Functional Constraints In Grammar: On The Unergative-unaccusative Distinction (Constructional Approaches to Language)

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Author: Susumu Kuno | Takami Ken-ichi | Kenichi Takami

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Functional Constraints in Grammar

Constructional Approaches to Language The series brings together research conducted within different constructional models and makes them available to scholars and students working in this and other, related fields. The topics will range from descriptions of grammatical phenomena in different languages to theoretical issues concerning language acquisition, language change, and language use. The foundation of constructional research is provided by the model known as Construction Grammar (including Frame Semantics). The book series will publish studies in which this model is developed in new directions and extended through alternative approaches. Such approaches include cognitive linguistics, conceptual semantics, interaction and discourse, as well as typologically motivated alternatives, with implications both for constructional theories and for their applications in related fields such as communication studies, computational linguistics, AI, neurology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. This peer reviewed series is committed to innovative research and will include monographs, thematic collections of articles, and introductory textbooks.

Editors Mirjam Fried

Jan-Ola Östman

Department of Slavic Language & Literature, Princeton University, USA

Department of Scandinavian Language & Literature, University of Helsinki, Finland

Advisory Board Peter Auer University of Freiburg, Germany

Seizi Iwata Osaka City University, Japan

Hans C. Boas University of Texas at Austin, USA

Paul Kay University of California, Berkeley, USA

William Croft University of Manchester, UK

Knud Lambrecht University of Texas at Austin, USA

Charles J. Fillmore Int. Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, USA

Michael Tomasello Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany

Adele Goldberg University of Illinois, USA

Arnold M. Zwicky Stanford University, USA

Volume 1 Functional Constraints in Grammar: On the unergative–unaccusative distinction by Susumu Kuno and Ken-ichi Takami

Functional Constraints in Grammar On the unergative–unaccusative distinction

Susumu Kuno Harvard University

Ken-ichi Takami Tokyo Metropolitan University

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia

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TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kuno, Susumu, 1933Functional constraints in grammar : on the unergative–unaccusative distinction / Susumu Kuno, Ken-ichi Takami. p. cm. (Constructional Approaches to Language, issn 1573-594X ; v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 1. Grammar, Comparative and general--Syntax. 2. Functionalism (Linguistics). 3. Generative grammar. I. Takami, Ken’ichi, 1952- II. Title. III. Series. P291.K859 2004 415-dc22 isbn 90 272 1821 8 (Eur.) / 1 58811 555 0 (US) (Hb; alk. paper)

2004055096

© 2004 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

Table of contents

Acknowledgement Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 What is ergativity/accusativity?2 1.2 Unergative and unaccusative verbs9 1.3 Unaccusative Hypothesis18 1.4 About this book22 1.5 Construction Grammar25 Chapter 2 The there-construction and unaccusativity 2.1 Introduction31 2.2 Generative Grammar account33 2.3 Problems with the Unaccusative Restriction39 2.4 Functional account of the there-construction44 2.4.1 Functional Constraint on the there-construction44 2.4.2 Spectator role of the speaker51 2.5 Derivation of there-sentences58 2.6 Conclusion64 Chapter 3 The way construction and unergativity 3.1 Introduction67 3.2 Generative Grammar account69 3.3 Problems with the Unergative Restriction73 3.4 A functional account of the way construction78 3.5 Other accounts of the way construction95 3.5.1 Jackendoff’s (1990) Conceptual Semantics95 3.5.2 Goldberg’s (1995) Construction Grammar98 3.6 Conclusion103

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vi

Table of contents

Chapter 4 The cognate object construction and unergativity 4.1 Introduction105 4.2 Generative Grammar account107 4.3 Problems with the Unergative Restriction111 4.4 A functional account of the cognate object construction117 4.4.1 Non-cognate ‘cognate’ objects118 4.4.2 Cognate objects as ‘resultant objects’118 4.5 Passive sentences involving cognate objects127 4.6 Some syntactic properties of cognate objects130 4.7 Conclusion134 Chapter 5 The pseudo-passive construction and unergativity 5.1 Introduction137 5.2 Unergative restriction on the pseudo-passive construction138 5.3 Perlmutter and Postal’s (1984) account of the Unergative Restriction142 5.4 Problems with the Unergative Restriction145 5.5 A functional account of pseudo-passive sentences147 5.5.1 Characterization148 5.5.2 Topicalization154 5.5.3 Involvement156 5.5.4 Further examples164 5.6 Conclusion168 Chapter 6 Extraposition from subject NPs and unaccusativity 6.1 Introduction169 6.2 Johnson’s (1985) analysis170 6.3 Problems with Johnson’s analysis174 6.4 An alternative functional account176 6.5 Extraposition of clauses from the subject NP183 6.6 Conclusion187

105

137

169

Table of contents

Chapter 7 Conclusion 7.1 Summary189 7.2 Functional factors that interact with syntax192 7.3 Concluding remarks194

189

Notes

199

References

225

Name index

235

Subject index

239

vii

Acknowledgement

This book examines in detail the following five English constructions, and elucidates the syntactic, semantic, and functional requirements that the constructions must satisfy in order to be appropriately used: the There-Construction, the (One’s) Way Construction, the Cognate Object Construction, the Pseudo-Passive Construction, and the Extraposition-from-Subject-NP Construction. It shows that syntactic claims based on the unergative–unaccusative distinction of intransitive verbs that have been made by other scholars about these constructions do not hold. It further shows that for each construction, acceptability status is determined by a given sentence’s semantic function as it interacts with syntactic constraints, and with functional constraints that apply to it in its discourse context. In the course of our writing of this book, we have benefited greatly from help that we have received from numerous scholars. Among them, two require special mention. Karen Courtenay and Nan Decker have given us their acceptability judgments on many of the crucial examples throughout this book, and provided us with examples of their own that enhanced our generalizations. They have read earlier versions of most of the chapters in the book and have given us innumerable invaluable comments. We have coauthored “The Way Construction and Unergativity”, which constitutes Chapter 3 of this book. We are also deeply appreciative of comments we have received on various parts of the manuscript at various stages from Dan Parmenter, Bruce Davison, Seiji Naito, Heizo Nakajima, Ken-ichi Mihara, William Philip, Grace Moon, Kozo Kato, Kazushi Takebayashi, and Shugo Hotta. We want to express our special thanks to So-One Hwang for the copy editing of our manuscript and for the computer plotting of the diagrams and phrase-structure representations in this book. We also want to thank the editors of this book, Jan-Ola Östman and Mirjam Fried, and an anonymous reviewer of the manuscript, for their numerous and invaluable comments and suggestions.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This book examines the following five English constructions and attempts to make clear the syntactic, semantic, and functional requirements that the constructions must satisfy in order to be appropriately used: (1) a.

There-Construction: ex. There once lived a king who had no ears. b. (One’s) Way Construction: ex. Mary danced her way through the park. c. Cognate Object Construction: ex. Mary laughed a sad laugh at the meeting. d. Pseudo-Passive Construction: ex. That bed was slept in by Napoleon. e. Extraposition from Subject NPs: ex. [A man with blond hair] appeared. (underlying sentence) [A man] appeared [with blond hair]. (extraposed sentence)

It has been argued in many studies for the last two decades that the acceptability of the above five constructions can be accounted for by distinguishing two types of intransitive verbs — ‘unergative’ and ‘unaccusative’ — and by assuming that each of the above constructions selects only unergative or unaccusative verbs, and not both. In this book, however, we will show that such arguments are based on an extremely limited set of data and are readily counter-evidenced when a full range of sentences is taken into consideration, and that therefore it is not possible to maintain them. We will show that the acceptability of these constructions is not dependent upon whether the verbs involved are unergative or unaccusative, but is determined by the independent semantic function that each construction carries with it — that is, by the interaction of the semantics of the verb and the other elements in each construction, coupled with a number of discourse factors. Before we start examining each of the constructions given in (1a–e), we will briefly explain in Section 1.1 of this introductory chapter the historical background of the concept of ‘ergative/accusative case’, from which the terms

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‘unergative’ and ‘unaccusative’ are taken. In Section 1.2, we will outline how unergative and unaccusative verbs have been semantically distinguished in the recent literature, and in Section 1.3 we will review the Unaccusative Hypothesis, which attempts to distinguish unaccusative from unergative verbs syntactically. Then in Section 1.4 we will outline the content of each of the ensuing chapters. In this book we use the term ‘construction’ as a non-technical term, meaning simply a ‘syntactic pattern’. This has been the standard usage of the term in syntactic theories such as Chomskian Generative Grammar and Relational Grammar, but in the framework of Construction Grammar (or Grammatical Construction Theory), the term ‘construction’ has a theoretical status as the basic unit of analysis and representation (see Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988), Fillmore (1989), Goldberg (1992, 1995), Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996), Kay and Fillmore (1999) and Kay (2002), among others). In Section 1.5 of this chapter, therefore, we will briefly examine the basic assumptions of Construction Grammar, and will make clear the differences and similarities between Construction Grammarians’ analytical framework and ours.

1.1 What is ergativity/accusativity? Verbs are commonly divided into intransitive verbs, which do not take objects, and transitive verbs, which do take them, as shown in the following: (2) a. She laughed. b. He swam in the river. (3) a. They discussed it. b. He hit her.

Verbs are generally specified in the lexicon as to whether they are intransitive or transitive. Laugh and swim in (2a,b) are intransitive verbs, while discuss and hit in (3a,b) are transitive verbs. There are some verbs, however, that can be used as either intransitive or transitive, as shown in the following: (4) a. The door opened. b. John opened the door. (5) a. The cup broke. b. The boy broke the cup.

Introduction

(6) a. The stone rolled. b. Jack rolled the stone. (7) a. The car stopped. b. The driver stopped the car.

Open, break, roll, and stop in (4)–(7) are used as intransitive verbs in the (a) examples, and as transitive verbs in the (b) examples. These verbs have in common the semantic property of representing motion or change. In the intransitive (a) sentences, the ‘theme’ argument (in the sense of a semantic role or θ-role) that undergoes motion or change takes the subject position, while in the transitive (b) sentences it takes the object position, and the ‘agent’ argument that causes such motion or change takes the subject position. In (4), for example, the door is the subject in (4a), and the object in (4b), but since it is the theme argument that undergoes the motion or change of being opened, there is no difference in the semantic relation between the door and the verb open in the two sentences. In his A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles, Part III, 16.4, Jespersen (1927) calls this type of verb the ‘move and changeclass’. Besides open, break, roll, and stop in (4)–(7), there are many other verbs of this type, such as begin, boil, burn, change, close, drop, dry, end, freeze, melt, shake, slip, start, tear, and turn. Fillmore (1968), paying particular attention to this constancy of the semantic relation, has argued that it is not the case that the verb open, for example, has two different lexical entries, the intransitive open and the transitive open; rather, there is only a single lexical entry, open, with the following case property, and it can occur as either an intransitive or a transitive verb: (8) open:

+ [___ O (A) (I)]

O, A, and I in (8) stand for Objective case, Agentive case, and Instrumental case, respectively, and the appearances of A and I are optional, as shown by the parentheses. Therefore, open takes Objective case (O) obligatorily and Agentive case (A) and Instrumental case (I) optionally in its underlying structure. When neither A nor I appears in the underlying structure, O moves to the subject position, thereby producing the intransitive sentence pattern in (4a) (= The door opened.). On the other hand, when A and O appear in the underlying structure, A moves to the subject position and O takes the object position, thereby producing the transitive sentence pattern in (4b) (= John opened the door.) (for details of these underlying structures and movements, see Fillmore (1968: 27–38)). (When I appears as well, a sentence such as John opened the door

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with a key derives.) This analysis by Fillmore based on his Case Grammar was the first attempt to capture in the theory of grammar the common semantic element (i.e., the theme argument undergoing motion or change) that the (a) and (b) examples of (4)–(7) have as the common structural element (i.e., Objective case moving to the subject position when neither A nor I appears). A verb of the type illustrated in (4)–(7), which displays the same semantic relationship between the subject and its intransitive version and the direct object and its transitive version, has often been referred to as an ‘ergative’ verb in the literature. This term derives from the ‘ergative’ case in ergative languages. In English (and in many other languages such as German, French, Latin, and Japanese), the subject is marked with nominative case, irrespective of whether the sentence is intransitive or transitive, and the object is marked with accusative case. Note that the subjects in (2a,b) and (3a,b) are the nominative she, he, and they and the objects in (3a,b) are the accusative it and her. Although in English only pronouns have different morphological forms depending on their cases, even ordinary noun phrases are assumed to have different cases depending on their positions in the sentences. For example, the subjects the door and John in (4a,b) are both nominative, while the object the door in (4b) is accusative, as shown in (9a,b): (9) a.

[The door] opened. (= (4a)) nominative b. [John] opened [the door]. (= (4b)) nominative accusative

Thus, in English and many other languages, the case of the subject in intransitive and transitive sentences is nominative, while the object in transitive sentences is distinguished by a different case (i.e., accusative); hence these languages are called accusative or nominative-accusative languages. There are languages in the world, however, in which the subjects of intransitive verbs and the objects of transitive verbs are marked with the same case, which is different from the case used to mark the subjects of transitive verbs. The case used to mark the subjects of intransitive verbs and the objects of transitive verbs is called the ‘absolutive’, while the case used to mark the subjects of transitive verbs is called the ‘ergative’. These languages are therefore called ergative or ergative-absolutive languages. To this type of language belong, for example, various Australian aboriginal languages, various Caucasian languages, Basque (a language spoken on both sides of the border between France and Spain), various American Indian languages (including Eskimo and Chukchi (a language spoken in East

Introduction

Siberia)), and various Polynesian languages. Let us give here two examples of such languages: ((10a,b), cited from Tsunoda (1991: 32), are examples of Warrungu, a language spoken in Queensland, Australia; (11a,b), cited from Shibatani, Kageyama, and Tamori (1982: 239), are examples of Basque): (10) a.

pama-Ø nyina-n. man-absolutive sit-past/present ‘A man sat.’ b. pama-ngku kantu-Ø palka-n. man-ergative dog-absolutive kill-past/present ‘A man kills/killed a dog.’

(11) a.

Aita-Ø ethorri du. father-absolutive came ‘My father came.’ b. Ni-k aita-Ø maite dut. I-ergative father-absolutive love ‘I love my father.’

These two types of languages can be summarized as in the following (see Comrie (1978) and Tsunoda (1984, 1991) for details): (12) a.

accusative languages

b. ergative languages intransitive subject

intransitive subject

transitive subject transitive object

nominative

transitive subject

transitive object

ergative

absolutive

accusative

In connection with these case distinctions, Sapir pointed out in 1917 that various languages of North American Indians have the following three basic patterns with respect to the cases of subjects and objects: (13)

type

1 2 3

transitive object A A A

intransitive subject inactive

active A

A

B B

transitive subject

language example

B B B

Chinook Dakota Takelma

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Type 3 in (13) represents languages in which intransitive and transitive subjects, just like those in English, are marked with the same case (i.e., the case called ‘nominative’ in the grammar of Indo-European languages), while transitive objects are marked with a different case (i.e., the case called ‘accusative’ in the grammar of Indo-European languages). This type of language, as mentioned above, was later called an accusative language (see (12a)). Next, type 2 in (13) represents languages in which active (i.e., agentive/volitional) intransitive subjects and transitive subjects are marked with the same case, while transitive objects and inactive (i.e., nonagentive/nonvolitional) intransitive subjects are marked with a different case. As examples of this type of language, not only Dakota but also Caucasian languages such as Bats and American Indian languages such as Eastern Pomo have been reported (see Comrie (1978: 366–367) and Dixon (1979: 80–85)). On the assumption that transitive subjects are always agentive, while transitive objects are non-agentive, this type of language can be considered to have two cases, i.e., active/agentive and inactive/ nonagentive.1 Finally, type 1 in (13) represents languages in which transitive objects and intransitive subjects are marked with the same case (i.e., absolutive case), while transitive subjects are marked with a different case (i.e., ergative case). This type of language was later called an ergative language (see (12b)). In ergative languages, as shown in (12b), intransitive subjects and transitive objects behave in the same manner, in the sense that they are marked with the same case (i.e., absolutive). This identical behavior of intransitive subjects and transitive objects has been called ‘ergativity’ (see Anderson (1968), Lyons (1968), and Fillmore (1968)). In accusative languages as shown in (12a), on the other hand, intransitive and transitive subjects behave in the same manner, in the sense that they are marked with the same case (i.e., nominative). This identical behavior of intransitive and transitive subjects has been called ‘accusativity’ (see Huddleston (1971)). Now, let us consider here why verbs that allow the intransitive-transitive alternation, such as open, break, roll, and stop in (4)–(7), have been called ergative verbs. In the English sentences given in (4)–(7), the intransitive subject position and the transitive object position, though they are case-marked differently (i.e., the former is nominative and the latter accusative), are occupied by the same element (e.g., the door in (4a,b)) — that is, the theme argument that undergoes the motion or change which the verb represents. In other words, the verbs in these sentences show ergativity in that they take the same element for the subjects of the intransitive sentences and the objects of the transitive sentences. For this reason, they are called ergative verbs. The word

Introduction

‘ergative’ derives from the Greek ‘ergat[es]’ (= ‘work[er]’), and contains the meaning of ‘cause’ or ‘bring about’, signifying that an action is performed on something. Therefore, the transitive sentence in (4b) means, strictly speaking, that John performed on the door an act of opening, and that as a result of it, the event of the opening of the door was brought about. The intransitive sentence in (4a), on the other hand, only describes the latter event. In English, not only ergative verbs such as those in (4)–(7) but also verbs that take optional objects, such as those given in the following, allow the intransitive-transitive alternation: (14) a. John sang. b. John sang a lullaby. (15) a. Mary danced. b. Mary danced a piece from Swan Lake. (16) a. We ate at one o’clock. b. We ate lunch at one o’clock.

In (14)–(16), the intransitive subject position in the (a) examples and the transitive subject position in the (b) examples are both nominative, and are occupied by the same element (e.g., John in (14a,b)), which is an agent argument performing a volitional act of singing, dancing, or eating. In other words, the verbs in these sentences show accusativity in that they take the same elements (i.e., agents) in intransitive and transitive subject positions and mark them with the same case (i.e., nominative). For this reason, they are sometimes called ‘accusative verbs’. Let us summarize here the verbs in (4)–(7) and (14)–(16) that allow the intransitive-transitive alternation: (17) Ergativity — Intransitive subjects correspond to transitive objects. a. [The door] opened. (= (4a)) Theme b. John opened [the door]. (= (4b)) Theme (18) Accusativity — Intransitive subjects correspond to transitive subjects. a. [John] sang. (= (14a)) Agent b. [John] sang a lullaby. (= (14b)) Agent

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In the case of the ergative verb open in (17), the subject position in the intransitive sentence (17a) and the object position in the transitive sentence (17b) are occupied by the same element (i.e., the door), which is a theme argument that undergoes the motion or change that the verb represents. On the other hand, in the case of the ‘accusative’ verb sing in (18), the subject positions in the intransitive and transitive sentences (18a,b) are occupied by the same element (i.e., John), which is an agent argument that volitionally performs the action that the verb represents. Now, let us note here that there are, semantically speaking, two types of intransitive verbs in English and many other Indo-European languages; one type encompasses intransitive verbs that take agents as their subjects and represent volitional actions of the agents (see (18a)), and the other includes those that take non-agents as their subjects and represent nonvolitional events of the non-agents (see (17a)). To the former type belong verbs such as sing, dance, and eat in (14)–(16) that have both intransitive and transitive uses, and to the latter belong ergative verbs such as open, break, roll, and stop in (4)–(7) whose intransitive subjects correspond to transitive objects. Ergative verbs, so called since they show ergativity, can also be called ‘unaccusative verbs’ in the sense that they do not show accusativity. Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) have called intransitive ergative verbs such as those in (4a)–(7a) unaccusative verbs. They have also classified as unaccusative those intransitive verbs that have no transitive use and take nonagents as their subjects (e.g., happen, exist, appear, occur) (we will discuss this point in detail in the following section). Then they have proposed that the subjects of these intransitive (unaccusative) verbs originate as objects and become subjects only in the surface structures of intransitive sentences (we will discuss this point in detail in Section 1.3). According to this proposal, the surface subjects of these verbs (e.g., open, break, roll, stop, happen, exist, appear, occur) are assumed to originate as accusative objects in the underlying structure, and are later turned into surface subjects that are not accusative, that is, unaccusative; hence the name ‘unaccusative verbs’. Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) have, in contrast to their unaccusative verbs described above, designated as ‘unergative verbs’ (i) intransitive verbs that take agents as their subjects (e.g., walk, work, talk, swim, skate) and (ii) those that take experiencers as their subjects (e.g., cough, sneeze, belch, sleep) (we will discuss this point in detail in the following section). They have proposed that the subjects of these verbs are subjects throughout the derivation (we will discuss this point in detail in Section 1.3). There are a great

Introduction

many intransitive verbs that take agents as their subjects. They consist of intransitive verbs such as sing, dance, and eat in (14)–(16) that can also be used transitively (sometimes called accusative verbs) and verbs such as talk, laugh, yell, moan, and swim that are generally used only intransitively. Although Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) do not say why the above intransitive verbs are called unergative verbs (they only state that they are indebted to Geoffrey Pullum (personal communication) for this term), there seem to be logical reasons for calling them unergative verbs. One reason is that intransitive verbs that can be called accusative verbs (e.g., sing, dance, eat) can also be called unergative verbs in English and other Indo-European languages in the sense that they do not show ergativity. Another is that in the case of ergative languages, the subjects of these verbs are marked with ergative case when used transitively, but when used intransitively, they are marked with absolutive case, or the case that is not ergative, i.e., unergative; hence the name ‘unergative verbs’. The above distinction between unergative and unaccusative intransitive verbs made by Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) has been applied to many languages of the world ever since the 1980s, and has been claimed to play a crucial role in accounting for a wide variety of linguistic phenomena. In the following section we will observe in more detail these two classes of intransitive verbs and some phenomena that the distinction has been assumed to account for.

1.2 Unergative and unaccusative verbs Perlmutter, who in 1978 first proposed to recognize the unergative/unaccusative distinction among intransitive verbs, was concerned with impersonal passives in Dutch and Turkish. In this study Perlmutter (1978: 162–163) provided the following list of English unergative and unaccusative verbs (and adjectives) (see also Perlmutter and Postal (1984: 98–99)): (19) Unergative Predicates a. Predicates describing willed or volitional acts: work, play, speak, talk, smile, grin, frown, grimace, think, meditate, cogitate, daydream, skate, ski, swim, hunt, bicycle, walk, skip (voluntary), jog, quarrel, fight, wrestle, box, agree, disagree, knock, bang, hammer, pray, weep, cry, kneel, bow, curtsey, genuflect, cheat, lie (tell a falsehood), study, whistle (voluntary), laugh, dance, crawl, etc.

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This category includes (i) manner-of-speaking verbs, such as whisper, shout, mumble, grumble, growl, bellow, etc. and (ii) predicates describing sounds made by animals, such as bark, neigh, whinny, quack, roar (voluntary), chirp, oink, meow, etc. b. Certain involuntary bodily processes: cough, sneeze, hiccough, belch, burp, vomit, defecate, urinate, sleep, cry, breathe, etc. (20) Unaccusative Predicates a. Predicates expressed by adjectives in English: This is a very large class, including predicates describing sizes, shapes, weights, colors, smells, states of mind, etc. b. Predicates whose subjects are semantically Patient: burn, fall, drop, sink, float, slide, slip, glide, soar, flow, ooze, seep, trickle, drip, gush, hang, dangle, sway, wave, tremble, shake, languish, flourish, thrive, drown, stumble, trip, roll, succumb, dry, blow away, boil, seethe, lie (involuntary), sit (involuntary), bend (involuntary), etc. This category includes the class of ‘inchoatives’, including melt, freeze, evaporate, vaporize, solidify, crystallize, dim, brighten, redden, darken, yellow, rot, decompose, germinate, sprout, bud, wilt, wither, increase, decrease, reduce, grow, collapse, dissolve, disintegrate, die, perish, choke, suffocate, blush, open, close, break, shatter, crumble, crack, split, burst, explode, burn up, burn down, dry up, dry out, scatter, disperse, fill, vanish, disappear, etc. c. Predicates of existing and happening: exist, happen, transpire, occur, take place, and various inchoatives such as arise, ensue, result, show up, end up, turn up, pop up, vanish, disappear, etc. d. Involuntary emission of stimuli that impinge on the senses (light, noise, smell, etc.): shine, sparkle, glitter, glisten, glow, jingle, clink, clang, snap (involuntary), crackle, pop, smell, stink, etc. e. Aspectual predicates: begin, start, stop, cease, continue, end, etc. f. Duratives: last, remain, stay, survive, etc. (Perhaps these should be considered a subclass of group (c) above.)

As is clear from the above list, unergative verbs are those that represent volitional acts of their subject referents and those that represent involuntary bodily processes of humans. In the former case the semantic role of the subjects is an agent, and in the latter it is an experiencer. On the other hand, unaccusative verbs are mainly those that represent nonvolitional events of the subject referents and express changes of state/location of these referents. The semantic role of such subjects is a theme/patient. Hence, even the same verb can be

Introduction

interpreted differently; it is an unergative verb when it represents a volitional act of the subject referent, as in the (a) examples below, while it is an unaccusative verb when it represents a nonvolitional act of the subject referent, as in the following (b) examples (the examples are from Perlmutter (1978: 163–164)): (21) a. Joe slid into third base. (volitional — unergative) b. The wheels slid on the ice. (nonvolitional — unaccusative) (22) a. The children stood on this table. (volitional — unergative) b. The figurine stood on this table. (nonvolitional — unaccusative) (23) a. Henry suddenly jumped over the fence. (volitional — unergative) b. The unemployment rate suddenly jumped in July. (nonvolitional — unaccusative)

Roughly speaking, unergative verbs can be construed as so-called ‘do-type’ expressions (see Ikegami (1981)), since they take humans or animals as their subjects, and since they describe volitional acts of their subject referents. On the other hand, unaccusative verbs can be construed as so-called ‘become-type’ expressions, since they mostly take inanimates as their subjects, and since they describe changes of state of their subject referents.2,3 Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984), as observed above, have made a semantic distinction between unergative and unaccusative verbs on the basis of the differences in the semantic roles of their subjects. However, their analytical framework is a syntactic one called Relational Grammar, and their main claim is that while the subjects of unergative verbs (whose semantic role is either agent or experiencer) are subjects in both underlying and surface structures, those of unaccusative verbs (whose semantic role is theme/patient) are underlying direct objects (we will discuss this point in more detail in the following section). It should be noted here that in the syntactic framework of Relational Grammar (or of Generative Grammar) this syntactic distinction has priority over the semantic one described above. We must hasten to add here that the above semantic classification of intransitive verbs based on the semantic roles of their subjects has been implicitly or explicitly adopted even in highly theoretical syntactic frameworks. For example, Burzio (1981, 1986), working in the framework of Generative Grammar, states that while an agent is associated with the subject NP, a theme/ patient is most commonly associated with the object NP; therefore, a theme subject originates in the object position and is moved to the subject position (for a similar point, see Miyagawa (1989a: 42), Tsujimura (1996: Chapter 5, Section 10; Chapter 6, Section 5) and many others). In other words, in Generative

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Grammar (and Relational Grammar), the structures of subjects are determined on the basis of the differences in their semantic roles, and in this respect it seems clear that the semantic classification of intransitive verbs given in (19) and (20) has played a very important role even in syntactic analyses of intransitive verbs in Chomskian theory. Now, Perlmutter (1978), on the assumption that the distinction between unergative and unaccusative verbs in English given in (19) and (20) applies more or less as it does to verbs in other languages, claims that Dutch and Turkish impersonal passives allow only unergative verbs, and they do not allow unaccusative verbs. Let us observe here the following Dutch impersonal passives involving unergative verbs, taken from Perlmutter (1978: 168): (24) a.

Er wordt hier door de jonge lui veel gedanst. ‘It is danced here a lot by the young people.’ b. Over dit problem wordt er vaak gesproken / gepraat / gedacht. ‘About this problem it is often spoken / talked / thought.’ c. Er wordt in deze kamer vaak geslapen. ‘It is often slept in this room.’

Sentences (24a–c) are all acceptable. According to Perlmutter, however, the following (b) examples, impersonal passives involving unaccusative verbs, are all unacceptable (the examples are from Perlmutter (1978: 169–170)): (25) a.

De lijken zijn al gerot / ontbonden. ‘The corpses have already rotted / decomposed.’ b. *Door de lijken werd al gerot / ontbonden.

(26) a.

Het water sijpelde / drippelde uit de rots. ‘The water seeped / dripped out of the rock.’ b. *Er werd door het water uit de rots gesijpeld / gedrippeld.

(27) a.

Dat blok hout heeft goed gebrand. ‘That block of wood burned well.’ b. *Er werd door dat blok hout goed gebrand.

In dit ziekenhuis sterven de patienten dikwijls. ‘In this hospital the patients often die.’ b. *In dit ziekenhuis wordt (er) door de patienten dikwijls gestorven.

(28) a.

(29) a.

Zulke dingen zijn hier nooit gebeurd. ‘Such things have never happened here.’ b. *Hier werd er door zulke dingen nooit gebeurd.

Introduction

Thus, according to Perlmutter, the distinction between unergative and unaccusative intransitive verbs can capture the acceptability of impersonal passives and is therefore empirically motivated.4 Ever since Perlmutter (1978), a large number of researchers have argued that the unergative–unaccusative distinction plays a crucial role in accounting for various phenomena in various languages. For instance, Burzio (1981, 1986) has claimed that the distinction is reflected in the selection of auxiliary verbs in Italian; unergative verbs select avere ‘have’, while unaccusative verbs select essere ‘be’ (see also Centineo (1986) and Van Valin (1987); for the selection of Dutch auxiliary verbs, see Rosen (1984) and Zaenen (1993); for the selection of Basque auxiliary verbs, see Levin (1989)).5 Further, providing examples such as (30a,b), Burzio (1981, 1986) claims that the clitic ne in Italian (which corresponds to a subpart of an NP such as [NP many of them], meaning ‘of them’) can be cliticized from the (surface) subject of an unaccusative verb, but not from the subject of an unergative verb: (30) a.

Ne arriveranno molti. (unaccusative) of-them will arrive many ‘Many of them will arrive.’ b. *Ne telefoneranno molti. (unergative) of-them will telephone many ‘Many of them will telephone.’

The verb arrivare ‘arrive’ in (30a) represents an appearance of its subject referent, and is a typical unaccusative verb, taking a theme argument as its subject. The verb telefonare ‘telephone’ in (30b), on the other hand, represents a volitional action of its subject referent, and is a typical unergative verb, taking an agent argument as its subject. Further, Zubizarreta (1985) claims that in the French faire-laisser ‘make/let’ causative construction, the subject of an unergative verb can be suppressed and left out, while the subject of an unaccusative verb cannot be, as shown in the following contrast taken from Zubizarreta (1985: 262, 265): (31) a.

Il faut laisser parler. (unergative) it is necessary to let speak ‘It is necessary to let speak.’ b. *Ça fait arriver en retard. (unaccusative) this makes arrive late ‘This makes one arrive late.’

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The verb parler ‘speak/talk’ in (31a) is an unergative verb, representing a volitional action of its subject referent. In this sentence, the subject of the verb is not overtly expressed, but the sentence is acceptable. On the other hand, the verb arriver ‘arrive’ in (31b), as observed in (30a) as well, is an unaccusative verb, and the sentence, in which the subject of the verb is not expressed, is unacceptable.6 In the above, we have observed the distinction between unergative and unaccusative verbs made by Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984), and some phenomena whose acceptability has been claimed to be attributable to this distinction. The classification of intransitive verbs by Perlmutter and Perlmutter and Postal is primarily based on the agentivity or nonagentivity of the actions or states that verbs represent, and this semantic classification has been widely accepted in many later studies. However, since there are some attempts that distinguish unergative from unaccusative verbs on the basis of other semantic criteria, let us briefly refer to them here. For example, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) introduce the semantic criterion of whether the event that a verb represents is caused by its subject referent him/herself (i.e., an internally caused eventuality) or by an external force (i.e., an externally caused eventuality), and argue that the verbs representing the former eventualities are unergative verbs, while those representing the latter eventualities are unaccusative verbs. However, the classification based on this criterion turns out to be more or less the same as that based on the semantic roles of the subjects, given in (19) and (20). One crucial difference between them, though, is that under Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s (1995) classification verbs representing the emission of sound or light (that is, verbs of emission, e.g., sparkle, bubble, flash, click, ring, gurgle, buss, squeak) are unergative verbs, representing eventualities internally caused by their subject referents themselves, while under Perlmutter and Postal’s classification they are unaccusative (see (20b,d)) (cf. DeLancey (1984) for some relevant discussion). Let us next mention the well-known verb classification made by Vendler (1967), Dowty (1979), and others, since unergative and unaccusative verbs are sometimes discussed in connection with this classification. Vendler (1967) and Dowty (1979) classify verbs (and verb phrases) into the following four types based on stativity/activity and telicity/atelicity (i.e., goal-directedness/non-goaldirectedness): (32) a. States: know, believe, love, have, exist, be broken, … b. Activities: run, dance, swim, walk, drive a car, eat pizza, push a cart, …

Introduction

c. Achievements: arrive, learn, notice, find, die, break (intransitive), … d. Accomplishments: teach, kill, break (transitive), run to the station, eat a piece of pizza, make a chair, jump over the fence, …

Stative verbs show that certain states of their subject referents continue, and activity verbs represent volitional acts of their subject referents that can be continuous. Therefore, stative and activity verbs are the same in that they both represent atelicity, but are different in that the former represent states, while the latter represent actions. Achievement verbs, on the other hand, are those representing the end points of events, and they show that the results which they represent are instantaneously brought about. Accomplishment verbs, in contrast, show that certain continuous actions have been completed, and that as a result of this, their final states have been brought about. For example, make a chair means that an action of making a chair has been continuously performed, and that the final state of a chair that has been made has been accomplished. Therefore, achievement and accomplishment verbs are the same in that they both represent telicity, but are different in that the former represent only results, while the latter represent results and the actions leading to them. (For further differences among the verbs in (32a–d), see Vendler (1967), Dowty (1979), and Van Valin (1990), among others.) If we use operators such as BE (signaling states), ACT (representing activity), BECOME (signaling change-of-state (inchoativeness)), and CAUSE (representing a causal relation between two events), the logical (lexical conceptual) structures of (32a–d) will be represented as in the following (for details, see Dowty (1979), Van Valin (1990), and Kageyama (1996), among others): (33) a. b. c. d.

States: x BE (y) Activities: x ACT (ON y) Achievements: x BECOME [x BE (y)] Accomplishments: x CAUSE [y BECOME z]

Now, if we compare the four types of verbs given in (32a–d) with the unergative/unaccusative verbs given in (19) and (20), we understand that, except for transitive verbs, states (e.g., exist, be broken) and achievements (e.g., arrive, die, break) correspond to unaccusative verbs, while activities (e.g., run, dance, swim) correspond to unergative verbs. Then, what about accomplishments such as run to the station and jump over the fence? Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) argue that unergative verbs (activities) such as run, swim, and jump turn to unaccusative verbs when accompanied by phrases indicating end points (e.g., to the station, over the fence), and become accomplishment verbs,

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representing telic eventualities (Tsujimura (1996: 326–329, 1999: 366–367) claims that the same applies to Japanese). That is, Levin and Rappaport Hovav argue that (intransitive) achievement and accomplishment verbs representing telic eventualities are unaccusative verbs. (However, it seems that there are problems with this classification. In this connection, see note 19 of Chapter 2.) Before proceeding to the next section, let us note the following two points. The first is the fact that many researchers, including Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), in deciding whether a given verb is unergative or unaccusative, use not only semantic criteria such as those described above but also various linguistic phenomena as diagnostic tests. For example, suppose that there is a certain syntactic construction in which some typical unaccusative verbs can appear, while some typical unergative verbs cannot. Then, this construction is assumed to serve as a diagnostic test differentiating unaccusative from unergative verbs. Given other verbs, they are accordingly claimed to be unaccusative if they can appear in the construction, but unergative if they cannot. However, this way of determining whether given verbs are unaccusative or unergative would give rise to serious problems if such a construction is not truly dependent upon the unergative–unaccusative distinction. What is worse, given two constructions one of which is assumed to select unaccusative and the other unergative verbs, it may be the case that one of the two constructions will determine that a given verb must be one type, while the other construction will determine that the same verb must be the other type. In fact, as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, it has been widely assumed that only unaccusative verbs can appear in the there-construction (e.g., Burzio (1986), Belletti (1988), Lumsden (1988), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)), and that only unergative verbs can appear in the cognate object construction (e.g., Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), Larson (1988), Keyser and Roeper (1984), and Massam (1990)). The verb live can appear both in the there-construction (e.g., There once lived a king who had no ears) and in the cognate object construction (e.g., He lived a miserable life). The only way to reconcile these two conflicting decisions would be to claim that live is ambiguous between unaccusative and unergative. Note that, as shown in (21)–(23), some verbs (e.g., jump) need to be recognized as being ambiguous between unergative (e.g., Henry suddenly jumped over the fence — volitional) and unaccusative (e.g., The unemployment rate suddenly jumped in July — nonvolitional). These two tokens of jump are semantically different — the former being a volitional verb, while the latter a nonvolitional verb. In contrast, there does not seem to be any semantic difference between the claimed unaccusative live in the there-sentence and the claimed unergative live in the

Introduction

cognate object construction. Therefore, attempting to reconcile the two conflicting decisions on the nature of live by claiming that the verb is ambiguous between unaccusative and unergative does not seem to be a tenable solution for the conflict. The second point that we need to point out here is the fact that there are cases in which verbs are classified differently depending on their languages. For example, the English verb die, as classified in (20b), is generally considered unaccusative, but Kageyama (1993, 1996) classifies the corresponding Japanese verb sinu ‘die’ as unergative, based on the fact that it can be used in the imperative and that it can appear in the Japanese adversity passive construction. Rosen (1984) also argues that the corresponding verb in Choctaw is unergative, not unaccusative. Rosen further says that the verb meaning ‘to sweat’ is unaccusative in Choctaw, but unergative in Italian (see DeLancey (1984) for such differences in various languages and a possible reason for them). Kishimoto (1996, 2000) states that the English sleep and weep are unergative (see (19a,b)), while the Japanese nemuru ‘sleep’ and naku ‘weep’ are unaccusative. These determinations derive from the differing behaviors of such verbs with respect to the syntactic constructions that have been hypothesized in the languages involved as requiring either unergative or unaccusative verbs. Naturally, there is always the possibility that there might be underlying semantic differences for their differing syntactic behaviors, but there is always the possibility also that the syntactic constructions in question might not select unergative or unaccusative verbs, as the case might be, but are controlled by the more complex interactions of verb semantics, sentence semantics, and the discourse factors involved. This situation makes research on unergativity and unaccusativity much more difficult than has generally been recognized. As observed above, there are some cases in which verbs are classified differently depending on which criterion is adopted. Following the standard classification made by Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984), we will use in this book the semantic roles of subject referents as the central criterion for the unergative–unaccusative distinction, but at the same time we will refer to the cases in which there are disagreements about this distinction among researchers.

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1.3 Unaccusative Hypothesis In the preceding section we have observed semantic distinctions between unergative and unaccusative verbs. In this section we will observe syntactic distinctions between them that have been proposed in the frameworks of Relational Grammar and Chomskian Generative Grammar. It has been assumed in these frameworks that the syntactic distinctions described below underlie as ‘undefined primitives’ the semantic distinctions considered in the preceding section, and that syntactically differentiated intransitive verbs turn out to have semantic properties observed in the preceding section. That is, for syntactic analyses such as Relational Grammar and Chomskian Generative Grammar, the syntactic distinctions between unergative and unaccusative verbs are of primary importance, and the semantic distinctions are considered to be derivative and secondary. First, in the framework of Relational Grammar, the subjects of unergative verbs are analyzed as subjects from the very beginning, while those of unaccusative verbs are analyzed as originally being objects and later advancing to the subject position (see Chapter 5). By way of example, the unergative sentence in (34a) and the unaccusative sentence in (34b) have the following relational networks, respectively (‘1’ stands for subject, ‘2’ for direct object, P for predicates, and ‘c1’ and ‘c2’ for strata): (34) a. The boy skated. (unergative) b. The house burned. (unaccusative) (35) a.

(= (34a))

skated

b.

the boy

(= (34b))

burned

the house

In (35a), as is clear from the fact that there is only one stratum, the subject of the unergative verb skated, the boy, is always the subject (‘1’). But in (35b), the house, the subject of the unaccusative verb burned, is the direct object (‘2’) in the first stratum and becomes the subject (‘1’) only in the second stratum. In the framework of Government and Binding Theory of Chomskian Generative Grammar, it has been assumed that the subjects of unergative verbs take the specifier position of IP (= S) at both D- and S-structure, while those of

Introduction

unaccusative verbs take the direct object position at D-structure, and move to the specifier position of IP at S-structure to receive nominative Case. Therefore, sentences (34a,b) have the following structures and derivation (see the discussion given in Chapters 2–4). (36) a.

(= (34a))

b.

(= (34b))

IP

IP

NP The boy

I¢ I

e

VP

I¢ I

VP

V

V

skated

burned

NP

the house

The subject the boy in (36a) takes the subject position (specifier position of IP) at both D- and S-structure, since the verb skated is unergative. The subject the house in (36b), on the other hand, takes the direct object position at D-structure, since the verb burned is unaccusative. Intransitive verbs such as burn cannot assign Case unless some extraordinary principle is invoked (see the discussion given in Chapters 2–4), and therefore the house, if it stayed in the direct object position, would remain Caseless in violation of the Case Filter (we will discuss this in Chapter 2). To avoid this, it moves to the specifier position of IP and is assigned nominative Case.7 The above syntactic distinctions made in the frameworks of Relational Grammar and Generative Grammar have been referred to as the Unaccusative Hypothesis, which runs as follows: (37) The Unaccusative Hypothesis: Unergative and unaccusative verbs are syntactically differentiated; while unergative verbs have nonderived subjects (i.e., surface subjects are generated as subjects at D-structure), surface subjects of unaccusative verbs originate as direct objects.

It has been assumed in Generative Grammar that the subjects of passive sentences take the direct object position at D-structure and move to the

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specifier position of IP at S-structure to be assigned nominative Case. Therefore, passive verbs are considered to constitute a subclass of unaccusative verbs. The syntactic analyses that postulate the above different underlying grammatical relations for unergative and unaccusative verbs are designed to express the fact that the subjects of unaccusative verbs share certain properties with direct objects of transitive verbs which the subjects of unergative verbs do not share (see Section 1.1). Observe the following sentences and their structures: (38) a. The boy burned the letter. (transitive sentence) b. The letter burned. (unaccusative sentence) (39) a.

(= (38a)) IP NP

I¢

The boy (agent)

I

VP NP

V burned

the letter (theme)

b. (= (38b)) IP e

I¢ I

VP V

NP

burned the letter (theme)

Introduction

As observed in Section 1.1, there are, among unaccusative verbs, so-called ergative verbs (e.g., burn, roll, open, close, break, drop, sink), which can be used also as transitive verbs.8 In (38a) burn is used as a transitive verb, and in this sentence, as shown in (39a), the subject the boy is an agent, while the object the letter is a theme. In (38b), in which an agent is not specified, the theme the letter becomes the subject of the sentence, and burn is used as an (intransitive) unaccusative verb. Here, as shown in (39b), if we assume that the theme the letter takes the object position at D-structure, it corresponds to the fact that it is the object in the transitive sentence in (38a) (= (39a)). That is, in (39a) and in (the D-structure of) (39b), the NPs having the same semantic role (i.e., theme) are structurally represented at the same position (i.e., the object position), and this conforms to the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) proposed by Baker (1988: 46), given in (40): (40) The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH): Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical structural relationships between those items at the level of D-structure.

In both (39a) and (39b), the letter, which is assigned the semantic role of theme, takes the object position at D-structure, and satisfies the UTAH in (40). Therefore, it has been claimed that considering the subjects of unaccusative verbs to be underlying objects is theoretically desirable, as well. The above assumption made for ergative verbs can be applied even to unaccusative verbs such as happen, exist, appear, and occur which do not show intransitive-transitive alternation. Since the subjects of these unaccusative verbs are assigned the semantic role of theme, they appear at the object position in D-structure. Hence, the UTAH is satisfied here as well. Unergative verbs, on the other hand, do not allow the intransitive-subject/ transitive-object alternation, as shown in (41a,b) and (42a,b), which are from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 80, 116): (41) a. The children played. b. *The teacher played the children. (cf. The teacher made the children play.) (42) a. Kay coughed. b. *The doctor coughed Kay. (cf. The doctor made Kay cough.)

The semantic role of the children in (41a) is that of agent, while that of Kay in (42a) is that of experiencer. As observed above, the semantic roles of the

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subjects of unergative verbs are either agents or experiencers, and such subjects correspond not to the objects, but to the subjects of transitive verbs, as shown in the following: (43) a. The children hit Mary. (transitive sentence — agent) b. The children played. (unergative sentence — agent) (44) a. Mike loves Sue. (transitive sentence — experiencer) b. Mike coughed. (unergative sentence — experiencer)

Thus, it is appropriate to assume that the subjects of unergative verbs appear at the surface subject position from the beginning.

1.4 About this book We have observed in Section 1.2 the claim that the unergative–unaccusative distinction plays a crucial role in accounting for the acceptability of several phenomena in Dutch, Turkish, Italian, French, and some other languages. It has been claimed in many previous studies, of course, that this distinction also plays a crucial role in accounting for the acceptability of such English phenomena as the there-construction, the (one’s) way construction, the cognate object construction, the pseudo-passive construction, and extraposition from subject NPs, among others. In this section we will briefly refer to the often made claims about these constructions, and mention what each of the chapters that follow will discuss. Presenting contrasting examples such as the following, Burzio (1986), Belletti (1988), Lumsden (1988), and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), among others, have claimed that the there-construction allows only unaccusative verbs denoting existence (as in (45a)) and appearance (as in (45b)), and does not allow unergative or transitive verbs (as in (46a,b)): (45) a.

There stood an old grandfather clock in the hall opposite the front door. (existence — unaccusative) (Lumsden, 1988: 41) b. There has just appeared another book by Chomsky. (appearance — unaccusative)

(46) a. *There danced a young girl in the ballroom. (unergative) b. *There ate an apple Mary. (transitive) (Belletti, 1988: 4)

The verb stand in (45a) denotes the existence of an old grandfather clock, and appear in (45b) denotes the appearance of another book by Chomsky; both verbs are unaccusative. On the other hand, dance in (46a) is an unergative verb,

Introduction

representing a volitional action of a young girl, and eat in (46b) is a transitive verb; hence (46a,b) have been claimed to be unacceptable. The contrast in the acceptability status of (45a,b) and (46a,b) has been attributed to this unergative– unaccusative distinction. The (one’s) way construction is a construction in which intransitive verbs generally take the object one’s way, which is followed by a PP (or an adverb) denoting a path. In (47a,b) below, yell, shout, moan, and dance are unergative verbs, representing volitional actions of their subject referents (i.e., John/Mary), while fall and rise in (48a,b) are unaccusative verbs, representing nonvolitional events of their subject referents (i.e., the apples/the oil): (47) a. John yelled / shouted / moaned his way down the street. (unergative) b. Mary danced her way through the park. (unergative) (48) a. *The apples fell their way into the crates. (unaccusative) (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 148) b. *The oil rose its way to the top. (unaccusative) (ibid.)

Given the fact that (47a,b) are acceptable, while (48a,b) are not, Marantz (1992) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), among others, have claimed that the way construction allows only unergative verbs, and does not allow unaccusative verbs. Massam (1990), Larson (1988), Keyser and Roeper (1984), and Macfarland (1995), among others, providing contrasting examples such as the following, argue that only unergative verbs can appear in the cognate object construction, and unaccusative verbs cannot: (49) a. Mary laughed a sad laugh at the meeting. (unergative) b. Bob grinned a sideways grin. (unergative) (50) a. *The glass broke a crooked break. (unaccusative) (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 40) b. *The ship sank a strange sinking. (unaccusative) (Keyser and Roeper, 1984: 404)

Laugh and grin in (49a,b) are unergative verbs, representing volitional actions of their subject referents, and the sentences are acceptable. On the other hand, break and sink in (50a,b) are unaccusative verbs, representing nonvolitional events of their subject referents, and the sentences are unacceptable. Pseudo-passive sentences are passive sentences involving intransitive verbs and prepositions. Sentences (51a,b), in which the unergative verbs sleep and play are used, are acceptable, but (52a,b), in which the unaccusative verbs arrive and sink are used, are unacceptable:

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(51) a.

That bed was slept in by Napoleon. (unergative) (Riemsdijk, 1978: 218) b. This hall has been played in by some of the finest orchestras in Europe. (unergative) (Perlmutter and Postal, 1984: 100)

(52) a. *Boston was arrived in late at night. (unaccusative) (cf. John arrived in Boston late at night). b. *The sea was sunk into by a yacht. (unaccusative) (cf. A yacht sank into the sea.)

From contrasting examples such as (51a,b) and (52a,b), Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), among others, claim that the pseudo-passive construction allows only unergative verbs, and does not allow unaccusative verbs. Extraposition from subject NPs is an operation in which a PP such as [PP with blond hair] in (53a) is separated from the subject NP that it modifies, and is extraposed to sentence-final position, as in (53b): (53) a. [NP A man [PP with blond hair]] appeared. b. [NP A man] appeared [PP with blond hair]. (unaccusative)

(53b) is an acceptable sentence, and the verb appear is an unaccusative verb. However, sentence (54b), in which the same operation is applied, is unacceptable. Here, the verb whisper is an unergative verb (see (19a)), representing a volitional action of its subject referent (i.e., a man): (54) a. [NP A man [PP with blond hair]] whispered. b. *[NP A man] whispered [PP with blond hair]. (unergative)

From this kind of difference in acceptability, Johnson (1985) and Coopmans and Roovers (1986), among others, argue that extraposition from subject NPs is allowed only for unaccusative verbs; it results in unacceptability when unergative verbs are involved. In this book, we will take up all the above claims and discuss them in detail in the following chapters. More specifically, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 discuss the there-construction, the way construction, and the cognate object construction, respectively. In each chapter, after reviewing how the claims are accounted for in the framework of Generative Grammar, we will present many counterexamples and make it clear that such claims are untenable. We will then examine, based on a wide range of examples, under what conditions these constructions become acceptable, and propose functional constraints that they must satisfy. It will be shown that such functional constraints can correctly

Introduction

capture the acceptability of each of the constructions. In Chapter 5 we will discuss the pseudo-passive construction. After reviewing how the above claim about this construction made by Perlmutter and Postal (1984) is accounted for in the framework of Relational Grammar, we will show by presenting many acceptable pseudo-passive sentences with unaccusative verbs that the claim is incorrect. We will then examine not only pseudo-passive sentences but also ordinary passive sentences involving transitive verbs, and propose a semantic and functional constraint that passive sentences as a whole must satisfy. In Chapter 6 we will discuss Extraposition from subject NPs, and make it clear by showing that there are many cases in which even unergative (and transitive) verbs can appear in this construction that the above claim concerning this operation cannot be maintained. We will then demonstrate that the acceptability of this construction is heavily dependent on the flow of information in English, and propose a functional constraint that this construction must satisfy. It has been claimed in many studies including those mentioned above that the constructions we will discuss in this book serve as diagnostic tests for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. We will demonstrate, however, that such claims, which are invariably based on a small set of data, are incorrect. We will show that the acceptability status of sentences in each of the constructions in question is basically independent of the unergative–unaccusative distinction, but is derived from complex interactions of a number of nonsyntactic (as well as syntactic) factors.

1.5 Construction Grammar Construction Grammar, proposed and developed by Fillmore (1985, 1988, 1989), Fillmore, Kay, and O’Connor (1988), Kay (1990, 2002), Goldberg (1992, 1995), Michaelis (1993), Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996), and Kay and Fillmore (1999), among many others, is a monostratal (i.e., nonderivational), constraint-based syntactic theory in which syntactic and semantic information is represented within a single structure in the manner of a gestalt. For example, sentence (55), which is an instance of the double object (ditransitive) construction, is schematically represented by Goldberg (1995) as in (56) (with irrelevant details omitted): (55) John handed Mary a letter.

25

26


(56)

Sem

Syn

CAUSE-RECEIVE

·agent

recipient

patientÒ

|

|

|

|

HAND

·hander

handee

handedÒ

Ø

Ø

Ø

Ø

V

SUBJ

OBJ

OBJ2

The composite structure (56) shows a pairing between a semantic level of argument roles such as agent and patient and a syntactic level of grammatical functions such as subject and object. The semantics associated with the double object construction is ‘CAUSE-RECEIVE’, which means that ‘Agent Causes Recipient to Receive Patient’. Agent appears as SUBJ (subject), Recipient as OBJ (indirect object), and Patient as OBJ2 (direct object) at the syntactic level. When a particular verb is integrated into the double object construction, the participant roles of the verb can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with the argument roles associated with the construction. The verb hand in (55) is associated with three participants: hander, handee, and handed. They are represented in (56) as the participant roles of hand, and are associated with the argument roles at the semantic level and with the grammatical roles at the syntactic level. As is clear from (56), the hander (i.e., John), associated with Agent at the semantic level, is realized as SUBJ at the syntactic level, the handee (i.e., Mary), associated with Recipient, is realized as OBJ, and the handed (i.e., a letter), associated with Patient, is realized as OBJ2. In Construction Grammar it is assumed that constructions are related through inheritance networks, and that there are inheritance links such as polysemy links, metaphorical extension links, subpart links, and instance links. Polysemy links capture the nature of the semantic relations between a particular sense of a construction and any extensions from this sense. Metaphorical extension links are posited between two constructions when they are found to be related by a metaphorical mapping. Subpart links are posited when one construction is a proper subpart of another construction and exists independently. Instance links are posited when a particular construction is a special case of another construction; that is, an instance link exists between constructions if and only if one construction is a more fully specified version of the other. Thus, an inheritance network such as the following is assumed, in which II stands for an instance link, and IS stands for a subpart link (see Goldberg 1995).

Introduction

(57)

Subject-Predicate Construction II

II

Intransitive Construction

Transitive Construction II

Caused-Motion Construction

II

II

Double Object Construction

IS

Intransitive Motion Construction

The basic tenet of Construction Grammar is that constructions themselves carry meaning, independently of the words in the sentence. A distinct construction is posited if one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from knowledge of other constructions existing in the grammar. Therefore, Goldberg (1995: 4), for instance, defines the term ‘construction’ in the following way: (58) C is a construction iffdef C is a form-meaning pair ·Fi, SiÒ such that some aspect of Fi or some aspect of Si is not strictly predictable from C’s component parts or from other previously established constructions.

Constructions are taken to be the basic units of language. Phrasal (idiomatic) patterns are considered constructions if something about their form or meaning is not strictly predictable from the properties of their component parts or from other constructions. Sentence patterns are also considered constructions if it can be shown that their meaning or form is not compositionally derived from the properties of their component parts or from other constructions. For example, the double object construction is posited because it typically implies that the agent argument acts to cause transfer of an object to a recipient, and yet this sense of actual successful transfer is not predictable from the words of double object sentences. Similarly, the caused-motion construction, as exemplified in the sentence Pat sneezed the napkin off the table, is posited because it typically implies that the causer argument (Pat) directly causes the theme argument (the napkin) to move along a path designated by the directional

27

28


phrase (off the table), and yet this sense of moving along a path is not predictable from the words of such sentences. Likewise, the (one’s) way construction, as exemplified in Mary danced her way through the park, is posited because it implies that the subject referent (Mary) moves along the path designated by the prepositional phrase (through the park), and yet this constructional sense cannot be fully predicted on the basis of the constituent parts of the construction.9 Within the framework of Construction Grammar, a large number of constructions have been investigated; among them are the let alone and the more, the merrier constructions (Fillmore, Kay, and O’Connor (1988)), have constructions (Brugman (1988)), What, me worry? construction (Lambrecht (1990)), ditransitive, caused-motion, resultative and (one’s) way constructions (Goldberg 1992, 1995)), the nominal extraposition construction (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996)), the What’s X doing Y construction (Kay and Fillmore (1999)), and the subjectless tagged sentence construction (Kay (2002)). In these studies, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of each construction and their interactions have been clarified, and it has been shown that the constructions themselves carry their own meanings.10 As we mentioned at the outset of this introductory chapter, we simply use the term ‘construction’ in this book as a non-technical term, meaning only a ‘syntactic pattern’, which is different from the technical use of ‘construction’ adopted in Construction Grammar, observed above. The analytical framework we use in this book is also different from that of Construction Grammar, in that ours is a continuation of a series of research conducted within the framework of what is called Functional Syntax, proposed and developed by Kuno (1972a, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1995), Kuno and Kaburaki (1977), Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999), Kuno and Takami (1993, 2002), Takami (1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001), among others. We have made it clear in these studies that the acceptability of a large number of constructions is not primarily controlled by purely syntactic conditions that many generative grammarians have proposed, but by functional factors or by the interactions of syntactic and nonsyntactic factors. We are therefore not particularly concerned with, say, an inheritance hierarchy of constructions or the correspondence rules between syntactic and semantic properties of constructions, to which much attention has been paid in Construction Grammar. (In Chapter 3 of this book, the reader will find some differences (and similarities) between our functional approach and Goldberg’s (1995) Construction Grammar approach with respect to how the (one’s) way construction is analyzed.)

Introduction

However, it should be noted that our functional analysis and Construction Grammar analysis have one thing in common — both attempt to account for the constraints under which a given construction can be used felicitously, with the conviction that subtle semantic and pragmatic factors are crucial to understanding the constraints on grammatical constructions. We will demonstrate in this book that the acceptability of the five English constructions referred to in Section 1.4 cannot be fully captured solely on the basis of understanding the meaning of the verb. We further propose constraints on the five English constructions, in which formal, functional, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of the constructions are incorporated as parts of a complex whole, and one dimension cannot be simply derived, or predicted, from any other dimension. This seems to be very ‘constructional’ in the technical sense of Construction Grammar. We believe, therefore, that this book will deeply interest anyone working within the framework of Construction Grammar as well as those working in different frameworks.

29

Chapter 2

The there-construction and unaccusativity

2.1 Introduction It has long been recognized that the so-called there-construction, as exemplified in (1), generally selects only the copula verb be, and that main verbs such as dance, sing, laugh, and play cannot be used in the construction, as shown in (2): (1) a. There are three bedrooms in this house. b. There is still a serious problem with this proposal. (2) a. b. c. d.

*There danced a young girl in the ballroom. *There sang a tall middle-aged woman on the stage. *There laughed several students during the lecture. *There played three children in the playground.

It has been noted in the literature, however, that some non-copulative verbs, though less common and more literary than be, can be used in the construction. Observe the following examples: (3) a.

There exist a number of similar medieval crosses in different parts of the country. (existence) (Quirk et al., 1985: 1408) b. There once lived a king who had no ears. (existence) c. There stood an old grandfather clock in the hall opposite the front door. (existence) (Lumsden, 1988: 41)

(4) a. There has just appeared another book by Chomsky. (appearance) b. There occurred a tragic event yesterday. (appearance) (McCawley, 1988: 84) c. In the middle of the sea battle, there arose a storm which neither side had anticipated.1 (appearance)

Sentences (3a–c) and (4a–c) are all acceptable or nearly so for most speakers. Exist, live, and stand in (3a–c) are verbs of existence and appear, occur, and arise in (4a–c) are verbs of appearance. Some other verbs that can be used in the there-construction include hang, lie, remain, reside, dwell (= verbs of existence),

32


emerge, happen, come, approach, take place, ensue, follow, grow, and develop (= verbs of appearance) (see Milsark (1974), Burzio (1986), Aissen (1975), Stowell (1978), Belletti (1988), Lumsden (1988), Keyser and Roeper (1984), McCawley (1988), Quirk et al. (1985), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)). Observing that verbs of existence (including be) and appearance are unaccusative verbs, while verbs such as dance, sing, laugh, and play in (2a–d) are unergative verbs, Burzio (1986), Belletti (1988), Lumsden (1988), and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) argue that only unaccusative verbs denoting existence and appearance are allowed in the there-construction, and that the construction serves as a diagnostic for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. This claim can be formalized as follows: (5) Unaccusative Restriction on the There-Construction: Only unaccusative verbs denoting existence or appearance can appear in the there-construction. No unergative (and transitive) verbs can.

In Section 2.2 of this chapter, we will review how the Unaccusative Restriction on the There-Construction above (henceforth the Unaccusative Restriction) is accounted for in the framework of generative grammar. We will also review in Section 2.2 Milsark’s (1974) claim that there are formally two crucially different subtypes of the there-construction (i.e., ‘inside verbal’ and ‘outside verbal’), and show how each subtype is assumed to derive in the framework of Government and Binding Theory. Then in Section 2.3 we will examine the Unaccusative Restriction in (5), and demonstrate the following four facts: (i) There are unergative verbs that can appear in the there-construction, (ii) there are transitive verbs that can appear in the construction, (iii) the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) predicts that unaccusative verbs that do not represent existence or appearance should not appear in the construction, but even in this case acceptability results if a prepositional phrase is placed at sentence-initial position or a certain type of adverb is inserted in the sentence, and (iv) the same fact as (iii) also obtains when the there-construction involves unergative verbs. (i)–(iv) show that the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) is incorrect, and that the there-construction does not serve as a diagnostic for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. Then in Section 2.4 we will propose an alternative functional account of the requirements that the construction must satisfy. In Section 2.5, further, we will discuss syntactic derivational processes of various types of there-sentences and offer analyses that are different from those assumed in generative grammar.


2.2 Generative Grammar account As observed in Chapter 1, unergative verbs are (i) those describing willed or volitional acts, taking agents as their subjects (e.g., talk, walk, smile, skate), and (ii) those describing certain involuntary bodily processes, taking experiencers as their subjects (e.g., belch, breathe, sleep, hiccough). In Chomskian generative grammar (particularly in the Government and Binding Theory) the subjects of unergative verbs are assumed to take the subject position (the specifier position of IP) throughout the derivation. On the other hand, unaccusative verbs are (i) those whose subjects are semantically themes or patients (e.g., burn, sink, tremble, slip), (ii) those of existence and appearance (e.g., exist, hang, emerge, happen), and (iii) aspectual verbs (e.g., begin, start, end). The subjects of unaccusative verbs are assumed in (the GB framework of) generative grammar to take the object position at D-structure and to move to the subject position at S-structure.2 We show below the D-structure configuration assumed for sentences with unaccusative verbs, and the one assumed for sentences with unergative verbs: (6) a.

the D-structure configuration assumed for unaccusative verbs (see (3c)): IP e

I¢ I

VP V¢

V

PP NP in the hall...

stood an old grandfather clock

33

34


b. the D-structure configuration assumed for unergative verbs (see (2a)): IP NP

I¢

a young girl I

VP V¢

PP

V danced

in the ballroom

Since (3a–c) and (4a–c) are sentences with unaccusative verbs, the logical (notional) subject (i.e., an old grandfather clock in (6a)) starts out in the object position of the verb, and remains in that position throughout the derivation of the sentence, with there assumed to be inserted at S-structure into the empty subject position to satisfy the Extended Projection Principle (Chomsky (1982)), given in (7):3 (7) Extended Projection Principle: Sentences must have subjects.

On the other hand, the verbs in (2) are unergative and the logical subject (i.e., a young girl in (6b)) takes the specifier position of IP throughout the derivation. Therefore, it has no way of moving down into the object position, and sentences such as (2a–d) are not derived.4 How is Case assigned to the logical subject in (3a–c) and (4a–c)? The verbs in these sentences (i.e., exist, live, stand, appear, occur, arise) are all unaccusative verbs and they assign θ-roles (theme/patient) to their logical subjects in object position (see (6a)). They lack NPs in subject position at D-structure and do not assign any θ-roles to the subject position. Therefore, according to Burzio’s Generalization, given in (8), they cannot assign accusative Case to their logical subjects in object position. (8) Burzio’s Generalization: All and only verbs that can assign θ-roles to the subject can assign accusative Case to an object.

If the logical subject in (3a–c) and (4a–c) were Caseless, however, this would result in a violation of the Case Filter, given in (9) (Chomsky (1981: 49)): (9) Case Filter: *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case.


Belletti (1988) circumvents this problem by arguing that the logical subject in sentences such as (3a–c) and (4a–c) is assigned inherent partitive Case at D-structure. Hence, no violation of the Case Filter arises, and the acceptability of (3a–c) and (4a–c) results.5, 6 It is assumed in generative grammar that passive verbs belong to unaccusative verbs, since their subjects are also assumed to originate in the object position. This predicts that passive verbs can also appear in the there-construction, so long as they are verbs of existence or of appearance. This prediction is correct as the following there-sentences involving passive verbs are acceptable: (10) a. b. c. d.

There were placed many silver spoons on the table. (existence) There was born a baby to the Joneses. (appearance) There was heard a rumbling noise. (appearance) In the evening, there were brought in, by the porters, some half dozen cases of whisky. (appearance)

So far, we have observed one pattern of the there-construction: ‘there + V + NP (logical subject) (+ PP)’. Milsark (1974) has called this pattern the ‘inside verbal’ there-construction, since the logical subject NP occurs VP-internally, adjacent to V. He has distinguished it from the pattern of ‘there + V + PP + NP’, as exemplified in (11) and (12), which he has called the ‘outside verbal’ there-construction, since the logical subject NP shows up to the right of the VP.7 (11) a.

Once upon a time there lived [PP on the other side of the forest] [NP a monster who demanded yearly tribute in the form of six virgins]. b. There came [PP to his mind] [NP her beautiful and intelligent face]. (Quirk et al., 1985: 1409)

(12) a.

Suddenly there ran [PP out of the bushes] [NP a grizzly bear]. (Aissen, 1975: 1) b. Then there danced [PP towards us] [NP a couple dressed like Napoleon and Josephine]. c. There walked [PP into the courtroom] [NP two people I had thought were dead]. d. There swam [PP towards me] [NP someone carrying a harpoon]. (Lumsden, 1988: 38)

Sentences (11a,b) involve unaccusative verbs live and come, and (12a–d) involve unergative verbs run, dance, walk, and swim. However, note that not only (11a,b) but also (12a–d) are acceptable. Therefore Milsark (1974: 249) argues that outside verbals, unlike inside verbals, are acceptable so long as the verbs are

35

36


intransitive and co-occur with locative expressions, as shown in (12a–d). Based on this observation, Burzio (1986), Lumsden (1988), and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) argue that the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) applies only to the inside verbal there-construction.8 It would not be amiss here to touch upon the derivation of outside verbals such as (11) and (12). Lumsden (1988) argues that outside verbals with unergative verbs, such as (12), derive from the following two operations: (i) the subject at the specifier position of IP moves to sentence-final position and adjoins to VP, and then (ii) there is inserted into the vacated subject position to satisfy the Extended Projection Principle in (7). Therefore, sentence (12a), for instance, has roughly the following derivational history (we omit suddenly for ease of exposition):9 (13) a.

D-structure: IP NP

I¢

a grizzly bear I

VP V¢

PP

V ran

out of the bushes

b. right adjunction of subject NP to VP: IP ei

I¢ I

VP VP

V¢

NPi PP a grizzly bear

V ran

out of the bushes


c.

there-insertion: IP NP there

I¢ I

VP VP

V¢

NPi PP a grizzly bear

V ran

out of the bushes

Note in (13b) that the trace left behind after the right adjunction of the subject NP a grizzly bear violates the following Proper Binding Condition (Fiengo (1977)), since a grizzly bear has undergone a downward movement and does not c-command its trace: (14) Proper Binding Condition: Traces must be bound (i.e., coindexed and ccommanded).

However, Lumsden (1988), along with Chomsky (1981: 87), assumes that the offending trace is erased by the insertion of there, as shown in (13c); hence no problem arises and the acceptability results. It is important to note here that the rule that Lumsden (1988) assumes (but does not spell out) for moving subject NPs to sentence-final position must be made conditional on the presence of a VP-final PP (the PP for out of the bushes in (13a)) — otherwise, unergative there-sentences without PPs, which Lumsden assumes to be unacceptable, would be freely generated: (15) a. A grizzly bear ran. b. *There ran a grizzly bear.

Let us turn to the derivation of outside verbals with unaccusative verbs, such as (11). Lumsden (1988:39) argues that they derive from the following three operations: (i) the logical subject, base-generated at the object position, moves to the specifier position of IP to receive nominative Case, (ii) then it moves to sentence-final position and adjoins to VP, and (iii) there is inserted into the vacated subject position (the specifier position of IP). ((ii) and (iii) are the same

37

38


operations observed above in the case of outside verbals with unergative verbs (see (13)).) Therefore (11b), for instance, has the following derivational history:10 (16) a.

D-structure: IP e

I¢ I

VP V¢

PP

V

NP

to his mind

came

her beautiful and intelligent face

b. subject NP movement: IP NPi

I¢

her beautiful and I intelligent face

VP V¢

PP

V

NP

came

ei

to his mind


c.

right adjunction of subject NP to VP: IP ei

I¢ I

VP VP

V¢

NPi PP


NP to his mind

V came

ei

d. there-insertion: IP NP there

I¢ I

VP VP

V¢ V came

NPi PP


NP to his mind ei

In this section we have observed how the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) is accounted for in the framework of generative grammar, and how outside verbals such as (11) and (12) are assumed to be derived.11

2.3 Problems with the Unaccusative Restriction When we examine further examples of the inside verbal there-construction, we find the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) seriously flawed. First, despite the fact

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40


that the restriction stipulates that unergative verbs cannot appear in the insideverbal there-construction, there are unergative verbs that can appear, as shown in the following: (17) a. There once ruled a king who had no ears. b. Late at night, there crept a silent band of soldiers into the small mountain village. c. In the afternoon, there proceeded a solemn cortege down the road to the cemetery. d. I couldn’t find anything so I switched chairs and in a few moments there crawled a small slimy gecko lizard off of my arm and onto the chair and the floor.12 (Open Web) e. There ambled two rabbits along the path. (McCawley, 1981 cited by Kato, 1992: 160) f. There raced two boys through the garden.13 (Johnson and Lappin, 1999: 29) g. Suddenly, there sprang a snarling tiger from the bushes near the path.14

Rule, creep, proceed, crawl, amble, race, and spring in (17a–g) are all unergative verbs, expressing volitional actions of the referents of their subjects. Therefore, the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) predicts that the sentences in (17a–g) should all be unacceptable. In spite of this prediction, they are all acceptable or nearly so for many speakers. It is clear that (17a) is underivable under the derivational processes that Lumsden assumes, which we reviewed in the preceding section; if it were, all unergative there-sentences without PPs would become derivable, with the consequence that the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) would become totally ineffective. Furthermore, acceptable sentences such as (17b–g) are also underivable in the same framework. Note, first, that Lumsden has to block the application of Heavy Constituent Shift of a PP to the right of a VP in outside verbals involving unergative verbs such as (18a) below, so as not to produce inside verbals such as (18b), simply because the latter type of sentence is generally unacceptable, and is assumed to be so for syntactic reasons in his framework (see the derivation given in (13)). (18) a.

There [VP [VP ran [PP out of the bushes]] [NP a grizzly bear]]. (outside verbal) b. *There [VP [VP [VP ran ei][NP a grizzly bear]] [PP out of the bushes]i]. (inside verbal) (Heavy Constituent Shift of PP to sentence-final position) (see also (2a–d))


Although Lumsden does not spell out how Heavy Constituent Shift of a PP to sentence-final position given in (18b) is blocked, let us assume for the sake of argument that his system can block it by some means (we will return to this issue at the end of this section). However, this would uniformly block inside verbals with unergative verbs, and no acceptable inside verbals with unergative verbs would be produced. For example, Lumsden’s framework would also block the derivation of (19b) from (19a), and (19b) would be predicted as unacceptable as (18b), contrary to fact: (19) a.

Late at night, there [VP [VP crept [PP into the small mountain village]] [NP a silent band of soldiers]]. (outside verbal) b. Late at night, there [VP [VP [VP crept ei][NP a silent band of soldiers]] [PP into the small mountain village]i]. (inside verbal) (= (17b))

This is also the case with (17c–g), and therefore it can be concluded that there is a serious problem with the derivation that Lumsden assumes, in that it would end up blocking acceptable sentences such as (17b–g). Let us turn to a second problem. As stated in the Unaccusative Restriction in (5), transitive verbs are claimed not to appear in the there-construction. To illustrate this, Belletti (1988: 4) and Haegeman (1994: 65) provide the following unacceptable sentences, respectively: (20) a. *There ate an apple Mary. b. *There saw three children the pigs.

In spite of this claim, there are acceptable there-sentences that involve transitive verbs, as shown in the following: (21) a. Then, all of a sudden, there reached her ear the sound of angel voices. b. There crossed her mind a most horrible thought.15 (Kayne, 1979: 715) c. There entered the room an indescribably malodorous breath of air. (ibid.) d. But every now and again, before committing some folly or telling a palpable untruth, or when faced by a difficult decision, there suddenly enters my mind the beefy figure of the Rev P C Underhill, headmaster of Wellington House in my time. (Collins Cobuild Corpus) e. At this point, there hit the embankment a shell from our own lines. (Harris, 1964: 196) f. Among the rest, there overtook us a little elderly lady. (Poutsma, 1926–9: Part II, Section II, 669)

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g. Job, the sufferer, knew that after this life there awaited him everlasting life with God. (Rachmiel Frydland, The Lesson of Purim)16,17

Although the judgments on the acceptability of (21a–g) vary from speaker to speaker, many people find them acceptable or nearly so. Further, it is clear to all speakers that (21a–g) are far better than (20a,b), in spite of the fact that transitive verbs are used in all of the sentences. Since transitive verbs take subjects and objects to start with, they cannot be unaccusative verbs in the underlying structure. Therefore, the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) incorrectly predicts that (21a–g) should be as unacceptable as (20a,b).18,19 A third problem with the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) is the fact that inside verbals with unaccusative verbs that do not express existence or appearance, though unacceptable, as predicted, are much improved if PPs are preposed to sentence-initial position or if a minor change is made. Observe, first, the following examples: (22) a. *There smoldered a flag in a corner of the room. b. *There burned a flag in a corner of the room. c. *There dissolved a mass of ectoplasm. (Bolinger, 1977: 97)

Smolder, burn, and dissolve are unaccusative verbs, but smolder and burn describe events that have occurred to the referents of their logical subjects, and dissolve describes disappearance (rather than existence or appearance) of the referent of its logical subject. Hence, sentences (22a–c) are unacceptable, resulting in a violation of the ‘verbs denoting existence or appearance’ portion of the Unaccusative Restriction in (5). However, compare (22a–c) with the following sentences: (23) a.

In a corner of the room there smoldered a flag that some angry patriot had torn down and ignited. (adapted from Bolinger, 1977: 100) b. Deep within him there smoldered an unquenchable desire.20 (McCawley, 1988: 86) c. Deep within him there burned an undying passion. (ibid.) d. There slowly dissolved a mass of ectoplasm. (Bolinger, 1977: 97)

The sentences in (23a–d) employ the same verbs as those in (22a–c), but they are acceptable or nearly so for most speakers. In each of (23a–c), a locative phrase (i.e., in a corner of the room, deep within him) is placed at sentence-initial position, in contrast to (22a,b), in which a locative phrase (i.e., in a corner of the room) is at sentence-final position. Further, the only difference between (22c) and (23d) is that in the latter the adverb slowly is placed between there and the verb.


Thus, the difference in acceptability between (22) and (23) points to the fact that the acceptability of there-sentences is not dependent on verbs alone, but on the position of a locative phrase and/or on semantic and discourse factors, as well. A fourth problem with the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) is the fact that some inside verbals with unergative verbs that do not express existence or appearance, though unacceptable, as predicted, are much improved if PPs are preposed to sentence-initial position. Observe the following: (24) a. ??/*There swam a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon towards the party of tourists. b. Towards the party of tourists (there) swam a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon.21 (25) a. b.

*There screamed the panther. In this alternate world, millions of years ago, there screamed the panther — there laughed the hyena — there howled the baboon — all was as if in our own sphere. ((25a,b) are from Bolinger, 1977: 102)

Swim, scream, laugh, and howl are all unergative verbs, describing volitional actions of their subject referents, but while (24a) and (25a) are unacceptable, (24b) and (25b) are acceptable or nearly so for most speakers. In (24a) a locative phrase is at sentence-final position, and in (25a) there is no locative phrase. On the other hand, in (24b) and (25b) a locative phrase is placed at sentence-initial position. This shows that an argument to the effect that unergative verbs cannot be used in the (inside verbal) there-construction, as stated in the Unaccusative Restriction in (5), does not capture the real controlling factors for the acceptability of there-sentences. We must hasten to add here that it might be argued that there-sentences of the pattern of (24b) and (25b) with unergative verbs are derived from the acceptable outside-verbal there-construction via fronting of the locative phrase. According to this claim, (24b) would be derived in the following manner: (26) a.

Outside Verbal: [IP There [VP [VP swam [PP towards the party of tourists]] [NP a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon]]] b. Fronting of PP: [[PP Towards the party of tourists]i [IP there [VP [VP swam ei] [NP a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon]]] (= (24b))

We find no problem with the above derivation except for the fact that if the

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fronting of the PP in question is to be allowed, then there does not seem to be any justification for blocking the application of Heavy Constituent Shift to the same PP in (26a). But as discussed at the beginning of this section, this would yield an unacceptable sentence, as shown in (27) (see (18a,b)). (27) a.

Outside Verbal: [IP There [VP [VP swam [PP towards the party of tourists]] [NP a man in a red wetsuit]]] b. Heavy Constituent Shift of PP applied to (27a): *[IP There [VP [VP swam ei] [NP a man in a red wetsuit]] [PP towards the party of tourists]]

In the absence in Lumsden (1988) of any specifics on how Heavy Constituent Shift, but not Fronting, of pre-logical-subject adjuncts is to be blocked in the outside verbal there-construction with unergative verbs, we must conclude that there is no accounting for the derivation of sentences such as (24b) in the framework of the Unaccusative Restriction in (5). To sum up this section, the acceptability of (17a–g) and (21a–g) and the difference in acceptability between (22a–c) and (23a–d), and between (24a)/ (25a) and (24b)/(25b) demonstrate that the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) fails to account for the acceptability status of there-sentences, and that the there-construction does not serve as evidence for unaccusativity.22

2.4 Functional account of the there-construction 2.4.1 Functional Constraint on the there-construction It has been held in generative grammar that there in the there-construction is an expletive or ‘dummy’ element having no semantic content, serving only as a place-holder of the specifier position of IP. However, Kuno (1972b) analyzes there as the ‘pro-adverb’ of a postposed adverbial locative phrase. That is, it serves as an element introducing a concrete locative phrase. Bolinger (1977: 91) argues that it is an extension of the adverbial locative there, with a meaning that refers to a generalized location. Langacker (1991: 352) also argues that it designates an abstract setting (or an unspecified setting) construed as hosting some relationship (see also Lakoff (1987)). These claims seem to be correct considering the fact that the there-construction generally takes a locative phrase, as observed in the many examples we have considered above. Even if a locative


phrase is not expressed, it can easily be inferred from the discourse context, as exemplified below: (28) a. There is a God (in the universe). b. There has just appeared another book by Chomsky (in the market). (cf. (4a)) c. There occurred a tragic event yesterday (in the royal family). (cf. (4b))

The fact that there co-occurs with (or implies) a locative phrase seems to indicate that they jointly serve to establish a scene or set a stage. As claimed by a number of researchers, there-sentences can be described as ‘presentative’ sentences (Quirk et al. (1985: 1408)). Therefore, it can be said that the function of the there-construction is to denote existence or appearance of someone or something (= the referent of the logical subject) in the understood or overtly specified location. As discussed in Section 2.2, Milsark (1974), Burzio (1986), Lumsden (1988), and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) have all argued that unergative verbs do not appear in the inside verbal there-construction. But we have shown in Section 2.3 that there are there-sentences with unergative verbs which by themselves do not represent existence or appearance that are acceptable if a locative phrase is placed at sentence-initial position. Observe the following sentences, with the above-mentioned function of the there-construction in mind: (29) a. b. c.

*There walked two prison guards into the courtroom. (inside verbal) There walked into the courtroom two people I had thought were dead. (= (12c)) (outside verbal) Into the courtroom there walked two people I had thought were dead. (inside verbal)

(30) a. ??/*There swam a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon towards the party of tourists. (= (24a)) (inside verbal) b. There swam towards the party of tourists a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon. (outside verbal) c. Towards the party of tourists there swam a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon. (= (24b)) (inside verbal)

What is the distinguishing property of the acceptable (29b,c) and (30b,c) that sets them apart from the unacceptable (29a) and (30a)? The key to this question seems to be whether, at the point the logical subject is introduced in the sentence, a predication that denotes existence or appearance has already been established. With this in mind, let us observe the above sentences with respect

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to whether or not the strings to the left of their logical subjects mean existence or appearance: (31) a. There walked… [neither existence nor appearance] b. There walked into the courtroom… [appearance] c. Into the courtroom there walked… [appearance] (32) a. There swam… [neither existence nor appearance] b. There swam towards the party of tourists… [appearance] c. Towards the party of tourists there swam… [appearance]

Note that walk in itself is an action verb, and does not represent either existence or appearance, but when it is combined with into the courtroom as shown in (31b,c), it denotes appearance at the location under discussion. Likewise, swim in itself does not represent either existence or appearance, but when it is combined with towards the party of tourists as shown in (32b,c), it denotes appearance at the location under discussion. A similar point applies to existence. Observe (22a,b) and (23a–c), repeated here. (22) a. *There smoldered a flag in a corner of the room. b. *There burned a flag in a corner of the room. (23) a.

In a corner of the room there smoldered a flag that some angry patriot had torn down and ignited. b. Deep within him there smoldered an unquenchable desire. c. Deep within him there burned an undying passion.

In (22a,b), we have only (there) smoldered and (there) burned to the left of the logical subject. These strings only describe an event that involves the referent of the logical subject, and do not represent existence or appearance. In contrast, in (23a) we have in a corner of the room (there) smoldered to the left of the logical subject. This string can be paraphrased as ‘in a corner of the room there lay smoldering’. That is, the locative phrase and the verb jointly serve to denote the existence of the referent of the logical subject. Similarly, in (23b,c), deep within him (there) smoldered and deep within him (there) burned mean ‘deep within him (there) existed, without having been extinguished’ and ‘deep within him (there) existed in a burning fashion’. Further, while in (22b) the verb burn implies an eventual disappearance of a flag, in (23c) it denotes the existence of an undying passion in a burning fashion deep within ‘him’. This difference also serves as a factor for the unacceptability of (22b) and the acceptability of (23c). The same is the case with the following contrasting pair of examples:


(25) a. *There screamed the panther. b. In this alternate world, millions of years ago, there screamed the panther — there laughed the hyena — there howled the baboon — all was as if in our own sphere.

Screamed in (25a) only describes an action of the panther, and does not represent either existence or appearance. In contrast, in (25b), the sentenceinitial place and time adverbials in this alternate world and millions of years ago signal that the sentence is about what the world was like then. Therefore, screamed in this sentence is interpreted not just as representing an action, but as meaning ‘lived, screaming around’. The same is true for laughed and howled. Hence in (25b) the string of words preceding the logical subject can be interpreted as denoting existence. We have observed above that an unergative verb that does not denote existence or appearance can yield an acceptable there-sentence if it is either preceded or immediately followed within the sentence by an adjunct which adds a denotation of existence or appearance to the verb. The following examples show that such an adjunct does not even need to be overtly present in the there-sentence. Observe the following sentences: (33) a.

Mary was glued to what was happening in rapid succession in front of her eyes. First, there screamed a little girl with a red headband. Next, there groaned an old woman with a black eye-patch. Then, there hollered a middle-aged man with a hatchet. b. This book tells us what the world was like millions of years ago. There screamed the panther — there laughed the hyena — there howled the baboon.

Note that in each of (33a,b) the sentence preceding the there-sentence (i.e., Mary was glued to what was happening in rapid succession in front of her eyes, This book tells us what the world was like millions of years ago) serves to introduce a scene in which something happened (appeared) or existed. From the above discussion we can hypothesize the following: (34) The Functional Constraint on the There-Construction (tentative): The there-construction is acceptable to the extent that the string to the left of its logical subject is interpretable as denoting existence or appearance.

Note here that there, since it is devoid of semantic content, does not contribute to the interpretability of the pre-logical-subject string as denoting existence or appearance.

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The Functional Constraint on the There-Construction given above (henceforth the Functional Constraint) can straightforwardly account not only for (29), (30), (22), (23), (25) and (33) but also for the following contrasting examples we observed in Section 2.1: (2) a. b. c. d.

*There danced a young girl in the ballroom. *There sang a tall middle-aged woman on the stage. *There laughed several students during the lecture. *There played three children in the playground.

(3) a.

There exist a number of similar medieval crosses in different parts of the country. (existence) b. There once lived a king who had no ears. (existence) c. There stood an old grandfather clock in the hall opposite the front door. (existence)

(4) a. There has just appeared another book by Chomsky. (appearance) b. There occurred a tragic event yesterday. (appearance) c. In the middle of the sea battle, there arose a storm which neither side had anticipated. (appearance)

Dance, sing, laugh, and play in (2a–d) are action verbs, and do not denote existence or appearance. These verbs, coupled with the PPs in the ballroom, on the stage, during the lecture, and in the playground, respectively, would denote existence or appearance, but these PPs are not available in (2) at the point the logical subject is introduced. Therefore these sentences do not satisfy the Functional Constraint in (34), and the unacceptability results. On the other hand, exist in (3a) inherently denotes existence, and live and stand in (3b,c), when they are used nonagentively, inherently denote existence. Likewise, appear, occur, and arise in (4a–c) inherently denote appearance. Therefore the sentences in (3a–c) and (4a–c) all satisfy the Functional Constraint in (34) and the acceptability results. (Note that be also inherently denotes existence, and that therefore the acceptability of sentences (1a,b) and (28a) is also explained.) The contrast between the acceptable passive sentences in (10a–d) (repeated here) and unacceptable ones such as (35a–c) can also be readily accounted for by the Functional Constraint in (34). (10) a. b. c. d.

There were placed many silver spoons on the table. (existence) There was born a baby to the Joneses. (appearance) There was heard a rumbling noise. (appearance) In the evening, there were brought in, by the porters, some half dozen cases of whisky. (appearance)


(35) a. *There was hit a man on the head. b. *There were blamed three people at the meeting. c. *There were arrested three rioters in the park.

Note that are placed in (10a) denotes existence, while was born, was heard, and was brought in in (10b–d) denote appearance. Hence the acceptability of these sentences results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (34). In contrast, was hit, were blamed, and were arrested in (35a–c) only represent events that involve their logical subject referents, and denote neither existence nor appearance. Hence, (35a–c) violate the Functional Constraint in (34) and the unacceptability results.23 Observe further the following sentences: (36) a. There emerged some new facts while we were working on the project. b. After a long delay, there entered a group of dancers dressed in red headdresses onto the elevated stage. (17) a.

There once ruled a king who had no ears.

Emerge and enter in (36a,b), just like appear, occur, and arise in (4a–c), inherently denote appearance, and therefore the acceptability of (36a,b) results. Ruled in (17a), coupled with the time adverb once, means ‘lived/existed as a ruler’, and therefore it denotes existence; hence acceptability. As evidence for this, when the verb rule means ‘to have and use the highest form of power over (a country, people, etc.)’, as in the following example, the resulting sentence is unacceptable: (37) *There ruled a king with an iron hand.

The Functional Constraint in (34) can further account for the acceptability and unacceptability of there-sentences involving transitive verbs, such as (20) and (21): (20) a. *There ate an apple Mary. (Belletti, 1988: 4) b. *There saw three children the pigs. (Haegeman, 1994: 65) (21) a. b. c. d.

e.

Then, all of a sudden, there reached her ear the sound of angel voices. There crossed her mind a most horrible thought. There entered the room an indescribably malodorous breath of air. But every now and again, before committing some folly or telling a palpable untruth, or when faced by a difficult decision, there suddenly enters my mind the beefy figure of the Rev P C Underhill, headmaster of Wellington House in my time. (Collins Cobuild Corpus) At this point, there hit the embankment a shell from our own lines.

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f. Among the rest, there overtook us a little elderly lady. g. Job, the sufferer, knew that after this life there awaited him everlasting life with God. (Rachmiel Frydland, The Lesson of Purim)

In comparing the unacceptable (20) with the acceptable (21), we notice that while in the former the object (i.e., an apple, three children) serves only as a theme that is involved in the described event, in the latter it (i.e., her ear, her mind, the room, my mind, the embankment, us, him) represents a location. In other words, the transitive verb phrases reached her ear, crossed her mind, entered the room, enters my mind, hit the embankment, overtook us, and awaited him in (21a–g) all denote the appearance of the logical subject referents into the perceptual field of the speaker, and hence the acceptability of these sentences results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (34). On the other hand, the transitive verb phrases ate an apple and saw three children in (20a,b) only represent actions, and therefore the sentences do not fulfill the Functional Constraint in (34) and the unacceptability results. Observe further the following examples: (38) a. *There dissolved a mass of ectoplasm. (= (22c)) b. *There ended a commotion. (McCawley, 1988: 86) c. *There subsided a wind. (Bolinger, 1977: 97) (39) There slowly dissolved a mass of ectoplasm. (= (23d))

Dissolve, end, and subside in (38a–c) inherently denote disappearance, and therefore these sentences do not satisfy the Functional Constraint in (34) and the unacceptability results. In (39), unlike in (38a), the adverb slowly is inserted between there and the verb, and the expression slowly dissolve, as Bolinger (1977: 97) states, holds the action on the stage. That is, it suggests the existence of a mass of ectoplasm, and hence the acceptability of the sentence results. It is true that there are speakers who find (39) marginal or unacceptable because a location is not overtly specified, but the fact that it is much better than sentences like (38a–c) even for such speakers seems to be explained in this way. Finally, observe the following sentences: (40) a. *There danced [PP with Mary] [NP a good-looking young man]. b. *There opened [PP with this key] [NP a fireproof heavy safe]. c. *There barked [PP in the morning] [NP a big, fierce dog].

(40a–c) are formally outside verbal there-sentences since they involve PPs immediately after the verbs. However, these PPs are not locatives, but represent


accompaniment, instrument, and time, respectively. Therefore, danced with Mary, opened with this key, and barked in the morning do not denote either existence or appearance, and the sentences do not fulfill the Functional Constraint in (34). Hence the unacceptability of (40a–c) results. We have shown above that the Functional Constraint in (34) can account not only for the acceptability status of the sentences given in Section 2.3 that pose serious problems for the Unaccusative Restriction in (5), but also for the acceptability status of the sentences observed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. In the following subsection we will examine some more acceptable and unacceptable there-sentences to sharpen our Functional Constraint. 2.4.2 Spectator role of the speaker In the preceding subsection we have shown that the there-construction is acceptable to the extent that, at the point the logical subject is introduced, the string to its left is interpretable as denoting existence or appearance. It is important to note here that the existence or appearance referred to here is anchored to the location of the speaker/narrator (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing). To illustrate this, let us observe the examples in (12a–d) (repeated here). (12) a. Suddenly there ran [PP out of the bushes] [NP a grizzly bear]. b. Then there danced [PP towards us] [NP a couple dressed like Napoleon and Josephine]. c. There walked [PP into the courtroom] [NP two people I had thought were dead]. d. There swam [PP towards me] [NP someone carrying a harpoon]. (41) Suddenly there ran [PP out of a hidden crack] [NP a very tiny mouse].

That a scene established by a locative phrase is anchored to the speaker/narrator is clear in (12b) and (12d) because of the existence of the PPs towards us and towards me. In (12c) it is understood that the speaker was in the courtroom, which made it possible for him/her to observe the on-going event. In (12a) also, it is understood that a grizzly bear, as a result of running out of the bushes, came into the view of the speaker. Since the established scene is anchored to the speaker/narrator in (12a–d), the referents of the logical subjects are understood to come into the view of the speaker (Kimball (1973)). In (41), out of a hidden crack is morphologically indefinite. But semantically, it is anchored to the speaker in that he/she must have been talking about the object, e.g., the stone wall, that this unknown crack was in.24

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The above discussion is confirmed by the unacceptability of the following sentence: (42) *There swam towards an old lobster fisherman someone carrying a harpoon.25 (cf. (12d))

The above sentence is unacceptable because there swam towards an old lobster fisherman, as understood by the indefinite NP an old lobster fisherman, is not interpretable as denoting the existence or appearance of someone carrying a harpoon at the location of the speaker or the person whose point of view he/she is representing.26 Whether the established scene is interpretable as denoting speaker-anchored existence or appearance is not an all-or-nothing matter, but a continuum. For example, compare the following three sentences: (43) a. b. c.

There danced on the stage a young girl with a red headband.

–/?There danced in the ballroom a young girl with a red headband. ?/??There swam in the river a young girl with a red headband.

When these sentences are given in isolation, many speakers make the acceptability judgments recorded above. We attribute the contrast to differences in ease with which the hearers can anchor the speaker of these sentences at the scene. The locative on the stage in (43a) readily places the speaker among the audience in the theater because action on the stage is for the audience to observe. The locative in the ballroom in (43b) places the speaker among the spectators, but not as easily as in the case of (43a), because dancing in the ballroom is ordinarily for the purpose of those who are dancing, and not for spectators to observe. Sentence (43c) in isolation is even less acceptable because one has to associate it with a scene in which the speaker of the sentence was perhaps standing on the bank of the river, observing what was going on in the river. The above observations show that there-sentences are acceptable to the extent that they establish the spectator role of the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing) at the scene that is either explicitly or implicitly specified in the sentences. This leads to the following revision of our Functional Constraint: (44) The Functional Constraint on the There-Construction (revised-tentative): The there-construction is acceptable to the extent that the string to the left of its logical subject is interpretable as denoting existence or appearance observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing).


It is interesting to note here the effect of the use of the progressive form in there-sentences on the interpretability of the pre-logical-subject string as representing ‘existence’. Observe the following sentences: (45) a. There was dancing in the ballroom a young girl with a red headband. b. There was swimming in the river a young girl with a red headband.27

The fact that the above sentences are considerably better than their counterparts in (43b,c) and are acceptable to most speakers shows that the progressive form, since it describes an on-going action or event, establishes the speaker as a spectator of the action or event, and this fact in turn contributes to the ‘existence’ interpretation of the string to the left of the logical subject. But this contribution made by the progressive form is not strong enough to establish the ‘existence’ interpretation of what precedes the logical subject in the following sentences: (46) a. *There was dancing a young girl with a red headband in the middle of the ballroom. b. *There was swimming a young girl with a red headband in the middle of the river.

Observe, now, the following sentences: (47) a. *There danced with Mary quite a good-looking young man. (cf. (40a)) b. *There was dancing quite a good-looking young man with Mary. (cf. (46a)) c. There was dancing with Mary quite a good-looking young man.28

As already noted, (47a) is unacceptable because the pre-logical-subject string (i.e., (there) danced with Mary) does not represent existence. Likewise, the use of the progressive form in (47b) is not sufficient to make the string to the left of its logical subject (i.e., (there) was dancing) interpretable as representing existence. Note in (47c) that the use of the progressive form, together with the adjunct with Mary, makes the sentence acceptable. This can be explained in the following fashion. First, the progressive form contributes towards establishing the spectator role of the speaker, and henceforth, to a certain degree, towards establishing the ‘existence’ interpretation of was dancing. Secondly, with Mary also reinforces the spectator interpretation because it implies that the speaker has been paying attention to Mary. Each of the above two factors in isolation is not sufficient to establish the ‘existence’ interpretation of the pre-logical-subject string, as witnessed by the fact that both (47a) and (47b) are unacceptable, but the two put together firmly establish the spectator role of the speaker, and

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henceforth, the ‘existence’ interpretation of the pre-logical-subject string. We have shown above that the use of the progressive form in there-sentences helps establish the spectator role of the speaker/narrator, and thus contributes to the interpretability of the pre-logical-subject string as representing existence or appearance. The following examples show that the semantics of verbs is another factor that plays a role in the establishment of the spectator role of the speaker/narrator: (17) b. c. d.

e. f.

Late at night, there crept a silent band of soldiers into the small mountain village. In the afternoon, there proceeded a solemn cortege down the road to the cemetery. I couldn’t find anything so I switched chairs and in a few moments there crawled a small slimy gecko lizard off of my arm and onto the chair and the floor. There ambled two rabbits along the path. –/?There raced two boys through the garden.

Creep, proceed, crawl, and amble in (17b–e) are unergative verbs that describe the movement of their subject referents. They do not by themselves denote existence or appearance. But note that these verbs describe the manner of longsustained movements, and imply that the speaker/narrator intensely watched what was going on for some period of time. Therefore, the spectator role of the speaker is firmly established, and the pre-logical-subject string becomes interpretable as denoting existence or appearance. (17f) is acceptable to some speakers and awkward or marginal to others. This variation seems to derive from the fact that race can be interpreted either as representing a long-sustained movement, or as representing a rapid movement. The sentence is acceptable to those who can assign the former interpretation to the verb and establish the spectator role of the speaker of the sentence, and awkward or marginal to those who cannot. The following example shows that the presence of an adverbial in the prelogical-subject string in the there-construction that enhances the spectator role of the speaker can also help contribute to the interpretability of the string as denoting existence or appearance: (17) g. Suddenly, there sprang a snarling tiger from the bushes near the path.

Note that while spring is an unergative verb that does not denote either existence or appearance, the use of suddenly at the beginning of the sentence signals


that the speaker/narrator was surprised by a sudden turn of event, and thus makes the pre-logical-subject string interpretable as denoting appearance. Temporal adverbials at sentence-initial position often serve as surrogates for locative adverbials and contribute to the ‘existence/appearance’ interpretation of the pre-logical-subject strings which would be interpreted merely as representing actions without them. For example, observe the following sentences: (35) c. *There were arrested three rioters in the park. (48) a.

Before the illegal, unconstitutional ‘elections’ of 11 October 1992, there were arrested about 2 thousand citizens, among them well known Russian Moscow dissident Valeria Nowodvorskaya… (Open Web) b. In the year 1909 there were arrested and brought into court fifteen thousand young people under the age of twenty, who had failed to keep even the common law of the land. (Open Web)29

The presence of a temporal adverbial in each of (48a,b) signals to the hearer that the same location that has been talked about in the preceding discourse is under discussion, and helps establish the ‘existence/appearance’ interpretation of the pre-logical-subject string (i.e., there existed under arrest [in the location under discussion]). The unacceptability of (35c) in isolation, then, is attributable to the fact that the absence of a locative/temporal expression in the pre-logicalsubject string, as well as its lack of a story-telling overtone, makes it difficult for the hearer to interpret the sentence as part of a narrative about a particular location, and thus to interpret the pre-logical-subject as representing existence or appearance. In the Functional Constraint in (44) we have assumed that there-sentences that denote disappearance are unacceptable. This assumption has been based on the unacceptability of sentences such as the following: (49) a. *There vanished a diamond ring from this drawer. b. *There disappeared three ships last week.

Observe now the following sentences: (50) a. There had vanished from the dresser two rings left me by my mother.30 b. There had disappeared from the safe two diamond rings that her ex-husband had given her.

The above sentences focus on the result of disappearance — that is, they denote absence. Their acceptability shows that there is nothing wrong with there-sentences whose pre-logical-subject string denotes absence.

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The above observation naturally leads to the examination of negative there-sentences such as the following: (51) a. b. c. d.

There is no place like home. There has never been anybody like you. There doesn’t exist any conflict between the two countries. There had never ruled a king who was as miserly as King Midas.

The above sentences all denote absence, and therefore their acceptability is consistent with that of (50a,b). Now let us observe negative there-sentences that negate appearance: (52) a.

For the first time since the beginning of the war, there didn’t emerge any fighter squadrons from the airbases in the desert. b. For some American feminists, it has long been a source of frustration and perplexity that in France, there has never emerged a woman’s movement as vocal and vigorous as the one in America. (Collins Cobuild Corpus) c. There hasn’t appeared any new paper by Chomsky for the past few months.

The above sentences are all acceptable. This shows a marked contrast with the unacceptability of the negative sentences shown below: (53) a. *There never stood in the corner of this room an old-fashioned rocking chair. (cf. (3c)) b. *There didn’t appear any new fact in the meeting. c. *There didn’t emerge any new fact while we were working on the project. (cf. (36a))

In comparing (53) with (51) and (52), we note that (51a–d) and (52a–c) imply that the speaker/narrator (or the person whose point of view he/she is representing) has/had expected the existence or appearance of the logical subject referent. The sentences say that the logical subject referent, contrary to such an expectation, does/did not exist or appear at the location anchored to the speaker/narrator. In other words, the absence or non-appearance of the logical subject referent is/was noticeable to the speaker/narrator because of his/her expectation of its existence or appearance. The above observation is confirmed by the fact that sentences (53a–c) become much better if the event under discussion is described in the present perfect form or a negative emphasizer such as single is inserted, as in the following (capital letters represent primary stress):


(54) a.

There has NEVER stood in the corner of this room an old-fashioned rocking chair. b. There didn’t appear a SINGLE new fact in the meeting. c. There didn’t emerge a SINGLE new fact while we were working on the project.

The present perfect form in (54a) indicates that the speaker has observed the situation in question from a certain past time to the present. Further, primary stress on never implies that the speaker, the hearer, or a third party had expected a rocking chair to be situated in the corner of the room. (The effect of the use of the perfect form in negative there-sentences is also observable in (52b,c).) In (54b,c) also, the addition of the negative emphasizer single implies that there was an expectation that one or more new facts would appear. These expectations make the non-appearance of the logical subject referents noticeable to the speaker/narrator. Hence, these sentences become acceptable, just like (52a–c). Lastly, let us reexamine the ‘observability’ requirement stated in (44) that the string to the left of the logical subject in the there-construction must be interpretable as denoting existence (or absence) or appearance (or non-appearance) observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing). The ‘observability’ requirement relates to the interpretation of there-sentences as ‘presentational’ sentences. Presentational sentences represent personal experiences of the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing). Therefore, the ‘presentational’ meaning is clearly observed in the acceptable there-sentences we have discussed in this chapter, that is, in there-sentences that Aissen (1975) has called presentational sentences, which involve dynamic motion verbs (e.g., walk, jump, swim) or stative verbs of location (e.g., stand, hang, lie). However, when there-sentences simply postulate the existence of some entity or entities (what is often called ‘ontological’ or pure existential sentences), not representing personal experiences of the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing), they lose the presentational force, and henceforth the observability requirement. For example, compare the following two sets of sentences: (55) a.

In the middle of the sea battle, there arose a storm which neither side had anticipated. (= (4c)) b. There ambled two rabbits along the path. (= (17e)) c. In a corner of the room there smoldered a flag that some angry patriots had torn down and ignited. (= (23a))

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(56) a. There is God. b. There exists God. c. There are seven days in a week.

The sentences in (55) have a clear ‘presentational’ force, while those in (56) do not. This must be due to the fact that the latter sentences, unlike the former, do not take any locative phrases indicating where the speaker is, and simply postulate the existence of some entity or entities. The above observations lead to the following final formulation of the Functional Constraint on the There-Construction: (57) The Functional Constraint on the There-Construction (final): The there-construction is acceptable to the extent that the string to the left of its logical subject is interpretable as denoting existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance of the logical subject referent. In addition, when the construction has a presentational force, the existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance that the construction represents must be observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing).

2.5 Derivation of there-sentences We have shown in this chapter that all of the following there-constructions are possible: (58) ‘There + V + NP’ (inside verbals without PPs) a. There once lived a king who had no ears. (= (3b)) (unaccusative) b. There once ruled a king who had no ears. (= (17a)) (unergative) (59) ‘There + V + NP + PP’ (inside verbals with PPs) a. There exist a number of similar medieval crosses in different parts of the country (= (3a)) (unaccusative) b. In the afternoon, there proceeded a solemn cortege down the road to the cemetery. (= (17c)) (unergative) (60) ‘There + V + PP + NP’ (outside verbals) a. There came to his mind her beautiful and intelligent face. (= (11b)) (unaccusative) b. Suddenly there ran out of the bushes a grizzly bear. (= (12a)) (unergative)


We have further shown that even the following there-construction involving transitive verbs is possible: (61) ‘There + V + NP + NP’ There crossed her mind a most horrible thought. (= (21b)) (transitive)

The acceptability of (58b) and (59b) shows that the inside verbal there-construction does not serve as a reliable diagnostic for unaccusative verbs. It further shows that there is no justification in claiming that in this construction, the surface post-V position of the logical subject is identical to its position in the underlying structure. Now that we have shown that the derivations of these patterns (reviewed in Section 2.2) in the framework of the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) do not work, we need to show how they can be derived in a theoretical framework that does not depend on the unaccusativity/unergativity distinction of intransitive verbs. We need to forewarn the reader that our derivations are of a run-of-themill type, with not much of a surprise factor in them.31 We assume that all of the above patterns are derived from a phrase structure configuration in which the logical subject NP appears sentence-initially, to the left of the verb (i.e., the specifier position of IP). (This structure might not represent the underlying position of the subject for some verbs, but that is irrelevant for our analysis.) Subject extraposition optionally applies to this configuration, and extraposes the subject to the right of the VP. This sort of subject extraposition typically occurs in existential and presentational sentences. In many languages (e.g., English, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, French, Spanish) locative phrases precede the subject in these types of sentences, which shows that there is a universal discourse constraint to the effect that a discourse scene has to be established first in existential and presentational sentences, and then relevant characters are introduced into the scene (see Kuno (1972b)). Subject extraposition is thus regarded as a syntactic means of reflecting this discourse constraint. After subject extraposition, in the case that the VP contains a heavy PP, Heavy Constituent Shift can apply to the PP, which moves to the end of the sentence crossing over the extraposed subject. This derivational process can be represented as in the following:

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(62) a.

‘NP + VP’ Phrase Structure Configuration: IP NP

I¢ I

VP V

PP

i.

A number of similar medieval crosses exist in different parts of the country. ii. A solemn cortege proceeded down the road to the cemetery. iii. A young girl danced in the ballroom. iv. A good-looking young man danced with Mary. b. Subject Extraposition followed by there-insertion: IP NP there

I¢ I

VP VP

V

i.

NP PP

There exist [in different parts of the country] [a number of similar medieval crosses]. ii. ?There proceeded [down the road to the cemetery] [a solemn cortege]. (The slight awkwardness of this sentence for some speakers is due to the fact that the PP is much heavier than the logical subject.) iii. There danced [in the ball room] [a young girl]. iv. *There danced [with Mary] [a good-looking young man]. (= (40a)) (violates the Functional Constraint in (57))


c.

Heavy Constituent Shift (the VP-internal PP moves to the right crossing over the logical subject): IP NP

I¢

there

I

VP VP

PP NP

VP V

i.

There exist [a number of similar medieval crosses] [in different parts of the country]. (= (3a)) ii. There proceeded [a solemn cortege] [down the road to the cemetery]. (cf. (17c)) iii. *There danced [a young girl] [in the ball room]. (= (2a)) (violates the Functional Constraint in (57)) iv. *There danced [a good-looking young man] [with Mary]. (* due partly to misapplication of Heavy Constituent Shift to the light constituent with Mary, and partly to violation of the Functional Constraint in (57))

As shown in (iv) of (62b) and (iii) and (iv) of (62c), the Functional Constraint in (57) serves as a filter to block those sentences in which the string that appears to the left of the logical subject does not denote existence or appearance. We assume that the sentence pattern of (61) involving a transitive verb is derived in the following manner: (63) a.

‘NP + V + NP’ Phrase Structure Configuration: IP NP

I¢ I

VP V

NP

i. A most horrible thought crossed her mind. ii. Mary ate an apple.

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b. Subject Extraposition followed by there-insertion: IP NP there

I¢ I

VP VP

V

c.

NP (subject) NP (object)

i. There crossed [her mind] [a most horrible thought]. (= (21b)) ii. *There ate an apple Mary. (= (20a)) (violates the Functional Constraint in (57)) Heavy Constituent Shift (the object NP moves to the right crossing over the logical subject): IP NP there

I¢ I

VP VP

VP V

NPi (object) NP (subject)

ei

i. *There crossed [a most horrible thought] [her mind]. ii. *There ate Mary an apple.

Heavy Constituent Shift in (63c) has moved the first NP immediately after the second NP, and neither of the two NPs is marked with a preposition. The application of this sort of Heavy Constituent Shift is generally blocked, as shown in the following double object construction in which the indirect object (i.e., his brother-in-law) is heavy-NP-shifted to the right of the direct object (i.e., a car with a sunroof):


(64) a. John bought [his brother-in-law] [a car with a sunroof]. b. *John bought ei [a car with a sunroof] [his brother-in-law]i. (cf. John bought [a car with a sunroof] for [his brother-in-law].)

Hence, the above two sentences in (i) and (ii) of (63c) violate this syntactic constraint, and the unacceptability of these sentences results. We observe that the PP in the sentence pattern of ‘PP + there + V + NP’ is a slot where thematic PP adverbials are deposited. For the present purposes it does not matter whether it is dominated by the higher segment of IP that is base-adjoined to the lower segment of IP, or by the node traditionally labeled as S≤ (or E) (see Chomky (1977), Banfield (1973)). We tentatively employ here the former structure, and thus the ‘PP + there + V + NP’ pattern has the following derivational history: (65) a.

‘PP (Topic) + NP + VP’ Phrase Structure Configuration: IP PP

IP NP

I¢ I

VP

V

i. Deep within him an undying passion burned. b. Subject Extraposition followed by there-insertion: IP PP

IP I¢

NP

there

VP

I VP

NP

V

i.

Deep within him there burned an undying passion. (= (23c))

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We have thus shown that all the patterns of there-constructions have more or less the same derivational history, irrespective of whether the verbs employed are unaccusative or unergative (or transitive). The acceptability of the resulting there-sentences is crucially dependent on the Functional Constraint in (57).

2.6 Conclusion We have shown in this chapter that the widely held assumption that only unaccusative verbs denoting existence or appearance can appear in the inside verbal there-construction is untenable. We have shown that unergative and even transitive verbs can participate in this type of the there-construction. We have further demonstrated that the acceptability of there-sentences (both inside verbals and outside verbals) is primarily controlled by the Functional Constraint in (57) [i.e., ‘The there-construction is acceptable to the extent that the string to the left of its logical subject is interpretable as denoting existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance of the logical subject referent. In addition, when the construction has a presentational force, the existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance that the construction represents must be observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing)’]. That is, the acceptability of there-sentences is dependent not on whether verbs alone denote existence, absence, appearance or non-appearance, but on whether verbs, with or without accompanying locative scene-setters, denote observable existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance at the point the logical subject is introduced. We have also shown how various types of there-sentences can be derived in a theoretical framework that does not depend on the unergative–unaccusative distinction of intransitive verbs. Let us finally compare here the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) and our Functional Constraint in (57). The former is partially consonant with the latter in that it stipulates that the acceptability of (inside verbal) there-sentences is dependent on the notion of existence or appearance. However, the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) is untenable for the following six reasons. It has missed the fact that (i) even unergative verbs can denote existence or appearance when accompanied by locative scene-setters to the left of the logical subject NPs, irrespective of whether they are within the same sentences or in the preceding context, and (ii) even transitive verbs can do so if their objects represent locations. Further, (iii) the Unaccusative Restriction, which exempts outside verbal there-sentences from its application by stipulation, fails to explain why it


is generally the case that unergative outside verbal there-sentences with locative PPs between the verb and the logical subject (e.g., (18a) There ran out of the bushes a grizzly bear) are acceptable while unergative inside verbal there-sentences with locative PPs following the verb and the logical subject (e.g., (18b) *There ran a grizzly bear out of the bushes) are unacceptable. Further, (iv) the Unaccusative Restriction, assuming that the existence or appearance of the subject referent can only be denoted by verbs, has left outside verbal there-sentences totally out of consideration, in spite of the fact that they in fact have an important similarity with inside verbal there-sentences. It has further not taken into consideration the fact that (v) the acceptability of the there-construction is dependent not on the notion of just existence or appearance, but on the notion of existence or appearance observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing), and (vi) the acceptability of the there-construction is dependent not only on the notion of existence or appearance but also on the notion of absence or non-appearance (observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing)). Thus, it is clear that the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) does not capture the core of the acceptability of the there-construction, which we can conclude is not a pure syntactic phenomenon (as considered in the framework of generative grammar), but a functional, semantic, and discourse phenomenon.

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Chapter 3

The way construction and unergativity Coauthored with Karen Courtenay and Nan Decker

3.1 Introduction In English, there is a so-called (X’s/one’s) way construction, which has received much attention in the recent literature (e.g., Jackendoff (1990), Salkoff (1988), Levin and Rapoport (1988), Marantz (1992), Goldberg (1995), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), Kageyama and Yumoto (1998)). Observe the following examples of the construction: (1) a. b. c. d. e. f.

John yelled/shouted/moaned his way down the street. Mary danced her way through the park. Lisa swam her way to three gold medals. The Beatles sang their way around the world. The guys whistled their way out of the restaurant. Babe Ruth homered his way into the hearts of America. (Jackendoff, 1990: 212) g. … volunteers sneezed and coughed their way through years of tests … (adapted from an AP Newswire (1990) example cited in Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 199)

As observed in (1a–g), one of the characteristics of the way construction is that the verb, though intransitive, takes an object NP, one’s way, together with a PP (or an adverb) denoting a path such as down the street in (1a) and through the park in (1b). Therefore, the construction seems to deviate sharply from the argument structure that intransitive verbs generally take.1 As another characteristic of the way construction, Marantz (1992) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) have argued that all intransitive verbs that can appear in the construction are unergative verbs; no unaccusative verbs can appear (for a similar argument, see Kageyama (1995)). They have claimed that

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the way construction serves as a diagnostic for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. As discussed in Chapter 1, unergative verbs are (i) those describing willed or volitional acts, taking agents as their subjects (e.g., talk, walk, smile, skate); and (ii) those describing certain involuntary bodily processes, taking experiencers as their subjects (e.g., belch, breathe, sleep, hiccough). On the other hand, unaccusative verbs are (i) those whose subjects are semantically themes or patients (e.g., burn, sink, tremble, slip); (ii) those of existing and happening (e.g., exist, hang, emerge, happen); and (iii) aspectual verbs (e.g., begin, start, end). The verbs yell, shout, moan, dance, swim, sing, whistle, and homer in (1a–f) describe volitional actions of the subject referents, and sneeze and cough in (1g) describe involuntary bodily processes. Therefore they are all unergative verbs. In the following examples, on the other hand, since open, fall, and rise in (2a–c) are verbs whose subjects are semantically themes, they are all unaccusative verbs. Likewise, since occur, arrive, appear, and remain in (2d–g) are verbs of existence or appearance, they are also unaccusative verbs. Sentences (2a–g) are all unacceptable, in contrast to (1a–g) ((2a) is adapted from Jackendoff (1990:213), (2b–g) are from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995:148, 150, 156)): (2) a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

*The window opened / fell its way into the room.2 *The apples fell their way into the crates. *The oil rose its way to the top. *The explosions occurred their way onto the front page. *She arrived her way to the front of the line. *Andrea appeared her way to fame. *Jill remained her way to a ticket to the show.

We can formulate the observations made by Marantz (1992) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) in the following way: (3) Unergative Restriction on the Way Construction: Only unergative verbs can appear in the way construction. No unaccusative verbs can.

In Section 3.2 of this chapter, we will briefly review how the Unergative Restriction on the Way Construction (3) (henceforth the Unergative Restriction) is accounted for in generative grammar. In Section 3.3 we will demonstrate the following two facts: (i) There are unergative verbs that do not allow the way construction, and (ii) there are unaccusative verbs that do allow the construction. Since the Unergative Restriction in (3) does not state that all unergative verbs can appear in the construction, (i) only shows that the

The way construction and unergativity

restriction is insufficient to account for the acceptability of examples of the construction. But (ii) shows that the restriction is incorrect, and that therefore the construction cannot serve as a diagnostic for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. Then in Section 3.4 we will propose an alternative functional/ semantic account of the requirements that the construction must satisfy. In Section 3.5, further, we will observe how Jackendoff’s (1990) Conceptual Semantics-based analysis and Goldberg’s (1995) Construction Grammar-based analysis attempt to account for the acceptability of examples of the construction, and demonstrate that our functional/semantic analysis is more comprehensive than theirs, pointing out that they run into many problematic sentences.

3.2 Generative Grammar account As observed in the preceding chapters, the subjects of unergative verbs are assumed in generative grammar (particularly in the Government and Binding Theory) to take the specifier position of IP throughout the derivation; and therefore the D- and S-structure of (1a), for instance, is represented as in the following (see note 2 to Chapter 2): (4) D-/S-structure of (1a): IP NP John

I¢ I

VP V¢ V¢

V

PP NP down the street

yelled

his way

A PP denoting a path is an obligatory element in the way construction (i.e., *John yelled his way.), and therefore it is assumed to be immediately dominated by V¢, not by VP, V¢ nodes being recursive in the base (see Rizzi (1990: 121, fn. 19), inter alia).3 In (4), the subject NP John is assigned nominative Case by

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70


I(nfl); but since intransitive verbs are generally not Case-assigners, unless some extraordinary principle is invoked, his way will fail to receive Case, and sentences such as (1a–g) will violate the Case Filter, given in (5) (Chomsky 1981: 49): (5) Case Filter: *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case.

Burzio (1986) assumes that Burzio’s Generalization, given in (6), applies to unergative verbs as well. (6) Burzio’s Generalization: All and only the verbs that can assign θ-roles to the subject can assign accusative Case to an object.

Namely, Burzio (1986: 185) assumes that although unergative verbs do not subcategorize objects (i.e., do not necessitate objects) because they are intransitive verbs, they assign θ-roles (i.e., agent/experiencer) to their subjects, and have the ability to assign accusative Case. As a result of this, there will be cases in which an unergative verb can co-occur with an object that is not subcategorized for, and as an example of this Burzio provides a sentence such as He talked his head off./He talked my ear off. Based on this assumption, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 137) consider one’s way in the way construction as an object that is not subcategorized for, which can be assigned accusative Case. Hence in (4), in spite of the fact that the verb yell is intransitive and his way is not subcategorized for, the unergative verb yell assigns a θ-role (i.e., agent) to its subject John; and accordingly, based on Burzio’s Generalization (6), his way is assigned accusative Case. Levin and Rappaport Hovav maintain that this satisfies the Case Filter in (5), and that the acceptability of (1a) results. The same reasoning applies to the acceptability of (1b–g).4 Note that the structure of (4) is identical to that of sentences involving transitive verbs, and that therefore the above account predicts that not only unergative but also transitive verbs can appear in the way construction. This prediction is correct, since the following sentences involving transitive verbs are acceptable: (7) a. b. c. d. e.

He made his way into the room. (Goldberg, 1995: 207) Sue pushed/forced her way through the crowd. The water forced its way into the cracks. Gradually, the moisture found its way under the paneling. As the business community picks its way through the debris of the recent market crash, it is starting to reexamine the very raison d’être of Wall Street … (Wall Street Journal (1987) corpus)


In (7a–e), the transitive verbs make, push, force, find, and pick assign θ-roles to their subjects, and Burzio’s Generalization allows them to assign accusative Case to his/her/its way. Hence, the Case Filter is satisfied and the acceptability of (7a–e) results. As observed in the preceding chapters, it has been assumed in the GB framework of generative grammar that the subjects of unaccusative verbs, unlike those of unergative and transitive verbs, take the object position at D-structure and move to the subject position (Spec-IP position) at S-structure. Therefore, sentence (8a) involving an unaccusative verb, for instance, is derived as shown in (8b): (8) a. The window opened. b. IP I¢

e I

VP V¢ V

NP

opened

the window

Thus, the derivational process of (2a), for instance, can be represented as in the following:

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(9) a.

D-structure of (2a): IP I¢

e I

VP V¢ V¢

PP

V¢

NP

into the room

its way

V

NP

opened

the window

b. S-structure of (2a) — movement of the subject NP: IP I¢

NPi the window

I

VP V¢ V¢

V¢

PP NP

V

NP

opened

ei

into the room

its way

Note that in (9a) (i.e., the D-structure of (2a)) the subject NP the window takes the object position of the verb opened, as in (8b), and that they constitute the innermost V¢, which constitutes the intermediate V¢ with the object its way. As observed in (4), since a PP denoting a path is an obligatory element, into the room is assumed to constitute the uppermost V¢ with the intermediate V¢. In (9b) (i.e., the S-structure of (2a)) the subject the window, as observed in (8b),


moves to the specifier position of IP from the object position of the verb opened and is assigned nominative Case by I. Since open in (2a) is an unaccusative verb, it assigns a θ-role (i.e., theme) to its object NP the window in (9a) at D-structure. However, it does not assign any θ-role to its subject because it is empty at D-structure (see (9a)). Therefore, Burzio’s Generalization does not allow the verb open to assign accusative Case to the object its way in (9b), and the Case Filter in (5) is violated. Hence Levin and Rappaport Hovav maintain that the unacceptability of (2a) results. The same reasoning applies to the unacceptability of (2b–g).

3.3 Problems with the Unergative Restriction When we examine further examples of the way construction, we find the Unergative Restriction in (3) seriously flawed. First, despite the fact that the restriction stipulates that unergative verbs appear in the construction, there are many unergative verbs that cannot appear in the construction, as shown in the following:5 (10) a. *Joe walked his way to the store. b. *Bill walked/ran his way down the hallway. (Napoli cited by Jackendoff, 1990: 297, fn. 1) (11) a. *The kid jumped his way into the sandbox. b. *She jumped her way over the ditch. (Goldberg, 1995: 212) (12) a. ?*He swam his way from one end of the pool to the other. b. ?*She sang her way through some very complex Schubert songs. c. *John flew his way to San Francisco. d. *She dove her way into the fire. (Goldberg, 1995: 212) e. *Bill hid/crouched his way into the room. (Jackendoff, 1990: 213) f. ??Sally drank her way through the glass of lemonade. (Goldberg, 1995: 204)

The verbs in (10)–(12) (i.e., walk, run, jump, swim, sing, fly, dive, hide, crouch, drink) are all unergative verbs, just like those in (1a–f), describing volitional actions of their subject referents. In spite of this, all these sentences are unacceptable, in contrast to (1a–f). Hence, the Unergative Restriction in (3), as it stands, has nothing to say about the unacceptability of examples such as (10)–(12). Interestingly, the following sentences involving some of the verbs in (10)–(12) are perfectly acceptable:

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(13) a.

Gandhi walked his way across the country to win democracy for his people. b. The priest walked his way across the country to protest nuclear arms. c. The novice skier walked her way down the ski slope. (Goldberg, 1995: 205)

(14) a. The kid jumped his way to the sandbox. (cf. (11a)) b. Tomorrow, ladies and gentlemen, Evel Knievel will jump his way over this ditch. (this ditch = the Grand Canyon)6 (cf. (11b)) c. She jumped her way over the ditches. (Goldberg, 1995: 240, fn. 5) (cf. (11b)) (15) a. She swam her way to three gold medals. (= (1c)) (cf. (12a)) b. The Beatles sang their way around the world. (= (1d)) (cf. (12b)) c. Since Bob received his mail order wings, he has flown his way to San Francisco many times. (cf. (12c)) d. Sally drank her way through a whole gallon of lemonade. (cf. (12f))

While sentences (10a,b) involving walk are unacceptable, (13a–c) also involving walk are perfectly acceptable. The sole difference between the unacceptable (11a) and the acceptable (14a) is the prepositions: while into is used in the former, to is used in the latter. Sentence (11b) is unacceptable, but if this ditch is intended to mean a canyon like the Grand Canyon, or is used in the plural form, ditches, the resulting sentences turn out to be perfectly acceptable, as shown in (14b,c). While sentences (12a,b,c,f) involving swim, sing, fly, and drink are unacceptable, (15a–d) involving the same verbs are perfectly acceptable. It becomes clear from these contrasting examples that the acceptability of sentences involving the way construction is not simply dependent on the verb alone, but on the meaning of the whole sentence. A second, and more crucial, problem with the Unergative Restriction in (3) is the fact that there are many unaccusative verbs that can appear in the way construction, in spite of the fact that the restriction stipulates that no unaccusative verbs are compatible with the construction. Observe the following examples:7 (16) a. The avalanche rolled its way into the valley. b. The big rock rolled its way down the mountain. c. The barrel rolled/tumbled its way down the alley. (adapted from Jackendoff, 1990: 212) (17) a. Rainwater trickles its way to the underground pool. b. Blood dripped its way from his head to his shoulder, and from there to the ground.


c.

The stream oozed its way through the rock wall, and when the weather turned cold, the water froze to create an icy path. d. The problem was found to be caused by oil seeping its way through the pipe joint and collecting in a puddle on the floor. (18) a.

The excuse that you are 900 miles away is meaningless — I personally support the aircraft carrier Lexington on display in Corpus Christi and there is no hope that it will ever float its way up to St. Louis. (Open Web — the Railway Preservation News Message Board, December 17, 1999) b. There was something seriously wrong with the engine, but she carefully worked the gas pedal and kept to the side of the road, and in this way the car stalled its way along the street to her office. c. A steel rope snaked its way across the construction site. d. Volcanic material blasted its way to the surface. (Goldberg, 1995: 16) e. We hope they’ve repaired that MBTA bus No. 8946, Route 501, that was smoking its way down the Pike towards Newton at 6:15 p.m. last Monday…8 (Boston Globe, September 20, 1999, page B2) f. (This baby who flirted with death, who arrived for surgery eight months ago near the bottom of the Down syndrome growth chart, has made a stunning reversal. She is now in the 50th percentile for weight and the 75th percentile for height among children her age with Down syndrome.) Naia has even grown her way onto the standard growth charts…. (Boston Globe, December 10, 1999, page F3)

In (16a–c), nonvolitional events such as the avalanche rolling down the valley, the big rock rolling down the mountain, and the barrel rolling/tumbling down the alley are described. Similarly, in (17a–d) nonvolitional events such as rainwater trickling, blood dripping, the stream oozing through the rock wall, and oil seeping through the pipe joint are described. This is also the case with (18a–f). In short, the verbs employed in (16)–(18) (i.e., roll, tumble, trickle, drip, ooze, seep, float, stall, snake, blast, smoke, grow) are all typical unaccusative verbs, since they take nonvolitional subjects interpreted as themes. Thus, the Unergative Restriction in (3) predicts that sentences (16)–(18) should all be unacceptable; but contrary to this prediction, they are perfectly acceptable.9 Compare next the following examples: (19) a. *The apples fell their way into the crates. (= (2b)) b. John, a novice skier, pratfalled/bellyflopped/tumbled/tripped/lurched his way down the hill, while his girlfriend skied smoothly down.

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We observed in Section 3.1 that sentence (19a) (= (2b)) was claimed to be unacceptable because of the unaccusative nature of the verb fall, but the verbs pratfall, bellyflop, tumble, trip, and lurch in (19b) are also unaccusative verbs because the sentence describes John’s nonvolitional event of pratfalling/ bellyflopping/tumbling/tripping/lurching down the hill and ‘he’ is interpreted as a theme. In spite of this, (19b) is perfectly acceptable, in contrast to (19a). Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 156) judge the following sentences involving the unaccusative verbs roll and bounce unacceptable, and claim that their unacceptability further supports the Unergative Restriction in (3) (the examples and their recorded judgments are Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s): (20) a. *The pebbles rolled their way into the stream. b. *The ball bounced its way into the street.

However, all the speakers we consulted found (20a,b) acceptable. They have pointed out that the acceptability of such sentences becomes even clearer when they are placed in contexts as in (21a–c), and further there are actually attested examples from the open Web, as in (21d–f): (21) a.

She walked along scuffing her feet, and the pebbles she dislodged slowly rolled their way into the ditch beside the road. b. When the car door flew open, all the balls rolled out onto the sidewalk. The soccer ball bounced its way into the street and the whiffleballs landed in the gutter. c. The ball was bouncing its way into the street when a child saw it and ran after it. d. Wu Jin Qiang tried the same follow through posture, purposely holding that position for a long time and pretending that he was following the ball that’s still in flight, whereas in reality his ball had bounced its way to only a few yards away to his right. e. (Having flown numerous times on business without a problem, our customer was surprised to find that his Toshiba laptop wouldn’t boot. On contact with us, he finally mentioned that it had travelled in the cargo hold of a plane.) We had a nagging suspicion that it had probably not only been thrown around by the baggage handlers but also bounced its way down the carousel! f. We first tried to reach Silver Falls in late April, but about 3 miles up the road there were three boulders on the road and a huge, impassable gouge in the dirt road where an even larger boulder had bounced its way across the road into the creek.


Thus, the fact that many speakers find (20a,b) acceptable, and the acceptability of (21a–f), call the Unergative Restriction in (3) into question. We have already cited several real-life sentences involving unaccusative verbs (i.e., (18a,e,f), (21d–f)). We give below a few more such examples from corpus data (from the Wall Street Journal (1987) corpus, the Collins Cobuild corpus, and so on): (22) a.

Treasury Secretary-designate Nicholas Brady expressed optimism that the U. S. is growing its way out of its trade and budget deficits. b. They argue that the country has demonstrated its potential to grow its way out of the debt problem. c. By the time dawn leaked its way along the eastern horizon, he and his mount were alone and far from the city. d. A year came and a year went and another began to tick its way into the clock of time. e. He came to a stop and groaned as he felt the top of his boot tighten from immediate swelling. “Lew!,” cried Payton as he slipped his way down the hill, “You alright?”

Grow, leak, and tick in (22a–d) are unaccusative verbs because they take inanimate subjects interpreted as themes (i.e., the U. S., the country, dawn, another year) and describe nonvolitional events. Likewise, slip in (22e) is an unaccusative verb because it represents a nonvolitional act, with the subject as theme. In spite of this, sentences (22a–e) are perfectly acceptable and natural. Observe further the following examples (from the Wall Street Journal (1987) corpus, the Associated Press corpus, and so on): (23) a.

But it seems clear to us that the Third World debt crisis is wallowing its way into a new phase. b. A dispute is wending its way through the German courts on the question of stollen. c. A dark shadow inched its way along one of the walls of the Drum. d. Super-lean beef will take time to filter its way into the market. e. Even the ride home after a busy day at the office can be a pleasant task as many cycleways meander their way through picturesque parks or beside one of the city’s waterways.

The verbs wallow, wend, inch, filter, and meander in (23a–e) could be regarded as unergative if they took human beings or animals as their subjects and described volitional actions. But in (23a–e) these verbs take inanimate subjects interpreted as themes (i.e., the Third World debt crisis, a dispute, a darker shadow,

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super-lean beef, many cycleways) and describe nonvolitional events. Therefore they are considered unaccusative. One may claim here that sentences (23a–e) are instances of metaphor, with these inanimate subjects being personified (e.g., ‘John ran from Boston to Maine.’ Æ ‘This road runs from Boston to Maine.’), and that therefore the verbs in question are unergative. But this claim would amount to saying that even typical unaccusative verbs such as roll can be used metaphorically (e.g., ‘John rolled intentionally.’ Æ ‘The barrel rolled.’), and that they can be ambiguously unergative. This metaphor-based claim, since it cannot predict when metaphor works and when it does not, has no explanatory power and is difficult to maintain. In any case, it is clear from the above discussion that the Unergative Restriction in (3) is too strong in the sense that it incorrectly predicts all the acceptable sentences in (16)–(23) to be unacceptable.10 In this section we have shown that the Unergative Restriction in (3) is seriously flawed and untenable because it is too weak in some cases (see (10)–(12)), and too strong in others (see (16)–(23)). This shows that the way construction does not serve as evidence for unergativity. It also demonstrates that the generative grammar account of the acceptability status of sentences involving the construction, which depends solely on whether one’s way can be assigned accusative Case, does not capture its essence.

3.4 A functional account of the way construction Let us first observe the following sentences: (24) a. John laughed his way out of the room. (path) b. Mike moaned his way through the tunnel. (path) (25) a. *John laughed his way in the room. (location) b. *Mike moaned his way in the tunnel. (location)

The acceptable (24a,b), involving a PP denoting a path, mean that John/Mike moved along the designated path while laughing/moaning. More specifically, the PP out of the room in (24a) expresses the physical distance from the inside of the room to the outside, and the PP through the tunnel in (24b) also expresses the physical distance from one end of the tunnel to the other; (24a,b) mean that John/Mike moved through the whole span of this physical distance while laughing/moaning. This is understandable since (24a,b) can be paraphrased as in the following:


(26) a. John went out of the room laughing. b. Mike went through the tunnel moaning.

On the other hand, the unacceptable (25a,b) involve a PP denoting a location (i.e., in the room, in the tunnel). That is, a locative PP does not express a physical distance through which the subject referent moves, and this seems to be the reason for the unacceptability of these sentences. Note here that if his way is taken out in (24) and (25), the acceptability of (24) and the unacceptability of (25) are reversed, as shown in the following: (27) a. *John laughed out of the room. b. *Mike moaned through the tunnel. (28) a. John laughed in the room. b. Mike moaned in the tunnel.

This shows that one’s way is associated with a path phrase (see Jackendoff (1990) and Goldberg (1995)), and that this path phrase expresses a physical distance through which the subject referent moves. As shown above, in (24a,b) the PP out of the room and through the tunnel specify the physical distance from the starting point to the end point at the reference times and places, that is, the distance from the inside of the room to the outside, and the distance from one end of the tunnel to the other (see also Marantz (1992) and Goldberg (1995)). But in sentences such as the following, while some distance is indicated, the starting and end points of the distance are not explicitly specified (a similar observation is made in Kageyama and Yumoto (1997: 184–186)): (29) a. The car stalled its way along the street. (cf. (18b)) b. The storm howled its way along the shore.

Along the street in (29a) can be interpreted as referring either to the whole distance from one end of the street to the other or to just some salient section of the street, and this is also the case with along the shore in (29b). But some speakers feel that the former interpretation is primary, and therefore they find more natural sentences such as the following in which an end point is specified:11 (30) a. The car stalled its way along the street to her office. (cf. (18b)) b. The car stalled its way along the highway and finally died just as it reached the exit.

Consider the following example, however:

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(31) The storm howled its way along the Maine coast, and unexpectedly veered out to sea at Rockland. (cf. (29b))

In this sentence, the distance that the storm traveled was not from one end of the Maine coast to the other, but only as far as Rockland (which is located somewhere near the middle of the Maine coast). But the fact remains that the implication of the sentence is that the distance that the storm traversed was not of a trivial or common nature. What the above examples show is that a distance through which the subject referent moves must be specified in the way construction. Otherwise, unacceptability results, as in (25a,b). Further, the specified distance is perceived by the speaker to be of a nontrivial nature. (We will discuss this point later in this section.) In all the one’s way sentences we have examined up to this point, PPs are used to specify the distance through which the referent of the subject moves, but lexical adverbs can be used instead of PPs to specify the distance, as shown in (32) (the examples are from the Wall Street Journal (1987) corpus, the Associated Press corpus, and so on): (32) a.

But there’s no machine that can tie shoelaces or find its way home, or basically learn very much from experience. b. Solid material brought down from the surface melts or boils in intense heat beneath the Earth’s crust, becomes lighter and forces its way upward, erupting into the atmosphere in the form of ash, vapor and molten rock called lava. c. Nicole hesitates a moment, then slips to her feet, and slowly wanders her way northward for a bit of privacy. d. This is when the brave and strong hearted Scouts and Scouters rise to brave the early morning air to paddle their way along in the Water Dog swim.

A homeward direction is expressed in (32a), an upward or northward direction is expressed in (32b,c), and a forward direction is expressed in (32d), since the subject referent paddles forward in the Water Dog swim. Each of these sentences implies that a nontrivial distance is involved. From the above observations it has become clear that the PP or adverb in the way construction specifies or implies a physical distance; but if such a distance can be expressed by the sequence of the verb and one’s way alone, the PP or adverb is not obligatory, as shown in the following examples (from the Wall Street Journal (1987) corpus):


(33) a.

Horticulture was a new course so the staff were feeling their way just as much as the new batch of students. b. But it quickly hushes up as another group gropes its way, begging for assistance.

‘Feel/grope one’s way’ in (33a,b) roughly means ‘to make one’s way by feeling with outstretched hands’, and way here literally means a ‘pathway’ through which the subject referent moves. Thus, a certain degree of distance is involved in (33a,b), and a PP or adverb is therefore not necessary.12 So far, we have observed that the PP or adverb in the way construction, or the sequence of the verb and one’s way alone, expresses a physical distance, but there are examples in which a temporal or psychological distance is expressed, as in the following:13 (34) a.

George traveled his way through the ’60s, and worked his way through the ’70s. b. Harry gambled/rocked his way through the ’60s, and then later became a church preacher.

(35) a. Babe Ruth homered his way into the hearts of America. (= (1f)) b. Poison gas is pushing its way into the world’s attention these days.

Through the ’60s/’70s in (34a,b) specifies the temporal distance from the beginning of this period to its end (see also (1g)). Into the hearts of America in (35a) specifies the psychological distance from the state in which Babe Ruth had not been known to Americans at all to the one in which he was known and beloved by them all, and into the world’s attention in (35b) also specifies the psychological distance from the state in which poison gas had not attracted the world’s attention to the one in which it has (see also (23a)). Thus, we can assume that for the way construction to be acceptable, a physical, temporal, or psychological distance must be specified; in the following examples the PPs in/during the ’60s/ ’70s, in the hearts of America, and in the world’s attention do not express such a distance, and hence the unacceptability of the sentences results: (36) a. *George traveled his way in/during the ’60s, and worked his way in/ during the ’70s. b. *Harry gambled/rocked his way in/during the ’60s, and then later became a church preacher. (37) a. *Babe Ruth homered his way in the hearts of America. b. *Poison gas is pushing its way in the world’s attention these days.

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To summarize the above argument, we can suggest the following hypothesis: (38) In the way construction, a physical, temporal, or psychological distance must be specified, and the specified distance must be perceived by the speaker to be of a nontrivial nature.

It is often felt about the way construction that the subject referent has some difficulty in moving through the specified distance. This implication of difficulty is attributable to the fact that the distance is perceived to be of a nontrivial nature, as argued in (38). For example, (35a) has the implication that Babe Ruth had difficulty or hardship hitting home runs and becoming beloved by all Americans. This implication can be attributed to the nontrivial nature of this psychological distance. However, the way construction does not always involve this sense of difficulty, and in fact there are instances in which no sense of difficulty obtains (see, for example, (21b) and (23e)) (we will further discuss this point in detail in Section 3.5.2). In addition to (38), there are some other constraints that control the acceptability of the way construction. Observe the following examples: (39) a. The avalanche rolled its way into the valley. b. The avalanche rolled into the valley. (40) a. John belched his way out of the restaurant. b. John belched when he went out of the restaurant.

Sentence (39a), with its way, implies that the speaker visualized a gradual durative slide of the snow and ice into the valley. On the other hand, sentence (39b), without its way, does not imply such a detail, and simply says that the avalanche ended up in the valley. Similarly, sentence (40a), with his way, means that John belched during the whole time he was getting out of the restaurant, but in sentence (40b), without his way, no such meaning is conveyed, and in fact John may have belched just once as he got out of the restaurant. This suggests that the way construction implies a gradual durative process of the subject referent moving through the specified distance. A similar point can be observed in the following pair of sentences: (41) a.

When the car door flew open, all the balls rolled out onto the sidewalk. The soccer ball bounced its way into the street and the whiffle balls landed in the gutter. (= (21b)) b. She dropped everything she was carrying; the bag broke, and the ball bounced into the street.


In (41a) it is understood from the use of its way that the soccer ball bounced many times in the process of getting into the street. That is, the ball gradually moved into the street. In (41b), in contrast, no such gradual movement is conveyed, and the sentence says that the ball simply ended up bouncing into the street. To summarize the above discussion, we can hypothesize the following: (42) In the way construction the subject referent must be interpreted as gradually moving through the whole span of the specified distance.14

In connection with (42), let us observe (40a) and (1a) (repeated here) once again: (43) a. John belched his way out of the restaurant. (= (40a)) b. John yelled/shouted/moaned his way down the street. (= (1a))

As observed above, (43a,b) mean that John moved through the whole span of the specified physical distance while belching or yelling/shouting/moaning. Therefore, the verbs belched and yelled/shouted/moaned represent his manner of movement. We further note here that this manner of movement is perceived by the speaker to be unusual and unexpected. That is, in (43b) John yelled/ shouted/moaned during the whole time he was going down the street, and this manner of movement is perceived by the speaker to be an unusual and unexpected manner of going down a street. The same is the case with (43a). In short, it can be said that the function of the way construction used in these sentences is to suggest that the subject referent moves in an unusual manner through the whole span of the specified distance. Similarly, observe the following: (44) a. Harry gambled his way through the ’60s. (cf. (34b)) b. Babe Ruth homered his way into the hearts of America. (= (1f))

Sentence (44a) says that, unlike most other people, Harry spent the ’60s gambling, and in this respect it can be said that he gradually moved through this temporal distance in an unusual manner (i.e., by gambling). The verb gamble represents the manner of his movement. Similarly, sentence (44b) says that, unlike most other people, Babe Ruth, by hitting many home runs, moved through the psychological distance to the state in which he became beloved by all Americans, and therefore it can be said that he moved through this psychological distance in an unusual manner (i.e., by homering). The verb homer represents the manner of his movement. The above arguments, including (38) and (42), lead us to the following final hypothesis:

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(45) The Functional/Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction: The way construction is acceptable to the extent that i. it involves a (nontrivial) physical, temporal, or psychological distance; ii. the subject referent gradually moves through the whole span of that distance iii. in an unusual manner; and iv. the verb describes that manner of movement.

Before moving on to examine whether the Functional/Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction (45) (henceforth the Functional Constraint) can account for other examples, it seems necessary here to compare it with Jespersen’s (1949) and Goldberg’s (1995) generalizations made for the way construction, which are different from (45). Jespersen (1949: Part III, 233) states that the direct object one’s way in the way construction is an ‘object of result’, i.e., an object produced as a result of some action, and Goldberg (1995: 203), following this statement, argues the following: (46) The path through which motion takes place is not pre-established, but rather is created by some action of the subject referent.

As an illustration of this argument, observe the following examples: (47) a. The prisoner dug his way out of the prison. b. The hikers clawed their way to the top. c. The avalanche rolled its way into the valley. (= (39a))

We understand that in (47a) the prisoner created his own pathway out of the prison by digging through the ground, and that in (47b) the hikers also created their own pathway to the top by making handholds by clawing. In (47c), likewise, the path that the avalanche moved through was not pre-established, but it was one that the avalanche itself created. Thus, (46) is motivated by these observations. It must be noted, however, that Goldberg’s (and Jespersen’s) argument (46) results only derivatively from the Functional Constraint in (45). That is, one way to satisfy the unusual manner requirement proposed in (iii) of the Functional Constraint in (45) is to create a new, independent path. (47a–c) are instances of such a case, but in the following examples, the path that the subject referent moved through was not one newly created, but one that was preestablished: (48) a. John yelled/shouted/moaned/limped his way down the street. (cf. (1a)) b. John belched his way out of the restaurant. (= (40a))


It is clear in (48a) that the pathway down the street along which John moved had already been established, and was not newly created by his movement. The same is the case with the pathway out of the restaurant in (48b). As observed in (43), the unusual manner requirement is satisfied in these examples by John’s unusual manner of going down the street or leaving the restaurant (i.e., by yelling/shouting/moaning/limping/belching). Goldberg (1995: 203–206) further argues that because the subject referent creates his/her own pathway by his/her action (see (46)), the way construction (which has a ‘means’ interpretation (see Section 3.5.2)) involves the following implication: (49) The subject referent moves despite some external difficulty, or in some indirect way. (Goldberg, 1995: 204)

However, this implication of some external difficulty is also derivable from the Functional Constraint in (45). That is, the implication of difficulty can come about as a result of the subject referent’s movement through a nontrivial physical, temporal, or psychological distance in an unusual manner. However, we will show in Section 3.5.2 that there are examples of the way construction which do not have any implication of difficulty. From the above argument it must be clear that the semantic interpretations in (46) (Jespersen (1949), Goldberg (1995)) and (49) (Goldberg (1995)), which are often associated with the way construction, result only derivatively from the Functional Constraint in (45), and that they are not inherent meanings of the construction. Now let us examine whether the Functional Constraint in (45) indeed works, and observe first the following examples: (50) a. *John went/came his way to the bank. b. *Mary moved her way through the crowd.

In (50a,b) the PPs to the bank and through the crowd express physical distances, thereby satisfying (i) of the Functional Constraint in (45). But the verbs go, come, and move describe only the movement of the subject referents, and do not describe the manner of the movement, thereby violating (iv) of the constraint. As a result of this, the requirement (iii) — the subject referent moves in an unusual manner — is also violated. Hence, the unacceptability of (50a,b) results.15 The sentences must be expressed without one’s way, as in the following: (51) a. John went/came to the bank. b. Mary moved through the crowd.

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Observe further the following contrasting examples: (10) a. *Joe walked his way to the store. b. *Bill walked/ran his way down the hallway. (13) a.

Gandhi walked his way across the country to win democracy for his people. b. The priest walked his way across the country to protest nuclear arms. c. The novice skier walked her way down the ski slope.

In (10a,b) the PPs to the store and down the hallway express physical distances, and the verbs walk and run describe the manner of Joe’s and Bill’s movement. But in these sentences there is nothing that indicates that they moved in an unusual manner; walking (or running) to the store or down the hallway is neither unusual nor unexpected in daily life. It is a common, ordinary action. Hence (10a,b) do not meet the requirement (iii) of the Functional Constraint in (45), and the unacceptability results. They must also be expressed without his way, as in (51). In contrast to (10a,b), (13a–c) are perfectly acceptable, in spite of the fact that the same verb walk is used. In (13a,b), however, Gandhi and the priest literally walked across the country to win democracy for his people and to protest nuclear arms, respectively; and therefore they are interpreted as having gradually moved across the country in their own unusual manner (i.e., by walking), and not in a way in which people ordinarily move across the country (e.g., by taking trains, buses, or planes). Hence, these sentences satisfy the Functional Constraint in (45), and the acceptability results. (13c) also indicates that the novice skier walked slowly and carefully down the ski slope, and this manner of movement (i.e., walking) is different from other people’s manner of movement down the ski slope (i.e., skiing). Therefore the skier is interpreted as having gradually moved down the ski slope in an unusual manner, and the acceptability of the sentence results, satisfying the Functional Constraint in (45). In both (10) and (13) the verb walk (as well as run) represents a manner of the subject referent’s movement (see (iv) of (45)). That is, he/she moved through the specified distance by walking (or running). But in (10), since the distances to the store and down the hallway are common and trivial, no sense of difficulty is involved. By contrast, in (13) the specified distances across the country and down the ski slope are of a nontrivial nature; the distance across the country seems to be nontrivial for a person who walks across, and the distance down the ski slope also seems to be nontrivial for a novice skier who walks down. These facts derivatively give rise to the implication of “external difficulty”.


A similar account applies to the following contrast: (52) a. *John flew his way to San Francisco. (= (12c)) b. Since Bob received his mail order wings, he has flown his way to San Francisco many times. (= (15c))

Since people fly to San Francisco every day, John’s manner of doing so in (52a) is no different from other people’s manner of movement to San Francisco; the sentence does not show that he moved in an unusual manner. Hence the requirement (iii) of the Functional Constraint in (45) is violated and the unacceptability results. By contrast, in (52b) Bob bought a mail order light airplane kit and has been to San Francisco many times flying the light airplane himself. Therefore the subject referent is interpreted as having moved to San Francisco in an unusual manner, and the acceptability of the sentence results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (45). Observe further the following contrasting examples: (19) a. *The apples fell their way into the crates. (= (2b)) b. John, a novice skier, pratfalled/bellyflopped/tumbled/tripped/lurched his way down the hill, while his girlfriend skied smoothly down.

In (19a), although the apples fell and moved into the crates, their falls were instantaneous, and not gradual. Further, they simply fell into the crates, and therefore they are not interpreted as having moved in an unusual manner. Thus, the sentence violates (ii) and (iii) of the Functional Constraint in (45) and the unacceptability results. In (19b), on the other hand, since John, a novice skier, pratfalled/bellyflopped/tumbled/tripped/lurched down the hill, he is interpreted as having gradually moved down the hill in an unusual manner (i.e., by pratfalling/bellyflopping/etc.), and the verbs pratfall/bellyflop/tumble/ trip/lurch represent the manner of his movement (i.e., movement while pratfalling/bellyflopping/etc.). Hence, the acceptability of the sentence results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint. Observe further the following sentences: (53) a. The stroke patient limped his way down the hallway. (cf. (48a)) b. The drunk staggered his way down the hallway. c. The kid skipped his way to the sandbox.

The PPs in these sentences (i.e., down the hallway, to the sandbox) express physical distances. The verbs limp, stagger, and skip indicate that their subject referents moved in an unusual manner. Hence they are interpreted as having

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gradually moved through the specified distances in an unusual manner, and the acceptability results, satisfying the Functional Constraint in (45). (In this respect, (53a–c) are in sharp contrast to (10a,b).) Similarly, observe the following pairs of examples: (54) a. *He walked his way through the forest. (cf. (10a,b)) b. He minced/strutted/goosestepped his way through the forest. (55) a. ?*He swam his way from one end of the pool to the other. (= (12a)) b. He breaststroked/dogpaddled his way from one end of the pool to the other. (56) a. ?*She sang her way through some very complex Schubert songs. (= (12b)) b. She warbled/chirped her way through some very complex Schubert songs. (57) a. ?*Then to everyone’s amazement, the arrow shot its way directly to the bull’s eye. b. Then to everyone’s amazement, the arrow whizzed its way directly to the bull’s eye.

In the (a) examples of (54)–(57), walk, swim, sing, and shoot, all common and ordinary verbs, do not indicate that their subject referents moved in an unusual manner; walking through the forest or singing songs, for instance, is not unusual or unexpected. Hence these examples violate (iii) of the Functional Constraint in (45) and the unacceptability results.16 By contrast, in (54b), for instance, the verb mince/strut/goosestep tells us that the subject referent moved in an unusual manner (not simply walking but mincing/strutting/goosestepping). In (55b) also, it is shown that the subject referent moved from one end of the pool to the other not simply by swimming, but by breaststroking/ dogpaddling; the subject referent is interpreted as having gradually/slowly moved in an unusual manner. The same applies to (56b) and (57b). Hence the (b) examples of (54)–(57) satisfy the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. The acceptability of the following sentence can be explained in a similar way: (58) John slept/snored his way through most of Physics 101.

Students do not ordinarily sleep/snore in class; they usually listen to the lectures and study. But sentence (58) says that John actually did so, which is unexpected and unusual. Therefore the subject referent is interpreted as having gradually moved through the temporal distance of most of Physics 101 in an unusual


manner (i.e., by sleeping/snoring), and the acceptability of the sentence results, satisfying the Functional Constraint in (45). The Functional Constraint in (45) can account not only for the examples observed in this section but also for the sentences in (1a–g) (repeated here) ((1a) and (1f) were already accounted for above as (43b) and (44b), respectively): (1) b. c. d. e. g.

Mary danced her way through the park. Lisa swam her way to three gold medals. The Beatles sang their way around the world. The guys whistled their way out of the restaurant. … volunteers sneezed and coughed their way through years of tests …

In (1b) the PP through the park specifies a physical distance from one end of the park to the other, through which Mary moved in an unusual manner, that is, dancing, not in a way that people ordinarily go through a park. In (1c) also, the PP to three gold medals specifies the distance from the state of having no gold medals that Lisa had been in at the beginning of the swimming matches to the state of having won three gold medals, and she is interpreted as having gradually moved through this distance by swimming and winning three gold medals one by one. In (1d), similarly, around the world specifies a physical distance through which the Beatles moved in an unusual manner, that is, singing their songs. In (1e) also, the guys left the restaurant whistling, which is not the way that people usually leave a restaurant. In (1g) through years of tests specifies a temporal distance (i.e., from the beginning of the years of tests to the end), through which volunteers moved in an unusual manner, that is, by sneezing and coughing. As is clear from these accounts, the verbs in (1b–g) describe the manner of the subject referents’ movement. Thus the sentences in (1b–g) all satisfy the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. The acceptability of the following sentences is accounted for in a similar way: (7) a. b. c. d. e.

John made his way into the room. Sue pushed/forced her way through the crowd. The water forced its way into the cracks. Gradually, the moisture found its way under the paneling. As the business community picks its way through the debris of the recent market crash, it is starting to reexamine the very raison d’être of Wall Street …

(33) a.

Horticulture was a new course so the staff were feeling their way just as much as the new batch of students.

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b. But it quickly hushes up as another group gropes its way, begging for assistance.

Sentence (7a) means that John moved into the room by pushing the crowd or climbing over/under obstacles. That is, the verb make represents the manner of his movement and he literally ‘made’ a pathway into the room. Hence the subject referent is interpreted as having gradually moved through the specified distance in an unusual manner, and the acceptability of the sentence results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (45). In (7b,c), similarly, the verbs push and force represent an unusual manner of Sue’s and the water’s movement, and the movement by pushing and forcing a crowd and other obstacles is generally interpreted as gradual. Hence the Functional Constraint in (45) is satisfied and the acceptability of the sentences results. In (7d), likewise, the verb find represents the manner in which movement took place, because the sentence means that at every turn, the moisture had to look for and find a path eventually reaching to the back of the paneling. Since this kind of movement is necessarily gradual, this sentence also meets the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. In (7e) ‘pick one’s way’ means ‘to walk carefully choosing the place to put one’s foot down’ (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English), and the verb pick represents an unusual manner of movement because the sentence suggests that at every step the business community had to choose the best way to take. This kind of movement is also gradual. Thus the sentence satisfies the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. Next in (33a,b), as observed above, a certain degree of distance is implied, and the verbs feel and grope represent an unusual manner of movement. Further, the movement by feeling/groping one’s way is gradual. Hence, the acceptability of the sentences results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (45). Let us next observe the unacceptable sentences in (2a–g) (repeated below) ((2b) was already accounted for above as (19a)): (2) a. c. d. e. f. g.

*The window opened / fell its way into the room. *The oil rose its way to the top. *The explosions occurred their way onto the front page. *She arrived her way to the front of the line. *Andrea appeared her way to fame. *Jill remained her way to a ticket to the show.

In (2a), although the PP into the room specifies a physical distance, the subject referent the window simply opened/fell into the room, and no unusual manner of movement is represented. Hence the sentence violates (iii) of the Functional


Constraint in (45) and the unacceptability results. In (2c) the verb rose only shows that the oil simply moved to the surface of the water, and no (unusual) manner of the movement is represented; hence the unacceptability of the sentence results. This points to the fact that the verb rise (and a similar verb sink in this connection) is incompatible with the way construction, as illustrated in the following: (59) a. *John (slowly) rose his way to the surface of the pool. b. *The tanker sank its way to the bottom of the sea.

In this respect, the verbs rise and sink are quite similar to the verbs go, come, and move in (50a,b), which represent only the movement of their subject referents, and not the manner of that movement. Next in (2d) the PP onto the front page specifies the distance from the state in which the explosions had not been known to anyone to the state in which they were reported on the front page of newspapers. But the explosions are not interpretable as having moved through this distance, and their occurrences do not represent a manner of movement either. In (2e) the verb arrive represents an instantaneous event of its subject referent. This means that ‘she’ did not move (gradually), and that her arrival does not represent a manner of movement. In (2f) the verb appear also shows an instantaneous event (i.e., appearance) of its subject referent. Therefore, Andrea did not move (gradually), and her appearance does not represent a manner of movement. In (2g), since remain is a stative verb, neither gradual movement nor a manner of movement can be expressed. Hence the sentences in (2d–g) violate (ii) and (iv) of the Functional Constraint in (45), and as a logical consequence they also violate (iii) (i.e., if movement and its manner are not expressed, then no unusual manner of movement is expressed, either), and the unacceptability results. The Functional Constraint in (45) can also account for the difference in acceptability of the following sentences: (60) a. The kid jumped his way to the sandbox. (= (14a)) b. *The kid jumped his way into the sandbox. (= (11a)) (61) a. She jumped her way over the ditches. (= (14c)) b. *She jumped her way over the ditch. (= (11b)) (12) d. *She dove her way into the fire. (14) b. Tomorrow, ladies and gentlemen, Evel Knievel will jump his way over this ditch. (this ditch = the Grand Canyon)

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The preposition to in (60a) indicates that the kid went to the sandbox jumping repeatedly or jumping over some obstacle. The plural form ditches in (61a) indicates that ‘she’ went over more than one ditch, jumping repeatedly. Therefore, in these sentences the kid and ‘she’ are interpreted as having gradually moved through the specified distances, and the acceptability results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (45). On the other hand, the preposition into in (60b) and the singular form ditch in (61b) indicate that the kid and ‘she’ jumped just once, which is an instantaneous act of movement, and not of gradual movement. Hence these sentences do not satisfy (ii) of the Functional Constraint in (45) and the unacceptability results. The same applies to (12d); diving into a fire is also an instantaneous event, and no gradual movement is expressed. Hence the unacceptability of the sentence results. In (14b) ‘this ditch’ is intended to mean the Grand Canyon, and it is generally the case that people go over it by plane or helicopter. But this sentence claims that Evel Knievel, a daredevil motorcycle performer, intends to jump across the Grand Canyon on his motorcycle, which is an unusual manner of movement for traversing that distance. This kind of jumping, if possible, will take time and is an action of gradual movement. Hence the sentence satisfies the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. Observe further sentence (12e) (repeated here): (12) e. *Bill hid/crouched his way into the room.

Hide and crouch represent certain modes of being in a place. Therefore gradual movement is not expressed in (12e), and as a result, no (unusual) manner of movement is represented either. Hence the unacceptability of the sentence results, violating (ii)–(iv) of the Functional Constraint. Observe further the following contrasting pair of examples: (62) a. ??Sally drank her way through the glass of lemonade. (= (12f)) b. Sally drank her way through a whole gallon of lemonade. (= (15d))

The PP through the glass of lemonade in (62a) specifies the ‘distance’ from the initial state in which the glass was full of lemonade to the final state in which it was empty, but the sentence only says that Sally drank the glass of lemonade. In our daily life people drink glasses of lemonade every day, and so Sally’s drinking one is neither unusual nor unexpected. That is, (62a) does not indicate that she did something unusual or that she drank a glass of lemonade in an unusual manner. Hence the unacceptability of the sentence results. In (62b), by contrast, Sally drank a gallon of lemonade, which is unusual and unexpected. To do so,


furthermore, the act of drinking must be repeated, which is regarded as a gradual process. Hence the acceptability of the sentence results. Note that the distance specified by through a whole gallon of lemonade is of a nontrivial nature (see Section 3.5.2). Compare (62a) with the following sentences: (63) a. The patient sipped her way through the glass of lemonade. b. *The patient sipped her way from the glass of lemonade.

Sentence (63a) shows that the patient gradually moved in an unusual manner (that is, sipping) through the ‘distance’ from the state in which the glass was full of lemonade to the state in which it was empty. Hence the sentence satisfies the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. By contrast, the preposition in (63b) is from (not through), which does not specify the distance through which the patient moved; the sentence only says that she sipped lemonade from the glass. Hence the unacceptability of the sentence results. The Functional Constraint in (45) can further account for the acceptability of (16)–(18). For example, observe the following five examples: (16) c.

The barrel rolled/tumbled its way down the alley.

(17) a.

Rainwater trickles its way to the underground pool.

(18) a.

… there is no hope that it (= the aircraft carrier Lexington) will ever float its way up to St. Louis. b. The car stalled its way along the street (to her office). f. (This baby who flirted with death, who arrived for surgery eight months ago near the bottom of the Down syndrome growth chart, has made a stunning reversal. She is now in the 50th percentile for weight and the 75th percentile for height among children her age with Down syndrome.) Naia has even grown her way onto the standard growth charts…

In (16c) the verb roll/tumble represents the manner of the barrel’s movement. Its movement down the alley is considered gradual, and the barrel is interpreted as having moved in an unusual manner (i.e., by rolling/tumbling).17 In (17a) also, the verb trickle represents the manner of the rainwater’s movement. Its movement to the underground pool can be considered gradual, and the rainwater is interpreted as having moved in an unusual manner (i.e., by trickling). In (18a) the proposition that the aircraft carrier Lexington will move all the way to St. Louis by floating is being denied. This movement, if it takes place, is predicted to be a gradual movement through the specified physical

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distance in an unusual manner. Sentence (18b) suggests that the car moved along the street to her office by repeating a process of, say, slowing down, choking, stalling, and being restarted (or speeding up on its own). This kind of movement is of course gradual and is unusual. In (18a,b) the verbs float and stall represent the manner of the movement. Hence, the Functional Constraint in (45) is satisfied and the acceptability of the sentences results. Likewise, in (18f), the leading context makes clear that Naia has gradually moved along a nontrivial path from the bottom of the Down syndrome growth chart to the standard growth chart by continuing to grow. Thus the sentence satisfies the Functional Constraint in (45), and the acceptability of the sentence results. Finally, observe the following examples: (21) a.

She walked along scuffing her feet, and the pebbles she dislodged slowly rolled their way into the ditch beside the road. b. When the car door flew open, all the balls rolled out onto the sidewalk. The soccer ball bounced its way into the street and the whiffleballs landed in the gutter. c. The ball was bouncing its way into the street when a child saw it and ran after it.

In (21a) the pebbles are interpreted as having gradually moved into the ditch in an unusual manner (i.e., by rolling). In (21b,c), since the (soccer) ball moved by bouncing into the street, it is interpreted as having gradually moved through this distance in an unusual manner. The verbs roll and bounce in (21a–c) represent the manner of movement. Hence these sentences satisfy the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. In this section we have examined the controlling factors for the acceptability of the way construction, and observed that the construction becomes acceptable to the extent that it involves a physical, temporal, or psychological distance, the subject referent gradually moves through the whole distance in an unusual manner, and the verb represents the manner of that movement. From this observation it is clear that the acceptability status of sentences involving this construction has little to do with the unergative–unaccusative distinction, but is determined on the basis of the semantic content of the whole sentences.


3.5 Other accounts of the way construction 3.5.1 Jackendoff’s (1990) Conceptual Semantics Jackendoff (1990: Chapter 10) (see also Jackendoff (1992)) discusses the way construction within the framework referred to as ‘Conceptual Semantics’, and is particularly concerned with the conceptual structures of the construction and the nature of its syntax–semantics correspondence. In his discussion, he touches on the choice of verbs in the construction and argues the following (p. 213): (64) Jackendoff’s Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction: The verb in the way construction must either be inherently a process verb (e.g., eat, whistle) or else describe a repeated bounded event (e.g., belch, homer).

With the constraint in (64) in mind, observe the following examples (Jackendoff (1990: 211–213)): (65) a. b. c. d. e.

We ate our way across the U. S. She whistled her way through the tunnel. Bill belched his way out of the restaurant. Babe Ruth homered his way into the hearts of America. (= (1f)) Harry moaned his way down the road.

(66) a. *The window opened / broke its way into the room. b. *Bill hid / crouched his way into the room. c. *Bill slept / fell / blushed his way to New York.

Jackendoff attributes the acceptability of (65a–e) to the fact that eat and whistle are inherently process verbs, and that belch, homer, and moan describe repeated bounded events. On the other hand, he attributes the unacceptability of (66a,b) to the fact that “open and break are nonrepeatable events”, and that “hide and crouch are stative or unrepeatable inchoative” (p. 213). With regard to the unacceptability of (66c), Jackendoff (1990: 213) argues that although “sleeping, falling, and blushing are presumably processes”, they “are inherently homogeneous processes” and they do not describe “repetition of a bounded action;” hence the unacceptability of the sentence results. (We will further discuss (66c) involving blush directly in this section.) That is, Jackendoff claims that even if the verb is inherently a process verb, a homogeneous process verb does not qualify; it must describe repetition of a bounded action. Thus, the constraint (64) can be revised as in the following:

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(67) Jackendoff’s Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction: The verb in the way construction must describe repetition of a bounded event/action.

However, there are many examples that pose problems for the constraint in (67). For example, contrary to the constraint, even a single act is compatible with the way construction. Observe the following sentence: (68) a.

Tomorrow, ladies and gentlemen, Evel Knievel will jump his way over this ditch. (this ditch = the Grand Canyon) (= (14b)) b. John parachuted his way across the finish line.

Jump and parachute in (68) each describe a single act, but the sentences are acceptable or nearly so for many speakers. Hence, repetition of a bounded action is not a necessary condition for the acceptability of the way construction. Similarly, observe the following sentences:18 (69) a. Sam lied his way out of the jam. b. Bob finagled his way onto the team. c. The smuggler joked his way through customs.

In (69a), Sam may have told a single lie (see also Jackendoff (1990: 298, fn. 2)); in (69b), an event of Bob’s finagling may have taken place just once; and in (69c), the smuggler may have told a single joke. In spite of this, the sentences are all acceptable. Therefore, (69a–c) further suggest that a repeated bounded action is not a necessary condition for the acceptability of the way construction. What becomes clear from the acceptable examples in (65), (68), and (69) is that the acceptability of sentences involving the way construction, as argued in Section 3.4, hinges on whether the action represented by the verb covers the whole span of the specified distance (see particularly the discussion surrounding (24)–(25) and (39)–(42)), and not on whether it is repeated. Belching, homering, and moaning are momentary actions, and therefore, to move in such a manner through the whole span of the specified distance in (65), one must necessarily repeat these actions. On the other hand, jumping (over the Grand Canyon), parachuting, lying, finagling, and joking are continuous acts, taking some time, and therefore, one can move through the specified distance in (68) and (69), while carrying out these acts just once. Hence repetition of a bounded action is not obligatory in these examples. Jackendoff (1990: 213) states that sentence (66c) involving blush (repeated below) is unacceptable on the most prominent homogeneous interpretation of the verb: “maintain a blushing countenance”.


(70) *Bill blushed his way to New York. (cf. (66c))

But he goes on to state that “blush is ambiguous” and that “marginally, though, Bill blushed for hours can convey repeated blushing”. This means that sentence (70) is acceptable on this marginal interpretation. As is clear from the above argument, however, what is important is not whether blushing is homogeneous or repeated, but whether it covers the whole distance to New York. One generally blushes for a couple of minutes at the longest, but it takes a much longer time to get to New York. Therefore, for blushing to cover the whole distance to New York, it must necessarily be repeated. On the other hand, getting out of a room, for instance, generally takes ten seconds or so at the longest, and therefore in the following sentence Mary is interpreted as having gotten out of the room while blushing just once. And on this interpretation the sentence is acceptable: (71) Mary blushed her way out of the room.

Hence, Jackendoff’s constraint in (67) predicts that sentence (71) should be unacceptable on the homogeneous interpretation of the verb blush, but our Functional Constraint in (45) correctly predicts it to be acceptable. The Functional Constraint in (45) further accounts for the acceptability of (68) and (69) in the following manner: in (68) the PPs over this ditch (= the Grand Canyon) and across the finish line specify nontrivial physical distances, and jumping (over the Grand Canyon), and parachuting, though representing single acts, generally take some time and therefore are considered acts of gradual movement. The verbs jump and parachute represent a manner of movement. Hence each of the subject referents is interpreted as having gradually moved through the specified distance in an unusual manner, and the acceptability of (68a–b) results. In (69a) the PP out of the jam specifies a nontrivial psychological distance, and Sam is interpreted as having gradually moved through this distance by lying, which is an unusual manner of movement. The verb lie here represents the manner of his movement. In (69b), likewise, onto the team specifies a nontrivial ‘distance’ from the state in which Bob had not been on the team to the state in which he had joined it. He is interpreted as having gradually moved through this distance by finagling. This manner of movement is unexpected and unusual. A similar point holds of sentence (69c). Hence (69a–c) all satisfy the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. Another problem with Jackendoff’s constraint (67) is the fact that it fails to account for contrasting pairs of examples such as the following:

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(72) a. ??Sally drank her way through the glass of lemonade. (= (12f)) b. Sally drank her way through a whole gallon of lemonade. (= (15d)) (73) a. ?*He swam his way from one end of the pool to the other. (= (12a)) b. He swam his way to fame/three gold medals. (cf. (1c)) (74) a. *Joe walked his way to the store. (= (10a)) b. Gandhi walked his way across the country to win democracy for his people. (= (13a))

The (a) and (b) examples in (72)–(74) differ in acceptability, despite the fact that the same verb is used in each. However, the constraint in (67) cannot deal with the differing acceptability between these examples because it is only concerned with the kinds of verbs. From the above discussion it can be concluded that Jackendoff’s Semantic Constraint in (67) leaves many examples unaccounted for, and that it falls short of capturing the controlling factors for the use of the way construction. 3.5.2 Goldberg’s (1995) Construction Grammar Goldberg (1995: Chapter 9) (see also Goldberg (1996a,b)) examines the way construction within the framework referred to as ‘Construction Grammar’, and argues that a sentence such as (7a), repeated below as (75), is a conventionalized amalgam of two constructions: the creation construction, as in (76a), and the intransitive motion construction, as in (76b): (75) He made his way into the room. (= (7a)) (76) a. He made a path. (creation construction) b. He moved into the room. (intransitive motion construction)

Goldberg further argues that the way construction is divided into two distinct types with respect to its paraphrase: one in which the verb designates a means of motion, as in (77a), and the other in which the verb designates some other coextensive action of manner, as in (77b) (see also Levin and Rapoport (1988) and Jackendoff (1990)): (77) a.

For hours, troops have been shooting their way through angry, unarmed mobs. (means) = For hours, troops have been getting through angry, unarmed mobs by shooting. b. Joe whistled his way to the street. (manner) = Joe went to the street (while) whistling.


It has also been argued that the ‘manner’ interpretation is an extension of the more basic (or prototypical) ‘means’ interpretation.19 In Goldberg’s Construction Grammar framework, the two senses are related by a polysemy inheritance link, and the form is inherited from the means case by the manner case. In the case of the means interpretation, Goldberg claims that way is analyzable as a literal or metaphorical path that is created by the action performed by the subject referent (see (46)). She then claims that this “accounts for the fact that the means interpretation of the construction always entails that the subject referent moves despite external difficulty or in some indirect way” (p. 209) (see (49)). She attributes to this the difference in acceptability of the following sentences: (78) a. *Bill walked/ran his way down the hallway. (= (10b)) b. The novice skier walked her way down the ski slope. (= (13c)) (79) a. ??Sally drank her way through the glass of lemonade. (= (12f)) b. Sally drank her way through a case of vodka. (Goldberg, 1995: 204)

In normal contexts, just walking or running down a hallway does not involve any trouble at all. Goldberg thus claims that the unacceptability of (78a) results. On the other hand, (78b) implies that the novice skier had some difficulty getting down the ski slope. Hence she says that the acceptability of (78b) results. In (79a,b) drinking lemonade or vodka does not involve the literal movement of Sally along a designated path, but Goldberg regards such a case as a metaphorical extension of the literal use of the way construction. She says that even in this metaphorical case the contrast between (79a) and (79b) can be attributed to the fact that “it is much easier to construe drinking a case of vodka as requiring that some barrier be overcome than drinking a glass of lemonade” (p. 204); hence the difference in acceptability results. Turning to the case of the manner interpretation, Goldberg states that sentences such as (77b) “do not imply any external difficulty”, and that “the manner interpretation only entails that the subject referent moves along a (possibly pre-established) path” (p. 209). Thus, she says that “the way-phrase in direct object position is not [semantically] motivated” (p. 209). Before observing Goldberg’s analysis further, some response is due to her claim that the means interpretation involves external difficulty, while the manner interpretation does not. Observe first the following examples: (80) a. The novice skier walked her way down the ski slope. (= (78b)) b. Mary hopped her way down the street, humming ‘You Are My Sunshine’.

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As mentioned above, Goldberg argues that (80a) is interpreted as involving external difficulty because it has the means interpretation. Since the verb hop in (80b), just like walk in (80a), expresses bodily actions, the sentence is also considered as having the means interpretation. But the sentence does not imply that Mary moved “with some external difficulty or in some indirect way” (see (49)). She simply chose to go down the street in an unusual (and fun) manner. Conversely, let us observe (69) (repeated here): (69) a. Sam lied his way out of the jam. b. Bob finagled his way onto the team. c. The smuggler joked his way through customs.

These sentences are interpreted as having the manner interpretation, but the subject referents are clearly considered as having had some difficulty because they got out of difficult situations by lying, finagling, and joking. Hence it is clear from these facts that the interpretation of external difficulty, as we argued in Section 3.4, is secondarily derived as a result of the subject referent’s movement through a nontrivial physical, temporal, or psychological distance in an unusual manner, and is not inherent in the means interpretation of the way construction. (Further, the distinction between the means and manner interpretations is not necessarily clear, and in fact there are many sentences that can be interpreted in either way (see Jackendoff (1990: 214)).) Goldberg, after differentiating two types of the way construction, proposes the following three semantic constraints (pp. 212–214): (81) a.

The verb necessarily designates a repeated action (the same as Jackendoff’s constraint (67)). b. The motion must be self-propelled. c. The motion must be directed — it cannot be aimless.

She points out that (81a) applies to both the means and manner interpretations, while (81b,c) apply only to the means interpretation. Below, we will briefly review and comment on (81a–c) one by one, with some illustrative examples. Goldberg states that constraint (81a) can account for the difference in acceptability of sentences such as (82a,b), and for the fact that sentence (83) entails that there were a series of hiccups occurring over time, rather than a single hiccup: (82) a. Firing wildly, John shot his way through the crowd. (repeated firing) b. *With a single bullet, Jones shot his way through the crowd. (single firing)


(83) He hiccupped his way out of the room.

However, as we argued in Section 3.5.1, there are acceptable sentences that involve verbs expressing a single action (see (68a–b) and (69a–c)), and therefore (81a) is not a necessary condition for the acceptability of the way construction. What is at issue here is not whether an action is repeated, but whether the action covers the whole span of the distance specified in the sentence. According to the Functional Constraint in (45), (82a) is acceptable because John gradually moved, firing, from one end of the crowd to the other, while (82b) is unacceptable because a single firing is an instantaneous action that cannot cover the whole span of the specified distance. Constraint (81b) (i.e., the motion must be self-propelled) is claimed to be responsible for the unacceptability of sentences such as the following (p. 212): (84) a. *The wood burns its way to the ground. b. *The butter melted its way off the turkey.

Wood and butter are inanimate objects, and therefore their burning and melting are not self-propelled. Hence, Goldberg argues that the unacceptability of (84a,b) is attributable to the constraint (81b). The above account is clearly related to unergativity, and thus sentences (16)–(23), which pose serious problems for the Unergative Restriction in (3), also cast doubts on the constraint in (81b). Consider the following examples, for instance: (18) c.

A steel rope snaked its way across the construction site.

(21) a.

She walked along scuffing her feet, and the pebbles she dislodged slowly rolled their way into the ditch beside the road. b. When the car door flew open, all the balls rolled out onto the sidewalk. The soccer ball bounced its way into the street and the whiffleballs landed in the gutter.

(23) e.

Even the ride home after a busy day at the office can be a pleasant task as many cycleways meander their way through picturesque parks or beside one of the city’s waterways.

The subject referents in these sentences are also inanimate objects, and their movement is not self-propelled. It was propelled by some external force. In spite of this, these sentences are acceptable, and the constraint in (81b) fails to account for their acceptability.

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We must hasten to add that in (18c) the subject referent (i.e., a steel rope) did not literally move across the construction site, and that the sentence only describes the sinuous way that the rope was lying. But note here that the rope is metaphorically interpreted as having gradually moved across the construction site, and therefore the sentence satisfies the Functional Constraint in (45) and the acceptability results. The same is the case with the acceptability of (23e): although the subject referent many cycleways do not literally move, they are metaphorically interpreted as gradually moving through picturesque parks or beside one of the city’s waterways. According to the Functional Constraint in (45), on the other hand, (84a,b) are unacceptable because, given the verbs burn and melt, the sentences only suggest that the subject referents the wood and the butter change their states (i.e., the wood becomes ashes, and the butter changes from a solid to a liquid), and the meaning of their movement is difficult to obtain; it is difficult to interpret the wood and the butter themselves as having moved through the specified distances.20 Similarly, the following sentences, in which change-of-state verbs are used, are all unacceptable because it is difficult to interpret the subject referents themselves as having moved through the specified distances. (85) a. *The plastic fused its way onto the metal. b. *The water evaporated its way into the air. c. *The metal parts rusted their way to failure.

Finally, constraint (81c) (i.e., the motion must be directed — it cannot be aimless) is claimed to account for the unacceptability of the following examples (the recorded acceptability judgments are Goldberg’s) (p. 214): (86) a. *She wandered her way over the field. b. *She meandered her way through the crowds.

In these sentences, ‘she’ wandered over the field, and meandered through the crowd; the motion is nondirected and aimless. Thus, Goldberg attributes the unacceptability of (86a,b) to the constraint (81c). We agree with Goldberg’s judgment that (86a) is unacceptable, but we attribute its unacceptability not to the fact that ‘her’ motion is nondirected and aimless, but to the fact that the PP over the field specifies only a location in which an action of wandering took place, and that, consequently, the meaning of distance is difficult to obtain. With regard to (86b), we disagree with her judgment that it is unacceptable. In fact all the speakers we have consulted with have found the sentence perfectly acceptable and natural. Further, there are attested

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examples involving wander and meander that are acceptable, as in the following, and in each of these sentences the motion of the subject referent is nondirected and is clearly aimless due to the meanings of the verbs wander and meander: (87) a.

She wandered her way through the crowd in the Raven, no longer protected by LaCroix’s commanding presence… b. Mist wanders her way through the room, gradually closing in on the counter.21 c. He sighs, then watches the other hatchlings wander their way through the ranks of candidates. d. Even the ride home after a busy day at the office can be a pleasant task as many cycleways meander their way through picturesque parks or beside one of the city’s waterways. (= (23e))

Hence, it must be concluded that constraint (81c) is also difficult to maintain. To sum up this section: It is true that the way construction is paraphrasable with either a means interpretation or a manner interpretation. But Goldberg’s account of the acceptability of the construction is more complex than ours in the sense that the means interpretation is subject to four constraints (i.e., the subject referent must move along the designated path despite some external difficulty, and constraints (81a–c)), while the manner interpretation is subject only to constraint (81a). Moreover, it has been shown that (81a–c) run into many counterexamples and are hence untenable.

3.6 Conclusion In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter, we have shown that the Unergative Restriction in (3), held by Marantz (1992) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) (i.e., only unergative verbs can appear in the way construction, and no unaccusative verbs can) is incorrect. We have shown that there are unergative verbs that do not allow this construction, and that there are unaccusative verbs that do allow the construction. This shows that the construction cannot serve as a diagnostic for the distinction between unergative and unaccusative verbs. In Section 3.4 we have proposed the Functional/Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction (45) and have shown that the construction is acceptable to the extent that it involves a (nontrivial) physical, temporal, or psychological distance, the subject referent gradually moves through the whole span of the distance in an unusual manner, and the verb represents the manner of that


movement.22 We have also shown that Goldberg’s (and Jespersen’s) argument (46) (i.e., the path through which motion takes place is created by some action of the subject referent), and (49) (i.e., the subject referent moves despite some external difficulty) are derivable from our Functional Constraint in (45), and are not inherent in the construction. In Section 3.5 we have examined Jackendoff’s (1990) and Goldberg’s (1995) semantic accounts of the construction, and have shown that our analysis is more comprehensive than theirs, pointing out many crucial counterexamples to their analyses. In Chomskian generative grammar it has been assumed, as observed in Section 3.2, that the acceptability of the way construction is solely dependent on whether one’s way can be assigned accusative Case or not. That is, the construction is acceptable if an unergative verb is used, because it assigns a θ-role (i.e., agent) to its subject and accordingly, based on Burzio’s Generalization, one’s way is assigned accusative Case. It is unacceptable, on the other hand, if an unaccusative verb is used because it does not assign any θ-role to its subject and accordingly, one’s way is not assigned accusative Case, due to Burzio’s Generalization. However, as we have shown in this chapter, there are many unacceptable one’s way sentences that involve unergative verbs, and there are many acceptable one’s way sentences that involve unaccusative verbs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the generative grammar account of the acceptability of the way construction based on Case and Burzio’s Generalization is incorrect and does not capture the core of the phenomenon. We have shown that the acceptability of the way construction is determined by the Functional Constraint given in (45), irrespective of whether an intransitive or transitive verb is involved. Thus, it can be concluded that the acceptability status of the way construction is neither a phenomenon based on the unergative–unaccusative distinction and its structural difference, nor one based on the meanings of verbs alone, but a semantic and functional phenomenon in which the meaning of the whole sentence interacts with the function of one’s way.

Chapter 4

The cognate object construction and unergativity

4.1 Introduction In English, there is a so-called cognate object construction in which intransitive verbs take cognate objects, and this construction has received much attention in the literature (e.g., Poutsma (1926), Jespersen (1927), Visser (1963), Quirk et al. (1972, 1985), Jones (1988), Moltmann (1990), Massam (1990), Macfarland (1995)). Observe the following examples of the construction: (1) a. Mary laughed a sad laugh at the meeting. b. Bob grinned a sideways grin. c. Malinda smiled her most enigmatic smile. (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 40) d. Bill sighed a weary sigh. (Jones, 1988: 89) e. The wolf howled a long howl. f. Sue slept a sound sleep. g. Jack sneezed the most tremendous sneeze I had ever heard. h. He yawned a jaw-cracking yawn, finger-combed his damp hair, linked his hands behind his neck, and stretched. (from J. LaPierre, Unquiet Grave, p. 4 cited in Macfarland (1995: 2))

The verbs laugh, grin, smile, sigh, howl, sleep, sneeze and yawn in (1a–h) are generally used as intransitive verbs, but in these examples they take nouns of the same form; that is, the so-called ‘cognate’ objects. The cognate object construction, though a rather orotund style, as Quirk et al. (1985: 750) point out, is widely used in English. As one of the characteristics of the cognate object construction, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), Massam (1990), Larson (1988), Keyser and Roeper (1984), Omuro (1990), Macfarland (1995), and Miyamoto (1999), among others, have argued that all intransitive verbs that can appear in the construction are unergative verbs; no unaccusative verbs can appear. They have claimed


that the cognate object construction serves as a diagnostic for the unergative– unaccusative distinction. Unergative verbs, as already observed in the preceding chapters, are (i) those describing willed or volitional acts, taking agents as their subjects (e.g., play, speak, shout, work); and (ii) those describing certain involuntary bodily processes, taking experiencers as their subjects (e.g., cough, belch, hiccup, vomit). On the other hand, unaccusative verbs are (i) those whose subjects are semantically themes or patients (e.g., burn, drop, tremble, float); (ii) those of existing and happening (e.g., hang, remain, happen, occur); and (iii) aspectual verbs (e.g., begin, start, end) (see Chapter 1 for details). The verbs laugh, grin, smile, sigh, and howl in (1a–e) describe volitional actions of their subject referents, and sleep, sneeze, and yawn in (1f–h) describe involuntary bodily processes. Therefore they are all unergative verbs. In the following examples, on the other hand, since break, faint, fall, sprawl, sink, open, and melt in (2a–g) take subjects that are semantically themes, they are all unaccusative verbs. Likewise, since exist, stand, arrive, appear, approach, emerge, and come in (2h–n) are verbs of existence or appearance, they are also unaccusative verbs. Sentences (2a–n) are all unacceptable, in contrast to (1a–h) ((2a–d,h–k) are from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 40, 148, 150, 152); (2e,l,m) are from Keyser and Roeper (1984: 404); (2f,n) are from Omuro (1990: 76); and (2g) is from Macfarland (1995: 198).) (2) a. *The glass broke a crooked break. b. *The actress fainted a feigned faint. c. *The apples fell a smooth fall. d. *The city sprawled an extensive sprawl around the bay. e. *The ship sank a strange sinking. f. *The door opened its noisy opening. g. *The snow melted a slow melt. h. *Phyllis existed a peaceful existence. i. *The statue stood a heroic stance in the middle of the common. j. *She arrived a glamorous arrival. k. *Karen appeared a striking appearance at the department party. l. *We approached a strange approach. m. *It emerged a strange emergence. n. *John came an unhappy coming.

From contrasting examples such as those given in (1a–h) and (2a–n), Levin and Rappaport Hovav, Massam, Larson, Keyser and Roeper, Omuro, Macfarland, and Miyamoto have proposed a restriction such as the following:

The cognate object construction and unergativity 107

(3) Unergative Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction: Only unergative verbs can appear in the cognate object construction. No unaccusative verbs can.

In this chapter we will demonstrate that the Unergative Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction (3) (henceforth the Unergative Restriction) is incorrect, and consider the reason from a functional perspective that sentences such as (1a–h) are acceptable, whereas those such as (2a–n) are unacceptable. In Section 4.2, we will briefly review how the Unergative Restriction in (3) is accounted for in generative grammar. In Section 4.3 we will show that there are unaccusative verbs that allow the cognate object construction. This shows that the construction cannot serve as a diagnostic for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. In Section 4.4 we will propose an alternative functional account of the requirements that the construction must satisfy. As a further characteristic of the cognate object construction, Jones (1988) and Moltmann (1990), among others, point out that a cognate object cannot occur as the subject of a passive sentence, as shown below: (4) a. *A sad laugh was laughed by Mary at the meeting. (cf. (1a)) b. *A weary sigh was sighed by Bill. (Jones, 1988: 91) (cf. (1d)) c. *A terrifying scream was screamed by John. (Moltmann, 1990: 301)

The passive sentences in (4a–c) are unacceptable, and therefore it has generally been assumed that the cognate object construction cannot be transformed into passive sentences. We will briefly take up this problem in Section 4.5 and show that there are many passive sentences involving cognate objects that are acceptable. This shows that the claim made by Jones (1988) and Moltmann (1990) is incorrect. (This point has also been shown by Macfarland (1994, 1995, 1997).) We will then show that there is a certain characteristic of the cognate object construction that shows up only in passive sentences, and will revise our functional constraint in order to accommodate it. In Section 4.6, we will examine some syntactic properties of the cognate object construction.

4.2 Generative Grammar account As stated in the preceding chapters, the subjects of unergative verbs are assumed in generative grammar (particularly in the Government and Binding theory) to take the specifier position of IP throughout the derivation; and therefore the D-


and S-structure of (1b), for instance, is represented as in the following (see note 2 to Chapter 2): (5) D-/S-structure of (1b): IP I¢

NP Bob

I

VP V

NP

grinned

a sideways grin

The subject NP Bob is assigned nominative Case by I(nfl); but since intransitive verbs are generally not Case-assigners, the object a sideways grin will fail to receive Case unless some extraordinary principle is invoked, and sentences such as (1a–h) will be predicted to be unacceptable, violating the Case Filter, given in (6) (Chomsky 1981: 49): (6) Case Filter: *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case.

It is clear, however, that the sentences in (1a–h) are perfectly acceptable. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) attempt to account for the acceptability of the cognate object construction by means of Burzio’s Generalization, given in (7): (7) Burzio’s Generalization: All and only the verbs that can assign θ-roles to the subject can assign accusative Case to an object.

That is, Burzio (1986: 165) assumes that although unergative verbs do not subcategorize objects (i.e., do not necessitate objects) because they are intransitive verbs, they assign θ-roles (i.e., agent/experiencer) to their subjects, and thus have the ability to assign accusative Case. As a result of this, there will be cases in which an unergative verb can co-occur with an object that is not subcategorized for, and as an example of this Burzio provides a sentence such as He talked his head off./He talked my ear off (see Section 3.2 of Chapter 3). Based on this assumption, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 40, 137) consider a cognate object to be an object that is not subcategorized for that can nevertheless be


assigned accusative Case. In (5), since the unergative verb grin assigns a θ-role (i.e., agent) to its subject Bob, it can, in accordance with Burzio’s Generalization (7), assign accusative Case to a sideways grin, in spite of the fact that it is not subcategorized for. Levin and Rappaport Hovav maintain that this satisfies the Case Filter in (6), and that the acceptability of (1b) results (a similar account is given in Chomsky (1986a: 74), Nogawa (1996), and Matsumoto (1992)). The same reasoning applies to the acceptability of the other sentences in (1). It has been assumed in generative grammar that cognate objects are assigned not only accusative Case but also θ-roles (theme or patient) by the unergative verbs. Therefore, cognate objects are treated as being exactly the same as the objects of transitive verbs, which are assigned accusative Case and θ-roles (theme or patient) by those verbs. For example, Massam (1990) argues that cognate objects are direct objects, being assigned patient θ-role by the (intransitive) verbs. Similarly, Larson (1988: 386–387) maintains that unergative verbs are freely allowed to be “thematically reconstructed” as transitive verbs, as illustrated in (8) below (Larson (1988) assumes the VP-internal subject hypothesis in which the subject originates in the specifier position of VP and moves to the specifier position of IP at S-structure to receive nominative Case. YP in (8a) represents an arbitrary category). (8) Unergatives: Cognate Object Formation a.

b.

VP

John

V jump

Thematic intransitive Categorial transitive

V¢

NP

V¢

NP

VP

YP

John

NP

V jump

a mighty jump

Thematic transitive Categorial transitive

According to Larson (1988), the unergative verb jump in (8a), thematically an intransitive verb, is reconstructed as a transitive verb, as shown in (8b), and as a result of this, the cognate object a mighty jump is treated as a genuine direct object (for a similar assumption, see Nogawa (1996) and Matsumoto (1992)).1 It has been assumed in the GB framework of generative grammar that the subjects of unaccusative verbs, unlike those of unergative and transitive verbs, take object position at D-structure and move to subject position (Spec-IP

110


position) at S-structure. Therefore, sentence (9a) for instance, involving an unaccusative verb, is derived as shown in (9b): (9) a. The glass broke. b. IP e

I¢ I

VP V¢ V

NP

broke

the glass

Thus, the derivational process of (2a), for example, can be represented as in (10): (10) a.

D-structure of (2a): IP e

I¢ I

VP V¢

V

NP

NP a crooked break

broke

the glass


b. S-structure of (2a) — movement of the subject NP: IP I¢

NPi the glass

I

VP V¢

NP

V

NP

broke

ei

a crooked break

The verb broke in (10a) assigns a θ-role (i.e., theme) to its object NP the glass. However, it does not assign θ-role to its subject because that is empty at D-structure. Therefore, Burzio’s Generalization does not allow the verb broke to assign accusative Case to the object the glass, which is required then to move to subject position (see (10b)), and is assigned nominative Case by I(nfl). On the other hand, a crooked break cannot be assigned accusative Case by broke, and it cannot be assigned nominative Case by moving to the subject position, either, since that position is already occupied by the glass. Hence, sentence (2a) results in a violation of the Case Filter (6) and the unacceptability of the sentence results. The same reasoning applies to the unacceptability of (2b–n).

4.3 Problems with the Unergative Restriction When we examine further examples of the cognate object construction, we recognize that there are unaccusative verbs that can appear in the construction, in spite of the fact that the Unergative Restriction in (3) stipulates that no unaccusative verbs are compatible with this construction. Observe the following examples: (11) a. Mark Twain died a gruesome death. b. The general died the death of a hero. c. No one wants to die a horrible death.

The verb die is a typical unaccusative verb, taking a theme subject, since it represents a nonvolitional event concerning its subject referent. Therefore, the Unergative Restriction in (3) predicts that sentences (11a–c) should all be unacceptable; but contrary to this prediction, they are perfectly acceptable.

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Larson (1988: 386–387) and Macfarland (1995) assume that the cognate object construction serves as a diagnostic for unergative verbs, and argue that the verb die is an unergative verb because it can appear in this construction. It is clear, however, that the subject of the verb die is not an agent but a theme (or a patient). Therefore, to consider die as an unergative verb is quite contrary to the generally-held distinction between unergative and unaccusative verbs. Larson (1988) simply states that die is an unergative verb because it can appear in the cognate object construction. Macfarland (1995), on the other hand, makes this claim on the basis of the following two syntactic tests. The first test is based on Levin and Rappaport’s (1988) claim that while unaccusative verbs are compatible with the formation of adjectival passives, as shown in (12a), unergative verbs are not, as shown in (12b): (12) a.

Unaccusative verbs: wilted lettuce, a fallen leaf, a collapsed tent b. Unergative verbs: *a run man, *the coughed patients, *the swum contestant

She argues that since die cannot be used in the adjectival passive construction, as shown below, it must be an unergative verb. (13) *a recently died knight

The second of Macfarland’s syntactic tests for determining whether die is an unergative verb is based on Marantz’s (1992) claim that unergative verbs are compatible with the way-construction, as shown in (14), while unaccusative verbs are not, as shown in (15): (14) Unergative verbs: a. John yelled his way down the street. b. Mary danced her way through the park. (15) Unaccusative verbs: a. *The window opened its way into the room. b. *The apples fell their way into the crates.

She argues that since die can appear in the way construction, as shown below, it must be an unergative verb: (16) …for when you are lost in the cosmos, you are not lost in a place but in a condition. You could die your way out of it. You might, Percy implies, believe your way out, seeking a spiritual substitute… (J. Beatty, The New Republic, p. 38) (Macfarland, 1995: 197)


However, it is important to note here that neither of the above two syntactic tests works; there are unaccusative verbs that are not compatible with the formation of adjectival passives as shown in (17a–e) and conversely, there are unaccusative verbs that are compatible with the way-construction, as shown in (18a–f): (17) a. b. c. d. e.

*never-existed dragons *a suddenly come guest *a suddenly occurred idea *a recently happened incident *a still remained doubt

(18) a. The avalanche rolled its way into the valley. b. Rainwater trickles its way to the underground pool. c. Blood dripped its way from his head to his shoulder, and from there to the ground. d. The stream oozed its way through the rock wall and when the weather turned cold, the water froze to create an icy path. e. The problem was found to be caused by oil seeping its way through the pipe joint and collecting in a puddle on the floor. f. The driftwood floated its way to the south shore of the island.

Hence, adjectival passives and the way-construction do not serve as criteria for classifying die as an unergative verb. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is widely (albeit counterfactually) assumed in the theoretical framework in which Larson’s (1988) and Macfarland’s (1995) works are couched that unaccusative verbs are compatible with the there-construction, while unergative verbs are not: (19) Unaccusative verbs: a. There exist a number of similar medieval crosses in different parts of the country. b. There has just appeared another book by Chomsky. (20) Unergative verbs: a. *There danced a young girl in the ballroom. b. *There sang a tall middle-aged woman on the stage.2

Now, observe the following sentences in the light of the above claim: (21) a.

With the death of Sir Donald Bradman, there died the last surviving player to take part in the Test match at Adelaide whose events created a crisis of such magnitude. (Gerald Howat, Spirited Away, November 8, 2002)

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b. In 1938, the last year of the Moscow trials, there died or disappeared almost all the 80 members of the Council of War. (Arnold Beichman in The Washington Times, March 5, 2003)

In Larson’s and Macfarland’s theoretical framework, the acceptability of the there-sentences in (21a,b) implies that die is an unaccusative verb. This directly contradicts the conclusion that Macfarland derives from applying the way construction test to (16). Note, also, that Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1988) have hypothesized that unergative verbs can form agent nominals with -er, while unaccusative verbs cannot, and that this word formation can be used as a test for unergativity: (22) a.

Unergative verbs: runner, walker, swimmer, speaker, dancer, worker, prayer, sleeper, etc. b. Unaccusative verbs: *arriver, *appearer, *disappearer, *exister, *remainer, etc.

According to this hypothesis, the fact that dier ‘(intended meaning) a person who dies’ is unacceptable shows that die is not an unergative verb.3 This conclusion also contradicts the assumption made by Larson and Macfarland that die is an unergative verb. Proponents of the Unergative/Unaccusative Restrictions on the constructions under discussion might claim that die is ambiguous between unergative and unaccusative, that die as an unergative verb shows up in the cognate object construction and the way construction, and that die as an unaccusative verb shows up in the there-construction. But unless they can explain why die as an unergative verb fails to undergo agent nominal formation, and why die as an unaccusative verb fails to appear in the adjectival passive formation, there is no explanation in their theoretical framework as to why die displays conflicting behaviors. Blush is another verb whose categorization is unclear. Observe the following examples: (23) a. Mary blushed a deep/sudden blush. b. Catharine blushed a blush of anger. (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 160) c. Frederick, roused from his preoccupation, sprang to his feet, blushing the blush of shame. (ibid.)

As referred to in note 2 to Chapter 1, Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) state that the verb blush is an unaccusative verb because it represents a nonvolitional event of its subject referent and because the subject


receives the semantic role of theme (or patient). If this is the case, then the Unergative Restriction in (3) predicts that sentences (23a–c) should all be unacceptable; but they are perfectly acceptable cognate object sentences. However, it is also possible to argue that blush describes an involuntary bodily process, taking an experiencer as its subject (see note 2 to Chapter 1). In that case, the verb would be unergative. In this connection, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), contra Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984), consider blush to be an unergative verb (p. 160) because it appears in the cognate object construction, as in (23), and in the way-construction, as in (24), both of which they assume to require unergative verbs: (24) My 92-year-old mother would blush her way through this particular collection of stories, jokes and rhymes. (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995:160)4

It is interesting to examine here the behavior of blush in a construction which Levin and Rappaport Hovav have claimed can be used as a test for unaccusativity. Observe first the following contrast in the resultative construction (Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 35–36, 39)): (25) A. Unaccusative verbs: a. The river froze solid. b. The bottle broke open. c. The gate swung shut. B. Unergative verbs: a. *Dora shouted hoarse. (cf. Dora shouted herself hoarse.) b. *My mistress grumbled calm. c. *The officers laugh helpless.

Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: Chapter 2) have claimed, based on examples such as (25Aa–c) and (25Ba–c), that only unaccusative (and transitive) verbs can appear in the resultative construction, while no unergative verbs can (unless they take the so-called fake reflexives). Note here that blush can easily appear in the resultative construction, as shown below: (26) Linda blushed scarlet/crimson/pink.

Hence, Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s claim about the resultative construction as it applies to blush directly contradicts their claim about the cognate object construction and the way-construction as they apply to the same verb. We must hasten to add that Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2001) have since withdrawn their

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claim that only unaccusative verbs can appear in the resultative construction by pointing out that there are unergative verbs that can so appear (see (27a,b)). (27) a.

A 16-year-old girl said that while she was walking to work about 11 a.m. Friday, a man grabbed and groped her and tried to get under her clothing, but she kicked free and fled. (Staff, “Crime Reports”, The Courier-Journal, April 21, 1998, p. 05B) b. On the way to the speedway, one of his race cars wiggled loose inside the transporter and caused damage to both of his cars. (S. Rose, “Robby Gordon Finds Problems Again at Track”, The Kansas City Star, August 1, 1997, p. D11)

Therefore, the particular contradiction in their claims that we have seen above no longer exists. However, our general claim is still valid that the Unergative and Unaccusative Restrictions are inconsistent with each other because they make contradicting predictions about the categorization of the same verbs, which we have illustrated using the verb die.5 Now we move on to cases which pose even more serious problems for the Unergative Restriction in (3):6 (28) a. The tree grew a century’s growth within only ten years. b. –/?The gale blew its hardest blow yet in the next hour. (29) a. b. c. d.

The stock market dropped its largest drop in three years today. The stock market slid a surprising 2% slide today. Stanley watched as the ball bounced a funny little bounce right into the shortstop’s glove. The apples fell just a short fall to the lower deck, and so were not too badly bruised. (cf. (2c))

The verbs grow and blow in (28a,b) are typical unaccusative verbs since the growing of a tree and the blowing of a gale are nonvolitional events and since the verbs take theme subjects. Similarly, the verbs drop, slide, bounce, and fall are typical unaccusative verbs because the dropping/sliding of a stock market, the bouncing of a ball and the falling of an apple are all nonvolitional events also, and because these verbs too take themes as their subjects. Therefore, the Unergative Restriction in (3) predicts that the sentences in (28a,b) and (29a–d) should all be unacceptable; but contrary to this prediction, they are all acceptable.7 In this section we have shown, based on the acceptability of (11a–c), (23a–c), (28a,b), and (29a–d), that the Unergative Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction in (3) is incorrect. We showed in Section 4.2 that it is


generally assumed in the framework of generative grammar that the Unergative Restriction follows from Burzio’s Generalization about θ-roles and accusative Case in (7) and Chomsky’s Case Filter in (6), coupled with the hypothesis that the surface subject of unaccusative verbs originates in direct object position in underlying structure. The fact that the sentences in (11a–c), (23a–c), (28a,b), and (29a–d) are all acceptable shows that one or two (or all three) of these theoretical generalizations cannot be maintained.

4.4 A functional account of the cognate object construction It has generally been held in the literature that the cognate object construction is a construction in which intransitive verbs take as their objects only nouns cognate with them. But the verbs sing and dance, for example, take not only cognate objects, as seen in (30a,b), but also non-cognate objects, as shown in (31a,b). Therefore, these verbs have been considered to be transitive verbs, not as intransitive verbs: (30) a. John sang a Japanese song. b. Mary danced a Latin-American dance. (31) a. John sang a lullaby/the part of Carmen. b. Mary danced a jig/a piece from Swan Lake.

Thus, sentences such as (30a,b) have been distinguished from typical examples of the cognate object construction, and they have been treated as sentences in which transitive verbs have happened to take cognate nouns as their objects. It has often been pointed out (e.g., Baron (1971), Konishi (1981), Massam (1990)) that intransitive verbs, in contrast, can take only cognate nouns as objects, and that other nouns are incompatible with these verbs.8 Observe the following examples: (32) a. *Mary laughed a sad smile at the meeting. (cf. (1a)) b. *He laughed a cynical grin. c. ?*He smiled a silly grin. (Massam, 1990: 165) d. *The dog howled fierce barks. e. *Ellen sneezed a dry cough. f. *He died a glorious end. (Konishi, 1981: 12)

In these examples, the head nouns of the objects (i.e., smile, grin, bark, cough, and end) are not morphologically related at all, though semantically similar, to

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the verbs laugh, smile, howl, sneeze, and die, respectively. Thus, it has been claimed in the literature that the unacceptability of (32a–f) is attributable to the fact that the head nouns of the objects are not cognate with the verbs. When we examine further examples, however, we recognize, contrary to the above claims, that even intransitive verbs can take non-cognate nouns as their objects. In Section 4.4.1, we present some instances of the non-cognate ‘cognate’ object construction. In Section 4.4.2, we examine the semantic relationship that must hold between the verb and the cognate object, and propose a tentative functional constraint on the cognate object construction (whose final version will be given in Section 4.5). 4.4.1 Non-cognate ‘cognate’ objects Sentences (32a–f), as observed above, have been claimed to be unacceptable because the verbs take non-cognate objects. However, there are sentences in which non-cognate objects can appear. Observe, first, the following examples: (33) a. He smiled what I thought was a cynical smile. b. Rover barked what I would characterize as a friendly bark.

In (33a,b), the head nouns of the objects are what, though the cognate nouns smile and bark appear as part of the objects. Therefore, it is impossible to argue that (the head noun of) the object in the cognate object construction must be cognate with the verb. Observe further the following examples: (34) a. He slept a fitful slumber. (Horita, 1996: 241) b. Van Aldin laughed a quiet little cackle of amusement. (Agatha Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train, p. 19 cited in Omuro (1990: 76))

In (34a), the verb sleep takes the non-cognate slumber as the head noun of its object. Similarly, in (34b), the verb laugh takes the non-cognate cackle as the head noun of its object (see Omuro (2000) for similar examples). Thus, the acceptability of (34a,b) (and (33a,b)) disproves the claim that the head noun of the object in the cognate object construction must be cognate with the verb. 4.4.2 Cognate objects as ‘resultant objects’ Quirk et al. (1985: 749–750), presenting examples such as the following, point out that there are direct objects whose referents exist only by virtue of the


activities indicated by the verbs, and they call this type of object a ‘resultant object’ (Fillmore (1968) calls it an ‘effected object’): (35) a. b. c. d. e. f.

John made a box. The carpenter built the house. Mary has written a novel. Baird invented television. John has painted a new picture. They are designing a new car.

Note that in (35a–c), for example, a box, the house, and a novel are produced only as a result of the activities denoted by the verbs make, build, and write, respectively. Quirk et al. (1985: 750) distinguish between the notions of ‘affected objects’ and ‘resultant objects’ by using the following examples: (36) a. [affected object] I’m digging the ground. (theme/patient) b. [resultant object] I’m digging a hole. (result)

The ground in (36a) is an ‘affected’ object directly involved in the action of digging, while a hole in (36b) is a resultant object whose referent is produced only as a result of the action of digging.9 With the above point in mind, let us now observe the following examples involving cognate objects: (37) a. Sue slept a sound sleep. (= (1f)) b. Jack sneezed the most tremendous sneeze I had ever heard. (= (1g)) c. He yawned a jaw-cracking yawn, finger-combed his damp hair, linked his hands behind his neck, and stretched. (= (1h))

As is readily inferred from the above discussion, the cognate objects in (37a–c), just like the objects in (35a–f) and (36b), represent results of the actions denoted by the intransitive verbs. Sentence (37a) says that a sound sleep resulted from Sue’s sleeping; (37b) says that Jack sneezed, which resulted in the most tremendous sneeze the speaker had ever heard; (37c) says that ‘he’ yawned, which resulted in a jaw-cracking yawn. In short, the cognate objects in these examples are resultant objects whose referents are produced by the actions represented by the verbs. Similarly, observe the following examples: (38) a. Malinda smiled her most enigmatic smile. (= (1c)) b. Bill sighed a weary sigh. (= (1d)) c. The wolf howled a long howl. (= (1e))

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(38a) says that Malinda smiled, which turned out to be her most enigmatic smile. (38b) says that Bill sighed, which resulted in a sigh that showed he was weary. Similarly, (38c) says that the wolf howled, which resulted in a long howl. In a nutshell, in these examples the verb describes first what kind of action was performed by its subject referent, and then the cognate object describes what was produced by such an action. Thus, it can be concluded that ‘cognate’ objects are resultant objects and represent the results of the actions (or events) indicated by the intransitive verbs. That the cognate object construction focuses on the result of the action represented by the verb has already been pointed out in the literature. For example, Poutsma (1926: 76) argues that the cognate object “states the result or effect of the activity”. Likewise, Jespersen (1927: 234), in discussing the sentence “the King lived the life of an exile”, states that the cognate object is “a subdivision under the object of result: ‘the life of an exile’ is what resulted from his (manner of) living”. Quirk et al. (1985: 750) state that “a cognate object is similar to a resultant object in that it refers to an event indicated by the verb” (see further Visser (1963: 412) and Macfarland (1995)). Now, the assumption that cognate objects are resultant objects makes it possible to explain why (32a–f) are unacceptable, while (33a,b) and (34a,b) are acceptable. We notice that in the latter acceptable sentences the cognate object represents what naturally results from the action represented by the verb, while in the former unacceptable sentences this is not the case. In (34a), for example, slumber, though a literary expression, is a synonym of sleep, and a fitful slumber can readily represent a state or event resulting from the act of sleeping. In (34b), similarly, laughing can readily result in a quiet little cackle (‘a quiet little short high laugh’). The same applies to the acceptable sentences in (33a,b). Sentences with cognate objects are unacceptable when the cognate objects do not represent subsets of the possible results of the actions represented by the verbs. In (32a,b), the action of laughing necessarily involves accompanying sounds while the actions represented by smile and grin do not. Therefore, a sad smile and a cynical grin do not represent a subset of the possible results of laughing. Next, in (32c), the action represented by the verb smile generally shows happiness, amusement or friendliness, and therefore, what results from smiling must have one of these properties; but a silly grin lacks any such property. Hence the unacceptability or marginality of the sentence. This predicts that acceptability should result if silly in a silly grin is replaced by an adjectival expression that would imply happiness, amusement or friendliness. This prediction is borne out by the acceptability of sentences such as the following:


(39) a.

“Let’s wipe our brows and smile a graduation grin,” said Ms. Ator of Reisterstown. (from T. W. Waldron, The Baltimore Sun, cited in Macfarland (1995: 90)) b. …, and smiled his large, sunny grin. (from Stephen King, “Mrs. Todd’s Shortcut” in Slaleton Crew, p. 212 cited in Omuro (1990: 76)) c. He kissed her, smiled that quick boyish grin of his and left. (Sidney Sheldon, The Other Side of Midnight, p.262 cited in Omuro (1990:76))

Likewise, (32d) is unacceptable because fierce barks, i.e., fierce short sounds, do not represent a subset of the possible results of howling, which means making a long loud wailing sound. In (32e), coughing is essentially different from sneezing; and therefore, a dry cough does not represent a state/event resulting from sneezing. Finally in (32f), end basically represents the last part of something (e.g., a glorious end to one’s career), though it can mean euphemistically the death of a person. The sentence is unacceptable because a glorious end, instead of representing a subset of the results of dying, is a member of its superset. From the above discussion we can hypothesize the following constraint: (40) The Functional Constraint on the Cognate Object Construction (to be revised): In the cognate object construction, the cognate object (the whole NP) must represent a specific state or event that is a subset of the possible states/events resulting from the action represented by the verb.

In (40) and in the above discussion, we have used, following convention, the term ‘cognate objects’. As is clear from examples (33), (34), and (39), however, non-cognate nouns can appear in the construction. Therefore, the above constraint does not specify that the object NP must be headed by a noun cognate with the verb. Instead, the constraint attempts to capture the relationship between the verb and its ‘cognate’ object on the basis of the action and the possible resulting state/event. Note that the constraint is satisfied most easily when the head noun of the object NP is cognate with the verb (see the typical examples (1a–h) of the cognate object construction). The Functional Constraint in (40) can account for the fact, often pointed out in the literature, that a cognate noun necessitates some sort of modifier. Observe the following: (41) a. *Mary laughed a laugh at the meeting. b. *Bob grinned a grin. c. *Bill sighed a sigh.

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In these examples the objects are simply a laugh, a grin, and a sigh, and they do not represent subsets of the possible states/events resulting from laughing, grinning, and sighing. Hence, sentences (41a–c) violate the ‘subset’ condition of the Functional Constraint in (40) and the unacceptability results. (We will remove the ‘subset’ requirement in Section 4.5 and restate the Functional Constraint in such a way as to allow a whole set. We will then present a different explanation for the unacceptability of (41a–c)). The Functional Constraint in (40) can further account for the unacceptability of sentences such as the following: (42) a. *Whenever he smiles, he smiles a grin. b. *He grinned a smile at the meeting.

Smile and grin (‘a wide smile’) describe semantically quite similar actions, and therefore the state or event represented by a grin or a smile is not a subset of states or events resulting from grinning or smiling unless the object is accompanied by some sort of modifier (see (39a–c) and the following example). Hence, sentences (42a,b) do not satisfy the Functional Constraint in (40) and the unacceptability results.10 In contrast, observe the following sentence: (43) Nancy grinned a mischievous smile of recognition as she stooped to Ellen’s throat and undid the fastening of the cloak, and then shortly enough bade her “get up, that she might take it off.” (S. Warner, The Wide Wide World, p. 211 cited in Macfarland (1995: 90))

In this example, the object smile takes modifiers, and the whole NP is a mischievous smile of recognition, which represents a subset of the possible states/events resulting from grinning. Hence, the acceptability of the sentence results, in keeping with the Functional Constraint in (40).11 Let us next observe some of the unacceptable sentences given in (2) (repeated here), together with another unacceptable example in (44f): (44) a. *The glass broke a crooked break. (= (2a)) (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 40) b. *The actress fainted a feigned faint. (= (2b)) (ibid.) c. *She arrived a glamorous arrival. (= (2j)) (ibid.: 148) d. *Karen appeared a striking appearance at the department party. (= (2k)) (ibid.: 150) e. *It emerged a strange emergence. (= (2m)) (Keyser and Roeper, 1984: 404) f. *The accident occurred a sudden occurrence.


The verbs break, faint, arrive, appear, emerge, and occur in (44a–f) do not represent processes that may eventually lead to results, but rather results themselves. That is, they are all achievement verbs and describe the endpoints of activities or events (see Vendler (1967)). Therefore, the cognate objects in (44a–f) represent, so to speak, ‘the results of results’, which is contradictory. This violates the basic function of the cognate object construction, i.e., the verb represents an activity or event involving a temporal process (duration), and the cognate object represents a result (or consequence) brought about by the activity or event; hence the unacceptability of (44a–f). Before considering further examples, let us observe here an important difference between achievement verbs such as break, faint, arrive, appear, emerge, and occur in (44a–f) and activity verbs such as laugh, scream, and run. According to Vendler (1967), Dowty (1979), and Tenny (1994), the former verbs do not represent processes but endpoints or results, and therefore they are incompatible with durative temporal adverbials such as for an hour (but they are compatible with adverbials such as in an hour, which represents a point in time, and not a temporal duration); on the other hand, the latter, being activity verbs, are compatible with such durative temporal adverbials since they represent processes. Hence, the following differences in acceptability result: (45) a. *The glass broke for three minutes. (cf. The glass broke in three minutes.) b. *She arrived for an hour. (cf. She arrived in an hour.) (46) a. John laughed for three minutes. b. John ran for an hour.

Now, one might argue here that the above account of the unacceptability of (44a–f) cannot be maintained because the verb die can appear in the cognate object construction, as seen in (11a–c) (repeated here), in spite of the fact that it is an achievement verb (see (46a,b)): (11) a. Mark Twain died a gruesome death. b. The general died the death of a hero. c. No one wants to die a horrible death. (47) a. *She died for an hour. b. She died in an hour.

We must note here that the cognate object construction involving the verb die has historically a different derivational process from the ordinary cognate object

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construction. According to the OED (Oxford English Dictionary), the noun death in ‘to die a (specified) death’ represented instrumental in the Old English, and was used in the Middle English with various prepositions such as by, with, on, and in. It is in present-day English that death is used without a preposition. (In die a death, a was originally the preposition on and came to be treated as an indefinite article much later.) Thus, the whole object NP involving death does not represent a result of someone’s death; rather, die a specified death describes how someone dies. For example, sentence (11a) says that Mark Twain died in a gruesome manner; (11b) says that the general died in a heroic manner. Therefore, the whole cognate object NP describes a manner in which someone dies, and not something brought about as a result of someone’s death. Many studies have treated the cognate object construction involving the verb die as being exactly the same as the construction involving other intransitive verbs, but it is necessary to distinguish them and to recognize that they have historically different derivational processes. There is an important factor that determines the acceptability status of sentences with cognate objects. Compare (2c) and (29d), repeated below for ease of reference: (48) a. *The apples fell a smooth fall. (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 148) (= (2c)) b. ??The apples fell a short fall. c. The apples fell just a short fall to the lower deck, and so were not too badly bruised. (= (29d))

(48a), as observed by Levin and Rappaport Hovav, is unacceptable. This is undoubtedly due partly to the fact that its cognate object describes the manner, rather than the resultant event/state, of the falling of the apples. But (48b), which describes the resultant event of the falling of the apples, is still marginal. In contrast, (48c) is considerably better than (48b) and is acceptable to many speakers. This contrast must be due to the fact that while the speaker specifically explains in (48c) why he/she has chosen to mention the resulting event (i.e., a short fall) of the apples falling by saying that the apples were not too badly bruised, there is no such explanation in (48b). The impression that one has when one hears (48b) is: Why is the speaker mentioning the resulting event of the apples falling? In contrast, (29a,b), repeated below, are both perfectly acceptable without the speaker explaining why he/she has chosen to specifically mention the resulting event of the stock market falling:


(29) a. The stock market dropped its largest drop in three years today. b. The stock market slid a surprising 2% slide today.

The contrast between the marginal (48b) and the acceptable (29a,b) must be due to the fact that when the stock market drops (or rises), we conventionally pay attention to the resulting event with respect to how big the drop (or increase) has been, while when apples fall, we do not conventionally pay attention to how long or short the fall has been. On the other hand, (48c) is acceptable because it explains contextually why the speaker has chosen to mention the event resulting from the apples falling. From the above discussions we can hypothesize the following constraint: (49) The Functional Constraint on the Cognate Object Construction (to be further revised in Section 4.5): In the cognate object construction, i. the intransitive verb must represent an activity or event involving a temporal process, and ii. the object NP must represent a specific state or event that is a subset of the possible states or events resulting from the activity or event. N. B. ‘die a … death’ is an exceptional construction that has historically a different derivational process from the ordinary cognate object construction, and its cognate object represents the manner, rather than the result, of the event described by the verb. iii. the speaker’s specific reference to the state or event represented by the cognate object must be either conventionally or contextually justifiable.

It follows from the Functional Constraint in (49) that derived nominals, but not gerundive nominals, are used as the head nouns of cognate objects. This is because a derived nominal such as (a) yawn represents one specific activity bounded in time, while a gerundive nominal such as yawning (e.g., Yawning in class is really impolite.) represents a continuous activity; namely, atemporal abstract substance (see Langacker (1987: 91)).12 Therefore, derived nominals are count nouns, while gerundive nominals are not, as shown in the following: (50) a. a criticism of the book (derived nominal) b. *a criticizing of the book (gerundive nominal) (51) a. a proof of the theorem (derived nominal) b. *a proving of the theorem (gerundive nominal)

From this follows a contrast in acceptability such as the following:

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(52) a. Mary laughed a sad laugh at the meeting. (= (1a)) b. *Mary laughed a sad laughing at the meeting. (53) a. Bob grinned a sideways grin. (= (1b)) b. *Bob grinned a sideways grinning.

Sentences (52a) and (53a) involving the derived nominals laugh and grin satisfy the Functional Constraint in (49) and the acceptability results; (52b) and (53b) involving the gerundive nominals laughing and grinning, on the other hand, do not satisfy the ‘specific state or event’ requirement of the Functional Constraint in (49) and the unacceptability results. This shows that the unacceptability of (2e,f,n) (repeated here) is attributable to the fact that they involve gerundive nominals: (2) e. *The ship sank a strange sinking. (Keyser and Roeper, 1984: 404) f. *The door opened its noisy opening. (Omuro, 1990: 76) n. *John came an unhappy coming. (Keyser and Roeper, 1984: 404)

It also follows from the Functional Constraint in (49) that unacceptability results if the whole object NP represents the manner, rather than the result, of the action or event denoted by the verb. This accounts for the unacceptability of (2g,l) (repeated here): (2) g. *The snow melted a slow melt. (Macfarland, 1995: 198) l. *We approached a strange approach. (Keyser and Roeper, 1984: 404)

A slow melt in (2g) designates a process or manner of melting, and does not represent a result brought about by the snow’s melting. Similarly, a strange approach in (2l) designates a process or manner of approaching, and does not represent a result brought about by this activity. Hence, (2g,l) do not satisfy the Functional Constraint in (49) and the unacceptability results. It further follows from the Functional Constraint in (49) that stative verbs do not appear in the cognate object construction because they represent states, not activities or events, and therefore they are incompatible with the notion of ‘an activity or event involving a temporal process’ stated in (49). Hence, the unacceptability of (2d,h,i) (repeated below) is attributable to the fact that they involve stative verbs: (2) d. *The city sprawled an extensive sprawl around the bay. h. *Phyllis existed a peaceful existence. i. *The statue stood a heroic stance in the middle of the common.

Since sprawl, exist, and stand are all stative verbs, the sentences in (2d,h,i) do not satisfy the Functional Constraint in (49) and the unacceptability results.


4.5 Passive sentences involving cognate objects As observed in (4a–c) of Section 4.1 (repeated below), Jones (1988) and Moltmann (1990) have claimed that cognate objects cannot occur as the subject of passive sentences: (4) a. *A sad laugh was laughed by Mary at the meeting. (cf. (1a)) b. *A weary sigh was sighed by Bill. (Jones, 1988: 91) (cf. (1d)) c. *A terrifying scream was screamed by John. (Moltmann, 1990: 301)

However, as already pointed out by Macfarland (1994, 1995, 1997) (see also Langacker (1991) and Rice (1987a)), there are many passive sentences involving cognate objects that are acceptable. Observe the following: (54) a.

…when the Giants announced Phil Simms as their first-round draft pick in 1979, I say: The last laugh has now been laughed, and was it ever a long one! (D. Hickman, New York Times January 31, 1987, 26, cited in Macfarland (1997: 3)) b. It is a smile that could be smiled by the whole country. (N. Woodsworth, Financial Times August 25, 1990, IX, cited in Macfarland (1997: 3)) c. The blood-curdling scream that they had all heard in countless horror movies was screamed by one of the campers. (Langacker, 1991: 363) d. That precise scream was screamed by the murder victim. (ibid.)

Why is it the case that while the passive sentences in (4a–c) are unacceptable, those in (54a–d) are acceptable? This seems to be attributable to the difference in the information structure of the passive sentences between (4a–c) and (54a–d). Generally speaking, while active sentences are unmarked, passive ones are marked, and therefore there are reasons why speakers use marked passive sentences. One of the reasons is to conform to the Flow-of-Information Principle, i.e., elements in a sentence are ordinarily arranged in the order of older (less important) information to newer (more important) information. In other words, the subject of a passive sentence generally serves as the topic (old information) in the discourse, and the by-phrase serves to introduce new information. When the by-phrase refers to ordinary nonspecific people or to unspecified agents (e.g., by someone), it is generally deleted since it does not convey useful new information (see also Macfarland (1995: 178–182)). This indicates that definite NPs tend to occur as the surface subject of passive sentences, while indefinite NPs tend to occur in the by-phrase when it is overtly expressed.


With this point in mind, let us observe (4a–c). The subjects in these passive sentences are all indefinite NPs (i.e., a sad laugh, a weary sigh, a terrifying scream), and are introduced into the discourses for the first time. Thus, they do not serve as the topics in the discourses. Moreover, the NP in the by-phrase is a definite NP (i.e., Mary, Bill, John). Thus, the information structure in (4a–c) sharply deviates from the information structure generally imposed on passive sentences; hence the unacceptability of the sentences results. On the other hand, the subjects in (54a–d) are all definite NPs, as shown by the use of the definite article the or the demonstrative pronoun that (i.e., the last laugh, (relativized) the smile, the blood-curdling scream that they had all heard in countless horror movies, that precise scream); they have been already introduced into the discourses or their referents can be easily identified from the preceding contexts. Thus, they serve as the topics in the discourses. Moreover, the referent of the by-phrase in (54a) is deleted, and that in (54c) is indefinite and conveys new information. Although the by-phrase in (54b,d) is definite since its referent can be identified by the hearer, it conveys new information because the hearer had not previously known that it was the referent of the by-phrase that laughed or screamed. Hence, (54a–d) conform to the information structure imposed on passive sentences and the acceptability results. Note here that there are passive sentences whose subjects are indefinite. Observe the following sentences from the open Web (We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for these examples): (55) a. Pictures were taken, laughs were laughed, food was eaten. b. And the crowd responded with such outpourings of enthusiasm as I have never before witnessed. Screams were screamed, cheers cheered, sighs sighed, underwear thrown. c. Everyone looks back on their childhood and no one can say it was all bad or all good because it’s both and that’s what makes it a happy childhood. Laughs are laughed, and some cheeks blush, but the memoirs of our youth is what has molded us into what we are today.

Why are these examples acceptable, in spite of the fact that the subjects are indefinite NPs (laughs, screams, cheers, sighs, a scream)? Because the agents in these passive sentences are not overtly expressed (i.e., they are agentless passives). In these examples the referents of the by-phrases are already understood as the people or crowd in question, and therefore their overt expressions will lead to unnatural passive sentences (e.g., ??Laughs were laughed by (the) people., ??Screams were screamed by the crowd.). Thus, the by-phrases in these


sentences are omitted in accordance with the information structure of passive sentences. Then, these sentences describe as new information the fact that actions such as laughing or screaming were performed. When the speaker does not overtly express the agent of an action, and simply indicates that such an action was performed, it must be the case that he/she has to use a passive sentence with a cognate object as its subject. Hence, the passive sentences in (55) are acceptable, in spite of the fact that the surface subjects are indefinite NPs. What contributes further to the acceptability of the cognate object passive sentences in (55) is the juxtaposition of agentless sentences. In (55a) and (55b), cognate object passive sentences co-occur with agentless transitive-verb passive sentences. Likewise, in (55c), a cognate object passive sentence is followed by an agentless inchoative sentence. The presence of agentless transitive-verb passives and agentless inchoative sentences in these examples reinforces the justification for the passivization of cognate object sentences. From the above discussion it is clear that it is not possible to maintain the claim made by Jones (1988) and Moltmann (1990) that cognate objects cannot be passivized. The acceptability of the above sentences shows that the cognate objects in these sentences are real objects/arguments, and not adjuncts, of the verbs. The reader may already have noticed by now that the cognate object passive sentences in (55) do not satisfy the subset condition in (49) (i.e., the object NP must represent a specific state or event that is a subset of the possible states or events resulting from the activity or event). We attribute this to the fact that while cognate object NPs without modifiers (e.g., *they laughed laughs) are unacceptable in active sentences because they are semantically tautological and serve no useful purpose, they are acceptable in passive sentences (e.g., laughs were laughed) because here they do perform a useful function: passivization would not be possible without cognate objects (e.g., They laughed).13 The above observation necessitates the revision of the Functional Constraint on the Cognate Object Construction in (49) in the following way: (56) The Functional Constraint on the Cognate Object Construction: A. In the cognate object construction, i. the intransitive verb must represent an activity or event involving a temporal process, and ii. the object NP must represent a specific state or event that belongs to the set of the possible states or events resulting from the activity or event. N.B. ‘die a … death’ is an exceptional construction that has historically a different derivational process from the ordinary cognate


object construction, and its cognate object represents the manner, rather than the result, of the event described by the verb. B. The Cognate Object Construction is a marked construction, and its use must be justifiable: iii. the speaker’s specific reference to the state or event represented by the cognate object must be either conventionally or contextually justifiable; iv. in active sentences, if a cognate object does not have a modifier, as in laugh laughs, it is tautological and therefore, there is no justification for its use. On the other hand, in the passive construction, a cognate object without a modifier is acceptable as long as Passivization is justifiable.

4.6 Some syntactic properties of cognate objects It has been claimed in the literature that sentences such as (57a,b) are cognate object sentences, and those such as (58a,b) are ordinary transitive verb sentences that happen to have objects cognate with the verbs: (57) a. Mary laughed a sad laugh at the meeting. (= (1a)) b. The wolf howled a long howl. (= (1e)) (58) a. John sang a Japanese song. (= (30a)) b. Mary danced a Latin-American dance. (= (30b))

As evidence for this claim, it has often been argued that while the former verbs cannot take non-cognate objects, as shown in (59), the latter can readily take non-cognate objects, as shown in (60). (59) a. *Mary laughed a sad smile at the meeting. (= (32a)) b. *The wolf howled fierce barks. (cf. (32d)) (60) a. John sang a lullaby/the part of Carmen. (= (31a)) b. Mary danced a jig/a piece from Swan Lake. (= (31b))

However, as we made clear in Section 4.4.1, even the former verbs can take morphologically non-cognate nouns as their objects, and therefore the above argument cannot be maintained. The Functional Constraint in (56) makes it possible to determine that (58a,b) and (60a,b) are not examples of the cognate object construction. The object NPs in these sentences can readily refer to things that had pre-existed


before singing and dancing took place. In other words, the object NPs in these sentences are not ‘resultant’ objects, and therefore these sentences are not instances of the cognate object construction. Some of the most frequently occurring cognate object sentences involve the verb live. Observe the following sentences:14 (61) a. He lived la dolce vita. (la dolce vita = the sweet life) b. “Living la vida loca” (la vida loca = the crazy life) (the title of a popular pop song by Ricky Martin) c. Going to New Zealand will be living a fantasy he’s had for decades. d. She has been living a dream in LA. e. All their married life she had been living a lie. (a lie = a life with lies) f. She sat down on a very solid patio chair and knew she was living a nightmare. g. He was a man who had lived a sham, lived an untrue life, assumed a lifestyle and identity and activities that were all lies.

Although all the object NPs in the above examples refer to specific types of life (e.g., live a fantasy = live a life of fantasy), their range seems to be much wider than the range of objects that, say, smile can take (e.g., a graduation grin (see (39a))). But this might simply be due to the fact that there are many more subcategories of life than there are of a smile. Scream and shriek are two more verbs which have been said to take cognate objects, but which can also take a wide range of objects, all of which characterize things that result from screaming and shrieking. (62) a. John screamed a terrifying scream. b. The attacker screamed obscenities at the male before lunging at him with a cleaver. c. Pat grabbed her little girl, screamed a horrendous guttural sound, and shook her. (63) a. Sue shrieked a banshee-like shriek at the top of her lungs. b. Sue shrieked a war cry. c. Laird MacClawwen shrieked a farewell and flapped off for the meeting.

Does it make sense to consider sentences such as (61c–g), (62b,c), and (63b,c) as instances of the cognate object construction? It turns out that it is very difficult to answer the above question. There does not seem to be any test which can unambiguously determine for a given ‘cognate object’ sentence whether it is an instance of the real cognate object

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construction or a transitive sentence that happens to satisfy the Functional Constraint given in (56). We give below a syntactic test that distinguishes cognate object sentences involving live, scream, and shriek from all others, but it is unclear what conclusion we can legitimately draw from this fact. The test involves it-pronominalization of body-part expressions and cognate objects in discourse context. Observe first the following sentence: (64) During the first three months at the office, he worked his head off. *He had to work it (= his head) off because his regular employment was contingent on a positive review of his performance during that period.

The unacceptability of the second sentence in (64) shows that ‘direct object NPs’ of otherwise intransitive verbs in an exceptional construction cannot undergo it-pronominalization. Now observe the following sentences: (65) a.

John sang a beautiful song. He sang it (= the beautiful song) to cheer her up. b. He lived a happy trouble-free life. He could live it because his wife took care of all the difficulties. c. Mary screamed a blood-curdling scream and she screamed it practically in my ear. d. Upon hearing the news, Sue shrieked a banshee-like shriek at the top of her lungs, and I couldn’t help feeling that she shrieked it mostly for my benefit.

(66) a.

He was horrified, but he smiled a happy smile. *He smiled it (= the happy smile) in order to disarm the intruder. b. He laughed a hearty laugh. *He laughed it (= the laugh) because he was truly amused by her joke. c. She blushed a blush of anger. *She blushed it in spite of her attempt to stay cool. d. The stock market slid a surprising 2% slide. *It slid it in spite of some positive signs in the airlines and technologies industries. e. He died a terrible, lingering death. *There was no reason for him to die it (= the death) with all the powerful painkillers we have nowadays.

The fact that the second sentence in each of (65b–d) is acceptable seems to suggest that live, scream, and shriek in these sentences are regular transitive verbs that have happened to take cognate objects. On the other hand, the fact that the second sentence in each of (66a–e) is unacceptable seems to suggest that smile, laugh, blush, slide, and die are intransitive verbs that take ‘direct


object NPs’ in an exceptional context — that is, these sentences are instances of the cognate object construction. In Section 4.5, we have shown that there are cognate object sentences that can be passivized under certain conditions. It turns out that Passivization distinguishes between cognate object sentences with unergative verbs and those with unaccusative verbs: (67) a. Life can be lived in many different ways. b. Screams were screamed, cheers cheered, sighs sighed, and underwear thrown. (cf. (55b)) (68) a. Laughs are laughed, and some cheeks blush. (cf. (55c)) b. And then the great mammal descended back to the ocean. In its way was the potato chip. There was a splash and there was a potato chip. A smile was smiled somewhere. (Moments — One Smile, Open Web) (69) a. *A tragic death was died. b. *A blush of anger was blushed. (cf. (23b)) c. *A surprising 2% slide was slid today. (cf. (29b))

The above fact seems to indicate that the cognate object construction involving semantically unaccusative verbs is the least transitive-like. As shown above, the it-pronominalization test and the passivization test, together with the ‘resultant object’ requirement, produce the following characterization of various types of ‘cognate object’ sentences: (70) Sing-type Live-type Smile-type Slide-type Die-type

Resultant Obj

Passivization

It-Pronoun

No Yes Yes Yes No

Yes Yes Yes No No

Yes Yes No No No

That is, there is no single syntactic or semantic test that would distinguish true cognate object sentences from transitive verb sentences that happen to take objects that are cognate with the verbs. Since we have followed the traditional view and treated die a … death as a cognate object sentence pattern, there does not seem to be any compelling reason why we should not adopt the traditional view that live a … life is also a true cognate object sentence pattern. But, as shown in the above table, live behaves very much like a regular transitive verb.

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Macfarland (1995) has collected 2,000 real examples of the cognate object construction from corpus data. Of those examples the five most frequently occurring verbs in the corpus are live (420 tokens (21.0%)), smile (176 tokens (8.8%)), sing (148 tokens (7.4%)), tell (144 tokens (7.2%)), and die (113 tokens (5.7%)), which constitute about half of the examples (1,001 tokens (50.1%)). Sing and tell are inherently transitive verbs, and we would not include them in the cognate object frequency counts. It is interesting to observe here that, of the remaining three on the top-five list, smile is the only verb which is uncontroversially an intransitive verb that takes a cognate object. As mentioned above, die is an exceptional cognate object verb in that its cognate object represents the manner, rather than the result, of the action of the verb, while live is exceptional in that its cognate object shows the behavior that is characteristic of objects of ordinary transitive verbs.

4.7 Conclusion In this chapter we have examined the Unergative Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction in (3) claimed by Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), Massam (1990), Larson (1988), Macfarland (1995), and others — i.e., only unergative verbs can appear in the cognate object construction, and no unaccusative verbs can do this. We have shown that there are unaccusative verbs that can appear in the construction, and that therefore the Unergative Restriction in (3) is incorrect. This shows that the construction cannot serve as a diagnostic for unergative verbs, contrary to the generally-held assumption. We have also examined the claim made by Jones (1988) and Moltmann (1990) — i.e., cognate objects cannot occur as the subject of passive sentences; and we have shown that this claim is also incorrect by pointing out that there are many passive sentences involving cognate objects that are acceptable. We have further shown that verbs such as live, scream, and shriek show syntactic properties that are very similar to those exhibited by transitive verbs when they take cognate objects. But we have left unresolved whether they should be treated as not belonging to the cognate object construction. In this chapter we have defined the cognate object construction as a construction in which an intransitive verb takes a ‘resultant’ object, which must represent a specific instance of the whole or a subset of the possible states or events resulting from the action or event represented by the verb. We have observed that while active cognate object sentences in which cognate nouns are


not modified by scope-limiting adjectival expressions (e.g., *they laughed laughs) are unacceptable, their passive counterparts (e.g., laughs were laughed) are acceptable. We have accounted for this contrast by hypothesizing that the cognate object construction is a marked construction whose use must be justifiable. Active sentences without modifiers on cognate nouns (e.g., they laughed laughs) are tautological and there is no justification for their use. In contrast, in contexts where passive versions of intransitive sentences without cognate objects (e.g., they laughed) are needed, the presence of cognate objects is necessary for passivization. Thus, passive cognate object sentences with no modifiers on the cognate nouns are allowed. We have also resorted to the marked nature of the cognate object construction in order to account for the contrast between some unacceptable and some acceptable cognate object sentences. That is, the speaker’s specific reference to the state or event represented by the cognate object must be either conventionally or contextually justifiable. Finally, let us compare the Unergative Restriction in (3) and our Functional Constraint in (56). Since unergative verbs represent volitional actions or involuntary bodily processes of their subject referents, these actions or events correspond to ‘an activity or event involving a temporal process’ as stated in the first clause of (Ai) in the Functional Constraint in (56). In this respect it can be said that the Unergative Restriction in (3) partially captures the acceptability of the cognate object construction. However, even unaccusative verbs such as grow, blow, drop, slide, bounce, and fall represent events involving temporal processes. Since these verbs can also appear in the construction, the Unergative Restriction in (3) makes an incorrect prediction for them. Further, the acceptability of the construction is not a phenomenon dependent upon verbs alone, but one dependent upon the semantic relations between verbs and their entire object NPs, on the semantic functions of ‘cognate’ objects, and on our pragmatic knowledge, as stated in the Functional Constraint in (56). The Unergative Restriction in (3) is fatally flawed in that, without taking account of these factors at all, it simply stipulates that the acceptability of the construction hinges on which type of verb, unergative or unaccusative, is used in the construction. It can be concluded from the discussions in this chapter that the acceptability of the construction is not simply a problem contingent upon whether the verb is unergative or unaccusative, but a semantic, functional, and pragmatic phenomenon in which the meaning of the verb interacts with the meaning of the ‘cognate’ object, together with our knowledge based on our social customs.

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Chapter 5

The pseudo-passive construction and unergativity

5.1 Introduction This chapter discusses pseudo-passive (or prepositional passive) sentences in English and examines under what conditions they (and ordinary passive sentences involving transitive verbs) become acceptable. Pseudo-passive sentences are those involving intransitive verbs and prepositions, taking the pattern of NP (subject) + be (get) + ___ en + Preposition (+by NP). They are divided into two types; one type, as exemplified in (1a,b), involves intransitive verbs (sleep, write) and prepositions (in, on) which are part of adjuncts (in that bed, on this desk), and the other, as exemplified in (1c), involves what are often called ‘prepositional verbs’ (refer to):1 (1) a. That bed was slept in by Napoleon. (Riemsdijk, 1978: 218) b. This desk should not be written on. c. This book has been frequently referred to.

It has been well recognized in the literature that not all pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable. Compare (1a–c) with the following examples: (2) a. *Boston was arrived in late at night. (cf. John arrived in Boston late at night.) b. *The operation was died before by John. (cf. John died before the operation.) c. *The sea was sunk into by a yacht. (cf. A yacht sank into the sea.)

Sentences (2a–c), unlike (1a–c), are all unacceptable to most speakers. Why does such a difference in acceptability arise? Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) argue that pseudo-passive sentences in English are compatible only with unergative verbs, and that unaccusative verbs do not allow pseudo-passivization. Observe

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that the verbs in (1a–c) are all unergative verbs; sleep in (1a) describes an involuntary bodily process, taking an experiencer as its subject, and write and refer in (1b,c) describe volitional actions, taking an agent as their subjects. On the other hand, the verbs in (2a–c) are all unaccusative verbs; arrive in (2a) is a verb of appearance, and die and sink in (2b,c) describe nonvolitional events of their subject referents, which are semantically themes or patients (see Chapter 1 for the distinction between unergative and unaccusative verbs). Thus, Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) attribute the acceptability of (1a–c) to the fact that the verbs in these sentences are unergative, and the unacceptability of (2a–c) to the fact that the verbs in this set are unaccusative. This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we will formulate the above claim as the Unergative Restriction on the Pseudo-Passive Construction, and in Section 5.3 we will observe how this restriction is accounted for by Perlmutter and Postal’s (1984) analysis based on Relational Grammar. In Section 5.4 we will show that the Unergative Restriction on the Pseudo-Passive Construction cannot be maintained because there are many pseudo-passive sentences involving unaccusative verbs that are perfectly acceptable. In Section 5.5, we will present functional requirements that determine the acceptability status of pseudo-passive sentences.

5.2 Unergative restriction on the pseudo-passive construction As mentioned in the preceding section, Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) argue that pseudo-passives in English are possible only with unergative verbs and that unaccusative verbs do not allow pseudopassivization. Observe the following examples ((3b–g) and (4a–u) are from Perlmutter and Postal (1984: 100–101); (3h–l) and (4v,w) are from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 144, 157, 210)): (3) a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

That bed was slept in by Napoleon. (= (1a)) This hall has been played in by some of the finest orchestras in Europe. The room was exercised in by Spider Man. The bridge was skied under by the contestants. The bed was jumped on by the children. This hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates. The package was stepped on by a camel. This platform has been stood on by an ex-president.

The pseudo-passive construction and unergativity 139

i. j. k. l.

These chairs have been sat on by the Queen’s children. This track has been run on by our finest young athletes. This pool has been swum in by the last three world record holders. This carpet has been rolled on by three generations of children.

(4) a. *The package was accumulated on by dust. (cf. Dust accumulated on the package.) b. *The room was burst in by the bubble. (cf. The bubble burst in the room.) c. *The dome was collapsed under by the model. (cf. The model collapsed under the dome.) d. *The orifice was dripped into by the mucus. (cf. The mucus dripped into the orifice.) e. *The bridge was existed under by trolls. (cf. Trolls existed under the bridge.) f. *The bed was fallen on by dust. (cf. Dust fell on the bed.) g. *The hill was grown on by grass. (cf. Grass grew on the hill.) h. *The bed was happened in by something disgusting. (cf. Something disgusting happened in the bed.) i. *The hall was increased in by the noise. (cf. The noise increased in the hall.) j. *The bridge was jammed under by the cannon. (cf. The cannon jammed under the bridge.) k. *The bedroom was kept up in by the argument. (cf. The argument kept up in the bedroom.) l. *The conference room was leveled off in by the noise. (cf. The noise leveled off in the conference room.) m. *The oven was melted in by the ice cube. (cf. The ice cube melted in the oven.) n. *The sink was oozed into by the toothpaste. (cf. The toothpaste oozed into the sink.) o. *The ring was perished in by the overage fighter. (cf. The overage fighter perished in the ring.) p. *Ted’s chest was quivered in by the arrow. (cf. The arrow quivered in Ted’s chest.) q. *The hall was recurred in by the argument. (cf. The argument recurred in the hall.)


r. *The bed was shrunk in by Doll Man. (cf. Doll Man shrank in the bed.) s. *The test tube was united in by the ingredients. (cf. The ingredients united in the test tube.) t. *The woods were vanished in by Little Red Riding Hood. (cf. Little Red Riding Hood vanished in the woods.) u. *The kitchen was waned in by the dispute. (cf. The dispute waned in the kitchen.) v. *The golf course has been rolled on by only the best golf balls. (cf. Only the best golf balls have rolled on the golf course.) w. *This floor has been bounced on by every type of ball imaginable. (cf. Every type of ball imaginable has bounced on this floor.)

The verb sleep in (3a), as mentioned in the preceding section, describes an involuntary bodily process of its subject referent (here the NP in the by-phrase, that is, Napoleon); the verbs play, exercise, ski, jump, lecture, step, run, and swim in (3b–g,j,k) describe volitional actions of their subject referents; the verbs stand, sit, and roll in (3h,i,l), taking human subjects, also describe volitional actions of their human subject referents. In short, these verbs are all unergative, and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) claim that the sentences in (3a–l) are acceptable for this reason. On the other hand, the verbs accumulate, burst, collapse, drip, fall, grow, increase, jam, keep up, level off, melt, perish, quiver, recur, shrink, unite, wane, and bounce in (4a–d, f, g, i–m, o–s, u, w) all describe nonvolitional events of their subject referents whose semantic role is a theme (or a patient); the verb roll in (4v), taking an inanimate subject (the best golf balls), also describes a nonvolitional event of the best golf balls; the verbs exist, happen, ooze, and vanish in (4e,h,n,t) are verbs of existence or appearance (disappearance). In short, these verbs are all unaccusative verbs, and Perlmutter and Postal and Levin and Rappaport Hovav attribute the unacceptability of these sentences to that fact. Comparing (3) with (4), we immediately notice that the by-phrase referents (the referents denoted by the NPs in the by-phrases, to be more exact) are all human or animate in (3), while those in (4) (except (4c,e,o,r,t)) are not. However, Perlmutter and Postal (1984: 103) claim that animacy is not the real conditioning factor for the difference in acceptability between (3) and (4) because there are many acceptable passive sentences in which the by-phrase referent is inanimate, as shown in the following (Perlmutter and Postal (1984: 103)):


(5) a. b. c. d.

That hypothesis was refuted by the data. The danger of forest fires was increased by the drought. The situation was exacerbated by increased dependence on foreign oil. The class of grammatical sentences is characterized by a set of conditions on well-formed relational networks. e. The house is surrounded by tall elms. f. His position has been undermined by recent developments. g. The monotony has been relieved by an occasional hurricane.

The by-phrase referents in (5) are all inanimate, and therefore they do not intentionally cause the events described in (5). Hence, Perlmutter and Postal argue that there is no requirement to the effect that the by-phrase referent must be animate or semantically agentive. They attribute the difference in acceptability between (3) and (4) solely to the difference between unergative and unaccusative verbs. Perlmutter and Postal (1984: 101–103) further argue that the following contrasting pairs of sentences support their claim that the unergative–unaccusative distinction plays a crucial role for the acceptability of pseudo-passive sentences: (6) a. The closet was slid into by Ted. b. *The closet was slid into by the soap. (7) a. The desk was sat on by the gorilla. b. *The desk was sat on by the lamp. (8) a. The house was leaned against by the fullback.2 b. *The house was leaned against by the ladder.

While the (a) sentences of (6)–(8) are acceptable, the (b) sentences are unacceptable, in spite of the fact that the same verbs are used in each pair. The verbs slide, sit, and lean in the (a) examples are unergative verbs because they describe volitional actions of their animate subject referents (i.e., the by-phrase referents here). On the other hand, the same verbs in the (b) examples are unaccusative verbs because they describe nonvolitional events of their inanimate subject referents (i.e., the by-phrase referents). Hence, Perlmutter and Postal argue that the acceptability of the (a) examples and the unacceptability of (b) examples are attributable to the unergative–unaccusative distinction. The above discussion by Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) can be formulated as follows:

141


(9) Unergative Restriction on the Pseudo-Passive Construction: Only unergative verbs can appear in the pseudo-passive construction. No unaccusative verbs can.

Perlmutter and Postal and Levin and Rappaport Hovav claim that the pseudopassive construction serves as a diagnostic for unergative verbs.

5.3 Perlmutter and Postal’s (1984) account of the Unergative Restriction In this section we will see how Perlmutter and Postal (1984) account for the Unergative Restriction on the Pseudo-Passive Construction in (9) (henceforth the Unergative Restriction) in the framework of Relational Grammar. For this purpose we will first observe two assumptions made in Relational Grammar. First, in Relational Grammar, passivization is characterized as the advancement of a direct object (represented as 2) to the subject position (represented as 1), and pseudo-passivization as the advancement of an oblique complement (represented as 3) to the subject position. The original subject in the corresponding active sentence is in turn demoted to the so-called chômeur position (i.e., the by-phrase). Therefore, the active sentence (10a), for example, is represented as having the relational network (11a), and the corresponding passive sentence (10b) is represented as having the relational network (11b) (P stands for a predicate, Cho for a chômeur, and c1 and c2 for strata): (10) a. Melvin bought a lot of heroin. b. A lot of heroin was bought by Melvin. (11) a.

relational network of (10a):

P

bought

1

Melvin

2

c1

a lot of heroin


b. relational network of (10b):

P P

bought

2

1 Cho

c1 1 c2

a lot of heroin

Melvin

In the relational network (11a) of the active sentence (10a), Melvin is represented as 1 (subject) and a lot of heroin as 2 (direct object). In Relational Grammar, since a passive sentence like (10b) is assumed to derive from its corresponding active sentence like (10a), the relational network (11b) of the passive sentence (10b) keeps the relational network (11a) in its first stratum (i.e., c1 in (11b)). In the second stratum of (11b) (i.e., c2), a lot of heroin advances from 2 (direct object) to 1 (subject) via passivization. On the other hand, in the second stratum Melvin is demoted from 1 (subject) to the chômeur position (i.e., the by-phrase) via passivization (for further details, see Perlmutter and Postal (1983, 1984: 91–92)). Second, in Relational Grammar, unaccusative verbs are analyzed as having no 1 (subject), but only a 2 (direct object) in the initial stratum, which in the second stratum advances to 1 as shown in (12a), while unergative verbs are analyzed as having an initial 1 but no 2, as shown in (12b) (see Perlmutter and Postal (1984: 94–97)): (12) a.

Unaccusative Verbs:

P P

existed

b. 2

c1 1 c2

trolls

Unergative Verbs:

P

jumped

1

c1

the children

Note, in passing, that this syntactic account of the unaccusative–unergative distinction in Relational Grammar is essentially the same as that assumed in the framework of Government and Binding Theory in Chomskian generative grammar; that is, the subjects of unaccusative verbs take the direct object position at D-structure, and move to the surface subject position (= the


specifier position of IP) at S-structure, whereas those of unergative verbs take the surface subject position at both D- and S-structure. Now, coupled with the above two assumptions, Perlmutter and Postal (1984) attempt to account for the Unergative Restriction in (9) by means of the following (informally stated) law concerning advancement to 1 (see also Perlmutter (1978)): (13) 1-Advancement Exclusiveness Law (1AEX): No clause can involve more than one advancement to 1.

Observe the following sentences involving the unaccusative verb exist, and their relational networks: (14) a. Trolls existed under the bridge. b. *The bridge was existed under by trolls. (= (4e)) (15) a.


P P

2 1

existed

trolls

GRx c 1 GRx c2

the bridge


P P P existed

2 1 Cho trolls

GRx c 1 GRx c2 1 c

3

the bridge

In (15a) trolls involves an advancement to 1 (subject) from 2 (direct object) in the second stratum because of the unaccusative verb existed, as observed in (12a). Since the bridge takes the position of an oblique complement in (14a), it is represented as GRx in (15a). In the relational network (15b) of the passive sentence (14b), the bridge involves an advancement to 1 (subject) in the third stratum via passivization. Therefore, the pseudo-passive sentence (14b) turns out to involve two advancements to 1 (i.e., trolls and the bridge), in violation of the 1AEX; hence unacceptability. In short, Perlmutter and Postal argue that all


pseudo-passive sentences involving unaccusative verbs are ruled out by the 1AEX because they involve two advancements to 1. Therefore they claim that the unacceptability of the other sentences in (4) is accounted for in exactly the same manner. Observe, on the other hand, the following sentences involving an unergative verb and their relational networks: (16) a. The children jumped on the bed. b. The bed was jumped on by the children. (= (3e)) (17) a.


P

jumped

1

GRx c 1

the bed

the children


P P

jumped

1 Cho

the children

GRx c 1

1 c2

the bed

In (17a), the children is an initial 1 (subject) due to the unergative verb jumped, as observed in (12b). It does not involve any advancement to 1. In the relational network (17b) of the passive sentence (16b), the bed involves an advancement to 1 (subject) in the second stratum via passivization. However, the pseudo-passive sentence (16b) involves only one advancement to 1 (i.e., the bed), in keeping with the 1AEX; hence the acceptability of (16b). Perlmutter and Postal claim that the acceptability of the other sentences in (3) is accounted for in exactly the same way.3

5.4 Problems with the Unergative Restriction The most serious problem with the Unergative Restriction in (9) is the fact that there are many unaccusative verbs that can appear in the pseudo-passive

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construction, in spite of the fact that the restriction stipulates that no unaccusative verbs are compatible with this construction. Observe the following examples:4 (18) a. b. c. d.

*Boston was arrived in late at night. (= (2a)) The conclusion was arrived at late at night. The expected result was eventually arrived at. (Quirk et al., 1985:163) There is a construction in English that is arrived at in the following way: take a verb phrase whose head verb is be, and subtract the be. (Lakoff, 1987: 499)

(19) a. *The bed was fallen on by dust. (= (4f)) (Perlmutter and Postal, 1984) b. The cliff that was fallen from has been the subject of many famous photographs since the invention of the camera. c. It is an interesting fact of life that jobs which are simply fallen into, rather than pursued with a conscious plan, often turn out to be the most satisfying. (20) a. *This floor has been bounced on by every type of ball imaginable. (= (4w)) (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995) b. These ancient roads that have been rumbled over and bounced along for centuries still handle a large volume of traffic today.

We observed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 that the unacceptability of the sentences in (18a) (= (2a)), (19a) (= (4f)), and (20a) (= (4w)) has been claimed to result from a violation of the Unergative Restriction in (9), since arrive, a verb of appearance, and fall and bounce, which describe nonvolitional events of their subject referents (i.e., dust, every type of ball imaginable), are all unaccusative verbs. However, the sentences in (18b–d), (19b,c), and (20b) also involve the verbs arrive, fall, and bounce (and the unaccusative verb rumble). Therefore the Unergative Restriction in (9) predicts that they should all be unacceptable; contrary to this prediction, however, they are perfectly acceptable. Observe also the following sentences: 5 (21) a.

The floor finish was eventually recalled after dozens of reports that it had been slid and slipped on during normal use. b. This cliff has no doubt been stumbled over, slipped on, and fallen from more often than we know. c. That banana peel will be slipped on sooner or later. (Couper-Kuhlen, 1979: 60) d. This stone will be stumbled over if it’s not moved. e. This sort of thing is sometimes stumbled on/run across in consignment shops.


f.

His car was run into by a truck parked further up the hill that had its brakes fail.

The verbs slide, slip, stumble, fall, and run (across/into) in (21a–f) have been classified as typical unaccusative verbs, taking themes as their subjects. Therefore, the Unergative Restriction in (9) predicts that the sentences should all be unacceptable, but contrary to this prediction, they are quite acceptable. Observe further the following examples:6 (22) a.

The table with the vase on it was blundered into in the dark, and the household was awakened by the crash when the vase hit the floor. b. The second car that was caromed into was demolished when it fell off the edge of the road. c. Most of the ancient coin hoards are chanced upon by farmers ploughing new fields. d. The hard surfaces that had been ricocheted off had barely a trace of damage.

The pseudo-passive sentences in (22a–d) all describe nonvolitional events of a person or an object, and therefore the verbs blunder (into), carom (into), chance (upon), and ricochet (off) are unaccusative verbs. Thus the Unergative Restriction in (9) predicts that (22a–d) should all be unacceptable; but contrary to this prediction, these sentences are all perfectly acceptable.7 To sum up the above discussion, the fact that there are acceptable pseudopassive sentences with unaccusative verbs, as illustrated in (18)–(22), shows that the analyses by Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) cannot be maintained.

5.5 A functional account of pseudo-passive sentences Given that the Unergative Restriction on Pseudo-Passive Construction must be abandoned, we need to find a generalization that can account for the acceptability status of the sentences in (18)–(22), as well as those in (1)–(8). We will first enumerate various functional conditions that must be satisfied by pseudopassive sentences, and will then try to synthesize them into a higher-order generalization.


5.5.1 Characterization Let us first observe the following contrast: (23) a. That bed was slept in by Napoleon. (= (3a)) b. *The winter was slept through by the bear. (24) a. These chairs have been sat on by the Queen’s children. (= (3i)) b. *The bench had been sat on. (25) a. This track has been run on by our finest young athletes. (= (3j)) b. *This building was run into by John. (26) a.

This pool has been swum in by the last three world record holders. (= (3k)) b. *This river was swum in by my brother.

Note here that in the acceptable (a) sentences, the by-phrase referents are all prominent persons (i.e., Napoleon, the Queen’s children, our finest young athletes, the last three world record holders), whereas in the unacceptable (b) sentences they are either unexceptional (i.e., the bear, John, my brother), or not explicitly mentioned at all, as in (24b). As a result of this, we intuitively feel that in the former sentences something characteristic or special about the passive subject is described, while such a characteristic or salient property is not described at all in the latter. In (23a), for example, the fact that Napoleon slept in the bed in question is a remarkable characteristic about the bed that is worth mentioning, and it provides a special characterization of the bed. It may be displayed in a museum built in memory of Napoleon. In (24a), similarly, the fact that the Queen’s children have sat on these chairs qualifies as a characterization of the chairs. We understand that the speaker here is attempting to produce a sentence that characterizes or defines the chairs under discussion. On the other hand, in (23b) we cannot learn anything special about the winter from the statement that a bear slept through it. Such a statement hardly qualifies as a characterization of the winter. In (24b), similarly, the fact that someone sat on the bench is far from sufficient to tell what kind of bench it is, and doesn’t show the bench to be special in any way.8 This sort of contrast also holds between the acceptable (25a) and (26a) on the one hand and the unacceptable (25b) and (26b) on the other. In (26a,b), for example, the fact that the last three world record holders have swum in this pool constitutes an adequate characterization of the pool, but the fact that the speaker’s brother, an ordinary person, swam in the river is not sufficient to tell what kind of river it is. The above difference enables us to note that most of the unergative verb


examples given in (3a–l) and provided to us by Perlmutter and Postal and Levin and Rappaport Hovav are of the same type as the (a) examples of (23)–(26) (in fact, the above examples (24a) (= (3i)), (25a) (= (3j)), and (26a) (= (3k)) are Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s (1995)). Observe also the following: (3) b. c. d. f. h.

This hall has been played in by some of the finest orchestras in Europe. The room was exercised in by Spider Man. The bridge was skied under by the contestants. This hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates. This platform has been stood on by an ex-president.

Observe that the by-phrase referents in the above sentences are also all prominent persons or groups, and that therefore the referents of the passive subjects are interpreted as being characterized by the actions performed by such prominent people. In (3b), for example, the fact that some of the finest orchestras in Europe have played in this hall serves as a salient property of the hall, and it distinguishes the hall from other halls. Thus, the subject this hall is interpreted as being characterized by the statement given in the sentence. The same applies to the other examples in (3). The above account seems to be borne out by the following contrasting pairs of examples: (27) a. The office has never been worked in before. b. *The office was worked in by Mary last night. (28) a. This brand-new fountain pen has never been written with. b. *The pen was written with by John. (29) a. The world cannot be traveled around in a week. b. *John was traveled with by Mary. (30) a. This lake is not to be camped beside by anybody! (Bolinger, 1975:69) b. *The lake was camped beside by my sister. (ibid.:68) (31) a.

John can be argued with for hours before he gives in. (CouperKuhlen, 1979: 46) b. *John was argued with by the principal about the new plan.

(32) a. I don’t like to be waited for. b. *I was waited for by Mary.

Observe that the acceptable (a) sentences involve negative morphemes or auxiliary verbs such as can, and that therefore each of them describes a certain stable state, while the unacceptable (b) sentences describe single actions


performed in the past by an ordinary person. As a result of this, the former sentences can qualify as characterizations of the subject referents, whereas the latter sentences cannot. In (27a), for example, the fact that no one has ever before worked in the office in question can characterize the office as, say, brand-new, while in (27b) the fact that Mary, an ordinary person, worked in the office last night hardly qualifies as a characterization of the office. A similar difference holds between the acceptable (28a)/(29a) and the unacceptable (28b)/(29b).9 In (30a), the statement that no one should camp beside this lake clearly serves as a warning, and hence it characterizes the lake as, for example, one that is dangerous to camp beside, or one that is to be kept clean and is not to be polluted by being camped beside. In (30b), on the other hand, the fact that the speaker’s sister camped beside the lake does not qualify as a characterization of the lake. In (31) and (32), likewise, the passive subject is characterized in the acceptable (a) examples, but it is not in the unacceptable (b) examples. (32a), for instance, clearly conveys what kind of person the speaker is — he/she is a person who does not like to keep someone waiting for him/her as a result of his/her being late (therefore he/she always tries to be early). In (32b), on the other hand, a single event involving Mary’s waiting for the speaker at a certain time does not say much about what kind of person the speaker is. Observe also the following sentences (see Takami (1992: 132, 1995: 64)): (33) a. *The mountain was flown over by the plane. b. The mountain was flown over by the Air Force. c. The mountain was regularly flown over by the Air Force.

It is clear that the mountain cannot be characterized by a single event such as the one that a plane flew over it. Therefore, (33a) cannot be interpreted as a sentence that characterizes the mountain. In contrast, the fact that the Air Force flew over the mountain in question can serve as a characterization of the mountain. Therefore, (33b) can be interpreted as a sentence that characterizes the mountain. It is interesting to note here that the acceptable (33b) becomes even more acceptable if the adverb regularly is inserted, as in (33c).10 This is attributable to the fact that the characterization of the mountain advances even further in (33c) because the action of the Air Force’s flying over the mountain is understood as customary when the adverb regularly is used. From the above differences observed in pseudo-passive sentences, Takami (1992, 1995) has argued that the functional notion of characterization plays a crucial role in determining the acceptability of the pseudo-passive construction. Kuno (1990) has discussed passive sentences with inanimate subjects and


human by-agentives, and has claimed that the notion of characterization or definition plays a crucial role in determining the acceptability of this type of passive sentences, proposing the following hypothesis: (34) Subject Preference for Characterizational Sentences: Characterizational sentences normally place what they characterize in subject position. (35) Characterizational Property of Passive Sentences with Inanimate Subjects: Passive sentences with inanimate subjects and human by-agentives are acceptable to the extent that they can be interpreted as sentences that define or characterize the subjects.

With the above hypothesis in mind, let us observe the following examples given in Kuno (1990: 45, 49–50): (36) a. ??Shogun was watched by John. b. Shogun was watched by millions of people all over the world. (37) a. b. c.

??Shogun was read by John.

Shogun was read even by John. Shogun was written by James Clavell.11

The fact that John watched or read Shogun, in isolation, is not sufficient to qualify as a characterization or definition of the TV epic mini-series or the book, hence the unacceptability or marginality of (36a) and (37a). In contrast, the fact that millions of people all over the world watched the series is sufficient to qualify as a characterization of the epic series. Hence the acceptability of (36b) results. Likewise, sentence (37b) implies that many people read Shogun, including John, who perhaps rarely reads books. The sentence therefore characterizes the book. Similarly, the fact stated in (37c) that James Clavell wrote it readily qualifies as a characterizational statement. Hence, the acceptability of (36b), (37b), and (37c).12 From the above observations about the characterizational nature of acceptable pseudo-passive sentences, as well as of acceptable transitive-verb passive sentences with inanimate subjects, we can tentatively hypothesize the following constraint (see Takami (1992: 126, 1995: 59)): (38) The Characterization Requirement on the Pseudo-Passive Construction (to be revised): The pseudo-passive construction is acceptable if passivization can be justified by the Subject Preference for Characterizational Sentences.

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This Characterization Requirement can straightforwardly account for the acceptable and unacceptable sentences we have examined above in this subsection.13 The Characterization Requirement can also account for the acceptability of the following sentences. Recall from our discussions in Chapter 4 of this book that it has not been clear whether live and reside are unergative verbs or unaccusative verbs, but this is immaterial to our present discussion because our claim is that the pseudo-passive construction does not select unergative verbs, contrary to the claims of Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995). (39) a. This room has not been lived in for twenty years. b. The house has been lived in by several famous personages. (Bolinger, 1975: 68) c. These caves were once lived in by primitive men. (Quirk et al., 1985: 1164) d. This castle is resided in by the Head of State. (Couper-Kuhlen, 1979: 177)

In (39a), the fact that no one has lived in the room under discussion for twenty years, which is extraordinary and is thus worthy of mentioning, qualifies as a characterization of the room. In (39b), similarly, the fact that several famous personages have lived in the house in question constitutes an adequate characterization of the house (see also the (a) examples of (23)–(26)). Likewise, the fact, described in (39c), that primitive men once lived in the caves under discussion, and the fact, described in (39d), that the Head of State resides in the castle under discussion qualify as adequate characterizations of the caves and the castle, respectively. Hence, all the sentences in (39a–d) satisfy the Characterization Requirement in (38) and the acceptability results. Let us further observe the following contrasting examples, which involve unaccusative verbs: (18) a. b. c. d.

*Boston was arrived in late at night. (= (2a)) The conclusion was arrived at late at night. The expected result was eventually arrived at. (Quirk et al., 1985:163) There is a construction in English that is arrived at in the following way: take a verb phrase whose head verb is be, and subtract the be. (Lakoff, 1987: 499)

The fact that someone arrived in Boston late at night does not describe anything characteristic as to what kind of city it is, and therefore sentence (18a) does not


satisfy the Characterization Requirement in (38) and the unacceptability results. On the other hand, the fact that the people involved arrived at the conclusion late at night tells us that the conclusion, perhaps after having taken a long while, was in a state of having been reached, and therefore it qualifies as a characterization of the conclusion. (Note here that it does not make sense to say for (18a) that Boston was in a state of having been reached, pointing to the non-characterizational nature of (18a)). Similarly, (18c) states that the expected result was in an established, rather than pending, state, and thus fully qualifies as a characterization of the result. Likewise, (18d) describes how the English construction in question is derived; that is, it describes what kind of construction it is, and thus satisfies the Characterization Requirement in (38). It might be argued here that arrive (in) with concrete locative NPs (e.g., Boston) is an unaccusative verb, while the same verb with abstract NPs (e.g., the conclusion, the expected result, and the construction in English) is an unergative verb. In the next subsection, we will bring up acceptable pseudo-passive sentences involving arrive (at) whose surface subject NPs are concrete locative NPs, showing that treating arrive (at) as ambiguous between unaccusative and unergative is not the right solution for the contrast in (18). Observe further the following examples that we discussed in Section 5.4: (21) a.

The floor finish was eventually recalled after dozens of reports that it had been slid and slipped on during normal use. b. This cliff has no doubt been stumbled over, slipped on, and fallen from more often than we know. d. This stone will be stumbled over if it’s not moved.

In (21a), the fact that people slid and slipped on the floor finish constitutes an adequate characterization of the floor finish — it shows that it has the property of being overly smooth and slippery. In (21b), likewise, the fact that people have stumbled over, slipped on, and fallen from the cliff in question clearly serves as an adequate characterization of the cliff — it shows that it has the quality of not being obvious enough for safety — perhaps its edge is hidden by bushes. Sentence (21d) also tells us something characteristic about the stone; for instance, that the stone is dangerous because many people will stumble over it unless it is moved. Hence, the sentences in (21a,b,d) all satisfy the Characterization Requirement in (38) and the acceptability results.14

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5.5.2 Topicalization Observe the following sentences: (40) a. *Boston was arrived in late at night. (= (2a)) b. Boston is not like New York or Chicago. If it is arrived in late at night, it would look like a ghost town because all restaurants and bars are closed before eleven. c. That airport is in the middle of nowhere. It is at least ten miles away from the closest motel. If it is arrived at late at night, there might not be any means of transportation to the motel.

As already mentioned, (40a) is unacceptable for all speakers because it does not make sense to characterize Boston as a city that one arrived in late at night. If that explanation is correct, which we believe it is, why is it that there are speakers who accept (40b,c), which contain pseudo-passive clauses involving the same verb arrive in/at?15 The difference between (40a) and (40b,c) seems to lie in the fact that the leading statement in (40b,c) well establishes Boston and the airport as the topic of discourse, while there is nothing in (40a) which suggests that Boston has been the topic of the preceding discourse. As is well known, the subject position is the most felicitous position for topics. Let us formulate this preference in the following way: (41) Subject-Position Preference for Topics: A sentence with a topic NP is most felicitous when the topic NP is placed in subject position.

(Note that the Subject Preference for Characterizational Sentences given in (34) is a special case manifestation of the above condition.) What (41) says about (40b,c) is that the placement of the NPs referring to Boston and the airport in the if-clauses is well motivated because of this subject-position preference for topics, and hence, the acceptability of these sentences in the given contexts. The above observations lead to the following generalization (see also the discussion on passive sentences involving cognate objects given in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4): (42) The Topic Requirement for the Subject of the Pseudo-Passive Construction: Pseudo-passive sentences are felicitous if Passivization can be justified on account of the Subject-Position Preference for Topics.


(40a) is unacceptable because it satisfies neither the Characterization Requirement in (38) nor the Topic Requirement in (42), while (40b,c) are acceptable because they satisfy the Topic Requirement. Observe also the following sentences: (43) a. *The pen was written with by John. (= (28b)) b. The pen was written with by John and later became one of the centerpieces of the museum. (44) a. *The cab was ridden in by John from the airport to his house last night. b. The cab was ridden in by the killer and was impounded as material evidence for the crime.

The (a) sentences above are unacceptable because they satisfy neither the Characterization Requirement nor the Topic Requirement. In contrast, the (b) sentences are acceptable because the second VP conjunct establishes the pen and the cab as the topic of each sentence, and justifies the pseudo-passive predicate in the first conjunct. Observe also the following sentences: (45) a. ?*This office has been called/phoned from. (Quirk et al., 1985) b. This office has been called/phoned from so many times that it was natural to assume that it was the source of the latest call. (Quirk et al., 1985)

Quirk et al. (1985: 1164) state that “combinations of verb and prepositional phrase which are awkward in brief sentences can, however, become more tolerable within an enlarged context”. It is not the case, however, that just any enlarged context would make the sentences better. They improve only to the extent that the larger contexts justify the application of Passivization. In (45b), what the resultative clause says makes it clear that the office in question is the topic of discourse. Thus, the passivization applied to the main clause, which has placed the topic NP in subject position, is well motivated and satisfies the Topic Requirement in (42). Hence the acceptability of (45b) results. Observe also the following sentences: (46) a. *The cliff was fallen from by John. b. *The cliff was fallen from. c. The cliff that was fallen from has been the subject of many famous photographs since the invention of the camera. (= (19b))

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(46a) and (46b) are unacceptable because the fact that John or the person under discussion fell from the cliff hardly qualifies as a characterization of the cliff. Nor is there anything in the sentences that would motivate passivization. In contrast, (46c) is acceptable because the main clause firmly establishes the cliff as the topic of the sentence. Note that the cliff is also the topic of the relative clause.16 The same is the case with (19c) and (20b) (repeated here): (19) c.

It is an interesting fact of life that jobs which are simply fallen into, rather than pursued with a conscious plan, often turn out to be the most satisfying.

(20) b. These ancient roads that have been rumbled over and bounced along for centuries still handle a large volume of traffic today.

In (19c), jobs is established as the topic of the that-clause and at the same time it is the topic of the relative clause. Similarly, in (20b) these ancient roads is established as the topic of the sentence, and is also the topic of the relative clause. Hence, (19c) and (20b) satisfy the Topic Requirement and the acceptability results. 5.5.3 Involvement Observe the following sentences: (47) a. People often die after this operation. b. *This operation is often died after. c. *This operation, which is often died after, needs to be banned. (48) a. People often die of smoking. b. *Smoking is often died of. c. *Smoking, which is often died of, needs to be banned. (49) a. Jesus died for all of our sins nearly two thousand years ago. b. In fact, all of our sins were died for nearly two thousand years ago. (Open Web) (50) a. We must be willing to maintain what people died for and fought for. b. We must be willing to maintain what was died for and fought for. (Open Web)

(47b, 48b) and (47c, 48c) are intended to satisfy the Characterization Requirement and the Topic Requirement for the Pseudo-Passive Construction, respectively, but they are all unacceptable. In (49b, 50b), the same verb die is


used, but these sentences are acceptable. It is clear that this contrast cannot be attributed to any special property of the verb die, because we can observe the same contrast in the following sentences, also: (51) a. Many people voted in the first election after the liberation. b. *The first election after the liberation was voted in by many people. c. *The first election after the liberation, which was voted in by many people, was a cornerstone for the establishment of the country as democracy. (52) a. Many people voted against the referendum. b. The referendum was voted against by many people.

(51b,c) are unacceptable on the pseudo-passive interpretation of (51a), but (52b) is perfectly acceptable. It might be argued that (49b, 50b, 52b) are acceptable because die for and vote against are prepositional verbs in which the verbs and the prepositions form tight units behaving like transitive verbs, while die after and vote in in (47b,c), (48b,c), (51b,c) are simply sequences of intransitive verbs and adjunct prepositions, without a tight relationship between the two. But this approach fails to account for the acceptability of pseudo-passive sentences such as the following: (3) d. The bridge was skied under by the contestants. f. This hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates. (28) a.

This brand-new fountain pen has never been written with.

(30) a.

This lake is not to be camped beside by anybody!

The verb-preposition sequences in the above sentences (i.e., ski under, lecture in, write with, and camp beside) do not form tight units, and they are not considered to be prepositional verbs. In spite of this fact, these sentences are perfectly acceptable. The contrast between the unacceptable (47b,c), (48b,c), (51b,c) and the acceptable (49b), (50b), (52b), (3d,f), (28a), (30a) can be accounted for by the following constraint, which is independently required: (53) Involvement Requirement for Passivization in English: Transitive verbs are passivizable in English only to the extent that the referents of their underlying object NPs are involved in the actions or states initiated by the referents of the underlying subject NPs; that is, only to the extent that the actions or states that they represent indicate that something is done to/for their objects. (Kuno, 1983a, 1989)

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The expression “something is done to/for the object” in (53) is explained as follows: “If Mary hits John, something is done to John — in other words, John is directly involved in the action as its recipient. If Mary criticizes or praises John, something is done to/for him. If Mary loves John, something has been done for John in a metaphorical sense — John is the recipient of Mary’s love, regardless of whether he is aware of it or not” (Kuno 1989: 13–14). In short, in all these cases John is the direct target of the action or state represented by the verb in each case. Therefore, transitive passive sentences such as (54) below satisfy the Involvement Requirement for Passivization in English and the acceptability results. (Henceforth we will call the Involvement Requirement for Passivization in English the ‘Involvement Requirement’.) (54) John was hit/criticized/praised/loved by Mary.

Observe also the following sentences: (55) a. I was approached by the stranger. b. *I was approached by the train. (Bolinger, 1975: 68) (56) a. The demonstrators approached the guards at the gate of the embassy. b. ??The guards at the gate of the embassy were approached by the demonstrators.

In (55a) the speaker is the direct target of the action represented by the verb approach; that is, the stranger came directly toward the speaker for some purpose, such as in order to ask directions. In (55b), by contrast, the speaker is not the direct target of the train’s approach; it didn’t come directly toward the speaker, but toward the platform on which the speaker was waiting. In short, the speaker is not involved in the train’s approach. Hence, (55a) is acceptable, in keeping with the Involvement Requirement, but (55b) is unacceptable, since it is in violation of the requirement. Note further that the passive version of (56b) of the active sentence (56a) is unacceptable or strange because it sounds as if the demonstrators’ target of approach were not (the gate of) the embassy, but the head of the surface subject, the guards. The strangeness of (56b) thus seems to reinforce the adequacy of the Involvement Requirement. Let us look at the following passive sentences that do not satisfy the Involvement Requirement in (53) and result in unacceptability: (57) a. *The corner was turned by George. (Bolinger, 1975: 72) b. *Susan is resembled by Mary. c. *This house was bought by $250,000 in 1980. (cf. $250,000 bought this house in 1980.)


d. *East and West Germany were found finally united by 1990. (cf. 1990 found East and West Germany finally united.) e. *Five dollars are cost by the book. (Jackendoff, 1972: 44) (cf. The book costs five dollars.) (58) a. *The University of Hawaii was quit by Professor Sato. b. *The University of Hawaii was entered/left by John in 1960. c. *Mary was given up by John.

In (57a), even if George turned the corner, nothing was done to the latter. It is not involved at all in George’s action of turning. In (57b), similarly, even if Mary resembles Susan, nothing has been done to Susan. Likewise, what is common to (58a–c) is the fact that their transitive verbs do not involve the objects as direct targets. The actions represented by the verbs quit, enter, leave, and give up in (58a–c) are autonomous actions on the part of their subjects and do not involve their objects. For example, even if Professor Sato quits his university, nothing is done to the university itself. Hence, the unacceptability of (57) and (58) is accounted for by the Involvement Requirement in (53).17, 18 Returning to pseudo-passive sentences, (59a–c) and (60a–c) satisfy the Involvement Requirement, while (61a–e) do not: (59) a. John was spoken to by a stranger. b. The window was beaten against by a strange-looking man. (CouperKuhlen, 1979: 28) c. Mike was laughed/giggled/frowned at by Mary. (60) a. This question will be dealt with later in the book. b. The target was aimed at, but missed. (Couper-Kuhlen, 1979: 57) c. The bull was prodded at. (ibid.: 76) (61) a. *The room was burst in by the bubble. (= (4b)) (cf. The bubble burst in the room.) b. *The bridge was existed under by trolls. (= (4e)) (cf. Trolls existed under the bridge.) c. *The hill was grown on by grass. (= (4g)) (cf. Grass grew on the hill.) d. *The bed was happened in by something disgusting. (= (4h)) (cf. Something disgusting happened in the bed.) e. *The hall was increased in by the noise. (= (4i)) (cf. The noise increased in the hall.)

In each of (59) and (60), the passive subject is the direct target of the action represented by the verb. That is, the action depicted in each pseudo-passive


sentence involves the subject as the direct participant. If a stranger spoke to the speaker, something was done to the latter. If a strange-looking man beat against the window, something was done to the window. If Mary laughed/giggled/ frowned at Mike, something was done to him. If the book deals with a particular question, something is done to the question. The same is the case with the other examples. In contrast, in none of (61a–e) is it the case that anything was done to the referent of the surface subject NP. Note for example that in (61a) the bursting of a bubble did not involve any action to or for the room. Likewise, (61b) states that there were trolls under the bridge in question, but it does not say that any action emanating from the bridge was directed at the trolls. Thus we can say that the pseudo-passive sentences in (61a–e) are unacceptable because they do not satisfy the Involvement Requirement. What is noteworthy about the sentences in (59) and (60) is the fact that they do not seem to be sentences that characterize the referents of their subjects. Nor do they seem to require contexts that justify passivization. The latter point stands in marked contrast with the unacceptability of (40a), (43a), (44a), (45a), and (46a,b), which have been shown to require overt contexts that justify passivization. At this point, we will simply stipulate that pseudo-passive sentences do not need to satisfy the Characterization Requirement or the Topic Requirement if the Involvement Requirement is satisfied. Let us return to the contrast between (47, 48) and (49, 50). Observe, for example, (47a) and (49a), repeated below for ease of reference: (47) a. People often die after this operation. b. *This operation is often died after. c. *This operation, which is often died after, needs to be banned. (49) a. Jesus died for all of our sins nearly two thousand years ago. b. In fact, all of our sins were died for nearly two thousand years ago.

Note that in (47a) people, the surface subject referent, do not do anything to the operation in question. That is, dying does not represent an action initiated by the surface subject referent that targets the operation (i.e., the direct object referent). Therefore, the pseudo-passive counterparts (47b,c) of the sentence do not satisfy the Involvement Requirement. Hence the unacceptability of these sentences. In contrast, in (49a), something was done to the sins in question. That is, they were the direct target (i.e., the objective) of Jesus’ death. Therefore, the pseudo-passive counterpart (49b) of the sentence satisfies the Involvement Requirement. Hence the acceptability of the sentence. What the unacceptability of (47b,c) shows is that sentences that satisfy the


Characterization and Topic Requirements are unacceptable if they do not also satisfy the Involvement Requirement. Let us reexamine here some of the acceptable characterizational pseudo-passive sentences to see if they satisfy the Involvement Requirement: (21) a.

The floor finish was eventually recalled after dozens of reports that it had been slid and slipped on during normal use. d. This stone will be stumbled over if it’s not moved. e. This sort of thing is sometimes stumbled on/run across in consignment shops.

The above sentences, all of which involve unaccusative verbs, imply that people unintentionally interacted with the referents of the surface subject NPs. For example, (21a) implies that people walked on the floor finish and slid or slipped. (21d) implies that people will step on the stone and stumble. Likewise, (21e) implies that people will accidentally find that sort of thing. Therefore, these sentences satisfy the Involvement Requirement in the sense that they represent actions initiated, albeit unintentionally, by the underlying subject referents and directed at their underlying object referents (i.e., surface subject referents). However, since the actions involved are all nonintentional, the surface subject referents can be said to represent the direct targets of the actions only in a marginal sense of the expression. Observe also the following sentences: (3) c. The bridge was skied under by the contestants. d. This hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates. (28) a.


(30) a.

This lake is not to be camped beside by anybody!

In the above sentences, although the surface subject referents are involved in the actions represented by the verb-preposition sequences in some way or other, the degree of involvement is even weaker than in the case of (21a,d,e), and they can hardly be characterized as representing the direct targets of the actions. In (3c), the contestants as agents interacted with the bridge by skiing under it. That is, the bridge in question was the target of the contestants’ looking for a way to bypass it. So, in that sense, the bridge was involved in the contestants’ acts of skiing. However, it is not the case that the contestants did something directly aimed at the bridge. That is, the bridge was not the direct target of their actions. Similarly, in (3d), three Nobel laureates interacted with the hall in question by going there and lecturing in it. In that sense, it was involved in the

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laureates’ acts of lecturing. But it is not the case that the laureates aimed their actions at the hall. That is, the hall was not the direct target of their actions. Likewise, (28a) negates the proposition that someone has interacted with the fountain pen in question by using it for writing. In that proposition, the fountain pen is involved in that person’s act of writing, but it was not the direct target of that person’s act of writing. Similarly, (30a) prohibits people from going to the lake in question, and choosing lakeside sites for camping. Therefore, the lake is involved in people’s acts of camping. But it is not the case that the lake was the direct target of camping. We have noted that in none of the sentences in (21a,d,e), (3c,d), (28a), and (30a) can the referents of their surface subjects be said to represent the direct targets of actions represented by the verb-preposition sequences. The fact that these sentences are distinctly characterizational suggests that the weaker the degree to which the surface subject referents serve as direct targets of actions, the stronger the Characterization Requirement for the sentences. The fact that (47b,c), (48b,c), and (51b,c) are all unacceptable indicates that there is a threshold for this degree of targeting under which pseudo-passive sentences become unacceptable. It is impossible to define what that threshold is other than by saying that for most speakers, it lies between (21a,d,e), (3c,d), (28a), (30a) and (47b,c). This seems to explain why the acceptability judgments of pseudo-passive sentences that do not represent the direct target of action interpretation vary from speaker to speaker, and even from sentence to sentence for a single speaker. The above observations lead to the following statement of the constraints for the use of the pseudo-passive construction: (62) The Functional Constraint on the Pseudo-Passive Construction: A. The Involvement Requirement (required for all pseudo-passive sentences): Pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable only to the extent that their surface subject referents are involved in the actions or states represented by the verb-preposition sequences; that is, only to the extent that the actions or states that they represent indicate that something is done to/for their objects. B. The Characterization and Topic Requirements: Pseudo-passive sentences that satisfy the Involvement Requirement must satisfy either the Characterization Requirement or the Topic Requirement if the involvement does not reach the level of the direct target of an action/state.


B1. The Characterization Requirement: Pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable if passivization can be motivated by the Subject Preference for Characterizational Sentences. B2. The Topic Requirement: Pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable if passivization can be justified by the Subject-Position Preference for Topics.

Given an active sentence involving a verb-preposition sequence in which the referent of the object NP is the direct target of the action represented by the sequence, the active sentence ordinarily represents the description of the action or state from the perspective of the subject NP referent. In contrast, its pseudopassive counterpart represents the description of the same action or state from the perspective of the ‘affectee’ (i.e., the referent of the object NP) (see, for example, (59a–c) and (60a–c)). Thus, the need for a switch in the speaker’s perspective is the justification for the application of Passivization. When a given active sentence contains a verb-preposition sequence in which the object NP referent is involved in some way with the action represented by the sequence but is not its direct target, it is difficult to take the perspective of the object NP referent because it is not an ‘affectee’ (see, for example, (3c,d), (28a), and (30a)). It seems that the characterizational interpretation derives from the need to interpret the object NP referent as having been affected. Observe, for example, (3d) again: (3) d. The hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates.

The fact that three Nobel laureates lectured in the hall under discussion has affected the hall. That is, the events have changed the nature of the hall in such a way as to distinguish it from ordinary halls. Likewise, observe the following sentence: (28) a.


Passivization is justified in the above sentence because the fountain pen under discussion is an ‘affectee’ of the action represented by the sentence. The fact that no one has used it has affected its status in the sense that it is distinguished from ordinary fountain pens that have been used. It seems that the Topicalization Requirement is involved in the Functional Constraint on the Pseudo-Passive Construction given in (62) in the following way: when a given pseudo-passive sentence does not contain enough information to obtain the ‘affectee’ interpretation of the surface subject referent, other descriptions are needed to derive this ‘affectee’ interpretation. Observe, for example, the following sentences:


(45) a. *The cliff was fallen from by John. b. *The cliff was fallen from. c. The cliff that was fallen from has been the subject of many famous photographs since the invention of the camera.

The cliff under discussion was involved in John’s or the unnamed person’s act of falling from it. Perhaps, he/she slipped on it, and/or he/she tried not to fall off by clinging to it for a while. (Note here, however, that this involvement does not reach the level of the direct target of the action.) But (45a,b) do not contain enough information to tell why the cliff was “affected” by the fall. In (45c), the main clause predicate supplies that information — the cliff was affected in that its status was changed by the fall, because since then many photographers have come to the cliff to take pictures of it. 5.5.4 Further examples In this section, we will examine some more pseudo-passive sentences that show interesting contrasts in acceptability, demonstrate how our Functional Constraint in (62) can account for them, and show how some other conceivable alternative explanations fail. Observe first the following contrast: (63) a. The employers depend on the industriousness of the employees. b. The industriousness of the employees is depended on by the employers. (64) a.

The future prospects of the company depend on the industriousness of the present employees. b. *The industriousness of the present employees is depended on by the future prospects of the company.

The same verb-preposition complex depend on is used in (63b) and (64b), but while the former is acceptable, the latter is unacceptable and nearly uninterpretable. We attribute this contrast to the fact that while in (63a) there is an action (or an emotive state) originating from the employers that is directed towards the employees, there is no such action or emotive state involved in (64a). That is, in (63a) the employers do something (or remain in some emotive state) towards the employees, while there is no such directional action (or emotive state) involved in (64a). Thus, (63b) satisfies the Functional Constraint given in (62) and is acceptable on that account, but (64b) fails to satisfy the Functional Constraint, and is unacceptable for that reason. The contrast between (63b) and (64b) cannot be accounted for by assuming that depend (on) in (63a) is an unergative verb representing the subject referent’s


intentional action, while depend (on) in (64a) is an unaccusative verb whose subject is not an agent but a theme. As we have amply demonstrated in this chapter, unaccusative verbs can be used in pseudo-passive sentences, and therefore, the above explanation based on the unergative–unaccusative distinction does not work: (65) a.

Most of the ancient coin hoards are chanced upon by farmers ploughing new fields. (= (22c)) b. The hard surfaces that had been ricocheted off had barely a trace of damage. (= (22d)) c. On the shoreline we see abundant evidence of water erosion caused by violent seas. Rocks which have been pounded and washed against over thousands of years have a smooth, slippery appearance.19

The above sentences are acceptable in spite of the fact that the verbs chance (upon), ricochet (off), and wash (against) are distinctly unaccusative. For the same reason mentioned above, the contrast between the acceptable (63b) and the unacceptable (64b) cannot be accounted for by assuming that the by-NPs of pseudo-passive sentences must bear the thematic role of agent or experiencer. According to this assumption, (63b) is acceptable because the by-NP the employers is an agent, but (64b) is unacceptable because its by-NP the future prospects of the company is neither an agent nor an experiencer, but a theme. This account fails because (65a–c), whose by-NPs are themes, are all acceptable. The contrast between (63b) and (64b) cannot be accounted for by assuming that by-NPs in pseudo-passives must be animate (and preferably human), either. Observe the following acceptable pseudo-passive sentences: (66) a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

His generalization is referred to by all subsequently published papers in the field. The following problems are dealt with by this research. His miseries were added to by the money problem. The hypothesis is attested to by the following data. At least 400 jobs will be impacted on by the proposed changes. His authority has been cut into by recent developments. You can bet on a specific number being landed on by the ball… (Golden Palace Roulette — How to play roulette) 172, f68, Landed on by recent fallen trees, dead. (Calvin College Ecosystem Preserve — Comments on Mortality and Measurements of Sugar Saplings in Gap and Non-Gap Forest)

The by-NPs in the above sentences are all inanimate.


Observe next the following sentences: (67) a. Tall elms surround the house. b. The house is surrounded by tall elms. (= (5e)) (68) a. Tall elms stand around the house. b. *The house is stood around by tall elms. (69) a. The sea encroaches on the coasts. b. The coasts are generally low and encroached on by the sea. (Open Web)

Although all the above (a) sentences are stative in nature, there is a difference between (67a, 69a) and (68a). That is, while the transitive verb surround and the prepositional verb encroach on in (67a, 69a) imply a local or geographical relationship directed at the house and the coasts, respectively, there is no such directional relationship in (68a). In other words, in (67a, 69a), the object NP referents are involved in the directional local or geographical relationship represented by the verbs. But the object NP referent of (68a) is not involved at all in the action or state represented by the verb-preposition complex because there is no directionality in the meaning of the sentence. Thus, we attribute the contrast between the acceptable (67b, 69b) and the unacceptable (68b) to the Involvement Requirement of the Functional Constraint. It might be argued that the contrast in acceptability between (68b) and (69b) is attributable to the fact that encroach on in (69a) is a prepositional verb sequence in which the verb and the preposition form a tight unit and behave as if they constituted a single transitive verb (meaning ‘take over part of ’), while there is no such tight union between the verb and the preposition in stand around of (68a). This explanation fails because of the acceptability of sentences such as the following: (70) a.

The hall has been played in by some of the finest orchestras in Europe. (= (3c)) b. The bridge was skied under by the contestants. (= (3d)) c. This hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates. (= (3f))

Note that play in, ski under, and lecture in in the above sentences do not seem to have any tighter unions than does stand around in (68a). Therefore, an explanation of the contrast between (68b) and (69b) based on whether the verbpreposition sequence forms a tight unit or not does not seem to work. Observe next the following sentences:


(71) a. The resolution was settled on by the House. b. *The floor was settled on by dust. c. *The floor, which had been settled on by thick dust, looked like a scene from a science-fiction movie. (72) a. The desk was sat on by the gorilla. (= (7a)) b. *The desk was sat on by the lamp. (= (7b)) c. *The desk, which was sat on by half a dozen Oscar trophies as well as a dozen golf-tournament trophies, spoke volumes about the achievements of its owner. d. Tui the cat is really brassed off as her 60 tins of cat food are still not here. Our barge was sat on by the boat in October and holed so we have had no visits since then. (Open Web) (73) a. He was severely kicked and then fallen on by his horse. (Open Web) b. *The floor was fallen on by dust. c. He was fallen on by a tree and pinned down to the ground.

The Functional Constraint attributes the acceptability of (71a) to the fact that settle on, meaning ‘decide’ as it is used in the sentence, involves the referent of its underlying object as the direct target of the decision. In contrast, (71b) is unacceptable because the sentence does not have any strong implication that the dust did something to the floor. The unacceptability of (71c) shows that the degree of the floor’s involvement is so weak that the fulfillment of the Characterization and Topicalization Requirements cannot salvage the sentence. Similarly, the Functional Constraint can account for the acceptability of (72a, 73a) and the unacceptability of (72b,c) in the same fashion. (72d) is acceptable because an event in which a boat ended up overrunning a barge involves the barge as direct target. Likewise, (73c) is acceptable because a tree falling on someone is clearly an event that involves that person, and because the sentence satisfies the Topicalization Requirement as well. In this subsection, we have shown how our Functional Constraint on the Pseudo-Passive Construction can account for contrasts in the acceptability of sentences involving the same verb-preposition sequences. In the course of this demonstration, we have shown that none of the following generalizations can be maintained. (74) Putative constraints that do not work: i. Only unergative verbs can be used in the pseudo-passive construction. Unaccusative verbs cannot enter into the construction. (also demonstrated throughout this chapter)


ii. Overt or covert by-NPs in the pseudo-passive construction must bear either an agent or experiencer role. They must not bear any other thematic roles. iii. Overt or covert by-NPs in the pseudo-passive construction must be animate, and preferably human. Inanimate by-NPs yield unacceptability. iv. Only prepositional verb sequences in which the verbs and the prepositions form a tight unit as if they were transitive verbs can enter into the pseudo-passive construction. Verb-preposition sequences which do not have a tight union of the verb and the preposition cannot.

5.6 Conclusion In this chapter we have examined the Unergative Restriction in (9) (= Only unergative verbs can appear in the pseudo-passive construction, and no unaccusative verbs can.), hypothesized by Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) and widely assumed in the literature, and shown that it is untenable. We have shown that there are many pseudo-passive sentences involving unaccusative verbs that are perfectly acceptable. This acceptability makes it clear that the pseudo-passive construction cannot serve as a diagnostic for unergative verbs, and that the acceptability of the construction is not directly relevant to the unergative–unaccusative distinction. We have further shown in this chapter that the acceptability of pseudo-passive sentences is controlled by the notions of characterization, topic, and involvement, and have proposed the Functional Constraint on the Pseudo-Passive Construction given in (62). We have amply demonstrated that this functional constraint can account for the acceptability of a wide range of pseudo-passive sentences, including crucial counterexamples to the Unergative Restriction in (9). Finally, it can be concluded that the acceptability status of pseudo-passive sentences is not a phenomenon based on the verb alone, but a semantic, functional, and discourse phenomenon based on the meaning of the whole sentence and its relationship to the context.

Chapter 6

Extraposition from subject NPs and unaccusativity1

6.1 Introduction It has been well recognized that not all sentences that involve Extraposition from NPs are acceptable. For example, observe (1) and (2): (1) a.

A man with blond hair appeared. [[NP A man [PP with blond hair]] appeared] b. A man appeared with blond hair. [[NP A man] appeared [PP with blond hair]]

(2) a.

A man with blond hair whispered. [[NP A man [PP with blond hair]] whispered] b. *A man whispered with blond hair. [[NP A man] whispered [PP with blond hair]]

In (1b), the PP with blond hair, originally a part of the subject NP a man with blond hair in (1a), is extraposed to sentence-final position over the verb appeared, and the sentence is acceptable.2 Sentence (2b) is assumed to derive in the same way, but it is unacceptable. Similarly, observe the following: (3) a.

A man from Los Angeles criticized Mary yesterday. [[NP A man [PP from Los Angeles]] criticized Mary yesterday] b. *A man criticized Mary yesterday from Los Angeles. [[NP A man] [VP criticized Mary yesterday] [PP from Los Angeles]]

(4) a.

Mary criticized a man from Los Angeles yesterday. [Mary criticized [NP a man [PP from Los Angeles]] yesterday] b. Mary criticized a man yesterday from Los Angeles. [Mary criticized [NP a man] yesterday [PP from Los Angeles]]

In (3b), the PP from Los Angeles, originally a part of the subject NP a man from Los Angeles in (3a), is extraposed to sentence-final position over the VP criticized Mary yesterday, but the sentence is unacceptable. In (4b), the PP from Los


Angeles, originally a part of the object NP a man from Los Angeles in (4a), is extraposed over the adverb yesterday, and the sentence is acceptable, unlike (3b). Johnson (1985) attempts to account for the acceptability status of sentences such as the (b) examples of (1)–(4) in terms of the Barriers framework proposed by Chomsky (1986b), coupled with the assumption that Extraposition from subject NP is restricted to sentences involving unaccusative verbs (see also Coopmans and Roovers (1986), Nakajima (1993, 1995), and Takonai (1995)). In this chapter, we will first recapitulate Johnson’s analysis of Extraposition from NP. In Section 6.3, we will demonstrate that his account encounters a number of major problems, and that the hypothesis that only unaccusative verbs are allowed in sentences involving Extraposition from the subject NP is untenable. In Section 6.4, we offer an alternative functional explanation, and make it clear that the phenomenon under consideration is essentially controlled by functional rather than syntactic factors.

6.2 Johnson’s (1985) analysis Johnson (1985) is mainly concerned with Extraposition from the subject NP, as illustrated in the (b) examples of (1)–(3). He claims that the only possible instances of this phenomenon are those in which the subject NP occupies object position in D-structure. Such cases, as claimed in the literature (see Perlmutter (1978), Burzio (1981, 1986), and Belletti and Rizzi (1986, 1988)), involve the subjects of (i) unaccusative verbs such as arrive, appear, follow, (ii) passive verbs, which are also regarded as unaccusative because their surface subjects originate in underlying object position, or (iii) psych(ological)-verbs such as bother, impress, and worry. Let us observe these three instances one by one. Johnson (1985: 111) gives the following sentences as examples illustrating (i): (5) Unaccusative Verbs: a. Men appeared from Tanzania. b. A storm followed from the north. c. Books arrived at the store about Hammett’s life. d. A picture stands in the hallway by Picasso.

Verbs such as appear, follow, arrive, stand, arise, emerge, exist, and occur are unaccusative verbs, and their subjects are claimed to derive from D-structure object position, as shown in (6):

Extraposition from subject NPs and unaccusativity

(6) [ e [ appear [ a man]]] S VP NP

Johnson argues that Extraposition of PPs in (5) takes place from object position, before the associated NP is moved to subject position (see the derivational history of (11b–d) given below). As examples illustrating the case of (ii), Johnson (1985: 114) gives the following: (7) Passive Verbs: a. A man was seen/called/hired/freed/etc. with green eyes. b. A book was put on the table about Nicaragua. c. A book was given to Danny about Nicaragua.

The surface subjects of passive sentences are generally assumed to originate from object position in D-structure, as shown in (8): (8) [ e [ be seen [ a man]]] S VP NP

Johnson assumes that Extraposition of PPs in (7) takes place out of the object NP before the latter is moved into subject position. Finally, observe the following sentences (Johnson (1985: 114)) that illustrate the case of (iii). The recorded acceptability judgments are Johnson’s:3 (9) Psych-Verbs: a. Books impressed me about Nicaragua’s struggle. b. ??Pictures shocked him of those war atrocities. c. A proof surprised her of the theorem. d. ?Stories amused me about the Great Khan’s court. e. ??A customer upset her with that loud plaid coat.

Johnson, following Belletti and Rizzi (1986), argues that the surface subjects of psych-verbs start out in object position in D-structure. He hypothesizes a structure like (10b) for sentences involving psych-verbs:4

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(10) a. The picture bothered Mary. b. S NP

VP

e

V¢ V

NP

NP

bother Mary the picture

Here again, Johnson assumes that Extraposition of PPs in (9) takes place out of the object NP, before the latter is fronted to subject position. Johnson assumes that an element extraposed from a D-structure object NP which later becomes a surface subject is adjoined to S.5 Observe, for example, the derivation of sentence (5a) shown below: (11) a. Men appeared from Tanzania. (= (5a)) b. D-structure for (11a): [S e I [VP appear [NP men [PP from Tanzania]]]] c. Extraposition of PP: S

S

PP

NP

I

e

V

NP

appear

N¢

VP

N¢

N men

from Tanzania

t


d. Raising of the subject: S

S NP men

I

PP VP

from Tanzania

V appear

In the D-structure for (11a) (i.e., (11b)), the NP [men [from Tanzania]] occupies object position, and in (11c) only the PP [from Tanzania] is extraposed and adjoined to S. Then, as shown in (11d), the remaining NP men in object position is raised to the specifier position of the (lower) S, thereby yielding the surface sentence (11a) (i.e., Men appeared from Tanzania).6 Johnson claims that the adjunction, in (11c), of the PP from Tanzania from the D-structure object position to S does not violate Subjacency because it crosses only one barrier, namely, the lower S.7 He attributes the acceptability of (11a) to this fact. Examples (7a–c) and (9a–e), in which the subject NP is raised from the D-structure object position also, are accounted for in the same manner. In contrast, Johnson claims that the S-structure subject of transitive and unergative constructions is base-generated in subject position, and observes that in these constructions Extraposition of PPs from the subject NP results in unacceptability, as exemplified below (Johnson (1985: 109)): (12) Transitive Construction: a. *A man saw/met/hit/paid/remembered/etc. me from Nuie. [S [S [NP A man t] [VP saw/met/hit/paid/remembered/etc. me]] [PP from Nuie]] b. *A man put a picture on the table from the flea market. [S [S [NP A man t] [VP put a picture on the table]] [PP from the flea market]] c. *A man gave a story to Bill from Nuie. [S [S [NP A man t] [VP gave a story to Bill]] [PP from Nuie]] (13) Unergative Construction: a. *A man whispered/screamed/conversed/etc. from Nuie. [S [S [NP A man t] [VP whispered/screamed/conversed/etc.]] [PP from Nuie]]

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b. *A man ran/walked/jumped/drove/etc. from the EPA. [S [S [NP A man t] [VP ran/walked/jumped/drove/etc.]] [PP from the EPA]] c. *A man hiccuped/coughed/vomited/drank/etc. from the EPA. [S [S [NP A man t] [VP hiccuped/coughed/vomited/drank/etc.]] [PP from the EPA]]

The verbs in (12) (i.e., see, meet, hit, pay, remember, put, give) are all transitive verbs, and those in (13) (i.e., whisper, scream, converse, run, walk, jump, drive, hiccup, cough, vomit, drink) are all unergative verbs (see Perlmutter (1978), Burzio (1986), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)). As shown in (12) and (13), Johnson assumes that an element extraposed from a D-/S-structure subject NP is adjoined to S (see also note 5). Then he argues that Extraposition of PPs in (12) and (13) involves two barriers — the NP node and the lower S node.8 He attributes the total unacceptability of these sentences to the ensuing Subjacency violation. With respect to Extraposition from an object NP of transitive verbs, as illustrated in (4b), Johnson claims that the choice of verbs exercises no influence on its acceptability and that all such instances are acceptable. Observe (4b), repeated below as (14), where Johnson assumes that an element extraposed from a D-/S-structure object NP is adjoined to VP (see also note 5):9 (14) Mary criticized a man yesterday from Los Angeles. [S Mary [VP [VP criticized [NP a man t] yesterday] [PP from Los Angeles]]

In (14), the NP dominating [a man t] is θ-governed by the verb criticize, and it is neither a BC nor a barrier. The lower VP is a BC, but not a barrier (see note 7). Therefore, movement of the PP from Los Angeles crosses no barrier and the acceptability of the sentence results, in keeping with Subjacency. The above discussion given by Johnson (1985) can now be formalized as follows: (15) Unaccusative Restriction on Extraposition from Subject NPs: Extraposition from subject NPs is restricted to sentences involving unaccusative verbs (including passive and psych-verbs). Unergative and transitive verbs cannot appear in this construction.10

6.3 Problems with Johnson’s analysis It is important to note first that the acceptability judgments of the sentences discussed in the preceding sections widely vary from speaker to speaker. At one


extreme, there are speakers, clearly in the minority, who consider sentences such as (1b), (5a–d), and (7a–c) marginal. These are speakers who do not have Extraposition of PPs from the subject NP in their grammar, and we can exclude them from consideration in our attempt to find conditions for the application of the rule. At the other end of the spectrum, there are a small number of speakers who consider (2b), (3b), (12a–c), and (13a–c) acceptable or nearly so. Likewise, although Johnson states that (9a,c) are acceptable, the majority of the speakers consider them unacceptable. Such variations are typical for phenomena that are controlled by nonsyntactic factors, but not for those that are controlled by syntactic factors such as the one Johnson has proposed in (15). With the above-mentioned wide idiolectal variations in mind, let us observe the following sentences, which are acceptable to many speakers of English on the interpretation whereby the sentence-final PPs modify the subject NPs. (16) a. An animal sprang out of the bushes [with long hind legs]. b. A man jumped out of the dark corner [with a mustache and a long beard]. c. A man dashed out of the dark corner [of apparently Asian extraction]. (17) a. b. c.

d. e. f. g. h.

A thought crossed her mind [of the utmost importance]. (Kayne, 1979: 715) The thought never crossed my mind [of accepting their offer and dropping the suit]. As you are aware, several new members have joined our club [of unique ethnic backgrounds and unsullied reputation in the business community]. Four discussants have joined us here [of divergent theoretical perspectives]. Four judges have joined our court now [of sound mind and unsullied judicial reputation]. A woman entered the room [of apparently Asian extraction]. A sound woke me up [of someone trying to sneak into my bedroom]. An odor awakened me [of something burning].

Spring, jump, and dash in (16) are unergative verbs. The sentence-final PPs are extraposed from the subject NP, and therefore, according to the Unaccusative Restriction given in (15), these sentences should be unacceptable. In spite of this prediction, they are acceptable or nearly so to many speakers. Likewise, cross, join, enter, wake (up) and awaken in (17) are transitive verbs, taking the direct objects her/my mind, our club/us/our court, the room, and me. The

175


sentence-final PPs are extraposed from the subject NP, and therefore Johnson’s analysis predicts that these sentences should all be unacceptable. But, contrary to this prediction, they are perfectly acceptable or nearly so to most speakers. The above observations show that there is no way to maintain Johnson’s Unaccusative Restriction on Extraposition from Subject NPs.

6.4 An alternative functional account We hypothesize that Extraposition from subject NPs is subject to the following constraint: (18) Discourse Constraint on PP Extraposition from Subject NPs (tentative): PP extraposition from subject NPs is allowed only if the predicate that the PP crosses over represents information that is discourse-assumed.

The Discourse Constraint on PP Extraposition from Subject NPs receives its strongest support from sentences such as the following: (19) a. *An old man screamed the loudest with a mustache and a long beard. b. Speaker A: Who screamed the loudest? Speaker B: An old man did with a mustache and a long beard. (20) a. *An old man whispered it to me with a mustache and a long beard. b. Speaker A: Who whispered it to you? Speaker B: An old man did with a mustache and a long beard. (21) a. *An old man insulted me with a mustache and a long beard. b. Speaker A: Who insulted you? Speaker B: An old man did with a mustache and a long beard.

The majority of the speakers who consider (19a), (20a), and (21a) unacceptable consider (19bB) and (20bB) acceptable. According to Johnson (1985), (19a), (20a), and (21a) are unacceptable because of their violation of the Unaccusative Restriction on Extraposition from Subject NPs. But the acceptability of (19bB), (20bB), and (21bB) shows that the phenomena under discussion have little to do with the unaccusativity of the predicates, and that what determines the acceptability status of the derived sentences is whether the predicates over which the PPs are extraposed are discourse-assumed or not. In the (a) examples of (19)–(21) the predicates over which the PPs have been extraposed (i.e., screamed the loudest, whispered it to me, and insulted me) are uttered out of the blue, and hence they are not discourse-assumed. But in the (b) examples they

Extraposition from subject NPs and unaccusativity 177

are replaced with auxiliary verbs left behind by VP Deletion, and hence they are fully discourse-assumed. Thus, the former examples are unacceptable in violation of the Discourse Constraint given in (18), while the latter are acceptable, in keeping with this constraint. Observe also the following sentences: (22) a. *A man was killed from Germany. b. Many soldiers were killed in the war from Germany and Japan.

Johnson’s Unaccusative Restriction predicts that both (22a) and (22b) should be acceptable since they are passive sentences, but many speakers consider (22a) unacceptable, and (22b) acceptable. The unacceptability of (22a) can be attributed to the fact that was killed, the predicate over which the PP from Germany has been extraposed, is not discourse-assumed. In contrast, (22b) is acceptable because the expression in the war, where war is marked with the definite article the, indicates that the war has been the topic of discussion, which in turn makes were killed given information in the sense of Prince (1981) (that is, information that the speaker can legitimately assume to be in the awareness of the hearer). Hence, were killed in the war, over which from Germany and Japan has been extraposed, is discourse-assumed, and the acceptability of the sentence results. Observe also the following sentences: (23) a. *A portrait fell (to the floor) of Abraham Lincoln. b. –/?Quite interestingly, when the earthquake came, all the portraits fell of Abraham Lincoln, but those of General Grant stayed on the wall.

(23a) is unacceptable in isolation to most speakers because fell (to the floor), uttered out of the blue, is not discourse-assumed. In contrast, (23b) is acceptable or nearly so to many speakers. This must be due to the fact that the adverbial clause when the earthquake came in (23b) primes the hearer for various things on the walls and on the shelves falling to the floor, making fell to the floor given information in the sense of Prince. Hence, fell, over which of Abraham Lincoln has been extraposed, is discourse-assumed, and the acceptability of the sentence results. Likewise, observe the following sentences, which are due to Johnson (see (7a)): (24) a. A man was freed with green eyes. b. A man was called with green eyes.


Johnson considers both sentences acceptable, but the native speaker judgment of the acceptability status of these sentences varies widely. It seems that these sentences are acceptable to those speakers who place them in contexts such as (25a,b), and unacceptable to those who do not:11 (25) a.

The highly irrational judge insisted that only prisoners with green eyes would be freed, and so a man was freed with green eyes. b. The film director requested that the part be played by a man with green eyes, and so a man was called with green eyes.

Observe that in (25a), the predicate was freed over which the PP with green eyes has been extraposed is fully discourse-assumed. In (25b), was called represents given information in the sense of Prince because it can be easily inferred from the film director’s request. It has been generally assumed that extraposition from subject NPs is allowable only when the string up to the extraposed element can receive an existential or presentational clause interpretation. Observe, for example, the following generalization by Guéron (1980), in which ‘SX’ stands for phrases extraposed from subject position: (26) Guéron’s Predicate Restriction on SX: SX is subject to the restriction that the predicate must denote, essentially, the appearance of the subject in the world of the discourse.

Guéron uses the above generalization to account for the contrast between the unacceptable (27a) and the acceptable (27b): (27) a. *A man died with green eyes. b. Several patients from foreign countries died in the terrible accident. A woman died from Peru and a man died from India. (Guéron, 1980: 653)

Guéron says that died in (27a) does not denote the appearance of the subject, hence the unacceptability of the sentence. She also says, concerning the acceptability of a discourse such as (27b), that “Ss which are unacceptable in isolation become acceptable in a context in which the verb is pragmatically emptied of all semantic content beyond that of appearance in the world of the discourse” (pp. 653–654). This is perhaps intended to mean that, for example, the verb died in the sentence involving Extraposition in (27b) conveys nothing but the meaning of (dis)appearance, because it has already been used in the prior context. The examples given in (19b), (20b), and (21b) show that Guéron’s generalization cannot be maintained. We repeat below (19b) for ease of reference:


(19) b. Speaker A: Speaker B:

Who screamed the loudest? An old man did with a mustache and a long beard.

It is clear that (19bB) does not mean ‘there appeared an old man with a mustache and a long beard’, but contrary to Guéron’s prediction, the sentence is perfectly acceptable. The explanation for the acceptability of (27b) should be the same as that for (19bB); PP extraposition is allowed in (27b) because died, which the PPs have crossed over, is fully discourse-assumed. There is no denying the fact, however, that many sentences that involve extraposition from subject NPs represent existence or appearance of the referents of the subject NPs in the world of the discourse. Observe the following sentences, all of which we have already seen: (1) b. A man appeared with blond hair. (5) a. b. c. d.

Men appeared from Tanzania. A storm followed from the North. Books arrived at the store about Hammett’s life. A picture stands in the hallway by Picasso.

(7) a. A man was seen/hired with green eyes. b. A book was put on the table about Nicaragua. c. A book was given to Danny about Nicaragua. (16) a. An animal sprang out of the bushes [with long hind legs]. b. A man jumped out of the dark corner [with a mustache and a long beard]. c. A man dashed out of the dark corner [of apparently Asian extraction]. (17) a. b. c.

d. e. f. g. h.

A thought crossed her mind [of the utmost importance]. (Kayne, 1979: 715) The thought never crossed my mind [of accepting their offer and dropping the suit]. As you are aware, several new members have joined our club [of unique ethnic backgrounds and unsullied reputation in the business community]. Four discussants have joined us here [of divergent theoretical perspectives]. Four judges have joined our court now [of sound mind and unsullied judicial reputation]. A woman entered the room [of apparently Asian extraction]. A sound woke me up [of someone trying to sneak into my bedroom]. An odor awakened me [of something burning].


Observe that the above sentences all represent the appearance or existence of the referents of the subject NPs. Typically, ‘appearance’ sentences, especially those with indefinite subjects, represent unexpected events, and on that interpretation, the predicates do not represent discourse-assumed information. In spite of this fact, it is possible to say that given an ‘appearance’ sentence, it is easy to obtain an interpretation whereby its predicate represents more discourseassumed information than the subject. Take (17a), for example. It is easy to assume that it is an answer to an implicit question ‘What kind of thought crossed her mind?’ (note that it is next to impossible to obtain an interpretation of (17a) whereby the predicate represents less discourse-assumed information than the subject — it is least likely that (17a) is an answer to an implicit question ‘Whose mind did a certain thought cross?’). Likewise, it is easy to interpret (17g) as an answer to an implicit question ‘What kind of sound awakened you?’ It seems that what makes the predicates of ‘existence’ or ‘appearance’ sentences more discourse-assumed than the subjects is the fact that the existence or appearance of the referents of the subject NPs is anchored or grounded to the location of the speaker or the person whose point of view he/she is representing (see Chapter 2). It seems that what licenses PP extraposition in ‘existence’ or ‘appearance’ sentences is this ‘deictic’ grounding. We revise the Discourse Constraint on PP Extraposition from Subject NPs in the following way: (28) Discourse Constraint on PP Extraposition from Subject NPs (revised): PP extraposition from subject NPs is allowed only if the predicate that the PP crosses over represents anaphorically or deictically grounded information.

All the sentences in (19b), (20b), (21b), (22b), (23b), and (24a–b) involve anaphoric grounding, and those in (1), (5), (7), (16), and (17) involve deictic grounding.12 We need to ask why a constraint of the type given above exists for PP extraposition from subject NPs. In order to answer this question, let us examine the following sentences: (29) a. The last volume of Gibbon’s history book has just been published. b. The last volume has just been published of Gibbon’s history book. (30) Speaker A: Has Gibbon’s history book been completed? Speaker B: a. Yes, the last volume of his history book has just been published. b. ??/*Yes, the last volume has just been published of his history book.


(31) a. b.

Only two of these missing children now remain unregistered. Only two now remain unregistered of these missing children.

(32) a. Only two of them now remain unregistered. b. ??/*Only two remain unregistered of them.

The unacceptability of (30Bb) and (32b) shows that the PP that undergoes extraposition must represent information that is not discourse-assumed. This makes it possible to characterize PP Extraposition from the Subject NP as a process that places the most important information in sentence-final position, in accordance with the following principle: (33) Flow-of-Information Principle for Reordering: Optional reordering of constituents in a sentence takes place in such a way as to place those that represent less important (given) information closer to sentence-initial position, and those that represent more important (new) information closer to sentence-final position. (cf. Kuno (1979), Quirk et al. (1985), Rochemont (1986))13

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to point out that the interpretation of sentence-final PPs as extraposed PPs competes with a potential interpretation of the same PPs as adverbial adjuncts, and that for many speakers, the former loses if the latter is readily available. Observe, for example, the following sentences: (34) a. A man from North Carolina came here yesterday. b. A man came here yesterday from North Carolina. (35) a. A man with a telescope arrived. b. A man arrived with a telescope.

It is next to impossible to obtain PP-extraposition interpretations for (34b) and (35b) because adverbial adjunct interpretations of the PPs are readily available. Note that the post-VP PPs in (17) are all of the of-NP type, for which an adverbial adjunct interpretation is not readily available. Observe also the following sentences: (36) a. A book about Italian cooking has been purchased. b. A book has been purchased about Italian cooking. (37) a. A book by Johnson has been purchased. b. A book has been purchased by Johnson.

While it is easy to obtain an extraposed-PP interpretation of the post-VP PP for (36b), it is next to impossible to obtain such an interpretation for (37b). This is

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clearly attributable to the fact that an adverbial adjunct interpretation of the post-VP PP is readily available for (37b), but not for (36b). The interference that an extraposed-PP interpretation receives from an adverbial adjunct interpretation is not limited to cases where the adverbial adjunct interpretation is pragmatically plausible, as illustrated above. It seems to extend to situations, at least for some speakers, where the extraposed-PP interpretation does not make much sense, pragmatically speaking. For example, observe the following sentences: (38) a. A woman arrived of apparently Asian extraction. b. A man arrived with a telescope. (= (35b)) c. A man arrived with blond hair.

Most speakers consider (38a) acceptable, and (38b) marginal or unacceptable on the extraposed-PP interpretation of the sentence-final PP. As already mentioned, this is due to the fact that the adverbial adjunct interpretation of of apparently Asian extraction is not available, but that of with a telescope is. Among these speakers, there are some who consider (38c) (as well as (1b)) awkward or marginal on the extraposed-PP interpretation, in spite of the fact that the adverbial-adjunct interpretation of with blond hair is pragmatically implausible. This seems to be due to the fact that these speakers interpret with in (38c) as an adverbial preposition (meaning ‘carrying’) in the same way as they do for (38b), and they do not re-parse the sentence when they realize that blond hair is not something that a man usually carries with him when he arrives.14 It would not be amiss to discuss here Nakajima’s (1993, 1995) claim that the following sentences constitute counterexamples to our hypotheses proposed in this chapter (originally formulated in Takami and Kuno (1992) as the Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from NPs). He claims that sentences such as (39a,b) below are perfectly acceptable, in contrast to the unacceptable examples (40a,b): (39) a. A man died with malignant tumors. b. A man was arrested with lots of drugs. (40) a. *A man died with green eyes. (= (27a)) b. *A man was arrested with a head band.

Nakajima maintains that our analysis fails to account for the acceptability of (39a,b) because the strings which the extraposed elements have crossed over are exactly the same between (39a,b) and (40a,b).


Compare, however, each of (39a,b) (repeated below) with each of the corresponding sentences without Extraposition, given below: (41) a. [A man with malignant tumors] died. b. [A man] died [with malignant tumors]. (= (39a)) (42) a. [A man with lots of drugs] was arrested. b. [A man] was arrested [with lots of drugs]. (= (39b))

It is important to note that (41b) is not synonymous with (41a). (41b) is nearly synonymous with ‘A man died of malignant tumors’, and the sentence-final PP with malignant tumors is construed as the cause of his death, modifying the VP, not the subject NP. In (41a), on the other hand, the tumors might not have been the cause of his death — he might have been run over by a car or have died of a heart attack — but he is being identified as a man who had malignant tumors. Therefore, sentence (41b) cannot be regarded as an extraposed version of the PP. Similarly, (42b) means that there were a lot of drugs around the man when he was arrested (and that was probably why he was arrested). In short, the PP with lots of drugs is interpreted as modifying the VP, and not the subject NP. In (42a), on the other hand, a lot of drugs might not have been the direct cause of his arrest — he might have been arrested for speeding, for instance — but he is being identified as a man who had a lot of drugs. Hence, (42b) cannot be regarded as an extraposed version of the PP, either. Thus, it can be concluded from the above observation that the (b) examples of (41) and (42) are not synonymous with the (a) examples. Since the former cannot be regarded as sentences involving Extraposition from subject NPs, they do not constitute counterexamples to our analysis of PP Extraposition from subject NPs.

6.5 Extraposition of clauses from the subject NP Johnson (1985: 106–8) observes that Extraposition of relative clauses from subject NPs of transitive constructions, unlike PP Extraposition from subject NPs of transitive constructions (see (12)), does not always result in total unacceptability, and gives the following examples.15 The recorded acceptability judgments are Johnson’s: (43) a. b.

??A man knows Godel [who understands his Incompleteness Theorem]. ??A woman said that Gary had arrived [who knew him quite well].

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On the basis of the difference between the total unacceptability of (12a–c) and the non-total unacceptability of (43a,b), Johnson concludes that Extraposition of a PP and Extraposition of a relative clause are different in nature, and that Extraposition of a PP involves a movement operation, as we have observed above, whereas Extraposition of a relative clause does not necessarily involve movement. He conjectures that “because relative clauses have the appropriate syntactic properties for a predicate, namely an open variable, they may fall under the syntax of predication” (p. 108). Since he confines himself to the cases of Extraposition involving movement, he does not examine Extraposition of a relative clause any further. However, observe the following sentences: (44) a. b. c.

??/*A man hit John [who was wearing a T-shirt]. ??/*A man ate a fish [who was from Texas]. ??/*A man gave Mary a bouquet of flowers [who was wearing a

funny hat]. (45) a. b. c. d. e.

A woman entered the room [who was wearing a white hat]. A man accosted me [who had a big suitcase in his hand]. A man just phoned me [who is one of my college classmates]. A stranger called on me without warning [who claimed he had met me before]. The unworthy thought crossed my mind [that perhaps the Israelis wanted to commit us to a schedule of arms deliveries]. (Nakau, 1994: 368)

In each of (44a–c) Extraposition of a relative clause from a subject NP of the transitive construction has taken place, but the resulting sentences are all marginally unacceptable. (These sentences become much more acceptable if the extraposed clauses are made longer and more specific in content. We will discuss this phenomenon later in this section.) The same operation is applied to each of (45a–c), and in (45e) Extraposition of an appositive clause has taken place, while in (45d) the extraposed clause has crossed over a prepositional verb. But these sentences are perfectly acceptable to most speakers, in contrast to (44a–c). Since (44a–c), (45a–e) and (43a,b) have exactly the same structure in relevant respects, it is clear that Johnson’s conjecture that Extraposition of a relative clause may fall under the syntax of predication leaves totally unexplained why there is such a difference in the acceptability status of sentences involving Extraposition of clauses from subject NPs. Regardless of how these sentences are to be derived, an account must be sought that can explain the


contrast between the acceptable (45a–e) and the marginal or unacceptable (44a–c) and (43a,b). It would be even better if the same account could explain the contrast in acceptability of sentences involving PP Extraposition of the kind that we have seen above. We will argue below that extraposition of clauses from subject NPs observes the same constraint as extraposition of PPs from subject NPs. According to this hypothesis, (44a–c) are unacceptable because the predicates over which the clauses have been extraposed are neither anaphorically nor deictically grounded. In contrast, (45a–e) are acceptable because the predicates of these sentences, all denoting the appearance of the subject referents, are deictically grounded. Observe also the following sentences: (46) Speaker A: Who screamed the loudest? Speaker B: An old man did who had a mustache and a long beard. (47) Speaker A: Who gave you this book? Speaker B: A stranger did who said he had come from Islamabad. (48) Speaker A: Who whispered it to you? Speaker B: An old man did who had disgustingly bad breath.

Just like (19bB), (20bB), and (21bB) involving Extraposition of a PP, (46B), (47B), and (48B) involving Extraposition of a relative clause are perfectly acceptable because the predicates of these sentences (i.e., did) are anaphorically grounded. With respect to Johnson’s sentences in (43), it seems to us that (43a) is considerably better than (43b), and might be acceptable to some speakers. The sentence is synonymous with: (49) A man knows Godel only if he understands his Incompleteness Theorem.

It is most likely that (49) is uttered only in contexts in which ‘knowing Godel’ is being talked about. The same requirement holds for (43a). The sentence is acceptable to those who can readily imagine contexts in which ‘knowing Godel’ is talked about, and unacceptable to those who cannot. (43b) is less acceptable than (43a) because it is much more difficult to imagine contexts in which someone’s saying that Gary had arrived is being talked about. The above observation makes it possible to generalize the Discourse Constraint on PP Extraposition from Subject NPs in such a way as to include extraposition of clauses:

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(50) Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from Subject NPs: Extraposition from subject NPs is allowed only if the predicate that the extraposed constituent crosses over represents anaphorically or deictically grounded information, and if the extraposed constituent represents the most important information in the sentence.

Recall that the condition represented by the if-clause in the above constraint derives from the phenomenon illustrated in (29)–(32). The above constraint can account for the fact that the sentences in (44) become more acceptable if the extraposed clauses are made longer and more specific in content. Observe the following sentences:16 (51) a. A man hit John who was wearing a T-shirt that was on fire. b. A man ate a fish who had come from the vegetarian community down the road.

As the extraposed clauses are made longer and more specific in content, the degree of importance of the information they represent increases. Conversely, the degree of importance of the information that the predicates they have crossed over represent decreases, making it easier to interpret them as representing grounded information. Hence, sentences (51a,b) are much better than (44a,b) and are (nearly) acceptable. It would not be amiss to observe here the contrast between (52a) and (52b), which is due to Nakajima. Nakajima argues that our analysis (originally formulated in Takami and Kuno (1992) as the Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from NPs) is difficult to maintain because the strings which the extraposed clauses have crossed over are exactly the same between the two sentences:17 (52) a. b.

A man gave Mary a bouquet of flowers [who wanted to marry her]. ??/*A man gave Mary a bouquet of flowers [who was wearing a

funny hat]. (= (44c)) (53) Takami and Kuno’s 1992 Version of the Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from NPs: Extraposition from NPs is acceptable to the extent that the string which the extraposed element crosses over can be interpreted as representing information that is transparent.

Takami and Kuno’s (1992) formulation of the Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from NPs given in (53) is slightly different from the one given in (50), but there is a partial explanation for the contrast between (52a) and (52b).


When a man courts a woman, he often gives her flowers. That is, giving flowers is part of the courtship. Therefore, it is easy to imagine that (52a) has been uttered in contexts in which a man’s courtship of a woman has been talked about. In contrast, there is no implication of courtship in (52b), and therefore, it is much more difficult to assume that gave Mary a bouquet of flowers is anaphorically grounded. The second reason for the contrast between (52a) and (52b) is found in the requirement stated in our new formulation (given in (50)) that the extraposed element must represent the most important information. (52a) satisfies this requirement because the extraposed clause is what makes clear the man’s intention. In contrast, in (52b), there is no indication that the extraposed clause represents any important information. The clause is interpreted as representing casual information about the man in question, and thus as failing to satisfy the ‘most important information’ of extraposition from subject NPs. It seems to us that the sentence is judged unacceptable for the above two reasons.

6.6 Conclusion In this chapter, we have demonstrated that Johnson’s (1985) central proposal that Extraposition from the subject NP is restricted to sentences involving unaccusative verbs (including passive and psych-verbs) is difficult to maintain. We have shown (i) that there are many acceptable instances of Extraposition from subject NPs that involve unergative and transitive verbs, and (ii) that there are acceptable instances of Extraposition involving auxiliary verbs left behind by VP Deletion, irrespective of the unaccusativity/unergativity of the deleted VPs. We have then proposed a functional account of this phenomenon. More specifically, we have proposed that extraposition of PPs and clauses from subject NPs is allowed only if the predicates that they cross over are anaphorically or deictically grounded, and if the extraposed PPs and clauses represent most important information in the sentence.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Summary In Chapter 1 of this book we have outlined the historical background of the subcategorization of intransitive verbs into unergative and unaccusative verbs, and explained the semantic and syntactic criteria on which this distinction is based. In Chapters 2 through 6, we have examined the following five English constructions which have been claimed in many studies to be crucially dependent on the unergative–unaccusative distinction: (1) a. b. c. d. e.

There-Construction (Chapter 2) (One’s) Way Construction (Chapter 3) Cognate Object Construction (Chapter 4) Pseudo-Passive Construction (Chapter 5) Extraposition from Subject NPs (Chapter 6)

It has been argued by many scholars that these constructions select either unergative verbs or unaccusative verbs, but not both, and restrictions such as the following have been proposed: (2) Unaccusative Restriction on the There-Construction: Only unaccusative verbs denoting existence or appearance can appear in the there-construction. No unergative (or transitive) verbs can. (= (5) in Chapter 2) (3) Unergative Restriction on the Way Construction: Only unergative verbs can appear in the way construction. No unaccusative verbs can. (= (3) in Chapter 3) (4) Unergative Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction: Only unergative verbs can appear in the cognate object construction. No unaccusative verbs can. (= (3) in Chapter 4) (5) Unergative Restriction on the Pseudo-Passive Construction: Only unergative verbs can appear in the pseudo-passive construction. No unaccusative verbs can. (= (9) in Chapter 5)


(6) Unaccusative Restriction on Extraposition from Subject NPs: Extraposition from subject NPs is restricted to sentences involving unaccusative verbs (including passive and psych-verbs). Unergative and transitive verbs cannot appear in this construction. (= (15) in Chapter 6)

We have, however, shown in Chapters 2 through 6 that each of the widely assumed restrictions described in (2)–(6) is incorrect, and that the above five constructions do not serve as diagnostic tests for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. We have also shown that generative and relational grammar analyses that attempt to account for the acceptability of these five constructions on the basis of the generalizations in (2)–(6) do not capture the crux of these phenomena. We have further demonstrated in this book that the acceptability of the above five constructions is not dependent upon whether the verbs involved are unergative or unaccusative, but is determined by how well the semantics of the verbs and other elements in the construction fit the semantic and discourse functions that each construction carries with it. To be more specific, we have proposed the following constraints for the acceptability of the five constructions: (7) The Functional Constraint on the There-Construction: The there-construction is acceptable to the extent that the string to the left of its logical subject is interpretable as denoting existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance of the logical subject referent. In addition, when the construction has a presentational force, the existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance that the construction represents must be observable to the speaker (or the person whose point of view the speaker is representing). (= (57) in Chapter 2) (8) The Functional/Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction: The way construction is acceptable to the extent that i. it involves a (nontrivial) physical, temporal, or psychological distance; ii. the subject referent gradually moves through the whole span of that distance iii. in an unusual manner; and iv. the verb describes that manner of movement. (= (45) in Chapter 3) (9) The Functional Constraint on the Cognate Object Construction: A. In the cognate object construction, i. the intransitive verb must represent an activity or event involving a temporal process, and ii. the object NP must represent a specific state or event that

Conclusion

belongs to the set of the possible states or events resulting from the activity or event. N. B. ‘Die a … death’ is an exceptional construction that has historically a different derivational process from the ordinary cognate object construction, and its cognate object represents the manner, rather than the result, of the event described by the verb. B. The Cognate Object Construction is a marked construction, and its use must be justifiable: iii. the speaker’s specific reference to the state or event represented by the cognate object must be either conventionally or contextually justifiable; iv. in active sentences, if a cognate object does not have a modifier, as in laugh laughs, it is tautological and therefore, there is no justification for its use. On the other hand, in the passive construction, a cognate object without a modifier is acceptable as long as Passivization is justifiable. (= (56) in Chapter 4) (10) The Functional Constraint on the Pseudo-Passive Construction: A. The Involvement Requirement (required for all pseudo-passive sentences): Pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable only to the extent that their surface subject referents are involved in the actions or states represented by the verb-preposition sequences; that is, only to the extent that the actions or states that they represent indicate that something is done to/for their objects. B. The Characterization and Topic Requirements: Pseudo-passive sentences that satisfy the Involvement Requirement must satisfy either the Characterization Requirement or the Topic Requirement if the involvement does not reach the level of the direct target of an action/state. B1. The Characterization Requirement: Pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable if passivization can be motivated by the Subject Preference for Characterizational Sentences. B2. The Topic Requirement: Pseudo-passive sentences are acceptable if passivization can be justified by the Subject-Position Preference for Topics. (= (62) in Chapter 5) (11) Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from Subject NPs: Extraposition from subject NPs is allowed only if the predicate that the extraposed constituent crosses over represents anaphorically or deictically grounded information, and if the extraposed constituent represents the most important information in the sentence. (= (50) in Chapter 6)

191


7.2 Functional factors that interact with syntax In this book, we have identified various nonsyntactic factors that play important roles in determining whether sentences in the five constructions that we have examined in this book are acceptable or not. We will enumerate some of them here to provide a check list for future researchers to use for determining whether the acceptability/unacceptability contrasts they have uncovered for a given linguistic phenomenon might be due to nonsyntactic factors. (12) a.

Point of View: Whose point of view a given sentence represents might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 2; also see Kuno and Kaburaki (1977), Kuno (1980)) b. Involvement: Whether the referent of the object NP in a given sentence is directly involved in the action or state represented by the verb might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 5; also see Kuno (1983a), Takami (1992, 1995)) c. Characterization: Whether a given sentence characterizes the referent of its subject NP might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 5; also see Kuno (1990), Takami (1992, 1995)) d. Subject Position Preference for Topics: Whether the topic of a given sentence is placed in subject position or not might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 5; also see Kuno (1990)) e. Grounded Information: Whether the element in question in a given sentence represents deictically or anaphorically grounded information might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 6) f. Important Information: Whether the element in question in a given sentence represents the most important information in the sentence or not might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 6; also see Kuno (1982, 1983b), Takami (1992)) g. Flow-of-Information Principle: Whether optional reordering of elements in a given sentence takes place in such a way as to place less important information closer to sentence-initial position and more important information closer to

Conclusion 193

h.

i.

j.

k.

l.

m.

n.

o.

sentence-final position might be relevant for the acceptability of the derived sentence. (cf. Chapter 6) Status of a Substring of a Sentence: Whether a substring (most likely the initial substring) of a given sentence is interpretable in a certain way or not (e.g., as representing existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance) might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 2) Spectator Role of the Speaker: Whether a given sentence makes clear the spectator role of the speaker or the person whose point of view he or she is representing might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 2) Observability (related to (12h)): Whether a given sentence does or does not represent an on-going event observable to the speaker might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 2) Existence, Absence, Appearance, Non-appearance: Whether a given sentence does or does not denote existence, absence, appearance, or non-appearance of an object might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 2) Sustained Movement: Whether a given sentence describes a long-sustained movment or not might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapters 2 and 3) Action, State, Accomplishment, and Achievement Verbs: Whether the predicate of a given sentence describes an action, state, accomplishment, or achievement might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 4; also see Vendler (1968)) Resultative State: Whether a given sentence involves a specific state or event that belongs to the possible states or events resulting from the activity or event represented by the verb might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 4) Temporal Process: Whether a given intransitive verb represents an activity or event involving a temporal process might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 4)


p. Unexpected Actions: Whether the action (or state) described by a given sentence represents an unusual or unexpected one to the speaker/hearer might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 3) q. Manner of Movement: Whether the verb of a given sentence represents only the movement of the subject referent or the manner of its movement might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 3) r. Single/Repeated Actions: Whether the action described by a given sentence represents a single or repeated (gradual) action might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (cf. Chapter 3) s. Humanness: Whether the element in question is a human, a nonhuman animate or an inanimate might be relevant for the acceptability of the sentence. (see Kuno (1987), Kuno and Takami (2002)) t. Speaker/Hearer NP: Whether the NP in question in a given sentence represents the speaker, the hearer, or a third person might be relevant for the acceptability of the sentence. (see Kuno (1987)) u. Awareness: Whether the referent of the NP in question in a given sentence is aware of the event, state or thing described in the sentence might be relevant for the acceptability status of the sentence. (see Kuno (1987), Kuno and Takami (1993))

The above is not by any means an exhaustive list of nonsyntactic factors that we know interact with syntax (see Kuno (1987), Kuno and Takami (1993, 2002)), but we will have to leave a comprehensive examination of such factors for some future publication.

7.3 Concluding remarks Before we conclude this book, it may be instructive to observe some other constructions whose acceptability has been claimed to be accounted for by the unergative–unaccusative distinction. For example, Simpson (1983) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) have argued that the so-called resultative construction, exemplified in (13)–(15) below, allows only transitive and unaccusative verbs,

Conclusion 195

and that no unergative verbs appear in the construction (unless accompanied by the so-called fake objects): (13) a. Mary painted the shed green. b. The blacksmith hammered the metal flat. (14) a. b. c. d. e. (15) a. b. c. d. e.

The pond froze solid. The butter melted to a liquid. The window broke into little pieces. The saucepan boiled/burned dry. This time the curtain rolled open on the court of the Caesars … (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995: 39) *Dora shouted / yelled hoarse. (ibid.: 35) *My mistress grumbled calm. (ibid.: 36) *John danced / walked tired. *Those teenagers laughed sick. (Carrier and Randall, 1992: 191) *Joggers often run sick. (ibid.: 215)

In (13a,b), the resultative predicates green and flat describe the states of the direct object referents (i.e., the shed and the metal) resulting from the actions denoted by the transitive verbs paint and hammer. Sentence (13a) means that Mary painted the shed, and as a result it became green. Similarly, (13b) means that the blacksmith hammered the metal, and as a result it became flat. In (14a–e) and (15a–e), the resultative predicates are intended to describe the resulting states of the subject referents, but while (14a–e) are acceptable, (15a–e) are unacceptable. Simpson (1983) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) attribute this difference to the fact that the verbs in (14a–e) are unaccusative, while those in (15a–e) are unergative. Hence, the following restriction can be formulated: (16) Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction: Only unaccusative and transitive verbs can appear in the resultative construction; no unergative verbs can. That is, resultative predicates can only refer to direct objects in D-structure.

However, Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2001) have recently withdrawn the Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction in (16), and have shown that even unergative verbs can appear in the construction, as illustrated in the following (p. 774) (see Wechsler (1997) and Verspoor (1997) for further counterexamples):


(17) a.

A 16-year-old girl said that while she was walking to work about 11 a.m. Friday, a man grabbed and groped her and tried to get under her clothing, but she kicked free and fled. (Staff, “Crime Reports”, The Courier-Journal, April 21, 1998, p. 05B) b. One woman gets up to leave, but Red-Eyes grabs her roughly by the arm and pulls her into his lap. She wriggles free, but remains seated obediently beside him. (F. O’Reilly, “Killing Time in the Shadow of War”, The Ottawa Citizen, November 30, 1997, p. D10) c. On the way to the speedway, one of his race cars wiggled loose inside the transporter and caused damage to both of his cars. (S. Rose, “Robby Gordon Finds Problems Again at Track”, The Kansas City Star, August 1, 1997, p. D11)

Kick, wriggle, and wiggle in (17a–c), all denoting volitional actions of their subject referents, are unergative verbs, and the sentences are perfectly acceptable. Therefore, (17a–c) show that the Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction in (16) is incorrect, and that the resultative construction in English does not serve as a diagnostic test for the unergative–unaccusative distinction. Coopmans (1989), Hoekstra and Mulder (1990), L. Levin (1986), and Collins (1997) have claimed that the so-called locative inversion construction, exemplified in (18a–d) below, allows only unaccusative verbs, and that no unergative verbs appear in the construction (see also note 21 to Chapter 2): (18) a. b. c. d.

In a little white house lived seven dwarfs. At the foot of the mountain stood a beautiful white house. Into the room came a tall middle-aged man. On that table was placed a beautiful silver dish.

However, this claim is also proved wrong by the perfect acceptability of sentences such as the following (see also Birner (1994) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: Chapter 6)): (19) a. Into the midst of the revelers jumped a team of acrobats. b. Towards the party of tourists swam a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon. c. Out of a hidden crack in the cliff flew a steady stream of bats.

Jump, swim, and fly in (19a–c) are typical unergative verbs, all representing volitional actions of their subject referents. Hence it can be concluded that the locative inversion construction is not sensitive to the unergative–unaccusative distinction either.

Conclusion 197

We have now examined in this book all the major constructions that have been claimed to serve as diagnostic tests for the unergative–unaccusative distinction, and have shown that none of them do. It is hoped that we have also shown in this book how dangerous it is in linguistic research to draw sweeping generalizations on the basis of a limited set of data, because there is always the possibility that the contrast in acceptability that the initial set of data displays is due not to syntactic constraints, but to semantic, discourse-based, or pragmatic constraints. For the analysis of complex linguistic constructions of the type we have examined in this book, one must collect a large number of examples, and one must always bear in mind that a given sentence is just as likely to be acceptable or unacceptable for nonsyntactic reasons as for syntactic ones. It therefore seems necessary to first examine carefully the full range of relevant data and then to attempt to discover the real conditioning factors that lie behind such data, whether they are syntactic, nonsyntactic, or a combination of these. It seems that we must refrain from seeking only theoretical elegance or simplicity, while failing to pay sufficient attention to the intricate details of the phenomenon in question, or leaving counterexamples for the initial set of data out of consideration.

Notes

Notes to Chapter 1 1.Sapir (1917) distinguished intransitive subject cases in type 2 languages into active and inactive cases. Note here, as mentioned in the text, that an intransitive subject is marked active when its referent performs a volitional/intentional action, whereas it is marked inactive when the sentence describes a nonvolitional/unintentional event of the subject referent. Thus, in type 2 languages, intransitive subject cases are distinguished depending on whether the subject referent performs an action with his/her own will. The volitionality/intentionality of the subject referent, as will be described in detail in Section 1.2, is closely related to the semantic criterion by which Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) distinguish intransitive verbs into unergative and unaccusative verbs. 2.In their classification of unergative and unaccusative verbs, Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) classify verbs such as blush, suffocate, and tremble as unaccusative verbs. This is because these verbs represent nonvolitional events of their subject referents and the subjects are interpreted as themes (or patients). However, these verbs can alternatively be considered as representing involuntary bodily processes of their subject referents, and the subjects are then interpreted as experiencers. Therefore, it seems possible to assume, contra Perlmutter and Perlmutter and Postal, that these verbs are unergative (see DeLancey (1984) for some relevant discussion). In this connection, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 160), though not using a semantic criterion, consider the verb blush unergative (see Section 4.3 of Chapter 4). 3.Observe the following examples involving the intransitive verb come: (i) a. b.

A stranger came into the room. He hasn’t come yet.

It has generally been assumed in the literature that come is an unaccusative verb, since in (i-a,b) the speaker, as an observer, describes objectively an appearance (or non-appearance) of the subject referent. In other words, it is not the case that the speaker describes in these sentences the volitional action or volitional non-action of the referent of the subject a stranger. In this respect, sentences (i-a,b) are considered as the same as sentences such as the following, in which come takes inanimates as its subject and a nonvolitional event is described: (ii) a. b.

Spring has come. A good idea came to me.

In the following sentence, however, the subject is the speaker him/herself, and the verb come is interpreted as representing his/her volitional act:


(iii) I’ll come with you. Thus, according to the semantic criterion based on a volitional act versus nonvolitional event of the subject referent, come in (iii) turns out to be an unergative verb. In light of this, however, the following sentence can be interpreted either as the speaker’s objective description of an appearance of the subject referent or as a volitional act of the subject referent: (iv) They came into the room to protest to the boss. Therefore, it is not immediately clear whether come in (iv) is an unaccusative or unergative verb. This seems to cast doubt on the semantic criterion based on a volitional act versus nonvolitional event of the subject referent. 4.Zaenen (1993), however, objects to this claim by Perlmutter (1978), pointing out some acceptable impersonal passives in Dutch involving unaccusative verbs (see note 3 of Chapter 5). 5.Burzio (1981, 1986) (and Miyagawa (1989a,b)) calls unaccusative verbs ‘ergative’ verbs, and unergative verbs ‘intransitive’ verbs. As mentioned in Section 1.1, however, the term ‘ergative’ verb has been used for verbs that allow the intransitive-transitive alternation, such as open, break, roll, and stop in (4)–(7). Further, the term ‘intransitive’ verb has commonly been used in opposition to transitive verb. Therefore, these two terms given by Burzio have caused unnecessary confusion and misunderstanding. We will hence avoid using these terms in this book, and employ the more standard terms ‘unergative’ and ‘unaccusative’ coined by Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984). 6.For the phenomena in which it has been argued that the unergative–unaccusative distinction plays a crucial role, see further Grimshaw (1986), Burzio (1981, 1986), Harris (1982), Belletti (1988), Miyagawa (1989a,b), Van Valin (1990), Hoekstra and Mulder (1990), Kageyama (1993, 1996), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1986, 1988, 1995), Tsujimura (1996, 1999), Kishimoto (1996), and the discussions in the chapters that follow in this book. 7.In the framework of the Minimalist Program of Chomskian Generative Grammar, it has been assumed that the subjects of unergative verbs take the specifier position of vP, while those of unaccusative verbs take the object position of VP, both types of subjects moving to the specifier position of TP (= IP) for feature-checking (see Chomsky (1995: 315–316, 376) and Radford (1997)). 8.Haegeman (1991, 1994) and Kageyama (1996), among others, divide unaccusative verbs iuto ‘ergative verbs’, which can be used as transitive verbs, and ‘unaccusative verbs’, which cannot be used as transitive verbs (see note 11 of Chapter 2). 9.As shown in (57), constructions such as the intransitive and transitive constructions are also posited in Construction Grammar. However, observe the following sentences as instances of such constructions: (i) a. b.

John cried. John ate spaghetti.

As far as we can see, the meaning of (i-a) is compositionally derived from the meanings of the component parts, John and cried, and nothing more seems to be implied in the sentence. The form of (i-a) is also compositionally derived from the word order of John and cried; John is the subject and cried is an intransitive verb. Similarly, the meaning of (i-b) is compositionally derived from the meanings of John, ate, and spaghetti, and nothing more is implied in the sentence.

Notes 201

The form of (i-b) is also compositionally derived from the word order of John, ate, and spaghetti; John is the subject, ate is a verb taking the direct object spaghetti. Hence, in light of the definition (58), it seems that constructions such as the intransitive or the transitive construction cannot be posited as distinct constructions in Construction Grammar. 10.Note, in passing, that the assumption made in Construction Grammar that grammatical constructions are the crucial basis for syntax contrasts sharply with the assumption made in Chomskian Generative Grammar that language-particular grammatical constructions are taxonomic epiphenomena, arising solely from the interactions of general principles of Universal Grammar with nonuniversal restrictions reflecting language-specific parameter settings (Chomsky (1981, 1995)).

Notes to Chapter 2 1.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for sentence (4c). 2.It has been assumed in the Minimalist Program framework (Chomsky (1995: 315–316, 376)) that the subjects of unergative verbs take the specifier position of vP, while those of unaccusative verbs take the object position in VP, and that they both move to the specifier position of TP (= IP) for the sake of feature-checking. However, this assumption does not affect the discussion that follows in the text. 3.In the Minimalist Program framework advanced by Chomsky (1993, 1995), it is assumed that there already exists in the Numeration. In the process of structure building, it is selected from the Numeration and merges with a category already formed (= TP). Then, the TP node becomes T¢ and the top node dominating there and T¢ becomes TP. However, this assumption does not affect the discussion that follows in the text. 4.Lumsden (1988: 39) attributes the unacceptability of sentences such as (2a–d) to the assumption that since the verb is unergative, assigning a θ-role (i.e., agent or experiencer) only to its subject, it cannot assign a θ-role to an NP in the object position (e.g., a young girl in (2a)), thereby resulting in a violation of the θ-Criterion (Chomsky (1981)), given in (i): (i) θ-Criterion: Each argument bears one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role is assigned to one and only one argument. 5.Belletti (1988: 2, fn. 4) states that ‘an NP Case-marked partitive will always mean “some of”, “part of a larger set”’. Thus universally quantified NPs, such as all the books, every book, each student, and also an NP with the definite article the, such as the books, are incompatible with partitive Case and these NPs are predicted not to appear in sentences such as (3a–c) and (4a–c). This is generally called the ‘Definiteness Effect’ in generative grammar. However, it is worth noting that there are many there-sentences that do allow definite NPs (see examples in note 22, for instance), and therefore, it does not seem that this claim can be maintained. 6.Case of a postverbal NP (and of there) has long been a topic of investigation in generative syntax. As opposed to Belletti (1988), Chomsky (1986) assumes that the position of the postverbal NP is not one where Case is licensed, and that the postverbal NP is assigned Case


through transmission from there. Within the Minimalist Program framework, Chomsky (1991, 1993) argues that the postverbal NP (what he calls the ‘associate’ of there) moves to the position of there in the LF component to have its Case licensed (for further details, see Chomsky (1995), and for an alternative analysis based on Belletti’s inherent Case account, see Lasnik (1992, 1995)). 7.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for sentences (11a) and (12c). 8.The logical subject in the outside verbal there-construction in (11b) is a definite NP, her beautiful and intelligent face. Milsark (1974: 248), examining similar outside verbal there-sentences with a definite NP, argues that the Definiteness Effect (see note 5) applies only to inside verbals, and not to outside verbals. However, as we will point out in note 22, there are acceptable inside verbals that involve definite NPs. 9.Newmeyer (1987) and Rochemont and Culicover (1990) hold that the subject NP, originated in the specifier position of IP, adjoins to the IP, rather than to VP. 10.Coopmans (1989) and Rochemont and Culicover (1990: Chapter 4) assume a heavy constituent shift analysis for (11); namely, the base-generated logical subject at the object position directly adjoins to VP without moving to the subject position, with the empty subject position being filled with there. Concerning Case of the logical subject, it is assumed in Coopmans (1989) that the VP-adjoined subject is assigned nominative Case by I(NFL) because it is in the direct government domain of I. In Rochemont and Culicover (1990), on the other hand, it is assumed, following Safir (1985) (see also Chomsky (1986) and note 6), that the base-generated logical subject at the object position, before it adjoins to VP, receives nominative Case through transmission from there, which takes the specifier position of IP. 11.Unaccusative verbs are classified into two groups: those that function as transitive verbs, such as sink, open, close, increase, break, and drop, and those that do not, such as arrive, come, begin, exist, emerge, and occur. Haegeman (1991: 308–312, 1994: 334–337) distinguishes these two groups, and calls the former type of verbs ‘ergative’ and the latter type ‘unaccusative’. Observing the following contrast, she further argues that the there-construction is only associated with what she calls unaccusative verbs: (i) a. There arrived three men at the palace. (unaccusative) b. There came three new sailors on board. (unaccusative) c. *There sank three ships last week. (ergative) Haegeman’s above claim, however, is immediately falsified by the fact that verbs that function as transitive verbs (her ergative verbs) can be used in the construction, as shown in (ii). (ii) There hangs a picture of George Washington on one of the walls of her house. (ergative) A further problem with Haegeman’s analysis is the fact that even a sentence like (i-c) can become acceptable under certain circumstances, as pointed out by Kimball (1973: 265). Kimball states that the following sentence, unacceptable in a normal context, becomes acceptable ‘if one thinks of oneself as hidden under water watching the monster sink into view’: (iii) There sank a green monster into the lagoon.

Notes 203

The acceptability of (ii) out of context, and the acceptability of (iii) in a particular context show that Haegeman’s claim that the there-construction allows only those unaccusative verbs that do not function as transitive verbs is untenable. 12.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for sentence (17d). 13.Johnson and Lappin (1999: 29) observe that the there-construction ‘normally requires verbs which correspond to intransitives, where this class includes both verbs generally regarded as unaccusative, like “appear”, and those taken as unergative, like “race”’, and gives (17f) as the only example of the unergative there-construction. However, the acceptability status of this sentence seems to be less stable than that of (17a–e,g). Some speakers consider the sentence marginal. We will try to account for this in §2.4.2. 14.We are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for sentence (17g). 15.Kayne (1979) provides examples (21b,c) to show that there are instances that contradict Emonds’s (1976: 105) claim that rightward movement of the logical subject in the there-construction involving main verbs observes the structure-preserving hypothesis. The examples are not provided as counterexamples to the Unaccusative Restriction in (5). 16.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (21g). 17.Biber, Johansson, Leech, Conrad, and Finegan (1999: 946) give the following transitive verb there-sentence: (i) There seized him a fear that perhaps after all it was all true. However, our native-speaker consultants have found the sentence marginal. 18.Note that the ‘existence or appearance’ requirement mentioned in the Unaccusative Restriction in (5) applies only to unaccusative verbs, and is not extendable to sentences such as (20a,b). 19.Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 186–187) have argued in their discussion on the resultative construction and causative alternation that agentive verbs of manner of motion are unaccusative when they receive a directed motion interpretation. For example, the verb march in (i-a), which is an agentive verb of manner of motion and therefore unergative in itself, is argued to be unaccusative when it is used with a directional phrase, as in (i-b). (i) a. b.

The soldiers marched. (unergative) The solders marched to the tents. (unaccusative)

Based on this, one might argue here that while creep, proceed, and crawl in (17b–d) are unergative in isolation, creep… into the small mountain village, proceed… to the cemetery, and crawl … on to the chair and the floor are unaccusative rather than unergative because they take directional phrases, and that therefore (17b–d) do not constitute counterexamples to the Unaccusative Restriction in (5). Likewise, one might extend Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s notion of directed motion interpretation and claim that amble … along the path (to where the path leads), race … through the garden (to the other end of the garden), and spring … from the bushes near the path (towards the speaker) of (17e–g) are also unaccusative because they represent unidirectional movements towards certain goals. The above argument, however, does not seem to work for two reasons. First, it does not apply to (17a) because it does not involve a movement verb, and it does not have any directional phrase. Secondly, Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s above claim, as pointed out by


Goldberg (1995: 16), is inconsistent with their own claim that the way construction, as illustrated in (ii), is associated only with unergative verbs. (ii) a. b.

The kid jumped his way to the sandbox. John dogpaddled his way from one end of the pool to the other.

Jump and dogpaddle in (ii-a,b) are unergative verbs because they describe volitional actions of their subject referents. But in (ii-a,b) they take directional phrases and therefore they must be regarded as unaccusative, contrary to Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s claim. (Faced with examples such as (ii-a,b), Levin and Rappaport Hovav might claim that unergative movement verbs with directional phrases are ambiguous between unaccusative and unergative verbs; they are unaccusative when they appear in the resultative construction, but are unergative when they appear in the way construction. However, it is clear that this claim is quite ad hoc and offers no explanation because it is solely dependent on the (false) assumption that the resultative construction serves as a diagnostic test for unaccusative verbs, while the way construction serves as one for unergative verbs.) 20.McCawley (1988) provides example (23b) to show that while a (logical) subject generally precedes a verb in the canonical word order, the former follows the latter in the there-construction, and example (23c) to show that the verb in the there-construction ‘must have an appropriate meaning, typically one that ascribes existence or “visibility” to the subject’ (p. 86). Neither example is provided to make an argument such as the one given in the text. 21.Sentences without there, namely the sentence pattern of ‘PP + V + NP’, have often been called in the literature Stylistic or Locative Inversion (Emonds (1976), Rochemont (1978, 1986)). This construction has been claimed to be a diagnostic for the unaccusative syntactic configuration (Coopmans (1989), L. Levin (1986), and Collins (1997), among others) and to be compatible only with unaccusative verbs, as partly shown below: (i) a. b. c. d.

In a little white house lived seven dwarfs. At the foot of the mountain stood a beautiful white house. Into the room came a tall middle-aged man. On that table was placed a beautiful silver dish.

However, this claim is untenable because there are unergative verbs that can appear in this construction, as illustrated in (ii) below, and there are unaccusative verbs that cannot appear in the construction, as illustrated in (iii) (for further details and explanation, see Birner (1994) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: Chapter 6)): (ii) a. b.

Into the midst of the revelers jumped a team of acrobats. Towards the party of tourists swam a man in a wetsuit carrying a harpoon. (cf. (24b))

(iii) a. *On the streets of the town melted the snow that we had last night. b. *Into the lake sank a giant monster. 22.It has been pointed out in the literature (e.g., Bolinger (1977), Rando and Napoli (1978), Woisetschlaeger (1983), Holmback (1984), Lakoff (1987), Quirk et al. (1985), McCawley (1988), Prince (1992), Abbott (1993), Ward and Birner (1995)) that there are many counterexamples to the Definiteness Effect referred to in notes 5 and 8 (i.e., the logical

Notes 205

subjects in the inside verbals must be indefinite NPs). Observe the following examples, which are from Abbott (1993: 44): (i) A: B:

Is there anything to eat? Well, there’s the leftover chicken from last night.

(ii) A: B:

I guess we’ve called everybody. No, there’s still Mary and John.

The acceptability of (i)–(ii) clearly shows that the Definiteness Effect is an incorrect generalization, and casts serious doubt on Belletti’s (1988) claim that postverbal NPs are assigned inherent partitive Case. Ward and Birner (1995) propose a functional account to the effect that the logical subject in the there-construction constitutes a hearer-new instantiation of the variable in some salient open proposition. In this respect, it represents a hearer-new entity; the presence of the subject referent as a slot-filler is new to the hearer (for a similar account, see Rando and Napoli (1978)). In (i), for instance, while the referent of the definite expression the leftover chicken is uniquely identifiable, the speaker assumes at the time of his/her utterance that the hearer does not know what there is to eat. That is, the leftover chicken constitutes a hearernew instantiation of the variable in the open proposition ‘there is X (to eat)’. The same is the case with (ii) (for details, see Ward and Birner (1995) and Rando and Napoli (1978)). Although Ward and Birner (and Rando and Napoli) argue that the logical subject in the there-construction must be new information for the hearer, it is worth noting that in a presentational there-sentence such as the following, the appearance of the subject referent is new information also for the speaker (or for the person whose point of view he/she is representing): (iii) Suddenly there ran out of the bushes a grizzly bear. (= (12a)) (iii) says that a grizzly bear suddenly ran out of the bushes and appeared in the view of the speaker. The appearance of the grizzly bear is interpreted as new information also for the speaker. 23.This does not mean that sentences of the pattern of (35) are always unacceptable. We will return to this point in Section 2.4.2. 24.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for sentence (41) and the explanation as to why it is acceptable. 25.We are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for sentence (42). 26.Our argument that the established scene is anchored to the speaker/narrator is applicable also to the existential there-sentences involving be, as in the following: (i) a. b.

There is a vase on the table. There are three bedrooms in this house. (= (1a))

The anaphoric definite article the in the table in (i-a) indicates that the speaker knows the referent of this NP, which shows that the established scene is anchored to the speaker. The deictic demonstrative pronoun this in this house in (i-b) indicates that the speaker has uttered the sentence while observing the house in front of him/her, which also shows that the scene is anchored to him/her.


The above argument seems also to work even in there-sentences without locative phrases, as in the following, because we can readily infer a locative phrase that is anchored to the speaker, as given in the parentheses: (ii) a. b.

There is a God (in the universe). (= (28a)) There are seven days in a week (in this universe of discourse).

27.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (45a,b). 28.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (47c). 29.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (48a,b). 30.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (50a). 31.It might be argued here that our analysis of the there-construction, which shows that the construction can be accounted for without any syntactically interesting hypothesis, makes the construction, and henceforth, our analysis, ‘theoretically uninteresting’. We do not see why elucidating various constraints, be they syntactic or semantic, of a major construction in English should be theoretically uninteresting. But even granting, for a moment, that the there-construction is ‘theoretically uninteresting’, we will counter the above argument by stating that our analysis is ‘theoretically interesting’ in that it invalidates the illusion that has long been held that the construction is ‘theoretically interesting’.

Notes to Chapter 3 1.Not only intransitive but also transitive verbs such as make and find can appear in the way construction. This will be discussed in the following sections. 2.(2a) is a slightly modified version of the following sentence provided by Jackendoff (1990: 213): (i) *The window opened/broke its way into the room. We have changed broke to fell because a window cannot break into a room. 3.There are basically two problems with respect to this assumption. First, there are acceptable sentences that do not involve PPs denoting a path (see (33a,b) and note 12). We will discuss sentences of this pattern in Section 3.4. Secondly, the assumption that the ‘PP denoting a path’ is obligatory does not follow from any principle. Therefore, the proposed analysis, although it might be able to account for the presence of the object NP, will have to stipulate that a path-denoting PP be present under the V¢ node. 4.One might wonder here how the generative grammar account based on Burzio’s Generalization (6) can prevent accusative objects from appearing with unergative verbs, as in the following sentence: (i) *I talked him. In generative grammar, the ungrammaticality of sentences such as (i) has been attributed to a violation of the Case Filter; talked in (i), an intransitive verb, is not a Case-assigner, and therefore him fails to receive Case. It is only assigned accusative Case by a preposition, as in the following:

Notes 207

(ii) I talked to him. However, note here that talked, as observed in the text, assigns a θ-role to its subject, and therefore it can assign accusative Case to him, according to Burzio’s Generalization. Hence, there seems to be no way of ruling out (i) without any inconsistency with the account of the acceptability of sentences such as He talked his head off. 5.Jackendoff (1990) does not commit himself on the issue of whether the Unergative Restriction in (3) is correct or not, although he provides one acceptable example involving an unaccusative verb (The barrel rolled its way up the alley. (see also (16c) and notes 7 and 9)). His examples (10b) and (12e) are not provided as counterexamples to the Unergative Restriction in (3). Goldberg (1995: 212–213) seems to basically accept the Unergative Restriction in (3), though she says that “the relevant constraint is semantic” and argues that the motion described in the way construction must be self-propelled (see Section 3.5.2). (She hypothesizes some other constraints as well, and we will discuss them in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.2.) In any case, her examples (11b) and (12d,f) are not presented as counterexamples to the Unergative Restriction in (3), either. (We will observe in Section 3.5 Jackendoff’s and Goldberg’s analyses of the way construction and show that there are examples that pose serious problems for their semantic constraints on the verbs of the way construction.) 6.We are indebted to William Philip (personal communication) for (14b) and (15c). 7.Sentence (16c) is a slightly modified version of Jackendoff’s (1990: 212) example, The barrel rolled its way up the alley., which, as mentioned in note 5, is not provided as a counterexample to the Unergative Restriction in (3). Sentence (18d) is presented in Goldberg (1995) to illustrate what the way construction looks like, and is also not presented as a counterexample to the Unergative Restriction in (3). 8.We are indebted to Dan Parmenter (personal communication) for providing us with (18e). 9.Goldberg (1995: 240, fn. 7) judges unacceptable Jackendoff’s (1990: 212) example The barrel rolled its way up the alley. (see (16c)), and states that she suspects that he “may have had a personification interpretation in mind”. However, all the speakers we have asked have found (16c) perfectly acceptable. 10.Let us further consider examples of the way construction involving transitive verbs. We find here not only examples in which volitional actions of agentive human beings are described (see (7a,b)) but also those in which nonvolitional events of inanimate theme subjects are described, as in the following: (i) a. b. c. d. e.

The rain made its way under the door. The water makes its way into the Savannah River. (The Associated Press corpus) Since April 1991 the case has been making its way through federal court (ibid.) Gradually, the moisture found its way under the paneling. (= (7d)) A memo, which found its way to the Sunday Times, said that animals which could not be placed elsewhere would have to be killed. (The Associated Press corpus)

The Unergative Restriction in (3) stipulates that unaccusative verbs (taking theme subjects and describing their nonvolitional events) do not appear in the way construction. In (i-a–e), the verbs make and find, though transitive, take theme subjects and describe their nonvolitional events. The acceptability of (i-a–e), coupled with the acceptability of the sentences in


(16)–(23), unambiguously shows that the way construction can appear with theme subjects regardless of whether the verbs involved are intransitive or transitive, and points to the untenability of the Unergative Restriction in (3) and its implications. 11.We are indebted to Dan Parmenter (personal communication) for (30b). 12.Kageyama (1995:183) provides the following examples that do not involve PPs or adverbs: (i) a. b.

He came to America as an immigrant kid. Life was tough. He made his way. It’s the common story. (L. Michaels “Viva la Tropicana”) Just tell me how to go there and I’ll find my own way. (COBUILD)

Kageyama (1995) classifies the transitive-verb way construction into the make-type way construction (which includes verbs such as make, find, feel, pick, and grope) and the push-type way construction (which includes verbs such as push and fight). Then he says that while in the former type the sense of movement is obtained without PPs or adverbs (i.e., it is contained in the verb itself), in the latter this is not the case, and therefore PPs or adverbs designating directions are obligatory. Kageyama (1995) classifies the way construction involving intransitive verbs as belonging to the push-type, and states that it necessitates a locative expression. He further states that this type of way construction means that “the subject referent moves of his/her own volition or with his/her own force” (p. 190) (see also Goldberg’s (1995) argument (81b) that will be discussed in Section 3.5.2). However, as observed in Section 3.3 (see (16–23)), there are many acceptable examples in which the subject referent does not move of his/her own volition or with his/her own force. Therefore Kageyama’s characterization of the push-type way construction as involving volitional movement verbs, which clearly relates to unergativity, cannot be maintained (see also Section 3.5.2). 13.We are indebted to Grace Moon and Bruce Davison (personal communication) for this observation and (34a,b). 14.When one moves through a nontrivial distance, it is generally the case that such movement will turn out to be of a gradual durative process. Therefore, the requirement of gradual movement given in (42) may result from the requirement of a specified distance to be of nontrivial nature (see (38)). 15.This does not mean that move can never appear in the way construction. Observe the following sentence: (i) (Almost a dozen monkeys climbed into the barrel and proceeded to scramble around inside. Their antics tipped the barrel over and with each of their jabs, it edged closer to the street.) In this way, the barrel moved its way down the alley. Barrels don’t usually move on their own. Therefore, move (on its own) in the above sentence represents an unusual way that the barrel traversed the path down the alley. 16.Sentence (55a) (repeated below), unacceptable if uttered out of the blue, becomes much improved if it is uttered in a situation where the pool is crowded with people, without having any dividers marking the lanes: (55)

a. ?*He swam his way from one end of the pool to the other.

In such a situation it is very difficult to move from one end of the pool to the other, and therefore the verb swim indicates that the subject referent moved in an unusual manner.

Notes 209

17.It might be argued that rolling is not unusual for a barrel since it might be the most common means of locomotion for one. We argue that what is unusual in the ‘manner of movement’ semantics of (16c) is the fact that a barrel, which doesn’t ordinarily move on its own, moved by rolling (see also note 15). It might not be amiss here to compare the semantics of (16c) with the version that does not have its way: (i) a. b.

The barrel rolled its way down the alley. The barrel rolled down the alley.

(i-a) implies that (a) the barrel moved a nontrivial physical distance, and that (b) the movement was gradual (perhaps, it was not a straight down-hill movement, but was often interrupted with the barrel’s side caught by the curve of the alley). The sentence also (c) expresses the speaker’s subjective judgment that the movement was an unusual one. (i-b) doesn’t seem to have any of the above three implications. 18.We are indebted to Bruce Davison (personal communication) for (69c). 19.Goldberg (1995) supports this claim by pointing out the following three facts: (i) Out of 1177 examples found in the corpora (the Oxford University Press corpus, the Wall Street Journal (1989) corpus, the Lund corpus, and the United States Department of Agriculture corpus), the total number of occurrences of verbs with the manner interpretation was only 40, or 3.4%. (ii) There are speakers (including Goldberg herself) who find the manner interpretation only marginal. (iii) The means interpretation diachronically preceded the manner interpretation by several centuries. 20.As far as we know, there are no speakers who consider (84a) acceptable, but there are speakers who consider (84b) acceptable or nearly so. It seems that this is due to the fact that while wood burned to ashes is no longer wood, melted butter is still butter, and one can visualize it slowly dripping over the skin to the pan. 21.Mist in example (87c) is a woman’s name. 22.There are sentences involving ‘possessive NP + way’ in which the possessive NPs are not coreferential with the subject NPs. For example, observe the following sentences: (i) a.

b. c.

d. e.

f.

I learned very early that to stand still I had to bend my knees, and I remember being so tired from standing like that in line at the local movie theatre I’d pay my girlfriend’s way into the theatre so she would be close at hand and I could just touch her to keep my balance and not to have to bend my knees. (In 1730, he was thrown in jail for failure to pay his debts.) Dorothy borrowed from friends and paid her husband’s way out of jail. Marriages of convenience are made every day, and Jenny’s father was willing to buy his daughter’s way into the ton (= high society), if only she could be made to accept the husband he’d chosen for her. The TV ratings and the V-Chip can help parents navigate their children’s way through the vast world of television. The aim of this event was also to guide Ireland’s way into the next millennium in terms of sustainable development of its national marine resources, through the presentation of existing strategies and debate on new approaches. He wants Dennis to write how he, Cleve, paved Madlock’s way through murder.


g.

“Originally, the Sandie Shaw A-side was going to be ‘I Don’t Owe You Anything’ but the revived freshness of ‘Hand In Glove’ virtually powered its way onto the A-side.” [it = ‘Hand In Glove’] (Mick Middles, “The Smiths”: London: Omnibus Press, 1988)

In each of the above sentences, it is not the referent of the subject NP, but the referent of the possessive NP, that moves, while it is the referent of the subject NP that takes an action that makes the movement possible. For example, in (i-a) it was the speaker’s girlfriend that moved into the theatre, but the speaker, i.e., the referent of the subject NP, caused that movement by paying for the passage. The above sentences seem to lack the implication of ‘a gradual movement’ and/or ‘a nontrivial distance’ that we have hypothesized characterizes the semantics of the way construction. In this chapter, we have excluded sentences of the above type from discussion assuming that they are run-of-the-mill ‘transitive verb + direct object + adjunct’ sentences, and do not belong to the domain of the way construction. The following sentences, however, show that the possibility of disjoint reference between the subject NP and the possessive NP might have to be recognized even for the intransitive way construction: (ii) a.

b.

By working three jobs, watching every penny, and denying himself all luxuries and even small comforts, he managed to scrimp his daughter’s way into an expensive private school. Only a lawyer with the moxie of Albert Jones could weasel his client’s way out of a jail sentence.

Scrimp and weasel are used predominantly as intransitive verbs, and therefore, it is very likely that these sentences are bona fide way-construction sentences whose possessive NPs are not coreferential with the subject NPs. However, these verbs can also be used transitively — albeit much less frequently, as in the following: (iii) a.

b.

You’ll have to scrimp your pennies to buy books and when you get there you won’t be made to feel like you belong there. [scrimp = to be excessively sparing with or of — American Heritage Dictionary] With skilled fingers, Dax [female] found the connecting piece to the metal armor and weaseled his hand between it and her, so the hand touched her skin. [weasel = to cause something/someone to get into or out of tight place/ situation]

Therefore, it might not be totally impossible to treat (ii-a,b) as not belonging to the domain of the way construction. We must leave for future research the question of how to deal with sentences of the pattern of (ii-a,b). However, if future research turns up many more examples of the type of (ii-a,b) in which the verbs involved are indisputably intransitive, our generalization given in (45) and summarized in this concluding section will have to be restated in the following manner: (iv) The Functional/Semantic Constraint on the Way Construction (an Alternative Version): The (one’s) way construction is acceptable to the extent that a. it involves a (nontrivial) physical, temporal, or psychological distance; b. the referent of the possessive NP gradually moves through the whole span of that distance

Notes

c. d.

in an unusual manner; and the ‘subject + verb’ complex describes that manner of movement.

The above generalization will allow unacceptable sentences such as (v) a. *Mary danced her son’s way out of the room. (cf. (1b)) b. *Lisa swam her teammates’ way to a gold medal. (cf. (1c)) The unacceptability of these sentences can then be attributed to the pragmatic implausibility of the assertion that Mary’s son got out of the room by Mary’s dancing, and that Lisa’s teammates succeeded in winning a gold medal by Lisa’s (but nor their) swimming.

Notes to Chapter 4 1.Macfarland (1995) argues that cognate objects are arguments, just like ordinary direct objects. As observed in the text, Massam (1990), Larson (1988), and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) also consider cognate objects to be direct objects/arguments, which are assigned accusative Case and θ-roles by the verbs. On the other hand, Jones (1988) analyzes cognate objects as manner adjuncts, thereby without θ-roles. He further revises the Case Filter to the effect that only when an NP has a θ-role must it have Case. Therefore, cognate objects, having no θ-roles, are not subject to the revised Case Filter, and the acceptability of the cognate object construction is explained. Note, however, that while this analysis by Jones can account for the acceptability of (1a–h), it leaves the unacceptability of (2a–n) unaccounted for. 2.See Chapter 2 for our claim that the Unaccusative Restriction on the there-construction cannot be maintained. 3.The acceptability of the following agent nominals also shows that the unergativity restriction on agent nominal formation cannot be maintained: (i) Unaccusative verbs: dweller, stumbler, floater, sinker, survivor, thriver, a high liver, etc. 4.However, as we have made clear in Chapter 3 and in (18) above, the way-construction is compatible with unaccusative verbs as well, and therefore the construction cannot serve as a diagnostic for unergative verbs. 5.The verb live is another example which has received contradictory treatments. As discussed in connection with (19) and (20), it has been claimed that only unaccusative verbs can appear in the there-construction. The fact that live can appear freely in the there-construction, as shown in (i) below, leads to the conclusion that it is an unaccusative verb rather than an unergative one. On the other hand, the fact that it can also appear freely in the cognate object construction, as in (ii), leads to the contradictory conclusion that it must be an unergative verb: (i) Once upon a time, there lived a king who had a beautiful daughter. (ii) He lived a happy life. 6.We are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for (29a–d).

211


7.There are some speakers who find stylistically clumsy and unnatural a cognate object construction in which the form of the verb is exactly the same as that of its cognate object (e.g., drop and bounce in (29a,c)). Such speakers, therefore, find much improved a construction in which a verb is morphologically slightly different from its cognate object (e.g., diedeath, grow-growth in (11a–c) and (28a)). Note, however, that even for these speakers, while sentences such as (2a–n) are totally unacceptable, those such as (28a,b) and (29a–d) are much better, despite the fact that they involve unaccusative verbs. 8.This puts aside the so-called fake reflexives as in Dora shouted herself hoarse and body part expressions as in He talked his head off./He talked my ear off, that Burzio used in support of his generalization given in (7). 9.Besides ‘affected’ and ‘resultant’ roles of the direct object, Quirk et al. (1985: 749–754) point out a locative role (see (i-a,b)), an eventive role (see (ii-a,b)), an instrumental role (see (iii-a,b)) and a recipient role (see (iv-a,b)): (i) locative object: a. We walked the streets. b. The horse jumped the fence. (ii) eventive object: a. They are having an argument. b. They had a long fight. (iii) instrumental object: a. We employ a computer for our calculations. b. He nodded his head. (iv) recipient object: a. We paid the bus driver. b. The will benefits us all. 10.If anything, smile describes semantically a more general action than grin, and the latter is considered as a more specific case of the former. Therefore, it is more natural to consider a grin as a subset of the manner of the possible actions/events resulting from smiling than the other way around. Hence, although (42a) and (42b) are both unacceptable, the latter is worse than the former. In the following two sentences, the nouns grin and smile are accompanied by that, and therefore the speaker/hearer knows what kind of grin and what kind of smile that grin and that smile are. That is, that grin and that smile represent specific cases of a grin and a smile, respectively. Hence, the actions implied by these NPs can be considered to constitute a subset of the possible actions represented by the verbs smile and grin, and the acceptability of (i-a,b) results. Yet the above-mentioned difference between smile and grin applies here as well, and therefore (i-a) is considerably better than (i-b): (i) a. b.

…upon meeting me, he smiled that grin, and I instantly knew that he had won. …upon meeting me, he grinned that smile, and I instantly knew that he had won.

11.Horita (1996: 241–242) presents contrasting examples such as those in (i-a,b) and (ii-a,b), and examines from a cognitive grammar perspective under what conditions a noncognate noun can be used in the cognate object construction:

Notes

(i) a. *He laughed an ironical smile. b. ?*He died an untimely end. (ii) a. He slept a fitful slumber. (= (34a)) b. ?He smiled a knowing smirk. Horita (1996) attributes the unacceptability of (i-a,b) to the fact that the concepts represented by the nouns smile and end are similar to those represented by the cognate nouns laugh and death of the verbs laugh and die, respectively. She attributes the acceptability of (ii-a,b), on the other hand, to the fact that the concepts represented by the nouns slumber and smirk are specified kinds of those represented by the cognate nouns sleep and smile of the verbs sleep and smile, respectively. That is, she claims that unacceptability results if the meaning of the noun heading the object is similar to that of the noun cognate with the verb, while acceptability results if the former is a special kind of the latter. Horita’s above claim, though somewhat similar to our hypothesis in (40), is insufficient in that it fails to account for the fact that (iii-a) and (iii-b) are both acceptable: (iii) a. b.

“Let’s wipe our brows and smile a graduation grin,” said Ms. Ator of Reisterstown. (= (39a)) Nancy grinned a mischievous smile of recognition as she stooped to Ellen’s throat and undid the fastening of the cloak, and then shortly enough bade her “get up, that she might take it off.” (= (43))

Since smile and grin convey similar meanings, Horita predicts that (iii-a) and (iii-b) should both be unacceptable. Even if she assumed that the meaning of grin were a specified kind of the meaning of smile, she would leave the acceptability of (iii-b) unaccounted for; if she assumed the opposite, then she would leave the acceptability of (iii-a) unaccounted for. 12.It has been well recognized that the cognate object must represent a specific state or event. For example, Rice (1988: 207–210) states that the referent of the cognate object must refer to “a separate and perhaps readily categorizable entity” (p. 208) and that the cognate object construction is acceptable “when the cognate object achieves a necessary degree of individuation by virtue of modification” (p. 210). 13.What appears to be a cognate object without a modifier shows up in the relative clause construction, as well. Observe, for example, the following sentences: (i) a. b.

It is a smile that the whole country could smile. That is a smile that John always smiles when he is happy.

However, it seems that the underlying relative clauses for these sentences involve, at least semantically, a definite delimiting modifier: (ii) a. b.

The whole country could smile that (kind of) smile. John always smiles that (kind of) smile when he is happy.

14.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (61b), to Nan Decker (personal communication) for (61c,d), and to Nan Decker and Dan Parmenter (personal communication) for (61e).

213


Notes to Chapter 5 1.Combinations such as slept in and written on in (1a,b) are different from those like referred to in (1c) with respect to the strength of the semantic connection between the verb and the preposition. In the former combinations, the prepositions are related not so much to the preceding verbs as to the following NPs with which they form adjunct PPs, as in [PP in [NP that bed]] and [PP on [NP this desk]]. On the other hand, in the latter combinations (such as refer to, deal with, and rely on) the prepositions are related more tightly to the preceding verbs than to the following NPs. Passive sentences involving the so-called phrasal verbs such as take off, put off, and switch on, given in (i-a–c), are generally treated in the literature quite similarly to those involving transitive verbs: (i) a. b. c.

Your hats should be taken off in this auditorium. The match was put off. The TV was immediately switched on.

For the differences between prepositional and phrasal verbs, see Bolinger (1971), Palmer (1974, 1988), and Wekker and Haegeman (1985), and for further details on the types of pseudo-passives, see Takami (1992: 90–92). 2.There are speakers who consider (8a) marginal or unacceptable but (i) below acceptable: (i) The house was leaned against by the elephant. Our discussion in Section 5.5 will make clear why there are such speakers (see note 8). 3.Perlmutter (1978) and Perlmutter and Postal (1984) argue that the same analysis applies to impersonal passives in Dutch, Turkish, and German, and that impersonal passives of unaccusative clauses are universally impossible. Observe some of their examples: (i) a.

Er wordt hier door de jonge lui veel gedanst. (Dutch) ‘It is danced here a lot by the young people.’ b. *Er werd door dat blok hout goed gebrand. (Dutch) ‘That block of wood burned well.’ Burada gecenin geç saatlerine kadar dans edilir. (Turkish) ‘Here it is often danced until the late hours of the night.’ b. *Bu gibi durumlarda ölünür. (Turkish) ‘In such situations it is died.’

(ii) a.

Es wird gegessen, geschlafen. (German) ‘It was eaten and slept.’ b. *In diesem Krankenhaus wird oft gestorben. (German) ‘In this hospital it is often died.’

(iii) a.

Observe that the verbs in the (a) examples (i.e., gedanst ‘danced’, dans ‘danced’, gegessen ‘eaten’, geschlafen ‘slept’) are unergative verbs, whereas those in the (b) examples (i.e., gebrand ‘burned’, ölünür ‘died’, gestorben ‘died’) are unaccusative verbs. Hence, Perlmutter and Postal argue that the difference in acceptability between the (a) and (b) examples is attributable to the unergative–unaccusative distinction.

Notes

However, Zaenen (1993) claims that impersonal passive sentences in Dutch do not serve as a diagnostic for the unergative–unaccusative distinction, and presents the following acceptable sentence in which a typical unaccusative verb, aankomen ‘arrive’, appears (Zaenen (1993: 138)). (iv) In dat hotel heb ik geen oog dicht gedaan, want er werd the hele nacht aangekomen en vertrokken. ‘In that hotel I didn’t sleep a wink, for there was the whole night arrived and left.’ Zaenen argues instead that the impersonal passive construction in Dutch is compatible only with controllable and atelic eventualities such as telefoneren ‘phone’, zwemmen ‘swim’, and lopen ‘run’. She stresses that the acceptability of the construction depends on the aspect of the sentence as a whole, not just the Aktionsart of the lexical entry; aankomen ‘arrive’ itself is a telic (and controllable) verb, but the sentence in (iv) as a whole represents an atelic eventuality because it shows that many guests arrived at the hotel one after another. For this reason, she states, (iv) is also acceptable. 4.Quirk et al. (1985) give example (18c) not to make a claim such as the one made in the text, but to show that acceptability results if the subject of arrive at in a pseudo-passive sentence is an abstract noun such as the expected results, but unacceptability results if it is a concrete noun such as the splendid stadium, as shown below (see, however, Takami (1992: 130, 266) for the problem with this claim): (i) ?*The splendid stadium was eventually arrived at. Lakoff’s (1987) sentence (18d) is cited from his discussion on the there-construction, and is unrelated to our claim. We are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for (19b,c) and (20b). 5.Couper-Kuhlen (1979) gives (21c) in connection with a constraint on (pseudo-) passive sentences that she hypothesizes (see Takami (1992) for this constraint and its problems), and not as a counterexample to the Unergative Restriction in (9). We are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for (21a,b) and Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (21e,f). 6.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (22a–d). 7.Let us further consider examples of passive sentences involving transitive verbs. We find here not only examples in which volitional actions of agentive human beings are described (e.g., The door was opened by John.) but also those in which nonvolitional events of inanimate theme subjects are described, as in the following: (i) a. b. c. d. e.

His face was severely burned in a fire. The river is frozen over for several months each winter. The log was mostly rotted away. Small islands are scattered in the bay. These plants are now dispersed over a wide area.

The verbs burn, freeze, rot, scatter and disperse in (i-a–e) are transitive, but when they are used intransitively, they are unaccusative verbs because they describe nonvolitional events of their subject referents. Therefore, the acceptability of (i-a–e) casts serious doubt on the Unergative Restriction in (9), which stipulates that unaccusative verbs (= verbs that take theme subjects

215


and describe nonvolitional events of their subject referents) cannot appear in the pseudopassive construction. 8.(24b) is acceptable if the bench had just been painted, and was showing the effects of someone having sat on it (we are indebted to Karen Courtenay for this observation). In that context, the sentence describes something special about the bench. Recall also that we observed in note 2 that there are speakers who consider (8a) marginal or unacceptable, but (i) acceptable: (8) a.

The house was leaned against by the fullback.

(i) The house was leaned against by the elephant. This contrast must be due to the fact that it is much easier to imagine for (i) than for (8a) that there was something special about the house resulting from the fullback’s/elephant’s leaning against it — perhaps it tilted. Speakers such as Perlmutter and Postal who consider (8a) acceptable must be those who can imagine such an effect on a house even when a fullback leans against it. 9.In (29b) (repeated below), the fact that Mary traveled with John does not qualify as a characterization of John; hence the unacceptability of the sentence. However, (i-b,c) are acceptable: (i) a. *John was traveled with by Mary. (= (29b)) b. John is someone who can be traveled with comfortably. c. John can be traveled with by anyone, since he is so likable. (Takami, 1992: 125, 1995: 55) In (i-b,c), John is interpreted as being characterized because he is described as a person who can be traveled with comfortably or can be traveled with by anyone; hence the acceptability of the sentences. 10.We are indebted to Bruce Davison (personal communication) for pointing this out to us. 11.Shogun, based on James Clavell’s best-selling novel, was the most-watched epic miniseries shown on TV in 1980. 12.Kuno (1990) and Takami (1995) have argued that the notion of characterization also plays a crucial role in determining the acceptability of Japanese passive sentences such as those given below ((i-a,b) and (ii-a,b) are from Kuno (1990: 55) and (iii-a,b) are from Takami (1995: 99)): (i) a. *Kono hon-wa, Taroo-ni yom-are-ta. this book Taroo-by read-passive-past ‘(Lit.) This book was read by Taro.’ b. Kono hon-wa, tennoo-heika-ni-mo yom-are-te iru. this book emperor by also read-passive-ing is ‘(Lit.) This book has been read by the Emperor, too.’ (ii) a. ??Kono uta-wa, yoku Taro-ni utaw-are-ta. this song often Taro-by sing-passive-past ‘This song was often sung by Taro.’

Notes 217

b.

Kono uta-wa, Misora Hibari ni utaw-are-te, ichiyaku hitto-songu ni this song by sing-passive suddenly hit-song natta. became ‘This song, sung by Hibari Misora, immediately became a hit song.’

(iii) a. *Kono waapuro-wa, watasi-ni aiyoos-are-te iru. this word processor me-by love-passive is ‘This word processor is used by me.’ b. Wagasha-no waapuro-wa, sakka-no Sono Ayako-shi-ni-mo aiyoosour company’s word processor novelist Ayako-Ms.-by also loveare-te iru. passive-ing is ‘A word processor by our company has also been used by the novelist Ayako Sono.’ The fact that Taro read a book or sang a song, in isolation, is not sufficient to qualify as a characterization of the book or the song; hence the unacceptability of (i-a) and (ii-a). In contrast, the fact that the Emperor has read the book, described in (i-b), provides an adequate characterization of the book. Note here that the -te iru pattern, which in this context represents the current state resulting from a past event, reinforces the characterizational reading of the sentence. Similarly, in (ii-b) the fact that Hibari Misora, a well-known singer, sang the song under discussion constitutes an adequate characterization of the song. Furthermore, the characterizational force of the passive clause is reinforced by the second clause in the same sentence, which also points out something special about the song. Hence the acceptability of (i-b) and (ii-b) results. A similar difference is observed between (iii-a) and (iii-b); hence the contrast in acceptability results. 13.It seems necessary here to refer to Bolinger’s (1975) functional analysis of passive and pseudo-passive sentences. Bolinger employs the notion of ‘affectedness’ and proposes the following constraint, which is claimed to account not only for passives with transitive verbs but also for pseudo-passives: (i) The subject in a passive construction is conceived to be a true patient, i.e., to be genuinely affected by the action of the verb. If the grammatical object in the active construction is not conceived as a true patient, there will be no corresponding passive. Observe the following examples, taken from Bolinger (1975: 68): (ii) a. I was approached by the stranger. b. *I was approached by the train. (iii) a. The house has been lived in by several famous personages. b. *Chicago has been lived in by Ann. Bolinger states that in (ii-a) “I am viewed as affected; the stranger perhaps was a panhandler”, while (ii-b) shows “a purely spatial relationship in which I represents a terminus, not someone affected” (p. 68). Likewise, Bolinger maintains that in (iii-a) “the house has an aura by virtue of the people who have lived in it” (p. 68). In (iii-b), in contrast, Chicago has no such aura because a big city like Chicago has never been affected simply by the fact that an


ordinary person has lived in it. Bolinger thus claims that “the semantic contrast [observed in (ii-a,b) and (iii-a,b)] is between true patients … and things or persons that are merely located with reference to others or to existence itself, i.e., presence on the scene, or absence” (p. 68). Hence, he maintains that the above contrast is accounted for by the constraint (i). Bolinger’s analysis, though highly informative and ingenious, seems to encounter some problematic sentences, as those in the following (see Takami (1992, 1995) for details): (iv) a. b. c. d.

The world cannot be traveled around in a week. (= (29a)) This road can be walked across only at great risk. (cf. Couper-Kuhlen, 1979:54) This valley can be marched through in two hours. (Cureton, 1979: 45) In Australia, unlike in India, bridges can be both photographed and photographed from. (Siewierska, 1983: 568)

It is clear that the subject in each of (iv-a–d) cannot be construed as a true patient; it is not affected by the action of the verb. On the other hand, the Characterization Requirement in (38) can account for the acceptability of (iv-a–d), because in these sentences, a characterization is made about the passive subject in each of (iv-a–d). In (iv-a), for example, the fact that the world is so extensive that it will take more than a week to travel around it constitutes an adequate characterization of the world. In (iv-b), similarly, the fact that the road is so dangerous that it involves great risk to walk across it constitutes an adequate characterization of the road. 14.There seem to be three types embodying the notion of characterization as we illustrate below (see Takami (1995: 56–60)). First, as observed in the following examples, there is a type that shows a characteristic or property that the subject referent inherently has: (i) a. b. c.

I don’t like to be waited for. (= (32a)) John can be argued with for hours before he gives in. (= (31a)) The world cannot be traveled around in a week. (= (29a))

These sentences describe inherent or permanent characteristics of the subject referents, and therefore this type can be called ‘inherent characterization’. This type of characterization is not restricted to pseudo-passive sentences, and can also be seen in sentences such as the following: (ii) a. b.

Beavers build dams. John is a hard worker.

(ii-a) describes an inherent characteristic or property of beavers, that is, animals that build dams, dam-builders. Similarly, (ii-b) describes an inherent characteristic or property of John, that is, a person who works hard, a hard worker. The second type of characterization, in sharp contrast to the first, serves to differentiate the subject referent from other persons or objects by describing a prominent event that happened in or near it, or a state that it was in at a certain time. In this case, the sentences are generally described in the past tense, and this type can be called ‘temporary characterization’. Observe the following examples: (iii) a. b. c.

The room was exercised in by Spider Man. (= (3c)) The mountain was flown over by the Air Force. (= (33b)) This building was walked in front of by the Japanese Emperor last month.

Notes 219

In (iii-a), the fact that Spider Man exercised in the room in question enables the room to be differentiated from other rooms. That is, this salient action by Spider Man, though conducted at only one time in the past, constitutes an adequate characterization of the room. The same applies to (iii-b,c). The third type of characterization seems to be in between the first and the second; that is, it is a type in which a prominent or salient characteristic of the subject referent is shown by describing a habitual action connected with it or a continuous state that it is in. Therefore this type can be called ‘habitual characterization’. Observe the following examples: (iv) a. b. c.

This book has been frequently referred to. (= (1c)) Those benches have been frequently slept on by tramps. This bridge has been walked under by generations of lovers. (Bolinger, 1975: 69)

As is clear from the fact that the present progressive form is used in (iv-a–c), the sentences describe habitual or repeated actions, which constitute adequate characterizations of the subject referents. Given that there are three types of characterization, it is necessary to note, however, that there are many sentences in which the distinction among the three is far from clear. Observe the following examples: (v) a. b.

This river should not be swum in — you might be drowned. This floor should not be lain on — it hasn’t been swept in weeks. (CouperKuhlen, 1979: 9)

Sentence (v-a), out of context, seems to be of the first type, since it describes an inherent property of the river in question, that is, it is a river that is dangerous to swim in. However, suppose that the sentence is uttered when there has been a flood; then it turns out to be of the second type. Similarly, sentence (v-b) is considered to be of the first type because of the context of the second clause it (this floor) hasn’t been swept in weeks. But if this sentence is uttered in a context such as the following, it turns out to be of the second type: (vi) This floor should not be lain on — it has just been painted. Thus, it seems clear that which type of characterization a given acceptable pseudo-passive sentence represents is heavily dependent on context, and that there are many sentences in which the distinction is far from clear without sufficient context. 15.There are also speakers who do not accept be arrived in/at with concrete locative NPs in any context. 16.See Kuno (1973) for the claim that Relativization applies to the topic NP in the relative clause in Japanese. It is assumed here that the same applies to Relativization in English, at least at a semantic level. 17.While sentence (58b) involving the verb enter is unacceptable (repeated here as (i-a)), (i-b) involving the same verb is acceptable (we are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for (i-b)): (i) a. *The University of Hawaii was entered by John in 1960. (= (58b)) b. This university, entered by thousands of insecure freshmen since its founding 100 years ago, is now about to welcome its youngest students.


In (i-a), the fact that John entered the University of Hawaii in 1960 does not tell us what kind of university it is. In (i-b), on the other hand, the fact that thousands of insecure freshmen have entered the university under discussion over the last 100 years is sufficient to characterize the university as involved in the ‘entering’ action. While the verb enter in (i-a,b) means ‘to start working in a particular organization’ or ‘to become a member of’, the one in the following example means ‘to go or come into a place’: (ii) a. *The classroom was entered by John ten minutes late. b. The nuclear reactor was entered by a team of scientists for the first time yesterday. (Kuno, 1983a: 202) In (ii-a), John’s act of entering the classroom late is understood to be so localized and inconsequential that it is not possible to assume that something was done to the room by it; hence the unacceptability of the sentence. In contrast, the act of a team of scientists entering the nuclear reactor in question for the first time indicates that the nuclear reactor is involved in the act, that indeed something has happened to the reactor and that it is special in some way. Hence, the acceptability results, in keeping with the condition in (53). 18.Observe the following contrast: (i) a. *Mary was given up by John. (= (58c)) b. Mary was given up on by John. The verb give up on is different from give up in that the former implies that something is done to the object referent. The expression X gives up Y represents a unilateral action on the part of X, as mentioned in the text, and does not affect Y at all, while X gives up on Y is a twoparticipant action in which X decides not to do any more to help Y. In other words, something is done to Y. Hence, the difference in acceptability between (i-a) and (i-b) results, and this is accounted for by the Involvement Requirement in (53) (see Kuno (1983a: 202)). 19.We are indebted to Nan Decker (personal communication) for (65c).

Notes to Chapter 6 1.This chapter is an extensively revised version of Takami and Kuno (1992). 2.Rochemont and Culicover (1990) and Culicover and Rochemont (1990) argue that Extraposition from NPs does not involve a movement operation at all, and that ‘extraposed’ elements are base-generated in place. See Takami (1990) for their analysis and empirical problems. Kayne (1994), on the other hand, proposes that sentences that have been assumed to involve Extraposition from NPs are in fact derived by leftward movement of NPs, as shown below (see also Takonai (1995)): (i) [IP e [VP appeared [NP a man [PP with blond hair]]]] (cf. (1b)) However, the discussion that follows in the text is independent of how such sentences are derived. 3.Johnson (1985: 114, fn. 38) states that (9a–e) sound less acceptable to him than the passive sentences (7a–c), as some of them are marked with ? or ??. Based on the generally held

Notes 221

assumption that a rightward-moved element (such as a heavy NP-shifted element) conveys the focus of the sentence (Rochemont (1986), Guéron (1980)), he conjectures that “perhaps this is because the subjects of psych-predicates are less able to be taken as focussed” than those of passive predicates. Accordingly, he says that examples like (9a–e) improve if they are placed in proper settings, and gives the following discourse, in which the subject (particularly a part of it, the PP about Nicaragua) in the second sentence is considered as focused: (i) First I was impressed by a book about Nuie; and then a book impressed me about Nicaragua. 4.Belletti and Rizzi (1986) hypothesize a structure like (i) below for sentence (10a), which is somewhat different from (10b):

IP

(i)

NP e

I¢ I

VP V¢

NP

V

NP

bother

the picture

Mary

On the basis of a structure like (i), Belletti and Rizzi attempt to account for coreference relations between reflexives and their antecedents. See Kuno and Takami (1993: Chapter 5) for problems with Belletti and Rizzi’s analysis and for an alternative functional account of picture-noun reflexives. 5.As shown below in the text, Johnson assumes, along with Baltin (1978, 1981, 1983) and Guéron (1980), that an element extraposed from a D-/S-structure subject NP is also adjoined to S, whereas that extraposed from a D-/S-structure object NP is adjoined to VP (see further note 9). 6.Note here that Johnson assumes, following Chomsky (1981), that the configuration of S is NP + I(NFL) + VP, and that he does not employ the more recent two-level X-bar theory for lexical categories (i.e., N, V, A, P) and nonlexical categories (i.e., I and C) (see Chomsky (1986b)). 7.Johnson makes crucial use of the following concepts: (i) Blocking Category: α, α a maximal projection, is a Blocking Category (BC) for β iff α is not θ-governed and α dominates β. (ii) Barrier: α, α a maximal projection, is a barrier for β iff: a. α immediately dominates γ, γ a BC for β, or b. α is a BC for β.


(iii) θ-Government: α θ-governs β iff α is a zero-level category that θ-marks β, and α, β are sisters. (iv) Subjacency: α is subjacent to β iff there are less than 2 barriers for β that do not dominate α. Note that although Chomsky (1986b) defines Blocking Category on the basis of L(exical)marking, Johnson defines it on the basis of θ-government, since the distinction between a lexical category and a zero-level category, as Johnson states (p. 61), will play no role in his later discussions. The following describes the way in which Johnson explains the acceptability of (11a). In (11c), the PP from Tanzania is extraposed from the object NP and is adjoined to S, crossing over the maximal projections NP, VP, and the lower S. (Note that he assumes S to be a maximal projection.) The NP dominating [men t] is θ-governed by its sister V appear and is therefore neither a Blocking Category (BC) nor a barrier. VP is not θ-governed by I because I does not θ-mark VP, and therefore it is a BC. However, Johnson stipulates that VP, though a BC, is not a barrier, and justifies this stipulation by arguing that it does not have a complete head (i.e., V), because the inflectional morpheme(s) has not moved onto the head in S-structure. Since VP is assumed to be a BC, the lower S becomes a barrier because it immediately dominates the VP (see (ii-a)). However, movement of from Tanzania crosses only one barrier, the lower S, satisfying Subjacency, and acceptability results. Note further in (11d) that the movement of men does not cross any barrier either, since the intervening maximal projection VP is a BC, but not a barrier. 8.In (12a), the NP dominating [a man t] is not θ-governed because, as observed in note 7, I is not a θ-governor. NP, in contrast to VP, has a complete head (i.e., N man) and so it is a BC (Blocking Category) and a barrier. The lower S immediately dominating the NP inherits barrierhood, and becomes a barrier. Hence, movement of the PP from Nuie crosses two barriers. The same is the case with (13). 9.As observed in this section, Johnson assumes that there are two adjunction sites for extraposition of a PP from a D-structure object NP (i.e., S and VP). He assumes that if the D-structure object becomes the S-structure subject, the PP is adjoined to S (see (11c)), while if the D-structure object remains in situ at S-structure, it is adjoined to VP, as shown in (14). This requires, however, that one always take into consideration, before Extraposition takes place, whether the D-structure object later becomes the surface subject or not. But this seems a highly unreasonable requirement. Further, there does not seem to be any principled reason why the PP extraposed from the D-structure (and S-structure) object NP of the transitive construction has to choose a landing site that is different from that of the PP extraposed from the D-structure (but not S-structure) object NP of the unaccusative, passive or psych-verb construction. Therefore, this structural assumption made by Johnson seems to be nothing but an ad hoc stipulation. 10.Johnson (1985) hypothesizes that in addition to the syntactic PP extraposition rule under discussion, there is a stylistic PP extraposition rule which can apply to the subject of unergative predicates without violating Subjacency, yielding acceptable sentences if relevant nonsyntactic conditions are met, but which cannot apply to the subject of transitive verbs

Notes 223

without violating Subjacency. He attempts to justify this stylistic rule on the basis of the following contrast: (i) a. *First a man with green eyes bought a book, and then a man bought a book with brown eyes. (transitive) b. First a man with a green parachute jumped, and then a man jumped with a brown parachute. (unergative) However, all the native speakers of English we have consulted consider (i-b) acceptable only on the interpretation whereby with a brown parachute is an adverbial modifier of jumped — they say that the extraposed-PP interpretation is not available. Since Johnson has not adequately justified the presence of this stylistic PP extraposition rule, and since our claim is that the subjects of unergative and transitive verbs, as well as those of unaccusative verbs, can undergo PP extraposition given appropriate contexts, we will exclude it from consideration in this chapter. 11.We are indebted to Dan Parmenter (personal communication) for the contexts given in (25). 12.It is necessary here to account for why the following sentence involving PP extraposition is unacceptable, in spite of the fact that the predicate is deictically doubly grounded because of the expressions this book and me: (i) *An old man gave this book to me [with a mustache and a long beard]. The unacceptability of (i) is attributable to the fact that this book, part of the predicate, can be interpreted contrastively (e.g., this book, and not that book). To put it differently, it can be assumed that (i) is an answer to an implicit question ‘Which book did a certain man give to you?’ rather than to an implicit question ‘What kind of man gave a certain book to you?’ In this connection, see the discussion in the following section, particularly the Discourse Constraint on Extraposition from Subject NPs given in (50). 13.For the difference between the concept of ‘importance of information’ and that of ‘newness’, see Kuno (1983b) and Takami (1992). 14.There are speakers who consider (i-B) perfectly acceptable, but (ii-B) less than perfect: (i) Speaker A: Speaker B:

Who whispered it to you? An old man did with a mustache and a long beard.

(ii) Speaker A: Speaker B:

Who gave this to you? An old man did with a mustache and a long beard.

This might be due to the fact that give something to someone (together) with something else (as in: they gave a used car to their daughter with a check for $1,000 for insurance) is much more common than whisper something to someone (together) with something else (as in, he whispered the cause of the problem to her with the result of it). 15.(43a,b) are examples of a very formal and/or archaic construction which can be found in religious writings or in documents from the 19th century or earlier, as in: (i) a. He knows him best who guards against evil. b. Can it be imagined that he loves God who hates His Children because they are like God? (Thomas Watson, A Body of Divinity, 1692)


and they tend to sound very artificial when used today. We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for this observation. As we will show in (45), there are perfectly acceptable sentences involving extraposition of relative clauses from subject NPs of transitive constructions. 16.We are indebted to Karen Courtenay (personal communication) for (51a,b). 17.(52a,b) are different from the examples that Nakajima (1993, 1995) used with respect to details that are not related to our present discussion.

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Name index

A Abbott, B. 204–5 Aissen, J. 32, 35, 57 Anderson, J. 6 B Baker, M. 21 Baltin, M. 221 Banfield, A. 63 Baron, N. 117 Belletti, A. 16, 22, 32, 35, 41, 49, 170–1, 200–2, 205, 221 Biber, D. 203 Birner, B. 196, 204–5 Bolinger, D. 42–4, 50, 152, 204, 214, 217–9 Brugman, C. 28 Burzio, L. 11, 13, 16, 22, 32, 36, 45, 70, 108, 170, 174, 200, 212 C Carrier, J. 195 Centineo, G. 13 Chomsky, N. 34, 37, 63, 70, 109, 117, 200–2, 221–2 Collins, C. 196, 204 Comrie, B. 5–6 Conrad, S. 203 Coopmans, P. 24, 170, 196, 202, 204 Couper-Kuhlen, E. 146, 149, 152, 159, 215, 218 Culicover, P. 202, 220 Cureton, R. 218 D DeLancy, S. 14, 17, 199

Dixon, R. M. W. 6 Dowty, D. 14–5, 123 E Emonds, J. 203–4 F Fiengo, R. 37 Fillmore, C. 2–4, 6, 25, 28, 119 Finegan, E. 203 G Goldberg, A. 2, 25–7, 67, 70, 73–5, 79, 84–5, 98–102, 104, 204, 207–9 Grimshaw, J. 200 Guéron, J. 178–9, 220–1 H Haegeman, L. 41, 49, 200, 202–3, 214 Harris, A. 200 Harris, Z. 41 Hoekstra, T. 196, 200 Holmback, H. 204 Horita, Y. 212–3 Huddleston, R. 6 I Ikegami, Y. 11 J Jackendoff, R. 67–8, 73–4, 79, 95–8, 100, 104, 207 Jespersen, O. 3, 84–5, 104–5, 120 Johansson, S. 203 Johnson, D. 40, 203


Johnson, K. 24, 170–8, 183–4, 187, 220–3 Jones, M. 105, 107, 127, 129, 134, 211 K Kaburaki, E. 28, 192 Kageyama, T. 5, 15, 67, 79, 200, 208 Kato, K. 40 Kay, P. 2, 25, 28 Kayne, R. 41, 175, 203, 220 Keyser, S. 16, 23, 32, 105–6, 126 Kimball, J. 51, 202 Kishimoto, H. 17, 200 Konishi, K. 117 Kuno, S. 28, 44, 59, 150–1, 158, 181–2, 186, 192, 194, 216, 219–21, 223 L Lakoff, G. 44, 146, 152, 204, 215 Lambrecht, K. 2, 25, 28 Langacker, R. 44, 125, 127 Lappin, S. 40, 203 Larson, R. 16, 23, 105–6, 109, 112–4, 134, 211 Lasnik, H. 202 Leech, G. 203 Levin, B. 13–6, 21–4, 32, 36, 45, 67–8, 70, 73, 76, 98, 103, 105–6, 108–9, 112, 114–5, 124, 134, 137–8, 140, 142, 146, 149, 152, 168, 174, 194–6, 199–200, 203–4, 211 Levin, L. 196, 204 Lumsden, M. 16, 22, 31–2, 35–7, 40–41, 44–5, 201 Lyons, J. 6 M Macfarland, T. 23, 105–7, 112–4, 120, 126–7, 134, 211 Marantz, A. 23, 67–8, 79, 103, 112 Massam, D. 16, 23, 105–6, 109, 117, 134, 211 Matsumoto, M. 109 McCawley, J. 31–2, 40, 42, 50, 204 Michaelis, L. 2, 25, 28

Milsark, G. 32, 35, 45, 202 Miyagawa, S. 11, 200 Miyamoto, T. 105–6 Moltmann, F. 105, 107, 127, 129, 134 Mulder, R. 196, 200 N Nakajima, H. 170, 182, 186, 224 Napoli, D. 204–5 Newmeyer, F. 202 Nogawa, K. 109 O O’Connor, C. 2, 25, 28 Omuro, T. 105–6, 118, 126 P Palmer, F. 214 Perlmutter, D. 8, 11–4, 17, 24–5, 114, 137–40, 142–7, 149, 152, 168, 170, 174, 199–200, 214, 216 Postal, P. 8, 11, 14, 17, 24–5, 114, 137–40, 142–7, 149, 152, 168, 199–200, 214, 216 Poutsma, H. 41, 105, 120 Prince, E. 177–8, 204 Q Quirk, R. 31–2, 35, 45, 105, 118–20, 146, 152, 155, 181, 204, 212, 215 R Radford, A. 200 Randall, J. 195 Rando, E. 204–5 Rapoport, T. 67, 98 Rappaport Hovav, M. 14–6, 21–4, 32, 36, 45, 67–8, 70, 73, 76, 103, 105–6, 108–9, 112, 114–5, 124, 134, 137–8, 140, 142, 146, 149, 152, 168, 174, 194–6, 199–200, 203–4, 211 Rice, S. 127, 213 Riemsdijk, H. 24, 137 Rizzi, L. 69, 170–1, 221

Name index 237

Rochemont, M. 181, 202, 204, 220 Roeper, T. 16, 23, 32, 105–6, 126 Roovers, I. 24, 170 Rosen, C. 13, 17

V Van Valin, R. 13, 15, 200 Vendler, Z. 14–5, 123, 193 Verspoor, C. 195 Visser, F. 105, 120

S Safir, K. 202 Salkoff, M. 67 Sapir, E. 5, 199 Shibatani, M. 5 Siewierska, A. 218 Simpson, J. 194–5 Stowell, T. 32

W Ward, G. 204–5 Wechsler, S. 195 Wekker, H. 214 Woisetschlaeger, E. 204 Wu, Y. 28

T Takami, K. 28, 150–1, 182, 186, 192, 194, 214–6, 218, 220–1, 223 Takonai, K. 170, 220 Tamori, I. 5 Tenny, C. 123 Tsujimura, N. 11, 16, 200 Tsunoda, T. 5

Y Yumoto, Y. 67, 69 Z Zaenen, A. 13, 200, 214–5 Zubizarreta, M. 13

Subject index

A absence 55, 193 absolutive case 4, 6, 8 abstract setting 44 accomplishment verb 15–6, 193 accusative case 4, 6, 8, 34, 70–1, 73, 104, 108–9, 111, 206–7, 211 accusative language 4–6 accusative verb 7–9 accusativity 6–8 achievement verb 15–6, 123, 193 action verb 46, 48, 193 activity verb 14–5, 123 adjectival passive 112–4 advancement 142, 144 adversity passive 17 affected 217 — object 119 agent 3, 7–9, 11, 13, 21–2, 26–7, 33, 68, 70, 106, 112, 128–9, 138, 165, 201 — nominal 211 Agentive case 3 agentivity 14 agentless passive 128 anaphorically grounded 185–7 animacy 140 appearance 22, 31–3, 35, 42–3, 45–52, 54–7, 61, 68, 106, 140, 178–80, 185, 193, 200, 203 appositive clause 184 aspectual verb (predicate) 10, 33, 68, 106 associate of there 202 atelicity 15, 215 awareness 177, 194

B barrier 173–4, 221–2 blocking category (BC) 174, 221–2 bounded action 95–6 Burzio’s Generalization 34, 70–1, 73, 104, 108–9, 111, 117, 206–7 C Case Filter 19, 34–5, 70–1, 73, 108–9, 111, 117, 206, 211 Case Grammar 4 causative alternation 203 caused-motion construction 27 causer 27 change-of-state verb 102 characterization 148–53, 156, 192, 216–9 inherent — 218 habitual — 219 temporal — 218 Characterizational Property of Passive Sentences with Inanimate Subjects 151 Characterizational Requirement on the Pseudo-Passive Construction 151–3, 155–6, 160–3, 167, 191, 218 chômeur 142–3 Cognitive Grammar 212 Conceptual Semantics 95 construction 27–9 Construction Grammar 25–9, 98, 200–1 controllable 215 creation construction 98


D Definiteness Effect 201–2, 204–5 definite NP 127–8, 201–2 deictically grounded 185–6, 223 derived nominal 125–6 direct target 158 discourse-assumed 176–81 Discourse Constraint on PP Extraposition from Subject NPs 176–7, 180, 182, 185–6, 191, 223 double object construction 25–7 D-structure 19, 21, 33–6, 38, 69, 71–3, 107–11, 143, 170–4 durative 10 E effected object 119 ergative 7 — case 4, 6, 9 — language 4–6, 9 — verb 4, 6–8, 21, 200, 202 ergativity 6–9 existence 22, 31–3, 35, 42–3, 45–58, 61, 68, 106, 140, 179–80, 193, 203 existential sentence 59 experiencer 8, 10–1, 21–2, 33, 68, 70, 106, 115, 138, 165, 199, 201 Extended Projection Principle 34, 36 external difficulty 85–6, 99 F fake reflexive 115, 212 feature-checking 200–1 Flow-of-Information Principle 127, 181, 192 Functional Constraint on the Cognate Object Construction 121–2, 125–6, 129–30, 135, 190 Functional Constraint on the PseudoPassive Construction 162–4, 167, 191 Functional Constraint on the ThereConstruction 47–52, 55, 58, 190

Functional Constraint on the Way Construction 84–94, 97, 101–4, 190, 210 Functional Syntax 28 G generalized location 44 Generative Grammar 11, 18–9, 33, 44, 69, 71, 107, 109, 143, 200–1, 206 gerundive nominal 125–6 given information see old information government 202 Government and Binding Theory 18, 33, 69, 107, 143 grounded information 186, 192 H hearer-new 205 Heavy Constituent Shift 40–1, 44, 59, 61–2, 202 I imperative 17 impersonal passive 9, 12–3, 200, 214–5 important information 186–7, 192 inchoative 10 indefinite NP 127–9, 205 individuation 213 inherent Case 202 inheritance link 26 inheritance network 26 inside verbal 35, 40–1, 43, 45, 58–9, 202, 205 instance link 26 Instrumental case 3 intransitive motion construction 27, 98 intransitive verb 2–4, 8–9, 11–2, 18–9, 67, 70, 105, 108, 117–20, 137, 157, 189 Involvement Requirement for Passivization in English 157–61, 167, 191 it-pronominalization 132–3

Subject index 241

L lexical conceptual structure see logical structure L(exical)-marking 222 locative inversion 196, 204 logical structure 15 logical subject 34–5, 37, 42, 46, 50–1, 53, 56, 59, 202, 204–5 M manner 98–100, 126, 194, 209 marked 127, 135 means 98–100, 209 metaphor 78 metaphorical extension link 26 Minimalist Program 200–2 motion verb 57 N ne-cliticization 13 negative emphasizer 57 new information 127–9, 205 nominative case 4, 6–7, 19–20, 37, 69, 73, 108–9, 111, 202 Numeration 201 O Objective case 3 object of result see resultant object observability 57, 193 old information 127, 177–8 1-Advancement Exclusiveness Law (1AEX) 144–5, outside verbal 35–8, 40–1, 43–5, 50, 58, 202 P parameter setting 201 partitive Case 35, 201, 205 passive verb 35, 170–1 path 23, 27–8, 67, 69, 72, 78–9, 84, 90, 99, 206 patient 10–1, 26, 33–4, 68, 106, 109, 112, 115, 140, 199, 217–8 phrasal verb 214

physical distance 78–81, 83, 85–7, 89–90, 93, 97, 100, 103 point of view 192 polysemy inheritance link 99 polysemy link 26 predication 184 prepositional verb 137, 157, 214 presentational force 57–8 presentative sentence 45, 57, 59 present perfect form 57 process verb 95 progressive form 53–4, 58 Proper Binding Condition 37 psychological distance 81–3, 85, 97, 100, 103 psych(ological) verb 170–1 R recipient 26–7 Relational Grammar 11, 18–9, 142–3 relational network 18, 142–5 resultant object 84, 119–20, 131, 133–4 resultative construction 115–6, 194, 203–4 S self-propelled 100–1, 207 spectator 51–4, 193 S-structure 19–20, 33–4, 69, 71–2, 108, 110–1, 144, 174 stative verb 14–5, 57, 91, 126, 193 structure-preserving hypothesis 203 Subjacency 173–4, 221–2 subject extraposition 59–60, 62–3 Subject-Position Preference for Topics 154, 191 Subject Preference for Characterizational Sentences 151, 154 subpart link 26 T telicity 15 temporal distance 81, 85, 89, 100, 103 thematic PP adverbial 63


theme 3–4, 6–8, 10–1, 13, 21, 27, 33–4, 68, 73, 77, 106, 109, 111–2, 115–6, 140, 165, 199, 207–8 θ-Criterion 201 θ-government 221–2 topic 127, 154–6, 177, 219 Topicalization 154 Topic Requirement for the Subject of the Pseudo-Passive Construction 154–6, 160–3, 167, 191 transitive verb 2–4, 20–3, 41–2, 49, 58, 61, 70–1, 109, 117, 157, 166, 174–5, 194–5, 203, 207, 215 U Unaccusative Hypothesis 19 Unaccusative Restriction on Extraposition from Subject NPs 174–7, 190 Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction 195–6 Unaccusative Restriction on the ThereConstruction 32, 39–44, 189, 203 unaccusative verb 8–24, 32–5, 37, 42, 59, 68, 71, 73–8, 105–6, 109, 111–4, 116–7, 135, 137–8, 140–1, 143–7, 152–3, 161, 165, 170, 175, 189, 194, 196, 199–204, 207, 214–5

Unergative Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction 107, 111, 115–7, 134–5, 189 Unergative Restriction on the PseudoPassive Construction 142, 144, 146–7, 168, 189, 215 Unergative Restriction on the Way Construction 68, 73–5, 78, 101, 189, 207–8 unergative verb 8–15, 17–24, 32–6, 38, 40–1, 43–5, 47, 54, 68–71, 73, 77–8, 105–9, 112–5, 135, 137–8, 140–1, 143–5, 148, 152–3, 174–5, 189, 195–6, 199–201, 203–4, 206, 215 Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) 21 Universal Grammar 201 unmarked 127 V VP Deletion 177, 187 VP-internal subject 109

In the series Constructional Approaches to Language the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 1 2 3

KUNO, Susumu and Ken-ichi TAKAMI: Functional Constraints in Grammar. On the unergative– unaccusative distinction. 2004. x, 233 pp. + index. FRIED, Mirjam and Jan-Ola ÖSTMAN (eds.): Construction Grammar in a Cross-Language Perspective. vi, 199 pp. + index. Expected Fall 2004 ÖSTMAN, Jan-Ola and Mirjam FRIED (eds.): Construction Grammars. Cognitive grounding and theoretical extensions. viii, 314 pp. + index. Expected Fall 2004

Functional Constraints In Grammar: On The Unergative-unaccusative Distinction (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Functional Constraints In Grammar: On The Unergative-unaccusative Distinction

Constructional Approaches to English Grammar

Constructional Reorganization (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Locative Alternation: A Lexical-Constructional Approach (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Contexts and Constructions (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Constraints on Language: Aging, Grammar and Memory

Construction Grammar in a Cross-language Perspective (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Construction Grammar in a Cross-language Perspective (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Systemic Functional Grammar in Natural Language Generation

Syntax in Functional Grammar

An Introduction to Functional Grammar

An Introduction to Functional Grammar

Productivity: Evidence from Case and Argument Structure in Icelandic (Constructional Approaches to Language)

Constraints on error variables in grammar: bilingual misspelling orthographies

Functional Categories in Learner Language (Studies on Language Acquisition)

Approaches to Second Language Acquisition

A Functional Grammar of Gooniyandi (Studies in Language Companion Series)

Construction Grammars: Cognitive Grounding and Theoretical Extensions (Constructional Approaches to Language)

The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

Lexical Functional Grammar

Lexical-Functional Grammar

Lexical Functional Grammar

Lexical functional grammar

Functional Perspectives on Grammar and Discourse: In Honour of Angela Downing (Studies in Language Companion)

A New Architecture for Functional Grammar (Functional Grammar Series)

Grimm Language: Grammar, Gender and Genuineness in the Fairy Tales (Linguistic Approaches to Literature (Lal))

Functional Constraints In Grammar: On The Unergative-unaccusative Distinction (Constructional Approaches to Language)