Giraldus Odonis Ofm: Opera Philosophica, De Intentionibus

GIRALDUS ODONIS O.F.M. OPERA PHILOSOPHICA VOLUME TWO: DE INTENTIONIBUS

STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS begründet von

JOSEF KOCH weitergeführt von

PAUL WILPERT, ALBERT ZIMMERMANN und JAN A. AERTSEN herausgegeben von

ANDREAS SPEER in zusammenarbeit mit TZOTCHO BOIADJIEV, KENT EMERY, JR. und WOUTER GORIS (Managing Editor) BAND LXXXVI L.M. DE RIJK

GIRALDUS ODONIS O.F.M. OPERA PHILOSOPHICA VOLUME TWO: DE INTENTIONIBUS

GIRALDUS ODONIS O.F.M. OPERA PHILOSOPHICA VOLUME TWO: DE INTENTIONIBUS

critical edition with a study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350

BY

L.M. DE RIJK

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2005

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Life and works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The De intentionibus. Evaluation of the manuscripts used. Its date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The contents of De intentionibus. Its genre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The ratio edendi. Orthography. Punctuation. Headings . . . . . .

1 1 2 11 14

a study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350 Chapter I. Preliminary Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. On the origin of the usage of ‘intentio’. A first assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Post-Medieval perspectives. Brentano on intentionality . . . . . 1.3. The doctrinal sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1. Aristotle as the main doctrinal source of the intentionality debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2. An additional influential source: St. Augustine . . . . . . . 1.3.3. The species debate in the context of Arabic optics . . . . Chapter II. The Common Doctrine of Cognition ca. 1260 . . . . . . . . 2.1. Are we sufficiently equipped to know the outside things?. . . 2.2. The psychological genesis of human cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1. The cognitive process analyzed. Sensation and intellection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2. The role of abstraction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3. The primary object of cognition. The form qua enmattered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Referentiality and reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. The proper mode of being falling to cognitional tools . . . . . . 2.5. Verbal expression and representation. The inner word . . . . .

19 22 27 29 30 33 37 41 41 47 48 50 53 57 64 70

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contents 2.6. Aquinas on the proper subject of logic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7. Conclusion. The battlefield to come . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74 76

Chapter III. The ‘Epistemological Turn’ around 1270 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. The problem of God’s immutability. The status of cognitive objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. The problems around esse cognitum (esse obiectivum) in the early 14th century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. James of Ascoli and William of Alnwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. On Hervaeus Natalis finding his own way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1. Hervaeus on the role of the species in intellective cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2. The doctrinal position of the inner word . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3. On the distinction between immanent and transitive operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4. Hervaeus on the cognitive process in general. . . . . . . . . 3.4.5. Hervaeus on the general problem of intellective cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. How does the intellect relate to being in general? b. How does it relate to universal being?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. How does it relate to non-being? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . d. How does it relate to particulars?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

Chapter IV. The Intentionality Issue before Faversham and Radulphus Brito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. Aquinas on the basic items regarding intentionality . . . . . . . . 4.1.1. On Aquinas formally distinguishing between the several cognitional tools and devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2. The notion and connotation of ‘intentio’. Its role in cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3. The twofold foundation of conceptions upon Reality. The notion ‘cum fundamento in re’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4. On the explicit distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ in Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.5. The role of ‘intentio’ in Aquinas’s trinitarian theology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. The discussions about ‘persona’ in some later authors. A survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1. Giles of Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. John of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80 85 85 95 96 101 102 105 106 106 107 110 110

113 113 113 117 120 124 126 130 130 132

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4.2.3. William of Ware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4. James of Metz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5. Hervaeus Natalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.6. Durand of St. Pourçain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.7. Henry of Ghent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.8. John Duns Scotus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

137 138 145 148 150 158

Chapter V. Simon of Faversham on Second Intentions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. Simon of Faversham on the two levels of considering extramental things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. The ‘intentio vs. res subiecta intentioni’ issue in a broader perspective. Denomination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3. The broad scope of the notion ‘second intention’ . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4. Faversham on the real foundation of second intentions . . . . . 5.4.1. The Sophisma ‘A universal is an intentio’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2. Does Faversham depart from the common doctrine of the foundation of second intentions? . . . . . 5.5. The Quaestiones on De anima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1. On the role and the reliability of the intelligible species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2. On the reliability of the intellectual activities . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3. On attaining Reality. The roles of simple apprehension and judgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

165

Chapter VI. Radulphus Brito on Intentionality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1. Radulphus’ comments on I Sent., dist. 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. The commentary In Arist. III De anima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1. On the intellect’s potentiality .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2. On the thing’s quiddity as the proper object of cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3. On knowing the singulars ‘per reflexionem’. The particular status of the phantasm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4. On the activity of the active intellect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.5. The intelligible species in the soul identified with the intellective act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3. The Quaestiones In Arist. I De anima, q. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4. The Quaestiones in Porphyrium, qq. 5–8 and 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1. The fifth question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2. The sixth question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

165 168 171 173 173 177 181 181 183 185 189 191 192 194 194 196 198 200 201 203 206 207 208

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contents

6.4.3. The seventh question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.4. The eighth question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.5. The eleventh question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5. The sophisma ‘Aliquis homo est species’. On the ontic status of second intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.1. On the distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ . . . . . . . . . 6.5.2. How second intentions are caused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.3. On the ontic status of second intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6. Some additional clues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.1. Radulphus on the proper subject of logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.2. The distinction between essential and accidental esse (secundum) intellectum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. Super Topica Boethii, q. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. Super Perihermeneias, q. 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. The pivotal role of the accidental vs. essential esse intellectum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . d. On intentions primarily taken as modi, rather than res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter VII. Hervaeus Natalis’s Treatise, De secundis intentionibus . . 7.1. A survey of De secundis intentionibus, Distinction I: On the nature of first intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1. Dist. I, q. 1: Is the intelligible species the (only) first intention? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2. Dist. I, q. 2: Does the first intention coincide with the act of the intellect? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.3. Dist. I, q. 3: Whether a first intention is a universal thing, and this alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.4. Dist. I, q. 4: Whether privations pertain to first intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.5. Dist. I, q. 5: Whether fictions pertain to first intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2. Distinction II: On the nature of second intentions . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1. Dist. II, q. 1: Whether a second intention is precisely the act of intellecting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2. Dist. II, q. 2: Whether a second intention is something real in the intellect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3. Dist. II, q. 3: Whether a second intention is something extramental. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

210 213 215 218 219 224 225 230 230 232 232 234 241 244 245 251 253 253 256 261 263 265 267 268 269 270

contents 7.2.4. Dist. II, q. 4: Whether a second intention is merely a rationate relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.5. Dist. II, q. 5: Whether the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect is a second intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.6. Dist. II, q. 6: Whether only the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect is a second intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3. On De secundis intentionibus, distt. III–V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1. Dist. III, q. 2: Whether a second intention is immediately founded upon an extramental thing . . . . 7.3.2. Dist. III, q. 3: Whether a second intention is founded upon a first. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3. Dist. IV, q. 1: Whether a second intention can be predicated of an extramental thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.4. Dist. IV, q. 2: Whether one second intention is truly predicated of another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.5. Dist. IV, q. 3: Whether a second intention can be truly predicated of the foundation of the opposite intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.6. Dist. V, q. 1: Whether there is a discipline having second intentions as its primary and essential subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.7. Dist. V, q. 2: Whether logic alone is about second intentions as its primary subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.8. Dist. V, q. 3: Whether logic deals with the entire domain of second intention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.9. Dist. V, q. 4: Whether there is a discipline other than logic which in one way or another deals with second intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter VIII. Giraldus Odonis’s Treatise De intentionibus . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1. On the introductory sections (capp. 2–43) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2. Girald’s peculiar view of intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.1. On the argument taken from the lore of definition. . . 8.2.2. On the argument taken from the natural conditions of sensorial activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.3. On the argument taken from the genuine cause of universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix 273

274

276 279 279 281 282 284

284

288 289 291

292 294 303 304 306 306 310 312

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contents 8.2.4. On the argument taken from predication. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2.5. On the argument taken from the real nature of the predicamental order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3. The real status of the categorial division of being . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.1. Some preliminary remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.2. How should formal difference and real identity be understood? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.3. On the objections made by Hervaeus Natalis . . . . . . . . 8.3.4. On the real status of the categorial divisions and distinctions of being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4. On the nature of the universal according to Girald’s De natura universalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5. On Girald’s position in the Aristotelian tradition . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter IX. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1. On the general background of the Medieval semantic views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2. Intellection, being intellected, and intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1. Simon of Faversham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2. Radulphus Brito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.3. Hervaeus Natalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.4. Giraldus Odonis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3. The cum fundamento in re issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1. Henry of Ghent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2. Simon of Faversham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.3. Radulphus Brito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.4. Hervaeus Natalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.5. Giraldus Odonis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.6. An alternative, conceptualist position. Peter Auriol . .

313 313 317 317 318 321 326 326 331 333 333 335 335 337 342 345 346 348 349 349 350 351 352

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 List of Manuscripts Referred to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 Text of De intentionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. William of Ware (Guillelmus Guarro) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. James of Metz (Jacobus Mettensis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Hervé Nédellec (Hervaeus Natalis). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. Durand of St. Pourçain (Durandus de S. Porciano) . . . . . . . . .

597 607 619 625 635

contents E. F. G. H.

xi

Raoul le Breton (Radulphus Brito) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierre d’Auriole (Petrus Aureolus) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Franciscus de Prato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stephan of Rieti (Stephanus de Reate). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

643 695 749 777

Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Index locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Index nominum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Index verborum rerumque notabilium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

823 825 839 845

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing the second volume of Girald Odonis’s Opera Philosophica, once again the manifold help I have received from various sides has been of great importance. I am very grateful for the cooperation extended to me by the Conservators of several manuscripts collections. Without their complaisance, enterprises like this are almost impracticable. I wish also to express my great appreciation for many useful remarks from colleagues, particularly Dr. Joke Spruyt (University of Maastricht), Dr. Russell L. Friedman (Thomas-Institut, Cologne), and Professor Chris Schabel (University of Cyprus). To Professor Andreas Speer, Director of the Studien zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, I am grateful for accepting this book into this series of prestige, and for the encouragements I have always received for my work from dr. Wouter Goris, Managing Editor of the series. Sincere thanks are also due to Brill’s Publishing House, and to Mr Julian Deahl and Ms Birgitta Poelmans and to Mr J. Rustenburg and Mr I.J.H. Geradts (TAT Zetwerk, Utrecht) in particular for the great care they all have expended on the publication. University of Maastricht, Christmas 2004

de R.

INTRODUCTION

1. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Life and works It is commonly assumed that Girald Odonis was born at Camboulit, near Figeac, in the South of France in 1285. He entered the Franciscan Order in the convent of Figeac at an early age, and studied at the University at Paris. He first taught at the Franciscan Studium at Toulouse, where he, among others, as e.g. Peter Auriol, features as a signatory, as is evidenced by a document dated February 13, 1315 (1316, according to the Gregorian Calendar).1 Girald is mentioned as a Parisian bachelor of theology in a colophon found in several manuscripts, in which his lecturing is dated 1326–1328. He became regent master of the Franciscan Studium in Paris by 1329.2 He was a friend and protégé of Pope John XXII (Jacques Duèze, 1316–1334, who was a fellow-countryman of his). On June 10, 1329, at the General Chapter of Paris, Girald was elected Minister General of the Order, and on November 27, 1342, Pope Clement VI (Pierre Rogier 1342–1352, also a fellow-countryman of his) appointed him patriarch of Antioch (in South Turkey) and raised him to the purple. In his capacity of Latin Patriarch of Antioch, Girald was also active as Apostolic Administrator entrusted with the care of the bishopric of Catania, in Sicily, where he died of the plague in 1349. Girald was a rather prolific writer. He is the author of a commentary on the four Books of the Sentences, which remained unedited (for its contents see Schabel 2004) and a treatise on logic consisting of thee books (edited in De Rijk 1997). He owes his renown to his Scriptum super librum Ethicorum, which is an elaborate commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, and was edited twice (Brescia 1482 and Venice 1500). Unlike the lion part of Girald’s works, his doctrinal influence 1 It concerns the excommunication of some adherents to the Franciscan master Peter John Olivi and some Provençal Spirituals, and was edited by Dreiling (1913), 218. 2 See for these colophons our descriptions of the Mss. below. Notice that Girald figures as a bachelor of theology in the Toulouse document (from 1316) referred to in our previous note. See also our note 11 below.

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in ethical matters is undisputable.3 Stephen Brown’s judgement that, with the exception of Girald’s views on ethics and physics (which are scattered throughout his Sentences commentary),4 his doctrinal positions are hardly known, is indeed still to the point.5 Girald’s philosophical and theological works surely deserve more attention than they have been given so far.6 As had become usual in his days,7 Girald dealt extensively with problems surrounding intentionality in his comments on I Sent., dist. 23. This section was later elaborated in his De intentionibus, which will be edited in the present volume. 2. The De intentionibus. Evaluation of the manuscripts used. Its date In the collectaneous manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4229, an extensive treatise on first and second intentions is handed down under the title quartus liber sive quarta pars huius operis [viz. Girald’s Logica]. It is found (incomplete) on folls. 74va–122vb. The text turns out to be an adaptation of Girald’s comments on I Sent., dist. 23, and of some other parts of the Sentences commentary. Furthermore, the sections of the Sentences that were taken over, have been rearranged by the adaptor, and at several occasions new sections have been added. The text of De intentionibus is found in the Madrid manuscript right after the third tract of Girald’s Logica (De principiis scientiarum), where the same fine hand that also added titles of the previous tracts, wrote on the top of fol. 74va: ‘Incipit quartus liber sive quarta pars huius operis’. This manuscript is to be taken as our basic witness of De intentionibus as it was compiled as a separate treatise. Although it provides us with a rather 3 See de Rijk (1997), 3, nn. 7 and 8. For the characterization of his Expositio in Aristotelis Ethicam as a sententia cum questionibus see Olga Weijers (2003), 218–219, and James J. Walsh, ‘Some Relationships between Girald Odo’s and John Buridan’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics’ in FS 35 (1975), 237–275. 4 See de Rijk (1993), 183–193. 5 Brown (1975), 5. 6 For more details of Girald’s life and career see de Rijk (1997), 1–5, and the literature referred to there; also Schabel (2004), 1–10 and the literature referred to there in nn. 3–27. We owe a general introduction to the life and writings of Girald Odonis to C. Langlois, ‘Guiral Ot, Frère Mineur’ in Histoire littéraire de France 36 (1927), 203–225. 7 Friedman (2002, 83) rightly draws our attention to the fact that from the late 13th. century on, it became a trend for scholars to use the Sentences commentary as the major vehicle of scholastic expression.

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extensive text, the treatise has come down to us as a torso. Unfortunately, the missing portions are not found in the Sentences commentary either. The original text sections as occurring in the Sentences commentary are surely useful for correcting errors and omissions in the Madrid version. Thus we have four text witnesses available: Madrid, Bibl. Nac., cod. 4229, Madrid, Univ., cod. 65, Naples, Bibl. Naz., cod. VII B 25, Valencia, Catedral, cod. 139 (for In I Sent.) and Catedral, cod. 200 (for In II and III Sent.),8 and Sarnano, Bibl. Com., cod. E 98. M = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, cod. 4229 (formerly L 154) is a parchment codex which consists of 208 folios, measuring 205×145 mm. It seems to have been written ca. 1335, most likely as early as in the 1330’s.9 It has been executed by one scribe over two columns of 36 lines each, in a very nice Gothic minuscle, and it is adorned with rubricas in various colours. The provenance of this codex is probably the South of France. It formally belonged to the Biblioteca Central of Alcalá (formerly the Complutum or Collegium Complutense). There are some corrections in the same handwriting as the text, as well as a small number of contemporary marginal notes (apparently also added by the same scribe who wrote the text), the majority of which only concerning the division of the text. The treatise De intentionibus occurs on folls. 74va– 121va, where the text breaks off, leaving the remaining seven lines of the column blank.10 U = Madrid, Biblioteca de la Universidad, cod. 65 is a fourteenth century parchment codex (295×210 mm., 205 folios, 2 colls.), which also belonged to the Alcalá collection,11 contains In I Sent., dist. 23 on folls. 8 Professor John E. Murdoch (Department of the History of Science of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.) was kind enough to loan me his microfilms of the Valencia manuscripts. I owe the opportunity of consulting the Sarnano codex to the kindness of Professor Chris Schabel (University of Cyprus. Department of History and Archeology) and Dr. Paul Bakker (University of Nijmegen). 9 The Inventario general de manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid 1984) wrongly dates our codex to the fifteenth century; see de Rijk (1997), 5, n. 21. 10 For a more detailed description of this manuscript see de Rijk (1993), 175–193, and (1997), 5–10. I inspected this codex in 1971 (see de Rijk 1993, 173), but I have used a microfilm for establishing the text printed in the present volume. 11 See J. Villa-Amil y Casto, Catálogo de los manuscritos existentes en la Biblioteca del Noviciado de la Universidad Central (procedentes de la antigua de Alcalá). Madrid 1878; see also Schabel (2002), 355 f. (who erroneously has Biblioteca Nacionál), and the same (2004), 16. The explicit (f. 203va) runs: “Expliciunt Reperationes (sic!) secundum lecturam fratris gerardi odonis de ordine fratrum minorum bacallarii in theologia legentis sententias

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131rb–156rb. The Sentences commentary (in fact only Books I and IV) has been written in the same handwriting (gothic minuscle) in two columns of 48 lines each, without glosses or other additions or corrections. The text of In I Sent. opens as follows: f. 131rb: PREDICTIS etc. Supra Magister egit de diversitate divinorum nominum in generali. Hic incipit secunda pars, in qua agit in speciali. Et quoniam quedam nomina sunt substantialia, quedam relativa et hec convenit considerare absolute et ad se, ideo hec pars habet tres partes. Primo enim agit de nominibus substantialibus, secundo de relativis, infra [qua Ms.] dist. 26a: NUNC DE PROPRIETATIBUS, in 3a de hiis relativis adinvicem, infra dist. 33a: POST PREDICTA. In presenti autem distinctione agit de nomine ‘persona’. Dividitur autem presens distinctio in 4 partes. Primo ostendit modum per quem dicitur hoc nomen ‘persona’ de divinis. In secunda reddit causam quare sic dicitur, ibi: IDEO QUERITUR HEC QUESTIO. In 3a obicit contra se et solvit, ibi: SED CONTRA HOC TAMEN DICIMUS. In 4a epilogat, ibi: IAM SUFFICIENTER UT PUTO.

Next the main problem surrounding the use of ‘persona’ (‘Is it a first or a second intention?’) is differentiated: 131rb–va: Ad evidentiam autem eorum que dicuntur hic de intentione persone, inquirenda sunt aliqua de intentione in communi et aliqua in speciali de intentione prima et secunda et earum comparatione, et de intentione per se principaliter. Queritur ergo primo utrum intentio in communi dicatur univoce de intentionibus captis in speciali; 2o utrum intentio prima et secunda se habeant ut res intellecta et actus intelligendi; 3o utrum termini singulares significent aliquam intentionem an soli termini universales significent intentionem; 4o utrum prima intentio et secunda se habeant sicut cognitio rei sub modo proprio essendi et cognitione sub modo essendi communi; 5o utrum prima intentio et parisius anno incarnationis eiusdem domini MCCCXXVI”. The explicit of the tabula questionum (205rb) reads: “Expliciunt reperationes (sic!) super primum sententiarum secundum lecturam venerabilis doctoris in theologia magistri fratris g. odonis de ordine fratrum minorum”. Notice that the latter explicit calls Girald a doctor, not a bachelor, as is done in the former explicit; a similar state of affairs is found in the Sarnano Ms.; see below. Considering the fact that Girald’s In I Sent., dist. 23 contains some clues for dating this distinctio between 1316 and 1322 (see below), and in his In II Sent., dist. 6, Girald refers to Peter Auriol (“dicebat”; Ms. Valencia 200, f. 34vb) as no longer alive, it might seem that Girald’s lecturing on the second Book of the Sententiae should have taken place not before 1322, which supports the dates mentioned in our manuscript copies (1326–1328); cf. p. 353, n. 20 below. Chris Schabel kindly let me know (in a private communication) that the manuscripts of Girald’s Sentences commentary contain reportationes of his Toulouse lectures (around 1316). From the above colophons it can be gathered that Girald was still a bachelor at Paris as late as 1326–1328. See also Schabel (2004), 10 ff.

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secunda se habeant sicut cognitio rei sub modo essendi reali et cognitio rei sub modo essendi rationis; 6o utrum omnis intentio sit habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi; 7o utrum prima intentio et secunda distinguantur sicut duo genera intelligibilium [intentionum Ms.]; 8o utrum intentio logicaliter sumpta habeat determinate unum quid nominis; 9o utrum habeat quid rei; 10o utrum intentio prima et secunda se habeant sicut res predicamentalis et gradus predicamentalis; 11o utrum gradus predicamentalis et suprapredicamentalis et subpredicamentalis sint ex natura rei; 12o utrum intentio singularitatis et individualitatis sint preter actum [actus Ms.] intellectus; 13o utrum intentio universalitatis [singularitatis Ms.] sit preter actum [actus Ms.] intellectus; 14o utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen prime impositionis vel secunde; 15o utrum ‘persona’ significet primam intentionem vel secundam; 16o utrum ‘persona’ dicatur ad se vel ad aliquid; 17o utrum ‘persona’ significet substantiam.

As is plain, only the articles 1–13 could serve as material for the treatise De intentionibus. As a matter of fact, the 13th article winds up as follows: 155va: Quare patet quod iste sint intellectus maxime secundum quod accepi maximam. Et ista sufficiant de inconvenientibus in generali et de discussione [diffinitione Ms.] in generali. Patet ergo quod non omnis secunda intentio pendet ab intellectu. Argumentum principale [principaliter Ms.] solutum est in corpore questionis.

N = Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII B 25 (a paper codex, measuring 340×230 mm., 272 folios, 2 colls.), which seems to date from the early fifteenth century, contains only Book I of Girald’s commentary on the Sentences. On the upper margin of fol. 1 a late hand wrote ‘Hic liber est fratris geraldi ordinis minorum parisius legentis munere baccalarii qui legit anno 1327’. The explicit to Book I (264rb) runs ‘Expliciunt reportationes secundum lecturam fratris geraldi ordinis minorum baccalarii in theologia legentis parisius anno Mo CCCmo XXVIIo’. Dist. 23 occurs on folls. 161va–192ra. There are no glosses or other marginal notes. There are also two Mss. of interest to us which belong to the Cathedral library of Valencia (Spain), one for Book I, the other for the other Books:12 V = Valencia, Catedral, Ms. 139 (formerly 112) is a parchment codex of 137 folios in recent numeration (328×235 mm; written surface 245× 12 Elias Olmos y Canalda, Catálogo descriptivo: Codices de la Catedral de Valencia. Segunda edicion refundida y notablemente aumentada. Valencia 1943. A. Lopez, ‘Descriptio codicum franciscalium Bibliothecae Cathedralis Valentinae’ in Archivo Ibero-Americano XXXVI (1933), 172–222; also Schabel (2004), 16–17.

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175 mm), which dates from ca. 1350, and has been written in a gothic minuscle over two columns of ca. 63 lines each, contains Girald’s In I Sent. from folls. 1ra–136rb. On fol. 1ra the title is found: “Hec est interpretatio sententiarum”. On fol. 136rb the explicit runs: “Explicit lectura magistri geraldi odonis cardinalis ordinis carmelitarum [sic!; this word was erased by a later hand] super primum sententiarum. deo gratias amen”. It has rubricas in red and azure, and contains some marginal notes. There is found a tabula questionum on folls. 136rb– 137va. This manuscript is badly damaged by damp stains, which makes considerable portions of the text almost illegible. On the back of the cover, the title is found: Geraldi in 1um sententiarum. V = Valencia, Catedral, Ms. 200 (formerly 63) is a parchment codex of 229 folios (325×230 mm; written surface 227×145 mm) dating from about the fourteenth century. It has been written in a similar gothic minuscle over two colums of ca. 57 lines each, with some rubricas in red and azure. It contains the three other Books (with Girald’s De duobus communissimis principiis scientiarum in between Book III and IV).13 Folls. 1ra–104vb: In II Sent.; expl.: “Ad quam gloriam et patriam perducat jhesus christus filius dei benedictus ad cuius honorem et gloriam consummate sunt reportationes secundi libri sententiarum secundum lecturam fratris Geraldi hodonis de ordine fratrum minorum bacallarii in theologia legentis sententias parysius anno incarnationis MoCCCoXXVIIIo domini nostri Jhesu Xri cui est honor et gloria in secula seculorum. Amen”. A tabula questionum is found on folls. 104vb–105va. Folls. 108ra–175ra contain In III Sent., followed by a tabula questionum (f. 175ra–rb). The fourth Book is on folls. 193r–217v. The entire text is written in a clear handwriting, without glosses. Unlike codex 139, this codex is well preserved. On the back cover: Commentaria in libros Sententiarum et Quodlibet Guidonis Carmelite. S = Sarnano, Biblioteca Comunale, cod. E 98. This fine parchment codex of 202 folios, measuring 330×315 mm. is written in two columns in a clear Italian hand (gothic minuscle), and adorned with rubricas in various colours. It seems to contain a text of the Sentences commentary which shows some affinity with U and V. It formerly belonged to the library of the Franciscan convent.14 Book I occurs on ff. 1r–121v, and 13 See for further information about its contents the library catalogue, and de Rijk (1997), 16–17. 14 See G. Abate, ‘Antichi manoscritti ed incunaboli dell’ex biblioteca O.F.M. Conv.

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Book II on fols. 122r–201v. Whereas the explicit to Book I (‘Explicit primus sententiarum editus a suficientissimo in theologia doctore fratre gerardo odonis ordinis fratrum minorum’) calls the author doctor in theologia (like U does in the tabula questionum), that of Book II calls him bachelor in a colophon that is verbatim the same as that occurring in V (Valencia 200). The commentary on I dist. 23 is found ff. 69rb–82va. Our text witnesses are of unequal value. M is unique in that it alone contains the (unfortunately incomplete) revised and elaborated text of De intentionibus. However, it suffers from many omissions, for the correction of which we have to rely on UNVS, which, incidentally, are noticeably unanimous in this respect. One look at our apparatus criticus is enough to recognize the use of UNVS. By the way, it looks as if the redactor did not have a manuscript of the UNVS family at his elbow. E.g., at cap. 136, M has the correct conditio instead of UNVS’s cognitio; at cap. 138, M correctly reads supplet (twice!) where UNVS have supponet. At several occasions, the manus corrigens of M (Mc) corrects unanimous errors of MUNV, e.g., in capp. 36 (two corrections); 39; 290. On the other hand, UNVS are useful for correcting errors (mostly omissions) occurring in M. Furthermore there are, of course, the redactional differences between the revised text of M and the Sentences version found in UNVS. To begin with, the additions in M should be referred to, viz. the capp. 96–97; 108–131; 217–225; 342–347; 349–354; 364–369; 377–386; 394– 426; 428–452.15 Another noticeable difference between the two versions is that from cap. 211 onwards, M always reads questiones, where the UNVS version has dubia, as from cap. 253 onwards, M constantly reads intentio superior and intentio inferior, whereas the Sententie text of UNVS has the generic words, superius and inferius. As to be expected, the liberal compilation of the revised text led to dissimilarities such as (in cap. 44) between ‘hec autem plenius determinabuntur infra’ (M) and ‘hec autem superius sunt declarata’ (UNVS). Similarly, the M-version adds a reference to the Annexum to the third Book of Girald’s Logica: “(…) et di S. Francesco, ora Biblioteca Comunale di Sarnano (Marche)’ in: Miscellanea Francescana. Rivista trimestriale di scienze, lettere ed arti. Roma 47 (1947) [478–529, our codex p. 504], and P.G. Avarucci, ‘L’ antica biblioteca francescana, ora comunale di Sarnano’ in: Collectanea Francescana 60 (1960), 201–254. 15 These capita may have been taken from other distinctiones of the Sentences, as e.g. capp. 253–293 are taken from In I Sent., dist. 7, q. 5, and capp. 334–372; 376 and 387–391 from In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 3.

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aliquam rationem realem quidditativam indeterminate apprehensionis secundum quod dictum fuit supra, libro tertio” (cap. 358). U has sometimes the correct reading where the others are wrong, e.g., at capp. 187; 199; 205; 212; 229; 237; 246; 307. At other occasions (e.g., capp. 146; 165), it shares the better reading with V alone, or with N alone, e.g., capp. 76; 78; 81; 95; 143; 149; 160; 176; 186; 202; 248; 308. At some occasions (see e.g. cap. 143), it has the same readings as M. N is despite its rather late date (early 15th cent.) a rather good manuscript. It is the only one (against the others) that has correct readings at capp. 8; 58; 167; 189; 195; 197; 243; 329; 388. In cap. 314 it shares this privilege with M, in capp. 59; 69, and 240 with V, elsewhere with U or S (12 times; see above). V is reasonably good, and seems to be the only one that has been thoroughly corrected; see the apparatus criticus. In capp. 69 and 321 it is the only manuscript with the correct reading, and at capp. 59; 69 and 240 it shares our preference with N alone. S presents a very nice copy of the Sentences version of De intentionibus, and is often helpful where the copyist of M is negligent. According to Schabel (2004, 17), a critical examination of questions from distt. 38–41 shows that UV and NS represent two independent branches of the stemma roughly equal in quality. They all carry the same basic text, but there is some evidence that one of the two branches is a revision. The Mss. U and V were both heavily corrected in hands different from that of the text. As for the date of De intentionibus, we have to distinguish between its original version found in the first Book of the Sentences commentary and the adapted and elaborated version found in Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229. The first Book of the Sentences commentary cannot be dated before 1313, because in Dist. 23, Girald extensively reacts to Hervaeus Natalis’s De secundis intentionibus, which must have been written ca. 1313. On the other hand, while Girald explicitly deals with rival views of intentionality, in the Sentences version he completely ignores Peter Auriol’s extensive treatment of first and second intention occurring in the latter’s Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, of which we possess a copy finished in Cahors on May 19, 1317. Furthermore there is a chronological clue in Girald’s In I Sent., dist. 23 (both in the Sentences version and the later version, cap. 143 of the present edition), where Girald among others refers to Pope John XXII (1316–1334), King Philip V (1316 – Januari 3, 1322) as being in office, which provides us with the year 1315 as a terminus post quem, and 1322 as a terminus ante quem. All things considered, the proba-

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ble date for the composition of the Sentences version of De intentionibus is between 1316 and 1322, and since, most remarkably, Auriol too seems to completely ignore his fellow Franciscan, Girald Odonis’s In I Sent. dist. 23, we should think of a date before 1320 rather than after. As far as the separate tract De intentionibus (which is a later version of Girald’s In I Sent., dist. 23) is concerned, things are a bit more complicated. To begin with, who is the author of the elaborate version of De intentionibus as found in M? This question parallels that concerning the composition of Girald’s Logica.16 The three tracts making up the Logica were available separately before they were collected and supplemented with three rather extensive Annexa, which were drawn from several parts of the commentary on the Sentences. This collective (re-)edition, of which our Madrid Ms. Bibl. Nac. 4229 (our M) is (just as in the case of De intentionibus) our only text witness, is most likely to be dated in the early 1330s, shortly after Girald’s election as Minister General (in 1329), as may appear from a reference occurring in a contemporary logical textbook of Franciscan origin. This anonymous (ps.-Auriol) treatise, which is only preserved in Vat. Lat. 946 (written in a hand dating from the 1340–1350s), and can be dated almost certainly before 1336, contains a clear reference to the division of propositions presented by Girald in his Logica I, capp. 11–14 (pp. 91–92 ed. de Rijk), which is introduced by the words: “Hec est divisio reverendi patris generalis Ministri in Logica sua”.17 Hence it may be gathered that in Gerald’s lifetime, the Logica was referred to as a well-known work written by the Minister General of the Franciscan Order. The decisive question now is: Did Girald have the opportunity of reworking his logical works and also his De intentionibus as occurring in In I Sent., dist. 23 at any time after, say, 1324? In this connection it is important to notice [1] that neither in Girald’s work nor in Ockham’s Summa logicae (which is commonly dated ca. 1324) there is any trace of these authors’ familiarity with each other’s work,18 and [2] that in the elaborate re-edition of the Logica, a later hand in M sometimes refers to Ockham, [3] that it is unlikely that Girald had the opportunity of reworking both his logical works and De intentionibus before he was See de Rijk (1997), 23–25. This treatise has been edited as Logica Ad rudium (after its opening words). The passage in question is II, cap. 21, pp. 63–64, ed. de Rijk (1981). For its probable date see ibid., 11–12, and de Rijk (1997), 24, n. 57. 18 Unless De intentionibus, capp. 421–426 concern Ockham. 16 17

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assigned the tasks of Minister General, let alone that as Minister General he could himself undertake or continue such a vast labour. It seems obvious that the Minister General commissioned one (or more) of the brethren to do the job, under his supervision.19 On the other hand, the afore-mentioned chronological clue does not substantially differ in M from the (various) readings in UNVS: De intentionibus, cap. 143: Cognoscere [cognosco NS] Joannem ut Papam, Phylippum ut regem, Gastonem [MNVS; ludovicum U ] ut comitem, Petrum ut episcopum, Robertum ut legatum, Arnaldum [NVS; geraldum MU ] ut procuratorem [curatorem S], Geraldum [NVS; arnaldum MU ] ut prefectum non est secunda intentio; oppositum enim dicere est maxima et absurda nimis abusio.

This would suggest that, supposing that at the time of the revision, (the possible inedequacy of) this enumeration did not escape the redactor’s or the author’s attention, the main items were still to the point, Pope John XXII (1316–1334) and a King of France named Philip (this time Philip VI, 1328–1350) still being alive.20 In that case the terminus ante quem of the separate treatise De intentionibus—at least up to Prima Pars, art. IV, cap. 143—would be 1334, and the post quem 1328. Thus, with all due reservations, Girald’s De intentionibus as printed in the present edition could be dated between 1328 and 1334.

19

That Girald himself had a finger in the pie appears from the fact that at some occasions the De intentionibus text of M betrays a greater animosity towards people holding opposite views (Hervaeus Natalis, in particular) than is found in the original Sentences version. For example, at cap. 82: “quod est nequam dictu” where UNVS read “quod est inconvenienter dicta”. In cap. 98, the M-version adds: “licet ille maledictus Averroys dixerit oppositum, ponens unum intellectum in omnibus hominibus, et illum dicebat non esse singularem”. In cap. 135 the sober “hec opinio non est multum probabilis” (UNVS) became “hec opinio, adminus quantum ad istum articulum, est omnino digna despici” (M). In cap. 135, the M-version calls an opposite position “omnino digna despici”, while the Sentences version has “non multum probabilis”. In cap. 195, the common “Sed hec omnia videntur summe absurda” is explained by M adding “Hec enim sunt contra omnem rationem et sine ratione dicta”. In cap. 261, M maliciously adds “(…) hoc est manifestum cuicumque, etiam parum intelligenti”. In cap. 357, the author judges about an attempted refutation of one of his own arguments, replacing the original “Patet igitur quod ratio [viz. my argument] non solvitur” (UNVS) with “Patet igitur quod ratio remanet omnino illesa, et quanto plus discutitur, tanto fortior invenitur” (M). 20 The Petrus episcopus may be Peter, bishop of Aix en Provence (1318–1321), who was the predecessor of Peter Auriol (1321–1322). No Peter resided in Toulouse at the time. See P.B. Gams, Series episcoporum ecclesiae catholicae. Ratisbonae 1873.

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3. The contents of De intentionibus. Its genre The introductory text (cap. 1), which, by the way, is missing in the Sentences version of UNVS, suggests that the proper aim of the treatise is to deal with the problem of transcendent intentions, and that the entire exposition of the general theme of first and second intention is only intended to adequately prepare the discussion about transcendent intentions. It is a pity that the Pars Tertia (capp. 252–452 of the present edition), which, announced in the opening chapter under the title questiones de transcendentibus disputate, is devoted to the main theme of transcendent intention, breaks off rather prematurely, it seems. Although five rival opinions—among which (anonymously) those of William of Ware and Radulphus Brito—about first and second intention are mentioned, it is Hervaeus Natalis in particular who is under severe attack (capp. 7–16; 144–200; 406–434). The torso of Girald’s De intentionibus as we have it extant consists of three Partes: I: De intentione in communi, in five articuli; II: Quid sit prima intentio et quid secunda, in an articulus unicus, and III: Quid sit intentio transcendens et quid non-transcendens, which comprises (in our incomplete text) four questiones disputate, consisting of four, two, three, and one articulus, respectively. The first article of Pars prima (capp. 2–26) discusses (in a rather conventional way) the five different senses in which the word ‘intentio’ is used; the second (capp. 27– 41) enumerates the aforesaid five rival views of intention (as the term is used in its logico-epistemological sense, that is), which are criticized in the fourth article (capp. 109–200), and the third article (capp. 43–108) deals with the hot issue of whether any second intention is mind-dependent.21 The fifth article (capp. 201–242) mainly discusses the notion of intention from the logico-epistemological side by particularly focussing on the notions ‘thing intellected’ and ‘intentional being’, the latter as opposed to ‘real being’, from which perspective the relationships between first and second intention are discussed. In the articulus unicus of the Pars secunda (capp. 245–250), these relationships are further discussed, from different angles (penes esse, penes intelligi, penes significari, penes predicari, and penes ordinari).

21

Girald argues for an answer in the negative; see 305 ff. below.

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The Pars tertia, which contains Girald’s own contribution to the matter of intentionality, is devoted to the vast range of the notion of intentionality. The first questio disputata (capp. 253–351) is about the hierarchical order between the various intentions, and the nature of the different degrees to be distinguished (gradus predicamentalis, gradus suprapredicamentalis, gradus subpredicamentalis). A general thesis is argued for to the effect that the inferior and superior intentions found in one and the same predicamental line (such as homo and animal) are completely the same. In the first article (capp. 257–265), this thesis is proved in six ways. In the second article (capp. 266–293) the notions of (formal) identity and diversity are elaborated in various ways. The third article (capp. 294– 312) argues that the categorial degrees are rooted in nature, rather than in the mind. In the fourth article (capp. 313–331), finally, the author goes on to show that the various relationships between first and second intention should be understood in terms of the aforesaid ordering of intentions according to three intentional degrees (gradus suprapredicamentalis, predicamentalis and subpredicamentalis). In the second questio disputata (capp. 332–374) the well-known problem of the univocity of being is discussed in terms of the relationships between the transcendent intentions, ens and res to the intentions found in the categorial domain. In this context, the univocity thesis is argued for (first article, capp. 336–372), as well as the mind-independence of the gradus transcendentie (capp. 373–374). The third questio disputata (capp. 375–436) is about the intricate problem whether two intentions can be formally different, while being really the same. Its first article (capp. 376–391) discusses the real distinction between the different categories, and what one should understand by the expressions ‘formal difference’ and ‘real identity’. His own point of view is that this question comes to asking whether two intentions can differ in the way which he indicates (cap. 391) as “through universal, secondary, and qualificative realities”, while there is, at the same time, between them an identity founded upon what he calls “some numerically one, singular, primary, and determinate reality”. In the second article (capp. 392–420), the affirmative answer to the aforesaid problem is argued for, including the view that this answer is ad mentem Aristotelis. In the third article (capp. 421–436), an opposite view ascribed to quidam doctor is discussed and rejected (capp. 421–426), which is followed (capp. 427–429) by a discussion and rejection of the opposite view argued for by Hervaeus Natalis in a Quodlibet which is also referred to by Peter Auriol, but has not been handed down to us, it seems. This article

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winds up with a discussion of a certain objection against the use of the formal distinction in divinis, and a short reply to an in contrarium argument put forward in the opening section of the first article (cap. 377). The incomplete fourth questio disputata, which is intended to discuss the single categorial intentions, already breaks off in the first article, which broaches the intricate question of the precise meaning of the notion ‘categorial reality’. All things considered, the present work is markedly polemical, which particularly comes to the fore in the (at times venomous) criticism of Hervaeus Natalis. It might be suggested, therefore, that the elaborated version too originated in the context of academic disputation,22 which is highlighted by the prologue of De intentionibus, in which the questiones disputatae on transcendent intentions are presented as the proper theme of the treatise. Unlike Hervaeus’s treatise, Girald’s work seems to have met disappointingly little response.23

See Weijers (2002), 25–51. He is completely ignored by Franciscus de Prato in his Logica (tract 3 ed. Rode), as well as in his Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione (see ed. Mojsisch), whereas Stephanus de Reate has only one insignificant reference to Girald’s Logica and Scriptum; see Appendix G, cap. 128. Likewise Girald’s doctrine is completely disregarded in the Bologna tradition, e.g. in Mattheus de Augubio’s Determinatio de ente rationis, in which Girald’s rival Hervaeus is subjected to serious criticism. See the important studies of Lambertini (1989), (1992), (1999). There is also a treatise on second intentions by Maynus de Maineriis, who taught the artes in Paris. It is extant in Sevilla, Bibl. Capitolare y Colombina, cod. 5.6.12 (Tractatus de intentionibus secundis; ‘(…) compositus in studio parisiensi per magistrum Maynum de Maynis). It is dated 1329–1330. About this author see C.J. Ermatinger, “Maino de” Maineri in his still unstudied role as philosopher in early 14th-century Paris’ in: Manuscripta 20 (1976), 8–9. From the opening lines of the treatise proper it appears that it discusses second intentions from the viewpoint of logic, of which second intentions make up the proper subject: “Tractatum de secundis intentionibus, quantum ad logicum spectat, in quinque partes dividam principales. Quarum prima de intentionibus sermonem continet generalem. Secunda de intentionibus secundis notitiam tradit confusam. Tertia pars de intentionibus secundis penes primam operationem intellectus causatis specialem facit sermonem. Quarta pars de intentionibus secundis causatis secundum secundam operationem intellectus tradit notitiam specialem. Quinta et ultima pars est de intentionibus secundis causatis penes tertiam operationem operationem (bis!) intellectus sermonem continet [continens Ms.]. Propter primum notandum quod circha res nichil proponimus declarare, cum iste tractatus sit pure logicus”. In fact, it is a tract on logic, which deals with the usual main themes and subjects of logic, here arranged according the three operations of the intellect. There is no single mention of other authors, not even Hervaeus Natalis. 22 23

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introduction 4. The ratio edendi. Orthography. Punctuation. Headings

Because of its unique character as the only witness extant of Girald’s De intentionibus as a separate treatise the manuscript Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229 (= M) has been taken as our basic text witness, despite its numerous shortcomings.24 Four manuscripts (our UNVS) which have handed down Dist. 23 of the first Book of Girald’s commentary on the Sentences, in which the earlier version of Girald’s discussion of first and second intention is found that has served as the groundwork for the elaborated separate text, have turned out to be of much help for correcting M. They are mentioned in the critical apparatus, even when their readings were not followed. All in all, M’s readings have been set aside only when they obviously do not make sense, or suffer from minor errors, or apparent omissions. The critical apparatus makes it possible to reconstruct the original version as found in the Sentences commentary. Of course, insignificant variants, such as ergo/igitur, vel/aut (when interchangeable), autem/vero, ille/iste, the omission of est in cases such as ‘dicendum est’, and the like, as well as changes in word-order in matters of no consequence have not been taken into consideration. When the reading adopted in the edition is conjectural, or has been taken from parallellous passages of the present treatise or found in other works, the indication ‘coni.’ (or ‘coni. coll.’, respectively) is used. As it is of no use to distinguish between corrections made in the margin and those in the text, including interlinear ones, they are all indiscriminately indicated as readings of Mc, Vc etc. Their location is insignificant for marking them off from marginal notes added by Mm, Vm etc. In matters of orthography the manuscripts are followed in all those many cases in which our witnesses are unanimous or almost so. Whenever the same manuscript spells words inconsistently, the usual Medieval orthography has been followed, or the practice current in our manuscripts. A certain amount of arbitrariness and inconsistency is unavoidable on this account, but should be endured rather than anachronistically (and with a touch of disdain, perhaps) printing Medieval 24 Like the other text witnesses UNVS, I have for the present edition used M by working from a microfilm and a photocopy, without having the original manuscripts at my elbow. So I could not attempt to give anything approaching a full description of the codices.

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texts in classicized form. That ambivalent spellings allowing adjectival as well as adverbial interpretations, such as in ‘vere’, and ‘maxime’, have so be left ambiguous puts the modern reader in the same position as his Medieval companion. Every reader of Medieval manuscripts knows that they are always poorly punctuated, to such an extent indeed that one wonders time and again how people were able to seriously study such texts. So the punctuation of the present edition is entirely the editor’s. Anomalous punctuations (which are sometimes found in manuscripts) are to be ignored except for cases in which they betray a copyist’s misunderstanding the text. All headings are added by the editor, and always supported by clues in the text, and sometimes by indications in the margin. The division into numbered sections (‘capita’) is entirely the editor’s, but is supported by clues in the text most of the time.

A STUDY ON THE MEDIEVAL INTENTIONALITY DEBATE UP TO ca. 1350

chapter one PRELIMINARY MATTERS

As Jan Pinborg rightly observed as early as about thirty years ago (1975, 120), the impressive career of the so-called ‘second intentions’ (secunde intentiones) began when roughly around the middle of the thirteenth century, these notion appeared as the key tool in the discussions on the proper subject of logic. So it is in this context that Robert Kilwardby in his De ortu scientiarum (probably written ca. 1250)1 presents a short discussion of the nature of nouns of second intention. In an extensive examination (chs. 46–48) of the origin and focus of the discipline dealing with the requirements of correct expression (scientia sermocinalis), particularly logic, which is concerned with correct reasoning, Kilwardby makes clear that the main feature of logic is its being a scientia rationalis, which in its capacity of being a modus scientiarum, is about precisely the rationes that play the key role in the different ways in which we proceed from one term to another.2 In this context, the referential force of the terms is vital, and the distinction between nouns signifying first and second intention appears to be of decisive importance. The author says that the things by themselves are first intentions, and, accordingly, the nouns signifying them (e.g. ‘substance’, ‘quantity’) are nouns of first intention, while what he calls the rationes rerum (the ontic aspects of the things, that is),3 such as universale, particulare, antecedens, consequens and the like, are second intentions, and the nouns signifying them nouns of second intention. Finally Kilwardby declares the terminology used: the things are called first intentions because they are primarily comprehended, while the second intentions are the ontic aspects that are gathered from 1

Judy (1976), p. XV. De ortu scientiarum, cap. XLVIII, 457–458 Judy: “Hinc patere potest quare logica dicitur modus scientiarum (…). Ipsa enim in se modos rerum consideratarum in aliis scientiis et in semetipsa contemplatur (…). Patet etiam quare dicitur rationalis scientia. Modi enim praedicti rerum quas considerant scientiae, non sunt nisi rationes earum, sic dictae quia per illas distinguit eas ratio et discernendo connectit ac dividit, discurrens ab uno termino in alium, sive per solum intervallum, sicut in propositione accidit, sive per medium terminum, sicut in ratiocinatione. Quia igitur tales rationes rerum principaliter considerat logica, ideo rationalis scientia dicitur”. 3 See de Rijk (1994), 201 ff. 2

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considering the things according to their mutual logical relationships. That is why logic is also said to be about second intentions: De ortu scientiarum, cap. XLVIII, 459 Judy: Hinc etiam patet quare dicitur esse de secundis intentionibus et de nominibus significantibus secundas intentiones. Res enim ipsae sunt primae intentiones, et nomina eas significantia, cuiusmodi sunt ‘substantia’, ‘quantitas’ et huiusmodi, sunt nomina primarum intentionum. Sed rationes rerum, cuiusmodi sunt universale, particulare, antecedens, consequens et huiusmodi, sunt secundae intentiones, et nomina eas significantia nomina secundarum intentionum. Et dicuntur illae primae et istae secundae quia primo comprehenduntur res, et deinde ex consideratione et collatione rerum adinvicem colliguntur rationes earum.

Elsewhere, when the author speaks about the relationships between metaphysics and all the other speculative disciplines, he comes to mention those intentions that are properties of what is called ens simpliciter, to wit universality, particularity, generality, speciality, contrariarity, diversity, dissimilarity, and the like. These intentions apparently are based on considering properties (passiones) of things that come to the fore when they are regarded not by themselves (as merely belonging to them on each having their proper form), but according to the mutual relationships they possess in their capacity of being not yet categorially differentiated, but just an ens simpliciter (in which capacity the things are the proper subject of metaphysics).4 All things considered, Kilwardby’s account of the pair ‘first and second intention’ is rather vague. In the passage just mentioned, he does not use the label ‘second intention’, although he alludes to what was regarded later on as the formal aspect of the second intentions, or the second intentions in abstracto, universality, particularity, and so on. However with Kilwardby, these sort of second intention seems to concern real properties of the things, which they possess as soon as they are considered by our intellect according to certain logical relationships, such as universality, being a genus or species, logical priority or posteriority, and the like. However, the logical relationships as such are not under consideration, but rather the properties assigned 4 De ortu scientiarum, cap. XXXII, 330 Judy: “Aliter autem sese habent passiones propriae partialium entium ad passiones entis simpliciter secundum quod huiusmodi est. Passiones enim propriae circuli, trianguli et aliarum huiusmodi magnitudinum et numeri et aliorum partialium entium sufficienter sciuntur et demonstrantur ex propriis causis praeter cognitionem harum intentionum quae sunt proprietates entis simpliciter, scilicet universalitatis, particularitatis, generalitatis, specialitatis, contrarietatis, diversitatis, dissimilitudinis et huiusmodi (…)”.

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to the things on the basis of these relationships. Once again, any notion of the second intention as merely a mental product is missing. It must also strike the reader that the things themselves (res ipsae) are called first intentions, whereas the obvious idea that they are called first intentions in so far as they are involved in a mental process and designated by the terms used by the speaker or thinker, is not made explicit at all. It should be noticed, finally, that to Kilwardby’s mind, it is still reasoning that is the proper subject of logic, rather than the domain of second intentions. That logic is said to be about second intentions is merely a result of their role in the process of reasoning.5 In the logical writings of the 1270s and 1280s the notion of second intention seems to play a similarly modest role when it comes to defining the proper subject of logic, despite the fact that the problems involved continues to be the subject of heated debates.6 Trinitarian theology afforded another battlefield for controversial views concerning the proper meaning of the distinction between first and second intention. Unlike the theme of the proper subject of logic— in which the thesis that logic is about second intentions was not as such at stake, but rather that second intentions should be considered the proper subject of logic, and not reasoning in general, or the syllogism, as was often argued for—the theological controversy concerned a specific theological problem, viz. the logical status of the notion of persona in the doctrine on the Holy Trinity. In their comments on I Sent., dist. 23 (or 25), theologians came to discuss the proper meaning of the noun ‘persona’ when it is used in statements such as ‘The Father is a person’, ‘The Son is a person’, ‘The Holy Spirit is a person’.7 More specifically, they wondered whether in such cases this noun was of first or second intention. Its affinity with such terms as ‘individuum’ or ‘singulare’ might suggest that it is a noun of second intention, but from 5 Remarkably, Avicenna’s famous statement (Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75: “Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo quae apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis”) about logic dealing with the second intentions associated with first intentions is not even mentioned by Kilwardby. For that matter, unlike Averroes, Avicenna is not a single time referred to in De ortu scientiarum. 6 Pinborg (1975), 121. Aquinas’s attitude, too is illustrative of the situation: the operations of reason as well as ‘rationate being’—Schmidt’s (1966, 52, n. 15; see p. 76, n. 84) fortunate neologism for ‘ens rationis’—, including ‘intentiones’, are regarded as the subject of logic, without there being any preference made for either of them; in addition, ‘ens rationis’ is the usual label under which intentions come up for discussion. See particularly the excellent discussion in Schmidt (1966), 49–129. 7 Also Pinborg (1974), 50 f.

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the viewpoint of trinitarian theology this view is less attractive because it seems to negatively affect the common doctrine of the real distinction between the three Divine Persons. In fact, the ‘first vs. second intention’ issue had a tremendous impact on how one had to cope with the doctrine of ‘one God-three Divine Persons’. The development of the debate concerning the status of first and second intentions shows a blending together of the two above-mentioned themes, to the effect indeed that the theological issue of the Sentences commentary provides the main stream of the discussion about the role and function of the distinction ‘first-second intention’, including a rather sophisticated consideration of the (presumed) diverse relationships between the agents and components involved in the conceptual engineering under examination (such as the intellect, the act of the intellect, intentional being etc.). The discussion of whether second intentions are also the proper subject of logic, rather than the syllogism or copulative being (esse tertio adiacens), or something else, becomes an additional theme which is smoothly interwoven in the main one.8 In the next sections, first the origin of the technical use of ‘intentio’ will be discussed (1.1); then an approach of the Medieval problem of intentionality from some post-Medieval perspectives (particularly the intentionality issue found in Brentano) will be considered (1.2); finally a survey of the main (Ancient and Arabic) doctrinal sources of the several views of intentionality will be presented (1.3.1–1.3.3). 1.1. On the origin of the usage of ‘intentio’. A first assessment We owe to Christian Knudsen9 a very instructive account of the sources of the concept of intention in its logico-semantic sense. Two concepts already found in the Arab thinkers, Al-farabi (d. 950) and Avicenna (c. 980–1037) have substantially contributed to the development of Latin ‘intentio’ in the relevant sense, to wit, ma"qul and ma"na, both of which were translated as ‘intentio’. In his commentary on Aristotle, De interpretatione, ch. 1, Al-farabi uses the word ma"qul as a translation of the Greek 8 Father Philotheus Boehner already drew our attention to the fact that in the Later Middle Ages, two rival directions in logic were predominant, the one considering the second intention theme as the central one in establishing its proper object, while the other took it as being essentially a scientia sermocinalis. See Pinborg (1974), 49. 9 Knudsen (1982), 479 f. See also Gyekye (1971) and Pinborg (1974), 49 f. For the following lines I am highly indebted to Geykye and Knudsen.

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noêma (16a10 and 14) to indicate a thought that requires examination by the logician in two respects: [a] in its relation to the extramental things on which it bears, and [b] in its relation to the words expressing it.10 Its twin term ma"na (litt. something like ‘meaning’) occurs three times in the same author’s, De intellectu et intellecto, and is also found in Avicenna to signify a real thing known taken in its capacity of actually being known.11 In the Latin translation of Avicenna’s works, ‘intentio’ was used to render his term ‘ma"na’, which referred to an extramental thing’s intelligible form taken as a species acting in a cognitive act and as such present in the mind. It is not the extramental thing, properly speaking, but rather its mental representative, so it can be regarded as the object of cognition, but this taken in so far as it is being known.12 The latter qualification is of utmost importance. It connects the ontological and the epistemological points of view. Whenever an outside thing is an object of actual thinking, that thing is said to have a twofold status, both as ‘thing apprehended’ and as ‘thing apprehended’. Taken in the former state, it exists prior to, and independently of, apprehension, whereas in the latter state its mode of being entirely depends on apprehension, and is nothing but ‘being apprehended’. The recognition of this twofold status made the Medieval thinkers aware of the semantic ambivalence of the term ‘intentio’, but at the same time enabled them to examine and evaluate the (supposed) multifarious relationships between thinking and its object. In any of the diverse semantic diagrams, the contradistinction between thing apprehended and thing apprehended is at the basis of the distinction between first and second intention. Roughly speaking, the notion of first intention has to do, one way or another, with the thing apprehended, whereas second intentions arise whenever logical relationships of any kind are

The passage is quoted by Gyekye (1971), 35, n. 16. Avicenna believed that the power called vis aestimativa (wahm in Arabic) in the Latin West, enabled animals and human beings to have instinctive and learned behaviour, and that it did so by affording ‘intentions’, in the same way that sense afforded cognitive forms. See Sobol (2001), 193, who refers to Avicenna Latinus, Liber De anima seu Sextus De naturalibus IV 8, ll. 2–3 (ed. Van Riet): “Usus autem est ut id quod apprehendit sensus, vocetur forma, et quod apprehendit aestimatio, vocetur intentio”. 12 This aspect of the use of ‘intention’ was doubtlessly of predominant influence in the development of Medieval intentionalism. This is not to have a blind eye, however, for some Medieval authors (e.g. Albert the Great) being aware of the role the intention idea played in Avicenna’s contribution to dematerializing the sensorial process; see Sorabji (1991), 236 f., and p. 39, n. 55 below. 10 11

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under examination which are supposed to follow from the object’s being apprehended, rather than from how it is in its own right. Another aspect of the various doctrines about intentions should also be advanced at the outset. While the various intentions are truly representative of the objects known, they are so by bringing forward diverse intelligible quiddities found in the object. In other words, the various intentions representative of an object known do not exhaust its complete ontic intelligibility. Therefore intentions became easily associated with the object’s diverse formal ontic aspects, both in the latters’ capacity of somehow existing in the outside object as well as qua intentionally present in the mind. In Medieval philosophical and theological writings, the term ‘intentio’ is, as far as the cognitional procedure is concerned, used in the generic, ambivalent (or rather ‘ambivalence-producing’) sense of ‘concept (or thought)-including-what-it-intends-to-signify’. This ambivalent usage is at the heart of Medieval semantics. To understand the core of the (widely divergent, for that matter) semantic positions held by Medieval philosophers and theologians, it is important to keep in mind the following. The semantic views of the Medieval thinkers, being a vital part of their general philosophical attitude, however different they sometimes were from one thinker to another, were basically determined by a twofold firm conviction, to the effect [a] that there is an extramental world around us, which possesses by itself—independently, that is, of the operation of any created intellect—certain ontic features, and [b] that, in principle, our cognitive (sensitive and intellective) faculties provide us with the capability of having an effective access to this extramental Reality, and this owing to the fundamental parallelism existing between the various ontic articulations of things in the outside world, on the one hand, and the different natural ways in which we understand things, on the other.13 This latter idea went hand in hand with 13 The assumption of this characteristic of Ancient and Medieval thought, is usually indicated as ‘the parallelism postulate’. For Aristotle, see de Rijk (2002), I 14 f.; 39; II, 43; Perler (2002), who speaks of ‘analogy’ (14). For e.g. Aquinas see Meyer (1938), 72; 117; 131–138; 141; 148; 315; 462 f.; 693.; Copleston (1976), 49–54; Stump (1991), 144 ff.; (2003); Fuchs, (1999), 159–162. Notice that even the so-called ‘nominalists’ (rather ‘conceptualists’) all adhere to these basic convictions, and only testify to a more critical attitude towards the cognitive means we have at our disposal to attain trustworthy knowledge about the real world. For e.g. William of Ockham see de Rijk (1987a) and (1987b). Moody qualifies (1935, 303) this general view (as was also suo modo held by e.g. Duns Scotus) for Ockham: “Logic is, for Ockham, an art and not a speculative science; for Duns Scotus it is speculative, and deals with a conceptual order that

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the optimistic confidence that it is up to the human mind to really discover the truth about things. To the Medieval mind, any idea that human beings are simply inventing or creating truth was unthinkable. For this reason, the Ancients’ and Medievals’ conceptual engineering was quite naturally concerned with grasping the things of the outside world through concepts that designate these things, including their being taken qua conceived of.14 This two-sidedness of concepts was firmly grounded upon the aforesaid parallelism. Nothing prevented us, of course, to take the objects of our thinking, on occasion, just by themselves, quite apart, that is, from our different ways of conceiving them. But it never crossed people’s minds to construe an antagonistic opposition between the outside things as existing by themselves and their being conceived of, let alone to set apart their existence, in a quasiKantian fashion, as belonging to a domain of ‘things by themselves’ (‘Dinge an sich’), which are in principle inaccessible to thought. Not did they oppose the existence of things in the extramental world to their being as conceived of, as if there were two incongruous areas, one of real being, the other the mental domain of our conceptual engineering, a domain indeed to be regarded as an area autonomously produced by our mental activities.15 parallels a synthetic structure internal to things. But according to Ockham, the logician is interested in the discursive operations of the mind, not because they reveal a common structure internal to things qua adequated to mind, but because an accurate grasp of what is constant in human modes of apprehension and of complex signification, makes possible an accurate differentiation between things apprehended or signified” (Moody’s italics). In fact, Ockham, too, adheres to the parallelism postulate, but appears to simply presuppose it, unlike Scotus, to whom the structure of the human mind even reveals the ontic structure of things. Moody is therefore quite right in stating (306) that Ockham “is a nominalist in logic because he is a realist in metaphysics and in his conception of the sciences of nature— the forms of discursive signification are to be attributed to the nature of the human soul, as its characteristic mode of activity qua intelligent; but the truth of discourse is exhibited as a function of the nature and being of things distinct from it, signified by the concepts of which discourse is composed”. 14 Therefore, one should not speak of semantic ambiguity or even confusion in this respect, but of Ancient and Medieval thinkers exploiting semantic ambivalence; de Rijk (2002) I, 69–72; 162; 252; II, 149, n. 5; 154; 273, n. 86; 284, n. 111; 413. 15 See also the apologetic paper by Father Joseph Owens (1991), passim.—As a matter of fact, the parallelism postulate of Ancient and Medieval thought—which indeed betrays a conspicuous optimism in matters of cognition—prevented any form of radical subjectivism or scepticism coming up, and any kind of ‘Bewusztseinsphilosophie’ as well. See for Aristotle, de Rijk (2002), II, 43; particularly, I, 159–179; 358–368; II, 34–36; 384 ff.; 403–416; 572–593 (categorization). Kurt Flasch has argued (Flasch 1972, 1978 and 1984), that there are some remarkable aspects in later Medieval thought, which, on the face of it, indeed seem to come rather close to something like the notion of the

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In this general line of thought, two features of the diverse Medieval conceptions of intention deserve special attention. First and foremost we have to consider the Medievals’ basic idea of there being some relationship, or rather relatedness, between any psycho-linguistic entity and the ‘thing’ it expresses, or, speaking from the viewpoint of semantics proper, the phenomenon of the referentiality of any linguistic expression. In this connection, it is useful to consider the etymology of ‘intentio’. This word connotes a tendency existing between two things, which implies a certain distance between the two. As Aquinas remarks,16 what precisely characterizes the tendency is not the mere distance, but the fact that it exists between two things one of which is taken as related to the other which acts as the end of the operation proceeding from its counterpart. This not only applies to moral action, for the notion ‘intention’ is also used in the context of cognition, in which the tendency between apprehension and what is apprehended is constitutive of there being cognition at all. Secondly, we are faced with the Medievals’ passionate debates about the benefit (or inappropriateness) of multifarious relationships between the constituents that make up the semantic diagram of referentiality. The intricate problems concerning intentionality, including the controversial discussions on this score among Medieval philosophers and theologians as well, all centered around the basic notions of the representativeness and reliability of our thinking and talking about the world. It is not the representativeness and reliability that are questioned, but their ins and outs are the controversial matter among the intentionalistae and their opponents.

constitutive function of the mind in our conception of reality. However, this is still a far cry from the ‘Copernican revolution’ (Kant) of modern times, including the rejection of metaphysics in the Ancient and Medieval sense. See also Perler (2002), 165 ff. 16 In II Sent. dist. 38, art. 1, q. 3c (mainly discussing the will): “Intentio in ratione sua ordinem quendam unius ad alterum importat. Intendere enim dicitur quasi in aliud tendere. (…). Per hoc autem quod dicitur in aliquid tendere importatur quaedam distantia illius in quod aliquid tendit”.

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1.2. Post-Medieval perspectives. Brentano on intentionality In 1874—as is rightly stressed by Sorabji (1991, 247) as a major event in the development of intentionalism—Franz Brentano (1838–1917) introduced into the philosophy of mind the seminal idea of ‘intentional object’.17 An object’s ‘intentional’ being, which is opposed to its extramental existence, and is baptized ‘intentional inexistence’, is taken as a sufficient mode of being for acting as an object of immanent acts, such as seeing, hearing, thinking etc. In his Psychologie des Aristoteles (1867), Brentano had already interpreted Aristotle’s well-known doctrine that the senses receive form without matter as meaning that the object of sense-perception (colour, sound, temperature etc.) is not, or not only, physically present in the observer, but also has a kind of presentiality qua object (‘Objektiv’), i.e. as the objective content of perception. Later on, in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874), Brentano went so far as to ascribe to Aristotle’s doctrine of the senses receiving form without matter a certain awareness of intensional inexistence on Aristotle’s part. Throughout Brentano, who was a former Roman-Catholic priest, claimed to be following Medieval scholastic thinkers.18 In Brentano’s own view, the inhabitants of the mental domain are the immanent products (or objects) of sensorial or intellective activities, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, judging, inferring, but also loving and hating. To all of them he assigns ‘intentional inexistence’, that is to say, [a] these objects qua things cognized are inherent in the sense or the intellect, and [b] at the same time they relate to something which,

17 Sorabji (1991), 247. See also Perler (2002), 1–11 (Einleitung, & 1: ‘Brentanos Problem und die mittelalterlichen Intentionalitätstheorien’); cf. Perler (2003), 12–18. The (supposed) affinity between Brentano and scholastic doctrines of intentionality was earlier discussed by Geach (1972), 129–138, Marras (1976), and Hedwig (1978). See also Searl (1983) and Lyons (1995). Perler’s contribution also discusses misunderstandings about Brentano’s position. In Perler (2002), 399–411 some affinity between the Medieval and the modern discussions about the intentionality issue is considered, with due criticism of Kurt Flasch’s thesis of the ‘Copernican turn’ in Dietrich of Freiberg. 18 Sorabji (1991), 247 f. In Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt II 1 (ed. O. Kraus 1973, p. 124 f.; German text in Perler (2002), 3; quoted in English translation by Perler 2001a, 203) we read “Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object”. For the scholastic background of Brentano’s theory of the intentional see also Pasnau (1997), 34 f. and 63, and the literature (Herbert Spiegelberg, Ausonio Marras, Klaus Hedwig and John Haldane) referred to in Pasnau, 35, n. 10.

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from the formal point of view, does not coincide with their being qua immaterial psychic entities. The latter property [b] (which he called ‘Gerichtet-sein’) he described as ‘reference to a content’ or ‘direction upon an object’. Comparing Brentano’s views to those held by the early fourteenthcentury intentionalistae, two things at least must strike us: (1) Like Brentano’s, Medieval intentionalism covers both sensorial and intellective cognition. (2) Unlike Brentano, by the Medieval thinkers mental phenomena such as judging (in the sense of giving one’s assent or dissent), and loving and hating—which boil down to taking an intellectual or emotional (respectively) stand to mental contents19—are not examined in the context of intentionality. The Medievals’ including of judgment and inference did not go beyond the purely intellectual domain and, accordingly, merely concerned the extension of the intentional scope over the domain of all three intellectual operations, simple apprehension, framing propositions, and inference, which has led to the common distinction between simple or incomplex intentions, and complex ones (acting in assertion) and more complex ones (acting in ratiocination). No doubt, it has been partly due to the views of Brentano, who owing to his priest seminary education, was well acquainted with Medieval scholasticism, that—as later on those of Gottlob Frege (1848– 1925)—Medievalists began to take a vivid interest in 13th. and early 14th.-century intentionalism. However, as may be clear from the foregoing, any doctrinal comparison between Brentano and the Medieval intentionalists should not go beyond the domain of what Brentano called Vorstellungen (‘ideas’, ‘images’, ‘representations’, ‘thoughts’). We should not forget that in Brentano’s philosophy it is the emotive attitudes concerning the complex ideas in particular that are in the focus of his attention. More importantly still, the epistemological questions with regard to the reliability of the mental phenomena as representatives of the ‘real things’ (verae res), so focal an issue in the Middle Ages, are completely missing in Brentano. Quite understandably so, because

19 That Brentano’s ‘judging’ is not simply a matter of combining ideas or intentions but substantially includes assent or dissent has surely to do with the assertoric nature of ‘judgement’ in post-Aristotelian logic, for which in the surface structure, it is impossible to distinguish between assertoric sentences and so-called ‘blackboard sentences’. For Aristotle’s view of the anatomy of the proposition see my Aristotle (2002) I, 31–36; 75– 100.

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to a Post-Kantian thinker like Brentano, the various controversies surrounding the Medieval ‘cum fundamento in re’ idea are entirely out of scope.20 There is no good reason for us to doctrinally relate our findings about the Medieval notion of intentionality to Brentano or other modern thinkers about ‘intentions’ or ‘objective being’. Its historical roots and sources are as such recognizable enough. In addition, given the powerful Medieval authority idea,21 the historical background of the thirteenth and fourteenth-century intentionality debate is what deserves the historian’s attention.22 1.3. The doctrinal sources To assess the diverse Medieval discussions of the functions of nouns of first and second intention, it is useful to consider the several startingpoints of the Medieval debate about intentionality.23 This debate was

20 This does not alter the fact that, remarkably enough, not until his preface in the 1911 edition of Psychologie Brentano pays explicit attention to the representativity issue by admitting that he is no longer of the opinion that a mental relation can have something other than a real thing (Reales) as its object II 2 (ed. Kraus 1971, p. 2); see Perler (2001a), 205; cf. 221; Perler (2002), 7. Remarkable indeed, because of the Medievals’ common insistence on the vera res being the primary and ultimate object of cognition. Even a Hervaeus Natalis, who pertinaciously focussed on laying bare the true network of mental habitudines he took as indispensable for accounting for intellectual cognition, always kept in mind that it is the vera res which is the object of cognition. Incidentally, when in his later works (see Perler, op. cit., 221 f.), Brentano decided to give up a relational analysis of intentionality, defending instead the view that sentences such as ‘John is cognizing a horse’ should be rephrased in a non-relational form: ‘John is a horse-thinker’ (in which the ‘object’ added functions as an internal object merely specifying the act), Brentano did not realize that this interpretation is found as early as in Peter Abelard; see de Rijk (1989), 125–151, esp. 145–149. 21 See for the continuous impact of the authority idea upon Medieval thought de Rijk (1985), 66–99. 22 Otherwise Perler, who seems to have somewhat higher expectations about tracing back Brentano’s thought to the 13th.–14th. centuries by ‘a historic, not merely historiographically constructed, line’; however, his Methodical Preliminary Remarks (Perler, 2002, 23–30) are more cautious in this respect. Tachau (1999, 331 f.) seems to join the opinion which was prudently held by Jan Pinborg from the outset, that the Medieval notion of intentionality has little to do with the modern philosophical notions of intentionality as elaborated, for instance, in the works of Brentano, Husserl and Frege.—For a (rather superficial) similarity between Medieval ‘objective being’ and Popper’s ‘Third World’ see p. 94 below. 23 An extensive discussion of them is found in Perler (2002), 11–23.

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surely not unprecedented, as far as its doctrinal components are concerned. Leaving aside for the time being the grammatical lore of the first and second imposition of words (which seems to have a rather loose, and in any case merely superficial connection with the intentionality debate),24 we should mainly consider two roots: Aristotelian doctrine and Augustinian notions, on the one hand, and the rise of perspectivist theories under the influence of Arabic optics, on the other. 1.3.1. Aristotle as the main doctrinal source of the intentionality debate In the opening lines of De interpretatione, Aristotle offers the general semantic views which are at the basis of his apophantics as laid down in this treatise.25 Right at the start, Aristotle’s attention is focussed on the representative (or significative) character of expressions and mental entities, respectively:26 Spoken utterances are tokens of ‘affections in the soul’, and written marks tokens of spoken utterances. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken utterances. But what these utterances are in the first place significative of—affections of the soul— are the same for all people; and what these affections are likenesses of— things—are surely the same (1, 16a3–8).

Thus, right in the opening lines of this treatise, the phenomenon of semantic representativity conveyed by the word ‘likeness’ (Greek homoiôma) is predominantly present: expressions are said to refer primarily to mental entities27 (‘affections of the soul’), which, in their turn, refer to things (Greek pragmata).28 This clear statement, which was to become so pivotal in the Medieval discussions about meaning, is in Aristotle’s text followed by a footnote-like remark (16a8–9): “These matters have been discussed in the work On the soul, and are, of course (gar), subject of a different study”. However, in the Middle Ages this footnote—which Knudsen (1982), 484 f. Notice the terminological influence of Al-farabi’s commentary on precisely this passage of Aristotle. 26 For a thorough discussion see Weidemann (1994), 134–151, and de Rijk (2002) I, 192 f. and 20–23. All the following translations of Aristotle are mine. 27 The usual interpretation ‘thoughts’, however comprehensible in itself, given the apophantic context of De interpretatione, is rather unfortunate though, because, unlike the Greek pathêmata tês psychês (Latin passiones animae), this rendering in advance seems to rule out sensorial affections of the soul. 28 For the proper meaning of ‘pragmata’ in semantic contexts (‘things-being-so-andso’) see de Rijk (2002) I, 104–115; II, 133–135. 24 25

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was presumably added by an editor of Aristotle’s works—did not go by unnoticed, and even became an important source for some refinements of the semantic discussion. And quite understandably so, because Aristotle’s lapidary account of the crucial semantic relationships between outside things, on the one hand, and mental entities and linguistic tools, on the other, seemed rather inadequate by leaving open a number of vital details, the epistemological issues, in particular. Indeed, what can guarantee us the effectiveness of the cognitive process, including the adequacy and reliability of the tools and devices at work in it? This question can only be answered after a meticulous investigation of precisely that which by the incidental reference to the ‘different study’ seemed to have been left out of consideration, as though it were not to the present purpose at all. When at De anima II 12 sensation is defined, the main ingredients of a debate about the links between the faculty of sensation, its activity, and the (proper) object of sensation are presented. The faculty is characterized as receptive of the forms of sensible objects, and the latter are taken in their capacity of having this or that particular form, rather than in their identity as a particular thing sui iuris; consequently, it is their form, not their material constitution that is in the focus of attention: De anima II 12, 424a17–28: The following statements applying to each and every sense should be formulated. [a] Sense is something that is receptive of the sensible forms of things without their matter, just as a piece of wax receives the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or the gold; it takes on the golden or bronzen signet, but not in so far as they are gold or bronze. Just so in every case of sensation, the sense is affected by the thing that possesses colour, or flavour, or sound, but not qua being a particular substance,29 but qua having this or that form; and, accordingly, the reception takes place in accordance with the form.30 [b] The sense organ is that in which ultimately such a power resides, so as to make them extensionally one and the same thing, but their formal nature is different, since the sentient subject is something extended, whereas neither sensitivity as such nor sensation are spatial magnitudes, but rather a sort of formal disposition and power of this subject. 29 The Greek text alludes to the manner in which the object, taken by itself, is categorially addressed (named e.g. ‘signet-ring’ or ‘cymbal’ etc.). For the role of focalization and categorization for formally considering things according to their diverse ontic aspects see de Rijk (2002) I, 135–189; 419 ff.; 449 ff.; 572–593; II, 384 ff.; 403–416. 30 The Greek text reads kata ton logon. In this phrase the word logos is often used by Aristotle to indicate a thing’s immanent form (eidos) as it is expressed by its definiens (= logos). See de Rijk (2002) I, 465, n. 262: II, 208 f.

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As early as in Albert the Great’s comments on this passage, the object’s mode of being as it is received in the sense organ appears in its capacity of being ‘mental’ (esse spirituale) as opposed to its mode of being as an outside thing (esse naturale). This claim of Albert’s that it is not the sensible object as such that is received, but rather an intention of the sensible, Albert substantially contributed to the later debates about the nature of intentional being.31 It is noteworthy that, no doubt under the influence of Avicenna’s commentary on De anima, the semantic area of ‘intentio’ was also going to contain sensorial intention, a domain that was left out by Aristotle, who seems to put the ‘affections of the soul’ on a par with ‘noêmata’.32 Most fortunately, the Arab and Latin commentators provided Aristotle with the opportunity to extend his influence by their taking ‘the different study’ into serious consideration. In De anima III, 4 intellection comes up for discussion, where it is paralleled to sensation.33 Again, the potential nature of the cognizing subject, and the immaterial way of receiving the outside object into itself is underlined: De anima III 4, 429a10–28: Concerning that part of the soul (…) with which the soul cognizes and thinks, we have to consider what its distinctive feature is, and how thinking comes about. If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is thinkable, or something else of a similar kind. This part, then, of the soul must be, while impassive, capable of receiving the form of an object, that is to say, it must be of the same character as its object, but definitely not 31 Albert the Great, In Arist. II De anima, tract. 3, capp. 3–4. Also Tellkamp 72–81. One should read esse naturale instead of esse materiale. Cf. Aquinas, In II De anima, lect. 24, nr. 553: “(…) sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alteriusmodi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale”, and STh I, q. 85 (quoted p. 52, n. 18 below), where it appears that the res materiales are part of the res naturales. 32 For Avicenna see his De anima I, 5 (Avicenna latinus, p. 86): “Intentio autem est id quod apprehendit anima de sensibili, quamvis non prius apprehendat illud sensus exterior. (…). Differentia autem inter apprehendere formas et apprehendere intentionem hec est quod forma est illa quam apprehendit sensus interior et sensus exterior simul”. Thus according to Avicenna, an intention is what the inner sense finds in things over and above the phantasm found by the exterior senses. Prior to the process of abstraction, this intentional being is still sensorial, whereas by the abstraction process, the esse intentionale is upgraded to the intellectual level of ‘concept’. Therefore intention should not be equated to ‘concept’, as is often done (e.g. by Knudsen 1982, 480). 33 Aristotle’s (and the Medievals’) association (in the treatises On the soul) of these cognitive processes and their parallelism with the existence of two complementary parts of the soul’s one and the same cognitional activity cannot be underlined too often. Cf. Tachau (1988), 10, n. 19.

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this object; as sense is to the sensible, so must mind be to the thinkable. (…). Hence the mind, too, can have no characteristic except its receptivity. That part of the soul, then, which is called mind (nous)—by ‘mind’ I mean that part by which the souls thinks and judges—has no actual being until it thinks. (…). It has been well said that the soul is ‘the place of forms’, except for the fact that this description does not hold for the soul as a whole, but only the intellectual soul, and that it does not contain the forms actually but only potentially.

The main question arising from this passage and the like was that concerning the nature and function of the intelligible species, including the way in which they can be obtained. It is again Albert who in his comments on the aforesaid passage from the second book of De anima, undertook to implement Aristotle’s unspecified indications.34 1.3.2. An additional influential source: St. Augustine The discussions of the problem of intentionality was bound to be double-focussed. For one part, the debate was about the semantic problem of referentiality, for the other, it is the tools and devices primarily taken as psychic entities which became in the focus of attention. St. Augustine (354–430) made an influential contribution to the debates in both directions. In his De magistro VIII, 22 ff., he deals with the phenomenon that words when actually being used are primarily understood as referring to extralinguistic things, prior to their being taken as linguistic tools.35 When his interlocutor is faced with the thesis that in order to answer questions satisfactorily, you have to take the words used according to their significative function, his son Adeodatus wholeheartedly agrees, provided that the words are real verba.36 In the next 34 Albertus Magnus, In Arist. De anima II, tr. 3, cap. 4, ed. Colon. VII 1, p. 102a– b: “Adhuc autem notandum est quod differunt forma rei et intentio rei. Forma enim proprie est quae informando dat esse actu materiae et composito ex materia et forma. Intentio autem vocatur id per quod significatur res individualiter vel universaliter secundum diversos gradus abstractionis; et haec non dat esse alicui nec sensui quando est in ipso, nec etiam intellectui, quando est in illo, sed signum facit de re et notitiam. Et ideo intentio non est pars rei sicut forma, sed potius est species totius notitiae rei. Et ideo intentio quia abstrahitur de toto et est significatio totius, de se predicatur; intentio enim colorati quae est in oculo, totam rem notificat, sicut et intentio quae est in imaginatione, particulari non presente”. 35 A lucid interpretation of Augustine’s view is found in Panaccio (1999a), 11–18; cf. (1999b), 406. Caston (2001) examines this theme from the viewpoint of the intentionality debate. 36 Augustinus, De magistro VIII, 23: “Placet igitur firmumque animo tenes non respon-

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paragraph, the previous precept is even called ipsa lex rationis and illa loquendi regula, and it is said to be of natural predominance, because it is on the ground of this rule (ea scilicet regula) that when we hear signs, our attention is directed to the things signified.37 So much for the semantic item of referentiality. The twin issue, which concerns the significative tool taken as a psychic entity, in this context often called ‘internal word’ (‘verbum quod corde gestamus’, Augustine says), is under examination in De doctrina christiana I 12, and De Trinitate XV 19, p. 48676–80.38 Another Augustinian text which had a tremendous influence on the intentionality debate is his Quaestio de ideis. As a matter of fact, with St. Augustine, we find the first explicit discussion of the relationship between God and the exemplary Ideas.39 Augustine was one of the many Christian thinkers who, nourished with Platonism, were con-

dendum esse interrogationibus nisi ex iis rebus quae verbis significantur.—Non intelligo cur displiceat, si modo verba sint”. Notice that ‘verbum’ is used here (as often) in the pregnant sense of ‘significative word’. 37 Ibid., 24 ad fin.: “(…) non possum non putare ad id conclusionem referri quod his duabus syllabis [viz. ‘ho’ and ‘mo’] significatur, simulatque ista verba sonuerint, ea scilicet regula quae naturaliter plurimum valet, ut, auditis signis, ad res significatas feratur intentio”. 38 See Panaccio (1999), 111–118; Sirridge (1999), passim. Perler rightly refers (2002, 18, n. 31) to Aquinas, Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura, cap. 1, lect. 1 (ed. Marietti, nr. 25): “Ad intellectum autem huius nominis ‘verbum’ sciendum est quod secundum Philosophum [De interpr., cap. 1, 16a3 ff.] ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa earum quae sunt in anima passionum. (…). De necessitate autem oportet quod illud intrinsecum animae nostrae quod significatur exteriori verbo nostro, ‘verbum’ vocetur. (…). Si ergo volumus scire quid est interius verbum mentis, videamus quid significet quod exteriori voce profertur. In intellectu autem nostro sunt tria, scilicet ipsa potentia intellectus, species rei intellectae, quae est forma eius, se habens ad ipsum intellectum sicut species coloris ad pupillam, et tertio ipsa operatio intellectus, quae est intelligere. Nullum autem istorum significatur verbo exteriori voce prolato. Nam hoc nomen ‘lapis’ non significat substantiam intellectus, quia hoc non intendit dicere nominans; nec significat speciem, quae est qua intellectus intelligit, cum etiam hoc non sit intentio nominantis; non significat etiam ipsum intelligere, cum intelligere non sit actio exterius progrediens ab intelligente, sed in ipso manens. Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius quod intelligens intelligendo format. (…) illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enuntiantis, exteriori voce significatur. (…). Istud autem sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius. Et ideo comparatur ad intellectum, non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit, quia in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae. (…) verbum semper est ratio et similitudo rei intellectae (…), sicut conceptio quam aliquis habet de lapide, est similitudo lapidis”. 39 See de Rijk (1975), 207 f. and the literature referred to there. See also Hamesse (1990) and Hoenen (1997).

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vinced that Christianity and Platonism were congenial, and differred only terminologically, not really, and even that Christianity was the implementation of what Plato had meant to realize.40 Nonetheless as a Christian thinker, Augustine had to interfere in the Platonic view of the relationship between God and the Ideas quite substantially, to free Christian theology from any Neoplatonic emanatism. By putting the Highest Principle, Highest Being and the personal God-Creator in the same category, Augustine in fact bridged the notional gap between the Highest Principle and the Logos. In this Augustinian perspective, Intelligible Being will, so to speak, have its locus naturalis in God’s Mind (in mente divina), as a result of which the Plotinian ontological distance between the Highest Principle and Being is reduced to a matter of epistemology: God is no longer beyond being, but only transcends human knowledge. In his short monograph Quaestio de Ideis, Augustine takes the Ideas existing in God’s Mind as the exemplary Forms from which all creational being comes into existence, forms indeed which are themselves non formatae, and thus (per hoc) from eternity present in the Divine Mind (in divina intelligentia), and qua exemplars, acting as rationes creandi. The focal point of this interpretation is that the rationes creandi are identical with the Divine Mind (ipsa mens Creatoris).41 Augustine considers his

40 See e.g. De vera religione IV, capp. 6–7: “Qui ergo sensibilem istum mundum contemnere et animam virtute purgandam summo deo subicere atque subiungere vanum aut malum putant, alia ratione refellendi sunt, si tamen cum his dignum est disputare. Qui autem bonum et appetendum fatentur, cognoscant deum et cedant deo, per quem populis iam omnibus haec credenda persuasa sunt. Quod utique ab ipsis fieret, si tantum valerent, aut si non fieret, crimen invidentiae vitare non possent. Ergo cedant ei a quo factum est nec curiositate aut inani iactantia impediantur quominus agnoscant quid intersit inter paucorum timidas coniecturas et manifestam salutem correctionemque populorum. Illi enim si reviviscerent quorum isti nominibus gloriantur, et invenirent refertas ecclesias, templa deserta, a cupiditate bonorum temporalium atque affluentium ad spem vitae eaternae et bona spiritalia et intellegibilia vocari et currere humanum genus, dicerent fortasse, si tales essent quales fuisse memorantur: “Haec sunt quae nos persuadere populis non aussi sumus, et eorum potius consuetudini cessimus quam illos in nostram fidem voluntatemque traduximus”. Ita si hanc vitam illi viri nobiscum rursus agere potuissent, viderent profecto cuius auctoritate facilius consuleretur hominibus et, paucis mutatis verbis atque sententiis, Christiani fierent, sicut plerique recentiorum nostrorumque temporum Platonici fecerunt. Aut si hoc non faterentur nec facerent, in superbia et invidia remanentes, nescio utrum possent ad ea ipsa quae appetenda et desideranda esse dixerant, cum istis sordibus viscoque revolare”. Cf. De doctrina christiana II 43, for Plato’s supposed familiarity with the old Jewish prophets. 41 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 46 (Quaestio de Ideis), passim. Cf. De Trinitate VI 10, 11; De Genesi ad litt. V 15, 33 and IV 24, 41: Epist. 118 (ad Dioscurum), 20 f.; De civitate Dei VIII, 4.

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interpretive move well-founded, and obviously enough, it really is, as long as we are not puzzled by Plato’s unusual manner of speaking.42 However, Augustine’s interpretation of the relationship between God and the Ideas led to a new problem. The fact that there is such an intimate ontological relationship between God and the exemplary Forms in the Divine Mind can make us wonder if perhaps God’s immutability is affected by creation because of the contingent relations emerging between God and the contingent creatures. Augustine seems to have been aware of the difficulty when in Retractationes XII 19, he wrote: “It is difficult to see, Lord, how without changing Itself Thy Eternity creates changeable things”.43 The Medieval answer was, as far as the Ideas in the Divine Mind were concerned, to sharply distinguish between thinking qua psychic phenomenon, and its objective content.44 Thus Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) claims that, apart from their identity with the Divine Nature, the Ideas are something in their own right, namely objective contents of God’s knowledge, which should be well marked off from their esse subiective in God as knowing subject. Now the contingent acts of creation do not affect God’s immutable Nature, in which the objective contents, both before and after the creation of contingent things, are as such mere possibilia pointing ahead, so to speak, to things to be created. The actual creation of things only constitutes a unilateral relationship between creature and Creator, not any rapport the other way round.45 In the wake of Arab philosophy, Avicenna in particular, the ideas or rationes rerum in their objective status were taken as absolute natures, and contra-distinguished to their two modes of being occurring in the things created, to wit their being as universal natures (the logical universals) and as particular essences inhering in the singulars. The absolute mode of being they possess prior to the bifurcation into esse universale and esse singulare, is called esse essentiae or esse quidditativum. Whereas the esse singulare matches the well-known Aristotelian notion of esse extra animam, 42 Retract. I 3, 4: “Nec Plato quidem in hoc erravit quia esse mundum intelligibilem dixit, si non vocabulum, quod ecclesiasticae consuetudini in re illa inusitatum est, sed ipsam rem velimus attendere”. 43 “Namque rara visio est et nimis ardua conspicere, Domine, aeternitatem Tuam incommutabiliter mutabilia facientem”. 44 De Rijk (1975), 208–211; (1990), 91–98. 45 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX 2; Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, art. 68. In Quodlibet IX 2, Henry looks for support for his innovative interpretation, and suggests that perhaps Plato himself already viewed the Forms as objective contents of the Divine Mind.

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the latter’s counterpart, esse in anima divides into [a] esse subiective in the knower’s mind and [b] esse obiective qua objective content of the act of cognition, as taken on its own, irrespectively of its actually being conceived of.46 Substantially the same view of the ontological status of the Ideas is found in Duns Scotus (1266–1308). His lapidary statement runs: “The idea of a stone is nothing but the stone as grasped by the intellect”.47 Elsewhere Scotus testifies to the common view that as being grasped by the intellect, things have a weaker mode of being (esse diminutum), which is formally distinguished from the Divine Nature.48 James of Ascoli (who was a magister regens in theology in Paris c. 1310–1320) assigns to the Ideas an intentional mode of being (esse intentionaliter), which he regards as a mode of being midway between a mere esse rationis and esse reale.49 In his Reportatio Parisiensis, Duns Scotus likewise puts esse representatum as something in between esse reale and esse rationis.50 1.3.3. The species debate in the context of Arabic optics Finally, the role the intermediary species was supposed by many thinkers to play in the cognitive process, deserves our attention.51 From mid 13th century to the first decades of the 14th century, a standard explanation was given of perception and cognition based on perception. In the wake of the Arab thinkers, Avicenna and Alhazen (particularly the latter’s De aspectibus) the practitioners of the science of optics (perspectiva), who were called ‘perspectivists’ later on, were of the opinion that a visible object produces species of light and colour in the adjacent, transparant medium. These continuously multiplied species functioned as intermedi-

46 For the ‘epistemological turn’ initiated in the Latin West by Henry of Ghent see section 3 below. 47 Opus oxoniense I, dist. 35, q. unica, nr. 12 (I, 553b): “(…) idea lapidis non est lapis intellectus”. 48 Reportatio parisiensis I, dist. 36, q. 3, nr. 20. 49 Qu. disp., q. 1 (Vat. Lat. 1012, ff. 60v–62v); Quodlibet, q. 2 (Vat. Lat. 1012, ff. 48ra–49ra); de Rijk (1975), 212, n. 21; (1990), 96 ff.; for the latter text see Yokoyama (1967). This view is the one argued for by Scotus (Opus oxoniense I, dist. 36, q. unica). 50 Opus oxon. I dist. 36, q. un. For James of Ascoli and his opponent William of Alnwick see section 3.3 below. 51 For a good understanding and assessment of the role of optics in matters of semantics and epistemology in the period 1250–1345 the study by Katherine Tachau (1988) is still a must.

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aries (species in medio) in the process of sensorial cognition.52 All five sensitive faculties, together with the internal sense, complete the process of apprehension, as far as sensible objects are concerned, but do not account for rational (conceptual, judgemental or discursive) operations upon the apprehended forms obtained.53 In the wake of Aristotle it was assumed that the sensible species (or its derivative, the phantasm) were as such inadequate objects for intellective cognition and, accordingly, had to be adapted by transforming them by abstraction into intelligible species.54 It is obvious that in the eager debates of intentionality, the role of the sensible as well as the intelligible species (or their putative inadequacy), particularly when they went under the name ‘intention’, were in the focus of interest. What was at stake primarily was to determine the ontic nature of the sensible species, and to devise a mode of being for it free from any materialistic connotations. To put this development in the right historic perspective it should be noticed that Aristotle’s picture of the cognitive process left not only questions about the representativeness of cognition in the dark. Even some of the early Greek commentators (e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and John Philoponus) were unhappy with Aristotle’s account of the sensorial species, which, to their mind, he seemed to regard as a material affection of the sense These species go under several names. Roger Bacon (c. 1220–1292) calls them ‘powers’ (virtutes), ‘forms’, ‘images’, ‘similitudes’,’ phantasms’, and ‘intentions’. Tachau describes (1988, 8) the entire process of perception in detail (following D. Lindberg and A.M. Smith): “These species (…) generate further species in the medium contiguous to them, which results in a continuous multiplication of species along rays proceeding in all unobstructed directions from all points on the object’s surface. These visible species convey the object’s accidents through the intervening medium, which serves as their substance, to the eye of the viewer, upon which they are, loosely speaking, “impressed”. Strictly speaking, Bacon insists, the propagation of species is really not a transmission of impressions but a process of successive actualization of the potentials of the various media (including sense organs) involved. Once received in the sense organ, each species continues to be multiplied along the optic nerves into the cavities of the brain housing the internal senses. As all objects in the universe multiply species, clearly the process of the other external senses (with the arguable exception of hearing) can, mutatis mutandis, be understood in the same way”. See Bacon’s writings mentioned by Tachau (1988) 8, n. 15, and the study by Lindberg referred to by Tachau, and particularly the lucid exposition of Bacon’s sign theory in Biard (1989), 28–43. 53 Tachau (1988), 11. 54 The phantasma is the sense image or sensible species of an object as produced by, and present in, the internal sense of imagination. The phantasm cooperates with the active intellect to produce an intelligible species, which is impressed by the active intellect upon the passive intellect. 52

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in question. So in Aristotle’s physiology of the visual process, when I see a coloured scene, my eye-jelly (korê) takes on colour-patches whose colours, shapes and positions match the perceived scene; the same holds mutatis mutandis for hearing, smelling, and tasting. The Greek commentators set out to reinterpret the process in less materialistic terms. The Arabic writers (through whom the Medievals also became familiar with the interpretive dematerialization trend) have made a substantial contribution to the process of dematerialization by their idea of ‘intentio’.55 Two aims were thus reached. First, the odd material or corporeal mode of being previously assigned to the species and the medium was replaced with an immaterial, incorporeal, spritual mode; second, this spiritual mode of being was verbally expressed by the label ‘intentional being’ after its most characteristic feature of ‘tending towards something else’, and so, most fortunately, the semantic and epistemological issues of referentiality and reliability came in the focus of attention.56

55 At the same time the Greek Commentators began to emphasize the great diversity of the different senses, some being more and some less material, where Aristotle had held uniformity. The diversity idea is also found with the Arabs and some of the Latin Medievals (e.g. Albert the Great and Aquinas). See for the entire theme of dematerialization and diversification, including its historical development from Aristotle to the Arabic and Latin Medieval thinkers, the illustrative account in Sorabji (1991), 227– 247. 56 For the significant difference between ‘spiritual’ and ‘intentional’ see below, p. 64 ff. Sorabji’s discussion of the matter (1991, 242–244) is unconvincing.

chapter two THE COMMON DOCTRINE OF COGNITION ca. 1260 Copleston has good reason to think (1976, 61) that in understanding Reality in terms of expounding the ideal harmony and balance between faith and reason Aquinas was the representative thinker of the High Middle Ages. Copleston’s judgement certainly also applies to Aquinas’s views of cognition.1 Indeed, to study Aquinas’s philosophical positions very well suits our need for familiarizing ourselves with the common notions and ideas concerning cognition current around the middle of the 13th century, and, generally, the standard views about how to account for man’s possibilities and tasks in matters of maintaining his position in the world as a rational creature. Therefore I shall proceed with a succinct treatment of Aquinas’s doctrine about cognition in the context of his general philosophic position.2 2.1. Are we sufficiently equipped to know the outside things? In the Quaestio disputata de veritate, Aquinas claims that the basic requirement for any cognition is a process of assimilation between cognizer and the outside object of cognition, meaning that in one way or another the cognizer makes himself receptive of the object. The cognizer’s accessibility consists in his being receptive of the object’s ‘similitude’ by which the object enables the cognizer to accomplish the demanded assimilation. There are two kinds of assimilation: the first As is rightly observed by int. al. Pasnau (1997), 11 f. See also our chapter 9. An extensive discussion of this theme is found in Perler (2002), 31–105. Cf. Copleston (1976), 156–198. Meyer engagingly discusses (1938, 207–258; 393–463) Aquinas’s theory of cognition in the general context of his anthropology. See also Owens (1991), and Pasnau (1997), 11–19; 105–116; 126–146; 195–219. Pasnau discusses (1997, 256–271) the linguistic nature of Aquinas’s thought. In her successive studies of the matter, Eleonore Stump (1991; 1997; 1998; 1999a;1999b; 2003) lucidly explains the ins and outs of Aquinas’s doctrine of sensorial and intellective cognition. See also the thorough analysis of Aquinas’s theory of cognition in Kretzmann (1993) passim. The most adequate discussion of intellective cognition in the context of Aquinas’s view of the proper task of logic is still to be found in Schmidt (1966), 49–201; see also section 2.6 below. 1 2

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kind occurs when the cognizer receives the ‘similitude’ directly into himself, whereas in the other a third element is involved which acts as an intermediary between the cognizer and the object. Accordingly, there are two ways of cognition, matching this twofold assimilation. For instance, we perceive Socrates by sight in so far as our power of vision is made alike to Socrates, or to Socrates’s image: De veritate, q. 8, art. 5c: Dicendum quod omnis cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum. (…). Dupliciter igitur aliquid alicui assimilatur. Uno modo ex hoc quod similitudinem eius immediate ab eo accipit in se; alio modo ex hoc quod assimilatur alicui quod est simile ei. Et similiter etiam dupliciter fit cognitio: cognoscimus enim per visum Socratem inquantum visus noster assimilatur Socrati, et inquantum assimilatur imagini Socratis. Et utraque istarum assimilationum sufficit ad cognoscendum Socratem.

There are two different ways of receiving the aforesaid similitude. The first occurs whenever the cognitive power confines itself to picking up the similitude, without adapting it in any way; this is the way in which our five senses operate, by merely accepting the sensible species, and leaving it at that. Other powers, viz. the imaginative power and the intellect, are capable of forming other species out of the form received from sensation, a composite phantasm or a composite quidditative concept, respectively:3 Ibid.: Est (…) aliqua cognoscitiva potentia quae cognoscit tantum recipiendo, non autem ex receptis aliquid formando, sicut sensus simpliciter cognoscit illud cuius speciem recipit, et nihil aliud. Aliqua vero potentia est quae non solum cognoscit secundum quod recipit, sed etiam ex his quae recipit potest aliquam aliam speciem formare. Sicut patet in imaginatione, quae ex forma auri recepta et forma montis format quoddam phantasma aurei montis. Et similiter est in intellectu, quia ex forma generis et differentiae comprehensa format quidditatem speciei.

The reliability of our cognitive powers is founded upon human nature. The operations of both the senses (including the internal senses) and the intellect is extensively discussed in STh I, q. 4. For the life of a perfect animal not only the five senses are required but also imaginatio or phantasia as a storehouse for keeping the sensible forms of absent things. In addition, the formation of cognitive contents (Thomas speaks of intentiones) that are not directly offered by the external senses, plays an important role in human and animal life. In human life, however, 3

Cf. STh I q. 78, art. 4c quoted below.

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there are some more sophisticated ways of using sensible forms, namely the operation of the vis cogitativa, which enables human beings to make them subservient to more complicated situations in daily life: STh. I, q. 78, art. 4c: (…) ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud eius absentiam. (…). Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium cum praesentialiter immutatur ab eis, sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. (…). Sic ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis (…); ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia sive imaginatio (quae idem sunt): est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa; ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. (…). Considerandum est autem quod quia quantum ad formas sensibiles non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis (…); est enim collativa intentionum individualium—sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium.4 Ex parte autem memorativae non solum habet memoriam (sicut cetera animalia) in subita recordatione praeteritorum, sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam secundum individuales intentiones.

By his final remark, the author refers to what is commonly considered the proper cognitive operation of man, which is equally rooted in human nature, viz. intellection. In a previous question indeed, Aquinas explains that the intellective principle is the proper form of human beings, and that the human soul possesses a cognitive power, the intellect, in whose proper operation man’s corporeal conditions are not involved: Ibid., q. 76, art. 1c: Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis inquantum est homo, est 4 Elsewhere (De potentia q. 3, art. 11 ad 1) Aquinas says that sensitive life, though generally the same in all animals, is still at a higher level in human beings. In fact, the vis cogitativa comes very close to ratio, as to make Aquinas’s calling it (in the text quoted above) ‘particular reason’ quite understandable. See also Qu. disp. de anima, art. 13c, quoted section 2.21 below.

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chapter two intelligere; per hanc enim omnia alia animalia transcendit. (…). Relinquitur ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma. Sed considerandum est quod quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali et minus ei immergitur et magis sua operatione vel virtute excedit eam. (…). Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullomodo communicat materia corporalis. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus.5

A vital part of the Medievals’s anthropological view consists in their recognizing man’s psycho-physical unity: bodily condition belongs to the essence of man as well as to the essential nature of other animals. Accordingly, both sensation and intellection are acts of the entire psycho-physical organism, and are caused by a natural inclination.6 In addition, the Medievals all adhere to what we have called the ‘parallelism postulate’ to the effect that man’s cognitive faculties are appropriately ordered to the quidditative natures of the outside things: Ibid., q. 84, art. 3c: Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum reducitur, ut sentiat quidem per actiones sensibilium in sensum, ut intelligat autem per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Ibid., art. 7c: (…) potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. (…). Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit.

Cf. CG II, 68, nrs. 1454–1459. See e.g. STh I, q. 80, art. 1c: “(…) quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum. (…). Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. (…). In habentibus autem cognitionem sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum”. Cf. ibid., q. 117, art. 1c: “Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum’; ad 3um: ‘(…) magister (…) movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones”. 5 6

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Norman Kretzmann had good reason to consider (1991, 161), the Medievals’s views of cognition as resulting from their general anthropology, a form of ‘theistic reliabilism’, because their positions concerning the similarities to and divergencies from other animals were firmly embedded in their view of how God created man and his world. The Medievals’s insight into, and their confidence in the intelligible structure of the world are indeed ultimately based upon their firm conviction that God created the world, including man and his intellectual capacities, in accordance with the divine exemplary Ideas, as a result of which all creatural being in a way shares God’s intelligible nature. In a similar line of thought Stump points out (1991, 144) the role of theistic reliabilism in Aquinas’s theory of knowlege. She is right in putting his epistemological attitude not only in the perspective of his Aristotelian metaphysical realism, but also in Aquinas’s general philosophico-theological frame of mind, of which his theistic reliabilism is part and parcel. Metaphysical realism as adhered to by all Medieval thinkers—including such sceptics like Nicholas of Autrecourt, who basically questioned the knowledge claims made by others, and were convinced that fixed, immutable truth about Reality could never be attained by the human mind—consisted in the assumption that there really is an external world around us, which possesses certain features independent of the operation of any created intellect, so that it is up to our minds to discover truths about the world, rather than simply inventing or creating them. Basic to Aristotle’s metaphysical realism was his optimistic conviction that neither the senses nor the intellect can be mistaken about their proper objects, to wit the proper sensibles and the things’ quiddities, respectively. This confidence was part of the general Ancient optimistic view of sound thinking naturally matching Reality.7 Kretzmann is quite right in extensively drawing our attention (1991, 168–194) to the fact that the mechanism of sensorial as well as intellective cognition in Aquinas, including the details of sensorial and intellective reliability, is largely taken from Aristotle’s epistemology.8 The

7 For this so-called parallelism postulate of Ancient thought see de Rijk (2002) II, 42–43, and above our notes 38 and 40. 8 In one of the next sections it will be argued that the well-known idea of cognition being ‘cum fundamento in re’ is the 13th–14th cent. version of the Ancient parallelism postulate.

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impact of the theistic reliabilism component of the philosophic attitude displayed by people such as Aquinas and other optimistic thinkers consisted in their firm confidence that the human intellect was created by God for discovering such truths about the world.9 In accordance with the common adage that God and nature do nothing in vain,10 the Medieval thinkers were confident enough to assume that man could avail of reliable tools and devices to obtain genuine knowledge about the outside world. In the wake of Aristotle, they all recognized the fundamental role of sense-perception in the first place, and, by that, the experimental foundation of human knowledge. Most of them followed Aristotle in claiming that the human mind is initially a tabula rasa, a wax tablet on which nothing has yet been written. Accordingly, the mind is considered as primarily a power or capacity for obtaining cognition, rather than a store of actual knowledge, let alone a store of innate conceptions.11 All cognition, then, starts from sense-perception, which, in the final analysis, is the indispensable precondition for any cognizance, including intellectual knowledge of quidditative natures of the objects exam9

Cf. the way in which Aquinas interprets the well-known Aristotelian adage (De anima III 8, 431b21) ‘anima quodammodo omnia’ in STh I q. 80, art. 1c: “(…) sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum; in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, in quo omnia praeexistunt, sicut Dionysius dicit”. When Aquinas discusses (STh. I q. 14, art. 1c) the different ways of knowing as found in God and in animal and human beings, he argues that the mode of cognition depends on the modus immaterialitatis, and that, in this respect, God’s knowledge is the most perfect; clearly, the assumption here is that there is a certain parallelism between these different modi cognoscendi.—For the rest, to the Ancients, too ontology and the theory of knowledge were concerned with the general conditions of ‘intelligibility’ of ‘what is’. For Aristotle in particular, all the investigations he explicitly assigns to the domain of ontology are ‘logically’ interconnected and concern the conceptual apparatus indispensable for making our accounts of the world intelligible, and at the same time they are founded on the basic assumption of Reality possessing an intelligible (‘logical’, i.e. ‘logos-like’) structure. See de Rijk (2002), I, 11–23.—Stump adduces (1991, 144–149) a wealth of evidence for Aquinas’s adherence to Aristotle on this account (De veritate, q. 8, art. 1 ad 5; STh I, q. 17, art. 2c and 3c; q. 76, art. 5c, q. 91, art. 3c; q. 85, art. 6c and ad 1; q. 93, art. 2c, 4c, and 6c; q. 94, art. 4c); see also Stump (2003). 10 CG III 156, nr. 3295: “In operibus Dei non est aliquid frustra, sicut nec in operibus naturae”; ibid., 85, nr. 2606: “Nulla virtus datur alicui rei frustra”. Cf. In Arist. De caelo et mundo (ad 4, 271a33), lect. 8, nr. 91. 11 The mind, of course, also functions as a depository of cognition previously acquired, but even so the mind thus ‘informed’ and ‘qualified’ is a potential entity ordered to acquiring further actual cognition.

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ined. As is self-evident and also supported by our daily experience, in the cognitive process, the mind is not simply passive, however its role as recipient of sense-impressions is fundamental. This first raises questions about the precise extent and consequences of the mind’s activity, including a critical examination of the nature of the mental activities and the role of the tools and devices used, and, secondly, put the phenomenon of ‘referentiality’ in the focus of interest. The next two paragraphs will be devoted to these problems with respect to both sensorial and intellective cognition. It will strike the reader that, from the outset and continually, these two problem areas were closely interconnected. Again, Aquinas will be our guide to become familiar with the state of affairs around 1250. 2.2. The psychological genesis of human cognition The general starting-point concerning any sensorial cognition as voiced by Aristotle in De anima II 12, 427a17 ff., to the effect that the senses are receptive of species without matter, is interpreted by Aquinas in terms of the resemblance between agent and recipient as both being determined by a form. Any agent, then, acts through its form, and so any recipient receives an immaterial form. However, as far as cognition is concerned, the special mode of reception involved is important. In such cases of receptivity, the recipient’s material disposition for accepting the agent’s influence differs from the material disposition as found in the agent. And that is why the latter’s form is received without matter. This dissimilarity, then, concerns the different modes of being of the form under examination: in the sensible thing, the form has natural being, whereas in the senses it has what is called esse intentionale et spirituale: In Arist. II De anima, lect. 24, nrs. 551–553: Dicit ergo primo quod hoc oportet accipere universaliter et communiter omni sensui inesse quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia. (…). Omne enim patiens recipit aliquid ab agente secundum quod est agens; agens autem agit per suam formam et non per suam materiam; omne igitur patiens recipit formam sine materia. (…). quandoque vero forma recipitur in patiente secundum alium modum essendi quam sit in agente, quia dispositio materialis patientis ad recipiendum non est similis dispositioni materiali quae est in agente. Et ideo forma recipitur in patiente sine materia, inquantum patiens assimilatur agenti secundum formam et non secundum materiam. Et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia,

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chapter two quia alteriusmodi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale.

2.2.1. The cognitive process analyzed. Sensation and intellection In this account of the cognitive process, two points are made. The strong point is that the process concerns the main component of things, their form, rather than their indeterminate component, matter. The weak point is that the mode of being of the form as present in the outside object (the agent) differs from the one it has in the recipient, and thus the reliability of cognition (or rather its adequacy) is at stake. Leaving this observation aside for the time being,12 let us see how Aquinas analyzes the cognitional procedure in some more detail in the Quaestio disputata de anima, art. 13. In the opening lines of his exposition Aquinas states that any influence of the agens upon the patient consists in impressing its similitude upon the recipient (Nam agens ad hoc agit ut similitudinem suam in aliis inducat). As for the products of mental activity, the author enumerates the diverse degrees of their immateriality. A first degree occurs in sensation, in which immaterial species are received, but in a corporeal organ; another one is the degree involved in intellection, in which the species are received entirely set free from the object’s material conditions: Qu. disp. de anima art. 13, p. 329 f. Marietti: Oportet autem esse diversum gradum huiusmodi esse immaterialis. Unus enim gradus est secundum quod in anima sunt res sine propriis materiis, sed tamen secundum singularitatem et conditiones individuales quae consequuntur materiam; et iste est gradus sensus, qui est susceptivus specierum individualium sine materia, sed tamen in organo corporali. Altior autem et perfectissimus immaterialitatis gradus est intellectus, qui recipit species omnino a materia et conditionibus materiae abstractas, et absque organo corporali.

Next, sensorial cognition is diversified in accordance with the diverse needs of animal beings and the corresponding requirements for adequate sensorial cognition. First, the tasks of the five proper senses and that of the common sense are described: a proper sense has to receive species from sensible things, whereas it pertains to the common sense (which is itself an inner sense) to judge about the diverse objects of

12

I will return to this important issue in chapter 9.

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the five external senses.13 From the requirement that one should preserve the species the existence of phantasia or imaginatio is deduced, whereas to be able to receive additional conceptions (such as the awareness of the object’s being useful) man needs the vis cogitativa, and the other animals the vis aestimativa naturalis. Finally, we need memoria or the capacity to recall previous sense-impressions: Ibid.: Ad perfectam autem sensus cognitionem quae sufficiat animali, quinque requiruntur. [1] Primo quod sensus recipiat speciem a sensibilibus; et hoc pertinet ad sensum proprium. [2] Secundo quod de sensibilibus perceptis diiudicet et ea abinvicem discernat; quod oportet fieri per potentiam ad quam omnia sensibilia perveniunt, quae dicitur sensus communis. [3] Tertium est quod species sensibilium receptae conserventur. Indiget autem animal apprehensione sensibilium non solum ad eorum praesentiam sed etiam postquam abierint; et hoc necessarium est reduci in aliquam potentiam. (…). Huiusmodi autem potentia dicitur imaginatio sive phantasia. [4] Quarto autem requiruntur intentiones aliquae quas sensus non apprehendit, sicut nocivum et utile et alia huiusmodi. Et ad haec quidem cognoscenda pervenit homo inquirendo et conferendo; alia vero animalia quodam naturali instinctu, sicut ovis naturaliter fugit lupum tamquam nocivum. Unde ad hoc in aliis animalibus ordinatur aestimativa naturalis, in homine autem vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium—unde et ratio particularis dicitur, et intellectus practicus (passivus Marietti). [5] Quinto autem requiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt apprehensa per sensus et interius conservata, iterum ad actualem considerationem revocentur. Et hoc quidem pertinet ad memorativam virtutem; quae in aliis quidem animalibus absque inquisitione suam operationem habet, in hominibus autem cum inquisitione et studio. Unde in hominibus non solum est memoria, sed reminiscentia.14

13 The common sense is the first of the four internal senses (the others are imaginatio sive phantasia, vis aestimativa sive cogitativa, and memoria). It coordinates, and judges about the sense-data of the five extenal senses (visus, auditus, gustus, tactus and olfactus), and makes us be aware of our sensations. See STh I q. 78, art. 4 ad 2um: “(…) sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium ad quem referantur sicut ad communem terminum omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiuntur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit”. Cf. In III De anima, lectt. 2–3, nrs. 584–614. 14 Cf. STh I q. 78, art. 4c quoted section 2.1 above.

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So far for sensation. However closely sensation and intellection are tied, there is a telling difference between these two, the senses (including the inner senses) being concerned with a thing’s incidental features, whereas the intellect focusses on the object’s intrinsic nature (‘interiora rei’).15 Accordingly, the likeness involved in sensorial cognition bears on the object’s accidents, but that which is involved in intellection regards a thing’s essence: CG IV cap. 11, nr. 3475: Est autem differentia inter intellectum et sensum. Nam sensus apprehendit rem quantum ad exteriora eius accidentia (quae sunt color, sapor, quantitas, et alia huiusmodi), sed intellectus ingreditur ad interiora rei. Et quia omnis cognitio perficitur secundum similitudinem quae est inter cognoscens et cognitum, oportet quod in sensu sit similitudo rei sensibilis quantum ad eius accidentia, in intellectu vero sit similitudo rei intellectae quantum ad eius essentiam.16

2.2.2. The role of abstraction Intellection is dealt with most thoroughly in STh I, q. 85, entitled De modo et ordine intelligendi. Aquinas opens his expositions about intellective cognition by comparing it to its counterpart, sensorial cognition. In the first article, he distinguishes between three degrees of cognitional power: those of the senses, the angelic intellect and the human intellect, respectively. The proper object of the senses is something’s form taken in its material conditions, whereas the angelic intellect equally focusses on forms, but always, even if they actually exist embodied, freed from any material conditions, viz. as they are found in God or themselves. The position of the human intellect is somewhere in between, because it pertains to the human intellect as its proper task to cognize embodied, individual forms which are immanent in particulars, but not in so far as they exist in this or that individual matter. This happens with the help of abstraction, by which the form is freed from the material conditions it still has as it is represented by a phantasm: 15 Notice the etymology ‘intelligere’ quasi ‘intus legere’ (STh II–II, q. 8, art. 1c); De veritate, q. 1, art. 12c: “(…) nomen ‘intellectus’ sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi intus legere. Sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt, solus autem intellectus ad essentiam rei pertingit”. 16 In his commentary on De anima III, lect. 4, Aquinas joins Aristotle in rejecting the opinion of the antiqui (Empedocles int. al.) that sapere and intelligere pertain to the senses: “(…) neque sapere neque intelligere est idem quod sentire; haec enim duo intellectivae cognitioni attribuuntur. Intellectus enim habet iudicare—et hoc dicitur ‘sapere’—, et apprehendere, et hoc dicitur ‘intelligere’.” (nr. 629).

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STh. I q. 85, art. 1c: (…) obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis. [1] Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. [2] Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens; etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo. [3] Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet. Non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis (…). Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali quam representant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus. Et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus.

The present article started with the objection that abstraction leads to false cognition. It is countered by the claim that it is quite possible to consider a species of a material thing without its individual material conditions, since the latter do not belong to what it is to be a species. The abstraction procedure in fact boils down to abstracting what is universal from a particular or, to put it otherwise, abstracting an intelligible species from a phantasm. And this is what is accomplished by abstraction. No falsity is caused by the fact that a thing’s mode of being as occurring in the knower differs from the one it has in the outside world, because what is grasped by the intellect has immaterial being in the knower in conformity with the nature of the intellect, not material being in the way in which the material thing possesses it.17 Another 17 STh I q. 85, art. 1 ad 1um: “(…). Si vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius nihil considerantes de pomo colorato, vel quod sic intelligimus etiam voce exprimamus, erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis; pomum enim non est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi nihil intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis (puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi) possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus [?an legendum individuantibus; cf. CG II, cap. 77, nrs. 1581–1582], quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. (…). Est enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in

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objection in which the species’s immaterial mode of being is criticized more specifically by claiming that material constitution is an essential feature of natural things, so as to make immaterial intellection intrinsically faulty,18 gives Aquinas the opportunity to make the important difference between the common condition of materiality and the individual condition of having this or that particular chunck of matter.19 Now the general condition of material constitution is by no means put aside by abstraction, only individual matter is: Ibid., ad 2um: Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis; communis quidem, ut caro et os, individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi, sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui (ut dicitur in VII Metaphysicicorum), et ideo sine eis considerare potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus.20

Another objection, in which it was claimed that the phantasm is impressed in the intellect without abstraction, is invalidated by describing the individual, corporeal nature of the phantasm, which does not fit in with the passive intellect’s immaterial mode of being.21 Therefore intelligendo quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter per modum intellectus, non autem materialiter per modum rei materialis”. For the general problem see also Cohen (1982). 18 STh I q. 85, art. 1 init.: “Praeterea. Res materiales sunt res naturales in quarum definitione cadit materia; sed nihil potest intelligi sine eo quod cadit in definitione eius; ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi sine materia. Sed materia est individuationis principium. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi per abstractionem universalis a particulari, quod est abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus”. 19 This distinction plays a vital role in Aristotle’s search for the correct definition of the true ousia in Metaph. Z-H; see de Rijk (2002), II, 199 f.; 210–216; 249–288; 314–319. Aquinas’s expositions of Aristotle’s intentions, as nearly always, are congenial; see In Arist. VII Metaph., lect. 10, nrs. 1492–1497 (to Arist., Metaph. Z 10, 1035b33–1036a13). 20 Cf. STh I q. 75, art. 4c: “Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus; non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis, sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus, ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus”. 21 Like the active intellect, the passive (or possible) intellect is an immaterial faculty. It is the intellective part of the soul that is the recipient of the intellective information

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the activity of the active intellect is required, which produces a likeness (similitudo) of the thing conveyed by the phantasm. This is the intelligible species, which is not numerically one with the form conveyed by the phantasm. The expression ‘the intelligible species is set free from the phantasm’ should, accordingly, be understood in terms of representation, rather than locomotion: Ibid., ad 3um: Sed phantasmata cum sint similitudines individuorum et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus (…), et ideo non possunt se sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata; quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero forma quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.22

2.2.3. The primary object of cognition. The form qua enmattered In the second article of STh I, q. 85, Aquinas argues that the intelligible species which are set free from the phantasmata, are not that which is primarily cognized, but that through which the outside object is cognized. Secondarily, though, the intellect cognizes its own act, including the instrumental species. Whenever there is talk of an actual intellection— Aquinas says: ‘something actually grasped by the intellect’ (an intellectum in actu)—, two things are implied, viz. the outside thing that is the direct object of the intellection, and the act of intellection itself. And in so far as the cognitional instrument is concerned—Aquinas has: when there is talk of the universale cognitum—, likewise two things are involved, viz. the outside object’s nature (which is only found in individuals), provided by the passive (or agent) intellect, which, in turn, has the function of rendering the potentially intelligible present in the sense image (or phantasm) actually intelligible. Medieval philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition assigned a dual role to the (unique) intellect, one active (attributed to the active intellect), the other passive (attributed to the passive intellect). 22 For the production of the indispensable phantasms the soul needs the activity of two of the inner senses, viz. the vis cogitativa and the vis memorativa; cf. CG II 80, nr. 1618: “(…) anima intellectiva non potest intelligere sine phantasmatibus. Indiget etiam anima ad intelligendum virtutibus praeparantibus phantasmata ad hoc quod fiant intelligibilia actu, scilicet virtute cogitativa et memorativa”; cf. In III De anima, lect. 12c, nrs. 770–772, and In De memoria et reminiscentia, cap. 1, nrs. 312–316.

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and its universal applicability, which is only in the intellect. This is explained by an example: the particular form, humanity only exists in this or that man, but the notion of universality falls to this form in so far as it is perceived by the intellect, in which the likeness of the specific nature, man, rather than of the individuating principles are found: Ibid. art. 2c and ad 2um: Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt, et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo; (…) cum dicitur “intellectum in actu”, duo importantur, scilicet res quae intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et similiter cum dicitur “universale abstractum”, duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus, sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu. (…). Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine. Sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus—quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis—accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium principiorum.23

To be more precise, in the phantasm as well as in the sensible species, the similitude existing between thing and thing as cognized is still ridden with the thing’s individual material conditions, which should be taken away by the act of intellection accomplished by the active intellect. This process is described by Aquinas more than once, e.g.: STh. I q. 79, art. 4 ad 4um: (…) anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum; phantasmata autem econverso sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu, abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae,—quae quidem virtus dicitur ‘intellectus

23 Cf. Pot. q. 7, art. 9c: “Primo [prima sic saepius perperam Marietti] enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secundo [secunda sic saepius Marietti] autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi; hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit, inquantum reflectitur supra seipsum, intelligens se intelligere, et modum quo intelligit”.

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agens’—, et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum—quae dicitur ‘intellectus possibilis’—, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.24 CG II, cap. 77, nr. 1582: Anima autem intellectiva non est in potentia ad similitudines rerum quae sunt in phantasmatibus per modum illum quo sunt ibi, sed secundum quod illae similitudines elevantur ad aliquid altius, ut scilicet sint abstractae a conditionibus individuantibus materialibus, ex quo fiunt intelligibiles actu. Et ideo actio intellectus agentis in phantasmate praecedit receptionem intellectus possibilis. Et sic principalitas actionis non attribuitur phantasmatibus, sed intellectui agenti.

To Aquinas, the telling differences between the (form as residing in the) outside thing and its (mutually different, too) modes of being in sensation and intellection by no means affect the reliability of the intelligible species brought about by abstraction. When in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics II 2, 193b35 (“Abstrahentium non est mendacium”), Aquinas joins Aristotle’s view of mathematical abstraction, he advocates abstraction in general. When e.g. ‘white’ and ‘educated’ are conjoined in someone, either of them can be grasped without the other, since they are conceptually different. The same holds for ‘homo’ and ‘animal’ conjoined in the person of Socrates, as well as for the conceptual separation of the former two from Socrates. Returning then to mathematical abstraction, he claims that the mathematician’s abstraction is just as appropriate as considering educatedness apart from whiteness, as long as you refrain from asserting that what is white and what is educated is not one and the same thing: In Arist. II Phys., lect. 3, nr. 161: (…) multa sunt coniuncta secundum rem quorum unum non est de intellectu alterius, sicut album et musicum coniunguntur in aliquo subiecto, et tamen unum non est de intellectu alterius. Et ideo potest unum separatim intelligi sine alio; et hoc est unum intellectum esse abstractum ab alio. Manifestum est autem quod posteriora non sunt de intellectu priorum, sed econverso. Unde priora possunt intelligi sine posterioribus, et non econverso. Sicut patet quod animal est prius homine, et homo est prius hoc homine; nam homo se habet ex additione ad animal, et hic homo ex additione ad hominem. Et propter

24 For the difference between the two intellects see ibid., art. 7c: “Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis quia respectu eiusdem obiecti aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu, at aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiecrum econverso ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu”.

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chapter two hoc homo non est de intellectu animalis, nec Socrates de intellectu hominis. Unde animal potest intelligi absque homine, et homo absque Socrate et aliis individuis. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari. (…). Quia igitur [sc. quantities and their annexes] sic sunt abstracta a motu secundum intellectum quod non claudunt in suo intellectu materiam sensibilem subiectam motui, ideo mathematicus potest ea abstrahere a materia sensibili. Et nihil differt quantum ad veritatem considerationis utrum sic vel sic considerentur. Quamvis enim non sint abstracta secundum esse, non tamen mathematici, abstrahentes ea secundum intellectum, mentiuntur, quia non asserunt ea esse extra materiam sensibilem— hoc enim esset mendacium—, sed considerant de eis absque consideratione materiae sensibilis, quod absque mendacio fieri potest. Sicut aliquis potest considerare albedinem absque musica, et vere, licet conveniant in eodem subiecto. Non tamen esset vera consideratio si assereret album non esse musicum.25

In De potentia the same theme is discussed in the context of what is at the basis of the distinction between first and second intention. Aquinas contradistinguishes the conceptio intellectus or ratio ‘man’, which (qua first intention) refers to a really existing man, to such intentiones intellectuales that merely designate what falls to things in so far as they are grasped by the intellect, e.g. the logical relationships they have as genus or species. Despite the fact that such relationships are not found in the outside things by themselves, the intellect can truly attribute them to the objects qua cognized: De potentia q. 7, art. 6c: Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta26 nihil respondet. Sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in seipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt. Sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei et aliarum intentionum intellectualium, nam nihil est in rebus quae sunt extra animam cuius similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus,

25 In his Expos. super librum Boethii De Trinitate, q. 5 [= lectio II, q. 1], art. 3c, p. 372a ed. Marietti; ed. Decker, p. 1841–5), Aquinas distinguishes between abstraction (of the form from matter) and separation (from a whole from its parts); see the studies by L.B. Geiger and by Ph. Merlan referred to in Decker, p. 182, n. 1. “Unde cum abstractio non possit esse, proprie loquendo, nisi coniunctorum in esse, secundum duos modos coniunctionis praedictos, scilicet qua pars et totum uniuntur, vel forma et materia, duplex est abstractio: una qua forma abstrahitur a materia, alia qua totum abstrahitur a partibus”. The first one is involved in the formation of intelligible species. By the way, later on, an analogous distinction is made between abstractio formalis (which produces a thing’s abstract form, e.g. humanitas) and abstractio totalis (which produces the compositum of form and matter, but in abstracto, e.g. homo). 26 Notice that the expression ‘res intellecta’ is here used for the extramental thing

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quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in seipsum reflectitur: sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas. Et sic, sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam, ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio cui respondet res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptio hominis respondet res extra animam, rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet solum res intellecta.

2.3. Referentiality and reliability Any act of intellection is object-related.27 When in trinitarian theology interpreters are dealing with the relationship. between the Father and the Son, they are bound to stumble upon the mental acts by which one tries to conceive of this relationship. Thus as has been rightly remarked by Friedman (1999a, 13), theologians in the years between 1250 and 1325 used philosophical psychology in their trinitarian theology by investigating the functions and activities of the mind, including the formation of concepts and particularly focussing on the various relationships between the components that make up the picture of the mental processes. Subtle conceptualization is indeed pivotal in trinitarian contexts since trinitarian theology aims to demonstrate, against plain logic, how the Christian belief in one simple God who is three distinct Persons can be explained rationally, that is to say, how the three Divine Persons are essentially the same, but yet distinct as Divine Persons. It is indeed the account of trinitarian relationship that has to clarify how the distinction between the three Divine Persons in no way detracts from the dogmatic notion of the one simple God. One problematic aspect of this process is the correspondence between intellection and locution. Aquinas contradistinguishes the verbs ‘intelligere’ and ‘dicere’. The former conveys only the relationship between the knower and the thing known; this relationship says nothing about the provenance of that knowledge, but merely suggests a cer-

as opposed to ‘res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi’ (= ‘the extramental thing as conceived of ’), whereas in the final sentence the same expression stands for the latter. 27 STh I q. 14, art. 4, obi. 3: “(…) omne intelligere est aliquid intelligere”. Cf. CG I 72, nr. 619: “Oportet igitur esse habitudinem intelligentis et sentientis ad ea quae sunt intellecta et sensata secundum quod sunt in rerum natura”.

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tain ‘information’ occurring in our intellect,28 in so far as the intellect becomes actual under the influence of the form of the thing known. ‘Dicere’, on the other hand, because it is just the same as to utter a word, mainly conveys a relationship to the word conceived, but, by the intervenience of the word, it conveys its relationship to the thing known, which while the word is profferred, is made known to the knowing person.29 Obviously, any cognition is object-related or ‘referential’. But then, how can we be sure that our cognition is adequate and reliable, considering the pertinent differences between the thing taken by itself and qua conceived by the intellect and thus cognized. According to Aristotle, forms only exist as particular natures immanent in the outside things, meaning that there are no universal Forms in a (Platonic) transcendent Domain.30 The proper object of genuine knowledge, on the other hand, is a thing’s nature qua being universal, i.e. universally

28 The terminus technicus ‘informatio’ (‘informare’), which is a synonym of ‘formatio’ (‘formare’), is used to stand for any providing something with a form, including (as is here the case) the providing of the senses or the intellect with cognition. Notice that cognition is considered a quality of the soul (STh. I q. 14, art. 1, obi. 1); cf. the adage ‘anima est quodammodo omnia’. For that matter, knowledge as a habitus of the soul is common Aristotelian doctrine (Top. IV 2, 121b38: VI 6, 145a36–37); de Rijk (2002), I, 414, n. 153; 443. 29 STh I, q. 34, art. 1 ad 3um: “Nam intelligere importat solam habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam; in qua nulla ratio originis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectae. (…). Sed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum (nihil enim est aliud dicere quam proferre verbum), sed mediante verbo importat habitudinem ad rem intellectam, quae in verbo prolato manifestatur intelligenti”.—Pasnau deals (1980, 159 ff.) with the language-like aspects of thought as coming to the fore in Aquinas’s discussion of the intellect’s formation of the mental word (verbum). As for what he labels the ‘thesis of semantic likeness’ (“the claim that the content of our thought is in some way linguistic”; p. 558), within any Aristotelian context of learning it is uncontroversial that there is a semantic fit between our words and our thoughts; see for the Ancient background of this basic view (‘parallelism postulate’) de Rijk (2002) I, 14–23; II, 43; 186 ff. Besides, there can be talk of what he calls (559; 566 ff.) ‘the thesis of syntactic likeness’, to the effect that thought is also structurally linguistic, meaning that thoughts are language-like in their underlying form: complex thoughts are formed out of simpler conceptual units, in accord with some kind of syntax (a thesis which comes close to Fodor’s language-of-thought hypothesis (see Pasnau, op. cit., 573, n. 4). Pasnau’s discussion about Aquinas’s partial adherence to the thesis of syntactic likeness is basically hampered by his failing to take the deep structure of the complex thoughts into consideration, in which the copula-less syntactic construction comes to the fore; see Pasnau’s treatment (570 ff.) of CG I, 55, nr. 456; STh I, q. 85, art. 4c; In Arist. Periherm. I 4, 147–148; Quodlibet VII, q. 1, art. 2c and ad 1. 30 See de Rijk (2002) II, 207–210; 236–240, and passim.

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applicable to other things of the same kind.31 This is common doctrine in the Middle Ages as well. The crux of the reliability problem is the role of the phantasm, including the true meaning of the relational term ‘similitudo’ or ‘similitude’, ‘likeness’.32 The role of the phantasm naturally enters Aquinas’s discussion about intellective cognition, as we see time and again. The pivotal thing now is to what extent the phantasm is representative enough to guarantee that the intellection really is about the outside thing which is always said to be its primary object, despite the intermediary role of the phantasm (and the intelligible species, if there is any). Clearly, we should first consider what in this context should be understood by ‘similitudo’. For a start, ‘similitudo’ is commonly rendered ‘likeness’ or ‘image’. Perler rightly argues that one should not think of any pictorial representation.33 Therefore the translation ‘image’ has the wrong connotation. In addition, in the wake of St. Augustine, Aquinas distinguishes between similitudo and imago, the latter being a similitudo that is also an imitation.34 It is also very significant that, unlike the word ‘similitudo’, Aquinas does not use the term ‘imago’ in epistemological contexts.35 In any such contexts, the ‘similitude’ is the product of the assimilation of the cognizer to the object, which is required for there being cognition

Ibid., I, 379; II, 349 f., and passim. This problem is extensively discussed in Perler (2002), 42–105. 33 Perler (2002), 54 ff. This feature is rightly underlined by many commentators, e.g. Stump (1999a), 380, n. 3 (against Tweedale, who, recognizing well [Martin Tweedale, ‘Mental Representations in Later Medieval Scholasticism’ in J.C. Smith ed., Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, 35–51] that intelligible species cannot be anything like pictures or images, writes (38) “In fact it is hard to see at this point how being similar to the object could mean anything more than representing it”, but, remarkably enough, takes this to be more of a problem for the theory than anything else; see Pasnau 1997, 109, n. 58).—In point of fact, Aristotle’s term homoiôma (in De interpr. 1) should also be taken in terms of representation (executed by a substitute), without any pictorial connotation; see de Rijk (2002) I, 21–23; 192 f. The pivotal notion of ‘similitudo’ is lucidly discussed in Stump (1999), 385–386, and (2003). 34 STh I q. 93, art. 2c: “(…) sicut Augustinus dicit in Libro octoginta trium quaestionum [q. 51], ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo, sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago. Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis et quod ‘imago’ aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum; imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius”.—We owe to Fuchs (1999) a thorough, historical study of the development of the theory of sign and its epistemological impact from Aristotle and St. Augustine (pp. 21–77), and in the Middle Ages from Bonaventura to Aquinas (79 ff.), but it is a pity that the intentionality problem as such is nowhere in the focus of his attention; see his Sachregister svv. Intentio, Intention, Intentionalität. 35 See Imbach & Putallaz (1997), 72; 80. 31 32

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at all.36 The similitude involved in cognitional contexts is defined by Aquinas as one being in terms of a formal convenience.37 This formal convenience is commonly characterized as a formal identity between the object and the cognitive power: when the sensible thing is actually involved in a cognitive process, it coincides with the cognitive power in so far as the latter, by being actually involved in this process, obtains the (sensible or intelligible) species (which is taken or abstracted, respectively, from the outside object) as a new form. From the formal point of view, this form, which is a disposition or habitus acquired by the ‘sensing’ or ‘intellecting’ soul is precisely the outside thing taken in the mode of sensorial or intellective being it possesses in the soul. Only with regard to the potential states of the object and the senses or the intellect—in other words, prior to the actual process of cognition—the intellect and the senses are something different from the (sensible or intelligible) object: STh. I q. 14, art. 2c: Unde dicitur in libro De anima [III 8, 431b20–28] quod sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus quod intellectus noster vel sensus informatur in actu per speciem sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili quia utrumque est in potentia. Ibid., q. 85, art. 2 ad 1um: (…) dicendum quod intellectum [sc. the thing grasped by the intellect] est in intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus, sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu.

In his comments on the well-known adage ‘Anima quodammodo omnia’ (referred to in our first text quoted), Aquinas describes this process in more detail: In III De anima, lect. 13, nrs. 787–789: (…) dicamus quod omnia quodammodo est anima. Omnia enim quae sunt, aut sunt sensibilia, aut intelligibilia. Anima autem est quodammodo omnia sensibilia et intelligi36 STh I q. 12, art. 9, obi. 1: “Omnis enim cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sic enim intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu, et sensus in actu sensibile in actu, inquantum eius similitudine informatur”. Cf. CG I, 65, nr. 537; De veritate, q. 2, art. 5, obi. 5; ibid., q. 8, art. 5c (quoted above, 2.1 init.); In VI Metaph., lect. 4, nrs. 1234–1236; In I Sent. dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1, obi. 3: “Omnis cognitio est per speciem aliquam per cuius informationem fit assimilatio cognoscentis ad rem cognitam”. 37 De veritate, q. 8, art. 8c: “Dicendum quod omnis cognitio est per assimilationem; similitudo autem inter aliqua duo est secundum convenientiam in forma”.

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bilia, quia in anima est sensus et intellectus sive scientia; sensus autem est quodammodo ipsa sensibilia, et intellectus intelligibilia, sive scientia scibilia. Et qualiter hoc sit oportet inquirere. Sensus enim et scientia dividuntur in (…) actum et potentiam, quemadmodum et res, ita tamen quod scientia et sensus, quae sunt in potentia ad sensibilia et scibilia, se habent ad scibilia et sensibilia quae sunt in potentia; scientia vero et sensus, quae sunt in actu, ordinantur in sensibilia et scibilia quae sunt in actu. Sed tamen diversimode. Nam sensus in actu et scientia vel intellectus in actu, sunt scibilia et sensibilia in actu. Sed potentia animae sensitivae et id quod scire potest, idest potentia intellectiva, non est ipsum sensibile vel scibile, sed est in potentia ad ipsa, sensitivum quidem ad sensibile, quod autem scire potest, ad scibile. Relinquitur igitur quod anima quodammodo sit omnia. (…). Et dicit [sc. Ar.] quod si anima est omnia, necesse est quod sit vel ipsae res scibiles et sensibiles (…), aut sit species ipsarum. Non autem anima est ipsae res (…), quia lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis. Et per hunc modum dicitur intellectus in actu esse ipsum intellectum in actu, inquantum species intellecti est species intellectus in actu.

Elsewhere, too, Aquinas claims (in the wake of Aristotle, for that matter) that it is the object itself that is cognized through all the intermediaries: CG I 53, nrs. 443–444: Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est, eoquod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem. In quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit, sed intellectus hoc amplius habet quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit. Et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret. Haec autem intentio intellecta cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu; quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium, licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis, quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem, quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus formando huiusmodi intentionem rem illam intelligat.

The aforesaid manner of expression has led some modern interpreters to speak of an ‘Identity Thesis of Cognition’. This cognitive model is attributed to Aquinas by Perler (31 ff.) among others, and contradistinguished to what is called ‘Representationalism’ (Perler 80 ff.), a model (advocated for Aquinas by Panaccio 2001 among others), that takes the species and intentions representing the extramental objects of cognition as the primary objects, rather than the latter. To my mind,

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this controversy is merely about a non-issue. As a matter of fact, more than once Aquinas—in the wake of Aristotle, for that matter—claims that the (nature of the) outside thing is the proper object of cognition, not the intermediary species. This does not mean, however, that the theory of cognition as found in Aquinas can in no way labelled ‘representationalim’.38 The aforesaid formal identity between the cognizer and the thing cognized can only be interpreted in terms of the species etc. being representative of the outside thing, in so far as (= ‘in the formal aspect’) it can act on behalf of the object—or rather as its substitute, fully empowered qua equally ‘informed’ and therefore, formally, i.e. with regard to the requirements of the cognitive process, the same entity as the object.39 Thus, speaking properly, there is talk of a most adequate and effective case of representation.40 On the basis of clear textual evidence in Aquinas, Stump has successfully argued (1999a, 384–393) that the spiritual reception of sensible species boils down to there being a change in the matter of the bodily organ of the sense in question. This change does not alter the fact that for Aquinas the sensible species is as such an immaterial (incorporeal) form received with immaterial (or spiritual) reception. This alteration also extends to the medium cognitionis, as in his commentary on De anima Aquinas implicitly confirms. When he is trying to make clear that sight is the most spiritual of the five senses, he claims that they all undergo a certain change (immutatio), but that in sight this change is only spiritual and not mixed up with a natural change such as occurs in the other senses like particularly in taste, smell, or touch. In passing he says that, given that there is a spiritual change when a species is received in a sense organ or in the medium, this happens in the way in which intentional being is bestowed, not in the manner of natural reception. From this as well as many other passages it is plain that in each and every sensorial 38 As long, of course, this label is not taken in a Lockean sense (which, for that matter, is surely not done by Panaccio cum suis). Panaccio’s position is well-founded upon a detailed analysis of the relevant texts (2001, 186–199). 39 When in the Dutch Senate the vice-president (‘deputy Speaker’) is in the chair, he is taken to be the Speaker in full rights, rather than merely to act on behalf of the absent Speaker. In a similar fashion, the species acting as the absent object’s substitute is the object, as far as the cognition procedure is concerned. 40 An additional objection to Perler’s position could be his association of the Identity model with what he calls ‘direct realism’. ‘Representationalism’ as explained in the foregoing lines does not rule out that the real thing is taken as being cognized primarily and is prior to the intermediary tools and devices being known (in a reflexive act of knowing, that is).

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process there is a spiritual and intentional mode of reception, and that in sight the reception is exclusively spiritual and not accompanied by any kind of natural change.41 That actual cognition causes an actual change in the cognitive power is common Aristotelian doctrine. The kind of alteration corresponds to the nature of the power in question, according to the adage ‘Quidquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis’.42 In other words, the psychic condition of the cognitive power undergoes a change, so that Aristotle and his followers could define knowledge as an adventitious habitus of the soul. Stump has also developed (ibid., 387–393) an interesting view of the role of phantasms in the process of sensorial cognition. She asks why sensible species (and intelligible species, which are the intellect’s analogue to sensible species) are not together sufficient to produce the cognition of some object presented to a sense, and as far as that goes, why are sensible species by themselves not enough to bring about such cognition? This question is the more oppressive as Aquinas more than once claims that all cognition requires phantasmata.43 At the same time it is unmistakably clear, however, that on Aquinas’s faithful Aristotelian view, phantasia is not sense.44 The solution to the problem concerning the indispensable role of the phantasm should be found in the fact that to Aquinas, phantasia is the cognitive power; Stump convincingly argues (ibid., 390), “that In De anima II, lect. 14, nr. 418: “(…) apparet quod sensus visus est spiritualior ex modo immutationis. Nam in quolibet alio sensu non est immutatio spiritualis sine [sive wrongly editio Leonina] naturali. Dico autem immutationem naturalem prout qualitas recipitur in patiente secundum esse naturae (sicut cum aliquid infrigidatur vel calefit aut movetur secundum locum). Immutatio vero spiritualis est secundum quod species recipitur in organo sensus, aut in medio, per modum intentionis, et non per modum naturalis formae. Non enim sic recipitur species sensibilis in sensu secundum illud esse quod habet in re sensibili. Patet autem quod in tactu et gustu (qui est tactus quidam) fit alteratio naturalis; calefit enim et infrigidatur aliquid per contractum calidi et frigidi, et non fit immutatio spiritualis tantum; similiter autem immutatio odoris fit cum quadam fumali evaporatione, immutatio autem soni cum motu locali; sed in immutatione visus est sola immutatio spiritualis. Unde patet quod visus inter omnes sensus est spiritualior, et post hunc auditus. Et propter hoc hi duo sensus sunt maxime spirituales, et soli disciplinabiles. Et his quae ad eos pertinent utimur in intellectualibus, et praecipue his quae pertinent ad visum”. See also STh I, q. 56, art. 2 ad 3. 42 Liber de causis IX, p. 9946–49. 43 E.g. STh I, q. 79, art. 4 ad 3 and ad 4; q. 84, art. 7c and ad 2; cf. q. 85, art. 1 ad 3; CG II, q. 59, nr 1365. 44 Aquinas, In III De anima, nr. 641 (approvingly commenting upon Aristotle, De anima III 3, 428a5 sqq.). See also Tellkamp (1999), 254–263. 41

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it makes things appear to us or that gives us access to the sensory data taken in by the senses; that is, phantasia is the power that produces the conscious experience which is a component of ordinary sensing”.45 This interpretation of the role of phantasia in cognition also helps us to clarify the difference between phantasmata and sensible species in Aquinas’s account, in that in his view, the latter are not available to consciousness.46

2.4. The proper mode of being falling to cognitional tools Cognitional tools such as the phantasm and the sensible and intelligible species, however representative of the extramental thing, do not possess the latter’s proper mode of being; quite to the contrary, precisely in so far as this material mode of being is missing, they are able to represent the extramental object in the cognitive process. The question that now comes up is ‘What is the proper mode of being of the cognitional tools?’. The answer is that they—both the sensorial and the intellective tools—have what is called a spiritual and47 intentional mode of being. In II De anima, lect. 24, nr. 553: Quandoque vero forma recipitur in patiente secundum alium modum essendi quam sit in agente, quia dispositio materialis patientis ad recipiendum non est similis dispositioni materiali quae est in agente. Et ideo forma recipitur in patiente sine materia, inquantum patiens assimilatur agenti secundum formam, et non secundum materiam. Et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alteriusmodi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale.

In STh I, q. 78, the label ‘spiritual’ is explained in terms of the assimilation process (here called ‘immutatio’) which is required for there to be genuine sensation. While there is talk of natural being (esse naturale) whenever in a natural process a form is transferred (e.g. heat to what is 45 She refers to Father Joseph Owens making a roughly similar point in Owens (1992), 125; cf. Stump (2003). 46 Compare the role Aquinas assigns to the phantasia in its capacity of being the cognitive power which is responsible for consciously producing the images of dreams, or the production of images such as of golden mountains; see In III De anima, nr. 641 juncto 633. 47 Unlike the Marietti edition (which reads et), the editio Leontina wrongly reads sive, suggesting that the two terms are entirely synonymous; cf our note 61 below. For their formal differences see below.

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heated), sensation implies a spiritual assimilation by which an intention of a sensible form comes to be in the sense-organ.48 The difference is important; otherwise one should assume that all kinds of natural bodies, when changing, would have sensation: STh. q. 78, art. 3c: Est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale (sicut calor in calefacto), spiritualis autem secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale (ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata). Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur.49

The term ‘spiritualis’ is also used to stand for the product of intellective cognition.50 In De veritate, q. 27, several modes of being of a product of an operation are enumerated. As far as the products are concerned in which a cause is present per sui similitudinem, four modes of presence can be distinguished. Two by esse naturale, and two by esse spirituale, the second of which concerns the intelligible species resting in the soul: De veritate, q. 27, art. 7c: Effectus autem dicitur esse in causa dupliciter. Uno modo (…). Alio modo per sui similitudinem, secundum quod causa producit effectum sibi similem. Et hoc contingit quattuor modis. Uno modo quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale et secundum eandem rationem, sicut est in effectibus univocis; per quem modum potest dici quod calor aëris est in igne calefaciente. Secundo quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale, sed non secundum eandem rationem, sicut patet in effectibus aequivocis; per quem modum calor aëris est in sole. Tertio modo quando similitudo effectus est in causa non secundum esse naturale, sed spirituale, tamen quietum, sicut similitudines artificiatorum sunt in mente arti-

48 Albert the Great, in particular, introduced the use of the term ‘spiritual’ in cognitional contexts. See Tellkamp (1999), 58, who presents (56–129) an extensive doctrinal and historic discussion of the immutatio spiritualis. 49 Cf. In II De anima, lect. 14, nr. 418: “Dico autem immutationem naturalem prout qualitas recipitur in patiente secundum esse naturae, sicut cum aliquid infrigidatur vel calefit aut movetur secundum locum. Immutatio vero spiritualis est secundum quod species recipitur in organo sensus aut in medio per modum intentionis et non per modum naturalis formae. Non enim sic recipitur species sensibilis in sensu secundum illud esse quod habet in re sensibili”; for the complete text see our note 87. 50 Tachau (1999), 347 f. The term ‘spiritualis’ is often (but wrongly; see below) taken as only concerning sensation; e.g. by Perler (2002), 46.

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chapter two ficis. Forma enim domus in aedificatore non est natura quaedam sicut virtus calefactiva in sole vel calor in igne, sed est quaedam intentio intelligibilis in anima quiescens. Quarto modo quando similitudo effectus non secundum eandem rationem nec ut natura quaedam nec ut quiescens, sed per modum cuiusdam defluxus est in causa. Sicut similitudines effectuum sunt in instrumentis, quibus mediantibus defluunt formae a causis principalibus in effectus.51

As for the precise meaning of ‘spiritualis’, the substantive noun ‘spiritus’ has itself a gamut of meanings, which all connote a certain drive, impulse or impetus. In Contra gentiles, Aquinas presents a lucid survey, from which it is clear that both the sensible and the rational soul are called spiritus: CG IV, cap. 23, nr. 3592: (…) nomen ‘spiritus’ a respiratione animalium sumptum videtur, in qua aër cum quodam motu infertur et emittitur. Unde nomen ‘spiritus’ ad omnem impulsum et motum cuiuscumque aërei corporis trahitur. Et sic ventus dicitur spiritus (…); sic etiam vapor tenuis diffusus per membra ad eorum motus spiritus vocatur. Rursus, quia aër invisibilis est, translatum est ulterius ‘spiritus’ nomen ad omnes virtutes et substantias invisibiles et motivas. Et propter hoc et anima sensibilis et anima rationalis, et angeli et Deus spiritus dicuntur.52

The message of the final sentence is explained in STh I, q. 97, where ‘spiritus’ is explicitly linked up with the human soul’s intellective activities: STh. I q. 97, art. 3c: (…) anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est vitam corpori dare (…). Sed spiritus dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem.

A similar idea can be gathered from a passage of In II Sent. where it is implied that spiritual being is the mode of being corresponding to that possessed by the soul. Spiritual being is here opposed to material being, which follows any natural activity, such as the calefaction of water by fire. Analogously in the sensation process, the form or species

51 Cf. In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 4: “(…) quia non est in eo [sc. instrumento] per modum intentionis quiescentis, sicut sunt intentiones rerum in anima, sed per modum intentionis fluentis (…)”. Cf. In III Sent. dist. 62, qq. 3c and 4c. 52 A similar survey is found in In I Sent. dist. 10, q. 1, art. 4c: “(…); et similiter incorporea propter suam subtilitatem dicuntur spiritus, sicut dicimus spiritum Deum, et angelum, et animam”.

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taken from the outside thing which acts as the cause of the sensation (indicated here as ‘species agentis’), obtains, qua intention, spiritual being in the sense-organ: In II Sent. dist. 19, q. 1, art. 3 ad 1um: Duplex est passio. Una quae sequitur actionem naturae, quando scilicet species agentis recipitur in patiente secundum esse materiale, sicut quando aqua calefit ab igne. Alia quae sequitur actionem quae est per modum animae, quando scilicet species agentis recipitur in patiente secundum esse spirituale ut intentio quaedam; secundum quem modum res habet esse in anima, sicut species lapidis recipitur in pupilla.

Elsewhere it is said that the word ‘spiritus’ can be used as a synonym of ‘mens’ (‘mind’).53 Clearly, in cognitional contexts, it is used, as it is in English, to stand for the incorporeal part of man, like in ‘present in spirit though absent in body’. In De veritate, the mode of being indicated as esse spirituale is assessed in the framework of sensorial and intellective cognition. It is plain that the spiritual mode of being is attributed to (sensible as well as intelligible) species when they are taken by themselves, viz. in their capacity of mental or psychic entities, whereas if their relationship to the things cognized is concerned, their ‘intentional being’ or ‘being representative’ is in the focus: De veritate, q. 3, art. 2 ad 2um: (…) ad speciem quae est medium cognoscendi, requiruntur duo, scilicet [1] repraesentatio rei cognitae, quae competit ei secundum propinquitatem54 ad cognoscibile, et [2] esse spirituale vel immateriale, quod ei competit secundum quod habet esse in cognoscente. Unde per speciem quae est in intellectu, melius cognoscitur aliquid quam per speciem quae est in subiecto, quia est immaterialior. Et similiter melius cognoscitur aliquid per speciem rei quae est in mente divina quam per ipsam eius essentiam cognosci possit, etiam dato quod essentia rei possit esse medium cognoscendi, non obstante55 materialitate ipsius.

From all this textual evidence it is plain that ‘spiritualis’ simply matches the English ‘incorporeal’, and in the foregoing kind of contexts the characteristics ‘mental’ or ‘psychic’ are opposed to ‘physical’. That this label is used for the mode of being the sensorial or intellectual tools 53 STh I q. 79, art. 13, ad 1um: “(…) conscientia dicitur spiritus, secundum quod ‘spiritus’ pro mente ponitur”. 54 Notice that this article deals with the Ideas in God’s Mind as opposed to the less immaterial species in the human mind, and also the differences between the sensible and the intelligible species with regard to their different degrees of immateriality. 55 In should be noticed that the phantasm still reflects the object’s general condition of material constitution.

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(phantasmata, species etc.) possess in the mind, as opposed to the mode of being they have as referring to extramental things, merely bears on a formal distinction between these two entities, which are extensively the same.56 The texts such as the one just quoted might one lead to believe that because the word ‘spiritual’ is synonymous with ‘immaterial’, its counterpart ‘natural’ equals ‘material’. Perler is quite right in rejecting (2002, 46 ff.) such a strict correspondence, and refers to an interesting passage (STh. I, q. 56) dealing with the way in which an angel is cognized by a fellow angel. In support of the false thesis that angels cannot cognize fellow angels it was objected that such a cognition cannot take place through a species, because “that species would not differ from the the angel intellected, since both are immaterial”. Aquinas rejects the relevance of the property of immateriality as common to both the angel himself and his likeness as found in the intellect of the other angel, and answers that in such cases too, the mode of being of the object taken in its own right, despite his immateriality, is called natural being, and thus opposed to the mode of being the angel possesses in the intellect of his companion. The reason is that an angel of all natures other than his own merely possesses intelligible species which are impressed by God in his intellect:57 STh. I, q. 56, art. 2c and ad 3um: (…) aliarum vero naturarum, tam spiritualium quam corporalium, rationes sunt ei impressae secundum esse intelligibile tantum, ut videlicet per huiusmodi species impressas tam creaturas corporales quam spirituales cognosceret. (…). Ad tertium dicendum quod unus angelus cognoscit alium per speciem eius in intellectu suo existentem; quae differt ab angelo cuius similitudo est, non secundum esse materiale et immateriale, sed secundum esse naturale et intentionale. Nam ipse angelus est forma subsistens in esse naturali, non autem species eius quae est in intellectu alterius angeli, sed habet ibi esse intelligibile tantum.58

The same opposition is found in In I Sent. dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2c. Cf. De potentia, q. 4, art. 2 ad 8um: “(…) nihil Deus produxit in rerum natura cuius naturam non impresserit in mente angelica”. For the general problem of angelic speech see Panaccio (1997), 323–335; (1999a), 219–227. 58 “(…) One angel cognizes another angel through a species of him which exists in his own mind. Now this species differs from the angel whose likeness it is, not in terms of material being and immaterial being, but of natural being and intentional being. For the angel [cognized] himself is a subsistent form with natural being, whereas the species of him existing in the other angel’s intellect is not, but there merely has intelligible being”. 56 57

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Thus this passage shows that the labels ‘natural’ and ‘material’ are not complete equivalents.59 This does not amount, however, to ruling out the close association between natural and material being, and their actual equivalence, as far as natural bodies are concerned. Thus Aquinas sometimes juxtaposes these two, for instance when there is talk of the natural and material being of two contrary forms (e.g. white and black), which cannot be simultaneously present in the same body.60 As to the use of the label ‘intentional’, commentators and editors seem confused about its precise meaning. In a passage of Aquinas’s commentary In II De anima (lect. 24, nr. 553, quoted in the opening part of the present section), intentional being and spiritual being are juxtaposed. It is claimed there that in the sense-organ a form has a mode of being different from the one it has in the outside thing, to wit, in the latter it possesses natural being, in the former intentional and spiritual being. The editio Leonina has sive (‘or’) instead of et, which is correctly read in the Marietti edition.61 However, these two labels are formally distinct, ‘spiritual’ bearing only on the mental or psychic mode of being which the assimilation under discussion bestows on a form, leaving its semantic function out of consideration, whereas by using ‘intentional’, the author precisely focusses on the role of the assimilation with regard to this semantic function of referentiality. In Aquinas’s days, the term ‘intentional being’ does not very often occur. To my knowledge, it is not frequent in Aquinas own works either.62 In his commentary on De sensu et sensato, it is said that a natural body receives forms according to their natural and material being— which rules out the simultaneous reception of contrary forms—, whereas the senses and the intellect receive the forms of things in a spiritual and immaterial way, according to a kind of intentional being (secundum esse quoddam intentionale), as a result of which such a reception is possible: In De sensu et sensato, lect. 19, nr. 291: (…) non omnino se habet in sensu et intellectu sicut in corporibus naturalibus. Corpus enim naturale recipit formas secundum esse naturale et materiale, secundum quod habent 59 Cf. CG IV 11, nr. 3471c: “Ipsum vero Verbum Dei (…) est verus Deus habens naturaliter esse divinum, eoquod non est aliud naturale esse Dei et aliud Eius intelligere”. 60 E.g. in In De sensu et sensato, lect. 19, nr. 291, quoted below. 61 Likewise in the edition of STh I q. 78, art. 4c (quoted 2.1 init.), the editor (wrongly) adds a footnote (‘sive intentionalis’) to ‘spiritualis’, suggesting that it is a complete synonym of ‘intentionalis’. 62 A sixth time is found in the anonymous continuation of his commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorologica (lect. 6, nr. 631).

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chapter two [sc. album et nigrum] in se contrarietatem, et ideo non potest idem corpus simul recipere albedinem et nigredinem. Sed sensus et intellectus recipiunt formas rerum spiritualiter et immaterialiter secundum esse quoddam intentionale, prout non habent contrarietatem. Unde sensus, et intellectus, simul potest recipere species sensibilium contrariorum.

Other occurrences are found in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences (In I Sent. dist. 8, q. 5, art. 2 ad 4um; dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1 ad 1um, and In IV Sent. dist. 44, q. 2 art. 1,3 ad 2um). 2.5. Verbal expression and representation. The inner word As early as in the opening lines of Perihermeneias the role speech, speech acts and language in general have in expressing thoughts is touched upon. The message there is that “spoken utterances are tokens of what is called ‘affections of the soul’ or thoughts, and written marks tokens of spoken utterances; (…) but what these utterances are in the first place significative of—affections of the soul—are the same for all people; and what these affections are ‘likenesses’ (homoiômata) of—things—are surely the same”.63 As I have argued for elsewhere, the pivotal notion of this passage is homoiôma, whose semantic area, however, is not entirely covered by the English word ‘likeness’. In addition to the basic sense of likeness, image or replica, the Greek word homoiôma as used by, e.g., Plato and Aristotle connotes the idea of ‘being substitutable for’ or ‘representative of ’ the object the thing called homoiôma is said to be the likeness of, to the effect indeed that an object’s nature can be designated and clarified by its homoiôma. Aristotle uses several verbs to indicate the representative character of thinking and the corresponding linguistic tools. As such, the expressions are said to signify (sêmainein) or disclose (dêloun) thoughts.64 In the Perihermeneias Aristotle is clearly not interested in the psychological aspects of how thoughts may represent things; as we have seen already (our section 1.3.1), these aspects are regarded (De interpr. 1, 16a8– 9) as ‘not belonging to the present subject matter, but to the work on the soul’ (i.e. De anima).65 However, in the context of psychology, Aristotle does enter upon the important semantic issue of representativeness. 63 64 65

Aristotle, De interpr. 1, 16a3–8; De Rijk (2002) I, 20–23; 192 f. See De Rijk (2002) I, 21–23. For the context see section 1.3, p. 29 ff. above.

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In De memoria 1, 450b18–451a2, the author discusses the intricate question how one can remember what is no longer present. He shows that our own experience testifies to the fact that we can see or hear what is not present, referring to a picture painted on a panel, which at the same time is a picture and a likeness (he uses here the word eikôn). That is to say, while being one and the same thing extensionally it is both of these, although the modes of being are different. In the same way, Aristotle continues (450b24–27), we have to assume that the apparition within us (to en hêmin phantasma) is something which by itself is merely an object of sight, while with regard to something else it is also an apparition of that other thing. Now in so far as it is regarded by itself, it is just an object of sight, but when taken as related to something concerning another thing, it is, so to speak, a mnemonic representation.66 Thus Aristotle appears to be fully aware of the representative character of pictures and other, non-pictural presentations. It must strike the reader that Aristotle claims that we have to assume (450b24: dei hupolabein) that the phantasm in us is also representatively related to something concerning another thing (b25–26: allou).67 What in this account of semantic representation is also touched upon by Aristotle is the mediating role of ‘affections of the soul’, which, unlike linguistic tools, are the same for all people. As for the linguistic tools, the same Aristotle taught us that naming and modes of designation play an important role in reasoning and debating about things. Since it is impossible to argue by introducing the things themselves that are under discussion, we use their names as symbols to represent them. We are confident that what happens in the case of names, happens with the things as well. Aristotle compares this to our attitude in counting: people who calculate start from a similar supposition with regard to their counters. They too take the counters to be representative of what happens in reality. Unfortunately enough, as far as naming is concerned, he continues, there is a telling difference between what is representative and what is represented. Since the number of names (or Cf. Aristotle, De somniis 1, 459a14–22. This basic idea of signification has been handed down to the Middle Ages particularly theough St. Augustine’s famous definition of sign: “Signum est enim res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem venire, sicut, vestigio viso, transisse animal cuius vestigium est cogitamus, fumo viso, ignem subesse cognoscimus, et voce animantis audita, affectionem animi eius advertimus, et tuba sonante, milites vel progredi se vel regredi et si quid aliud pugna postulat oportere noverunt” (De doctrina christiana II 43, p. 32). 66 67

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significative words) is finite, but things are infinite in number, the same name must necessarily signify more than one thing, so you have to be familiar with the force of names; if not, you easily fall victim to false statements and false reasoning.68 What is claimed in this passage about the role of linguistic expressions is succinctly said of mental tools in the famous adage at De anima II 8, 431b29–432a1: “The stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone”. It is precisely this twofold aspect of the problem concerning the representativity and reliability of our intellectual activity in acquiring knowledge of the outside world which makes up the nucleus of the semantic problem of the inner word in the Middle Ages. The Medievals held that we understand the world by intellectively discovering and grasping the universal features of the things. This ‘intellection’ is in fact only possible by forming certain mental constructs, such as species, intentions, in a word, conceptual tools, in order to grasp the corresponding various ontic articulations found in the objects themselves. In using the terminology of verbum in this context, the Medieval thinkers were explicitly fusing theological and philosophical issues.69 The theological element, stemming from the prologue to the Gospel of John (in which the Greek logos was translated into Latin as verbum) was mediated to the Latin West by St. Augustine, who most firmly linked the theological sense of verbum with philosophical questions about mental representation. Pasnau rightly refers (1993, 121) to De Trinitate XV, in which St. Augustine writes at lenght about “the word that we speak in our heart, a word which is not Greek nor Latin nor part of any other language”.70 Thus, through St. Augustine, this aspect of the semantic

Cf. Aristotle, Soph. El. 1, 165a6–17. See De Rijk (2002) I, 538 f., and 104–115. Pasnau (1993, 121 ff.) has described this development as lucidly as concisely in his introduction to his edition of Peter John Olivi, Tractatus de verbo. See also Panaccio (1999a), 36–52; 94–119. Friedman rightly observed (1999a, 13) that in the Medieval university, trinitarian theology and philosophical psychology were tied together by the identification of the second Person of the Trinity, the Son, with a word or concept (Verbum): Father generates Son as conceiving mind generates a ‘word’ or concept. For the general theme see the fundamental study by Panaccio (1999a), esp. 108– 118. 70 De Trinitate XV x, 19, p. 48676–80: “Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus verbum est quod in corde dicimus, quod nec graecum est nec latinum nec linguae alicuius alterius, sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur perferre notitiam aliquod signum quo significetur assumitur”. Small wonder that this passage is frequently quoted or alluded to by the Medieval authors. 68 69

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doctrine became known as the lore about the inner or mental word (verbum interius, verbum mentis). The Medievals’ unanimous attention for Augustine’s move, did not lead, of course, to agreement about the role of the inner word. Medieval debates about the (human) inner word became a substantial (or putatively substantial) part of debates about the way in which our intellect is able to obtain reliable knowledge of the outside world. Its mediate function in the process of cognition was beyond doubt, as it was common doctrine that the inner word is a prerequisite for the significative function of the spoken or written word (verbum exterius).71 Pasnau has drawn our attention to the at first glance remarkable position a Peter Olivi as early as between 1279 and 128772 held about the inner word: it is no entity distinct from the act of conceptualization, and misses any ontic states apart from the species; it coincides in fact with our actual speaking, whether this happens vocally or mentally.73 However, Olivi’s criticism only concerns the putative difference between the inner word and the species memorialis, whose distinctness from the intellective act, despite Olivi’s sensibility for the principle of economy, is undoubted.74 71

So this basic doctrine is found in Aquinas and in a Peter John Olivi as well, despite the latter’s serious criticism of Aquinas’s viewpoint about the ontic status of the inner word. For the study of this theme in a broader context see Panaccio (1992), (1999a), 177–201 (where the immense semantic and gnoseological impact of the inner word issue is highlighted); Pasnau (1997), Fuchs (1999), 145–167, and Perler (2002), 90– 100 (particularly about the difference between inner word and intelligible species in Aquinas), and 138–155. 72 Pasnau (1993), 122; 129 f.; Perler (2002), 138, n. 57. Perler presents (ibid., 139–155) a lucid exposition of the criticism the common doctrine about the inner word was subjected to by Peter John Olivi and Dietrich of Freiberg, who both underlined the intellect’s creativity in the proces of cognition. 73 Tractatus de verbo 6.2.3, p. 145356–361 ed. Pasnau: “Verbum enim non significat quodcumque a loquente expressum, quia secundum hoc omnis res de qua loquimur quam loquendo exprimimus, esset verbum nostrum, sed solum dicit tale expressum quod sit ipsa actualis expressio. Est enim idipsum quod [Pasnau’s est seems superfluous] nostra actualis et expressiva locutio, et hoc sive sumatur pro vocali sermone forinseci oris, sive pro mentali locutione nostri cordis”. 74 Ibid., p. 144339–145348: “(…) quicquid per actualem considerationem nostri intellectus concipimus primo et per se, hoc concipimus in ipso actu considerandi. In eius quidem interna conceptione et formatione non solum ipse actus concipitur, sed etiam suum obiectum inquantum intentionaliter seu representative in ipso actu existit. Et hic est conceptus quem primo intra nos experimur. Quia vero, tali actu praetereunte, remanet apud nos memoria illius actus et sui obiecti, idcirco secundario experimur quod aliquid remanet in nobis per quod actus praetereuntis et sui obiecti possimus recordari. Et hoc vocat Augustinus species memoriales (…)”; p. 145362–371: “(…) prima abstractio rationum universalium fit in solo actu abstractivae considerationis realem

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So many things of great importance for the intentionality issue remain in the dark, as can be expected from an author who speaking (elsewhere) about mental representation remarks “I don’t much care about these philosophical matters”.75 The innner speech issue became extremely important from 1320 onwards, particularly with Ockham, when the intentionality issue was addressed from the theoretical angle that is labelled by Perler (2002, 321) the ‘model of the natural signs’, in which linguistic signs too could obtain renewed interest.76 2.6. Aquinas on the proper subject of logic A number of texts in Aquinas state that logic or ‘scientia rationalis’ is concerned with the operations of reason.77 That is to say, logic is about the acts of reason as its proper subject (propria materia), as it is once stated. Reason directs not only the activities of the other, lower faculties, but also its own specific acts, including self-reflection.78 Elsewhere Aquinas is somewhat more specific in that he mentions not only the three acts of reason, conceptualization, framing of propositions, and

rationem naturae communis vel specificae absque ratione suae individuationis attendentis et considerantis. Per hoc autem nihil obiectivum realiter abstrahitur vel formatur quod differat a praefatae considerationis actu, licet per eam causetur quaedam species in memoria quae postmodum remanet in nobis, actu praetereunte, et ad illam recurrimus cum rerum quas intellectualiter et praesentialiter primo consideravimus, volumus postmodum in earum absentia recordari”. 75 See Pasnau (1993), 123, n. 4. 76 Perler (2002), 319 ff., esp. 374 ff.; Panaccio (1992); (1997); (1999a); also Richard Gaskin, ‘Ockham’s Mental Language, Connotation, and the Inherence Regress’ in Perler (2001), 227–263. 77 E.g. In I Periherm., prooemium, nr. 2: “Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis”, to wit, conceptualization (indivisibilium intelligentia), framing of propositions (componere et dividere), and reasoning (ratiocinare). Cf. In I Post. Anal., prooemium, nr. 4. The subject of logic according to Aquinas is extensively and masterly discussed in Schmidt (1966), 49–129. See also Pini (2002, 32–36; 45–67), who compares (32–36) Aquinas’s position to others’ (inter alios Albert the Great, Thomas Sutton, Radulphus Brito, Peter of Auvergne and Scotus). 78 In I Post. Anal., prooemium, nrs. 1 and 2: “Ars quaedam necessaria est quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis scientia. Quae (…) rationalis est (…) etiam ex hoc quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam”.

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modes of reasoning as that which is logic all about, but also includes the logical intentions that are involved in these acts, particularly conceptualization.79 Unlike later authors, Aquinas does not consistently regard either reasoning or intentional being as the proper subject of logic exclusively. What is found on account of the subject matter of logic in Aquinas is such that it can be interpreted either way. On the one hand, he proclaims the manner of assigning names to something (modus praedicandi)80 as the proper subject of logic; “Logicus considerat modum praedicandi” (In VII Metaph., lect. 17, nr. 1658). When explaining Aristotle’s use of the adverb ‘logice’ where the Stagyrite proceeds to deal with the quidditative nature of things ‘logikôs’ (at Metaph. VII 4, 1029b13), Aquinas says that this word bears on the precise way in which one should use the term quiddity (‘quod quid est’, ‘quod quid erat esse’, the Latin equivalents of Greek to ti esti and to ti en einai):81 “(…) logice dicit se de eo quod quid est dicturum inquantum investigat quid sit quod quid erat esse ex modo praedicandi; hoc enim ad logicum proprie pertinet”.82 This approach to the question of what is the proper subject of logic is mainly E.g. In I Post. Anal., lect. 20, nr. 171: “Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari logica, logica autem est de operationibus rationis, logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de intentionibus rationis quae ad omnes res se habent, non autem ita quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus sicut de subiectis; considerat enim logica sicut subiecta syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi”. It is of vital importance to be aware that it is mainly the material or objective aspect of the intentio intellecta (i.e. the intention as representing the object cognized, which was later called its esse obiectivum) which logic is all about. The formal aspect of the intention as perfecting the intellect, i.e. reducing it from its potential to its actual state, is only secondarily under consideration, in so far, that is, as the generation of the intention affects its objective content. 80 There is still misunderstanding about the word ‘praedicare’ when used to stand for Greek katêgorein, which is itself also often mistaken for ‘predicating’ in the sense of ‘putting something in a sentence in predicate position’, instead of just ‘naming’ or ‘appellating’ something. For Greek katêgorein as ‘naming’ or ‘designating’ or ‘bring something up by using some categorial appellation’ see de Rijk (2002) I, 159–169; 364– 374; II, 403–416. When in his In Post. Anal. (lect. 35, nr. 299), Aquinas is commenting on the use of the labels ‘praedicatio per se’ and ‘praedicatio per accidens’, he means the designation of the object of demonstration after an essential or an accidental category, respectively. For Aristotle on this matter see de Rijk (2002) I, 608–628. Schmidt too is rather confused (1966, 57–59) about the meaning of ‘praedicare’ in this context. 81 For the Greek terms see de Rijk (2002) II, 158, n. 30. 82 In I Post. Anal., lect. 35, nr. 299: “Ad logicam autem communiter pertinet considerare praedicationen universaliter, secundum continet sub se praedicationem quae est per se, et quae non est per se”. For the technical terms ‘quod-quid-est’ and ‘quod-quiderat-esse’ and for the Greek to ti estin and to ti ên einai see de Rijk (2002) II, 158, n. 30. 79

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a matter of logico-semantics, and therefore brings us close to the area of ‘intentions’. On the other hand, Aquinas sometimes seems to mention a rival claimant to the title of the proper subject of logic, namely ‘the true and the false’.83 However, once again, he is speaking of the true (and the false, we may supply) which logic is about, qua logical intention: “Verum est intentio quaedam in mente existens”. It can be gathered from the previous texts that Aquinas favours ‘rationate being’ (using the neologism proposed by Schmidt)84 as the claimant for the title ‘proper subject of logic’, and that its rivals (‘predication’ or ‘naming’, and ‘the true and the false’, including reasoning, the syllogism in particular), when taken as such claimants, are being examined after their being involved in intentional operations. What is missing in Aquinas, however, is the explicit association of the notion ‘proper subject of logic’ with that of second ‘intention’,85 and particularly any antigonistic opposition between the several clamants, as is found in later authors. 2.7. Conclusion. The battlefield to come As far as the common doctrine about the basics of cognitive psychology and epistemology is concerned, Aquinas can reasonably be taken as a reliable mouthpiece. However, when it came to sharply discern the components at work in the various cognition processes, it is around the 83 In IV Metaph., lect. 17, nr. 736: “Verum autem et falsum pertinent proprie ad considerationem logici; consequuntur enim ens in ratione de quo considerat logicus, nam verum et falsum sunt in mente, ut in sexto huius habetur”. 84 Schmidt (1966, 52, n. 15) has good reason to introduce this unusual word. There is hardly an adequate equivalent of ‘ens rationis’ in English. The Latin term simply refers to an entity which has no existence outside the mind, i.e. independently of its being thought; its being is completely due to its being fabricated by the mind. Clearly, labels like ‘being of reason’ or ‘rational being’ will not do. ‘Mental being’ has the disadvantage that in modern usage the adjective ‘mental’ has the broader connotation of ‘psychic’, and is not sufficiently restricted to the faculty of intellect or reason. ‘Conceptual being’ has the disadvantage of being too associated with the first operation of the intellect, conceptualization or first apprehension, and so seems to miss any reference to discourse, which is included in the Medievals’ use of ‘ens rationis’, since, in principle, this term bears on the products of each of the three operations of reason. See the texts in Schmidt (1966), 118–122; 127 f. 85 This does not mean, however, that Aquinas is not quite explicit about the fact that ‘things’ that follow the modus intelligendi (i.e. precisely that which is later on indicated as the proper domain of second intention) are the proper subject of logic. See also section 4.13 below.

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turn of the century, roughly speaking, that hot debates about details were going to have a great impact on the development of philosophic as well as theological thought. To point out a significant everlasting controversial item, Aquinas often insisted on neatly distinguishing the several tools and devices functioning in the cognitive process,86 but by the end of the thirteenth century scholars began to question the natures and functions of the different tools, including the rejection of some of them as being superfluous intermediary entities. This is the context where also the specific item concerning the proper subject of logic belongs. The battlefield any student of the fourteenth-century intentionality debate is bound to enter can nicely be pictured from the perspective of the role played by what we may call ‘the fundamentum in re idea’. As we have remarked before, the intricate problems concerning intentionality, including a host of controversial discussions among the Medieval thinkers, all centered around the basic notions of the representativeness and reliability of our thinking and talking about extramental Reality, including the reliability/representativeness of the tools and devices we use in discovering truths about the world. Now the entire idea of the representativeness/reliability of human cognition, which was firmly rooted in the Medieval mind,87 was ultimately based upon the Medievals’ view of the nature of the specific mode of being (called esse diminutum or ‘diminutive being’) they unanimously assigned to, say, the mental ingredients of the cognitive process, such as species, phantasms, forms, intentions etc. In their usual account of this process the extramental thing (vera res) is considered naturally capable of producing in sensorial as well as in intellective cognition some representatives (often called similitudines). And although they only possess diminutive being (ens diminutum) qua being, say, only a ‘minus variant’ of the complete being of the real thing, these representatives are nonetheless adequate enough to cause reliable knowledge about extramental Reality.88 As we have seen before, in Medieval thought the idea that sensorial and intellective cognition in one way or another are founded in extramental Reality is part and parcel of common doctrine. The question we are left with is how the cum fundamento in re idea should be understood. See section 4.11 below. See our earlier discussion of the secular (Aristotelian) and the theological sources of their optimistic epistemology. Their God was not a Cartesian deus malignus. 88 For the term ‘ens diminutum’ see the fundamental study by Maurer (1950). 86 87

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Does this principle amount to stating an almost full correspondence between mental products and the outside things they are concerned with, in that each and every articulation occurring in the sensorial or intellective domains will match similar articulations in Reality? If so, then certain questions are bound to come up, to wit, about the status of the thing cognized, and its relationship to the real thing (vera res), as well as those about the (various) connections the thing cognized has with the cognitive powers (the intellect in particular), and about cognate problems concerning the mutual relationships putatively existing between the different cognitional tools. As we will see in the next sections, the diverse views of the nature of the real foundation of knowledge (fundamentum in re) continued to vary from assuming an almost full correspondence of the mental tools with the outside objects to a more cautious attitude of qualifyimg this correspondence as found in, at least, a part of the cognitional tools and devices. It is up to us now to implement the foregoing sketch of the development of the intentionality debates.

chapter three THE ‘EPISTEMOLOGICAL TURN’ AROUND 1270

As will be clear from our foregoing observations, the association of two main areas of investigation—that of semantics, to wit the whole of semantic and epistemological problems pertaining to referentiality, and that concerning the psychology of cognition—was to strongly influence the development of the Medieval discussions about intentionality. For one thing, the semantics of De interpretatione and De magistro played a predominant role as far as the crucial theme of referentiality was concerned, whereas the issues involved in Aristotle’s expositions of De anima II 12 and III 4, which were taken up in the afore-mentioned works by St. Augustine, brought the roles of sensation and intellection into focus. In addition, from Henry of Ghent onwards, an epistemological turn took place, which was initiated by the critical examination of the (supposed) indispensability of intermediary devices occurring in the cognitional procedure, particularly the species, including a questioning of the relationships between the intellect, its acts and its products It is especially Henry of Ghent’s interpretation of St. Augustine’s expositions in his Quaestio de Ideis that initiated the epistemological turn.1 Inspired by Avicenna’s well-known distinction between three modes of being, Henry drew attention to what he called the ideatum as the objective counterpart of idea. In his view, God’s act of cognition implies the constitution of essences (essentiae rerum), which, apart from their being imitable by creation, are as such cognitive contents, ideata, that is.2 1 The common opinion among historians of philosophy that such an epistemological turn took place as late as the seventeenth century is due to sheer ignorance of Medieval developments of the kind. Misled by the post-Medieval origin of the technical terms ‘criteriologia’ and ‘epistemologia’ one jumped to the conclusion that the theory of knowledge was not a central area in Medieval philosophy, ignoring indeed that, on the contrary, the theory of human cognition even was an obligatory theme in every commentary on the Sentences. For the Medieval epistemological turn see the still invaluable study of the philosophy of Henry of Ghent in Paulus (1938), 1–13; 67–135; 208–242. Also de Rijk (1990), 94–98; Hoenen (1997). 2 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, 2: “Modus (…) theologorum magis consuetus est appellare ideas ipsas rationes imitabilitatis”.

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It is useful to pay some attention to the development of the doctrine concerning intelligible being (esse intelligibile) in the first decades of the fourteenth century, because this notion played a key role in the various debates about the nature of the several components of the epistemological procedure. 3.1. The problem of God’s immutability. The status of cognitive objects Roughly speaking, the problem of the relationship between God and the Exemplary Ideas in the Divine Mind might seem to have been satisfactorily solved by St. Augustine, who takes the Ideas to be the creative forms of things which are non formatae by themselves and therefore (per hoc) eternally present in the Divine Mind (in divina intelligentia). However, as we have remarked earlier (section 1.32), a cognate problem still awaited a solution, viz. whether or not God’s immutability was affected by creation. St. Augustine too seemed aware of the difficulty judging from a passage in his Retractationes (XII, 19) where he addresses the Lord, saying that it is difficult to comprehend how without changing Itself Thy eternity creates changeable things.3 For Aquinas and many of his contemporaries the problem is not yet urgent. The exemplary Ideas in God’s Mind are considered really identical with the Divine Nature, and in fact an aspect of it, the Divine Essence, that is to say, they are the Divine Essence in so far as it is imitable by creation (sub ratione imitabilitatis). Thus God’s simplicity is by no means affected: the Ideas are the Divine Essence, as known by God in their capacity of being imitable by creation.4 The aforesaid problem area surrounding God’s immutability is left untouched in Aquinas.

3 “Namque rara visio est et nimis ardua conspicere, Domine, aeternitatem tuam incommutabiliter mutabilia facientem”. Cf. de Rijk (1975), 207 f. 4 See e.g. STh I, q. 15, art. 2 init. and ad 3um: “Si dicatur quod ideae multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas, contra: Pluralitas idearum est ab aeterno. Si ergo ideae sunt plures, creaturae autem sunt temporales, ergo temporale erit causa aeterni. Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi respectus quibus multiplicantur ideae, non causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino, comparante essentiam suam ad res”. Ibid., q. 44, art. 3c: “Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, idest formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode”. Cf. In I Sent., dist. 36.

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With Henry of Ghent a substantial change of viewpoint occurs.5 He stresses that, apart from their real identity with the Divine Nature, the Ideas are something in their own right, to wit, objective contents of God’s self-knowledge. This objective mode of being constitutes them as possibilia or rerum essentiae in divina cognitione existentes, i.e. the natures of possible things to be created. As such, they are no longer completely reduced to the Divine Nature, but in their capacity of possibilia they point ahead to things to be created. The difference between the Divine Nature by itself and the rationes ideales qua imitabilitates quedam divine essentie is continually highlighted by Henry. The difference is in fact based upon two different observations of the Divine Nature. The author never ceases to stress that the ‘observational’ (say, formal) distinctness between the rationes ideales does not take anything away from God’s Simplicity: Summa, art. 68, q. 5 Q-R (Folio 229b–230a): Sunt autem rationes perfectionales primarie quasi divine essentie primo naturaliter indite in duplici genere. Quedam enim sunt omnino absolute et generales, cuiusmodi est Vivere sive Vita, sub quo continentur Intelligens et Volens sive Intelligentia et Voluntas. Quedam vero sunt omnino respective et speciales, cuiusmodi sunt rationes ideales, que non sunt nisi imitabilitates quedam divine essentie a creaturarum essentiis secundum gradus diversos in naturalibus perfectionibus earundem quibus essentie creaturarum per se referuntur ad divinam essentiam ut mensurata ad mensuram secundo genere relationis. Et sunt eedem rationes iste ideales et perfectionales ut communiter distinguuntur contra attributales, licet inter se propriis rationibus distinguantur. Dicuntur enim ipse rationes ideales ‘rationes perfectionales’ inquantum continentur unite in divina perfectione sive in divina essentia ut ipsa perfecta est; et per illas ipsa divina essentia perfecta ut mensura refertur ad essentias creaturarum, sed per accidens, quia scilicet ipse essentie creaturarum per se referuntur ad divinam essentiam secundum suas perfectiones ut mensurata ab illa secundum rationes perfectionales existentes in illa. Ipse autem eedem rationes perfectionales dicuntur rationes ideales inquantum continentur quasi segregate et distincte in divina notitia sive intelligentia, et hoc in ordine sive habitudine ad essentias creaturarum et secundum rationem forme exemplaris, in cognoscendo scilicet per illas creaturarum essentias et secundum rationem efficientis in instituendo illas ut sint aliquid secundum esse essentie sub determinato gradu perfectionis in ipsa earum essentia. Omnes enim rationes perfectionales quibus diversi gradus perfectionum respondent in creaturis ut perfectionales sunt in perfectione 5 See the outstanding monograph by Jean Paulus (1938), 82–103, esp. 99–101; for the Divine Ideas in particular 90 ff. Friedman even speaks (1999a, 20, referring to Panaccio 1992) of Henry’s criticism of details of Aquinas’s ideas on concept formation as “part of a fifty-year deconstruction of Aquinas’s synthesis”.

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chapter three divine essentie virtute, et ut in uno simplici indiviso atque indivisibili continente eas unite, quemadmodum in calore si esset separatus, in uno simplici virtute continerentur omnes gradus omnium calorum existentium et natorum existere in materia, preter hoc quod in calore separato continerentur virtute omnes gradus calorum in uno simplici finito et in gradu finite perfectionis existente, in divina vero essentia continerentur virtute in uno simplici infinito et perfectionis infinite absque omni gradu.

The same rationes perfectionales which in God are absolutely one, are at the same time formal principles for measuring the diverse amounts of ontic perfection found in creatures. Once again, the focus of attention is on the cognitional (say, formal or even intentional) character of the distinctness between the rationes ideales both in the Divine Nature and in creatural being taken on the level of their esse essentiae: Ibid. S (Folio 230a): Eedem vero rationes, que ut in divine essentie perfectione sunt unite, sunt rationes perfectionales et principia formalia in mensurando perfectiones creaturarum. Ut autem actu [actione ed.] sunt in divina notitia ut in apprehendente et distinguente eas et plurificante, sunt rationes ideales et principia exemplaria in instituendo perfectiones creaturarum in esse essentie, et hoc priusquam secundum rationes illas fiant ipse essentie creaturarum in esse actuali. Quarum distinctionem re vera nec intellectus divinus circa perfectionem divine essentie apprehenderet ut plures secundum rationem nisi in habitudine ipsius divine essentie ad distinctionem realem ipsorum creabilium imitantium secundum diversos gradus perfectionis sue perfectionem divine essentie. Non quod idea, secundum divinam considerationem aut nostram, limitationem aliquam importet, etiam per comparationem ad veram limitationem existentem secundum gradus in essentia creature secundum quam quelibet creatura suam ideam existentem in Deo imitatur (licet aliqui hoc dicant), ymo tota perfectio divine essentie infinita includitur in ratione cuiuslibet idee, et tota perfectio divine essentie est idea cuiuslibet creature, licet nonnisi ratione illa qua continet virtute perfectionem que propria est cuique creature, et que considerantur in ipsa perfectione divine essentie in habitudine ad quamcumque creaturam. Aliter enim falsus esset omnis intellectus idearum, et similiter omnis sermo de ideis, quia omnis sermo et intellectus comprehendens in Deo aliquid limitatum falsus est.

Any limitation as well as any distinctness are on the part of the (possible) creatures; as far as the Divine Nature itself is concerned, there is only perfection and simplicity. The pivotal notion of imitability is explained in these terms: Ibid.: Unde et quelibet essentia creature perfectionem divine essentie imitatur secundum modum suum diversimode, non propter aliquam diversitatem ex parte Dei, neque secundum rem, neque secundum rationem considerationis Dei aut nostri, sed solummodo propter diversitatem rea-

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lem ex parte essentie ipsius creature; et hoc quemadmodum etiam in producendo creaturas et in gubernando productas Deus se habet ad illas secundum unam dispositionem, licet ille ad Deum non se habeant secundum unam dispositionem, sed secundum diversas, ut dicit 10a propositio De causis.

The differences between the ideas, accordingly, do not include any diversity in God’s nature, since they are entirely on the part of the creatures, and the notion of idea does as such not include limitation or diversity; any diversity and limitation is entirely on the part of creation and creatures. In God there are no diverse ideas; the diversity is found entirely in the order of creatures: Ibid.: Et sic idea neque secundum considerationem nostram, sicut neque secundum considerationem Dei, aliquam limitationem importat, etiam in comparatione ad veram limitationem in creaturis, licet ipsa nominet respectum ad limitatum.6 Unde non dicitur quod in Deo alia sit idea equi, alia hominis, neque secundum aliam rationem idealem dicitur homo factus et secundum aliam equus, nisi quia essentia divina continens virtute omnes rationes perfectionales creature alio respectu comparatur ad essentiam hominis, alio vero ad essentiam equi, et hoc ex eo solo quod comparatur ad aliud et aliud, sed hoc non habendo in se illos respectus ab extra, sed solummodo ad extra, ut videlicet non quia essentie creature extra sunt alie et alie ideo idee in Deo sint alie et alie, quasi alietas essentiarum creature extra sit causa alietatis in Deo, sed potius econverso essentie creaturarum extra sunt alie et alie, quia idee earum quas imitantur sunt alie et alie, licet alietas idearum non accipiatur per intellectum, etiam divinum, nisi in ordine ad alietatem essentie creature.

Imitation and imitability are, accordingly, explained in terms of cognition rather than ontologically: Ibid., S-T (Fol. 230a–b): Imitantur, dico, non tam in essendo quam in cognoscendo. In essendo quia essentia creature ex hoc est essentia quod est ideatum quemadmodum per imitationem divine essentie. Et illud quod non est tale, scilicet quod non habet divinam essentiam ut ideam sibi correspondentem quam imitatur ut formam exemplarem et rationem perfectionalem, purum nichil est et non intelligibile nec res alicuius predicamenti. In cognoscendo autem: quia creature non cognoscuntur a Deo nisi quia cognoscit se imitabilem ab illis nec potest se intelligere imitabilem ab illis nisi simul cointelligendo illas, non in seipsis ut obiecta causantia in Deo suam notitiam, sed in sua imitabilitate existente in Deo ut illa que sunt creata a notitia quam Deus habet de ipsis. Notitia enim Dei de creaturis non est causata ab illis, sed potius causativa illarum.

6

In so far as there can be talk of idea hominis as being different from idea equi.

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Henry is aware of his innovative view of the status of the Ideas, and tries to find some support with authorities as St. Augustine, and, more justifiably indeed, with the Arabs, Avicenna in particular.7 From the latter he also takes the well-known division of the modes of being falling to everything’s quiddity and nature: Quodlibet III, q. 9, fol. 99r: (…) quidditas et natura rei cuiuscumque (…) triplicem habet intellectum verum, sicut et tres modos habet in esse. Unum enim habet esse naturae extra in rebus, alterum vero habet esse rationis, tertium vero habet esse essentiae. Animal enim acceptum cum accidentibus suis in singularibus est res naturalis; acceptum vero cum accidentibus suis in anima est res rationis; acceptum vero secundum se est res essentiae, de qua dicitur quod esse eius est prius quam esse eius naturae vel rationis, sicut simplex prius est composito.8

When dealing with the status of diminutive being (esse diminutum) falling to the esse essentiae (taken as the mode of being of possibilia as compared to that of real things created), Henry also comes to speak about the mode of diminutive being falling to the esse cognitum in the human intellect: Quodlibet IX, q. 2, fol. 65r: Est talis haec Dei cognitio in cognoscendo se secundum rationem formae exemplaris. A quo secundum rationem causae formalis habent esse aliquid per essentiam ipsa exemplata in esse suo cognito. Et hoc quemadmodum intellectus noster entia facta ab ipso constituit in esse cognito, quae ut sic sunt diminuta entia respectu aliorum existentium, sic enim ista eadem entia [sc. the outside things] respectu entis quod Deus est, sunt diminuta entia, non tamen sic diminuta sicut sunt entia operata ab intellectu nostro, quia illa nullo modo nata sunt habere aliquod esse verum extra intellectum praeter esse cognitum quod habent in intellectu.9 7 Henry regarded it as an open question if his view of the Ideas was Plato’s own, but from Timaeus 51B–52A (in Calcidius’ translation) he takes the suggestion that Plato too viewed them as present in Divine Thought, i.e. as objective contents of Divine Thinking. See Quodlibet IX, q. 2, fol. 66r: “Sed utrum Plato cum sequacibus suis Ideas appellabat respectus quosdam imitabilitatis in divina essentia, vel ipsas rerum essentias in divina cognitione existentes, non satis clarum est ex dictis suis”; after a long quotation from Timaius 51B–52A he says “magis apparet quod posuit [sc. Plato] Ideas ipsas rerum essentias in divina notitia quam ipsas rationes in divina essentia”. 8 Cf. Summa, art. 43, q. 2,5, p. 693; Quodlibet VII, q. 13, fol. 404v, where the esse naturae is called esse in effectu. 9 A remarkable position is held by Thomas Wylton, who assigns to the Ideas not only obiective being, but also a kind of actual subjective being in God (‘aliquod esse in se formaliter in actu’). Thus the Ideas should neither be regarded as forms linked up with God’s knowledge nor be associated with the Divine Nature, and are not formed at all (cf. St. Augustine’s ‘formatae non sunt’). For that matter, the author is

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3.2. The problems around esse cognitum (esse obiectivum) in the early 14th century A cognate question is that of the precise status of the esse cognitum or esse obiectivum in general, irrespective of any theological context.10 Right from the outset, the doctrinal developments in question took place in the broader context of the general problems of cognition (divine and angelic cognition as well as human cognition). Apart from the discussions about the status of the objects of the cognition taken qua cognized, the general problem area also covered the cognitive process and its phases and constituents. Let us investigate this problem area in more detail by turning to some early fourteenth-century authors who were interested in the nature of intelligible being (esse intelligibile) including its different shapes (esse representatum, esse cognitum, esse obiectivum, esse intentionale), and their different opinions about the cognitive process and its constitutive elements, the intelligible (and sensible) species in particular. 3.3. James of Ascoli and William of Alnwick According to the Franciscan Friar James of Ascoli and other adherents to the esse obiective doctrine, objective being is a mode of being that should be well distinguished from the mental operation itself. In this connection it is noticeable that the adherents of this doctrine always speak of taking cognitional entities in its objective mode of being alone (esse obiective or esse obiectivum solum or tantum), meaning that it is their objective being that is marked off from their being as psychic entities in the knowing subject.11 In other words, the mode of objective being falling to conceptual tools when they are taken just as thought contents, or objects of thinking alone is opposed to their subjective being in the mind of the knowing subject, which mode of being is, understandably, not convinced that his opinion will not be received with open arms. See his Quaestio de Ideis (anonymously found in Ms. Vat. Lat. Borgh. 171, ff. 34ra–36va (it is wrongly attributed by inter alios Ledoux 1937, p. 3, n. 3 ad fin. to Henry of Harclay). This short tract has been edited by A. Maurer in MS 23 (1961), 163 ff. 10 For the rest, Henry deals with intelligible being mainly in the context of the problem of the universal; see Paulus (1938), 67–81. 11 For the present section see also Perler (2002), 230–251.

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being taken by its own, but together with the subject these objects inhere in; then indeed they are not taken in their objective being alone, but together with their subjective being in the knowing subject. Clearly, when they distinguished esse obiectivum from esse subiectivum, these Medieval thinkers did nothing but distinguish between two ways of addressing the same mental entity (ens rationis or ‘rationate being’): you can either take it as a mental product including its object or content, or consider merely (solum, tantum) its objective content, quite apart from the knowing subject that acts as its subject-substrate, and from the act of thinking of which it is the product, as well. The Franciscan Friar James of Ascoli acted as a magister regens in theology in Paris around 1310–1320. According to the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, James took part in a Council of Parisian theological masters held in April, 1309 against ‘quedam pseudomulier de Hanomia, nomine Margareta dicta Porrette’, who had written a heretical book; he figures here among the magistri theologiae. James is the author of Quaestiones disputatae (or Quaestiones ordinariae) about problems concerning divine knowledge and a Quodlibet (or Quaestiones quodlibetales) about cognate matters (all of them disputed in 1311 or 1312),12 which are of interest for our present purpose, in so far as they are about human cognition.13 William of Alnwick (d. 1333), whose floruit is commonly put about 1315, lectured on the Sentences in Oxford and Paris. He was one of Scotus’s closest associates in the early fourteenth century. If he is the same as ‘ille Guillermus anglicus’ who was among the brethren who stayed at Paris during the conflict between Philip the Fair and Pope Boniface VIII, and whose taking sides with Philip is reported in a document of June, 5, 1303, William’s university activities can be dated earlier. Whatever this may be, his academic career seems to have been split between Paris and Oxford. He was licensed to teach theology at Paris, and read the Sentences there in the period 1313–1315. He was functioning as Franciscan regent master in Oxford during the chancellorship of Henry of Harclay, perhaps in 1316, and taught as regent master in Paris during the academic year 1317–1318. One of his most important, still Friedman (2002), 76, n. 95. Two Questions (viz. q. 5 of the Qq. disp., and q. 2 of the Quodlibet) are edited by Yokoyama (1967). For the Mss. see ibid., 33 f. He appears to have been a faithful follower of Duns Scotus’s. See Z. Włodek’s judgement about Ascoli referred to by Yokoyama, p. 31. His commentary In I–IV Sent. is lost. 12 13

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unedited works is his Determinationes, which were written in the period in which, after teaching in Paris, William served as lector at the Franciscan convents at Montpellier and Bologna.14 James of Ascoli clearly establishes the specific nature of objective being as to be well distinguished from an object’s subjective being and the formal being of the cognitive act: Quaestio disputata, q. 5, art. 1, p. 42 ed. Yokoyama: Id quod est in aliquo solum obiective, impossibile est quod sit totaliter idem cum eo quod est in illo formaliter. Quod patet, quia tunc idem, et secundum quod idem, esset in aliquo obiective et non obiective, quae sunt contradictoria. Sed cognitio qua Deus cognoscit creaturam, est in Deo formaliter, lapis autem cognitus a Deo non est in Deo formaliter, sed solum obiective.15

It is particularly this split between objective being, on the one hand, and subjective being and the cognitional activity or its power, on the other, that is a controversial matter between Alnwick and Ascoli. In Alnwick’s De esse intelligibili, we find a reference to James of Ascoli and his followers, in which this split is under attack: Quaestio disputata de esse intelligibili p. 323–51 Ledoux: (…) dicunt aliqui moderni [James of Ascoli in particular; see Ledoux, p. 3, n. 3] quod esse repraesentatum alicuius obiecti significat entitatem distinctam a repraesentante, et esse cognitum alicuius obiecti entitatem distinctam a cognitione (…). Et hoc primo ostendunt16 sic. Ubicumque aliquid dicitur univoce de duobus maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio generis vel speciei, ibi utrumque est ens entitate sibi propria, quia univoca sunt quorum ratio substantialis est una; sed enti et totaliter non enti non est aliqua ratio substantialis una. Lapis autem dicitur de lapide in esse cognito sive representato et de lapide in esse reali producto maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio generis aut speciei (ut probabitur). Ergo lapis secundum eius esse cognitum et repraesentatum habet entitatem sibi propriam, sicut secundum eius esse in effectu; et per consequens lapis in esse cognito et repraesentato differt a cognitione et a repraesentante, sicut ab eis distinguitur in esse suo producto in effectu.

When asked about the nature of this contradistinction, its adherents refer to the threefold division of being, real being, intentional being, 14 Friedman (2002), 79–80, also for further information. An extensive analysis of the Determinationes (compiled from the version found in Vat. Pal. Lat. 1805, ff. 1r–193v) is found in Ledoux (1937), pp. XXIII–XLV. Other Mss. are mentioned by Ledoux (1937), 610. 15 For the complete argument see p. 4286 ff. ed. Yokoyama (1967). The controversy between Ascoli and Alnwick, including its background in Scotus is extensively discussed in Perler (2001), 206–221 and (2002), 230–245. 16 Cf. James of Ascoli, Qu. Disp., q. 5, art. 4, p. 569 ff. Yokoyama.

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and rationate being. Real being is the mode of being that belongs to the singular things of the outside world alone. I quote the texts as found in Alnwick:17 Ibid., p. 63–12: Sed quale est istud esse, et qualis est ista distinctio esse representati et esse cogniti a repraesentante et cognitione? Ad hoc dicunt sic opinantes quod triplex est esse in universo, scilicet esse reale, esse intentionale, et esse rationis. Esse reale est illud quod convenit rei ut existit formaliter et in natura propria. Et tale esse non convenit nisi singulari [viz. subsistent beings] vel ei quod habet esse in singulari [viz. accidental beings], quia solum singulare existit in natura propria per se et primo; universalia autem non existunt nisi ut habent esse in singularibus; de quo esse intelligitur illud Philosophi in Praedicamentis [Arist., Categ. 5, 2b5–6] “Destructis primis, impossibile est aliquod aliorum remanere”.

Intentional being is the mode of being that falls to a thing in so far as it possesses representative being in some other (real) entity; it equally belongs to universals and singulars, and is a kind of diminutive being, and is always founded in something real,18 albeit objectively: Ibid., p. 613–21: Esse vero intentionale est illud quod convenit rei ut habet esse representative sive esse representatum in aliquo alio ente reali. Et quia repraesentari in aliquo alio obiective indifferenter convenit tam universali quam singulari, ideo esse intentionale convenit tam universali quam singulari. Ideo esse intelligibile non magis appropriat sibi esse universale quam singulare, nec econverso. Et tale esse intentionale est debilius esse reali, et ideo semper fundatur in ipso, licet obiective.

Rationate being (esse rationis),19 finally, belongs to a thing in so far as it has conceptual being in the mind, and there alone. And because this mode of being is a kind of diminutive being (esse diminutum), it always presupposes one of the two aforesaid modes of being: Ibid., p. 622–25: Esse vero rationis convenit rei ut habet esse conceptus20 in sola consideratione intellectus operantis. Et tale cum sit esse diminutum, semper praesupponit alterum duorum praecedentium.

17 The following quotations are all faithfully drawn by Alnwick from Ascoli’s Quaest. disp., q. 5, art. 2, ed. Yokoyama (1967), 4449–4574. 18 Note that in this context the ens reale is the cognition as it is really present in the knower’s mind, in which it, in accordance with Aristotelian doctrine, is an acquired habitus of the soul. 19 For ‘rationate being’ rendering ‘ens rationis’ (Schmidt) see p. 76, n. 84 above. 20 I take conceptus as a genitive. Or should we read (with James himself; see Yokoyama, p. 4563) conceptibiliter?

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The intermediate position in between real and rationate being can now be elucidated according to Ascoli cum suis: Ibid., p. 625–74: Dicunt igitur quod esse intentionale non est esse reale, quia potest convenire rei non existenti in natura propria. Nec etiam est esse rationis, quia enti rationis repugnat existere in re, ei autem quod habet esse repraesentatum in aliquo et esse obiectivum in anima, non repugnat existere in re. Ideo istud esse intentionale est medium (ut dicunt) inter esse reale et esse rationis.

Before proceeding to the second part of Ascoli’s argument, two notes should be inserted about the ins and outs of his view of objective (or intentional) being. First. Ascoli defines ens in anima that is contradistinguished to ens extra animam, as precisely that which is objectively in the soul, the latter as opposed to what is subjectively in the soul as its substrate. In addition, this objective being does not only comprehend intellectual, but also sensorial being, in a word, the mode of objective being present in any of the soul’s apprehensive powers: Qu. disp. q. 5, art. 2, p. 434–16 Yokoyama: (…) ens in plena sui divisione dividitur in ens in anima et in ens extra animam, ut apparet per Philosophum et Commentatorem 5o and 6o Metaphysicae [Arist., Metaph. V 7, 1017a22–35 and VI 2, 1026a34-b1; Averroes, In Arist. Metaph. (Venice 1562, vol. VIII), foll. 116r–v; 147r.]. Ens autem in anima condivisum contra ens extra animam non est in anima quocumque modo, quia tunc scientia esset ens in anima, cum sit subiective in anima. Sed ens in anima quod dividitur contra ens extra animam est esse in anima obiective. Esse autem obiective in anima comprehendit non solum esse obiective in intellectu, sed etiam esse obiective in imaginatione et esse obiective in quacumque potentia apprehensiva animae. Et ideo ens in anima quod dividitur contra ens extra animam est plus quam ens rationis et se habet ad ipsum sicut superius ad inferius. Esse enim in imaginatione est esse in anima, et tamen esse imaginatum non est esse rationis, proprie loquendo.21

Second. Ascoli sharply distinguishes between speaking of ‘real being’ and ‘intentional being’ on the one hand, and speaking of that which possesses real being and that which possesses intentional being, on the other. Now although you cannot say something about an object’s real and intentional being in a stricter univocal sense than in cases in which 21 Note that objective being comprehends potential (and habitual) being as well. See ibid., 4317–20: “Utrumque autem istorum, tam ens in anima quam extra, dividitur per potentiam et actum. Et ideo ens in anima condivisum ex opposito contra ens extra animam comprehendit sub se non solum esse actu cognitum, sed etiam esse cognoscibile, sive in potentia sive in habitu”.

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its generic or specific mode of being is involved, this is possible when there is talk about that which possesses real and intentional being. For example, alhough the mode of being a colour on the wall has is of a different kind from the mode of being the same colour intentionally has in the medium cognoscendi or also in the sense organ, nonetheless the colour to which both modes belong is specifically and numerically the same in both places, both on the wall and in the medium: Ibid., art. 4, p. 5733–42: (…) aliud est loqui de esse reali et de esse intentionali, et aliud est loqui de illo quod habet esse realiter et de illo quod habet esse intentionaliter. Modo dico quod licet de esse reali et de esse intentionali non possit dici aliquid univoce maiori univocatione quam sit generis vel speciei, tamen de illo quod habet esse realiter et de illo quod habet esse intentionaliter, potest dici aliquid univoce maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio generis et speciei. Exemplum: Licet esse quod habet color in pariete, sit alterius rationis ab esse quod habet idem color intentionaliter in medio sive etiam in organo, tamen color cui convenit utrumque esse est idem in specie et numero utrobique, et in pariete et in organo.

Returning now to the principal line of argument, it is along the same lines of thought he followed to make the aforesaid division of being, that James of Ascoli conceived a threefold division of distinctio. The real distinction is the one by which things are distinguished as they exist in the outside world; the intentional distinction distinguishes things as they are in their objective or representative mode of being, whereas the rationate distinction (distinctio rationis) is only based upon an operation of the intellect.22 Alnwick resolutely rejects Ascoli’s view, and argues for the opposite thesis to the effect that [a] a object’s represented being is really identical with the form that represents the object, and [b] that cognized being is really identical with cognition. His argument, which is based upon the positive nature of the representative form, which makes it a real entity, independent of the mind’s operation, has a rather complex syllogistic form. Its major premiss states that positive entities, which do not depend on the soul’s activity, are real, whereas the minor claims that represented being is such a positive entity. Hence, given that represented being is a real entity [what implicitly is inferred from the aforesaid major and minor], it follows that, Alnwick argues, it is not an entity 22 Ascoli, ibid. p. 4566–73. The text is quoted by Alnwick, including two corollaries and the supportive arguments (see Ascoli, op. cit., 45,74 ff.) in his De esse intelligibili, 74–817 Ledoux.

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different from the representative form, because if it were a different mind-independent entity, it would have subjective being in that form, and, as such, differ from it. Since this would be absurd, represented being is really the same as the representing form De esse intelligibili, q. 1, p. 819–910 Ledoux:23 Sed non videtur mihi quod ista sint vera. Unde ostendo quod [a] esse representatum est idem realiter cum forma representante, et [b] esse cognitum idem realiter cum cognitione, nam: Omnis entitas positiva, non dependens ab anima est entitas realis, quia talis entitas haberet esse, etsi anima non esset, unde Philosophus et Commentator, 6o Metaphysicae, dividunt ens prima divisione in ens in anima et ens extra animam, et ens extra animam dicunt esse reale, quia illud dividunt in decem praedicamenta, quorum quodlibet est ens reale sive entitas realis; quod enim nulla res est, nihil est; patet igitur quod esse non dependens ab anima est reale—. Sed esse repraesentatum est esse positivum et entitas quaedam positiva (ut etam concedunt), et non dependens ab operatione intellectus vel animae (ut etiam concedunt), quia species repraesentaret, etsi intellectus non intelligeret.— Ergo si esse repraesentatum est esse reale sive entitas realis, non alia quam entitas ipsius repraesentantis, quia si esset entitas alia extra animam realis, haberet esse subiectivum distinctum realiter a repraesentante. Igitur esse repraesentatum est idem realiter cum forma repraesentante.

Thesis [b] (that cognized being really coincides with cognition) is proved in a similar way (ibid., 910–21), and another nine arguments to the same effect follow (pp. 922–153). Next, the general conclusion is presented (p. 154 ff.) that an object’s represented being does not differ from the representing form, just like Cesar’s being represented by the statue representing him only differs from the statue owing to their different modes of signifying. Clearly, what Alnwick has in mind is the following. Given the fact— which, for that matter, is not denied or ignored by his opponents— that what acts as a real natural cause (to wit, the representing form or species, and the cognitive act, respectively) must have a real effect (to wit, the object’s being represented, and being cognized, respectively), it is wrong to assign a different ontic status to the effects in question than the causes have; and their common reality, on the penalty of ending up in absurdities, forces us to recognize that these real entities must coincide. In his second counter-argument, Alnwick is quite explicit on this score: 23 Sometimes I follow an alternative lectio. As always, I take the liberty of a different punctuation, particularly in order to clear up the syllogistic form of arguments.

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chapter three Ibid., p. 923–103: Item. Secundo arguo sic. Quidquid sequitur entitatem realem necessitate naturali, vere est entitas realis, quia si antecedens in causando est reale, et consequens necessitate naturali est reale. Sed ad formam repraesentantem necessario necessitate naturali sequitur esse repraesentatum, et ad cognitionem esse cognitum. Cum igitur forma repraesentans sit entitas realis (et cognitio similiter), et esse repraesentatum est entitas realis (et esse cognitum similiter). Sed non alia a realitate repraesentantis et cognitionis, quia sic esset ens reale subiectivum, distinctum realiter a repraesentante et cognitione, quod falsum est, et ab eis negatum. Igitur sunt idem realiter cum forma repraesentante et cognitione.24

Alnwick’s extensive refutation of his opponents’ (in fact Ascoli’s) arguments throws additional light on his underlying conviction. When Ascoli (following Scotus, for that matter) claims (see quotation, p. 59–24 Ledoux) that, because it is anyhow mind-dependent, represented being is a mode on being midway between real and rationate being (which is entirely mind-dependent), Alnwick counters that, speaking absolutely, there exists no real intermediate entity of the kind, because any entity is either of first or second intention, without there being an intermediate intention between these two. Now if represented being is of second intention, then it is just rationate being; if it is of first intention, it is a real entity.25 He argues that the notion of ‘being intermediate’ should be qualified. Speaking absolutely, there is no intermediate being between real and rationate being. One can speak of intermediate being, however, as long as it relates to this or that object actually being represented, just like notions such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Thus e.g. a hermit is by himself either a good or a bad hermit, but with respect to an urban milieu, the simple ‘either-or’ opposition will not do to judge his position, and something intermediate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is required. Likewise, in so far as an object’s actually being represented is concerned, there is room for a threefold division, since such an actual

24 Elsewhere (Quodlibet, q. 8, pp. 46426–4658 Ledoux) the same view is expressed in terms of the similitudo (= ‘forma repraesentans’) doctrine: “(…) in cognitione enim abstracta, in qua res non est secundm se praesens intellectui nostro, sed in sua similitudine. Lapis enm non est in anima praesens lapis; similitudo enim rei est formaliter in anima, res autem secundum nullum esse sibi proprium est n anima formaliter, sed tantum secundum suam similitudinem. Lapis ergo secundum esse quod habet in anima, non habet aliquod esse sibi proprium, distinctum ab esse similitudinis suae in anima, immo esse lapidis in sua similitudine praecise non est distinctum ab esse suae similitudinis”. 25 De esse intelligibili, q. 1, p. 2019–26 Ledoux.

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case of being represented is neither the object’s real being nor its merely rationate being, because its being represented is not merely due to mental activity. In such cases of represented being in a qualified sense the ‘either first or second intention’ rule does not apply either. Hence it is clear, Alnwick concludes, that not every objective being in the soul is rationate being, since both mental being produced by a direct act of cognition and mental being taken with respect to apprehensive powers other than the intellect, such as esse imaginatum, are not rationate being, because they do not depend on the discursive intellect.26 To support his own basic view of the sameness of cognized being and cognition, and of represented being and the representing form, Alnwick presents a parallel. It is true, a body’s being placed can only be said to belong to it in so far as being placed is distinguished from place, and yet its being-placed is nothing else but the place-surrounding-the-body, just as being-white is nothing other than whiteness-denominating-itssubstrate.27 A different, but closely related controversial matter comes to the fore in the in-depth attack Hervaeus Natalis launches against the views of the species intelligibilis impressa as put forward by Henry of Ghent in some of his Quodlibetal Questions. Since this discussion also concerns the general cognitional procedure, it is of particular interest for people like Hervaeus, who persist regarding any cognitional tool as indispensable component of this procedure. Ibid., p. 216–26: “(…) licet esse repraesentatum non sit absolute esse medium inter esse reale et rationis, tamen respectu obiecti repraesentati est esse medium inter esse reale istius obiecti et esse rationis. Sicut licet inter bonum et malum non sit absolute medium, tamen respectu huiusmodi potest esse medium, sicut heremita, qui in se est bonus aut malus, respectu tamen civitatis neque est bonus neque est malus. Unde esse repraesentatum alicuius obiecti non est esse reale istius obiecti, nec etiam est esse rationis obiecti, quia non convenit sibi per actum rationis. (…) licet absolute esse repraesentatum sit primae intentionis aut secundae, respectu tamen huius obiecti nec est esse primae intentionis nec secundae, quia non habet iudicari intentio prima nec secunda respectu istius obiecti, sed in se secundum propriam naturam. Ex quo patet non omne esse in anima obiective est esse rationis, quia non esse in anima cognitione directa, nec etiam esse in anima respectu aliarum potentiarum apprehensivarum ab intellectu, ut esse in imaginatione, quia huiusmodi esse non est per operationem intellectus comparantis”. Alnwick’s speaking of the discursive intellect bears on the analytic activity of the intellect whenever it attributes to something an immanent property, which in fact cannot be really distinguished from its substrate, such as a thing’s being white or located; see the examples adduced by Alnwick in the next note. 27 Ibid., p. 2725–283: “Exemplum: esse locatum convenit corpori locato prout distinguitur a loco, et tamen esse locatum non est aliud quam locus circumdans locatum, sicut esse album non est aliud quam albedo denominans subiectum. (…). Aliud exem26

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Before going on to Hervaeus’s position and the other developments of the esse obiectivum theory it might be of interest to refer to a seeming parallel in modern developments of epistemology. When distinguishing between ‘objective being’ and ‘subjective being’, the Medievals had nothing other in mind than to distinguish between two ways of approaching one and the same rationate entity (ens rationis): one can take thinking either as a mental phenomenon including its object (content), or as just this objective content quite irrespective of its being inherent in actual thinking as its substrate. In this light, the Medieval view has some affinity with Frege’s theory of the objective contents of thinking.28 Sir Karl Popper’s ‘Third World’ Theory may also come to mind in this respect.29 Popper distinguishes (op. cit., 108 f.) two different senses of knowledge or thought, viz.[1] knowledge or thought in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of mind or consciousness, or a disposition to behave or to react, and [2] knowledge or thought in an objective sense, consisting of problems, theories and arguments as such. So to Popper, knowledge in the objective sense is ‘knowledge without a knower’, or ‘knowledge without a knowing subject’. Like the Medievals, Popper assigns to objective being a lower degree of being (esse diminutum or ‘diminutive being’) than extramental entities have. Clearly, Popper’s Third World is much more densely populated than the Medievals’ domain of objective being; among its inhabitants are, more prominently than incomplex ‘intentions’, theoretical systems, problems and problem situations, and, above all, critical arguments, concerning all of which their intentional state or intentional mode of being is in the focus of interest. However, apart from the quantitative difference of scope between the two doctrines, there is an interesting qualitative contrast as well. As we have remarked more than once, unlike Popper, the adherents of the esse obiectivum theory did not take objective being as a third mode of being beside real and mental being,

plum conveniens est de honore et esse honorato, et laude et esse laudato. Honor enim et laus est in honorante et laudante, et tamen denominant laudatum et honoratum prout distinguitur a laudante et honorante”. 28 Gottlob Frege, ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ in Zeitschrift für Philos. und philos. Kritik 100 (1892), 25–50. 29 See in his Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford 1973, 2nd edition) the chapters ‘Epistemology without a Knowing Subject’ (pp. 106–152), and ‘On the Theory of the Objective Mind’ (pp. 153–190). Incidentally, the basic idea of Popper’s Third World appears to be a mere replica of Frege’s universe of objective contents of thinking, despite Popper’s explicite claim (op. cit., 106) that it merely “resembles most closely”.

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but merely as a subdivision of the latter. They stuck to the Aristotelian two-membered division of being into real, extramental being (ens or esse reale) and mental (or rationate) being (ens or esse rationis) and subdivided rationate being into esse subiectivum, i.e. mental acts including their contents and esse obiectivum solum or tantum, i.e. the objective contents taken apart from the corresponding acts. I think, the Medievals’ bipartition is more adequate (for Popper’s theory as well) than the tripartition. 3.4. On Hervaeus Natalis finding his own way The Dominican Hervaeus Natalis (Hervé Nédellec or Noël) was born ca. 1250/60 and died 1323. He entered the Order 29 April, 1276. A document (dated June, 26, 1303) testifies to his presence in the convent of Saint Jacques in this year, when Philip the Fair attempted to convocate a council against Pope Boniface VIII. Among the other Dominican signatories are John of Paris (Quidort) and Durand of St. Pourçain. Hervaeus is reported to have received the license to teach theology, Easter, 1307.30 It is possible that as a baccalarius formatus, he used the four years’ period before the license to write some Quodlibets (the nrs. VI– IX of the Venise edition).31 Hervaeus read the Sentences at Paris shortly after 1300, problably in 1302–1303, and was regent master in theology there in 1307–1309 (during which period Durand de Saint-Pourçain read the Sentences under his direction),32 and again in 1316–1318. As early as during the Dominican Provincial Chapter of Rouen (1301) he was appointed ‘definitor’ (or ‘delegatus capituli provincialis’). In 1309 (Sept., 17) he was elected head of the Dominican province of France (Francia),33 and from 1318 until his death he was Magister General of the Order. His powerful authority on the manageral level, too may appear from the fact that he was elected unanimously and already in the first ballot.34 30 Guimaraes (1938), 25; 51. For this degree see Weijers (1987), 46–51; Teeuwen (2003), 88–91. 31 Guimaraes (1938), 32; 34; 49 f. For tasks of the baccalarius formatus see Weijers (1987), 176; 379; Teeuwen (2003), 34 and 310. 32 Guimaraes (1938), 52; Roensch (1964), 108. 33 Guimaraes ascribes (1938, 55) Hervaeus’s absence among the participants of the council against Margarita dicta Porrette (see 3.3 init.) to his being then (1309) already provincial superior of the Dominicans. 34 Guimaraes (1938), 69. In 1322 Hervaeus took an active (and successful) part in the famous Poverty Conflict between Franciscans and Dominicans. His De paupertate

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The written ordinatio of his commentary In I–IV Sent. (which we have extant in 12 manuscripts and two early printed editions) probably acquired its present form in 1309 or some time later.35 After reading the Sentences, Hervaeus had the opportunity to write other works, to which Guimaraes reckoned (49) the Defensio doctrinae fratris Thomae, and the extensive animadversion upon Henry of Ghent, entitled Determinationes contra Henricum de Gandavo or De quattuor materiis. Unlike the period he was Magister General of the Order, the one between 1309 and 1318 did not isolate him from the academic milieu, nor preve nted him from performing modest academic tasks.36 Guimaraes (p. 63) and Roensch (1964, 107) have good reason to assume that Hervaeus’s administrative duties, at least during his leadership of the Order in France, did not stand in the way of serious study and publishing activities. 3.4.1. Hervaeus on the role of the species in intellective cognition In his work known under the title De quattuor materiis, Hervaeus mainly attacks Henry of Ghent’s metaphysics and noetics, including divine, angelic, and human natures and cognition, particularly in so far as these matters are found in Henry’s quodlibetal questions.37 Of this work it is especially the section dealing with the materia de specie et intellectu (which was partially edited by Stella in 1959) that is of interest now. Some unmistakable evidence suggests (Stella, 135) that De quattuor materiis was written by Hervaeus during the period 1303/4–1307 when he was baccalarius formatus at Paris, preparing himself for the license. As a matter of fact, his In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 1 contains a reference to De quattuor materiis, which proves that at least (part of) this work was written Christi [edited by J.G. Sikes in AHDLMA 11 (1937–1938), 209–297] once more testifies to Hervaeus’s unremitting scientific activities. 35 Guimaraes (1938), passim. Friedman (2002), 69. On the date of the written version and the differences between the lectures and their final redaction see Decker (1967), 73– 77. 36 Guimaraes (1938), 58; 60; 62 f.; 65. If Hervaeus’s Quodlibet IV is mainly directed against Peter Auriol (for evidence see Guimaraes, p. 65 f.) there is reason to insert a period of academic activity at Paris between 1316 and 1318, because Peter Auriol was not sent to Paris until 1316, and from June, 1318 onwards Hervaeus was already Magister General. 37 Stella (1959, 134) would rather prefer a title like Contra Henricum de Gandavo, ubi impugnat Thomam. For that matter, Stella seems to ignore our oldest (anonymous) copy, Paris, BNF 3157 (s. XIV init.) which has the title Determinationes contra Henricum de Gandavo.

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before Hervaeus finished the definitive redaction of his Commentary on the Sentences. This surmise is confirmed by two contemporaneous marginal notes in one of our manuscripts of De quattuor materiis, in which the author is called baccalarius parisiensis.38 This leads us to date this work between 1304 and 1309. Henry of Ghent is under attack because of his criticism upon the role assigned by Aquinas and others to the intelligible species. The problem about its role in cognition is mentioned right in the beginning of the Determinatio de intellectu et specie, where Hervaeus addresses it in the broader context of the different tools making up intellectual cognition, including their diverse relationships: De intellectu et specie, exordium, P 50ra (1411–1428S): Omnes iste questiones39 sunt pro magna parte mote ad investigandum utrum sit ponere in intellectu speciem intelligibilem que sit alia ab actu intelligendi, et quomodo se habeat talis species (si ponatur) et verbum ad [et P S] actum [actus P S] intelligendi et habitum [habitus P S] qui dicitur scientia. Et ideo conveniens est aliquid de premissis tractare, antequam descendatur ad questiones de hac materia supra positas. Primo ergo inquirendum est [Ia] utrum sit ponere speciem in intellectu, et [Ib] quomodo habeat ad actum intelligendi; secundo [II] quomodo talis species se habeat ad habitum qui est scientia; tertio [III] quomodo se habeat verbum ad actum intelligendi (de comparatione vero scientie ad verbum et ad actum intelligendi pretermitto, quia constat apud omnes habitum qui dicitur scientia, esse diversum ab utroque); quarto [IV] vero, quia magna briga [= ‘altercation’, ‘dispute’] est de hoc quod dicitur quod quedam sunt operationes manentes in agente, et quedam transeuntes in exteriorem materiam sive in aliud, dicetur aliquid de hoc.

In the first section [I], the author opens the discussion with the statement [Ia] that to assume an intelligible species different from the intellective act is reasonable. Several arguments in support of this thesis are presented, one to the effect that for any cognition, intellective as well 38 The Ms. Vat. Lat. 859 (Stella’s T ) contains on f. 22r the note: De speciebus. Determinatio hervei bachalaurei parisiensis ordinis predicatorum contra henricum de gandavo, and on f. 40r: De essentia et esse in creaturis. Determinatio hervei bachalaurei parisiensis contra gand. Notice, in addition, that compared to the later treatise On second intentions, Hervaeus is less resolute; see p. 101, n. 47 below. 39 Sc. those concerning the anima separata. My quotations (which omit insignificant errors) are taken from the oldest manuscript, Paris, BNF 3157 (not used by Stella, who used Bordeaux, Bibl. Municipale, cod. 147 = E; Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 516– 302 = O; Vat. Lat. 859 = T ; Vat. Borgh. 315 = S; Venice, San Marco, Z. lat. 139 (2010) = Class. IV 42 = M, and Worcester, Cathedral Library, codex 69 = N ). For the reader’s benefit I add the pagination of Stella’s (partial) edition.

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as sensorial, a likeness (similitudo) is required which does not coincide with the cognitional act in question. Furthermore, Aristotle is referred to, who takes the cognitive species he postulates as principium cognoscendi, rather than identifying it with the cognitive act itself.40 As for question [Ib] about the causal relatonship between the species and the intellective act, Hervaeus claims that the species is not the formal cause of the intellective act, and that it is not that by which the intelligens is formally intelligens; for this happens by the intellective act alone, whereas the species only acts as an effective principle, just like something heavy going down is formally heavy by its heaviness alone, and its going down formally by its descent alone, whereas the heavy thing indeed comes down in virtue of its heaviness, albeit not formally, but effectively. Likewise, the species is indeed the effective cause of the intellective act, but not as a moving substrate, but as its ratio agendi, or active principle.41 He concludes the first part by stating that clearly one has to assume the existence of an intelligible species in the intellect, which is different from the intellective act, and it is also plain how this species causally relates to the act.42 In section [II], the relationship the species has to the habitus, knowledge (habitus qui dicitur scientia)43 comes under consideration. Hervaeus is of the opinion that, properly speaking, the species is not this habitus, and rather pertains to the knowledge of the principles, which is called ‘understanding’ (intellectus). Three preliminary remarks are intended to clarify this. First. Three degrees or stages are to be distinguished in our intellective process. The first is that of the first operation of the intellect, namely, simple apprehension (simplex apprehensio or prima apparitio), by which an object’s (substantial or accidental) quiddities are confusely and imperfectly apprehended: Ibid., P 50vb (1451–20S): (…) videtur michi quod species, proprie loquendo, non sit habitus qui dicitur scientia, sed magis pertinet ad habitum principiorum qui dicitur intellectus [Greek nous; cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. II, 19]. Ad cuius evidentiam premitto tria. Primum istorum trium est quod in processu intellectus nostri in intelligendo est considerare triDe intellectu et specie I, 1429–14338S. Ibid., p. 14339–14410. 42 Ibid., P 50vb (14437–38S): “Et sic ubicumque patet quod est ponere intelligibilem speciem in intellectu, diversam ab actu intelligendi [Ia], et qualiter se habeat in causalitate respectu actus” [Ib]. 43 Note that in the Aristotelian tradition knowledge is considered an affection or acquired property (or habitus) of the soul. 40 41

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plicem gradum. Quorum primus est quod in intellectu nostro de rebus [“in our understanding of things”] que nate sunt nostrum intellectum immediate movere (sicut est color vel corpus vel aliquid tale) fit quedam simplex et confusa apparitio [Pc; operatio P], similis apparitioni que fit in sensu exteriori, in hoc differens quod sensui apparent res particulariter, intellectui autem apparent universaliter. Et ista prima apparitio ipsius intelligibilis est confusa et imperfecta apprehensio ipsius quodquid-est, sive ipsius quidditatis. Non autem est perfecta apprehensio eius quod-quid-est que fit per diffinitionem ipsum quod-quid-est explicite manifestantem, quia talis cognitio non attingitur nisi post multum discursum, [P 51ra] componendo et dividendo. Licet enim diffinitio (puta “animal rationale mortale”) sit oratio imperfecta—non habens copulam verbalem affirmativam vel negativam, circa quam proprie consistit compositio et divisio intellectus—, nichilominus tamen non attingitur nisi post discursum rationis formantis talem compositionem et divisionem. Quando vero dico quod talis simplex apparitio est confusa cognitio [Pc; apprehensio P] ipsius quod-quid-est, non accipio “quod-quid-est” prout tantum invenitur in genere Substantie (que substantia est simpliciter quod-quid-est et ens; alia vero magis sunt entis quam entia), sed accipio ipsum prout invenitur etiam in accidentibus, in quibus est aliquo modo quod-quid-est.

The second stage is about the second operation of the intellect, viz. the framing of assertions by composing or separating simple concepts. Hervaeus presents a description of this stage of the intellective proces, including the acts of consenting or dissenting: Ibid., P 51ra (14521–31S): Facta autem tali apparitione confusa de aliquo (puta de motu vel quantitate vel aliquo tali), sequitur secundus gradus, qui est componere et dividere talia sic confuse apprehensa. In quibus quidem compositionibus et divisionibus sunt quedam quibus statim acquiescit intellectus assentiendo, et quedam a quibus statim dissentit, quia statim apparet intellectui, virtute luminis naturalis una cum predicta apparitione [seu cognitione add. Pm] confusa presupposita, veritas talium conceptuum complexorum (sicut huius quod dico “Motus est in rebus”), vel falsitas (sicut huius quod dico “Motus non est in rebus”). Quedam vero sunt de quibus non statim apparet intellectui utrum ita sint vel non (sicut “Utrum locus sit dimensio separata vel non”); et talibus non assentit vel dissentit intellectus nisi inquantum sequuntur ad prima complexa, quibus primo et per se assentit, vel eis repugnant.

The assertions of the last-mentioned type, then, require the third stage, viz. that of ratiocination, a process in which intelligible things are inferentially ordered: Ibid., P 51ra (14532–36S): Et ideo sequitur tertius gradus, qui est talia prima complexa ordinare ad inferendum aliquem conceptum complexum. Per quam ordinationem et illationem fit quod intellectus assentit illi concep-

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The second preliminary remark is to the effect that not of every simple thing that is grasped by us there are species—calling a species a likeness of a simple thing which is impressed in our intellect and is really different from the intellective act—, but of those simple things alone that are naturally suited to appear to us, without anything being previously known. All the rest is cognized owing to the intermediary cognition of those things that primarily appear to us.44 The third remark concerns the nature of scientia in its capacity of knowledge acquired by a discursive process, rather than by immediate assent (or dissent).45 Hence it is clear that scientia is not merely an incomplex species obtained by simple apprehension, nor a collection of such incomplex species, but rather an impression left in the soul as a result of frequent discursive thinking. For this reason, the species under examination does not pertain to the habitus scientie, but to the habitus that is called intellectus principiorum.46

44 Ibid., P 51ra (14537–1465S): “Secundum quod premitto est quod non oportet omnium, etiam simplicium [= “however simple they are”], que a nobis intelliguntur, esse species (vocando “speciem” similitudinem alicuius simplicis impressam intellectui nostro, diversam re ab actu intelligendi), sed solum illorum que, nullo alio precognito, sunt nata nobis apparere. Alia vero que cognoscuntur ex habitudine ad talia primo apparentia—vel quia sunt effectus eorum, vel quia sunt eorum cause—cognoscuntur per species ipsorum primo apparentium, non quidem immediate, sed mediante cognitione eorum que primo apparent”. 45 Ibid., P 51rb (1466–11S): “Tertium quod premitto est quod scientia non est talium simplicium primo apparentium, nec etiam primorum complexorum quibus statim, absque discursu, assentit intellectus. Sed est illorum complexorum quibus assentit intellectus propter hoc quod sequuntur ex aliquibus prius notis, ita quod scientia est talium complexorum, non qualitercumque, sed secundum quod sunt conclusa sive sequentia ex prius notis; unde et dicitur scientia esse conclusionum”. 46 Ibid., P 51rb (14612–28S). Hervaeus also cautiously assumes that knowledge of the cognitive principles might be responsible for the involvement of phantasia in the intellective act, which is indispensable for the intellection of the first principles, which appears from the inability of insane and frenetic people in this respect (14625–28S): “et forte, ultra hoc, habitus principiorum importat debitam habitudinem fantasie ad intellectum, sine qua habitudine nec ipsa prima principia nata sunt a nobis intelligi, sicut patet in amentibus et freneticis”.

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3.4.2. The doctrinal position of the inner word As for the relationship between the mental word and the intellective act, Hervaeus argues that it is plausible to regard them as different. He adduces three arguments in support of this assumption, which all come to marking off the mental word as cognitional tool from the cognitive acts (e.g. judging, or assenting or dissenting) which bring it about. Here is the first of these arguments (notice the author’s caution): Ibid., P 51rb (14631–1476S): Quantum vero ad tertium, scilicet quomodo se habeat verbum mentale ad actum intelligendi, videtur michi, quantum occurrit adnunc,47 quod verbum mentale non sit idem quod actus intelligendi. Et hoc videtur posse persuaderi sic: Verbum mentale Pc om. P  ordinatur ad manifestandum aliquid sibi. Sed illud quod ordinatur ad manifestandum aliquid, non videtur esse ipsa manifestatio sive apprehensio (quod idem est), sicut nec illud quod ordinatur ad motum localem est ipse motus localis. Ergo verbum non est ipsa manifestatio, sive ipsa apprehensio, rei de qua verbum formatur.

Hervaeus therefore considers it probable that there should be a real difference between the inner word and the intellective act. He winds up this section with an additional remark on dicere, which is defined as the formation of the inner word. His general conclusion is to the effect that dicere does not coincide with confused intellection, nor (let alone!) is it the same as the actual knowledge brought about by the inner word or concept: Ibid., P 51va (14714–20S): Sic igitur videtur michi probabiliter quod verbum mentale sit diversum realiter ab actu intelligendi. Et similiter dicere, quod est formare verbum, est aliud (ut michi videtur) ab actu intelligendi, licet non sit sine actu intelligendi, quia dicere nichil aliud est quam talem conceptum formare qui habeat movere intellectum ad expressam cognitionem eius de quo formatur; ita quod nec est ipsum intelligere confusum quod est principium formandi verbum, presupposita specie (ut suppono adnunc), nec est etiam ipsa cognitio expressa quam talis conceptus causat. Hoc sit dictum adnunc de verbo.

Later on, returning to the subject, the author claims that the inner word also differs from the thing intellected taken in its universal status. He adduces a twofold prood, one from theology, the other from the nature of human cognition:

47 Notice that, unlike the later tract, De secundis intentionibus, the present work contains many demure reservations.

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chapter three Ibid., P 55ra–rb (not in Stella): Quod autem iste [sc. Henricus] dicit quod verbum est ipsa res intellecta facta universalis prout actu movet intellectum ad intelligendum, falsum est. Et hoc patet primo in divinis quia: Res sic considerata est primum principium motivum ad intelligendum. Sed in divinis principium intelligendi dicitur tantum essentialiter, verbum [P 55rb]autem dicitur principaliter. Ergo etc. Idem patet in nobis quia: Eius est formare verbum cuius est dicere. Sed dicere est operationis intelligentis in actu. Ergo verbi [verbum P] est formare intelligentem in actu. Sed solius intellectus agentis, cuius non est intelligere, est facere rem representatam in fantasmate in tali esse quod moveat intellectum possibilem ad intelligendum, saltem ad primum actum intelligendi. Ergo res in tali esse constituta non est verbum.

3.4.3. On the distinction between immanent and transitive operations Next follows a discussion of the distinction between immanent and transitive operations (or actions), which is of decisive importance for discerning the diverse ways in which something can denominatively be called after one of its forms. A thing may be called after a form it receives from an agent in a threefold denomination. The first case is about simple denomination after some form, without implying the previous action; e.g. taking the form ‘heat’, something is merely said ‘to be warm’ (calere, calidum esse). In the second case, the efficient cause is implied, such that reference is made to the calefactor involved. In the third case, finally, the patient or material cause is implied; then there is talk of something ‘being heated’: Ibid., P 51va (14725–33S): (…) sciendum quod aliquid contingit tripliciter denominari secundum aliquam formam que causatur ab aliquo agente in aliquo passo. Uno modo quod ipsa forma denominet ipsum cuius est, absolute, secundum rationem proprie speciei tantum, non includendo actionem vel passionem; sicut secundum calorem dicitur aliquid calere vel calidum esse (quod idem est). Alio modo contingit hoc esse implicando illud quod est ex parte cause efficientis; et sic dicitur causa efficiens caloris calefacere, et denominatur a calore calefaciens, sive a calefactione. Alio modo contingit hoc fieri implicando illud quod est ex parte patientis sive cause materialis; et isto modo denominatur a calore effecto sive ab ipsa passione caloris calefieri.

This picture is somehow complicated by the fact that there are two types of operation: the immanent operations (such as living, shining, being warm) vs. the transitive ones (such as illuminating, heating). To use the same label ‘action’ for actions of these different types involves equivocation, similar to the way in which ‘whitening’ is used equivocally for both the painter and the colour, whiteness. Indeed, immanent

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actions are not actions, properly speaking, since they have nothing to do with causing an effect; they merely possess the formal effect of the form in question, e.g. shining is just the formal effect of light, as being warm is the formal effect of heat: Ibid., P 51va–vb (14734–1486S): Ulterius notandum est quod (secundum quod communiter dicitur) duplex est genus actionum sive operationum. Quedam enim sunt actiones sive operationes manentes[P 51vb] intra, sicut intelligere et videre, et similiter lucere et calere. Alie vero sunt actiones transeuntes, sicut illuminare et calefacere. Et ista duo genera actionum dicuntur actiones equivoce, sicut et equivoce dicuntur pictor et albedo dealbare. Nam actiones non [add. Pc om. P] manentes [non add. P del. Pc] dicuntur proprie actiones, prout actio pertinet ad causam efficientem, quia actio sic dicta idem est quod causare effective actum, sicut calefacere est causare effective calorem; lucere vero et calere et consimilia, que dicuntur actiones manentes, non sunt [est P] causare lucem vel calorem, sed sunt idem quod habere talem actum qui est lux vel calor. Unde et talia dicuntur effectus formales illarum formarum a quibus descendunt, sicut lucere sive lucidum esse est effectus formalis lucis, et calere caloris.

Putting it briefly, in the case of immanent actions, the form does not really differ from the action. And that is why the common saying is that the words signifying the form and the effect of a formal cause (such as ‘shining’ and ‘light’) do not convey things that are really diverse. Things are altogether different as soon as a transitive action is in order. In that case the action does not coincide with the form causing the effect.48 Hervaeus’s final remark is about the twofold way in which transitive actions occur. There are actions that cause a real effect in the patient, such as calefaction causes in the patient an instance of heat different from its own form. In other actions, on the other hand, the transition from the cause to the effect is not real, but merely a conceived one (secundum rationem tantum). And it is in this respect that they resemble immanent actions, in that they do not cause something real in the patient (but something intentional, we may supply): Ibid., P 51vb–52ra (14823–32S): Ulterius etiam advertendum est circa hoc quod actio transiens dupliciter potest intelligi transire. Uno modo secundum rem, sicut quando per actionem agentis aliquid reale causatur in eo quod dicitur passive respectu eius, sicut calefaciens causat rem que est calor [P 52ra] in calefacto, quod dicitur passive respectu calefacientis. Alio modo contingit istum transitum intelligi secundum rationem tan48 Ibid., P 51vb (1487–22S). Cf. Quodlibet II, q. 8, art. 1: ‘Quomodo differant operatio immanens et operatio transiens’; see also Koch (1927), 53,17 ff.

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chapter three tum, sicut quando nichil ponit in eo quod dicitur passive. Et sic videre et intelligere est actio transiens, et similiter representare, quia transitive et per modum actionis representantur [Pc; significatur P]. Et de talibus actionibus sic—per modum [Pc; secundum rationem P] intelligendi tantum—transeuntibus quantum ad rem idem est iudicium sicut de actionibus manentibus in agente, quia et tales actiones, quantum ad rem pertinet, sunt actiones manentes, nichil reale causantes in eo quod dicitur passive.

Hence it can be stated that, although the actions of seeing and thinking only fall to real things, this does not mean that they fall to the real seeer and thinker through some inherent form which is different from the acts of seeing and thinking themselves. Therefore you cannot properly say that whoever sees or thinks is someone who performs an action, because such activities are rather possessing an actual state (habere actum): Ibid., P 52ra (14832–1491S): Et ideo, sicut dictum est de operationibus manentibus, que nec transeunt [sunt qui nec transeunt P; omnino secundum rem et rationem Pc] secundum rem nec secundum rationem intelligendi, quia non significantur transitive (sicut est lucere et calere), quod non conveniunt nisi enti in actu per aliquam formam, non oportet quod conveniant ei cuius sunt operationes, per formam vel actum sibi inherentem qui sit aliud re ab ipsa operatione que dicitur lucere vel calere,— ita dico de intelligere et videre quod, licet non conveniant nisi enti in actu, non tamen [enim P] oportet quod conveniant illi enti in actu cuius sunt operationes (puta intelligenti et videnti) per aliquam formam sibi inherentem aliam ab actu intelligendi et videndi ad hoc quod possit dici intelligens et videns operari sive operans, quia, ut dictum est supra, tale operari sive tale agere non est causare actum, sed habere actum.

This discussion winds up in a remarkable way. Hervaeus sticks to his marking off the species from the intellective act (against Henry of Ghent, who rejected this difference), but explicitly states that he does so on the basis of arguments previously put forward, definitely not because of the foregoing discussion, which might point in the opposite direction: Ibid., P 52ra (1491–6S): Nec ergo [Pc; econverso P] supra posui speciem diversam ab actu intelligendi esse omnino [Pc om. P] necessariam ad intelligendum propter hoc quod hec operatio que est intelligere ex hoc quod est operatio manens, sive ex hoc quod per modum actionis significatur [Pc signatur P], requirat aliquam formam in intelligente operantem [operantem MON operante PES] preter actum intelligendi per quam intelligens sit in actu,—sed hoc posui propter alia motiva, ut supra patuit.

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3.4.4. Hervaeus on the cognitive process in general Elsewhere in De quattuor materiis (viz. in his reply to Henry’s Quodlibet V, q. 14: ‘Utrum angelus cognoscat alia a se per eorum proprias essentias, an per eorum similitudines’) Hervaeus presents in passing some remarks on the cognitive process in general, including human cognition. Here are some of them: [a] As to the nature of universal being, and generally the issue of the representativity of cognition (the cum fundamento in re issue), Hervaeus confirms (in accordance with Henry, for that matter) that universality does not fall to things taken in their real extramental being, but to their objective being in the intellect. He adds that no thing, whether substance or accident, taken in its real being, can be said to be universal, but that all the same universality can be assigned to it on the basis of something real that in its real being is naturally suited to move the intellect to represent this thing as universal (read, ‘universally applicable’). However (against Henry’s assumption of there existing essential being preceding the wel-known bifurcation into universal and singular being), this real characteristic must be considered as possessing singular being in the outside world: Ibid., P 56ra (15036–1513S): Et quod iste [sc. Henricus] dicit quod res in suo esse reali non habet esse universale et abstractum, sed hoc convenit sibi prout est obiective in intellectu per aliquid repraesentans,—dico quod nulli rei, sive substantiae sive accidenti, convenit esse universale per praedicationem (sicut dicimus genera et species esse universalia), et hoc in suo esse reali. Sed tamen, licet res in suo esse reali non sit universalis, illa tamen universalitas potest sibi convenire per aliquid reale quod in suo esse reali natum est movere intellectum ut sic universaliter obiectum repraesentetur et appareat intellectui. Unde et etiam illud inhaerens quod ipse ponit, oportet quod sit aliquid reale habens esse singulare in rerum natura. Sicut enim natura subsistens in suo esse reali est singularis, ita et natura inhaerens, suo modo.

[b] As to the difference between species and intellective act, Hervaeus claims that such a distinction must be made, because the intellective act is induced by a species representative of an object, which implies a transition from the act to the object represented: Ibid., P 57ra (1548–13S): (…) actus intelligendi (ut patet ex dictis) non se habet ad speciem ut lucere ad lucem, nec quantum ad hoc quod sit idem re cum specie, sicut lucere est idem cum luce, nec quantum ad hoc

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chapter three quod sit absolutus a transitu secundum rationem in obiectum exterius—, immo ex hoc ipso quod est actus elicitus a specie representativa rei, debet importare transitum in rem cuius est illa species, sicut in repraesentatum et cognitum.

[c] Hervaeus firmly rejects (his resoluteness on this score strikes the reader as unusual, as far as De quattuor materiis is concerned) Henry’s peculiar position about the inactivity of the active intellect with respect to the phantasm, while assuming its activity to the outside thing represented by the phantasm (called here res phantasiata): Ibid., P 57vb (15633–1573S): Quod vero postmodum addit de reductione nostri intellectus in actum, scilicet quod intellectus agens nichil agit circa fantasma nec circa speciem existentem in eo, sed circa rem fantasiatam—est mirabile dictu, quia actio qua intellectus agens agit circa rem fantasiatam, aut est realis, aut non. Realis esse non potest, quia in re exteriori que est fantasiata, nullus posuit aliquid reale causari, sive ab intellectu agente, sive a quacumque alia vi ad cognitionem pertinente. Si autem non est realis, tunc mirabile est quomodo res fantasiata, que secundum se non est nata movere intellectum possibilem, nulla reali immutatione facta circa ipsam vel circa eius fantasma, possit causare motionem realem sive immutationem realem intellectus possibilis qua movetur ad actum intelligendi.

3.4.5. Hervaeus on the general problem of intellective cognition Hervaeus’s discussion of the problem whether our intellect in its material condition is capable of grasping something intellectively (which is the subject matter of Henry’s Quodlibet IV, q. 1) leads our author to extensively go into the process of human intellective cognition. The relationship our intellect has towards things is examined from four different angles: first, its relationship to being in general; second, to universal being; third, to non-being, and finally, to particular being.49 a. How does the intellect relate to being in general? On account of the first issue, generally speaking (i.e. including the divine or the angelic intellect) the primary object of the intellect is being qua being; specifically, i.e. as far as our intellect in its material

49 Ibid., P 59va (16112–16S): “Ad evidentiam igitur maiorem huius questionis qua generaliter queritur utrum aliquid possit ab intellectu nostro intelligi, primo ostendendum est quomodo se habeat intellectus noster in intelligendo ad ipsum ens; secundo

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condition is concerned, the intellect’s primary object is sensible being, more precisely, the quiddity of sensible things: Ibid., P 59va (16117–19S): Quantum ergo ad primum sciendum quod obiectum primum et per se intellectus, generaliter accepti, est [Pc om. P] ens secundum quod ens; specialiter vero, per se obiectum intellectus nostri coniuncti est ens sensibile sive quidditas rei sensibilis.

The latter statement is supported by our use of the well-known abstraction process, owing to which in the acquired phantasm it is the nature or quiddity of the sensible object which is presented to our intellect. Notice, by the way, that Hervaeus here seems to speak of habitudo as an entity that constitutes something real between the phantasm and the intellect: Ibid., P 59vb (1626–12S): Quod autem primo et per se obiectum intellectus nostri coniuncti, secundum statum et cursum naturalem presentis vite, sit natura et quidditas rerum sensibilium patet sic quia: Per se obiectum intellectus nostri secundum statum presentis vite est quod possumus [possimus P] intelligere abstrahendo a fantasmatibus. Sed nichil potest nobis proponi in fantasmate nisi natura rei sensibilis, vel aliquid [Pc om. P] secundum aliquam habitudinem ad ipsam. Ergo primum et per se obiectum intellectus nostri secundum presentem statum est natura rei sensibilis, et quidquid intelligimus, vel est ipsa vel habens habitudinem ad ipsam.

b. How does it relate to universal being? The second issue, which concerns the nature of universal being, brings the author to an extensive discussion of universality, under two aspects, first the semantic aspect of representation and representativeness, the other the logical aspect of predication. It is mainly the latter aspect under which the universal is of our concern now.50 Two things should quomodo se habeat ad universale; tertio quomodo se habeat ad non-ens; et quarto quomodo se habeat ad particulare”. 50 Ibid., P 59vb (16213–22S): “Quantum vero ad secundum, scilicet quomodo intellectus se habeat in intelligendo ad universale, sciendum quod ‘universale’ tripliciter dicitur adpresens. [a] Uno modo secundum causalitatem, sicut sol dicitur causa universalis generabilium et corruptibilium. [b] Et secundum representationem, sicut si species existens in intellectu vel conceptus diceretur ‘universale’, quia videlicet representat aliquid commune multis. [c] Et secundum predicationem, sicut species et genus (puta ‘homo’ et ‘animal’) dicuntur universalia. De universali primo modo dicto nichil ad propositum. De universali autem secundo modo dicto non pertinet principaliter ad propositum, sed secundario, inquantum respicit universale tertio modo dictum, de quo principaliter pertinet ad propositum”.

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well be distinguished, that which universality is attributed to, and universality by itself. The former is a real thing (res vera) existing in the outside world, such as the nature of an animal, or an ox, or a man, whereas the latter is merely a rationate being (ens rationis), which does not bear on a real form being present in something as its substrate.51 What counts, then, is to realize that ‘natures’ have a twofold mode of being, one in particulars of the outside world, in which they are found as their substrates (subiective), the other in the intellect, i.e. objectively (litt. ‘qua put before’).52 A thing’s nature ‘being put before the intellect’ then happens in two ways (dupliciter obicitur intellectui). Either an agent affects something receptive of its action, viz. when, under the influence of the active intellect, something’s nature causes the possible intellect conceive a species, or perform an intellective act, or both of them. Or a nature puts itself before the mind as something cognized to the cognizer, when the intellect has come to actually know this nature, and in this case the nature is said to be in the intellect in the manner of an object (obiective).53 Now since universality means a sort of separation between a nature and its presence in a plurality of things, it is unthinkable that the nature that is really present in the outside particulars should be really separated from them and as a subsistent form be outside the intellect, or within the intellect as in its substrate like an inherent form,—because a subsistent nature cannot possibly be in some substrate, as it is also impossible that a species as it exists in the intellect qua substrate, befits the outside particulars—, therefore the universal is not identical with the intelligible species nor with the concept of the mind, which are

Ibid., P 59vb (16222–26S). Ibid., P 59vb (16226–34S): “Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod natura ipsa que intenditur adpresens, habet duplex esse. Unum esse habet in particularibus extra animam, in quibus est quasi subiective. Dico autem “quasi subiective”, quia natura substantialis completa comprehendens formam et materiam non est proprie in aliquo sicut in subiecto, tamen dicitur esse quasi subiective in particularibus inquantum in eis est realiter secundum modum cuiusdam forme se habens ad ea, utputa faciens ea formaliter talia entia, sicut humanitas facit formaliter Sortem esse hominem. Aliud esse habet talis natura in intellectu, et hoc obiective”. 53 Ibid., P 59vb (16234–39S): “Dupliciter autem obicitur hec natura intellectui. Uno modo sicut movens mobili, quando virtute intellectus agentis movet intellectum possibilem ad speciem vel ad actum intelligendi,vel etiam ad utrumque. Alio modo obicitur sibi sicut cognitum cognoscenti, quando scilicet intellectus iam eam cognoscit; et tunc dicitur esse in intellectu obiective, sicut parietem visum dicimus esse in prospectu videntis”. 51 52

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universal by representation, but are not so by predication. Therefore it is a thing’s nature in so far as it is in the intellect objectively that universality falls to. Briefly, universality does not mean something real, but only requires the real existence of the species or concept in the mind.54 Next Hervaeus is more specific about the nature of this sort of universal, claiming that it is, so to speak a state (quaedam conditio) of the thing grasped by the intellect, which may be compared to the temporal condition something is assigned to when verbs are used which put acts in a temporal context. Thus we get the following picture: What is intellected is a real thing of the outside world, which in so far as it is objectively in the intellect, the aforesaid universality falls to; and this universality consists in its being grasped apart from its individuating conditions. Besides, this state of universal being can also be focussed upon, and then it is merely rationate being (ens rationis).55 This contradistinction ‘nature really being in particulars’ against ‘abstract nature only objectively in the intellect’ is clear enough, but then the problem is that ‘that-some-real-nature-has-real-being-in-particulars’ seems inconsistent with ‘that-it-is-mentally-separated-fromthese-particulars’. In other words, how can the condition of (rationate) universality falling to a nature qua intellectively cognized go together with its real (particular) existence in the outside world? The problem is not so much the coexistence of these two alternative lines of thought. It is the reliability of our intellective cognition that appears to be undermined, given the fact that the intellect’s object seems to be the thing’s objective state in the mind, and not its real state in the outside world. However, Hervaeus insists that it is universality as a condition of the real-thing-qua-cognized that must be in the focus of our interest, rather than the abstract phenomenon of logical universality as such. So he is most explicit about his conviction that the primary object of the intellect is the thing’s real being in the outside world, rather than its objective being in the intellect. Apparently, he is confident that in recognizing the thing’s objective being (= ‘the real thing qua intellected’) we are in touch with the real thing qua intellected: Ibid., P 60rb (16332–1646S): Ex hiis potest patere quomodo ista duo stant, quod [quia Pc om. P] scilicet obiectum intellectus est res vera in rerum

54 55

Ibid., P 59vb (16239–1632S). Ibid., P 60rb (16321–31S).

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chapter three natura existens, et quod obiectum intellectus sive illud quod intelligitur est universale. Nam quando dicitur quod obiectum intellectus est universale, non est sic intelligendum quod semper consideratum principaliter ab intellectu sit universalitas (nisi quando considerat intellectus [Pc om. P] intentiones logicas prout dicitur universale secundo modo intelligendi). Sed est intelligendum primo modo, quia scilicet res vera que intelligitur, non intelligitur nisi cum tali modo sive cum tali conditione eam circumstante ex modo quo intelligitur, quia videlicet intelligitur separatim, ut sepe dictum est. Et quia “aliquam-naturam-realem-in-esse-reali-esse-inparticularibus” et “eam-separari-secundum-rationem-ab-eis” (separatim scilicet intelligi, illis non cointellectis) non repugnant, ideo non repugnant ista duo, scilicet quod obiectum intellectus sit universale, et tamen sit verum ens in rerum natura existens. Et quando dicitur quod omne ens reale est singulare, verum est in suo esse reali; et idem etiam ens reale, secundum esse obiectivum quod habet in anima, est universale et abstractum. Licet enim illud esse obiectivum sit esse rationis, illud tamen cui convenit est ens reale. Obiectum autem primum intellectus non est illud esse obiectivum, sed res cui convenit.

c. How does it relate to non-being? What is signified by terms referring to non-beings, such as ‘nothing’, can only be known by looking at beings. For there to be science, the reality of the main subject is required, not that of each and everything which comes up for discussion.56 Therefore this item can safely be dismissed. d. How does it relate to particulars? To answer the question about the cognition of particular beings, one should first make a distinction concerning particularity, similar to the one we have made about universality. On the one hand there is the abstract notion of particularity, on the other there is particularity taken as a condition or state or mode of being falling to the real particular thing qua cognized: Ibid., P 60va (16419–28S): Quantum autem ad cognitionem particularis sciendum quod sicut distinctum est de cognitione universalis, ita distinguendum est de cognitione particularis, nam dupliciter potest intelligi quod particulare cognoscatur. Uno modo quod [quia P] ipsa particularitas sit principaliter considerata et cognita; et sic intelligere particulare est intelligere universalem rationem particularitatis, et est intelligere univer-

56

Ibid. P 60va (1647–18S).

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saliter ipsam particularitatem. Alio modo potest intelligi quod particulare cognoscatur ab intellectu, non quod particularitas ipsa sit principaliter cognita sive intellecta, sed quia apprehenditur ut modus quidam circumstans rem intellectam, ita quod res intelligatur particulariter sive sub sua particularitate. Et sic etiam intelligitur particulare ab intellectu nostro, ut communiter ponitur.

Two arguments are brought in support of this view. First, our framing of a proposition such as ‘Socrates is a man’, which combines the universal ‘man’ with the particular, Socrates, testifies to the correctness of this view. Second, the sensitive appetite can only be controlled by the intellect if the latter has a grip on particular good and evil things and particular acts.57 Hervaeus is not certain, however, about the ins and outs of this procedure. It could be, he believes, that the particular phantasm has the key role in this cognitive process. He suggests that the intellect directly and primarily tends to the nature of the thing imagined, and secondarily to this medium in which it is represented, to wit the singular phantasm. Without referring to Aquinas or using his formula of conversio ad phantasmata, our author presents a similar solution to the problem as Aquinas did (“Et sic per talem determinationem ad phantasma cognoscit singulare in sua singularitate sive singulariter”).58 Two difficulties are bound to come up. For one thing, the species, like any other cognitive tool involved, is immaterial, whereas the singular is precisely characterized by its material conditions of being here and now etc. Therefore the intellect’s assimilation with the singular in its singularity is dubious. The other difficulty goes somewhat deeper. Are the universal and the singular grasped by just one intellective act? This seems impossible, for then the material conditions are grasped and set apart at the same time. Assuming that two different acts are required is equally untenable, because the intellect and the senses each have their own direct object.59 The first objection is easily countered by pointing out that the assimilation required concerns a conformity in representation, rather than in real being. The other objection is refuted by clarifying the position and role of the phantasm in the intellective process. The thing is that the individual material conditions are ruled out in the phantasm, but the condition of materiality is not. An additional objection is that the 57 58 59

Ibid., P 60va (16428–37S). Ibid., P 60va (16438–16513S). Ibid., P 60va (16514–34S).

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phantasm is always something particular and as such inaccessible to the intellect. Hervaeus replies that the intellect’s activity is not limited to the object qua represented by the phantasm, but also as something by itself, and this allows there to be just one intellective act.60

60

Ibid., p. 16535–16621.

chapter four THE INTENTIONALITY ISSUE BEFORE FAVERSHAM AND RADULPHUS BRITO

4.1. Aquinas on the basic items regarding intentionality With regard to the basic items concerning intentionality as they come to the fore in the later treatises on first and second intention, and the phenomenon of intentionality as such, we have to consider to what amount in Aquinas’s writings, the notions ‘(first and second) intention’ and ‘the proper subject of logic’ play a role. It seems useful to deal first with Aquinas’s treatment of the cognitional tools and devices that are in order whenever there is talk of intentionality and the proper task of the intellect. 4.1.1. On Aquinas formally distinguishing between the several cognitional tools and devices In De potentia Aquinas deals with the nature of the relationships between the Father and the Son in the Holy Trinity, which concern the divine intelligere. In this context, he also comes to speak extensively about the different elements of the intellection act in general. Whoever exercizes the act of intellection, he claims, may have a fourfold relationship, viz. to the [1] thing that is grasped by the intellect, [2] the intelligible species by which the passive intellect becomes actual, [3] his own intellectual act, and [4] the concept produced by the intellect.1 De potentia, q. 8, art. 1c: Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quattuor potest habere ordinem, scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem, qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus.

1 In the phrase ‘conceptio intellectus’ ‘intellectus’ is a subject’s genitive (‘the conception exsecuted by the intellect’).

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As is required by the subject matter of the present article, it is the differences between the fourth item and the three others that is now focussed upon in particular. The concept is said to differ from the thing grasped by the intellect, because [a] unlike the concept, this thing is occasionally2 extramental, and [b] the concept is related to the thing grasped by it as its end. It differs from the intelligible species, because the former is the principle of the act of intellection. Finally it differs from the intellectual act, because it is regarded as its terminus, and something that, so to speak, is constituted by the act, to wit the definitorial content of the thing grasped: Ibid.: Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. [1] A re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem; propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. [2] Differt autem a specie intelligibili, nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. [3] Differt autem ab actione intellectus, quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum; intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam.

In order to arrive at the subject proper of his exposition, namely the procession of the Son (‘Verbum’) from the Father, the author next proceeds to elaborate the idea of concept as an inner word. The concept, as the inner word, he continues, is signified by the external (spoken or written) word. The external word indeed neither signifies what is intellectually grasped itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the intellectual act, but the concept framed by the intellect through which as its intermediary the intellect directs itself towards the outside thing: Ibid.: Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie ‘verbum’ dicitur; hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur. Vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum neque speciem intelligibilem neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem.

After the intellection process has been described, Aquinas characterizes the inner verb shaped in human intellection. It is (unlike the Divine

2 Viz. in cases of human intellection, which in this article is only indirectly under examination; hence the use of ‘interdum’.

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Verb) not intrinsically linked up with the essence of the human intellect, but rather as an accidental feature, but this does not mean that it is extrinsic to the act of intellection itself, because the inner word is an essential constituent of intellection: Ibid.: Huiusmodi autem verbi nostri intellectus est quidem extrinsecus ab esse ipsius intellectus—non enim est de essentia, sed est quasi passio ipsius—, non tamen est extrinsecum ab ipso intelligere intellectus, cum ipsum intelligere compleri non possit sine verbo praedicto.3

In the Contra gentiles this situation is explained in more detail, including the different modes of being falling to the real thing in the outside world and its likeness in the intellect. In the divine, things are completely different: the Verbum Dei is a real Person, the Son: CG IV 11, nr. 3471b–c: Non autem sic est de verbo intellectus humani. Cum enim intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, aliud est esse intellectus et aliud ipsum intelligere; substantia enim intellectus erat in potentia intelligens antequam intelligeret actu. Sequitur ergo quod aliud sit esse intentionis intellectae et aliud intellectus ipsius, cum intentionis intellectae esse sit ipsum intelligi. Unde oportet quod in homine intelligente seipsum verbum interius conceptum non sit homo verus naturale hominis esse habens, sed sit homo intellectus tantum, quasi quaedam similitudo hominis veri ab intellectu apprehensa. Ipsum vero Verbum Dei, ex hoc ipso quod est Deus intellectus, est verus Deus habens naturaliter esse divinum, eoquod non est aliud naturale esse Dei et aliud Eius intelligere. (…). Verbum enim hominis non posset dici simpliciter et absolute ‘homo’, sed secundum quid, scilicet ‘homo intellectus’. Unde haec falsa esset ‘Homo est verbum’, sed haec vera potest esse ‘Homo intellectus est verbum’.

Further on in De potentia some of the aforesaid differences are mentioned again. First. What is grasped (‘intellectum’) is not entirely the same as the outside thing, because as merely potentially intelligible it is outside the intellect in act, despite the fact that the thing as grasped by the intellect is one with the intellect in act. Second. What is grasped by the intellect is as such not the same as the likeness (the intelligible species, that is) of the thing grasped, since the proper act of intellection is made possible by the species, and thus the species is rather the principle of intellection:

3 Cf. ibid., q. 9, art. 5c: “(…) in intellectu nostro aliud est intelligere et aliud est esse. Et ideo verbum conceptum in intellectu nostro cum procedat ab intellectu inquantum est intellectus, non unitur ei in natura, sed solum in intelligere”.

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chapter four De potentia q. 9, art. 5c: De ratione autem eius quod est intelligere est quod sit intelligens et intellectum. Id autem quod est per se intellectum non est res illa cuius notitia per intellectum habetur, cum illa quandoque sit intellecta in potentia tantum et sit extra intelligentem, sicut cum homo intelligit res materiales, ut lapidem vel animal aut aliud huiusmodi—cum tamen oporteat quod intellectum sit in intelligente et unum cum ipso. Neque etiam intellectum per se est similitudo rei intellectae per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum. Intellectus enim non potest intelligere nisi secundum quod fit in actu per hanc similitudinem, sicut nihil aliud potest operari secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod fit actu per aliquam formam. Haec ergo similitudo se habet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium (ut calor est principium calefactionis), non sicut intelligendi terminus.4

What is primarily intellected is that which the intellect within itself conceives about the thing intellected, no matter if this is what is expressed by the thing’s definiens or by a enunciation. Now this concept of the thing is called ‘inner verb’. It is precisely what is signified by the external verb, which signifies the intermediary concept through which cognition takes place, rather than what is intellected by itself, or the intelligible form that informs the intellect, or the act of intellection itself: Ibid.: Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio (secundum quod ponuntur duae operationes intellectus in III De anima). Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum dicitur ‘verbum interius’; hoc enim est quod significatur per vocem. Non enim vox exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem, ut cum dico ‘homo’ vel ‘homo est animal’.

In De spiritualibus creaturis, the aforesaid differences are assessed in a broader context, in which the Arab nomenclature is mentioned as well: De spirit. creat., art. 9, ad 6um: (…) res intellecta non se habet ad intellectum possibilem ut species intelligibilis, qua intellectus possibilis fit [sit Marietti] actu, sed illa species se habet ut principium formale quo intel4 Cf. Quodlibet V, q. 5, art. 2c: “Manifestum est autem quod omnis operatio intellectus procedit ab eo secundum quod est factus in actu per speciem intelligibilem, quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu. Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quae est principium operationis intellectualis, differt a verbo cordis quod est per operationem intellectus formatum—quamvis ipsum verbum possit dici forma vel species intelligibilis sicut per intellectum constituta, prout forma artis quam intellectus adinvenit, dicitur quaedam species intelligibilis”. See also what is said about the ‘intentio intellecta’ (= internal verb; see CG IV 11, nr. 3469) in CG I 53, nrs. 443–444, quoted section 2.3 above.

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lectus intelligit. Intellectum autem sive res intellecta,5 se habet ut constitutum vel formatum per operationem intellectus, sive hoc sit quidditas simplex, sive sit compositio et divisio propositionis. Has enim duas operationes intellectus Aristoteles assignat in III De anima.—unam scilicet quam vocat intelligentiam indivisibilium [indivisibilem Marietti], qua videlicet intellectus apprehendit quod quid est alicuius rei (et hanc Arabes vocant ‘formationem’ vel ‘imaginationem per intellectum’); aliam vero ponit, scilicet compositionem et divisionem intellectuum (quam Arabes vocant ‘credulitatem’ vel ‘fidem’).—Utrique autem harum operationum praeintelligitur species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus possibilis in actu, quia intellectus possibilis non operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu, sicut nec visus videt nisi per hoc quod est factus in actu per speciem visibilem, unde species visibilis non se habet ut quod videtur, sed ut quo videtur. Et simile est de intellectu possibili—nisi quod [= except for the fact that] intellectus possibilis reflectitur supra seipsum et supra speciem suam, non autem visus.6

4.1.2. The notion and connotation of ‘intentio’. Its role in cognition Aquinas is quite familiar with the basic connotation of the word ‘intentio’.7 It refers to the tendency existing between the cognitive act and its object. For one thing, it seems nearly synonymous with the cog-

5

As is plain from the context, ‘res intellecta’ here indicates the thing qua intellected. At STh I, q. 55, art. 1 ad 2um (text quoted in section 9.3, n. 565), the difference, both in sensitive and in intellective cognition, between the faculty and the species or likeness (similitudo) is emphasized. 7 STh I–II, q. 12 art. 1c: “(…) intentio, sicut nomen ipsum sonat, significat in aliud tendere”; cf. In II Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3c. In fact, more than once Aquinas uses the word ‘intentio’ to designate sensible or intelligible species by which sensorial or intellective cognition is accomplished, and the different kinds of intention occasionally occur in his other works as well. E.g. STh I, q. 76, art. 3 ad 4 (intentiones logicas); q. 78, art. 3c (intentiones sensibiles, intentiones universalium); ibid., art. 4 c, and In Arist. II De anima, nr. 396 (intentionum individualium, intentionum universalium); ibid., q. 81, art. 3c (intentiones individuales/ individualium, intentiones sensibiles); ibid., q. 85, art. 2 ad 2, and art. 3, ad 4, and In Arist. II De anima, nr. 378; 380 (intentio universalitatis); In II Sent. dist. 19, q. 1, art. 3 ad 1 (intentio sensibilis); Quaestio disp. de anima, q. unica, art. 11, ad 14 (intentio communis); In I Sent., dist 2, q. 1, art. 3c; ibid., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 3c, and dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1 ad 3, and In III Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, quaest. 1c (nomen primae intentionis); CG, II, 73, nr. 1510 (intentio particularis); De veritate q. 10, art. 5 ad 2 (intentio singularis); ibid., q. 13, art. 3c (intentio cognoscitivae partis); cf. In I Sent. dist. 3, q. 4, art. 5c and ad 3, and Quodlibet VII, q. 1, art. 2c (intentio cognoscentis); De potentia q. 7, art. 9c (intentio generis et speciei); cf. In I Sent., dist. 33, art. 1 ad 3.—As for the general use of ‘intentio’ in Aquinas, the interesting study by Simonin (1930) is still worth reading. He presents (456–460) a useful survey of its use in cognitional contexts. One of Simonin’s other merits is his underlining (448–450) of Aquinas’s awareness that any kind of intentional being is quoddam esse incompletum or esse diminutum. 6

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nizer’s attention or mental direction to the object,8 for another, it signifies the likeness of the object cognized. The latter sense, which is the common one, is relevant to our present purpose. In sensorial as well as in intellective cognition the object qua cognized is indicated by the term ‘intentio’.9 In the latter case, the label ‘intentio intellecta’ is the favourite one. In the Contra gentiles, it is distinguished from the intelligible species, insofar as in the context of the intellection process the species, in its capacity of being the principle of the intellective operation, informs the intellect and reduces it to act, whereas the intention acts as the term or end of the operation; however both the intention and the species are a representative likeness of the object: CG I 53, nr. 444: Haec autem intentio intellecta cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium, licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo.

The process is explained elsewhere. In the intellect’s potential state, the likenesses are present as dispositions, whereas when they are actually ‘intellected’ (grasped), they are in the intellect as perfective forms, which make the intellect become identical with the thing intellected (qua intellected, that is). The go-between in the process, so to speak, is the intention: Quodl. VII, q. 1, art. 2: In intellectu in habitu sunt similitudines intelligibilium ut dispositiones. Sed quando sunt actu intellectae, sunt in eo ut formae perficientes; et tunc intellectus fit omnino res intellecta. Et hoc contingit per intentionem, quae coniungit intellectum intelligibili.

In Contra gentiles IV 11, the nature and function of the intentio intellecta is described in more detail. There it is said to be a likeness of the object known which is conceived within the intellect. Being different both from the outer object and from the intellection taken by itself as 8 De veritate, q. 13, art. 3c: “Ad actum cuiuslibet cognoscitivae potentiae requiritur intentio. (…); intentio autem unius non potest ferri ad multa simul, nisi forte illa multa hoc modo sunt adinvicem ordinata ut accipiantur quasi unum”. 9 E.g. STh I–II, q. 22, art. 2c, where he talks about an intention acting in sensation: “Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem secundum quod in seipsa est, sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum”; cf. ibid., ad 3. Other instances: STh I q. 78, art. 3c; I–II, q. 5, art. 6, ad 2; I–II q. 37, art. 4, obi. 1; In II Sent. dist. 19, art. 1, q. 3 ad 1; In IV Sent. dist. 44, art. 2. q. 1. 3c and 3, q. 1. 3c: In II De anima, lect. 14. (nrs 399–426)—In e.g. CG I 53, nr. 443, Aquinas speaks of an intellective intention: “(…) intellectus per speciem formatus intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius quam significat definitio”.

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a psychic entity,10 it is a certain likeness, conceived of the thing that is the object of the intellection, to wit, the likeness or representative entity signified by the words used. The latter are called ‘outer words’ to distinguish them from the intention itself, which, accordingly, is called ‘inner word’: CG IV 11, nr. 3466: Dico autem “intentionem intellectam” id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res que intelligitur, neque est ipsa substantia intellectus. Sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio “verbum interius” nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum.11

Next, the twofold difference is explained in terms of the difference between grasping an outside thing and grasping the inner intention by which this thing is grasped. This is because (unde) the same applies to knowledge: some forms of knowledge concern outside things, while others are about intentions. In a similar way it is clear that the intention does not coincide—in us, unlike God, in whom it does—with the intellect itself, since the intention’s being is simply ‘being intellected’, whereas as far as our intellect is concerned—again, unlike God’s Intellect—its being is not identical with its actual acts of intellecting: Ibid.: Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur, unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus et aliae de intentionibus intellectis. Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit, non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere. 10 Aquinas is fully aware of the distinction between a sensorial or intellectual sign taken as just a psychic entity in the soul and taken in its significative function. As for this distinction concerning ‘imago’ taken as a sign—which in Aquinas only occurs outside the strictly epistemological context—see e.g. STh III, q. 25, art. 3c, where the corresponding different considerations (motus animae) are distinguished; cf. ibid. II–II, q. 103, art. 3 ad 3. See also Imbach & Putallaz (1993), 77–79. 11 Cf. CG IV 11, nr. 3473: ‘Est autem de ratione interioris verbi quod est intentio intellecta, quod procedat ab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi terminus intellectualis operationis: intellectus enim intelligendo concipit et format intentionem sive rationem intellectam quae est interius verbum’; ibid., nr. 3474: “Verbum autem interius conceptum est quaedam ratio et similitudo rei intellectae”; De veritate q. 4, art. 1, ad 9: “Constat enim quod interius verbum significat omne illud quod intelligi potest, sive per essentiam sive per similitudinem intelligatur. Et ideo omne intellectum, sive per similitudinem sive per essentiam intelligatur, potest verbum interius dici”.

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However, different as they are, in some way there is a form of identity between the intention and the object known. In the person who intellects, what is intellected is what is called ‘the intentio intellecta’ and the ‘inner word’.12 That these differences and the samenesses are able to go hand in hand is then clarified by Aquinas. There are distinct modes of being in order, one that of natural being, the other of what is called elsewhere ‘intentional being’,13 two modes of being which are mutually opposed as physical being and mental being or being conceived of, respectively. What is meant here is clarified by contradistinguishing a real man and a man conceived of by intellection, or the inner word, ‘man’: CG IV 11, nr. 3471c: Verbum enim ‘hominis’ non posset dici simpliciter et absolute homo, sed secundum quid, scilicet ‘homo intellectus’.

4.1.3. The twofold foundation of conceptions upon Reality. The notion ‘cum fundamento in re’ The term ‘second intention’ does not occur frequently in Aquinas. However, he is quite at home with the difference between two kinds of concepts which corresponds to that between first and second intention. This appears from what he says on account of the different ways in which our mind proceeds in knowing the outside world. To begin with, there are three important discussions in his commentary on the Sentences in which Aquinas deals with the different ways in which the outside things can be conceived of and named. In apprehending things, he says, reason acts in a threefold way. Sometimes a thing is apprehended that exists in reality in the way in which it is apprehended, e.g. when the form of a stone is apprehended. Sometimes a thing completely non-existent is apprehended, e.g. a chimaera. And sometimes, something is apprehended that possesses a nature, but not the one according to which it is apprehended. The latter happens when e.g. the concept of a substantial genus14 (intentionem generis substantiae) is apprehended, while in reality this is a nature 12 CG IV 11, nr. 3469: “Intellectum autem in intelligente est intentio intellecta et verbum”. Cf. the passage quoted above from Quodl. VII, q. 1, art. 2. 13 STh I q. 56, art. 2 ad 3; q. 67, art. 3c (where the author talks about the esse intentionale of the colour of a wall in sensorial cognition); cf q. 78, art. 3c, where Aquinas speaks of esse spirituale of a colour in an eye. 14 I.e. a generic concept in the category of substance. Or should we render this phrase: ‘the concept of the category, Substance’?

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that as such is not determined to this or that species; in fact, then, reason assigns to this apprehended nature the notion of generic commonness which in reality does not belong to the object apprehended. This process bears on a mode of being according to which the object is present in the apprehending intellect. From all instances in which the aforesaid nature is found, the apprehending intellect takes one common feature: In I Sent. dist. 30, art. 1, q. 3 solutio: Ratio in intellectu rerum tripliciter se habet. Quandoque enim apprehendit aliquid quod est in re secundum quod apprehenditur, ut quando apprehenditur forma lapidis; quandoque vero apprehendit aliquid quod nullo modo in re est, ut quando quis imaginatur chimaeram vel aliquid huiusmodi; aliquando autem apprehendit aliquid cui subest in re natura quaedam, non tamen secundum rationem qua apprehenditur. Sicut patet quando apprehendit intentionem generis substantiae, quae in re est natura quaedam non determinata secundum se ad hanc vel ad illam speciem. Et huic naturae apprehensae, secundum modum quo est in intellectu apprehendente, qui ex omnibus accipit unum quid commune in quibus invenitur natura illa, attribuit rationem generis, que quidem ratio non est in re.

In a previous distinction, Aquinas discusses the semantics of this epistemological picture. Nouns, he says, signify three different kinds of things. Some of these things are completely (i.e. according to their complete mode of being) outside the mind, to wit, ‘complete beings’, such as man and stone. Others have only mental existence, such as an image from a dream or a mental picture of a chimaera. Still others do have a foundation in extramental Reality, but, in addition, have a formal mode of being which comes to it through the mental operation alone, as is evident in the universal. Thus, ‘humanity’ does have real existence, but in Reality it does not possess the ontic aspect of universality, because outside the mind there is not a humanity-that-is-shared-by-a-multitude;15 in so far as humanity is conceived in the intellect, an intention is added to it through the operation of the intellect after which it is called a species: In I Sent. dist. 19, art. 5, q. 1 solutio: Eorum quae significantur nominibus invenitur triplex diversitas. Quaedam enim sunt quae secundum suum esse totum completum sunt extra animam; et huiusmodi sunt entia completa, sicut homo et lapis. Quaedam autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio chimaerae. Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum 15

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chapter four rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae; ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis, sed secundum quod concipitur [scripsi; accipitur Moos] in intellectu, adiungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species.

In distinction two of the same Book, the semantic and epistemological points of view are taken together. Unlike distinction 19 just referred to, in which the classes of entities signified by names (i.e. the significata) are under examination, in the present distinction the diverse relationships between the concepts and the things in Reality are in the focus of interest. Thus it is concepts which are divided according to their (significate’s) being founded in Reality. Some conceptions of the intellect have an immediate foundation in the extramental world. Others possess only a remote foundation in Reality, in that, although their immediate foundation is merely in the intellect, they do convey intentions which ultimately are based in the real things, since these intentions follow from the ways in which the real things are conceived of by the intellect. The latter type includes not only intentions of generality and particularity, but also intentions of other logical devices following from our way of grasping things, such as mathematical abstraction and the like. The third class of concepts contains the ones whose significate has no single foundation in the external world, neither immediate nor mediate or remote, because it does not refer to an extramental reality, nor does it follow from our conceptual engineering concerning some natural thing: In I Sent. dist. 2, art. 1, q. 3 solutio: Ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. [1] Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine ‘homo’. Et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re16 immediate, inquantum res ipsa ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur. [2] Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen, non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam. Et huiusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit, sicut significatum huius nominis ‘genus’ non est similitudo alicuius rei extra animam existentis, sed ex hoc quod intel16

Notice the occurrence of the expression ‘fundamentum in re’.

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lectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis. Et huiusmodi intentionis, licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis quae consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum, et huiusmodi. [3] Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimaerae, quia neque est similitudo alicuius rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam naturae. Et ideo ista conceptio est falsa.

A similar line of thought is found in a passage of De potentia: De potentia, q. 1, art. 1 ad 10: Intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus, reflexus supra ipsum, considerat illud. Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, idest mediante intelligentia rei. Verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis aliis speciebus; ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit eam ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus, sed intelligentiae ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res.17

As is clear from the foregoing texts, Aquinas is fully aware of what is elsewhere called the distinction between nouns of first and second intention. In fact, his distinction between (nouns signifying) concepts

17 Cf. Pot. q. 7, art. 6cA (in which second intentions are called ‘intentiones intellectuales’): “Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet. Sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in seipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt, sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei et aliarum intentionum intellectualium, nam nihil est in rebus quae sunt extra animam cuius similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei—(litt. ‘for in the extramental things, there is nothing of such a nature that [note the use of the consecutive subjunctive mood, sit] it is a likeness of what precise a genus or species is’)—. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus, quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in seipsum reflectitur: sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas. Et sic, sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam, ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio cui respondet res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi, sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet solum res intellecta”. Cf. ibid., q. 1, art. 1 ad 10 (quoted section 2.2 ad fin.), and q. 7, art. 9c, quoted p. 54, n. 23.

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with an immediate foundation in the outside world and those which only are remotely founded in it, precisely covers what is conveyed by the pair ‘first vs. second intention’.18 4.1.4. On the explicit distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ in Aquinas The later distinction between first and second intention is alluded to in De potentia, where what is primarily intellected (primo intellecta) is opposed to what is secondarily intellected (secundo intellecta). The former are the extramental things, the latter the intentions that follow our conceptual engeneering: De potentia, q. 7, art. 9c: Primo [prima perperam ed.] enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secundo [secunda perperam ed.] autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi; haec [hoc ed.] enim secundo intellectus intelligit inquantum reflectitur super seipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit.

Aquinas’s use of the terms ‘prima intentio’ and ‘secunda intentio’ is peculiar in three respects.19 First, he still uses them only in conjunction with the word ‘nomen’. Second, almost all occurrences of the pair ‘nouns of first vs. second intention’ are in a theological context Knudsen has a point when he says (1982, 481) that Aquinas provided a much more detailed and systematic treatment of intentions than Roger Bacon had done. This observation might wrongly suggest, however, that in order to designate the entities of the cognitional areas, Aquinas uses the ‘first vs. second intention’ device as explicitly as Bacon does. When in his Quaestiones In IV Metaph. he deals with a threefold distinction between modes of abstraction, Bacon defines the second mode as the abstraction of an intention from a thing which belongs to the domain of physics, where intentions such as ‘man’ and ‘horse’ are set free from singulars. Bacon’s third mode is the abstraction of an intention from an intention, which concerns the recognition of second-order relationships existing between intentions of the aforesaid type, and, accordingly, this mode belongs in the domain of logic. “Triplex est abstractio. Quaedam est abstractio rei a re, et hoc modo de ipso [sc. ente] in mathematicis determinatur, cum abstrahantur res mathematicae a sensibilibus; de quibus sunt scientiae mathematicae. Alia est abstractio intentionis a re, et sic de ipso ente determinatur in physicis, unde haec intentio ‘homo’ vel ‘lapis’ a particularibus abstrahitur; de quibus in physicis determinatur. Tertia est abstractio intentionis ab intentione; et hoc modo de ipso determinatur in logica, unde dicitur quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Unde super istas intentiones primas homo, asinus, et huiusmodi fundatur hec secunda intentio quae est species. Et similiter dicendum est de genere et de aliis universalibus de quibus est logica. Unde in logica determinatur numerus universalium, quia 5 sunt, sed non in naturalibus”. 19 See Schmidt (1966), 123, n. 90. 18

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in which the distinction between the terms ‘individuum’, ‘singulare’, ‘particulare’, ‘suppositum’, ‘persona’, and ‘hypostasis’ is in the focus of interest. Third, the logical formula ‘nouns of first or second intention’ is frequently used in juxtaposition to the grammatical one ‘nouns of first or second imposition’.20 The second feature comes to the fore whenever problems of trinitarian theology are under examination; these problems will be discussed in our next section. The subsequent quotation contains the only occurrence I know of in the writings attributed to Aquinas in which, outside the context of trinitarian theology he speaks about the opposition between nouns of first and second intention. The author discusses the ‘predication’ of what he calls ‘nomina intentionalia’, such as those indicating genera and species, and in the usual way these universals are opposed to nouns signifying the suppositum or substrate of natural things: De natura generis, cap. 6, nr. 525: Ad huius igitur evidentiam considerandum est quod nomina primae intentionis sunt quae rebus sunt imposita absolute, mediante conceptione qua fertur intellectus super ipsam rem in se, ut ‘homo’ vel ‘lapis’. Nomina autem secundae intentionis sunt illa quae imponuntur rebus non secundum quod in se sunt, sed secundum quod subsunt intentioniquam intellectus facit de eis, ut cum dicitur ‘Homo est species’, ‘Animal est genus’. Quia igitur in rerum natura invenitur quod essentia rei a supposito differt non solum secundum operationem intellectus sed in natura sua—ut docetur septimo Metaphysicae [VII 6, 1031b28–32]—, ideo res naturae est nomen primae intentionis impositum ipsi supposito. Sed quia per actum intellectus super ipsam naturam designatam per modum totius efficiuntur nomina intentionalia (ut ‘species’ et ‘genus’), ideo super rem naturae inveniuntur nomina intentionum, utputa ‘suppositum’, quod est nomen secundae intentionis ipsius rei, inquantum per actum intellectus fit praedicatio speciei de re naturae. Et ideo res naturae vocatur suppositum, cum preadicatum sit superius naturaliter ipso subiecto. Inquantum vero genus et species dicuntur universalia, res naturae dicuntur particulares.

This text is remarkable indeed, not from the doctrinal point of view, but for its terminology. The label ‘nomina intentionalia’ (used to stand for nouns of second intention) is found nowhere else in the authentic writings. The same holds for the phrase ‘per modum totius’, which is used for what is elsewhere expressed by the formula ‘per completum esse’. In general, the text completely lacks the manner of expression found in all other parallel passages. I tend therefore to agree with 20

For examples see Schmidt ibid.

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Mandonnet21 that De natura generis is spurious. If this assessment is correct there is no single exception to the rule that Aquinas always uses the labels ‘first and second intention’ in conjunction with ‘nouns’. 4.1.5. The role of ‘intentio’ in Aquinas’s trinitarian theology As was stated before, the pair ‘nouns of first vs. second intention’ occurs in Aquinas only when he discusses the different intentions concerning the notions individuum, singulare, suppositum, hypostasis, and the like. In particular in contexts of trinitarian theology in which the use of persona in divinis is under examination. Even in this context, however, the ‘first vs. second intention’ issue itself does not play a prominent role. At In I Sent. dist. 23, q. 1, art. 3c, Aquinas first discusses the various opinions about the meaning of the word ‘persona’.22 Some regard it as an equivocal noun, others as a univocal one. The first group includes, to begin with, those who ascribe the word’s equivocity to its different uses in the course of history: before the rise of heresy it signified the Divine Essence as distinct from other essences; thereafter, it signified in the singular essence, in the plural relation; after Boethius it only signifies relation, both in the singular and in the plural. This position is rejected by Aquinas. Other adherents to the equivocity thesis assign the word’s manifold senses to its proper meaning, and simply state that ‘persona’ sometimes bears on essence, sometimes on hypostasis, sometimes on a property. On this account, Aquinas remarks that it is not a matter of ‘either-or’, because these meanings are all included in the proper meaning of ‘persona’. A third group considers the word’s different senses a result of its being combined with another word; when taken by itself, it means substance, whereas joined to a numerical term, it has a relational sense. This position cannot get Aquinas’s approval either. The adherents to the univocity thesis have different positions as well. Some of them say that the only meaning of ‘persona’ is substance in the sense of hypostasis or prima substantia, but, to Aquinas’s mind, this precludes the word from having a relational sense which is required 21 Pierre Mandonnet O.P., Des écrits authentiques de Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Fribourg (Suisse) 1910, p. 150, no 92, where Cajetanus, De subjecto naturali philosophiae, ad fin.) is quoted: “(…) tractatum illum forte numquam vidit sanctus Thomas. Stylus enim eius non est; et multa ibi sunt quae doctrinae ejus non consonant.” (see Opuscula ed. Lyon 1587, p. 211). 22 Compare the extensive discussion in STh I, q. 29, artt. 1–4 and in De potentia, q. 9, art. 4c A-F.

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to allow it to be used in the plural. Others are of the opinion that ‘persona’ signifies both substance and relation, one primarily, the other secondarily; this group mutually disagree, some of them saying that relation is the primary sense, and substance the secondary one, whereas their rivals see it the other way round; still others think the word contains two primary meanings, viz. substance and property, but they in turn disagree about the semantic relationship between these two meanings. Aquinas proposes to screen all these different positions and proceeds to sift the wheat from the chaff. He starts from the definition saying that ‘persona’ signifies an individual substance. Next he states that an individual can be signified in a twofold way, viz. either by a noun of first intention or by a noun of second intention. When it is signified by a noun of second intention, like the noun ‘individuum’ or ‘singulare’, it conveys the concept of being an individual (intentio singularitatis), rather than a singular thing, whereas when an individual is indicated by a noun of first intention, a thing is signified to which the concept of individuality is added. Now ‘persona’ is such a noun of first intention; it indeed signifies a thing itself, but including the notion of individuality. As far as the word ‘persona’ is used to stand for a divine Person, it signifies precisely that which is distinct in the Divine Nature.23 Next, this notion of distinctness is elaborated to determine the differences exist23 In I Sent. dist. 23, q. 1, art. 3c (ll. 67–101 ed. Busa, Opera omnia, cum hypertextibus in CD-Rom, Milano 1996) “(…) ut videatur quid veritatis sit in singulis opinionibus et in quo deficiant, videndum est quod ‘persona’ (ut dictum est ubi supra) significat individuam substantiam. Sed individuum dupliciter potest significari. Vel per nomen secundae intentionis, sicut hoc nomen ‘individuum’ vel ‘singulare’, quod non significat rem singularem, sed intentionem singularitatis; vel per nomen primae intentionis, quod significat rem cui convenit intentio particularitatis. Et ita significatur hoc nomine ‘persona’; significat enim rem ipsam cui accedit intentio individui. Secundum hoc ergo dupliciter possumus loqui de significatione ‘personae’: vel per se, scilicet quid hoc nomen ‘persona’ secundum se significet; vel per accidens, secundum quod accipitur in tali vel in tali natura. Per se quidem significat substantiam intellectualem individuam, quaecumque sit illa et qualitercumque individuetur. Si autem accipiatur persona humana, significat hoc quod est subsistens in tali natura, et distinctum tali distinctione qualis competit naturae humanae, scilicet per naturam determinata. Et sic loquimur hic de significatione ‘personae’ prout dicitur Persona Divina, et secundum hoc significabit hoc quod est distinctum existens in natura divina. Ut ergo videamus quid sit ibi distinctum et quomodo sibi competat ratio personae, notandum est quod secundum necessitatem fidei, quae in Deo tres et unum confitetur, oportet ponere aliquid commune, secundum quod sunt unum, et aliquid proprium, quod est distinguens, ex qua distinctione sunt tres. Et illud commune est essentia vel natura divina prout significatur nomine divinitatis; et illud distinguens est relatio, ut paternitas”.

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ing between the divine Persons. In the extensive semantic discussion which follows about the relationships between the various labels used in trinitarian theology (‘deus’, ‘deitas’, ‘pater’, ‘paternitas’ etc.), on the one hand, and the ratio personae, on the other, the distinction between the pair ‘noun of first vs. second intention’ is no longer considered, let alone that, like in later days, with a Peter Auriol or a Girald Odonis, the distinction is regarded as significant enough to insert an extensive discussion of all the ins and outs of the problem of intentionality. In the parallel passages in the Summa theologiae I, qq. 29 and 30, the well-known definition of person given by Boethius in his De duabus naturis (“persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia”) is discussed. In one of the objections the difference between nomen rei and nomen intentionis is adduced, and it is claimed that by putting the noun ‘individuum’ (which is a nomen intentionis) in the definition of person (which is a nomen rei), Boethius inflicts the rule that a noun that stands for an intention, should be used in a definition of something real, like a person is.24 In his reply to this objection (Ad tertium), Aquinas exculpates this use of ‘individuum’ by remarking that sometimes a nomen intentionis is used to indicate a real thing, to wit, when a corresponding nomen rei is not available. This applies, he claims, to the word ‘individuum’ when it comes to designate a particular substance’s property of subsistence.25 In the next question, which deals with the problem whether the designation ‘person’ is a common name and so can be attributed to each of the three divine Persons alike, the initial answer is in the negative, because only the divine essence is common to the three divine Persons, whereas ‘persona’ (when it is used in the nominative case) does not indicate the essence. In his determination, Aquinas claims that, when we speak of ‘tres Personae’, it is not a real commonness that is involved (as was already shown in the commentary on the Sentences; see above). The question then which kind of commonness is actually at stake is answered in different ways. Some take it as one of nega24 STh I, q. 29, art. 1 init.: “Praeterea, nomen intentionis non debet poni in definitione rei; non enim esset bona assignatio si quis diceret ‘Homo est species animalis’, ‘homo’ enim est nomen rei et ‘species’ est nomen intentionis. Cum igitur ‘persona’ sit nomen rei—significat enim substantiam quandam rationalis naturae—, inconvenienter ‘individuum’, quod est nomen intentionis, in eius definitione ponitur”. 25 Ibid.: “(…) nomina intentionum possunt accipi ad definiendum res, secundum quod accipiuntur pro aliquibus nominibus rerum quae non sunt posita. Et sic hoc nomen ‘individuum’ ponitur in definitione personae ad designandum modum subsistendi qui competit substantiis particularibus”.

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tion, because the word ‘individuum’ connotes incommunicability, as was stated in the previous question (art. 3, ad 4). Others are of the opinion that the commonness is based on this word being a nomen intentionis, comparable to the commonness of being an animal to horse and bovine animal.26 Aquinas rejects both answers, since ‘persona’ is a nomen rei. He explains the unmistakable commonness of the term ‘persona’ in terms of a logical commonness falling to a so-called individuum vagum,27 which, to his mind, is different from the logical commonness belonging to genus or species: unlike ‘persona’, the latter signify things according to their common essential nature. But expressions referring to an individuum vagum, like ‘aliquis homo’, indicate the common essence including the object’s particular mode of being that makes it distinct from other individuals (and thus, as it were, qualifies the commonness). Now ‘persona’ is used to signify a thing, rather than in its capacity of sharing its essence with other persons, only in so far as it is something subsistent, distinct from the others.28 In De unione Verbi incarnati, we find a similar discussion of the nature and status of the Divine Persons, the Son in particular. Discussing the ‘first vs. second intention’ issue in the context of attempts of some the26 STh I, q. 30, art. 4 c: “Qualis autem sit communitas, investigantes diversimode locuti sunt. Quidam enim dixerunt quod est communitas negationis, propter hoc quod in definitione personae ponitur ‘incommunicabile’. Quidam autem dixerunt quod est communitas intentionis, eoquod in definitione personae ponitur ‘individuum’, sicut si dicatur quod esse speciem est commune equo et bovi. Sed utrumque horum excluditur per hoc quod hoc nomen ‘persona’ non est nomen negationis neque intentionis, sed est nomen rei”. 27 Simon of Faversham defines (Notulae in Petri Hispani Tractatus I, p. 88) individuum vagum (which is opposed to individuum signatum) as “illud [sc. individuum] quod est eiusdem communitatis cum sua specie, sicut ‘aliquis homo’ convertitur cum ‘homine’”. See de Rijk (1968), 88. 28 STh I, q. 30, art. 4c: “Et ideo dicendum est quod etiam in rebus humanis hoc nomen ‘persona’ est commune communitate rationis, non sicut genus vel species, sed sicut individuum vagum. Nomina enim generum vel specierum (ut ‘homo’ vel ‘animal’) sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas naturas communes, non autem intentiones naturarum communium quae significantur his nominibus ‘genus’ vel ‘species’. Sed individuum vagum, ut ‘aliquis homo’, significat naturam communem cum determinato modo existendi qui competit singularibus, ut scilicet sit per se subsistens distinctum ab aliis. (…). Hic [hoc ed.] tamen interest quod ‘aliquis homo’ significat naturam, vel individuum ex parte naturae, cum modo existendi qui competit singularibus. Hoc autem nomen ‘persona’ non est impositum ad significandum individuum ex parte naturae, sed ad significandum rem subsistentem in tali natura”. Cf. In III Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, solutio 1, nrs. 21–22 Moos, p. 223 f., and ibid., nr 23, where the semantic difference between ‘persona’ and ‘individuum’ is discussed in terms of the distinction between particulare in genere substantiae and particulare in quolibet genere, respectively.

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ologians to evade the Nestorian heresy by putting in Christ one person and two hypostases, Aquinas rejects such evasions and explains that there is in Christ only one hypostasis or suppositum. The extensive argument is underscored by showing the semantic behaviour of the nouns pertaining to individuation, regardless of whether they are of first imposition, like ‘persona’ and ‘hypostasis’, which signify the individual things themselves, or of second imposition, such as ‘individuum’, ‘suppositum’ and the like, which signify the intention of individuality.29 4.2. The discussions about ‘persona’ in some later authors. A survey As is clear from the preceeding section, the discussion proper of the trinitarian problem concerning the Divine Persons is not affected by the sort of controversies about the ins and outs of the general problem of intentionality that later on played such a decisive role in the discussions about first and second intention. Like Aquinas, the majority of authors between Aquinas and, say, Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, only confront us with the simple choice between the two horns of the trinitarian dilemma ‘Is “persona” said of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit a noun of first or second intention?’. It will suffice to insert here a short survey of the answers given by some authors immediately after Aquinas.30 4.2.1. Giles of Rome The Sentences commentary by Giles of Rome (1247–1316) is extant in several manuscripts and a printed edition (Venice 1521; reprint Minerva Frankfurt 1968). In 1287 Giles was made the official teaching doctor

29 De unione Verbi incarnati, q. unica, art. 2c, p. 427a–b: “Ut igitur sciri possit quid in talibus concedendum sit et quid negandum, considerandum est quod nominum ad individuationem pertinentium—sive sint nomina primae impositionis (sicut ‘persona’ et ‘hypostasis’), quae significant res ipsas, sive sint nomina secundae impositionis (sicut ‘individuum’, ‘suppositum’ et huiusmodi), quae significant intentionem individualitatis—quaedam eorum pertinent ad solum genus substantiae, sicut ‘suppositum’ et ‘hypostasis’, quae de accidentibus non dicuntur, et ‘persona in rationabili natura’ (…), quaedam vero pertinent ad individuationem in quocumque genere, sicut ‘individuum’, ‘particulare’ et ‘singulare’, quae etiam in accidentibus dicuntur”. 30 See also Decker (1967), 499–501.

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of the Augustinian Order and in 1292 he became the order’s General. Recent research suggests that he lectured on the Sentences before 1271, although he did not receive the master’s degree until sometime between 1285 and 1287, as a result of the investigation into the orthodoxy of 51 articles taken from his commentary on I Sent. Giles made an ordinatio version of his In I Sent. (around 1271–1273) and of In II Sent. (not finished before 1309). The printed edition contains the ordinatio version of his In I Sent.31 In the first Book, dist. 25, q. 1 (edition, p. 134B ff.) it is asked if in Divinity, ‘persona’ is a nomen commune. First, this is denied. But considering the fact that it is said of a plurality of things, it must be a common noun. In the corpus quaestionis Giles adheres to the latter view, and proceeds with a discussion of this community. He claims that because ‘persona’ = ‘hypostasis’ bears on subsistence, it is not, properly speaking, a common noun, but with regard to its modus significandi it resembles the common character of ‘man’ or rather the indeterminate ‘some man’ (aliquis homo). However, since the ratio communitatis only indirectly falls to hypostases, we are not able to assign any proper mode of commonness to ‘persona’. The second question is about the cognate problem whether in Divinity ‘persona’ is something universal. This seems to be the case, fot it is being said of a plurality of things. However, any universal contains instances which are really different in number, meaning that they each have their own particular nature. With regard to the Divine Persons things are different. In fact, only the first of the four conditions required for being genuinely universal (‘being said of a plurality of instances’; ‘being plurified in them’; ‘being in any of its instances subsistently’; ‘having in any of them a different mode of being’) obtains. Therefore persona is not, properly speaking, a universal. The third question is about Boethius’s definition of persona (“persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia”). Giles remarks that this definition adequately falls to human beings, somewhat less adequately to angels; it can only applied to the Divine Person by extending its meaning, e.g. by interpreting individuality in terms of incommunicability. Richard of St. Victor’s remedy is referred to anonymously: “Ad secun-

31 I owe all this information, as nearly all other information about the other writers of Sentences commentaries discussed in this section to the extensive survey in Russell Friedman (2002), 55 ff.

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dum et ultimum dicendum quod diffinitio Boetii corrigitur a quodam doctore 3o de tri. c. 22 quod est intellectualis nature incommunicabilis existentia sive subsistentia. Et isto modo anima proprie non est persona, et sic sibi diffinitio persone data ab eodem non convenit. Large tamen potest dici persona, licet improprie tamen”. All things considered, Giles is basically agrees with Aquinas, and likewise rejects the view of those who regard ‘persona’ as a noun of second intention, putting this word on a par with ‘individuum’, which is indeed commonly taken as a noun of second intention. To Giles, the name ‘person’ must be a noun of first intention since it immediately signifies a real Person. 4.2.2. John of Paris The Black Friar John of Paris (John Quidort, who was born probably in 1250 or 1254, and died 1306), long recognized as a defender of Aquinas as well as an original thinker,32 is mainly known for his important contribution to Medieval political thought (De potestate regia et papali) and his corrections of William of La Mare’s Correctorium (containing itself ‘correctives’ to the doctrine of Aquinas), rather than for his commentary on the Sentences.33 Quidort lectured on the Sentences in Paris (between 1284 and 1286) as a bachelor of theology. Only his commentary on the first two Books of this work have thus far been edited.34 The work is a reportatio of another series of his Parisian lectures, which took place between around 1292–1295. In 1302 he wrote his aforementioned celebrated work on papal and royal power, and in 1303 he was (like his Dominican colleage Hervaeus Natalis) among the signatories of the appeal (dated June 16) directed to the Coucil called by Philip the Fair against Pope Boniface VIII. His teaching on the Eucharist was censured twice (ca. 1285 and in 1304–1305). In the 1280’s he managed to justify himself before the Master General of the Order, but on the second occasion he was censured by four bishops and deprived of his license to teach and preach. He appealed directly to Pope Clement V

32 For the life and works of this important representative of the Early Thomist School in France see Roensch (1964), 98–104, and 275–289. 33 See Friedman (2002), 57–58. 34 Jean de Paris (Quidort) O.P., Commentaire sur les Sentences. Réportation, Livres I–II, éd. J.P. Muller O.S.B. (Rome 1961–1964). Muller also presents an exemplary Introduction to his edition (pp. IX–XL).

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for judgment, but he died in 1306 in Bordeaux, where he was awaiting the pontiff’s decision. Quidort did not become a master of theology until two years before he died. In the second question of his In I Sent., dist. 23, John deals with the problem of the precise meaning of ‘persona’: Does it signify substance (essence) or relationship? The former horn of the alternative (with some qualifications) is argued for (p. 2491–25030) by referring to Boethius, St. Augustine, Peter Lombard, and Richard of St. Victor. Next, the author first refers (25031–25159) to some moderni (Henri of Ghent, Summa, art. 53, qq. 4 and 5, and Giles of Rome, In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 3, could be meant) who assert that the noun ‘person’ conveys relationship. After discussing (25160–25292) Aquinas’s view of the matter, John basically joins him by showing the specific meaning the word ‘persona’ has among the different nouns we use to speak about the Divine Nature: ‘persona’ indicates a relationship taken in its subsistency (“relationem per modum substantiae”): In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, p. 252103–253107: Unde advertendum est quod sunt quaedam nomina in divinis quae significant puram essentiam (sicut ‘deus’ et ‘divinitas’), quaedam quae significant puram relationem (sicut ‘pater’ et ‘paternitas’), quaedam quae significant substantiam per modum relationis (sicut ‘potentia generandi’), quaedam relationem per modum substantiae, ut ‘persona’.

Finally, John refers to Aquinas (cf. De potentia, q. 9, art. 4c) in support of his own view: Ibid., 253108–122: Aliter ostendit idem [= Aquinas] hanc eandem veritatem sic. Dicit enim quod significatum alicuius rei per nomen potest importari dupliciter. Uno modo ut importetur per nomen significatum suum formale; et hoc modo hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat illud quod dicit sua diffinitio; unde significatum suum formale est ‘animal rationale mortale’. Alio modo ut per ipsum nomen importetur suum materiale significatum super quod radicatur et fundatur formale significatum; et sic ‘homo’ significat aliquid habens cor, epar, et cerebrum. Ita hoc nomen ‘persona’ significat suppositum distinctum in natura intellectuali, et in divinis ‘persona divina’ significat suppositum distinctum in natura divina; et hoc est formale significatum ‘personae divinae’. Sed quia suppositum non distinguitur in divinis nisi penes relationem originis, ideo ‘persona divina’ quasi materialiter significat relationem; sicut quia ‘animal rationale mortale’, quod est formale significatum ‘hominis’, non est sine epare, corde, et cerebro, ideo etiam ‘homo’ quasi materialiter significat habens cerebrum et cor et epar.

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The reader will be struck by John’s intelligent and creative interpretation of what Aquinas in De potentia presented as his solution to the semantic problems surrounding ‘persona in divinis’.35 In the first question of dist. 25, John asks whether in Divinity ‘persona’ signifies something common. The answer (263,8 ff.) is in the affirmative with some qualification. The commonness, he says, is merely a communitas rationis, not a communitas rei. But what is ‘rationate commonness’? Some are of the opinion that the mode of being common assigned to ‘persona’ is only per modum negationis, in a similar way as ‘non-homo’ is common to goats and asses, and so ‘persona’ is incommunicable, and not a universal either, properly speaking.36 Others think of intentional commonness,37 in the way being a genus is common to animal and plant, and being a species to man and ass. Consequently, ‘persona’ is a noun of second intention, a position held by theologians who, as usual, refer to the Boethian definition of ‘persona’ (“per-

35 Aquinas, De potentia, q. 9, art. 4c F: “Sed sciendum quod aliquid significatur [significat Marietti] dupliciter, uno modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. Formaliter quidem significatur per nomen id ad [ad id Marietti] quod significandum nomen est principaliter impositum; quod est ratio nominis, sicut hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat aliquid compositum ex corpore et anima rationali. Materialiter vero significatur per nomen illud in quo talis ratio salvatur, sicut hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes sine quibus non potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod hoc nomen ‘persona’ communiter sumpta nihil aliud significat quam substantiam individuam rationalis naturae. Et quia sub ‘substantia individua rationalis naturae’ continetur substantia individua— idest incommunicabilis et ab aliis distincta—tam Dei quam hominis quam etiam angeli, oportet quod ‘persona divina’ significet subsistens distinctum in natura divina, sicut ‘persona humana’ significat subsistens distinctum in natura humana. Et haec est formalis significatio tam ‘personae divinae’ quam ‘personae humanae’. (…). Distinctum vero incommunicabile in natura divina non potest esse nisi relatio, quia omne absolutum est commune et indistinctum in divinis. Relatio autem in Deo est idem secundum rem quod eius essentia. Et sicut essentia in Deo idem est et habens esse essentiae (ut Deitas et Deus), ita idem est relatio et quod per relationem refertur. Unde sequitur quod idem sit relatio et distinctum in natura divina subsistens. Patet ergo quod ‘persona’ communiter sumpta significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturae; ‘persona vero divina’ formali significatione significat distinctum subsistens in natura divina. Et quia hoc non potest esse nisi relatio vel relativum [= a determinate relational being’], ideo materiali significatione significat relationem vel relativum. Et propter hoc potest dici quod significat relationem per modum substantiae, non quae est essentia, sed quae est hypostasis. (…)”. 36 Op. cit., 264,12–19; Muller refers to William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, cap. 4, q. 2. 37 That is to say, in terms of nomination or appellation, rather than signification (p. 26422: “Alii dicunt quod nominat aliquid commune secundum intentionem”). For the impact of this technical difference see below.

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sona est naturae rationalis individua substantia”).38 Subsequently, John refers (264, 30 ff.) to others, who claim, as Aquinas did,39 that this word is a noun of first imposition, not of second intention, and, accordingly, designates something to which ‘intentio’ may be assigned. This is explained as follows. There is a twofold rationate commonness, one that is properly universal, such as man is with regard to Socrates and Plato; the other rather has a connotation of particularity, in the way aliquis homo is common to them. The latter commonness is that of an indeterminate individual (individuum vagum). A noun signifying an indeterminate individual conveys a common nature together with the determinate mode of being that belongs to singulars to underline their distinctness. Its counterpart is the determinate individual, such as in the use of the noun ‘Socrates’, this flesh and these bones are indicated, quite unlike the case of universal nouns like ‘man’ and ‘animal’, which convey the common natures without any determinate mode of being.40 Then John makes clear to what extent the semantic position of ‘persona’ can be compared to that of ‘aliquis homo’.41 In the case of the Divine Persons, the rationate commonness of ‘persona’ boils down to the fact that each of them subsists in the Divine Nature, but as a person who is distinct from the others: Ibid., p. 26541–49: Modo ‘persona’ significat essentiam divinam sub ratione alicuius incommunicabilis, scilicet cum modo essendi qui debetur composito; unde habet virtutem individui vagi. Hoc autem interest quod ‘aliquis homo’ significat individuum ex parte naturae cum modo significandi qui competit singularibus, hoc autem nomen ‘persona’ non est impositum ad significandum individuum ex parte naturae, sed ad significandum rem existentem in tali natura. Hoc est commune secun-

38 Op. cit., 264,22–29; e.g. Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quattuor libros Sententiarum I, dist. 25, 2 e. 39 Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, art. 3; STh I, q. 30, art. 4; q. 39, art. 1. 40 Op. cit., 26430–26540: “Alii dicunt quod ‘persona’ non est nomen secundae intentionis, sed nomen primae impositionis; unde significat aliquid cui intentio convenire potest. Est enim duplex communitas secundum rationem: una universalis in se (sicut communitas ‘hominis’ ad Sortem et Platonem), alia magis particularis in se, sicut ‘aliquis homo’ est communis ad Sortem et Platonem. Et ista est communitas individui vagi. Unde ‘individuum vagum’ [i.e. a noun or phrase signifying an individual in an indeterminate way] significat naturam communem cum determinato modo essendi qui competit singularibus, ut scilicet sit per se distinctum ab aliis; individuum autem signatum significat ipsum determinatum, distinctum et distinguens, sicut in nomine ‘Sortis’ significantur haec caro et hoc os. Illud autem cui convenit universale (sicut ‘homo’ et ‘animal’) significat naturam communem absque determinato modo essendi”. 41 Cf. Giles of Rome; section 4.21.

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chapter four dum tationem Personis Divinis ut unaquaeque earum subsistat in natura divina, distincta ab alia. Et secundum hoc persona est commune Divinis Personis sicut individuum vagum.

Next, some objections are put forward (26550–72), to the effect that observing the well-known logical supposition rules, you will see that they suggest that the Divine Essence is numerically different in the three Persons, like being a human numerically differs in the diverse supposits of ‘aliquis homo’. Finally, this view is opposed to the alternative view that ‘persona’ ‘nominates’ (or ‘appellates’) what is intentionally common. Unlike signification, nomination concerns the indication of instances or instantiations of a common nature signified by a common noun, such as the singular, Socrates as an instance of man, or his manhood as an instantiation of manhood. Now instances are properly supposited for, whereas instantiations are primarily signified. Using the distinction between signification and supposition, you can say that the noun of an intention is sometimes used to both signify and supposit for the intentional being it conveys, while on other occasions it signifies it without suppositing for it. Thus in ‘Individual is an intention’ intention (read, the instantiation, ‘intentional being’) is both signified and (supply, ‘this instance of intentional being’ is) supposited for; but using the intention ‘individuum’ in the proposition ‘Socrates is an individual’, the instantiation, individuality is signified, but the concrete individual (i.e. the instance of individuality), Socrates, is supposited for: Ibid., p. 26673–79: Aliqui42 tamen dicunt quod ‘persona’ nominat commune secundum rationem per modum intentionis, quia sicut est communitas ‘individui’ ad Sortem et Platonem, ita est communitas ‘personae’ ad Patrem et Filium. Sed nomen intentionis [= a noun signifying an intention] aliquando intentionem significat et supponit (sicut cum dicitur ‘Individuum est intentio’), aliquando vero eam significat, sed non supponit, unde aliud significat et aliud supponit (sicut cum dicitur ‘Socrates est individuum’).

Applying now this line of thought to the ‘persona’ problem, in the expression ‘Person is something incommunicable’ the noun ‘person’ both signifies and supposits for the intentional being it conveys, whereas in ‘The Father is a person’—which equals ‘The Father is the one to whom being a person belongs’—one thing (sc. paternity) is signified, and another thing (sc. the person of the Father) is supposited for: 42

Muller (1961–1964) refers to Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 53, q. 5, n. 35.

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Ibid., p. 26679–82: Ita ‘persona’ intentionem significat et supponit, sicut cum dicitur ‘Persona est aliquid incommunicabile’; aliquando vero aliud significat et aliud supponit, ut cum dicitur ‘Pater est persona’, idest ‘Pater est cui convenit esse personam’.

Thus with regard to the utmost complex meaning of ‘persona in divinis’ a well-balanced semantic picture seems to be obtained, comparable to the one argued for by Aquinas. However, not everyone is happy about this interpretation of ‘persona’ as a noun of second intention. John refuses to take sides, and instead he leaves it up to us: “Et ideo, teneatis quod vultis”. In the second question of the same distinctio, John deals (pp. 26696– 26725) with the parallel question of whether the noun ‘Trinity’ signifies substance (essence) or relationship. The easy answer ‘both and’ calls for the further question ‘but which of them primarily?’ (p. 2663–6). Aquinas (In I Sent., dist. 24) and others opted for ‘primarily essence, secondarily relationship’, claiming that the word in the nominative case signifies essence, and in the oblique cases relationship. Others went the other way round. Understandably, John wonders what to think of this (p. 267: “Quid istorum est verius?”). This time he makes his choice, and opts for the latter view, because the former seems to imply the false propositions ‘Pater est trinus’, ‘Filius est trinus’. 4.2.3. William of Ware Another author who refuses to resolutely opt for either the first or the second intention as candidate for characterizing the semantic nature of ‘persona’ is William of Ware (Guillelmus Guarro). We know basically nothing about him, neither when he was born nor when he died. The tradition has it that he was Scotus’s teacher,43 but he is never referred to as magister in the extant sources, but only as inceptor.44 It seems that William read the Sentences at least twice, once at Oxford around 1295, and then at Paris at a later date. In recent days especially Ludwig Hödl has been instrumental in confirming just how central a role William 43 Ms. Vienna Lat. 1424 (saec. XIV), f. 169v: “(…) Varronis qui fuit magister Scoti sive doctoris subtilis”. See A. Daniels O.S.B., ‘Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Wilhelm von Ware und Johannes Duns Scotus’ in Franziskanische Studien 4 (1917), [217–238], 222, n. 1. Daniels throws light on certain parallels between William and Scotus on account of the scientific status and the proper object of theology. 44 Friedman (2002), 63–65. Again, all informations have been taken from Friedman’s survey and the literature referred to by him.

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of Ware played in setting the theological agenda of both Franciscan and Dominican theologians in the first decade of the fourteenth century.45 Father Daniels showed (op. cit., 225–229) remarkable (often textual) resemblances between William and Henry of Ghent on account of God’s infinity and the limitation of human knowledge. In his first question on I Sent., dist. 2346 (“Utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen secunde intentionis vel prime”), William presents an exposition of the two above-mentioned rival views, including the respective supportive arguments. After a short digression on a threefold division of significative nouns (cap. 10), the author sets out to question the stringency of the arguments put forward by adherents to either position, without taking sides however. In the second question William transfers the problem to the question whether the noun ‘persona’ signifies a substance or a relationship. He chooses the latter view, because this noun derives from a relational property (cap. 24). Once again the author qualifies his choice, by cautiously arguing (cap. 26) that ‘persona’ signifies only an indeterminate relationship, and that in Divinity it primarily designates an intentional relationship, then the composite of the Divine Essence and the relational property (including this property taken from the formal point of view), and thirdly the Divine Essence itself. 4.2.4. James of Metz A contemporary theologian is James of Metz. We are basically in the dark about James’s life, and are even unable to explain why he was called Metensis, and whether or not he was officially a magister. From the text of the copies we have extant of his Sentences commentaries we can gather that James read the Sentences twice, and there is some circumstantial evidence for the conjecture that the first lecture took place around 1300–1301, and the second around 1302–1303.47 According to Bruno Decker,48 James discusses the first vs. second intention issue about ‘persona’ only in the first redaction of his commentary on the Sentences, which is only preserved in Ms. Troyes, Bibl. Comm. 992; for 45 Ludwig Hödl, ‘Literar- und problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Sentenzenkommentar des Wilhelm von Ware O.M. (nach 1305)’ in RTAM 57 (1990) [97–141], 106–122. 46 For the text see Appendix A. 47 Friedman (2002), 69–70. See also the important study in Köhler (1971), 17–31. 48 Bruno Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Munster Westfalen 1967, p. 493.

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the text see our Appendix B.49 The question is divided into three articles. The first discusses the common answer in the affirmative as presented by William of Ware; the second clarifies the distinction between first and second intention, the third contains James’s evasive standpoint. James prefaces (capp. 2–3) his treatment of the question proper by a short discussion of an opinio falsa to the effect that ‘persona’ is a noun of second imposition or intention, which is based upon a division of nouns that strongly resembles the one we came across in William of Ware’s treatment of the question (see Appendix A, cap. 10). Remarkably enough, James does not judge this opinion (cap. 3) on its own merits, as we will see. Instead his critique is confined to the semantic views the opinio falsa is based upon. Let me start our treatment of James’ discussion by quoting his account of the position held by the quidam, to the effect that ‘persona’ is a noun of second imposition or intention:50 In I Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, capp. 3–4: Circa primum sciendum quod quidam dicunt quod nomen ‘personae’ est nomen secundae impositionis vel intentionis. Ad cuius evidentiam praemittunt quandam distinctionem nominum. Dicunt enim quod [1] quaedam sunt nomina quae significant pure rem (ut ‘Sortes’, ‘Plato’ et nomina significantia substantias particulares), [2] quaedam vero significant primam intentionem (ut significantia secundas substantias homo, animal, quia significant substantiam universalem, quae non habet esse nisi in intellectu et intellectione [intentione Decker]),[3] alia sunt nomina significantia intentiones logicas ab intellectu factas (ut esse genus et speciem etc.).

Thus the theologians under discussion countenance the following division of significative nouns: [1] nouns merely indicating individual (particular) things themselves, e.g. proper nouns like ‘Socrates’, or expressions like ‘this man’ [2] nouns signifying a first intention, e.g. those indicating the secondary substances man or animal, which are used to stand for uni49 For this manuscript see Köhler (1971), 34; 40–43; 46–51 The text of In I Sent., dist. 2–48 (ff. 34va–68rb) is preceded by the Additiones (7ra–25vb). The complicated relationship between the three ‘redactions’ is discussed in Köhler (1971), 52–65. I have made use of Decker’s transscription (494–498, nn. 4–13) of I, dist. 25, q. 1, taken from the copy found in Troyes, Bibliothèque communale, cod. 992 (saec. XIII–XIV; see ibid., 13), ff. 50vb–51rb. There exists also a revised edition of the first redaction (Köhler ibid., 32– 36). 50 For the text see Appendix B; the punctuation and the division into chapters are mine.

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versal substances, which only have being in the intellect (and in the intellection accomplished by it) [3] nouns standing for logical intentions made by the intellect, such as the notions ‘genus’ and ‘species’, which indicate logical relations between concepts and the things signified by these concepts in so far as they are signified by the latter. It is by making use of this division that the theologians under discussion prove their thesis that ‘persona’ is a second intention syllogistically by claiming that like the noun ‘individuum’ signifies a second intention, so does ‘persona’, which indicates an individual of an intellectual nature:51 Ibid., cap. 5: Tunc dicunt quod nomen ‘personae’ est nomen secundae intentionis. Et hoc probant quia: ‘Individuum’ significat secundam intentionem. Sed ‘persona’ dicit quoddam individuum in genere intellectualis naturae. Ergo etc.

James does not reject either the conclusion as such, or the two premisses, which only bear on nouns of second intention. He merely refutes the claim expressed by the second member of the division, in which it is said that universal nouns like ‘man’ and ‘animal’ which indicate universal substances only existing in the mind, are nonetheless first intentions. Whoever subscribes to this claim, James objects, can extend it to primary substances as well. The author presents two arguments to support his objection. First. Of anything grasped by it, the intellect can build second intentions, including those founded upon primary substances, because primary substances are among the things grasped by the intellect, and, therefore, they, too can be considered according to the logical way in which they are conceived of, and this observation produces second intentions. Second. Nouns bearing on secondary substances either signify a thing—and then they are not different from nouns bearing on primary substances—, or they signify an intention. Now this can only mean that they precisely signify an intention—but this is not true, because in that case sentences such as ‘Man is white’ would be false (since intentions are not white!)—, or that they signify that which underlies the intention, to wit the thing itself, but in that case the previous difficulty returns. James concludes that their distinc-

51 According to the famous definition presented by Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init; cf. cap. IV init. Notice that the generic term ‘individuum’ covers animals, trees and stones as well.

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tion of significative nouns is useless, although, he concedes again, their conclusion is perhaps sound enough: Ibid., cap. 6: Quidquid sit de conclusione—que forte vera est—, tamen distinctio eorum non est bona. Non enim est verum quod nomina significantia secundas substantias significent primam intentionem, quia eodem modo hoc potest dici de nominibus significantibus primas substantias.

As for the identification of the quidam, the division of significative nouns resembles that given by William of Ware, and should not be ascribed to Henry of Ghent, as Decker did.52 In his discussion of their opinion, James alludes to the fundamental distinction between intentio and res subiecta intentioni (illud quod substernitur intentioni), which he applies to both first and second intentions: Ibid., cap. 7: Nomina secundarum intentionum vel significant rem (et sic non distinguuntur a nominibus primarum substantiarum), vel significant intentionem. Quod non potest intelligi nisi dupliciter. Uno modo quod significent precise intentionem; quod falsum est, quia tunc esset falsa ‘Homo est albus’, et similes. Vel significant illud quod substernitur intentioni; et hoc non est aliud quam ipsa res; et sic redit primum. Non igitur valet distinctio, licet forte valeat conclusio.

In the second article, James puts forward his own view of the distinction between first and second intention. To this end he first explains the three different uses of the words ‘intentio’ and ‘intentionale’. They are used in a threefold way. If (I) ‘intentionale’ is the counterpart of ‘reale’ it indicates what is entirely dependent upon a mental operation. Using these words in this sense, a sensible or intelligible species are not intentional, nor are the mental operations themselves, because [a] species are perfections of a real sensorial or intellectual faculty, and [b] even if there were no intellect, a white body would still produce a species in a medium, and this would, of course, be something real outside the mind. (II) In its second sense, ‘intentionale’ is the counterpart of ‘naturale’ (the latter taken to be a synonym of ‘physical’ or ‘corporeal’). In this sense of the word, a species or form of, say, white or black is an intentional or spiritual entity; unlike physical entities, such contrary species can be in one and the same thing simultaneously. (III) Finally, 52 Decker (1967), 495 wrongly identified those quidam as the circle around Henry of Ghent, and referring (1967, 495) to the latter’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, a. 53, q. 5, 64 H I, where indeed a similar text is found. In fact, James’s text shows more affinity with the report given by William of Ware, who, for that matter, often copies complete sections from Henry of Ghent with only small adaptations.

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there is a third sense of ‘intentio’ and ‘intentionale’ in which it has the connotation of being directed to something else as its ‘representative’. In this sense, someone’s image can be called intentional being, because it directs itself towards something else, viz. the thing represented by it. In this way too a species is congruously called intention, since it directs one’s attention to an outside object—this despite the fact that as a psychic entity, it is a real thing by itself (taking the aforesaid sense I, that is): Ibid., capp. 8 and 10–11: (…) sciendum primo quod intentionale quandoque distinguitur contra reale. Et sic accipiendo ‘intentionale’ illud est intentionale quod nichil est nisi secundum aliquam operationem intellectus. Unde hoc modo species in medio (ut species coloris) vel in organo vel in intellectu, vel operatio intellectus non sunt intentiones vel intentionalia. (…). Aliter dividitur intentionale contra naturale. Et hoc modo species est aliquid intentionale vel spirituale. Secundum enim esse naturale duo contraria non possunt esse simul. Et ideo cum species albi et nigri simul possint esse in eadem parte medii, huiusmodi species non habent esse naturale in medio, sed spirituale vel intentionale. Aliter et tertio dicitur intentio vel intentionale quod tendit in aliud ut representativum eius, ut imago beati Nicolai posset dici intentionale ens, quia tendit in aliud. Et hoc etiam modo species congrue dicitur intentio, quia tendit in obiectum, quamvis sit res vera.

Clearly, sensible and intelligible species are intentional entities in the second and third senses of the word. Thus James distinguishes three aspects of any cognitional species. [a] As a real psychic entity (sense I), it really inheres in a cognitive (sensorial or intellective) power; [b] while being something psychic, its (real) mode of being is spiritual (or intentional), rather than natural or extramental, and [c] at the same time, this real psychic entity can also be called intentional in its capacity of being representative of (‘being directed towards’) an object. Next James states three things (capp. 12–14): [1a] Whatever is intellectively grasped, has objective being (‘est obiective’) in the intellect, and [1b] certain modes of being such as universality, particularity and abstractivity fall to things grasped in so far as they are grasped. In addition one should know, he says, that [2] just as the property of being the intellect’s object (esse obiectum intellectus) does not put anything real in the thing grasped, but merely a rationate53 relationship (viz. between the intellection and extramental thing), likewise the aforesaid modes of being do not either; they rather establish a rationate relationship 53

For the neologism ‘rationate’ (Schmidt) see p. 76, n. 84.

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(e.g. esse intellectum or esse representatum), and [3] the intellect not only directs itself towards the things grasped, but also bends itself backwards (‘reflects’) on its own act and the aforesaid modes of being falling to the things grasped in so far as they are grasped. We are now in the right position to understand what is a first and what a second intention. From the foregoing observations it is clear, James goes on, how we should define first and second intention. A first intention is the thing itself which is directly presented to the intellect as its proper object, as a result of which procedure it obtains a kind of logical or rationate being, namely a logical relation. The modes of being accompanying the thing in precisely its capacity of being grasped by the intellect are constitutive of a second intention. James adds a series of examples of second intention, among which not only the general mode of being intellected and represented, but also modes implying logical relationships like being a genus or species, and being abstracted or concrete; all of these have, qua its modes, a necessary relationship to the thing once it is intellected: Ibid., cap. 15: Ex hiis patet quod prima intentio est ipsa res que directe obicitur intellectui ut obiectum proprium; per quod acquirit quoddam esse rationis, scilicet relationem rationis. Secunda autem intentio sunt modi consequentes rem intellectam secundum quod intellectam, esse intellectum, representatum, esse particulare, universale, genus, species, abstractum, concretum etc., quia hec omnia necessariam habent habitudinem ad rem preintellectam ut modi rei preintellecte.

Finally, it is patently clear, the author concludes, what precisely the difference is between nouns of first intention and those of second intention. Nouns of first intention signify extramental things, either qua particulars (such as ‘Socrates’) or qua universals (such as ‘man’ or ‘animal’), whereas nouns of second intention signify the cognitional modes of being that fall to the thing grasped qua grasped by the intellect: Ibid., cap. 16: Ex hiis patet manifeste distinctio inter nomina prime intentionis et secunde. Nam nomina prime intentionis significant res ipsas— vel particulariter (ut ‘Sortes’), vel ut universale (ut ‘homo’, ‘animal’). Nomina vero secunde intentionis significant modos consequentes ipsas res intellectas (ut genus, species etc.).

The present discussion winds up with the third article of Dist. 25, dealing with the correct answer to the initial question whether ‘persona’ is a noun of first or second intention. First, the opposite view of some theologians who take this noun for one of first intention, is rather extensively criticized. They bring forward three arguments: [a] unlike

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nouns of second intention, ‘persona’ indicates a real thing, as also appears from its etymology and its original uses, viz. for a horrific mask (larva), an excellent person, or, in general, any authoritative person; [b] all teachers of theology54 use ‘persona’ to stand for a real substance or a real relationship, which rules out that they take it for a second intention; [c] Boethius’s well-known definition of person implies that it is a kind of substance, which is also incompatible with being a second intention.55 Others are of the opposite opinion, taking the noun ‘persona’ as a noun of second intention. They show up with two arguments: [1] It is impossible to found a second intention upon this supposedly first intention (‘persona’); so it must be itself a noun of second intention, since any first intention potentially underlies a second intention; [2] ‘persona’ is an equivalent of ‘individuum’ and ‘suppositum’, which both are nouns of second intention. They are fair enough to agree that in common parlance these nouns sometimes occur as subjects of real predicates. Finally, James replies to the arguments profferred by the opposite parties. Both Koch and Decker observed that in answering to some oppositions brought forward against the respective positions, James does not properly take sides. Koch thinks that James is too cowardly to reject the common opinion, whereas Decker sings the praises of James, who was upright enough not to make a pertinent choice between two rival positions he considered equally defensible.56 James’s final observations are indeed rather irresolute, and are to make his initial favourable attitude towards William of Ware’s position seem rather gratuitous. However this may be, on behalf of those who adhere to the view of ‘persona’ as a noun of first intention, he counters the objection made by their opponents by claiming that although the universal applicability of the common noun ‘persona’ is a logical feature, the commonness of For this use of ‘doctor’ in Paris see Weijers (1987), 145 ff.; Teeuwen (2003), 77. Cf. In I Sent. (Additiones), dist. 23, q. 1: “Primum est videre unde impositum est hoc nomen ‘persona’. Dicit enim Boethius Libro de duabus naturis quod nomen ‘personae’ dicitur a per se sonando, quia antiquitus histrio, volens aliquem commendare, faciebat larvam personare vel resonare. Et ideo larva quae videtur resonare, primo vocata est persona, postea ille qui faciebat eam resonare, postea ille pro quo resonabat, postea habens aliquam dignitatem in ecclesia, ut personatus a ‘persona’ dicitur; postea autem quaelibet substantia rationalis individua. Sic ergo secundum Boethium persona proprie est substantiae (!) rationalis individua substantia. (…). Ideo est alia opinio quae dicit: persona non dicitur a per se sonando, sed dicitur a per se unitate quasi per se una, quia substantia quae per se est una, per se existit” (17vb), taken from Decker (1967), 504 f., nn. 28 f. 56 Koch (1929/30), 219 f.; Decker (1967), 498. 54 55

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being a person is not purely logical, for taken by itself, persona is not a common thing; and therefore this noun is still one of first intention. The adherents to the opposite view also find their mouthpiece in James. On their behalf he qualifies their opponents’ use of the Boethian definition of person, making clear that ‘persona’ does not signify an intellectual first substance in an absolute sense, but rather an individual falling under the notion of rational or intellectual substance; now ‘individual’ belongs to the area of second intention.57 Overviewing James’s discussion of the phenomenon of intentionality, it is plain that [1] he is well aware of the three aspects belonging to a cognitional tool such as a species (viz. [a] real psychic entity, [b] having an intentional = spiritual mode of being, [c] being also intentional in its capacity of ‘tending to something else’) [2] he is familiar with the basic distinction between ‘intention’ and ‘thing underlying an intention’ [3] he has the common view of the ‘first vs. second intention’ issue [4] he is of the opinion that the logical modes falling as second intentions to the things cognized should be interpreted in terms of necessary relationships between these modes and the thing cognized. 4.2.5. Hervaeus Natalis Hervaeus Natalis was a celebrated Dominican philosopher and theologian in France. He was a Breton, born around the middle of the thirteenth century in the diocese of Treguieris. Already a mature man, and presumably already in the possession of a master of arts degree, Hervaeus entered the Order, possibly in the Dominican convent at Morlaix. His presence at St. Jacques in Paris around 1303 is confirmed by his being mentioned among the signatories of the appeal to the council called by Philip the Fair against Pope Boniface VIII. As early as 1301, he served as a definitor at the Provincial Chapter held in Rouen. He was a prolific author, and the list of his writings suggests that he discussed all the important questions which arose in the earli57 ‘Ad rationem in oppositum: tenendo partem oppositam, dicendum quod “persona” non significat primam substantiam intellectualem absolute, sed individuum in rationali vel intellectuali substantia; individuum autem ad intentionem secundam pertinet’ (ibid.).

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est controversies surrounding Thomism. Roensch rightly observed (107) that the period of Hervaeus’s writings coincides with his careers both as a teacher and as Master Provincial, and his scientific commitment extended throughout his career as Master General of the Order, until his death. Hervaeus is commonly supposed to have read the Sentences at Paris shortly after 1300 (probably in 1202–1203).58 However, Stella has drawn (1959, 135; 170) our attention to a passage of the first Book where Hervaeus explicitly refers to the discussion of the meaning of the verb ‘esse’ found in his tract De materia de ente et essentia, part of his work De quattuor materiis. Some more evidence for the anteriority of De quattuor materiis seems to occur in the second Book.59 One of the manuscripts of De quattuor materiis (Vat. Lat. 859) contains (fol. 22r) two notes saying that Hervaeus wrote this work as a bachalaureus parisiensis,60 and by the aforesaid self-references the anteriority of De quattuor materiis to (at least) the definitive redaction of the Sentences commentary is evidenced. This much is certain, Hervaeus was a magister regens in theology in Paris in 1307–1309, and again in 1316–1318.61 The written ordinatio of his commentary on the fourth Book of the Sentences was probably worked into its present form (which is found in two early printed editions) in 1309 or later, when Hervaeus was already head of the Dominican province of Francia.62 I think, there is reason enough to date the text of the Sentences commentary as we have it extant not earlier than 1308.63

58 Friedman (2002), 69; see also Decker (1967), 73 and 499–500, and the extensive bibliography of Hervaeus by Ag. De Guimaraes O.M. Cap. (1938), 5–81. See also Roensch (1964), 106–117. 59 In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 1: “Et hoc sufficiat ad presens quantum ad istum articulum, quia locutus sum diffuse de hoc alibi”. Cf. the references to De materia de specie et intellectu in In II Sent., dist. 17, q. 2, artt. 1–3, and dist. 3, q. 4, artt. 2–4 (Stella 1959, 135), and section 3.41 above. 60 One note regards De intellectu et specie: ‘Determinatio hervei bachalaurei parisiensis ordinis predicatorum contra magistrum henricum de gandavo’, the other is to De essentia et esse in creaturis: ‘Determinatio hervei bachalaurei parisiensis contra gand.’. For the title Determinationes contra Henricum de Gandavo see the contemporaneous manuscript Paris, BNF Lat. 3157. The determinatio was a scholastic exercise which in the Parisian Arts faculty, from the 13th. century onwards was a prerequisite for being admitted to the licentiate; see Weijers (1987), 404 f.; Teeuwen (2003), 250–252. 61 Guimaraes, op. cit., 51. 62 For Hervaeus’s scholastic activities beyond lecturing on the Sentences, see Guimaraes, op. cit., 32 (Quodlibeta); 49 (De quattuor materiis, among other writings.); 58–69 passim. 63 This may be regarded as an important clue for the date of Hervaeus’s De secundis intentionibus; see p. 251 below.

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In his comments in In I Sent. dist. 23,64 Hervaeus prefaces (first article, capp. 5–11) his answer to the question whether ‘persona’ in divinity signifies an essence or a relationship (cap. 1) with a discussion about this word’s origin and meaning. After some pros and contras he opts for its deriving from personando, rejecting the ‘persona’ quasi ‘per se una’ thesis. Next he refers (capp. 10–11) to people who, by associating ‘persona’ with such terms as ‘particulare’, ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc., claim that ‘persona’ too stands for a second intention. Their view is refuted (capp. 17–18), inter alia by asserting that there is a difference between ‘something is a rationate being’ (as a second intention is) and ‘its being common concerns rationate commonness’. The rationate property of being common does indeed not prevent the common thing (e.g. man) from being itself a real thing. In capp. 12–16 Hervaeus speaks approvingly about an alternative view according to which ‘persona’ does not signify an intention at all, but rather an absolute (i.e. non-relational) thing that underlies an intention (res absoluta substrata intentioni). This thing is the suppositum of an intellectual nature, not an intention, because unlike intellectual natures, intentions do not convey dignity or deserve praise. Hence it follows that Boethius’s definition of persona is excellent: a person is an individual (i.e. incommunicable; Hervaeus silently follows the interpretive correction made by Richard of St. Victor)65 substance of an intellectual or rational nature. In the second article, the question whether the term ‘persona’ can be properly used of the Divine Persons is answered in the affirmative (cap. 19). In reply to the opposite view (to the effect that nouns are imposed to signify sensible things in our surroundings) Hervaeus brings forward a distinction (capp. 21–23) between a noun’s formal and material significate. Its formal significate is that which a noun is primarily intended to signify, whether abstractively or concretively, whereas its material significate is the concrete thing in which the formal nature in question is found. As far as the formal significate is concerned, a noun’s semantic area is not restricted to the sensible domain, but it can also designate perfections, such as are in God. Some nouns, however, like ‘creator’, are not imposed but to signify divine entities. In the third article the question whether in Divinity ‘persona’ signifies an essence or a relationship comes up for discussion (cap. 24). 64 65

For the text see Appendix C; short analysis in Decker (1967), 499–500. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV, cap. 22.

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Three theses are developed (25–31): [a] ‘persona’ implies both subsistence and relationship; [b] when used of one of the Divine Persons, it only bears on the distinctive property of paternity, filiation, or ‘spiration’, respectively; in other words, the Father is not paternity, but he is the Father through paternity; and the same goes mutatis mutandis for the Son and the Holy Spirit, and [c] ‘persona’ formally signifies a relationship in the manner of substance. The third thesis is extensively discussed (capp. 28–31). Finally, the initial objections made in capp. 2 and 3 are enervated in the usual way. 4.2.6. Durand of St. Pourçain Durand of saint Pourçain (died 1334) lectured between 1304 and 1307/8 on the Sentences. We have his commentary in three different redactions. The first redaction (prima lectura) was connected with lectures that Durand gave at one of the provincial Dominican studia, and he worked it into written form in the years 1304–1307 or 1308 at the latest. We have three Books of this redaction (I–II and IV), plus a fragment of additiones to the first Book which modified and made more precise Durand’s views.66 A second lecture series took place at Paris in 1307 or latest 1308, this time to fulfill the requirements for receiving his master’s degree; the reworking of these lectures (only Books II–IV are extant) probably took place in 1310–1311. Durand was magister regens in theology at Paris from 1312–1313, and left Paris for Avignon to become lector at the papal Curia’s school. The third redaction of Durand’s Sentences commentary dates from the time (between 1317 and 1327) when he was bishop, fist of Limoux, then of Le Puy-en-Velay, and finally of Meaux. It is this third redaction that was published (some 15 times!) in the early modern period; the Venice 1571 edition was reprinted by The Gregg Press in 1964. Our Appendix D contains my transcription of the prima lectura as it occurs in Ms. Paris BN Lat. 14.454, supplemented by the text of the printed edition of the third redaction. First, it is asked whether ‘persona’ signifies a substance (or essence) or a relationship. Boethius is adduced in support of the latter view, and St. Augustine in support of the former view (capp. 2–4). The solution to this question is prepared by a discussion of the preliminary question whether ‘persona’ is a noun of a thing or of an intention. First, 66 All information (including what follows) has been drawn from Friedman (2002), 71 f., who, as always, presents basic secondary literature.

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the second possibility is investigated (capp. 6–8). The main argument runs as follows (cap. 7). Any noun significative of a thing falls in a category under an intention, such as the noun ‘substance’ comes under the intention ‘genus’, whereas ‘homo’ comes under the intention ‘species’, and ‘Sortes’ under the intention ‘individuum’ or ‘suppositum’. Now the noun ‘persona’ does not signify a thing falling under genus or species, because such things have a mode of being that is communicable or predicable of a plurality of things that are specifically or numerically different. It does not signify a thing falling under the intention ‘suppositum’ either, since unlike such things ‘persona’ falls to a plurality. Therefore ‘persona’ is not a noun falling under some intention (nomen rei sub intentione aliqua), but rather is the noun conveying the intention of that of which it is the suppositum, albeit not in any nature, but only in an intellectual nature. In this context, the word ‘intention’ is loosely used to stand for a thing’s condition that matches the different intentions in the proper sense, to wit, singularity, indivision etc. which contract the species in the same way as a species contracts a genus (capp. 7–8). Another line of thought (capp. 9–15) is to the effect that ‘persona’ does not signify itself an intention of a species, but a thing underlying an intention (res subiecta intentioni). In fact, it signifies the nature underlying the intention ‘individuum vagum in natura intellectuali’, not the intention itself. Proof: ‘persona’ conveys dignity and laudability; now intentions do not deserve such things. In the third redaction Durand adds (cap. 11a) the reply given by the adherents of this view to their opponents to the effect that ‘persona’ does not indicate a thing under the intention of a genus, a species, or a determinate individual (individuum signatum), but under the intention ‘individuum vagum’, just as ‘aliquis homo’ does. However, Durand rejects the ‘individuum vagum’ option as well, including the counter-arguments about dignity and laudability. In the third redaction Durand adds (capp. 13a–b–c) some more objections against this view, inter alia one concerning the incommunicable nature of persona, considering the communicability of ‘individuum vagum’. As for the main question of whether ‘persona’ in Divinity signifies a substance or a relationship, Durandus first claims (capp. 16–18, resp. 18b) that according to either of the two aforesaid views ‘persona’ signifies neither a substance nor a relationship, and that these notions are put aside by abstraction. For this reason, the question should be rephrased as follows: “What is it in Divinity that the noun ‘persona’ is predicated of ?”, and the answer should be that this is neither a sub-

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stance alone nor relation alone, but that which is composed of substance and relation (cap. 19). Next this is proved (cap. 20), and the arguments in support of the Boethian view that ‘persona’ signifies a relationship are refuted (capp. 21–22), as well as the rival onesided Augustinian view that it signifies substance alone (cap. 23). In order to throw some light on the parallel discussion of the ‘persona’ problem (‘Is it a noun of first or second intention?’) found elsewhere, I return now to two authors of an unmistakably alternative doctrinal tradition, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus—without suggesting, however, that the foregoing authors could all be reckoned to the Thomistic tradition. Besides, as is rightly remarked by Friedmann (2002, 47), there seems to be a complete lack of confrontationalism in the Sentences commentaries of the earlier years. 4.2.7. Henry of Ghent Henry of Ghent (Henricus de Gandavo), who is born around 1217 and died 1293, taught at the University of Paris from 1276 to his death. He did not write a commentary on the Sentences. His Quodlibeta were published in Paris 1518 (reprint Louvain 1961, and now available in a critical edition). His chef d’oeuvre is the Summa quaestionum ordinariarum (Paris 1520; reprint Franciscan Institute 1943). Henry of Ghent took intentions to have being only within the actual consideration of things by the intellect, for which opinion he was later severely attacked by Hervaeus Natalis.67 The intellect is able to form two intentions of one and the same thing, which duality resembles the way in which in nature leaves as well as fruits are drawn from one root. Generally speaking, an intention is the result of the different relationships really existing between the knower and the thing known. The intention is itself not something extramental, but is all the same no fictive thing entirely mind-dependent, but something based upon the nature of the outside things owing to whose actual consideration by the intellect the virtual intentions of the extramental things (read, their formal natures making up them) become actual intentions (read, actual intentional relationships) as soon as a thing is somehow known by the intellect: 67 See Stella (1959), 125–139, and Hervaeus’s Determinatio de intellectu et specie edited by Stella, ibid., 141–168. For Henry of Ghent on second intentions see Pini (2002), 68–72.

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Quodlibet V, q. 12c, 171 X-Y (ed. 1518): Unde et intentio non dicitur esse aliquid in re ut est extra, sed solum ut cadit in intellectus actuali consideratione considerantis unum in re ut duo in intentione. Quod vero non fictive duo est intentione, quia in natura illius rei ut in fundamento et quasi in radice est utraque intentio, educenda de ea opere intellectus tamquam res rationis et intellectus, quemadmodum in ligno velut in radice sunt folia et fructus ut diversa educenda opere naturae tamquam res naturae.68

The Summa quaestionum ordinariarum contains (art. 53) a well-known passage in which to prepare his discusion of the proper meaning of ‘persona’, Henry explains what precisely is signified by nouns and how the noun ‘persona’ in particular is used. To this end he distinguishes between three semantic levels, [a] nouns signifying pure realities, [b] nouns signifying pure intentions, and [c] nouns signifying something in between, to wit what in a way is a thing, and in a way an intention: Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, art. 53, q. 5, Fol. 64v, H: Quia questio ista est de significato huius nominis ‘persona’, quid scilicet sit quod significetur per nomen, quod sciri non potest nisi primo cognitis in generali iis que per nomina habent significari et qualiter consuetum est uti ipso nomine de quo est questio, idcirco hic primo oportet considerare que sint ea que habent significari per nomina, secundo ex usu huius nominis ‘persona’ oportet investigare quid illorum per ipsum significetur. Circa primum igitur horum sciendum quod nominum quoddam significat rem puram, quoddam vero significat intentionem puram, quoddam vero significat medio modo se habens, aliquid scilicet quod quodammodo res est et quodammodo intentio.

These levels are discussed in a slightly inversed order. Nouns of the first level are the nouns indicating singulars such as ‘Peter’ and ‘Paul’ or ‘this man’ or ‘this stone’. They have nothing intentional about them, and convey natural, mind-independent being alone. To the third level belong the universals set free from the singulars; they find themselves in between being a purely extramental thing and being an intention; they are things in so far as they represent the formal nature which possesses its being in the singulars, whereas they are intentions in so far as they have the condition of something abstract in the intellect; consequently, the nouns in question are partly nouns of things, partly of intentions, to wit first intentions (for there are first and second intentions, Henry explains). Thus their signification is ambivalent in 68 Cf. Hervaeus’s extensive discussion (against Henry of Ghent) of the activity of the human intellect as we have found in his Determinatio de intellectu et specie; see section 3.44.

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that they signify the formal nature as set free from the singulars, and at the same time the singulars as possessing this nature.69 All other nouns belong to the second level; they concern the intellect’s consideration of the extramental things precisely in so far as they are considered by the intellect, and are, accordingly, about both universals and particulars (mediately or immediately); they are second intentions, because the intellect conceives them after conceiving the notion of universality: Ibid., H-I: Rem puram significant nomina rerum singularium; singularia enim sunt res pure et nullo modo intentiones, quia solummodo habent esse a natura et nullo modo a consideratione rationis, ut sunt ‘iste homo’, ‘iste lapis’. Unde cum nomina eis fuerint imposita, secundum quod ‘Petrus’ vel ‘Paulus’ est nomen istius hominis, illa appellantur simpliciter nomina rerum. Universalia autem rerum singularium et sunt quodammodo res et quodammodo intentiones: res inquantum illam naturam representant que habet esse in singularibus, intentiones vero inquantum habent rationem abstracti in consideratione intellectus; propter quod nomina eis imposita sunt quodammodo nomina rerum et quodammodo intentionum, scilicet [sed ed.] primarum; intentionum enim quedam sunt prime, quedam vero secunde. Et sic quodlibet universale reale inquantum habet rationem abstracti, est intentio predicabilis, quia extra singularia non est nisi in consideratione intellectus. Cetera vero que per considerationem intellectus considerantur sive operantur et circa universalia et circa particularia (sive mediate sive immediate), sunt intentiones pure. Propter quod nomina eis imposita vocantur nomina intentionum, scilicet [sed ed.] secundarum, quia post conceptam rationem universalis rationaliter [realiter ed.] concipit eas intellectus et circa universalia rerum et circa singularia.

Next Henry makes a distinction between logical and grammatical intentions. The former bear on the logical relationships resulting from the various intellective considerations, whereas the latter match the grammatical distinctions between verb and substantival or adjectival nouns etc.: Ibid, I.: Sed iste sunt in duplici genere, quia quedam sunt accepte ab intellectu ut proprietates circa res principaliter, quedam vero ut proprietates circa nomina rerum. De genere primo sunt intentiones logicales— ut sunt ratio universalis, generis scilicet et speciei et differentie et huiusmodi circa universalia rerum, individuum, particulare et huiusmodi circa singularia [singula ed.] rerum—ista enim nomina non significant nisi respectus et habitudines inter ipsas res comparatas adinvicem consi69 This basic semantic ambivalence plays a pivotal role in the Aristotelian philosophic tradition. See de Rijk (2002) I, 69–72; 162; 252; II, 149; 154; 273, n. 86; 284, n. 11; 413.

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deratione intellectus. De secundo genere sunt intentiones gramaticales, ut sunt ratio nominis, verbi, adiectivi, substantivi et huiusmodi, que non significant nisi modos nominum; propter quod dicuntur nomina nominum.

This general introduction ends with a short observation (from the viewpoint of the distinction between first and second intention) about the diverse disciplines which in one way or another deal with knowing things. First intentions, which relate to things on their own (i.e. in so far as they are mind-independent), belong to the domain of the scientie reales (as opposed to the scientie rationales or sermocinales). Both logic and grammar make use of second intentions, and pertain to the rationate or sermocinal disciplines, but differently: second intentions in logic are about things, albeit in so far as the things are under consideration in their capacity of being expressible by words, whereas the grammatical intentions concern the nature of the words themselves. Therefore logic is less sermocinal than grammar, and finds itself, so to speak, halfway in between real disciplines and the purely sermocinal discipline, grammar: Ibid.: Consideratio primarum intentionum quae est rerum secundum se, pertinet ad scientias reales. Consideratio vero secundarum intentionum quia vel est circa res ut sunt expressibiles vocibus—et hoc quoad intentiones logicales—, vel est circa ipsas voces—et hoc est quoad intentiones gramaticales—pertinet ad scientias sermocinales. Et tamen logica minus sermocinalis et magis realis est quam gramatica, et quasi media inter scientias reales et gramaticam.70

Coming now to the main question Henry opens with a reference to the common view about the use of ‘persona’ in Divinity to the effect that everyone (a) regards this term as a noun standing for a thing, not an intention, and (b) takes it to signify substance or essence, but not merely so. However, this unanimity vanishes as soon as the ins and outs of this signifying the Divine essence are taken into consideration.

70 Cf. ps.-Kilwardby, Comm. On Priscianus Maior cap. 11. p. 77 ed. Pinborg et al. (1975b): “Sunt tamen aliqui qui dicunt quod triplex est differentia nominum. Quaedam enim sunt nomina rerum, ut ‘homo’; alia quaedam sunt nomina intentionum, ut ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc.; quaedam sunt nomina nominum, ut ‘nomen’, ‘pronomen’ etc. Primorum nominum impositio pertinet ad metaphysicum, cuius est res generaliter et per se considerare. Secundorum nominum impositio pertinet ad logicum, cuius est per se intentiones considerare; est enim logica de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis, ut dicit Avicenna. Tertiorum nominum impositio pertinet ad grammaticum, cuius est considerare nomina partium orationis secundum eorum proprias rationes, ut patet intuenti”. For ps.-Kilwardby see Fuchs (1999), 127–139.

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chapter four Ibid., K: Circa secundum autem sciendum quod secundum quod diversis apparet diversus usus huius nominis ‘persona’, secundum hoc diversimode iudicaverunt de eius significatione in divinis. Sed omnes quos audire aut videre potui, negant ipsam esse intentionis nomen, sed ponunt ipsam esse nomen rei et significare substantiam sive essentiam, licet non solum. Sed ipsorum quidam dicunt ‘personam’ plura significare et equivoce, quidam autem plura sed univoce, quidam vero tantum unum.

What follows is a gamut of rather sophisticated standpoints (including all kinds of ramification) about the precise semantic impact of the diverse components making up the supposed meaning of ‘persona’ in Divinity (such as univocity or equivocity, suppositum and hypostasis, relationship, and property in general). After an extensive discussion of all these viewpoints, Henry turns to his own opinion of the matter, which boils down to the recognition that ‘persona’ is a nomen intentionis, not, like all the previous opinions hold, a nomen rei. This is argued for by showing that like words such as ‘individuum’, ‘persona’ conveys individuality, rather than that it signifies the individuals themselves: Ibid., Fol. 56r, T: Omnium predictorum opiniones ponunt ‘personam’ esse nomen rei, et non nomen intentionis. Sed utrum hoc verum sit, ex usu huius vocabuli ‘persona’ circa creaturas investigare debemus, quia ab usu quem habuit in creaturis, assumptus est usus in Deo. Nunc autem in creaturis intellectualibus aperte videmus quod hoc nomen ‘persona’ circa substantias intellectuales non significat aliud quam hoc nomen ‘individuum’ circa substantias non-intellectuales, sive non-intellectuales creaturas, dicente Boetio, De duabus naturis quod persona est rationale individuum, et ibidem: “Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia”. Dico autem quod significat illud circa substantias intellectuales sive rationales, quia ‘persona’ non significat ipsas substantias, sed tantum individuationem quam importat determinate ut intentionem quandam singularitatis circa huiusmodi substantias, quemadmodum ‘simum’ determinat curvitatem quam significat circa nasum, non autem ipsum nasum significat; non quod ille substantie sint de significato ‘persone’, quemadmodum nasus non est de significato, sed solum de intellectu ‘simi’.

As a matter of fact, ‘persona’ is a noun of second intention, because it only bears on the conceptual mode in which, in the framework of conceptual relationships to superior (i.e. generic) and collateral intentions, the intellect conceives what is a person. And in this perspective, the word ‘persona’ mainly conveys the notion of incommunicability: Ibid., Fol. 56r–v, T: Quare cum non sit dubium quin hoc nomen ‘individuum’ circa substantias irrationales non est nomen rei, sed nomen intentiones secunde, que nichil aliud est quam modus quo intellectus rem concipit respectu superioris et collateralis (ut determinatam et non

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divisam in aliqua sub se, atque divisam ab eo quod est iuxta se), non est dubium quin hoc nomen ‘persona’ in creaturis rationalibus non sit nomen rei, sed nomen intentionis, dicens predictum modum individuationis circa illas, ut non significet rem cui accidit individuatio, sed quod ignificet intentionem individuitatis, ut omnino idem sit dicere ‘Petrus est individuum’ et ‘Petrus est persona’. Et significat idem quod ‘suppositum incommunicabile’. Est enim ‘suppositum’ nomen secunde intentionis, commune ad substantia communem et singularem. Et est incommunicabile, commune ad singulare substantiae et accidentis. (…). Unde quod dicitur hic ‘suppositum incommunicabile’, hoc dicit Boetius in definitione persone ‘substantiam individuam’, sumendo ‘substantiam’ more Grecorum pro ‘subsistentia’, ‘individuum’ autem pro ‘incommunicabili’, secundum quod corrigit eum Ricardus.

Next, Henry goes on to semantically underscore his view of ‘persona’ as a noun of second intention. (Remarkably, he believes that in doing so he can show that his view is ultimately in concordance with the aforesaid views and those held by the Church Fathers; a classic example of a creative interpretatio benivolens). He claims that although all nouns primarily are intended to designate, in a contextual framework, concrete objects as instances of a certain significate, they can also be used to stand for either their significate or their appellatum. For instance, if we use the nomen rei, ‘homo’, it supposits for its significate, manhood (as it is instantiated in this or that particular man, that is); sometimes it supposits for manhood by itself (as in ‘Man is a species’), sometimes for its appellatum, i.e. this or that particular man (such as in ‘a (the) man is running’): Ibid., Fol. 56v, V: Et est sciendum, ad nos concordandum cum aliis et cum dictis sanctorum, quod licet omne nomen ubicumque ponitur in enunciatione aliqua, per se et principaliter supponat et pretendat suum significatum, tamquam signum signatum, ad quod presentandum imponitur, tamen aliquando nomen illud supponit pro ipso significato, aliquando autem non pro significato sed pro suo appellato, vel quasi. Verbi gratia, in nomine quod significat rem, hominem, in quacumque enunciatione ponitur, supponit humanitatem quam significat et aliquando supponit pro ipsa (ut cum dicitur ‘Homo est species’); aliquando vero pro appellato (ut cum dicitur ‘Homo currit’). Dicitur enim terminus supponere pro illo pro quo locutionem natus est verificare, et pro quo alteri comparatur in enunciatione.

Something similar applies to a nomen intentionis. Whenever the noun of a species occurs in a proposition, it supposits for the concept of the universal (ratio universalis)—which expresses a certain relationship and an intention—which it signifies. And sometimes it stands for the

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intention taken by itself, e.g. in ‘A species is a rationate intention and a certain universal’. On other occasions, however, the noun of an intention stands for a concrete appellatum signified by it (or its quasiappellatum), e.g. for a man or an ass; this is the case in ‘A species is what is said of a plurality of numerically different things’; then indeed the species is not defined as an abstract intention nor as standing for its significate. Clearly, in this way it is not said of numerically different things, because it cannot be truly said ‘Peter is a species’ or ‘Paul is a species’. On the contrary, it is then defined as it is present in the thing of which it is the intention [‘intention’ taken in the sense of ‘formal nature’], and in the way in which it supposits for this formal nature, while not being confined to any one of its particular instances. Examples of such intentions are ‘man’, ‘ass’ and so on, which are said of the individuals falling under them. And it makes a huge difference if one is speaking about the intention’s significate as it is considered by itself and as it supposits for the significate itself, on the one hand, or if it is spoken of in the manner in which it stands for one of its inferiors or appellata (or its quasi-appellatum, in cases in which it is not possible to call it its appellatum properly), on the other. Summa summarum: If an intention is considered by itself and as standing for its significate, then it signifies only the rationate intention from which the noun in question has received its imposition. If, on the other hand, it is considered in its capacity of standing for a concrete thing concerning which it connotes the intention, and you ask for its significate (in the broad sense) with regard to this supposition, then it is that concrete thing that falls within the intention’s significate, this taken again in its broad sense: Ibid.: Similiter in nomine significante intentionem. Verbi gratia. Species in quacumque enunciatione ponitur, supponit rationem universalis—que est respectus quidam et intentio—quam significat. Et aliquando supponit pro ipsa (ut cum dicitur ‘Species est intentio rationis et universale quiddam’), aliquando vero supponit pro appellato vel quasi appellato, ut pro homine aut asino aut huiusmodi (ut cum dicitur ‘Species est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero’), ubi definitur species, non ut est intentio abstracta et ut supponit pro suo significato—sic enim non predicatur de differentibus numero; non enim vere dicitur ‘Petrus est species’, ‘Paulus est species’—, sed definitur ut est in re cuius est et ut supponit pro ipsa sub indifferentia quadam ad quamlibet illarum. Cuiusmodi sunt ‘homo’, ‘asinus’ et huiusmodi que predicantur de solis individuis suis. Et multum refert loqui de eius significato ut consideratur secundum se et ut supponit pro ipso significato, et ut supponit pro sub-

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strato [subtracto ed.] sive appellato, aut quasi-appellato, si non possit dici proprie eius appellatum. Si enim consideratur secundum se et ut supponit pro suo significato, tunc significat intentionem rationis tantum a qua nomen imponitur. Si vero consideratur secundum quod supponit pro re circa quam connotat intentionem, et queratur de suo significato (large loquendo de significato) ut sic supponit, sic res illa cadit in suo significato, large loquendo de significato.

Now we are sufficiently prepared to understand the author’s solution to the initial problem about the semantic position of ‘persona in divinis’. This solution is to the effect that on the basis of its original imposition [a] ‘persona’ is a nomen intentionis, not a nomen rei and [b] it signifies (when it is only used to stand for intellectual natures) nothing other than the formal concept of ‘incommunicable suppositum’, but not in the way in which it signifies it, but by way of consignification, just as in the way a substrate is included in the notion of its proper attribute. Nevertheless, however, ‘persona’ can suppositum for its significate, meaning that it is a rationate intention taken for the significate itself, for example in ‘A (divine) Person is a suppositum or a certain hypostasis’. Sometimes, on the other hand, it stands for its appellatum, or something like it, to wit, its quasi-substrate, concerning which it connotes such an intention, e.g. in ‘The Person generates’ or ‘is generated’, or ‘The Father is a Person’ or ‘The Person is the Father’. And although qua being considered by itself and suppositing for its proper significate, it only signifies a rationate intention, if you ask for the significate it has in its capacity of standing for the thing concerning which it connotes that intention, then it includes only the thing (it appellates) together with the formal intention: Ibid., Fol. 56 X: Descendendo igitur ad propositum, dicimus quod hoc nomen ‘persona’ est per se a prima impositione nomen intentionis, et significat solum rationem ‘suppositi incommunicabilis’ a prima impositione a qua nomen impositum est solummodo circa intellectualem naturam, non ut quam significat, sed que est de intellectu eius, quemadmodum quodammodo subiectum est de intellectu proprie passionis.71 Aliquando tamen potest supponere illud significatum suum quod est intentio rationis pro ipso significato (ut cum dicitur ‘Persona est suppositum sive hypostasis quedam’); aliquando vero pro eius appellato vel quasi, ur pro suo quasi-subiecto circa quod connotat huiusmodi intentionem (ut cum dicitur ‘Persona generat’, aut ‘generatur’, ‘spirat’, aut ‘spiratur’, ‘Pater est Persona’, aut ‘Persona est Pater’). Et licet ut secundum se consideratum, ut supponit pro suo proprio significato non significet nisi intentionem 71

In this way, ‘nose’ is included in its propria passio ‘snub’ (= ‘snubnose’).

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Now it is in this way that the Church Fathers and the doctores speak of ‘persona’ when they are looking for its significate. However, this manner of speaking of a noun’s significate comes to firmly extending the concept ‘signification’. And this is not the way Boethius takes the significate of ‘persona’, because in his definition too of ‘persona’, that which formally pertains to ‘intention’, functions as a genus, to wit, ‘individual substance’; and that which formally pertains to ‘thing’, functions as a differentia, to wit, ‘rationalis essentie’, just as in the definition of a propria passio, that which is of its own nature functions as a genus, and what pertains to its substrate, functions as a differentia, all in accordance with the book. In fact, all the arguments that were adduced above, are conclusive according to diverse significations of the noun ‘persona’, whereas they are not according to diverse other interpretations of this word: Ibid.: Et hoc modo loquuntur sancti et doctores de nomine ‘persone’, cum querunt eius significatum. Sed sic loqui de significato est multum extendere significationem. Et non sic loquitur Boetius de significato ‘persone’, unde et in definitione ‘persone’ id quod pertinet ad rationem intentionis ponitur loco generis, ut ‘substantia individua’, et id quod pertinet ad rationem rei, loco differentie, ut ‘rationalis essentie’; quemadmodum in definitione proprie passionis id quod est sue nature, ponitur loco generis, et quod pertinet ad subiectum, loco differentie, secundum artem Philosophi. Omnia igitur argumenta supra inducta concludunt secundum diversas sognificationes huius nominis, et secundum diversos alios modos non concludunt. Sed oportet eis respondere propter dicersas difficultates quas implicant.

4.2.8. John Duns Scotus John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) studied theology at Oxford and perhaps at Paris in the 1290’s.72 He lectured on the Sentences several times and also revised his lectures more than once. He delivered lectures on the Sentences at Oxford, which have come down to us in the form of Scotus’s Lectura. We know from his own testimony that he was at work on the revised version of his Sentences lectures called the Ordinatio or Opus

72 I substantially owe all biographical and bibliographical information to the useful survey in Friedman (2002), 65 ff.

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oxoniense, by 1300, and that during that time he was at Oxford. In the autumn of 1302 Scotus was sent to Paris to lecture on the Sentences, where, with a short interruption (1303–1304) he stayed until 1307, when the Order moved him to the Franciscan convent in Cologne, where he died the next year. We have also several reportationes of Scotus’s Parisian lecture series on the Sentences, of which the Reportata parisiensia are most well-known. One of the alternative Parisian reportationes (known as Reportatio I A), which is as yet unpublished, most likely contains a text that post-dates Book I of the afore-mentioned Ordinatio.73 In the Reportata parisiensia II, dist. 13, q. 1, Scotus lists four senses of the equivocal word ‘intentio’: [1] ‘act of the will’, [b] ‘formal mode of being in a thing’; [c] ‘concept’, and [d] ‘property of directing oneself to something else’.74 The first main sense, which only concerns the will’s activity, is not of our concern now. The three other senses regard cognition and epistemological aspects. The second main sense of the term ‘intentio’ links it to a formal, quidditative (either substantial or accidental) characteristic present in a thing.75 Two uses are distinguished. First a thing’s formal ratio is that owing to which a thing is what it is; e.g. heat is the ratio formalis of the hot thing, because it is by its own76 immanent heat that it is hot.77 Second. The phrase ‘formal ratio’ can also designate more specifically the nearest cause productive of some effect or the nearest cause of a 73 Allan Wolter and Girard Etzkorn are preparing a critical edition of this work from all five extant manuscripts; see Friedman (2002), 66, n. 70. 74 Rep. Par. II, dist. 13, q. 1, n. 4 (ed. Wadding vol. XI 2, p. 334): “(…) nomen ‘intentio’ aequivocum: uno modo dicitur actus voluntatis; secundo ratio formalis in re (sicut intentio rei a qua accipitur genus, differt ab intentione a qua accipitur differentia); tertio modo dicitur conceptus; quarto ratio tendendi in obiectum (sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est)”—A thorough study of Scotus’s various uses of the word ‘intentio’ is found in Verhulst (1975). She rightly rejects (22–32) the interpretations presented by Swiezawski (1934) passim. See also Pini’s extensive discussion of Scotus’s view of second intentions (2002), 99–137. See also Biard (1989), 46–51; Tachau (1999), 333–342, and Perler (1994), (2002), 185–251, (2003) passim. 75 For this use see de Rijk (1994). 76 Note that according to Scotus, a thing’s immanent characteristic is particular, not universal, despite the fact that the property in question can be shared by its possessor with other possessors of it. This is the authentic Aristotelian view; see de Rijk (2002) II, 207–210, and section 8.5 below. 77 Rep. Par. IV, dist. 10, q. 3 (ed. Wadding vol. XI 2, p. 644): “Ratio formalis alicuius potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quod sit quo aliquid est formaliter tale, ut calor est formalis ratio qua aliquid est calidum, et similitudo ratio formalis qua aliquid est simile, et albedo qua aliquid est album; et ideo nullo modo plurificatur nisi plurificata sua ratione formali”.

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thing’s suppositum; in this way, heat is the formal ratio of the act of heating, whiteness of the act of making the sight discern something,78 and similitude of the act of assimiliation, all quite irrespectively of their extern effects.79 Unlike the former sense, the latter sense only concerns the intrinsic effect or operation of something viewed in its capacity of being a power: heat is what (by its very nature and of necessity) heats, whiteness is what makes white, similitude is what makes similar. The former sense is about extrinsic effects of such powers as the aforesaid, in so far as these powers are responsible for the immanent forms (rationes formales) that intrinsically cause these effects. In the third main sense, ‘intentio’ is used to stand for concept in so far as it makes an external thing, or one of its formal ontic aspects present to the mind. The fourth sense of ‘intentio’ comes most closely to its etymology and underlines its representative character and its being related to something else, which is, as usual, indicated as ratio tendendi.80 All the epistemological senses well considered, it is plain that they in fact are concerned with different aspects of the act of cognition. Taken as a formal ratio present in an object of cognition, the intention is something extramental which, after having been drawn from the object by an intellective act, possesses an intentional mode of being in the mind. Its conceptual nature comes to the fore in the third main sense ‘concept’, which as such underlines its psychic or mental nature, whereas the fourth sense in its turn gives emphasis to the semantic aspect of the notion ‘intention’. When dealing with the problem of the precise meaning of ‘persona’ in Divinity, Scotus presents an operational definition of first intention:

78 Cf. Aristotle, Topica III 5, 119a29–30: “(…) such as the definiens of ‘white’ is ‘a colour which causes sight to discern something (color disgregativus visus)”. 79 Rep. Par. IV, dist. 10, q. 3 (ed. Wadding vol. XI 2, p. 644): “Alio modo accipitur ratio formalis alicuius pro causa proxima elicitiva alicuius effectus vel causa fundamenti proxima alicuius, sicut dicimus quod calor est formalis ratio calefaciendi et albedo disgregandi et similitudo assimilandi”. I think the logical balance of this passage requires to supply similitudo; see my previous note. 80 The common etymological link is of course also found in Scotus. See Opus oxoniense, II, dist. 38, q. 1 (ed. Wadding vol. VI 2, p. 1001): “Intendere enim dicit in aliud tendere. Hoc potest accipi generaliter, sive ab alio habeat quod in illud tendat, sive a se movente se in illud. Potest etiam tendere in aliquid sicut in obiectum praesens, vel ut in terminum distantem vel absentem. Primo modo convenit omni potentiae respectu sui obiecti; secundo modo magis proprie sumitur pro illo scilicet quod tendit in aliud et non ducitur in illud, sed ducit se in illud”.

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every concept is a concept of first intention if it is naturally suited to be immediately caused by a real thing, independently of the mind’s activity.81 In a previous passage, in which he rejects the thesis (adhered to by Henry of Ghent) that in Divinity ‘persona’ only signifies a second intention, Scotus had already defined second intention as a special kind of rationate relation: “Every second intention is a rationate relationship, not any whichever, but one pertaining to the terminus of the act of the intellect composing or dividing, or at least comparing one thing to another; this is plain, because, everyone agrees, it is caused by an act of the intellect dealing with some thing of first intention, which act can only bring about rationate relationship(s) concerning the object in question”.82 Clearly, there is a real thing somehow corresponding to the thing of first intention, to wit, the formal ratio that is nothing but an ontic aspect or mode of being of the object of cognition. But what does the phrase ‘thing of second intention’ (used by the adherents of the opposite thesis about the meaning of ‘persona’ in Divinity) stand for? From Scotus’s extensive discussion of the problem surrounding the Divine Persons in Ord. I, dist. 23 it unmistakably appears that to him, there is as such nothing real about the thing of second intention, but, as a product of the intellect dealing with things of first intention, it is entirely mind-dependent; the intellective act does in fact not end up in a real product.83 Thus the notion of second intention is only about relationships following from the intellect’s dealing with first intentions. Several cognitional relationships between the first intentions can be identified as second intentions. Among them the intentions of universality and particularity are most usual. As a matter of fact, Scotus regards each 81 Ordinatio I, dist. 23, q. unica (Vatican edition vol. V, p. 36017–20): “(viewed from the viewpoint of its being incommunicabilis) ‘persona’ proprie non dicet aliquem conceptum positivum proprie, sed tamen non dicet aliquem conceptum intentionis secundae: omnis enim conceptus est intentionis primae qui natus est fieri immediate a re, sine opere vel actu intellectus negotiantis”. 82 Ibid., p. 35212–18: “(…) omnis intentio secunda est relatio rationis, non quaecumque, sed pertinens ad extremum actus intellectus componentis et dividentis, vel saltem conferentis unum ad alterum. Hoc patet, quia intentio secunda secundum omnes causatur per actum intellectus negotiantis circa rem primae intentionis; qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem vel relationes rationis”. Cf. Ord. I, dist. 8, q. 4 (Vatican edition vol. IV, p. 254): “(…) intellectus actu suo non potest causare nisi relationem rationis, ex hoc scilicet quod est virtus collativa potens conferre hoc ut cognitum ad illud”. 83 Ibid., p. 349: “(…) Persona est terminus productionis realis et adoratur; secunda intentio nec terminat productionem realem, nec adoratur”.

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of the so-called ‘predicables’ when they are formally taken, as second intentions, whereas they can be taken to stand for the res primae intentionis as well. The gamut of the overlapping three main senses of ‘intentio’ clearly comes to the fore in Scotus’s discussion of the notion of ‘universal’. Taken as a concrete noun it is used in a threefold sense: it is sometimes used for the substrate in question, i.e. the thing of first intention to which the intention ‘universal’ can be applied; sometimes for the form, i.e. the ‘thing’ of second intention, which is caused by the intellect and applicable to things of first intention; at other occasions it stands for a second intention itself, to wit, anything that only exists owing to the way the intellect considers things.84 Similar observations are made with regard to the twofold sense of ‘differentia’. This label too can be used as a noun of first or second intention. In the first sense it abstractively stands for the notion of multitude or plurality, taken as an ontic differentiation, whereas in its concretive sense it refers to what is applicable to the formal principle of the differentia as it occurs as a thing of first intention.85 Scotus’s discussion in the Lectura I, dist. 23 basically presents the same views.86 Generally speaking, just as Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, Scotus does not present a detailed discussion about first and second intention. Differences of opinion during those days are about the semantic position of ‘persona’ in Divinity, which is rather complex because of its being associated with ‘essentia’, ‘relatio’, and the cluster ‘hypostasissuppositum-individuum’. The distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ is, 84 Scotus, Super universalia, q. 3 (ed. Wadding vol. I, p. 89): “(…) universale sicut cetera concreta tripliciter sumitur. quandoque enim sumitur pro subiecto, idest pro re primae intentionis cui applicatur intentio universalis [universalis is a genitive case]; et hoc modo universale est primum obiectum intellectus. quandoque sumitur pro forma, scilicet pro re secundae intentionis, causata ab intellectu et applicabili rebus primae intentionis; et sic loquitur logicus proprie de universali”. Ibid., q. 34, p. 120 (speaking about the predicable accidens): “Alio modo significat idem quod secunda intentio, scilicet quidlibet quod causatur a sola consideratione intellectus”. 85 Ibid., q. 27, p. 113: “(…) differentia potest esse nomen primae intentionis vel secundae. Primo modo est nomen abstractum et significat relationem; et est species multitudinis ut Multum est differentia entis. Secundo modo est concretum sicut et alia nomina intentionum de quibus hic agitur; et transsumitur a differentia et est nomen primae intentionis; significat autem intentionem applicabilem ei quod est principium formale differentiae ut est res primae intentionis”.—Verhulst (1975, 21, n. 31: “c’est l’espèce de plusieurs choses car les différences réelles sont nombreuses”) failed to correctly interpret ‘Multum’ in its metaphysic capacity of ontic differentia. 86 Vatican edition vol. XVII, pp. 303–315.

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as such, part of common doctrine. It is not until intentionality came to be examined in much greater detail, particularly the diverse relationships between active and passive elements making up the complex process of cognition, that there was room for heated debates about the intentionality issue as such.87

87 In this connection it is interesting to see that as a faithful Aristotelian, Aquinas is most explicit about the identity between the actual knower as such and the thing cognized as such. See e.g. In Arist. II De anima, nr. 377: “Unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu est ipsum cognitum in actu”.

chapter five SIMON OF FAVERSHAM ON SECOND INTENTIONS

The tracts De intentionibus written by Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Auriol and Girald Odonis all suggest that in the first decades of the fourteenth century there was a kind of canon of writers on the subject, among whom Radulphus Brito had a prominent place. The influence of other authors should not be underestimated, however. One of them is Simon of Faversham (ca. 1260–1306),1 who was active at the Arts Faculty of Paris around 1280.2 We owe to this important professor a number of logical commentaries, including a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, a commentary on Peter of Spain’s Tractatus (called afterwards Summulae logicales), and a sophisma ‘A universal is an intention’. An investigation of his works easily persuades us that Simon of Faversham deserves a place of honour in the list of ancestors of the early fourteenthcentury doctrine on intentionality. However, since he did not write a special treatise on the subject matter, Faverham’s position concerning the intentionality issue is to be gathered from scatttered evidence, in which the author makes use of his views of intentionality in solving certain problems of a wider scope. 5.1. Simon of Faversham on the two levels of considering extramental things Faversham defines first and second intention from the angle of how we can consider things. A thing can be considered by the intellect in two ways. The first or primary consideration is what is called ‘the essential way of understanding’ (intellectus essentialis). What Simon understands by ‘essential way’ becomes clear from its counterpart, the ‘accidental or respective way’ of understanding, which consists in conceiving the thing with regard to other things of a similar nature.3 Thus the first considerSee Ebbesen et al. (1984), Introd. pp. 5; 13; also Sharp (1934), 307. For his life and works, see Wolf (1966), 17–28 and 29–52; de Rijk (1968), 72–74; Ebbesen et al. (1984), Introd. 3 Pini wrongly takes (2002, 73) the expression ‘sub intellectu eius essentiali’ to mean 1 2

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ation is the way of understanding a thing by which the mind conceives this thing, including its nature by itself, according to its own being, but taking it as a thing stripped from all its individuating conditions. The second or secondary consideration, which is the accidental or respective one, comes down to understanding a thing respectively, i.e. according to the logical relationships it has to other things of the same kind. The primary understanding is called the first intention (or concept) of the object, whereas the secondary understanding is its second intention:4 Notulae super Summulas V (De locis), p. 94 ed. de Rijk:5 (…) duplex est intentio: prima et secunda. Intentio prima est primus intellectus sive conceptus rei quo anima rem et naturam rei comprehendit secundum se et sub intellectu eius essentiali, prout res ab omnibus condicionibus individualibus est abstracta. Verbi gratia, quando anima intelligit hominem inquantum homo et intelligit eum inquantum animal et rationale, certum est quod tunc intelligit hominem inquantum est sub intellectu essentiali; et talis intellectus dicitur intentio prima. Intentio autem secunda est intellectus sive conceptus rei secundus, quo anima apprehendit rem non secundum se nec sub intellectu essentiali, sed sub intellectu accidentali vel respectivo. Verbi gratia, quando anima intelligit hominem non inquantum homo vel animal vel rationale, sed inquantum species vel diffinitio vel diffinitum, talis intellectus hominis vocatur intentio secunda.

Universal concepts can again be considered in a twofold way, either as an intention sec (pro esse intentionis), or as including their presence in their supposits (pro esse quod habet in suppositis). In the former way the intention is taken abstractively, in the latter concretively. We can gather Faverham’s position on this score if we look at wht he says about the different modes of predication. Our author distinguishes two kinds of predicate. One type, he claims, is of predicates that are said of a subject ‘paying attention to the essential features of the thing and abstracting these essential features from the individual conditions’. It rather forms a hendiadys with the preceding ‘secundum se’. 4 Pini’s opinion (2002, 73 f.) that only the first and second intentions in abstracto are here defined is untenable, because [1] Faversham shares the common opinion (taken over from Avicenna) that logic is about concrete second intentions joined to the corresponding first intentions (adiunctis primis) as its proper subject, and [2] the abstraction spoken of in Faversham’s definition of first intention concerns the taking away of the individuating conditions of this or that particular, rather than taking the quidditative nature apart from the suppositum as such. 5 On occasion I have corrected the texts as quoted in my 1968 paper. For the impressive list of authors referred to by Faversham in his Summulae commentary see de Rijk (1968), 99.

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with regard to the mode of being they have in the supposits; in this case (e.g. in ‘Homo currit’), the predicate (‘runs’) is said of the subject term (‘man’) in so far as this term does not stand for man in abstracto, but in so far as the common human nature is found in its supposita. If, on the other hand, a predicate is said of a subject in so far as the subject term is taken to stand for its intentional being sec (pro esse quod habet in anima et pro esse intentionis),6 then the intention is taken abstractively, e. g. in ‘Homo est species’, in which ‘homo’ does not stand for its supposita, because this or that particular man is not a species.7 On account of the conversion of subject and predicate, the author comes to speak about a cognate distinction between an intention and the thing underlying the intention (res subiecta intentioni). Every universal, he claims, signifies both universality and the thing subject to universal application. Next the impact of this distinction is explained with regard to conversion. Taking the subject and predicate terms formally as expressing two different intentions, you cannot mutually convert them. If you take them to stand for the things they actually refer to, then there are again two possibilities. Taking the predicated thing as being predicated (and the subjected thing as being subjected), conversion is still impossible. However, taking the things underlying the intentions, subject or predicate as merely actually put in subject or predicate position, but without being characterized by this logical relationship of subjection or predication, then the things signified can be subject to conversion. A comparison is made: whiteness cannot be changed into blackness, but a white thing can be changed into a black thing.8 This comparison is interesting in that it alludes to Faverham’s preference for 6 This expression is a hendiadys; cf. Notulae super Summulas, p. 88: “(…) de subiecto quod habet in anima vel pro esse intentionis, quod idem est”. 7 Ibid., pp. 87–88: “Quedam enim sunt predicata que dicuntur de subiecto pro esse quod habet in suppositis; ut ‘Homo currit’; hoc verbum ‘currit’ predicatur de homine non abstracte considerato, sed prout est in suppositis. Secundo modo quedam dicuntur de subiecto pro esse quod habet in anima et pro esse intentionis; ut ‘Homo est species’; species enim non predicatur de homine ratione suorum suppositorum, sed in eo quod habet esse in anima”. 8 Ibid., p. 89: “(…) est notandum quod subiectum et predicatum duo possunt nominare: uno modo nominant intentionem predicati et subiecti, alio modo rem subiectam illis intentionibus, sicut universale nominat intentionem universalitatis et rem subiectam universalitati. (…). Ipsa [sc. conversio] autem (…) est possibilis, intelligendo quod de predicato, idest de illo quod habet se in loco predicati, non habens tamen rationem sive notam dicendi de altero, fiat subiectum, et econverso. Verbi gratia, sicut de albedine non potest fieri nigredo, nec econverso, sed bene circa rem subiectam albedini creari potest nigredo”.

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putting the ‘intentio vs. res subiecta intentioni’ issue on a par with the cognate problem of the meaning of concrete accidental terms. 5.2. The ‘intentio vs. res subiecta intentio’ issue in a broader perspective. Denomination In the second chapter of the Super Summulas commentary (De predicabilibus), Faversham comes to speak about the universal, genus. In his opinion what should be understood by e.g. the universal or genus animal are two things: [1] the intention, animal, and [2] at the same time (cum hoc) the animal underlying the intention. To clarify his position he refers to the well-known logical rule concerning concrete accidental terms, to the effect that they signify two things at the same time, viz. an accidental form and the thing underlying this accidental form.9 Similarly, a second intention term, such as one expressing a genus (e.g. animal), signifies both the intention of generality falling to animal and an extramental thing, to wit the animal quiddity, which underlies the intention, animal: Sup. Summulas II, p. 91: Regula est in logica quod omne nomen concretum accidentis duo significat, videlicet formam accidentalem et rem subiectam tali forme accidentali; et hoc est rationabile, quia secundum Philosophum in Peryermenias significare est intellectum constituere. Modo planum est quod, prolato nomine accidentis, per tale nomen significatur res subiecta et forma accidentalis, sicut quando dicimus ‘album’, hic intelligo accidentalem formam ut est albedo, et etiam rem subiectam tali forme. Et cum hoc ita sit in concreto accidentis realis, in concreto rationis erit ita quod cum genus sit concretum accidens intentionis et 9 The discussion about the semantic impact of concrete accidental terms—which, as a result of Platonic or would-be-Platonic repercussions, was a hot topic as early as in Peter Abelard’s consideration of the so-called nomina sumpta (see e.g. Dialectica, esp. V, pp. 596–598)—became a key problem in late thirteenth century semantics. See Ebbesen (1988), who distinguishes (117 ff.) four main positions, the view of the majority being (in the words of Radulphus Brito in his Quaestiones super Soph. El., q. 25) that “terminus accidentalis concretus significat aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente, tamen significat utrumque sub ratione accidentis”. Simon of Faversham was one of the adherents to this view (Ebbesen (1988), 118; 148; 151 f.).—As a matter of fact, the general issues of paranomy and denomination (including the semantics of concrete terms) played an important role in the intentionality discussions, the epistemological and metaphysical aspects in particular; see Ebbesen (1986) and (1988), and de Libera (1999), 357–373. Jolivet presents (1975) a clear survey of the paronymy discussions (in both grammar and dialectics) from Antiquity up to the thirteenth century, which testifies to the fundamental influence of the semantic roots of Medieval philosophical thought.

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rationis, duo significabit: intentionem generis et cum hoc rem subiectam illi intentioni. Unde per genus animal  intelligo intentionem et cum hoc animal quod est res subiecta illi intentioni.

Hence it can be gathered that a logical genus is nothing other than a second intention produced by the intellect and applying to the thing grasped in that it denotes [1] an essential and quidditative nature and [2] the relationship to its supposita which are formally and specifically different. This definition is analyzed step by step: Ibid., p. 91 f.: Unde sic ex dictis patet quod per genus logicum intelligimus nil aliud nisi secundam intentionem ab intellectu causatam, rei intellecte applicatam, denotantem essentialem et quidditativam naturam et habitudinem rei ad supposita forma et secundum speciem differentia. Et dico intentionem secundam protanto quia genus de quo determinatur, est ens rationis logicum; nam intentio secunda est de intentione logice, quia dicit Avicenna quod logica est de intentionibus secundis, adiunctis primis; et ideo genus est intentio secunda. Et dico ab intellectu causatam, quia sicut esse reale causatur haquiqua, sic esse intentionale causatur ab intellectu. Dico autem ibi rei intellecte applicatam, quia genus cum sit intentio secunda, non potest super re fundari absolute, sed ut est intellecta (quia intentio secunda, que est intellectus secundus, fundatur super secundos conceptus, sicut intentio prima super primos). Et dico denotantem essentialem et quidditativam naturam etc., quia genus est quoddam ens respectivum. Unde sicut dicit Albertus in Logica sua, genus est intentio secunda ab intellectu causata, applicata rei intellecte, denotans essentialem et quidditativam habitudinem rei ad supposita forma et secundum speciem differentia[m].

Considering the parallel discussion about the twofold meaning of accidental terms, the question is whether in the definition of genus, the intention, genus is defined or the thing underlying the intention, or both. Like in the discussion about accidental terms, Faversham goes for the ‘both-and’ option. Thus what is defined is neither just the bare intention nor just the thing underlying the intention, but the two of them. As for the res, it is the quidditative account or definiens presented of the common noun; now the common generic term formally signifies the intention of the genus, not absolutely, but as applied to the underlying thing.10 So what is actually defined is [1] neither the thing taken 10 Sup. Summulas II, p. 92: “DIFFINITUR AUTEM SIC GENUS [Peter of Spain, Tractatus II, cap. 2 ed. de Rijk]. Circa istam diffinitionem solet dubitari quid hic diffiniatur, scilicet utrum diffiniatur intentio, vel res subiecta, vel utrumque. Certum est quod per ‘genus’ formaliter non intelligit [sc. Petrus Hispanus] intentionem tantum, vel rem subiectam tantum, sed intelligit quandam intentionem secundam ab intellectu

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absolutely as an extramental thing (res absolute considerata, et ut est intellecta), for such things are not predicated, given that being predicated is mind-dependent;11 nor [2] the thing as it is taken in abstracto, for abstract entities are not predicated of something (as we cannot say ‘Sortes est albedo’), but [3] the intention of the generic term is formally defined as it applies to this or that particular thing, while denoting an essential relationship to its supposita which are formally and specifically different. Hence genus is here taken as a second intention applying to the thing underlying this intention: Ibid., p. 92: Unde quando dicitur ‘genus est quod predicatur’, hic non diffinitur res absolute, quia res absolute considerata non predicatur, quia predicari est actus rationis; unde res absolute considerata, et ut est intellecta, hic non diffinitur, quia talis res non predicatur. Similiter res considerata ut abstracte est intellecta hic non diffinitur, quia talis res de suppositis non predicatur, eoquod talis res abstracte intellecta est de suppositis abstracta; nunc autem abstractum de aliquo non potest predicari. Et ideo hic non diffinitur res abstracte considerata in intellectu. Tertio autem dico quod hic formaliter diffinitur intentio generis ut est tali vel tali rei applicata, per intellectum eius rei causata, essentialem habitudinem denotans [denotat Ms.] ad supposita inter se formaliter et secundum speciem differentia[m] (…). Exquo igitur illud nomen ‘genus’ formaliter dicit intentionem generis non absolute sed ut est applicata rei, ideo hic diffinitur genus prout est intentio secunda applicata rei.

What Faversham tries to make clear in this rather puzzling passage (the text witness of which is not entirely reliable, it seems), is, I think, [1] that the formal definition of genus focusses on the ‘thing’ underlying the intention (res subiecta intentioni), i.e. not the intention considered absolutely, and [2] that this ‘thing’ should not be taken in abstracto, but in concreto, i.e. including the intention’s object or content. Hence the author’s remark that to know a second intention requires knowing its object, since this is the only way of becoming familiar with a second

causatam rei intellecte applicatam etc., ut ostensum est. Et res quam nomen significat est diffinitio secundum Philosophum quarto Metaphisice. Et ideo est exquo illud nomen ‘genus’ significat formaliter intentionem generis non absolute, sed ut est applicata rei”. 11 Cf. Qq. super Porph., q. 22, p. 44: “(…) verum est quod predicari est actus rationis; si enim nos circumscriberemus intellectum, nihil predicaretur; tamen, circumscripto intellectu, adhuc homo esset animal, sed non propter hoc animal predicaretur de homine. Unde multum reffert dicere [et perperam add. Mazz.] hoc predicari de hoc et hoc esse hoc. Dicimus enim quod genus predicatur de specie, tamen hec non est vera ‘Species est genus’”.

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intention. Faversham explains Hispanus’s harmless exemplification (‘ut animal’) to prove that the author of the Summulae is of the same opinion: Ibid.: Et quia intentiones secunde non sunt nobis note nisi per res obiectas super quas fundantur, quia istarum intellectus (qui est causa istarum intentionum) non potest manifestari nisi per res obiectas, ideo auctor rationabiliter monstrat hanc intentionem genus per rem obiectam super quam fundatur, cum dicit “ut animal”. Et dicitur ista diffinitio intelligi: Genus est semper intentio secunda, ab intellectu causata, rei intellecte applicata, que predicatur de pluribus etc.12

As the denominative use of common nouns plays an important role in Faversham’s opinion about the semantics of terms with second intention, it is useful to give his description of semantic denomination as occurring in concrete accidental terms. As was common doctrine in Ancient and Medieval times, the concrete term (e.g. ‘album’) was supposed to derive from the abstract (‘albedo’), not the other way round, as we moderns take it. The (philosophical) reason is that the formal, abstract entity was considered the cause of the concretum, and thus had ontic priority. All the same, our author sticks to the common lore about concrete accidental words that the concrete accidental term equally signifies the form and its substrate:13 Ibid., p. 97: Secundo fit denominatio a formaliori, sicut concretum denominatur ab abstracto, ut ‘albus’ ab ‘albedine’. Licet enim ‘albus’ importet albedinem et subiectum illius, tamen quia albedo in ipso magis est formalis, ideo denominatur ab ipsa. Abstractum enim importat magis puram formam.

5.3. The broad scope of the notion ‘second intention’ The domain of second intention is not limited to incomplex concepts, but covers the mental products of the second and third operations of the mind as well. Thus in addition to the products of simple apprehension, there are also second intentions of complex objects, such as enunciation, proposition, affirmation etc., and of more complex objects, like syllogism, locus, argument, and so on. In Sup. Summulas V (De locis), 12 When he discusses the three domains of second intentions (see section 5.3), Faversham argues that in spite of their being simple and incomplex by themselves, some second intentions are regarded as composite and complex because of the complex nature of their objects or contents. 13 See section 4.27, p. 152, n. 69.

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Faversham shows his affinity with the so-called Modistae14 by making mention of the large domain of second intentions: Sup. Summulas V, p. 94: Iste autem intentiones secunde sunt triplices, quia quedam sunt simplices et incomplexe, sicut ille que fundantur super obiecta simplicia et incomplexa, ut species, genus et consimiles; genus enim fundatur super animal, animal est quid simplex, species super hominem, homo est quid simplex; vel dicuntur simplices quia sunt causate a prima operatione intellectus, que est simplicium apprehensio. Alie sunt composite sive complexe, sicut ille que fundantur super obiecta composita et complexa, sicut enuntiatio, propositio, et huiusmodi; et dicuntur complexe quia fundantur super inherentiam predicati ad subiectum; vel dicuntur complexe quia sunt causate a secunda operatione intellectus, que est simplicium compositio et divisio. Alie sunt magis complexe sive composite, sicut ille que fundantur super obiecta magis complexa, ut super discursum rationis, ut sillogismus, locus, et argumentum et cetera; vel dicuntur magis complexe quia sunt causate a tertia operatione intellectus, que est ratiocinatio. Et nota quod omnes intentiones iste sunt simplices secundum se accepte; quod patet cum dico ‘sillogismus’ vel ‘propositio’, quod simplex est. Tamen considerando eas ratione obiectorum super que fundantur, tunc quedam sunt simplices, quedam composite, quedam magis composite, sicut dictum est.

In another notula, Faversham points out that several, formally diverse second intentions can be founded on one and the same object, as a result of diverse ways of considering it. He refers to Avicenna and his example of being sensible, which, depending on different considerations, is a species, or a genus, or a differentia, or a proprium, or a common accident: Ibid., pp. 94–95: Nota etiam quod licet iste intentiones differant formaliter et in specie, nichilominus tamen possunt fundari super unum et idem obiectum sive fundamentum, diversimode consideratum, ut vult Avicenna in logica sua, tertio De permixtione universalium. Dicit15 enim quod bene est possibile quod super unam rem fundantur diverse intentiones secunde. Et ponit exemplum, ut sensibile est species respectu indi14 The Modistae were philosophers who, while chiefly teaching in Paris, by their special interest in linguistic theory gave special attention to the supposed ontological impact of the various modi significandi, and to metalogical questions in general. In their view, logic is to be divided on the basis of the three operations of the mind; simple apprehension, statement-making, and ratiocination, each of these operations being an act from which specific logical concepts (‘second intentions’) result. See e.g. Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum, ed. Green- Pedersen & Pinborg, pp. 3 ff.; Radulphus Brito, Accessus to his Quaestiones super artem veterem (Appendix E, sect. II, capp. 16–18). Cf. Knudsen (1982), 487; Pini (2002), 81 f. 15 Cf. Prima philosophia VIII 5, p. 40910–41016.

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vidui; et est genus respectu visus et auditus et aliorum sensibilium particularium; et est differentia respectu corporis animati (et ponitur a latere eius, ut patet in arbore Porfirii); et est proprium animalis, eoquod causatur a propriis principiis essentialibus animalis; et est accidens commune bovis et hominis etc.

Returning then to the main subject matter of De locis, Faversham applies this principle to the second intentions that can be taken from one and the same statement ‘Homo currit’: in so far as it enuntiates something true or false, it is an enunciation, while it is a question if it is doubted upon.16 The same holds of still more complex second intentions, such as syllogisms and other forms of argument: Ibid., p. 95: Ex hoc ad propositum. Licet iste intentiones differant formaliter, scilicet questio, propositio etc., tamen fundantur super unum et idem fundamentum et super eandem rem diversis respectibus. Unde cumdicitur ‘Homo currit’, inquantum in ipsa est simpliciter veritas vel falsitas, sicest enuntiatio; inquantum autem in ipsa est dubitatio, sic est questio. Et sic etiam est de magis complexis. Est enim bene possibile quod super unum et eundem discursum rationis fundentur sillogismi vel loci, vel argumenta et alia.

5.4. Faversham on the real foundation of second intentions This pivotal question is discussed by our author more or less explicitly twice, to wit, in his Sophisma ‘Universale est intentio’, and in his Quaestiones-commentary on Porphyry. Both works deserve our attention when it comes to establishing Faversham’s position on account of the real foundation of second intentions. 5.4.1. The Sophisma ‘A universal is an intention’ The structure of this sophisma is rather unclear. Whereas in the introductory part, the author promises to deal with three questions (‘What is the active cause of universality?’; ‘What is its material cause?’, and ‘What is its formal cause?’), his magistral determination only discusses the first explicitly, and merely offers a few suggestions about his opinion regarding the two other issues.17 Compared to his sources (Avi16

Cf. the Boethian definition of quaestio as dubitabilis propositio. For an analysis of the text extant (found in one complete and two incomplete copies) see Pinborg (1971), 363. 17

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cenna, Averroes, and Albert the Great) Faversham’s doctrine is far more explicit. He carefully distinguishes between the roles of the active and the passive intellect, by which he intends to decrease the importance of the active intellect and to underline the influence of the object itself in the formation of universal concepts.18 The first two sections discuss the different roles of the two intellects, the active intellect’s main job being to produce the object’s abstract form, whereas the passive intellect completes the formation of the universal. In the third section, it is stated first (in the wake of Avicenna) that a thing’s nature is by itself neither universal nor particular; otherwise it could neither be one and complete in the particulars nor be plurified as found in a plurality of things; and his second claim is, that universality as such is mind-dependent: Sophisma, “Universale est intentio” (ed. Yokoyama p. 6; corr. by Pinborg, p. 360): Considerandum est ergo quod natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis. Si enim secundum se esset universalis, tunc non posset esse una nec plurificata; et sic natura humana non esset tota in Sorte nec natura equina tota in Brunello. Similiter, si secundum se esset particularis, tunc non posset esse plures. Cum ergo natura rei sit una in uno et plures in pluribus, sequitur quod natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis. Sed ipsa est particularis secundum esse quod habet in materia extra, cui ut sic coniuncta sunt principia individuantia, et est universalis secundum esse quod habet in anima.

In the fourth section, he extensively supports the common doctrine that for there to be a complete universal, three things are required: the universal should be [a] actually set free from the extramental object, [b] actually grasped by the intellect, and [c] actually related to its supposita. This last requirement is vital: it is only when the intellect discovers that these supposita are not mutually different with regard to the quiddity considered, that the second intention of universality can be assigned to this quiddity, and there can be talk of a ‘universal nature’: Ibid., p. 9 Y; p. 361 P: (…) ad hoc quod natura rei sit [fit ed.] actu universalis, non sufficit quod sit [fit ed.] actu intellecta. Sed cum natura rei apprehenditur ab intellectu per comparationem ad supposita, et intellectus considerat quod supposita in illa natura rei conveniunt ita quod quantum ad naturam illam unum suppositum ab alio non differt,—tunc intellectus agens agit in ea intentionem universalitatis et accipit ipsam ut aliquid praedicabile de pluribus. Quodsi intellectus apprehendit ipsam de pluribus differentibus specie solum praedicabilem, attribuit sibi inten18

Pinborg (1971), 363 f.

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tionem generis; si autem de pluribus differentibus numero solum predicabilem, attribuit ei intentionem speciei; et sic de aliis.

Thus the intention of universality is a certain concept in the soul, which is attributed to the things involved. Genus and species, and other things that have mental being only, are said to be concepts of this kind.19 A crucial point is the reliability of universal knowledge: how can the universal concept be representative of the particular extramental object? To answer this question, the author tries to clarify the difference between the mode of being in which the thing’s quidditative nature is in the singulars and the mode it has in the intellect. He stresses the conveniences (which are to guarantee the reliability of our knowledge), and reduces the dissimilarity to mere differences in modes of predication. Since a thing’s nature as it is in the intellect through its species, and as it inheres in the singulars through its subsistence, is substantially the same, therefore the intellect takes the nature grasped as essentially attributable to the extramental singulars, albeit only accidentally attributable to them qua conceived of: Ibid., p. 11 Y; p. 362 P: Ulterius, quia eadem est natura secundum substantiam quae est in intellectu per suam speciem et quae est in singularibus per suam substantiam, ideo intellectus illam naturam quam intelligit, accipit ut praedicabilem de singularibus in quid, ita tamen quod illa natura non praedicatur essentialiter in quid de singularibus sub ea ratione sub qua est intellecta (nam ista praedicatio est accidentalis ‘Sortes est homo intellectus’), sed sub ea ratione sub qua est absolute considerata praeter omne accidens.

Along these lines the nature’s different modes of being in the singulars and in the intellect, respectively can be further explained. The nature’s logical property of universality is as such entirely mind-dependent, that is to say, the thing’s nature is never assigned to a plurality of things unless it is actually grasped by the intellect. Nonetheless, Faversham argues, it is the real particular nature that is taken to belong to others of the kind, rather than the nature only in so far as it grasped by the intellect: 19 Ibid., p. 11 Yokoyama (corr. by Pinborg, p. 362): “Intentio universalitatis est conceptus quidam in anima, attributus ipsis rebus. Huiusmodi autem conceptus dicitur esse genus vel species et huiusmodi, quae non habent esse nisi per animam. Unde in ea sunt sicut in causa efficiente, sed in re intellecta inquantum intellecta est sicut in subiecto. Istae autem intentiones non praedicantur de ipsis singularibus (quia non dicimus quod Sortes sit species vel universale), sed praedicantur de natura rei ut intellecta est. Unde dicimus quod ‘Homo est species’, ‘Animal est genus’”.

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chapter five Ibid. (punctuation mine): Et sic natura quae praedicatur est in singularibus sicut in subiecto, in intellectu autem sicut in termino. Et cum praedicatur de singularibus, habet ordinem ad ipsum intellectum, et protanto dicuntur res quae praedicantur de pluribus, esse in intellectu. Sed sunt in re extra sicut in subiecto. Unde verum est dicere quod numquam natura rei praedicaretur de pluribus nisi esset actu intellecta, quia20 predicari est actus rationis. Nihilominus tamen sub illa ratione sub qua est intellecta, non praedicatur de pluribus, sed sub illa ratione sub qua est natura particularis et substantia.

Next this general view is applied to the universal. In so far as the intention of universality is concerned, the universal is in the intellect, rather than in the singulars, but taking the thing underlying the universality, the universal is in the singulars as in its substrate, and is predicated of them quidditatively. It is therefore truly said that, when predicated of the singulars, the universal nature is the nature grasped, but it is not predicated in its capacity of being grasped. Therefore a thing’s nature by itself is neither determined to mental being nor to the mode of extramental being of which it is predicated: Ibid.: Sic ergo ex brevibus apparet quomodo differentia est. Nam universale quantum ad intentionem universalem, in anima est sicut in subiecto; et illo modo non est in singularibus neque praedicatur de ipsis. Universale autem quantum ad rem subiectam intentioni universalitatis, in re est sicut in subiecto, et de singularibus praedicatur in quid. Unde verum est quod cum ipsa natura rei praedicatur de singularibus, est intellecta, sed non praedicatur sub ea ratione qua intellecta. Ideo natura rei ut de se nec est determinata ad esse in anima nec ad esse extra animam de quo praedicatur.21

The corpus of the determinatio magistralis winds up with a summary containing five conclusions:22

20 Our best Ms. (Vat. Lat. 2173) rightly does not read the cum, which was taken over by both Yokoyama and Pinborg from the two other (incomplete) Mss. 21 The last statement once again betrays Avicenna’s influence. Cf. Sophisma, p. 6 Y quoted p. 174 above. 22 As for the first two conclusions see Sophisma, p. 7 Y, p. 361 P: “(…) sciendum est quod secundum Avicennam [Sufficientia, I, cap. 10; Avicennae Opera (Venice 1508), fol. 19a] agens dicitur quattuor modis: perficiens, disponens, adiuvans, consilians. Perficiens dico illud quod ducit formam in complementum rei; disponens vero non inducit formam, sed praeparat et disponit ad inductionem [introductionem ed.] formae. Dico ergo quod intellectus agens agit universale tamquam disponens, sed intellectus possibilis agit universale tamquam perficiens, ita quod ratio universalitatis dispositive est ab intellectu agente, completive autem ab intellectu possibili”.

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– in so far as the disposition or preparatory arrangement of the universal is concerned, its cause is the active intellect – in so far as its completion or perfection is concerned, the passive intellect is involved as a cause – however actually grasped the thing may be, it still is not actually universal until it is related to its supposita – a thing’s nature is first grasped by the intellect, then related to its supposita – as soon as it is related to its supposita, the nature becomes universal. Hence for there to be a complete universal it is required that a thing’s nature be [a] actually abstracted, [b] actually intellected, and [c] actually related to its supposita, that is to say, by itself it is one in them, and, from the mental point of view, it is plurified, but not according to its extramental being: Ibid.: Ex praedictis quinque manifesta sunt in generali. Primum est quod universale dispositive est ab intellectu agente. Secundum est quod est completive ab intellectu possibili. Tertium est quod, quamvis res sit actu intellecta, tamen non est actu universalis antequam ad supposita comparetur. Quartum est quod natura rei est prius intellecta quam sit ad supposita comparata. Quintum est quod simulac ad supposita comparata, ipsa fit [sit ed.] universalis. Ad habendum igitur naturam completam universalis requiritur quod natura rei sit actu abstracta, actu intellecta, actu comparata ad supposita, hoc modo quod secundum se sit una in illis, et secundum iudicium animae quod sit plurificata, tamen secundum esse extra non.23

5.4.2. Does Faversham depart from the common doctrine of the foundation of second intentions? In the previous section Faversham’s opinion about how universal intentions are formed became clear enough. He is most explicit about their real foundation: the actual universal concept must always refer to the thing’s universal nature and to their supposita, i.e. the substrates they each really inhere in. So Faversham is faithful to the general purport of the common doctrine by positing the intellect as the cause of second intentions (because it is the intellect that considers the things understood and that compares them to their supposita).24 However, consid23

non. 24

I cannot see why Pinborg (who thinks this passage is seriously corrupt) cancels this Super Porph., q. 12; cf. q. 26.

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ering his foregoing expositions so outspokenly stressing the role of the extramental object in the formation of second intentions, one may wonder how far the (active and passive) intellect’s causality extends: Are second intentions founded on properties falling to things in so far as they are grasped by the intellect, or are they founded on properties inhering in the things taken by themselves? Pini (2002, 76 ff.) is of the opinion that Faversham is departing from the common opinion on this score as it is found in e.g. Aquinas. To solve the question, let us begin with stating the agreements between their positions. As is still commonly done by authors around 1300, two stages of considering extramental things are distinguished. By a first consideration, the intellect grasps the thing’s quidditative nature, by a second the intellect relates this quiddity to its supposita. Both the idea that it is not until the second stage that the intellect assigns universality to the quiddity, as well as the conviction that universality only exists in the mind, are part and parcel of the common doctrine. As we have seen already, there can be no mistake about Faversham’s remarks: “The intention of universality is a certain concept in the mind, assigned to the things involved. Now genus, species, and similar notions that do not have being outside the mind, are said to be concepts of this kind”.25 However, in his Quaestions on Porphyry, Faversham explicitly relates the formation of various logical intentions to corresponding diverse real properties of the extramental objects, and is aware that when the intellect frames logical intentions (which, by definition, are second intentions) it is moved by the object’s ‘appearances’ (apparentia). He uses this statement to prove that the observations in logic ultimately go back to real things and that logic is not a mere figment of the intellect: Qq. super Porph., q. 2, p. 19 Mazzarella: Cum autem intellectus causat tales intenciones, [et perperam add. Mazz.] movetur ab apparentibus in re. Et propter hoc intellectus diversas intenciones logicales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates (…). Ideo tota logica accipitur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset figmentum intellectus; quod non dicimus.

Indeed, the author concludes from this (ex absurdo, it seems) that it was not a logician who discovered logic, since this discipline considers 25 Sophisma “Universale est intentio”, p. 11 Y, p. 362 P: “Intentio universalitatis est conceptus quidam in anima, attributus ipsis rebus. Huiusmodi autem conceptus dicitur esse genus vel species et huiusmodi quae non habent esse nisi per animam”.

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intentions, not real natures, so that although concept formation by the intellect is ultimately founded upon real things and their properties, the logician qua professionally merely focussing on second intentions, does not consider real objects, or only in as far as they underly intentions: Ibid.: Ex quo sequitur quod qui logicam invenit, logicus non fuit. Exquo enim consideravit naturas rerum logicus non fuit, cum logicus, secundum quod logicus, non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intenciones solas; vel si res consideret, hoc solum est ut sub intentionibus sunt.

A remarkable way indeed of maintaining one’s faithfulness to the basic, definitorial thesis that second intentions make up the proper subject of logic. Whatever reason Faversham may have had to put things this way, the message is also explicitly found in the same author’s Sophisma, section IV, where in the case of an actual universal, the distinction between the intention, universality and the nature underlying it is discussed: Sophisma, p. 8 Y; p. 361 P: In universali secundum actum est duo considerare, scilicet intentionem universalitatis et naturam subiectam intentioni. Intentio autem universalitatis cum non sit purum figmentum, causatur ex aliqua proprietate reali. Et ideo contingit quod anima diversas intentiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates rerum.

The idea that the intellect forms diverse concepts concerning one and the same object by considering the diverse quiddities making up its genus, as they present themselves in the object’s appearance, is also found in the Quaestions on Porphyry; the occurrence of the notion of appearance should be noticed: Qq. super Porph., q. 20, p. 39: Advertendum est hic quod contrarietas que est in genere, non est contrarietas secundum rem, sed solum secundum intellectum. Genus enim non significat unam naturam realem in diversis speciebus, sed solum unam secundum rationem et intellectum. Non enim possibile est quod aliqua una quiditas plurificetur per diversas quiditates; hoc non est possibile, quia tunc unum essencialiter esset plura essencialiter. Si autem genus significaret unam naturam realem in diversis speciebus, una quiditas divideretur in plures quiditates, quia illud quod significatur nomine generis, dividitur in plures species per diversas differencias. Quod cum sit impossibile, relinquitur quod genus non significat unam quiditatem. Dico tunc quod genus non significat unam quiditatem, sed significat diversas quiditates diversarum specierum secundum quod sub aliquo conceptu communi veniunt apud intellectum. Et iste conceptus communis sumitur ab aliquo communi apparenti in re. Ab operacione enim senciendi, que apparet in homine et in asino et in bove et in

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Plainly, Faversham recognizes the decisive role of the intellect in matters of concept formation. However, the intellect’s powers are limited. For it is the intellect’s job not only (in accordance with the common doctrine) to recognize real properties as they are present in the object in question, but furthermore to do so by taking universality as a real ontic aspect actually belonging to the things themselves. So when the intellect frames universal concepts, the only thing it does is to recognize the universal aspect involved as a real property of the object. Thus second intentions are produced by the intellect, Faversham seems to think, not by merely reflecting upon its own acts and devices, but by a secondary, accidental or respective consideration of the extramental object under examination. To underline, first, the pungent nature of our initial question about the foundation of second intentions according to Faversham, it can be remarked that Wolf (1966, 117) is of the opinion that Faversham deviates from the common view on this score by attributing universality to the abstraction process, rather than seeing it as something already present in the extramental object. To my mind, Faversham is quite in line with the common doctrine of the genesis of the universal intention. It is true that it is the intellect that discovers the (logical) property of universal applicability in examining the phantasmata produced by the sensorial cognition of the object, which are as many of its mere apparentia (pace Pini), but these apparentia are taken by Faversham to represent the object’s real properties (pace Wolf). Thus in spite of the fact that, unlike, say, Aquinas,26 our author does not speak of actual universality in intellectu, and potential universality in re, he in fact adheres to the common doctrine about the foundation of second intentions.

26 STh I, q. 84, art. 7c: “Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalium in particulari existentem”; ibid., q. 85, art. 2 ad 2um: “Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis est in intellectu”.

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5.5. The Quaestiones on De anima As may be expected, in Faversham’s comments on Aristotle’s De anima, the doctrine of the function of the human intellect shares common ground with the intentionality issue. As far as we know, Faversham commented several times on De anima.27 I confine myself to the Questiones super tertium De anima diputate a magistro Symone de Faversham extant in Oxford, Merton College, cod. 292, ff. 364r–372r, and the De anima commentary found in Leipzig, Univ. Library, cod. 1359, ff. 44r–77v.28 5.5.1. On the role and the reliability of the intelligible species Globally speaking, Faversham’s views of the human intellect are in line with what is commonly found in the last decades of the thirteenth century, in spite of their showing some personal accentuations, as far as the functions of the active and passive intellect are concerned.29 In line with the contemporary views of cognition, the intelligible species is taken by Faversham as the representative of the extramental thing. Its reliability in this capacity is based upon the supposed identity between the intellect in its actual state of intellecting and what is actually intellected. These two are indeed one, because the likeness of the thing as actually grasped by the intellect is in fact the forma of the intellect in its actual state. This is unequivocally stated in the tenth question of the Merton commentary, in which it is asked whether the intelligible species is that which is grasped by the intellect. This question is somewhat cautiously answered in the affirmative. The intelligible species is not what is primarily intellected: Qq. in III De anima, q. 10, p. 333 ed. Sharp: Dicendum quod species intelligibilis non est illud quod primo intelligitur quia: Forma non agit, 27 See Wolf (1966), 35, nrs. 26–32; J. Vennebusch, ‘Die Questiones in tres libros De anima des Simon of Faversham’ in Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 47 (1965), Heft 1. 28 The Leipzig commentary, which has the incipit: “Philosophus scribit in primo De partibus animalium quod plus delectamur et diligimus scire de rebus incorruptibilibus et eternis (quamvis solum probabiliter et topice sciamus) quam scire omnia reliqua que apud nos sunt, necessario et demonstrative” has not yet been edited. The Qq. In III De anima were badly edited by Sharp (1934) and partly corrected by Wolf (1966), 195–201. My quotations from Sharp’s edition include Wolf ’s (partial) corrections of Sharp’s text; those from the Leipzig commentary (In Arist. I–III De anima comm.) have been taken from Wolf (1966), p. 131; 133 f., and nn. 358; 365; 367. 29 See Wolf (1966), 59–174; esp. 107 ff.

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chapter five sed compositum per formam, quia unumquodque agens agit inquantum est ens actu. Sed forma non est actu. Ideo etc. Et sicut forma non agit, sic nec species; similitudo est enim forma et similitudo rei intellecte. Et ideo non agit in intellectum. Ex hoc arguo: Omne quod intelligitur agit in intellectum. Sed species non agit in intellectum, cum sit forma intellectus vel similitudo rei intellecte. Ergo etc..

What is grasped by the intellect primarily is the extramental thing, rather than the species, because it is the thing, not the intelligible species, by which the intellect arrives at its actual perfection. The species is cognized secondarily and indirectly (secundum quandam reflexionem), and this in its twofold state, both as a particular and as a universal: Ibid., p. 334: Sed quamvis intellectus non primo cognoscit speciem, tamen secundum quandam reflexionem intelligit eam, et in universali et etiam in particulari, in particulari quando intelligit se habere intelligibilem speciem, in universali quando intelligit naturam speciei.30

The species is, therefore, indispensable for there to be genuine knowledge. But this fundamental observation by the same token makes it clear that there is no identity between the extramental object and the object cognized (whether sensed or intellected), but only a likeness (similitudo). And this precisely is the ratio of intentionality, which is the appropriate mode of being of things qua intellected: In Arist. I–III De anima comm. (Leipzig, Univ., cod. 1359, f. 72rb): Lapidis essentia [= ‘the real stone’] non imprimitur speculo, sed species eius. Modo, si speculum esset cognoscitivum, per talem speciem utique intelligeret tamquam per similitudinem. Sed nunc ita est quod materialia non sunt in intellectu essentiis [= ‘per essentias’: “owing to their actual being”]. Ibi enim sunt per intentiones, quibus intellectui sunt proportionalia.

Bacically, it all hinges on correctly understanding the meaning of the phrases ‘intellectus in actu’ and ‘intellectum in actu’, the latter in particular. Quite in line with the Ancient and Medieval habit of making profit of semantic ambivalence in order to describe a complex state of affairs as two-sided, rather than contradictory,31 the author takes refuge to the two complementary senses of ‘what is actually intellected’ (intellectum in actu): 30 In this cognitive procedure, the conversio ad phantasma has the key role; Wolf (1966), 107–107; 115–117. 31 For the vital distinction in Ancient semantics between a word’s or a phrase’s ambivalent uses and their ambiguous uses see de Rijk (2002) I, 69–72.

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Qq. in III De anima, q. 10, p. 333 ed. Sharp: (…) dico quod protanto intellectus in actu et intellectum in actu sunt unum in actu quia similitudo rei intellecte in actu est forma intellectus in actu. (…) dico quod intellectum in actu dicit duo, scilicet rem intellectam, et ita est in rebus extra; dicit etiam cognitionem illius nature, et in tantum est in intellectu.

5.5.2. On the reliability of the intellectual activities The correct understanding of our intellectual activities is indispensable for evaluating the reliability of their results. Two things are basic on this score. First, a clear insight into the nature of the abstraction procedure which is productive of the universal, without which any genuine knowledge is out of the question, and in this context the sharp distinction between the different functions of the active and the passive intellect. Second, full awareness of the fact that this clear insight should be counterbalanced by observing, at the same time, the close ontological and epistemological interrelationship between the abstracted universal and the particular from which it is abstracted. To begin with, what is required to arrive at genuine knowledge of things is the active intellect (intellectus agens). Genuine knowledge is based upon universal, intelligible being. However, universal, intelligible being does not as such exist in the outside world, since whatever exists in the outside world is particular. Now it is the active intellect alone that can provide us with the intelligibles that are needed to move the passive intellect (intellectus possibilis): Ibid., p. 338: Unde dico quod necesse est ponere intellectum agentem. Et hoc primo patet ex parte intellectus. (…). Anima autem humana est de genere naturalium inquantum est perfectio corporis. Et ideo est in potentia. Et ibi non sistit. Oportet igitur quod ducatur in actum. Et ideo oportet ponere duas differentias, ita quod per unam sit in potentia intelligens et per aliam ducatur in actum. Prima est possibilis, secunda vero agens. Item. Hoc declaratur ex parte intelligibilis. Intellectus enim noster est in potentia ad intelligibilia. Ergo oportet quod intelligibilia moveant intellectum. Nunc autem id quod non est, non potest movere intellectum. Ergo oportet quod intelligibile aliquid sit. Nunc autem intelligibile secundum quod intelligibile non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quia omne existens in rerum natura est particulare et unum numero, intelligibile autem est unum in multis. Intelligibile igitur ut sic non est existens. Oportet ergo quod intelligibile fiat tale per aliud. Sed illud non potest esse intellectus possibilis, quia ille patitur. Oportet ergo quod fiat per virtutem agentem.32 32

On several occasions, Faversham refers to optics in order to explain the genesis

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What the active intellect needs to do is clear, to wit to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasmata produced by sensorial cognition; it is up to the passive intellect to receive the intelligible species. However, pace Averroes, according to Faversham (and the other Medieval thinkers), our soul ultimately posseses one undivided intellect, and so, although the active and the passive intellect have their own proper activity, the intellectual activity as such (intelligere) falls to them both equally.33 There being just one unique intellectual power is at the basis of what I earlier called the close ontological and epistemological interrelationship between the abstracted universal and the particular from which it is abstracted. In picturing this state of affairs Faversham also uses the notion ‘intentio’. When asking whether what the active intellect grasps is some thing (aliquid; this term is here pregnantly used for ‘not-nothing’), he answers in the affirmative. However, this answer is qualified in a rather sophisticated way. In its capacity of being active, the active intellect only acts, whereas qua intellect it produces something intellected.34 of the intelligible species, and the diverse roles of the active and passive intellect on this score. E.g. in In Arist. I–III De anima comm., Leipzig Univ. 1359, f. 72va: “Inquantum autem sunt visui visibilia illuminata, mediante medio illuminato vident et cognoscunt, ita quod due vires sive potentie sint in tali oculo. Una vis est scilicet illuminativa medii, alia est illuminatorum receptiva. Et sic est in proposito, scilicet una vis [virtus Wolf ] illuminativa fantasmatum [phantasmata Wolf ], que est abstractiva specierum a fantasmatibus; alia est vis intellectus receptiva huiusmodi specierum. Prima vis vocatur intellectus agens, secunda est intellectus possibilis”. 33 Qq. in III De anima, p. 342: “(…) omnia intelligibilia a nobis fiunt actu intellecta per intellectum agentem, quia quidquid intelligitur a nobis, intelligitur in fantasmatibus, quia intellectum necesse est simul fantasmata speculari. Omne ergo quod intelligitur a nobis est a sensu; nullum autem sensibile est de se intelligibile; ergo oportet quod abstrahatur ad hoc quod intelligatur. Nichil ergo intelligitur a nobis nisi per intellectum agentem”; p. 345: “(…) dico quod abstrahere sive agere est propria operatio intellectus agentis, et recipere est propria operatio intellectus possibilis, sed intelligere nec est propria unius nec alterius. Quod propria operatio intellectus agentis sit agere, et intellectus possibilis recipere patet per Philosophum dicentem quod intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere, et possibilis quo est omnia fieri. Sed intelligere neutrius est propria operatio”; p. 346: “Cuius ergo est intelligere propria operatio? Dico quod est propria operatio intellectus secundum quod intellectus est qui aggregat in se istas duas differentias, agens et possibile. Ulterius est advertendum quod sicut intellectus agens et possibilis sunt idem secundum substantiam, ita abstrahere, quod est propria operatio intellectus agentis, et recipere, quod est propria operatio intellectus possibilis, sunt unum intelligere secundum substantiam, sicut actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam; actio autem et passio sunt unus motus, sed actio dicitur respectu termini a quo, passio vero respectu termini ad quem”. 34 Ibid., p. 346: “Quando ergo queritur utrum intellectus agens aliquid [notice the position of aliquid preceding the verb] intelligat, dico quod intellectus qui est agens,

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The next question is whether the abstraction activity produces something. The author goes on to explain that this is really the case: in the phantasma Socrates or Plato etc. the intention man is potentially present; in considering it, the intellect observes the common universal man as present in such particulars, and abstracts it from them, and puts it in the passive intellect; next it knows the individuals, Socrates and Plato in the respective intelligible species through a certain reflection. Hence it follows that the result of abstraction is some thing, because otherwise the intellect could just as well abstract the intention man from a stone: Ibid., p. 346: Sed tu queres: Intellectus in abstrahendo intelligitne aliquid? Dico quod sic; et per hunc modum: In fantasmate Sortis est intentio hominis in potentia; similiter in fantasmate Platonis, et similiter aliorum hominum. Hec [hic ed.] inspiciens intellectus agens videt quod talis intentio non reperitur in diversis nisi per aliquod commune; et tunc abstrahit illud commune et reponit in intellectu possibili. Et tunc, mediante hac intentione, intelligit Sortem et Platonem et alia individua similia in specie secundum quandam reflexionem. Et ideo necesse est ponere quod intellectus agens aliquid cognoscat in abstrahendo; aliter non magis abstraheret intentionem hominem a Sorte quam a lapide.35

5.5.3. On attaining Reality. The roles of simple apprehension and judgement In the context of the reliability issue the evaluation of the two intellectual operations, simple apprehension and judgement or statementmaking, is imperative. Given the basic facts commonly recognized in Ancient and Medieval philosophy, that [a] any genuine knowledge starts from the individual things (singularia or particularia) existing in the extramental world, and [b] that there is only genuine knowledge of

aliquid intelligit. Probatio quia: Intellectus qui est agens, est idem secundum substantiam cum intellectu. Sed intellectus intelligit. Ideo etc. Secundum [sed ed.] tamen quod est agens, non intelligit, quia secundum quod est agens agit solum. Sed intelligere non est agere solum. Ideo etc.; (…; for this portion see the quotation in our main text). Unde dico quod intellectus agens simul abstrahit et intelligit; sed abstrahit ut agens, intelligit ut est intellectus. Unde sicut ista duo sunt inseparabilia secundum substantiam, intellectus agens et intellectus, similiter ista duo sunt inseparabilia, abstrahere et intelligere; ideo idem secundum substantiam abstrahit et intelligit. Similiter dico de intellectu possibili quod recipit et intelligit, recipit secundum quod possibilis, intelligit secundum quod intellectus”. 35 This passage seems to interrupt the main stream of the argument; see our previous note. Notice that the above De anima passage implicitly reflects the two levels of intellection doctrine found in the Notule super Summulas (see section 5.1 above).

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what is universal, the cognitive procedure must stand up to the seemingly inconsistent requirement of respecting both the nature of individual being and that of the universal. As far as individual being is concerned, Faversham not only adheres to the Aristotelian adage that the soul cognizes the singular through the senses, and the universal through the intellect, but he also describes the cognitive process from the angle of intellectual activity. The universal and the singular are cognized by the intellect, the universal immediately, the singular indirectly: In Arist. I–III De anima comm., Leipzig, Univ., 1359, f. 71va: Singulare cognoscitur ab anima per sensum, universale autem intellectu. Vel ambo cognoscuntur ab intellectu tamquam eadem virtute diversimode se habente, sicut linea aliter se habet, ipsa existente curva vel recta. Et hoc modo intellectus diversimode se habet ad universale et singulare, hinc quidem recte, hinc autem oblique.36

With respect to the role of the intelligible species in the cognitive process, the different contributions made by the first and second mental operations should be taken into consideration, according to Faversham. In our cognition of the intelligible forms, he claims, a twofold order is to be observed: first a thing’s quiddity is grasped (in simple apprehension), then its properties are observed and stated in judgements. Nonetheless, these two operations of the intellect are closely related one to the other, as appears from what the author says in Q. 20 of the Merton commentary, in which it is asked whether our intellect knows by combining and dividing, rather than by simple apprehension. Two arguments are adduced in support of a negative answer. First, for combining and dividing things the simultaneous apperception of a plurality of things is required, which is beyond the intellect’s capability. Second, the acts of combining and dividing in question imply the perception of temporality, but the intellect knows things abstractively, without their temporal conditions, that is.37 In his reply, Faversham rejects these arguments 36 Cf. what Faversham (in line with the common view) remarks about the mediating role of the phantasma administered by the senses; see In III De anima, p. 346, quoted above, and ibid., p. 363: “(…) intellectus noster quidquid intelligit, ex fantasmatibus intelligit; et ideo nichil potest intelligere nisi quod prius fuit apprehensum per sensum”. A similar comparison with the shape of a line is found in the Leipzig commentary, In Arist. I–II De anima, f. 71vb: “Arbor elevata dicitur habere lineam directam, ipsa autem recurvata et reclinata dicitur habere lineam reflexam. Sic intellectus debet se habere intelligendo directe universale, indirecte autem intelligendo singulare, quia tunc deprimit se”. 37 Ibid., p. 354: “Queritur circa particulam istam Indivisibilium autem etc. [De anima

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and instead decides to look at the matter from both sides, claiming that our intellect (in fact, our passive intellect, it seems) first receives the object’s quiddity, and then comprehends its properties and asserts them to the thing intellected or deasserts them from it. The question is then whether the intellection on the level of the second mental operation of judging is of necessity at all. The answer is to the effect that our intellect naturally not confines itself to simply apprehending the object’s quiddity, but goes on to interrelate whatever is apprehended of the object by ‘judgementally’ combining or dividing the things apprehended; and thus the second mental operation obtains a prominent position: Ibid., p. 354: Intellectus autem noster recipit formas intelligibiles secundum quendam ordinem, sicut materia prima primo recipit formas sensibiles. Commentator super II Metaph. dicit38 quod materia prima primo recipit formas simplicium corporum et, mediantibus illis, formas aliorum recipit usque ad ultimam formam naturalem. Sic intellectus noster recipit intelligibilia secundum quendam ordinem. Unde illud quod primo cognoscit intellectus de re est quidditas eius, secundo comprehendit proprietates eius, et tunc componit hec [hic ed.] adinvicem et dividit. Sed que est necessitas quod intellectus intelligat componendo et dividendo? Intelligendum quod de natura intellectus non est solum apprehendere intelligibilia sed apprehensa comparare adinvicem secundum convenientiam et differentiam.—talis autem comparatio secundum convenientiam est compositio, secundum differentiam est divisio—. Et ideo habemus duas operationes intellectus.39 III 6, 430b6], ubi Philosophus determinat de operationibus intellectus, scilicet de apprehensione simplicium, et compositione et divisione eorundem. Et hic queritur utrum intellectus noster intelligat componendo et dividendo. Et arguitur quod non quia: Omnis virtus que componit aliqua adinvicem aut dividit, apprehendit multa simul. Sed intellectus non apprehendit simul. Ideo etc. Item. Omnis virtus que componit aliqua aut dividit, apprehendit tempus presens, preteritum, et futurum. Sed intellectus abstrahit ab omni tempore. Ideo etc.”. 38 Averroes, In I Arist. Metaph., nr. 17, tom. VIII, Fol. 31r: “Primo recipit [sc. materia] formam universalem et postea, mediante forma universali, recipit formas alias usque ad individuales”. 39 The Leipzig commentary contains an appealing observation about the proper tasks and different potential of the cognitive faculties. In Arist. I–III De anima comm., f. 71vb: “(…) licet sensus et intellectus cognoscant singulare, hoc tamen est differenter. Et est differentia quadruplex. Prima stat in hoc quod intellectus est cognoscens ipsum singulare distincte, ipsum determinate resolvendo in partes suas sive in principia rationalia; que sunt secundum rationem, quia, sicut intellectus cognoscit asinum ut est substantia animata sensibilis, rudibilis, ita etiam cognoscit hunc asinum [hominem Ms.] tali subsistentia [substantia Ms.], tali animatione, tali rudibilitate. Sed sensus hoc modo distincte singulare non cognoscit, sed confuse, ipsum non resolvendo in partes nominis. (…). Tertia differentia est quia sensus cognoscit singulare secundum se et absolute, sed intellectus cum sit virtus collativa, cognoscit etiam ipsum comparando ad universale,

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The two arguments in support of the opposite view, holding that our intellect does not have complex intellection, are countered by remarking that our intellect indeed does not apprehend the many things qua many, but takes them in so far as they are one (the object including its properties, that is), without taking them in their own rights. There is a difference between apprehending many things at the same time (apprehendere multa simul) and apprehending them as a unity (simul apprehendere ut unum): Ibid.: (…) intellectus non simul apprehendit multa ut multa sunt, tamen simul apprehendit multa ut unum. Verbi gratia, intellectus simul intelligens totum, simul apprehendit omnes partes totius ut sunt unum in toto, sed non apprehendit eas sub rationibus propriis. Similiter [simul ed.] intellectus non simul intelligit subiectum ut subiectum est, et predicatum ut predicatum est, sed potest simul intelligere subiectum et predicatum ut conveniunt aut differunt; nom tamen simul intelligit rationes per quas conveniunt et differunt, quia tunc apprehenderet multa simul.

A similar reply is given to the other argument. Our intellect only conceives of the object’s temporal conditions secondarily, by bending backwards to the things apprehended. Of a proposition such as ‘Homo est albus’ the intellect primarily grasps that which is conveyed by it, and conceives the temporal conditions expressed by it only secondarily: Ibid., pp. 354–355: (…) intellectus non intelligit primo presens vel preteritum vel futurum, sed per reflexionem quandam. Quando enim intellectus intelligit hanc propositionem ‘Homo est albus’, primo intelligit illud quod importatur per propositionem, secundo vero intelligit tempora [tempore ed.] per quandam reflexionem.

As we have already observed (section 5.61 above), Faversham’s account is in line with common doctrine. In his lore of the intelligible species, our attaining the truth about Reality is warranted by the very nature of the cognitive process in which the universal form inhering in the object intellected coincides with the universal form present in the intellect qua grasping the object. Thus in the context of what we have earlier called the reliability or the ‘cum fundamento in re’ issue, the question remains how in Faversham’s view, the ‘universale in intellectu’ relates to the ‘universale in re’. Unlike the Sophisma (see our section 5.62 above), this question is not discussed in the Merton and Leipzig De anima vel penes convenientiam, vel penes differentiam. (…). Et est advertendum quod sensus primo et per se et directe cognoscit singulare, intellectus autem non directe, ymo per lineam reflexam”.

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commentaries. However, in the passage of the Merton commentary, in which the course of the cognitive process is described, the author speaks (see the text quoted in our section 5.62 ad fin.) of the universality or commonness of the intention man as present in the phantasms, Socrates and Plato, claiming that the intellect recognizes the common predicability of that intention in these phantasms, and then goes on to abstract the universal from them. As we have seen already, there is no reason at all to assume that this should contradict his clear statements elsewhere (see our section 5.42) about the extramental object affording the ultimate cause of universality. 5.6. Summary Faverham’s position with regard to intentionality issue can be summarized in the following points: [1] Extramental things can be considered by the intellect on two levels. By the essential or primary way of understanding (intellectus essentialis or primus) an object is conceived of in its own right, leaving aside its individuating conditions. This way produces first intentions. The relational way of understanding (intellectus accidentalis or respectivus or secundus) considers the object in question according to the logical relationships it has to other things of the same kind. This secondary way produces second intentions (our section 5.1). [2] Accordingly, a first intention is defined by Faversham as a first intellection or conception of a thing, by which the soul apprehends it and its nature alone, e.g. when a man is grasped by the intellect qua man, or animal, or rational. A second intention is the secondary intellection or conception of the thing in question, by which the soul apprehends it according to its being a genus or species, or a definition or definitum,40 and so on (ibid.). [3] An intention can be considered either abstractively, i.e. as an intention sec (pro esse intentionis), or concretively, i.e. including its supposita (pro esse quod habet in suppositis). In the former consideration, the intention’s intentional being is focussed upon, whereas in the concretive consid-

40

For such complex intentions being involved see our item [5].

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eration it is the common quiddity signified by the common noun that conveys the intention, which is under examination (ibid.). [4] Every universal (or universal intention) signifies both universality and the thing underlying the intention (res subiecta intentioni). To consider the universal intention merely according to its universality equals taking it abstractively, whereas to focus on the thing underlying the intention boils down to taking it concretively (5.1; 5.2). [5] All three mental operations (simple apprehension, statementmaking, and discourse) are within the scope of the notion ‘second intention’. To Faversham, the second operation is of particular interest, because of its function in attaining truth and genuine knowledge (5.3; 5.52). [6] Faversham adheres to the common view that second intentions are mind-dependent. He holds that, nonetheless, they are ultimately founded upon real properties present in the extramental things. He is of the opinion that in causing second intentions the intellect is moved by what he calls the object’s appearances (apparentia in re), and that it discovers commonness and universality (or universal applicability) in the phantasmata provided by the previous sensorial cognition of the extramental object. Thus basically he is quite in line with the common doctrine of the proper status of second intentions (5.42; 5.53). [7] The semantic equivalence of the notions ‘intellect-in-its-actual-stateof-intellecting’ and ‘what-is-actually-intellected’ plays the key role in upholding the thesis of the representativeness and reliability of (human) cognition. Faversham’s position in question is underpinned by his picture of the teamwork achieved by the active and passive intellect [5.51– 5.52] [8] Our knowledge of the extramental things is due to the intellect’s activities. In the final analysis, it is the intellect that upgrades the indispensable sensorial cognition to the level required for there to be genuine knowledge of the extramental reality (5.53).

chapter six RADULPHUS BRITO ON INTENTIONALITY

Radulphus Brito was a professor (some time as a ‘magister actu regens in artibus’) in the Arts Faculty in the University of Paris around 1296– 1306; the earliest certain date of his academic life is 1296, when one copy of his Quaestiones super Topica Aristotilis is dated.1 He is reported to have been lecturing on the Sentences in Paris 1308–1309,2 but he may very well have taught theology at an earlier date.3 He incepted as master of theology 1311–1312, and acted as a procurator of the Sorbonne from 1315 onwards up to his death in 1320.4 As a secular priest he enjoyed prebends of the Cathedral of Saint-Quentin and the collegiate church of Sillery (in the diocese of Rouen), and was endowed by Pope John XXII with several canonries (Le Mans, Laon, and Beauvais).5 Radulphus’s views of intention and intentional being had a great influence upon the development of early fourteenth-century intentionalism.6 Jan Pinborg was right in drawing our attention to the fact that in logical and epistemological texts from the first decades of the fourteenth century, Radulphus’s opinions are frequently alluded to, and his theory of conceptualization and the role of intentions is almost invariably summarized and discussed.7

1 Ms. Erfurt, Algemeinbibliothek cod. 4o 276, f. 131r: ‘date a.d. 1295 dominica Reminiscere [= Febr. 19th, 1296 according to the Gregorian Calendar] complete deo gracias et sunt correcte multum omnino sicut de ore suo processerunt’. 2 At the end of Radulphus’ In I–III Sent. as handed down in our only manuscript (Pavia, Univ. Aldini 244), this work is dated (f. 54v) March 15th, 1309. 3 His treatment of In I Sent., dist. 23 as it is handed down in the unique manuscript Pavia, Aldini 244 (see Appendix E, section I) does not show any familiarity with the discussions in William of Ware or James of Metz. 4 For this office see Weijers (1987), 273–277; Teeuwen (2003), 113–115. 5 Glorieux (1933), no. 225; the same (1966), 133 f.; 210; Fauser (1974), 3–4; 12; Pinborg (1975), 119. 6 E.g. Hugo of Utrecht, whose Qq. on Porphyry are extant in Erfurt, Algemeinbibl. Cod. 2o 336, ff. 1–28 and Leipzig, Univ. 1363, ff. 71–94. 7 Pinborg (1980), 56. It cannot be underlined often enough that Jan Pinborg was the first to recognize Radulphus’s important position in early fourteenth-century phi-

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Radulphus, who worked in the ambiance of the Modistae, has greatly contributed to propagating the refinements and the further application of the modistic analyses of the basic logical concepts as they are active in the three operations of the mind, with a particular interest in the cognitional aspects involved.8 Unlike Hervaeus Natalis, however, Radulphus did not write an all-round treatise on intentions, so like in Faversham’s case, we have to turn to several of his writings, which contain pertinent expositions of the matter, including interesting clues that allow us a glance at the manner in which, more or less implicitly, Radulphus applied his views of intentionality to his arguments about general logical matters. 6.1. Radulphus’ comments on I Sent., dist. 23 In his commentary on the Sentences, I, dist 23, Radulphus brings up the usual dilemma, “Does ‘persona’ used for the Divine Persons signify an essence or a relationship?”. First (capp. 9–12),9 he discusses the opinion of people who claim that ‘persona’ is a second intention like ‘individuum’, rather than something real. After enumerating some arguments to the contrary (capp. 13–15), he denies (16–17) their validity against the opposite position, since to claim that ‘persona’ is an intention, is not to deny that there is a real thing corresponding to the intention. All the same, Radulphus sides (18) with those who claim that ‘persona’ signifies something real, but he chooses quite a different line of argument by insisting on the precise meaning of ‘intentio’. First (19–20), intention is defined as an intellective cognition (intellectus). But the cognition of a thing is twofold, to wit, [1] a thing is cognized as it is by its own; this occurs in a primary cognition or intellection, or [2] it is cognized in its particulars; the latter occurs in a secondary cognition, and this is regarded as secondary because anything is earlier known by itself than in its particulars. Accordingly, intention

losophy. But we must not forget that Radulphus was himself tributary to Simon of Faversham; see section 6.6, and Pini (2002), 83–98. 8 Remarkably, in spite of the fact that the Qq. on De anima contain many an exposition on the linguistic aspects of cognition problems, these are completely ignored in Radulphus’s Qq. on Priscian. We owe to Jolivet (1984) a nice paper on this subject. 9 See Appendix E, section I.

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is twofold as well. The primary cognition or intellection is a first intention; the other is a second intention, which is posterior to the first intention in so far as something is earlier known absolutely than in its particulars. For example, the first cognition or intellection I have about a man is that he is an animal and a rational being; this involves cognizing the man by himself, and produces a first intention. A secondary cognition comes down to cognizing man in his capacity of being said of a plurality of men, i.e. cognizing him as a species; and then we are faced with the second intention, man. Replying now to the initial question, Radulphus claims (21) that persona is not an intention, but a real thing. However, of what nature is this thing? It is not something (merely) relational, for any correlativeness is missing (22). St. Augustine’s opinion that ‘persona’ conveys an essence, is rejected (23) as well, because person can be multiplied (‘three Persons’), whereas essence cannot (not, ‘three gods’). Others claim that it has both connotations, essence and relationship, that is to say, essence plus the relational mode of being as a further determination of the essence, which should be expressed by using an oblique case, saying e.g. ‘persona Patris’, meaning the Divine Person who is the Father. Radulphus opts (25–26) for the thesis that ‘persona’ conveys both essence and relationship, but the latter as a relational property, rather than a relationship as such. That is to say, ‘persona’ signifies some aggregate consisting of an essence and a property, in so far as this property is indiscriminately common both to the thing taken apart from the relational property and taken together with it, without signifying either of them determinately. This view requires some explanation (26). Just as from things falling under one of the other categories some common concept can be drawn, so too from things falling under the category Relation. For instance, from whiteness the concept ‘quality’, which is common to whiteness and blackness can be abstracted, which, however, does not signify either of them determinately, that is to say, the quality qua common is not whiteness or blackness determinately, but colour, indeterminately. It is in this manner that ‘persona’ conveys relationship indeterminately, rather than ‘paternal’ etc., which all convey a relationship determinately. Finally, Radulphus generally rejects (31–32) the idea that ‘persona’ conveys what he calls aliquod intentionale. It must strike the reader that, discussing the arguments of his opponents, Radulphus confines himself to rejecting the second intention idea. The possibility that ‘persona’ is somehow a noun of first intention is left out of consideration. Radul-

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phus does not engage himself into early fourteenth-century discussions about intentionality as occurring with theologians such as William of Ware and James of Metz. 6.2. The commentary In Arist. III De anima It is not surprising that Radulphus’s observations in his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima provide us with a main source for our knowledge of the author’s position in matters of intentionality. As a matter of fact, like other writers of De anima commentaries, it is by commenting upon cognitional psychology that Radulphus could fill the serious gaps in Aristotle’s treatment of the cognitional and epistemological issues the fourteenth-century scholars were so profoundly interested in. 6.2.1. On the intellect’s potentiality The second question of Book III (109–126 Fauser) deals with the problem of the potentiality of the intellect, asking whether the intellect is a passive faculty, meaning that to ‘understand’ or to ‘grasp by means of the intellect’ implies ‘undergoing’ something. Clearly, the solution to this problem is decisive for our insight into the cognitional impact of the extramental object of knowledge. Diverse answers to this question are mentioned and commented upon by Radulphus (116–120). Some people are of the opinion, he says, that intellection—and sensation as well, for that matter—are internal acts remaining in the agent, and that, consequently, the intellect and the senses are able by themselves to provoke acts of intellection or sensation.10 Others diversify their answer with regard to the three different operations of the intellect, and take the intellect to be passive as far as the first operation (the so-called ‘first apprehension’ or ‘conceptualization’) is concerned, but active when it comes to framing statements and arguments out of the concepts that have become available after the first operation, owing to which the intellect is already actualized.11 A third group of philosophers mod10 “De ista quaestione quidam dicunt quod sentire est agere quod non transit sed remanet in agente; et sic dicunt de intelligere. Et dicunt quod sensus et intellectus possunt elicere active suam operationem” (116, 156–163 Fauser). I follow by preference the earlier PL redaction (cf. Fauser, 82), occasionally using my own punctuation. 11 “Alii dicunt quod intelligere est pati quantum ad primam operationem, sed quantum ad secundam et tertiam non. Et ratio illorum talis est quia: Unumquodque quod

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ify the first case by differentiating the intellect’s first operation into the apprehension of the intelligible (or the reception of the intelligible species) and the statement-making about the thing apprehended. As to the apprehension proper, the intellect is passive, as to the statementmaking it is as active as in its second and third operations.12 Finally, some people accept a variation of the last-mentioned opinion, holding that the intellect has a passive role as far as the reception of the intelligible species is concerned, but is active in making use of the intelligible species with regard to its act of intellection.13 Next our author passes over to a rejection of the first three positions (118213–120289), particularly the third one, which is the most extreme in restricting the passive role of the intellect in the cognitionial procedure. Radulphus is of the opinion that they all are at variance with Aristotle’s doctrine, and argues for the passive role of the intellect with regard to all three of its operations (121290–295), but qualifies his rigid position by introducing an important distinction concerning the notion of passivity. The passivity that is at stake here is not the proper one involved in e.g. something’s undergoing the influence of its contrary, but rather an improper one which is implied when something is brought to a higher degree of perfection. Well, the passivity involved in the reception of the intelligible species by the intellect amounts to its potential receptivity being activated et actualized. Therefore what is at stake here must be a weaker kind of passivity; and this holds of the three intellectual operations alike.14

est in actu, potest agere. Sed intellectus cum est informatus prima cognitione rei, est ens in actu. Ergo quantum ad secundam et tertiam operationem poterit agere” (116171– 117189). 12 “Alia est opinio quod in prima operatione intellectus sunt duo, quia ibi est apprehensio intelligibilis ab intellectu sive receptio speciei intelligibilis; et quantum ad hoc intellectus est passivus. Secundo est ibi iudicium de re apprehensa; et quantum ad hoc intellectus est activus” (117, 205–209). For the distinction ‘intellectus possibilis vs. passivus’ in Aquinas see STh I–II, q. 51, art. 3c: “In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum: unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis, aliud autem intellectus quem Aristoteles vocat [De anima III 5, 430a24–25] ‘passivum’, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa”. 13 “Alii volunt quod intellectus est passivus quantum ad receptionem speciei intelligibilis, sed est activus mediante illa specie respectu suae intellectionis” (118, 210–212). 14 “Sed primo distinguendum est de passione, quia quaedam est passio proprie dicta—sicut contrariorum est passio proprie dicta, quae est cum abiectione contrarii per mutuam actionem a se invicem–, et alia est passio improprie dicta, quae est salus et perfectio seu receptio perfectionis. Modo dico quod intellectus non patitur ab intelligibili primo modo, sed patitur secundo modo. (…). Illud quod habet potentiam

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However, this passivity is most conspicuous in the first operation, because, prior to first apprehension, the intellect is only in its potential state, without any cognition of the extramental thing, that is, whereas in making statements or framing arguments it uses the products of the first apprehension (122338–346). Another remark concerns the nature of the activity exerted by the intelligible. Analogically to the pair ‘calefacere’‘calefieri’ used for physical action and passion, we could frame the verbs ‘intelligere-facere’ and ‘intelligere-fieri’ for the description of the activity of the intelligible and the corresponding passivity of the intellect (123347–365).15 It may be clear now that, unlike some of his contemporaries, Radulphus insists on recognizing the causal role of the extramental thing in the acquisition of knowledge. His position is clarified when he comes to speak about the proper object of cognition. 6.2.2. On the thing’s quiddity as the proper object of cognition In the seventh Question (173–176), it is asked whether the proper object of cognition is the intelligible species existing in the soul or the outside thing. In the wake of Aristotle (De anima III 4, 429b10–22), Radulphus argues for the second horn of the dilemma: “Dico quod illud quod primo intelligitur est quod quid est rei et non eius species” (17421–22). As for the opinion held by some people that it is concepts that are primarily grasped, whereas the extramental thing is grasped by means of concepts, Radulphus answers to the arguments in favour of their position contain some important information about his own conception of the ontological status of the extramental thing in so far as it is signified. The opponents’ first argument runs as follows (17549–51): Words signify concepts, rather than things; if not, then words would lose their meaning when the things referred to by them have passed away. Our author rejects this argument by stating that after a thing’s ceasing to exist its ‘esse significatum’ persists, since it is not signified under its mode of

receptivam alicuius formae seu perfectionis, est passivum passione quae est receptio perfectionis. Sed intellectus est huiusmodi secundum quamlibet eius operationem, ut de se manifestum est. Ergo etc.” (121295–122337). 15 “(…) actionem intelligibilis in intellectu possemus nominare ‘intelligere-facere’ et passionem intellectus per modum passionis significatam ‘intelligere-fieri’” (123,361– 363).

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extramental being, but of what, alluding to the usual technical expression ‘esse obiectivum’, is called ‘sub esse intellecto’. And, what matters in this respect, is that the words used do not signify this esse intellectum, but the extramental thing itself, albeit under its esse intellectum.16 The second argument adduced (17552–54) against the Aristotelian thesis shared by Radulphus, to the effect that it is the outside thing that is primarily grasped rather than the intermediating concept, concerns the vital notion of ‘assimilation’ involved in the relationship between the extramental thing and the intellect in the cognitional procedure. The opponents start from the common thesis that when [x] undergoes something by [y], the latter always acts as [x]’s like (suum simile), and conclude that because the similitude existing between the intellect and concepts (which both are immaterial) is greater than that between the intellect and the material thing, words must primarily refer to concepts, rather than outside things. This argument is countered by Radulphus by stating that in the case of improper passivity, the assimilation is improper as well, that is to say that it only concerns the impact on the intellect caused by the object, by which the intellect undergoes the assimilation as something that brings it to a higher degree of perfection, viz. its further actualization consisting in the reception of intelligible species of the thing cognized. And when it is said that, rather than the extramental thing, the concept is assimilated to the intellect, this is only true as long as the ‘res’ is taken in its extramental existence; when ‘res’ is taken (as it should be) in the sense of ‘res abstracta’, the similitude between the concept and the intellect is not superior to that between the intellect and the thing.17 With regard to the arguments that were put forward earlier in support of the opposite thesis (1733–18), Radulphus declares (17571–74) that when Aristotle says at De anima III 4, 430a3–4 that what thinks and what is thought are the same thing (“idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur”), he means to say that what thinks and the thing thought is 16 “Sed primum non valet, quia voces non significant conceptus, sed res. Et cum dicitur quod tunc voces caderent a suis significatis etc., dicendum quod res ut significata est, non corrumpitur, scilicet [sive ed.] quantum ad suum esse significatum, licet secundum se corrumpatur, quia non significatur sub illo modo essendi sub quo existit extra animam, sed sub esse intellecto; et sic manet. Neque tamen propter hoc vox significat illud esse intellectum, sed rem sub tali esse” (175,55–61). 17 “Sed si sit patiens improprie, patitur a suo simili improprie. Et cum dicitur in minori “conceptus magis assimilatur intellectui (qui est virtus passiva) quam res”, verum est: quam res quae existit in re extra; tamen non magis assimilatur quam res abstracta” (175,64–67).

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the same thing only with regard to the formal aspect under which the thing is grasped (quantum ad rationem formalem secundum quam res intelligitur). Accordingly, we should express what is meant by the De anima passage more precisely by saying that what is thought is by itself the object’s quiddity as such, to which befalls both to be signified and to be abstracted from its material conditions, and it should be noted that the quiddity of the extramental thing is grasped, but not in its extramental being, but precisely qua being grasped by the intellect.18 The leading thesis coming to the fore in the seventh Question is that it really is the extramental thing that is cognized, but not in its extramental being as such; rather it is grasped in its quiddity as found in the intellect, where it is part of the thing’s ‘esse intellectum’. 6.2.3. On knowing the singulars ‘per reflexionem’. The particular status of the phantasm At De anima III 4, 429b10, Aristotle remarks that we can distinguish between a spatial magnitude and what it is to be such (i.e. its quiddity), and between water and what it is to be water etc. This leads the Medieval commentators of De anima to asking whether the intellect, which naturally is able to grasp quiddities, has access to singulars as well. So Radulphus devotes his ninth Question to Aristotle’s lore that the intellect has access to singulars. In the wake of Aristotle our author states (18323–26) that our intellect is unable to know singular things directly (recto aspectu), but can know them indirectly (secundum lineam circumflexam). However, the Aristotelian position is explained in diverse ways (18346– 18581). Radulphus takes the same position as Aquinas, to the effect that the intellect does not know the singular in a direct way, but only by, in an act of reflexion, considering the singular phantasm (phantasma)19

18 “(…) dico quod illud quod intelligitur, de se est quidditas rei secundum se, cui accidit et esse significatum [signatum sic semper perperam Fauser] et esse abstractum. Tamen intelligitur sub esse quod habet in anima, ita quod illud esse quod habet in anima, non est id [illud Fauser] quod intelligitur, sed id sub quo res intelligitur. Et ita quidditas rei quae est extra animam, intelligitur non sub esse quod habet extra animam, sed sub esse intellecto” (176,76–81). 19 Perler is right in following the Medieval usage of transliterating Latin phantasm instead of using renderings such as ‘image’, because they might make us understand the phantasm in terms of pictorial representation. See the lucid exposition in Perler (2002), 52–60.

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as the location of the intelligible species.20 When he rejects (18452–56) the position held by John Philoponus (In De anima III 4, p. 2336–52 ed. Verbeke) that, just by converting itself to the phantasm the intellect grasps the singular, Radulphus interprets John’s position in terms of a similar way of grasping phantasms and singulars, which, to his mind, only shunts the difficulty, because the phantasms are singulars which exist in them in their capacity of being signified and particularized (sub esse significato et particulato).21 In the fourteenth Question (218–220), Radulphus discusses a cognate problem, viz. whether in the cognitional procedure the active intellect actually cognizes the phantasmata that it produces when adapting them for the passive intellect. He agrees with Averroes that the active intellect does not—with the important proviso (usually found in the Latin Medieval tradition) that he does not share the Commentator’s lore of the separate, superhuman active intellect and instead maintains that the active intellect is a faculty of the individual human soul22 (“ideo dico, tenendo quod sit potentia animae nostrae, quod intellectus agens non habet cognoscere phantasmata”; 21849–50). The active intellect is the intellectual substance whose proper activity is to abstract the intelligible species out of the phantasm and present it to the passive intellect.23 To the next Question (“Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere intellectum agentem”; 221–225), Radulphus answers in the affirmative, arguing for the position that, by being familiar with the abstractum, the passive intellect has access to the activity of the active intellect and, through its cognition of this activity, arrives at cognizing the agent itself.24 20 “(…) intellectus isto modo intelligit singulare: ad modum lineae reflexae et non recto aspectu” (185,98–99). Cf. Aquinas, STh I, q. 86, art. 1c: “(…) singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest (…). Indirecte autem et quasi per quandam reflexionem potest cognoscere singulare, quia (…) etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III De anima”. 21 It may strike the reader that our author interprets (184,52–71) the (supposedly) opposite views of Philoponus, Averroes, and an anonymous author rather malevolently. 22 See the Questions 12 and 13 (194–216). After all, Aristotle’s own position seems rather close to Averroes’s. 23 “Modo intellectus agens est substantia intellectualis cuius operatio est abstractio phantasmatum, per quam abstractionem fit intellectio in intellectu possibili” (219,68– 70). 24 “Ideo dico ad istam quaestionem, tenendo quod intellectus agens sit potentia animae nostrae, quod intellectus possibilis potest intelligere intellectum agentem, quia:

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6.2.4. On the activity of the active intellect The extensive sixteenth Question (225–244) deals with the proper activity exerted by the active intellect when it adapts the phantasm for the passive intellect, asking whether it has a certain impact or influx on the phantasm, or only takes away obstacles. Radulphus presents (229104– 244525) a far-flung discussion of three possible answers. One is the common opinion to the effect that the active intellect has no positive25 influence upon the phantasm and confines itself to removing the obstacles consisting in the singular’s individuating conditions which still appertain to the phantasm. This opinion is supported by the argument that the quiddity, once it is detached from the individuating conditions, is able to activate the passive intellect, without any additional activity on the part of the active intellect. In our author’s view, however, this does not suffice for adapting the phantasm (229104–231153). He thinks it is more likely that the active intellect disposes the phantasm in a more substantial way, because, inter alia, the active intellect’s activity is of an essential nature, and, as such, affects the phantasm by instilling a certain form in it, thus formally assimilating the phantasm to its own immaterial conditions.26 The question remains (233232–234) how the active intellect is able to impress on the phantasm the power to activate the passive intellect. In line with the current views of the close relationships between semantics and optics in concept formation, Radulphus claims

Intellectus possibilis ex cognitione operationis devenit in cognitionem substantiae cuius est illa operatio, sicut ex cognitione operationis hominis devenit in cognitionem hominis. Modo intellectus possibilis cognoscit operationem intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere, quia cognoscit abstractum; et ideo habet cognoscere abstractionem. Et ideo ex cognitione abstractionis, quae est operatio intellectus agentis, potest devenire in cognitionem intellectus agentis” (22357–22467). 25 Note that this term is used to mark the difference from the negative action of merely removing obstacles. 26 “Alia est via quod intellectus agens agit super phantasmata aliquid imprimendo phantasmati. Et videtur probabilis” (231,154–155); “(…) aliquae rationes istius opinionis tactae sunt in arguendo (2265–22863), et adhuc possunt adduci rationes speciales. Prima talis sic quia: Intellectus agens aut est agens per se respectu phantasmatum, aut agens per accidens; non potest esse agens per accidens, quia agens per accidens reducitur ad agens per se, sed non est aliquod agens per se ad quod possit reduci nisi ad quidditatem. Sed ipsa quidditas non est agens per se respectu intellectus possibilis, quia est potentia [ablative case: ‘potentially’] intellecta, et tale non est agens per se respectu intellectus possibilis, quia agens per se est in actu respectu passi. Ergo relinquitur quod sit agens per se respectu phantasmatum. Sed agens per se aliquam formam imprimit in passo, quia assimilat sibi passum secundum formam. Ergo etc.” (231173–232184).

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that the active intellect bestows upon the phantasms the capability to be freed from the particular conditions they, as products of sensation, are invested with.27 The main outcome of the foregoing observations seems to be that Radulphus lays emphasis upon the different substantial contributions performed by the outside object and the intellect in order to arrive at really knowing something, as a result of a cognitional procedure which recognizes both the initial material conditions of the outside object and the requirements for genuine knowledge of the objects’s quiddity. 6.2.5. The intelligible species in the soul identified with the intellective act In De anima III 8, 431b21–432a1, Aristotle remarks that the soul is in a way all existing things, and that it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form. With reference to this passage, Radulphus brings up the question (Question 25292–300) whether the intelligible species in the soul is something real which differs from the cognition of the thing cognized (2924–5: “Utrum species intelligibilis quae ponitur in anima, sit aliquid reale differens a cognitione rei”.). After the discussion and rejection of three alternative answers (2926–297143), Radulphus goes on to argue for the identification of the intelligible species and the cognition of the thing represented by it, called also (292,14; 297,153) ‘actus intelligendi’. Many arguments are brought forward in support of this position, and for the rejection of the opposite views (29457–60; 297147– 299204). Their general purport is that the actualization of the potency of the passive intellect does not require a species as an instrument which is 27 “Si colores essent [note that a subjunctive mood used in the prodosis, when followed by the indicative mood in the apodosis is not a signal of the modus irrealis; it rather stands here for a ‘potentialis modestiae’ indicating Avicenna’s position as a reasonable assumption, on which the ‘via probabilis’ (231,155; 239,393) is based] potentia visibiles, sicut Avicenna posuit, tunc simile esset de intellectu agente respectu phantasmatum et de lumine respectu colorum, quia sicut colores de se essent potentia [‘potentially’] visibiles et per contactum luminis fierent actu visibiles, sic phantasmata sunt potentia intellecta de se et per contactum luminis intellectus agentis fiunt actu intellecta. Sed si ita esset, lumen aliquam virtutem positivam daret coloribus per quam possent immutare medium et organum quam prius non haberent. Ergo similiter in proposito intellectus agens virtutem positivam dat phantasmatibus per quam possint [possunt ed.] intellectum possibilem immutare sive movere quantum ad rationem quidditatis praeter accidentia et conditiones particulares sub quibus est in phantasia” (233234– 234246). For an adequate understanding of the coherence of 13th–14th centuries optics, epistemology and the foundations of semantics Tachau (1988) is still the indispensable standard work.

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prior in existence to the cognitive act; the species rather is concomitant with the act. As a matter of fact, the primary thing the passive intellect receives is the very act of cognition, because it is disposed to receive it in the highest degree.28 A serious objection was made at 29214–29321 to the effect that, if the intelligible species entirely coincided with the act of the intellect, then when this act ceases to be, no species would remain. Now this is not the case, as is also clear from Aristotle in De anima (II 5, 417a22-b2; III 4, 429b5–9). In this passage Aristotle says that after the first intellection of a thing, the soul is no longer in potency to actual cognition in quite the same way as it was before. The solution to this question is that after the first intellection something in the soul remains, and this cannot be anything but a species or ‘similitudo rei’. In his reply to this objection, Radulphus distinguishes two modes of actualization, one accomplished by a primary act, the other by a secondary act. He agrees that after the first intellection the soul is not equally in potency to actual cognition, and habitually retains the species, and thus is disposed to a secondary act of cognition. However, this does not imply, Radulphus wishes to maintain, that, in the first intellection, at least, you should tell the intelligible species apart from the act of intellection.29 The present Question winds up with an interesting remark on concept formation. To bluntly claim that it is the intellect that causes our concepts is not correct. Rather you should say that concepts and cognition are caused in the intellect with the thing as the ultimate cause (ex re), with the outside thing as its initial material, that is; and this happens in virtue of the efficacy of the active intellect.30

28 “Quandocumque aliquid est in potentia passiva ad aliquem actum et primo et de se est summe dispositum ad recipiendum illum actum, primum quod recipit est ille actus. Sed intellectus possibilis per se et primo est in potentia passiva ad actum intelligendi sive ad cognitionem intelligibilis, et est de se dispositus sufficienter ad recipiendum. Ergo primum quod recipit est cognitio sive actus intelligendi” (297,147– 153). Notice, however, that Aquinas unmistakably denies the sameness of intelligible species and the intellective act; see e.g. CG I 53, nrs. 443–444, quoted in section 2.3; also section 4.11. 29 “Ad aliud, quando dicitur: cessante actu intelligendi, non remaneret [remanet Fauser] species, dicendum quod cognitio rei vel actus intelligendi potest dici actus vel cognitio habitualis in actu primo, vel in actu secundo. (…). Et quando dicitur: post actum intelligendi primum anima non est eodem modo in potentia, verum est, quia retinet in habitu speciem vel cognitionem rei, et est in potentia ad actum secundum” (298,173–181). 30 “Ad aliud, cum dicitur: intellectus format conceptum etc., dicendum quod non

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6.3. The Quaestiones In Arist. I De anima, q. 6 This question deals with the pungent problem whether the universal is caused by the intellect, period (as is held by Averroes), or exists without the operation of the intellect.31 To solve this problem it is useful, Radulphus says (cap. 7), to first define the notion ‘intentio in communi’. This is that by which the intellect tends towards something else. Speaking, then, about first and second intention, Radulphus has the opportunity of broaching the distinction ‘abstract vs. concrete’. The first intellection of a thing, by which it is primarily intellected on the basis of its proper phantasm (ex proprio suo fantasmate), is a first intention in abstracto, whereas the object thus intellected is a first intention in concreto. As for second intentions, they are cognitions of an object with reference to some other thing and, accordingly, a second intention is taken from a common mode of being, such as being universal or universality. Now universality or universal (quiddity) in abstracto is the cognition of a thing as it is suited to be in a plurality of instances, whereas the universal in concreto is the object being known as it actually is found in a plurality of things (capp. 8–9). There are also complex intentions, such as in ‘A man is running’. When such a complex is cognized in its capacity of being a combination of subject and predicate, it is, according to its being primarily intellected, a first intention in abstracto, whereas what is thus cognized is a first intention in concreto. In a similar way, the notions ‘propositio’, ‘questio’ are explained, in accordance, that is, with the use made of the complex (cap. 10). Now that these preliminary things are stated, the initial question about the role of the intellect in the coming about of universals, can be solved. The universal is, Radulphus claims, a (common) noun of an intention in concreto; and this intention can be taken for a first or a second intention. When the noun stands for a first intention in concreto, it indicates something that is not mind-dependent, to wit, the noun’s material significate or the thing’s quiddity. When the noun stands for its formal significate, then the universal is something that is caused by the active intellect in cooperation with the phantasm. On est verum, immo formatur in intellectu ex re conceptus sive cognitio; et hoc in virtute intellectus agentis effective” (300,241–243). 31 See for the texts Appendix E, item IV.

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the other hand, when the noun is used to stand for a second intention in concreto, then speaking from the material viewpoint, it likewise is not mind-dependent, and indicates the extramental object in so far as it is secondarily intellected (capp. 10–13). To be more precise, an intention conveyed by a universal noun can be assigned to a thing that only possesses being in the intellect, and so indeed it depends upon an operation of the intellect, but this does not alter the fact that the universal intention conveyed by the noun primarily concerns the extramental object, since the object’s being in a plurality of things is a real, extramental property, although its being one in many is due to its being considered by the intellect (cap. 14). Next it is objected that also the material significate of a second intention is mind-dependent. Radulphus replies that the phrase ‘the thing primarily intellected is an object of second intention’ has a twofold sense. In one sense it bears upon the aggregate consisting of the object and the first intellection thereof. The same phrase can also mean that an object that is first intellected absolutely, then is grasped through a respective (or relational) intellection, to wit, as it is found in a plurality of other things of the same kind. Now if the phrase is taken in the second sense, then the material significate of the second intention in question is not mind-dependent. It is true, however, that its formal significate does depend on the activity of the (active) intellect and, accordingly, is mind-dependent (capp. 15–19). Four arguments are brought forward, then, in support of the thesis that the intention conveyed by a universal noun—or, saying this otherwise, the conceptual aspect (ratio) of that which is the formal element of the significate of this intention taken in concreto—is caused by the cooperation of the active intellect and the object, and this because of the object’s mode of being which corresponds to that intention’s (capp. 20–23). If the term ‘universal’ is taken in the usual sense either for an object’s quiddity in its own right (i.e. as a potential universal), or for its quiddity that universality can be assigned to, the universal is not minddependent, because the intellect is not the cause of an extramental thing. To be more precise, the quiddity to which the intention of universality can be attributed, is primarily extramental, because universality is not attributed to a thing in so far as it is intellected, but in its capacity of being part of the outside world. The outside object has has a mode of being that corresponds to that of the intention, to wit, being in a plurality of supposits (cap. 24).

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When in support of the opposite thesis (to the effect that the universal is not caused by the intellect at all) it is objected (cap. 4) that the active intellect acts upon the sensorial phantasm, rather than some intellective being, Radulpus replies (capp. 29–30) that this is true, taking this statement in its primary and immediate sense, but this does not alter the fact that abstraction from the phantasm by the intellect is required for making it receptive to the passive intellect. And thus the active intellect appears to bring about the second intellection or intention of the universal mediately. Radulphus clarifies what he means to say by adding that the internal sense of imagination (phantasia) is capable of cognizing the object as existing in a plurality of things, because number and plurality are something sensible (albeit a common sensible). Thus the phantasia, which perceives all common sensibles, is capable of cognizing the multiplication of the supposits, just as it cognizes the supposits taken by themselves, but, as a sensorial faculty, it is unable to cognize the supposits as instantiations of the object’s quiddity, because it only has access to the supposits’s sensible accidents (viz. number and plurality).32 The determinatio magistralis winds up (cap. 25) with a remark concerning intentions being denominatively predicated of (or attributed to) intentions. Since (universal) intentions are certain intellections in concreto, they are said of the objects denominatively, but this does not mean that such intentions were present in them as in their substrate (in a similar fashion as a man is denominatively called ‘a white thing’ after the whiteness present in him as its substrate); rather the denomination is based upon their being objectively in the intellect. A final remark (ibid., cap. 31) is about the correct meaning of the expression ‘The universal is that which is in a plurality of things’. This statement bears on the potential universal, i.e. the extramental thing that the intention conveyed by a universal (or common) noun can be assigned to. The actual universal is the thing intellected qua one in many. Now this thing (to wit, the object taken under the aspect of its universality) surely depends on an operation of the intellect. 32 Notice that to Ancient and Medieval thought, one is not a number, but the principle of counting (principium numerandi). So the phrase ‘number and plurality’ is a hendiadys. Latin numerus (like Greek arithmos, at that), properly speaking, stands for an ordered series of two, or more, elements that are somehow alike and therefore countable. Similarly, taken concretively ‘number’ indicates a countable aggregate (cf. ‘numerum facere’ or ‘numerum ponere’ for ‘to be countable’ or ‘to be of a similar kind’). See de Rijk (2002) II, 260–262; 371–374; 379–381.

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Unlike his Commentary on De anima III, in his Questions on Porphyry Radulphus comes to speak about what, by the cooperation of the outside thing and the active intellect, is impressed upon the passive intellect, in terms of ‘intentio’.33 Thus in the context of what we learned from the commentary on De anima, to Radulphus’s mind, intentions come into existence as the result of the activity exerted by the active intellect upon the phantasms: they are set free from their material, particular conditions and, thus adapted to the requirements of genuine knowledge, they are presented as the outside thing’s quiddity (quod quid est) to the passive intellect. This process warrants not only the coming about of genuine knowledge but also its objectivity. However, any straightforward statement on this score is bound to leave some controversial questions unanswered, all of which concerning the nature of the object proper of cognition. Radulphus tries to find his own way in these matters. As for the texts extant of the Questions on Porphyry, they are transmitted in 12 manuscripts and an early printed edition. As usual with university texts, it is impossible to assess the relationships between the Mss. Nonetheless the 13 text-witnesses can be roughly arranged into two groups, containing what is labelled the A-version and the B-version, respectively.34 According to Pinborg, the doctrinal differences between the extant texts are slight and do not reveal any systematic or evolutionary pattern.35 As for the date of Radulphus’s works on logic, Fauser (1974, Introd., pp. 13–16) has good reason to assume that they were written in the period between 1295 and 1307/8, in which the author was active in the Arts Faculty in Paris.

33 The discussion of ‘intentio’ in commentaries on Porphyry is traditional business after Albert the Great. The discussions of second intentions taken as the formal object of logic appeared roughly around the middle of the 13th century in connection with the strong Avicennean influence in logical matters; see Pinborg (1975), 120. 34 For this division and other complexities of the text tradition see Pinborg (1980), 56–58. 35 Pinborg (1980), 58.

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6.4.1. The fifth question In the fifth question, Radulphus discusses the problem whether universale in communi is a genus to the five universals (or predicabilia). After the usual pro and con arguments, Radulphus mentions (6675–6897) diverse solutions to the question, among which Albert the Great’s, who goes for the negative answer, arguing that ‘universale’ is used analogically when it is used for both the common term and its specifications. Radulphus rejects this answer and goes on to make a distinction by introducing the notion of intention. The word ‘universale’ can either mean the thing underlying an intention (res subiecta intentioni), or stand for the second concrete intention itself, i.e. the property of universality assigned to the things signified. Now taking the word in the first sense, the initial question should be answered in the negative, because the things underlying the intention expressed by a universal noun do not fall as such under the common notion of ‘universal’. On the other hand, if you take the common ‘universal’ in the second sense to stand for the concrete second intention as expressed by the universal noun, then the answer is yes, since the relationship ‘genus-species’ unequivocally applies to concrete universality, and in that case these two only relate as superius and inferius, while the notion of generality and speciality remains unaffected by the diverse modi essendi found in the things signified. On the other hand, the things signified have diverse modes of being, to wit, the substantial mode beside nine accidental ones, and this real diversity, which is founded upon the things’ belonging to different categories, is bound to frustrate the ‘genus-species’ relationship.36 The foregoing observations are further elucidated when Radulphus turns to opposite views. Following the B-version (which is here more clear), we read (p. 73157 ff.) that extramental things (entia realia) such as man and animal, have a twofold mode of being (duplex esse), viz. their quidditative being outside the mind, and an accidental mode of being falling to them in their capacity of being grasped and abstracted by the intellect (esse intellectum et abstractum). Likewise, rationate beings (entia rationis), such as genus and species, have a twofold mode of being, viz. the mode of being arising from their being primarily intellected, which is essential to them, and an accidental mode of being, falling 36 Q. 5 (A-version), p. 68107–110 ed. Pinborg: “(…) sicut dicit Simplicius in Praedicamentis, genus et species primo reperiuntur in substantiis, ex consequenti autem in accidentibus, sicut etiam in concretis non est aeque proprie genus et species sicut in abstractis”.

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to them in so far as they are examined by the intellect precisely qua intellected, and thus implying certain logical interrelationships. Now the universal in communi merely differs from the five predicables after the accidental mode of being, since after the latter, through the knowledge of the thing, have been generated in the intellect, the intellect is able to discern some common abstract feature, to wit, their common universality, which is affected by their differences from the universal in communi in an accidental way only. This accidental difference does, however, not affect their common, unequivocal universality resulting in the well-known unequivocal relationship of superius and inferius.37 6.4.2. The sixth question In the sixth question Radulphus investigates whether there can be a universal without there being any operation of the intellect whatsoever (“Utrum universale habeat esse, circumscripta quacumque operatione intellectus”). To the affirmative answer Averroes’s well-known statement is opposed that it is the intellect that causes universality in things (“intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus”; p. 8419). Radulphus’ solution is prepared by a distinction concerning the universal. What is universal can be either taken to stand for [a] the thing signified or [b] for the concrete second intention. In the first case, it is taken [a1] for the thing as it is subjected to universality, or [a2] for the thing absolutely. For example, man can be taken [a1] for the thing, man in so far as it is considered a species (i.e. as the second intention, species is assigned to it), or [a2] for the human nature irrespective of this logical assessment.38

37 Q. 5 (B-version), p. 75208–214 Pinborg: “Modo universale commune differt a quinque universalibus solum secundum suum esse intellectum accidentale, quia postquam quinque universalia per cognitionem rei facta sunt in intellectu, tunc intellectus potest intelligere aliquod commune abstractum ab eis in quo communicant. Tale autem est universale commune, quod secundum esse intellectum accidentale solum differt a quinque universalibus. Ideo non oportet quod differat ab eis simpliciter”.—The essential vs. accidental issue is elaborated in cognate discussions elsewhere; see sections 6.45 and 6.62 below. 38 Q. 6 (B-version), p. 8718–23: “Ad istam quaestionem dico quod universale potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet vel pro re, vel pro intentione secunda concreta. Modo si universale accipitur pro re, adhuc hoc est dupliciter, quia aut accipitur pro re obiecta universalitati, aut pro re absolute. Verbi gratia sicut homo potest considerari vel pro re secundum quod sibi attribuitur haec intentio secunda quae est species, vel pro natura humana absoluta”.

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Now (p. 8724 ff., B-version) if the universal is taken in the [a1] sense, or in the [b] sense (i.e. for the concrete intention considered in its relationship to the thing it denominates), then the universal cannot do without the operation of the intellect. On the other hand, if the universal is taken in the [a2] sense, no mental operation is involved, since, then, the thing in question is only potentially subjected to universality, and so the universal merely conveys the quiddity of the thing signified, quite irrespective of any logical relationship to others. Indeed, a thing’s quiddity is only potentially universal, because it is potentially receptive of abstraction and of being predicable of many things; prior to abstraction by the active intellect, it is materially determined by its individuating conditions. In other words, the quiddity of an extramental entity does not owe its being to the intellect. Now the universal taken for the thing signified absolutely is such a quiddity.39 The A-version follows an alternative line of argument, applying the distinction between first and second intention to the present subject matter. An actual universal can be taken either [a] with regard to first or [b] to second intention. That is to say, with regard to the primary sense of ‘universal’, the actual universal is the thing primarily intellected under its proper mode of being (such as man or animal in so far as it is grasped qua sensing or moving); and in this case a primary cognition of the thing, or first intention is involved. But taken as a second intention it is the thing grasped in so far as it is found in a plurality of things. Now in either way (whether in first or second intention, that is) a mental operation is required.40 Some lines further on, the res intellecta is put on a par with the universal in concreto, and a

39 P. 8972–9185 (B-version): “(…) quod-quid-est sive essentia rei est in potentia ad hoc quod sit universalis, quia est in potentia ad hoc quod abstrahitur, et per consequens ad hoc quod sit unum in multis et praedicatur de multis, quia ante abstractionem intellectus agentis aliquid est signatum et coniunctum conditionibus individuantibus. (…). Vel aliter potest declarari quia: quod-quid-est rei existentis extra animam non habet esse ex operatione intellectus. Sed universale pro re absolute sumpta est quod-quid-est sive essentia rei existentis extra animam. Ergo etc.”. 40 P. 8638–46 (A-version): “(…) universale in actu potest accipi dupliciter: vel quantum ad primam intentionem, vel quantum ad secundam. Universale in actu quantum ad primam rationem ‘universalis’ est res primo intellecta sub proprio modo rei, ut homo vel animal secundum quod intelligitur sentiens vel movens. Et haec est prima intentio sive cognitio rei. Talis prima rei intentio secundum modum essendi proprium eius est universale in actu quod est prima intentio. Universale autem in actu quod est secunda intentio, est res intellecta ut est in pluribus vel cognitio rei sic intellectae”.

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thing’s first intention is defined as cognitio rei absoluta, whereas the second intention or cognition is defined as the thing’s cognition as it is found in a plurality of things.41 The message of this discussion is clear. The logical property of universality actually assigned to something intellected definitely depends upon a mental operation. However, that which is receptive of abstraction and of being considered universal, to wit the thing’s quiddity in the absolute sense, belongs to the extramental thing, quite independent of any mental operation. This quiddity is signified by the thing’s concrete first intention, whereas its concrete second intention is the same res intellecta, taken according to a respective way of cognition by which it is assessed in its logical capacity of being predicable of a plurality of things. 6.4.3. The seventh question The next question is about the cause of the universal, whether the agent needs the cooperation of the possible intellect (“Utrum ad esse universalis sufficiat operatio intellectus agentis”). Radulphus rejects the usual solution to the effect that the universal receives its being from the active intellect incohative, and from the possible intellect completive. His own solution is prepared by a general exposition of the first vs. second intention issue. An actual universal, he claims, either conveys its significate in first intention or in second intention. These intentions can be taken abstractively or concretively. The first intention of a universal in abstracto is the thing’s primary cognition or intellection executed after the thing’s proper mode of being, whereas the first intention in concreto is the thing primarily intellected after its proper manifestation or mode of being, such as man is a first intention in concreto as he is grasped qua reasoning or sensing; and the same holds for other entities. The second intention of a universal in abstracto is the intellection of a thing in its capacity of being found in a plurality of things; this intellection is not absolute but in respect of one of its properties. The second intention of a universal in concreto is the thing grasped as it is actually 41 Ibid., p. 8653–57: “(…) universale quocumque modo sumatur, sive pro prima intentione sive pro secunda, in concreto acceptum est res intellecta. Ergo si accipiatur vel pro prima intentione (quae est cognitio rei absoluta), vel quantum ad secundam cognitionem (quae est cognitio rei ut in pluribus; quae est cognitio respectiva), non est sine operatione intellectus”.

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found in a plurality of things. Now what is here observed with regard to the universal holds good of all other incomplex intentions and what is attributed to an incomplex thing in the framework of the first operation of the intellect (i.e. simple apprehension) Q. 7 (A-version), p. 9855–63: Sed ego dico quod universale actu aut dicit primam intentionem universalis, aut dicit secundam; et istae intentiones possunt accipi in abstracto et in concreto. Modo primo videamus quid sit intentio prima et quid secunda, tam in abstracto et in concreto. Intentio prima universalis in abstracto est prima rei cognitio vel intellectio secundum proprium modum essendi ipsius rei. Prima autem intentio in concreto est res primo [modo] intellecta secundum proprium apparens vel modum essendi ipsius rei, sicut homo secundum quod intelligitur ratiocinans vel sentiens dicitur prima intentio; et sicut dico de homine, sic intelligo de aliis.42

The second intention of a universal in abstracto is the intellection of a thing in its capacity of being found in a plurality of things; this intellection is not absolute but in respect of one of its properties. The second intention of a universal in concreto is the thing grasped as it is actually found in a plurality of things. This observation concerning the universal holds good of all other incomplex intentions attributed to an incomplex thing, in the framework of the first operation of the intellect (i.e. simple apprehension): Ibid., p. 10064–71: Secunda intentio universalis in abstracto est ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus; et talis non est intellectio rei absoluta, sed respectiva, quia prius est intelligere rem absolute quam ut est in pluribus. Sed intentio secunda universalis in concreto est res intellecta ut est in pluribus. Et sicut dico de universali, sic intelligo de aliis intentionibus incomplexis et attributis rei incomplexae iuxta primam operationem intellectus, sicut est ‘praedicatum’ et ‘subiectum’, et sic de aliis secundum diversos modos essendi ibi repertos.

Three statements can now be made (p. 10074–104131): – An actual universal conveying a first intention abstractively or concretively requires the possible intellect, because for there to be any intellective cognition, the passive intellect is required, since the passive intellect is the subject of any cognition.43 Cf. Qq. In artem veterem. Accessus, cap. 15. Ibid., p. 10081–88: “(…) Universale, sive sit prima intentio sive secunda, sive in abstracto sive in concreto, est quaedam cognitio (quantum ad universale in abstracto), vel res cognita (quantum ad universale in concreto), absoluta (quantum ad primam intentionem), respectiva (quantum ad secundam). Modo nulla cognitio potest esse sine 42 43

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– For there to be the universal itself the passive intellect is not an effective cause, but rather the active intellect together with the thing’s mode of being in virtue of which it is founded in the object. This holds good for both the first and the second intention. The universal that is a first intention in abstracto, is the thing’s first or primary cognition, whereas the first intention in concreto is the thing itself as it is primarily cognized on its own. Now the cognition of a thing causally depends upon the object of this cognition, and the active intellect; this object is the thing’s quiddity taken after its proper mode of being as present in the phantasm, which affords the cognitive aspect (ratio intelligendi). Therefore the universal as a first intention is caused by the mode of being as present in the phantasm and the active intellect, which has to abstract the quiddity from the singular phantasms.44 The same goes for the second intention. Taken abstractively the second intention is the cognitive aspect concerning the thing as it is found in a plurality of things (not the cognitive aspect concerning the thing taken absolutely). Taken concretively the second intention is the thing grasped itself as it is found in a plurality of things. Now for there to be these second intentions two causes are required: the thing’s quiddity as intellective object, and the common mode of being corresponding to the cognitive aspect involved in this type of cognition.45

intellectu possibili, quia intellectus possibilis est subiectum omnis cognitionis intellectivae. Ideo sine intellectu possibili non est universale in actu, quocumque dictorum modorum accipiatur”. 44 Ibid., p. 102104–111: “(…) Universale quod est prima intentio in abstracto, est prima rei cognitio; vel in concreto est ipsa res primo cognita secundum se. Modo cognitio rei effective dependet ex obiecto illius cognitionis et intellectu agente; modo obiectum intellectus est quod-quid-est ipsius rei sub modo essendi proprio eius fantasiato ex quo sumitur talis ratio intelligendi. Ideo effective ad universale ut est intentio prima, facit modus essendi rei fantasiatus, et intellectus agens qui habet abstrahere ipsum quod-quidest [Greek to ti estin, or ‘quiddity’] a fantasmatibus singularibus”. 45 Ibid., p. 102112–122: “Item hoc apparet de universali quod est secunda intentio, quia: Universale quod est secunda intentio in abstracto, est ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus (et non est ratio intelligendi rem absolute, sicut est prima intentio); secunda autem intentio concreta est res intellecta ut est in pluribus (sicut quando dico ‘Homo est universalis’, sensus est: Homo est intellectus ut est in pluribus). Modo ad hoc quod res sit intellecta ut est in pluribus, effective facit res (vel ipsum quod-quid-est quod est obiectum ipsius intellectus), et communis modus essendi correspondens isti rationi intelligendi cum intellectu agente. Ergo effective ad hoc quod sit universale quod est secunda intentio, facit intellectus agens cum re et modo essendi rei”.

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– Coincidentally (i.e. mediately), the possible intellect can somehow contribute to the universal as it is a second intention, because the respective cognition involved in the second intention presupposes the absolute cognition involved in the production of the first intention, and in this production the possible intellect has a role.46 It is a good idea to prevent the obvious misunderstanding that two intellective acts are in the intellect at the same time. What is meant in the foregoing exposition is that to the thing that first has been grasped by itself, afterwards a second intention is assigned, because it is impossible that there are two distinct intellections or cognitions in the intellect simultaneously.47 6.4.4. The eighth question A closely related problem is discussed in the eighth question (“Utrum universale quod est intentio, sit in re extra sicut in subiecto, vel in intellectu”). First two arguments are presented in support of the position that the universal qua intention is found in the extramental thing as its substrate; next two supportive of the opposite view. Radulphus goes on to solve the problem by calling upon the distinction ‘vel in abstracto, vel in concreto’. Now the universal as first intention in abstracto is nothing other than the first cognition of a thing according to its proper mode of being, whereas taken concretively it is the thing grasped in this way. The universal qua second intention in abstracto is the secondary grasp or second cognition of the thing considered in its capacity of being found in a plurality of things, whereas taken concretively it is the thing grasped in this secondary way.48 That indeed the universal taken as a second intention in concreto conveys these two things, the thing and the cognitive aspect, is proved 46 Ibid., p. 102123–104131: “Est tamen intelligendum quod per accidens facit intellectus possibilis ad hoc quod universale quod est secunda intentio, sit quia: Cognitio rei respectiva praesupponit cognitionem absolutam. Modo universale ut est secunda intentio, dicit cognitionem respectivam [viz. in cases of a second intention in abstracto], vel rem cognitam respective [in cases of a second intention in concreto]. Ergo universale ut est secunda intentio, praesupponit rem primo intellectam absolute, ita quod antequam intelligatur res ut est reperibilis in pluribus, intelligitur secundum se et absolute. Modo intellectio est operatio intellectus possibilis. Et ita per accidens requiritur operatio intellectus possibilis ad universale ut est secunda intentio”. 47 Ibid., p. 104132–150. At 104,137, Pinborg wrongly has intentiones instead of intellectiones. 48 Ibid., p. 11433–40. See for the the general theme of this question de Libera (1996) and (1999), 358–361.

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as follows. Just as absolute accidents relate to their substrates, so second intentions relate to their objects. Now concrete absolute accidents relate to their substrates in such a way as to signify the accident itself in its capacity of denominating the substrate. Therefore concrete second intentions formally convey the cognitive aspect as it denominates the thing. What Radulphus is trying to say is that second intentions in concreto precisely convey (in the sense of ‘connote’) the thing’s ontic form that is involved in using this or that universal noun.49 For example, designating Socrates as ‘hoc album’ (‘this white entity’), ‘album’ taken as a concrete second intention formally signifies the whiteness in Socrates, in virtue of which he is brought up as ‘this white entity’. By the way, notice that the same holds if Socrates is brought up in virtue of one of his non-accidental forms such as man, animal and the like. Radulphus’s solution to the initial problem is presented in the form of two statements. First. The universal taken as a first or second intention in abstracto has only mental being in the intellect, because any cognition is found in the intellect as its substrate. Second. The concrete universal, in its capacity of thing grasped, whether as a first or as second intention, is found outside the mind in so far as the thing is concerned, and in the intellect in so far as the cognitive aspect is concerned.50 A final remark is about the meaning of the phrase ‘res intellecta’. Whoever uses this phrase refers to [1] the extramental thing which causes intellection, and [2] the cognitive aspect involved which denominates the thing. Even if one uses the qualified phrase res intellecta ut intellecta (‘thing grasped qua grasped’) it is not necessary to say (as some people claim) that the thing grasped qua grasped is in the soul. Only if

49 Ibid., p. 11441–46: “Et quod universale in concreto dicat ista duo, scilicet rem et rationem intelligendi, hoc probo quia: Sicut se habent accidentia absoluta ad sua subiecta, ita se habent intentiones secundae ad sua obiecta. Modo accidentia concreta absoluta sic se habent ad sua subiecta quod dicunt ipsum accidens ut denominat subiectum. Ergo intentiones secundae in concreto dicunt formaliter rationem intelligendi ut denominat ipsam rem”. 50 Ibid., p. 11447–54: “Tunc dico ad quaestionem quod universale, pro prima intentione vel secunda in abstracto, habet esse in intellectu, quia omnis cognitio est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. (…). Secundo dico quod universale in concreto ut est res intellecta, vel pro prima vel secunda intellectione, quantum ad rem est extra animam, quantum ad rationem intelligendi est in anima”. In the B-version the notion ‘cognitive aspect’ is explained in terms of intentionality (ibid., p. 11545–47): “(…) intentio est illud secundum quod intellectus tendit in aliud, scilicet in rem. Illud autem per quod tendit in rem, est cognitio rei sive ratio intelligendi rem”.

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you understand by res intellecta, not the thing grasped qua grasped, but the thing’s being grasped (esse intellectum rei), you are talking of something in the soul: Q. 8 (A-version), p. 11662–72 ed. Pinborg: Unde notandum quod qui dicit rem intellectam, dicit duo, quia dicit [1] rem quae est efficiens intellectionem et [2] rationem intelligendi quae denominat rem. Ideo non debet dici (sicut quidam dicunt) quod res intellecta ut intellecta est in anima. Illud falsum est, quia qui dicit rem intellectam ut intellectam, dicit duo, scilicet rem et rationem intelligendi. Et ideo res intellecta ut intellecta non est in intellectu; sicut agens secundum quod agens non est in passo, ita res intellecta ut intellecta non est in intellectu. Sed esse intellectum rei est in anima, res autem extra animam est, quia esse intellectum est esse activum in intellectu, licet significetur per modum passionis. Et ideo, sicut agens non est in passo, ita res intellecta ut intellecta non est in intellectu.

Notice the grammatical parallel with ‘actio-passio’, which to Radulphus, can be drawn because esse intellectum is not considered just a passive mode, but rather an active mode of being such-and-such (‘intellective being’), which is a positive property falling to the thing grasped. As for the distinction in question itself, it is higly sophisticated indeed, distinguishing as it is between the thing grasped qua being grasped as present in extramental reality, whereas its being grasped as such is mind-dependent. 6.4.5. The eleventh question This question discusses the problem whether in Porphyry’s well-known definition of genus (‘Genus est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie’), what is defined is the intention of the generic term or the thing underlying the intention (res subiecta intentioni).51 In his determinatio, Radulphus rejects (cap. 7) the answer presented by some people to the effect that what is defined is the thing the intention of the genus can be applied to (res cui applicabilis est intentio generis). In his own opinion, what is defined is neither the thing taken absolutely nor the intention of the genus in abstracto, but rather this intention in concreto, no matter if by ‘concrete intention’ the whole aggregate composed of thing and intention should be understood, or merely the intention in its relationship to the thing. Radulphus leaves the latter question unsolved and sets out to prove (capp. 8–12) that it is neither the thing taken absolutely nor 51

For the text see Appendix E, item III; the division into chapters is mine.

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the intention in abstracto which is defined, but the concrete intention as it denominates the thing. The latter precisely is the proper subject of logic. Once again, he does not care about the precise scope of what is here labelled intentio in concreto.52 For starters, Radulphus in fact does enter (capp. 13–15) upon the various senses of the phrase intentio in concreto he just was not interested in, which he loosely associated with the closely related (frequently discussed) question of the various senses of any concrete accidental term. The latter item concerns a semantic problem which, from the times of Plato and Aristotle, has had a broad impact upon philosophical thought. Stated briefly, does the concrete accidental term ‘album’ merely signify the form whiteness in relationship to its substrate ‘(white) thing’, or does it mean the whole aggregate consisting of substrate plus whiteness? It is precisely this question that is at stake when Radulphus is about to introduce his reply to his opponents. Quite in line with the tradition, he begins (cap.13) with a reference to Aristotle’s discussion in Metaphysics VII, 5–6 about the correct definition of accidents. It is the issue that played a decisive role in his controversy with Plato (who in Aristotle’s eyes, wrongly hypostatized accidental features to transcendent subsistent Forms).53 In so far as concrete accidents are concerned, the substrate should figure in the role of genus; e.g. if snub(nose) is defined the formula should run: ‘the snub is a concave nose’; here nose, which is the substrate of snubness, acts as a genus (and concavity as a differentia). In such cases, the concrete accidents denominate their substrates, and are brought up in their capacity of relating to the substrates, and that is why they are put in the definition of concrete accidents.54 Now just as such real concrete accidents denominate their 52 Q. 11, cap. 8: “(…) ad presens non curo, utrum scilicet ‘intentio concreta’ dicat aggregatum ex re et intentione, vel solam intentionem in habitudine ad rem; et universaliter de quolibet termino accidentali concreto utrum dicat solam formam in habitudine ad subiectum, vel totum aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente (…)”; cap. 12: “Et ideo dico quod ibi diffinitur intentio generis concreta. Et hoc ego probo sic quia: Illud est ibi diffinitum quod per se consideratur a logico. Modo logicus non considerat ipsam rem absolute nec intentiones absolute, ymo considerat intentionem concretam ut denominat ipsam, sive dicat aggregatum ex re et intentione sub ratione intentionis, sive dicat solam intentionem in habitudine ad rem. Ergo ibi diffinitur genus pro intentione concreta, et non res absolute nec intentio absolute”. 53 Cf. De Rijk (2002) II, 186–197, on Metaph. VII, 5–6, 1030b14–1032a12, esp. 6, 1031b23 ff. Also Ebbesen (1986 and 1988). 54 Q. 11, cap. 13: “Sed propter solutionem rationum est intelligendum quod, sicut dicit Aristotiles septimo Metaphisice, in diffinitione accidentium habent poni sua subiecta. Sed hoc est differenter in accidentibus in abstracto et in concreto. (…). Sed in dif-

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substrates, likewise second intentions denominate the objects they bear on. Accordingly, in the definition of a concrete second intention, the thing (obiectum) they relate to, should figure in the role of a genus. More precisely, it is the object’s mode of being that should figure in the definition (as the differentia, that is), because second intentions depend on the cognition of certain modes of being by which the intentions are founded in the object.55 Let me try to implement the suggested parallel between the semantic behaviour of concrete accidental terms and that of concrete second intentions, when it comes to framing a definition of the well-known genus plus differentia type. Take, for example, the concrete accidental term ‘album’ (= ‘the white thing’). It is commonly defined56 as res alba or rather res affecta albedine, in which res is put as a genus and alba or affecta albedine as a differentia. Likewise the concrete second intention homo should be defined as res affecta humanitate (or bipes as res affecta bipedalitate), in which the object signified by the common noun ‘homo’ (or ‘bipes’, respectively) acts as a genus and affecta etc. as a differentia. What Radulphus is now trying to make clear is that the object’s mode of being or form on which the concrete second intention is founded (being human or humanity and being twofooted or twofootedness, respectively) should figure in the definition of the intention. Next (cap.14) this procedure is applied to Porphyry’s definition of genus. This definition too contains two elements, to wit, the object

finitione accidentium in concreto habet poni subiectum loco generis, sicut si diffiniatur simus, diceretur ‘Simus est nasus cavus’; ibi ‘nasus’, quod est subiectum simi, ponitur in sua diffinitione loco generis. Modo sicut accidentia realia in concreto denominant sua subiecta et dicuntur in habitudine ad ipsa et propter hoc ponuntur in diffinitione sua, ita intentiones secunde denominant sua obiecta.”. 55 Ibid.: “Et ideo sicut in diffinitione propria ipsorum accidentium in concreto ponitur subiectum loco generis, ita in diffinitione secundarum intentionum concretarum debet poni obiectum suum loco generis. Quia etiam iste intentiones secunde dependent ex cognitione modorum essendi ratione quorum fundantur in obiecto, et diffinitio datur causa cognoscendi rem, ideo in diffinitione istarum intentionum debent poni modi essendi ratione quorum fundantur in obiecto”. 56 E.g. Peter Abelard (who calls the nouns signifying concrete accidents nomina sumpta), Dialectica V, p. 5965–10 ed. de Rijk: “(…) duplex enim horum nominum que sumpta sunt, significatio dicitur, altera vero principalis, que est de forma, altera vero secundaria, que est de formato. Sic enim ‘album’ et albedinem quam circa corpus subiectum determinat, primo loco significare dicitur et secundo ipsius subiectum quod nominat. Cum itaque album hoc modo diffinimus: formatum albedine, queri solet utrum hec diffinitio sit tantum huius vocis que est ‘album’, an alicuius sue significationis”. Later on, the participle ‘affectus’ is commonly used.

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on which the intention expressed by the generic term is founded, and the mode of being in virtue of which it is founded upon the object. By the element ‘quod predicatur’ (‘that which is defined’) in Porphyry’s definition the thing that is the intention’s object should be understood, and the property of ‘being said of a plurality of specifically different things essentially’ is the mode of being of the genus (man, animal, twofooted, white, and the like) in virtue of which the intention ‘genus’ is assigned to man, animal etc. Hence it is plain that Porphyry’s definition bears on the concrete second intention conveyed by the generic common noun, because the cognition of the intention depends upon the object on which the second intention is founded plus the mode of being in virtue of which it finds its foundation there. So what is defined in Porphyry’s definition is not the thing taken absolutely, but the object in so far as it is denominated by the feature expressed by the intention (cap. 15). 6.5. The sophisma ‘Aliquis homo est species’. On the ontic status of second intentions In his Sophisma “Aliquis homo est species”, Radulphus extensively discusses a problem he and his contemporaries were strongly engaged in, viz. the ontological status of second intentions. This sophisma is the redacted form of a vivid dispute under Radulphus’s presidence, which, as Jan Pinborg had good reason to assume, took place some time during the later part of Radulphus’s career as a master of arts, and so concurred with the period of his occupation with the commentary on Porphyry.57 Even in its redacted form, the sophisma has kept many traits of an actual dispute. The determinatio magistralis by Radulphus, in which three different ways of solving the problem are developed, comes clearly to the fore.58 The problem to be discussed in this sophisma is a specific one, viz. whether second intentions fall per se under the division of being as presented in Aristotle’s Categories.59 In his determinatio Radulphus opens with See Pinborg (1975), 119. The main structure of this sophisma is lucidly pointed outed by Pinborg, ibid., 120. 59 I make use of the critical edition made by Pinborg (1975), 127–152; the punctuation is mine. Pinborg’s edition is preceded by a short but very informative introduction to the general problem of the (controversial) role of the second intention in the cognitive process. 57 58

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the common solution to the problem he had also profferred elsewhere, to the effect that second intentions do not fall under the categories.60 To understand Radulphus’s position correctly it is important to see that he obstinately refuses to accept any kind of ‘objective’ existence of conceptual contents, including the ‘entities’ called second intentions.61 This does not mean of course, that he denies the difference between concepts taken as psychic entities in the soul and their significative contents. It must strike the reader that Radulphus begins his magistral determination with the remark that this matter is new and therefore makes it difficult to detect the truth, so that he advises the audience to content themselves with probable conclusions.62 After the rejection of the common solution to the problem Radulphus proceeds to explore a different route.63 6.5.1. On the distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ Radulphus begins with some preliminary matters, viz. the distinction between first and second intention (49–51), and the question of what is the cause of the second intentions (52–55). First, intention as such (‘intentio in abstracto’)64 is defined as just an information of the intellect (‘informatio’65 being an action by which a form is impressed upon the intellect) by which the intellect directs itself to something else, something extramental, that is. This form is identified as a concept (ratio 60 Note that the author often speaks of ‘those second intentions’ (‘istae secundae intentiones’), meaning the well-known logical concepts, genus, species, oratio, syllogismus etc. This is quite understandable, considering the fact that our problem was often discussed in the context of the question about the proper subject of logic. 61 Pinborg (1975), 122. For the general device of ‘esse obiectivum’ taken as a ‘third realm’ of being see de Rijk (1975) and section 3.3 above. 62 “Circa istam materiam quia non est alias tractata, difficile est procedere et veritatem invenire. Sed nobis sufficiat aliqua probabilia dicere et dubitationes movere” (cap. 43 Pinborg). 63 “Sed adhuc circa istud aliam viam considerem. Et propter hoc praemitto aliqua; primo quid sit prima intentio et quid est secunda intentio; et secundo quid est causa agens istarum intentionum. Et tunc videbimus cuiusmodi entitatem habent istae intentiones” (49). 64 Contrary to our first impressions, the authors commonly take the opposition ‘abstract vs. concrete’ as preceding the division into first and second intention. This interesting feature of the intentionality doctrine is (concerning Radulphus Brito) well observed by Biard (1989), 110. 65 For this technical term see our Index s.v. informatio. A fine chapter on cognition as intentional information is found in Pasnau (1997), 31–42.

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intelligendi) of the extramental thing, and, to say it otherwise, a certain cognition of the thing inside the intellect. Well, cognition is twofold, one primary, the other secondary.66 By the former we are to know a thing after its proper mode of being (and this holds, the author adds, for each of the three mental operations, concept formation, statementmaking, and reasoning). Next, this line of thought is elaborated for concept formation, and elucidated by an example. Primary cognition of a man (say, Socrates) or an ass (Brownie) occurs when the object is apprehended according to its proper mode of being as exhibited by the phantasm representing it; in the case of a man, this proper mode of being is the capacity of reasoning, with animals, it is sensation. Now this primary cognition is a first intention taken abstractively, whereas the outside thing thus cognized is a first intention taken concretively. Then, the denominations ‘in abstracto’ and ‘in concreto’ are explained: Intentio enim in abstracto nihil aliud est nisi quaedam informatio intellectus per quam intellectus intendit in aliud; unde intentio est illud per quod intellectus tendit in rem, et istud est quaedam ratio intelligendi rem vel quaedam rei cognitio quam habet intellectus penes se. Modo duplex est rei cognitio; quaedam enim est prima rei cognitio qua res primo cognoscimus secundum modum essendi proprium rei, secundum quamcumque operationem intellectus. Hoc fit sic [sit sicut Pinborg] per primam operationem intellectus: apprehendendo [apprehendo Pinborg] hominem vel asinum secundum modum essendi proprium fantasiatum talis rei, sicut intelligendo hominem secundum istum modum essendi qui est ratiocinari, et animal secundum istum modum essendi fantasiatum qui est sentire, et sic de aliis. Et ista cognitio est prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic cognita dicitur prima intentio in concreto, unde [= “because”] omnis cognitio, quaecumque sit, habet denominare suum obiectum; dicimus enim “scibile scitur”: ibi scientia denominat scibile, et “color est visus” et “sonus auditus”, et sic de aliis; ibi enim cognitio denominat suum obiectum (cap. 49 ed. Pinborg).

Next, the author goes on to clarify the designations ‘second intention in abstracto’ and ‘in concreto’. First, the distinction ‘first vs. second’ is cleared up. Cognition always denominates its object in the way in which absolute accidents do, because a thing should be first understood taken by itself, prior to its being understood in its relation to something else. So man is first cognized in his being an individual, and secondarily in his universal applicability to other instances of the species. Now if a man is cognized by himself and absolutely we speak of pri66

Cf. Simon of Faversham; section 5.1 above.

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mary cognition, whereas the cognition of man taken in his relationship to a plurality of men is called secondary cognition. As for the distinction between the two kinds of second intention, the latter, relational cognition is called ‘second intention in abstracto’, whereas the object cognized in terms of secondary cognition is called ‘second intention in concreto’: Et ita semper sic cognitio denominat suum subiectum sicut accidentia absoluta denominant suum subiectum, unde [= “because”] res prius habet intelligi secundum se quam in habitudine ad aliud—sicut prius est cognoscere hominem secundum se quam ut est principium intelligendi plura vel ut est reperibilis in pluribus—, quia intellectus absolutus prior est intellectu respectivo. Et ideo cognitio hominis secundum se et absolute dicitur prima cognitio, sed cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus, dicitur secunda cognitio. Et ista cognitio rei in habitudine ad aliud dicitur secunda intentio in abstracto, et res sic cognita dicitur intentio secunda in concreto (ibid.).

In the next step of the argument, Radulphus deals with the notions ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc., which act as general headings over the different universals instanced above (‘homo’, ‘animal’), and he clarifies the difference between universal and universality, which corresponds to that between second intention in concreto and in abstracto. In this line of thought, when I call ‘man’ a species, this comes to saying that ‘man’ is understood in its capacity of being in a plurality of individuals, of which it can be said essentially. In this sense, there is a denominative designation67 in expressions such as ‘Man is a species’ or ‘Animal is a genus’, as its being intellected is a thing’s accidental property. Because of the denomination we say ‘Man is universal’, not ‘universality’: Sicut quantum ad primam operationem intellectus cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus, est secunda intentio quae est universalitas, et homo sic cognitus est secunda intentio in concreto quae est universale, eodem modo genus, species, differentia etc. sunt quaedam intentiones secundae secundum primam operationem intellectus, secundum quod res habet intelligi ut est reperibilis in pluribus differentibus vel numero vel specie et secundum quod est praedicabilis de illis in quid vel in quale. Et res sic intellecta dicitur genus vel species vel differentia. Unde quando dico 67 I prefer to speak of ‘designation’ rather than ‘predication’, since in the first mental operation the focus is on concept formation, not judgement. For ‘praedicare’ having the general sense of ‘designare’ (rather than ‘to use as a syntactical predicate’ see de Rijk (1988), passim). For the Ancient background of this usage see de Rijk (2002) I, 75–100. Cf. Girald Odonis, De intentionibus, cap. 372: “Philosophus sumit ‘predicare’ pro ‘supponere’”.

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chapter six ‘Homo est species’, hoc non est aliud nisi ‘Homo est intellectus ut est in pluribus differentibus numero, praedicabilis de illis in quid’. Et ita ista praedicatio est denominativa ‘Homo est species’, ‘Animal est genus’, et sic de aliis, sicut esse intellectum est accidentale rei. Et ideo dicimus ‘Homo est universalis’, et non ‘universalitas’ (49).

As far as the second mental operation is concerned, you can analogically speak of first and second intentions, because the intellect can take the concepts ‘man’ and ‘running’ not only by themselves, but also in a composition or division, thus framing the propositions ‘Man is (not) running’, in which case (the content of) this complex is the object of the second mental operation.68 In line with the previous discussion it is stated that, when I understand this complex as a certain state of affairs arising from both the nature of its components, and its own proper mode of being, seeing that this composition cannot be found in other terms, the intention involved is, again, a first intention in abstracto, whereas the object thus cognized is the first intention in concreto. If, on the other hand, this complex is understood with respect to common relationships found in it (e.g. as far as it is put forward as a dubium or a conclusion or a premiss), the cognition of this complex is a second intention in abstracto, whereas the object itself thus understood is a second intention in concreto, qua conclusion, proposition or question etc., that is. Thus again, there is denomination, saying e.g. ‘A man is running is a sentence’ etc., because such intentions are certain cognitions through which such an object is cognized, as either a propositio, e.g. serving as a premiss of a conclusion, or as itself a conclusion, or as a question: Modo quando intelligo istud complexum quantum ad naturam terminorum istius complexi et secundum modum essendi proprium ipsius, quia ista compositio non potest reperiri in aliis terminis—, ista intentio est prima intentio in abstracto secundum secundam operationem intellectus, et istud obiectum sic cognitum est prima intentio in concreto. Si autem intelligam tale complexum non secundum se et absolute et secundum naturam propriam terminorum qui sunt ibi, sed quantum ad habitudines communes ibi repertas (sicut inquantum est dubitatum, vel con68 “Quantum ad secundam operationem intellectus sunt etiam primae et secundae intentiones, quia intellectus postquam apprehendit primo simpliciora secundum modum proprium fantasiatum (sicut postquam intellexit [intelligit ed.] ‘hominem’ secundum se et ‘currit’ secundum se), potest ista sic primo apprehensa componere et dividere secundum secundam operationem intellectus, sicut ‘Homo currit’. Istud enim complexum ‘Homo currit’ est illud quod habet rationem obiecti in ista secunda operatione intellectus” (50).

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clusum, vel positum pro conclusione habenda, et sic de aliis), ista cognitio istius obiecti complexi est secunda intentio in abstracto, et istud obiectum sic intellectum est secunda intentio in concreto (sicut conclusio, propositio, quaestio, et sic de aliis secundis intentionibus ibi attributis rei secundum diversas habitudines communes ibi repertas), ita quod talis intentio secunda praedicatur denominative de tali obiecto (ut dicendo ‘Homo currit est enuntiatio, quaestio vel propositio vel conclusio’), quia istae intentiones sunt quaedam cognitiones quibus tale obiectum cognoscitur. Sic [Sicut Pinborg] secundum quod est pro alio positum69 (sicut pro conclusione habenda), sic est propositio; secundum quod est conclusum et probatum, sic est conclusio; secundum quod est dubitatum, sic est quaestio, et sic de aliis (50).

Mutatis mutandis, the same holds good for the third mental operation. When an expression containing a reasoning (e.g. ‘Every man is running; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is running’) is taken by the intellect absolutely and on its own, as differing from another reasoning (e.g. ‘Every ass is running; Brownie is an ass; therefore, Brownie is running)’, then this cognition is primary, and is called a first intention in abstracto, whereas the complex involved consisting of the premisses and the conclusion in so far as it is thus cognized is a first intention in concreto. If, on the other hand, I understand this reasoning according to its common mode of being (e.g. in virtue of the union of the extremes in the middle, or in so far as it is a process from a universal to its particulars) such a cognition is a second intention in abstracto, whereas the complex itself taken as merely an instance of a logical procedure (e.g. this induction or this syllogism) is a second intention in concreto: Eodem modo secundum tertiam operationem intellectus sunt quaedam primae intentiones et quaedam secundae, quia quando intellectus intelligit aliquem discursum secundum se et secundum suam naturam propriam vel modum essendi proprium (…), ista cognitio qua intellectus intelligit talem discursum secundum se, dicitur prima cognitio vel intentio in abstracto secundum tertiam operationem intellectus; et illud complexum ex praemissis et conclusione habet ibi rationem obiecti, et illud complexum sic cognitum dicitur prima intentio in concreto. Si autem intelligam istum discursum (…) secundum modum essendi communem (…), talis cognitio est secunda intentio secundum tertiam operationem intellectus (…); et talis cognitio dicitur secunda intentio in abstracto. Sed tale complexum sic intellectum est secunda intentio in concreto (51).

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This formula is often used as the etymology of ‘propositio’.

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6.5.2. How second intentions are caused The other preliminary problem is about the cause of second intentions, and it is considered a very difficult question by our author.70 The pair ‘first-second’ could indeed suggest that second intentions are made of first ones. Radulphus assumes (‘credo’) that as far as concept formation is concerned, second intentions are caused [a] by the outside thing taken after its common mode of being and [b] by the active intellect, without any causal activity on the part of the passive intellect, which is merely the subject-substrate and recipient of cognition. In fact, the outside thing as it is in the mode of being exhibited in the phantasm, and the active intellect, which abstracts the ratio intelligendi 71 from the thing’s common mode of being disclosed in the phantasm, these two are, the author argues, the cause of second intentions like genus, species, subject, predicate, and other ones assigned to the thing as it is apprehended in the first operation of the intellect. The syllogistic argumentation runs as follows: An intention is nothing but a ratio cognoscendi (for instance, a species is the cognition of a thing as it is found in a plurality of individuals). Now the passive intellect is passive with regard to any cognition whatsoever, because, according to the Philosopher, De anima III (3, 429a13–16) ‘to understand’ boils down to ‘the intellect being affected by something intelligible’ (as sensation is the senses being affected by something sensible). Therefore since the intellect is passive with regard to that cognition, the passive intellect will not be its efficient cause, but only the subject-substrate and receiver of this cognition (52). As a matter of fact, the relationship between the primary and secondary cognition (and first and second intention) should not be taken in terms of causality, but rather as one

70 “Ulterius est intelligendum de secundo, scilicet a quo causantur istae intentiones secundae. Et illud videre est multum difficile” (52). 71 A ‘ratio cognoscendi’ or ‘ratio intelligendi’ is (taken abstractively) an ontic aspect or form by which something is actually ‘cognized’ (‘grasped by the intellect’), or (taken concretively) a thing’s ontic aspect or form qua cognized (grasped by the intellect); briefly a cognitive aspect’. See de Rijk (1994), passim, esp. 206, where Aquinas, In III Sent. dist. 14, art. 1, solutio 4 is quoted: “Ratio autem cognoscendi est forma rei inquantum est cognita”. Cf. In I Anal. Post., lect. 4, nr. 6: “Definitio est ratio quam significat nomen”; cf. In IV Metaph., lect. 16, nr. 733; STh I q. 13, art. 8 ad 2; CG I 53, nr. 443. In I Sent. dist. 2, art. 1, q. 3 solutio, ratio is defined as ‘id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicuius nominis’.

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between something absolute and something relational, because a second intention presupposes a preceding first intention.72 So much for the origin of intentions in the case of concept formation. But what should we say about the origin of intentions concerning the two other mental operations, the author asks. The answer is that it is the activated intellect, having primary cognition (and first intentions) available which acts as the cause of judging and reasoning.73 6.5.3. On the ontic status of second intentions After these preliminary questions Radulphus goes on (56–59) to deal with the proper problem addressed in this sophisma, viz. what kind of being do these second intentions have (‘cuiusmodi entitatem habent istae intentiones’; cap. 49). As for the intentions framed in the process of concept formation, which are attributed to the thing apprehended and to which immediately the outside thing corresponds, they seem to be certain dispositions or habitus of the intellect, and to be, as such, real things belonging to a category. In the syllogistic argumentation presented in support of this point of view, the real character of the second intentions is argued for by the fact that they depend upon the thing cognized and its mode of being, rather than being effected by the intellect, despite their occurrence in the intellect.74 There are, however, different degrees of being real involved, that of the first intention being 72

“Est tamen unum notandum quod licet intellectus possibilis non sit causa agens istarum secundarum intentionum secundum primam operationem intellectus, tamen ista secunda rei cognitio praesupponit primam rei cognitionem, non ordine causalitatis sed magis sicut respectivum praesupponit absolutum” (54). 73 “(…) intellectus factus in actu et habens primam rei cognitionem habet componere praedicatum cum subiecto, ut ‘Homo currit’. Ista enim oratio vel unio praedicati cum subiecto numquam esset, si intellectus non esset. (…). Eodem modo iste discursus ‘Omnis homo currit, Sor est homo, ergo Sor currit’ non esset nisi intellectus esset” (55). 74 “De intentionibus secundis, quae scilicet sunt attributae rei apprehensae secundum primam operationem intellectus, quibus immediate correspondet res extra, videtur quod sint quaedam dispositiones intellectus vel quadam passiones intellectus, quia intelligere est pati secundum Philosophum III De anima, et quod sint verae res in praedicamento quia: quantumcumque aliquid sit in intellectu, dummodo non dependeat ab intellectu effective sed ex re et modo essendi rei, videtur esse quidam habitus realis vel passio ipsius intellectus. Modo intentiones secundae attributae rei secundum primam operationem intellectus (sicut genus, species etc.) non causantur ab intellectu effective (ut declaratum est), immo causantur a re sub modo essendi communi eius. Ergo istae secundae intentiones videntur esse quidam habitus reales in praedicamento existentes” (56).

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absolute, whereas the second intention has a relational mode of being as compared to the first intention. Nonetheless, they both possess the degree of reality required for belonging to a category.75 However, those second intentions which, being the products of the second or third operation of the intellect, entirely depend upon it as their efficient cause (such as ‘proposition’, ‘syllogism’), cannot belong to any category, precisely because they are mental products. As a matter of fact, that logic is not a ‘scientia realis’, but is called ‘scientia rationalis’ follows from its being mainly about this kind of intentions (59). There is still another view to the effect that any intention, including those produced by the second or third operation of the intellect, exists as a real thing in the category of Quality (or in the category of Passion). This is argued for as follows. Every effect is real and belongs, as such, to a category whose causes, no matter of what nature they are, are real and belong to a category. Now all causes of second intentions are such, since whether you assume that the outside thing, or its mode of being, or the intellect, or the thing’s first cognition is the cause of these second intentions, all these causes are real things belonging to a category.76 When he returns to the discussion about the proper subject of logic, Radulphus makes clear that the second intentions are its proper object, not in so far as they are real psychic entities residing in the soul, but in their capacity of being likenesses of things (“ut sunt similitudines rerum”). These intentions can indeed be related to the intellect they inform as they are certain habitus disposing it, and as such they are real things. But they can also be regarded as likenesses of things, according to their relationship to the outside thing cognized, and, when taken as likenesses, they have a minor degree of reality, just as a colour existing 75 “(…) credo tamen quod licet ita sit quod una est aeque realis sicut et alia quantum ad realitatem quae requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit in praedicamento et ita bene una sit in praedicamento sicut alia, bene tamen verum est quod maior est realitas in prima cognitione rei quam in secunda absolute. Tamen, sicut modus essendi a quo sumitur prima intentio, est realis, ita etiam modus essendi communis rei a quo sumitur secunda intentio, est realis. Et ita cognitio vel intentio secunda sumpta ab isto modo essendi communi erit realiter in praedicamento existens; sicut videmus sub aliquo genere quod una species est perfectior alia, et tamen, hoc non obstante, una est ita bene in praedicamento sicut et alia” (58). 76 “Ille effectus est realis in praedicamento existens cuius causae, quaecumque sint, sunt verae res in praedicamento existentes. Modo omnes causae secundarum intentionum quarumcumque sunt verae res in praedicamento existentes, quia sive ponatur quod res extra, sive modus essendi rei, vel intellectus, vel prima rei cognitio sit causa istarum secundarum intentionum, omnia ista sunt verae res in praedicamento existentes” (60).

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in the mirror is less real than it is in the wall. Taking the ontic status of second intentions along this line of thought, they are called ‘entia debilia’.77 It is hard to see what precisely separates Radulphus from contemporary logicians who used to qualify this mode of being qua representative of the outside object as ‘esse obiectivum’. Arriving now to his magistral determination proper, Radulphus rejects (65) the thesis of the second respondens (26 f.) that no intention belongs to a category, although he has to admit that, unlike the second intentions concerning concept formation, those involved in statementmaking and reasoning do depend upon the activity of the intellect. Instead he favours the second solution to the effect that the second intentions involved in concept formation belong to a category, whereas those concerning statement-making and reasoning are, as such, mental products, and so do not belong to any category. Although Radulphus explicitly sides with this solution to the problem concerning the ontic status of second intentions, he does not flatly reject the third solution,78 according to which every second intention is a real thing, and belongs to the categories of Quality or Passion. I would think, his favourable attitude towards the third solution bears on the identification of second intentions as qualities (or passions) of the soul, as such a qualification fits in very well with the second intentions being described (56 f.) as real habitus and dispositions of the intellect. Finally, Radulphus’s choice of the second solution is supported (66– 71) by refuting the arguments which were put forward in favour of the first, rejected solution. One of them deserves special attention, because it deals with the important distinction between intentions taken as psy77 “Propter quod intelligendum est quod istae intentiones secundae possunt comparari ad intellectum quem informant ut sunt quidam habitus disponentes intellectum; et sic sunt verae res. Alio modo possunt considerari, non in respectu huius respectu cuius sunt verae res, sed in comparatione ad rem cognitam. Et quia cognitio rei non habet tantam entitatem sicut res extra cuius est cognitio—sicut similitudo coloris in speculo non habet ibi tantam entitatem sicut habet in pariete extra—, ita etiam istae secundae intentiones ut sunt similitudines rerum, non habent tantam entitatem sicut habet res extra cuius sunt similitudines sive cognitiones. Et ita in comparatione ad obiectum suum sunt debilia entia” (64). Cf. “(…) in comparatione ad obiecta quae denominant, non sunt [sc. second intentions, such as genus and species] realia, et tamen secundum se et absolute et ut informant intellectum, sunt quaedam res, sicut similitudo coloris quae est in speculo, in comparatione ad obiectum extra non est realis, tamen secundum se et absolute est quaedam res” (66). 78 “Quae autem istarum viarum sit melior, credo quod media, vel ultima” (65). Cf. the (marginal?) note added by one of the Mss. (Vat. Lat. 3061) at the end of cap. 59: “et hec via est communis et que michi videtur esse melior quoad nunc”.

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chic entities informing the soul and their semantic contents, owing to which they are significative. Let us first refer to the objection (cap. 11) to the thesis that second intentions, contrarily to what the first contends (cap. 1), do belong to a category. It is said that, supposing that second intentions, such as genus and species, were to belong to a category [supply: and, accordingly, were real things], then a genus would really differ from its species; now this is absurd, because a genus and its species indicate the same thing essentially; therefore it is absurd that second intentions belong to a category. Next, this inference is proved as follows: a genus differs from its species formally (‘secundum rationem’); now for mental entities it is true that just like their mental being is their being simpliciter, so their difference in terms of their mental being is their difference simpliciter; and so a genus and its species differ simpliciter.79 Radulphus counters (71) this objection as follows. First, he concedes that a genus formally differs from its species, but to his mind, this does not mean that they differ simpliciter. To make this clear one should make a distinction concerning mental being (‘esse secundum intellectum’). Radulphus begins with (in the wake of Aristotle, De anima III 4, 429a13– 16) separating the operation of the intellect and its content. Now like to extramental things it may befall accidentally to be conceived of and reflected upon in a certain way—for example, it can befall, as well as not befall, to ‘man’ to be considered in his capacity of being universally applied to a plurality of men—, just so it may befall, or not befall, to the intellection of a thing residing in the soul to be the object of a secondary intellection and reflection. Using again ‘man’ as an example, in the way as man can be set free from this or that individual, similarly an intellection (e.g. the species ‘man’) can be set free from another intellection (e.g. the genus ‘animal’). In both cases there is an accidental occurrence befalling the thing taken in its primary, essential being. Putting it in other words: the activity of the intellect is twofold: [a] to accomplish an intellection of something (intellectio rei), and [b] to understand this intellection in a reflexive act; [a] concerns the intellection’s primary, essential mode of being, whereas [b] is merely about 79 “Si istae intentiones secundae essent in praedicamento, tunc genus differret realiter a suis speciebus. Modo istud est inconveniens, quia genus et species eandem essentiam dicunt. Ergo inconveniens est quod intentiones secundae sint in praedicamento. Probatio consequentiae quia: Genus secundum rationem differt a suis speciebus. Modo in entibus secundum intellectum, sicut suum esse secundum intellectum est suum esse simpliciter, ita suum differre secundum intellectum est suum differre simpliciter. Et ita ibi genus et species differunt simpliciter” (11).

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an accidental mode of being, because a reflexive act does not make up the intellection’s proper mode of being, and so its being involved in a secondary act of reflection is merely a matter of chance. Again, this situation is compared to the intention, ‘man’: just as it is only accidental to it to be set free from this or that individual human being, so it does not affect the proper mode of being that, qua species, it can be related to the genus ‘animal’: Ad aliam, cum dicitur quod tunc differrent genus et species simpliciter, falsum est; et cum dicitur “genus differt secundum rationem a suis speciebus”, verum est. Et cum dicitur quod in entibus secundum intellectum ‘suum differre secundum intellectum’ est ‘suum differre simpliciter’ sicut ‘suum esse secundum intellectum’ est ‘suum esse simpliciter’, distinguo de esse istorum entium quae sunt in anima, quia suppono80 quod intellectus intelligit suam operationem et ea quae sunt in ipso, secundum intentionem Philosophi III De anima; modo sicut rei quae est extra animam, accidit quod intelligatur (sicut accidit homini quod intelligatur ut est in pluribus differentibus numero), ita etiam intellectioni rei quae est in anima, accidit quod intellectus ipsam intelligat et super ipsam reflectatur. Sicut enim homini accidit quod abstrahatur ab hoc homine et ab illo, ita intellectioni accidit quod abstrahatur ab hac intellectione vel ab illa; et ista intellectio est sibi accidentalis, sicut accidentale est homini quod intelligatur ut abstrahitur ab hoc homine vel ab illo (71).

It should be noticed that the author’s preliminary supposition concerning the two simultaneous aspects of the intellect’s activity, viz. the mental operation as such, on the one hand, and its content, on the other, plays a vital role here. The previous observations equally bear on the ‘intellectio rei’ taken as an act and its content; in fact the author deals with intellections, including their contents. Now it is the contents of the intellections that can be considered both after their primary, essential esse intellectum and after their secondary, accidental esse intellectum. Radulphus is of the opinion that in the case of mental entities, the equation of a thing’s ‘esse secundum intellectum’ with its ‘esse simpliciter’ is not valid as far as its primary, essential being is concerned. And since genus and species only differ after their accidental mode of ‘esse intellectum’, their logical relationships, that is, therefore the opponent’s argument is not conclusive: Cum igitur dicitur quod “in entibus secundum intellectum … etc.”, verum est secundum primum suum esse intellectu; tamen si differant secundum suum esse intellectum accidentale, non oportet quod simpliciter 80

See his Qq. in Arist. librum tertium De anima, q. 11, pp. 19232–19365.

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chapter six differant. Modo genus et species in istis intentionibus solum differunt secundum suum esse accidentale, et non secundum suum esse intellectum essentiale. Quare non valet (71).

6.6. Some additional clues Some additional clues about Radulphus’s position in the second intention issue can be gathered from other works by Radulphus. Among them is the Accessus to his Commentary on the Ars vetus, and that to the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, in which the notion of second intention is used to divide logic and, accordingly, as a ratio dividendi for the Aristotelian corpus of logical works. Another is found in a special question about the nature of the enunciation and its relationship to affirmation and negation. 6.6.1. Radulphus on the proper subject of logic In the second part of the Accessus in artem veterem, which in most of our manuscripts precedes the commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Radulphus goes on to divide logic in accordance with a division of concrete second intentions, which, as Avicenna has taught, are the proper subject of logic.81 Second intentions then should be classified after their being involved in one of the three operations of the intellect. So some second intentions are assigned to a thing obtained by simple apprehension, others to the product of statement-making, still others to the product of framing a syllogism or another type of intellective discourse (Accessus, capp. 16–17; see our Appendix E, section II). In the Accessus to the Posterior Analytics, the author is somewhat more explicit on the matter.82 After defining the second intention as a mode of cognizing or grasping a thing in its capacity of being in a plurality of objects, he claims that logic is about second intentions, not taken in abstracto, but concretively, as concerning the thing primarily grasped, because the logician is not interested in the abstract notions such as generality or speciality, but in genera and species as they signify concrete things after their generic or specific relationships. Now in this line of thought, three kinds of second intention come to the fore, the 81 For the Avicenna’s influence on the Medieval discussion of the proper nature of logic see Maierù (1987). 82 For the text see Appendix E, section II, ad 16.

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incomplex ones as products of simple apprehension, the complex ones as products of statement-making or framing reasonings, respectively. Special attention is then given to the second intentions produced by simple apprehension, such as the intentions, genus and species, which are attributed to an incomplex thing as apprehended by the first operation of the intellect. Thus a genus or species is a certain incomplex thing as denominated by the intentional (common) names, in such a way indeed that just like the intention or concept of a concrete accidental such as ‘album’ denominates its substrate (viz. the white thing) through the accidental form (whiteness), so these intentions denominate the object upon which they are founded, because just as in ‘The man is white’ there is an accidental predication, likewise there is in ‘Man is a species’ and ‘Animal is a genus’.83 What the author means to say is that just as what is white is denominated (or accidentally designated) by calling it, not, say, man or wall, but ‘white thing’, likewise what a man is is accidentally designated by calling it by means of the intention, species. Not everyone is in agreement about the use of the label ‘accidental predication or designation’ in so far as the assignment of intentions is concerned, in that some people consider these designations as essential since the genus and species terms signify the thing involved. Radulphus does not deny this, but rightly claims that nevertheless the designation of the objects through intentional concepts such as genus and species bring them up denominatively, viz. according to secondary, accidental relationships falling to them, not qua self-contained, subsistent things, but qua being compared to other kindred objects. Therefore to say ‘Man is a species’ comes down to saying ‘The form, Man is grasped by the intellect in its capacity of essentially occurring in a plurality of things that are (only) numerically different’.84 The accidental nature of intentional designations, as merely based upon secondary, logical (and therefore mind-dependent) relationships 83 Comm. on Posterior Analytics (BNF. Lat. 14.705, f. 73rb): “Unde genus, species dicuntur quedam incomplexa ut denominata sunt intentionibus, ita quod sicut intentio concreti accidentalis forma accidentali subiectum denominat (sicut in hoc quod est ‘album’), ita iste intentiones denominant obiectum super quod fundantur, quia sicut ista est per accidens ‘Homo est albus’, ita ista ‘Homo est species’ et illa ‘Animal est genus’, et sic de aliis”. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 29, art. 1 init. 84 Ibid.: “Licet aliqui dicant quod iste sint per se, quia genus et species dicunt rem, tamen iste intentiones non dicunt res nisi ut denominate sunt intentionibus; ut ‘Homo est species’, hoc est dicendo: ‘Homo est intellectus ut est in pluribus numero differentibus in quid”.

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plays a pivotal role in Radulphus’s distinction between two kinds of intellectual being, one falling to entities essentially, the other merely by accident. 6.6.2. The distinction between essential and accidental esse (secundum) intellectum Both the Quaestiones super libro Topicorum Boethii and the Quaestiones super Perihermeneias contain a question about the nature of the relationship between enunciation, on the one hand, and affirmation and negation, on the other; do they relate as genus and its species, respectively? Radulphus solves this complex question by calling upon the notion of intentional being, and making the distinction between two kinds of intellective being we have already come accross in our section 6.4.3. a. Super Topica Boethii, q. 5 In the fifth question of Sup. Top. Boeth., Radulphus discusses the aforesaid problem (“Utrum affirmatio et negatio sint species enunciationis”). After the usual pro and con, the author goes on to distinguish between the different senses in which the key terms can be used. They can indeed be taken to stand for the things underlying the intentions enuntiatio, affirmatio, and negatio taken absolutely, or for the intentions that have their foundation in these things. In the former case, there is no genus-species relationship between them, in the latter case there can be.85 One of the arguments in support of this position runs as follows. The generic intention enuntiatio is taken from the fact that a predicate is said in an absolute sense, i.e. irrespective of its featuring on the specific level as an affirmation or a negation, whereas the intentions conveyed by an affirmation or a negation are taken from some predicate actually being asserted or deasserted, respectively. Now the generic mode of being, viz. esse enuntiatum taken tout court 86 has a broader scope that the qualified modes esse enuntiatum assertive and deassertive, which thus can act as two unequivocal species of the genus enuntiatum esse:

85

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For this passage and the other texts see the edition in Green-Pedersen (1978), 15– Such an enunciation can be compared to what we call a ‘black-board sentence’.

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Qq. Sup. Top. Boeth., q. 5 ed. Green-Pedersen, p. 1623–34:87 Item hoc apparet ex alio quia: Intentio propositionis vel enunciationis sumitur ex eo quod absolute praedicatum enuntiatur de subiecto assertive, et intentio negationis sumitur ex eo quod enuntiatur deassertive; sicut ergo est in modis essendi ex quibus sumuntur istae intentiones, sic erit in ipsis intentionibus. Modo modus essendi vel obiectum sub modo essendi a quo sumitur intentio propositionis est in plus quam modus essendi a quo sumitur intentio affirmationis et negationis, quia esse enuntiatum assertive et esse enuntiatum deassertive est esse enuntiatum. Ergo eodem modo se habebunt intentiones utrobique quod intentio enunciationis erit in plus et erit genus respectu intentionis affirmationis et negationis.

What Radulphus is trying to say is that to take e.g. the expressions ‘Homo est albus’ and ‘Homo non est albus’ has to do with two intentions which are two species of a generic absolute (i.e. neither asserted nor deasserted) intentional complex merely containing album to be said of homo. Radulphus’s reply to an objection makes clear what he has in mind. Some people thought they had good reason to deny that in the case of second intentions, you can speak of a (generic) superius and (specific) inferiora, because they differ formally (secundum rationem; p. 171–15). Radulphus undermines this argument by making a distinction: they differ, he concedes, accidentally (secundum rationem accidentalem), not essentially. In line with this distinction is the distinction between the intentions’ being intellected in virtue of which they arise in the intellect as a combination of the object, and their mode of being on account of which they are founded in the object; now this mode of intellective being is their essential being. For instance, taking the state of affairs expressed by ‘A man is running’, and assuming that running is here enunciated of man in an absolute sense, i.e. non-assertorily, the enunciation has an essential mode of being in the intellect. If, on the other hand, the intellect proceeds to assert or deassert this state of affairs as intellected absolutely, which boils down to grasp this complex intention as to be corresponding to the objective state of affairs, then the intention has an accidental mode of being in the intellect. Taking the genus animal with regard to its species animal rationale and animal irrationale, there is an analogical picture: animal likewise differs from these two accidentally (secundum rationem accidentalem): Ibid., p. 1716–31: Cum dicitur: genus et species debent differre secundum rationem, verum est secundum rationem accidentalem, sicut animal dif87 I have changed the punctuation in order to disclose the syllogistic structure of the argument.

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chapter six fert a suis speciebus secundum rationem accidentalem. Et quando dicitur quod istae intentiones non habent esse nisi secundum intellectum (…), distinguo de esse secundum intellectum intentionum quia quoddam est esse earum secundum intellectum earum quo primo fiunt in intellectu ex obiecto et modo essendi ratione cuius in obiecto fundantur—et istud esse secundum intellectum est esse earum essentiale; verbi gratia ut haec intentio quae est enuntiatio, attribuitur huic obiecto ‘Homo currit’ ut predicatur ibi aliquid de alio absolute, et istud esse quod habet in intellectu, est sibi essentiale—; aliud autem esse habent in intellectu quia postquam enuntiatio habet esse in intellectu primo sicut dictum est, iterum intellectus potest ipsam intelligere; et istud esse intellectum quo intellectus intelligit istas intentiones ut convenientes vel disconvenientes [convenienter vel disconvenienter Ms; conveniunt vel disconveniunt G-P] est esse intellectum earum accidentale.

The obvious message is that, just as to animal taken on the generic level the addition of rationale or irrationale is merely accidental—however essential the difference between rational animal and irrational animal is—, likewise of esse enuntiatum, its being asserted or de-asserted is an accidental feature, however essential the opposition of affirmation to negation is. b. Super Perihermeneias, q. 11 Before entering upon the somewhat more extensive and detailed exposition of the same issue as found in Sup. Periherm., q. 11 it should be noticed that the basic idea underlying Radulphus’s solution to the closely related problem how to explain that the universal in communi is common to the five predicables as a genus to its species, is substantially the same as the one underlying the present problem about the genus-species relationship concerning enunciation and affirmation & negation. Sup. Periherm., q. 1188 contains the question ‘’Utrum affirmatio et negatio sint species enunciationis” or “Utrum enuntiatio sit genus ad affirmationem et negationem”. After the arguments pro and con Radulphus sets out to present his own answer to the question, basically along the same lines as in Sup. Top. Boeth. The key terms ‘affirmation’, ‘negation’, and ‘enunciation’ can be taken either for the object of the inten88 This question has been edited by Judith Dijs unsatisfactorily (2003, 250–255), after Ms. Vat. Lat. 2141, ff. 111ra–112rb, where it is numbered ‘Q. 9’. In other Mss., our question occurs as Q. 11. I have consulted Brussels, Bibl. Royale 2910 (3540–3547), ff. 114v–117v; Vat. Lat. 3044, ff. 88v–91v.

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tion, which is a thing, or for the intention itself as it is founded on the object, no matter if this intention is taken abstractively or concretively. In the former case they do not relate as genus and species, in the latter case they do, because then the intention is in fact a certain cognition of a thing (or a mode of grasping it), so the intention is something fabricated by the intellect by which it cognizes and grasps the thing.89 Next Radulphus puts the occurrence of intentions in a broader perspective, by making three preliminary remarks. First, the intentions are diversified in accordance with the three mental operations. So there are incomplex intentions (corresponding to simple apprehension), such as those signified by generic or specific common nouns; others are complex while corresponding to the framing of propositions, such as the intentions expressed by enunciations, affirmations, and negations whose objects are certain complex entities, like (the state of affairs expressed by) e.g. ‘Socrates is running’; others again concern more complex entities such as syllogisms, inductions etc., which correspond to the third operation of the intellect, reasoning. Another extension of the intention’s scope is obtained by considering the diverse possibilities within the respective operations. So we see that one and the same thing can be called man, rational being, or animal in accordance with its diverse modes of being, and these differences result in different intentions. The same holds good for complex objects, in which diverse intentions can be founded. For instance, taking the complex ‘Man runs’ (‘Homo currit’), one can consider it absolutely, i.e. as just an enunciation, or as proved by arguments, i.e. as a conclusion, or as doubted upon, in which case it is a question.90 89 Sup. Periherm., q. 11: “(…) affirmatio, negatio et enuntiatio possunt considerari dupliciter: vel pro obiecto intentionis, vel pro ipsa intentione fundata in tali obiecto, sive illa intentio dicatur in abstracto, sive in concreto. Modo si queras utrum enuntiatio sit genus ad affirmationem vel negationem pro obiecto quod est res, sic dico quod non est genus. (…). Si autem queras utrum enuntiatio sit genus ad affirmationem et negationem pro intentione in concreto vel in abstracto, tunc dico quod intentio est quedam rei cognitio vel quidam modus intelligendi rem, ita quod intentio est aliquid operatum ab intellectu per quod intellectus cognoscit et intelligit rem”. 90 Ibid.: “Secundo est notandum quod secundum diversos modos essendi in obiecto repertos possunt diverse intentiones attribui rei intellecte. Sic videmus quod eadem res importatur nomine ‘hominis’, ‘rationalis’, ‘animalis’, et secundum diversos modos essendi repertos in illa sibi attribuuntur diverse intentiones. Sicut penes hunc modum essendi qui est predicari de pluribus differentibus specie in quid, fundatur ibi intentio generis, et penes istum modum essendi qui est predicari de pluribus differentibus numero in quid, fundatur intentio speciei, sed penes predicari de pluribus differentibus in quale essentiale, fundatur intentio differentie; et sic de aliis. Et sic in eodem obiecto incomplexo possunt fundari

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His third remark is about the well-known distinction ‘first-second intention’. There are two ways in which the intellection or cognition of something comes into existence. First, there is the intellection or cognition concerning the thing through which the intellect takes a first grasp of the thing’s quiddity and nature; e.g. taking the essential nature of a man by apprehending the quiddity man. Now the man thus grasped with regard to his proper mode of being or quiddity is a first intention. So a first intention is the thing as primarily grasped. The second intention comes into the picture when, after this first grasp, the intellect grasps the object under some common mode of being, such as its property of being found in (and being predicable of) a plurality of things, or another logical property. This operation of the intellect involves second intentions such as genus, species, subject, predicate; in a word, according to diverse properties found concerning the object, the intellect goes on to found the diverse intentions upon the object, that is to say, the thing primarily grasped absolutely (i.e. irrespectively of any such property) now acts as the foundation of these second intentions.91 As to the second operation of the intellect, the intentions concern complex objects, such as the state of affairs expressed by ‘Socrates is running’, which leads to the fabrication of the intentions of enunci-

intentiones diverse penes diversos modos essendi ibi repertos. Eodem modo in obiecto complexo penes diversos modos essendi ibi repertos possunt diverse intentiones fundari. Sicut in isto complexo ‘Homo currit’, quia si consideremus illud complexum absolute ut ibi unum enuntiatur de altero indicando, sic est enuntiatio; si autem consideremus istud complexum ‘Homo currit’ ut est ibi pro alio positum, tunc ibi fundatur intentio propositionis; si autem consideremus illud complexum ut probatum argumento vel argumentis, sic est conclusio; si autem consideremus illud idem complexum prout dubitatur de inherentia predicati ad subiectum, sic est questio”. 91 Ibid.: “Ulterius est notandum quod duplex est intellectio sive cognitio de re, quia quedam est cognitio sive intellectio de re mediante qua cognitione intelligens intelligit primo rem quantum ad suum quod-quid-est et naturam. Sicut intellectus primo intelligit hominem quantum ad suam naturam et essentiam, apprehendendo quod-quidest hominis; modo homo sic intellectus quantum ad suum quod-quid-est dicitur prima intentio, ita quod prima intentio est res primo intellecta. Et tunc intellectus postquam intellexit rem istam que est homo quantum ad primum intellectum suum, iterum intelligit hominem sic intellectum sub aliquo alio modo essendi communi sive sub aliqua proprietate, scilicet prout est reperibilis in pluribus (et sic intellectus fundat ibi intentionem universalis), vel prout dicitur de pluribus differentibus numero solo (et sic intellectus fundat ibi intentionem speciei), vel prout de ipso aliquid dicitur vel enuntiatur (et sic fundat ibi intentionem subiecti). Et sic in ista eadem re que est homo, vides quomodo intellectus penes diversos modos essendi sive proprietates que sunt in ipso, fundat diversas intentiones secundas, ita quod res primo intellecta ut absolute erit obiectum istarum intentionum secundarum”.

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ation, proposition, question, conclusion etc. This process is described as happening in three stages. First, taking e.g. the complex ‘Socrates is running’, the subject and the object are conceived of through a primary grasp separately; then the two are composed one with the other; finally after having grasped the complex through a primary grasp, the intellect once more, this time in a secondary grasp, conceives this aggregate as it presents itself under another mode of being, or under diverse modes, and thus founds on it one or more second intentions, in accordance with the diverse modes of being discovered in it, to wit, the intention of enunciation, proposition, question, and conclusion, and so on.92 After these three preliminary notes the author goes on to define enunciation. It is defined as the name (or formula) expressing an intention, i.e. something informing93 the intellect. This is explained by referring to Avicenna, who in his Metaphysics links the notions intendere et informare. Now ‘enunciation’ signifies an information of the intellect with regard to a complex object (i.e. a state of affairs), upon which the intention is founded in so far as something is said of something else, absolutely, irrespectively, that is of the use of this enuntiatum in an affirmation or denial etc.: Ibid.: Ex hoc apparet quid est enuntiatio quia enuntiatio dicitur nomen intentionis, idest informationis intellectus, quia, ut dicit94 Avicenna in Metaphisica sua, nomen intentionis est nomen informationis, quia intentio dicitur de “intendo, -dis”, ita quod sicut intendere intellectus est suum informare, sic intentio est informatio intellectus. Est ergo enuntiatio nomen intentionis, idest informationis intellectus, in habitudine ad aliquod complexum super quod fundatur secundum quod absolute profertur aliquid de alio. Sic ergo apparet in quo fundatur intentio.

92 Ibid.: “Eodem modo potest declarari in re apprehensa per secundam operationem intellectus—quod est componere et dividere, quorum obiecta sunt quedam complexa, ut ‘Sortes currit’—[1] istud totum intelligit intellectus componens et dividens, ita quod intelligit Sortem secundum se et currit secundum se, et hoc primario intellectu; et tunc [2] ista sic intellecta sic componit unum cum alio; et tunc [3] illud totum compositum, sic aggregatum et intellectum primario intellectu, intellectus iterum intelligit secundario intellectu ut stat sub aliquo modo essendi sive sub diversis, et secundum hoc fundat ibi intentionem unam secundam vel diversas secundum diversos modos essendi ibi repertos, scilicet intentionem enunciationis, propositionis, questionis, et conclusionis, et sic de aliis’. 93 Notice that in the Aristotelian tradition, knowledge is commonly regarded as a form impressed in the intellect. 94 Liber de philosophia prima, tract. V, cap. 3, p. 24610–13.

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The crucial question now is whether enunciation is an affirmation or a negation, formally speaking. On the face of it this seems to be the case, considering the similar definitions of both affirmation and negation: Ibid.: Modo videndum est an sit affirmatio vel negatio. Affirmatio enim est nomen intentionis que fundatur super complexum secundum quod in ipso est assertio predicati de subiecto; negatio vero est nomen intentionis que fundatur super complexum secundum quod in ipso est deassertio predicati a subiecto.

The initial question can now be answered. Radulphus claims that, provided that ‘enunciation’ is taken to stand for an intention, it is indeed genus to affirmation and negation Two main arguments are presented in support of this claim. It is shown first that there exist between affirmation-negation and enunciation the formal relationships required for there to be the genus-species connection.95 Second, that the different modes of being from which enunciation and affirmationnegation, respectively, are taken, mutually relate as superius and inferius, so enunciation will be predicated of affirmation or negation as a superius of its inferius, which is the characteristic of the genus-species relationship. The first main argument is elaborated at great length. There is, to begin with, the simple support that if one is asked what an affirmation or negation is, the appropriate answer will be that they are enunciations.96 The two other parts of the first main argument are of particular interest for a clear understanding of Radulphus’s opinion about the relationship between the genus, enunciation and its two species, affirmation and negation. That affirmation and negation differ formally is argued for as follows. The composition of the extremes of the complex acts as the constitutive forma of the enunciation; now affirmation and negation are formally different from one another because one is an affirmative composition, the other a negative one; therefore they differ formally: 95 Sup. Periherm, q. 11 corp.: “Tunc istis sic intellectis dico quod enuntiatio est genus ad affirmationem et negationem, accipiendo enunciationem pro intentione. Et ratio huius duplex est. Prima est hec quia: Illud quod predicatur in quid de aliquibus differentibus secundum formas et descendit etiam in eis per formales differentias, est genus ad ea. Sed enuntiatio est huiusmodi respectu affirmationis et negationis. Ergo enuntiatio est genus ad ipsas. Maior patet, quia hec est ratio generis”. 96 Ibid. “Minor declaratur quantum ad omne membrum. Et primo quantum ad primum quia: Si queratur quid est affirmatio et quid negatio, convenienter respondetur ‘enuntiatio’. Enuntiatio ergo predicatur convenienter de ipsis”.

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Ibid. Secundo quantum ad secundum membrum, scilicet quod affirmatio et negatio differant per suas formas quia: Compositio extremorum est forma in ipsis orationibus sive enunciationibus. Modo affirmatio et negatio differunt penes compositionem, quia in una est compositio affirmativa et in alia compositio negativa. Quare affirmatio et negatio differunt penes formas.

As for the thesis that the enunciation descends into affirmation and negation in virtue of some formal differentiae it is claimed that the notions of affirmation and negation arise by the formal differentiae ‘assertive’ and ‘deassertive’ being added to the generic notion of enunciation, which qualify the basic notion of composition. Indeed, the generic, indeterminate ‘being profferred’ present in the notion of enunciation is contracted and specified by the specific differentiae ‘assertive’ and ‘deassertive’: Ibid.: Tertio declaratur tertium membrum, scilicet quod enuntiatio descendat in affirmationem et negationem per differentias formales quia: Descendit in ipsas per has differentias que sunt assertivum et deassertivum. Sed iste se tenent ex parte compositionis, que quidem compositio est forma in orationibus. Ergo iste sunt differentie formales. Maior patet. Minor declaratur quia: hoc quod est proferri aliquid absolute determinatur et contrahitur per hoc quod est proferri assertive vel deassertive.

The other main argument, which focusses on the superius-inferius relationship between enunciation and the pair affirmation-negation, starts from the parallelism between intentions and the modes of being they are taken from. In the case under examination the parallel consists in the common superius-inferius bond. The major premiss is clear enough, Radulphus says, because whatever intentions have, they entirely owe to the modes of being they are taken from: Ibid.: Item. Sicut est in modis essendi ex quibus sumuntur intentiones, ita est in intentionibus. Sed ita est in modis essendi ex quibus sumuntur enuntiatio, affirmatio, et negatio, quod modus essendi ex quo sumitur enuntiatio, est superior quam modus essendi ex quo sumitur affirmatio, et quam modus essendi ex quo sumitur negatio. Ergo enuntiatio est superior quam affirmatio et negatio. Maior patet, quia quicquid habent intentiones iste, totum habent ex modis essendi ex quibus sumuntur, et totam rationem suam inde trahunt.

The minor requires a more detailed support. By means of a syllogism Radulphus makes clear that the enunciation’s absolute, unqualified mode of being (which consists in just profferring something in the manner of a ‘black-board sentence’) is superior to the determinate, qualified modes of affirmation and negation:

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chapter six Ibid.: Minor declaratur quia: Enuntiatio sumitur ex eo quod in ipso complexo in quo fundatur enuntiatio, predicatum absolute attribuitur subiecto indicando; affirmatio vero sumitur ex eo quod illud predicatum attribuitur subiecto assertive, negatio autem sumitur ex eo quod illud predicatum attribuitur subiecto deassertive. Modo aliquid attribui assertive vel deassertive alicui presupponit attribui absolute. Ergo predicatum absolute attribui subiecto (ex quo sumitur enuntiatio) predicabitur sicut superius de attribui assertive (ex quo sumitur affirmatio) et de attribui deassertive (ex quo sumitur negatio). Sic ergo patet quod modi essendi ex quibus sumuntur enuntiatio, affirmatio, et negatio, sunt sicut superius et inferius. Et sic enuntiatio predicabitur de affirmatione et negatione sicut superius de inferiori.

Putting it in other words, on the level of the enunciation sec (‘blackboard sentence’), there is only an ascription of a predicate to a subject, non-assertorily, so the composition that is the forma of the enunciation, is also present in affirmation and negation in which this form goes together with the differentiae ‘assertive’ and ‘deassertive’, respectively. Next follows an objection with a reply. It regards our ignorance about the essential nature of the differences between enunciation, affirmation, and negation, which forces us to use circumlocutions with the help of things better known, such as corresponding modes of being, to wit, ‘being assertive’ and ‘being deassertive’. If one continues to argue against the author that, speaking properly, these two differentiae belong to the objects of these intentions, rather than to the intentions, affirmation and negation themselves, Radulphus takes refuge to the parallelism existing between the semantic behaviour of intentional entities and that of substantivated accidental terms: just as in the case of accidental terms (such as ‘album’) genus and differentiae are taken as relating to their substrates, likewise in the case of intentions they are to be taken in their relationship to their objects: Ibid.: Intelligendum tamen quod non est admirandum quod isti modi essendi differant sicut esse assertivum et esse deassertivum dicuntur differre, quia differentie essentiales sunt nobis ignote; et ideo oportet eas circumloqui per ea que nobis nota sunt, sicut per modos essendi et per alia. Sic ergo esse assertivum et esse deassertivum sunt differentiae enunciationis sine aliquo inconvenienti. Et si dicas contra quia: esse assertivum et deassertivum sunt differentie obiectorum illarum intentionum que sunt affirmatio et negatio; ergo non sunt differentie istarum intentionum,— dicendum est quod: Sicut accidentia respiciunt subiectum, ita intentiones secunde respiciunt obiectum. Sed genus et differentie in accidentibus sumuntur per comparationem ad suum subiectum. Ergo eodem modo

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in intentionibus genus et differentie sumuntur per comparationem ad obiectum suum. Et sic est non inconveniens easdem esse differentias in intentionibus et obiectis illarum intentionum. Et ideo ratio procedit sua via.

c. The pivotal role of the accidental vs. essential esse intellectum Like in Super Top. Boeth., in the Super Periherm. the two different senses of esse intellectum play a key role in clarifying Radulphus’s position about the proper relationship between the genus, enunciation and its species, affirmation and negation. The author’s exposition of the matter occurs in his reply to the fourth argument in support of the opposite thesis that enunciation is not a genus to affirmation and negation. This argument runs as follows: If enunciation were their genus, it would really and simpliciter differ from its species (which is impossible).97 Radulphus begins his reply with agreeing that a genus should differ from its species secundum rationem et intentionem, but this only holds good, Radulphus argues, secundum intentionem et rationem accidentalem. Likewise, the closely related issue ‘essential vs. accidental intellective being’ we already know of from the expositions in Sup. Top. Boeth., comes up for discussion. Radulphus points out that in intellective entities such as second intentions, there is a twofold intellective being (esse secundum intellectum), one essential, the other accidental. Second intentions such as enunciation, affirmation and negation are first in the intellect with an essential way of being, namely in so far as they are primarily grasped by the intellect. Accidental being, however, falls to these second intentions as soon as they are grasped another time with respect to their mutual logical relationships, such as the genus-species connection. Now to understand the genusspecies relationship it is crucial to be aware of the difference between two modes of being of the genus, enunciation, one in so far as it, in a first grasp by the intellect, is taken essentially and in its absolute sense (as absolute prolatum), i.e apart from its use in terms of assertion or deassertion, the other when, in a second grasp, it is taken accidentally and relatively, i.e. together with (one of) its differentiae, esse assertivum, esse deassertivum: Sup. Periherm., q. 11 ad fin.: Ad probationem, cum dicitur “Ubicumque est genus, semper differt secundum rationem et intentionem a suis speciebus”, verum est secundum intellectum et rationem accidentalem. Et ideo bene volo quod si enuntiatio esset genus ad affirmationem et nega97

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chapter six tionem, quod differret ab ipsis secundum rationem accidentalem. Et cum dicitur ulterius “In entibus secundum intellectum, suum esse secundum intellectum est suum esse simpliciter, et suum differre secundum intellectum est suum differre simpliciter”, dico quod in entibus secundum intellectum (sicut in intentionibus secundis, que sunt entia rationis) duplex est esse intellectum. Primum est esse intellectum quod est esse intellectum essentiale, quo iste intentiones (que sunt entia secundum intellectum) primo fiunt in intellectu—quia intellectus intelligit istos modos essendi, ut esse assertivum et deassertivum, vel esse absolute prolatum, ita quod per illud esse intellectum fundat intellectus in istis modis essendi istas intentiones secundas.—Et illud esse intellectum est esse essentiale in ipsis intentionibus. Et tunc de isto esse dico quod ista propositio est vera (…). (…). Aliud est esse magis accidentale in ipsis intentionibus quo ille intentiones intelliguntur postquam ipse primo facte sunt ab intellectu. Unde postquam iste intentiones fundate sunt in ipsis modis essendi ab intellectu, tunc intellectus intelligit istas intentiones que sunt apud se, quia potest intelligere omne intelligibile. Et sic dicta propositio non habet veritatem.

Time and again Radulphus stresses the (chrono)logical order (postquam) between the intention’s essential, absolute mode of being and its accidental, respective mode of being. He never tires of conceding that the second intentions, enunciation, affirmation and negation are really different according to their absolute, essential being, but at the same time maintaining that their mutual differences concern their accidental modes of being. And this is precisely what the opponent fails to understand.98 Finally, Radulphus proceeds to explain this twofold grasp by which the intellect conceives the being of intentions, by associating it with the twofold grasp by which extramental objects are intellected. Man, for example, has essential intellective being regarding his quidditative nature; in addition, it has accidental intellective being qua being abstracted from particular human beings. Something similar can be said about the intentional domain. Intentions have essential intellective being in so far as their quiddity is concerned (and it is qua invested 98 Ibid., ad fin.: “Et cum dicitur in minori quod enuntiatio, affirmatio et negatio sunt entia rationis, concedatur. Et ideo bene volo quod si differant secundum esse intellectum essentiale quo primo fiunt in intellectu, quod simpliciter differunt, sicut suum esse intellectum essentiale est suum esse simpliciter. Modo differentia, scilicet enunciationis, affirmationis et negationis, est solum secundum suum esse intellectum accidentale, quia solum differunt postquam facte sunt in intellectu, eo videlicet quod enuntiatio intelligitur ut aliquid communius, et affirmatio et negatio ut aliquid minus commune. Et dicta differentia est secundum esse intellectum accidentale, et ideo non oportet quod simpliciter differant”.

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with this mode of being that they primarily arise in the intellect). For example, the intellect affords to the second intentions, enunciation, affirmation and negation each their own essential being, by assigning their own characteristic to each one of them (reddendo singula singulis), to wit, esse absolute prolatum, esse assertivum or esse deassertivum, respectively: Ibid.: Et quod illud duplex esse quod dictum est, sit in ipsis intentionibus potest declarari, quia homo habet duplex esse: unum esse intellectum quantum ad suum quod-quid-est et suam naturam (et illud esse est sibi essentiale); aliud autem habet esse in intellectu secundum quod abstrahitur a Sorte et Platone, et sic de aliis particularibus hominibus; et illud esse est sibi accidentale. Sic eodem modo in ipsis intentionibus est duplex esse intellectum: unum quantum ad suum quod-quid-est et naturam, quo primo fiunt in intellectu—sicut quando intellectus intelligit illos modos essendi, ut esse assertivum et deassertivum et esse absolute prolatum, ita quod per illud esse intellectum fundat intellectus in istis modis essendi istas secundas intentiones, scilicet affirmationem et negationem et enunciationem, reddendo singula singulis—; et illud esse intellectum in istis intentionibus est essentiale.

The other mode of being, viz. the respective or accidental one, is bestowed to the intentions by the intellect though a second grasp (because the intellect can conceive of everything that is intelligible; so why not its own products?). In this second move, the intellect conceives of affirmation and negation, and enunciation as well, as occurring in a plurality of particular instances, e.g. in this or that affirmation, or negation, or enunciation, by abstracting these intentions from these instances. Now such an abstractive mode of being is accidental to them: Ibid.: Aliud autem est esse intellectum magis accidentale istarum intentionum, ut postquam iste intentiones fundate sunt in istis predictis modis ab intellectu, intellectus tunc intelligit istas secundas intentiones que sunt apud se, eoquod semper intellectus intelligit (sive potest intelligere) omne intelligibile. Ergo intellectus intelligit affirmationem et negationem ut sunt quedam intentiones ut sunt in pluribus (sicut in hac affirmatione et in illa, et in hac negatione et in illa); eodem modo intelligit enunciationem utrobique, ut est in affirmatione et in negatione. Et tunc intellectus istas intentiones ab illis pluribus abstrahit, quia omne quod est in pluribus, potest abstrahi per intellectum ab illis pluribus. Et illud esse abstractum est eis accidentale.

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d. On intentions primarily taken as modi, rather than res It is Radulphus’s manupulating of this ‘accidental vs. essential’ issue which throws some more light on his view of intentionality. As we have seen in the foregoing discussions, to Radulphus’s mind, the contraction of enunciation into affirmation and negation is accidental to it, whereas its essential being is just being an enunciation sec, free from any being applied assertorically (assertive or deassertive). Now its essential being consists in being a composition of subject and predicate (attribute), and when enunciation is (accidentally) involved in being contracted to an affirmation or a negation, it retains its nature of composition, as appears from the fact that while the affirmation is defined as an affirmative composition, the negation is likewise called a negative composition, rather than a division. As a matter of fact, in deep structure two contradictory enunciations, such as ‘Deus est’ and ‘Deus non est’ are sometimes said to have the same dictum Deum esse, and so affirming and denying boil down to asserting and deasserting the same dictum Deum esse, schematically: ‘[Deum esse] sic’ and ‘[Deum esse] non’.99 Hence it appears that the enunciation sec taken as an intention is a dictum or enuntiabile, say, hominem esse album or hominem currere, rather than the statement ‘homo est albus’ or ‘homo currit’. Continuing this line of thought, the intentions that are the products of simple apprehension, are states or modes of being of an object, such as, for example, esse-hominem, esse-animal, esse-lapidem, rather than the simple apprehensions homo, animal, lapis. Consequently, intentional being, properly speaking, is to be regarded, not as the mode of being falling to intentions, but rather the very nature of intentions. Intentions do indeed not have intentional being, but are themselves intentional beings, to wit, intentional modes of being falling to extramental objects as soon as the intellect is engaged with them. This would imply that 99 Compare Nicholas of Autrecourt’s condemned thesis that ‘Deus est’ and ‘Deus non est’ signify completely the same, albeit in different ways. See De Rijk (1994), Appendix B, p. 170, nr. [4]: “Item. Quod iste propositiones ‘Deus est’, ‘Deus non est’ penitus idem significant, licet alio et alio modo.—Revoco tanquam falsum’. For the general thesis see ibid., p. 182, nr. [35]: “Item. Dixi in quadam disputatione quod contradictoria adinvicem idem significant.—Revoco tamquam falsum”.—For a similar deep structure analysis of sentencehood in Aristotle see de Rijk (2002) I, 75–100; 193 ff.; 250 ff. For the Medieval view on this account see Spruyt (1989), who discusses (175; cf. 167–169) Peter of Spain’s view of sentencehood as coming to the fore in his treatment of composition and negation, in which Peter turns out to be aware of the underlying deep structure of sentences such as ‘Sortes currit’, meaning something like ‘[Socratesrunning] is-the-case’.

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whenever people like Radulphus take an intention for res subiecta intentioni or res intellecta, this should concern the thing qua intellected, rather than the extramental thing the intention is directed to. However, many accounts of intentionality by Radulphus or his contemporaries are not unequivocal in this respect. 6.7. Summary Radulphus’ doctrine of intentionality can only be gathered from evidence scattered all over his several works.100 It turns out to have been initially influenced by Simon of Faversham, but Radulphus greatly contributed to the development of the intentionality debate by propagating and elaborating the refinements introduced by Modistic grammar studies and the application of modistic analyses to the subject matter. Our findings can be summarized as follows: [1] Intention is defined as a cognition by the intellect or intellection (cognitio intellectus or intellectio). It is an intentional entity, because it is that by which the intellect tends towards something else. The intellection is twofold: either a first intellection (prima rei cognitio vel intellectio), by which the thing is cognized in its own right, or a second intellection, by which the object in question is cognized in its subjective parts or supposits, including their mutual logical relationships (6.1; 6.3; 6.4.3; 6.5.1; 6.6.2[b]-[c]). [2] Taken as a psychic or mental entity residing in the soul, an intention (like any other concept, at that) is a certain disposition or habitus of the soul (intellect), and is, as such, a real (albeit of course not extramental) thing belonging to the category of Quality (or to that of Passion). In its capacity of being merely a mental entity, an intention is clearly opposed to its being significative. It possesses, however, as ens debile a smaller degree of reality than extramental things (6.5.3; 6.6.1). [3] The twofold division of intention parallels that of cognition and intellection. A first intention is a first or primary intellection, whereas a second intellection equals a second intention. Notice that Radulphus 100 As a result of this the present survey is not systematic. For doctrinal coherence see our Chapter nine below.

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uses the example of homo in a similar fashion (including the details) as Faversham does (6.1; 6.4.3; 6.5.1). [4] A primary intellection of a thing, by which it is cognized on the basis of its proper phantasm (ex proprio suo fantasmate), is a first intention in abstracto, whereas the thing thus intellected is called a first intention in concreto (6.2.2; 6.3; 6.5.1). [5] An object’s quiddity is the proper object of intellection, not the intelligible species, or any other concept. Radulphus explains the wellknown Aristotelian adage “What intellects and what is intellected are the same thing” as meaning that what is intellected is as such the object’s quiddity set free from its material conditions. Accordingly, the extramental object’s quiddity is cognized qua intellected (6.2.2) [6] Singular objects are cognized by the senses directly (recto aspectu), and by the intellect indirectly (secundum lineam circumflexam), via the phantasms, which belong to the domain of the singulars (6.2.3) [7] The intelligible species is identified with the act of intellection (actus intelligendi). There are two successive acts of intellection. After the first one the soul (the passive intellect, that is) is no longer in a purely potential state, and habitually retains the intelligible species, and is thus disposed to perform a secondary act of intellection. However, this does not force us to separate the intelligible species from the act of intellection (6.2.4). [8] One should not bluntly claim that it is the intellect that causes our concepts (including second intentions); instead, concepts, and cognition in general, are caused by the intellect out of the thing (ex re), i.e. with the thing as their ultimate cause (6.2.5; 6.4.3; 6.5.1–6.5.3). [9] Complex intentions (such as in ‘A man is running’) are first intentions in abstracto in so far as they are primarily intellected as a combination of subject and predicate; the complex object thus cognized is a first intention in concreto. In a similar fashion one can take ‘propositio’, ‘questio’, ‘dubitatio’ etc. as complex intentions in abstracto and in concreto (6.3; 6.5.1–6.5.3; 6.6.1–6.6.2). [10] Universality or a universal (quiddity) in abstracto concerns the cognition of an object as it is suited to be in a plurality of instances or supposits; a universal (quiddity) in concreto is the quiddity being intellected as it is actually instantiated in a plurality of supposits (6.3; 6.4.3).

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[11] Grammatically speaking, a universal is a common noun conveying a universal intention in concreto, or, saying it otherwise, the noun’s material significate or the object’s concrete quiddity. It is as such not minddependent. Even if the noun is used for a second intention in concreto, then, speaking from the material viewpoint, it is not mind-dependent either, because it indicates an extramental object in so far as it is secondarily intellected. The outside object indeed has a mode of being that corresponds to that of the intention, to wit, its being in a plurality of instances. However, when the noun is taken to stand for its formal significate, then the universal is something caused by the active intellect in cooperation with the phantasm (6.3; 6.4.2–6.4.5). [12] To say this otherwise: The universal (quiddity) that is present in a plurality of things, is a potential universal, something, that is, to which universal applicability can be assigned, but it is still an extramental, mind-independent object. The actual universal, on the other hand, is the object intellected qua one in many, and this consideration depends on the intellect (6.3). [13] In so far as universal intentions are certain intellections in concreto, they are said of their objects denominatively, in which case the denomination is based upon the objects’ being in the intellect (6.3; 6.4.4–6.4.5; 6.5.1; 6.6.1). [14] The word ‘universal’ can either concretively mean the thing underlying an intention (res subiecta intentioni), or stand for this concrete second intention absolutely, i.e. the property of universal applicability (6.4.1– 6.4.2; 6.4.5). [15] Both extramental things (entia realia) and rationate beings (entia rationis) possess a twofold mode of being (duplex esse), viz. an essential one outside the mind, and an accidental one in the mind. According to the essential consideration, the extramental object’s quidditative being is in the focus of attention, whereas the accidental consideration takes it in its capacity of being intellected and abstracted. In a similar fashion, the essential consideration takes rationate beings in their capacity of being primarily intellected (which is indeed their essential mode of being), whereas after the accidental way of considering, they are taken according to their logical interrelations of, say, being a genus or species (6.4.1; 6.5.1; 6.5.3; 6.6.2[c]).

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[16] The duplex esse of rationate beings is also defined from the viewpoint of being intellected (esse intellectum). As far as the logical interrelationships between intentions such as genus and species are concerned, two kinds of ‘being intellected’ or esse (secundum) intellectum can be distinguished, one essential, the other accidental. For example, to the intention, animal taken on the generic level the addition of the intention, rationale or irrationale is merely accidental, notwithstanding the essential difference existing between the intention, animal rationale (or man), and the intention, animal irrationale (say, horse). Something similar applies to the addition of the intentions, being asserted or deasserted to the generic intention, esse enuntiatum. It concerns indeed an accidental feature, in spite of the essential difference between the intentions, affirmation and negation (6.6.2[a],[b],[c]). [17] The twofold being intellected which is involved in the two kinds of intellections that produce first and second intentions (see our items [1] and [3]), equally falls to objects and intentions. By a first intellection, the object, or the intention, respectively, is grasped according to its quidditative being sec, whereas the second intellection conceives the object, or the intention, according to the logical relationships they have to similar objects, or intentions, respectively, in which their quiddity is instanced (6.6.2[c]). [18] Second intentions come into being, Radulphus assumes (credo), by a twofold cause: first, the outside thing taken after its common mode which is potentially present in the phantasm, and second, the active intellect (whereas the passive intellect only acts as the recipient of the abstractum). Any second intention presupposes a preceding first intention, but without there being a causal relationship between these two (6.5.2). [19] Concrete second intentions are the proper subject of logic, not, of course, in so far as they are mental entities residing in the soul,101 but qua likenesses, which, by definition, are significative and refer to some else. As intentional beings, they possess a minor degree of reality (entia debilia) than extramental things (6.5.3; 6.6.1). [20] In final analysis, any intention is a state or mode of being of an object, that is to say, an intention like homo, animal or lapis produced 101 As such they are the subject matter of psychology (De anima, and the cognate so-called Parva naturalia).

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by simple apprehension conveys the states esse-hominem, esse-animal, esselapidem, rather than just the conceptual contents ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘stone’ (6.6.2[d]).

chapter seven HERVAEUS NATALIS’S TREATISE, DE SECUNDIS INTENTIONIBUS

Hervaeus Natalis was the first to write an all round treatise about intentiones. We can make a reasonable guess about its date. Whereas as early as the fourteenth century the commentaries on I Sent., dist. 23 or 25 became the locus naturalis for expositions on the subject, Hervaeus’s treatment (In I Sent., dist. 23)1 of the well-known issue of the meaning of ‘persona’ in so far as the Divine Persons are concerned, mainly discusses (in the third Article) the usual question whether in divinity ‘persona’ signifies essence or relationship. In the first Article, two opinions are discussed, one to the effect that ‘persona’ signifies a second intention [capp. 10–11], and the other [12–16]; that it does not, but signifies ‘an absolute thing underlying an intention’ (rem abstractam2 substratam intentioni). The first opinion is rejected [capp. 17–18], whereas the other is accepted, because in divinity ‘persona’ signifies a thing worthy of our praise, not a concept, which is unable to act with responsibility. Although in this discussion the word ‘intention’ occurs, any exposition of the notions ‘intention’, ‘first or second intention’ is missing. More importantly, there is no reference whatsoever to a fuller treatment of the subject matter in another (existing or intended) writing. Considering that the printed edition reports the last version of the Commentary on the Sentences (which is commonly dated ca. 1308–1309), there is reason to take this date as a terminus post quem for the production of De secundis intentionibus. That in his monumental Scriptum super primum Sententiarum—of which we have a copy finished in Cahors on May 19, 1317—, Peter Auriol’s discussion of some of Hervaeus’s views found in De secundis intentionibus, presents us with a safe clue to a terminus ante quem for the completion of Hervaeus’s De secundis intentionibus around, say, 1316/17.3 Taking also 1 See Appendix B. See also Amerini (2004), 334–354, who rightly pays attention to Hervaeus Quodlibet III, qq. 1–2, and De verbo, qq. 1–3. 2 This term is here opposed to ‘denominative’. 3 The same holds for Auriol’s as yet unpublished Reportatio in I Sent., a critical edition

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into account that Hervaeus possibly lectured about the subject (and cognate matters of cognition as already found in his De quattuor materiis, which seem to date from the period 1301–1307)4 in the period between ca. 1308 and 1316, the date ‘ca. 1313’ which is sometimes assigned to De secundis intentionibus is more than a reasonable guess.5 I have consulted the three best manuscripts of De secundis intentionibus, and also made use (for Distt. I and II) of the first version of a critical edition of those parts, made about ten years ago by Judith Dijs (University of Leiden). In my view, there is a striking difference between the tradition (if any) represented by the Ms. Avignon 300 (AF 361), ff. 1r– 37v [dating from the first half of the fourteenth century] and the tradition appearing in the Mss. W [= Vienna VNP 2411, ff. 1–59, which also dates from the fourteenth century, and contains many corrections] and V [Vat. Lat. 847, also fourteenth century, and closely related to the Vienna Ms.]6 For that matter, there is no doctrinal variation between A an WV, but A seems to contain a concise reportatio in which the scriba (?or reporter) leaves out many text portions someone familiar with the matter discussed is himself able enough to supply, whereas WV do include such passages. On occasion (e.g. at the end of Dist. I, q. 5; see our section 7.15 below), the WV tradition contains passages in which the author seems to cautiously qualify his view as expressed in the A-version. The interesting thing is, furthermore, that a similar treatise which is almost contemporaneous, viz. the De intentionibus by Girald Odonis, contains three extensive quotations from Hervaeus’s work all of which throughout follow the WV version, without any trace of the Aversion. So it is highly plausible that the WV reportatio should represent the authorized standard text. The work consists of five Distinctiones. The first deals with first intention, the four others with second intention. Distinctio II discusses of which is being prepared by R.L. Friedman, L.O. Nielsen and C. Schabel, who have been kind enough to send me a copy of their preliminary version of In I Sent., dist. 23. 4 Koch (1927), 269–271; Roensch (1964), 115. 5 See Biard (2001), 267. Cf. Pinborg (1975a), 54, and Perler (2002), 294 (‘between 1309 and 1316’). 6 There are three more Mss. dating from the fourteenth century, Basel, Univ. B III 22, ff. 147–188, apparently written by a careless copyist; Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 274, ff. 41–54, an incomplete and carelessly written copy (only Dist. I–III, q. 3, in the middle of which it breaks off); and the incomplete Ms. Vat. Lat. 4584, ff. 1r–8v (only Dist. II, q. 3-IV, q. 2). There is also a fifteenth-century complete copy in Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, cod. 104, ff. 192ra–224ra, which is difficult to read and on occasion almost illegible; it has many corrections in the margin.

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the latter’s mode of being, III and IV its relationship to first intention, and V is about the way in which second intentions are known, and deals with the proper subject of logic, in particular. The next sections will contain a survey of the main views found in Hervaeus’s De secundis intentionibus. 7.1. A survey of De secundis intentionibus, Distinction I: On the nature of first intentions The first Distinctio consists of five questions. 7.1.1. Dist. I, q. 1: Is the intelligible species the (only) first intention? The first question examines the problem whether it is the intelligible species that is the first intention. After the usual pro and cons, the author proceeds with his answer to the question. First he makes three distinctions. The first concerns the well-known account of the two senses in which the term ‘intention’—whose focal meaning is to convey a tendency towards something else (tendentia in quoddam alterum)—is used both for matters of the will and the intellect. As for the activities of the intellect, the term is used to stand for [a] anything leading the intellect by way of representation to the cognition of something, whether this is an intelligible species, an act of the intellect, or a concept in the mind when the intellect forms a perfect concept of the object. This first sense concerns the notion of intention from the viewpoint of the cognizer, and can be extended to any kind of similitude leading to the cognition of something: De secundis intentionibus I init.: Ex parte autem intellectus dicitur intentio dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis omne illud quod per modum alicuius representationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis, sive actus intellectus, sive conceptus mentis quando format perfectum conceptum de re. Isto etiam modo nomen ‘intentionis’ posset extendi ad quamcumque similitudinem sive exemplar ducens in cognitionem rei.

Taken from the viewpoint of the object grasped by the intellect (‘the thing intellected’), the term ‘intentio’ is used for its content, i.e. the object grasped in so far as the intellect directs itself towards it in its capacity of being cognized by the intellective act. In this sense, ‘intention’ formally and abstractively bears on the end of the tendency, or the

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act of ending itself (ipsa terminatio), which is a relationship between the thing intellected and the intellective act, whereas when taken concretively and materially, ‘intention’ bears on what is intellected, whatever this thing may be: Ibid.: Alio modo dicitur intentio illud quod se tenet ex parte rei intellecte; et hoc modo dicitur intentio res ipsa que intelligitur inquantum in ipsam tenditur intellectus sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum intelligendi. Et intentio sic dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicit terminum ipsius tendentie sive ipsam terminationem, que est quedam habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi; in concreto autem et materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur, quidquid sit illud.

It should be noticed now that, when we talk about first or second intention—in saying that nouns of first imposition (such as ‘man’, ‘ox’ etc.) signify a first intention, and those of second imposition (such as ‘universal’, ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc.) signify a second intention—the phrase ‘first and second intention’ is not taken from the viewpoint of the cognizer (since, then, only intelligible species were first intentions), but from the viewpoint of the thing intellected. And in the latter case (which is the usual one) ‘intelligible species’ is taken in accordance with the twofold kind of the intelligibles (duo genera intelligibilium) that act as the end of the intellective act. Some intelligible species indeed fall to intelligible things, without being objectively in the intellect owing to the operation of the speculative intellect; instead, without any such objective being, they fall to the objects either affirmatively (e.g. man, ox, white, black etc.) or privatively (e.g. blind, deaf etc.); they all pertain to concrete and material first intention. Other intelligible species fall to the things in as far as they are objectively in the intellect (such as being abstracted, being universal etc.), and those pertain to the domain of second intention.7 Finally, one should know that when it is taken from the viewpoint of the cognizer, being an intention is not opposed to real being simply; such intentions rather are real things, to wit, a species or an act of the intellect.8 In addition, a first intention considered from the perspective of the thing intellected, is, in so far as its concrete and material object is concerned, not opposed to real being either, since what is intellected is often something real, such as whiteness or blackness. However, what is formally signified by a first intention, viz. the relationship of the ‘thing intellected’ to the intellective act, is a 7 8

Ibid. The species qua psychic entities inhering in the soul are meant.

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mere rationate being contradistinguished to real being, because such a relationship is a rationate relationship. Furthermore, what is conveyed by a second intention—both formally (viz. the aforesaid relationship to the intellective act) and materially (viz. that which is secondarily intellected, e.g. universality, being abstracted etc.)—is rationate being contradistinguished to real being (ibid.) The second preliminary distinction is about the notion of intentional being as deriving from the noun ‘intention’ (intentionale quod descendit ab hoc nomine ‘intentio’). Intentional being can be taken in two ways, essentially and denominatively, just as to possess qualitative being (esse quale) falls to things either essentially or denominatively. Now just as ‘whiteness’ bears on an essential mode of qualitative being, but a white body is said to possess qualitative being only denominatively, just so what is an intention is essentially said to have intentional being in an essential way, but that of which it is an intention, is said to have intentional being only denominatively. Thus intentions that are taken from the part of the cognizer, e.g a species, an intellective act, or an exemplary form, possess intentional being in an essential way, because they are intentions of things, whereas the things they are the intentions of are said to have intentional being denominatively. Now those intentions that are representative of something, are called intentional, which means that the thing intellected (say, a substance or a quality) is in the intellect intentionally, and this is so because such intentions convey the relationship to the thing represented, rather than to the subject-substrate (the soul or the intellect) they inhere in (ibid.). The third preliminary remark is about the twofold sense of ‘being in the intellect’ (esse in intellectu). It occurs in two ways, viz. subjectively and objectively. That which is in the intellect as its substrate is said to be in the intellect subjectively; in this way, a species, an intellective act, or a piece of knowledge are in the intellect. To be in the intellect objectively occurs in two manners. In the first one, anything (say, a horse or an ox) cognized by the intellect, no matter that it exists in a substrate outside the mind, is in the mind objectively (i.e. as an object or content of cognition). The other manner occurs if a thing because it follows something else in so far as this has objective being in the intellect (e.g. when being set free from, say, Socrates and Plato) follows man as it is objectively in the intellect, not as man is found in the outside world. Next, in the corpus quaestionis, the twofold question is answered, viz. whether the intelligible species is an intention, and, if so, whether it

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is a first intention. The first question is answered in the affirmative. The second one, too, that is to say, if intention is taken from the perspective of the cognizer, because, then, the species is the primary tool representative of the object cognized. However, this answer is inappropriate, since the question is about intentions viewed from the perspective of the thing intellected. Now if ‘first intention’ is taken abstractively, i.e. for the relationship between the thing intellected and the intellective act, plainly the intelligible species is not a first intention. But if ‘first intention’ is taken concretively and materially, viz. standing for that to which the intellect directs itself as the thing to be intellected, then the proposition ‘The intelligible species is a first intention’ has a twofold sense, meaning first, that the intelligible species is among the first intentions (and this is true); second, that it alone is the first intention: now this is impossible. This is proved by three arguments.9 7.1.2. Dist. I, q. 2: Does the first intention coincide with the act of the intellect? The solution to this question first refers to two opinions.10 The first account roughly says that the first intention is just the thing intellected, meaning that to be a first intention does not add anything, neither really nor logically, to this thing. Hervaeus rejects this view. The other holds that a first intention is the first act of the intellect, whereas the second intention is the second act of the intellect, and this when it is taken abstractively; if it is taken concretively, the first intention is the thing intellected. That this is the opinion held by Radulphus Brito is confirmed by the supportive exposition about the twofold cognitio rei Hervaeus refers to. Hervaeus presents extensive criticism upon Radulphus’s view of the matter. First he censures the adherents of this opinion for their view of the second intention in concreto, then for their view of abstract intention in general, and the way in which they take the foundation of second intentions upon first intentions. The opponents claim that the second intention in concreto is the thing as it is grasped qua being found in a plurality of things, taking this 9 Dist. I, q. 1c. The question winds up in the usual manner by the author’s reply to the rationes in oppositum. 10 See also Perler (2002), 306–310. Hervaeus’s explicitly distinguishing between the cognitional tools and the intellect is, like other doctrinal items, already found in De quattuor materiis, albeit more hesitatively expressed; see sections 3.41–3.45.

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cognition of the object as a respective cognition, meaning that the object is somehow related to the many things in question. Hervaeus’s criticism focusses on the nature of this relationship. Is it real or merely rationate?, he asks. If it is real, then any real relation is a concrete second intention, whereas its cognition is an abstract second intention. This would lead to the absurd conclusion, he claims, that to grasp a father qua father pertains to the domain of second intention, because such a grasp concerns the object’s real being. If, on the other hand, the relationship is merely rationate, then the thing grasped qua being found in a plurality of things is an abtract rather than a concrete second intention. That the opponents equate first and second intention with first and second cognition, respectively, is not tenable either, because in this line of thought, to cognize some real hot thing first qua being hot and then qua being calefactive would lead us to think of a succession of first and second intention, instead of first intention alone. Their view of second intentions being founded upon first intentions should be rejected as well, because it remains unclear whether the second intention is founded upon the real extramental object, or upon its being in the soul. When Hervaeus proceeds with his own opinion about the nature of first and second intention, he distinguishes two issues; first, What is meant by ‘intention’?, second, What is the order between first and second intention? As for the first question, he recalls the aforesaid distinction between ex parte intelligentis and ex parte rei intellecte, which accounts for opposing [a] intentions qua viewed as species (if there are any), or the intellective act, or generally anything representative of something else to be cognized to [b] intentions coinciding with [b1] the thing which is cognized by itself, or [b2] the thing being the intellect’s formal object, including its relationship to the intellective act. The [a] option being out of the question,11 we have to choose between [b1] and [b2]. Now as was proved earlier,12 ‘intention’ cannot possibly refer to the thing itself, since the notion ‘thing itself ’ rules out any idea of (first or second) intention. Therefore the property of being an intention must either [1] append to the thing cognized owing to its being related to the intellective act, or [2] just mean the intellective act as such, or [3] bear on the relationship between this act and the thing intellected. Hervaeus 11 12

As being an inappropriate answer to the main question. I.e. when the first opinion was rejected.

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favours the first alternative, holding that, when we speak of first or second intention, intentionality is the relationship existing between the thing intellected and the intellect or the intellective act: Dist. I, q. 2c: Quantum autem ad ipsam intentionem sciendum quod (sicut supra dictum est) intentio prout pertinet ad intellectum potest accipi vel ex parte intelligentis, vel ex parte rei intellecte. Ex parte intelligentis dicitur intentio vel species (si ponatur), vel actus intelligendi, vel quodcumque se habens per modum representationis ad ducendum in cognitionem rei. Ex parte autem rei intellecte intentio non potest accipi nisi ut ipsa res que intelligitur et que est formale obiectum intellectus, et eius habitudo ad actum intelligendi. Modo (sicut supra probatum est) ipsa res intellecta, secundum se accepta et precise (puta homo vel lapis, nichil plus includendo), non est intentio prima vel secunda, quia tunc sequeretur quod in ratione hominis vel lapidis includeretur hoc quod est esse intentionem. Et ideo oportet quod super rem que intelligitur esse intentionem addat13 sive habitudinem rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi prout ipsum terminat, vel dicat ipsum actum intelligendi, vel eius habitudinem ad rem intellectam. Quorum primum michi videtur probabilius, scilicet quod intentionalitas quam obiectum quod intelligitur preter rem que intelligitur importat, quando dicitur intentio prima vel secunda, sit habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum (sive actum intelligendi).14

Next this position is further argued for by the author. Everything signifying a real outside thing is a concrete first intention. Now the aforesaid intentionality cannot be a concrete first intention, because it rather is an abstract first intention, and goes beyond the notion of a real extramental entity; the intellective act, on the other hand, and its relationship to the thing intellected is a real thing, because knowledge and the intellective act relate to the intelligible15 thing. Hence it follows that the aforesaid intentionality is neither the intellective act as such nor its relationship to the intelligible thing. The only remaining option is that intentionality is the relationship of the thing intellected to the intellective act, and this relationship is only rationate and concerns rationate being alone. Notice that Hervaeus implicitly defines first and second intention; and what is particularly noteworthy is that here the bifurca13 Cf. ibid.: “(…) illa intentionalitas (…) est preter rationem cuiuscumque entitatis in rerum natura existentis”. That this esse intentionem supervenes the thing qua intellected causes, I think, Hervaeus’s everlasting focussing on a real network of relationships. Small wonder, too that it is Hervaeus who introduced, and abundantly used, the technical term ‘intentionalitas’ in this context. 14 Cf. Girald Odonis (De intentionibus I, capp. 39–41) reporting Hervaeus’s position. 15 In this context, ‘intelligible’ stands for ‘potential object of the intellect’.

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tion ‘abstract vs. concrete intention’ logically precedes the division into first and second intention.16 After another extensive argument, which focusses on the second intentions’ foundation upon first intentions, Hervaeus concludes that [1] a concrete intention, whether first or second, is that which is intellected, no matter if this is real or intentional being; [2] when ‘intention’ is taken abstractively, i.e. as intentionality, it bears on the relationship the thing intellected has towards the intellective act in so far as the former brings the latter to its end (terminat); in this sense, intention is a rationate relationship and a rationate being.17 On account of the other problem, viz. the one concerning the order between first and second intention, Hervaeus comes to the following statements: [1] To take first and second intention abstractively, i.e in the sense of intentionality, boils down to focussing on the relationship between the object and the intellective act; hence this relationship is differentiated in accordance with the differentiation of the intellective acts. [2] The formal diversity of intellective acts is to be taken in terms of the formal distinction between intelligible objects. [3] Hence this distinction, and the order between first and second intention as well, should be taken in accordance with the distinction and the order existing between the intelligible things in their relationship to the intellect. [4] Taken concretively, the intelligible things themselves are precisely concrete intentions. [5] First and second intention are taken in accordance with the twofold mode of being falling to intelligibles, one esse reale, the other esse rationis; now by ‘real being’, whether affirmative or negative, is meant any mode of being that falls to the objects in their real state (no matter if this is a true or a fictitious state), independently of the any operation of the intellect, whereas according to rationate 16 Ibid.: “Omne illud quod dicit rem veram in natura existentem, est prima intentio concretive dicta. Sed predicta intentionalitas non potest esse prima intentio concretive, quia illa intentionalitas est prima intentio in abstracto dicta, et est preter rationem cuiuscumque entitatis in rerum natura existentis; sed actus intelligendi secundum se, et eius habitudo ad rem intellectam est ens reale, quia scientia et actus intelligendi referuntur realiter ad intelligbile. Ergo predicta intentionalitas non est ipse actus intelligendi nec eius habitudo ad intelligibile. Relinquitur ergo quod sit habitudo ipsius rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi; que est relatio secundum rationem tantum et dicit tantum ens secundum rationem”. See for Radulphus Brito on this score Biard (1989), 110. 17 Ibid.: “(…) intentio concretive dicta, tam prima quam secunda, est illud quod intelligitur, sive sit ens reale, sive ens intentionale. Sed intentio in abstracto accepta, scilicet intentionalitas, dicit habitudinem rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi ut ipsum terminat; et est habitudo rationis et ens tantum secundum rationem”.

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being, intention is taken for any mode of being that only falls to the objects in so far as they are objectively in the mind. The latter passage must have suffered from haplography in all our text witnesses; here is my reading, conjectured with the help of all the extant Mss.:18 Dist. I, q. 2c: Duplex est ergo genus intelligibilium secundum quod accipitur [dicitur B] prima intentio et secunda. Accipitur [dicitur WV ; accipitur bis in B] enim secundum esse reale et esse rationis. Et dicitur [accipitur Mss.; secundum perperam add. W ] esse reale, sive affirmative sive negative [affirmative sive negative om. B] omne illud esse [omne illud WB; esse illud V ; pro omni eo A] quod convenit rebus in sua realitate vel vera vel ficta, circumscripto omni [B om. cet.] opere intellectus, sic scilicet quod in sua ratione non includunt habitudinem ad intellectum nec aliquem modum convenientem rebus ut sunt obiective in intellectu. Dicitur autem esse rationis omne illud esse quod convenit rebus ut sunt obiective in intellectu.

Returning now to my summary of Hervaeus’s doctrinal statements: [6] the order between first and second intention bears on the priority of one general mode of being over another; the first general mode of being is the real one, whereas the second is the rationate mode of being. [7] What counts for the distinction between, and the order of, first and second intention is the primary division of being into real being (esse rei) and rationate being (esse rationis).19 Hence [8] it is plain that the intellective act is not the intentionality that is appended by a first or second intention to the object of cognition. 18

In all the Mss. that contain the first Distinctio (including the deterior ones, Basel [B], Klosterneuburg [K ], and Rome [R]), the remark about what should be understood by ‘rationate being’ is missing. It must have been omitted as a result of haplography. I have made an attempt to supply it conjecturably. That some lines must have been left out is unmistakably clear, not only from the logical balance of the passage, but also from the summary Girald Odonis (De intentionibus I, cap. 40) presents of Hervaeus’s view: “De differentia vero et ordine prime intentionis et secunde dicit [sc. Hervaeus] quod duo sunt genera intelligibilium, secundum duos modos essendi entium: unus est modus essendi realis, alius est modus essendi rationis. Modum essendi realem vocat (…) omnem modum positivum vel privativum, absolutum vel respectivum, verum vel fictitium, qui ante operationem intellectus competit rebus, non dependens ab opere intellectus. Modum vero essendi secundum rationem vocat omnem modum qui solum competit rebus prout sunt obiective in intellectu”. See also Hervaeus, De intentionibus I, q. 4 c: “Aliud vero genus intelligibilium est quod dicit esse rationis; et hoc est esse illud quod rebus convenit prout sunt obiective in intellectu”, and the texts discussed in sections 7.2.3, 7.3.3 and 7.3.7. 19 Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus I, q. 2c ad fin.: “Quare autem prime due differentie intelligibilium accipiantur secundum illa duo esse [sc. real and rationate being] causa est quia etiam prima divisio essendi est in esse rei et esse rationis, et omnes alie divisiones cadunt sub altero istorum membrorum, precipue in ordine ad intellectum,

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7.1.3. Dist. I, q. 3: Whether a first intention is a universal thing, and this alone The determinatio proper of the third question is preceded by establishing the correct purport of this question. It does not formally question the nature of the intentions, universality and particularity; rather the question is about the things upon which these intentions are founded, to wit, whether man, ox, stone etc. (i.e. the things that are universally taken, without including their universality) are first intentions, and these alone, meaning that it does not fall to the person, Socrates or Plato to be a first intention. Next our author rejects the erroneous position of those who determine the nature of first and second intention by starting from the threefold division of nouns into [a] the ones (e.g. ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’) that signify a thing and no (first or second) intention, [b] the universal nouns (such as ‘man’, ‘stone’, ‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’) that signify first intentions, and [c] the ones that signify second intentions, e.g. ‘universal’, ‘particular’, ‘subject’, ‘predicate’ etc.20 Hervaeus thinks that in this opinion some indispensable subtle distinctions are ignored. To begin with, his favourite opposition between ex parte intelligentis and ex parte rei intellecte is disregarded. Now if intention is taken in the latter way it can considered either in abstracto, i.e. as standing for intentionality, or in concreto, i.e. standing for that which intentionality belongs to. And this again happens in a twofold way, because the thing intellected this intentionality belongs to, can be taken either as including this intentionality qua denominating the object, or absolutely. Thus what emerges is a picture similar to the one that comes to the fore in cases of real accidents (i.e. non-rationate accidents as are found in our present case), such as in the relationships between whiteness, white thing, and body. In this line of thought, Hervaeus comes to the following view: [a] things (such as man, ox, stone etc.) that are universally intellected without their universality do not include intentionality either; [b] let alone that they coincide with intentionality precisely, or include the property of having intentionality, but [c] they signify the thing the intentionality falls to, without including the fact that intentionality actually falls to them. The same holds for particularity. Hence it follows that the notion ‘first intention’ as such concerns neither universality nor particularity. cuius obiectum primum est illud quod preintelligitur actu, secundum autem est illud quod convenit rei intellecte ex habitudine ad ipsum actum”. 20 It is the position held by William of Ware and his followers; see section 4.23 above.

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The initial question then whether particular nouns such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’ indicate a first intention should be answered as follows. Taking intention from the perspective of the thing intellected in the aforesaid way, there are two possibilities: if we take intention in abstracto (i.e. intentionality as such) such particular nouns do not indicate a first intention, and taken concretively and including the intention qua denominating the object, they still do not signify a first intention, just as ‘body’ does not imply being white. If, however, ‘first intention’ is taken to stand for that which is denominated after this intentionality, then they signify a first intention, since they are naturally suited to have the relational property of bringing the intellective act to its end: Dist. I, q. 3c: Et ideo videtur aliter esse dicendum quando queritur utrum res in particulari, puta Sortes vel Plato, dicant primam intentionem, quod, accipiendo intentionem ex parte rei intellecte modo quo dictum est: Si accipiatur intentio in abstracto (scilicet ipsa intentionalitas), sic nec homo nec Sortes dicunt primam intentionem. Si autem accipiatur in concreto, includendo ipsam intentionem ut denominantem [denotantem WV ; denominative A], sic adhuc ‘homo’ vel ‘Sortes’ non significant primam intentionem, sicut nec ‘corpus’ significat esse album. Si autem accipiatur prima intentio pro eo quod ab illa intentionalitate denominatur, sic tam homo quam Sortes dicunt primam intentionem, quia nata sunt habere illam habitudinem terminandi actum intellectus.

Finally, this picture is (in the usual way) compared to cases in which concrete real accidents are involved. Just as a body is white, without ‘body’ including the property of being white (since in saying ‘white body’ is only talk of an accidental assignment), similarly the objects that are intellected are denominated after the intentionality involved, without, however, formally including this denomination, since when man or the individual, Plato is called a first intention, this is an accidental assignment only: Ibid.: Unde sicut corpus est album, non tamen includit esse album (quia est predicatio accidentalis), ita res que intelliguntur denominantur ab illa intentionalitate, non tamen in suo intellectu includunt sic denominari, quia est predicatio accidentalis quando homo vel Plato dicitur esse prima intentio.

When he replies to the arguments in favour of the opposite view, Hervaeus takes the opportunity to further clarify his own position. He claims that the nouns that indicate a true thing existing in the extramental world do not indicate intentionality nor include in their notion to be denominated after it (just as the noun ‘body’ does not

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include being white either; the real thing can, however, be denominated after this intention as that in which the intention is founded). When man is called a first intention, this is correct in so far as a concrete intention is concerned, which is the object signified by ‘man’ as it is denominated after this first intentionality.21 Now this concrete intention is not founded upon something else. Hence the intention is itself the foundation of its intentionality. And what holds for the universal man, holds good for the particular Socrates as well.22 7.1.4. Dist. I, q. 4: Whether privations pertain to first intentions To solve the question whether privations pertain to the domain of first intention, the first thing to do is to observe the aforesaid division of intention taken from the perspective of the thing intellected into [a] taken abstractively, i.e. taking it for intentionality, which is the relationship the thing intellected has towards the intellective act, whether this is found in a first or in a second intention; [b] that which can be denominated after such an intentionality, viz. that which is intellected. Now blindness, not-man and any other privation or negation of things having real being pertain to the domain of first intention, taking ‘intention’, that is, for that which is intellected and denominated after that intentionality. The determinatio winds up with a notandum aiming to make clear once again that nouns such as ‘man’ in their formal signification do not include the notion of first or second intention, although it concerns a concrete first intention and can so be called in accidental predication, because it can be denominated after this intentionality. If, however, man or stone is taken as that in which, qua cognized and intellected, the 21 The first intentionality is the one pertaining to the first intention in abstracto (which should be distinguished from the second one pertaining to the second intention in abstracto). 22 Dist. I , q. 3 ad fin.: “Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis intentio quantum ad ipsam intentionalitatem fundatur in aliquo, et illud in quo fundatur quantum ad primam intentionalitatem est ipsa res prout ei correspondet actus intelligendi ut fundamentum opposite relationis. Sed illud quod dicitur intentio concretive (in quo scilicet ista intentionalitas fundatur et quod ab ea denominatur) non habet necessario fundari in alio quo; alioquin iret in infinitum. Quando ergo dicitur quod homo est prima intentio, verum est concretive accepta, que est ipsa res quam ‘homo’ significat ut denominatur ab illa prima intentionalitate; nec fundatur in alio quo. Et ideo non oportet quod fundetur in particulari sicut intentio fundatur in re, sed ipsa est fundamentum intentionalitatis. Et similiter est de ‘Sorte’ respectu intentionalitatis sibi convenientis”.

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intellective act finds its end, then this whole aggregate homo terminans actum intelligendi includes that which pertains to the rationate being that is objectively in the intellect; in a similar way, such things as ‘being blind’ or ‘being a not-man’ do not include anything formally pertaining to rationate being either. Now the fact that such notions act as the end of the intellective act makes them include rationate being, because they formally include only the negation of true being. However, in so far as they are taken in their capacity of end of the intellective act, they are taken as though they were positive concepts, to the extent that we say that blindness or not-man is something intellected. And in this sense, these terms indicate a sort of positive being. Therefore whenever they are taken affirmatively, this happens in the framework of the intellective act.23 This pivotal view of Hervaeus’s, which was to come under heavy criticism with his contemporaries, is further explained in his discussion of one of the counter-arguments. Hervaeus claims that when privative terms are taken as expressive of a sort of positive things (saying that to think being blind or being a not-man boils down to grasping something), then taking them as a sort of positive beings only concerns rationate being in the mind. However when they are taken by themselves and absolutely, they only indicate the negation of real being and pertain to first intention. It should be noticed, Hervaeus adds, that affirmation and negation pertain to intellectual activity. But being the end of these acts pertains to being objectively in the intellect, which is merely rationate being, formally speaking. The real thing or its not being as signified or represented by these privative terms, on the other hand, pertain to real being, to wit, either as a privative thing or as a non-entity.24 23 Dist. I, q. 4c ad fin.: Est autem hic notandum quod hoc quod dico ‘homo’ in sua ratione vel diffinitione non includit esse primam vel secundam intentionem. Est tamen prima intentio concretive et predicatione accidentali, quia ab ipsa intentionalitate potest denominari. Sed si accipiatur homo vel lapis ut terminus ad quem terminatur actus intelligendi ut ad quoddam cognitum et intellectum, sic hoc totum aggregatum homo terminans actum intelligendi includit illud quod pertinet ad esse rationis, quod est esse obiective in intellectu; ita et hoc quod dico ‘esse cecum’ vel ‘non-hominem’ et consimilia non includunt aliquid formaliter pertinens ad esse rationis. Sed talia esse termini actus intelligendi iam includit esse rationis, unde [= ‘because’] talia non includunt formaliter in sua ratione nisi negationem veri entis. Sed prout accipiuntur ut terminus actus intelligendi, accipiuntur quasi positive, prout dicimus quod cecitas vel non-homo est aliquid intellectum. Et sic accepta, quasi positive dicunt esse. Unde quandocumque accipiuntur affirmative, hoc est secundum rationem intelligendi. 24 Ibid. (the text as it stands is doubtful here and there): “Ad tertium dicendum quod quando ista [viz. blind or not-man] accipiuntur quasi quedam res positive (ut dicendo

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7.1.5. Dist. I, q. 5: Whether fictions pertain to first intentions The final question of the present Distinctio deals with the closely related question whether fictive things pertain to the domain of first intention. Four arguments are brought forward in support of the view that they should belong to second rather than to first intentions, and one to the contrary. Hervaeus begins his determinatio by recalling that [a] intentions taken from the perspective of the thing intellected are meant, and [b] ‘intention’ is to be taken not for the intentionality that accompanies the thing intellected in its relationship to the intellective act, but for that accompanying the intelligible thing which is denominated after this intentionality; and furthermore [c] that first intention is the first genus intelligibilium, viz. anything not including something that, in so far as it is in the intellect objectively, falls to a thing in its relationship to the intellect; and this being is called rationate being in so far as the latter is contradistinguished to real being, whereas those intelligibles which in their concept include such rationate being (such as being a genus or being a universal etc.) are called second intentions.25 Another preliminary remark is to the effect that there is a difference between asking whether a fiction indicates a second intention and asking whether nouns such as ‘goat-stag’ or ‘golden mountain’ indicate a second intention, because, although a golden mountain is an unreal, fictitious being, yet it does not include a fiction in its concept (which is plain if it were definied by saying that it is a mountain made of gold). Therefore although being a fiction, formally speaking, indicates that which pertains to second intention, ‘golden mountain’ does not. Hence I believe, Hervaeus says, that just as in ‘Man is a first intention’ there is an accidental predication, similarly there is one in ‘A golden mountain, or a goat-stag, is a fiction’, because a goatstag does not intelligere cecum vel non-hominem est intelligere aliquid): cum talia non sint positiva secundum rem sed tantum secundum rationem intelligendi inquantum accipiuntur ut quidam termini actus intelligendi, sic accipere ea quasi quedam positiva est esse secundum animam et esse tantum secundum rationem. Sed quando accipiuntur secundum se et absolute, non dicunt nisi negationem esse realis, et pertinent ad primam intentionem modo predicto. Est autem notandum quod affirmatio et negatio pertinent ad actum intellectus, sed esse terminum horum actuum pertinet ad esse obiective in intellectu, quod est esse rationis tantum, formaliter loquendo. Sed res vel non-entitas rei, significata vel representata per ista, pertinent ad esse reale, vel sicut res privativa, vel sicut non-entitas”. 25 Dist. I, q. 5c init. Cf. Dist. I, q. 4c quoted p. 264, n. 23.

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coincide with the act of imagination or of the intellect through which a goat-stag is feigned, since then it would be a real thing (the act in question is indeed a real thing); that which is represented by this act, however, is not a real thing, but a non-entity. Next Hervaeus argues that goat-stag, chimaera etc. pertain to the domain of first intention. First, because they do not indicate something that accompanies a thing as it is objectively in the intellect, since, formally speaking, they do not indicate rationate being. Another argument is drawn from the relationship between a complex expression to a simple one. Just as in complex intelligibles, what is really incompatible relates to being a first intention, so in simple intelligibles does that which is made up from incompatible parts. Now in complex intelligibles, the things in which what is really incompatible is affirmed, pertain to first intention; the sentence ‘A man is an ass’ indeed pertains to first intention, although it is something false, in a similar way as ‘A man is an animal’ or ‘A man is not an ass’. Therefore in simple intelligibles too, that which indicates something made up from really incompatible parts (e.g. chimaera, goat-stag etc.) pertains, it would seem,26 to first intention. This is because they signify neither rationate being pertaining to second intention nor real being (existent or possible), nor the negation of possible being such as ‘not-man’, but a certain thing that cannot possibly exist in reality, just as the complex phrase ‘A man is an ass’ does not signify the match of some things that in reality do not match, nor the negation of disparate things, but the match of things that cannot possibly match.27 26

note.

Notice that the standard version found in WV reads ut michi videtur; see the next

27 Dist. I, q. 5 ad fin.: “Secunda ratio sumitur ex habitudine complexi ad simplex quia: Sicut in intelligibilibus complexis se habent incompossibilia secundum rem ad esse primam intentionem, ita in simplicibus se habet compositum ex partibus incompossibilibus. Sed in complexis illa in quibus affirmantur incompossibilia secundum rem, pertinent ad primam intentionem; nam ista ‘Homo est asinus’ pertinet ad primam intentionem, licet sit quoddam falsum, sicut ista ‘Homo est animal’ vel ‘Homo non est asinus’. Ergo et in simplicibus illa que dicunt aliquid compositum ex partibus incompossibilibus secundum rem, pertinent ad primam intentionem, ita quod chimera, ircocervus et consimilia pertinent, ut michi videtur, ad primam intentionem [WV ; ut chimaera et similia A]. Ista enim non significant esse rationis quod pertinet ad secundas intentiones, nec etiam esse reale, existens vel possibile esse, nec etiam negationem entis possibilis (sicut ‘non-homo’), sed significant quoddam impossibile esse in rerum natura, sicut etiam hec vox complexa, scilicet ‘Homo est asinus’ non significat aliquorum convenientiam in rerum natura convenientium, nec etiam negationem differentium, sed convenientiam impossibilium convenire”.

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When he replies to one of the arguments put forward in support of the opposite view, Hervaeus claims that of what, without the activity of the speculative intellect, does not possess any kind of being, but owing to such an activity comes into being, it is truly said that such a thing pertains to second intention. And in this line of thought, one can say that without the intellect’s activity, chimaera and golden mountain do not possess real being, and even granted that they posit an intellective act, they do not possess being, because such things, whether or not they are conceived of, never possess real being. When someone thinks a golden mountain to be, it is not true that a golden mountain really exists, although it is true that something is feigned, and this qua being a fiction pertains to second intention. However, saying ‘A golden mountain is something feigned’ implies an accidental predication, and so the predicate does not belong to the subject’s concept. If you claim that such things only have fictitious being it should be remarked that, formally speaking, they do not indicate feigned being nor something possessing real being, but that they indicate something that cannot possibly be, but which being feigned can fall to. It can be concluded, therefore, that rationate being, and being feigned as well, can fall to them, but, formally speaking, they do not indicate their being feigned itself.28 7.2. Distinction II: On the nature of second intentions The second Distinctio, which is about second intention, contains six questions. They all concern the nature of second intention. Is it the act of the intellect; does it really exist in the intellect; is it something

28 Ibid. “Vel potest dici, et melius, (…) quod illud quod non habet esse, circumscripto actu intellectus speculativi, sed, posito et existente actu intellectus, ipsum est et ponitur, verum est quod tale pertinet ad secundam intentionem. Et tunc (…) dicendum est quod chimera et mons aureus, circumscripto actu intelligendi, non habent esse; et etiam posito actu intellectus, non habent esse, quia talia, sive concipiantur sive non, numquam habent esse, unde [‘because’] quando aliquis concipit montem aureum esse, falsum est montem aureum esse, licet sit aliquid fictum vel figmentum, et verum est quod esse figmentum pertinet ad secundam intentionem. Sed, sicut dictum est, montem aureum esse fictum est predicatio accidentalis, nec est predicatum de ratione subiecti. Si dicas quod talia non habent esse aliud quam esse fignmentum, dicendum quod talia, essentialiter loquendo, nec dicunt esse fictum, nec aliquid quod habeat esse reale, sed dicunt quoddam impossibile esse, cui potest convenire esse fictum. Et ideo bene sequitur quod esse rationis, sicut et fingi, potest eis convenire, sed formaliter non dicunt ipsum fingi”.

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really existing in the outside world; is it merely a rationate relationship; is it the only relationship between the thing intellected and the intellect; and finally, does this relationship alone make up the nature of a second intention? 7.2.1. Dist. II, q. 1: Whether a second intention is precisely the act of intellecting In his determinatio, Hervaeus begins with a discussion of two opinions. The first view held by Radulphus Brito (who is not mentioned) and his followers entails that, as far as intentionality is concerned, both first and second intention coincide with the intellective act (actus intellectus, more precisely the act of intellecting or intellection (actus intelligendi),29 whereas with regard to the concrete object they coincide with the thing intellected. That is to say, the thing intellected taken on its own is a first intention (e.g. man, ox etc.), whereas the primary intellective act through which the object is intellected absolutely, is an abstract first intention; the second intention, on the other hand, is when taken concretively, the thing intellected itself viewed in its relationship to the plurality of things in which it is found.30 Like another opinion (discussed earlier in Dist. I, q. 2 init.), according to which the thing intellected is the first intention, whereas the intellection act (actus intelligendi) is the second intention, Radulphus’s opinion is rejected as well, because they both fail to observe the various relationships between the object, the act, and the intellect, which, to Hervaeus at least, are the pivotal items. First Hervaeus makes clear that the act of intellecting, when taken as a psychic phenomenon is a real thing, and therefore cannot be some rationate being as is a second intention. Another argument against the opposite view is taken from the position of the universal. The universal by representation is disregarded, since qua intelligible species it is something real existing in the mind. The mode of being of the universal by assignment or predication (universale per predicationem), which is a second intention, does not belong to the act of intellecting in so far as it is something real in the mind. When taken as an object of the 29 The difference (if any) is rather subtle, the actus intelligendi being the final stage of the activity of the intellect (actus intellectus). Notice that actus intelligendi in the sense of intellectio can more easily be taken for the intellective content as a second intention, than actus intellectus. 30 The definition of the second intention in abstracto is missing here. It was earlier (Dist. I, q. 2, init). described as the second cognition or secondary act of the intellect, by which the relationship ‘ut in pluribus’ is in the focus of interest.

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intellect, the act of intellecting is a universal common to singular acts of intellecting. However, this universality and singularity fall to these acts qua real (psychic) entities, not in that they are modes of objective being. Now only in the latter capacity, Hervaeus argues, they can belong to the domain of second intention. The author concludes—in the WV version, once again somewhat cautiously—that no second intention, neither taken abstractively nor concretively, can coincide with the act of intellecting: Dist. II, q. 1c ad fin.: Ergo sic videtur michi [not found in A] quod nulla secunda intentio, sive accipiatur abstractive sive concretive, est actus intelligendi. Nam intentionalitas in abstracto accepta importat tantum hoc quod est esse intentionem formaliter, et est relatio predicta rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi, tam in prima intentione quam in secunda; que non est actus intelligendi. Intentio etiam secunda concretive dicta sive illud cui predicta intentionalitas attribuitur, similiter non est actus intelligendi (…), sed est illud quod consequitur rem prout est obiective in intellectu, puta esse abstractum vel esse superius et huiusmodi.

Thus, quite in line with his passion for subtly distinguishing between the different relationships the various tools and devices making up the complex intellective process mutually have, Hervaeus censures the opponents’ deficiencies in their defining the nature of second intention. 7.2.2. Dist. II, q. 2: Whether a second intention is something real in the intellect In this question, Hervaeus rejects the view adhered to by some people who identify second intentions with intelligible species, or with concepts devised by the mind when it conceives of the various material conditions of objects. They agree in assigning reality to these tools, but without putting them in the domain of the categories, because to them, species and concepts lack the degree of perfect being required for belonging to the predicamental order (quia non habent entitatem ita perfectam que attingat ad entitatem generis). First Hervaeus argues for their belonging to the domain of the categories; and that precisely rules them out from being second intentions, which do not belong to the categorial domain. Such conceptual tools are indeed universals by predication in so far as they are representative of something in an indeterminate way and universally, but as has been argued in the previous question, this is no good reason for regarding them as second intentions.

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7.2.3. Dist. II, q. 3: Whether a second intention is something extramental The discussion of this question is important because of its significant clues for understanding Hervaeus’s view of intentionality, objective being in particular, and, by the same token, his ideas about the cum fundamento in re issue. After the usual pros and cons concerning the affirmative answer, the author recalls, once again, the distinctions made earlier. A first or second intention viewed from the perspective of its content (ex parte intelligibilis or rei intellecte) can be taken either in abstracto for the intentionality which is the relationship between the object intellected to the intellective act or to the intentionality itself, or in concreto for the intelligible thing that brings the intellective act to its end, and which that relationship falls to, in accordance with what we earlier have indicated as the correlation with the twofold kind of intelligibles. Next three theses are developed. The first is that, formally speaking, an intention does not convey anything really existing in some thing of the extramental world, that is, in so far as intentionality as such is concerned. Hervaeus substantiates this thesis by extensively pointing out that the relationship of intentionality, if it were something real existing in something else as its substrate, must be either in the intellect or in the object intellected. These two possibilities—which are discussed by our author intermingledly—both prove to be illusory, also when you start from the views held by the opponents concerning the natures of first and second intention. The nucleus of the entire argument is the fact that intentionality is always engaged in a convolution of rationate being, rather than sharing in real being, which is a prerequisite for there to be any real inherence. The second thesis is to the effect that, formally speaking, a second intention taken concretively does not indicate any real, extramental thing either. This is because such an intention belongs to the second kind of intelligibles, such as being universal, being predicable, being a genus or species etc., which accompanies things in so far as they are objectively in the intellect.31

31 Dist. II, q. 3c: “(…) sciendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, secunda intentio concretive dicta est secundum genus intelligibilium, quod scilicet consequitur res prout sunt obiective in intellectu, sicut hoc quod dico esse universale, predicabile, genus et species et consimilia”.

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The third thesis declares how concrete second intentions differ from what is called ‘absolutely nothing’. This difference can be regarded from two angles, both from that of the thing intellected and from that of the intellect. Taking things from the former angle, the relationships (indicated by second intentions) that accompany the objects as they are objectively in the intellect, are either [a] between the object and the intellect, or [b] between the object and the object as intellected.32 In the former case, the object’s being the end of the intellection act presupposes some real entity, although it does not formally posit any entity in the object intellected. Now to presuppose some real entity is precisely what ‘absolutely nothing’ fails to do: Dist. II, q. 3c: Si primo modo, sic illud ens rationis quod nominat hoc quod dico ‘intentio’ aliquod ens reale supponit, quantum ad illud quod primo intelligitur; nam primum terminans actum intelligendi oportet esse ens reale (non enim potest intelligi non-ens nisi prius intelligatur ens, sicut nec privatio intelligitur nisi preintelligatur habitus). Esse ergo terminum ad quem actus intelligendi terminatur, licet formaliter nullam entitatem ponat in re intellecta, tamen supponit entitatem realem, saltem quantum ad primo (prima Mss.) intellecta; omnino autem nichil nec formaliter aliquid ponit nec supponit.

In the [b] case, things are basically the same. That is to say, with regard to what falls to the object primarily (e.g. a primary predicate or subject) in a similar way as in case [a], real entities are presupposed, whereas when a predicable (e.g. being a genus or species) is involved, some real entity is presupposed in which the generic or specific formally (dis)similar forms really inhere: Ibid.: Sed loquendo de secundis intentionibus que dicunt rei intellecte habitudinem ad rem intellectam (sicut hoc quod dico genus et huiusmodi), quantum ad aliqua idem est de eis et de premissis, quia scilicet in eis quibus primo conveniunt, supponunt aliquam entitatem, puta primum predicatum et primum subiectum. (…). Alia autem sunt que, etiamsi non ponant formaliter aliquam entitatem in re intellecta, tamen 32 Ibid.: “Quantum autem ad quartum, quomodo predicta, scilicet secunde intentiones, differant ab omnino nichil, supposito quod, formaliter loquendo, non dicant aliquam entitatem realem in aliquo subiective existentem, sciendum quod inter predicta et omnino nichil potest inveniri differentia et ex parte rei intellecte et ex parte intellectus. Et primo videndum est quomodo inveniatur ex parte rei intellecte. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod cum ita sit quod secunde intentiones dicant habitudines quasdam que, ut dictum est, consequuntur res prout sunt obiective in intellectu, talis habitudo vel est rei ad intellectum, prout hoc quod dico intentio dicit habitudinem rei intellecte ad habitudinem rei prout est terminus actus, vel est habitudo rei intellecte ad rem intellectam, sicut hoc quod dico genus, species, predicatum et subiectum et consimilia”.

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Taking now the present question from the other angle, viz. from that of the intellect, rather than from that of the thing intellected—asking, that is, for the difference between concrete second intentions and what is absolutely nothing—the answer is that concrete second intentions do not formally posit any real entity in the intellect as their substrate. They differ from ‘absolutely nothing’ in that they only fall to something being, or not being even if the intellective act is presupposed through which they are represented in one way or another, viz. universally or particularly. One should know, Hervaeus explains, that in order to escape from the ‘absolutely nothing’ it is not necessary to formally indicate some entity, but it is sufficient to presuppose it, meaning that it cannot fall to something without some real entity being presupposed. In a similar sense, then, second intentions, which are called rationate beings, presuppose some real entity, either viewed from the angle of the intellect alone (e.g. when non-being is conceived of, the fact that non-being is a first intention or an object of the intellect presupposes an intellective act, which is a real thing); or from the angle both of the object intellected and the intellect, in cases in which a genus or a species (which only fall to things) presupposes a real entity, and in which what is primarily intellected, viz. a primary subject or predicate, presupposes a real entity, because a primary thing suited to present itself to the intellect (whether the intellect is simply apprehending things, or conceiving complex things) must be a real thing: Ibid.: Ex parte etiam ipsius intellectus potest poni differentia inter predicta et omnino nichil, non quidem quod talia dicant aliquam entitatem, formaliter loquendo, que sit in intellectu ut in subiecto, sed quia talia non conveniunt enti, vel etiam non-enti, nisi presupposito actu intelligendi quo talia representantur et quo talia sic vel sic (puta universaliter vel particulariter) representantur. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod ad hoc quod aliquid dicatur recedere ab omnino nichil, non oportet quod, formaliter loquendo, dicat aliquam entitatem, sed sufficit quod eam supponat, ita quod illud non possit convenire alicui nisi quadam entitate reali presupposita. (…). Et similiter [viz. like in things signified by potential or privative terms] etiam non conveniret alicui esse intellectum (obiective loquendo) vel esse abstractum nisi esset aliquis actus intelligendi

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in rerum natura cuius obiectum diceretur terminare actum intelligendi vel sic esse abstractum. (…). Et similiter secunde intentiones, que dicuntur entia rationis, supponunt aliquam entitatem realem. Vel ex parte intellectus tantum—ut quando non-ens intelligitur, ipsum non-ens esse intentionem primam vel esse obiectum intellectus supponit actum intelligendi, qui est res vera—; vel ex parte rei intellecte simul et intellectus, sicut genus et species, que non conveniunt nisi rebus, et sicut primum intellectum (vel primum subiectum vel primum predicatum), quia primum quod natum est occurrere intellectui (sive simplici sive complexo) oportet esse rem aliquam veram.

7.2.4. Dist. II, q. 4: Whether a second intention is merely a rationate relationship To solve the question whether a second intention is merely a rationate relationship, a preliminary distinction should be made concerning the nouns signifying rationate beings or concrete second intentions. One group of these nouns signify privations, such as ‘abstractum’, which is in order when e.g. man is set free from Socrates or Plato. Another group signify positive things, such as ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘predicate’ and ‘subject’ etc.; this does not mean, however, that, formally speaking, they posit some real thing in something else as in its substrate, but merely something rationate (aliquid, non secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem). This distinction enables Hervaeus to offer a differentiated answer to the question. The nouns that signify privatively do not signify— I think, Hervaeus says,33—any relationship whatsoever, neither a real nor a rationate one, whereas those signifying positively, such as ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc., are said to signify certain (logical) relationships, but not such relationships as fall under the category Relation, since they do not signify something real. This is further explained by our author. Although any rationate being accompanies things only in so far as they are objectively in the intellect, this does not mean that any rationate being conveys a relationship, for some convey a privation; although the latter cannot be without any relationship, nonetheless they do not indicate it formally. In positive things, however, any rationate being must, formally speaking, convey some relationship, whether between the thing intellected and the intellect, or a relationship between one thing intellected and another, viz. in so far as one thing is compared by the intellect to another. 33

The WV version reads videntur michi significare, where A has significant.

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7.2.5. Dist. II, q. 5: Whether the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect is a second intention This question is about the problem whether the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect is per se a second intention. Hervaeus first recalls his basic view concerning intentions when taken from the perspective of the thing intellected (ex parte rei intellecte). In this sense, intention can be taken in a twofold way: either in abstracto for intentionality as such, according to which the thing intellected is called a concrete first or second intention; or in concreto, in so far as the thing intellected upon which such an intentionality is founded, is called a first or a second intention, viz. in cases in which we say e.g. that man indicates a concrete first intention, and a species a second intention: Dist. II, q. 5c init.: Respondendo ad questionem istam dicendum est quod, sicut supra frequenter fuit dictum, intentio, et prout se tenet ex parte rei intellecte, duplicitur accipitur: uno modo in abstracto, scilicet ut ipsa intentionalitas, secundum quam res intellecta dicitur concretive prima vel secunda intentio; alio modo in concreto, prout ipsa res intellecta in qua fundatur talis intentionalitas, dicitur prima vel secunda intentio; prout scilicet dicimus quod ‘homo’ dicit primam intentionem, et ‘species’ dicit secundam intentionem.

Now, in case of an abstract intention, the aforesaid relationship is neither determinately a first intention, nor determinately only a second intention, but it indicates something common to these two. That is because intentionality in abstracto, according to which anything intellected bears the name of concrete first or second intention, is precisely the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect in so far as this object brings the tendency of the intellective act (towards some potential object) to an end. Now intention (or intentionality) in abstracto does not indicate a first or second intention alone; otherwise it could not denominate anything that is called a concrete intention. Therefore the aforesaid relationship does not indicate only a first intention nor only a second intention. If, however, ‘intention’ is not taken for intentionality, but concretively for the thing that intentionality is founded upon, then the aforesaid relationship between the thing intellected and the intellect indicates only a second intention.34 This rather sophisticated view needs some explanation and support. It is underpinned by introducing two kinds of reflection, one by which 34

Dist. II, q. 5c init.

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the intellect reflects upon its own act (or at least over something of the kind), the other by which it reflects upon the relationship its object has to the act. And in this way one intentionality can afford the foundation of some other. From this perspective, it is claimed that in concrete intentionality, the concrete relationship between some intelligible object and the intellect can be taken not only as the object’s relationship as such, but also as the very object that possesses this relationship, and in the latter case this relationship only indicates a concrete second intention: Ibid.: Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod, quia actus intelligendi potest reflecti super se, vel saltem super illud quod est eiusdem generis secum,— quod [viz. this restrictive remark] ideo dico quia hic [hoc WV ; om. A] nolo diffinire utrum idem actus intelligendi numero sit reflexibilis super se, ita quod idem numero sit et quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur—et potest etiam reflecti super habitudinem sui obiecti ad ipsum. Et ideo ipsa intentionalitas in abstracto qua aliqua res denominatur ‘intentio concretive dicta’ (ut quando dicimus quod ‘homo’ dicit primam intentionem concretive, et eius habitudo ad intellectum dicit primam intentionem in abstracto), potest intelligi esse fundamentum cuiusdam alterius intentionalitatis. Et sic se habebit in ratione cuiusdam intelligibilis habentis habitudinem ad intellectum; et erit intentio concretive dicta. Et sic intelligendo questionem de intentione in concreto: inquantum talis habitudo potest accipi non solum ut ipsa habitudo obiecti, sed etiam ut ipsum obiectum habens habitudinem talem, talis habitudo tantum dicit secundam intentionem, concretive accipiendo.

Hervaeus thinks that all this can easily be gathered from the foregoing discussions, particularly by recalling the distinction concerning the twofold genus intelligibilium, one the domain of extramental being, the other that of rationate being accompanying objects in so far as they are objectively in the intellect. Applying this to intentions, the former kind of being is that falling to concrete first intentions, whereas the latter is the mode of being belonging to concrete second intentions. Now the aforesaid relationship between the object intellected and the intellect plainly pertains to the second kind of intelligible beings. For this reason, the aforesaid relationship taken as something intelligible—as well as ‘intention’ (or ‘intentionality’) taken concretively—is only a second intention.35

35

Ibid.

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7.2.6. Dist. II, q. 6: Whether only the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect is a second intention This question is answered by Hervaeus in plain language. [a] Intention in abstracto, viz. the intentionality according to which something is called a concrete first or second intention, involves a relationship between the thing intellected and the intellect; and only this relationship is called an intention, whether a first or a second intention. [b] If there is an intention in concreto, then the aforesaid relationship, [b1] is not a first intention at all, nor [b2] the only second intention either.36 Item [a] is plain: An abstract intention, according to which by denomination intelligible objects are called concrete first or second intentions, is the object’s relationship towards the intellective act in so far as it [viz. the object] brings the intellective act’s tendency towards the object once cognized to an end. Item [b1] is plain as well: A concrete first intention pertains to the domain of the first kind of intelligibles, to wit, that which falls to things after their affirmative or negative being, leaving their being in the intellect out of consideration. Now the aforesaid relationship formally indicates rationate being alone. Therefore it is not some concrete first intention. Item [c], finally, is plain from e.g. the nature of privative intentions (such as being an abstractum), which are second intentions without indicating such relationships. But it is equally clear from the nature of positive intentions, such as being a genus and being a predicate, which do indicate a relationship (viz. to being a species and being a subject, respectively); but such relationships are not between an object intellected and an intellective act, rather they are between one thing intellected and another, or between one intellective act and another. (For that matter, our author would prefer the former view to the latter). Next, the occurrence of a twofold intentionality, one being founded on the other is explained by what occurs in the domain of real, extramental things. In this domain indeed, what is a denominative form 36 Ibid.: “Respondeo. Ad evidentiam huius questionis sciendum quod, sicut frequenter dictum est, intentio, etiam prout hic de intentione agitur [viz. ex parte rei intellecte], dupliciter accipitur, scilicet abstractive et concretive. Si ergo accipiatur intentio in abstracto, ut ipsa scilicet intentionalitas secundum quam aliquid dicitur concretive intentio prima vel secunda, fit habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum; et sola talis habitudo est intentio, tam prima quam secunda. Si autem intentio accipiatur in concreto, sic accipiendo intentionem predicta habitudo nec est aliqua intentio prima, nec etiam ipsa sola est intentio secunda”.

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with regard to substrate [x] can itself be a denominated substrate with regard to [y]; for instance, when a surface is a denominative form of a substance, which formally makes it of this or that size, and at the same time is a denominated substrate with regard to the whiteness by which it is a white surface. In a similar way, this occurs, mutatis mutandis, in the case of two intentionalities, since that which is a denominative intentionality with regard to one thing intellected can, in turn, secondarily be a denominated intention with regard to another thing, which is the relationship between the object intellected to the intellect (in as far as the thing intellected is the end of the intellective act); and this relationship is the intentionality that is denominative of the thing intellected being called a concrete intention; now when a relationship different from the former is conceived, this can be conceived of as denominative of the former. And when such a relationship is conceived of, it is, qua object intellected, the foundation of another relationship. Thus what with regard to one thing was a denominative intentionality, is a denominated one with regard to another: Ibid.: Ad declarationem autem istorum que dicta sunt sciendum quod, sicut in esse reali rerum extra animam illud quod est forma denominans respectu unius, potest esse subiectum denominatum respectu alterius, modo quo unum accidens dicitur subiectum alterius (puta superficies denominat substantiam, faciens eam formaliter quantam, et ipsa eadem est subiectum denominatum respectu albedinis qua dicitur superficies alba), ita suo modo est in ipsis intentionibus. Nam illud quod est intentionalitas denominans respectu unius potest esse intentio denominata respectu alterius. Nam, sicut dictum est, habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum (prout ipsa res intellecta est terminus actus intelligendi), que est intentionalitas denominans rem intellectam esse intentionem concretive dictam: quando alia ab ipsa habitudine intelligitur, potest illa ut denominans priorem intelligi. Et quando talis habitudo intelligitur, ipsa habitudo, inquantum est obiectum intellectum, est fundamentum alterius habitudinis. Et sic illud quod respectu unius fuit intentionalitas denominans, respectu alterius est intentio denominata.

The author then provides an example. When I conceive of (a) man, the relationship between (the) man intellected and my intellect is an abstract intentionality, according to which (the) man intellected is called a concrete first intention. This relationship does not coincide with the object cognized (as (the) man is intellected as a primary and per se object), but it is a certain rationate relationship accompanying the object intellected qua intellected. Now since the intellect can afterwards

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reflect upon its own intellective act and upon the relationship accompanying the object intellected, then from the fact that such a relationship is conceived, which was earlier a relationship of the object intellected and is now itself a thing intellected, it can afterwards itself be a primary object intellected. And just as the previous primary object, namely the man intellected, was accompanied by a relationship that was the intentionality that denominated it as a concrete first intention, so it is itself accompanied, in turn, by a rationate relationship towards the intellect, as soon as such a relationship is conceived as an object intellected on its own. Hence the first relationship acts as the foundation of the second, and, consequently, it can be denominated after the second one, just as sometimes the intellective act too is conceived of through a reflexive act, and then the act that is intellected is not that through which the person who intellects intellects, but that which this person intellects: Ibid.: Verbi gratia, quando intelligo hominem, habitudo hominis intellecti ad intellectum est ipsa intentionalitas abstracta, secundum quam homo intellectus dicitur prima intentio concretive. Et ista habitudo non est ipsum obiectum cognitum ut homo intelligitur ut primum et per se obiectum, sed est quedam relatio rationis consequens ipsam rem intellectam ut sic. Sed quia ulterius intellectus potest reflecti super suum actum intelligendi et super habitudinem que consequitur rem intellectam, ex hoc quod intelligitur talis habitudo que prius fuit relatio rei intellecte, et nunc [scripsi; non Mss.] res intellecta, potest postea esse primum obiectum intellectum. Et sicut prius primum obiectum (puta hominem intellectum) consequebatur quedam habitudo que erat intentionalitas ipsam denominans primam intentionem concretive dictam, ita etiam, quando talis habitudo intelligitur ut obiectum per se intellectum, consequitur eam quedam relatio rationis ad intellectum, ita quod illa prima habitudo est fundamentum secunde habitudinis, et per consequens denominabilis est ab ipsa, sicut etiam actus intelligendi quandoque intelligitur actu reflexo, et tunc actus qui intelligitur non est quo intelligens intelligit, sed quod intelligens intelligit.

This view presents a problem, however. For cases like the previous ones seem to involve relationships between one thing intellected and another, rather than between the thing intellected and the intellect.37

37 For the text see Girald Odonis, De intentionibus, cap. 42, where the WV version of the Hervaeus passage is quoted in full, and criticized by Girald as evidencing the man’s supposed inconsistency.

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7.3. On De secundis intentionibus, distt. III–V The third Distinctio, which consists of four questions, deals with the way in which a second intention is founded upon a first intention. The fourth consists of three sub-questions and discusses the relationship between first and second intention with regard to its predicability of real things, and of other second intentions, and predications such as ‘Homo est genus’. The final Distinctio discusses the position of logic, and consists of four questions. In his own treatise on the intentionality issue, Girald Odonis only discusses some problems from the foregoing three Distinctiones, two from III, two from IV, and two from V. For this reason, I confine myself to analyzing these six questions. 7.3.1. Dist. III, q. 2: Whether a second intention is immediately founded upon an extramental thing This question is answered by Hervaeus after three preliminary remarks have been made. First. An extramental thing does not possess any intentional relationship whatsoever without there being intellectual activity. If, however, there is talk of a thing intellected and an intellective act, then there are two relationships: one is real, and is between the intellect and the object intellected; the other is rationate, and is between the object intellected and the intellect in actual operation. This domain of rationate being is threefold, comprising, first, rationate beings produced by simple apprehension, then, those produced by sentence-making, finally, those produced by discursive thinking. The second preliminary remark concerns the foundation of a second intention. Two formulas should be distinguished, namely ‘whiteness is founded upon that which is white, taken abstractively’ and ‘whiteness is founded upon that which is white qua white’, because in the former formula, nothing other is said than that upon which or in which whiteness is white, whereas in the latter, because of the reduplication, it is indicated that whiteness is the cause of the foundation; and this is absurd. Now there is a similar difference between ‘that upon which abstract intentionality is founded possesses being in the intellect’ and ‘such an intentionality is founded upon the intellect according to the mode of being it has in the intellect’. This is because such a being objectively in the intellect is, formally speaking, that well-known rela-

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tionship existing between the thing intellected and the intellect which is called intentionality. Therefore this intentionality cannot possibly be founded upon something else that is not itself objectively in the intellect. However, the intentionality in question is not founded upon the object that is in the intellect according to the mode of being it has in the intellect, meaning that its being in the intellect would be the cause of the foundation, because this would amount to founding itself. Rather the primary intentionality is founded upon the real being of the extramental things in question.38 In his third remark, Hervaeus begins with recalling his basic doctrine of intentionality: intention is taken either abstractively, i.e. for intentionality as such, or concretively, i.e. for that upon which intentionality is founded, viz. the object intellected. Now the primary intentionality, which is founded upon the object intellected that possesses real being (e.g. a substance or a body), is the first intention in abstracto, namely the intentionality or relationship between the object intellected and the intellect; and the latter is the concrete second intention, in so far as this relationship is sometimes itself the object intellected. That is to say, when the relationship founded upon the object intellected which has real being, is itself an object intellected, another rationate relationship is founded upon it, which is a secondary intentionality in abstracto, whereas the primary intentionality is a concrete second intention. The problem can now be solved as follows. In case of an abstract second intention or intentionality, no second intention is founded upon extramental reality, because what is immediately founded upon rationate or intentional being, is not immediately founded upon real outside 38 Dist. III, q. 2c init.: “Secundo sciendum quod aliud est dicere quod albedo fundetur super illud quod est album, abstracte accipiendo, et dicere quod albedo fundetur super illud quod est album inquantum album. Nam in primo non ponitur nisi quod illud super quod, vel in quo, est albedo, sit album; in secundo autem, propter reduplicationem positam, denotatur quod albedo sit ratio et causa fundationis; quod esse non potest. Et similiter aliud est dicere quod illud super quod fundatur intentionalitas in abstracto accepta, habeat esse in intellectu, et aliud est dicere quod talis intentionalitas fundatur in ipso secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, nam ipsum esse in intellectu obiective est formaliter illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum que dicitur intentionalitas ipsa. Et ideo non potest esse quod talis intentionalitas fundeur in aliquo et non sit in intellectu obiective. Tamen talis intentionalitas non fundatur super rem que est in intellectu obiective, secundum illud esse quod est in intellectu, ita quod esse in intellectu sit causa vel ratio ipsius fundationis, quia idem esset ac ratio fundandi seipsum. Et hoc dico quantum ad primam intentionalitatem. Fundatur enim super esse reale rerum, prout tamen coexigit actum intelligendi ut fundamentum opposite relationis”.

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things. If, however, there is a concrete second intention, to wit, rationate being, which is the second kind of intelligibles, then we have to do with a second intention that is immediately founded on a real thing, since, as a concrete second intention, it is the primary intentionality which is founded on the first kind of intelligibles, viz. on an object possessing real being. No other second intention, however, except for this one (which is an abstract first intention and a concrete second intention) is founded upon a real extramental thing. It should be noted, Hervaeus remarks at the end of his determinatio, that of this primary intentionality, which in its concreteness has precedence among concrete second intentions, it cannot be truly said—in spite of the fact that it is founded upon what is actually in the intellect— that it is founded upon what is in the intellect according to the mode of being it actually has in the intellect. Thus the author once again underlines the real foundation of the aforesaid kind of concrete second intentions. However, any other second intentions whatsoever, he warns, cannot only be said to be founded upon its being in the intellect, but you can also say that they are founded upon an object existing in the intellect according to this mode of being. All those other second intentions then are founded in reality, but only by the intermediary of this mode of being in the intellect. 7.3.2. Dist. III, q. 3: Whether a second intention is founded upon a first This question is answered in the affirmative by firmly stating that any second intention is founded upon a first one, either mediately or immediately. This basic view is differentiated, then. Taking first intentions concretively, any second intention, whether in concreto or in abstracto, is founded on a concrete first intention. Taking, however, first intentions abstractively, viz. as primary intentionality, then some second intentions, whether in abstracto or in concreto, can be founded on a first intention. One should know indeed that an abstract intention, viz. the intentionality according to which something is denominated a first or a second intention, is the relationship between the primary object intellected and the intellect; so such a relationship alone is an abstract intention, whether a first or a second one. Any other things indicate concrete intentions, and, formally speaking, abstract intentions as well, because they indicate a relationship between the object intellected and the intellect in so far as this object brings the intellect’s tendency towards it to an end; this is a manner of speaking according our mode

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of intellecting. The qualification ‘according to our mode of intellecting’ is added because in terms of real being, to intellect something does not as such posit anything in the object intellected. The determinatio winds up with another exposition of the twofold intentionality, which to Hervaeus, is at the basis of the distinctions ‘abstract vs. concrete intention’ and ‘first vs. second intention’. The primary intentionality, which is the relationship between the extramental object and the intellect, acts, in so far as this relationship is intellected, as the foundation of another relationship to the intellect, which is founded upon the former (primary) one, as it acts as the object now intellected in this way; and then the primary intentionality in abstracto is also a second intention in concreto, albeit with regard to diverse things. This is explained in detail: Dist. III, q. 3c ad fin.: Secundo sciendum quod predicta intentionalitas prima, que est habitudo obiecti realis ad intellectum prout est intellecta, est fundamentum alterius habitudinis, fundate in ea ut in obiecto sic intellecto, ad intellectum; et tunc intentionalitas prima in abstracto et est secunda intentio in concreto, licet per comparationem ad diversa dicatur prima et secunda. Nam prout est habitudo primi obiecti intellecti ad intelligentem in actu, habet rationem intentionalitatis, et est prima intentio in abstracto. Sed prout est obiectum intellectum super quod fundatur habitudo ad intellectum, est secunda intentio in concreto, et habitudo fundata super ipsam est intentio secunda in abstracto. Prout vero illa habitudo est medium mediante quo entia rationis que non dicunt habitudinem obiecti ad intellectum sed vel dicunt privationem secundum rationem vel habitudinem unius obiecti ad aliud obiectum, prout sunt obiective in intellectu modo supra exposito, illa intentionalitas habet tantum rationem intentionalitatis in abstracto. Nec tamen habet rationem secunde intentionis in concreto, quia ut sic non se habet in ratione obiecti intellecti, ymo in ratione habitudinis obiecti intellecti ad intellectum, qua supposita, consequuntur quedam que sunt entia rationis (ut dictum est) que inquantum possunt intelligi, possunt etiam esse intentiones in concreto, inquantum scilicet super ea sic intellecta potest fundari habitudo ad intellectum actu ipsa intelligentem.

7.3.3. Dist. IV, q. 1: Whether a second intention can be predicated of an extramental thing This question in fact deals with the problem whether it is truly said ‘A man is a species’, in which the subject stands for an extramental object. The solution requires some preliminary statements. First, a second intention, which indicates rationate being, is predicated of a thing that has real being in the outside world, denominatively. Second, the thing

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of which a second intention is predicated, in some respect is outside the mind, in some other respect inside the mind. Third, the predication in question is accidental. Hervaeus begins with the well-known assessment of the intentionality doctrine: the basic division is into abstract and concrete; next follows the distinction between first and second: Dist. IV, q. 1c init.: Quantum ad primum sciendum quod, sicut supra dictum fuit frequenter, intentio potest accipi abstractive et concretive. Intentio (prout nunc loquimur de intentione) accepta in abstracto, sive prima sive secunda, est ipsa habitudo ipsius rei que intelligitur, ad intellectum prout eius actum terminat, prout accipitur obiectum ut quoddam ad quod actus intelligendi terminatur. Intentio autem concretive dicta dicitur ipsum obiectum in quo fundatur talis habitudo. Et illa dividitur in primam et secundam secundum duo genera intelligibilium, quorum unum dicit ens reale, et aliud ens rationis quod consequitur rem prout est obiective in intellectu.

Next it is claimed that second intentions can be truly predicated of things that have real being. It should be noted now that certain properties fall to objects cognized according to their own nature, rather than in so far as they are objectively in the intellect (e.g. a stone’s being cognized as heavy or hard), whereas other properties follow from their being cognized, such as their being immaterial (viz. in their capacity of being intentional), and still other properties, such as their being set free from singulars, fall to them when they, qua cognized, are compared to others. The second kind of properties concerns nothing but the psychic or spiritual character of their intramental mode of being, which is given simultaneously with their being in the intellect. The third kind, however, presupposes their being objectively in the mind, and those properties, accordingly, are indeed mind-dependent. The phrase ‘being outside the intellect’ falling to objects such as man in ‘Man is a species’ should be taken for an object’s properties that do not as such conceptually include mind-dependence, e.g. man’s generic nature of animality. To understand the accidental nature of predications such as in ‘Man is a species’ one should be aware of the distinction ‘essential vs. denominative predication’. In the former case, the predicate is essentially the same as the subject, e.g. in ‘Man is an animal’. In cases of denominative predication, however, such as in ‘Man is a species’, this does not obtain, because the predicate merely falls to the subject in that man (accidentally, i.e. only as a result of its being the object of an intellective act) is

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taken in its state of objectively being in the intellect, and so denominatively is called a species, after its specific nature of humanity. In his reply to one of the rationes in oppositum, Hervaeus claims that in ‘Man is a species’ the term ‘man’ has the semantic value of a singular term, since it is taken to stand for the common nature, manhood.39 7.3.4. Dist. IV, q. 2: Whether one second intention is truly predicated of another The standard example is ‘Genus est species’, and the answer is in the affirmative. Hervaeus explains in what respect one intention can be truly predicated of another in concreto, and in what sense it cannot. He claims that there are some intentions that, taken abstractively, cannot be mutually predicated, but in concreto and accidentally can. Just as real accidents relate to one and the same substrate, so do second intentions to one and the same formal object. Now real accidents that are compatible with regard to one and the same real substrate—without, however, being mutually inclusive of necessity—are mutually predicated concretively and per accidens, e.g. saying ‘What is white is sweet’. Therefore second intentions that are mutually compatible with respect to one and the same formal object, albeit without necessary correlationships, are predicated of the other if they are taken concretively. This holds good of second intentions of the type of being a genus or being an actual subject. 7.3.5. Dist. IV, q. 3: Whether a second intention can be truly predicated of the foundation of the opposite intention The standard example is ‘Man is a genus’, the problem being whether, given that ‘Man is an animal’ is true, and animal is a genus, and genus and species are opposite intentions, you can truly predicate what is the second intention, genus in concreto (animal), of that upon which the opposite specific intention, man, to wit, the object, man, is founded. The solution to this intricate problem requires a distinction concerning the foundation of second intentions. This foundation is twofold, one pri39 Dist. IV, q. 1c ad fin.: “(…) in ista propositione ‘Homo est species’ ‘homo’ habet vim termini singularis in eo quod tenetur pro natura communi, prout sub eo non potest fieri descensus respectu talis predicati. Ideo negatio preposita non distribuit terminum pro omnibus suis suppositis, sicut etiam nec in affirmativa tenetur pro aliquo illorum, sed tantum pro natura communis illius. Unde non sequitur ‘Non est homo species; ergo nullus homo est species”. Notice that for Plato, the idea Homo is singular.

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mary and remote, the other immediate and proximate. The former is upon the extramental thing, whereas the latter is upon the object qua intellected. That the second intention’s primary and remote foundation is the extramental thing is plain, because, qua primary object of the intellect, it belongs to the first kind of intelligibles which comprises the extramental things. Furthermore, that its immediate foundation is the object qua intellected is plain as well, since ‘being objectively in the intellect’ equals ‘being intellected’ and, given that second intentions follow objects qua intellected, their immediate foundation is not the extramental thing as such or taken absolutely, but precisely qua cognized.40 There is also an interesting note about denominative designation of the object cognized. When an object is denominated after the intellective act, and, for example, is called ‘intellectum’, then this denomination does not depend on a rationate being, since the intellective act is more real than whatever bodily quality. However, the object can also be denominated after the rationate relationship in virtue of which it is naturally suited to relate to the intellect, in its capacity, that is, of being the end of the intellective act. And so ‘being intellected’ is used in two different senses: sometimes it stands for the denomination through which the object is denominated after the intellective act, sometimes for the denomination through which it is denominated after the rationate relationship it has qua naturally suited to act as the end of the intellective act: 40 Dist. IV, q. 3c init.: “(…) sciendum quod istarum [viz. second] intentionum est duplex fundamentum, scilicet fundamentum primarium et remotum, et fundamentum immediatum et propinquum. Fundamentum primarium et remotum est res habens esse reale in rerum natura, proximum autem et immediatum est ipsa res sic vel sic intellecta. Primum, scilicet quod fundamentum primarium et remotum secundarum intentionum sit res habens esse reale, de facili patet quia: Primum fundamentum eorum que consequuntur obiectum intellectus ut est obiective in intellectu, est illud quod est primum obiectum intellectus. Sed primum obiectum intellectus est res habens esse reale in rerum natura; nam, sicut frequenter dictum est supra, primum genus intelligibilium est ens reale in rerum natura. Ergo etc. Et illud non oportet multum pertractare, quia satis patet. Secundum etiam faciliter ostenditur, scilicet quod immediatum et propinquum fundamentum talium intentionum sit res sic vel sic intellecta quia: Illud quod consequitur rem ut est obiective in intellectu, consequitur rem ut est intellecta, quia esse obiective in intellectu idem est quod esse intellectum (sicut potest patere ex supradictis; quod enim sic vel sic est in intellectu, est in eo sicut cognitum in cognoscente). Sed dicte intentiones consequuntur rem prout sunt obiective in intellectu. Ergo predicte intentiones consequuntur res ut sunt intellecte. Et per consequens fundamenta talium intentionum proxima non sunt res prout sunt absolute in suo esse reali, sed prout sunt intellecte”.

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chapter seven Dist. IV, q. 3c init.: (…) obiectum potest denominari ab actu intelligendi, sicut quando dicitur quod aliquod ens est ‘intellectum’, et ista denominatio non est denominatio ab ente rationis, quia actus intelligendi (ut supra dictum est) habet verum esse reale, magis quam quecumque qualitas corporalis. Potest etiam denominari ab ipsa habitudine rationis qua obiectum natum est referri ad intellectum, prout dicitur esse terminus actus intelligendi vel esse obiective in intellectu. Et ideo differenter: hoc quod dicitur ‘esse intellectum’ quandoque accipitur pro ipsa denominatione qua res denominatur ab ipso actu intelligendi, et quandoque pro denominatione qua res denominatur ab ipsa habitudine.

This subtle distinction is intended to solve the intricate problem whether perhaps Hervaeus’s view of ‘res intellecta’ implies the absurd consequence that being intellected is founded upon itself. The author argues that if ‘being intellected’ is taken as assigned to the object in so far as it corresponds to the intellective act qua foundation of the opposite relationship, no absurd consequence will follow. The usual parallel with properties concerning such things as whiteness is drawn: likewise, Hervaeus argues, the similarity between two white things is only founded upon a whiteness in so far as it corresponds to another instance of whiteness to be the foundation of the other relationship. The final conclusion should be that the object intellected is the immediate foundation of any second intentions, although this happens to a primary second intention in a different way than to the secondary ones: Ibid.: Et tunc dico quod ista habitudo, scilicet esse intellectum sive esse obiective in intellectu, fundatur super rem ut est intellecta, accipiendo ‘esse intellectum’ primo modo, idest super rem ut ei correspondet actus intelligendi ut fundamentum opposite relationis. Non autem secundo modo, scilicet super rem intellectam, idest super rem ut habet habitudinem ad actum intelligendi, quia tunc ipsa habitudo predicta fundaretur super seipsam. Sed secundum primum modum non sequitur quod fundetur super seipsam, nec quod fundetur super actum intelligendi, sed quod fundetur super rem ut ei correspondet actus intelligendi ut fundamentum opposite relationis; sicut etiam nec super albedinem fundatur similitudo nisi prout correspondet sibi alia albedo que sit fundamentum alterius relationis. Sic ergo patet quod res sic vel sic intellecta est proximum fundamentum omnium secundarum intentionum, licet diversimode hoc conveniat ei que est prima inter secundas intentiones, et aliis postea consequentibus.

Next the difference between the primary and secondary second intentions is explained. First, the well-known threefold division of intentions according to the threefold operation of the intellect is recalled. As far as simple apprehension is concerned, diverse ontic aspects of the object

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can be focussed upon, which produces either first or second intentions, as either the objects as such or their intentional relationships are under examination: Ibid.: (…) cum res moveat intellectum ad diversas cognitiones secundum diversa apparentia (sicut quando movetur intellectus ad apprehendendum hominem secundum apparens quod est rationale, et apprehendendum ipsum secundum apparens quod est sensibile, et sic de aliis), hoc quod est talem rem esse hominem et esse animal vel esse rationale et esse sensibile et esse corporeum et consimilia non dicunt entia rationis sive secundas intentiones, ymo dicunt verum esse reale in rerum natura existens; nam ista sunt una res realiter, homo, animal, corpus et consimilia. Sed ista differre dicuntur secundum rationem abinvicem. Et esse diversa obiecta intellectus vel esse diversos terminos diversorum actuum intellectus; vel etiam hoc ipsum quod est ista esse diversos terminos actuum diversorum intelligendi talia, inquantum dicunt entia rationis et secundas intentiones concretive dictas modo quo supra frequenter est expositum.

Just as simple apprehension can (secondarily) lead to rationate being and second intentions, so do the two other operations of the mind, viz. sentence-making and discursive thinking: Ibid.: Et sicut inveniuntur diverse intentiones secunde consequentes rem ut est obiective in intellectu secundum apprehensionem simplicem (puta genus, species, et consimilia), ita etiam inveniuntur diverse secunde intentiones consequentes rem ut est obiective in intellectu secundum cognitionem complexam, sicut hoc quod dico esse complexum et unum complexum esse contrarium alteri. Et similiter inveniuntur quedam secunde intentiones quantum ad actum intelligendi discursivum, sicut antecedens et consequens, premissa et conclusio,41 et quedam alia.

Now the order between the diverse second intentions can be established. The general rule is that intentions (whether first or second ones) following an object as it is objectively in the intellect through simple apprehension, always precede those that follow sentence-making, and those following discursive thinking. Now among the second intentions following the act of simple apprehension the primary one (with regard to any object) is that which indicates the relationship the object has to the intellective act, whereas it is by its intermediary that any other second intentions following the object intellected receive their foundation. For example, when a man is conceived of (through simple apprehension) as a rational being, the primary second intention (in concreto, that is) is the relationship between man qua rational and the intellective act. 41

Antecedens esse, premissam esse etc. are meant.

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Taking now man abstractively, any other intentional relationship, following man as compared to, say, animal or rational, is founded immediately upon the intellective act, and through it, mediately on the object intellected.42 Finally the initial question (“Whether a second intention can be predicated of the foundation of the opposite intention”) is answered. Speaking of the remote foundation of the two intentions involved, then [a] in cases of simple apprehension, second intentions such as genus, species, differentia, proprium, universale, abstractum etc. can have the same real foundation, but not with respect to the same thing; [b] in cases of complex cognition in which the complex is essentially one (e.g. in ‘Homo est animal’ or ‘Homo est risibilis’), there seems to be some one foundation, whereas for contingent complexes such as in ‘Homo est albus’ there is not. Speaking, on the other hand, of the immediate foundation of the intentions involved, some (e.g. subject and predicate) have the same foundation, whereas others (viz. the five predicables) have not.43 7.3.6. Dist. V, q. 1: Whether there is a discipline having second intentions as its primary and essential subject To answer this question one has first to make clear what should be understood by a discipline’s primary and essential object. For something to be a discipline’s primary and essential object three things are required. The first condition is that it should be primarily known in this discipline. The second is that anything considered in this discipline should have a relationship of attribution to the primary object. The third is that the entire scientific procedure should consist in a formal causal reduction of all the properties, observations and considerations at hand to the primary object, and that they all should find their end in it. Now these conditions are met by rationate being or the domain of second intentions, because this domain is up to the third condition (which in fact includes the first two). This is plain because there is nothing prior to rationate being when it comes to acting as the ultimate end of the discipline about second intentions. At the end of the determinatio the domain of rationate being is unambiguously recognized as a genuine applicant for being a discipline’s primary object: 42 43

Dist. IV, q. 3c. Dist. IV, q. 3c ad fin.

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Dist. V, q. 1c ad fin.: Ex hiis faciliter patet ad questionem principalem, utrum scilicet aliqua scientia possit esse de ente rationis ut de primo et per se subiecto. Nam ex premissis patet quod sic quia: De illo potest esse scientia ut de primo et per se subiecto cui possunt competere tres predicte conditiones, scilicet quod processus scientie stet ad ipsum sicut ad primum, et quod alia reducantur ad ipsum, et quod sit primo consideratum (…). Sed ens rationis est huiusmodi (…). Ergo etc..

7.3.7. Dist. V, q. 2: Whether logic alone is about second intentions as its primary subject This question, properly speaking, is twofold: [a] is logic about second intentions in this way?, and [b] is it the only discipline dealing with second intentions? In addition, ‘second intention’ is here used for the second kind of intelligibles. The question is assessed by Hervaeus concisely and lucidly: Dist. V, q. 2c init.: (…) quando hic queritur utrum logica sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subiecto, hic non accipitur intentio secunda tantum pro ipsa intentionalitate que est habitudo obiecti ad intellectum—prout dicitur prima intentio habitudo fundata super primum genus intelligibilium, et secunda intentio habitudo fundata super secundum genus intelligibilium (…)—, ymo accipitur hic intentio secunda pro ipso secundo genere intelligibilium, sive dicat habitudinem obiecti ad intellectum—sicut est ipsa intentionalitas secundum quam aliquid dicitur prima intentio vel secunda concretive—, sive dicat habitudinem unius intelligibilis ad aliud, sicut genus, species, universale, particulare, et consimilia. Et universaliter accipitur hic secunda intentio illud quod consequitur rem ut est obiective in intellectu.

The first sub-question is answered as follows. Logic is about second intentions as its primary subject, but not any second intention is its primary subject, since many second intentions (e.g. being abstract, being universal etc.) are themselves only properties (passiones) and subjective parts (partes subiective) of the second intentions (e.g. being obiectively in the intellect) that make up the primary subject of logic. The reply to the other sub-question meets a major difficulty in that grammar and rhetoric, too seem to deal with rationate being and second intention. The elimination of the difficulty requires a distinction concerning the notion of rationate being. Some rationate being follows things in virtue of their own nature, whereas another kind of rationate being falls to them by institution. To follow by nature happens in two ways, either merely in virtue of something’s real nature; so the property of having the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles falls

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to triangles merely owing to their nature, without any extrinsic factor being active, that is. In this way, the phrase ‘ex natura sua’ is opposed to ‘ab extrinseco’. Now no second intention falls to a thing in virtue of its own essential nature as it exists in the extramental world; being abstracted or being universal indeed do not fall to things in virtue of their own nature, but owing to the operation of an exterior factor, the intellect.44 On the other hand, the phrase ‘ex natura sua’ can be used in strict opposition to ‘ex institutione’, to the effect that something is said to follow another thing naturally when it follows it without there being any institutional cause, although there is no essential link between the thing’s nature and the property falling to it either, as is plain from the triangle example. Now in this way the second intentions considered by the logician follow the things intellected, because it is not by institution that things are naturally suited to be intellected abstractively and indeterminately; quite to the contrary, our intellect is naturally suited to be moved by a thing to conceive it, and, consequently, it is natural that a certain indetermination should fall to the thing intellected as it is objectively in the intellect (rather than to the object according to its extramental natural being, that is).45 Hervaeus is of the opinion (for the time being, he says: quantum adnunc videtur michi) that logic is the only discipline that is about that rationate being which we call ‘second intention’, as its primary object, 44 Dist. V, q. 2c: “(…) aliquid potest dici consequi rem ex ipsa natura rei dupliciter. Uno modo quia scilicet consequitur rem ex sola natura rei quantum ad suum esse reale, circumscripto quocumque alio, ita quod, ipsa re posita, necesse est illud poni, circumscripto quocumque alio, sive per possibile sive per impossibile, sicut habere tres angulos equales duobus rectis consequitur triangulum ex natura sua. Et isto modo dicitur aliquid consequi rem ex natura sua per oppositum ad consequi ab extrinseco. Et sic nulla secunda intentio consequitur rem ex natura sua quantum ad suum esse reale accepta; ad nullam enim rem ex natura sua quantum ad suum esse reale, circumscripto quocumque alio, consequitur esse abstractum vel universale vel genus vel speciem, vel aliquid tale”. 45 Ibid.: “Alio modo potest dici aliquid consequi rem ex natura sua per oppositum ad consequi ex institutione alicuius instituentis secundum placitum. Et tunc dicitur aliquid consequi rem ex natura sua sive naturaliter quando ad naturam eius in comparatione ad quodcumque natum est consequi, nullo secundum placitum instituente. Et isto modo intentiones secunde quas considerat logicus, consequuntur res intellectas ex natura rei. Non enim ex institutione alicuius secundum placitum instituentis est quod res nate sunt intelligi abstractive et indeterminate, ymo naturaliter intellectus natus est sic moveri a re quod eam indeterminate intelligat; et per consequens isto modo nata est consequi rem intellectam quedam indeterminatio prout est obiective in intellectu. Et sic patet quomodo quedam entia rationis consequuntur rem ex natura sua, modo quo expositum est”.

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because logic alone considers rationate being in communi, whereas other disciplines are about some determinate rationate being: Ibid. 2c medio: Quantum ergo ad istam partem questionis, utrum scilicet aliqua alia scientia a logica sit de ente rationis quod vocamus ‘secundam intentionem’ ut de primo et per se subiecto—quantum adnunc videtur michi quod loquendo de ente rationis quod consequitur res naturaliter ex modo quo naturaliter sunt intelligi (sicut sepe expositum est)—videtur michi quod sola logica sit de tali ente rationis ut de primo et per se subiecto, et nulla alia scientia a logica. Et hoc persuadeo una ratione et uno signo. Ratio talis est: Si aliqua scientia alia a logica habeat ens rationis pro primo et per se subiecto, aut considerat de ente rationis secundum magis universalem rationem ipsius entis rationis quam logica, ita scilicet quod illa scientia consideret de ente rationis in communi, et logica de aliquo determinato ente rationis; aut econverso, scilicet quod logica determinet de ente rationis in communi, et illa alia scientia determinet de aliquo determinato ente rationis; aut ita est quod ambe, scilicet logica et illa alia scientia, determinent de diversis entibus specialibus rationis, ita quod una consideret de uno et alia de alio, vel quod ambe sint de eodem ente rationis considerato secundum diversas rationes. Sed hoc esse non potest. Ergo etc..

Next it is extensively proved that logic alone has (part of the) second intentions for its primary object. 7.3.8. Dist. V, q. 3: Whether logic deals with the entire domain of second intention The De secundis intentionibus winds up with asking two short questions. First, it is asked if all second intentions belong to the object of logic. Two arguments are given in support of the thesis that logic is about any kind of rationate being (including the kind of rationate being that comprises second intention); they are followed by one counterargument to the effect that logic does not deal with any intention or any rationate being.46 The answer is prepared by three preliminary remarks. First the author reminds us of the special sense in which the phrase ‘rationate being’ (ens rationis) should be taken, as has been made clear in the previous question. Next a surmise (suppositio) is made (and argued for) to the effect that logic is about rationate being, that is to say, that which falls to objects as they are objectively in the intellect, and this in so far as the consideration of them is useful for acquiring the modus procedendi 46 Dist. V, q. 3 init.: “Ergo logica non tractat de omni ente rationis” WV ; de omni intentione sive de omni ente rationis ed.

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in other disciplines, which consists in defining simple concepts and in proceeding from general to special notions and from what is known to us to what is unknown etc. Four conclusions are now brought forward: [1] Logic is not about rationate being produced as a result of human institution, such as e.g. the imposition of nouns which grammar is about; [2] Logic does not consider determinate kinds of rationate being, which make up the domain of the special disciplines; [3] Logic generally deals with any rationate being that falls to any being in a general, unspecific way (at least in so far as created being is concerned), such as genus, species, antecedens and consequens, and so on, because all this pertains to the general modus procedendi useful for any discipline; [4] Not every consideration of such general kinds of rationate being, however, pertains to logic, because not everyone concerns the general modus procedendi (as will be made clear in the next question). Finally, the solution to the initial problem, viz. whether logic is about any kind of rationate being, is presented: Logic is not about things that are merely institutional, nor about determinate rationate being, but only about rationate being that falls to things in so far as they are naturally suited to be an object of intellective apprehension, and this kind of rationate being only in so far as its consideration is useful for acquiring the general modus procedendi common to any discipline. 7.3.9. Dist. V, q. 4: Whether there is a discipline other than logic which in one way or another deals with second intentions Before we can answer this question a few preliminary topics should be dealt with. First, we need to make a distinction regarding the phrase ‘to consider rationate beings’; second, we have to state what kind of consideration pertains to logic, and what kinds do not; third, we should show how the conceptual unity of the rationate beings in question has to do with the unity of the discipline involved. Taking, then, the first two questions together, which both concern the consideration of rationate being with regard to real being, we have to consider whether, for example, in reality, a genus is separated from its species, and the species from its individuals, is the business of metaphysics, whereas if it is the logical relationships between rationate beings (e.g. that of predication) one is after, logic is the place to be.47 47

Dist. V, q. 4c: “(…) sciendum quod, loquendo generaliter de omni ente rationis,

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As for the third question, Hervaeus begins by explaining in what way you have to take the role of the conceptual unity of a discipline, and then he exemplifies this by describing the position of metaphysics on this score: Dist. V, q. 4c ad fin.: Quantum ad tertium, scilicet quomodo unitas illius a quo, vel in ordine ad quod, sumitur ratio istorum entium rationis facit ad hoc quod aliqua una scientia possit tractare de ipsis,—non sic intelligendo quod una sola scientia consideret de ipsis secundum quamcumque sui communem considerationem natam haberi, nam, sicut iam dictum est, secundum diversas considerationes possunt considerari a diversis scientiis, saltem a metaphisica et logica, sed hoc est sic intelligendum quod omnia ista entia rationis quantum ad unum modum considerantur ad unam scientiam, et ad istam unitatem reductionis facit unitas eius a quo eorum ratio sumitur. Verbi gratia, consideratio omnium entium rationis prout considerantur in ordine ad esse reale, inquirendo scilicet utrum habeant entitatem realem et utrum consequantur res in esse reali, ista, inquam, consideratio pertinet ad unam, scilicet metaphisicam.

Next he claims that what provides logic with the conceptual unity it needs in order to be one discipline, is the intellective act being common to any kind of rationate being involved: Ibid.: Et ad istam unitatem qua ista reducuntur ad unam scientiam propter unitatem obiecti principalis mediante qua principaliter scientia habet unitatem, facit unitas eius a quo ratio istorum sumitur. Nam ex hoc quod ratio istorum, inquantum sunt entia rationis, sumitur in ordine ad unum, qui est actus intelligendi, habetur quod omnia talia consequuntur res prout sunt obiective in intellectu. Et ex hoc accipitur una ratio communis quare ista non consequuntur res in suo esse reali extra animam. Et sic unitas eius a quo, vel in ordine ad quod, sumitur ratio duplex potest esse consideratio de ente rationis—accipiendo ens rationis quod consequitur res non ex institutione humana; de quibus, ut supra dictum fuit, non habet considerare logica, sed grammatica—: Una in habitudine ad ens reale, ut si consideretur utrum talia habeant formaliter entitatem realem, et utrum in entitate reali sit genus separatum a speciebus, et species ab individuis, et quomodo etiam talia fundentur in esse reali, utrum scilicet fundentur ex natura rei, circumscripto actu intellectus, vel hoc fiat mediante actu intellectus; et breviter, quidquid de eis investigari potest in habitudine ad esse reale. Alia potest esse consideratio de ipsis quantum ad hoc quod eis convenit secundum quod accipiuntur ut iam constituta in esse rationis, et quantum ad ea que conveniunt eis secundum se, sicut generi convenit predicari in quid de pluribus differentibus specie, differentie vero convenit predicari in quale substantiale, et sic de aliis. Et si sic loquamur de prima consideratione entium rationis, dico quod consideratio entium rationis (…) pertinet ad metaphisicam. (…). Modo dico quod consideratio entium rationis que consequuntur omnia vel plura genera entium, sicut predicamentum, genus, species, verum et falsum et consimilia: quantum ad ea que consequuntur ea secundum se et in suo esse rationis (…) pertinet ad logicam”.

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chapter seven predictorum, facit ad unitatem considerationis sive scientie considerantis de eis. Similiter unitas eius in ordine ad quod sumitur ratio eorum, facit ad unitatem scientie que considerat de predictis entibus rationis quantum ad ea que eis competunt secundum se et in suo esse rationis. Sicut patet de logica, que, una scientia existens, considerat omnia entia consequentia omnia vel plura genera entium, et hoc quantum ad premissa, que scilicet consequuntur ea secundum se et secundum suum esse rationis, sicut predicari in quid vel in quale, vel predicari de differentibus specie vel numero, et sic de aliis. Nam ex hoc quod ratio eorum sumitur in ordine ad unum, scilicet ad actum intelligendi (quia scilicet consequuntur res prout sunt obiective in intellectum, et ideo primum fundamentum sui generis in eis accipitur in ordine ad intellectum), habent quandam connexionem cum eis, que consequitur ipsa secundum tale esse rationis, puta generis cum specie et differentia, et econverso; et ista etiam cum enuntiabilibus, et sic de aliis. Ratione cuius connexionis habent reduci ad unam scientiam.

7.4. Summary Hervaeus has written a fully-fledged treatise on the diverse problems of intentionality. Basic theme of this work is the nature of second intention and its relationships to the extramental objects and to its counterpart, first intention. However, his work does not present a fully consistent account of the matter48 The present summary does not aim at completeness in presenting the main stream of Hervaeus’ lore on intentionality. [A]. In his Commentary on Sentences I, dist. 23 In his commentary on the Sentences (In I Sent., dist. 23; for the text see our Appendix C), the phrase res abstracta substrata intentioni is used in opposition to intentio, but not discussed (capp. 12–13, dealing with the notion persona in divinis). Any mention of the ‘first vs. second intention’ issue is conspicuously missing. 48 See for criticism of Hervaeus’ positions from the part of two fellow-Dominicans (Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus of Reate), who were among his admirers, p. 303, n. 2 below. To another Dominican, a Conradus magister we owe a small treatise De intentionibus (extant in Vienna, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Pal. Lat. 2350, ff. 75va–79va, s. XIV, and Budapest, Hungarian National Museum, cod. 269, ff. 146r– 153r, s. XV), which frequently refers to what beatus Thomas teaches on the matter, without, however, any reference to Hervaeus or other writers on the subject. Judith Dijs was kind enough to let me use her transcription of Conradus’s treatise.

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[B]. On ‘intentio’ in general In De secundis intentionibus, before defining first and second intention, some preliminary things are settled: [1] Any intention conveys a significative tendency (tendentia in quoddam alterum). Taken from the viewpoint of the cognizer, an intention is something that, by way of representation, leads the intellect to the cognition of something, whether this be an intelligible species, an act of the intellect, or just a concept. Taken from the viewpoint of the thing intellected, an intention is an intellective content (7.1.1; cf. Stephanus de Reate [henceforward SR], capp. 5–8). [2] When taken as thing intellected (res intellecta), an intention formally and abstractively bears either on the terminus of the significative tendency, or on the very act of terminating. In this capacity it is a relationship between the thing intellected and the act of intellection. When taken, on the other hand, concretively and materially, an intention is what is intellected, whatever this thing may be (7.1.1; 7.2.3; 7.3.2; SR, cap. 8). [3] In this fashion, an intention can be taken either in abstracto (i.e. qua intentionality as such), or in concreto (i.e. including its content). Formally speaking, an intention does not convey anything really existent in some thing of the extramental world (7.1.2; 7.2.3; SR cap. 12). [4] The basic distinction surrounding the intentionality issue is that between ‘abstract vs. concrete’, rather than the division into first and second intention (7.1.2; 7.3.2; 7.3.3). [5] A concrete intention, whether first or second, is that which is intellected, no matter if this is real or intentional being. When ‘intention’ is taken formally and abstractively, i.e. as intentionality, it bears on the relationship the object intellected has towards the intellective act in so far as the former brings the latter to its end (terminat); in this sense, intention is a rationate relationship or relatio rationis and a rationate being or ens rationis (7.1.2; SR cap. 12). [6] To take (first or second) intention abstractively, i.e. in the sense of intentionality, boils down to focussing on the relationship between the object and the intellective act. Hence this relationship is differentiated in accordance with the differentiation of the intellective act (7.1.2; SR cap. 52). [7] Being an intention is not opposed to real being simply, since in their

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capacity of psychic (mental) entities, such as a species or an act of intellection, intentions are real. Furthermore, being an intention or intentionality concerns a certain relationship between the thing intellected and the intellect or intellection. This being an intention is something that is added to the thing intellected.49 (7.1.1–7.1.2; 7.2.1). [8] Intentional being is twofold, viz. either essential or denominative, just as it happens to real being. For example, a thing’s being white falls to it either essentially (i.e. qua whiteness), or denominatively (qua white thing). In a similar fashion, an intention has by itself an essential mode of intentional being, whereas what it is an intention of [i.e. what is elsewhere called res subiecta intentioni] possesses intentional being denominatively (7.1.1; 7.1.3; 7.2.6; 7.3.5; SR capp. 17–21; 40). [9] Being intellected or in the intellect (esse in intellectu) occurs in a twofold way as well, either subjectively, or objectively. That which is in the intellect as in its substrate (e.g. an intelligible species, an act of intellection, or a piece of knowledge) is in it subjectively. To be in the intellect objectively is also twofold: [a] anything cognized by the intellect is in it objectively as its cognitive content; [b] similarly, anything following something that is objectively present in the intellect, also has an objective mode of being itself. Thus both man intellected and its being the product of abstraction from particular human beings [and other logical features] are in the intellect objectively (7.1.1; 7.3.3). [10] The phrase ‘being intellected’ is used in two different senses, to wit, either for the denomination through which the object is denominated after the intellective act, or for the denomination through which it is denominated after the rationate relationship it has qua naturally suited to act as the end of the intellective act (7.3.5). [11] Being in the intellect means being objectively in the intellect (7.3.5). [12] Between an object intellected and the intellective act a twofold relationship exists, one real, which is between the intellect and the object intellected, the other rationate, which is between the object intellected and the intellect in actual operation (7.3.1; SR cap. 39). [13] Intentionality is always engaged in a convolution of rationate being (7.2.3). 49 Notice that its being added is constitutive of a network of relationships in the agents and patients of intentionality.

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[14] Intentionality is twofold, in so far as that which is a denominative intentionality with regard to one object intellected, can be a denominated intention with regard to something else, viz. a secondary relationship existing between the object intellected and the intellect. In such cases, the secondary relationship is founded upon the primary (7.2.6; SR capp. 17–21; 40). [15] The distinction between these two types of intentionality is at the basis of the distinctions ‘abstract vs. concrete intention’ and ‘first vs. second intention’. The primary intentionality, which is the relationship between the extramental object and the intellect, acts, in so far as this relationship is intellected, as the foundation of another (secondary) relationship to the intellect, which is founded upon the former (primary) one, as it acts as the object now in this way intellected. And then the primary intentionality in abstracto is also a second intention in concreto, albeit in reference to diverse things (7.3.2–7.3.3). [16] The intentionality issue ranges over all three operations of the intellect. As far as simple apprehension is concerned, diverse ontic aspects of the object can be focussed upon, and this produces either first or second intentions, as either the objects as such or their intentional relationships are under examination. Just as simple apprehension can thus secondarily lead to rationate being and second intentions, so do the two other operations of the intellect, viz. sentence-making and discursive thinking. The domain of rationate being too is threefold, comprising, first, rationate beings produced by simple apprehension, then, those produced by sentence-making, and finally, those produced by discursive thinking (7.3.1; 7.3.5). [17] The domain of rationate being (ens rationis, esse rationis) is threefold, comprising, first, rationate beings produced by simple apprehension, then, those produced by sentence-making, and finally, those produced by discursive thinking. Once the definitions of the preliminary technical expressions ‘intention’, ‘being an intention’, ‘being intellected’, and ‘intention taken formally and abstractively’ vs. ‘intention taken concretively and materially’ have been established, the notions ‘first intention’ and ‘second intention’ are defined and mutually assessed.

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[C]. On the nature of first intention [1] Hervaeus rejects the definitorial reduction of first and second intention to first and second intellection (7.1.2; 7.1.5; 7.2.3; 7.2.5; SR capp. 14–15; 48–49; 52–56). [2] The distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ parallels that between the two kinds of intelligibles (genera intelligibilium) found in real being (esse reale) as opposed to rationate being (esse rationis). The second kind of intelligibles (such as being universal, being predicable, being a genus or species etc.) accompanies things in so far as they are objectively in the intellect (7.1.1; 7.1.2; 7.1.5; 7.2.3; SR capp. 14; 50). [3] The notion ‘first intention’ as such concerns neither universality nor particularity (7.1.3). [4] An abstract first intention is the relationship between an object intellected and the intellect or an intellection, whereas a concrete first intention is anything that indicates an extramental thing (7.1.2–7.1.5; SR cap. 15). [5] If ‘first intention’ is taken formally and abstractively, i.e. for the relationship between the thing intellected and the intellective act, plainly the intelligible species is not a first intention. If, however, ‘first intention’ is taken concretively and materially, viz. standing for that to which the intellect directs itself as the object to be intellected, then the proposition ‘The intelligible species is a first intention’ has a twofold sense, meaning first, that the intelligible species is among the concrete first intentions (and this is true); second, that it alone is the first intention, but this is impossible (7.1.1). [6] A first intention does not coincide with the act of intellection (7.1.2). [7] When an intention conveyed by a particular noun is taken abstractively (i.e. for intentionality as such), such a noun does not indicate a first intention; when such an intention is taken concretively and the particular noun includes the intention qua denominating the object, this noun does not indicate a first intention either (just as ‘body’ does not imply being white). When, however, the word ‘first intention’ is taken for what is denominated in the context of intentionality, such particular nouns do signify a first intention, because they are naturally suited to terminate the intellective act (7.1.3–7.1.4).

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[8] Privations and negations of things that possess real being, pertain to the domain of first intention (7.1.4; SR capp. 26–30). [9] Fictions too belong to the domain of first intention, because they do not indicate rationate being (7.1.5; SR capp. 31–34). [D]. On the nature of second intention [1] A second intention is anything indicating a thing that belongs to the second kind of intelligibles, i.e. the intelligibles that include rationate being, such as being a genus or species or being a universal (7.1.2–7.1.5; 7.2.3; 7.2.5; SR capp. 14; 48–49; 52–56). [2] A second intention does not coincide with an intellection in as far as the intellection qua species or another conceptual entity is merely a psychic entity; in this capacity it is indeed a real entity in the mind (7.2.1–7.2.2; SR cap. 57). [3] Formally speaking, a concrete second intention does not indicate any extramental thing, but nonetheless it differs from what is called ‘absolutely nothing’ (omnino nichil). (7.2.3; SR capp. 70; 74). [4] No second intention falls to a thing in virtue of its own quidditative nature as it exists in the extramental world. So being abstracted or being universal do not fall to things in virtue of their own nature, but owing to the operation of the intellect (7.3.7). [5] However, second intentions presuppose some real entity, either from the part of the intellect (viz. a real intellection), or from the part of the object intellected, viz. the real property of being universal (generic or specific etc.), which fall to extramental things as they are by themselves (7.2.3; SR cap. 75). [6] The relationships posited by concrete second intentions as conveyed by positive nouns (such as ‘genus’, ‘species’) are merely rationate, whereas concrete second intentions conveyed by privative nouns do not posit any relationship whatsoever (7.2.4). [7] In case of an abstract intention, the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect neither is determinately a first intention nor determinately a second intention, but it indicates something in between, common to these two. If, however, ‘intention’ is not taken abstractively for intentionality, but concretively for the thing upon

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which intentionality is founded, then the aforesaid relationship indicates a second intention (7.2.5). [8] In the case of abstract intentions, only the intentionality in question (i.e. the relationship between the thing intellected and the intellect) is a first or second intention. In the case of concrete intentions, this relationship is not a first intention at all, nor the only second intention either (7.2.6). [9] Every second intention is founded upon a first intention, either mediately or immediately. There is a twofold foundation of second intentions, one primary and remote, the other immediate and proximate. The primary and remote foundation is upon the extramental object, whereas the immediate and proximate one is upon the object intellected, albeit that this happens to the primary second intentions in a different way than to the secondary ones (7.3.1; 7.3.2; 7.3.5). [10] A second intention can be truly said of things that have real being, e.g. as in ‘Man is a species’ (in which the term ‘man’ has the semantic value of a singular term, since it is taken to stand for the common nature, manhood). Certain properties indeed fall to objects cognized in virtue of their own nature, rather than in so far as they are objectively in the mind, whereas other ones fall to them according to their being objectively in the mind (7.3.3). [11] A second intention can be truly said of another, e.g. as in ‘A genus is a species’. That is to say, second intentions that are mutually compatible in reference to one and the same formal object are predicated one of the other if they are taken concretively (7.3.4). [12] The question whether a second intention can be predicated of the foundation of the opposite intention (such as in ‘Man is an animal’) requires a qualified answer (which is given in 7.3.5). [E]. On the proper subject of logic [1] The domain of rationate being (esse rationis) is a genuine applicant for being a discipline’s primary object (7.3.6; SR capp. 122–124). [2] Logic is the only discipline that is about that rationate being which we call ‘second intention’ as its primary object (7.3.7).

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[3] Logic is only about rationate being that falls to things in so far as to consider it is useful for acquiring the general modus procedendi common to any discipline. Logic is not about things that are merely institutional, nor about determinate rationate being, but only about rationate being that falls to things in so far as they are naturally suited to be an object of intellective apprehension, and this kind of rationate being only in so far as considering it is useful for acquiring the general modus procedendi common to any discipline (7.3.8). [4] The intellective act being common to any kind of rationate being is the source of the conceptual unity of the domain of logic (7.3.9).

chapter eight GIRALDUS ODONIS’S TREATISE DE INTENTIONIBUS

Basically Girald’s own work on intentionality (De intentionibus) is meant as an extensive, extremely negative reaction to the well-known tract of Hervé Nédellec (presumably written in the second decade of the century) on the same subject (De secundis intentionibus).1 The systematic exposition of Girald’s own views of intentionality is found from cap. 202 onwards. They also come to the fore, of course, in the preceding sections in which Girald attacks the views of others, those of Hervaeus in particular. Girald Odonis is not the only one to accuse Hervaeus of inconsistency. Two militant defenders of Hervaeus’s lore of intentionality, his fellow-Dominicans, Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus of Reate laid their finger on a good many lacks of clearity and conspicuous inconsistencies in the honorable master’s expositions, which they intend, they say, to elucidate or correct in their own tracts.2 1 Edited twice (Paris 1489; Venice 1513). A critical edition of the first two books (Distinctiones) is being prepared by Judith Dijs, under the supervision of Dr. E.P. Bos (University of Leiden). 2 Francis (floruit between 1330 and 1345; see Amerini 1999) opens his Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione (written against Ockham) as follows (cap. 1 ed. Mojsisch, p. 153): “Quia a nonnullis merito dubitatur quid sit prima intentio formaliter dicta secundum magistrum Hervaeum, qui videtur de dicta materia in diversis locis confuse et diversimode loqui, ideo ad istam dubitationem tollendam octo per ordinem faciemus (…)”; the work winds up with the rather equivocal peroration (cap. 26, p. 173: “Licet multa quae ego dixi, sint apparenter contra dicta Hervaei, non tamen sunt contra eum secundum rei veritatem, immo credo hanc esse intentionem Hervaei. Non tamen allegavi ubi haec dicit Hervaeus, et etiam multa alia omisi propter temporis brevitatem, et quia occupatus sum”. See for Francis’s tract also Ebbesen & Pinborg (1982), 112–114. Stephan (floruit ca. 1350), who, as far as the tenor of the doctrine is concerned, follows Hervaeus faithfully, albeit selectively (see Appendix G, esp. capp. 41; 46; 65;), but, like Girald Odonis (see the latter’s De intentionibus, capp. 42 and 146–152; see also section 7.26 p. 278, n. 34 our note 494), he lays his finger on a inconsistency, claiming (capp. 65; 67) that in his Qq. quodlibetales III, q. 1, Hervaeus on account of the proper nature of rationate being, clearly departs from what he correctly says in De secundis intentionibus. All things considered, Hervaeus was an author of great renown. An anonymous author of a tract on the principle of contradiction (found in Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, Ms 1053, 62r ff.) even speaks of Herveistae (“Difficultates cuiusdam reverendi doctoris ideo evadere potero quia circa eas Herveistarum more procedam”; f. 62r ad fin.).

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Girald’s work opens with a discussion of six ways to take the term ‘intentio’ (including duo correlaria contra Herveum). This is followed by a survey of five different opinions about ‘intentio’, the fifth one of which is ascribed to Hervaeus.3 Next comes an extensive discussion of Girald’s own, original view of the real status of certain second intentions. This view is extensively defended against all other intentionalistae, and covers no less than 66 chapters (44–109). It is useful to preface our discussion of Girald’s thesis by a concise survey of the previous articuli (2–43). One of the things Girald accused some of his predecessors of, is that they failed to define the notion of ‘intentio’ apart from its use in the formulas ‘first’ and ‘second intention’. To correct this omission the author begins his expositions on intentionality by defining the label ‘intentio in communi’; the entire Pars Prima of his treatise (2– 242) is devoted to investigating the common nature of ‘intention’. Five different meanings of the term are listed. First, ‘intentio’ stands for whatever by its formal being bestows some non-real being upon something else. This happens through a transfer of the objective content of that which affords such a reduced kind of being (ens diminutum, or ‘diminutive being’) to the recipient of this being; for instance, this occurs in all immanent actions, which indeed do not transfer anything with respect to their being substrates, but only with respect to their objective semantic content. The process is further explained in terms of intellectual activity: intellection is defined as the type of action that is transferred to the intelligible thing only with respect to its objective content; and that is why this action bestows upon this thing the aforesaid non-real being, which is being intellected, being cognized, or being apprehended. Therefore intention taken in this sense is nothing other than the intellection of something accessible to the intellect. Likewise, the act of volition bestows upon something aspired its being desired (esse volitum), just as sensation affords being sensed (esse sensatum) to something subject to the senses. Generally speaking, we can say for any

3 The others are all anonymous, but they seem to include William of Ware and Radulphus Brito. Cf. the auctores referred to by Peter Auriol in his Scriptum super I Sent., dist. 23 (see Appendix F), and in his Commentum breve super I Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 1; q. 2, art. 1; q. 4, correlaria.

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action of this kind that, if it is objectively transferred to something else, it affords some non-real being to this object. Consequently, any such action can be said to be an ‘intentio’ of its object in so far as it receives this kind of being from the action.4 So much for ‘intentio’ used in the case of actions that are immanent in the proper sense. Next the phenomenon of representativeness and significativeness is introduced. Whatever is representative or significative of something else bestows upon its object esse representatum or esse significatum (which both are a sort of non-real being). This too happens owing to, so to speak, an objective transfer into the representable or signifiable thing. In this way, intelligible and sensible species can be called ‘intentions’ of their objects, in their capacity of being their representatives, as in a similar way pictures of human beings may be called ‘intentions’ of the people represented by them. Likewise, whatever is naturally or by convention significative of something else can be called an intention of what is signified by it, because all these things bestow upon their objects certain types of non-real being, to wit, being cognized, being desired, being sensed, being represented, or being signified.5 Anticipating his thesis about the real status of some second intentions, Girald posits [cap. 7] a corollary against Hervaeus Natalis. From the foregoing observations it must be clear, he says, that the noun ‘intentio’ taken in the first sense mentioned can be a real thing (vera realitas), in spite of the fact that the kind of being given by it is not real, (supply extramental) being. Indeed, the act of intellection, as well as the intelligible and sensible species are intentions, of which it cannot be denied that they all are true realities (vere realitates). Another sense of ‘intentio’ occurs when it is used as the verbal noun deriving from ‘intendere’, and stands for the act of intellection (actus intelligendi). In this sense, in accordance with any verbal noun, it has a threefold meaning, viz. (a) ‘the action of that which acts as intendent’ (actio intendentis), (b) ‘the being affected of that which is intented to’ (intenti passio), and (c) ‘the intended thing itself ’ (ipsa res intenta).6 In the third sense, ‘intentio’ is taken to stand for the act of volition, in so far as it bears on some goal. In the fourth sense, ‘intentio’ signifying a state of being intense, is used for any vehement application of a

4 5 6

De intentionibus I, cap. 3. Ibid., 4. Ibid., cap. 18.

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power to an object (“pro vehementi applicatione cuiuscumque potentie ad obiectum suum”; cap. 22), such as in intenta supplicatio (“earnest supplication”).7 In the fifth sense, the term ‘intentio’ is taken to mean ‘habitual or potential meaning’, which should be well distinguished from meaning tout court. In this case too the word can be taken in a threefold sense, viz. to stand for either the action of the significative word, or for the being affected of the thing intended to, i.e. signified, or for the intended thing itself, i.e. the signified thing itself.8 8.2. Girald’s peculiar view of intentionality After our author in the second article (capp. 27–42), has roughly9 criticized five different opinions about the nature of first and second intentions, among which the view held by his main target, Hervaeus Natalis,10 he proceeds to present his arguments in support of a thesis that contradicts the common view all his predecessors adhered to. All were of the opinion that each and every second intention depends on an act of the intellect, and thus lacks real being of its own. In opposition, Girald will argue that this does not apply to every second intention. In order to convince his readers, he sets out to present five ostensive arguments (capp. 48–105), and one argument ad impossibile in which he adduces two inconvenientia his opponents are forced to accept (capp. 106– 108). 8.2.1. On the argument taken from the lore of definition Girald’s first argument runs as follows (cap. 48; cf. cap. 86). The definition of anything dependent upon the intellect must contain something that depends on the intellect; if this were not the case, it would not be a genuine definition. Well, it is not true to say of each and every

Ibid., capp. 19–20 and 21–22. Ibid., cap. 23. 9 They are subjected to more serious criticism in the fourth article (capp. 109–200). 10 Girald’s grimness towards Hervaeus surely has something to do with the great renown the latter enjoyed (in Dominican circles, in particular) as a defender of Thomas Aquinas. Both Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus of Reate present their apologies for Hervaeus’s doctrine of intentionality as dealing with the sound doctrine of beatus Thomas and magister Hervaeus. 7 8

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second intention that its definition contains something that depends on the intellect. Therefore not every second intention depends on the intellect: De intentionibus I, cap. 47: Primum sic. Omnium dependentium ab intellectu diffinitiones aliquid includunt dependens ab intellectu; aliter enim non essent diffinitiones nisi aliquid includerent de esse diffiniti. Sed non omnium secundarum intentionum diffinitiones aliquid includunt dependens ab intellectu. Ergo non omnes intentiones secunde dependent ab intellectu. Maior est evidens, et est probata. Et confirmari potest per illud quarti Metaphisice [IV 7, 1012a23–24] quod ratio quam significat nomen, est sua diffinitio. Si ergo diffinitio nichil includit dependens ab intellectu, nomen diffiniti nichil significat dependens ab intellectu.

The minor of this syllogism obviously requires some support. To that end it is claimed that there are certain logical ingredients, such as the notions ‘singulare’ (‘individuum’ or ‘particulare’) and ‘universale’, as well as a notion like ‘predicability’, whose existence does not as such depend upon an intellectual act, but which all have as such a real foundation in extramental reality. As far as Girald is concerned, the definition of ‘singulare’ or ‘unum numero’—which runs “singulare vel individuum vel particulare signatum est indivisum in se et divisum a quocumque alio”—does not contain anything that is dependent upon the intellect, because neither a thing’s being divided nor its being by itself, nor its being different from something else imply something that is dependent on the intellect. This is obvious, for otherwise nothing would be numerically one except by virtue of an intellectual activity; the inescapability of such an absurd conclusion requires no further evidence, he presumes. So we can only conclude that the second intention of singularity, particularity, and individuality does not depend on the intellect.11 Things are a bit more complicated, however. According to Hervaeus, you have to distinguish between, on the one hand, ‘singular’ taken in the sense of ‘unum numero’ and, on the other, as formally standing for ‘singularity’, as it is used by the logicians. In the former sense singularity is a natural property and does not depend on the intellect. In the second sense, singularity does depend on the intellect, because then it boils down to the property of being predicated of one sole thing, and this predicability does depend on the intellect, and means that

11

De intentionibus I, cap. 48.

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something is a subjective part of a species or a genus. Well, Hervaeus claims, being a subjective part depends on the intellect, and therefore so does singularity. Girald now goes on to prove that Hervaeus is wrong in a fourfold way. First, the distinction he made is invalid; second, the logical ‘singulare’ does not convey predicability; third, predicability does not depend on the intellect; finally, neither does ‘being a subjective part’ (capp. 49–50). First. The logical ‘singulare’ is the same as that which is found in the outside world, because the properties of being here and now (hic et nunc), being sensed and being this particular thing (esse hoc aliquid) belong to a thing’s nature; now the logical singular as it is opposed to the natural singular has these properties; therefore, it is the same as the singular that is numerically one, of which Hervaeus concedes that it is completely natural. Second. The logical singular does not imply predicability, for the simple reason that it cannot be predicated of something else (as is clearly asserted by Aristotle in Categ. 5, 3a36–37) nor of itself, because e.g. the expression ‘Sortes est Sortes’ only means that Socrates can be so named, and not that that Socrates is predicated of himself.12 Third. Predicability itself does not depend on the intellect either. That is to say, one should distinguish between two kinds of predicability. One is the predicability of a term, the other concerns the thing signified by the term. The former is nothing but a term’s capacity to be used in an assertion after the copula, whereas the other predicability is the (predicate) term’s capacity to make something clear about the thing signified by the subject term, according to the basic formula ‘hoc est hoc’. Thus a sentence such as ‘Homo est animal’ means that the thing that is a man is the thing that is an animal. In this case it is two things that have a predicative relationship, rather than two terms.13 Now one term’s predicability of another term depends, of course, upon intellectual activity, since it is the intellect that bestows significativeness upon terms. However, a thing’s capacity to make something clear about another thing follows from its own ‘intelligibilitas’ or power of presenting itself to the intellect, and its ‘manifestabilitas’ or power of disclosing itself, quite independently of any actual activity of the intellect. In a word, a thing’s intelligibility and manifestability are naturally

12 13

Ibid., capp. 51–53 and 54–58. Ibid., cap. 59.

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prior to the significativeness bestowed by the intellect upon the term by which it is signified.14 In a similar way Hervaeus’s thesis that a species’s being a subjective part of a genus depends upon the intellect’s activity is rejected (cap. 65). Finally (cap. 66), an alternative definition of ‘singulare’ is brought up, which on the face of it seems more appropriate to logic. It runs ‘singulare est quod est divisibile in plures partes quarum quelibet sit ipsum’, and is opposed to the definition of its counterpart, the universal, which is ‘divisibile et repperibile in plures partes quarum quelibet sit ipsum’. Girald proves (cap. 67) that this definition too has no components that depend on the intellect. Next, Girald devotes an extensive discussion to the threefold definition of the universal. (capp. 68–80). Taking the first one (‘Universale est quod est aptum natum in pluribus esse’), it can be claimed that (a) the thing conceived of in the neuter substantivated relative noun15 ‘quod’ is put in the definition as the subject-substrate, (b) the plurality of things in which the universal can occur is put as the terminus of the relationship, and (c) the aptitude for existing in a plurality of things is put as a genus. Now each of these elements are real things, which do not depend on intellectual activity: (a) the universal nature, e.g. Man or Animal, (b) the concrete termini of the relationship implied by the notion of ‘universal’, e.g. Socrates and Plato, in which these universal natures are found, and (c) the universal’s capacity to exist in a plurality of things, which is a real property of the universal nature as found in extramental things.16 In a similar way it is proved (capp. 72–77 and 78) of two other definitions of the universal (‘Universale est quod est unum in multis’, and ‘Universale est quod est unum de multis’) that they do not contain any element which depends upon intellectual activity. The same applies to the definition of the universal which is based on its being predicated of a plurality of things (‘Universale est quod est aptum natum de pluribus (vel: in pluribus) predicari’). This definition does not contain anything dependent on the intellect either (capp. 79–80). The investigation of the definitions of the predicables, genus, species, differentia, proprium, and accidens opens up no new perspectives on

Ibid., cap. 61. Grammatically speaking, a relative noun with the antecedent included (so ‘quod’ = ‘id quod’). 16 Ibid., capp. 71–72. 14 15

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this score. There is no reason whatsoever, Girald argues, to assume that these predicables stand for things that are mind-dependent (capp. 81– 85). The author recapitulates his first argument triumphantly: Ibid. I, cap. 86: Probata est ergo sufficienter minor principalis rationis, scilicet quod non omnium intentionum secundarum logice acceptarum diffinitiones includunt aliquid ab intellectu dependens. Resumo ergo rationem. Omnium dependentium ab intellectu diffinitiones includunt aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Sed non omnium intentionum secundarum diffinitiones includunt aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Ergo non omnes secunde intentiones dependent ab intellectu. Premisse autem probate sunt.17

8.2.2. On the argument taken from the natural conditions of sensorial activity Girald’s second main argument once again bears on the notions of universality and particularity, this time under the aspect of their being involved in sensation as its natural conditions. It runs as follows. Whatever conditions that are distinctive of the object of a sense, in so far as the object relates to that sense in its potential state and in so far as it is attained by the actualization of the sense, are founded upon the thing’s real nature (ex natura rei), and do not depend upon the intellect. Now some second intentions are such conditions. Therefore they are not mind-dependent. The truth of the major of this syllogism appears in a twofold way. First, no natural distinctive feature stems from the intellect, but they are all ex natura rei. Second, the fact that a sense qua potency relates to its primary object, as well as the fact that the sensorial act actually attains its primary object do not with respect to any condition depend upon the intellect: Ibid., cap. 93: Secundo ad principale. Quecumque conditiones naturaliter distinctive obiecti sensus, secundum quod respicitur a potentia et secundum quod attingitur ab actu potentie, sunt ex natura rei, non ab intellectu. Sed alique secunde intentiones sunt conditiones huiusmodi.

17 After the refutation (capp. 87–91) of an objection about an alternative phraseology of the several definitions that were at stake in the foregoing arguments—to the effect that they are all incomplete by omitting a decive determination that should be added to the notion of ‘secunda intentio’, to wit ‘applicata vel applicabilis rei’, as a result of which omission the relationship between the second intentions and the intellect actually applying them to things gets lost in the shuffle, as, accordingly, does the second intentions’ dependence on the mind—our author victoriously concludes (cap. 92): “Hec autem sufficiant pronunc de prima ratione principali, que per nullam cavillationem infringi potest”.

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Ergo sunt ex natura rei, non ex intellectu. Maior patet ex duobus. Primum quia nullum naturale distinctivum est ab intellectu, sed omne ex natura rei. Secundo quia sensum respicere suum primarium obiectum ut potentia, et actum sensus attingere suum primarium obiectum quantum ad nullam conditionem dependet ab intellectu.

The minor needs to be argued further. Girald sets out to prove it with regard to two particular second intentions, to wit universality and particularity, which both play a role in sensorial activity. Universality can be defined as the condition that is involved in the sense qua potency relating to its primary object; there is no other feature distinctive of the sense’s object in this respect, apart from the object itself, in so far as it has the natural capacity for being attained by the sensorial act. Singularity, on the other hand, is the condition that is involved in the sense’s natural capacity for actually attaining its object; there is no other feature distinctive of the sense’s object taken in its natural capacity for being attained, apart from the object itself taken in its natural capacity for relating to the sense-in-potency.18 What the author is trying to say, I think, is that universality plays a role in so far as a sense’s primary object relates to the sense in potency, whereas when there is actual sensorial activity, the object’s being this or that concrete particular is at stake. This is explained in the next chapter: Ibid., cap. 95: Hoc autem probo auctoritate et ratione. Primo auctoritate sic. Philosophus secundo Posteriorum [II 19,100a16–17]:19 “Sensus est universalis, sentire vero particularis”. Ubi quisque considerare debet quod quodlibet sentire singulare attingit necessario singulare, non aliquid indifferens et commune. Quidlibet vero sensus respicit ut est commune, quamcumque sit singularis sensus et singularis potentia. Puta visus meus vel tuus sensibile habet in universali, non quod respiciat universalitatem, sed sensibile ut stat sub illa conditione. Et sic patet ex intentione Philosophi propositum. Ratione sic. Constat tamen de actu sensus quod respicit et attingit obiectum sub ratione singularitatis. Et probatur propter contentiosos quoniam: Omne quod attingitur sub conditionibus que sunt hic et nunc, attingitur sub conditione singularitatis; patet, quia ille conditiones presupponunt hanc. Sed obiectum sensus attingitur per actum sensus sub conditionibus hic et nunc. Ergo sub conditione singularitatis.20

18 19 20

Ibid., cap. 94. Cf. de Rijk (2002) I, 168–169; 726–733. Cf. De intentionibus III, cap. 306.

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In the next two chapters (96–97), Girald proceeds to make clear that the sensorial faculty relates to its primary object under the latter’s condition of universality. He claims that particular objects, such as this instance of whiteness or of blackness, cannot be attained by sensorial acts unless the sense’s primary object, and the general feature of being a primary object are preserved in them. Therefore the primary object of a sense should, in principle, be shared by many things. An argument taken from the lore of logical supposition is added (cap. 97). A term signifying a sense’s primary object (as in ‘Colour is the primary object of sight’) can only supposit for it if it is used with simple supposition, not with personal supposition; otherwise you might deduce from the aforesaid example that whiteness or blackness is the primary object of sight, which is absurd. Therefore, when you speak of the primary object of sight, it is universal colour you have in mind, rather than this or that particular instance of colour. 8.2.3. On the argument taken from the genuine cause of universality In the third main argument, our author is forced to take up the gauntlet against the damned Averroes (‘ille maledictus Averroys’), who explicitly claimed that it is the intellect that causes universality. By this Averroes means that the active intellect (which, to Averroes, is a unique cosmic power, rather than proper to individual human beings) abstracts intelligible species from phantasms, as representative of the universal which was not present in the things before. Girald proffers two counterarguments. First. Assuming that the intelligible species is suited to represent a real entity, it is argued that this reality is (a) either numerically one in many things, or (b) a collection of whatever falls under one species or genus, or (c) something common to those single things. Now (a) is impossible, because in that case there would be no difference between a sensible and an intelligible species, and, if there were, the intellect would only be able to grasp the singular. Case (b) is not possible either, for in that case the intellect would first grasp a plurality of things. Therefore (c) must be the case, that is to say, the aforesaid reality which is naturally capable of being represented by the intelligible species, is already something common and universal, prior, that is, to its being actually represented. Second. Starting from the Boethian adage that only a species is defined, not a singular, and assuming Averroes’s statement that definitions are given of extramental sensible things, it follows that those things already are universal on their own account, in

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their capacity of being species specialisimae or subalternae. Therefore it is not the intellect that bestows universality and quidditative being upon them.21 8.2.4. On the argument taken from predication The fourth main argument (capp. 101–104) concerns the necessary predicative relationship existing between a number of second intentions (to wit, the five predicables) and the outside things they are apt to represent. For instance, in the sentence ‘Album est accidens’, the second intention ‘accidens’ is necessarily predicated of whiteness, since, of necessity, whiteness only occurs in things contingently, and is therefore, by definition, an accident, according, that is, to Porphyry’s definition ‘Accidens est quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’. 8.2.5. On the argument taken from the real nature of the predicamental order Girald continues with the discussion of the fifth main argument (cap. 105) to the effect that the universal natures as found in generic and specific things as well as in individuals, are really existing. Now since these natures are all second intentions, it is clear that there are some second intentions that are as such founded upon extramental reality, rather than being mind-dependent. The author refers to the Tertia Pars of his De intentionibus for an extensive discussion of the ontic nature of the predicamental order. It is found in chapters 294–312. The underlying idea of his argument is that the predicamental order should be put in the broader context of the natural order of existing things, including what is called the subpredicamental and suprapredicamental orders as well. It must strike the reader that the majority of Girald’s arguments (capp. 295–307) in support of his thesis about the natural order of things are taken from authorities such as Plato and Aristotle, Algazel, and the author of De causis. Here are some of them. At Metaph. I 2, 982a25–26, Aristotle says that metaphysics is about universals, because it is about what is the most remote from the senses,

21 De intentionibus I art. 3, cap. 100 ad fin.: “Sequitur ergo quod res sensibiles existentes extra intellectum sunt universales, quia sunt species vel specialissime vel subalterne. Non ergo facit intellectus universalitatem in rebus, cum non largiatur eis esse quidditativum, quod est esse diffinibile; et istud est esse universale”.

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which indeed has the highest degree of universality; and he adds that metaphysics is the most certain discipline precisely because it is about the things that are primary in an absolute sense (de maxime primis). Combining these two statements, viz. that metaphysics is about what is most universal, and that it is about what is absolutely primary, you can conclude that what is most universal is at the same time absolutely primary. And this proves, Girald argues, that there exists an order between what is most universal and what falls under it (“inter maxime universalia et inferiora eis”). Now you cannot imagine this order to be a product of reason, because no order fabricated by reason bestows certitude upon knowledge; rather certitude stems from a certain condition of necessity residing in the things themselves. This can only mean that the aforesaid order is not mind-dependent.22 Elsewhere (capp. 305 and 307) Girald discusses the natural order which (to his mind) exists between generic and specific intentions, such as between ‘triangle’ and ‘isosceles’, or between ‘man-of-skill’ (artifex) and ‘physician’ (medicus). At Anal. Post. I 4, 73b38–74a3, Aristotle claims that the property of having three angles equal to the sum of two right angles primarily resides in the triangle, and secondarily in the isosceles. He means to state that this generally holds of any proper property, which indeed primarily resides in its primary subject-substrate, and secondarily in what is contained under the primary subject. Thus it appears that the higher intention (such as ‘triangle’) and the lower one (such as ‘isosceles’) possess a natural order with regard to a third intention, to wit, the property of having three angles equal to the sum of two right ones, and this in diverse ways, viz. in the way of prior and posterior, or at least in that of what is direct and what is mediary. Likewise, you can distinguish with Aristotle (Metaph. V 2, 1013b32– 1014a10) between two causes of health, to wit the physician as the immediate cause, and the man-of-skill as the mediate one.23 Now these two (as well as medicine and skill as such) mutually relate as higher and lower intentions, and, therefore, relate qua proximate and remote, respectively, to a third intention, viz. health. From Aristotle’s remarks it

De intentionibus III, cap. 298. Of course, there is here talk of just one person, whose medical capacity once is indicated indeterminately as a skill, once specifically as medical skill. For this important feature of Aristotelian semantics see de Rijk (2002) I, 167; 449 ff.; 541 f.; 572–593; 623, n. 208; 682; 723, n. 476; II, 130, n. 78; 205; 264; 363 f.; 384 ff.; 403–416. 22 23

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is clear, Girald argues, that he intends to say that the higher intention and the lower one have a natural order (a different ordering, that is) to the third intention, health. Another argument runs as follows (capp. 308–309). That order is as such founded upon the things’ extramental natures (ex natura rei) which is such that if it were not found in extramental reality, we would inevitably be confronted with contradictory states of affairs in extramental reality. This is clear enough, he thinks, for the following reason: If nature does not allow there to be a vacuum, can it even less allow the simultaneous truth of contradictory states of affairs; now if there were not in extramental reality any order between higher and lower intentions, such states of affairs would be inevitable; therefore this order must exist in reality. The minor of this syllogism can be proved by considering the diverse possible relationships between a higher and a lower intention (such as animal and man, or colour and whiteness). They relate either (a) as two disparate things, or (b) as two things that are entirely and convertibly one and the same thing, or (c) they are the same, but subordinately and inconvertibly so. Now if we assume case (a) we would end up with a contradiction, because the sentences ‘Man is an animal’ and ‘Whiteness is a colour’ are true, but if man and animal, and whiteness and colour, respectively, are disparate intentions these sentences are false; so case (a) is impossible. Neither case (b) is acceptable, because it would lead to the conclusion that contradictory predicates are verified of something entirely and convertibly the same. Contradiction can only be avoided by assuming case (c), to the effect that man and animal, and whiteness and colour are things that are subordinately and inconvertibly the same. And to assume the latter boils down to assuming the existence of the aforesaid extramental order. To Girald’s mind, the general conclusion is—at first sight, at least— obvious: the order existing between a higher and a lower intention is extramental, and, consequently, the different levels which are sections and portions of this order, are extramental as well; now these levels are called second intentions in the previous discussions: De intentionibus III, q. 1, cap. 310: Probatum est ergo quod ordo intentionum superioris et inferioris est ex natura rerum. Et per consequens quod illi gradus qui sunt decisiones et distinctiones illius ordinis, sunt ex natura rerum, qui, inquam, gradus dicti sunt ‘intentiones secunde’ in precedentibus.

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However, in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle seems to contradict this conclusion.24 It is up to Girald then to carefully reconsider what Aristotle has to say. Supposing, he says, that Aristotle means to say that there is no order between the ontic components of subsistent being, one has to realize that order can be considered in two different ways. One is the necessary order between the conceptual elements making up a substance, which should be observed in conceiving this subsistent being; for example, in conceiving ‘snub nose’ (nasus simus), you have to observe the necessary conceptual order between nasus and simus, and, in accordance with the priority of the notion ‘nose’ over ‘snub’, you should give conceptual priority to the substance’s being a nose over its snubness (cap. 311). The other order is quite different, and does not impose any conceptual prioritization. Girald refers to a passage of the Ethics (Eth. Nicom. I 2, 1095a30-b4) where Aristotle discusses the possible priority of arguments (“Are we on the way from or to the first principles?”) and (to Girald’s mind, at least) seems to make clear that there are cases, e.g. a race-course in a stadium, in which the location of the starting-point does not matter, since the course could just as well start at the judges’ stand and finish at the turning-point, or vice versa. Girald is of the opinion that there is a similar open order between higher and lower intentions. Just as in producing arguments, the rule that prescribes us to begin with what is evident,—but does so by taking the kind of evidence into consideration, i.e. whether it concerns things evident to us, or those evident in an unqualified sense—allows us to start where we like, so we may give priority, if we like, to the lower intention which is closer to us, over the higher one which is naturally prior (cap. 312). Next (capp. 313 ff.), the author deals with the different positions the first and second intentions take on the predicamental, subpredicamental, and suprapredicamental levels that make up the comprehensive natural order of things. Let us confine ourselves to what Girald teaches

24 De intentionibus III, cap. 310: “Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod dicit Philosophus septimo Metaphisice, capitulo de unitate diffinitionis dicens quod ordo non est in substantia; quomodo namque oportet intelligere hoc quidem posterius, illud vero prius?; quasi dicit quod nullo modo”. The reference is to Aristotle, Metaph. VII 12, 1038a33– 34 (“But there is no order in the substance; for how are we to think the one element posterior, and the other prior?”).

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us about what exactly we should understand by the real status of the categorial division of being.25 8.3. The real status of the categorial division of being This problem is addressed within the broader framework of the compatibility of formal difference and real identity (capp. 375–452). It is worded thus (cap. 375): “Can two intentions differ formally in virtue of their real nature, while they are really identical?”. So what we should first do, Girald thinks, is to determine what precisely should be understood by ‘formal difference’. He begins by rejecting some erroneous views (capp. 379–386). In order to state the correct understanding of the phrase ‘formal difference’, a preliminary discussion is required concerning the notion of ‘reality’. To this end he presents a fourfold division of what is real, four preliminary theses about universal reality, and four kinds of conceptual relationship between singular and universal realities (capp. 388–390). 8.3.1. Some preliminary remarks The first division of what is real is between universal and singular things (cf. Aristotle, De interpr. 7, 17a38-b1). The second one is between ‘reality in an unqualified sense’ (realitas simpliciter) and ‘reality in a certain respect’ (realitas secundum quid). The third division distinguishes between primary and secondary reality; it goes back to Aristole’s opposing (at Categ. 5, 2a11–19) primary substance to secondary substance, but this opposition may be extended, Girald claims, to the nine other categories. The fourth division concerns the distinction between concrete individual reality (realitas hoc aliquid) and ‘specified reality’ (realitas quale quid), which is found on account of substance in the Categories (ibid.) but may be extended to the other categories as well. These four divisions, then, can be telescoped into one comprehensive division opposing sin-

25 Unfortunately, the discussions of the questions “Utrum aliquod transcendens (puta res vel ens) possit habere differentiam extra rationem suam” and “Utrum per proprias passiones, ita quod diffiniantur per ipsum ut per additamentum”, which are announced in De intentionibus III, cap. 375, are missing both in the Madrid manuscript and in the extant Mss. containing Girald’s In I Sent., dist. 23.

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gular, unqualified, primary, and individual reality to universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying reality (cap. 388). The four preliminary theses run: (a) universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying reality is expressed by a quiddity or quod quid est; this is plain because a thing’s quiddity is the reality that is naturally suited to be answered to the question ‘What is the thing?’; (b) universal reality is formal reality; (c) to differ by universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying reality boils down to differing by quiddity and quidditatively; (d) to differ by universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying reality comes to differing by formal reality and formally (cap. 389). The four kinds of conceptual relationship between singular and universal realities are: (a) two singular realities fall under one universal reality; (b) two universal realities reside in one singular reality; (c) two singular realities fall under two universal realities, and (d) two universal realities reside in two singular realities. Theses (c) and (d) involve plurality and diversity of the things compared without there being unity and identity, whereas (a) and (b) involve unity, identity, plurality, and diversity simultaneously. Only the latter ([a] and [b]) are of interest to us (cap. 390). 8.3.2. How should formal difference and real identity be understood? The initial question (of cap. 375: “Can two intentions differ formally ex natura rei, while nevertheless they are really identical?”) can now be restated as follows: Can two intentions differ by universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying realities, while at the same time there exists between them an identity in some singular, unqualified, primary, and individual reality? The state of affairs under examination is the counterpart of the one we are acquainted with, to wit, that two things can differ by singular, unqualified, primary, and individual realities, while at the same time there exists between them an identity in some universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying reality, such as is the case with Socrates and Plato, and whatever other real singulars that are contained under one and the same species; they indeed do not differ by any universal reality, since what is universal in the one, is universal in the other as well.26 Our initial question should be understood along these 26 Notice that according to Aristotle, any immanent form is singular, definitely not universal. Its ‘being universal’ is merely the logical property of being applicable to other instances possessing the form in question. See de Rijk (2002) II, 207–210. See

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lines, Girald affirms. It is to the question thus understood that I will reply, he adds, not to any other interpretation, since my understanding of the question is Aristotle’s.27 In the next article, the affirmative answer (cap. 392) to this question is argued for. First Aristotle’s authority is called upon (capp. 393– 398). The general purport of all the authoritative texts taken from the Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, De anima, and De generatione et corruptione is that whenever Aristotle speaks of things differing in virtue of their quidditative being, he precisely has in mind what Girald understands by ‘their being different by universal, qualified, primary, specifying reality, while at the same time there exists between them a real unity and identity, which is to be taken as a singular, unqualified, primary, individual reality’.28 Girald’s other arguments all concern the epitheta assigned by Aristotle to the First Cause in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics (XII 7, 1072a23–1073a13).29 According to Girald, these attributes are all one singular reality, in every respect one and the same by the identity and unity belonging to singularity. He claims (cap. 402) that quiddities are mutually different when one be can be added to another without bringing about ‘a more’ (magis), just as one can be removed from the other without bringing about ‘a less’ (minus). Now if the quiddity, Eternity is appended to, say, Goodness or Wisdom, this addition does not result ‘a more’, just as its removal does not result in ‘a less’ either. Therefore the quiddity, Eternity, must be different from any other attribute. Furthermore (cap. 404), the quiddity of one attribute of the First Cause is found in something (say, in my or your intellect) according to its common nature,30 without there being the quiddity of another attribute. Therefore these attributes are formally and quidditatively different.

for Girald’s peculiar view of ‘universal’ sections 8.4 and 8.51–8.52 below. 27 De intentionibus III, cap. 391. As a matter of fact, Girald is wrong (see next note). 28 Ibid., cap. 398. As will be argued for later on (our section 8.52 below), Girald seems to ignore a fundamental difference between himself and Aristotle on account of the ontological status of the immanent forms residing in particulars, as a result of which they simply are not on speaking terms. 29 In Girald’s words (ibid., cap. 399): ‘Causa Prima est actus, substantia eterna simplex unica optima necessaria continens naturam, vita, speculatio delectatio divina infinita immaterialis et impassibilis’. 30 The text reads secundum rationem communem, i.e. taken after its quidditative acpect. In other words, the particular quiddities as found in the two particulars are not identical. For this sense of ‘ratio’ see de Rijk (1994), 197–218.

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The antecedent is plainly true, because the common quiddity of knowledge is found in a specific act of my (or your) intellect, in which it occurs without the common quiddity of love, since in me31 love and knowledge are essentially different. The inference is valid, because one quiddity is not found in something without being present in it (sine seipsa)—unless one would say that although a higher and a lower quiddity are in fact identical, the higher one is found without the lower one. However, this does not apply to our case, since knowledge and love do not relate as something (conceptually) higher and lower. Yet another argument is adduced (cap. 405) in support of the thesis put forward in chapter 398. The First Cause knows whatever is knowable in so far as it is knowable by any knowledgeable entity whatsoever, but He does not desire or strive after whatever is appetible by any appetitive entity whatsoever. Hence it follows that in the First Cause, knowledge and appetite are by nature formally different. The second part of the antecedent is clear, because many bad people consent more readily to fornicating or stealing than God does, since God only tolerates such things happening, and indeed He sometimes does not allow the fulfillment of bad desires at all. The validity of the inference is proved as follows:32 It is neither possible nor comprehensible that something which is one and the same entity, both is brought to doing something and is not, in the same sense, that is, of the expression ‘being brought to something’.33 Now the First Cause is ultimately brought to an act of knowledge concerning the fornication, not to an appetitive act. Therefore there is a formal difference between the way in which the First Cause is ultimately brought to knowing the fornication and the way in which He is not ultimately brought to consenting to it.34

31

Unlike in the First Cause, that is. In expressions such as ‘probatur quia’, ‘consequentia tenet quia’ the conjunction ‘quia’ is, of course, not used in the sense of ‘because’ (as though it were to give the reason for the fact that a proof is given!). It rather introduces a complex argumentative procedure (mostly a syllogism), and should, therefore, be taken brachylogically and rendered with something like ‘and here is the proof ’. The present author usually avoids clumsy renderings such as ‘it is proved, because’ for ‘Probatur, quia’—which suggests that the major of the syllogism contains the reason for the proof being given—by punctuating ‘Probatur quia:’ and rendering it: ‘It is proved as follows’. See the Glossary appended to the Introduction to my edition and translation of the Letters of Nicholas of Autrecourt in: de Rijk (1994), Glossary, pp. 39–42, s.v. ‘quia’. 33 The text uses the verb ‘ferri’, which has the somewhat stronger sense of ‘getting carried away to something’. 34 De intentionibus III, cap. 405. 32

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No doubt, all these arguments are truly supportive of the thesis that there exist both formal differences, and at the same time real unity and identity, between the diverse quidditative attributes assigned to the First Cause. However, Girald all too easily jumps to his favourite conclusion that the formal differences and the real unity and identity under examination can be, and should be, explained ad mentem Aristotelis in terms of his own dearest conception of ‘these quiddities differring in God by universal, qualified, secondary, and specifying reality, including at the same time their real unity and identity’. In God, all these quiddities are really the same, and completely identical with the Divine Nature. However, Girald fails to see that their being formally different is entirely due to human understanding, as is their being called ‘attributes’ as well.35 In a word, we have to realize (with all opponents of our author) that any talk of ‘universality’ or ‘formal differences’ and the like has its origin in logical operations, and, speaking generally, in the ways in which the human mind is naturally forced to deal with Reality (whether natural or supernatural), by crumbling it, so to speak.36 8.3.3. On the objections made by Hervaeus Natalis Many people disagree with the views of Girald’s just mentioned. Our author confines himself to replying to master Hervaeus, who deals extensively with this matter in his first Quodlibet, q. 2 (“Utrum in divinis praeter distinctionem unius relationis ab alia sint quaedam formalitates realiter distinctae, vel sit aliquid formaliter distinctum ex natura rei” ed. Zimara, ff. 4vb–7va, this at f. 6rb). Girald begins by presenting (cap. 406) a lengthy quotation from this quodlibetal question in which Hervaeus explicitly claims that God does not conceive all intelligible entities by separate acts, like human beings do.37 He does not use the labels ‘formal difference’ and ‘real identity’ in this context, but uses the 35 In order to remain true to the Catholic Faith, Girald (among many theologians) has good reason to take refuge to the logically rather odd device that in the First Cause, neither the addition of one attribute to another nor the removal of one from another has any effect upon the Divine Nature. Instead, they insist, one should avoid the confusing term ‘attribute’. 36 Hervaeus Natalis seems to have a far more acceptable view about the role of the human intellect; see his discussion with Henry of Ghent (our section 3.45[b]) and our next section. 37 De intentionibus III, cap. 406 (quoting Hervaeus, Quodlibet I, q. 2).

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general term ‘precisiones’ (literally ‘cut-outs’). The general purport of Hervaeus’s approach to the matter is that all such precisions as applied to the Divine Nature stem from the human intellect, and are founded in what he calls ‘objective being’, and have only a remote foundation in the extramental things (‘licet habeant fundamentum in re’): De intentionibus III, cap. 406 ad fin. (still quoting Hervaeus): Sed tales precisiones non competunt rebus nisi mediante actu intellectus, quia constat quod sapientia in communi non est alicubi sine sapientia hac, nisi tamen in intellectu obiective. Precisio etiam alicuius alterius rei a Sapientia ut sapientia est, et non ab hac Sapientia, nec [non MS] est alicubi nisi in intellectu obiective. Illa autem que competunt rebus ut sunt in intellectu obiective, sunt entia rationis, et que competunt rebus mediante actu intellectus. Ergo tales precisiones, et per consequens distinctiones secundum tales precisiones, sunt precisiones et distinctiones secundum actus intellectus et secundum rationem tantum, licet habeant fundamentum in re. Hec iste doctor.

Girald certainly realizes that Hervaeus might think that his account has taken the edge off of all Girald’s arguments (“videtur ei quod omnia dicta in precedenti ratione sint exsufflata”). However, this is no time to give up. Our author sets out to attack Hervaeus on a broad front. First he will show that with some of his claims Hervaeus plays into his opponent’s hands; secondly he will make clear that Hervaeus’s reply has failed in attempting to render Girald’s line of reasoning null and void; thirdly, Hervaeus contradicts himself in places; finally, some of Hervaeus’s statements are simply mistaken. Let us try to sum up the bottom-line of Girald’s fourfold counterattack (408–420).38 First, on account of Hervaeus’s supposed agreement with his own main claims about the matters at issue, Girald has it that his opponent in fact agrees that what belongs to any instance of

38 Russell Friedman has rightly drawn my attention to the fact that what it is all about is Girald’s applying to the matters in question the Scotistic formal distinction, which is based on the conviction that, prior to any act of the intellect, there really exists some sort of non-identity or distinction (distinctness) of entities within things. Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4 (Vatican edition Opera omnia, vol. IV, pp. 260– 261), where Scotus speaks of a ‘distinctio praecedens intellectum omni modo’. From the logical point of view, this cannot help seeming to come across as confusing, because it implies the recognition of the real identity of God’s Sapientia and Bonitas, together with the refusal of imputing their being distinct to the typically human (defective indeed) way of considering things. People like Hervaeus are (comprehensibly) unable to regard the formal distinction as something sui iuris, rather than merely a peculiar kind of logical distinction.

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wisdom whatsoever in so far as it is wisdom, belongs to it in virtue of the nature of wisdom, rather than some activity of the intellect. This is plain inductively, he thinks, because what belongs to a man in so far as he is a human being (e.g. being able to laugh) belongs to him in virtue of his human nature, definitely not on the basis of my or your manner of viewing things; the same goes for fire taken as such. Girald thinks he can support this statement by what Hervaeus says elsewhere in the same quodlibetal question, namely, that what by itself (per se) is inconsistent with a higher thing, is inconsistent with each instance of the lower one as well; the phrase ‘per se’ is explained by Girald in terms of ‘ex natura rei’—whereas it can be used in a logical sense as well, but this Girald seems to ignore. So this equation is, I am afraid, entirely due to Girald’s own way of thinking about the issues of universality and mind-dependence. In a word, he seems to have a deaf ear to what Hervaeus says about universality being ultimately founded on reality; in any case he gives an interpretation of the label ‘fundamentum in re’ that is quite different from Hervaeus’s (and from that of many other authors as well, for that matter). Girald’s misreading his opponent’s exposition comes to the fore once again when he tries to refute (cap. 412) what Hervaeus has remarked about the nature of ‘precisio’. According to Hervaeus, Girald notes, statements such as ‘Divine Wisdom qua wisdom not is Justice’ have their source in reality as a remote foundation, because if there were no real basis for wisdom’s diversity, justice could never be conceived of without wisdom being conceived. This recognition on Hervaeus’s part leads Girald to draw up the following argument. Every division or distinction (precisio) between a true thing and nothing (nullam rem), which has its source in a true thing as its remote foundation, and in which thing the immediate foundation does not differ from the remote one, stems from the nature of such things. Now the ‘precision’ at issue is of this kind. Therefore it stems from nature. The minor is plain, because (a) it actually is between true thing and nothing, since Divine Wisdom qua wisdom and Divine Justice qua justice are each a true thing. That Hervaeus cannot possibly disagree that there is in the present case no difference at all between the immediate and the remote foundation is argued for by Girald with remarkable sophistication. If you are claiming that the remote foundation is Wisdom qua wisdom, I maintain, he says, that this same foundation is an immediate one. But if you are calling Deity (Divine Nature) the remote foundation, and Wisdom the immediate, and are marking off these two, I have

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arrived at the intended conclusion, that Deity and Divine Wisdom are different. If you are saying, on the other hand, that the remote foundation is created wisdom, which really differs from justice, your own sayings are to the contrary; for you have conceded that the Divine Intellect truly recognizes that Divine Wisdom qua wisdom not is Justice. Now the Divine Intellect recognizes this prior to the existence of any created wisdom. Therefore the act of distinction between Wisdom and Justice as it is found in the Divine Intellect, does not have its source in created wisdom. What Girald is doing is, as he often does, dodging the issue with an ostentation of subtlety. The only thing Hervaeus intends to say is that any making of a formal difference between, say, Divine Wisdom and Divine Justice or between created wisdom and created justice results, and must result, from the activity of an intellect (whether divine or created). Plainly enough, the reader will agree, because any distinction between A and B takes its origin from A and B being actually distinguished by some intellect, rather than their being actually separate entities of their own, however divergent they may really be by themselves. We should now realize that as far as Divine Nature is concerned, there is no disagreement whatsoever between Hervaeus and Girald that the divine so-called ‘attributes’ are really one and identical with the Divine Nature; to think otherwise would be heretical. But in the next few lines (413), Girald tries to pull a fast one by supposing that the man presumably is considering the (at least theoretical) possibility that the Divine Intellect conceives the divine attributes as distinct because in the created order wisdom and justice are different (as was the view held by Godfrey of Fontaines in his Quodlibet VII, q. 1).39 Girald rightly rejects such a view as absurd, but is apparently not aware (or simply ignores on purpose) that Hervaeus claims no such thing.40 What Hervaeus and the other adherents to the view that any formal distinctions are mind-dependent continually maintain is that formal distinctions are dependent on human thinking, which is incapable of adequately conceiving the absolute unity of the so-called ‘attributes’ in the Divine Nature, and, accordingly, is forced to conceive them as discernible, analogically to created attributes. What Girald has Hervaeus say is something different altogether. Girald portrays Hervaeus

39 40

I owe this information to the kindness of Russell Friedman. Ibid., cap. 413.

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as if he considered it possible that God should exercize the human way of conceptually splitting up the unity of the Divine Nature into separate attributes. A ridiculous idea indeed. For then God would conceive his Wisdom as different from the quiddity of wisdom. However, this is not what Hervaeus cum suis mean to say. It does not occur to Girald that the only thing his opponents maintain is the fourfold thesis that (a) God’s Nature is one, and (b) that the formal distinctions between the divine attributes are man-made, and (c) that these distinctions are as such mind-dependent, and (d) that they have a remote foundation in Reality.41 Putting it briefly, unlike Girald, Hervaeus is fully aware of the basic opposition between ontology and logic: differences are, whereas distinctions are made (by an intellect, that is). The only weakness of Hervaeus’s viewpoint seems to be that the precise meaning of the phrase ‘fundamentum remotum in re’ featuring in (d) remains unclear, particularly how it should be understood in the context of the objective being thesis. In the next chapter (415) Girald’s objections against Hervaeus betray, once again, how he continually fails to understand that distinguishing A from B is always due to an intellectual activity. The attack is directed at his opponent’s remark that the universal form of wisdom (sapientia in communi) only is given as instantiated in particulars, and that, for that reason, the notion ‘universal wisdom’ is due to the intellect. The way in which Girald tries to refute Hervaeus’s view is remarkable in that he fails to understand that even in cases in which it is real things that are subject to mental activities (such as distinguishing or ‘reduplicating’ by means of the expressions ‘ut’, ‘inquantum’, or ‘in eo quod’ and the like), it still is the mind’s activity that is at stake: Ibid., cap. 415: (…). Sed hoc est ridiculum. Et si vadam ad intellectum eius, patet quod eius motivum nichil est. Vult enim arguere, quia sapientia in communi non existit in aliquo intellectu sine hac vel sine illa, quod propter hoc distinctio sapientie in communi non sit nisi per intellectum. Sed hoc nichil est; ‘ homo enim inquantum homo distin41 In Hervaeus’s words (in the quodlibetal question quoted by Girald at the end of cap. 406; see p. 321, n. 37 above): “Ergo tales precisiones, et per consequens distinctiones secundum tales precisiones, sunt precisiones et distinctiones secundum actus intellectus et secundum rationem tantum, licet habeant fundamentum remotum in re’. Russell Friedman has remarked (in a private communication) that by thinking that b/c and d are compatible, Girald seems to take the notion ‘formal distinction’ in a Scotistic way.

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chapter eight guitur ab asino; ergo hec distinctio est ab intellectu’ non sequitur, ymo est oppositum. Quando enim reduplicatur ‘homo ut homo’ et ‘natura hominis ut natura hominis’, non reduplicatur aliquid factum ab intellectu.

By moving on to this line of argument, Girald proceeds to address the general problem of the universal, but first the initial problem of the real distinction between the categories should be treated. 8.3.4. On the real status of the categorial divisions and distinctions of being The fourth Questio of the PARS TERTIA is intended to discuss the problem of whether the categorial intentions are really different. Its first article (capp. 443 ff.) inquires what kind of reality should be understood by ‘categorial reality’. However, our text of De intentionibus ends abruptly as early as in cap. 452. I must therefore refer back to our discussion (in sect. 4.5) of the third article of the first Questio (capp. 294–312), where the closely related thesis was under examination, to the effect that the order of the intentions making up the diverse predicamental levels are founded upon the things’ real, extramental natures. 8.4. On the nature of the universal according to Girald’s De natura universalis The Madrid manuscript Bibl. Nac. 4229 contains among other short treatises, which for the most part are taken from other Distinctiones of Girald’s commentary on the Sentences, a very interesting one which I have entitled De natura universalis. We owe to my friend and collaborator Dr. Joke Spruyt an elucidating paper on Girald’s outspokenly ‘realistic’ view of the nature of the universal.42 Only the second and third parts (questiones 2 and 3) are of our concern here. The second question runs Utrum entitas vel unitas universalis sit ex opere intellectus. As usual, our author prefaces the exposition of his own view by discussing the opposite viewpoint that the universal is just a men42 Spruyt (1996), 171–208. In the present section I will abundantly use her thorough analyses of this treatise. The work consists of three questions, the two first of which are found in our Madrid MS, foll. 204ra–207vb, whereas q. 2 also occurs in In I Sent., dist. 19, and q. 3 is only extant, it seems, in dist. 19 of the Sentences commentary. Spruyt follows the division and numbering of my preliminary (unpublished) edition.

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tal entity, rather than being extramental. The latter view (which is, of course, Girald’s own) is given support by a remarkable argument to the effect that if something’s antecedent is not mind-dependent, its consequent is not either, because the two originate from one and the same cause. Now a thing’s particular mode of being (entitas particularis), which is not due to a mental operation, is antecedent to the corresponding universal entity (entitas universalis). In this line of argument, the following inference is correct: ‘This stone, or this man, really exists; therefore, the universal stone, or man, exists’. Hence it follows that like the particulars, the universals are also extramental.43 Obviously, Girald’s entire argument hinges on the premiss that the particular and the universal have the same cause, which of course cannot be the human mind. Clearly, such an argument begs the question. Next, our author deals with all those who adhere to the opposite view (the majority opinion, he says), i. e., that every universal entity and unity stems from the intellect, formally, that is, and completively, whereas their foundation is in extramental reality.44 This common view is supported by its adherents with many authorities (Avicenna, Algazel, Themistius, and Averroes in particular), but at the end of the discussion (capp. 38–45) Girald claims that this appeal on the authorities is entirely mistaken. Let us look at what he makes of Averroes’s unmistakably ascribing universality to the intellect’s activity; “Intellectus est qui agit in eis (viz. the particulars) universalitatem”.45 The meaning of this testimony is, according to Girald, the opposite, to wit that the intellect is responsible for the sensible’s universality being known, not for the universal being as such—this naturally inheres in the sensible, prior to any mental operation.46 To clarify his own account of the matter Girald begins by explaining what we should understand by the terms ‘entity’ and ‘unity’ as used in De natura universalis, q. 2, cap. 27, quoted in Spruyt (1996), 179, n. 29. Ibid., cap. 29: “(…) opinio multorum fuit, et est, quod omnis entitas et unitas universalis est ex opere intellectus, formaliter quidem et completive, sed fundamentaliter a re extra”. The phrase ‘formaliter et completive’ underlines the fact that the mind’s activity is responsible for completing the universal’s formal being. Cf. Dionysius Carthusianus, Elementatio Theologica (Opera omnia, vol. 33) cap. 45, p. 146A: “Persona in divinis designat substantiam simul et relationem: substantiam quasi per modum fundamenti ac materialis, relationem per modum formalis et completivi”. Russell Friedman has kindly drawn my attention to a similar terminology in Henry of Ghent, e.g. Summa, art. 53, q. 3. 45 Averroes, Comm. Magnum in Arist. De anima, p. 1225–26. 46 De natura universalis, capp. 43–44, quoted in Spruyt (1996), 190, nn. 65–66. 43 44

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the phrase ‘universal entity and unity’. Four relationships can be discerned between an object and a concept thereof. First an object relates to its concept as that which (a) causes or (b) terminates it, whereas the concept relates to its object as (c) that which is caused or (d) terminated. The bottom-line of the four arguments taken by Girald from these relationships47 is that prior to any formation of a specific concept of something extramental, there must be something to which the concept corresponds, which is described by Girald as an ‘indivisio’ or ‘indistinctio’ of a certain kind, which ‘terminates’48 the specific concept. He clarifies his use of the notions of ‘terminating’ and ‘being terminated’ as follows. In order for something to be understood or to enter the domain of mental being through an act of the intellect, two things are required, to wit, (a) that it is actually understood (quod intelligitur), and (b) that it is understood qua being understood (inquantum intelligitur). The important thing is that the object that is understood terminates the act of understanding (intellectionem) before the aggregate consisting of the act of understanding and the object comes into existence. However, that which terminates conceptualization is neither the object as occurring in the whole range of particulars nor as taken as just this or that particular; rather it is something the particulars have in common.49 Now this common aspect is their esse specificum which is made up by the aforesaid particulars’ ‘indivision’, which was indicated before as their universal entity and unity. To be more precise (taking an example adduced by Girald at cap. 32), this instance of whiteness and that other instance of whiteness (which are really different) are naturally suited to cause one specific concept, owing to the specific indistinction or indivision (called esse specificum) residing in each of them prior to any conceptualization.50 It is important to notice that, according to Girald, this specific being is not due to the act of conceptualization. Therefore he rejects the view of people who would have it that the reason why we can assign specific being both to particulars and the corresponding specific concept (e.g. by stating that both a particular man and the concept ‘man’ possess ‘being (a) man’) is due to the specific concept’s primarily having esse See the detailed analysis in Spruyt (1996), 180–186. The expression ‘actum terminare’ is commonly said of an action which makes something arrive at its proper end or goal, e.g. in ‘color terminat visum’, meaning that colour brings the act of vision to its proper end. 49 De natura universalis, cap. 33, quoted in Spruyt (1996), 182, nn. 42–43. 50 Ibid., cap. 32, quoted and explained by Spruyt (1996), 180–182. 47 48

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specificum, because, Girald asserts, specific being falls to each of them in the same formative way (uniformiter).51 Finally, Girald goes on to elucidate his position in terms of the semantic item of ‘likeness’, a basic notion in Aristotelian semantics. There is likeness between concepts and objects on the one hand, and between two numerically different specific concepts, on the other. The problem we are faced with is how two numerically different concepts of ‘man’ (e.g. the one in Socrates’s mind, the other in Plato’s) can possibly exhibit a certain amount of likeness both to a third thing and to each other. Girald is convinced that this question cannot be answered satisfactorily by pointing to their sharing in what is commonly called ‘objective being’ (esse obiectivum) alone, that is to say, their likeness is not exclusively due to their sharing the same conceptual ontic content. Something more is required, namely their sharing similar intrinsic essences, which are the primary causes of the likeness.52 In the same way as in De intentionibus, our author rejects53 any (supposed) attempt to dodge the issue by generously conceding to Hervaeus the correctness of his position as long as it is taken in terms of real foundation (fundamentaliter), but at the same time he rejects it when the formative completion of the specific unity is at issue, since the latter, the opponents keep maintaining, is entirely due to the intellect. Girald never tires of arguing for the existence of universal entities and unities as instances of specific being which reside in the extramental things quite independently of any intellectual activity. However, this assumption, which is a sine qua non for Girald, is underscored by a variety of arguments which all seem to beg the question by taking for granted that whatever the human mind conceives of must already be tale quale in extramental reality, totally prior to the mind’s activity. So too in his final argument (cap. 37), in which the author simply postulates that any formal differences must be based upon differences there being simply prior to formal conceptualization. “And once again here is my proof that it is not the intellect which gives being in the formal sense (esse formaliter) to the specific unity” runs his patient intro:

51 Ibid., cap. 34, quoted by Spruyt (1996), 183, n. 44. The technical term ‘uniformis’ bears on a thing’s having the same form as another thing; ‘uniformiter’, accordingly, indicates that the same form acts (in virtue of its being formative, that is) in the same way in each of them, not primarily in one, and secondarily in the other. 52 De natura universalis, cap. 35, quoted by Spruyt (1996), 184 f., nn. 47–48. 53 Cap. 36, quoted by Spruyt (1996), 185, n. 49.

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chapter eight De natura universalis, cap. 37: Et iterum probo quod intellectus non det esse formaliter isti unitati quia: Cuius formalitas est simpliciter negatio vel privatio, non accipit esse formaliter per rationem vel per actum intellectus. Sed formalitas unitatis specifice est simpliciter negatio vel privatio, quia secundum Philosophum, quinto Metaphisice esse unum est esse indivisum. Ergo huiusmodi formalitas non est per intellectum, sed potius ex natura rei.

Thus Girald regards the ‘indivision’ of an object (here brought up as there simply being a negation [‘non-division’] or privation [‘indivision’] or ‘being divided’) as the formative cause of its being given in extramental reality, which is at work quite independently of the human mind. Next, Aristotle enters the scene to support this view. The subject matter of the passage in question (Metaph. V 6, 1016a24-b6) is generic and specific unity, such as is found in man, horse, and dog, or in man and animal, respectively. It is plain from the context, however, that in Aristotle’s exposition of these senses of ‘oneness’, it is the relationship between a significative account (or content; comparable to what in the Middle Ages is called ‘objective being’) and what is signified or denoted by it he is interested in. It is the ambivalent use of such concepts54 that Aristotle is here focussing upon: in a way indeed the two are one, in another they may (or even should) be distinguished. They are one qua referring to what is really one and the same thing (e.g. the specific being-a-man, and the generic being-an-animal in one and the same person, Socrates), whereas their formal definitions are different and should be marked off from what they denotatively refer to. So what Aristotle is trying to say should be understood along the lines of referential vs. formal identity, an idea that seems to be completely ignored by Girald.55 It goes without saying that Hervaeus Natalis and the other adherents to the position so severely repudiated by Girald, find strong support in Aristotle. The idea that it is the mind which in conceptualizing and judging outside things, invents distinctions which can be applied to them one way or another, is typical of Aristotle, as are the basic idea that any correct thinking is cum fundamento in re, and the parallelism postulate. Let us in our concluding section try to evaluate Girald’s general 54 For the important semantic difference between the ambivalent and the ambiguous uses of terms and expressions see de Rijk (2002) I, 69–72. Putting it briefly, the ambiguous use of a term obscures the speaker’s intention, whereas the ambivalent use enriches the expression by retaining diverse complementary conceptual aspects. 55 See de Rijk (2002) II, 179–181.

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philosophic position on account of the nature of Reality and human thinking against the background of Aristotle’s views of the matter. Poor Girald problably has no idea what he has let himself in for by his appeal to Aristotle’s authority. 8.5. On Girald’s position in the Aristotelian tradition It is useful to clarify Girald’s position in the Aristotelian tradition. I shall particularly focus on Girald’s unAristotelian view of universality. By considering the esse significatum the reliable messenger between the extramental object and the knowing subject Girald is clearly following common doctrine. What makes his position so peculiar is that his esse significatum (in his terminology, esse specificum) is an entity that is as such entirely independent of the mind’s activity, and occurs as an ontic component of the things outside. Taking into account that specific being is identified by him as ‘universal entity and unity’ we can understand that it is Girald’s view of the universal that determines his entire position in matters of cognition. The decisive question, therefore, is: Are the immanent forms of things universal or particular entities? In the Aristotelian context there is no simple answer to this question, because the wealth of evidence in favour of the particular status of the immanent form56 seems to be contradicted by the (general Greek) requirement (also adhered to by Aristotle) that the proper object of any definition and any genuine knowledge is what is universal, and that the thing’s immanent form, which has the pivotal role when it comes to genuinely knowing things must, therefore, be universal, not particular. However, there is no contradiction at all, since we have to sharply distinguish between ontic particularity and logical universality. Whenever Aristotle and later authors, including most Medievals, talk about the universality of the forms (as required for there to be genuine knowledge), it is the logical property belonging to abstract forms of being universally applicable to other objects they are concerned with, not the ontic particular status of each and every single form residing in a particular. If there is a real problem, then, it is that of the representativity of abstraction—by which procedure

56

See ibid. II, 273–279.

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universal is acquired—, but in Ancient and Medieval thought the reliability of abstraction is commonly accepted. What various Medieval authors disagree about is the extent of this reliability. In the wake of Aristotle, Girald’s opponents all appear to be satisfied with the ‘fundamentum in re’ idea. As we have seen many times, Girald is not. What Girald never ceases to insist upon is that universality is a property of the universal specific being which, to his mind, is as such part of the external world. So universality belongs to things as an ontological feature, definitely not something that only falls to them as a result of the mind’s operation. What logic does is to observe the things’ universal natures. Joke Spruyt has good reason to see a parallel between Girald’s esse specificum and Henry of Ghent’s esse essentiae.57

57 Spruyt (1996), 191.—It is interesting to see that one of Henry’s pupils, his fellow countryman, Geoffrey of Fontaines (born ca. 1250 in Fontaines-les-Hozémont, near Liège, and deceased before 1310) does not follow his master on this score. In his Quodlibet VII, q. 5, p. 3306–16 (ed. M. De Wulf & J. Hoffmanns), Geoffrey explicitly points out the particular nature of the Aristotelian eidos as appearing in Metapysics VII 6, 1032a4–10: “Hoc modo etiam verificatur intentio Philosophi in septimo Metaphysicae, quod in his quae sunt per se (per quae, ut ibi patet, intelligit substantias materiales) non differt quidditas et habens quidditatem (per illa, ut patet, intelligens substantias primas sive supposita, et species sive diffinitiones quae sunt explicationes essentiae specierum). Dicit enim quod substantia quae est quidditas et substantia singulariter, scilicet individuum substantiae, sunt idem. Substantia enim quae est quidditas est substantia singularis, et substantia singularis nihil aliud est quam substantia quae est quidditas eius. Verbi gratia, Sortes est animal rationale; Sortes nihil aliud est quam animalitas, rationalitas quae sunt quidditas eius; nec animalitas et rationalitas sunt quidditas nisi Sortis et Platonis”; cf. Quodlibet V, q. 10, p. 39: “Sic enim verum est quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus, non quidem quod per eius actionem contingat quod res secundum id quod sunt in seipsis, sint universales, sed sic quod eius actione vel virtute fit quod quidditas rei, quae singulariter existit, per hoc quod per lumen intellectus agentis attingitur secundum quod id quod est quidditas essentialis, praeter designantia accidentia ab intellectu possibili sic apprehendatur”; see also section 9.36 below, p. 354, n. 24.

chapter nine CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, I intend to assess Girald’s position on account of the intentionality issues among his predecessors and contemporaries. Since they all shared the basic Aristotelian traditional views of cognition, it is useful to preface this assessment by a short account of the background of the depositum of Medieval semantic views. 9.1. On the general background of the Medieval semantic views In Medieval philosophical writings of the period, the ambivalent (or rather ‘ambivalence-producing’) usage of labels such as ‘conceptus’ and ‘intentio’ touches the heart of Medieval semantics.1 To understand the core of the (widely divergent, for that matter) semantic positions held by medieval philosophers and theologians, it should be observed first that the semantic views of the Medieval thinkers, being a vital part of their general philosophical attitude, however different they sometimes were from one thinker to another, were basically determined by a twofold firm conviction, to the effect [a] that there is an extramental world around us, which possesses on its own account—independently, that is, of the operation of any created intellect—certain ontic features, and [b] that, in principle, our cognitive (sensitive and intellective) faculties provide us with the capability of having an effective access to this extramental Reality, owing to the fundamental parallelism existing between the various ontic articulations of things in the outside world, on the one hand, and the different natural ways in which we understand things, on the other.2 This latter idea went hand in hand with their optimistic

1 For the momentous role of ambivalence (as opposed to ambiguity) in Ancient and Medieval semantics see note 3 below. 2 As for this characteristic of Ancient and medieval thought, we usually speak of ‘the parallelism postulate’. For Aristotle, see de Rijk (2002) I, pp. 14 f.; 39; II, pp. 43; 693.

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conviction that it is up to the human mind to really discover the truth about things. To the Medieval mind, the idea that it is human beings who create or invent truth would be outragious. For this reason, the Ancients’ and Medievals’ conceptual engineering was quite naturally concerned with grasping the things of the outside world through concepts that designate the extramental things, including their being taken qua conceived of.3 This two-sidedness of concepts was firmly grounded upon the aforesaid (supposed) parallelism. Nothing could prevent people, of course, from taking the objects of our thinking, on occasion, simply in their own right, quite apart, that is, from our different ways of conceiving them. But it never occurred to anyone to construe an antagonistic opposition between the outside things as existing by themselves and their being conceived of. Let alone that their existence should ever, in a quasi-Kantian fashion, be set apart as belonging to a domain of ‘things by themselves’ (‘Dinge an sich’), which are in principle unaccessible to thought. Likewise nobody could fancy the idea that the things’ existence in the extramental world should be opposed to their being as conceived of, as though there would exist two incongruous areas, one of real being, the other the mental domain of our conceptual engineering, to be regarded as an autonomous area produced by our mental activities.4 In this general line of thought, two features of the diverse Medieval conceptions of intention (and of concept in general) deserve special attention. First and foremost we have to consider the Medievals’ basic idea of there being some relationship, or rather relatedness, between any psycholinguistic entity and the ‘thing’ expressed by it, or, speaking from the viewpoint of semantics proper, the phenomenon of the referentiality of any linguistic expression. Secondly, we meet with the Medievals’ passionate debates about the benefit (or inappropriateness, to other people’s mind!) of multifarious relationships between the constituents that make up the semantic diagram of referentiality. In fact, the intricate problems concerning intentionality, including the contro3 Therefore, one should not speak of semantic ambiguity or even confusion in this respect, but of Ancient and Medieval thinkers exploiting semantic ambivalence; de Rijk (2002) I, 69–72; 162; 252; II, 149, n. 5; 154; 273, n. 86; 284, n. 111; 413. 4 As a matter of fact, the parallelism postulate of Ancient and Medieval thought— which indeed betrays a conspicuous optimism in matters of cognition—prevented the development of any form of radical subjectivism or scepticism, and of any kind of ‘Bewusztseinsphilosophie’ as well. See for Aristotle, see de Rijk (2002) II, 43; and also I, 159–179; 358–368; II, 34–36; 384 ff.; 403–416; 572–593 (categorization).

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versial discussions among Medieval philosophers and theologians as well, all centered around these two features, the importance of which was commonly recognized, for that matter. As we have frequently remarked before, the main stream of the debate was about the semantic problem of referentiality annex the representativeness and reliability of cognition, and about the roles and natures of the mental entities (supposedly) involved in the process of cognition. Basically, the problem revolved around the following. From the material point of view, sensorial cognition is closer to the extramental objects of cognition than intellective cognition is, and from the formal viewpoint, it falls short with regard to the obligate ideal of genuine knowledge, which is unattainable without the cooperation of the intellect with its own requirements and demands. For that reason, the ins and outs of the formal process by which the intellect appropriates the initial sensorial materials, were bound to determine the decisive points of issue. In the context of the intentionality issue the problem area in question came to the fore in multifarious ways. This diversity was a result of the fact that the Medieval scholars went to focus their attention on the specific character of the diverse tools and devices (supposedly) operating in the trajectory between the extramental object and the intellect, particularly by examining the cognitional roles of the two fundamental agents, the thing and the intellect, and looking for the proper meanings of ‘intellection’ and ‘being intellected’, including the intentional relationships arising between the intellect and the object of cognition. 9.2. Intellection, being intellected, and intentionality Confining ourselves to the development of the intentionality issue from Simon of Faversham to Girald Odonis, the following observations can be made. 9.2.1. Simon of Faversham Quite in line with the basic contemporaneous views of cognition, Faversham holds that ultimately genuine knowledge of the extramental world depends upon the intellect’s activities, because for acquiring genuine knowledge of extramental reality it is imperative that the intellect should upgrade sensorial cognition (our section 5.5.3).

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The activity of the intellect is twofold. Through the essential way of understanding (called intellectus essentialis or primus) an object is grasped as it is in its own right, leaving aside its individuating conditions. Notice the influence of what we have earlier indicated as ‘the parallelism postulate’ on this score: the intellection is itself called essential because it grasps the object’s quiddity. The accidental, secondary, or relational way of understanding considers the object in question according to the logical relationships it has to other instances of the same quiddity. The designations ‘secondary’ and ‘relational’ are clear enough, but the label ‘accidental’ should not mislead us into thinking that the object’s own extramental, ontic accidents are involved; it rather refers to the incidental circumstance occurring to the object qua cognized. It is true, the basic parallelism postulate entails the firm conviction that the logical appurtenances in question (universality, in particular) are regarded as nicely corresponding to the object’s ontic features. The essential way of intellection produces first intentions, the accidental way second intentions (5.1). Viewed from this angle, both the primary intellection (first intention) and the secondary intellection (second intention) are intellectual tools which as such exclusively focus upon the object’s quiddity and the logical features conducted by the quiddity’s universality. In its capacity of cognitional tool, an intention can also be considered in its own right, which in this case might mean that the intention is taken as just a mental entity residing in the soul as its habitus, taken apart from its being significative (its intentionality in the strict sense); this consideration is also called ‘abstractive’ by Faversham, and bears, he says, on the intention’s own mode of being (pro esse intentionis). Its counterpart, the concretive consideration focusses upon the (quidditative) mode of being the intention possesses in its supposita (pro esse quod habet in suppositis). (5.1) It remains in the dark, though, if by the phrase esse intentionis Faversham understands only the mode of being qua merely mental entity, devoid of intentionality, or if intentionality is included in the abstractive consideration, and only the (universal) intention’s applicability to concrete instances is left out of consideration. In the latter case, the difference from the previous ‘abstract vs. concrete’ consideration is questionable. At any rate, when Faversham goes on to describe the notion ‘universal (intention)’, he uses the ‘abstract vs. concrete’ distinction in a way that seems to support the latter interpretation. Every universal (or universal intention) is said to signify both the feature of universality and the thing underlying the intention (res subiecta

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intentioni). Once again the aforesaid distinction is applied by Faversham claiming that to consider the universal intention merely according to its universality comes to taking it abstractively, whereas to focus on the thing underlying the intention equals taking it concretively (5.1– 5.2). A first intention, then, is a primary intellection of an extramental thing, by which the soul apprehends it according to its quidditative nature and properties, e.g. when a human being is grasped qua man, or animal, or rational, and the like. A second intention is the secondary intellection of the object in question, by which the soul apprehends it according to its being a genus or species, or its acting as a definition or definitum, or as a subject or a predicate, or its functioning as complex intention in sentence-making or discursive thought (5.1; 5.3; 5.5.2). As far as the representativeness of the cognitional tools and devices annex the reliability of our cognition is concerned, the thesis of its reliability is, in the context of the parallelism postulate, underpinned in several ways. First and foremost by, in the wake of Aristotle, upholding the semantic equivalence of the phrases ‘intellect-in-its-actual-state-ofintellecting’ and ‘what-is-actually-intellected’. Furthermore, by picturing the teamwork of the active and the passive intellect in adapting and applying the sensorial data (5.5.1–5.5.2). In addition, by the claim that, although second intentions are as such mind-dependent, they are ultimately founded upon real properties present in the extramental things. In producing second intentions the intellect is indeed moved by what is called the object’s ‘appearances’ (apparentia in re). In this line of thought it is clear that the intentions’ commonness or universality (i.e. universal logical applicability) is discovered by the intellect in the phantasms which are brought about by the sensorial cognition of the extramental object (5.4.2; 5.5.3). Finally, all three mental operations (simple apprehension, judgement or sentence-making, and discourse) fall within the scope of the notion of second intention. In this context, Faversham is particularly interested in the role of the second operation of the intellect because of its function in acquiring truth and genuine knowledge (5.3; 5.5.2). 9.2.2. Radulphus Brito Roughly speaking, Radulphus Brito’s contribution to the intentionality debate consists in applying (Modistic) notional and doctrinal refinements to the discussion of the intentionality problem.

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When taken as a psychic or mental5 entity residing in the soul, an intention (like any other concept), is a disposition or habitus of the soul (intellect), and is as such a real (albeit not extramental) thing which belongs to the category of Quality or to Passion. Its purely mental state is opposed to its being significative. However, its real mode of being is qua esse debile only a minor variant of ‘being real’ (6.5.3; 6.6.1). In the wake of Simon Faversham, intention is defined as an intellection (cognitio intellectus, intellectio) of something existing in the outside world. It is an intentional entity, i.e. something through which the intellect directs itself towards something else (intellectus tendit in rem). There are two kinds of intellection, the primary one, by which the object is cognized in its own right, and the secondary one, by which the object in question is cognized in its (subjective) parts or supposita, including their mutual logical relationships (6.1; 6.3; 6.4.3; 6.5.1; 6.6.2[b]-[c]). Again, in the wake of Faversham (notice the ‘homo’ example), a first intention is defined as a primary intellection, whereas a secondary intellection equals a second intention (6.1; 6.4.3; 6.5.1). A primary intellection, by which a thing is cognized on the basis of its proper phantasm (ex proprio suo fantasmate), is a first intention in abstracto, whereas the object thus intellected is a first intention in concreto (6.2.2; 6.3; 6.5.1). The intelligible species is identified with the intellection act (actus intelligendi). There are two, successive acts of intellection. After the first one the soul (the passive intellect, that is) is no longer in a purely potential state, and habitually retains the intelligible species, and is thus disposed to a second act of intellection. This does not force us, however, to separate the intelligible species from the act of intellection (6.2.4). The notion ‘being intellected’ too is given due attention. The twofold being intellected involved in the two kinds of intellection that produce first and second intentions, equally falls to objects and intentions. Through a primary intellection, the object or the intention, respectively, are conceived according to their quidditative being sec, whereas the secondary intellection conceives the object or the intention according to the logical relationships they have to similar objects or intentions, respectively, in which the quiddity in question is instanced (6.6.2[c]). A similar statement is found elsewhere, this time in the broader context of the twofold mode of being (duplex esse) falling equally to extramental things (entia realia) and rationate beings (entia rationis), to wit, an essential one outside 5 Older authors such as e.g. Albert the Great) used to speak of ‘spiritual’ entities; see section 2.4 above.

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the mind, and an essential one in the mind. According to the former, the extramental object’s quidditative being is examined, whereas the accidental consideration takes it in its capacity of being intellected qua abstracted from its supposita. Now in a similar fashion, this twofold mode of being (duplex esse) falls to rationate beings (entia rationis). The essential consideration takes them in their capacity of being primarily intellected (which is indeed their essential mode of being), whereas after the accidental consideration, they are taken according to their logical interrelationships of, say, being a genus or species (6.4.1; 6.5.1; 6.5.3; 6.6.2[c]). Thirdly, as far as the logical relationships between intentions such as a genus and its species are concened, once more two kinds of being intellected (esse intellectum or esse secundum intellectum) are distinguished, one essential, the other accidental. For example, taking the intention, animal on the generic level, the supervenience of the intentions, rationale or irrationale is merely accidental, in spite of the essential difference between the intentions, animal rationale (man) and animal irrationale (say, horse) (6.6.2[a],[b],[c]). In the final analysis, any intention is a mode of being of an object, that is to say, an intention like man, animal, stone, which is produced by simple apprehension, conveys the states (modes of being), being-aman, being-an-animal, being-a-stone, rather than just the concepual contents man, animal, stone. In this line of thought, intentional being, properly speaking, is to be regarded not as a mode of being falling to intentions, but rather as the intentions’ very nature. Intentions do not, as it were, have intentional being, but are themselves intentional beings, to wit, intentional states falling to extramental objects as soon as they are involved in intellectual (or sensorial, at that) cognition (6.6.2[d]). The foregoing observation would imply that whenever people like Radulphus take an intention for res subiecta intentioni or res intellecta, this should concern the thing qua intellected, rather than the extramental thing in its own right (ibid.). In line with the Modistic tradition, Radulphus also recognizes complex intentions produced by the intellect’s second or third operation. Complex intentions, such as that-a-man-is-running, as conveyed by the sentence ‘A man is running’, are abstract first intentions in so far as they are primarily intellected as a combination of a subject and a predicate, whereas the corresponding complex object, i.e. the (asserted) state of affairs, thus cognized is a concrete first intention. The same holds for the other propositional attitudes (asking, doubting, wishing etc.). (6.3; 6.5.1–6.5.3; 6.6.1–6.6.2).

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As for the notion of ‘universal’ or ‘universal intention’, the noun ‘universal’ is used ambivalently by Radulphus. For starters, the word ‘universal’ can either concretively mean the thing underlying an intention (res subiecta intentioni), or stand for the concrete second intention in question absolutely, i.e. the very property of universal applicability (6.4.1–6.4.2; 6.4.5). A universal (quiddity) in abstracto or universality concerns the cognition of an object as it is suited to be in a plurality of instances or supposita, whereas a universal (quiddity) in concreto is the quiddity being intellected as it is actually instanced (6.3; 6.4.3). Grammatically speaking, a universal is a common noun conveying a concrete universal intention, or, saying it otherwise, the common noun’s material significate or the object’s concrete quiddity. It is as such not minddependent; even if the noun is used for a concrete second intention, then, speaking from the material viewpoint, it is not mind-dependent either, because it refers to an extramental object in so far as it is secondarily intellected (6.3; 6.4.2–6.4.5). Thus ‘universal’ sometimes stands for a quiddity as mind-independently inhering in the extramental object, and sometimes for the universal applicability assigned to it by the intellect. In so far as universal intentions are certain intellections in concreto, they are said of their objects denominatively, in which case the denomination is based upon the object’s being in the intellect (6.3; 6.4.4– 6.4.5; 6.5.1; 6.6.1). Remarkably, Radulphus does not use the expression ‘objective being’ to indicate the object’s mode of being in the intellect. The issue of the representativeness and reliability of cognition is also prominently found in Radulphus. To begin with, the positions of sensation and intellection are clearly assessed. Singular objects are cognized by the senses directly (recto aspectu), and by the intellect indirectly (secundum lineam circumflexam) via the phantasms which belong to the domain of the singulars (6.2.3). Furthermore, there is the well-known Aristotelian adage ‘What intellects and what is intellected are the same thing’, which to Radulphus means that what is intellected is as such the object’s quiddity set free from its material conditions. Accordingly, the extramental object’s quiddity is cognized qua intellected (6.2.2). The ‘qua intellected’ qualification guarantees that there is genuine knowledge, whereas the intellection being a grasp of the quiddity by the active intellect from the sensorial phantasm secures the real impact. The outside object indeed has a mode of being that corresponds to that of the universal intellection-intention as viewed as the common noun’s material significate, to wit, being in a plurality of instances, whereas

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considered from the part of the formal significate, a universal is said to be something caused by the active intellect in cooperation with the phantasm (6.4.2–6.4.5). The causation issue concerning an object’s intellective being is bound to play a key role in the reliability question. One should not bluntly claim (with Averroes) that it is the intellect that causes our concepts (including second intentions); instead, concepts, and cognition in general, are caused by the intellect out of the thing (ex re) or on the basis of its proper phantasm (ex proprio suo fantasmate), that is to say, with the thing as their ultimate cause (6.2.2; 6.2.5; 6.4.3; 6.5.1–6.5.3). Second intentions come into being, Radulphus assumes (credo), by a twofold cause; first, the outside thing taken after its common mode of being which is potentially present in the phantasm, and second, the active intellect (whereas the passive intellect only acts as the recipient of the abstractum). Any second intention presupposes a preceding first intention, but without there being a causal relationship between these two (6.5.2). In this context, the ambivalent meaning of ‘universal’ is momentous. The universal (quiddity) that occurs in a plurality of things, is a potential universal, something that universal applicability can be assigned to, but to Radulphus and others, it is still an extramental, mind-independent entity. The actual universal, on the other hand, is the object intellected qua one in many, and this consideration, he agrees, depends on the intellect (6.3). Clearly, Radulphus’s discussion of universality focusses on the mind-independence (and hence the reliability) of the quiddity’s universality. He is (with the great majority of Medieval thinkers, at that) of the opinion that an object’s being in a plurality of supposita is a property falling to it like being a man or a stone, or being white or black, all of which are mind-independent properties. But this is all wrong, most moderns would object, because an object, say, a stone is by itself white or hard etc., but that there are many other stones is not a ‘property’ of a stone. It is on account of our intellect’s comparing and counting things that the concept of stone applies to a plurality of things. Radulphus’s additional argument to the effect that a quiddity’s real occurrence in a plurality of instances is based on number and plurality, which are sensorially cognized, and in this respect independent of the intellect, falls short because of an optical error: unlike whiteness and blackness, number and plurality are mind-dependent features. In addition, in contradistinguishing potential to actual universality—as is done by all these thinkers in the wake of Thomas Aquinas (except

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for Girald Odonis)—one should have realized that a potential universal is not a universal, no more than an egg is a chicken. It is true, assigning universality or number and plurality happens, using the welknown Medieval device, cum fundamento in re, but the parallelism postulate is itself a bad adviser for determining how this device should be explained. Finally, the problem of the applicability of rationate being to the real world is in order when the proper subject of logic is under examination. Concrete second intentions are said to be the proper subject of logic, not, of course, in so far as they are mental entities residing in the soul as its dispositions, but qua likenesses, which, by definition, are significative and refer to something else. As intentional beings they possess a minor degree of reality (entia debilia) than extramental things (6.5.3; 6.6.1). 9.2.3. Hervaeus Natalis Prior to the usual definitions of first and second intention, Hervaeus lays great emphasis on distinguishing between two angles from which intentions can be examined. Viewed from the first one, an intention is something leading the intellect by way of representation to the cognition of something, no matter if this an intelligible species, or an act of the intellect, or a concept. Along this line ‘intention’ is defined from the viewpoint of the cognizer (ex parte ipsius intelligentis). The other angle, which is the usual one, is from the part of the thing intellected (ex parte rei intellecte). Along this line, an intention is the object that is intellected in so far as the intellect tends towards this thing as something cognized through the intellective act or intellection. Now when an intention is taken as object intellected, the opposition ‘abstract vs. concrete’ comes into the picture. Taken formally and abstractively, an intention concerns the end of the intellect’s tendency towards the object or the termination as such, to wit, intentionality by itself, which is a relationship between the object intellected and the intellective act, whereas from the concrete and material point of view, an intention is that which is intellected, whatever this thing may be. Thus the basic distinction concerning intentionality is that between abstract vs. concrete (which concerns the opposition between intentionality as such and the intentions’ content), rather than the division into first and second intention. Intentionality is a rationate relationship (relatio rationis) and as such a rationate being (ens rationis). The intention’s content (whether of a first or second concrete intention) can be a real,

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extramental being or merely an intentional being. Being an intention (intentionality) is a feature that supervenes the object intellected qua intellected. Like real, extramental being, intentional being is twofold, viz. either essential or denominative. Its essential mode is what falls to the intention by itself, whereas its denominative mode is what falls to the intention’s content or that which underlies the intention (res subiecta intentioni). Being intellected or being in the intellect occurs in a twofold way, either subjectively or objectively. That which is in the intellect as in its substrate (e.g. a species, or an intellection, or a piece of knowledge) is in it subjectively and, accordingly, has subjective being. Its counterpart, objective being is twofold: anything cognized by the intellect is in it objectively as its cognitive content, and, in a similar fashion, anything that follows something that is objectively present in the intellect, also possesses itself an objective mode of being. In other words, as far as concrete intentions (or intentional contents) are concerned, being an intention or being intellected or being in the intellect comes down to possessing objective being or being objectively in the mind. Hervaeus rejects the definitorial reduction of first and second intention to first (or primary) and second (or secondary) intellection, respectively as argued for by Faversham and Radulphus Brito and prefers to reduce the distinction ‘first vs. second intention’ to the parallel opposition between the two kinds of intelligibles (duo genera intelligibilium), to wit, intelligibles having real being (esse reale), and those possessing rationate being (esse rationis). A first intention is qua intention neither universal nor particular. An abstract first intention is qua intentionality the relationship between an object intellected and the intellect or an intellection, whereas a concrete first intention is anything that signifies an extramental thing. The intelligible species is among concrete first intentions. Privations and negations of things that possess real being, pertain to the domain of first intention, as is also the case with fictions, since they do not indicate rationate being. A second intention—which is a kind of rationate being, but definitely does not coincide with it6—is anything that signifies a thing that belongs 6 See e.g. Dist. V, q. 2c medio (quoted in section 7.3.7), where Hervaeus asks if there is a discipline other than logic dealing with “(de) ente rationis quod vocamus ‘secundam intentionem’” as its primary subject. Some lines further he opposes ens rationis in communi to determinatum ens rationis.

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to the second kind of intelligibles. Formally speaking, a concrete second intention does not refer to any extramental thing, but does differ from what is called ‘absolutely nothing’ (omnino nichil). Second intentions presuppose some real entity, either from the part of the intellect (viz. a real intellection), or from the part of the object intellected, viz. the real property of being universal which fall to extramental things as they are by themselves. No second intention falls to a thing in virtue of its own quidditative nature as it exists in the extramental world; being abstracted or being universal do not fall to things in virtue of their own nature, but owing to the operation of the intellect. The intentionality issue ranges over all three operations of the intellect, each time in a twofold way. As far as simple apprehension is concerned, diverse ontic aspects of the object can be focussed upon, which results into either first or second intentions, as either the objects themselves or their intentional relationships are considered. The same holds for sentence-making and discursive thinking. The nucleus of Hervaeus’s doctrine of intentionality is the convolution of interconnections (habitudines) the diverse cognitional tools and devices have, both mutually and with respect to the intellect or the diverse intellections. From the outset, this web of interrelations has been considered a superfluous sophistication7 and hence criticized by other intentionalists—amiably by Hervaeus’s admirers, sharply by his opponents—as the system’s weak spot. Apparently, the recognition of this convolution, including multifarious intentionality, being intellected etc., in particular,8 serves for picturing the ultimate foundation of second intentions through first intentions upon extramental reality. And this strategem is intended to ascertain the representativeness and reliability of the cognitive processes. The assessment of logic, too should be understood in the context of Hervaeus’s doctrinal positions. To him, logic only concerns the kind of rationate being (ens rationis) that falls to things in so far as they are 7 It might be said that Aquinas’s clear (real) distinction between the diverse cognitional tools and devices (see sections 4.1.1–4.1.2) is at the basis of Hervaeus’s network of habitudines, but this convolution itself remains of Hervaeus’s own invention. 8 See sections 7.1.2; 7.2.5–7.2.6; 7.3.1; 7.3.2 (esp. the text quoted there); 7.3.3; 7.3.5, in which the subtle question concerning the multiple order between second intentions is dealt with; cf. 7.4, B5 and 14–15; D7 and 9. A rather complex case is found in section 7.2.5 (see 7.4, D7), where it is said that the relationship between the object intellected and the intellect neither is determinately a first intention nor determinately a second intention, but something in between, common to these two.

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naturally suited to be an object of intellective apprehension—and this kind of rationate being only in so far as considering it is useful for acquiring the general modus procedendi common to any discipline active in the pursuit of Reality. 9.2.4. Giraldus Odonis Giraldus Odonis was mainly interested in matters of referentiality and the cognate questions concerning the reliability issue. Unlike Hervaeus Natalis, who used all his ingenuity to fill up the (putative) gap between the mind and the things with a host of subtle elements, Girald’s main concern was how to make sure that our speaking about extramental reality is effective enough to arrive at the nature of the things themselves, without being confused by the intellect acting in between us and the extramental things. His peculiar position culminates in his obstinatedly defended view of the real status of certain second intentions, universality, in particular. In describing the nature of intention, and intellective activity in general, Girald always lays emphasis on the pivotal role of objective being. It is through the transfer of the objective semantic content of the nonreal (i.e. intentional, diminutive) being—being apprehended, being intellected, being cognized—to objects subject to intellection that cognition proceeds and genuine knowledge is acquired. An intention, accordingly, is whatever by its formal being bestows some diminutive being (hence called ‘intentional being’) upon something else. In a similar fashion, whatever is representative or significative of something else, though what is called an objective transfer, bestows upon its object being represented (esse representatum) or being signified (esse significatum), which equally are a kind of diminutive being, as we are taught in the very opening (programmatic, as it were) chapters of De intentionibus (capp. 3–4). In this line of thought, Girald claims (against Hervaeus; see ibid., cap. 7) that intellections, and intelligible species as well as the related intentions are true realities (vere realitates). It is from this angle that, against all his colleagues (he proudly says himself), Girald combats the common view that each and every second intention depends on an act of the intellect.9 Ultimately, the entire controversy between Girald and the others (including fundamentally kindred spirits such as a Radulphus or a

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Hervaeus) hinges on Girald’s peculiar view of the representativeness of objective being, and his failing to understand that the existence of formal differences is, by definition, thoroughly due to the intellect’s activity. He fails to realize that any talk of universality and the like has its origin in logical operations, and ultimately goes back to the fact that the human mind is naturally forced to deal with extramental reality by crumbling it, so to speak. 9.3. The cum fundamento in re issue The Aristotelian adage (De anima III 6, 430a3–4) ‘What intellects and what is intellected is the same thing’10 is commonly adopted by the Medieval thinkers, and explained in terms of the outside object being the proper object of cognition, rather than the intermediary species; or to express their adherence to the adage otherwise, they uphold the formal identity between the cognizer and the object cognized.11 This does not come to denying, however, the role of the species. It is almost common doctrine that the cognition of an object should be interpreted in terms of the species being the representative of the outside thing; formally speaking, the species indeed acts, so to speak, on behalf of the extramental thing and as its substitute, fully empowered qua equally ‘informed’ (i.e. endowed with the intentional forma of the object) and, therefore, formally (i.e. with reference to the formal requirements of the cognitive process) the same entity as the outside object.12 10

Notice that it is developed by Aristotle in connection with his tabula rasa idea. In the words of Aquinas (STh. I, q. 85, art. 2 ad 1um): “(…) dicendum quod intellectum [‘what is intellected’] est in intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus, sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu”. For cognition as ‘informatio’ (= ‘bestowing a form’) see p. 58, n. 28; 60, n. 36; and sections 6.5.1; 6.6.2[b], where intentio is defined as informatio intellectus. See also the next note. 12 See for the assessment of Aquinas’s position on this score (his ‘representationalism’) sections 2.3; 4.1.3. Also STh I, q. 87, art. 1 ad 3um (where the soul’s self-knowledge is discussed): “(…) verbum illud Philosophi universaliter verum est in omni intellectu [‘in more than one sense’]. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile propter similitudinem sensibilis quae est forma sensus in actu, ita intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu propter similitudinem rei intellectae quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo intellectus humanus qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per eandem speciem intelligitur sicut per formam suam. Idem autem est dicere quod in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, as si diceretur quod in his quae sunt intellecta 11

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As we have often observed before (see our section 2.7 in particular), the fourteenth-century debate on intentionality can adequately be pictured from the angle of the role played by what we may call ‘the fundamentum in re topic’, rather than by measuring its progression by modern developments as found in, say, Brentano and Frege. The decisive factor figuring in the backgound was the optimistic (Ancient and) Medieval epistemological view that the so-called ‘diminutive’ being (ens diminutum) the Medievals unanimously assigned to the mental ingredients of the process of cognition—species (if any), phantasms, forms, intentions, and the like,—was indeed a minus variant of the complete being of the real things, but, at the same time, not only adequate enough to cause reliable knowledge of extramental reality, but even, qua being immaterial, the indispensable tool for acquiring intellectual cognition. The background of the aforesaid optimistic epistemological view concerning the representativeness if diminutive being was the parallelism postulate holding that man’s cognitive faculties are appropriately ordered towards the quidditative natures of the outside things.13 This postulate was the core of the cum fundamento in re idea. Now the diverse developments of the intentionality debate can be properly measured by examining how the fundamentum in re idea was actually implemented by the different authors, because this is where as early as in the first decades of the fourteenth century the scholars took different ways. A Giraldus Odonis took the aforesaid questions about the reliability of our cognition utmost seriously and came to assume a remarkable amount of correspondence between thinking and Reality, which made him, for example, assign a real, that is, mind-independent, status to universals and some other logical tools and devices.14 Others, on the other in actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur; per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu quod est sine materia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia quorundam essentiae sunt sine materia, sicut substantiae separatae quas angelos dicimus, quarum unaquaeque et est intellecta et est intelligens, sed quaedam res sunt quarum essentiae non sunt sine materia, sed solum similitudines ab eis abstractae”. In STh I, q. 55, art. 1 ad 2um, the process is explained: “(…) sicut sensus in actu est sensibile in actu (ut dicitur in III De anima [8, 431b20–28])—non ita quod ipsa vis sensitiva sit ipsa similitudo sensibilis quae est in sensu, sed quia ex utroque fit unum sicut ex actu et potentia—, ita et intellectus in actu dicitur esse intellectum in actu, non quod substantia intellectus sit ipsa similitudo per quam intelligit, sed quia illa similitudo est forma eius”.—For Aquinas’s general view of the matter see sections 2.1–2.4 (esp. 2.2.3 ad fin., where his influential position in the universalia issue is luce clarius), and 2.6. 13 See sections 1.1; 1.2; 6.6.2[b]; 9.1; 9.2.1–9.2.2. 14 Although Girald himself asserts that on account of the mind-independent status of universals etc., he takes a lonely stand, some of his remarkable arguments are also found

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hand, such as Peter Auriol and William of Ockham, maintained the basic idea expressed by the parallelism postulate, but imposed restraints on its range. They not only rejected any reification of mental tools, but even considered distinctions made by others between the several cognitional devices and the sense or intellect-in-action misleading. To their mind, with regard to any actual intellection process—and others than actual ones do not exist—to talk about the res intellecta as it is apart from its being intellected makes no sense, because the res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi is completely identical with the intellect by which it is actually intellected. Hence the usual discussion about intricate relationships between the (putative) diverse ingredients of the cognitive process makes no sense either. The multitude of thinkers, theologians as well as philosophers, including such influential thinkers like Radulphus Brito and Hervaeus Natalis, can be positioned in between these extremes. All of them (but in various ways) regarded the roles of the different mental tools as significant enough to justify thorough investigations concerning their exact natures and mutual relationships. All things considered, they all roughly stuck to the basic ideas profferred by Aquinas on account of the representativeness and reliability of our thinking about Reality.15 Let us now consider some stages of this doctrinal development. 9.3.1. Henry of Ghent Henry of Ghent claims (see our section 4.2.7 above) that intentions are not found in the real world, but do have a significative function in the intellect’s actual consideration. What he means to say is that, for example, universality only falls to the object when, owing to something representative of it, this object has obtained intentional, objective being in the intellect. When the intellect thus considers something what is really one as intentionally two (unum in re ut duo in intentione), the intentional

in earlier expositions of the subject matter or refutations of anonymous positions ‘to the contrary’ (in contrarium, videtur quod …). For the rest, on many subjects Girald’s ideas are not traditional. He has been called not only an extreme realist, but also an atomist, and a semi-Pelagian, and he develops an unusual theory of time and heavily stresses the self-determination of the human free will. See Schabel (2004), 14, who has good reason to assume that further investigation of the Sentences commentary will reinforce the impression that Girald was a bold and independent thinker. 15 The same holds for scholars like Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus (see sections 4.2.7–4.2.8; 9.3.1), Ascoli and Alnwick (our section 3.3), William of Ware and James of Metz (sections 4.2.3–4.2.4), and other authors of the older generation.

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duality is not fictitious, though, because the intentional differences are founded upon the object’s nature as it were in its roots (quasi in radice), in which (nature) the dual intention resides to be extracted from it by the intellect in the shape of rationate and intellectual things (tamquam res rationis et intellectus).16 In this fashion, it seems, Henry adheres to the common view of the potential universality as belonging to an outside object as a real property. We will recall (our section 9.3.4 below) the way in which Hervaeus Natalis countered Henry’s view of the matter. 9.3.2. Simon of Faversham Faversham finds himself in the common main stream on account of the intentionality issue (see our sections 5.1–5.5). According to his doctrine of the intelligible species, our attaining the truth about Reality is warranted by the very nature of the process of cognition, in which the universal form inhering in the object intellected coincides with the universal form present in the intellect ‘informed’ as it is through grasping the object. When, with regard to the fundamentum in re issue, he discusses the question how the universal in intellectu relates to the universal in re, Faversham claims that the commonness or universality of the intention man is present in the phantasms, Socrates and Plato and that our intellect recognizes the common predicability of that intention in these phantasms and then goes on to abstract the universal from them. By the same token he recognizes the natural link between thought and Reality by observing the commonness (universality) of the intention of, say, man as nicely corresponding to the (potential) universality residing in the phantasm which is a trustworthy representative of the outside particular. 9.3.3. Radulphus Brito Radulphus too clearly adheres to the parallelism postulate and the Aristotelian adage about the formal identity of thought and thing (see our section 6.2.2). Commenting on De anima III 6, he claims that when Aristotle says that what thinks and what is thought are the same thing, he means to say that what thinks and the object thought are identical with regard to the formal aspect under which the object is grasped 16 Summa, art. 68, q. 5, Fol. 230a ad fin.: “(…) licet alietas idearum non accipiatur per intellectum, etiam divinum, nisi in ordine ad alietatem essentie creature”; for the context see sections 3.1 and 3.4.4.

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(quantum ad rationem formalem secundum quam res intelligitur). Therefore one should express, Radulphus explains, what is meant by the De anima passage more adequately by saying that what is thought is by itself the object’s quiddity as such, to which it happens to be signified, and set free from its material conditions. It is the extramental object’s quiddity that is grasped, not in its extramental mode of being, but according the intentional being it has in the soul. However, this intentional being still acts as the representative of the outside object, which is indeed that which (id quod) is intellected, whereas the intentional object is that in whose shape (id sub quo) the outside object is known. In his Quaestiones in I De anima, q. 6 (see our Appendix E, item IV), Radulphus argues (cap. 24; see also capp. 11; 14; 18) for the common position to the effect that the universal as taken to stand for the object’s quiddity is by itself mindindependent.17 9.3.4. Hervaeus Natalis As we have seen earlier (our section 3.44), Hervaeus in De quattuor materiis combats Henry of Ghent’s position concerning the nature of universal being by claiming that, although in its extramental being a thing is not universal, yet universality falls to a thing owing to something real residing in its real being, something, that is, which is naturally suited to move the intellect, with the result that in this way the object represents itself and appears before the intellect. In the same work, Hervaeus underpins his views of the matter by accurately analyzing the relationships between being (universal and particular, and non-being as well) and the intellect (our section 3.4.5). In De secundis intentionibus, the diverse relationships (habitudines) are in the focus of Hervaeus’s attention, which leads to a true convolution of interconnections the diverse cognitional tools and devices possess, both mutually and with respect to the intellect. In doing so Hervaeus appears to have gone too far, because his attempt to present a more convincing underpinning of the representative annex reliability thesis could only result in an entanglement of interconnections between the agents and patients of the process of cognition which even to his admirers could not disguise its incoherences and shortcomings.

17

Cf. Qq. In artem veterem, In Isag., q. 4, cap. 17.

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9.3.5. Giraldus Odonis Giraldus Odonis is fully and proudly aware of his isolated position on account of the reliability thesis and the parallelism postulate. He takes a much greater correspondence between thing and thinking for granted than his contemporaries did, and even assigns a real, mindindependent status to the universal and some other second intentions. With Girald, we find no trace of the idea of the merely potential state the universal is supposed to have in things, which should be clearly opposed to the state of the entirely mind-dependent actual universal. It may be helpful to screen the foregoing positions (which, at least as far as thinkers such as Faversham, Brito and Hervaeus are concerned, are substantially convergent) by facing them with the alternative, conceptualist position held by Peter Auriol. To give this some more profile, the purport of Girald’s controversy with Hervaeus—which was embroidered by Girald himself as a matter of high importance—deserves some more attention. Did Girald make a real point against Hervaeus? I am afraid, not. In the controversy ‘conceptualism vs. realism’ Girald and Hervaeus undoubtedly find themselves on the same side, rejecting any kind of conceptualism such as found with Auriol or Ockham. So given the fact that Girald claims that his own view of the controversial issue (‘real foundation of some second intentions upon Reality’) is not shared by others, the decisive question should be: What is, in Girald’s mind, the pivotal difference between himself and the others, particularly the target of his continuous, stinging criticism, Hervaeus? To get a firm grip of the matter, the meaning of two phrases should be well kept apart: [a] ‘things being not the same’ (or ‘being distinct’) and [b] ‘things being actually distinguished’. [a] can be taken as mindindependent indeed, whereas [b] definitely cannot. In other words, [a] concerns an ontological difference between things (supposedly) existing in the extramental world, while [b] implies an act of distinguishing things by the intellect. Now all Medieval interpreters (including people such as Auriol and Ockham) assume that there is some fundamentum in re which justifies our making distinctions when analyzing real states of affairs. The thing is, however, to determine the mind’s precise role in this process. The contradistinction ‘formal vs. material’ plays the key role here. Compare our thinking about the counterpart of distinctness, ‘sameness’. For example, Socrates’s being human is denotatively (‘extensionally’ or ‘materially’) identical with his being an animal, but, even so,

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these two are formally different. Our intellect is, e.g. for the benefit of a discussion of the difference between manhood and animality, capable of separating these two, although in reality they are not two distinct things; quite the contrary, indeed, for in re Socrates’s animality is part of his manhood. Hervaeus and his contemporaries turn out to have been fully aware that [a] making distinctions is the intellect’s business, and that true distinctions are made cum fundamento in re, but that [b] the distincta need not as such be separate things in reality. Again, a meaningful conceptual construct (such as the use of the notion of ‘universal’) need not be based upon a similar configuration in the real world. Our conceptual framework is not as such a blueprint of Reality. Taking a controversial issue of Girald’s discussion with Hervaeus,18 the distinction between Essence and Attributes in the Divine Nature is a matter of (theologically fruitful) human thinking, in reality God is absolutely simple. To Girald’s opponents, the same goes for second intentions. For example, that animal (animality) is predicable of man (manhood) is a property assignable to the extramental things in question, but it owes its occurrence exclusively to an intellectual activity; predicability or assignability only figure in an intellectual game. Throughout the Middle Ages, most logicians (including the realists) have claimed that it is our concepts of things that are predicated, not the things themselves (res de re non predicatur). Without the intellect (omni operatione intellectus circumscripta), ‘being predicable’ is a meaningless expression. Of course, they are all confident that true predication happens cum fundamento in re. In the broader context of the aforesaid controversy about the impact of the cum fundamento in re issue, the realist Hervaeus is, I think, less naïve than the realist Gerald. Hervaeus has a better understanding than Girald of the causal function of intellectual acts, and their indispensability. 9.3.6. An alternative, conceptualist position. Peter Auriol By reflecting more deeply the problems surrounding the representativeness thesis, and going further into the purport of the parallelism postulate, people like Auriol and Ockham and their likes (to my mind, most fortunately) came to their conceptualism (in my view, Auriol more ele-

18

See Girald’s De intentionibus, capp. 406–429.

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gantly than Ockham). The conceptualists were all more open-minded vis-à-vis the problems surrounding the cum fundamento in re issue than the realists. Take for instance, their (various!) views of the ‘reality’ to be ascribed to the Aristotelian categories (particularly, the status of Relation: ‘no relation exists actually in extramental reality; it rather is a conceptual category’).19 Let me preliminarily remark that, properly speaking, Auriol’s position is beyond the scope of the present study, substantially ignored as he is by his fellow Franciscan brother, Girald Odonis.20 However, as Girald’s doctrinal antipode, Peter deserves our attention. Auriol (who was probably born about 1280) taught at Bologna and at the Franciscan Studium of Toulouse,21 and was sent to Paris to read the Sentences as part of the requirements for attaining the master’s degree. He stayed at Paris, serving as regent master until 1320 or 1321, when he was appointed by Pope John XXII to the Archbishopric of Aix-enProvence, where he died as early as in the beginnings of 1322.22 Far from being just a forerunner of his slightly younger contemporary Ockham, Auriol emerges from recent studies as an extremely 19

See (among others) Crathorn, In I Sent., q. XVIII (“Utrum relatio sit distincta res a fundamento”), pp. 471–477 ed. Hoffmann (cf. the editor’s Einführung, pp. 57–59). For Peter Auriol, no relation actually exists in extramental reality; relation, rather, is a conceptual category, i.e. relation comes about through an intellective act, namely when something that does not have the nature of a relation is conceived of as really having that nature. See Friedman (1999a), 23, who nicely pictures Auriol’s marginalization strategy apropos the reification of what is merely a (meaningful) mental construct. See also Friedman’s study (1999) on Auriol’s view of first intentions and essential predication (‘appellation’). See also Brown (1995); Tachau (1999), Panaccio (1999a), 198 f. and Nielsen (2002). 20 At cap. 217, Girald (or the revisor?) briefly mentions some people’s conceptualist position, and leaves it at that (“Ecce igitur breviter dicta super hoc”). This chapter is missing in the Sentences version, and its insertion as a sixth question disturbs the enumeration of the dubia as found in the Sentences version. It should be noted, however, that in his discussion of other people’s opinions about the principle of individuation (in In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 4), Girald extensively deals with Auriol’s theory of conceptualization. 21 Peter was—together with Girald Odonis, for that matter—among the signatories of a Toulouse document dating from February, 1316; see p. 1 above. Given the date of Peter’s extensive Scriptum super primum Sententiarum (1316) and the probable date of the original Sentences version of Odonis’s De intentionibus (between 1316 and 1320; see p. 9 f. above) as well as their being acquaintances as fellow brethren (they at least were together in the Franciscan Studium of Toulouse in 1316), Girald’s silence about Peter’s commentary is hardly imaginable. On the other hand, Schabel (2002, 353–355) has good reason to argue for some positive influence of Auriol on Odonis in matters of the futura contingentia issue. 22 Friedman (2002), 82 f.

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important and innovative thinker in his own right, with an utmost fertile and acute mind, whose ideas were the focus of an immense amount of critical attention right into the Early Modern period.23 Auriol’s view of the representativeness of intellectual cognition should be assessed in his general philosophical attitude of marginalizing with much ingenuity the putative ontic relevance of conceptual constructs.24 To my mind, Auriol’s judicious evaluation of the parallelism postulate and his cautiously handling the fundamentum in re idea both testify to the effectivity of his marginalization strategy. In his Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, Auriol in plain words testifies25 to his abhorrence of Hervaeus’s sophisticated web of habitudines by rigorously arguing for the indistinctness of the thing conceived (res concepta) and its passive conception or intellection (sua passiva conceptio). This conception does not consist, he claims, in a relationship between the thing intellected and the intellect, but precedes it as its foundation.26 An 23 Tachau (1988), 85–112; Friedman (1999a), 23, (2000, 177–193), and (2002), 82, n. 113, and the litterature mentioned there. 24 Auriol’s philosophical attitude was in principle thoroughly Aristotelian. In his rejection of Plato’s metaphysics of Transcendent Forms, Aristotle applies (see particularly Physics I 4, 188a17–18) the principle of economy, which was the ancestor of ‘Ockham’s razor’; see de Rijk (2002) I, 534. As early as ca. 1300, Geoffrey of Fontaines argues for universality (‘communitas’) as a mere logical tool. See his Quodlbet VII, q. 5, pp. 33039–33114: “(…) est intelligendum quod ex hoc quod res non existunt nisi singulariter prout nomine proprio significantur, communiter autem sive secundum suam communitatem non existunt sed sic solum intelliguntur et sic etiam nomine communi generis vel speciei significantur, patet quomodo suppositum est idem vel non idem cum natura, quia non differt sicut conceptus communis et indeterminatus quantum ad aliquid ad essentiam pertinens (qualis est conceptus generis) et conceptus specialis et determinatus (qualis est conceptus speciei). Nec differt natura speciei et individui sicut nomen generis et speciei, quae significant unam et eandem rem aliter et aliter conceptam et intellectam quantum ad id quod ad ipsam essentiam pertinet, quia eiusdem rei significatae nomine singularis individui et communis vel speciei non sunt sic diversi conceptus intellectus, quia solum est eius unus conceptus et omnino determinatus, quantum ad id quod ad essentiam pertinet, qui significatur nomine individui et speciei; singulare enim materiale primo et per se et sub propria ratione conceptu intellectus non apprehenditur”. 25 See capp. 116–117 in Appendix F. 26 Cap. 116: “(…) Intentio est rei passiva conceptio cui miscetur indistinguibiliter res concepta. Sunt enim res concepta et sua passiva conceptio idem per omnimodam indistinctionem. (…) Que quidem conceptio non est relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum, ymo ipsam precedit sicut fundamentum relationem”. Of course, Auriol does not deny (the possibility of putting) such a relationship, but he nullifies it as epistemologically irrelevant. The fundamental role of the notion of presentialitas in Auriol’s view of intentionality is lucidly discussed in Biard (2001), who rightly takes the relationship between intention and ‘presence’ as the heart of Auriol’s position in matters of intentionality.

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intention, accordingly, is defined as the objective concept itself framed by the intellect, indiscriminately comprehending the passive conception and the thing conceived. Therefore an intention is just a concept, and a first intention is the same thing as a first order concept, as a second intention is merely a second order concept.27 In his Commentarium breve super Sententias, Auriol equally gives short shrift to the sophistications of his predecessors, Hervaeus in particular, by laying strong emphasis on the complete identity of intention and concept, and of concept and thing conceived of; he even speaks of an integral whole: Comm. Breve super I Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, art. 1: Hiis visis ponam istam conclusionem quod res concepta est formaliter et quidditative intentio. Nam intentio integratur ex re et suo concipi passive, quod quidem concipi est res a re concepta penitus indivisa.28

Next he points out that in conceiving of, say, a rose, by the same token I grasp it as universally applicable to all roses of the world. However, on other occasions, quite different intellections may occur to which no extramental object corresponds, and a rationate concept (conceptus rationis) is all there is. Generally speaking, unlike in the case of real things such as roses, in conceiving what is only a rationate being, there is no correspondence to real things: Ibid. [the opening lines seem to be corrupt in the extant manuscripts]: Secundo addo aliud notabile tale, quod cum quandoque intellectus concipit, per suam intellectionem sibi [i.e. ‘to this intellection’] non tantum correspondet concipi, sed res que est apta nata esse extra. Sicut quando concipio rosam, non tantum habeo concipi, sed habeo rosam simpliciter; et ideo omnes rose de mundo dicuntur concipi participatione illius rose simpliciter. Quandoque autem erit sic quod quando intellectioni non correspondet res que sit apta nata esse extra, sed tantum concipi. Certum enim est quod quando intellectus potest ad multas intellectiones assurgere quibus non correspondet res extra, sed tantum concipi, ille conceptus dicitur tantum conceptus rationis. Sic igitur quando concipio ens rationis tantum, tunc conceptui meo nichil correspondet nisi concipi; quando vero concipio ens extra animam (sicut rosam), tunc conceptui meo ultra concipi correspondet etiam res.

See ibid., cap. 117. I have used the preliminary redaction (which happily includes alternative manuscript readings) of In I Sent., dist. 23 compiled by Lauge O. Nielsen, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel, which they were kind enough to put at my disposal. The (suggested) text establishment is mine. 27 28

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Another remark is about the division of concepts into primary and secondary concepts, the latter of which are founded upon the primary ones. Both kinds are subdivided. Of each kind there are concepts to which, in addition to the bare fact of being conceived (concipi), corresponds a true thing that is naturally suited to be outside, besides concepts to which no thing corresponds, but only passive conception (concipi), meaning that an intellection develops in the intellect which is at once (by the same token, that is) followed by a passive conception, because, he adds, to intellect is to conceive, and conceiving entails being conceived. In the latter case there is only a conception without there being a thing conceived of: Ibid.: Tertium notabile pono. Et est quod eorum que concipiuntur quedam sunt primo concepta, quedam secundario, preexigentia ipsa prima in ratione fundamenti, ut sic conceptuum quidam sint primi, non innixi aliis conceptibus, quidam vero sint posteriores, aliis innixi. Et uterque illorum modorum subdividitur, quoniam quidam sunt conceptus—sive primi, aliis non innixi, sive secundarii, aliis innixi—quibus preter concipi correspondet vera res apta nata esse extra; quidam autem sunt quibus non correspondet res, sed tantum concipi, hoc modo quod in intellectu oritur intellectio et intellectionem statim sequitur concipi, quia intelligere est concipere, concipere autem infert concipi. Cum igitur in intellectu possit esse intellectio cui nulla res correspondebit que sit apta nata esse extra, sequitur quod ibi est concipere et concipi absque re.

It is plain that Auriol rejects any idea of a web of interconnections between the outside thing and the intellect, including the whole gamut of intellectual tools and devices. The only thing to be observed is the thing conceived, on the proviso, it is true, that the intellect is in a position to also perform the act of conceiving without there being objects conceived. Small wonder that the remainder of the second quaestio is used to settle scores with Hervaeus’s adherents and sympathizers. One cannot conceive of a cleaner and more restrained way of applying the parallelism postulate29 in the pre-Kantian period. People like 29 The parallelism postulate was surely adhered to by Auriol, but suo modo, as appears from passages of his Sentences commentaries. In the Commentarium breve. In I Sent., dist. 23, q. 4 we read: “Ad ista omnia dubia simul respondeo quod ista duo simul stant quod aliqua nomina significent res extra, et tamen non significent eas nisi ut sunt concepte. Nam ista simul stant quod res prout sunt extra, habeant esse conceptum; alioquin non posset intellectus intelligere res prout sunt extra”. Cf. what is said in the Scriptum version of his comments on I Sent., dist. 23, capp. 125–126 (our Appendix F). His ambivalent attitude to the fundamentum in re issue clearly comes to the fore: things are really signified as they are outside (prout sunt extra), but at the same time it holds that they are only

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Peter Auriol shared with Kant at least the basic idea that, from the viewpoint of epistemology, to think of things inescapably boils down to deal with these things qua conceived. Any idea, however, of a Kantian Ding an sich remained entirely alien to him like the other Medievals, because, through Aristotle as well as Plato, they were thoroughly imbued with the Ancient metaphysical presuppositions of Realism.

designated qua conceived, not in so far as they are independent of intellectual activity, that is. Quite in line with the Ancient and Medieval epistemological optimism, this paradox is enervated by the conviction that otherwise we would fall victim to the absurd view that there is no knowledge at all: “alioquin non posset intellectus res intelligere secundum esse quod habent extra”. The thing is that, unlike second order concepts, first order concepts grasp the objects as they are, since the objects as conceived by the first order concepts have a mode of being that is of the same form (uniformis; not meaning that they are of a similar shape as the real things they signify, but ascribing to them the property of being ‘informed’ by the same forma) as that inhering in the outside objects: “Sic igitur nomina primarum intentionum sunt in duplici genere. Sunt enim quedam que exprimunt rem conceptam habentem in esse concepto modum alium quam in esse reali; et tales sunt substantie secunde et res secunde in omni genere, ut homo, animal, albedo et color. Quedam vero habent uniformem modum essendi in esse concepto et in esse extra; et tales sunt prime substantie, ut Sortes, Plato, hec albedo, hic color”.—For the general theme see the interesting (but not entirely convincing) observations by Flasch (1972) and (1978), and also de Libera (1984).

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LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS REFERRED TO Legendum A, B, C (etc.) A, B, C (etc.) 39

Appendix A, B, C (etc.) Appendix A, B, C (etc.), cap. 39

Avignon Bibliothèque d’Avignon. Musée Calvet cod. 300 (Ancien Fonds 361): 252, n. 6 Basel Oeffentliche Bibliothek der Universität cod. B III 22: 252, n. 6; 260, n. 18 Bordeaux Bibliothèque Municipale cod. 147: 97, n. 39 Breslau, see s.n. Wroslaw Brussels Koninklijke Bibliotheek cod. 2910 (3540–3547): 234, n. 88; App. E III Budapest Hungarian National Museum cod. 269: 294, n. 48 Cambridge Gonville & Caius College cod. 516–302: 97, n. 39 Copenhagen Kongelige Bibliothek cod. Thott 581: App. G; H II

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Erfurt Algemeinbibliothek cod. 2o 336: 192, n. 6 cod. 4o 276: 192, n. 1 Florence Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Conventi Soppressi, cod. E I 252: App. E IV Biblioteca Laurenziana cod. Plut. 33 D 1: App. A Klosterneuburg Stiftsbibliothek cod. 274: 252, n. 6; 260, n. 18 Leipzig Universitätsbibliothek cod. 1359: 183, n. 32; 187, n. 39 cod. 1363: 181; 181, n. 28; 191, n. 6 Madrid Biblioteca Nacional cod. 4229 (formerly L 154): 3–10; 326 Biblioteca de la Universidad cod. 65: 3–10 Naples Biblioteca Nazionale cod. VII B 25: 3–10 Oxford Merton College cod. 292: 181–189 Paris Bibliothèque Nationale BN lat. 3157: 96, n. 57; 97, n. 39; 146, n. 60 BN lat. 14.454: 148; App. D BN lat. 14.705: 231, n. 83 App. E II ad 16 Pavia Biblioteca Universitaria cod. Aldini 244: 191, nn. 1–2; App. E 1–36

list of manuscripts referred to Rome Biblioteca Angelica cod. 104: 252, n. 6; 260, n. 18 cod. 1053 (R.8.7): App. G Sarnano Biblioteca Comunale cod. E 98: 3–10 Sevilla Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina cod. 5.6.12: 13, n. 23 Troyes Bibliothèque Communale cod. 992: 138; 139, n. 49; App. B Valencia Biblioteca de la Catedral cod. 139 (formerly 112): 3–10 cod. 200 (formerly 63): 3–10 Vatican city Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. Lat. 847: 252 Vat. Lat. 859: 97, nn. 38 f. Vat. Lat. 946: 9 Vat. Lat. 2141: 234, n. 88 Vat. Lat. 2173: 176, n. 20 Vat. Lat. 3044: 234, n. 88; App. E III Vat. Lat. 3061: 227, n. 78 Vat. Lat. 4584: 252, n. 6 Borgh. Lat. 171: 84, n. 9 Borgh. Lat. 315: 97, n. 39 Borgh. Lat. 329: App. F Chigi B VII 114: App. A Pal. Lat. 1805: 87, n. 14 Venice Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Z.L. 139 (2010) = Class. IV 42: 97, n. 39

375

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Vienna Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek VPL 1424: 37, n. 43 VPL 1438: App. A VPL 1724: App. A VPL 2350: 294, n. 48 VPL 2411: 252 Worcester Chapter Library of Worcester Cathedral cod. 69: 97, n. 39 Wroslaw (formerly Breslau) University Library cod. IV Q 4: App. H I; H II.

DE INTENTIONIBUS

CONTENTS

Introductio

de intentione in communi Articulus I. De quinque acceptionibus huius nominis ‘intentio’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De prima acceptione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inferuntur duo correlaria contra Herveum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda acceptione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tertia acceptione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quarta acceptione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinta acceptione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recapitulatur.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2–26 3–6 7–16 17–18 19–20 21–22 23–24 25–26

Articulus II. De quinque opinionibus circa intentionem. . . . . . . De prima opinione. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda opinione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tertia opinione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quarta opinione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinta opinione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod Herveus aliter videtur dicere in quadam questione . .

27–42 27–28 29–34 35–37 38 39–41 42

Articulus III. Quod non omnis secunda intentio dependet ab intellectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43–108 De tribus premittendis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 De tribus inferendis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45–46 Probatur conclusio principalis ostensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47–105 De prima ratione ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48–92 Quod ‘singulare’ logicaliter sumptum est idem quod ‘unum numero’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51–53 Quod singulare logicum non includit predicabilitatem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54–58 Quod predicabilitas non dependet ab intellectu . . . . . . . 59–64

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contents

Quod esse partem subiectivam non dependet ab intellectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod nulla diffinitio ‘singularis’ includit aliquid dependens ab intellectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod diffinitiones ‘universalis’ nichil includunt dependens ab intellectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De diffinitione ‘universalis’ reddita per ‘predicari’ . . . . De diffinitionibus singulorum predicabilium . . . . . . . . . . Recapitulatur .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opponitur circa probationem minoris principalis rationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda ratione ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sensus respicit obiectum suum primarium sub conditione universalitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tertia ratione ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quarta ratione ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinta ratione ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Probatur conclusio principalis ducendo conclusionem oppositam ad impossibile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusio opposita ad inconvenientia deducitur . . . . . . . . . Articulus IV. De opinionibus supra recitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De prima opinione eiusque quatuor defectibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit circa intentionem in communi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit circa intentionem primam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit circa intentionem secundam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit circa motivum suum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda opinione eiusque tribus defectibus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit in prima sua conclusione. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit in secunda sua conclusione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod terminus communis non significat solam creaturam intellectus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod nec significat aggregatum ex intentione et realitate singulari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod nec significat aggregatum ex re universali et intentione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod non dicit sufficienter quid est intentio in communi et quare et quomodo.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65 66–67 68–78 79–80 81–85 86 87–92 93–97 96–97 98–100 101–104 105 106–108 106–108 109–200 109–114 110–111 112 113 114 115–131 115 116 117–122 123–127 128–129 130–131

contents De tertia opinione eiusque quatuor defectibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod male dicit intentionem universaliter esse cognitionem et actum intelligendi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod male dicit primam intentionem esse cognitionem sub modo essendi proprio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod male dicit secundam intentionem esse cognitionem sub modo essendi communi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod deficit circa distinctionem modorum essendi proprii et communis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quarta opinione eiusque quatuor defectibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quibusdam defectibus circa principia quinte opinionis De quinque eius defectibus circa intentionem in communi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De contradictione in ipsa conclusione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De contradictione in assignatione rationis ‘intentionis’ adhibita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De falsitate ipsius conclusionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De falsitate in ratione adhibita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De improprietate locutionis de abstracto et concreto . De duobus defectibus in distinctione duplicis generis intelligibilium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arguitur contra modos essendi a quibus sumuntur hec duo genera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arguitur contra distinctionem duplicis generis intelligibilium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De defectibus circa ordinem prime et secunde intentionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinque dictis circa primam intentionem . . . . . . . . . . De quatuor contradictionibus circa primum dictum . . De quodam inopinabili circa secundum dictum . . . . . . . De quodam maxime falso circa quartum dictum. . . . . . De falsitate quinti dicti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinque dictis Hervei circa secundam intentionem . . . . . De falsitate primi dicti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De inconvenientibus circa secundum dictum . . . . . . . . . . . . . De destructione tertii dicti per istummet doctorem . . . . . . De falsitate quarti dicti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De frivolitate quinti dicti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

381 132–142 133 134–135 136–140 141–142 143 144–200 145–166 146–151 152–153 154–155 156–164 165–166 167–169 167–168 169 170–192 171 172–180 181 182–186 187–192 193–200 194 195 196 197–199 200

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Articulus V. De quid nominis et quid rei eius quod est intentio . . . 201–241 De significato ‘intentionis’ logice sumpte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 De quinque conclusionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Quod intentio logica in quinta acceptione intentionis sumitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 De quibusdam distinctionibus circa exercitium significationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205–209 De septem modis notificandi quid nominis eius quod est intentio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 Articulus VI. Declarantur decem questiones circa quid rei ‘intentionis’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) Quod ‘res’ sumitur modo communissimo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) Quod esse intentum est esse non-reale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) Quod esse intentum est a voce habitualiter significante (4) Quod esse intentum datur rebus ad tradendum de eis notitiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5) Quomodo esse intentum est in re et quomodo non . . . . . (6) De obiecto et significato primo vocis significative. . . . . . . . Solvuntur duo motiva prime opinionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (7) Quare intentio magis dicatur intenta a voce significativa quam a conceptu sibi adequato. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (8) Quomodo se habeat intentio ad illa de quibus predicatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (9) Quomodo se habeat intentio ad intentionem primam et ad secundam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De distinctione gramaticali nominum prime impositionis et secunde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quadam alia distinctione. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De triplici gradu predicamentali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duabus cohordinationibus entium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duplici impositione nominum et eorum duplici intentione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod prima et secunda intentio sunt partes in modo intentionis secundum se sumpte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (10) Quid sit differre intentionaliter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod contradictio est ‘aliqua esse diversa intelligibilia et esse penitus eadem’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recapitulatur.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

211–240 212 213 214 215 216 217–224 225 226 227 228–236 229–231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238–240 241

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quid sit prima intentio et quid secunda De intentione intenta et intendente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242–243 Articulus unicus. De variis comparationibus intentionis prime et secunde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245–250 De earum comparatione penes esse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 De earum comparatione penes intelligi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 De earum comparatione penes significari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 De earum comparatione penes predicari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 De earum comparatione penes ordinari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

quid sit intentio transcendens et quid non-transcendens quatuor questiones disputate de transcendentibus Questio Ia. Utrum intentiones inferiores et superiores differant ex natura rei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duobus pro intellectu questionis exponendis . . . . . . . . . . . . De modo procedendi ad determinandum questionem. . . . . . Articulus I. De probatione conclusionis intente . . . . . . . . . . . . . De sex viis probantibus minorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De via sensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De via intellectus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De via adequationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De via contrarietatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De via transmutationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De via reduplicationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus II. De modis ydemptitatis et diversitatis inter superiorem intentionem et inferiorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod intentio superior non potest comparari intentioni inferiori secundum ydemptitatem . . . . . . . . . . . Quomodo poterit proprie comparari intentio superior inferiori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod intentio superior et inferior se habent ut totum et pars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De causa modorum ydemptitatis et diversitatis inter eas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quomodo superior intentio predicari potest de inferiori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

253–331 254–255 256 257–265 258–265 258 259 260 261 262 263–265 266–293 267–270 271 272–274 275–276 277–279

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De multifaria divisione terminorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quomodo pars affirmari potest de suo toto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod pars predicetur per se et in quid de suo toto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod pars quidditatis inferioris significata nomine intentionis superioris habet ista quatuor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod semper exigitur quod habens et habitum sit una res per se. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod superior intentio et inferior sunt eadem vel diversa inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sunt eadem vel diversa inconvertibiliter . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus III. Quod gradus predicamentales sunt ex natura rerum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ordo intentionum superiorum et inferiorum est ex natura rei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primo arguitur ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secundo arguitur ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tertio arguitur ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quarto arguitur ad principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recapitulatur et obicitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quomodo predictus ordo intentionum sumi debeat . . . . . Articulus IV. De predictis gradibus et de intentionibus in eis ordinatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De comparatione prime intentionis et secunde quantum ad esse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De earum comparatione quantum ad intelligi . . . . . . . . . . . De earum comparatione quantum ad significari . . . . . . . . . De earum comparatione quantum ad predicari . . . . . . . . . . De earum comparatione quantum ad ordinari . . . . . . . . . . . Recapitulatur .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Questio IIa. Utrum aliqua intentio transcendens sit communis univoce ad omnia predicamenta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De multifaria divisione equivocationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus I. Respondetur ad questionem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod intentio transcendens est communis secundum unam rationem ad omnes alias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primo arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secundo arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tertio arguitur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

280–283 284–285 286–287 288 289 290 291–293 294–312 295–309 295–298 299–302 303–307 308–309 310 311–312 313–331 314–319 320–323 324 325–327 328–330 331

332–374 334–335 336–372 337–347 337–341 342–343 344–346

contents Quarto arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quadam ratione sumpta ex fundamentis aliorum doctorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda ratione ex illis sumpta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De prima ratione principali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda ratione principali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur ad sex argumenta principalia in contrarium adducta .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus II. Quod gradus transcendentie est ex natura rei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinque maneriebus graduum universaliter distinctorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Questio IIIa. Utrum due intentiones possint differre formaliter ex natura rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali Articulus I. Utrum predicamenta distinguantur realiter . . . . De nonnullis erroneis intellectibus huius questionis . . . . . . De convenienti intellectu questionis eiusque modo . . . . . . De quatuor divisionibus realitatum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quatuor suppositionibus circa realitatem universalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quatuor comparationibus diversarum realitatum . . Datur intellectus nostre questionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus II. Quod due intentiones possunt differre formaliter ex natura rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod hec conclusio est ad mentem Aristotilis. . . . . . . . . . . . Quod hec conclusio est de necessitate rationis . . . . . . . . . . . De responsione ad nostram rationem a magistro Herveo data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur magistro Herveo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod fundamentum solutionis ab Herveo date nullius momenti est. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De triplici contradictione in positione Hervei inclusa De tribus falsis in positione Hervei inclusis . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus III. De rationibus et motivis sententie opposite . . . De triplici ratione cuiusdam doctoris contra meam sententiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

385 347 348–354 355–357 358–368 358–361 362–368 369–372 373–374 374

375–436 376–391 379–386 387–391 388 389 390 391

392–420 393–398 399–405 406 407–420 415 416–417 418–420 421–436 421–423

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contents Respondetur ad has rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur ad rationem Hervei contra positam conclusionem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quadam oppositione contra distinctionem formalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur ad argumenta principalia in contrarium adducta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Questio IVa. De singulis intentionibus predicamentalibus. . . . . Utrum intentiones predicamentales distinguantur realiter. . Articulus I. Que realitas debeat dici realitas predicamentalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duodecim conclusionibus circa talem realitatem ponendis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinque persuasionibus circa primas quinque conclusiones ponendis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De septem ceteris conclusionibus circa predictam realitatem ponendis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

437–452 438–442

427–429 430–434 435–436

443–452 443 444–448 449–452

Conspectus siglorum M Mc Mm

codex matritensis Bibl. Nat. 4229 saec. XIV manus corrigens M manus notas marginales praebens

Codices textum nostri auctoris Comm. In Sent. continentes U N V S O

codex matritensis Bibl. Univ. 65 saec. XIV codex napolitanus Bibl. Nat. VII B 25 saec. XIV codex valentinus Bibl. Cat. 139 saec. XIV; 200 saec. XIV codex sarnanensis Bibl. Com. E 98 saec. XIV consensus codicum UNVS

Sigla in apparatu critico adhibita ] … […] add. coll. coni. del. om. suppl.

scripsi(t), scripserunt textus ab editore suppletus textus ab editore deletus addidit, addiderunt collato, collatis conieci, coniciendo delevit omisit, omiserunt supplevi(t)

Introductio 1

De intentionibus primis et secundis, transcendentibus et non transcenM74va dentibus in generali—et quantum ad aliqua, in speciali—oportet prehabere notitiam ad sufficienter determinandas questiones de transcen5 dentibus disputatas, que infra sub propriis titulis conscribuntur. Quapropter primo investigatur quid est intentio in communi; secundo quid prima et quid secunda et que earum habitudo adinvicem; tertio quid intentio transcendens et quid non-transcendens et que earum adinvicem habitudo; quarto iuxta premissa ad questiones singulas responde10 tur.

PARS PRIMA

DE INTENTIONE IN COMMUNI articulus i 15

DE QUINQUE ACCEPTIONIBUS HUIUS NOMINIS ‘INTENTIO’

Investigando autem quid est intentio in communi sic proceditur. Primo 2 namque exponuntur quinque acceptiones huius nominis ‘intentio’; secundo ponuntur quinque opiniones circa quid intentio; tertio opiniones discutiuntur quantum ad aliquid commune in quo omnes conveniunt; 20 quarto discutiuntur quantum ad aliqua dicta specialia in quibus disconveniunt; quinto traditur secundum veritatem quid nominis eius quod est ‘intentio’ logice sumpta; sexto traditur quid rei.

1 Incipit quartus liber sive quarta pars huius operis titulus in M adinvicem] add. coll. sect. 59 infra om. MO

7 et que …

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pars prima De prima acceptione

3 Intentio igitur secundum unam acceptionem est vel sumitur pro quo-

cumque per suum esse formale alteri largiente esse aliquod non reale. Hoc autem fit per transitum obiectivum largientis tale esse secundum quid in recipiens tale esse, verbi gratia, in omni actione immanente, non transeunte subiective sed obiective solum. Intellectio enim est quedam actio talis transiens solum obiective in rem intelligibilem, et propter hoc largitur ei hoc esse non reale quod est esse intellectum, esse cognitum, esse apprehensum. Quare intentio hoc modo est intellectio rei intelligibilis. Hoc eodem modo volitio largitur rei volibili esse volitum, sensatio rei sensibili esse sensatum. Et eodem modo universaliter: in omni actione simili contingit quod actio transiens obiective solum largitur obiecto esse aliquod non reale. Et per consequens, queM74vb libet talium actionum potest dici intentio sui obiecti recipientis | ab ea esse huismodi. 4 Predictus vero transitus obiectivus non solum habet esse istarum talium actionum que sunt actiones proprie immanentes, ymo in quibusdam aliis, ad similitudinem tamen istarum, verbi gratia in omni representativo et in omni significativo. Quodlibet enim representativum quasi per transitum obiectivum in rem representabilem largitur rei representabili esse representatum (quod est esse non reale, quia nichil realiter acquiritur per hoc rei representate). Quodlibet etiam significativum per transitum obiectivum in rem significabilem largitur ei esse significatum, quod est esse non reale. Hoc modo species intelligibiles, species sensibiles possunt dici intentiones suorum obiectorum tamquam quedam representativa ipsorum, et ymagines hominum intentiones ymaginatorum et representatorum per eas. Et quecumque significativa naturalia vel ad placitum intentiones dici possunt suorum significatorum. Omnia enim hec largiuntur obiectis quedam esse non realia, puta esse cognitum, esse volitum, esse sensatum, esse representatum, esse significatum. 5 Quod autem auctores utantur nomine ‘intentionis’ in hac acceptione apparet in multis locis per Avicennam, sexto Naturalium, parte quarta,

3 largiente] NV largienti MUS 4 largientis] V largienti MUN 7 transiens] non add. necnon del. Mc om. O 9 quare] quia sic saepius M 9–10 intellectio] O intentio M 18–19 representativo] McO presentativo sic saepius M 19 enim] McUN om. MV 26 representativa] coni. representabilia MO 33 sexto] US primo MNV

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capitulo sexto, ubi sic ait1: “Thesaurus vero apprehendentis intentionem est virtus custoditiva, cuius locus est posterior pars cerebri; et ideo cum contingit infirmitas, constipatur illud cui proprium est custodire has intentiones; que virtus vocatur memorialis”. Et infra, eodem capitulo2: “Thesaurus intellectus est memoratio que retinet intentionem”. Hic apparet quod Avicenna utitur hoc nomine ‘intentio’ pro aliquo representativo ponente obiectum sensus vel intellectus in esse representato, quod est esse non reale. Hoc etiam modo Averroys accipit intentionem in tertio De anima in 6 multis locis. Dicit3 enim in commento quinto: “Diffinitio intellectus possibilis est quod est in potentia omnes intentiones omnium formarum materialium universalium”. | Et infra, eodem commento4: “Continua- M75ra tio intellectuum in nobis hominibus est per continuationem intentionis intellecte cum in nobis sunt intentiones ymaginate, scilicet partis que est in nobis de eis aliquo modo quasi forma”. Et alibi5: “quod proportio virtutis cognoscitive est ad duas intentiones, scilicet ydolum et intentionem ydoli est, sicut proportio sensus communis ad intentiones quinque sensuum particularium”. Hic autem apparet quod Averroys sumit ‘intentionem’ pro ydolo representativo et extimatione ydoli que ponit ydolum in esse apprehenso, et pro specie intelligibili et pro specie sensibili. Quare huiusmodi acceptio ‘intentionis’ videtur esse manifesta ex communi usu doctorum. Inferuntur duo correlaria contra Herveum

25

Ex premissis autem infero duo correlaria. Primum est quod ‘intentio’ in 7 ista significatione accepta potest esse vera realitas, licet esse datum per eam non sit esse reale. Hoc apparet, quia in precedentibus manifestum est quod actus intelligendi et species intelligibilis et species sensibilis sunt intentiones, tamen hec omnia sunt vere realitates.

11 omnium] O om. M sensibilis] O om. M 1 2 3 4 5

13 in] O om. M

22 communi] O om. M

Tractatus naturalium VI 4, p. 98–9. Ibid. In III Arist. De anima Comm. Magnum 5, p. 38729–38830. Ibid., 405517–520. Cf. ibid., 41564–67.

27 et …

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Secundum correlarium est quod distinctio posita in prima questione cuiusdam libelli facti de intentionibus ab Herveo Predicatore est male assignata de hoc nomine ‘intentionale’. Ponitur enim sub hiis verbis6: “Esse intentionale potest accipi essentialiter et denominative, sicut habere esse quale contingit dupliciter: essentialiter et denominative. Nam 5 sicut albedo dicitur esse quale essentialiter sed corpus album dicitur habere esse quale denominative, ita illud quod est intentio per essentiam, dicitur habere esse intentionale essentialiter, sed illud cuius est intentio, dicitur habere esse intentionale denominative. Et sic accipiendo intentiones que sunt ex parte intelligentis, species intelligibilis, actus intelli- 10 gendi et forma exemplaris habent essentialiter esse intentionale, quia sunt intentiones rerum, illa autem quorum sunt intentiones tamquam obiectorum, dicuntur habere esse intentionale denominative”.

Et infra subditur7 quod ex parte rei intellecte habitudo ad intellectum dicitur esse intentionale essentialiter eo modo quo essentiale contingit in talibus que non dicunt formaliter rem aliquam. 9 Probo igitur ex premissis | et ex concessis ab Herveo quod intentio M75rb sumpta pro actu intelligendi vel pro specie intelligibili non sit essentialiter ipsum esse intentionale sicut qualitas est essentialiter esse quale. Et arguo sic. Nulla vera realitas est essentialiter esse non reale. Sed intentio sumpta pro actu intelligendi vel pro specie intelligibili est vera realitas—ut conceditur ab isto in hac eadem questione—et ipsum esse intentionale est esse non reale, ut apparet ex premissis et concessis ab isto; dicit enim habitudinem rationis esse essentialiter tale esse intentionale, quod non esse potest nisi esse intentionale esset esse non reale. Ergo intentio isto modo sumpta non est essentialiter ipsum esse intentionale. 10 Preterea. Nulla qualitas que est essentialiter esse quale, est essentialiter esse non quale. Sed actus intelligendi vel conceptus mentis est vera qualitas de prima specie, adminus conceptus habitualis, et per istum est essentialiter esse quale. Esse autem intentionale est esse non quale— quod apparet, quia “qualitas est secundum quam quales dicimur”,8

5 quale] O om. M 6 album] suppl. coll. textu Hervaei om. MO 7 esse] O om. M 9 et sic] coll. textu Hervaei sicut MO 11 habent] coll. textu Hervaei habet MO | esse] O om. M 12 rerum] NS realiter MUV 13 esse] O om. M 15 modo] O om. M 17 herveo] M isto doctore sic saepius O 20 esse] O om. M 22 esse] O om. M 30 istum] O istud M 6 7 8

De intentionibus, dist. I q. 1, resp. init. Ibid. Arist., Categ. 8, 8b25.

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nullus autem dicitur qualis per esse intentionale; quod apparet, quia ad interrogationem factam per ‘quale?’ de aliquo numquam respondetur intentionale esse; si enim queratur ‘qualis est homo?’, numquam respondebitur ‘representatus’ vel ‘intellectus’ vel ‘intentionalis’. Quare intentio in hoc modo sumpta pro conceptu vel pro specie non est essentialiter esse intentionale. Preterea. Accipio primo quod esse intentionale sequens intellectionem non est nisi esse intellectum. Si ergo probavero quod intellectio non est esse intellectum essentialiter, sufficienter erit probatum quod non est essentialiter esse intentionale. Et arguo sic. Quod non necessario est intellectum, non est essentialiter esse intellectum. Sed intellectio potest esse non intellecta; non enim est necessarium quod supra quamlibet intellectionem fiat reflexio pro eo quod intelligatur. Ergo intellectus non est essentialiter res intellecta vel ipsum esse intellectum sicut albedo est essentialiter esse album. Preterea. Quod inest essentialiter non-realitati, non est de esse alicuius realitatis. Sed esse intentionale inest essentialiter alicui non realitati. Ergo esse intentionale non est de esse alicuius realitatis, puta intellectionis vel | speciei intelligibilis. Minor probatur ex concessione ab isto. Dicit9 enim quod esse intentionale est de esse cuiusdam habitudinis rei intellecte ad intellectum, que, inquam, habitudo non dicit formaliter rem aliquam. Si vero respondeatur pro predicto Herveo quod esse intentionale quod est essentiale habitudini rationis, non est essentiale intentioni se tenenti ex parte intellectus, et ita non est repugnantia quod unum esse intentionale sit essentiale alicui realitati et alterum sit essentiale alicui non realitati,—contra hoc arguo: Accipio enim quod ad actum intelligendi concurrunt ista, scilicet potentia intellectiva, obiectum eius, actus intelligendi, habitudo illius actus ad obiectum, et habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi vel ad potentiam intelligentem. Potentia intellectiva non est ipsum esse intellectum; obiectum intellectus non est ipsum esse intellectum; actus intelligendi non est ipsum esse intellectum (quia, ut ipsemet dicit,10 actus intelligendi se tenet ex parte intellectus,

10 essentialiter] O essentiale M 11 esse] O om. M 13 eo] O om. M 14 res] suppl. om. OM 16 non realitati] McO realitati M 24 est] McO om. M 27 arguo] ad actum intelligendi concurrunt tria nota bene add. Mm 31 esse] O om. M 9 10

Hervaeus, De intentionibus, IV, q. 1, resp. Ibid., dist. I, q. 2 passim.

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esse autem intellectum se tenet ex parte rei intellecte); habitudo etiam fundata supra actum intelligendi non est ipsum esse intellectum, quia ista habitudo significatur per modum actionis, esse autem intellectum per modum passionis; et secundum hoc distinguuntur intelligens et intellectum, intelligere et intelligi; intelligere enim includit habitudinem intellectionis ad intellectum, intelligi vero habitudinem intellecti ad intelligens. Non igitur intellectio ut se tenet ex parte intelligentis et ut dicit talem habitudinem, est esse intellectum. Relinquitur ergo quod nullum concurrit ad actum intelligendi nisi illud quod denominat rem intellectam et dicit habitudinem rei intellecte ut est res intellecta ad intelligens et ad intellectionem. 14 Ex hoc igitur apparet manifestissime quod ad unum actum intelligendi non concurrant plura esse intellecta, sed unicum tantum. Et illud esse intellectum, dicit11 iste bonus vir, est esse essentiale ipsi habitudini, que, per eum, non est aliqua realitas. Patet igitur quod sufficere debuit ei quod illud esse unicum intellectum diceret esse essentiale alicui realiM75vb tati | vel alicui non realitati; non utrique simul, cum salvari non possent absque contradictione. Est igitur sciendum quod ipse deceptus est propter falsum existimare; ipse enim ymaginatus est quod sic comparetur esse intentionale ad illud quod est intentio sicut esse quale ad illud quod est qualitas. Ex hac enim extimatione ortum habet reprobatus error. 15 Quod autem hec extimatio falsa sit patet, quoniam esse quale est actus formalis ipsius qualitatis et per consequens idem essentialiter quod qualitas, et iterum per consequens communicatur illi rei cui communicatur qualitas, et iterum per consequens denominans formaliter subiectum qualitatem habens. Esse vero intentionale non est actus formalis alicuius forme que est idipsum quod est intentio, et per consequens non est idem essentialiter cum ea, et iterum non communicatur ei cum sibi communicatur intentio, ut ipsemet dicit. Dicit12 enim quod subiecta habentia tales intentiones non habent esse intentionale, et iterum per consequens non denominabit subiectum intentionem habens.

8 est] O om. M michi add. N 9 concurrit] US concernit MNV 10 res] O om. M 14 alterum esse] O om. M 18–19 propter] S per MUNV 19 ipse … est] S om. MUNV 24–25 communicatur … consequens] MUNV om. S 24 communicatur] Vc non communicatur MO | cui] non add. M 27 idipsum] O ad ipsum M 28 essentialiter] quod qualitas add. M 31 denominabit] McO demonstrabit M 11 12

Ibid., dist. I, q. 2, resp., init. Ibid.

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Et illud totum declaratur in aliquo quod simul est qualitas dans 16 esse quale et intentio dans esse intentionale. Accipio enim conceptum mentis—que est vera qualitas de prima specie qualitatis, ut ipsemet dicit—dans esse quale ipsi menti, quia mens per ipsum conceptum 5 formaliter est concipiens. Et hoc esse quale, quod est idem cum ista qualitate que est conceptus et communicatur ei cui communicatur conceptus, denominat subiectum conceptus. Dicitur enim quod mens est concipiens, sciens et intelligens. Hec autem eadem qualitas, que simul est qualitas et intentio, dat obiecto suo esse intentionale, puta esse con10 ceptum, esse intellectum seu esse scitum. Hoc autem esse scitum non communicatur menti ex hoc quod habet talem conceptum, nec denominat ipsam mentem. Non enim dicimus quod mens ut conceptum habens sit concepta, sit intellecta vel scita. Patet igitur quod radix erroris fuit ignorantia. 15 Et hec sufficiant de prima acceptione huius nominis ‘intentio’. De secunda acceptione 17

Secundum igitur aliam acceptionem sumitur ‘intentio’ | pro actu intelM76ra ligendi. Et tunc est nomen verbale descendens ab hoc verbo ‘intendere’. Et secundum hoc potest sumi secundum triplicem rationem, ut similia 20 nomina verbalia. Potest enim sumi ut intendentis actio, vel ut intenti passio, vel ut ipsa res intenta. Quod autem doctores utantur hoc verbo ‘intendere’ secundum istam 18 triplicem acceptionem apparet in multis locis. Primo sexto Ethicorum, ubi dicitur13 quod intendendum utique rursus de virtute; exponitur 25 ‘intendendum’ idest ‘considerandum’. Item quarto Metaphisice in nova translatione dicitur14 sic: “Nullus particulariter intendentium nititur aliquid dicere de principiis”; pro quo habetur in antiqua translatione15:

4 quia] per consequens add. M | mens] UNVcS om. MV 5 concipiens] O conveniens M 8 sciens] O faciens M 14 ignorantia] M falsa extimatio (!) O 20 enim] O etiam M 25 intendendum] McNVS intendit M intentio U 26 particulariter] US pariter M de particularibus NV Arist., Eth. Nicom. VI 13, 1144b1. Arist., Metaph. IV 3, 1005a29–30. 15 Non loqui videtur auctor noster de translatione vetustissima quae dicitur, nec de translatione veteri sive composita, nec de translatione anonyma sive media, nec de nova translatione, nec de translatione Moerbekiana, sed de Michaelis Scoti latina translatione lemmatum quae commentariis Averrois addita sunt. 13 14

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“Nullus considerantium de particularibus intromittit se ad dicendum de principiis”. Ex quo patet quod idem est ‘intendens’ et ‘considerans’, et idem significat ‘intendere’ et ‘considerare’, ‘intentio’ et ‘consideratio’. Item. Averroys exponens verba Aristotilis utitur hoc verbo ‘intendere’, ut apparet in locis innumeris, utputa primo commento primo De anima 5 dicit16 ita: “Intendit per ‘subtilitatem’ confirmationem demonstrationis; et intendit per hoc quod dixit ‘Aut quia sunt cognite partes nobiliores’ nobiliorem subiecti; hoc autem quod dicitur ‘intendit per subtilitatem’ nichil aliud esse dictum nisi intelligere per subtilitatem”. Hoc modo utitur Augustinus nomine ‘intentionis’ in sermone contra Iudeos dicens17: 10 “Prevaricatores Legis, intendite legem”. De tertia acceptione 19 Secundum aliam acceptionem sumitur ‘intentio’ pro actu volendi, non

pro quibuscumque, sed pro actu respiciente finem. In hoc enim differunt propositum et intentio quia propositum est de hiis que sunt ad 15 finem et in potestate nostra, intentio vero est de ipso fine. Hoc autem modo hoc nomen ‘intentio’ est nomen verbale descendens ab hoc verbo ‘intendere’ quod idem est quod ‘velle ordinatum in finem’. Et potest sumi tripliciter, sicut dictum est de actu intendendi ex hoc quod est nomen verbale. 20 20 Quod autem auctores utantur hoc modo hoc nomine ‘intentio’ M76rb apparet in multis locis. Ut in sexto Ethicorum, | capitulo duodecimo18: ‘Opus perficitur secundum prudentiam et secundum moralem virtutem; virtus enim quandam intentionem facit rectam, prudentia autem que ad hanc’. Et infra duodecimo capitulo19: ‘Est utique quedam po- 25 tentia quam vocant “dinoticam”; hec autem est talis ut ad suppositam intentionem contendentia possit hec operari et sortiri ipsis; siquidem igitur intentio sit bona, laudabilis est, si autem prava, astutia est’. Hic

1 particularibus] NV partibus M particulariter US 3 intendere] O intelligere M 7 hoc] V licet MUNS 11 legis] NVS legum MU 16 ipso] O om. M 21 modo hoc] coni. suppl. om. MO 22 duodecimo] UVS 17o. MN 25 utique] itaque MO 16 17 18 19

Cf. In Arist. I De anima, comm. 1, p. 39–17. Tractatus adversus Iudaeos (Migne PL 42, col. 1123). Arist., Eth. Nicom. VI 12, 1144a8–9. Ibid., 1144a22–26.

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autem patet evidenter ‘intentionem’ sumi pro actu voluntatis respicienti finem. Et inde sumptus est ille versus: ‘Quicquid agant homines, intentio iudicat omnes’. De quarta acceptione Secundum autem aliam acceptionem sumitur pro vehementi applica- 21 tione cuiuscumque potentie ad obiectum suum. Et in hac significatione etiam est nomen verbale descendens ab hoc verbo ‘intendere’ quod idem est quod ‘attendere’. ‘Intendere’ autem in hac significatione non est verbum activum, sicut nec ‘attendere’; in precedentibus autem 10 acceptionibus erat verbum activum. Quod autem auctores utantur hoc modo hoc nomine ‘intentionis’ 22 apparet in multis locis. Avicenna enim in sexto Naturalium, parte quinta, capitulo secundo dicit20 ita: “Anima enim cum occupata fuerit circa interiora, non solet curare de exterioribus quantum deberet, et cum 15 occupata fuerit circa exteriora, pretermittit gubernare virtutes interiores; ipsa cum intenta considerat sensibilia exterius, ea hora qua de hiis tractat, debilitatur eius ymaginatio”. Hic apparet quod intente considerare nichil aliud est quam cum vehementi applicatione considerare. Et secundum hoc dicitur21 de bono Martino: “Oculis ac manibus in 20 celum semper intentus”. Item. Gregorius in hympno22: “Intenta supplicatio dormire cor mundum vetat”. 5

De quinta acceptione Secundum aliam acceptionem sumitur ‘intentio’ pro significatione. Est 23 tamen differentia quia significare est actualiter | intellectum consti- M76va 25 tuere,23 intendere autem vocis significative est intellectum habitualiter

5 sumitur] O om. M 8 attendere] O ascendere M 9 attendere] O ascendere M 11 modo hoc] modo O om. M 13 capitulo] MNVS commento U 20 gregorius in hympno] US augustinus in sermone MNV 25 intellectum] O om. M Tractatus naturalium VI 4, 2, p. 1485–89. Laudes in die festo Sti Martini (Nov. XI), antiphona IVa: ‘Oculis ac manibus in celum semper intentus, invictum ab oratione spiritum non relaxabat’. 22 Perperam attribuitur. Re vera Prudentius, Carmina (Migne PL 59, col. 783A); apud Othlonem Emmeranum, Proverbia (= ps.-Beda, ed. Migne PL 90, 1099B); ed. Korfmacher, p. 36, I 42. 23 Conferas Arist. De interpr. 3, 16b20. 20 21

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constituere. Unde intentio idem est quod habitualis significatio. Hoc autem modo ‘intentio’ est nomen verbale descendens ab hoc verbo ‘intendere’ quod idem est quod ‘habitualiter significare.’ Idcirco potest sumi tripliciter: vel pro intendentis dictionis actione, vel pro rei intente, idest significate, passione, vel pro ipsa re intenta, idest pro ipsa re significata. 24 Quod autem auctores utantur secundum hanc significationem hoc nomine ‘intentionis’, et maxime pro re intenta idest significata, apparet in multis locis. Primo quarto Metaphisice capitulo quarto, ubi sic dicitur24: “quodsi hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat unam intentionem”; hoc autem in antiqua translatione.25 Super quo Commentator26: “Si hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat unam intentionem et intentio illa habet diffinitionem, sit igitur illud ‘animal bipes’”. Et infra: “Dico quod hoc nomen ‘homo’ significat unam intentionem cum fuerit acceptum secundum veram acceptionem ad quam fuit positum, scilicet ad ‘animal rationale’; cum vero fuerit acceptum secundum transsumptionem, significabit intentiones universales”. Unde hic manifestissime apparet quod Philosophus et eius Commentator utuntur nomine ‘intentionis’ pro significatione, ut ‘significatio’ dicit rem significatam. Et infra dicit27 Aristotiles: “Hoc nomen ‘homo’ non significat intentionem tantum unam et significat aliquod unum; non dico quod predicetur de uno”. Super quo Commentator28: “Non intendimus cum dicimus quod ‘homo’ significat unum, quod predicetur de uno. Nomina enim que predicantur de uno et sunt denominativa, non significant unam intentionem (verbi gratia, ‘album’ et ‘musicum’), sed intendimus significationem nominum non denominativam”. Et Commentator in principio quinti Metaphisice dicit29: “Intendit in hoc tractatu distinguere significationes nominum secundum intentiones considerandas in hac scientia; et omnia nomina hec dicuntur secundum relationem ad unum quid diversimode; et ideo

5 idest] Vc om. MO 7–8 hoc nomine] O om. M 8 idest] O et M 9 quarto] om. MO 15 veram acceptionem] U veram intentionem NVS unam intentionem M 16 vero] UVS non MN 25 album et] NS est MUV Arist., Metaph. IV 4, 1006a30. Translatio latina lemmatum commentariis Averrois additorum. Videas notam 15 additam supra. 26 Averroes, In IV Arist. Metaph., Fol. 77A2–5; 8–14. 27 Arist., Metaph. IV 4, 1006b15. 28 Averroes, In IV Arist. Metaph. Fol. 78A7–10. 29 In V Arist. Metaph., Fol. 100vA23–30. 24 25

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expositio istorum nominum est pars istius scientie”. Ex hiis autem patet quod ‘intentio’ sumitur pro significatione, et maxime secundum quod ‘significatio’ dicit rem significatam. Recapitulatur 5

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Et per consequens patent quinque acceptiones huius vocis ‘intentio’. 25 Prima | est acceptio ‘intentionis’ pro quocumque per transitum obiec- M76vb tivum alteri largiente esse non reale, quod vocatur ‘esse intentionale’. Secunda acceptio est sumptio ‘intentionis’ pro actu intelligendi. Tertia est sumptio eius pro actu volendi. Quarta est sumptio eius pro vehementi applicatione cuiuscumque potentie ad obiectum suum. Quinta sumptio est pro habituali significatione, et maxime videtur pro re intenta. Est autem sciendum quod non est inconveniens unam et eandem 26 rem dici intentionem secundum plures ‘intentionis’ acceptiones. Potest enim dici actus intelligendi primo modo ‘intentio’, et secundo modo et ultimo. Primo modo, quia dat obiecto suo esse cognitum, quod est esse non-reale; secundo modo, quia est quoddam intendere; ultimo modo, quia significatur et intenditur per hanc vocem significativam ‘intellectio’. Item. Sciendum secundo quod non est inconveniens duas res diversas esse sui adinvicem intentiones secundum diversas acceptiones. Vox enim significativa est intentio rei significate per hoc quod largitur ei esse significatum, quod est esse non-reale sed intentionale; hoc autem est secundum acceptionem ‘intentionis’ primo loco expositam. Res autem significata potest esse intentio vocis significative, et per hoc quod est significatio eius; secundum quod ‘significatio’ sumitur pro re significata, et ‘intentio’ per consequens significat rem intentam. Hec sufficiant de primo articulo huius tractatus.

6–7 obiectivum] O obiectum M 7 largiente] largienti MO 11 est] US om. MNV 21 est] McO om. M 26 significat] coni. secundum MO | intentam] MO apparet igitur quod intentio in communi non dicitur univoce de intentionibus sumptis in speciali add. O

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De prima opinione 27 Opiniones dicentium30 quid est intentio et secundum quam acceptio-

nem predictarum quinque a logico sumi oportet, sunt multe et varie. Adpresens autem recito quinque. Opinio prima fuit dicentium quod prima intentio est ipsa res intellecta, intentio autem secunda ipse actus intelligendi. Isti autem non dicunt quid est intentio in communi secundum quod intentio est intentio, sed solum quid est prima et quid secunda. Hec autem opinio quantum ad intentionem primam dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo quod ipsa res de se sumpta sine determinatione intellectus sit intentio prima, alio modo quod res non sine determinatione sed secundum quod intellecta est sit intentio prima. Quantum ad secundam intentionem potest etiam dupliciter intelligi: primo modo quod actus intelligendi de se sumptus sit intentio secunda, secundo quod actus intelligendi, non de se et in se sumptus sed ut tenet M77ra vicem obiecti per transitum | eius in obiectum, sit intentio secunda. 28 Hec autem opinio qualitercumque intellecta confirmatur tali motivo. Logica dicitur scientia rationalis, alie vero scientie dicuntur sermocinales, vel scientie reales. Omnes autem scientie sunt de intentionibus, ut haberi potest ex principio Metaphisice Avicenne31. Cum ergo logica distinguatur ab aliis scientiis per hoc quod est rationalis, videtur sequi quod ipsa sit de actibus rationis, qui sunt actus intelligendi. Sed ipsamet est de secundis intentionibus, ut habetur quarto Metaphisice32. Ergo intentiones secunde sunt actus intelligendi. Et pari ratione probari potest quod intentiones prime sunt ipse res, quoniam scientie

8–9 secundum … intentio] O om. M om. M

9 quid] O om. M

12–13 alio … prima] McO

Eosdem auctores memorare videtur Petrus Aureoli; videas App. E, capp. 26 sqq. Prima philosophia, tr. I, p. 14–6. 32 Ibid. VI 2, p. 1073–75: “Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo”. 30 31

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naturales sunt de rebus et ipsemet sunt de intentionibus, non secundis ut logica, sed de primis. Ergo prime intentiones sunt ipse res. De secunda opinione 5

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Opinio fuit alia dicentium33 quod tria sunt genera nominum. Nomina primi generis significant rem et non intentionem, ut sunt nomina significantia substantias primas et ea que singulariter sunt in eis, ut ‘Sortes’ vel ‘Plato’. Nomina secundi generis significant aliquo modo rem et intentionem, quia significant rem in universali conceptam; et ista sunt nomina significantia substantias secundas vel accidentia in universali, ut hoc nomen ‘homo’, ‘animal’, ‘albedo’ et ‘color’. Nomina tertii generis significant intentionem et nullo modo rem. Et secundum ista tria dicunt tenentes istam opinionem ad questionem quod ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’ et similia non significant intentionem primam; nomina autem secundi generis, cuiusmodi sunt ‘homo’, ‘animal’ et similia, significant intentiones primas. Nomina autem tertii generis, cuiusmodi sunt ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘differentia’, ‘proprium’ et ‘accidens’, significant secundas intentiones precise. Iste tres conclusiones probantur per ordinem. Prima sic. Illa sunt res et nullo modo intentiones que nullo modo dependent ab intellectu. Hoc apparet quia: Omnis intentio videtur dependere ab intellectu. Sed res significata per ‘Sortem’ et ‘Platonem’ in esse suo nullo modo dependet ab intellectu, ut evidens est de se. Ergo talia sunt res, et non intentiones. Secunda sic. Et primo probatur quod talia, puta ‘homo’ et ‘animal’, dicant intentionem; secundo probatur quod illa intentio sit prima. Primum probatur sic. Quod in esse suo dependet ab intellectu, est intentio. Sed ‘homo’ et ‘animal’ in esse suo dependent ab intellectu. | Ergo sunt intentiones. Maior supponitur. Minor probatur sic. Quicquid humanitatis intelligitur preter Sortem et Platonem (et sic de aliis), habet esse non reale sed pure dependens ab intellectu, quia non est de humanitate que est in Sorte vel in Platone vel in aliquo simili. Sed humanitas hominis intelligitur in communi, que intelligitur preter Sortem et Platonem

12 tenentes … opinionem] O om. M 15–17 nomina … precise] Mc O om. M 24 illa] O om. M 29 dependens] O dependet M 30 humanitas] O humanitatis M 31 intelligitur] O intelligi M 33

Guillelmi Warensis eiusque sequacium; videas Petrum Aureoli, App. E, cap. 26 sqq.

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et consimiles. Ergo illa humanitas est aliquid dependens in esse suo ab opere intellectus. Quare relinquitur quod sit intentio. 32 Probatur ad idem. Quecumque secundum suas rationes formales differunt intentionaliter, ipsa sunt, vel includunt, intentiones. Sed ‘homo’ et ‘animal’ secundum suas rationes differunt formaliter et intentionaliter; sunt enim diverse intentiones; quod apparet, quoniam abinvicem ponunt in numerum, secundum quod secunde substantie. Si ergo sunt due secunde substantie, sequitur quod sint due intentiones. Quare relinquitur quod ipsemet sunt intentiones, vel includunt intentiones, quia cum abstrahantur a singularibus et eorum gradibus videntur aliquid de intentionalitate includere; videntur enim esse realitates abstracte a singularibus. 33 Quod autem sint prime intentiones apparet quia: Quod primo intelligitur de re, est prima intentio. Sed homo et animal primo intelligitur de Sorte et Platone. Ergo sunt prime intentiones. Sumo autem hic ‘intentiones’ secundum quod humanitas vel animalitas comparantur ad suam universalitatem. 34 Tertia conclusio probatur sic. Illa de quibus agit logicus sunt secunde intentiones. Universale et singulare, genus et species et similia sunt de quibus principaliter agit logicus. Ergo ipsa sunt secunde intentiones.

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De tertia opinione 35 Opinio alia fuit quorundam dicentium34 quod omnis intentio est cogni-

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tio non secundum se sumpta sed secundum quod transit vel tendit in obiectum, vel obiectum tendit in intellectum per ipsam cognitionem. Ideo describunt intentionem in communi hoc modo: ‘Intentio est 25 cognitio rei sub modo essendi proprio vel communi’. Et secundum hoc distinguunt primam intentionem a secunda. Dicunt enim quod intentio prima est cognitio rei sub modo essendi proprio, puta si | cognoscatur animal sub isto modo essendi qui est esse sensitivum. Dicunt autem quod secunda intentio est cognitio rei sub modo essendi communi, 30 ut si cognoscatur animal sub isto modo essendi qui est esse repartibile in multa differentia secundum speciem. Ponunt autem differentiam inter modum essendi proprium et communem. Dicunt enim quod pro6 quod] O quam M 22 opinio] popinio (!) sic saepius M 31–32 repartibile] coni. repperibile M divisibile O 34

Radulphus Brito eiusque sequaces; cf. sectt. 132–142 infra.

23 sed] McO om. M

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prius modus essendi est qui repperitur in determinato predicamento, sicut esse per se repperitur in predicamento Substantie vel esse sensitivum vel esse animatum. Modus essendi communis est circumiens omne genus et repperitur in omni predicamento, ut esse repartibile in plura differentia secundum speciem repperitur in omni predicamento, et esse divisibile in plura differentia solo numero repperitur in omni predicamento. Isti autem dant rationem duorum dictorum. Primo quoniam dicunt 36 omnem intentionem esse cognitionem rei, et primam intentionem esse rei cognitionem sub modo essendi proprio, secundam intentionem cognitionem rei sub modo essendi communi. De primo dicunt quod cognitio est intellectio, et intelligere idem est quod intendere. Et hoc satis habere putant, considerantes ea que dicta sunt in secunda acceptione ‘intentionis’. Dicunt etiam quod ‘intendere’ idem est quod ‘intus tendere’, et ‘intentio’ est idem quod ‘intus tentio’ vel ‘tendentia’; hec autem tendentia est obiecti in intellectum, vel intellectus in obiectum. Hoc autem fit per intellectionem quandam. Quare intellectio est intentio, et econverso. De secundo autem dicunt quod res potest concipi sub modo essendi 37 proprio, ut animal sub esse sensitivo, non concepta re sub modo essendi communi. Potest enim concipi animal ut sensitivum, non concepto eo quod est repperibile in pluribus specie differentibus. Res autem non potest concipi sub modo essendi communi, non concepto sub modo essendi proprio; non enim potest concipi animal ut repartibile in plura differentia specie nisi concipiatur aliquis modus essendi proprius animalis qui etiam possit repperiri in plura differentia secundum speciem. Quare intentio sumpta sub modo essendi proprio dicitur prima, quia prima rei cognitio. Intentio vero sumpta a modo essendi communi dicitur | secunda intentio, quia secunda rei cognitio. M77vb

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De quarta opinione Opinio autem alia fuit quorundam multum convenientium cum pre- 38 dicta opinione. Dicunt35 enim quod omnis intentio est cognitio rei 3 circumiens] O continens M 4 repartibile] repperibile M divisibile O 10 rei … cognitionem] Mc om. MO | proprio] vel communi add. MO del. Mc 13 satis … putant] O habere possunt M 24 repartibile] coni. repperibile MO 35

Cf. Simonem de Faversham; videris Introductionem nostram, sect. 5.1.

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sub aliquo modo essendi, ea ratione qua illi quorum opinio statim fuit recitata. Et prima intentio secundum istos est cognitio rei sub aliquo modo uno essendi, et secunda est cognitio sub alio. Dicunt autem differenter ab istis. Quantum ad istos modos dicunt quod sunt duo modi essendi summe oppositi, scilicet modus essendi realis et modus 5 essendi rationis. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod prima intentio est cognitio rei sub modo essendi reali; vocant autem modum realem omnem modum essendi absolutum vel relativum, positivum vel privativum qui est in rebus ante omnem operationem intellectus. Et per consequens dicunt quod secunda intentio est cognitio rei sub modo essendi rationis; 10 vocant autem modum essendi rationis omnem modum qui est in rebus per operationem intellectus vel qui presupponit operationem intellectus ad hoc quod conveniat rebus. Dant autem rationem ordinis qui est inter primam intentionem et secundam quia sicut modus realis est primus, sic intentio sumpta a reali modo est intentio prima, et sicut 15 modus essendi rationis est modus modum autem realem necessario presupponens, sic intentio sumpta a tali modo est intentio secunda, intentionem primam ante se presupponens. De quinta opinione 39 Opinio alia fuit quorundam36 dicentium quod intentio est habitudo 20

rationis rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi. Quod probatur quia: Intentio vel est res ipsa que intelligitur, vel actus intelligendi, vel habitudo actus intelligendi ad rem intellectam, vel habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi. Non est autem aliquid priorum trium modorum, cum omnia sint realia vere: tam res que intelliguntur, quam actus quo 25 intelliguntur, quam habitudo vel relatio qua actus intelligendi realira M78 ter ad obiectum refertur. Restat | igitur quod sit quartum, videlicet habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi. Hoc autem intelligendum est de intentione sumpta formaliter et in abstracto, que dicitur esse ipsa intentionalitas secundum quam aliquid dicitur intentio prima vel 30

16 est … modum] O est modus modus Mc modus M patet M 29 esse] UNS om. MV

21 probatur] UNS probant V

36 Sc. Hervaei Natalis eiusque sequacium. Conferas nostri auctoris In I Sent. dist. 7am, art. 1um: “Quantum ad primum sciendum est quod fuit opinio cuiusdam doctoris, scilicet magistri Hervei de Ordine Predicatorum, quod intentio est habitudo rationis rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi”.

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secunda, logice accipiendo ‘intentionem’. Dicit37 enim quod intentio in concreto potest sumi dupliciter: primo modo pure materialiter pro eo quod substernitur intentionalitati, ut lignum, album; alio modo pro aggregato ex fundamento et ipsa intentionalitate. Intentionem primo modo sumptam in concreto dicit esse rem que intelligitur, sumptam vero secundo modo dicit esse rem cum intentionalitate. Et hec probari possunt ex comparatione concreti ad abstractum. De differentia vero et ordine prime intentionis et secunde dicit quod 40 duo sunt genera intelligibilium, secundum duos modos essendi entium: unus est modus essendi realis, alius est modus essendi rationis. Et istam distinctionem modorum posuimus in precedenti opinione. Modum essendi realem vocat (sicut dictum est supra) omnem modum positivum vel privativum, absolutum vel respectivum, verum vel fictitium, qui ante operationem intellectus competit rebus, non dependens ab opere intellectus. Modum vero essendi secundum rationem vocat omnem modum qui solum competit rebus prout sunt obiective in intellectu. Primum ergo genus intelligibilium est genus intelligibilium secun- 41 dum modum essendi realem, secundum vero genus intelligibilium est genus intelligibilium secundum modum rationis. Dicit ergo primam intentionem in concreto esse rem primi generis, secundum quod intentio in concreto dicit rem solam que intentionalitati substernitur et ab ipsa denominatur; secundam vero intentionem in concreto dicit rem secundi generis, secundum quod intentio in concreto sumitur pro re sola que intentionalitati substernitur. Primam autem intentionem in abstracto dicit esse habitudinem rei primi generis intellecte ad actum intelligendi; secundam vero intentionem in abstracto dicit habitudinem esse et rei secundi generis | intellecte ad actum intelligendi. M78rb Et sic apparet intentio eorum de intentione in communi, et de differentia prime et secunde.

1 intentionem] istam rationem facit in 2a questione improbatis duabus opinionibus in ponendo suam add. MO sed del. Mc 2 pure] O om. M 4–6 intentionem … intentionalitate] O om. M 17 est … intelligibilium] McO om. M 27 esse] et add. M 28 eorum] M ipsius doctoris O 37

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus dist. II, q. 6c.

406

pars prima Quod Herveus aliter videtur dicere in quadam questione

42 Aliter autem doctor huius operis videtur dicere quantum ad aliqua in

questione qua queritur utrum sola habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi sit secunda intentio. Obicit38 enim contra se et obiectioni respondet, suam sententiam explicans sub hiis verbis: 5 “Contra illud quod frequenter dictum est, scilicet quod intentionalitas secundum quam dicitur aliquid prima intentio vel secunda, est habitudo predicta rei intellecte ad intellectum, et nullum aliud, quia constat quod genus et abstractum et universale et similia dicunt intentiones in concreto; ergo abstracta eorum dicunt intentiones in abstracto, scilicet 10 generalitas, abstractio, universalitas. Sed talia non dicunt habitudinem unius rei intellecte ad intellectum, sed magis dicunt habitudinem unius rei intellecte ad aliam rem intellectam. Ergo intentionalitas in abstracto non convenit solum illi habitudini sed etiam aliis.

M78

Ad huius igitur evidentiam sciendum quod quando aliquid denominatur ab aliquo formaliter, illud quod a forma illa denominatur, sive accipiatur in concreto sive in abstracto, non est illa forma a qua denominatur ita quod accipiamus subiectum illius forme denominantis circumscripta forma. Verbi gratia, homo denominatur ‘albus’ ab albedine, homo autem nec in concreto nec in abstracto est albedo, quia nec homo nec humanitas est albedo (aliter homo etiam dicitur concretive intentio prima); homo autem nec concretive nec abstractive acceptus est ipsa intentionalitas abstracta; et sicut homo non est intentionalitas abstracta, sic nec humanitas. Secundo sciendum est quod ‘intentio’ dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo prout distinguitur esse intentionale contra esse reale et dicit mere ens rationis; et sic intentio, qualitercumque accipiatur, | dicit, formaliter loquendo, ens rationis. Alio modo dicitur intentio terminatio secundum quam obiectum dicitur terminare actum intelligendi modo quo supra est expositum. Secundum quam determinationem dicitur aliquid prima vel secunda intentio denominative secundum duplex genus intelligibilium, prout superius est dictum.

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Modo dico quod intentio primo modo dicta convenit non solum habitudini rei intellecte ad intellectum, sed etiam habitudini rei intellecte ad aliam rem intellectam. Sicut cum dico: ‘hec universalitas’ vel ‘hec generalitas’, et ea que privationem secundum rem dicunt, sicut ‘abstractum’ 35 6 scilicet] McO om. M 7 quam] quod MO 8–12 ad intellectum … rei intellecte] O om. M 8 intellectum] sed magis dicuntur (!) habitudinem unius rei ad intellectum perperam inseruit M 17 forma] O om. M 19 forma] O om. M 20 homo autem] O om. M 29 dicitur] O om. M 32 solum] om. M 33 etiam] suppl. coll. textu Hervaei om. MO 34 hec] O om. M 38

Ibid., ad fin.

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vel aliquid tale. Sed intentio secundo modo dicta non convenit nisi habitudini rei intellecte ad intellectum in actu, si accipiatur intentio sic dicta in abstracto, quia talis intentio (ut supra dictum est) non est aliud nisi ipsa formalis terminatio secundum quam obiectum cognitum dicitur terminare actum intelligendi, qui secundum rationem intelligendi accipitur ut quidam actus tendens in obiectum. Hiis premissis potest responderi ad obiectionem factam quod, si accipiatur intentio prout dividitur contra esse reale, sic esse intentionem non convenit soli illi habitudini, sed si accipiatur ‘intentio’ pro ipsa terminatione actus intelligendi secundum quam (ut dictum est) denominatur obiectum intelligibile prima vel secunda intentio, sic accepta non convenit soli habitudini, sed cuilibet obiecto intelligibili in concreto. Et sciendum quod, ut ex hiis que dicta sunt apparet quod dicta habitudo est intentio prout distinguitur contra esse reale, quia talis habitudo non ponitur relatio realis et est intentio prout ‘intentio’ dicit terminationem predictam actus intelligendi secundum quam denominantur obiecta concretive prima vel secunda intentio. Et ex hoc ulterius apparet quod predicta habitudo est ipsa intentionalitas abstracta secundum quam, ut modo dictum est, dicuntur obiecta prima vel secunda intentio concretive, prima quidem inquantum est predicta terminatio sive habitudo obiecti modo predicto, et est concretive secunda intentio, inquantum potest esse quoddam obiectum intellectum pertinens ad secundum genus intelligibilium’.”

Et hec de secundo articulo sufficiant.

6 tendens] O intendens M 8–9 prout … intentio] McO om. M 11 intelligibile] O intentionale M | intentio] MO et intentio add. M | non] O om. M 12 cuilibet] McO cui M | intelligibili] O intentionali M 14 distinguitur] O sumitur Mc om. M | habitudo] O om. M 18 ut] suppl. coll. textu Hervaei om. MO 20 prima quidem] suppl. coll. textu Hervaei om. MO

articulus iii QUOD NON OMNIS SECUNDA INTENTIO DEPENDET AB INTELLECTU 43 Discussio predictarum opinionum quantum ad illud commune in quo

omnes conveniunt, respicit tantum unam conclusionem que ab eis 5 M78vb abstrahi potest. Et est quod omnis secunda intentio | dependet ab

intellectu. Hanc autem reputo falsam. Et probo suam contradictoriam esse veram. De tribus premittendis 44 Ne tamen dici possit quod ad nomen, non ad intellectum, ad vocem, 10

non ad rem disputem premitto tria. Primum quod omnis ars et omnis scientia est de intentionibus; secundo quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis; tertio quod scientie que vocantur reales, sunt de primis intentionibus. Primum probo per Avicennam, in principio primi Metaphisice, ubi ait39: “Postquam auxilio Dei complevimus tracta- 15 tum de intentionibus scientiarum logicarum et naturalium et doctrinalium, convenientius est accedere ad cognitionem intentionum sapientialium”. Ex quibus apparet quod ipse vocat tractatus, artes et scientias continentes tractatus de intentionibus scientiarum et artium; quod non faceret nisi artes et scientie essent de intentionibus. Secundum et ter- 20 tium probo per eundem, in eodem, capitulo secundo, ubi ait40: “Subiectum vero logice (ut scisti) sunt intentiones intellecte secundo que apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis”. Hic autem vocat ‘intentiones intellectas secundo’ intentiones secundas, et ‘intellectas primo’ intentiones primas. Quare expresse dicit logicam esse de secundis intentioni- 25 bus. Et ex eodem patet tertium quoniam: Intentiones logice apponuntur intentionibus aliarum scientiarum. Semper autem apponuntur pri7 falsam] utrum omnis secunda intentio sit ab intellectu. Respondet quod non contra herveum add. Mm 21 capitulo secundo] M commento quarto O 39 40

Prima philosophia, tr. I, p. 14–6. Ibid., tr. VI 2, p. 1073–75.

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mis. Ergo intentiones aliarum scientiarum sunt intentiones prime. Hec autem plenius determinabuntur infra. De tribus inferendis Ex hiis tribus infero alia tria. Primum quod termini omnium scientia- 45 5 rum et artium significant intentiones primas vel secundas, eo modo quo Avicenna utitur hoc nomine ‘intentio’; quod patet, exquo scientie et artes sunt de intentionibus et non sunt nisi de significatis suorum terminorum. Secundum quod intentiones prime sunt ea que significantur per terminos proprios realium scientiarum et artium; quod patet ut pri10 mum. Tertium quod intentiones secunde sunt ea que significantur per terminos logicales; quod patet ut primum et secundum. Nunc igitur habeo quod termini logicales significant secundas intentiones; termini vero logicales sunt ‘singulare’, ‘universale’, ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘predicabile’ et termini aliorum predicabilium. 46 15 Probato igitur quod tales | termini habeant pro significatis primis M79ra aliqua non dependentia ab intellectu, probatum erit quod non omnis secunda intentio dependet ab intellectu. Et erit disputatio ad intellectum, non ad nomen, ad rem significatam, non ad vocem significantem. Primo ergo probo ostensive, secundo ducendo ad impossibile.

20

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Primum sic. Omnium dependentium ab intellectu diffinitiones aliquid 47 includunt dependens ab intellectu; aliter enim non essent diffinitiones nisi aliquid includerent de esse diffiniti. Sed non omnium secundarum intentionum diffinitiones aliquid includunt dependens ab intel25 lectu. Ergo non omnes intentiones secunde dependent ab intellectu. Maior evidens, et est probata. Et confirmari potest per illud41 quarti

1–2 hec … infra] M hec autem superius sunt declarata O num M 8–10 prime … intentiones] O om. M

6 intentio] O intentio-

41 Arist., Metaph. IV 7, 1012a23–24: “Diffinitio vero fit ex significare aliquid necessario res esse. Ratio namque cuius nomen est signum, diffinitio est rei” (transl. Moerbekiana). Conferas autem Thomam Aquinatem, In IV Arist. Metaph., num. 733: “Nam ratio quam nomen significat, est definitio rei”.

410

pars prima

Metaphisice quod ratio quam significat nomen est sua diffinitio. Si ergo diffinitio nichil includit dependens ab intellectu, nomen diffiniti nichil significat dependens ab intellectu.

de prima ratione ad principale 48 Minor probatur inducendo per multas diffinitiones. Et primo per diffi- 5

nitionem ‘singularis’, quod sic diffinitur: ‘singulare vel individuum vel particulare signatum est indivisum in se et divisum a quocumque alio’. Hec enim diffinitio convenit uni numero, quod idem est quod particulare vel singulare vel individuum, ut patet tertio Metaphisice. Nam, ut ait42 Philosophus: “‘Numero unum’ aut ‘singulare’ dicere nichil differt”. In antiqua vero translatione dicit43 sic: “Nulla differentia est inter sermonem dicentem ‘unum numero’ et dicentem ‘unum particulare’”. Ubi Commentator dicit44 quod ‘unum numero’ est sinonimum nomen cum ‘particulari’. Ex quo patet quod eadem est diffinitio utrorumque. Hec autem diffinitio nichil includit dependens ab intellectu, quia nec esse divisum nec hoc quod dicitur ‘in se’ nec ipsa alietas aliquid includit dependens ab intellectu. Quod evidens est de se. Et etiam probatur quoniam aliter nichil esset unum numero nisi per intellectum; et inconveniens illud non eget ampliori declaratione. Relinquitur ergo quod secunda intentio singularitatis et particularitatis et individualitatis non dependet ab intellectu. 49 Ad hoc respondet quidam,45 cuius intellectus facit secundas intentiones omnes de quibus est logica, ut dicit et facit libellum De intentioniM79rb bus, | dicens46 quod singulare vel singularitas, ut est idem quod unum numero, non dependet ab intellectu sed est ex natura rei; sed singulare consideratum a logico dependet ab intellectu, quia dicit predicabilitatem de uno solo, que predicabilitas dependet ab intellectu, et dicit esse

1 quam] O quod M 5 inducendo] O ducendo M autem M 13 numero] O numerum M

9 tertio] O quarto M

10 aut] O

Metaph. III 4, 999b33–34. Transl. Michaelis Scoti. 44 Averroes, In III Arist. Metaph., ad 999b33–34. 45 Sc. Hervaeus Natalis. Videas nostri auctoris In I Sent. dist. 12am, art. 2um: “(…) opinio fuit magistri hervei in illo libello de intentionibus quod singulare vel singularitas, ut est idem quod unum numero, non dependet ab intellectu sed est ex natura rei”. 46 Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 3, resp. init. 42 43

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partem subiectivam speciei vel generis. Hoc autem quod est ‘esse partem subiectivam’ dependet ab intellectu, et per consequens ipsa singularitas. Hec autem solutio vel responsio deficit in quatuor. Primo quia dicit 50 5 aliud esse singulare quod est idem quod unum numero, et aliud quod consideratur a logico; secundo quia dicit singulare consideratum a logico importare predicabilitatem; tertio quia dicit predicabilitatem dependere ab intellectu; quarto quia dicit hoc quod est ‘esse partem subiectivam’ dependere ab intellectu. 10

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Quod ‘singulare’ logicaliter sumptum est idem quod ‘unum numero’ Primum patet, quia logicus ponens differentiam inter universale et sin- 51 gulare utitur eo ut ‘uno secundum numerum’ et sicut aliquo indivisibili significato in rerum natura, ut patet47 primo Posteriorum: “Universale est ubique et semper, singulare vero est hic et nunc”; esse autem hic et nunc non debetur alicui per intellectum. Ymo istemet doctor dicit48 logicas intentiones in nullo esse ut in subiecto prout in loco; quare non debet dicere singulare logicum esse tale quid fantasiacum. Item, primo Phisicorum49: “Universale dum intelligitur, particulare dum sentitur”. Item, in Predicamentis50: “Secunda substantia videtur significare hoc aliquid, non tamen significat, sed potius quale quid”; et redditur ratio quia non est unum numero subiectum, idest significatum eius quemadmodum prima substantia. Ex hiis probo quod singulare logice consideratum sit singulare quod 52 est in rerum natura, quoniam: Singulare cui debetur esse nunc et esse hic, esse sensatum et esse hoc aliquid est singulare naturale. Sed singulare logicum ut dividitur contra naturale et ut consideratur a logico est huiusmodi, ut patet ex premissis. Ergo ipsum est singulare quod est unum numero, quod conceditur ab ipso esse penitus naturale. Et quod concedit confirmatur, quia in tota logica non invenitur unum verbum de singularitate facta per istum. Ego vero non curo nisi de sin-

13 est] O et M 18 phisicorum] posteriorum MO 29 quod concedit] coni. concedit M om. O 30 istum] venerabilem doctorem add. US universalem doctorem add. NV 47 48 49 50

Arist., Anal. Post. I 31, 87b29–33. Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. V, q. 3, resp. Arist., Phys. I 5, 189a5–8. Arist., Categ. 5, 3b13–16.

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pars prima

M79va gularitate | logica. Item. Singulare metaphisicum non differt ab uno

secundum numerum, ut allegatum est supra ex tertio51 Metaphisice. Sed singulare logicum est singulare metaphisicum. Ergo singulare logicum nichil differt ab uno secundum numerum. Assumptum probo secundum Commentatorem super tertium Metaphicice, ubi proponit Philosophus questiones, querens hanc questionem, utrum philosophus primus consideret de rebus de quibus logici tractant. Et super hoc dicit52 Commentator: “Philosophus et logicus conveniunt in perscrutatione de istis rebus, quia uterque considerat de ente simpliciter”. Et hoc idem dicit ibi et Philosophus et Commentator. Quare eadem res est singularitas logica seu considerata per logicum et considerata per metaphisicum. Hii enim non differunt in re considerata, sed in modo. 53 Et si diceretur quod metaphisicus non considerat per se has intentiones singularitatis et universalitatis, contra: Per Avicennam, primo Metaphisice, capitulo quarto:53 “Hec scientia (scilicet metaphisica) inquirit intentiones que non sunt ex accidentibus propriis ipsarum causarum inquantum sunt cause: inquirit enim universale et particulare, potentiam et effectum, possibile et necessarium”. Sicut ergo intentiones actus et potentie, possibilis et necessarii cadunt per se sub consideratione primi philosophi, sic et intentiones universalis et particularis. Ex hiis ergo habeo quod consideratum a logico singulare est idem quod unum numero. In cuius opposito fundata erat predicta responsio.

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Quod singulare logicum non includit predicabilitatem 54 Secundo ostendo quod singulare logicum non includat predicabilitatem

quia: A quo nulla est predicatio, nullam includit predicabilitatem. A 25 singulari nulla est predicatio. Ergo etc. Minor probatur ex Predicamentis, capitulo primo de substantia:54 “A principali igitur substantia nulla est predicatio”; ‘principalis vero substantia’ sumitur ibi pro prima et singulari substantia; quod patet. Hoc idem patet, quia primo Peryermenias describitur per non esse aptum natum predicari. Dicit55 enim Philoso- 30

1 metaphisicum] O logicum M 51 52 53 54 55

2 tertio] quarto MO

Arist., Metaph. III 4, 999b33–34. Averroes, In III Arist. Metaph., Fol. 39C12-D1. Avicenna, Prima philosophia I, tr. 1, p. 612–14. Arist., Categ. 5, 3a36–37 (Arist. Lat., editio composita). Arist., De interpr. 7, 17a38–40.

7 rebus de] O om. M

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phus: “Rerum quidem hee sunt universalia, hee autem singularia; universale autem dico quod in pluribus natum est predicari, | singulare M79vb vero quod non”. Hoc idem probo ratione. Et amovebo motivum dicentium opposi- 55 tum. Moventur enim aliqui ad credendum quod singulare predicetur de uno, quia predicetur de seipso, dicendo ‘Sortes est Sortes’; et per consequens credunt quod singulare includat huiusmodi predicabilitatem que est de uno solo. Ad evidentiam huius premitto duo. Primum quod ‘predicatum’ sumitur dupliciter. Primo modo pro altero duorum terminorum in quos resolvitur propositio, apposito vel diviso ‘esse’ vel ‘non esse’, ut habetur56 primo Priorum. Et hoc modo dicitur ‘predicatum’ de termino potius quam de significato termini. Ut cum dico ‘homo non est asinus’, hic est predicatum iste terminus ‘asinus’, non tamen significatum ‘asini’, secundum quod predicatio respicit significata terminorum. Alio modo dicitur predicatum illud quod est manifestatum de aliquo quod insit ei. Et secundum hanc intentionem describitur57 ‘predicari’ primo Topicorum per hoc quod est ‘convenienter responderi ad interrogationem factam de aliquo’. Interrogatio enim querit aliquid manifestari de illo de quo queritur, ut cum queritur ‘quid est homo?’, queritur manifestatio quidditatis hominis de homine. Hoc ergo erat primum. Secundum est quod licet omnis propositio includat predicatum primo modo sumptum, non tamen predicatum secundo modo sumptum, nec per consequens predicationem acceptam ut accipitur in descriptione predicabilium, quia ‘predicatio’ sumitur in illa descriptione eo modo quo ‘predicatum’ sumitur in secunda significatione. Ex hiis autem apparet quod non est bonum motivum quod, si hec 56 propositio ‘Sortes est Sortes’ est vera, quod Sortes predicetur de Sorte. Quod probo, simul probando quod Sortes non possit (vel quodlibet aliud singulare) de seipso predicari; et per consequens manifestum erit quod ‘singulare’ non includit predicabilitatem. Et arguo sic. Omne quod potest predicari de Sorte, convenienter responderi potest ad interrogationem factam de Sorte (patet ex primo Topicorum).58 Sed ‘Sor-

9 pro] O quod M | duorum] O om. M 11 ut] UNS om. MV 12 est] O et M 15 est] UNS om. MV 21 est] UNS om. MV | primo] O illo sic saepius M 23 descriptione] O predicatio(!) M 56 57 58

Arist., Anal. Pr. I 1, 24b16–18. Arist., Top. I 5, 102a32–35. Ibid.

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tes’ non potest convenienter responderi ad interrogationem factam de Sorte. Ergo Sortes non potest predicari de Sorte. 57 Minorem probo. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod, iuxta illud M80ra commune dictum, in omni questione et interrogatione aliquid | supponitur et aliquid queritur, et aliud queritur et aliud supponitur. Illud autem quod queritur respondetur si responsio detur; aliter non esset responsio. Si enim queram ‘Qualis est homo?’ et dicatur michi ‘Deus fecit hominem’, non est michi responsum, quia non querebam ‘Quis fecit hominem?’, sed qualis erat homo. Illud vero quod supponitur non queritur, quoniam aliud est suppositum, aliud quesitum, sicut supponere et querere, tamquam ea que includunt contradictoria. Tunc arguo sic. Quod supponitur in questione facta de Sorte, non potest responderi ad questionem factam de Sorte sub eodem nomine, sub eadem ratione, sub eodem conceptu. Sed Sortes supponitur in questione facta de Sorte sub eodem nomine, sub eadem ratione, sub eodem conceptu. Ergo ‘Sortes’ non potest responderi ad interrogationem, vel ad questionem, factam de Sorte. Et sic patet minor que probanda fuerat principalis argumenti. Maior autem huius prosillogismi patet per premissa. Si enim quis respondere voluerit quod non querebatur, minime respondit. Quod autem supponebatur, non querebatur sub eodem nomine, sub eadem ratione, sub eodem conceptu. Cum autem dico ‘Sortes est Sortes’, ab utraque parte orationis ponitur idem et sub nomine eodem et sub eadem ratione et sub eodem conceptu. Quare idem ponitur a parte predicati ac si detur pro responso quod supponebatur penitus et non querebatur. Quare numquam est michi responsum querenti ‘Quid est Sortes?’, si dictum fuerit ‘Sortes’. Ex hiis igitur manifestum est quod, licet vere dicatur ‘Sortes est Sortes’, tamen Sortes non predicatur de Sorte, nisi quod hic terminus ‘Sortes’ sumptus ab utraque parte orationis ab una dicitur subiectum, ab alia predicatum, sicut si dicerem ‘Sortes non est Brunellus’. 58 Si vero obiciatur contra Porfirium, qui dicit59 singulare predicari de uno solo, respondendum est quod Porfirius, introductionis modo loquens (ut ipse testatur60 in principio libri sui) nec multum attentus ad 7 queram] NV queras M queratur US 14–15 sed … conceptu] suppl. coll. N om. MUVS 21–22 sortes] McO om. M 22–29 ponitur idem … orationis] McO om. M 24 quod] suppl. om. MO 31 porfirium] UcNS philosophum MUV 32 porfirius] O philosophus M 59 60

Porphyrius, Isag. 2, 17–19 Busse, tr. Boethii, Arist. Lat. p. 7. Conferas ibid. 1, 7–10, p. 5.

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virtutem vocabulorum, pro eodem sumpsit ‘affirmari de seipso’ et ‘predicari de seipso’, licet secundum artem et secundum veritatem et secundum Aristotilem multum differant; quod apparet, quoniam inferiora predicari non possunt proprie de superioribus, possunt tamen veraciter 5 affirmari, quod ostendit conversio; si enim homo est animal, sequitur ‘ergo animal est homo’. Eodem modo dicendum est ad Boetium dicentem:61 ‘Nulla propositio verior illa in qua idem predicatur de seipso’; glossandum est: ‘predicatur’, idest ‘affirmatur’. Aristotiles tamen, cui magis credendum est, omnia ista negat, ut supra dictum est. Concludo 10 ergo quod ‘singulare’ logice sumptum, exquo nec de seipso nec de alio predicari potest, non includit predicabilitatem. In cuius opposito fundata | fuerat predicta responsio. M80rb Quod predicabilitas non dependet ab intellectu Tertio ostendo quod predicabilitas non dependet ab intellectu. Distin- 59 guo tamen de predicabilitate quoniam alia est predicabilitas termini, alia rei significate per terminum. Predicabilitas termini nichil aliud est quam sumptibilitas eius in enuntiatione post copulam implicitam vel explicitam; implicitam, ut ‘homo currit’, explicitam, ut ‘homo est currens’; hoc modo sumitur primo Priorum, ut dictum est supra. Predica20 bilitas autem rei significate per terminum est manifestabilitas eius de re significata per alium terminum; et hoc modo sumitur primo Priorum, ubi dividitur62 predicatio dicens ‘hoc est hoc’ ab aliis. Cum enim dicimus ‘Homo est animal’, res significata per hunc terminum ‘animal’ predicatur de re subiecta, significata per hunc terminum ‘homo’, predi25 catione dicente ‘hoc est hoc’, quia sensus est quod res que est homo est res que est animal. Non tamen termini predicantur de se invicem, quia hic terminus ‘homo’ non est hic terminus ‘animal’. Quare patet quod alia est predicabilitas termini, alia rei significate per terminum. Ego autem probare volo et loqui de predicabilitate rei significate 60 30 per terminum, quoniam illa includitur in quolibet predicabili. De alia vero non est questio, quia certum est quod intellectus largitur terminis 15

2–3 et … aristotilem] O om. M 7 propositio] UV predicatio NS 8 tamen] O om. M ad 13 utrum predicabilitas dependeat ab intellectu. Respondet quod non contra herveum add. M 22 dividitur] O dicitur M 24 significata … homo] NVS om. MU 61 62

Boethius, In Arist. Periherm. ed. Ia, p. 21518–20; ed. IIa, p. 4807–9. Arist., Anal. Pr. I 46, 51b5–7.

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esse significativum, et per consequens quod possunt supponere sic vel sic. Et ita palam est quod ipsa talis predicabilitas dependet ab intellectu. 61 De secunda vero probo quod non. Et hoc sic. Intelligibilitas seu manifestabilitas rerum non dependet ab intellectu. Sed predicabilitas est quedam intelligibilitas et quedam manifestabilitas. Ergo non dependet ab intellectu. Maior apparet quoniam: Omnis res intelligibilis et manifestabilis prius natura necessario est intelligibilis et manifestabilis intellectui quam intelligatur seu intellectui manifestetur. Ergo prius natura habet intelligibilitatem et manifestabilitatem. Minor etiam est evidens cuicumque intelligenti quid importatur per nomen ‘predicationis’; idem enim significant ‘predicare’ et ‘manifestare’, et ‘predicari’ et M80va ‘manifestari’, ‘predicatio’ | et ‘manifestatio’, ‘predicabilitas’ et ‘manifestabilitas’. Sed manifestabilitas qua aliquid potest manifestari intellectui, non est nisi intelligibilitas. Quare nec ipsa predicabilitas, cum sit idipsum quod manifestabilitas. 62 Est autem considerandum quod intellectio vel manifestatio possunt concernere duo tantum, vel possunt concernere tria. Duo, ut cum res simpliciter intelligitur, tunc intellectio non concernit nisi intellectum et rem intellectam; tria vero, cum non intelligitur res simpliciter sed aliquid de re, ut cum non intelligitur homo simpliciter, sed animalitas intelligitur de homine; tunc enim intellectio concernit intellectum et illud quod intelligitur (puta animalitatem) et illud de quo vel in quo intelligitur (puta hominem). Et simile huius habetur63 quarto Topicorum de donatione, que respicit dantem et recipientem et rem datam. 63 Predicabilitas autem predicabilium logicaliter acceptorum dicit manifestabilitatem seu intelligibilitatem secundum quod intelligibilitas concernit duo ex parte obiecti, scilicet quod manifestatur et de quo manifestatur. Semper enim dicit habitudinem eius quod intelligitur ad illud de quo intelligitur. Obiecta tamen sunt ex natura rei, scilicet animalitatem posse manifestare intellectui et posse manifestari in homine vel de homine. Dico autem ‘in homine vel de homine’, quoniam aliquando philosophi utuntur hac prepositione ‘in’, aliquando ‘de’. Aristo-

6 et] O om. M 16 idipsum] McO ad ipsum M 20 simpliciter] O om. M 27 intelligibilitatem] O manifestabilitatem(!) M 30 scilicet] O om. M 33 prepositione] propositione sic semper MO 63

Arist., Top. IV 4, 125a16–17.

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tiles primo Peryermenias dicit:64 “Universale dico quod est aptum natum in pluribus predicari”; Porfirius dicit65 “de pluribus”. Infra66 reddetur ratio de utroque. Ex hiis autem patet ad principale propositum argumentum quoniam 64 5 si predicabilitas predicabilium logicorum non dependet ab intellectu (ut probatum est) et ipsa est quedam secunda intentio, necessario sequitur quod non omnis secunda intentio dependet ab intellectu. Concludo ergo quod predicabilitas non dependet ab intellectu. In cuius opposito predicta responsio fundabatur. 10

Quod esse partem subiectivam non dependet ab intellectu

Quarto ostendo quod esse partem subiectivam non dependet ab intel- 65 lectu. Et primo accipio quid est esse partem alicuius, secundo quid est esse partem subiectivam. De primo dico quod esse partem est esse aliquid alicuius | et non totum illud. De secundo dico quod esse partem M80vb 15 subiectivam est esse tale quid, sed non omne tale, ut esse partem subiectivam hominis nichil aliud est quam esse hominem, sed non omnem hominem. Et quod ita sit patet, quoniam, hoc stante solum, quolibet alio per impossibile circumscripto, necesse est stare partem subiectivam. Hoc enim stante quod aliqua res sit homo, non tamen omnis 20 homo, necesse est rem illam esse partem hominis subiectivam. Ex hoc arguo sic. Sortem hominem esse et non omnem hominem esse in nullo dependet ab intellectu. Sed Sortem hominem esse et non omnem hominem esse est Sortem esse partem subiectivam hominis. Ergo esse partem subiectivam non dependet ab intellectu. In cuius opposito pre25 missa responsio fundabatur. Quod nulla diffinitio ‘singularis’ includit aliquid dependens ab intellectu Sic ergo patet non fuisse responsum ad rationem probantem quod dif- 66 finitio ‘singularis’ nichil includit dependens ab intellectu. Potest etiam alia diffinitio dari de singulari, que magis est logica. Et est quod sin30 gulare est ‘quod est indivisibile in plures partes quarum quelibet sit 15–16 est … subiectivam] O om. M 64 65 66

28 singularis] O om. M

Arist., De interpr. 7, 17a39–40. Porphyrius, Isag. 2, 17–19 Busse; tr. Boethii, Arist. Lat. p. 7. Sect. 78.

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ipsum’. Et datur ad oppositum ad rationem universalis, quod est ‘divisibile et repartibile in plures partes quarum quelibet sit ipsum’. Homo enim divisibilis est in Sortem et Platonem, quorum quilibet est ipsum et homo. 67 De ista etiam diffinitione patet quod nichil est includens dependens 5 ab intellectu. In hac enim diffinitione aliquid includitur tamquam additamentum, scilicet res ipsa divisibilis que includitur in hac dictione ‘quod’, et aliquid tamquam formale, scilicet ipsa indivisibilitas, que dicit impossibilitatem ad divisionem, et aliquid tamquam terminus divisionis private per indivisibilitatem, scilicet partes tales. Primum autem, sci- 10 licet res ipsa, non dependet abintellectu. Nec secundum, ipsa scilicet indivisibilitas, quia indivisibilitas nulla datur rei exteriori per intellectum. Nec tertium. Quare patet quod nulla diffinitio singularis includit aliquid dependens ab intellectu nostro. Quod diffinitiones ‘universalis’ nichil includunt dependens ab intellectu

15

68 Probata igitur minori propositione principalis rationis per inductionem

in diffinitione huius intentionis ‘singulare’, probo eam per inductionem in diffinitione plurium aliarum. Et primo in diffinitione universalis et predicabilis, secundo in diffinitionibus predicabilium singulorum. Universale autem aliquando diffinitur per esse, aliquando per predicari. 20 Et hoc secundo modo habet eandem diffinitionem cum predicabili. ra M81 Per esse vero diffinitur tripliciter. | Primo sic: ‘universale est quod est aptum natum in pluribus esse’; secundo sic: ‘universale est quod est unum in multis’; tertio sic: ‘universale est quod est unum de multis’. De istis tribus diffinitionibus ostendo quod nichil includunt dependens ab 25 intellectu. 69 Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod secundum doctrinam Philosophi septimo Metaphisice 67 quedam sunt accidentium que diffiniuntur per modum accidentium absolutorum, quedam per modum accidentium respectivorum. Ea que diffiniuntur per modum accidentium abso- 30 lutorum, diffiniuntur per additamentum generis subicibilis, ut ‘simus est nasus cavus’, et per aliquid sibi essentiale de genere predicabili. (Nasus 2 repartibile] coni. repperibile MO 3 et] O om. M 21 diffinitionem] O intentionem M 23 est] McO om. M 28–30 quedam … respectivorum] Vc om. MO 30–31 absolutorum] suppl. coni. om. MO 67

Videas Arist., Metaph. VII 1, 1025b30 sqq.; 5, 1030b29–35.

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enim ponitur pro genere circa quod nata est fieri simitas, quod supplet locum differentie, cavitas vero ponitur pro genere essentiali et predicabili). Ea vero que diffiniuntur per modum accidentium respectivorum diffiniuntur et per genus subicibile et per genus predicabile et ultra hoc per terminum.68 Ut si diffiniatur paternitas, dicetur quod est habitudo eius qui genuit ad eum qui genitus est vel natus. Nunc autem ita est quod universale diffinitur per modum accidentis respectivi. Et ideo ponuntur hec tria in qualibet eius diffinitione. Cum enim dicitur in prima diffinitione quod universale est quod est aptum natum in pluribus esse, res intellecta in illo neutro ‘quod’ substantivato ponitur pro subiecto, sed illa plura in quibus potest esse pro termino et obiecto, illa vero possibilitas essendi in pluribus seu aptitudo ponitur pro genere predicabili. Tunc arguo sic ad propositum quod hec diffinitio nichil includat dependens ab intellectu: Res posita pro genere subiecto non dependet ab intellectu, nec ipsa plura posita pro obiecto, nec ipsa possibilitas posita pro genere predicabili. Sed omne inclusum in hac diffinitione est aliquid istorum trium. Ergo nullum in hac diffinitione inclusum dependet ab intellectu. Minor est evidens ex premissis. Maior autem patet discurrenti per partes eius. Nec enim ipsa res subiecta (puta homo vel animal) dependet ab intellectu, nec ipsi termini (puta ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’), nec ipsa possibilitas | essendi in pluribus, quia constat quod Deus et natura possunt facere duos asinos et per consequens asinum esse in hoc supposito et in illo, absque omni dependentia ab intellectu nostro. Sed nec Deus nec natura posset facere sine possibilitate essendi asinum et naturam asini in hiis duobus suppositis duos asinos; necesse est enim si sunt duo asini, quod habeant in se naturam asini. Si ergo fieret sine possibilitate, impossibile esset possibile. Quare illa possibilitas posita in diffinitione ‘universalis’ non dependet ab intellectu. Sic ergo patet quod in prima diffinitione ‘universalis’ nichil includitur dependens ab intellectu. Hoc idem probo de secunda, in qua includitur fundamentum seu genus subiectum. Ipsa res (puta animal), de qua constat quod non dependet ab intellectu, et terminus seu obiectum, ipsa scilicet multa in quibus est, de quibus constat quod non dependent ab intellectu. Et 4 diffiniuntur] NVc om. MUV dependent] UVS dependet MN 68

32 hoc … probo] O circa idem. Probo M

Sc. terminum sive fundamentum relationis.

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ponitur genus essentiale et predicabile, scilicet ipsa unitas que secum compatitur multitudinem; que est unitas generis vel speciei. De qua probo quod non dependet ab intellectu per duas rationes adpresens, quoniam infra certius probabitur quod unitas generis vel speciei non dependet ab intellectu. 73 Prima talis est. Quecumque res exteriores sunt per se unum, sunt unum unitate non facta per intellectum; contradictio enim esset quod essent per se unum et tamen per aliud contingenter respiciens eas. Sed ea que sunt unum unitate speciei vel generis, sunt per se unum, ut habetur69 quinto Metaphisice, distinctione de ‘Uno’. Ergo hec unitas non est ab intellectu. 74 Secundo ex eodem quinto70: Nullum exactum exigentia naturali ad effectum naturalem, qualitercumque exactum fuerit, sive ut principium sive ut condicio principiorum, vel quocumque modo, dependet ab intellectu; hec ex se est evidentissima. Sed unitas generis vel speciei est exacta ad effectum naturalem. Ergo non dependet ab intellectu. Minor probatur quia: Impossibile est naturaliter generare equum nisi masculus et femella sint eiusdem speciei; impossibile est generari mulum nisi M81va masculus et femella | sint eiusdem generis et diversarum specierum. Et impossibile est ab albedine subiectum alterari nisi ad formam unius generis cum albedine; non enim fit ex albo dulce sed ex albo nigrum, ut habetur71 primo Phisicorum et decimo Metaphisice; impossibile est etiam fieri mixtionem nisi miscibilia sint eiusdem generis, et maxime quantum ad materiam, ut habetur72 primo De generatione. Ergo talis unitas generis et speciei necessario exacta ad effectum naturalem non dependet ab intellectu, cum effectus naturalis non dependeat ab intellectu. 75 Tertia talis est. Res naturales ex natura sua sunt differentes sine opere intellectus; ergo habent aliquid unum in se et idem ex natura rei quod inquantum unum est universale; postquam est in multis, communia tenet, quia si antecedens ex natura rei non est ex intellectu, necesse est consequens, si vere consequens est esse ex natura rei. Sed aliquid esse commune ad multa est necessario consequens ad differre rerum;

4 unitas MO universalitas] perperam Vc om. MU 69 70 71 72

19 et] O om. M

Arist., Metaph. V 6, 1015b36–1016a25. Arist., Metaph. V, capp. 1–2; conferas Averroem ad loc. Arist., Phys. I 5, 188b21–26; Metaph. X 9, 1058b3–4. Arist., De gener, et corr. I 10, 328a18 sqq.

22 etiam] NS enim V

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quod patet, quia ponitur in eius diffinitione: dicit73 enim Philosophus quinto Metaphisice quod differentia sunt quecumque diversa sunt ad unum et idem entia, ut homo et asinus differunt quia diversa sunt, et aliquid unum sunt, quia ambo sunt animal. Patet ergo consequentia. Antecedens autem conceditur ab omnibus, quia res sunt differentes ex natura sua; alias sequeretur quod omnia essent unum extra intellectum, quod est error delatus primo Phisicorum. Diversa enim sunt quecumque sunt, non tamen idem sunt; differentia vero et sunt diversa inter se et sunt eadem in aliquo eis communi. Et hanc unitatem et ydemptitatem addit differentia super diversitatem. Et per illud additum probatur intentum. Quarta ratio talis est. Res exteriores ex natura sua sine opere intel- 76 lectus sunt similes et equales. Ergo habent aliquid unum in se ex natura sua commune eis. Antecedens conceditur communiter, licet ab aliquibus negetur.—Non est tamen verisimile quod talia dicta sint per philosophos et alios sapientes de similibus nisi essent ex natura sua similia, puta illud commune: ‘Omne simile applaudit suo simili’, et illud: ‘Natura est vis insita rebus ex similibus similia procreans’, et illud: ‘Tunc perfectum est unumquodque cum potest sibi simile | genera- M81vb re’, et talia infinita; supponatur ergo adpresens quod res naturales ex natura sua sunt sibi invicem similes.—Consequentia probatur quia: Unitas qualitatis in diversis ponitur in diffinitione similitudinis; dicitur74 enim quinto Metaphisice quod similia sunt quorum qualitas est una. Hec autem unitas non potest esse numeralis, cum ipsa similia inter se sint diversa. Restat ergo quod universalis. Quinta ratio. Aliqua sunt diversa specie vel genere ex natura sua. 77 Ergo quodlibet istorum habet unitatem generis vel speciei ex natura sua. Antecedens conceditur ab omnibus, et habetur ex quinto Metaphisice75 in diffinitionibus ‘diversi specie’ et ‘diversi genere’. Et patet ratione quia: Constat quod non plus differunt diversitate numerali Sortes et Brunellus quam Sortes et Plato. Ergo cum plus differunt ex natura sua Sortes et Brunellus quam Sortes et Plato, necesse est quod ex natura sua differant non solum numero sed etiam specie. Sic igitur apparet

6–7 alias … phisicorum] O om. M om. M 33 etiam] O om. M 73 74 75

Arist., Metaph. V 9, 1018a12. Ibid., 1018a15–16. Ibid., 1018a10 sqq.

19 tunc] UNS omne MV

31–32 ergo … plato] O

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antecedens. Consequentia probatur sic. Quecumque sunt diversa specie ex natura sua, sunt plura secundum speciem ex natura sua. Tunc ultra: Quecumque pluralitas est in rebus ex natura rerum, habet unitates ex natura rerum (unitates dico ex quibus est). Sed pluralitatis secundum speciem sunt proprie unitates constituentes eam specifice. Ergo a primo ad ultimum: si aliqua sunt diversa specie ex natura sua, sequitur quod sit unitas specifica ex natura rerum. 78 Probatum est ergo quod in illa diffinitione ‘universalis’ secundo posita nichil includitur dependens ab intellectu. Hoc idem apparet de tertia. Illa enim non differt a secunda nisi quantum ad has prepositiones ‘de’ et ‘in’. Per ‘de’ enim denotatur quod sit aliquid unum de quiditate multorum; et hoc est dictum ‘unum de multis’, idest unum aliquid quod est de essentia et quiditate multorum, ut animal est unum in homine et asino, quia est unum aliquid quod est de essentia et quidditate hominis et asini, quia inest homini et asino. Hec vero prepositio ‘in’ denotat illud aliquid unum essentiale inesse hiis de quorum essentia et quidditate est, ut animal est unum in homine et asino. Aliquando tamen illud‘in’ posset denotare aliquid unum accidentale inesse, ut in accidente et proprio, que sunt quedam universalia et predicabilia. Et in hiis etiam ‘de’ proprie denotaret tale quid accidentale, sicut et ipsa prepoM82ra sitio ‘in’, ut dictum est. Probato | igitur quod diffinitio secundo posita nichil includit dependens ab intellectu, probatum est et de hac.

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De diffinitione ‘universalis’ reddita per ‘predicari’ 79 Diffinitur vero aliquando universale per predicari, ut in primo76 Pery-

ermenias: ‘Universale est quod est aptum natum in pluribus predicari’. 25 Et hoc modo diffinitur predicabile: quod est natum de pluribus vel in pluribus predicari. Circa quod sciendum est quod ‘de pluribus predicari’ est circumlocutio eius quod dicebatur prius ‘unum in pluribus esse’; et hoc quod dicitur ‘in pluribus predicari’ circumlocutio est eius quod dicebatur prius ‘unum in pluribus esse’. Quod apparet, quia unum ali- 30

5 eam] unitates add. M 14–15 quia … asini] UNS om. MV 15–17 hec … asino] O om. M 18 illud] O id sic saepius M | in] O an M 19 in] UNS om. MV 20 proprie] O propositione(!) M 22 et] O om. M 24 vero] US autem N pro M ergo V 30 in pluribus esse] et hoc quod dicitur in pluribus predicari circumlocutio est eius quod dicebatur prius unum in pluribus esse add. MO del. Vc 76

Arist., De interpr. 7, 17a39–40.

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quid predicari de pluribus non facit illud unum esse universale illis pluribus, ymo de necessitate supponit illud esse universale illis, quia predicari aliquid de pluribus non est nisi manifestari illud aliquid esse de illis pluribus seu inesse illis pluribus. Sed per hoc aliquid est universale plu5 ribus quia inest pluribus. Ergo sicut manifestari aliquid pluribus inesse supponitur necessario illud inesse pluribus, eadem necessitate supponet illud esse universale illis pluribus. Si ergo vellem me expedire cito, possem dicere quod istud ‘posse pre- 80 dicari’ non includitur in diffinitione ‘universalis’, quia non est nisi cir10 cumlocutio dans intelligi illud quod essentialiter includitur, scilicet ‘esse de multis vel in multis’; de hiis autem probatum est quod non dependent ab intellectu. Sed ne videar fugere, dico quod nec istud ‘posse predicari’ dependet ab intellectu, cum non sit nisi quedam manifestabilitas et intelligibilitas que est ex parte obiectorum intelligibilium quam sup15 ponit intellectus, ut declaratum est supra. Quare palam est quod nulla diffinitio ‘universalis’ vel ‘predicabilis’ quidquam includit dependens ab intellectu. De diffinitionibus singulorum predicabilium Probata igitur minore principalis rationis inducendo per diffinitiones 81 ‘universalis’ et ‘predicabilis’, ‘singularis’ et ‘predicabilis’, nunc probo eam inducendo per diffinitiones predicabilium singulorum. Et primo accipio diffinitiones generis, speciei, et differentie, scilicet diffinitio generis est: ‘quod predicatur de | pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod M82rb quid est’; diffinitio speciei: ‘quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus 25 solo in numero in eo quod quid est’; diffinitio vero differentie: ‘quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie vel numero in eo quod quale’. Ecce quod in omnibus istis diffinitionibus aliquid ponitur pro genere subiecto, scilicet res que datur intelligi per illud neutrum substantivatum ‘quod’, et est res cui debetur predicatio; et in hoc hee tres diffini30 tiones communicant. Ponitur etiam aliquid pro termino et obiecto, quia diffiniuntur tamquam respectiva, et est illud vel illa que dantur intelligi per illa plura numero vel specie differentia, et sunt illa de quibus fit predicatio; et etiam hee tres diffinitiones communicant in hoc quod diffe20

9 est] O om. M 12–13 nec … dependet] O istud … non dependet M 16 universalis] O om. M 20 predicabilis] particularis add. M 25 est] O om. M | vero] O una M 27 diffinitionibus] O differentiis M 29 hee] O om. M 33 in hoc] O non M 33–424.1 differunt] O om. M

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runt specie illa solo numero. Ponitur etiam aliquid pro genere essentiali et predicabili; et est illud quod datur intelligi per ‘esse natum predicari’, quia accipio (ut omnes accipiunt) ‘predicari’ aptitudinaliter, non actualiter; et illud vel est essentiale hiis differentiis vel circumloquens aliquid essentiale; dico autem quod circumloquens est, ut supra probavi de universali; universalitas enim generis et ipsa generalitas sunt idem essentialiter. Et ideo si predicabilitas est circumlocutio in diffinitione universalitatis, universalitas erit in diffinitione generis quedam circumlocutio; hoc idem dico respectu speciei et differentie,—tamen adpresens non curo, quia nec ipsa predicabilitas pendet ab intellectu.—In ipsa predicabilitate autem conveniunt omnes tres diffinitiones predicte, nisi quod diversificantur per ‘quid’ et per ‘quale’. 82 Nunc autem ad propositum applicando dico quod nullum istorum trium dependet ab intellectu. Constat de eo quod ponitur pro genere subiecto; aliter enim haberemus dicere quod animalitas, humanitas, rationalitas dependent ab intellectu, quod est nequam dictu. Constat etiam de eo quod ponitur vel de hiis que ponuntur pro termino vel terminis, pro obiecto vel obiectis; illa enim sunt Sortes et Plato, homo et M82va asinus, qui non dependent | ab intellectu, nec determinationes eorum, puta ‘esse plura’ et ‘differentia numero’ et esse plura differentia specie. De pluralitate et differentia numerali constat per se; de pluralitate et differentia specifica constat per se, et probatum est supra. Constat etiam ex predictis de eo quod ponitur pro genere, pro predicabili et essentiali, sive illud sumatur tamquam essentiale in diffinitis vel tamquam circumloquens aliquid essentiale. Probatum enim est quod predicabilitas seu manifestabilitas quidditatis de eo cuius est quidditas, vel qualitas essentialis de eo cuius est qualitas, non dependet ab intellectu, ymo supponitur in omni opere intellectus. Nisi enim res essent intelligibiles, manifestabiles, predicabiles, nequaquam ab intellectu intelligerentur. Aliter enim intelligeretur quod non erat possibile intelligi. 83 Quare patet quod nulla istarum trium diffinitionum includit aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Quia tamen Porphirius dat alias diffinitiones de istis eisdem—dicit77 enim quod genus est ‘cui supponitur species’, et species ‘que ponitur sub genere’, et differentia est ‘qua differunt a 5 est] UNS om. MV 8 universalitatis universalitas] coni. universalitatis U S universalitas MVN 10 ipsa] O om. M 16 nequam] M inconvenienter O 20–21 et esse … specie] O om. M 32 porphirius] O philosophus M 77

Porphyrius, Isag. 2,11; 4,10–11; 11,22–23 Busse; Arist. Lat., p. 6; 9; 18–19.

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se singula’—de hac ultima descriptione differentie constat quod nichil includat dependens ab intellectu; nec enim ipsa singularia dependent ab intellectu nec principia distinctiva singulorum nec ipsum differre, quod est idem quod distinctum esse, ut de se patet. Quare etc. De primis etiam duabus satis patet quoniam: Hominem supponi animali tamquam quid distinctivum sue quiditati vel parti quiditatis est speciem poni sub genere. Sed hoc non dependet ab intellectu. Ergo nec illud, scilicet speciem supponi generi, in quo consistunt ille due descriptiones. Quare palam nullam diffinitionem generis, speciei vel differentie includere aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Hoc idem induco in diffinitione proprii, in qua dicitur78 quod ‘pro- 84 prium est quod inest omni et soli et semper’. Et ex hac diffinitione infert79 Porphirius quod convertitur cum eo cuius est proprium. Nec tamen poni debet in diffinitione, ut aliqui ponunt, quia nugatio esset, quia in tribus primis | particulis includitur convertibilitas, ut patet con- M82vb sideranti. In hac autem diffinitione, sicut in ceteris predictis, aliquid ponitur ut genus subiectum, scilicet res intellecta per illud neutrum ‘quod’, et aliquid pro termino, scilicet illud cui est proprium et illud quod datur intelligi per substantivationem illorum neutrorum ‘omni’ et ‘soli’. Et ponitur ‘aliquid’ pro genere predicabili et essentiali, illud scilicet quod datur intelligi illi per illam appropriationem seu adequationem que datur intelligi per ‘omni’ et ‘soli’ et ‘semper’. Nunc autem dico quod nullum istorum quidquam includit pendens ab intellectu. Constat enim de genere subiecto. De hoc exemplificat80 Porphirius per ‘risibile’; ipsum enim ‘risibile’ est proprium homini. Nec risibile autem nec homo cui est proprium risibile, dependet ab intellectu, nec etiam hoc quod est inesse et omni inesse et soli inesse et semper inesse dependent ab intellectu. Aliter enim cum non cogitaret intellectus, nullus realis triangulus haberet tres angulos equales duobus rectis, aut ille triangulus non haberet de quo non cogitaret, aut non soli triangulo conveniret, si intellectus alicui alteri quoquo modo attribueret habere tres. Hec autem omnia sunt nequissima dictu. Quare diffinitio proprii nichil includit pendens ab intellectu. 6 distinctivum] US quidditativum NV difitatum(!) M enim M 22 que … intelligi] O qua experimur M dictu] O dicta M 78 79 80

Ibid., 12,17–19 Busse; Arist. Lat., pp. 19–20. Ibid. 12,20–21 Busse; Arist. Lat., p. 20. Ibid.

18 scilicet … cui] O illud 28 realis] Vc om. MO 32

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Hoc idem patet et etiam per se notum est de diffinitionibus accidentis. Dantur81 autem a Porphirio due positive. Prima est quod accidens est ‘quod adest et abest preter subiecti corruptionem’; alia ‘quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’. Tertia vero data privative talis est: ‘accidens est quod nec est genus nec species nec differentia nec pro- 5 prium, inest autem rei’. De hiis autem per se notum est quod nichil includit ab intellectu dependens. Recapitulatur

86 Probata est ergo sufficienter minor principalis rationis, scilicet quod

non omnium intentionum secundarum logice acceptarum diffinitio- 10 nes includunt aliquid ab intellectu dependens. Resumo ergo rationem. Omnium dependentium ab intellectu diffinitiones includunt aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Sed non omnium intentionum secundarum diffinitiones includunt aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Ergo non omnes M83ra secunde intentiones dependent ab | intellectu. Premisse autem probate 15 sunt. Opponitur circa probationem minoris principalis rationis 87 Sed forte dicetur quod probatio minoris totaliter deficit, quia nullam

sumit diffinitionem veram, propriam et completam, quia in omnibus diffinitionibus omittitur quod est principale in diffinitionibus, scilicet 20 ‘secunda intentio applicata vel applicabilis rei’. Omnes enim diffinitiones predicte hoc primo et principaliter includunt, si integre sint accepte. Debet enim dici: ‘genus est quedam intentio secunda applicata vel applicabilis rei que inquantum res predicatur predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est’, et quod individuum 25 sive singulare est quedam secunda intentio applicata vel applicabilis rei, que inquantum res est indivisa et indivisibilis in partes quarum quelibet sit ipsa. Hoc eodem modo debet apponi in principio cuiuslibet predictarum diffinitionum, si proprie debent sumi. Totum autem istud: ‘secunda intentio et applicatio eiusdem ad rem’ pendet ab intellectu. 30

2 positive] O posite M 81

5 species nec] O om. M

Ibid., 1225–131 Busse; Arist. Lat., p. 20.

23–25 dici … individuum] O om. M

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Quare diffinitiones huiusmodi includunt aliquid dependens ab intellectu. Quare videtur illius minoris probatio totaliter defecisse. Sed quod hec oppositio sit absurda et quod per illud appositum 88 non diffinitio compleatur probo quinque viis. Primo sic. Omnis bona diffinitio vera, completa et integra predicatur de quocumque predicatur diffinitum; hec maxima traditur secundo Topicorum et sexto, ubi dicitur82 quod hec est prima pars negotii quod est circa diffinitiones (et remittitur ad secundum librum, ad locos de accidente). Sed nulla predictarum diffinitionum cum illo addito seu supplemento predicatur de aliquo de quo predicatur diffinitum. Ergo nulla illarum diffinitionum cum illo supplemento est vera diffinitio. Minor patet in singulis. Hec enim est vera: ‘Sortes est singulare’, hec autem falsa: ‘Sortes est quedam secunda intentio applicata vel applicabilis rei indivise’. Eodem modo in omnibus aliis: hec enim est vera ‘Homo est universalis’, ‘Homo est species’, hec autem falsa ‘Homo est quedam secunda intentio applicata vel applicabilis rei etc.’; et hec est vera ‘Animal est genus’, hec autem falsa ‘Animal est quedam secunda intentio applicata vel applicabilis rei etc.’. Quare manifestum est quod de quibus predicatur diffinitum, non predicatur illud quod assignatum fuerat | pro diffinitione completa. M83rb Quare illud supplementum fuit nocumentum, illa additio destructio. Et confirmatur illud per simile. Si enim diffiniatur ‘simus’, bene dicitur ‘nasus curvus’. Si autem dicatur pro supplemento et complemento diffinitionis quod simus est quedam propria passio nasi qua, inquam, nasus est simus vel curvus, prima diffinitio, que vera, bona, completa fuerat, est per illam additionem destructa, quia iam predicari non potest de quo predicatur diffinitum. Falsum enim est dicere quod nasus est quedam propria passio nasi. Ex secunda via arguo per duas considerationes sexti Topicorum83. 89 Prima est quod ‘si positum in diffinitione pro genere sit relativum, et ipsum etiam diffinitum’; et ‘si genus non datur ad idem in generali ad quod dicitur diffinitum in speciali, diffinitio peccat’. Et dat exemplum Philosophus de opinione; si enim opinio dicitur ad opinatum, diffinitum per opinionem tamquam per genus oportet dici ad quoddam

1 huiusmodi] huius sic persaepe M 5 completa] O om. M 6 hec maxima] O hoc maxime M 13–16 applicata … etc.] O om. M 16 autem] O enim M 23 est] O om. M | qua] O que M 30 datur] O dicitur M 82 83

Arist., Top. II 1, 109a10 sqq.; VI 1, 139a24 sqq. Ibid., VI 9, 147a23–28.

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opinatum, et si multipliciter dicitur ad submultiplex, oportet diffinitum per multiplex tamquam per genus dici ad submultiplex quoddam. Sed genus non dicitur ad illud in speciali ad quod dicitur secunda intentio in generali; genus enim dicitur ad speciem ut genus speciei genus. Et in hoc laborat totus quartus Topicorum: si aliquid assignatur pro genere alicuius, est genus eius; et ita formatur problema de genere ‘Estne animal genus hominis an non?’. Quare manifestum est quod genus dicitur ad speciem, et est habitudo rei ad rem. Secunda autem intentio (ut isti homines dicunt) vel est actus intelligendi vel habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum vel ad actum intelligendi. Ergo talis diffinitio peccat ponens secundam intentionem in diffinitione generis. 90 Ex eadem via arguo sic per aliam considerationem eiusdem sexti quoniam: Diffinitio bona predicatur in quid in primo modo dicendi per se de diffinito ratione generis. Sed secunda intentio non predicatur in primo modo dicendi per se et in quid de genere. Ergo diffinitio M83va generis accipiens | secundam intentionem pro genere ipsius generis diffiniti non est bona. Minorem probo per eos. Et arguo sic. Nulla habitudo ad intellectum et rem intelligibilem predicatur vere in primo modo dicendi per se de habitudine unius rei intellecte ad aliam; hec est evidentissima, quoniam impossibile est habitudinem unam de alia a se predicari. Sed per eos (ut supra monstratum est) intentio secunda est aliquid intermedium inter intellectum et rem intellectam; genus autem dicit habitudinem unius rei ad alteram. Ergo secunda intentio non predicatur de genere in primo modo dicendi per se. Quare palam quod illa diffinitio cum supplemento suo nulla omnino est. 91 Unus tamen doctor intentionum dicit quod hec est in primo modo dicendi per se ‘Genus est secunda intentio’. Sed non est credendum ei, quia ipsemet contradicit sibi. Dicit enim in aliqua alia questione quod sola habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi est secunda intentio et prima, secundum quod intentio est id a quo aliquid dicitur prima intentio vel secunda. Ad istam autem exclusivam sequitur ista quod omnis intentio a qua aliquid dicitur prima intentio vel secunda, est habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi. Hec autem propositio sit maior unius sillogismi. Et addo sibi hanc minorem quod intentio que predicatur de genere, est talis intentio a qua genus dicitur secunda intentio. Ergo sequitur quod illa intentio que predicatur de genere in

9 intelligendi] vel econverso add. M 28 aliqua alia] alia M aliqua O

10 ponens] O penes M

27 sed … ei] O om. M

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primo modo dicendi per se, est habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum. Dicit etiam ultra quod nec genus nec generalitas dicit habitudinem rei intellecte ad intellectum, ymo potest intelligi sine illa habitudine. Si hec autem adinvicem conferantur, evidentissimam contradictionem 5 includunt. Quare etc. Hec autem resumuntur infra loco suo si ista est per se vel per accidens ‘Genus est secunda intentio’, ita quod genus vel species, universale vel singulare debeat diffiniri per secundam intentionem vel non. Hec autem sufficiant pronunc de prima ratione principali, que per 92 10 nullam cavillationem infringi potest. Dicatur ergo quod omnium dependentium ab intellectu diffinitiones aliquid includunt dependens ab intellectu, sed non omnium secundarum intentionum diffinitiones etc.

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Secundo ad principale. Quecumque conditiones | naturaliter distincM83vb tive obiecti sensus, secundum quod respicitur a potentia et secundum quod attingitur ab actu potentie, sunt ex natura rei, non ab intellectu. Sed alique secunde intentiones sunt conditiones huiusmodi. Ergo sunt ex natura rei, non ex intellectu. Maior patet ex duobus. Primum quia nullum naturale distinctivum est ab intellectu, sed omne ex natura rei. Secundo quia sensum respicere suum primarium obiectum ut potentia et actum sensus attingere suum primarium obiectum quantum ad nullam conditionem dependet ab intellectu. Minor probatur in duabus secundis intentionibus, scilicet univer- 94 salitate et particularitate. Universalitas enim est conditio secundum quam sensus ut potentia respicit obiectum suum primarium; nec est aliud distinctivum obiecti sensus secundum quod natum est respici a potentia; nec natum est sic attingi a seipso secundum quod natum est attingi ab actu potentie. Singularitas autem est conditio secundum quam obiectum sensus attingi natum est ab actu potentie; nec est aliud distinctivum obiecti sensus, ut natum est sic attingi, a seipso ut a potentia natum est respici.

15 respicitur] MUNcVS recipitur N respicit add. M 24 enim] O om. M

16 attingitur] O accipitur M 20–21 potentia] 29 nec … attingi] suppl. coni. om. MO

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Hoc autem probo auctoritate et ratione. Primo auctoritate sic. Philosophus secundo84 Posteriorum: “Sensus est universalis, sentire vero particularis”. Ubi quisque considerare debet quod quodlibet sentire singulare attingit necessario singulare, non aliquid indifferens et commune. Quidlibet vero sensus respicit ut est commune, quamcumque sit sin- 5 gularis sensus et singularis potentia; puta visus meus vel tuus sensibile habet in universali, non quod respiciat universalitatem, sed sensibile ut stat sub illa conditione. Et sic patet ex intentione Philosophi propositum. Ratione sic. Constat tamen de actu sensus quod respicit et attingit obiectum sub ratione singularitatis. Et probatur propter con- 10 tentiosos quoniam: Omne quod attingitur sub conditionibus que sunt hic et nunc, attingitur sub conditione singularitatis; patet, quia ille conditiones presupponunt hanc. Sed obiectum sensus attingitur per actum sensus sub conditionibus hic et nunc. Ergo sub conditione singularitatis. Quod sensus respicit obiectum suum primarium sub conditione universalitatis85

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96 Quod autem potentia sensitiva respicit obiectum suum primarium sub

conditione universalitatis probo dupliciter. Primo sic. Omne quod respicitur a potentia sub hac conditione que est posse salvari in multis, respicitur sub conditione universalitatis. Hoc patet quia: Ipsa conditio talis 20 M84ra | est ipsa universalitas. Sed obiectum sensus respicitur a potentia sensitiva ut ipsum salvari potest in multis. Ergo sub conditione universalitatis. Minor patet quia: Obiecta particularia, ut hec albedo vel nigredo, non possunt attingi ab actibus sensuum nisi salvetur in eis obiectum primarium et ratio obiecti primarii. Ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit obiec- 25 tum primarium sensus, exigitur quod sit in multis salvabile et a multis participabile. Sic ergo patet minor. 97 Secundo probo idem sic logice: Illud pro quo non potest accipi terminus supponens pro eo nisi habeat suppositionem simplicem, habet secum necessario conditionem universalitatis. Patet quia: Simplex sup- 30 positio est acceptio termini communis pro re universali. Sed terminus significans obiectum primum sensus non potest pro eo supponere nisi 3 quidlibet] MUVS quilibet N om. V 7 habet] UNS om. MV 84 85

5 commune] coni. potentia MO 6 vel tuus] MUNS 11–12 que … conditione] O om. M 23 vel] licet M

Arist., Anal. Post. II 19, 100a16–17. Sectt. [96] ac [97] desiderantur in O.

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suppositione simplici. Cum dicimus ‘Color est primum obiectum visus’, ille enim terminus ‘color’ habet suppositionem simplicem, non personalem. Quod patet quia: Sub quocumque termino communi habente suppositionem personalem licet fieri descensum sub sic vel sic, ut cum 5 terminus distributus est vel sub disiunctione; ergo ille vel ille color est in corpore; ergo in illo corpore, ut habetur86 in Predicamentis. Sed sub ‘colore’ valet fieri descensum sub nec sic nec sic cum dicimus ‘Color est primum obiectum visus’; ita palam sicut si diceremus ‘Color est genus’. Sicut enim non licet dicere ‘Color est genus, ergo albedo vel nigredo 10 vel aliquis medius color est genus’, sic non licet dicere ‘Color est obiectum primum visus, ergo albedo vel nigredo vel aliquis medius color’; ergo sicut hic ‘Color est genus’ ‘color’ habet suppositionem simplicem, sic hic ‘Color est obiectum primarium visus’. Ergo sequitur ultra quod sicut ‘genus’ determinat colorem ad conditionem universalitatis, 15 sic hoc quod est ‘obiectum primum visus’. Infero igitur ex hiis quod quicumque concedit colorem esse naturaliter obiectum primum visus, concedit colorem naturaliter universalem.

de tertia ratione ad principale Tertio sic ad principale. Conditiones exacte necessario ad posse intelli- 98 gere et ad posse intelligi non sunt ab intellectu; hec est per se nota. Sed hee conditiones universalitatis et particularitatis sunt huiusmodi. Ergo non sunt ab intellectu. Maior probatur quia: Ad hoc quod intellectus possit intelligere, necessario exigitur quod intellectus sit singularis, cum | actio singularis et passio singularis necessario exigant principium M84rb 25 et subiectum immediata esse singularia. Cuiusmodi sunt actus intellectus, licet ille maledictus Averroys dixerit oppositum, ponens unum intellectum in omnibus hominibus, et illum dicebat non esse singularem. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid possit intelligi, necessario exigitur quod habeat conditionem universalitatis. Quod patet87 tertio De anima 30 et primo Posteriorum. Patet etiam ratione quoniam: Illud quod primo presentatur intellectui, primo intelligitur. Universale vero primo pre20

5 sic vel sic] coni. vel super (!) M 26–28 licet … singularem] M om O oppositum] O obiectum M 27 non esse] O necesse M 86 87

Arist., Categ. 2, 1a27–28; 5, 2b1–2. Arist., De anima II 5, 417b22–23; Anal. Post. I 31, 87b38–39.

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sentatur intellectui, quia species intelligibilis est et est presentativa rei universalis. Quare etc. 99 Sed forte dicetur quod secundum Averroym primo88 De anima, commento octavo, intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus, ita quod intellectus agens, abstrahens speciem intelligibilem a fantasmatibus, facit universalitatem, quia facit illam speciem representativam universalis, quod non erat in rebus ante quantum ad illam universalitatem. 100 Sed contra eum arguo dupliciter. Primo sic. Accipio quod illa species nata est representare realitatem seu entitatem, quia non universalitatem, et per consequens illa realitas et entitas est nata representari per illam speciem intelligibilem. Ex hiis arguitur sic. Illa realitas vel est una numero in rebus, vel est omnes que sub una specie sunt vel genere, vel est quid commune illis singulis. Primum dari non potest, quia non esset differentia inter speciem intelligibilem et sensibilem, nec intellectus per talem speciem intelligeret nisi singulare. Nec potest dari secundum, quia tunc intelligeret primo plura simul, quod est impossibile. Ergo dabitur tertium, quod illa realitas nata representari per speciem intelligibilem antequam representetur est aliquid commune et universale. Secundo sic. Accipio dictum Boetii89 quod sola species diffinitur; quod palam est et propter auctoritatem et propter quod sola species habet genus et differentias, ex quibus datur diffinitio; et propter hoc nullus attemptavit singularia diffinire. Sed Averroys dicit90 eodem commento quod hic apparet quod diffinitiones dantur de rebus sensibilibus existentibus extra intellectum. Sequitur ergo quod res sensibiles existentes extra intellectum sunt universales, quia sunt species vel specialissime M84va | vel subalterne. Non ergo facit intellectus universalitatem in rebus, cum non largiatur eis esse quidditativum, quod est esse diffinibile; et istud est esse universale.

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de quarta ratione ad principale 101 Quarto ad principale arguo sic. Quecumque predicantur de rebus exte- 30

rioribus predicatione necessaria, sunt independentia ab intellectu; hec est evidentissima, quia quecunque dependent ab intellectu, contingen7 ante quantum] M antequam O 88 89 90

17 representari] O presentari M

In Arist. I De anima, comm. 8, p. 1225–26. Boethius, De divisionibus 886A5 sqq. Averroes, In I Arist. De anima, p. 836–37.

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ter respiciunt res exteriores, que possunt intelligi et non intelligi, concipi et non concipi, presentari et non presentari. Sed multe secunde intentiones predicantur de rebus exterioribus predicatione necessaria. Ergo multe secunde intentiones sunt independentes ab intellectu. Minor apparet. Hec enim videtur necessaria ‘Substantia est pre- 102 dicamentum’, ‘Substantia est genus generalissimum et inquantum est genus generalissimunm’; aliter enim ille propositiones non pertinerent ad scientiam. Omnes enim propositiones ad integritatem scientie pertinentes vel sunt principia vel conclusiones. Sed hee et ille sunt necessarie’, ut patet primo Posteriorum. Ergo omnes propositiones scientie sunt necessarie. Predicte vero sunt scientie, quia logicus et metaphisicus tradunt eas; quare videntur necessarie. Hoc idem in multis aliis apparet. Hec enim est necessaria ‘Album est accidens’. Sed accidens dicit secundam intentionem, quia est unum de quinque predicabilibus; et eo modo quo accidens diffinitur inter predicabilia et ut predicabile, eo modo predicatur necessario de albo. Quod apparet quia Porphirius diffiniens accidens ut predicabile dicit91: ‘Accidens est quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’; et sumit eam ab Aristotile diffiniente92 accidens ut est unum de quatuor predicatis. Utroque autem modo, et ut predicatum et ut predicabile, est secunda intentio et est de consideratione logici. Quod autem hoc modo sit necessaria probo quia: Si hec non est 103 necessaria ‘Album est accidens’, hec est necessaria ‘Album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’, quia idem est iudicium de diffinitione et diffinito quantum ad necessitatem predicandi respectu eiusdem subiecti; et si hec non est necessaria ‘Album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’, ita quod illa contingentia que predicatur, non necessario uniatur albo, ista erit vera ‘Non necessario album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’, quia sua contradictoria esset falsa, scilicet hec ‘Necessario album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’. Si enim hec esset vera, haberem propositum. Si vero hec sit vera ‘Non necessario album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’, hec erit vera | per equipollentiam ‘Possibile est M84vb non contingere album eidem inesse et non inesse’. Et si hec est vera, per equipollentiam eius quod est ‘non contingere’ et ‘impossibile esse’ 6–7 et … generalissimum] O om. M 10–11 ut … necessarie] O om. M scite M 13 album] O albedo M 23–26 est … album] O om. M 91 92

Porphyrius, Isag 12, 25–26 Busse; Arist. Lat., p. 20. Arist., Top. I 8, 103b17–19, 103b21.

11 scientie] O

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esset hec etiam vera ‘Possibile est esse impossibile album eidem inesse et non inesse’. Et si hec est vera, ipso possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile. Sed illo possibili posito in esse, ponitur ipsum impossibile, quia dicebatur ‘Possibile est esse impossibile album eidem inesse et non inesse’. Ergo, ipso impossibili posito, non est positum impossibile. Ergo impossibile non est impossibile, si ad positionem impossibilis non sequitur positio impossibilis, nec ipsum possibile erit possibile, cum ad positionem possibilis ponatur impossibile. Ergo possibile est impossibile et non possibile, et impossibile est possibile et non impossibile, quia quod primo fuit possibile, modo est impossibile. Et ad istam positionem ‘Non necessario album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’ sequuntur tot impossibilia. Quare relinquitur quod hec sit vera ‘Necessario album contingit eidem inesse et non inesse’. Et patet per consequens quod hec est necessaria ‘Album est accidens eo modo quo accidens est predicabile vel predicatum’. 104 Et sic palam est aliquas secundas intentiones predicari de rebus extra intellectum predicatione necessaria. Hoc idem apparet de ista ‘Risibile est proprium homini’, quia si est non necessaria, vel hoc est quia contingit risibile non inesse homini vel non omni vel non soli vel non semper; que tamen omnia sunt evidenter falsa.

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de quinta ratione ad principale 105 Quinto ad principale arguo sic. Universalitates individuales et univer-

salitates generum et specierum sunt ex natura rei. Sed iste sunt secunde intentiones. Ergo secunde intentiones alique sunt ex natura rei. Premisse huius silligismi declarabuntur infra;93 quare nunc supersedeo de 25 probationibus earum.

1 esse] O om. M 2 posito] O om. M 9 prius impossibile] O possibile M 13 per consequens] O om. M 14 quo] O quod M 17 risibile] O rationale M 18 est] O om. M 93

Sectt. 294–312.

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probatur conclusio principalis ducendo conclusionem oppositam ad impossibile Conclusio opposita ad inconvenientia deducitur 5

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Probato ergo ostensive quod non omnis secunda intentio sit ab intel- 106 lectu, deduco conclusionem oppositam ad aliqua inconvenientia. Et est unum inconveniens quoniam ad salvandum illa que salvari possunt sine efficientia intellectus, recurritur ad efficientiam intellectus, sicut faciunt aliqui naturales, nescientes salvare apparentia in natura per opus nature, recurrunt ad miracula efficientie Prime Cause, cum tamen salvari possunt sine miraculis. Sic aliqui logici, nescientes | salvare ea M85ra que apparent in rebus per logicam secundum naturam rerum de quibus agunt logici, recurrunt ad miracula intellectus, cum tamen salvari possent sine efficientia et miraculis intellectus. Declarabitur enim infra quomodo universalitas et singularitas et quinque predicabilia salvari possunt secundum naturam rerum sine efficientia intellectus. Secundum inconveniens est quod, stante illa positione, salvari non 107 possunt veritates logicarum maximarum. Est enim maxima quarto Topicorum posita94 ‘Quod non est in genere, non est in aliqua eius specie’. Hec autem salvari non potest, stante quod genus et esse in genere, et species et esse in specie sunt ab intellectu quoniam: Intellectus potest comparare animal ad omnia singularia seu individua animalis inquantum omnia participant sensum. Et in hoc ponit omnia individua animalis in genere animalis. Habeo ergo quod, hoc facto, omnia individua animalis sunt in genere animalis. Et cum hoc habeo quod non omnia sunt in aliqua eius specie, quoniam intellectus nondum comparavit omnia individua animalis ad singulas species, nec species ad individua, reddendo cuilibet speciei sua singularia. Et sic sequitur quod aliqua sunt in genere que non sunt nec erunt in aliqua eius specie. Cuius oppositum dicebatur per illam maximam. Et sic de multis aliis que apud logicos verissima reputantur.

27 reddendo] O respondendo M

29 aliis] O om. M

94 Arist., Top. IV 1, 121a28–29: “Nam impossibile est participare genus quod nullam specierum participat”.

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Et95 si dicatur quod non habeo intellectum maxime, quia sic debet intelligi: non est in genere quod non est, idest quod esse non potest, in aliqua eius specie; nunc autem cum intellectus ponit individua animalis in genere animalis, potest utique ponere eadem individua in singulis speciebus, et si non posset esse, non esset in genere animalis—contra hoc dico quod intellectus maxime debet esse secundum quod maxima est applicabilis ad arguendum in quolibet proposito; hec enim est natura dyaleticarum propositionum. Sed non est applicabilis secundum intellectum tuum sed secundum meum. Ergo intellectus tuus falsus est, et meus est verus. Probatio assumptarum. Volo secundum illam considerationem fundatam in illa maxima utrum aqua sit colorata scire. Et considero quod non est alba nec nigra nec in medio colore posita. Quare secundum istam maximam infero quod non est colorata. | Quod tamen inferre non possem, si attenderem ad potentiam, quia utique colorata potest esse et qualitas eius comparari ad colorem ut ad genus. Et de menstruo potest probari quod non sit animal per hanc maximam secundum intellectum meum, non secundum tuum: quod hoc non sit animal, potest esse animal. Et omnium istorum est ratio quia genus comparatur ad species ut consequens ad antecedens. Sed secundum Philosophum nono96 Metaphisice si ad esse antecedentis sequitur necessario esse consequentis, ad possibile esse antecedentis sequitur necessario esse possibile consequentis, quia certum est intelligentibus quod illud quod est in genere actu, est in aliqua eius specie actu, et quod est in genere in potentia, est in aliqua eius specie in potentia; et quod non est actu in genere, non est in aliqua eius specie actu, et quod non est ibi in potentia, nec hic. Quare patet quod ille fuit intellectus maxime secundum quam accepi maximam. Quare non valet cavillatio. Et ista sufficiant de inconvenientibus in generali de discussione in generali, quia infra in speciali contra singulas opiniones inconvenientia inducuntur. Hec ergo nunc sufficiant.

27 quare] quia M 95 96

Haec sectio desideratur in O. Arist., Metaph. IX 4, 1047b14–16.

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de prima opinione eiusque quatuor defectibus Opinionum97 discussio in speciali incipiet ab opinione primo loco reci- 109 5 tata [27–28]. Que deficit in quatuor: primo circa intentionem in communi; secundo circa intentionem primam; tertio circa intentionem secundam; quarto circa motivum. Quod deficit circa intentionem in communi Circa intentionem in communi deficit propter insufficientiam, quia non 110 dicit quid est intentio secundum se sumpta, cum possit abstrahi a primitate et a secunditate; et maxime cum ex infra dictis possit colligi maximum inconveniens de hoc quod oportet ponere intentionem in communi secundum illa dicta. Dicit enim quod res (ut lapis) intellecta est intentio prima, actus vero intelligendi est intentio secunda. Sed inten15 tio secundum se sumpta est quid commune ad primam et secundam. Ergo intentio secundum se sumpta erit quid commune lapidi et actui intelligendi lapidem. Sed hiis nichil est commune nisi ‘res’ vel ‘ens’ vel aliquod aliud transcendens. Et ex hoc sequitur quod intentio secundum se sumpta, que nec prima nec secunda est, sit ens vel res. 20 Ad hoc sequitur unum inconveniens absolute, et aliud contra opinio- 111 nem. | Primum est quod ens vel res sit talis intentio quod nec prima M85va nec secunda. Secundum inconveniens est quod si est ens, ens dividitur in primum et secundum, et intentio in primam et secundam; et sicut intentio secundum se sumpta est ens secundum se sumptum, sic 25 membra divisionis coincidunt ita quod primum est sit prima intentio, secundum secunda. Et ita universaliter substantia erit prima intentio, cum universaliter sit primum ens; et universaliter accidens sit secunda intentio, cum accidens universaliter sit secundum ens. Et hoc est con10

16 erit] O et M 97

Sectt. [109]-[131] desiderantur in O.

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tra opinionem. Cum ergo ista opinio hec non declaret, videtur insufficiens, cum evidenter ipsam sequantur tot inconvenientia, nisi aliud dicatur. Quod deficit circa intentionem primam 112 Secundo deficit circa intentionem primam, quia dicit absque aliqua 5

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determinatione quod res intellecta est prima intentio, quoniam res intellecta sine aliqua determinatione, nullo addito rei vel rationis, est ipsa prima intentio prout intellecta. Nullo istorum modorum potest esse verum. Probo quantum ad primum quia: Si lapis, nullo sibi addito rei vel rationis, est prima intentio, sequitur quod de quidditate et essentia lapidis sit intentionalitas et ipsa primitas que dicit privationem anterioris vel ordinem ad posterius. Hoc autem evidenter est impossibile, cum ‘lapis’ non dicat privationem aut ordinem quidditative. Quantum ad secundum probo quod res ut intellecta non sit intentio prima. Et dicitur ex datis. Primo quia: Res intellecta ut intellecta non plus dicit de realitate quam quecumque secunda intentio; hoc patet, quia esse intellectum potest convenire non enti. Sed hec opinio dicit quod scientie dicuntur reales quod sunt de rebus, hec autem stare non possunt infundate, scilicet quod scientie dicantur reales quia de rebus, et quod non sint de rebus ut sunt res, sed ut sunt intellecte, quod est commune rei et non rei. Secundo quia: Res ut intellecta est posterior actu intelligendi. Ergo si prima intentio est res intellecta ut intellecta et secunda intentio est ipse actus intelligendi, sequitur quod prima intentio est posterior secunda intentione, quod est absurdum | dicere. Et hec de secundo defectu.

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Quod deficit circa intentionem secundam 113 Tertio deficit hec opinio circa secundam intentionem, quia dicit eam

esse actum intelligendi, qualitercumque sumatur. Et arguo sic. Omnis actus intelligendi vel de se sumptus vel vice obiecti vel ut transiens in obiectum est aliquid intermedium inter intellectum et obiectum intel- 30 lectus; quod patet, quia actus est quedam apprehensio obiecti. Et intellectus dicitur per eam apprehendens obiectum, et obiectum dicitur per actum illum apprehensum ab intellectu, et obiectum dicitur esse in

5 aliqua] alia sic saepius M

29 sumptus] sumpti M

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intellectu, quia a principio eius est in intellectu; et dicitur tunc apprehensio tenere in esse obiecti apprehensi. Sic ergo patet quod actus intelligendi, qualitercumque sumatur, est intermedia habitudo vel fundamentum intermedie habitudinis intellectus et obiecti, et econverso. 5 Sed generalitas aut specialitas seu multe tales intentiones secunde non dicunt habitudinem intellectus ad obiectum aut obiecti ad intellectum, aut non sunt actus intelligendi. Minor apparet, quia omne genus est genus sua generalitate ad aliqua plura, ut color ad multos colores, non ad intellectum; et sic de aliis. Hoc autem quod actus intelligendi non 10 sit secunda intentio magis declarabitur infra circa alias opiniones, que magis sunt michi cordi. Quod deficit circa motivum suum

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Quarto deficit hec opinio circa motivum suum, quod dicit logicam esse 114 scientiam rationalem. Et dicit ‘rationalem’ quia est de actibus rationis tamquam de materia de qua agit, quoniam nulla doctrina et nulla ars docens operari agit de operationibus tamquam de materia; hoc patet inductive: planimetria docet mensurare planum, non est autem de actibus mensurandi tamquam de materia, sed de ipsis planis; hoc eodem modo de altimetria et cosinimetria, et breviter de omnibus artibus et doctrinis docentibus operari.98 Sed logica docet rationari. Ergo non est de ipsis actibus rationis. Et confirmatur hoc ex processu logices, quia cum docet considerare prioristice, docet considerare de inventione medii ad antecedens et consequens et ad extremum; et de istis agit, non de actibus considerandi, sed de obiectis. Docens | vero M86ra considerare posterioristice docet considerare subiectum et passionem et causam propter quam passio inest subiecto, et quomodo hec se habent; et de istis agit, non de actibus. Docens vero considerare dyaletice docet considerare ad speciem et ad similia; non agit ergo de ipsis actibus, sed de obiectis actuum. Et per hoc dicitur ‘rationalis’ quia docet ratiocinari, et est denominatio a fine. Patet igitur quod motivum huius opinionis fuit nullum, et quod ipsa non est vera.

23 extremum] extraneum M 98 Conferas Gerardi Harderwickensis Commentaria in Summulas Petri Hispani ed. Coloniae 1488 I, p. 13A45 sqq.: “… scientiis mathematicalibus, in quibus invenitur quedam docens, puta geometria, quedam ordinata ad utentes, que sunt altimetria, profundimetria, planimetria, cosinimetria”.

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de secunda opinione eiusque tribus defectibus Quod deficit in prima sua conclusione 115 Opinio autem secundo loco posita[29–34] deficit in tribus, scilicet in

primis duabus conclusionibus et in insufficientia. Dicit enim prima conclusio quod nomina concreta significantia primas substantias nullo 5 modo significant intentiones, sed puras res. Contra hoc arguo sic. Ostendo quod ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’ significent intentiones concretive dictas, non quod id quod significant includat intentionalitatem, sed quod ipsum potest dici denominative ‘intentio’ ita vere sicut ‘homo’ vel ‘animal’. Et arguo sic. Omnis res significata est intentio in quinta accep- 10 tione ‘intentionis’, eo scilicet modo quo plures utuntur philosophi nomine isto; sumitur enim hoc nomen ‘intentio’ in illa acceptione pro re intenta, idest habitualiter significata. Sed hec nomina ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’ significant res significatas; aliter enim non significarent. Ergo significant aliquo modo. Et de hoc videbitur infra quod ita logicus debeat acci- 15 pere. Motivum huius conclusionis est nullum, quia hee res dependent ab intellectu in esse significato, per quod esse dicuntur intentiones. Et etiam deficit quia non videtur intelligere quid nominis ‘intentio’. Quod deficit in secunda sua conclusione 116 Secundo deficit in secunda conclusione quantum ad fundamentum, 20

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quia dicit hominem et animal esse primas intentiones quia dependent ab intellectu in isto esse quo super ipsa cadit consideratio scita, ut homo inquantum homo sine hoc homine, animal ut animal sine hoc animali acceptum. Contra hoc arguo quoniam ‘homo’ vel [1] dicit secundam intentionem creaturam intellectus, vel [2] aliquod aggregatum ex illa 25 creatura intellectus et ex aliqua realitate singulari, vel [3] aggregatum ex illa creatura intellectus | et ex illa re communi quam vocamus ‘naturam’ vel ‘quod quid est’ seu ‘quidditatem specificam’, vel [4] dicit solam realitatem istam quam vocamus ‘quod quid est’. Nullum priorum trium dari potest. Dabitur ergo quartum. 30 Quod terminus communis non significet solam creaturam intellectus

117 Probo ergo primo quod non possit dari primum, scilicet quod termini

communes non significent nisi intentionem que est creatura intellectus, et nullam rem. Et duco ad quinque inconvenientia. Primum est quod

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qui dicit rem, non dicit rem. Quod ostendo sic. Secundum enim hanc opinionem qui non dicit hanc rem, non dicit rem, quia solum singularia sunt res. Sed qui dicit rem, non dicit hanc rem, cum res et ens sint maxime universalia. Ergo qui dicit rem, non dicit rem. Quod videtur satis inconveniens, scilicet inconveniens quod hec sit falsa ‘Sortes est homo’, quoniam impossibile est verificari non-rem de re, aliquid nonreale de aliquo reali, creaturam intellectus nostri de creatura Dei. Sed secundum hanc opinionem ‘homo’ dicit non-rem, aliquid intentionale, non-reale, creaturam intellectus. ‘Sortes’ vero dicit veram rem, aliquid reale, creaturam Dei vel nature. Ergo impossibile est hominem verificari de Sorte. Et intelligo verificationem propositionis dicentis ‘Hoc est hoc’. Et si dicatur quod hic ‘Sortes est homo’ non predicatur natura com- 118 munis, vel si predicatur, non tamen est illud pro quo predicatur sed hec natura que in Sorte est, illud pro quo homo verificatur de Sorte; et ita predicatur hec res vel pro hac re de ista re; quare propositio erit vera, dato quod homo in communi non dicat nisi intentionem puram— contra hoc. Sed primo sciendum est quod terminus communis potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel personalem. Cum autem habet simplicem, non est distinctio inter illud quod terminus predicat et illud pro quo predicat; cum vero habet personalem, fit distinctio inter illud quod predicat et illud pro quo predicat. Sed semper est commune eis quod in quacumque suppositione semper illud quod significat, predicat. Terminus autem communis semper significat rem communem et universalem; et inde dicitur terminus communis. Et hoc idem est a parte subiecti sicut a parte predicati. Et tunc arguo sic. In quacumque propositione affirmativa, si id 119 quod predicatur et id quod subicitur repugnant sibi invicem, impossibile est in ea inveniri aliquid pro quo predicatum verificetur (vel vere predicetur) de subiecto. Sed in hac propositione ‘Sortes | est homo’ M86va illud quod predicatur et illud quod subicitur repugnant sibi adinvicem, quia ‘Sortes’ dicit veram rem et ‘homo’, accipiendo illud quod predicatur, idest significatum termini communis, dicit non-rem secundum hanc opinionem; et ita repugnant adinvicem. Ergo in hac propositione nichil poterit inveniri pro quo homo verificetur de Sorte, quod est satis inconveniens. Et probatur illa maior assumpta per illud99 primi Priorum quod propositio affirmativa predicatum significat inesse subiecto. Et iterum,

99

Arist., Anal. Pr. I 2, 25a1–3.

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si cum significata terminorum, predicati scilicet et subiecti, repugnant adinvicem, non posset aliquid inveniri pro quo predicatum verificaretur de subiecto, nulla propositio posset esse falsa vel probari quod esset falsa. Si enim dicerem ‘Omnis homo est asinus’ et tu dicas michi quod falsa est quia termini repugnant adinvicem, potero respondere ita sicut tu. Dicam enim quod termini repugnant quantum ad id quod predicatur et ad id quod subicitur, non tamen quantum ad ea pro quibus hoc predicatur et illud subicitur. Et cum hoc salvarem quod secundum me et secundum te minus differunt homo et asinus quam homo et hic homo, quia homo et asinus ambo sunt res secundum me, ambo non-res secundum te. Et iterum tu dicis quod homo et hic homo differunt ut res et ut non-res. 120 Tertium inconveniens est quod nulla esset diffinitio, quia diffinitiones dantur de rebus et non dantur nisi de speciebus, ut dicit100 Boetius. Si ergo res specifica non sit vera res sed sola intentio, nulla erit diffinitio. Preterea ad idem inconveniens ducendo: Diffinitio datur ex hiis que sunt de essentia diffiniti. Sed secundum hanc opinionem animal non erit de essentia hominis; dicit enim in ratione fundamentali quod homo et animal sunt diverse intentiones. Ergo si sunt sole intentiones et non sunt eedem sed diverse, unum non erit de essentia alterius. Et sicut dico de animali, ita dico de aliis superioribus ad hominem. 121 Quartum inconveniens est quod nulla propria passio realis verificari (vel predicari vere) poterit de aliquo subiecto scientie; quod est satis inconveniens. Quod probo quia: Nulla realis passio potest verificari de nomine. Sed secundum istos omne subiectum scientie est nonres, cum sit universale. Ergo nulla realis passio de ipso verificari poterit. Et si dicatur quod passio que predicatur etiam est universalis et M86vb quod per consequens | non realis sed est pura intentio sicut subiectum universale—contra hoc: Omnis propria passio probata scientie necessitate et demonstrative de subiecto necessario convertitur cum subiecto ita quod, posito subiecto, necessario ponitur passio. Sed secundum hanc glosam passio demonstrata de subiecto non necessario sequeretur subiectum, quia non est necesse, intellecto subiecto et facto per intellectum (puta facto et intellecto homine communi intelligibili per intellectum), intelligi sine qualibet illius subiecti propria passione (puta risibile et flebile et discipline susceptibile). Sepe enim intelligimus homi1 si cum] sicut M 100

Boethius, De divisionibus 886A5 sqq.

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nem in communi, non intellecto universali in communi, ut docet experientia. Quare necessario sequitur illud inconveniens. Quintum est quod omnis dignitas et omnis maxima in quacumque 122 scientia esset calumpnialis. Si enim dicatur pro maxima ‘Omne totum 5 est maius sua parte’, dicam, tenendo hanc opinionem, quod est falsum, quia ‘totum’ sumitur in universali et universaliter, et per consequens non est res sed sola intentio; et ‘pars’ eodem modo. Sed una nonres non est maior alia non-re. Ergo nec totum sua parte est maius; quod est satis inconveniens. Ergo non potest dari primum membrum pre10 misse disiunctionis, scilicet quod terminus communis significet solam creaturam intellectus. Quod nec significet aggregatum ex intentione et realitate singulari

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Probo etiam secundo quod nec secundum membrum dari possit, scili- 123 cet quod ‘homo’ vel ‘animal’ vel quicumque alius terminus communis significet aliquid aggregatum ex illa intentione creatura intellectus et ex aliqua realitate singulari, quia sequerentur quinque inconvenientia, sicut ad primum membrum. Primum est quod non esset aliqua scientia, cum omnis scientia sit de universali et de ente per se. Sed, dato isto secundo membro, nullum erit universale, quia Sortes, quacumque intentione superveniente, numquam potest esse universale. Quare ergo illud aggregatum ex Sorte et ex illa intentione non erit quid universale. Et iterum, hoc dato, nullum erit ens per se de quo scientia speculationem faciat, quia illud aggregatum est ens per accidens, quia altera pars alteri accidit, ut illa intentio Sorti. Quare nullum erit universale per se ens de quo sit scientia. Et per consequens non erit scientia. Secundum inconveniens est quod hec erit falsa ‘Sortes est homo’, vel 124 ista ‘Plato est homo’, quia si ‘homo’ dicit Sortem-cum-illa-intentione, Plato non est homo, sicut ista ‘Plato est Sortes-cum-aliqua-quacumque-intentione’. Si vero ‘homo’ dicit Platonem-cum-intentione-illa, | M87ra hec erit falsa ‘Sortes est homo’, sicut hec ‘Sortes est Plato’. Et ultra hoc sequitur quod etiam si ‘homo’ dicat Sortem-cum-intentione, hec non erit per se ‘Sortes est homo’, quoniam illud aggregatum per accidens de nullo per se ente dici potest predicatione per se, ut habetur101 ex quinto Metaphisice, distinctione de ente. 1 ut] et M 101

Arist., Metaph. V 7, 1017a7–22.

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Tertium inconveniens est quod nulla esset diffinitio quoniam: Diffinitio est de ente per se et de sola specie. Sed dato hoc membro, nulla esset species ens per se. Quare nulla erit diffinitio. Et preterea: Omnes diffinitiones dantur per essentialia diffinito. Sed hoc dato, genus et differentia ex quibus datur diffinitio, non erunt essentialia ipsi speciei, quia illa intentio ex qua aggregatur genus, non est de esse intentionis ex qua aggregatur species. Quare nulla esset diffinitio, si hoc esset. 126 Quartum inconveniens est quod nulla propria passio haberet primum subiectum cui primo et per se inesset quoniam: Omnis passio demonstrabilis inest omnibus contentis sub primo subiecto per ipsum subiectum cui primo inest. Sed dato hoc membro, propria passio per nullum subiectum primum inerit contento sub eo, quia si ‘homo’ dicit Sortem-et-intentionem, palam est quod Plato non erit risibilis per Sortem-et-intentionem. Ymo sequetur quod nichil continebitur sub subiecto primo passionis. 127 Quintum inconveniens est quod omnis dignitas erit calumpnialis, quoniam proposito quod omne totum maius est sua parte, stante hac opinione, iuxta secundum membrum dicetur quod falsum est, quia ‘totum’ non dicit totalitatem suam salvabilem in quolibet contento, sed dicit quandam totalitatem singularem, superaddita sibi una intentione. Accipiatur ergo illud singulare totum, et sit ille quaternarius, cuius pars sit hic binarius. Ille quaternarius distribui non poterit in partes subiectivas, cum sit singulare. Ergo distribuetur in partes integrales. Et tunc erit sensus quod omne totum maius est sua parte, idest: quelibet pars totius quaternarii erit maior isto binario; quod satis est inconveniens.

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Quod nec significet aggregatum ex re universali et intentione 128 Probo igitur tertio quod nec tertium membrum dari posset, scilicet

quod omnis terminus communis significet aggregatum ex re universali M87rb et communi et ex illa intentione creatura intellectus, quia sequerentur |

quinque inconvenientia. Primum esset contradictio quoniam: Si omnis 30 terminus communis significet rem universalem et intentionem, intellectus poterit resolvere unum ab alio et seorsum intelligere; et per consequens utique nomen. Accipiam ergo nomen significans rem universalium, non intentionem. Et certum est quod illud nomen est terminus communis, cum significet rem universalium. Et tunc comparabo has 35 3 preterea] propterea sic saepius M

20 superaddita] superadditam M

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duas propositiones ‘Omnis terminus communis non significans secundam intentionem significat tale quid congregatum ex re et ex intentione’ et ‘Aliquis terminus communis non significans secundam intentionem (puta iste terminus ‘A’) significat solam rem inquantum illud 5 congregatum sumat resolutum’. Hee autem propositiones opponuntur contradictorie. Secundum inconveniens est quod hec non esset per se ‘Sortes est 129 homo’, quia ens per accidens non dicitur de ente per se. Tertium inconveniens est quod nulla esset diffinitio, cum omnis diffinitio detur de per 10 se ente et universali. Quartum inconveniens est quod nulla entia per se dicerentur de aliquo subiecto scientie, quoniam accidit risibili quod dicatur vel insit alii realitati considerate vel formate per intellectum. Quintum inconveniens est quod nullum esset primum principium, quia principium primum oportet esse ex terminis quorum conceptus 15 sunt irresolubiles; hoc autem membro dato, nullus terminus haberet conceptum irresolubilem, cum omnis terminus communis significet tale quid aggregatum. Cum ergo dari non possit aliquod priorum trium membrorum, dabitur ergo quartum. Quod non dicit sufficienter quid est intentio in communi et quare et quomodo Tertius defectus huius opinionis est quia non dicit sufficienter quid 130 est intentio in communi, et quare, et quomodo. Motiva huius opinionis quantum ad conclusionem non habent efficaciam. Cum enim dicit quod quidquid humanitatis intelligitur preter Sortem et Platonem et similes habet esse non reale sed pendens totaliter ab intellectu, dico 25 quod hec propositio necessario est falsa, quamcumque opposita opinio haberet falsam ymaginationem. Si enim opposita opinio ymaginaretur quod esset aliqua humanitas separata a Sorte et Platone, quamcumque hoc esset impossibile, tamen necesse esset esse intelligere humanitatem intelligere realitatem, cum humanitas ut humanitas | includat rea- M87va 30 litatem essentialiter. Ergo ista necessario est falsa quod quidquid humanitatis intelligitur preter Sortem et Platonem et similes sit non-reale, ymo quidquid realitatis intelligitur necessario est realitas; ymo si intelligerem humanitatem inesse chimere, ego intelligerem realitatem inesse chimere, quia posito possibili vel impossibili, realitas ubique sequitur 35 humanitatem. Quare illa propositio necessario fuit falsa, et maxime 20

3 aliquis] aliquid sic saepius M

8 de … se] per se de ente M

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ad bonum intellectum. Qui enim intelligit humanitatem ut humanitatem, non intelligit eam existere sine Sorte et Platone et similibus, sed intelligit eam non intelligendo ea, sicut intelligens circulum non intelligit aurum vel cuprum vel lignum; et tamen non est sine hiis. Homo ergo vel quodcumque aliud universale est aliquid intelligibile preter multa, idest non intelligendo multa; non tamen est aliquid existens preter multa vel natum existere preter multa. Quare motivum illud non concludit. 131 Alia ratio que inducitur quod homo et animal formaliter includant intentionalitatem, non videtur concludere. Cum enim dicit quod quecumque differunt secundum suas formales rationes intentionaliter, sunt intentiones formaliter vel includunt formaliter intentiones, concedatur. Minor tamen negatur quod homo et animal secundum suas formales rationes differant intentionaliter. Cuius negationis ratio est quia formalis ratio ‘animal’ includitur quidditative in formali ratione ‘hominis’, et intentio que dicitur de animali, non includitur quidditative in intentione que dicitur de homine. Et cum pono quod homo et animal sunt diverse intentiones, verum est, sicut corvus et nix sunt diversa qualia et diversa visibilia, non tamen secundum rationes formales. Quare bene conceditur quod corvus et nix sint diversa et differentia qualitative et visibilia, non tamen quod has differentias habeant per differentias eseentiales et per formales rationes et quidditativas. Eodem modo conceditur quod homo et animal sunt diverse intentiones, non tamen quod vb M87 intentionalitatem habeant per rationes suas formales | et quidditativas. Quare ex hoc inferri non potest quod homo et animal dependeant in esse quidditativo ab intellectu. Et hec de opinione ista.

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de tertia opinione eiusque quatuor defectibus 132 Opinio tertio loco recitata[35–37] deficit quantum ad quatuor, scilicet

quantum ad intentionem in communi, quantum ad primam, quantum ad secundam, quantum ad distinctionem modorum essendi proprii et 30 communis, a quibus dicit sumi intentiones. Quod male dicit intentionem universaliter esse cognitionem et actum intelligendi 133 Deficit ergo primo quia dicit intentionem universaliter esse cognitio-

nem et actum intelligendi. Quod probo sic. Non omnis scientia est 35 de actibus intelligendi. Sed omnis scientia est de intentionibus. Ergo

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non omnes intentiones sunt actus intelligendi. Maior est evidentissima; et cum hoc quod additur de transitu actuum in obiecta intelligendi, quia nec hoc modo scientie agunt de actibus intelligendi ut ipsi actus transeunt in obiecta. Minor est probata superius per Avicennam, principio Metaphisice sue.102 Et si dicatur quod omnis intentio in secunda acceptione accepta est actus intelligendi, ut patet ex hiis que dicta sunt, distinguendo hoc nomen ‘intentio’; (in hac ergo acceptione sumendo ‘intentionem’ minor rationis mee falsa est nec valet probatio), probo quod Avicenna non sumit ‘intentionem’ in hac acceptione. Contra istud habeo quod ista positio est nulla, quia intendit reddere rationem de intentionibus de quibus est logica principaliter et secundario, scilicet de secundis, de quibus logicus agit principaliter, et de primis, quibus apponuntur secunde; de quibus primis agit logicus minus principaliter sed solum ex hoc quod eis apponuntur secunde. Ex hiis ergo habeo quod hec positio intendit loqui de intentionibus secundum quod cadunt universaliter in considerationibus scientiarum. Hoc autem modo loquitur Avicenna de intentionibus. Sed modo propter argumentum positio transfert se ad aliam significationem ‘intentionis’, ad istam scilicet de qua et apud philosophos non est sermo. Quare ista positio ista esset nulla propter duo: primo quia | mutat propositum, secundo quia loqui- M88ra tur de logicalibus non logicaliter, de scientiis non scientifice, de hiis de quibus agunt philosophi non ad intentionem philosophorum. Ego vero non curo disputare de intentionibus nisi eo modo quo de eis apud philosophos est sermo. Hoc autem modo loquitur Avicenna.

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Quod male dicit primam intentionem esse cognitionem sub modo essendi proprio

Deficit secundo quia dicit primam intentionem esse cognitionem rei 134 sub modo essendi proprio quoniam: Cognitio huiusmodi non est universaliter illud cui applicatur et apponitur secunda intentio. Sed prima 30 intentio est universaliter illud cui applicatur secunda intentio. Ergo prima intentio non est universaliter cognitio. Maiorem sic intelligo quod cognitio non sit universaliter illud cui applicatur et apponitur

5 intentio] O om. M 8 probatio probo] probatio O probo M 19 ista] O om. M 28 est] O om. M 102

Avicenna, Prima philosophia, tr. I, p. 14–6.

12 primis] O prima M

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pars prima

secunda intentio: applicatio enim et appositio secunde intentionis est sumptio alicuius denominati per secundam intentionem sub secunda intentione. Ut si dicam: ‘A quocumque removetur genus, et quelibet eius species; sed animal est genus hominis, homo et asinus sunt species eius; ergo a quocumque removetur animal, removetur homo et asinus’, ecce quod intentio generis applicata et apposita est animali, intentio speciei homini et asino. Maior igitur sic intellecta est manifesta, ut patet in exemplo dato. Minor est manifesta per Avicennam, principio Metaphisice sue dicentem103 quod subiectum logice sunt intentiones secundo intellecte, que apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis. Quare sequitur conclusio. 135 Preterea. Nullus actus intelligendi est universaliter intellectus, et nulla cognitio est universaliter intellecta. Sed prima intentio est universaliter intellecta, ut apparet per Avicennam, qui pro eodem habet104 intentionem primam et intentionem primo intellectam. Ergo prima intentio non est universaliter cognitio. Preterea. Hanc opinionem sequitur inconveniens mirabile. Non enim potest reddere nomina specialia significantia primas intentiones in speciali, quod iudicio meo est tantum et tam horrendum quod tota opinio est digna despici. Non enim dicit quod homo vel animal significet primam vel secundam intentionem, sed dicit quod universale et singulare, genus et species significant suas intentiones. Nec habemus nomina quibus utamur disputando contra M88rb istum articulum sicut habemus | disputando contra sequentem. Quare palam est quod hec opinio, adminus quantum ad istum articulum, est omnino digna despici.

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Quod male dicit secundam intentionem esse cognitionem sub modo essendi communi 136 Deficit tertio quia dicit secundam intentionem esse cognitionem rei sub

modo essendi communi. Quod probo sic. Modus essendi communis non est cognitio rei sub modo essendi communi. Sed modus essendi 30 communis est secunda intentio. Non est ergo cognitio rei sub modo

1 secunda] O prima M 8 principio] primo MO 9–10 secundo intellecte] O secunde intellectis M 22 disputando] O om. M 24–25 adminus … despici] M non est multum probabilis O 30 communi] O om. M 31 ergo] O om. M 103 104

Ibid., tr. VI 2, p. 1073–75. Ibid.

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essendi communi. Maior est evidentissima, quia nullum obiectum et nulla formalis conditio sub qua cognoscitur obiectum, est ipsa cognitio terminata ad tale obiectum. Minorem vero probo. Dicitur primo in generali quia: Modus cognitionis est ipsamet communitas, vel adminus includit communitatem. Sed ipsa communitas est secunda intentio quedam. Ergo modus essendi communis vel est ipsa secunda intentio vel includit eam. Secundo probo idem in speciali per dicta huius opinionis. Dat enim exemplum hec opinio de isto modo essendi communi in genere. Dicit enim quod genus seu intentio que est genus, est cognitio rei sub isto modo essendi qui est esse repartibile in plura differentia secundum speciem. Sed hec repartibilitas in plura non est nisi universalitas, et hec universalitas generis non est nisi generalitas. Universalitas autem seu generalitas est ipsa secunda intentio. Ergo iste modus essendi communis est secunda intentio. Sic igitur patet quod hec opinio implicat contradictionem, dicendo omnem secundam intentionem esse cognitionem rei sub modo essendi communi, cum iste modus essendi communis non possit esse talis cognitio, et necessario sit secunda intentio. Preterea. Si secunda intentio est cognitio, ista predicatio ‘Animal est 137 genus’ verificatur vel quia animal est cognitio, vel quia est cognoscens, vel quia est cognitum, vel est omnino falsa. Nullum istorum dari potest. Ergo nec illud unde necessario sequitur. Non primum, quia animal non est cognitio, sicut nec color vel quodcumque aliud genus. Nec secundum, quia sequeretur quod quidquid esset genus, esset cognoscens, quod est evidenter falsum. Nec quartum: hee enim propositiones reputantur vere ab omnibus ‘Animal est genus’, ‘Color est genus’. De | tertio vero singulariter probo quod non possit dari, scilicet quod M88va hec ‘Animal est genus’ non verificetur tamquam per suam causam veritatis ex eo quod animal est cognitum sub isto modo essendi qui est esse divisibile vel repperibile in plura differentia secundum speciem. Et arguo sic. Si hec propositio ‘Animal est genus’ verificatur quia animal est sub tali modo cognitum, ad istam propositionem ‘Animal est’ sub tali modo cognitam, sequeretur per se ista ‘Animal est genus’, per illam regulam105 secundi Topicorum: ‘Si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad

2 conditio] M cognitio O 10 repartibile] repperibile sic saepius MO sic probata est minor add. O 105

Arist., Top. II 11, 115b3–4.

14 intentio] et

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pars prima

magis, maxime ad maxime’. Sequetur ergo quod si animal est magis cognitum, animal erit magis genus sub illo modo quo animal est magis genus, et si animal est maxime cognitum, animal erit maxime genus. Sed hoc est nimis absurdum quod animal sit magis vel minus genus. Ergo illud ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod hec propositio ‘Animal est genus’ verificatur quia animal est cognitum sub isto modo essendi. Et per consequens manifestum est quod secunda intentio non est cognitio rei sub modo essendi communi. 138 Preterea. Supposito tamquam noto quod substantia sit universalior animali per habere maiorem universalitatem: si intentio universalitatis est essentialiter cognitio, tunc necessario est sequi unum de quatuor, scilicet quod illa cognitio que est universalitas substantie, sit maior universalitas universalitate animalis ratione sui, quia essentialiter universalior, vel ratione subiecti, quia est in subiecto universaliori, vel ratione obiecti, quia de obiecto universaliori, vel ratione modi, quia transit in obiectum ut modificatum modo universaliori. Sed nec primum nec secundum dari potest, quia cognitio substantie et cognitio animalis sunt equaliter res singulares in se et in eodem subiecto, puta in eodem intellectu. Dabitur ergo tertium vel quartum, quod scilicet cognitio substantie est universalior cognitione animalis ratione sui obiecti vel ratione modi sui obiecti. Et tunc arguam ultra. Omnis cognitio universalior vel ratione obiecti vel ratione modi obiecti sui supplet necessario universalitatem in obiecto suo. Sed cognitio substantie est universalior cognitione animalis ratione obiecti vel modi sui obiecti. Ergo supplet necessario in obiecto suo, scilicet in substantia, universalitatem. Ergo universalitas substantie que supponitur a cognitione substantie sub tali modo, non est cognitio substantie sub illo modo. Falsum est igitur quod intentio universalitatis, que est intentio secunda, sit cognitio rei sub modo essendi communi, et per consequens magis falsum de omni. 139 Preterea. Omnis cognitio dicit habitudinem | intelligentis ad illud M88vb quod intelligitur et non unius rei intellecte ad aliam. Sed multe secunde intentiones sunt que nullam habitudinem intelligentis ad intellectum dicunt, sed habitudinem unius rei ad aliam, ut generalitas, specialitas, superioritas et inferioritas. Ergo huiusmodi secunde intentiones 1–2 animal … genus] O om. M 3 rei] in speciali add. M 8 communi] O om. M 9 noto] O nota M 21 vel] coni. altera MO 22 sui] O om. M | supplet] M supponet O 23 substantie] O sortis M 24 ratione … obiecti] O om. M | supplet] M supponet O 33–34 generalitas … superioritas] O generalitatis specialitatis, superioritatis M 34 et inferioritas] O om. M

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non sunt cognitiones, nec apparet aliqua ratio quare debeant dici tales cognitiones. Preterea. Cognitio sub quocumque modo essendi rei est perfectio simplex. Sed generalitas et huiusmodi intentiones numquam. Ergo etc. Preterea. Cognitio est actus vitalis. Sed generalitas et speciali5 tas et huiusmodi intentiones non sunt actus vitales. Ergo etc. Preterea. Cognitio animalis sub illo modo essendi communi potest 140 multiplicari ita quod per diversas cognitiones in diversis hominibus et in uno solo in diversis temporibus potest cognosci sub illo modo communi. Sed generalitas animalis non potest multiplicari simul in diversis 10 hominibus nec in uno in diversis temporibus; aliter enim scientia tua et mea de genere non esset de eodem, sed tua esset de una singulari generalitate (scilicet de tua cognitione) et mea esset de una singulari; et tua sciencimet; aliquando esset de una generalitate, aliquando de alia, quod est nimis absurdum et dissonum rationi. Quare generalitas et quecum15 que similis intentio non est cognitio. Et sunt alia infinita inconvenientia ad que hec opinio potest duci valde de facili. Quod deficit circa distinctionem modorum essendi proprii et communis Deficit quarto ista opinio quantum ad distinctionem modorum essendi 141 proprii et communis quia: Modi essendi transcendentium, puta entis et 20 unius, sunt in quolibet predicamento repperibiles et in nullo determinate, et tamen intentiones transcendentes secundum istam opinionem debent dici prime, pro eo quod ista opinio dicit quod intentio prima est prima rei cognitio et secunda est secunda rei cognitio, ita quod res non potest cognosci sub modo essendi communi nisi prius cognita sub 25 modo essendi proprio. Sed quecumque res potest primo cognosci ut res vel ens, non cognita prius sub alio modo essendi, dicente106 Avicenna in Metaphisica sua quod ens et res prima impressione imprimuntur intellectui. Ergo cognitio rei et entis sub istis modis communissimis secundum hanc opinionem erit prima | intentio (quia prima rei cognitio), et M89ra 30 tamen ex alia parte (quia erit sub modo essendi communi) erit secunda, non prima, tr. Intentio. Et ita sequetur ex dictis de necessitate contradictio. 18 opinio] O om. M

19 proprii et communis] O proprium et communem M

106 Avicenna, Prima philosophia I 5, p. 312–324: “Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae nec acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se”.

452 142

pars prima

Et ista contradictio provenit ex repugnantia que est vel implicatur in dictis de distinctione modorum. Dicitur enim quod modus essendi proprius est in determinato predicamento, et modus communis in quolibet. Et ex hoc sequitur quod modus entis vel rei sit modus communis, non proprius. Et ex alia parte dicitur quod sub modo essendi communi 5 nichil potest cognosci nisi eo precognito sub modo proprio. Et quia evidens est aliquid posse cognosci sub modo entis, non precognito eo sub alio modo, evidenter sequitur quod modus rei et entis sit modus proprius, non communis. Et ita sequitur conferendo ultima primis quod idem modus sit communis et non communis, quod sit proprius et non 10 sit proprius. Quare isti modi essendi non videntur fuisse bene distincti.

de quarta opinione eiusque quatuor defectibus 143 Opinio quarto loco posita[38] deficit in quatuor, sicut precedens. Primo

M89rb

quantum ad intentionem in communi; secundo quantum ad intentionem primam; tertio quantum ad intentionem secundam; quarto quantum ad distinctionem modorum essendi, prout respiciunt intentiones primas et secundas. Primus defectus et secundus ostendi possunt sicut ostensi sunt in opinione precedente. Tertius vero ostendi potest per aliquas rationes contra precedentem inductas, sed adhuc hoc ostendetur amplius in ostensione quarti defectus. Ostendo igitur quod cognitio rei sub modo essendi rationis non sit secunda intentio et quod talis modus non faciat universaliter secundas intentiones. Et arguo sic. Cognoscere Joannem ut papam,107 Phylippum ut regem,108 Gastonem ut comitem, Petrum ut episcopum, Robertum ut legatum, Arnaldum ut procuratorem, Geraldum ut prefectum non est secunda intentio; oppositum enim dicere est maxima et absurda nimis abusio. Sed tale cognoscere est cognitio rei sub modo essendi rationis; esse enim papam vel regem vel comitem, episcopum vel legatum etc. est esse rationis pendens ex ratione electorum vel testatorum vel institutorum in tali vel tali officio. Ergo nec cognitio rei sub modo | essendi rationis est secunda intentio

3 modus communis] O modis communis M 11 bene] O om. M 19 hoc] O om. M 21 quod] O om. M 22 cognoscere] MUV cognosco NS 23 gastonem] MNV ludovicum U 24 petrum] N p. M pe U pe-m V | arnaldum] NVS geraldum MU 25 geraldum] NVS arnaldum MU 107 108

Johannes XXII papa (1316–1334). Philippus V rex (1316–1322).

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universaliter. Quare male sunt distincti modi essendi quibus distinguuntur prime et secunde intentiones.

de quibusdam defectibus circa principia quinte opinionis Opinio quinto loco posita[39–41] quantum ad ea que recitata sunt et 144 quantum ad ea que in illo volumine De intentionibus continentur, deficit in multis. Que adpresens recitari non possunt, prolixitate nimia prohibente. Sed recitabo defectus aliquos circa huius opinionis principia, ut ruentibus eius principiis, ruat ipsa. Accipio igitur aliquos defectus eius 10 quantum ad illud quod dicit in communi de intentione, aliquos quantum ad illud quod dicit de distinctione duplicis generis intelligibilium, aliquos quantum ad illud quod dicit de ordine prime et secunde intentionum et habitudine earum adinvicem. 5

De quinque eius defectibus circa intentionem in communi 15

In hoc autem quod dicit de intentione in communi ostendo eam defi- 145 cere in quinque. Primum est quia ipsemet contradicit alibi conclusioni; secundum quia alibi contradicit rationi; tertium quia conclusio falsa ultra illam contradictionem; quartum quia ratio falsa; quintum quia impropriissime loquitur de concreto et abstracto.

20

De contradictione in ipsa conclusione

Contradictio in conclusione hec est. Dicit in plerisque locis illius volu- 146 minis quod sola habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi vel ad intellectum actu intelligentem est intentio formaliter et in abstracto secundum quod de intentione apud logicos est sermo. Hec autem 25 exclusiva valet has duas exponentes, scilicet ‘talis habitudo est intentio logicalis’, et ‘nichil aliud’. In questione autem illa utrum sola talis habitudo sit intentio dicit109 quod generalitas et universalitas sunt in abstracto et essentialiter intentio. Generalitas autem et universalitas bene sunt intentiones logicales, et secundum hanc opinionem non dicunt

10–11 in communi … dicit] O om. M 109

15 eam] MUV eum NS

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. II, q. 6, resp., ad fin.

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habitudinem rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi, sed habitudinem unius rei intellecte ad aliam. Et sic ista opinio dicit quod nulla alia habitudo ab habitudine rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi est intentio formaliter, et quod alia quedam habitudo ab ista est intentio formaliter. Hec autem sunt contradictoria. 147 Sed statim videntur posse salvari ista dicta sine implicatione contradictionis per distinctionem huius doctoris quam ponit de intentione, ut superius est expressum. Dicit110 quod ‘intentio’ potest sumi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod dividitur contra esse reale, et sic omne ens rationis potest esse formaliter et essentialiter intentio; et hoc modo generalitas et universalitas sunt formaliter et essentialiter intentio. Alio modo secundum quod dicit terminationem actus intelligendi M89va in rem intellectam, | secundum quam aliquid dicitur prima intentio vel secunda. Et hoc secundo modo sola habitudo illa est intentio. Et sic nulla apparet contradictio. 148 Sed ista responsio nulla est. Primo quia cum hoc non potest evadi contradictio; secundo quia hec ostendit maximam abusionem et insufficientiam in assignatione rationis eius quod est intentio. Primum ostendo nam: Ipse dicit111 in questione utrum una secunda intentio predicetur de altera quod ista est in primo modo dicendi per se ‘Genus est secunda intentio’, et similes isti, puta ‘Universale est secunda intentio’. Sed constat quod cum dicitur ‘Genus est secunda intentio’, quod genus dicitur secunda intentio secundum intentionem qua predicatur, illa vero que predicantur in primo modo dicendi per se, sunt de essentia subiectorum. Ergo intentio secundum quam aliquid dicitur secunda intentio, est de essentia generis et generalitatis in abstracto, universalis et universalitatis. Ergo necesse est sequi ex dictis unam de duabus contradictionibus: vel istam que dicta est, quod sola habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum sit intentio secundum quam aliquid dicitur prima intentio vel secunda, et quod non sola, ymo quodlibet ens rationis (et certe ista nullo modo excusari potest); vel aliam, scilicet quod habitudo importata per genus et universale et similia non est habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum; prima pars huius contradictionis ponitur in pluribus locis illius libelli, secunda vero pars ponitur in hoc quod dicitur secunda intentio predicari in primo modo dicendi per se de genere et universali. 4 et quod … formaliter] UVS om. MN 110 111

Ibid. Ibid. dist. IV, q. 2 init.

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Si tamen ad fugiendam primam contradictionem velint dicere quod cum dicitur in primo modo dicendi per se ‘Genus est secunda intentio’, quod ibi sumatur ‘intentio’ pro habitudine rei intellecte ad intellectionem, et tunc evidens contradictio in hoc quod genus dicitur esse habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum, non ad actum intelligendi; et cum hoc quod genus dicatur habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi essentialiter et in primo modo dicendi per se. Si vero ad hoc non fugiant, necesse quod dicant quod sola illa habitudo est intentio secundum quam aliquid dicitur prima intentio vel secunda, et quod non ipsa sola, ymo quecumque alia habitudo rationalis vel quodcumque ens rationis. Et sic patet quod non possunt fugere contradictionem. Si tamen adhuc | velint velamen ponere dicentes quod sola habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem est intentio secundum quam aliquid dicitur denominative (non essentialiter nec quidditative) prima vel secunda intentio, non tamen est proprium ei secundum eam essentialiter et quidditative dici prima vel secunda intentio,—hec cavillatio esset et non evasio. Quod ostendo sic. A quocumque quod est essentialiter prima vel secunda intentio potest aliquid denominari, ab eo potest dici prima vel secunda intentio denominative. Sed quodcumque ens rationis secundum istos est essentialiter prima vel secunda intentio, et a quocumque ente rationis potest aliquid denominari, ut patet in omnibus. Ergo a quocumque ente rationis per dicta istorum potest aliquid denominative dici prima vel secunda intentio. Et sic, ut prius, patet quod non potest vitari contradictio. Et preterea sequetur ex supraposita responsione quedam maxima abusio et insufficientia in assignatione rationis eius quod est intentio, quia cum in principio tanti operis vellent assignare rationem intentionis logicaliter sumpte, invenerint nescio quas habitudines, dimiserint intentionem—que dicitur essentialiter de genere et specie et aliis predicabilibus et ipso universali, que sunt intentiones de quibus theoriam faciunt logici ex probabilibus, ut dicitur112 tertio Metaphisice—, videtur abusio maxima et insufficientia grandis in tali assignatione rationis.

4 evidens contradictio] M evidens est quod non est contradictio perperam O 5 intellectum] UNS intellectam MV 7–8 si … fugiant] O om. M 25 quedam] coni. quod MO 112

Arist., Metaph. III 1, 995b23–24.

149

150 M89vb

151

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De contradictione in assignatione rationis ‘intentionis’ adhibita 152 Contradictio autem in assignatione rationis hec est quoniam: Ut supra

recitatum est, iste doctor volens probare quod intentio non sit habitudo fundata super actum intelligendi qua actus refertur ad obiectum, dicit illam esse realem; infra vero in questione “Utrum aliqua scientia sit de 5 intentionibus”, dicit113 illam non esse realem sed rationis tantum. In hiis manifeste implicatur contradictio. 153 Si vero dicatur quod aliam partem huius contradictionis dixit non multum assertive, et ideo non est plena contradictio,—contra hoc dici potest quod equipollet plenissime contradictioni quoniam: Quodlibet 10 sumptum pro principio est apud sumentem indubitanter verum. Sed qualitercumque negatum, vel assertive vel dubitative, apud negantem non est indubitanter verum. Quare apud eundem idem est indubitanM90ra ter verum et non indubitanter | verum. Et apud eundem idem erit sumendum pro principio et non sumendum pro principio. Et ultra: etsi 15 non est sumendum pro principio, tota doctrina ruet que fundata fuerit super eo tamquam super principio vero. De falsitate ipsius conclusionis 154 Falsitas conclusionis in hoc patet quoniam: Nec logica nec aliqua alia

scientia est de illis habitudinibus. Sed omnes scientie, ut supra per 20 Avicennam114 patuit, sunt de intentionibus. Ergo intentiones de quibus apud philosophos est sermo, non sunt ille tales habitudines. Maior patet, quia nullam scientiam videmus de illis habitudinibus probare unam conclusionem, nec logica nec aliqua aliam, ut patet discurrenti per singulas. Nec valet quod dicit,115 scilicet quod logicus agit de dici- 25 bili et abstracto, et per hoc agit de istis habitudinibus quia talia dicunt habitudinem ad intellectum; per hoc enim salvari non potest logicam esse de intentionibus quia (ut dicit116 ille doctor) hee habitudines multiplicantur multiplicatis actibus intelligendi. Sed dicibilitas, que idem est quod predicabilitas et manifestabilitas (ut supra ostensum est), non mul- 30 2 assignatione rationis] O ratione M 113 114 115 116

14–15 et non … principio] O om. M

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1, resp., ad fin. Avicenna, Prima philosophia, tr. I, p. 14–6. Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. V, q. 2, in contrarium. Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. V, q. 2 init.

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tiplicatur multiplicatis actibus intelligendi. Ergo dicibilitas talis non est habitudo talis de quali ipse loquitur. Et hoc idem ipse concedit117 infra in eodem libello in questione ‘Utrum secunda intentio predicetur de altera’. Dicit enim predicabilitatis habitudinem subordinari habitudini 5 illi que est rei intellecte ad intellectum actu intelligentem. Et licet in hoc dicat falsum, tamen ab ipso habetur probatio contra eum. De hoc autem quod est esse abstractum loquitur improprie (ut vide- 155 bitur infra) quia: logicus loquitur de hoc per comparationem ad terminos, sicut gramaticus de substantivo et adiectivo. Quare propter ista 10 non potest salvari quod aliqua scientia agat de habitudine rei intellecte ad intellectum, adminus ut de principali subiecto. De hoc tamen magis videbitur infra ubi agetur quomodo logica et scientie cetere agunt de intentionibus primis et secundis, et quomodo non. De falsitate in ratione adhibita Falsitas in ratione apparet dupliciter. Primo maiorem sumit ex insuffi- 156 cienti divisione. Dicit enim quod intentio in abstracto vel est res ipsa, vel actus intelligendi, vel habitudo actus intelligendi ad rem intellectam, vel habitudo rei intellecte ad actum | intelligendi. Hec autem divisio est M90rb penitus insufficiens. Quod patet in multis. Primo quia est habitudo rei 20 intelligibilis ad intellectum non actu intelligentem sed potentia solum, que habitudo dicitur intelligibilitas vel conceptibilitas, de qua sine comparatione esset dictum rationabilius, ut infra patebit. Secundo patet, quoniam ex parte rei est aliquis modus qui non est de quidditate rei, qui nullus est de quatuor predictis; de quo videbitur infra quod est 25 intentio logica. Tertio patet idem ex dictis huius doctoris, qui ponit multa alia entia rationis, que non sunt aliquid de quatuor supradictis, ut generalitatem et universalitatem et unitatem specificam, et multa similia. Quare patentissimum est quod illa divisio fuit insufficiens, et per consequens quod primum fundamentum huius opinionis nullum est. 30 Deficit preterea hec ratio quod in probando minorem supponit quod 157 illud quod est essentialiter ipsa intentio, non sequitur naturam rerum, sed apprehendens per intellectum, quod superius monstratum est esse falsum. Constat enim ex predictis quod singularitas est ex natura rei 15

3–5 eodem … in] O om. M 6 habetur probatio] O probo M 26 que] qui M quo O 28 illa] O om. M 117

Ibid. dist. IV, q. 2, resp.

24 nullus] nullum MO

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et est intentio logica. Secunda etiam ratio (quam propter sui ridiculositatem superius nolui recitare) deficit, quia per primam et secundam intentionem vult118 probare quid est intentio in communi. Formatur enim sic: ‘Secunda intentio concretive dicta presupponit primam, ut in qua fundatur quantum ad totum quod prima includit. Sed secunda intentio non potest fundari nisi in re intellecta prout est obiective in intellectu. Ergo intentionalitas qua prima intentio dicitur intentio, super rem que intelligitur non addit nisi ipsum esse obiective in intellectu; hoc autem est ipsam habere relationem ad actum intelligendi. Ergo etc.’ Hec ratio deficit, quia, accipiendo primam et secundam intentionem, accipit intentionem, et ita sumit quod probare intendit. Et postea concludit aliam conclusionem a proposita; prima enim ratio que cum ista eandem conclusionem probare debebat, concludit de omni intentione, hec autem solum de prima. 158 Et ultra hoc maior est falsa ad intellectum suum, et minor similiter. Quod autem maior sit falsa ad intellectum suum apparet, quia in proM90va batione exponit119 quod secunda intentio fundatur | super esse intellectum, et in hoc petit minorem, cuius falsitas statim probabitur. Sed primo volo discutere probationes maioris. Que sunt due. Prima est hec quia: Si universale et genus et huiusmodi intentiones concretive dicte fundantur super naturas rerum secundum se acceptarum, sequeretur quod fundarentur et conserentur res in suo esse reali, circumscripto omni opere intellectus; quod est inconveniens. Qui ergo legit intelligat!: ipse vult probare in minori quod secunda intentio fundetur super rem per comparationem ad intellectum, et modo accipit hoc pro principio in probatione maioris. Item. Ista probatio deficit, quia consequentia nulla et quia inconveniens ad quod adducit non est inconveniens. Consequentia enim nulla; quod patet per eummet, qui dicit120 esse intellectum immediate fundari super rem—et hoc vere dicit—, sicut esse visum super colorem immediate, et esse auditum super sonum, et sic de multis aliis. Tamen talia non sequuntur res in esse reali rerum, idest propter esse reale ita quod, ipso posito, ponantur—inconveniens quod adducit[ur] non est inconveniens, ut probabitur contra minorem—quia

3 quid] coni. quod MO 6 obiective] O obicere M 8 ipsum] coni. ipsam M 22 conserentur] M consequerentur O 31 talia] US alia MNV 118 119 120

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. III, q. 2c. Ibid., dist. I, q. 3 init. Ibid., dist. III, q. 3c.

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idem sunt. Alia probatio que est ita quia: ‘Secunda intentio non dicitur nisi respectu prime; ergo supponit eam; et per consequens ut fundamentum’ deficit per fallaciam consequentis, procedendo a pluribus causis ad unam. Plures enim possunt esse cause quare secunda intentio presupponit primam. Sicut dicimus ‘prima intellectio et secunda’ ita quod secunda presupponit primam tamquam priorem se, et si inferatur ‘ergo tamquam fundamentum’, non sequitur, quia processus est a pluribus causis ad unam. Et sic posset dici in proposito. Nondum tamen dico quod secunda intentio non fundetur super primam, tamen bene video quod probatio nulla fuit. Quod autem minor sit falsa similiter probo sic. Illud est proximum 159 fundamentum generalitatis de quo predicatur primo genus, et illud non de quo non predicatur. Hoc apparet evidentissime, et ratione et inductione. Ratione sic. Omne quod est conditio vel proprietas realis vel rationis, quecumque sit, predicatur primo de illo cui primo inest secundum qualecumque inesse reale vel rationis; patet, quia ratio est huius inesse primo. Sed primo inest proximo fundamento. Ergo primo predicatur de ipso. Ergo hoc est verum, quod illud est fundamentum proximum generalitatis de quo primo predicatur, et illud non de quo non. Sed genus predicatur de animali, non de animali intellecto. Ergo animal est fundamentum proximum generalitatis, non animal intellectum, istud scilicet aggregatum ex re et esse intellecto. Minor apparet121 per multas considerationes quarti Topicorum. Est 160 enim consideratio una quod si positum pro genere sit accidens speciebus, vel ipsum vel aliquid eius, ita quod contingat eis inesse vel non inesse, | manifestum est quod positum pro genere non est genus. Sed M90vb animal ut intellectum contingit inesse vel non inesse homini; contingit enim quod homo sit aliquid intellectum vel non intellectum. Ergo animal intellectum non est genus hominis per istam considerationem. Item. Quod est genus hominis, predicatur de homine in primo modo dicendi per se. Sed animal intellectum non sic predicatur de homine, cum includat aliquid plus quam homo. Ergo etc. Item. Quod est genus hominis est cum homine in eodem predicamento (ex alia consideratione). Sed animal intellectum non est in eodem predicamento cum 4 causis] veritatis add. M 13–19 hoc apparet … de quo non] O om. M 24 una] UNS om. MV 27–28 contingit … intellectum] O om. M 31 sic] O om. M 33–34 ex alia … predicamento] O om. M 121

Arist., Top. IV.

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homine propter duo: primo quia non est in predicamento, cum sit ens per accidens, ut habetur122 ex quinto Metaphisice, quia ens aggregatum per accidens; secundo quia si esset in predicamento aliquo, esset in illo ad quod ipsum determinatur per suum formale, scilicet per esse intellectum. Sed esse intellectum non determinat animal ad predicamentum Substantie, in quo est homo, quia si sic, omne esse intellectum esset in predicamento Substantie. Quare patet quod animal intellectum non est genus hominis; quare nec fundamentum proximum generalitatis. 161 Et si dicatur ad hoc quod homo intellectus est species animalis, et per consequens quod animal ut intellectum potest de homine predicari,— contra hoc est quia: Sic omnia que sunt in predicamentis essent entia per accidens, quod est contra totam metaphisicam. Et iterum, predicamenta non distinguuntur per sua formalia; constat enim quod esse intellectum est esse formale in aggregato ex re et ex tali esse; non enim potest esse materiale; quare necessario est formale. Quare cum penes esse intellectum predicamenta non sint distincta, impossibile est quod res predicamentales includant esse intellectum. Sic ergo probatum est quod genus et universale et similia non habent pro proximo fundamento esse intellectum. 162 Probatio etiam huius minoris nulla est. Dicit quod hee secunde intentiones, universale, genus, et similia non possunt fundari super res secundum entitatem quam habent in rerum natura, nec super actum intelligendi, quia ista sunt vere res, nec super actum intelligendi ut est representativus rei universalis, quoniam hic sumitur ‘universale’ non per representationem sed per predicationem, quia universale per representationem est aliquis singularis actus vel species; relinquitur ergo quod fundentur super rem intellectam prout est obiective in intellectu. Hec autem probatio primo nulla est quia non probat quod universalitas non possit fundari super rem veram et naturalem; hoc enim habuit principaliter demonstrare, et de hoc nichil probat. Secundo nulla est M91ra quia dicit quod non potest fundari | super actum intelligendi ut est representativus alicuius communis. Quero ergo de quo actu intelligit. Et videtur quod de primo actu, quia hoc etiam attribuit speciei intelligibili; illa autem differt in hoc a specie sensibili quoniam species sensibilis est representativa rei singularis, species autem intelligibilis rei universalis. 6 omne esse] omne UN S esse MV om. M 122

Arist., Metaph. V 7.

14 est] O om. M

31 ut] O nec M

34 autem] O

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Tunc ergo super hoc fundo unam rationem talem ex ista minori con- 163 tra hanc minorem: Nulla condicio rei representate ut representate per primam speciem intelligibilem et per primum actum intelligendi fundatur super habitudinem rei representate ad actum intelligendi; hoc patet, quia prius est representata per speciem intelligibilem prioritate nature quam ipsa referatur ad actum intelligendi, quia hec est causa illius, non econverso; in illo autem priori nature condicio representati fundata est in representato nec fundari potest in illa habitudine posteriori secundum naturam, cum fundamentum non possit esse posterius re fundata. Sed universalitas et communitas, ut habeo per probationem huius minoris, est condicio rei representate; dicit enim actum et speciem esse universalia representatione, quia representant aliquid commune. Ergo talis habitudo non est fundamentum illius communitatis. Item ex eodem puncto quia: Dicit actum non esse universale predicatione ut proximum fundamentum universalitatis, quia est aliquid singulare. Et arguo ex eodem medio contra eum sic. Nullum singulare est proximum fundamentum universalitatis; hanc habeo per eum, quia hoc est fundamentum suum. Quare, si habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi est singulare, ergo ipsa non est proximum fundamentum universalitatis. Minorem probo ex datis in eadem questione.123 Omne multiplica- 164 bile (seu plurificabile, ut verbis eius utar) ad plurificationem singularium est singulare.—Hoc apparet sic: intelligendo quod quodlibet illorum respondeat uni singulari et cuilibet illorum respondeat unum singulare, necesse est quod quodlibet talium sit singulare; quod ostendi potest in obiecto; substantia enim predicamentum protanto est universalis quia cuilibet substantie singulari non respondet una substantia predicabilis ita quod sint tot substantie predicabiles generalissime quot sunt substantie singulares; quare patet quod quecunque plurificantur, plurificatis singularibus, sunt singularia.—Sed habitudines | ille pluri- M91rb ficantur (secundum eum in eadem questione), plurificatis actibus intelligendi (qui sunt singulares secundum eum). Ergo talis habitudo non debet poni proximum fundamentum generalitatis secundum eum. Et sic patet falsitas huius rationis fundamentalis.

18 si] O sed M 123

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. V, q. 3c.

462

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De improprietate locutionis de abstracto et concreto 165 Improprietas locutionis de abstracto et concreto patet manifeste, quo-

niam differentia significandi facit differentias essendi; abstractum enim et concretum sunt differentie significandi. Dicunt enim auctoritates quod idem significatur in concreto vel in abstracto, ut albedo et album, et quod terminus significat in abstracto per modum per se stantis, ut ‘hec albedo’, vel in concreto per modum dependentis et inherentis, ut ‘albus, -ba, -bum’. Ipse vero utitur hiis differentiis ac si essent modi essendi, non significandi, dicens quod homo, bos et leo et omnis vera res est prima intentio in concreto, et universale, universalitas, genus et generalitas et similia, et omnia entia rationis sunt secunda intentio in concreto; ille vero habitudines rerum intellectarum sunt secunde vel prime intentiones in abstracto. Et ecce quomodo utitur improprie differentiis modorum significandi ut differentiis modorum essendi. 166 Et ideo posset sic argui contra eum, licet ipse respondere posset secundum illam improprietatem: Omne concretum includit formam significatam per abstractum; hoc ostendi potest inducendo in omnibus, ut ‘album’ albedinem, ‘nigrum’ nigredinem, et sic de aliis; et auctoritate Philosophi in Predicamentis:124 ‘Denominativa vero dicuntur quecumque solo casu differentia secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a “gramatica” “gramaticus”, a “fortitudine” “fortis”’. Ergo ex hiis patet quod si denominativa (que sunt concreta) solo casu differunt, quod forma gramatice includitur in ‘gramatico’, forma fortitudinis in ‘forti’. Accipio ergo quod omne concretum includit formam significatam per abstractum. Sed homo, bos, leo, universale, genus, et similia secundum eum non includunt intentionalitatem. Ergo non sunt intentiones in concreto, sicut nec lignum est albedo in concreto, licet denominetur ab albedine ut significata in concreto. Et sic patet improprietas locutionis de abstracto et concreto quam repetit nugatorie.

3 differentia] O differentias M 5 idem] UVS illud N hoc M 18 nigrum] O om. M 27 sicut … concreto] O om. M 124

Arist., Categ. 1, 1a12–15.

7 ut] N om. MUVS

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De duobus defectibus in distinctione duplicis generis intelligibilium Arguitur contra modos essendi a quibus sumuntur hec duo genera

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Defectus vero in distinctione duplicitatis generis intelligibilium redu- 167 cuntur ad duos: | primus circa modos essendi a quibus sumuntur hec M91va duo genera; secundus circa ipsa genera. Primus, quia dicit omnem modum esse realem qui debetur rebus, circumscripto opere intellectus, sic scilicet quod in sua ratione non includat habitudinem nec aliquem modum convenientem rebus ut sunt obiective in intellectu; omnem vero alium modum vocat modum essendi rationis. Contra hoc est manifeste quia: Esse obiective in visu, puta esse visum, esse obiective in auditu, puta esse auditum, est esse non reale, sed esse rationis tantum, sicut est esse obiective in intellectu. Et tamen istud esse debetur rebus ante omnem operationem intellectus. Quare illa distinctio videtur esse falsa. Item. Ipsemet dicit quod esse intelligibile est esse rationis, et tamen precedit omnem operationem intellectus; et eodem modo dicere possuimus de esse visibili et esse audibili. Item. Ex dictis huius doctoris probari potest quod ens rationis, puta 168 illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum, sit ens reale; ipse enim in prima questione sui operis, probando quod species intelligibilis sit ens reale, arguit125 sic: “Omne habens causam realem et effectum realem est ens reale; illa species est huiusmodi; ergo etc.”; simili modo arguo de illa habitudine: ‘Omne habens causam realem et effectum realem est ens reale. Sed illa habitudo est huiusmodi. Ergo est ens reale’. Maior est sua. Minorem ostendo. Primam partem per eum, qui dicit actum intelligendi esse realem et causam illius habitudinis et ipsam rem intellectam; secundam partem probo per Philosophum octavo Ethicorum dicentem126 “Amat autem unusquisque non ipsi bonum sed apparens; differt autem; nichil enim erit amabile apparens”. Ex quibus apparet quod esse apparens quod est causa amationis, que est effectus realis, dicit habitudinem rei intellecte et apparentis ad intellectum. Ergo talis habitudo est causa effectus realis. Et sic haberet concedere ille doctor 3 duplicitatis] N duplicis MUVS 4 duos] O duo M 8 convenientem] UNS consequentem MV 11 puta] O per M 11–12 sicut est] US sicut M quod est quantum NV 18 sit] O nullo modo sit perperam M 21 arguo] O arguendo M 27–28 apparens … amabile] O om. M 125 126

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1, in contrarium. Arist., Eth. Nicom. VIII 1, 1155b23–25.

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M91vb illam habitudinem esse ens reale, licet contradictorium huius | dicat.

Quare secundum eum illi modi essendi videntur male distincti. Arguitur contra distinctionem duplicis generis intelligibilium 169 Contra distinctionem duplicitatis generis intelligibilium potest argui ex

dictis eius et probari quod ens rationis sit de primo genere intelligibilium. Et hoc sic. Intelligibilia simpliciter prima sunt de primo genere intelligibilium; hec est evidentissima. Sed ea que secundum eum sunt entia rationis, sunt intelligibilia simpliciter prima. Ergo ea que secundum eum sunt entia rationis, sunt de primo genere intelligibilium. Minorem probo sic. Ens quod natum est intelligi vel quod intelligitur sine ‘hoc’ et sine ‘illud’ (puta homo sine Sorte et Platone) est simpliciter primum intelligibile. Sed ens quod intelligitur ut natum est intelligi sine hoc et sine illo, est ens rationis secundum eum. Ergo illud quod est ens rationis secundum eum, est simpliciter primum intelligibile. Maior huius sillogismi patet sic: Quod est primo representabile seu representatum per speciem intelligibilem est simpliciter primum intelligibile. Sed res universalis intelligibilis sine hoc et sine illo est primum representatum per speciem intelligibilem. Ergo quod est intelligibile sine hoc et sine illo, est simpliciter primum intelligibile. Premisse huius prosillogismi patent127 ex tertio De anima. Est ergo certa conclusio principalis quod ens rationis secundum eum tamen est de primo genere intelligibilium. Cuius oppositum ipse dicit et hic et alibi. Quare male videntur distincta secundum dicta sua hec duo genera intelligibilium secundum duos modos essendi entium.

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170 Defectus huius opinionis quantum ad ea que dicit de ordine et habitu-

dine et ratione prime intentionis et secunde sunt multi. Qui ut melius pateant, repeto decem dicta de eis, quinque de prima intentione et quinque de secunda.

4 duplicitatis] N duplicis MUV 11 illud] MV illo UN 15 sillogismi] Uc prosillogismi MO 16 simpliciter] O om. M 18 est] O om. M 21 tamen] MUS vero V om. N 127

Arist., De Anima III 4.

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De quinque dictis circa primam intentionem Quinque dicta de prima sunt hec. Primum quod prima intentio in con- 171 creto est quodcumque ens de primo genere intelligibilium, quod est idem quod ens reale, ut sumitur ens reale pro quocumque quod con5 venit rebus preter operationem intellectus. Secundum dictum est quod prima intentio in abstracto est habitudo rei de primo genere rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi. Tertium est quod prima intentio in abstracto est secunda intentio in concreto. Quartum est quod prima intentio in abstracto est ens primum inter omnia entia rationis. Quintum 10 | quod prima intentio in abstracto fundatur super rem non absolute M92ra sumptam, sed super rem ut sic vel sic intellectam. De quatuor contradictionibus circa primum dictum

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Circa primum dictum invenio quatuor contradictiones. Una est inter 172 primum dictum et tertium. Ad cuius evidentiam accipio quod dicit128 iste doctor in prima questione huius libelli, scilicet quod nomina prime impositionis (ut ‘homo’, ‘bos’ et ‘leo’) significant primas intentiones, nomina vero secunde impositionis (ut ‘universale’, ‘genus’, ‘singulare’) significant secundas; hoc autem debet intelligi in concreto secundum expositiones eius. Tunc arguo sic. Omnia correlativa pertinent ad idem genus impositionis nominum. Sed cognoscens et cognitum, intellectus et intellectum sunt correlativa. Ergo pertinent ad idem genus impositionis nominum; et si ad idem genus impositionis, ergo ad idem genus intentionis (per premissam). Ipse vero ponit cognoscens et actum cognoscendi, seu intelligens et actum intelligendi, inter primas intentiones in concreto, cum sit ens reale. Et per consequens debet inter eas ponere esse intellectum. Cuius oppositum facit in tertio dicto. Et cum ponit esse intellectum inter secundas intentiones in concreto, necessario habet ponere esse intelligens in ter secundas intentiones. Cuius oppositum facit in prima conclusione seu in primo dicto. Maior argumenti patet inductione et ratione. Inductione sic. Ut acti- 173 vum et passivum, duplum et subduplum, mensura et mensuratum, hec enim videntur pertinere ad genus nominum prime impositionis ab utro4 ut … reale] O om. M intentiones] O om. M 128

20–22 sed … impositionis] O om. M

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1c init.

25–27 in concreto …

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que extremo,129 genus vero et species, superius et inferius, predicatum et subiectum ab utroque extremo pertinere videntur ad genus nominum secunde impositionis, et sic de singulis. Nec valet si exciperentur correlativa in quibus est relatio rationis in altero extremo et relatio realis in altero, quoniam secundum communia dicta doctorum relatio creature ad Creatorem est realis, sed Creatoris ad creaturam est rationis, et Creator et creatura pertinent ad idem genus impositionis et ad idem genus intentionis; utrumque enim est nomen prime impositionis et utrumque significat rem prime intentionis. Hoc idem patet de mensura et mensurato, in quibus est relatio realis ex uno extremo et rationis ex altero. Nec potest dari singularitatis exemptio in aliquibus duobus correlativis. Et sic patet inductione. 174 Ratione vero sic. Nulla res importata | per nomen secunde imposiM92rb tionis est de intellectu vel cointellectu rei importate per nomen prime impositionis. Hec propositio maxime est manifesta per istum doctorem, qui dicit130 res importatas per nomina prime impositionis esse de primo genere intelligibilium, et alias de secundo genere intelligibilium. Secundum autem intelligibile non est de intellectu primi intelligibilis nec de cointellectu; aliter non esset secundum intelligibile, sed simul intelligibile. Sed quodcumque correlativum est de intellectu vel cointellectu sui correlativi; quod evidens est etiam in istis: de intellectu enim vel cointellectu eius quod est ‘intelligens’ est ‘esse intellectum’. Ergo si unum correlativum importatur per nomen prime impositionis, necessario et reliquum; et si unum per nomen secunde, necessario et reliquum. Sic igitur patet quod si ponit ‘esse intelligens’ primam intentionem in concreto esse, necessario etiam habet ponere esse intellectum primam intentionem in concreto, et econverso. Et sic sequitur contradictio. 175 Preterea. Quecumque pertinent ad idem genus impositionis nominum, pertinent ad idem genus intentionis; patet per predicta. Sed ‘intelligens’ et ‘intellectum’ pertinent ad idem genus impositionis. Ergo ad idem genus intentionis. Minorem probo sic. Quecumque pertinent ad condeclinium eiusdem verbi, pertinent ad idem genus impositionis;

2 pertinere videntur] O om. M 11 singularitatis exemptio] O simplex expositio M 26–27 necessario … concreto] O om. M 30 genus] impositionis add. M 31 intentionis] intentionum MO 31–32 pertinent … condeclinium] O om. M 32 verbi] O vel M 129 130

‘extremum’ = ‘fundamentum relationis’. Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1c. init.

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hoc patet, quia totum condeclinium imponitur unica impositione, puta ‘amo’ et ‘amare’, et ‘amari’ et ‘amatum’, et ultra. Sed ‘intelligens’ et ‘intellectum’ pertinent ad condeclinium unius et eiusdem verbi, scilicet ‘intelligo’ cum suo passivo ‘intelligor’. Ergo ad idem genus impositionis; et per consequens ad idem genus intentionis. Quare si unum ponit primam intentionem in concreto, et reliquum habet ponere; et per consequens contradicere. Et hoc idem est de secunda. Preterea. Quecumque pertinent ad idem genus scientie, pertinent ad 176 idem genus intentionis; hoc patet per Avicennam, primo sue Metaphisice, qui secundum diversa genera intentionum accipit131 diversa genera scientiarum; et patet etiam, quia logica distinguitur ab aliis scientiis quia ipsa principaliter considerat secundas intentiones. Sed ‘intelligens’ et ‘intellectum’ pertinent ad idem genus scientie et discipline, quoniam omnium oppositorum eadem est disciplina; ipsa vero sunt relative opposita. Ergo | pertinent ad idem genus intentionis. Quare si unum M92va significat intentionem primam, et reliquum. Quare necessario sequitur contradictio. Secundam contradictionem invenio quoniam aut dicit132 ens reale 177 esse primam intentionem quia includit intentionalitatem, ut ‘album’ albedinem, aut quia denominatur ab intentione, ut lignum a colore dicitur ‘coloratum’. Si primo modo, contradicit sibi, quia contradictorium huius dicit133 prima questione de secundis intentionibus contra eos qui ponebant ‘hominem’ absolute dicere intentionem. Si secundo modo, pari ratione sequetur quod sit secunda intentio, quia secunda intentio predicatur de ente reali non dependente ab intellectu. Quod patet per eum in hoc eodem passu, ubi dicit quod ens reale non dependens ab intellectu est primum genus intelligibilium. Genus autem, ut ipsemet dicit, est secunda intentio, et intelligibilitas secundum eum, et etiam primitas. Quare ens reale secundum eum denominatur a secunda intentione. Et per consequens secundum eum oportet ipsum esse secundam intentionem in concreto. Cuius contradictorium dicit in multis locis. 1 imponitur] O imponuntur M 8–9 scientie … genus] O om. M 11 scientiarum] UNS sententiarum MV 13 idem] O om. M 14 relative] O relativa M 16 primam] O om. M 22 prima] O tertia M | secundis] coni. coll. textu Hervaei primis MO 30–31 secundam] O secundum M 131 132 133

Avicenna, Philosophia prima I. ‘dicit’= ‘dicere vult’. Hervaeus, dist. II, q. 1c.

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178

Preterea. Supposito (sicut supra) quod ens reale sit prima intentio in concreto vel quia includit intentionalitatem vel quia denominatur ab ea, ostendo (secundum eum) quod neutro modo. De primo modo certum est quod non, et ipse dicit hoc quod non includit intentionalitatem in se. De secundo modo etiam probo quod non quoniam: Omne quod denominatur ab aliqua forma reali vel rationis, denominatur ab ea accepta in concreto vel in abstracto. Sed ens reale non potest denominari ab hac intentionalitate in abstracto accepta, quia tunc non esset denominatio sed essentialis predicatio, cum sola concreta sint denominativa, et cum abstracta predicentur essentialiter de quibuscumque predicantur; nec in concreto accepta, cum secundum eum ipsa sit secunda intentio in concreto et non sit prima intentio in concreto, quia secundum eum nullum ens rationis est prima intentio in concreto. Relinquitur ergo quod ens reale non sit prima intentio ex eo quod denominetur ab intentionalitate, et per consequens quod nullo modo. Cuius convb M92 tradictorium ipse dicit. Et licet | adhuc posset aliquo modo dici, non tamen potest dici sine incidentia in alia inconvenientia propter nimiam improprietatem locutionis de abstracto et concreto. Et hec de secunda contradictione sufficiant. 179 Tertiam contradictionem invenio quoniam: Secundum istud dictum intelligibilitas erit prima intentio in concreto, cum conveniat rebus ante omnem actum intellectus. In questione vero “Utrum hec sit vera ‘Homo est species’” dicit134 intelligibilitatem esse ens rationis et secundam intentionem. Quare videtur contradicere sibi ipsi. 180 Quartam contradictionem invenio quoniam secundum istud dictum singularitas que debetur rebus ante omnem operationem intellectus, esset prima intentio; cuius oppositum ipsemet sepe dicit, sicut et tota scola communis. Nec valet si dicatur (ut dictum est supra) quod singulare logicum sit secunda intentio sed singulare metaphisicum prima, quia, sicut supra probatum est, eandem intentionem dicit ‘singulare’ apud logicum et apud metaphisicum; ut patet etiam per ea que dicuntur in logica et metaphisica de ipso singulari; que sunt eadem hic et ibi. Etiam posito quod esset aliqua diversificatio, non tamen esset tanta equivocatio sicut in casu equivocationis, quod posset pertinere ad diversa genera impositionum.

12 et non … concreto] O om. M 134

Ibid., dist. IV, q. 1, sed contra.

16 adhuc] US ad hoc MNV

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De quodam inopinabili circa secundum dictum

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Circa secundum dictum invenio istud inopinabile quod hoc quod dicit 181 prima intentio, non significabit primam intentionem quoniam: Omne significans primam intentionem dicit eam vel in concreto vel in abstracto. Sed secundum dicta huius doctoris prima intentio nec in concreto nec in abstracto dicit primam intentionem. Ergo nullo modo. Maior est evidens ex sufficienti divisione. Prima pars minoris patet per eum, qui dicit135 primam intentionem esse ens reale solum in concreto acceptam; et istam primam intentionem exemplificat per hec verba ‘homo’, ‘leo’, ‘bos’; et iterum dicit quod hec prima intentio a qua homo dicitur prima intentio, non est secunda intentio in concreto; ex quo sequitur quod non est prima intentio in concreto. Secunda pars minoris probatur sic. Nullum denominativum | concretive sumptum M93ra dicit formam a qua fit et a qua sumitur denominatio in abstracto.— Patet quia: Contradictio esset dicere quod denominativum et concretum significarent in abstracto, quia concretive et per modum inherentis et dependentis significare includit oppositum eius quod est abstractive et per modum per se stantis significare; et econverso: sic significare includit oppositum eius quod est aliter significare.—Sed hoc quod est prima intentio est denominativum secundum istum doctorem, qui dicit quod hec est predicatio denominativa ‘Homo est prima intentio’, et sic de similibus; et per consequens prima intentio est quid denominativum sumptum. Ergo non dicit primam intentionem in abstracto. Ergo nullo modo secundum eum prima intentio dicit primam intentionem. Quod satis debet reputari inopinabile.—De tertio dicto pertranseo, quia satis ipsum in precedentibus tetigi. De quodam maxime falso circa quartum dictum

Circa quartum vero invenio unum maximum falsum, quod scilicet 182 habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem sit primum inter omnia entia 30 rationis. Cuius falsitas apparet etiam per dicta eius. Dicit136 enim in

12 prima] M secunda UNS om. V 17 est] abstractive et per modum quod est add. U 21 hec] UN S hoc MV 26 ipsum] O om. M 135 136

Ibid., dist. I, q. 3 init. Ibid., dist. I, q. 1 ante resp.

470

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prima questione, distinguendo esse in intellectu, quod albedo est obiective in visu sine dulcedine lactis, licet ipsa albedo sit ipsa albedo lactis, numquam tamen est subiective albedo lactis sine dulcedine lactis. Sed istud esse obiectivum albedinis quod habet in visu sine dulcedine, est esse rationis et non esse reale; et est prius quam esse eiusdem albedinis in intellectu, quia nichil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in aliquo sensu. Quare habitudo rei intellecte ad rem intellectam, que est esse in intellectu obiective, non est primum ens rationis, ymo priora sunt multa, puta esse visum, esse auditum, et breviter esse apprehensum a quocumque sensu exteriori vel interiori. 183 Quod hec sint entia rationis probo quadrupliciter. De quibuscumque dicitur aliquod commune essentialiter et univoce: si unum illorum est ens rationis, et reliquum (vel reliqua, si sint plura); hec propositio patet, quia nichil est commune univocum et essentiale enti reali et enti rationis. Sed de eo quod est esse intellectum et de eo quod est esse apprehensum ab aliquo sensu, dicitur essentialiter et univoce illud quod est esse cognitum simpliciter sumptum; et esse intellectum per eum est esse M93rb rationis. Ergo et reliquum vel reliqua, puta | esse visum, esse apprehensum, esse sensatum. Minorem probo, scilicet quod esse cognitum sit univocum et essentiale in intellecto esse et sensato esse, per illam considerationem137 quarti Topicorum que est quod si aliquod relativum est genus ad aliqua alia relativa, quod opponitur relative generi est genus ad ea que opponuntur relative speciebus. Verbi gratia, si multiplex est genus ad triplex et ad duplex, submultiplex, quod opponitur relative multiplici, erit genus ad subduplex et ad subtriplex, que opponuntur relative duplici et triplici. Hec ergo consideratio sit maior huius prosillogismi; et hec erit minor, scilicet quod realis apprehensio seu cognitio dicitur essentialiter et univoce et tamquam genus de intellectione et visione. Hec enim omnia cadunt in eadem cathegoria realiter, et quantum ad habitudinem quam dicunt sunt in tertio modo relativorum, ut patet138 ex quinto Metaphisice. Cognitio autem ponitur ut communius, visio autem et intellectio ut minus communia. Ergo oppositum relative ipsi cognitioni quod est esse cognitum, erit commune univocum et

1 questione] MUV distinctione NS | in intellectu] O intellectum M 6 prius] O primo M 7 rem] O om. M 19 scilicet] UN om. MV 20 essentiale] scilicet add. MV 33–471.1 ipsi … relative] O om. M 137 138

Arist., Top. IV 4, 124b15 sqq. Arist., Metaph. V 15, 1021a29-b3.

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essentiale oppositis relative visioni et intellectioni, que sunt esse visum et esse intellectum; essentiale dico essentialitate rationis eo modo quo essentialitas debetur talibus, ut istemet doctor accipit. Et per consequens, sicut esse intellectum est esse rationis, sic esse visum et similia erunt esse rationis. Secundo arguo sic. Omne esse non dicens ens reale aut privationem 184 aut negationem entis realis, est esse rationis.—Hoc patet per descriptionem quam iste doctor ponit139 de esse reali ut dividitur contra ens rationis in secunda questione illius libelli; et etiam patet de se. Et iterum patet per quoddam notabile huius doctoris superius recitatum, ubi sic dicit140: “Sciendum quod ‘intentio’ accipitur uno modo prout esse intentionale distinguitur contra esse reale, et est mere ens rationis; et sic intentio, qualitercumque accipiatur, dicit formaliter loquendo ens rationis”. Ex quibus patet quod omne esse non reale secundum eum est esse rationis, dumtamen non privativum vel negativum.—Sed esse visum non dicit ens reale; nichil enim ponit in re visa reale; nec dicit privationem aut negationem entis realis, ut patet de se. Ergo est esse rationis, sicut esse intellectum. Tertio arguo sic. Et accipio propositionem datam ab isto doctore141 185 in questione “Utrum homo sit species”: “Sicut se habet per se obiectum visus ad esse | visibile, sic se habet per se obiectum intellectus M93va ad esse intelligibile”. Ergo sicut esse intellectum est esse rationis, sic esse visum est esse rationis. Antecedens habeo per eum. Probatio consequentie quoniam: Ad falsitatem consequentis sequitur falsitas antecedentis. Quod declaro sic. Accipio colorem qui est obiectum visus et intellectus; qui est visibilis et intelligibilis. Esse vero visibile coloris dicit aptitudinem ad esse visum, esse vero intelligibile coloris dicit aptitudinem ad esse intellectum. Ponatur ergo quod esse intellectum sit esse rationis, et esse visum non sit esse rationis. Ex hoc sequitur quod esse intelligibile sit aptitudo ad quoddam esse rationis, et esse visibile sit aptitudo, non ad esse rationis sed ad quoddam aliud esse. Ex hoc sequitur quod color, qui est obiectum et visus et intellectus, non sic se habeat ad esse visibile sicut ad esse intelligibile, quoniam impossibile est quod

15 privativum] O prius tantum M 30–31 ad … aptitudo] O om. M 139 140 141

26 qui] O que M

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1c. Ibid. dist. I, q. 1c. init. Ibid., dist. IV, q. 1c.

29 alterum esse] N om. MUVS

472

pars prima

aliquid eodem modo se habeat ad esse visibile sicut ad esse intelligibile, quoniam impossibile est quod aliquid se eodem modo habeat ad aptitudinem respectu esse rationis et ad aptitudinem respectu esse quod non est esse rationis, quia tunc, si similiter se habeat ad utramque aptitudinem, necessario similiter et uniformiter se haberet ad esse rationis et ad 5 esse non rationis, et ad esse reale et ad esse non reale, quod est falsissimum. Patet igitur quod si consequens primi entimematis est falsum, necessario antecedens erit falsum. Concludo igitur quod esse visum et esse auditum est esse rationis. Et per consequens demonstratum est quod esse intellectum seu illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem 10 non est primum ens rationis. 186 Quarto sic. Esse representatum est esse rationis. Sed esse representatum est prius natura quam esse intellectum. Ergo esse intellectum non est primum inter entia rationis. Consequentia patet. Prima pars antecedentis ponitur de plano in questione proximo recitata ab isto doctore 15 sub hiis verbis:142 “Sciendum quod aliquid dicitur intelligibile ex hoc quod natum est intelligi. Ex hoc autem natum est aliquid intelligi quia eius representatio nata est esse apud intellectum, sive illa representatio sit actus sive aliqua alia similitudo a quocumque causetur illa similitudo, sicut ex hoc dicitur 20 aliquid esse visibile quia eius similitudo ipsum representans potest esse in visu. Ex hoc autem quod talis representatio est apud intellectum, consurgit quedam relatio inter ipsum intellectum talem representationem habentem et | ipsam rem representatam, ita quod intellectus in quo est talis representatio, refertur realiter ad rem representatam, res autem 25 representata in qua formaliter nichil ponit talis representatio, refertur secundum rationem”.

M93vb

Hec ipse. Ex hiis vero patet quod esse representatum per actum vel similitudinem que est species intelligibilis, est esse rationis. Quod autem istud esse representatum sit prius natura quam esse intellectum patet, 30 quia species intelligibilis que largitur rei de qua est esse representatum, est prior natura ipso actu qui largitur rei intellecte esse intellectum. Patet etiam per istum, qui dicit143 quod ex hoc res nata est intelligi quod est nata representari. Hoc autem non potest intelligi de representatione 1–2 ad esse … habeat] O om. M 3 ad] O om. M 6 est] O om. M 8–9 visum … esse] O om. M 18 autem] UN om. MV 20 quocumque] coni. coll. textu Hervaei qua MO 25 autem] O om. M 30 prius esse] O om. M 142 143

Ibid. dist. IV, q. 1c ad fin. Ibid., dist. IV, q. 1c init.

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que fit per actum intelligendi, licet ipse hoc posuerit sub distinctione, quia tunc idem esset causa et ratio sui ipsius. Idem enim est representari per actum intelligendi et ipsum intelligi. Et licet sit aliud ita quod representari sit ratio et causa eius quod est intelligi, tantum valet michi 5 quantum pariter habeo quod esse representatum est causa et ratio eius quod est esse intellectum, et per consequens prius natura. Quare sequitur demonstrative quod esse intellectum non est primum ens rationis. De falsitate quinti dicti 10

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Quintum dictum ostendo ex dictis eiusdem esse falsum dupliciter. Pri- 187 mo quia: Secundum eum in questione predicta144 intelligibilitas est prima intentio in abstracto, quia est habitudo rei primi generis intelligibilium ad actum intelligendi, habitudo, dico, habitualis; et est ens rationis secundum eum. Sed intelligibilitas non fundatur super rem ut intellectam. Ergo non omnis prima intentio in abstracto fundatur super rem ut sic vel sic intellectam. Cuius oppositum dicebatur per eum. Secundo. Ipsum esse intellectum secundum eum est prima intentio in abstracto. Sed istud esse intellectum non fundatur super rem ut sic vel sic intellectam. Ergo non omnis prima intentio in abstracto fundatur super rem ut sic vel sic intellectam. Minor patet, quia si esse intellectum fundaretur super rem ut sic vel sic intellectam, idem fundaretur super se; et etiam fundamentum non esset prius habitudine sua; quod omnino est impossibile. Ergo etc. 188 Ad hoc respondet ipse dicens145 quod aliquid potest denominari ‘inM94ra tellectum’ seu dici denominative ‘intellectum’ dupliciter. Uno modo quod fiat denominatio ab intrinseco, scilicet ab actu intelligendi; alio modo quod fiat denominatio ab extrinseco ab habitudine rationis quam habet res intellecta ad actum intelligendi. Modo dicit146 quod hec habitudo que importatur per esse intellectum secundo modo acceptum, fundetur super rem intellectam prout res dicitur intellecta per esse intellectum secundo modo acceptum. Et secundum hoc salvari videtur quod idem non fundetur super seipsum, et quod fundamentum erit natura 6 esse] O in(!) M 13 non] U om. MNV 18–19 fundatur … intellectam] O om. M 25 intrinseco] O extrinseco M 26 extrinseco ab] UNS ab Vc om. MV 30 secundo] O primo M 144 145 146

Ibid., dist. IV, q. 1c ad fin. Ibid., dist. IV, q. 3 init. Ibid., dist. I, q. 3c.

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prius respectu fundati super ipsum, quia prius est esse intellectum dictum ab actu quam esse intellectum dictum a respectu. 189 Sed contra hoc arguitur dupliciter. Primo sic. In quocumque signo nature res est intellectione intellecta, in illo est terminata intellectio ad rem, et res terminat ipsam intellectionem; ymo hoc quod est ‘rem terminare intellectionem obiective’ est ratio quod res sit intellectione intellecta, quia, non intellecta tali terminatione, impossibile est intelligi rem esse intellectam tali intellectione. Sed ipsa terminatio secundum istum doctorem est illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem quam vocat147 primam intentionem in abstracto. Ergo in quocumque signo nature vel in quocumque signo ordinis intelligendi potest dici res intellectione intellecta, potest dici secundum terminationem intellectionis intellecta, etiam posito quod sit duplex denominatio, una ab actu, alia a respectu; quod tamen improbabitur in sequenti ratione. Quare responsio nulla. 190 Secundo ostendo falsitatem ymaginationis sue. Ad cuius evidentiam accipio duo exempla similia. Primum est quod aliquid potest dici equale alteri secundum quantitatem, quia proprium est quantitati secundum eam equale vel inequale dici,148 et potest dici aliquid equale alicui secundum equalitatem. Modo si aliquis ymaginetur quod propter hoc sint duo ‘esse equalia’ in hac re equali, scilicet secundum quantitatem et secundum equalitatem, et quod esse equale secundum quantitatem, sit prius quam esse equale secundum equalitatem, et quod esse equale secundum equalitatem fundetur super rem ut equalem secundum quantitatem, falsissime ymaginabitur. Quod patet, quoniam: Esse equale secundum equalitatem est esse relativum. Sed in ista re equali M94rb non est esse relativum nisi esse | equale secundum equalitatem; aliter aliquid posset dici vere equale, circumscripta ab eo equalitate, et posset intelligi equale sine equalitate, quod est falsissimum. Secundum exemplum est quoniam: Esse passum potest dici passione passum et potest dici ab agente passum. Modo si quis ymaginetur quod in re passa sint duo ‘esse passa’ (unum secundum quod passum patitur passione, aliud secundum quod passum patitur ab agente) et quod passum esse ab agente est prius quam passum esse passione et quod passum esse pas-

1 fundati] O fundato M | ipsum O eum M 3 arguitur] M arguo O 14 improbabitur] NS improbatur MUV 21–22 et secundum … quantitatem] O om. M 32 secundum] O om. M 147 148

Ibid., dist. I, q. 1c. Conferas Arist., Categ. 8, 8b25.

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sione fundetur super passum esse ab agente, falsissime ymaginabitur. Et ratio huius est—et in hoc exemplo et in precedenti—quoniam res accipiens esse aliquod a diversis diversimode (puta ab uno tamquam a forma intrinseca, ab alio tamquam ab efficiente vel a fundamento materiali), non recipit diversa esse, quoniam unum et idem est effectus forme et effectus efficientis, ut idem est calidum per calorem tamquam per formam et calidum a sole tamquam per agens et efficiens. Ymaginatio vero huius doctoris omnino est eadem, vel similis, yma- 191 ginationibus recitatis, quoniam cum dicitur quod res potest dici intellecta intellectione et intellecta formaliter suo esse intellecto, quod dicit habitudinem rationis secundum eum ad actum intelligendi, ymaginatur ipse quod ibi sint duo ‘esse intellecta’, unum secundum quod res est intellecta actu intelligendi, facta denominatione ab extrinseco, aliud secundum quod res est intellecta suo intellecto esse, facta denominatione a predicta habitudine intrinseca; et quod esse intellectum dictum a tali habitudine rationis fundetur super esse intellectum dictum ab intellectione. Ergo hec ymaginatio est falsa, sicut et precedentes. Et pro ostensione falsitatis huius ymaginationis singularis facio talem 192 rationem quoniam: Secundum hanc ymaginationem vel esse intellectum dictum ab actu, ut est prius alio esse intellecto dicto ab habitudine, est esse reale vel esse rationis. Non potest dari quod sit esse reale, quoniam, ut ipsemet dicit,149 nichil ponit in re cuius est esse. Nec potest dici esse rationis secundum eum, quia ipse dicit quod primum esse rationis est illa habitudo quam ponit | posteriorem tali esse intellecto dicto ab M94va actu. Ergo utroque modo patet falsa ymaginatio.

de quinque dictis hervei circa secundam intentionem De secunda intentione recito alia quinque dicta. Primum est quod 193 secunda intentio in concreto est quodcumque ens rationis. Secundum, parum distans a primo, quod secunda intentio in concreto est quidquid 30 consequitur rem aliquam prout est obiective in intellectu. Tertium quod secunda intentio in abstracto est sola habitudo entis rationis ad actum intelligendi. Quartum quod omnis secunda intentio fundatur in re intellecta, mediante habitudine eius ad actum intelligendi sive mediante hoc 12 unum] O om. M 18 singularis] N singulariter UVS similiter M intellecto(!) M 29 parum … primo] M om. O 149

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1c.

25 actu] O

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quod est esse intellectum, hac tamen habitudine solum excepta. Quintum quod logica est de aliquo ente rationis ut de per se subiecto, et de aliis ut de partibus illius et proprietatibus et passionibus eius. De falsitate primi dicti 194 Primum autem dictum oportet esse necessario falsum, quia ex eo multa 5

falsa sequuntur. Sequitur enim quod esse visum, esse auditum, esse ymaginatum, et breviter esse a quocumque sensu sensatum sit secunda intentio, quoniam probatum est supra quod hec omnia sint entia rationis. Item sequitur quod esse formale cuiuslibet sacramenti (puta baptismi, confirmationis et aliorum) sit secunda intentio. Formale enim in 10 omnibus sacramentis est esse rationis, scilicet esse significativum ad placitum ipsius gratie. Item sequitur quod esse electum vel esse episcopum vel esse senescalcum sit secunda intentio formaliter. Hec enim omnia sunt entia rationis. De omnibus autem istis est absurdum nimis et falsissimum quod sint secunde intentiones. Nec ad hoc disputare oportet. 15 De inconvenientibus circa secundum dictum 195 Ad secundum dictum etiam sequuntur multa inconvenientia. Sequitur

M94vb

enim quod potestas papalis sit secunda intentio. Et hoc sic. Omne quod consequitur rem non prout habet esse reale in se sed prout habet esse obiective in intellectu, est secunda intentio. Sed potestas papalis 20 consequitur personam pape, non prout habet esse naturale seu reale in se—quia tunc veniret naturaliter—, sed prout habuit esse obiective in intellectu electorum. Ergo potestas papalis est secunda intentio. Item sequeretur quod beatitudinem esse desideratam sit secunda intentio quoniam: Beatitudinem esse intellectam—ut describit150 eam Boetius: 25 “Beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione completus”— statim sequitur quod sit desiderata, ita quod | ipsam esse obiective in intellectu sequitur ipsam esse obiective in appetitu. Ergo esse desidera-

5 necessario] O necessarium M 23 intellectu] et voce add. O sequitur US om. MV 26 aggregatione] perfectus vel add. O

24 sequeretur] N

150 De consolatione philosophiae, III, pr. 2: “Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum” (p. 23210–12, ed. Rand. Loeb 1978).

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tum est secunda intentio. Sed hec omnia videntur summe absurda. Hec enim sunt contra omnem rationem et sine ratione dicta. De destructione tertii dicti per istummet doctorem Tertium dictum destruitur per istummet doctorem. Qui dicit151 hanc 196 5 propositionem esse per se in primo modo: ‘Genus est secunda intentio’. Ex qua sequitur quod generalitas sit essentialiter id quod est formaliter secunda intentio, illa videlicet intentionalitas, sic quod includatur in ea. Et ipsemet dicit152 alibi quod generalitas non dicit talem habitudinem rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi. Ergo sola illa habitudo non est 10 secunda intentio in abstracto. Nec valet illa distinctio de secunda intentione prout dividitur in secundam intentionem que convertitur cum ente rationis, et in secundam intentionem secundum quam aliquid dicitur secunda intentio secundum quamlibet intentionem secundam, que est essentialiter secunda intentio, quoniam secundum quamlibet secun15 dam intentionem que est essentialiter secunda intentio potest aliquid dici secunda intentio essentialiter et aliquid accidentaliter, ut dictum est supra. De falsitate quarti dicti Quartum dictum probari potest esse falsum per dicta huius doctoris. 197 20 Pro quorum demonstratione formo talem rationem. Omnem habitudinem quam impossibile est intelligi non preintellecto vel cointellecto fundamento, impossibile est intelligi non preintellecto vel cointellecto fundamento proximo; hoc patet, quia non est possibilitas intelligendi aliquam formam realem vel rationis absolutam vel respectivam sine 25 fundamento nisi ratione proximi fundamenti. Istud patet inductione. Circulus enim potest intelligi sine cupro, quod est fundamentum mediatum et remotum, non tamen sine superficie, que est fundamentum proximum; habitudo etiam calefactivi ad calefactibile potest intelligi sine corpore in quo est ut in fundamento non proximo, non potest tamen

1–2 hec enim … dicta] M om. O 7 sic] O om. M om. M 20 demonstratione] O determinatione M impossibilitas M 151 152

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. IV, q. 2c. An in quodam suo Quolibet?

14–15 quoniam … intentio] O 23 possibilitas] NS potestas UV

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intelligi non intellecta virtute que est principium calefaciendi, in qua est sicut in fundamento proximo. Et sic patet universaliter, deducendo in omnibus. Sic ergo patet illa propositio, scilicet generalitas et universalitas est talis habitudo quam impossibile est intelligi sine aliquo fundamento. Et tamen potest intelligi non intellecto hoc quod est esse 5 intellectum, sive non intellecta illa habitudine rei intellecte ad intellectum actu intelligentem. Ergo generalitas et universalitas et similia non habent pro fundamento proximo esse intellectum, sed potius rem sine qua intelligi nequeunt. 198 Prima pars minoris apparet experientia et auctoritate, et multis ratio- 10 M95ra nibus. Sed credo quod a nullo negatur; quare non curo probare. Secunda pars minoris ponitur ab isto doctore in questione “Utrum sola habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum sit secunda intentio” sub hiis verbis:153 “Possunt alique secunde intentiones intelligi sine dicta habitudine, idest sine ipsa cointellecta, quia non oportet quod quandocumque intelligun- 15 tur alique secunde intentiones, puta intellectio universalitatis vel generalitatis, quod intelligatur ipsa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum”.

Hec ipse. Ex quibus concludi potest certissime quod esse intellectum non est proximum fundamentum secundarum intentionum. Nec per consequens secunde intentiones fundantur in rebus mediante illo esse. 20 199 Item. Summe mirandum est quomodo homo illuminatus potest dicere quod differentia, proprium et accidens fundantur in rebus mediante tali habitudine sive tali esse intellecto, quoniam per se notum est quod illud quod est ratio differendi hominem ab asino est fundamentum proximum huius habitudinis differendi qua refertur homo ad asi- 25 num ut differens ab eo, et mediante illo fundamento fundatur predicta habitudo in homine. Sed etiam per se notum est quod esse intellectum non est ratio formalis differendi hominem ab asino, sed est aliquid essentiale homini. Ergo certum debet esse cuilibet potenti inspicere has duas propositiones quod differentia non fundatur in homine mediante 30 tali habitudine seu tali esse intellecto. In talibus ergo potest dici quod intellectus, qui vult omnia que invenit facta iterum facere, querit impossibilia facere, sicut intellectus Anaxagore. De proprio autem et accidente nescio quid movit hominem ad talia, quia de proprio dicitur 3 scilicet] M sed O 5 est] O om. M 14 secunde] MUNS due V 16 secunde] MUNS due V 25 differendi] N differentia MUVS 26 fundamento] O om. M 28 est] US om. MNV 33 sicut … anaxagore] M om. O 153

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. II, q. 6, ad rationes in oppositas, ad 2am.

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quotidie quod ‘habere tres’ est per se proprium triangulo; quomodo ergo per esse intellectum? De accidente vero quomodo potest dici quod accidentia—que, nullo cogitante, eveniunt—sint accidentia et habeant accidentalitatem mediante esse intellecto. Talia dicere non est, ut vide5 tur, nisi sompnia fingere, et ut videtur michi, in sompniis hoc audio. Quare videbitur, si aliter secundas intentiones inveni fundatas. De frivolitate quinti dicti Quintum dictum videtur valde frivolum. Si enim ponatur aliqua secun- 200 da intentio subiectum primum in logica, oportet quod ponatur prima | M95rb 10 inter secundas. Sed prima intentio inter secundas intentiones secundum ipsum est habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum. Ergo illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum erit secundum eum primum subiectum logice. Sed quod illud sit falsum patet cuilibet logico, quoniam de omni primo subiecto scientie probantur alique proprietates in scientia (ex 15 primo154 Posteriorum). Sed de illa habitudine seu de illo esse intellecto nulla proprietas probatur in logica a principio usque ad finem, ymo nec nominatur in ea, ut patet discurrenti per totam logicam. Ergo esse intellectum seu habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem non est subiectum primum in logica. 20 Et sic patet quod fundamenta huius opinionis non sunt in vera ratione fundata, et per consequens quod super eis non est magnum hedificium construendum. Et hec sufficiant de discussione huius opinionis.

3 sint] O sicut M 5–6 et ut videtur … fundatas] M om. O 6 inveni] cuiusque(?) add. M 14 ex] O in M 15 illo] O om. M 21–23 et per … opinionis] M om. O 154

Arist., Anal. Post. I 5.

articulus v DE QUID NOMINIS ET QUID REI EIUS QUOD EST INTENTIO 201 Quid nominis eius quod est intentio logice sumpta exponetur in duo-

bus, scilicet in ostendendo in qua predictarum quinque acceptionum 5 intentio logice sumitur, et secundo ostendendo quid in eius significato includatur. De significato ‘intentionis’ logice sumpte 202 Ad evidentiam primi accipio tria communiter concessa de intentione

logica. Primum est quod significatum huius nominis ‘intentio’ dicitur et predicatur de quibuscumque scibilibus. Et hoc habetur per Avicennam, primo Metaphisice sue, ut supra recitatum est; ubi dicit155 se egisse vel acturum esse de intentionibus omnium scientiarum. Quod non intelligitur nisi de rebus scibilibus per omnes scientias. Secundum est quod significatum huius nominis ‘intentio’ habet aliquam habitudinem ad quodcumque nomen. Quod patet156 per Aristotilem, quarto Metaphisice, et maxime per Commentatorem, ut ostensum est supra in expositione quinte acceptionis. Et induco alium passum, in quo Commentator utitur157 hoc nomine ‘intentio’, scilicet duodecimo Metaphisice post illum passum MOVET AUTEM UT INTELLIGIBILE ET APPETIBILE. Dicit ergo sic: “Fecit hic differentiam inter unum et simplex, quia famosior intentio quam significat hoc nomen ‘unum’, est illud quod dicitur de continuo, et famosior intentio quam significat hoc nomen ‘simplex’, est simplex absolutum”. Hic autem Commentator videtur loqui de intentione logice et metaphisice sumpta. Eodem enim modo sumitur ‘intentio in communi’ per logicum et metaphisicum, nisi quod hic

11 avicennam] O auctoritatem M 19 scilicet] O om. M 155 156 157

12 sue] O om. M

13 acturum] UNS actum MV

Avicenna, Prima philosophia, tr. I, p. 14–6. Arist., Metaph. IV 4, 1006a30; Averroes, ad loc. (videas sect. 25am supra). Averroes, In Arist. XII Metaph., ad 1078a10 sqq.

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primo considerat primas, et ille primo secundas. Ex hoc autem videtur quod ipsa | intentio sic in communi accepta dicat aliquam habi- M95va tudinem ad quodcumque nomen. Tertium communiter concessum de intentione est quod ipsa dividitur per primam et secundam; et dico 5 per talem secundam de qua tractat logica, et per talem primam de qua tractat quelibet alia scientia. Et hoc habetur per Avicennam primo Metaphisice dicentem158 “Subiectum logice est intentiones secundo intellecte, que opponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo”. De quinque conclusionibus Ex hiis autem ostendo quinque conclusiones. Prima est quod intentio 203 logice sumpta non sumitur in prima significatione. Secunda conclusio quod non in secunda. Tertia, quod non in tertia. Quarta, quod non in quarta. Quinta, quod in quinta acceptione intentio logice sumitur. Prima conclusio et tertia et quarta patent, quia nulli intentioni accepte 15 in aliqua illarum acceptionum conveniunt ille tres conditiones communiter concesse de intentione logica, ut patet discurrenti per singulas. Secunda conclusio satis patet per ea que dicta sunt contra predictas et discussas opiniones. Quinta vero conclusio, quia facit ad propositum, diligentius declaratur.

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Quod intentio logica in quinta acceptione ‘intentionis’ sumitur

Dico igitur, ut supra dictum est, et ut dicit159 Petrus Helye in princi- 204 pio Minoris, quod ‘intentio’ et similia nomina verbalia possunt sumi in hac acceptione tripliciter, scilicet pro dictionis intendentis et significantis actione, vel pro rei intente et significate passione, vel pro ipsa re 25 intenta seu habitualiter significate. Predicte vero tres conditiones non conveniunt illi actioni aut illi passioni, sed conveniunt ipsi rei intente seu habitualiter significate. Quod patet discurrendo per eas. Res enim habitualiter intenta seu significata dicitur de quolibet de quo est tradita

1 primas] O secundas M | secundas] O primas M conclusio et] secunda et add. M

13 intentio] O om. M

14

Cf. Avicenna, Prima philosophia, tr. VI 2, p. 1073–75. Perperam attribuitur. Re vera Petrus Hispanus non papa in tractatu de constructionibus compilato Absoluta cuiuslibet qui vulgo nuncupatur, p. 2, ed. Kneepkens (1987, Deel IV). 158 159

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scientia, quoniam omnis scientia est tradita per nomina significantia res de quibus est scientia, quoniam omnis res de qua est scientia tradita, est res intenta seu res habitualiter significata. Secunda conditio patet de se. Evidens enim est quod res intenta ut intenta dicit habitudinem ad dictionem intendentem et habitualiter significantem. Tertia conditio pate- 5 bit infra, cum dicam quomodo nomina prime impositionis significant primas intentiones et nomina secunde impositionis significant secundas intentiones, et quomodo non. Quare concludo quod intentio logice sumpta | sumitur pro re intenta per vocem significativam seu pro re habitualiter significata. Et ad hoc habeo argumentum maximum quia 10 quecumque logice de intentione dicuntur, in hac acceptione salvantur. De quibusdam distinctionibus circa exercitium significationis

205 Ad evidentiam secundi premitto aliquas distinctiones de voce signifi-

cativa et de re significata. Prima est quod cum omnis vox significativa seu dictio exerceat significationem, sunt tamen alique que sic exercent significationem circa aliquam rem quod ipsum exercitium significationis sue vel aliene in suo significato non includit, ut hec dictio ‘homo’ sic significat naturam humanam quod in significato suo, quod est humana natura, nullam significationem includit. Sunt iterum alie dictiones que sic exercent significationem quod ipsum exercitium significationis, non sue tantum sed aliene, in suo significato includunt. Ut hec dictio ‘distributio’ et exercet significationem propriam et significat alienam; significat enim hoc quod est distribui, quod non per eam sed per aliam vel per alias exercet, puta per signa distributiva, ut ‘omne’, ‘nullum’, ‘utrumque’, ‘neutrum’. Sunt iterum alie dictiones que sic significationem exercent quod ipsum exercitium significationis in communi, et sue et aliene, in suo significato includunt, ut hec dictio ‘significatio’ et exercet in speciali significationem et significat in communi quamcumque significationem. 206 Hec autem eadem distinctio potest fieri de re significata, quoniam omnis res significata vel est in communi ipsum exercitium cuiuslibet significationis exercite per suum nomen proprium, vel per alium in speciali. Ut res significata per hoc nomen ‘significatio’ vel est exercitium significationis unius nominis et significatum alterius (ut res significata 7 primas … significant] O om. M 13 secundi] articuli add. O 14 vox] O om. M 17 sic] U om. MNVS 21 tantum] U om. MNVS 23 quod] O om. M 24 exercet] U exercetur MNVS 32 alium] V alienum MUNS

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per hoc nomen ‘distributio’, et exercita per hoc signum ‘omne’ vel ‘nullum’), vel est res significata per vocem aliquam aliam, sed exercita per nullam, quia non est exercitium alicuius, ut res significata per hoc nomen ‘homo’ sic est significata quod non est exercitium nec res exercita. Alia distinctio est superius tacta, scilicet quod omnis vox articulata vel significat habitualiter, puta vox nondum ad significandum | imposita, ut ‘batadafa’. Vel significat habitualiter, puta vox iam imposita, non tamen actualiter imposita; et ista per impositionem est habilis iam ad constituendum intellectum, quod idem est quod ipsum significare;160 sed quia non consideratur nec profertur, in auribus audientium intelligentium non actualiter constituit intellectum. Vel significat actualiter, puta vox cum actu profertur et auditur et intelligitur. Hec autem distinctio eadem potest fieri de re significata, quoniam omnis res vel significatur actualiter quia de ipsa actu constituitur intellectus, vel significatur habitualiter, quia iam habet nomen per quod significari potest, vel significatur aptitudinaliter, puta illa que, nata habere nomen, nondum habet nomen. Sic ergo posset sumi exercitium significationis actuale vel habituale vel solum aptitudinale. Alia distinctio—supraposita, tamen ad repetendum necessaria—talis est quod exercitium significationis potest sumi active pro actione vocis significantis, vel passive pro passione rei significate, vel concretive, scilicet pro aggregato ex significatione passiva et re significata. Et hee distinctiones sunt preambule ad propositum.

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207 M96ra

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De septem modis notificandi quid nominis eius quod est ‘intentio’

Secundum predicta dico quod hoc nomen ‘intentio’ logice sumptum 210 includit in significato suo exercitium in communi significationis cuiuscumque dictionis habituale passive sumptum, et cum re habitualiter significata conceptum. Hec autem collecta sunt ex predictis, sicut 30 patere potest cuilibet. Et secundum hec responderi potest quid nominis eius quod est intentio septem modis. Licet semper respondeatur idem,

7 habitualiter] habitudinaliter sic saepius M 8 batadafa] M bacadava NS bacada V om. U | iam imposita] O om. M 19 solum] O om. M 20 supraposita … necessaria] M om. O 22–23 scilicet] O sibi M 31 septem] M quinque O 31–484.1 licet … intelligatur] M om. O 160

Cf. Arist., De interpr. 3, 16b20.

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tamen pono istos septem modos, ut melius intelligatur. Sic ergo dico quod intentio secundum rationem sui nominis est res per dictionem intenta; vel sic: intentio est res per vocem significativam habitualiter significata; vel sic: intentio est res per conceptum alicui voci significative adequatum concepta; vel sic: intentio est obiectum primum vocis signi- 5 ficative; vel sic: intentio est obiectum primum conceptus adequati alicui voci significative; vel sic: intentio est aggregatum ex habituali significatione passiva et ipsa re habitualiter significata; vel sic: intentio est exercitium significationis habituale | passivum et cum re habitualiter significata acceptum. Ille autem notificationes nominis satis exprimunt 10 ipsum quid nominis eius quod est intentio, et satis notificant conceptum. Unde hec sufficiant de quid nominis.

2 sui] O om. M

3–4 per vocem … res] O om. M

articulus vi DECLARANTUR DECEM QUESTIONES CIRCA QUID REI ‘INTENTIONIS’ Quid rei vero pro sua declaratione exigit determinationem decem bre- 211 vium questionum. Quarum prima est quomodo sumitur ‘res’ in predictis notificationibus, ut per hoc videatur quid est intentio materialiter. Secunda questio est quid est esse intentum a dictione, ut per hoc videatur quid est intentio formaliter. Tertia questio est a quo est illud esse intentum, ut per hoc videatur eius causa efficiens. Quarta, prop10 ter quid est, ut videatur eius causa finalis. Quinta, quomodo se habeat esse intentum ad rem intentam. Sexta, quid est obiectum primum vocis significative. Septima, quare intentio magis dicitur intenta a voce significativa quam a conceptu sibi adequato, cum sit obiectum utriusque. Octava, quomodo se habeat intentio ad illa de quibus predicatur cum 15 dicitur ‘Homo est intentio’ vel ‘Genus (vel “Universale”) est intentio’. Nona, quomodo se habet ad ea in que dividitur, puta ad primam et secundam. Decima, quid est differre intentionaliter; per hoc enim apparere poterit quantum habet de realitate quod significatur per hoc nomen ‘intentio’. 5

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[1] Quod ‘res’ sumitur modo communissimo

Ad primam questionem dico quod in predictis notificationibus sumitur 212 ‘res’ modo communissimo extenso ad omne illud de quo potest formari conceptus, sive illud sit positivum vel non positivum, negativum vel privativum, verum vel fictitium. Quod probo dupliciter. Primo quia: 25 Omne illud quod potest per vocem significari, potest esse res intenta, de qua superius mentio fiebat. Sed omne illud de quo potest formari con-

4–5 quid … prima] M declaranda sunt novem dubia primum dubium O 7 secunda questio] M secundum dubium O 8 tertia questio] M 3um O 9 quarta] M 4um O 10 quinta] M 5um O 11–12 sexta … significative] M om. O 12 septima] M 6um O 14 octava] M 7um O 16 nona] M 8um O 17 decima] M 9um O 18 quantum] O quam M 21 primam questionem] M primum ergo dubium O 23 negativum] O om. M

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ceptus, potest per vocem significari, vel per impositam vel per imponendam. Ergo omne tale potest esse res intenta vel res logicalis. Premisse tenent ex seipsis. Secundo sic. Omne illud potest esse res intenta et a logico (saltem in communi) considerata ad quod potest extendi principium logicale. Sed principium logicale potest extendi ad omne illud 5 de quo potest formari conceptus, sive sit reale sive non reale, | positivum vel non positivum. Ergo omne illud de quo potest formari conceptus, est vel esse potest res intenta vel res logicalis. Maior patet, quia non plus extenditur principium quam termini primi principii logicalis, termini autem principii logicalis dicunt rem logicalem, idest considera- 10 tam a logico. Minor etiam apparet, discurrendo per principia logicalia. Sufficiat autem unum, istud scilicet ‘Consequentia est bona cuius consequentis oppositum repugnat antecedenti’. Ecce quod termini huius principii sunt ‘consequens’ et ‘oppositum consequentis’. Si autem unum istorum salvatur in ente rationis, reliquum non erit determinate ens 15 reale, ymo salvari poterit in non ente. Quare patet quod res que dicitur intenta vel res logicalis, est res communissimo modo sumpta. Et hec res sic accepta est materiale in significato huius nominis ‘intentio’. Hec de prima questione. [2] Quod esse intentum est esse non reale

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213 Ad secundam questionem dico quod esse intentum est esse non reale

quod res significata accipit per transitum obiectivum vocis significative in se. Et hoc modo dictum est supra (distinguendo hoc nomen ‘intentio’) quod vox significativa potest dici intentio respectu rei significate in prima acceptione ‘intentionis’, sed in ultima acceptione res dicitur 25 intentio vocis. Hec de secunda questione. [3] Quod esse intentum est a voce habitualiter significante 214 Ad tertiam questionem dico quod istud esse intentum est a voce habi-

tualiter significante, ut dictum est in precedenti questione, non tamen primo nec originaliter, sed ab intellectu imponente, qui largitur dictioni 30

13 termini] U terminus MNV 19 prima questione] M primo dubio O 21 secundam questionem] M secundum O 26 secunda questione] M secundo dubio O 28 tertiam questionem] M tertium O

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rationem significandi et esse significativum. Dictio vero, accepto tali esse significativo, ponit rem in esse intento seu habitualiter significato. Hec de tertia questione. [4] Quod esse intentum datur rebus ad tradendum de eis notitiam Ad quartam questionem dico quod hoc esse intentum datur rebus ad 215 tradendum de eis notitiam. Quod potest fieri per expressionem mentis conceptus. Et hoc habet fieri per voces significativas, ponentes res in esse intento. Et ideo dicitur161 primo Elencorum quod non portamus res ad disputationes, sed vocibus utimur pro rebus. Et sic patent quatuor 10 cause intentionis. Hec de quarta questione. 5

[5] Quomodo esse intentum est in re et quomodo non Ad quintam questionem dico duo. Primo quod esse intentum non 216 habet rem pro subiecto; secundo quod habet eam pro fundamento, secundum quod talibus entibus rationis competit habere fundamentum. 15 | Primum probo sic. Omne quod habet aliquam rem pro subiecto, inest M96vb ei realiter; hoc apparet, quia per inherentiam rei realiter et non esse de essentia eius aliquid dicitur esse in subiecto. Sed tale esse intentum non potest inesse rei realiter, cum non sit aliquid reale. Ergo nichil habet pro subiecto. Item. Omne quod est in subiecto, est in subiecto singu20 lari. Sed res ut hic accepta non se determinat ad esse singulare, ut patet ex predictis. Ergo etc. Item. Omne subiectum est reale. Sed res ut hic accepta non necessario est aliquid vere reale. Ergo nullius ut sic potest esse subiectum. Secundum probo sic. Omnis forma intentionalis seu rationis, habens esse circa aliquid per transitum obiectivum non 25 realem alicuius actionis, habet illud pro fundamento quod haberet pro subiecto, si esset forma realis acquisita realiter per realem et subiectivum transitum actionis realis. Sed si esse intentum esset forma realis acquisita realiter per realem et subiectivum transitum actionis signifi3 tertia questione] M tertio dubio O 5 quartam questionem] M quartum O 6 tradendum] O tradendam M 9–10 patent … cause] M patet quid sit causa materialis quid formalis quid efficiens et quid finalis O 10 quarta questione] M quarto dubio O 12 quintam questionem] M quintum O 20–21 sed … predictis] M om. O 22 vere] O om. M 26–28 realis … actionis] O om. M 27 actionis] O actione M 161

Arist., Soph. El. 165a6–8.

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cationis, ita quod actio significationis esset realis et realiter et subiective transiens, ipsum esse intentum esset in re significata tamquam in subiecto. Ergo non est in ea tamquam in fundamento eo modo quo pertinet ad ipsum habere fundamentum. Et sic patet quomodo esse intentum est in re et quomodo non. Hec de quinta questione. 5 [6] De obiecto et significato primo vocis significative 217 Ad162 sextam questionem dixerunt quidam163 quod conceptus rei, et non

ipsa res de qua est conceptus, sit obiectum et significatum primum vocis significative. Ad quod moventur duplici motivo. Primo quia dicit164 Philosophus primo Peryermenias: “Sunt ea que sunt in voce earum que sunt in anima passionum note”; secundo quia illud per vocem significativam primo significatur quod per eam primo exprimitur; ergo quod per eam primo exprimitur primo per ipsam significatur. Aliis vero visum est quod primum obiectum vocis significative esset res que est obiectum conceptus, et non ipse conceptus. Et hoc duplici motivo. Primo quia: Secundum Philosophum165 quod terminus significat, hoc subicit et predicat. Sed terminus rem obiectam conceptui subicit et predicat (quod apparet dicendo ‘Sortes currit’; certum enim est quod ‘Sortes’ supponit pro re Sortis, non pro conceptu Sortis). Ergo rem significat, non conceptum. Secundo quia: Significare secundum Philosophum, primo166 Peryermenias est intellectum constituere; ergo vox illud primo significat de quo primo constituit intellectum. Sed primo constituit intellectum M97ra de re que est obiectum conceptus (ut patet experimento |; si enim quis proferat hoc nomen ‘Deus’, intellectus audientis constituetur non de conceptu, sed de re que est Deus, primum Principium). Ergo etc. Ecce igitur breviter dicta super hoc. 218 Michi autem videtur dicendum quod cum vox significativa sit signum ad placitum impositum ad significandum et signum quo aliquis potest uti, ipsa vox potest respicere et impositionem et usum. Et secundum hoc dico duo. Primo quod vox secundum rationem impositio-

5 quinta questione] M quinto dubio O 162 163 164 165 166

18 supponit] supplet M

Sectt. 217–225 desiderantur in O. An Petrus Aureoli Gullielmusve de Ockham eorumque sequaces? Arist., De interpr. 1, 16a3–4. Cf. Arist., Anal. Pr. I 1, 24a16–17. Arist., De interpr. 3, 16b20.

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nis habet pro obiecto primo et significato primo rem que erat obiectum conceptus quem habebat imponens; secundo dico quod secundum rationem usus vox potest habere aliqua alia pro obiecto, non primo sed accidentali vel secundario. Primum probo quadrupliciter. Primo sic. Illud est vocis significative primum significatum ad quod terminatur per impositionem; hoc patet, quia sicut illud est primum obiectum et primus terminus relationis realis et naturalis ad quod terminatur per naturam suam vel fundamenti, sic illud est primum obiectum et primus terminus relationis rationis que est ab intellectu ad quod determinatur per intellectum. Vox autem significativa includit quandam relationis rationis que est ab intellectu, scilicet rationem significandi, ratione cuius formaliter vox significativa dicitur habere obiectum. Quare patet illa propositio. Sed vox significativa per impositionem determinatur ad rem que est obiectum conceptus eius. Ergo ipsam habet pro obiecto primo. Minor probatur sic. Vox cum ad significandum imponitur, ad illud determinatur quod ab impositore ut est impositor actu consideratur. Sed obiectum actualis considerationis eius (non ipsa consideratio) et obiectum conceptus (non ipse conceptus) ab impositore ut est impositor, cum vox ad significandum imponitur, actu consideratur. Ergo ad ipsum obiectum conceptus vox significativa seu habitudo eius ad significandum per intellectum determinatur. Premisse huius prosillogismi sunt satis evidentes, tamen propter contentiosos declaratur maior. Primo quia: Intellectus ad nichil aliud potest aliquam considerationem facere nisi ad illud quod actu considerat. Sed intellectus impositoris ut est impositor, imponendo vocem alicui rei, facit aliquam considerationem. Ergo. Minor vero est manifesta dupliciter: primo quia nullus considerat de consideratione qua considerat, quia etsi super eam reflecti potest, hoc erit per aliam; secundo patet hoc experientia: frequenter enim loquendo in mathematicis imponimus nomina lineis (ut cum | dicimus quod linea exiens a centro ad circumferentiam notetur AB, certum est quod tunc actu consideramus id quod est in circulo, non id quod est in animo; ergo ad illud determinatur habitudo significationis illius AB). Et sic patet tota minor propositio. Secundo ad principale arguo sic. Illud est obiectum primum vocis significative quod modificatur modis significandi passivis correspondentibus modis significandi activis sub quibus vox significat; hoc patet

25–27 sed … considerationem] suppl. coni.

28 qua] que M

36 passivis] activis M

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pars prima

ex proportione exacta inter modos significandi actionis et passionis ex parte vocis significantis et ex parte rei significate; intelligo autem istam modificationem esse realem, vel methaphoricam et realem, saltem quoad aliqua. Sed res ipsa que est obiectum conceptus, intelligitur, ut in pluribus, ut modificata realiter vel methaphorice per modos significandi passivos correspondentes modis significandis activis. Ergo res ipsa per vocem primo significatur, non conceptus eius. Minor apparet, discurrendo per aliquos modos. Et accipio causa exempli lapidem et petram, et modum istum significandi activum qui est masculinitas, qui est modus huius nominis ‘lapis’, et istum modum qui est feminineitas, qui est modus huius nominis ‘petra’. Et isti duo modi sunt activi, quia voces per eos modificate active significant. Ex parte autem rei significate est activitas ledendi pedem, correspondens masculinitati huiusmodi nominis ‘lapis’, et passivitas cernendi a petra, correspondens femineitati huius nominis ‘petra’. Certum est autem quod hec activitas et hec passivitas sunt modi rei lapidis, non conceptus lapis, rei petre, non conceptus petre. Quare patet quod obiectum vocis et conceptus est idem, quia modificatur modis significandi passivis. 222 Tertio sic. Omne signum habet illud pro primo significato per conformitatem ad quod habet veritatem et est verum signum, et per difformitatem ad quod habet falsitatem et est falsum signum. Sed vox significativa est signum verum per conformitatem ad obiectum conceptus, et falsum per difformitatem. Ergo ipsa habet pro primo obiecto et primo va M97 | significato obiectum conceptus, non conceptum. Maior est manifesta, quia veritas et falsitas signi sunt per se conditiones significationis, que, inquam, significatio primo respicit primum significatum. Minor apparet maxime in voce significativa que est ‘enuntiatio’, cui maxime debetur veritas vel falsitas; de ista enim dicitur167 in Predicamentis quod ab eo quod res est vel non est oratio vera vel falsa dicitur; et sic exponitur ‘ab eo quod res est’: “si res est sicut per orationem significatur, oratio vera dicitur”; sed ‘ab eo quod res non est’: si res non est sicut per orationem significatur, oratio falsa dicitur. Hoc idem habetur168 quarto Metaphisice sub verbis istis: “Verum dicentes dicimus esse quod est et non esse quod non est, falsum autem dicentes esse quod non est et non 1 proportione] propositione M 29 est] esse M 167 168

3–4 saltem] similiter M

Arist., Categ. 5, 4b8–10; conferas 12, 14b21–22. Arist., Metaph. IV 7, 1011b26–27.

6 passivos] passiones M

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esse quod est”. Hoc idem habetur169 nono Metaphisice sub hiis verbis: “Verum est divisum putans dividi et compositum componi”. Sic igitur patet quod vox est signum verum per conformitatem ad rem obiectam, et falsum per difformitatem. Quarto sic. Si ‘lapis’ ut est quoddam nomen significaret conceptum 223 lapidis, Philosophus non faceret differentiam inter lapidem et speciem lapidis quantum ad hoc quod est esse in anima; et tamen facit super hoc differentiam, quia dicit170 quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis. Si ergo ‘lapis’ significaret conceptum, species non est plus in anima quam lapis, quia conceptus est in anima sicut species. Secundum probo sic. Illa possunt esse obiecta secundaria et acci- 224 dentalia vocis significative et cuiuscumque signi que nata sunt intelligi, intellecto primo significato; hec patet, quia illa dicuntur esse obiecta secundaria cuiuscumque potentie apprehensive que apprehenduntur vel que nata sunt apprehendi, apprehenso primo obiecto. Ut patet in colore, quo apprehenso apprehenditur figura, que est secundarium obiectum et per se visus; et apprehenditur homo, qui est obiectum per accidens. Sed inquantum aliquis utitur voce ut signo: intellecto significato primo vocis, natus est concipi conceptus quem de significato primo habet ille qui utitur tali signo. Ergo ille conceptus potest esse secundarium obiectum vocis significative; et forsan aliqua alia, ut | unum M97vb relativum est forsan secundario de significato alterius. Solvuntur duo motiva prime opinionis

Per hoc patet solutio ad duo motiva prime opinionis. Ad primum, 225 cum dicitur quod sunt ea que sunt in voce etc., dico quod verum est quod sunt note istarum passionum, idest conceptuum sicut secundariorum significatorum; et hoc magis in usu quam in impositione, quia ex impositione non significant conceptus huius utentis, quos tamen significant propter usum solum. Ad secundum dico quod exprimere est 30 actus interpretationis. Que interpretatio tria respicit, si proprie sumatur, scilicet duo ydiomata idem significantia, idest aliud tertium quod per utrumque significatur. Verbi gratia, ‘sophia’ et ‘sapientia’ sunt duo nomina diversorum ydiomatum, et ambo idem significant; unum au25

22 de significato] coni. designato M 169 170

Ibid. IX 10, 1051b3–5. Arist., De anima III 8, 431b29–432a1.

492

pars prima

tem istorum duorum nominum non significat reliquum, et tamen unum interpretatur reliquum. Apud nos enim ‘sapientia’ interpretatur ‘sophia’, et apud Grecos ‘sophia’ ‘sapientiam’, quia ambo idem significant. Sic in proposito vox et conceptus sunt duo unum et idem significantia; unum autem istorum est michi et tibi communiter notum, sci- 5 licet vox, alterum autem est michi soli vel tibi soli notum, scilicet conceptus. Quando ergo volo tibi conceptum meum exprimere seu interpretari per signum michi et tibi notum, interpretor tibi signum solum michi notum, non quod unum significet primo reliquum, sed ambo idem tertium. Secundario vero possunt se mutuo significare, ut supra 10 est expositum. Hec de sexta questione. [7] Quare intentio magis dicatur intenta a voce significativa quam a conceptu sibi adequato 226 Ad septimam questionem dico, supposito quod idem sit obiectum vocis

significative et conceptus ei adequati, tamen prius est obiectum conceptus quam vocis, quia numquam esset obiectum vocis nisi quia prius erat obiectum conceptus quam vocis. Hoc, inquam, supposito, dico quod esse intentum quod includitur in significato huius nominis ‘intentio’, magis dicitur quod est esse intentum a voce significativa quam esse intentum a conceptu; propter duo, scilicet propter communiorem usum et propter maiorem notitiam; propter communiorem usum quia ubira M98 que legimus dici intentiones nominum et numquam vel | raro intentiones conceptuum; propter maiorem notitiam quia magis sunt nobis note voces hominum quam conceptus eorum; in hoc tamen vis constituenda non est de illo, nam de esse intento non intendimus facere theoriam, sed de hiis que denotantur ab eo. Quia ergo esse intentum sumptum a conceptu vel sumptum a voce denominare potest ea de quibus agimus, non multum curo, licet videatur probabilius quod sumatur esse intentum ut aliquid intenditur a voce quam ut intenditur a conceptu, propter illa duo que dicta sunt. Hec de septima questione.

14 septimam questionem] M sextum O 25 nam de] coni. nam M enim O denotantur] denominantur MO 30 septima questione] M sexto O

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[8] Quomodo se habeat intentio ad illa de quibus predicatur Ad octavam questionem dico quod intentio ad ea de quibus predi- 227 catur cum dicitur ‘Genus est intentio’, ‘Homo est intentio’, se habet sicut predicatum denominatum ad ea que denominantur per ipsum. 5 Quod probo sic. Omne predicatum includens aliquid non inclusum in subiecto predicatur de eo denominative denominatione per se vel per accidens. Sed intentio includit aliquid non inclusum in homine nec inclusum in genere nec in aliquo alio simili. Igitur predicatur de illis denominative. Maior est certa, quia si predicatur quidditative, non 10 denominative, necesse est quod quidquid in predicato includitur includatur in subiecto in primo modo dicendi per se. Minor etiam manifesta est per ea que dicta sunt supra; dictum est enim supra quod hoc nomen ‘intentio’ includit in significato suo habituale exercitium significationis. Hic autem predicatur significatum huius nominis ‘intentio’ cum dicitur 15 ‘Homo est intentio’. Constat autem quod in significato huius nominis ‘genus’ non includitur tale habituale exercitium significationis. Ex hoc autem evidens est absurditas illius dicti quod hec predicatio ‘Genus est intentio’ sit in primo modo dicendi per se, et non solum ex hoc, sed ex dictis sic dicentis, ut superius est obiectum. Hec de octava questione. 20

[9] Quomodo se habeat intentio ad intentionem primam et ad secundam

De nona questione dico quod intentio secundum se sumpta ad intentio- 228 nem primam et ad intentionem secundam se habet ut totum in modo ad partes. Quod ostendo sic. ‘Primum’ et ‘secundum’ vel dicuntur de intentione quia sunt differentie intellectionum, vel quia sunt differentie 25 impositionum, vel quia sunt differentie ipsarum intentionum sine intellectione et impositione. Sed quocumque istorum modorum accipiantur, semper erunt differentie constituentes | partes in modo. Ergo intentio M98rb est totum in modo ad primam et ad secundam. Consequentia est manifesta, sed declaro premissas. Si igitur ‘primum’ et ‘secundum’ dicantur 30 de intentione quia sunt differentie intellectionum.—Ut videtur sentire Avicenna, primo Metaphisice dicens171 quod subiectum logice sunt inten2 ad … dico] M septimum est O 10 includitur] O om. M 14–16 hic autem … significationis] O om. M 19 octava questione] M septimo O 21 nona questione] M octavo O 24 sunt] O om. M 171

Avicenna, Prima philosophia, tr. VI 2, p. 1073–75.

494

pars prima

tiones intellecte secundo que apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis, hic ergo videtur Avicenna distinguere inter primas intentiones et secundas per esse intellectum primo et esse intellectum secundo, ita quod prime intentiones sint intellecte primo, et secunde secundo.—Si igitur hoc modo primum et secundum attribuantur intentioni, mani- 5 festum est quod non sunt differentie essentiales. Quare erunt differentie accidentales constituentes sub intentione partes in modo, sicut ‘sanum’ et ‘egrum’ sub animali constituunt partes in modo. Si vero ‘primum’ et ‘secundum’ dicantur de intentione quia sunt differentie impositionum,—ut videntur multi sentire, dicentes quod nomina prime 10 impositionis significant primas intentiones et nomina secunde secundas (ut de quodam fuit superius recitatum),—; sed quia hoc non potest salvari eo modo quo doctores gramatici in sua facultate accipiunt differentias istas, idcirco videndum est qualiter hec salvari possunt. De distinctione gramaticali nominum prime impositionis et secunde

15

229 Sciendum quod doctores in gramatica communiter sumunt nomina

prime impositionis pro illis nominibus que significant res sic significatas quod non sunt significantes, ut hec nomina ‘homo’ et ‘animal’, ‘albedo’ et ‘nigredo’; nomina vero secunde impositionis sumuntur pro illis nominibus que significant res sic significatas quod etiam sunt significantes, ut hec nomina ‘nomen’, ‘pronomen’, ‘dictio’, ‘terminus’ et similia; hec enim nomina significant voces significativas que etiam significant; hec autem sunt valde bene et artificiose dicta. Et secundum hec dicta apparet ratio ordinis: ‘primum’ enim non dicit ordinem ad secundum, quia primum dicitur ante quod nichil, sed ‘secundum’ dicit ordinem ad primum. Sic autem est de nominibus prime impositionis et secunde quoniam nomina secunde impositionis dicunt ordinem ad nomina prime sicut M98va significans ad | suum significatum; includunt enim in suo significato vocem significativam, et supponunt per consequens ante se aliquam aliam vocem ad significandum impositam. Quare non sine ratione dictum est quod hec nomina sunt secunde impositionis quia eorum impositio supponit aliam ante se, que dicitur prima. 230 Secundum hanc autem distinctionem nominum prime impositionis et secunde non posset salvari quod nomina prime impositionis solum significarent primas intentiones, et nomina secunde solum secundas,

23 dicta] US om. MNV

28 suum] O om. M

20

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30

35

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5

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495

quia hec nomina ‘singularitas’ et ‘universalitas’ secundum hanc distinctionem sunt nomina prime impositionis, quia non significant voces significantes, sed eorum significata sic sunt significata quod non sunt significantia, et tamen certum est quod significant secundas intentiones, ut secunde intentiones sumuntur a logico. Quare oportet aliter distinguere nomina prime impositionis et secunde, si predicta coaptatio sit salvanda. Ex hoc autem apparet falsitas illius dicti superius recitati, scilicet 231 quod nomina prime impositionis solum significant primas intentiones, et nomina secunde secundas, cum etiam ille qui dicit hoc, dicat ‘singulare’ et ‘universale’ significare non voces significativas, sed habitudines rerum intellectarum adinvicem; et cum hoc non dat aliam distinctionem nominum prime intentionis et secunde. Si igitur sic accipiantur ‘primum’ et ‘secundum’ ut sunt tales differentie impositionum, manifestum est quod non sunt differentie essentiales intentionis, cum primum in impositione non sit precise primum in intentione, nec secundum in impositione sit precise secundum in intentione, ut modo patuit. Illa tamen distinctio nominum prime et secunde impositionis dari non potest—non dicendo aliquid contra ipsam, quia illa simpliciter melior est quam aliqua alia que possit dari—tamen propter coaptationem, ut possit dici aliquo modo quod nomina prime impositionis significant intentiones primas, et nomina secunde secundas. De quadam alia distinctione

Propter quod sciendum quod aliqua alia distinctio potest dari de impo- 232 sitione penes vocem, et alia penes rem. Sicut de constructione dicit Petrus Helye, in principio Minoris dicens172 quod omnis constructio est transitiva vel intransitiva ex parte vocis significate; ex parte autem rei potest fieri distinctio quadrimembris, ut dicatur quod | constructio vel M98vb est transitiva, vel intransitiva, vel reciproca, vel retransitiva,—sic igi30 tur ego aliter temptabo dividere nomina prime impositionis et secunde penes rem significabilem quam sint distincta penes vocem, ut scilicet vox dicitur significare vocem. 25

2 quia] O quod M 10 nomina] O om. M 17 in] O om. M 18 non] US om. MNV 26 petrus helye] p. h. M pe. he. UVS p. helie N 31 sint] O sicut M 172 Re vera Petrus Hispanus non papa in tractatu de constructionibus compilato Absoluta cuiuslibet qui vulgo nuncupatur, p. 2 ed. Kneepkens (1987, Deel IV).

496

pars prima

De triplici gradu predicamentali 233 Est ergo sciendum quod rerum significabilium alie sunt in aliquo gradu

predicamentali vel subpredicamentali vel suprapredicamentali; in gradu predicamentali, ut substantia, animal, homo; in subpredicamentali, ut Sortes, Plato; in suprapredicamentali, ut ens et res et aliquid. Alie vero res sunt ipsi gradus, puta gradus predicamentales, genus et species; gradus subpredicamentales, singulare et individuum, gradus suprapredicamentales, transcendentia ipsa. De primis significabilibus duo notanda sunt. Primum quod ipsa sunt ita significabilia in diversis gradibus sine inclusione graduum quod impossibile est ea significari in eodem gradu. Verbi gratia, res que est homo et animal et substantia, sic est significabilis sub diversis gradibus—sub ratione formali humanitatis et sub ratione formali animalitatis et sub ratione formali substantialitatis—quod impossibile est eam significari unica significatione sub hac triplici ratione formali et in eodem gradu predicamentali. Impossibile enim est quod aliquid sub ratione formali humanitatis sit in supremo gradu predicamentali, et impossibile est quod aliquid sub ratione formali substantialitatis sit in infimo gradu predicamentali, et impossibile est quod aliquid sub ratione formali animalitatis sit in supremo vel in infimo gradu predicamentali. Hec autem tria impossibilia et plura sequerentur, si aliquid sub hac triplici ratione unica significatione et ut res eiusdem gradus predicamentalis significaretur.

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De duabus cohordinationibus entium 234 Secundo sciendum quod, sicut antiqui opinati sunt philosophi quod

essent due cohordinationes, una entium realium et positivorum, alia 25 non-entium seu privationum seu entium rationis, ita oportet nos ponere vel ymaginari esse quandam cohordinationem talium entium per simiM99ra litudinem ad cohordinationem verorum entium. | Et sicut prima significabilia realia sunt in diversis gradibus suarum cohordinationum, ita prima significabilia non-realia sunt metaphorice in gradibus suarum 30 cohordinationum, et secunda significabilia dicant illos gradus realiter in realibus, et non realiter in non-realibus, in istis proprie, in illis per similitudinem ad ista.

3 subpredicamentali vel] O om. M 6 ipsi] coni. isti MO 27 talium entium] talium US entium MNV

20 gradu] O om. M

articulus vi

497

De duplici impositione nominum et eorum duplici intentione Hiis igitur premissis, posset dici quod nomina prime impositionis sunt 235 ea que significant res veras vel non veras ordinabiles in diversis gradibus suarum cohordinationum; nomina vero secunde sunt ea que signifi5 cant ipsos gradus vel quecumque includentia vel importantia tales gradus. Et hoc modo distinguendo talia nomina posset dici quod nomina prime impositionis precise significant primas intentiones, nomina vero secunde impositionis precise significant secundas intentiones. Quod autem omne ordinabile in aliquo predictorum graduum sit prima inten10 tio, et omne dicens vel includens aliquem illorum graduum sit secunda intentio probabitur infra, ubi distinguuntur prima intentio et secunda; et ibidem apparebit ratio ordinis primi et secundi. Quod prima et secunda intentio sunt partes in modo intentionis secundum se sumpte Si igitur, redeundo ad propositum, primum et secundum hoc modo 236 sint differentie impositionum, manifestum est quod non sunt differentie essentiales intentionum ita quod possint constituere species diversas sub intentione ut sub suo genere. Quod patet, quia hoc modo sunt differentie ipsorum significabilium, que respiciunt intentiones materialiter (ut supra, questione quinta ostensum est). Differentie autem materiales 20 non constituunt species nec diversificant, ut habetur173 decimo Metaphisice de masculino et feminino respectu animalis. Sicut ergo animal masculinum et animal femininum sunt partes in modo ipsius animalis secundum se sumpti, sic prima intentio et secunda intentio sunt partes in modo intentionis secundum se sumpte, hoc modo sumendo ‘pri25 mum’ et ‘secundum’. Si vero primum et secundum attribuantur intentioni tamquam differentie eius, non alicuius alterius, ut dicatur prima intentio prima habitualis significatio, et secunda intentio secunda habitualis significatio, nec hoc modo possunt dici differentie essentiales intentionis propter duo: primo quia non videntur habere ordinem essentialem 30 inter se due significationes nisi ipsum accipiant a significabilibus, vel a vocibus vel ab impositoribus; secundo quia—dato quod | haberent: M99rb 15

3 diversis] O om. M 19 ut … est] M om. O 22 et … femininum] O om. M 24 intentionis] O om. M 25 si vero] O sive M 28 hoc] O om. M 173

Arist., Metaph. X 9, 1058a31–32.

498

pars prima

si aliquis vellet fingere—non videmus quod aliquod esse intentum seu habituale significatum includat formaliter talem ordinem. Quare nec hoc modo videntur esse differentie formales constituentes diversas species sub intentione, ut sub genere constituunt eius partes in modo, ut superius dictum est. Si vero queratur circa hoc precise unde trahunt 5 originem hee due differentie ‘primum’ et ‘secundum’, prout attribuuntur intentioni, dico quod ex natura rerum, ut infra monstrabitur et assignabuntur de omnibus rationes. Et hec sufficiant de questione nona quantum ad presens. [10] Quid sit differre intentionaliter

10

237 Ad questionem decimam dico quod differre intentionaliter est differre

per aliud et aliud esse intentum; differre vero per aliud et aliud esse intentum est differre per aliud et aliud esse significatum; differre vero per aliud et aliud esse significatum supponit differre per aliud et aliud significabile, quia impossibile est aliqua esse diversa significata nisi sint 15 diversa significabilia. Differre vero per aliud et aliud esse significabile supponit differre per aliud et aliud esse intelligibile, quia impossibile est aliqua esse diversa significabilia nisi sint diversa intelligibilia, quia impossibile est aliquid esse significabile nisi sit aliquo modo intelligibile. Differre vero per aliud et aliud esse intelligibile necessario supponit 20 aliquam non-ydemptitatem in ipsis intelligibilibus; quod apparet, quia differre per aliud et aliud esse intelligibile est quod unum differentium sit unum intelligibile et reliquum sit aliud intelligibile, ita quod quodlibet illorum possit intelligi propria intellectione, non intellecto altero sub propria intellectione. Et dico bene ‘sub propria intellectione’, quia 25 licet homo non possit intelligi nisi intellecto animali etiam sub eadem intellectione, potest tamen intelligi, non intellecto animali sub propria intellectione, quia non est eadem intellectio propria hominis et intellectio propria animalis.

2–3 nec hoc modo] O hoc modo non M 4 eius] coni. ergo MO 8–9 questione … presens] M octavo dubio O 11 questionem decimam] M de nono dubio O 13–16 intentum … aliud esse] O om. M 25 et dico … intellectione] O om. M 26 intelligi] O intelligo M 28 hominis] U homini MNV 29 animalis] U animali MNV

articulus vi

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Quod contradictio est ‘aliqua esse diversa intelligibilia et esse penitus eadem’

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Hoc ergo supposito, ostendo quod contradictio est aliqua esse diversa intelligibilia (ut est expositum) et esse penitus et omnibus modis ydemptitatis eadem. Et accipio quod unum intelligibile sit A, alterum intelligibile sit B. Si ergo A et B sint omnino et penitus eadem, arguam ad alteram partem contradictionis, dicendo sic: Omne quod est proprium ipsi A, est proprium ipsi B. Sed esse intelligibile propria intellectione (que vocetur C) est proprium ipsi A (ex ypotesi). Ergo est proprium ipsi B. | Maior est vera, nisi duo contradictoria sint vera de aliquo uno penitus eodem et uno. (positum enim erat quod A et B essent penitus et omnino eadem). Si ergo non sint vera, contradictoria erunt de uno et eodem omnino vera; et sic haberem propositum. Si tamen sint vera et non habeam illam contradictionem, supponatur ut vera. Minor vero stat ex ypotesi. Habebo ergo ex hoc sillogismo quod proprium est ipsi B esse intelligibile intellectione propria ipsi A, que vocatur C. Modo arguo ad aliam partem contradictionis, dicendo autem ex suppositis: Nullum intelligibile aliud ab A est intelligibile intellectione propria ipsi A; hoc enim fuerat positum in exponendo quid est esse aliud et aliud intelligibile, et maxime sic intelligendo istam maiorem quod nullum intelligibile aliud ab A est intelligibile tamquam proprium sibi ipsi intellectione propria ipsi A. Sed B est aliud intelligibile ab A (ex ypotesi). Ergo B non est intelligibile intellectione propria ipsi A, ita quod illa intellectio que vocata est C sit ei propria. Hec autem conclusio huius sillogismi contradicit conclusioni primi sillogismi, qui erat quod proprium est ipsi B intelligi vel intelligibile esse tamquam propria intellectione, illa intellectione que dicta est C, que erat propria ipsi A. Patet igitur contradictio ex diversis partibus ypotesis, scilicet quod A et B sint penitus eadem, et cum hoc diversa intellectione. Sic ostensum est quod licet differre intentionaliter non sit formaliter differre realiter, nec vero esse idem realiter, tamen (a primo ad ultimum) supponit ea que differunt intentionaliter, non esse idem penitus et totaliter ex natura rei. Non voco autem differre intentionaliter ea que importantur omnino per nomina synonima. Hec de decima questione.

24 conclusioni] secunde perperam add. U 29 intellectione] M intelligibilia] O vero] NV non MU 34 decima questione] M nono dubio O

31

238

M99va

239

240

500

pars prima

Recapitulatur 241 Per hoc igitur satis potest videri tota realitas importata per hoc nomen

M99vb

‘intentio’ et quid materiale in eius significato et quid formale, et quomodo sumitur illud materiale et quomodo formale, et quomodo se habent adinvicem, et quomodo intentio se habet ad denominata per 5 eam, et quomodo ad primam et secundam, et quomodo ad intentionalem differentiam. | Et hec sufficiant de investigatione intentionis in communi ut importatur hoc nomine ‘intentio’. De cetero enim agitur de hiis que denominantur ab intentione in communi, et a prima et secunda. 10

2 potest] O patet M

6 eam] O ea M

PARS SECUNDA

QUID SIT PRIMA INTENTIO ET QUID SECUNDA

De intentione intenta et intendente 5

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30

Postquam investigatum est quid est intentio in communi, consequenter 242 investigandum est quid prima, quid secunda, et que earum habitudo adinvicem. Ad evidentiam autem processus premitto unam distinctionem de intentionibus. Que talis est: intentionum alie sunt intente solum, alie simul intendentes et intente. Intentiones intendentes et intente simul sunt ille que habitualiter significant et habitualiter significantur. Per hoc enim quod significant dicuntur intendentes; per hoc vero quod significantur sunt intente; et per hoc solum dicuntur intentiones ut logici sumunt eas. Et hoc modo potest dici intentio intendens et intenta intentio significata per hanc vocem ‘nomen’ vel ‘terminus’. Ipsa enim est intenta, quia significata per hoc nomen ‘terminus’ vel ‘nomen’; ipsa vero est intendens, quia significans aliquid aliud. Intentiones autem solum intente sunt ille que sic sunt significate quod non significant, ut intentio significata per hoc nomen ‘homo’, et sic de similibus. Huic autem distinctioni coaptari potest distinctio nominum prime 243 impositionis et secunde, que communiter datur a gramaticis, ita quod nomina prime impositionis significant intentiones que sunt intente, non intendentes; et nomina secunde impositionis significant intentiones que simul sunt intendentes et intente. Et hec patere possunt ex predictorum collatione, scilicet illorum que dicta sunt de hac distinctione et de illa. Sciendum iterum quod sub parte utraque huius distinctionis cadunt alique prime intentiones et alique secunde, secundum quod infra declarabitur. Hiis ergo premissis, patet quod primo agendum est de comparatione 244 intentionum primarum et secundarum que sunt solum intente et que significantur per nomina prime intentionis, et secundo de compara-

21–22 sunt … que] O om. M 24 collatione] NS collectione MUV intente] O intendentes et M 30–502.2 prime … nomina] UVS om. MN

29 solum

502

pars secunda

tione intentionum primarum et secundarum que simul sunt intendentes et intente et que significantur per nomina secunde impositionis, secundum quod hec nominum distinctio currit communiter apud gramaticos, non secundum aliam distinctionem ad coaptandum inventam.

articulus unicus

5

DE VARIIS COMPARATIONIBUS INTENTIONIS PRIME ET SECUNDE 245 Inter intentiones igitur primas et secundas que utrimque1 sunt solum

intente, pono differentias quinque, scilicet penes esse, penes intelligi, M100ra penes | significari, penes predicari, penes ordinari.

10

De earum comparatione penes esse 246 Penes esse pono quatuor differentias. Prima est hec superius tacta, quod

prima intentio est res vel entitas in gradu predicamentali, vel subpredicamentali, vel suprapredicamentali. In gradu predicamentali, ut homo, animal, substantia; in subpredicamentali, ut Sortes et Plato; in supra- 15 predicamentali, ut esse vel ens vel res vel aliquid. Secunda intentio est ipse gradus, ut singularitas, generalitas, universalitas, specialitas et transcendentia. Ex hac autem differentia pendent omnes alie, ut patebit deducendo. Secunda differentia est quod prima intentio est entitas alicui modo essendi adequata, vel modus essendi alicui entitati adequa- 20 tus, secunda vero intentio est gradus essendi vel modus essendi illi entitati adequatus. Tertia differentia est quod prima intentio non est ratio distinctiva superiorum ab inferioribus, ut animal ab homine; secunda vero intentio est ratio distinctiva superiorum ab inferioribus. Et potest addi ad hanc differentiam quod nichil pertinens ad primam intentio- 25 nem dicitur de inferiori quin posset dici de superiori indefinite sumpto, aliquid tamen potest dici de inferiori pertinens ad secundam intentionem quod non potest dici de superiori. Quarta differentia est hec

4 aliam] O om. M 8 et secundas] O om. M | utrimque] coni. utrique UNS utique V in re est(!) M 23–24 ut animal … inferioribus] V om. MUNS 1

Utrimque, sc. tam apud grammaticos quam apud logicos.

pars secunda

503

quod diversa genera generalissima differunt per aliquid prime intentionis, conveniunt tamen in aliquo secunde intentionis, quantumcumque diversa. De earum comparatione penes intelligi Penes intelligi etiam pono alias quatuor differentis. Differentia prima est 247 quod prima intentio potest intelligi, non intelligendo vel non cointelligendo secundam, secunda vero intentio non potest intelligi, non cointelligendo aliquo modo primam. Secunda differentia est quod prima intentio non diffinitur per secundam, secunda autem diffinitur per pri10 mam tamquam per additamentum. Alia differentia est quod scientie de primis intentionibus sunt scientie tantum, non modi sciendi; scientia vero de secundis, ut logica, est scientia et modus sciendi. Quarta differentia est quod scientia de secundis intentionibus ad omnium methodorum principia viam habet, scientia vero de primis non. 5

15

De earum comparatione penes significari

Penes significari pono duas. Prima est quod prime intentiones signifi- 248 cantur nominibus prime impositionis, secunde vero nominibus secunde, iuxta distinctionem nominum prime impositionis et secunde ultimo positam. Secunda est declarativa istius, et est quod prime | intentio- M100rb 20 nes significantur sub determinato gradu pertinente ad secundam intentionem, non includendo in significato suo illum gradum; secunde vero significantur ut illi gradus determinati, non includendo in significato suo determinate aliquid pertinens ad primam intentionem, licet indeterminate. 25

De earum comparatione penes predicari

Penes predicari pono alias duas. Prima est quod secunda intentio pre- 249 dicata de prima (ut dicendo ‘Animal est genus’) facit universaliter et necessario primam intentionem que subicitur ei, habere simplicem suppositionem, prima vero intentio predicata de prima vel de secunda non 30 facit primam vel secundam que subicitur ei, necessario habere simpli-

7 non] McO om. M 9 intentio] O om. M | autem] N tamen MUV 21 includendo] UN includo MV 23 suo] O om. M

13 est] O om. M

504

pars secunda

cem suppositionem. Secunda differentia est quod secunda intentio in concreto sumpta ut genus potest supponere pro prima, prima vero non pro secunda. Dicendo enim ‘Omne genus predicatur in quid’, sequitur ‘ergo animal’; dicendo vero ‘Omne animal’, non sequitur ‘ergo genus’. De earum comparatione penes ordinari

5

250 Penes ordinari vero pono alias duas. Prima est quod intentiones prime

sunt in ordine exposito supra, quia scilicet sunt in gradu predicamentali vel subpredicamentali vel suprapredicamentali; secunde vero intentiones sunt divisiones, distinctiones, determinationes, graduationes illorum ordinum. Secunda differentia est quod secunde intentiones sunt 10 circumeuntes omnia predicamenta, prime non.

1 intentio] O om. M

PARS TERTIA

QUID SIT INTENTIO TRANSCENDENS ET QUID NON-TRANSCENDENS

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10

Ad probandum autem et declarandum et ad explicandum omne quod 251 dictum est in hiis comparationibus, et ad eliciendum et ad colligendum diffinitiones intentionis prime et secunde ex hiis habitudinibus, necesse est primo quatuor puncta ostendere. Primo quod tales gradus sint ex natura rerum; secundo quod omnes sint; tertio quid sint; quarto quod si sunt, ipsi formaliter intentiones secunde sunt.

quatuor questiones disputate de transcendentibus

Ad ostendenda vero ista quatuor puncta volo predeterminare quatuor 252 questiones disputatas, ex quarum solutione hec puncta quatuor apparebunt. Propter primum determinabo utrum superiora et inferiora dif15 ferant ex natura rei; propter secundum, utrum aliqua intentio sit communis univoce ad omnia predicamenta; propter tertium, utrum due intentiones possint differre ex natura rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali; propter quartum, utrum quidquid est | universale contrahatur ad M100va hoc aliquid singulare per materiam.

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questio ia UTRUM INTENTIONES INFERIORES ET SUPERIORES DIFFERANT EX NATURA REI1 253 Primo igitur utrum intentiones inferiores et superiores in eadem linea

predicamentali sint penitus idem ex natura rei vel sit inter ipsa aliqua 5 diversitas sive non-ydemptitas ex natura rei. Et arguitur primo quod sint penitus idem quia: Quecumque uni et eidem numero omnibus modis ydemptitatis eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem, si illud tertium in se est idem. Sed homo et animal intentio superior et inferior sunt idem Sorti, qui in se est unus et idem numero et omnibus 10 modis ydemptitatis idem. Ergo homo et animal sunt sic adinvicem idem. Quare etc. In oppositum: Quecumque inter se sunt penitus idem: cuicumque unum istorum est idem, et reliquum. Sed animal est idem alicui cui homo non est idem, puta asino. Ergo homo et animal inter se non sunt penitus eadem. 15 De duobus pro intellectu questionis exponendis 254 Pro solutione autem questionis primo exponam intellectum et difficul-

tatem questionis; secundo respondebo ad difficultatem eius. Pro intellectu autem questionis sunt duo exponenda: primum est acceptio terminorum ‘superioris’ et ‘inferioris’; secundum est acceptio ‘ydemptita- 20 tis’ er ‘diversitatis’. Acceptionem autem terminorum inferioris et superioris expono tripliciter. Primo per significationem. Intendo enim comparare illud quod primo significatur nomine ‘substantie’ ad illud quod primo significatur nomine ‘animalis’ et ad illud quod primo significatur nomine ‘hominis’; et sic in qualibet linea predicamentali supremum ad 25 infimum, ad omnia media, ita quod precise fiat comparatio inter significata, non inter supposita significatorum. Secundo penes suppositionem. Suppositio autem est acceptio termini communis pro aliquo. Cum autem sit suppositio alia naturalis, alia accidentalis, intendo facere comparationem inter ea pro quibus stant termini in suppositione naturali, 30

4 intentiones … superiores] M inferiora et superiora sic semper O 5–6 vel sit … rei] O om. M 8 si] O sicut M 9 intentio … superior] M superius et inferius sic semper O 1

Ad sectt. [253]-[292] conferas nostri auctoris In I Sent. dist. 7am, q. 5am.

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ut si ‘animal’ per se sumptum, habens naturalem suppositionem, ad ‘hominem’ per se sumptam comparetur; vel si habeant suppositionem accidentalem: quia illa dividitur in simplicem et personalem, intendo facere comparationem inter ea pro quibus stant termini ut habent simplicem suppositionem, non ut habent personalem suppositionem, quia tunc nulla esset comparatio inter hominem et animal, quia tunc animal posset stare pro homine, et tunc fieret comparatio inter hominem et hominem, vel inter hominem et asinum, si animal staret pro asino in tali suppositione personali. Tertio penes | reduplicationem. M100vb Intendo enim comparare hominem ut hominem ad animal ut animal, non hominem ut animal ad ipsum animal, vel animal ut hominem ad ipsum hominem. Sic igitur satis patet qualiter termini superiorum et inferiorum in ista comparatione sumi debent. Hec de primo. Acceptionem autem ‘ydemptitatis’ et ‘diversitatis’ non intendo pro- 255 prie accipere, quia Philosophus, decimo Metaphisice dicit2 quod non debet dici animal esse idem homini vel diversum genere vel specie. Sed intendo tantum querere utrum inter hominem et animal, vel quodcumque superius et inferius, sit aliqua talis non-ydemptitas quod super ipsis ex natura rei possint fundari diverse conditiones, vel graduales vel alie, qualitercumque vocentur, vel aliquid huiusmodi. De modo procedendi ad determinandum questionem

Respondendo autem ad difficultatem questionis sic procedo. Primo 256 namque probabo conclusionem intentam. Secundo dabo modum simul et propter quid huius nominis ‘ydemptitas’. Tertio ex hiis inferam tales 25 esse gradus quales supra dixi esse. Quarto verificabo de illis gradibus et rebus in huiusmodi gradibus ordinatis ea que dicta sunt in comparationibus prime intentionis et secunde adinvicem. Primo igitur probabo hanc conclusionem quod homo et animal vel albedo et colorem, linea et quantitas, et quecumque intentiones superiores et inferiores simili 30 modo comparate, non sint omnino eadem ex natura rei, ymo ex natura rei est causata non-ydemptitas seu diversitas (si proprie dici possit diversitas), ita quod possunt fundare diversas conditiones ex natura rei. 2 si] O om. M 6–8 et animal … inter hominem] O om. M 19 conditiones] O contradictiones M 24 huius nominis ydemptitas] coni coll. sect. 267a infra om. MO 32 conditiones] O contradictiones M 2

Arist., Metaph. X 8, 1057b35 sqq.

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articulus i DE PROBATIONE CONCLUSIONIS INTENTE 257 Et ad hoc probandum induco solum unam rationem. Que talis est. De

nullo uno et eodem omnibus modis ydemptitatis se tenentibus ex parte rei eodem et indistincto verificantur contradictoria predicata, ita quod 5 causa veritatis sit in illo eodem ante omnem actum intellectus. Sed de homine ut homo est et de animali ut animal et de albedine ut albedo (et sic de similibus similiter comparatis) verificantur contradictoria predicata, ita quod causa veritatis est in istis ante omnem actum intellectus. Ergo hec reddendo singula singulis non sunt omnino eadem ex 10 natura rei. Maior propositio probatione non indiget, quia principium M101ra est communissimum et | firmissimum, ut dicitur3 quarto Metaphisice, et si negetur, recursus erit ad elencticas probationes quas ponit ibidem Aristotiles. De sex viis probantibus minorem

15

De via sensus 258 Minorem vero probo sex viis. Prima est via sensus. Pro qua accipio

quod ante omnem actum intellectus sapor ut sapor est primum obiectum gustus, ita quod quidquid per se natum est gustu percipi est sapor, et omnis sapor est natus aliquo gustu percipi, et omne quod immutat 20 gustum, immutat ipsum sub ratione saporis; hoc enim est esse primum obiectum potentie. Habeo igitur quod de sapore ut sapor est verificatur hoc predicatum quod est ‘esse primum obiectum gustus’. Sed de dulcedine verificatur istud non esse primum obiectum gustus; non enim quidquid gustu percipitur, sub ratione dulcedinis percipitur. Ergo de 25 sapore et dulcedine verificantur contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘esse’ et ‘non esse primum obiectum gustus’. Quod autem hec sint vera vel habeant causam veritatis ante omnem actum intellectus patet, quoniam illud est causa huius veritatis quod est causa quod gustus sit limitatus ad sapores, et non ad dulcedines; sed huius est natura ante intelligere 30 nostrum. Ergo etc.

3

Ibid. IV 4, 1006a11–18; 1006a28–1009a5.

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509

De via intellectus Secunda via est via intellectus. Pro qua accipio quod animal sit intel- 259 ligibile actualiter et distincte, proprie et explicite intellectione diffinitiva sicut unumquodque proprie diffinibile; illa autem intellectio voce5 tur A. Tunc erit verum ante omnem actum intellectus (vel saltem causa intelligentis eius) quod animal est intelligibile vel natum intelligi actualiter et proprie et explicite intellectione A. Sed homo non est natus intelligi actualiter et proprie et explicite intellectione A. Quare de homine et animali verificantur contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘esse’ et ‘non 10 esse natum intelligi dicto modo hac intellectione A’; non enim intelligitur homo actualiter, intellecto animali actualiter, nec intelligitur homo distincte et explicite, sic intellecto animali, adminus necessario, ut homo (primo4 Posteriorum); esse autem vel non esse natum intelligi prius erit omni actu intelligendi. 15

De via adequationis

Tertia via est via adequationis subiecti et propre passionis. Pro qua acci- 260 pio quod animal ut animal est causa | sensationis adequata et precisa, M101rb ita quod sicut animal ex natura sua est causa, sic et precisa et adequata causa; non enim est ab alio causalitas et ab alio precisio, limitatio et 20 adequatio causalitatis. Sed homo ut homo non est precisa causa sensationis; regula est enim primo5 Posteriorum quod si in causis precisis affirmatio est causa affirmationis, negatio est causa negationis. Sed negatio hominis non est causa negationis sensationis; de asino enim negatur homo, non tamen sensatio. Quare de homine et animali verificantur 25 contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘esse’ et ‘non esse causam adequatam sensationis quantum est a parte potentie’. Pro eadem via accipio iterum quod homo sub ratione qua homo, est causa precisa et adequata risibilitatis seu subiectum precisum et adequatum et primum. Sed animal ut animal sub ratione qua animal non est causa precisa vel adequata risi30 bilitatis nec subiectum eius primum et adequatum. Quare de homine et animali verificantur contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘esse’ et ‘non esse subiectum primum et adequatum risibilitatis vel causam adequatam’. 2 via] O om. M 4 5

16 via] O om. M

Arist., Anal. Post. I 4, 73a29–31. Ibid. I 25, 86b30–36.

510

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De via contrarietatis 261 Quarta via est via contrarietatis. Pro qua accipio quod albedo sub

ratione albedinis habet proprie contrarium, puta nigredinem, et ipsa albedo proprie est contraria nigredini; hoc est manifestum cuicumque, etiam parum intelligenti. Sed color sub ratione coloris non contrariatur 5 nigredini, ymo salvatur in nigredine. Ergo de colore et albedine verificantur contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘contrariari’ et ‘non contrariari nigredini’, ‘salvari’ et ‘non salvari in nigredine’. De via transmutationis 262 Quinta via est via transmutationis. Pro qua accipio quod omnis trans- 10

M101va

mutatio est a forma unius generis in formam aliam eiusdem generis, ita quod idem genus vel forma generis salvatur in utroque termino transmutationis; numquam autem est mutatio a forma unius generis ad formam alterius generis, ut dicit6 Philosophus, decimo Metaphisice et primo De generatione; et inducit per exempla: est enim mutatio ab albo in 15 nigrum, non ab albo in longum, nisi per accidens. Accipio ergo quod albedo ut albedo potest esse per se terminus alterationis a quo in oppositum suum vel in quem ab opposito suo. Qualitas | autem ut qualitas non potest esse per se terminus alterationis ab opposita forma vel in oppositam formam; hec patent ex premissis. Quare de albedine et qua- 20 litate verificantur contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘posse’ et ‘non posse per se terminum esse alterationis naturalis’, ut est expositum. De via reduplicationis

263 Sexta via est via reduplicationis. Pro qua accipio quod hec est vera

‘Homo inquantum homo est rationalis’ et quod ista est falsa ‘Homo est 25 rationalis inquantum animal’. Et tunc ultra arguo et infero quod hee due propositiones sunt abinvicem diverse, quia impossibile est unam et eandem propositionem esse simul falsam et veram. Et tunc ultra infero quod vel sunt hee due propositiones abinvicem diverse, quia impossibile est unam et eandem propositionem esse simul falsam et veram et tunc 30

2 via] O om. M 6

4–5 hoc … intelligenti] M om. O

20–21 et qualitate] McO om. M

Arist., Metaph. X 7, 1057a26–28; De gener. et corr. I 1, 314b23–25.

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ultra infero quod vel sunt diverse totaliter, ita quod quidquid includitur in una est diversum ab omni eo quod includitur in alia, vel non sunt diverse totaliter, ymo aliquid includitur in una quod includitur in alia. Constat autem quod non sunt diverse totaliter, ymo ambe includunt aliqua eadem, et per illa non sunt diverse. Accipio ergo illa eadem in utraque propositione, ut postea inferam illa per que propositiones sunt diverse. Idem autem in utraque propositione est ‘homo’ in parte subiecti positus et hoc verbum ‘est’ et hoc predicatum ‘rationale’ et hec reduplicatio ‘inquantum’. Necesse est ergo propositiones esse diversas per hec reduplicata ‘homo’ et ‘animal’, cum omnia alia indubitanter habeant eadem. Ergo necesse est hec duo reduplicata secundum rationes formales esse diversa, quia rationes formales reduplicantur. Et hec est conclusio principalis. Et potest esse probatio minoris quia: Homo secundum rationem for- 264 malem hominis non est causa falsitatis predicte propositionis in qua reduplicatur; animal autem secundum rationem formalem animalis est causa falsitatis predicte propositionis in qua reduplicatur ita quod in predicta propositione nichil aliud est diversum, nichil aliud reduplicatum, et homo reduplicatus. Quare de homine et animali verificantur contradictoria predicata, scilicet ‘esse’ et ‘non esse secundum rationem suam formalem causam falsitatis illius propositionis’ qua contradictoria reducuntur ad hec, scilicet ad esse et non esse rationem includi | M101vb in homine hoc quod est ‘rationale’. Humanitas enim seu ratio formalis hominis est ratio includendi seu ratio includens rationale, animalitas autem non est ratio includendi nec ratio includens hoc quod est ‘rationale’. Ex hiis igitur manifestum est quod animal et homo, intentio superior 265 et inferior, in eadem linea predicamentali, non sunt idem omnibus modis ydemptitatis se tenentibus ex parte nature rei, ut ostensum est. Et hec de primo articulo sufficiant.

15–17 predicte … falsitatis] O om. M

28 in … predicamentali] O om. M

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articulus ii DE MODIS YDEMPTITATIS ET DIVERSITATIS INTER SUPERIOREM INTENTIONEM ET INFERIOREM 266 Consequenter ostendo modum et propter quid huius nominis ‘ydemp-

titas’. Circa quod primo ostendam quod intentio superior non potest 5 comparari intentioni inferiori secundum aliquem modum ydemptitatis proprie acceptum ab Aristotile positum. Secundo ostendam modum secundum quem poterit proprie comparari superior inferiori. Tertio ostendam causam modorum ydemptitatis et diversitatis inter superiorem intentionem et inferiorem. 10 Quod intentio superior non potest comparari intentioni inferiori secundum ydemptitatem 267 Ad ostentationem primi sciendum quod aliqua dicuntur eadem que-

madmodum dicuntur unum, ut habetur7 quinto Metaphisice sub hiis verbis: “Alia vero secundum se dicuntur idem quecumque quemadmodum 15 et unum; et est quorum materia una aut specie aut numero eadem dicuntur, et quorum substantia una”. Quare palam quod ydemptitas unitas quedam est. Ex hiis ergo accipio quod tot modis dicitur idem quot modis dicitur unum, sicut habetur8 ex primo Topicorum. Duas autem invenio distinctiones unius positas a Philosopho, quinto Metaphi- 20 sice; quarum primam resumit9 decimo Metaphisice summarie et copulatim sub hiis verbis: “Dicitur igitur unum tot modis continuum natura et totum natura et singulare et universale”. Aliam ponit10 quinto Metaphisice sub hiis verbis: “Amplius autem alia secundum naturam sunt unum, alia secundum speciem, alia secundum analogiam”. Hec autem distinc- 25 tio reducitur ad primam, quia unum numero est unum singulare vel singulari continuitate vel singulari totalitate vel singulari indivisibilitate; unum autem secundum speciem et unum secundum genus et unum

8 comparari] O operari M 8–10 tertio … inferiorem] O om. M unum M 19 unum] O idem M 7 8 9 10

Ibid. V 9, 1018a5–7. Arist., Top. I 7, 103a23–24. Arist., Metaph. X 1, 1052a34–36. Ibid. V 6, 1016b31–32.

18 idem] O

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secundum analogiam reducuntur ad unum universale secundum diversos gradus universalitatis. Distincto igitur uno tot modis, etiam distinguitur idem, ut possit dici quod aliqua sunt eadem | continuitate, puta M102ra quorum ultima sunt unum et idem; aliqua dicuntur eadem totalitate, puta illa que habent unam formam aliquam que non est eiusdem rationis in toto et in parte, ut in quolibet toto etherogeneo, sicut focular vel animal; aliqua sunt eadem singularitate, puta illa que omnino in esse singulari sunt indivisa; aliqua sunt eadem universalitate, puta que sunt eadem specie vel eadem genere vel eadem proportione vel analogia. Hiis ergo premissis, ostendo quod superior intentio non comparetur 268 inferiori proprie secundum aliquem predictorum modorum ydemptitatis proprie acceptorum. Primo igitur patet quod non possunt comparari ut eadem continuitate, quia comparatio superioris et inferioris est in non-continuis, ut inter colorem et albedinem, inter saporem et dulcedinem, inter numerum et binarium. Secundo patet quod non debent comparari ut eadem totalitate, quia talis comparatio est in nonhabentibus talem totalitatem, ut in predictis exemplis colore et albedine, numero et binario. Tertio patet quod non sunt eadem proprie ydemptitate singularitatis, quia superior intentio in se non est singularis, nec una numero, et per consequens non sunt eadem numero vel eadem singularitatis ydemptitate. Quarto patet quod intentio superior et inferior non sunt proprie eadem universalitate que est species, quia vel superior intentio erit ipsa species et inferior intentio individuum ipsum (ut homo et Sortes), et tunc non possunt dici eadem specie proprie, quia quecumque sunt eadem specie, continentur sub eadem specie una, ut quecumque sunt in eodem tempore, et mensurantur et continentur eodem tempore; sed ipsa species et individuum speciei non continentur sub eadem specie, cum unum illorum sit ipsa species, sicut nec potest dici proprie quod tempus sit simul tempore cum aliqua re mensurata a tempore, quia ipsum tempus est illud per quod aliqua duo sunt simul tempore, sic ipsa species est illud per cuius participationem aliqua duo vel plura dicuntur eadem specie,—vel superior intentio erit genus et inferior erit species vel individuum, ut substantia, animal, homo et Sortes; et nec tunc possunt dici proprie eadem specie, quia ipsum genus in se non est idem specie; et per consequens nulli est idem specie.

12 possunt] O debet M aliqua duo] O om. M

24–25 proprie] O proprietate M

30–32 sunt simul …

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269 Patet etiam quinto secundum eandem viam quod intentio superior et M102rb inferior non possunt | proprie comparari ut eadem universalitate que

est genus sic quod dicantur eadem genere, quia cum ipsum genus possit esse intentio superior, nulla intentio inferior potest dici eadem genere, cum ipsa sicut intentio inferior ad speciem non potest dici eadem specie cum intentione que est species iuxta suppositam rationem. Sexto patet quod non possunt dici eadem universalitate que est proportio vel analogia, inquantum solum dicantur eadem proportione seu anologia, quia hoc modo illa que sunt summe diversa quorum unum non predicatur de altero formaliter, possunt dici eadem, ut Substantia et Quantitas et alia predicamenta. Et hec ratio potest concludere universaliter quod intentio superior et inferior non dicantur proprie eadem vel diversa ydemptitate vel diversitate cuiuscumque universalitatis, quoniam illa que sunt disparata et quorum unum non predicatur de altero, possunt dici secundum quemlibet modum ydemptitatis universalis, ut patet de Sorte et Platone, que sunt eadem specie, et tamen adinvicem sunt diversa et disparata sic quod unum non predicatur de altero. Idem patet de homine et asino, que sunt aliqua eadem genere, et tamen sic sunt diversa et disparata quod unum non predicatur de altero. Idem patet de scientia et albedine, que sunt eadem proportionr, et tamen unum de altero non predicatur. Sed intentio superior et inferior non sic sunt diversa et disparata quin unum quidditative et formaliter possit de altero predicari. 270 Apparet igitur quod intentio superior et inferior non possunt proprie comparari secundum aliquem modorum ydemptitatis vel diversitatis positum ab Aristotile. Et hoc est quod ipse dicit11 decimo Metaphisice sub hiis verbis: “Palam quia ad illud quod vocatur genus quod nec idem nec diversum specie nichil est eorum que conveniunt ut generis specierum”. Sic autem negat ydemptitatem et diversitatem specie inter genus et speciem. Sic etiam intelligenda est negatio cuiuslibet alterius ydemptitatis et diversitatis positarum ab ipso, sicut superius est ostensum.

7 est] O om. M 11

12 eadem] vel diversa add. V

Ibid. X 8, 1058a21–23.

19–21 idem … predicatur] O om. M

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515

Quomodo poterit proprie comparari intentio superior inferiori

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Ostenso igitur quomodo non debent comparari intentio superior et 271 inferior ut eadem vel diversa, ostendendum est quomodo poterunt comparari ut eadem vel ut non eadem. Et hoc ostendo tripliciter. Primo ergo dico quod aliqua possunt esse eadem vel diversa duobus modis, scilicet eadem et diversa totaliter, et eadem vel | diversa partia- M102va liter. Tunc ergo dico quod intentio superior et inferior nec diversa nec eadem sunt totaliter, tamen eadem et diversa partialiter. Quod probo sic. Quecumque se habent ut totum et pars, illa nec eadem nec diversa sunt totaliter, tamen sunt eadem et diversa partialiter.—Hoc apparet deducendo in quocumque toto essentialiter respectu suarum partium. Homo enim non est idem totaliter aut diversus totaliter ab anima, quia tunc sequeretur vel quod totus homo vel tota essentia hominis esset anima, vel quod tota essentia hominis esset sine anima, homo tamen est idem partialiter cum anima, quoniam aliqua pars essentie hominis est idipsum quod anima, et ita homo est idem partialiter cum anima; differt tamen partialiter, quoniam aliqua pars hominis, puta corporeitas, est essentialiter diversa ab anima. Et sic patet predicta propositio in quibuscumque totis essentialibus deducendo.—Sed intentio superior et inferior se habent sicut totum et pars. Ergo nec eadem nec diversa sunt totaliter, tamen et eadem et diversa sunt partialiter. Quod intentio superior et inferior se habent ut totum et pars

Minorem declarabo. Dicitur primo penes includere, secundo penes 272 includi, ita quod penes includere intentio inferior est totum et intentio 25 superior est pars. Quod declaro sic. Accipiendo pro intentione inferiori hominem et pro superiori animal; homo enim includit ipsum animal et omnia inclusa in animali et amplius aliquid aliud, puta differentiam, in qua animal non includitur et que non includitur ab animali. Ergo penes includere homo est totum respectu animalis, et animal pars 30 respectu hominis. Secundo declaro quod penes includi intentio superior sit totum, et intentio inferior sit pars. Quod ostendo in eisdem terminis: animal enim includitur in homine et in quocumque includitur illud quod est homo, et adhuc includitur in quodam alio (puta in asino) in 3 vel diversa] O om. M 8–10 quod probo … partialiter] O om. M 12 totaliter] O om. M 14 anima … esset] O om. M 25 superior] O inferior M 32 enim] O om. M 33 quodam alio] O aliquo M

516

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quo non includitur homo, et quod non includitur in homine. Quare penes includi animal est totum respectu hominis. 273 Et hoc est quod alias dixi quod intentio inferior respectu superioris est totum secundum conceptum, sed intentio superior respectu inferioris est totum secundum ambitum. Cuius dicti ratio est illud quod 5 iam exposui quoniam conceptus cuiuscumque quidditatis non simpliciter simplicis sumitur per comparationem ad inclusa in quidditate; quod apparet, quoniam in conceptu cuislibet quidditatis includitur implicite conceptus quidditatum in quidditate ista inclusarum. Si enim accipiatur conceptus hominis, accipietur talis in quo includitur conceptus sui 10 M102vb generis | et sue differentie implicite vel explicite; ambitus autem quidditatis cuiuscumque eorum sumitur per comparationen ad includentia huiusmodi quidditatem. 274 Ex hiis igitur patet quod intentio superior et inferior nec eadem nec diversa sunt totaliter, tamen et eadem et diversa sunt partialiter. Et sic 15 apparet modus et propter quid ydemptitatis et diversitatis intentionis superioris et inferioris. De causa modorum ydemptitatis et diversitatis inter eas 275 Circa istum modum et causam modi tria essent querenda. Unum

utrum differentia quam addit intentio inferior ad superiorem sit aliqua 20 entitas vel realitas, vel formalitas alia ex natura rei ab entitate, realitate seu formalitate intentionis superioris. Sed quia inferius determinanda est questio querens hec, iam adpresens supersedeo. Aliud querendum est utrum differentia quam addit intentio inferior ad superiorem, sit prima ratio diversitatis partialiter et non-ydemptitatis harum intentio- 25 num, an illud de quo amplius dicitur intentio superior quam inferior. Et quod hec sit rationabiliter quesitum apparet per superius dicta. Dictum est enim supra quod intentio superior est totum respectu inferioris penes includi in pluribus et penes ambitum ad plura; dictum est etiam quod totum diversificatur ab una parte per aliam; dictum est 30 etiam quod intentio inferior est totum respectu superioris penes includere plura et penes conceptum plurium. Ergo rationabiliter queritur utrum pars inferioris intentionis connumerata cum superiori sit prima ratio distinguendi et diversificandi intentionem inferiorem a superiori,

3 alias] O animal M 6 exposui] O expositum(!) M 6–7 simpliciter] O similiter M 12 cuiuscumque eorum] coni. cuiuscumque O eorum M 15 totaliter] O formaliter M

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vel pars intentionis superioris connumerata cum inferiori. Utrobique enim videtur esse eadem ratio. Quare dubium que sit prima ratio vel que non, an ambe sint de pari. Ad hoc respondeo quod pars formalis inclusa in intentione inferiori 276 connumerata cum superiori est prima ratio distinguendi seu diversificandi partialiter intentionem inferiorem a superiori. Quod ostendo dupliciter. Primo quia: Quecumque distinguuntur vel diversificantur abinvicem, diversificantur per aliqua inclusa in eis, vel per aliquid inclusum in altero eorum. Sed pars intentionis superioris non includitur in ea, quia per illam intentio superior non diversificatur ab inferiori, ymo nichil includitur in intentione superiori quin totum includatur in inferiori. Ergo per illam non diversificatur primo ab inferiori. Sed pars intentionis inferioris connumerata cum superiori includitur in ea, quia per illam fit primo diversitas partialis inter has intentiones, unde animal nichil habet essentialiter | per quod diversificetur ab homine; homo M103ra enim habet essentialiter per quod diversificetur ab animali. Secundo idem ostendendo quia: Pars quam plus habet intentio inferior quam superior est causa et ratio quod intentio superior habeat aliquam partem plus quam inferior, ymo est causa etiam quod hec intentio sit superior, et hec inferior.—Quod patet, quia quod dividit superius et constituit inferius, est causa et ratio quod hoc sit inferius et illud superius, quia superius non est superius nisi quia est divisum in aliqua sub se constituta, nec inferius est inferius nisi quia est constitutum, substantivato diviso in ipsum; et per consequens illud idem est ratio quod ipsum superius habeat partem.—Sed pars quam plus habet intentio inferior quam superior, dividit superiorem et constituit inferiorem; quod apparet, quia illa pars est ipsa differentia, differentia vero est divisiva generis et constitutiva speciei. Quare illa pars est ratio quod intentio superior habeat partem subiectivam. Quomodo superior intentio predicari potest de inferiori Adhuc querendum est quomodo est possibile superiorem intentionem 277 predicari de inferiori. Videretur enim quod non quia: Nec totum vere predicatur de parte nec pars de toto, ut nec homo de anima nec anima de homine. Sed statim dictum est quod hec intentio est totum respectu

2 esse] O om. M 9–13 superioris … intentionis] O om. M 15–16 homine … ab] O om. M 23 est inferius] O om. M 31 adhuc] coni. aliud hic M ad hoc O

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illius, et econverso, diversimode. Quare non videtur vere una de altera predicari, ut animal de homine. 278 Dicendum quod ex una parte difficultas est, ex altera parte non est. Si enim queritur quomodo est possibile animal de homine predicari cum animal sit totum secundum ambitum, habens partes multas respectu hominis (puta leonem, bovem et asinum), dico quod hic nulla difficultas est pro eo quod: Nulla pars non inclusa in toto secundum formam secundum quam predicatur totum, prohibet totum de parte altera predicari. Sed bos et asinus et leo sunt partes animalis non incluse in animali secundum formam secundum animal predicatur, idest secundum formalem rationem animalitatis, quia non includuntur formaliter in illa ratione formali, licet includantur infra ambitum animalis, non tamen infra conceptum. Quare partes huius non prohibent animal de homine predicari; et in hoc non est difficultas. 279 Si vero queratur quomodo est possibile animal de homine predicari cum sit pars eius secundum conceptum et altera pars (puta rationale) coincludatur in homine cum animali, hic difficultas apparet quia M103rb videtur quod pars hominis coinclusa in homine cum animali | prohibeat animal predicari de homine, sicut materia coinclusa in composito cum forma prohibet formam predicari de composito, et forma prohibet materiam de composito predicari, adminus predicari in quid, predicatione dicente ‘Hoc est hoc’ (cuiusmodi predicationem ponimus inter hominem et animal, dicendo ‘Homo est animal’, ‘Sortes est homo’, et sic de aliis). De multifaria divisione terminorum

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280 Ad evidentiam autem huius difficultatis sciendum est quod modus

enuntiandi unum de altero manifestat causam veritatis unius de altero ex parte rerum; modum autem enuntiandi intellige quantum ad acceptionem terminorum sub quibus fit talis enuntiatio. Propter quod dico quod sunt aliqui termini significantes naturam, aliqui significantes ha- 30 bens naturam; et utrique adhuc dividuntur quia terminus significans naturam vel significat eam in communi, ut ‘animalitas’, ‘humanitas’, vel in singulari, ut ‘sorteitas’; terminus autem significans habens naturam vel significat eam in communi, ut ‘animal’, ‘homo’, vel in singu11 formaliter] O om. M 15 queratur] O queritur M 20 prohibet] O prohibeat M 22–24 cuiusmodi … de aliis] M om. O 26 autem] O ergo M 28 intellige] O intelligo M 33 autem] O etiam M

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lari, ut ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’. Terminus autem significans naturam in communi dicitur significare quid; terminus autem significans habens naturam in communi dicitur significare quale quid; terminus autem significans naturam in singulari non proprie dicit solum quid, sed aliquando fingimus ita quasi dicat solum quid, ut cum dicimus ‘Sorteitas’. Terminus vero significans habens naturam in singulari dicitur significare hoc aliquid seu hoc quid, ut hoc aliquid extenditur ad substantiam et ad accidentia. Item. Terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus; ter- 281 minus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus; significatio enim termini significantis habens naturam sumitur a natura significata secundum se per terminum principalem; quare ille principalis, ille vero sumptus dicitur. Et cum hoc, hic terminus principalis significat naturam absque hoc quod eius significatio concernat habens naturam; terminus vero sumptus sic significat naturam quod in eius significatione concernit habens eam; quare ille abstractus dicitur, iste vero concretus. Item. Terminus significans naturam qui dicitur principalis, ab eodem 282 imponitur et ad idem imponitur et pro eodem imponitur; ‘animalitas’ enim significat naturam et imponitur ab ipsamet natura ita quod a nullo alio sumitur eius impositio, et ad eandem naturam significandam imponitur, non aliquid aliud, et pro ea solum. Unde Avicenna dicit12 quod equinitas ut equinitas | non est nisi equinitas, idest equi- M103va nitas a nullo alio sumitur tamquam a priori, ad nichil aliud extenditur, pro nullo alio imponitur tamquam posteriori vel inferiori, sed solum est equinitas; illo igitur modo significatur natura equi per hunc terminum ‘equinitas’ quo modo sumitur a natura solum. Terminus vero sumptus seu concretus ab alio imponitur ad significandum, et ad aliud significandum imponitur, et pro aliis, ut supponat pro eis, imponitur; sumi-

3 significare] O singulare M 5 fingimus] O significamus M 6 significare] O singulare M 7 substantiam et ad] O formam et M 13 cum hoc hic] coni. cum hic M preterea hic O 18 qui] O que M 21 eandem] O om. M 12 Avicenna, Philosophia prima, tr. V, p. 22829–36: “Definitio enim equinitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis, nec universalitas continetur in definitione equinitatis. Equinitas etenim habet definitionem quae non eget universalitate, sed est cui accidit universalitas. Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid aliud nisi equinitas tantum; ipsa enim in se nec est multa, nec unum, nec existens in his sensibilibus, nec in anima, nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu ita ut hoc contineatur intra essentiam equinitatis, sed ex hoc quod est equinitas tantum”.

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tur enim eius impositio a natura, sicut impositio termini principalis, et imponitur ad significandum habens naturam, et sic imponitur quod potest supponere pro inferioribus suis. 283 Hoc autem modo possumus dicere quod aliquis terminus significat partem dupliciter: uno modo quia significat partem ut illud a quo 5 imponitur, non tamen ut illud ad quod imponitur, ut ‘animatum’; imponitur enim ab ‘anima’ et pro anima, sed alio modo, quia significat partem ut illud a quo imponitur et ut illud ad quod imponitur, ut ‘anima’ imponitur ad habens animam. Et hoc modo de quibuscumque aliis totis et partibus. 10 Quomodo pars affirmari potest de suo toto 284 Hiis ergo premissis, dico quod natura ut significata per terminum impo-

situm ad partem significandam et a parte potest enuntiari seu affirmari de toto, ut dicendo sic: ‘Homo est anima’ vel ‘Homo est materia sua’, ut est de se evidens. Sed pars ut significata per terminum impositum a parte sed non ad partem significandam precise, sed ad totum habens partem, vere potest affirmari de toto, ut dicendo sic: ‘Homo albus est homo’ vel ‘Homo est materiatus’ vel ‘carneus’, vel ‘Homo est animatus’; in hiis enim omnibus predicatur pars de toto. Et sic patet quomodo pars potest affirmari de suo toto. Hoc ergo modo possibile erit animal de homine predicari, quia ‘animal’ non est impositum ad significandum precise materiam que est pars hominis, sed aliquid habens talem materiam in communi, quod vere potest affirmari de quolibet habente eam in singulari vel in speciali. Quare patet huiusmodi possibilitas iam quesita. 285 Sed adhuc videtur remanere alia difficultas quia animal dicimus de homine predicari per se et in quid; nulla pars autem, quamcumque verificetur de toto, predicari videtur de ipso per se et in quid. Quod 103vb patet in exemplis positis: homo enim | non predicatur per se de homine albo; carneum autem et animatum non predicantur in quid de homine sed potius in quale; quare non videtur sufficienter dictum.

6 tamen] O om. M 28 per se] O om. M

7 et pro anima] O om. M

7–8 alio modo … anima] O om. M

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Quod quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod pars predicetur per se et in quid de suo toto

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Ad hoc respondeo et dico quod quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod 286 pars secundum modum expositum predicetur per se et in quid de toto. Primum est quod ipsa faciat per se unum cum sua conparte, ita quod totum sit per se unum ex illis partibus. Secundum est quod sit pars formalis. Tertium est quod sit determinabile quid per aliquid posterius aliquo ordine rationis vel nature, non quod sit determinatio seu aliquid determinans. Quartum est quod sequitur ex isto, scilicet quod significetur ut concretum dictum a concernendo suppositum, non ut concretum dictum a concernendo subiectum vel quasi subiectum. Primum patet quoniam: Quod non est unum per se aliquid in seipso, 287 nichil est per se nec suscipit predicationem per se ab aliquo alio nec per se predicatur de aliquo alio. Unde regula generalis potest dari quod ens per se numquam predicatur per se se ente per accidens, nec ens per accidens predicatur per se de ente per se; et ideo homo non predicatur per se de homine albo. Secundum patet nono Metaphisice, ubi dicit13 Philosophus quod materia predicatur sicut passiones. Unde dicit quod nullum materiatum est id ex quo est, sed ecininum, puta archa non est lignum, sed ligneum; quare etc. Tertium patet quia: Omne quod significatur per terminum concretum dictum a concernendo subiectum, predicatur in quale ac si esset vera qualitas, ut patet discurrendo per singula. Et hoc modo omnes differentie, tam substantiales quam accidentales, sunt significate per terminos sic concretos et per modum determinationum quarundam determinantium aliquod quid seu aliquod quale quid; quare numquam predicantur in quid. Requiritur ergo ad predicari in quid quod illa ratio partialis que predicatur, seu illa pars formalis que predicatur, sit aliquod quale quid, non solum aliquid determinatum et amplius determinabile; et per consequens quod terminus talem partem significans sit concretus dictus a concernendo suppositum, non a concernendo subiectum vel quasi subiectum. Et sic patent tertium et quartum, et per consequens | omnia quatuor. M104ra

3 et dico] O om. M 13–14 per se] O om. M 14 aliquo alio] coni. aliquo O alio M 22 vera] M vere O 22–23 singula] M singulas O 30 suppositum] O compositum M 13

Ibid. IX 7, 1049a26-b1.

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pars tertia Quod pars quidditatis inferioris significata nomine intentionis superioris habet ista quatuor

288 Modo igitur dico quod illa pars quidditatis intentionis inferioris signifi-

cata nomine intentionis superioris habet ista quatuor. Ipsa enim facit per se unum cum sua conparte, scilicet cum formalitate significata nomine differentie contrahentis intentionem superiorem ad inferiorem, sicut animal cum rationali ad hominem. Et sic patet primum. Item. Ipsa est pars formalis, ut habetur14 septimo Metaphisice quod partes diffinitionis sunt partes formales; genus autem est prima pars diffinitionis, ut habetur15 in principio quarti Topicorum. Et sic patet secundum. Item. Ipsa est quoddam quale quid amplius determinabile per differentiam contrahentem eam ad intentionem inferiorem, et non est determinatio alicuius prioris se; hic enim accipio intentiones que sunt in recta linea, quoniam ad illas stat totus ordo superiorum et inferiorum; nulla autem istarum est determinatio alicuius prioris in predicamento vel supra (ut de se patet), ymo determinatio determinatur ad eas. Et sic patet tertium. Item. Ipsa significatur per terminum concretum dictum a concernendo suppositum, non subiectum; quod patet per terminos positos in Arbore Porfirii, ut sunt ‘substantia’, ‘animal’, ‘homo’ et ceteri. Et sic patet quartum. Quare manifestum est quod licet animal, quantum ad illud a quo sumitur, sit pars hominis secundum conceptum et secundum includi, potest vere predicari de homine et vere affirmari predicatione dicente ‘hoc est hoc’, sic intelligendo: ‘hoc habens humanitatem est illud habens animalitatem’ (et est predicatio per se et in quid). Et hec de hac difficultate. Quod semper exigitur quod habens et habitum sit una res per se 289 Sin autem adhuc dubitetur quare hec predicatio ‘Habens superficiem

est habens albedinem’ non est ita per se sicut ‘Habens humanitatem est habens animalitatem’, cum habens superficiem sit illud idem habens

7 cum … hominem] cum rationali M ad hominem O 8 pars] O om. M 8–9 diffinitionis] O diffinitiones M 9 partes] O om. M 13 accipio] M accipimus O 18 subiectum] O formaliter M 22 includi] O includere M 27 sin autem] M sed tamen O | dubitetur] M dubitatur O | superficiem] O similitudinem M 14 15

Ibid. VII 10, 1035b33–1036a1. Arist., Top. IV 1 passim.

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cum eo quod habet albedinem sicut ibi, respondeo quod ad predicationem huiusmodi que est per se in primo modo, ubi habens naturam predicatur de habente naturam, semper exigitur quod habens et habitum sint una res per se; aliter, ut dictum est supra, non potest esse predica5 tio per se. Et ratio est quod natura habita per illud quod predicatur, includatur in natura habita per illud quod subicitur; neutrum autem horum duorum invenitur in ‘habens superficiem’ et ‘habens albedinem’; quare | in illis est per se predicatio, in illis vero minime. M104rb Quod superior intentio et inferior sunt eadem vel diversa inadequate 10

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Ostensum est ergo quomodo intentio superior et inferior sunt eadem 290 vel diversa, et quomodo non possunt dici eadem et diversa omni modo ydempitatis et diversitatis, sed solum totaliter et partialiter, et quomodo, non obstantibus totalitate et partialitate, possunt esse vere predicationes. Consequenter potest ostendi quod intentio superior et inferior non sunt eadem totaliter vel diversa vel eadem adequate vel inadequate; secundus modus tamen in idem redit cum primo. Potest ergo dici quod aliqua sunt eadem vel diversa adequate vel inadequate, et tunc quod intentio superior et inferior sunt idem et diversa inadequate, tamen nec eadem nec diversa sunt adequate. Quod patet quia: Quecumque eadem sunt adequate, cuicumque unum illorum est idem, et reliquum, et quodcumque uni illorum est idem, et reliquo; hoc enim modo dicuntur aliqua eadem adequate, et aliter non; et hoc modo habent se partes diffinitionis et diffiniti. Sed intentio superior et inferior nequaquam cuicumque unum illorum est idem, et reliquum; superior enim intentio est eadem alicui cui non est eadem intentio inferior (verbi gratia, animal est idem asino, cui non est idem homo), et aliquid est idem intentioni inferiori quod non est idem intentioni superiori (verbi gratia, rationale quidditative et essentialiter est idem homini, non tamen animali). Quare homo et animal non sunt idem adequate, sunt tamen idem inadequate, nec diversa adequate, idest non omnino sunt diversa vel non omnino de pari habent principia diversitatis, quia homo includit principium diversitatis sui ab animali, animal tamen non includit aliquod principium diversitatis sui ab homine. Quare patet quod non 11 possunt dici] O penes divisionem M | eadem et diversa] O om. M 12 solum] O secundum M 14–15 quod intentio … inadequate] Mc om. MO 15 eadem] O eedem M 16 secundus modus] O secundo modo M 21 et quodcumque … reliquo] O om. M 22–23 partes] M res O

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sunt eadem vel diversa adequate. Ex quo relinquitur quod sunt eadem vel diversa inadequate. Et hoc est idem cum prima distinctione; illa enim que sunt eadem totaliter, sunt eadem adequate, illa vero que sunt eadem partialiter, sunt eadem inadequate. Quod sunt eadem vel diversa inconvertibiliter

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291 Tertio hoc potest ostendi aliter; quantum ad verba tamen ad idem redit

cum primis duobus modis. Potest ergo dici quod aliqua sunt eadem convertibiliter aliqua vero inconvertibiliter. Dico igitur quod superior intentio et inferior sunt idem inconvertibiliter, et non sunt idem convertibiliter. Quod patet quia: Quecumque sunt idem convertibiliter: uno M104va eorum posito, | ponitur reliquum, et uno eorum remoto, removetur reliquum; hoc enim modo se habent quecumque convertuntur secundum consequentiam subsistendi. Sed intentio superior et inferior non convertuntur. Ergo non sunt eadem convertibiliter. Premisse patent de se. Restat ergo quod sint eadem inconvertibiliter. Iste autem modus dupliciter potest sumi; et uno modo sumptus est idem cum primis, alio modo non. Potest enim intelligi convertibilitas quantum ad ea que comparantur ista que dicuntur convertibiliter eadem; et tunc est sensus quod cuicumque comparatur unum istorum ut idem, et reliquum, et econverso; et sic ille modus est idem cum primis; quod enim est ita convertibiliter alicui idem, est idem totaliter et adequate illi, et que est opposito modo (scilicet inconvertibiliter) alicui idem, est partialiter et inadequate idem illi. 292 Potest autem aliter intelligi convertibilitas ista quantum ad supposita; et tunc est sensus quod in quocumque invenitur unum eorum que sic sunt eadem convertibiliter, in illo invenitur et reliquum. Et hoc modo sumendo predictam convertibilitatem, non est idem ille modus cum prioribus. Hoc enim modo homo et rationalitas seu quelibet species cum sua differentia sunt eadem convertibiliter, quia in quocumque supposito invenitur species, invenitur ultima differentia huius speciei constitutiva, et econverso; non tamen propter hoc est eadem totaliter et adequate differentia cum sua specie, quoniam aliquid includitur in specie quod non includitur in differentia, puta genus; quare ille modus

1 sunt] O om. M 7–8 aliqua … inconvertibiliter] Oc om. MV 20 est idem] O om. M 24 aliter] O similiter M

11 eorum] O om. M

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sic sumptus est alius a premissis. Hoc autem modo possumus dicere etiam quod superior intentio et inferior non sunt eadem convertibiliter, ut probatum est supra. Hec autem sufficiant de ostensione modorum ydemptitatis et diver- 293 5 sitatis inter superiorem et inferiorem intentionem, et de causa talium modorum, et per consequens de toto secundo articulo.

articulus iii QUOD GRADUS PREDICAMENTALES SUNT EX NATURA RERUM Consequenter ostendendum est quod in intentionibus superioribus et 294 inferioribus sunt gradus predicamentales et subpredicamentales et suprapredicamentales ex natura rerum absque omni opere intellectus nostri. Ad quod probandum accipio quod idem est probare quod sit aliquis ordo ex natura rei intentionum superiorum et inferiorum et ex 15 natura rei esse gradus huiusmodi inter ipsas, quoniam impossibile est evidenter esse aliquem ordinem ex natura rei et non esse gradus seu signa, decisiones seu distinctiones ex natura rei. Probato igitur quod ordo intentionum superiorum et inferiorum sit ex natura rei, probatum erit illos gradus seu illa signa quibus distinguitur | ille ordo, esse ex M104vb 20 natura rei. 10

Quod ordo intentionum superiorum et inferiorum est ex natura rei Probo ergo hunc ordinem esse ex natura rei. Primo sic. Omnis ordo 295 nature ex natura rei est; hec autem sic est evidens quod non eget probatione. Sed ordo intentionum superiorum et inferiorum est ordo 25 nature. Ergo est ex natura rei. Minorem probo quadrupliciter. Primo per Philosophum quinto Metaphisice sic dicentem16: “Alia vero dicuntur priora secundum naturam et substantiam quecumque contingit esse sine aliis et alia non sine istis; qua divisione usus est Plato”. Hec Philosophus. Habeo igitur auctoritatem horum duorum philosophorum 1 alius] O aliud M 5 et inferiorem] O om. M 6 toto … articulo] M tota questione O Responsio ad istum articulum de ista questione habetur in ..?.. ideo usque hic scribitur add. Mm 14 rei] O om. M 17 rei] O om. M 23 sic] O om. M 16

Arist., Metaph. V 11, 1019a2–6.

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297

298 M105ra

pars tertia

quod unumquodque est prius alio secundum naturam sine quo potest esse et illud aliud non sine isto. Sed animal potest esse sine homine (quia in asino), sed homo non potest esse sine animali. Ergo animal est prius secundum naturam homine. Et ita habeo ordinem nature inter hominem et animal, et pari ratione inter quamlibet intentionem superiorem et inferiorem. Et sic patet minor principalis sillogismi. Ad eandem possum inducere auctoritatem Aristotilis in Postpredicamentis in secundo modo ‘prioris’, ubi dicitur17 pari modo quod illud est prius altero a quo non convertitur consequentia subsistendi; sed ab animali non convertitur respectu hominis (sequitur enim ‘Homo est; ergo animal est’, sed non sequitur econverso ‘Animal est; ergo homo est’). Ergo animal est prius natura homine. Hic enim modus prioritatis et posterioritatis est naturalis, ut dicunt expositores, et apparet in exemplis Philosophi de uno respectu duorum. Quare patet quod ordo intentionum superioris et inferioris est ordo nature. Ad idem etiam induco Philosophum, primo Posteriorum, ubi exponens hanc conditionem demonstrationis que dicitur ‘ex prioribus’, ait18 ita: “Priora autem et notiora dupliciter sunt. Non enim idem est natura prius et ad nos prius nec notius et nobis notius. Dico autem ad nos priora et notiora proxima sensui; simpliciter autem priora et notiora que longius sunt. Sunt autem longiora quidem universalia maxime, proxima autem singularia”. Hec Philosophus. Ex quibus evidenter habetur quod universaliora sunt priora simpliciter et secundum naturam singularibus et notiora, sed quoad nos singularia. Ubi autem est prioritas nature, ibi ordo nature. Sed in hiis, scilicet intentionibus superioribus et inferioribus est huiusmodi prioritas, ut patet ex hiis dictis Philosophi. Ergo ordo nature. Et sic iterum patet minor Ad eandem iterum induco illud primi Metaphisice per quod Philosophus probat | metaphisicam esse de diffinitionibus, quia de maxime remotis a sensu, que sunt universalia maxime. Et ibidem probat eam esse certissimam quia de maxime primis. Dicit19 enim sic: “Certissime scientiarum sunt que maxime primorum sunt”. Coniungamus igitur ista duo, scilicet quod metaphisica est de maxime universalibus et

17 que dicitur] O om. M 19 prius] primum MO | prius] O posterius M simpliciter] O similiter M 21 quidem] O quedam M 17 18 19

Arist., Categ. 12, 14a34–35. Arist., Anal. Post. I 2, 71b33–72a5. Arist. Metaph. I 2, 982a25–26.

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quod est de maxime primis, et sequitur quod maxime universalia sunt maxime prima; et per consequens esse unum ordinem inter maxime universalia et inferiora eis. Iste autem ordo non potest fingi esse factus a ratione, quia nullus ordo factus a ratione nostra largitur certitu5 dinem scientie, sed potius conditio aliqua necessitatis ex parte rei. Sed ordo ille, scilicet primitas, secundum Philosophum largitur certitudinem scientie metaphisice, sicut obiecto largitur notitiam. Ergo ille ordo non est factus per rationem. Relinquitur ergo quod sit ordo nature. Sic igitur patet quod illa minor est secundum dicta philosophorum et omnino 10 consona rationi. Secundo arguitur ad principale

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Secundo arguo sic ad principale. Omnis ordo per se causalis in quo- 299 cumque genere cause est ex natura rerum causantium et causatarum; hec est evidentissima, quoniam ab eisdem oportet esse causalitatem et per se ordinem illius causalitatis. Sed ordo superioris et inferioris est ordo per se causalis in genere cause formalis. Ergo est ex natura rerum. Minorem ostendo esse ex intentione multorum philosophorum, et singulariter Aristotilis in multis locis. Et primo induco commentum De causis, super prima propositione, ubi sic habetur:20 “Oportet quod sit res esse in primis, demum vivum, postea homo; vivum ergo est causa hominis propinqua et esse est causa eius longinqua”. Ex hiis autem patet quod esse, vivum et homo habent talem ordinem inter se; iste vero est in genere cause formalis. Sed esse et vivum et homo sunt intentiones superiores et inferiores. Quare etc. Secundo induco Algazel in Metaphisica sua, tractatu primo, de divi- 300 sione entis per universale et singulare, dicentem21 sic: “Humanitas non recipitur in certitudine animalitatis eoquod essentia animalitatis plena et integra intelligitur constituta sine humanitate et equinitate et ceteris differentiis. Non sicut corporeitas, que si absens intelligatur, profecto et ipsa essentia animalitatis destructa intelligitur. Si enim humanitas 4 ratione] O regione M 5 rei] et secundo add. M 7 obiecto … notitiam] coni. obiectum largitur sed notificatur M obiectum largitur notitie O 12 per se] O om. M 16 est] O om. M 18–19 commentum de causis] O commentatorem M 20 res] rei MO 25 de] O om. M 26 entis] et add. M 29 intelligatur] coll. textu Algazelis intelligas MO 20 21

Anonymus, Liber de causis, prop. 1a, comm. Algazel, Metaph. I 2, 3, pp. 2932–308 ed. Muckle.

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M105rb esset | causa animalitati ad essendum animalitatem, sicut corporeitas

est causa ei, tunc animalitas non esset in equo, eoquod equus non est homo, sicut animalitas non inest ei quod non est corpus. Animalitas vero tota et plena inest equo, sicut homini. Ergo differentie non intrant in essentiis intentionum universalium”. Ex hiis ergo apparet quod animalitas est causa humanitatis. Hee autem se habent sicut intentiones superiores et inferiores. Quare intentiones ille habent inter se talem ordinem. 301 Tertio adduco Aristotilem, secundo Metaphisice, ubi probat statum in causis formalibus, dicentem22 sic: “Sed nec quod quid erat esse convenit reduci ad aliam diffinitionem multiplicantem rationem; semper enim que ante est magis est, et que posterior est non est; cuius autem primum non est, nec habitum”. Ex hiis autem verbis patet quod Philosophus intendit probare statum in ordine causarum formalium secundum ordinem diffinitionum explicantium formales rerum rationes secundum diversos gradus talis ordinis. Et arguit ex suppositione istius ordinis. Supponit enim quod diffinitionum et formalium rationum hec sit anterior, illa posterior. Et hoc supposito, arguit sic ducens ad impossibile: ubi primum, non est ibi habitum, idest consequenter ens non est, nec per consequens ordo prioris et posterioris; quod est contra suppositum, et ita est impossibile. Patet igitur quod ratio Philosophi fundatur super hoc quod est esse ordinem formalium rationum. Quare manifestum est quod hoc est de intentione sua. 302 Quarto induco eundem, septimo Metaphisice, capitulo de partibus diffinitionis, ubi querit23 que partes intrant diffinitionem tocius et que partes sunt priores toto. Et respondet quod partes formales sunt priores toto et intrant diffinitionem totius. Infra vero, capitulo de unitate diffinitionis, dicit24 quod in diffinitione nichil est nisi genus primum et differentia; alia vero genera sunt primum et cum hoc comprehense differentie, ut primum animal, habitum vero animal bipes, et iterum animal bipes non alatum; similiter autem et si plura dicantur. Ex hiis igitur habeo quod genus supremum et secundum et tertium (et sic

9 adduco aristotilem] O inducitur ar. M 11 multiplicantem] multiplicem MUV multiplicitatem N 13 patet quod] O om. M 28 diffinitione] O diffinitionis M 29 differentia … comprehense] coll. textu Aristotelis om. MO 22 23 24

Arist., Metaph. II 2, 994b16–20. Ibid. VII, capp. 10 sqq. Ibid. VII 12, 1037b29–1038a1.

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deinceps usque ad diffinitum) sunt partes diffinitionis, et per consequens partes formales diffiniti et priores. Quare manifestum est esse de intentione Philosophi superiores intentiones habere talem ordinem in | genere forme ad superiores. Et sic patet quod minor huius secunde M105va 5 rationis evidenter habetur a philosophis. Tertio arguitur ad principale

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Tertio arguo sic ad principale. Quecumque habentia ordinem ex natura 303 rei ad aliquod tertium diversimode, scilicet secundum prius et posterius, mediatius et immediatius, illa inter se habent ordinem ex natura rei. Hec est evidens, quoniam impossibile est aliqua duo entia in eodem gradu inequaliter distare quocumque genere distante ab aliquo tertio, sicut impossibile est duas quantitates inequaliter se habentes ad tertiam equales esse inter se. Sed intentiones superiores et inferiores habent ordinem ex natura rei ad aliquod tertium diversimode, scilicet secundum prius et posterius, mediatius et immediatius. Ergo inter se habent ordinem ex natura rei. Minorem ostendo esse de intentione philosophorum. Et primo de 304 intentione auctorum, et commentatoris De causis, dicentis25 propositione quarta: “Prima rerum creatarum est esse”. Certum est autem quod esse creatum et esse inclusum in rebus creatis habent essentialem ordinem, idest dependentiam, ad Primam Causam, et tamen non eodem modo, ymo diversimode, ut dicit presens auctoritas, cuius intellectus est quod prima ratio inclusa in re creata est esse. Et illud quod habet immediatius habitudinem ad Primam Causam est ipsum ens. Quare patet quod ratio formalis ipsius esse habet essentialem ordinem ad alias rationes formales que sunt sub esse; aliter enim non esset prima rerum creatarum, hocest primum inclusum in qualibet re creata. Non enim est intelligendum quod esse sit creatum seorsum ab aliis. Quare manifesta est illa minor. Secundo induco Aristotilem, primo Posteriorum dicentem26 quod ha- 305 bere tres primo inest triangulo et consequenter ysosceli. Et hoc modo intendit dicere de qualibet propria passione que primo inest subiecto suo primo, et ex consequenti contentis sub primo subiecto suo. Patet igitur quod intentio superior (sicut triangulus) et inferior (sicut ysoceles)

25 26

Anonymus, Liber de causis, prop. 4a, textus. Arist., Anal. Post. I 4, 73b38–74a3.

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habent naturalem ordinem ad aliquod tertium, puta ad habere tres, M105vb et tamen diversimode, quia secundum prius et posterius | secundum

mediatius et immediatius. Quare etc. Tertio induco eundem, secundo Posteriorum dicentem27 quod sensus universalis, sentire vero singulare. Ex quibus dictis accipio quod primum obiectum sensus est aliquod universale, puta ipsius visus color simpliciter, non hic color vel ille, sensationis vero primum obiectum est aliquod singulare, puta hic color vel ille. Tunc autem comparo colorem simpliciter et universalem ad visum, et est primum obiectum eius; et comparo ad eundem visum hunc colorem, et non est eius primum obiectum. Certum est autem quod color ut color habet naturalem ordinem cum visu, quia naturaliter visibilis; et hic color etiam, quia naturaliter visibilis. Ergo intentio superior (puta color), et inferior (puta hic color) habent naturalem ordinem ad aliquod tertium (puta ad visum), et tamen secundum prius et posterius, primum et non primum. 307 Quarto induco eundem, quinto Metaphisice, capitulo de causa dicentem28 quod medicus est causa propinqua sanitatis, artifex vero causa remota seu longinqua; et hoc idem intelligo de medicina et artificio. Sed medicus et artifex se habent ut intentiones superiores et inferiores. Ergo huiusmodi intentiones ad aliquod tertium ordinate (puta ad sanitatem) se habent ad eam ut propinquum et longinquum. Patet ergo esse de intentione Philosophi quod superior intentio et inferior habent naturalem ordinem ad aliquod tertium, sed diversimode, ut dictum est. Et sic patet illa minor. Et confirmatur per hoc quod Philosophus in eadem linea predicamentali ponit29 aliquas propositiones mediatas et aliquas immediatas. Quod non faceret nisi de intentione esset in illa linea esse naturalem ordinem. In vanum enim laboraret ad ostendendum quomodo intellectus eius faceret illum ordinem, quia intellectus cuiuslibet posset pariter facere alium et alium, et sufficeret quod qui306

2 posterius] dicentem add. M 5 sentire … singulare] MO an pro? sentire vero singularis, vel pro? sentitur vero singulare [conferas textum Aristotelis] 7 simpliciter] O similiter M 14 ordinem] McO om. M 27 Ibid. II 19, 100a16–17; in the translatio Jacobi: “et namque sentire quidem singulare est, sensus autem universalis est, ut hominis, non Callie hominis”, while the translatio ‘Johannis’ reads: “etenim sentitur quidem singulare, sensus autem universalis est, sicut hominis, non Callie hominis”. The Greek text runs: κα γρ ασ νεται μν τ κα ’κα-

στον,  δ’ ασ ησις το κα λου στν κτλ. 28 29

Arist., Metaph. V 2, 1013b32–1014a10. Ibid. 1013b35–1014a25.

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libet sciret suum; quod tamen nimis est absurdum iuxta dicta eius. Et iterum nulla propositio ex natura rerum significatarum per terminos | suos esset immediata; nec per consequens esset aliquod principium M106ra scientie ex natura rerum. Et nulla propositio ex natura rerum signifi5 catarum per terminos suos esset mediata, et per consequens nulla esset scibilis, et ita periret omnino omnis scientia. Hoc autem est evidenter impossibile. Ergo illud ex quo sequitur. Quarto arguitur ad principale 10

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Quarto arguo sic ad principale. Ille ordo est in natura rerum quo non 308 posito in natura rerum, non potest vitari contradictio in natura rerum. Hec patet quia: Si natura non potest pati vacuum, multo minus simultatem contradictoriorum. Sed intentionum superiorum et inferiorum ordine non posito in natura rerum, non potest vitari contradictio in natura rerum. Quare ipse est necessario in natura et ex natura rerum. Minor probari potest per sex vias superius positas ad ostendendum 309 quod de intentione superiori et inferiori possunt verificari contradictoria predicata. Que ita possunt induci ad presens propositum ostendendum quoniam: Intentio superior et inferior (puta animal et homo, color et albedo) vel sunt res disparate, vel sunt penitus una et eadem res convertibiliter, vel sunt res subordinate inconvertibiliter eedem. Primum dari non potest sine contradictione. Hee enim sunt vere: ‘Homo est animal’, ‘Albedo est color’, et si sunt res disparate, non sunt vere, ymo falsissime; quare primum dari non potest. Nec secundum, quia sequeretur quod de una re penitus et convertibiliter eadem verificantur contradictoria predicata, ut superius est ostensum per sex vias. Ad vitandum ergo contradictionem dabitur tertium, scilicet quod homo et animal, albedo et color sunt res subordinate eedem inconvertibiliter. Et hoc posito, ponitur ille ordo. Quare etc. Recapitulatur et obicitur

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Probatum est ergo quod ordo intentionum superioris et inferioris est ex 310 natura rerum. Et per consequens quod illi gradus qui sunt decisiones et distinctiones illius ordinis, sunt ex natura rerum, qui inquam gradus dicti sunt intentiones secunde in precedentibus. Sed contra hoc videtur 6 omnis scientia] US scientia NV om. M 20 eedem] O esse M

9 ille] O om. M

14 ipse] UNS ipsa MV

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esse quod dicit Philosophus septimo Metaphisice, capitulo de unitate diffinitionis dicens30 quod ‘ordo non est in substantia; quomodo namque oportet intelligere hoc | quidem posterius, illud vero prius?’; quasi dicit quod nullo modo. Quare etc. Quomodo predictus ordo intentionum sumi debeat

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311 Ad hoc potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo quod Philosophus secundum

aliquos expositores dicit hoc tamquam inconveniens ad quod inducitur si differentia inferior preponatur superiori. Et secundum hanc expositionem magis est pro quam contra. Si tamen sit de intentione sua quod ordo non sit in substantia, sciendum est quod duplex potest considerari ordo. Unus qui ponit necessitatem intellectuum unde incipiat intelligere, ita quod non ab altero duorum ordinatorum incipere possunt indeterminate sed ab uno precise, ab altero indeterminate.—Verbi gratia, ‘simus’ et ‘nasus’; hec enim sic sunt ordinata secundum intelligibilitatem quod intellectus intellecturus utrum necessario habet incipere ab ipso naso et non a simo.—Talis igitur ordo necessitatem imponit intellectui unde incipiat intelligere. 312 Est autem alius ordo, qui non imponit necessitatem intellectui quid primo, quid secundo intelligat, ut habetur31 primo Ethicorum. De quo Aristotiles commendat plura. Et dat exemplum de cursu in athletis, qui ab utraque parte potest incipi. Et ille ordo est inter intentiones superiores et inferiores, ita quod intellectus potest incipere suam considerationem a superioribus vel ab inferioribus. Cum ergo Philosophus dicit non esse ordinem in substantia, si intendit negare aliquem ordinem, certum est quod intendit negare ordinem primum, ubi necessitas imponitur intellectui unde simum intelligere incipiat. Et hoc sonat littera sequens, ubi dicitur quomodo enim oportet intelligere hoc quid prius, hoc autem posterius, quod dicit quod non oportet, idest non est necessarium, quia hincinde potest incipere; incipiens autem a superiori incipit a priori secundum naturam, incipiens vero ab inferiori incipit a priori secundum nos, ut habetur32 primo Posteriorum, ut dictum est

3–4 dicit quod] O om. M 14 simus] N curvus MUV 30 31 32

13 ab uno] O om. M | indeterminate] O determinate M 29 autem] O tamen M

Ibid. VII 12, 1038a33–34. Arist., Eth. Nicom. I 2, 1095a30-b4. Arist., Anal. Post. I 2, 71b33–72a4.

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supra. Et in hoc est signum magnum quod huiusmodi ordo est qui iam probatus est quod est de intentione philosophorum, quia omnes auctoritates | sonant superiora esse priora secundum naturam. M106va Et hec sufficiant de isto tertio articulo. 5

articulus iv DE PREDICTIS GRADIBUS ET DE INTENTIONIBUS IN EIS ORDINATIS

De quarto vero facile est ostendere quod ea que dicta sunt de prima 313 intentione in comparatione ad secundam, verificantur de re ordinata 10 in gradu in comparatione ad gradum, et dicta de secunda in comparatione ad primam, et verificantur de gradu in comparatione ad rem graduatam. De comparatione prime intentionis et secunde quantum ad esse 15

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Dictum est enim primo quod intentio prima est res ordinata in gradu 314 predicamentali vel subpredicamentali vel suprapredicamentali, ut substantia, Sortes, ens; secunda vero est ipse gradus predicamentalis vel subpredicamentalis vel suprapredicamentalis, ut generalitas, singularitas, transcendentia. Hoc autem dictum non oportet declarari, cum evidentius sit de re et gradu quam de intentione prima et secunda, cum non sint nisi res et gradus. Secundo dictum est quod prima intentio est aliqua entitas habens 315 aliquem modum essendi proprium, vel est aliquis modus essendi proprius alicui entitati; secunda vero intentio non. Hec autem sunt maxime evidentia de re et gradu rei quoniam: Omnis res constituta in gradu transcendentie vel est ipsa entitas, vel modus proprius entitati, vel simpliciter vel sub distinctione, qui omni et soli enti inest. Omnis autem res constituta in gradu predicamentali vel est genus generalissimum (et sic habet aliquid proprium quo distinguitur ab omni alio predicamento), vel est illud proprium quod inest cuilibet illius predicamenti (et ita vel est res habens proprium, vel ipsum proprium quod omni et soli con2 quod est] O om. M 11 primam] et add. M 16–17 predicamentalis … vel suprapredicamentalis] predicamentalis vel suprapredicamentalis vel subpredicamentalis MNS predicamentalis vel suprapredicamentalis UV 20 sint] V sit MUNS 21 secundo] O secundum M 26 sub distinctione] O subiectione M

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tento sub illo genere seu sub entitate generis illius convenit), vel est species subalterna vel species specialissima vel differentia. Quodcumque autem istorum sit, habet aliquid proprium quod inest omni et soli, puta si est species quecumque, habet differentiam propriam, vel est ipsa differentia que est propria. Omnis autem res constituta in gradu subpredicamentali habet aliquem concursum accidentium sibi proprium, qui inventus in uno numquam similis per omnia poterit inveniri in alio secundum Porfirium33. Sic igitur patet prima pars huius differentie. 316 Secunda pars apparet. Gradus enim non est aliqua entitas habens aliquem modum essendi proprium, quia non est entitas nec includens M106vb entitatem. Quod apparet quia: esset processus infinitus in entitatibus; | hoc est impossibile; quare et illud. Probatio consequentie. Accepta enim re graduata, si resolvatur in rem seu entitatem et gradum, hec resolutio vel terminatur ad duas res seu ad duas entitates, vel non sed ad unam entitatem et ad gradualitatem. Si detur secundum, habeo propositum. Primum vero dari non potest sine processu in infinitum, quia tunc illa entitas gradualitatis erit adhuc graduata, quia vel erit limitata vel illimitata secundum se; ergo iterum resolvam entitatem gradualitatis in entitatem et gradualitatem, et sic in infinitum. 317 Quare patet quod licet generalitas vel specialitas vel singularitas habeat aliquem modum essendi proprium, ipsa non est concipienda ut aliqua entitas, secundum quod de entitate loquimur comparando rem ordinatam in gradu ad ipsum gradum, nec ipse talis gradus est aliquis modus essendi proprius alicui entitati, eo scilicet modo quo dicimus proprium quod inest omni et soli. Accipio enim gradum animalis, et sit generalitas; ille non est proprius animali propter duo: primo quia non inest omni animali, quia hoc animal (puta Sortes) non est genus; secundo quia non inest soli, ymo communiori et cuilibet predicamento. Sic igitur patet quomodo verificantur de re et gradu rei dicta de intentione prima et secunda quantum ad secundam differentiam prius assignatam inter eas. 318 Tertio dictum est quod superiora non habent aliquid pertinens ad primam intentionem quod sit ratio differendi ab inferioribus, habent tamen aliquid pertinens ad secundam intentionem. Hec autem statim evidentia sunt de re in gradu et de ipso gradu. Constat enim quod res 8 differentie] quod scilicet omnis res in gradu vel habet proprium vel est proprium add. O 21 essendi] O om. M 26 primo] primum MO 33

Porphyrius, Isag., 7, 22–24 Busse; tr. Boethii, Arist. Lat., pp. 13–14.

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ordinata in gradu superiori nichil includit quod non sit inclusum in inferiori, ut quidquid includitur in animali, et inclusum est in homine, et accidentia etiam que insunt animali, insunt homini; et ideo animal nichil habet in se pertinens ad rem suam quod sit ei ratio differendi ab homine; habet tamen aliquid pertinens ad gradum eius quod est ei ratio differendi ab homine; non enim est homo in gradu predicamentali in quo est animal; per illum ergo gradum animal differt ab homine, et quidquid dicitur de animali ratione illius gradus, pertinet ad differentiam animalis et hominis. Et per talia predicata causatur fallacia accidentis, | attribuendo aliquid huiusmodi similiter animali et homini, cum dis- M107ra similiter insit eis. Verbi gratia, ‘Animal est primum obiectum sensus; homo est animal; ergo homo est primum obiectum sensus’. Ecce quod esse subiectum sensus pertinet ad rem animalis; et hoc bene convenit homini, sed esse primum et adequatum obiectum sensus pertinet ad gradum animalis, et idcirco esse obiectum sensus aliter convenit homini. Quarto dicebatur quod predicamenta distinguuntur per pertinentia 319 ad primas intentiones, non per ea que pertinent ad secundas. Hec autem manifesta sunt statim de re in gradu et ipso gradu, quia substantiam unius videmus differre ab aliis per realitatem substantie, non per gradum, quoniam alia predicamenta habent eosdem gradus predicamentales, puta supremum, medium et ultimum, non tamen eandem rem. Hee igitur erant quatuor differentie intentionis prime et secunde quantum ad esse. De earum comparatione quantum ad intelligi

Quantum ad intelligi primo igitur dicebatur quod prima intentio potest 320 intelligi, non intellecta secunda, non tamen secunda, non intellecta prima, in generali vel in speciali, determinate vel indeterminate. Hec autem sunt manifesta de re in gradu et ipso gradu; conceptus enim 30 rei non includit gradum; licet res intelligatur in gradu, tamen sine inclusione gradus, ipse tamen gradus non potest intelligi, non intellecto ut graduato, quia gradus non habet conceptum precisibilem a conceptu rei ut est concepta.

2 est] O om. M 5–6 habet … homine] O om. M om. M 24 esse] quatuor add. M

7 ergo] O om. M

20 videmus] O

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321

Secundo dicebatur quod prima intentio potest diffiniri, non includendo in sua diffinitione secundam, non tamen secunda, non includendo in sua diffinitione primam, cum secunda includat per modum additamenti primam intentionem. Hec autem manifesta sunt de re et de gradu, sicut de intelligi, quia res sicut intelligitur, sic diffinitur. 322 Tertio dicebatur quod scientia de primis intentionibus est tantum scientia, non modus sciendi, scientia tamen de secundis intentionibus est scientia et modus sciendi, puta logica. Hec autem manifesta sunt de scientia rerum in gradibus suis et de scientia graduum, quod est quia scientia de rebus tantum notificat essentias rerum de quibus est et probat passiones proprias de subiectis; et ita est solum scientia, non modus sciendi. Sed scientia de gradibus predicamentalibus notificat que passio de quo subiecto probari debeat in hoc quod distinguit id M107rb quod est subiectum primum | ab eo quod non est subiectum primum, ostendendo quod res in uno gradu est convertibilis cum aliqua passione et in alio gradu non; notificat etiam quid per quid debeat diffiniri, ostendendo quod res in gradu inferiori est diffinienda per res vel per rem que est in gradu superiori; quod diffiniri non posset cognosci, non cognitis rerum diffinibilium gradibus. Quare propter hoc et alia scientia logica agens de istis gradibus modus sciendi merito dici debet. 323 Quarto dicebatur quod scientia de secundis intentionibus ad omnium methodorum principia viam habet, sed scientia de primis intentionibus non. Quod apparet dupliciter esse verum de scientia rerum et graduum. Primo per illud quod dictum est quod modus sciendi ad omnium methodorum principia viam habet; secundo quia termini significantes gradus huiusmodi possunt supponere pro terminis quorumcumque principiorum. Et per hoc scientia talibus utens terminis ad omnium methodorum principia viam habet, quia data una maxima in illis terminis, invenitur habere veritatem in quibuscumque principiis. Verbi gratia, ‘A quocumque removetur genus, et quelibet eius species’ bene sequitur in naturali scientia; ergo quod non movetur, non alteratur, quia a quocumque removetur moveri (quod est genus), removetur alterari (quod est species). A quocumque ergo removetur res sumpta in gradu superiori, removetur etiam sumpta in gradu inferiori; que est eadem maxima cum prima. Et sicut habet veritatem ista maxima in naturali materia, sic in omni alia. Et si fuisset data hec maxima in ter-

2–3 non tamen … primam] coni. om. MO 3 cum] V tamen MO | includat] V includit MO 4 de] O om. M 5 res] O om. M

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minis naturalibus puta sic: ‘A quocumque removetur moveri, et alterari’, nichil per hoc sequitur in aliis scientiis. Et hee sunt quatuor differentie inter intentionem primam et secundam quantum ad intelligi. De earum comparatione quantum ad significari Et sunt alie due quantum ad significari. Prima est quod prima intentio 324 significatur per nomina prime impositionis, secunda vero per nomina secunde, iuxta distinctionem secundo loco supra positam de hiis nominibus. Secunda vero differentia est quod prima intentio significat ut res in gradu, secunda intentio ut ipse gradus. Et hec differentia est exposi10 tiva prime. Hec autem duo manifesta sunt per se de re in gradu et ipso gradu absque alia declaratione. Quare non dico plus de | illis differen- M107va tiis, quia hoc sufficit. 5

De earum comparatione quantum ad predicari Due vero differentie date erant penes predicari. Primo igitur dictum 325 est quod secunda intentio predicata de prima facit universaliter et necessario habere terminum prime intentionis simplicem suppositionem, prima vero intentio predicata de prima vel de secunda non universaliter. Hec autem sunt maxime manifesta de re in gradu et ipso gradu. Gradus enim predicatus de re in gradu facit stare terminum 20 significantem illam pro significato suo, non pro aliquo contento sub significato, cum ipsum significatum sit in illo gradu, non eius supposita. Sed omnis terminus stans pro significato suo, non pro aliquo supposito significati nec pro aliquo incluso in significato sed precise pro eo, habet simplicem suppositionem, ut declarabitur infra. Ergo talis termi25 nus in tali acceptione habet semper simplicem suppositionem. Exemplum huius est hec: ‘Homo est species specialissima’; sensus est quod significatum huius termini ‘homo’ est species, non aliquod suum suppositum nec aliquod inclusum in homine, sed precise illud quod primo significatur hoc nomine ‘homo’, Si vero aliquid pertinens ad primam 30 intentionem predicetur de homine quod sit aliqua natura in aliquo gradu, non habebit simplicem suppositionem; quia pertinebit ad rem, 15

20–23 contento … aliquo] O om. M pertinebat MUVS

31 quia] UNS quod MV | pertinebit] N

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non ad gradum, ut si dicatur ‘Homo est animal’; sensus enim est quod aliquod suppositum hominis vel quodlibet est animal. Et sic habebit personalem suppositionem. 326 Aliquando vero contingit quod predicatur aliquid pertinens ad primam et secundam intentionem ad rem et ad gradum rei. Ut si dicatur ‘Homo est primo risibilis’; ecce quod risibilitas pertinet ad rem et ad primam intentionem; primitas vero ad gradum. Quantum est ergo ex parte risibilitatis, homo posset supponere personaliter, quia pro Sorte vel pro Platone (unde potest dici ‘Sortes est risibilis’), sed ex parte primitatis prohibetur supponere personaliter, quia de nullo supposito hominis est verum quod sit primo risibile. Primitas enim pertinet ad illum gradum in quo homo et risibile convertuntur. Et sic patere potest differentia inter rem et gradum eius. 327 Secundo dictum est quod secunda intentio concretive sumpta potest supponere pro prima, sed prima non pro secunda. Hec autem maxime manifesta sunt de re et gradu. Terminus enim significans gradum potest M107vb | supponere pro re cuius est gradus, quoniam omnis terminus significans formam aliquam in concreto potest supponere pro omni eo quod per formam illam concernitur, secundum quod per terminum significatur. Sed talis gradus concretive sumptus concernit rem in gradu. Ergo terminus significans in concreto gradum huiusmodi potest supponere pro re in gradu. Exemplum huius habetur hic: ‘Omne genus predicatur in quid’; ecce quod gradus significatus nomine generis in concreto sumitur pro quolibet habente gradum huiusmodi. Unde bene sequitur ‘Ergo animal predicatur in quid’. Quare hic terminus ‘genus’ significans in concreto talem gradum potest supponere pro re que est in tali gradu. Sed terminus significans rem non potest supponere pro tali gradu, quia nec suppositione naturali (cum non sit de significatione eius), nec suppositione accidentali simpliciter simplici (pari ratione), nec simpliciter personali ut pars alicuius gradus (cum gradus non sit suppositum talis rei); unde non sequitur ‘Animal currit; ergo genus currit’. Et sic patet hec differentia.

11 enim pertinet] O om. M 28 suppositione] naturali add. M 29 simpliciter] O om. M 30 simpliciter personali] O om. M | ut] coni. om. MO | pars … gradus] M om. O

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De earum comparatione quantum ad ordinari

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Due vero differentie date sunt penes ordinari. Primo igitur dicebatur quod prime intentiones sunt in ordine predicamentali, suprapredicamentali et subpredicamentali, sed secunde intentiones sunt gradus, signa, divisiones, distinctiones illorum ordinum vel illius ordinis. Hec autem sine aliqua declaratione per se manifesta sunt de re in gradu vel de ipso gradu. Quare non dico plus de ista Secundo dicebatur quod secunde intentiones sunt circumeuntes predicamenta, prime vero non. Hec autem manifesta sunt de rebus et rerum gradibus. Gradus enim predicamentales sunt qui sunt in omni predicamento, non quasi res predicamentales, sed quasi signa et distinctiones predicamentalium ordinum. Hoc autem est circumire predicamenta. Res vero que dicuntur prime intentiones vel transcendunt predicamenta, vel sunt in determinatis predicamentis, vel subsunt determinatis predicamentis, ut singularia; transcendere vero predicamenta vel esse in predicamento ut res eius vel subesse predicamento non est circumire predicamenta. Quare patet quod omnes differentie date de primis et secundis intentionibus inter se verificantur de rebus et rerum gradibus, ita quod prime intentiones sunt res ordinate et omnia que pertinent ad eas ratione realitatis, non ratione graduum, secunde vero sunt ipsi gradus rerum et ea que | pertinent ad naturam et rationem graduum.

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Recapitulatur 25

Per hec dicta patet responsio ad argumenta principalia quia primum 331 deficit quia sumit quod sicut aliquid est in se idem, ita omnia que illi sunt eadem. Hoc enim est falsum, quia ipsum sibi ipsi est convertibiliter idem, non tamen omnia que illi sunt eadem. Secundum vero demonstrat quod intentio superior et inferior non sint totaliter et convertibiliter eadem.

2–3 dicebatur] O declarabitur M 3–4 suprapredicamentali et] O om. M 7 de ipso] O et ipso M 10 qui sunt] N om. MUVS 15 transcendere] O transcendentia M

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questio iia UTRUM ALIQUA INTENTIO TRANSCENDENS SIT COMMUNIS UNIVOCE AD OMNIA PREDICAMENTA 332 Secundo queritur utrum aliqua intentio transcendens sit communis uni-

voce ad intentiones diversorum predicamentorum, puta intentio entis vel rei. Et videtur quod non, dicente34 Porfirio: “Si quis omnia ‘entia’ vocet, non univoce nominabit”. Item. Aristotiles in Predicamentis35: “Singulum incomplexorum aut significat substantiam aut quantitatem etc.”; sed ‘ens’ est terminus incomplexus; quare significat de primo significato aliquod istorum, aut aliqua aut omnia, et nichil commune istis. Item. Primo36 Phisicorum circa medium: “Principium maxime proprium est quod multipliciter dicitur quod est”, idest ens. Item. Tertio37 Phisicorum, enumeratis predicamentis dicit: “Hiis aut nullum est commune preter ipsa”; quare etc. Item. Quarto38 Metaphisice dicit, addens exemplum quod sicut salubre dicitur de animali et cibo, sic ens de substantia et aliis entibus; sed hic est equivocatio; ergo et ibi, vel saltim analogia. Item. Nono39 Metaphisice: “‘Ens’ nichil predicat nisi substantiam aut quantitatem aut qualitatem et alia predicamenta”. Quare videtur quod sit de intentione philosophorum quod ‘ens’ non significat aliquid commune istis, sed ipsammet entitatem, equivoce tamen seu analogice, ut videtur40 determinare expresse in quarto. 333 In oppositum. Omnia connumerata inter se de necessitate sunt connumerata sub aliquo univoco multiplicato eis. Sed accidentia et substantia sunt inter se connumerata, ut habetur41 primo Phisicorum quod substantia quanti et qualitatis, sive resoluta sive non, multa sunt que sunt hoc idem; dicit ibidem de quantitate et substantia quod si sunt substantia et quantitas eius multa sunt que sunt. Ergo habent aliquid

4 sit communis] McO om. M 34 Porphyrius, Isag. 6, 8–9, p. 12: ‘Si omnia quis “entia” vocet, aequivoce (inquit) nuncupabit, non univoce’. 35 Arist., Categ. 4, 1b25–27. 36 Arist., Phys. I 2, 185a20–21. 37 Ibid. III 1, 200b34–201a1. 38 Arist., Metaph. IV 1, 1003a33–35. 39 Conferas ibid. IX 1, 1045b27–32. 40 Arist., Metaph. IV 1, 1003a33–35. 41 Arist., Phys. I 2, 185a27 sqq.

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univocum. Maior huius rationis habetur ab Augustino, septimo De Trinitate, capitulo quarto, ubi diffuse declarat42 eam. Item. tertio43 Phisicorum: “Quot sunt species motus, tot | sunt species entis”. Ergo habet spe- M108rb cies, sicut motus; ergo est eis univocum, sicut motus speciebus motus. 5 Sed motus est eis univocum, quoniam omnes mutationes conveniant in motus diffinitione que ponitur ibidem44: “Motus est actus entis in potentia secundum huiusmodi”. Item. Quinto45: “Quot sunt species entis, tot unius et eedem”; quare si speciebus unius est aliquid commune univocum, aliquid erit univocum speciebus entis. Sed speciebus unius est ali10 quid commune univocum (hee enim species sunt equalitas, ydemptitas, similitudo, ut habetur ibidem), istis autem communis est relatio primi modi relativorum. Quare speciebus entis erit aliquid commune univocum. Item. decimo46 Metaphisice: “Quod idem significat ‘ens’ et ‘unum’ palam per assequi aliqualiter cathegorias et quia non sunt in una, ut 15 nec in quid nec in quale”. Ex hiis tria colligo: primum quod ens et unum habent aliquod unum significatum it idem; secundum est quod non est in aliqua cathegoria; tertium est quod illud est consequens ad omnem cathegoriam. Ex quibus sequitur propositum. De multifaria divisione equivocationis Pro47 solutione huius questionis primo ostendam punctum et difficulta- 334 tem questionis; secundo respondebo ad questionem. Ad evidentiam difficultatis accipio quod Boetius super Antepredicamenta dicit48 quod equivocorum alia sunt equivoca casu, alia consilio et arte equivoca. Casu equivoca sunt quorum solum nomen est commune et ratio substan25 tie sic est diversa quod unum non est alteri ratio quod ab illo nomine sit vocatum, quemadmodum duo viri sibi ipsis extranei quorum quilibet vocatus est Alexander. Consilio vero et arte equivoca sunt quorum solum nomen est commune et ratio substantie sic diversa quod unum equivocatorum est alteri ratio et causa et occasio quod sit illo nomine

20

7 quot] quod M 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

14 una] via M

Augustinus, De Trinitate VII, cap. IV 7, pp. 255–257. Arist., Phys. III 1, 201a8–9. Ibid., 201a7–8. Ibid. V 2, 227b3. Arist., Metaph. X 2, 1054a13–15. Ad sectt. 334–372 conferas nostri auctoris In II Sent. dist. 3am. Boethius, In Arist. Categ. 166B.

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sic vocatum, sicut Cesar dicitur de illo principe et eius ymagine, ille tamen vocatus Cesar ratio est quod etiam ‘Cesar’ eius ymago vocetur. Aliquando tamen contingit quod duo sic equivoca sumunt rationem ab aliquo tertio, ut dicetur postea. Non est autem intellectus questionis querere utrum ens sit casu equivocum (quia numquam fuit dictum per M108va aliquem), sed querere utrum | sit arte vel consilio equivocatum. Sed quia ille modus equivocationis subdividitur multipliciter, ideo sciendum quod secundum aliquos philosophos omnes modi huius equivocationis reducuntur ad unam causam, quam vocant ‘fontanam-originem’. Ad quam aliqua equivoca se habent dupliciter: uno modo quo unum originatur ab altero, alio modo quo ambo originantur a tertio. Exemplum de primo: ‘sanum’ dicitur de animali et de urina; animal tamen est fontana-origo respectu urine, quia urina non dicitur sana nisi quia significat sanitatem animalis. Exemplum de secundo, hoc nomen ‘Tullius’ dicitur de libro edito ab illo retore et de ymagine illius retoris. 335 Secundum autem hos duos modos posset intelligi questio, ita quod esset questio utrum ‘ens’ dicatur de substantia ut de fontana-origine et de accidente ut de originato, et iterum utrum dicatur de novem predicamentis accidentium ut de originatis ab eodem, puta a substantia, que est primum ens. Sed quia ista fontana-origo est duplex, ideo adhuc de ipsa distinguo quoniam: Alia est ubi in fontana- origine est formaliter tota forma a qua fit denominatio, et nichil est in originato; exemplum de sanitate, que tota formaliter est in animali, et nichil de forma sanitatis est formaliter in urina. Alia vero est fontana-origo ubi aliquid de forma a qua fit denominatio, est in utroque, scilicet in origine et in originato; exemplum de veritate complexa, que dicitur de principio tamquam de fontana-origine et de conclusione tamquam de originato, et tamen utrumque habet eam formam. Hoc eodem modo invenitur in multis aliis, ut luciditas dicitur concretive de sole ut de origine, de aere ut de originato, et tamen luciditas est forma in utroque. Et ille secundus modus analogie potest stare cum univocatione. Propter quod supposito quod substantia sit fontana-origo omnium accidentium—ut habetur49 ex primo Phisicorum et ut omnes concedunt, nullo contradicente, nec de hoc querit quomodo—hoc, inquam, supposito, est intellectus questionis, utrum in hoc modo fontane-originis quo forma non invenitur in

15 illo] bono add. O 49

30 et tamen] O om. M | luciditas] et claritas add. O

Arist., Phys. I 2, 185a20 sqq.

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utroque, sed in altero | tantum dicatur ‘ens’ de substantia et accidente M108vb an alio modo, ita quod formalis ratio quam significat ‘ens’, inveniatur eodem modo in substantia et accidente, puta formaliter in utroque, licet a substantia originetur ad accidens. Hoc enim est querere utrum 5 ens vel alia intentio sit communis ad predicamenta ita quod nomen et ratio sit eadem. Et in hoc est punctum difficultatis huius questionis.

articulus i RESPONDETUR AD QUESTIONEM Respondendo50 autem ad questionem sic procedam: primo ponam 336 10 illam sententiam quam melius intelligo; secundo inducam motiva aliarum sententiarum contra istam, et absolvam ut potero; tertio dicam ad principalia in quibus multi fundant suas sententias. Sententia igitur quam adhuc melius intelligo est quod aliqua intentio transcendens est communis secundum unam rationem ad accidens, ad Deum et crea15 turam. Et idcirco primo probo istam conclusionem, secundo dicendo quod hoc nomen ‘ens’ ut eo utuntur philosophi, significat illam unam rationem. Quod intentio transcendens est communis secundum unam rationem ad omnes alias 20

Primo arguitur

Arguo igitur ad primum. Primo sic. Quecumque cadunt essentialiter 337 sub uno et eodem extremo reali et positivo unius et eiusdem contradictionis, habent aliquam rationem communem sibi essentialem et unam per quam cadunt sub illo extremo. Sed Deus et creatura, substantia et 25 accidens cadunt sub eodem tali extremo. Ergo habent aliquam rationem communem. Pro confirmatione rationis inducam responsiones aliquas que possent dari. Primo ergo diceret aliquis quod maior est falsa necessario. Quod ostenderet in multis exemplis. Primo quia ens et non ens cadunt sub eodem extremo unius contradictionis, quia acciperet 30 hec predicata ‘cecitatem’ et ‘non-cecitatem’; certum est autem quod 12 fundant] intentiones add. M 50

Sectt. 336–339 desiderantur in O.

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338 M109ra

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cecitas dicit privationem non-cecitatis; ergo dicit positionem, et tamen dicitur de ente et non ente: ‘Sortes non est cecus’ et ‘ycorcervuus non est cecus’, et tamen Sorti et yrcocervuo nichil est commune univocum. Item. Esse intelligibile et non esse intelligibile sunt contradictoria; esse autem intelligibile dicitur de ente et non ente. Item. Esse possibile et non esse possibile sunt contradictoria, et tamen esse possibile dicitur de ente et non ente. Secundo forte dicetur quod minor est falsa, cum Deus et creatura cadant sub extremis eiusdem contradictionis, puta esse ab alio et non esse ab alio; eodem modo accidens et substantia: esse in alio, non esse in alio. Quare videtur ratio esse nulla. Sed hiis non | obstantibus, ratio remanebit illesa. Et primo quia maior per naturam contradictionis habet certissimam veritatem; natura enim contradictionis est quod ididem unum et idem quod est alterum extremum contradictionis, dicatur de omnibus illis que cadunt sub eo et non sub altero secundum rationem illam et sub illa unitate quam exigit hoc quod est esse extremum contradictionis. Hec igitur est evidentissima, vel nulla contradictio est contradictio, quia non est contradictio nisi unius predicati et unius subiecti. Propter tamen illas instantias adductas sciendum quod aliquid potest cadere sub extremo contradictionis dupliciter: uno modo essentialiter et quidditative, alio modo accidentaliter et denominative. Exemplum de primo, ‘Omne quod est, vel est homo vel non est homo’; Sortes autem cadit sub isto extremo quod est homo essentialiter et quidditative, illa vero que cadunt sub altero extremo, scilicet sub non esse hominem, cadunt sub eo denominative tantum, quia denominantur ab illa negatione hominis. Hoc modo est si dicatur ‘Omne quod est, vel est album vel non est album’. Et sub extremis huius contradictionis potest aliquid cadere denominative hincinde. Iste autem denominationes possunt fieri ab esse vel a non esse, ab esse reali vel intentionali, ab esse positivo vel privativo. In omnibus tamen denominationibus istis necesse est quod ratio denominans—sive sit realis vel non realis, positiva vel privativa, intentionalis vel non intentionalis—sit una in omnibus que cadunt per eam sub illo extremo contradictionis. Aliter enim impossibile est quod teneret alterum extremum in contradictione. Et per hoc dico ad instantias quod enti et non enti potest esse aliqua communis ratio dicta de illis denominative, puta hec ratio deno-

12 quia] queritur M

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minativa ‘non esse cecum’ denominat ens et non ens. Et hec ratio est intelligibilitas seu opinabilitas, de qua dicit51 Philosophus in principio quarti Topicorum quod opinabile communius est quam ens, quia ratio eius extenditur ad ens et non ens. Et hec possibilitas secundum eandem rationem denominat ens et non ens; et sic de infinitis aliis. Hee igitur instantie duo supponunt falsa. Supponunt enim quod enti et non enti nichil sit commune essentiale et quidditativum. Et hoc est falsum, ut | visum est in tertia parte huius operis, in qua de subiecto logice M109rb dicebatur. Supponunt etiam quod enti et non enti nichil sit commune denominativum. Et hoc etiam est falsum et implicatio contradictionis, cum dicunt quod tam ens quam non ens est intelligibile et possibile, et quod illa ratio intelligibilitatis seu opinabilitatis que facit alterum extremum contradictionis sub quo cadunt, non denominet utrumque. Questio tamen non querit utrum accidenti et substantie sit aliquid denominativum secundum unam rationem commune. Et quia hoc negari non potest, cum constet cuilibet quod generalitas et predicabilitas denominet secundum eandem rationem utrumque, et intelligibilitas. Sed querit utrum accidenti et substantie sit aliquid essentiale commune, ita quod intellectus possit aliquid intelligere quod sit de esse utriusque; et ad hoc vadit ratio. Est igitur vera irrefragabiliter ista maior, scilicet quod quecumque essentialiter sub uno cadunt et eodem extremo reali et positivo unius et eiusdem contradictionis, habent aliquam rationem communem et unam et sibi essentialem per quam cadunt sub illo extremo contradictionis. Minor etiam est evidentissima. Accipio enim ista predicata contra- 341 dictoria scilicet ‘esse nichil per essentiam’ et ‘non esse nichil per essentiam’. Si ergo queratur de Deo quod horum extremorum sibi conveniret, certum est quod est istud: ‘non esse nichil per essentiam’, quod equipollet huic ‘esse aliquid per essentiam’. Sub eodem autem extremo cadit creatura et accidens et substantia, ut evidens est de se. Quare etc. Instantia autem adducta contra hoc nichil valet, quia possibile est aliqua duo eadem cadere sub diversis extremis contradictionis unius, et sub uno et eodem. Exemplum, homo et asinus cadunt sub diversis extremis huius contradictionis ‘esse rationale’ et ‘non esse rationale’, et 3 est] O om. M 4 hec] ratio add. M 5 de infinitis aliis] quod enti et non enti est aliquid commune et essentiale et quidditativum add. M 9 dicebatur] O om. M 15 commune] O communem M 51

Arist., Top. IV 1, 121b2–4.

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cadunt sub eodem extremo huius: ‘esse et non esse animatum’, et sic de infinitis similibus. Sic ergo dico quod Deus et creatura, accidens et substantia possunt cadere sub diversis extremis unius contradictionis, et sub eodem extremo alterius. Sic ergo patet quod ratio illesa remansit omnino. 5 Secundo arguitur 342 Secundo52 arguo sic. Quibuscumque inest per se aliqua proprietas ex

natura sua, illis est aliqua essentialis ratio communis per quam pro-

M109va prietas inest eis tamquam proximis fundamentis. Sed Deo et | crea-

ture, substantie et accidenti inest aliqua per se proprietas una ex natura sua. Ergo illis est aliqua ratio communis essentialis per quam inest eis talis proprietas communis. Maior est manifesta, quoniam necesse est proxima fundamenta proprietatis unius rationis esse unius rationis communis vel specialis. Hoc patet inductione et sillogismo. Inductione sic: Figurari qualitercumque quia est unius rationis, habet fundamentum unius rationis; colorari quia est unius rationis, habet fundamentum unius rationis, scilicet superficiem, sicut figurari habet continuum tamquam proximum fundamentum; et sic de singulis; igitur etc. Syllogismo sic. Omnis proprietas habens causam determinatam, et non contingentem et fortuitam nec ut indeterminatam nec ut casualem, habet fundamentum proximum unius rationis; dato enim quod non, iam non habebit causam determinatam; et qua ratione habebit duas rationes fundamentales, eadem ratione habebit infinitas, sicut res casuales. Sed omnis per se proprietas habet causam determinatam; aliter non esset per se nec naturalis. Ergo necesse est talem proprietatem unius rationis habere proxima fundamenta unius rationis. 343 Minor etiam patet multipliciter. Primo ex primo Ethicorum ubi habetur53 quod omnia bonum appetunt; ab hac regula non potest excipi Deus vel creatura, dum et Deus summe appetat se Ipsum, et creatura etiam ipsum Deum; accidens etiam, unde de accidentibus dicitur in principio omnis ars et omnis doctrina similiter et actus et electio bonorum aliquod appetere videtur. Ubi dicit54 Eustratius commentator quod 22 habebit] habebat M 52 53 54

Sectt. 342–347 desiderantur in O. Arist., Eth. Nicom. I 1, 1094a3. In I Arist. Eth. Nicom., pp. 12–14, ed. Mercken.

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istud appetere est quedam naturalis tendentia in finem. Habent ergo omnia hanc proprietatem communem sibi quod est bonum appetere, quod est unius rationis in communi in hiis omnibus. Item. Constat de Deo et creatura quod ambo possunt movere unum lapidem. Hoc autem 5 posse movere est unius rationis in communi, qualitercumque conveniat eis in speciali. Accidens etiam et substantia creata habent hoc commune quod est esse finitam perfectionem; hec autem finitas et limitatio sunt unius rationis in communi in substantiis et accidentibus, ut patet de se. Et sic in infinitis proprietatibus in quibus conveniunt Deus 10 et creatura, accidens et substantia. Ergo habent aliquid commune sibi essentiale. Tertio arguitur 344

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Tertio arguo sic. Omnia | illa habent aliquid sibi essentiale commune M109vb inter que est essentialis ordo nature et naturalis dependentie. Sed inter Deum et creaturam, accidens et substantiam est talis ordo. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia impossibile est ordinem talem intelligi sine aliquo ordine concomitantium sub una ratione sub qua intelligatur ordo; et hic quemlibet remitto ad propriam experientiam. Et do exemplum. Si dico ‘primus homo et secundus asinus’, iam labitur intellectus ab ordine. Cum enim dixi ‘secundus asinus’, non potui referre ad hominem, quia non sub eadem ratione aliqua communi vel speciali istum ordinem intellexi; possem tamen dicere et intelligere hominem ut primum animal, asinum ut secundum. Apparet igitur quod nullus intellectus potest intelligere aliqua ordinata nisi intelligat ea sub unica ratione, et intelligendo ordinem essentialem eorum necessario intelligit sub ratione essentiali seu per se. Minor vero manifesta est. Ordo enim naturalis essentialis dependen- 345 tie est creature ad Deum, ut habetur55 octavo Phisicorum et duodecimo Metaphisice, quod ad Ipsum dependet totaliter; natura accidentis etiam ad substantiam est huiusmodi, ut habetur56 quarto (in principio) et septimo (in principio), et in aliis multis passibus Metaphisice, et primo Phisicorum, quod materia et forma sunt causa accidentium, et secundo quod 16 sine] nisi M Arist., Phys. VIII 6, 258b10–16; Metaph. XII 6, 1071b3–11. Arist., Metaph. IV 2, 1003b16–18; 1004a25–31; VII 1, 1028a13–20; Phys. I 9, 192a13– 14; conferas ibid. II 1, 192b32–193a2. 55 56

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est aliud natura, aliud habens naturam, aliud a natura. A natura vero sunt accidentia. Quare patet hec minor. 346 Apparet confirmatio huius ex probatione maioris. Videmus enim quod numquam Deus intelligitur prior et creatura posterior nisi sub unica ratione. Non enim dicimus ‘primus Deus et secundus homo’, 5 sed dicimus ‘primum ens, secundum ens’. Hoc modo etiam non dicimus, ordinando accidens et substantiam, ‘prima substantia et secunda quantitas vel qualitas’—hic nullus intelligeretur ordo inter substantiam et qualitatem vel quantitatem—, sed dicimus ‘substantia est primum ens; deinde qualitas vel quantitas secundum’, et sic deinceps, ut 10 habetur57 primo Ethicorum et quarto Metaphisice. Quare est aliqua ratio communis rebus sic ordinatis. Quarto arguitur 347 Quarto arguo sic. Quecumque distincta non per omnem rationem

inclusam in eis habent rationem aliquam sibi communem in qua sunt indistincta; hec est evidens, quia habent illam que non est distinctiva unius ab altero; oportet enim in illa hec talia esse indistincta. Sed Deus ra M110 | et creatura, accidens et substantia sunt aliqua inter se disparata non per omnem rationem inclusam in eis. Ergo habent aliquam rationem communem eis que includitur in eis. Minorem probo primo in generali de omnibus. Suppono igitur quod hec omnia inter se essentialiter sint distincta, et ostendo quod non per omnem rationem inclusam in eis. Et hoc sic. Nulla ratio est distinctiva huius A ab aliquo alio quod non cadit sub contradictorio huius rationis. Exemplum, albedo non est ratio distinctiva ab aliquo nisi a non-albo (et hoc est per se notum). Sed aliqua ratio includitur in Deo sub cuius contradictorio non cadit creatura aliqua in substantia sub cuius contradictorio non cadit accidens. Declaro istud sic. Accipio primo ‘nichil’ et postea ‘contradictorium nichili’, et suppono illud esse ‘aliquid’, ‘res’ vel ‘ens’, quocumque modo vocetur. Et accipio quod istud evidenter includitur in Deo, et tamen creatura non cadit sub nichilo; et istud etiam includitur in substantia, et tamen accidens non cadit sub nichilo. Ergo manifestum est

1 aliud] aliquid M

4 nisi] in M

57 Arist., Eth. Nicom. I 4, 1096b18 sqq.; conferas Thomam Aquinatem, In X libros Ethicorum expositio, num. 80; Arist., Metaph. IV 12, 1003b5–10.

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quod aliqua ratio includitur in Deo sub cuius contradictorio non cadit creatura, et aliqua in subtantia sub cuius contradictorio non cadit accidens. Quare habetur propositum, ut prius. De quadam ratione sumpta ex fundamentis aliorum doctorum 5

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Ad hanc conclusionem inducte sunt alias multe alie rationes, sed induco duas solum ex fundamentis aliorum doctorum. Et formo primam taliter quod multe frivole instantie que dari solent ex sola forma appareant nulle. Et arguo sic. Omnis ratio que sumpta pro predicato cum ratione A sumpta pro subiecto causat evidentem complexionem, est una et alia ab omni ratione que cum predicta ratione A non potest causare evidentem complexionem. Hec patet, nisi dicatur quod contradictoria predicata vera sunt de eodem, scilicet hec ‘precise causare evidentiam complexionis’ et ‘non precise hoc facere’. Sed rationi realitatis seu entitatis sumpta pro predicato cum ratione A sumpta pro subiecto causat evidentem complexionem, quod non potest facere ratio substantie vel ratio accidentis vel ratio Dei, si sumantur rationes eorum proprie. Ergo ratio entitatis seu realitatis est aliqua una ratio alia ab istis. Non est autem ratio alia ab hiis tamquam disparata ab eis nec tamquam inferior eis. Est ergo alia tamquam eis superior et communis. Pro58 declaratione minoris accipio rationem | lucis pro ratione A, et facio hanc complexionem: ‘Lux est ens’; et est evidens, quia ratio entis vel rei evidenter includitur in ratione lucis. Hee autem complexiones non sunt evidentes: ‘Lux est substantia’, ‘Lux est accidens’, ut habetur59 ex secundo De anima ubi disputatur istud; quod non fieret, si essent complexiones evidentes. Item. Accipio solem vel ignem vel motorem firmamenti, et formo has complexiones: ‘Sol est ens’, ‘Ignis est ens’, ‘Motor ille est ens’; et ille sunt evidentissime, quia ens evidentissime includitur in illis. Hee vero non sunt evidentes: ‘Sol est deus’, ‘Sol est creatura’, ‘Motor firmamenti est deus’. Apparet igitur ista minor, et per consequens tota ratio concludens. Per hoc patet nullas esse rationes que dari solent. Dicitur enim ab aliquibus quod ratio entis non est una que possit evidentiam dare predictis complexionibus, sed est evidentia de duabus rationibus disiuncte 9 a sumpta] M assumpta sic saepius O 58 59

Sect. 349–354 desiderantur in O. Arist., De anima II 7, 418b3 sqq.

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sumptis, ita quod cum dicitur ‘Lux est ens’, hec est evidens; sensus est quod lux est substantia vel aliquod accidens, non tamen aliqua tertia ratio entis sic inclusa evidenter in luce. Et secundum istos patet sic quid dat evidentiam hanc. Sed hoc est dictum contra experientiam et contra scientiam. Contra experientiam, quia quandocumque enuntiamus de aliquo subiecto predicatum disiunctum, experimur quod intellectus transfertur ab uno disiuncto in alterum. Et est experientia et necessitas, ut dum dicimus ‘Astra sunt paria vel imparia’, intellectus quidem transfertur a conceptu paritatis ad conceptum imparitatis, sed hic, cum dicimus ‘Lux est ens’, nullam talem translationem intellectus experimur. Ergo hoc est dictum contra experientiam. 351 Item. Est dictum contra scientiam. Quod ostendo dupliciter. Primo quidem quia: Ubi nulla est dictio exercens disiunctionem, ibi est nullum predicatum disiunctum. Sed quando dico ‘Lux est ens’, hic nulla est dictio exercens disiunctionem. Quod patet maxime secundum hanc opinionem. Accipio igitur hanc vocem ‘ens’ ut est sola vox sine ratione significandi, cuiuscumque acceptionis; et accipio iterum eandem vocem cum hac ratione significandi secundum quam significat substantiam; et accipio iterum eandem vocem cum hac ratione signiva M110 ficandi secundum quam significat accidens |. Hiis vero sic acceptis, arguo sic. Si hic cum dicitur ‘Lux est ens’, a parte predicati esset aliqua dictio exercens disiunctionem, vel hec esset ipsa sola vox ut non est dictio (et hoc est impossibile quod aliquid ut non significativum vel ut non consignificativum et ut sine ratione significandi exerceat disiunctionem), vel aliquid quod est proprium dictioni; vel hec esset vox cum altera ratione significandi—et hoc etiam est impossibile, quia nulla dictio exercet disiunctionem inter se et alteram sed semper fit per aliquam tertiam). Ergo impossibile est omnino quod ibi sit predicatum disiunctum, cum ibi nichil sit disiunctionem exercens. 352 Secundo ostendo hoc esse contra scientiam sic. Nullum predicatum disiunctum est evidens de aliquo subiecto nisi disiunctio predicati sit disiunctio contradictoriorum vel nisi determinata subiecti constantia supponatur. Hec est evidentissima per differentias contradictionis ad alias oppositiones: altera enim pars est necessario vera de quolibet conceptibili acceptibili pro subiecto, et ideo predicatum disiunctum disiunctione contradictoriorum est evidens de quolibet conceptibili acceptibili pro subiecto. Sed nullius alterius oppositionis vel disiunctio27 fit] sit Mc om. M contrariorum M

29 disiunctionem] dictionem M

32 contradictoriorum]

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nis altera pars verificari potest de quolibet conceptibili acceptibili pro subiecto; patet enim quod omnes ille sunt false: ‘Yrcocervus est albus vel niger, sanus vel eger, videns vel cecus, homo vel asinus, substantia vel accidens’. Ergo manifestum est quod nullum predicatum disiunctum est verum evidenter de aliquo subiecto nisi disiunctio predicati sit disiunctio contradictoriorum vel nisi determinata subiecti constantia supponatur. Sed hic non est disiunctio contradictoriorum; substantia enim et accidens non sunt contradictoria, quia tunc alterum eorum verificaretur necessario de chimera, quod est falsum. Restat ergo quod supponatur determinata subiecti constantia. Quid igitur erit illud quod supponetur ratione cuius habet evidentiam hec propositio: ‘Lux est substantia vel accidens’? Certum quod non substantia (tunc enim esset istud evidens: ‘Lux est substantia’ plus quam illa disiuncta); nec accidens, pari ratione. Restat igitur quod concedatur veritas luce clarior, scilicet quod ens est sufficienter divisum in substantiam et accidens. | M110vb Patet igitur quod hec cavillatio in nullo rationem infringit quin ens aliquam unam rationem habeat. Solet propterea dici ab aliis quod cum dico ‘Lux est ens’, quod sub 353 nomine entis quod predicatur ibi, intelliguntur duo conceptus confusi et indistincti, et due rationes vel plures que simul iuncte dant predicte complexioni evidentiam certam; et ita secundum istos non oportet quod sit tertia ratio communis substantie et accidenti, sed sunt simul ille due concepte confuse. Sed hoc non potest substi-ri, quia vel intelligit quod ille due rationes iuncte affirmentur de luce, vel altera disiunctive. Si ambe simul, tunc ista non est evidenter vera: ‘Lux est ens’, ymo nimirum evidenter falsa; si vero altera sub disiunctione, ostensum est quod hoc est omnino impossibile et irrationabile. Solet propterea dici ab aliis quod cum dicitur ‘Lux est ens’, hec 354 est evidentissima de solo nomine, non de ratione; et per consequens non est necesse quod ens dicat aliquam rationem. Exemplum datum: si quis michi dicat quod canis est in foro, habeo certitudinem quod aliquid quod vocatur canis, est in foro, non tamen de marino nec de sidere nec de latrabili. Sed et hoc parum valet et quia hec cavillatio fundatur super exemplum, vado ad exemplum. Et dico quod in nullo est ad propositum, quia ponitur in ratione supra posita quod ratio entis causat evidentem complexionem, et de hoc arguo; hic autem nulla est evidens complexio. Quod apparet secundum istos, quia impossibile michi vel tibi aliquam aliam complexionem evidentem esse nisi scientia de termino predicati et de termino subiecti pro quo supponit et in qua significatione sumitur, si sit equivocum. Et ipsimet dicunt quod

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non habet hec complexio: ‘Canis est in foro’ evidentiam ex terminis aliquam, sed ex dicto alterius cuiusdam. Hec autem complexio ‘Lux est ens’ est evidens non quia tu dixisti michi, sed ex terminis habetur hec evidentia, et non ex terminis ut sunt voces solum, sed ex terminis stantibus pro suis significatis. Remanet ergo illesa ratio. 5 De secunda ratione ex illis sumpta 355 Secunda ratio. Omne illud a quo potest abstrahi aliqua ratio inclusa

quidditative in A, habet aliquam rationem communem cum A inclusam essentialiter in utroque. Sed a creatura potest abstrahi aliqua ratio inclusa essentialiter et quidditative in Deo, et aliqua ab accidente inM111ra clusa essentialiter in substantia. Ergo creatura habet aliquam | rationem communem et essentialem cum Deo, et accidens cum substantia. Maior est per se nota cui vult animadvertere. Minorem ostendo quantum ad utramque partem. Primo quod a creatura respectu Dei. Accipio enim quod intelligat aliquis Deum ut ens vel ut rem. Constat autem quod entitas seu realitas includitur in Deo essentialiter et quidditative. Sed illa ratio entitatis seu realitatis est abstracta a creatura. Ergo etc. Probatio assumpti quia: Omnis ratio abstracta non a Deo est abstracta a creatura. Illa autem ratio est abstracta non a Deo, cum Deus nullum fantasma habeat presens intellectui abstrahenti. Restat igitur quod a creatura, ut assumptum fuerat. Pari ratione posset ostendi in aliquibus de substantia et accidente. 356 Sed ad hoc dicit quidam sic quod esse predicatum de Deo ratione naturali est esse Dei, nec tamen sequitur quod essentia eius cognoscatur in speciali sed in generali, non quod hoc conveniat alii; universalis enim providentia nulli alii convenit quam Deo vel formaliter esse immobilem vel eternum. Sed essentia illa cui hec conveniunt, non est nobis in singulari vel in se manifesta vel nota. Hoc dicit ille pro solutione. Sed hec solutio nichil dicit ad argumentum et implicat preter hoc duas contradictiones. Quarum prima est in hoc quod dicit illam essentiam vel illud esse quod naturali ratione predicatur de Deo, esse proprium Deo et essentie Dei; et ex alia parte dicit quod, cognito tali esse, non cognoscitur Dei essentia in speciali, sed solum in generali. Ex hac enim

7 illud] O om. M 13 cui … animadvertere] qui vult animadvertere M diligenter intuenti O 14 primo] O om. M 23 sed … quidam] M ad istam responsionem dicitur ab aliquibus O 26 formaliter] O totaliter M 32 essentie] O esse M

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parte sequitur contradictorium prime, et ex prime contradictorio contradictorium huius secunde. Quod ostendo sic. Omnis essentia cognita in aliquo sibi eodem formaliter, convertibiliter et adequate et sibi proprio cognoscitur in speciali et in singulari, si singularis est. Sed essentia divina ratione naturali cognita in esse suo sibi soli proprio cognoscitur in aliquo quod est idem sibi formaliter, convertibiliter et adequate et proprium divine essentie; patet, quia esse et essentia in Deo, et precipue secundum istum doctorem, sunt idem formaliter, adequate et convertibiliter. Ergo cognoscitur in speciali. Quod est contradictorium partis secunde. Et ex parte secunda eodem modo potest inferri contradictorium prime. Secunda contradictio stat in hoc quia dicit quod essentia divina non est nota in se, et ex alia parte dicit quod est nota in suo esse proprio. Hec autem contradicunt, cum cognosci in suo proprio esse, non in generali, sit cognosci in se. 357 Si vero ad fugiendam istam contradictionem dicat quod intelligit M111rb quod ‘non est nota in se’ idest ‘non in suo proprio representativo’, incidit in aliam contradictionem, scilicet quod illa ratio essentialis Deo sit abstracta a creatura, et quod non sit abstracta. Hanc enim secundam habet ponere, negando rationem quam vult solvere. Nec potest dici quod aliquod fantasma creature representet proprium esse Dei; hoc enim est omnino impossibile evidenter, si quis vult advertere ad naturam representantis. Ad argumentum autem nichil dicit nisi quod vult evadere per hoc quod dicit de probatione quasi velit dicere quod illud esse non est cognitum per abstractionem, sed per probationem; et ita vult fugere. Sed nec per hoc potest. Quod ostendo sic. Omne predicatum conclusum et illatum de aliquo subiecto in conclusione sillogismi necessario est precognitum et preacceptum tamquam extremitas in aliqua premissarum. Sed esse secundum istum ratione naturali predicatur de Deo. Ergo ante conclusionem, ubi iacet probatio, fuit preacceptum tamquam extremitas in altera premissarum, et in illa preacceptione non potest dici quod fuerit habitum per probationem; ergo per abstractionem. Patet igitur quod ratio remanet omnino illesa, et quanto plus discutitur, tanto fortior invenitur. Hec sufficiant de convenienti probatione huius conclusionis principalis que fuit proposita.

1 prime] O primo M | contradictorio] O om. M 5 sibi] O om. M 15 dicat] M dicant O et sic saepius 27 tamquam extremitas] O om. M 31 per] O om. M 32–33 remanet … invenitur] M non solvitur O

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pars tertia Quod ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie

De prima ratione principali 358 Nunc autem induco duas rationes principales probantes quod hic ter-

minus ‘ens’ significet aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie. Quarum prima talis est. Omnis terminus distributus pro aliquibus pluribus vel in aliqua plura significat eis aliquam formam seu rationem communem. Sed hic terminus ‘ens’ distribuitur in Deum et creaturam, in accidens et substantiam. Ergo significat aliquam formam seu rationem communem eis in quam distribuitur. Si aliquis negat maiorem, dicens quod aliquid potest distribui pro ente et non ente, quibus tamen aliquid commune significare non potest, ut patet hic: ‘De quolibet affirmatio vel negatio, et de nullo simul’; aliquid enim hic intelligitur distribui, et tamen nichil commune hiis pro quibus distributio intelligitur—Sed hoc quippe nichil est. Impossibile enim est terminum pro aliquo distribui nisi pertinente ad formam vel rationem que distribuitur. Ipum enim significatum termini distribuitur in participantia ipsum. Ergo illa maior est vera. Aliter enim non posset fieri M111va suppositio sub termino distributo nisi illud | quod sumeretur sub eo, participaret ipsum. Sed distributio non fit pro aliquo quod non potest sumi sub termino distributo. Igitur pro quocumque fit distributio, participat ipsum significatum termini. Et sic iterum est vera maior. Nec valet instantia de ente et non ente, quoniam aliquis terminus potest significare aliquam rationem non realem communem eis denominative— sicut hic: ‘esse conceptibile per se vel per accidens’: ecce quod aliqualis conceptibilitas est communis utrique—et aliquam rationem realem quidditativam indeterminate apprehensionis secundum quod dictum fuit supra, libro tertio.60 359 Minorem vero ostendo multipliciter. Primo ex decimo Metaphisice, ubi habetur61 quod omne ens omni enti comparatum est idem vel diversum; hoc autem habet veritatem tam in Deo quam in creatura, tam in accidenti quam in substantia, quia ens pro omnibus hiis et 19 eo] O om. M determinate M 60 61

26–28 et aliquam … tertio] M om. O

Giraldi Odonis, Logica III, Annexum, cap. 72, p. 486. Arist., Metaph. X 3, 1054b18–21.

27 indeterminate] O ita

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in omnia hec distribuitur unica distributione; ergo significat aliquam formam seu rationem communem omnibus. Sed non significat aliquam rationem seu formam factam per intellectum meum vel tuum, ymo ipsam realitatem communem que necessario includitur in omni eo quod potest dici proprie idem alteri vel diversum ab altero. Quare hic terminus ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem realem inclusam in Deo et creatura, in accidente et substantia. Quare etc. Si vero adhuc aliquis neget maiorem, dicens quod terminus equivo- 360 cus potest distribui in sua significata et in supposita suorum significatorum, et per consequens quod maior non est vera—contra hoc accipio duas propositiones. Prima est quod distributivum signum non exerceret distributionem nisi circa vocem significativam et ut significativam; et huius ratio est quia distributio non est nisi denotatio quod predicatum affirmatur vel negetur de aliquibus participantibus significatum termini. Quare necesse est solum distribui vocem ut significativam sive ut dictionem. Secunda propositio est quod signum simul et semel sumptum non exercet distributionem circa diversas rationes. Cuius ratio est quia, semel cane sumpto, sumptio est unica et unica distributio solum; et est alia ratio ex parte termini distribuibilis quia termino semel sumpto non utimur equivoce secundum logicos; uteremur autem equivoce si | M111vb simul distribueretur pro diversis significatis. Ex hiis duabus propositionibus apparet vera maior, et quod cavillatio 361 contra eam nichil valet. Prima enim ostendit quod sola vox non determinata ad aliquod suorum significatorum non potest distribui in sua significata, quia tunc vox accepta ut non significativa vel ut non determinata ad significare distribueretur; quod est impossibile, ut dicit prima propositio. Secunda ostendit quod signum non potuit distribuere terminum equivocum in supposita diversorum significatorum, quamcumque terminus sit equivocus; tunc enim non fieret distinctio propositionum, nisi subiceret terminus equivocus in disputationibus, sed ferretur instantia ex aliquo supposito unius illorum significatorum et esset similiter falsa, sicut est quelibet alia propositio universalis nisi invenitur instantia in aliquo suppositi termini distributi.

18 sumptio] O asumptio(!) M

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De secunda ratione principali 362 Secunda ratio principalis est hec. Omnis terminus habens singulare et

plurale, supponens in plurali pro aliquibus necessario significat in singulari aliquam formam seu rationem communem eis. Sed hic terminus ‘ens’ habet plurale et singulare et in plurali supponit pro Deo et creatura, pro substantia et accidente simul; hoc apparet62 duodecimo Metaphisice, ubi dicitur: “Entia nolunt male ordinari”, et primo Phisicorum: “Substantia et quantitas, sive resoluta sive non resoluta sunt, multa sunt que sunt”; et infra ibidem: “Substantia et quantitas sunt multa et non unum sunt que sunt”; hoc autem quod dicitur ‘que sunt’ idem est ac si diceretur ‘entia multa sunt’. Ex hiis ergo apparet quod ‘ens’ vel ‘esse’ in plurali supponit pro Deo et pro creatura et accidente. Ergo ‘ens’ significat in singulari aliquam unam formam communem omnibus istis. 363 Minor negaretur forte ab aliquibus ignorantibus propriam vocem; qui dicerent quod cum dicitur ‘canes sunt in foro’, hic terminus ‘canis’ potest simul supponere pro latrabili et marino, et ita maior in ea non haberet veritatem. Sed contra hoc dicitur confirmando maiorem primo quia, ut dictum est, termino semel sumpto non utimur equivoce, sed videtur esse multipliciter equivoce, si simul et semel uterer eo pro diversis significatis, quod est contra suppositiones Philosophi, quarto MetaM112ra phisice, quas ponit ad arguendum | contra negantes principia. Inter que dicit63 quod nichil significat quod non unum significat; quod intelligitur quantum ad actualem constitutionem intellectus que est actualis significatio; quod enim de uno non constituit intellectum, de nullo constituit intellectum; de uno, dico, significato plurificato vel non plurificato. Quare patet esse de intentione Philosophi quod termino semel sumpto non utimur equivoce. Et sic patet falsitas illius cavillationis. 364 Secundo64 patet idem quia: Numeratio pluralis sub quo sumitur ille terminus equivocus, vel est modus significandi solius vocis ut intelligitur ante significare, que communis est solis equivocatis, vel alterius dictionis tantum, scilicet ipsius vocis ut applicate et determinate ad alteram significationem, vel utriusque. Non potest dari primum, quia modus 4 eis] O om. M 6 duodecimo] O nono M 14 maior] O minor M 15 qui] O que M | hic terminus canis] O huius termini canes M 24 non] O om. M 27 sic] O om. M 62 63 64

Arist., Metaph. XII 10, 1076a3–4; Phys. I 2, 185a27–29; b3–4. Arist., Metaph. IV 4, 1006b7. Sectt. 364–368 desiderantur in O.

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significandi accidentalis (cuiusmodi est pluralis numerus) supponit formam dictionis que est ratio significandi. Ergo ante illa non potest inesse voci aliquis modus significandi accidentalis. Et patet etiam idem quia: Modus significandi est consignificatum. Sed consignificatum (ut patet de se) supponit significatum. Quare non poterit dari primum. Nec est ultimum, quia unicus modus significandi non potest esse diversorum significantium, sicut una et eadem sequela numero non potest esse diversarum formarum numero. Quare dabitur medium, scilicet quod ille modus significandi sit vocis ut determinate ad alteram significationem. Et per consequens non intelligetur pluralitas significatorum sub diversis significatis, sed sub uno tantum. Omnibus autem illis suppositis sub eodem significato contentis communis est illa ratio que includitur in significato. Quare ratio nostra prius facta concludit illesa. Sed contra hoc dicunt aliqui. Quorum recito dicta. Et primo dicit 365 unus doctor quod nichil est commune substantie et accidenti nisi analogice, sicut sanum animali et urine. Et ad hoc inducunt multas auctoritates, quarum alique posite sunt in proponendo questionem, et ille precipue que magis faciunt ad propositum. Inducit etiam aliquas alias rationes. Et in una inducit tria inconvenientia. Dicit ergo sic: “Si ens esset commune decem predicamentis, predicamenta non essent primo diversa, quia in aliquo communi convenirent et in aliquibus differrent”. Secundum inconveniens quod ex hoc sequeretur quod ens esset genus ad predicamenta. Tertium quod eius differentia esset nichil, ut habetur65 tertio Metaphisice. Hec autem sunt inconvenientia. | Secundo sic. M112rb Quod importat conceptum unum, potest habere causam unam. Sed ens non potest habere causam unam. Ergo nec conceptum unum. Maior patet. Minor probatur duodecimo66 Metaphisice per multiplicitatem ‘entis’. Item quia possunt habere decem cathegorie eadem principia, quod negat Philosophus ibidem, addens67 quod extra substantiam et alia predicamenta nichil est commune; et hoc videtur optime ad propositum huius viri. Sed hec conclusio nulla est (ut supra monstratum est) et motiva nulla. 366 Ad primum ergo dico quod primum quod ponit pro inconvenienti non est inconveniens, ymo conveniens necessarium. Quod ostendo sic. Phi5 primum] nec secundum add. M 65 66 67

Arist., Metaph. III 3, 998b26–27. Ibid. XII, chs. 1 sqq. Ibid. XII 4, 1070b1–2.

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losophus dicit68 in Predicamentis quod secunde substantie significant quale quid, non hoc aliquid. Sed substantia predicamentum est secunda substantia. Ergo dicit quale quid; hoc eodem modo omnia alia predicamenta dicunt aliquid tale seu quid quale sicut substantia quale quid. Sed que dicunt qualia que non distinguuntur per sua que, sed per qualia. Et ita non distinguuntur se totis, nec per consequens sunt primo diversa. Quod autem adducit secundo quod ens esset genus, nego consequentiam, quia negari potest per multas considerationes quarti Topicorum. Nec enim est hoc sufficiens ad construendum quod aliquid sit commune ad aliqua tamquam genus, si est commune eis etiam essentiale. Quare non valet. Ad tertium inconveniens dico quod est ut sic et est ut non. Et quomodo sic et quomodo non ostendetur infra, ubi habetur super hoc questio specialis. Et tunc ostendetur non valere. 367 Ad rationem secundam dico quod maior quam dicit esse patentem est falsa et impropria. Quod autem impropria sit patet, quia de vocibus significativis dicitur quod important conceptus, non autem de rebus dicitur. Hic autem de rebus loquimur, non de vocibus, cum querimus utrum Deo et creature possit esse aliquis communis conceptus et aliqua ratio que sit obiectum conceptus. Ipse vero dicit sic: “Quod importat unum conceptum potest habere causam unam”. Si hoc ‘quod’ sumatur proprie pro voce importante conceptum, concedi potest; tamen non est ad propositum; ‘id’ enim est aliqua singularis vox. Si vero sumatur proprie ad intellectum suum et intelligatur sic ‘illud quod importatur’ idest ‘illud de quo ut de obiecto potest formari conceptus unus’, potest habere causam unam, sic est falsissima. De Deo enim secundum te potest formari conceptus unus, qui nullam potest habere causam. Et si dicas quod intelligis de creaturis solum, M112va tunc dico quod est contra te, quia obiecta creata, | scilicet substantia et accidens, habent unam causam efficientem, scilicet Deum. Si vero dicas quod intelligas de causa materiali, adhuc contra te. Scientia enim et albedo non habent unam materiam, et tamen habent unum conceptum. Quare impossibile est hanc rationem habere aliquod fundamentum. Tamen non est mirum quod tales rationes solet facere Commentator Averroys. 368 Ad tertiam dico quod non oportet eadem esse principia omnium a quibus potest abstrahi conceptus unus communis. Ad auctoritatem 12 ubi] ut M 68

Arist., Categ. 5, 3b13–16.

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dico quod extra predicamenta, idest ante predicamenta, non est aliquid commune elementum omnibus eis. Et hec est intentio Philosophi ibidem subiungentis de elemento et exponentis se. Dicit69 enim sic: “Prius est elementum quam quorum est elementum”. Quare non valet. 5

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Respondetur ad sex argumenta principalia in contrarium adducta Ad principalia vero argumenta respondeo. Ad primum quod duplex 369 est univocatio: una generum et specierum, altera transcendentium. Primam autem intendit70 negare ab ente Porfirius, non secundam. Ad secundum dico quod illa regula ‘Singulum incomplexorum’ indiget glosa; quod apparet, quia dictiones sincathegorematice sunt incomplexe, et tamen non significant rem alicuius predicamenti. Est igitur illa regula intelligenda cum duabus conditionibus. Quarum prima est ex parte dictionum, alia ex parte rerum. Ex parte dictionum, quod dictio significet ut cathegorematica; et ex parte rerum, quod res significata sit aliquid positivum et non commune ad predicamenta, non quidem quod significetur per hoc nomen ‘ens’, aliquod predicamentum vel unumquodque eorum, sed aliquid inclusum in eis omnibus. Ad tertium dico quod Philosophus cum dicit quod ‘est’ multipliciter dicitur, non intelligit de multiplicitate significatorum sub eadem voce, sed de multiplicitate suppositorum sub eodem significato. Et illud apparet per hoc quod eodem modo interrogat de individuis substantie et aliorum predicamentorum et de multiplicitate eorum sicut de multitudine entis. Ad quartum dico quod communiter male intelligitur passus ille71 ter- 370 tii Phisicorum. Intelligitur enim quod ‘nullum commune’ sumatur ibi pro ‘communi predicamentali’. Et pro hoc male intelligitur quia huic intellectui non concordat littera nec sententia. Sic enim iacet72 in textu: “Non enim motus preter res; mutatur enim semper illud quod mutatur aut secundum substantiam, aut secundum quantitatem, aut secundum qualitatem, aut secundum locum; commune autem in hiis nullum est accipere quod nec hoc nec quantum | nec quale nec aliorum predi- M112vb camentorum ullum. Quare nec motus nec mutatio ullius erit extra ea que dicta sunt, cum nichil sit extra predicta”. Ecce quod quilibet potest

69 70 71 72

Ibid. XII 4, 1070b2–3. Isag. 6, 8–9, Arist. Lat., p. 12. Phys. III 1, 201a8–9. Ibid., 200b32–201a3.

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advertere si vult, quod Philosophus probat aliquem motum non esse preter illos quatuor supradictos. Duo autem sunt que possint huic conclusioni obsistere. Unum, si in aliis predicamentis ab hiis quatuor nominatis posset esse motus. Hoc Philosophus probat esse falsum ex inductione quod non apparet motus nisi in hiis. Secundum autem quod posset obsistere, si in aliqua re que esset extra predicamenta, esset motus. Et contra hoc arguit73 Philosophus sic: nullus motus est preter res in quibus est; sed preter predicamenta non est aliqua res; ergo nec motus. Et hec res ad quam poneretur est illud commune quod negatur a Philosopho. Non enim est verisimile quod Philosophus esset ita simplex quod intenderet probare quod non poterat esse quintus motus ad illam rem que est communis predicamentis communitate predicationis, quia hoc esset maxima truffa, licet ita videatur intelligere truffationem Averroys. Quare auctoritas nichil probat contra me. 371 Ad quintum dico quod non omnes similitudines currunt quatuor pedibus. Cum dicit74 Philosophus quarto Metaphisice quod ens dicitur de substantia et aliis predicamentis sicut sanum de animali et urina, dico quod est simile et dissimile. Simile quantum ad hoc quod de substantia dicitur ens tamquam de fontana-origine entitatis, de accidente ut de originato, sicut sanum dicitur de animali ut de fontana-origine, se urina ut de originato. Est autem dissimile quantum ad hoc quoniam de forma sanitatis nichil est formaliter in urina sed tota est formaliter in animali; sed forma entitatis est formaliter in substantia et accidente. Et hoc credo quod non negant adversarii. Si autem hoc concedunt, necesse quod concedant nobiscum unam conclusionem, vel quod negent Philosophum. Ipse enim dicit quod ens non dicit diversas naturas, sed unam, sicut sanum. Si igitur illa una natura inveniatur formaliter in accidente, necesse est quod ens dicatur de utroque per eandem rationem et ad eandem, licet non secundum eandem, quia unum eorum est fontanaorigo, aliud vero originatum. Sic patet quod intentio Philosophi non M113ra est contra me, quia non intendit | negare univocationem termini, quia unum est origo, reliquum originatum, ut dictum est.

10 esset] O om. M 73 74

31 negare] O om. M | termini] non add. M

Conferas ibid. III 1, 200b32–33. Arist., Metaph. IV 1, 1003a33–35.

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Ad sextum de nono Metaphisice dico quod Philosophus sumit ibi75 372 ‘predicare’ pro ‘supponere’. Et tunc distinguo de suppositione entis quoniam aliquando supponit personaliter, ut hic: ‘Quod movetur est ens’. Modo dico quod significatum ‘entis’ est illud pro quo supponit 5 suppositione simplici, ut ibi76: ‘Ens et unum assequuntur omnes cathegorias’: nullum enim suppositum ‘entis’ assequitur omnes cathegorias, sed solum significatum ‘entis’. Illud vero pro quo ‘ens’ supponit suppositione personali, non est significatum ‘entis’ nec de significato, est tamen suppositum significati. Ut si dicam ‘Homo currit’, hic terminus suppo10 nit pro Sorte currente, qui non est de significato hominis. Tunc igitur dico quod ‘ens’ non predicat nec supponit suppositione personali nisi pro subiecto seu pro substantia aut pro quantitate seu pro quanto; et sic de aliis; tamen suppositione simplici supponit pro aliquo communi omnibus eis.

articulus ii

15

QUOD GRADUS TRANSCENDENTIE EST EX NATURA REI Modo ex hac questione habeo quod gradus transcendentie est ex na- 373 tura rei, sicut ex natura rerum hoc quod dico ‘res’ vel ‘ens’ est aliquid 20 commune, transcendens gradus et ambitus predicamentales. De quinque maneriebus graduum universaliter distinctorum Et sic possumus ex precedentibus colligere quinque genera seu quinque 374 maneries graduum universaliter distinctorum, tres in predicamento, et duos sub et supra. Infimus autem gradus est gradus singularitatis. 25 Secundus gradus post eum est gradus specialissime specialitatis. Tertius est gradus subalternitatis; ille vero est multiplex in quolibet predicamento; tamen non potest assignari universalis distinctio. Quartus est generalissime generalitatis. Quintus gradus est transcendentie. Ad istos autem gradus reducuntur omnia conceptibilia, omnia intelligibilia,

1 nono] decimo MO 75 76

12 subiecto seu pro] O om. M

Ibid. IX 1, 1045b27–32. Conferas Arist., Metaph. X 2, 1054a13–19.

12–13 seu … aliis] O om. M

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omnia per scientiam considerabilia. Quod ostendo sic. Omnia considerabilia per scientiam aliquam vel sunt istimet gradus, vel aliqua entia vel non entia in istis gradibus; sicut enim dictum est supra, ymaginari debemus cohordinationes non entium metaphorice ad similitudinem cohordinationum istorum entium, et quod habeant gradus suos distinctos methaforice sicut entia. Sic enim intelligimus ea per analogiam et proportionem ad entia, et numquam per se. Quare patent eorum gradus. Entia vero sunt intelligibilia ut subsunt predicamentis, et sic intelliguntur ut in gradu infimo. Vel ut sunt in predicamentis, et sic intelliguntur ut in aliquo istorum trium graduum. Vel ut sunt supra, ita quod | intelliguntur abstractissime, et sic in gradu transcendentie. Quia tamen circa predicamenta concurrunt quatuor predicabilia, scilicet genus, species, differentia, proprium—accidens enim commune facit predicata sua per se, sed ista quatuor inveniuntur per se in quolibet predicamento—, ideo sciendum quod quodlibet proprium reducitur ad gradum in quo est species cuius est proprium; differentia vero ad illum gradum in recta linea in quo est species cuius est differentia ultimate constitutiva. Et ideo intentiones ille ‘proprium’ et ‘differentia’ sunt quia concernunt speciem in gradu determinato. Et hec magis patebunt infra. Hec autem dicta sunt anticipative propter bonitatem doctrine. Et hec de questione dicta sufficiant.

4 debemus] O om. M 9 ut] O om. M Mc om. N 16 illum] O om. M

13 proprium] et accidens add. MUVS sed secl.

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questio iiia UTRUM DUE INTENTIONES POSSINT DIFFERRE FORMALITER EX NATURA REI, STANTE INTER EAS YDEMPTITATE REALI Tertio queritur utrum due intentiones possint formaliter distingui vel 375 esse diversa ex natura rei, stante inter illas ydemptitate reali. Sed quia hec formalis diversitas potest multipliciter considerari—uno modo scilicet tamquam inter duas quidditates ubi diversitas predicatur; alio modo tamquam inter duas species diversitas predicatur; alio modo inter quid 10 et quale quid eiusdem speciei; alio modo tamquam inter fundamenta alicuius modi vel passionis, vel gradus ex una parte et ista ex altera— ; et quia alique questiones disputate ad hos articulos pertinent, ideo consequenter post istam tractabo illas. Quarum prima post presentem erit ‘Utrum predicamenta distinguuntur realiter’; alia ‘Utrum aliquod 15 transcendens (puta res vel ens) possit habere differentiam extra rationem suam’; alia ‘Utrum per proprias passiones, ita quod diffiniantur per ipsum ut per additamentum’. 5

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Ad77 primum igitur sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit possibile quod 376 realiter differant. Quecumque enim plus differunt quam secundum numerum, differunt realiter; sola enim differentia secundum numerum sufficit ad differre realiter. Sed que differunt formaliter secundum 25 quidditates, plus differunt quam secundum numerum, quia differunt necessario specifice. Ergo quecumque differunt formaliter | secundum M113va quidditates differunt realiter. Non ergo est possibile quod differant formaliter et sint idem realiter. Item. Quecumque differunt diffinitione, differunt realiter, cum diffinitio (ut habetur78 primo Topicorum) indicet 9 species] O om. M 17 per] O om. M formaliter] O realiter M 77 78

24 formaliter] O realiter M

27–28

Ad priorem partem sect. 376 conferas nostri auctoris In II Sent., dist. 3am, q. 3am. Arist., Top. I 5, 101b38.

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quid est esse rei per essentialia; et ita per consequens quecumque differunt diffinitione, differunt necessario aliquo (vel aliquibus) essentiali (vel essentialibus), et per consequens essentialiter et realiter. Sed que differunt formaliter et quidditative, differunt diffinitione, quia diffinitio quidditatem explicat. Ergo ut prius. 377 In79 oppositum arguitur. Quecumque differunt specifice, differunt formaliter et quidditative, quia diversarum specierum diverse sunt quidditates. Sed una et eadem numero est in diversis speciebus; calor enim est quidam habitus et quedam dispositio corporis humani vel alterius animalis, et ita est de prima specie qualitatis; et est quedam passio, que potest esse principium et terminus transmutationis sensualis; et per consequens ut passio et passibilis qualitas, et sic erit necessario de tertia specie qualitatis, et sic de diversis. Quare inter intentiones harum specierum potest esse realis ydemptitas, ipsis tamen ex natura rei distinctis et formaliter et quidditative. Item. Locus et superficies differunt formaliter et quidditative, quia sunt diverse species quantitatis, et tamen sunt idem realiter secundum Philosophum, quarto80 Phisicorum. 378 Pro solutione questionis huius primo dabo intellectum questionis; secundo dicam quid michi videtur; tertio inducam obiectiones oppositas impugnantes istum et respondebo impugnantibus earum.

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De nonnullis erroneis intellectibus huius questionis 379 De primo ergo sciendum quod aliqui intelligunt per ‘differre formali-

M113vb

ter’ differre virtualiter, secundum quod differre formaliter potest stare cum ydemptitate reali. Et dant exemplum de calore, qui realiter unus et idem existens, est simul exsiccativus et indurativus luti et humidati- 25 vus et liquefactivus | cere, sic quod volunt etiam dicere quod eadem res potest de se causare conceptus diversos quidditativos, et per consequens ipsa ex natura sua est una realiter et ex natura sua est plures conceptibiliter quidditative et formaliter. Sed hoc omnino nichil est, et in se, et ad propositum. In se quidem, quoniam conceptus est representativus 30 alterius obiecti, et vocatur conceptus quidditativus quia habet quidditatem pro obiecto et ille est representativus quidditatis. Tunc igitur 5 quidditatem] quidditative M 8 quidditates] Mc quantitates M om. M 19 quid] quod M 20 istum] istam M 79 80

Sectt. 377–386 desiderantur in O. Arist., Phys. IV 1, 209a7–9.

13 inter] Mc

pars tertia

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vel isti duo conceptus undecumque causati representant unam quidditatem solam vel plures. Si unam solam, ergo ipsi non sunt plures conceptus quidditativi, nisi numerati sint conceptus equinitatis in intellectu Sortis et in intellectu Platonis. Per hoc autem nullus dicit equinitatem ut equinitatem differre conceptibiliter; quod tamen supponimus de re de qua habentur plures conceptus quidditativi. Ergo, hoc dato, positio hec seipsam interimit. Si vero hii duo conceptus representant plures quidditates, ergo nulle formaliter erunt plures quidditates, cum quidditas formaliter sit in habente quidditatem quiddificato per ipsam, et non virtualiter, secundum quod dicimus in sole calorem esse virtualiter. Ergo, hoc dato, positio hec seipsam destruit, ut prius. Si vero dicatur quod hii duo conceptus representant unam solam 380 quidditatem, tamen sub diversis modis, et per consequens dici possunt plures quidditativi conceptus de unica quidditate—et sic stat positio— contra hoc arguo sic quoniam: Vel isti modi includuntur in hiis que primo representantur per hos conceptus, vel non. Primum est impossibile. Secundum autem repugnat positioni; impossibile enim est quod modus aliquis qui non constituit quidditatem, includatur in primo representato per conceptum quidditativum per quem sola quidditas representatur; aliter enim non esset quidditativus, vel si esset quilibet conceptus partis in modo, posset esse | quidditativus—puta ille qui M114ra esset ‘hominis-asini’—, quia in tali conceptu vel in eius obiecto primo includeretur aliqua quidditas et aliquis modus, qui vero est de quidditate. Quare impossibile est quod in primo representato per conceptum quidditativum includatur talis modus. Quare illud primum non potest dari. Secundum autem repugnat positioni. Positio enim tenet quod sint diversi conceptus quidditativi. Sed istud quod non includitur in eorum altero, non diversificat eos quidditative. Quare intellectus huius positionis in se omnino nullus est. Sed etiam ad propositum nullus est. Hec enim questio maxime mota est propter perfectiones Cause Prime, que sunt in ea formaliter et non virtualiter sicut perfectiones Ydearum. Queritur ergo de illis perfectionibus que sunt in Causa Prima formaliter, si inter se habent aliquam formalem differentiam, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali. Quare tales expositores non intelligunt questionem. Aliqui vero intellexerunt per ‘differre formaliter’ differre modaliter, 381 ita quod dicebant quod aliqua poterant differre per diversos modos, non differendo per diversas res, cum modus rei non sit res. Et ita

19 representato] representativo M

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intelligunt differre formaliter posse stare cum non differre realiter. Sed iste intellectus non est universaliter ad propositum quoniam: In ista questione pro eodem habetur differre formaliter et differre quidditative. Sed differre quidditative non est differre per modos—quod probo sic: differre quidditative est differre per quidditates; sed modi non sunt quidditates, ymo quidditates sunt primo indifferentiabilia, quia maxime abstracte; quare non sunt modi, nec econverso—. Quare intellectus iste est nullus. 382 Aliqui vero—et principales in hac questione—intellexerunt per ‘difM114rb ferre | formaliter’ differre synchategorematice, dicentes quod aliqua differre poterant cum unione extremorum et non differre in extremis, ita quod ponunt possibilem esse differentiam unionis extremorum absque differentia extremorum. Quod declaratur ita. In Causa Prima est amor et notitia, et hec duo sic se habent quod amor est notitia et econverso, et quidditas amoris est quidditas notitie et econverso, et formalitas amoris est formalitas notitie et econverso. Et ita omnimoda ydemptitas et nulla differentia in extremis, in unione vero extremorum est differentia, quia amor est amor realiter et per se et primo, notitia tamen non est amor realiter, per se et primo, ita quod amor verificatur de amore in primo modo dicendi per se, non tamen de notitia. Et sic patet hic intellectus. 383 Sed iste intellectus est impossibilis. Quod ostendo tripliciter. Primo sic. Accipio has duas propositiones datas quod ‘Amor est amor realiter, per se et primo’ et iterum ‘Notitia est amor realiter, per se et primo’. Hee due propositiones sunt diverse, quia una est vera, reliqua est falsa secundum istos. Una autem et eadem propositio non potest simul esse vera et falsa. Nec est intelligendum quod prima ratio diversitatis inter eas sit veritas vel falsitas, quoniam veritas vel falsitas sunt passiones significationis propositionum seu enuntiationum, ita quod non sunt de essentia propositionum, sed necessario supponunt diversitatem aliquam in significatis propositionum ad hoc quod simul et semel una earum sit vera et altera falsa. 384 Hiis igitur sic acceptis, accipio confirmationem Philosophi sexto Thopicorum,81 et arguo ita. Quelibet duo tota inter se diversa vel sunt diversa M114va quia omnes partes unius sunt diverse ab omnibus | partibus alterius,

27 et] est M 81

33 sexto] septimo M

Arist., Topica VI, 4–6 passim.

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vel quia non omnes, sed alique. Hec autem duo tota, scilicet predicte due propositiones, sunt diversa, et non quia omnes partes unius sunt diverse ab omnibus partibus alterius, sed utrobique enim sunt alique partes penitus eedem. Ergo necesse est quod sint diverse quia aliqua vel altera pars vel partes unius sunt diverse; vel est diversa ab aliquibus vel aliqua parte alterius. Inducam igitur quod sunt ille partes vel illa pars, et incipiam ab ultima. Invenio ergo in utraque propositione hanc dictionem ‘primo’; per illam ergo non differunt. Et invenio etiam ‘per se’; ergo nec per illam. Et invenio etiam in utraque a parte predicati hanc partem ‘amor’; ergo nec per illam differunt. Invenio etiam hoc verbum ‘est’; ergo nec per illud. Invenio autem ex parte subiecti unius hoc quod est ‘amor’, ex parte tamen subiecti alterius invenio hoc quod est ‘notitia’; ergo necesse quod per hec duo, scilicet quod per ‘notitiam’ et ‘amorem’, propositiones sint diverse. Quare ipsa erunt prius diversa quam iste propositiones, et prius quam uniones indicate per has propositiones. Quare iste modus intelligendi implicat opposita, dicendo ex una parte quod amor et notitia non differunt differentia extremorum, et ex altera quod differunt differentia unionis extremorum. Hec enim ultima differentia necessario reducitur, ut ostensum est, ad differentiam extremorum. Secundo arguo ad idem sic. Quodcumque et quocumque modo 385 debetur amori existenti sub ratione amoris, eodem modo debetur ei quod est idem quod amor existens sub ratione amoris. Sed ista est falsa, quia duo contradictoria erunt simul vera et semel, scilicet ‘esse amorem per se’ et ‘primo deberi amori existenti sub ratione | amoris’ (ut M114vb habeo per te) et ‘Notitia est amor et ratio notitie est ratio amoris’. Ergo esse amorem per se et primo debetur notitie, conclusio hec conceditur huic positioni. Ergo erit ei neganda. Et si sic, necessario negabit alteram premissarum. Non potest maiorem negare sine implicatione contradictionis. Ergo negabit minorem quam primo posuit. Et sic iterum iste intellectus apparet nullus et impossibilis. Tertio arguo sic. Amor et notitia secundum istos differunt per diffi- 386 nitiones; ergo differentia extremorum. Consequentia tenet, quia diffinitiones dantur de quidditatibus extremis, non de unione sinchategorematica talium quidditatum. Quare hic intellectus est nullus.

21 quodcumque] quicumque M 25 deberi] debetur M

23 existens] existenti M

24 scilicet] sed M

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pars tertia De convenienti intellectu questionis eiusque modo

387 Nunc82 igitur restat exponere intellectum et modum convenientem et

possibilem. Ad cuius evidentiam premitto quatuor divisiones et quatuor suppositiones et quatuor comparationes. 5

De quatuor divisionibus realitatum 388 Prima divisio est quod rerum alie sunt universales, alie singulares; hec

divisio traditur83 primo Peryermenias. Ex hac igitur divisione habeo quod differentia duorum posset sumi vel per realitatem singularem, vel per realitatem universalem ex hac parte vel ex illa, saltem secundum ymaginationem. Secunda divisio quod realitatum alia est realitas simpliciter, alia secundum quid. Et hec divisio traditur in diversis locis ab Aristotile; et potest sumi ex septimo Metaphisice, ubi disputat84 contra Platonem. Et hec divisio coincidit cum prima: realitas enim singularis est realitas simpliciter, et realitas universalis est realitas secundum quid. Et non accipio hic hanc divisionem secundum quod potest dividere inter substantiam et accidens, quoniam aliter sumitur hic et ibi ‘simpliciter’ et ‘secundum quid’. Tertia divisio est quod realitatum alia prima, alia secunda. Hec M115ra | divisio traditur85 in Predicamentis de substantia solum, tamen potest extendi ad alias cathegorias, sicut dictum est de precedenti. Hec autem divisio coincidit cum precedentibus; realitas enim singularis est realitas simpliciter et realitas prima, sed realitas universalis est realitas secundum quid et secunda. Quarta divisio est quod realitatum alia est realitas hoc aliquid, alia quale quid. Hec autem divisio traditur86 in Predicamentis de substantia secunda solum, tamen potest extendi ad alias cathegorias, sicut dictum fuit de precedenti. Hec autem divisio coincidit cum aliis precedentibus; realitas enim singularis est realitas simpliciter et realitas prima est realitas hoc aliquid, sed realitas universalis est realitas secundum quid, realitas secunda, realitas quale quid. Et sic patent hee quatuor divisiones. 7 traditur] O tangitur M om. MUVS 82 83 84 85 86

14 est] O om. M

23–25 hec autem … precedenti] N

Ad sectt. 387–391 conferas nostri auctoris In II Sent. dist. 3am, q. 3am. Arist., De interpr. 7, 17a38-b1. Arist., Metaph. VII 2, 1028b18 sqq. Arist., Categ. 5, 2a11–19. Ibid.

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De quatuor suppositionibus circa realitatem universalem Suppositiones sunt iste. Prima, quod quidditas vel quod quid est dicit rea- 389 litatem universalem et secundum quid et secundam et quale quid.87 Hoc autem patet, quia quidditas est realitas nata responderi ad interrogatio5 nem factam per ‘quid?’; sola autem realitas universalis est realitas nata sic responderi et predicari, ut habetur88 ex illa divisione in Antepredicamentis: ‘Eorum que sunt alia dicuntur de subiecto etc.’. Quare quiditas est universalis realitas. Secunda suppositio est quod realitas universalis est universaliter (vel saltem sumitur universaliter ut) formalis rea10 litas, unde, ut in precedentibus dictum est, superiora et universaliora sunt formaliora respectu inferiorum, et inferiora materialiora respectu superiorum. Tertia suppositio sequitur ex prima, quod differre per realitatem universalem, seu secundum quid, seu secundam, seu quale quid, est differre per quidditatem et quidditative. Hec enim evidens est ex 15 prima. Quarta suppositio sequitur ex secunda, scilicet quod differre per realitatem universalem, secundum quid et secundam et quale quid est differre per realitatem formalem et formaliter. Hec autem supponatur adpresens. De quatuor comparationibus diversarum realitatum Quatuor comparationes sunt iste: prima est duarum realitatum singu- 390 larium sub una universali; secunda duarum realitatum universalium in una singulari; tertia duarum realitatum singularium sub duabus universalibus; quarta duarum universalium in duabus singularibus. In ultimis duabus comparationibus est implicita pluralitas et diversitas compara25 torum sine unitate et ydemptitate. In primis duabus implicantur unitas, ydemptitas, pluralitas et diversitas simul. Quia vero hic querimus simul unitatem cum pluralitate, ydemptitatem cum diversitate, ille due ultime comparationes dimittantur, et alie due sumantur, una pro danda ymaginatione, altera pro questione.

20

4 realitas] McO om. M 11 formaliora] O formalia M | materialiora] O materialia M 13 quale quid] O quale M 27 due] O om. M 87 Cf. Arist., Categ. 5, 3b13–16: “In secundis autem substantiis videtur quidem similiter figura appellationis hoc aliquid significare cum dicit hominem vel animal, non tamen verum, sed magis quale quid significat; non enim unum est suppositum, sicut prima substantia, sed de multis homo dicitur et animal”. (transl. Moerbekiana, p. 9019–23). 88 Ibid. 2, 1a20-b9.

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pars tertia Datur intellectus nostre questionis

391 Hiis ergo premissis, do intellectum nostre questionis. Dico igitur quod M115rb querere utrum due intentiones possint | differre formaliter ex natura

rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali est querere utrum due intentiones possint differre per realitates universales, et secundum quid et secundas 5 et per qualia que, stante inter eas ydemptitate in aliqua una realitate singulari et simpliciter et prima et hoc aliquo. Sicut enim videmus econverso quod aliqua duo differre possunt per realitates singulares et simpliciter et primas et per hec aliqua, stante inter eas ydemptitate in aliqua realitate universali secundum quid et secunda et que est 10 quale quid, ut Sortes et Plato et quecumque aliqua alia singularia realia sub eadem specie contenta que per nullam realitatem universalem differunt, quia quicquid universale est in uno, et in altero. Iste est igitur intellectus questionis. Et ad istum intellectum ego respondeo, non ad alium. Et hunc reputo de intellectu Aristotilis esse sumptum. 15 Et hec de primo articulo sufficiant.

articulus ii QUOD DUE INTENTIONES POSSUNT DIFFERRE FORMALITER EX NATURA REI, STANTE INTER EAS YDEMPTITATE REALI

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392 Ad questionem igitur sic intellectam dico quod est possibile duas inten-

tiones differre formaliter ex natura rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali. Et hanc conclusionem primo ostendo esse de intentione Aristotilis in multis locis. Secundo ostendam eam esse de necessitate rationis. Quod hec conclusio est ad mentem Aristotilis 393 Primo ergo induco quod scribitur89 tertio Phisicorum: “Non enim omnia

eadem sunt quolibet modo eisdem, sed in quibus esse est idem”. Sciendum autem quod Philosophus sumit ‘eadem’ pro reali ydemptitate, 3–5 utrum … differre] M utrum sit possibile quod aliqua sint idem realiter et differunt formaliter est querere utrum aliqua possint differre O 9 hec aliqua] O aliqua M 13–16 iste est … sufficient] M om. O 27–28 eadem … ydemptitate] O om. M 89

Arist., Phys. III 3, 202b14–16.

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ydemptitatem secundum esse pro ydemptitate secundum rationem et secundum quod quid erat esse. Quod autem sumat pro eodem ‘unum seu idem ratione’ et ‘unum seu idem secundum esse’ probo ex primo Phisicorum, ubi disputans90 contra Parmenidem accipit quod si omnia sint unum ratione, sequitur quod idem erit esse bono et malo, et esse bono et non bono, et tali esse et tanto esse. Ergo manifestum est quod pro eodem sumit ‘aliqua esse eadem secundum rationem’ et ‘aliqua esse eadem’ secundum esse. Hoc idem patet in multis locis. Quod autem pro eodem sumat ‘esse’ et ‘quod quid erat esse’ probo ex septimo Metaphisice, ubi disputat91 hanc questionem ‘Utrum idem est quod quid erat esse et unumquodque’. Hanc enim questionem sic propositam sub hiis verbis in fine concludit92 eam determinatam sub istis: “Igitur in primis et secundum se dictis unicuique esse et unumquodque | idem et M115va unum”. Ex hiis ergo patet quod pro eodem sumpsit concludendo hoc quod est ‘esse’ et proponendo ‘quod quid erat esse’. Ultra possumus addere quod ‘esse rei’, ut hic sumitur, est idem et sumitur pro eodem pro quo sumitur ‘quidditas’; quod quid erat esse enim est ipsa rei quidditas. Sed ut probatum est, ‘esse rei’ sumitur pro quod quid erat esse; ergo etiam pro quidditate. Ubicumque ergo dicit Philosophus quod res est eadem, esse autem diversum et non idem, intelligendum est quod sunt idem realiter, non tamen formaliter seu quidditative. Ut patet ex hiis dictis. Secundo93 induco quod scribitur94 eodem tertio Phisicorum: “Nichil 394 prohibet duobus esse unum et eundem actum, non sicut esse idem”. Ex quibus habeo quod unus actus numero secundum rem est non unus secundum esse, hocest secundum quidditatem seu secundum quod quid erat esse seu secundum rationem. Tertio induco quod scribitur quarto Phisicorum de nunc, ubi habetur95 sic: “Est autem nunc idem secundum quod quid est: esse autem ipsi alterum est. Ipsum autem nunc tempus mensurat secundum quod prius et posterius est. Ipsum autem nunc est quidem sicut idem, est vero sicut non idem. Secundum quidem enim

3 probo] per eum add. O 18 etiam] coni. ut M om. O est] suppl. coll. textu Aristotelis 90 91 92 93 94 95

Ibid. I 9, 192a16–25. Arist., Metaph. VII, capp. 4–6. Ibid. VII 6, 1032a4–6. Sectt. 394–426 hoc loco desiderantur in O. Arist., Phys. III 3, 202b8–9. Ibid. IV 11, 219b10–15.

28–572.2 quid est … nunc

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quod in alio et alio, alterum est hoc vero erat esse ipsi nunc; inquantum autem quodcumque ens est ipsum nunc, est  idem.” 395 Quarto induco quod habetur96 primo De generatione et secundo De anima, scilicet quod idem actus est augmentatio et nutritio, est autem non idem. Quod sic intelligendum, ut declarat ibidem97: Actio autem anime qua anima convertit cibum in carnem corporis cibati, est omnino eadem realitas in singulari accepta. Sed quia per hanc actionem cibus quantus convertitur, ideo animal augetur et nutritur; augetur enim quia cibus est quantus, sed nutritur quia cibus est potentia caro. Et per consequens illa eadem actio est augmentatio et nutririo. Et quia motus trahit speciem a termino ad quem vadit, termini autem isti sunt diversarum specierum, hinc est quod hec actio seu hic actus vel motus est diversarum specierum. Et sic habemus quod iste actus est una realitas numero, diverse tamen actiones secundum esse et quidditatem. Et sic patet intentio Philosophi sicut prius. 396 Quinto induco quod scribitur quinto98 Ethicorum, ubi dicitur quod virtus et legalis iustitia est idem secundum quidditatem, esse autem M115vb non idem. Quod intelligendum est sicut predicta | sunt exposita. Sexto induco sextum Ethicorum, ubi habetur99 sic: “Erit autem utique quedam et huic architectonica; est autem et politica et prudentia idem quidem habitus, esse autem non idem ipsis”. 397 Septimo induco quartum Metaphisice, ubi sic dicitur100: “Ens et unum idem et una natura, eoquod se adinvicem consequuntur sicut principium et causa, sed non ut una ratione ostensa”; quod intelligendum est ut supra expositum, probando per primum101 Phisicorum quod pro eodem sumit Aristotiles ‘unam rationem’ et ‘unum esse’ et ‘unumquodque esse’, quia communis usus est apud Aristotilem sumere ‘rationem’ pro diffinitione seu pro quidditate explicita per diffinitionem. Quare patet quod ipse negat unitatem rationis et quidditatis, assumendo unitatem nature et realitatis inter ens et unum. Sed de hiis infra dicetur.

13 est] Mc om. M primum M 96 97 98 99 100 101

16 quinto] sexto M

20 huic] hic M

Arist., De gener. et corr. I 5, 322a25–28; De anima II 4, 416b11–12. Cf. Arist., De anima II 4, 416b12–20. Arist., Eth. Nicom. V 2, 1130a10–13. Ibid. VI 8, 1141b22–24. Arist., Metaph. IV 2, 1003b22–25. Arist., Phys. I 7, 191a12 sqq.

23–24 principium]

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Octavo induco decimum Metaphisice, ubi dicitur102: “Non enim idem igni et elemento esse, sed ut quidem re et natura ignis et elementum”; quod intelligendum est ut predicta. Per hec igitur et alia multa patet esse de intentione Aristotilis aliqua 398 5 differre secundum esse quidditativum, quod est differre per realitatem universalem, secundum quid et secundam et quale quid, stante inter talia unitate et ydemptitate reali, hocest realitate singulari et simpliciter et prima et hac aliqua. Et hec sufficiant pro intentione auctoris. Quod hec conclusio est de necessitate rationis 10

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Ad ostendendum autem quod hec conclusio sit de necessitate ratio- 399 nis et necessario vera premitto duas suppositiones. Prima est quod ea que Aristotiles dicit de Prima Causa duodecimo Metaphisice, que immediate recitabo, sunt in ea ex natura rei, sine opere intellectus tui vel mei. Que sunt huiusmodi. Dicit103 enim quod Causa Prima est actus, substantia eterna simplex unica optima necessaria continens naturam, vita, speculatio, delectatio divina, infinita, immaterialis et impassibilis. Secunda suppositio est quod hec omnia sunt unica singularis realitas, omnino eadem ydemptitate | et unitate singularitatis. Hanc autem pro- M116ra bat ibidem Aristotiles de aliquibus, puta quod substantia et intelligere Prime Cause sunt unum et idem. Et facit104 hanc rationem: Si est aliud intelligere eius et substantia eius, sequitur quod substantia eius non sit optima, quod est reputandum impossibile. Consequentiam probat105 quia: Per intelligere inest ei honorabile (et supple: tale honorabile quod solum debetur rei optime). Si ergo substantia eius non sit intelligere eius, ergo substantia eius per se et per essentiam suam non erit honorabilissima et optima, ymo per aliud. Quare relinquitur quod substantia Prime Cause sit intelligere Prime Cause; et, sicut prius de hiis duobus, quod sunt idem. Sic de omnibus aliis propter duo que supponimus de Prima Causa, 400 ut dictum est, supponimus omnimodam simplicitatem et infinitatem. Ex simplicitate autem probatur sic quia: Secundum Augustinum,

7 hocest] hec est M 102 103 104 105

8 hac] hec M

Arist., Metaph. X 1, 1052b11–13. Ibid. XII 7, 1072a23–1073a13. Ibid. 9, 1074b17 sqq. Ibid., 1074b20–21.

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primo106 Sententiarum, articulo octavo, divina simplicitas consistit in hoc quod ipse Deus est quicquid habet, ita quod esse quod in Deo est, est idipsum quod Deus. Quare omnia que habet in se, sunt una realitas. Ex infinitate vero probatur sic: Si enim aliquid est in Deo aliud ab eo, vel illud inest Deo, vel Deus inest illi. Si illud inest Deo, ergo actualitas divine essentie non est infinita, cum fiat ei additio ulterioris actualitatis; si vero Deus inest illi, ergo divina virtus et actualitas divine essentie non est infinita, cum ad aliud terminetur, puta ad illud substractum, terminans eius inherentiam. 401 Hee autem suppositiones absque probatione supponuntur et conceduntur ab omnibus. Quare earum probationibus non insisto, sed ex hiis suppositis arguam ad conclusionem intentam. Primo sic. Omnia attributa Prime Cause sunt unica eadem unitate singularitatis et simplicissima realitas, et tamen differunt formaliter per diversas quidditates et per diversas realitates universales et per diversas realitates secundum M116rb quid et per diversas realitates | secundas et per diversa qualia que. Ergo possibile est aliqua differre formaliter ex natura rei (ut est expositum), stante inter ea ydemptitate reali. Consequentiam huius entimematis est evidens per locum a parte subiectiva. Antecedens autem patet ex suppositionibus premissis quantum ad primam partem sui; secundam autem habeo probare, scilicet quod talia attributa Prime Cause differant formaliter per talia distinctiva qualia exposui, scilicet per quidditates diversas et universales realitates diversas. Hoc autem probo multipliciter. 402 Et primo sic. Ille quidditates adinvicem sunt diverse quarum una alteri apposita non dat magis, nec remota minus; hec est evidentissima; non enim est possibile quod quidditas hominis et equi maneat, ipsa remota ab homine, sicut apposita homini. Sed quidditas eternitatis apposita bonitati vel sapientie non dat magis, nec remota minus. Ergo sunt diverse. Minor patet ex primo Ethicorum, ubi dicit107 Philosophus: “Sed neque quidem perpetuum esse magis bonum erit, si neque magis album quod dioturnius est eo quod unius diei”. Ex hoc habeo quod si sint duo bona vel duo sapientes, et uni horum bonorum vel sapientum apponatur eternitas et ab altero removeatur, ceteris existentibus paribus, quod istud a quo removetur non erit minus 3 que] Mc om. M 106 107

Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona, In I Sent., dist. 8a. Arist., Eth. Nicom. I 4, 1096b3–5.

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bonum vel minus sapiens, nec istud magis cui perpetuitas apponetur. Et istud apparet etiam sine auctoritate. Si enim hic sunt duo homines iusti vel magnanimi in eodem gradu: si unus moreretur cras et alter ex divino dono perpetuaretur et conservaretur in eodem gradu, non esset ille perpetuus iustior illo cras morituro, vel sapientior. Hanc autem comparationem facit Aristotiles duodecimo Metaphisice inter | M116va nos et Deum, dicens108: “Deductio autem est qualis optima parvo tempore nobis. Sic semper illud est, nobis quidem impossibile”. Ex hoc igitur habeo quod quidditas eternitatis diversa est a quidditate cuiuslibet alterius attributi. Ad idem arguo sic. Quorumcumque quidditates habent essentialem 403 ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis naturalis presuppositionis, ipsa differunt formaliter et quidditative per huiusmodi quidditates; hec patet, quia impossibile est necessario et naturaliter unam quidditatem ad seipsam habere talem ordinem naturalis presuppositionis, sed necessario sunt diverse. Sed quidditates attributorum Prime Cause sunt huiusmodi. Ergo ipsa sunt distincta quidditative, ut est expositum. Minor probatur de notitia et amore et delectione. Hec omnia sunt in Prima Causa. Hec autem omnia habent essentialem ordinem naturalis presuppositionis ex natura suarum quidditatum; delectatio enim necessario et naturaliter presupponit in quocumque sit appetitum rei ex cuius attingentia provenit delectatio; impossibile enim est aliquid delectari in re non appetita qualicumque appetitu, et iterum impossibile est esse amorem in aliquo, non presupposita notitia. Unde Augustinus, decimo De Trinitate, capitulo primo109: “(…) quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto potest”. Non est tamen reciproca presuppositio. Non enim notitia ex natura notitie in communi presupponit amorem vel delectationem, cum notitia sit actus naturalis intelligibilis, amor autem est actus liber et appetitus. Quare etc. Patet igitur quod attributa Prime Cause, secundum rationes suorum generum seu realitatum in communi sumptarum, habent essentialem ordinem naturalis presuppositionis, et per consequens diversa sunt quidditative. Ad idem arguo tertio sic. Quidditas unius attributi Prime Cause 404 repperitur secundum rationem communem in aliquo sine quidditate alterius. Ergo ipsa sunt diversa formaliter et quidditative. Antecedens 20 delectatio] delectio M 108 109

22 delectatio] delectio M

Arist., Metaph. XII 7, 1072b14–16. Augustinus, De Trinitate X 1, p. 31229–30.

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patet, quia communis ratio notitie invenitur in quodam actu intellectus M116vb | mei vel tui, in quo non invenitur communis ratio amoris, cum in

me amor et notitia sunt diversa essentialiter. Consequentia tenet, quia una quidditas non invenitur in aliquo sine seipsa,—nisi dicatur quod quidditas superior et inferior sint idem, et tamen superior invenitur sine inferiori; tamen in proposito locum non habet, quia notitia et amor non se habent ut superius et inferius; et cum hoc etiam dictum est aliter supra de hiis. 405 Ad idem quarto sic. Prima Causa novit omne cognoscibile inquantum est cognoscibile per quodcumque cognoscitivum. Sed non vult vel appetit omne appetibile per quodcumque appetitivum. Ergo notitia et appetitus in ea differunt formaliter ex natura rei. Prima pars antecedentis apparet de se; et ponit110 eam Algazel in Metaphisica sua, tractatu tertio, sententia tertia sub hiis verbis: “Primus (idest Prima Causa) scit omnes species et genera omnium que sunt, et nichil deest scientie Ipsius”. Secunda pars patet, quia multi homines mali appetunt plus fornicari et furari quam Deus hec appetat, unde Deus talia non vult nisi permissive, ymo etiam aliquando non permittit quod mala desideria compleantur. Sic igitur patet antecedens. Consequentia tenet quia: Non est possibile nec intelligibile quod aliquid unum et idem et secundum eandem rationem lationis feratur et non feratur. Sed Causa Prima (ut dictum est) fertur ultimate secundum notitiam super hac fornicatione, non autem secundum appetitum. Ergo alia est ratio formalis notitie secundum quam Prima Causa ultimate fertur super hac deformitate furti, alia ratio formalis appetitus secundum quam non ultimate fertur. Ergo per consequens notitia et appetitus in Prima Causa differunt formaliter. Sic igitur probatum est antecedens nostre rationis quadruplici medio. Et per consequens eius conclusio.

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De responsione ad nostram rationem a magistro Herveo data 406 Ad hanc autem rationem nituntur aliqui respondere diversimode. Ta- 30 M117ra men solum | volo recitare responsionem magistri Hervei, qui diffu-

sius tractat eam. Quam responsionem ponit111 primo Quolibet sub hiis verbis: 4 seipsa] Mc ipsa M 110 111

Algazel, Metaphysica, tr. III, 4, p. 661–2 ed. Muckle. Hervaeus Natalis, Quolibet I.

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“Ad maiorem evidentiam huius questionis et propter solutionem argumentorum notandum quod cum ista dicuntur differre adinvicem inquantum unumquodque precise accipitur et quodammodo prescindendo omne aliud, dupliciter potest intelligi ista precisio. Uno modo quod fiat ista precisio secundum rem (et hec est impossibilis); alio modo potest accipi ista precisio secundum rationem. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo in intelligibili simplici, concipiendo unumquodque istorum, ut includendo in conceptu nec excludendo a re concepta, sicut quando homo concipit sapientiam in communi, ut concipiendo iustitiam vel sapientiam Dei, non concipiendo iustitiam eius. Et sic circumscribere non contingit perfecte intelligenti, nam perfecte intelligens omnia intellectibilia non potest ea sic circumscribere, intellecto aliquo intelligibili. Unde Deus nichil sic intelligit actu circumscriptivo, sed homo potest sic intelligere sapientiam vel iustitiam circumscriptive. Alio modo potest ista circumscriptio fieri in intellectu enunciativo et circumscribente a re concepta. Et hoc dupliciter Vel absolute (ut si intellectus dicat ‘Sapientia non est iustitia’), vel cum reduplicatione (ut si intellectus dicat ‘Sapientia ut sapientia non est iustitia’). Et quodlibet istorum potest dupliciter accipi: vel in communi, vel in natura determinata. In communi, dicendo ‘Sapientia non est iustitia’; et isto modo in intellectu vero potest utrumque dici, nam illud quod est inferioris potest absolute dici de superiori, et cuidam sapientie convenit quod non sit iustitia, sicut potest absolute dici ‘Animal est rationale vel irrationale’. Et cum reduplicatione, ut cum intelligatur reduplicatio esse negativa, quia quod est inferioris non convenit per se superiori. Unde ista est vera quod ‘Sapientie ut sapientia non convenit esse iustitiam. Si autem accipiatur in natura speciali, aut in Deo aut in creatura. Si in Deo accipiantur, ista est falsa: ‘Sapientia Dei non est iustitia | Dei’. Si M117rb autem accipiatur cum reduplicatione, aut reduplicabit sapientiam tantum sub hoc sensu quod intellectus divinus non alicuius intelligat sapientiam divinam non esse iustitiam in eo quod sapientia est; et si sic, est intellectus verus, quia quicquid convenit cuicumque sapientie in eo quod sapientia est, convenit omni sapientie. Constat autem quod non omni sapientie convenit esse iustitiam. Si autem fiat reduplicatio ad totum congregatum quod est Sapientia divina, erit falsa. Unde ista est falsa: ‘Sapientia divina non est iustitia’, ymo sapientia divina in eo quod sapientia divina est omnis perfectio simpliciter dicta et formaliter formalitate reali. Si autem accipiantur in creatura, utroque modo erit verum, quia sapientia creata absolute et sapientia creata in eo quod creata non est iustitia. Precisiones autem que faciunt ad propositum—scilicet quando sapientia concipitur, non concepta iustitia intellectu simplici vel qui concipitur intellectu enunciativo quia sapientia Dei unde sapientia enim non est iustitia—habent ortum a re sicut a fundamento remoto, quia si sapientia in nulla re inhereret, diversitatem aliquam realem a iustitia numquam posset concipi, non concepta iustitia; numquam etiam esset verum quod

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pars tertia sapientia divina ut sapientia nec sapientia in communi ut sapientia nec esset iustitia. Sed tales precisiones non competunt rebus nisi mediante actu intellectus, quia constat quod sapientia in communi non est alicubi sine sapientia hac, nisi tamen in intellectu obiective. Precisio etiam alicuius a sapientia 5 ut sapientia est et non ab hac sapientia non est alicubi nisi in intellectu obiective. Illa autem que competunt rebus ut sunt in intellectu obiective, sunt entia rationis, et que competunt rebus mediante actu intellectus. Ergo tales precisiones, et per consequens distinctiones secundum tales precisiones sunt precisiones et distinctiones secundum actum intellectus 10 et secundum rationem tantum, licet habeant fundamentum | remotum in re”.

117va

Hec iste doctor. Respondetur magistro Herveo 407 Ex hiis autem videtur ei quod omnia dicta in precedenti ratione sint 15

exsufflata. Sed hiis non obstantibus, ratio in sua permanet firmitate. Unde circa hac faciam quatuor. Primo namque ostendam rationem esse confirmatam per aliqua hic dicta; secundo ostendam non esse infirmatam per illa que videntur eam infringere; tertio ostendam in hiis esse aliqua repugnantia; quarto, aliqua summe falsa et evidenter. Ad 20 maiorem tamen evidentiam premitto duo. Primum est quod scribitur112 nono Metaphisice, scilicet quod “Verum et falsum in rebus sunt componi aut dividi; verus enim est divisum putans dividi et compositum putans componi, mentitur autem econtrario habens res, quandocumque est aut non est; quare quod verum dicitur aut falsum hoc perscrutandum 25 quid dicimus; non enim propter nos estimare te vere album esse tu albus es, sed propter te esse album nos hoc dicentes verum dicimus”. Hec Aristotiles. Ex hoc habeo quod causa veritatis est in rebus componi vel dividi. Secundum quod premitto est quod sapientia secundum istum doctorem (et secundum quemlibet alium) in communi sumpta 30 est in seipsa aliqua indivisione indivisa, qua indivisione non est indivisa iustitia, quoniam aliter in quocumque inveniretur essentialiter sapientia, inveniretur iustitia, sicut in quocumque invenitur sapientia, inveni-

6 ab] ut M circa M 112

12 in] a M

23 verus] coll. textu Aristotelis verum M

Arist., Metaph. IX 10, 1051b1–9.

28 causa] Mc

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tur ipsamet sapientia. Et ex hoc habeo quod sapientia est divisa a iustitia divisione opposita illi indivisioni qua sapientia est indivisa in seipsa et non iustitia. Hiis premissis, confirmo conclusionem veram et rationem ex tribus dictis huius doctoris. Primum sit istud quod hec est vera quod ‘Sapientiam ut sapientia non convenit esse iustitiam’. Ad istud dictum addo illud quod dicit | in hac eadem questione, scilicet quod illud quod repugnat superiori per se, repugnat cuilibet inferiori. Modo arguo sic. Quod convenit cuicumque sapientie in eo quod sapientia est convenit ei ex natura sapientie, non ex opere intellectus; hec patet inducendo in omnibus; quod enim convenit homini in eo quod homo est (puta esse risibile), convenit homini ex natura sua; vel quod competit igni in eo quod ignis, convenit ei in natura sua, non ex consideratione mea vel tua. Et istud etiam patet ex dicto huius doctoris, scilicet quod illud quod repugnat superiori per se, repugnat cuilibet inferiori; sed si per se, ergo per naturam suam, quia quod repugnat vel competit igni vel cuicumque alteri rei per se, repugnat vel competit ei per naturam suam, quia unumquodque est idem quod natura sua. Quare manifestum est quod quicquid repugnat vel competit cuicumque sapientie in eo quod sapientia, repugnat vel competit ei per naturam suam, non per considerationem meam vel tuam. Sed sapientie in communi et cuilibet in speciali in eo quod sapientia est repugnat esse indivisum a iustitia sicut a seipsa, et competit ei esse divisum a iustitia divisione opposita. Ergo istud repugnat et illud competit cuilibet sapientie create vel increate ex natura sua. Minor apparet ex datis, scilicet ex secundo premisso, et ex dicto repetito secundum quod dictum est quod hec est vera in intellectu divino: ‘Sapientia divina in eo quod sapientia non est iustitia’ et hec etiam: ‘Sapientia divina est iustitia, et omnis perfectio simpliciter’. Modo arguo sic. Cuilibet negative vere respondet in rebus de quibus est enunciatio aliqua divisio in rem subiecti et rem predicati. Sed hec negativa vera est etiam in intellectu divino: ‘Sapientia divina in eo quod sapientia non est iustitia’. Ergo inter sapientiam divinam et iustitiam est aliqua | divisio que est causa veritatis huius negative. Maior patet ex primo premisso de nono113 Metaphisice. Minor datur ab isto

7 quod] Mc om. M 113

12 risibile] reale M

Arist., Metaph. IX 10, 1051b6–9.

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doctore. Ergo necesse est quod inter iustitiam et sapientiam ut sunt obiecta divini intellectus sic enuntiantis, sit aliqua divisio ad hoc quod illa negativa sit vera. 410 Hanc autem divisionem probo modo quod sit ex natura, non ex consideratione aliqua. Et arguo sic. Causa veritatis illius negative est ex natura sapientie ut sumitur in reduplicatione. Sed divisio est causa. Ergo divisio est ex natura sapientie, non ex mea consideratione vel ex quacumque. Maior patet, quia amota illa reduplicatione non esset enunciatio vera. Sed forte dices quod illud quod reduplicatur est ens rationis, et ita ex ente rationis provenit illa divisio et causa veritatis illius negative propositionis; quare in vanum laboro. Sed contra: Illud reduplicatum quod primo sumitur est quod se compatitur cum subiecto; cum enim dico ‘Homo inquantum homo est risibilis’, non est intelligendum quod homo pro uno subiciatur et pro alio reduplicetur, etsi aliquando sumatur aliquid cum hoc syncategoremate ‘inquantum’, quod non primo sumptum sit oportet necessario quod illud reduplicatum predicetur de subiecto, ut si dicatur ‘Homo inquantum coloratus est visibilis’, necesse est quod homo sit coloratus; aliter non esset visibilis. Ergo cum dicitur ‘sapientia divina inquantum sapientia’, oportet necessario quod sapientia divina sit illa sapientia que reduplicatur. Constat autem quod sapientia divina non est aliquod ens rationis. Ergo sapientia sumpta in reduplicatione non est ens rationis. Ergo divisio illa inter sapientiam divinam et iustitiam divinam, ut hec est sapientia et ut illa rb M118 est iustitia, | est ex natura rei, et hec divisio est causa veritatis dicte negative. 411 Ex eodem dicto possum sic tertio arguere. Ratio formalis sapientie ut salvatur in sapientia divina, cum reduplicatur est causa veritatis illius negative sepe repetite. Ratio autem formalis divine essentie secundum te non esset causa veritatis si reduplicaretur. Ergo alia est formalis ratio sapientie que includitur in sapientia divina et alia formalis ratio divine essentie. Totum antecedens habeo per hunc doctorem. Consequentia tenet, quoniam aliter verificarentur contradictoria de eadem ratione, scilicet esse et non esse causam veritatis illius dicte negative. 412 Tertium dictum est quod hee precisiones, scilicet quod ‘Sapientia divina ut sapientia non est iustitia’ et similes habent ortum a re sicut a fundamento remoto, quia si sapientia in nulla re haberet diversitatem realem, iustitia numquam posset concipi, sapientia non concepta. Ex hoc arguo sic. Omnis divisio vel precisio inter nullam rem et veram rem, habens ortum a vera re ut remoto fundamento, in qua non differt fundamentum proximum a remoto, est ex natura talium rerum; hec

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sic conditionata a quocumque debet concedi. Sed hec precisio vel divisio est huiusmodi. Ergo est ex natura rei. Minor patet, primo quod sit inter nullam rem et veram rem, quia quod divina sapientia ut sapientia est, et divina iustitia ut iustitia est, quelibet est vera res. Quod autem habeant ortum a vera re habeo per hunc doctorem. Quod autem non differat in hac divisione fundamentum proximum a remoto patet. Si enim dicas quod fundamentum remotum sit sapientia | ut sapientia, illud idem dico proximum. Si vero dicas deitatem fundamentum remotum et sapientiam proximum, et dicas ista differre, habeo propositum quod deitas et sapientia divina differunt. Si vero dicas quod fundamentum remotum est sapientia creata, que est diversa realiter a iustitia, contra ex datis a te: Dedisti enim quod intellectus divinus vere intelligit sapientiam divinam in eo quod sapientia est, non esse iustitiam. Hoc autem intelligit ante omnem sapientiam creatam, que diversa potest esse realiter a iustitia. Ergo hec precisio in intellectu divino non habuit ortum a sapientia creata. Si vero iterum velit fugere dicendo quod licet sapientia actu et realiter non esset diversa a iustitia, erat tamen possibile; et ad hec consideravit Deus, et ex illa possibilitate habuit ortum illa divisio seu precisio quam intellexit divinus intellectus—Sed hoc est inconveniens et falsum; etiam insufficiens est quippe inconveniens quod Deus nesciat suas perfectiones absolutas perfecte et distincte, sine comparatione ad extra, cum tamen aliquo ordine prius intelligat intrinseca quam extrinseca. Sed falsum est quod intellectus divinus intelligat sapientiam divinam ut sapientiam est, non esse iustitiam hac de causa quoniam sapientia creata est diversa a iustitia, quia si hoc haberet veritatem, pari ratione posset intelligere sapientiam divinam non esse sapientiam in eo quod sapientia, quoniam aliqua sapientia diversa est realiter ab alia sapientia. Si enim diversitas perfectionum in rebus creatis facit Deum talia intelligere de perfectionibus suis, ergo intelliget in se sapientiam esse diversam a sapientia; quod est falsissimum. Quare manifestum est quod talis fuga cadit necessario in multiplicem falsitatem. Sed est etiam omnino insufficiens. Si enim Deus intelligeret ante mundi constitutionem possibile esse quod sit aliqua | sapientia diversa realiter ab omni iustitia et intelligeret impossibile esse aliquam sapientiam esse diversam ab omni sapientia, de necessitate Deus intellexit causam huius diversitatis. Et non potest esse aliqua causa huius impossi1 debet] Mc om. M possibilem M

3 nullam] unam M

33 enim] Mc om. M

34 possibile]

M118va

413

414 M118vb

582

pars tertia

bilitatis et illius possibilitatis nisi ratio formalis sapientie et iustitie. Illud enim quod est futurum et quod nichil est, non potest esse causa huius presentis possibilitatis et impossibilitatis. Ergo necesse fuit Deum intelligere rationes sapientie et iustitie ut distinctas ad hoc quod intelligeret huiusmodi possibilitatem et impossibilitatem. Quare patet quod hec 5 responsio fuit valde insufficiens. Quod fundamentum solutionis ab Herveo date nullius momenti est 415 Sic igitur habeo confirmationem conclusionis et rationis mee ex hiis

que dicta sunt ad solvendum.114 Modo ostendo quod illud in quo fundatur responsio ad rationem meam danda nullius momenti est. Dicit enim quod tales precisiones non competunt rebus nisi mediante actu intellectus. Hoc est penitus falsum, ut demonstravi ex datis ab eo. Et cum probat dictus doctor quod constat quod sapientia in communi non est alicubi sine hac sapientia, hic videtur supponere dicta illorum qui dicebant quod omne quod non est in loco, est nichil, ut recitatatur115 quarto Phisicorum. Per hoc enim probatur quod sapientia in communi non sit res, quia non habet locum. Sed hoc est ridiculum. Et si vadam ad intellectum eius, patet quod eius motivum nichil est. Vult enim arguere, quia sapientia in communi non existit in aliquo intellectu sine hac vel sine illa, quod propter hoc distinctio sapientie in communi non sit nisi per intellectum. Sed hoc nichil est: ‘Homo enim inquantum homo distinguitur ab asino; ergo hec distinctio est ab intellectu’ non sequitur, ymo est oppositum. Quando enim reduplicatur ‘homo ut homo’ et ‘natura hominis ut natura hominis’, non reduplicatur aliquid factum ab intellectu.

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De triplici contradictione in positione Hervei inclusa 416 Nunc autem tertio ostendo in predicta positione aliqua sibi invicem M119ra

repugnari. Hec sunt tria. Primum est iam ostensum quoniam monstratum est quod tria dicta repugnant conclusioni intente. Secundum sit istud quia in uno loco dicit quod divinus intellectus intellectu sim- 30 plici non potest concipere sapientiam, non includendo iustitiam in conceptu sapientie; in alio loco dicit quod divinus intellectus intellectu

114 115

Sc. meam conclusionem atque rationem a me adductam. Arist., Phys. IV 1, 208a29–31.

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enuntiativo potest negare vere iustitiam a sapientia ut est sapientia. Hec autem sunt incompossibilia et repugnantia. Quod ostendo sic. Preaccipio autem primo quod intellectus negans iustitiam a sapientia ut sapientia concipit subiectum et predicatum intellectu simplici. Tunc arguo sic. Nullus intellectus potest vere excludere vel negare ab aliquo subiecto illud predicatum quod concepit quidditative conceptu subiecti, sumendo et concipiendo subiectum conceptu simplici; hec est evidentissima consideranti eam. Sed intellectus divinus semper et necessario concipiendo sapientiam conceptu simplici concepit iustitiam ut quidditative inclusam in conceptu iustitie et ut includentem quidditative iustitiam—ut patet per te in primo dicto. Ergo intellectus non potest vere negare iustitiam de sapientia ut sapientia est. Quod est contra secundum dictum. Pro minori cum eadem maiori in secunda figura inferam contra primum. Est autem advertendum quod hic videtur causata deceptio ex eo quod iste doctor ymaginatus est intellectum divinum non posse concipere intellectu simplici unum predictorum, non includendo alterum, quod non potest scire alterum, ignorando alterum actu vel habitu. Sed ista multum adinvicem differunt, nec propter hoc debuit illud ponere. Tertia incompossibilitas sit hec. In principio enim dicit quod precisio 417 sapientie a iustitia non est secundum rem, in alio autem loco dicit quod est precisio sapientie a iustitia in eo quod sapientia. Hec autem repugnant. Quod ostendo sic. Quod debetur sapientie ut est sapientia, debetur ei secundum rem. Sed precisio sapientie a iustitia debetur sapientie ut | sapientia. Ergo debetur ei secundum rem. Conclusio ista M119rb est contra primum dictum. Ergo secundum dictum, unde sequitur ista conclusio, repugnat primo dicto; minor enim accepta fuit ex secundo dicto. Si vero dicas quod maior non est vera, et ideo propter falsitatem illius maioris sequitur conclusio falsa, probo illam sic. Quod debetur sapientie ut est res, debetur ei secundum rem; hec est evidentissima. Sed quod debetur sapientie ut est sapientia, debetur ei ut est res; patet, quia scientia ut scientia est vera res. Ergo quod debetur ei ut sapientia, debetur ei secundum rem.

1 a] et M

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De tribus falsis in positione Hervei inclusis 418 Nunc autem quarto ostendo falsa inclusa in ista positione. Et sunt

tria. Primum autem iam tactum est, ubi dicitur quod precisio sapientie a iustitia non est secundum rem—sic intelligendo quod hic est non-ydemptitas que exprimitur per negationem perseitatis in illa propositione ‘Sapientia inquantum sapientia non est iustitia’—et quod sapientia non per se includit iustitiam. Istud enim est omnino falsum, ut ostensum est ex dictis huius doctoris. Unde concedo cum eo quod hec est vera; ‘Sapientia ut sapientia non est iustitia’, negando rationem. Secundum falsum est quod dicit de intellectu simplici, scilicet quod in conceptu simplici sapientie includatur quidditative iustitia apud intellectum perfecte intelligentem. Et de hoc satis dictum est. Tertium falsum est quod dicit quod si sapientia nusquam esset et in nullo diversa realiter a iustitia, non posset concipi, non includendo iustitiam, et econverso. Hoc autem patenter falsum est, etiam per eum in hac questione; dicit enim, et bene, quod entitas et bonitas et veritas in nullo sunt diversa realiter, et tamen unum istorum (puta entitas) potest concipi, non includendo in conceptu eius bonitatem vel veritatem; et hec duo sunt sine invicem. Quare esto quod sapientia et iustitia in nullo differrent realiter, adhuc posset unum eorum concipi sine altero. Quare dictum est falsum. 419 Est autem advertendum quod causa deceptionis videtur esse ex eo va M119 quod iste doctor ymaginatus est | converti consequentiam que non convertitur, ut potest haberi ex septimo Metaphisice. Est enim bona consequentia ‘Hec duo posunt in aliquo vel in aliquibus separatim ut diversa realiter inveniri; ergo unum sine altero potest concipi’. Sed non convertitur ‘Possunt sine invicem concipi; ergo in aliquo sunt diversa realiter’. Non sequitur; nec etiam sequitur ad destructionem primi antecedentis si dicatur ita: ‘Hec in nullo sunt diversa realiter; ergo non possunt sine invicem concipi’; non sequitur. Et hoc habetur116 ex septimo Metaphisice sub hiis verbis: “Quecumque quidem igitur videntur facta in diversis specie, ut circulus in ere et lapide et ligno, hec quidem manifesta esse videntur, quia nichil circuli substantie es nec lapis propter separari ab ipsis; que vero non videntur separata, nichil prohibet

4 hic est] hec M 116

33–34 propter] potest M

Arist., Metaph. VII 11, 1036a31-b1.

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similiter hiis se habere, ut si circuli omnes videantur enei”. Ex hiis patet quod licet aliqua numquam sint separata, non propter hoc tamen potest argui quod unum sit de quidditate alterius nec quin unum possit sine alio concipi, licet sit difficile separare secundum Philosophum 5 ibidem.117 Quare manifestum est quod positio ista non est talis propter quam 420 debeat nostram positionem supra declarata dimitti. Et hec de secundo articulo.

articulus iii 10

DE RATIONIBUS ET MOTIVIS SENTENTIE OPPOSITE De triplici ratione cuiusdam doctoris contra meam sententiam

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Nunc autem pro tertio articulo questionis ponam rationes et motiva 421 opinionum huic sententie contradicentium. Arguit igitur quidam doctor triplici ratione. Prima est hec: Si aliqua duo sunt idem realiter et differunt formaliter, sumatur realitas qua sunt idem, et formalitates quibus differunt precise. Et tunc arguit ita: Illi realitati et illis formalitatibus vel est aliquid commune, vel nichil. Quolibet istorum dato, sequitur impossibile. Si enim detur quod nichil, sequitur quod hec sunt primo diversa quia in nullo conveniunt; et si primo | diversa, nullo modo sunt eadem. M119vb Sed positum erat quod essent idem realiter. Ergo erunt idem realiter et nullo modo idem. Si vero detur quod aliquid est eis commune, vel illud commune erit aliquid reale, vel aliquid solum rationis, vel aliquid indifferens ad utrumque. Si detur primum, sequitur quod tam realitas quam hee formalitates sunt entia realia—quia reale non dividitur nisi in realia—, et per consequens ista differunt realiter. Quod est contra conclusionem positam. Si vero detur quod illud commune sit solum ens rationis, sequitur quod omnia sunt entia rationis, quia ens rationis non dividitur per se nisi in entia rationis. Quod est contra positionem conclusionis. Si vero detur tertium, vel ambo erunt—tam realitas quam formalitas—tale ens quod est sic indifferens, vel unum est res, reliquum ratio. Si primum detur, sequitur quod ambo sunt realia et ambo rationis entia, quod est contra conclusionem positam. Si secundum, sequitur quod formalitas non est nisi ens rationis, et differre formaliter erit

117

Ibid., 1036b2–3.

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differre secundum rationem tantum, quod est contra positionem nostre conclusionis. Et ita patet et videtur ei quod nichil possit dari sine impossibili. 422 Secunda ratio est hec. Illa formalitas sumpta precise ut formalitas ut est formaliter distinctiva, vel est aliqua res, vel nulla res. Cum autem 5 ‘nichil’ et ‘nulla res’ equipolleant—secundum Augustinum, primo118 De doctrina christiana—sequitur quod differre per duas formalitates sit differre per duo nihila; quod est contra me. Si est aliqua res, vel est illa res que supponebatur ut realitas, vel alia. Si illa, sequitur quod idem M120ra erit principium ydemptificans et diversificans, quod est | impossibile. 10 Si alia, ergo sunt ille due res distincte, et per consequens distinctio est realis, quod est contra positionem meam, cum ponam quod sine distinctione reali est distinctio formalis. 423 Tertia ratio est hec. Que differunt per quidditates, differunt per realitates et realiter, cum quidditates sint realitates seu formalitates. Sed que 15 differunt per formalitates, differunt per quidditates, cum formalitates sint quidditates (ut concessum est). Ergo que differunt per formalitates sive formaliter, differunt realiter, quod est contra me. Respondetur ad has rationes 424 Ad hec statim respondeo. Ad primum dico quod, dato utrolibet mem- 20

bro prime divisionis, non sequitur aliquod impossibile. Si enim detur quod nichil est commune duabus formalitatibus et illi realitati substrate, non sequitur quod sint primo diversa et quod in nullo conveniant, quia convenire contingit dupliciter: uno modo in genere predicabili, alio modo in genere subicibili. Dico igitur quod licet duo nullum 25 haberent commune predicabile, dumtamen habeant aliquod commune subicibile in quo sint idem realiter, non propter hoc sunt primo diversa. Quod patet in genere et differentia: hiis nichil est commune essentiale, ut communiter dicitur, tamen est eis commune subicibile, puta species. Et propter hoc non sunt primo diversa nullam ydemptitatem habentia, 30 res generis et res differentie. Quare hoc dato, nichil sequitur impossibile, ut dixi. Si vero detur quod est eis aliquid commune et detur etiam quod reale, nullum sequitur impossibile. Cum enim dicit quod ambo, 9 ut] Mc om. M 118 Augustinus, De doctrina christiana I cap. 2, p. 916–17: “Quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est”.

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scilicet realitas et formalitas, erunt realia, concedatur quare supra dictum fuit quod quidditates seu formalitates erant realitates universales, sicut etiam iste doctor supponit quod illud commune divisum sit aliquid reale. Certum est autem quod sicut | illud est commune et universale, sic sua realitas est communis et universalis. Quare possum concedere quod ista differentia est realis, dicta realis a realitatibus universalibus que sunt principia huis differentie absque hoc quod realitates singulares distinguantur. Quare patet quod utrolibet eorum dato, nullum sequitur inconveniens. Item. Improprie queritur cum dicit an realitati et formalitati sit aliquid commune. Hoc enim est querere an homini et Sorti sit aliquid commune; que questio nulla est. Sumitur enim, ut dictum est prius, formalitas pro universali realitate et realitas simpliciter pro singulari. Ad secundum dico quod formalitas est res, ut supra exposui, scilicet res universalis, res secundum quid, res secunda, res de hoc quali quid, ut ipsa dici possit res qualiscumque, non tamen est res aliqua singularis, ut supra dictum est. Et cum postea dicit ‘Ergo vel est aliqua res substracta vel alia’, dico quod falsum est. Et consequentia peccat per fallaciam dictionis, mutando quale quid in hoc aliquid, rem universalem in rem singularem. Et est similis forma in hoc paralogismo: ‘Si homo dicitur de Sorte et de Platone, est res vel est res Sortis vel alia res a re Sortis; si res Sortis, tunc res Sortis predicatur per se et vere de re Platonis (quod est falsum); si res alia, ergo res alia a Sorte predicatur de Sorte per se et vere predicatione dicente “hoc est hoc”’ (quod est impossibile). Patet igitur quod iste doctor sumit paralogismum pro demonstratione, quod est turpe in eo. Ad tertium dico quod differre per quidditates est differre per realitates universales, et per consequens differre realiter realitatibus universalibus; differre tamen realiter talibus realitatibus non est differre | realiter simpliciter pro eo quod realitates huiusmodi non sunt realitates simpliciter, ut superius dictum fuit. Quare non dicimus enunciando simpliciter et absolute differre illa realiter que solum differunt realitatibus universalibus, sed dicimus formaliter et quidditative talia differre, ut iustitiam et sapientiam in Deo, in quo non concurrunt simul differre per realitates universales et per realitates singulares. Patet igitur quod rationes iste non debent aliquid movere contra positionem hanc sic expositam.

34 quo] quibus M

M120rb

425

426 120va

588

pars tertia Respondetur ad rationem Hervei contra positam conclusionem

427 Arguit etiam Herveus primo Quolibet contra positam conclusionem uni-

ca ratione in generali. Que talis est:119 “Nulla passio simplex vel disiuncta extenditur amplius quam genus subiectum cuius est passio. Sed ydemptitas et diversitas seu differentia, dis- 5 tinctio et indistinctio sunt passiones entis, ut patet de se, et ens non extenditur nisi ad ens reale et ad ens rationis. Ergo nulla differentia nec diversitas nec distinctio. Quare nulla erit differentia aut diversitas seu distinctio nisi realis vel rationis solum. Quod est contra hanc conclusionem, que ponit differentiam formalem non esse solis rationis nec simpliciter 10 realem. Quare videtur positio esse penitus impossibilis.” 428 Ad120 hec respondeo. Et dico quod argumentum peccat dupliciter. Et

ostendo primo fallaciam equivocationis, quia ‘ens reale’ dupliciter dicitur: uno modo ens singulare et hoc aliquid et primum, quod est ens simpliciter; alio modo ens universale, quale quid et secundum, quod est ens secundum quid. Et quod hoc secundo modo habeamus ponere ens reale patet per istum doctorem et alios qui dicunt ens reale extra animam dividi in decem predicamenta; illud autem ens reale divisum necessario est ens universale. Modo apparet quod ens extenditur ad ens rationis et ad ens reale simpliciter et ad ens reale secundum quid. Et quando infert ‘Ergo nec differentia extenditur nisi ad ens tantum rationis et ad ens reale simpliciter’, non sequitur, ut patet per equivocationem eius quod est ‘ens reale’, quia potest esse differentia que nec M120vb erit solum rationis nec realis simpliciter, sed realis secundum | quid, sicut dictum est de ente. Et hanc vocamus differentiam formalem ad differentiam differentie simpliciter realis. 429 Secundo peccat quoniam concessa conclusione primi sillogismi— que debet esse ista, scilicet quod nulla differentia extenditur nisi ad ens reale vel rationis—nichil sequitur contra me, quia cum postea ex hac conclusione infertur quod nulla erit differentia nisi realis vel rationis, dico quod non sequitur. Quod declaro in simili. Accipio quod passio propria trianguli non extenditur nisi ad triangulum habentem tria latera equalia, vel tria latera inequalia, vel duo equalia et unum de duo-

2–3 arguit … talis est] M contra illud arguitur sic O unum de] de unum M 119 120

Hervaeus, Quolibet I, ubinam? Sectt. 428–452 desiderantur in O.

33 equalia] Mc inequalia M |

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bus inter se equalibus inequale, quia passio trianguli non habet latera, licet sit passio habentis latera. Et est peccatum in consequentia fallacie figure dictionis ex similitudine terminationis accusative. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod ‘extendi aliquam passionem’ potest multi5 pliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod extendatur ad aliqua ut ad subiecta quorum sit passio; et hoc modo extenditur ad alia ad que extenditur subiectum cuius est passio, non tamen eodem modo, quia subiectum extenditur ad illa quidditative, passio vero denominative. Alio modo potest intelligi quod extendatur ad aliqua ut ad proprias differentias; 10 et hoc modo non extenditur ad differentias subiecti sui, quia non eisdem differentiis dividitur subiectum passionis et passio subiecti sui, ut patet de triangulo et passione eius. Cum ergo arguitur ab una ad aliam, tangitur figura dictionis, quia non est motivum nisi similitudo terminationis accusative, que exprimitur per illud ‘aliqua’, cum tamen sit dissi15 milis habitudo. Quare est figura dictionis. Unde per istud argumentum non posset probari quod aliqua passio entis esset realis vel rationis, ut patuit in terminis datis et positis sub eadem forma. Quare constat quod ratio est nulla. De quadam oppositione contra distinctionem formalem Argui etiam potest contra predicta, precipue contra illa que de Prima 430 Causa dicta sunt, scilicet quod in Prima Causa non possit poni | forma- M121ra lis distinctio attributorum, sic: Quandocumque ponitur distinctio formalis sine reali, ponuntur realitates secundum quid, ut patet ex datis. Sed in Prima Causa nulla est realitas secundum quid, quia hec dicit 25 imperfectionem, quam nefas est poni in ea. Ergo etc.. Secundo sic. Omne infinitum realiter est idem realiter cuicumque inexistenti sibi realiter; ergo infinitum formaliter erit idem formaliter cuicumque inexistenti formaliter. Sed Causa Prima est infinita formaliter. Ergo est idem formaliter cuicumque sibi inexistenti formaliter. Tertio sic. In quocum30 que est realitas et realitas realiter distincte, in eo est compositio realis; ergo in quocumque est formalitas et formalitas formaliter distincte, in eo est compositio formalis. Sed in Causa Prima nulla est talis compositio. Ergo nulla talis distinctio. Quarto sic. Omne tale non per propriam quidditatem sed per aliam est potentiale et imperfectum. Sed 35 secundum hanc positionem Prima Causa est talis, puta sapientius, non 20

1 equalibus] Mc inequalibus M 34 potentiale] coni. possibile M

24 est] Mc om. M

30 realiter] et add. M

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per propriam quidditatem sue divinitatis sed per quidditatem sapientie. Ergo est potentiale et imperfectum; quod est absurdum. 431 Respondeo. Ad primum dico quod realitas secundum quid duplex est. Una que includit imperfectionem et excludit perfectionem et actualitatem, sicut ens in potentia et homo mortuus; et huiusmodi realitates secundum quid non sunt in Prima Causa. Tamen est realitas secundum quid que non includit nec excludit perfectionem vel imperfectionem actualitatis, sed quantum est de se permittit utramque, idest est compossibilis utrique. Et talis bene potest poni in Deo; sufficit enim quod realitates et perfectiones que sunt in Prima Causa cum deitate, permittant perfectionem omnimodam, quia sola ratio deitatis ponit omnem aliam rationem compossibilem sibi in actuali existentia. Tales autem realitates sunt realitates universales, que in Deo sunt formaliter. Et ideo ex hoc nullum sequitur inconveniens. Quare ratio non concludit contra me. 432 Ad secundum dico quod prima consequentia non est bona, quoniam aliter sumitur ‘inexistentia’ cum dicitur aliquid inexistere realiter et aliM121rb ter cum dicitur inexistere | formaliter, quia cum dicitur aliquid inexistere Cause Prime realiter, sensus est quod tota realitas singularis que dicitur realitas simpliciter, inexistat ei primo et non in aliquo alio; cum autem dicitur aliquid inexistere formaliter, non est sensus quod ipsa formalitas, scilicet universalis realitas, inexistat ei primo et per se et in se ut universalis est, sed quia inexistit ei in aliquo suo singulari. Quare si illa singularis realitas que primo est et in se et inexistit, ydemptificatur ei realiter, non propter hoc sequitur quod universalis realitas secundum se in sua formali ratione ydemptificetur ei. Et hoc erat esse idem formaliter, ut supra est expositum. 433 Ad tertium dico etiam quod prima consequentia non est bona. Cuius ratio est quia formalis compositio non dicitur a formalitate et formalitate, sed a formali ratione, quia compositio proprie est rerum singularium, non universalium, et formalis compositio non est a formali compositione rerum, ymo exigit quod alterum compositorum ponatur materialiter ut subiectum; unde formalis compositio est duarum rerum singularium realiter distinctarum se habentium ut actus et potentia, ut perfectio et perfectibilis simulpositio. Si tu [situm M] velis distinguere inter compositionem per formalem et realem (ut ego distinguo realitatem), ita quod compositio realis sit compositio singularis, et compositio formalis sit compositio universalis, tunc dico etiam quod consequentia 2 potentiale] coni. possibile M

30 sed] coni. et M

35 si tu] situm(!) M

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non est bona. Cuius ratio est quia sicut in nullo singulari est realitas universalis nisi per realitatem singularem, sic in nullo est compositio universalis nisi per compositionem singularem. In Causa vero Prima nulla est compositio singularis. Quare nec universalis. 5 Ad quartum dico quod maior est duplex, quia cum dicitur ‘omne 434 tale non per propriam quidditatem’, illa negatio vel potest negare universaliter, ita quod nullo modo sit tale per propriam quidditatem, vel partialiter, ita quod non sit formaliter tale per propriam quidditatem, tamen aliquo alio modo sit tale per propriam quidditatem, | puta emi- M121va 10 nenter tamquam per fontanam et originalem plenitudinem. In primo autem sensu maior est vera et minor falsa. Prima enim Causa per propriam sue deitatis quidditatem est eminenter et virtualiter tamquam per fontem omnis Perfectio simpliciter. In secundo autem sensu minor est vera, quia certum est quod nichil est formaliter sapiens nisi per habere 15 formaliter quidditatem sapientie. Maior tamen in hoc sensu est falsa. Illud enim est perfectissimum quod est eminens fontana et origo omnis perfectionis simpliciter, ita quod in quocumque ponatur ponitur necessario omnis Perfectio simpliciter sub gradu infinitatis, licet formaliter non largiatur tale esse. 20

Respondetur ad argumenta principalia in contrarium adducta

Ad primum principale [377] dico quod ‘plus differre quam secundum 435 numerum’ potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo quod in hac pluri differentia includatur differentia secundum numerum; alio modo quod non includatur. Et tunc in primo sensu concedo maiorem, scilicet quod que 25 plus differunt quam secundum numerum, differunt realiter; sed minorem nego, dicendo quod non est verum universaliter quod quecumque differunt formaliter, plus differant quam secundum numerum, nisi cum differentia formali rerum universalium contrahat differentia realis rerum singularium, ut inter Sortem et Brunellum. 30 Ad secundum [ibid.] dico quod que differunt diffinitione, differunt 436 realiter realitatibus significatis per diffinitiones, que suntbres universales. Differre autem realiter isto modo vocamus differre formaliter ubi alia differentia rerum singularium non concurrit, quod non fit universaliter in omnibus. 35 Et hec de questione ista sufficiant. 35 sufficiant] sequuntur lineae septem circiter non usitatae in M

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questio iva DE SINGULIS INTENTIONIBUS PREDICAMENTALIBUS 437 Ostenso per questionem precedentem quod alique due intentiones dis121vb

tinguuntur formaliter ex natura rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali, 5 nunc autem queritur singulariter de intentionibus predicamentalibus. Utrum intentiones predicamentales distinguantur realiter

438 Et primo utrum intentiones predicamentales distinguantur realiter. Et

439

440

441 M122ra

videtur quod sic. Prima rerum principia distinguuntur realiter. Sed ut dicit121 Porfirius, predicamenta sunt rerum principia prima. Ergo etc. In oppositum arguitur. Illa que solum distinguuntur intentionaliter, non distinguuntur realiter. Sed intentiones predicamentales solum distinguuntur intentionaliter. Ergo non distinguuntur realiter. Minor probatur quoniam: Illa solum distinguuntur intentionaliter que solum sunt intentiones. Sed predicamenta solum sunt intentiones. Ergo solum distinguuntur intentionaliter. Iuxta hoc querebatur utrum realitas transcendenter acceptibilis sufficienter dividatur in decem predicamenta. Arguitur quod non quia infinitum est aliqua realitas, et tamen non est in aliquo determinato predicamento, cum infinitum non possit determinari, sicut nec terminari. In oppositum est auctoritas122 Aristotilis in Predicamentis: ‘Singulum incomplexorum aut significat substantiam aut quantitatem etc.’. Iuxta hoc querebatur utrum ens finitum sufficienter dividatur in decem predicamenta. Videtur quod non. Inherentia accidentis est aliquod ens finitum, et tamen non est in aliquo determinato predicamento, cum sit communis ad novem genera. In oppositum est auctoritas Aristotilis in Predicamentis ut statim in questione precedenti allegatum est. Iuxta hoc querebatur quarto utrum divine simplicitati repugnat esse in predicamento. Videtur quod sic. Omnimode simplicitati repugnat quecumque compositio. Sed divina simplicitas | est omnimoda et in re que est ens, que est in predicamento aliqualiter compositio, quia saltem

121 122

Porphyrius, Isag, 6, 7–8; Arist. Lat., p. 12. Arist., Categ. 4, 1b25–27.

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ex genere et ex differentia. Ergo etc. In oppositum. Deo non repugnat habere conceptum determinabilem, determinantem et determinatum. Sed nulla est compositio in genere ratione generis nisi istorum conceptuum. Ergo Deo non repugnat quecumque compositio generis, nec per 5 consequens simplicitati sue. Pro solutionibus istarum quatuor questionum sex sunt declaranda. 442 Primo quid est res vel intentio predicamentalis. Secundo utrum omnis res predicamentalis reducatur ad aliquod decem predicamentorum. Tertio utrum quecumque res simpliciter et universaliter accepta sit in 10 aliquo decem predicamentorum; et in hoc articulo solventur tres questiones. Quarto utrum distinctio predicamentorum sit extra animam ex natura rei. Quinto utrum aliqua una realitas predicamentalis possit simul esse in diversis predicamentis. Sexto utrum in aliqua una realitate singulari possint salvari realitates plurium predicamentorum. 15

articulus i QUE REALITAS DEBEAT DICI REALITAS PREDICAMENTALIS De duodecim conclusionibus cica talem realitatem ponendis

De primo articulo pono duodecim conclusiones ad ostendendum que 443 20 realitas debeat dici realitas predicamentalis. Prima conclusio est quod res predicamentalis est realitas nata predicari. Secunda, quod est res universalis. Tertia, quod est res secundum quid. Quarta, quod est res secunda. Quinta, quod est quid vel quale quid. Sexta, quod est ratio. Septima, quod est ratio non-transcendens. Octava, quod est ratio 25 generis vel speciei vel differentie. Nona, quod est ratio positiva. Decima, quod est ratio realis. Undecima, quod est ratio per se una. Duodecima, quod est ratio permissive infinita. Prime quinque conclusiones habent eandem causam veritatis, et una illarum sequitur ex altera: res enim que est nata predicari, est universalis, et econverso; et res secundum 30 quid | est res secunda et res quid vel quale quid. Quare illas quinque M122rb declaro simul quinque persuasionibus.

594

pars tertia De quinque persuasionibus circa primas quinque conclusiones ponendis

444 Prima persuasio sumitur ex descriptione predicamenti que magistrali-

ter talis est: ‘predicamentum est dicibile incomplexum, ordinabile in genera, per se et formaliter in plura diffusivum, totius illius diffusionis principium et omnium istorum que sunt illius originis universaliter collectivum’. In ista descriptione ponuntur quatuor ex quibus patet quod res predicamentalis est res nata predicari et res universalis. Primum est ‘dicibile’, idest predicabile. Secundum est quia ‘formaliter diffusibile’, idest in partes subiectivas divisibile. Tertium est quia ‘diffusionis principium’, idest divisionis qua totum universale in suas partes dividit. Quartum est quia ‘istorum que sunt eiusdem originis collectivum’, idest plurium numero vel specie differentium in unitate speciei vel originis collectivum. 445 Secunda persuasio sumitur ex dicto Boetii super Predicamenta, ubi dicit123 “Predicamentum est originatio et ordinatio predicabilium secundum sub et supra”. Sed omne predicabile est res universalis et nata predicari. Ergo res predicamentalis est res universalis. 446 Tertia persuasio sumitur ex dicto Porfirii, dicentis124 quod in ordinatione predicamentali sunt extrema ita quod extrema habent tantum unam habitudinem, media vero duas; unum autem extremum vocat generalissimum, quod habet tantum habitudinem ad inferiora, alterum vocat specialissimum, quod habet tantum habitudinem ad superiora. Certum est autem quod si connumerantur res singulares et individuales inter res predicamentales, quod illud quod ipse vocat extremum infimum specialissimum, non esset extremum nec infimum in predicamento, nec tantum haberet habitudinem ad superiora, hocest ad superiores res predicamentales, ymo haberet habitudinem ad singuva M122 lares res predicabiles. Quare patet quod res individuales | non sunt res predicamentales, et per consequens quod omnis res predicamentalis est res universalis. 447 Quarta persuasio sumitur ex dictis Aristotilis in Antepredicamentis, ubi antequam agat de predicamentis, agit de natura predicationis, agendo 3 dicibile] discibile M extrema M

8 dicibile] discibile M

18 dicentis] dicens M

21 inferiora]

123 Locum invenire non potui. Conferas autem nostri auctoris Logicam III, Annexum, cap. 74, p. 487: “Tertius autem ordo est inter res ordinabiles secundum quod sub et supra in predicamento”. 124 Conferas Porphyrium, Isag., 4, 15–21; Arist. Lat., p. 9.

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de equivocis et de denominativis et de univocis, et distinguit de esse in subiecto et de non esse in subiecto, et postea ponit regulam de hiis que dicuntur de subiecto, dicendo125 “Quando alterum de altero etc.”; et ibidem126 dat regulam: “Diversorum generum et non subalternatim 5 positorum etc.”, non intromisit se de diversitate individuorum, quasi non essent realitates predicamentales. Ex quibus omnibus colligi potest quod de intentione Aristotilis est solas realitates universales esse predicamentales. Quinta persuasio sumi potest ex tali ratione. Coordinationes predica- 448 10 mentorum sunt permixte in rebus predicamentalibus. Sed non sunt permixte in rebus singularibus. Ergo realitates predicamentales non sunt predicabiles, licet salventur et predicantur de eis et in eis. Hec de quinque conclusionibus. De septem ceteris conclusionibus circa predictam realitatem ponendis Sexta conclusio, scilicet quod res predicamentalis est ratio, probatur sic. 449 Omnis res universaliter nata predicari est ratio. Sed omnis realitas est universaliter nata predicari, ut iam probatum est. Ergo etc. Maior probatur primo ex diffinitione univocorum in Antepredicamentis, que talis127 est: “Univoca dicuntur quorum nomen est commune et secundum illud 20 nomen ratio substantie est eadem, ut ‘animal’, ‘bos’”. Et addit quod communi nomine utraque, scilicet ‘homo’ et ‘bos’, et animalia nuncupantur, et est ratio substantie eadem. Ex quibus patet quod animalitas significata nomine ‘animalis’ dicto de bove et homine dicitur ‘ratio substantialis’. Non enim est intelligendum quod de bove et homine secun25 dum suam substantiam predicetur aliqua ratio facta per intellectum, ut aliquis dicere voluerit. Secundo probatur idem ex quarto Metaphisice, ubi dicitur128 quod ratio quam significat nomen, est substantie diffinitio. Sed nomen significans rem diffinibilem significat rem universalem. Quare illa res universalis est ratio, secundum quod Aristotiles utitur 30 nomine ‘rationis’. 15

4 regulam] rationem M 125 126 127 128

17 universaliter] universalis M

Arist., Categ. 1, 1a1–2, 1b9. Ibid. 3, 1b10–24. Ibid. 1, 1a6–8. Conferas Arist., Metaph. IV 4, 1006a28-b9.

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Septima conclusio, scilicet quod res predicamentalis non est ratio transcendens probatur dupliciter. Primo sic. Nulla ratio transcendens est in isto gradu predicamentali, ut apparet per Porfirium; et apparet quia: Sunt communia predicamentis. Sed omnis res predicamentalis M122vb est in aliquo gradu predicamentali. | Ergo nulla res predicamentalis 5 est ratio transcendens. Secundo sic. Predicamenta differunt rationibus predicamentalibus. Sed non differunt rationibus transcendentibus. Ergo rationes transcendentes non sunt res predicamentales, nec econverso. 451 Contra istam conclusionem posset sic obici sophistice: Ens est ratio transcendens. Sed res predicamentalis est ens. Ergo ratio predicamen- 10 talis est ratio transcendens. Responsio peccat per sophisma accidentis, procedendo a suppositione simplici ad personalem. 452 Octava conclusio [Cetera desunt].

6 rationibus] realitatibus M

APPENDICES

CONTENTS

appendix a: william of ware Quaestiones in I Sent., dist. 23 Questio prima. Utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen secunde intentionis vel prime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–15 Quid sit nomen prime vel secunde intentionis . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Quod ‘persona’ est nomen prime intentionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4–7 Contra hoc arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8–9 De triplici differentia nominum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Ad argumenta alterius opinionis arguitur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11–13 Ad argumenta principalia arguitur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14–15 Questio secunda. Utrum persona dicatur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16–35a Quod persona in divinis dicatur secundum substantiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20–21 Quod ‘persona’ significat relationem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22–23 Quomodo aliquod nomen actu dicatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 De duobus modis significandi relationem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Contra hoc arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26–27 Respondetur ad hec argumenta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28–29 Ad argumenta positionis dicitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Ad argumenta principalia respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31–33b

appendix b: james of metz In I Sent., dist. 25a, q. 1 Respondetur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus I. De quadam opinione falsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quadam distinctione nominum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ est nomen secunde intentionis. . . . . . . . . . . Quod prefata distinctio nominum non est bona. . . . . . . . . . Articulus II. De prima intentione et secunda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De triplici divisione ‘intentionalis’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 3–7 4 5 6–7 8–16 8–11

600

contents

Quid est prima intentio et quid secunda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus III. De proposito principali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen prime intentionis vel secunde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sit nomen prime intentionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sit nomen secunde intentionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad argumenta in oppositum.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12–16 17–24 17 18–20 21–22 23–24

appendix c: hervaeus natalis Quaestiones In I Sent., dist. 23 Utrum ‘persona’ in divinis significet essentiam vel relationem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod significet substantiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus I. De ortu et significatione huius nominis ‘persona’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ significet secundam intentionem . . . . . . . . Quod significet rem abstractam substratam intentioni . . . Quod ‘persona’ non dicat secundam intentionem . . . . . . . Articulus II. An persona proprie conveniat in divinis . . . . . . . Quod persona non proprie conveniat Deo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De formali significato nominis et materiali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus III. Utrum ‘persona’ in divinis substantiam vel relationem significet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tribus conclusionibus probandis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ includit utrumque, sc. substantiam et relationem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ nil significat in recto, sed in obliquo . . . . Quod ‘persona’ significat formaliter relationem per modum substantie. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes principales in oppositum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2–4 5–17 10–11 12–16 17 19–23 20 21–23 24–34 25 26 27 28–32 33–34

appendix d: durandus de sancto porciano Quaestiones in I Sent., dist. 23 Quod ‘persona’ significet relationem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ significet intentionem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ significet rem subiectam intentioni. . . . . . . . . Utrum ‘persona’ significet substantiam vel relationem. . . . . .

2–5 6–8 9–15 16–23

contents

601

appendix e: radulphus brito I. Quaestiones in I Sent., dist. 23 Utrum ‘persona’ in divinis significet essentiam vel relationem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A quo sumitur ‘persona’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quid dicat ‘persona’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ dicit intentionem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ dicit aliquid reale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ non dicit aliquid intentionale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duplici cognitione rei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duplici intentione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum ‘persona’ significet essentiam vel relationem . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ dicit utrumque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In oppositum arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad argumenta in oppositum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes alterius positionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes principales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1–3 4 5 6–12 13–17 18 19 20–21 22–24 25–26 27–28 29–30 31–34 35–36

II. Quaestiones in artem veterem. Accessus III. Quaestiones in Porph. Isag., qq. 1–4, and 11 Q. 1a: Utrum logica sit scientia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arguitur quod non . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad solutionem illius questionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q. 2a: Utrum logica sit scientia realis vel rationalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quaestio 3a: Utrum sillogismus sit subiectum logice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sillogismus non sit subiectum in logica. . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod modus sciendi non sit subiectum in logica. . . . . . . . . Respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quaestio 4a: Utrum universale sit subiectum in libro Porphirii . . . . Quod universale non sit subiectum in libro Porphirii . . . . Respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quaestio 11a: Utrum diffinitione generis diffiniatur intentio vel res subiecta intentioni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1–17 2–7 8 9–17 1–16 7–8 9–16 1–13 2–4 5–6 7–9 10–13 1–20 2–7 8–12 13–20 1–18

602

contents Arguitur quod ibi diffiniatur intentio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oppositum arguitur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Questio determinatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quid est intelligendum propter rationes solvendas . . . . . . . Ad rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV. Quaestiones in Arist. I De anima, q. 6 Arguitur quod sit preter operationem intellectus . . . . . . . . . . . . Arguitur in oppositum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Determinatur questio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quid sit intentio in communi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De prima intentione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda intentione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Similiter in complexis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quando universale sumitur pro prima intentione in concreto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quando universale sumitur pro secunda intentione in concreto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refutatur dubium quoddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod materiale significatum secunde intentionis non sit sine intellectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod formale significatum secunde intentionis non sit ab intellectu possibili . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sit ab agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi ipsius probatur quadrupliciter .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod universale sumptum pro quidditate rei secundum se non est ab intellectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unde intentiones denominative predicantur de obiectis suis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2–3 4–6 7–12 13–15 16–18

2–5 6 7–10 7 8 9 10 11–12 13 14 15 16–18 19 20–23 24 25 26–31

appendix f: petrus aureolus Scriptum super I Sent., dist. 23 Utrum nomen ‘persone’ significet in divinis commune vel aliquid prime intentionis aut secunde intentionis tantum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod ‘persona’ sit nomen prime intentionis et non secunde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9–16 17–24

contents Respondetur ad questionem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus I. Opinio Radulphi et quorundam aliorum. . . . . . . De tribus conclusionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinio Hervei in tractatu De secundis intentionibus et in Quolibet suo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinque conclusionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinio quorundam aliorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articulus II. Quid dicendum secundum veritatem . . . . . . . . . . De primo defectu prime opinionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secundo defectu prime opinionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tribus erroribus Radulphi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De prima propositione generali in hac materia colligenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De decem defectibus opinionis secunde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De primo defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secundo defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tertio defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quarto defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quinto defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De sexto defectu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De septimo defectu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De octavo defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De nono defectu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De decimo defectu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda propositione generali in hac materia colligenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recollectio omnium que de intentionibus sunt tenenda . Articulus III. An persona sit nomen secunde intentionis . . . Opinio Henrici in Summa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinio Scoti in Scripto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinio Guarronis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quid dicendum secundum veritatem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De prima propositione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda propositione. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tertia propositione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Responsio ad obiecta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

603 25 26–47 31–33 34–41 42–46 47 48–117 48–55 56–62 63 64 65 65–73 74–77 78–85 86 87–97 97–101 102–105 106–107 108–111 112–115 116 117 118–143 118 119 120 121–135 121–126 127 128–135 136–143

604

contents

appendix g: franciscus de prato Tractatus de ente rationis De opinione antiquorum et aliquorum modernorum. . . . . . . Contra istam opinionem arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondent Ocham et quidam alii doctores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contra istum modum ponendi arguitur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De opinione beati Thome et magistri Hervei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Impugnatur vera opinio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hic ponuntur quedam pro solutione rationum dictarum . . . Responsiones que fiunt ad rationes supra oppositas . . . . . . . . De quodam alio modo loquendi de ente rationis . . . . . . . . . . . Ad secundum argumentum principale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad tertium principale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad quatuor argumenta in principio posita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2–5 6–11 12 13–15 16–28 29–44 45–49 50–54 55–57 58–79 80–82 83–86

appendix h: stephanus de reate I. Tractatus de quibusdam logice principiis pars prima: De primis et secundis intentionibus1 Introductio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–2 Pars prima. De primis et secundis intentionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum I: Quid sit intentio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4–11 De intentione sumpta ex parte intelligentis . . . . . . . . . . . . 5–7 De intentione sumpta ex parte rei intellecte . . . . . . . . . . . 8 De quodam dubio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Respondetur .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10–11 Capitulum II. De prima intentione materialiter et in concreto sumpta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–34 Quid sit ens reale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A quo ens reale intellectum dicatur intentio . . . . . . . . . . . 14–16 De istis propositionibus ‘Ens reale est intellectum’,‘Ens reale intellectum est intentio’ . . . . . 17 De duplici denominatione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18–21 Utrum prius ens reale dicatur ‘intellectum’ quam ‘intentio’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22–23 De quodam dubio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1

= Tractatus de quibusdam logicae principiis, pars prima.

contents Respondetur .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad primam intentionem in concreto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duplici dubio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum figmenta possint reduci ad primam intentionem in concreto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duplici dubio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondetur .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum III. De prima intentione in abstracto sumpta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tribus notandis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De opinione quorundam modernorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duplici dubio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum IV. De secunda intentione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda intentione in concreto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De duobus videndis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De secunda intentione formaliter sive in abstracto . . . . De tribus videndis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum secunda intentio sit aliquid existens in intellectu subiective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tribus conclusionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum V. An secunda intentio sit aliquod ens positivum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De quadam alia opinione magistri Hervei . . . . . . . . . . . . . De opinione propria auctoris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum VI. An secunda intentio sit in aliquo subiecto .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De tribus conclusionibus ipsius auctoris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utrum secunda intentio habeat causam efficientem . . Quod ens rationis ut consequitur rem intellectam, nullo modo possit esse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum VII. An ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, sit relatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De relatione reali et relatione rationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum VIII. An secunda intentio possit intelligi . . . . . De duplici actu intelligendi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contra hoc arguitur et respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ad rationes primas respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitulum IX. Sequitur recapitulatio.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

605 25 26–27 28 29–30 31 32 33–34 35–46 36–40 41–42 43–46 47–66 48–49 50–51 52 53–56 57–62 63–66 67–76 67–74 75–76 77–104 86–88 89–94 95–104 105–109 106–109 110–120 112–115 116–118 119–120 121

606

contents Capitulum X. De subiecto proprio logice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sit argumentatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sit sermo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod sit sillogismus vel ens rationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quod est ens rationis quod est secunda intentio. . . . . . . Capitulum XI. De opinione doctorum modernorum . . . . Contra ista arguitur necnon respondetur . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II. Tractatus de ente reali et ente rationis.

122–131 123–124 125 126–127 128–131 132–140 136–140

appendix a WILLIAM OF WARE Quaestiones in I Sent., dist. 23 (before 1300) C 5 L P V

Vatican City, Chigi, B VII 114, ff. 60va–61rb Florence, Bibl. Laurenziana, Plut. 33 D 1, f. 62r–v Vienna, VPL 1724, ff. 51vb–52rb Vienna, VPL 1438, f. 72rb–vb1

questio prima 10

utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen secunde intentionis vel prime 1

Deinde circa distinctionem 23 queritur utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen C60va; L62r; secunde intentionis vel prime. Quod prime probatur sic. De re sive de P51vb; V72rb nomine prime intentionis non predicatur per se nomen secunde intentionis. Sed hec est per se ‘Pater est Persona’; sed ‘pater’ est nomen 15 prime intentionis. Quare et persona. Item. Adoratio non debetur nostris conceptibus nec secundis intentionibus, sed adoratio debetur personis, sicut dicitur2 in prefatione de Trinitate. Quare etc.

12 quod prime] CL videtur quod prime intentionis quod prime PV | sive de] CV vel L sive vel sub P 13 predicatur] CL dicitur P est V 14 sed … pater] CLP pater autem V 15 quare et persona] CL ergo etc. PV 17 quare etc.] CL om. PV 1 I owe copies of these manuscripts to the kindness of Russell Friedman. Although CL are far from being entirely reliable, they seem to present a better text than PV. The critical apparatus only mentions more or less significant variants. 2 Missale romanum, Praefatio SSmae Trinitatis: “Vere dignum et iustum est, aequum et salutare nos Tibi semper et ubique gratias agere, Domine sancte Pater, omnipotens aeterne Deus. Qui cum unigenito Filio tuo et Spiritu Sancto unus es Deus, unus es Dominus, non in unius singularitate personae sed in unius Trinitate substantiae. Quod enim de tua gloria, revelante Te, credimus, hoc de Filio tuo, hoc de Spiritu Sancto sine differentia discretionis sentimus, ut in confessione verae sempiternaeque Deitatis et in personis proprietas et in essentia unitas et in maiestate adoretur aequalitas (…)”.

608 2

V72va

appendix a

Contra. In diffinitione nominis prime intentionis non cadit nomen secunde intentionis; cuius ratio est quia illud quod cadit in diffinitione, prius est diffinito; nomen vero secunde intentionis secundum suum esse intellectum, sive ipsa intentio secunda que accidit rei prime intentionis secundum suum esse intellectum, cum sit aliquid fabricatum ab intel- 5 lectu super ipsam rem, est posterius ipsa re. Sed in diffinitione persone cadit nomen secunde | intentionis; est enim persona rationalis nature individua substantia; ‘individuum’ vero est nomen secunde intentionis secundum omnes. Quare etc. Quid sit nomen prime vel secunde intentionis

10

3 Respondetur quod intentio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo intentio idem

est quod in aliud tentio, intendere enim est in aliud tendere; et sic est actus voluntatis. Et secundum hoc non dicitur nomen prime intentionis vel secunde. Alio modo dicitur intentio quasi intus tentio; est enim intendere quasi intus tendere vel capere. Et sic est actus intellectus, ita quod secun- 15 dum quod intellectus quasi intus tenet vel capit aliquid tamquam principale obiectum, sic imponit nomen prime intentionis. Secundum vero quod intellectus tenet vel capit quasi secundario aliquid fabricatum ab intellectu, sic accipit nomen secunde intentionis. Quod ‘persona’ est nomen prime intentionis

20

4 Secundum hoc dicunt aliqui ad questionem quod ‘persona’ est nomen

prime intentionis, ita quod, sicut videmus in creaturis quod nomen prime intentionis significat primo aliquid aggregatum ex materia et forma, et secundario ipsam formam, et tertio ipsam materiam.—cuius tamen contrarium dicit3 Commentator quarto Metaphisice, scilicet quod 25

3–4 secundum suum esse intellectum] C om. LPV 4–5 ipsa … intellectum] CL res V respectus P 7–8 est enim … intentionis] LP om. CV 9 secundum omnes] CLP om. V 12 intendere enim] CL tendere enim V nam intendere P 13 non dicitur] CLP est non Vc non V | intentionis] CLP om. V 14 intus] LP intellectus C intellectu V 16 quasi intus] LPV om. C | tamquam] CLP quasi V 17 sic imponit] CL sic preponit W sit V 19 accipit] LPV accipitur C 21 secundum hoc] CLP sed hic V 22–23 ita … intentionis] CLV om. W 22 alterum quod] om. V | nomen] CLPVc om. V 23 significat] CLPV enim add. P | primo aliquid] CL primo P aliquid V 24 materiam] CLV essentiam P 25 tamen] CLP om. V 3

Averroes, In IV Arist. Metaph. Comm. (ad Arist., Metaph. IV 4, 1006b20 ff.).

william of ware

609

nomen principaliter significat ipsam formam—, sic ‘persona’ in divinis proportionaliter significat primo aggregatum ex essentia et proprietate, et secundario ipsam proprietatem, et ultimo ipsam essentiam. Ad hoc ponuntur tres rationes. Quarum prima est quod actionis 5 5 realis oportet quod sit et terminus aliquid reale. Sed generatio in divinis est actio realis, et Persona est terminus generationis. Quare Persona erit aliquid reale, et non res sive nomen secunde intentionis. Item. De re secunde intentionis verissime predicatur ipsa intentio; 6 bene enim dicitur ‘Species est intentio’. Sed hec predicatio non admit10 titur in divinis, scilicet ‘Persona est intentio’. Quare Persona non erit nomen secunde intentionis. Item. Trinitas consistit in rebus perfectissimis, non in conceptibus 7 nostris nec in secundis intentionibus, secundum Augustinum De doctrina christiana, libro primo.4 Sed res perfectissime sunt res prime intentio15 nis. Quare cum Trinitas consistat in Personis, necessario Persona erit nomen prime intentionis. Contra hoc arguitur

Contra hoc arguitur sic. Si Persona esset res prime intentionis, tunc 8 queritur aut res esset substrata generi generalissimo, aut generi subal20 terno, aut speciei subalterne, aut specialissime, aut individuo singulari. Non potest dici quod sit res substrata generi generalissimo vel generi subalterno aut speciei, quia persona est individua substantia; res autem substrata talibus non est aliqua res individua, sicut de se patet. Nec potest dici quod sit res substrata individuo, quia Persona de pluribus 25 dicitur, sed res singularis non predicatur de pluribus.

2 primo] CLP om. V | essentia] CLP natura V 4 actionis] CLP si actus V 5 sit et terminus] C terminus sit LPV 6 erit] CLP est V 7 secunde] CLP om. V 10 scilicet] CLV om. W 10–11 quare … intentionis] CLP ergo etc. V 10 erit] CL est P 15–16 quare … intentionis] CLP om. V 17 contra opus add. Lm 18 esset res] CLP est nomen V | intentionis] CLPV sive res add. V 19 queritur aut] CP sequitur aut L aut quia V | substrata] CL subiecta V substenta (!) P 19–20 generi … specialissime] coni. generi subalterno aut speciei specialissime CL generi subalterno aut specialissimo V speciei subalterne aut specialissime P 21 non] CLP sicut V | substrata] CL subiecta PV 23 substrata] CL substracta(!) W subiecta V | res] CLPV talis scilicet add. V | individua] CLV indivisa P 24 substrata] CLP subiecta V 24–25 de pluribus … non] CLP om. V 25 predicatur] CL dicitur PV 4

St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I II, cap. 2-V, cap. 5.

610 9

C60vb

appendix a

Item. Sicut se habet individuum ad naturam singularem existentem in quolibet predicamento et suppositum ad naturam singularem existentem in genere substantie, sic se habere videtur persona ad naturam singularem existentem in natura rationali. Sed ‘individuum’ ita se habet, et ‘suppositum’, quod sunt nomina secunde intentionis. Ergo 5 similiter ‘persona’ erit nomen secunde intentionis. Sicut enim natura quelibet singularis in quolibet predicamento dicitur individua substantia et natura singularis | in genere substantie existens dicitur suppositum, sic individua sive singularis substantia existens in rationali natura dicitur persona. Et propter hoc conceditur quod Verbum assumpsit 10 sic individuum, quia hanc naturam, sed suppositum vel personam non assumpsit. De triplici differentia nominum

10 Dicitur ergo ad questionem distinguendo quod sunt nomina sub tri-

plici differentia. Quedam que significant pure ipsam rem, sicut sunt 15 huiusmodi nomina ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’, que significant ipsas res, ad quarum esse nichil facit anima, sicut dicit5 Commentator quarto Phisicorum, ra W52 capitulo de tempore. Quedam que se habent medio modo, sicut sunt | huiusmodi nomina ‘animal’, ‘homo’; et omnia talia nomina, nam licet significent ipsam rem extra: quia tamen animal se habet per modum 20 communis, quia significat rem communem predicabilem de multis per modum communis et abstracti (quod non potest fieri nisi per actum intellectus), ideo dicitur quod talia nomina se habent medio modo. Quedam autem nomina sunt que significant pure ipsam intentionem, sicut ‘individuum’ et ‘persona’ (de hoc Commentator secundo Phisico- 25

1 existentem] C om. LPV 3–4 in genere … singularem] CLV om. W | se habere … natura] Cc om. C 5 et] LP ad CV 5–6 ergo … persona] CLV om. W 6 erit … intentionis] CL om. PV 7 quolibet] CLV quocumque W 7–8 substantia] CPV om. L 8 existens] CLV om. W 10 assumpsit] CLP assumptum V 11 sic] C om. LPV | hanc naturam] CLP habet naturam hanc humanam V 15 que] CLP enim V 16 sortes et plato] CLV petrus gaudendus W 17 anima] CPV esse L 18 tempore] CLP vacuo V | quedam] CLPV sunt add. V 18–19 sunt … nomina] CLP om. V 19 animal homo] CLP homo et animal V | talia] CLP om. V | nomina] LV om.C P | nam] CV om. LP | licet] CLPV quia add. V 20 ipsam] CLP om. V | per] CLP ad V 21–22 quia … communis] CL om. PV 22 et abstracti] CLP ad substantiam V 25 secundo CLP septimo V 5

Averroes, In IV Arist. Phys. Comm. (ad Arist., Phys. IV 11, 219b17 sqq.).

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rum, capitulo decimo). Persona enim se habet ad naturam singularem in natura rationali sicut individuum ad naturam singularem in quolibet predicamento, sicut dictum est. Ad argumenta alterius opinionis arguitur

Secundum hoc ad argumenta alterius opinionis. Ad primum [5], quod 11 idem argumentum posset fieri in creaturis quod individuum non esset terminus generationis, vel quod individuum non esset nomen secunde intentionis. Et ideo dicendum quod, sicut illud quod est individuum, est terminus generationis, et tamen cum hoc stat quod sit nomen secunde 10 intentionis, sic stat ex parte persone quod illud quod est persona est terminus generationis, et tamen quod sit nomen secunde intentionis. Ad secundum [6], quod bene potest concedi, formaliter loquendo, 12 quod persona est intentio, sicut species est intentio. Verumptamen, sicut, concretive accipiendo speciem, melius dicitur ‘Species est quid 15 intentionale’, sic melius dicitur ‘Persona est quid intentionale’. Ad tertium [7], quod est illud verum, non ratione Personarum in- 13 quantum sunt secunde intentiones, sed ratione rei que subicitur. 5

Ad argumenta principalia arguitur

Ad primum in questione [1] dicitur quod hec non est per se ‘Pater 14 20 est persona’. Et si arguitur ultra quod | de Deo nichil predicatur per V72vb accidens, dicitur quod ‘per accidens’ dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ‘per aliquam naturam extraneam additam’, et sic est verum. Alio modo potest dici ‘per accidens’ quando unum non est de intellectu alterius. Et sic bene est predicatio per accidens in Deo, puta hec ‘Sapientia est 25 Bonitas’, quia Bonitas sub ratione bonitatis accepta non est de intellectu Sapientie.

1 decimo] L secundo C quarto PV 6 idem] CLP primum V 7–9 vel quod … generationis] CLV om. P 10 persona est] CLV om. W 11 quod CLV persona W 12 potest concedi] CLP concludi potest V 13 quod] CLP om. V 14 sicut] CLP om. V 16 illud] CLV om. P 17 secunde] CLV due P 19 in questione] CLP quando V 19–20 pater est persona] CLP persona est pater V 20 nichil] CLP nisi V 21 dicitur] CLP om. V 24 in deo] CLP om. V | sapientia] CLPV non perperam add. PV 25 accepta] CLP om. V

612 15

appendix a

Ad secundum [2] dicitur, sicut ad tertium alterius opinionis [7], quod adoratio non debetur Personis inquantum sunt nomina secunde intentionis, sed ratione rei substrate.

questio secunda utrum persona dicatur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem 16

5

Queritur utrum persona dicatur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem. Quod secundum substantiam videtur. Omne nomen ad se dictum in divinis significat substantiam. ‘Persona’ est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior est vera. Probatio minoris. Augustinus, septimo De Trini- 10 tate, capitulo 9:6 Ad se quippe dicitur Persona, non ad Filium vel ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut ad se dicitur Deus et Magnus et Bonus et Iustus, et si aliud quid huiusmodi. 17 Item. Questio ‘quid est?’ querit de substantia. Sed convenienter ad L62v questionem ‘quid est?’| de Persona in divinis respondetur ‘persona’. 15 Respondetur enim convenienter cum queritur ‘quid est?’, scilicet ‘Tres Persone’ secundum Augustinum, septimo De Trinitate, capitulo 7o:7 ‘Si quid tres sunt Persone queramus, licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate Tres Personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia non contradicit’. 20 8 18 Item. Augustinus, septimo De Trinitate, capitulo 9: ‘Quemadmodum hoc illi est esse quod Deum esse, quod Magnum esse, quod Bonum esse, ita hoc illi est esse quod personam esse’. Sed Deus est aliquo substantiali. Ergo et Persona. 1 dicitur … tertium] CLP et ad tertium dicendum V | opinionis] CLP positionis V 2–3 nomina secunde intentionis] CLV secunde intentiones P 3 sed] CLPV sub add. V 8 videtur] CV om. LP | nomen] CLV om. W 10 maior est vera] CL om. PV 13 quid] CL plus V om. P 14 questio] CLP om. V est add. C | querit] CLV queritur W 15 de … divinis] CLP om. V | persona] CLPV in divinis add. CV 16 convenienter cum] convenienter C cum LPV 17 de … septimo] CLV om. P 18 tres sunt persone] CL sunt V est sicut P 19 non] CLP sed V | dicit sed quia] LPV om. C 19–20 non contradicit] CLP scriptura convenit V 21 augustinus] CLV om. W 22 illi] LPV ibi C | est] CLP tres V | tertium quod] CLP om. V 23 primum esse] L om. CPV | illi] CLPV tres add. V | est] CLP quod V | quod] CL om. PV | est] CLPV in add. CV 6 7 8

St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII vi, cap. 11, p. 26222–24. Ibid. VII iv, cap. 8, p. 25893–95. Ibid., VII vi, cap. 11, p. 26225–27.

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Contra. Quicquid ad se dicitur in divinis, de tribus singulariter dici- 19 tur. Sed persona non dicitur de tribus singulariter, sed pluraliter. Quare etc. Quod persona in divinis dicatur secundum substantiam

Dicunt quidam quod persona in divinis dicitur secundum substantiam, 20 et non secundum relationem. Cuius ratio est una quia: Persona, vel nomen persone, ex creaturis proprie transfertur ad divina; ergo eundem modum et consimilem habebit in divinis et in creaturis. Sed in creaturis ‘persona’ est nomen absolutum et dicitur secundum substantiam. 10 Quare et in divinis similiter. Quod autem nomina translata a creaturis ad divina habeant eundem modum hic et ibi, patet de entitate, veritate et bonitate, et huiusmodi. Item. Persona est substantia. Quare etc., ita quod secundum istos: 21 quia ‘persona’ de principali significato suo dicit ipsam | naturam ratio- C61ra 15 nalem et accidit quod Persona constituatur in tali natura per formam absolutam vel respectivam, ideo dicitur persona secundum substantiam. 5

Quod ‘persona’ significat relationem

Contra hoc arguunt alii, ponentes ‘personam’ significare relationem, 22 20 sic. Illud quo formaliter aliquid in divinis constituitur, principaliter significatur per nomen. Sed persona in divinis formaliter constituitur ipsa proprietate relativa. Ergo ‘persona’ principaliter significat relationem. Item. Richardus, quarto De Trinitate, capitulo 6o:9 “Sub nomine ‘per- 23 25 sone’ intelligitur quedam proprietas que non convenit nisi uni; nulli

1 in divinis] CLV om. W | de tribus] V in divinis W om. CL 2 tribus] CLPV suppositis add. V 6 et non … una] CLP om. V | quia] CLV quod W 6–7 vel nomen persone] C om. LPV 7–8 eundem … consimilem] CLP consimilem modum V 8 habebit] CLV habet P 12 et huiusmodi] CLP om. V 14 principali] CLV primo W | ipsam] W om. V 16 respectivam] LV relativam CP | persona] CLP om. V 19 personam] W personas V 20 sic] PV om. CL | illud] CLV id W | in divinis] Lc om. CLPV 22 ipsa] CP om. P | proprietate relativa] CLP per ipsam relationem sive proprietatem relativam V 22–23 persona … relationem] CLP etc. V 24 6o] LPV 8o C 25 quedam] CLV quelibet P | nulli] CP ulli V nulla L 9

Richardus a Sto Victore, De Trinitate IV, cap. 6.

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appendix a

tamen determinate, sicut in proprio nomine.” Sed proprietas est relatio. Quare etc. Secundum hoc ergo in divinis ultra distinguitur, quia quedam nomina significant ipsam essentiam; quedam ipsam relationem, sicut ‘paternitas’; quedam significant aliquod compositum ex essentia et relatione, sicut ‘pater’. 5 Quomodo aliquod nomen actu dicatur 24 Ad videndum autem utrum nomen aliquod dicatur secundum substan-

tiam, vel secundum relationem, vel significet aliquod compositum ex duobus, attendendum est unde trahat originem suam, utrum scilicet a forma absoluta, vel a proprietate relativa, quia si trahat originem suam 10 a forma absoluta, est nomen absolutum; si vero trahat a proprietate relativa, sicut facit hoc nomen ‘persona’, est nomen relativum. De duobus modis significandi relationem 25 Sed ultra sciendum est quod significare relationem vel dici secundum relatio-

W52rb

nem est duobus modis. Uno modo quia significat relationem certam et 15 determinatam, sicut hoc nomen ‘pater’; alio modo quia significat relationem non determinatam, sed indeterminatam et per modum indeterminatum, sicut facit hoc nomen ‘relatio’ in divinis et hoc nomen ‘persona’, que significat relationem non certam | nec determinatam. Dicitur ergo persona in divinis secundum relationem, quia ‘persona’ 20 significat primo ipsam relationem intentionalem, postmodum compositum ex essentia et proprietate relativa et ipsam proprietatem relativam formalius, et ultimo significat ipsam essentiam.

1 relatio] CcP respectiva L om. C 4 significant CLP om. V | aliquod] CL ipsum V om. P 8 secundum] CLV om. P 9 scilicet] V om. CLP 10 a] CLV om. P | relativa] CL relata sic saepius PV | suam] CP om. LV 14–16 significare … significat] V aliqua nomina significant CLP 17 sed indeterminatam] LPV om. C | indeterminatum] LP indeterminate V 18 divinis] CLV divino P 19 que CLP persona vero V | significat] LP significatur per CV | determinatam] CLV determinata P 21 primo] CLV om. W | intentionalem] CLPV vel intelligibilem add. C | postmodum] CLPV ipsum add. V 22 relativam] CLP relata V 23 ultimo] LPV utilius C | ipsam] CLP suam V

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Contra hoc arguitur

Aliqui tamen arguunt contra hoc sic: Sicut persona est communis tribus 26 Personis, sic deus est quid commune ipsis tribus suppositis, et sic habet et continet sub se ista tria supposita. Sed non dicitur deus secundum 5 relationem, quia sic esset quid commune continens sub se supposita relativa que referuntur. Quare nec persona. Vel dato quod sic, diceretur deus secundum relationem; quod est falsum. Item. Si persona dicatur secundum relationem, tunc sicut Pater dici- 27 tur relative ad Filium et dicitur ‘Pater Filii’, similiter posset dici ‘Per10 sona Filii’. Consequens est falsum, secundum Augustinum, septimo De Trinitate, capitulo 9, ubi dicit10 quod Pater non est persona Filii. Consequentia probatur. Sequitur enim ‘Hoc est duplum respectu dimidii; ergo est multiplex respectu dimidii’. Ergo similiter sequitur ‘Pater est Pater Filii; ergo Pater est Persona Filii’. Respondetur ad hec argumenta

15

Ad primum istorum [27] est dicendum quod aliter est commune hoc 28 nomen ‘deus’ et hoc nomen ‘persona’. ’Persona’ enim ita est commune quod significat relationem, et ideo dicitur secundum relationem; | ‘deus’ vero ita est commune quod non significat relationem, nec per V73ra 20 consequens dicitur secundum relationem. Ad secundum [28] quod illud tenet quando non est aliquid idem 29 ex utraque parte, sicut in exemplo adducto de duplo et multiplici, que tantum se tenent ex una parte. Quando vero idem est ex utraque parte, non est verum. Sicut, verbi gratia, de hoc nomine ‘relatio’, quod est 25 commune relationi paterne et filiali. Non enim sequitur ‘Pater est pater Filii; ergo Pater est relatio Filii’. Et quia ‘persona’ similiter est nomen

1 argumenta egidii (?) add. Lm 2 aliqui] CL alii V alioquin (!) P | tribus] CLP omnibus V 3 ipsis] CLP om. V | suppositis] CLP personis sumptis V | et] CLV idest P 4 sub se] CPV om. L 5 sic] CLPVc deus V | esset] CLV est P 5–6 continens … referuntur] CL om. PV 6 relativa] L universalia C 8 dicatur] CLV dicitur P | sicut] CLP si V 13 est] CLP om. V 18 significat] CLP significet V | ideo] CLV ita P 19 vero] CLP non V | non significat] CLP significet V 19–20 nec … relationem] CLP om. V 22 in] CL patet ex PV | duplo] CLV duplici P | que] CLV quando P 24–25 quod est commune] V que est communis CLP 25 filiali] CLV filiationi P 10

Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII vi, cap. 11, p. 26215–27.

616

appendix a

commune, non significat relationem certam sive determinatam, nec habet aliquid ad quod referatur, sicut nec relatio in communi habet aliquid ad quod referatur, cum sic in communi abstrahatur a relatione que est in utroque extremo, et per consequens non habet relationem oppositam. Et ideo non potest dici Pater ‘Persona Filii’. 5 Ad argumenta positionis dicitur 30 Ad argumenta positionis [20 sq.] dicitur quod Creator et creatura magis

univocantur in nominibus secunde intentionis quam prime. Cuius ratio est quia talia nomina sunt magis abstracta et magis abstrahunt a perfectione limitata. Et quia ‘persona’ est nomen secunde intentionis, ideo 10 propriisime transfertur ad divina. Et cum arguitur ultra: ergo oportet habere consimilem modum, dicitur quod verum est; vel quod oportet habere consimilem modum vel modum nobiliorem. Et sic est in divinis quod persona ibi habet modum nobiliorem quam in creaturis. Ratio enim ibi personalitatis est nobilissima et perfectissima que possit esse. 15 Ad argumenta principalia respondetur 31 Ad primum principale [16] dico quod ‘persona’ dicitur nomen ad se

dictum propter duas rationes: tum quia non significat relationem determinatam, sicut facit hoc nomen ‘Pater’, tum quia non habet aliquod rb C61 relatum ad quod | referatur. 20 32 Ad secundum [17] dicendum quod quando queritur ‘Quid est Deus?’, non bene respondetur quod Persona, sed quando queritur

1 commune] CLPV sicut relatio add. CcP | non] CLPV enim add. CP | sive] LPV nec C 2–3 sicut … referatur] CLP om. V 2 nec] CcLPV om. C 3 sic] CPV sicut L 5 et ideo non] LP non vero (?pro ergo) C et per consequens non V 7 argumenta] CLP argumentum V | dicitur] CP dicendum LV 8 quam] CLPV in nominibus add. P 11 arguitur] LPV dicitur C | oportet] CLP debet V 12 modum] CLPV vel modum vel modum (!) nobiliorem add. C vel modum nobiliorem add. L 12–13 dicitur … nobiliorem] CPV om. L 12 quod] CP om. V 14 quod] CPV quia L | ratio] CLP non V 15 enim ibi] LPV ratio add. V | est] CLPV ratio add. LPV | et] CLPV ibi add. C 17 dico] C dicit L dicitur P dicendum V 18 non] CLV si P 19 aliquod] CLP om. V 20 referatur] CLP refertur V 21–617.3 ad … substantia] om. L 21 quando] V si CP

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617

‘Quid tres?’, bene respondetur quod tres Persone, quia quid dicit quidditatem realem. Et ita relatio habet suam quidditatem, sicut quantitas et substantia. Ad tertium [18] dicendum quod, sicut est aliud Patrem esse Patrem et 33 Patrem esse Deum—quia idem est pater et deus, sed non eodem Pater est pater et deus, quia deitate est deus et paternitate est pater—, sic, licet idem sit deus et persona, non tamen eodem est persona et deus, quia deitate est deus et personalitate est persona. Quod11 hic videtur arguere aliter quam infra sic quia: Aliter est 33a commune tribus nomen ‘persona’, aliter ‘deus’, quia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus distincti sunt in personalitate, sed non in deitate. Item sic. Deus est communis tribus, quia: Unus numero Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; sed non est una persona numero communis tribus; unde communitas persone non est communitas realis, sed magis secundum rationem. Quia ergo tres persone sunt distincte in personalitate et non in deitate, ideo aliter significat ‘persona’ in divinis, aliter ‘deus’. Aliter ad hoc secundum, quod tenet de duplo et multiplici quia: 33b Utrumque12 de nomine suo dicit aliquid aliud. Non de patre et persona, quia quamquam idem pater de nomine suo dicatur respectu filii, persona tamen de nomine suo non differt a filio seu per aliquid [?; ad L] aliud, sed ratione contenti sui, sicut nec respectus. Unde non sequitur ‘Pater est pater Filii; ergo est respectus Filii’, quia respectus de nomine suo non refertur, ut patet clarius in solutione secundi argumenti principalis in prohemio.

1 quid] CPV est add. V | bene] PV om. C | quod tres] P tres C om. V | quia] CP quare V | quid dicit] P persona dicit C dicit persona V 2 realem] PV relativam C vel realem add. Cm 2–3 quantitas et] CP qualitas vel V 4–8 ad … persona] om. L 4 sicut] coni. sic C om. PV 5 deum] CP om. V | quia] PV quod C | idem] C eodem PV | deus] CPV est add. V 6 deitate] C divinitate PV 6–8 sic licet … personalitate est persona] C om. PV 12 quia] quod L 11 The paragraphs [33a] and [33b], which are not found in CPV, occur in the left margin of L 62v. Their occurrence might have caused the omission of [33] in L. 12 Sc. duplum and multiplex.

appendix b JAMES OF METZ In I Sent., dist. 25a, q. 1 (versio prima; ca. 1300–1301). Troyes, Bibl. Comm., cod. 992 (saec. XIV), foll. 50vb–51rb1 5

1

Circa 25am distinctionem queritur utrum nomen ‘persone’ sit nomen T50vb prime vel secunde intentionis (…). Respondetur Tria sunt scienda hic. Primo ponenda est quedam opinio falsa; secundo 2 distinctio inter nomen prime intentionis et secunde; tertio propositum.

10

articulus i de quadam opinione falsa Circa primum sciendum quod quidam dicunt quod nomen ‘persone’ 3 est nomen secunde impositionis vel intentionis. Ad cuius evidentiam premittunt quandam distinctionem nominum.

15

De quadam distinctione nominum

Dicunt enim quod quedam sunt nomina que significant pure rem, ut 4 ‘Sortes’, ‘Plato’ et nomina significantia substantias particulares. Quedam vero significant primam intentionem, ut significantia secundas substantias ‘homo’, ‘animal’, quia significant substantiam universalem, 20 que non habet esse nisi in intellectu et intellectione. Alia sunt nomina significantia intentiones logicas ab intellectu factas, ut genus et speciem etc. 17 nomina] nomine T | particulares] particularem T 1 Text taken from Decker (1967), pp. 494–498, nn. 4–5 and 8–13 (orthography, punctuation, and division into chapters are mine).

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appendix b Quod ‘persona’ est nomen secunde intentionis

5 Tunc dicunt quod nomen ‘persone’ est nomen secunde intentionis. Et

hoc probant quia: ‘Individuum’ significat secundam intentionem. Sed ‘persona’ dicit quoddam individuum in genere intellectualis nature. Ergo etc. 5 Quod prefata distinctio nominum non est bona 6 Quidquid sit de conclusione—que forte vera est—, tamen distinctio

eorum non est bona. Non enim est verum quod nomina significantia secundas substantias significent primam intentionem, quia eodem modo potest hoc dici de nominibus significantibus primas substantias. Ratio est quia: Circa omne illud quod intellectus intelligit, fundare potest secundam intentionem; omne enim quod intellectus intelligit, vel cognoscit illud ut incommunicabile, et sic potest fundare rationem individui, vel intelligit illud ut communicabile, et sic fundat vel potest fundare intentionem generis, speciei, differen-tie. Sed intellecus intelligit non solum secundas substantias, sed et primas. Ergo funda-re potest intentionem secundam supra vel circa primas substantias, sicut supra T51ra vel | circa secundas. Prime igitur substantie possunt dici prime intentiones, sicut et secunde substantie. 7 Item. Nomina secundarum substantiarum vel significant rem (et sic non distinguun-tur a nominibus primarum substantiarum), vel significant intentionem. Quod non potest intelligi nisi dupliciter. Uno modo quod significent precise intentionem; quod falsum est, quia tunc esset falsa ‘Homo est albus’, et similes. Vel significant illud quod substernitur intentioni; et hoc non est aliud quam ipsa res; et sic redit primum. Non igitur valet distinctio, licet forte valeat conclusio.

2 quod] cum T

7 que] quia T

10 primas] personas T

17 primas] personas T

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articulus ii de prima intentione et secunda De triplici divisione ‘intentionalis’ 5

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Secundo videnda est distinctio inter nomina prime intentionis et secunde. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum primo quod intentionale quandoque distinguitur contra reale. Et sic accipiendo ‘intentionale’ illud est intentionale quod nichil est nisi secundum aliquam operationem intellectus. Unde hoc modo species in medio (ut species coloris) vel in organo vel in intellectu, vel operatio intellectus non sunt intentiones vel intentionalia. Ratio est duplex. Prima quia: Perfectio cuiuscumque potentie realis, faciens compositionem cum potentia, non est intentionale ens ut dividitur contra reale; quod enim non est res, non potest facere compositionem cum re, nec potest esse rei perfectio. Sed species est perfectio potentie realis sensitive vel intellective (idem dico de actu et de talibus). Ergo etc. Et confirmatur ratio quia: Perfectio quanti est nobilioris subiecti quam color in pariete. Ergo est accidens quodammodo realius et nobilius colore. Unde, ut dicetur in secundo, color de pariete non potest causare suam speciem in medio sine virtute activa corporis celestis, tamquam species coloris in medio sit perfectio vel accidens nobilius colore. Secunda quia: Quidquid est preter operationem intellectus, non est intentionale ut distinguitur contra reale, sed oportet quod sit res aliqua. Sed si non esset intellectus et esset corpus album, adhuc faceret suam speciem in medio. Ergo species in medio non debet dici intentionale ut dividitur contra reale. Aliter dividitur intentionale contra naturale. Et hoc modo species est aliquid intentionale vel spirituale. Secundumenim esse naturale duo contraria non posunt esse simul. Et ideo cum species albi et nigri sinul possint esse in eadem parte medii, huiusmodi species non habent esse naturale in medio, sed spirituale vel intentionale. Aliter et tertio dicitur intentio vel intentionale quod tendit in aliud ut representativum eius, ut imago beati Nicolai posset dici intentionale ens, quia tendit in aliud. Et hoc etiam modo species congrue dicitur intentio, quia intendit in obiectum, quamvis sit res vera.

16 quanti] coni, quanto Decker

17 color] calor T

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appendix b Quid est prima intentio et quid secunda

12 Secundo videndum quid est prima intentio et quid secunda. Sciendum

13

14 T51rb 15

16

igitur [a] quod omne quod intelligitur, est obiective in intellectu, ut color in visu, quia in prospectu visus; item [b] res intellectas, secundum quod huiusmodi, sequuntur quidam modi, sicut est intelligi universaliter, particulariter, abstracte. Item. Sicut esse obiectum intellectus nichil reale ponit in ipsa re intellecta sed tantum relationem rationis, sic nec modi consequentes rem intellectam inquantum intellectam—puta universalitas, particularitas etc., prout dicimus rem intelligi universaliter, particulariter—ponunt aliquid reale in re intellecta, sed dicunt ens rationis, puta relationem rationis (ut esse intellectum vel representatum), vel separationem rationis (ut esse abstractum vel aliquid tale). Item. Intellectus non solum fertur in res intellectas, sed etiam reflectitur super actum suum et super modos consequentes rem intellectam, licet secundario, sicut et supra speciem et potentiam et talia. Ex hiis patet quod prima intentio est ipsa res que directe obicitur intellectui ut obiectum proprium; per quod acquirit quoddam esse rationis, scilicet relationem rationis. Secunda autem intentio sunt modi consequentes rem intellectam secundum quod intellectam, ut esse intellectum, representatum, esse particulare, universale, genus, species, abstractum, concretum etc., quia hec omnia necessariam habent habitudinem ad rem preintellectam ut2 modi rei preintellecte. Ex hiis patet manifeste distinctio inter nomina prime intentionis et secunde. Nam nomina prime intentionis significant res ipsas, vel particulariter, ut ‘Sortes’, vel ut universale, ut ‘homo’, ‘animal’. Nomina vero secunde intentionis significant modos consequentes ipsas res intellectas, ut genus, species etc.

17 prima] persone T 2

‘ut’= ‘in so far as they are …’.

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articulus iii de proposito principali Utrum ‘persona’ sit nomen prime intentionis vel secunde 5

Tertio videndum propositum principale, utrum nomen ‘persone’ sit 17 nomen prime intentionis vel secunde. Quod sit nomen prime intentionis

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Dicunt aliqui quod prime, propter tria. Primo quia nomen secunde 18 intentionis significat aliquid quod rem intellectam consequitur secundum quod intellectam solum; sed hoc non videtur posse dici de ‘persona’, quia ‘persona’ a ‘personando’ est dicta, unde [= ‘because’] primo impositum fuit hoc nomen ad significandum larvam, in qua personabatur laus alicuius magni; postea ad significandum personam de excellentia commendatam; postea dilatatum est ad significandum quemcumque in dignitate constitutum (unde et personatus inveniuntur in ecclesiis); ultimo ad significandum suppositum intellectualis nature, ratione alicuius preeminentie respectu aliorum suppositorum. Preeminentia autem respicit rem quamcumque secundum suum esse reale. Ergo etc. Secundo quia: Omnes doctores qui locuti sunt de hoc nomine ‘per- 19 sona’, ex principali intentione inquirentes de significato, dicunt quod vel significat substantiam, vel relationem, vel utrumque, unum in recto, reliquum in obliquo. Sed significare substantiam vel relationem non est significare secundam intentionem. Ergo etc. Tertio quia: Boetius, ubi diffinit personam, investigat eius diffini- 20 tionem per divisionem ‘substantie’. Quod non esset, si ‘persona’ est nomen secunde intentionis. Ergo est nomen prime. Quod sit nomen secunde intentionis

Aliis videtur contrarium. Primo quia: Super omne nomen prime inten- 21 tionis potest fundari secunda intentio. Sed fundari non potest super 30 nomen ‘persone’. Ergo etc. Item quia: ‘Persona’ idem dicit quod ‘individuum’ vel ‘suppositum’. 22 Que sunt nomina secunde intentionis. Ergo etc. Addunt autem quod

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quandoque ex usu loquentium supponuntur predicatis realibus, ut cum dicitur ‘Suppositum agit’, et cetera talia. Ad argumenta in oppositum 23 Ad argumentum primum in oppositum tenendo quod est nomen secun-

de [prime ed.] intentionis [21], potest dici quod communitas persone est 5 communitas rationis, sed ‘persona’ non significat illam communitatem, sicut et communitas hominis est communitas rationis (non enim est Homo communis per se existens, ut Plato posuit), sed tamen ‘homo’ non significat communitatem suam. Ideo est nomen prime intentionis. 24 Ad rationem in oppositum, tenendo partem oppositam [19], dicen- 10 dum quod ‘persona’ non significat primam substantiam intellectualem absolute, sed individuum in rationali vel intellectuali substantia. ‘Individuum’ autem ad intentionem secundam pertinet.

appendix c HERVAEUS NATALIS Quaestiones In I Sent., dist. 23 (1309) editio Paris 1647, foll. 112rb–113va

ed. 5

Nota bene: I did not follow the edition’s orthography and punctuation. Deviations (apart from the correction of obvious misprints) are reported. Utrum ‘persona’ in divinis significet essentiam vel relationem

10

Circa vigesimam tertiam distinctionem queritur utrum ‘persona’ in 1 divinis significet essentiam vel relationem. Quod significet substantiam

Et videtur quod significet substantiam, quia hoc dicit1 Augustinus ex- 2 presse, quod scilicet significet substantiam. Preterea. ‘Persona’ importat proprietatem ad dignitatem pertinen- 3 15 tem. Sed ‘relatio’ nullam dignitatem importat. Ergo etc. Respondeo. Hic sunt tria videnda. Primum est de ortu huius nominis 4 ‘persona’, unde scilicet primo habuit ortum, et de eius significatione. Secundum an proprie conveniat in divinis. Tertium quid significet in divinis.

articulus i

20

de ortu et significatione huius nominis ‘persona’ Quantum ad primum sunt due opiniones. Prima est quod ‘persona’ 5 non habuit ortum a personando, quia tunc media sillaba esset brevis,

1

Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII iv, cap. 11 passim.

626

6

7

8

9

appendix c

sicut et de ‘personare’; sed dicitur persona quasi per se una, quia dicit aliquid unum numero habens esse et unitatem per se individuum, scilicet substantie. Sed hoc non potest stare. Primo quia: Illud quod significat specialiter suppositum nature rationalis, non habet ortum ab eo quod convenit omni substantie. Sed habere per se unitatem et entitatem convenit omni substantie particulari. Ergo etc. Secundo quia: Illud quod importat quandam dignitatem specialem, non habet ortum ab eo quod nullam dignitatem importat. Sed ‘persona’ importat dignitatem; unde non convenit nisi habentibus intellectum; esse autem per se unum nullam dignitatem specialem importat, quia hoc convenit substantiis universalibus sicut substantiis dignitatem habentibus. Ergo etc. Et ideo melius dicitur quod habuit ortum a personando, quia scilicet quando aliquis debebat commendari, aliquis accipiebat larvam2 quandam, que representabat illum commendandum, et in illa personabat laudes eius; unde et illa larva vocata est persona, et postea ille cuius laudes personabantur, dictus est persona. Et inde nomen ‘persone’ impositum est ad significandum suppositum nature dignitatem habentis, scilicet suppositum nature intellectualis sive rationalis. Ad illud autem quod alii dicunt [5] quod media sillaba deberet esse brevis, si diceretur persona a personando, dicendum quod non oportet, quia sicut ad placitum sunt nomina imposita ad significandum, ita ad placitum possunt in compositis produci,3 non obstante quod sint brevia in simplicibus; et maxime quando subest aliqua causa quare debeat ita fieri. Et sic est hic. Nam forte ad denotandum dignitatem illius cuius laudes personabantur, media sillaba producta est ut denotaretur quod ‘persona’ significabat rem magni ponderis.

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Quod ‘persona’ significet secundam intentionem 10 Quantum autem ad significationem sciendum est quod quidam dicunt 30

quod ‘persona’ significat secundam intentionem, sicut ‘particulare’, ‘genus’, ‘species’ et consimilia. Et hoc probant dupliciter. Primo per diffinitionem persone quia: In eius diffinitione ponitur ‘individua substantia’; ‘individuum’ autem est nomen secunde intentionis; ergo etc.

2 3

‘Larva’ = ‘demon’, ‘devil’; hence ‘horrific mask’. ‘Producere syllabam’ = ‘to lengthen a syllable’.

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Secundo quia: Illud quod est commune secundum rem in divinis, est 11 unum numero in omnibus Personis; sicut patet de omnibus absolutis, unde omnes Persone sunt unus Deus, unus Creator numero, et sic de aliis. Sed Persone divine non sunt una Persona numero. Ergo etc. Quod significet rem abstractam substratam intentioni

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Aliis videtur quod ‘persona’ non significet intentionem, sed rem abstractam substratam intentioni, sicut ‘homo’ non significat secundam intentionem (sicut significat ‘species’), sed rem abstractam substratam intentioni. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod, sicut ‘homo’ significat rem abstractam substratam intentioni que est species, ita etiam ‘aliquis homo’ significat rem substratam intentioni que est individuum vagum. Sicut autem ‘aliquis homo’ significat rem substratam isti intentioni que dicitur individuum vagum in natura humana, ita ‘persona’ significat rem substratam intentioni particularitatis sive individui vagi in omni natura intellectuali. Unde significat illud quod est unum numero sive subsistens incommunicabile in natura intellectuali. Et quod ita sit potest ostendi sic quia: Hoc nomen ‘persona’ impositum est ad significandum suppositum nature intellectualis, secundum quod quandam dignitatem importat. Intentiones autem secunde non important aliquam dignitatem, sed res substrata intentionibus, unde animalitas non importat maiorem dignitatem in homine. Ergo etc. Secundo quia: Hoc nomen ‘persona’ est impositum ad significandum aliquid dignum laude. Intentiones non dicunt aliquid dignum laude vel vituperio, quia hoc convenit soli rei habenti dominium sui actus. Ergo etc. Ex hiis patet quod diffinitio quam dat4 Boetius de persona (scilicet quod est nature rationalis individua substantia): quia cum ‘persona’ dicat suppositum nature habentis dignitatem (scilicet nature intellectualis vel rationalis), et diffinitio hoc plane manifestet et contineat ea quibus persona per se habet distingui ab omni alio,—perfecta est illa diffinitio. Per hoc enim quod dicitur ‘substantia’, distinguitur ab accidentibus; per hoc vero quod dicitur ‘nature rationalis’, distinguitur ab 6–7 abstractam] absolutam ed. absolutam ed. 4

8 abstractam] absolutam ed.

Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init.; cf. cap. IV init.

10–11 abstractam]

12

13

14

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inanimatis et a vegetabilibus sive plantis, et ab irrationalibus sive nonintellectualibus, nam ‘rationale’ stat pro ‘intellectuali’ et ‘individuum’ pro ‘incommunicabili’, quia ‘individuum’ non ita convenit intellectualibus omnibus, puta divinis sicut ‘incommunicabile’. Quod ‘persona’ non dicat secundam intentionem

5

17 Ad primum [10] ergo quod alii inducunt ad probandum quod ‘persona’

dicat intentionem secundam, dicendum quod, quia sepe nos latent differentie essentiales, utimur ad circumloquendum eas quibusdam accidentibus, vel rei vel intentionis. Et sic est in proposito, ut si diceretur quod homo est ‘illud quod invenitur in specie nature humane’, vel aliquid tale. 18 Ad secundum [11] dicendum quod differt aliquid esse ens rationis et communitatem esse communitatem rationis. Nam quando dicitur ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘Plato est homo’ et sic de singulis, ly ‘homo’ non dicit ens rationis, sed ens reale; sed eius communitas sive unitas secundum quam dicitur esse quid commune multis vel quid unum in multis, non est communitas secundum rem, sed secundum rationem. Sed si dicatur ‘Homo est species’, ‘Equus est species’ et sic de aliis, sic ipsum quod dicitur commune et eius communitas est rationis. Quando ergo dicitur [11] quod illud quod est commune secundum rem in divinis, est unum numero in omnibus Personis, verum est, accipiendo ‘commune secundum rem’ illud quod non solum dicit ens reale, sed etiam eius communitatem et unitatem secundum rem, sicut patet de Essentia divina. Sed non oportet quod omne quod dicit rem in divinis, sit unum numero in omnibus Personis. Alioquin, cum Paternitati et Filiationi sit commune hoc quod dico ‘relatio’ (que rem veram dicit), sequeretur quod utraque esset una relatio numero; quod falsum est, quia ly ‘relatio’ dicit rem, eius tamen communitas non est communitas sive unitas secundum rem.—Et sic patet de ortu huius nominis ‘persona’ et eius significatione in generali.

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articulus ii an persona proprie conveniat in divinis 19 De secundo, scilicet an persona proprie conveniat in divinis, satis

patet ex dictis quia: Persona, quantum ad illud ad quod nomen est impositum, in Deo proprie invenitur, quia ‘persona’ significat, ut dic- 35

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tum est, aliquid subsistens et incommunicabile in natura intellectuali sive suppositum nature intellectualis. Hoc autem proprie invenitur in divinis, sicut de se patet. Ideo etc. Nec obstat quod diffinitio persone habet plures partes, quia non sunt partes rei, sed rationis et secun5 dum rationem. Licet enim repugnet Deo habere partes rei vel secundum rem etc., non tamen repugnat ei habere partes vel plura secundum rationem. Quod persona non proprie conveniat Deo

Tamen contra predicta arguunt quidam, scilicet contra hoc quod dic- 20 10 tum est quod persona proprie convenit Deo, quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen est impositum quia: Ut dictum est, nomina a nobis sunt imposita ad significandum res sensibiles nobis notas. Quae in Deo esse non possunt. Ergo nullum nomen a nobis impositum potest convenire Deo proprie. 15

De formali significato nominis et materiali

Et ad hoc dicendum est quod in significato nominis est considerare ali- 21 quid formale ad quod directe significandum, sive in abstracto sive in concreto, impositum est nomen; et hoc proprie erit aliqua natura vel aliqua perfectio. Materialiter autem importatum in significato nominis 20 est omne illud in quo talis natura invenitur. Sicut ‘iustum’ formaliter significat illud quod habet iustitiam, quidquid sit illud et quomodocumque habeat eam, dummodo habeat eam formaliter, sive per identitatem sive per inherentiam; materialiter autem importat hoc vel illud in quo iustitia invenitur. 25 Quando ergo dicitur quod nomina a nobis inventa sunt imposita ad 22 significandum res sensibiles nobis notas: si intelligatur de formali significato, non habet veritatem universaliter, ymo quedam nomina sunt imposita ad significandum formaliter aliquam perfectionem absolute sine modo determinato quo convenit sensibilibus vel spiritualibus, crea30 tis vel increatis, sicut esse, vivere et similia. Si autem intelligatur de materiali quod importatur in significato nominis, sic verum est quod talia prius significamus per nomina prout in sensibilibus nobis notis apparent quam significemus ea esse in Deo, vel prout sunt in Deo. Non

5 enim] P autem ed.

32 significamus] significans ed.

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tamen sunt primo et principaliter imposita ad significandum precise ea una cum modo secundum quem solum conveniunt creature sensibili. 23 Quedam etiam nomina sunt que significant solum illud quod convenit Deo primo et principaliter, et solum sunt imposita ad significandum ea que sunt in Deo. Sicut hoc quod dico ‘creator’ vel aliquid tale; 5 qui licet noverimus prius res sensibiles et significaverimus quam Deum, tamen ex rebus sic notis Deum cognoscimus quantum ad ea que sunt propria eius, et nomina ad ea sola significanda imposuimus. Unde illud dictum quo dicitur quod ‘nomina non conveniunt Deo quantum ad illud ad quod significandum imponuntur’, accipiendo universaliter, est 10 manifeste falsum.

articulus iii utrum ‘persona’ in divinis substantiam vel relationem significet 24 Quantum ad tertium, quid scilicet ‘persona’ significet in divinis, utrum 15

scilicet substantiam vel relationem, premitto tres conclusiones probandas. De tribus conclusionibus probandis 25 Prima est quod ‘persona’ includit utrumque, scilicet substantiam et

relationem, non ut relatio est, sed ut est proprietas distinctiva. Secunda 20 conclusio est quod si accipiantur in obliquo ‘substantia’ et ‘relatio’, ‘persona’ nil significat in recto, sed in obliquo. Tertia conclusio est quod, si utrumque, scilicet ‘substantia’ et ‘relatio’, accipiantur in concreto, ‘persona’ significat formaliter relationem per modum substantie, loquendo de formalitate fundamenti, in quo scilicet fundatur significatum huius 25 nominis ‘persona’ secundum quod iam exponetur. Quod ‘persona’ includit utrumque, sc. substantiam et relationem 26 Prima conclusio patet sic quia: Illud de cuius ratione est quod sit sub-

sistens distinctum unitate et incommunicabile, includit in sua ratione et illud per quod est distinctum et incommunicabile. Sed de ratione per- 30 sone est quod est subsistens etc. Ergo ‘persona’ includit in sua ratione illud per quod subsistit et illud per quod est quid distinctum et incommunicabile. Sed Persona divina subsistit per divinam substantiam, quia

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per eam omne quod est in divinis, habet esse, non in aliquo alio sustentante. Esse autem distinctum et incommunicabile habet per relationem, non ut est relatio, sed ut est etiam proprietas distinctiva in esse supponibili sive subsistentali, quia ut est relatio referens et distin5 guens in esse relativo ut relativum est tantum, non est de ratione ‘persone’, cum persona sit suppositum distinctum in natura subsistentali intellectuali. Unde quia distinctio subsistentis oportet quod fiat per aliquid quod distinguat in esse substantiali, ideo dicitur quod relatio ut proprietas distinctiva in esse subsistentali est de significato ‘perso10 ne’. Hoc autem habet relatio in divinis inquantum ipsa est substantia divina. Quod ‘persona’ nil significat in recto, sed in obliquo

Secunda conclusio etiam faciliter patet quia: Formaliter loquendo, con- 27 cretum formam a qua descendit, importat in obliquo, quia forma abs15 tracta accipitur ut ratio concreti, unde albedo est ratio essendi album. Cum ergo ‘persona’ significet concretive—quia significat per modum suppositi et per modum eius quod est, non autem per modum quo est aliquid—concretum autem quod est Persona in divinis, nil aliud sit quam subsistens divinum, unitate distinctum et incommunicabile, opor20 tet quod, formaliter loquendo, formam abstractam per quam est subsistens, et formam abstractam qua est distinctum, importet in obliquo. Unde si diffiniretur Persona divina in generali, diceretur quod est subsistens in natura divina, distincta proprietate. Sed si diffiniretur Persona Patris in speciali, diceretur quod est subsistens in natura divina, 25 distinctum paternitate. In istis autem, sicut patet, ponitur tam substantia quam essentia quam relatio in obliquo. Quod ‘persona’ significat formaliter relationem per modum substantie

Quantum autem ad tertiam conclusionem sciendum quod S. Thomas 28 Ia, q. 29, art. 4 dicit5 quod formale in significato ‘Persone’ est relatio. In 30 questionibus autem disputatis De potentia q. 9, art. 4 dicit quod ‘persona divina’ nec substantiam nec relationem significat formaliter, sed significat subsistens divinum distinctum, quidquid sit illud quo distinguitur.

5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, art. 4c; Quaestio disputata de potentia, q. 9, art. 4cF.

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29

Ista autem duo, etsi videantur repugnare, non tamen repugnant, si bene intelligantur. Nam in Questionibus disputatis accipit ‘formale significatum’ illud quod primum occurrit intellectui de significato nominis. Et quia quando dico ‘Persona divina’ vel ‘suppositum divinum’, non occurrit intellectui proprietas distinctiva in speciali—puta relatio, paternitas vel filiatio vel aliquid tale in speciali—, sed solum aliquid distinctum, ideo dicit quod formaliter ‘persona’ non significat relationem in speciali. In prima autem parte accipit ‘formale significatum persone’ illud quod est formale in eo in quo fundatur illud quod dicitur primo modo ‘significatum formale’, ita quod illud est formale in eo in quo fundatur hoc quod est subsistens divinum distinctum. Hoc autem est, ut ibi dicit, relatio prout significatur per modum substantie, et hoc in concreto. Ut, si accipiatur ‘Pater’ (vel etiam ‘Filius’) non adiective sed substantive, hoc est formale fundamentum in quo fundatur significatum ‘Persone’. Et hoc patet sic quia, si accipiatur aliquod absolutum concretive, non erit ultimate distinctum et incommunicabile, sicut patet de hoc quod dico ‘Deus’, ‘Creator’, ‘Iustus’ et consimilia omnia. 30 Similiter ‘Pater’ vel ‘Filius’ adiective non dicit suppositum, quia non dicit nisi illud quod habet paternitatem, quidquid sit illud, sive distinguatur per paternitatem suppositive, sive non. Sed ‘Pater’ prout tenetur substantive, prout scilicet idem est suppositum in esse suppositi, distinctum est paternitate, prout nata est distinguere in esse subsistentie. Sic relativum concretive et per modum substantie acceptum est formale fundamentum significati ‘persone’ in divinis. 31 Sed contra hoc dicunt quidam quod si ita esset, non plus ‘pater’ significaret suppositum vel personam quam ‘album’ quando substantivatur. Et ad hoc dicendum est quod ymo, quia forma a qua ‘album’ descendit, scilicet albedo, in nullo facit etiam secundum rem ad esse distinctum suppositi quod importatur per ‘album’ substantivum. Paternitas autem secundum rem facit ad constitutionem suppositi habentis paternitatem, licet hoc non conveniat ei inquantum est relatio. Unde essentialiter ipsa paternitas est ipse Pater subsistens, et ipsum realiter a Filio distinguens. Et ideo non est simile. 32 Quidam autem dicunt quod ‘Persona divina’ non dicit relationem secundum se, sed dicitur relative secundum suum inferius, quod est Pater vel Filius. Sed hoc nichil est, quia licet aliquo modo possit quod

35 relationem] coni. relativum ed.

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Pater vel Filius sint inferiora ad Personam divinam communiter dictam modo quo superius et inferius possunt esse in divinis, tamen relativum non se habet ut inferius ad Personam divinam absolute dictam, quia omnis Persona divina est persona relativa. Et ideo responsio suprapo5 sita est melior. Ad rationes principales in oppositum

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Ad primum in oppositum [2] dicendum est quod quando Augustinus 33 dicit6 ‘personam’ significare substantiam, vel hoc dicit propter identitatem realem—et sic etiam ‘relatio’ dicit substantiam, quia relatio est realiter substantia divina—, vel ibi accipit ‘substantiam’ pro supposito substantie; ‘substantia’ autem sic dicta in divinis dicit relationem per modum substantie. Ad secundum [3] dicendum quod quando dicitur quod persona est 34 hipostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente: si intelligatur quod proprietas que distinguit universaliter personas in quacumque natura intellectuali, dicat aliquam dignitatem spiritualem, falsum est, quia ita distinguitur unus homo ab alio per quantitatem (supponendo quod quantitas faciat ad individuationem) sicut unus lapis distinguitur ab alio, nec quantitas hominis, essentialiter loquendo, est nobilior quantitate lapidis. Si autem intelligatur quod proprietas constituens personam vel distinguens eam numeraliter—vel quasi numeraliter; quod dico propter divina—sit in natura habente dignitatem, scilicet in natura intellectuali, verum est quod sic proprietas pertinens ad dignitatem est de constitutione persone. Et talem dignitatem habet Persona divina, et quidquid est in divinis. Unde illa dignitas que pertinet ad Personam, se tenet ex parte nature substantialis vel intellectualis in qua est Persona, et ex parte proprietatis individualis numeraliter distinguentis.

14 pertinente] pertinentem ed. 6

22 sit] coni. Sic ed.

Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII iv, cap.11 passim.

appendix d DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO Quaestiones in I Sent., dist. 23 P 5

ed.

codex parisinus BN lat. 14.454, ff. 68rb–69ra (prima lectura; 1304– 1307) editio, Venetiis 1571, foll. 70rb–71rb (lectura ultima; between 1317– 1327)

Nota bene: only the relevant textual variants of the printed edition are reported (in the text or in our critical apparatus). 10 PREDICTIS TAMEN ADICIENDUM EST etc.1 dist. 23a. Circa 1 quam queritur de hoc nomine ‘persone’, utrum significat substantiam vel relationem. Quod ‘persona’ significet relationem

Et videtur quod significet relationem. Primo per Boetium, libro de Tri- 2 15 nitate, qui dicit2 quod omne nomen ad Personas pertinens significat relationem. Sed nullum nomen magis pertinet ad Personas quam hoc nomen ‘persona’. Quare etc. Preterea. Quidquid plurificatur in divinis, pertinet ad relationem, 3 quia secundum Boetium essentia continet unitatem, relatio vero trini20 tatem. Sed persona plurificatur in divinis; dicimus enim esse tres Personas. Ergo etc.

14–16 circa … relationem] P circa distinctionem istam duo queruntur. primum est de hoc nomine persona scilicet utrum significet substantiam an relationem. Secundum erit de comparatione ad alia nomina. Ad primum arguitur sic ed. 18 relationem] P relationes ed. 19 vero] multiplicat add. ed. 1 In the printed edition, the contents of this and the next distinctiones are extensively analyzed. 2 Boethius, De Trinitate, cap. V init.; cf. cap. VI init.

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4

Sed contra. Augustinus dicit3 septimo De Trinitate: “Cum dicimus ‘personam Patris’, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris; ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum, sicut ad se dicitur Deus”. Igitur ‘persona’ significat essentiam. 5 Respondeo. Videnda sunt duo. Primum est utrum ‘persona’ sit no- 5 men rei vel intentionis. Secundum est quid significet in divinis, utrum substantiam vel relationem. Quod ‘persona’ significet intentionem 6 Quantum ad primum est duplex modus dicendi. Primus est quod no-

men ‘persone’ significat intentionem. Quod probatur dupliciter. Primo sic. Quidquid dicit ‘individuum’ in omni natura et ‘suppositum’ in genere substantie, dicit ‘persona’ in genere intellectualis nature. Sed ‘individuum’ et ‘suppositum’ sunt nomina intentionis, et non rei. Ergo et ‘persona’. 7 Secundo sic. Omnia nomina significantia res aliquas sunt in predicamento sub aliqua intentione, sicut ‘substantia’ sub intentione generis, ‘homo’ sub intentione speciei, ‘Sortes’ sub intentione individui vel suppositi. Sed ‘persona’ non est res sub intentione generis vel speciei vel individui. Ergo etc. Minor probatur. Quod enim venit sub intentione P68va generis vel speciei, oportet quod illi conveniat esse | communicabile vel predicabile de pluribus differentibus numero vel specie. Sed de ratione persone est quod sit incommunicabilis, ut patet ex diffinitione eius quam ponit Boetius. Ergo ‘persona’ non est nomen rei cui conveniat esse genus vel speciem. Nec dicit rem sub intentione suppositi, quia illa uni soli convenit, ut ‘Sortes’; ‘persona’ autem pluribus. Quare ‘persona’ non est nomen rei sub intentione aliqua, sed est nomen intentionis eius cuius est suppositum, non tamen in omni natura, sed in intellectuali tantum. Est enim persona nature rationalis individua substantia secundum Boetium.4 6 intentionis] inventionis P 10 intentionem] ed. inventionem P 11 natura] P genere ed. 13 intentionis] P intentionum ed. | rei] P rerum ed. 14 et] ed. om. P 16 sicut … generis] ed. vel generis ut animal P 18 res] ed. om. P 18–21 vel individui … predicabile] P quia de ratione rei cui convenit esse genus vel species est quod sit pluribus communicabilis ut patet in diffinitionibus generis et speciei, que sunt esse predicabile ed. 24 vel speciem] ed. om. P 27 in] ed. om. P 3 4

Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII VI, cap. 11, p. 26215–27. Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init; cf. cap. IV init.

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Accipitur autem hic ‘intentio’ non pro ratione quam format intellec- 8 tus circa res, ut sunt genus, species et huiusmodi, quia individuatio et singularitas non sunt in rebus per intellectum, sed ex natura rei. Sed vocamus hic ‘intentiones’ large conditiones rei ex opposito correspon5 dentes intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, indivisio, suppositatio, personalitas, que contrahunt speciem, sicut species ipsum genus. Quod ‘persona’ significet rem subiectam intentioni

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Alius modus dicendi est quod ‘persona’ significat non intentionem speciei, sed rem subiectam intentioni. Dicunt enim isti quod sicut ‘homo’ significat non intentionem speciei, sed rem subiectam intentioni, et ‘aliquis homo’ significat rem subiectam intentioni, que est individuum vagum in natura humana specialiter, ita ‘persona’ significat naturam subiectam intentioni que est individuum vagum in natura intellectuali generaliter, et non ipsam intentionem. Quod probatur dupliciter. Primo sic. Hoc nomen ‘persona’ impositum est ad significandum suppositum nature intellectualis secundum quod quandam dignitatem importat. Intentiones autem non important aliquam dignitatem, sed res subiecte intentionibus; universalitas enim non importat maiorem dignitatem in homine quam in equo. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Nomen ‘persone’ impositum est ad significandum aliquid dignum laude. Intentiones autem non dicunt aliquid dignum laude (vel vituperio); hoc enim convenit soli rei habenti dominium sui actus. Ergo etc. Et5 respondent ad rationem alterius positionis, dicentes quod ‘persona’ non dicit rem sub intentione generis vel speciei vel individui signati, sed dicit rem sub intentione individui vagi, nec significat idem quod ‘suppositum’ in genere substantie, sed potius rem sub intentione individui vagi in natura intellectuali generaliter, sicut ‘aliquis homo’ dicit suppositum vagum in natura humana, quemadmodum dictum fuit prius. Quidquid sit de conclusione principali, ista tamen non valent. Impossibile est enim quod ‘persona’ dicat solam rem subiectam intentioni

3 singularitas] simplicitas [?vel simgularitas(!)] sic saepius P | sunt] P fiunt ed. 8 intentionem] speciei add. P 9 subiectam] speciei add. P 16–17 secundum quod] ed. et similiter P 21–22 laude] vel vituperio add. ed. 30 quidquid] ed. quid P 30–31 impossibile est enim] Pc impossibile est. P quia non est probabile ed. 5

This section of the edition is not found in P.

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que est individuum vagum, que de natura sua est communicabilis pluribus. Sed res que est persona, non est communicabilis, ymo incommunicabilis, ut dicit diffinitio persone, quod persona est intellectualis nature incommunicabilis substantia. Ergo etc. Item. Res subiecta intentioni que dicitur individuum vagum, importatur per terminum significantem naturam generis vel speciei addito signo particulari, ut ‘aliquod animal’ vel ‘aliquis homo’. Res vero subiecta intentioni individui vagi in natura intellectuali bene potest designari per hec nomina que sunt scilicet ‘quedam natura intellectualis’, ‘quidam angelus’, ‘quidam homo’. Quod autem significatur per hoc nomen ‘persona’ valde extraneum est. Item.6 De ratione rei subiecte intentioni individui vagi non potest esse quod sit incommunicabilis. Sed de ratione persone est quod sit communicabilis, ut patet per eius diffinitionem sive descriptionem que datur secundum Boetium et Richardum,7 quod persona est rationalis nature individua sive incommunicabilis substantia. Ergo ‘persona’ non dicit rem subiectam intentioni individui vagi. Minor iam patet. Sed maior probatur quia: Res subiecta intentioni individui vagi semper est communicabilis pluribus, et totidem sicut natura subiecta intentioni speciei; de totidem enim predicatur aliquis homo sicut homo. Et ideo de ratione talis rei non potest esse incommunicabilitas, cum repugnet nature rei. Ex hoc enim dicitur vagum quia potest pluribus convenire, et non uni tantum. Et ideo, si hoc nomen ‘persona’ diceret rem subiectam intentioni individui vagi, impossibile esset quod de ratione eius esset incommunicabilitas. Si autem nomen ‘persone’ designet non rem, sed rationem suppositi in natura intellectuali, nichil prohibet quod nomen ‘persone’ pluribus conveniat, et tamen res cui convenit ratio persone, non conveniat pluribus, quia quamvis res aliqua sit incommunicabilis pluribus (ut Sortes), tamen ratio incommunibilitatis (ut esse individuum signatum vel esse suppositum, vel personam) potest convenire pluribus. Quamvis enim solus Sortes sit Sortes, quia ‘Sortes’ est nomen rei subiecte rationi indi-

1–4 que de natura … ergo etc.] P om. ed. 5 item] P cuius ratio est quia ed. | dicitur] P est ed. 7 vero] P ergo ed. 10 quod … significatur] P quid autem significetur ed. 16 incommunicabilis] coll. textu Richardi communicabilis ed. 6

Sections [13a]–[13c] are not found in P. Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init.; cf. cap. IV init.; Richardus a Sto Victore, De Trinitate, cap. 22. 7

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vidui signati, suppositi vel persone, tamen non solus Sortes est individuum signatum, suppositum vel persona, ymo Plato et ceteri homines, quia ista dicunt rationem que potest pluribus convenire; res tamen cui talis ratio convenit, non potest pluribus convenire. Quod autem isti arguunt, per se valde est facile solvere, dicendo 14 ad primum [10] quod nomen ‘persone’ impositum est ad significandum intentionem suppositi, non absolute, sed tantum in natura intellectuali, que super alias dignitatem importat. Et sic solum est nomen ad dignitatem pertinens, non ratione formalis significati, sed ratione nature subiecte, ex qua sortitur speciale nomen, sicut et nomen suppositi importat quandam dignitatem supra individuum, non ratione formalis significati—quia utrobique est una, scilicet intentio singularitatis—, sed ratione nature subiecte. ‘Suppositum’ enim dicit individuum, non quodcumque, sed subsistens et completum. Per idem patet ad secundum [11] quod adducit quoddam satis fri- 15 volum, scilicet quod ‘persona’ importat aliquid dignum laude. Constat autem quod laude nullus est dignus nisi virtuosus. Si ergo ‘persona’ significat aliquid dignum laude, sequitur quod non omne suppositum intellectualis nature dicetur persona, sed solum virtuosus, quod est absurdum. Licet enim | origo nominis ‘persone’ fuerit a reputatione lau- P68vb dum cum factione cuiusdam larve, tractum est tamen ad significandum suppositum intellectualis nature. Propter quod utimur nomine ‘persone’, equivoce tamen; quandoque scilicet pro intentione—et sic diffinitur a Boetio et Richardo—; quandoque vero pro re subiecta, ut cum dicimus quod talis est bonus persona. Que equivocatio est causa diversitatis opinionum. Hec de primo. Utrum ‘persona’ significet substantiam vel relationem

Quantum ad secundum sciendum est quod si prima opinio de signifi- 16 cato ‘persone’ est vera, scilicet quod ‘persona’ non significet rem sed 5 est] Pc om. P 9–12 sed ratione … significati] suppl. coll. ed. om. P 12 una] ed. via P 14 sed] P om. ed. 15 quod adducitur] P om. ed. 20–21 a reputatione laudum] ed. ad representationem laudis P 21 factione] P fictione ed. | larve] ed. lave P 22–26 propter quod … primo] P puto ergo quod nomen ‘persone’ prout Boetius et Richardus eo utuntur et describunt ipsum et prout sumitur in divinis significat rationem suppositi, et non rem subiectam rationi licet de ea predicetur; vulgus tamen aliter utitur nomine ‘persone’, scilicet pro re subiecta intentioni individui vagi, ut cum dicimus quod iste vel ille est bona persona, idest bonus homo. Sic de ratione persone non est esse incommunicabile. Et sic patet primum ed. 29 significet] P significat ed.

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intentionem, tunc patet quod ‘persona’ nec in divinis nec in creaturis significat substantiam vel relationem. Si vero significet rem intentioni subiectam, ut dicit secunda opinio, adhuc dicendum quod nomen ‘persone’ non significat substantiam nec relationem, sed abstrahit ab utroque. 17 Quod patet sic. Quid unumquodque nomen significet, accipere oportet ex eius diffinitione. Idem enim significant diffinitio et diffinitum, et diffinitio est ratio quam significat nomen, ut dicitur8 quarto Metaphisice. Ex hoc sic arguitur. A quocumque abstrahat intellectus significatum diffinitionis, ab eodem abstrahit intellectus et significatum diffiniti. Sed formaliter intellectus significatum diffinitionis ‘persone’ abstrahit ab essentia et relatione, licet materialiter et in obliquo includat essentiam vel substantiam. Ergo etc. 18 Minor patet per diffinitionem persone quam ponit9 Boetius, scilicet quod persona est rationalis nature individua substantia. Quod idem est ac si diceretur ‘persona est suppositum’; ibi enim ponitur ‘substantia individua’ pro ‘ypostasi’ vel ‘supposito’; est, inquam, suppositum nature intellectualis. Extra autem significatum et intellectum huius diffinitionis est relatio et essentia, ut de se patet. Si enim in divinis non esset nisi unum suppositum essentiale, ut gentiles ymaginantur, illi vere competeret ratio persone. Et si in creaturis constitueretur suppositum per relationem, sicut nunc fit in divinis, illud vere haberet rationem persone, quod non esset, si in formali significato rationis persone includeretur essentia vel relatio vel utrumque. Sunt ergo extra formale significatum ‘persone’ et sue diffinitionis. Materialiter tamen et in obliquo includitur essentia, quia ‘persona’ dicit suppositum in tali natura solum, scilicet intellectuali. Sed quod illud sit absolutum vel relativum, totum est extra significatum ‘persone’.

3 dicendum] P posset videri alicui ed. 10 abstrahit] et add. P | significatum] suppl. et significatio ed. om. P 17 est] P vel est ed. | inquam] P tamquam ed. est add. P 19 in divinis] ed. om. P 20 essentiale] et absolutum add. ed. | illi] nature add. ed. 20–21 competeret] ed. competere P potest competere Pc 22 fit] P om. ed. 23 esset] P haberet ed. 27 intellectuali] P intellectiva ed. 8 Aristotle, Metaph. IV 7, 1012a22–24: “Diffinitio vero fit ex significare aliquid necessario res esse. Ratio namque cuius nomen est signum, diffinitio est rei” (transl. Moerbekiana). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Arist. IV Metaph. cap. 7, nr. 733: “Nam ratio quam nomen significat, est definitio rei”. 9 Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init; cf. cap. IV init.

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Istud10 autem non potest esse verum, quia, sicut infra patebit, nullus conceptus unus realis et essentialis potest abstrahere a substantia et relatione. Nomen enim impositum secundum illum conceptum esset univocum substantie et relationi; quod non est possibile. Propter quod si ‘persona’ significet rem subiectam intentioni, cum illa dicatur essentialiter de persona absoluta in creaturis et de relativa in divinis, impossibile est quod hoc sit secundum unum conceptum abstrahentem ab utroque, quia sic esset aliquid univocum ad utrumque. Ad rationem illorum dicendum quod diffinitio persone, prout dictum est, non abstrahit a substantia, ymo expresse includit, cum dicitur quod persona est rationalis nature individua substantia. Et sic ‘substantia’ hic non accipitur pro ‘essentia’, sed pro ‘supposito’. Tunc diffinitur persona, prout dicit intentionem, et non rem intentioni subiectam. Si vero queratur, non de significato, sed de eo de quo nomen ‘persone’ dicitur—nomen enim de multis dicitur que tamen per nomen non significantur, sicut homo predicatur de Sorte et de Platone, et tamen neutrum significat—ut sit sensus questionis: quid est illud in divinis de quo nomen ‘persone’ predicatur, sic dicendum est quod illud non est relatio tantum nec essentia tantum, sed constitutum ex essentia et relatione. Quod probatur sic. Illud de cuius ratione est quod sit subsistens, distinctum et incommunicabile, includit in se illud per quod subsistit et illud per quod est distinctum et incommunicabile. Sed persona est huiusmodi. Quare etc. Sed in divinis quidquid subsistit, subsistit per essentiam vel relationem; et quidquid distinguitur et est incommunicabile, hoc habet per proprietatem relativam. Ergo illud de quo predicatur persona in divinis, includit essentiam et relationem sive proprietatem relativam, ut ‘Pater’ et ‘Filius’ et huiusmodi; que etsi imponantur ad significandum a sola relatione, tamen, ut accommodantur divinis, important totum constitutum ex relatione et essentia significata, ut Filius vel totum illud de quo dicitur. Et sic nomen ‘persone’ importat relationem, quia de relativo predicatur. Ad primum argumentum [2] dicendum quod omne nomen pertinens ad Personam importat relationem, vel tamquam illud quod formaliter

15 nomen] P non ed. 18 nomen persone] P persona ed. | relatio] P relatum ed. 20 quod sit] ed. om. P 22 et] ed. om. P 28–29 accommodantur divinis] ed. accommodatur in P 29–31 significata … predicatur] P om. ed. 31 relativo] relatione P 33 personam] P personas ed. 10

Sectt. [18a] and [18b] not in P.

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significatur, ut ‘Pater’ vel ‘Filius’, vel tamquam illud de quo dicitur; et sic nomen ‘persone’ importat relationem, quia de relativo predicatur, sed relationem non significat. 22 Ad secundum [3] dicendum per idem quod illud quod plurificatur in P69ra divinis, pertinet | ad relationes quantum ad ea in que plurificatur et de 5 quibus dicitur. Sed non oportet quod hoc sit quantum ad formalem rationem significandi, quia, sicut dictum est, significatum communis nominis non includit in se rationem illorum de quibus dicitur. 23 Ad aliud in oppositum [4] dicendum quod Augustinus accipit ibi ‘substantiam’ pro ‘ypostasi’ vel ‘supposito’, et non pro essentia solum. 10 Et bene concessum est quod nomen ‘persone’ suppositum significat. Et hoc dicit protanto quod illud de quo dicitur Persona, non solum includit relationem, sed etiam cum relatione essentiam.

1–2 ut pater … predicatur] ed. Om. P 5 relationes] ed. Relationem P | plurificatur] plurificantur P ed. 12 et hoc dicit] P vel hoc dicitur ed.

appendix e RADULPHUS BRITO I. Quaestiones in I Sent., dist. 23 (before 1300?) Pavia, Bibl. Univ., cod. Aldini 244, ff. 27vb–28ra

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Utrum ‘persona’ in divinis significet essentiam vel relationem

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Utrum ‘persona’ in divinis significet essentiam vel relationem. Et vide- 1 tur quod significet essentiam, per Augustinum in littera, qui dicit1 quod eodem modo dicitur ‘persona’ sicut ‘deus’; sed ‘deus’ significat essentiam; ergo ‘persona’ significabit essentiam. Item, per Boetium, qui dicit2 10 quod persona est individua substantia; et illud quod est individua substantia, principaliter significat substantiam vel essentiam; ergo ‘persona’ principaliter significabit substantiam vel essentiam. Maior est manifesta per Boetium ubi dictum est. Probatio minoris quia: individuum est individuum per se ens; et ideo quod est individua substantia, principaliter 15 significabit substantiam. In oppositum arguitur quia: Nullum nomen quod significat essen- 2 tiam vel substantiam, multiplicatur. Sed ‘persona’ multiplicatur. Ergo ‘persona’ non significat substantiam. Maior apparet quia: Nomen ‘deus’ significat substantiam in divinis; ideo non multiplicatur ita quod 20 dicamus quod sint tres dii. Minor declaratur quia: Nos bene dicimus quod sunt tres Persone. Ergo etc. Ad istam questionem sic est procedendum quod primo est videndum 3 a quo sumitur ‘persona’, secundo dicendum est ad questionem. A quo sumitur ‘persona’ 25

De primo aliqui dicunt quod ‘persona’ dicitur a ‘personando’; unde per- 4 sona idem est quod per se sonans. Istud tamen non valet, quia illud quod

1 2

Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII VI, cap. 11, p. 26215–27. Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init.; cap. IV init.

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competit alicui nature, non debet appropriari alicui nature irrationali. Sed esse per se unum competit alicui nature. Ergo non debet appropriari et nature rationali. Quod autem competit alicui nature, hoc est manifestum, quia quodlibet ens est per se unum. Alio modo potest dici, et melius, secundum Richardum3: persona dicitur a personando; unde per- 5 sonatum dicitur quasi per se sonatum vel laudatum vel puplicatum. Quid dicat ‘persona’ 5 Secundo videndum est quid dicat ‘persona’.

Quod ‘persona’ dicit intentionem 6 Aliqui dicunt quod dicit secundam intentionem, sicut ‘individuum’ 10

dicit secundam intentionem. Modo ‘individuum’ ponitur in diffinitione persone, ut patet4 per Boetium in libro de Trinitate (sicut dictum est) quod persona est individua substantia. Ergo significat intentionem, et non rem. 7 Item. Illud quod significat communitatem (que est intentio, et non 15 res), illud significat intentionem. Sed persona est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior patet quia: Quod significat realem communitatem, exquo non est res subiecta intentioni, oportet quod sit intentio. Modo advertitur quia: In divinis solum sunt due communitates reales, una est communitas deitatis, alia est communitas relationis; et ideo illud quod non signifi- 20 cabit aliquam istarum communitatum, non significabit communitatem realem, sed communitatem que dicitur intentio. Modo ‘persona’ non significat aliquam istarum communitatum. Ergo etc. 8 Quod autem non significet aliquam istarum communitatum probatio: Primo non significat communitatem deitatis quia: Ista non multi- 25 plicatur, et alia multiplicatur, scilicet ipse Persone sunt plures, quia sunt tres, et solum est unus Deus. Et ideo non est communitas deitatis. Nec est communitas relationis, quia persona non habet aliquod correlatum, sed unum relatum habet, scilicet relatum ad quod refertur.

3 rationali] scripsi irrationali P 3 4

Richardus a Sto Victore, De Trinitate IV, cap. 20 col. 944 Migne. In fact Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init.; cap. IV init.

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Ergo non est communitas realis. Ergo patet quod sit communitas que est intentio. Item. Si persona esset aliquid reale, tunc sequeretur quod ab eisdem individuis abstraherentur due species univoce reales. Hoc autem est 5 impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod ‘persona’ dicat aliquid reale. Falsitas consequentis est manifesta. Unde non esset impossibile quod ab aliquibus individuis sumantur due species equales. Tamen bene esset possibile quod ab eisdem individuis sumerentur due species sub distinctione, quarum una esset superior et alia inferior, sicut a Sorte 10 vel a Platone possunt accipi homo et animal; tamen quod due species equales, hoc est impossibile. Probatio consequentie quia: A Patre et a Filio abstrahitur quedam communitas que dicitur sicut species; que vocatur deitas. Et similiter persona accipitur a Patre vel Filio vel Spiritu Sancto. Et ideo, si esset 15 aliquid reale, tunc ab eisdem individuis sumerentur due communitates equales, quia una non esset superior et alia inferior. Ergo ‘persona’ non potest dicere aliquid reale.

9 10

11

12

Quod ‘persona’ dicit aliquid reale

Sed contra quia: Illud quod est terminus productionis realis, non dicit intentionem, ymo dicit aliquid reale. Sed Persona est terminus productionis realis. Ergo est aliquid reale. Maior apparet, quia productio realis non est aliquod ens rationis, sed aliquod ens reale. Minor apparet, quia Persona est terminus spirationis, que est productio realis. Item. Illud cui debetur adoratio, est aliquid reale, et non intentio. 25 Sed Persone debetur adoratio. Ergo est aliquid reale. Maior est evidens, quia adoratio non debetur figmento vel enti solum secundum animam. Minor est de se manifesta, quia nos adoramus Personas divinas. Et confirmatur quia: Persone divine non habent causari ab intellectu. Sed illud quod est intentio, habet causari ab intellectu, et non haberet 30 esse, si intellectus non esset. Iste autem rationes non multum concluderent contra aliam positionem, quia Persone divine non tantum dicunt intentionem, sed cum hoc dicunt ipsam rem; sed per accidens ipsam intentionem. Et ideo quando dicitur [13] quod est terminus productionis realis, tunc dico

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2 intentio] coni. relatio P

31–32 positionem] coni. partem P

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quod, quantum ad reale quod est suppositum, est terminus productionis, non tamen quantum ad intentionem. 17 Ad secundum [14], per idem, quod ipsi Persone debetur adoratio ratione realis quod est ibi, et non ratione intentionis. Quod ‘persona’ non dicit aliquid intentionale

5

18 Non obstante tamen quod iste rationes non concludunt, dicendum

quod ‘persona’ dicit aliquid reale, et non dicit aliquid intentionale. Cuius probatio est: De duplici cognitione rei 19 Sed primo est intelligendum quod intentio nichil aliud est quam cogni- 10

tio intellectus. Sed duplex est cognitio de re. Quedam est cognitio qua res cognoscitur in se; et ista vocatur prima rei cognitio vel intellectio. Alia est cognitio qua res cognoscitur in suis particularibus; et ista vocatur secunda rei cognitio, quia prius aliquis cognoscitur in se quam in suis particularibus. 15 De duplici intentione 20 Et sicut est duplex cognitio, ita erit duplex intentio. Quedam enim est

que vocatur prima rei cognitio. Alia est intentio que dicitur secunda rei cognitio; et ista dicitur secunda intentio. Et dicitur consecutive ad primam intentionem secundum quod aliquis primo cognoscitur in se 20 quam in suis particularibus. Verbi gratia. Prima cognitio quam habeo de homine est quod sit animal et quod sit rationale; et istud est cognoscere hominem in se, et dicitur esse prima intentio quam habeo de homine. Sed secunda cognitio quam habeo de homine, est quod sit in pluribus et quod de eis predicetur in quid. Et ex hoc accipitur quod 25 est species; et istud vocatur secunda intentio. 21 Hoc viso, dico quod persona non est intentio quia: Illud cui repugnat multiplicari, non est intentio. Sed ipsi persone non repugnat multiplicari. Ergo non est intentio. Maior apparet, quia ipsi intentioni repugnat

13 particularibus] partibus P 14 prius] primo P 19 consecutive] coni. insecutive P 20 prius] primo P

15 particularibus] partibus P 21 particularibus] partibus P

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multiplicari. Minor declaratur quia: Secundum Richardum5 persona non est individua substantia, sed est substantia communicabilis. Et ideo persone competit multiplicari. Et arguit quia communicatio non est aliquid ad secundam intentionem, sed ad rem. 5

Utrum ‘persona’ significet essentiam vel relationem 22

Sed que est illa res, de hoc est dubium. Aliqui | dicunt quod dicit P28ra relationem. Istud tamen est falsum quia: Semper unum relativum habet aliud correlativum ad quod refertur. Sed persona ut sic significata est, non habet aliud correlativum. Ergo non dicit relationem. 10 Alii dicunt, sicut Augustinus et Magister, quod ‘persona’ significat 23 essentiam. Istud tamen non est verum quia: Illud quod significat essentiam in divinis, non multiplicatur; sicut non dicimus quod sunt tres dii. Sed persona multiplicatur, quia semper dicimus quod sunt tres Persone in divinis. Ergo ‘persona’ non dicit essentiam. 15 Alii dicunt quod ‘persona’ significat utrumque; tamen dicunt quod 24 significat essentiam cum ipsa relatione in obliquo, et non in recto. Ideo dicunt quod non est verum quod refertur ad aliud relativum. Istud tamen non valet, quia semper relativum—quomodocumque accipiatur, sive in recto, sive in obliquo—semper refertur ad aliud, sicut apparet 20 per diffinitionem relativorum. Ideo cum persona non habeat aliquod relativum ad quod referatur, non dicit relationem, nec in recto nec in obliquo. Quod ‘persona’ dicit utrumque

Ideo dicendum est aliter quod ‘persona’ dicit utrumque, essentiam et 25 25 relationem. Non tamen dicit relationem ut relatio est, sed dicit aliquam proprietatem. Unde ‘persona’ dicit aliquod aggregatum ex essentia et proprietate secundum quod illa proprietas est communis ad absolutum et respectivum; nec dicit alterum determinate. Et potest sic declarari quod sicut videmus quod a rebus aliorum 26 30 predicamentorum abstrahantur quidam conceptus communes, ita ab ipsa relatione potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus communis, qui non dicet

5 Richardus a Sto Victore, De Trinitate IV, cap. 22 col. 945 Migne: “Iuxta illam itaque ‘existentiae’ significationem (…) non inconvenienter fortassis dicere poterimus quod persona divina sit divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia”.

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determinate aliquod absolutum vel respectivum. Ut a Sorte abstrahitur conceptus corporis vel substantie; et similiter ab albedine abstrahitur conceptus qualitatis qui est communis ad albedinem et nigredinem. Nec significat aliquid istorum absolute et determinate, ita quod ab ipsa relatione potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus communis (vel aliquis 5 conceptus particularis), communis ad absolutum vel non-absolutum. Et talem proprietatem dicit ‘persona’. Et ideo dicit aggregatum ex essentia et tali proprietate. In oppositum arguitur 27 Sed contra quia: Si esset talis conceptus in divinis abstractus a supposi- 10

tis, sequeretur quod in divinis esset totum universale. Sed istud est contra Augustinum in littera, qui dicit quod in divinis non est totum universale quia: Esse totius universalis diversificatur in suppositis. Sed non potest esse diversificatio in divinis. Ergo non potest esse ibi universale. Et per consequens nec talis conceptus abstractus. Maior est manifesta, 15 quia exquo ille conceptus est communis, oportet quod sit universale. Minor declarata est. 28 Item. Impossibile est quod ab ultimate distinctivis accipitur aliquis conceptus communis. Sed in divinis proprietates relatorum sunt ultimate distinctive. Ergo ab ipsis non potest accipi aliqua relatio com- 20 munis ad relationes particulares. Maior est evidens quia: Ultimate distinctiva seipsis sunt distinctiva. Modo illa que conveniunt in aliquo communi, non seipsis distinguuntur, ymo per aliquid aliud distinguuntur. Minor est manifesta, quia relationes sunt ultimate distinctiva in divinis. 25 Ad argumenta in oppositum 29 Ad primum argumentum [27] dico quod Augustinus non negat quin in

divinis posset esse aliquo modo universale, quia in relationibus potest accipi relatio communis ad relationes particulares, sicut ad paternitatem et filiationem. Et ratio huius est quia relatio que est in Patre, non 30 est eadem cum relatione que est in Filio. Et ideo est aliqua relatio communis ad istas relationes particulares. Sed protanto negat Augustinus universalitatem in divinis quia universale distinguitur et diversificatur

1 ut] coni. unde P

21 ultimate] ultimata sic saepius P

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in suppositis; modo in divinis non diversificatur essentia. Non tamen negat hoc simpliciter. Ad aliud [28] dico quod non est simile in creaturis et divinis, quia 30 in creaturis [quia] semper creatura determinatur per aliquid aliud in 5 constitutione sua; et ideo est dare aliqua distinctiva ultimate que seipsis distinguuntur. Nec ab ipsis potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus communis, sicut ab duobus predicamentis non potest abstrahi conceptus communis. Sed Persone divine in constitutione sua non determinantur per aliquid aliud, ymo seipsis determinantur. Et in talibus potest abstrahi 10 conceptus communis. Ad rationes alterius positionis

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Ad rationes alterius positionis, que tenet quod ‘persona’ dicit aliquod intentionale. Ad primam, quando dicitur [6] quod individuum est aliquod pertinens ad secundam intentionem, dico quod quando Boetius dicit6 quod persona est individua substantia, non accipitur hic ‘individuum’ ut dicit secundam intentionem, sed ut dicit proprietatem, cui est applicabilis intentio. Ad aliam [7] dico quod illud quod significat communitatem, est secunda intentio. Tamen illud quod significat illud quod est commune, non oportet quod sit secunda intentio, sicut si ‘homo’ potest significare illud quod est commune, non propter hoc sequitur quod significet secundam intentionem. Si tamen significaret communitatem, significaret secundam intentionem. Modo ‘persona’ non significat communitatem, sed significat illud quod est commune. Ideo non convenit ratio. Ad aliam [10] dico quod sicut ‘album’ significat subiectum et formam et ab ipso potest abstrahi ratio substantie et ratio qualitatis secundum quod diversa significat, sic similiter ‘persona’ plura significat, quia significat essentiam et proprietatem communem ad absolutum et respectivum. Et ideo ab ipsa persona possunt abstrahi plura communia secundum diversas rationes. Et ideo ratio supponebat unum falsum quod ab eisdem acciperetur deitas et ipsa relatio, quia deitas abstrahitur ab ipsa essentia, et relatio a proprietate; que utraque ‘persona’ significat. Sed tu dices: exquo significat relationem, refertur ad aliud relatum. Dico quod verum est, si formaliter diceret relationem vel sub propria

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Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init.; cf. cap. IV init.

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ratione relationis. Modo ‘persona’ non dicit formaliter ipsam relationem, sed dicit illam proprietatem communem ad absolutum et respectivum. Ad rationes principales 35 Ad rationes principales dicendum est. Primo ad primam, quando dici- 5

tur [23] quod Augustinus dicit etc., dico quod in tribus temporibus ‘persona’ tria significabat. Tempore beati Augustini dicebatur quod significabat essentiam; et postea quod significabat relationem; ultimo autem dicitur quod significat utrumque, ut dictum est. 36 Ad aliam [24] soluta est: non solum significat substantiam, sed sub- 10 stantiam vel essentiam cum proprietate relativa.

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II. Quaestiones in artem veterem. Accessus (Vat. Lat. 3044, ff. 1r–3v; Brussels, Bibl. Royale, cod. 2910, ff. 33r–35r) 1

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Sicut dicit7 Philosophus sexto Metaphisice, tres sunt partes principales V1r; B33r scientie speculative, scilicet naturalis, mathematica et divina. Et ratio huius propositionis est quia: Scientie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem suorum obiectorum de quibus sunt, sicut patet8 per Philosophum tertio De anima. Sed res speculabiles a nobis sunt triplices, scilicet mathematica, naturalis et divina. Ergo erunt tres scientie speculative principales, scilicet naturalis, mathematica et divina. Minor declaratur quia: Quedam sunt res speculabiles et transmu- 2 tabiles vel habentes attributionem ad motum; et de istis est scientia naturalis, que considerat ens mobile secundum quod mobile et sensibile. Tale autem ens sensibile est vel quod est sensibile per se (sicut calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, et sic de consimilibus), vel quia sit aliqua substantia que per suam essentiam sibi determinat ad hoc quod salvetur in esse determinatam complexionem qualitatum sensibilium, ita quod sub alia dispositione non salvaretur, sicut homo et omnes alie forme substantiarum sensibilium. Aliud est esse mathematicum. Et istud est coniunctum in esse cum materia sensibili. Tamen per naturam suam non determinat sibi aliquam complexionem qualitatum sensibilium ad hoc quod salvetur in subiecto, ut numerus et magnitudo, quia ita bene essent numerus et magnitudo in materia calida et frigida (et sic de aliis quibuslibet qualitatibus sensibilibus); et de istis sunt scientie mathematice. Que sunt quatuor, scilicet arismetica, geometria (que sunt pure mathematice), musica et astrologia (que sunt partim mathematice et partim naturales). Sed quia ista entia mathematica sunt in esse coniuncta cum sensi- 3 bilibus, tamen per naturam suam sibi non determinant aliquam qualitatem sensibilem, ideo per se sunt abstrahibilia secundum intellectum a qualitatibus sensibilibus quia: Abstractio secundum intellectum nichil est aliud quam intelligere aliquid prius in esse coniunctum cum altero, non intelligendo posterius. Modo ista mathematica sunt in esse coniuncta cum sensibilibus, et sunt eis priora secundum naturam, quia sibi qualitates sensibiles non determinant. Ergo sunt abstrahibilia secundum intellectum a sensibilibus.

7 8

Aristotle, Metaph. VI 1, 1026a18–19. Cf. Aristotle, De anima III 2, 426b8 ff.

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Sed iuxta hoc est notandum quod multiplex est abstractio. Una est universalis a particulari; et illa communis est omni scientie. Alia est abstractio alicuius subiecti ab accidentibus, quod tamen subiectum determinat sibi illa accidentia; et talis abstractio potest esse in substantiis sensibilibus, quia homo vel equus cum sint priores per naturam qualitatibus sensibilibus, possunt intelligi non intelligendo qualitates sensibiles. Alia est abstractio alicuius | prioris a posteriori cui in esse est coniunctum vel actualiter quod non determinat sibi in esse illud posterius; et ista est abstractio mathematica, quia linea et numerus et alia mathematica in esse sunt coniuncta sensibilibus qualitatibus et per naturam suam priora sunt eis nec determinant sibi eas. Aliud est ens divinum, quod secundum esse est separatum a sensibilibus. Et de illo ente divino, sicut sunt substantie separate, considerat metaphisica sive scientia divina. Et si dicas quod ibi multa determinantur de entibus aliis, dicendum quod ipsa considerat de ente secundum quod ens, et per consequens habet principaliter considerare de primis entibus, que sunt substantie separate. Et propter hoc denominatur divina quia de eis principaliter considerat et omnia alia que considerat, considerat finaliter propter substantias separatas. Sic igitur patet quod tres sunt scientie speculative principales. Et dicuntur scientie speculative que sunt de entibus a nobis speculabilibus, et que sunt propter scire, non propter aliquam operationem. Sed practice dicuntur que ordinantur ad operationem. Nam theorice finis est veritas, practice vero opus, ut dicit9 Philosophus secundo Metaphisice. Et etiam practicarum | quedam sunt active, quedam autem factive. Et iste differunt quia factive sunt quarum operationes transeunt in materiam exteriorem et non remanent in agente, sicut sunt artes mechance (sicut ars fabrilis et sutoria et consimiles). Active vero sunt scientie morales, quarum operationes non transeunt in materiam exteriorem, sed remanent in agente.—Et istam distinctionem ponit10 Philosophus in sexto Metaphisice. Alie autem sunt scientie speculative que sunt adminiculative istis. Et sunt due, scilicet logica et gramatica. Quod autem logica et gramatica sint adminiculative et administrative principalibus scientiis, sic potest ostendi. Et primo de logica quia: Quelibet scientia habet aliquem modum sciendi. Et propter hoc ne in qualibet scientia idem frequen-

9 10

Aristotle, Metaph. II 1, 993b20–21. Aristotle, Metaph. VI 1, 1025b18 ff.

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ter repetatur, oportet esse communem aliquam scientiam que passiones et proprietates modi sciendi per propria eius principia consideret; talis autem est logica. Et ideo logica, que docet modum sciendi in qualibet scientia, probando de ipsa suas proprias passiones per sua propria principia, est necessaria et administrativa sive adminiculativa aliis scientiis, sive propter scientias principaliter speculativas, et per consequens erit propter omnes alias scientias. Item. Hoc idem probatur de gramatica, scilicet quod gramatica est administrativa scientiis speculativis et omnibus aliis scientiis quia: Quod quilibet invenit secum, parum est, multum autem quod ab aliis per doctrinam vel disciplinam addiscit, ut dicitur11 secundo Metaphisice. | Modo instrumentum discipline est sermo significativus, ut dicitur12 in libro De sensu. Ideo necessaria fuit scientia que proprietates sermonis significativi doceret. Sed scientia que docet proprietates sermonis significativi est gramatica. Ideo grammatica necessaria est propter disciplinas in omni scientia, cum consideret sermonem significativum, qui est instrumentum discipline. Et sic patet quod gramatica est adminiculativa omnibus scientiis, cum omnis scientia sit per disciplinam cuius instrumentum est sermo significativus. De quo considerat gramatica, cum parum sit quod quilibet de se invenit, sed omnia fere habemus per disciplinam. Omissis autem omnibus aliis, solum de logica hic intendamus. Ideo logica dividenda est secundum divisionem sui principalis subiecti. Subiectum autem in logica est modus sciendi secundum quod est instrumentum sciendi quo aliquis scit ita quod scit; cuiusmodi instrumentum est diffinitio vel divisio vel demonstratio. Et dico ‘secundum quod est instrumentum sciendi’, quia modus sciendi alio modo est habitus acquisitus de ipsis instrumentis sciendi. Cuiusmodi est logica, secundum quam significationem ait13 Philosophus secundo Metaphisice quod vanum est simul querere scientiam et modum sciendi. Et quia omnis modus sciendi ad sillogismum ordinatur, ideo dicitur quod sillogismus est subiectum in tota logica sicut principalis modus sciendi ad quem omnes alii modi ordinantur. Ideo secundum divisionem istius modi sciendi principalis qui est sillogismus (qui dicitur subiectum in tota logica) ipsa logica dividitur. Sillogismus autem potest considerari dupliciter. Vel in se et absolute; et sic de ipso est scientia

11 12 13

Aristotle, Metaph. II 1, 993b2–4. Aristotle, De sensu et sensato, cap. 1, 437a14–15. Aristotle, Metaph. II 3, 995a13–14.

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libri Priorum. Vel secundum quod habet esse in suis partibus integralibus, vel ut habet esse in suis partibus subiectivis. Si consideretur ut habet esse in suis partibus subiectivis, hoc est dupliciter, quia partes sillogismi subiective, sunt per contractionem eius ad materiam specialem. Modo ista materia specialis est duplex: vel necessaria, vel probabilis. Et ideo due sunt partes sillogismi subiective, quia si sillogismus contrahatur ad materiam necessariam, sic est sillogismus demonstrativus; de quo tamquam de subiecto (accipiendo ‘subiectum’ pro ‘obiecto’) determinatur in libro Posteriorum. Si autem contrahatur ad materiam probabilem, sic est sillogismus dialeticus; de quo determinatur in libro Topicorum. De sillogismo autem sophistico determinatur in libro Elenchorum, non quia sit sillogismus nec pars sillogismi, sed quia habet quandam similitudinem et apparentiam | cum sillogismo, sicut de homine mortuo determinari potest, non quia sit homo, sed quia habet similitudinem et apparentiam cum homine vivo. Si autem consideretur sillogismus secundum quod habet esse in suis partibus integralibus, hoc est dupliciter, quia aut habet esse in partibus suis integralibus propinquis, aut remotis. Si vero in propinquis partibus integralibus, sic est liber Peryermenias, in quo determinatur de enuntiatione et propositione, | et sic de aliis que sunt partes propinque sillogismi; ex pluribus enim propositionibus ordinatis in modo et in figura statim fit sillogismus. Si autem consideretur sillogismus secundum quod habet esse in suis partibus remotis, sic est liber Predicamentorum; in quo determinatur de dicibili incomplexo secundum quod est ordinabile in genere, quod est pars remota sillogismi. Alii autem libri sunt adminiculativi predictorum librorum logice, sicut Liber Porphirii et liber Sex principiorum, ordinantur ad librum Predicamentorum, differenter tamen, quia in libro Predicamentorum determinatur de terminis incomplexis, et fit ibi mentio de generalissimo et specialissimo, de genere et specie, et sic de aliis; et ideo Porphirius ad completiorem doctrinam libri Predicamentorum fecit librum De quinque predicabilibus. Liber autem Sex principiorum ordinatur ad librum Predicamentotum, quia Philosophus, in Predicamentis determinando de ipsis, succincte et breviter determinavit de ultimis sex predicamentis; ideo Gilbertus Porretanus (ut dicit Albertus) composuit librum Sex principiorum de illis sex predicamentis sive principiis ad completiorem artem et doctrinam libri Predicamentorum. In quo quidem libro Sex princi- piorum forma extrinsecus adveniens est subiectum. Ulterius, quia Aristotiles in Topicis de loco sive sillogismo dialetico determinat secundum suum usum et amplitudinem, et non secundum

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eius essentiam—non enim determinat quid sit locus diffinitive nec quot sunt, sed solum ostendit quomodo ex locis distinctis potest sillogizari et probari argumentum—, ideo Boetius de loco determinavit secundum suam essentiam,—ostendendo quid est locus, et non applicando eum ad terminandum problema aliquod—, ad completiorem doctrinam libri Topicorum Aristotilis. Et ideo est bona ista distinctio qua dicitur quod Aristotiles determinat de locis quantum ad eorum usum et applicationem, Boetius autem determinat de ipsis secundum suam essentiam. Item. Quia secundo Posteriorum Philosophus docet invenire ipsum quod-quid-est sive diffinitionem quod est medium in demonstratione per viam aggregativam ex sillogismo et divisione, et tamen nullam scientiam nobis tradiderat de divisione, ideo Boetius librum Divisionum ad completiorem doctrinam secundi libri Posteriorum nobis composuit. Et protanto illi quatuor libri, scilicet liber Porphirii, Sex principiorum, et Divisionum et Topicorum Boetii, sunt de bene esse logice, idest valentes ad esse logice. Et ex hoc removetur quedam obiectio que posset fieri. Diceret enim aliquis ‘isti quatuor libri sunt de bene esse logice; ergo sunt de esse’ (per locum a parte in modo), sicut sequitur ‘homo albus; ergo homo’. Dicendum quod non sequitur ‘isti quatuor libri predicti sunt de bene esse etc.’, quia ‘bene’ in proposito non addit super ‘esse’, sed magis diminuit. Est enim sensus quod sunt de bene esse logice valentes ad esse. Et ideo magis proprie diceretur quod sunt ad esse logice quam quod sunt de bene esse, quia valent ad completam doctrinam librorum logicalium. Aliter tamen potest logica dividi penes divisionem secundarum intentionum, que sunt entia rationis de quibus est logica, ut dicit14 Avicenna. Ait enim quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Ad cuius evidentiam oportet intelligi quod intentiones secunde sunt quedam cognitiones secunde ipsius rei | sicut quedam rationes intelligendi rem secunde, sumpte ex quibusdam modis essendi. Et sunt presupponentes primam rei cognitionem, sicut cognitio respectiva presupponit cognitionem absolutam. Prima autem intentio vocatur prima rei cognitio sive prima ratio intelligendi, sumpta a modo essendi proprio rei; verbi gratia, sicut hominem possum intelligere primo secundum quod ratiocinans et intelligens. Et illa cognitio vocatur prima cognitio sive prima ratio intelligendi hominis, sumpta a modo essentiali proprio hominis | qui est ratiocinari; et res sic primo cognita vocatur prima

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Cf. Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75.

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intentio in concreto, sicut homo. Ulterius hominem sic primo cognitum, inquantum scilicet est intelligens et ratiocinans, possum postea intelligere ut est in pluribus reperibilis et de pluribus predicatur; et homo sic cognitus vocatur secunda intentio in concreto. Ulterius possum cognoscere hominem inquantum reperitur in pluribus differentibus numero; et homo sic cognitus vocatur secunda intentio in concreto, que est species; dicitur enim quod homo est species. Sed dicitur secunda intentio in abstracto, sicut specialitas et universalitas, que sunt cognitiones vel rationes intelligendi secunde, ut est in pluribus absolute vel ut est in pluribus differentibus numero vel specie, et sic de aliis. Et sic ille intentiones sumuntur a modis essendi communibus sicut a modo essentiali in pluribus differentibus specie (quantum ad genus) et numero (quantum ad speciem), et sic de aliis. Isti enim modi essendi sunt communes, ut patet. 16 Hiis visis, dividamus logicam penes divisionem secundarum intentionum concretarum de quibus est logica. Modo intentiones secunde debent dividi penes operationes intellectus, cum sint entia dependentia ab intellectu. Modo intellectus triplicem habet operationem sive cognitionem. Una est simplicium apprehensio, alia est apprehensorum simpliciter compositio et divisio, tertia est collatio sive discursus ab uno composito ad aliud, sive a causa ad effectum et ab antecedente ad consequens. Modo intentiones secunde de quibus est logica, attribuuntur rei simpliciter apprehense et cognite per primam operationem intellectus tamquam obiecto, aut rei cognite ab intellectu per secundam operationem, que est simpliciter comprehensa componere et dividere, aut attribuuntur rei cognite per tertiam operationem intellectus, que est discursus ab uno composito ad aliud compositum.15

15 A similar picture is found in other Accessus by Radulphus. E.g. the one that introduces his commentary on the Posterior Analytics (quoted after Paris, BNF Lat. 14.705, f. 73rb): “Intentio secunda nichil aliud est quam quedam ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus, sive quedam cognitio rei, sicut universale nichil aliud est quam quedam ratio intelligendi ut est in pluribus, et genus nichil aliud est quam quedam ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus differentibus specie, et sic de aliis. Logica igitur est de secundis intentionibus, non in abstracto, sed in concreto ut concernunt rem primo intellectam, unde [‘because’] logicus non considerat de generalitate et specialitate in abstracto, sed considerat de genere et specie in concreto modo. Iste intentiones sunt triplices secundum triplicem operationem intellectus, quia exquo intentio est cognitio: sicut est triplex cognitio vel operatio intellectus, sic erunt triplices intentiones. Una enim est operatio intellectus que apprehendit simplicia; alia est que simpliciter apprehensa componit et dividit; tertia est discurrere a premissis ad conclusionem. Unde quedam intentiones secunde attribuuntur rei apprehense per primam operationem intellectus,

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Si autem intentiones secunde attribuantur rei cognite per primam operationem intellectus, sic est Liber Predicamentorum, qui est de terminis simplicibus simpliciter apprehensis; est enim de dicibili incomplexo. De istis etiam dicunt Liber Porphirii et Liber sex principiorum, qui sunt adminiculativi libro Predicamentorum, differenter tamen, ut dictum est. Si autem intentiones secunde de quibus est logica, attribuantur rei cognite per secundam operationem intellectus, sic de istis determinatur in libro Peryermenias, in quo determinatur de enuntiatione, propositione et oppositione, et sic de aliis que sunt quedam intentiones secunde attribute rebus secundum quod sunt composite per secundam operationem intellectus. Propositio enim est quedam intentio secunda attributa alicui complexo ex subiecto | et predicato, et sic de aliis. Si autem intentiones secunde attribuantur rei cognite penes tertiam operationem intellectus, que est discursus intellectus ab uno composito in aliud compositum, sic de ipsis determinatur in nova logica. In tota enim nova logica determinatur de sillogismo, qui est quedam secunda intentio attributa rei penes tertiam operationem intellectus. In sillogismo enim fit discursus ab uno composito in aliud compositum sicut a premissis in conclusionem. Et de isto determinatur in nova tota logica, differenter tamen, ut dictum est, quia de sillogismo secundum se et absolute determinatur in libro Priorum, de sillogismo autem contracto ad materiam probabilem determinatur in libro Topicorum, de sillogismo sophistico in libro Elenchorum, de sillogismo autem demonstrativo sive de sillogismo contracto ad materiam necessariam in libro Posteriorum; liber autem Divisionum Boetii propter secundum Posteriorum, et liber Topicorum Boetii propter liber Topicorum Aristotilis, ut dictum est prius. Sed intelligendum est—ne aliquis credat quod sillogismus, qui est subiectum in libro Priorum, sit subiectum in tota logica—quod sillogismus potest dupliciter considerari. Vel quantum ad omnem modum essendi quem potest habere in se et absolute, considerato, et in suis partibus subiectivis et integralibus propinquis | et remotis et in omnibus aliis que habent attributionem ad sillogismum; et ille sillogismus sicut intentio speciei et generis (et sic de aliis) attribuuntur rei incomplexe apprehense per primam operationem intellectus. Unde genus, species dicuntur quedam incomplexa ut denominata sunt intentionibus, ita quod sicut intentio concreti accidentalis forma accidentali subiectum denominat (sicut in hoc quod est ‘album’), ita iste intentiones denominant obiectum super quod fundantur, quia sicut ista est per accidens ‘Homo est albus’, ita ista ‘Homo est species’ et illa ‘Animal est genus’, et sic de aliis. Licet aliqui dicant quod iste sint per se, quia genus et species dicunt rem, tamen iste intentiones non dicunt res nisi ut denominate sunt intentionibus; ut ‘Homo est species’, hoc est dicendo: ‘Homo est intellectus ut est in pluribus numero differentibus in quid’.”

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est subiectum in tota logica. Vel potest considerari sillogismus quantum ad unum modum essendi solum, scilicet quantum ad istum modum essendi qui est esse secundum se et absolute solum, scilicet quantum ad materiam et formam sibi debitam in modo et in figura, et non ut in hac parte vel in illa; et sic est pars sillogismi primo modo considerati, et ut sic est subiectum in libro Priorum. 20 Sed intelligendum quod si aliquis forte probaret quod liber Porphirii et liber Predicamentorum et Sex principiorum sunt superflui, quia: In istis libris determinatur de terminis incomplexis ut sunt partes sillogismi; et ut sic etiam determinatur in libro Priorum de ipsis; ergo in istis tribus libris determinantur superflue, dicendum quod determinare de illis que sunt partes sillogismi et inquantum sunt partes intrantes sillogismum, pertinet ad librum Priorum. Determinare tamen de illis que sunt partes sillogismi non inquantum sunt partes, sed sub alia ratione—sicut quantum ad modum predicandi de pluribus (sicut est universale), vel de pluribus differentibus numero vel specie (sicut sunt genus vel species), quantum ad librum Porphirii, vel quantum ad rationem subiciendi vel predicandi, vel dici de aliquo, et sic de aliis—non sic de ipsis determinare non pertinet ad librum Priorum, sed ad librum Porphirii, et Predicamentorum, et Sex principiorum. Ideo etc.

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III. Quaestiones in Porph. Isag., qq. 1–4,16 and 11 (Vat. Lat. 3044, ff. 3v–9r and 17v–19r; Brussels, Kon. Bibl. 2910 (3540–3547), ff. 35r–40r and 46v–48r)

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Hiis visis nunc accedamus ad tres partiales libros librorum logice, sciliV3v; B35r cet ad Librum Porphirii et Predicamentorum et Librum Peryermenias, querendo in communi primo circa logicam quedam, et deinde descendendo specialiter ad Librum Porphirii. Primo igitur circa logicam in communi queritur utrum logica sit scientia. Arguitur quod non

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Arguitur quod non quia: Modus sciendi non est scientia. Logica est 2 modus sciendi. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia modus rei non est res. Minor patet per Philosophum secundo Metaphisice. Vult enim ibi quod logica est modus sciendi, unde dicit17 ibi quod vanum | est simul querere V4r 15 scientiam et modum sciendi; et Commentator ibidem ait18 quod per ‘modum sciendi’ intelligit logicam. Item. Subiectum cuiuslibet scientie est intelligibile. Modo subiectum 3 logice non est intelligibile. Ergo logica non est scientia. Maior de se manifesta est. Minor declaratur dupliciter. Primo sic quia: Quod non 20 est sensibile, non est intelligibile, quia intellectus natura ex sensatis dependet; modo sillogismus, qui est subiectum logice, non est sensibilis, quia nullus videt sillogismum vel alio sensu sentit; ergo subiectum logice non est intelligibile. Etiam hoc apparet ex alio quia: Obiectum alicuius virtutis debet precedere illam virtutem; modo entia logicalia non pre25 cedunt intellectum, ymo sequuntur ipsum; quare etc. Minor declaratur quia: Illa entia de quibus est logica, causantur ex operatione intellectus; ideo non precedunt intellectum; ergo illud de quo est logica, non est obiectum intellectus; et si non est obiectum intellectus, non est intelligibile; quare etc. 5 partiales] V principales B 16 17 18

Qq. 5–8 have been edited by Pinborg (1980), 60–123. Aristotle, Metaph. II 3, 995a13–14. Averroes, In II Arist. Metaph., ad loc.

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Item. Omnis scientia est ex propriis. Logica non est ex propriis. Ideo etc. Maior patet19 primo Posteriorum. Minor apparet, quia logica est ex communibus, sicut apparet in principio libri primi Topicorum, ubi dicitur20 quod ad omnium methodorum principia et viam habet. Item. Omnis scientia habetur per aliquem modum sciendi. Sed logica non habetur per aliquem modum sciendi. Ideo etc. Maior de se patet. Minor declaratur quia: Si logica haberetur per aliquem modum sciendi, queratur de illo modo sciendi per quem haberetur logica, quia: Iste vel ille modus sciendi est notus vel ignotus. Si non est notus, tunc per ipsum logica non est vel non poterit esse nota vel scita. Si dicatur quod ille modus sciendi sit notus, aut ergo erit notus per logicam, aut per aliam scientiam. Non potest dici quod ille modus sciendi sit notus per logicam, quia exquo logica est per illum modum sciendi, nota: si iste esset notus per logicam, tunc vel esset notius et ignotius respectu eiusdem et esset notius seipso, quia logica esset notior illo modo sciendi inquantum notificaret ipsum, et esset ignotior ipso inquantum per ipsum notificatur. Etiam nec | quod ille modus sciendi per quem scitur logica est notus per aliam scientiam, quia illa alia scientia per quam ille modus sciendi esset notus, habebit modum sciendi per quem scitur. Et nunc queratur de illo modo sciendi sicut prius; aut est notus, aut ignotus; si non est notus, nec illa scientia cuius est, erit nota, nec per consequens logica. Si dicatur quod sit notus, aut ergo est notus per illam scientiam cuius est, aut per aliam; non per illam scientiam cuius est, quia tunc idem esset notius et ignotius respectu eiusdem, ut deductum est. Si per aliam scientiam sit notus, tunc illa alia scientia habebit modum sciendi, et ille erit notus vel ignotus, sicut prius. Si ignotus, per ipsum nichil potest sciri; si notus, hoc erit per aliam scientiam. Et sic procedetur in scientiis et modis sciendi in infinitum, vel oportet dare quod logica non habet aliquem modum sciendi per quem sciatur. IN OPPOSITUM sunt omnes auctoritates et communiter loquentes.

19 20

Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 2, 71b20–24. Aristotle, Topica I 2, 101b4.

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Ad solutionem illius questionis

Ad illam questionem propter metum illarum rationum aliqui dixerunt 8 quod logica est modus sciendi, et non est scientia. Sed dico breviter quod logica est scientia, quia, sicut apparet21 primo Posteriorum, scien5 tia est habitus conclusionis demonstrationis, quia scientia est effectus demonstrationis, ergo scientia est habitus conclusionis demonstrationis in qua demonstratur propria passio de subiecto per propria principia illius subiecti. Tunc arguo. Omnis cognitio conclusionis per propria principia ipsius et causas est scientia, | sicut apparet per diffinitionem V4v 10 scientie, primo Posteriorum datam, qua dicitur22 “scire est rem per causam cognoscere, et quoniam illius est causa, et quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere”. Modo logica est talis cognitio; est enim habitus quo cognoscimus entia logicalia et passiones suas per propria sua principia, sicut passiones sillogismi de sillogismo per propria principia sillogismi 15 et passiones predicamenti de predicamento, et passiones sillogismi dialetici de ipso per propria eius principia; et sic apparet inducendo in quocumque ente logicali. Ergo logica ets scientia. Ad rationes

Tunc ad rationes. Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘Modus sciendi non est 9 scientia’, ad hoc dicitur communiter quod verum est quod modus sciendi non est illa scientia cuius est modus sciendi, tamen potest esse alia scientia. Modo logica est modus sciendi in aliis scientiis. Et ideo non est aliqua scientia alia. Istud tamen non valet, quia logica non solum est modus sciendi in aliis scientiis, ymo est modus sciendi in 25 semetipsa logica. Ideo aliter dico, scilicet quod ‘modus sciendi’ dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro instrumento sciendi quo aliquis scit quod scit, sicut est demonstratio vel diffinitio vel divisio. Alio modo sumitur ‘modus sciendi’ pro cognitione vel habitu acquisito in anima de istis instrumentis sciendi. Modo modus sciendi primo modo non est 30 scientia, sed modus sciendi ut est habitus acquisitus de istis istrumentis vel de subiecto, bene potest scientia, quia illa instrumenta sciendi sicut demonstratio, diffinitio etc. bene habent causas et principia per que 20

2 metum] V motum B 21 22

Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 2, 71b20–24. Ibid., 71b9–12.

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possunt sciri, sicut alia entia. Modo logica est modus sciendi secundo modo, scilicet habitus acquisitus de hiis instrumentis sciendi per suas causas et principia; tamen non est modus sciendi primo modo. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Subiectum cuiuslibet scientie debet esse intelligibile’, concedatur. Et cum dicitur ‘Subiectum logice non est intelligibile’, falsum est. Et cum dicitur ‘quia quod non est sensibile, non est intelligibile’, dicitur quod aliquid est intelligibile dupliciter, vel primo, vel secundario. Modo illud quod est intelligibile primo modo, oportet quod sit sensibile vel per se, vel sua accidentia sicut sunt substantie, quia nulla substantia est per se sensibilis, sed per sua accidentia, sicut per dimensiones et qualitates sensibiles, ut albedo, nigredo et similia. Sed illud quod est intelligibile secundario ex intellectione alterius, non oportet quod sit sensibile, sicut privatio est intellectus per habitum. Et ideo non oportet quod privatio sit sensibilis. Modo intentiones secunde de quibus est logica, intelliguntur per intellectiones rerum supra quas fundantur. Ideo non oportet quod ille sint sensibiles. Et si dicas: omne quod intelligitur dependet ex sensu, dico quod verum est primario vel secundario. Modo intentiones dependent ex sensu secundario, sed propter hoc non oportet quod sint sensibiles; dependent enim ex sensu, | quia dependent ex cognitione rerum super quas fundantur, que per sensum cognoscuntur. Ideo non oportet quod ille intentiones sint sensibiles. Ergo si dicas quod intentiones secunde si intelligantur, oportet quod dependeant ex sensu, dico quod omne quod intelligitur dependet ex sensu. Et ideo concedo quod cognitio illarum intentionum dependet ex sensu, quia dependet ex cognitione rerum supra quas fundatur, et cognitio rerum dependet ex sensu. Et ideo, a primo usque ad ultimum, cognitio intentionum logicalium dependet ex sensu. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘obiectum virtutis debet eam precedere’, verum est principale obiectum et primum, sed illud quod est secundarium non oportet quod precedat illam potentiam cuius est obiectum, sed solum quantum ad actum illum secundum quem considerat illud obiectum. Et cum dicitur ‘Entia logicalia non precedunt intellectum’, verum est absolute, tamen quantum ad illum actum qui est scire logicalia, ipsa precedunt intellectum, quia oportet primo esse entia logicalia antequam habeatur scientia de ipsis.

12 intelligibile] intellectuale VB

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Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Omnis scientia est ex propriis’, concedo. Et cum dicitur ‘Logica non est ex propriis’, dico quod, licet illa de quibus est logica, communia sint in aliis scientiis per applicationem—quia entia que considerantur in logica, | que sunt intentiones secunde, possunt applicari omnibus scientiis et cuilibet materie, sive sit legalis, sive naturalis, sive mathematica, sive divina, sicut intentio generis, predicati et subiecti, et sic de aliis intentionibus possunt in quacumque materia reperiri—, tamen illa sic communia aliis scientiis logice sunt propria. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Omnis scientia habetur per aliquem modum sciendi’, concedo. Et cum dicitur ‘Logica non habetur per aliquem modum sciendi’, falsum est. Et cum dicitur ‘Ille modus sciendi aut est notus etc.’, dico quod est notus. Et cum dicitur ‘aut per logicam, aut per aliam scientiam’, dico quod ille modus sciendi per quem scitur logica, est per logicam notus; ille enim modus sciendi per quem habetur logica, vel est demonstratio vel diffinitio vel divisio. Unde modus sciendi in quocumque libro logicali est demonstratio, que est nota per librum Posteriorum. Et tu queres quomodo tunc modus sciendi in libro Posteriorum erit notus. Dico quod modus sciendi ibi est aliqua demonstratio particularis, sicut est illa: ‘Omnis sillogismus faciens scire est ex primis, veris immediatisque causis conclusionis; omnis demonstratio est sillogismus faciens scire; ideo etc.’ Modo illa demonstratio particularis per librum Posteriorum erit nota illo modo quia illa demonstratio est quedam demonstratio particularis et determinata, continet tamen omnes terminos generales omni demonstrationi. Modo illa demonstratio potest considerari ut continet terminos generales omni demonstrationi et ut una particularis est. Et sic est instrumentum sciendi demonstrationum in communi. Potest etiam considerari non ut est particularis, sed ut convenit in ratione et quidditate demonstrationis ut demonstratio est cum aliis demonstrationibus. Et sic illa demonstratio est nota in hoc quod alie demonstrationes sunt note. Unde in hoc quod ista notificat demonstrationem in communi, notificat etiam per seipsam inquantum convenit cum aliis demonstrationibus in ratione demonstrationis in communi, quia, nota demonstratione in communi, notificatur quelibet demonstratio particularis. Et illa est quedam demonstratio, et sic illa demonstratio particularis notificat seipsam, sed alio et alio modo est notificans et notificata, quia notificans est inquantum est quedam particularis demonstratio continens terminos communes omni demonstrationi; et est etiam notificata inquantum est demonstratio in communi.

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Et illud non est inconveniens, sed quantum ad hoc quod est inferre conclusionem de necessitate habet cognosci per librum Posteriorum; quantum est ad veritatem propositionum, ita habetur cognosci per seipB36v sam, quia per suos terminos et propositiones | ex quibus constitue sunt immediate, sicut illa est immediata et per se nota: ‘Omnis sillogismus faciens scire est ex propriis veris etc.’; et ideo illa per seipsam est nota, cognitis suis primis, et hoc quantum ad suam veritatem, quia non potest per alia probari. Et minor, qua dicitur ‘omnis demonstratio est sillogismus faciens scire’, est immediata, quia ibi probatur diffinitio de diffinito. 17 Eodem modo etiam intelligendum de illo modo sciendi qui est diffinitio, quia diffinitio per diffinitionem diffinitionis est manifesta et nota. Et diffinitio diffinitionis per seipsam est nota, quia diffinitio diffinitionis, que ait ‘Diffinitio est oratio quid est esse rei significans’, inquantum continet terminos generales omni diffinitioni, notificat diffinitionem in communi. Et quia illa est quedam diffinitio que, sicut et alie particulares diffinitiones, est eiusdem rationis cum illis inquantum diffinitio, etideo illa notificabit seipsam ut convenit cum aliis diffinitionibus in ratione diffinitionis. Et illud est rationale in entibus secundum intellectum secundum quod intellectus potest reflecti super se quod illa diffiV5v nitio particularis sit notificans inquantum | continet terminos communes cuilibet diffinitioni, et notificata inquantum convenit cum aliis in ratione demonstrationis in communi. Et sic ad aliud.

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q. 2a utrum logica sit scientia realis vel rationalis

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1 Consequenter queritur utrum logica sit scientia realis vel rationalis. Et

arguitur quod sit scientia realis quia: Illa scientia est realis que considerat entia realia vel res extra animam existentes. Modo logica tales res considerat. Ideo etc. Maior de se patet. Sed minor etiam apparet, quia: In logica determinatur de predicamentis, sicut de substantia, 30 quantitate, qualitate, et sic de aliis. Modo illa predicamenta sunt vere res extra animam existentes, ut vult23 Philosophus sexto Metaphisice, qui

22 diffinitioni] B demonstrationi V 23

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. VI 4, 1027b31–32.

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dividit ens verum in decem kathegorias, idest in decem predicamenta, que sunt decem rerum principia. Et si dicatur ad illam rationem quod logica non considerat illa predicamenta secundum esse suum reale, sed considerat de illis secundum quod ibi fundantur secunde intentiones; si ergo dicatur sic contra quia: Illo modo determinatur de illis in libro Predicamentorum quomodo assignantur sibi proprietates inesse et quomodo sibi conveniunt iste proprietates. Modo proprietates assignate de predicamentis in libro Predicamentorum, debentur eis secundum esse suum reale. Ergo predicamenta considerantur in libro Predicamentorum secundum esse suum reale. Et sic ad logicam pertinent secundum esse reale, et non secundum esse intentionale. Maior de se patet. Minor etiam apparet: Sicut recipere contraria, illa proprietas debetur substantie secundum suum esse reale, et non suscipere magis et minus (et sic de aliis proprietatibus substantie), eodem modo est in aliis predicamentis, sicut competit quantitati non habere contrarium secundum suum esse reale, et qualitati secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici, et sic inducendo in aliis. Item. Scientia non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile. Sed logica est quedam res vera in predicamento existens, scilicet Qualitatis. Ergo oportet quod scibile logicale sit res in predicamento existens. Modo talis scientia que est de scibili, quod est vera res in predicamento existens, est scientia realis. Quare etc. Maior patet, quia dependet ex suo scibili, et ideo non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile. Ergo si scibile logicale non esset vera res extra animam existens, iam scientia esset maioris entitatis quam suum scibile. Item. Illa scientia est realis que habet verificare de rebus. Modo logica verificat de rebus. Ideo etc. Maior de se manifesta est. Minor apparet quia dicendo ‘Homo est species’ ibi verificatur species de homine. Maior etiam patet quia ab eo quod res est vel non est dicitur oratio vera vel falsa. Et confirmatur quia: Communiter dicitur quod logica est scientia discernendi verum a falso. Modo quod discernit verum a falso, cogitat per se et falsum et verum. Modo illud quod cogitat per se falsum et verum, habet considerare ipsas res, quia ab eo quod res est vel non est dicitur oratio vera vel falsa.24 Deinde ostenditur quod logica sit scientia per se sermocinalis quia: Illa scientia est per se sermocinalis que considerat aliqua in quorum 1 verum] unum VB 24

Cf. Aristotle, Categ. 5, 4b8–10; 12, 14b21–22.

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diffinitione habet poni sermo. Modo logica considerat talia in quorum diffinitione cadit sermo, quia considerat sillogismum, enuntiationem, propositionem, et sic de aliis. Modo in diffinitione omnium istorum cadit sermo, quia sillogismus est oratio … etc; ibi enim ponitur sermo, B37r quia oratio, que est | sermo; eodem modo dicitur quod enuntiatio est 5 oratio, et sic de aliis. Ergo logica est scientia sermocinalis. 6 IN OPPOSITUM sunt auctores, qui communiter dicunt quod logica est scientia rationalis, et non realis vel sermocinalis. Er arguitur ratione quia: Illa scientia est rationalis que est de entibus rationis. Modo logica V6r est huiusmodi, | quia est de intentionibus secundis que sunt entia 10 rationis. Ideo etc. Respondetur 7 Dicendum est quod logica est scientia rationalis. Et ratio huius potest

esse duplex. Prima sit hec quia: Illa scientia est rationalis que est directiva rationis vel intellectus in ratiocinando. Modo logica est huiusmodi. Quare etc. Maior patet, quia scientia dicitur rationalis uno modo quia est directiva rationis vel intellectus in ratiocinando. Minor patet, quia per logicam dirigitur intellectus in ratiocinando et procedendo a principiis ad principiatum. 8 Item. Illa scientia est rationalis que est de entibus dependentibus in esse ab intellectu et ratione. Modo logica est de talibus entibus que in esse dependent ex intellectu et ratione. Ideo etc. Maior apparet, quia sicut illa scientia dicitur realis que est de entibus que ab intellectu non dependent, ita per oppositum illa scientia que est de entibus que dependent ab intellectu in esse, est rationalis. Minor patet quia: Logica est de secundis intentionibus; modo ille intentiones secunde solum habent esse in intellectu et etiam habent esse ab intellectu, quia licet habeant esse effective ab ipsa re, hoc est a causa efficiente remota, sed intellectus agens est causa efficiens secundarum intentionum magis propinqua; et de hoc magis inferius videbitur.

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Ad rationes 9 Tunc ad rationes. Ad primam, cum dicitur ‘Illa scientia est realis que

considerat res etc.’, verum est si considerat res ut extra animam existentes et secundum esse reale. Si autem consideret eas ut super ipsas fundantur communes intentiones logicales, non oportet. Et quando dicitur 35 quod logica considerat res veras, scilicet predicamenta, dico quod con-

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siderat ipsa non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum quod super ipsa predicamenta fundantur intentiones secunde, sicut intentio generalissimi, specialissimi, et subalterni. Et quando contra hoc arguitur quia illo modo determinatur in Libro predicamentorum de predicamentis quo modo assignantur eis sue proprietates in esse, propter dissolutionem istius rationis est advertendum quod quando aliquod scibile consideratur ab aliquo artifice secundum unum modum essendi, potest ille artifex multa determinare de illo scibili secundum alium modum essendi secundum quem ipsum non considerat, et hoc per accidens, dumtamen hoc valeat ad cognitionem eius secundum illum modum essendi secundum quem ipsum considerat. Modo cognitio predicamentorum ut super ipsa fundantur intentiones secunde, dependet ex cognitione rerum predicamentalium secundum se et absolute; et universaliter, cognitio cuiuslibet intentionis secunde dependet ex cognitione rei super quam fundatur. Et ideo Aristotiles considerans predicamenta in Libro predicamentorum ut super ipsa fundantur intentiones secunde, determinat de ipsis predicamentis ut sunt res quedam secundum se et absolute, et hoc per accidens, ut valent ad cognitionem predicamentorum ut super ipsa fundantur intentiones secunde. Tunc ad formam rationis. Quando dicitur ‘Modo illo determinatur de predicamentis quo modo etc.’, dico quod verum est, si sint proprietates per se intente. Si autem sint intente per accidens, non est verum. Et cum dicitur ‘Proprietates determinate in predicamentis, debent ipsis predicamentis secundum suum esse reale’, dico quod ille proprietates predicamentorum determinate et significate de predicamentis in Libro predicamentorum, non sunt per se ibi intente, sed magis proper maiorem cognitionem predicamentorum ut super ipsa fundantur intentiones secunde. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Scientia non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile etc.’, propter illam rationem ibi aliqui coguntur dicere quod logica non est habitus de prima specie qualitatis existens ut scientia, tamen non oportet ita dicere quia, secundum quod vult25 Philosophus secundo Ethicorum, habitus generatur | in anima ex operationibus, sicut ex hoc quod aliquis multotiens citharizat | habet habitum citharizandi et fit citharista. Sicut est in aliis habitibus, ita etiam ex hoc aliquis mul-

7 secundum] B secunde V 25

35 fit citharista] fit citharisticus V sic citharizat B

Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nicom. II 1, 1103a23–34.

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totiens speculatur aliquod scibile et considerat, circa ipsum generatur in anima sua habitus illius scibilis. Unde ex frequenti consideratione circa aliquod scibile, servantur habitus in anima de illo scibili. Ita quod dicas in proposito, quod scilicet quando aliquis multotiens sillogizat et considerat circa sillogismum, ex illo frequenti actu considerandi generatur scientia de sillogismo in anima sua. 12 Tunc ad rationem ‘Scientia non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile etc.’ dico quod non oportet, quia scientia non recipit realitatem et entitatem a suo scibili, ymo a suo subiecto et a causa immediata ex qua causatur in subiecto, sicut quodlibet accidens recipit entitatem a suo subiecto et a causa sua immediata ex qua causatur. Modo subiectum logice est vera res, scilicet ipsa anima in qua est sicut in suo subiecto et causa immediata ipsius logice ex qua causatur. Omnis enim anima est vera res, sicut sillogizare est quidam actus realis, sicut sentire vel videre, quia est operatio forme realis. Ideo ille operationes ex quibus scientia immediate causatur, sunt vere res in predicamento existentes. Ideo cum logica immediate ex istis causetur, est vera res in predicamento existens, tamen denominationem recipit ab obiecto suo, licet non realitatem. Et ideo dicitur rationalis, sicut obiectum suum est ens rationis. 13 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Illa scientia est realis que verificat aliquid de rebus’, verum est, si hoc sit secundum esse reale. Et cum dicitur ‘Logica est huiusmodi’, verum est non secundum esse reale, sed secundum esse intentionale. Unde dicendo ‘Homo est species’ species verificatur de homine secundum esse cognitum et intellectum. Vel potest dici quod verum est, si verificet aliquod reale de aliquo reali; tamen si verificet aliquod intentionale de re quam denotat, non oportet. Modo illo modo logicus verificat unum de alio. Quare non valet. 14 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur quod logica est scientia discernendi verum a falso, illud sic debet intelligi, non quod per puram logicam discernatur verum a falso in qualibet scientia, sed protanto dicitur quod discernit verum a falso quia ibi determinantur quedam intentiones communes per applicationem ad omnia entia specialia, et ille qui habet habitum logice per applicationem illarum intentionum communium ad scientias speciales, faciliter scit quid verum et quid falsum in qualibet scientia speciali. Unde sola logica non sufficeret ad discernendum verum a falso in qualibet scientia speciali nisi cum aliqua scientia speciali, sicut cum geometria vel arismetica, quia aliquis non habet applicare universale

16 immediate] V immediata B

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ad particulare nisi cognoscat utrumque. Modo habens puram logicam non cognoscit particularia, sed ex tali applicatione intentionum communium ad scientias speciales habetur veritas. Et ideo per puram logicam non discernitur verum a falso. 5 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Illa scientia est per se sermocinalis que con- 15 siderat etc.’, intelligendum quod logica considerat modum sciendi sive instrumentum sciendi, sicut est diffinitio, sillogismus etc. Modo illud instrumentum sciendi et docendi debet includere et presupponere sermonem, quia sermo est instrumentum doctrine, ut dicit26 Philosophus, 10 libello De sensu et sensato; et ideo illa includunt sermonem. Ad finem rationis. Cum dicitur ‘Illa scientia est sermocinalis que 16 considerat aliqua in quorum diffinitione ponitur “sermo”’, verum est, si consideret ea penes illud quod est ibi sermonis; si autem consideret ea non sic, sed penes hoc quod fiunt a ratione et penes quod sunt directiva 15 rationis, | non oportet quod talis scientia sit sermocinalis. Modo illa B38r que considerantur in logica, non considerantur penes illud quod est ibi sermonis, ymo magis penes hoc quod sunt ab intellectu et ratione et penes hoc quod sunt directiva rationis.

quaestio 3a utrum sillogismus sit subiectum logice

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1

Consequenter queritur de subiecto logice utrum sillogismus sit ibi subV7r iectum. Quod sillogismus non sit subiectum in logica

Arguitur quod non quia: Nichil unum et idem potest esse subiectum et 2 instrumentum. Modo sillogismus est instrumentum in logica. Ideo etc. Item. Nichil unum et idem est subiectum totius et partis. Modo 3 sillogismus est subiectum in parte logice, quia est subiectum in libro Priorum. Ideo etc. Maior patet, quia si idem esset subiectum totius et partis, tunc totum et pars essent equalis ambitus, quod est inconveniens. 30 Minor de se patet. 25

21–22 ibi subiectum] V in tota logica B 26

Aristotle, De sensu et sensato, cap. 1, 437a14–15.

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Item. Si sillogismus esset subiectum in logica, tunc partes sillogismi essent subiecta partium logice. Modo illud est falsum. Ideo etc. Maior probatur quia: Sicut se habet totum ad totum, ita pars ad partem; ergo si sillogismus esset subiectum in logica tota: sicut sillogismus esset subiectum in tota logica, ita partes sillogismi essent subiecta in partibus 5 logice. Minor declaratur quia: In libro Elenchorum, qui est pars logice, nulla pars sillogismi est subiectum, nec pars integralis eius nec subiectiva, quia sillogismus sophisticus, qui est ibi subiectum, non est in aliquo modo pars sillogismi, nec integralis nec subiectiva. Quod modus sciendi non sit subiectum in logica

10

5 Deinde arguitur quod modus sciendi non sit ibi subiectum, quia mate-

ria et finis non coincidunt, ut apparet27 secundo Phisicorum. Modo modus sciendi est finis in logica; iste enim est finis intentus in logica quod aliquis habeat modum sciendi in aliis scientiis. Ergo modus sciendi non est subiectum in logica. 15 6 IN OPPOSITUM sunt omnes expositores, et Albertus expresse super libro Priorum. Aliqui dicunt quod ens rationis est subiectum in logica, alii quod sillogismus, et alii quod modus sciendi. Sed non est vis quocumque modo dicatur, quia omnes modi sciendi sunt entia rationis et inter istos modos sciendi sillogismus est principalior. 20 Respondetur 7 Ideo dico duo ad questionem. Primo quod subiectum in logica com-

mune communitate predicationis est ens rationis vel secunde intentiones, sed subiectum ibi commune communitate attributionis est sillogismus. 25 8 Primum declaratur sic quia: Illud est subiectum in logica commune communitate predicationis quod est predicabile de omnibus illis que determinantur in logica. Modo ens rationis vel intentiones secunde communes sunt ad omnia in logica determinanda, quia quidquid in logica determinatur sunt intentiones secunde concrete rebus, sicut in 30

27 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In II Phys. Comm. (ad Aristotle, Physics II 7, 198a21 ff.), nr. 242 ad fin.: ‘Materia vero non est nec idem specie nec idem numero cum aliis causis, quia materia inquantum huiusmodi est ens in potentia, agens vero est ens in actu inquantum huiusmodi, forma vero vel finis est actus vel perfectio’.

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Libro Porphirii determinatur de predicabili, quod est nomen intentionis; in Libro Predicamentorum etiam determinatur de predicamentis; modo predicamentum est nomen intentionis secunde; in Libro Peryermenias determinatur de enuntiatione; in Libro Priorum determinatur de sillogismo simpliciter, et sic inducendo in aliis libris logicalibus. Sic ergo apparet quod intentiones communes sunt per predicationem ad omnia in logica per se determinata, licet sint communes ad omnia ibi determinata per accidens, quia ibi determinatur de entibus realibus per accidens ut super ipsa fundantur intentiones concrete. Secundum declaratur quia: Illud est subiectum in scientia commune 9 per attributionem de quo presupponitur quid est et quia est et ad quod omnia alia habent attributionem determinata in scientia. Modo de sillogismo presupponitur in logica quid est et quia est, et omnia ibi determinata habent attributionem ad ipsum. Unde determinatur de sillogismo et de eius partibus sicut de eius partibus propinquis et remotis et integralibus, sicut de termino et de enuntiatione; et de partibus eius subiectivis, sicut de sillogismo dialetico et demonstrativo et omnia determinata in logica habent attributionem ad sillogismum, sicut sillogismus sophisticus ibi determinatur inquantum habet apparentiam et similitudinem sillogismi dialetici. Etiam ibi determinatur de coniugationibus inutilibus | inquantum sunt quidam defectus et privationes sillogismi; B38v et ibi determinatur de passionibus sillogismi, sicut habere tres terminos, esse in aliqua trium figurarum.—Et sic quidquid in logica determinatur est sillogismus, vel habens attributionem ad ipsum, vel sicut partes vel sicut passiones vel sicut defectus eius. Ideo sillogismus est ibi subiectum commune per attributionem. Ad rationes

Tunc ad rationes. Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘Nichil unumquodque idem 10 etc.’, verum est eodem modo consideratum. Et cum dicitur ‘Sillogismus 30 est instrumentum in logica’, dico quod aliquis sillogismus | particularis V7v est instrumentum in logica, sed sillogismus in communi consideratus secundum omnem modum essendi quem habet in se et in suis partibus integralibus et subiectivis et in eis que habent attributionem ad ipsum sicut est subiectum in tota logica, sic non eodem modo est subiectum et 35 instrumentum. 9 concrete] V secunde B

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11

Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Nichil unum et idem est subiectum totius’, verum est, eodem modo consideratum. Et cum dicitur ‘Sillogismus est in parte logice’, dico sicut dicit28 Albertus primo Priorum quia sillogismus aliter et aliter est subiectum in tota logica et aliter in libro Priorum, quia sillogismus communis secundum omnem modum essendi quem habet in se et absolute et in suis partibus integralibus et subiectivis et in illis que habet attributionem ad ipsum, est subiectum in tota logica, sed sillogismus consideratus quantum ad eius materiam et formam secundum se et absolute, sicut est subiectum in libro Priorum. Unde sillogismus universaliter dicitur esse subiectum in tota logica, sed sillogismus consideratus secundum se et absolute quantum ad materiam et formam sillogismi est subiectum in libro Priorum. 12 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Si sillogismus esset subiectum in tota logica, tunc partes sillogismi etc.’, dicendum quod non oportet, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum in aliqua scientia non oportet quod sit commune omnibus determinatis in scientia per predicationem, sed solum sufficit quod sit commune per attributionem, ita quod omnia alia determinata in scientia ad ipsam habeant attributionem. Et cum dicitur ‘Sicut se habet totum ad totum etc.’, dico quod est simile et dissimile. In hoc enim est simile quod sicut unum est totum respectu alterius, ita aliud est pars respectu alterius, tamen quantum ad aliud est dissimile, quia multa insunt toti que non oportet inesse partibus. Ideo quamvis sillogismus sit subiectum in tota logica, non oportet quod partes sillogismi sunt subiecta in qualibet parte logice. 13 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Materia et finis non coincidunt’, distinguo de materia quia: Quedam est materia ex qua, et alia est materia circa quam. Modo de materia ex qua verum est quod illa non circumcidunt cum fine, sed de materia circa quam non oportet. Modo illo modo modus sciendi est subiectum in logica. Vel potest dici: concedo maiorem; et cum dicitur ‘Modus sciendi finis est in logica’, falsum est, ymo cognitio modi sciendi est ibi finis, et ipse modus sciendi cognitus est ibi subiectum.

28

Albert the Great, In Arist. Anal. Priora, init.

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quaestio 4a utrum universale sit subiectum in libro porphirii Consequenter queritur specialiter circa istum librum Porphirii. Et pri- 1 mo queratur utrum universale sit ibi subiectum. 5

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Quod universale non sit subiectum in libro Porphirii

Arguitur quod non quia: Quod est subiectum in omni scientia, non est subiectum in ista. Modo universale est subiectum in omni scientia. Ergo etc. Maior patet quia scientie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem suorum subiectorum, sicut potentie secundum distinctionem obiectorum, ut patet29 secundo De anima. Et ideo quod est subiectum in aliis scientiis, non est subiectum hic. Minor apparet quia omnis scientia est de aliquo universali sicut de subiecto, quia de singularibus non est scientia. Item. Quod est subiectum in aliqua scientia, est ens quia: De non ente non est scientia, ut habetur30 primo Posteriorum. Modo universale non est ens. Ergo universale non est subiectum in aliqua scientia, nec per consequens in ista. Minor declaratur quia: Boetius tertio De consolatione dicit31 quod omne quod est, ideo est quia unum numero est. Modo universale non est unum numero, quia tunc esset singulare; quod falsum est; ergo universale non est ens. Quare etc. Item. Omne quod est subiectum in aliqua scientia, debet esse intelligibile. Sed universale non est intelligibile. Ergo non est subiectum in aliqua scientia, nec per consequens in illa. Maior apparet, quia omne illud de quo est scientia, debet movere intellectum ut de ipso intellectus habeat scientiam, cum scientia sit habitus intellectualis. Probatio minoris, scilicet quod universale non sit intelligibile—saltem universale pro intentione, quia de tali | loquor et de illo queritur questio—, quia si universale esset intelligibile, tunc idem, puta intellectus, esset in actu | et in potentia respectu eiusdem. Modo hoc est impossibile. Quare etc. Probatio maioris quia: Intellectus inquantum intelligeret univer29 Aristotle, De anima II 11, 422b18 ff. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In II De anima comm., nr. 522: “Ad evidentiam autem eorum quae hic dicuntur, considerare oportet quod distinctio potentiarum et obiectorum proportionabilis est”. 30 Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 2, 71b25–26. 31 Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, ubi?

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sale et etiam quantum ad intelligibile, esset in potentia respectu ipsius, quia intellectus est in potentia respectu intelligibilis, ut dicitur32 tertio De anima; etiam quia intellectus faciens omnes intentiones secundas, et per consequens intentionem universalis. Ideo intellectus est in actu respectu universalis, quia agens est in actu respectu eius quia agit et intellec- 5 tus est in actu et in potentia respectu universalis, sed universale posset intelligi ab intellectu. Modo illud est inconveniens. Ideo etc. 5 Item. Illud idem probatur sic, scilicet quod universale non sit intelligibile, quia: Intellectus naturaliter dependet ex sensu. Modo universale non est sensibile, ymo solum singulare est sensibile et hic et nunc. Modo 10 universale non est singulare. Ergo universale non est sensibile, nec per consequens intelligibile. 6 Si universale esset hic subiectum: cum quinque sint universalia, quinque essent subiecta in illo libro. Modo hoc est falsum, quia unius debet esse unum subiectum vel obiectum. Ergo universale non est hic subiec- 15 tum. 7 IN OPPOSITUM est Porphirius, qui dicit33 quod vult tradere scientiam de quinque universalibus, et Albertus et Boetius, et omnes expositores, qui dicunt quod illa scientia est de universali sicut de subiecto. Respondetur

20

8 Ad illam questionem dico distinguendo de universali. Nam universale

potest considerari dupliciter: vel pro re super quam fundatur intentio universalis, vel pro intentione universalis concreta; et illa intentio universalis concreta est res ut est intellecta in pluribus. 9 Tunc dico duo ad questionem. Primo quod universale secundum 25 quod dicit rem super quam potest fundari intentio universalis, non est subiectum in illo libro. Secundo dico quod universale ut dicit intentionem concretam est hic subiectum. 10 Primum declaratur quia: Illud non est hic subiectum quod non considerat logicus per se. Modo logicus non considerat rem cui applicabilis 30 est intentio universalis, sicut lapidem vel hominem. Ergo res cui intentio universalis potest applicari, non est hic subiectum. Maior declaratur quia: Ista scientia est logicalis; et ideo illud quod per se non est de consideratione logici, non est subiectum in illa scientia; minor appa-

32 33

Cf. Aristotle, De anima III 5, 430a10–17. Porphyrius, Isag., I 1, p. 52–10.

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ret, quia logicus non considerat res per se nisi ut super ipsas fundantur intentiones secunde; et hoc est considerare rem per accidens. Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod universale ut est intentio con- 11 creta ut dicit rem ut est intellecta in pluribus ut sic, est subiectum hic. Et ratio huius potest esse duplex. Prima sit hec. Illud est subiectum in illa scientia quod est commune per applicationem ad decem predicamenta et quod per se pertinet ad considerationem logici. Modo universale ut dicit intentionem concretam commune est ad decem predicamenta per applicationem, et est per se de consideratione logici. Ideo etc. Maior patet quia: Illa scientia logicalis est, et immediate ordinata ad librum Predicamentorum. Et ideo illud est hic subiectum quod per se a logico consideratur et est applicabile ad decem predicamenta. Minor declaratur, scilicet quod universale pro intentione concreta sit per se de consideratione logici, quia: Logica, ut dicit34 Avicenna, est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Et universale illo modo acceptum commune est ad decem predicamenta per applicationem, quia in quolibet predicamento reperitur res sub ista ratione, scilicet ut intellecta est in pluribus, vel differentibus numero, vel specie. Item. Illud est hic subiectum de quo presupponitur quid est et quia 12 est | et de quo et de cuius proprietatibus et partibus in illo libro deter- V8v minatur. Modo de universali ut dicit intentionem concretam, presupponitur quid est et quia est et de eius partibus et de proprietatibus, et de ipso determinatur in illa scientia. Quare etc. Maior apparet quia: Ille sunt conditiones requisite ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum in aliqua scientia, scilicet quod de ipso presupponitur quid est et quia est, ut apparet35 primo Posteriorum; de subiecto enim presupponitur quid est et quia est. Et etiam requiritur quod de ipso et de suis partibus et passionibus determinetur in illa scientia. Ergo etc.. Minor manifesta est, quia in illa scientia presupponitur quid est universale, scilicet quod est aptum natum esse in pluribus. Etiam presupponitur hic universale esse. Etiam de partibus eius in illa scientia determinatur, sicut de specie et de genere, et sic de aliis universalibus, que sunt partes subiective universalis pro intentione concreta. Etiam de proprietatibus universalis hic determinatur, sicut quod predicatur in quid vel in quale et quod habeat esse in pluribus differentibus numero vel specie, et sic de aliis.

34 35

Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75. Aristotle. Anal. Post. I 13, 78a22–79a16.

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appendix e Ad rationes

13 Tunc ad rationes. Ad primam. Cum dicitur ‘Illud quod est subiectum

in qualibet scientia, non est hic subiectum’, verum est eodem modo quo est subiectum in qualibet scientia. Et cum dicitur ‘Universale est subiectum in qualibet scientia’, dico quod universale quod est res cui v B39 applicabilis | est intentio universalis, est subiectum in aliis scientiis, sicut quantitas ut est quid abstrahibile est subiectum in mathematica, et intentio corpus mobile subiectum est in naturali philosophia. Modo illa de quibus sunt alie scientie, sunt res cui applicabilis est intentio universalis, sed in libro Porphirii universale est subiectum non pro re cui applicabilis est intentio universalis, sed ut est intentio secunda concreta. Et sic differenter universale est subiectum in aliis scientiis et in illa. 14 Et si dicas: ‘Aut universale sub ratione qua universale est subiectum in aliis scientiis, aut sub ratione qua particulare. Non ut particulare est, quia de particularibus non est scientia. Ergo ut universale est et universale secundum quod universale est subiectum in aliis scientiis. Ergo eodem modo est subiectum in libro Porphirii et etiam in aliis scientiis’— dico ad hoc quod in aliis scientiis subiectum est id quod est universale secundum suam essentiam cui accidit esse universale et esse particulare. Unde non est subiectum in aliis scientiis nec secundum quod universale nec secundum quod particulare, sed est ibi subiectum secundum suam essentiam, sicut corpus mobile, cui accidit esse particulare et esse universale, est subiectum in naturali philosophia, non secundum quod universale est. 15 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Quod est subiectum is aliqua scientia, est ens’, concedo. Et cum dicitur ‘Universale non est ens’, falsum est. Et quando probatur quod omne quod est ideo est quia unum numero est, dico quod omne quod est extra animam est unum numero, et sic intellexit Boetius. Modo universale secundum quod universale non est extra animam. Ideo etc. Vel potest dici quod ‘unum numero’ dicitur multipliciter: vel unum ex divisione quantitatis; et illud est unum numero simpliciter, vel unum numero numerositate essentie, idest aliqua essentia in se indivisa et a qualibet alia divisa; et illud unum numero convertitur cum ente. Modo omne quod est est unum numero aliquo istorum duorum modorum: vel unum numero simpliciter, vel unum numero numerositate essentie. Modo universale, dicis tu, non est unum numero; verum est primo modo dictum; tamen bene est unum numero secundo modo dictum.

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Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Illud quod est subiectum in aliqua scientia, debet esse intelligibile’, conceditur. Et cum dicitur ‘Universale non est intelligibile’, falsum est. Et quando probatur hoc dupliciter, uno modo sic; et illa fuit secunda probatio minoris. Si solvatur tamen primo modo ‘Quod non est sensibile, non est intelligibile’, | dico quod aliquid est intelligibile dupliciter: vel primario, vel secundario et ex intellectione cuiusdam alterius. Modo verum est quod illud quod est intelligibile primo, oportet quod sit sensibile vel per se, vel per aliquod sui accidens, sicut substantie per sua accidentia sentiuntur, que sunt primo intelligibiles et non secundario. Sed quod est intelligibile secundario et ex intellectione cuiusdam alterius, non oportet quod illud sit sensibile, sicut intellectus noster sensibilis non est, cum sit intelligibilis, est per alia et ex intellectione aliarum rerum, et primario non est intelligibilis per habitum. Modo illa que sic secundario sunt intelligibilia, non oportet quod sint sensibilia. Modo universale pro intentione est intelligibile ex intellectione rei super quam fundatur, et non est primo intelligibile. Et ideo non oportet quod sit sensibile. Et si dicas tunc ‘Ergo universale erit figmentum quia: quod solum est in intellectu et nichil sibi correspondet in re, est figmentum; modo universale, sicut tu dicis, non est sensibile, ymo solum est in intellectu; ergo etc.’, dico quod licet universale non sit sensibile, tamen bene dependet ex sensu, quia ex modo essendi rei ratione cuius fundatur in re, sicut ex illo modo essendi qui est esse reperibile in pluribus. Unde rei intellectio super quam fundatur intentio universalis, dependet ex sensatione rei. Et intellectio universalis quod est intentio, dependet a re super quam fundatur. Et ideo, a primo ad ultimum, intellectus universalis dependet ex sensu. Et ita non erit figmentum, quia aliquid correspondet sibi ex parte rei. Ad aliam probationem. Cum dicitur ‘Si universale esset intelligibile, idem esset in actu et in potentia etc.’, falsum est illud eodem modo et secundum idem. Et cum dicitur ‘Si intellectus intelligeret universale, tunc esset in potentia respectu universalis’, concedo, quia intellectus est in potentia respectu cuiuslibet intelligibilis. Et cum dicitur ‘Intellectus facit illas secundas intentiones; ergo est in actu respectu ipsarum’, illud potest negari. Intellectus enim possibilis non facit | illas secundas inten-

30–31 cum … est] B minoris dico quod non est verum V vel add. V

35 secundas] operationes

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tiones, ymo causa efficiens illarum secundarum intentionum est modus essendi rei cum ipso intellectu agente. Si autem intellectus possibilis aliquid ad hoc faceret, hoc est per accidens inquantum oportet prius rem intelligi secundum se et absolute quam intelligatur ut universalis, sicut prius intelligo hominem secundum se quam intelligatur ipsum ut est reperibilis in pluribus differentibus numero, quia intellectus absolutus rei precedit quemcumque intellectum eius respectivum. Et ideo non est in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem et secundum idem. 19 Qui autem vellet sustinere quod intellectus possibilis sit causa efficiens intentionum quodammodo, posset respondere ad rationem quod illud non est in actu et in potentia, quod verum est eodem modo et secundum idem. Et cum dicitur ‘Intellectus est in potentia respectu universalis’, verum est per naturam qua possibilis est. Et cum dicitur quod etiam facit eas, verum est, sed hoc non est per naturam qua possibilis est, sed per naturam qua est informatus prima rei cognitione. Unde intellectus potest considerari vel ut est possibilis, vel ut iam habet rei cognitionem, et sicut est in actu. Modo si consideret ut possibilis est, sic est in potentia respectu cuiuslibet intelligibilis, sed ut est in actu perv rei cognitionem, sic potest esse agens intentiones secundas. 20 Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Si universale esset hic subiectum: cum quinque sint universalia etc.’, dico quod universale in communi ad illa quinque universalia est subiectum in illa scientia, et non universale quod est genus vel species (et sic de aliis), sed universale in communi, quod realiter non est aliud ab istis, sed solum secundum rationem.

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quaestio 11a utrum diffinitione generis diffiniatur intentio vel res subiecta intentioni 1 Consequenter queritur circa diffinitionem generis qua dicitur Genus V17v; B46v est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus | specie etc., 30 B47r

utrum ibi diffiniatur intentio generis vel res subiecta intentioni. Arguitur quod ibi diffiniatur intentio

2 Arguitur quod ibi diffiniatur intentio quia: Illud ibi diffinitur quod

per se logicus considerat. Modo logicus considerat per se genus quod est intentio, et non genus quod est res. Ideo etc. Maior patet, quia 35

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Porphirius hic est logicus, et ideo diffinitur illud quod per se considerat logicus. Minor patet, quia genus quod est res, non pertinet ad logicum, quia tunc esset realis artifex. Item. Illud ibidem diffinitur quod est applicabile et commune ad 3 5 omnia predicamenta. Modo genus quod est res, non est commune ad omnia predicamenta, quia nulla res una communis est omnibus predicamentis, ymo genus quod est intentio, commune est ad omnia predicamenta, quia in omnibus predicamentis repperitur modus essendi a quo sumitur intentio generis, scilicet esse in pluribus differentibus specie. 10 Maior patet, quia Porphirius dicit36 se de istis quinque universalibus velle determinare propter doctrinam Libri Predicamentorum; et ideo diffinitur hic quod est commune ad omnia predicamenta. Oppositum arguitur

OPPOSITUM ARGUITUR quia: Illud ibi diffinitur quod predicatur 4 de pluribus specie differentibus. Modo intentio generis non predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Ideo etc. Maior patet, quia hec dicit diffinitio. Minor patet, quia male diceretur ‘Homo est genus’, ‘Equus est genus’, et sic de aliis, ymo res est illud quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Ideo etc. 20 Item. Si hic diffiniretur genus quod est intentio, tunc in hac diffini- 5 tione poneretur aliquid de genere intentionum. Modo in illa diffinitione nichil ponitur de genere intentionum dicendo ‘Genus est quod predicatur de pluribus etc.’ Ergo ibi non diffinitur genus quod est intentio, ymo genus quod est res. Maior patet, quia in diffinitione intentionis debet 25 poni aliquid intentionale, quia partes diffinitionis debent esse de essentia diffiniti. Minor patet, quia predicare de pluribus non est intentionale. Item. Illud hic diffinitur quod per diversas considerationes in Libro 6 Thopicorum terminatur. Modo genus quod est res est huiusmodi, et non genus quod est intentio. Ideo etc. Maior patet de se. Minor etiam 30 apparet consideranti omnes considerationes quarti Thopicorum.37 15

1–2 porphirius … logicus] V iste liber logicalis est B 36 37

Porphyrius, Isag. 1, 1, p. 52–10. Aristotle, Topica IV passim.

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7 Ad illam questionem propter rationes tactas dicunt aliqui quod in illa

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diffinitione qua dicitur Genus est quod predicatur de pluribus etc., diffinitur res cui applicabilis est intentio generis; et rationes sue tacte sunt. Sed credo quod hoc non est verum. Ideo dico quod nec res ibi absolute diffinitur, nec etiam generis intentio, | et hoc in abstracto, ibi diffinitur, sed magis intentio generis in concreto, sive dicat totum aggregatum ex re et intentione, sive dicat solam intentionem in habitudine ad rem. Quia de hoc ad presens non curo, utrum scilicet ‘intentio concreta’ dicat aggregatum ex re et intentione, vel solam intentionem in habitudine ad rem (et universaliter de quolibet termino accidentali concreto utrum dicat solam formam in habitudine ad subiectum, vel totum aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente)—quod autem non diffiniatur ibi res absoluta ostenditur quia: Illud quod non spectat ad considerationem logici non diffinitur hic. Modo res absolute considerata non pertinet ad logicum. Ideo etc. Maior patet, quia auctor iste enim logicus est; et ideo debet diffinire illud quod per se ad logicum pertinet. Minor patet de se. Item. Omnis diffinitio generis que est ipsius rei absolute, convenit omnibus eius inferioribus, sicut diffinitio animalis omnibus speciebus animalis convenit; nam sicut animal est substantia animata sensibilis, ita etiam homo est substantia animata sensibilis, et equus, et sic de aliis speciebus animalis. Modo illa diffinitio hic data generi non inest cuilibet inferiori contento sub genere quod est res, quia predicari de pluribus differentibus specie non inest cuilibet contento sub animali, sicut homini et equo. Igitur ibi non diffinitur genus quod est res absolute. Item. Nec datur illa diffinitio de intentione generis absolute, quia sicut res absoluta non consideratur a logico, ita nec intentio absoluta, ymo considerat intentiones ut concernunt ipsas res, quia, ut dicit38 Avicenna, logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Unde non de secundis intentionibus absolute neque de primis intentionibus absolute. Non enim considerat de generalitate et specialitate, que sunt quedam intentiones secunde in abstracto. Nec considerat de re absolute, sicut de animali, vel de homine absolute, sed considerat de genere et specie, et sic de aliis que dicunt intentiones secundas concretas.

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Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75.

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Item. Illi qui dicunt quod ibi diffinitur res ut sibi est applicabilis 11 intentio generis, aut intelligunt | quod hoc est ut sibi est intentio gene- B47v ris actu applicata, aut non ut est sibi applicata. Si primo modo intelligant, scilicet quod ibi diffiniatur res cui est applicabilis intentio generis ut sibi est actu applicata, tunc illud non differt ab intentione concreta, quia res cui actu est applicata intentio generis, dicit aggregatum ex re et intentione. Omnia etiam argumenta sua sunt contra ipsos, quia res cui actu applicata est intentio generis, ut ibi est actu applicata non predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, quia ‘animal’ secundum quod dicit aggregatum ex re et intentione, non predicatur de homine. Si autem intelligant quod ibi diffiniatur res cui est applicabilis intentio generis non ut sibi actu applicata est, sed secundum illud quod applica-bilis est, tunc oportet quod illa diffinitio generis predicatur de omnibus speciebus generis, quia omnis diffinitio generis que est rei absolute, inest cuilibet contento sub illa re. Et ideo dico quod ibi diffinitur intentio generis concreta. Et hoc ego 12 probo sic quia: Illud est ibi diffinitum quod per se consideratur a logico. Modo logicus non considerat ipsam rem absolute nec intentiones absolute, ymo considerat intentionem concretam ut denominat ipsam, sive dicat aggregatum ex re et intentione sub ratione intentionis, sive dicat solam intentionem in habitudine ad rem. Ergo ibi diffinitur genus pro intentione concreta, et non res absolute, nec intentio absolute. Quid est intelligendum propter rationes solvendas 13

Sed propter solutionem rationum est intelligendum quod, sicut | dicit39 V18v 25 Aristotiles septimo Metaphisice, in diffinitione accidentium habent poni sua subiecta. Sed hoc est differenter in accidentibus in abstracto et in concreto, sicut videtur esse de intentione Commentatoris in eodem septimo,40 quia in diffinitione accidentium in abstracto ponitur suum subiectum loco differentie—sicut dicendo ‘Simitas est nasi cavitas’; ibi 30 enim ponitur subiectum loco differentie et aliquid sui generis loco generis—, sed in diffinitione accidentium in concreto habet poni subiectum loco generis, sicut si diffiniatur simus, diceretur ‘Simus est nasus cavus’; ibi ‘nasus’, quod est subiectum simi, ponitur in sua diffinitione loco generis. Modo sicut accidentia realia in concreto denominant sua

39 40

Aristotle, Metaph. VII 6, 1031a1–3. Averroes, In VII Arist. Metaph., ad Arist., Metaph. VII 6, 1031a1–3.

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subiecta et dicuntur in habitudine ad ipsa et propter hoc ponuntur in diffinitione sua, ita intentiones secunde denominant sua obiecta. Et ideo sicut in diffinitione propria ipsorum accidentium in concreto ponitur subiectum loco generis, ita in diffinitione secundarum intentionum concretarum debet poni obiectum suum loco generis. Quia etiam iste intentiones secunde dependent ex cognitione modorum essendi ratione quorum fundantur in obiecto, et diffinitio datur causa cognoscendi rem, ideo in diffinitione istarum intentionum debent poni modi essendi ratione quorum fundantur in obiecto. 14 Modo in diffinitione ibi data de genere ista duo ponuntur, scilicet obiectum super quod intentio generis fundatur, et modus essendi ratione cuius ibi fundatur, quia quando dicitur ‘Genus est quod predicatur de pluribus etc.’, sensus est: genus est quod predicatur, idest res que predicatur; ibi enim li ‘quod’ est obiectum intentionis generis, et predicatur materialiter de intentione concreta;—sicut si diceretur ‘Simus est nasus cavus’ vel ‘Album est corpus colorem talem habens’—, ita quod ibi tunc est predicatio materialis dicendo ‘Genus est quod predicatur etc.’. In illa enim diffinitione ponitur modus essendi ratione cuius fundatur intentio generis in tali obiecto, sicut predicari de pluribus differentibus specie in quid (iste enim est modus essendi ratione cuius attribuitur rei talis intentio), vel saltem esse in pluribus differentibus specie in quid et essentialiter, cui correspondet iste modus intelligendi qui est predicari de plu-ribus differentibus specie in quid. 15 Sic ergo illa diffinitio est bene data de intentione concreta generis quia aliter non est possi-bile quod diffiniatur nisi isto modo, quia ex istis dependet sua cognitio, scilicet ex obiecto super quod fundatur, et ex modo essendi ratione cuius fundatur in obiecto. Et propter hoc, sicut intentio non predicatur de speciebus, sic etiam nec illa diffinitio predicatur de speciebus, sicut predicari de pluribus differentibus specie in quid non inest homini vel equo, licet res subiecta intentioni generis absolute (sicut animal) insit eis, quia illa diffinitio non est rei absolute, ymo rei denominate ab intentione.

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Ad rationes 16 Nunc ad rationes. Rationes que primo adducte fuerunt, sunt pro me. B48r Sed ad alias in oppositum. Ad primam. | Cum dicitur ‘Illud ibi diffi- 35

nitur quod predicatur etc.’, dico quod falsum est; sed sufficit quod ibi diffiniatur quod habet habitudinem essentialem ad rem que predicatur de pluribus etc., quia accidentia diffiniuntur per additamenta, et non

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per ea que sunt de sua essentia, sicut apparet41 septimo Metaphisice. Et ideo non oportet quod ibi diffiniatur quod predicatur de pluribus etc., sed sufficit quod ibi diffinitum habeat habitudinem ad rem que predicatur. Modo illud quod habet habitudinem ad rem que predicatur de pluribus etc. est intentio generis concreta, ita quod dicendo ‘Genus est quod predicatur etc.’, ly ‘quod’ predicatur materialiter de ipsa intentione, sicut dicendo ‘Simus est nasus’. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Si ibi diffiniretur genus quod est inten- 17 tio, ibi poneretur | aliquid de genere intentionum’, illa potest negari, V19r quia intentiones concrete debent diffiniri per illud ex quo sua cognitio dependet. Modo cognitio generis non dependet ex cognitione intentionis generis in communi, ymo ex cognitione obiecti sui et modi essendi ratione cuius fundatur in obiecto. Et quia diffinitio data est de re causa innotescendi eam, ideo in diffinitione generis quod est intentio concreta, debet poni obiectum suum et modus essendi rei ratione cuius fundatur in obiecto. Etiam quando dicitur in minori quod in illa diffinitione generis non ponitur aliquid de genere intentionum, falsum est, quia predicari de pluribus etc. est quid intentionale: licet ista plura de quibus fit predicatio, non sint intentionalia, tamen predicari de pluribus est quid intentionale, quia: Nisi istud esset intentionale, iam cuilibet speciei inesset, quia esse reale quod inest generi, inest speciebus. Modo predicari de pluribus etc. non inest speciebus. Ideo istud pertinet ad rationem generis ut differt a speciebus. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Illud genus ibi diffinitur quod per diver- 18 sas considerationes etc.’, potest dici dupliciter. Primo quod non oportet quod ista scientia et scientia libri Thopicorum sunt diverse scientie vel non immediate adinvicem ordinate. Tamen, quia ista ratio posset adduci contra diffinitionem generis datam42 in Thopicis, quia ibi diffinitur eodem modo sicut hic,—concedatur maior. Cum dicitur quod genus quod est res, terminatur ibi per esse diversas considerationes, falsum est, ymo est genus quod est res ut denominata est intentione generis, unde ille regule generales et considerationes ibi date sunt ad quamlibet materiam applicabiles. Verumtamen, quia cognitio intentionis generis dependet ex cognitione rei et modo essendi rerum, ideo exemplificat ibi Philosophus de istis considerationibus in rebus secundum se.

41 42

Aristotle, Metaph. VII 6, 1031a19–28. Aristotle, Topica I 5, 102a31–32.

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IV. Quaestiones in Arist. I De anima, q. 6 (Florence, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. E I 252, foll. 162vb–163vb); see also Pinborg (1980), 124–129 (only capp. 1–25) 1 Consequenter dictis, quia Commentator dicit43 super illam partem44 F162vb

Universale aut nichil est aut posterius est quod intellectus est 5 qui facit universalitatem in rebus, ideo queritur utrum universale fiat ab intellectu, vel sit preter operationem intellectus. Arguitur quod sit preter operationem intellectus

2 Arguitur quod fit preter operationem intellectus quia: Diffinibile est

universale. Sed aliquid est diffinibile preter operationem intellectus. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia singularium non est diffinitio, ut dicitur45 septimo Metaphisice. Minor declaratur quia: Aliquid est diffinibile per ea que insunt sibi essentialiter et non secundum accidentia. Sed esse intellectum est esse accidentale rei et esse verum extra animam est essentiale. Ergo preter esse intellectum est res diffinibilis. 3 Item. Obiectum cuiuslibet potentie precedit potentiam cuius est obiectum. Sed universale est obiectum intellectus. Ergo precedit intellectum et eius operationem. Maior patet, quia universalia priora sunt potentiis, ut patet46 secundo De anima. Minor patet quia: Quod quid est est obiectum intellectus. Sed quod quid est est universale. Ergo etc. 4 Si universale esset per operationem intellectus, hoc esset per operationem agentis vel possibilis. Non per operationem possibilis quia: Intellectus possibilis secundum quod huiusmodi est in potentia passiva ad omnia intelligibilia. Sed tale non est passivum, sed activum, quia omne agens agit secundum quod est ens actu. Ergo etc. Item F163ra non habet esse per operationem agentis quia: Universale | est secunda intentio, que presupponit primam intellectionem sive intentionem. Sed intellectus agens non agit nisi quantum ad primam intellectionem, abstrahendo a singularibus; et postquam intellectio prima est in intellectu, super illam non se extendit ultra operationem intellectus agentis ad hoc

9 diffinibile] difficile F 43 44 45 46

12 aliquid] ad F

18 priora] coni. prima F

Averroes, Comm. Magnum in Arist. De anima, p. 1225–26. Aristotle, De anima I 1, 402b7–8. Aristotle, Metaph. VII 15, 1039b27–29. Aristotle, De anima II 2, 417b23–28.

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quod fiat secunda intellectio sive secunda intentio. Ergo per operationem intellectus agentis non habet esse universale. Item. Universale est quod natum est esse in pluribus. Sed res reperi- 5 bilis est in pluribus sine intellectu, sicut asinus vel equus. Ideo etc. Arguitur in oppositum

5

IN OPPOSITUM est Commentator, qui dicit47 quod intellectus facit 6 universalitatem in rebus. Determinatur questio Quid sit intentio in communi

Ad solutionem istius questionis primo videndum est quid significetur 7 nomine prime intentionis et secunde, quia universale potest accipi et pro prima intentione et pro secunda. Et primo ad hoc videndum est quid significetur nomine ‘intentionis’ in communi. Unde notandum est quod intentio est illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud (et hec est 15 cognitio in ipso intellectu existens). Et hoc est manifestum secundum interpretationem, quia intentio est in aliud tentio.

10

De prima intentione

Sed prima intellectio rei qua intelligitur primo ex proprio suo fantas- 8 mate, est prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic intellecta dicitur prima 20 intentio in concreto; sicut cognitio hominis vel asini que sumitur ex proprio suo fantasmate, dicitur prima intentio in abstracto, et res iste sic intellecte dicuntur intentio prima in concreto. De secunda intentione 25

Secunda autem intentio est secunda rei cognitio, que non sumitur 9 a modo essendi proprio vel fantasmate proprio rei, sed est quedam

14–15 et hec … existens] F an textus interpolatus 15 secundum] F per Pinborg intelligitur] codd. al. Pinborg intendit F 24 autem] codd. al. om. F 47

Averroes, Comm. Magnum in Arist. De anima, p. 1225–26.

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secunda cognitio rei respectu alterius. Et sumitur ex aliquo modo essendi communi corespectivo, sicut esse universale vel universalitas est secunda cognitio rei. Unde universalitas vel universale in abstracto est cognitio vel ratio cognoscendi rem ut nata est esse in pluribus, et universale in concreto est esse cognitum rei ut est in pluribus. 5 Similiter in complexis 10 Et similiter in complexis (sicut ‘homo currit’) est quoddam comple-

xum secundum intellectum. Hoc autem complexum potest intelligi aut ratione unionis subiecti et predicati secundum esse intellectum primum quo fit. Et hec cognitio est prima intentio in abstracto, et hoc sic cogni- 10 tum est prima intentio in concreto. Sed hoc idem cognitum vel ut dubitatur de inherentia predicati cum subiecto, vel ut ponitur pro alio (et sic de aliis) dicitur ‘questio’ vel ‘propositio’, que sunt nomina secundarum intentionum concretarum. Sed iste cognitiones quibus cognoscitur tale complexum ut quesitum vel pro alio positum, dicuntur secunde 15 intentiones in abstracto in talibus. Et simili modo est in consimilibus. Sed de hoc alibi super logicam plenius est discussum.48 Quando universale sumitur pro prima intentione in concreto 11 Tunc ad questionem est dicendum quod quia universale est nomen

intentionis concrete, ideo potest accipi vel pro prima intentione con- 20 creta vel secunda. Si sumatur primo modo, tunc dicendum quod, quantum ad illud quod materiale est in significato suo, non est ab intellectu, quia res sive quod quid est rei que intelligitur, non est ab intellectu. Sed illud quod est materiale in significato concreti universalis primo modo sumpti est quod quid est rei sive natura, quia intellectio quecumque deno- 25 minative predicatur de obiecto suo et ipsum concernit in concreto, sicut ‘album’ concernit suum subiectum et ipsum denominat. Ergo quod materiale est in significato universalis primo modo dicti, non est ab intellectu aliquo.

2–3 est … cognitio] F om. Pinborg 10 est] est ut F 11 sed] codd. al. secundum F 15 quesitum vel] suppl. om. codd. 17 alibi] F aliter Pinborg 23 que] F quod Pinborg 25 quod quid] quidquid F 48

Qq. In artem veterem, Accessus, capp. 16–18 above.

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Si autem sumatur quantum ad illud quod est formale ibi,49 quod est 12 ipsa prima intellectio rei qua res dicitur intellecta et intellectus intelligens, tunc dicendum quod non fit effective ab intellectu possibili, sed agente. Quod non a possibili, probatur quia: Intellectus possibilis est in 5 pura potentia respectu intellectionis, saltem quantum ad intellectionem primam. Sed quod est in pura potentia respectu alicuius alterius, non est causa effectiva eius, sed solum potest esse causa susceptiva. Ideo etc. Sed tamen idem effective est ab intellectu agente vel ab anima, mediante intellectu agente, quia Philosophus dicit50 quod sicut intellec10 tus possibilis est in potentia fieri omnia (scilicet quantum ad cognitionem rerum intelligibilium), sic intellectus agens est potens omnia intelligibilia potentia intellecta facere actu intellecta. Et sic omnis prima intellectio que recipitur in intellectu possibili, effective fit ab intellectu agente una cum fantasmatibus. Sed per quem modum hoc fit, inferius 15 patebit. Quando universale sumitur pro secunda intentione in concreto

Si autem sumatur universale pro secunda intentione in concreto, eo- 13 dem modo dicendum est quantum ad illud quod est ibi materiale: non est ab intellectu, quia sicut prima intentio denominat rem que intel20 ligitur primo intellectu, sic | secunda intellectio sive secunda inten- F163rb tio denominat rem ipsam secundum quod secundario intelligitur. Sicut enim hec est vera ‘Homo absolute intelligitur’, sic hec est vera ‘Homo est aliquid intellectum in pluribus’. Sed tale esse intellectum ut in pluribus est quod significatur nomine universalis. Sed res illa que est sic 25 intellecta, potest esse sine operatione intellectus. Ergo universale pro re que significatur materialiter nomine universalis, potest esse sine operatione intellectus.

2 prima] codd. al. Pinborg propria F 6 alicuius alterius] coni. alterius F alicuius codd. al. Pinborg 11–12 intelligibilia] codd. al. Pinborg intellectiva F 14 inferius] quod (? an pro quidem) add. F 19 intellectu] possibili add. F 26 nomine universalis] F om. cet. codd. Pinborg 49 50

Sc. in significato suo. Aristotle, De anima III 8, 431b21.

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14 Tamen notandum est quod intentio universalis51 potest attribui rei que

habet esse solum in intellectu, et potest illam rem concernere et de illa concretive predicari. Et tunc obiectum suum quod materialiter importatur nomine universalis (vel posset importari), non esset sine opera- 5 tione intellectus.—Sed tale obiectum non est quod primo concernit intentio universalis, quia esse in pluribus (quod est modus essendi ex quo sumitur universale) non est reperibile primo in eis que sunt in intellectu, sed in eis que sunt extra animam, licet unitas rei in pluribus sit secun-dum intellectum. 10 Quod materiale significatum secunde intentionis non sit sine intellectu 15 Sed diceret aliquis quod obiectum quod concernit intentio secunda uni-

versalis, est res primo intellecta, et non res secundum se. Sed res primo intellecta non est sine operatione in-tellectus. Ergo quod materiale est in significato universalis ut est secunda intentio, non est sine intellectu. 15 Respondetur 16 Ad hoc dicendum quod ‘rem primo intellectam esse obiectum secunde

intentionis’ potest intelligi dupliciter. Vel quod aggregatum ex re et prima intellectione rei sit obiectum eius. Et hoc non est verum quia: (a) Tunc ista non esset vera ‘Homo est species’ vel ‘Animal est genus’, quia 20 homo ut significatur et animal non significant hominem intellectum et animal intellectum, sed significant veram naturam hominis et animalis. Sed species et genus si respicerent aggregatum ex re et intellectione prima pro obiecto, de tali aggregato denominative predicarentur vel verificarentur. Ergo tunc de homine et animali et sic de consimilibus 25 que talia aggregata non significant sed naturam rei secundum se, non possent intentiones iste concretive predicari. Item. (b) Tunc essent eiusdem rei due intellectiones simul in intellectu, quia res primo intellecta intelligeretur secunda intentione, et sic simul esset intellectio prima rei in actu in intellectu et secunda intellectio eiusdem rei. 30 9 unitas] Pinborg veritas F 23 intellectione] coni. intentione F Pinborg 27 concretive] coni. concrete codd. concretae Pinborg 51

‘Intentio universalis’ = ‘the intention conveyed by a universal noun’.

24 vel] suppl.

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Alio modo potest intelligi ‘rem primo intellectam esse obiectum sec- 17 unde intentionis’, quia res que primo secundum se intelligitur et absolute, postea intelligitur intellectu respectivo, sicut primo intelligitur homo vel animal secundum se, et postea intelligitur (sive intelligibilis 5 est) ut in pluribus. Modo intellectus rei secundum se est prior quam intellectus eius ut est in pluribus, qui est respectivus intellectus. Et sic concedo quod obiectum secunde intentionis est res intellecta 18 primo intellectu, idest res que prius secundum se intelligitur et postea intelligitur secunda intellectione respectiva. Et sic prima intentio non 10 est obiectum nec pars obiecti respectu intentionis secunde, licet presupponat rem esse prius intellectam secundum se, sicut respectivum presupponit absolutum. Sed res ratione alicuius modi essendi communis et respectivi existentis in ea est obiectum eius. Quod formale significatum secunde intentionis non sit ab intellectu possibili

15

Si autem sumatur intentio universalis concreta ratione formalis52 quod 19 est in significato suo, tunc adhuc dico quod non fit ab intellectu possibili, sed ab agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi ex quo sumitur talis intentio. Cuius ratio est quia: Intellectus possibilis est in potentia 20 passiva respectu intellectionis secunde sicut respectu prime. Sed quod est in potentia passiva respectu alicuius, non est effectivum eius (ut prius declaratum est). Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia omne intelligere est pati intellectum ab intelligibili quod est obiectum illius intellectionis (ut patet53 in III De anima). Minor patet de se. Sequitur ergo quod intel25 lectus possibilis non est effectivus secunde intellectionis rei. Sed talis intellectio est secunda intentio, ut prius visum est. Ideo etc. Quod sit ab agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi ipsius probatur quadrupliciter 30

Sed quod intentio universalis in abstracto, vel, ratione eius quod for- 20 male est in significato intentionis universalis, in concreto, causetur ab 3 intellectu] F in intellectu perperam Pinborg intellectum] codd. cett. nullum F 52 53

‘Formale’= ‘the formal element’. Aristotle, De anima III 4, 429a10–11; 13–14.

16 ratione] codd. cett. om. F

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intellectu agente et obiecto ratione modi essendi correspondentis illi intentioni in re sive in obiecto probatur quia: Universale quantum ad rationem formalem suam est intellectio rei ut est in pluribus. Sed omnis intellectio que est in intellectu possibili sive in anima mediante possibili, effective est ab obiecto et intellectu agente. Ergo etc. Maior patet ex dictis, quia universale significat aliquid intelligi ut in pluribus. Minor similiter patet, quia omnis intellectio est ab obiecto, quia ab obiecto F163va sumit | determina-tam speciem. 21 Item. Effective est54 ab intellectu agente, saltem respectu eorum que primo intelliguntur, quia ab eo habet esse abstractum. Sed intellectio eorum que secundario intelliguntur ex intellectione aliorum, habet esse ab intellectu agente mediante, scilicet mediante intellectione illorum ex quorum intellectione intelliguntur. Ergo etc. 22 Item. Si ponatur quod intentio universalis sit quantum ad suum formale intellectio prima rei cum respectu ad plura superaddito, ita quod intentio prima et secunda non sunt due intellec-tiones sed una intellectio secundum se (et in respectu ad plura, sicut aliqui dicunt), adhuc ma-gis patet quod sint ab intellectu agente et obiecto, quia non est dubium quin prima intellectio rei sit ab intellectu agente et obiecto. Ergo cum secunda intentio non differat a prima nisi per respectum superadditum, erit similiter ab intellectu agente. 23 Item. Si ponatur quod intentio universalis sit prima intellectio secundum quod ad rem primo intellectam sequitur aptitudo essendi in pluribus, adhuc patet quod est ab intellectu agente et obiecto, quia (ut dictum est) prima intellectio est effective ab obiecto et intellectu agente.

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Quod universale sumptum pro quidditate rei secundum se non est ab intellectu 24 Si autem sumatur universale (sicut solet aliquando accipi) vel pro quid-

ditate et natura rei secundum se, quod est universale in potentia, vel pro quidditate ut sibi applicari vel attribui potest intentio universa- 30 lis, sic non habet esse ab intellectu, quia intellectus non est causa rei existentis extra animam. Sed quidditas et natura rei cui attribuibilis est

12 ab] Fc om. F 15 prima] codd. al. om. F 30 vel] codd. al. om. F 32 est] codd. al. cum F 54

Sc. intentio universalis in abstracto.

19 intellectio] coni. intentio F Pinborg

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intentio universalis, primo est res vera extra animam, quia (ut dictum est) non attribuitur rei ut intellecta est sed rei existenti extra, quia res extra animam habet modum essendi sibi correspondentem, scilicet esse in pluribus suppositis. Dato enim quod intellectus non esset, asinus esset 5 plurificatus per diversa supposita. Ergo si sumatur isto modo universale, non est ab intellectu. Unde intentiones denominative predicantur de obiectis suis

Sed adhuc circa dicta notandum est quod intentiones cum sint quedam 25 intellectiones vel quedam intellecta in concreto sumpta, predicantur de 10 re obiecta denominative, non quia sint in obiecto sicut in subiecto (sicut dicitur homo ‘albus’ ab albedine in ipso existente formaliter), sed quia sunt in eis sicut in obiecto, et hoc est esse in aliquo movente vel efficiente respectu earum. Et ideo, sicut dicitur ‘Sor est percutiens’ percussione que est in passo, et similiter ‘Color videtur’ visione que 15 est in oculo, et similiter ‘Scibile scitur’ scientia que est in anima, sic intentiones concrete, que quantum ad suum esse formale quod est intellectio, sunt in anima, denominative predicantur de obiectis earum, quamvis non sint in eis sicut in subiecto. Unde sicut ista est vera ‘Lapis intelligitur intellectione que est in anima’, sic ista ‘Homo est species’ 20 vel ‘Animal est genus’ (et sic de aliis), quia esse genus et species—et sic de aliis intentionibus secundis—sunt quedam intellectiones vel quedam esse intellecta. Et ideo predicantur denominative de obiectis suis. Ad rationes

Ad rationes. Ad primam, cum dicitur [2] ‘Diffinibile est universale’, 26 25 verum est, accipiendo universale pro quidditate rei cui potest attribui ratio universalis. Sed accipiendo universale pro intentione secunda, non est verum quod omne diffinibile sit universale isto modo. Item. Licet diffinibile sit universale sumptum pro re primo intellecta, tamen diffinitio non debetur sibi neque datur ei pro illo esse intellecto, sed 30 pro esse suo quidditativo et pro sua principia essentialia que sunt extra animam. Et quando dicitur in minori ‘Aliquid est diffinibile preter

1 quia] codd. al. om. F 2 est] cum F 3 scilicet] F secundum Pinborg 13 efficiente] codd. al. Pinborg effective F 19 intelligitur] codd. al. Pinborg intellectus F 25 potest] ponit F

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28 F163vb

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operationem intellectus etc.’, dicendum quod diffinitio non esset rei nisi esset intellectus diffiniens, neque res est diffinibilis nisi in habitudine ad intellectum diffinientem. Sed tamen non propter hoc datur ab intellectu diffinitio rei pro esse intellecto, sed pro esse vero quod habet extra. Unde differt dicere ‘rem diffiniri vel esse diffinibilem sub alia ratione intelligendi accep-tam vel sub aliquo esse intellecto’ et ‘rem diffiniri vel esse diffinibilem pro esse intellecto’, quia primum dictum est verum, sed secundum falsum est. Et ideo diffinitio que datur de re accepta sub alia ratione intelligendi, non est sine intellectu. Tamen non datur diffinitio ab intellectu rei pro illo esse intellecto, sed pro suo esse quidditativo et essentiali per sua realia principia. Ad aliam, quando dicitur ‘Obiectum potentie precedit potentiam etc.’, verum est secundum se et absolute | acceptum, sed obiectum ut actu obicitur sive ut actu terminat potentiam, simul est cum potentia, quia agens in actu et passum simul sunt. Et quando dicitur in minori quod universale est obiectum intellectum, verum est, accipiendo universale pro quod quid est rei, cui potest ratio universalis sive intentio attribui. Et istud precedit operationem intellectus, ut dictum est, et est sine operatione intellectus. Ad aliam, quando dicitur ‘Aut esset per operationem intellectus possibilis, aut agentis’, dicendum est quod per operationem agentis, accipiendo universale pro ipsa cognitione vel intellectione in absoluto, vel pro eo quod est formale in significato universalis in concreto sumpti. Et quando dicitur quod intellectus agens non agit super illud quod est in intellectu sed super fantasmata, verum est primo et immediate, sed per abstractionem quidditatis a fantasma-tibus fit apta nata intelligi ut sit una in pluribus, et per consequens fit apta nata quod sic ab intellectu possibili intelligatur. Et sic mediate sive ex consequenti intellectus agens agit ad secundam intellectionem sive intentionem secundam universalis, quia eoquod res est fantasiata esse in pluribus per actionem intellectus agentis, potest intelligi ut in pluribus. Et hoc sic intellectum est universale. Quod autem fantasia possit cognoscere rem ut in pluribus patet, quia numerus et pluralitas est quid sensibile, licet sit commune sensibile. Et ideo fantasia, que percipit omnia sensibilia communia, potest plurificationem suppositorum cognoscere, sicut cognoscit supposita alicuius

22 intellectione] coni. intentione F

27 sic] coni. sit F

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nature secundum se. Sed bene verum est quod supposita ratione nature sive quidditatis non cognoscit, sed ratione accidentium sensibilium illorum suppositi. Ad aliam. Cum dicitur ‘Universale est quod est in pluribus’, dicen- 31 5 dum quod hoc est universale in potentia, scilicet res cui intentio universalis potest attribui. Sed universale in actu est res intellecta ut una in pluribus. Et hoc non nisi est secundum operationem intellectus agentis.

appendix f PETRUS AUREOLUS Scriptum super I Sent., dist. 23 codex Vaticanus Borghesianus lat. 329, foll. 257vb–265rb Commentariorum in librum primum Sententiarum auctore Petro Aureolo Verberio Ordinis Minorum Archiepiscopi Aquensis. Romae 1596 Pinborg his edition of B, foll. 260r–261r in CIMAGL 35 (1980), pp. 133–137 10 Perler his edition of B, foll. 259r–260r and 261r–264r in AHDLMA (1994), pp. 242–262. B 5 ed.

1

PREDICTIS ADICIENDUM EST etc. Postquam Magister determinaB257vb vit de divinis nominibus in generali, hic determinat de eis in speciali. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo namque tractat de nominibus personali15 bus et de hiis que dicuntur ex tempore; secundo vero tractat de tribus specialibus nominibus, videlicet ‘scientia’, ‘potentia’, ‘voluntate’, que requirunt specialem tractatum; secundum facit infra, Distinctione XXXV: CUMQUE SUPRA DISSERUIMUS. Circa primum duo facit. Primo namque agit de nominibus propriis, secundo de nominibus appro20 priatis et translative dictis; secundum facit infra, Distinctione XXXIIII circa medium: EX PREDICTIS CONSTAT QUOD SICUT ESSENTIA. Adhuc circa primum duo facit. Primo enim agit de nominibus personalibus cuiusmodi sunt ‘trinitas’ et ‘persona’, secundo agit de nominibus personalibus propriis significantibus proprietates Persona25 rum; secundum facit infra, Distinctione XXVI: NUNC DE PROPRIETATIBUS. Circa primum tria facit. Primo namque inquirit de hoc nomine ‘persona’, quid significet in divinis; secundo de hoc nomine ‘trinitas’ et de terminis numeralibus; tertio redit ad nomen ‘perso-

17 tractatum] B conceptum ed. | infra] B ibi ed. 18 disseruimus] B dixerimus ed. 20 infra] B ibi ed. 21–22 sicut essentia] B sic esse ed. 23–24 cuiusmodi … personalibus] B om. ed. 25 infra] B ibi ed.

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ne’, inquirens sub quo intellectu pluraliter predicetur; secundum facit Distinctione XXIIII: HIC DILIGENTER; tertium facit Distinctione XXV: PRETEREA CONSIDERANDUM. Circa primum tria facit. Primo enim agit de hoc nomine ‘persona’; secundo de ypostasi et substantia; tertio recapitulat dicta; secunda ibi: QUOD ENIM; tertia ibi: IAM SUFFICIENTER. Adhuc circa primum tria facit. Primo namque nomen ‘persone’ excipit a regula supraposita de nominibus significantibus substantiam; secundo vero probat quod ‘persona’ significat substanB258ra tiam; tertio quoque | contra hoc instat, et solvit; secunda ibi: QUOD AUTEM PERSONA; tertia ibi: IDEO HIC ORITUR. 2 Dicit itaque primo quod hoc nomen ‘persona’, quod secundum substantiam dicitur, excipitur a regula data superius secundum quam dicebatur quod nullum nomen significans substantiam pluraliter predicatur. Manifestum est enim quod ‘persona’ dicitur in plurali, nam Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non sunt una persona, sed tres persone. 3 Postmodum ibi: QUOD AUTEM PERSONA probat quod hoc nomen significet substantiam in divinis. Primo quidem quia Augustinus dicit1 VII De Trinitate, capitulo IX, quod Deo idem est esse et personam esse; constat autem quod ‘esse’ significat substantiam. Secundo vero quia libro eodem, capitulo V, expresse dicit2 Augustinus quod cum dicimus Patris personam, non aliud dicimus quam Patris substantiam. Tertio quoque quia idem dicit3 quod Pater dicitur persona non ad Filium, sed ad se, sicut ad se dicitur magnus vel bonus. 4 Postmodum ibi: IDEO HIC ORITUR QUESTIO Magister obicit contra ea que dicta sunt, et solvit. Et circa hoc tria facit secundum tres questiones quas movet, et solvit; secunda ibi: SED QUERITUR; tertia ibi: VERUM ET HEC ALIA. Circa primum tria facit. Primo enim movet questionem, dicens quod mirum est, exquo ‘persona’ significat idipsum quod ‘substantia’ vel ‘essentia’, quare non dicimus quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt una persona tantum, sicut sunt una essentia vel substantia. Secundo ibi: QUIA VOLUMUS respon-

1 intellectu] B intendendo ed. 6–7 nomen persone] B personam ed. 10 persona] B personam ed. 12 quam] B quod ed. 18 deo] B ideo ed. | esse] B essentiam ed. 24–26 magister … queritur] B om. ed. 27 verum] B unde hi ed. | hec] B hic ed. | tria] B tertia ed. 28–29 significat] B significet ed. 1 2 3

St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII iv, cap. 11, p. 2617–8. Ibid., p. 26218–20. Ibid., p. 26222–27.

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det ad hoc secundum Augustinum4 quod inopia humani eloquii urget, cum confiteamur in Deo trinitatem, ut nomen aliquod reservetur quod respondeat interrogantibus qui tres sunt. Et cum non sint tres dii aut tres boni, dictum est quod sunt tres persone, non ut illud proprie diceretur, sed ne hereticis in gentibus penitus taceretur. Tertio ibi: QUA NECESSITATE Magister solutionem confirmat per ea que accidunt inter Grecos, dicens quod eadem necessitate et eadem penuria laborantes Greci concesserunt quod Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, cum sint una usia et essentia, sunt nichilominus tres ypostases vel tres substantie, accipiendo per ‘substantiam’ et ‘ypostasim’ quod nos intelligimus per ‘personam’. Postmodum ibi: SED QUERITUR movet secundam questionem, dicens quod dubium est, cum dicamus pluraliter in divinis ‘tres personas’, cur non dicamus similiter et ‘tres deos’, cum utrumque significet substantiam et aliquid commune tribus. Et respondet quod Scriptura contradicit ne dicamus ‘tres deos’, quia scriptum5 est Deuteronomio VI ‘Audi Israel, Deus tuus unus est’; de ‘persona’ vero non obviat, propter quod cum adhibere cogeremur aliquod nomen quod pluraliter diceretur, magis fuit ydoneum de nomine ‘persone’ quam de nomine ‘dei’. Postmodum ibi: VERUM ET HEC ALIA movet tertiam questionem, cur non dicimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum ‘tres essentias’, cum Scriptura non contradicat. Et respondet quod magis esset propinquum ad hoc quod confiteremur tres deos. Postmodum ibi: QUOD ENIM DE PERSONIS tractat Magister de hiis nominibus ‘ypostasis’ et ‘substantia’. Et dicit quod simili necessitate Greci, cum confiteantur unam usiam, hocest unam essentiam, confitentur tres ypostases tres substantias; et possent etiam dicere ‘tria prosopa’, quia ‘prosopon’ idem est quod ‘persona’. Ultimo ibi: IAM SUFFICIENTER epylogat ea que dicta sunt Magister, dicens quod ex | predictis patet qua necessitate dictum est quod tres persone sunt in divinis, et tamen non tres dii vel tres essentie. Hoc 3 respondeat] B respondeatur ed. | cum] B cur ed. | sint] B sunt ed. 5–6 qua necessitate] B sed queritur ed. 6 solutionem] B resolutionem ed. 12 sed queritur] B qua necessitate ed. 16 scriptum] B dictum ed. 20 verum et hec] B unde hec et ed. 22 non] ed. om. B 23 confiteremur] B confiterentur ed. 27 dicere] B dici ed. 28 prosopon] ed. prosopum B 30 quod] B om. ed. Ibid., VII, iv, cap. 9, p. 259120–125. Deuteronomium VI 4–5: “Audi, Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est”; cf. ibid. XXXIII, 39–40: “Videte quod ego sim solus, et non sit alius Deus preter me”. 4 5

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enim dictum est ne diversitas intelligatur in Deo, in quo nec est diversitas nec singularitas, sicut probat Magister septem auctoritatibus, que patent in litera. Et in fine concludit quod nec etiam multiplicitas est in eo, et inducit auctoritatem Ambrosii hoc dicentis.6 Hec est sententia. 5 Utrum nomen ‘persone’ significet in divinis commune vel aliquid prime intentionis aut secunde intentionis tantum 9 Et quia Magister agit hic de nomine ‘persone’ inquirendo quam com-

munitatem importat, ideo inquirendum occurrit utrum sit aliquod commune prime intentionis vel secunde. Et videtur quod sit nomen intentionis secunde. Illud enim in cuius diffinitione ponitur secunda intentio, videtur esse nomen intentionis secunde. Sed ‘individuum’, quod est secunda intentio, ponitur in diffinitione persone quam ponit Boetius in libro De duabus naturis et una persona in Christo, dicens7 quod est rationalis nature individua substantia. Ergo videtur quod sit nomen secunde intentionis. 10 Preterea. Illud quod opponitur secunde intentioni relative, importat secundam intentionem; opposita enim debent esse eiusdem generis et eiusdem conditionis. Sed ‘persona’ opponitur ‘universali’, sicut ‘individuum’ et ‘singulare’, unde nullum universale est persona; universale autem est res secunde intentionis. Ergo ‘persona’ significat intentionem secundam. 11 Preterea. Illud quod dicit rem et primam intentionem, in divinis non potest plurificari. Sed ‘persona’ plurificatur in divinis. Ergo non significat rem aut primam intentionem, sed tantum secundam. 12 Preterea. Si ‘persona’ significaret primam intentionem, eius communitas esset generis vel speciei; omnis enim prima intentio que predicatur de pluribus in quid, est genus vel species. Nunc autem ad interrogationem factam per ‘quid?’ de Patre vel Filio vel Spiritu Sancto respondetur de quolibet quod est persona; et per consequens, si ‘persona’ sit nomen prime intentionis, erit genus vel species respectu trium perso-

1 est ne] non est ne B non est ut ed. | nec] B non ed. 2 septem] B octo ed. 6–7 titulum add. Bm 13 boetius] B philosophus ed. 29 per] B in ed. 6 7

Hymnus “Splendor paternae gloriae” ed. Migne (PL 16), 1411. Boethius, De duabus naturis, cap. III init.; cf. cap. IV init.

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narum. Sed Augustinus VII De Trinitate, capitulo IX negat8 rationem speciei aut generis in divinis. Igitur idem quod prius. Preterea. Persona et suppositum induunt esse. Sed ‘suppositum’ est nomen secunde intentionis, cum dicatur a ‘subsistendo’ quidditati et 5 universali nature. Ergo ‘persona’ significat intentionem secundam. Preterea. ‘Individuum’ est nomen secunde impositionis et secunde intentionis. Sed Damascenus dicit9 libro III, capitulo IIII quod ‘ypostasis’ et ‘persona’ individuum denotant. Ergo idem quod supra. Preterea. Illud quod est commune secundum rem in divinis est unum 10 numero, sicut Damascenus dicit10 libro primo, capitulo XI quod communitas in divinis est secundum rem, distinctio vero secundum rationem. Sed persona non est una numero in divinis. Ergo non est reale aliquid, sed intentio secunda tantum. Preterea. Illud quod dicit puram negationem, non videtur esse nisi 15 secunda intentio, quia negationes sunt entia rationis. Sed ‘persona’ significat negationem, quoniam diffinitur per incommunicabilitatem, que negationem importat. Igitur significabit intentionem secundam.

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Quod ‘persona’ sit nomen prime intentionis et non secunde Sed IN OPPOSITUM videtur quod nulla secunda intentio precipitur 17 adorari. Sed persone divine precipiuntur adorari, sicut clamat auctoritas11 quod in personis adoretur proprietas. Ergo ‘persona’ non significat secundam intentionem. Preterea. Nulla secunda intentio potest esse formalis terminus pro- 18 ductionis realis. Sed persone | in divinis realiter producuntur. Ergo B258va 25 persona non est intentio secunda.

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2 idem] coni. id sic saepius B illud sic saepius ed. 3 induunt] B idem videntur ed. 7 sed … dicit] B secundum damascenum ed. 7–8 capitulo IIII … supra] B om. ed. 9–10 preterea … dicit] B om. ed. 10 capitulo XI] B om. ed. 11–12 est secundum … ergo] B om. ed. 13 aliquid] ed. om. B 18 titulum add. Bm 20 sed … adorari] B om. ed. | clamat] B declarat ed. 23 nulla] B om. ed. | potest] B non potest ed. 8 St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII vi, cap. 11, p. 26474–76: “Non itaque secundum genus et species ista [sc. nomina divina] dicimus, sed quasi secundum communem eandemque materiam”. 9 Johannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa III, cap. 4, p. 180 ed. Buytaert. 10 Ibid., I, cap. 9. 11 E.g. Missale romanum; see our Appendix A, cap. 1.

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appendix f

Preterea. Illud est nomen prime intentionis quod significat rationem realem non creatam ab actu intellectus. Sed ‘persona’ significat incommunicabilem subsistentiam, que vere realis est in Deo et non facta per intellectum. Ergo non est nomen intentionis secunde. Preterea. Quod significat aliquid existens vere in re, circumscripto omni actu intellectus, non est nomen intentionis secunde. Sed manifestum est quod si non esset aliquis intellectus, adhuc Pater esset vera persona, et Filius similiter. Igitur idem quod prius. ‘Persona’ in intellectuali natura valet idem quod ‘individuum’ in qualibet natura. Sed ‘individuum’ non significat secundam intentionem, sed veram rem existentem unam numero et indivisam. Ergo nec ‘persona’ significabit intentionem secundam. Preterea. ‘Trinitas’ in divinis non est nomen secunde intentionis, sed vere rei; alioquin redit error Sabellii. Sed trinitas predicatur de Personis. Ergo persona non est intentio secunda. Preterea. Augustinus primo De doctrina christiana, capitulo quinto dicit12 quod “res quibus fruendum est sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus”, et ita ‘res’ dicitur pluraliter de eis. Sed manifestum est quod nullum nomen dicitur pluraliter de eis nisi ‘persona’. Ergo ‘persona’ significat rem, et non intentionem secundam. Preterea. Nullum nomen secunde intentionis predicatur de vera re. Sed Pater est vera res in divinis, qui nichilominus est persona. Ergo ‘persona’ non est nomen secunde intentionis.

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Respondetur ad questionem 25 Ad questionem istam respondendo hoc ordine procedetur. Primo nam- 25

que inquiretur in quo differunt prima intentio et secunda secundum opiniones diversorum doctorum. Secundo vero dicetur de eis iuxta id quod videtur. Tertio quoque respondebitur ad id quod queritur de persona, an sit nomen prime vel secunde intentionis.

9 intellectuali] ed. materiali B 11 indivisam] B individuum ed. 14 sed vere rei] ed. om. B 16 capitulo quinto] B om. ed. 17 est] B om. ed. 19 nullum nomen] coni. nil B nomen ed. | nisi persona] B ubi supra ed. 24 titulum add. Bm 26 differunt] differt B ed. 27 opiniones] B opinionem ed. 28 id] B illud ed. | id] B hoc ed. 12

St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I v 5, p. 91–2.

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articulus i opinio radulphi et quorundam aliorum

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Circa primum ergo dixerunt aliqui quod intentio, prout hic loquimur, est actus intellectus, qui protanto ‘intentio’ appellatur quasi in aliud tendit et obiective procedit. Intellectionum autem quedam sunt de rebus secundum esse quod habent extra, utputa intellectio Sortis, Platonis et hominis; et tales appellantur prime intentiones. Quedam autem sunt de rebus non secundum esse quod habent extra, sed presupposita prima intellectione, sicut intellectio universalitatis circa hominem presupponit intellectionem cadentem super hominem; et tales dicuntur intentiones secunde; sunt enim primas subponentes. Dixerunt ergo isti quod intentio accipi potest vel in abstracto vel in concreto. In abstracto quidem nichil aliud est quam quedam rei cognitio quam habet intellectus penes se, in concreto vero res ipsa sic cognita pro eo quod omnis cognitio habet denominare suum obiectum sicut accidentia absoluta suum subiectum, ut scientia denominat scitum et cognitio cognitum. Est autem ulterius advertendum quod intentio in abstracto—que nichil aliud est quam cognitio quam habet intellectus penes se, per quam tendit in rem, et est quedam ratio cognoscendi—dividitur in intentionem primam et secundam in qualibet operatione intellectus. In prima quidem operatione cognitio secundum quam res intelligitur iuxta modum essendi proprium—utputa homo vel leo secundum proprium fantasiacum hominis, quod est ratiocinari, et leonis, quod est rugire, vel | animalis, quod est sentire—talis, inquam, cognitio dicitur intentio prima in abstracto, homo autem, leo vel animal sic cognita dicuntur prime intentiones in concreto. Illa vero qua animal cognoscitur ut est in pluribus, est secunda intentio in abstracto, que est universalitas; et animal sic cognitum est secunda intentio in concreto; est enim universale. Et sic intelligendum est de genere et specie et ceteris intentionibus secundis. 1–2 primus articulus opinio radulphi et quorundam aliorum add Bm opinio quorundam add. ed. 4 quasi] quia si ed. quia B 5 intellectionum] B intellectiones ed. 6 utputa] coni.coll. sect. 28 infra, lin. 5 utpote saepissime B ed. 9 circa] ed. esse B 12 vel] B om. ed. 14 sic] B sit ed. 16 ut] coni. unde B ed. 18 que] B om. ed. 20 dividitur] B et dividitur ed. | in] ed. om. B 21 in] B et in ed. 23 utputa] recte B ed. 25 rugire] B mugire ed. | talis inquam] talis autem ed. et talis inquam B 30 sic] B nunc ed.

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In secunda vero operatione componere vel dividere primo apprehensa—utputa hominem et cursum, dicendo ‘Homo currit’—tale, inquam, componere et complexe intelligere secundum se et absolute est intentio prima in abstracto, et cognitum tali intellectione est prima intentio in concreto. Intelligere vero huiusmodi complexum, prout est affirmativum vel negativum, vel prout est principium inferendi aliquid aut ut est conclusum ab aliquo, vel inquantum est quesitum et dubitatum et positum pro problemate—hoc siquidem intelligere est secunda intentio in abstracto, cognita vero per tale intelligere sunt intentiones secunde in concreto, de quibus determinat logicus. 30 In tertia quoque operatione intellectus, apprehendens aliquem discursum secundum se et naturam suam propriam ac modum essendi proprium—utputa cum discurrit: ‘Omnis homo currit; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes currit’—sic utique absolute apprehendens, habet penes se intellectionem que est prima intentio in abstracto, et cognitum per talem discursum est prima intentio in concreto. Cognoscens vero istum discursum sub ratione unionis extremorum in medio aut ut est processus ab universalibus ad particularia sub tali modo vel tali figura, habet penes se cognitionem discursivam, que est secunda intentio in abstracto, cognitum vero per talem discursum est secunda intentio in concreto quantum ad istam operationem intellectus.

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De tribus conclusionibus 31 Ex hiis autem inferri possunt tres conclusiones secundum sic ponentes.

Prima quidem quod cum dicitur ‘Homo est universalis’ vel ‘Leo est species’ et ‘Animal est genus’, huiusmodi predicationes sunt denominative. 25 Est enim sensus quod homo est intellectio ut in pluribus differentibus numero predicabilis in quid; et similiter leo et animal. Esse autem intentionem est esse accidentale rei, et ob hoc non dicitur homo ‘universalitas’ abstractive, sed ‘universalis’ denominative et concretive. 32 Secunda vero, quod logica, que considerat secundas intentiones, 30 tractat de intellectionibus, non ut sunt vere res, sed ut sunt rerum simili-

2 utputa] utpote B ed. | et] B om. ed. 3 complexe] B complete ed. 7 prius est] B om. ed 8 pro problemate] B problematice ed. 9 in] Bc ed. ab B 12 propriam] Bc ed. om. B 13–14 homo] ed. om. B 16 cognoscens] B cognoscere ed. 21 istam] B tertiam ed. 23 inferri] B referri ed. 25 est] suppl. om. B ed. 26 intellectio] coni. intellectus B intelligibilis ed. | in] B om. ed. 27–28 esse … intentionem] ed. rem autem intellectam B 31 rerum] ed. om. B

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tudines res ipsas denotantes. Possunt enim prime intentiones comparari ad intellectum quem informant; et sic sunt habitus quidam et dispositiones ipsius ac res vere ad considerationem phisici pertinentes. Vel possunt considerari, non quidem respectu intellectus, respectu cuius sunt vere res, sed in ordine ad obiecta que denominant. Et quia cognitio non est vere ipsa res cognita nec habet tantam entitatem quantam habet res ipsa, ideo logica, que isto modo considerat de intellectionibus rerum, dicitur scientia non realis, sed rationalis, et esse de intentionibus secundis subiective, prout denominant obiecta sua. Tertia quoque, quod intentiones secunde vere sunt in predicamento 33 Qualitatis. Quod patet, tum quia sunt cognitiones existentes in intellectu per modum habituum et dispositionum; tum quia alioquin logica non esset in predicamento, cum eius obiectum non esset in predicamento; tum quia genus | et species et cetere secunde intentiones non B259ra sunt aliud nisi quedam cognitiones rei ut est in pluribus differentibus numero; tales autem cognitiones habent principia vere realia, utputa intellectum agentem, et proprium modum essendi, ut proprium fantasiacum, illud autem quod est vera res habens principia realia, est in predicamento. Quare intentiones secunde sunt in predicamento Qualitatis. Opinio Hervei in tractatu De secundis intentionibus et in Quolibet suo13

Dixerunt quoque alii quod intentionalitas in abstracto est quidam re- 34 spectus rationis. Qui quidem respectus non tenet se ex parte actus 25 intelligendi vel ex parte scientie in ordine ad rem intellectam, sed magis econverso est respectus rationis tenens se ex parte rei intellecte in ordine ad ipsum intellectum. Quod igitur sit respectus rationis se tenens ex parte rei intellecte 35 patet. Omne enim quod dicit veram rem in natura existentem, est 30 prima intentio concretive dicta, et per consequens non est intentionalitas, que est intentio in abstracto. Sed omne aliud preter habitudinem

2 sic] B om. ed. 8 scientia] ed. om. B 10 quod] B quia ed. 12 alioquin] suppl. om. B ed. 17–18 ut … fantasiacum] B ac proprium fundamentum ed. 21–22 titulum add. Bm 26 est respectus] B respectu ed. 31 intentio] B intellectio ed. 13

Hervaeus Natalis, Quolibet I, q. 9.

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rei ut intellecta est ad actum intelligendi, omne, inquam, aliud est existens in rerum natura tamquam res vera. Cum enim sit considerare tria—videlicet actum intelligendi secundum se, et eius habitudinem ad rem intellectam, et rem ipsam veram intellectam—, quartum autem sit respectus rationis fundatus super rem intellectam, non dubium quod tria prima sunt vere res, actus scilicet intellectus, et respectus eius ad rem intellectam, quia scientia et actus realiter referuntur ad intelligibile; res etiam existens extra apparet quod est vera res. Et per consequens nichil est quod non sit res in natura existens nisi respectus rei que intelligitur et que est formale obiectum intellectus, ad actum intellectus. Ergo nichil aliud potest poni intentionalitas in abstracto nisi ille respectus. 36 Preterea. Secunda intentio concretive dicta presupponit primam intentionem tamquam fundamentum quantum ad totum quod prima intentio comprehendit. Universale namque et abstractum et cetere intentiones secunde concretive accepte aut fundantur super naturas rerum secundum se acceptarum—quod esse non potest, tum quia consequeretur res in esse reali, circumscripto omni opere intellectus, sicut esse calidum consequitur ignem, tum quia non diceretur secunda intentio si non sequeretur rem prout est intentio, sed ut existit in natura— aut fundatur14 in re prout includit intentionalitatem formaliter. Et sic habetur propositum quod secunda intentio fundatur in prima quantum ad totum quod comprehendit et quantum ad rationem intentionalitatis. Sed manifestum est quod secunda intentio non fundatur super actum intellectus ut est accidens reale ipsius intelligentis, quia tunc fundaretur super entitatem realem, nam et actus intellectus est quedam realis natura. Nec fundatur etiam super ipsum actum ut representativus est alicuius communis, quia universale (quod est secunda intentio de qua hic loquimur) est quidem universale per predicationem, non per representationem. Actus autem intelligendi vel species, etsi sit universalis representative, est tamen singularis entitative, nec potest fundari super rem prout est extra. Relinquitur ergo quod fundatur super rem

1 aliud] B aliquid Perler 4 ipsam] B om. ed. 5 quod] B quia ed. 6 prima] Bc om. B | sunt] B sint ed. 10 que] B qui ed. 16 secunde] ed. om. B 18 circumscripto … opere] B circumscripta omni operatione Perler 21 fundatur] B fundantur perperam corr. Perler 29 quidem] B quoddam ed. 30 autem] B om. ed. | intelligendi] coni. intellectus B ed. | vel] B ut ed. 32 est extra … prout] B om. ed. 14

sc. secunda intentio.

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prout est obiective in intellectu, utputa super hominem intellectum preter Sortem et Platonem, qui quidem est universalis per predicationem. Sed constat quod in homine sic intellecto, qui est universalis in concreto, non est | aliquid aliud nisi ipsa res vera et habitudo eius prout B259rb est intellecta ad actum intelligendi. Ergo huiusmodi habitudo erit intentionalitas in abstracto. Preterea. Illud est intentionalitas in abstracto per quod homo, animal 37 et similia sunt intentio in concreto. Sed homo et animal ut sic non sunt prime intentiones, sed tantummodo prout sunt in intellectu obiective et prout accipiuntur sub habitudine ad actum intellectus quam importat esse cognitum et esse intellectum. Hoc autem patet, quia ista non est per se ‘Homo vel animal est prima intentio’ in primo modo dicendi per se, quia tunc in ratione animalis clauderetur esse primam intentionem; quod est manifeste falsum. Relinquitur ergo quod vel sit per accidens vel per se in secundo modo. Et per consequens prima intentio addit aliquid ad animal. Constat autem quod non est aliud quam esse intellectum. Ergo intentionalitas in abstracto non est aliud quam huiusmodi habitudo. Viso igitur quid sit intentionalitas in abstracto, satis patet secundum 38 istos quid sit prima et secunda intentio in concreto. Dicunt enim quod cum habitudo rei cognite ad actum intellectus sit intentionalitas in abstracto, ista plurificabitur secundum distinctionem et ordinem intelligibilium obiectorum. Sunt autem intelligibilia quedam quidem primo, quedam vero secundo. Iste autem ordo quandoque oritur ex parte nostri intellectus—quando non potest aliquid cognoscere nisi alio precognito, quamvis illud sit cognoscibile in se; unde motor celi, qui immediate potest cognosci ab intellectu (cuius cognitio non dependet a sensibus) non potest a nobis primo cognosci, sed mediante motu—, quandoque vero oritur ex natura intelligibilium in se, ut quando unum intelligibile non potest habere rationem cognoscibilis in ordine ad aliquem intellectum nisi alio precognito; talis est autem ordo inter illud quod est in rerum natura—sive affirmative, ut homo vel album, sive negative, ut cecitas vel chimera—et illud quod est ens rationis formatum ab intellectu, quia non potest illud tale intelligi nisi presupposito actu intelligendi ad quem illud habet habitudinem. Sunt autem itaque duo modi 2 qui] B que ed. 12 dicendi] essendi ed. 16 prius est] ed. om. B 22 ista] B et ista ed. 24 quandoque] B quandocumque ed. 28–29 quandoque vero] B quando ed. 30 cognoscibilis] ed. cognoscibilem B 31 et 11 illud] ed. id sic saepius B 33 et 11 illud] ed. id sic saepius B 35 itaque] Bc ed autem B

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intelligibilium generales: primus quidem eorum que sunt vel non sunt secundum rem; secundus autem eorum que sunt secundum rationem. Et prima quidem intelligibilia sunt prius nota et prime intentiones concretive, quia esse cognitum vel esse in intellectu obiective est intentionalitas abstractive. Alia vero intelligibilia sunt secundario nota et secunde intentiones concretive. Habitudo autem eorum ad actum intellectus per quem apprehenduntur, est secunda intentionalitas abstractive. 39 Adiciunt autem ad precedentia sic dicentes quod secunde intentiones, cum non habeant esse reale, ymo dividantur contra totum esse reale quod Philosophus dividit15 in decem predicamenta (VI Methaphisice), et per consequens secunde intentiones sunt extra predicamentorum denarium,—adiciunt, inquam, quod non sunt in predicamento. Et confirmatur ex communi modo loquendi doctorum, qui postquam concludunt de aliquo quod sit ens rationis vel secunda intentio, statim probasse videntur quod non sit aliquid reale. 40 Dixerunt quoque ulterius quod secunde intentiones non habent esse alicubi subiective, quia nec in intellectu (cum non sint actus nec species) nec in rerum natura, sed tantummodo habent esse in intellectu obiective. Hoc autem patet, quia si haberent ese subiective in intellectu, haberent entitatem que posset in aliquo genere contineri, cum accidentia anime, que spiritualia sunt, sint nobiliora accidentibus corporis— B259va | de quibus constat quod in predicamentis sunt—et etiam nobiliora relationibus, que constituunt verum genus. Sed manifestum est quod secunda intentio et ens rationis deficit a quacumque entitate existente in quocumque genere; alias non distingueretur contra ens commune divisum in decem predicamenta sicut16 ens deficiens a toto ambitu eius. Ergo non possunt poni in intellectu subiective. 41 Preterea. Abstractum quod est secunda intentio, non est realiter separatum ab individuis; universale enim non dicitur per representationem, sed per predicationem. Sed manifestum est quod ea que in intellectu sunt subiective, sunt separata a singularibus, nec sunt universalia predicativa sed representativa tantummodo. Igitur non sunt intentiones secunde.

7 quem] B quam ed. 9–10 ymo … reale] Bc om. B 9 ymo] Bc vero Perler 12 adiciunt] B addunt ed. adhinc Perler 22 quod] B om. ed. | et] B om. ed. 23 verum] coni. unum B ed. 26 ens] B omnes ed. 29 enim] coni. etiam B ed. 15 16

Aristotle, Metaph. VI 2, 1026a35-b1. ‘sicut’ = ‘tamquam’ (‘in its capacity of ’).

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De quinque conclusionibus

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Secundum hoc igitur dicta istorum possunt reduci ad certas conclu- 42 siones. Primam quidem quod homo et animal non sunt formaliter prime intentiones, sed sunt immediatum fundamentum primarum intentionum. Et similiter nec universale aut particulare sunt secunde intentiones, sed sunt fundamentum immediatum secundarum intentionum in abstracto. Et similiter nec universalitas aut particularitas sunt secunde intentiones nisi concretive, nec humanitas aut animalitas intentiones prime. Secundam vero quod intentionalitas abstractive est habitudo rei in- 43 tellecte ad intellectum quam importat esse cognitum et esse obiective in intellectu. Que quidem habitudo, si fundetur super intelligibilia primi ordinis—utputa super hominem et animal concretive, vel humanitatem et animalitatem abstractive, ita ut ista habeant esse cognitum et esse obiectivum in intellectu—, hec siquidem habitudo dat talibus intelligibilibus ut sint prime intentiones concretive. Si vero fundetur super intelligibilia secundi ordinis (que sunt entia rationis), utputa super universale, abstractum, universalitatem sive abstractionem, ita ut talia sint in anima obiective, dabit illis ut sint intentiones secunde. Ipsa vero habitudo (que est intentio in abstracto) nec est prima intentio nec secunda, sed aliquid commune eis. Nichilominus, si capiat esse obiectivum in intellectu, ita ut capiatur per actum reflexivum, fundabit habitudinem rei cognite ad intellectum. Et per consequens erit secunda intentio concretive, cum sit de secundo ordine intelligibilium obiectorum. Tertiam quoque quod huiusmodi habitudo (que est intentionalitas) 44 nullo modo fundari potest in actu super rem prout habet esse extra, nec super rem ut habet esse in intellectu obiective, sic quod illud esse sit ratio fundandi, cum habitudo de qua loquimur, non sit aliud quam illud esse actualiter in intellectu obiective. Fundatur ergo super rem que est in intellectu, non prout est in intellectu. Et idcirco potest fundari super particularia (ut sunt Sortes, Plato) et super non-particularia (ut super hominem et animal) et super negationes (ut super surditatem et cecitatem) et super figmenta (ut sunt chimera et tragelaphus). Omnia enim sunt intelligibilia et possunt esse in intellectu obiective et fundare 2 igitur] B om. ed. 14 ista] B ideo ed. 16 fundetur] B fundentur ed. 17 super] Bc ed om. B 20 intentio] Bc ed. om. B 21 aliquid] B aliquod ed. 22 capiatur] B capiat ed. 23 erit] B est ed. 26 super sqq.] B supra sic interdum Perler 32 super] suppl. om. B ed. 33 tragelaphus] tregelaphus sic semper B 34 prius et] B ut ed.

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huiusmodi habitudinem intellecti ad intellectum, que est intentio in B259vb abstracto. Et per consequens hec omnia possunt esse | prima intentio

in concreto. Si vero loquamur de aptitudine ad intelligi, quod non est aliud quam habere aptitudinem ad esse in intellectu obiective, non dubium quod potest fundari immediate super rem extra, quoniam res extra habent aptitudinem ut intelligantur. 45 Quartam vero quod secunda intentio, si accipiatur in abstracto, nullo modo potest fundari super rem extra immediate existentem, sed super secundum genus intelligibilium, que sunt entia rationis. Si vero accipiatur concretive secunda intentio pro omni ente rationis, tunc secunda intentio concretive—que est prima intentio abstractive, videlicet habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intellectus; hec quidem habitudo si consideretur ut aptitudinalis—fundatur immediate super rem extra; si vero ut actualis, non (ut in conclusione immediate precedente dictum est). Omnes autem secunde intentiones alie (sive sint genus sive abstractum, et sic de aliis) presupponunt rem habere esse cognitum in actu, et per consequens primam intentionem concretive sumptam, propter quod non possunt fundari immediate super rem extra. Secunda vero intentio concretive sumpta, que non est aliud quam ens rationis, fundatur super primam intentionem concretive sumptam, que non est aliud quam res cognita obiective. Et hoc est verum de omni secunda intentione concretive sumpta, cum omne ens rationis fundetur super ens reale ut habet esse cognitum et intellectum. Per quod etiam patet quod fundatur super primam intentionem abstractive sumptam, videlicet super esse in intellectu obiective, non quidem quod istud esse sit fundamentum, sed quasi medium et ratio fundandi. Secunda vero intentio sumpta abstractive fundatur super primam abstractive, inquantum habitudo quam importat esse intellectum, potest fundari super aliud esse cognitum; habitudo enim illa potest cognosci et ita fundare aliam habitudinem ad actum intellectus. Et universaliter: secundum quot modos potest fieri comparatio esse cogniti vel ad rem extra, vel ad aliud esse cognitum, vel ad secundo intelligibilia, vel secundorum intelligibilium ad prima, mediante esse cognito, tot modis potest quilibet percipere per seipsum quomodo una intentio potest aliam fundare, sive prima secundam, sive secunda secundam. 1 intellecti] B intellectus ed. 7 accipiatur] accipitur B 9–10 accipiatur] B accipiantur ed. 17 sumptam] secundam B ed. 21 obiective] Bc ed. om. B Perler 22 reale] B realiter ed. 27 fundatur … abstractive] B om. ed. 28 intellectum] B intellecta ed. 30 quot] B quos ed.

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Quintam quoque quod logica est de secundis intentionibus tantum 46 tamquam de proprio subiecto, non autem rethorica seu gramatica. Non quidem gramatica, quia entia rationis de quibus considerat (ut de vocibus et dictionibus et modis significandi) non sunt secunde intentiones, 5 quia non consequuntur ex natura rei actum intellectus, sed ex sola institutione et ad beneplacitum imponentis; universale autem et particulare et cetere intentiones secunde quas logicus considerat, sequuntur de necessitate rem intellectam. Nec etiam rethorica, quia non considerat ut obiectum formale modum probabilem inferendi unum ex alio—nam 10 hoc spectat ad librum Topicorum—, sed magis res in quibus fit persuasiva illatio et probabilis, utputa conditiones iudicis et causas et sermones persuasivos ex quibus habet persuadere. Unde sic se videtur habere ad modum persuasivum probabilem traditum in libro Topicorum, sicut ad modum demonstrativum, qui in libro Posteriorum docetur, habent se 15 scientie demonstrative reales. Opinio quorundam aliorum 47

Fuerunt autem alii qui dixerunt quod actus intellectus potest dupliciter B260ra considerari. Uno modo ut est res existens in certa specie qualitatis; alio modo ut est similitudo tenens vicem obiecti, ymo quodammodo ipsum 20 obiectum. Secundum hoc ergo prima intentio est ipsa vera res ut existens extra vel etiam in intellectu subiective. Secunda vero intentio est ipsemet actus intellectus, inquantum est quodammodo obiectum actus siquidem intellectus, etsi sit realiter et subiective in ipso. Et per consequens prima intentio melius dicitur secunda, inquantum est intentiona25 liter res cognita obiective, unde intellectio lapidis est lapis intentionaliter et cognitio animalis est animal intentionale.

12 persuasivos] coni. passionativos B persuasionis ed. 16 titulum add. Bm ed. 17 fuerunt] ed. sunt B 18 res] B om. ed. 20 hoc ergo] B ergo hec ed. 23 siquidem] Bc quidem B ed. 24 melius] melyus (!) B nichilominus ed. 24–25 intentionaliter] B intentio aut ed. 25 intellectio] B intellectus ed.

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articulus ii quid dicendum secundum veritatem De primo defectu prime opinionis 48 Circa secundum autem considerandum quod modus dicendi primo

loco recitatus [26–30] evidenter deficit in duobus. Primo quidem in hoc quod ait actum intellectus esse formaliter et in abstracto intentionem primam et secundam, et obiectum tantum denominative dici, et non formaliter, intentionem secundam vel primam. Manifestum est enim quia: Illud dicitur formaliter in ordine ad quod omnia alia dicuntur— ut patet, quia sanitas animalis dicitur formalis quia in ordine ad ipsam medicina et dieta et omnia alia ‘sana’ dicuntur—. Sed species vel actus ex hoc dicuntur intentiones quod per ea intellectus tendit in aliud obiective. Ergo obiectum cognitum sive conceptus obiectivus formaliter intentio dicetur. 49 Preterea. Ibi primo et formaliter reperitur intentio ubi primo et formaliter consideratur intentionalis distinctio; distinctio namque est quedam passio consequens illud super quod fundatur. Sed constat quod intentionalis distinctio primo et formaliter invenitur in conceptibus obiectivis; nullus enim dicit quod due species aut duo actus intellectus tantum intentionaliter differant, ymo vere realiter; de duobus autem conceptibus formatis de eadem re—quales sunt conceptus hominis et animalis, aut albedinis et coloris—consuetum est dici quod differant intentionaliter, et sunt due intentiones eiusdem rei, non autem due res aut distincta realiter. Ergo manifeste patet quod ratio intentionis invenitur per prius et formalius in obiectivis conceptibus quam in actibus intellectus. 50 Preterea. Sicut se habet suo modo intentio et esse intentionale in sensu, sic se habet in intellectu. Sed querentes de coloribus yridis aut de coloribus qui sunt in collo columbe aut de ymagine que apparet in speculo aut de candela apparente extra situm, utrum habeant esse

3 titulum add. Bm ed. necnon et primo ostenditur primus defectus prime opinionis et tertie scilicet quod actus intellectus sit formaliter prima vel secunda intentio add. Bm ed. 6 actum] B accidentia ed. 6–8 intentionem … formaliter] B om. ed. 7 tantum] ed om. B 9 quia] coni. quod B 10 quia] B quod Pinborg 11 medicina et dieta] B medicinam et dietam ed. | alia] Bc ed. animalia B | sed] B si ed. 18 invenitur] B repperitur ed. 22 est] B ed. enim add. ed. 27 esse] B omne ed.

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reale aut intentionale tantum, intendunt querere utrum habeant esse obiectivum tantum et ficticium seu apparens, aut habeant esse reale et fixum extra in rerum natura absque omni apprehensione; per quod patet quod esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio aut apparitio obiectiva. Ergo nec in intellectu erit aliquid aliud quam conceptus obiectivus. Preterea. Ibi est per prius et formalius prima et secunda intentio ubi est per prius et formalius secunde super primam fundatio; est enim communis omnium loquentium acceptio quod secunda intentio fundatur super primam. Sed manifestum est quod hoc | repperitur per prius et formalius ex parte conceptuum formatorum obiective.—nam conceptus universalitatis fundatur super conceptum animalitatis et inest sibi formaliter tamquam subiecto proprio (ut quilibet experitur), actus autem intellectus quo universalitas apprehenditur, non inest tamquam subiecto actui quo intelligitur animal; quamvis enim inter eos sit ordo presuppositionis, non est tamen inherentie habitudo.—Ergo prima et secunda intentio per prius et formalius se tenent ex parte obiectivorum conceptuum quam ex parte actus intellectus. Preterea. Illud non est intentio primo et formaliter et in abstracto sine quo intentio logice diffinitur; logicales enim diffinitiones formales sunt, sicut et metaphisice. Sed logicus, diffiniens genus tamquam ‘illud quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid’, nullam mentionem facit de actu intellectus—predicari enim non est formaliter intelligi, alioquin de rebus que sunt extra, predicaretur actus intelligendi; non est igitur predicatio in intellectu formaliter sed obiective, nec inest actui intellectus sed est ab ipso effective et formative.— Ergo actus intellectus non est formaliter intentio, sed magis obiectivus conceptus. Preterea. Avicenna dicit17 primo Metaphisice quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Sed manifestum est quod logica non coniungit actum intellectus actui intellectus, sed conceptus secundarios conceptibus primis, utputa predicari animali et homini, et affirmari vel 3 rerum natura] B verorum naturam ed. 5 nec] ed. om. B Pinborg | aliquid aliud] coni. aliud B ed. 8 per prius] B primo ed. 10–11 per prius] B om. ed. 15 quo] Bc om. B 20 logice] B logicae perperam Pinborg 24 intelligi] coni. intelligere B ed. Pinborg 26 inest actui] B est in actu ed. 17 Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75. The present formula is the usual paraphrase found in Avicenna ad loc.: “Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo”.

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negari, et sic de aliis. Ergo manifestum est quod secunda intentio et prima non sunt actus intelligendi, sed obiectivi conceptus 54 Preterea. Omnes concedunt quod logica est de secundis intentionibus, sive tamquam de subiecto adequato, sive aliter, secundum quod opinantur diversi diversimode. Sed constat quod logica est de dicibili incomplexo (de quo determinat in libro Predicamentorum) et de enuntiatione (de qua determinat in libro Peryermenias) et de oratione sillogistica simpliciter, et de oratione demonstrativa et dyaletica, sicut patet; nullum autem istorum est actus simpliciter intellectus formaliter, etsi sit formative ab actu intellectus; nusquam autem repperitur in logica tractatum aut discussum de actibus intellectus formalibus, sed tantummodo de formatis per intellectum. Ergo mirum est quod in ymaginationem ascenderit alicuius philosophice sapientis quod prima et secunda intentio sint actus intellectus aut conceptus formales, et non potius conceptus formati. 55 Preterea. In omnibus iuxta doctrinam Philosophi18 loquendum est ut plures, et maxime secundum quod philosophantes loquuntur. Sed Commentator intentiones vocat obiectivos conceptus.—Dicit19 enim in III De anima quod intentiones intellecte continuantur cum intentionibus ymaginatis et sunt in eis quasi forma in materia et sicut color in pariete; et hoc dicit commento XVIII et XLIII. Manifestum est autem quod loquitur de intentionibus obiectivis que sunt intellecte et ymaginate, quia de illis semper experimur quod intentio intellecta innititur ymaginate, sicut color parieti, quod non est verum de actibus; unde et commento XVIII dicit20 quod sensationes non sunt intentiones alie ab intentionibus rerum existentium extra animam in natura. Ex quo patet quod intelligit per ‘sensationes’ et ‘intentiones’ rerum apparitiones B260va obiectivas | que sunt realiter eedem cum hiis que existunt extra.—Ergo secundum modum loquendi philosophicum intentiones non sunt actus, sed aliquid obiectivum.

2 obiectivi] B obiectivus ed. 5 diversi] suppl. 12 in] ed. om. B 13 ascenderit] B ascendit ed. intentio] suppl. 26 natura] coni. materia B ed. 18 19 20

10 nusquam] B numquam ed. 14 sint] B ed. sit Pinborg 23

Cf. Aristotle, Topica II 2, 110a15–22. Averroes, Comm. Magnum in Aristotelis De anima, p. 404, 500 sqq. Ibid.

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De secundo defectu prime opinionis

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Secundo vero deficit, quia ymaginatur quod res concepta denominetur 56 tantummodo ab actu intellectus et non capiat aliquod esse intentionale plus quam Cesar qui pingitur capiat a pictura. Hoc enim est impossibile. Manifestum est siquidem quod denominari presupponit nomen aut aliquod aliud vocabulum. Sed conceptus qui lucet in acie cogitantis et qui formatur et concipitur obiective, nullius lingue est, ymo ab omni nomine et omni vocabulo abstrahit secundum Augustinum21 XV De Trinitate, capitulo X. Ergo res que concipitur capit esse aliquod aliud quam solum denominari. Preterea. Commentator dicit22 IX Metaphisice, commento VII, quod 57 entia que non sunt extra animam, non dicuntur esse simpliciter, sed esse in anima cogitativa. Sed manifestum est quod per solum denominari non dicerentur esse in ea; alioquin Cesar sculptus aut pictus eque erit in pictura sive sculptura sicut res intellecte erunt in anima. Ergo res concepta capit aliquid aliud quam denominari, utputa esse intentionale et diminutum. Preterea. Philosophus dividit23 ens per esse in anima et esse in re 58 extra (V et VI Metaphisice); omnes etiam loquentes dividunt ens in ens reale et rationis. Sed si obiectum caperet solum denominari et non esse, divisio nulla esset; alioquin deberet dividi esse rerum primo quidem in esse extra et in esse in denominante, deinde vero esse in suo denominante deberet dividi in esse in pictura et esse in sculptura et esse in anima; unde non esset prima divisio esse rei in duo, videlicet in esse in anima et esse extra; quod absonum est et contra mentem Philosophi et contra omnes loquentes. Igitur rem esse in anima obiective non est solum denominari.

1 titulus in B ed. secundus defectus prime opinionis scilicet quod obiectum non capit ab actu intellectus aliquod esse intentionale sed tantum denominari add. B scilicet quod … denominari add. ed. 2 denominetur] ed. denominatur B 6 aliquod aliud] coni. coll. sect. 57 infra aliquod B om. ed. 7 et] B om. ed. | est] B adeo ed. 9 capitulo X] B om. ed. 14 dicerentur] B dicantur ed. 19 omnes] B dicens ed. 22 in] B om. ed. 21 St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV x, cap. 19, p. 48676–78: ‘Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus verbum est quod in corde dicimus, quod nec graecum est nec latinum nec linguae alicuius alterius (…)’, 22 Averroes, In Arist. IX Metaph. 23 Aristotle, Metaph. V 7, 1017a22–35; VI 2, 1026a33-b2.

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Preterea. Denominari ab aliquo non est esse presens aut apparens denominanti, sed nec esse in conspectu aut prospectu ipsius, et nec illi obici aut offerri; sicut patet quod Cesar pictus non est presens aut apparens picture nec in conspectu aut prospectu illius nec sibi obicitur aut offertur. Sed experientia docet quod res cognita est apparens, presens, obiecta intelligenti necnon et in prospectu aut conspectu illius. Ergo non habet ibi solum denominari, ymo aliquod esse intentionale. 60 Preterea. Omne denominari presupponit intelligi; intellectus enim est qui facit denominationem unius rei ab alia, unde nec Cesar est in pictura intentionaliter nec denominatur ab ea pictus, sed intellectus facit istam denominationem Cesaris a pictura, eoquod ducitur in notitiam eius per picturam; ex quo patet quod omnis denominatio presupponit apprehensionem. Sed constat quod hoc non esset nisi apprehendi esset aliquid plus quam ab apprehensione denominari; pari enim ratione hec denominatio presupponeret aliam apprehensionem, et illa aliam, et sic in infinitum. Ergo necessarium est rei intellecte attribui aliquid plus quam denominari. 61 Preterea. Si esse intellectum non est aliud quam | denominari ab B260vb intellectione, aut istud denominari non est aliud quam vocari et secundum vocem et vocabulum derivari—et hoc dici non potest, quia, nullo vocabulo existente, res habet esse cognitum obiective—, aut istud denominari non est secundum appellationem, sed quia obiectum capit aliquid aliud ab intellectione quam vocetur secundum appellationem; et hoc utique verum est. Manifestum est autem quod illud aliquid non potest esse aliquod esse reale; alioquin omne intellectum existeret vere realiter. Ergo necesse est quod capiat esse intentionale. 62 Preterea. Homo et animal, qui sunt conceptus existentes in anima obiective, non est dubium quod non sunt eadem res sub alia et alia denominatione; non enim solum differunt denominative. Sed constat quod sunt una et eadem res sub alio et alio conceptu obiectivo, vel potius sunt eadem et alius et alius conceptus obiectivus. Ergo esse con-

1 est] ed. suppl. Pinborg om. B 2–4 sed … illius] B om. ed. 2 conspectu] B aspectu ed. | ipsius] ed. illius B | et] coni. sed ed. B Pinborg 6 obiecta] B oblata ed. 7 ibi] B illi ed. 8 omne] B esse ed. 9 est] B om. ed. 10 intentionaliter] B essentialiter ed. 14 aliquid] B ad ed. aliud Pinborg 15 et illa] B om. ed. 16 necessarium est] B necessario ed. 16–17 attribui … plus] B attribuitur aliud ed. 19 aut … denominari] B et ed. 20 et] B om. ed. 23 vocetur secundum] ed. vocem aut B Pinborg 25 aliquod] B aliquid ed. | omne] B esse ed.

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ceptum obiective non dicit solum denominari, ymo quendam specialem modum essendi intentionalem et deminutum, ex quo non licet inferre esse simpliciter et reale. De tribus erroribus Radulphi

Apparet itaque quod predicta opinio deficit in hiis duobus. Ex quo 63 sequitur quod non est verum quod addit ulterius intentiones secundas esse in predicamento Qualitatis ex hoc quod actus intellectus est in illo predicamento. Nec est etiam verum quod hec propositio sit denominativa ‘Homo est species’ ab actu intellectus quo apprehenditur species; 10 sed est denominativa ab universalitate specifica que est in intellectu obiective, subiective vero secundum esse intentionale in homine apprehenso. Nec illud etiam quod dicit24 de logica quod tractat de intellectionibus prout sunt similitudines obiectorum et tenent vicem ipsorum, cum aperte pateat discurrenti per omnes libros logice quod non fit 15 mentio de actibus intellectus, sed vel de oratione diffinitiva aut enunciativa aut sillogistica vel de dicibili incomplexo, que utique non sunt actus intellectus, sed potius voces conceptus obiectivos exprimentes. 5

De prima propositione generali in hac materia colligenda

Ex predictis ergo colligitur prima affirmativa propositio in hac materia, 64 20 quod scilicet Intentio non est aliud (prout hic loquimur de ea) nisi conceptus formatus obiective per actum intellectus.

Et quia duo sunt ordines conceptuum: primus quidem eorum qui directe formantur, secundus vero eorum qui super primos fundantur— 25 utputa universalitas aut predicabilitas (quod idem est) necessario concipitur circa aliquid preconceptum, sicut rectitudo in rerum natura existit in linea—, idcirco duplex est genus intentionum, quia quedam

8–9 denominativa] B denominata ed. 12 illud etiam] B idem est ed. | tractat] B tractet ed. 17 obiectivos] B ed. conceptus add. ed. 20 quod scilicet] B ed. quod add. (!) ed. 21 aliud] Pinborg aliquid B 25–26 concipitur] B accipitur ed. 26 preconceptum] B preceptum ed. 27 existit] B ed. exit perperam Pinborg 24 Cf. Radulphus Brito, Sophisma “Aliquis homo est species”, capp. 60–64 ed. Pinborg CIMAGL 19 75, pp. 147–149.

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sunt primi ordinis, videlicet conceptus qui formantur de rebus, quedam vero secundi, videlicet conceptus qui formantur circa primos conceptus. De decem defectibus opinionis secunde De primo defectu 65 Ulterius autem considerandum quod secunda opinio25 impossibilis est 5

in multis. Primo quidem in eo quod ait26 quod animal aut homo secundum quod huiusmodi non sunt prime intentiones nisi ultra addatur eis relatio aut habitudo intellecti ad actum intellectus. Apparet enim evidentissime quod homo et animal important primas intentiones;27 illa namque quorum distinctio nullo modo realis est inquantum talia sunt, sed penitus intentionalis, illa inquantum huiusmodi important intentioB261ra nes. | Impossibile est enim quod aliqua distinguantur realiter, nisi alterum vel utrumque sit res; alterum quidem, ut ens et nichil realiter differunt ratione alterius extremi; utrumque vero, ut lapis et homo; similiter etiam impossibile est quod aliqua differant intentionaliter, nisi fuerit alterum intentio vel utrumque. Sed manifestum est quod homo inquantum homo et animal inquantum animal differunt quidem non realiter, sed intentionaliter et secundum rationem. Ergo necesse est quod homo et animal sint intentiones et habeant aliquid admixtum de opere intellectus inquantum huiusmodi sunt. 66 Preterea. Illud quod non est existens in rerum natura nec habet esse fixum extra secundum quod huiusmodi, illud, inquam, est quid intentionale; hac enim propositione utuntur positores huius positionis (ut supra patuit recitando), et est propositio per se nota et vera. Sed manifestum est quod homo inquantum differt a Sorte, et animal prout distinguitur ab homine—horum, inquam, rationes ut sic accepte—non sunt in rerum natura habentes esse extra; alioquin redit error Platonis 1 primi] B ed. primo perperam Pinborg 3 titulus in B | decem] coni. quinque B in quibus deficit opinio secunda. Primus defectus quod animal et homo secundum quod huiusmodi non sunt intentiones add. Bm ed. 6 ait quod] B om. ed. 12 realiter] B om. ed. 18 primum et] B etiam ed. 19 sint] B habeant ed. | opere] B operatione Perler 21 rerum] Bc ed. om. B 24 est … vera] B hec propositio de se non est vera ed. 25

Sc. Hervaei Natalis. Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus. 27 Sc. homo et animal prout (in eo quod sunt diversi modi essendi Socratis) distinguuntur a Socrate; videas sectt. 67–68. 26

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et erit dare hominem tertium separatum ab hominibus singularibus, et similiter animal separatum; quod esse non potest. Ergo necesse est quod homo et animal secundum quod huiusmodi sint intentiones. Preterea. Omne fabricatum per intellectum quod non est nisi conceptus obiective formatus, est vere intentio; constat enim quod intellectus non fabricat res, sed intentiones. Sed manifestum est quod ratio hominis et animalis prout distinguuntur a Sorte, est fabricata per intellectum nec est aliud nisi conceptus obiective formatus; non enim fecit has distinctas rationes natura in existentia actuali secundum sic ponentes et omnimodam veritatem. Ergo necesse est quod sint quedam intentiones. Preterea. Impossibile est quod una res sit plura quedam realiter, sed tantum intentionaliter et secundum rationem; una quidem candela potest apparere plures et esse multe in esse intentionali et apparenti, sed in esse reali non est possibile. Sed manifestum est quod homo et animal sunt una res ut quedam plura et distincta; ‘rationale’ enim et ‘animal’ important duas rationes distinctas quarum una non est alia, et tamen sunt una res secundum sic ponentes. Igitur homo et animal erunt intentiones. Sed forte dicetur (sicut istimet innuunt) quod homo potest accipi vel animal dupliciter. Primo quidem ut relatio actus intelligendi terminatur ad ipsa tamquam ad obiecta; et secundum hoc homo et animal distinguuntur ratione, nec sunt ut sic intentiones. Secundo vero ut super ea fundatur respectus cooppositus ad actum intellectus, videlicet habitudo rei cognite quam importat esse in intellectu obiective—relatio enim preexigit fundamentum opposite relationis—; et secundum hoc homo et animal sunt prime intentiones concretive, quia huiusmodi habitudo est prima intentio abstractive. Hec autem evasio nullius est apparentie aut momenti, ut patet ex duobus. Primo quidem quia rationes quatuor statim [65–68] inducte probant quod homo et animal prout terminatur ad rationes eorum actus intellectus, necessario sunt intentiones, tum quia ut sic non distinguuntur realiter sed intentionaliter tantum, tum quia ut sic non sunt in rerum natura, tum quia formata sunt ab intellectu inquantum huius1 singularibus] B significantibus ed. 4 omne] B esse ed. 7 distinguuntur] B distinguitur Perler 10 est] Bc ed. om. B 17 important] Bc ed. non important B 21 terminatur] B terminetur perperam ed. 22 ipsa] B ipsam ed. 23 intentiones] B prime intentiones perperam ed. 31 terminatur] coni. terminantur B Perler determinatur ed. 32 quia] coni. quod B Perler 32–33 non … sic] B om. ed.

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modi, tum quia sunt una res et quedam plura, que quidem pluralitas B261rb necessario est intentionalis. Secundo vero quia falsum assumit, | vide-

licet quod exigatur aliqua alia relatio quam importat esse cognitum, postquam actus intellectus attingit ea obiective (intellectus enim attingit ea obiective), non secundum esse quod habent extra—ubi omnino sunt idem homo et animal, nec homo est quid unicum, ymo plures homines individuales.—; nec attingit ea secundum esse datum eis ab aliquo alio ab intellectu, quia illud esse distinctum quo rationes animalis et hominis diversificantur, non capiunt28 aliunde quam ab intellectu; nec ipse intellectus per aliquem alium actum dat eis tale esse nisi per illum per quem obiective ipsa attingit, ita ut ipsum attingere ex parte intellectus sit eis dare tale esse, et attingi ex parte rei sit tale esse recipere. Sed manifestum est quod tale esse non est nisi obiectivum et intentionale. Ergo intellectus in attingendo dat eis esse obiectivum et intentionale. Et per consequens non est verum quod expectetur alia habitudo que vocetur prima intentio et que exprimat esse in intellectu obiective. 71 Unde considerandum quod secus est de conceptione passiva qua formaliter res constituitur in esse concepto. Illa enim clauditur indistinguibiliter intra rationem animalis et hominis et ceterorum conceptuum obiectivorum. Et secus est de relatione que fundatur super concipi secundum quam totus conceptus animalis sive tota ratio eius dicitur relative concepta. Talis enim relatio non est intrinseca relatio rationi animalis, ymo extrinseca, et fundatur non super precisam realitatem animalitatis, sed super realitatem et conceptionem passivam ipsius, ex quibus consurgit una ratio simplex et indistinguibilis, ratio scilicet animalis. Et est simile de relatione producti ad producens, que fundatur super rem que producta est et super productionem passivam, ut patet29 primo Methaphisice. 72 Et propter hoc obiectiva conceptio passive dicta non respicit rem per modum substrati, ymo res que concipitur est aliquid sui et immiscetur indistinguibiliter sibi, unde conceptio rose idem est quod rosa, et conceptus animalis idem quod animal. Iste nimirum conceptus claudit 1 et] B om. ed. 2 quia] B quod ed. 4–5 intellectus … obiective] ed. om. B 5 ubi] B ed. ut Perler 6 unicum] ed. unum B 11 quem] B ed. quod Perler 12 esse] B om. ed. | alterum sit] B om. ed. 13 nisi] B om. ed. 17 passiva] ed. passive B 18 illa] B alia ed. 23 et] B om. ed. 26 que fundatur] B om. ed. 28 primo] B quinto ed. 30–719.6 res que … ymo] B om. ed. 28 29

Sc. ille rationes. Aristotle, Metaph. I 3, 984a21–29.

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indistinguibiliter realitates omnium particularium animalium et quendam modum essendi qui est intentionalis, qui non est aliud quam passiva conceptio. Non quod possit intellectus realitates illas prout clauduntur in conceptu precise accipere et super illas modum intentionalem essendi sive conceptionem passivam superextendere eo modo quo super albedinem fundat similitudinem, ymo realitates illas a conceptione distinguere non potest, sed constituitur unus conceptus simpliciter et intentio que dividi non potest. Super hoc autem totum postmodum reflectendo fundat relationem seu habitudinem intellecti. Et secundum hoc patet quomodo animal et homo ut sic, absque omni respectu ad intellectum, sunt intentiones prime, quoniam claudunt realitatem ut conceptam passive. Nec obsistit quod ab aliquibus inducitur in oppositum quod secun- 73 dum hoc erit hec propositio per se primo modo ‘Animal est prima intentio’ et diffinietur animal per primam intentionem, exquo intra rationem animalis clauditur intentionalitas. Dicendum quidem ad hoc quod idem est iudicium de prima intentione et de vera re. Unde si ista est per se primo modo ‘Animal est vera res’, et ista ‘Animal est prima intentio’; in utraque namque predicatur ens: in prima ens reale, in secunda ens intentionale. Cum igitur animal, inquantum differt ab homine ratione, non sit precise res, ymo includens | aliquid rationis, B261va nec sit precise ratio, ymo includens aliquid vere realitatis, nec sit compositum ex realitate et ratione tamquam ex duobus que distinguibilia sint, sed sit aliquid simplicissime et indistinguibiliter adunatum,—tam ‘vera res’ quam ‘prima intentio’ predicari possunt per se de ipso, quia non se habent per modum partis. Et predicantur in primo modo, sicut et ‘ens’; nec ponuntur in diffinitione animalis, sicut nec ipsum ens. De secundo defectu

30

Secundo vero impossibilis est hec opinio quantum ad illud quod dicit 74 de universali et genere ac specie ac differentia. Dicit enim quod ista nec in abstracto (utputa universalitas) nec in concreto (ut dicendo universale) sunt secunde intentiones formaliter et in abstracto, sed tantum7 simpliciter] B simplex ed. 9 intellecti] ed. intellectus B 15 diffinietur] B ed. definiretur Perler 21 ratione] B om. ed. 24 simplicissime] B simpliciter ed. 28 quod (!) secundus defectus quod genus species universale inquantum huiusmodi non [om. B!] sunt secunde intentiones intrinsece sed fundamentaliter tantum add. Bm ed. 31 ut] B om. ed. 31–32 universale] B universales ed.

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modo per modum substrati et quasi concretive, pro eo quod subiciuntur habitudini et respectui quem habet res intellecta ad actum intellectus, qui quidem respectus est secunda intentio formaliter in abstracto. Unde dicit30 expresse ista opinio quod sicut se habent corpus, albedo et album, sic universale et habitudo illa rei intellecte, que est intentio abstractive, et totum compositum, quod est intentio concretive, videlicet universalitas ut intellecta. 75 Hoc autem dictum stare non potest. Illud enim quod secundum se totum non est aliquid reale existens in rerum natura, secundum se totum est aliquid intentionale, aut est omnino nichil. Quod autem secundum se totum est intentionale, non se habet per modum substrati ad intentionem, ymo intrinsece et formaliter est intentio. Sed manifestum est quod respectus importatus per ‘universale’ aut ‘universalitatem’ et per ‘genus’, ‘speciem’ et similia nullo modo est aliquid reale in rerum natura, sed aliquid sui, ymo secundum se totum non est existens in rebus. Ergo necesse est quod secundum se totum sit quid intentionale, et per consequens quod intrinsece et formaliter sit intentio, non substratum intentioni. 76 Preterea. Si universale aut universalitas aut genus aut species et similia non sint formaliter intentio sed aliquid substratum intentioni, querendum est de isto substrato qualis res sit. Aut enim est nichil, aut res existens extra, aut intentio et ratio quedam. Sed non potest dici quod nichil; alias logicus determinans de universali determinaret de nichilo; nec etiam dici potest quod sit res extra existens. Ergo necesse est quod sit ratio et intentio quedam. Claret autem quod non est intentio prima. Quare restat quod sit intentio secunda. 77 Preterea. Illud quod intellectus format et facit habet rationem intentionis. Sed Commentator dicit31 primo De anima, commento VIII, quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Ergo universalitas secundum quod huiusmodi est intentio non solum per relationem sibi advenientem. Sed constat quod non est prima. Igitur erit secunda.

3 qui quidem] B om. ed. 4 ista opinio] B om. ed. 5 est] B autem ed. 6 est] B cum ed. 7 intellecta] B intellectus ed. 8 secundum] B om. ed. 11 secundum] B om. ed. 15 rerum] B rei ed. | sed] B secundum ed. | secundum] B om. ed. 19 tertium aut] B vel ed. 20 sint] B sunt ed. 28 commento VII] B om. ed. 30 31

Hervaeus, De secundis intentionibus, dist. I, q. 1. See our section 7.11. Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima I, 8, p. 1225–26.

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De tertio defectu

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Tertio quoque est impossibilis in eo quod ait de habitudine seu respectu rei intellecte ad intellectum quod hec sola sit formaliter intentio et in abstracto, et quod homo et animal per hoc fiant intentiones in concreto quia subiciuntur illi; universale vero, genus et species similiter sunt secunde intentiones concretive per hoc quod subiciuntur tali | habitudini que est intentionalitas in abstracto. Hoc siquidem stare non potest. Probatum est enim quod animal et homo secundum quod huiusmodi sunt intentiones, et similiter universale, genus et species, cum nullum istorum sit in re. Sed manifestum est quod ratio hominis inquantum huiusmodi non includit respectum rei intellecte ad intellectum; similiter nec ratio animalis; alioquin esset predicatio respectiva ‘Sortes est homo’, nec posset concipi ratio hominis nisi respective ad intellectum; quod falsum est. Ergo homo et animal non sunt prime intentiones per huiusmodi respectum, cum, eo excluso, adhuc remaneant prime intentiones. Nec genus aut species sunt secunde intentiones per illam habitudinem, cum in seipsis sint quedam intentiones formaliter, etiam habitudine illa exclusa. Preterea. Secunde substantie que sunt homo et animal et similia, inquantum huiusmodi sunt prime intentiones, quoniam inquantum huiusmodi non sunt res extra existentes nec significant hoc aliquid, sed quale quid secundum Philosophum32 in Predicamentis. Sed manifestum est quod secunde substantie inquantum huiusmodi non includunt respectum ad intellectum; alioquin non essent in predicamento Substantie, cum essent intrinsece relativa. Ergo, dempto illo respectu, adhuc remanent prime intentiones. Et per consequens non sunt prime intentiones per illum respectum, sed potius in seipsis. Preterea. Illud quo totaliter presciso et remoto aliquid remanet vere intentio, non est intentionalitas in abstracto qua formaliter fit intentio —quidquid est concretive intentio—; alioquin remaneret effectus formalis sine causa formali, unde illud non est formaliter albedo quo

1 tertius defectus quod habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum sit tantummodo intentio formaliter et in abstracto add. Bm 5 illi] B om. ed. 10 manifestum] B necessarium ed. 15 non sunt] ed. sunt B 25 cum] B quasi ed. 29 qua] B que ed. | fit] coni coll. linea 9 infra. sit B Perler 30 quidquid … intentio] B om. ed. 32

Aristotle, Categ. 5, 3b13–16.

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dempto aliquid remanet album. Sed Avicenna dicit33 quinto Metaphisice, capitulo primo, quod quidditas abstrahit ab esse unum et multa et ab esse in intellectu et extra; unde equinitas non est nisi equinitas tantum, a qua prescinditur, sicut patet, habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum. Et tamen constat quod ut sic est intentio nec habet esse reale, ymo tantum intentionale inquantum huiusmodi. Et per consequens, exclusa habitudine rei intellecte, remanet equinitas intentio. Ergo non est verum quod talis habitudo sit intentionalitas in abstracto per quam formaliter fiat intentio,—quidquid est intentio concretive. Preterea. Diffinitio exprimit unam rem ut intentionaliter et conceptualiter plures. Sed non exprimit habitudinem rei intellecte ad intellectum. Ergo res est plures intentionaliter, circumscripta habitudine rei intellecte ad intellectum. Preterea. Prius est rem concipi quam rem conceptam ad intellectum referri, nam ipsam ad intellectum referri presupponit ipsam passive fuisse conceptam—est autem passive concepta per primum actum intellectionis, qui directus est; refertur autem per actum secundum, qui reflexivus est; oportet enim super rem conceptam reflecti intellectum, si debeat ipsam referre ad actum primum—. Sed manifestum est quod res capit esse intentionale per concipi passive, ymo non est aliud intentio quam rei obiectiva conceptio, ut supra dictum est. Ergo intentio non est formaliter intentio per habitudinem rei intellecte ad actum. Preterea. Nullum fundamentum relationis capit quod fit per relationem, ymo magis econverso relatio oritur ex fundamento. Sed manifestum est quod res sub esse intentionali et quatenus est intentio, est fundamentum | habitudinis sepedicte; non enim est fundamentum eius res secundum esse reale quod habet extra, nam homo qui concipitur, secundum illud esse quo concipitur, non habet esse in rerum natura, nec illud esse in quo concipitur est aliquid absolutum factum ab intellectu circa rem; alioquin conciperetur aliquid aliud a re. Et ideo relinquitur quod illud esse non sit aliud quam passive concipi et esse conceptum. Passive autem concipi sive conceptio obiectiva est intentio vel 2 capitulo primo] B om. ed. 4–5 et tamen] B etenim ed. 10 ut] B ut rem ed. 15 ipsam] suppl. om. B ed. 16 est] B cum ed. 18 reflexivus] ed. reflexus B 20–21 ymo … intentio] B intentio vero non est aliud ed. 23 fit] ed. sit B Perler 26 non] B nec ed. | fundamentum eius] B eiusmodi ed. 30 circa] B secundum ed. | aliquid aliud] coni. aliud B ed. Perler 31 sit] B est ed. 31–32 et esse … concipi] B om. ed. 33

Avicenna, Philosophia prima V, 1, ll. 228–229.

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res posita in esse intentionali. Et per consequens intentio fundat respectum seu habitudinem sepedictam. Ergo impossibile est quod res formaliter sit intentio per habitudinem illam. Unde actus primus quo formaliter homo concipitur, terminatur ad 85 5 rationem hominis, de qua supra probatum est quod est intentio seu ratio claudens realitatem sub esse concepto. Constat autem quod super hominem qui terminat actum primum, fundatur relatio quam intellectus format, reflectendo se super intentionem hominis in ordine ad actum primum. Et ita manifestum est quod intentio hominis est funda10 mentum illius relationis. Et per consequens est prior illa nec formaliter est per illam. De quarto defectu

Quarto autem est impossibilis quoad multa que ponit consequi ex pre- 86 dictis, videlicet quod huiusmodi habitudo, que est prima intentio in 15 abstracto, fiat secunda intentio in concreto per hoc quod fundat aliam habitudinem; et in multis aliis que supra posita sunt quoad modum fundandi unam intentionem super aliam. Existente enim ruinoso fundamento, necesse est quod sint alia ruinosa que fundantur in illo, quia parvus error in principio maximus est in fine secundum Philosophum.34 20 Probatum est autem quod impossibile est fundamentum, videlicet quod habitudo rei intellecte ad actum intellectus sit intentionalitas in abstracto. De quinto defectu

Quinto tamen in speciali est impossibilis in hoc quod ait secundas 87 25 intentiones non esse in predicamento; nec forte prime intentiones poni possunt, cum dicant ens per accidens constitutum ex habitudine sepedicta et ex intelligibilibus primi ordinis, qualia sunt homo et animal et similia. 12 quartus defectus omnium conclusionum que sequuntur ex isto fundamento add. Bm ed. 13 quaro] B quartus ed. 14 que] B om. ed. 18 alia] B aliqua ed. 19 est] B fit ed. 23 quintus defectus cum ponit secundas intentiones non esse in predicamento. Et ostenditur quod omnis dictio significans [significativa B; significat ed.] aliquem conceptum positivum reducitur ad aliquod predicamentum add. Bm ed. 25 prime] Bc om. B Perler 34

Aristotle, De caelo I 9, 271b8–9.

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Et de primis quidem intentionibus, quod non sint in predicamento, statim apparet falsum, cum omne predicamentum dividatur in rem primam et secundam, utputa substantia in primam et secundam, et qualitas in primam qualitatem (que sunt individua) et secundam (que sunt universales qualitates). Manifestum est autem quod secunde substantie inquantum huiusmodi non sunt res extra nec aliquod esse habent nisi intentionale. Ergo prime intentiones vere sunt in predicamentis. Preterea. Predicamentum non est aliud quam ordinatio predicabilium secundum sub et supra. Sed constat quod res predicabiles sunt prime intentiones; non enim predicantur res prout existunt extra in esse reali. Ergo intentiones prime vere sunt in predicamento. 89 De secundis autem intentionibus etiam satis patet, quoniam Philosophus in Predicamentis dividit35 omne dicibile incomplexum—quod non est aliud quam vox significans simplicem conceptum—in decem prediB262rb camenta; ex quo patet quod | quidquid est dicibile et incomplexum, reducitur ad aliquod predicamentum. Sed manifestum est quod secunde intentiones sunt quedam dicibilia incomplexa; predicatur enim ‘sillogismus’ de dyaletico et demonstrativo et ‘enuntiatio’ de cathegorica et ypothetica et de modali et de inesse. Ergo secunde intentiones sunt in aliquo predicamento. Alioquin falsum est verbum Philosophi, qui dicit36 singulum eorum que secundum incomplexionem dicuntur, significare aut substantiam aut quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid, et sic de decem predicamentis. 90 Preterea. Omne universale et vere predicabile est in aliquo predicamento. Sed secunde intentiones vere sunt universales; ad interrogationem namque factam per ‘quid est genus?’ respondetur quod universale, et ‘quid est species?’ quod universale, et ‘quid proprium vel differentia?’ quod universale; ex quo patet quod universale est genus ad quinque predicabilia. Similiter etiam patet quod ‘genus’ est universale quia predicatur in quid de generalissimo et subalterno, et ‘sillogismus’ de dyaletico et demonstrativo; ex quo patet quod secunde intentiones sunt 1 sint] B sunt ed. 3 utputa … secundam] B om. ed. 9 sub et] Perler sensum ut B | predicabiles] B predicamentales ed. 11 vere] Bc ed. om. B 13 omne] B esse ed. 15 incomplexum] B complexum ed. 18 et] ed. om B 22 ad aliquid] B aliquid aliud ed. 24 omne] B esse ed. 25 secunde] B verae ed. | vere] B verae ed. 27 est] B om. ed. | quod] B quid ed. 29 predicabilia] ed. om. B | est … quia] coni. om. ed. | quia] B om. Perler 30 subalterno] B subalteratio (!) ed. 31 ex quo] ed. ex quibus B 35 36

Aristotle, Categ. 4, 1b25–2a10. Ibid. 4, 1b25–27.

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quedam universalia habentia genus et differentias, unde potest coordinatio quedam in ipsis fieri secundum sub et supra. Ergo necesse est quod sint in aliquo decem predicamentorum. Alioquin coordinatio intentionum constitueret undecimum predicamentum, quia quot sunt coordinationes predicabilium adinvicem inpermixte, tot sunt predicamenta. Preterea. Secundum Boetium et Simplicium37 super Predicamenta di- 91 stinctio predicamentorum est distinctio vocum significativarum simplicium et incomplexarum. Et hoc satis innuit Aristotiles cum in predicamenta dividit38 dicibile incomplexum (quod nichil aliud est quam dictio incomplexa). Unde sicut gramaticus reducit omnes voces incomplexas in octo maneries secundum Donatum,39 vel septem secundum Priscianum,40—quas vocat partes orationis et facit hanc reductionem attendendo ad modos significandi—, sic logicus reducit omnes voces incomplexas ad decem maneries quas vocat decem predicamenta, attendendo non ad modos significandi sed ad conditiones significatorum, quia quedam voces significant hoc (ut ‘homo’ vel ‘animal’), quedam quantum (ut ‘bicubitum’ vel ‘tricubitum’), quedam ad aliquid (ut ‘pater’ et ‘filius’), et sic de aliis. Et hinc est quod Boetius super Predicamenta reprehendit41 illos qui putant quod Aristotiles in Predicamentis dividat entia vel res; non est enim hoc verum, ut Boetius dicit, sed dividit significativas voces; alioquin logicus non esset artifex sermocinalis sed realis; ex quibus patet quod omnis vox incomplexa expressiva alicuius positivi conceptus est in predicamento. Sed manifestum est quod hee voces ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc. significant conceptum positivum. Ergo vere sunt in predicamento aliquo. Et idem intelligendum est de ceteris dictionibus exprimentibus secundas intentiones. Preterea. Cui competit diffinitio, et diffinitum. Sed diffinitio relatio- 92 nis predicamentalis competit intentioni generis et speciei; sunt enim ad aliquid secundum Philosophum42 in Predicamentis ‘quibus hoc ipsum est 8–9 predicamenta] B predicamento ed. 11 maneries] B mansiones(!) ed. 13 ad] B non ad ed. | sic] B similiter ed. 14 ad … maneries] B om. ed. | quas] B que ed. 16 quia] B que ed. 20 dividat] B dividit ed. 24 hee voces] ed. hec vox B | etc.] ed. om. B 25 idem] B ita ed. 37 Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, 159C–161A ed. Migne. Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, p. 1218 38 Aristotle, Categ. 4, 1b25–27. 39 Donatus, De arte grammatica, pp. 18–19 ed. Keil. 40 Priscianus, Inst. gramm. II, pp. 18–21 ed. Keil. 41 Boethius, In Categ., 162B-C. 42 Aristotle, Categ. 7, 8a39-b1, translatio Boethii (Arist. Lat., p. 2227–28 ed. Minio-

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esse ad aliquid quodammodo se habere’; constat autem quod genus esse aut speciem esse est quodammodo ad aliquid se habere, unde illudmet ‘esse intentionale’ quod dicunt non est esse ad se, sed ad aliud. Ergo manifestum est quod sunt in predicamento Relationis formaliB262va ter et | quidditative. Alioquin oportebit aliud predicamentum relationis poni ut coordinentur huiusmodi relationes. 93 Est igitur considerandum quod istud dictum43 procedit ex falsa ymaginatione. Ymaginantur namque communiter loquentes quod distinctio predicamentorum sit distinctio verarum rerum, et quod nichil sit in predicamento nisi sit vera res; et innituntur quammaxime verbo Philosophi in VI Metaphisice, qui postquam divisit44 ens in entia in anima et entia que sunt extra, dicit45 quod dimittamus ens quod est in anima, et tunc assumit ens quod est extra et dividit46 illud in decem predicamenta. Hec autem ymaginatio non est vera. Tum quia ibidem dicit47 Philosophus de quibusdam predicamentis quod cogitatio dividit illa; quod exponens Commentator, commento VIII, dicit48 quod intendit predicamenta que habent comparationem; existimatur enim quod ista non essent nisi anima esset; per quod patet quod aliqua sunt predicamenta que habent esse per operationem anime. Tum quia Philosophus expresse dicit49 IIII Phisicorum quod tempus non esset nisi anima numerans esset; et Commentator, commento LXXXVIII, dicit50 quod tempus est de numero entium quorum actus completur per animam; et tamen Philosophus in Predicamentis ponit51 tempus speciem quantitatis.

1–2 constat … habere] Bc ed. om. B 2 aliquid] coll. textu Aristotelis aliud Bc ed. | unde] B ergo ed. 3 esse] B esset ed. 9 et] B om. ed. 10 quammaxime] B quasi maxime ed. 12 et] B et in ed. | dimittamus] B admittamus ed. 16 commento VIII] B om. ed. 19 operationem] B comparationem ed. 21 commento LXXXVIII] B om. ed. 23 tamen] B cum ed. | quantitatis] B quantis ed. Paluello): “relativis autem hoc est esse: ad aliquid quodammodo se habere”. 43 Sc. dictum Hervaei eiusque sequacium, qui putant secundas intentiones non esse in predicamento. 44 Aristotle, Metaph. VI 2, 1026a33-b1. 45 Ibid.VI 4, 1028a2–4. 46 Ibid. VII 1, 1028a10–13. 47 Ibid. VI 4, 1027b31–33: “aut enim quid est aut quale quid aut quantitatem aut si quid aliud copulat aut dividit mente” (ed. Vuillemin-Diem, Arist. Lat. XXV 2, p. 1226–7). 48 Averroes, In VI Arist. Metaph., Fol. 152rb–va. 49 Aristotle, Phys. IV 14, 223a21 sqq. 50 Averroes, In IV Arist. Phys., Foll. 173vb–174ra (ad Aristotle, Phys. IV 11, 21917 sqq.). 51 Aristotle, Categ. 6, 4b24.

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Tum quia Philosophus in Predicamentis ponit52 in prima specie qualitatis calorem et frigus, et similiter in tertia; quod non esset si species qualitatis realiter differrent. Tum quia ista ymaginatio procedit ex falso intellectu verbi Philosophi, qui vocat ens in anima—contra quod dividuntur decem predicamenta—ens quod significat verum et quod consistit in complexione, de quo tractat in VI Metaphisice, ubi dicit53 quod dimittamus loqui de ente quod consistit in cogitatione; est enim cogitatio compositio aut divisio; ubi dicit54 Commentator, commento VIII, quod enti existenti in cogitatione debetur compositio aut divisio absque eo quod sit extra animam ens; et subdit: ‘Dimittamus igitur perscrutari de ente quod est veridicans’, scilicet quod est in anima. Non est ergo intentio Philosophi aut Commentatoris ea que sunt 94 in anima per modum simplicium conceptorum, excludere a decem predicamentis, cum expresse dicat55 oppositum; sed est sua intentio de hiis que sunt in anima per modum compositionis aut divisionis; nullum enim complexorum est in predicamento. Vel possumus dicere quod metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia—qui considerat modos essendi rerum—quam logicus dividat dicibile incomplexum in decem predicamenta; omnem enim vocem dicibilem et predicabilem necesse est reduci ad aliquod predicamentum secundum logicum. Philosophus autem in VI Metaphisice non curat de predicamentis prout sunt coordinationes incomplexorum dicibilium, sed tractat de modis variis essendi rerum. Tenendum est itaque pro regula generali quod omnis vox incom- 95 plexa—quam Philosophus vocat ‘dicibile’—significans conceptum aliquem positivum est vere in predicamento, sive illi conceptui correspondeat res similis in existentia (cuiusmodi sunt ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’ et cetera nomina individuorum), sive huiusmodi conceptus sint res que sunt extra per intellectum posite in esse intentionali alio et alio (cuiusmodi sunt ‘animal’, ‘homo’, ‘albedo’ et ‘color’ et cetera | nomina sub- B262vb 5 ens] B per ens ed. 5–6 consistit in complexione] B consignificat in complexionem(!) ed. 6 ubi] ed. unde B 7 cogitatione] coni. cognitione B ed. | cogitatio] cognitio B ed. 9 cogitatione] cognitione B ed. | aut] B et ed. 12 intentio] B interio(!) ed. 15 aut] B et ed. 18 quam] B ed. quoniam perperam Perler | dicibile] B discibile sic saepius ed. 19 et] B om. ed. 27 res] B et res ed. 28 cetera] suppl. om. B ed. 30 albedo] ed. om. B 52 53 54 55

Ibid. 8, 8b36–39; 9a30–31. Aristotle, Metaph. VI 4, 1027b17 sqq. Averroes, In VI Arist. Metaph., Fol. 152rb–va. Sc. Commentator ad loc.

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stantiarum secundarum aut accidentium que possunt dici res secunde), sive conceptus ille sit totaliter formatus ab intellectu, sicut ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘sillogismus’ et sic de ceteris intentionibus secundis. Unde omnes dictiones significative vere sunt in aliquo predicamento, quia vel significant hoc aut quantum aut quale aut ad aliquid, et sic de aliis, sicut Aristotiles dicit.56 96 Et si dicatur quod secundum hoc dictiones significantes entia prohibita aut negationes et privationes erunt in predicamento (utputa ‘cecitas’ et ‘chymera’), dicendum de privationibus et negationibus quod cum non habeant precisos conceptus, sed cointellectus—concipiuntur enim simul cum habitibus et ut negationes eorum; non enim concipitur ‘nichil’ per se tamquam habens precisum conceptum, sed necessario concipitur ut non ens—de istis, inquam, dicendum est quod sunt in predicamento per reductionem; sicut Augustinus dicit57 de ‘ingenito’ V De Trinitate, capitulo VII, quod est dictio relativa pertinens ad predicamentum Relationis, sicut et ‘non-homo’ ad predicamentum Substantie. De dictionibus vero que significant entia prohibita (ut ‘tragelaphus’ vel ‘chymera’), dicendum est quod nullo modo sunt in predicamento, quia nullum conceptum significant; illud enim quod contradictionem implicat, inconceptibile est; entia vero prohibita contradictionem implicant, quia si conceptus aliquis non est sibi ipsi repugnans et contradictionem implicans, non est impossibilis nec prohibitus. Si etiam ulterius diceretur quod predicamenta secundum hoc non sunt decem genera entium sive rerum—cuius oppositum dicit58 Boetius in Predicamentis—, dicendum quod Boetius accipit ‘ens’ et ‘rem’ in suo toto ambitu prout claudit omne conceptibile, sive sit ens reale sive ens rationis.

1 secunde] B vere ed. 3 ceteris] suppl. om. B ed. 4 quia vel] B que ed. 10 cum … habeant] B non habent ed. 11 habitibus] B habentibus ed. | non] B si ed. 13 ut] suppl. om. B ed. 15 capitulo VII] B om. ed. | pertinens] B et pertinens ed. 19 quod] B om. ed. 20 inconceptibile … implicant] B om. ed. 22 impossibilis] B possibilis ed. 26 omne] B om. ed. | sit ens] ed. om. B 56 57 58

Aristotle, Categ. 4, 1b25–27. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V vi, cap. 7, pp. 21113–21249. Boethius, In Categ. Aristotelis, 162B–163C.

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De sexto defectu

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Sexto vero est impossibilis in hoc quod dicit entia prohibita et negationes esse primas intentiones. Non enim sunt aliquo modo intentiones, vel prime vel secunde. Quod enim non habet verbum,59 non habet intentionem, quia sive verbum sit intellectio sive sit res concepta aut passiva conceptio, consequens est ut omne rationem habens intentionis possit habere verbum. Sed nullum impossibile habet verbum, quia omne verbum est possibile, saltem apud Deum, sicut testatur60 angelus Luc. I. Ergo entia prohibita—que impossibilia sunt—non sunt intentiones. Preterea. Unumquodque sicut se habet ad concipi vel ad esse obiective conceptum, sic se habet ad esse intentionem, sicut patet ex predeterminatis. Sed manifestum est quod ens prohibitum, implicans contradictionem et repugnantiam in suis partibus, non potest habere conceptum obiectivum—quamvis enim partes conceptibiles sint, compositio tamen partium, cum implicent contradictionem et repugnantiam, mente dici non potest, sicut Philosophus dicit61 IV Metaphisice de ponentibus contradictoria simul esse; quia etsi voce dicerent, non tamen mente—. Ergo entia prohibita non sunt intentiones. Et confirmatur quia intentio dicitur illud in quod intellectus tendit; non tendit autem in compositionem partium contradictorie et formaliter repugnantium, unde nulla mens potest albedinem et nigredinem in uno conceptibili simplici entitative ligare, dicendo videlicet quod unum et idem sit albedo et nigredo. Preterea. De negationibus, quod intentiones prime non sint | satis patet. Quod enim non concipitur ut aliquid positivum in se—positione, inquam, non realitatis sed conceptibilitatis—, tale non est intentio. Negationes autem non occurrunt intellectui sicut conceptibilitas positiva sed sicut privatio alicuius conceptibilitatis positive, utputa hominis ad 1 sextus defectus cum dicit entia prohibita et negationes esse primas intentiones add. Bm 3 non] B si ed. 6 omne] B esse ed. 7 sed … verbum] B om. ed. | quia] ed. Perler igitur B 12 conceptum] B om. ed. 14 non] B om. ed. 16 tamen implicent] B cum pars implicet ed. 17–18 de ponentibus] B deponentibus(!) ed. 18 dicerent] B disserent ed. 20 illud in quod] B id in quo ed. 26 aliquid] aliquod B ed. | positione] B possibile ed. 27 realitatis] B recipientis ed. 29 alicuius] B actus ed. 59 60 61

Sc. accipiendo ‘verbum’ pro ‘conceptu obiectivo’; videas sect. 101 infra. Lucas I, 37. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. IV 5, 1009a15–22.

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vel leonis, cum dicitur ‘non-leo’ et ‘non-homo’, vel visus cum concipitur cecitas, vel realitatis cum concipitur nichilitas. Ergo negationes non sunt intentiones, sed privationes intentionum. Et hinc est quod negatio non est dictio cathegorematica sed sincathegorematica, ut dicunt sophiste. 100 Sed huic obviare videtur quod mons aureus videtur esse quoddam conceptibile, et similiter yrcocervus; potest enim fingi animal cuius medietas yrcus sit et medietas cervus; et iterum quod dicit62 Philosophus secundo Peryermenias quod chymera est opinabilis et per consequens conceptibilis. Et rursus quod ait63 in primo quod quidquid contingit intelligere, contingit significare, et quod significare est intellectum constituere. Cum enim voces imponuntur ad significandum entia prohibita et negationes, videtur quod sint quedam conceptibilia, et per consequens quod sint intentiones. Et adhuc manifestum est quod qui cognoscit aliquam propositionem, concipit terminos. In primo autem principio dicitur64 quod impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse; quare istum terminum65 ‘simul esse et non esse’ necesse est concipi mente; et ita contradictoria in eodem conceptibili connectuntur; et per consequens entia prohibita poterunt habere conceptum. 101 Hiis tamen non obstantibus, dicendum est sicut prius, unde nec entia prohibita nec negationes habent verbum (accipiendo ‘verbum’ pro ‘conceptu obiectivo’), et per consequens non sunt intentiones. Nec procedunt instantie. Prima siquidem non, quia mons aureus non est ens prohibitum; posset enim absque contradictione Deus componere talem montem. Similiter nec yrcocervus, consideratis membris corporeis; nulla enim repugnantia videtur esse inter figuram yrcini capitis et corporis cervi vel aliorum membrorum. Sed tota repugnantia est ex parte anime; impossibile est enim concipi unam animam constitutam ex animabus cervi et yrci. Nec etiam secunda procedit. Cui enim chi1 cum] B non ed. 2 realitatis] B realitas ed. | negationes] B negotiationes(!) ed. 8 iterum] B item ed. 10 rursus] B rursum ed. 11 contingit significare] B om. ed. 12 imponuntur] ed. imponantur B Perler 15 autem] B ac ed. 18 connectuntur] B convertuntur ed. 19 poterunt] B potuerunt ed. 27 cervi vel] B cervilis ed. 28 concipi] ed. om. B 29 cui] B est ed. Aristotle, De interpr. 11, 21a32–33. Ibid. 3, 16b19–21. 64 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. IV 3, 1005b19–22. 65 Unlike modern interpreters, Peter rightly takes the formula ‘simul esse et non esse’ (at Metaph. IV 4, 1006a29–30) as one single term (the Greek text reads the singular onoma); see de Rijk, (2002) II, 48 f. 62 63

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mera est opinabilis, illi non occurrit ut ens prohibitum et implicans contradictionem. Non valet etiam tertia, quoniam dictio potest imponi ad significandum negationem intelligibilem, sicut patet de dictione ista ‘inintelligibile’ et ‘inopinabile’; ergo dictiones significantes entia prohi5 bita significant quedam inintelligibilia et inopinabilia. Non valet deinde quarta, quia quamvis contradictoria concipi possint eodem actu intellectus, non tamen ligari possunt in eodem conceptibili obiective. Et hoc dicit primum principium quod impossibile est contradictoria simul esse, hocest habere idem esse, vel reale vel intentionale. 10

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De septimo defectu

Septimo autem impossibilis est in hoc quod dicit de gramatica quod non est de secundis intentionibus; illud enim quod consequitur rem ut conceptam, est vere secunda intentio, etiam secundum sic ponentes. Manifestum est autem quod modi intelligendi—per modum habitus et quietis, qui exprimitur per nomen, et per modum fieri distantis, qui exprimitur per verbum, et sic de aliis—consequuntur rem ut | intellecta est. Non enim cursus habet modum quietis et stantis in rerum natura, et tamen ut sic concipitur et per nomen significatur. Cum igitur gramatica sit de modis significandi, qui exprimunt modos intelligendi, necesse est dicere quod sit de secundis intentionibus. Et si dicatur quod gramatica non tractat de modis significandi aut intelligendi prout sunt intentiones sed prout tenent se ex parte vocum, non valet, quia nec etiam logica determinat de genere et specie nisi prout sunt quedam dicibilia incomplexa, nec de conceptu diffinitivo nisi prout exprimitur per diffinitionem, que est oratio, nec de conceptu discursivo nisi inquantum exprimitur per sillogisticam orationem, sicut patet in tota logica. Preterea. Congruitas et incongruitas sunt secunde intentiones; res enim extra non sunt congrue nec incongrue. Sed manifestum est quod gramatica agit de istis. Ergo tractat de aliquibus intentionibus secundis. Preterea. Illud pertinet ad secundas intentiones quod est de ordine 1 est] B om. ed. | occurrit] B occurritur ed. 3 intelligibilem] B intelligibiliter ed. 4 inintelligibile] B intelligibile ed. 5 inintelligibilia] B intelligibilia ed. 6 eodem] B ed. modo eodem add. ed. 7 ligari] B ligare ed. | conceptibili] B conceptibile ed. 8 quod] B quia ed. 10 septimus defectus cum ait quod gramatica non est de secundis intentionibus add. Bm 13 conceptam] B conceptiva ed. | vere] B vera ed. 15 exprimitur] B ed. per verbum et sic de aliis add. necnon del. B 16 consequuntur] B consequitur ed. 21 aut] B ac ed. 23 logica] B logicus ed. 24 diffinitivo] ed. diffinitionis B

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intelligibilium secundorum. Sed manifestum est quod significare et significari sunt huiusmodi—significare namque non competit sono inquantum res est, sed prout conceptus est; oportet enim ipsum preconcipi antequam intelligatur in eo relatio significationis fundari; similiter et res non significatur nisi prout concipitur, sicut etiam nec predicatur.—. Ergo significationes et consignificationes vocum active et rerum intellectarum passive, de quibus est gramatica, eque spectant ad secundas intentiones sicut predicationes et enuntiationes, de quibus est logica. 105 Nec valet illud quod inducit ista opinio, videlicet quod ea que gramaticus considerat, sunt ad placitum instituta et non necessario. Non valet, inquam, tum quia congruitas et incongruitas sunt necessaria nec ad placitum, ymo sequuntur naturam rei, quia modos significandi, qui sequuntur modos intelligendi, de quibus constat quod sunt immobiles et idem apud omnes; tum quia ‘ad placitum’ et ‘necessarium’ non tollunt rationem secunde intentionis. Sicut enim rerum quedam sunt necessarie et quedam contingentes et quedam voluntarie—quia artificiatum et voluntarium est idem, ut Philosophus dicit66 in VI Metaphisice, et operationes humane voluntarie sunt et elective—, sic intentionum secundarum quedam sunt necessarie et quedam voluntarie institute. Nec per hoc tollitur formaliter ratio secundarum intentionum, dumtamen rei non competant prout habet esse extra, sed inquantum est intellecta.

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De octavo defectu 106 Octavo quoque impossibilis est in hoc quod ait rethoricam non esse de

secundis intentionibus; manifestum est enim quod rethorica docet ora- 25 tionem sibi propriam componere dividendo eam in prologum, narrationem et conclusionem, et iterum locos rethoricos invenire et entimemata

5 et] B etiam ed. | sicut etiam] B om. ed. 7 eque] ed. om. B 9 illud] ed. id B Perler 12 quia] B sequuntur perperam add. Perler | modos] B modum ed. 12–13 qui … modos] B sequitur modus ed. 18 voluntarie … et] B sunt ed. 20 nec] B et ed. 21 rei] B om. ed. | habet] recte Perler habent B ed. 27 iterum] B item ed. | invenire] B om. ed. 66 Aristotle, Metaph. VI 1, 1025b24: “idem enim factum et prevoluntarium” (transl. anonyma); “idem enim agibile et eligibile” (transl. Moerbekiana). For the doctrinal position, cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicom. III 5, 1113b3–5 iuxta III 2, 1111b7 sqq. For the word ‘artificiatum’, cf. Thomas Aquinas, In VI Metaph., nr. 1153: “(…) principium scientiarum factivarum est in faciente, non in facto, quod est artificiatum”.

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communia et propria formare, et per metaphoras et fabulas arguere et per exempla, ut patet67 secundo et tertio Rethorice, sicut et dyaleticus docet sillogismum tamquam orationem dyaleticam ex propriis propositionibus constituere et locos dyaleticos invenire; non autem sunt idem loci dyaletici et rethorici, ut patet68 per Boetium in tertio Topicorum et per doctrinam | Philosophi in secundo Rethorice. Sed manifestum est B263va quod oratio rethorica et eius partes eque sunt intentiones secunde ut dyaleticus sillogismus, et loci rethorici sicut et loci dyaletici. Ergo rethorica est eque de secundis intentionibus sicut et dyaletica. Preterea. Sicut dyaleticus docet quatuor problemata terminare con- 107 siderando quatuor habitudines et modos generales omnium problematum et universalium questionum, sic rethor docet tres causas ex probabilibus terminare considerando tres modos generales omnium thematum et particularium questionum, ut patet69 ex primo Rethorice Aristotilis et ex dictis Tullii et Boetii. Sed manifestum est quod propter illud dicitur dyaletica esse de intentionibus secundis. Ergo et rethorica propter istud erit. Nec valet si dicatur quod ille tres cause sunt illa tria negotia moralia, utputa iudiciale, deliberativum et exclamativum; non valet, inquam, quia similiter et tertius Topicorum est de materia morali, cum tractetur70 ibi de eligendis; nichilominus quia ex communibus et universalibus, utputa per locum a genere, et coniugatis et casibus et similibus, proceditur ad materiam illam, remanet dyaleticus in illa parte artifex intentionalis et non realis. Consimiliter ergo rethorica intentionalis censenda est, quia terminat illas causas per vias similes, ut patet ex modo procedendi Philosophi in Rethorica sua, et ex modo Tullii et Boetii.

1 et propria] B om. ed. | et] B om. ed. 4 autem] coni. enim B ed. Perler 7 ut] B om. ed. 8 loci] B om. ed. 12 et] B particularium questionum add. necnon del. B | rethor] B rethorica ed. 16 esse] suppl. om. B ed. | rethorica] dicitur add. B 17 illa] ed. om. B 18 exclamativum] B exclarativum(!) ed. Perler 23 et non … intentionalis] B om. ed. 23–24 censenda] ed. sencenda(!) B scientia perperam Perler Aristotle, Rhet. II 20, 1393a23–1394a18; III 14, 1414b19–19, 1420b3. Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis comm. III, col. 1083B-C; Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 1397a6– 1400b33. 69 Aristotle, Rhet. I 3, 1358b5–9; Cicero, De inventione I, 5–6 ed. Stroebel; Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis comm. I, col. 1084D. 70 Aristotle, Topica III, capp. 1–6. 67 68

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108 Nono vero impossibilis est in eo quod dicit rethoricam se habere ad

librum Topicorum sicut se habent scientie speciales ad artem demonstrativam traditam in libro Posteriorum. Quandocumque enim alique due scientie sunt de eque communibus et sunt similes in sua generalitate, una non est specialis respectu alterius nec sic se habens ad eam sicut ad artem demonstrativam habent se scientie speciales. Sed Philosophus dicit71 primo Rethorice quod rethorica assecutiva est dyaletice; ambe enim de talibus quibusdam sunt que communiter quodammodo omnium est cognoscere et nullius scientie determinate; propter quod et omnes homines quodammodo participant ambabus; omnes enim homines conantur usque ad aliquid sermone exquirere et sustinere, defendere et accusare. Ergo manifestum est quod rethorica non subicitur dyaletice eo modo quo scientie speciales arti demonstrative. 109 Preterea. Si rethorica se haberet ad librum Topicorum sicut speciales scientie ad librum Posteriorum, hoc non esset nisi quia liber Topicorum traderet artem entimematum et rethoricarum persuasionum et modum formationis orationis rethorice, sicut opinio ista fingit. Sed manifestum est quod totum oppositum huius est, sicut patet rethoricam intuenti. Ergo idem quod prius. 110 Preterea. Illa facultas que est pars logice contra dyaleticam condivisa, est de secundis intentionibus, nec se habet ad dyaleticam sicut speciales scientie ad artem demonstrativam. Sed Philosophus dicit72 in primo Rethorice quod rethorica tractat de entimemate—‘entimema autem est sillogismus quidam; de omni autem sillogismo pertinet ad B263vb dyaleticam videre’; | et intelligit per ‘dyaleticam’ logicam totam, quia statim subdit73 quod de omni sillogismo videre est logice totius aut partis alicuius; et per consequens patet quod rethorica est pars logice in 1 nonus defectus cum ait rethoricam se habere ad librum topicorum sicut se habent scientie speciales ad artem demonstrativam traditam in libro posteriorum add. Bm 6 non] B om. ed. 8 primo rethorice] B om. ed. 10 determinate] ed. determinare B Perler 11–12 quodammodo … homines] B om. ed. 12 sermone] coni. sermonem B ed. Perler 13 accusare] B acceptare ed. 14 scientie] Bc om. B Perler 15–16 sicut … topicorum] B om. ed. 17 traderet] B cederet ed. | entimematum] B enti metaphysicum(!) ed. | rethoricarum] B rethoricam ed. 20 idem] illud B ed. 21 facultas] B om. ed. 28 alicuius] B om. ed. | in] B et in ed. 71 72 73

Aristotle, Rhet. I 1, 1354a1. Ibid., 1355a6–7; 8–9. Ibid., 1355a8–10.

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communi, divisa contra dyaleticam, unde sicut sillogismus tractatur in communi in libro Priorum et determinatur ad materiam probabilem in libro Topicorum, sic in secundo Priorum agitur de enthimemate et exemplo in generali et determinatur ad materiam particularem et proba5 bilem in arte rethorica. Et differunt dyaletica et rethorica sub logica, quia dyaletica nititur ex probabilibus terminare questiones universales, ut ‘Utrum mundus sit eternus vel non’, rethorica vero questiones particulares, ut ‘Utrum sit contra Carthaginienses pugnandum vel non’ vel ‘Utrum Medea sit punienda vel non’.—Ergo manifestum est quod 10 rethorica est de secundis intentionibus, sicut et dyaletica, nec aliquo modo est sibi subiecta. Preterea. Si rethorica esset subiecta dyaletice, considerare de ora- 111 tione deprecativa et optativa ac similibus pertineret ad dyaleticam, cum sint orationes rethorice. Sed Philosophus dicit74 primo Peryermenias quod 15 orationes huiusmodi relinquantur; rethorice enim vel poetice considerationis sunt, enuntiativa vero est presentis speculationis. Igitur idem quod prius. De decimo defectu

Ultimo autem est impossibilis, in eo quod ait logicam esse de secun- 112 dis intentionibus tamquam de subiecto adequato. Hoc enim stare non potest propter tria. Primo quidem quia probatum est quod gramatica est etiam de secundis intentionibus. Secundo vero quia Philosophus dicit75 quarto Metaphisice quod considerare de genere, specie et similibus ad metaphisicum pertinet. Tertio quoque quia supra probatum est 25 (dum ageretur76 de subiecto theologie) quod vox ut expressiva conceptus, est subiectum in logica, cum sit sermocinalis scientia, vox vero ut expressiva modorum intelligendi predictorum conceptuum, quod utique fit per modos significandi, est subiectum gramatice. Est ergo sciendum quod conceptus et modi concipiendi dupliciter 113

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2 probabilem] B ed. aliquid add. ed. 3 sic] B sicut ed. 7 vero] B om. ed. vel … non] B om. ed. 11 subiecta] B substituta ed. 16 idem] id B illud 18 decimus defectus cum dicit logicam esse de secundis intentionibus tamquam subiecto adequato add. Bm 19 autem] ed. om. B | in eo quod] ed. cum B metaphisicum] B metaphisicam ed. 74 75 76

Aristotle, De interpr. 4, 17a3–7. Aristotle, Metaph. IV 2, 1005a13–18. Prooemium, q. 5, p. 285 sqq. ed. Buytaert.

9 ed. de 24

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possunt considerari. Uno modo in se ut sunt quedam entia rationis et una differentia entis; et sic spectat ad metaphisicum determinare de ipsis. Alio modo prout sermones nostros habent regulare; modi quidem concipiendi quantum ad congruitatem vel incongruitatem, quoniam illos modos sequuntur modi significandi; conceptus vero quantum ad veritatem et falsitatem; et sic spectat ad gramaticum determinare de modis intelligendi et ad logicum de conceptibus primis et secundis. 114 Et hinc est quod in Predicamentis determinatur de decem conceptibus generalibus comprehendentibus omnes primas intentiones, non quidem inquantum prime intentiones sunt, sed inquantum significata sunt omnium dicibilium incomplexorum. Similiter in libro Peryermenias determinatur de conceptibus compositis et divisis, non quidem prout entia quedam sunt rationis, sed inquantum per enuntiationem dyaleticam exprimuntur affirmativam vel negativam; in libro vero Priorum de conceptibus discursivis prout per orationem sillogisticam exprimuntur. Quia vero dyaleticus componit probabilem sillogismum aliquando ex genere, aliquando ex specie, aliquando ex proprio, aliquando ex communiter accidentibus, et sic de aliis, idcirco habet considerare de genere B264ra et ceteris universalibus. Et similiter logicus | in communi, qui habet considerare de consequentiis prout exprimuntur per orationem sillogisticam, entimematicam et inductivam, considerationem suam ponit circa genus, speciem et cetera universalia, ut possit inde trahere regulas consequentiarum secundum quas sillogismorum utilis ac inutilis coniugatio habet videri. Principalis ergo consideratio logici est de voce expressiva conceptuum et de oratione indagativa veri vel falsi, quamvis de aliis intentionibus tractet propter orationem. 115 Est quoque ulterius attendendum quod logica in communi, que est de oratione indagativa veri, dividitur in quatuor partes inquantum quedam oratio sententiat de vero ex necessariis, quedam autem ex probabilibus in universali, quedam autem ex probabilibus et in particulari, quedam vero ex delectabilibus et figmentis, non curans de vero nisi quatenus delectabile est. Et de prima quidem oratione est ars demonstrativa, de secunda dyaletica, de tertia rethorica et de quarta poetica.

3 quidem] B quidam ed. 5 vero] B nec ed. 6 gramaticum] B gramaticam ed. 7 logicum] B logicam ed. 10 sunt] ed. om. B 14 affirmativa vel negativa] ed. affirmativam vel negativam perperam B 19 qui] B om. ed. 21 inductivam] B meditativam(!) ed. 22 trahere] B tractare ed. 23 ac] B aut ed. 24 principalis] B principaliter ed. | est] B om. ed. 25 de oratione] B omnino ed. 26 orationem] B rationem ed. 30 probabilibus] B ed. et add. B 32 est] B om. ed.

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Poeta enim intendit orationem ut delectabile, sive ex veris sive ex figmentis procedat, quia multa mentiuntur fingentes poete, ut Philosophus dicit77 primo Metaphisice. Rethorica vero agit de oratione persuasiva nec intendit delectare principaliter sed ex consequenti, ut possit iudici persuadere, ut Philosophus docet78 primo et tertio Rethorice. Quia vero poetica et rethorica cadunt ab oratione simpliciter quam considerat logicus in communi, tum quia inquirunt circa particularia, tum quia non procedunt sillogistice sed tantum entimematice et exemplariter, dyaleticus autem circa universales questiones negotiatur et utitur sillogismo et entimemate et omni modo arguendi, similiter et demonstrator,— idcirco due partes logice simpliciter assignantur, videlicet demonstrativa et dyaletica, iuxta illud Boetii in primo Topicorum suorum, qui ait79 quod omnis ratio disserendi, hocest omne logicum negotium, in duobus consistit, videlicet in iudicio quoad demonstrativam et in inventione quoad dyaleticam, nam temptativa et sophistica ad dyaleticam reducuntur— sophistica quidem tamquam illa que est de vitio contingente circa dyaleticum sillogismum, temptativa vero tamquam illa que utitur dyaletico sillogismo. Alie vero due non sunt proprie partes logice, sed quodammodo secundum quid et assecutive, rethorica scilicet et poetica. Omnes tamen sunt de oratione, et ita de secundis intentionibus, sicut patet. De secunda propositione generali in hac materia colligenda Ex predictis itaque potest colligi secunda propositio generalis affirma- 116 tiva in materia intentionum, multas conclusiones comprehendens, videlicet quod

25

Intentio est rei passiva conceptio cui miscetur indistinguibiliter res concepta.

Sunt enim res concepta et sua passiva conceptio idem per omnimodam indistinctionem, ita ut homo et animal inquantum huiusmodi sint prime intentiones, et genus ac species et universale secunde, quia non 1 enim] B om. ed. | ut delectabile] B delectabilem ed. | veris] B verbis ed. 3 dicit] B dicitur ed. 10 et] B om. ed. 14 quoad] B quantum ad ed. 15 nam … dyaleticam] B om. ed. 16 est] B om. ed. | circa] B ad ed. 22 propositio generalis] B generalis regula ed. 28 sint] B sunt ed. Aristotle, Metaph. I 2, 983a3–4. Aristotle, Rhet. I 1, 1355a4–5; III 1, 1403b5–6. 79 Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis comm. I, col. 1045C 9–11; De topicis differentiis I, col. 1173 B 3–5. 77 78

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potest abstrahi passiva conceptio ab eis, ita ut ipsa sit intentio in abstracto. Que quidem conceptio non est relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum, ymo ipsam precedit sicut fundamentum relationem.80 Recollectio omnium que de intentionibus sunt tenenda 117 Secundum hoc igitur patet quod intentiones non sunt ipsi actus intelli- 5

B264rb

gendi—ut fingit opinio prima, et tertia—nec etiam obiectum cognitum ut fundat relationem ad actum intelligendi, sic quod huiusmodi relatio sit intentionalitas in abstracto—ut posuit opinio secunda—, sed est | ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum formatus, claudens indistinguibiliter conceptionem passivam et rem que concipitur per ipsam. 10 Et idem est dictu ‘intentio’ quod ‘conceptus’, et ‘intentio prima’ idem

1 abstrahi] B abstrahere ed. 4 recollectio … tenenda] add. Bm 5 non] Bc ed. om. B 7 sic] B sicut ed. 10 ipsam] B ed. ipsum Perler 11 dictu] B dicta ed. dictum Perler 80 In his Commentarium breve super I Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, art. 1, Peter underscores his important second general thesis about intention more extensively: “Hiis visis pono istam conclusionem quod res concepta est formaliter et quidditative intentio. Nam intentio integratur ex re et suo concipi passive, quod quidem concipi est res a re concepta penitus indivisa”. Some few paragraphs further on, Peter opposes his view to that of Hervaeus Natalis and others, ibid.: “(…) illi qui sunt alterius opinionis, dimittunt in assignando rationem intentionis illud quod est formale in intentione, et tendunt ad illud quod est posterius et sequitur ipsam intentionem. Considerandum enim est quod cum intellectus terminatur ad hominem vel animal—quod ipsi dicunt esse medium inter rem et rem conceptam et super illud fundari intentionem—, tale, inquam, esse hominis vel animalis ut terminat conceptum, non est res pura, quoniam tunc animal et rationale essent res distincte (cum sint distincta inquantum terminant intellectionem), sed sunt res cum suo concipi. Intellectus enim attingit rem cum suo concipi. (…). Et res cum suo concipi dicitur intentio, sive illi concipi sit adiuncta realitas que apta nata sit esse extra animam, sive sit ibi purum concipi, sicut est cum intelligo dextrum in columpna. Et prima intentio est res cum concipi passive primario, non innixo alteri concipi, et hoc sive tali concipi annectatur res extra, sive sit ibi mere concipi. Unde cum concipio dextrum in columpna, habeo intentionem primam; ibi tamen preter concipi non est res que sit apta nata esse extra. Secunda autem intentio est res cum concipi secundario innixo alteri concipi, sicut sunt predicabilitas, universalitas, genus, species, et huiusmodi. Ut sic prima intentio et secunda non sunt aliud nisi alius et alius ordo conceptuum obiectivorum, quorum unus ordo innititur alteri, alter vero non. Pono igitur istam conclusionem quod intentionalitas non est respectus qui fundatur super rem conceptam, ad intellectum, sed est ipsum concipi, indistinctum a re que illo concipi formaliter dicitur esse concepta”.—I have made use of the preliminary redaction (including alternative readings) of this text compiled by the team who is preparing a critical edition of the Commentarium breve, which Dr. Russell Friedman was kind enough to put at my disposal. The (suggested) text establishment is mine. For another quotation see section 9.3.6., p. 355 f. above.

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quod ‘conceptus primi ordinis’ quos intellectus format circa res, non reflectendo se super suos conceptus. Intentiones vero secunde sunt conceptus secundi ordinis; quos intellectus fabricat reflectendo et redeundo super primos conceptus, ut sunt ‘universalitas’, ‘predicabilitas’ et huiu5 smodi quantum ad actum simplicem, et ‘actualis affirmatio vel negatio unius de altero’ quantum ad actum componentem et dividentem, et ‘connexio extremorum in medio’ quantum ad actum tertium discursivum. Sunt autem omnes intentiones huiusmodi in predicamento Relationis. Sicut patet, quia universalitas est relatio universalis ad particu10 lare, et similiter particularitas relatio particularis ad universale; affirmatio et negatio sunt quedam relationes, connexio etiam extremorum in medio et illatio maioris extremitatis de minori virtute medii est habitudo quedam. Considerat quoque logica de istis, non ut sunt quedam entia rationis—quia de ente reali et rationis determinare spectat ad 15 metaphisicum—, sed prout reducuntur ad orationem enuntiativam vel sillogisticam vel dicibile incomplexum, de quibus agit logicus tamquam de proprio subiecto. Et in hoc secundus articulus terminetur.

articulus iii 20

an persona sit nomen secunde intentionis Opinio Henrici in Summa

Circa tertium autem considerandum quod aliqui dicere voluerunt quod 118 ‘persona’ nomen sit secunde intentionis, sicut ‘individuum’ et ‘suppositum’. Est enim considerare in individuo illud quod est individuum, 25 utputa Sortem et Platonem, et istud est prima intentio; vel inquantum est individuum, et sic est intentio secunda; individuum enim dicitur relative ad speciem, et per consequens est intentio secunda, sicut et species. Consimiliter in proposito: persona id quod est, scilicet Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non sunt secunda intentio, ymo ut sic vere 30 sunt res quibus debetur adoratio et realis productio. Vel potest conside2 sunt] B om. ed. 3 reflectendo et redeundo] Bc ed. redeundo B 5–6 simplicem … actum] B om. ed. 7 tertium] B medium ed. 8 omnes] B ed. iste add. ed. 9 quia] ed. quod B 10 particularis] suppl. Perler om. B ed. 13 quoque] B ergo ed. 15 reducuntur] B reducitur ed. 16 dicibile] B dicibilem ed. 18 hoc] B hiis ed. 21 Articulus … summa add. Bm opinio henrici in quolibeto 5 et 6 add. ed. 26–27 dicitur relative] B dicit relatioem ed.

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rari inquantum persona, et sic est intentio secunda fundata super ipsas res. Hec autem opinio fundari potest octo rationibus, superius [9–16], arguendo primo loco, inductis. Opinio Scoti in Scripto 119 Dixerunt autem alii quod ‘persona’ nullo modo est nomen intentionis 5

secunde, cum non significet relationem rationis nec extremum actus intellectus conferentis unum obiectum ad alterum, sed duplicem negationem importatam per incommunicabilitatem que vere est in divinis, circumscripta omni operatione intellectus. Et pro hac opinione sunt octo rationes superius [17–24] inducte, ad oppositum arguendo. 10 Opinio Guarronis 120 Dixerunt vero alii81 quod nomina sunt sub triplici differentia. Quedam

B264va

enim significant ipsas res, ad quarum esse anima nichil facit, sicut dicit82 Commentator de tempore quarto Phisicorum; cuiusmodi sunt ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’ et cetera nomina singularium. Quedam vero significant pure 15 ipsam intentionem, ut ‘genus’ et ‘species’ et ‘universale’, quorum esse anima facit; et talia nomina sunt secunde intentiones. Quedam autem significant aliqua que se habent medio modo, sicut ‘animal’ et ‘homo’, nam licet significent ipsam rem que est extra, nichilominus eam significant per modum communis et abstracti, | quod non potest fieri nisi 20 per actum intellectus. Secundum hoc ergo ‘persona’ et ‘individuum’ significant puram secundam intentionem. Et hec opinio fundari potest rationibus quibus prima.

2 res] B om. ed. | fundari] B fulciri ed. 4 opinio … scripto] add. Bm opinio scoti in libro sent. dist. 23 quest. unica add. ed. 7 obiectum] B conceptum ed. | sed] B secundum ed. 8 incommunibilitatem] ed. communibilitatem B 11 opinio guarronis] opinio garr. opinio garrrrrrrrrro (!) add. Bm opinio quorundam aliorum add. ed. 15 cetera] suppl. coll. Sect. 123 infra om. B ed. 18–20 aliqua … significant] B om. ed. 18 et] B om. ed. 22 fundari] B fulciri ed. 81 82

Sc. Willam of Ware. See our Appendix A, cap. 10. Averroes, In IV Arist. Phys, Foll. 173vb–174ra. (ad Aristotle, Phys. IV 11, 219b17 sqq.).

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Quid dicendum secundum veritatem De prima propositione

Restat ergo nunc dicere quid videtur, sub triplici propositione. Prima 121 quidem quod 5

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Omne nomen significat vel primam intentionem vel secundam.

Omne namque nomen exprimit mentis conceptum obiectivum iuxta illud83 Philosophi: “Voces sunt note earum passionum que sunt in anima”; cuius ratio est quia intellectus imponit nomen ad significandum illud quod concipit, nec relatio signi potest terminari nisi ad rem ut conceptam. Sed declaratum est supra [43] quod omnis conceptus est primi ordinis vel secundi, et ita prima intentio vel secunda. Ergo omne nomen significat primam vel secundam intentionem. Preterea. Omne nomen est prime vel secunde impositionis, secun- 122 dum vulgatam divisionem. Sed nomina prime impositionis significant primas intentiones, et secunde secundas. Igitur idem quod prius. Preterea. Si esset aliquod nomen non significans intentionem, illud 123 esset ‘Sortes’ vel ‘Plato’ et cetera nomina singularium rerum. Sed manifestum est quod hec nomina significant primam intentionem—Sortes enim, etsi sit in rerum natura, habet nichilominus esse intentionale in anima, cum sit quiddam conceptum ab intellectu; nec imponitur nomen ‘Sortis’ ad significandum rem Sortis pro esse reali; alioquin, illo esse corrupto, nomen ‘Sortis’ nichil significaret, cum non maneat relatio, termino transeunte. Unde oportet quod significatum huius nominis, Sorte transeunte, realiter remaneret in mente, et per consequens Sortes conceptus per ipsum nomen vere significatur.—Ergo omne nomen exprimit primam intentionem vel secundam. Sed forte dicetur quod supra dictum est de aliquibus divinis nomini- 124 bus quod possunt significare meram Dei essentiam prout extra existit; et tum ‘esse existentie’ vel ‘existere’ videntur significare non res prout 1 quid … veritatem] add. Bm quid dicendum secundum quod videtur add. ed. 3 ergo] B om. ed. 9 illud] id B ei(!) ed. 15 idem] id B ed. 20 quiddam] B quoddam ed. 22 significaret] B significat ed. | non] B enim ed. 23 termino] B tertio ed. 23–24 unde … transeunte] B om. ed. 24 remaneret] B om. ed. 25 nomen] B nomen non ed. 26 vel] B om. ed. 29 tum] B iterum ed. | existere] B existentia ed. | non] B om. ed. 83

Aristotle, De interpr. 1, 16a3–4.

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habent esse in anima, sed prout habent esse extra. Et adhuc videretur secundum ista quod non possemus loqui de rebus que sunt extra, exquo nullum nomen significat eas prout sunt extra. Et rursus non erit differentia inter nomen Sortis et Platonis, exquo utrumque significat primam intentionem. 125 Sed dicendum ad hec quod non procedunt. Non quidem tria primo posita, quoniam ista simul stant quod nomina aliqua significent res prout sunt extra, et quod nichilominus non significent eas nisi ut sunt concepte, quia et ista simul stant quod res prout sunt extra, habeant esse conceptum; alioquin non posset intellectus res intelligere secundum esse quod habent extra. Nec etiam procedit quartum, nam obiectalium que sunt prime intentiones, aliqua sunt que ex passiva conceptione habent alium modum essendi ab esse quod habent extra, sicut realitas hominis habet abstractionem et communitatem in esse concepto, quam non habet extra. Quedam vero sunt que nullo modo habent diversum modum essendi sed uniformem, sicut ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’, qui non transferuntur de ordine singularium ad ordinem universalium ex hoc quod concipiuntur, quemadmodum de homine et animali dicit84 Commentator in tertio De anima. 126 Sic igitur nomina primarum intentionum sunt in | duplici genere. B264vb Sunt enim quedam que exprimunt rem conceptam habentem in esse concepto modum alium quam in esse reali; et tales sunt substantie secunde et res secunde in omni genere, ut homo, animal, albedo et color. Quedam vero habent uniformem modum essendi in esse concepto et in esse extra; et tales sunt prime substantie, ut Sortes, Plato, hec albedo, hic color.

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De secunda propositione 127 Secunda vero propositio est quod Individuum secundum suam formalem rationem est nomen secunde intentionis. 30

1 in … esse] B om. ed. 1–2 videretur] ed. videtur B 3 et rursus] B sed rursum ed. 4 platonis] B hominis ed. 6 hec] B hoc ed. | alterum non] B nisi ed. 11 quartum] B exemplum ed. 11–12 obiectalium que] ed. conceptuum obiectalium qui perperam B 12 aliqua sunt que] ed. aliqui sunt qui B 14 communitatem] B communicatam ed. 15 quam] B quod ed. 24 vero] B vero que ed. 84

Commentum magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros; where?

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Omnis enim conceptus formatus per actum intellectus reflectentis se et reducentis super aliquem primum conceptum est vere intentio secunda, ut patet ex predeterminatis. Sed respectus individui est quedam relatio quam intellectus capit circa Sortem primo conceptum; 5 individuum enim dicitur alicuius communis individuum; unde dicimus quod Sortes est individuum hominis. Ergo ‘individuum’ formaliter significat intentionem secundam. De tertia propositione

Tertia quoque propositio est quod 10

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‘Singulare’ et ‘unum numero’ et ‘persona’ et ‘subpositum’, si dicatur a ‘subsistentia’ et non a ‘subsistendo’ quidditative rationi, sunt nomina prime intentionis, et nullo modo secunde.

Nomen enim quod significat conceptum primum non fundatum super alium conceptum est significans intentionem primam, non secundam, ut patet ex predictis. Sed manifestum est quod ‘unum numero’ significat conceptum rei indivise, quidquid rei est ut est extra. Nec est conceptus secundarius aut reflexus, quoniam indivisio numeralis debetur rei ut est extra; similiter etiam solitudo, quam importat ‘singulare’, debetur rei prout est extra; perseitas etiam tertii modi, quam importat ‘persona’; et similiter persistentia aut per se stantia, quam ‘subpositum’ dicit. Igitur ista nomina significant primam intentionem. Preterea. Omne nomen significans secundam intentionem exprimit 129 conceptum relativum fabricatum ab intellectu super aliquem primum conceptum, sicut patet quod genus addit ad animal conceptum predicabilitatis de pluribus in eo quod quid, et similiter enuntiatio addit ad simplices conceptus unius compositionem cum altero vel divisionem. Sed manifestum est quod ‘unum numero’, ‘singulare’, ‘subpositum’ et ‘persona’ nec dicunt respectum relativum, quia omne unum numero est in se unum et non ad aliud unum, et omne singulare est in se et non ad aliud aut alterius singulare; similiter etiam et subpositum et per1 intellectus] ed. om. B 3 respectus individui] ed. relative individuum B 4 capit] B concipit ed. 10 singulare] B singularis ed. 11 subsistendo] ed. substando B 12 et] non add. necnon del. B | nullo modo secunde] ed. secunde nullo modo B (?an legendum et non secunde, nullo modo!) 13 non fundatum] B fundatur ed. 14 est] B om. ed. 16 quidquid] B qui quidem ed. | est] B om. ed. 19–21 persona … ista] B om. ed. 24 conceptum] ed. obiectum B 27 numero] ed. om. B 28 omne] B esse ed. 29 omne] B omnem ed.

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sona ad se dicuntur, secundum Augustinum85 VII De Trinitate, capitulo V. Esto etiam quod conceptum relativum exprimerent, patet quod non fundantur super alium conceptum, ymo immediate super rem. Ut si ‘unum numero’ importet divisionem ab alio, ‘individuum’ autem dicit respectum relativum fundatum super primum conceptum singularis, quoniam singulare dicitur individuum speciei. Ergo ‘persona’, ‘subpositum’, ‘unum numero’, ‘singulare’ sunt nomina intentionis prime. Sed forte dicetur quod ‘unum numero’ valet idem quod ‘individuum’, cum possit dici individuum quod est indivisum in se et divisum ab alio quocumque; et iterum ‘unum numero’ videtur negationem importare; dictum est autem supra [96 sqq.] quod negationes non exprimunt primas intentiones; et adhuc singulare et individuum sunt idipsum; et rursum subpositum dicitur quod subest speciei, et per consequens videtur importare relativum conceptum; et iterum ‘persona’ vel negationem importat secundum aliquos, vel si perseitatem tertii modi, erit secunda intentio, cum omnes modi per se sint secunde | intentiones. Sed dicendum ad hec quod ‘individuum’, ‘unum numero’, ‘singulare’, etsi idem sint subiective, nichilominus differunt formaliter secundum ipsosmet conceptus quos exprimunt circa idem. Nam ‘unum numero’ exprimit rem cui competit duplex negatio, scilicet indivisio in se et divisio ab alio, ‘singulare’ vero exprimit eandem rem prout sibi competit solitudo, ‘individuum’ vero rem prout sibi competit non dividi sub conceptu specifico. Et quoniam res non habet habitudinem ad conceptum specificum, nec istam habitudinem fabricat intellectus nisi super rem preconceptam, patet quod ‘individuum’ importat conceptum relativum formatum ab intellectu reflectente se super primo conceptu, non sic autem de solitudine quam dicit ‘singularitas’, aut ‘indivisio’, que per ‘unum numero’ importatur. Et ita primum et tertium dubium non procedunt. Secundum etiam non valet, quia, ut supra dictum est, unitas numeralis non importat negationem in recto, sed id a quo negatio profluit importat in recto,

1–2 capitulo V] B om. ed. 3 fundantur] ed. fundatur B 8 valet] coni. videtur B ed. 9 cum … individuum] B illud ed. 12 sunt] B super ed. 17 hec] B hoc ed. | unum] B om. ed. 19 ipsosmet] coni. ipsos et B rationem et ed. 20 scilicet] B videlicet ed. 21 alio … vero] B altero significare nec(!) ed. | sibi] B ibi ed. 22 solitudo … competit] B om. ed. 85

St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII vi, cap. 11, p. 2617–8.

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et negationem in obliquo. Quartum etiam non procedit, quia ‘persona’ negationem etiam importat, non quidem in recto, sed in obliquo. Perseitas etiam tertii modi non est secunda intentio, quia non est modus predicandi, sicut primus modus et secundus, sed realiter essendi, ut patet86 primo Posteriorum. Ulterius forte dicetur quod non omnis secunda intentio est conceptus 133 relativus, quoniam sillogismus non videtur dici ad aliquid relative; similiter immaterialitas et abstractio sunt secunde intentiones, cum consequantur rem conceptam, quoniam ut est extra nec immaterialis est nec abstracta, et tamen non videntur importare conceptum relativum. Sed dicendum ad hoc. Ad primum quidem quod sillogismus vel 134 potest accipi ut oratio significans, et sic relative dicitur ad significatum, vel ut conceptus sillogisticus designatus; de quo constat quod addit ad conceptus qui exprimuntur per terminos simplices, et qui sunt prime intentiones respectu unionis in medio. Unde manifestum est quod sillogismus, quomodocumque accipiatur, semper importat respectum. Et potest dici quod sillogismus relative dicitur ad conclusionem; sillogizatur enim conclusio et probatur. Et hinc est quod logici dicunt conclusionem non esse de esse sillogismi, sed magis terminum ad quem refertur, quia sillogismus dicitur conclusionis sillogismus, et dicimus nos sillogizare talem vel talem conclusionem. Ad secundum vero dicendum quod abstractum dicitur relative in ordine ad illud a quo abstrahitur; universalitas vero dicitur privative, privatio est tamen relativa, quia in ordine ad individuum, quod est materiale. Et secundum hoc patet quod omnes secunde intentiones sunt relativi 135 conceptus et in predicamento Relationis. Cuius ratio est quoniam intellectus fabricat eas et format circa primos conceptus, non format autem aliquid absolutum, sed habitudines et respectus quibus confert unum conceptum ad alium. Et in hoc tertius articulus terminetur.

2 etiam] B autem ed. 7 quoniam] B quando ed. | ad] B om. ed. 8 immaterialis] B etiam simul(!) ed. 10 abstracta] B abstractus ed. 13 vel ut] B prout ed. | de quo] Bc ed. om. B 14 exprimuntur] B exprimitur ed. 15 respectu] B respectum ed. 18 probatur] ed. probatur eius conclusio B 18–19 conclusionem] B om. ed. 19 esse] B essentia ed. 20 et] B et tamen ed. 21 vel talem] B om. ed. 22–23 universalitas] B immaterialitas ed. 23 privatio est] privatione B ed. | in ordine] Bc ed. om. B 27 eas] B eos ed. 28 absolutum] ed. ?abstractum B | unum] ed. primum B 86

Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 4, 73b10–16.

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136 Ad ea ergo que superius [9–16] inducuntur dicendum est. Ad primum

137 B265rb 138

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141 142

quidem quod illa Boetii diffinitio in qua ponitur ‘individuum’, corrigitur87 per Ricardum, et loco ‘individue substantie’ ponitur ‘incommunicabilis existentia’. Incommunicabilitas autem inest rei preter operationem intellectus, nec est secunda intentio. Et ita in diffinitione persone non ponitur aliquid pertinens ad secundam intentionem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet ‘individuum’ importet conceptum relativum universali cooppositum, non tamen | ‘persona’, ut dictum est in corpore questionis [3]. Ad tertium dicendum quod ymo aliquid reale plurificatur in divinis, quia Pater et Filius non solum sunt plures intentionaliter, ymo realiter; alioquin rediret error Sabellianus. Ad quartum dicitur quod communitas quam habet persona respectu trium in divinis, non est communitas generis aut alicuius universalis, pro eo quod non dicit in recto aliquid determinatum, ut inferius apparebit. Ad quintum dicendum quod ‘subpositum’, prout est idem quod ‘per se stans’, habens perseitatem tertii modi, est idem quod ‘persona’ in natura intellectuali; prout autem dicitur a ‘subsistendo specifice quidditati’, non clauditur in significato ‘persone’. Primo autem modo est prima intentio, et sic clauditur in ‘persona’. Ad sextum dicendum quod individuum et persona non sunt idem secundum formales rationes, ut dictum est in corpore questionis. Ad septimum dicendum quod communitas persone non est alicuius secundum rem, sed tantum secundum conceptum, non quidem determinatum, ut infra patebit. Licet autem communitas persone non sit secundum rem, nichilominus non est intentio secunda. Nam homo non est communis secundum rem singularibus hominibus, sed solum secundum rationem, nec tamen ‘homo’ significat intentionem secundam.

1 responsio ad obiecta] add. Bm 3 individuum] B per individuum ed. 11 reale] B relative ed. 13 rediret] ed. redit B | sabellianus] B sabelliani ed. 14 dicitur] B dicendum ed. 15 generis] B generationis ed. 16 in recto] Bc ed. om. B | aliquid] ed. Ad B 26 tantum] B om. ed. 87 Richardus a Sto Victore, De Trinitate IV, cap. 22 (ed. Migne PL 196, col. 945): “Iuxta illam itaque “existentiae” significationem (…) non inconvenienter fortassis dicere poterimus quod persona divina sit divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia”.

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Ad octavum dicendum quod ‘persona’ non dicit in recto negatio- 143 nem, sed tantum in obliquo. Et dato quod diceret, non propter hoc esset intentio secunda. Non enim omne ens rationis est est secunda intentio, quia dextrum in columpna est relatio rationis, nec tamen est 5 intentio secunda.

3–5 non enim … intentio] B om. ed.

appendix g FRANCISCUS DE PRATO Tractatus de ente rationis (between 1341 and 1343) R 5

H

codex Romanus (Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, Ms. 1053 (R.8.7), ff. 55r–62r) codex Hafniensis (Copenhagen, Kongelige Bibliothek, Thott 581, ff. 105r–111v)1 1

Quoniam testante2 beato Gregorio, multis est cura perversa laudare, R55r; H105r recta corrumpere, quorum quosdam ignorantia premit, quosdam pro10 tervia et elatio erigit, adeo ut doctrinam veridicam doctoris egregii sancti Thome ac etiam eius declaratoris, excellentis doctoris Hervei denigrare conarentur, ne talis indiscreta scriptura et importuna doctrina ac nostris iuvenibus plurimum noxia nimium invalescat, cogitavi ad brevem tractatum reducere aliqua in operibus magistri Hervei 15 dispersim reperta, que sint introductoria ad scientiam sancti Thome et magistri Hervei doctrinam. Qui tractatus, ut eius notitia habeatur clarior, in capitulis distinguetur. De opinione antiquorum et aliquorum modernorum

Primo videndum quid importetur per ens rationis et ens reale, et quo- 2 20 modo adinvicem differant. Pro quo sciendum est quod opinio aliquo12 conarentur] R conentur H 16 ut eius] RcH cuius R 17 in] H om. R 19 ens … reale] H ens reale et rationis R om. H

16–17 clarior] R om. H 20–750.1 aliquorum] R

1 A revised description of this manuscript is found in Ebbesen & Pinborg (1982), Appendix I, pp. 122–125, as well as some fragments of the present tract taken from the Thott manuscript (Appendix II, pp. 125–127). For the life and works of Franciscus de Prato see Amerini (1999), 147 ff. 2 Cf. Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Job, VII, XXXVII, 57 (ed. M. Adriaen. Brepols Turnholti 1979. CCSL 32, p. 1432–5; ed. Migne PL 75, 799C): “Duo sunt genera locutionum importuna valde et noxia generi humano: unum quod curat etiam perversa laudare, aliud quod studet semper etiam recta corripere”.

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rum antiquorum fuit—et est etiam aliquorum modernorum, precipue Gulielmi Ocham—quod ens rationis sit actus intelligendi, tam rectus quam reflexus. Quod probatur duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Illud ens quod distinguitur contra omne ens existens extra animam est actus intelligendi. Sed ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Minor patet per Philosophum, quinto et sexto Metaphisice, qui dividit3 ens communiter dictum in ens in anima et in ens extra animam. Et per ens in anima intelligunt omnes philosophi et doctores ens rationis; et per ens extra animam intelligunt ens reale. Maiorem probat4 Gulielmus Ocham sic quia Nullum ens potest distingui contra ens omne extra animam nisi sit in anima subiective; et illa videtur esse satis nota. Nullum autem ens est in anima subiective (secundum eum) nisi actus intelligendi, quia ipse vult quod species intelligibilis, actus intelligendi et verbum mentale sint idem realiter, quia frustra ponitur distinctio et multiplicatio inter aliqua inter que eque bene potest salvari unitas et identitas; sed non debet fieri per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora, ut patet5 primo Phisicorum. Sed omnia que dicuntur de specie et de actu et de verbo mentali potest attribui soli actui et salvari potest per solum actum (ut dicit). Sequitur ergo quod ens rationis sit actus intelligendi. 3 Secunda ratio est ista. Protanto aliquod ens dicitur ens rationis quia non habet esse nisi in ratione et quia ratio utitur ipso ad aliud vel propter aliud, idest propter obiectum. Sed nullum ens habet istas conditiones nisi actus intelligendi. Ergo solus actus intelligendi est ens rationis. Maior videtur esse nota, quia si aliquod ens haberet esse extra rationem, iam non posset dici ens rationis sed potius ens reale; et videtur quod ratio fabricet entia rationis ut negotietur in eis loco et vice obiectorum. Minor probatur quia: Actus intelligendi habet esse solum obiective in anima; et anima utitur actu intelligendi propter obiectum, quia propter actum intelligendi intelligit obiectum; ergo etc.

1 etiam] R om. H 10 quia] R quod H | omne] R om. H 11 esse] R om. H 15 bene] R om. H 19 ens … intelligendi] R actus intelligendi sit ens rationis vel econverso H 20 ens] R om. H 21–22 ad … aliud] aliud vel propter aliud R ad aliquid vel propter aliquid H 24 haberet] R habet et H 25–26 et videtur quod] R hoc etiam videtur ut H 26 ut] RcH et R | vice] R voce H Arist., Metaph. V 7, 1017a22–25; VI 2, 1026a34-b2. Cf. Ockham, Expositio in Perih. Arist. I, prooemium, pp. 248–376 (Opera Philosophica II); In Sent., dist. II, q. 8, pp. 266–292 (Opera Theologica II). 5 Arist., Physica I 4, 188a17–18. 3 4

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Tertio arguitur ab aliis sic. Omne ens | intentionale est ens rationis. H105v Sed actus intelligendi est ens intentionale. Ergo est ens rationis. Maior patet quia: Omne ens aut est ens reale aut ens rationis; sed ens intentionale distinguitur contra ens reale; ergo est ens rationis. Minor patet 5 per hoc quia: secundum omnes ens in anima est ens intentionale; sed actus intelligendi est ens in anima; ergo etc. Quarto sic. Actus intelligendi non est ens reale. Ergo est ens rationis. 5 Consequentia patet per hoc quia de quolibet ente est verum dicere quod sit ens reale vel ens rationis. Sed probo antecedens quia: si actus 10 intelligendi esset ens reale, esset in aliquo decem predicamentorum; sed actus intelligendi non est in aliquo decem predicamentorum; ergo non est ens reale. Maior est nota. Minoris probatio quia: si actus intelligendi esset in aliquo decem predicamentorum, precipue esset in predicamento Qualitatis; sed hoc est falsum, quia, ut de se patet, non 15 est in quarta specie, quia | non est forma neque figura constans circa R55v quantitatem; nec est in tertia, quia non est passio nec passibilis qualitas, quia tales qualitates sunt sensibiles; neque in secunda, quia non est naturalis potentia vel impotentia; neque in prima, quia non est habitus vel dispositio; ergo etc. 20

Contra istam opinionem arguitur

Contra istam opinionem arguo sic. Nullum ens rationis est ens reale. 6 Sed omnis actus intelligendi est verum ens reale. Ergo nullus actus intelligendi est ens rationis. Maor patet, quia ens rationis distinguitur contra ens reale communiter dictum; et ideo ens rationis non est ens reale 25 communiter dictum, sicut etiam quod distinguitur contra substantiam absolute dictam non est substantia. Minorem probo multipliciter. Primo sic. Illud est ens reale quod dicit perfectionem simpliciter; sed actus intelligendi est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior probatur quia: illud est ens reale quod dicit perfectionem realem; sed quod dicit perfectionem sim30 pliciter, dicit perfectionem realem et per consequens est ens reale. Sed probo minorem quia: illud dicit perfectionem simpliciter quod melius et nobilius est habere quam non habere, sive quod habens est perfec2 sed … rationis] H om. R 6 ergo etc.] H om. R 8 de] RcH om. R 9 sit] R est H 10 predicamentorum] sive decem predicamenta dividunt sufficienter ens rationale add. R 11 sed … predicamentorum] R om. H 15 constans] R consistens H 23 quia] H om. R 24 non] R om. H 25 communiter dictum] H om. R 26–27 primo sic] R om. H 27–29 quod dicit … ens reale] H om. R 32 et nobilius … habere] R est hoc quam non hoc H

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tius non habente; sed melius et nobilius est intelligere et habere actum intelligendi quam non intelligere et non habere actum intelligendi; ergo actus intelligendi dicit perfectionem simpliciter et per consequens est ens reale et non est ens rationis. Secundo sic. Nostra formalis beatitudo est verum ens reale. Sed nostra formalis beatitudo est actus intelligendi. Ergo actus intelligendi est verum ens reale. Probatio maioris quia: nostra formalis beatitudo est ultima et nobilissima perfectio que a nobis haberi possit per quam sumus perfecti realiter; ens autem rationis non facit nos perfectiores realiter, cum non dicat perfectionem realem. Minor etiam est nota, tam per Aristotilem, qui ponit6 nostram felicitatem in actu speculativo intellectus, quam etiam per multos doctores, qui dicunt quod beatitudo nostra consistit in actu intellectus; ergo etc. Tertio sic. Illud est ens reale quod producitur in actione reali. Sed actus intelligendi est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior probatur per hoc quia: protanto aliqua actio dicitur esse realis quia habet terminum realem. Minor probatur quia: actus intelligendi producit realiter per realem actionem intellectus agentis et etiam terminantis. Quarto sic quia: Illud est ens reale de quo considerat philosophus naturalis. Sed actus intelligendi est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior patet ex hoc quia naturalis philosophia protanto dicitur scientia realis quia considerat de ente reali, sicut logica dicitur scientia rationalis quia considerat de ente rationis. Minor patet nam: Philosophus tertio De anima tractat7 de actu intelligendi; ergo etc. Quinto sic quia: Maiorem entitatem habent accidentia anime quam accidentia corporis. Sed accidentia corporis, puta albedo et nigredo et sic de aliis, sunt entia realia. Ergo et accidentia anime, puta actus intelligendi, erunt entia realia. Sexto quia: Illud est ens reale quod habet esse in predicamento reali. Sed actus intelligendi est in predicamento reali, scilicet Qualitatis. Maior est nota de se. Minor etiam apparet. Ergo etc. 1 nobilius] R perfectius H 9 sumus] R om. H | perfectiores] H perfecte R 11 tam] H om. R 12 multos] H om. R | dicunt] R ponunt H 14 actione] RHc ente H 17 realiter per] R om. H 18 agentis] R agens H | terminantis] H per realem actionem fundamenti R 19 quia] R om. H 21 dicitur … realis] R naturalis scientia H 22 ente] R hente (!) sic saepius R | rationalis] R rationis H 26 sed … corporis] H om. R 30 sed … scilicet] H realis R 31 maior … apparet] H om. R 6 7

Arist., Eth. Nicom. I 6, 1098a12–18. Arist., De anima III, capp. 3–8.

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Respondent Ocham et quidam alii doctores

Ad ista obiecta respondet Gulielmus Ocham, et quidam alii docto- 12 res quod actus intelligendi potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo inquantum in se: actus intelligendi in se est quidam actus et quedam 5 forma perficiens potentiam intellectivam; et isto modo actus intelligendi est verum ens reale, sicut probant ille sex rationes superius posite. Alio modo actus intelligendi potest considerari ut accipitur loco et vice obiecti, idest inquantum representat suum obiectum; et isto modo actus intelligendi est ens rationis et ens diminutum. Et dicit quod divisio entis 10 in ens reale et ens rationis non est divisio in duo simpliciter opposita eo modo quo animal dividitur in rationale et irrationale, sed per divisionem illam importatur, ut dicit, ens reale quod est in anima, quod distinguitur ab ente reali quod est extra animam. Unde ipse non vult quod ens rationis distinguatur ab ente | reali communiter dicto sive ab ente reali R56r 15 omni, cum secundum eum ens rationis sit quoddam ens reale existens in anima, sed vult quod ens rationis solum distinguatur ab omni ente reali existente extra animam. Contra istum modum ponendi arguitur

Contra istum modum ponendi vel declarandi et etiam contra con- 13 clusionem arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic. Quod continetur sub ente extra animam, non est ens in anima. Sed actus intelligendi continetur sub ente extra animam. Ergo non est ens in anima. Maior patet8 in quinto et sexto Metaphisice; et probatur per Gulielmum Ocham, qui dicit quod ens in anima distinguitur contra ens extra animam. Minor 25 patet quia secundum Philosophum ibidem ens extra animam dividitur in decem predicamenta, sub quorum uno, scilicet Qualitate, continetur actus intelligendi. Secundo sic. Hoc ens rationis, scilicet esse abstractum, non convenit 14 illi quod est realiter separatum ab individuis contentis sub re intellecta, 30 quia universale, cui convenit esse esse abstractum respectu particularium, non abstrahitur vel non separatur realiter ab ipsis particularibus, 20

2–3 doctores quod] R dicentes H 10 divisio] R om. H 12 secundum quod] H ens R 15 omni] H om. R 17 existente] R quod est H 20 multipliciter] R om. H 23 probatur … ocham] R patet per eum H 26 in] H om. R 8

Arist., Metaph. V 7, 1017a22–25: VI 2, 1026a34-b2.

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quia universale non habet esse realiter in rerum natura preter particularia. Sed actus intelligendi, qualiscumque accipiatur, est realiter separatus ab individuis contentis sub re intellecta. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris quia: quod realiter et universaliter et vere negatur ab aliquo, est realiter ab ipso divisum; sed actus intelligendi—sive accipiatur ut est quidam actus realis, sive accipiatur vice obiecti, sive vice rei intellecte—est realiter et universaliter et vere negatus ab ipsis individuis, ut si intelligo hominem Sortem, qui est sub homine, non est realiter actus intelligendi, quocumque modo accipiatur actus intelligendi. Ergo actus intelligendi est quid reale divisum ab omnibus individuis contentis sub obiecto intellectus, et per consequens illud ens rationis, scilicet esse abstractum, non est actus intelligendi. 15 Preterea. Prima divisio entis in ens in anima et ens extra animam est divisio entis in duo entia, quorum unum non est realiter alterum; istud dictum patet sexto Metaphisice, ubi Philosophus dividit9 ens in anima v H106 contra ens extra animam | distinctum in decem predicamenta, de quo intendit tractare in metaphisica. Sed opinio superius posita ponit quod idem est ens reale et ens rationis diversimode consideratum; nam dicit quod idem actus intelligendi, prout est quedam forma perficiens intellectum, est ens reale, et ut tenet se vice obiecti est ens rationis. Ergo idem erit ens reale et ens rationis. Quod est falsum, ut patet per superius dicta, et per ea que dicentur inferius.

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De opinione beati Thome et magistri Hervei 16 Et ideo est alia opinio beati Thome et magistri Hervei, qui ponit10 quod

ens rationis non est aliquid existens subiective in intellectu realiter nec 25 in aliqua natura reali secundum suum esse reale, sed est quidam modus consequens obiectum intellectus inquantum illud obiectum est intellectum ab intellectu, ita quod ens rationis non se tenet ex parte actus intelligendi, sed tenet se ex parte rei intellecte, sive obiecti intellecti inquantum intellecti. 30

6–7 est realiter] coni. realiter R est H 13 prima] H om. R | in ens] R om. H 20 et] H om. R 21 rationis] ut dictum est add. H 21–22 ut … dicta] R om. H 22 inferius] clarius ostendetur add. H 24 qui] H que R 25–26 nec … reale] R om. H 29 intellecti] coni. est intellectum R est intellecti H 9 10

Arist., Metaph. VI 4, 1027b31–1028a4. Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus passim.

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Ad cuius positionis evidentiam faciam tria, quia primo declarabo istam positionem; secundo eam probabo; tertio arguam contra eam et solvam obiectiones. Quantum ad primum est sciendum quod aliquid dicitur esse in intellectu duobus modis. Uno modo subiective, sicut species intelligibilis, actus intelligendi, conceptus mentis, et habitus intellectuales sunt subiective in intellectu, quia sunt in eo sicut in subiecto. Secundo modo aliquid dicitur esse in intellectu obiective. Esse autem in intellectu obiective idem est quod esse in prospectu intellectus, sicut cognitum est in cognoscente, eo modo quo dicitur esse in prospectu hominis totum illud quod homo videt. Modo sic est quod entia rationis non dicuntur esse in intellectu primo modo, scilicet subiective, quia illa que sunt in anima subiective sunt entia realia, sed | dicuntur entia rationis esse in anima secundo modo, scilicet obiective. Ubi etiam est notandum quod esse in intellectu obiective potest esse duobus modis. Uno modo est aliquid obiective in intellectu, quia scilicet est obiectum cognitum; et illud quod est isto modo obiective in intellectu, non est semper ens rationis, ymo tale obiectum cognitum potest esse tam ens reale quam ens rationis indifferenter. Alio modo potest esse aliquid obiective in intellectu, non quia sit obiectum cognitum, sed quia est quidam modus consequens obiectum ut cognitum; et illud quod isto modo est in intellectu, semper est ens rationis. Concludo ergo quod ens rationis potest sic diffiniri sive describi: Ens rationis est modus consequens obiectum intellectum inquantum obiectum cognitum est. Per illam opinionem solvuntur clare omnia illa que dicuntur communiter de ente rationis. Que sunt tria. Primum est quod ens rationis distinguitur contra omne ens reale; et hoc ponit illa opinio que non dicit quod ens rationis sit res, sed dicit quod est modus consequens rem intellectam, non secundum se secundum suumesse reale, sed inquantum est intellecta. Secundum quod dicatur de ente rationis est quod est ens in anima; et hoc ponit illa positio que dicit quod ens rationis est ens in anima non subiective sed obiective. Tertium quod dicitur de ente rationis est quod est fabricatum ab intellectu. Quod optime salvat illa opinio que dicit quod ens rationis consequitur 4 esse] R om. H 8 intellectus] R intellectu H 9 est] R om. H | quo] H quod R 10 totum] R om. H 10–11 videt … modo] R in communi non H 11–12 quia illa] H om. R 16 obiective] H om. R 18 tam … quam] R ens reale et H | indifferenter] H om. R 23 intellectum] R om. H 24 illam] enim add. H 28–29 non … inquantum] R ut H 29 intellecta] H intellectum R | dicatur] H om. R 31 anima] scilicet add. H | obiective] existens in intellectu add. H 33 consequitur] R non sequitur H

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rem intellectam, non secundum suum esse reale vel per opus nature, sed inquantum est intellecta; non autem est res intellecta nisi per opus intellectus, idest per actum intelligendi. Si autem ens rationis esset actus intelligendi, tunc ens rationis non distingueretur contra omne ens reale, cum actus intelligendi sit quoddam ens reale, nec etiam esset fabricatum ab intellectu, sed potius a fantasmate et rebus extra, cum actus intelligendi causetur a fantasmatibus, aliquando etiam a rebus exterioribus. Hic autem est notandum quod cum ens rationis teneat se ex parte rei intellecte sive obiecti intellecti, et non ex parte anime vel intellectus sive actus intelligendi, est clare quoddam ens rationis quod | convenit rei intellecte vel obiecto intellecto in ordine ad actum intelligendi. Et tale ens rationis vocatur intentionalitas sive habitudo rei intellecte vel obiecti intellecti; et a tali ente rationis obiectum intellectus denominatur intentio. Est vero quoddam aliud ens rationis quod convenit rei intellecte in ordine ad rem intellectam. Et tale ens rationis est multiplex secundum quod diversimode una res intellecta comparatur ad aliam rem intellectam. Et sic etiam importatur per diversa nomina. Que sunt ista, scilicet ‘universale’, ‘particulare’, ‘singulare’, ‘abstractum’, ‘species’, ‘genus’, ‘differentia’, ‘proprium’, ‘veritas’, ‘falsitas’, ‘antecedens’, ‘consequens’, ‘sillogismus’, ‘predicatum’, et similia omnia illa que formaliter accepta important ens rationis. Quantum ad secundum est sciendum quod illa opinio potest declarari multipliciter. Et primo sic. Philosophus distinguens in quinto Metaphisice de triplici ordine relativorum, dicit11 quod relativa ordinis tertii ita se habent quod unum refertur ad aliud secundum rem et ad aliud secundum rationem, sicut scientia refertur ad scibile secundum rem et mensura ad mensuratum. Sed relatio scibilis per quam scibile refertur ad scientiam vel ad scientem, non est actus intelligendi, sed est quidam modus vel quedam relatio tenens | se ex parte obiecti. Ergo etc. Secundo sic. Relatio identitatis per quam idem refertur ad seipsum est relatio rationis sive ens rationis, cum relatio realis teneat duo 1 non] R om. H 2 res] R om. H 4–5 ens rationis … intelligendi] R actus intelligendi esset ens rationis tunc ens rationis H 5 omne] R om. H 9 autem] H om. R 12 vel] R sive habitudo H 17 intellecta] R om. H 20 antecedens] R om. H 23–24 declarari] R confirmari H 25 triplici] R tertio H 26–27 et … rem] H om. R 28 relatio … quam] H om. R 30 modus] H motus R 32 teneat duo] H om. R 11

Arist., Metaph. V 15, 1021a26–32.

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extrema distincta formaliter. Sed identitas non est actus intelligendi, ymo est quedam ratio relatio conveniens rei existenti extra intellectum inquantum intellectus accipit rem illam ut duo extrema illius relationis, scilicet identitatis. Tertio sic. Relatio Dei ad creaturam possibilem est relatio rationis, licet relatio Dei ad creaturam actualem sive actu existentem secundum quosdam sit relatio realis. Et tamen illa relatio non est actus intelligendi sed est relatio fabricata per intellectum. Quarto sic. Universalitas per predicationem, que est ens rationis, convenit illi quod est indifferens ad plura quorum unumquodque est ipsum, sicut quando Petrus intelligit equum universaliter, illa universalitas equi intellecti universaliter convenit equo absolute accepto, qui equus convenit singularibus equis, quorum quilibet est equus. Sed illa universalitas non convenit actui intelligendi qui est in Petro, cum ille actus sit singularis. Ergo illud ens rationis non se tenet ex parte actus intelligendi, sed tenet se ex parte rei intellecte. Quinto sic. Scientia est de universalibus abstractis et separatis a singularibus, ut patet12 primo Posteriorum. Sed illa abstractio sive separatio non est realis; alias rediret opinio Platonis. Ergo est secundum rationem, ita quod illa abstractio est ens rationis; et tamen illa abstractio non est subiective in intellectu, sed solum obiective, cum conveniat solum rei ut sic intellecta est. Sexto sic. Dextrum et sinistrum in calumpna secundum omnes dicunt relationem rationis et non rei. Et tamen ille relationes non dicunt formaliter actum intelligendi nec fundantur super actum intelligendi, sed tenent se ex parte rei intellecte, quia conveniunt columne diversimode considerate in ordine ad nos. Sed forte dicetur quod columpne vel stile non dicuntur referri secundum rationem quia aliqua relatio secundum rationem sit in eis, sed protanto dicuntur referri secundum rationem quia aliqua referuntur ad ipsa. Sed hoc non valet, quia omnis relatio denominat subiectum suum denominatione intrinseca, idest est in eo quod per ipsum refertur. Et sic relatio secundum rationem est in eo quod refertur secundum rationem. 1 distincta] H dicta R 2 relatio] RH ratio perperam Hc 4 identitatis] H identitas R 8 relatio] R ratio H 13 sed] R et H 15 sit] R est H 21 solum] H om. R 22 sic] R om. H 24 relationem rationis] H relationes R | rei] H secundum rem R 25 formaliter] R om. H 28 stile] coni. scibile RH 30 aliqua] R om. H 32 idest] R et H 12

Arist., Anal. Post. I 30, 87b38–39.

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Septimo sic. Distinctio que est | inter hominem et animal, et distinctio que est inter relationem et divinam essentiam, et distinctio que est inter attributa divina, et distinctio que est inter ens et bonum, et sic de multis aliis, sunt distinctiones secundum rationem. Et per consequens sunt entia rationis, licet illa in quibus fundantur ille distinctiones, sint 5 entia realia. Sed tamen ille distinctiones non dicuntur formaliter actus intelligendi, quia distinctio etiam tenet se ex parte ipsorum actuum intelligendi, quia distinctio que se tenet ex parte actuum intelligendi, est distinctio realis, cum diversi actus intelligendi distinguantur realiter. Ergo tales distinctiones tenent se ex parte obiectorum sive ex parte 10 obiectorum sive ex parte rerum intellectarum, et sunt quidam modi consequentes res non secundum eorum esse reale, sed prout diversimode obiciuntur intellectui. Et sic patet de secundo. Impugnatur vera opinio

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29 Quantum ad tertium est sciendum quod contra illam opinionem argui-

tur multipliciter. Primo sic. Si ens rationis distinguitur contra omne ens reale, tunc ens rationis erit nulla res, et per consequens ens rationis erit nichil. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Ergo etc. Consequentia patet per sanctum Augustinum, qui dicit13 quod omnino nulla res est nichil. Falsitas 20 consequentis probatur multipliciter. Primo sic quia: si ens rationis est nichil, tunc divisio entis in ens rationis et ens reale est divisio in ens et R57v nichil, et per consequens esset | divisio in ens et non-ens, cum ‘nichil’ et ‘non-ens’ convertantur; sed hoc est inconveniens, scilicet quod ens dividatur in ens et non-ens, sicut et illa divisio esset inconveniens: albo- 25 rum aliud album, aliud non-album. Secundo quia: illud quod est nulla res vel nichil, non predicatur de aliquo ente reali, quia illa est falsa ‘Ens reale est nulla res vel nichil’; sed ens rationis predicatur de ente reali, saltem denominative, ut cum dicimus ‘Homo est universalis’ vel ‘Homo est species’. Tertio quia, si ens rationis esset nichil, sequeretur quod 30 contradictoria verificarentur de eodem simul, quod est impossibile; pro-

1 septimo] R om. H 2 relationem] R rationem H 6–7 sed … parte] R om. H 7–8 ipsorum … tenet] H om. R 9 est … realis] H om. R 15 impugnatio vere opinionis add. H 22 reale] R rei H 25 dividatur] R dividitur H 25–26 alborum] R arborum H 13

Augustinus, De doctrina christiana I, cap. 2, p. 916–17.

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batio consequentie quia: si ens rationis est nulla res, sequitur quod sit non-ens, quia ‘nulla res’ et ‘non-ens’ convertuntur; et ex alia parte ponitur quod sit ens rationis; et sic ens rationis erit ens et non-ens. Quarto sic; si ens rationis est nulla res et nichil, videtur multis mirabile quod tam excellens doctor quantum fuit magister Herveus, qui fecit magnum tractatum de secundis intentionibus, que sunt entia rationis, voluerit subtiliare se ad tractandum de nichilo sive de hiis que sunt nichil. Quinto sequeretur quod logica, que tractat de secundis intentionibus sive de entibus rationis, tractaret de nichilo; quod videtur inconveniens. Secundo principaliter arguitur, scilicet quod ens rationis non distinguatur contra omne ens reale. Primo sic quia: Illud est ens reale quod habet causam realem. Sed ens rationis habet causam realem. Ergo est ens reale. Maior patet quia: non pro alio aliquid dicitur esse causa realis nisi quia habet effectum realem. Probatio minoris quia: intellectus sive actus intelligendi est causa realis, ut de se patet; ergo etc. Secundo sic. Scientia refert realiter ad suum scibile, ut patet14 quinto Metaphisice; sed omnis relatio realis habet terminum realem, cum relatio dicatur realis a termino reali; sed logica que est de ente rationis, est quedam scientia; ergo refertur realiter ad suum scibile, scilicet ad ens rationis; ergo oportet quod ens rationis dicat terminum realem, et per consequens est quoddam ens reale. Tertio sic. Ens rationis aut est per se existens (et sic est substantia), aut est alteri inherens (et sic est accidens). Sed tam substantia quam accidens est ens reale. Quarto sic. Ens rationis aut est quid increatum (et sic est Deus), aut ens creatum (et sic est creatura). Sed tam Deus quam creatura est ens reale. Quinto sic. Quod fundatur in aliquo secundum esse reale, est ens reale. Sed aliquod ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior videtur esse nota. Sed minor probatur quia: habitudo rei intellecte ad intellec5 fecit] H om. R 7 tractandum] R faciendum tractatum H 11 primo sic] R om. H 12–13 ergo … reale] R om. H 13 causa realis] R reale causans H 14 effectum] R causam H 16 secundo] R tertio principaliter arguitur H 19–21 ens rationis … quoddam] R ens reale sit ens rationis sit ens reale (!) H 22 ens rationis] R om. H 23 alteri] H aut R 24 est ens] Rc est R ens H | ergo etc.] R om. H 25–27 ens rationis … ens reale] R om. H 25 increatum] Rc creatum R 28 5o … quod] R om. H 28–29 est ens reale] RcH om. R 29 rationis] R reale H 29–30 videtur … sed] R patet H 30–760.1 intellectum] H actum intelligendi R 14

Arist., Metaph. V 15, 1021a29–30.

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H108r tum immediate fundatur super ipsa re intellecta, et non super | actum

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intelligendi, quia super actum intelligendi fundatur alia relatio opposita, que est relatio realis. Sexto sic. Quod est subiective in ente reali est ens reale. Sed ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior est concessa per magistrum Herveum. Sed probatur minor quia: plus videntur dependere a subiecto entia rationis quam accidentia corporalia; sed accidentia corporalia sunt subiective in ente reali; ergo multo magis entia rationis. Minor est nota de se. Sed probatur maior quia: entia rationis minus habent de entitate quam accidentia corporalia. Septimo sic. Obiectum intellectus comparatur ad intellectum ut movens ad motum, nam intellectus movetur | ab obiecto. Sed ens rationis potest esse obiectum intellectus, cum possit intelligi ab intellectu. Ergo potest movere intellectum. Sed omne movens ad actum realem est ens reale. Octavo sic. Omne quod est in ratione, vel est ipsa potentia rationis, vel est actus rationis, vel dispositio ad actum rationis. Sed omnia ista sunt entia realia; sed protanto dicitur aliquid ens rationis quia est in ratione. Ergo etc. Nono sic. Ens rationis cum non sit ens increatum, oportet quod sit ens productum. Et tunc quero de eius productione, quia sua productio aut est realis aut est rationis. Si realis, ergo eius terminus, qui est ens rationis, erit ens reale; si rationis, ergo erit dare ens rationis ante omne ens rationis; quod est impossibile. Decimo [9o H] sic. Productio primi entis rationis aut est ens reale, aut ens rationis. Si ens reale, ergo et terminus eius erit ens reale, quia non pro alio aliqua productio dicitur realis nisi quia ab ea producitur ens reale. Si dicatur quod illa productio sit ens rationis, ergo ante primum ens rationis erit dare ens rationis, quod est impossibile. Undecimo sic. Sicut se habet terminus realis ad actionem transeuntem realiter, ita se habet ens rationis ad actionem transeuntem secundum rationem. Sed terminus realis est idem cum actione transeunte realiter et est in eodem subiective cum ea. Ergo ens rationis erit idem

1 re] H om. R 2–3 relatio opposita] R ratio H 4 6o] R 5o H | ens] R est H 5 rationis] RcH om. R | maior] patet et add. H 9 de se] R probatur H 10 quam] entia sive add. H 11 7o] R 6o H 16 8o] R 7o H 18 sed protanto … quia] R ens autem rationis ideo dicitur quod H 20 9o] R 8o H 21 quia sua productio] R om. H 25 10o] 9o H om. R 25–26 sic … reale] H om. R 27 ab ea] R per eam H 28 illa productio] R om. H 29 dare] H om. R 30 11o] R 10o H

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cum actu intelligendi, qui est actio transiens secundum rationem. Et per consequens sequitur quod ens rationis sit ens reale et quod sit in intellectu subiective, et non solum obiective, nam actus intelligendi est ens reale quod est subiective in intellectu. Maior et minor sunt concesse per magistrum Herveum. Ergo conclusio erit vera. Que tamen conclusio est contra magistrum Herveum, qui dicit quod ens rationis non est ens reale, nec est subiective in intellectu. Duodecimo sic. Illud dicitur ens reale cuius contradictorie oppositum negat ens reale; ista propositio patet, quia illud dicit una pars contradictionis quod altera negat. Sed ens rationis et purum nichil opponuntur contradictorie, etiam secundum magistrum Herveum, qui dividit ens rationis ex opposito contra purum nichil. Sed purum nichil negat ens reale. Ergo ens rationis dicit ens reale. Tertio decimo sic. Illud est ens reale quod reducitur ad predicamentum reale. Sed ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior est nota de se. Minor probatur quia: ens rationis est habitudo sive relatio rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi, vel est habitudorei intellecte ad rem intellectam; sed omnis habitudo sive relatio est in predicamento Relationis, sicut omnis substantia reducitur ad predicamentum Substantie (excepto Deo, qui est substantia illimitata ad predicamentum); Relatio autem est unum de decem predicamentis realibus; ergo etc. Quarto decimo sic. Illud quod presupponit aliud est aliquid, et per consequens est ens reale, quia ‘ens reale’ et ‘aliquid’ convertuntur; ista maior patet, quia illud quod nichil est, non presupponit aliud. Sed ens rationis presupponit actum intelligendi et rem intellectam. Ergo est aliquid in se, et per consequens est ens reale in se. Tertio principaliter arguitur quod non videtur quod ens rationis sit modus consequens rem intellectam vel obiectum intellectum propter duo. Primo quia si hoc esset verum, sequeretur quod quando intelligimus Deum, tunc fundaretur in Deo aliquod ens rationis, | et cum ens rationis sit ens diminutum, | tunc sequetur quod ens diminutum operatur in Deo. Secundo sic. Omne ens rationis est ens in anima. Sed 3 subiective] R obiective H 4 quod est subiective] R obiective H 5–6 ergo … herveum] R om. H 7 est] R sunt H 8 12o] R 11o H 9 propositio] H maior R 14 13o] R 12o H 15 sed] H om. R 17–18 vel … intellectam] R om. H 20–21 relatio … realibus] R sed relatio est predicamentum reale H 22 14o] R 13o H | aliud est aliquid] R aliquid est aliud genus H 23 ens reale] illa patet add. H 23–24 ista … aliud] R om. H 25–26 actum … ens reale in se] R ens reale ergo etc. H 27 quod] H quia R | non videtur quod] R om. H | sit] R non sit H 28 vel] R ut H 29 primo] H om. R 31 sequetur quod] R aliquod H 31–32 operatur] R erit H

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modus consequens obiectum cognitum non est ens in anima. Ergo etc. Maior est concessa ab omnibus. Sed probatur minor quia: modus consequens obiectum cognitum non est in anima subiective (ut de se patet), nec etiam obiective, cum non sit obiectum, sed modus obiecti. Ergo etc. Hic ponuntur quedam pro solutione rationum dictarum

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45 Pro solutione dictarum difficultatum ego premitto et dico quod ‘ens’

potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo formaliter, sicut si diceremus quod substantia est formaliter ens et quantitas est formaliter ens. Alio modo dicitur ‘ens’ denominative vel suppositive tantum, sicut, si diceremus quod in homine ceco est cecitas, cecitas non est formaliter et positive ens sed est ens suppositive et denominative proquanto supponit hominem in quo fundatur, a quo et cecitas illa denominatur humana, quia potest vocari et denominari cecitas humana; et sic cecitas est ens tantum suppositive et denominative. Et sic per oppositum ‘nichil’ potest accipi duobus modis. Uno modo pro eo quod non dicit aliquam entitatem positivam formaliter, ita quod non est aliquod ens vel aliqua entitas formaliter, licet sit ens denominative vel suppositive. Et isto modo privatio realis sicut cecitas est nichil formaliter, licet sit ens suppositive, quia supponit subiectum in quo fundatur. Alio modo accipitur ‘nichil’ negative et simpliciter protanto quia non dicit ens formaliter neque suppositive, sed omnia negat. Sicut ergo ‘ens’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet ens formaliter et ens suppositive, ita et ‘nichil’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet nichil formaliter et nichil simpliciter sive purum nichil. 46 Apparet ergo ex hiis quod illud idem quod est ens suppositive tantum, est nichil formaliter. Et patet quod illud quod est nichil formaliter tantum, est medium inter ens formaliter et nichil simpliciter sive purum nichil. Dico ergo quod ens rationis non est ens formaliter neque est nichil simpliciter sive purum nichil, sed est ens suppositive tantum sive nichil formaliter. Nam, ut dictum est, omne illud quod est ens suppositive tantum vel denominative tantum, est formaliter nichil, et econverso omne illud quod est nichil formaliter tantum, est ens suppositive. 47 Hic etiam est notandum quod privatio realis, puta cecitas, surditas et huiusmodi entia rationis, in aliquo conveniunt et in aliquo differunt. 5 hic … dictarum add. H 7–9 formaliter … denominative] R inverso ordine in H 16–17 ita … formaliter] H om. R 18 realis sicut] R sive H 19–20 negative] R privative H 24 ergo ex hiis] R autem H 27–28 dico … purum nichil] R om. H 31 illud] R om. H

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Nam ens rationis et privatio conveniunt in hoc quia nullum ipsorum ponit vel dicit aliquam entitatem formaliter propter quod unumquodque ipsorum dicitur esse nichil formaliter vel non positive. Conveniunt etiam in hoc quod unumquodque ipsorum supponit aliquam entitatem, et ideo dicuntur entia suppositive vel denominative tantum. Sed in hoc differunt quia ens rationis, licet non ponat formaliter aliquam entitatem, ergo negat aliquam entitatem, non tamen negat aliquam entitatem. Nec potest argui sic: ens rationis non ponit formaliter aliquam entitatem; ergo negat aliquam entitatem, nam consequentia illa non valet, quia aliud est non ponere aliquid et negare, sicut patet in alio exemplo: animal enim absolute acceptum non ponit sive non includit formaliter rationale, non tamen sequitur quod animal absolute acceptum neget sive excludat formaliter rationale. Sic ergo dico quod ens rationis non negat formaliter aliquam entitatem nec etiam ponit formaliter aliquam entitatem, sed bene supponit aliquam entitatem. Privatio vero realis, puta cecitas, non solum non ponit formaliter aliquam entitatem, ymo etiam negat sive privat | aliquam entitatem simpliciter, sicut cecitas non solum non dicit formaliter aliquam entitatem formaliter, ymo etiam negat sive privat visum. Unde concludo quod ens rationis est nichil formaliter sive nichil non positive; sed non potest dici quod sit nichil negative, cum ens rationis non neget aliquam entitatem. Neque etiam potest dici quod ens rationis sit simpliciter nichil sive purum nichil, cum ens rationis sit ens suppositive, | illud autem quod est purum nichil sive simpliciter, nullo modo est ens, neque formaliter neque suppositive. Sed hic est unum dubium tale. Si ens rationis sortitur nomen entis ab esse quod sibi supponitur: cum illud ens quod presupponitur enti rationis sit ens reale, ens rationis vocabitur ens reale, nam dicimus quod cecitas est ens reale sive privatio realis, quia privat ens reale, scilicet visum, et fundatur in ente reali, scilicet in animali. Ad hoc dico quod licet illud ens a quo ens rationis sortitur nomen entis suppositivi, sit ens reale, tamen quia illud ens reale non presupponitur enti rationis secundum suum esse reale, circumscripto opere intellectus (ymo hoc

1 privatio] realis add. H 2 vel dicit] R om. H 3 non] R om. H 6 differunt] R differt H 7 non tamen] R ergo H 8–9 nec potest … ergo negat] R om. H 13 excludat] R includat H 15 nec … entitatem] H om. R 16 vero] R om. H 17–19 aliquam … privat] H om. R 18 dicit] Hc ponit H 20 concludo] R concedo H 21 non] H om. R 25 suppositive] R positive H 26 hic] R hoc H | entis] R om. H 27 esse] R ente H 31 rationis] H om. R 33 secundum] R sed H

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habet ab opere rationis), ideo ens rationis non dicitur ens reale sed ens rationis, quia ens rationis non habet quod supponat ens reale neque habet quod sit ens reale suppositive nisi per opus rationis. Non sic autem est de cecitate et de quacumque alia privatione reali, nam cecitas per realem actionem expellit habitum sibi oppositum et fundatur in 5 animali secundum esse reale animalis, circumscripto opere intellectus, et ideo merito cecitas est ens reale sive privatio realis. Responsiones que fiunt ad rationes supra oppositas 50 Hiis premissis respondeo ad argumenta in oppositum que sunt superius

facta. Ad primum dico quod illa consequentia est bona, et antecedens et consequens sunt vera quod ens rationis distinguitur contra omne ens reale, et quod ens rationis est nichil, scilicet formaliter, et non positive. Et ad alia que sunt contra hec, dico quod divisio entis in ens reale et ens rationis non est divisio entis in ens et nichil simpliciter sive nonens simpliciter, sed est divisio entis in ens formaliter et ens suppositive. Nec est ibi divisio entis in ens formaliter et ens suppositive. Nec est ibi divisio entis in aliqua duo perfecte et equaliter participantia rationem entis, sed est divisio entis in duo quorum unum participat perfecte et aliud diminutive, sicut etiam hic: entium aliud positivum et aliud privativum sive negativum. Neque est similiter de albo et non albo ex una parte et de ente reali et de ente rationis ex alia parte, quia nonalbum excludit album simpliciter, sed ens rationis non excludit ens reale simpliciter, ymo ipsum supponit, ut dictum est. 51 Ad secundum argumentum dico quod, licet illud quod est nichil simpliciter sive quod est purum nichil, non predicetur de aliquo ente reali, tamen illud quod est tantum nichil formaliter sive illud quod est nichil tantum non positive, potest predicari denominative de ente reali; sicut patet de cecitate, nam cecitas, que est nichil vel nulla res formaliter, potest predicari denominative de homine, nam illa potest esse vera ‘Homo est cecus’. Modo sic est quod ens rationis non dicit nichil simpliciter, sed dicit nichil tantum formaliter. Et ideo potest predicari de ente reali. Unde illa est vera ‘Homo est prima intentio’ 3 suppositive] R sive positive H | rationis] R intellectus H 8 responsiones … supra add. H 10 bona] H vera R 11 contra] R in H 12 est] R non est H | positive] R suppositive H 15 entis] R om. H 16–17 nec … entis] R om. H 20 est] H om. R 21 de ente] R ens H 24 argumentum] H om. R | est] R om. H 28 est] RcH om. R 30 cecus] R cecitas H 32 prima] R primaria H

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vel ‘est species’. Sed verum est quod illud quod est rationis vel illud quod est nichil vel nulla res formaliter, non potest predicari de ente reali essentialiter. Unde iste sunt false: ‘Homo est nichil formaliter’, ‘Homo est nulla res formaliter’ vel ‘Homo est cecitas’. Potest tamen predicari denominative, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dico quod illa propositio est vera ‘Ens rationis est nichil formaliter’ sive ‘Ens rationis est nulla res formaliter’ sive ‘Ens rationis est non-ens formaliter’; sic etiam illa est vera ‘Cecitas est nulla res formaliter’, vel ‘nichil formaliter’ vel ‘non-ens formaliter’. Sed illa esset falsa ‘Ens rationis est nichil simpliciter’ vel ‘nulla res simpliciter’ vel ‘non-ens simpliciter’, idest ‘nullo modo est ens’, quia ens rationis aliquo modo est ens, quia est ens suppositive. Ista etiam non sunt contradictoria ‘Ens rationis est ens suppositive’ et ‘non est ens | formaliter’. Sed illa essent contradictoria ‘Ens rationis est ens formaliter’ et ‘non est ens formaliter’. Et etiam illa essent | contradictoria ‘Ens rationis est ens suppositive’ et ‘non est ens suppositive’. Et ideo ratio non valet. Ad quartum dico quod, licet excellens doctor magister Herveus multum subtiliaverit se ad faciendum magnum tractatum de secundis intentionibus, que sunt entia rationis, non propter hoc potest argui quod entia rationis non sint nichil formaliter, quia beatus Thomas, qui fuit excellentior eo, subtiliter et diffuse tractavit de peccato originali, veniali et mortali et disputavit etiam questiones de nichilo, et tamen secundum eummet et beatum Augustinum peccatum sive malum est formaliter nichil. Dico ergo ad argumentum quod si magister Herveus fecisset tractatum longum de eo quod est simpliciter nichil idest omnino nichil, tunc esset mirandum. Sed non est mirandum si fecit tractatum de eo quod est nichil solum formaliter, est tamen ens suppositive (tale autem ens est ens rationis), ymo tractare de tali ente rationis fuit valde utile et necessarium, quia per notitiam talis entis docemur qualiter res diversimode obiciuntur intellectui et quomodo diversificantur actus intelligendi et rationes obiective, sicut est utile scire quid sit et qualiter causatur peccatum, quia per notitiam peccati docemur qualiter in nobis regulantur actus mortales.

1 sed verum est] si verum est R verum est autem H 8 sic] R om. H 9 nichil … vel] R om. H 11 idest] R et H 14 ens] R ens H 15 essent] R sunt H 21 tractavit] R tractatum H 22 primum et] R om. H | etiam] R et etiam H 23 sive malum] R et nichilum H 25 nichil] R om. H | idest] R sive H 29 docemur] R docentur H 30 intellectui] H intellectus R 31 scire] R om. H

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Ad quintum dico sicut ad quartum, quod, licet esset inconveniens quod aliqua scientia tractaret de eo quod est omnino et simpliciter nichil, non tamen est inconveniens quod tractet de eo quod est nichil solum formaliter, cum illud tale sit ens suppositive, sicut non esset inconveniens esse aliquam scientiam que tractaret de peccato originali, 5 veniali vel mortali, que nichil formaliter dicuntur. Logicus ergo convenienter tractat de ente rationis, quod est nichil formaliter tantum, sed est ens secundum quid, scilicet suppositive. De quodam alio modo loquendi de ente rationis

55 Et quia ille modus ponendi, scilicet quod ens rationis sit formaliter 10

nichil, est forte difficilis et obscurus iuvenibus, ideo ego ponam unum alium modum loquendi de ente rationis, qui erit facilior et clarior, licet non verior. Et dico quod potest satis probabiliter teneri quod licet ens rationis sit nulla res formaliter sive nullum ens reale et per consequens sit nichil reale, non tamen sequitur quod sit formaliter nullum ens simpliciter vel nichil simpliciter, ymo dico quod ens rationis est formaliter ens, quia est ens rationis, quia in plus se habet ‘ens’ quam ‘ens rationis’, cum ens dividatur in ens reale et ens rationis. Unde dico quod ille propositiones sunt vere ‘Ens rationis formaliter est nulla res’ et ‘Ens rationis formaliter est nichil reale’; sed ille sunt false ‘Ens rationis est formaliter nullum ens’ et ‘Ens rationis est formaliter nichil’, nam sicut ista est vera ‘Accidens formaliter est nulla substantia’, tamen illa est falsa ‘Accidens est formaliter nullum ens vel nichil’, ita illa est vera ‘Ens rationis est formaliter nulla res et nichil reale’, tamen illa est falsa ‘Ens rationis est nullum ens formaliter’, quia ens rationis est formaliter ens. 56 Notandum est hic quod ‘res’ potest accipi duobus modis. Uno modo stricte pro eo quod est in rerum natura preter opus intellectus, et secundum quod descendit a ‘rato esse et firmo’ secundum aliquos; et sic ens rationis non est res, et ‘res’ isto modo accepta habet se in minus quam ‘ens’. Alio modo potest accipi ‘res’ large prout convertitur cum R60r ‘ente’ et prout secundum aliquos descendit | ab hoc verbo ‘reor, -ris’; et isto modo ens rationis sicut formaliter est ens rationis, ita formaliter est res rationis.

3 est] R om. H 8 ens] R om. H 13 licet] R li H 14–15 et … nichil reale] R om. H 15 formaliter] R om. H 21–23 nam … vel nichil] H om. R 29 quod] R quam H

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Notandum est etiam quod ille modus loquendi de ente rationis, licet 57 sit contra magistrum Herveum quantum ad modum quem ipse ponit, non tamen est contra eum quantum ad conclusionem, ymo concordat cum eo. Secundum ergo illam viam facile erit respondere ad argumenta superius posita. Nam potest dici ad primum quod, licet ens rationis non sit ens reale stricte accipiendo ‘ens reale’, non sequitur quod sit nichil simpliciter. Et per consequens divisio entis in ens reale et ens rationis non erit divisio in ens et nichil vel non-ens. Ad secundum dico quod quando ens rationis predicatur de ente reali, non predicatur illud quod est nichil formaliter de ente reali, ymo illud quod est formaliter ens predicatur denominative de ente reali, cum ens rationis sit formaliter ens | secundum istum modum loquendi de ente rationis. Ad tertium H110r dico quod, licet ens rationis sit nulla res stricte accipiendo ‘rem’, non tamen sequitur quod sit nullum ens simpliciter. Ad quartum dico quod magister Herveus tractando de ente rationis non tractavit de nichilo simpliciter, ymo tractavit de aliquo ente, cum ens rationis sit aliquod ens formaliter secundum istum modum loquendi de ente rationis. Ad quintum dico sicut ad quartum quod logica tractans de secundis intentionibus non tractat de nichilo simpliciter, cum ens rationis sit aliquod ens. Patet ergo quod ille secundus modus dicendi est magis facilis et magis clarus ad solvenda argumenta, sed primus modus, qui est magistri Hervei, est verior. Ad secundum argumentum principale

Ad secundum argumentum principale dico quod ens rationis distingui- 58 tur contra omne ens reale accipiendo ‘ens reale’ stricte. Et ad primam probationem que est in oppositum, dico quod ens rationis non habet causam realem. Et quando dicitur quod actus intelligendi est causa entis rationis et actus intelligendi est causa realis, dico quod, licet actus intelligendi sit ens reale, non tamen est causa realis vel actio realis, ymo 30 est causa vel actio solum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi sive secundum rationem. Et ideo non oportet quod illud quod dicitur effectus eius sit ens reale vel effectus realis, sed sufficit quod sit ens secundum rationem vel secundum nostrum modum intelligendi. 25

8 prius non] R om. H 15 de] secundis intentionibus vel de add. H 18–19 intentionibus] sive de hentibus (!) rationis H 19 tractat] R tractavit H 25 omne] R om. H 29 vel actio] R om. H 30–31 nostrum … secundum] R om. H

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Sed forte dicetur sic: actus intelligendi est actio secundum rationem et non realis; ergo actus intelligendi est ens secundum rationem, et non est ens reale (per locum ab inferiori ad suum superius constructive). Ad hoc dico quod argumentum ab inferiori ad suum superius cum dictione destruente vel diminuente non tenet constructive. Unde sicut illa est mala consequentia ‘Ovum est animal solum in potentia; ergo ovum est ens solum in potentia’, ita illa est mala consequentia ‘Actus intelligendi est actio secundum rationem; ergo est ens solum secundum rationem’, ymo actus intelligendi est verissimum ens reale. Nota tamen hic quod si actus intelligendi comparetur ad causam suam productivam, tunc actus intelligendi est actio realis, cum actio et actus productus sint idem realiter intrinsece, actus autem intelligendi sit actus realis productus in nobis; ergo est actio realis. Si vero actus intelligendi comparetur ad ens rationis vel ad quodcumque suum obiectum ut ad obiectum terminatur, tunc est actio secundum rationem. Posset autem aliter responderi ad probationem illam factam in oppositum, scilicet quod non semper effectus cause realis est ens reale. Nam homo est causa peccati et deformitatur in actu mortali, et tamen peccatum et deformitans non | sunt entia positiva realia. Et ideo ratio non concludit. Prima tamen responsio est melior in proposito. Ad secundum dico quod scientia refertur realiter ad suum scibile quando scibile est ens reale; sed quando scibile est ens rationis, tunc scientia refertur solum secundum rationem. Scibile autem, sive sit ens reale sive sit ens rationis, refertur semper secundum rationem. Et hoc intellexit Philosophus quinto Metaphisice. Potest etiam aliter responderi ad istud argumentum, scilicet quod nulla scientia est sic de ente rationis quin etiam aliquo modo sit de ente reali, saltim ut de materiali subiecto. Nam ens rationis non potest esse obiectum intellectus quin etiam simul cum eo et eodem actu intelligatur ens reale, sicut etiam non possumus intelligere privationes et negationes quin intelligatur simul cum eis et eodem actu habitus et entia positiva. Et hoc est quod dixit Avicenna cum dixit15 quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis; secunde intentiones sunt entia rationis,

4 argumentum] R om. H 6 ovum] R hovum H 8 solum … rationem] R rationis H 14 suum] R om. H 19 ratio] RcH om. R 21 realiter] R om. H 22–23 sed … autem] R om. H 24 semper] R solum H 27 aliquo modo] H om. R 29 simul] R sit H 15

Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75.

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sed prime sunt entia realia. Et sic logica est de ente rationis ut de formali obiecto, sed de ente reali ut de materiali obiecto. Unde poterat dici quod logica referatur realiter ad suum scibile materiale, sed refertur secundum rationem ad suum formale scibile sive ad suum formale obiectum (quod idem est). Ad tertium dico quod ens rationis non est per se existens realiter neque alteri inherens realiter. Et ideo non est neque substantia neque accidens neque ens reale; est tamen alteri inherens secundum rationem et nullum esse reale formaliter habet. Et ideo est ens secundum rationem sive ens rationis. Nota tamen hic quod non omne illud quod est inherens secundum rationem est ens rationis. Nam sapientia divina inheret secundum nostrum modum intelligendi sive secundum rationem essentie divine inquantum apprehendimus eam per modum | qualitatis cuiusdam informantis divinam essentiam, et tamen sapientia divina non est ens rationis, ymo est verum ens reale. Et ratio est quia, licet sapientia inhereat secundum rationem, habet tamen formaliter verum esse reale. Et ideo est ens reale, non ratione illius inherentie, sed ratione esse realis quod formaliter habet. Ens vero rationis sic inheret secundum rationem quod nullum esse reale formaliter dicit, licet dicat vel habeat esse reale suppositive. Ad quartum dico quod ‘esse quid creatum’ potest accipi duobus modis. Uno modo, quia est per se terminus realis creationis; et sic ens rationis non est quid creatum nec propter hoc sequitur quod sit Deus, quia solum illud ens increatum est Deus quod est ens reale et nullo modo causam habet. Alio modo potest dici aliquid ens creatum quia consequitur aliquid ex creatione alterius; et sic aliquod ens rationis erit creatum, cum aliquod ens rationis consequatur aliquod obiectum intellectum, non realiter sed secundum rationem, ex creatione vel productione actus intelligendi in intellectu. Vel potest dici brevius quod ens rationis est quid creatum non realiter, sed secundum rationem, et ideo non est ens reale, sed ens rationis.

3 quod logica] H om. R | realiter] R om. H 6 tertium] R secundum H | per] R pro H | realiter] R formaliter H 7 est] H om. R 8–10 alteri … sive] H om. R 14 per] R secundum H 15 informantis] H informans R 16 rationis] H om. R 18 et ideo … reale] R om. H 20 reale] R formale H sive reale add. Hm 23 quia] R qui H | per se] R om. H | sic] R isto modo H 24 est] R om. H 26 dici] R accipi H | ens] R om. H 27 rationis] H om. R 28 aliquod] R om. H 29 non … rationem] H om. R 30 in intellectu] H om. R

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Ad quintum dico quod ‘aliquid fundari in aliquo secundum esse suum reale’ potest intelligi duobus modis. Uno modo quod fundetur super rem secundum suum esse reale, remoto omni actu intelligendi et per opus nature; alio modo quod fundetur in re secundum suum esse reale, concurrente actu intelligendi et per operationem intellectus, inquantum ipsa res est intellecta et obiective in intellectu secundum suum esse reale. Hac distinctione premissa, dico quod illud quod fundatur in re secundum suum esse reale primo modo, semper est ens reale, sed illud quod fundatur in re secundum esse reale secundo modo, numquam est ens reale. Ens autem rationis numquam fundatur in re primo modo, sed aliquando secundo modo. Nota tamen hic quod licet ens rationis | numquam possit fundari in re nisi mediante actu intelligendi vel nisi concurrente actu intelligendi, non propter hoc oportet quod actus intelligendi sit fundamentum entis rationis, cum ens rationis fundetur in obiecto cognito, et non in actu intelligendi, ut dictum est supra. Sed verum est quod actus intelligendi est necessario requisitus ad hoc quod ens rationis fundetur in re, sicut patet in illo exemplo. Filiatio non potest fundari in filio nisi mediante paternitate vel nisi concurrente paternitate, et tamen paternitas non est fundamentum filiationis, sed est aliquid necessario requisitum ad hoc ut filiatio fundetur in filio, quia si cessaret paternitas, cessaret filiatio. Idem dico de actu intelligendi et de ente rationis quantum ad istud propositum. Nota etiam hic quod cum de ratione entis rationis sit quod fundetur in obiecto cognito ut cognitum est, tunc solum poterit ens rationis fundari in actu intelligendi quando actus intelligendi habebit rationem obiecti cogniti, sicut quando intelligo me intelligere, ens intelligitur, et alias non. Ad sextum dico quod ‘esse subiective in aliquo’ potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo realiter, alio modo secundum rationem tantum. Modo sic dico quod illud quod est subiective realiter in aliquo, semper est ens reale, sed illud quod est in aliquo subiective secundum rationem solum, non oportet quod sit ens reale. Ens autem rationis est solum subiective secundum rationem in ente reali intellecto. Et sic intellexit magister Herveus. 1 quod] H om. R 9 sed] R secundum H 10 reale] H est R 17 ens] H est R 24 etiam] R tamen et H 25 est] R ens H 26 habebit] R habet H 27 cogniti] R om. H | intelligo me intelligere] R intelligis H 29–30 dupliciter] R om. H 32–34 solum … rationem] H om. R

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Ad septimum dico quod obiectum intellectus comparatur ad intellectum in duplici ordine cause, scilicet vel in ordine cause moventis, vel in ordine cause terminantis. Modo sic est quod illud quod comparatur ad intellectum in ratione obiecti moventis, semper est ens reale, sed illud quod comparatur ad intellectum solum in ordine vel in genere cause terminantis solum, sive in ordine obiecti solum terminantis, non oportet quod sit ens reale. Non enim oportet quod omne obiectum intellectus sive omne quod intelligitur moveat intellectum. Alias privationes et negationes non possent a nobis intelligi, quia talia cum non habeant entitatem formaliter, non possunt movere. Et si queratur quando intellectus intelligit privationes et negationes et entia rationis, a quo movetur, tunc dico quod | tunc movetur ab ente reali. Nam ens reale quod est illud quod movet intellectum primo ad cognitionem sui, secundario movet ad cognitionem privationum et negationum et entium rationis. Cum igitur ens rationis comparetur ad intellectum in ordine obiecti terminantis solum et non moventis, non oportet quod ens rationis sit ens reale. Ad octavum dico quod illa maior est insufficiens. Nam aliquid habet esse in ratione obiective quod non est potentia rationis, nec actus intelligendi, nec dispositio ad actum intelligendi. Huiusmodi autem est ens rationis. Nec dicitur aliquid esse ens rationis quia sit ens rationis in ratione subiective, sed quia est in ratione obiective, modo quo supra positum est. Modo sic est quod illud quod est in ratione realiter, est ens reale, sed illud quod est in ratione obiective, non oportet quod sit ens reale. Ad nonum dico quod ens rationis potest dici large et improprie ens productum. Et quando queritur utrum eius productio sit realis vel secundum rationem, dico quod productio entis rationis non est realis, sed est productio rationis sive secundum rationem. Et quando dicitur ‘ergo erit dare ens rationis ante ens rationis’, dico quod non sequitur, quia, licet productio entis rationis sit productio secundum rationem, est tamen verum ens reale, quia aliud est esse actionem vel productionem

2 in] R om. H | vel] R om. H 5 solum] R om. H | vel in genere] R om. H 6 sive … terminantis] R om. H 7 enim] H om. R 12 quod] coni. add. om. RH 14 movet] R om. H 16 obiecti] R cause H 18 habet] R potest H 19 potentia] R in potentia H 20 nec] RcH om. R 21–22 sit … ratione] H om. R 22–23 sed quis … realiter] H om. R 29 dicitur] R queritur H queritur vel dicitur Hc 30 dico quod] R om. H 31 productio] R om. H 32 actionem vel] R om. H

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secundum rationem et aliud est esse ens rationis vel secundum rationem, ut declaratum est supra. Ad decimum dico quod productio primi entis rationis est verum ens reale, sed est solum | secundum rationem, ut dictum est supra. Ad undecimum dico quod illa maior propositio in aliquo sensu est vera et in aliquo sensu est falsa. In isto enim sensu est vera quod, sicut terminus actionis transeuntis realiter est in eo quod habet se passive realiter et non est in eo quod est agens realiter, ita ens rationis, quod est terminus actionis transeuntis secundum rationem, est in eo quod se habet passive secundum rationem et non est in eo quod est agens secundum rationem ut agens est. Sed non est vera in isto sensu, scilicet quod, sicut actio transiens realiter est idem cum termino suo et simul cum eo, ita actio transiens secundum rationem est semper vere idem cum termino suo et simul cum eo in eodem; ymo ista duo genera actionum in multis differunt, licet in aliquo conveniant. Sed magister Herveus accipit illam maiorem in illo sensu in quo est vera. Ad duodecimum dico quod aliqua possunt esse contradictoria adinvicem dupliciter. Uno modo per se et primo, sicut ens et non-ens, homo et non-homo; alio modo possunt aliqua esse contradictoria per se sed non primo, sicut homo et non-animal, et sicut accidens et non-ens. Hoc premisso, dico quod illa que sunt contradictoria primo modo, scilicet per se et primo, ita se habent quod totum illud ponit una pars contradictionis quod altera pars negat; unde tantum ponunt animal et ens quantum negant non-animal et non-ens. Sed quando aliqua contradicunt sibi secundo modo, scilicet per se et non primo, tunc non oportet quod tantum ponat una pars contradictionis quantum negat altera, unde non tantum ponit, vel dicit, homo quantum negat non-animal; alias homo esset equus, cum non-animal neget equum. Ens autem rationis et purum nichil contradicunt sibi non primo modo, sed secundo, idest contradicunt sibi per se et non primo. Et ideo non oportet quod ens rationis dicat formaliter ens reale, licet purum nichil neget ens reale. Ad tertium decimum dico quod illa maior est vera in proposito, sed illa minor est falsa. Et ad probationem: cum dicitur quod omnis relatio 1 secundum rationem] R rationis H 2 declaratum] R probatum H 3 entis] bis in R 7 passive] R patiens H 8 quod] R om. H 10 passive] R patiens H 12 quod] H om. R 13 vere] R om. H 14 ymo ista] H om. R 18 primo] modo perperam add. R 19 aliqua] R om. H 22 et primo] H om. R | illud] quod add. H 23 quod] R totum H | pars] R om. H | ponunt] H ponit vel dicit R 24 negant] H negat R 26 contradictionis] R om. H | altera] pars contradictionis add. H 27 dicit] R non dicit H 29 idest … sibi] R scilicet H

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reducitur ad predicamentum Relationis, dico quod verum est de relatione reali. Relatio autem rationis, nec aliquod ens rationis, non reducitur ad aliquod predicamentum, nisi forte denominative, inquantum entia rationis possunt predicari denominative de entibus realibus que 5 habent esse in predicamento reali. Ad quartum decimum dico quod non oportet quod illud quod pre- 79 supponit aliquid reale, sit formaliter ens reale. Nam privatio, puta cecitas, non est aliquid reale formaliter, et tamen presupponit ens reale, cum omnis privatio sit negatio in determinato subiecto. Et quando 10 dicitur quod illud quod est ‘nichil’, non presuponit aliquid, dico quod verum est de eo quod est omnino nichil, sed illud quod est solum nichil reale formaliter, potest aliquid aliud presupponere, sicut patet de | pri- H111v vatione. Patet ergo quod ens rationis potest presupponere ens reale, et tamen in se non est aliquid reale formaliter. 15

Ad tertium principale

Ad tertium principale dico quod ens rationis est modus consequens 80 obiectum intellectus ut cognitum est. Et cum Deus possit a nobis intelligi, dico quod ens rationis fundatur in Deo intellecto a nobis sicut fundatur in aliis rebus a nobis intellectis. 20 Et ad primam probationem que est in oppositum, dico quod non est 81 inconveniens quod ens diminutum conveniat Deo secundum rationem. Sed bene esset inconveniens quod ens diminutum conveniret Deo realiter, ens vero rationis convenit Deo secundum rationem. Vel posset aliter dici quod non est inconveniens quod ens diminutum conveniat Deo, 25 sed bene esset inconveniens quod ens conveniret Deo diminute. Aliud est enim dicere ‘Ens diminutum convenit Deo’ et aliud est dicere ‘Ens diminute convenit Deo’. Vel posset dici quod ens diminutum potest esse duplex. Uno modo quia diminuit | de perfectione; et tale ens diminu- R62r tum non convenit Deo. Alio modo est ens sic diminutum quod non 30 diminuit realiter de perfectione eius cui convenit; et tale ens potest convenire Deo. Ens autem rationis, licet sit ens diminutum, non tamen 1 dico] H dicitur R 2 non] R om. H 5 reali] H om. R 7–8 puta cecitas] H pura tenta R 9 negatio] R om. H 12 aliquid aliud] coni. aliud R aliquid H 17 et] R om. H 18 dico] R dato H 22–25 diminutum … quod ens] H om. R 25–26 aliud … convenit deo] H et aliud est dicere quod alicui conveniat ens diminutum et aliud quod sibi conveniat ens diminutum R 27 vel posset dici] H potest etiam aliter dici R 28 de perfectione] R perfectionem H 29 ens] R om. H 30 de perfectione] R aliquid et perfectiones H

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diminuit realiter de perfectione eius cui competit. Et ideo potest competere Deo et fundari in Deo, quando Deus a nobis intelligitur. 82 Ad secundum dico quod ens rationis est in anima obiective, non quia sit semper obiectum, sed quia est modus obiecti ut obiectum est. Ad quatuor argumenta in principio posita

5

83 Hiis visis, respondeo ad quatuor argumenta que fuerunt posita supra in

principio huius capituli. Et ad primum dico quod minor est vera, sed maior est falsa. Nam actus intelligendi non distinguitur contra omne ens existens extra animam, de quo ente extra animam loquitur16 Philosophus sexto Metaphisice, ymo actus intelligendi continentur sub ente extra animam, cum actus intelligendi sit in predicamento Qualitatis. Sed verum est quod actus intelligendi distinguitur contra omne ens reale existens extra animam subiective. Sed hoc non est ad propositum, nec vadit ad intentionem Philosophi. Utrum autem actus intelligendi et conceptus intellectus et species intelligibilis sint idem vel non, non pertinet ad presentem materiam. 84 Ad secundum dico quod minor est vera, sed maior est falsa. Nam protanto dicitur aliquid esse ens rationis quia est modus consequens rem inquantum est obiective in ratione, et non pro alia causa dicitur aliquid esse ens rationis. Neque etiam est verum quod ratio utatur ente rationis vice obiecti realis, ymo ens rationis consequitur obiectum inquantum ratio iam est usa obiecto. Et ad probationem dico quod non oportet quod illud quod est extra animam subiective, sit ens reale, dummodo sit in anima obiective, sicut est in proposito. Nam licet ens rationis non sit in anima subiective, ymo sit extra animam subiective, est tamen in anima obiective modo quo dictum est supra. Et ideo non oportet quod sit ens reale. Illud autem ens quod non est in anima subiective neque obiective, bene est ens reale. 85 Ad tertium dico quod ens intentionale potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo large pro omni eo quod per modum alicuius representationis 1 eius] RHc om. H | competit] H convenit R 6 argumenta] H om. R | supra] R om. H 9 ens] R ens reale H 13 reale] R om. H 15 et conceptus … et] R om. H 16 pertinet] H pertinent R 17 secundum] R tertium H 22 iam] H om. R 24 sicut] H sic R 25 sit … subiective] R om. H 26 tamen] R om. H 27 non] R om. H 29 tertium dico] R quartum dicendum H 30 alicuius representationis] R representativi H 16

Metaph. VI 2, 1026a34-b2.

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ducit intellectum in cognitionem alterius, sive sit species intelligibilis, sive sit actus intelligendi, sive conceptus mentis. Et isto modo hoc nomen ‘intentionale’ potest extendi ad omnem similitudinem sive ad quodcumque exemplar ducens in cognitionem rei. Et sic accipiendo 5 ‘intentionale’ actus intelligendi est ens intentionale. Et ‘intentionale’ isto modo acceptum non est ens rationis, ymo est verum ens reale. Alio modo potest accipi ‘intentionale’ stricte prout distinguitur contra omne ens reale; et tale ens intentionale est ens rationis, sed actus intelligendi non est tale ens intentionale. Et ideo ratio non valet. 10 Ad quartum dico quod consequentia est vera, sed antecedens est fal- 86 sum. Et ad probationem antecedentis dico quod actus intelligendi est in tertia specie Qualitatis. Et quando dicitur quod ea que sunt in tertia specie Qualitatis, sunt qualitates sensibiles, dico quod passio et passibilis qualitas non solum dicunt qualitates sensibiles sed etiam intelligi15 biles qualitates. De quarum numero est actus intelligendi, cum secundum Philosophum, tertio De anima17 intelligere sive actus intelligendi sit quoddam pati sive quedam passio. Explicit primus articulus, de ente rationis.

2 hoc] H potest ostendi R 3 potest extendi] H om. R 8 ens] H om. R 10 quartum] R quintum H | est … sed] R non est vera et H 11 antecedentis] R consequentis H 14 etiam] R om. H 16 sit] R est H 18 primus articulus] R tractatus H 17

De anima III 5, 430a10–15.

appendix h STEPHANUS DE REATE

I. Tractatus de quibusdam logice principiis pars prima: De primis et secundis intentionibus 5

codex Bratislavensis, Wroslaw, Univ. IV Q 4, foll. 74ra–83vb editio quam vir doctus Iulius Domanski edendam curavit in Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum 12 (1967), 75–106.

B d

Introductio 1

Sicut dicit1 Philosophus primo Posteriorum, ignoratis principiis posteriora B74ra 10 ignorare necesse est. Cuius propositionis ratio potest esse quoniam cognitio posteriorum ex priorum cognitione dependet, sicut cognitio conclusionis dependet ex notitia premissarum. Et ideo dicit2 Philosophus primo Phisicorum quod ex notioribus nobis tamquam ex prioribus devenimus in certiora et notiora natura. Cum igitur cognitio veri15 tatis sequentium scientiarum ex cognitione scientiae logicalis velut ex priori dependeat, cum ipsa sit scientia scientiarum ad omnium methodorum principium viam habens,3 sequitur quod in aliis scientiis volentes fructum amplecti, quod in floribus logice primitus velut in quibusdam principiis delectentur, maxime cum ipsa sit methodus per quam in aliis 20 scientiis speculari possunt veritatem. Unde quidam ait quod logica est rationalis scientia que subtilissimis rationibus in omnibus scientiis vera discernit a falsis. Hinc est quod nunc plerique studentes propter defectum logice ignorantie tetris tenebris involvuntur. Quare cum ipsi sine

ad 9 incipit tractatus de secundis intentionibus stephani de reato ordinis predicatorum add. B 14 natura] coni. nature B d 18 quod] B saepius del. d 23 tetris] apte coni. d ceteris B | quare] coni. quia B d | ipsi sine] coni. ipsa B d 1 2 3

Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 2, 72a37-b4. Aristotle, Phys. I 1, 184a16–18. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus I, cap.1.

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appendix h

logica esse discipuli veritatis volunt, fiunt in aliis scientiis magis erroris, existentes veritatis humane destituti. 2 Quapropter, carissime et dilecte frater, considerans erga me vestre dilectionis affectionem, considerans vestri intellectus instituta, nobilissimum cogitavi vobis in hoc opusculo quedam logice principia declarare, 5 quorum imbuti veritate in scientiis aliis veritatem apertius et perfectius cognoscatis. Nam, ut ait4 Hieronimus, hec est vera amicitia copulata quam non utilitas rei familiaris subdola et palpans adulatio, sed Dei timor et sacrarum scripturarum studia concilient. Ut autem intentionem huius operis levius videatis, et ipsum in sequentibus dividemus, 10 imponentes ei finem cum veritate dictorum. Quod facere concedat qui est in secula benedictus. Amen.

pars prima de primis et secundis intentionibus 3 Quoniam Avicenna docet5 in sua Prima Philosophia ‘Loyca est de secun- 15

dis intentionibus, adiunctis primis’, etideo congruum iudico, antequam tradamus notitiam principiorum logice, quod in hac prima parte nostri tractatus de ipsis primis et secundis intentionibus aliquid disseramus, videntes primo in hoc capitulo quid sit intentio.

1 volunt] suppl. coni. nolint suppl. d om. B | magis] B magistri d 4–5 nobilissimum] corr. d nobilium B 8 quam] que B | utilitas] suppl. coll. textu Hieronymi | sed] d scilicet B 9 concilient] d consilient B 4 Hieronymus, Epist. 53, 1 (Migne PL 22, col. 540): “Vera enim illa necessitudo est et Christi glutino copulata quam non utilitas rei familiaris, non praesentia tantum corporum, non subdola et palpans adulatio, sed Dei timor et divinarum scripturarum studia concilient”. 5 Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75.

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capitulum i quid sit intentio Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod, ut docet6 Herveus, questione 4 prima, articulo primo De intentionibus, intentio potest accipi dupliciter: 5 uno modo ex parte intelligentis, alio modo ex parte rei intellecte. De intentione sumpta ex parte intelligentis

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Intentio sumpta ex parte intelligentis sunt omnia accidentia que sunt in intellectu possibili subiective, ut sunt species intelligibiles, actus intelligendi, conceptus mentis et verbum. Quod autem ista accidentia dicantur intentiones ex parte intelligentis, patet dupliciter. Primo quia: Intentio ex parte intelligentis est illa que intellectum intelligentis ducit in cognitionem rei intellecte per modum representantis ipsam. Cum igitur predicta accidentia sint huiusmodi, igitur dicuntur vere intentiones ex parte intelligentis. Prima propositio patet ex diffinitione que communiter ponitur talis intentionis. Secunda propositio declaratur per hoc quoniam tam species quam actus, conceptus et verbum per modum representantis representant intellectui rem intellectam. Verbi gratia, nam sicut imago Herculis representans aspectum videntis Herculem potest dici ut sic intentio ex parte videntis, sic talia accidentia representantia in intellectu rem intellectam sunt intentiones ex parte intelligentis. Secundo patet idem sic. Sicut se habent accidentia rei intellecte ad rem intellectam, sic se habent accidentia intelligentis intellectus ad ipsum. Sed accidentia sumpta ex parte rei intellecte reducuntur ad genus intentionis sumpte ex parte rei intellecte. Igitur accidentia que sunt species intelligibiles, | actus intelligendi, conceptus mentis et verbum, reducuntur ad genus intentionis sumpte ex parte intelligentis. Et ideo est notandum quod quando dicit7 Avicenna quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis, non est intelligendum de intentionibus sumptis ex parte intelligentis, quoniam logica non est de

6 7

Hervaeus Natalis, De intentionibus, Dist. I, q. 1. Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75 (videas nostram Appendicem F, sect. 53).

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B74va

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appendix h

specie intelligibili, actu intelligendi, conceptu mentis et verbo, que sunt tales intentiones. De intentione sumpta ex parte rei intellecte 8 Intentio sumpta ex parte rei intellecte est res intellecta inquantum est

intellecta, quecumque sit illa. Dico ‘inquantum intellecta est’ quoniam 5 res ut sic non dicitur intentio, ut docet8 Herveus, articulo quinto de primis intentionibus: ‘res non est intentio nisi inquantum actu intelligitur’. Et secundum istum modum intentio potest sic diffiniri: intentio est in quam actu intellectus tendit. Ratio autem huius est: Quoniam intentio sic accepta sit res intellecta, et res intellecta sit in quam actu tendit 10 intellectus, sequitur quod intentio ex parte rei intellecte sit res in quam actu intellectus tendit. Hoc autem simili modo possumus declarare sic nam: sicut se habet res volita in ratione subiecti ad voluntatem, sic se habet res intellecta in ratione subiecti ad intellectum. Sed res volita dicitur intentio voluntatis quia in ipsam tendit voluntas, quemadmo- 15 dum bibere, quod est res volita bibentis, dicitur intentio sitientis. Igitur res intellecta dicitur intentio intellectus quia in ipsam intellectus tendit. Et hoc est esse intentionem ex parte rei intellecte. De quodam dubio 9 Sed hic est dubium. Nam cum intentio ex parte intelligentis possit 20

esse res intellecta, cum species intelligibiles et alia accidentia possint intelligi, sequitur quod intentio ex parte intelligentis possit esse intentio ex parte rei intellecte. Respondetur

10 Ad hoc autem est dicendum quod intentio ex parte intelligentis (puta 25

B74vb

species intelligibilis) potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo ratione obiecti cogniti, puta pro eo quod cognoscitur; et isto modo species intelligibilis, actus intelligendi et alia hiis | similia possunt dici res intellecte, et per consequens intentiones ex parte rei intellecte. Alio modo potest accipi 1 intelligibili] conceptu perperam inserendo add. B concepta add. d | conceptu] om. B d 29 intentiones] suppl. om. B d 8

Hervaeus Natalis, De intentionibus, Dist. I, q. 5.

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in ratione medii cognoscendi, puta pro eo quo mediante aliquid aliud cognoscitur; et sic species intelligibilis dicitur ex parte rei intelligentis, quoniam ut sic talis species non est res intellecta nec obiectum cognitum, sed est quoddam medium quo mediante intellectus attingit obiectum cognitum et rem intellectam. Verbi gratia, imagine existente in speculo, possum ipsa uti dupliciter. Uno modo ut obiecto cognito, proquanto ad ipsum terminatur cognitio; et sic talis imago potest dici intentio ex parte rei cognite. Alio modo possum ipsa uti ut quodam medio quo mediante venio in cognitionem; et sic talis imago potest dici intentio ex parte intelligentis vel cognoscentis. Sic autem est in proposito. Nam si species intelligibilis sumatur ut obiectum cognitum, erit intentio ex parte rei intellecte, et si sumatur ut medium cognoscendi, intentio erit ex parte intelligentis, modo supradicto. Postquam manifestavimus in generali quid sit intentio et quid nomi- 11 ne ‘intentionis’ importetur, nunc declarare intendimus quid sit prima intentio. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum: ut patet per Herveum pluries in tractatu De intentionibus, intentio prima est duplex, scilicet materialis et in concreto, et formalis et in abstracto. In hoc autem capitulo ostendere intendimus quid sit intentio prima materialiter et in concreto sumpta.

capitulum ii de prima intentione materialiter et in concreto sumpta Circa quod sciendum est quod intentio prima materialiter est omne ens 12 reale intellectum ut intellectum est, sive illud ens reale sumatur indefi25 nite (ut homo, lapis, leo, bos, equus, substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et similia), sive illud ens sumatur singulariter et particulariter (ut Petrus, Martinus, hic lapis, quidam leo, aliquis bos, et similia). Quid sit ens reale 13

Ut autem sciatur quid sit ens reale, est sciendum quod ens | reale B75ra 30 est illud quod habet esse in rerum natura, circumscripta operatione intellectus, sicut, verbi gratia, omnia entia in nostro conspectu que

1 aliquid] suppl. om. B d 13 intentio] suppl. om. B d verba del. d 31–782.1 omnia … intellectui] suppl. coni.

31 sicut verbi gratia] B quae

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appendix h

obiciuntur nostro intellectui. Nam si numquam intellectus intelligeret, ista entia essent entia realia, puta animal, homo, lapis, leo, bos, et similia. Et ideo, cum ista entia realia et alia intelligantur, inquantum intelliguntur, vocantur prime intentiones materialiter sive in concreto. A quo ens reale intellectum dicatur intentio

5

14 Cum igitur supra ostensum est quid est intentio materialiter dicta, nunc

restat videre a quo ens reale intellectum—quod est prima intentio in concreto—dicatur intentio et dicatur res intellecta. Circa quod sciendum est quod ens reale dicitur prima intentio a primitate primi generis intelligibilium; est autem primum genus intelligibilium genus entium realium. Et idcirco, cum queritur unde habet prima intentio in concreto quod dicatur prima, est dicendum quod hoc habet quia talis intentio est ens reale. Ratio autem quare ens reale dicatur primum genus intelligibilium est quia, si debeat intelligi ens reale et ens rationis, ens reale intelligitur prius et ens rationis intelligitur posterius, ut infra ostendetur. 15 Dicitur autem ens reale prima intentio in concreto quoniam est subiectum intentionalitatis in abstracto. Et ideo, sicut murus dicitur concretive albus quia est subiectum albedinis, ita ens reale intellectum dicitur concretum in esse intentionis quia est subiectum intentionalitatis in abstracto que ipsum consequitur dum intelligitur. Dicitur ulterius ens reale prima intentio ab ipsa intentionalitate cuius est subiectum. Cuius ratio est quia impossibile est quod aliquid subiectum sit alicuius forme accidentalis quin ab ipsa forma denominetur in concreto, sicut impossibile est quod aliquid sit subiectum quantitatis quin sit quantum a quantitate denominatum. Cum igitur ens reale intellectum sit subiectum intentionalitatis, que est quedam forma accidentalis secundum intellectum, relinquitur quod ab ipsa dicatur intentio. 16 Dicitur autem | ens reale intellectum ab actu intelligendi. Nam B75rb sicut res visa dicitur visa actu videndi inquantum videtur, sic ens reale dicitur intellectum actu intelligendi inquantum intelligitur. Ex quibus elicio istam conclusionem quod esse intentionem non convenit enti reali realiter, quia tunc ens reale non intellectum esset intentio, quod est contra rationem intentionis sumpte ex parte rei intellecte, que intentio est res intellecta ut intellecta est. Igitur esse intentionem convenit enti 2 realia] suppl. om. B d denominetur B d.

23 aliquid] B aliquod d

24 denominetur] coni. non

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reali secundum rationem, quod est esse intellectum obiective. Et ideo supra dictum est quod ens reale intellectum dicitur intentio inquantum est intellectum. De istis propositionibus ‘Ens reale est intellectum’,‘Ens reale intellectum est intentio’

5

Habito a quo prima intentio in concreto dicatur prima et a quo dicatur 17 intentio, nunc vero videre restat quomodo se habeant iste propositiones ‘Ens reale est intellectum’; ‘Ens reale intellectum est intentio’. Ubi considerandum est quod, dato quod quelibet istarum propositionum sit 10 accidentalis et denominativa, aliter est denominativa prima et aliter est denominativa secunda. Quod autem utraque istarum propositionum sit accidentalis patet quia: Predicatum in ordine ad subiectum non habet se substantialiter, cum nec esse intellectum nec esse intentionem ponatur in diffinitione exprimente essentiam nominis,9 ut patet. Igitur sunt 15 accidentales, quia tam esse intellectum quam esse intentionem accidit enti reali. Et quia omnes propositiones accidentales sunt denominative, idcirco tales propositiones dixi accidentales et denominativas. Quod autem premisse propositiones non sint eodem modo denominative patet sic. De duplici denominatione

20

Ubi sciendum est quod denominatio in propositionibus accidentalibus 18 est duplex: quedam est denominatio ab intrinseco et quedam ab extrinseco. Denominatio ab intrinseco est quando denominans est subiective in denominato, sicut cum dicimus ‘Homo est album’; albedo enim 25 dicitur denominative de homine ab intrinseco, quia subiective est in homine denominato ‘albo’. | Et secundum istum modum ista propo- B75va sitio non est denominativa ‘Ens reale est intellectum’, quoniam actus intelligendi a quo ens reale dicitur intellectum, non est subiective in ente reali quod intelligitur, sed est subiective in ipso intellectu intelli30 gente. Ista vero propositio ‘Ens reale intellectum est intentio’ predicto modo denominationis potest dici denominativa, quia intentionalitas a qua ens reale dicitur intellectum, est subiective in ipso ente reali. 14 nominis] hominis B d 9

Sc. ‘ens reale’.

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19

Denominatio ab extrinseco est quando denominans non est in denominato sed est in alio subiective, sicut actio que denominat agens non est in agente sed in patiente subiective, et motus qui denominat movens non est in movente sed in mobili subiective, ut patet10 tertio Phisicorum. Et isto modo denominationis actus intelligendi denominat rem intellectam, quia ipse actus intelligendi subiective est in intellectu, et non in re intellecta. 20 Est autem notandum hic quod actus intelligendi potest comparari ad duo, scilicet ad suum subiectum in quo est, quod subiectum est intellectus possibilis; et sic talis actus denominat intellectum intelligentem, eoquod intellectus formaliter dicitur intelligens per actum intelligentis qui in eo est subiective, sicut potentia visiva informata formaliter dicitur videns per actum visionis que in tali potentia dicitur esse subiective. Similiter actus intelligendi potest comparari ad obiectum, quod obiectum terminat ipsum actum, que est res intellecta; et sic actus intelligendi denominat rem intellectam ab extrinseco, modo supradicto. 21 Si autem queratur quomodo actus intelligendi denominetur quando intellectus actu intelligit actum intelligendi—quia ut sic actus intelligendi dicitur res intellecta—, est dicendum quod posito quod quando intellectus intelligit actu actum intelligendi, intelligat ipsum per actum reflexum distinctum realiter ab actu intelligendi recto—quod credo B75vb verum—| tunc, cum dicitur ‘actus intelligendi est in intellectu’, est denominatio ab intrinseco, quia dato quod talis actus intelligendi reflexus sit subiective in intellectu, non est tum subiective in actu intelligendi quem denominat intellectum; et ideo denominatur ab extrinseco et non ab intrinseco. Si autem ponatur quod actus intelligendi rectus qui intelligitur, et actus intelligendi reflexus quo intelligitur talis actus, ponatur esse idem realiter—ut multi ponunt; quod non credo verum—, tunc talis denominatio poterit dici ab intrinseco, non sicut subiecti ab accidente (quoniam actus reflexus ut sic non est accidens actus recti), sed sicut eiusdem a seipso aliter et aliter considerati.

18 actu] suppl. coni. 10

19 quod] suppl. om. B d

Cf. Aristotle, Phys. III 1, 200b32–201a3.

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Utrum prius ens reale dicatur ‘intellectum’ quam ‘intentio’

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Ostenso quomodo premisse propositiones non dicuntur eodem modo 22 denominative, nunc vero inquirendum restat an prius ens reale dicitur ‘intellectum’ quam ‘intentio’. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod aliquid dici prius altero, quantum ad ‘prius’ spectat, potest dici dupliciter: uno modo secundum tempus, alio modo secundum naturam. Si igitur accipiatur ‘prius’ secundum tempus, sic ens reale non prius est intellectum quam intentio, quoniam in eodem instanti temporis quo ens reale est intellectum, est intentio, cum res intellecta sit intentio, et intentio in concreto sit res intellecta. Si autem accipiatur secundum naturam ‘prius’, sic ens reale est prius intellectum quam intentio, inquantum esse intentionem fundatur in ente reali mediante esse intellecto. Unde quando aliqua sic se habent quod unum in esse presupponit aliud—dato quod sint convertibilia, inquantum sunt simul tempore tam illud quam aliud—, quod supponitur datur prius natura eo cui presuponitur. Et ideo, quia esse intellectum in ente reali presupponitur intentioni, propterea secundum naturam prius est ens reale intellectum quam intentio. Hoc autem potest in simili ostendi. Licet enim nix in eodem instanti 23 | temporis simul sit quanta et alba, cum non possit dari aliquod instans B76ra in quo non fiat nix non alba, tamen, cum ipsa albedo fundetur in nive mediante quantitate, quantitas erit prius secundum naturam. Et sic isto modo, cum intentio in ente reali fundetur mediante esse intellecto, erit per consequens ipso posterius secundum naturam. De quodam dubio

Sed hic est unum dubium. Nam si nix est prius secundum naturam 24 quanta quam alba, et ens reale est prius intellectum quam intentio, sequitur quod in illo priori nix sit quanta et non alba, et ens reale sit intellectum et non intentio; que omnia sunt falsa. 30

Respondetur

Ad hoc autem est dicendum quod prioritas secundum naturam non 25 est esse hoc sine hoc, sed esse hoc mediante hoc. Et ideo non potest 20 possit dari] coni. potest dari d potest dare B intellecto] intellectum B d

21 tamen] suppl. d om. B

23

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appendix h

argui in prioritate nature ‘Hoc est prius; igitur in illo priori est, non existente illo respectu cuius dicitur esse prius’. Et ideo, dato quod nix sit prius secundum naturam quanta quam alba, et ens reale sit prius intellectum quam intentio, tamen non est in illo priori nix quanta et non alba; et ens reale sic est intellectum in illo priori quod est intentio. 5 In prioritate autem temporis, secundum quam attenditur esse hoc sine hoc, ille modus argumentandi tenet. Utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad primam intentionem in concreto 26 Hoc igitur sic declarato: quia iam ostensum est quod ens reale intellec- 10

tum est prima intentio materialiter sive in concreto, nunc restat videre utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad hoc genus intentionis. Ubi considerandum est quod aliquid pertinere ad primam intentionem in concreto potest intelligi dupliciter, ut docet11 Herveus articulo quarto De primis intentionibus. Uno modo positive; et isto modo solum entia positiva (ut homo, animal, lapis, et similia) ut intelliguntur pertinent ad genus intentionis sumpte in concreto. Et isto modo privationes rb B76 reales non pertinent ad genus talis intentionis, | cum non sint entia positiva. Alio modo aliquid pertinet ad primam intentionem in concreto sumptam negative. Et isto modo negationes et privationes entium realium, ut sunt terminus actus intelligendi, possunt reduci ad primam intentionem in concreto acceptam. 27 Quod autem hoc sit verum potest ostendi dupliciter. Primo sic. Illud pertinet ad primam intentionem in concreto quod convenit rebus, circumscripta operatione intellectus. Sed esse cecum, esse non-hominem, esse surdum convenit rebus, circumscripta operatione intellectus. Probatur quia: Homo realiter est cecus, realiter est surdus, et lapis realiter est non-homo. Igitur talia pertinent ad primam intentionem in concreto. Secundo sic. Affirmatio et negatio pertinent ad idem genus, licet unum pertineat positive ut affirmatio, et aliud pertineat negative ut negatio, ut homo et non-homo, videns et cecus. Sed homo et videns reducuntur ad genus intentionis sumpte materialiter. Igitur non-homo et cecus reducuntur ad idem genus intentionis.

1 in] suppl. d 11

7 tenet] tenetur B d

De intentionibus, Dist. I, q. 4.

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De duplici dubio

Sed contra premissa duplex est dubium. Primum est quia: Communiter 28 doctores, et maxime sanctus Thomas voluit12 quod tales privationes reducerentur ad ens rationis. Sed nullum ens rationis potest esse prima 5 intentio in concreto. Igitur tales privationes non reducuntur ad genus talis intentionis. Secundum dubium est quia: Quod est prima intentio in concreto, est res intellecta, ut patet ex dictis. Sed privatio non potest esse res intelleca, cum non sit ens; quod autem non est, non convenit sciri, ut patet13 primo Posteriorum. Igitur nulla privatio potest dici prima 10 intentio in concreto. Respondetur

Ad primum dicendum est quod ista propositio ‘Privatio est ens ratio- 29 nis’ est falsa de virtute sermonis, quia quod non est ens, non est ens rationis, cum ens rationis sit ens, ut patet14 secundo Metaphisice. Et per 15 consequens negatio, que ens non est, esset ens, quod est contradictio. | B76va Et idcirco sic intelligendo istam propositionem—salva reverentia istam ponentium—propositio est falsa. Si autem intelligant quod privatio est ens rationis quod quando intellectus utitur ea vice entis positivi (ut cum dicimus ‘Intelligo cecum’), tunc, cum talis privatio non possit habere 20 rationem entis positivi nisi per opus intellectus, tunc privatio reducitur ad genus entis rationis; et isto sensu propositio est concedenda. Sed tunc ratio non est ad propositum, quia loquitur de privatione ratione privativi, et non ratione positivi. Ad secundum est dicendum quod, dato quod non ens non possit 30 25 intelligi directe, proquanto non intelligitur nisi intelligatur ens, potest tamen intelligi indirecte et ex consequenti. Et quando dicitur quod illud quod non est, non contingit sciri, dico quod verum est directe, sed non est verum indirecte. 9 sciri] d scire B d

9–10 prima intentio] privatio B d

20 intellectus] intellectum B

12 E.g. In IV Arist. Metaph., nr. 540: “Nam unum (sc. esse), quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quas dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus”; cf. ibid., nr. 560 et In XII Arist. Metaph., nr. 2420. 13 Anal. Post. I 2, 71b25–26. 14 Aristotle, Metaph. VI 4, 1027b17 sqq.

788

appendix h Utrum figmenta possint reduci ad primam intentionem in concreto

31 Ulterius autem post premissa restat inquirere utrum figmenta—que

B76vb

significant quiddam impossibile secundum naturam, ut hircocervus, mons aureus, et similia—possunt reduci ad primam intentionem in concreto. Ubi est sciendum quod in hoc videtur stare ratio eius quod 5 potest esse prima intentio in concreto quod in sua ratione non includat esse obiective in intellectu vel aliquod esse secundum rationem. Quo premisso, cum queritur utrum predicta figmenta possint esse prima intentio in concreto, dicendum est quod sic. Primo quia talia in sua ratione formali non includunt aliquid pertinens ad intellectum—proba- 10 tio: Si diffinias montem aureum, dices quod est mons de auro, quorum nullum pertinet ad intellectum; similiter si diffinias hircocervum, dices quod est animal compositum ex hirco et cervo, quorum etiam nullum pertinet ad intellectum. Igitur talia possunt esse prima intentio—. Secundo quia, sicut complexum ex partibus impossibilibus secundum 15 rem pertinere potest ad intentionem in concreto (ut istud ‘Homo est asinus’), | sic incomplexum compositum ex partibus impossibilibus secundum rem (ut hircocervus) pertinere potest ad genus prime intentionis materialiter dicte. De duplici dubio

20

32 Sed est hic duplex dubium. Primum est quia: Mons aureus et hirco-

cervus sunt quedam figmenta. Sed figmentum est ens rationis, cum sit ens secundum animam, quia est ens fictum ab anima. Igitur non potest pertinere ad primam intentionem in concreto. Secundum dubium est quia: Illud quod pertinet ad primam intentionem in concreto, habet 25 esse, remota operatione intellectus. Sed, remota operatione intellectus, talia non sunt, ut patet. Igitur non possunt esse prima intentio in concreto. Respondetur 33 Ad primum est dicendum quod ista propositio ‘Hircocervus est figmen- 30

tum’ est accidentalis sicut15 ista ‘Homo est albus’. Et ideo, sicut non sequitur ‘Homo est albus; albus est accidens; igitur homo est accidens’,

15

‘Sicut’ stands here for ‘eodem modo quo’.

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ita non sequitur ‘Hircocervus est figmentum; figmentum est accidens secundum animam includens aliquid pertinens ad animam; ergo hircocervus est ut sic ens secundum animam’. Ad secundum est dicendum quod ista propositio nisi bene intelli- 34 5 gatur non est vera. Sunt enim multa accidentia in intellectu obiective que, remota operatione intellectus, esse non habent, ut patet de verbo16 secundum multos, et tamen verbum est vera qualitas realis nichil includens secundum rationem in sua ratione formali. Tamen quidquid sit de virtute propositionis, est sciendum quod ‘aliquid non habere esse nisi 10 per operationem intellectus’ potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quia est ens fictum ab intellectu; et isto modo potest dici quod hircocervus est ens non habens esse preter operationem intellectus. Alio modo quia illud tale formaliter includit aliquid quod pertinet ad operationem intellectus. Et isto modo falsum est dicere quod hircocervus, non-homo non 15 haben esse preter operationem intellectus, quia non includunt formaliter aliquid pertinens ad operationem intellectus. Et istud sufficit ad hoc quod pertineat ad primam intentionem in concreto.

capitulum iii de prima intentione in abstracto sumpta

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35

Postquam supra aliqualiter ostensum est quid sit prima intentio in B77ra concreto sumpta, nunc vero restat ostendere quid sit prima intentio in abstracto sumpta. Circa quod est sciendum quod prima intentio formaliter sumpta est intentionalitas consequens ens reale intellectum 25 ut intellectum est. Nam sicut inter rem calefacientem et rem calefactam consurgit quedam relatio, sic inter rem intelligentem et rem intellectam, qua res intellecta ad rem intelligentem refertur. Et ideo, cum queritur quid sit prima intentio formaliter, est dicendum quod est intentionalitas consequens ens reale dum intelligitur.

4 bene] suppl. om. B d 16

17 primam] om. B d

27 qua] que B d

‘Verbum’ seems to be used here for ‘action expressed by a verb’.

790

appendix h De tribus notandis

36 Sunt autem hic notanda tria. Primum est quod aliter dicitur prima

intentio in concreto prima et intentio, et aliter prima intentio in abstracto prima et intentio, quoniam prima intentio formaliter17 dicitur prima, non quod sit de primo genere intelligibilium, cum talis intentio non sit ens reale, sed dicitur prima intentio quia consequitur primam intentionem in concreto. Prima autem intentio in concreto dicitur prima a primitate sui generis, quod est ens reale. Dicitur similiter prima intentio in abstracto intentio formaliter, quia ipsa denominat primam intentionem in concreto, sicut si diceretur albedo alba, non diceretur alba nisi proquanto album est album ex albedine. Sic in proposito talis intentionalitas dicitur intentio formaliter, quia ipsum ens reale dum intelligitur denominatur intentio in concreto. Prima autem intentio dicitur intentio, non quia ipsa est aliqua intentio, sed quia ipsa denominatur intentio a tali intentionalitate, que est intentio prima formaliter. 37 Secundo notandum est quod prima intentio formaliter non potest esse prima intentio in concreto, quoniam prima intentio in concreto est ens reale intellectum. Cum igitur prima intentio formaliter non possit esse ens reale, cum sit ens rationis, igitur non potest esse prima intentio in concreto. 38 Si autem queratur utrum prima intentio formaliter possit esse secunB77rb da | intentio, dicenda sunt duo. Primum est quod potest esse secunda intentio in concreto, quia ens rationis intellectum ut intellectum est est secunda intentio sic dicta. Cum igitur prima intentio formaliter sit ens rationis, igitur si talis prima intentio formaliter intelligatur, erit secunda intentio materialiter. Secundum est quod talis intentio prima formaliter non potest esse secunda intentio formaliter, quia intentio secunda formaliter est intentionalitas consequens ens rationis dum intelligitur, sed prima intentio formaliter numquam consequitur ens rationis, cum non habeat esse nisi quando solum intelligitur ens reale. 39 Tertio notandum est quod prima intentio formaliter aliquando vocatur ‘intentionalitas’ et aliquando vocatur ‘habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum’, aliquando vocatur ‘relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’ et aliquando vocatur ‘esse obiective in intellectu’. Vocatur autem inten-

15 que] quod B d 17

33 intellecte] d intellecta B

I.e. formaliter sive in abstracto sumpta.

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tionalitas quia ab ipsa re intellecta denominatur intentio. Vocatur habitudo quia per ipsam res intellecta habet novum modum essendi in intellectu. Vocatur relatio quia per ipsam res intellecta refertur ad intellectum. Et vocatur esse obiective quia consequitur rem prout est obiectum 5 intellectus. Si autem queratur utrum ista propositio sit denominativa ‘Inten- 40 tionalitas est intentio formaliter’, dico quod sic. Nam sicut aliquando effectus denominatur a causa (sicut album denominatur tamquam a causa formali ab albedine), sic quandoque causa denominatur ab effec10 tu (sicut agens denominatur ab actione, que est effectus agentis). Quando ergo dicitur quod intentionalitas est intentio formaliter, talis denominatio est ab intellectu formaliter, et non est effectus a causa, ut patet. Et quia causa formalis et effectus formalis non differeunt, poterit talis propositio ‘denominativa’ dici denominatione ab extrinseco. 15

De opinione quorundam modernorum

Licet autem que usque nunc diximus de prima intentione in concreto et 41 in abstracto, | sint dicta tam secundum opinionem sancti Thome quam B77va secundum opinionem Hervei, tamen sint quidam moderni qui, non distinguentes primam intentionem in primam in concreto et primam 20 in abstracto, aliter ponunt primas intentiones. Ubi est considerandum quod isti primas intentiones non posuerunt 42 nisi nomina significantia naturales res existentes in rerum natura, quae nomina in propositionibus possunt supponere pro illis rebus quas significant, et hec nomina secundum gramaticos vocantur nomina prime 25 impositionis, ut ‘Petrus’, ‘Antonius’, vel ‘substantia’, et sic de aliis. Et idcirco, quae in precedentibus capitulis vocantur ‘prime intentiones in concreto’, secundum istos dici debent ‘nomina prime intentionis’. Ratio autem secundum eos est quoniam nulla res existens extra animam est intentio, cum solus conceptus anime sit intentio. Et ideo, sicut nomina 30 quae significant tales conceptus, sunt nomina secunde intentionis (ut species et genus et similia), sic nomina quae ordinantur talibus conceptibus significando res, dicuntur ‘nomina prime intentionis’.

12 formaliter] formalis B d

14 denominativa] B denominative d

792

appendix h De duplici dubio

43 Sed hic est duplex dubium. Primum est quomodo quedam nomina

dicantur nomina prime intentionis et quedam nomina dicantur nomina secunde intentionis, cum intentio dividatur in primam et secundam. Secundum dubium: quomodo intelligendum est verbum Avicenne:18 ‘Logica est de primis intentionibus et secundis’ si non est dare primam et secundam intentionem, sed solum nomina prime et secunde intentionis. 44 Ad primum est dicendum quod nichil est intentio nisi ens in anima. Cum igitur entia extra animam distinguantur contra entia in anima, igitur nullum ens extra animam potest dici ‘intentio’. Et cum dicitur quod tunc non posset esse distinctio nominum si non est distinctio intentionis in primam et secundam intentionem, est dicendum quod talis distinctio nominum non sumitur in comparatione ad primam et secundam intentionem, sed in ordine ad diversa significata, ut illa B77vb nomina dicantur nomina | secunde intentionis que significant conceptus anime, et illa nomina dicantur prime intentionis que significant res extra animam. 45 Ad secundum est dicendum quod Avicenna accipit ‘primas et secundas intentiones’ pro ‘nominibus primarum et secundarum intentionum’. Et si dicatur contra, quia logica non est de nominibus, cum non sit gramatica, est dicendum quod aliter logica est de nominibus et aliter gramatica, quia logica est de nominibus ut significant conceptum, gramatica vero non. 46 Si quis autem vellet tenere opinionem Hervei, facile solveret rationem in oppositum nam: Quando dicitur quod intentio est ens in anima subiective, verum est, accipiendo intentionem ex parte intelligentis. Et cum dicitur quod entia extra animam non sunt entia in anima, dico quod verum est. Et ideo sequitur quod entia extra animam non sunt intentio ex parte intelligentis; sed non sequitur quod non sint intentio, accipiendo intentionem ex parte rei intellecte.

4 intentio] non perperam add. d d 18

13 intentionis] nominum B d

Avicenna, Prima philosophia VI 2, p. 1073–75.

30 non] suppl. om. B

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capitulum iv de secunda intentione Declarato superius quid sit prima intentio in concreto et quid sit prima 47 intentio in abstracto, nunc vero restat determinare de secunda inten5 tione. Et quia secunda intentio est duplex, scilicet in concreto et in abstracto, in hoc capitulo videbimus quid sit secunda intentio in concreto. De secunda intentione in concreto

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Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod intentio secunda in concreto 48 est omne ens rationis intellectum. Nam sicut omne ens reale dum actu intelligitur, est in concreto prima intentio, sic omne ens rationis dum intelligitur, est secunda intentio in concreto. Ut autem sciatis quid sit ens rationis, est sciendum quod, sicut ens reale est illud quod habet esse in rerum natura preter operationem intellectus, ita ens rationis est illud quod convenit rebus mediante operatione intellectus. Ut sunt genus, species, et individuum, differentia, universale, proprium, possibile, predicamentum, subiectum, antecedens, consequens, propositio, oratio, sillogismus, et sic de aliis. Que omnia, formaliter loquendo, sunt entia rationis, quia conveniunt rebus mediante operatione intellectus. Igitur omnia ista entia et similia quando intelliguntur, sunt et vocantur secunda intentio in concreto. Ex hoc autem patet quod numquam intentio secunda in concreto 49 potest esse prima intentio in concreto, quia nulla virtute ut sic ens rationis potest esse ens reale. Igitur cum ens rationis reducatur ad secundam intentionem in concreto et ens reale reducatur ad primam intentionem in concreto, sequitur quod numquam secunda intentio materialiter possit esse prima intentio materialiter. De duobus videndis

Quantum autem pertinet ad secundam intentionem in concreto sump- 50 tam, sunt videnda duo. Primum est a quo habet talis intentio quod 30 dicatur ‘secunda’; secundum est a quo habet talis intentio quod dicatur ‘intentio’. Circa primum est sciendum quod, sicut entia realia constituunt primum genus intelligibilium proquanto intelliguntur prius ex sua natura, ita entia rationis constituunt secundum genus intelligibilium proquanto entia rationis intelliguntur posterius; nam semper intel-

794

appendix h

lectionem entis rationis precedit intellectio entis realis. Et ideo entia rationis dicuntur de secundo genere intelligibilium quia sunt posterius intellecta. Cum igitur queritur unde habet secunda intentio in concreto quod dicatur ‘secunda’, dico quod habet ex natura sui generis quod est secundum genus intelligibilium, quod est ens rationis, quia, sicut omne 5 ens reale ex natura sui generis est primum, ita omne ens rationis ex natura sui generis est secundum. 51 Quantum vero pertinet ad secundum, est sciendum quod, sicut prima intentio in concreto dicitur intentio a quadam intentionalitate ipsam consequente dum intelligitur, ita ens rationis in concreto dicitur a 10 quadam intentionalitate ipsam consequente dum intelligitur, que intentionalitas se habet ad ens rationis sicut forma accidentalis et denominativa ad suum subiectum. Et idcirco ista propositio ‘Ens rationis est intentio’ est denominativa ab intrinseco. Patet igitur quid sit secunda intentio in concreto. 15 De secunda intentione formaliter sive in abstracto 52 Viso quid sit secunda intentio in concreto, nunc restat videre quid

est secunda intentio formaliter sive in abstracto. Ubi considerandum est quod secunda intentio in abstracto est relatio entis rationis ad ipsum intellectum actu intelligentem. Nam sicut in ente reali intellecto 20 consurgit quedam relatio rationis ipsius ad intellectum, ita in ente rationis consurgit quedam relatio rationis per quam ens rationis refertur ad intellectum. Talis igitur relatio ut sic precise sumpta est secunda intentio formaliter. De tribus videndis

25

53 Circa quam intentionem sunt videnda tria. Primum est unde talis in-

tentio dicatur ‘intentio secunda formaliter’; secundum est utrum talis intentio possit esse secunda materialiter; tertium est quibus nominibus nominetur talis intentio. 54 Quantum ad primum est sciendum quod talis relatio idcirco vocatur 30 ‘secunda intentio formaliter’ quia ens rationis denominat intentionem materialiter; proquanto dicimus quod ens rationis est secunda intentio materialiter.

15 in concreto] suppl. om. B d

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Quantum vero ad secundum est dicendum quod secunda intentio 55 formaliter potest esse secunda intentio materialiter, quia cum omne ens rationis inquantum intelligitur sit secunda intentio materialiter, sequitur quod secunda intentio formaliter, que est ens rationis, si intelligatur, 5 quod erit secunda intentio materialiter. De tertio autem est dicendum quod secunda intentio in abstracto 56 vocatur ‘habitudo seu relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’, ‘intentionalitas’, et ‘esse obiective’ ea ratione qua ista nomina dicuntur de prima intentione formaliter sumpta. Utrum secunda intentio sit aliquid existens in intellectu subiective

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Postquam aliqualiter ostensum est quid sit secunda intentio in concreto et quid sit secunda intentio in abstracto, nunc vero videndum restat utrum secunda intentio sit aliquid existens in intellectu subiective. Et videtur primo quod non, quia ens rationis consequitur rem intellectam ut intellecta est, et non intellectum. In contrarium quia: Hoc quod dico | ‘abstractum’ fit in intellectu possibili virtute intellectus agentis, ut communiter dicitur. Ex se abstractum est secunda intentio. Igitur ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, est in intellectu subiective. Circa istam conclusionem est duplex modus dicendi. Primus est ponentium quod ens rationis est subiective in intellectu. Ratio autem est quia: Ens rationis est actus intelligendi. Sed actus intelligendi est subiective in intellectu. Igitur ens rationis est subiective in intellectu. Minor huius rationis patet. Sed maior probatur per Philosophum quinto Metaphisice ubi dividit19 ens in ens in anima et in ens extra animam, et dicit quod ens in anima est ens rationis. Cum igitur ens quod est in anima, sit actus intellectus, igitur ens rationis est actus intelligendi. Sed contra istum modum dicendi arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic: Nullum ens reale est ens rationis. Sed actus intelligendi est ens reale. Igitur actus intelligendi non est ens rationis. Secundo sic: Esse abstractum, quod est ens rationis, non competit illi quod est realiter separatum ab individuis contentis subiective in intellectu. Sed actus intelligendi est realiter separatus et abstractus ab individuis contentis subiec-

5 quod] B secl. d 19

19 circa] B contra d

Aristotle, Metaph. V 7, 1017a8–35.

57

B78va

58

59

796

appendix h

tive in intellectu. Igitur ens rationis non est actus intelligendi. Maior patet quia: Universalia non separantur ab individuis secundum rem; alias esset incidere in errorem Platonis. Cum igitur tale abstractum sit universale, quod est ens rationis, igitur ens rationis non est actus intelligendi. 60 Sed iste rationes non valent. Nam quando dicitur in prima quod nullum ens rationis est ens reale, ista propositio est falsa; ymo omne ens rationis est ens reale, cum omnis actus intelligendi sit ens reale. Et cum dicitur quod ens rationis et ens reale dividuntur, dico quod non dividuntur sicut ens reale et ens non reale, quia utrumque est ens reale, B78vb sed dividuntur sicut entia realia | quorum unum est in anima—et istud vocatur ens rationis quod est actus intelligendi—, et aliud est ens reale extra animam. 61 Ad secundum est dicendum quod maior est vera sed minor est falsa, quia esse abstractum est actus intelligendi, sicut universale est actus intelligendi proquanto ‘universale’ et ‘abstractum’ in talibus propositionibus supponit simpliciter. Et cum dicitur quod tunc esset incidere in errorem Platonis, negatur, quia tale abstractum non ponitur extra intellectum, realiter separatum ab individuis (sicut ponebat Plato), sed ponitur in intellectu subiective. 62 Secundus modus dicendi ponit tres conclusiones, premissa tamen tali distinctione quod ‘ens rationis’ potest accipi tripliciter: uno modo pro actu intellectus, secundo pro obiecto movente intellectum, tertio pro modo qui consequitur tale obiectum intellectus. Ista distinctione premissa, ponit iste modus tres conclusiones.

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De tribus conclusionibus 63 Prima est quod, accipiendo ‘ens rationis’ primo modo, quod est ens

rationis in intellectu subiective. Ratio est quia: Ens rationis est actus intelligendi isto modo, ut patet. Sed actus intelligendi subiective est in intellectu, cum sit actio movens intellectum subiective, ut patet20 30 nono Metaphisice. Igitur etc. Nec valet ratio prime opinionis, quia poterit dici quod ens in anima potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo subiective,

7 nullum] B om. d 20

10 ens non reale] non ens reale B d

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. IX 10, 1051b33–1052a1.

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alio modo obiective. Ens in anima obiective est ens rationis, et non subiective. Et ideo non omne ens rationis est actus intelligendi, qui est subiective in anima. Secunda conclusio est quod ens rationis secundo modo est in rerum natura extra intellectum. Ratio est quia: Omne ens reale est ens existens in rerum natura, ita quod non includitur in ratione eius esse in intellectu obiective. Sed ens rationis secundo modo sumptum est ens reale, quia obiectum movens intellectum est ens reale existens extra. Igitur tale ens rationis extra intelllectum est in rerum natura. Tertia conclusio est | quod ens rationis secundo modo sumptum est in re prout est obiective in intellectu. Ratio est quia: Modus est in eo cuius est modus. Sed ens rationis secundo modo est modus rei intellecte ut intellecta est. Igitur tale ens rationis est in re prout est obiective in intellectu. Isto autem modo solum Herveus loquitur de ente rationis ubicumque loquitur in tractatu De intentionibus, et nos locuti sumus supra in precedentibus capitulis. Isto etiam modo loquitur Commentator primo De anima commento, ubi dicit21 quod intellectus agens est agens in rebus universalitatem; nam ipsa universalitas, que est quidam modus rei intellecte, est ens rationis. Ad rationes autem in contrarium potest patere responsio ex dictis.

64

65 B79ra

66

capitulum v an secunda intentio sit aliquod ens positivum De quadam alia opinione magistri Hervei

Consequenter videndum restat utrum secunda intentio que est ens 67 25 rationis consequens rem prout est obiective in intellectu, sit aliquod ens positivum. Circa quod est sciendum quod Herveus dicit22 tertio Quolibet, questione prima, quod ens rationis formaliter non dicit aliquam entitatem positivam quia: Ens rationis distinguitur contra ens reale communiter dictum autem—quod autem sit contra ens reale formaliter dictum, 30 videtur nichil importare—. Et sic, dato quod ens reale non sit nichil,

9 extra intellectum] ex intellectu B d 21 22

27 rationis] bis in B

Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Arist. De anima I 8, p. 1225–26. Hervaeus Natalis, Quaestiones quodlibetales III, q. 1.

798

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69 B79rb

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negando omnem entitatem, est tamen nichil, ponendo aliquam entitatem. Et secundum hoc videtur posse dici quod secunda intentio, que est ens rationis, non sit aliquod ens positivum. Sed non videtur posse stare. Primo quia: Ens de nullo essentialiter predicatur nisi sit vere ens; alias non vere ens esset essentialiter ens, quod est absurdum. Sed ens rationis est essentialiter ens. Igitur est vere ens. Sed ‘vere ens’ dicit veram entitatem. Igitur ens rationis non est formaliter nichil. Maior istius rationis patet. Minor declaratur quia: Sicut hec est essentialis ‘Ens reale est ens’, ita ista est essentialis ‘Ens rationis est ens’, cum ens dividatur in ens rationis et in ens reale. Secundo sic. Aut ens rationis | est ens per entitatem suam formaliter, aut per entitatem quam supponit. Si primo modo, habetur propositum. Si secundo modo, tum si talis entitas supposita sit entitas realis, ergo ens rationis erit ens per entitatem realem; sed quod est ens per entitatem realem, est ens reale; igitur ens rationis est ens reale. Si dicatur quod ens rationis est ens per entitatem quam supponit, que est entitas secundum rationem, contra: Aut talis entitas est ens reale, aut est ens rationis. Si detur primum, habetur propositum. Si detur secundum, tunc petam per quid est ens reale ens rationis, sicut prius. Tertio sic. Impossibile est quod illud quod est nichil formaliter, aliquid presupponat in quo sit. Sed ens rationis est nichil formaliter. Igitur nichil ponit, et per consequens non distinguitur contra id quod est omnino nichil. Minor patet per eos, sed maior declaratur dupliciter. Primo sic. Presupponere aliquid ex parte subiecti aut convenit enti rationis ut est omnino ens, aut ut non est omnino ens; non est dare medium, cum sit contradictoria. Si primo modo, ergo ens rationis est formaliter ens—aliter non esset omnino ens—, et sic formaliter non est nichil. Si secundo modo, ergo est omnino nichil, quia sicut ‘non-ens’ et ‘nichil’ equipollent, sic ‘omnino non-ens’ et ‘omnino nichil’ equipollent. Et sic ens rationis non distinguitur ab eo quod est omnino nichil. Secundo sic. Ens rationis est formaliter nichil. Igitur formaliter non est in aliquo, et per consequens ens rationis erit in nullo. Probo quia: Si ens rationis est in aliquo, tum si det esse denominative ei in quo est, oportet quod sit in eo formaliter. Sed, posito effectu formali, ponitur forma que est causa talis effectus—sicut posito albo, necessario ponitur

7 vere ens] vere B d 9 ens reale] suppl. om. B d 10 ens] suppl. om. B d om. B d 25 ut] suppl. om. B d 33 si] suppl. om. B d | est] suppl. om. B d

13 si] suppl.

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albedo—, quia quod est in aliquo formaliter, est aliquid formaliter; aliter non daret esse formaliter. Igitur ens rationis non est formaliter nichil. Si dicatur quod ens rationis est aliquid materialiter inquantum sup- 73 5 ponit | esse illud in quo est, non valet quia: Illud quod est tantum mate- B79va rialiter, non dat esse alicui formaliter. Sed ens rationis dat esse rationis formaliter et denominative rei intellecte, ut patet. Ergo etc. Item. Per esse subiecti materialiter non ponitur aliquid a subiecto distinctum. Igitur esse materialiter, secundum quod esse ens rationis, non est aliqua 10 res distincta ab eo in quo est. Si dicatur: per subiectum esse non ponitur in subiecto aliqua res nisi 74 secundum rationem, et hoc est ens rationis, contra quia: Si isto modo ut ens rationis ponitur res in subiecto, oportet quod in se sit aliqua res, nec eius oppositum est intelligibile. Sed illud quod in se est aliqua 15 res, dicit formaliter aliquam entitatem. Igitur ens rationis dicit aliquam entitatem formaliter. De opinione propria auctoris

Quod est contra eos, et idcirco videtur michi aliter dicendum. Ad 75 cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod, sicut realiter possunt dici aliqua 20 in ordine ad aliquod positivum (ut album in ordine ad albedinem) et realiter in ordine ad aliquod privativum (ut homo cecus in ordine ad cecitatem), sic in entibus rationis secundum rationem possunt dici aliqua positive et aliqua privative. Verbi gratia, hoc ens rationis ‘individuum’ formaliter dicit privationem negationis et idcirco, licet sit ens 25 rationis, non tamen est ens rationis nisi privativum; et illam divisionem que privatur, voco ens rationis; et de tali ente rationis in hoc capitulo non queritur. Hoc autem ens rationis quod est genus, formaliter sumendo ipsum, non est ens rationis privativum, ymo est ens rationis positivum, ita tamen quod ly ‘positivum’ solum determinet aliquid 30 secundum rationem. Quod autem hoc sit verum, probatur sic. Illud est ens positivum 76 quod est ratio alicuius quod vere affirmetur de entibus positivis, quia negatio non est causa alicuius effectus positive. Sed hoc ens rationis ‘genus’ est causa animalis ut predicetur vere de homine, de leone, et de

13 ut] suppl. om. B d 14 sed] d secundum B 26 privatur] coni. privat B d 33–34 hoc … genus] coni. hoc est ens rationis igitur perperam B d

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B79vb aliis | hiis similibus entibus positivis. Ergo etc. Probo quia: Ut commu-

niter tenent logici, animal predicatur ut genus de suis speciebus. Nec videatur hec distinctio quam modo posuimus, alicui inconveniens, nam et magister Herveus ea frequenter utitur, ut patet intuenti tractatum De secundis intentionibus. 5

capitulum vi an secunda intentio sit in aliquo subiecto 77 Ulterius inquirendum restat an secunda intentio que est ens rationis,

sit in aliquo subiecto. Circa quam questionem magister Herveus, tertio Quolibet, questione prima, dicit23 absolute quod ens rationis necubi est subiective. Quod declarat primo sic. Existentia obiecti universaliter intellecti sine particularibus quantum ad illud quod est, est formaliter ens rationis. Et tunc quero de natura Sortis et Platonis, aut est in re extra in esse reali, aut in intellectu, aut necubi. Non in re extra, quia rediret opinio Platonis. Nec in intellectu sicut in subiecto, quia nulla res existens in intellectu sicut in subiecto est diversa tantum secundum rationem a contentis sub ‘homine’, ymo ab eis est totaliter diversa. Ergo illud formaiter dicit ens rationis quod necubi est subiective. Secundo: Illud quod est subiective in aliqua natura reali, non distinguitur contra ens reale communiter dictum, ut patet24 sexto Metaphisice. Sed ens rationis distinguitur contra ens reale communiter dictum. Igitur etc. 78 Sed ista conclusio25 non est vera, ymo est falsa, et in se et in rationibus. Quod autem ista conclusio sit falsa in se, probatur primo sic. Ens rationis est ens, ut patet26 quinto et sexto Metaphisice, cum ens dividatur in ipsum. Igitur aut erit ens in se, aut erit ens in alio. Non potest dici quod sit ens in se, quia tunc esset substantia; quod communiter esse falsum. Igitur erit ens in alio. Sed non potest poni ens in alio nisi eo modo quo accidens est in subiecto, ut patet27 discurrenti modos essendi impositos a Philosopho, quarto Phisicorum. Ergo etc.

25 prius ens] suppl. om. B d 23 24 25 26 27

Hervaeus, Quaestiones quodlibetales III, q. 1. Aristotle, Metaph. VI 4, 1027b17 sqq. Sc. positio Hervaei quod ens rationis necubi est subiective. Aristotle, Metaph. V 7 et VI 4. Aristotle, Phys. IV passim.

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Secundo quia conclusio directe est contra eum. Nam tertio Quolibet, questione prima, dicit28 sic: “Dico quod, licet ens dividatur in ens et nichil (negando omnem entitatem), tamen nichil prohibet ens dividi in ens simpliciter et in illud quod nichil ponit, licet supponat”. Ex quo patet quod ens rationis aliquid supponit. Tunc arguo sic. Ens rationis aliquid supponit, vel quia est id quod supponit, vel est in illo quod supponit. Non potest esse primum, quia tunc idem supponeret seipsum et esset in seipso. Si dicatur: Sed habetur propositum, quia nullo alio modo ens rationis potest dici ens in eo quod supponit, nisi eo modo quo accidens est in subiecto. Nec est simile de cecitate, quia cecitas non dicit aliquam rem distinctam a subiecto cecato; et ideo ista propositio est falsa de virtute sermonis ‘Cecitas supponit subiectum’, cum nichil aliud dicat nisi subiectum non habere habitum sine forma, ut inferius ostendetur. Sed ens rationis est aliquid distinctum ratione ab eo in quo est, et est ens verum in se, ut patet ex dictis suis supra, ubi dicit29 sic: ‘Ens rationis precipue competit ubi invenitur transitus secundum rationem intelligendi’—tunc arguo sic. Sicut per actionem transeuntem realiter aliquid realiter producitur (ut patet30 nono Metaphisice), sic per actionem rationis transeuntem secundum rationem producitur aliquid secundum rationem. Igitur ens rationis in re intellecta est aliquid secundum rationem. Cecitas autem non est aliquid in subiecto. Igitur patet ex dictis, quando ens rationis est aliquid existens in re intellecta, quod eius existere est per modum accidentis. Quod autem dicta conclusio non sit vera in suis rationibus, patet. Primo quantum ad primam rationem. Nam cum queritur [77] de natura Sortis et Platonis aut est in re extra in esse reali dicto, aut in intellectu, dico hic quod, ponendo quod universale est vera res extra intellectum, quod natura | humana realiter est in Sorte et Platone, quia Sortes et Plato realiter sunt homo. Et cum dicitur ‘sic dicere est incidere in errorem Platonis’, dico quod non est verum, quia Plato posuit talem naturam realiter separatam a Sorte et Platone, sed sic ponitur non realiter ab ipsis separatum. Similiter potest dici quod talis natura est in intellectu obiective, nec tamen ex hoc habetur aliquid de existentia 7 esse] suppl. om. B d 28 29 30

17 ubi] B corr. d qui perperam legit nisi

Hervaeus Natalis, Quaestiones quodlibetales, III, q. 1. Ibid. Aristotle, Metaph. IX 10, 1051b33–1052a1.

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entis rationis, cum talis natura non sit ens rationis, sed ens reale. Est autem ens rationis illud quod talem naturam sequitur ut intellecta est. Et tunc, cum tale ens rationis sit in re ut sic intelligitur, tunc dico quod ens solum secundum rationem est subiective in re intellecta. 82 Secundo patet falsitas dicte conclusionis quantum ad secundam rationem. Que nichil concludit, nam peccat per fallaciam equivocationis. Nam esse in aliqua natura reali subiective potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo realiter, et in isto sensu maior est vera sed minor est falsa, quia ens rationis ut sic in nullo est subiective. Alio autem modo secundum rationem, et isto sensu maior est falsa; quod enim est subiective solum secundum rationem in aliqua natura, distinguitur contra omne ens reale communiter dictum, et isto modo ens rationis est subiective in re intellecta. Similiter, quando ulterius in minori dicitur quod ens rationis distinguitur contra ens reale communiter dictum, posset dici quod illud est falsum, maxime secundum illos qui ponunt quod actus intelligendi est ens rationis; et sic ens rationis quod est actus intelligendi, non distinguitur contra ens reale communiter dictum, sed distinguitur contra ens reale existens extra intellectum. 83 Sed contra hoc quidam arguunt dupliciter. Primo sic quoniam: Philosophus, quinto Metaphisice, dividit31 ens rationis contra ens divisum in decem predicamenta et contra ens de quo intendit tractare in Metaphisica. Sed illud est ens reale communiter dictum. Igitur etc. Secundo sic quia: Ista divisio non magis competeret enti in anima quam uni alteri B80va enti, quia sicut | entia que sunt in anima, non sunt illa que sunt extra animam, ita entia realia que sunt in hoc, non sunt quecumque alia. 84 Sed iste rationes non valent. Nam quando dicitur in prima quod Philosophus dividit ens rationis contra ens reale communiter dictum: si ly ‘communiter dictum’ determinet ens reale quod est extra animam, propositio est vera, et tunc nichil ad propositum; si autem determinet quodlibet ens reale, quodcumque sit, tunc quod dicitur est falsum. Et cum dicitur quod Philosophus accipit ibi ens reale de quo agit in Metaphisica, dico quod verum est, quia in Metaphisica agit Philosophus tam de ente reali extra animam quam de ente reali in anima quod est ens rationis.

19 quoniam] coni. quando B quod secl. d 31

Aristotle, Metaph. V 7.

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Ad secundum est dicendum quod divisio entium realium est in esse 85 hoc et non esse hoc. Dato quod esset distinctio et divisio aliqualis entium realium, non tunc esset divisio per esse in anima et per esse extra animam, quorum primum pertinet ad ens rationis quod est actus 5 intelligendi, et secundum pertinet ad ens reale extra animam existens. Et ideo non est simile. De tribus conclusionibus ipsius auctoris

Et idcirco circa preeuntem conclusionem32 pono tres conclusiones. Pri- 86 ma est quod, accipiendo ‘ens rationis’ pro actu intelligendi, quod tale 10 ens rationis subiective est in intellectu, quia talis actus est accidens ipsius intellectus. Secunda conclusio est quod, accipiendo ‘ens rationis’ pro eo quod 87 sequitur rem intellectam ut intellecta est, quod ens rationis est subiective in re intellecta, quam consequitur solum secundum esse rationis. 15 Ratio est quia, sicut accidens reale est realiter in re quam denominat ab intrinseco, ita ens rationis, quod est accidens secundum rationem, est in re intellecta quam denominat ab intrinseco. Tertia conclusio est quod, accipiendo ‘ens rationis’ pro obiecto intel- 88 lectus, tunc, si tale obiectum sit substantia, sic in nullo est subiective, 20 quia quod vere est, nulli inest, ut patet33 primo Phisicorum. Si autem sit accidens reale, tunc est subiective realiter in suo subiecto, quodcumque est illud, quia accidentis esse est inesse, ut patere34 potest ex primo Thopicorum. Utrum secunda intentio habeat causam efficientem 25

Ostenso quomodo secunda intentio que est ens rationis, est in aliquo 89 subiective, nunc vero ostendendum restat utrum ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, habeat causam efficientem. Quod autem ens rationis habeat causam efficientem, probatur sic. Omne quod ante esse habuit non esse, habet causam reducentem ipsum de non esse ad esse, cum 1 esse] suppl. om. B d 9 tale] d talis B 16 ita] d nam B 25 que] quod B d 29 ipsum] suppl. coll. linea 804,3a om. B d 32 33 34

20 est] d inest B

Sc. conclusionem Hervaei dicentis quod ens rationis necubi est subiective. Aristotle, Phys. I 8, 195b15–16. Arist. Topica I 5, 102b5 sqq.

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nichil reducat se de non esse ad esse ut sic. Sed ens rationis ante esse habuit non esse, ut patet, quia talia entia rationis non ponantur eterna. Igitur habet causam reducentem ipsum de non esse ad esse. Causa autem talis est causa efficiens. Secundo sic. Ens rationis est ens; aut igitur est creatura, aut est creatrix essentia; ista propositio patet35 per beatum Augustinum, primo De Trinitate. Sed non est creatrix essentia, quia tunc esset Deus. Igitur est creatura; habet ergo causam efficientem. Ergo ens rationis habet causam efficientem. Tertio sic. Ens rationis effective aut est a se, aut ab alio. Non potest dici quod effective sit a se, quia nichil est impossibilius quam quod idem gignat seipsum, ut patet36 per beatum Augustinum in secundo De Trinitate. Igitur ens rationis ab alio est effective. Et sic habet causam efficientem. Sed contra istam conclusionem arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic. Si ens rationis habet causam efficientem, aut illa causa est ens reale, aut est ens rationis. Si est ens reale, contra quia: Causa realis producit effectum realem, ut patet37 secundo Phisicorum. Cum igitur ens rationis distinguatur contra ens reale, igitur non habet causam realem. Si sit ens rationis, tunc queratur de causa illius entis rationis; et erit processus in infinitum. Secundo sic. Actiones sunt singularium, ut patet38 primo Metaphisice. Cum igitur universalia non sint | singularia, sequitur quod non possint produci per actionem alicuius agentis. Et sic universale non habet causam efficientem. Sed universale est ens rationis. Ergo etc. Tertio sic. In omni natura producta est res nature. Res autem nature non est res universalis nec ens rationis. Ergo ens rationis a nulla causa producitur.

2 ponantur] d ponentur B

13 habet] suppl. d lacuna in B

25 ens] corr. d esse B

35 Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I VI, cap. 9, p. 3817–19: “Omnis enim substantia quae deus non est, creatura est, et quae creatura non est, deus est”. 36 Cf. ibid. II I, cap. 3, pp. 82–84. 37 Cf. Aristotle, Phys. II 3, 195b25–28. 38 Aristotle, Metaph. I 1, 981a16–17.

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Quod ens rationis ut consequitur rem intellectam, nullo modo possit esse

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Hiis ergo rationibus videtur quibusdam quod ens rationis, sumendo ipsum ut consequitur rem intellectam, quod nullo modo possit esse. Quod patet tripliciter. Primo sic. Si ens rationis esset in re intellecta, tunc aut esset in re intellecta secundum esse reale, aut secundum esse rationis. Non primo modo, quia nullum ens rationis fundatur in aliquo esse reali. Nec secundo modo, quia tunc, cum illud esse rationis sit ens rationis, queratur quomodo fundatur in ente, aut secundum esse reale, aut secundum esse rationis. Sicut prius. Secundo sic. Si ens rationis non esset nisi quando intellectus intelligit, cum in esse consequatur rem intellectam ut intellecta est, sequitur quod non sit esse. Probo quia: Cum dividatur ens in ens reale et in ens rationis, quero aut illud ens intelligitur, aut non. Si non, non est ens rationis, quia, remoto actu intelligendi, tale ens non est. Si intelligitur, ergo ens rationis ipsum consequitur. Sed nulla res alia consequens est ipsa. Igitur ens rationis non erit ens. Tertio sic quia: Per actionem immanentem nichil extra producitur, ut patet39 nono Metaphisice. Sed intelligere est actio immanens. Igitur per ipsum in re extra producitur nichil. Igitur ens impossibile est quod sit. Sed hiisce non obstantibus, volo modo tenere opinionem de ente rationis quam magister Herveus tenet, et in tertio Quolibet et in primo, et in tractatu De intentionibus. Est sciendum quod, ut dicit40 Albertus in Commento super Porphirium, capitulo sexto, produci ab aliquo agente vel habere causam effectivam ad | ens potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo principaliter et per se, et alio modo secundario et per accidens sive ex contingenti. Primo modo solum entia singularia habent causam effectivam. Secundo autem modo habent causam effectivam ipsa universalia et entia rationis. Et hoc intendit auctor Sex principiorum quando dicit41 quod in hiis natura occulte operatur. Per hoc autem patet solutio ad primum argumentum [92] quia: Dato quod ens rationis habeat causam efficientem ens reale, habet tamen eam non principaliter, sed ex contingenti. Et isto modo non oportet quod causa realis producat effectum realem. 13 non] suppl. om. B d 39 40 41

20 hiisce non] hiisce B his ne d

Aristotle, Metaph. IX, cap. 10. Albert the Great, In Porpyrii Isagogen cap. 6. Anonymus, De sex principiis, cap. 9, p. 372.

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Ad secundum [93] est dicendum quod actiones primo et per se sunt singularium, sed ex contingenti et per accidens possunt esse universalium. Ad tertium [94] est dicendum quod in omni natura productum est ens nature, si sit productum principaliter et per se. Si autem sit productum ex contingenti, ut est ens rationis, non oportet. Alie autem rationes non cogunt. Nam quando dicitur in prima [95]: ens rationis aut fundatur in ente reali secundum esse reale, aut secundum esse rationis, dico quod ens rationis aliquod fundatur in ente reali secundum esse reale, non quod tale ens sit ratio talis fundationis sicut accidens fundatur in substantia, que habet esse substantiale, sed quod tale est causa talis fundationis; alias, manente ente substantiali, semper maneret illud accidens. Et cum dicitur: nullum ens rationis fundatur in aliquo esse reali, si ly ‘esse reali’ denotet causam fundationis, propositio est vera; si autem denotet en reale in substantiali esse, tunc propositio est falsa, quia ens rationis fundatur in ente reali secundum quod habet esse reale. Et cum dicitur quod ens rationis est in re dum intelligitur, dico hic quod est aliquod ens rationis quod convenit rei intellecte mediante alio ente rationis, sicut predicari singulari convenit mediante universali. Et de tali ente rationis | est verum quod convenit enti reali secundum esse rationis. Hoc tamen non obstante, est aliquod ens rationis (puta esse in intellectu) quod immediate fundatur in re, non precise sed ut obiectum intellectus. Unde rem habere tale esse nichil aliud est nisi rem esse obiectum intellectus. Et tale ens rationis est in re, que res dicitur habere tale esse denominative ab actu intelligendi. Et tale ens rationis fundatur in ente reali habente esse reale. Ad secundum [96] est dicendum quod quia ens dividitur in ens rationis, tale ens rationis non consequitur ens divisum, sed consequitur alia entia que intelliguntur. Que entia rationis recipiunt predicationem ‘entis’; et istud est dividi in ens rationis. Ad tertium [97] dicendum est quod, dato quod extra realiter nichil producatur per actionem immanentem, tamen potest produci extra per ipsam secundum rationem.

11 esse] suppl. om. B d | sed] corr. d non B om. B d 19 singulari] corr. d sibi B

12 est] corr. coni. sit B d

15 in] suppl.

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capitulum vii an ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, sit relatio Habito igitur quomodo ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, habet 105 causam efficientem, restat nunc videre utrum ens rationis quod est 5 secunda intentio, sit relatio ita quod non sit dare aliquod ens rationis quod non sit relatio. Ad cuius evidentiam primo videbimus quid sit relatio realis et quid sit relario rationis. De relatione reali et relatione rationis

Ubi considerandum est quod relatio realis est illa que habet extrema 106 realia quorum unum realiter ab alio dependet; sicut relatio paternitatis est relatio realis, que habet extrema realia et realiter mutuo dependentia, que extrema sunt pater et filius. Et isto modo sumendo ‘relationem’, nullum ens rationis est relatio, sumendo ‘ens rationis’ ut in precedenti capitulum [62] est sumptum. Ratio autem est quia: Talis relatio est ens 15 reale, ut patet42 quinto et sexto Metaphisice. Sed nullum ens rationis est ens reale. Ergo etc. Relatio rationis est que solum est in extremis que non habent mu- 107 tuam dependentiam realem adinvicem. Et talis relatio, ut dicit43 sanctus Thomas, est duplex. Una est que | est relatio rationis ultimi extremi, ut B81vb 20 relatio generis et speciei, et econverso. Alia est que est relatio rationis ex parte unius extremi et est relatio realis ex parte alterius, ita quod non una modo relatio sit rationis et realis, sed alia et alia. Sicut relatio scibilis ad scientiam est relatio rationis, quia scibile in esse reali non dependet a scientia, ut patet44 in Predicamentis, capitulo Ad aliquid; relatio 25 autem scientie ad scibile est relatio realis, quia scientia in esse reali dependet a scibili; non enim potest esse scientia, scibili non existente. Idem dicendum est de relationibus rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi quod relatio rationis et actus intelligendi ad rem intellectam est relatio realis, propter causam dictam. 10

42 43 44

Aristotle, Metaph. V 15, 1021a23–25; X 6, 1056b34–36? Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate I, art. 5 ad 16. Aristotle, Categ. 7, 6b34–36.

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108

Secundo est sciendum quod habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum semper est relatio rationis, quia talis habitudo est relatio rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi, que relatio est relatio rationis. Et quia talis relatio rationis est ens rationis, ideo omnis talis habitudo, sive sit in essentia rationis, sive sit inter rem intellectam et actum intelligendi, semoer est 5 relatio rationis. 109 Tertio est sciendum quod sunt quedam entia rationis que conveniunt rebus mediante tali habitudine, ut sunt genus, species, que, etlicet sint correlativa, non sunt tamen relationes. Et sic videtur non posse dici quod omne ens rationis sit relatio. 10

capitulum viii an secunda intentio possit intelligi 110 Consequenter videndum restat an secunda intentio que est ens rationis,

possit intelligi. Et videtur quod non quia: Illud intelligitur quod movet intellectum ad actum intelligendi. Cum igitur ens rationis non possit 15 movere intellectum ad talem actum, cum sic movere sit causare talem actum, igitur etc. Maior rationis apparet protanto quia: Omne quod intelligitur, intelligitur actu intelligendi. Qui actus non causatur ab B82ra intellectu, cum intellectus habeat se | passive respectu eius. Oportet ergo quod causetur ab obiecto. Minor etiam apparet quia: Actus 20 intelligendi est verum ens reale. Sed ens rationis nullius entis realis potest esse causa. Igitur etc. 111 Secundo arguitur sic. Nichil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu, ut patet45 primo Posteriorum. Sed secunda intentio que est ens rationis, nullo modo est sensibilis. Igitur nollo modo est intelligibilis. 25 De duplici actu intelligendi 112 Ad evidentiam autem eius considerandum est quod duplex est actus

intelligendi, ut ponitur communiter, scilicet rectus et reflexus. Et secundum quod est duplex actus, sic ponitur duplex obiectum, scilicet movens et terminans. Actus autem rectus intellectus est quo intellectus 30

1 quod] corr. d est B 45

20 ergo] suppl. d om. B

Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 18, 81a38-b9.

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primo fertur in obiectum cognitum, quodcumque sit illud. Actus autem reflexus est reflexio primi actus, qui est actus intelligendi rectus; sic motus reflexus est reflexio motus recti, ut patet46 octavo Phisicorum.— Utrum autem actus rectus et reflexus sit unius actus, non est presentis speculationis.—Obiectum autem movens est illud quod efficit actum intelligendi. Obiectum autem terminans est illud quod terminat vel actum rectum vel reflexum intellectus. Hiis premissis, pono aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod obiectum movens est res singularis. Quod probo dupliciter. Actiones sunt singularium. Sed movere intellectum est quoddam agere. Igitur talis actio est rei singularis. Et secundum istam viam dicitur communiter quod non universalia sed singularia movent. Secundo sic. Effectus singularis arguit causam singularem, ut patet47 secundo Phisicorum. Sed actus intelligendi est quedam res singularis, ut patet. Igitur eius causa non est res universalis, sed res singularis. Secunda conclusio est quod obiectum terminans actum rectum intellectus est universale, et est reale secundum ipsum ponentes. Ratio est quia: | Aut tale obiectum est res universalis intelligibilis, aut est res singularis sensibilis. Sed res singularis sensibilis non potest esse obiectum intellectus in actu recto, cum sit obiectum sensus, ut patet48 secundo De anima; est enim res singularis dum intelligitur. Igitur obiectum primo terminans actum intelligendi est res universalis intelligibilis. Et istud videtur esse de mente Philosophi primo Posteriorum:49 “sensus est singularium, ratio autem et intellectus universalium.” Tertia conclusio est quod entia rationis possunt intelligi inquantum possunt terminare actus intellectus. Cuius ratio est quia: Illud potest sic intelligi quod potest esse pars vere vel false propositionis. Ens autem rationis, ut patet, est huiusmodi. Igitur etc. Et confirmatur ratio quia: Ens rationis ut communiter ponitur, est subiectum (ut infra probabitur). Ergo ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, potest intelligi de eo non posse esse scientiam. Secundum autem eos qui ponunt universalia esse res extra intellectum, isto modo singularia et particularia possunt

17 et] suppl. d om. B 23 posteriorum] phisicorum B d 31 scientiam] corr. d scientia B 46 47 48 49

Aristotle, Phys. VIII, cap. 8. Aristotle, Phys. II 3, 195b25–28. Aristotle, De anima II 5, 417b22–23. Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 31, 87b37–39.

29 probabitur] B probatur d

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114 B82rb

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appendix h

intelligi; et secundum istum modum intellectus format aliquas species significantes res singulares. Secundum autem eos qio ponunt universalia et entia rationis esse conceptus, est dicendum quod nichil in ratione obiecti vere intelligitur nisi res singulares. Ratio autem est quia: Sicut potentia intellectiva ordinatur ad sensitivam, in ratione obiecti cogniti 5 est idem iudicium de obiecto intellectus et sensus. Cum igitur obiectum sensus sit res singularis, sequitur quod obiectum potentie intellectus sit res singularis. Contra hoc arguitur et respondetur 116 Sed contra hoc arguitur dupliciter. Primo sic. Quia sensus et intel- 10

lectus sunt distincte potentie, igitur earum obiecta sunt distincta, quia distinctio potentiarum sumitur a distinctione obiectorum. Igitur idem obiectum non est utriusque potentie. Secundo sic. Quia sensus est singularium, intellectus vero est universalium, igitur non idem obiectum est sensus et intellectus. 15 117 Ad | primum est dicendum quod sensus et intellectus sunt distincte B82vb potentie, nec sequitur: ‘igitur earum sunt distincta obiecta’, quia, remota distinctione obiectorum, adhuc tales potentie remanent distincte seipsis. Tum, si queratur ratio distinctionis in ordine ad obiecta istarum potentiarum, dico quod sensus tantum cognoscit singularia, 20 intellectus autem cognoscit singulare et universale. 118 Ad secundum patet per idem. Nam quando dicitur quod intellectus est universalium, est sensus quod intellectus in ordine ad obiectum ideo distinguitur a sensu quia intellectus, dato quod cognoscat singulare, cognoscit tamen cum hoc universale. Et ideo intellectus ut sic est 25 universalium; quorum non est sensus. Ad rationes primas respondetur 119 Ad rationes primas [110–111] est dicendum quod non oportet quod

omne illud quod intelligitur moveat intellectum, sed sufficit quod per ipsum moveat vel quod ipsum terminet modo predicto [112]. 30

10 primo sic] suppl. coni. om. B d 15 est] suppl. coni. om. B d om. B d 30 terminet] corr. d terminat B

17 earum] suppl. coni.

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Ad secundum [111] est dicendum quod nichil est in intellectu in 120 ratione obiecti moventis quod prius non fuerit in sensu; in ratione autem obiecti terminantis non. Et ideo entia rationis intelliguntur.

capitulum ix sequitur recapitulatio

5

Recapitulando igitur que dicta sunt, patet ex premissis quod intentio 121 ex parte intelligentis est omne illud quod intellectum ducit in cognitionem alicuius. Et intentio ex parte rei intellecte est ipsa res intellecta in quam intellectus actualiter tendit. Intentio prima materialiter est ens 10 reale dum intelligitur, quodcumque sit illud. Et intentio prima formaliter est relatio sive habitudo entis realis intellecti ad actum intelligendi; a qua ens reale denominatur ‘intentio’. Ex quo patet quod prima intentio formaliter fundatur in prima intentione materialiter. Intentio secunda materialiter est omne ens rationis dum actu intelligitur. Secunda inten15 tio formaliter est relatio sive habitudo entis rationis intellecti ut intellectum est, ad actum intelligendi; a qua ens rationis denominatur ‘intentio’. Ex | quo patet quod secunda intentio formaliter fundatur B82vb in secunda intentione materialiter, sicut prima intentio formaliter fundatur in prima intentione materialiter. Et sic, si multiplicentur actus 20 intelligendi in infinitum, poterunt tales intentiones in infinitum accipi. Nec sic est inconveniens quia in accipiendis secundis intentionibus in infinitum procedatur.

capitulum x de subiecto proprio logice 25

Ut autem noster tractatus ordinate procedat, videamus an subiectum 122 logicalis scientie sit secunda intentio, que est ens rationis. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod de ista questione multe opiniones inveniuntur.

16 est] suppl. d om. B

812

appendix h Quod sit argumentatio

123 Nam Avicenna in sua Logica, Algazel, Alfarabius, ut dicit50 Albertus in

suo Commento, dicunt quod subiectum logice est argumentatio quia: Cum logica ordinetur in cognitionem, illud erit in logica principaliter intentum per quod nobis manifestatur ignotum. Sed hoc est argumen- 5 tatio. Ergo etc. 124 Sed contra hoc quia: Genus non transcendit suas species. Sed tota logica, ut patet, transcendit suas species argumentationis, que sunt sillogismus, entimema, inductio et exemplum. Ergo tota logica transcendit genus argumentationis. Et quia scientia non excedit suum subiectum, 10 igitur argumentatio non est subiectum logice. Quod sit sermo 125 Quidam alii posuerunt quod subiectum logice est sermo; et ideo logica

vocatur scientia sermocinalis. Hoc vero, ut dicit Albertus, non est verum, cum per significationem rei nobis non ignote stat veritas eius 15 quod est ignotum, sumendo ‘sermonem incomplexum’. Similiter multi libri logice sunt in quibus de sermone nichil tractatur. Quod sit sillogismus vel ens rationis 126 Quidam alii sunt qui dicunt quod, accipiendo subiectum logice per

attributionem, subiectum logice est sillogismus; sumendo autem subiec- 20 tum logice per predicationem, subiectum logice est ens rationis. Primum patet, quia omnia considerata in logica habent velut partes ad totum ad sillogismum attributionem, quia que considerantur in logica, sunt sillogismi partes, aut remote, ut termini, aut propinque, ut propositiones. Secundum patet, quia omnia que considerantur in logica, 25 recipiunt predicationem entis rationis, ut patet de termino, oratione et sillogismo. 127 Sed illud videtur repugnare ei quod dicit Philosophus primo De anima, ubi arguit51 unitatem scientie ad unitatem subiecti. Igitur cum 4 cognitionem] suppl. subiectum suppl. d om. B 14 sermocinalis] B sermocinationis d 15 rei] suppl. om. B d 19 dicunt quod] suppl. d om. B 50 51

Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus, cap. IV, pp. 6b–7a. Aristotle, De anima I 1, 402a11–16.

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logica sit una scientia, erit tantum eius unum subiectum, et hoc vel erit sillogismus, vel erit ens rationis. Quod est ens rationis quod est secunda intentio 5

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Et ideo est alia opinio sancti Thome,52 quarto Methaphisice et in Scripto, et Hervei, primo53 Quolibet, et Gerardi,54 tam in Logica quam in Scripto, quod subiectum logice est ens rationis quod est secunda intentio. Quod adpresens probo tripliciter. Primo sic. Logica est scientia; ergo ut de subiecto est de aliquo ente, quia de non ente non est scientia, ut patet55 primo Posteriorum. Aut ergo de ente reali, aut de ente rationis. Non de ente reali, quia tunc esset scientia realis, quod nullus ponit. Igitur ut de subiecto est de ente rationis. Secundo sic. Sicut se habet scientia naturalis ad ens reale vel naturale, ita se habet scientia rationalis ad ens rationis. Sed scientia naturalis dicitur naturalis quia ut de subiecto est de ente naturali. Igitur logica dicitur scientia rationis quia ut de subiecto est de ente rationis. Tertio sic. Sicut se habet potentia ad obiectum, ita se habet scientia ad subiectum. Sed proprium obiectum potentie est illud sub cuius ratione obicitur, quidquid obicitur potentie, ut patet de colorato respectu visus. Igitur subiectum in scientia erit illud sub cuius consideratione consideratur, quidquid in scientia consideratur. Sed, ut patet, in logica hoc est ens rationis. Igitur etc. Ex hiis patet quod quando considerata in logica habent se ad sillogismum ut partes ad totum, dico quod verum est ut partes integrales ad suum totum. Sed istud non sufficit ad rationem obiecti, quia oportet subiectum esse quoddam | per eius esse predicatum de omnibus in scientia contentis. Et hoc intendit Philosophus cum dicit56 quod scientia est una que est unius generis subiecti, idest unius generis predicati modo predicto.

4 et] suppl. om. B d 52

ad 1. 53

14 igitur] suppl. d om. B

28 predicto] B Etc. add. B

Thomas Aquinas, In IV Arist. Metaph., nr. 736; Scriptum In I Sent. dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2

Hervaeus Natalis, Quaestiones quodlibetales I. Giraldus Odonis, Logica III, cap. I, nr. 102, p. 362 (see ibid., Annexum, capp. 34–37, p. 476 sq.); In I Sent., dist. 23, and his De intentionibus, Pars prima, art. III, cap. 46. 55 Aristotle, Anal. Post. I 2, 71b25–26. 56 Aristotle, ibid., I 28, 87a38. 54

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capitulum xi de opinione doctorum modernorum 132 Potest autem cuilibet studioso ea que dicta sunt intuenti patere quod in

hiis tam de primis intentionibus quam de secundis intentionibus dictis secutus sum sententiam magistri Hervei. Et hoc ideo seriose factum est ut studentes nostre provincie clare videant quid de hiis intentionibus sentiant nostri doctores. Verum quia hoc hodie doctrine communis studentium turba non recipit, idcirco intendo manifestare in hoc ultimo capitulo quid de hiis intentionibus moderni doctores sentiant, ne illi qui volunt illa recipere, ista suscipiant. Nam sequens doctrinam Hieronimi in multis multa legi et cogor singulorum opiniones ponere. 133 Sunt igitur quidam moderni qui dicunt quod intentio est quiddam in anima existens quod est signum naturaliter significans aliquid aliud, pro quo potest supponere vel potest esse pars mentalis. Hoc autem signum in anima existens est actus intelligendi, quia nulla alia qualitas est in intellectu subiective nisi talis actus. 134 Quod autem ita sit probatur sic. Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora, ut patet57 primo Phisicorum. Sed omnia que salvantur ponendo in intellectu aliqua realiter distincta ab actu intelligendi, salvantur actu solummodo intelligendi posito, eoquod supponere pro aliquo est singulare, et hoc potest competere actui intelligendi, sicut cuicumque alteri signo. Igitur preter actum intelligendi non oportet aliud ponere in intellectu. 135 Hoc autem signum secundum eos potest esse pars mentalis propositionis. Et est duplex. Unum quod est signum alicuius rei que non est tale signum, sicut est ista intentio anime ‘homo’, que est predicabilis de omnibus hominibus, et ista intentio anime ‘albedo’, que est predicabilis de omnibus albedinibus; et tale signum secundum eos vocatur ‘prima intentio’. Dicitur autem ista intentio anime ‘homo’ signum rei; que non est conceptus, quia hec intentio ‘homo’ non significat conceptum, sed rem extra, que non est conceptus, dato quod subordinetur conceptui 3 quod] B quid perperam d 4 dictis] coni. dicta B d 5 sum] B d et suppl. d 6 quid] B quod perperam d 8 turba] suppl. coni. multitudo suppl. d lacuna in B 17 fit] B fiunt perperam corr. d | quod] corr. que B d | potest] B possunt perperam corr. d 19–20 salvantur] d salvatur B 20 solummodo] corr. subiecto B d | posito, eoquod] scripsi posito eo, quod male interpungendo d 57

Cf. Aristotle, Phys. I 4, 188a17–18; ibid. 6, 189a14–16.

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in significando talem rem. Et isto modo voces sunt signa conceptuum. Intentio autem secunda est illa que est signum talium primarum intentionum, ut sunt iste intentiones ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc. Contra ista arguitur necnon respondetur 5

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Sed contra ista arguitur quia: Non videtur quod in intellectu non sit aliud accidens quam actus intelligendi, quia intellectus de se est indifferens ut plura intelligat, cum possit omnia fieri, ut patet58 tertio De anima. Ergo oportet adhuc, ut terminetur ad hoc intelligendum vel illud, quod in eo ponatur aliud quod ipsum determinet. Quod non est actus intelligendi, sed species intelligibilis. Hoc est etiam directe contra Philosophum, tertio De anima, ubi preter actum ponit speciem intelligibilem in intellectu. Ad primum est dicendum quod intellectus est indifferens ad multa intelligibilia. Quod autem determinetur ad hoc intelligendum, non est ab aliquo superaddito, distincto ab actu intelligendi, sed est solum a determinato obiecto movente. Ad secundum est dicendum quod Philosophus posuit speciem propter opinionem antiquorum, non propter aliquam necessitatem. Et ideo non plus est inconveniens species negare quam ponere. Patet etiam quomodo ista que nunc diximus, discrepant ab hiis que diximus supra, capitulo nono [121]. Studiosus autem lector quod placet eligat, et suo bono amicus fruatur. Per hoc patet prima pars nostri tractatus. In quo potius sum aliorum recitator quam alicuius subtilitatis inventor. Et ideo, si varias opiniones recito, nullus miretur, cum hoc sit necessarium in scientia logicali. Idcirco, si dicta varia attendas, attende quod non ut unus, sed ut plures loquor. Quod etiam in sequentibus observabo.

20 diximus] B d quarum add. B 22 fruatur] coni. d f ’r B 26 attende] suppl. om. B | quod] B del. d 27 observabo] B d Etc. signum conclusivum add. B Explicit prima pars de prima et secunda intencione secundum fratrem Stephanum de reato ordinis predicatorum scripta per fratrem nicolaum fructum Ordinis eiusdem XV kalendis februarii 1424 in padwa add. B 58

Aristotle, De anima III 8, 431b21.

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appendix h

II. Tractatus de ente reali et ente rationis H

codex Hafniensis (Copenhagen, Kongelige Bibliothek, Thott 581, ff. 112r–113v)59

1 UT Scias quid sit ens rationis et quid ens reale, et quid prima intentio H112r

et quid secunda, que sunt multum necessaria volenti studere in logica, cum ipsa sit de ente rationis et de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis, debes primo scire quod ens reale est illud quod habet esse per se in rerum natura, ita quod intellectus noster non facit illud esse, sicut homo, lapis, lignum, albedo, nigredo, linea, et omnia alia entia que sunt in rerum natura, quecumque sint illa, sive sint substantie sive sint accidentia; nam omnia ista entia ideo dicuntur entia realia quia ipsa non facit intellectus alicuius. Unde si numquan intelligerem hominem, parum est non minus esset. Et sic etiam est de omnibus aliis entibus. Non enim intellectus alicuius facit substantiam aut quantitatem aut qualitatem aut relationem et cetera huiusmodi. Et ideo omnes substantie, omnes quantitates et cetera predicamenta protanto dicuntur entia realia quia intellectus non facit illa. 2 Ens autem rationis est ens factum ab intellectu. Et sunt ista: predicamentum, predicabile, universale, subiectum. Predicatum, antecedens, consequens, propositio, oratio, enuntiatio, sillogismus, entimema, inductio, exemplum, genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, individuum, particulare, singulare. Ista enim et similia dicuntur entia rationis quia intellectus facit illa. Unde si non esset intellectus, subiectum non esset, predicatum non esset, universale non esset, particulare non esset, animal non esset genus, homo non esset species, differentia non esset predicans in quale, risibile non esset proprium, albedo non esset accidens, sillogismus non esset nec entimema; nec cetera huiusmodi, si intellectus non esset. 3 Est autem hic notandum quod cum dico ‘predicamentum’, duo dico, quia possum dicere ens rationis et ens reale. Verbi gratia, dicendo

59 Ebbesen & Pinborg (1982), 124–125. This tract is also found in Wroclaw (formerly Breslau), Bibl. Univ. IV Q 4, item 8; f. 54r: “Incipit tractatus de ente rationis fratris stephani de Reato ordinis predicatorum. Ut scias ….” F. 55v: “Explicit … sed in concreto. Et hec dicta sufficient pro isto tractatu. Scriptus die sequenti immediate post festum sanctorum apostolorum Simonis et Iude per fratrum nicolaum fructus studentem theologie protunc in padwa 1423.” See Domanski (1967), 70.

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predicatum: si sumatur pro substantia vel pro qualitate vel pro relatione (et sic de aliis), tunc predicatum est ens reale; si vero sumatur pro illo ente quod predicatur de substantia, que est subiectum predicati, tunc est ens rationis. Similiter cum dico ‘universale’, duo possum dicere, scilicet ens reale et ens rationis. Verbi gratia, sumendo ‘universale’ pro animali vel pro homine vel pro equo, tunc tale universale est ens reale, quia animal, homo, equus et substantia sunt entia realia; si autem sumatur ‘universale’ prout predicatur de homine et de equo vel de animali (ut dicendo ‘Animal est universale’, ‘Homo est universale’), tunc universale est ens rationis. Sumendo ergo pro animali est ens reale, sed prout predicatur de animali est ens rationis. Similiter quando dico ‘species’, duo dico, scilicet ens reale et ens rationis; ens reale sumendo ‘speciem’ pro homine vel pro asino, ens rationis prout predicatur de homine. Unde ista predicatio ‘Homo est species’ est entis rationis, quia iste terminus ‘species’ est ens rationis. Est autem sciendum quod iste predicationes et propositiones ‘Substantia est predicatum’, ‘Animal est genus’, ‘Homo est species’, ‘Petrus est individuum’, ‘Rationale est differentia’, ‘Corpus est species subalterna’, ‘Animal est predicatum’ et ‘Homo est subiectum’, et quecumque consimiles propositiones sunt entia rationis, quia ista predicata sunt entia rationis, ut dictum est. Est sciendum quod entia rationis sunt in entibus realibus. Verbi gratia, istud ens rationis quod est predicatum, est in hoc ente reali quod est substantia, et istud ens rationis quod est species, est in hoc ente reali quod est homo. Et sic est dicendum de omnibus aliis entibus realibus | et rationis. Nunc autem restat manifestare quod frequenter diximus: ‘Ista sunt unum realiter’, ‘Ista sunt distincta realiter’, ‘Ista sunt unum secundum rationem’ et ‘Ista sunt distincta secundum rationem’. Ad cuius evidentiam est considerandum quod ista sunt unum realiter quorum unum est reale ens, sive que sunt una res, sicut homo et rationale. Ista dicuntur distincta realiter que sunt diverse res, sicut homo, equus, lapis, lignum etc. Unum ratione sunt ista que non sunt unum nisi quia intellectus intelligit esse unum, sicut homo et equus sunt unum ratione in genere, Petrus et Marchus sunt unum in specie. Unde unitas generis et speciei sunt unitates secundum rationem. Et distincta ratione sunt illa in quibus sunt diversa entia rationis, sicut animal in quo est genus, homo

13 vel] Hc om. H

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818

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appendix h

in quo est species dicuntur ratione distingui. Et ista distinctio dicitur distinctio rationis, idest in intellectu, quia intellectus facit eam. Ut autem scias quid sit prima intentio et quid secunda intentio, debes scire quod prima intentio est duplex. Quedam est prima intentio que dicitur prima in concreto sive materialiter. Unde substantia, qualitas, quantitas et alia predicamenta et omnia entia realia que superius dicta sunt, dicuntur et cocantur prime intentionis in concreto sive materialiter. Secundo modo intentio prima dicitur in abstracto; talis enim intentio est relatio entis realis dum intelligitur ab ipso intellectu. Unde debes ymaginari quod quando intelligitur homo, ibi est homo, qui est prima intentio in concreto, et ibi est quedam relatio qua homo refertur ad intellectum intelligentem; que relatio vocatur intentionalitas entis realis, que est prima intentio in abstracto. Secunda intentio est duplex, quia est secunda intentio in concreto sive materialiter, et est secunda intentio in abstracto sive formaliter. Intentio secunda in concreto est omne ens rationis, ut predicatum, genus, species etc., et omnia entia rationis dicta superius. Intentio secunda in abstracto sive formaliter est intentionalitas entis rationis. Unde debes ymaginari quod, sicut quando tu intelligis entia rationis, ipsa sequitur relatio quedam ipsorum ad intellectum tuum, que vocatur intentionalitas entium rationis, que est secunda intentio formaliter, sicut intentio prima in abstracto est intentionalitas que fundatur in entibus realibus dum intelliguntur. Est autem notandum quod, si tu intelligis intentionalitatem entium realium, tunc talis intentionalitas est secunda intentio in concreto. Et si intelligis intentionalitatem entium rationis, tunc talis intentionalitas erit secunda intentio in abstracto. Sed debes scire quod prima intentio in concreto dicitur ens reale et denominatur intentio ab ipsa intentionalitate que fundatur in ipso intellectu. Et sic de aliis. Nunc autem restat videre utrum accidens in concreto sit in subiecto. Ideo ut clara habeatur cognitio, prius videndum est quid sit accidens concretum et quid accidens abstractum; tertio quomodo accidens concretum et accidens abstractum sunt in subiecto. Quantum ad primum debetis scire quod accidens concretum descendit ab accidente abstracto, sicut album descendit | ab albedine, et sic de aliis. ‘Album’ semper significat subiectum, non solum inquantum ipsa accidentia in concreto sunt in subiecto, sed inquantum subiectum ipsum includitur in signi-

18 entis] entia H

20 que] qui H

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ficato ipsorum. Verbi gratia, ‘album’ includit corpus in quo est talis albedo, quia ‘album’ significat corpus; est enim album corpus habens albedinem. Et ideo album et cetera accidentia similia dicuntur accidentia in concreto quia habent compositum sive mixtum sive concretum significatum, quia significatum talium accidentium est compositum ex subiecto et accidente, sicut significatum album est compositum ex corpore et albedine. Et ideo dicitur communiter quod accidens concretum est illud quod in suo modo significandi vel in suo modo significato subiectum includit sive concernit. Accidens autem abstractum est quoddam significatum simplex, ita quod in suo modo significandi non includit subiectum sicut in modo significandi ‘albi’. Nam licet albedo in suo modo essendi includat subiectum, non tamen in suo modo significandi, quia modus significandi ‘albedinis’ non includit aliquam rem que non sit albedo. Et ideo significatum ‘albedinis’ non compositum est ex pluribus rebus sicut significatum ‘albi’, quod est compositum ex corpore et albedine, que sunt diverse res. Et ideo accidens abstractum dicit abstractum quoddam a subiecto, non quantum ad modum essendi sed quantum ad modum significandi, quia non significat subiectum. Sed hic est videndum de ista consequentia: ‘Modus essendi albedinis includit subiectum; ergo albedo includit subiectum in suo modo significandi’. Ad hoc est dicendum quod, licet modus essendi albedinis supponatur a suo modo significandi, non tamen modus significandi ‘albedinis’ significat illum modum essendi in quo includitur subiectum. Ex hiis ergo patet quod album non ponitur in aliquo predicamento per se. Ratio huius est quia: Ens per accidens, ut ait60 Philosophus septimo Metaphisice, non est in aliquo predicamento; sed album est ens per accidens; ens per accidens est illud quod est compositum ex pluribus rebus diversorum predicamentorum—album enim est compositum ex corpore et albedine, que sunt diversorum predicamentorum, et ideo est ens per accidens—; ergo non est per se in aliquo predicamento. Et sic patet primum. Etc. Quantum ad secundum, scilicet quomodo differunt accidens concretum et accidens abstractum, sciendum est quod ista duo accidentia, scilicet album et albedo, sunt unum per essentiam, et differunt reali-

15 compositum est] coni. concretum H 60

22 modus] Hc om. H

Aristotle, Metaph. VII 6 passim. Cf. V 7, 1017a22 ff.; VI 4, 1027b30 ff.

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820

appendix h

ter extrinsece secundum duos modos significandi. Verbi gratia, una et eadem res prout in suo modo significandi concernit subiectum, dicitur album; ut autem in suo modo significandi non concernit subiectum, dicitur albedo. Et ideo album et albedo differunt solum in uno, quia album concernit subiectum, et albedo non. Et propter talem differentiam album non potest esse species qualitatis, sicut et albedo, quia: Omnis species Qualitatis est qualitas, sicut omnis species Substantie est substantia; sed H113v album non est species Qualitatis; ergo album non | est qualitas. 15 Sed hic est unum dubium quare Philosophus dicit61 in predicamento Substantie quod ‘album’ puram qualitatem significat; sed illud quod puram qualitatem significat, non distinguitur ab accidente in abstracto; ergo etc. Ad hoc dicendum est quod, licet secundum rem ‘album’ significet qualitatem solam, non tamen significat solam qualitatem secundum modum suum significandi, ut dictum est. Et ideo non distinguitur ab accidente in abstracto. 16 Quantum ad tertium, scilicet quod accidentia tam in concreto quam in abstracto sunt in subiecto, est enim sciendum quod hoc probatur ratione et auctoritate. Ratione sic. Sicut se habent substantie ad inesse, sic se habent accidentia ad per se. sed substantia non potest inesse, ut patet62 in primo Phisicorum. Ergo accidens non potest per se esse. Auctoritate sic probatur. Philosophus loquendo de accidentibus concretis et abstractis in Predicamentis dicit63 sic: “Eorum vero que in subiecto sunt, in pluribus quidem nec nomen nec ratio verificatur et predicatur; in quibuscumque vero nec nomen prohibet predicari”. Unde Philosophus non distinguit ista accidentia per hoc quod est esse in subiecto, quia dicit ‘eorum que sunt in subiecto’, sed per hoc quod est predicari de subiecto, quia accidens in abstracto non predicatur de subiecto aliquo modo. Accidens autem in concreto, licet non predicetur de subiecto secundum rationem, predicatur tamen secundum nomen de subiecto. Item. Philosophus dicit64 in eodem loco quod est color in corpore, et tamen color est accidens in abstracto. Item. Philosophus primo Thopicorum, loquens indifferenter de quolibet accidente, dicit65 quod accidens semper est in subiecto persistens.

61 62 63 64 65

Aristotle, Categ. 5, 3b19. Aristotle Phys. I 7, 190a33-b1. Aristotle, Categ. 5, 3a15–18. Aristotle, Categ. 5, 2b1; cf. 2, 1a28. Aristotle, Topica I 5, 102b4 ff.

5

10

15

20

25

30

stephanus de reate

821

Sed hic est unum dubium. Non videtur quod accidens in abstracto 17 (ut patet de albedine) predicatur de subiecto. Ergo non est in subiecto. Ad hoc est dicendum quod accidens in abstracto non predicatur de subiecto, sed in concreto. 5 Etc. Et sic est finis. Laus Deo amen. Explicit Tractatus de ente reali et ente rationis secundum fratrem Stefanum de reate Almi ordinis predicatorum Etc.

INDICES

INDEX LOCORUM Legendum 13, n. 22 = p. 13, footnote 22 Odint 39 = Giraldus Odonis, De intentionibus, cap. 39 A, B, C (etc.), 33 = Appendix A, B, C (etc.), cap. 33 Abaelardus, see s.n. Petrus Abaelardus Aegidius Romanus Ordinatio in I Sent. dist. 23, q. 3: 133 dist. 25, q. 1: 131 Albertus Magnus In Porph. Isag. Comm. cap. 6: H I 98 De praedicabilibus IV, pp. 6b–7a: H I 23 In Anal. Priora Comm. prooemium: E III, q. 3, cap. 10 In II De anima tr. 3, capp. 3–4: 32, n. 31; 33, n. 34 Alexander Halensis Glossa in IV libros Sent. I, dist. 25, q. 2c: 135, n. 38 Algazel Metaphysica I 2, 3, pp. 2932–308: Odint 300 III 4, p. 661–2: Odint 405 Ambrosius Hymnus ‘Splendore paternae gloriae’ 1411: F 8

Anonymus Liber de causis prop. 1a, comm.: Odint 299 prop. 4a, textus: Odint 304 IX, p. 9946–49: 63, n. 42; 313 Anonymus (ps.-Gilbertus Porretanus) De sex principiis cap. 9, p. 372: H I 98 Aristoteles (Opera omnia ed. Im. Bekker, 1831) Categoriae 1, 1a1–2: Odint 447 1a6–8: Odint 449 1a12–15: Odint 166 2, 1a20-b9: Odint 389 1a27–28: Odint 97 1a28: H II 16 1b9: Odint 44 3, 1b10–24: Odint 447 4, 1b25–2a10: F 89 1b25–27: 332; F 89; 94 5, 2a11–19: Odint 388 2b1: H II 16 2b1–2: Odint 97 2b5–6: 88 3a15–18: H II 16 3b13–16: 51; Odint 366; ad 389; F 80 3b19: H II 15 3a36–37: Odint 54 4b8–10: 222; E III, q. 2, cap. 4 6, 4b24: F 93

826

index locorum

7, 6b34–36: H I 107 8a39-b1: F 92 8, 8b25: Odint 10 8b36–39: F 93 9a30–31: F 93 12, 14a34–35: Odint 296 14b21–22: 222; E III, q. 2, 4 De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8: 30; 34, n. 38; 70, n. 63 16a3–4: Odint 217; F 121 16a8–9: 70 3, 16b19–21: F 100 16b20: 23; Odint 217 4, 17a3–7: F 111 7, 17a38-b1: 317; Odint 54; 63; 79; 388 11, 21a32–33: F 100 Analytica priora I 1, 24b16–18: Odint 55; 217 I 46,51b5–7: Odint 59 Analytica posteriora I 2, 71b9–12: E III, q. 1, 8 71b20–24: E III, q. 1, 4 and 8 71b25–26: E III, q. 4, 3; H I 28; H I 128 71b33–72a5: Odint 297; 312 72a37-b4: H I 1 I 4, 73a29–31: Odint 259 73b38–74a3: 314; Odint 305 I 5: Odint 200 I 13, 78a22–79a16: E III, q. 4, 12 I 18, 81a38-b9: H I 111 I 25, 86b30–36: Odint 260 I 28, 87a38: H I 131 I 31, 87b29–33: Odint 51 87b37–39: 98; G 25; H I 114 II 19, 100a16–17: Odint 95; 306 Topica I 2, 101b4: E III, q. 1, cap. 4 I 5, 101b38: Odint 376 102a31–32: E III, q. 11, cap. 8 102a32–35: Odint 55 f.; 102b4 ff.: H I 88; H II 16 I 7, 103a23–24: Odint 267 I 8, 103b17–19: Odint 102 103b21: Odint 102 II 1, 109a10: Odint 88

II 2, 110a15–22: F 55 II 11, 115b3–4: 137 IV passim: Odint 160; 366; E III, q. 11, cap. 6 IV 1 passim: Odint 288 IV 1, 121a28–29: Odint 107 121b2–4: Odint 340 IV 2, 121b38: 58, n. 28 IV 4, 124b15 ff.: Odint 183 125a16–17: Odint 62 VI 1, 139a24 ff.: Odint 88 capp. 4–6: Odint 384 VI 6, 145a36–37: 58, n. 28 VI 9, 147a23–28: Odint 89 Sophistici Elenchi 1, 165a16–17: 72, n. 68 165a6–8: Odint 215 Physica I 1, 184a16–18: H I 1 I 2, 185a20 ff.: Odint 335 185a20–21: Odint 332 185a27 ff.: Odint 333; 362 I 4, 188a17–18: 354, n. 24; G 2; H I 134 I 5, 188b21–26: Odint 74 189a5–8: Odint 51 I 6, 189a14–16: H I 134 I 7, 190a33-b1: H II 16 191a12 ff.: Odint 397 I 8, 195b15–16: H I 88 I 9, 192a13–14: Odint 345 192a16–25: Odint 393 II 1, 192b32–193a2: Odint 345 II 3, 195b25–28: H I 92; H I 113 II 7, 198a21 ff.: E III, q. 3 ad 5 III 1, 200b32–201a3: Odint 332; 370; H I 19 200b32–201a2: Odint 370 201a7–8: Odint 333 201a8–9: Odint 333; 370 III 3, 202b8–9: Odint 394 202b14–16: Odint 393 IV passim: H I 78 IV 1, 208a29–31: Odint 415 209a7–9: Odint 377 IV 11, 219b10–15: Odint 394 219b17 ff.: A ad 10; F 120

index locorum IV 14, 223a21 ff.: F 93 VIII 6, 258b10–16: Odint 345 VIII cap. 8: H I 112 De caelo et mundo I 4, 271a33: 46, n. 10 I 5, 271b8–9: F 86 De generatione et corruptione I 1, 314b23–25: Odint 262 I 5, 322a25–28: Odint 395 I 10, 328a18 ff.: Odint 74 De anima I 1, 402a11–16: H I 127 402b7–8: E IV 1 II 2, 417b23–28: E IV 3 II 4, 416b12–20: Odint 395 II 5, 417a22-b2: 202 417b22–23: Odint 98; H I 114 II 7, 418b3 ff.: Odint 349 II 11, 422b18 ff.: E III, q. 4, cap. 2 II 12, 424a17–28: 31 III 2, 426b8 ff.: E II 1 427a17 ff.: 31 III, capp. 3–8: G 9 III 3, 428a5 ff.: 63, n. 44 429a13–16: 224; 228 III 4: Odint 169 III 4, 429a10–28: 32 429a10–11: E IV 19 429a13–14: E IV 19 429b5–9: 202 429b10–22: 196; 198 430a3–4: 197; 346 III 5, 430a10–17: E III, q. 4, cap. 4; G 86 430a24–25: 195, n. 12 430b6: 186, n. 37 III 8, 431b20–28: 60; 346, n. 12 431b21–432a1: 201 431b21: 46, n. 9; E IV 12; H I 136 431b29–432a1: 72 De sensu et sensato 1, 437a14–15: E II 8; E III, q. 2, cap. 15 De memoria 1, 450b18–451a2: 71 450b24–27: 71

827

De somniis 1, 459a14–22: 71, n. 66 Metaphysica I 1, 981a16–17: H I 58 I 2, 982a25–26: 313; Odint 298 983a3–4: F 115 I 3, 984a21–29: F 71 II 1, 993b2–4: E II 8 993b20–21: E II 6 II 2, 994b16–20: Odint 301 II 3, 995a13–14: E II 9; E III, q. 1, cap. 2 III 1, 995b23–24: Odint 151 III 3, 998b26–27: Odint 365 III 4, 999b33–34: Odint 48; 52 IV 1, 1003a33–35: Odint 332; 371 IV 2, 1003b16–18: Odint 345 1003b22–25: Odint 397 1004a25–31: Odint 345 1005a13–18: F 112 IV 3, 1005a29–30: Odint 18 1005b19–22: F 100 IV 4, 1006a11–18: Odint 257 1006a28–1009a5: Odint 257 1006a28-b9: Odint 449 1006a29–30: Odint 24; 202; F 100 1006b7: Odint 363 1006b15–24: Odint 204 1006b20 ff.: A ad 4 IV 5, 1009a15–22: F 98 IV 7, 1012a22–24: Odint 47; D 17 IV 12, 1003b5–10: Odint 346 V, capp. 1–2: Odint 74 V 2, 1013b32–1014a10: 314; Odint 307 1013b35–1014a25: Odint 307 V 5, 1030b14 ff.-6, 1031b23 ff.: 216, n, 53 V 6, 1015b36–1016a25: Odint 73 1016b31–32: Odint 267 V 7: Odint 160; H I 78; 83 V 7, 1017a7–22: Odint 124 1017a8–35: H I 58 1017a22–35: F 58 1017a22–25: G 2; 13; H II 13 V 9, 1018a5–7: Odint 267

828

index locorum

1018a10 ff.: Odint 77 1018a12: Odint 75 1018a15–16: Odint 76 V 11, 1019a2–6: Odint 295 V 15, 1021a23–25: H I 106 1021a26–32: G 21 1021a29-b3: Odint 183 1021a29–30: G 31 VI 1, 1025b18 ff.: E II 6 1025b24: F 105 1025b30 ff.: Odint 69 1026a18–19: E II 1 VI 2, 1026a33-b1: F 39; 58; 93; G 2; 13 VI 4: H I 78 VI 4, 1027b17 ff.: F 93; H I 28; 77 1027b30–1028a4: G 15; H II 13 1027b31–33: E III, q. 2, cap. 1; F 93 1028a2–4: F 93 VII 1, 1028a10–13: F 93 1028a13–20: Odint 345 VII 2, 1028b18 ff.: Odint 388 VII, capp. 4–6: Odint 393 VII 4, 1029b13: 75 VII 5, 1030b29–35: Odint 63 VII 6, passim: H II 13 VII 6, 1031a1–3: E III, q. 11, cap. 13 1031a19–28: E III, q. 11, cap. 16 1032a4–10: 8.5, n. 563 1032a4–6: Odint 393 VII, cap. 10 ff.: 302 VII 10, 1035b33–1036a13: 52, n. 19 1035b33–1036a1: Odint 288 VII 11, 1036a31-b1: Odint 419 1036b2–3: Odint 419 VII 12, 1037b29–1038a1: Odint 302 1038a33–34: 316, n. 24; Odint 310 VII 15, 1039b27–29: E IV 2 IX 1, 1045b27–32: Odint 332; 372 IX 4, 1047b14–16: Odint 108 IX 7, 1049a26-b1: Odint 287

IX 10: H I 97 IX 10, 1051b1–9: Odint 407 1051b33–1052a1: H I 63; 80 X 1, 1052a34–36: Odint 267 1052b11–13: Odint 397 X 2, 1054a13–19: Odint 372 1054a13–15: Odint 333 X 6, 1056b34–36: H I 106 X 7, 1057a26–28: Odint 262 X 8, 1057b35 ff.: Odint 255 1058a21–23: Odint 270 X 9, 1058a31–32: Odint 236 1058b3–4: Odint 74 XII capp. 1 ff.: Odint 365 XII 4, 1070b1–2: Odint 365 1070b2–3: Odint 368 XII 6, 1071b3–11: Odint 345 XII 7, 1072a23–1073a13: 319; Odint 399 1072b14–16: Odint 402 XII 9, 1074b17: Odint 399 1074b20–21: Odint 399 XII 10, 1076a3–4: Odint 362 XIII, 3, 1078a10 ff.: Odint ad 202 Ethica Nicomachea I 1, 1094a3: Odint 343 I 2, 1095a30-b4: 316; Odint 312 I 4, 1096b3–5: Odint 402 1096b18 ff.: Odint 346 I 6, 1098a12–18: G 7 II 1, 1103a23–34: E III, q. 2, cap. 11 III 2, 1111b7 ff.: F 105 III 5, 1113b3–5: F 105 V 2, 1130a10–13: Odint 396 VI 8, 1141b22–24: Odint 396 VI 12, 1144a8–9: Odint 20 1144a22–26: Odint 20 VI 13, 1144b1: Odint 18 VIII 1, 1155b23–25: Odint 168 Rhetorica I 1, 1354a1: F 108 1355a4–5: F 115 1356a6–19: F 110 I 3, 1358b5–9: F 107 II 20, 1393a23–1394a18: F 106 II 23, 1397a6–1400b33: F 106

index locorum III 1, 1403b5–6: F 115 III 14, 1414b19— 19, 1420b3: F 106 Augustinus De civitate Dei VIII, cap. 4: 35, n. 41 De doctrina christiana I, capp. 2–5: A 7 I 2, p. 916–17: Odint 422; G 29 I 5, p. 91–2: F 23 I 12: 34 II 43: 35, n. 40; 71, n. 67 De Genesi ad litteram V, cap. 15, 33: 35, n. 41 VI, cap. 24, 41: 35, n. 41 De Trinitate I 9, p. 3817–19: H 90 II 3, pp. 82–84: H 91 V 7, pp. 21113–21249: F 96 VI 10: 35, n. 41 VII 8, pp. 255–257: Odint 333 p. 25893–95: A 17 VII 9, p. 259120–125: F 4 VII, cap. 11 passim: C 2; 33 VII 11, p. 2617–8: F 3 p. 26215–27: A 28; E 6 p. 26218–20: F 3 p. 26222–27: F 3 p. 26222–24: A 16 p. 26225–27: A 18 p. 26474–76: F 12 X 1, p. 31229–30: Odint 403 XV 19, p. 48676–80: 34; 72, n. 70; F 36 De magistro VIII, capp. 22 ff.: 33; 34, n. 37 De vera religione IV, capp. 6–7: 35, n. 40 Liber LXXXIII quaestionum q. 46: 35, n. 41 q. 51: 59, n. 34 Quaestio de Ideis passim: 35, n. 41 Adversus Iudaeos (ed. Migne) col. 1123: Odint 18

829

Epistulae 118 (Ad Dioscurum) capp. 20–21: 35, n. 41 Retractationes I, 3, 4: 36, n. 42 XII, 19: 36; 80 Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona Quaestiones in Sententias I, dist. 8: Odint 400 Averroes (ed. Iuntina Venice 1562) In Arist. Phys. Comm. IV, Foll. 173vb–174ra: A 10; F 93; 120 VII: E III, q. 11, cap. 13 IX: F 57 In Arist. De anima Comm. Magnum I 1, p. 39–17: Odint 18 p. 836–37: Odint 100 I 8, p. 1225–26: 327, n. 45; Odint 99; E IV 1 and 6; F 77; H 65 III 5, pp. 38729–38830: Odint 6 III 6, p. 404500 ff.: F 55 p. 405517–520: Odint 6 p. 41564–67: Odint 6 In Arist. Metaph. Comm. I, Fol. 31r: 187, n. 38 II: E III, q. 1, cap. 2 III, Fol. 39C12-D1: Odint 52 IV, Fol. 77A2–5: Odint 24; A 4 77A8–14: Odint 24 78A7–10: Odint 24 V, Fol. 100A23–30: Odint 24 VI: F 93 XII, ad 1078a10 ff.: Odint ad 202 Avicenna Liber de prima philosophia sive scientia divina (ed. Van Riet) I 1, p. 14–6: Odint 28; 44; 133; 154; 202 I 5, pp. 312–324: Odint 141 I 6. pp. 12–14: Odint 53 V 1, pp. 228–229: F 81 p. 22829–36: Odint 282 V 3, p. 24610–13: 237, n. 94

830

index locorum

VI 2, p. 1073–75: 21, n. 5; 23, n. 11 f.; Odint 28; 44; 134 f.; 202; 228; E II 15; E III, q. 4, 11; E III, q. 11, 10; F 53; G 63; H I 3; 7; 43 VI 4, p. 98–9: Odint 5 p. 1485–89: Odint 22 VIII 5, pp. 20910—41016: 172, n. 15; 174 Scientia de naturalibus I, cap. 5: 32, n. 32 IV, cap. 8, p. 82–3: 23, n. 11 Sufficientia I, cap. 10: 176, n. 22 Biblia Sacra Deuteronomium VI, 4–5: F 5 Lucas I 37: F 97 Boethius De consolatione philosophiae III, pr. 2: Odint 195 ubi?: E III, q. 4, cap. 3 De duabus naturis III init.: 128; 131; 140, n. 51; 144, n. 55; 147; C 16; D 7; 13a; 18; E I 6; 31; F 9 IV init.: 128; 131; 140, n. 51; 144, n. 55; 147; C 16; D 7; 13a; 18; E I 6; 31; F 9 In Arist. Categ. (ed. Migne) coll. 159C–161A: F 91 col. 162B–C: F 91 coll. 162B–163C: F 96 col. 166B: Odint 334 In Periherm. (ed. Meiser) Ia, p. 21518–20: Odint 58 IIa, p. 4807–9: Odint 58 De topicis differentiis (ed. Migne) I, col. 1173B3–5: F 115 De divisionibus (ed. Migne) col. 886A5 ff.: Odint 100; 120 In Ciceronis Topica (ed. Migne) I, col. 1045C9–11: F 115

III, col. 1083 B-C: F 106 1084D: F 107 Boethius de Dacia Qq. sup. librum Topicorum 3 sqq.: 172, n. 14 Cajetanus De subjecto naturali philosophiae Ad fin., p. 211: 126, n. 21 Cicero De inventione I, capp. 5–6: F 107 Crathorn Qq. in I Sent. (ed. Hoffmann) q. XVIII: 353, n. 19 Dionysius Carthusianus Elementa theologica cap. 45, p. 146A: 327, n. 44 Donatus De arte grammatica pp. 18–19: F 91 Durandus de Sto Porciano Quaestiones in Sententias I, dist. 23: D 1–23 Eustratius In Arist. Ethica Nicom. Int. pp. 12–14: Odint 343 Gerardus de Harderwick In Summulas Petri Hispani I, p. 13A45 ff.: Odint ad 114 Giraldus Odonis Quaestiones in Sententias passim: Int., p. 6–14 I, dist. 7, art. 1: Odint ad 39 dist. 12, art. 2: Odint ad 49 dist. 19: 326, n. 42 dist. 23: 317, n. 25

index locorum II, dist. 3: Odint ad 334; ad 376; ad 387 dist. 6, q. 4: Int., p. 7, n. 12; 9.36, n. 583 Logica (ed. de Rijk) III, 1, no, 102, p. 362: 13, n. 23; H I 128 De natura universalis (ed. Spruyt) q. 2, cap. 27: 327, n. 43 cap. 29: 327, n. 44 capp. 32–36: 328–329, nn. 49– 53 cap. 37: 329 capp. 43–44: 327, n. 46 De intentionibus (ed. de Rijk) Contents: 11–12 capp. 2–43: 304 ff. cap. 3: 305, n. 4 cap. 4: 305, n. 5 cap. 18: 305, n. 6 capp. 19–22: 306, n. 7 cap. 23: 306, n. 8 capp. 27–42: 306 capp. 39–41: 258, n. 14 cap. 40: 260, n. 18 cap. 42: 278, n. 37; 303, n. 2 cap. 47: 307 capp. 48–105: 306 cap. 48: 306 capp. 51–58: 308, n. 12 cap. 59: 308, n. 13 cap. 61: 309, n. 14 capp. 71–72: 310, n. 16 capp. 86–91: 310, n. 17 cap. 86: 306; 309, n. 16; 310 cap. 92: 310, n. 17 cap. 93: 310 capp. 95–97: 311–312 cap. 100: 313, n. 21 capp. 101–104: 313 capp. 106–108: 306 capp. 109–200: 306, n. 9 capp. 146–152: 303, n. 2 cap. 217: 353, n. 20 capp. 294–312: 313; 326 cap. 298: 314, n. 22 cap. 305: 314

cap. 306: 311, n. 20 cap. 307: 314 cap. 310: 315; 316, n. 24 cap. 375: 317, n. 25 cap. 391: 319, n. 27 cap. 398: 319, n. 28 cap. 399: 319, n. 29 cap. 405: 320, n. 34 cap. 406: 321, n. 37; 322; 325, n. 41 capp. 408–420: 322–326 cap. 412: 323 cap. 413: 324, n. 40 cap. 415: 325 capp. 443 sqq.: 326 Expositio in Arist. Ethicam 2, n.3 Godefridus de Fontibus Quodlibeta V, q. 10: 39; 332, n. 57 VII, q. 1: 324 q. 5, p. 3306–16: 332, n. 57 q. 5, p. 33039–33114: 354, n. 24 Gregorius Magnus papa Moralia in Job (ed. Adriaens) VII, XXXVII, 57: G 1 Gulielmus de Alnwick De esse et intelligibili (ed. Ledoux) pp. 323–51: 87 pp. 63–74: 88–89 pp. 74–819: 90. n. 22 pp. 819–153: 91 pp. 923–103: 92 pp. 2019–26: 92, n. 25 p. 216–26: 93, n. 26 pp. 2725–283: 93, n. 27 Quodlibet (ed. Ledoux) q. 8, pp. 46426–4658: 92, n. 24 Gulielmus Autisiodorensis Summa aurea I, cap. 4, q. 2: 134, n. 36

831

832

index locorum

Gulielmus Guarro Quaestiones in Sententias I dist. 23: A 1–35a Gulielmus Ockham Quaestiones in Sententias I, dist. 2, q. 8, pp. 266–292: G 2 Expositio in Perih. Arist. I, prooemium, pp. 248–376: G2 Henricus de Gandavo Quodlibeta III, q. 9: 84 IV, q. 1: 106 V, q. 14: 105 VII, q. 13: 84, n. 8 IX, q. 2: 36, n. 45; 79, n. 2; 84, n. 17 Summa quaestionum ordinariarum art. 43, q. 2, 5: 84, n. 8 art. 53, qq. 1–5: 133 q. 3: 327, n. 44 q. 4: 133 q. 5: 133; 151 art. 68, q. 5: 36, n. 45; 81–84; 349, n. 16 Hervaeus Natalis Quaestiones in Sententias I, dist. 8, q. 1: 146, n. 59 dist. 23: 147; 251; 294; C 1– 34 II, dist. 3, q. 4, artt. 2–4: 146, n. 59 dist. 17, q. 2, artt. 1–3: 146, n. 59 Quodlibeta I, q. 2: 321 II, q. 8, art. 1: 103, n. 48 V, q. 12c: 105 De quattuor materiis 95 ff.; 146, nn. 60, 62; 256, n. 10; 350 De intellectu et specie (ed. Stella) pp. 1411–16621: 97–112; 146, n. 62; 150, n.67; 151, n. 68

De secundis intentionibus dist. I, q. 1: 253–256; Odint 8; 152; 172; 174; 182; 184; F 74; H I4 dist. I, q. 2.: 256–260; 268, n. 30; Odint 13–15 dist. I, q. 3.: 261–263; Odint 49; 128; 181 dist. I, q. 4: 260, n. 18; 263 f.; H I 26 dist. I, q. 5: 265–267; H I 8 dist. II, q. 1: 268 f.; Odint 177 dist. II, q. 2: 269 dist. II, q. 3: 270 f.; 274 dist. II, q. 4: 273 dist. II, q. 5: 270 f. dist. II, q. 6: 276–279 dist. II, q. 6c: Odint 39; 42; 146 f.; 198 dist. III, q. 2: 279–281; Odint 157 dist. III, q. 3: 281 f.; Odint 158 dist. IV, q. 1: 282–284; Odint 12; 179; 185 f. dist. IV, q. 2: 284; Odint 148; 154; 196 dist. IV, q. 3: 284–288 dist. V, q. 1: 288 f. dist. V, q. 2: 289–291; 343, n. 6; Odint 154 dist. V, q. 3: 291 f.; Odint 51; 164 dist. V, q. 4: 292–294 Quaestiones quodlibetales I: H I 128 III, q. 1: H 67; 77; 79 f. Quodlibeta I: Odint 406; 427 I, q. 9: F 34 ff. III, qq. 1–2: 251, n. 1 De verbo qq. 1–3: 251, n. 1 Hieronymus Epist. 53, col. 540: H I 2 Hugo Ultraiectensis Quaestiones in Porphyrium 191, n. 6

index locorum Jacobus de Ascoli Quaestiones disputatae q. 1: 37, n. 49 q. 5: 87, n. 15 q. 5, art. 1: 87 q. 5, art. 2: 88, n. 17 q. 5, art. 4: 87, n. 16 Quodlibet q. 2: 37, n. 48; 86, n. 13 Jacobus Mettensis Quaestiones in Sententias I, dist. 23, q. 1: 144, n. 55; 145, n. 57 dist. 25, q. 1: 139; B 1–24

ps.-kilwardby In Priscianum maiorem comm. cap. 11, p. 77: 153, n. 70 Maynus de Maineriis Tractatus de intentionibus secundis prooemium: 13, n. 23 Missale Romanum Praefatio sanctissimae Trinitatis App. A 1; F 17 Othlo Emmeranus Libellus proverbiorum (= ps.-Beda) col. 1099B: Odint ad 22

Johannes Damascenus De fide orthodoxa (ed. Buytaert) III 4, p. 180: F 9; 14 f.

Petrus Abaelardus Dialectica (ed. de Rijk) V, p. 5965–10: 217, n. 56

Johannes Duns Scotus Opus Oxoniense I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4: 322, n. 38 dist. 23, q. unica: 161, nn. 81– 83 dist. 35, q. unica, nr. 12: 37, nn. 47, 50 dist. 38, q. 1: 160, n. 80 Reportatio Parisiensis I, dist. 36, q. 3, nr. 20: 37, n. 48 II, dist. 13, q. 1: 159, n. 74 IV, dist. 10, q. 3: 159, n. 77; 160, n. 79 Super Universalia q. 3: 162, n. 84 q. 27: 162, n. 85 q. 34: 162, n. 84

Petrus Aureolus Scriptum super I Sententiarum prooemium, q. 5, p. 285 ff.: F 112 dist. 23, capp. 116–117: 354, n. 26 ff. Comm. Breve super Sententias I, dist. 23: 251, n. 3; 355 ff. q. 2, art. 1: 355; F ad 116 q. 4: 356, n. 29

Johannes Parisiensis In Sententias I, dist. 23, q. 2: 133 dist. 25, q. 1: 134 Johannes Philoponus In Arist. De anima (ed. Verbeke) p. 2336–52: 199

833

Petrus Hispanus Tractatus sive Summulae logicales (ed. de Rijk) I, cap. I: H I 1 II, cap. 2: 169, n. 10 Petrus Hispanus non papa Absoluta cuiuslibet (ed. Kneepkens) p. 2: Odint 204; 232 petrus joh. olivi Tractatus de verbo (ed. Pasnau) pp. 144339–145348: 73, n. 74 p. 145356–361: 73, n. 73 p. 145362–371: 73, n. 74

834

index locorum

Plato Timaeus 51B–52A: 84, n. 7 Porphyrius Isagoge (ed. Minio-Paluello) p. 17–10: Odint 58 p. 52–10: E III, q. 4, cap. 7; q 11, cap. 3 p. 211: Odint 83 p. 217–19: Odint 58; 63 p. 410–11: Odint 84 p. 415–21: Odint 315; 446 p. 67–8: Odint 438 p. 68–9: Odint 332; 369 p. 722–24: Odint 315 p. 1122–23: Odint 84 p. 1217–19: Odint 84 p. 1220–21: Odint 84 pp. 1225–131: Odint 85 p. 1225–26: Odint 102 Priscianus Institutiones grammaticae II, pp. 18021: F 91 Prudentius Carmina (ed. Migne) col. 783A; Odint ad 22 Radulphus Brito In I–III Sent.: 191, n. 2 In I Sent. dist. 23: 192–194; E I, 1–35 Quaestiones in Priscianum 192, n. 8 Quaestiones in artem veterem accessus: 172, n. 14; 230–232; E II, 1–20 Quaestiones in Porphyrium (ed. Pinborg) qq. 5–8: 206–215; E III q. 11: 215–218; E III; 6.4; 6.45 Super Perihermeneias q. 11: 234–245 Quaestiones in Anal. Post. prooemium: E II ad 16 fol. 73rb: 231, n. 83 f.; E II ad 16

Super Topica Boethii (ed. GreenPedersen) q. 5, p.1623–34: 232 f. p. 1716–31: 234 Quaestiones in I De anima q. 6: 192, n. 8; 203–205; E IV Quaestiones in III De anima (ed. Fauser) 194–202 p. 116156–163: 194, n. 10 pp. 116171–117189: 194, n. 11 pp. 117205–118212: 195, n. 12 f. pp. 121295–122337: 195, n. 14 pp. 122338–346: 196 p. 123347–365: 196 p. 1733–18: 196–197 p. 17421–22: 196 p. 17549–61: 196–197 p. 17564–67: 197, n. 17 p. 17571–74: 197 p. 17676–81: 198, n. 18 p. 18323–26: 198 pp. 18346–18581: 198 p. 18452–71: 199 p. 18598–99: 199, n. 20 pp. 19232–19365: 229, n. 80 pp. 194–216: 199, n. 22 pp. 218–220: 199 p. 21849–50: 199 p. 21968–70: 199, n. 23 pp. 221–244: 199 ff. pp. 229104–244525: 200 pp. 292–300: 201 ff. Sophisma “Aliquis homo est species” 218–230; App. F 63 Ricardus de Sto Victore De Trinitate IV, cap. 6: A 23 cap. 20: E I 4 cap. 22: 131; 147, n. 65 D 13a; E I 21; F 136; Robertus Kilwardby De ortu scientiarum cap. XXXIII, 330: 20, n. 4 cap. XLVIII, 457–458: 19, n. 2 459: 20

index locorum Rogerus de Baconia Quaestiones in Arist. Metaphysicam IV: 124, n. 18 Simon de Faversham Notulae in Petrum Hispanum I, pp. 87–89: 167, n. 7 f. p. 88: 129, n. 27 II, pp. 91 ff.: 168–170 p. 94: 166; 172 p. 97: 171 Quaestiones super Porphyrium q. 2: 178 q. 12: 177, n. 24 q. 20: 179 q. 22: 170, n. 11 q. 26: 177, n. 24 Quaestiones super III De anima 181–189 In I–III De anima comm. 181–189 Sophisma ‘Universale est intentio’ 174–179 Simplicius In Arist. Categ. comm. p. 1218: F 91 Stephanus de Reate Tractatus de quibusdam logicae principiis Pars I: De primis et secundis intentionibus: 295–300; H I Thomas Aquinas (ed. Marietti) Scriptum in Sententias I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3c: 117, n. 7; 122; 224, n. 71 q. 3, art. 1: 122 f. dist. 3, q. 4, art. 5c: 117, n. 7 dist. 8, q. 5, art. 2: 70 dist. 10, q. 1, art. 4c: 66, n. 52 dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2 ad 1: 121; H I 128; dist. 23, q. 1, art. 3c: 117, n. 7; 126; 127, n. 23 dist. 25, q. 1, art. 3: 135, n. 39

835

dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1 ad 3: 117, n. 7 dist. 29, artt. 1–4: 126, n. 22; 128, n. 24 f.; C 28 dist. 30, art. 1, q. 3: 70 dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1: 117, n. 7; 121 dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2c: 68, n. 56 dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1, obi. 3: 60, n. 36; 80, n. 4 II, dist. 19, q. 1, art. 3 ad 1: 67; 117, n. 7 dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3c: 117, n. 7 III, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, q. 1c: 129, n. 28 dist. 14, art. 1, sol. 4: 224, n. 71 dist. 62, q. 3c: 66, n. 51 dist. 62, q. 4c: 66, n. 51 IV, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 4: 66, n. 51 dist. 44, q. 2, art. 1,3 ad 2: 70; 118, n. 9 Super Evangelium S. Johannis Lectura cap. 1, lect. 1, nr. 25: 34, n. 38 Summa theologiae I, q. 4: 42 q. 12, art. 9 obi. 1: 60, n. 36 q. 13, art. 8 ad 2: 224, n. 71 q. 14, art. 1c: 46, n. 9 art. 2c: 60 art. 4, obi. 3: 57, n. 27 q. 15, art. 2: 80, n. 15 q. 17, 2c and 3c: 46, n. 9 q. 29, artt. 1–4: 126, n. 22; 128 q. 30, art. 4c: 4.15, 129, nn. 26, 28; 135, n. 39 q. 34, art. 1 ad 3: 58, n. 29 q. 39, art. 1: 135, n. 39 q. 44, art. 3c: 80, n. 15 q. 55, art. 1 ad 2: 117, n. 6; 346, n. 12 ff. q. 56, art. 2c: 68 art. 2 ad 3: 63, n. 41; 68; 120, n. 13 q. 67, art. 3c: 120, n. 13 q. 76, art. 1c: 43 art. 5c: 46, n. 9

836

index locorum

q. 78, art. 3c: 65; 117, n. 7; 118, n. 9; 120, n. 13 art. 4c: 42, n. 3; 43; 49, n. 14 art. 4c: 69, n. 61; 117, n. 7 art. 4 ad 2: 49, n. 13 q. 79, art. 4 ad 4: 54; 63, n. 43 art. 7c: 55, n. 24 art. 13 ad 1: 67, n. 53 q. 80, art. 1c: 44, n. 6; 46, n. 9 q. 81, art. 3c: 117, n. 7 q. 84, art. 3c: 44 art. 7c: 2.1; 44; 63, n. 43; 180, n. 26 q. 85, art. 1 init.: 52, n. 18 art. 1c: 51 art. 1 ad 1: 53 art. 1, ad 2: 52 art. 1 ad 3: 63, n. 43 art. 2 ad 1: 346, n. 11 art. 2c, and ad 2: 54, n. 60 art. 2 ad 2: 117, n. 7; 180, n. 26 art. 3 ad 4: 117, n. 7 art 4c: 58, n. 29 art. 6c: 46, n. 9 q. 86, art. 1c: 199, n. 20 q. 87, art. 1 ad 3: 346, n. 12 q. 91, art. 3c: 46, n. 9 q. 93, art. 2c, 4c, 6c: 46, n. 9; 59, n. 34 q. 94, art. 4c: 46, n. 9 q. 97, art. 3c: 66 q. 117, art. 1c: 44, n. 6 I–II, q. 5, art. 6 ad 2: 118, n. 9 q. 6 ad 2: 118, n. 9 q. 12, art. 1c: 117, n. 7 q. 22, art. 2c: 118, n. 9 q. 51, art. 3c: 195, n. 12 II–II, q. 8, art. 1c: 50, n. 15 q. 103, art. 3 ad 3: 119, n. 10 III, q. 25, art. 3c: 119, n. 10 Summa contra Gentiles I, cap. 53, nrs. 443–444: 61; 118; 202, n. 28; 224, n. 71 cap. 55, nr. 456: 58, n. 29 cap. 65, nr. 537: 60, n. 36

cap. 72, nr. 619: 57, n. 27 II, cap. 59, nr. 1365: 63, n. 43 cap. 68, nrs. 1454–1459: 44, n. 5 cap. 73, nr. 1510: 117, n. 7 cap. 77, nrs. 1581–1582: 51, n. 17; 55 cap. 80, nr. 1618: 53, n. 22 III, cap. 85, nr. 2606: 46, n. 10 cap. 156, nr. 3295: 46, n. 10 IV, cap. 11, nr. 3466: 119 nr. 3469: 116, n. 4; 120, n. 12 nr. 3471b–c: 69, n. 59; 115 nrs. 3473–3474: 119, n. 11 nr. 3475: 50 cap. 23, nr. 3592: 66 In Boethii De Trinitate q. 5, art. 3c: 56, n. 25 De spiritualibus creaturis art. 9 ad 6: 116 De unione Verbi incarnati q. un., art 2c, p. 427a–b: 130, 29 De potentia q. 1, art. 1 ad 10: 123; 123, n. 17 q. 3, art. 11 ad 1: 43, n. 4 q. 4, art. 2 ad 8: 68, n. 57 q. 7, art. 6c: 56; 123, n. 17 art. 7c: 55, n. 24 art. 9c: 54, n. 23; 117, n. 7; 124 q. 8, art. 1c: 113–115 q. 9: C 28 q. 9, art. 4c A-F: 156, n. 22 art. 4cF: 134, n. 35 art. 5c: 115, n. 3; 116 De veritate q. 1, art. 5 ad 16: H I 107 art. 12c: 50, n. 15 q. 2, art. 5, obi. 5: 60, n. 36 q. 3, art. 2 ad 2: 67 q. 8, art. 1 ad 5: 46, n. 9 art. 1 ad 15: 2.1, n. 90 art. 5c: 242; 60, n. 36 art. 8c: 60, n. 37 q. 10, art. 5 ad 2: 117, n. 7 q. 13, art. 3c: 117, n. 7; 118, n. 8 q. 27, art. 7c: 65

index locorum Quaestiones disputatae q. unica de anima, art. 11 ad 14: 117, n. 7 art. 13c: 43, n. 4; 48 f. Quodlibeta V, q. 5, art. 2c: 116, n. 4 VII, q. 1, art. 2: 58, n. 29; 118 In Arist. Periherm. I, nr. 2: 74, n. 77 nrs. 147–148: 58, n. 29 In Post. Anal. I, nrs. 1–2: 74, n. 78 nr. 4: 74, n. 77 nr. 6: 224, n. 71 nr. 171: 75, n. 79 nr. 299: 75, n. 82 In Arist. Phys. comm. II, nr. 161: 55 nr. 242: E III, q. 3 ad 5 In Arist. Meteorol. nr. 631: 69, n. 62 In Arist. De anima comm. II, nr. 377: 163, n. 87 nrs. 378–380: 117, n. 7 nrs, 399–426: 118, n. 9 nr. 396: 117, n. 7 nr. 418: 63, n. 41; 65, n. 49 nr. 522: E III, q. 4, cap. 2

837

nrs. 551–553: 47; 69 nr. 553: 32, n. 31; 69 III, nrs. 584–614: 49, n. 13 nr. 629: 50, n. 16 nr. 633: 64, n. 46 nr. 641: 63, n. 44; 64, n. 46 nrs. 770–772: 53, n. 22 nrs. 787–789: 60 In Arist. Metaph. comm. IV, nr. 540: H I 28 nr. 560: H I 28 nr. 733: 224, n. 71; Odint ad 47; D ad 17 nr. 736: 76, n. 83; H I 128 VI, nr. 1153: F ad 105 nrs. 1234–1236: 60, n. 36 VII, nrs. 1492–1497: 52, n. 19 nr. 1658: 275 XII, nr. 2420: H I 28 In Arist. De caelo et mundo lect. 8, nr. 91: 46, n. 10 In Arist. De sensu et sensato nr. 291: 69 In Arist. De memoria et reminiscentia nrs. 312–316: 53, n. 22 In Arist. X libros Ethicorum expositio I, nr. 80: Odint 346 De natura generis cap. 6, nr. 525: 125.

INDEX NOMINUM Legendum 61, n. 14 = p. 61, footnote 14 A, B, C (etc.), 39 = Appendix A, B, C (etc.), cap. 39 Odint 39 = Giraldus Odonis, De intentionibus, cap. 39 See also the Index locorum Abate, G.: 6, n. 14 Abelard, see s.n. Petrus Abaelardus Aegidius Romanus, see s.n. Giles of Rome Albertus Magnus: 23, n. 12; 30–33; 39, n. 55; 65, n. 48; 74, n. 77; 174; 206, n. 33; 207; 338, n. 5; E III, q. 3, cap. 6; E III, q. 4, cap. 7; H I 125 Alcalá: 3; 3, n. 11 Alexander Halensis: 135, n. 38 Alexander Aphrodisiensis: 38 Alfarabius: 27; 30, n. 25; H I 123 Algazel: 313; 327; H I 123 Alhazen: 37 Ambrosius: F 8 Amerini, F.: 251, n. 1; 303, n. 2; G, n. 173 Antioch: 1 Aquinas, see s.n. Thomas Aquinas Aristotle: 29–33; 39; 98, n. 43; 316; 331–332, and passim Arnaldus Prefectus: Odint ad 143 Arnaldus Procurator: 10; Odint 43 Augustinus: 33–37; 59, n. 34; 71, n. 67; 79; 133; 148; 193; E I 27; 29; G 53 Augustinus Triumphus de ancona: Odint ad 400 Auriol, see s.n. Petrus Aureolus Avarucci, P.G.: 6, n. 14 Averroes: 10, n. 19; 21, n.5; 174;

199, n. 21; 208; 230, n. 81; 312; 327; 341; Odint 98 Avicenna: 32; 37; 166, n. 4; 201, n. 27; 206, n. 33; 208; 327; 367; H I 123 Bakker, P.: 3, n. 8 Biard, J.: 38, n. 52; 159, n. 74; 219, n. 64; 252, n. 5; 259, n. 16; 354, n. 26 Boehner, Ph.: 22, n. 8 Boethius, Anicius: 133; 148; 173, n. 16 Boethius of Dacia: 172, n. 14; 312 Bologna: 13, n. 23 Bonaventura: 59, n. 34 Boniface viii Pope: 86; 95; 132; 145 Bos, E.P.: 303, n. 1 Brentano, F.: 22; 27–29; 347 Brown, S.: 2; 353, n. 19 Buridanus, Johannes: 2, n. 3 Cajetanus: 126, n. 21 Camboulit: 1 Caston, V.: 33, n. 35 Catania: 1 clemens v papa: 132 Clemens vi Papa: 1 Cohen, S.M.: 51, n. 17 Collegium Complutense: 3 Conradus Magister: 294, n. 48 Copleston, F.: 24, n. 13; 41 Crathorn: 353, n. 19

840

index nominum

Daniels, A.: 137, n. 43 Decker, B.: 56, n. 25; 96, n. 35; 130, n. 30; 138, n. 48; 139, n. 49; 141; 144; 146, n. 58; 147, n. 64; B, n. 14 Dietrich of Freiberg: 27, n. 17; 73, n. 72 Dijs, J.: 234, n. 88; 252; 294, n. 48; 303, n. 1 Dionysius Carthusianus: 327, n. 44 Domanski, J.: 814, n. 59; ad H I; H II Dreiling, R.: 1, n. 1 Duèze, Jacques, see s.n. Johannes XXII papa Duns Scotus, see s.n. Johannes Duns Scotus Durandus de S. Porciano: 95; 148–150; D Ebbesen, S.: 165, n. 1 f.; 168, n. 9; 216, n. 52 ; 814, n. 59; ad G; ad H I; H II, n. 249; — 5.0, nn. 317 f.; 5.2, n. 325 Ermatinger, C.J.: 13, n. 23 Etzkorn, G.: 159, n. 73 Eustratius: Odint 343 Fauser, W: 191, n. 5; 194 ff.; 202, n. 29; 206 ff. Faversham, see s.n. Simon of Faversham Figeac: 1 Flasch, K.: 25, n. 15; 27, n. 17; 356, n. 29 Fodor, J.D.: 58, n. 29 Franciscus de Prato: 13, n. 23; 294, n. 48; 303, n. 2; G; n. 173 Frege, G.: 29, n. 22; 94, n. 28 f. Friedman, R.: 2, n.7; 57; 72, n. 69; 81, n. 5; 86, n. 12; 89, n. 14; 96, n. 35; 131, n. 31; 132, n. 33; 138, n. 47; 146, n. 58; 148, n. 66; 150; 158, n. 77; 159, n. 73; 251, n. 3; 322, n. 38; 324, n. 39; 325, n. 41; 327, n. 44; 347; 353, nn. 19 and 22; 354, n. 23; 355, n. 28 Fuchs, M: 24, n. 13; 59, n. 34

Gams, P.B.: 10, n. 20 Gaston Comes: 10; Odint 143 Gaskin, R.: 74, n. 76 Geach, P.: 27, n. 17 Geiger, L.B.: 56, n. 25 Geraldus Prefectus: 10; Odint 143 Geraldus Procurator: 10; Odint ad 143 Giles of Rome: 130–132; 135, n. 41 Giraldus Odonis: 1–15; 303–332; 345 f.; 347, n. 14; 351 f., and passim Glorieux, P.: 191, n. 5 Godfrey of Fontaines: 324; 354, n. 24 Green-Pedersen, N.J.: 172, n. 14; 232, n. 85 Gregorius Magnus: Odint 22; H I, cap. 1 Guimaraes, A. de: 95 f.; 146, nn. 58 and 61 f. Gulielmus de Morbeka: Odint ad 18 Gulielmus de Ockham see s.n. William of Ockham Gulielmus Warensis (Guarro) see s.n. William of Ware Gyekye, K.: 22, n. 9; 23, n. 10 Haldane, J.: 27, n. 18 Hamesse, J.: 34, n. 39 Hanomia: 86 Hedwig, K: 27, n 17 f. Henricus de Gandavo: 36, n. 45; 37, n. 46; ; 79; 81, n. 5; 85, n. 10; 93; 96–112; 138; 141; 150–156; 337; 348–350; 348, n. 15; F 118 Henry of Ghent, see s.n. Henricus de Gandavo Henry of Harclay: 84, n. 9; 86 Hervaeus Natalis: 4 ff.; 10, n. 19; 12 f.; 13, n. 23; 29, n. 20; 95–112; 132; 145–148; 151, n. 68; 192; 251; 301; 304; 306; 321–326; 330; 345 f.; 348; 351 f.; 354–356; Odint 7–15; 39–42; 144–200; 406–420;

index nominum 421–436; F 34 ff.; G 16 ff.; 53; 57; H I 132; — Herveistae: 303, n. 2 Hieronymus: H I 132 Hoedl, L.: 137, n. 43; 138, n. 45 Hoenen, M.J.F.M.: 34, n. 39; 79, n. 1 Hugo of Utrecht: 191, n. 6 Husserl, E.: 29, n. 22 Imbach, R.: 59, n. 35; 119, n. 10 James of Ascoli: 37; 85–90; 348, n. 15 James of Metz: 138–145; 191, n. 3; 348, n. 15 Johannes Duns Scotus: 24, n. 13; 37; 92; 137; 158–163; 348, n. 15; F 119 Johannes xxii Papa: 8; 191; 352; Odint 143 Johannes Philoponus: 38; 199, n. 21 John of Paris (Quidort): 95; 132– 137 Jolivet, J.: 168, n. 9; 192, n. 8 Judy, A.G.: 19, n. 1 f.; 20, n. 4 Kant, I.: 25, n. 15; 334; 356 f. Kildwardby, see s.n. Robertus Kilwardby ps.-Kilwardby: 153, n. 70 Kneepkens, C.H.: Odint ad 204; ad 232 Knudsen, CH: 22; 124, n. 18; 172, n. 14 Koch, J.: 30, n. 24; 32, n. 32; 103, n. 48; 144; 252, n. 4 Koehler, T.W.: 139, n. 49 Korfmacher, G.C.: Odint ad 22 Kraus, O.: 27, n. 18; 29, n. 20 Kretzmann, N.: 41, n. 2; 45 f. Lambertini, R.: 13, n. 23 Langlois, C.: 2, n. 6 Ledoux, A.: 84, n. 9; 87, n. 14; 90, n. 22 Libera, A. de: 168, n. 9; 213, n. 48; 356, n. 29

841

Lindberg, D.: 38, n. 52 Locke, J.: 62, n. 38 Lopez, A.: 5, n. 12 Lyons, W.: 27, n. 17 Mandonnet, P.: 126, n. 21 Margarita dicta Porrette: 86; 95, n. 33 Marras, A.: 27, n. 17 f. Martinus (sanctus): Odint 22 Matheus de Augubio: 13, n. 23 Maurer, A.: 77, n. 88; 84, n. 9 Maynus de Maynis: 13, n. 23 Merlan, PH: 56, n. 25 Meyer, H.: 24, n. 13; 41, n. 2 Michael Scotus: Odint ad 18; ad 48 Modistae: 172, n. 14; 192; 337 Mojsisch, B.: 13, n. 23 Moody, E.: 24, n. 13 Morlaix: 145 Muller, J.P.: 132–137 Murdoch, J.E.: 3, n. 8 Nicholas of Autrecourt: 45; 244, n. 99; 320, n. 32 Nicolaus Fructus: H I ad 140 Nielsen, L.O.: 251, n. 3; 355, n. 28 Ockham, see s.n. William of Ockham olmos y canalda, E.: 5, n. 12 Othlo Emmeranus (ps.-Beda Venerabilis): Odint ad 22 Owens, J.: 25, n. 15; 41, n. 2; 64, n. 45 Panaccio, C.: 33, n. 35; 34, n. 38; 61; 62, n. 38; 68, n. 57; 72, n. 69; 73, n. 71; 74, n. 76; 81, n. 5; 353, n. 19 Pasnau, R.: 27, n. 18; 41, n. 1 f.; 58, n. 29; 59, n. 33; 72 ff.; 219, n. 65 Paulus, J.: 79, n. 1; 81, n. 5 Pelagius: 347, n. 14 Perler, D.: 24, n. 13; 25, n. 15; 27, n. 17 f.; 29, nn. 20 and 22; 34, n. 38; 41, n. 2; 59 ff.; 65, n. 50; 73,

842

index nominum

n. 72; 74 ff.; 85, n. 11; 159, n. 74; 198, n. 19; 252, n. 5; 256, n. 10; App. F Peter of Auvergne: 74, n. 77 Petrus Abaelardus: 29, n. 20; 168, n. 9 Petrus Aureolus: 1; 3, n. 11; 8; 10, n. 20; 12; 96, n. 36; 128; 251; 348; 351–357; Odint ad 27; ad 217; F Petrus Episcopus: 10, n. 20; Odint 143 Petrus Heliae: Odint 204; 232 Petrus Hispanus: 169, n. 10; 244, n. 99; H I 1 Petrus Hispanus non papa: Odint ad 204; 232 Petrus Johannis Olivi: 1, n. 1; 73 f. Petrus Lombardus (Magister): 132 ff.; A; B; C; D; E I; F passim philippus v rex: 8 f.; Odint 143 Philippus VI (The Fair) Rex: 10; 86; 132; 145 Philoponus, see s.n. Johannes Philoponus Pierre Rogier (Pope Clemens VI): 1 Pinborg, J.: 19; 21, n. 6 f.; 22, n. 8 f.; 29, n. 22; 172, n. 14; 173, n. 17; 174, n. 18; 175, n. 19; 176, n. 20; 177, n. 23; 206, n. 33 ff.; 207–215; 218, n. 57 ff.; 219–230; E III; E IV; F; G Pini, G.: 74, n. 77; 130, n. 6; 150, n. 67; 159, n. 74; 165, n. 3; 172, n. 14; 178 ff. Plato: 35 ff.; 84, n. 7; 313; H I 61; 81 Popper, K.: 29, n. 22; 94 Porphyry: 206–218; 313; E II Prudentius: Odint ad 22 Putallaz, F.X.: 59, n. 35; 119, n. 10 Radulphus Brito: 74, n. 77; 166; 168, n. 9; 172, n. 14; 191–249; 304, n. 3; 337–342; 343; 346; 348–351; E I–IV; Int., p. 9; 2.6, n. 158; 5.0; 5.2, n. 325; 5.3, n. 330; 6; 6.1–6.7; 8.1, n. 499; 9.22; 9.3; 9.33

Richard of St. Victor: 131–137; 147 Robert Kilwardby: 19 ff. Robertus Legatus: 10; Odint 143 Roger Bacon: 38, n. 57; 124, n. 18 Rode, CH.: 13, n. 23 Roensch, F.J.: 96; 132, n. 32; 146; 252, n. 4 Schabel, CHR.: 2; 3, nn. 8 and 11; 251, n. 3; 347, n. 14; 353, n. 21; 355, n. 28 Schmidt, R.W.: 21, n. 6; 41, n. 2; 76 ff.; 88, n. 19; ; 124, n. 19; 125, n. 20; 142, n. 53 Searle, J.R.: 47, n. 17 Sharp, D.: 165, n. 1; 181, n. 28 Sikes, J.G.: 95, n. 34 Simon of Faversham: 129, n. 27; 165–190; ; 183, n. 32; 191, n. 7; 220, n. 66; 335–337; 338; 343; 349; 351Odint ad 38 Simonin, H.D.: 117, n. 7 Simplicius: 207, n. 36 Sirridge, M.: 34, n. 38 Smith, A.M.: 38, n. 52 Sobol, P.G.: 23, n. 11 Sorabji, R.: 23, n. 12; 27, n. 18; 39, n. 55 f. Spiegelberg, H.: 27, n. 18 Spruyt, J.: 326 ff. (nn. 42 f.; 46 f.; 49–53;57 f.); 332 Stella, P.: 96–112; 150, n. 67 Stephanus de Reate: 13, n. 23; 294, n. 48; 295–297; 303, n. 2; 306, n. 10 H I; H II; — Int., p. 9, n. 24; 7.4; n. 505; 8.0, n. 508; 8.2, n. 516 Stump, E.: 24, n. 13; 29, n. 22; 32, n. 33; 41, n. 2; 45; 46, n. 9; 59, n. 33; 64, n. 45 Swiezawski, S.: 159, n. 74 Tachau, K.: 37, n. 51; 38, n. 52; 65, n. 50; 159, n. 74; 201, n. 27; 353, n. 19; 354, n. 25 Teeuwen, M.: 95, n. 30 f.; 144, n. 54; 146, n. 60; ; 191, n. 4

index nominum Tellkamp, J.A.: 32, n. 31; 63, n. 44; 65, n. 48 Themistius: 38; 327 Thomas Aquinas: 21, n. 6; 24, n. 13; 39, n. 55; 41–77; 81, n. 5; 113–130; 198; 341; 344, n. 7; 346, n. 11; 348; G 1; 16 ff.; 53; H I 41 Thomas Sutton: 74, n. 77 Thomas Wylton: 84, n. 9 Thomas del Vio, see s.n. Cajetanus Toulouse: 3, n. 11; 10, n. 20; 353, n. 21 Treguieris: 145 Tweedale, M.: 59, n. 33 Vennebusch, J.: 181, n. 27 Verbeke, G.: 199 Verhulst, Chr.: 159, n. 74; 162, n. 85 Villa-amil y casto, J.: 3, n. 11

843

Walsh, J.J.: 2, n. 3 Weidemann, H.: 30, n. 26 Weijers, O.: 2, n. 3; 13, n. 22; 95, n. 30 f.; 144, n. 54; 146, n. 60; 191, n. 4 William of Alnwick: 37, n. 50; 85–88; 348, n. 15 William of Auxerre: 134, n. 36 William of la Mare: 132 William of Ockham: 9; 24, n. 13; 74; 348; 351 ff.; 354, n. 24; Odint ad 217; G 2; 12 f. William of Ware: 137–139; 141; 191, n. 3; 261, n. 20; 304, n. 3; 348, n. 15; Odint ad 29; A; F Wlodek, Z.: 86, n. 13 Wolf, F.A.: 165, n. 2; 180 ff. Wolter, A.: 159, n. 73 Yokoyama, T: 37, n. 49; 87 ff.; 174 ff.

INDEX VERBORUM RERUMQUE NOTABILIUM Legendum 61, n. 14 = p. 61, footnote 14 Odint. 39 = Giraldus Odonis, De intentionibus, cap. 39 App. A, B, C (etc.) 24 = Appendix A, B, C (etc.), cap. 24 Absolutus accidens absolutum vs. respectivum: Odint 69 abstractio(n) the role of abstraction: 50–53; 183; 331; triplex est abstractio: 124, n. 18; multiplex est abstractio: E II 4; mathematical abstraction: 55 f.; 122; abstractio formalis (opp. totalis): 56, n. 25 abstractivus significare concretive (opp. abstractive): C 27; see also s.v. denominativus abstractus (opp. concretus) def.: E II 3: E III, q. 11, cap. 13; C 27; locutio de abstracto et concreto: 340 f.; Odint 165 f.; terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus, terminus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus: Odint 281; abstractum et concretum sunt differentie significationis: Odint 165; esse abstractum non convenit illi quod est realiter separatum ab individuis contentis sub re intellecta: G 14; being an abstractum as a privative intention: 276; abstractum quod est secunda intentio [i.e. opp. cetera abstracta], non est realiter separatum a sensibilibus: F 41; secunda intentio est duplex: in

concreto sive materialiter, in abstracto sive formaliter: H II 8; see also s.vv. concretus, accidens, intentio abstrahere abstrahere et intelligere: 185; abstrahentium non est mendacium: 55 f. abusio maxima et absurda nimis abusio: Odint 143; 151 accidens (predicabile): Odint 85; 102 accidens (opp. substantia): Odint 358–361 def. Odint 85; ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie: Odint 358–361; utrum ‘ens’ dicatur de accidente ut de originato: Odint 335; a natura sunt accidentia: Odint 345; in diffinitione accidentium habent poni sua subiecta: E III, q. 11, cap. 13; concrete accidental terms: 186, n. 9; accidens concretum descendit ab accidente abstracto: H II 10; omne [accidens] concretum includit formam significatam per abstractum: Odint 166; accidentia habent accidentalitatem mediante esse intellecti (Hervaeus): Odint 199;

846

index verborum rerumque notabilium

utrum accidens in concreto sit in subiecto: App. H II 10–17; accidens abstractum est quoddam significatum simplex, ita quod in suo modo significandi non includit subiectum sicut in modo significandi ‘albi’: H II 11; omnis res constituta in gradu subpredicamentali habet aliquem concursum accidentium sibi proprium: Odint 315; quia sepe nos latent differentie essentiales, utimur ad circumloquendum eas quibusdam accidentibus: C 17; accidens absolutum vs. respectivum: Odint 69; ‘per accidens’ dicitur dupliciter: A 14; ens per accidens non dicitur de ente per se: Odint 129; ‘essential vs. accidental’ issue: 207, n. 36; 213–218; 219 ff.; 232–245; 247; 262 f.see alo s.vv. denominatio, denominativus accidens syn. ‘attributum’, ‘predicatum’: fallacia accidentis: Odint 318 accidentalis terminus accidentalis concretus: 168, n. 9; suppositio alia naturalis, alia accidentalis: Odint 254; intellectus accidentalis: 165 f.; 336; 339; see also s.v. consideratio accidentalitas accidentia habent accidentalitatem mediante esse intellecti (Hervaeus): Odint 199 actio actio immanens (opp. transiens): Odint 3 ff.; duplex est genus actionum vel operationum (scilicet manentes et transientes): 102–104; actio transiens realiter (opp. secundum rationem): G 40; 74–76; intellectio est quedam actio transiens solum obiective in rem intelligibilem: Odint 3; actionis realis oportet quod sit

et terminus aliquid reale: A 5; cf. E I 13 actus terminare actum: 253 f.; 328, n. 48; actus rectus (opp. reflexus): H I 112; actus intelligendi, see s.v. intelligere; actus (opp. potentia): ens actu see s.v. ens adequatio, adequatus de via adequationis: Odint 260; idem (diversum) adequate et inadequate: Odint 290; conceptus adequatus: Odint 226; adminiculativus scientie adminiculative: E II 7 adoratio adoratio non debetur figmento: E I 14; cf. F 17 aestimativus vis aestimativa: 23, n. 11; 49 affirmatio ‘enuntiatio’ vs. ‘affirmationegatio’: 232–245 agere agens dicitur quatuor modis: 176, n. 22; unumquodque agens agit inquantum est ens actu: 182 aggregatus aggregatum ex intentione et realitate singulari: Odint 123; aggregatum ex significatione passiva et re significata: Odint 209; [inconveniens est quod] omnis terminus communis significet tale quid aggregatum [argued for by Hervaeus, sc. ex re universali et communi et ex illa intentione creatura intellectus]: Odint 128 f.; albus, albedo de significatione ‘album’: E I 33; nix in eodem instanti temporis simul est quanta et alba: H I 23; licet albedo in suo modo essendi includat subiectum, non tamen in suo modo significando: H II 11; albedo dicit esse

index verborum rerumque notabilium quale essentialiter, sed corpus album dicitur habere esse quale denominative: Odint 8; accidens concretum descendit ab accidente abstracto , sicut album descendit ab albedine: H II 10; ‘album’ semper significat subiectum, non solum inquantum ipsa accidentia in concreto sunt in subiecto, sed inquantum subiectum ipsum includitur in significato ipsorum: H II 10; modus significandi ‘albedinis’ non includit aliquam rem que non dit albedo: H II 11; see s. vv. abstractus, concretus, denominatio alienus significatio aliena (opp. propria): Odint 205 aliquid ‘aliquid’ = ‘not nothing’: 184; hoc aliquid (‘individual thing’): 317 ff.; 326 ff.; and passim altimetria de altimetria et cosinimetria: Odint 114 ambivalence semantic ambivalence opp. semantic ambiguity: 1.1, 25, n. 14; 330, n. 54; 333–335; 341 amens amentes et frenetici: 100, n. 46 amor amor et notitia in Prima Causa: 382–386 analogia proportio vel analogia: 269; secundum analogiam: Odint 267 ff.; 332; equivoce seu analogice: 332 anima anima occupata circa interiora: Odint 22; maiorem entitatem habent accidentia anime quam accidentia corporis: G 10; ‘esse existentie’ vel ‘existere’ videntur significare non res

847

prout habent esse in anima, sed prout habent esse extra: F 124; nichil est intentio nisi ens in anima: H I 44; ens in anima potest accipi dupliciter, subiective et obiective: H I 63– 65; rem esse in anima obiective non est solum denominari: F 58; signum in anima existens est actus intelligendi: H I 133; anima quodammodo omnia: 58, n. 28; 60 f.; 200 f. animal ‘Animal est genus’: 44, n. 6; 46, n. 9; Odint 137; ‘Animal est prima intentio’: F 73; H II 4 anticipativus anticipative dictus: Odint 374 apparentia: 178–180 apparentia in re: 337; hec evasio nullius est apparentie aut momenti: F 70 apparere, apparens: 178–180 salvare apparentia in natura: Odint 106; ymago que apparet in speculo: F 50; candela apparens extra situm: F 50; esse apparens: Odint 168; esse obiectivum tantum et fictitium seu apparens: F 50; — cum intellectus causat tales intenciones, movetur ab apparentibus in re: 5.42; conceptus communis sumitur ab aliquo communi apparenti in re: 5.42 apparitio prima apparitio: 98; apparitio obiectiva rerum: F 50; 55; esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio et apparitio obiectiva: F 50 applaudere omne simile applaudit suo simili: Odint 76 applicabilis genus est quedam intentio secunda applicata vel applicabilis rei que inquantum res

848

index verborum rerumque notabilium

predicatur, predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est: Odint 87 apponere apponere diffinitioni supplementum (complementum): Odint 87 ff.; apprehendere ‘apprehendere multa semel’ vs. ‘simul apprehendere ut unum’: 188 f.; esse apprehensum: Odint 3; thesaurus apprehendentis intentionem est virtus custoditiva: 5. apprehensio simplex apprehensio: 96 ff.; 185– 189 arbor arbor elevata dicitur habere lineam directam: 186, n. 36 argumentatio tota logica transcendit genus argumentationis: H I 124; ars omnis ars et omnis scientia est de intentionibus: Odint 44; equivocatio arte vel consilio: Odint 334 artifex realis artifex: E III, q. 11, cap. 2 artificiatus artificiatum et voluntarium est idem: F 105 aspectus recto aspectu: 198; 246; 340 assimilatio assimilation in the cognitive process: 197 f. atomism Giraldus Odonis as an atomist: 347, n. 14 attingentia ex attingentia provenit delectatio: Odint 403 Baptismus esse formale baptismi: Odint 194

beatitudo def.: Odint 195; nostra formalis beatitudo est verum ens reale: G7 being, see s.vv. ens, esse, entitas Bewusztseinsphilosophie: 25, n. 15; 334, n. 4 bonitas entitas, veritas, bonitas: A 20 Brunellus plus differunt Sortes et Brunellus quam Sortes et Plato: Odint 77 Calor de calore, qui, realiter unus et idem existens, est simul exsiccativus et indurativus luti et humidativus et liquefactivus cere: Odint 379 calumpnialis inconveniens est quod omnis dignitas erit calumpnialis: Odint 127 candela candela apparens extra situm: F 50; cf. F 68 canis ‘Canes sunt in foro’: Odint 363; cf. Odint 356 cat(h)egoria ens et unum assequuntur omnes cathegorias: Odint 372; nullum suppositum ‘entis’ assequitur omnes cathegorias, sed solum significatum ‘entis’: Odint 372; the categorial division of being: 317–326; focalization and categorization: 31, n. 29; the real nature of the predicamental (categorial) order: 313–331; 353, n. 19; see also s.vv. genus, predicamentum causa de ordine causarum: Odint 299 ff.; causa quam vocant ‘fontanam-originem’: Odint 334; Prima Causa: Odint 304 ff.;

index verborum rerumque notabilium 380 ff.; 399 ff.; 430 ff.; 319–326; amor et notitia in Prima Causa: 382–386; First Cause: 320 ff.; quidditas unius attributi Prime Cause repperitur secundum rationem communem in aliquo sine quidditate alterius: Odint 404; miracula efficientie Prime Cause: Odint 106 cera calor liquefactivus cere: Odint 379 cerebrum virtus custoditiva, cuius locus est posterior pars cerebri: Odint 5 chymera entia prohibita ut chymera: F 96; 100; chymera et tragelaphus: F 44; see also s.v. figmentum circulus circulus potest intelligi sine cupro: Odint 197 circumflexus secundum lineam circumflexam: 198 f.; 245; 340 circumscribere ‘circumscripto omni actu intellectus’ = ‘any act of the intellect being ruled out’ cognitio de duplici cognitione rei: E I 19–20; E II 15 ff.; cf. F 27 ff.; omnis cognitio dicit habitudinem intelligentis ad illud quod intelligitur, et non unius rei intellecte ad aliam: Odint 139; cognitio absoluta vs. cognitio respectiva: 53 ff.; 210 ff.; cognitio taken as ‘informatio’: 346 f.; cf. intentio defined as informatio intellectus: 52, n. 21; 58, n. 28; 60, n. 36; 219, n. 65; 237; cognition taken as a habitus of the soul: 58, n. 28; quiddity as the proper object of cognition: 53–57; 196–198; the status of the objects of cognition: 80 ff.;

849

optimistic view of cognition: 45; 77, n. 87; 333 f.; 347; 356, n. 29; Girald’s view of cognition: 331 f.; 347; 351 ff.; see also s.vv. intentio, prima, secunda intentio cognoscitivus virtus cognoscitiva: Odint 6 cognoscere res cognita obiective: F 47; esse cognitum: 85; 306 ff.; 335–346; Odint 4; 3.2; 8.1; 9.21–9.24; esse cognitum est esse non reale: Odint 4; 26 cohordinatio, see s.v. coordinatio collateralis superius et collaterale: 154 color color est primum obiectum visus: Odint 97 columba collum columbe: F 50; communitas differt aliquid esse ens rationis et communitatem esse communitatem rationis: C 18 completivus formaliter et completive: 327, n. 44; inchoative vs. completive: 176, n. 22; 210 conceptibilis conceptus diversi conceptibiliter quidditative et formaliter: Odint 379 conceptibilitas opp. realitas: F 99 conceptio intentio est rei passiva conceptio cui miscetur indistinguibiliter res concepta: F 116; conceptio rose idem est quod rosa: F 72; superextendere conceptionem: F 72 conceptualization conceptual engeneering in the Middle Ages: 22 ff.; 202; 328; 334 Peter Auriol’s theory of conceptualization: 353, n. 20; 354, n. 24

850

index verborum rerumque notabilium

conceptualism Peter Auriol’s conceptualism: 348; 351–357 conceptus significare non competit sono inquantum res est, sed prout conceptus est: F 104; duo ordines conceptuum: F 64; 117; quia suo sunt ordines conceptuum, idcirco duplex est genus intentionum: F 64; Odint 64; conceptus rei (opp. ipsa res de qua est conceptus): Odint 217; Trinitas consistit in rebus perfectissimis, non in conceptibus nostris: A 7; intentio non est aliud nisi conceptus formatus obiective per actum intellectus: F 64; conceptus obiective formatus: F 67 ff.; conceptus obiectivus: accipiendo ‘verbum’ pro conceptu obiectivo: F 101; omnis vox incomplexa significans conceptum aliquem positivum est vere in predicamento: F 95; conceptus mentis est vera qualitas de prima specie: Odint 10; 215; conceptus representativus alterius obiecti: Odint 379 ff.; conceptus adequatus: Odint 226; conceptus habitualis: Odint 10; conceptus positivi sunt res que sunt extra per intellectum posite in esse intentionali: F 95; conceptus relativus: F 135; conceptus irresolubilis: Odint 129; plures quidditativi conceptus de unica quidditate: Odint 380; conceptus equinitatis numerati sunt in intellectu: Odint 379; magis sunt nobis note voces hominum quam conceptus eorum: Odint 226 conciliare ‘to bring together’: H I 2 concipere intentio seu ratio claudens realitatem sub esse concepto:

F 85; ista simul stant quod nomina significent res prout sunt extra et quod nichilominus non significent eas nisi ut sunt concepte, quia ista simul stant quod res prout sunt extra, habeant esse conceptum: F 125; intentio integratur ex re et suo concipi passive (Peter Auriol): 352–357 concretivus significare concretive (opp. abstractive): C 27; concretus (opp. abstractus) omne concretum includit formam significatam per abstractum: Odint 166; terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus, terminus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus: 168, n. 9; Odint 281; nomen concretum formam a qua descendit, importat in obliquo: C 27; forma abstracta accipitur ut ratio concreti: C 27; potest esse prima intentio in concreto quod in sua ratione non includat esse obiective in intellectu vel aliquod esse secundum rationem: Odint 31; de prima intentione materialiter et in concreto sumpta: H I 12–36; secunda intentio est duplex: in concreto sive materialiter, in abstracto sive formaliter: H II 8; H I 35–46; see also s.vv. abstractus, denominatio, materialis condeclinium totum condeclinium [sc. verbi] imponitur unica impositione: Odint 175 conditio conditiones exacte necessario ad posse intelligi non sunt ab intellectu: Odint 98; conditiones naturaliter distincte obiecti sensus: Odint 93

index verborum rerumque notabilium confirmatio (sacramentum) esse formale confirmationis: Odint 194 congruitas congruitas et incongruitas sunt secunde intentiones; res enim extra non sunt congrue nec incongrue: F 103 connotation: 214 ff. conpars cum sua conparte: Odint 288 conserare conserari in sui esse reali: 158 consideratio(n) different considerations: 172; 293; Odint 408; 410 consilium equivocatio arte vel consilio: Odint 334 constructio: Odint 232 contentiosus probatur propter contentiosos: Odint 95 continuare intentiones intellecte continuantur cum intentionibus ymaginatis et sunt in eis quasi forma in materia et sicut color in pariete: F 55; continuatio continuatio intellectuum: Odint 6 contradictio maior per naturam contradictionis habet certissimam veritatem: Odint 338 contradictorius aliqua possunt esse contradictoria adinvicem dupliciter: G 77 contrarietas via contrarietatis: Odint 261 conversio conversio ad phantasmata: 111; 180, n. 26; 182, n. 30; 198 f.; 199, n. 20 co(h)ordinatio coordinatio intentionum secundum sub et supra: F 90;

851

de duabus cohordinationibus entium: Odint 234; F 58 corvus corvus et nix sunt diversa qualia er diversa visibilia: Odint 131 cosinimetria de altimetria et cosinimetria: Odint 114 creare ‘esse quid creatum’ potest accipi duobus modis: G 66 creator: C 23; C 29 creatura creatura intellectus: Odint 117; 123; 128; — (opp. Creator): quod ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie: Odint 358–372; Creator et creatura magis univocantur in nominibus secunde intentionis quam prime: A 31; nomina translata a creaturis ad divina: A 20 credulitas credulitas vel fides: 117 custoditivus virtus custoditiva, cuius locus est posterior pars cerebri: Odint 5 Debilis esse debile: 227; 245; 338; 342; see also s.v. esse diminutum deductio (διαγωγ ) ‘spending life-time’: Odint 402 definition: 306–310 see also s.v. diffinitio delectabilis quedam oratio sententiat de vero ex delectabilibus et figmentis: F 115; poeta intendit orationem ut delectabile, sive ex veris sive ex figmentis procedat: F 115 delectari impossibile est aliquid delectari in re non appetita qualicumque appetitu: Odint 403

852

index verborum rerumque notabilium

delectatio delectatio presupponit in quocumque sit, appetitum rei ex cuius attingentia provenit delectatio: Odint 403 denominare,denominatio de denominatione: 221 f.; 255; 277 f.; 285; 296; 343;Odint 181; 188 f.; 191; 227; G 45; F 56–62; rem esse in anima obiective non est solum denominari: F 58; denominatio ab intrinseco (opp. ab extrinseco): Odint 188; H I 18–21 (cf. H I 40); prima intentio in concreto dicitur ens reale et denominatur intentio ab ipsa intentionalitate que fundatur in ipso intellectu: H I 9; see also s.vv. accidens, concretus, habens-habitum denominativus denominativus (opp. abstractivus): 251, n. 2; denominativum def.: Odint 166; forma accidentalis et denominativa: H 51; significatio denominativa: Odint 24; reducere denominative: G 78; ‘ens’ potest dici dupliciter, uno modo formaliter, alio modo denominative: G 45; ens tantum suppositive et denominative: G 45 ff.; enti et non enti potest esse aliqua communis ratio dicta de illis denominative: Odint 340; utrum intentiones denominative predicentur de obiectis suis: E IV 25–31 dependentia essentialis ordo nature et naturalis dependentie: Odint 344; dependere per modum dependentis et inherentis: Odint 165; deprimere intellectus intelligendo singulare deprimit se: 186, n. 36

descensus (logice): Odint 97 deus quod ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie: Odint 358–372; deus et natura possent facere duos asinos: Odint 71; non potest dici quod aliquod fantasma creature representet proprium esse Dei: Odint 357; motor firmamenti est Deus: Odint 349; multi homines mali appetunt plus fornicari et furari quam Deus hec appetat: Odint 405; see also s.v. causa prima; — Cartesian ‘deus malignus’: 77, n. 87 dexter dextrum et sinistrum in calumpna: G 26 diale(c)tica, see s.v. dyaletica dicere dicere as the formation of the inner word: 101 dicibilis dicibile, idest predicabile: Odint 444; dicibile incomplexum: Odint 444; dicibilitas dicibilitas idem est quod predicabilitas et manifestabilitas: Odint 154 dictio cum omnis dictio exerceat significationem, sunt tamen [follow diverse exercitia]: Odint 205–210; omnes dictiones significative vere sunt in aliquo predicamento: F 95 difference, differentia formal difference, opp. identity: 317 ff.; quia sepe nos latent differentie essentiales, utimur ad circumloquendum eas quibusdam accidentibus: C 17 differentia (predicabile): Odint 83

index verborum rerumque notabilium differre differre formaliter, differre virtualiter, differre conceptibiliter: 88, n. 20; Odint 379 ff.; differre modaliter: Odint 381; differre sincathegorematice: Odint 382 diffinitio de diffinitione: Odint 88 ff.; 120; diffinitio fit ex significare aliquid necessario res esse: Odint 407, n. 41; metaphisica est de diffinitionibus: Odint 298; diffinitio-diffinibilediffinitum: D 17 ff.; E IV 26 ff.; esse quidditativum, quod est esse diffinibile: Odint 100; quod-quid-est (Greek to ti esti) sive diffinitio: E II 13; E IV 11; alternative way of defining: Odint 87; diffusio, diffusibilis, diffusivus predicamentum (…) per se et formaliter diffusivum, et totius illius diffusionis principium: Odint 444;; formaliter diffusibile, idest in partes subiectivas divisibile: Odint 444 diversus diversus adequate vel inadequate: Odint 44; 46; diversus inconvertibiliter: 291–293 dignitas (maxima) omnis dignitas, idest omnis maxima in quacumque scientia: 22; inconveniens est quod omnis dignitas erit calumpnialis: Odint 127 diminutus esse diminutum: 33–37; 77; 84; 88; 94; 117, n. 7; 225 ff.; 304; 338; 345; esse diminutum potest esse duplex: G 81; see also s.v. debilis disciplina parum est quod quilibet de se invenit, sed omnia fere habemus per disciplinam: E II 8; on a discipline’s primary and essential object: 288 f.; on its unity: 293 f.

853

dispositivus dispositive (vel incohative) vs. completive: 176, n. 22; 210 disputare disputare ad nomen, non ad intellectum (non ad rem): Odint 44; 46 distinctio distinctio secundum rationem: G 28; distinctio penitus intentionalis: F 65; formal distinction (Scotistic): 322, n. 38; 430–434 distinctus distinctus realiter (opp. secundum rationem): H II 6; illud de cuius ratione est quod sit subsistens, distinctum et incommunicabile, includit in se illud per quod subsistit et illud per quod est distinctum et incommunicabile: D 20 distribuere signum non potest distribuere terminum equivocum: Odint 361 distributio pro quocumque fit distributio, participat ipsum significatum termini: Odint 358; cf. 360 distributivus sigum distributivum: Odint 360 diversificatio non potest esse diversificatio in diversis: E I 27 diversus res est eadem, esse autem diversum et non idem: Odint 393; see also s.v. idem doctor doctor intentionum: Odint 91; nostri doctores: H I 132; moderni doctores: H I 132; doctores in gramatica: Odint 229 donatio de donatione: Odint 62 dyaletica dyaletica est de secundis intentionibus: F 107

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Economy principle of economy (‘Ockham’s razor’): 354, n. 24 efficacia motiva huius opinionis non habent efficaciam: Odint 130 efficientia efficientia Prime Cause: Odint 106; efficientia intellectus: Odint 106 elector in intellectu electorum: Odint 195 elementum prius est elementum quam quorum est elementum: Odint 368 elencticus probatio elenctica: Odint 257 eloquium inopia humani eloquii: F 4 ens divisio entium: 207 f.; H I 83 ff.; due cohordinationes entium: Odint 234; F 58; metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia quam logicus: F 94; ‘ens’ potest dici dupliciter, uno modo formaliter, alio modo denominative: G 45; quod ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie: Odint 358–372; utrum ens dicatur de substantia ut de fontana-origine: Odint 335; 371; ‘ens’ significat in singulari aliquam unam formam communem: Odint 362; entia malunt male ordinari: Odint 362; ens diminutum, see s.vv. diminutus, esse; ens simpliciter: 1.0; ens tantum suppositive et denominative: G 45 ff.; de suppositione ‘entis’: Odint 372; intentio entis vel rei: Odint 332; ens in actu (opp. in potentia): unumquodque agens agit inquantum est ens actu: 182;

enti et non enti potest esse aliqua communis ratio dicta de illis denominative: Odint 340; de non ente non est scientia: E III, q. 4, cap. 3; ens et unum assequuntur omnes cathegorias: Odint 372; nullum suppositum ‘entis’ assequitur omnes cathegorias, sed solum significatum ‘entis’: Odint 372; illud pro quo ‘ens’ supponit suppositione personali, non est significatum ‘entis’ nec de significato, est tamen suppositum significati: Odint 372; metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia quam logicus dividat dicibile incomplexum in decem predicamenta: F 44; utrum ‘ens’ dicatur de accidente ut de originato: Odint 335; ens per accidens non dicitur de ente per se: Odint 129; ens est ratio transcendens: 451; ‘Lux est ens’: Odint 349–354; ens positivum: H I 67 ff.; non-ens: 110; nichil est intentio nisi ens in anima: H I 44; ens in anima potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo subiective, alio modo obiective: 94, n. 29; Odint 63; H I 63–65; de ente reali et ente rationis: Odint 428 ff.; G 2–86; H II 1–17; ens reale vs. ens rationis: G 2–86; ens rationis non negat formaliter aliquam entitatem nec etiam ponit (eam), sed bene supponit eam: G 48 ; H II 1–17; quod ens rationis ut consequitur rem intellectam, nullo modo ponit esse: H I 95– 104; predicamentum aut est ens reale, aut ens rationis: H II 3; de ente reali: H I 12–30; H II 1–17; omne ens reale est ens existens in rerum natura, ita quod non includitur in ratione eius esse in intellectu obiective: Odint 64; a

index verborum rerumque notabilium quo ens reale intellectum dicatur intentio: H I 14–16; utrum prius ens reale dicatur ‘intellectum’ quam ‘intentio’: H I 22–25; intentionalitas a qua ens reale dicitur intellectum, est subiective in ipso ente reali: H 18; prima intentio in concreto dicitur ens reale et denominatur intentio ab ipsa intentionalitate que fundatur in ipso intellectu: H I 9; si tu intelligis intentionalitatem entium realium, tunc talis intentionalitas est secunda intentio in concreto; et si intelligis intentionalitatem entium rationis, tunc talis intentionalitas erit secunda intentio in abstracto: Odint 9; see also s.v. esse reale; de ente rationis: ens (esse) rationis (‘rationate being’): 21, n. 6; 76, n. 84; 88 (def.); 142 ff.; 259; 343, n. 6; C 18; G 19; 80; H II 3; differt aliquid esse ens rationis et communitatem esse communitatem rationis: C 18; ens rationis def.: G 19; 80; ens rationis distinguitur contra omne ens reale: G 19; protanto aliquod ens dicitur ens rationis quia non habet esse nisi in ratione: G 3; ens rationis = ens in anima: G 2; ens rationis logicum: 5.2; ens rationis non negat formaliter aliquam entitatem nec etiam ponit (eam), sed bene supponit eam: G 48 ; H II 1–17; quod ens rationis ut consequitur rem intellectam, nullo modo ponit esse: H I 95–104; in entibus rationis aliqua secundum rationem possunt dici positive et aliqua privative: H I 75; si tu intelligis intentionalitatem entium realium, tunc talis intentionalitas est secunda intentio in concreto; et si intelligis intentionalitatem entium

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rationis, tunc talis intentionalitas erit secunda intentio in abstracto: Odint 9; H II passim; intentio secunda in concreto est omne ens rationis, intentio secunda in abstracto sive formaliter est intentionalitas entis rationis: H II 8; ens rationis potest accipi tripliciter: uno modo pro actu intellectus, secundo pro obiecto movente intellectum, tertio pro modo qui consequitur tale obiectum intellectus: Odint 62; H I 62; ens rationis est actus intelligendi: G 2–28; ens rationis quod est secunda intentio: H I 67–115 passim; 128; an secunda intentio sit aliquod ens positivum: H I 67–76; intentionalitas se habet ad ens rationis sicut forma accidentalis et denominativa ad suum subiectum: H 51; secunda intentio que est ens rationis, nullo modo est sensibilis: H I 111; de tribus conclusionibus circa ens rationis tripliciter sumptum: H I 86–88; Herveus ponit quod ens rationis est quidam modus consequens obiectum intellectus inquantum illud obiectum est intellectum ab intellectu: G 16; Herveus dicit quod ens rationis formaliter non dicit aliquam entitatem positivam: H I 67–74; ens rationis est actus intelligendi, tam rectus quam reflexus: G 2; ens rationis non se tenet ex parte actus intelligendi, sed ex parte rei intellecte sive obiecti intellecti inquantum intellecti: G 16; utrum omne ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, sit relatio: H I 105–109; secunda intentio que est ens rationis: H I 67–115 passim; utrum ens rationis quod est secunda intentio, habeat causam efficientem: H I 89–104;

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ens rationis non est nisi quando intellectus intelligit: H I 96; ens rationis denominat intentionem materialiter: H I 54; productio primi entis rationis aut est ens reale, aut ens rationis: G 39; 75; videtur quibusdam quod ens rationis ut consequitur rem intellectam, nullo modo possit esse: H I 95 ff.; de quodam alio modo loquendi de ente rationis: G 55–57; see also s.v. esse rationis entitas entitas, veritas, bonitas: 327 ff.; A 20; ens rationis non negat formaliter aliquam entitatem nec etiam ponit (eam), sed bene supponit eam: G 48 ; H II 1–17; quod ens rationis ut consequitur rem intellectam, nullo modo ponit esse: H I 95– 104; entitas positiva: H I 67 ff.; ‘entitas generis; = ‘ontic state of the predicamental order’: 269; scientia non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile: E III, q. 2, 3; see also s.vv. esse, essentialis entitativus nulla mens potest albedinem et nigredinem in uno conceptibili simplici entitative ligare F 98 enuntiatio ‘enuntiatio’ vs. ‘affirmationegatio’: 232 ff.; as ‘black-board sentence’: 232, n. 86 epistemology, the ‘epistemological turn’: 79, n. 1; see also s.v. cognition equinitas equinitas ut equinitas: 379; Odint ad 282 equivocatio de multifaria divisione equivocationis: Odint 334 f.; secundum aliquos philosophos omnes modi huius equivocationis [sc. arte vel consilio] reducuntur ad unam

causam, quam vocant ‘fontanamoriginem’: Odint 334 equivocus signum non potest distribuere terminum equivocum in supposita diversorum significatorum: Odint 361; error error Platonis: Odint 59; H I 6; 8 esse aliud est intelligere, aliud est esse: 115, n. 3; Philosophus cum dicit quod ‘est’ multipliciter dicitur, non intelligit de multiplicitate significatorum sub eadem voce, sed de multiplicitate suppositorum sub eodem significato: Odint 369; triplex est esse in universo, scilicet esse reale, esse intentionale, esse rationis: 88; ‘esse existentie’ vel ‘existere’ videntur significare non res prout habent esse in anima, sed prout habent esse extra: F 124; esse cognitum, esse intellectum, esse intelligibile, esse intentionale, esse obiectivum, esse reale, esse representativum, esse significatum, esse specificum, see s.vv. cognoscere, intelligere, obiectivus etc.; esse quidditativum, quod est esse diffinibile: Odint 100; esse specificum: 328 f.; modus essendi realis, opp. modus essendi rationis: Odint 38; 40 f.; 141 f.; 165 f.; 167 f.; sicut esse intellectum est esse rationis, sic esse visum est esse rationis: Odint 185; 6.44; 8.1; 9.21–9.24; esse reale et fixum: F 50; 66; esse naturale (opp. esse spirituale): 1.31; 2.22, n. 99; esse diminutum, see s.v. diminutus; quando intellectus intelligit privationes et negationes et entia rationis, tunc movetur ab ente reali: G 72; intentio potest esse vera realitas, licet

index verborum rerumque notabilium esse datum per eam non sit esse reale: Odint 7; intentio secundum unam acceptionem sumitur pro quocumque per suum esse formale alteri largiente esse aliquod non reale: Odint 3; largiens aliquod esse non reale […], puta esse cognitum, esse volitum, esse sensatum, esse representatum, esse significatum: Odint 4; nulla qualitas que est essentialiter esse quale, est essentialiter esse non quale: Odint 10; ‘aliquid fundari in aliquo secundum suum esse reale’ potest intelligi duobus modis: G 67; quod-quid-est: E II 13; E IV 11; passim; quod-quiderat-esse: Odint 301; 393 f.; ‘esse’ significat substantiam: F 2; res est eadem, esse autem diversum et non idem: Odint 393; omne esse non dicens ens reale aut privationem aut negationem entis realis est esse rationis: Odint 184; modus essendi transcendentium: Odint 141; esse intellectum, see s.v. intelligere; esse intentionale, see s.v. intentionalis; esse intentum, see s.v. intendere; aliquid dicitur esse in intellectu duobus modis, subiective et obiective: 253 ff.; G 17 ff.; 7.11; ens in anima potest accipi dupliciter: subiective et obiective: H I 63– 65; rem esse in anima obiective non est solum denominari: F 58; esse obiectivum: 80– 95; 108 ff.; 219, n. 61; 340 ff.; utrum secunda intentio sit aliquid existens in intellectu subiective: H I 57–63; potest esse prima intentio in concreto quod in sua ratione non includat esse obiective in intellectu vel aliquod esse secundum rationem: Odint 31; secunda intentio in

857

abstracto vocatur ‘habitudo seu relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’, ‘intentionalitas’, et ‘esse obiective’: Odint 56; H I passim; esse obiectivum tantum et fictitium seu apparens: F 50; ‘esse subiective in aliquo’ potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo realiter, alio modo secundum rationem tantum: G 70 essentia ‘lapidis essentia’ = ‘the real stone’ (opp. its image): 182; ‘per essentias’ = ‘owing to (their) actual being’: 182 essentialis ex parte rei intellecte habitudo ad intellectum dicitur esse intentionale essentialiter eo modo quo essentiale contingit in talibus que non dicunt formaliter rem aliquam: Odint 8; nulla qualitas que est essentialiter esse quale, est essentialiter esse non quale: Odint 10; ‘essential vs. accidental’ issue: 207; 215–245; see also s.v. essentialitas essentialitas essentiale essentialitate rationis: Odint 183 eternitas quidditas eternitatis diversa est a quidditate cuiuslibet alterius attributi: 319; Odint 402 evasio hec evasio nullius est apparentie aut momenti: F 70 exemptio exemptio singularitatis: Odint 173; 230 exercitium exercitium significationis: Odint 205–209; habituale exercitium significandi: Odint 227; see also s.v. significatio existentia ‘existentie’ significatio: 645, n. 5

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existere ‘esse existentie’ vel ‘existere’ videntur significare non res prout habent esse in anima, sed prout habent esse extra: F 124; ‘existens’ used as present participle to esse, e.g. logica’ una scientia existens, considerat … etc.: 294 experientia patet experientia: Odint 220; ut docet experientia: Odint 121; H I 1; ad propriam experientiam remittere: Odint 344 experimentum patet experimento: Odint 217 experiri semper experimur: F 53 exprimere exprimere est actus interpretationis: Odint 225 exquo ‘exquo’ = ‘because’ (opp. ‘ex quo’ = ‘hence’): Odint 45, p. 407, n. 6; F 73; and passim exsiccativus calor exsiccativus et indurativus luti: Odint 379 extraneus quod significatur per hoc nomen ‘persona’ valde extraneum est: D 13 Fabula per metaphoras et fabulas arguere: F 106 falsitas see s.v. veritas falsus see s.v. verus fantasia fantasia, que percipit omnia sensibilia communia: E IV 30 fantasiacus fantasiacum quid: Odint 51; proprium fantasiacum: F 28; 33 fantasiatus res fantasiata: 106; E IV 29;

modus essendi fantasiatus: 212, n. 44; 220 fantasma intellectus agens agit super fantasmata: E IV 29; intellectus agens non agit super illud quod est in intellectu, sed super fantasmata: E IV 29; non potest dici quod aliquod fantasma creature representet proprium esse Dei: Odint 357; ex proprio suo fantasmate: 203; 338; 341; 349; E IV cap. 8; see also s.v. phantasma felicitas Aristotiles ponit nostram felicitatem in actu speculativo intellectus: G 7 femineitas correspondens femineitati huius nominis ‘petra’: Odint 221 ferre ‘ferri’ = ‘getting carried away’: 320, n. 33 fictitius esse obiectivum tantum et fictitium seu apparens: F 50; 265–267 (fiction) fides credulitas vel fides: 117 figmentum figmenta significant quiddam impossibile secundum naturam: Odint 31; utrum figmenta possint reduci ad primam intentionem in concreto: 265 ff.; 299; 343; Odint 31–34; H I 31–34; universale erit figmentum: E III, q. 4, cap. 17; figmenta, ut hircocervus, mons aureus: 31; figmenta ut sunt chimera et tragelaphus: F 44; cf. 265–267 (fiction); quedam oratio sententiat de vero ex delectabilibus et figmentis: F 115; poeta intendit orationem ut delectabile, sive ex veris sive ex figmentis procedat: F 115

index verborum rerumque notabilium figura figura est secundarium obiectum visus: Odint 224 figurare figurari iuxta colorari: Odint 342 fingere multa mentiuntur fingentes poete: F 115; sompnia fingere: Odint 199 firmamentum motor firmamenti est Deus: Odint 349 firmus res descendit a rato esse et firmo: G 56; fixus esse reale et fixum extra in rerum natura: F 50; 66 focalization focalization and categorization: 31, n. 29 fontana secundum aliquos philosophos omnes modi huius equivocationis [sc. arte vel consilio] reducuntur ad unam causam, quam vocant ‘fontanam-originem’: Odint 334; utrum ‘ens’ dicatur de substantia ut de fontana-origine: Odint 335; 371 forma forma abstracta accipitur ut ratio concreti: C 27; nomen concretum formam a qua descendit, importat in obliquo: C 27; una et eadem sequela non potest esse diversarum formarum: Odint 364; forma accidentalis et denominativa: H 51; — particular status of the immanent form: 331 f. formalis de formali significato nominis et materiali: C 21–23; conceptus formales vs. conceptus formati: F 54; 127; secunda intentio formaliter que est ens rationis, si intelligatur, est secunda

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intentio materialiter: H I 55; secunda intentio est duplex: in concreto sive materialiter, in abstracto sive formaliter: ‘ens’ potest dici dupliciter, uno modo formaliter, alio modo denominative: G 45; H II 8; nichil formaliter vs. suppositive: G 50 ff.; differre formaliter: Odint 375 ff.; formaliter et completive: 327, n. 44; formal vs. material: 351; formal vs. referential: 330; 334 ff.; 340 ff. formare conceptus formatus obiective: F 64; conceptus formati vs. conceptus formales: F 54: 127 fornicari multi homines mali appetunt plus fornicari et furari quam Deus hec appetat: 320; Odint 405 freneticus amentes et frenetici: 100, n. 46 frustra frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora: H I 134; nulla virtus datur alicui rei frustra: 46, n. 10 fundamentum ‘fundamentumin re’ issue: 29; 45, n. 8; 77 f.; 105; 120 ff.; 172–190 (esp. 188); 270 ff.; 279 ff.; 322; 330; 332; 342; 346 ff.; Odint 187 ff.; 195 ff.; 406; see also s.vv. fundare, mind, terminare— ‘fundamentum’ = ‘supportive argument’: Odint 348 ff. fundare ‘aliquid fundari in aliquo secundum suum esse reale’ potest intelligi duobus modis: G 67 furari, see s.v. fornicari Generalitas gradus predicamentalis, ut generalitas: Odint 314; Int., p. 12; see also s.v. gradus

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genus (kind) genus intelligibilium: H I 14; 51; and passim genus (category) ‘entitas generis; = ‘ontic state of the predicamental order’: 269 genus (predicabile) ‘genus est secunda intentio’: 81 ff.; 91; Odint 91; 227; universalitates individuales et universalitates generum et specierum sunt ex natura rei: Odint 10; genus non significat unam naturam realem in diversis speciebus, sed solum unam secundum rationem et intellectum: 179; duplex est univocatio, una generum et specierum, altera transcendentium: Odint 369; alternative definition: Odint 87 — ‘nomen generis’ = ‘a noun indicating a genus’: passim; utrum diffinitione generis diffiniatur intentio vel res subiecta intentioni: E III, q. 11, capp. 1–18 goat-stag: 265 f. see also s.v. figmentum graduatus res graduata: Odint 313 gradus de triplici gradu predicamentali: Odint 233; 294 ff.; 313–331; de gradibus in quibus intentiones ordinantur [sc. gradus predicamentalis, subpredicamentalis, suprapredicamentalis]: 12; Odint 313 ff.; de quinque gradibus universaliter distinctorum: Odint 374; de quinque manieribus graduum universaliter distinctorum: Odint 374; quod gradus predicamentales sunt ex natura rerum: Odint 294–312; gradus singularium: Odint 32 gramatica de gramatica: F 102–105; doctores in gramatica: Odint

229; grammar and rationate being: 289 f.; E II 8 Habere semper requiritur quod habens et habitum sit una res per se: Odint 289; aliud est natura, aliud habens naturam et aliud a natura [accidentia]: Odint 345 habitualis habitualis significatio: Odint 23; conceptus habitualis: Odint 10; intentio est habitualis significatio: Odint 23; habitualiter significare: Odint 23; 207; 214 habitudo esse intentionale est de esse cuiusdam habitudinis rei intellecte ad intellectum: Odint 12; ex parte rei intellecte habitudo ad intellectum dicitur esse intentionale essentialiter: Odint 8; intentionalitas sive habitudo rei intellecte vel obiecti intellecti: G 20 ff.; habitudines ad intellectum multiplicantur multiplicatis actibus intelligendi: Odint 154; F 34–36; 78 ff.; ille habitudines rerum intellectarum sunt secunde vel prime intentiones in abstracto: Odint 165; prima intentio formaliter sumpta aliquando vocatur ‘intentionalitas’, aliquando ‘habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum’, et esse obiective in intellectu: H I 39; aliquando secunda intentio in abstracto vocatur ‘habitudo seu relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’, ‘intentionalitas’, et ‘esse obiective’: H 56; — according to Hervaeus Natalis, a ‘habitudo’ is an entity that constitutes something real between the phantasm and the intellect: 106 ff.; 268–288; 342–350; Hervaeus’s network of relationships (habitudines): 295, n. 49; 344 f.; 350; 354–356

index verborum rerumque notabilium haquiqua esse reale causatur haquiqua: 169 hircocervus figmenta, ut hircocervus, mons aureus: Odint 31; H I 31; see also s.v. yrcocervus homo ille maledictus Averroys ponens unum intellectum in omnibus hominibus: Odint 98; homo illuminatus: Odint 199; multi homines mali appetunt plus fornicari et furari quam Deus hec appetat: Odint 405; ‘Homo est prima intentio’: Odint 181; 227; ‘Homo est universalis’: F 31; 37; H II 3; magis sunt nobis note voces hominum quam conceptus eorum: Odint 226 humidativus calor humidativus cere: Odint 379 Idea ideae as rationes rerum: 33 f.; Idea in mente divina: 33 ff.; 67, n. 54; 80, n. 4; 81, n. 5; see also s.v. ydea idealis rationes ideales: 81 idem idem (opp. diversum) adequate (opp. inadequate): Odint 290; idem (diversum), convertibiliter (inconvertibiliter): Odint 291 ff. identitas see s.v. ydemptitas identity opp. formal difference: 318–326 idioma, see s.v. ydioma ignis ‘Ignis est ens’: Odint 349 ff. illuminatus homo illuminatus: Odint 199 imago, see s.v. ymago immanens

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actio immanens (opp. transiens): Odint 3 ff. immutatio immutatio spiritualis (opp. natuturalis): 63, n. 41; 65, n. 48 imponere nomina a nobis inventa sunt imposita ad significandum res sensibiles nobis notas: C 22; omnis vox articulata vel significat habitualiter, puta vox nondum ad significandum imposita, vel significat habitualiter (puta vox iam imposita), non tamen actualiter imposita: Odint 207; importare nomen concretum formam a qua descendit, importat in obliquo: C 27; impositio impositio (opp. usus) vocis: Odint 218–220; omne nomen est prime vel secunde impositionis: F 122; de prima et secunda impositione nominum: Odint 229–232; 235 f.; 243 f.; cf. 282–284; nomen prime intentionis = nomen prime impositionis: H II 42; doctores in gramatica communiter sumunt nomina prime impositionis pro illis nominibus que significant res sic significatas quod non sunt significantes; nomina vero secunde impositionis sumuntur pro illis nominibus que significant res significatas quod etiam sunt significantes: Odint 229 incohativus incohative (cf. dispositive) vs. completive: 210 incomplexus dicibile incomplexum: Odint 444 incommunicabilis illud de cuius ratione est quod sit subsistens, distinctum et incommunicabile, includit in se illud per quod subsistit et

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illud per quod est distinctum et incommunicabile: D 20 incommunicabilitas incommunicabilitas inest rei preter operationem intellectus, nec est secunda intentio: F 143 indagativus logica in communi est de oratione indagativa veri: F 115 indistinctio indistinctio vel indivisio: 328; F 116; indistinguibiliter claudi intra rationem [x] et [y]: F 71 ff.; 116 indistinguibilis ratio indistinguibilis: F 72 ff.; individualis universalitates individuales et universalitates generum et specierum sunt ex natura rei: Odint 105; materia signata vel individualis: 50 ff. individualitas intentio singularitatis et particularitatis et individualitatis non dependet ab intellectu: Odint 48; cf. D 8 individuation principle of individuation: 353, n. 20 individuum: 126 ff.; A 9 ff.; B5 ff.; C 14 ff.; E I 6; F 9 ff.; 127–131; H I 75; 4.15 alternative definition: Odint 87; individuum vagum (opp. individuum signatum): 129; 149; C 13; D 9 ff.; E I 6 ff.; 31 ff.; 4.15 and n. 256; 4.26 indivisio indivisio vel indistinctio: 328; 354, n. 26; vocamus hic ‘intentiones’ large conditiones rei ex opposito correspondentes intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, indivisio, suppositatio, personalitas, que contrahunt speciem, sicut species

ipsum genus: D 8 indurativus calor indurativus luti: Odint 379 inexistere, inexistentia: Odint 430– 432 infinitus ratio permissive infinita: Odint 443; de infinito: Odint 430 informare intendere et informare: 237; 295 informatio intentio defined as informatio intellectus: 58, n. 28; 60, n. 36; 219; 237; 346, n. 1; see also s.v. intentio inherentia inherentie habitudo vs. ordo presuppositionis: F 51 inherere per modum dependentis et inherentis: Odint 165 inquantum de reduplicatione ‘inquantum’: Odint 263 f.; 410 intellectio: 165–171; 203–218; 335 ff. def. intellectio est quedam actio transiens solum obiective in rem intelligibilem: Odint 3; intellectio prima (opp. secunda): E IV 8 ff.; F 26 ff.; esse intentionale sequens intellectionem non est nisi esse intellectum: Odint 11; in quocumque signo nature res est intellectione intellecta, in illo est terminata intellectio ad rem, et res terminat ipsam intellectionem: Odint 189; hoc quod est ‘rem terminare intellectionem obiective’ est ratio quod res sit intellectione intellecta: Odint 189; intellectivus potentia intellectiva: Odint 13 intellectus (facultas) nichil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in aliquo sensu: Odint 182; intellectus est qui agit (facit) universalitatem in rebus:

index verborum rerumque notabilium 208; 327; Odint 99; E IV 1 ff.; 6; 8.5, n. 563; sensus tantum cognoscit singularia, intellectus autem cognoscit singulare et universale: H I 117 f.; intellectus intelligendo singulare deprimit se: 186, n. 36; singulare materiale primo et per se et sub propria ratione conceptu intellectus non apprehenditur: 9.36, n. 587; sicut se habet suo modo intentio et esse intentionale in sensu, sic se habet in intellectu: F 50; ad hoc quod intellectus possit intelligere, necessario exigitur quod intellectus sit singularis: Odint 98; intellectus potest omnia fieri: H I 136; quando intellectus intelligit privationes et negationes et entia rationis, tunc movetur ab ente reali: G 72; primum quod natum est occurrere intellectui (sive simplici sive complexo) oportet esse rem aliquam veram: 273; ens rationis potest accipi tripliciter: uno modo pro actu intellectus, secundo pro obiecto movente intellectum, tertio pro modo qui consequitur tale obiectum intellectus: H I 62; Averroys ponens unum intellectum in omnibus hominibus: 312; Odint 98; via intellectus (opp. via sensus): Odint 258 f.; intellectus agens (opp. possibilis): 174 f.; 176, n. 22; 183 ff.; 194 ff.; 198–201; E (the agent intellect as an individual faculty (against Averroes); 201 ff.; E IV20 ff.; 29; intellectus agens non agit super illud quod est in intellectu, sed super fantasmata: E IV 29; intellectus possibilis def.: Odint 6; E IV 12; intellectus possibilis est causa efficiens intentionem quodammodo: E III, q. 4, cap. 19; intellectus possibilis

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secundum quod huiusmodi est in potentia passiva ad omnia intelligibilia: E IV, 4; cf. 19 ff.; intellectus est indifferens ad multa intelligibilia: H I 137; recurrere ad miracula intellectus: Odint 106; quod termini communes non significant nisi intentionem que est creatura intellectus: Odint 117; triplex est operatio intellectus: E II 16; de tribus operationibus intellectus: 186 ff.; 194–196; 222 f.; intentiones triplices, sc. secundum triplicem operationem intellectus: E II 16; ad 16; F 28–30; does the intellect have access to singulars?: 198 f.; see also s.vv. esse, habitudo (according to Hervaeus Natalis) intellectus (conceptus) intellectum constituere: Odint 217; intellectus essentialis vel primus (0pp. intellectus accidentalis)): 165 f.; 189; 336; continuatio intellectuum: Odint 6; and passim; — intellectus (acceptio, sensus); intellectus accidentalis: 165 f.; 336; 339; intellectus questionis: Odint 254; 334; 379 ff.; disputare ad nomen, non ad intellectum (non ad rem): Odint 44; 46; intellectus maxime: Odint 108 (cf. 402); — ‘understanding’: 325 f.; 346, n. 12; Odint 44; 381; secundum intellectum tuum: Odint 108; ‘in omni intellectu’ = ‘in more than one sense’: 346, n. 12 intelligere intelligere idem est quod intendere: Odint 36; def. intelligere = ‘intus legere’: 50, n. 1; primum principium motivum ad intelligendum: 102; signum nature vs. signum ordinis intelligendi: Odint 189; aliud est intelligere, aliud est esse: 115, n.3; intelligere sive actus

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intelligendi est quoddam pati sive quedam passio: G 86; ‘intelligere facere’ vs. ‘intelligere fieri’: 196, n. 15; idem est intelligere et quod intelligitur: 197 f.; 245; 340; 346; 349; actus intelligendi as the final stage of the intellective act: 268, n. 29; omne quod intelligitur dependet ex sensu: E III, q. 1, cap. 11; ad hoc quod aliquid possit intelligi, necessario exigitur quod habeat conditionem universalitatis: Odint 98; intellectus intelligendo singulare deprimit se: 186, n. 36; conditiones exacte necessario ad posse intelligere et ad posse intelligi non sunt ab intellectu: Odint 98; intentio potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte intelligentis, alio modo ex parte rei intellecte: H I 4; de intentione sumpta ex parte intelligentis: Odint 5–7; 9–11; H I; intentiones intellecte continuantur cum intentionibus ymaginatis et sunt in eis quasi forma in materia et sicut color in pariete: F 55; actus intelligendi: 201 ff.; 268 ff.; 274 ff.; taken merely as a mental act: G 60; and passim; intelligere sive actus intelligendi est quoddam pati sive quedam passio: G 86; actus intelligendi ut est representativus universalis: Odint 162; concurrente actu intelligendi: G 67 ff.; actus intelligendi potest dupliciter considerari: F 47; G 12; actus intelligendi potest considerari ut accipitur loco et vice obiecti: G 12; cf. F 47; solus actus intelligendi est ens rationis: G 2– 15; de duplici actu intelligendi (rectus et reflexus): H I 112– 115; actus intelligendi est intentio: Odint 7; 17 f.; actus

intelligendi est verum ens reale: H I 110; actus intelligendi est in predicamento Qualitatis: G 83; actus intelligendi vel conceptus mentis est vera qualitas de prima specie: Odint 10; ens rationis est actus intelligendi: G 2–28; ad unum actum intelligendi non concurrunt plura esse intellecta, sed unicum tantum: Odint 14; actus intelligendi [secundum Herveum] est essentialiter esse quale: Odint 10; fuerunt alii qui dixerunt quod actus intellectus potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut est res existens in certa specie qualitatis; alio modo ut est similitudo tenens vicem obiecti, ymo quodammodo ipsum obiectum: F 47; does the first intention coincide with the act of the intellect?: 256–260; ens rationis potest accipi tripliciter: uno modo pro actu intellectus, secundo pro obiecto movente intellectum, tertio pro modo qui consequitur tale obiectum intellectus: H I 62; nec hoc modo scientie agunt de actibus intelligendi ut ipsi actus transeunt in obiecta: Odint 133; (esse) intellectum: 229 ff.; 232 (two kinds); 241 ff.; 248; 255; 286; 296; 335 f.; 343; Odon 11; G 17 and passim; primo (vs. secundo) intellectum: Odint 44; and passim; sicut esse intellectum est esse rationis, sic esse visum est esse rationis: Odint 185; esse intentionale sequens intellectionem non est nisi esse intellectum: Odint 11; ad unum actum intelligendi non concurrunt plura esse intellecta, sed unicum tantum: Odint 14; aliquid potest denominari ‘intellectum’ seu dici denomina-

index verborum rerumque notabilium tive ‘intellectum’ dupliciter: ab intrinseco vel ab extrinseco: Odint 188; intentionalitas a qua ens reale dicitur intellectum, est subiective in ipso ente reali: H 18; utrum prius ens reale dicatur ‘intellectum’ quam ‘intentio’: H I 22–25; res intellecta (opp. secundum quod huiusmodi): 56, n. 26; 115, n. 3; 214 f.; 295; modi consequentes rem intellectam: B 14–16; res primo intellecta: E IV 16; intentionalitas sive habitudo rei intellecte vel obiecti intellecti: G 20 ff.; intentio potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte intelligentis, alio modo ex parte rei intellecte: H I 4; de intentione sumpta ex parte rei intellecte: H I 8–11; intelligibilis intentio est intellectio rei intelligibilis: Odint 3; esse intelligibile: 85 ff.; 335–346; the intelligible as the potential object of the intellect: 258, n. 15; intelligibile ut sic non est existens: 183; subiectum cuiuslibet scientie est intelligibile: E III, q. 1, cap. 3; duo genera intelligibilium: Odint 40 f.; 167– 169; H I 14; 50 f.; de ordine intelligibilium: F 38; 104; duo modi intelligibilium generales: 253–259; 274 f.; 294–301; F 38; primum genus intelligibilium: Odint 187; intelligibilia primi ordinis: F 38; species intelligibilis: 253 ff.; and passim; intentio sumpta pro actu intelligendi vel pro specie intelligibili non est essentialiter ipsum esse intentionale: Odint 9; — the intelligible as the potential object of the intellect: : 258, n. 15 intelligibilitas intelligibilitas est prima intentio

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in abstracto, quia est habitudo primi generis intelligibilium ad actum intelligendi: Odint 187; predicabilitas est quedam intelligibilitas et quedam manifestabilitas: Odint 61;; intelligibilitas seu manifestabilitas rerum non dependet ab intellectu: 308 f.; Odint 61–64; 80 intendere de hoc verbo ‘intendere’: Odint 19; A 21–24; 30; cf. F 26; intendere est intus tendere: Odint 36; intendere vs. significare: Odint 23; intendere as in aliud tendere: 160, n. 80; 305; intendere est habitualiter significare: Odint 23; intendere et informare: 234 ff.; de intentione intenta et intendente: Odint 242–244; res intenta, idest significata: Odint 24; quare intentio magis dicatur intenta a voce significativa quam a concepto sibi adequato: Odint 226; esse intentum est esse non reale: Odint 213; esse intentum est a voce habitualiter significante: Odint 214; esse intentum non habet rem pro subiecto, sed pro fundamento: Odint 216; quomodo esse intentum est in re, et quomodo non: Odint 216; de esse intento non intendimus facere theoriam, sed de hiis que denotantur ab eo: Odint 226; licet videatur probabilius quod sumatur esse intentum ut aliquid intenditur a voce quam ut intenditur a conceptu: Odint 226 intentio origin and various uses of the term: 22–36; 32, n. 32; 160, n. 80; intentio dicitur dupliciter: in aliud tentio vel intus tentio: A 3; cf. E IV, 7; de quinque

866

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acceptionibus ‘intentionis’: Odint 2–26; ‘intentio’ vs. ‘propositum’: Odint 19); Odint 27 ff.; 36; 159; quid nominis ‘intentionis’: Odint 201–204; 210; responderi potest quid nominis eius quod est intentio septem modis: Odint 210; quid rei ‘intentionis’: Odint 201–204; 211 ff.; logical (opp. grammatical) intention: 58, n. 29; 60, n. 36; 152; de hoc nomine ‘intentio’ logice sumpto: Odint 210; intentio logice et metaphisice sumpta: Odint 202 ff.; Medieval concept of intention: 23 ff.; its doctrinal sources: 29–39; its development: 23 ff.; 117 ff.; 138 ff.; 192 ff.; 253 ff.; 304 ff.; intentio divided and defined (including doctrinal differences): 203 ff.; 245; 338; 342; de duplici intentione: E I 20–21; intentio est cognitio rei secundum quod transit vel tendit in obiectum: Odint 35–37; defined as informatio intellectus: 58, n. 29; 60, n. 36; 219 ff.; 237; 346, n. 11; intentio est habitualis significatio: Odint 23; intentio secundum unam acceptionem sumitur pro quocumque per suum esse formale alteri largiente esse aliquod non reale: Odint 3; sic sumpta, intentio est vera realitas: Odint 8; def. intentio est intellectio rei intelligibilis: Odint 3; intentio magis dicitur a voce significativa quam a conceptu sibi adequato: Odint 226; intentio non est aliud nisi conceptus formatus obiective per actum intellectus: F 64; intentio est rei passiva conceptio cui miscetur indistinguibiliter res concepta: F 116; intentio est rei passiva conceptio cui miscetur indistinguibiliter res concepta: F 116; cf. F 117; p. 736, n. 80; H

I 4–11; intentio integratur ex re et suo concipi passive (Peter Auriol): 352–357; accipitur intentio pro ratione quam format intellectus circa res: cf. D 8; on intentions primarily taken as modes of being of the objects cognized: 234 ff.; intentio taken as mental entity (vs. semantic content or significate): 227 ff.; fuerunt alii qui dixerunt quod actus intellectus potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut est res existens in certa specie Qualitatis; alio modo ut est similitudo tenens vicem obiecti, ymo quodammodo ipsum obiectum: F 47; Commentator intentiones vocat obiectivos conceptus: F 55; de opinione modernorum doctorum de primis et secundis intentionibus: H I 132–135; intentiones pure: 152; de intentione in communi: def. 203 ff.; 304 ff.; Odint 130 ff.; 145–166; E IV 7; thesaurus apprehendentis intentionem est virtus custoditiva: Odint 5; doctor intentionum: Odint 91; aliquid quod quodammodo res est et quodammodo intentio: 151 f.; ‘homo’ dicit Sortemcum-illa-intentione: Odint 124; utrum intentiones denominative predicentur de obiectis suis: E IV 25–31; ymagines hominum possunt dici intentiones ymaginatorum: Odint 4; sicut se habet suo modo intentio et esse intentionale in sensu, sic se habet in intellectu: F 50; sensorial intention: 117, n. 6; sensationes non sunt intentiones alie ab intentionibus rerum existentium extra animam in natura: F 55; intentio entis vel rei: Odint 332; a quo ens reale intellectum dicatur intentio: H I; Odint 14–16; illud

index verborum rerumque notabilium quod est terminus productionis realis, non dicit intentionem, ymo dicit aliquod reale: E 13; cf. A 5; F 18; omnia nomina significantia res aliquas sunt in predicamento sub aliqua intentione: D 7; de singulis intentionibus predicamentalibus: Odint 437 ff.; utrum prius ens reale dicatur ‘intellectum’ quam ‘intentio’: H I 22–25; intentio potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte intelligentis, alio modo ex parte rei intellecte: H I 4; vocamus hic ‘intentiones’ large conditiones rei ex opposito correspondentes intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, indivisio, suppositatio, personalitas, que contrahunt speciem, sicut species ipsum genus: D 8; nomen intentionis (opp. nomen rei): 151 ff.; nichil est intentio nisi ens in anima: H I 44; de intentione intenta et intendente: Odint 242– 244; intentio, opp. res subiecta (substrata) intentioni: 141 ff.; 147 ff.; 168–171; 207–216; 251; 294; 340; 343; C 12–16; E III, q. 111–18; ens rationis denominat intentionem materialiter: H I 54; quare intentio magis dicatur intenta a voce significativa quam a conceptu sibi adequato: Odint 226; quomodo se habeat intentio ad illa de quibus predicatur: Odint 227; quomodo se habeat intentio ad intentionem primam et secundam: Odint 228; esse intentionale non est actus formalis alicuius forme que est idipsum quod est intentio: Odint 15; intentio est habitualis significatio: Odint 23; negationes non sunt intentiones, sed privationes intentionum: F 99; species intelligibiles, species

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sensibiles possunt dici intentiones suorum obiectorum tamquam quedam representativa ipsorum: Odint 4; intentio potest esse vera realitas, licet esse datum per eam non sit esse reale: Odint 7; omnes scientie sunt de intentionibus: Odint 154; omnis ars et omnis scientia est de intentionibus: Odint 44; intentio sumpta pro actu intelligendi vel pro specie intelligibili non est essentialiter ipsum esse intentionale: Odint 9; intentio transcendens: Odint 1; 141; 252–452; intentio transcendens est communis secundum unam rationem ad omnes alias: Odint 337–372; utrum aliqua intentio transcendens sit communis univoce ad intentiones diversorum predicamentorum: Odint 332–374; de ordine intentionum: Odint 294–331; de intentionibus superioribus et inferioribus: Odint 253–331; 266 ff.; 294 ff.; ordo intentionum superioris et inferioris est ex natura rerum: Odint 310; quod due intentiones possunt differre formaliter ex natura rei, stante inter eas ydemptitate reali: Odint 392–420; de scientia intentionum: Odint 322–323; intentiones triplices, sc. secundum triplicem operationem intellectus: 203; 172; 207–218; 261–263; 294; E II 16; ad 16; F 28–30; E IV 8; F 26 ff.; 34 ff.; cf. H II 7 f.;45; quando universale sumitur pro intentione in concreto: E IV 11–13; intentio in abstracto (opp. in concreto): 39; 41 ff.; 203 ff.; 207–218; 219 ff.; 259; 261; 267 ff.; 274; 282 ff.; 286; 295 ff.; 337–346; E IV 1–13; F 26 ff.; 34 ff.; H I 11 ff.;

868

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35 ff.; H II 7 f.; 48 ff.; prima intentio, secunda intentio: 19 (Kilwardby); 56; 143; 165 ff.; 219– 225; 236 ff.; 254 ff.; 279 ff.; 282 ff.; 286; 295 ff.; 305; 337–346 (344, n. 89); Odint 27 ff.; 38; 228 ff.; 236 ff.; 242–250; 314 ff.; B 8 ff.; E IV 7–31; F 25–115; H I 3 ff.; H II 7 ff.; Avicenna accipit ‘primam’ et ‘secundam intentionem’ pro nominibus primarum et secundarum intentionum: 120 ff.; H I 45; de duplici intentione (prima rei cognitio, secunda rei cognitio): E I 20; de distinctione prime intentionis et secunde: H I 43–45; prima intentio, secunda intentio (against Hervaeus): Odint 170–200; quomodo se habeat intentio ad intentionem primam et secundam: Odint 228; prima intentio est ipsa res intellecta; secunda intentio est ipse actus intelligendi: Odint 27 f.; 109–114; quod primo intelligitur de re, est prima intentio [William of Ware]: Odint 29–34; 115– 131; A 3 ff.; def.: intentio est cognitio rei secundum quod transit vel tendit in obiectum; intentio prima est cognitio rei sub modo essendi proprio; secunda intentio est cognitio rei sub modo essendi communi [Radulphus Brito]: Odint 35–37; 132–142; F 26–30; 48–63; 117; prima intentio est cognitio rei sub modo essendi reali; secunda intentio est cognitio rei sub modo essendi rationis [?Simon of Faversham]: 38; 143; intentio est habitudo rationis rei intellecte ad actum intelligendi [Hervaeus]: Odint 39–42; 144–200; F 34 ff.; 65– 115; 117; and passim; does the first intention coincide with the act of the intellect?: 256–260;

foundation of second intentions: 279–284; 294 ff.; nomen prime intentionis = nomen prime impositionis: B 8–11; H II 42; omne nomen significat vel primam intentionem vel secundam: F 121–126; Avicenna accipit ‘primam’ et ‘secundam intentionem’ pro nominibus primarum et secundarum intentionum: H I 45; quomodo quedam nomina dicantur nomina prime intentionis et quedam nomina secunde intentionis: H I 43–46; prima intentio est ipsa vera res ut existens extra, vel etiam in intellectu subiective; secunda vero intentio est ipsemet actus intellectus inquantum est quodammodo obiectum actus siquidem intellectus, etsi sit realiter et subiective in ipso: ibid.; quid sit prima intentio, quid secunda: Odint 242–250; 313– 331; A 1–15; B 12–16; E IV 7–10; F 26 ff.; 34 ff.; secunda intentio que est ens rationis, nullo modo est sensibilis: H I 111; quia duo sunt ordines conceptuum, ideo duplex est genus intentionum: F 64; [moderni quidam] primas intentiones non posuerunt nisi nomina significantia naturales res: H I 42; quomodo se habeat intentio ad intentionem primam et secundam: Odint 228; de comparatione prime intentionis et secunde quantum ad intelligi; Odint 320–323; quantum ad esse: Odint 314–319; quantum ad significari: Odint 324; quantum ad predicari: Odint 325–327 [cf. A 6: de re secunde intentionis verissime predicatur ipsa intentio]; quantum ad ordinari: Odint 328–330; an secunde intentiones sint in predicamento:

index verborum rerumque notabilium 22 fff.; 269; 338; F 89; ad F 93; F 95; omnes secunde intentiones sunt in predicamento Relationis: F 135; intentiones secunde vere sunt in predicamento Qualitatis: F 33; 63; does the first intention coincide with the act of the intellect?: 256–260; foundation of second intentions: 279–284; 294 ff.; utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad primam intentionem in concreto: H I 26–30; prima intentio melius dicitur secunda inquantum est intentionaliter res cognita obiective: F 47; secunda intentio que est ens rationis [opp. secunde intentiones in concreto]: H I 67–115 passim; a quo habet intentio secunda quod dicatur secunda: H I 50; an secunda intentio sit in aliquo subiecto: H I 77–88; secunda intentio necubi est subiective: H I 77 ff.; an secunda intentio que est ens rationis, possit intelligi: H I 110–120; an secunda intentio sit aliquod ens positivum: H I 67– 76; prima intentio est duplex: in concreto vs. in abstracto: H II 7; H I 12–34; 35–46; ipsa terminatio est illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem quam vocat [sc. Hervaeus] primam intentionem in abstracto: Odint 189; potest esse prima intentio in concreto quod in sua ratione non includat esse obiective in intellectu vel aliquod esse secundum rationem: Odint 31; quidam moderni non distinguunt primam intentionem in primam in concreto et in abstracto: H I 41 f.; prima intentio formaliter sumpta est intentionalitas: H I 35; secunda intentio formaliter que est ens rationis, si intelligatur, est

869

secunda intentio materialiter: H I 55; secunda intentio que est ens rationis, nullo modo est sensibilis: H I 111; intentionalitas entium realium est secunda intentio in concreto: H II Odint 9; prima intentio in concreto dicitur ens reale et denominatur intentio ab ipsa intentionalitate que fundatur in ipso intellectu: H I 9; secunda intentio est duplex: in concreto sive materialiter, in abstracto sive formaliter: H II 8; ille habitudines rerum intellectarum sunt secunde vel prime intentiones in abstracto: Odint 165; de secunda intentione in concreto: H I 48–51; 121; intentio secunda in concreto est omne ens rationis: H II 8; de secunda intentione formaliter sive in abstracto: H I 52– 56; 121; secunda intentio in abstracto vocatur ‘habitudo seu relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’, ‘intentionalitas’, et ‘esse obiective’: Odint 56; utrum secunda intentio sit aliquid existens in intellectu subiective: H I 57–63; omnes secunde intentiones sunt relativi conceptus et in predicamento Relationis: F 135; intentiones secunde sunt triplices: 172; intentiones secunde debent dividi penes operationem intellectus: E II 16; cf. 172; 207– 218; 261–263; 294; E II 16; ad 16; F 28–30; E IV 8; F 26 ff.; 34 ff.; cf. H II 7 f.;45; logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis: Odint 44; divisio logice penes divisionem secundarum intentionum (concretarum): E II 15 ff.; F 46; 53–55; 112–115; 117; H I 1; 3; 7; quomodo logica et cetere scientie agunt de intentionibus primis et secundis, et quomodo

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non: Odint 155; logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis: Odint 44; three logical domains of second intentions: 171–173; 172, n. 14; see also s.v. logica; causa et dependentia: conditiones exacte necessario ad posse intelligere et ad posse intelligi non sunt ab intellectu: Odint 98; intentio singularitatis et particularitatis et individualitatis non dependet ab intellectu: Odint 48; intentio que est creatura intellectus: Odint 117; circumscripto intellectu, adhuc homo esset animal: 5.2; cum intellectus causat tales intenciones, movetur ab apparentibus in re: 5.42 intentionalis de triplici divisione ‘intentionalis’: 142; B 8–11; ens intentionale potest accipi dupliciter: 255; 296; G 85; esse intentionale: 69 ff.; 85; 88; 139 ff.; 335–346; Odint 8–25; 184; E I 18 ff.; esse intentionale et spirituale: 32, n. 31 f.; 38, n. 52; 64 ff.; 120, n. 13; 338, n. 5; sicut se habet suo modo intentio et esse intentionale in sensu, sic se habet in intellectu: F 50; esse intentionale est esse non reale: 69 f.; 142; 193; 253 f.; Odint 9; ens intentionale: B 8–11; omne ens intentionale est ens rationis: G 4; esse intentionale est esse non quale: Odint 19 f.; esse intentionale potest accipi essentialiter et denominative: Odint 8; esse intentionale est de cuiusdam habitudinis rei intellecte ad intellectum: Odint 12; esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio et apparitio obiectiva: F 50; conceptus positivi sunt res que sunt extra per intellectum posite in esse intentionali:

F 95; ex parte rei intellecte habitudo ad intellectum dicitur esse intentionale essentialiter: Odint 8; intentio sumpta pro actu intelligendi vel pro specie intelligibili non est essentialiter ipsum esse intentionale, sed est vera realitas: Odint 9; esse intentionale sequens intellectionem non est nisi esse intellectum: Odint 11; esse intentionale non est actus formalis alicuius forme que est idipsum quod est intentio: Odint 15; intentionaliter: illa que solum distinguuntur intentionaliter, non distinguuntur realiter: Odint 438; differre intentionaliter: Odint 237; esse intentionaliter: 37; prima intentio melius dicitur secunda inquantum est intentionaliter res cognita obiective: F 47; intentionalitas: 258, n. 13; 296 ff.; 306 ff.; 342 ff.; Odint 39–42; 112; 131; 178; F 34 ff.; notion and label ‘intentionalitas’ introduced by Hervaeus Natalis: 258, n. 13; (twofold) intentionality: 276 ff.; 294 ff.; 306–317; 333–346; intentionalitas sive habitudo rei intellecte vel obiecti intellecti: G 20 ff.; intentionalitas a qua ens reale dicitur intellectum, est subiective in ipso ente reali: H 18; intentionalitas se habet ad ens rationis sicut forma accidentalis et denominativa ad suum subiectum: H 51; intentionalitas in abstracto (opp. in concreto): F 34 ff.; intentionalitas est ipsum concipi: 736, n. 80; G 20; H I 39 f.; H II 7 ff.; intra rationem animalis clauditur intentionalitas: F 73; intentionalitas entium realium est secunda intentio in concreto: H II 9; secunda

index verborum rerumque notabilium intentio que est ens rationis, nullo modo est sensibilis: H I 111; prima intentio formaliter sumpta est intentionalitas: H 35; prima intentio formaliter sumpta aliquando vocatur ‘intentionalitas’, aliquando ‘habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum’, et ‘esse obiective in intellectu’: H I 39; secunda intentio in abstracto vocatur ‘habitudo seu relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’, ‘intentionalitas’, et ‘esse obiective’: H 56; intentio secunda in abstracto sive formaliter est intentionalitas entis rationis: H II 8; si tu intelligis intentionalitatem entium realium, tunc talis intentionalitas est secunda intentio in concreto; et si intelligis intentionalitatem entium rationis, tunc talis intentionalitas erit secunda intentio in abstracto: H II 9; prima intentio in concreto dicitur ens reale et denominatur intentio ab ipsa intentionalitate que fundatur in ipso intellectu: H I 9; — intentionality in Thomas Aquinas: 41–70; 113–132; 344, n. 7; 346, n. 12 interpretatio exprimere est actus interpretationis: Odint 225; interpretatio benivolens: 55 interrogatio in omni questione er interrogatione aliquid supponitur et aliquid queritur, et aliud est quesitum et aliud suppositum: Odint 57 intromittere se intromittere de diversitate: Odint 447 invenire parum est quod quilibet de se invenit: E II 8

871

iris see s.v. yris irrefragabilis maior est irrefragabiliter vera: Odint 340 irresolubilis conceptus irresolubilis: Odint 129 Knowledge knowledge as a habitus of the soul: 58, n 28; 98, n. 43; 237, n. 94; see also s.v. cognitio(n); reliability of universal knowledge: 175; 314; see also s.v. fundamentum Labi labitur intellectus ab ordine: Odint 344 laborare in hoc laborat totus (liber): Odint 89 lac albedo lactis, dulcedo lactis: Odint 182 lapis opp. petra: Odint 221; ‘lapidis essentia’ = ‘the real stone’ (opp. its image): 182 largiri largiens esse aliquod non reale: 214; passim; Odint 3 f.; cf. 26; larva quando aliquis debebat commendari, aliquis accipiebat larvam quandam, que representabat illum commendandum: 144; B 18; C 8; D 15 legere in multis multa legi et cogor singulorum opiniones ponere: H I 132 lex ipsa lex rationis: 34; prevaricatores Legis: Odint 18 linea linea circumflexa: 198 f.; 245; 340; linea reflexa; 86, n. 36; 187, n. 39;

872

index verborum rerumque notabilium

linea predicamentalis: Odint 253 ff.; 307 liquefactivus calor liquefactivus cere: Odint 379 locus locus et superficies: Odint 377; loco et vice obiecti: G 12; cf. F 47 logica de logica: Odint 28; 44; 114; 133; 154; 200; 322; E II 9 ff.; E III, qq. 1–2; F 32; 46; 52–54; G 63 ff.; logica dicitur modus scientiarum: 19, n. 2; proper subject of logic: 19; 74–79; 215–219; 219, n. 60; 230–232; 289–294; 300; 342; 344; 360; E II 9 ff.; E III, q. 3; F 112 ff.; H I 45; H II 122– 131; plerique studentes propter defectum logice ignorantie tetris tenebris involvuntur: H I 1; logica in communi est de oratione indagativa veri: F 115; logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis: Odint 44; intentiones de quibus est logica principaliter et secundario, scilicet de secundis, de quibus logicus agit principaliter, et de primis, quibus apponuntur secunde: Odint 133; logica tractat de intellectionibus, non ut sunt vere res, sed ut sunt rerum similitudines res ipsas denotantes: F 32; de subiecto proprio logice: H I 122–131; utrum sillogismus sit subiectum logice: E III, q. 3, capp. 1–12; utrum logica sit scientia: E III, q. 1, capp. 1–17; logica est modus sciendi in aliis scientiis: E III, q. 1, 9; utrum logica sit scientia realis vel rationalis: E III, q. 2, capp. 1–16; logicam esse scientiam rationalem: Odint 114; tota logica transcendit genus argumentationis: H I 124;

divisio logice penes divisionem secundarum intentionum (concretarum): E II 15 ff.; F 46; 53–55; 112–115; 117; H I 1; 3; 7; quomodo logica et cetere scientie agunt de intentionibus primis et secundis, et quomodo non: Odint 155; see also s.v. scientia logicalis loqui de logicalibus non logicaliter: Odint 133; principium logicale: Odint 212; intentiones logicales: 178 f. logicus metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia quam logicus dividat dicibile incomplexum in decem predicamenta: F 44; logicus, secundum quod logicus, non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intentiones solas: 178–180; genus logicum: 168–171; singulare logicum, opp. metaphisicum: Odint 180; see also s.v. logica loqui in omnibus loquendum est ut plures, et maxime secundum quod philosophantes loquuntur: F 55; non ut plures, sed ut unus loquor: H I 140; loqui de logicalibus non logicaliter: Odint 133; illa loquendi regula: 34 lux ‘Lux est ens’: Odint 349 ff. Magistralis magistraliter: Odint 444 maledictus ille maledictus Averroys: Odint 98 manifestabilitas intelligibilitas seu manifestabilitas non dependet ab intellectu: Odint 59–64; 80; predicabilitas est quedam intelligibilitas et quedam manifestabilitas: Odint 61

index verborum rerumque notabilium masculinitas (grammatice) correspondens masculinitati huius nominis ‘lapis’: Odint 221 materia materia nec est idem specie nec idem numero cum aliis causis: E III, q. 2 ad cap. 5; materia prima: 187; materia signata vel individualis: 52 materialis res materiales as a subdivision of res naturales: 52, n. 18; — materialis (opp. formalis); de formali significato nominis et materiali: C 21–23; secunda intentio formaliter que est ens rationis, si intelligatur, est secunda intentio materialiter: H I 55; secunda intentio est duplex: in concreto sive materialiter, in abstracto sive formaliter: H II 8; mathematicus, -a, -um de mathematica: E II 1 ff.; mathematical abstraction: 2.23; loquendo in mathematicis: Odint 220 memoratio thesaurus intellectus est memoratio que retinet intentionem: Odint 5 memorativus vis memorativa: 53, n. 22 memorialis virtus memorialis: Odint 5; species memoriales: 73, n. 74 mens nulla mens potest albedinem et nigredinem in uno conceptibili simplici entitative ligare F 98; verum est intentio quedam in mente existens: 76; ‘spiritus’ pro mente ponitur: 67, m. 53; see also s.v. mind mentiri multa mentiuntur fingentes poete: F 115

873

metaphisica, -us metaphisica est de diffinitionibus: Odint 297; metaphisica as a discipline: Odint 53; 293; 314; metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia quam logicus dividat dicibile incomplexum in decem predicamenta: F 44; singulare logicum, opp. metaphisicum: Odint 52; 180 metaphora per metaphoras et fabulas arguere: F 106 metaphoricus modificatio metaphorica et realis: Odint 221; distinctus metaphorice: Odint 374 mind mind-(in)dependence: 306– 332; see also s.vv. fundamentum, mens miraculum recurrere ad miracula: Odint 106 modalis differre modaliter: Odint 381 modernus quidam moderni: G 2–11; H I 41 f.; 133 f.; de opinione modernorum doctorum de primis et secundis intentionibus: H I 132–140 modista: 172, n. 14; 192; 245; 337; 339 modus modus consequens obiectum intellectum: ens rationis potest accipi tripliciter: uno modo pro actu intellectus, secundo pro obiecto movente intellectum, tertio pro modo qui consequitur tale obiectum intellectus: H I 62; modus essendi, see s.v. esse; modus significandi, see s.v. significare momentum hec evasio nullius est apparentie aut momenti: F 70

874

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mons figmenta, ut hircocervus, mons aureus: Odint 31; F 100 f.; H I 31 ff.; mons aureus videtur esse quoddam conceptibile: F 100; H I 31–34 motus de motu: Odint 370 mulus mulum generare: Odint 74 Nasus ‘snub nose’: def. Odint 76; 316; Odint 69; natura signum nature: Odint 189; essentialis ordo nature et naturalis dependentie: Odint 344; Deus et natura possunt facere duos asinos: Odint 71; ex natura rei: passim; in rerum natura: passim; universale non habet esse realiter in rerum natura preter particularia: G 14; aliud est natura, aliud habens naturam et aliud a natura [accidentia]: Odint 345; natura singularis: A 9; terminus significans naturam vel significat eam in communi, ut ‘animalitas’, ‘humanitas’, vel in singulari, ut ‘sorteitas’: Odint 280; terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus, terminus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus: Odint 281 genus non significat unam naturam realem in diversis speciebus, sed solum unam secundum rationem et intellectum: 179 naturalis res naturales: H I 42; res materiales as a subdivision of res naturales: 52, n. 18; esse naturale (opp. esse spirituale): 32; 52, n. 18; esse naturale (opp. esse intentionale): 142; B 8–

11; essentialis ordo nature et naturalis dependentie: Odint 344; quecumque significativa naturalia vel ad placitum intentiones dici possunt suorum significatorum: Odint 4; nullum naturale distinctivum est ab intellectu, sed omne ex natura rei: Odint 93; (philosopus) naturalis: Odint 106; G 9; aliqui naturales, nescientes salvare apparentia in natura per opus nature, recurrunt ad miracula efficientie Prime Cause: Odint 106; immutatio spiritualis (opp. naturalis): 63, n. 41; 65, n. 48 f. logice: suppositio alia naturalis, alia accidentalis: Odint 254 negatio Stud. 263 ff.; 299; 343; quando intellectus intelligit privationes et negationes et entia rationis, tunc movetur ab ente reali: G 72; utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad primam intentionem in concreto: H I 26–30; negationes non sunt intentiones, sed privationes intentionum: F 99; ‘enuntiatio’ vs. ‘affirmatio-negatio’: 232–245 nichil quod nulla res est, omnino nichil est: 271 ff.; 299; 343; Odint 422; omnino nulla res est nichil: G 29; nichil formaliter vs. suppositive: G 50 ff.; nix nix in eodem instanti temporis simul est quanta et alba: H I 23; corvus et nix: Odint 131 nomen ad nomen, non ad intellectum disputare: Odint 44; n quid nominis-quid rei: Odint 201 ff.; sciri non potest nisi primo cognitis in generali iis que per nomina habent significari: 151;

index verborum rerumque notabilium tria sunt genera nominum: 138; 261 ff.; Odint 29; F 120; de triplici differentia nominum: A 10; de quadam distinctione nominum: B 3–7; nomen intentionis (opp. nomen rei): 152 f.; D 5; nomina nominum: 152 f.; quomodo aliquod nomen actu dicatur: A 24; nomina a nobis inventa sunt imposita ad significandum res sensibiles nobis notas: C 20; omnia nomina significantia res aliquas sunt in predicamento sub aliqua intentione: D 7; nomen de multis dicitur que tamen per nomen non significantur: D 19; nullum nomen significat res que sunt extra prout sunt extra: F 124; de formali significato nominis et materiali: C 21–23; nomen concretum formam a qua descendit, importat in obliquo: C 27; nomina sumpta: 168, n. 9; 217, n. 56; nomina rerum singularium: 152; de prima et secunda impositione nominum: Odint 229–232; 235 f.; cf. 282–284; omne nomen est prime vel secunde impositionis: F 122; doctores in gramatica communiter sumunt nomina prime impositionis pro illis nominibus que significant res sic significatas quod non sunt significantes; nomina vero secunde impositionis sumuntur pro illis nominibus que significant res significatas quod etiam sunt significantes: Odint 229; cf. H I 41 ff.; nomina translata a creaturis ad divina: A 20; omne nomen significat vel primam intentionem vel secundam: 120 ff.; F 121–126; Avicenna accipit ‘primam’ et ‘secundam intentionem’ pro nominibus primarum

875

et secundarum intentionum: 120 ff.; H I 45; quomodo quedam nomina dicantur nomina prime intentionis et quedam nomina secunde intentionis: H I 43– 46; [moderni quidam] primas intentiones non posuerunt nisi nomina significantia naturales res: H I 42; nomen prime intentionis = nomen prime impositionis: H II 42; ‘nomen generis’ = ‘a noun indicating a genus’: passim notitia amor et notitia in Prima Causa: 382–386 non non-ens: 110; see also s.v. negatio nothing absolutely nothing: 271 f. ; 299; 343 nunc de nunc: Odint 394 Obiectivus (opp. subiectivus) intellectio est quedam actio transiens solum obiective in rem intelligibilem: Odint 3; conceptus obiectivus: accipiendo ‘verbum’ pro conceptu obiectivo: F 101; ordo conceptuum obiectivorum: ad F 116, n. 80; transitus obiectivus: Odint 3 f.; conceptus obiectivus: F 55; esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio et apparitio obiectiva: F 50; ‘obiective’ = qua put forward ‘in the manner of an object’; 85; 108; and passim; esse obiective in intellectu: 89, n. 21; 107–110; 142; 205; 254 ff.; 283 f.; 296; 322; 325; 329 f.; 340; 343; 348; and passim; Odonis 182 ff.; F 44 ff.; F 50; G 18; H I 65; 67–74; and passim; see also s.v. esse; rem esse in anima obiective non est solum denominari:

876

index verborum rerumque notabilium

F 58; esse obiective tantum et fictitium seu apparens: F 50; hoc quod est ‘rem terminare intellectionem obiective’ est ratio quod res sit intellectione intellecta: Odint 189; res cognita obiective: F 47; intentio non est aliud nisi conceptus formatus obiective per actum intellectus: F 64; prima intentio formaliter sumpta aliquando vocatur ‘intentionalitas’, aliquando ‘habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum’, et ‘esse obiective in intellectu’: H I 39; secunda intentio in abstracto vocatur ‘habitudo seu relatio rei intellecte ad intellectum’, ‘intentionalitas’, et ‘esse obiective’: H I 56; see svv. esse, intentio obiectum obiectum movens (opp. obiectum terminans): H I 112–115; 120; de obiecto et significato primo vocis significative: Odint 217–225; actus intelligendi potest considerari ut accipitur loco et vice obiecti: G 12; cf. F 47 obliquus in recto (opp. in obliquo): C 25–27 operatio duplex est genus actionum vel operationum (scilicet manentes et transientes): 102 ff.; de tribus operationibus intellectus: 172; 185 ff.; 194 ff.; 221 ff.; 230 ff.; 235 ff.; 279 ff.; 286 f.; 297; 337; 339; 344; E II 16–20; F 28–30 opinabilitas ratio intelligibilitatis seu opinabilitatis: Odint 340 oratio logica in communi est de oratione indagativa veri: F 115 ordinare entia malunt male ordinari: Odint 362

ordo essentialis ordo nature et naturalis dependentie: Odint 344; ordo conceptuum obiectivorum: ad F 116, n. 80; si dico ‘primus homo et secundus asinus’, iam labitur intellectus ab ordine: Odint 344 organum organum corporale: 48 originatus utrum ‘ens’ dicatur de accidente ut de originato: Odint 335 origo eiusdem originis collectivum, idest plurium numero vel specie differentium in unitate speciei vel originis collectivum: Odint 444; fontana-origo, see s.v. fontana Papa, papalis Johannes XXII papa: Odint 143; potestas papalis consequitur personam pape: Odint 195 parallelism parallelism postulate in Ancient and Medieval thought: 24, n. 13; 25, n. 15; 44 f.; 58, n. 29; 330; 333; 334, n. 4; 336 ff.; 242; 347 ff.; see also s.v. ‘fundamentum in re’ issue paranomy: 168, n. 9 pars quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod pars predicetur per se et in quid de toto: Odint 286; pars subiectiva: Odint 65 particularis natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis: 174; ratio particularis (= vis cogitativa): 43; 43, n. 4; particular status of the immanent form: 331 f. particulare particulare sive singulare (opp. universale): passim; universale non habet esse realiter in rerum

index verborum rerumque notabilium natura preter particularia: G 14; particulare signatum: Osint 48; particular being: 110–112; 185– 189; 331 f.; particular status of the immanent form: 331 f.; see also s.v. universale particularitas on particularity: 261; intentio singularitatis et particularitatis et individualitatis non dependet ab intellectu: Odint 48 particulare (verb) sub esse particulato: 199 passio passio proprie (opp. improprie) dicta: 195, n. 14; passio propria trianguli: Odint 429 paternitas def.: Odint 69 pati esse passum: Odint 190 Pelagianism Giraldus Odonis as a semiPelagian: 347, n. 14 per per se et formaliter: Odint 444; per se et in quid: Odint 286 permissivus ratio permissive infiniti: Odint 443; velle permis-sive: Odint 405 persona: 21; def. [Boethii]: D 7; E 4, and passim de ortu et significatione huius nominis ‘persone’: C 4–9; persona a personando: 147; B 18; C 5–9; E I 4; persona quasi per se una: 147; C 5–9; E 4; ‘persona’ idem est quod per se sonans: E I 4; prosopon idem est quod persona: F 7; nomen ‘persone’ impositum est ad significandum aliquid dignum laude: C 15; D 11; quod significatur per hoc nomen ‘persona’ valde extraneum est: D 13; utrum ‘persona’ est nomen secunde intentionis vel prime’: A 1–15; B 17–24;

877

C 12–18; D 6–8; F 9–24; 118– 120; 128–143; utrum persona dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem: A 16–28; C 1–4; 24–34; D 2– 5; E I capp. 1–3; 22–36; quia ‘persona’ est nomen commune, non significat relationem certam sive determinatam, nec habet aliquid ad quod referatur: A 30; ‘persona’ dicit aliquod reale: E I, capp. 10–18; ‘persona’ dicit aliquod intentionale: E I 31; quod ‘persona’ significet rem subiectam intentioni: D 9; utrum persona proprie conveniat in divinis: C 19–23; in tribus temporibus ‘persona’ tria significabat: E I 35; on persona: 126; 140, n. 51; 163; 192–194; 192–194; 327, n. 44 personalitas vocamus hic ‘intentiones’ large conditiones rei ex opposito correspondentes intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, indivisio, suppositatio, personalitas, que contrahunt speciem, sicut species ipsum genus: D 8 personare personare laudes alicuius: C 8; persona a personando: B 18; C 5–9 personatus: B 18 persuasio de quinque persuasibus circa conclusiones ponendis: Odint 443 ff. perversus multis est cura perversa laudare: G1 petra opp. lapis: Odint 221 phantasia: 63; 205 phantasiatus res phantasiata: 106; E IV 29; 3.44 phantasm(a): 38, n. 54 (def.); 50–57; 71 ff.; 86, n. 36; 198 f.; 203 ff.; 341

878

index verborum rerumque notabilium

conversio ad phantasma: 182, n. 30; see also s.v. conversio; the particular status of the phantasma: 198 f.; 327 ff.; see also s.vv. fantasma, habitudo (according to Hervaeus Natalis) philosophari in omnibus loquendum est ut plures, et maxime secundum quod philosophantes loquuntur: F 55; cf. H I 140; — philosophical attitude of the Medieval thinkers: 23–26 philosophicus aliquis philosophice sapiens: F 54 placitum significativum ad placitum, opp. significativum naturale: Odint 4 planimetria planimetria docet mensurare planum: Odint ad 114 plurificabilis omne plurificabile ad plurificationem singularium est singulare: Odint 164 plurificare natura rei (…) non posset esse una nec plurificata: 174 poeta poeta intendit orationem ut delectabile, sive ex veris sive ex figmentis procedat: F 115; multa mentiuntur fingentes poete: F 115 positivus (opp. privativus) an secunda intentio sit aliquod ens positivum: H I 67–76; in entibus rationis aliqua secundum rationem possunt dici positive et aliqua privative: H I 75; conceptus positivi sunt res que sunt extra per intellectum posite in esse intentionali: F 95; posterioristicus ‘posterioristice considerare’ = ‘to consider according to the doctrine of Posterior Analytics’: Odint 114

potentialis modus potentialis modestiae: 201, n. 27 precisio lit. the ‘cutting out’ for ‘taking apart’, ‘abstracting from’: ista dicuntur differre adinvicem inquantum unumquodque precise accipitur et quodammodo prescindendo omne aliud, dupliciter potest intelligi ista precisio; uno modo secundum rem, alio modo secundum rationem: 321 ff.; Odint 406– 417 precisus, see s.v. precisio preconcipere aliquid preconceptum: F 64 predicabilis circa predicamenta concurrunt quatuor predicabilia: Odint 374; dicibile, idest predicabile: Odint 444; diffinitiones predicabilium non dependent ab intellectu: Odint 81 ff.; omne universale et vere predicabile est in aliquo predicamento: F 90 predicabilitas: Odint 59 ff. predicabilitas est quedam intelligibilitas et quedam manifestabilitas: Odint 61 predicamentalis res predicamentales: Odint 161; 450; res predicamentalis est realitas nata predicari: Odint 443; realitas predicamentalis: Odint 443; res significabiles sunt in aliquo gradu predicamentali: Odint 233; de triplici gradu predicamentali: Odint 233; 294 ff.; 313–331; linea predicamentalis: Odint 253 ff.; quod gradus predicamentales sunt ex natura rerum: Odint 294– 312; de singulis intentionibus predicamentalibus: Odint 437 ff.; rationes transcendentes non sunt

index verborum rerumque notabilium res predicamentales: Odint 450; — the predicamental division of being: 317–326; 353, n. 19; the real nature of the predicamental order: 313–326; 353, n. 19; predicamental order: 313 ff. predicamentum cum dico ‘predicamentum’ duo dico: H II 3; predicamentum est dicibile incomplexum, ordinabile in genera, per se et formaliter in plura diffusivum, totius illius diffusionis principium et omnium istorum que sunt illius originis universaliter collectivum: Odint 444; predicamentum aut est ens reale, aut ens rationis: H II 3; omnia nomina significantia res aliquas sunt in predicamento sub aliqua intentione: D 7; omnes dictiones significative vere sunt in aliquo predicamento: F 95; utrum aliqua intentio transcendens sit communis univoce ad intentiones diversorum predicamentorum: Odint 332–374; circumire predicamenta: Odint 329; metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia quam logicus dividat dicibile incomplexum in decem predicamenta: F 44; res vere in predicamento existens: E III, q. 2, cap. 3; utrum predicamenta distinguantur realiter: Odint 376–391; F 63; ymaginantur communiter loquentes quod distinctio predicamentorum sit distinctio verarum rerum: F 93; circa predicamenta concurrunt quatuor predicabilia: Odint 374; see also s.vv. categoria, genus predicare the genuine meaning of ‘predicare’: 75, n. 80; 170, n. 11; 221, n. 67; 353, n. 19; quod terminus significat, hoc

879

subicit et predicat: Odint 217; predicari est actus rationis: 5.2; quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod pars predicetur per se et in quid de toto: Odint 277–279; 286; de comparatione prime intentionis et secunde quantum ad predicari: Odint 325–327; Philosophus sumit ‘predicare’ pro ‘supponere’: Odint 372; multum reffert dicere hoc predicari de hoc et hoc esse hoc: 170, n. 11; ‘predicare’ est ‘affirmare’: Odint 58 predicatio universale non dicitur per representationen, sed per predicationem: F 41 predicatum ‘predicatum’ sumitur dupliciter: Odint 55 preintellectus res preintellecta: B 15 prepositio on the prepositions ‘in’, ‘de’: Odint 63; 78 prescindere, see s.v. precisio presentialitas notion of ‘presentialitas’ in Peter Auriol: 354, n. 26 presuppositio inherentie habitudo vs. ordo presuppositionis: F 51 prevaricator prevaricatores Legis: Odint 18 prevoluntarius idem enim factum et prevoluntarium: ad F 105, n. 66 primus ‘primum non dicit ordinem ad secundum, quia primum dicitur ante quod nichil, sed ‘secundum’ dicit ordinem ad primum: Odint 229; si dico ‘primus homo et secundus asinus’, iam labitur intellectus ab ordine: Odint 344; primum principium motivum ad intelligendum: 102

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principalis terminus sumptus (opp. terminus principalis): Odint 281; passim; terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus, terminus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus: Odint 281 principium omnes propositiones ad integritatem scientie pertinentes vel sunt principia vel conclusiones: Odint 102; primum principium oportet esse ex terminis quorum conceptus sunt irresolubiles: Odint 129; primum principium motivum ad intelligendum: 102; intellectus principiorum: 102 principle principle of economy (‘Ockham’s razor’): 354, n. 24 prior aliquid dici prius altero potest dici dupliciter: H I 22 prioristicus, see s.v. posterioristicus prioritas prioritas secundum naturam non est esse hoc sine hoc, sed esse hoc mediante hoc: H I 25; privatio: 263 ff.; 299; 343 quando intellectus intelligit privationes et negationes et entia rationis, tunc movetur ab ente reali: G 72; utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad primam intentionem in concreto: H I 26–30; negationes non sunt intentiones, sed privationes intentionum: F 96; 99 privativus (opp. positivus) in entibus rationis aliqua secundum rationem pos-sunt dici positive et aliqua privative: H I 75 probatio probatio elenctica: Odint 257

producere producere sillabam: C 9 productio illud quod est terminus productionis realis, non dicit intentionem, ymo dicit aliquod reale: E 13; cf. A 5; F 18 profundimetria Odon. ad 114 prohibere entia prohibita: F 96 ff. propositio(n) quomodo propositio intelligatur: 188; ‘propositio absolute sumpta’ = ‘taken as a black-board sentence’: 232, n. 86; 230 f.; anatomy of the proposition in Aristotle: 28, n. 19; see also s.v. sentence propositum propositum vs. intentio: Odint 19–20 proprius proprium (predicabile): Odint 84 prosopon prosopon idem est quod persona: F 7; provincia studentes nostre provincie: H I 132 Qualis qualitas est essentialiter esse quale: Odint 9; albedo dicit esse quale essentialiter, sed corpus album dicitur habere esse quale denominative: Odint 8; esse intentionale est esse non quale: Odint 10; esse quale est actus formalis ipsius qualitatis et per consequens est idem essentialiter quod qualitas: Odint 15 qualitas def. qualitas est secundum quam quales dicimur: 10; nulla qualitas que est essentialiter esse quale, est essentialiter esse non quale:

index verborum rerumque notabilium Odint 10; qualitas est essentialiter esse quale: Odint 9 quasi ‘quasi’ as used for introducing an etymology: 147 questio in omni questione er interrogatione aliquid supponitur et aliquid queritur, et aliud est quesitum et aliud suppositum: Odint 57 quid quod-quid-est (Greek τ τ στι) sive diffinitio: 75, n. 82; 99; 117; 206; 209, n. 39; 212, n. 44 f.; 236, n. 91; 243; 318; E II 13; E IV 11; in eo quod quid est: passim; quod-quid-erat-esse (Greek τ τ !ν ε"ναι): Odint 301; quod-quid-eratesse enim est ipsa rei quidditas: Odint 393; per se et in quid: quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod pars predicetur per se et in quid de toto: Odint 286; res secundum quid: Odint 443 quiddificare habens quidditatem quiddificatum per ipsam: Odint 379 quidditas quidditas formaliter est in habente quidditatem quiddificato per ipsam: Odint 379; non est possibile quod aliqua una quidditas plurificetur per diversas quidditates: ; quiddity as the proper object of cognition: 53–57; 196–198 quidditativus esse quidditativum, quod est esse diffinibile: Odint 100 Ratio ratio as formal concept: 204; 224, n. 71; secundum quod Aristotiles utitur nomine ‘rationis’: Odint 449; illud de cuius ratione est quod sit

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… [etc.]: D 20; passim; ratio permissive infinita, ratio nontranscendens, ratio positiva, ratio realis, ratio per se una: Odint 443; ratio essentialis: Odint 357; ratio substantialis: Odint 449; rationes transcendentes non sunt res predicamentales: Odint 450; ideae as rationes rerum: 36 f.; rationes ideales: 81; — ratio as faculty: in vera ratione fundata: Odint 200; consonus rationi: Odint 298; ens rationis, see s.v. ens; differt aliquid esse ens rationis et communitatem esse communitatem rationis: C 18; relatio rationis, see s.v. relatio; ratio particularis (= vis cogitativa): 43, n. 4; — ratio as argument: minor rationis mee falsa est: Odint 133; ratio remanebit illesa: Odint 338; 341; 354; 357; ratio quam vult solvere: Odint 357; ratio non valet: passim; cf. rationem reddere: Odint 133 rationalis utrum logica sit scientia realis vel rationalis: 153; E III, q. 2, capp. 1–16; logicam esse scientiam ratio-nalem: Odint 114; see also s.v. logica rationate ‘rationate being’ is Schmidt’s fortunate rendering of ‘ens rationis’: 76, n. 83; 88, n. 19; 288; and passim; two kinds of rationate being: 280 f. 291 f. razor principle of economy (‘Ockham’s razor’): 354, n. 24 realis ratio realis: Odint 443; scientia realis: 153; E III, q. 2; realis artifex: E III, q. 11, cap. 2; actionis realis oportet quod sit et terminus aliquid reale: A 5;

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utrum negationes et privationes reales pertineant ad primam intentionem in concreto: H I 26– 30; illa que solum distinguuntur intentionaliter, non distinguuntur realiter: Odint 438; largiens aliquod esse non reale […], puta esse cognitum, esse volitum, esse sensatum, esse representatum, esse significatum: Odint 4; esse reale et fixum extra in rerum natura: 85–95; 141 ff.; 207 ff.; F 50; ens reale: 85–95; 141 ff.; 207 ff.; universale non habet esse realiter in rerum natura preter particularia: G 14; utrum logica sit scientia realis vel rationalis: E III, q. 2, capp. 1–16; transitus realis et subiectivus: Odint 216 realism Giraldus Odonis as an extreme realist: 347, n. 14 realitas realitas (opp. conceptibilitas): de duobus modis significandi relationem: A 25; F 99; intentio potest esse vera realitas, licet esse datum per eam non sit esse reale: Odint 7; cf. 9; de quatuor divisionibus realitatum: 345; Odint 388; aggregatum ex intentione et realitate singulari: Odint 123; res predicamentalis est realitas nata predicari: Odint 443 ff.; realitas singularis: 424; 432; Odint 123; realitas universalis: Odint 389 f.; 432; realitas hoc aliquid (opp. realitas quale quid): 317 ff.; 326 ff. recipere quidquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis: 57–64 reduplicatio via reduplicationis: Odint 263; its use: 325; 410 ff. referentiality: 24 ff.; 57–65; 76–78 referentiality and reliability: 57–

65; 76–78; 335–357; ‘referential’ vs. ‘formal’: 330; 334 ff.; 340 ff.; see also s.v. fundamentum in re reflexio on knowing singulars per reflexionem: 198 f.; per quandam reflexionem: 188; 198 f.; reflexio juxta conversio ad phantasma: 185; 186, n. 36 reflexus actus reflexus (opp. actus rectus): H I 112; linea reflexa; 86, n. 36; 187, n. 39; see also s.vv. circumflexus, reflexio relatio de duobus modis significandi relationem: A 25 ff.; secundum relationem (opp. secundum substantiam): A 16–28; C 1–4; 24–34; D 2–5; E 1–3; 32–36; relatio in communi non habet aliquid ad quod referatur, cum sic in communi abstrahatur a relatione que est in utroque extremo: A 30; quia ‘persona’ est nomen commune, non significat relationem certam sive determinatam, nec habet aliquid ad quod referatur: A 30; de relatione reali et relatione rationis: H I 106–109; relatio dicitur realis a termino reali: G 31; omnes secunde intentiones sunt relativi conceptus et in predicamento Relationis: F 135; conceptualistic view of relatioship: 353; — Hervaeus Natalis’s network of relationships (habitudines): 295, n. 49; 344 f.; 350; 354–356 reliability referentiality and reliability: 57– 64; 76–78; 175 ff.; 335–357; see also s.v. referentiality reor res descendit a rato esse et firmo: G 56;

index verborum rerumque notabilium repartibilis sub isto modo essendi qui est esse repartibile in multa differentia secundum speciem: Odint 35; passim representare esse non reale, puta esse representatum: 85 ff.; 305; 335– 346; Odint 4; cf. 186; 379 ff.; res representata: 163 representatio universale non dicitur per representationen, sed per predicationem: F 41 representationalism representationalism as an epistemological issue: 57–64; 346, n. 12 representativus actus intelligendi ut est representativus universalis: Odint 162; quodlibet representativum quasi per transitum obiectivum in rem representabilem largitur rei representabili esse representatum: Odint 4; passim; ydolum representativum: Odint 6; — representativeness, see s.v. referentiality res res descendit a rato esse et firmo: G 56; natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis: 174; res pura: ad F 116, n. 80; res vera: 273; ‘ex natura rei’ (‘in virtue of a thing’s nature’): 313–332; 373 ff.; Odint 253– 312 passim; C 8; res et ens sunt maxime universalia: Odint 117; res est obiectum conceptus: Odint 217; aliquid quod quodammodo res est et quodammodo intentio: 151 f.; res potest accipi duobus modis, stricte et large: G 56 f.; ‘res’ sumpta modo communissimo: Odint 212; res materiales as a

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subdivision of res naturales: 52, n. 18; de duplici cognitione rei: E I 18–20; E II 15 ff.; cf. F 27 ff.; primum quod natum est occurrere intellectui (sive simplici sive complexo) oportet esse rem aliquam veram: 273; res extra non sunt congrue nec incongrue: F 103; quod nulla res est, omnino nichil est: Odint 422; omnino nulla res est nichil: G 29; intentio entis vel rei: Odint 332; res primo intellecta: E IV 16; res fantasiata: 106; E IV 29; 3.44; res intellecta, see s.v. intelligere; res significabiles sunt in aliquo gradu predicamentali: Odint 233; res speculabilis: E II, 1–2; de re secunde intentionis verissime predicatur ipsa intentio: A 6; res predicamentalis est realitas nata predicari: Odint 443; nullum nomen significat res que sunt extra prout sunt extra: F 124; res subiecta (substrata) intentioni, opp. intentio: 149; 167–171; 207 ff.; 215 f.; 245; 247; 251; 296; 337; 339 f.; 343; C 12–16; D 9–15; E III, q. 11, capp. 1–18; F 76; res secunda: Odint 443; in quocumque signo nature res est intellectione intellecta, in illo est terminata intellectio ad rem, et res terminat ipsam intellectionem: Odint 189; nomina rerum singularium: 152; res graduata: Odint 313; semper requiritur quod habens et habitum sit una res per se: Odint 289; nomina a nobis inventa sunt imposita ad significandum res sensibiles nobis notas: C 22; res significata, see s.v. exercitium significandi; vox significativa est intentio rei significate per hoc quod largitur ei esse significatum: Odint 26; ymaginantur

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communiter loquentes quod distinctio predicamen-torum sit distinctio verarum rerum: F 93 rethorica de arte rethorica: F 106–111; rhetoric and rationate being: 289 f. Sacramentum esse formale sacramenti: Odint 194 sapiens aliquis philosophice sapiens: F 54 sapientia sapientia divina: 322 ff.; Odint 406 ff. sapientialis intentiones sapientiales: 44 scibilis scientia non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile: E III, q. 2, 3; scientia refert ad suum scibile: G 31; 62 scientia scientia est habitus intellectualis: E III, q. 4, cap. 4; omnis scientia est ex propriis: E III, q. 1, cap. 4; omnis scientia est tradita per nomina significantia res de quibus est scientia: Odint 204; omnes scientie sunt de intentionibus: Odint 154 (cf. 44); omnis ars et omnis scientia est de intentionibus: Odint 44 ; subiectum cuiuslibet scientie est intelligibile: E III, q. 1, cap. 3; considerabilia per scientiam: Odint 374; ad integritatem scientie pertinere: Odint 102; scientia est de universalibus abstractis et separatis a singularibus: G 25; de non ente non est scientia: E III, q. 4, cap. 3; scientia refert ad suum scibile: G 31; de divisione scientiarum: E II 1–20; scientie distinguuntur secundum

distinctiones suorum obiectorum: E II 1; diversa genera scientiarum sunt secundum diversa genera intentionum: Odint 176; scientia realis: 153; E III, q. 2, capp. 13– 16; scientia sermocinalis: 153; Odint 28; E II, q. 2, cap. 5; scientia rationalis: 153; scientia non est maioris entitatis quam suum scibile: E III, q. 2, cap. 3; omnes propositiones ad integritatem scientie pertinentes vel sunt principia vel conclusiones: Odint 102; nec hoc modo scientie agunt de actibus intelligendi ut ipsi actus transeunt in obiecta: Odint 133; loqui de scientiis non scientifice: Odint 133; — utrum logica sit scientia: E III, q. 1, capp. 1– 17; logica est modus sciendi in aliis scientiis: E III, q. 1, cap. 9; quomodo logica et cetere scientie agunt de intentionibus primis et secundis, et quomodo non: Odint 155 scientificus loqui de scientiis non scientifice: Odint 133 scire de modo sciendi: E III, q. 3, capp. 5–12; modus sciendi non est scientia: E III, q. 1, capp. 2 and 9 ff.; q. 3, capp. 5–13; sciri non potest nisi primo cognitis in generali iis que per nomina habent significari: 151 secundus see s.v. primus semantics Aristotelian semantics: 314, n. 23; 331 f.; 354, n. 24; 356, n. 29; Medieval semantics: 333–335 senescalcus esse senescalcum: Odint 194 sensatio: Odint 3 sensationes non sunt intentiones

index verborum rerumque notabilium alie ab intentionibus rerum existentium extra animam in natura: F 55; sensatus esse sensatum: Odint 3 f.; esse sensatum non est esse reale: Odint 4 sensibilis secunda intentio que est ens rationis, nullo modo est sensibilis: H I 111; nomina a nobis inventa sunt imposita ad significandum res sensibiles nobis notas: C 22; spiritualis vs. sensibilis: C 22 sensorial sensorial intention: 117, n.7; sensorial activity: 310 ff. sensus de sensu: Odint. 94 ff.; omne quod intelligitur dependet ex sensu: E III, q. 1, cap. 11; nichil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in aliquo sensu: Odint 182; sensus tantum cognoscit singularia, intellectus autem cognoscit singulare et universale: 186, n. 36; 187, n. 39; H I 117 f.; sicut se habet suo modo intentio et esse intentionale in sensu, sic se habet in intellectu: F 50; singularitas est conditio secundum quam obiectum sensus attingi natum est ab actu potentie: Odint 94; universalitas est conditio secundum quam sensus ut potentia respicit obiectum suum primarium: Odint 94; via sensus (opp. via intellectus): Odint 258 f. sentence sentencehood in Aristotle: 28, n. 19; 244, n. 99; see also s.vv. proposition, semantics sententiare quedam oratio sententiat de vero ex necessariis: F 115 sequela una et eadem sequela non potest

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esse diversarum formarum: Odint 364 sermo de sermone: H I 25 sermocinalis scientia sermocinalis: 153; E III, q. 2, cap. 5 ff. signare individuum vagum (opp. individuum signatum): 129, m. 28; 149; D 11a ff.; E I 6 ff.; 31 ff.;; materia signata vel individualis: 52 significabilis de rebus significabilibus: Odint 233 ff.; res significabiles sunt in aliquo gradu predicamentali: Odint 233 significare significare vs. intendere: Odint 23; significare non competit sono inquantum res est, sed prout conceptus est: F 104; significare concretive (opp. abstractive): C 27; de formali significato nominis et materiali: C 21–23; nullum nomen significat res que sunt extra prout sunt extra: F 124; omnis vox incomplexa significans conceptum aliquem positivum est vere in predicamento: F 95; omnia nomina significantia res aliquas sunt in predicamento sub aliqua intentione: D 7; illud pro quo ‘ens’ supponit suppositione personali, non est significatum ‘entis’ nec de significato, est tamen suppositum significati: Odint 372; Philosophus cum dicit quod ‘est’ multipliciter dicitur, non intelligit de multiplicitate significatorum sub eadem voce, sed de multiplicitate suppositorum sub eodem significato: Odint 369; nullum suppositum ‘entis’ assequitur omnes cathegorias, sed solum

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significatum ‘entis’: Odint 372; esse significatum non est esse reale: 331 f.; Odint 4; 8.5; vox significativa est intentio rei significate per hoc quod largitur ei esse significatum: Odint 26; quecumque significativa naturalia vel ad placitum intentiones dici possunt suorum significatorum: Odint 4; de formali significato nominis et materiali: C 21–23; E IV 15; 19; de obiecto et significato primo vocis significative: Odint 217–225; nomen de multis dicitur que tamen per nomen non significantur: D 19; doctores in gramatica communiter sumunt nomina prime impositionis pro illis nominibus que significant res sic significatas quod non sunt significantes; nomina vero secunde impositionis sumuntur pro illis nominibus que significant res significatas quod etiam sunt significantes: Odint 229; habitualiter significare: Odint 214; cf. 23; accidens abstractum est quoddam significatum simplex, ita quod in suo modo significandi non includit subiectum sicut in modo significandi ‘albi’: H II 11; modus significandi, opp. modus essendi: Odint 165; modus signifiandi activus-passivus: Odint 221; modus significandi accidentalis: Odint 364; de duobus modis significandi relationem: A 25 ff.; de comparatione prime intentionis et secunde quantum ad significari: Odint 324; signum non potest distribuere terminum equivocum in supposita diversorum significatorum: Odint 361; pro quocumque fit distributio, participat ipsum significatum termini: Odint

358; cf. 360; see also s.vv. nomen, terminus significate, significatum formal vs. material significate: 147; 247; 255 ff.; 341 f.; esse significatum: 331 f. 345; Odint 162; C 21–23; D 18; E IV 11–19; H I 73; see also s.v. significare significatio de significatione: Odint 23 ff.; intentio est habitualis significatio: Odint 23; signum-significatio: 71, n. 67; 151 ff.; Odint 218; de quibusdam distinctionibus circa exercitium significationis: Odint 205–210; habitualis significatio: Odint 23; cf. 204; 214; significationem propriam exercere, opp. significationem alienam significare: Odint 205; aggregatum ex significatione passiva et re significata: Odint 209 significativus quecumque significativa naturalia vel ad placitum intentiones dici possunt suorum significatorum: Odint 4; omnes dictiones significative vere sunt in aliquo predicamento: F 95; see also s.v vox signum signum-significatio: 71, n. 67 Augustine’s famous definition); 151 ff.; Odint 218; signum nature vs. signum ordinis intelligendi: Odint 189; cum vox significativa sit signum ad placitum impositum et signum quo aliquis potest uti, ipsa vox potest respicere et impositionem et usum: Odint 218; omne signum habet illud pro primo significato per conformitatem ad quod habet veritatem et est verum signum, et per difformitatem ad quod habet falsitatem et est falsum signum:

index verborum rerumque notabilium Odint 222; signum naturaliter significans aliquid aliud: H I 133; signum in anima existens est actus intelligendi: H I 133; de duplici tali signo, [sc. prima et secunda intentio]: H I 135; — signum (logice): signum (sc. sincathegorematicum) non potest distribuere terminum equivocum in supposita diversorum significatorum: Odint 361; signum distributivum: Odint 260; signum verum: Odint 222; — signum (argumentative; Greek τεκμ ριον), opp. ratio: 291 sillogismus utrum sillogismus sit subiectum logice: E III, q. 3, capp. 1–12; F 134 similis omne simile applaudit suo simili: Odint 76 similitudo: 202; 226; 329; Odint 76; 186 ff.; G 85 similitudo is not a pictorial representation: 59 f.; 197 f.; similitudines rerum res ipsas denotantes: F 32; ‘similitudo’ = ‘comparison’: non omnes similitudines currunt quatuor pedibus: Odint 371 simus simus bene dicitur nasus curvus: Odint 69; 88; cf. E III, q. 11, cap. 13 sincathegorematicus dictiones sincathegorematice sunt incomplexe: Odint 369; differre sincathegorematice: Odint 382 singularis de singulari: 186; 307; 317 f.; 326– 332; 336; Odint 48–58; 66 f. ; 164; 309; F 127–131; 5.53, n. 355; 8.21; 8.31; 8.4; ‘ens’ significat in singulari aliquam unam formam communem: Odint 362; on knowing singulars per

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reflexionem: 198 f.; see also s.v. conversio ad phantasma; intellectus intelligendo singulare deprimit se: 186, n. 36; nomina rerum singularium: 154 f.; sensus tantum cognoscit singularia, intellectus autem cognoscit singulare et universale: H I 117 f.; singulare materiale primo et per se et sub propria ratione conceptu intellectus non apprehenditur: 354, n. 24; scientia est de universalibus abstractis et separatis a singularibus: G 25; alternative definition: Odint 87; singulare logicum, opp. metaphisicum: Odint 180; gradus singularium: Odint 32; omne plurificabile ad plurificationem singularium est singulare: Odint 164; ad hoc quod intellectus possit intelligere, necessario exigitur quod intellectus sit singularis: Odint 98; aggregatum ex intentione et realitate singulari: Odint 123; natura singularis: A 9; realitas singularis: Odint 123; totalitas singularis: Odint 127; — singulare (grammatice, opp. plurale): de termino habente singulare et plurale: Odint 362; — singularis (Anglice ‘peculiar’): ymaginatio singularis: Odint 192 singularitas de singularitate: Odint ; 315 ff.; D 8; singularitas est conditio secundum quam obiectum sensus attingi natum est ab actu potentie: Odint 94; exemptio singularitatis: Odint 173; gradus subpredicamentalis, ut singularitas: Odint 314; intentio singularitatis et particularitatis et individualitatis non dependet ab intellectu: Odint 48–67; singularitas

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est ex natura rei: Odint 157; singularitatis exemptio: Odint 173; 230; vocamus hic ‘intentiones’ large conditiones rei ex opposito correspondentes intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, indivisio, suppositatio, personalitas, que contrahunt speciem, sicut species ipsum genus: D 8 som(p)nium sompnia fingere: Odint 199 sonus significare non competit sono inquantum res est, sed prout conceptus est: F 104 sorteitas terminus significans naturam in singulari, ut ‘sorteitas’: Odint 280 species (image) species est aut ens reale, aut ens rationis: H II 3; species qua ‘mental entities’: 254, n. 8; 338; and passim, see s.v. intentio; species intelligibiles, species sensibiles possunt dici intentiones suorum obiectorum tamquam quedam representativa ipsorum: Odint 4; cf. 7; 186; non plus est inconveniens species negare quam ponere: H I 138; intermediary species: 37 f.; 57–64; 96–100; 113–117; 181–183; 201 f.; 253–260; species memoriales: 73, n. 74 species (predicabile) sola species diffinitur: Odint 100; 120; ‘Species est intentio’: A 6; and passim specificus esse specificum: 328; 332; see also s.v esse speculabilis res speculabiles: E II 1–2 speculativus Aristotiles ponit nostram felicitatem in actu speculativo intellectus: G 7

speculum ymago que apparet in speculo: F 50; de ymagine que apparet in speculo: F 50 spiritualis: 338, n. 5 immutatio spiritualis (opp. naturalis): 63, n. 41; 65, n. 48 f.; esse naturale (opp. esse spirituale): 32; 52, n. 18; 64 ff.; 338, n. 5; esse intentionale et spirituale: 32, n. 31 f.; 58, n. 52; 64 ff.; 120, n. 13; spiritualis vs. sensibilis: C 22 spiritus ‘spiritus’ pro mente ponitur: 67, m. 53 stare per modum per se stantis: Odint 165 stila columpne vel stile: G 27 studere studentes nostre provincie: H I 132; doctrine communis studentes: H I 132; plerique studentes propter defectum logice ignorantie tetris tenebris involvuntur: H I 1 subiectivus (opp. obiectivus) transitus realis et subiectivus: Odint 216; esse subiective: 85; ‘esse subiective in aliquo’ potest intelligi dupliciter: G 70; H I 57 ff.; 77 ff.; secunda intentio necubi est subiective: H I 77 ff.; see also svv. ens, esse, intentio, obiectivus subicere quod terminus significat, hoc subicit et predicat: Odint 217 subiectum (suppositum, substratum) illud pro quo ‘ens’ supponit suppositione personali, non est significatum ‘entis’ nec de significato, est tamen suppositum significati: Odint 372; see also s.v. suppositum

index verborum rerumque notabilium subpredicamentalis: 12; 313 ff. gradus subpredicamentalis: Odint 233; 294 ff.; Int., p. 12; see also s.v. gradus subsistentalis supponibilis sive subsistentale: C 26 subsistere illud de cuius ratione est quod sit subsistens, distinctum et incommunicabile, includit in se illud per quod subsistit et illud per quod est distinctum et incommunicabile: D 20 substantia quod ‘ens’ significat aliquam rationem communem Deo et creature, accidenti et substantie: Odint 358–372; utrum ‘ens’ dicatur de substantia ut de fontana-origine: Odint 335; secundum substantiam (opp. secundum relationem): A 16–28; C 1–4; 24–34; D 2–5; E 1–3; 32– 36; ‘substantia’ hic non accipitur pro ‘essentia’, sed pro ‘supposito’: D 18b; primary vs. secondary substance: 317 substantialis ratio substantialis: Odint 449; subtiliare subtiliare se ad tractandum de nichilo: G 29; 53 sumere terminus sumptus (opp. terminus principalis): Odint 281; and passim; terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus, terminus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus: Odint 281 superextendere superextendere conceptionem: F 72 superpredicamentalis intentio superpredicamentalis:

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12; Odint 233; 294 ff.; see also s.v. gradus supponere (to surmise) in omni questione et interrogatione aliquid supponitur et aliquid queritur, et aliud est quesitum et aliud suppositum: Odint 57 supponere (logice) opp. significare: 155 ff.; Philosophus sumit ‘predicare’ pro ‘supponere’: Odint 372; supponere personaliter (opp. simpliciter): Odint 372; signum non potest distribuere terminum equivocum in supposita diversorum significatorum: Odint 361; Philosophus cum dicit quod ‘est’ multipliciter dicitur, non intelligit de multiplicitate significatorum sub eadem voce, sed de multiplicitate suppositorum sub eodem significato: Odint 369 supponibilis supponibilis sive subsistentale: C 26 suppositatio vocamus hic ‘intentiones’ large conditiones rei ex opposito correspondentes intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, indivisio, suppositatio, personalitas, que contrahunt speciem, sicut species ipsum genus: D 8 suppositio (surmise): 291 suppositio (logice) suppositio alia naturalis, alia accidentalis: Odint 254; suppositio simplex (opp. personalis): Odint ; 97; 118; 249; 327; 372; simplex suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro re universali: Odint 97; cf. 118; suppositivus ens tantum suppositive et denominative: G 45 ff.; nichil formaliter vs. suppositive: G 50 ff.

890

index verborum rerumque notabilium

suppositum illud pro quo ‘ens’ supponit suppositione personali, non est significatum ‘entis’ nec de significato, est tamen suppositum significati: Odint 372; nullum suppositum ‘entis’ assequitur omnes cathegorias, sed solum significatum ‘entis’: Odint 372; suppositum vagum in natura humana: D 11a; ‘substantia’ hic non accipitur pro ‘essentia’, sed pro ‘supposito’: D 18b; see also s.v. individuum suprapredicamentalis gradus suprapredicamentalis: 313 ff.; Odint 233; 294 ff.; Int., p. 12; see also s.v. gradus sustentare aliquid aliud sustentans: C 26 syllaba producere syllabam: C 9 syllogismus see s.v. sillogismus Tabula ‘tabula rasa’ idea in Aristotle: 46; 346, n. 10 tempus simul tempore: Odint 268; nix in eodem instanti temporis simul est quanta et alba: H I 23; — tempora verbi intelligere: 188 tendere,tendentia see s.v. intendere terminare hoc quod est ‘rem terminare intellectionem obiective’ est ratio quod res sit intellectione intellecta: Odint 189; terminare actum: 253 ff.; 295;328, n. 48; Odint 42; and passim; obiectum movens (opp. obiectum terminans): H I 112–115; 120 terminatio ipsa terminatio est illa habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectionem

quam vocat [sc. Hervaeus] primam intentionem in abstracto: Odint 189 terminus (extremum relationis) illud quod est terminus productionis realis, non dicit intentionem, ymo dicit aliquod reale: E 13; cf. A 5;F 18; relatio dicitur realis a termno reali: G 31 terminus (finis) actionis realis oportet quod sit et terminus aliquid reale: A 5; cf. terminare terminus (logice) de multifaria divisione terminorum: Odint 280–283; quod terminus significat, hoc subicit et predicat: Odint 217; terminus significans naturam est principalis et abstractus, terminus vero significans habens naturam est sumptus et concretus: Odint 281; termino semel sumpto non utimur equivoce secundum logicos: Odint 360; 362; de termino habente singulare et plurale: Odint 362; quod terminus communis significet aliquid aggregatum ex illa intentione creatura intellectus et ex aliqua realitate singulari: Odint 123; cf. 128; 129; terminus significat in abstracto per modum per se stantis, vel in concreto per modum dependentis et inherentis: Odint 165; primum principium oportet esse ex terminis quorum conceptus sunt irresolu-biles: Odint 129; quod termini communes non significent nisi intentionem que est creatura intellectus: Odint 117; simplex suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro re universali: Odint 97; cf. 118; terminus sumptus (opp. terminus principalis): Odint 281; 361; signum non potest distribuere terminum

index verborum rerumque notabilium equivocum in supposita diversorum significatorum: Odint 361 theoria de esse intento non intendimus facere theoriam, sed de hiis que denotantur ab eo: Odint 226 thesaurus thesaurus apprehendentis intentionem: Odint 5 time Odonis’ unusual theory of time: 9.3, n. 577 totalitas totalitas singularis: Odint 127; totalitas salvabilis in quolibet contento: Odint 127; ‘totum’ non dicit totalitatem suam salvabilem in quolibet contento, sed quandam totalitatem singularem: Odint 127 totus omne totum maius est sua parte: Odint 127; quatuor requiruntur ad hoc quod pars predicetur per se et in quid de toto: Odint 286; ‘totum’ non dicit totalitatem suam salvabilem in quolibet contento, sed quandam totalitatem singularem: Odint 127 tragelaphus chymera et tragelaphus: F 44; 96 transcendentia gradus trancendentie est ex natura rei: Odint 373 f.; opp. generalitas, singularitas: 12; Odint 314 ff.; see also s.v. gradus transcendere intentio transcendens: 12; Odint 1; 141; 251–452;; modi essendi transcendentium: Odint 141; utrum aliqua intentio transcendens sit communis univoce ad intentiones diversorum predicamentorum: Odint 332–374; ratio transcendens: Odint 450; ratio non transcendens: Odint 443;

891

ipsa transcendentia [ens, unum, bonum, verum, res, aliquid]: Odint 233; de univocatione transcendentium: Odint 369; duplex est univocatio, una generum et specierum, altera transcendentium: Odint 369; — Plato’s transcendent World: 354, n. 24; see also s.n. Plato transire nec hoc modo scientie agunt de actibus intelligendi ut ipsi actus transeunt in obiecta: Odint 133; actio transiens (opp. immanens): 102–104; Odint 3 ff. transitus transitus obiectivus: Odint 3 ff.; 213; 216; transitus realis et subiectivus: Odint 216 translatio translatio antiqua: Odint 18; 24; 48 transmutatio via transmutationis: Odint 262 triangulus passio propria trianguli: Odint 429; cf. 305; realis triangulus: Odint 84 trinitas Trinitas consistit in rebus perfectissimis, non in conceptibus nostris: 21 ff.; A 7 truffa hoc esset maxima truffa (‘bloomer’, ‘twaddle’): Odint 370 truffatio licet ita videatur intelligere truffationem Averroys: Odint 370 Unde ‘unde’ = ‘because’: 220 f.; 264, n. 23; B 18; ad E I 16, p. 654, n. 15; and passim uniformis ‘uniformis’ = ‘informed by the same form’: 329, n. 51; 356,

892

index verborum rerumque notabilium

n. 29; ‘uniformiter’ =in the same formative manner’: 329, 51; similiter et uniformiter: Odint 185 unitas unity analyzed: 327 ff. universalis natura rei secundum se nec est universalis nec particularis: 174; universaliter: de quinque gradibus universaliter distinctorum Odint 374; and passim universale three fold meaning of ‘universal’: 162; 176 f.; the question of the universal: 203 ff.; 207 ff.; 261 ff.; 268; 309 ff.; 317 ff.; 327 ff.; 331 ff.; 340 ff.; 346; 346, n. 11 (Thomas Aquinas); 351 ff.; 390 ff.; 424 ff.; Odint 66–80; def. Odint 66; E IV 7–9; 13–15; 19–31; utrum universale sit subiectum in libro Porphirii: E III, q. 4, capp. 1– 20; ‘intentio universalis (genitive case)’ = ‘the intention conveyed by a universal noun: E IV 14; and passim; universale non est intelligibile: E III, q. 4, cap. 4; universale non dicitur per representationen, sed per predicationem: F 41; res et ens sunt maxime universalia: Odint 117; universale: aut ens reale, aut ens rationis: H II 3; omne universale et vere predicabile est in aliquo predicamento: F 90; universale non habet esse realiter in rerum natura preter particularia: G 14; sensus tantum cognoscit singularia, intellectus autem cognoscit singulare et universale: H I 117 f.; scientia est de universalibus abstractis et separatis a singularibus: G 25; utrum universale fiat ab intellectu: E IV; diffinitiones ‘universalis’ nichil includunt dependens ab intellectu: Odint

68–80; utrum universale sit subiectum in libro Porphirii: E III, q. 4, capp. 1–20; universale potest considerari dupliciter: E III, q. 4, cap. 8; universale in potentia vs. in actu: E IV 31; universale secundum quod est universale, non est extra animam: E III, q. 4, cap. 15; quando universale sumitur pro intentione in concreto: E IV 11– 13; aliquis non habet applicare universale ad particulare nisi cognoscat utrumque: E III, q. 2, cap. 14; — universal being: 107– 110; 203–205; 207–218; 261–263; 312 f.; 317 f.; 326–332; 335–346; 347, n. 14; the universal is an intention: 173–177; see also s.vv. particularis, universalitas universalitas universalitas est conditio secundum quam sensus ut potentia respicit obiectum suum primarium: Odint 94 ff.; 197; 230; cf. E I 29; universality as the intellective state of a thing grasped (Hervaeus): 175; universale erit figmentum: E III, q. 4, cap. 17; Girald’s unAristotelian view of universality: 331 f.; conceptus universalitatis fundatur super conceptum animalitatis: F 51; cf. G 20; intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus: Odint 99; intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus: E IV 1; 6; 8.5, n. 563; intentio universalitatis non est purum figmentum: 179; ad hoc quod aliquid possit intelligi, necessario exigitur quod habeat conditionem universalitatis: Odint 98; universalitates individuales et universalitates generum et specierum sunt ex natura

index verborum rerumque notabilium rei: Odint 105; see also s.v. particularitas univocatio de univocatione: Odint 332–374; A 31; duplex est univocatio, una generum et specierum, altera transcendentium: Odint 369; de univocatione transcendentium: Odint 369 univocus utrum aliqua intentio transcendens sit communis univoce ad intentiones diversorum predicamentorum: Odint 332–374 unus ens et unum assequuntur omnes cathegorias: Odint 372; ratio per se una: Odint 443; unus realiter (opp. secundum rationem): H II 6; — unum numero dicitur multipliciter: E III, q. 4, cap. 15; E IV 1–31 usus impositio (opp. usus) vocis: Odint 218–220; cum vox significativa sit signum ad placitum impositum et signum quo aliquis potest uti, ipsa vox potest respicere et impositionem et usum: Odint 218 Vagus Individuum vagum (opp. signatum), see s.v. individuum velle velle permissive: Odint 405; res volita: H I 8; esse volitum, see s.v. esse verbum verbum as ‘significative word’: 33, n. 36; verbum interius, verbum mentale (‘inner word’): 70–74; 101 f.; 114 ff.; 119 f.; G 2: H I 6; 2.5; 3.42; 4.11 and n. 233; 4.12, n. 240; accipiendo ‘verbum’ pro conceptu obiectivo: F 97; 101 veritas entitas, veritas, bonitas: A 20;

893

omne signum habet illud pro primo significato per conformitatem ad quod habet veritatem et est verum signum, et per difformitatem ad quod habet falsitatem et est falsum signum: Odint 222; maior per naturam contradictionis habet certissimam veritatem: Odint 338; veritas et falsitas propositionum: Odint 383 verus oratio vera: Odint 222; logica in communi est de oratione indagativa veri: F 115; signum verum: Odint 222; verum est intentio quedam in mente existens: 76; quedam oratio sententiat de vero ex delectabilibus et figmentis: F 115; poeta intendit orationem ut delectabile, sive ex veris sive ex figmentis procedat: F 115 via de viis probandi: Odint 258–265 vice loco et vice obiecti: G 12; cf. F 47 videre sicut esse intellectum est esse rationis, sic esse visum est esse rationis: Odint 185 virtus virtus custoditiva: Odint 5 vis vis aestimativa: 23, n. 11; 43 visio esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio et apparitio obiectiva: F 50 visus color est primum obiectum visus: Odint 97; figura est secundarium obiectum visus: Odint 224 volitus esse volitum, see svv. esse, velle voluntarius artificiatum et voluntarium est idem: F 105

894

index verborum rerumque notabilium

vox ad vocem, non ad rem disputare: Odint 44; 46; impositio (opp. usus) vocis: Odint 218–220; vox significativa, opp. res significata: Odint 205; voces non significant conceptus, sed res: 197, n. 16; vox significativa est intentio rei significate per hoc quod largitur ei esse signifivatum: Odint 26; cum omnis vox significativa seu dictio exerceat significationem, sunt tamen … [follow diverse exercitia]: Odint 205–210; cum vox significativa sit signum ad placitum impositum et signum quo aliquis potest uti, ipsa vox potest respicere et impositionem et usum: Odint 218; omnis vox articulata vel significat habitualiter, puta vox nondum ad significandum imposita, vel significat habitualiter (puta vox iam imposita), non tamen actualiter imposita: Odint 207; omnis vox incomplexa significans conceptum aliquem positivum est vere inpredicamento: F 95; vox significativa est intentio rei significate per hoc quod largitur ei esse significatum: Odint 26; de obiecto et significato primo vocis significative: Odint 217–225; magis sunt nobis note voces hominum quam conceptus eorum: Odint 226; Philosophus cum dicit quod ‘est’ multipliciter dicitur, non intelligit de multiplicitate significatorum sub eadem voce, sed de multiplicitate suppositorum sub eodem significato: Odint 369

Will self-determination of the human free will: 347, n. 14 word ‘inner word’: dicere as the formation of the inner w; word: 101; see also s.v. verbum Ydea perfectiones ydearum: Odint 380; see also s.v. idea ydemptitas de modo et propter quid huius nominis ‘ydemptitas’: Odint 256 f.; 266–277 ydioma duo ydiomata idem significantia: 225 ydolum ydolum representativum: Odint 6 ymaginari (opinari): 190; passim debes ymaginari: H II 8; F 93 ymaginatio (opinio) falsitas ymaginationis sue [Hervaei]: Odint 190; and passim; ymaginatio singularis (‘peculiar view’): Odint 192 ymago ymagines hominum possunt dici intentiones ymaginatorum: Odint 4; ymago que apparet in speculo: F 50 ypostasis Greci confitentur tres ypostases tres substantias: F 7; Augustinus accipit ‘substantiam’ pro ‘ypostasi’ vel ‘supposito’: D 23 yrcocervus: Odint 352; F 100; H I 31–34 see also s.v. hircocervus yris colores yridis: F 50.

STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS 3. Koch, J. (Hrsg.). Humanismus, Mystik und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters. 2nd. impr. 1959. reprint under consideration 4. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate. Ad fidem codicis autographi nec non ceterorum codicum manuscriptorum recensuit B. Decker. Repr. 1965. ISBN 90 04 02173 6 5. Koch, J. (Hrsg.). Artes liberales. Von der antiken Bildung zur Wissenschaft des Mittelalters. Repr. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04738 7 6. Meuthen, E. Kirche und Heilsgeschichte bei Gerhoh von Reichersberg.1959. ISBN 90 04 02174 4 7. Nothdurft, K.-D. Studien zum Einfluss Senecas auf die Philosophie und Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts. 1963. ISBN 90 04 02175 2 9. Zimmermann, A. (Hrsg.). Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250-1350. Band I. 1971. ISBN 90 04 02177 9 10. McCarthy, J. M. Humanistic Emphases in the Educational Thought of Vincent of Beauvais. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04375 6 11. William of Doncaster. Explicatio Aphorismatum Philosophicorum. Edited with Annota-tions by O. Weijers. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04403 5 12. Pseudo-Boèce. De Disciplina Scolarium. Édition critique, introduction et notes par O. Weijers. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04768 9 13. Jacobi, K. Die Modalbegriffe in den logischen Schriften des Wilhelm von Shyreswood und in anderen Kompendien des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts. Funktionsbestimmung und Gebrauch in der logischen Analyse. 1980. ISBN 90 04 06048 0 14. Weijers, O. (Éd.). Les questions de Craton et leurs commentaires. Édition critique. 1981. ISBN 90 04 06340 4 15. Hermann of Carinthia. De Essentiis. A Critical Edition with Translation and Commentary by Ch. Burnett. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06534 2 17. John of Salisbury. Entheticus Maior and Minor. Edited by J. van Laarhoven. 1987. 3 vols. 1. Introduction, Texts, Translations; 2. Commentaries and Notes; 3. Bibliography, Dutch Translations, Indexes. 1987. ISBN 90 04 07811 8 18. Richard Brinkley. Theory of Sentential Reference. Edited and Translated with Introduction and Notes by M. J. Fitzgerald. 1987. ISBN 90 04 08430 4 19. Alfred of Sareshel. Commentary on the Metheora of Aristotle. Critical Edition, Introduction and Notes by J. K. Otte. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08453 3 20. Roger Bacon. Compendium of the Study of Theology. Edition and Translation with Introduction and Notes by T. S. Maloney. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08510 6 21. Aertsen, J. A. Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08451 7 22. Tachau, K. H. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08552 1 23. Frakes, J. C. The Fate of Fortune in the Early Middle Ages. The Boethian Tradition. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08544 0 24. Muralt, A. de. L’Enjeu de la Philosophie Médiévale. Études thomistes, scotistes, occamiennes et grégoriennes. Repr. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09254 4

25. Livesey, S. J. Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century. Three Questions on the Unity and Subalternation of the Sciences from John of Reading’s Commentary on the Sentences. Introduction and Critical Edition. 1989. ISBN 90 04 09023 1 26. Elders, L. J. The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09156 4 27. Wissink, J. B. (Ed.). The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09183 1 28. Schneider, N. Die Kosmologie des Franciscus de Marchia. Texte, Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09280 3 29. Langholm, O. Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09422 9 30. Rijk, L. M. de. Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis): Syncategoreumata. First Critical Edition with an Introduction and Indexes. With an English Translation by Joke Spruyt. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09434 2 31. Resnick, I. M. Divine Power and Possibility in St. Peter Damian’s De Divina Omni-potentia. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09572 1 32. O’Rourke, F. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09466 0 33. Hall, D. C. The Trinity. An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Expositio of the De Trinitate of Boethius. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09631 0 34. Elders, L. J. The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09645 0 35. Westra, H. J. (Ed.). From Athens to Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09649 3 36. Schulz, G. Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei. Untersuchungen zur Wahrheitslehre des Thomas von Aquin und zur Kritik Kants an einem überlieferten Wahrheitsbegriff. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09655 8 37. Kann, Ch. Die Eigenschaften der Termini. Eine Untersuchung zur Perutilis logica Alberts von Sachsen. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09619 1 38. Jacobi, K. (Hrsg.). Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09822 4 39. Butterworth, C. E., and B. A. Kessel (Eds.). The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09842 9 40. Kaufmann, M. Begriffe, Sätze, Dinge. Referenz und Wahrheit bei Wilhelm von Ockham. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09889 5 41. Hülsen, C. R. Zur Semantik anaphorischer Pronomina. Untersuchungen scholastischer und moderner Theorien. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09832 1 42. Rijk, L. M. de (Ed. & Tr.). Nicholas of Autrecourt. His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo. A Critical Edition from the Two Parisian Manuscripts with an Introduction, English Translation, Explanatory Notes and Indexes. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09988 3 43. Schönberger, R. Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09854 2 44. Saarinen, R. Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought. From Augustine to Buridan. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09994 8 45. Speer, A. Die entdeckte Natur. Untersuchungen zu Begründungsversuchen einer „scientia naturalis“ im 12. Jahrhundert. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10345 7 46. Te Velde, R. A. Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10381 3 47. Tuninetti, L. F. „Per Se Notum“. Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbstverständlichen im Denken des Thomas von Aquin. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10368 6 48. Hoenen, M.J.F.M. und De Libera, A. (Hrsg.). Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10439 9 49. Bäck, A. On Reduplication. Logical Theories of Qualification.1996. ISBN 90 04 10539 5

50. Etzkorn, G. J. Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum. A Description of Some One Hundred Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus Collection. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10561 1 51. Sylwanowicz, M. Contingent Causality and the Foundations of Duns Scotus’ Metaphysics. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10535 2 52. Aertsen, J.A. Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10585 9 53. Honnefelder, L., R. Wood, M. Dreyer (Eds.). John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10357 0 54. Holopainen, T. J. Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10577 8 55. Synan, E.A. (Ed.). Questions on the De Anima of Aristotle by Magister Adam Burley and Dominus Walter Burley 1997. ISBN 90 04 10655 3 56. Schupp, F. (Hrsg.). Abbo von Fleury: De syllogismis hypotheticis. Textkritisch herausgegeben, übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10748 7 57. Hackett, J. (Ed.). Roger Bacon and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10015 6 58. Hoenen, M.J.F.M. and Nauta, L. (Eds.). Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Vernacular Traditions of the Consolatio philosophiae. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10831 9 59. Goris, W. Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel. Versuch über die Einheitsmetaphysik des Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10905 6 60. Rijk, L.M. de (Ed.). Giraldus Odonis O.F.M.: Opera Philosophica. Vol. 1.: Logica. Critical Edition from the Manuscripts. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10950 1 61. Kapriev, G. …ipsa vita et veritas. Der “ontologische Gottesbeweis” und die Ideenwelt Anselms von Canterbury. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11097 6 62. Hentschel, F. (Hrsg.). Musik – und die Geschichte der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften im Mittelalter. Fragen zur Wechselwirkung von ‘musica’ und ‘philosophia’ im Mittelalter. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11093 3 63. Evans, G.R. Getting it wrong. The Medieval Epistemology of Error. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11240 5 64. Enders, M. Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit bei Anselm von Canterbury im Gesamtzusammenhang seines Denkens und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Antiken Quellen (Aristoteles, Cicero, Augustinus, Boethius). 1999. ISBN 90 04 11264 2 65. Park, S.C. Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11272 3 66. Tellkamp, J.A. Sinne, Gegenstände und Sensibilia. Zur Wahrnehmungslehre des Thomas von Aquin. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11410 6 67. Davenport, A.A. Measure of a Different Greatness. The Intensive Infinite, 1250-1650. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11481 5 68. Kaldellis, A. The Argument of Psellos’ Chronographia. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11494 7 69. Reynolds, P.L. Food and the Body. Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11532 3 70. Lagerlund, H. Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11626 5 71. Köhler, T.W. Grundlagen des philosophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses im dreizehnten Jahrhundert. Die Erkenntnisbemühung um den Menschen im zeitgenössischen Verständnis. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11623 0 72. Trifogli, C. Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 1250-1270). Motion, Infinity, Place and Time. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11657 5 73. Koyama, C. (Ed.) Nature in Medieval Thought. Some Approaches East and West. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11966 3 74. Spruyt, J. (Ed.) Matthew of Orléans: Sophistaria sive Summa communium distinctionum circa sophismata accidentium. Edited with an introduction, notes and indices. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11897 7

75. Porro, P. (Ed.) The Medieval Concept of Time. The Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12207 9 76. Perler, D. (Ed.) Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12295 8 77. Pini, G. Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12329 6 78. Senger, H. Ludus Sapientiae. Studien zum Werk und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12081 5 79. Fitzgerald, M.J. Albert of Saxony’s Twenty-five Disputed Questions on Logic. A Critical Edition of his Quaestiones circa Logicam. 2002. ISBN 90 04 125132 80. Darge, R. Suárez’ Transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13708 4 81. Gelber, H.G. It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300-1350. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13907 9 82. Bos, E.P. Logica modernorum in Prague about 1400. The Sophistria disputation ‘Quoniam quatuor’ (MS Cracow, Jagiellonian Library 686, ff. 1ra-79rb), With a Partial Reconstruction of Thomas of Cleve’s Logica. Edition with an Introduction and Appendices. 2004. ISBN 90 04 14009 3 83. Gottschall, D. Konrad von Megenbergs Buch von den natürlichen Dingen. Ein Dokument deutschsprachiger Albertus Magnus-Rezeption im 14. Jahrhundert. 2004. ISBN 90 04 14015 8 84. Perler, D. and Rudolph, U. (Eds.). Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter. 2005. ISBN 90 04 11118 2 85. Bezner, F. Vela Veritatis. Hermeneutik, Wissen und Sprache in der Intellectual History des 12. Jahrhunderts. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14424 2 86. De Rijk, L.M. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M.: Opera Philosophica. Vol. II: De Intentionibus. Critical edition with a study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350. 2005. ISBN 90 04 11117 4