also 'Wahrheit, Gewissheit und Glaube', GSTi, 2.30. 78 ATP, 4977 ? ATP, 497. 80 BQTi, ii.

74


the last section of this chapter why he thinks it is indispensable. In the present sub-section we have seen how Pannenberg makes his claim that 'reality as a whole' has to be understood historically. We turn now to the other main point to be clarified. 2. Reality as a whole as an anticipated unity of meaning The great difficulty of the idea of reality as a whole is that the course of history is not yet complete. What exists now is not a totality complete in itself. Therefore the idea of reality as a whole cannot easily be thought of as having the unity of a system. This creates a tension for theology. It cannot equate the unity and totality of the real with anything presently existing; but it cannot give up thinking about the larger unity within which all things have their existence. The question at issue here is whether the nature of reality as a whole can be known. Metaphysicians have always thought it can be known, but they have generally visualised it too much as a closed system. This is the standard criticism of Greek metaphysics; it regarded reality as existing complete in the cosmos. It is also the basis of Pannenberg's criticism of Hegel, with whom he also has important ideas in common. Hegel failed to keep the future truly open, in a way that would permit new things to be continuously brought forth.81 But the more the system is open, the more its incompleteness forces itself on us. How, then, can it be known as a whole? Pannenberg answers this with the help of two concepts which are very important in his thought: the concepts of 'meaning' and 'anticipation': The totality of reality does not exist anywhere complete. It is only anticipated as a totality of meaning. The totality which is an essential framework for any item of experience to have a determinate meaning does not exist at any point as a totality; rather, it can only be imagined by transcending what exists at any point. This anticipation, without which ... no experience is possible at all, always involves an element of hypothesis, of subjective conjecture, which must be confirmed - or refuted - by subsequent experience.82

This means that metaphysics must be done more modestly. We have to remember our finitude and especially 'the historicity of 81 82

BQTi, 134TPS, 310. 75

GOD AND THE FUTURE

every starting point for metaphysical reflection.'83 Our way of thinking about the great metaphysical problems - especially 'the domination of the concept5 - has to be modified. The old secure foundations are no longer there. In contemporary terms, this is a nonfoundational enterprise: Any metaphysics, if it is to be taken seriously, can no longer claim the character of a definitive foundation, constructed of concepts, for being and knowledge. Metaphysical reflection must take on the form of a conjectural reconstruction in relation to its object, one which distinguishes itself from its intended truth while at the same time construing itself as a preliminary form of this truth. Its characteristic reflective form will thus have to be more that of anticipation than that of concept in the sense of classical metaphysics. Put more precisely, the philosophical concept will reveal itself to have the structure of anticipation.84

The key question is the relation between the anticipation and the anticipated reality. We shall look more closely at this problem in the next chapter, but note for now that Pannenberg's use of 'anticipation' is governed by its theological usage in relation to the idea of the kingdom of God. As we saw in the previous chapter, the structure of the kingdom of God is characterised by an 'already' and a 'not yet' element. It is not a case of a present reality extending into a not yet existing future. Pannenberg sees it as the presence of the future (the 'not yet') in the present (the 'already'). The future remains future, and it must provide confirmation of what is claimed to be already present in the anticipation. But when the confirmation is given, the anticipation will turn out to be 'a real instance of something's occurring in advance'.85 The anticipated future is thus already present in its anticipation. But the anticipation will be ambiguous. Until its true nature is confirmed, the 'anticipation' may as plausibly be understood as something altogether different. Until its confirmation in the resurrection, Jesus' ministry could as easily have been understood as prophetic enthusiasm. The idea of anticipation, as we saw, has a wider application. Pannenberg speaks of an anticipation of meaning, the meaning of 8

3 W. Pannenberg, 'Concept and Anticipation', MIG, 93. M/G, 93f. Pannenberg's italics. 8 5 M/G, 96.

84

76


the whole of reality. Because of the incompleteness of reality as a whole, what it all means cannot be definitively known; it can only be anticipated. If it turns out that there is an intrinsic coherence and unity of meaning in reality as a whole - as distinct from the bits of it which we invest with meaning - there will have been grounds for calling our intuitions of meaning anticipations of the real meaning of things. So Pannenberg thinks the meaning of the whole of reality can be anticipated in the present. For some this way of discussing the question of meaning will be foreign. Why, they might ask, should we suppose that there is any such meaning? For Pannenberg, just as the problem of truth must not be narrowed down to the truth of assertions,86 the problem of meaning must not be reduced to the meaning of statements. Every event in history has meaning, depending on the context in which it occurs. For Pannenberg, then, 'reality as a whole' is not only the totality of what 'is'; it is also the largest possible 'semantic whole'. The whole of reality is thus 'the semantic context' of all phenomena in creation (in history), past, present and future;87 it has a semantic character. Thus reality as a whole is to be approached hermeneutically. Here Pannenberg was strongly influenced by Dilthey's project. Dilthey advocated the autonomy of the 'human' or 'cultural' sciences (Geisteswissenschaften], their difference from the 'natural' sciences. The natural sciences aim at the formulation of general laws about phenomena. The human sciences are sciences of the individual and the unique. They are 'value-related' sciences.88 In the latter every event has its meaning as part of a larger semantic whole. This is important for understanding Pannenberg. Dilthey adopted the historical framework of Hegel's thought and his view of truth and reality as the final whole of experience. But, as one commentator puts it, 'the appeal to final coherence works better as a semantics than as a logic'.89 Thus it makes sense to speak of a hermeneutics of totality, which moves from the individual to the whole. 86

W. Pannenberg, 'Die Einengung des Wahrheitsbegriffs auf die Aussagewahrheit'; GSTz, 2.35. 8 ? TPS, 68. 88 The phrase is T. Plantinga's; Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey, 2.7. 89 P. Clayton, in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 134.

77

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Pannenberg's metaphysics of the whole is best seen as an ontology of 'final coherence', in which reality as a whole is understood as a totality of meaning. Pannenberg's theory of meaning owes most to Dilthey's contextual view of meaning. The concept of meaning is not only about the relation of the sign to what it signifies, but also about 'the relation between the parts of a semantic whole and their relation to this whole'.90 This applies to words within the 'semantic whole' of sentences, and to sentences within the larger whole of a discourse. A sentence has a relative autonomy of meaning, but it also exists as 'the anticipation of an indefinite semantic whole which transcends it'.91 We understand texts in the same way, by seeing the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in the context of the whole. But the same semantic structure is inherent in the life of individuals and social groups: The individual life-moments, the experiences undergone by an individual, have their meaning in the context of the course of his life. But the individual is himself, in turn, a part of life-forms and nexuses of meaning that transcend individualized human existence. These, in turn, are coordinated within still more encompassing totalities of historical life - such as peoples and states - and refer beyond all of them to the totality of mankind and universal history. Thus, 'the relationship between whole and parts' exists everywhere in society and in history.92

As one would expect, the discernment of meaning is a complex and tentative task. Connections between events will run in every direction. We do not arrive at a final determination of meaning, but with time we discover further complexes of meaning. New experiences confirm or challenge the perceived meaning. The interpretation of meaning always moves concurrently in opposite directions: from parts to whole and from whole to parts. New experiences produce adjustments to a semantic whole, while a comprehensive system of meaning will also cause revisions in the way in which individual experiences are understood. This is the unavoidable circularity of hermeneutics. We have been considering Pannenberg's ontology of the whole, notably his belief that 'reality as a whole' must be understood in 9° TPS, 115. TPS, 2,17. ? BQTi, 161. 91 2

78


historical terms. Just as, in his view, the experience of finite things presupposes the infinite, so events in history presuppose larger semantic wholes. Dilthey said that we cannot know the meaning of a person's life until she or he has died, until there is a whole in which to understand the parts.93 Neither can we conclusively understand the meaning of history until we have arrived at its end But this meaning can be 'anticipated' in the course of history.94 Given the incompleteness of the course of history, the idea of the whole of reality becomes understandable when it is regarded as a semantic whole, to be approached hermeneutically, which is already present in anticipations of the meaning it confers. Can there be a universal history? Pannenberg placed history at the centre of his theology early in his career,95 and the concept of universal history appears first in 'Hermeneutic and Universal History'. Already in 'Redemptive Event and History' Pannenberg said that when we speak of God's revelation in history we must have 'history as a whole' in mind. A 'universal-historical horizon' must be in view, corresponding to the universality of God.96 Theologically, he was insisting that theology's concern is not only with a special stream of history, the history of Israel and Jesus, but with the whole of history. Historically, he was arguing that, although historians normally deal with small bits of history, historical thought presupposes 'a unity of history'. Everything in history 'stands under over-arching continuities'; no single event can be understood purely in terms of itself. 'It is the horizon of world history which first makes it possible to appreciate the full significance of an individual event.'97 The concept of history with which Pannenberg was working in the early essays was one in which history is tied to God's promises. Later a new perspective took its place, that of 'the history of the 93 BQTi, 163. 94

Pannenberg writes elsewhere, The end of time ... is eternity. It is from the standpoint of this end that the essence of each individual thing, the manner in which it has anticipated eternity, will be decided'; 'Concept and Anticipation', M/G, 109. 95 RAH was published in 1961. The important essay, 'Redemptive Event and History' (BQTi, ch. 2) was first given as a lecture in January 1959. 96 BQTi, 67. ^ BQTi, 6SL

79

GOD AND THE FUTURE

transmission of traditions',98 which gave prominence to hermeneutics in Pannenberg's theology. He saw the historical and hermeneutical concerns of theology as closely related, partly converging and partly in tension with each other." The hermeneutical approach moves back and forth between the text and the present situation of the interpreter. The historical approach goes behind the text for the essential content, in order to interpret it within the broadest context possible, not restricted to the present. The text itself demands that a step back be taken to the subjectmatter of the text, for in the face of a variety of interpretations of the text it is necessary to measure these against the source of the Christian tradition, the historical Jesus or the (already differentiated) primitive Christian proclamation of Christ.100 However, the process of interpretation is an open one; what is to be interpreted is not fixed but 'always contains more than is immediately present in it'. Pannenberg sees the meaning as inherent in the content, not as attached to it in the interpretation. But it 'cannot be expressed exhaustively and definitively within any limited horizon of meaning or in any particular interpretation'.101 So there is never a final meaning. He makes two important points here. First, the meaning of something is intrinsic to it; it is not read into it. Meaning is more than subjective. Second, this meaning has a life of its own and is not confined to any single context. The widest possible context will determine its meaning, and this can be nothing less than universal history. Pannenberg aims to establish the necessity of the idea of universal history. There are four points to be made in support of this endeavour. The first is christological. The Christian claim is that in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus the triune God has disclosed the divine life and purpose and has acted salvifically for the world. In this claim Jesus Christ is related to the being and 'economy' of God, so that he is known as Lord and Son of God. Such christological claims must have the same breadth of reference as all statements about God, and Pannenberg sees language about 98

BQTi, xvii, 81-95.

W. Pannenberg, 'Hermeneutic and Universal History', Part i, BQTi, 96-100. 100 w. Pannenberg, 'On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic', BQTi, 139. 101 BQTi, 140. 99

80


God as correlative to the whole of reality.102 If God exists, God is related to reality in its totality, and conversely, everything in the universe is to be understood in its relation to God. The second point is soteriological. The person of Jesus Christ has attracted a peculiar claim to authority, universal in scope. 'The appearance and destiny of Jesus already claims for itself universally decisive meaning. This anticipation of universal meaning inherently presses for confirmation by the totality of man's experience of reality at any time whatever.'103 The missionary expansion of Christianity underscores the early Christian conviction that there is no other name through which people might be saved, and that people in every place should have opportunity to test this conviction in their own experience. While the claim of Christ's universal significance constitutes the scandal of the Christian Gospel, universal history is the only acceptable hermeneutical context for it. The third point is hermeneutical. The concept of universal history is demanded, in Pannenberg's view, not only in the course of a historical approach to theology but also as part of a hermeneutical approach. The historical approach to past events requires that they be grasped 'in the continuity of meaning in which they stand, which connects them with the present age of the historian'.104 This implies the overarching concept of universal history. The hermeneutical approach to theology likewise requires the perspective of universal history. H.-G. Gadamer, a seminal thinker in contemporary hermeneutics, makes the 'claim' of the text on the present-day interpreter the centre of his hermeneutical concern. In the act of interpretation the distance between the then of the text and the now of interpretation is bridged. In the process of understanding, the horizons of the past and present are 'fused',105 and a new horizon is formed: When our historical consciousness places itself within historical horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in I0i 103

BQTi, 156. Pannenberg, 'On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic', BQTi,

141. IQ 4 BQTi, 100. 105 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, ed. G. Barden and J. Gumming (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 2.58. 81

GOD AND THE FUTURE

any way with our own, but together they constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness. It is, in fact, a single horizon that embraces everything contained in historical consciousness.106

This is close to Pannenberg's idea of the all-embracing horizon of universal history. But at the last moment, Pannenberg thinks, Gadamer turns back from the implication of his own insights. The idea of the fusion of horizons moves in the direction of the idea of a universal history, for 'only a conception of the actual course of history linking the past with the present situation and its horizon of the future can form the comprehensive horizon within which the interpreter's limited horizon of the present and the historical horizon of the text fuse together'.107 But Gadamer stops short of this. The fourth point is historiographical. Any subject matter at all undergoes historical development and is historically structured. Truth is not 'a timeless identity of a given essential content'; truth itself is history.108 New words will be spoken on the subject, new understanding will come, and it will be related to many other subjects. This presupposes and contributes to a much more comprehensive hermeneutical 'whole', namely, the totality of tradition. Since no boundaries can be arbitrarily erected, interpreters are engaged in a projection of universal history. This is not to say that a universal history can be achieved, for all our knowledge and understanding are provisional, open to correction and confirmation. Ted Peters differentiates between the idea of a 'whole' and the material content of the whole of history, which is beyond anyone's capacity to see. He goes on to say, 'to posit such a wholeness of truth is not necessarily to claim absoluteness for the one positing, because one's anticipatory acknowledgment of the whole is not knowledge of ... the whole'.109 It is clear from what has been said that Pannenberg's concern is 106

Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2,71. ? BQTi, 12.9. 108 BQTi, 131. 109 Ted Peters, Truth in History: Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Pannenberg's Apologetic Method', Journal of Religion 55.1, January 1975, 51I0

8l


with the totality of experience, meaning, truth and reality. Theologians may not settle for a discussion of assorted bits and pieces without taking into account the relation of these matters to the most comprehensive semantic whole, reality in its totality. The fundamental reason is that God acts in relation to all things. Pannenberg argues that the totality of things must be understood historically. 'Reality as a whole' is thus 'history as a whole' or 'universal history'. But Pannenberg is a theologian, not a historian. The concept of universal history is not in great use by working historians. We must look briefly at its provenance and consider the question of its legitimacy. The idea that history, with its myriad events and occurrences, forms a single pattern or 'whole' of some kind, and therefore has some all-embracing meaning, is a hypothesis advanced by some philosophers. The philosophy of history is a modern enterprise, derived from the theology of history, which is older.110 The philosophy of history is a speculative philosophy, which aims at the articulation of precisely such an overall pattern of meaning. Many historians consider such thinking about history to be impossible, but others seek 'less provincial' accounts of historical issues.111 They may look for some general principle by which to explain historical movement. The theories that arise in such speculation are usually part of some metaphysical or anthropological theory.112 Speculative philosophy may be metaphysical, empirical or religious.113 The question with which speculative philosophies of history wrestle is whether, in addition to human action and natural event, there is another level or type of explanation which 110

Karl Lowith, one of Pannenberg's teachers, says that Voltaire invented the term 'philosophy of history', and used it over against the 'theology of history'. Instead of seeing divine providence as the leading principle, Voltaire made human will and reason the central category. 'Philosophy of history' meant a 'systematic interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by which historical events and successions are unified and directed toward an ultimate meaning'; Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), i. 111 The phrase is used by W. H. Dray, Philosophy of History, Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 64. 112 See W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction, quoted by Dray, Philosophy of History, 65. 113 Dray uses these terms. He regards Hegel, Toynbee and R. Niebuhr as representative of these various types; cf. chs 6-8 in his book.

83

GOD AND THE FUTURE

offers a fuller, richer account of history. Hegel saw it in terms of the human movement toward freedom, which he saw as part of the self-development of the Absolute Spirit. Toynbee studied the rise and fall of civilisations but ended up with a religious view of the fulfilment of transcendent purposes. Others see the world of human affairs within the framework of the purpose of a sovereign God, who alone gives unity to history. In the light of such speculative philosophy of history, Pannenberg's concept of universal history is understandable. He was very likely influenced in this by Hans von Campenhausen, who described Augustine as 'the first universal theologian of history in Western civilisation5, and who urged his students to undertake a comprehensive theology in the spirit of Augustine.114 On the whole, historians are critical of their peers who play the philosopher or the prophet in their historical work.115 Hegel was aware of the ambiguity of history, describing it as 'the slaughterbench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized';116 yet he asked about the final purpose for which these sacrifices are made time and again. If we ask why this question should be asked at all, the answer can only be that it simply arises in our minds, at least in any culture which does not accept the idea of fate. In Hegel's terms, history is a history of the Absolute Spirit. For Pannenberg, 'history has a unity only in the form of a divine history, a history of revelation ... History cannot be secularized without disintegrating, without losing its unity.'117 The necessity to see history in such terms is a theological one. Is it also a historical necessity? Most historians would deny it; and it cannot be a requirement on historians that they provide us with theories of universal meaning. The historian qua historian will think long before confusing her or his role with that of the philosopher or theologian. At the same time, writing history within larger semantic wholes will appeal to some. Pannenberg "4 J. M. Robinson 'Revelation as Word and as History', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History^ 7-10. "5 In Australia this is evident in the very mixed response among academic historians to the work of Manning Clark. 116 This quotation is from Lowith, Meaning in History-, 53. 117 W. Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Law', Anglican Theological Review 55, October 1973, 404.

84


would challenge the historian's veto on grand frameworks of meaning. His source of inspiration in this was Dilthey, who was certainly no theist. Dilthey did not understand history theologically, yet he considered the theme of universal history to be unavoidable. Pannenberg comments: In the hermeneutic of the historical school and in Dilthey the theme of universal history is intimately related to the old hermeneutical principle that in the process of interpreting a text, the whole and its parts reciprocally illumine each other. The result of the application of this principle to historical knowledge was, for Dilthey ... that 'basically, there can be no other history than universal history because the meaning of the individual itself is determined only from the standpoint of the whole'.08

Heidegger applied Dilthey's key insights to the sphere of human existence and historicity, rather than to history as a whole. Pannenberg finds contemporary support from the Gottingen historian, R. Wittram, who is reserved about the idea of universal history but makes the interesting observation that the unity of history is the 'presupposition' without which it is scarcely possible to think historically.119 Likewise, W. Mommsen, who regards the achievement of a total view of the historical world as impossible in practice, takes the idea of universal history to be important as a guiding principle.120 Pannenberg expresses his position with some care: All historical study remains oriented to the problem of universal history. If this ... assertion is correct, then one may conjecture that the theme of the totality of history is a strictly common frame of reference for both historical and theological work. The historian as such may not usually speak explicitly of God, but his work nevertheless remains oriented toward that theme which on its part, justifies speaking about God, viz., the problem of universal history.121 us BQTi, 162. Pannenberg quotes here from Gadamer's Truth and Method. 119 Wittram's position is ambiguous; in addition to remarks in BQTi, 160 (note 19) and 69 (note 136), see W. Pannenberg, 'Response to the Discussion', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 244. IZO Pannenberg, 'Response', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 243f.

"' BQTi, 159-

85

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Pannenberg is swimming against a very strong tide. If it is acceptable for historians not to speak explicitly about God, there can hardly be a historical necessity for them do so, whether explicitly or in some veiled way. To do so would turn them into philosophers or theologians of history. However, for theologians a theological view of history - history in its relation to God - is not an optional extra but an unavoidable responsibility. It raises several difficult challenges. First, what is at issue here is whether the secular reality of life can be understood 'theonomously'.IZZ This is a form of the question about the relation between the finite and the infinite. Pannenberg does not equate God with the historical process; even Hegel did not do so.113 There is no static 'presence of the infinite in the finite' in Pannenberg's thought. The relation between the finite and the infinite is mediated negatively. The infinite puts the finite in crisis, but also preserves and transforms it: History is not the field of a finitude which is enclosed within itself, an 'immanence' to which one could and indeed would have to oppose a 'transcendence'. History is far rather the ongoing collapse of the existing reality which is enclosed in its own 'immanence' (because centred on itself). The power of the infinite is active and present in this collapse of the finite. Thus the infinite expresses itself in the first place negatively. But because the finite lives not by clinging to itself, but only in transformation of itself ... insofar as the power of the infinite expresses itself also positively, as reconciliation and preservation of the finite in the midst of its collapse.IZ4

Here is the essence of Pannenberg's theology of history. History in its length and breadth and in all its secularity is not merely the sum of human finitude. It is constituted by the presence of God, who discloses God's deity through history. God does this both by affirming the finite and by negating it, by enabling it to transcend itself and become more splendid than it already is and by standing in judgment over the finite, even to the point where the finite IZi

The term is Tillich's. W. Hamilton describes Pannenberg's view of history as 'theonomous'; 'The Character of Pannenberg's Theology', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 186. Pannenberg replies on 148-50. IZ 3 W. Pannenberg, 'The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel', in BQTj, esp. 160-5. 124 Pannenberg, in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 2,5if. 86


perishes. In this way God reveals who God is, establishing the divine rule (the kingdom of God) in and over the finite creation.125 Pannenberg no more ignores history's 'slaughter-bench' than Hegel did. God has to be seen in connection with the negative, the evil, and the tragic. Human use of power comes under judgment in the 'perishing' of the finite. Thus the second important issue in respect of God's relation to history is the problem of theodicy. Pannenberg does not regard theodicy as the critical problem some writers take it to be; it should not be given an exaggerated importance on the theological agenda.126 Every doctrine of the faith has the task of substantiating the truth claims of Christian discourse about God. 'The entire process of divine economy leading to [the] final consummation amounts to a self-demonstration of God's existence.'127 Yet it is only in relation to the Christian hope for the glorification of God in the perfection of creation that the problem of suffering finds its proper theological context. In discussing theodicy theologians must avoid another trap. Pannenberg says that I do not think it the task of theology to exculpate God theoretically for the evil in the world. In the face of the horrors of evil every theoretical theodicy would function as an ideological device. There can be only one valid answer to the reality of evil: the eschatological reconciliation of God with his world by that glorification of his suffering creatures which alone will finally prove his true divinity. iz8

Theoretical argument cannot solve this problem; only the practice of faith. Human misery and suffering cannot be alleviated by rational argument, no matter how cogent. There is no solution on this level. Pannenberg insists that the answer must be seen in connection with God's victory over evil through the cross and resurrection, expressed in trinitarian terms.129 Not just the problem of evil and suffering, but the entire 125

Pannenberg, in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 25 3 f. W. Pannenberg, 'Christianity as the Legitimacy of the Modern Age', BQT3, 184, note 4. See also STz, ch. 7, part 3 & STj, ch. 15, part 5. 127 W. Pannenberg, Introduction to Systematic Theology, 12. 128 W. Pannenberg, 'Postscript', in E. F. Tupper, The Theology ofWolfhart Pannenberg (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 3°4129 W. Pannenberg, 'Vom Nutzen der Eschatologie fur die christliche Theologie', Kerygma und Dogma 25, April-June 1979, 93. We shall return to the trinitarian point in the final chapter. 126

87

GOD AND THE FUTURE

problem of God's relation to history in its totality, is susceptible only to an eschatological solution. The reason for this is that history, in Pannenberg's view, gains its unity only from God's faithfulness in God's historical acts,130 that is, through time, and this will not be finally evident until the eschaton. It follows that the concept of universal history has its fullest meaning only in a theological view of reality. This is not to suggest that the idea of universal history is theologically problem-free; it has the same problems as any statement about the biblical God. But it is suggested that the notion of universal history has a justifiable place within the framework of any theology that encompasses the course of history - natural history no less than human history - from beginning to end, from the creation of the heavens and the earth to their consummation. In this chapter we have considered Pannenberg's fundamental ontological vision of a differentiated totality, 'reality as a whole', understood as history in its universal dimensions and in its relation to God, its 'determiner', that is, its creator, redeemer and perfecter. This ontology of the whole is, as we have seen, the single subject of Pannenberg's scientific, philosophical and theological work. The scope of his vision is vast, as is his view of the task of theology, in partnership with philosophy and the sciences. But at the end of the day, all explanations and solutions call for eschatological confirmation, for only then will we know what at present we see dimly. In the meantime we have to see everything in the framework of larger semantic wholes. However, for Pannenberg the future is far more than a confirming reality at the end of time. He sees it as having an ontological priority over present time and past time. This truly innovative aspect of his ontology we take up in the next chapter.

T

3° W. Pannenberg, The God of History', The Cumberland Seminarian 19.2-3, 1981, 30. This essay is a translation of 'Der Gott der Geschichte', GST2, II2.-2.8.

88

4

The ontological priority of the future Introduction

I

n this chapter we shall consider the nature of Pannenberg's distinctive eschatological ontology. The key points of focus will be the ontological priority of the future and its relation to the present, and here the concept of anticipation is central; indeed, without it the future can have no relation to the present. We shall also examine Pannenberg's view of time. In this chapter we are still concerned with ontology, but his ontological ideas are closely connected with his ideas about God. Certainly there has to be consistency between them. Pannenberg thinks of the ultimate future as the eschatological rule of God, in which all things will have their right relation to God. God is the future, and if God truly /s, the ultimate future is inconceivable apart from the reality and power of God. The genesis of Pannenberg's fascination with the future as ontologically significant is not simple. We saw in the early chapters how the idea of the kingdom of God and the resurrection of Jesus were decisive in shaping Pannenberg's entire theological vision. However, this eschatological theology also has other roots. His preoccupation with modern atheism also pushed him in the direction of a view of God as not simply an 'existing' being; God must transcend everything that is real at present. As he said in an early essay, God is 'not among the beings existing in the world, but is the Lord of the future, toward whose coming the world is moving'.1 An idea of increasing importance is the association of God with the 1

W. Pannenberg, The Question of God', BQTz, 2.33.

89

GOD AND THE FUTURE

future of God's reign, and its effect on the present. In a word, 'the deity of God is his rule'.z The influence of the neo-Marxist philosopher, Ernst Bloch, on the theology of Moltmann is well known, and the question of a possible influence on Pannenberg's idea of God as future is worth asking. Bloch's great work on hope, The Principle of Hope,3 was published in 1959, but Pannenberg does not regard it as influential on his own thinking. In 1965 he wrote 'The God of Hope' for a Festschrift for Bloch's eightieth birthday.4 He writes in glowing terms of Bloch's contribution to the recovery of the category of eschatology in understanding biblical thought, but is critical of Bloch's 'ontology of the not-yet'. Bloch has recovered the biblical tradition's eschatological mode of thought as a theme for philosophical reflection (and for Christian theology!) but the primacy of the future is not properly established.5 Bloch has not protected the Utopian hope from the possibility that it is merely the symbolic expression of our psychological strivings. The heart of the matter is Bloch's atheism. Bloch finds the idea of God dispensable. He is interested in messianic thinking, but finds this incompatible with theism. 'The place that has been occupied in individual religions by what is conceived as God ... has not itself ceased after it has ceased to be ostensibly filled'.6 We project what we long for onto the future, but there is a metaphysical correlate of this projection, which is at once utterly mysterious and real. It does not disappear with the loss of the god-hypothesis. The kingdom remains when God has gone. '... the kingdom, even in secularized form ... remains as a messianic Front-space even without any theism, indeed it can only remain at all ... without theism'.7 Atheism is not the enemy of religious Utopia but its precondition. z 3

TKG, 55-

Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag). It appeared in English in three volumes, trans. N. Plaice, S. Plaice and P. Knight (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 4 BQT2, 134-49. 5 BQTi, 138-40. 6 E. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 3, 1199. See further pp. 1183-311. 7 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 3, 12.00 (Bloch's italics). The religious kingdom-intention as such involves atheism, at last properly understood atheism7 (1199). 90

THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE FUTURE

For Pannenberg, the grounds of Bloch's utopianism are tenuous. Human hope for a better future is no foundation for the Utopia of the kingdom. For Pannenberg the kingdom is inseparable from the God whose rule it is. 'When the coming kingdom is designated in biblical terms as the kingdom of God, that is out of concern for the ontological primacy of the future of the kingdom over all present realities, including, above all, psychological states.'8 Despite the service which Bloch has rendered to theology, his treatment of the idea of God is unconvincing. Human fulfilment can indeed only come from the future; and this deep conviction of Bloch is a form of the ontological priority of the future. But in Pannenberg's view, human misery and hope for a better future require not only the Utopia of the kingdom but the hidden God who is the kingdom's ground. Is Bloch's influence on Pannenberg then only marginal? Probably, his reading of Bloch came at an important time, but there is little dialogue with Bloch's ideas. Pannenberg found in Bloch a notion of the ontological primacy of the future, in terms of which he could develop his own ideas about the futurity of God,9 but it is clear that Pannenberg was already on the track of eschatological theology by the time he read Bloch. It is probably more correct to think of 'a provocative confluence with Pannenberg's own eschatological vision of universal history'.10 Pannenberg claims that the influence of Bloch was never as strong as some commentators suggested.11 The influence of others Dilthey for example - was much stronger. Nevertheless, Bloch has helped theology by changing the shape of the question about God. By turning the question of the most perfect being into a question about 'the highest Utopian problem', Bloch has created space for thinking again about God as 'the power of the future', even though he himself did not think in such theistic terms. Yet Pannenberg sees 8 9

5QT2, 240.

This is suggested by Polk, On the Way to God, 255. 10 As suggested by Tupper, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 26. 11 W. Pannenberg, 'Providence, God, and Eschatology', in Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price (eds.), The Whirlwind in Culture: Frontiers in Theology (in honor of Langdon Gilkey; Bloomington, IN: Meyer Stone Books, 1988), 181, note 16. In personal conversation, Pannenberg confirmed this opinion and spoke instead of a 'convergence' of Bloch's thought and his own. 91

GOD AND THE FUTURE

rich possibilities for thinking about God in relation to the future, a God 'with futurity as a quality of being'.11 Already in the early essay to honour Bloch, Pannenberg speculates that ontological questions, too, may have to be seen in a new way; that 'being itself is perhaps to be understood as 'the power of the future'.13 Pannenberg is primarily a theologian. But the theologian cannot work in isolation from philosophy. Theological talk about God 'requires a relationship to metaphysical reflection if its claim to truth is to be valid',14 for only such reflection can establish a concept of the world, which is correlative with the idea of God. Over the years Pannenberg has written various essays on philosophical subjects. In 1988, coinciding with the first volume of Systematic Theology, he published Metaphysics and the Idea of God. Not only is the concept of the future to be given its proper place in theology, but Pannenberg also applies himself to the task of developing 'a new way of understanding the structure of reality',15 an understanding in which the idea of futurity is determinative. Even in early writing Pannenberg had something radical in mind, a reversal of the normal relation between present and future.16 Leaving aside the implications of such a reversal for thinking about God - to which we return in the next chapter - it is clear that the concept of time, especially the idea of the future, requires major rethinking. In the programmatic essay, 'Theology and the Kingdom of God', Pannenberg argues for a view of the future that is concrete and existential, not abstract and formal. The future is actually experienced as a power; it confronts humankind sometimes as 'a dark and uncertain power', sometimes as a power that promises fulfilment.17 But does the future actually have any such power? In Pannenberg's view, the future is not simply the prisoner of the past and the present. Rather, one must speak of 'the unpredictable new thing that is hidden in the womb of the future'.18 This is poetic language, to be sure, but can * BQTi, 24if. 3 BQTi, 242. 4 MIG, 6. 5 So Richard J. Neuhaus, 'Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a Theologian', TXG, 12. 16 TKG, 5417 TKG, 56. 18 WM, 42,. 92


ontological sense be made of such an idea? The basic issue is the sense in which the future can be said to exist at all.19 A distinction has to be made between the ordinary sense of future and Pannenberg's theological understanding of it. Ordinarily, the future is seen as an extension of the past and present. In theology the emphasis is on the novelty of the future; it confronts and runs counter to the present world.20 In the everyday perception of the future, it is not quite 'real'. It exists only in thought or imagination. Its reality is at least of a very different order from that of the present. Since it has not happened yet, it is thought not yet to exist. There are grounds for questioning this 'everyday' understanding of the future; the revolutions in physics in the last century have made the 'ordinary' perception of space and time quite inadequate. Pannenberg ascribes a very definite reality to the future. The division of time into past, present and future is unavoidable in a finite world, but it has its limitations. If we could imagine a standpoint outside of time this division would be meaningless.21 If we were able to see the world sub speciae aeternitatis, time would appear very different. As we shall see, Pannenberg thinks that time participates in eternity. From such a standpoint the future will appear very different. In close connection with the idea of God, who is the future of humankind and of the entire universe, the future is seen by Pannenberg as 'a reality in its own right'.22 However, his view of the future should be argued on grounds that do not require the concept of God, even though they may be more compelling within a theistic framework. In fact, his arguments for the ontological priority of the future do not presuppose the truth of the God-hypothesis. Being and appearance We observed in the last chapter that Pannenberg's ontology is a thoroughly temporal ontology; our ideas about what 'is' are 19

Philip Hefner early said that the crucial question about Pannenberg's thought is whether futurity is viable as a basic ontological category. 'Theological Reflections (4)', Una Sancta 25.3, 1968, 44. 20 W. Pannenberg, 'Future and Unity', in E. H. Cousins (ed.), Hope and the Future of Man (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972.), 60. 21

22

WM, 70.

Pannenberg, 'Future and Unity', 6z. 93

GOD AND THE FUTURE

irreducibly historical. Pannenberg has a correspondingly temporal view of being and appearance. This is a subject he addresses in 'Appearance as the Arrival of the Future',*3 an essay from 1967. There is a long history in philosophy of the distinction between what something is in and for itself and what it is for us or how it appears to us. Pannenberg argues that Greek philosophy tended to separate being and appearance, sometimes strongly, sometimes less strongly. Self-sufficient ideas or substances were ontologically prior to the world of phenomena and sense experience. Centuries later, Hegel saw the relation between essence and existence (or appearance) in more reciprocal terms, but the realm of appearance is still in effect 'reduced to the status of the nonessential'.24 With Kant the understanding is explicitly related to appearance, that is, the phenomenal world. Following Kant and German Idealism, philosophy gave priority to existence (appearance) over essence. It was at the heart of Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel. Pannenberg endorses Heinrich Earth's view that the idea of appearance includes both 'the act of coming-into-appearance' and 'the "something" that appears', which is not exhausted in the act of appearing.25 Being (or essence) and appearance may not be separated, for they belong together; nor may they be equated, for there is a difference between them. Precisely this antinomy Pannenberg seeks to penetrate further. What guides his thinking is the point that what appears is not exhausted in the appearance; the appearance is only a partial realisation of the possibilities of what appears in it.z6 What he seeks to articulate more adequately is the unity of identity and difference between being (or essence) and the form in which it appears. He turns to theology for examples that throw light on the general problem. In Jesus' teaching about the kingdom of God, opening oneself to the coming kingdom makes it already a present reality, yet without abolishing its futurity. The kingdom of God is expressed in the present but not exhausted by its presence in that *3 TKG,ch. 4, 127-43. 24 Pannenberg is aware that for Hegel 'essence' and 'being' are not the same, and that the concept of essence underwent significant changes in the centuries between Plato and Aristotle and Hegel. But Hegel accepted 'the ontological precedence of essence over its appearance'; TXG, 130. 2 5 TKG, 131. z6 TKG, 132. 94


time and space. Such presence of the kingdom of God, says Pannenberg, is 'derived from [its futurity] and is itself only the anticipatory glimmer of its coming'.27 There is both identity and differentiation. The example presupposes a religious background very different from the Platonic view of the world. The ontological issue which Pannenberg wants to explore with the help of this example is the difference the introduction of temporality makes to our understanding of the relation between identity and difference. Does the problem of identity and difference in the relation of being and appearance reflect the relation between future and present in general? 'Does that which appears in the appearance . . . present itself in the mode of futurity?' 28 In answering this question, Pannenberg first argues that such a view is not, contrary to popular opinion, completely foreign to classical ontology, at least from Plato on. He claims to find it in Plato's quest for the good, which is not a possession but something sought, striven for, which implies the idea of the future.29 The idea is not strong enough in Plato to transform his view of the relation between the forms and the empirical world, but it is not completely absent. Pannenberg argues that Aristotle's notion of entelechy, too, can be taken in a futurist sense. 'The essence of a thing, its eidos, is the goal of its movement - at least of its natural, unforced movement.'30 This teleological view of the world is, of course, different from the eschatological view Pannenberg espouses.31 But the idea of a thing's essence as future is implied in what Aristotle says about movement. None of this by itself makes Pannenberg's futurist ontology compelling, but he is justified in finding some indirect support in Plato and Aristotle. In modern philosophy there has been, as Pannenberg notes, a TKG, 133. TKG, 136. TKG, 137. TKG, 139. 31 Pannenberg says that 'the concept of prolepsis, especially as anticipatory occurring of the end . . . forms exactly the counterconcept to a "protologically" founded teleology . . .'; Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 261. The entelechy is not the anticipation of the not yet attained goal, but is the already present . . . germ, out of which the goal unfolds itself; TKG, 139.

* ^ ^ 3°

95

GOD AND THE FUTURE

sharper focus on the 'appearance' itself, rather than on that which 'appears' in the appearance. Pannenberg speaks of the dissolution of Aristotelian metaphysics of substance into appearance. 'Philosophy no longer succeeded in thinking of what appears independently of the way in which it appears.'3Z Since Kant the cognitive faculty itself has been the subject of interest. The imagination goes beyond what is immediately given in experience in order to give shape to experience. This puts the focus on the subject's relation to the world. Pannenberg suggests that the subject thus goes beyond the given and alters it, making itself into the future of its world. It does this through technology or through the constructions (projections) of the imagination. But what is to be made of such projections? Pannenberg rejects any one-sided understanding of these. They are indeed projections of the imagination, but they are more; their anticipatory nature also has to be taken seriously: Do we not ... have to understand the synthetic constructions of the productive imagination ... as anticipations of the essential future of what is given in appearance? Is it not only with this presupposition that we can possibly understand the miracle of the correspondence to objective reality and of the readability of spontaneous human constructions?33

I have referred at length to this early essay because it shows the beginnings of Pannenberg's futurist ontology. It contains hints and suggestions rather than systematic developments. In later work the vision is expanded and clarified, though it is never the kind of thing for which 'knock-down' arguments can be produced. Seen in the context of other proposals that move 'beyond static conceptualisations of being',34 it invites serious consideration. An ontology which gives an integral place to the temporal process surely has advantages which make it prima fade attractive. The choice in considering the relation between being and appearance is between two options. The appearing reality can be understood as 'the appearance of something that always is' - as held in classical ontology - or, in Pannenberg's phrase, as 'the arrival of what is 3* TKG, 140.

33 TKG, i4of.; Pannenberg's italics. 34 Cf. the discussion by Philip Clayton in 'Being and One Theologian', The Thomist 52.4, October 1988, 650!. 96


future'."* The first way has the force of history behind it, but it has one great weakness which Pannenberg thinks is overcome by the second way. The first way, which 'sees what appears in the appearance only as a timeless universal, will inevitably underestimate ... the importance for our experience of reality, of the contingently new, of the individual, and of time'.36 The endless repetition of a fixed structure of being in the infinite multiplicity of events, attractive though it may have been, is not able to account for the experience of contingency and genuine novelty which are an undeniable feature of existence in the world. Pannenberg's conviction has been that appearance is better seen as an anticipatory arrival of the future, and that an ontology of the future gives a better account of contingency and freedom. Contingency and connection We shall see in this section how Pannenberg understands the contingency of events and the part it plays in articulating an ontology of the primacy of the future. There is no doubt about the element of contingency in nature and history. Events have an 'essential indeterminateness', for which there are both theological and scientific grounds.37 Theologically, the first point is the contingency of the cosmos itself. The world has its origin in the free decision of God in God's impenetrable eternity; in this its contingent character is grounded.38 The biblical view of reality presupposes the divine freedom and the contingent nature of events in the world. In Israel new and unforeseen events take place constantly and are understood as the work of God. If there is a 'necessity' about the course of events, it is not as a result of some immutable law but on account of the free, sovereign action of God in the world. 35 TKG, 141. 36 TKG, 141.

37 Science and theology discuss the notion of contingency in different but complementary ways. S. Grenz says, 'science speaks about regularities in temporal sequences, presupposing contingency, whereas theology discusses the contingency of events, representing their consequences as history'; Reason for Hope, 87. R. J. Russell has noted the importance of the notion of contingency as a bridge between a theological doctrine of creation and the scientific understanding of the universe in Pannenberg's theology; cf. 'Contingency in Physics and Cosmology; A Critique of the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg', Zygon 23.1, March 1988, 23-43. 3* STz, 9.

97

GOD AND THE FUTURE

In science there has been a gradual move away from a teleological view of nature to one in which chance plays a major role.39 Often this is not adequately recognized, when the observed regularities are uncritically described in terms of law. But there is increasing recognition that each scientific hypothesis of law describes uniformities in the behavior of the object of such affirmations. The object itself, however, is contingently given in relation to its hypothetical description as a case where the affirmed law obtains ... However, the applicability of scientific formulas to concrete cases of natural processes requires initial and marginal conditions that are contingent in relation to the uniformity affirmed in the equation as such.40

With the replacement of a mechanistic view of the world with the principles of modern physics - notably relativity and indeterminacy - the place of contingency in the system is secure. Pannenberg regards the contingent nature of the world as the highest priority in the dialogue between scientists and theologians. Even where processes in the world of nature can be discussed in terms of natural law, they must also be considered as events 'in the course of the contingent sequence itself'.41 Theology is interested particularly in the contingent. This is not to deny theology's interest in the connectedness of events which science describes in terms of law. As noted in the last chapter, Pannenberg regards history not as a collection of contingent, disconnected events. There is a continuity in the sequence of events, without which historical narrative would be impossible. But the continuity is not sought in unchanging structures of reality. It is found in the fidelity of the creator and perfecter of all finite reality,42 which does not compromise the See W. Pannenberg, The Doctrine of the Spirit and the Task of a Theology of Nature' and Theological Questions to Scientists', TTN, chs 5 & i. Other chapters are also pertinent. 40 W. Pannenberg, The Doctrine of Creation and Modern Science', TTN 36. See Theology and Science', The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 13.3, 1992., esp. 3o3f. 41 TTN, 36. Elsewhere Pannenberg writes, '... in every new stage or research, the total process of natural events presents itself again as a mesh of contingency and regularities'. TTN, 78. 4Z Cf. W. Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Law', Anglican Theological Review 55, October 1973, 401. 39

9«


contingency of events. In fact, the continuity and contingency of historical events - including events in nature - have a common root; both are grounded in something which transcends history, namely, God.43 God is the origin of the contingent and of the unity which constitutes contingent events as history. God is the ground of contingency by virtue of God's transcendent freedom, but this is a freedom exercised in faithfulness. God maintains the cosmos in being at every moment and is the power that will bring it to its perfection. Pannenberg links God's faithfulness with both contingent events and the uniformities of nature: In the theological perspective such uniformities ... as well as the enduring forms of natural reality are considered as contingent in the same way as any single event. The laws of nature appear to the theologian as contingent products of the creative freedom of God. The unity of contingency and continuity in the creative activity of God as well as in its products is rooted ... in God's faithfulness.44

God's faithfulness is God's constancy in relation to the created world. It refers both to creation and redemption. Faithfulness also implies duration; it can only be expressed over time. Creation will reach its eschatological completion through the faithful love of God, the ground of both the contingency and the connectedness of events. How does this discussion of contingency offer support to a futurist ontology? Pannenberg understands the continuity of historical events in terms of a movement from the present to the past, not the reverse. If the new is genuinely contingent, it cannot have had to come into being. The new is accounted for by something more than antecedent causes. It is received, as it were, from the future and brought into relation with past events, which have come into being in the same way: If ... the connection of events is grounded in the faithfulness of the free God, then we do not have to conceive a continuity of something enduring from the past into the future after the manner, say, of a development. Rather, we have to think of events which are in themselves contingent, as being at the same time linked backward and « BQTi, 74. «« TTN, 37. 99

GOD AND THE FUTURE

referred to what has happened. By means of such backward linking the continuity of history is constantly re-established. This is the way in which the faithfulness of God expresses itself. Only in this way ... can the primary connection of history be conceived without losing its contingency.45

Pannenberg's point is that if the new can only be accounted for as an outcome of past events, there is no genuine freedom and contingency; no escape from determinism. There can be no simple account of causality; certainly, future acts cannot be deduced simply from antecedent events.46 The link between new events and the past is created retroactively. If the new cannot be adequately accounted for simply as the effect of past causes, the only alternative is to see it as coming in some way from the future. Pannenberg sees this in terms of the creative activity of God, the power of the future. But can this be expressed in a non-theistic form? Is there an adequate ontological basis for such a view? Do events in fact spring from the future? Pannenberg hints how this might be so. The whole of reality may be divided into the sum of individual contingent events and indeterminate, unpredictable future events. This future is full of ambiguity; it is 'not yet ... decided upon'. It is open; it does not yet exist: In every event the infinite future separates itself from the finite events which until then had been hidden in this future but are now released into existence. The future lets go of itself to bring into being our present. And every new present is again confronted by a dark and mysterious future out of which certain relevant events will be released. Thus does the future determine the present.47

This is unusual language to describe what we regard as natural. The initiative lies with the future; it 'separates itself from what comes into existence and 'releases' it into existence. Pannenberg does not say how the metaphor of release and separation is related to the image of decision, nor what makes the image of decision appropriate. In a theistic context, where the power that operates in contingent events is personal, this language has some justification. In more recent work Pannenberg seeks to clarify his earlier 45 46 47

W. Pannenberg, 'Redemptive Event and History', BQTi, 75^ See TTN, 2,2,. TKG, 59. IOO


ideas. The future is 'the field of the possible', and 'the basis of the openness of creation to a higher consummation and the source of what is new, i.e., of contingency in each new event'.48 In discussing the priority of the future, as the field of the possible, with philosophers and physicists, Pannenberg proposes that the concept of 'field' might function as a mediating term between theology and science.49 The triune God may be thought of as a dynamic 'field', with a trinitarian structure. In particular, the work of the Holy Spirit in creation has the character of a dynamic field of force.50 More precisely, the power of the future, understood as a field of the possible, is the sphere in which the dynamic of the Spirit expresses itself in creation.51 This is a bold move, for which he offers some reasons. Theologically, it restores the link between pneumatology and eschatology. The enlivening work of the Spirit, directed to all creatures, is the proleptic effect of the Spirit's eschatological reality. In the life-giving activity of the Spirit in creation we see an anticipation of the eschatological consummation; it is an expression of the power of the future. Scientifically, Pannenberg draws on some implications of quantum theory, as outlined by H.-P. Diirr. Diirr connects quantum indeterminacy with the concept of possibility, which presupposes the future. He leans strongly in the direction of affirming the primacy of the future; it has greater power than the factual, that is, the past.52 He certainly wants to overturn the 'everyday' view, namely, that the future is determined by what is actual. This, of course, calls into question the predictability of the future. But far too much is read into the notion of the predictability, in principle, of future events, given established 48

49

ST2, 9 7 f.

Pannenberg's use of the 'field' concept has been criticized as insufficiently nuanced by Jeffrey S. Wicken, Theology and Science in the Evolving Cosmos: A Need for Dialogue', Zygon 2.3.1, March 1988, esp. 51-3. Pannenberg's response is in Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings: Response to Hefner, Wicken, Eaves, and Tipler', Zygon 14.2, June 1989, 2,55-71, esp. 156-8. 50 See ST2, 83^; this is discussed further in chapter six. *' SeeSTi, 98. 52 STz, 99. Pannenberg thinks it is better to speak of 'the power of the realm of the future being given concrete form by the event that takes place in the present'. 101

GOD AND THE FUTURE

starting conditions. Essentially, predictability has no firmer ground than statistical probability. Pannenberg argues for pressing the question whether interest in predictability has not implicated scientific thought in an inversion of the real relation between the actual and the possible. Rather than regarding an ontology in which primacy lies with the future as false, may it not be the conventional ontology, in which primacy lies with the given, that is mistaken? It has to be asked whether there is adequate recognition of contingency in the 'everyday' view of the relation between the actual and the possible. At least, a much less simple account of causality should be offered, to take account of factors beyond what is immediately given. Pannenberg draws support for his futurist ontology from new directions of thought which find the orthodoxies of the past in science and philosophy unsatisfactory.53 It may well be that a 'paradigm shift' is underway. If so, only time will tell whether this new ontological proposal will make better sense of old problems. Reference has been made several times to the 'power' of the future, or to the greater power of the possible over the actual. Clearly, the notion of power is indispensable in this discussion. However, as Lewis Ford says, 'the real problem ... lies in the difficulty of understanding how the future can exert power upon the present'.54 What kind of power, if any, do possibilities have? Ford says that in many accounts of causation there is no effective role for possibilities.55 This is because the ontological status of possibility is far from clear. The conventional wisdom is that possibilities have power only if they are real; but what does 'real' mean here? Pannenberg turns this upside down: only by virtue of its power to shape the present can (future) possibilities be said to be 'real'. In effect, they can be 'real' without (yet) 'existing'. Pannenberg severs the usual connection between what 'exists' and what is 'real'. 53 Pannenberg gives an example in STz, 100. His arguments on the basis of new conceptions in modern physics require detailed evaluation from those familiar with the field. I claim no detailed acquaintance with it. A step in this direction, but without reference to STz, was taken by D. Z. Nowell in ch. 4 of his unpublished thesis, 'Futurity and contingency: An alternative paradigm', submitted to Baylor University in 1991. 54 Lewis S. Ford, The Nature of the Power of the Future', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg, 75. 55 Ford, The Nature of the Power of the Future', 76.

IO2,


Pannenberg is searching for 'an alternative to an understanding of the real which is concentrated entirely upon what is existent'.56 What is 'real' is not restricted to what 'exists' at present. Both the past (which has existed) and the future (which is not yet existent) are 'real', because they are 'effective in the present moment'. Something may be said to be 'real' if it is 'effective' in the present:57 What belongs to the future is not yet existent, and yet it already determines present experience, at least the present experience of beings who ... are orientated towards the future and always experience their present and past in the light of a future which they hope for or which they fear. Thus the future is real, although it does not yet exist.58

The future is 'real' because it has an effect upon the present. The present could not come into being without its 'determination' by the future. The present is dependent on what the future releases. Freedom is inconceivable without the reality of the future, for it operates in a realm of possibilities not yet realized. When certain possibilities are grasped and become actual, the future is powerful over the present. The future and freedom thus belong together; neither 'exists' as such, but each has 'power over what exists here and now'.59 The idea of power is one of three ideas that are central and inseparable in Pannenberg's ontology; the others are unity and the future. The key term is that of power; only through power is unity established out of unrelated, contingent events. At this point Pannenberg slides over into speech about God's power. God is the power of the future. Only in the future, and by the all-determining power that is God, does the cosmos receive its unity and coherence: The coming of God to his sovereignty over the world is his gift to the world, unifying its scattered events. The coming of God also means that God has the power over the future of those who are under his rule. Thus the circle is closed. Jesus' message of the Kingdom of God implies that the unity of the world is to be expected from the future.60 no. D. Polk points out that the German words for 'real' and 'effective' (wirklich and wirksam) have 'an essential parallelism'; On the Way to God, 258. 58 BQT3, 110 59 BQT3, in. 60 TKG, 59 f. 56

57

BQt3,

103

GOD AND THE FUTURE

The impetus for such an ontology is the biblical idea of the kingdom of God. But the idea of a unity existing at the heart of all finite events is a fundamental religious idea. The search for a unifying principle or power is at once the question reaching for God and the fundamental ontological question. Pannenberg has transposed an eternal transcendent unity into an eternal eschatological unity, for the unity of all things is a future reality. We have been examining the major elements of Pannenberg's future-oriented ontology. His ontology and his understanding of God are intertwined. He sets out to bring theological ideas about God and the understanding of the cosmos into dialogue. To speak of God is, at least implicitly, to speak of the future of the cosmos. But the converse is also true. From a theological standpoint, to speak of the future is, at least indirectly, to speak of God. 'Every event in which the future becomes finitely present must be understood as a contingent act of God, who places that finite reality into being by distinguishing it from his own powerful future.'61 How God creates the present from the future must be further considered in the next chapter. So far we have looked at some of the ontological implications of Pannenberg's eschatological theism. Much has been said about the future, but we have yet to consider Pannenberg's understanding of time. The ontological primacy of the future has its basis in the eternity of God. Time and eternity The problem of time, especially its relation to eternity, has long preoccupied Pannenberg. In an early essay he wrote, 'The truth of time lies beyond the self-centeredness of our experience of time as past, present, and future. The truth of time is the concurrence of all events in an eternal present.'62 Twenty-five years later he published his view of the relation between time and eternity in an important essay and in his Systematic Theology.6"63 The importance 61

TKG, 61. In 'Contingency and Natural Law' Pannenberg considers several scientific models of the universe, exploring how they might be compatible with the theological notion of 'creation'. Some models are particularly open to the idea of a creation from the future of the world; cf. TTN, 102-5. 62 WM, 74. Eternity is 'the truth of time, which remains hidden in the flux of time'. 63 W. Pannenberg, 'Being and Time', published in M/G, ch. 4, 69-90 & 5T2, ch. 7, part z, 84-102. 104


of the problem is indicated in his discussion with scientists, where he says that 'without an answer to the question regarding time and eternity, the relation of God to this world remains inconceivable'.64 He raises the question of the possibility of relating the extension of time and space to a mathematical model of eternity, a problem not irrelevant to the question of God's existence. Most characteristically, he argues that dividing time into past, present and future presupposes c an undivided whole of time', comprising all temporal distinctions; this is what a contemporary concept of eternity denotes: 'not as timeless, but as infinite unity of life'.65 Here we are at the heart of Pannenberg's view of time. A key issue is that of God's relation to time. Pannenberg takes a middle way between two incompatible forms of theism: classical theism, developed by the early patristic theologians, and a later form of theism which rejects major elements of classical theism.66 A key feature of classical theism is 'the denial that God is in any literal sense temporal or really related to the world'; it can be called 'nontemporalistic theism'.67 This is rejected in many other types of theology, including recent contextual and narrative theologies. These also have in common a rejection of metaphysics in theology. Ogden claims that Heidegger, in one of few references to God, proposes a thesis of the temporality of God which is ontologically well substantiated.68 Ogden observes 6

4 TTN, 15-28, esp. 24. W. Pannenberg, 'Theology and Science', in The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 13.3, 1992,, 305. 66 In an astute study of a footnote in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Schubert Ogden has described these two types of theism. The crucial issue is the relation of God to time and temporality; see The Temporality of God', The Reality of God (London: SCM Press, 1967), ch. 5, esp. 158-63. 67 Ogden, The Temporality of God', 158. 68 The footnote reads: 'It requires no extensive discussion to show that the traditional concept of eternity, in the sense of the "stationary now" (nunc stans), is drawn from the vulgar understanding of time and is limited by an orientation to the idea of "constant" presence-on-hand. If the eternity of God would admit of being "construed" philosophically, it could be understood only as a more primal and "infinite" temporality ...'; M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 499, note xiii. (The British edition, London: SCM Press, 1961, has the quotation in slightly different words.) The quotation is found in Ogden's essay on p. 145. 65

105

GOD AND THE FUTURE

the familiar spectacle of classical theists trying to adjust to the demands of temporality, and of modern temporalists inconsistently appealing to the God of traditional theism. In neither case are we offered anything like a real third alternative, but are left to choose either the sacrifice of time and man to God's eternity or the abandonment of God and infinity for the temporality of man.69

Heidegger's view of God as essentially temporal is a major advance. Pannenberg provides just the third option that Ogden calls for. In his discussion of time there are two fundamental aspects: the contrast between biblical views of God in relation to time and the view of time typically found in Greek philosophy, and the challenge to the received philosophical wisdom about the concept of time. First, the contrast between biblical and philosophical ideas about God and time.70 The major difference is that the God of the Bible, though eternal, does things. The god of Greek philosophy is not capable of doing anything. Tn order to act, God would have to pass from rest into movement and thus would lose his eternity along with his constancy.'71 The eternal is the utterly constant and unchanging, the utterly simple and undifferentiated; Aristotle's 'unmoved mover' exemplifies this. In Pannenberg's view, 'the eternity of the Greek God is that of the empty, eternal being'.72 The eternity of the biblical God is God's presence to every time; 'his action and power extend to everything past and future as to something that, for him, is present'.73 God's eternity is God's omnipresence. The biblical God allowed the boundless diversity of his creative possibilities to take form in creation, and remains the unity of this richness. However, God is not bound to the world as it is; neither to a primordial ordering of events such as is celebrated in myth and cult, nor to an unbreakable chain of cause and effect describable in scientific terms. God confronts the course of events with the 69

S. Ogden, The Temporality of God', 160. See Pannenberg's essay on time and eternity in the religious experience of Israel and Christianity, 'Zeit und Ewigkeit in der religiosen Erfahrung Israels und des Christentums', in GSTz, 188-206. This essay has not been translated. For a concise account of this contrast see WM, 74-6. 71 WM,757* WM, 75. 73 WM, 74; also ST2, 9if. 70

106


new. Israel's sense of time was governed by its orientation to the future. 74 The sense of the past remained strong, but with the prophets Israel slowly learnt to expect its salvation from the future and to relate in trust and hope to the God in whose hands this future lay. In the preaching of Jesus the reality of God becomes inextricably linked to the future of God's rule; if there were to be no completion of God's rule there could be no God! This future has a strong bearing on the present. In the early Christian community, the experience of the Spirit signified the presence already now of the future salvation reality. But how could this 'present' be understood? In Pannenberg's view, it was understood as the presence of eternity.75 In one sense, God's eternity and human temporality stand over against each other. The difference between the infinite and the finite is never dissolved, even in the eschaton. In another sense, they also coincide. Here Pannenberg appeals to the idea in apocalyptic thought that those things which belong to the end-time already exist in heaven. This does not dissolve the distinction between future and present; the future provides the meaning of the present. But the 'not yet' of the future is anticipated already in the present. In apocalyptic thought - and in the New Testament there is a remarkable interweaving of time and eternity; this is very different from the Greek opposition between a timeless eternity and all things temporal and transitory. Pannenberg describes the future of God as 'the parousia of his eternity', and it is this that constitutes the dimension of depth in the present.76 Conversely, the present has its place in the eternity of God and finds its meaning therein. Eternity is the presence of life in its totality; the whole is already present in the part.77 However, the coincidence of eternity and time is mediated temporally. The present has its relation to the hidden dimension of the eternal only via the future. Without this temporal mediation 74 Pannenberg says that in ancient Israel there was no concept of time as such. Israel knew the course of days, months and years by which what we now call 'time' was measured, and it knew the time which God determines for the events of life; cf. 'Zeit und Ewigkeit in der religiosen Erfahrung Israels und des Christentums', GSTi, 193. 7 5 GST2, 199. 76

77

GST2,

202.

See STi, 403 & STz, 92. 107

GOD AND THE FUTURE

the eternal and the present would become polarised in a stark dualism, as seen already in some of the New Testament writings, notably the Fourth Gospel.78 For Pannenberg the true point of the coincidence of time and eternity is the eschaton. This is part of his third option, over against the focus on the primordial past, which remains normative in mythology, and the Neoplatonist idea of the circular movement of origin from, and return to, God. The second important aspect of Pannenberg's discussion of time is his challenge to the received philosophical understanding of time. He believes that the early Christian sense of the presence of God's eschatological future was displaced by other influences as Christianity spread beyond the sphere of Judaism. The sense of the future was retained only indirectly; it lost its place as the linchpin of the Christian understanding of time. Significant in the shift was the Platonist antithesis of the eternal and the temporal, part of the close connection between Christian thought and Platonism.79 For Plato time was the image of eternity; temporal reality copied the eternal forms. For Augustine time was the creature of God, and as such he could view it more positively. As the fall of humankind had taken place in time, the conversion of the will also had to take place in time. Pannenberg sees a 'historicisation of time' in Augustine's thought. With his view of a comprehensive future salvation, he broke out of the framework of Platonist thought, especially its cyclical idea of reincarnation. He asserted the irreversibility of the history that has its goal in God. But he was not consistent in this 'historicisation' of reality; in some respects he remained closer to Neoplatonism.80 Pannenberg is more positive about Plotinus, who broke with earlier philosophers in refusing to define time in relation to motion. Time is presupposed by the idea of motion.81 Plotinus developed his theory of time from a 78

GSTz, 203. See W. Pannenberg, The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of God as a Dogmatic Problem of Early Christian Theology', BQT2, ch. 5; also 'Christentum und Platonismus'. In both articles Pannenberg makes clear that Christian thinkers also challenged Platonist ideas. 80 Pannenberg, 'Christentum und Platonismus', 160. He expresses surprise at how little Augustine's view of God, in contrast to his anthropology, was affected by his 'historical' outlook. 81 In 5T2, 93 Pannenberg describes in more detail the positions against which Plotinus developed his theory of time; see also M/G, 76. 79

108


consideration of the nature of the soul, which he uses as a mediating concept. Time is related to eternity; in fact, derived from it. The soul is tied to the eternal, but it is also the principle that brings about the moving apart of the various moments of life within the flow of time. The soul, while participating in the One, also experiences the succession of moments. But it grasps these moments in their connectedness.81 The key point for Pannenberg is time's relation to eternity. We saw in the previous chapter that understanding the part in relation to the whole is the driving force of Pannenberg's ontological thought. Everything historical, every moment in history, can be understood only within the 'semantic whole' that constitutes history in its totality. Similarly, time can only be understood in the framework of eternity. But eternity is the fulness of time, not its antithesis. For Augustine there was no time in God's eternity; time and eternity stand in antithesis. But Plotinus had a different view; he defined eternity as 'the presence of the totality of life'.83 For him the eternal is 'the whole of life, namely, of "life that is fixed within Sameness, because the whole is always present in it - not now this, then another, but all simultaneously" in the sense of "completion without parts" '.84 For Plotinus eternity is not opposed to time but is the presupposition of understanding it. The Platonist antithesis of time and eternity does remain in Plotinus's thought to some extent; time is understood as 'the dissolution of the unity of life into a sequence of separate moments'. But it is also 'constituted a sequence by the reference to the eternal totality'.85 This is the line of thought taken by Boethius, who regards eternity as 'the simultaneous and perfect presence of unlimited life'; in other words, authentic duration.86 There is, then, a discontinuity between time and eternity, in Plotinus's view; but this is only one side. Eternity is also the unity and perfection of time; that is the other side. Time arises in the fall of the soul from eternity. The soul participates in the eternal, and 82

M/G, 76, quoting from Enneads; see also STz, 93. 3 571,403. 8 « MIG, 7 6f. 85 STi, 403, 404. It is clear that the relation between eternity and time in Plotinus' understanding requires fairly nuanced statement. Can time and eternity be 'not opposed' but at the same time be 'antithetical'? 86 STi, 404. 8

109

GOD AND THE FUTURE

thus longs for its wholeness, but it suffers a 'fall' from eternity, which breaks the perfect wholeness of eternity. The result (paraphrasing Plotinus) is the separation of the moments and parts of life, the diastasis ... zoes, and along with the independence of the finite or the many, time arises. Time is characterized as the manner in which the many remains bound, even in its independence, to the whole. Given the nature of temporal moments as parts, the whole is present only in the sense that it hovers over the parts as the future whole .. .8?

Elsewhere Pannenberg speaks of the time-spanning presence of eternity. 'A present can be eternal only if it is not separate from the future and if nothing sinks for it into the past.'88 The reference to the future comes from Plotinus himself. Pannenberg concludes that 'when the theory of time is oriented toward the eternal totality, the consequence is a primacy of the future for the understanding of time'.8? Pannenberg credits Plotinus, not Heidegger, with first affirming the primacy of the future in the philosophy of time. However, for both the totality of existence is possible only in the light of its future. The part can only be understood against the whole, and the whole can be understood only as a future reality. The future therefore shapes the present and its meaning, and this gives the future its reality, despite the fact that it does not yet 'exist'. Totality includes the whole of the past, present and future, and is thus indistinguishable from the idea of eternity. This was the context of Plotinus's view of time. Heidegger's thought is focussed on the wholeness that an individual person may experience in his or her existence, and is thus much narrower in scope. The Western understanding of time has been shaped by the christianised Neoplatonism of Augustine rather than by the thought of Plotinus, which has resulted, in Pannenberg's view, in the loss of something important. There is no parallel in Augustine to Plotinus's notion of the primacy of the future. Biblical eschatology could have provided the impetus for such a move, but Augustine was more concerned with the origin of time as the creation of God than with time from 8

? MIG, 77.

88 8

ST2, 92. 9 MIG, 77. no


the standpoint of its future. In his analysis of the experience of time Augustine moved beyond Plotinus, and here his work has remained definitive. The present is a bridge between the remembered past and the expected future. The soul is extended beyond the present and gives unity to what is remembered, experienced and expected. It creates the sense of duration, which is the way into the experience of time. Whereas Plotinus derives time from the experience of the separation of the moments of life, Augustine's emphasis is on bringing these moments of life together through the soul's extension. Plotinus goes deeper here, in Pannenberg's view, because he sees finite being, with its disjunctive experience of time, as grounded in eternity, by which he means the eternal being of God.90 Decisive for Pannenberg is the connection of the analysis of time with the idea of eternity. In so far as Augustine failed to make such a connection, his analysis of time, whilst psychologically sharp, is ontologically inferior to that of Plotinus. The same criticism applies to Heidegger. There is a narrowing of vision here which can be attributed to Kant. What Kant did in the first Critique, according to Pannenberg, was to derive the unity of time from the unity of the ego. Pannenberg finds this a serious flaw. Kant saw time as 'the form ... of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state'.91 However, there is more to his view, for there is a background to this subjectivist view which stands in tension with it. What is prominent in Kant is his 'anthropocentrically oriented intention', but he also sees differentiated time as presupposing 'a constant unity of time'.92 For Pannenberg, if time is given in intuition as an infinite whole, it cannot be derived from the ego, for the ego is not an infinite whole. The conclusion is that the awareness of time cannot be based on the self-intuition of the ego.93 Thus Plotinus's derivation of time from eternity is superior to Kant's reduction of everything to the transcendental subject. Pannenberg's insistence that time should be viewed against the horizon of the eternal makes him as critical of Heidegger as he is of 9° M/G, 8if. 91 M/G, 83.

9Z 5T2, 94. Pannenberg cites the Critique of Pure Reason, §A, 3 if. [See the Transcendental Aesthetic', Section II, §4, part 4 & 5, p. 75 in the Norman Kemp Smith edition (London: Macmillan, 1933).] 93 M/G, 83.

in

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Kant. In grounding the notion of time, Kant replaces eternity with the subjectivity of the ego. Heidegger replaces it with individual human existence (Dasein). Pannenberg argues against Heidegger that the wholeness of human existence is not experienced in the face of death, for death fragments existence. 'We will need another light than the one that death throws on a life, if we are to recognize in that life some sort of totality.'94 Pannenberg concludes that the leading role in our consciousness of time belongs to the future understood as the source of possible completion, as can be clearly seen in Plotinus. Working outward from this perspective, the present and the past can then be interpreted as participating in the future totality, or as falling short of it.95

This quotation underscores the point that being and time belong together. The future, understood as the field of the possible and the source of life's unity and of its discrete moments and events, is the source of possible completion of our existence. If this is so, the essence of an individual's existence is determined by its future. On this basis Pannenberg speculates whether beings are to be conceived as the anticipation of their essences, indeed whether 'everything that exists is what it is only as the anticipation of its future, in which ... the wholeness of each being might be established'.96 Pannenberg concludes that eternity represents the possibility that finite beings will have their being completed, that all temporal moments participate in eternity, and that the future is to be seen as the source of the wholeness of finite being.97 The present as anticipation of the future If the future is the source of the completion and meaning of individual being, how is the present to be understood? Does Pannenberg - as some critics think - devalue the present?98 The answer to this depends on the capacity of Pannenberg's concept of 94 M/G, 86. 95 M/G, 87.

96 M/G, 88; Pannenberg's italics. 97 M/G, 88f. 98 See e.g. P.C. Hodgson's criticism (based only on Jesus - God and Man) that in an apparent over-reaction to existentialism Pannenberg emphasizes the future at the expense of the present; 'Pannenberg on Jesus: A Review Article', Journal of the American Academy of Religion 36, December 1968, 374. See 112


'anticipation' to link, yet differentiate, the present and the future. The concept of 'anticipation' (or 'prolepsis') plays a role in his discussion of many subjects. Its use, especially when equated with 'prolepsis', has a long history, not only in theology but in philosophy." However, Pannenberg has given it an importance in systematic theology unparalleled by any other theologian. It reflects his unparalleled elevation of the concept of the kingdom of God to theological importance. He writes: The category of anticipation or prolepsis, which was originally introduced to describe the distinctive structure of the history of Jesus, especially of his resurrection, ... shows itself to be a fundamental structural element both of cognition and of language, and of the being of beings in their temporality.100

Pannenberg has himself described its importance in terms of its correlation with the notion of eschatology. If Christianity cannot do without an eschatology, the present experience of salvation has to be connected with it. For Pannenberg it is not a question of realised eschatology; the eschaton is still future. But it has come proleptically, by anticipation. If Weiss was right about Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God, it follows that the final salvation, the presence of the eschaton, was not yet at hand except by anticipation. Then it is also the case that the reconciliation of the world 'has been accomplished - but by anticipation'.101 The concept of anticipation has its meaning in the framework of the Christian experience of the already and the not yet. Present Christian experience is that salvation is already truly experienced, but not yet in its fulness. There is continuity between this present experience and the future reality of salvation, but they are not identical. Salvation has been given and the kingdom of God has

also H. Burhenn, Tannenberg's Doctrine of God', Scottish Journal of Theology 2,8.6, 1975, 547. 99 A detailed history of the concept of anticipation was traced by L. Kugelmann, Antizipation; Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986). D. Polk lists some theologians and biblical scholars in whose work the idea can be found some decades before Pannenberg; On the Way to God, 2.30, note 72. 100 Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, 2,60. 101 W. Pannenberg, 'Can Christianity Do Without an Eschatology?', 29. 113

GOD AND THE FUTURE

come, but 'only in the form of an anticipation of a future which in its fulness has not yet materialized'.102 The concept of anticipation serves not only to describe the connection between present and future salvation but also to make intelligible the 'scandal' of the Christian claim that in a particular event in history something of universal significance has taken place. It provides a way of seeing how the particular and the universal can coincide. It establishes an essential connection between a historical event and the eschatological event which Christians believe will determine the eternal destiny of all people. How can so much be claimed for a single event in history? Responding to G. Klein, who thinks that the 'once for all' claim of Christianity is at risk in his theology, Pannenberg argues that it is 'only through the idea of the prolepsis of this "once and for all" that the unsurpassability of the Christ-event becomes clear ... since this event, although it took place once in the past at a definite time, still remains before us as our ultimate future'.103 For Pannenberg everything hinges on the eschatological nature of the Christ event, since 'absolute meaning' could be claimed for nothing less than such an event. The same holds true for its 'once for all-ness'. But the Christ-event also takes place in ordinary time. Hence it can be an eschatological event only proleptically or in an anticipatory way. Speaking of revelation, Pannenberg writes: While it is only the whole history that demonstrates the deity of the one God, and this result can only be given at the end of all history, there is still one particular event that has absolute meaning as the revelation of God, namely, the Christ event, insofar as it anticipates the end of history.104

As an eschatological event, it is impossible for any other event to surpass it as the demonstration of God's deity. Neither can the Christ-event be surpassed as the salvation-event, because it is the prolepsis of the eschatological event, which remains before us as our ultimate future. IOZ

Pannenberg, 'Can Christianity Do Without an Eschatology?', 30. The terms 'anticipation' and 'prolepsis' are also scattered throughout the Systematic Theology. The basis for it is 'the proleptic presence of the salvation of the divine rule in the message and work of Jesus'; STz, 402.. 103 RAH, postscript to the ind edition, 194. 104 RAH, 144. 114


Pannenberg believes that without the Christ-event's proleptic structure the claim of absoluteness, 'once for all-ness' or universality is no more than a bare assertion. It could only be asserted fideistically. But by means of the concept of anticipation this central Christian claim can be seen to have an objective basis, namely, in the relation that always pertains between the present and the future. The concept of anticipation thus provides a way out of relativism in theology; it is Pannenberg's attempt to overcome the problem that defeated Troeltsch.105 If Troeltsch was unable to echo the traditional affirmation of the Christ-event as 'absolute', Hegel failed to do justice to the irreducible finitude of experience and to recognise 'the impossibility of taking account of the contingent and the individual by means of the universal'.106 For Pannenberg the way through this Scylla and Charybdis is by a proper appreciation of eschatology and its correlative notion of anticipation. This requires moving beyond both Hegel and Troeltsch, keeping the horizon of the future open and preserving the finitude of human experience, yet not succumbing to a relativism which surrenders the claim of Christ's universal significance. The history of Jesus, in its relation to the Israelite-Jewish tradition, gives us an understanding of history in which its totality is already established by the fact that its end has become accessible in a provisional and anticipatory way. The appeal to eschatology and the concept of anticipation open up a view of history which, in Pannenberg's view, makes the Christian claim defensible. Whether one has in mind Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God or the resurrection of Jesus, the concept of anticipation connects yet differentiates present experience and future 105 Pannenberg has many positive things to say about Troeltsch, e.g. TPS, 103-16. But there are two great problems in his thought: the one-sided emphasis on the kingdom of God as a future reality, 'at the expense of the presence of this future in the history of Jesus', and the location of the absolute as a final goal 'totally beyond present experience'. TPS, no. Thus present experience in Troeltsch's view has no room for the absolute. The concept of anticipation was intended to overcome these problems. L. Allen says that Pannenberg, more than any other, has taken up Troeltsch's tasks in the late twentieth century. 'From Dogmatik to Glaubenslehre: Ernst Troeltsch and the Task of Theology', Fides et Historia n.z, Spring 1980, 54. 106 BQTi, 134-

H5

GOD AND THE FUTURE

fulfilment. Jesus' claim about God's judgment and salvation in his own ministry and the Christian claim of the presence of eschatological life through the risen Christ both imply 'an anticipation of a confirmation that is to be expected only from the future'.107 Both claims have an anticipatory or proleptic structure. A claim is made which, if it receives eschatological confirmation, will be shown to have been not mere wishful thinking but the accurate perception of the future reality as already present. The concept of anticipation thus has a 'strictly theological' root, as Pannenberg confirms.108 Anticipation has an epistemological and an ontological aspect. Epistemologically, it calls for confirmation from the future. It looks to the prospect of overcoming the present contestability of Christian claims about the Christ-event and about God. Until then anticipation includes 'the eschatological reservation that applies to all Christological conclusions drawn from Jesus' resurrection'.109 The ontological aspect is more radical. Assuming that there will be a future confirmation (and everything depends on this), the future reality already appears proleptically in the present, although it remains future. What happens in the present already has the character of the future reality. Such a view presupposes the reality of the future - indeed its primacy over the present and the past even though it does not yet exist. To make matters even more difficult, Pannenberg also sees the relation between future and present from the other side. Pannenberg insists that an event in time - the resurrection of Jesus from the dead - has determined the ultimate future. Without the resurrection of Jesus, the ultimate future of the general resurrection of the dead could not be what, in the light of Jesus' resurrection, it will be. There is certainly a reciprocal relation here, but where then does the priority lie? Pannenberg accepts Clayton's description of this paradoxical state of affairs as meaning that 'the gist of the final outcome has been decided (ontologically) in Jesus' resurrection'.110 Of course, we do not yet know this with certainty; it all depends on the actual IQ

7 JGM, 58.

108 w Pannenberg, 'A Response to my American Friends', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 319. I0 ? /GM, 397. 110 Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 131. Pannenberg's endorsement of this is on p. 32.0. 116


arrival of that final outcome in the parousia of Jesus. This is certainly a 'robust' ontological doctrine.111 Wherever Pannenberg uses the concept of anticipation this same condition applies: unless the future of which something is said to be an anticipation actually arrives, that event will not have been an anticipation of the supposed future reality. But the concept of anticipation is not used only in relation to events; it plays a key role in Pannenberg's discussion of other subjects. In a discussion of the nature of theological language, Pannenberg reflects on the proleptic element of dogmatic statements (about God).112 Dogmatic statements 'rest entirely on an anticipation of the eschaton', for they make reference to 'something that will fully appear only in a future which is inconceivable for us, but which has already happened in Jesus at a specific time'.113 Language 'lags behind' the reality which it seeks to express. It is always provisional. But Pannenberg asserts more than the provisionality of theological statements. That to which theological language refers will only be finally disclosed by the arrival of the eschaton. Theological language points ahead to its referent, and relies on confirmation from the eschatological future. Theological models 'have the function of an anticipatory presentation of the truth of God, for the conclusive revelation of which in the world faith is waiting'.114 Pannenberg extends his view of the proleptic character of theological language to the concept of truth. In both Greek and Hebrew understanding, truth is something that can be experienced, but it is characteristic of the Israelite notion of truth that its full disclosure is expected from the future. Truth 'always proves itself for the first time through the future. Therefore it is accessible now only by trusting anticipation of the still-outstanding proof, and that means precisely, by faith.'115 Truth is not the correspondence of thought to reality. It is not simply 'available' to those who open their eyes to the inner structure of things. Truth is historical, 111

C. Braaten's phrase; Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg^ 129. 112 See esp. part 6 of 'What is a Dogmatic Statement?', BQTi, 201-5. IJ 3 BQTi, 204, 205. 114 STi, 60. (Here I have slightly changed Bromiley's translation; cf. the German original, p. 71.) IJ 5 W. Pannenberg, 'What is Truth?', BQTz, 7. 117

GOD AND THE FUTURE

proving itself in the course of history. It is given from the future, says Pannenberg; it is ultimately the truth of God, whose mode of being is future. 'All constancy, whether it be in the orders of nature, in the life of nations, or in the individual, is embraced by the truth of God and is grounded in it.'116 Pannenberg works with a view of truth not usually found in philosophical discussion. His concern is neither with the narrow question of the truth of propositions nor with the modern subjectivisation of truth.117 The two aspects of the problem of truth which are paramount for Pannenberg are the unity of truth and its historicity. In the modern (post-Enlightenment) discussion of truth these two aspects coincide. The unity of truth can only be thought of as the history of truth. Truth itself is historical; the essence of truth is the process of its history.118 Hegel tried to articulate a theory of reality on this basis. He saw truth as a process that runs its course, and saw that the unity of the process, which is full of contradictions, can only be seen from the standpoint of its end. The higher stage will always synthesise into a unity the contradictions of the previous stage. The highest stage is that of the Absolute, which Hegel understood theistically. But the key point at which Hegel failed, in Pannenberg's view, was his incapacity to see the Absolute in its futurity. He thus associated the Absolute with his own thought, rather than with an open future. Pannenberg, often criticised for being too Hegelian, moves away from Hegel here, adopting the biblical view that truth must be understood eschatologically. Only at the end, understood eschatologically, not as some timeless Absolute, will truth - the truth of all things and the truth about God - disclose itself. This raises the question of the status of present truth-claims; what is the relation of present truth to this final, eschatological truth? The issue is not one of the adequacy of concepts for the reality to which they are supposed to correspond. Truth becomes a matter of anticipation, of openness to its future disclosure. Pannenberg sees this as the same as trust in God, whose reality awaits its verification from the same future. The problem of truth can therefore never be only a philosophical matter; it is as much 116 ZI

BQTz, 9.

7 BQT2, 18. See also 'Wahrheit, Gewissheit und Glaube', GSTz, 2.2.9. 118 BQT2, zof. 118


theological. In particular, it is christological; the Christian claim is that Jesus Christ is the ultimate, unsurpassable revelation of God, and thus embodies the truth of God. But this itself is to be understood proleptically. The truth that appeared in Christ is an appearance of the eschatological truth in the form of anticipation. Its truth can only be definitively established in the eschatological future, but it is nonetheless an anticipatory form of the same truth. Pannenberg understands not only the concept of truth but the nature of reflection in this anticipatory, eschatological way. In his discussion of the 'concept' and its place in philosophy he takes up Dilthey's criticism of 'the domination of the concept'.119 Again, Hegel's view of philosophical truth as a higher form of religious or theological truth exemplifies the problem. This is not intended as a veto on metaphysical thought or conceptual clarity. But any metaphysical statement - and it is no less true for theological statements - is unavoidably limited by the historicity of its starting point. What follows, then, for metaphysics and philosophical thought generally? Metaphysical reflection must ... take on the form of a conjectural reconstruction in relation to its object, one which distinguishes itself from its intended truth while at the same time construing itself as a preliminary form of this truth. Its characteristic reflective form will have to be more that of anticipation than that of concept in the sense of classical metaphysics. Put more precisely, the philosophical concept will reveal itself to have the structure of anticipation.120

Beyond recognizing the anticipatory structure of all assertions, and especially of hypothetical assertions concerning reality as a whole, Pannenberg sees it as the task of metaphysics to investigate 'the structure of anticipations'.121 The relation between the anticipation and the content toward which it is directed may be seen either as external, that is, accidental, or as intrinsic. Pannenberg argues for a more than accidental connection between an anticipation and its content. On the one hand, the truth of the anticipation 'hinges on the still-absent future'; on the other hand, the anticipation is 'a real instance of something's occurring in 119 120 121

W. Pannenberg, 'Concept and Anticipation', M/G, 92. M/G, 93f. Pannenberg's italics. M/G, 94. 119

GOD AND THE FUTURE

advance'.122 An anticipation is unavoidably ambiguous. Its truthcontent will always depend on a future verification. But if there should be no future confirmation of the truth-claim implicit in the anticipation, it will turn out to be wrong, mere 'prophetic enthusiasm'. We can never have final certainty about the truth of our assertions in philosophy, theology or any science that is empirical and predictive. As we have seen, the notion of 'anticipation' is of major importance in Pannenberg's theology and has its applicability across an almost unlimited field of experience. The breadth of its scope is accounted for by the fact that the forms of anticipation of final reality are many and varied; there is no concept, no statement, no historical being of which it cannot be said that it is an anticipation of final reality, either ontically or noetically. This, of course, is more obvious in respect of some things than others. In everyday speech or experience we are more or less unaware of the reality or truth of which a particular thing or statement is an anticipation. Pannenberg describes these kinds of anticipation as 'broken'.123 In thinking about people, for example, we are more likely to regard them as the product of their past history than as the anticipation of their final identity or essence. In other experiences - Pannenberg suggests things like peace, spirit, love and life - there is a greater continuity between the present experience and its full eschatological reality. He calls these examples of 'unbroken' or 'pure' anticipation, even though our participation in these realities is not actually pure. When Christians speak of 'life in the Spirit' or 'abiding in Christ' they speak of an anticipation of an essentially eschatological reality; Pannenberg would regard this a case of 'pure' anticipation. The same would be true in the Christian experience of holy communion as a foretaste of the heavenly banquet. The terms 'broken', 'unbroken' and 'pure' are probably not the clearest, but they intend to point to varying degrees of obvious continuity between the present experience and the future reality which it anticipates. It should be emphasised, however, that Pannenberg sees the truth of every statement and the truth of every creature from the standpoint of its final, eschatological 122

M/G, 96.

12.3 w. Pannenberg, 'Response to the Discussion', in Robinson and Cobb (eds.), Theology as History, z6zL 12O


truth or being. There is nothing created that does not have some relation to God's eschatological rule over the whole creation. The concept of anticipation permits the predication of both identity and difference between something that exists now and its final essence. Consider human persons, to whom we readily attribute a unique set of attributes which, together with a unique history, make them what they are. But what are they? Are they what they are becoming, or are they becoming what they are? If the latter, how is this so? It cannot be disputed that they change with time, that what they are changes over time.114 Only at their death - and in an important sense not even then - is their identity established finally and fully. Pannenberg writes, 'Not only our knowing but also the identity of things themselves [is] not yet completely present in the process of time.'115 What something is changes with time, as it becomes part of new contexts of meaning; thus its essence appears only at the end. But at the same time it has to be said that this had been its essence all along. This is a paradoxical state of affairs, which Pannenberg illustrates from the field of horticulture: A zinnia is already a zinnia as a cutting and remains one during the entire process of its growth up to blossoming, even though the flower bears its name on account of its blossom. If there were only a single such flower, we could not determine its nature in advance; and yet over the period of its growth it would still be what it revealed itself to be at the end. It would possess its essence through anticipation, though only at the end of the developmental process would one be able to know that this was its essence.126

Pannenberg makes both a noetic and an ontological point here. We cannot know the essence of something until it is fully disclosed at the end of its existence; this is not a controversial remark. It is the ontological point that is the heart of his claim. What he claims here is that the essence or identity of something is not determined until its end; if the end were to be different its essence would also be different; yet by anticipation it already possesses its essence. Pannenberg describes this as the retroactive constitution of the 124

Pannenberg argues that there is no supra-historical identity that persists through time; ATP, 240, 513-15. IZ 5 MIG, 104. Ii6 M/G, 105. IZI

GOD AND THE FUTURE

essence of a thing from the future.12-7 Technically, he proposes a modification of Aristotle's concept of substance by allowing 'time and becoming [to be] the medium that constitutes the whatness of things'. Then things would 'be what they are ... retroactively from the outcome of their becoming on the one hand, and on the other in the sense of anticipating the completion of their process of becoming, their history'.128 This is an important statement for understanding the notion of anticipation and the primacy of the future. What is most difficult here is the idea of the retroactive establishment of essence or identity. From the standpoint of the present it is established from the future; yet this future is anticipated already in the present. What endures through time is a series of changing (enriching or diminishing) anticipations of the identity that is established retroactively from the future. It may be objected that there must be some ontic structure that exists in and through historical change,129 but Pannenberg would not see any such constant structure or element as non-temporal. Nor would he see the need for it to avoid the structure of anticipation.130 Pannenberg's ontology of the future sounds unfamiliar and counter-intuitive. But it is also strangely attractive. He has been developing his theological-philosophical vision with great consistency for several decades now, and shown it to be comprehensive and far-reaching. He has mounted strong criticisms of alternative ontological positions.131 A major strength of his position is its emphasis on the openness of being to the new. It is immensely liberating, for example, to think of human persons as not simply the outcome of their past history but as the anticipation of their future identity. Similarly, Pannenberg's view of truth, of concepts, and of the relation between thought and reality is thoughtprovoking and challenging. The whole proposal, in its breadth and detail, is breathtaking in its originality. In contrast to the school of I2 7 Ii8 IZ9

M/G, 107. M/G, 107.

P. Clayton, 'Being and One Theologian', 668. '3° ATP, 514. 131 R. Olson says that Tannenberg's critiques of ... other metaphysical concepts of God and the world are extremely cogent. His historical and logical analyses meticulously reveal their inner aporias'; Review of M/G in Journal of Religion 72.2, April 1992., 2,86. 12,2


process thought, to which many thinkers have contributed, Pannenberg has single-handedly developed an alternative ontological vision which is fully a match for process thought in its sophistication.132 Pannenberg's ontological proposals have generated a good deal of interest. But have they - especially the idea of anticipation been persuasive? P. Clayton, a friendly critic, is not satisfied that Pannenberg's concept of anticipation has been shown to work. There have been five areas of criticisms. First, ever since Pannenberg moved away from a theology of hope and began to develop a theology of the future it has been claimed that his ontological ideas lack substantiation, and such claims continue to be made. However, whether this was ever a fair criticism or not, it can no longer be made after the publication of three volumes of Systematic Theology and Metaphysics and the Idea of God. This is a criticism which cannot be substantiated, and it is easily dismissed. Second, a related criticism, not deserving of any more attention than the first, is that Pannenberg's theology is too much concerned with ontological questions. Thirty years ago H. Obayashi made the criticism that Pannenberg's ontology 'ultimately succumbs to an ontological totalitarianism'.133 R. Ahlers suggests that, in attending too closely to the metaphysical questions of modern philosophy, a theologian may not only fail at that level but also surrender his/her proper theological obligations.134 These criticisms are mainly methodological; about the proper business of theology. Pannenberg is unwilling to do theology in isolation from other areas of thought, especially philosophy and the natural sciences. He is indeed a strongly philosophical theologian, but no reader of the Systematic Theology could fail to discern a very theological theologian. This, too, is not a serious criticism. I3Z

See J. B. Cobb, 'Pannenberg and Process Theology', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 55. P. Hefner has described the magnitude of his programme as 'stunning'; p. 2.83 of the same volume. 133 H. Obayashi, 'Future and Responsibility: A Critique of Pannenberg's Eschatology', Sciences Religieuses/Studies in Religion i, 1971, 198f. 134 R. Ahlers, Theory of God and Theological Method', Dialog 2.2, Summer 1983, 2,39. 113

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Third, another criticism, deserving of serious consideration, is that Pannenberg is (consciously or not) a 'determinist'. This criticism is prompted by his understanding of God as the all-determining reality, which, on the face of it, might be incompatible with any real human freedom. For Pannenberg to make God's alldetermining power a matter of the future does not, it is alleged, overcome the problem.135 This criticism continues to be made; several contributors to The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg refer to the matter.136 But Pannenberg, in his response, speaks of 'the supposed peril of determinism';137 he has consistently denied the charge. However, the criticism warrants careful consideration, and this is best done in discussing God's action from the future in the next chapter. Fourth, Pannenberg is also criticised for accepting the idea of a future consummation of history. If this idea is rejected, the whole notion of the anticipation of the eschatological future must be rejected with it. What does 'the end of history' or 'the consummation of creation' mean? Some regard the idea of the end of the world as a hermeneutical necessity, but it is a horizon that is never actually reached; perhaps a vestige of apocalyptic thought which now needs to be abandoned.138 Process theologians, committed to the idea of a completely open future, question the validity of the idea of a temporal consummation of history. J. B. Cobb, while accepting the idea of human survival, cannot connect this with an assured consummation of history.139 L. Ford says that process theologians do not think of history or time as having an end.140 However, Pannenberg has consistently argued for the necessity of a final consummation of all things in history, although he postulates no simple series of events corresponding to the symbols of 135 This is the criticism of David McKenzie in Tannenberg on God and Freedom', The Journal of Religion 60.3, July 1980, esp. 319-19. 136 See the essays by Clayton (140!.), Polk (152-68), Ford (75-89) and Cobb (68-70). It is also a major issue discussed in D. Polk, On the Way to God, esp. ch. 8. 137 Pannenberg, 'A Response to my American Friends', 321; italics added. 138 W. Logister, 'Het Eschatologisch Probleem bij Wolfhart Pannenberg: Analyse en Kritiek', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 24, April 1970, 283-6. 139 Cobb, Tannenberg and Process Theology', 67. 140 L. Ford, The Divine Activity of the Future', Process Studies 11.3, Fall 1981, 178.

124


eschatological expectation.141 He has devoted the last chapter of his theological system to a discussion of many aspects of the Christian expectation of the end, including the idea of the kingdom of God as the entry of eternity into time.142 This is a criticism which, if it had validity, would apply to almost all theology claiming to be Christian. Fifth, Pannenberg is criticised for not being consistent in his use of the concept of anticipation. This criticism is made most carefully by P. Clayton, who claims that Pannenberg uses the term in two different senses, one of which would make him a determinist. The first sense (anticipation^ implies an ontologically determinate view of history; the second (anticipationJ has a more open view of history.143 The question is whether the totality of meaning anticipated in a particular event is thereby unalterably and invariably set in place - in which case a 'determinist' reading of history is warranted - or whether there is a real possibility that the end which is purportedly anticipated may turn out to be different from what is expected - in which case the event will not have been correctly understood as that anticipation. Clayton is justified in claiming that there is such a discrepancy in Pannenberg's use of 'anticipation' and in insisting that the tension between the two senses of the concept must be resolved. It is not enough to say that 'the two belong together'.144 There is no detailed response to Clayton's criticism in Metaphysics and the Idea of God. While the concept of anticipation is in many ways remarkable, a fuller discussion of it, focussing especially on the tension between an open and a determinate view of history, would be helpful. In this chapter we have surveyed the major aspects of 141 W. Pannenberg, 'Can Christianity Do without an Eschatology?', in G. B. Caird, The Christian Hope, 3 zf. These things are finally a matter of hope. They also exceed all our concepts, as does the divine reality itself; STj, 52.7. 142 STj, 595-607. Pannenberg says, The relation between time and eternity is the crucial problem in eschatology'; 595. Many theological problems can only be clarified on the basis of an adequate view of the relation between time and eternity. I4 ^ P. Clayton, 'Anticipation and Theological Method', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 137^ 144 Clayton, 'Anticipation and Theological Method', 138. Pannenberg's response is on p. 311.

125

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Pannenberg's eschatological ontology. From the beginning he was fascinated with the ontological implications of Jesus' understanding of the kingdom of God and Jesus' resurrection from the dead. In the course of developing these implications in both the noetic and ontic realms, Pannenberg overturned some standard ontological assumptions, such as the priority of the past over the present and the future, and argued for the priority of the future. What he proposes might well be the beginning of a 'paradigm shift' which, if the problems with it can be resolved, may throw new light on old ontological questions. We have made frequent reference to God. Pannenberg is right to insist that ontology and theology cannot properly be separated. The focus in this chapter has been on ontological issues; in the next chapter the focus will be on the understanding of God which Pannenberg develops in tandem with his ontology. For him the point is unquestionably theology, and theology is essentially the 'science' of God. The ontology has a supportive role, though it is intended to make a contribution in its own distinctive realm. The next two chapters will investigate Pannenberg's understanding of the being and action of God in relation to the cosmos. In particular, we shall ask what kind of God has the futurist ontology we have been considering as its correlate.

12,6

5

The God of the future Introduction

A

good deal has already been said about Pannenberg's understanding of God in the previous two chapters, since his ontological and theological thought cannot be separated. We now have to see how the eschatological perspective shapes the doctrine of God. This will first be done in a general way and then in the final chapter quite explicitly in a trinitarian way. In particular, we must show what Pannenberg means by the idea that God is the power of the future or that the future is God's mode of being, and what this means both for God's being and God's action in the world. This will involve a comparison of Pannenberg's view of God with that of some other theologians, notably process thinkers. The underlying issue will be the relation of God to the course of history. Critics have pointed to the danger of falling into a Hegelian equation of God and history, but Pannenberg steers well clear of such a confusion.1 The question about God's being and God's relation to created reality must be posed on the tension between God as the all-determining reality - Pannenberg's working definition of God - and as the world's future which gives freedom to the world to go its own way. Indeed, Pannenberg argues that it is precisely the freedom of human beings and the contingency of events in the world that 1 Grenz defends Pannenberg on this point; Reason for Hope, 71. T. Bradshaw regards Pannenberg's theology as 'a Hegelian doctrine of quite a pure strain', with an ultimate identification of the divine and the historical; see 'God's Relationship to History in Pannenberg', Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology, Special Study 3, 1989, 59, 61.

127

GOD AND THE FUTURE

require an understanding of God as future. This does not mean that God is only future; as the future of every past, God's action can be described in all three tenses. However, this tension gives rise to two important questions. First, if God is related to the world primarily as its future, how does God create from this future? This question, already raised in the previous chapter, must be pressed further. It represents a point of significant interaction with process theology. Second, can Pannenberg survive the criticism that he is a crypto-determinist in his view of history?2 Prima facie, understanding God as the 'all-determining' reality or power stands in tension with other things Pannenberg claims about God's relation to created reality. This alleged determinism needs to be substantiated or refuted. Before considering these questions, it will be useful to see how the idea of God's futurity originates and develops in Pannenberg's thought. Here three essays are of particular importance: 'The Question of God',3 'The God of Hope'4 and 'Theology and the Kingdom of God'.5 These essays, together with the view of God Pannenberg was expressing in his work on Christology,6 show clearly the direction in which his theology was heading. Their discussion of God's futurity forms a foundation for his later articulation of the doctrine of God. Pannenberg can hardly have foreseen in the early 19605 how these ideas would find their systematic shape,7 but he saw already then that there would be radical implications. These early ideas about God contain the seed of his developed theological thought, culminating in the Systematic z To my knowledge, this term has not actually been used of Pannenberg. I use it because the criticism that he is a determinist is made despite his vigorous denials. 3 First given as a lecture in Gottingen in July 1964, published in Evangelische Theologie, 2,5, 1965; see BQTz, ch. 7. 4 First published in the Festschrift, Ernst Block zu Ehren, ed. S. Unseld (Frankfurt, 1965); see BQTz, ch. 8. 5 First published in Una Sancta 2,4.2, 1967, 3-19; later in TKG, ch. i, 51-71. 6 W. Pannenberg, Grundzuge der Christologie (JGM) was published in 1964. 7 He refers to the 'many years' it took him to fit the many topics of theology into a systematic whole, the doctrine of God being the most difficult. 'An Autobiographical Sketch', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 16.

12,8

THE GOD OF THE FUTURE

Theology. Their importance cannot be overstated, for there is a very clear continuity between his early and his later theological thought. Early ideas about God Pannenberg was driven in his early work on reformulating the doctrine of God by two main concerns: a positive and a negative one. The positive concern, discussed already, was the conviction that in both Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God and in his resurrection a thoroughly eschatological reality is in view. It is a matter of the ultimate future of God and God's power over all things. This gives rise to a simple theological syllogism: 1i) The concept of God cannot be detached from the idea of the kingdom of God. (2) The kingdom of God is unquestionably an eschatological reality. (3) Therefore God must be understood in an eschatological way. Years later Pannenberg spoke of reformulating the doctrine of God 'on the basis of eschatology' or 'from the point of view of Jesus' eschatological message'.8 As we noted in chapter two, Pannenberg regards Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God as strongly influenced by apocalyptic thought. God can be thought of only in relation to the coming of God's eschatological rule. 'God's being and existence cannot be conceived apart from his rule.'9 The negative concern is equally important: dissatisfaction with the classical philosophical understanding of God in theology. There are clearly serious difficulties with this understanding of God, as both theological critics and atheist observers have pointed out. Pannenberg's own view is that 'the classical Christian concept of God, if rigorously developed, could result in unacceptable, deterministic consequences'.10 Pannenberg was driven to his doctrine of God, negatively, by his dissatisfaction with the reformulations of the concept of God in German Idealism (especially 8

Pannenberg, 'Providence, God, and Eschatology', 175. TKG, 55. 10 Pannenberg, 'Providence, God, and Eschatology', 175; cf. 'Speaking about God in the Face of Atheist Criticism', BQTj, ch. 3, esp. 107-15. 9

129

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Hegel) and by process thinkers, beginning with Whitehead and Alexander.11 The combined force of these influences resulted in the initially very surprising idea that God's reality is essentially future. The key phrase Pannenberg used in respect of God was 'the power of the future'; it is found in certain key essays, after which it recedes into the background.12 The reason is probably twofold. First, Pannenberg later developed a much fuller account of the problem of time, in which the priority of the future was given a more solid ontological foundation.13 Second, Pannenberg was also developing his doctrine of the Trinity in the 1970S,14 and one of the key elements in such a doctrine is the relation of God to history. For Pannenberg, the doctrine of the Trinity provides the key to understanding how God can be 'absolute in His relation to the world and not restricted by it, but fulfilled ... through that relationship'.15 The details of this discussion will be considered in the final chapter, but his doctrine of the Trinity is a more differentiated attempt to articulate the Christian belief that God acts on the present (and thus has acted on what is now the past) from the future. However, this is to anticipate the culmination of Pannenberg's doctrine of God. The initial moves in this direction develop the idea of God as 'the power of the future', especially in the essays referred to. In the even earlier monograph on Christology there are already strong hints of such a view of God. In the discussion of Jesus' participation in the lordship of God, Pannenberg links the futurity of God's lordship with God's eternity.16 Eternity is not to be understood as timelessness but as inclusive of time and as its source and goal. However, from the standpoint of time this fulness can only be sought in the future.17 In the early work the idea of the 11

Pannenberg, 'Providence, God, and Eschatology', 175. It still occurs in 'Eschatologie und Sinnerfahrung' (1972.), published in Gottesgedanke und menschliche Freiheit and GSTz; ET in BQTj, ch. 7; see esp. 2.10. 13 Pannenberg, 'Being and Time', in MIG, ch. 4, 77-84: '... when the theory of time is oriented toward the eternal totality, the consequence is a primacy of the future for the understanding of time'. 14 See the three important essays on the Trinity in GST2, chs 3-5. 15 Pannenberg, The God of History', 35. A translation of 'Der Gott der Geschichte', GSTz, 12.2. 16 /GM, 368. J 7 STi, 408. 12

130


creation of all things from the future also appears but is not developed. Creation takes place out of the ultimate future, from the eschaton, for 'only from the perspective of the end are all things what they truly are'.18 In this early work Pannenberg does not develop the idea of God as future. For this we must look at the three important essays mentioned above. i. 'The Question of God' In this first essay the issue is the justification of speech about God in a secular climate of thought. Pannenberg agrees that the question of God arises primarily in the context of the (religious) experience of a power that can bring human existence to its wholeness and grant it coherence and meaning.19 It is especially important to defend the personal nature of this power,20 that is, its non-manipulability and concrete claim upon individuals. In the personhood of Israel's God lay his freedom and faithfulness, experienced in a history of ever new events. God's reality and faithfulness can only be finally established in the future. Given the difficulty - in the modern world - of speaking about God, the key point is God's future, 'the future of his reign, which will be the definitive revelation of his deity'.21 The future of God is thus critical for the knowledge that God is and who God is. But God is known precisely in God's rule, as the history of the world is given its coherence and meaning in relation to God; and this rule will be conclusively real in the future. Only the coming God is Lord over all things. The same point is made anthropologically. On the one hand, belief in God precipitates the question of what it means to 18

/GM, 2,30. See also TKG, 70. See BQTz, 222-7. The framework within which speech about God can take place in the modern world, in Pannenberg's view, is that of anthropology. 20 This is a major task Pannenberg sets himself; cf. BQTz, 2.2.6-32. Pannenberg argues that thinking about God as personal is not a projection on the basis of the 'personal' character of human existence, but that 'the modern concept of the personal has arisen out of Christian theology; indeed from the problems of Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity'; 229. The claim is substantiated in Pannenberg's article, 'Person', in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vol. 5, 3rd edn., 1961, cols 230-5. The key point, contra Fichte, is that the infinity of God is not a barrier to God's personhood, but actually underscores it; BQTz, 231. Pannenberg returns to this theme in 'The God of Hope', BQTz, esp. 245. " BQTz, 232. 19

131

GOD AND THE FUTURE

be human; on the other hand, understanding the human being includes the question about God. This question, too, reaches its goal only 'in the eschatological future of God's public reign'.22 Thus, in this early essay, Pannenberg claims that in both an ontological and epistemological sense God can only be thought of in connection with the future. The future of God's rule will prove who and what God is, and will confirm that the human quest for God, now so ambiguous, has a solid ground and a sure goal. 2. 'The God of Hope' In this second essay, more important than the first, Pannenberg asks whether there are new possibilities for speaking of God in the wake of modern atheism's rejection of the idea of the highest being or the omnipotent deity who leaves no room for human freedom.23 His argument is that the biblical God is the God of the promises, 'the God who leads history into a new future', 'the God of the coming kingdom', and that in this light all reality is to be understood as eschatologically oriented.24 This focus on the future received unparalleled sharpness in the life and teaching of Jesus, with the result that God's future was seen as determinative of the present. As we saw in chapter four, there are points of connection here with Bloch, who had shown the power of the still-open future and of the hope that reaches out to it. Bloch would have the eschatological kingdom without the God of the kingdom, which for Pannenberg makes the kingdom ontologically precarious. There is neither a kingdom without God nor a God without the kingdom. This has radical implications for the way we understand God: from the biblical standpoint the being of God and that of the kingdom are identical, since the being of God is his lordship. He is God only in the execution of this lordship, and this full accomplishment of his lordship is determined as something future. To this extent, the God to whom the hope of the kingdom refers is characterized in a radical and exclusive sense by 'futurity as a quality of being'/5

In this essay we see a more developed view of God's being and encounter ideas of great originality. In a few pages he sets out ideas ^ Z 3 n 2 5

5QT2, 2,32,. The God of Hope', JBQT2, 235. JBQT2, 237. BQTz, 240. 132


which will become foundational in his doctrine of God. Six points are particularly salient.26 First, the accent shifts to God's futurity. Pannenberg makes a significant modification to the classical doctrine of God. God is still to be thought of as transcendent, but not in the usual way. With encouragement from Bloch's thought, the question of God as the most perfect being now assumes a temporal form and becomes a question about 'the end' of all things.27 God is not to be thought of as 'a self-contained being alongside other beings'. It is no longer credible to think of God as 'a thing at hand, even as a thingified person, or a "reified hypostasis" '. God as 'absolute in the mode of being present at hand' is no longer thinkable, because all existing things can be superseded. God cannot be superseded by a greater reality or power. If the idea of God is to have meaning, it can only be a God with futurity as a quality of being. Pannenberg sees this as a move away from 'the God of theism'.28 Pannenberg was reluctant to predicate existence of God - a point to which we shall return - and the emphasis on God's being as essentially future appealed as a way out of the problem. Second, God's being is God's rule. The emphasis on God's futurity goes hand in hand with a move from a static to a dynamic conception of God. On the basis of the centrality of the kingdom of God in the preaching of Jesus, Pannenberg discusses the connection between God's deity and God's kingdom. Is the kingdom of God, the future of God's lordship, integral to God's deity or incidental to it? For him God is God 'only in the accomplishment of his lordship over the world', and God's lordship will be fully apparent only when the kingdom comes.29 So God's deity - God's being God - and God's kingdom or rule are inseparably connected. Without God's rule God could not be God. God's being implies God's rule; and if God's rule is not complete till the eschaton, God's being, too, cannot be already complete.30 Third, God is powerful as the future is powerful. The answer to 26

See BQTz, esp. pp. 240-9. BQT2, 24if. The following quotations come from the same pages. i8 BQTz, 242. Pannenberg does not explain this phrase, but he must mean the God of classical theism, essentially above or beyond time. 2 9 BQTz, 242. 30 'Does this not mean that God is not yet, but is yet to be?' BQTz, 242. This raises difficult questions which we shall consider. 27

133

GOD AND THE FUTURE

the question whether God already is or is yet to be is that God 'exists only in the way in which the future is powerful over the present'.31 God does not exist as something that is at hand in the present; God is not an object in the world. God is not 'the quiescent background of all beings, the timeless being underlying all objects', but 'the power of the future'. 32 The future 'decides' over the present; everything that has ever happened has been brought about by the power of the future, confronting every present. God has existed 'as the future that has been powerful in every present'.33 God's futurity implies God's eternity, but not as timelessness or as mere endurance. God's eternity has to be thought of as the power of the future over the present. It is not clear from this early essay what all this means; what it means that God determines or decides the present, or how God is active in the world. Pannenberg does offer this suggestion: 'God, through the realization of the historical future at a given time, pushed this away from himself as power of the ultimate future and in this way mediated himself to it in his own eschatological futurity.' 34 This requires a good deal of elucidation and development, but the key point is that the immediate historical future of any event - not its past - is the point at which God is causally active in relation to it. Fourth, God creates from the future. A God who is the power of the future cannot be thought of as creator along conventional lines, as 'first cause' of all things in the universe. As Pannenberg expresses it, the God of the coming kingdom had to become the occasion for an eschatological reversal of the idea of creation as soon as he was recognized ... as the one who by the future of his lordship is alone powerful over the present world and decisive for its meaning, its essence.35

We will consider the nature and extent of this 'eschatological 31 BQT2, 242. 3- BQT2, 242. 3a3 BQT2, 244. The theme of eternity as futurity is not further developed here. 34 BQT2, 2.44. The idea of an event's participation in God's immediate historical future and the correlative idea of God's self-mediation (as the power of the ultimate future) to the immediate historical future stand in need of considerable elucidation. 35 BQT2, 243. 134


reversal' in due course, but it is clear from this quotation that the idea of creation includes the determination of its essence and its meaning, which has to wait until the future. How God is causally involved in creation is not yet clear, nor the way in which the present gets its shape. We have only a first intimation of ideas which receive more detailed attention in subsequent works, notably the second volume of Systematic Theology. What is clear is its orientation to the future rather than to the past. God is the future that is powerful in every present. Fifth, the seal of God's futurity is the Trinity. Especially striking in this early essay is the trinitarian note on which it ends. The issue is the future of God, the fulfilment of all that has been promised, which involves the participation of the world in the glory of God. This can be understood on the analogy of the relation between the Son and the Father.36 Their unity presupposes Jesus' self-differentiation from God, but in thinking of the future lordship of God the emphasis is on the unity of the Son with the Father, which, in Pannenberg's view, can only be consistently thought in trinitarian terms. He wants to show the nature of the relation between what presently exists and the future of God's lordship and appeals to the doctrine of the Trinity to show that the Son is one with the Father by dedicating himself completely to the Father's coming kingdom. His point is that participation in the glory of God requires openness to God's future and acknowledging its primacy over everything that exists now. This does not require a negative attitude to the present but the recognition that every given state of affairs must be left behind, in order that it may be transformed. This transformation is the expression of God's love and the power of its future over the present, through which the present is transformed toward the glory of God. The doctrine of the Trinity reinforces the priority of God's future over everything that 36

At the time of writing there was no question about the appropriateness of using the term 'Father' for God. In later writings Pannenberg has defended the traditional terminology. He finds it 'unacceptable that a revision should be called for in addressing God as Father on the grounds of our changed views about the position of woman in society'; Christianity in a Secularized World, 54. He leaves himself open to sharp criticism in saying that 'the exchange of this name inevitably results in turning to another God'; 1ST, 31. A fuller discussion may be found in STi, 159-64; also 'Feminine Language About God?', Asbury Theological Journal 48.2, Fall 1993, 2.7-9, esP- 27-

*35

GOD AND THE FUTURE

presently exists. Pannenberg describes it as 'the seal of the pure futurity of God'.37 It prevents us from reducing the relation between present creaturely reality and the future reality of God's rule to that of a stark antithesis. As the Father draws the Son to himself in love, so the future of God draws present created reality, with its negativity and pain, into itself.38 Sixth, God's futurity safeguards human freedom. Pannenberg sees a direct connection between the idea of God as the power of the future and the establishment of human freedom. If God were both omnipotent and 'a being presently at hand', human freedom would amount to nothing. What he means by freedom is 'the freedom to transcend every present state of affairs'. 39 Human power and freedom and divine omnipotence each have to be given their due. Far from threatening human freedom, God as the power of the future reinforces it. The power of the future 'frees man from his ties to what presently exists in order to liberate him for his future, to give him his freedom'.40 This is part of Pannenberg's notion of creation from the future, which preserves the contingency of each event in history. Just as God, as a personal agent, is free in the sense of not being bound by the present, so the human person is similarly free, not bound to the present and not bound by the past. Human beings are free because they have a future to which they can be open. So, freedom is 'the power that transforms the present'. But freedom itself has futurity as a condition of its possibility. Thus, freedom and future are correlative ideas, both in respect of the human being and (a fortiori) of God. Freedom is the capacity to transcend the present. Having a future which is not just the outcome of the past and the present is what makes room for a real notion of freedom. God, the power of the future, does not erode human freedom but gives it its possibility. With these major themes running through this essay - albeit not developed - it is clearly of importance.

37 BQT2, 249. 38

39

terms. 40

BQTz, 249. These ideas are developed in STz, ch. n, esp. §§4 & 5. BQTz, 141. Pannenberg will not discuss freedom in purely formal BQT2, 243. Pannenberg's italics. 136


3. 'Theology and the Kingdom of God' By contrast with this essay, the better-known 'Theology and the Kingdom of God' breaks little new ground. It has the appearance of a summary essay, presenting in outline and less technical language points argued more fully elsewhere. It does, however, highlight two methodological commitments. Pannenberg argues the case for the Gospel of God's coming rule on premises which are publicly accessible. Second, the point of departure for his thought is the Christian Gospel. Pannenberg's understanding of reality is shaped by the idea of the future kingdom of God, which already impinges on the present.41 In addition, there are four points in this essay that throw light on Pannenberg's understanding of God as future. First, God's being is God's rule. This point, which already appeared in the previous essay, is one of Pannenberg's key theological ideas. Here he puts it in a way that gained him a certain notoriety. It begins with the familiar observation that God's being and existence cannot be conceived apart from God's rule. In the language of the philosophy of religion, 'the being of the gods is their power'.42 God's power does not require there to be a created cosmos over which to have power, but once there is a created world God must have power over it; this belongs to the very idea of God. However, if God's rule is a future reality rather than an existent one, does this mean that the being of God is also a future rather than a present reality? Pannenberg gives the following answer: it is necessary to say that, in a restricted but important sense, God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's being is still in the process of coming to be. Considering this, God should not be mistaken for an objectified being presently existing in its fullness ... Obviously, if the mode of God's being is interlocked with the coming of his rule, we should not be surprised or embarrassed that God cannot be 'found' somewhere in present reality.43

41

Neuhaus, describing Pannenberg's theology, says, 'the truth about the universe, Christian theology contends, is that the Kingdom of God is at hand'; TKG, 23. 42 TKG, 5543 TXG, 56. Polk describes it as a 'cryptic observation, widely quoted and almost as widely misunderstood'; On the Way to God, 2,50. 137

GOD AND THE FUTURE

The idea that 'God does not yet exist' is carefully qualified; it is true in a restricted sense. There is a sense in which it is not true; no denial of God's reality is implied. But there is also a sense in which the proposition is true. The issue is whether it is possible, within the context of a history that is not yet complete, to speak of the full reality of God. If this is not possible, then what is the appropriate way to speak of the present reality of God?44 The underlying question is about God's relation to history. Specifically, how is God affected by time? We will return to this question in due course. Second, God, the unity of all things, is essentially a future reality. If God's being is inseparable from God's rule, and if that rule reaches its fulness only in the eschatological future, then God's being must be in process of becoming. This fundamental point, to be further elucidated, is now reinforced by a second argument. Pannenberg asserts that a meaningful sequence of events requires not only the character of contingency, but also a unity. This unity may be supplied by a chain of cause and effect, as in a deterministic view of the world, but events describable as personal acts can never be reduced to such a sequence. Personal acts are characterised by both contingency and a unity that makes them the expression of a particular individual. Pannenberg proposes that God be regarded as the personal power at work in the infinitely complex series of contingent events that constitutes the universe. It is God who constitutes - or will constitute - these events as a unity. There is no simple step from postulating the unity of all things to the idea of God as the creator of all things, but from ancient times these ideas have been connected. 'The quest for the ultimate unity which integrates and thus unifies everything is the question reaching for God, as that question has been asked since the beginning of Greek philosophy.'45 Any concept of God which could not account for the unity of all reality would be inadequate. However, this unity is not apparent as a presently-existing reality. Neither is it any longer an option to think of it as existing in an eternal realm above the world of changing phenomena. Being 44 Polk astutely identifies three connected concerns out of which these early remarks of Pannenberg can be seen to arise; On the Way to God, 2,52,.

4

5 TKG, 60.

138


cannot be thought of apart from time. Pannenberg adopts an eschatological approach: the unity of all things can only be expected from the future, as 'something to be achieved by a process of reconciling previous schisms and contradictions'.46 Again, the implication is that God provides this unity - brings about completeness or closure, and therefore acts from - the future. This has implications for God's being. Third, God exercises power from the future. For Pannenberg, the idea of the future is not an abstract one; it is not an empty category.47 While we tend consciously to think of the future as created out of the present, we also experience it as a powerful reality moving toward us with either threat or promise. Does the future then actually have power over against the present? In the previous chapter we saw how Pannenberg sees the future as a powerful field of the possible, the sphere in which the Spirit expresses itself in creation.48 We noted already that the concept of power is closely tied up with the idea of the future. Now it becomes for Pannenberg a mediating idea between the future and God. Theologically speaking, God is powerful over the present as the future is powerful over the present. As we confront the future we confront God. The power of the future is the power of God. 'In every present we confront the infinite future, and in welcoming the particular finite events which spring from that future, we anticipate the coming of God.'49 There is no possibility of an argument which shows that the power of the future must be understood as the power of God. But if Jesus' message about the kingdom of God is true, God must be the future of the world. Then it follows that 'all experience of the future is, at least indirectly, related to God himself. In this case every event in which the future becomes finitely present must be understood as a contingent act of God .. .'5° In later years Pannenberg refines his ideas on how God creates from the future. 51 It has to be remembered that Pannenberg's 46 47

TKG, 60.

TKG, 56. It is 'neither empty category nor bundle of chances', 59. See ch. 4, 'Contingency and connection', above pp. yji. ^ TKG, 59. 5° TKG, 61. 51 See STi, ch. 7. On p. 98 Pannenberg refers to ideas presented in the essay under discussion as 'a first sketch'; see note 256. 48

139

GOD AND THE FUTURE

purpose in this early essay is not to justify speaking about God. He is exploring the implications of Jesus' message of the kingdom of God for the understanding of God. Thinking of God as the power of the future is an implication of accepting the reality of the coming kingdom of God. To see how Pannenberg grounds 'Godtalk' more generally we would have to look at his discussion of anthropology.52 Fourth, the power of the future is the power of love. Most striking in this essay is the identification of the power of the future with love. This, too, has its basis in the message of Jesus. 'It was possible for Jesus to interpret life comprehensively and exclusively in terms of eschatology only because Jesus discovered God's love in the imminence of the Kingdom.'53 The power of the coming kingdom of God already manifests itself as love in the forgiveness of sins and in the offer of salvation. Wherever new life is given, the power of the kingdom has already come in the form of love. In the Christian view of the world it is not possible to separate power and love. But love has its ontological grounding in the future: The creative character of love is linked to the power of the future ... The idea of power by itself is ambiguous, making possible both destruction and life. But creative love is unambiguous in asserting that the present is set free to life. Love is the only real answer we have to the startling question, Why should there be anything at all rather than nothing? Love grants existence and grants it contingently. This means that love grants new existence, in spite of the self-asserting arrogance of that which already is. In love we recognize the intrinsic dynamic at work in the eventuating of contingent events from the future and releasing them in the process of time.54

Only because the rule of God comes in love rather than sheer power can humankind participate in God's future. There would be no future for us if God were not a loving, reconciling God. Creation itself has its origin in the divine love. In the last chapter 52 Pannenberg believes that the ground on which the battle between theology and atheism is to be fought is anthropology; cf. 'Speaking about God in the face of Atheist Criticism', BQT$, esp. 106. Pannenberg later stated that 'theologians will be able to defend the truth precisely of their talk about God only if they first respond to the atheistic critique of religion on the terrain of anthropology'; ATP, 16. 53 TXG, 64. 54 TXG, 65. Cf. STi, ch. 6, §7, entitled The Love of God'.

140


of his theological 'system' Pannenberg also sees the eschatological consummation as the revelation of the love of God.55 But these ideas are already intimated in this early essay. Christian speech about God begins and ends with the love of God. The grammar of this speech is trinitarian, a point Pannenberg already emphasises at the end of this essay. 'The trinitarian doctrine describes the coming God as the God of love whose future has already arrived and who integrates the past and present world, accepting it to share in his own life forever.'56 We have looked at some of Pannenberg's early ideas about God. From these a view of God has begun to emerge which is a correlate of the eschatological ontology outlined in the previous chapter. Already it is apparent what far-reaching implications are contained in the idea that God's being is inseparable from God's rule. As God's rule is an eschatological reality, God's being must be such as to accommodate this. There must be a sense in which God is as well as a sense in which God is becoming. What this means for God's relation to time will have to be considered. Before doing this, however, we shall consider the way Pannenberg sees the relation between God's futurity and eternity. God's futurity and eternity The theme of the future is as prominent in Pannenberg's thought as it is perplexing. To understand Pannenberg's view of its ontological status requires a shift from familiar patterns of thought. The future is 'the "place" ... for the eternal presence that ancient Greek thought conceived as timeless'. This future is 'the point where time and eternity coincide'.57 This calls for some comment on the relation between God's eternity, which is an aspect of God's non-finite reality, and what might be called God's 'futurity'. Fundamental to this discussion is the redefinition of the notion of eternity. We saw in the previous chapter that the major element in this revision was the rejection of the notion of eternity as 55 56

ST3, 645.

TKG, 71. Pannenberg's trinitarian theology is the subject of ch. 6 below. 57 Pannenberg, 'Providence, God, and Eschatology', 178; see also the 'Response' in Braaten and Clayton, The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg, 321. 141

GOD AND THE FUTURE

timelessness. Eternity is the totality of life; the 'infinite unity of life'.58 Early Christian views of God's eternity were influenced by Plato's concept of the Forms or Ideas, which was itself influenced by Parmenides' notion of 'the One' which neither was nor will be but which is now all at once, a single whole.59 Pannenberg found in Plotinus the bridge between the antithesis of eternity and time and eternity as the fulness of time.60 Boethius developed this view into the classical line that eternity is 'authentic duration' and not just the negation of time.61 Time remains in relation to eternity, for the many moments of time remain bound to the fulness of time. The 'whole', however, is present 'only in the sense that it hovers over the parts as the future whole', toward which all finite things strive in time.62 The whole is indistinguishable from eternity. As the fulness of time, eternity implies duration, but not in the brokenness of separated moments which characterises time. Pannenberg claims that a theory of time oriented toward the eternal totality will give priority to the future. 63 But what is the relation between futurity and eternity? Does God's futurity constitute God's eternity, or does God's eternity include God's futurity? Is anything significant at stake in this question? It is interesting to see where the continuity lies between Pannenberg's earlier writings, dominated by the notion of God as the power of the future, and his later writings, in which he more typically speaks of God's eternity. In particular, is Pannenberg's discussion of God's eternity (in the Systematic Theology) still shaped by the understanding of God as the power of the future? In one of the early essays we looked at, Pannenberg clearly sees God's eternity in the light of God's futurity/ 4 Pannenberg wants to say that the future is not a mode but the mode of God's being. The future of God's lordship is integral to God's deity. Speaking directly about the relation between God's futurity and eternity, he 58

W. Pannenberg, Theology and Science', The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 13.3, 1992., 305. 59 See e.g. W. Kneale, Time and Eternity in Theology', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 61, 1961, 87-108. 60 See ch. 4, Time and eternity', above pp. iO4f. 61 STi, 404. 6i MIG, 77. 63 This is attributed to Plotinus. See M7G, jji. 64 W. Pannenberg, The God of Hope', BQTz, esp. 242-4. 142


argues that 'the futurity of God implies his eternity'.65 God's eternity is included in God's futurity, for God has been the future of every past moment, no matter how far back in time. Thus God has been active 'before our present and before every present', precisely 'as the future that has been powerful in every present'. God's eternity is thus predicated upon God's being 'the power of the future over every present'.66 To use spatial categories, instead of imagining God to be behind every moment in the past and the present, pushing the present into the future, God is better thought of as being in front of every past and present moment, allowing it to participate in that part of God's future that is most immediate to it. In a later essay on time and eternity in the experience of Israel and Christianity, Pannenberg starts from the concept of God's eternity but understands it as the future of the world.67 He also speaks of the future of God as the parousia of God's eternity.68 God's futurity is not a matter only of distant futurity; it spans the whole of time. In fact, the time-spanning presence of God's future is God's eternity. God's eternity is then constituted by God's futurity, which is already present, not merely for Godself but also for the person who lives in faith, who already now trusts this future. In the early essays, when the notion of God's futurity is high on Pannenberg's theological agenda, God's eternity is described as an implication of God's futurity. It is not a question of reducing the former to the latter, but of showing their identity. In Pannenberg's mature, systematic account of God's being, found especially in the first volume of Systematic Theology, God as Holy Trinity is discussed first, followed by God's unity and attributes.69 Eternity is one of the attributes ascribed to God on the basis of what the concept of God implies; other attributes are ascribed to God on the basis of God's self-revelation in history. Thus to speak of God's eternity is a form of speaking about God's infinity. Pannenberg says that 'eternity, omnipotence, and omnipresence may be viewed as concrete manifestations of [God's] 6

5 BQT2, 244. BQT2, 244-

66 67

W. Pannenberg, 'Zeit und Ewigkeit in der religiosen Erfahrung Israels und des Christentums', GSTz, 201. 68

6

GST2,

202.

9 STi, chs 5 & 6. 143

GOD AND THE FUTURE

infinity from the standpoints of time, power, and space'.70 To predicate eternity of God is to assert that God embraces all time; that all time is present to God.71 It is clear from the later work that Pannenberg's agenda is no longer shaped by the concerns of his earlier writings. These concerns have not disappeared; he still insists on 'the constitutive significance of [the eschatological] consummation [of the kingdom] for the eternity of God'.72 But the focus is now on the eternity of God rather than on God as the power of the future. This is best explained as the replacement of a programmatic line of thought with a more careful, systematic working out of the Christian understanding of God. This systematic account coincides with the fuller exploration of the problem of time and eternity in Metaphysics and the Idea of God. There is no equivocation about including God's futurity in the attribute of eternity. Eschatology must colour our understanding of God's eternity. The future of the divine rule and God's eternity coincide; they come together in the eschaton. Thus the change of focus does not indicate a material change in Pannenberg's theology. But God's eternity must have priority over God's futurity because God's being encompasses all the modes of time. As Pannenberg says, 'all time is before the eyes of God as a whole'.73 For God everything past, present and future is simultaneously present; this is implied in God's eternity. Only in relation to the temporal process may priority be ascribed to the future. To speak of God as the power of the future is appropriate from within the temporal process. As far as God's being is concerned, God's futurity is not set over against God's eternity. To conclude this discussion, three points may be made. First, Pannenberg's focus on the eternity of God and his dropping of the phrase 'power of the future' does not represent any substantial change in his thought. The key point remains constant in his entire work, viz. the qualification of God's being (God's deity and eternity) by God's eschatological rule. Second, it may be surmised that Pannenberg's earlier suggestion that God's futurity is God's eternity was largely a strategic device intended to deflect the 70

STi, 397-

71STi, 403

7* STi, 33 i. 73 STi, 401. Cf. STi, 91, & ST3, 598. 144


charge that he was replacing the traditional doctrine of God's eternity with a new doctrine of God's futurity. To speak of God as the power of the future presupposes the experience of time. It does not stand in conflict with God's eternity. If it stands in competition with anything, it is the view that God is related to the created cosmos only as its beginning.74 Third, great care is needed with the abstract term 'futurity'. While it is well established to speak of God's eternity, one cannot speak of 'futurity' as an attribute of God, and Pannenberg does not really do so.75 To say that God is eternal implies that what in our experience is past, present and future is present to God simultaneously.76 Thus it includes the future of God's rule. We are on safer ground simply to speak of the future, though ultimately we must mean God's future. However, the concept of the future is by no means a straightforward one. The process theologian Lewis Ford - who has explored the possibilities of convergence between process theology and Pannenberg's trinitarian theology - differentiates the future as that which will be from that which might be; the latter does greater justice to the realm of indeterminate possibility which marks the future.77 Pannenberg contrasts the view of the future found in secular futurology and theology; the latter is characterised by 'an emphasis on the novelty of the future'. 78 However, there is a firm line between theological views developed 'on the basis of the exegetical rediscovery of early Christian eschatology' and the Whiteheadian view, in which 'the idea of a future confronting and not just prolonging the present' is uncharacteristic.79 In particular, the idea that the future culminates in something that we designate the end of time is integral to Pannenberg theology, but attracts some strong criticism. The review of Pannenberg's early essays left no doubt about the 74

See STz, 140, 143. Pannenberg speaks mainly of God as 'the power of the future' and of the future or futurity as 'God's mode of being'. 76 STi, 401. Lewis Ford says that for Pannenberg God is 'the compresence of all times'; 'A Whiteheadian Basis for Pannenberg's Theology', Encounter 38, 1977, 312.. 77 L. S. Ford, 'Creativity in a Future Key', in Robert C. Neville (ed.), New Essays in Metaphysics, 179. 78 Pannenberg, 'Future and Unity', 60. 79 Pannenberg, 'Future and Unity'. As we shall see, Lewis Ford modifies this Whiteheadian line of thought considerably. 75

J

45

GOD AND THE FUTURE

importance of the idea of the kingdom of God for his theology in general and his doctrine of God in particular. The kingdom of God or the establishment of God's rule is an expectation which Christians have on the basis of the nature of the God revealed by Jesus. Jesus' message revolved around the coming of this kingdom, and Pannenberg aims to work out the implications of this eschatological concept. The kingdom of God is the eschatological future, which will establish the unity of all things. Its coming will finally reveal the reality and identity of God before the whole creation and bring the cosmos to its completion.80 Pannenberg regards this eschatology as central to the Christian faith; it may neither be secularised nor demythologised. Christianity cannot leave the question of eschatology undecided, for belief in reconciliation through Christ and in the presence of God and his kingdom depends on it.81 The two major symbols of God's own ultimate reality and the (individual and social) realisation of human destiny are the kingdom of God and the resurrection of the dead.8* There can be no doubt that Pannenberg thinks of the eschaton as an end. In the final chapter of the Systematic Theology he provides a detailed account of his understanding of this matter. The future of the kingdom of God - for which Christians pray in the words of Matt. 6:ioa - is the essence of Christian hope.83 In 'The Kingdom of God and the End of Time' Pannenberg describes the content of this hope. First, it means the perfection of human society. 'Because God is the Creator of the world, where he reigns his creatures attain to the goal of the destiny that is constitutive of their nature.'84 The framework for this is the renewal of the whole world. Second, the kingdom of God means the end or consummation of history. Pannenberg accepts the basic apocalyptic conviction that the series of world empires will come to an end in the kingdom of God, an idea that has become problematical in the modern world. Pannenberg regards the consummation of the world as implied in the view that reality is an all-encompassing process; that human experience is characterised fundamentally 80 81 82 83

8

These ideas come from Theology and the Kingdom of God. W. Pannenberg, 'Can Christianity do without an Eschatology?', 30. See e.g. W. Pannenberg, 'Future and Unity', esp. yof. ST3, 5*7-

4 5T3, 580.

146


by its historicity; and that the idea of a meaning of history presupposes its completeness, and thus its end.85 But the end of the world is expected as God's act. Obviously, it makes a great difference whether God or nothingness is regarded as the end of time.86 Third, the coming of the kingdom of God means the entry of eternity into time. Here the relation between time and eternity is pivotal. But the central conviction is that only through the coming of eternity into time is it possible to attain life in its fulness, and thus its true essence.87 This involves the participation of creatures in God's eternity, which necessitates a radical transformation. In connection with this, Pannenberg also discusses the judgment and the return of Christ. The theme of the coming of God's rule in its fulness is not complete without some final comments on theodicy, for it also means the vindication of God in relation to evil. As the consummation of the creation, it is also the revelation of God's love. Pannenberg's approach to this theme has a double foundation. First, there is the eschatological thrust of Jesus' message of the kingdom of God, influenced by Jewish apocalyptic thought but also at variance with it in some ways. Closely allied with this is the reality of Jesus' resurrection, understood as a fulfilment of Jesus' message about the kingdom of God. It cannot be understood apart from the general framework of apocalyptic expectation. Second, there is the philosophical principle that the meaning of the part is determined by its place in the whole, understood as ca semantic whole'. Within such a whole there are various levels of 'meaning totalities', all 'related to each other as parts and wholes'.88 For Pannenberg the notion of the whole of finite reality, understood as a historical process, requires the idea of its end, just as for Dilthey the meaning of an individual existence can only be determined from its end.89 85

ST3, 591ST3, 594. 87 ST3, 603. The future of consummation is the entry of eternity into time. For it has the content that characterizes eternity but that is lost in the disintegration of time, namely, the totality of life and therefore also its true and definitive identity.' 88 W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Categories "Part" and "Whole" ', M/G, 139. 89 The key passage is in 'On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic', BQTi, esp. 162-4. 86

147

GOD AND THE FUTURE

The idea of an end to history is not viewed equally positively by all theologians and has come under criticism in several ways.90 At the end of chapter four this criticism was mentioned in relation to the concept of anticipation. One criticism is that the idea of the end of the world cannot be understood literally; no particular event will instantiate it. It is rather a horizon against which to understand the course of history. This would make it a regulative idea; its existence cannot be demonstrated, but it is a condition for thinking meaningfully about the present. It could also be regarded as a 'hermeneutical necessity', a horizon that is never actually reached.91 Pannenberg is not unaware of the difficulty of the idea of the end of the world. Scientific cosmology lends some support to it, since it generally favours the idea of a universe which had a beginning and will have an end. But Pannenberg has in mind an eschatological reality, which is different from an event in time and space which physicists may project on the basis of a present understanding of the universe.92 These criticisms have in common the unthinkability or unspecifiability of the end of history or the world. A different kind of criticism comes from process theologians, who find the idea of the end of history in conflict with their understanding of God. On the grounds of an inevitable plurality in being and the view that if God is love God must have a world to love and respond to, Daniel Day Williams regards the idea of an end of the world as untenable. The idea of a 'final event' is a contradiction 'because God's creative action does not end'.93 John B. Cobb extends this criticism and offers two models to illustrate how differently Pannenberg and process theologians see the God-world relation. For Pannenberg God is 'the power of a temporally remote future' who, as its end, gives unity and meaning to the whole cosmic process. For Whitehead God was 'the everlasting companion through whom relevant aspects of eternal 90

S. J. Grenz has summarized the criticisms; Reason for Hope, 204-7. W. Logister, 'Het Eschatologisch Probleem bij Wolfhart Pannenberg: Analyse en Kritiek', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 24, April 1970, 183-6. 92 ST3, 589^ See also Theological Questions to Scientists', TTN, 18, 2,4-7. 9 3 D. D. Williams, 'Response to Wolfhart Pannenberg', E. H. Cousins (ed.), Hope and the Future of Man, 86f. 91

148


possibilities become effective in each moment'.94 For process thinkers the future is indeterminate, and 'since there will be no end to the arising of new occasions, there will be no final definitive meaning of the occasion'. Its ultimate meaning is conferred on it by the fact that God values it.95 In part, this disagreement has its basis in a difference of fundamental intuition. Pannenberg does not accept that God needs an 'other' to love, to act upon and respond to. The creation of the cosmos takes place out of the plenitude of the divine being, the richness of the mutual love of the persons of the Trinity. Once such a world is in existence, God is in relation to it, but it is not ontically necessary to God.96 God's decision to bring a universe into being is an act of freedom and love: The contingency of the world as a whole and of all individual events, things, and beings has its basis in the omnipotent freedom of the divine creating. Precisely by this freedom of origin, that things are or are not becomes an expression of divine love. God had only one reason to create a world ... namely, that God graciously confers existence on creatures, an existence alongside his own divine being and in distinction from him.97

Ultimately, this problem is settled along trinitarian lines, which highlights a major difference between Pannenberg and process theologians. Pannenberg writes out of the classical tradition of Christian orthodoxy, in which the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation are accepted as the legitimate theological outcome of biblical faith. Process theologians do not on the whole find anchorage in this tradition, though some may see their theology as compatible with it. Pannenberg is struck by their freedom vis-a-vis the theological tradition. In a dialogue with Lewis Ford, he is troubled that for process theologians the movement between theological tradition and process philosophy is only one-way. This entails a reduction of the intentionality of the Christian faith. He 94

J. B. Cobb, 'Pannenberg and Process Theology', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg, 60. 95 Cobb, 'Pannenberg and Process Theology', 60. 96 The point is that God could in principle exist without a cosmos. This remains true even though, once such a cosmos exists, God's rule over it is ultimately integral to God's deity. 97

5T2, 20.0.0.

149

GOD AND THE FUTURE

looks for a greater concern for 'the Christian identity' of the concepts used within the theological tradition.98 The immediate issue which prompted this criticism was the meaning of the phrase, 'the power of the future', and whether it could be reconceived in terms of 'process' categories. Ford has developed a Whiteheadian sense of Pannenberg's idea of God as the power of the future, in which God as the power of the future is necessarily effective in all things, but nowhere as the sole agent." This makes the apocalyptic hope for an unambiguous display of God's power 'an idle dream, resting upon a misconception as to how God acts'.100 This would make the expectation of a cosmic end similarly untenable. It follows from an axiomatic Whiteheadian point that it is the fundamental postulate of Whitehead's metaphysics that every finite act of synthesizing the past in a fresh act of becoming adds one more item to be synthesized by subsequent acts of becoming, ad infinitum. Time can have no end, and it is highly unlikely that world history should have an end either. If so, God's everlasting synthesis of temporal acts cannot come to some final end.101

For Ford, God can be said to be in the future, but this is not a future which will someday be present. The infinite futurity of God cannot merge with the finite actualities of the present. So God can be seen as the dynamic completion and unification of time, incorporating each temporal moment as it occurs, but only by being forever future.102 Pannenberg expects precisely the meeting of eternity and time, the infinite and the finite. God is the God of the coming kingdom, not the synthesizer of a temporal process in which God is as much 98 W. Pannenberg and L. S. Ford, 'A Dialogue About Process Philosophy', Encounter 38, 1977, 3i8f. 99 See L. S. Ford, 'A Whiteheadian Basis for Pannenberg's Theology', Encounter 38, 1977, 307-17; 'God as the Subjectivity of the Future', Encounter 41, 1980, 287-91; 'The Divine Activity of the Future', Process Studies n, Fall 1981, 169-79; 'Creativity in a Future Key', in R. C. Neville (ed.), New Essays in Metaphysics, 179-97; and 'The Nature of the Power of the Future', in Braaten and Clayton (eds.), The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, 75-94. TOO pord, 'A Whiteheadian Basis for Pannenberg's Theology', 315. ioi por(j? esp. 2.51-2.. 54 Pannenberg, The God of History', 36.

196

THE REIGN OF THE TRIUNE GOD

the Son and the Spirit. The Son gains his deity by his obedient service to the Father (with whom he is one and from whom he also distinguishes himself) and from the Spirit, who raises him from the dead and glorifies him. Correspondingly, the Spirit is glorified as divine in so far as it is the Spirit who glorifies the Father and the Son in their union. None of the trinitarian Persons is a divine subject in his own right and in isolation from the other two. Reiterating what he emphasises in the earlier two essays, Pannenberg says: The model of a self-static subjectivity has no place in the trinitarian life of God, as it actualises itself in God's historical revelation and thus also in God's eternity. The Father is not the truly divine Subject who produces the other so-called modes of being; nor is the Spirit, and certainly not the Son. The construction of the Trinity as the self-development of a divine Subject unavoidably violates the co-eternity of the divine Persons and reduces their plurality to mere modes of being which are subordinated to the divine Subject. 55

This requires a detailed treatment of the work of each of the persons of the Trinity, which Pannenberg does not attempt in this essay. He gives only an indication of how it might be done: through the old doctrine of appropriation (Attributionenlehre}. According to this doctrine, the divine acts ad extra are the acts of the one God, although they are attributed to one Person of the Trinity in particular. However, the other Persons are also involved. Pannenberg wants to develop this involvement of the other two Persons in greater detail, especially its implications for God's being. He speaks of an />z£r i?5> J 77> 179 Cosmos, cosmology 103, 126, 148, i68f., 170, 181, 199, 224 Creation i68f., 176, 179, 181, 183, 197, i99f., 224, 23 if., 234 from the future 104, i2if., 128, i3if., 134-6, 139^, 161-75, 178

257

GOD AND THE FUTURE

God (cont.) all-determining 68, iz4f., izyf., 154, 173, 175-82, becoming, development 153, i57f., 159-61, 193^, 2.2.1, 223 doctrine of 21, 127, 204 existence 134, i37f., 154-6, 186 futurity 24, 89-92, 128, 130-4, 136, 138, 141-51, 150, 184, i86f., 216, 225-7, 230 glory, glorification 3, 135, 198, 200, 206, 2o8f., 234^ God's being as God's rule 5, 90, 129, 133, 137, 141, 144, 156, 160, 182, 183, 196, 222,

236,

237

lordship 24, i32f., 142, 206, 2o8f., 211, 226 personhood 131, 138, 187-91, 227 plausibility 3 power of 5, 131, 133, 155, 174, 179, 181 proofs of 17, 57f., 137 reign of, see Kingdom of God subject, subjectivity 189^, 197, 218 God, attributes of aseity 161 eternity 130, 134, 141-51, J 54> 172, 197, 207,

221-4

faithfulness 99, 131 immanence 153, 183, i9if., 2.13, 224

immutability 177, 196 infinity 143, 154, 224, 228 love 2, 5, 135, i4of., i48f., 164, i79f., 181, 187, 203, 224f., 231 omnipotence 136, 143, 149, 176, 180 simplicity 210 transcendence i52f., 183, 19 if., 195, 213, 224 unity 190, 200, 202, 210, 215 Hermeneutics 8 if.

Historical thinking 71-5 History concept of 79, 83 end of 10, 124, 146, 148, i5of., 155, 158, 173, lyyf. flight from 8, 9, n, 12 God's relation to 73, 84, 86, 88, 98, i27f., 130, 132, 148, i56f., i6if., 180, 186, 191-201, 213-16, 2i8f., 226, 228, 230, 235 and revelation 16, 17 theology of 15, 17, 83, 86 totality, universal history 17, 29^, 36, 79-88, 151 unity of 21, 28, 74, 104, 167 Hope 15, 1 6 Humanity see Anthropology Incarnation 154, 207 Infinite, the 66f., 86, 192 Jesus, Christ cross, crucifixion i54f., 157, 196, 199, 2o6f., 208, 215, 2171"., 219 finality of 6 resurrection, see Resurrection return of 147 self-distinction from Father 135 Son of God 206 Kingdom of God 7, 125, 132, 139^, 146, i78f., 180, 184, 210-13, 219,231-4, 236 as eschatological 3, 19, 21, 76, 91, 107, 137, 184, 212, 219, 230, 233 as future and present 42f., 53, 94, 115, 200 Jesus' understanding of 6f., 20, 38-43, 53, 129, 151, 212, 237 Logos 202 Meaning 7if., 75, yyf., 80 as anticipated 751"., 125 158

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Salvation 21, 45, 81, ii3f., 205, 209, 2i3f., 221, 237 Science, scientists 164^, 169 theology and 58-62, 101, 105, 164, 168, 172, 217 Soul 109, in Spirit (Holy) 101, 165, i78f., 2oif.,

Metaphysics (see also Ontology) 3, 57, 65f., 71, 75f., 78, 92, 96, 105, 119, 160 Nature, laws of nature 99, 164, 167 Ontology 3, 20, 55^, 62-9, 78, 89, 95f., 102, 104, 122, 126, 185 principle of retroactive permanence i58f., 216,

205, 208f., 2l6, 220, 233

as eschatological 101, 173 as field 165^, 170-4, 179, 181, 211, 227

222f., 229, 235

in creation 101, 169-72, 182, 234

Parousia 143 delay of 50-2 Philosophy (see also Metaphysics, Ontology) 65, 67f. Greek 6, 70, 106, 180 and theology 55-64, 66-9, 92 of time 70-2 Physics 93, 98, 168, 170, 175^, 181 Possibility 102 Process 69-71 Process thought 70, 123^, 130, 148-51, 159-61, 174, 2.28 Prolepsis (see also Anticipation) 5if., 113-15 Promise 15, 16, 18 Reality, the real 103 and appearance 74, 93 f. as a whole, see Whole as historical 71-3, 108 openness of 75, 177, 179 unity of i38f., 146, 148, 178 views of 73-5, 98 Reconciliation 2if., 23 2f. Religion 63-5 Resurrection 146 and apocalyptic 27, 47-50 and end of the world 44-7, 52 foundational for theology 43, 53 and kingdom of God 44-6, 52 general 51, 53, 116, 151 of Jesus 4, i8f., 21, 43-52, ii5f., 129, 147, 196, 199, 2o6f., 2O8,

Temporality 69-79, 95, 152 Theodicy 87, 147, 199!". Theology 2 as Gottesivissenschaft 2, 61 of history, see History of hope 4, 14 relation to philosophy 55-64, 66-9 Time, 69, 92, 122, 152-61, 229 and eternity 46, 93, 104-12, 130, 141, 147, 150, 181, 198, 217, 22of., 230

God's relation to 105-8, 151, 152-61, 193^ relation between present and future 92-7, no, 112-26, 132, i66f., 217 Trinity, triune God 101, 127, 135, 141, 143, 151, 153, 155, 159, i69f., i8of., 183-236 appropriation, attribution 197 doctrine of 130, 149, 160, i8of., 203, 230 immanent and economic 159-61, 177, i84f., 188, 195, 213-25, 228 intra-trinitarian relations i35f., 149, 153^, 157, 185, 187-91, 196, 198, 202, 204-13, 2i7f., 229f., 235 perichoresis 186 Persons 149, 155, 157, 169^,

22O, 222, 237f.

187, 191, 196, 200, 202,

Revelation 12, 30, 87, 114, 119, 143, 190, 204, 205

209, 224, 227, 236

processions 205 259

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Truth, truth-claims i, 74, 77, 117-2.2. Whole, 142 reality as 571"., 61, 64^, 69-71, 77, 81, 83, 147

as semantic, hermeneutical 77-9, 82 Word of God 9, u World end of 46f., 148 God's relation to, see History

260

Index of Authors Ahlers, R. 123 Allen, L. 115 Alexander 130 Aquinas, Thomas 202, 228, 230 Aristotle 58, 94!"., 106, 122 Athanasius 202, 207, 214, 229 Augustine 84, 108-11, 152, 205

Dorner, I. 189, 203 Dray, W. H. 83 Dupre, L. 61 Durr, H.-P. 101

Earth, H. 94 Earth, K. 31"., 8-14, 58, 61, 1521"., 188-92, 194, 203-5, 213-15, 217 Easil 202 Eetz, H. D. 31 Bloch, E. 20, 22, 90-2, 132-3 Boethius 109, 142 Bonhoeffer, D. 192 Borg, M. 29 Bornkamm, G. 39 Braaten, €.117 Bradshaw, T. 127, i55f., 228 Bultmann, R. 3, 8-14, 23, 58, 61 Burhenn, H. 113

Faraday, M. 170 Fichte, J. G. 72 Ford, L. S. 70, 102, 124, 145, 149^, 157, i74f., 177-9 Fuchs, E., 28 Funk, R.W., 41

Campenhausen, H. von 84 Cappadocian Fathers 202, 211 Chilton, B. 41 Clark, M. 84 Clayton, P. 56, 71, 77, 96, 116, 122-5, J5 1 . 178* 187, 189 Cobb, J. B. 70, 123^, i48f., 160, 177 Collingwood, R. G. 9, 72 Collins, J. J. 32-5, 46, 48 Descartes, R. 66, 72 Dilthey, W. 23, yif., 77-9, 85, 91, 119, 147, 158, 223

Ebeling, G. 28 Evans, C. F. 471".

Gadamer, H.-G. 8 if., 85 Galloway, A. D. 27 Gilkey, L. 176 Glasser, A. 226f. Greenspoon, L. J 48f. Grenz, S. 97, 127, 148, 225-7, 230-1 Gunton, C. 184 Haering, Th. 152 Hamilton, W. 86 Hanson, P. D. 33-6 Harnack, A. 7, 212 Hartshorne, C. 157!". Hasel, G. F. 49 Hefner, P. 19, 62, 93, 123, 164, 166, 173 Hegel, G. W. F. 20, 66, 72, 75, 77, 83f., 86f., 94, 115, n8f., 130, 156, 189-95, 2-°3? 2I 8, 226-8 Heidegger, M. 9, 20, 23, 65, 69-72, 85, 105^, 110-12 Henrich, D. 57 Herder, J. G. 71 261

GOD AND THE FUTURE

Herrmann, W. 8 Hill, W. J. 225 Hodgson, P .C. 112 Hollis, M. 67 Huyssteen, J. W. van 59

Parmenides 141 Perrin, N. 37 Peters, T. 82, Pike, N. 2.2,3 Plantinga, T. 72, 77 Plato 74, 94^, 108, 142. Plotinus 108-12, 142 Polk, D. 36, 91, 103, 113, 124, i37f., i76f., 179

Jaspers, K. 9 Jenson, R. 201, 213, 2i6f. Jiingel, E. 1531"., 157, 159, 196, 201, 203,

214-17

Rad, G. von 15 Rahner, K. 154, 114-17 Rhem, R. 59 Richard of St Victor 2.03 Ringleben, J. 161 Ritschl, A. 7-8 Robinson, J. M. 84 Rossler, D. 28 Rowland, C. 32-4, 37, 47 Russell, R. J. 97

Kahler, M. 8, n Kant, I. 72, 94, 96, inf., 218 Kasemann, E. 27, 29, 39f. Kasper, W. 214 Keck, L. 6 Kierkegaard, S. 20, 94, i93f. Klein, G. 114 Kneale, W. 142 Kugelmann, L. 113

Sanders, E. P. 39-41 Sauter, G. i4f., 20, 3of. Schleiermacher, F. 63, 66 Schner, G. P. 59 Schweitzer, A. 6-7 Shults, F. L. x, 591".

LaCugna, C. M. 214 Ladd, G. E. 36 Lakatos 173 Leibniz 170 Lindbeck, G. 59 Logister, W. 124, 148 Lowith, K. 83f. Luckman, T. 64 Macquarrie, J. 20 Marx, K. 20 McDonald, J. 41 McKenzie, D. 124, 176 Meeks, M. D. 16 Minear, P. S. 10 Moltmann, J. 4, 14-19, 3°> 9°> T 53^ 5 157, 191, 196, 201, 212, 214-17 Mommsen, W. 85 Murdock,W. R. 3 if., 35 Neuhaus, R. J. 92, 137 Nickelsburg, G. W. E. 49 Niebuhr, R. 83 Nowell, D. Z. 102 Obayashi, H. 123 O'Donnell, J. 63, 181, 188, 228-30 Ogden, S. io5f. Olson, R. 122, 225, 227, 229

Teilhard de Chardin, P. 165 Tillich, P. 6 1, 86, 165 Toynbee, A. J. 831". Tracey, D. 59 Tracy, T. F. i62f. Troeltsch, E. 9, 581"., 115 Tupper, E. F. 87, 91 Venema, C. 226 Voltaire 83 Wagner, F. 189 Walsh, B.J. 56 Walsh, W. H. 83 Webster, J. B. 59 Weiss,]. 6, 8, 113 Whitehead, A. 70, 130, 148, 1501"., 157-60, 164, 175, 178 Wicken, J. S. 101 Wilckens, U. 28, 39f. Williams, D. D. 148 Wittram, R. 85

262

God and the future: Wolfhardt Pannenberg's eschatological doctrine of God

Doctrine of the knowledge of God

The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God

Becoming God: The Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa

Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God

God Working with God

St. Augustine's City of God and Christian Doctrine

Engines Of God - 01 - Engines Of God

The Doctrine of God (Church Dogmatics, vol. 2, pt. 1)

Engines of God 1 - Engines of God

The Doctrine of God (Church Dogmatics, vol. 2, pt. 2)

The Forge Of God

God of the Razor

The Hammer of God

The Scourge of God

The Hammer of God

The Fatherhood Of God

The Shadows of God

The Tears of God

The Forge of God

The Forge of God

The Footprints of God

The Existence of God

The Evolution of God

The Engines of God

The Grace Of God

The Evolution of God

The Hounds of God

The Footprints of God

The Anger of God

God and the future: Wolfhardt Pannenberg's eschatological doctrine of God

Doctrine of the knowledge of God

The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God

Becoming God: The Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa

Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God

God Working with God

St. Augustine's City of God and Christian Doctrine

Engines Of God - 01 - Engines Of God

The Doctrine of God (Church Dogmatics, vol. 2, pt. 1)

Engines of God 1 - Engines of God

The Doctrine of God (Church Dogmatics, vol. 2, pt. 2)

The Forge Of God

God of the Razor

The Hammer of God

The Scourge of God

The Hammer of God

The Fatherhood Of God

The Shadows of God

The Tears of God

The Forge of God

The Forge of God

The Footprints of God

The Existence of God

The Evolution of God

The Engines of God

The Grace Of God

The Evolution of God

The Hounds of God

The Footprints of God

The Anger of God

Recommend Documents