From Hierarchy to Anarchy: Territory and Politics Before Westphalia

From Hierarchy to Anarchy Territory and Politics before Westphalia

jeremy Larkins

pal grave macmillan 2009

Contents

List ofIllustrations

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

1

Introduction: Territoriality, Westphalia, and International Relations

1

International Relations, Political Theory, and the Territorial State

17

3

Theorizing Territoriality: Discourse, Culture, History

35

4

Hierarchy, Order, and Space in the Medieval World

53

5

Christendom, Hierarchy, and Medieval Political Discourse

73

6

The Renaissance Critique of Hierarchy

101

7

Machiavelli, Territoriality, and Lo Stato

123

8

Picturing Renaissance Territoriality

145

9

The Renaissance Territorialization of International Society

169

Conclusion: Territoriality, the Renaissance, and International Relations

195

2

10

Notes

201

Bibliography

245

Index

263

Illustrations

5.1

5.2

8.1

8.2

8.3

8.4

The Skrzicziek Miniature, in Gratian of Bologna, Decretum: Distinctiones 9, Pars 1, c.1140. Archives of the Prague Castle, Prague, Czech Republic. © Archives of the Prague Castle. The Emperor in Majesty, c. 975 (vellum) by German school (tenth century). Aachen Cathedral, Aachen, Germany. Bildarchiv Foto Marburg/The Bridgeman Art Library. German. Out of copyright. View of an Ideal City, 1490-1500 (oil on panel) by Italian School (fifteenth century). ©Walters Art Museum, Baltimore, USA/The Bridgeman Art Library. Portraits of Duke Federico da Montefeltro (1422-82) and Battista Sforza, c.1465 (tempera on panel) by Francesca, Piero della (c.1415-92). Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright. The Triumphs of Duke Federico da Montefeltro (1422-82) and Battista Sforza, c.1465 (tempera on panel) by Francesca, Piero della (c.1415-92). Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright. Arrival of Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga, greeted by his father Marchese Ludovico Gonzaga III (reigned 1444-78) and his brothers, from the Camera degli Sposi or Camera Picta, 1465-74 (fresco) by Mantegna, Andrea (1431-1506). Palazzo Ducale, Mantua, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright.

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151

156

157

161

x

8.5

8.6

9.1

9.2

•

Illustrations Map of the world, based on descriptions and coordinates given in "Geographia," by Ptolemy (Claudius Ptolemaeus of Alexandria) {c.90-168 AD), published in Ulm, Germany, 1486 {color engraving) by German School {fifteenth century). British Library, London, UK/© British Library Board. All Rights Reserved/The Bridgeman Art Library. German. Out of copyright. Carta della Catena, 1490 {Detail) by Italian School {fifteenth century). Museo de Firenze Com'era, Florence, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright. Columbus at Hispaniola, from "The Narrative and Critical History of America," edited by Justin Winsor, London, 1886 {engraving) by Bry, Theodore de (1528-98) {after). Private Collection/The Bridgeman Art Library. Flemish. Out of copyright. Credit: Copy of Monumenta Cartographia, 1502 {color litho) by © Royal Geographical Society, London, UK/The Bridgeman Art Library.

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Acknowledgments

T

his book has taken far too long to reach completion and in the process I have incurred a considerable number of debts. Some of the ideas presented here first saw the light of day during my graduate studies at the London School of Economics. During the enjoyable years I spent at the LSE many people contributed to my intellectual journey. My greatest debt is to my teacher and supervisor Mr. Michael Banks who encouraged my forays into pastures new while reigning in some of my wilder impulses. Several other members of the department of International Relations at the LSE also offered valuable support and encouragement. In particular I would like to mention Chris Coker, Mark Hoffman, Justin Rosenberg, and Hayo Krombach. My examiners David Campbell and Chris Brown provided many insightful comments and criticisms that have been incorporated into the present work. The graduate community at the LSE in the mid-1990s was remarkable in many ways and Molly Cochrane, Joal de Almeida, Eddie Keene, Bernice Lee, Mairi Johnson, Bice Maiguashca, and Agostinho Zacarias were sources of inspiration and friendship. In recent years colleagues in several institutions have made me feel welcome. Despite our differences over the nature of research methods, Yossi Mekelberg at Regents' College has been instrumental in my return to teaching. I also appreciate the warmth shown to me by the members of Department of Politics at Goldsmiths, in particular fromJasna Dragovic-Soso, Richard Greyson, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Gonzo Pozzo, and Sanjay Seth. My future research ambitions have in no small way been inspired by the department's intellectual ethos. Within the broader International Relations community, Mats Berdal, Stephen Chan, James Der Derian, Mervyn Frost, Nick Renegger, Hidemi Suganami, and Rob Walker have all contributed in various ways to the project. I would also like to thank the members of the Warburg Institute of the University of London for allowing me to use their wonderful library.

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At Palgrave Macmillan several people have played important roles in nurturing this project. I am particularly indebted to Peter Wilson the editor of the "History oflnternational Thought Series" for expressing an interest in my work and encouraging me to submit a manuscript for consideration. This series is an important outlet for those of us who think that the history of ideas matters. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, Toby Wahl, and Asa Johnson have all provided a publishing novice with invaluable support and advice. I would also like to thank Victoria Hogarth at Bridgeman Art Library and Marek Suchy at the Archives of the Prague Castle for their help with obtaining the images. The external reviewer's comments were extremely insightful and I am very grateful for their close reading of my manuscript. I have incorporated many of the reviewer's valuable suggestions and believe that the final text is considerably improved as a result. Finally many thanks to Philip Davis for his diligent work compiling the index and reading the proofs. Emotional and psychological support on what has sometimes been a difficult journey has come from many people. Professor Valerie Cowie provided not only valuable professional assistance but also hours of stimulating conversation. I am grateful for the, often bemused, understanding and patience shown by Zoe Rahman and Zaklina Manevska-Hamilton. One could not wish for better friends than Spyros Economides and Katerina Dalacoura who have picked up the pieces on more than one occasion. My parents Fay and Gordon, my sister and brother, Frances and Matthew, and their families, have all been sources of kindnesses beyond the call of family duty. I have dedicated this book to Oominique Jacquin-Berdal. Dominique's tragic death in early 2006 not only robbed the International Relations community in Britain of one of its brightest prospects and Africa of one of its most passionate advocates but also many of us of a dear friend. Dominique was an unfailing source of wisdom, generosity, and kindness and I consider myself blessed to have been able to count her among my dearest friends.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Territoriality, Westphalia, and International Relations

International Relations and the Territorial State The sine qua non of modern International Relations theory has been the idea of an international system comprised of independent political communities or states. Since this representation of the international system has no place for an overarching Leviathan or hegemon it is generally assumed that the relations between states are structured by anarchy. International theorists, perhaps mindful of Kenneth Waltz's caution against reductionist explanations of international processes and outcomes, have tended to leave the task of theorizing the state to political theorists. 1 Nevertheless, even those theories of International Relations that explicitly eschew the business of state theory implicitly endorse certain assumptions about the nature and character of the states that make up the international system. Mainstream theories of international relations have been particularly well served by Max Weber's famous account of the state as a human community that "claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." 2 Violence, legitimacy, and territory define the Weberian state. In International Relations the themes of violence and legitimacy have been subject to much debate and discussion. Most attention has focused on the idea of legal domination, which for Weber distinguished modern from traditional or charismatic forms of state domination. Legal domination in international political theory is rewritten as the principle of sovereignty, which, it is claimed, is the constitutive principle of the Westphalian international system. However, the territorial aspect of the state, the fact of the state's physical presence in space-which for Weber, writing in a culture dominated by geopolitics, seemed

2

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From Hierarchy to Anarchy

self-evident-has not received equivalent critical consideration in International Relations. Indeed, it would be fair to say that, for most international political thought the claim that the state has a territory or is in some sense territorial has assumed the status of a common-sensical, self-evident truth. All states, regardless of historical and geographical variables, are assumed to have some physical extension in space, to occupy an identifiable place on the surface of the earth, to have borders that clearly distinguish inside from outside and self from others. As Stephen Krasner writes "[t]he assertion of final authority within a given territory is the core element in any definition of sovereignty," the only alternatives being "either a world in which there are no clear boundaries or a world in which there is no final authority within a given territory." 3 This final authority is not just derived from the internal monopoly of violence but also comes from the constitutive principle of the state system "that political life must be territorially organized with one final authority within a given territory.'"~ Following Kant I identify this essentialist account of the relationship between the state and territory as the "territorial a priori." In Kant's Newtonian framework space and time were universal a priori conditions for knowledge. However, the intellectual revolution associated with the early twentieth century sciences of relativity forced a paradigm shift in understandings of space and time and showed that the Newtonian-Kantian categories were not universal but particular, the products of historically specific knowledge. This book will make a similar claim with respect to the territorial a priori of International Relations. It will suggest that the idea of the territorial state is neither universal nor immutable but contingent and historical. It is a modern cultural representation, a discursive construct, with a complex history whose origins lie in the Renaissance transformation of man's understanding of his being-in-space. Contemporary Neorealists are unlikely to be unduly disturbed by the assertion that the territorial state has a history. After all they deny that differences in the nature of the units that make up any international system have any causal impact on the dynamics of war and the balance of power. However, their Classical Realists predecessors, whose Realism was more imbued with history and political theory, recognised that the modern state's territoriality was a fundamental factor in the emergence of the modern international system. Hans Morgenthau stated clearly that an international system composed of sovereign territorial states only emerged in the period after the end of the Thirty Years War. Sovereignty or supreme power over a particular territory became the determinant political fact of early modern Europe only once it reflected the new social reality derived from the double victory of the territorial princes: externally over the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope, and internally over local barons. For Morgenthau the legal doctrine of territorial sovereignty formulated by the jurists and lawyers of

Introduction

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3

the later sixteenth century was a response to the emergence of the "new phenomenon of the territorial state. It referred in legal terms to the elemental political fact ofthat age-the appearance of a centralized power that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority within a certain territory." 5

The Westphalia Narrative Morgenthau's claim that the sovereign territorial state emerged out of the turmoil of the religious wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is one account of the Westphalia 'myth', according to which the agreements reached at the Congresses of Munster (1644-48) and Osnabriick (1645-48) and subsequently ratified by the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) gave birth to the modern states-system. According to this narrative ever since Westphalia the international system has been a territorial order whose actors, sovereign states, have been coterminous with bounded, compartmentalized, spaces. 6 Although the International Relations 'myth' ofWestphalia is often at odds with the historical events and social and political conditions of the time, the aura ofWestphalia remains largely undiminished; not least because Westphalia has a significance that goes beyond the immediate concerns oflnternational Relations.? For many it connotes the moment when politics, having spent several centuries in the darkened caves of medieval Christianity, emerged blinking into the daylight of modern rationality and reason. Westphalia symbolized a transformation from a system .of political rule based in the hierarchical structures of medieval Christianity to one ordered in terms of independent sovereign territorial states: a transition from hierarchy to anarchy. For Leo Gross, the Homer of the Westphalia myth, this structural transformation is precisely what made Westphalia so significant: it "marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world." 8 Westphalia represented the victory of centrifugal forces, empowered by the rising sense of individualism promoted by the Renaissance and Reformation, over the Papacy and Empire upon which the hierarchies of the Christian medieval world had been centered. It "marked man's abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option for a new system characterized by the co-existence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free from any external earthly authority." 9 In the Westphalian international system, composed of independent sovereign territorial states, the structure of authority is horizontal: there is no Leviathan or transcendental authority figure dictating how states should relate to each other. This structural transformation in the nature of political authority from medieval hierarchy to modern anarchy both enabled and required a profound

4

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From Hierarchy to Anarchy

alteration in man's conception of his political being-in-space or his territoriality. The transition from a vertical to a horizontal political cosmology is, suggests Michael Shapiro, captured in Aldous Huxley's novel Grey Eminence in which Cardinal Richelieu and his foreign emissary Father James embody, respectively, aspects of the modern and medieval spatial imaginaries. In Father James's medieval cosmology the world appears as a vertical set of spaces organized into a mundane present and a transcendental eternity, whereas for Richelieu the hierarchies of the Christian order have given way to the modern geopolitical horizontal of sovereign states. The novel can thus be read as a chronicle of the waning of the medieval and the waxing of the modern spatialization of the world, an effect so powerful that, ever since, people pursuing statecraft have been able to subjugate and direct ecclesiastical authority on behalf of policy that unfolds within a horizontal, desacralized world. Indeed, much of the subsequent history of world politics involves the demise of the authorities connected to a vertical world and the ascension of those connected to a horizontal, geopolitical one. 10 Shapiro's observations raise two fundamental questions. First, under what circumstances, within what set of intellectual and cultural conditions could this transition from a hierarchical to an anarchical territorial order be conceived and represented? Second, when did this transformation occur? With respect to the first question, one of the working premises of this book is that, contrary to the implicit claim of the territorial a priori, ideas of sovereign-territoriality are not universal, fixed and objective, but particular, transitory and subjective; they are embedded in a culture's collective imagination and become manifest in its representations of its being-in-space. The transformation from hierarchy to anarchy was, maintains Shapiro, primarily derived from changes in the way that the relationship between space and politics was imagined: "the separation of the world into kinds of space is perhaps the most significant kind of practice for establishing the systems of intelligibility within which understandings of global politics are forged." 11 How we imagine our being-in-space has consequences for politics and vice-versa. Concepts of space and political ideologies combine in practices of representation, made manifest in texts and images, which do not simply reproduce the truths of some pre-existing reality. They are discourses understood not as "groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)" but in Michel Foucault's sense as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak." 12 Thus when we examine texts or images that convey, implicitly or explicitly, particular notions of territoriality we must, as David Campbell warns, be mindful of the political consequences of "adopting one mode of representation over another." 13 Thus territory must

Introduction

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5

be addressed as an object or an idea that is produced by discourse. This book's insistence on the notion of the territorial imaginary seeks to posit an alternative to the territorial a priori in which territory is synonymous with extension in physical space. The territorial imaginary reminds us that in any culture or society assumptions about man's political being-in-space are "constituted by the ensemble of representations which extend beyond the limit imposed by the facts of experience and the deductive conclusions authorized by them." 14 As far as the historical purview of this work is concerned one can begin by reiterating Donald J. Puchala's statement that "[t]here were, of course, international relations before 1648." 15 Commenting on the various dates put forward to signify the birth of the modern states-system, Martin Wight has observed that they tend to derive less from balanced assessments of historical data than from scholars' personal value systems and ideological biases. Thus, if one's priority is to emphasize the legal recognition of independent sovereign states then Westphalia is an appropriate date. However, if one thinks that an operative balance of power is a necessary requirement for an international system then the 1713 Treaty ofUtrecht might be more attractive. 16 Yet, notes Wight, even if we identify Utrecht a~> the coming-of-age of the modern states-system, we must recognize that it was preceded by a long period of gestation, which began in the fourteenth century. The real break, prepared through the fourteenth century, becomes manifest in the fifteenth. In the fifteenth century the old constitution of the Respublica Christiana finally breaks down. The attempt at its constitutional reform in the Conciliar Movement is a failure. The papacy is transformed from an ecumenical theocracy into an Italian great power. The assertion of sovereignty by the secular powers, growing since the thirteenth century, becomes normal. The first lamentations about international anarchy are heard. To mitigate the anarchy, the first attempts at collective security are made. To assist them, the new invention of reciprocal resident embassies becomes general. As collective security proves itself unworkable, because demanding too much, the simpler system of a balance of power grows up. 17 Despite Wight's insistence that institutional developments in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries established the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a distinctly modern form of international relations it is notable that this period of European history, the Renaissance, has received remarkably little scholarly attention within the discipline oflnternational Relations. Of course, this is primarily a consequence of the Westphalian narrative that has drawn a deep, if arbitrary, line across the historical record. Ironically, the discipline's foundational historical myth requires that earlier events and ideas are themselves mythologized;

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From Hierarchy to Anarchy

presented as curios that serve to illustrate the distance that the civilized modern world, imbued with Enlightenment ideals, has taken from the passions and doxas of medieval Christendom. As Wight observes "[t]he Westphalian interpretation of the history of the states-system fits in with the doctrine that the Scientific Revolution marks a more important epoch in the general history of Europe than does the Renaissance." 18 Of course history is rarely so neat. As Krasner points out both the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire remained significant international actors after 1648, and several medieval political entities (the independent city states of northern Italy, the realm of England and some German city states) were de facto if not de jure sovereign institutions with effective control over their territories from as early as 1300. 19 In many ways the Westphalian narrative dovetails with the ideal of modernity as Cosmopolis. As described by Steven Toulmin, Cosmopolis was the utopia of seventeenth century rationalists, an order combining nature (cosmos) and human society (polis) in which the perceived structure of nature reinforced a rational social order according to the dictates of reason. 20 The intellectual architects of Cosmopolis, motivated by faith in science and the dictates of natural philosophy, set out to distance their society from the values, principles, and ideals of an earlier Renaissance humanist tradition of modernity. Toulmin, however, makes too much of the Renaissance/Cosmopolis distinction. Not all Renaissance thought was as open-minded and as 'sceptically tolerant' of plurality and ambiguity as his reading of Montaigne, Rabelais, Shakespeare, and Erasmus implies. Conversely, many Classical minds were opposed to the rationalist architectonic projects of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Indeed, with respect to space and territoriality the conditions of possibility for a Cosmopolitan imaginary in which space could be known rationally, ordered systematically and rendered the object of man's desires, was established during the European Renaissance of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Renaissance texts and images reveal that in terms of space and territoriality it was during this period and not during Cosmopolis that the rupture or break with the medieval territorial imaginary was initiated. It was during the Renaissance that the hierarchical arrangement of medieval culture, structured by the prevalent spatial figure of above and below, was undermined. The medieval mind conceived of sovereign-territoriality through a prism in which order was determined by rigid perpendicular chains of being. The multiple overlapping jurisdictions and allegiances of the medieval political world were structured vertically through hierarchies of political authority that extended up far beyond the temporal authorities of Emperor and Papacy to culminate in the ethereal realm of the Civitas Dei. This whole edifice was destabilized by the Renaissance re-imagining and reconstituting of the relationship between man and his being-in-space. In terms of political territoriality this resulted in the gradual delegitimization of any claims to sovereignty located

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7

above the state. The Renaissance established the modern territorial imaginary in which territorial sovereignty is parceled out over a horizontal plane and the dominant spatial motif opposes inside and outside. This transformation from a medieval to modern political cosmology, from a vertical and hierarchical order of sovereign-territoriality to a horizontal and anarchic order, is the subject of this book.

International Relations and the Renaissance The dichotomy between medieval and modern international systems is less neat than the Westphalia narrative presumes. This has been acknowledged by those few International Relations scholars who have incorporated aspects of the Renaissance-a period of European history that bridged "the medieval" and "the modern" while simultaneously bringing both into question-within their histories of international relations. International Relations scholarship on the Renaissance tends to focus on three issue areas: the political philosophy of Machiavelli and other humanists; the Renaissance contribution to modern diplomacy; and the social relations leading to the institutional rise of the sovereign state. The remainder of this introduction will briefly consider their work, both to situate the present study and to indicate how its arguments extend beyond existing discussions of the Renaissance irt international political thought. Scholars of political philosophy often remark that the efflorescence of political theory associated with Renaissance humanism is not matched by equivalent advances in thinking about international politics. Torbj0rn L. Knutsen argues that although Machiavelli's writings on self-interest and raison d'etat anticipated some of the concerns of modern international political theory, The Prince is primarily concerned with domestic politics and is not a modern treatise since it continues to articulate power politics in terms of the classical categories of virtu and fortuna. 21 Indeed, for Knutsen, the closest the Renaissance came to developing a theory of international relations is Guicciardini's adaptation of Thucydides' balance of power theory to describe Lorenzo de Medici's foreign policy. David Boucher, who unlike Knutsen does not limit himself to The Prince, agrees that Machiavelli did not entertain the concept of a balance of power, but maintains that the Florentine did have a distinctive view of international relations: "Machiavelli's view of human nature and the subordination of morality to politics postulates a dynamic view of the relations among nations, each of which has its own common good which it is prepared to enhance at the expense of others." 22 Since it is human nature to always desire more, in the competitive environment of international relations, all states, even those that seek only to maintain the status quo, will be threatened by others, a threat that will spur their own desire and need for conquest. Both Knutsen and Boucher,

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From Hierarchy to Anarchy

highlighting a theme that will be discussed extensively throughout this work, acknowledge that even if Renaissance political thought articulated little by way of explicit international relations theory, the humanist critique of medieval scholasticism did pave the way for the subsequent development of modern secular political and international theory. Machiavelli and Guicciardini's descriptive realism, which described and explained politics in terms of human nature, the exercise of free will and rationality, isolated politics from the normative prescriptions of Christian theological discourse. Renaissance political theorists were no longer compelled to frame their discussions of the state in terms of its relations to either celestial or temporal Christian authorities, but rather depicted it as a human creation that needed constant vigilance in order to be sustained. Boucher and Knutsen treat this theme, which Boucher neatly terms "the priority of the secular," largely through an explication of Machiavellian statecraft and raison d'etat as adumbrated within the concepts of necessita, virtu, and fortuna. Important as these concepts are to understanding Renaissance political theory, neither study provides an extensive discussion of how the state was understood during the Renaissance. Thus in chapter 4 a close textual reading of Machiavelli will explore how humanist political thought conceived of lo stato and how that conception played out in terms of a territorial imaginary. If the Renaissance lacked a general theory of international relations, its contribution to the theory and practice of diplomacy is well acknowledged. In his classic Renaissance Diplomacy, Garrett Mattingly argues that modern diplomacy began with the exchange of permanent resident embassies between the principal courts of Renaissance Italy during the period of the Milanese wars (1444-54). 23 Drawing on Jacob Burckhardt's characterization of political life in Renaissance Italy as illegitimate and requiring permanent vigilance, Mattingly claims that the resident ambassadors were simultaneously "the agents and the symbols of continuous system of diplomatic pressures." 24 During the remainder of the fifteenth century the machinery of Renaissance diplomacy was gradually refined and the rights and duties of diplomats were clarified. The heyday of Renaissance diplomacy was brought to a close by the French invasion of 1494 and the ensuing struggles between the Valois and Hapsburg dynasties for hegemony over the peninsula. However, because the northern powers adopted the Italian diplomatic model it became the European standard, even surviving the CounterReformation wars of religion. Renaissance Diplomacy remains a valuable work if only for its insistence that the period between 1420 and 1530 was significant in the history of international relations. Yet, Mattingly's claim that modern diplomatic practice emerged during the Renaissance has been challenged. For James Der Derian Mattingly's text shares two of the characteristic flaws of the classical tradition of diplomatic studies. First, by narrowly conceiving of diplomacy as "an exchange of accredited envoys by states, and as a valuable norm for the

Introduction

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international order" it serves to "reinforce if not reify ... a status quo diplomatic system.' 25 Second, it reinforces this tradition's evolutionist historical narrative that records the gradual refinement and improvement of diplomatic practice. Nevertheless, Der Derian agrees that the establishment of permanent residences during the Italian Renaissance was an important innovation, especially in the context of the humanist revival of the classical doctrine of raison d'etat. Just as Meinecke's diplomat was "the discoverer of the interests of states" so Machiavelli posited raison d'etat as the state's "intelligence," which allowed it to form an objective awareness of its environment. 26 However, for Der Derian neither Machiavellian raison d'etat nor the institution of permanent residences qualify as instances of "diplomacy" understood as the "mediation of mutual estrangements between states." 27 Renaissance practice "corresponded to an extreme state of anarchy and estrangement of the city states from hegemonic empires' and is thus a manifestation of "proto-diplomacy" or a one sided mediation, whose genealogy can be traced back to St. Augustine. 28 Although for Der Derian the gaze of Renaissance is primarily directed to the past, occasionally it glimpses the future. For, like Boucher and Knutsen, he credits Machiavelli with sweeping away "the remnants of a mythical Christian unity to open the way for a system of diplomacy based on states' interests." 29 This work will share Der Derian's suspicion of evolutionist narratives, but whereas for Der Derian the Renaissance is still predominantly an expression of medieval thought and practice, I shall contend that the modern territorial imaginary had its genesis during this transformational epoch in European cultural history. DerDerian's refusal to enfold Renaissance diplomacy within an evolutionist historical narrative is echoed in Christian Reus-Smit's comparative study of international societies in The Moral Purpose of the State. 3 For Reus-Smit the primary institutions of international society are historically and culturally contingent. Their differences are derived from the fundamental set of core values or constitutional structures that the states that comprise each international society look to when justifying their right to exist and act as sovereign entities. International society is ordered by these "coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms" because they determine which actors are legitimately recognized as states and the limits to their actions. 31 Of these, the moral purpose of the state is the fundamental normative criterion: it determines the basis upon which sovereign rights are established, the organizing principle of sovereignty, the norm of procedural justice, and ultimately the nature of an international society. Reus-Smit argues that the social structure of Renaissance Italy was constituted by patronage, which had arisen as a response to the anxieties generated by the erosion of guild-based corporate structures and the retreat of papal and imperial sources of authority. Relations of patronage bound "patrons and clients in a web of mutual obligations, established and maintained

°

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From Hierarchy to Anarchy

through rhetorical speech and ritual gesture." 32 All authority claims were grounded in "appeals to honorific grandeur," which engendered a specific rational for sovereignty-"the pursuit of civic glory, or grandezza, was celebrated as the city-state's primary raison d'etre." 33 The realization of grandezza, required the nurturing of concordia whereby individuals would place the common good before their own self interest or factional advantage. Although the humanists promoted concordia as substantive justice, rewarding virtue and rectifying vice, in practice the values of patronage prevailed in "the ritual enactment of virtue, through ceremonial rhetoric and gesture, determining patterns of social and political interaction, individual worth and entitlement, and the distribution of social goods." 34 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as city states moved to seigniorial or oligarchic rule, these ritual norms and practices not only shaped relations between individuals but also came to determine those between rulers and subjects and were adopted by political elites "to establish the social identity, legitimacy and status of their city states within the interstate system, and when courting cooperative relations with other states." 35 Thus resident ambassadors served as the conduits for "oratorical diplomacy" or the presentation and promotion of civic grandeur as a key element of a state's identity and an essential element in the balance of power. Reus-Smit makes an important claim, one fully endorsed here, that the political institutions of the Renaissance need to be understood within a broader matrix of social relations and normative values. This contextual approach has some affinity with historical sociological studies of the development of the modern states-system, such as Justin Rosenberg's historical-materialist critique of Realism's "transhistorical theory of states-systems sui generis" in The Empire of Civil Society. 36 For Rosenberg because Realists isolate geopolitical structures from the social relations within which they are embedded, they reify what are historically specific social forms of sovereignty and anarchy and reduce international history to recurrent power struggles between sovereign states operating within anarchy. This impoverished historical imagination occludes the differences between different historical state systems and could be enriched by adopting a historical-materialist method that recognises how the prevailing forms of the relations of production constitute social and political institutions, including those underpinning the international system. Since relations of production change across time so do political structures and the nature of the relations between them. Thus with respect to the Renaissance, Rosenberg takes issue with Mattingly's assertion that "Italy first found the system of organising interstate relationship[s] which Europe later adopted, because Italy, towards the end of the Middle Ages, was already becoming what later all Europe would become." 37 Mattingly fails to acknowledge that the autonomous political institutions of the Italian city-state arose as particular responses to "a radical institutional

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separation of politics and economics premised upon a form of material reproduction dominated by exchange relations, itself contingent upon a structural location within feudal Europe which enabled the cornering of such flows sufficient to support them." 38 The Communes' ability to isolate themselves from private individual power so prevalent in feudal Europe and so reconstitute an autonomous public sphere of political life-characterized by the institutions of the poderteria and capitaneria-was derived from their unique role in the feudal economy: their control of East-West trade, their production of manufactures such as textiles, and the presence of colonies of Italian merchants in various European cities. Rosenberg's argument is persuasive if one accepts his economic determinism, but from the perspective of discourse analysis it is too restrictive. There are surely limitations to any discussion of the Renaissance, which if it was anything was a cultural and intellectual movement that eschews any consideration of ideas and art. This may be a consequence of Rosenberg's idiosyncratic dating of the Renaissance to the emergence of the Communes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. However, few intellectual or cultural historians would accept that Renaissance culture in any meaningful sense existed before the late thirteenth century when it erupted in Florence with the writings of Dante Alighieri and Francesco Petrarch and the painting of Giotto di Bondone. Rosenberg's chronology merely serves to efface an important distinction between medieval and Renaissance cultures that in terms of their different territorial imaginaries is profound. The Westphalian narrative of the modern states-system is also contested in Hendrik Spruyt's institutional historical sociology. 39 The processes of evolution and change underlying the transformation from a feudal system to one of sovereign territorial states are not, he suggests, satisfactorily explained by N eoMarxist, Neo-Durkheimian or Neo-Weberian "unilinear explanations" that highlight one explanatory variable-the economic contradiction in feudalism, changes in dynamic density, or an instrumentally rational formal organization. These functionalist and teleological explanations cannot account for the eventual triumph of the sovereign state as the dominant political institution of Early Modern Europe for there was "nothing inevitable about the emergence of the sovereign, territorial state.'>4° Spruyt's nonlinear view of institutional evolution, derived from Fernand Braude! and Stephen Jay Gould, argues that the political landscape of Late Medieval Europe was profoundly altered by the expansion of trade and the growth of towns. Neither the conflict-ridden feudal institutions of lordship nor the universal Church or Holy Roman Empire were unable to take advantage of these developments. By contrast, the emergent institutions of the sovereign territorial state, city-league, and city-state, embodied in Capetian France, the Hanseatic League and Italian city-states, were able to bolster and legitimize their political authority by means of effective alliance formations

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with the new urban configurations of social and economic power. The ultimate victory of the sovereign state was not due to superior war-making as many historical sociologists have contended. For although the Hanseatic League and Italian city-states had effective command of money, warfare and security, it was the ability of the larger territorial states to deploy their superior organizational capabilities to provide the higher degree of standardization and certitude required for the expansion of commerce that secured their victory. As regards Italy, Spruyt shares Rosenberg's interest with the emergence of the two to three hundred independent communes that dominated Italy around 1200. By 1450, however, this political landscape had changed profoundly for the ascent of the signoria, tougher market conditions and foreign interventions had reduced their number to a handful of territorial city states that in many ways "resembled the sovereign, territorial state. Like the French monarchy, the city-state had developed notions of sovereignty and the public realm. Roman law figured predominantly. And like the sovereign state, the city state had territorial parameters.'>4 1 However, the Italian city-states cannot be considered as fully fledged sovereign territories because many of the previously independent towns within their territories retained considerable degrees of independence and factional struggles within the cities prevented the emergence of a sovereign authority analogous to the French king. Spruyt is correct that Renaissance city-state territoriality was structured in terms of centers and peripheries. However, this did not preclude Renaissance political thinkers like Machiavelli from articulating an idea of sovereign territoriality that, while it may have been a more apt description of the northern states at the time, did nevertheless establish the conceptual and ideological premises underlying the modern discourse of sovereign territoriality. Since Spruyt, like Rosenberg, favors a methodology that tends to pass over primary source material in favor of secondary interpretations, these expressions of the modern territorial imaginary in Renaissance discourse are overlooked.

Chapter Outlines The next chapter, "International Relations, Political Theory, and the Territorial State," considers the place and role of the territorial a priori in International Relations theory. It argues that International Relations theory, from Realism to Constructivism and from Liberal Institutionalism to International Society, implicitly endorses an ideal of the territorial a priori that is derived from an "absolutist" tradition of political theory reaching from Hobbes to Hegel. Since Max Weber's theory of the state established the paradigm of the modern territorial a priori and its attendant geopolitical sensitivity it is discussed in detail. Finally, the poststructuralist critics of the "sovereignty problematic" in International Relations is considered as a starting point for further investigation

Introduction

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into the workings and provenance of the modern territorial imaginary. Building on this discussion of post-structuralism, chapter 3, "Theorizing Territoriality: Discourse, Culture, History," establishes the theoretical or methodological premises that underpin the subsequent inquiry into the cultural history of space and territoriality. Drawing on a wide body of work that has addressed the intellectual, social, cultural, and political nature of space, the chapter defines three aspects of the "territorial imaginary" that serves as the primary heuristic concept used throughout this work. First, the "territorial imaginary" recognizes that the idea of state territoriality is a representation of space, a product of various discourses of knowledge and power that order political space. Second, the concept of the "territorial imaginary" alert us to the fact that political discourses of sovereign territoriality are informed by a broad matrix of ideas and practices that together constitute a society's culture of space. This culture, comprising various discourses of space, determines the epistemic field of possibility within which representations of territoriality come to have meaning and value. Third, the "territorial imaginary" refuses the claim that territoriality is a primordial or transcendent feature of all human social formations. Territorial imaginaries are historically and culturally contingent. New configurations of spatial discourse and practice produce new frameworks for understanding man's being-in-space. With the theoretical framework in place, the next two chapters move to the historical account of the transformation of the European territorial imaginary. The medieval culture of space was dominated by the episteme of hierarchy. Chapter 4 begins by outlining the writings of Diortysius the Areophagite on the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies, for they established the paradigm of hierarchy within which the medieval understanding of man's political being-in-space was articulated. The Dionysian hierarchical order of space was made manifest in medieval society through the structures of feudalism, notably vassalage and fief-holding, in the codes of chivalry and, in particular, in feudalism's legitimizing "mental representation" of the three orders. Dante's Divine Comedy is read to demonstrate how the medieval culture of space interwove physical and political cosmology within a shared spatial episteme determined by the figure of above and below. Scholastic theological discourse, which reinforced the hierarchical structure of being, also impacted on medieval geography. In the famous T-0 maps, the earth's spaces were not, as in modern maps, defined in terms of abstract mathem~tical coordinates, but were distributed in places that were allocated different values according to hierarchical principles. Chapter 5, "Christanitas, Hierarchy, and Medieval Political Discourse," builds on this general account of the medieval culture of space to argue that its hierarchical architectonics determined the possibilities for thinking about territoriality within medieval political discourse. This claim is made with reference to the tripartite power struggle between Papacy, Empire, and Monarchy that defined

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medieval international relations. At stake was not only the right to rule over but the ability to determine the nature of European political society. However, the differences between the ideals of Ecclesia or Christianitas promoted by the papal doctrine of plenitudo potestatis, Dante's imperial ideal of humana civilitas, or John of Paris's Capetian-sponsored advocacy of civitas were less significant than their shared territorial imaginary. All were premised on the understanding that sovereign-territoriality was not restricted to the horizontal plane of the earth's surface but was structured hierarchically, extending from the Civitas Terrena to the Civitas Dei, the divine font of sovereignty. The spaces of the medieval world, including its territorial imaginary, were structured according to the episteme of hierarchy. Chapter 6, "The Renaissance Critique of Hierarchy," begins the task of identifying in the Renaissance culture of space those ideas that would challenge the hierarchies of the medieval order. The meaning of the Renaissance is contentious and the chapter begins by acknowledging the difficulties in defining its contours and determining its relationship to medieval and modern cultures. An important challenge to the medieval episteme of hierarchy was mounted in the Renaissance cosmologies of Ficino and Pica della Mirandola that developed a recognizably modern notion of sovereign identity. Their promotion of the "dignity of man" not only released man from his lowly fixed position in the cosmos and thereby destroyed the pivotal foundation of the hierarchical universe, but also asserted that man as self-fashioner was capable of shaping and ordering nature and its spaces, rather than being shaped and ordered by them. Machiavelli's realism also assisted in dismantling the hierarchies of the medieval political cosmos. Machiavelli not only situated politics within a new conception of time, but also resited politics in the space of modern territorial sovereignty. In maintaining that religion had no purpose other than to cement solidarity within political society and by castigating Christianity as an especially ineffective form of state religion, Machiavelli brought down territorial sovereignty from the celestial spaces of the Civitas Dei to the mundane world of terrestrial politics. Machiavelli is also the main subject of the next chapter, "Machiavelli, Territoriality, and Lo Stato", which explores the modernity of Machiavelli's territorial imaginary in terms of his promotion of the secular state. Starting with a consideration of the various meanings of lo stato in Renaissance political discourse, the chapter then identifies in Machiavelli's discussion of the state in The Prince and The Discourses three elements of the modern territorial imaginary. First, Machiavelli's emphasis on the legal concept of dominion embodies a distinct sense of sovereignty as the extension of political authority over a defined territory. Second, Machiavelli's distinction between the internal and external exercise of political violence legitimizes the spatial figure of inside/ outside. Finally, Machiavelli's evocation of italianita, articulated in terms of

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an opposition to the barbarian other, expresses the modern desire to ground national identity on the territory of the state. Chapter 8, "Picturing Renaissance Territoriality," moves to the representation of sovereign territoriality in Renaissance art. A particular concern is the effect that the technique of perspective had in transforming man's relationship to space. The basic principles of perspective construction are introduced with reference to the rules laid out by Alberti and their use in painting by Piero della Francesca. Perspective is also addressed as a discourse of power/knowledge that not only objectified space but also constituted man's subjectivity in space. The chapter considers how Renaissance paintings of principalities (as represented by Piero della Francesca's diptych of Federico da Montelfeltro and Battista Sforza) and city states (as depicted in the ideal cityscapes of the Urbino, Baltimore, and Berlin panels) endorsed the values of an emerging modern territorial order of sovereignty, politics and space. Perspective was also instrumental in promoting a cartographic sensibility that allowed the territorial boundaries between Renaissance kingdoms to be drawn on topographical and regional maps. Moving from the internal projections of Renaissance territoriality, chapter 9, "The Renaissance Territorialization of International Society" looks outward to the territorialization of the "new world." The "invention of America" and the epistemological revolution derived from the voyages of discovery radically altered man's perception of his being-in-the-world, not least in freeing him from the confines of the medieval Christian geographical imaginary. The discovery of the "new world" shattered the medieval view of the world as a cosmic jail and freed man from the confines of the Orbis Terrarum. These transformations went hand in hand with more explicitly political territorializations of the new spaces of international society. The famous papal demarcation line of the Inter caetera bulls and the division of the new world agreed to at the Treaty of Tordesillas reflected, at the level of high politics, strategies of territorialization on the ground. These processes, which reflected the complex interplay between the drives to conquest and conversion, were legitimized through texts and images. Accounts of the naming and possession of territories in the journals ofColumbus and Vespucci and the cartographic representation of the "new world" on maps like the Miller Atlas and the Cantino Planisphere were instrumental in the production of territorialized spaces that constituted the new reach of Renaissance International Society.

CHAPTER 2

International Relations, Political Theory, and the Territorial State

M

artin Wight established a famous dichotomy between, on the one hand, the tradition of political theory that since Plato and Aristotle has sought to establish the conditions by which mankind might progress to some ideal of the "good life" within the state and, on the other hand, international theory, which focusing on relations between states, that amounts to little more than a depressing account of the eternal recurrence of war and the balance of power. 1 Whereas students of domestic politics assume the presence of some sort of governmental system in which law and institutions override the naked struggle for power, students of international politics presume that government in any meaningful sense is absent and those laws and institutions that do exist are always vulnerable to the machinations of power politics. 2 Although Wight was personally attuned to the tragic nature of international politics, this dichotomy has served to legitimize International Relations as an academic discipline in so far as study of the anarchic relations between states has become its sole preserve. Yet, as Justin Rosenberg observes, this disciplinary identity is secure only as long as the idea of the sovereign state retains its legitimacy: "the same absolute character of the sovereignty of the modern state that is the foundation of order within national boundaries simultaneously dictates the persistence of an external condition of anarchy among states."3 One important feature of this dichotomy between sovereignty and anarchy is that it is inscribed in space: "[t]he borders and landscape of this environment are set and policed by the twin concepts of sovereignty and anarchy.'>4 This chapter will explore how the modern ideal of political space, as embodied in the idea of the territorial state, has served to maintain these dichotomies.

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The first section looks at state theory in International Relations and argues that it tends to be underpinned by, what I term, the territorial a priori. The second section will trace the emergence of the idea of the territorial state in an absolutist tradition of political theory that, reaching from Hobbes to Hegel, reaches its apotheosis in Weber's famous definition of the modern state as an institution laying legitimate claim to the means of violence within a defined territory. Section three frames this paradigm of state territoriality within the Cosmopolitan tradition of modernity. Finally, I shall discuss how the poststructuralist critique of the "sovereignty problematic" in International Relations unsettles the assumptions that underpin the idea of the territorial state.

The Territorial a Priori of International Theory In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant asserts that space and time "are the pure forms of sensible intuition, and are so what make a priori synthetic propositions possible." 5 This statement refers back to some of the basic elements of Kant's critical project. Thought is in immediate relation to objects through intuition. Intuition requires that we receive representations of objects through the capacity of sensibility: "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding and from the understanding arise concepts."6 The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation Kant terms sensation. Sensation produces empirical intuitions whose undetermined object is appearance. The appearance that corresponds to sensation is matter, but Kant is interested in that which "so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered" or the form of appearance. While matter is given to us a posteriori only (as empirical knowledge possible only through experience) form must "lie ready for the sensations" a priori in the mind-a priori knowledge being absolutely independent of all experience. The critique's necessary first step is the constitution of the transcendental aesthetic that identifies the pure forms of sensible intuition. These pure forms are space and time and they serve as the principles of a priori knowledge. In the eighteenth century there were two competing conceptions of space. The dominant paradigm was Newton's in which space was conceived of as absolute pure entity, the same throughout and immovable, and which existed in and of itself without any relation to anything external to it. The secondary paradigm, associated with Leibniz, conceived of space like time as a relative quality, as "an order of co-existences as time is an order of successions." 7 Kant proposes four postulates about space that reveals his affinity with the Newtonians. First, space is not an empirical concept derived from outer experience, for any representation of an object as being outside of oneself, or as different from other objects, presupposes the representation of space. Second,

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[s]pace is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them. It is an a priori representation, which necessarily underlies outer appearances. 8 Third, because we can only represent one space to ourselves "space is essentially one" rather than multiple. It is pure intuition rather than a general concept that requires thought to impose limitations on it. Finally, space is represented as an "infinite given magnitude" containing an infinite number of representations within it. 9 Space then in Kant's idealist framework is an a priori intuition located within the subject. It precedes objects and allows the concept of the object to be determined a priori. 10 I shall return to Kant presently, but at this stage I want to advance the proposition that territory in international theory has a status analogous to space in Kant's transcendental aesthetic. Just as for Kant space is the condition of possibility for sensible intuition of the world, so territory serves as an a priori condition underpinning state theory in International Relations. The territorial a priori takes many different forms in International Relations theory ranging from crude associations with some physical or material reality to more profound, but nonetheless still unsatisfactory, attempts to understand territory in terms of the institutional determinants of sovereignty. The most explicitly materialist statements of state territoriality tend to be made by Classical Realists who argue that the power of the state is dependent on the material resources at its disposal.U According to John Herz the modern nation-state has an underlying essence that is found "in its physical, corporeal capacity: as an expanse of territory encircled for its identification and its defense by a 'hard shell' of fortifications." 12 Reflecting on the state of the state at the beginning of the Cold War, Herz forecast the "passing of the age of territoriality" as the state's space became penetrated by economic forces and by psychological, air, and nuclear warfare. However, ten years later, he expressed renewed confidence in the ability of the territorial state to survive. The "new or neo-territorial" state was now capable of resisting both nuclear attack and the forces of transnationalism.13 Herz also maintained that the state's territorial impermeability was the underlying foundation of the classical system of international relations and its institutions of international law, the balance of power, and war. Accordingly, now that the state's territorial integrity was guaranteed he did not foresee any imminent structural changes to the contemporary states-system. 14 Raymond Aron also emphasized the material reality of the state's territory, claiming that a state's authority was dependent on its possession of "a fragment of the earth's

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crust, with the men and objects thereon." 15 Because the space or milieu a state occupies is an important source of its power-it provides the resources and manpower required for defense-it is in the interests of states to increase their space. Thus the history of the international system has been driven by conflict over space, as states, seeking to increase their power, dispute the territories occupied by some and desired by others. The consequence of this Darwinian struggle for possession of the earth's physical space is that "[e]very international order, down to our own day, has been essentially territorial. It represents an agreement among sovereignties, the compartmentalization of space." 16 In Kenneth Waltz's structural neorealism the territorial a priori is less explicit. For Waltz, who resists any reductionist explanations of the international system in terms of the nature of the units that make it up, the question of state territoriality takes a back seat. 17 Because all international systems are structured by anarchy the actors are logically undifferentiated and functionally equivalent, meaning that the only significant variable of concern to international theory is the distribution of power. Analysis of international politics must "abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities." Territory is simply a component of a state's material power resource or capability. States can thus be ranked according to "how they score on all the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence." 18 In contrast to Waltz, Robert Gilpin offers a more rigorous and historically sensitive neorealist account of state territoriality. Gilpin acknowledges that the state has taken on many different forms in practice and that only the modern state embodies complex class and social structures, asserts a claim to national identity, and exercises a distinctive means of controlling its territory. 19 The modern state is the only state form characterized by "a strong central authority that is differentiated from other social organizations" and is capable of exercising "control over a well-defined and contiguous territory." 20 For Gilpin a state's territoriality has a functional role similar to that of property rights in the domestic realm. Resources in international politics are distributed in terms of relative territorial extension and just as the redistribution and redefinition of property rights signals fundamental transformations in domestic politics, so the redistribution of territory following major wars indicates significant transformation in the realm of international politics. 21 Contemporary realism has adopted some of the theoretical premises of constructivism. Alexander Wendt rejects both the neorealist insistence that anarchy forces states into self-interested behavior resulting in conflict, and the neoliberal hypothesis that states in anarchy can learn to cooperate with one another in the pursuit of absolute gains. For Wendt anarchy is a fluid concept determined by the "inter-subjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system." 22 Anarchy is the product of the practices of state interaction. Although

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Wendt denies any fixed essential meaning to anarchy, he nevertheless privileges the state as actor on the grounds that "states are ontologically prior to the states system." 23 Despite its changing identities and interests "the essential state is an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory." 24 Territory is one of the properties of the state and quite possibly the most important: "No territory, no state." For Wendt the relationship between the state and its territory is evident from the Latin etymology that combines "terra ('earth' or 'land') to torium ('belonging to' or 'surrounding,' presumably the state.)" 25 It is precisely its exercise of authority over territory that distinguishes the state from other institutional actors such as the church or firms. To be fair, Wendt does admit that the assumption of International Relations states-system theory that territory is an exogenous given is problematic. The historical record demonstrates, first, that territorial boundaries tend to be flexible and shifting rather than rigid and fixed, and second, that national interests and identities are rarely coterminous with the boundaries of the state. Yet, if we are to successfully develop a social theory of the states system such anomalies must be put aside. It is not the task ofinternational Relations scholars to write a "'biology' of the state" that seeks to "problematise territory 'all the way down'." 26 Ideas all the way down then; at least until one collides with the hard material shell of territory. Wendt makes an analytical distinction between sovereignty and territory, which he discusses as two distinct and not necessarily related properties of the state. By contrast, in Stephen Krasner's theory of sovereignty as an institutional structure that conditions, to varying degrees, the interests, capabilities and actions of states in foreign affairs, the relationship between sovereignty and territory is rather more complex. Krasner identifies four possible meanings of sovereignty. Two of these, "domestic sovereignty" that refers to the organization and effectiveness of public authority within a state, and "interdependence sovereignty" that denotes the ability of public authorities to control trans-border movements, are only implicitly connected to territory. However, the other two meanings of sovereignty are explicitly grounded in the principle of territoriality. "International legal sovereignty" attests to states' mutual recognition of each other as the only legitimate participants in international relations. Such recognition is only extended to "entities, states, with territoriality and formal juridical autonomy." 27 Finally, "Westphalian sovereignty" is an institutional arrangement for organizing political life based on the principles of territoriality and independence from external intervention in the exercise of domestic authority. Westphalian sovereignty is symbolized by the norm of non-intervention formalized by Wolff and Vattel at the end of the eighteenth century. However, endemic violation of this norm by states means that the institution of sovereignty amounts

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to little more than a form of organized hypocrisy. 28 Although Krasner posits territory as an a priori reality underpinning the various permutations of sovereignty, he avoids crude materialism and recognizes that territorial-sovereignty is constituted through a permanent exchange between knowledge and practice. Territory in not simply synonymous with physical space but is embodied in the principle of territoriality. It is an institution or idea that is not anterior to but produced in practice. The English School or International Society approach also acknowledges a mutually constitutive relationship between territory and sovereignty. Rejecting the structural determinism of neorealism, English School scholars maintain that states accept, or at least pay lip service to, the rules and institutions of international society because they promote their common interests and values. Mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty is the ground rule of international society and confirms membership of the society of states. However, in order to gain access to this club, prospective members must possess a territory. Hedley Bull defines states as "independent political communities" that "possess a government and assert their sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population." 29 Similarly Alan James asserts that since each of the member states of international society exclusively represents a distinct "physical sector of the land mass of the globe", so the landscape of international society is "divided into states by frontiers rather as a farm is into fields by fences and walls." 30 Now that international society has expanded globally "almost every square kilometer of the earth's land surface" has been allocated to "one sovereign state or another, with virtually all frontiers being tidily delineated or clearly demarcated." 31 English School thinkers also endorse the institutionalist assumption that the inside/outside spatial distinction between domestic and international politics is primarily articulated in terms of sovereignty. Bull, for example, distinguishes the exercise of internal sovereignty (which gives a state supremacy over all other authorities within· a territory and over a population) from external sovereignty (which denotes independence from outside authorities). 32 Again the underlying assumption here is that territory exists a priori and is something onto which sovereignty is somehow fixed. English School emphasis on the importance of international law has lead many of its advocates to endorse the idea of the state as a Rechstaat, that is, as the embodiment of the collective agency of social power through representative institutions, created by laws, customs, and practices. However, even the Rechstaat resides upori the territorial a priori. As Cornelia Navari defines it, the Rechstaat is "a particular kind of political community, one that is territorially located, with a more or less delimited set of persons distinguished from the citizenry by the name of government, and that is conceived as law maker." 33 English School theories of international relations that emphasize the state's

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entrapment within webs of legal constraints thus fail to offer an alternative to the territorial a priori of the Classical realists. 34 Certainly classical international law offers a standard account of the state's relation to its territory. As defined by Hans Kelson, territory is that space within which, in principle, one state, the state to which the territory belongs, is entitled to carry our coercive acts, a space from which all the other states are excluded. It is the space for which, according to general international law, only one definite national legal order is authorized to prescribe coercive acts, the space within which only the coercive acts stipulated by chis order tnay be executed. It is the space within the so-called boundaries of the state.35 In sum we can endorse John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge's observation that international theory, or at least states-system theory, is floundering in a "territorial trap." They argue that International Relations' geographical imaginary divides the world up into mutually exclusive territorial states, thereby restricting the discipline's potential field of enquiry. This territorial trap is set by three related intellectual dispositions. First, the assumption that state territoriality is always and everywhere coterminous with state sovereignty has the effect of sanctifying the sovereign territorial state as a "sacred unit beyond historical time."36 The second presumption, derived from the mercantilist subordination of economics to politics, posits territorial states as the primary nodes of international economic exchange. Finally, the social is subsumed within the political in so far as the only social groups (nations) viewed as being significant are those coterminous with the boundaries of the territorial state. Unable to see beyond the walls and bars of the architecture of its incarceration, mainstream theory is, they argue, unable to account for the emergent phenomena of globalization such as population movements, capital mobility, environmental insecurities and the chronopolitics of the modern military: "(s]ocial, economic and political life cannot be ontologically contained within the territorial boundaries of states through the methodological assumption of'timeless space'." 37

The Territorial Legacy: Political Theory from Hobbes to Hegel International theory is far from being the only body of thought to have stumbled into the territorial trap. Indeed International Relations theorists might, with some justification, claim that the theory of the state they draw on has a venerable ancestry reaching back to Hobbes, if not further. Navari points out that Hobbes' political philosophy reflects the discursive strategy, ' implicit in much political discourse of his time, to establish the identity of the modern state

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by opposing it to the state of nature represented as its other. The architects of the new sovereign state presented it in its modernity. It was bounded, abstract, institutional, demythologized, and secular. 38 At the same time "a number of princes sitting in a field uttering the words, cuius regia, eius religio" invented international relations as a state of nature. 39 Many of these princes represented the emerging absolutist states, the archetypal political projects of Cosmopolis. For Zygmunt Bauman the absolutist state, with its projection of an image of order and security, offered a palliative to the pervasive sense ofinsecurity and fear that swept though early modern culture as the theocratic hierarchies of the medieval world were swept away by the new spirit of rationalism. The Cosmopolitan search for order manifested itself in spatial projects that sought to substitute the chaotic and disorderly space of the medieval town for the linear purity and perfect order embodied by Versailles. 40 This new order was designed, created and legitimized by a modern "space-managing state" that set about "landscaping the wasteland ... subjecting all local features to one unifying homogenizing principle of harmony.'>4 1 The Cosmopolitan opposition between the absolutist state and the state of nature replicates the inside/outside dichotomy characteristic of modern political discourse. Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan neatly sets up the opposition between the state of nature and the sovereign state. 42 Rob Walker argues that Hobbes's political theory is infused with a desire to overcome the temporal and contingent nature of politics by fixing it to a secure and permanent space. 43 Hobbes believed that through the application of science and geometry to politics "man could construct a political order as timeless as a Euclidean theorem.'>4 4 Nevertheless, Leviathan does not contain an explicit statement of modern sovereign territoriality. The Common-wealth's territoriality is only addressed in the context of a discussion of the rights that the European Commonwealths have over their colonies. Since God allocated raw materials to different parts of the earth Commonwealths must by necessity trade with one another. These bodies are partially distinguished by their dominion over different territories: "[t]his Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth: Forraign, that which is imported from without.'>4 5 Perhaps the most striking representation of sovereign territoriality in the Leviathan is the famous image adorning the frontispiece. Here the Leviathan, made up of the members of the commonwealth and brandishing a scepter of justice and a sword, towers over the city and its surrounding countryside that he both protects and controls. A more direct engagement with the spatial aspect of politics can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Following Aristotle, Rousseau in the Social Contract seeks to establish the optimum size for a state. A successful political community must maintain an appropriate balance between the size of its territory and the

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number of people that inhabit it. Men "make up the State and the land feeds the men.'>4 6 Rousseau's admiration for the ancient polis and the Renaissance city-state led him to conclude that social harmony is to be found in small communities and to doubt the benefits of expansionist policies. The larger a state grows the more protracted the social bond becomes and the greater the chance of" deficient government" and the suppression of freedom. 47 Further, the social contract is forged in a bond that unites individual private property with state territory. In order to establish a political community each individual must give himself, "his force and possession," to it. "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction ofthe general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part ofthe whole. »4B Under such an arrangement it is understandable how the combined and contiguous lands of private individuals become public territory, and how the right of sovereignty, extending from the subjects to the ground they occupy, comes to include both property and persons, which places those who possess land in a greater dependency and turns even their force into a guarantee of their loyalty. This advantage does not appear to have been well understood by ancient monarchs who, only calling themselves Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, seem to have considered themselves leaders of men rather than masters of the country. Today's kings more cleverly call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, etc. By thus holding the land, they are quite sure to hold its inhabitants. 49 With respect to colonial territories, Rousseau argues that the European powers do not have the right to dispossess the indigenous inhabitants of their lands even if these people have no recognizable state institutions. The inhabitants of a land are protected by the right of first occupant secured through private property. However, certain conditions must be met for this right to be recognized: the first inhabitants must only occupy previously uninhabited land, they may only take the amount ofland required for subsistence, and possession must be taken by labor and cultivation rather than by "vain ceremony.'' From these premises Rousseau, with an eye to the exclusion of the French from the conquest of South America, criticizes the territorial claims of the European colonial powers. How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and deprive the whole human race of it except through punishable usurpation, since this act takes away from the remaining men the dwelling place and foods that nature gives them in common? When Nunez Balboa, standing on the shore, took possession of the South Sea and all of South America in the name of the crown of

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Castile, was this enough Princes of the world?5°

to

dispossess all the inhabitants and exclude all the

By the time Immanuel Kant published Perpetual Peace the idea of the territorial state was firmly established in European political thought. 51 Kant, like Rousseau, accepted that the legitimate actors of international politics were independent sovereign territorial states. Yet he considered the Ancien Regime practice of acquiring states by "inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift" to be illegitimate because a state, unlike the ground upon which it is based, is not a possession (patrimonium). It is a society of men, which no-one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state as if it were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it into a commodity. 52 Anticipating the English School requirement that the members of international society must be territorial states, Kant declares that in order for the republican states to combine successfully in a pacific federation they must first have established control over their own territories. Once accepted as members of the federation they will retain their territorial integrity. Kant does not desire the borderless space of a universal state. Indeed, international justice requires the "separate existence of many independent adjoining states." Although such a divided territorial order can nevet fully eradicate the threat of war, reason shows that it is to be preferred to "an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy." 53 Kant also holds territorial differentiation to be a necessary condition for the cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality, which requires that the "stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory." 54 While the stranger may be turned away, as long as he behaves in a peaceable manner he must not be treated with enmity.55 In Hegel's philosophy of right the state is the arena in which subjectivity and expressive unity, the necessary conditions of freedom in modernity, come together. The state is the place where Spirit achieves its most elevated political being. 56 It is an absolute rational being where the ethical idea achieves its highest mode of expression. Thus attributes such as power, wealth and spatial extension are contingent facts of external appearance, historical variables that are not consequential for understanding its essential being. 57 However, asserts Henri Lefebvre, Hegel was instrumental in inscribing modern politics within space. With Hegel historical time gives birth to the space that the state occupies and rules over; "[f]or Hegel space brought historical time to an end and

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the master of space was the state. Space perfected the rational and the realsimultaneously."58 Certainly in his writings on international law, Hegel affirms the individual subjectivity ofindependent territorial states. In order to be autonomous they can and should meet their needs within their own borders.59 The individual state, like the individual human being, is a subject to the extent that it is aware of its own existence "as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others."60

Max Weber and the Modern Territorial State If the territorial a priori was implicit rather than explicit in political philosophy from Hobbes to Hegel, Max Weber would bring it centre stage. [A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly ofthe legitimate use ofphysical force within a given territory. Note that "territory" is one of the characteristics of the state .... The state is considered the sole source of the "right" to use violence. 61

Weber emphasizes the state's territoriality as a consequence of his realist political ontology that stresses domination and coercion rather than cooperation and negotiation. A "ruling or dominating {Herrschaftverband) organization" will be called "political" insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staf£ A compulsory political organization with continuous organizations (politischer Anstaltbetrieb) will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. 62 The particular potency of the modern territorial state derives from its capacity to command the forces of rationalization, nationalism and geopolitics. In modernity the eclipse of value rationality by purposeful rationality, evident from the scientific mastery of nature to the bureaucratic control of society, make most human life, motivated only by instrumental goals, drearily predictable.63 An important aspect of bureaucratic rationalization was the use of discipline or "the consistently rationalized, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the

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command," to regulate the body's location in space and movement in time. 64 The modern state is able to coerce its subject population not only because it has access to the means of physical violence but, equally importantly, because it has a vast bureaucratic machinery at its disposal through which it disciplines everyday activity. However, there is a price to pay, for the bureaucratic state is in danger of becoming a "frozen spirit" or a "living machine" that "[t]ogether with the dead machine (in the factories) ... is in the process of erecting the scaffolding of that future subjection or enslavement."65 In developing Weber's concepts of rationalization and discipline, Anthony Giddens argues that the modern state's administrative capability is defined by a potent form of surveillance, which combines the collection and organization of information stored by agencies used to monitor the activities of an administered population with the direct supervision of the activities of subordinates by superiors in a particular organization. 66 Together they form the basis of an administrative power that controls the timing and spacing of human activity. All states utilize surveillance to some degree but only the modern nation state has the necessary technologies to effectively police the codes of criminal law and to control deviance across its entire territory. 67 Another aspect of state territoriality explored by Weber is the mapping of national identity onto territory. State legitimacy per se depends on the justification of the claim to the monopoly of violence within a defined territory. While other states looked to tradition or charismatic leadership to ground this claim, the modern state appeals to legal rational authority or the de focto legality of rules and the right of those who enact those rules to do so. 68 However, in a disenchanted world modern states faced a "legitimacy deficit" for the procedural criteria of legal and political legitimacy could not secure political commitment to the state. What was required was an appeal to nationalism or those "irrational political instincts in the masses towards the nation-state." 69 For Weber nationalism was simultaneously subjective-a nation exists where a people have a sense of belonging to a "community of sentiment"-and objective--' the subjective sense of solidarity is based in objective factors such as common race, language, religion, customs and political experience. To qualify as a nation a group must meet three criteria: there must be an objective common factor between the people that differentiates them from others; this common factor must be considered as a source of value able to produce "a feeling of solidarity against outsiders"; and this feeling of solidarity must be expressed in autonomous political institutions coextensive with the community.7° A nation's identity is secured through its Kulture or "those particular values which distinguish a group or society from others ... and which are given self-conscious formation, typically in the art or literature of the society." 71 Where national Kulture corresponds with the boundaries of the state a mutually reinforcing relationship

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develops between state and nation. The state provides the protection necessary for safeguarding Kulture, while national communities generate the feelings of solidarity that reinforce the state's legitimacy. However, while state and nation are ideally coextensive, Weber recognized that this was not always so. "There are three rational components of a political boundary, military security, economic interest, community of national culture; the three do not just coincide like that on a map." 72 Weber's desire to fix national identities within bounded territories was a typical response to the sense of insecurity generated by transformations in the European experience of space during the fin de siecle. The development of the new technologies of railways, telegraphs and telephones had two important consequences for Europeans. First, places that had previously been experienced as distant appeared to become more proximate as exchanges between them increased in volume. Second, the idea that the European heartland constituted the centre of the world was undermined by an increased awareness of the existence of other places and cultures. The combination of collapsing distances and the decentering of Europe led to what David Harvey has called the "insecurities of a shifting relative space." 73 This cultural unease precipitated measures to reaffirm personal and communal identities in place. Indigenous traditions were reinvented and local cultural memory affirmed in museums, libraries, exhibitions, and ruins. The perception that the world's spaces were shrinking and combining revitalized the European desire "embedded in their historical consciousness" to take command of space. 74 This desire to master space imbued much contemporary geopolitical writing that asserted that politics and history were ultimately determined by spatial factors such as states' size, location and the distance between them. Friedrich Ratzel, the discipline's founder and Weber's contemporary, drew on Darwinian evolutionary theory to represent national struggles for survival as conflicts over space. States were rooted, living organisms that had to evolve by increasing their territories. National cultures were grounded in the "spatial unity of life" or the land (culture meaning literally the tillage of soil) and cultural development was dependent on territorial expansion. The larger a state became the more civilized it could become and, conversely, "[a]ll people who remain at lower stages of cultural development are also spatially small (kleinriiumig)." 75 Ratzel, implicitly justifying imperialist expansion, argued that the development of all states "stands under the law of progress from small to big spaces." 76 This Darwinian geopolitical discourse, premised on the assumption that the state is an organic body that must necessarily evolve to greatness, is also found in Weber's writings on geopolitics which, while critical of the cult of Machtpolitik, betray grandiose aspirations for Germany. All political organizations seek to reach their full potential and Germany was

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no different. Its rightful destiny was to achieve the value-prestige or glory of power that accrued to great powers/ 7 To be fair, Weber was mindful of the obligations that the great powers had to their smaller neighbors. In a world of Machstaaten the balance among the Great Powers must not threaten the independence of smaller nations and Germany had a duty to prevent the world being carved up between the "regulations of Russian officialdom" and the "convention of Anglo-Saxon society." 78 Weber's political writings are premised on a theory of the state conditioned by the territorial a priori and so logically lend themselves to an interpretation of international relations as geopolitics. As such we can concur with Michael J. Smith that in many ways Weber was the intellectual forefather of much Realist discourse/ 9 At the same time, it renders problematic Fred Halliday's proposition that International Relations theory should incorporate the institutional state theory of neo-Weberian historical sociologists such as Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol. 8 For Halliday this school's sophisticated state theory is a considerable advance on the vague notion of a "national-territorial totality" commonplace in International Relations theory. By isolating the coercive and administrative institutions of the state from broader social, political and economic structures, institutional state theory enables the analyst to identify the state's relative autonomy vis-a-vis not only other states but also its own domestic constituency. However, because neo-Weberian historical institutionalists work within the Weberian state paradigm a crude geopolitics tends to determine their understanding of international relations. For example Michael Mann claims that the state has several defining characteristics: the exclusive ability to make rules and back them up with a monopoly of violence; differentiated institutions and personnel; and "a central place and a unified territorial reach" in that the resources and authority of state elites radiate out from a centre to territorial boundaries. 81 Whether a state is despotic (able to carry out its activities without routine institutionalized negotiation with civil society) or infrastructural (able to control and infiltrate social life by means of an exchange with civil society), its autonomous power is partially derived from its territoriality. Furthermore Mann acknowledges that there is a necessary correspondence between the territorial state and geopolitics. "The very definition of the state as a delimited territory suggests a further set of political relations between this state and other states-that is, geopolitics." 82 This logic deriving geopolitics from the ideal of the territorial state is acknowledged by Theda Skocpol who admits that the modern state as conceptualized by Weber and Hintze is necessarily "part of a system of competing and mutually involved states." 83 The modern state is "Janus faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class divided socioeconomic structures and an international system of states." 84 Weberian historical sociology offers no way out of the territorial trap.

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Postmodernism Confronts the Territorial a Priori The inability ofWeberian state theory to offer an alternative to the territorial a priori should come as no surprise. Weber's analysis of the state is, suggests Walker, characteristic of a tradition ofWestern thought that privileges the "spatial delineation of an inside and an outside" and seeks to limit political life to the former. Weber's emphasis on the territorial foundations of the state was an attempt to reinforce state autonomy in a world of "radical historicity" by fixing "history on a spatial terrain." 85 Walker's emphasis on the role of this spatial figure of inside[outside in the constitution of modernity's political order is central to the so-c~lled postmodern critique of international political theory. With particular reference to the work of Walker and Richard Ashley, the final section will consider how postmodernism in International Relations highlights the discursive production of territoriality and offers a useful starting point for thinking about the relationship between politics and space in terms of the territorial imaginary. For Ashley and Walker international theory is conceived of under the "sign of sovereignty." Neorealism and neoliberalism represent the state as an autonomous unit capable of making rational decisions about its interests and mobilizing the necessary resources to carry them out. This implies that the state is "an entity having absolute boundaries unambiguously demarcating a domestic 'inside' and setting it off from an international 'outside'." 86 For Ashley this demarcation privileges the state, imbuing it with sovereign presence and is typical of modern "heroic practice" which turns on a simple hierarchical opposition: a dichotomy of sovereignty versus anarchy, where the former term is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the latter term is understood only in a derivative and negative way, as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this ideal. On the one hand, the sign of "sovereignty" betokens a rational identity: a homogeneous and continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique center of decision presiding over a coherent "self," and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an external domain of difference and change that resists assimilation to its identical being. On the other hand, the sign of "anarchy" betokens this residual external domain: an aleatory domain characterised by difference and discontinuity, contingency and ambiguity that can only be known for its lack of coherent truth and meaning expressed by a sovereign presence. 87 In political thought the principle of sovereign identity underpins a hierarchical opposition between "domestic community as presence" and an "international absence ofcommunity." 88 The universal values of freedom, truth and obligation

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are restricted to communities within the boundaries of a sovereign state. Outside the state there is only the residual realm of the particular, the different and the other. Insides and outsides, selves and others are produced in state discourse and practice. 89 The domestic domain of sovereign men, securely enclosed within the boundaries of the territorial state, is constituted and differentiated from the foreign, dangerous and external by means of the knowledge-practices of statecraft.90 Statecraft produces and secures the identity of the domestic state-society by marking off as dangerous and as requiring discipline and control, other forms of knowledge and ways of being such as the insane and the criminal. By inscribing specific problems and dangers as exterior to sovereign men statecraft isolates the space of the domestic population over which the state is dominant and able to secure its claims to legitimacy. 91 One realm of otherness marked out by statecraft is "international politics" envisioned as the permanent threat of war and anarchy. The representation of international relations as a constant source of insecurity, danger and threat allows domestic society to cohere around a sovereign centre offering security in exchange for subordination. "international politics" is a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the externalization and totalisation of dangers, and the mobilization of populations to control these dangers-all in the name of a social totality that is never really present, that always contains traces of the outside within, and that is never more than an effect of the practices by which total dangers are inscribed. The sign of international politics is invoked in opposition to a "domestic society" conceived as an identical social whole. 92 Ashley and Walker stress that the sign of sovereignty does not just condition modern political and international relations theory and practice but regulates the epistemological and ontological possibilities of modern Western thought per se. 93 Representations of the sovereign state mirror the desired ideal of Western man as a rational, sovereign, self-identical presence. At the heart of the paradigm of sovereignty is a set of preconceptions and assumptions about space. Modern philosophical epistemology is predicated on an a priori spatial separation between the autonomous knowing subject and the known object. Walker claims that modern philosophical categories are attempts to overcome "a metaphysics of distance, a dialectics of here and there, the delineation of presence and absence in the stately measure of eternal geometry." 94 Sovereign identity is secured through the establishment of difference; it is derived from the "claim to be able to fix a point of identity-a universality in space and time against which all differences in space and time can be measured, judged and

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put in their place'. 95 Likewise for Ashley, a "Cartesian practice of spatialization" reinforces the distinction between domestic and international politics by drawing an absolute boundary between inside and outside and privileging the former over the later. The inside is taken to be the space of identity and continuity-the privileged space of the Sel£ Here, it is assumed, is a sharply bounded identity-an identity that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre of decision presiding over a coherent Self, and that is demarcated from and in opposition to an external space of difference and change beyond its boundaries and eluding its rational control. Here, too, according to Cartesian practice, resides the very possibility of rational political subjectivity, be it that of an individual or a political community. As for the outside, this is the space of difference and discontinuity-the residual space of the Other that escapes the rational truth residing within.96 Ashley does not specify which particular themes in Descartes' work lead him to the notion of Cartesian practice of spatialization. Descartes' major contribution to the mathematical understanding of space was to advocate the use of coordinates to determine the position of a point in a plane by its distance from two fixed lines. However, it is likely that Ashley is referring to the philosopher's famous dualism of mind and matter as the two mutually exclusive divisions of the universe. Walker also hints at a broader frame of reference by suggesting that the combination of the political doctrine of state sovereignty with certain "spatial constructs associated with Euclid and Newton" produced a "sense of inviolable and sharply delimited space." 97 By drawing Descartes and Newton into the frame of reference Ashley and Walker imply that the discourse of territorial sovereignty cannot be accounted for exclusively within the terms of politics. Walker suggests that discourse of sovereignty fed off a spatial consciousness that extended "from Descartes' philosophy to Mercator's cartography, from Galilean mechanics to the magnificent constructions of Isaac Newton and Immanuel Kant." 98 Following Ashley and Walker this work will seek to identify significant correspondences and relays between overtly political conceptions of space, such as state territoriality, and ideas and representations of space generated in fields outside of the political sphere. However, it will reject Ashley's notion of Cartesian practice with its implicit claim that the territorial a priori emerged with the Cosmopolitan modernity of Descartes. Rather, it will argue that the origins of the territorial a priori are to be found in the widespread revolution in the conceptualization and representation of space that occurred during the

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Renaissance. Despite this particular historical oversight, International Relations post-structuralism is instructive in that it questions the assumption of modern political discourse that the territorial state is a universal political category. Poststructuralism, which construes territoriality as discourse, denies to the territorial state an ontological a priori status that transcends history. Only by adopting the idea of territoriality as discourse can we account for the transition from a hierarchical to an anarchical order of political space.

CHAPTER 3

Theorizing Territoriality: Discourse, Culture, History

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he discourse of International Relations, or at least that part of it concerned with the nature and evolution of the states-system, constructs theory on the grounds of the territorial a priori. Territory is conceived of as a material object, a portion of the earth's surface, a universal sine qua non of political community. In this chapter I want to propose an alternative understanding of territory that counters the claims inherent in the territorial a priori. First, against the assertion that territory is an objective material resource, I want to recast it as an idea, a component of the social imaginary that is produced in discourse. Second, rather than conceiving of territory exclusively from within the paradigm of political theory, I shall propose that discourses of territoriality, which produce and naturalize the politics of space, need to be related to the ideas and practices that permeate a society's culture of space. Third, I question the assumption that territory is a universal feature of human society shared by all political communities. Rather, I shall suggest that since the territorial imaginary is a cultural product it changes as societies develop new representations and understandings of their being-in-space.

Territorial Discourse These three heuristic principles-territory as an idea rather than an objective material reality, territory as related to cultural representations in non-political spheres, and territory as historically contingent rather than universal-are implied in Robert Sack's work on territoriality as the geographical manifestation of social power. Territoriality, for Sack, is a geographical strategy that controls people and

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things by controlling the area they are located within. Territoriality is "the means by which space and society are interrelated. Territoriality's changing functions help us to understand the historical relationship between society, space and time." 1 The designation of an area as a territory involves more that simply circumscribing things in space or on a map. Territoriality is a social practice through which an individual or group aims to "affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area." 2 A territory is a place that needs to be maintained through constant vigilance and whose boundaries must be permanently policed. Territoriality produces three effects: classification by area; the communication of the limits of that area by physical or verbal boundary markers; and control over access to the area and things in it. As a social practice, territoriality has different historical meanings depending on the extent to which societies maintain different degrees of access to people, things, and relationships. It is a form of power that is not limited to the political sphere but is exercised in every arena in which humans interact in space: from a parent restricting a child's access to certain parts of the kitchen, to the layout of desks in offices, or to the zoning strategies of city planning. Nevertheless, the most effective instrument of territorialization is the modern state which is able to control a society in which different classes pursue distinctive economic activities abstracted from place. The state itself is an abstracted form of power and in order for it to appear "more accessible, visible or 'real'" it is "endowed with the most basic attribute of objects-location and extension in space. In civilisation, the political power of the state is areal or territorial. The state is reified by placing it in space. Whatever else a state may be or do, it is territorial." 3 Sack's theory of territory as a historically contingent product of social practice is insightful. However, it retains elements of the territorial a priori. First, Sack insists that in order to explain complex interactions a theory of territoriality must disclose a set of propositions which are logically and empirically linked. 4 As such he remains committed to what David Campbell has termed an epistemic realism, which assumes that "the world comprises objects the existence of which is independent of ideas or beliefs about them" and which locates the explanations of action and events in material causes. 5 Second, Sack's contention that territoriality as a social construct is willed into being can be construed as remaining beholden to the discourse of sovereign presence, in so far as a territory is envisioned as the desired outcome of a process orchestrated by a fully constituted sovereign being (parent, chief, city-authority or state bureaucracy) whose identity is secured prior to its deployment of territoriality-the regulation of behavior within defined boundaries. 6 Such a utilitarian notion of territoriality as a form of social control at the service of an already constituted power does not allow for the possibility that the subjectivity or identity of the body exercising territoriality is itself produced by such practices.

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Sack's theory of territoriality then retains a place for the humanist ideal of a fully constituted subject able to know and control its world. This humanist subject is rejected in historical materialist geographies, like that of David Harvey, which class space and time as epiphenomena that express the dominant relations of production. Harvey argues that material practices of capitalism reproduce the structures of social life, including the categories of time and space. Every mode of production incorporates "a distinctive bundle of time and space practices and concepts." 7 Furthermore, contemporary consumer capitalism is particularly adept at restructuring geographical space in order to both widen and deepen markets so as to fulfil its inherent logic of expansion. 8 Yet, not all historical materialist geographers are as economically determinist as Harvey. Indeed the pioneer of historical materialist geography, Henri Lefebvre, argues against such determinism, claiming that the relays between space and social production are complex, with neither having ultimate priority over the other. Relations of production both produce and are produced in space. While each mode of production has a distinctive space, it is not possible to assert that the forces of production necessarily give rise to particular configurations of space or time. 9 The production of social spaces from the raw material of nature involves many layers of mediation from economics to technology and from politics to culture. Social space for Lefebvre is at once a precondition and a result of social superstructures. The state and each of its constituent institutions call for spaces-but spaces which they can then organize according to their specific requirements; so there is no sense in which space can be treated solely as an a priori condition ofthese institutions and the state which presides over them. Is space a social relationship? Certainlybut one which is inherent to property relationships (especially the ownership of the earth, of land) and also closely bound up with the forces of production {which impose a form on that earth or land); here we see the polyvalence of social space, its "reality" at once formal and material. Though a product to be used, to be consumed, it is also a means ofproduction; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus this means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society. 10 Indeed, Lefebvre insists that although space is formed out of natural and historical elements it is also profoundly political: "it is a product literally filled with ideologies." 11 In order to expose these ideologies Lefebvre's methodology differentiates three moments or modalities of social space: the perceived, the

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conceived, and the lived. Perceived space is embodied in spatial practice or the time-space routines and spatial structures through which social, political, and economic life is produced and reproduced. Spatial practice can be observed empirically. It is the material expression of social relations in space as manifest in architecture, city-planning, classrooms, marketplaces, factories, and in everyday life. 12 By contrast, lived or representational spaces are those appropriated by the imagination to give physical space meaning by way of historically embedded signs and imagesP Representational space "is alive: it speaks, it has an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or square, church, graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action, and of lived situations ..." 14 Further, it is often a place of resistance where cultural and artistic movements oppose the spatial practices of the dominant social order. For our purposes the most important of Lefebvre's three modalities is conceived space or representations of space. These are the conceptual abstractions, the frames of knowledge (savoir) that configure spatial practices. Representations of space are the abstract, visual, and imaginary spaces of social engineers, urban planners, architects, and cartographers who materially inscribe the dominant social order's relations of production. They are the conduits through which knowledge of space leads to the production of space in practice. Representations of space intervene and modify spatial textures and have a substantial role in the production of space. Their intervention occurs "by way of architecture, conceived of not as the building of a particular strUcture, palace or monument, but rather as a project embedded in a spatial context and a texture which calls for 'representations' that will not vanish into the symbolic or imaginary realms." 15 Lefebvre's concept of representations of space has some similarity with Michel Foucault's theory of discourse. To be sure, Lefebvre refused any such association and regarded Foucault as an intellectual sophist, purveying idealist conceptions of space premised on the mistaken ontological assumption that the mental realm envelops the social and physical worlds. For Lefebvre, Foucault's use of spatial metaphors-for example where Foucault writes "knowledge [savoir] is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse"-lacked intellectual rigor. It failed to specify either the nature of the spaces being considered or how the gap between epistemology and the social use of space could be bridged. 16 Nevertheless, Foucault's investigation into the discursive production of space, especially in the later genealogy with its concern with the political mapping of forms of power, has more affinity with the notion of representations of space than Lefebvre seems to allow for. In the earlier archaeology, which sought to reveal how knowledge in diverse systems of thought was conditioned by common figures and tropes, Foucault rejected the standard epistemological assumptions that discourse denotes "the sign of something else" of "things" which are

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"silently anterior to it," and that words are linked to things by relations such as symbolization, reference, or truth. 17 As it is not possible to decipher the truth of the world through signs, any representation of the world does violence to things. 18 Discourse is not a "groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)," but "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak." 19 Foucault's increasing awareness of the institutional constraints and controls exercised over the formation of discourses led him toward the genealogical concept of the dispositif or apparatus. As a heterogeneous matrix of discourse and institutional practices the dispositif arises at a given historical moment in response to a particular need, it "has a strategic function and manipulates specific relations of force." 2 For example, the apparatus which identified and controlled madness and neurosis arose as a response to the mercantilist economy's need to assimilate the mobile population. 21 In the dispositif fluid relations of power and knowledge combine to reproduce idc;as of truth and subjectivity. 22 Two important consequences derive from the concept of the dispositif First, the subject is unable to speak truth to power. There is no privileged position outside of power from where its hidden effects can' be uncovered by truth. Truth in all societies is the effect of an accepted truth regime in which certain discourses, reproduced by institutions and techniques, are validated as being true. 23 Second, discourses of power/knowledge create subjectivity and identity. They categorize and define the individual qua individual and produce the individual's identity as a subject. 24 Although Foucault does not offer a systematic method for analyzing the relationship between space and discourse he is acutely aware of its importance. "There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory." 25 In Discipline and Punish Foucault shows how, in the Classical era, incarceration and surveillance were enabled by the discovery of the "docile body" as an object of power to be appropriated, taken apart, and reconstituted for speed and efficiency. 26 Disciplinary power constituted individuals in space by means of several strategies: enclosure within confined spaces such as colleges, schools, barracks, workshops, and factories; partitioning or the assignment of individuals to separate places; the production of functional sites or "useful spaces" coded for particular operations; and classification which allocates places in a system of ranking. 27 Although Foucault was at pains to distinguish disciplinary power from sovereign power, Michel de Certeau observes discipline producing and organizing space at all levels of society. Disciplinary power pervades science, politics, and military strategy. It can be deployed by any subject power willing and able to designate a place as its own from which relations with "an exteriority composed of targets or threats" can be managed and controlled.

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The primary task of disciplinary power is to "delimit one's place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other." 28 Its secondary concern is to overcome and master the uncertainties of history and time by achieving ownership of and control over an autonomous place. Sight is the primary modality enabling the exercise of disciplinary power. "The division of space makes possible a panoptic practice proceeding from a place whence the eye can transform foreign forms into objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and 'include' them within its scope ofvision." 29 De Certeau's broader conceptual framework implies that the state also has disciplinary powers at its disposal. It is therefore at odds with Foucault's insistence that disciplinary power is of another order to "juridico-discursive" or state power based in the discourse of right. The juridico-discursive power of sovereignty and law operates by prohibition, negative interdiction, and repression. By contrast disciplinary power is productive, and in order to understand how it works we must "cut off the King's head," that is forget the person of the sovereign and his representation of power. 30 If a territory is a geographical area controlled by a juridico-political power and Foucualt's distinction between disciplinary and sovereign power is to be respected it may be methodologically problematic to analyze state territoriality deploying genealogical concepts such as power/knowledgeY However, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's depiction of the state as a body that striates space offers a possible resolution. 32 Like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari are interested in non-sovereign forms of power or "micropolitics." However, they situate the relationship between micro politics and state power within a broad conceptual landscape characterised by a ubiquitous opposition between the forces of nomadism and the dictates of State power. This all-pervasive struggle between the rhizomatic nomad and the arboreal State manifests itself in certain registers as "territorialization." Deleuze and Guattari derive their notion of territorialization from Lacan's contention that a mother's nourishment and care is imprinted on her child's libido, producing charged erogenous zones and objects out of organs. However, territorialization is not just limited to this primal psychological relationship but pervades all aspects of man's social relationships. Territorialization denotes the incessant and all-pervasive regulation and coding of flows by social and political "machines." No human society is a milieu of free-exchange and circulation, everyone is marked by "a socius of inscription" whose primary function is to code flows. 33 The most effective agent of territorialization is the state. This "apparatus of capture" draws into itself flows of people, commodities, and capital. As a "milieu of interiority" the state resists and opposes the nomads and the war-machine which inhabit the outside realm of exteriority. 34 This realm of exteriority is the domain of smooth space, which the nomad seeks to expand and which the State seeks to counter by deploying geometric

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and mathematical theories of striation. 35 It segments space into homogeneous units of equal and translatable values. As with Foucault's disciplinary spaces and Lefebvre's representations of space, vision is at the heart of this process. "The central eye has as its correlate a space through which it moves, but it itself remains invariant in relation to its movements." 36 The state's primary function then is to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a means of communication in the service of striated space. It is the vital concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to control migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire "exterior," over all of the flows traversing the ecumenon .... There is still a need for fixed paths in well-defined directions, which restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in detail the relative movement of subjects and objects. 37

Territoriality in Cultures of Space The second heuristic premise to be developed is that representations of political space, and hence the production of territoriality, are informed by structural codes that determine how a particular cultures represent and use space. Stephen Kern's study of European culture between 1880 and 1914 shows how a culture's dominant representations and conceptions of space impact on almost all dimensions of life. Kern writes, All people, everywhere, in all ages, have a distinctive experience of time and space and, however unconscious, some conception of it. It is possible to interpret how class structures, modes of production, patterns of diplomacy, or means of waging war were manifested historically in terms of changing experiences of time and space. 38 In Fin de siecle Europe analogous conceptions of space emerged simultaneously in diverse realms of knowledge from philosophy to aesthetics, from architecture to urban design, and from anthropology to studies of the natural world. Developments in one sphere resonated in others and across the culture as a whole there emerged an understanding of space which substituted universality and homogeneity with relativity and heterogeneity. Elements of this new spatial vocabulary can be identified in Einstein's theory of relativity, which replaced absolute space with an infinite number of spaces perpetually changing position vis-a-vis one another, in Cubism which "abandoned the homogeneous space of linear perspective and painted objects in a multiplicity of spaces from multiple perspectives," and in Durkheim's anthropology of religion which showed

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that perceptions of space were not, as Kant had asserted, based on some innate understanding shared by all men, but were culturally determined. 39 These intellectual reconceptualizations of space mirrored profound transformations in social relations. The Cubist leveling of the traditional aesthetic hierarchy, which had prioritized the subject over its background, found its social equivalent in the leveling of aristocratic society, the emergence of democracy, and the collapse of the distinction between sacred and profane spaces in religion. Kern's work is important in that it promotes the idea of an overarching culture of space in which common vocabularies of space are to be found across a wide range of knowledges. The implication for our study is that political theories of territoriality are likely to be conditioned by spatial categories that permeate representations of space throughout the culture of modernity. However, Kern's vivid descriptions of changes in the way in which space was thought about are not complemented by a coherent explanatory methodology. How do changes in one sphere impact on another? Is there a deep underlying structure that determines the conditions of possibility for thinking about space that somehow straddles diverse branches of knowledge? In this respect, Lefebvre is perhaps bolder when he asserts that modernity has one dominant spatial code, one language of space, derived from classical perspective and Euclidean space that arose out of "a specific relationship between town, country and political territory.'>4° These codes produce a space of common sense, of knowledge (savoir), of social practice, of political power, a space hitherto enshrined in everyday discourse, just as in abstract thought, as the environment of and channel for communications; the space, too, of classical perspective and geometry, developed from the Renaissance onwards on the basis of the Greek tradition (Euclid, logic) and bodied forth in Western art and philosophy, as in the form of the city and town. 41 John Ruggie is one of a few International Relations scholars who has sought to explain transformations in the international system with reference to how changes in territoriality reflect broader developments in the cultural representation of space. 42 For Ruggie the transformation from the medieval to the modern international system was premised on a profound re-imagining of territoriality, itself a response to an equally fundamental transformation in the principle of socio-political individuation. Ruggie, as a social constructivist, opposes the neorealist view that all international systems are functionally similar. Rather, he sees the modern system of states as embodying a distinctive territorial order. Its social construction drew upon the raw material found in three irreducible dimensions of European collective experience: first, the material environment constituted by eco-demographics, relations of production and

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relations of force; second, the "matrix of constraints and opportunities within which social actors interacted" as defined by the structure of property rights, coalitions between social actors and differences between private and social rates of return; and, third, the mental equipment people use "in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community or collective existence."43 This last dimension, which Ruggie terms the "social episteme," reveals that the emergence of principles of differentiation in political doctrines like cujus regia ejus religio and Rex in regno suo est lmperator regni sui mirrored equivalent transformations in social epistemology such as the replacement of Latin by vernacular vocabularies, the standardization of the 1-form of speech, the invention of single-point perspective in visual art, and new notions of individual subjectivity.44 A social episteme denotes "the process whereby a society first comes to imagine itself, to conceive of appropriate orders of rule and exchange, to symbolize identities and to propagate norms and doctrines.'>45 However, Ruggie does not develop the idea of the social episteme other than to suggest that it combines the thesis of German social theory that society comprises webs of meaning and signification and the French idea of mentalites collectives. Ruggie passes over any methodological difficulties that might arise from combining Durkheim's science positive with Weber's verstehen or Foucault's critique of subject-centered reason with Habermas's project for communicative rationality. Ruggie's social episteme, while suggestive of the relays between territoriality and cultural representations of space, lacks methodological rigor and cannot be deployed uncritically. More useful is Foucault's concept of the episteme as worked out in the archaeology of knowledge. Although the archaeology does not set out a specific program for investigating spatial discourses as such, its ethos has a distinctly spatial tincture. Foucault's language is full of spatial metaphors: he talks of the "space of knowledge," "epistemological space" and "sites of dispersion." However the utility of the episteme for analyzing the territorial a priori can be derived from more substantive material. In The Order of Things Foucault describes an episteme as a sort of"historical a priori" which in a given period, delimits in the totality of experienc~ a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in the field, provides man's everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognised to be true. 46 The episteme denotes an unconscious set of rules, a system of regularities, that determines how a culture orders things. This system, which establishes relations of similarity and difference between things, provides objects with their identities. In making reference to the Renaissance or Classical episteme Foucault does not

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intend to invoke the sense of a Weltanschauung or spirit of an age. An episteme does not underpin all forms of knowledge within a culture. 47 The archaeologist's task is to expose the "discursive regularities" that identify and order the objects of knowledge in heterogeneous discourses. Thus, in the Classical age (roughly 1650-1800), which is the main focus of The Order of Things, Foucault finds a pattern of discursive regularities, a "polymorphous cluster of correlations," in the relations within and between the empirical sciences of natural history, general grammar and the analysis of wealth. 48 Each of these branches of knowledge was subject to the epistemic order of representation in which the identities of things were established by marking out their differences from others. Its main structures were mathesis- 'a universal science of measurement'and taxonomia-the principle of classification or ordered tabulation. From an archaeological perspective there is identity where we might expect difference: natural history, general grammar, and the analysis of wealth share codes that produce similarities between statements produced in each branch of knowledge. In accordance with this archaeological principle, the conditions of possibility for the articulation of the modern territorial a priori must be sought not only in the realm of political discourse but also in other spatial discourses which share its underlying ordering principles. Foucault set his archaeology against progressive narratives of the evolution of science in which the subject as historical consciousness achieves ever greater objectivity and knowledge of the world. Rather, archaeology traces the ruptures, breaks, and discontinuities between epistemes. The Classical episteme did not evolve organically out of the Renaissance episteme, "the prose of the world," in which words and things were united in a web of resemblance or similitude. This form of knowledge is incommensurable with the Classical episteme which "replaced infinite resemblance with finite difference.'>4 9 Likewise, the ordered regularities of the Classical episteme are incommensurable with the dynamic historical categories of the modern episteme, which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. The modern episteme was the first to posit man in his factual, contingent existence as a legitimate object of inquiry. Hence Foucault's controversial claim that "the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date.'' 50 Thus the archaeology also demonstrates there is difference where we might expect identity: in terms of their ordering principles these Classical empirical sciences of natural history, general grammar, and the analysis of wealth have little in common with the modern discourses of philology, political economy, and biology that replaced them. It might be objected that if our task is to prove that the modern territorial a priori was established during the Renaissance then Foucault's archaeology is an inappropriate method because it stresses discontinuity. According to its caesurallogic Renaissance territoriality is most likely to be incommensurable with classical, let alone, modern

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territoriality. However, Foucault made it clear that epistemes do not pervade an entire culture, but unite specific discourses. "Archaeology disarticulates the synchronicity of breaks .... [t]he period is neither its basic unity, not its horizon .... if it speaks of these things it is always in terms of particular discursive practices." 51 Both Lefebvre and Kern agree that the modern spatial episteme extended from the Renaissance invention of perspective to Einstein's subversion of the Euclidean paradigm, and it is within this epistemic timeframe that the territorial a priori was articulated and legitimized. Foucault's archaeology traverses established disciplinary boundaries in its search for the epistemic "conditions of possibility" underlying the articulation of statements in different discursive formations. This inter-disciplinary ethos is taken a step further in Deleuze and Guattari's "schizoanalysis" which describes the multiple rhizomatic networks that criss-cross multiple domains of being and thought. Unlike Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari also prioritize the question of space and its relationship to thought. In particular, they highlight the relays and associations between, on the one hand, smooth space and nomadic or rhizomatic thought, and on the other hand, striated space and state thought. 52 Deleuze and Guattari term the dominant tradition ofWestern thought, particularly as represented by linguistics and psychoanalysis, as arborescent or State thought. It is organized by the principle of interiority that establishes a structure or axis (the soul, consciousness, or production) in terms of which objects and their relations to other objects are understood and explained. They contrast arborescent thought with rhizomatic or nomadic thought which, driven by desire, seeks to forge multiple, ever changing and mutating connections or lines between heterogeneous realms such as semiotic chains, organizations of power, the arts and sciences, and social struggles. 53 The antagonism between arborescent and nomadic thought extends into all realms of intellectual endeavor. In the sciences, for example, nomadic thought is represented by Archimedean and atomist sciences which fix on flux and flows and emphasize becoming and heterogeneity. However, they are marginalized by the keepers of royal or State sciences who promote Euclidean space and Newtonian gravity in order to prioritize the stable, the eternal, and the identical. Similarly, modern philosophy, as embodied in the Cartesian cogito and Kantian critique, takes the form of State thought. In the modern rational state everything "revolves around the legislator and the subject." 54 State thought orders mental space in terms of two universals: "the Whole as the final ground of being" and "the Subject as the principle that converts being into being-for-us." 55 Although dominant, State thought has been challenged by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Foucault whose nomadic ethos seeks to undermine the universal thinking subject, resist any grounding in totality, and offers sites of resistance to State thought. 56

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In terms of space, the arborescent/nomadic confrontation is manifest in the opposition between the smooth and the striated. Whereas in the abstract realm striated and smooth spaces exist and are produced in opposition to one another, in practice they combine in unstable configurations. Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate the alterity between smooth and striated space across several registers or modalities: a technological model contrasts the parallels and perpendiculars of woof and weave in doth with the fibrous entanglement of felt; a musical model, drawing on Boulez, distinguishes the organization of horizontal melodic lines and vertical harmonies with the continuous variation of form that produces properly rhythmic values; an environmental model opposes the open undefined spaces of desert, sea or steppe with the dosed delineated spaces of the city; and a mathematical model separates the fixing of points and line within coordinates and axes in Euclidean physics from the open geometry of Archimedes or the multiplicities of Riemann space. 57 There are profound differences between smooth and striated spaces. First, the relations between points and lines differ: in striated space a line is something that goes between two points, as in geometry, while in smooth space priority is given to the line, with the points acting merely as relays between successive lines. Second, lines have different characteristics in the two spaces: in smooth space lines are locally directional with open intervals, while in striated space lines are subordinate to global dimensionality and have dosed intervals. Third, the surface of each space is different: "[i]n striated space, one doses off a surface and 'allocates' it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one 'distributes' oneself in open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one's crossing (logos and nomos)." 58 In striated space, whose archetypes are Euclidean geometry and Renaissance perspective, planes and surfaces are homogeneous; it has no qualitative values but viewed from or concentrated on a central point is abstract and universally replicable; in it points can be specified, counted, and mapped and trajectories are determined by the points from which they leave and arrive. By contrast in the heterogeneous "particularities" of smooth space, points are subordinate to the trajectory; the inside spaces of tents, igloos or boats conform to and are determined by the outside-steppe, ice or sea; smooth space is directional rather than dimensional or metric; lines are vectors which organize the points and stops; in smooth space affects rather than properties dominate and perception is haptic rather than optic-one travels by being receptive to the tactile and sonorous qualities of the intensities, particularly winds, that occupy it. At the political or social level, whereas the state is the institution of territorialization or striation par excellence, the nomad occupies smooth space. Nomadic territoriality is exercised across smooth space by constituting points, such as water holes and assembly points, as mere relays on a trajectory, subordinate to and not determining of paths. Nomadic trails or routes have a different

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function to the sedentary roads imposed by state bodies which parcel out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating communication. The nomad's trajectory "distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and non-communicating." 59 While sedentary space is striated by "walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures", nomadic space is smooth, "marked only by 'traits' that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory."60 Just as the state perpetually seeks to striate space so the nomad deploys the war machine "the constitutive element of smooth space" to continually expand smooth space, to "increase the desert."61

Histories of Space and Territory So far we have established two heuristic propositions. First, the object of enquiry, the territorial a priori, is not an objective material resource but an idea, a component of the modern social imaginary produced in discourse. Second, we should not examine territory exclusively from within the parameters of political theory. Discourses of territoriality produce and naturalize the politics of space• and need to be related to the ideas and practices that permeate a society's culture of space. The third proposition is that as cultures of space emerge, mutate, and disapp~tar so do discourses of territoriality. This principle is opposed to the primordialist contention that territory is a universal pre-condition o{all social life. Advocates of primordialism trace it back to Aristotle's writings on the polis, and see its paradigmatic statement in Ferdinand Tennies' theory that by according symbolic or sacred value to soil Gemeinschaft societies are able to ensure that residence thereon is the basic qualification for membership of the community. 62 To be sure, the primordialist theory of territory is more sophisticated than the territorial a priori in so far as territory is not simply synonymous with empty physical space but is understood as the repository of symbolic value. Because territory is life sustaining the collective consciousness becomes symbolically attached to it and its boundaries become defined by shared language, religion, or law. 63 Nevertheless, for primordialists, like Stephen Grosby, this symbolic attachment is "a fundamental feature of all human societies," as basic to human existence as nourishment or shelter. 64 It is universal and cannot be "segregated historically'' for in all historical situations "man has believed that his (sic) own life is dependent upon the continued existence of the territorial sovereignty of 'his country' for it gives and sustains life."65 Putting aside the questionable hermeneutic which gives Grosby knowledge of the meaning that territory has had for all men and the contestable humanist assumptions embodied in his notion of man, can it really be the case that territoriality exists outside of history, unaffected by changes in economic modes of production, cultural codes or political institutions?

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Even within International Relations primordialism has been challenged. Ruggie maintains that the configuration of political space and territory that characterises the modern international system is, in some instances, being replaced by a postmodern order based in alternative principles of spatial differentiation.66 Ruggie worries that International Relations, relying on Waltz's neorealist understanding of change in the international system as being determined by variations in the distribution of capabilities among constituent units, lacks the appropriate conceptual vocabulary with which to account for this transformation. He hopes that by exploring how changes in the principles of differentiation caused the previous structural transformation from the medieval to modern international system, we might derive an appropriate conceptual vocabulary with which to theorize the emergence of a postmodern international system. Again neorealism is found wanting here. Waltz is unable to explain the transformation from a medieval to modern international system because he understands differentiation as denoting the comparative differences between units rather than the underlying principles that separate them. 67 Drawing on Meinecke's portrayal of medieval actors as being restricted by "heteronomous shackles on their authority," Ruggie claims that in medieval Europe the underlying principle of differentiation was that of heteronomy, meaning that actors were subject to a variety of different laws or principles. Political authority was exercised through personal relations that blurred the boundaries between public and private. The medieval political landscape was a complex mosaic of "overlapping and incomplete rights of government" in which "different juridical instances were geographically interwoven and stratified; and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties and anomalous enclaves abounded."68 Inside and outside did not exist as clearly demarcated realms. The first territorial markers established in the thirteenth century functioned more as permeable frontier zones rather than as rigid boundaries. The conflation of public authority with private estates and multiple chains of lord-vassal relations meant that the medieval aristocracy claimed authority over non-contiguous spaces throughout Europe. Further, the common bodies of law, religion, and custom that legitimized the medieval system of rule by recourse to inclusive natural rights did not threaten the integrity of the constituent units in the system because the units "viewed themselves as municipal embodiments of a universal community."69 In sum, "the spatial extension of the medieval system of rule was structured by a nonexclusive form of territoriality, in which authority was both personalized and parcelized within and across territorial formations and for which inclusive bases of legitimation prevailed." 70 The principle of differentiation which underpins the distribution of political S\)ace i.n moderni.ty i.s the antonym of heteronomy: homonomy whi.ch denotes 'oe\:n~ s;u.'o\ect. t.o the same \a-ws. \\:\.e mo4 As the light ray descends so it creates things-angels, men, animals-until it reaches a place where it can penetrate no further and there is only darkness and nothingness. Lying about the feet of God is a golden chain binding all that exists between the two infinities. Each rank in the chain strives to ascend the order and to transmit

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its manifestation of divine light to the stage below. The creations of the divine ray are finite mirror images (speculum) of God, a theophany or manifestation of the divine, whose position within the hierarchy are determined by their relative degree of perfection. 5 Medieval scholastics reinforced the Dionysian hierarchy by combining it with the doctrine of analogy, which denoted a proportional relationship between God and his creations. The universe is ordered by analogy: all created things are images (aenigmata) or symbols of a divine reality, which they can indicate but not have a pure sense of. Even forms drawn from the lowliest matter can have correspondence with heavenly beings, for matter "owes its subsistence to absolute beauty and keeps, throughout its earthly ranks, some echo of intelligible beauty. Using matter, one may be lifted up to the immaterial archetypes."6 These archetypes or ideas (paradeigmata), which determine the order of the universe, exist only in God in whose being they are united. The relationship of the divine to created effects is one of manifestation. Conversely effects are related to their cause by imitation (mimesis) or participation (methexis). The models are thus both causal principles and goals toward which created things strive. Analogy denotes the possible degree of imitation any particular being can have to the absolute, its place and role in the hierarchy of reality. Driven by love all things seek assimilation or union with the divine. Yet even after achieving such union they retain their place in the hierarchical order, for the degree of perfection they can achieve by becoming themselves is a relative state of perfection as established by the divine idea. Salvation does not result in a thing losing its identity through assimilation with God, but is a perfect correspondence between a thing and its archetype.? For Dionysius hierarchy is a trinity: it is "a sacred order, a state of understanding and an activity approximating as closely as possible to the divine." 8 Its goal is to enable beings to be as like as possible to God and to be at one with him. A hierarchy has God as its leader of all understanding and action. It is forever looking directly at the comeliness of God. A hierarchy bears in itself the mark of God. Hierarchy causes it members to be images of God in all respects, to be clear and spotless mirrors reflecting the glow of primordial light and indeed of God himself. It ensures that when its members have received this full and divine splendour they can then pass on this light generously and in accordance with God's will to beings further down the scale.9 There are, as Joseph Anthony Mazzeo observes, military connotations to this representation of hierarchy as a sacred order or ranking (taxis). Hierarchy is a "cosmological chain of command" which ensures that divine radiation is transmitted according to the precise order that God, who is master of all hierarchies,

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establishes between the ranks. Order pertains to hierarchy in the senses of both arrangement and commandment. The structure of the universe and the place of beings in it are fixed absolutely by divinely establisl).ed laws. An order of being can only partake of divine illumination through the mediation of the order above, for each rank not only has its own illumination and powers but incorporates the attributes of those lying below: "[h]ierarchy is thus a 'scale of forms,' each higher form transcending but including the functions and powers of the forms below." 10 The highest hierarchy, which most nearly attains to perfection, is the heavenly hierarchy of angels or intelligences. They have no need of mediation through other forms and therefore surround God.U The nine intelligences are grouped into three triads, positioned in ascending ordet according to their functions of purification, illumination, and perfection. The first triad, which "circles in immediate proximity to God," comprises, starting with the most perfect, seraphim or perpetual warmth, cherubim or "the power to know and to see God,'' and God-bearing thrones. Seraphim, closest to God, is able to absorb divinity perfectly and can hold the divine light unveiled and undiminished; it is aflame with love for God. Second, cherubim, able to contemplate divine power in its primordial essence, is radiant with light derived from its knowledge of God and his mysteries, with which it seeks to enlighten others. Finally, thrones, which are free of all earthly passion and material concern, can receive god's justice in its divine essence, glorify in it, and transmit it to rulers on earth. The middle ranks of heavenly intelligences, which "indicate ways in which God is imitated and conformed to," include dominions, the virtues and the powers. Dominions are unfettered by earthly tendencies toward the tyranny of dissimulation or slavery and send down power to assist temporal authorities to govern prudently. The virtues, looking directly to the transcendent power, receive divine enlightenment with courage and determination. They are filled with a divine strength which allows them to perform great miracles. Third, the powers or holy authorities receive God in a harmonious and uniform way and embody the orderly nature of celestial and intellectual authority. They have power over the devil and can help people resist the temptations offered to them by demons. The final triad comprises the "godlike principalities, archangels and angels." It is closest to the world and is primarily concerned with revelation. The principalities, imbued with princely powers, command the lower angels and direct them to the fulfillment of divine orders. The archangels and angels "take care of our own hierarchy." Archangels, the guardians of nations and individuals, oversee prophecies, knowledge, and the understanding of God's will. At the bottom of the heavenly hierarchy and closest to men are the angels. Angels are appointed as men's guardians. They announce the lesser mysteries and intentions of God and teach people how to live virtuously and righteously before God. Each of the

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heavenly powers have specific functions and, as movers of the spheres, rule over natural processes. However, for Dionysius their most important role is as mediators and transmitters of light as grace, knowledge, being and beauty. They are intermediary beings between god and man, representing degrees of knowledge and consciousness, which radiate truth and grace down to the place where the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies converge. In De ecclesiastica hierarchia, Dionysius reaffirms that "every hierarchy is divided in three" but recasts the division in terms of sacraments, initiators and initiated. 12 Divinity extends its sacred gifts into the human domain through the lowest order of hierarchy: that of the Law. In this hierarchy truths are contained in symbolism, enigmas, and imagery, for men's "weak eyes" would be harmed if they looked directly upon the truths contained in the divine light. The legal hierarchy described by Dionysius is that of the Jewish rite which preceded the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Christian rite. It comprises three elements: sacraments or an "uplifting to worship in spirit; the initiators or those men whom Moses initiated into the holy tabernacle; and the initiated or those whom these symbols of the law lift up." 13 Between the heavenly hierarchy and the hierarchy of the law stands the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It shares with the celestial hierarchy the "contemplation of understanding" and with the hierarchy of the Law "the use of varied symbolism." While the pure intelligences of celestial hierarchy function according to spiritual principles, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is composed ofincarnate intelligences that transmit spiritual truths and powers via sensible agencies such as the sacraments and teaching. The members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy have special knowledge of the Scriptures and transmit this knowledge through language and rites to men. As with the other two hierarchies, the powers are ordered according to functions of purification, illumination and perfection. Deacons oversee purification by providing ethical instruction to those who do not carry "God's likeness within them," i.e. catechumens, penitents, and the possessed. 14 Once purified, these souls are then lifted up to the "light-bearing order of priests" which "guides the initiates to the divine vision of the sacraments." However, only the "divine order of hierarchs," the highest within the human hierarchy, who are able to contemplate the intelligible realm directly have the powers of consecration. The rites of bishops "are images of the power of the divinity, by which the hierarchs perfect the holiest of symbols and all the sacred ranks." All the hierarchs from pope to bishops have spiritual plenitudo potesttt,tis, or the power to sanctify, instruct and govern. The pope is the sole ruler of this monarchical structure. We shall return to a consideration of the role of the papacy in this hierarchical structure, and in particular to the question of the relationship of the pontiff to the heavenly hierarchy, in the next chapter. However, for now it is enough to recognize that this vertically ordered Dionysian hierarchy served

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as the epistemic condition of possibility for the erection of a hierarchical spatial architectonics that would support medieval theocracy for a millennium.

Feudalism and the Three Orders Ernst Cassirer suggests that the distinction between the lower and higher worlds, which is fundamental in Dionysius's account of the hierarchies, operated as a structural principle that ordered the entire social and political imaginary of medieval European culture. In religious life we find the ecclesiastical hierarchy that reaches from the Pope at the summit, to the cardinals, the archbishops, the bishops down to the lower degrees of the clergy. In the state the highest power is concentrated in the Emperor, who delegates this power to his inferiors, the princes, the dukes, and all the other vassals. This feudal system is an exact image and counterpart of the general hierarchical system; it is an expression and a symbol of that universal cosmic order that has been established by God and which, therefore, is eternal and immutable. 15 Drawing on this observation, and in accordance with our working principle that territorial imaginaries are produced in heterogeneous discourses of space, this section will discuss how the hierarchical spatial imaginary was manifested in feudalism and its ideology of the three orders. Feudalism was the dominant social order across much of Europe from the mid ninth to early thirteenth centuries. As in Marc Bloch's classic definition, feudalism denotes A subject peasantry; widespread use of the service tenement (i.e. the fief) instead of a salary ... ; the supremacy of a class of specialized warriors; ties of obedience and protection which bind man to man and, within the warrior class, assume the distinctive form called vassalage; fragmentation of authority .... 16 Feudalism incorporated two primary institutions: first, the personal relations of vassalage that bound a lord to his freeman or noble follower; and second, the fief or the property relationship that vassalage impliedP In feudal society "the characteristic human bond was the subordinate's link with a nearby chie£ From one level to another the ties thus formed-like so many chains branching out indefinitely-joined the smallest to the greatest." 18 Compared to serfdom, which bound the peasant tenants to servile labor on lordly estates in perpetuity, vassalage was more of a voluntary or reciprocal personal relationship which

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had to be reaffirmed whenever one of the original parties to the arrangement died. Vassalage was a relationship of protection distinctive to a warrior class. Originating in the personal ties of the barbarian war-bands, it flourished in the Frankish kingdoms of the eighth century where the state was weak and neither family nor village could provide protection against external threats. Free men entered into vassalage through the ritual of commendation and by taking an oath of fidelity. The homage or commendation paid by a vassal to the lord was symbolized by placing joined hands between those of the lord, a kneeling proclamation of declaration and, finally, a kiss. These rituals signaled that the vassal would enter into a relationship of dependence and protection with a king or lord for the rest of his life. In return for providing the lord with military assistance (auxilium) and counsel (consilium) he would receive protection and some form of maintenance. He might become a member of the lord's household or receive wages in money or land. The homage ritual was subsequently reinforced by Christian rites of fealty, such as laying hands on gospels or relics. These rites symbolized that the rights and duties of vassalage were based in mutual fealty or fidelity. The Frankish Kings Pepin III (747-68) and Charlemagne (768-814) promoted vassalage as a system of hierarchically arranged layers of lords to extend their authority from their own vassi dominici to all their subjects. Despite the king's position at the apex of the pyramid of vassal relations he could not count on the support of all those at lower levels. The peliSonal nature of the links between lords and vassals meant that in a situation where the king came into conflict with a lord it was likely that lord's vassals wo1,1ld fight on the lord's behalf against the royal forces. As the thirteenth century French jurist John de Blanchot put it "the man of my man is not my man." 19 Indeed, as the emergence of a plethora of private vassalages, following the break-down of the Carolingian Empire in the middle of the ninth century, showed vassalage could exist independently of a centralized state authority. The forces that bound society together were personal bonds rather than abstract ideas of res publica. In classical feudalism property relations of vassalage were embodied in benefice or fiefs. Fiefs were units of property either created by a lord granting property, usually in land, to someone to hold in fief to him, or through the surrender of an alod or independent property to a lord which was then received back as a fief. A fief was distinguished from the servile holdings of peasants and privately held alods-although the distinction became blurred following the collapse of the Carolingian Empire when many fiefs became effectively alodized. With the revival of monarchical authority in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the alods were converted back to fiefs. Subsequently, practically all social groups above the peasantry were bound together by vassalage relations. Each vassal owed duties both to his immediate lord above him and to his own vassals below to whom he had granted a fief. As such "landholdings formed a

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hierarchy-the 'hierarchy of tenure' or 'feudal pyramid'." 20 Whereas Roman law concepts of dominion held that property rights were absolute, the system of fiefs was based in the convention that property was divisible. As Bloch points out, in the feudal world the word "ownership" (propriete') as applied to landed property (un immeuble) would have been almost meaningless. 21 Harold Berman argues that according to feudal notions of property land "was not 'owned' by anyone; it was 'held' by superiors in a ladder of 'tenures' leading to the king or other supreme lord. ('Tenure,' derived from the Latin word tenere, 'to hold,' itself means 'a holding')." 22 Further, property as fief was not clearly distinguished from government, reflecting the absence of rigorous distinction between public and private realms. Fiefs carried jurisdictional rights and obligations that were settled in local courts. The hierarchical structures of feudal society were symbolized in the rituals of chivalry. The rigid mores and codes of chivalry, in Johan Huizinga's view "the crown of the whole social system," reinforced the conviction that the social order was divinely ordained. 23 Value was determined by one's proximity in space to God: "if the degrees of the social edifice are conceived of as the lower steps of the throne of the Eternal, the value assigned to each order, will not depend on its utility, but on its sanctity-that is to say, its proximity to the highest place." 24 The social hierarchy of feudalism was also symbolized by depictions of God as a magisterial figure in Carolingian art. Pictures showing God enthroned as an imperial sovereign, the Pantocrator, his head encircled by the mandorla, affirmed that "God had become a feudal lord or Dominus." 25 A similar message is found in texts like the Libri Carolini which reiterated St. Augustine's assertion that the "Creator is called creator with respect to his creatures just as the master is called master with respect to his servants,'' and St Anselm's Cur Deus Homo which portrayed God as a feudal lord owed vassal service by angels, monks, and peasants. 26 Georges Duby has argued that most significant collective "mental representation" or imaginaire of feudal society was that of the three orders, first articulated by two eleventh century bishops in Northern France.27 In the poem Carmen ad Rodbertum regem, Adalberon bishop of Laon declared that The celestial people then form more bodies, and the people of the earth are arranged in its image .... The house of God, which is, believed to be one, is therefore divided into three: here below, some prey (orant), others fight (pugnant) and others still work (laborant). These three parts co-exist and cannot be separated; the services rendered by one provide the conditions by which the others can operate. 28 Likewise, the Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium records a speech by Gerard bishop of Cambrai in which "he demonstrated that from the beginning, the

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human species has been divided into three: between the people of prayer (oratoribus), the cultivators (agricultoribus) and the warriors (pugnatoribus); he provided the self-evident proof that each is the object of a part and at the same time of a reciprocal care." 29 Duby maintains, following Georges Dumezil, that the bishops' scheme is derived from the prevalence in Indo-European civilizations of a tripartite structure of sovereignty in which jurist, warrior and prie,st constitute its three different aspects of law, violence and religion. Other cu'itural historians, such as Jacques Le Goff, claim that the three orders imagery was derived from the Roman structure of]upiter, Mars and Quirinus. 30 The French bishops may also have drawn on Anglo-Saxon images in which the three orders serve as the pillars of monarchical authority. In Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae, authored or inspired by Alfred around 892, it is noted that for a king to sustain his power he must be able to call upon "sceal habban jebedmen & weorcmen" and in Wulfstan's letters to Aelfric he states that "every throne that rules effectively, bases its rule on three pillars: the men of prayer, the men of work and the warriors." 31 The three orders imaginary replaced the idea of a concentric order, promoted by the Carolingian authorities, in which the Empire was envisaged as the terrestrial reflection of the kingdom of God. Just as God ruled from the centre of the civitas Dei so the Emperor occupied the centre of his kingdom. "In this sphere, one unique centre, the king; anointed by Christ, image of a single God, he presided over the destinies of all Christian people to whom he had the responsibility to guide them towards their salvation." 32 With the demise of the Carolingian empire this monarchical imagery became obsolete and was replaced by a plethora of diverse imaginaries promoting the legitimacy of the different groups-heretical orders, the Cluniacs etc.-which proliferated in a world of feudal structures based in lordship and church authority. Whereas the concentric model had assigned the Church a privileged position at the king's side, now it was just one, albeit the wealthiest, of several competing seigniories. The new social status of the Church as an enriched part of the seigniory required the elaboration of a new mental representation: a modified Carolingian model. Adalberon and Gerard did not totally abandon the idea of monarchy; it could not be dismissed entirely for just as there was only one sovereign in the civitas Dei so there should be only one supreme ruler on earth. However, they transferred sovereign authority "into the realm of the unreal, no longer conserved in the realm of appearance but in the powers of the supe"".p.atural." 33 If the three orders model was only incidentally an instrument of mbnarchical ideology, it was very much a hierarchy. The priests resided at the top and the peasants endured at the bottom. In the era of bastard feudalism, however, the institution of monarchy could not function as a viable pivot upon which this hierarchy could be supported and so its proponents turned toward the Christian

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patriarchs in order to reproduce "sur terre l'ordre celeste." 34 Although monarchy was not an integral component of the three orders imaginary it could, however, be readily absorbed into it. Thus with the resurgence of Capetian power at the end of the twelfth century, Andreas Capellanus in De am ore and Guillaume Le Breton in Philippidos libri XII remolded the three orders model to legitimise a monarchical structure of authority. 35 Adalberon and Gerard constructed their theocratic edifice for the three orders using building blocs provided by three of the Christian Fathers: from St Augustine came the notion that order is both peace and the way to God; Gregory the Great offered a prescription for ordering Christian society in rigid, almost military, structures of subordination; and Dionysius provided the conceptual framework, the structural analogies, which connected the visible to the invisible, celestial to temporal society and enabled the bishops to "rattacher l 'ordre politique a celui des etoiles." 36 Exegetes of the Fathers argued that when God became incarnate as Christ the hierarchical order became immanent in the terrestrial world; the two hierarchies were united in Christ's body. The Church, instituted by Christ as his successor, therefore "constituted the entire terrestrial order: from the Church and through the Church divine law spread out over humanity." 37 The Dionysian model had particular appeal to the champions of Episcopal authority for not only did it demote the monasteries as rival sources of spiritual authority, it also made the bishops the direct recipients of celestial wisdom, including that pertaining to political action. It placed the bishops above human law at the apex of the pyramid. The Dionysian framework allowed "the ecclesiastical hierarchy to represent itself as an 'entre-deux' able to progressively emancipate humanity from its spatiotemporal constraints, allowing it to emerge in ways ever more total and pure into the strictly intelligible world, incorporeal and in-temporal, that of the divine." 38 Once the three orders framework was reimagined as a theocratic hierarchy, the bishops could abandon any pretence that the three functions had equal status and mutual relations of exchange. Their relative orders of merit could be divined from those Dionysius established among the angels. Gilbert of Limerick's De statu ecclesiae 1110-39, for example, described society as a pyramid with the clergy at the top. I mean to say that those who are at the apex of the pyramid are those who pray; and since some among them are married, therefore we have nominated both men and women. The labourers, men and women, are to the left of the pyramid. To the right are the warriors, again both men and women. 39 Images and texts representing the three orders appeared up to the Renaissance. However, its influence waned from the second half of the twelfth century as it was gradually replaced by a hierarchy in which the ranks were distinguished

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according to the socio-professional status of different estates, rather than the will of God or divine law. The humanistic tendencies of this social imaginary prompted a counter response from the Church authorities who promoted the idea of Christendom as divinely ordained hierarchy within one unified body, albeit a bicephalous one, in which the two heads are the pope and emperor. 40 In the next chapter we shall consider in some detail how this idea of Christendom as a divinely ordained hierarchy, and the particular notions of territoriality it implied, established the conditions of possibility for medieval political discourse.

Hierarchies of Space in Medieval Cosmology and Geography I suggested in the last chapter that representations of territorial sovereignty are enclosed within a culture's spatial imaginary. This section discusses the extent to which medieval understandings of space as represented in cosmology and geography were configured by hierarchy. Today geography and cosmology are considered to be different branches of knowledge but in medieval learning they combined in a set of general reflections on man and his place in the world. However, as Edmundo O'Gorman has pointed out, the vocabularies of medieval cosmology and geography did make significant distinctions between various categories of being. The "universe" designated the totality of the celestial and sub-lunar spheres. The "terraqueous globe" referred to the entirety of the earth's sphere, both land and water. The Orb is Terrarum or Island ofthe Eartb denoted the known interconnected continental landmass of Europe, Asia and Africa. Finally "the world" signified man's cosmic dwelling place and was generally thought to be contained within the Orbis Terrarum-few could envisage that men could be living in the far away antipodal lands separated by vast seas. 41 Christian theologians rejected the ideal of the ancients that the cosmos was complete and harmonious; a realm of beauty, order and dignity. Rather, man's world was seen to be tainted by sin and only the celestial world remained as a space of perfection. In this dualist vision "the concept of the 'cosmos' broke up into two diametrically opposed concepts: civitas Dei and civitas terrena, with the latter closely bordering on the concept of civitas diaboli.'>4 2 The opposition between earth and heaven was not conceived of as one of terrestrial life in space as opposed to heavenly life existing in some form of non-space, for life in heaven also unfolded in space. 43 Opposed to heavenly life, earthly life became a value category with moral and religious significance. Christianity's spatial dualism was reinforced by the vertical structures of Dionysius' hierarchies. As A. J. Gurevich notes, "[c]osmic space, social space and ideological space were all given hierarchic structure" and the beings within ,them were distributed on various planes according to their relative degrees of perfection.44 The values of different spaces Were determined according to the places that they were allocated on the vertical

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axis of being. Above was associated with God, nobility, purity, and goodness and below with Satan, baseness, evil, and coarseness. 45 The text which most explicitly inscribes this spatial value system into the cosmological landscape is Dante's Divine Comedy. In Inferno the hierarchy of sins is symbolized by the corresponding position of the sinner. Men are already judged and "put in the place that is theirs forever; the physical character of each station accords with the ethical worth of its inhabitants."46 The medieval cosmological imagination combined elements of Aristotelian physics, Ptolemaic astronomy, and Christian theology. From Aristotle came the assumption that "an unbridgeable gap separates the 'above' from the 'below,' the 'higher' heavenly world from the 'lower' sublunar world.'>47 The universe takes the shape of a sphere, the perfect solid form, eternal and finite. However, as Johannes de Sacrobosco states in De Sphaera (c.1230), the eternal and perfect are placed over and above the mutable and imperfect. The machine of the universe is divided into two, the ethereal and the elementary regions. The elementary region, existing subject to continual alteration, is divided into four. For there is earth, placed, as it were, as the centre in the middle of all, about which is water, about water air, about air fire, which is pure and not turbid there and reaches to the sphere of the moon, as Aristotle says in his book of Meteorology. 48 In the sublunar world nature is corruptible and objects are impermanent. The elements are ordered into concentric circles according to their relative degrees of baseness: the earth at the centre is surrounded by water, then air and, finally, fire. Dante's depiction of the sublunar world follows this pattern precisely. At the centre of the universe is the Earth, "the bedrock of the elemental core" (although, as Arthur Lovejoy points out, strictly speaking Dante's universe is diabolocentric in that its core is Lucifer's abode at the bottom of the upturned funnel extending into the interior of the northern hemisphere). 49 Above Earth lie the waters or oceans which cover three quarters of the world. Above the waters is the sphere of air, untainted by any cold vapors from the sea or Earth. Dante and Virgil enter this sphere while climbing Mount Purgatory "that soars highest to Heaven from the sea." 50 On reaching the summit Dante enters the bounteous Garden of Eden and inhales "that free air open to heaven and earth." 51 Then, accompanied by Beatrice, he ascends the sphere of fire'to the moon, the lowest sphere of the heavens. In the heavens, by contrast, the celestial bodies are made of quinta essentia or imperishable substance and revolve for eternity through geometrically perfect cycles: "all is changeless, eternal, divine. Motion is in circles, space is filled with ether, the heavenly bodies as well as their spheres are of an ethereal

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substance." 52 Beatrice tells Dante that because the heavenly bodies are made up of ether they are neither heavy nor light. 53 In the heavens the rotating spheres carry along the stars and planets which have no motion themselves. Above all is the Prime Mover, primum mavens immobile, who is one and eternal and upon whom the whole of heaven and all of nature depends. According to Beatrice the hierarchical structure reaches from the very top of the universe to its lowest place. She tells Dante that although men's souls, the spheres and the angels were created directly by God and are thus immortal, the elementsfand their compounds, as well as the souls of plants and animals, were created by the intermediate agencies of the heavenly bodies.54 The order of thi-?gs is tightly circumscribed: all things, whatever their mode, observe an inner order. It is this form that makes the universe resemble God . . . . all Being within this order, by the laws of its own nature is impelled to find its proper station round its Primal Cause. 55 In the Almagest Ptolemy had positioned the seven planets according to the relative time they took to rotate the Earth. The fixed stars were assigned to the outermost sphere and Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, whose motions were most similar to them, were placed furthest from the earth. The moon, whose motion was the most dissimilar to that of the stars, was placed nearest the earth. The remaining three planets, Sun, Mercury and Venus all shared an annual orbit around the earth. Their relative positions were assigned in accordance with astrological tradition. The Sun was allocated to the middle sphere, which left Venus and Mercury beneath it. Christian theologians adapted the Ptolemaic system to make the cosmos comply with the description of the heavens in Genesis. The biblical firmament was identified as the eighth sphere of the fixed stars. The waters above the firmament, which were understood to be hard and made of crystal, became the crystalline heaven. The heaven created on the first day was allocated to the outermost sphere, the motionless Empyrean, the ultimate container of the universe and the dwelling place of God and the elect. Dante's cosmological landscape accurately represents this composite scheme, combing ancient wisdom and Christian dogma. The moon is "Ia prima stella," Mercury "il secondo regno," Yen& "il terzo del," the spirits met in the sun are "la quarta famiglia," Mars is "questa quinta soglia," and "piu levato" than the last heaven, Jupiter ;s the "stella sesta," Saturn "il settimo splendore." The starry heaven is alluded to as "la

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spera ottava." The Primum Mobile is "il cile velocissimo," "il maggior corpo." The Empyrean, "il ciel ch' e pura luce," is called "l' ultimate spera," .. .56 In Canto XXVII of Paradiso Dante and Beatrice reach the Primum Mobile, the sphere "that spins with it as it goes all of the universe." 57 The ultimate source of the motions of the planets and starry skies is God the Prime Mover. It was thought that the spheres moved due to one of two causes. Either each of Dionysius' nine orders of angels had responsibility for the movement of one sphere which they imparted through fervor and adoration. Or, the ardent longing of "every particle of the crystalline heaven to be united with every particle of the most divine tranquil heaven" causes an intense gyrating movement that is passed on to the other spheres. 58 It is love or the striving for perfect union that sets the spheres in motion. All such movement proves the existence of a First Mover who is "loved, I desired by all creation, sole, eternal I who moves the turning Heavens, Himself unmoved." 59 As one progresses down through the ranks of the hierarchy so one encounters less movement. Finally, at the bottom there is the heavy immobile earth that is the domain of the geographers. W. G. L. Randles maintains that the discourse of medieval geography entertained an uneasy synthesis between the Christian chorographical representation of the world as the flat oecumene and the classical a,stronomical theory of a round earth. 60 The notion of a spherical terraqileous globe was of ancient provenance. Aristotle had hypothesized that the earth was a sphere from the premise that all objects fall to the earth's centre to find their natural location. Building on Aristotle, Crates de Mallos (c. 180-50BC) proposed the four island theory. Crates had noted a contradiction between estimates of the circumference of the earth's sphere by mathematicians, such as Eratosthenes, and the empirically known extent of the oecumene which, lying between the Ganges and the Pillars of Hercules, could, at best, only account for a quarter of the sphere. In order to counter this imbalance in the sphere, which offended the Greek sense of symmetry, Crates drew a globe with three other "continents." Crates' scheme was subsequently outlined in Macrobius' fifth century Commentary on Cicero's Dream of Scipio. Then referring to our quarter, indeed, and speaking about those who are separated from us and from each other, he [Cicero] says, Some nations stand obliquely, some transversely, and some even stand diametrically opposite us; hence not only the barriers that separate us from another people but also the barriers that separate all of them from each other are intended. They must be divided as follows: those who are separated from us by the torrid zone, whom the Greeks named antoikoi, the Antoeci; next, those who live on the underside of the southern hemisphere, the Antipodes, separated from the Antoikoi

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by the south frigid zone; next, those ["Perioikoi"] who are separated from their Antoeci, that is, the inhabitants of the underside of zone, by their torrid zone; they are in turn separated from us by the north frigid zone. 61 Medieval cosmologists generally accepted the idea of a spherical earth. However, a minority of Christian theologians, citing the authority of the Christian fathers, considered it to be heretical. In The Divine Institutions (Divinarum Institutionum) c. 303-11 Lactantius had rejected it in favor of the flat earth theory, arguing that "it is impossible that the sky is below the earth."62 Similarly St. Augustine had argued that it was only scientific conjecture rather than "historical knowledge" (i.e., biblical knowledge) that the "earth is suspended within the concavity of the sky, and that it has as much room on the one side of it as on the other."63 Macrobius mentions that torrid and frigid zones separate the four continents. Here he is drawing on Parmenides' theory of the five climatic zones, which also had considerable influence on the medieval geographical imaginary. The two peripheral zones lying between the Arctic and Antarctic circles and their corresponding poles were considered to be uninhabitable because they were glacial. Also considered uninhabitable and, for many, un-traversable was the equatorial area or Torrid Zone lying between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, whose intense heat no man could hope to survive. This left two temperate zones where life was theoretically possible: one located between the Arctic Circle and the Tropic of Cancer and the other between the Antarctic Circle and the 'Tropic of Capricorn. In Cicero's words, You can also make out certain belts, so to speak, which encircle the Earth; you observe that the two which are furthest apart and lie under the poles of the heavens are stiff with cold, whereas the belt in the middle, the greatest one, is scorched by the heat of the sun. The two remaining belts are habitable: one, the southern, is inhabited by men who plant their feet in opposite direction to yours and have nothing to do with your people; the other, the northern, is inhabited by you Romans. 64 Macrobius' assumption in this passage that the antipodes were inhabited was not universally accepted in medieval geography. The four island theory certainly implied that it was likely that men lived in other continents than the Orbis Terrarum. This conclusion was uncontroversial for the ancients but posed a dilemma for the Christian theologians who had to resolve it with the scriptural doctrine that all mankind was descended from Adam. Their solution was to confine humanity to the Orbis Terrarum and to declare the other continents uninhabitable on the basis of their inaccessibility. Thus, a hierarchical division

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of the earth's sphere emerged in which one of the four continents came to have greater value than the others. Gradually the four islands combined into two, forming a simple opposition: the oecumene in the temperate boreal zone and an antipodal continent in the temperate austral zone. St. Augustine was happy to dismiss "the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say, men on the opposite side of the earth, where the sun rises when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposite ours" as being "on no ground credibie."65 It was absurd, he conjectured, to suggest "that some men might have taken ship and traversed the whole wide ocean, and crossed from this side of the world to the other, and thus even the inhabitants of that distant region are descended from that one first man." 66 Later St. Isidore of Seville, rather less adamantly, admitted there could be a body of land in the southern hemisphere but denied it could be inhabited. Dante seems to have adopted a similar position. Before he begins his ascent out of the lower depths of hell by climbing up the cavern formed by Lucifer's fall, Virgil explains to him that, You are under the other hemisphere where you stand; the sky above us is the half opposed to that which canopies the great dry land. On this side he plunged down from heaven's height, and the land that spread here once hid in the sea and fled North to our hemisphere for fright; 67 The implication being that apart from Mount Purgatory, which was pushed up by the force of Lucifer's fall, no dry land exists in this hemisphere. Randles notes that the views of more modern thinkers like Roger Bacon in his Opus Majus (1264/67) and Albert LeGrand in De Natura Locorum (first printed 1514) that the Torrid Zone could be crossed and that the austral hemisphere was not only habitable but inhabited, were sidelined due to a lack of supporting empirical evidence. In so far as the Scriptures made no mention of land in the southern hemisphere, St. Augustine readily concluded that it was entirely covered by water. This relates to another topic of contention in medieval geography concerning the relative proportions of land and water that covered the earth's sphere. Here medieval thinkers faced a paradox. An axiom of Aristotelian physics was that lighter elements entirely enclose heavier ones. Therefore logically all land should be immersed under water. How then to explain the prese:Ptce of those lands that rose out of the seas? In the Imago Mundi (1410) Pierre d'Ailly offers a possible Aristotelian explanation: "the Water does not surround all the Earth, but leaves a part uncovered for the habitation of animals. There is a part of the Earth which is less heavy than the other; this is why it is higher and farther from the

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centre of the Earth. The rest, besides the islands, is entirely covered by water according to the common opinion of the philosophers."68 However, a more popular explanation was provided by the creation narrative in Genesis.(Psalm 103), which recorded how, on the third day, God ordered the waters to assemble in one location (congregatio aquae). Although Aristotle's Physics had not specified the proportional relations that existed between the elements, medieval philosophy of the natural world established a ratio of 1:10 between the volume of one and the next in decreasing order of density. According to this principle the surface area of earth left uncovered by the water, which corresponded to the '¢hristian oecumene, remained insignificant with respect to the immensity of the sphere of water and as such "pouvait-elle etre representee comme plate."69 As medieval voyagers began to travel further, recording ever extending coastlines, one solution to the problem of the antipodal lands was to maintain that the Orbis Terrarum was considerably larger than had been previously thought. The authority invoked to support this thesis was the Book of Esdras which claimed, contrary to Aristotle, that the ratio of land to sea was 6:1. If this was the case it could be surmised that the Orbis Terrarum was an island of such magnitude that some of its inhabitants could have reached the antipodes by land and therefore justifiably claim descent from Adam. Columbus would cite Esdras as proof that a sea voyage was possible from the western (Iberian) to eastern (Chinese) shores of the island earth. However this was a minority view and the standard view of the Orbis Terrarium, as expressed by Sacrobosco, held that it was located "between the semicircle drawn from east to west along the equator and the semicircle carried from east to west through the Arctic pole." Not all of it was inhabited, however, "since that zone which lies between the tropics is said to be uninhabitable because of the fervour of the sun ... those two zones which are described by the Arctic Circle and the Antarctic Circle about the poles of the world are uninhabitable because of too great cold." 70 Pierre d'Ailly writes that According to Pliny, Solin, Orose, Isidore and many other cosmographers or describers of the World, in agreement with certain astrologers like Albategni, the Earth is divided into three parts, that is Asia, Africa and Europe ... the ancients did not divide these three parts of the Globe equally. Thus Asia extends eastward from the Midi until the Septentrion; Europe goes from the Septentrion to the west and Africa from the west to the Midi. From which it appears that two of these divisions, Europe and Africa, occupy a half of the World, while only Asia occupies the other half. 71 This landmass, Dante's "gran secca," consisted of the dry land God '&ad gathered together, as recorded in Genesis I: 9. According to Ptolemy's calculations it extended about 180 degrees oflongitude and, apart from a small meridional

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strip, was confined between the equator and arctic pole .. Dante's oecumene had an "extension less than one seventh of the entire terraqueous surface." 72 In cartography the land that made up the oecumene was traditionally represented by the T-0 motif of the mappae-mundi. The boundaries of the Orbis Terrarum were determined by the Ocean Sea-the 0 on the maps.Y3 For Dante "the sea that girdles all the land" was the only limit to the Empire's potential extension. 74 Since man possessed a material body it was natural that his world should be located on the soil of the oecumene. However, this correspondence implied that the rest of the universe comprised foreign or alien spaces. The Ocean was certainly regarded as a hostile environment. Although it formed part of the terraqueous globe, it also symbolizes the limits of man's world. In terms of geography "the Ocean was nothingness or a void; it was not considered susceptible of juridical possession or ofbeing an object on which the sovereignty of princes could be exercised." 75 Consequently, argues O'Gorman, the world was not just man's home in the cosmos but also a jail with impregnable boundaries. Furthermore, it was only because God had ordered the congregatio aquae that the world existed at all. As such the world really belonged to God and man was little more than a tenant or serf on land over which he had neither absolute propriety nor usage. The crossbar or T of the mappae-mundi was formed by the intersection of the Tanais and Nile rivers. It divided the upper semi-circle of Asia from the lower quarter-circles of Europe and Africa, which were!,themselves separated by the Mediterranean, the T's down-stroke. This perpendicular arrangement evoked the form of the Christian cross. This Christian symbolism was further reinforced by the location of}erusalem at the heart of the mappae-mundi. In the ancient, or at least Roman, geographical imaginary, Rome, the Eternal City, was situated at the centre of the world. However, as the pagan religions of Rome were gradually replaced by Christianity the focal point moved east and by the time of the Crusades Jerusalem was the fulcrum of the world. The appropriateness of this was signaled by the fact that on midsummer's day at twelve noon the sun casts no shadow. Dante, for example, placed Jerusalem directly beneath "the high point of its [the sun's] meridian circle." 76 We have seen how in Christian cosmology space is ordered hierarchically: different places within the hierarchy have different values. The same principle underpinned the arrangement of geographical space. Jerusalem was the sovereign centre of medieval space, the place to which all other spaces were orientated. On the extraordinary Ebstorf map which incorporates the entire oecumene into Christ's body, Christendom's orientation toward the Holy City is symbolized by an image of the resurrection in which the omphalos of Christ's body and the site of the Holy Sepulchre share the same coordinates. The representation of the eastern landmass as the site of spiritual journeys of enlightenment in the mappae-mundi was replicated in the

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semi-fantastical travel narratives recalling the experiences of personal pilgrimages following the route from Jerusalem to the Earthly Paradise. 77 Mandeville's journal recalls the inscription near the St. Sepulchre "Hie Deus rex noster ante saecula est salutem in medio terre." 78 Spaces are accorded distinctive moral values in these narratives. As Yuri Lottman writes "[g]eography becomes a kind of ethics." 79 A journey through space symbolizes a passage to salvation or damnation. In the Commedia, Dante's journey unfolded in accordance with the established tropes for representing the moral journey of a righteous person or sinner in space: from the parental home to a monastery or house of sin; from one's own country to holy or impure lands; and from earthly lands to paradise or hell. John G. Demaray reads the Commedia as a figural pilgrimage: Dante's fantastical ascent up Mount Purgatory in the southern hemisphere mirrors and evokes the real journey of palm-bearing pilgrims up Mt Sinai in the northern hemisphere. 80 Compared to Europe and Africa, Asia, occupying the entire upper semicircle, was represented as a vast landmass on the mappae-mundi. Europeans imagined Asia as both the source of great wealth and marvels and the domain of Prester John's theocratic utopia. The spaces of the oecumene, especially its Asian parts, tended to be defined in terms of their relative alterity to the culture of Christendom. Although Europe and Christendom were not coterminousthe Moorish settlements in Spain were a constant source of embarrassment to those who sought to locate the civitas terrarum within the boundaries of the Roman Empire-"the geographical horizon was a spiritual one, that of Christian Europe." 81 In both geographical and cultural terms the acY.:zantine Empire was the closest. The Byzantines occupied a liminal place in theWestern Christian geographical imaginary for as schismatic Christians they simultaneously belonged to and were independent of Christendom. The chronicles of the first crusade record that the Western crusaders both respected and were somewhat envious of the material riches and cultural sophistication of Constantinople. Islam, however, occupied a more clearly defined space, that of the infidel, the "enemy-elect" with whom, at least in Crusade propaganda, there could be no reconciliation. Christian views of Muslims ranged from polemical crusade narratives such as Jacques de Vitry's Historia Orienta/is in which Muslims were depicted as subhuman and Mahomet as an and-Christ to the more objective, if still patronizing, views of Aquinas. 82 In the chansons de geste the representation of Muslims as beasts defiling the sanctity of the Holy Land conveniently overlooked the prosperous mercantile contacts that trading cities like Venice maintained with Muslim traders and the diffusion of Arab science into European cultures during the Renaissance of the twelfth century. The third zone of alterity was occupied by other pagans, who, although they worshipped idols, were, unlike the Muslims, regarded as potential Christians.

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Such peoples on the northern and eastern reaches of Christendom, in Seleucia, Pomerania, and Prussia to the north of Poland, were subjected to proselytizing campaigns of forceful conversion to ensure that they did not succumb to the false promises of the Byzantine and Muslim missionaries. Finally, at the eastern extremities of the Orbis Terrarum were the Mongols. For the Christians of central Europe who were the victims of their regular raids these men were the fearsome, bloodthirsty, monstrous Tartars. However others believed that they were the Christian peoples who had been converted by the legendary Prester John. Indeed, in the thirteenth century several missions were sent to the East with the intention of creating an anti-Muslim Christian alliance. The project was, however, abandoned following Marco Polo's descriptions of the Tarter's social and political life, which were deemed incompatible with basic Christian tenets. Our review of the medieval culture of space has shown that the perception and representation of man's-being-in-space was, in several different registers, determined by the figure of hierarchy. The medieval culture of space was structured by the rigid hierarchies that Dionysius had identified as the divinely authorized design of all celestial and terrestrial being. If the Kantian ideal of the space of modernity is abstract, homogeneous, universal and empty, the heterogeneous spaces of the medieval imaginary are differentiated, full of particular significances, meanings and values. Such criteria were generally determined by their relative positions in the hierarchy of things. Dionysius' hierarchies with their value laden spaces and places provided the basic structural principles underpinning the social order of feudalism and its three orders, Dante's vision of the cosmos, and the discourse of medieval geography. Medieval political discourse was also interwoven within the knowledge structures and cultural practices of Christianity. Thus we might expect that the conditions of possibility for the articulation of the medieval territorial imaginary were also determined by hierarchy. We shall pursue this hypothesis in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Christendom, Hierarchy, and Medieval Political Discourse

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e ha~e established that the principle ~f hi~rar~hy conditio~ed medieval 1deas of place, space, and mans bemg m them. Th1s chapter examines medieval political discourse in order to determine whether a similar spatial logic of higher and lower, inferior and superior, also underscored medieval ideas of sovereign-territoriality. To be sure, the term medieval political discourse is problematic. This is especially so if one maintains that post-Westphalian political theory and practice is modern precisely because it emancipated itself from Christian theology. Certainly, the Christianization of classical political philosophy by medieval political theology produced an intricate weave, an interlacing of temporal and spiritual concerns, that makes it difficult to identify a discrete realm of political discourse as such. Such issues cannot be resolved here and I shall not attempt to do so. Nevertheless, historians of medieval political discourse have argued that the templates for many of the concepts characteristic of modern political thought were established between the ninth and fourteenth centuries when institutional rivalry and ideological upheaval combined in the "crisis of church and state." At the heart of this crisis was a tripartite struggle for supremacy between the institutions of Papacy, Empire, and Monarchy. This contest, which constituted the essence of medieval international politics, was both a physical armed conflict and a war of ideology. At stake in the ideological struggle between sacerdotium, imperium, and regnum was the nature and legitimacy of political sovereignty within Christian European society. These three bodies promoted alternative visions of Christian political society as Ecclesia or Christianitas, humant;t civilitas, or civitas, each of which entailed different settlements between tert'iitory and

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sovereignty. 1 In this respect they articulated variations of the medieval territorial imaginary. However, these differences of emphasis were subsumed within a common understanding that space was structured hierarchically. In terms of territoriality, this translated into the undisputed recognition that over and above the civitas terrena lay the civitas Dei-the divine font of all sovereignty. Papal universalists, imperial dualists, and monarchists each claimed that they and they alone occupied the liminal space at the fulcrum of the political cosmos between the celestial kingdom of the civitas Dei and the mundane world of Christendom. From this privileged place they were able to gaze upon the civitas Dei and know God's intentions for the best political arrangement of men on earth. It is with these rival claims that this chapter is primarily occupied.

Sacerdotium The meaning that medieval actors gave to their political actions and sought to convey in their political tracts can only be understood within the context of the hegemony of Christianity, which permeated every aspect of medieval life. Knowledge was produced in, communicated through, and controlled by ecclesiastical institutions. Therefore it makes sense to start our investigation into the hierarchical conditions of possibility within which the medieval discourse of territorial sovereignty could be articulated with the doctrines of papal universalism which, while contested, largely determined the parameters of political debate in the first centuries of the second millennium. The doctrine of papal universalism, initially developed during the pontificate of Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) and promoted by Canonists well into the fourteenth century, is a substantial and complex body of thought. 2 Nevertheless, its essence is conveyed by the Skrziczick miniature, which appears in a fourteenth century Czech edition of Gratian of Bologna's Decretum (c. 1140). Gratian had standardized medieval canon law and subsequent editions of the Decretum contained further commentary by the Decretists on the basic principles he had set out. In the opening Distinctiones Gratian discusses the proper limits of ecclesiastical power and concludes from the fact that the Church was founded on the rock of faith by Christ "who conferred simultaneously o'n the blessed key-bearer of eternal life [Peter] the rights over a heavenly and an earthly empire" that the Emperor's imperial power was ultimately derived from the pope. 3 The Skrziczick miniature (figure 5.1) is a representation of the Dionysian hierarchical principle of emanation in the political register. Christ's celestial sovereignty is transmitted first to the pope, as Peter's successor, and then on to the lower ecclesiastical and temporal authorities on earth. 4 The miniature emphasizes a rigid spatial division between the upper and lower realms. The upper level shows the civitas Dei in heaven, signified by a background of stars. Christ,

Figure 5.1 The Skrzicziek Miniature, in Gratian of Bologna, Decretum: Distinctiones 9, Pars 1, c. 1140. Archives of the Prague Castle, Prague, Czech Republic. ©Archives of the Prague Castle.

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enthroned and holding a papal tiara, is flanked by two kneeling angels bearing a scepter and a crown, symbols of temporal authority. Heaven and earth are separated by a neutral area of floral motifs that signify the atmosphere of the universe. The Perrine throne, placed near the apex of the Earth's hemispheric curve, is occupied by the pope in his capacity as vicarius Christi. The extension of the pope's halo into the heavenly sphere illustrates the direct passage of Christ's authority to the pope. Within his person, it becomes bifurcated and then passed on down to the ecclesiastical and temporal authorities. The pope hands the book conveying the truths of the eternal scriptures to, a cardinal and gives a sword indicating the duty of material protection of the Church to the emperor. By depicting the moment when the emperor accepts the gladius materia/is from the pope at his investiture this image reinforces the message that the emperor is an ecclesiastical ruler, a minister and servant of God who receives his authority from the pope rather than directly from Christ. The rest of the lower level shows the structure of the hierocratic system on earth. In the ecclesiastical hierarchy authority passes down from the cardinal to two bishops and then on to a monk and priest in accordance with Dionysian principles. Beneath the emperor are two kings, one holding a royal staff indicating legislative power and the other wielding a sword symbolizing executive power. These, in turn, have as their subordinates a knight and noble. The miniature presents the societas Christiana as being contained within the greater political organization of the civitatis rex Christus. Christ resident in the celestial realm is the ultimate source of sovereignty and the emperor as an ecclesiastical ruler is subordinate to papal authority. The spatial composition of this image conveys a clear hierarchy of powers: the emperor in the lower position is the servant or vassal of the pope who occupies a more elevated place. This hierarchical imagery was complemented by the canonist representation of Christendom as one body, with the pope as its head. In his controversial bull Unam Sanctam (1302) Boniface VIII (1294-1303) asserted that there is only one holy Catholic Church outside of which there can be no remission of sins. This church "quae unum corpus mysticum repraesentat, cuius caput Christus, Christi vero Deus" ("represents one mystical body whose head is Christ, while the head of Christ is God.") 5 This body is a unity, the seamless garment of the Lord which was not cut but fell by lot. Therefore there is one body and one head of this one and only church, not two heads as though it were a monster, namely Christ and Christ's vicar, Peter and Peter's successors, for the Lord said to this Peter, 'Feed my sheep.'(John 21: 17). 6 Prior to Gregory VII's pontificate the Church was identified as corpus Christi, the Body of Christ, "besides which or in which the 'states' functioned as governments rather than as autonomous bodies." 7 As Bishop Jonas of Orleans insisted

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in De institutione regia (c. 830) "[a]ll the faithful must know that the Universal Church is the Body of Christ, that the same Christ is its head and that there are in it mainly two exalted persons, the priestly and the kingly." 8 The implication being that political authority was derived from and exercised within rather than over or besides the Church. In the twelfth century, as states began to refer to themselves as bodies politic, the Roman Church reasserted its status as the supreme political corporation by deploying the formula corpus Christi mysticum, with its connotations of spiritual foundation and divine status.9 During the period of the crisis of church and state, two traditions of hierocratic thought emerged: Ecclesia and Christianitas, each of which promote4 1 For Foucault, Machiavelli's account of the relationship between territory and sovereignty in Il Principe reflected the juridical principle, characteristic of contemporary theories and philosophies of public law, that "sovereignty is not exercised on things, but above all on a territory and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it." Variations in the attributes of the territory-such as its fertility, the numbers of people occupying it, and their wealth or labor-are insignificant "by comparison with territory itself, which is the very foundation of principality and sovereignty.'>4 2 And yet, the prince's relationship to his territory is fragile, synthetic, and permanently threatened by external enemies and internal opponents. It needs constant attention if the prince is to achieve his raison d' etre, which is simply to hold onto what he has got. In this sense, irrespective of how he has acquired his principality, whether by conquest or inheritance, the prince remained alienated from it. 43 The objective of the prince's exercise of power is to strengthen and protect the principality, understood not as "the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory, but rather the prince's relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects.'>4 4 Foucault draws our attention to a paradox. Although territory is a fundamental component of Machiavellian sovereignty, the sovereign prince is estranged from the territories which define his sovereignty. In Renaissance sovereign-territoriality the hyphen between the two terms separates rather than unites; it differentiates the subjectivity of the sovereign prince from the object of his power, his territory.

Violence In the first chapter we saw how the inside/outside spatial demarcation which underpins the territorial a priori is reinforced by Max Weber's assertion that the state exercises the legitimate monopoly of violence throughout its territory. Machiavelli shared Weber's premise that violence is an integral element of political life and his realism dispensed with the euphemisms which medieval writers had used to disguise this aspect of political life. If, for St. Augustine, violehce was debased, an instrument appropriate to terrestrial authority commanded to execute the coercive sanctions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, for Machiavelli, violence replaced divine sanction as the warrant of secular power politics. Sheldon Wolin claims that Machiavelli saw the state as an "aggregate of power" whose "profile was that of violence.'>4 5 Machiavelli stressed that a successful state had to have good institutions or laws (buone istituzione) and strong

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armies (eserciti efficienti), but, when push comes to shove, armies are the most important. "The main foundations of all states, whether new, old or mixed are good laws and good armies .... It is not possible to have good laws without good armies and where there are good armies good laws follow .... "46 Machiavelli was adamant that if the prince were to achieve his political ends, he must not shirk from employing violence where appropriate, even at the risk of being considered cruel. For a prince to acquire and maintain a principality he must cultivate military virtU. All the most accomplished rulers in history have devoted themselves to the study of war, the greatest of the princely arts. Francesco Sforza's acquisition of the Duchy of Milan was a recent illustration of how a man who has mastered the art of war can rise from the mass of private citizens to become a successful prince. Conversely, rulers who neglect the study of war while pursuing the finer rewards of power will loose their states. 47 Machiavelli was convinced that a state should exercise its monopoly of violence through a standing army made up of soldiers drawn from the subject population. The question of armies was very important to Machiavelli, who had been responsible for recruiting a militia force for Florence, and discussions on how to raise, maintain, and deploy armed forces appear in all his major works. 48 He repeatedly insisted that the Italian rulers should establish their own forces rather than deploy unreliable and dangerous mercenaries or auxiliaries. 49 Mercenaries are "disunited, ambitious, undisciplined and treacherous"; they have no fear of God, no loyalty to the prince who hires them, and will not risk their lives for their paltry wages. 5 Consequently, any prince who tries to hold "his state on the basis of mercenary forces will never be stable or secure." 51 Living memory could furnish an acute example of the limitations of using mercenary forces. During the 1494 invasion of Italy by the French King Charles VIII, the mercenary forces employed by Italian rulers had dispersed in the face of superior foreign troops, thus allowing Charles to "conquer Italy with a piece of chalk." 52 Equally dangerous was the policy of hiring another's man's troops as auxiliaries. These troops are loyal only to their own commander who, if the prince is in a dire situation, can easily switch allegiance and turn his men against the prince, thereby destroying him. A strong prince will be able to defend himself against any attacker without calling for any external assistance. Machiavelli advised both princes and the ruling elites of city-states to replace mercenaries with militia forces made up of loyal local men. The state's security cannot be guaranteed if the armies, the means of violence, come from outside the boundaries of the dominio. Fortuna in the guise of internal rebellion or foreign incursion can only be overcome by virtu as embodied in an indigenous militia force. Armies must be autochthonous, made up of men whose livelihoods come from the lands which make up the state's dominio, and who recognize that by enlisting in the militia and making the state more secure

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their own interests would be better protected. The militia has both an internal coercive function and an external defensive function. If the militia is conducted properly, "it naturally suppresses all disturbances-rather than fomenting them-among its constituents" as well as being able "to protect them against the fear of foreign enemies." 53 The inherent resentment and hostility a popolo exhibited toward their rulers could be contained if they were drafted to serv~ as soldiers in a military structure in which the mechanisms of discipline and control were well developed. Further, in the "tightly-packed condition of political space" where the new prince had to carve out a new state while "hemmed in by vested interests and expectations, privileges and rights, ambitions and hopes" the prince could not expect to hold onto power without creating enemies.54 In a political environment where faction and intrigue are rife it is the militia that must be relied upon to quell any rebellious factions or internal challenges to the prince's authority. A loyal and well-disciplined army is especially important for a regime which has just taken power, for it must liquidate anybody hostile to the new order. "He who establishes a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, and he who establishes a democratic regime and does not kill the sons of Brutus will not last long." 55 A militia was also required for external warfare. At a time when the marauding armies of the oltramontani were rampaging through Italy, Machiavelli admonished those princes and republican leaders who lacked sufficient of their own soldiers to defend their own states or to join in a united effort to rid Italy of the foreigners.56 Machiavelli's hopes that Florence would acquire a militia force capable of both internal peace-keeping and external war-fighting is symptomatic of the modern sovereign territorial imaginary in so far as the modern territorial state is defined by its ability to exercise violence, internally and externally, at will. However, in Renaissance Italy, few princes or republican leaders had sufficient coercive resources at their disposal to exercise their sovereignty equally effectively over all the spaces that made up their dominions. Machiavelli, therefore, advised a weak prince under attack from superior forces to "fortify and provision his city, and to make no account of the territory lying outside it." 57 The prince should "take refuge behind walls and defend them" for he will be able to withstand a siege and hold onto his state if he makes sure that the city is well fortified and that the people within it remain loyat.5 8 As long as the city holds fast, the countryside or contado is expendable; a space that the enemy can occupy without threatening the existence of the state as a whole. However, this image of state territoriality, structured around central and peripheral spaces, fails to meet the standards ofWeber's ideal type in which the state's monopoly of violence is exercised evenly across the entire territory. Florentine republican writers, who used lo stato in a geographical sense to denote the extent of the city's dominion, automatically made a distinction between a center based on

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the city and a periphery of outlying areas. "Giovanni Villani divides the stato of Florence into city, contado and distretto" and Guicciardini "speaks circa 1508 of Pisa as belonging to 'lo stato nostro.' " 59 Elana Guarani claims that this centerperiphery territorial order reflected the reality of Italian political communities in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Renaissance states which had territories further out than the castles and villages located in the immediate contado did not exercise "a form of immediate sovereignty over a territory." 60 Rather, the jurisdiction they exercised over the people living in these outlying spaces was indirect and diffused, being filtered through local institutions and communal structures. The center-periphery structure of Renaissance state territoriality, therefore, still maintained the vestiges of a "hierarchical and polarized organisation of. .. space." 61 While serving in the Florentine Chancery, Machiavelli travelled extensively, visiting potentially rebellious cities and recruiting soldiers for the militia. During these trips he became sensitive to the potential weaknesses of these center-periphery systems and shared the general view that the inability of the communes to unify and discipline the feudal aristocracies domiciled in their distretti had led to the crises of the fourteenth century. In this context, Pisa, which Florence had brought from Gabriele Maria Visconti in 1405 and lost in 1494 following Charles VIII's invasion, had a special role in II Principe for it demonstrated the difficulties facing a prince trying to hold onto a recently acquired city-state that has a long established tradition of liberty. Earlier, in the Discorso dell'ordinare lo stato di Firenze aile armi (1506), Machiavelli had contrasted the restlessness in the Florentine distretto populated by rebellious cities to the peaceful contado of the city's immediate vicinity. 62 He worried that Florence's survival was threatened by "the fragility of its territorial system, badly guarded, exposed to external pressures, undermined internally by the presence of cities 'which desire your death even more than their life'." 63 For Florence to ensure peace and security within her dominio she must develop both a military force capable of defending the city and controlling the rebellious cities, and a coercive justice system capable of punishing seditious subjects. One might surmise that Machiavelli might have encouraged the Florentine authorities concerned to quell dissension in the dominio to sanction more of the spectacular violence that some Renaissance rulers were partial to. In the tract "On the Method of Dealing With the Rebellious Peoples of the Valdichiana," Machiavelli warned the Florentine leaders that the Duke of Valentino, Cesare Borgia, who was seeking to establish his authority in Romagna and to build a powerful territorial state in central Italy, was trying to incite rebellion among the discontented peoples of the Florentine state. 64 However, in Il Principe, Valentino is praised for his attempts to hold onto his new principality in the most difficult of circumstances. Valentino had conquered Romagna not only by using other

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men's forces-his armies were heavily reinforced by mercenaries belonging to the Orsini and by soldiers on loan from the French king, Louis XII-but also with the assistance offortuna-he had been able to rely on the support of pope Alexander VI, Roderigo Borgia, his father. Valentino recognized his position was threatened by the dubious loyalties of the Orsini mercenaries, Louis' disapproval of his plans for further expansion into Tuscany, and the resentment of those living in Romagna who were sick of being ruled by weak, exploitative lords. Valentino eradicated the leaders of the Orsini and Colonna families and broke his alliance with the French. 65 In order to pacify Romagna, he put in charge "Messer Remirro de Orco, a man cruel and ready" who "in a short time tendered the province peaceful and united." Then, in order to avoid incurring resentment at the violent means used to restore order, Cesare wanted to show that any cruelty which had gone on did not originate with himself but with the harsh nature of his agent. So getting an opportunity for it, one morning at Cesena he had Messer Remirro laid in two pieces in the public square with a block of wood and a bloody sword near him. The ferocity of this spectacle left those people at the same time gratified and awestruck. 66 The Remirro case is an example of the use of spectacular violence in the consolidation of the territoriality of a Renaissance state. This state shared many characteristics with the states of Early Modern Europe, in which, as Foucault pointed out, control was maintained by both spectacular and disciplinary violence. 67 However, the modern state rarely, if ever, engages in spectacular violence, for it is able to ensure order by means of an extensive surveillance apparatus, which permits it to coordinate individuals' time-space routines across the entire territory under its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Renaissance states did have some mechanisms of disciplinary power at their disposal. Pierangelo Schiera argues that if the modern state constitutes "a point of unity" in which the institutional and legitimate organization of power is combined with the discipline that determines the collective behavior its subjects, then while these three elements came together in the seventeenth century, they all developed, albeit separately, in Italian humanism. 68 The institutional dimension arose out of negotiations between the signoria, the papal and imperial vicariati, and the principate, and replaced an ancient civic legitimacy with a state based legitimacy. City-states derived their legitimacy, as Marsiglio had noted, from their status as a community that protects individuals so that "the men belonging to it may live and live well." 69 Discipline arose from the codes of the guilds, corporations, universities, and Church, which ensured the co-ordination of the citizens' behavior with the needs of the communal civic order. Machiavelli, despite his contempt for the

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institutions of the Roman church, recognized, as we have seen, that religion had a vital role in reinforcing social cohesion and identity. It is the duty of "the rulers of a republic or of a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they hold. If they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and united." 70 Religion can also assist in securing the discipline of armies. Machiavelli praised rulers who "with very great ceremonies ... had their soldiers swear to observe military discipline, in order that if they acted against it, they would have to fear not merely the laws and men but God; and they used every device to give them strong religious feeling." 71 Nevertheless, the territoriality of center and periphery remained the norm. It characterized not just relations between citta and distretto, but also those between citta and contado. Although city and countryside in Renaissance Italy were closer knit than they had been in feudal society, mutual distrust and resentment was still endemic. The replacement of serfdom by more flexible tenancies, based in commercial leases and contractual sharecropping or mezzadria, drew the cities and countryside together in relations of dependency: city dwellers relied on food, fuel, and labor drawn from rural areas, while investment and speculation by the mercantile and noble classes of the cities brought prosperity to the countryside. Like Machiavelli, who owned a farm at Sant' Andrea in Percussina outside Florence, many city dwellers had farms near the city or were absentee landlords in estates further out. Yet, economic ties of necessity between the urban upper classes and the agrarian workers did not necessarily engender mutual feelings of trust or affection. Franco Sacchetti's declaration that "[t]he city should produce good men, the villa good beasts" is indicative of the type of prejudice that many of urban landowners felt toward the peasantry. 72 The animosity of urban dwellers toward rural society was a legacy of the medieval conviction that law and order were restricted to the city, while the countryside was a lawless space full of dangers and threats. This theme is evident, for example, in Giotto's frescoes for the Arena Chapel which depict Injustice as a tyrant, sitting outside the city-gates, ruling over a wilderness in which brigands are robbing and murdering the unfortunate inhabitants. 73 Many later Renaissance paintings, notably those by Mantegna and Leonardo, continued to promote the ideal of urban life as the embodiment of civic virtue and economic wealth by contrasting it to the lawlessness and anarchy shown outside in the countryside. Indeed, for Lauro Martines, artists were so "[i]nfected by the arrogance of the domineering city" that many picture of walled cities depicted the surrounding rural space as "a sort of no man's land fit for armies and desolation, not for civilized living (vivere civilmente)," thereby producing "fantasticated pictures of the established relationships of power." 74 Indeed, territoriality in Italy, would remain structured along a center-periphery axis long into the sixteenth century. The Medici rulers of that century were well

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aware that the degree of power they exercised over the immediate environs of Florence and her contado was attenuated in the outer Tuscan territories. Tuscany was a pluralistic society in which cities, towns and rural communities maintained their own councils and government bodies. They were responsible for tax collection and public expenditure as well as the maintenance of public order and defense.7 5 One city-state where relations between the city and its peripheral spaces were especially strained was Venice which, notes Machiavelli, had taken "possession of a large part ofltaly, for the most part not with war but with money and craft." 76 The Venetian state was a heterogeneous mix of the city, "a strange centre placed at the borders of its state, a seafaring and mercantile city, foreign to the world of common law," and the Terrafirma, "a multiform and polycentric periphery, organized around big urban poles and dotted with feudal lordships and 'little princes'." 77 Venice's policy of territorial acquisition was admired by Machiavelli in so far as it showed that her leaders had absorbed the lesson of imperial Rome that territorial expansion could diffuse internal tensions and struggles. Expansion could refocus the destructive energy generated by internal conflict and, by projecting it outward in a constructive manner, so increase the state's power resources against rivals and bolster the citizens' sense of civic virtit. 78 Of course, expansionist policies risk increasing the sense of threat felt by other states and setting the logic of the security dilemma into motion. Indeed, Venice's expansion did not just alarm other Italian powers but was seen as a threat by the Spanish, French, and German rulers. Under Pope Julius II's leadership these disparate interests were brought together in the League of Cambrai which defeated the Venetians at the battle of Agnadello (May 14, 1509). For Machiavelli, the Venetians had attained such a reputation for power that not merely to the Italian princes but to the kings beyond the Alps they gave cause for dread. Hence when these foreign rulers made a league against them, in one day the Venetians were deprived of the territory which in the course of many years they had gained with boundless expense.7 9

Identity Together with sovereignty and violence, the third interlocking component of the modern territorial a priori is identity. In a reading of Rousseau's tract The Government ofPoland, William Connolly demonstrates how identity, violence, and territory combine in the modern political imaginary. Rousseau argued that if the Poles were to become a free people they needed to inscribe their identity into a defined territory. The people who inhabit the land must all use a common language, and have shared values and mores. Connolly identifies in

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Rousseau's argument a set of correspondences underwritten by violence: "to be free you must belong to a people; to be a people you must have a common identity burned into you; to be a flourishing people you must exclusively inhabit a contiguous territory; to flourish freely as a territorialized people you must stringently limit contact with the foreign." Poland could only be endeared to its citizens through violence: the violence "done to the internal other (those inhabiting the territory who do not belong), the interior other (the other within the self which resists such strong identification with the collectivity) and the external other (those who are foreign)." 80 Machiavelli first touches upon issues of identity in II Principe in his discussion of the problems faced by a prince who has recently acquired mixed principalities. 81 If the new territory has the same customs, mores, and language as those established in his antico stato and if the inhabitants of the new territory are already accustomed to princely rule then assimilating the territory in tutto un corpo will be relatively easy. The prince does not need to alter existing laws and taxes, but merely has to ensure that all members of the previous ruling family are wiped out. If he follows these rules "in a very short time they unite with his old princedom in a single body." 82 If, however, the inhabitants of the newly acquired territory speak a different language and have different laws and customs, the prince will require good fortuna and need to cultivate virtu. He will either have to move his court to the new lands or to establish colonies in it. He must forge alliances with the minor nobility of the region, while being careful not to increase the power of any potential rivals. Some of the hardest territories to retain are those where the previous ruler shared power with several minor lords. These lands will contain several alternative foci of allegiance around which those who oppose the new prince's rule could coalesce. However, the hardest stati to retain are those republican cities with strong traditions of liberty and procedures of civil life based in time-honored indigenous laws. The prince cannot expect to eradicate memories of liberty and freedom and if he wants to hold onto such a republic he must destroy the city, set up his court within its walls, or establish a government that retains most of the old laws. 83 Like Rousseau, Machiavelli maintained that identity is constituted through language. The language spoken by the inhabitants of the newly acquired provincia would determine whether or not they shared the same identity as the subjects of the prince's antico stato. 84 "[T]he territories [stati] a conqueror annexes and joins to his own well-established state are either in the same country (provincia) with the same language or they are not." 85 Although Machiavelli sometimes uses provincia to designate Italy, here lingua does not refer to a national language. Gramsci, four centuries later would still be ruing the fact that Italian remained the exclusive vernacular of the cultural and social elites and that the vast majority of the population still spoke various incompatible dialects,

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which compromised any attempts to coalesce into an effective political force. 86 Nevertheless, many Renaissance humanists felt that it was important to define the role and function of the language of Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio. Dante, himself, had insisted in De vulgari eloquentia that his new vernacular or curiale, the language of the courts spoken by courtiers, popes, dukes, and literary men was not, as many Florentine humanists insisted, based in the Florentine dialect. Machiavelli, as a good Florentine, wrote a counter tract refuting Dante's denial of the Florentine patrimony of Italian and even accused the poet of defaming their common patria. 87 Machiavelli's criticism of Dante has a tincture of campanilismo, the fierce allegiance to and pride in one's city or region felt by many Renaissance Italians. Florentines, argues de Grazia, felt that the Palazzo della Signoria and the Duomo symbolized the city's grandeur and glory. "Brunelleschi's cupola high in the heavens is the cosmos centred in Florence and covering an empire of the peoples of Tuscany." 88 However campanilismo could easily slip into the type of smallminded parochialism that Machiavelli mocked in Mandragola where one of the characters is belittled by being told that "you're not used to losing the Cupola from sight." 89 Indeed, although Machiavelli rose to Florence's defense when he felt that she had been unfairly maligned and famously declared that "I love my country more than my soul," he was not a Florentine chauvinist. 90 He rarely trumpeted his city's prodigious cultural achievements, which, in his eyes, could not compensate for the failure of this "[t]ruly ... great and miserable city" to achieve its promise of political greatness. He would have gladly exchanged her cultural riches for a political elite of equal military virtu and boldness of spirit to the senatorial class of ancient Rome. Only then could the petty factionalisms, internecine rivalries, and class conflicts that had bedeviled the city since the eradication of the noble class be overcome. However, despite such disappointments, the spirit of Florence still burned in his soul. Every time that I have been able to honour my patria, even at my own expense and risk of danger, I have done so voluntarily; because a man has no greater obligation in his life. On it depends his whole being and moreover from it comes every good thing which fortuna and nature have conceded to us; these are notably so much greater in those who come from the most noble patria. 91 It is true that the territorialization of political identity in Renaissance Italy was primarily local or regional, determined by residency in or cultivation of the lands that made up a prince's dominio or a republic's contado. However the piccola patria was not the only locus of identity. Humanist writings regularly display a tension between the immediate loyalty owed to the piccola patria, one's citta or

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stato, and La grande patria or some notion ofltaly-embodying the cultural heritage derived from the Roman Empire-that extended over all the lands in the peninsula beneath the Alps. 92 Appeals to Italian identity were most often made in periods when the political situation in the peninsula was particularly dire-a condition usually marked by the presence of foreign armies. Machiavelli's most farnous evocation of an Italic spirit in the final chapter of Il Principe was itself prompted by the conflict and disorder precipitated by the expedition of the French king Charles VIII in 1494. 93 In "Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians" Machiavelli suggests that the time is ripe for a new ruler to emerge in Italy, who will lead its people toward a better future. For just as the qualities of great leaders like Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus were born out of adversity, so the true valor of the Italian spirit will rise out of the dire circumstances in which Italy currently finds itself: "more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more dispersed than the Athenians; lacking either leadership or order; beaten, despoiled, lacerated, devastated, and having been subject to every sort of ruination." 94 Italy's hopes rest with the illustrious Medici family, whom Machiavelli urges to take up the righteous cause of Italy's salvation. The Medici should deploy their "great military skill and valour" to lead an army of Italian soldiers-who as individuals have unrivalled military skill and virtU, but because of a lack of leadership have not yet been combined into an effective army-against the foreign armies. No one will resist the liberator, who will be received warmly by all those who are oppressed by foreign domination and are thirsty for revenge. [T]his barbarian rule stinks to everyone. Your illustrious house must therefore take on this challenge with the spirit and that hope that comes from taking up any just cause, so that under its standard this patria will be ennobled and under its auspices will be verified Petrarch's saying: 95 Then Virtue will seize arms 'Gainst madness, and the battle will be brief, For ancient valour is Not dead, as yet, within Italian hearts. 96 Machiavellian scholars continue to debate the intended meaning of this chapter. Nineteenth century followers of Ranke, who viewed Machiavelli as an Italian patriot and the prophet of the modern national state, claimed that Machiavelli intended that all the advice he offered throughout Il Principe should assist the potential liberator to free Italy. However, Meinecke argued that Il Principe was not a unified composition and that the final chapter was a rhetorical addendum, designed to curry favor with the Medici. Machiavelli's loose

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use of language means he could have been advocating a temporary military alliance, a permanent federal constitution, or a unified national state. Against this divisionist view, unifiers, like Chabod, claim that Il Principe has a natural narrative progression leading toward the telos of the final chapter. 97 Either way .it would be rash to assume that Machiavelli envisaged a national territorial based identity, equivalent to that aspired to by the state-builders of modernity. Prezzolini argues that the romantic and mystical discourse of nineteenth century nationalism, proclaiming the right of a population to form a separate state when they have a common language and cultural traditions, would have been alien to Machiavelli. His nationalism was utilitarian in that "conformity of language, of customs [religion] and institutions [laws and military]" could provide a realistic basis for a viable state, free of the religious allegiances of the medieval territorial imaginary. 98 Chabod concurs that Machiavelli had no sense of the sacredness attributed to the modern nation. He cut off religion from the political but did not transfer the religious sentiments of sacrifice and martyrdom to the nation. His only interest was the unity of the state: "the nation exists for him to the extent that it is organised or can be organised into a political body, in a unified state, with an established government." 99 To be sure, Machiavelli only rarely uses the term nazione and applies it to both the large populations of foreign states and to the piccole patrie of Italy. 100 However, even if Machiavelli's idea of the nation was not fully modern, we cannot deny that it does convey a sense of a communal identity grounded on a space that exceeded the boundaries of the local patria. Even if Machiavelli remained hopeful that the Italian polities could survive if they continued to develop the traditions of civic humanism, upon which their liberties and greatness had depended upon in the past, his time as Florentine emissary to the court of France and the lessons of 1494 would have made him acutely aware that the power of the northern kingdoms surpassed that of any of the Italian city-states. 101 Hence, Machiavelli's appeal for a national militia assembled under a Medici leader, that could rival the armies of the French, Spanish, and Swiss. Exactly which parts of the peninsula such troops should be recruited from is not clear. If only Italian speakers were to be enlisted then by Machiavelli's own criteria theywould.be restricted to men from five provinces: Lombardy, Romagna, Tuscany, the territory of Rome, and the kingdom ofNaples. 102 As Vincent Ilardi notes, "Venice, Piedmont, Liguria, and the islands (Sicily and Sardinia) were not part of Italy for Machiavelli, linguistically speaking." 103 Nevertheless, ltalia did have meaning for Machiavelli. In citing Petrarch 's "ltalia Mia" he purposely invoked the sentiment of italianita-a sense of shared cultural identity characterized by common language, literature, customs, manners and traditions-that had been nurtured by Italian humanists for generations. In "Italia Mia" Petrarch had grounded this identity in spatial images.

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He praised the fecundity of Italy's soil-"this verdant earth"; the beauty of her landscape-"our lovely countryside"; and her territorial uniqueness-"that part of the world which is most fair." 104 Furthermore, by combining imagery of maternal nurturing with the nourishing capacity of the homeland, the poem also alludes to the modern territorial theme of blood and belonging. Is this soil not the earth that I first touched? This not the nest where I Have been so sweetly nursed? And is this not my homeland that I trust? A mother, pious, kind, Who shelters both my parents in her soil? 105 Although italianita was not a mass sentiment, being largely limited to the intellectual elite, it nevertheless expressed themes that would echo in later nationalist rhetoric. First, it was a discourse whose appeal was strongest when the political fortunes of the peninsula were lowest. Fazio degli Uberti's ''Ai Signori e Popoli d' Italia" (c.1350) had described the parlous state of fourteenth century Italy during the "age of despots", when princes fought wars using marauding bands of foreign mercenaries. 106 For Uberti, only an Italy united under a Ghibelline monarch could restore the fortunes of the peninsula and evict the foreign soldiers. During the fifteenth century, when foreign interference was minimal and Italian politics were relatively autonomous, humanists could praise the virtues of their own piccola patria, while retaining a sense of belonging to and having a responsibility to a greater community. Thus Coluccio Salutati praised Florence for" defending her own freedom" on the grounds that in doing do "she had 'saved liberty in Italy.' " 107 After the devastation of the French expedition of 1494, italianita flourished once again. Second, just as the German Romanticists would seek the origins of German culture in a mythical golden age of the Holy Roman Empire, so the Italian humanists drew on the legacy of Rome. Projects such as Flavio Biondo's archaeological descriptions of the ruins of Roman civilization in Romae instauratae libri tres (1482) reinforced a sense of an inherited cultural superiority. 108 Third, the sheer physical presence of the Alps provided a natural territorial marker or boundary for italianita. The coherence of Italian culture seemed to be divinely ordained, in that "God-or Nature-had placed the Alps as a protecting wall around Italy. People living beyond the Alps were foreigners and it was unnatural for oltramontani to interfere in Italian affairs.'' 109 These proto-nationalist themes: the forging of identity in adversity, the evocation of cultural genealogies, and the delineation of natural territorial markers, were often expressed in rhetoric which differentiated ltalia from the barbarian other. In "ltalia Mia" Petrarch acknowledged that

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Nature made good provision for our state, To set an Alpine shield Between us and the Germans' ravening.U 0 He contrasted the "noble Latin blood" that runs in Italian veins with the "blood of the barbarians." 111 By the fourteenth century, the word barbarian in Italian discourse had acquired several connotations: a non-Christian, a writer of bad Latin, and the ancient sense of someone outside of the cultural ambit ofRome. 112 From the fourteenth century on, humanists developed the latter meaning to distinguish Italy from the rabies barbarica north of the Alps. Salutati's official correspondence of 1376 "identified Florence with Italy, Italy with Latinitas and barbarism with the French and English mercenaries." 113 With the sixteenth century revival of italianita the barbarian theme came to the fore again. In the History ofFlorence, Machiavelli uses barbarian to describe and to draw analogies between the Germanic tribes who attacked the Roman Empire between 377 and 439 and contemporary foreign invaders. Recent wars had opened a new road "to the barbarians, and Italy put herself back into slavery to them." 114 However, notes Marcel Gagneux, it was Guicciardini rather than Machiavelli who did most to privilege "the couple 'Barbarians-Italians' as the fundamental element of identification through opposition."llS In Storia d1talia, Guicciardini records a speech by Marchionne Trivisano warning his fellow senators of the Venetian Consigli de' Pregato not to enter an alliance with the French against Lodovico Sforza, on the basis that all barbarians are "eternal enemies of the Italian" and there is an essential "difference between barbarian and Italian spirits." 116 Guicciardini also praised Pope Giulio II, the incarnation of the national struggle, as "Iiberatore di ltalia da' barbari." 117 Guicciardini's discursive construction of italianita through opposition to the figure of the barbarian is aptly demonstrated in an analogy he drew between Hannibal and Charles VIII. [P]assing into Italy through the mountain pass of Monginevra ... through which Hannibal of Carthage passed with great difficulty in antiquity, the king entered Italy on the ninth of September 1494 bringing with him the seeds of innumerable calamities, ghastly events, and changes in almost all things. 118 Clearly, much of chapter XXVI of II Principe rehearses the standard themes of italianita: "[!]aments over the oppressed state of Italy, and over the divisions among the Italian leaders, contempt for the foreigners as 'barbarians,' yearnings for the great Roman past, appeals for a leader, the wish to be free of the invaders ... " 119 Machiavelli's depiction of a coherent Italian identity, differentiated from the surrounding world and threatened by foreign forces, was not new.

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However, Machiavelli's originality was to fuse these disparate elements into a program of political action. He sought to revive Italian virtu by installing a spirit of martial valour into the people, by forming an army of indigenous soldiers to replace the mercenary troops, and by unifying the province under one prince. Machiavelli's models for Italian unity were contemporary France and Spain: "Italy was to become a "provincia unita" in order to withstand the assaults of other 'provincie unite'." 120 Yet this political program would remain an aspiration rather than a reality. For Italy's regional princes, italianita was merely a convenient tool of realpolitik which they appealed to when their own interests were threatened. 121 Florentine and Papal negotiators seeking to encourage Venice to drop her stance of neutrality after Charles VIII's invasion argued that" 'a good Italian' with concern for the 'universal danger' and 'universal needs of Italy' " would abandon such a policy. 122 But Italian interests rarely took precedence over the immediate interest of the piccola patria. The Venetian Doge replied to the Pap allegate that Venice would not risk going to war with Milan and France for the sake of a vague ideal. Furthermore, princes were prepared to put their contempt for the barbarians aside, if the military services they offered could be used to overcome local rivals. The weakness of Italian interest when set against personal ambition became abundantly clear in 1494 when, motivated by his desire for territorial gains at the expense ofVenice, the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, encouraged Charles VIII's invasion on the pretext of the Angevin claim to the Kingdom of Naples. Machiavelli was disgusted at Sforza and blamed his deviousness for "the growth of those evil seeds that not long after, since no living man could destroy them, devastated-and are still devastating-Italy." 123 Italy would not achieve anything like the status of a national territorial state until well into the nineteenth century, and would experience many more "barbarian" incursions before then. Nevertheless Renaissance political discourse, by aligning the state space with sovereignty, violence, and identity commenced a process of striation that would eventually coalesce into the modern territorial imaginary.

CHAPTER 8

Picturing Renaissance Territoriality

I

n the dedicatory letter to Lorenzo de Medici prefacing II Principe, Machiavelli expressed his worries that Lorenzo might take offence that a mere citizen should presume to offer counsel on the conduct of princely affairs. He justified his unsolicited advice by means of an analogy. I hope it will not be thought presumptuous if a man of low and humble station dares to discuss and advise on the conduct of princes. For just as those who draw up maps of countries place themselves in low lying valleys to observe mountains and high places and to observe low lying areas situate themselves high up in the mountains so, likewise, to understand clearly the nature of the people one must be a prince, and to discern clearly that of princes, he must be one of the populace. 1 Machiavelli's analogy evokes a passage in Leonardo da Vinci's Treatise on Painting in which Leonardo declared that the artist who mastered perspective would become lord of all types of peoples and of all things. If he wants valleys, if he wants from high mountain tops to unfold a great plain extending down to the sea's horizon, he is lord to do so; and likewise if from low plains he wishes to see high mountains. 2 Carlo Ginzberg argues that Machiavelli was attracted to this image of the "sovereign painter" with the world at his command because it posited an analytical distance between the painter and the world he represented. 3 A similar principle underpinned Machiavelli's desire to describe political life in terms of "la verita

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effectual delle cosa." Politics is a relationship between the prince and his people. So, Machiavelli, occupying the low plain, can provide the prince with an objective view on the conduct of politics which the prince, who occupies the heights, is unable to experience. Machiavelli combined perspective and politics through metaphor. However, according to the International Relations theorist John Ruggie, there is, in terms of the production of modern territoriality, a more immediate relationship between perspective and politics. In chapter three we discussed Ruggie's contention that the transformation from the heteronomous territoriality of the medieval international order to the homonomous territoriality of modernity was partially produced by a reimagination of subjectivity within the European social episteme. Ruggie contends that the essence of modern subjectivity and its being-in-space is embodied by single-point perspective, which prioritized the sovereignty of "a single point of view, the point of view of a single subjectivity, from which all other subjectivities were differentiated," in relation to the vanishing point. 4 As in art, so in politics political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint. The concept of sovereignty ... was ... the doctrinal counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial organisation of politics. 5 Unfortunately, Ruggie does not develop this tantalizing observation much further, leaving us to wonder how exactly single-point perspectival forms were applied to the spatial organisation of politics. This chapter, building on Ruggie's suggestive insight, addresses the question of how perspective, in essence a code or technique of pictorial representation, could have assisted in the promotion of the modern territorial imaginary. In particular, it explores how following the collapse of the vertical structures of medieval territoriality, perspective enabled the territorialization of politics along a horizontal axis. Perspective will be addressed from two, as it were, perspectives. First as an epistemic structure whose assumptions about the subject and its being-in-space are reproduced across various spatial discourses. Second, as a representational technique which lent itself to the legitimization of the modern idea of territorial sovereignty. The first section introduces the basic principles of perspective with reference to Leon Battista Alberti's paradigmatic text On Painting and some of Piero della Francesca's paintings. This is followed by a discussion of recent work on perspective by cultural theorists and critical geographers who have theorized it as a representation of space or a matrix of power/knowledge. With the conceptual framework in place, we can analyze how the Renaissance regime of perspective served to striate the territorial imaginary, with reference to three pictorial expressions of

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territorialized politics: the ideal cityscape, the portrait of a prince in a landscape and local topographical maps.

Perspective Theory and Practice In essence, perspective is a technique of pictorial representation that allows artists to depict three-dimensional space and the positions of objects within it on a two-dimensional canvas. Erwin Panofsky describes perspective as the capacity to transform the material reality of a picture's surface into a transparent plane or a window, and so create the illusion that "we are looking through this window into a space." 6 This "space comprises the entirety of the objects in apparent recession into depth, and is not bounded by the edges of the picture, but rather only cut off." 7 In Renaissance art history three foundational events constitute the "invention" or "rediscovery" of perspective: Filippo Brunelleschi's peepshow experiments carried out in Florence's Piazza del Duomo and Piazza dei Signori (1425), which demonstrated the principles of perspective; Masaccio's application of these principles in the Trinity fresco in Florence's Santa Maria Novella (1427); and the systematization of these principles in Alberti's De pictura (1435)-"the 'Magna Carta' of the Renaissance." 8 De pictura set out the rules for perspective construction with a geometrical rigor and established the parameters of the discipline of painting within the liberal arts. 9 Alberti started with the most fundamental humanist premise. The Stoics taught that man was by nature constituted the observer and manager of things. Chrysippus thought that everything on earth was born only to serve man .... Protagoras ... seems to some interpreters to have said essentially the same thing, when he declared that man is the mean and measure of all things. 10 Man has a duty to study "the natural order of things in God's creation" and the painter's particular task is to reveal Nature's concinnatus or harmony, which the divine has inscribed in the perfect proportional correspondences of number, shape, and location in the world. 11 Since perspective could show things in proportion, it enabled the artist to represent the classically defined ideal of beauty as a harmony of parts. 12 Alberti began De pictura with a general description of geometrical concepts such as point, line, and surface and discussed their material existence. He explained that the world is made manifest through rays of light, which issue from the surface of an object and converge on the eye in the configuration of a cone or pyramid. 13 The visual pyramid is constituted by three points or surfaces: the seen surface, which forms the base; extrinsic light rays, which constitute the

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sides of the pyramid and "hold on like teeth to the whole of the outline, form an enclosure around the entire surface like a cage"; and the vertex in the eye, where the angles of the quantities meet. Two other types of rays complement the extrinsic rays: median rays, which convey surface characteristics such as light and color; and the centric, perpendicular or axial ray-"the leader and prince of rays" -which passes along our visual axis and whose position determines what appears on the surface. The concept of the visual pyramid in itself was not new-it had been a standard device of medieval optics or Perspectiva-however, Alberti was the first to describe a painting as the intersection of the visual pyramid by a plane perpendicular to the centric ray and to imply that because the painting forms a proportional triangle within the broader triangle, the objects recorded on it retain their relative sizes and positions. 14 Book Two set out the rules of costruzione legittirna or vanishing point construction. Alberti believed that if the artist adhered to these rules he would be able to represent the vertical and horizontal dimensions in and across the space of a picture in correct proportion. The fundamental principle underlying costruzione legittirna is that man is "the scale and measure of all things," in relation to whom the sizes and distances of objects can be represented in proportion. 15 Once the artist has learnt the rules he will be ready to produce a painting in the three stages which mirror our perception of things in Nature: circumscription-outlining the position of the object in space; composition-reproducing various combinations of an object's surfaces; and, finally, the depiction of surface colors through sensitivity to "the reception of light." 16 Finally, Alberti discussed artistic virtu. In order to choose the most suitable istoria or subjects selected from scripture, history, or myth, the painter must be learned in the liberal arts. He must also be a student of nature, able to discern all of its qualities, especially that of beautyP Only then can he paint appropriate istoria with "a systematic and communicative naturalism within a framework of order and restrained delectation." 18 Piero della Francesca was one of many Renaissance artists influenced by Alberti's rules of costruzione legittirna. For Henri Focillon, Alberti's principles are particularly well demonstrated in Piero's use of space in the Flagellation of Christ (1455-60). The composition of the image is severe and simple. The convergence of the floor and ceiling lines to an imaginary point reveal the presence of a structuring scheme that orders and divides the space, in which "[t]he figures, similar to pawns in a game of chess, are placed with implacable and rigorous precision in their halves." 19 Piero uses the architecture of the elegant classical temple to organize the space of the Flagellation so that it complies with Alberti's rules for measuring volume and space. The Flagellation is composed around a single vanishing point that not only assigns a place to all the objects within the pictorial space, but also determines the place of the observing viewer-in order to make sense of the composition as a unified whole, the observer must

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stand directly in front of the painting's centre. 20 The sense that the protagonists "appear to be inscribed in eternity" comes from Piero's adherence to Alberti's recommendation that the spaces of paintings should not be crowded out by highly animated figures, but should include empty spaces in which the principal figures can move with grace and dignity. 21 Neither Piero nor Alberti treated perspective as merely a set of rules for achieving a realistic aesthetic representation of the world. Perspective was a symbolic system capable of reproducing the harmony of God's created universe. Piero was not only a master technician of perspective on canvas but also a theorist of perspective, interested in its wider symbolism. In the treatise De prospectiva pingendi (c. 1474) he insisted that if the artist wished to reproduce the harmony of Nature he had to be attentive to the correct geometrical representation of objects and figures. 22 In The Flagellation both the proportions and dimensions of the architecture and the numerical harmonies of the angular stones have symbolic overtones which, in combination with the light, were intended to reflect the divine order. There is, for example, the regular occurrence of the number eight, a numeral heavy with Christian symbolism (coming after the seven days of creation, the eighth day signified rebirth or Christ's resurrection). 23 In Piero's work, geometry and perspective are "symbolic elements for the representation of the dimensions of the Absolute, which are themselves mirrored in perceivable reality." 24 In terms of perspective's broader cultural impact, Henri Lefebvre identifies it as the dominant Renaissance representation of space. Perspective gradually overlaid the traditional representational space "of religious origin, which was now reduced to symbolic figures, to images of Heaven and Hell, of the Devil and the angels." 25 Drawing on Lefebvre, Stuart Cosgrove has identified the Renaissance as the birthplace of "landscape" or modernity's characteristic "way of seeing." Landscape, made possible by a fusion of linear perspective and Euclidean geometry, enabled the appropriation of the external world "by a detached, individual spectator to whom an illusion of order and control is offered through the composition of space according to the certainties of geometry." 26 Landscape pervaded many levels of man's interaction with his environment: from landscape painting and garden design to the surveying of estates and mapping of the new world. Whereas in the medieval imaginary man came to terms with the alterity of spaces, the threats and dangers they contained, by crowding them with signs and symbols of the divine, the cosmopolitan spirit of modernity required spaces to be brought under man's control, to be made subject to his sovereignty. Thus through technologies of landscape man imposed order on space, stripping it of symbolic meaning and rendering it an abstract object to be appropriated and used at will. Renaissance perspective or landscape introduced into European culture three modern aspects of

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space. First, the eye became the sovereign ruler of modernity's ocular-centric cultureP In Alberti's costruzione legittima the rays of the visual pyramid centre on the eye, it is the sovereign centre of the visual world. The eye, writes Norman Bryson, has "absolute mastery over space. Visually space is rendered the property of the individual detached observer, from whose divine location it is a dependent, appropriated object." 28 Second, the rise of the sovereignty of the eye augmented the process of de-corporealization. Lefebvre describes how the abstract ideal of the humanist subject came to replace the living body as the standard by which space was measured and conceived and in terms of which man understood his being-in-space. 29 Alberti's Man now occupied "a central position as observer of a pictorial world of which he himself is the measure." 30 Giulio Argan claims that once man was no longer conceived of as a particular inscribed within a universal transcendent Nature, perspective became the vehicle by which the newly constituted Ego, by means of the senses and reason, was able to apprehend "nature as a reality conceived by man and as distinct from him as the object from the subject." 31 Third, the sovereignty of the eye and de-corporealization complemented a new understanding of space as "geometrically isotropic, rectilinear, abstract and uniform." 32 Panofsky argues that the emergence of perspective accompanied the transformation of psychophysiological space into modern rational, systematic, and mathematical space. Perspective served the modern Weltanschauung which "demands and realizes a systematic space"-in modernity perception is "governed by a conception of space expressed by strict linear perspective" which, in turn, is "comprehensible" only for a "specifically modern, sense of space, or ... sense of the world." 33 Note that for Panofsky modern systematic space is a prerequisite for rather than a product of perspective. He identifies in early Renaissance paintings such as Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Annunciation (1344) an underlying coordinate system ordering the space long before it was postulated by the abstract mathematical thought of costruzione legittima. 34 Samuel Edgerton agrees that "a 'systematic' space, infinite, homogeneous, and isotropic" precipitated the rediscovery of linear perspective in the quattrocento. 35 The practice of linear perspective was based on the assumption that "visual space is ordered a priori by an abstract uniform system of linear coordinates" which allows painters to conceive of a subject in the realm of spatial homogeneity. 36 However, James Elkins warns that this argument falsely projects back onto the Renaissance a Kantian conception of space in which an a priori intuition of pure space makes possible the appearance of the a posteriori world of objects. Perspective, for Elkins, did not arise from a general sense of rationalized space. While some painters did have "an inchoate idea of rationalized space" it is going too far to "attribute an interest in the rationalization of all space to painters who looked at specific objects with geometrical eyes." 37

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The Ideal City

Figure 8.1 View of an Ideal City, 1490-1500 (oil on panel) by Italian School (fifteenth century). © Walters Art Museum, Baltimore, USA/The Bridgeman Art Library.

Perspective was an urban-based revolution which complemented the rise of the town and the decline of the feudal landed order (figure 8.1). It was during the Renaissance that the medieval conception of the town as a metaphysical presence, as imago mundi, gradually dissipated. Now the town was able assume its own identity as an urban space unified in terms of a political principle and represented graphically according to plans in perspective. 38 According to Lewis Mumford, the aspirations to grandiosity, uniformity, and regimentation characteristic of the Baroque city, and, we might add, the Baroque absolutist territorial state, had their origins in the Renaissance ideal of a city reflected in the purity and harmony of its architectural forms. 39 Indeed, the archetype for the Baroque city is captured in three Renaissance paintings of ideal cities, known as the Urbino, Baltimore, and Berlin panels. All three show images of grand architectural or theatrical scenes constructed with strict adherence to the principles of costruzione legittima. Ordinary housing is barely evident and the countryside can only just be glimpsed far outside of the city walls. There are no human figures present in either the Berlin or Urbino panels and the few that populate the Baltimore panel appear "lost in the vastness of the spatial composition.'>4° The layout of the squares and the styles of the buildings comply with the principles of architectural humanism set out in Alberti's De re aedificatoria (1443-52)_41 The buildings shown in the paintings are examples of the standard types common to ideal urban layouts: a templum or principal church, a basilica or law court, palaces for leaders serving both administrative and domicile functions, squares for commercial and political meetings, and symbolic antique monuments. 42 The details of the facades, porticos, loggia windows, and columns all conform to Alberti's requirements.

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Art historians continue to debate the provenance and purpose of the panels. One view is that the panels depict architectural or urban models. Fiske Kimball suggests that the paintings were made by Luciano Laurana, the architect who built Federico da Montelfeltro's palace at Urbino between 1470 and 1480.43 Laurana was a member of Federico's court at the same time as Bramante and Raphael and their influence seems to be evident in the architectural style represented in the paintings. Likewise, for Andre Chaste! the panels are "urban views in perspective" similar to the images found on many marquetry panels and cassone frontals. The paintings are representations of the city designed to valorize its spaces. Perspective was used "to define solemn places, ennobled by forceful architectural references, Colissea, triumphal arches, temples ... so as to suggest singular crystalline spaces set apart in the interior of the city, ideal for processions ... One should think of them in the context of ritual entries, of ceremonial decotations."44 Another school of thought claims that the panels are theatrical scenography. Alessandro Parronchi identifies them as sets designed by the Ghirlandaio brothers for the comedies, including Machiavelli's Mandragola, that were staged as part of the festivities celebrating the marriage of Lorenzo di Medici and Madeleine di II Tour d'Auvergne in September 1518. The panels later found their way to Urbino when Pope Leo X made Lorenzo de Medici duke of the province in 1519. 45 Richard Krautheimer argued (before retracting his statement) that the panels were not specific stage sets but generic models of theatre architecture; figural representations of what Sebastiana Serlio would later term, drawing on Vitruvius, the tragic (Baltimore) and comic (Urbino) scenes. 46 All these readings, argues Hubert Damisch, are limited by their adherence to a "descriptive allusion," which seeks to establish the real world referents of the buildings. This allusion is premised on the false assumption that both language and art are primarily concerned with representation: the notion that pictures or linguistic statement have meaning to the extent that they describe or present some external objective reality of facts, whether real or imaginaryY Damish brackets such concerns and asks a different question: how do the paintings function as a series demonstrating the function of perspective as an "expressive apparatus." Just as the sentence assigns "the subject a place within a previously established network that gives it meaning" so perspective determines the position of objects on the pictorial plane. 48 As conduits of the modern principle of sovereign identity the sentence and perspective have similar spatial functions of allocation, distribution, and differentiation. Perspective functions like a language, for it "institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point, a factor analogous to the 'subject' or 'person' in language, always posited in relation to a 'here' or 'there'.'>49 In the Urbino panel the orthogonals come together at a vanishing point within the opening of the tempio door "at the height of an eye

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of an imagined observer standing there, half hidden by the closed panel door and directing a Cyclopean gaze towards us." 50 This is the place occupied by the sovereign subject, toward which our sight is inexorably drawn and from which the panoptic gaze, which for de Certeau and Foucault is the primary instrument of discipline in modernity, observes us. In modernity, as Lefebvre indicates, the symbolic places of the medieval imaginary are colonized by the abstract and rational spaces of capital and sovereign territoriality. Archetypes of modern abstract spaces, the representations of space of urban planers and architects, are reproduced and legitimized in these paintings. For Lauro Martines these panels with their "vast organised spaces ... neatly boxed and absolutely controlled" are representative of Renaissance projects for ideal cities in which "power and imagination united and the ensuing vision of space was domineering, moved by faith in men's ability to control the spatial continuum." 5 1 The perfected forms of the imaginary ideal city-grand, symmetrical, proportioned, in fixed optical recession-went forth from a wish for control over the whole environment and from the implicit assumption that this was possible. The quest for the control of space in architecture, painting and bas-relief sculpture was not analogous to a policy for more hegemony over the entire society; it belonged, rather, to the same movement of consciousness. Behind the two different enterprises was the same drive to comprehend the environment: to convert the surroundings, urban and even rural to a "known" field. 52 The rigorously planned, tightly controlled representations of space in these panels contrast with the organic lived-in spaces of medieval cityscapes. Cosgrove draws our this contrast by comparing Ambrogio Lorenzetti's frescoes of Good and Bad Government to Pietro Perugino's Christ Giving to St Peter the Keys to the Kingdom ofHeaven. Lorenzetti's city is a vibrant, bustling world, the sights, sounds, and smells of which are communicated to viewers as if they were pedestrians walking in the streets. How different to Perugino's formal monumental space, in which the regimentations of the checkerboard piazza and the trees and hills in the background attest to the rigid geometrical order striating the spaces of the urban landscape. 53 Rather than random and spontaneous gatherings, Perugino's human groups strike choreographed theatrical poses. Individuals do not inhabit this impersonal space; they have no personal relationship to it, but exist in it as objects situated by an external plan or scheme. In the ideal city panels the logic of de-corporealization is taken yet further. These spaces are almost entirely devoid of human figures, as if their impure physical presence would contaminate the space's perfect proportions and refined lines. Although

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a few isolated figures populate the Baltimore panel, these bodies, most noticeably the burdened figure leaning on a stick in the foreground, seem to be visibly oppressed by the totalitarian monumental spaces that enclose them. These ideal cityscapes capture the spirit of the territorial imaginary of the cosmopolitan absolutist state: the broad avenues and monumental order, symbolizing ecclesiastical and secular power, are striated, coded, and free from all traces of nomadic existence; here there are no "vagabonds, vagrants or nomads." 54 In so far as these spaces evoked the moral values of purity and cleanliness, they can be aligned with the dispositifthat, as documented by Richard Sennett, legitimized the construction ofJewish ghettoes in Venice. In the early sixteenth century Venice's fortunes were in decline and the city was beset by cultural and moral unease. 55 It was also home to a number of Jewish immigrants who had been expelled from Spain in 1494. These newcomers were easy scapegoats for the authorities who, seeking to apportion blame for an outbreak of syphilis, encouraged a general "fear of touching" The Jewish body became associated with corrupting bodily vices, which had to be isolated to avoid infecting or contaminating the Christian community. However, the Venetian rulers were aware that the Jewish community had made a significant contribution to the city's economic fortunes, and "sought a spatial solution to deal with its impure but necessary Jewish bodies." 56 In 1515 Zacaria Dolfin drew up plans to use the foundry site of Ghetto Nuovo to segregate the Jews and advised the Venetians to "[s]end all of them to live in the Ghetto Nuovo which is like a castle, and to make drawbridges and close it with a wall; they should have only one gate, which would enclose them there and they would stay there." 57 In 1516 seven hundred Ashkenazi Jews were sent to the Ghetto Nuovo, and in 1541 the nearby Ghetto Vecchio was also designated as a part of the city exclusively reserved for Jewish habitation. The sanitized de-corporeal spaces of the panels were also examples of what Martines terms "signorial space"-they revealed the elites' aspirations to construct environments that would evoke the grandeur of classical antiquity. 58 Renaissance urban planners, commissioned by the wealthy and powerful, constructed real and imaginary cities comprising vast squares, wide streets and large buildings in which "more space was allotted to the powerful and less to the powerless." 59 Alberti's De re aedificatoria, for example, striated space according to class distinctions. Alberti advised the tyrant to build his city according to a circular plan of two walled cities. This wall, I believe, should not run diametrically across the city but should form a kind of circle. For the wealthy citizens are happier in more spacious surroundings and would readily accept being excluded by an inner wall, and would not unwillingly leave the stalls and the town-centre workshops to the

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market traders; and that rabble, as Terence's Gnatho calls them, of poulterers, butchers, cooks, and so on, will be less of risk and less of a nuisance if they do not mix with the important citizens. 60

De re aedificatoria was, argues Franc;:oise Choay, an "instaurational" text that founded the discourse of urbanism. It was the first to conceive of the built domain as a totality and the first to propose a rational method for conceptualizing and realizing buildings. Moreover, it expressed a new Foucauldian epistemological configuration, which, extending across the discourses of architecture, painting and sculpture, "resulted in the imposition of a new ideal of control over the world and a transformation of relations between European man and his productions."61 Of course, few really existing Renaissance cities achieved the aspirations of striated territoriality evoked by the ideal cityscapes. Class boundaries were rarely as neatly demarcated in space as Alberti and his tyrant might have liked. Further, when it came to actual control of urban space, the elites sought to asset their territorial supremacy over each other. In Renaissance Florence, for example, patrician families, seeking to extend their territorial power within the city, contested the ownership of private and public spaces. 62 The patronage of churches and convents was particularly sought after and their walls were inscribed with family coats of arms and other patrimonial symbols as signs of territorial possession. K. J. P Lowe argues that in a Florence "obsessed with ownership, display and boundaries," the Medici were the most effective practitioners of territorial patronage and used such means throughout the quattrocento to extended their territorial control outside of their immediate neighborhood of S. Lorenzo. 63 However, once they had fallen from power many of their symbols of hereditary family rule were erased by Soderini and over-coded with symbols of republican rule. In the convent of Le Murate a votive wax statue of Lorenzo the Magnificent was replaced by one of the Virgin Mary; and at the convent of San Gallo, founded by Lorenzo, Soderini dedicated a chapel to his own family.

Painting the Prince Perspective not only contributed to the Renaissance territorial imaginat·y by enabling the representation of ideal cosmopolitan cityscapes, it also gave princes an ideological tool with which to promote their claims to territorial sovereignty. The most striking example of this is the diptych of Federico da Montefeltro the Duke of Urbino and his wife Battista Sforza by Piero della Francesca (figure 8.2 and 8.3). 64 On the diptych's inner panels we see Federico and Battista in profile. Battista's portrait has two notable features: first, her face is very white like a funeral mask, alluding to her recent death in childbirth;

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Figure 8.2 Portraits of Duke Federico da Montefeltro (1422-82) and Battista Sforza, c.1465 (tempera on panel) by Francesca, Piero della (c.l415-92). Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright.

second, her elaborate hairstyle and exquisite jewelry are rendered in considerable detail revealing Piero's mastery of miniature portraiture. Federico's portrait is also very detailed, showing the various moles and blemishes on his olive skin. Federico presents his left profile to the viewer and thereby hides from view his blind right eye which, like his broken nose, was acquired in battle. Behind both Federico and Battista, receding into the far distance until it reaches the horizon where it merges with the sky is an extensive countryside landscape, comprising cone-shaped hills, fields, and a lake. On the reverse panels, Battista and Federico are represented in triumphal procession. Federico's carriage is being pulled by two white cavalry horses driven by Eros. Federico is sitting in a gilded chair, dressed in a full suit of amour and holding a scepter and is in the process of being crowned by the angel of la Vittoria. Toward the front of the carriage sit the four Virtues: Prudenza, T emperanza, Fortezza, and Giustizia. Battista's carriage, also driven by Eros, is drawn by two unicorns the symbols of chastity and purity. She has taken on a pious reading pose and is accompanied by Fede and Carita, at the front, and Speranza and Modestia, at the back, of the

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Figure 8.3 The Triumphs of Duke Federico da Montefeltro (1422-82) and Battista Sforza, c.I465 (tempera on panel) by Francesca, Piero della (c.I415-92). Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright.

carriage. Once again the backgrounds of both pictures are provided by extensive landscapes of the Urbino territories: behind Federico is Lake Trasimeno and behind Battista is the fertile countryside ofValdichiana. The message Federico sought to convey through these paintings is clearly one of territorialized sovereignty. The Latin inscription underneath his triumph declares: "His eminence is carried in great triumph for his famed eternal virtue proclaims him worthy of bearing the sceptre as the equal of the most distinguished condottieri."65 Federico, following in the Montefeltro family's traditional "profession of arms," had made his fortune as a successful condottiero and became the ruler of Urbino in 1444 (subsequently raised to a duchy by Sixtus IV in 1474). 66 Although Federico seems to have embodied many of traits of princely virtU admired by Machiavelli and could even be regarded as an equal to Cesare Borgia in terms of ambition and ruthlessness, Machiavelli despised him not only because he was a condottiero or mercenary but also because of a personal history of treachery toward Florence. 67 Machiavelli noted that during

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the formation of two rival alliances between 1473 and 1474 which had pitted Florence, Milan, and Venice against the Papacy and Naples, Frederick, the ruler of Urbino, then considered the ablest general in Italy, had for a long time carried on wars for the Florentine people. The Pope [Sixtus IV] and the King [Ferdinand of Naples], therefore, in order that the hostile league might be without this leader, determined to get hold of Frederick, so the Pope advised him to visit the King of Naples and Ferdinand invited him. Frederick consented, to the wonder and displeasure of the Florentines ... and Frederick returned from Naples and Rome with high honour and as general of Sixtus and Ferdinand's league. 68 Federico's shift of allegiance to Rome broke with the Montefeltro family's traditional allegiance with the Empire. Damisch suggests that this move prompted Federico to revoke "the Ghibelline mode of tyranny" and while "motivated by power politics as much as by reason" to endorse the idea that his authority should be founded on virtu and prudence. 69 The iconography of the portraits indicates that Federico sought to project an image of himself not as "the leader of a band of mercenaries" but as someone who strove to "comport himself like prince." 70 Although in the triumphal procession he is wearing amour, the standard iconography of the warrior-prince is largely absent. His military virtU is presented alongside and complementary to other princely qualities of good governance and cultural patronage. As his biographer Paltroni surmised, the life of this excellent prince is to be compared and equated with the life of any of the more worthy and notable ancients in any of the great generations. For the things he did so outstandingly in handling arms he merits the greatest fame and eternal memory, as he does for his singular sapienza (wisdom) in ruling and governing ... and for being learned in scienza (knowledge), eloquence, liberality, benevolence, and clemency, and for the splendid court and for magnificent and splendid buildings.7 1 Castiglione also felt that Federico's military virtU was equal to that of the great generals of antiquity and insisted that it was just one of his many qualities alongside "prudence, humanity, justice, generosity and an indomitable spirit." 72 His contemporary biographers were particularly impressed by the palace at Urbino designed by Laurana-Castiglione considered it the "most beautiful to be found anywhere in ltaly." 73 It was not only furnished and decorated with luxurious trappings of wealth and prestige, but also displayed a wealth of objects-antique statues, pictures, musical instruments, and rare Latin, Greek,

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and Jewish texts-which testified to its patron's high culture and learning.Y4 The architecture of the palace was designed to symbolize Federico's benevolent and compassionate rulership. The public spaces of the cortile and garden were accessible to all of his subjects, whom, we are told, he treated with such kindness and humility that they considered themselves to be the favored children of a kindly parent?5 Just as the palace architecture embodied Federico's good governance, so did the images that decorated its walls. It seems likely that the diptych would have hung in one of the palace's public rooms, thereby informing any visitors that the fruits of the prince's good government were evident throughout his domains. As such these paintings belong to the tradition of pictorial representations of good and bad government established by Ambrogio Lorenzetti's frescoes of Allegories of Good and Bad Government in Siena's Palazzo Pubblico (1338-40). Lorenzetti symbolized the abstract idea of good government by making its consequences manifest in the realistic visual landscape and the human activity taking place therein. Elegantly attired city folk ride out to enjoy the reinvigorating effects of the country, while peasants walk to town to sell their animals and crops. The landscape is the scene of various pastoral practices-reaping in the fields, tilling the soil, hunting in the country-all of which testify to the fecundity of Sienna's contado. Even the hillsides in the far distance have been extensively cultivated according to the rules of sound agricultural practice. This detail communicates the essential meaning of the fresco: the presentation of a well-governed land where human needs and pleasures are satisfied?6 For Kenneth Clark, Renaissance landscape painting evolved out of a tradition in medieval art which had developed an increased realism and naturalism to critique Christian symbolism and didactic imagery. The medieval "landscape of symbols," in which material objects were presented as symbols of spiritual truth and arranged in an unified flat surface in a decorative yet harmonious pattern, was replaced by a "landscape of fact" in which istoria could be presented in realistic settings that embodied "a new nexus of unity, enclosed space." 77 Chronologically, the Lorenzetti frescoes predate both the rediscovery of perspective and the maturity of the genre of landscape art, yet intimations of landscape emerged in art from the early fourteenth century. 78 The realistic landscape of Duccio di Buoninsegna's Entry into jerusalem (1308-11), argues Richard Turner, removed this event from its traditional representation within the symbolic narrative of the unfolding of divine will. Rather, Duccio communicates a sense of how the participants in and witnesses to the event might have experienced it. Further, the landscape itself was a source of meaning, rather than just a nugatory backdrop for the istoria? 9 By the dawn of the quattrocento, Renaissance landscape was increasingly represented as a domesticated and humanized space, a place that served man's

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physical needs and spiritual yearnings. "Its fields and groves are carefully groomed and only rarely give way to wild ravines, spectacular vistas, or deserted places." 80 Renaissance landscape had come to symbolize man's capacity to exercise sovereignty over his environment and was a forerunner of the cosmopolitan desire to organize, manage and cultivate space, which as William Connolly's reading of Tocqueville's justification for the foundation of the American state shows, is integral to the modern territorial imaginary. 81 Tocqueville, while aware that th~ foundation of this new state imposed an alien social fortn on the preexisting Indian communities, nevertheless argued that since the Indians were nomadic wandering tribes, lacking the knowledge of agricultural practice, they occupied but did not posses the land they lived on. Thus the continent of North America was effectively empty, waiting for the introduction of "civilization" by newcomers who would territorialize the land through agriculture, possession, and the exploitation of natural wealth. Similarly, the landscape extending behind Federico and Batista has been coded by agriculture. It is a space which, by means of agricultural processes, directed and overseen by the sovereign authority that possesses it, has been civilized. For Eugenio Batisti, the landscape has clearly been "modified by man" and there is a modernity to the general system of agriculture. The countryside has been shaped by modern farming practices: irrigation schemes, artificially created pastures, farms enclosed within rectangular hedgerows, and modern ploughing and tillage systems. Further, the buildings have been constructed according to the latest techniques, the little farmsteads are fecund, and a network of roads brings the component parts together. 82 In this representation of territorial sovereignty Piero painted a relatively unembellished landscape. By contrast, Andrea Mantegna's lncontro fresco (1474), in the Camera degli Sposi of the palace at Mantua, represented the same theme against an invented landscape. The Incontro shows an outdoor meeting between the Marquis of Mantua, Ludovico Gonzaga, and his son Francesco, who had recently been elevated to the status of a cardinal. Both men are accompanied by their entourages. The image symbolized a union of tem8oral and spiritual power within the persons of the Gonzaga family. Like Piero, Mantegna expressed the transcendental sovereignty of his signori by according their figures a rigid formality and monumentality. However, while Piero's sovereigns are shown against a landscape that was recognizably that of Urbina's contado, Mantegna's sovereigns are placed in an entirely fictitious landscape, com rising a vast walled medieval city set on top of a hill, the slopes of which are strew with antique temples, pyramids, and statues. By placing the Gonzaga arms o two of the entrance gates, whose approaches are presided over by Hercules, th god of political and civic wisdom, Mantegna makes it clear that the family con rols and effectively owns this city, the seat of their political power. However, Ma tua is actually situated in a flat countryside and lacks any significant Roman r ins.

Figure 8.4 Arrival of Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga, greeted by his father Marchese Ludovico Gonzaga III (reigned 1444-78) and his brothers, from the Camera degli Sposi or Camera Picta, 1465-74 (fresco) by Mantegna, Andrea (1431-1506). Palazzo Ducale, Mantua, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright.

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The city is, therefore, "a fantasy Mantova, a city of Lodovico's dreams," which with its allusions to imperial grandeur sought to present the Gonzaga as the inheritors of the majesty of imperial Rome. 83 Perspective serves to unite figures with the spaces that enclose them. In the Urbina Portraits this unifying quality of perspective lent itself to the visual representation of sovereign-territoriality by facilitating the inscription of the human figures of the sovereigns into the landscape of their territories (figure 8.4). One notable compositional feature of the painting is Fiero's successful unification of two distant perspective planes, the foreground figures and the landscape background, without resorting to the traditional ploy of placing an architectural balustrade between the figures and the landscape. Piero achieved "a remarkable synthesis ... between the accurate description according to the rules of linear perspective, as elaborated by Italian art, and "miniaturistic" painting obtained thanks to the techniques of oil paints, developed ... by Netherlandish artists." 84 Federico and Battista are inscribed into the landscape of their territorial dominion by means of pictorial juxtapositions: the wealth and authority revealed by the minutia of portrait detail in their faces and clothes are mirrored in the precise execution of the symbols of fertility and productivity in the landscape. The space of the painting is dominated by the imposing hieratic profiles of the sovereigns in the same way that "the power of the rulers portrayed dominates over the expanse of their territories." 85 The geometric lines of their profiles replicate and unite with the horizontal and receding lines which carve out the extended territory behind them. Although both sovereigns are placed against a background landscape of hills and mountains, there is an important difference conveying a political message. In the duchess's portraits the landscape encloses the scene, while behind the duke it opens onto a navigable body of water. Damisch reads this "almost as if these were the two complementary wings of a single political agenda, one of them affirming the dynasty's geographic roots, the other signaling the opening to the exterior reflected in the duke's enterprises." 86 These images are visual representations of the modern territorial imaginary, which not only express the fact of the extension of the prince's authority over a territory but also serve to legitimate it by showing the order and prosperity that have arisen as a consequence.

Mapping Territorial Boundaries Another form of image used by Renaissance state authorities to promote and legitimise their territoriality was the map. Deleuze and Guattari point out that the State-thought is constantly seeking to striate space. Now, in many ways, the map is the instrument of striation par excellence. As Mark Monmonier points out, maps are useful instruments for asserting claims to territorial sovereignty.

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The map is the perfect symbol of the state. If your grand duchy or tribal area seems tired, run down, and frayed at the edges, simply take a sheet of paper, plot some cities, roads and physical features, draw a heavy, distinct boundary around as much territory as you dare claim, colour it in, add a nameperhaps reinforced with the impressive prefix of "Republic of"-and presto: you are now the leader of a new, sovereign, autonomous country. Should anyone doubt it, merely point to the map. Not only is your new state on paper, its on a map, so it must be real. 87 Renaissance mapping and cartography combined tradition with innovation. The reception of Jacopo d'Angelo's Latin translation of Ptolemy's Geographia in 1406 nicely captures this Janus faced looking back and reaching forward. 88 Although the dissemination of the Geographia would have widespread repercussions, reaching beyond the obvious constituencies of geography and cosmology into many branches of Renaissance knowledge, its publication did not immediately render obsolete the medieval cartographic imaginary, based in the coordinates of divine symbolism. 89 The rediscovery of the Geographia was initially filtered through a scholastic discourse which ensured that "the modernization of Ptolemy was complex, tentative and obscure." 9 For a start, the Geographia appealed to churchmen interested in the traditional discourse of perspectiva. The optical theorem that only the aspect of an object on an axis with the eye's centre could be clearly observed, resonated in Ptolemy's instruction to mapmakers to view the part of the world to be mapped as if it were connected at its centre to the centre of the viewer's eye by an abstract visual axis or perpendicular line. 91 The Geographia, argues Edgerton, reinforced rather than overturned the traditional belief of Euclidean-based perspectiva that the perfect harmonies and symmetries of geometry revealed the plan of the universe as designed by God. 92 Renaissance Europe retained the belief that geometric patterns found in orthogonal relationships symbolized the ordered perfection of God's universe. Ptolemaic scientific cartography did not dispel these notions, but reinforced faith in the divine mission of Christianity. Indeed, the cartographic grid became a talisman of Christian authority. 93 However, the Geographia did inspire new cartographic techniques. Ptolemy showed how to map places in terms of longitude and latitude and gave cartographers the ability to preserve the correct proportion of small areas to the whole earth. His method unified within one geometrical space, two mapping techniques: chorography which mapped small areas using pictorial elements and geography which produced maps of the world showing features by lines and dots. The striating longitude and latitude grid system of the Geographia (figure 8.5) which "depended on imagining the globe not as amorphous topography but as a homogeneous surface ruled by a uniform geometric grid" would, as we shall see

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Figure 8.5 Map of the world, based on descriptions and coordinates given in "Geographia," by Ptolemy (Claudius Ptolemaeus of Alexandria) (c.90-168 AD), published in Ulm, Germany, 1486 (color engraving) by German School (fifteenth century). British Library, London, UK/© British Library Board. All Rights Reserved/The Bridgeman Art Library. German. Out of copyright.

in the next chapter, eventually presage the end the T-0 map. 94 However, in Italy, which even during the middle ages had been "by far the most map-conscious part of Europe," Renaissance cartographers inspired by the Geographia, pioneered topographical mapping as a technique for territorializing the local landscape and marking-out territorial boundaries. 95 Unlike small-scale maps, which show a whole province or nation, the topographical map is a large-scale map of a small area or district, which shows the shapes and patterns of the landscape in terms of standardized formats and within a uniform scale. Representations of territoriality were promoted in two types of Italian Renaissance topographical map: bird's-eye views of towns and district or regional maps. Until the fifteenth century the picture maps of Italian towns tended to' be rather basic, showing little more than the outlines of walls and the most no~a­ ble buildings (figure 8.5). Some were made of Milan and Florence but the v~st majority, such as the maps in Paolino Veneto's Magna chronologia (1320-30) r in Flavia Biondo's Roma instaurata (1444-46), were of Rome. By the end oft e quattrocento the basic plan no longer satisfied the realism required of art, a

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Figure 8.6 Carta della Catena, 1490 (Detail) by Italian School (fifteenth century). Museo de Firenze Com' era, Florence, Italy/The Bridgeman Art Library. Italian. Out of copyright. cartographers sought inspiration from the more realistic ground-view images of towns in paintings like Lorenzetti's Siena in Good Government or Benedetto Bonfigli's Perugia in the chapel of the Palazzo dei Priori (1454). Cartographers combined realism with perspective to construct bird's-eye views of cities of striking accuracy. Such detailed realism characterized the engravings of Pisa, Florence, Rome, and Constantinople made by Francesco Rosselli's workshop in Florence. One of the most famous of Rosselli's maps is the Map with Chain (1482), which depicts Florence as seen from the hills to the south-west. This map is an intriguing example of the representation of Renaissance territoriality within the regime of perspective, since Rosselli purposely included the person of the artist-surveyor, the agent of territorialization, drawing up the plan in the bottom right hand corner. Territoriality is being produced by knowledge. This simple self-referential motif embodies the ideological claim of the modern perspective regime that man is master and owner of all that he surveys. Yet, in so far as the walls separating the city from the contado are the most prominent territorial boundaries, the image also reflects the characteristic center-periphery ordering of Renaissance territoriality. Another feted practitioner of topography was Jacopo de' Barbari who, in 1500, produced a map of Venice that P. D. A. Harvey calls "a masterpiece of the vision and skill of the Italian Renaissance." 96 To achieve the single perspective required by a bird's-eye view, Barbari

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combined a mosaic of individual sketches within the framework of an existing plan ofVenice, which had been adjusted to achieve the uniform foreshortening. Through his mastery of painterly techniques, Barbari was also able to emphasize the city's great size, its wealth and its power. Leonardo da Vinci also drew several bird 's-eye maps of towns. During the 1503 war between Florence and Pisa, Machiavelli, as Florence's Secretary of State for War, commissioned Leonardo as a military architect to draw up an embanking scheme to divert the course of the Arno to cut Pis a off from the sea. This map was not only drawn to scale, but also depicted the surrounding countryside as a flattened projection as seen from above. It is possible that Machiavelli commissioned Leonardo after seeing the latter's bird's-eye plan of lmola, which the artist had presented to Cesare Borgia in 1502. In this map the plans of the buildings are drawn in proportion and the monuments remain to scale. Eight compass lines radiate out from the centre of the city to the circumference of the map's frame to enable accurate plotting of distances. Leonardo's maps showed how, by drawing to scale and supplanting pictorial imagery for outline plans, cartography could be used to promote landscape as both an economic resource and as an arena for military strategy and tactics. 97 A second type of topographical map produced during the Renaissance was the district or regional map of a small area. State authorities began commissioning these as administrative tools in the quattrocento and they had become widespread by the end of the sixteenth century. Perhaps aware of Machiavelli's insistence that "[t]he prince who lacks expertise in topography lacks the first quality needed by a general, because it teaches how to find the enemy, to choose encampments, to lead armies, to plan battles, and to besiege towns with advantage," many of these maps were used as aids to military strategic planning. 98 Several surviving fifteenth century maps provide "a graphic guide to the theatre of war at the time of the first Venetian conquests of the terrrafirma." 99 During the war between Milan and Venice (1437-41) two maps were made ofLombardy showing several items of military significance, such as walled towns and bridges and the Fosse Bergamasca boundary ditch between Milan and Bergamo. In the fifteenth century, district maps of Verona, Padua, Parma, and Brescia were also commissioned. A substantial Venetian mapping project was initiated in 1460 when the Council of Ten requested that the governors of territories, cites, and castles under Venetian rule should commission maps and surveys and then send them to Venice. Several of these maps survive including those made of Padua (1465), Brescia (1469-70), and Verona (1479-80). 100 There is also a 1496-99 military map of the Venetian terrafirma that highlights its territorial fortifications. These maps were used to "define borders,. to aid in water and lagoon management, to illustrate and clarify ambassadorial dispatches, for defense and fortress designs, and to resolve disputes in court cases." 101 Although district

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maps in the quattrocento were almost exclusively restricted to north Italy, there were some notable exceptions: a manuscript of the Geographia printed in 1448 reproduced a map of Tuscany by Pietro de Massaio; and Giovanni Pontano in the first decade of the sixteenth century produced a scale map based on a measured survey of the northern boundary ofN aples for King Ferdinand. There was a massive increase in the Venetian mapping projects in the sixteenth century. Venetian land surveyors or periti mapped and charted 150,000 hectares of land in the terrafirma between 1560 and 1600. The periti, armed with compasses, cross-staff quadrants, and astrolabes mapped the land using methods which combined perspective and Euclidean geometry with naturalistic landscape imagery. 102 One map commissioned by the Office of the Border Commissions (1538) showed the land between Strasoldo, Cervignano, Aquileia, and the Aussa River, has a "dear demarcation of proprietorship between Venice and Germany (de Tedeschi)" 103 Renaissance cartography, where it clearly demarcated the borders between political communities, manifested the principles of the modern discourse of territorial sovereignty. However, Renaissance cartography, underscored by the regime of perspective, would also play a significant role in the political territorialization of spaces beyond European Christendom. The Renaissance expansion of European international society would lead Europeans into spaces of danger and alterity. Cartography would be one of several discursive strategies called upon to territorialize these spaces and discipline their inhabitants. These processes, which are considered in the next chapter, would not only enfold them within the framework of a European territorial imaginary, but also require and enable Europe's own transition from a medieval to modern political spatial cosmos.

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CHAPTER 9

The Renaissance Territorialization of International Society

M

artin Wight has written "[w]hether or not we agree with Adam Smith that 'the discovery of the Americas and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind,' those events largely governed the development of international society." 1 If the previous two chapters discussed the internal dimension of Renaissance territorialization, this chapter looks outward, to its external projection through the discovery and conquest of the New World and the beginning of the expansion of European International Society. This process was, as William Connolly has observed, one in which the inscriptions of identity and difference were paramount. 2 Columbus did not discover America but a "world of otherness." The encounter between Europeans and Amerindian natives was not simply a meeting between two already-constituted subjects and the subsequent mastery of one by the other. America was not a preexisting world which the Europeans happened upon but a text to be discovered in the sense of an unfamiliar, unrecognizable set of empirical date which, in order to be made intelligible and therefore conquerable, was created and imagined in terms of the cultural predispositions and expectations of the Europeans, which were themselves altered by the experience of the encounter. In terms of space, the new was rendered intelligible and conquerable by processes of territorialization, which drew on representational media, notably cartography and traveler's narratives, to invent America as a space that could be understood, assimilated, and possessed by Europeans. Our concern, then, is with how the expansion of international society was achieved by strategies of territorialization. Such strategies demarcated and

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possessed space on behalf of political sovereignty, not only through direct physical occupation but also by means of representational media deploying spatial figures and vocabularies that determined how contemporaries understood and represented their individual and collective being-in-space. Clearly these historical events have generated a wealth of literature and the focus of this chapter is restricted to the initial period of discovery, broadly speaking from Christopher Columbus' first voyage in 1492 to the publication of Martin Waldseemiiller's Cosmographiae introductio in 1507. The "new" spaces of international society were territorialized by representational discourse operating at two interrelated levels of analysis. First, the machinations of various sovereign powers at the level of high politics, that is through the diplomatic negotiations which lead to the Treaty ofTordesillas (1494) and the division of the world into Portuguese and Spanish spheres. However, the Renaissance territorialization of international society was not simply the result of popes and sovereigns arbitrarily dividing the world into spheres of influence. Equally significant, and providing the conditions for such grand gestures, was the discursive construction of the "discovered" territories by cartographic practices, which sought to make familiar the nature and limits of these unfamiliar spaces, and the rituals of naming and possession, recorded in explorers logs and official correspondence, which accorded these lands and their inhabitants their identity within international society.

The Invention of America and the European Territorialization of the New World The thesis that America was invented rather than discovered, associated with the pioneering work of Edmundo O'Gorman, provides a useful heuristic model with which to address the Renaissance territorialization of international society. The political territorialization of the new world was deeply implicated in the epistemological invention of America. This process profoundly changed man's perception of his being-in-space, for it broke with the medieval conception of the orbis terrarum as a cosmic jail and promoted a new ideal of sovereign man as an agent capable of fashioning his world. For O'Gorman, discovery and invention are different acts. One discovers by finding something whose essence was already known, such as a new planet. Invention by contrast, denotes the act of bringing into existence a new category of being, that is the planets themselves. The weight of documentary evidence indicates not only that Columbus set sail fully intending to reach the western shores of Asia but also that throughout his voyages he never wavered from the conviction that he had achieved this goal. Nevertheless, Columbus scholarship from Oviedo to Morison has portrayed Columbus as the discoverer of America by resorting to one of two hypotheses: either Columbus was the instrument of a larger historical process of which he

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was unaware, or he was an agent of chance. 3 However, argues O'Gorman, for an act to have meaning it must have intention and it is logically nonsensical to assert that Columbus could have discovered America without first showing that he had the intention of doing so. In order to have discovered American he would have had to have been aware of the specific being of the land which he found, that is a continent named America. Thus "when we are told that Columbus revealed the being of an object entirely different from the one with which he endowed it, we are actually being asked to believe that the object itself revealed its secret and hidden being at the moment when Columbus perceived it.'>4 This argument not only discounts Columbus' own purposes and opinions, but also makes man the agent of intentions supposedly present in some inanimate object. For O'Gorman, the root of the problem lies in the assumption of Western metaphysics that all things have an immutable Platonic essence, that the being of things is fixed in nature and transcends time and space. This substantialist conception of reality fails to recognize that the being (not existence) of a thing is merely the meaning or significance it is given within an overall framework of reality accepted as truth at any particular historical moment, "the being of things is not something that they contain within themselves, but something that is assigned or granted to them." 5 The error of the discovery thesis, then, is to assume that the lump of cosmic matter that we now know as the American continent has always been such, rather than only becoming America when this meaning was given to it. America is not a thing in itself, an a priori essence, but an idea, the product of a historical process of invention. The invention of America was part of a widespread re-assessment of man's place in the world, precipitated by the early voyages of discovery, which undermined many of the assumptions of the medieval Christian geographical imaginary. 6 W. G. L. Randles argues that the empirical evidence of the discoveries undermined a clever synthesis of the medieval geographical imaginary. This had managed to combine the Greek proposition of a spherical earth with the biblical image of a flat earth, by positing a vast surface disproportion between the tiny habitable oecumene and the infinitely vast surface of the sphere. This synthesis began to come apart as the Portuguese voyaged along the African coast south of the Equator. Sacrobosco's hypothesis of the existence of uninhabitable zones collapsed and the distinct possibility emerged that humans ignorant of God's message lived in antipodal lands. The adventurer Duarte Pacheco Pereira reported that "under this equinoxialline there are many people, as we have seen in practice; and as experience is mother of everything, it is through it that we have come to know the whole truth." 7 These travelers' accounts were integrated into official cosmologies such as Enciso's Suma de geografia (1519). Between roughly 1480 and 1520 the surface of the oecumene almost quadrupled, all of its constituent parts were proven to be accessible, and most appeared to be habitable. In 1515

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Vadianus wrote that "today there is no region of the earth which is not inhabited by men and other animals." 8 Second, the empirical experience of the navigators in the southern hemisphere refuted the Aristotelian-Biblical consensus that a sphere of water encircled that of the earth, and led to the modern idea of the terraqueous globe. 9 Encisco could declare that water and earth together form one body at the centre of the universe. Third, the discoveries led to a revival of Crates' four island theory as an epistemological model to locate the new lands. In his Physices compendium (1520) Pedro Margalho asserted that the Spanish, traveling to the west beyond the Fortune Isles (Canaries), had encountered the lands of the periokoi, while the Portuguese, having sailed beyond the Tropic of Capricorn, had reached the lands of the antoikoi. 10 In sum, as biblical authority gave way to empirical observation of the austral hemisphere, so the medieval image of the flat earth gave way to the new notion of the terraqueous globe: "experience had established in an incontestable fashion that the oecumene was spherical." 11 O'Gorman has laid out in painstaking detail the gradual process by which American was invented. The crux of his thesis is that, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary, Columbus throughout his four voyages refused to abandon his a priori belief that the lands he had come across were the outer regions of the eastern coast of the orbis terrarum, wherein lay the dominion of the Grand Khan as described by Marco Polo. During the first voyage (1492-93) he informed his patrons Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile that "I shall set out for another large island which, according to the indications given me by the Indians whom I have aboard, must be Chipangu. They however call it Coiba (Cuba) and say that there are many large ships and sailors there .... I am still determined to go to the city of Quinsay (Hangchow-the capital of Great Khan as described by Marco Polo) to deliver your Highnesses' letters to the Grand Khan ..." 12 Much of the second voyage (1493-96) was spent navigating what is today's southern coast of Cuba. However, despite being told by the indigenous people that they lived on an island, "[t]he Indian ... told the Admiral that Cuba was definitely an island," Columbus maintained that he was navigating the southern coastline of the Chinese province of Mangi. 13 He even had a public instrument drawn up to this effect and had his crew declare on oath, under threat of fines and flogging, that because the coastline was so long it could not be insular and that the civilizations of the Golden Chersonese could be found a few leagues to the south. 14 The third voyage (1498-1500) was undertaken with the intention of locating the sea passage to the Indian Ocean, which Columbus believed lay south of the Golden Chersonese. Columbus, however, carne across a substantiallandmass-today's north-eastern coast of South America. To salvage his belief in the presence of a sea passage to the Indian Ocean he was forced to admit that the land was an inhabited southern orb or new world comparable to the orbis terrarum. The heresy implicit in this position was somewhat mitigated by identifying these lands

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as the site of the Garden of Eden, which was spiritually, if not geographically, regarded as being located within the world, that is the cosmic place assigned to man. 15 The fourth voyage (1502-4), also undertaken with the aim of locating the elusive sea-passage, navigated shores in the vicinity of the Panamanian-Costa Rican border. On the basis of native reports that a wealthy province replete with gold, jewels, and spices lay only nine days away by overland travel, Columbus identified these coasts as part of an isthmus, an additional Asian peninsula, lying between him and the province ofCiguare in the Indian Ocean. 16 It was, however, Amerigo Vespucci's voyage (1501-2) that for O'Gorman opened up the possibility of the invention of America. Vespucci set sail expecting to reach Cattegara, the southernmost point of Asia, where, it was generally believed, the coastline turned to the west. From there he intended to cross the Sinus Magnus to India and then return to Portugal having circumnavigated the globe. 17 However, after reaching the eastern coast of Brazil and following the coast south, the expected turn to the west did not materialize and the caravel sailed as far as the Antarctic Circle before returning to Lisbon by way of the Atlantic. At first Vespucci did not conclude that the southern land mass was separate from Asia and the orbis terrarum, although he did surmise that as it extended at least fifty degrees south latitude it must be part of a continental landmass. In the subsequent Mundus Novus, however, he identified the land mass as a new world. During these last few days I have written to you at length on the subject of my return from these new regions which we have explored and discovered, thanks to the armed fleet paid for and commissioned by his serene highness the King of Portugal. ... it truly seems that they are another world, and is not without justification that we have called them a new world [mondo nuovo] because the ancients had no knowledge of them and the things that have recently been rediscovered [ritrovate] by us overrides their opinions. They maintained that beyond the equator towards the south there is nothing apart from an extensive sea and a few barren islands; this sea they called the Atlantic, and if some among them have affirmed that there is a continent there they have understood it to be barren and uninhabited. But my last voyage has clearly demonstrated that this last opinion is false and totally contrary to the truth, since beyond the Equator I found lands [paesi] more fertile and more densely populated by men and animals than our own Europe, or even Asia or Africa, and furthermore a more temperate and agreeable climate than is found in whatsoever region known to us. 18 Once it was accepted that the new land was a continent, the next task was to establish whether it was contiguous with Asia and therefore formed part of

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the oecumene (as for Columbus) or whether it was independent anti-oecumene. In Mundus Novus Vespucci favors the second option: "We recognised that this land was a continent and not an island because its coast extended for a considerable distance without enclosing it and because it was filled with an infinite number of inhabitants." 19 Vespucci, argues O'Gorman, was correct to identify the discovered lands as new because they were previously unknown and their presence refuted the traditional belief that the southern hemisphere was entirely covered by sea. Not only did Vespucci conceive of the new lands as a different geographical entity to the three parts (Europe, Asia and Africa) of the orbis terrarium, but, having seen that they were inhabited, he identified them as a new world in the heretical sense of an orbis alterius, distinct from the orbis terrarum assigned to man by God. Vespucci's view that he had sailed to the fourth part of the world was, claims Randles, derived from Isidore de Seville's Etymologiarum, "Outside of these three parts of the world, there exists a fourth, beyond in the Ocean in a southerly direction, a region which is unknown to us due to the fieriness of the sun, at the interior limits of which it is reported live the antipodes of the fable." 20 Because Vespucci reverted to the traditional concept of the orbis alterius to identify the new lands, America had not yet been invented. Nevertheless, his voyage was the "empirical determinant that opened up the possibility of explaining the new-found lands in a way that contradicted the accepted picture of the world." 21 Later in the Lettera, Vespucci would affirm that the new lands neither belonged to Asia (and thus the orbis terrarum) nor were they an orbis alterius. Rather they constituted a previously unknown geographical unity, "a barrier running north and south through both hemispheres and lying across the Ocean between Europe and Asia, separate and distinct from the Island of the Earth." 22 It was left to Waldseemiiller in the Cosmographiae to assign the being of America to this unforeseen land barrier. Summarizing the current state of cosmographical knowledge, Waldseemiiller began by noting that the sphere of the earth is infinitesimally small compared to the size of the celestial globe. However, whereas the ancients had knowledge of about one quarter of the earth's sphere, the inhabited Island of the Earth, modern geographical knowledge recognizes that a fourth part has been discovered by Amerigo Vespucci (...). Inasmuch as both Europe and Asia received their names from women, I see no reason why anyone should justly object to calling this part Amerige, i.e., the land of Amerigo, or America, after Amerigo, its discoverer, a man of great ability.... Thus the earth is now known to be divided into four parts. The first three parts are continents, while the fourth part is an island, inasmuch as it is found to be surrounded on all sides by the ocean. 23

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All these ideas were illustrated in the accompanying map. For O'Gorman Waldseemiiller's naming of America is less important than his conception of the new lands as an identifiable geographical being: "[t]he independence of the new lands is finally recognized; they are conceived of as a distinct entity, separate from the Island of the Earth. Moreover, a specific being has been attributed to that entity and a proper name has been given to it to distinguish it from other similar entities." 24 The meaning of the new found land is "the meaning of being the "fourth part" of the world." 25 Yet, for O'Gorman, there is an apparent contradiction in the Cosmographiae for the new lands are at once geographically distinct from the orbis terrarum and comprise its fourth part. Now orbis terrarum not only signified the traditional tripartite landmass, but also denoted the traditional landmass and the new lands which, although insular (being separated from the other three parts by the Ocean), also belong to it. This new representation of the orbis terrarum implied that the traditional conception of the Ocean as an absolute boundary was no longer valid. The archaic notion of the world as a bounded place within the universe collapsed as the Ocean is transversed and the world extends beyond its ancient insular boundaries to embrace the entire terraqueous globe. Further, this world is no longer providentially given or assigned to man. Rather, from now on man can, potentially, make his world anywhere; it is a place which he makes, owns, and is responsible for. When the author of the Cosmographiae lntroductio asserted that the new lands, notwithstanding their isolation by the Ocean, were one of the parts that for the moment made up the world, he was really claiming for the first time in history his sovereignty over the whole universe .... the world having ceased to be considered as a sort of cosmic jail, man was able to picture himself as a free agent in the deep and radical sense of possessing unlimited possibilities in his own being, and as living in a world made by him in his own image and to his own measure. 26

Inter Caetera, Territoriality, and Sovereignty The voyages of discovery underpinned a new geographical imaginary that, echoing the conquest of cosmological space heralded by Ficino and Pico, declared the sovereignty of man over the world's spaces. However, the voyages of discovery were not primarily motivated by a desire to advance geographical knowledge but by religious, economic, and political interests. These interests would determine how the naked ontological presence of these newly encountered lands would be integrated within the European territorial imaginary. The "discoveries" would project the dynamics of territorialization onto spaces well beyond the boundaries of those European states nestled within the traditional orbis terra rum.

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From the beginning the race between Castile and Portugal to acquire colonies was adjudicated and legitimized by the Holy See. The legality of Rome's claim to adjudicate on such matters was established in Nicholas V's bull Romanus Pontifex (1455), which granted the Portuguese crown sovereignty over the recently discovered islands of Madeira, Cape Verde and the Azores, and over any further discoveries in the Atlantic. Nicholas claimed he was the rightful arbiter of disputes in the Christian world, including those concerning rival claims to lands inhabited by unbelievers, on the basis that he was "the successor of the key-bearer of the heavenly kingdom and vicar of Christ." Romanus Pontifex also confirmed that the right of the Christian princes to possess the new lands was derived from their role in the ongoing crusade of Christianity against Islam. The Portuguese deserve "suitable favours and special graces" for their role as "intrepid champions of the Christian faith," whose primary intention was to "restrain the savage excesses of the Saracens and of other infidels" by "vanquish[ing] them and their kingdoms and habitations ... and subject [ing] them to their own temporal domain." Portuguese colonial policies-such as the campaign against the Saracens in Africa, the founding of Christian settlements on the Atlantic islands, and the conversion of pagan peoples along the African coast-were commended for their contribution to the divine mission of spreading the Christian imperium wherever possible. In order to make this mission more secure in future, Nicholas gave his approval to Alonso and his successors "to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens and pagans, whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed" and "to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery" and to appropriate and use for their own ends any "kingdoms, dukedoms, counties, principalities, dominions, possessions, and goods" from the "capes of Bojador and ofNao as far as through all Guinea and beyond." 27 Clearly, a correspondence between the territorialization of international society and the Christian mission was established at the very outset. On his return journey to Castile at the end of the first voyage in March 1993 a storm forced Columbus to land in Lisbon where he was received by Joao II. Having heard Columbus' descriptions of the lands he had happened upon, Joao remarked "that it seemed to him, according to what had been agreed between them, that the newly conquered lands should belong to him." 28 The agreement Joao was alluding to was the Treaty of Ald.4° Second, Inter Caetera reaffirmed the tenet of Romanus Pontifex that it was proper that those who were committed to spreading the faith should receive appropriate economic rewards for doing so. Alexander thought that hardships incurred pursuing the task of spiritual conversion could be compensated by material rewards, especially in the form of gold. In return for their efforts in bringing "the residents and inhabitants" of "certain islands and continents, remote and unknown, and not hitherto discovered by others" to "the worship of our redeemer and the profession of the Catholic faith" it is right that the Catholic sovereigns should have exclusive access to the "[g] old, spices and a great many other precious things" found in these lands. Columbus also elides gold and conversion. "Your Highnesses must resolve to make them Christians, for I believe that once you begin you will in a short space succeed in converting to our faith a multitude of peoples while gaining great kingdoms and riches and all of their peoples for Spain. Because without doubt there is in these lands a huge amount of gold ... "41 For Todorov this association derives from Columbus' hopes that gold finds in the new lands would finance a new crusade to liberate Jerusalem. The language used by Columbus and Alexander was characteristic of what Stephen Greenblatt calls the "discursive economy of Christian imperialism," which assumed that all desires are convertible and amenable to exchange. 42 For Columbus "[g] old constitutes treasure, and he who possesses it may do what he will in the world, and may so attain as to bring souls to Paradise."43 Commodities are converted into gold, which is used to finance the project of conversion and thus to save souls. Further, the discourse of Christian imperialism is able to conflate earthly gain and divine purpose by reasoning that by depriving the Indians of their temporal possessions and enslaving them, the Spanish are thereby freeing them from their own bestiality and providing the conditions for the salvation of their souls.

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Inter Caetera can also be read as a document which symbolizes the transition from hierarchy to anarchy. It embodied an important juncture in the state of relations between the waning authority of the papacy and the waxing authority of the incipient nation-states. The language which Alexander deployed to authorize his conferring of apostolic favor on Castile's overseas enterprise harked back to the hierarchical discourse of papal plenitudo potestatis. [F]rom the plenitude of our apostolic power, the authority of Almighty God conferred on us in blessed Peter and the vicarship ofJesus Christ, which we hold on earth, by these decrees we give, grant, and assign forever to you, your heirs and successors, the monarchs of Castile and Leon, all islands and continents [insulas et terras firmas] found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered towards the west and south of a line to be drawn from the Arctic pole, namely the north, to the Antarctic pole, namely the south, whether these continents and islands to be found are in the direction oflndia or toward anywhere else, found by your envoys and captains, together with all their dominions, cities, forts, towns, and villages, and all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances. 44 By what right could Alexander make these concessions? Michael Donelan, for whom the proselytizing aspect of the conquests indicates a fideistic impulse underpinning the initial expansion of international society, notes that the bulls did not seek to legitimize the Spanish enterprise in terms of just war: there was no mention of the recovery of wrongly annexed lands, the right to defense from attack in support of preaching, or the correction of a breach of naturallaw. 45 This is perhaps surprising since the European monarchs were well aware that territorial aggrandizement could be veiled by the discourse of just war. A letter from Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome, Jerome Vich, written while preparing for an expedition against Algiers in 1510, had acknowledged that for a better justification of the said war [against Algiers] it would be appropriate for His Holiness to declare war ... against all infidels, to give us the right of conquest over all lands we would acquire from them, because it is said that it is not lawfully permissible for Christian princes to make war in any of the lands of the infidels, except in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, unless these infidels start a war against Christians, or unless war is declared against them by the Supreme Pontiff. 46 Another hypothesis is that Alexander's division of the new-found lands between the crowns of Portugal and Spain was an act of feudal investiture. This infeudation thesis has, however, been rejected by Luis Weckmann-Muiioz because

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Alexander did not request vassalage from the kings of Castile in return for ceding to them dominions in the New World. 47 Further, in 1493 no one had any notion that a new continent had been discovered. Neither Inter Caetera nor the drawing of the so-called Alexandrine line entailed the enfoeffement of a continent for "how can Alexander VI have "divided" a continent whose existence was not even suspected?'>4 8 Rather, suggests Weckmann-Muiioz, the pope's authority as fons iuris with the prerogative to grant new-found lands to Spain on condition that the Spanish converted the natives to Christianity, was derived from the omni-insular doctrine established in Urban II's Cum Universae Insulae (1091). Citing the spurious Donation of Constantine (750-800)-which asserted that Pope Sylvester had been bequeathed "all provinces, palaces and districts of the city of Rome and Italy and the regions of the West" by the first Christian Emperor on his withdrawal to his Eastern capital of Constantinople-this bull had claimed that all islands in Western Europe, particularly those recovered from the Muslims, were automatically assigned to the dominion of the Holy See, which had the right to cede them to whomsoever it wished. Initially the reach of the omni-insular doctrine was limited to the Mediterranean basin, but following the Portuguese discoveries in the Atlantic its range was extended in bulls such as Romanus Pontifex. Yet, points out Miguel Battlori, the remit of an omni-insular doctrine would not have covered lands identified as terra firma. 49 Rather, Alexander relied on the medieval theocratic doctrine of papa vicarius Christi, which had asserted the pope's sovereignty over both spiritual and temporal spheres. As vicarius Christi the pope could arbitrate in disputes where the princes directly petitioned the Holy See. Similarly, Donelan maintains that the only way the temporal powers of the papacy could have been legitimately stretched to give lordship over the Indies to the Castilian monarchs in return for spreading the Faith was by conflating Innocent III's principle of plenitudo potestatis, which allowed the pope to exercise temporal power for the well-being of Christendom, with Innocent IV's claim that as vicarius Christi the pope exercised God's lordship over the world. 50 Of course, Ferdinand and Isabel would have rejected the implications of these outdated and barely credible remnants of medieval theocratic discourse as being antithetical to attempts by princes and kings, like themselves, to carve out enclaves of territorial sovereignty free from papal interference. However, Renaissance Europe was a society whose norms, values, and laws were still filtered through the skein of Catholicism and the Spanish monarchs were aware of the requirement to at least seem to be operating within the discursive framework of Christian doctrines and institutions. Inter Caetera was evidence that, at least in terms of ideology, the Renaissance expansion of European international society was not exclusively a secular project, but was imbued with the still pervasive, if essentially empty, temporal claims of the papacy. If we cannot fully endorse

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Wight's assertion that Inter Caetera was "the most far-reaching exercise of papal world-sovereignty," there is truth to Donelan's argument that as an attempt to keep peace between Spain and Portugal "it was well-grounded use of the papal "plenitude of power" in the society of states." 51 Either way, it is evident that the territorialization of European international society did not begin with a caesura! rupture with the hierarchies of the Christian-Medieval cosmos. Although they were happy to utilize the rhetoric of Christian mission for their own expansionist ends, the Iberian monarchs considered themselves to be independent sovereigns and would have extended their territorial reach to the newly discovered lands with or without the approval of the pope. The terms of agreement drawn up between Columbus and the Castilian crown indicate that commercial motives far outweighed any religious concerns. In the memorandum of intent to form a business partnership, known as the Santa Fe Capitulations (April 17, 1492), Ferdinand and Isabel granted Columbus five concessions. 52 First, he was given a commission as admiral "on all those islands and mainland discovered or acquired by his command or expertise in the Ocean Seas." Second, he was appointed viceroy and governor general in the same territories. Third, he was given the right to "one-tenth of all and any merchandise, whether pearls, precious stones, gold, silver, spices," obtained or exchanged within the limits of his admiralty. Fourth, he was given jurisdiction over lawsuits arising from any matters pertaining to commerce within his admiralty. Fifth, he was given the right to invest one eighth of the cost of fitting out any vessels for trade or business and take one eighth of any resulting profits. These terms were confirmed in the Granada Capitulations (30 April 1492) in which the sovereigns re-affirmed that because Columbus was prepared to put his life in danger while seeking out new lands and islands on their behalf he should be rewarded appropriately. "You will be empowered from that time forward to call yourself Sir Christopher Columbus, and thus your sons and successors in this office and post may entitle themselves sir, admiral, viceroy, and governor of them." 53 In contrast to the papal bulls, these agreements make no mention of any duty to convert pagans and barbarians or to advance the universitas fidelium. The rationale for the discovery and possession of these lands was exclusively commercial, and these documents are to be interpreted in light of the struggle between Spain and Portugal for control of anticipated Atlantic trade routes to Asia. The stakes of this rivalry had increased dramatically since the annexation of Genoese trading stations by the Ottomans at the end of the fifteenth century, which had severed an important access route to the Asian markets for European traders. The Portuguese were seeking a sea route to Asia by circumventing Africa. In light of the progress they were making down the Western coast of Africa, Castile feared that it would be permanently eclipsed by its rival. This fear grew considerably when Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good

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Hope in 1488.54 Castile's response was to sponsor Columbus's expedition to the west as a way to preempt its rival and negotiate a commercial monopoly with the mainland Asians before the Portuguese arrived by the southern route. Henri Vignaud famously rejected the thesis that the Spanish intended to reach the Asia mainland, insisting that their aims were limited to reaching certain islands in the Atlantic. 55 However, the presence of the term tierra firme in these documents does suggest that the objective was to reach the fabled cities of the Asian mainland. Ferdinand and Isabel wrote that they were commissioning Columbus to go "to the region of India, by way of the Ocean Sea." 56 This raises another intriguing question. If tierra firme refers to the Asian mainland, how could Ferdinand and Isabella have expected to acquire and possess land that, presumably, already lay under the sovereignty of the Chinese rulers? Helen Nader suggests that the Spanish intended to establish fortified trading posts on the Asian coasts in accordance with the model already established by the Portuguese, who financed their Atlantic ventures as royal monopolies and claimed sovereignty over their trading posts. The most important Portuguese trading post, Sao Jorge da Mina, was established in 1480 with the permission of local West African rulers. 57 The Capitulations clearly stated that Columbus, as "admiral, viceroy, and governor," was a royal agent, invested with the authority to take possession of and to govern land and seas that he added to the royal dominions on their behalf. Evidently the Castilian monarchs sought to extend their sovereignty to the overseas islands and main-lands. However, in appointing Columbus, a foreigner, as a hereditary admiral, Ferdinand and Isabel came up against a constitutional barrier. Castilian law prohibited monarchs from permanently giving away or selling any part of the crown's military or juridical functions as hereditary offices. Any such actions would have violated a fundamental tenet of monarchical government that had "developed in Europe on the premise that the royal domain belonged to the royal family as a function of the monarch's judicial and military responsibilities, carried out for the welfare of the entire realm." 58 In order to circumvent this obstacle, the Castilian royal secretary Fernan Alvarez de Toledo drafted a preface to the agreements stating that the monarchs were acting of their own free will and added a postscript confirming the royal intention to make these grants in perpetuity as hereditary private possessions. He justified this permanent alienation of royal offices and income with arguments from philosophy, Roman law, and scripture. 59 The question of how to take legitimate possession of the newly discovered lands also exercised the discoverers themselves. The Crowns had issued highly formalized general instructions for its representatives taking possession of lands: The manner that you must have in the taking of possession of the lands and parts which you shall have discovered is to be that, being in the land or

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part that you shall have discovered, you shall make before a notary public and the greatest number of possible witnesses, and the best known ones, an act of possession in our name, cutting trees and boughs, and digging and making, if there be an opportunity, some small building [ediftcio], which should be in a part where there is some marked hill or a large tree, and you shall say how many leagues it is from the sea, a little more or less, and in which part, and what signs it has, and you shall make a gallows there, and have somebody bring a complaint before you, and as our captain and judge you shall pronounce upon and determine it, so that, in all, you shall take the said possession; which is to be for that part where you shall take it, and for all its district [partido] and province or island, and you shall bring testimony thereof signed by the said notary in a manner to make faith. 60 In the following account, of Columbus taking possession of the Indian island of Guanahani, it appears that while he did not enact any of the established symbolic rituals that physically marked the land, such as placing stones, cutting grass, raising mounds or pillars, or erecting crosses, he did perform the required speech acts of proclamation and naming. Immediately some naked people appeared and the Admiral went ashore in the armed boat, as did Martin Alonzo Pinzon and Vincent Yanez his brother, captain of the Nina. The Admiral raised the royal standard and the captains carried two banners with the green cross which were flown by the Admiral on all his ships. On each side of the cross was a crown surmounting the letters F and Y (for Ferdinand and Isabella). On landing they saw very green trees and much water and fruits of various kinds. The Admiral called the two captains and the others who had landed and Rodrigo de Escobedo, recorder of the whole fleet, and Rodrigo Sanchez de Segovia, and demanded that they should bear faithful witness that he had taken possession of the islandwhich he did-for his sovereigns and masters the King and Queen. He further made the required declarations, which are recorded at greater length in the evidence there set down in writing. 61 The display of the royal standard established the context within which these formal speech acts had meaning: they were performed on the sovereigns' behalf and were made official by being enacted in the presence of witnesses and recorded in writing. Stephen Greenblatt claims that there were two (absent) audiences for these linguistic acts, whose efficacy lay in the phrase "y no me fue contradichio," "and I was not contradicted." The real intended audiences were the other European powers who had the language and discursive conventions to dispute the claims but were not in situ. The Indians constituted a second

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intended audience despite that fact that the proclamations were issued in a language they could not be expected to understand. Columbus, argues Greenblatt, was not concerned with the subjective consciousness of the Indians bur with the correct enactment of the legal process by which, according to Roman law, land could be transferred from one patrimony to another as long as the original owner consented. Columbus staged a legal ritual that depended upon the formal possibility of a contradiction without actually permitting such a contradiction; "it enables him to empty out the existence of the natives, while as the same time officially acknowledging that they exist." 62 However, if the Indians, as Columbus himself admitted, had identifiable, if primitive, social, and economic conventions, then the legality of the possession remained dubious. 63 Francisco de Vitoria would later insist that although the Indians might be pagan and living in mortal sin, in so far as they were rational beings with political, cultural, and social institutions and systems of exchange requiring the use of reason, there was no legal basis for appropriating their territory. 64 In natural law, lands had to be either uninhabited, in which case they became the property of the first occupant, or they had to belong to a recognized enemy who had been defeated. Thus during the third voyage, by which time Inter Caetera and Tordesillas had formally designated the new lands as spaces under Portuguese or Spanish sovereignty, Columbus adopted a more derogatory representation of the Indians as lawless, warlike nomads living beyond the bounds of civilisation. The previous markers of civility, the "infinity of small hamlets," disappeared to be replaced by "a large and warlike people, with customs and beliefs very different from ours. These people live in mountains and forests without settled townships." 65 Once the Indians were depicted, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, as the nomadic war-machine, the other against which European civilization has defined itself since Aristotle, they could legitimately be territorialized by whatever means necessary. The second discursive ritual by which the new-found lands were possessed was that of naming. I passed from the Canary Islands to the Indies with the fleet which our most illustrious king and queen, our sovereigns, gave to me. And there I found very many islands filled with people innumerable, and of them I have taken possession for their Highnesses, by proclamation made and with the royal standard unfurled, and no opposition was offered to me. To the first island which I found, I gave the name San Salvador, in remembrance of the Divine Majesty, who marvellously bestowed all this; the Indians call it "Guanahanf." To the second, I gave the name Isla de Santa Maria de ConcepciOn; to the third, Fernandina; to the fourth, Isabella; to the fifth, Isla Juana, and so to each one I gave a new name. 66

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Tzvetan Todorov has remarked that, rather like Adam in Eden, in order to make sense of and possess the virgin world that confronted him Columbus set abo~t naming it. Occasionally this precipitated "a veritable naming frenzy." 67 He steered east to a cape which he called Be/prado, a distance of four leagues, and from there to the southeast is the mountain which he called Monte de Plata, and he says it is eight leagues. From cape Be/prado east by south is the cape he called del Angel. ... From Cabo del Angel four leagues in the same direction is a point which he called the Punta Seca, then six leagues farther is the cape which he called Redondo ... 68 Columbus' first gesture on contact with new lands was "an act of extended nomination, the declaration that the lands will henceforth be part of the Kingdom of Spain. 69 This naming was intrinsic to the "principle of attachment" which, suggests Anthony Pagden, informed the Europeans' initial responses to the encounter with the Indians. Strange Indian customs, habits, and rituals were interpreted through European categories of reference. This allowed commonalities and equivalences to be identified between Indian and Christian rituals, even if they were really incommensurable. Although the "principle of attachment" reduced the distance between self and other by rendering that marked by alterity as partially knowable, in making Indian otherness accountable, it also ran the risk of, if not eliminating the difference, assimilating the unknown to the known. For Pagden the discoverer entered into his discoveries through a sequence of epistemological strategies: attachment, recognition, and naming, which set up the conditions for the final act of possession. The first person to see a new land could claim a right ofpossession, which was recorded and secured by naming and the appropriation of tides. "The Europeans as they crossed and re-crossed the oceans, became inveterate namers and possessors." 70 Names, of course, are transferable; they are symbolic units that could be transported across the globe. "Just as maps could transform the un-possessable world into a series of lines and figures which could then be carried home to Barcelona or Lisbon, names had the power to reduce what still remained to be explored, possessed and settled into a single transportable set of phonemes." 71

Tordesillas and the Cartographic Representation of International Society The relative importance of fideistic and commercial motivations for the Renaissance expansion of international society will probably never be resolved. For Nader, because the papal decrees rested legal tide to islands and continents on the imperative to convert the native people to Christianity, the Spanish appeal

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to the papacy changed the nature of the Indies enterprise from its purely commercial origins to a mission infused with religious objectives. 72 Yet, Battlori is surely right that despite the personal religious beliefs of the sovereigns and their interests in evangelizing and maintaining the true faith, "the Alexandrine bulls had only subsidiary value in claims to dominion over the new lands." 73 Perhaps it is best to assume that economic gain and spiritual salvation were complementary objectives as the economy of exchange between gold and souls suggests. Whatever the underlying motivations and the respective interests of papacy and kings, they coalesced in Alexander VI's infamous drawing of a demarcation line on a world map to mark out the respective spaces of Portuguese and Spanish sovereignty. This was not the only time that cartography would have a pivotal role in the territorialization of Renaissance international society. In Inter Caetera Alexander had affirmed that the line should be "distant by one hundred leagues west and south from whatever of the islands that are called in Spanish 'the Azores and Cape Verde' or any territory that was in the effective possession of any Christian king or prince before the Christmas just past, from which the present year one thousand four hundred and ninety-three begins." 74 Samuel Edgerton has drawn our attention to the distinctly cursory nature of this division: Pope Alexander VI ... sat down before his mappamundi and arbitrarily, in the blank space to the left of the oikoumene, drew in a new meridian that he proclaimed to be "one hundred leagues west of the Azores." All the vast terra incognita to the west of this purely abstract "demarcation line" he awarded to the Spanish. Everything east must go to PortugaF5 However, this was not to be the end of the matter. Later in the year Alexander, responding to further pressure from Castile, issued Dudum Siquidem (September 26, 1493) which stated that if any Spanish agents, when sailing west or south, landed in eastern regions and "there discover islands and main-lands that belong to India" they did not have to cede them to the Portuguese. The Spanish were granted the freedom and authority to "take corporal possession of the said islands and countries and hold them forever, and to defend them against whosoever may oppose." 76 This blatant declaration of Spanish interest, which effectively nullified Portuguese rights over any further discoveries, displeased Joao who insisted that the line be extended further to the west. After a period of intense diplomatic maneuvering an agreement was reached between the two crowns and confirmed by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Under its terms the signatories agreed that "a boundary or straight line be determined and drawn north and south, from pole to pole, on the said ocean sea, from the Arctic to the Antarctic pole. This boundary or line shall be drawn straight ... at a distance of

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three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands." All islands and main-lands, known or to be discovered, to the east of the line "shall belong to, and remain in the possession of, and pertain forever to" the King of Portugal and his heirs while those to the west shall belong to Spain. 77 Both sides agreed not to send ships into each other's sphere of influence with the specific purpose of discovering land and accepted that any accidental discoveries must be passed to the rightful owner. Although lip service was paid to the traditions of religious oaths-the parties swore not to violate it "before God and the Blessed Mary and upon the sign of the Cross, on which they placed their right hands and upon the world of the Holy Gospels," and it was agreed that pope would be asked to confirm and approve it by issuing a bull-Tordesillas dispensed with the rhetoric of proselytization and conversion that is so marked in Inter Caetera. The sole stated purpose of the agreement was the "sake of peace and concord" between the two kingdoms. Tordesillas is an intriguing document of territorialization not least because it describes in some detail the process by which this line could be inscribed onto the physical surface of the globe. In order that the line should be both straight and at a distance of three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands both crowns agreed to commission a joint expedition comprising pilots, astrologers, and sailors who, having studied the sea, courses, winds, and the degrees of latitude would be able to identify a mutually acceptable point through which the line should be drawn north to the Arctic pole and south to the Antarctic pole. Once they had agreed on where this point should lie, delegates of both sides, conferred with their respective sovereign's authority and power, should "draw up a writing concerning it and affix thereto their signatures," thereby confirming that it was a permanent mark or boundary that could not be denied, erased or removed. If the line should cross any island or mainland, at the first point of such intersection ... some kind of mark or tower shall be erected, and a succession of similar marks shall be erected in a straight line from such mark or tower, in a line identical with the above-mentioned bound. These marks shall separate those portions of such land belonging to each one of the said parties; and the subjects of the said parties shall not dare, on either side, to enter the territory of the other, by crossing the said mark or bound in such island or mainland. 78 Clearly it was intended that this line should designate an absolute limit in space rather than just a frontier, there being, as Daniel Nordman has noted, a significant difference in the meaning of these two terms at the time/ 9 A limit denoted a theoretically fixed or immutable barrier, whether marked physically into the

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terrain or represented symbolically on a map, between two or more political or administrative bodies: signories, dioceses, juridical, or administrative zones, state boundaries. Their immutability was often reinforced by being established along divinely designated natural physical demarcations, such as mountain ranges or coastal littorals, and as they changed so geographical representations changed. A frontier, by contrast, separated two societies or groups whose stance toward one another was generally hostile; it was often marked by a visible material military presence, a garrison, or fortress, which, because it could be captured or destroyed, meant that the frontier advanced and retreated in space. "While the limit is immobile the frontier is movable." 80 The Tordesillas division of the world, which was anterior to most of the discoveries, effectively transformed a frontier zone between Spain and Portugal into an absolute limit, establishing their respective areas of present and future domination. This process, this territorialization of the world, known and unknown, physical and representational, entailed a significant shift in man's relationship to the sea. Recall that in the medieval geopolitical imaginary the Ocean was an empty void that could neither be possessed nor made subject to the exercise of sovereignty. To some extent this attitude still prevailed at the end of the fifteenth century. Frank Lestringant points out that because the ocean was an abstract place devoid of shape, relief, and color it was natural that the Tordesillas line of demarcation "was in the beginning traced across the indefinite space of the seas." 81 The sea, Deleuze and Guattari's "espace lisse par excellence," the archetype of all smooth space, was a blank canvas on which the fantasies of the imperial imagination could run free. Immersed in this space the Renaissance mind reacted with a mixture of wonder and respect. 82 The Spanish cosmographer Pedro Medina considered the crossing of an ocean to be a wondrous achievement because it traced a course across "a thing so vague and spacious ... where there is neither path nor trace." 83 However, as with all smooth spaces the sea was soon to be exposed to the forces of striation. Medina taught seafarers the new art of astronomical navigation and was a pioneer in the "politics of science" which territorialized and striated the sea. Maritime space became enclosed within the striations of the cartographic grid, as technicians of space combined bearings obtained by astronomical calculations and the plotting of locations within meridians and parallels. The Capitulations, writes O'Gorman, show a "desire on the part of the Crown to exercise an act of sovereignty on the Ocean ... the~\ contain an express declaration in favor of Spanish seigniory and lordship over the Ocean, which was ... something unusual if not unprecedented." 84 The forces of striation were in the ascendant. The striation of the sea was only one role that cartography would play in the invention of the spaces of Renaissance international society (figure 9.2). Renaissance cartography not only enabled the intellectual visualization of land

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Figure 9.2 Credit: Copy of Monumenta Cartographia, 1502 (color litho) by © Royal Geographical Society, London, UK/The Bridgeman Art Library.

but also provided practical tools for its "conquest, appropriation, subdivision, commodification, and surveillance." 85 Visible emblems of political and religious ideology decorated the Renaissance maps of European expansion. Particularly striking was the sweeping line of royal blue running from pole to pole on maps like the Cantino planisphere (1502). This cerulean swathe symbolized the Tordesillas demarcation and converted maps into "stridently geopolitical documents," recording and symbolizing "the division of the world into different national spheres of influence." 86 Yet, territorial claims were not just asserted through the drawing of boundary lines. Decoration, inscriptions recording discovery, commemorative portraits, and coats of arms all communicated ownership and possession. Embedded in the new world lands of the Cantino map are images of the. national flags of Portugal and Spain that act as declarations of

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ownership, which reaffirm the physical acts of possession enacted by explorers underneath the unfurled banners of their sovereigns. Just as these acts of territorial possession were recorded and legitimized in legal documents, so maps were covered in script confirming the symbolic messages of territorialization. Next to the image of the land that today denotes Brazil the author of the Cantina map affirms that this territory was "found by Pedro Alvares Cabral, a nobleman of the King of Portugal," while the islands of the West Indies are marked as the "Antilles of the King of Castille" (Has antilhas Rey de castella), "discovered by Columbus, who is Admiral of them." 87 In the Cosmographiae, Waldseemiiller explained that "[a]s farmers usually mark off and divide their farms by boundary lines, so it has been our endeavour to mark the chief countries of the world by the emblems of their rulers." Thus "the emblems of those sovereigns" were placed over "the fourth division of the earth, discovered by the kings of Castile and Portugal." 88 Symbols of political conquest were often accompanied by signs symbolizing the religious mission. For example, on the Juan de la Cosa world map (c.1500) the compass rose situated on the Tropic of Cancer embraces the Holy Family, while thrust into the core of the dense, dark, heavy mass of the terra incognita is an image of Columbus as Christoferrens, bearing the Christ child into the unknown world. These early maps of discovery did not just communicate the international politics of modern territoriality through iconography. At a formal level they expressed and contributed to the transformation of man's being-in-space enabled by perspective and its rationalization of space. Edgerton states that Alexander's gesture of demarcation was made on a mappa-mundi but it is probable that maps derived from Ptolemy's Geographia were also used during the formulation of Inter caetera and the negotiations leading to Tordesillas. The Geographia presented a world ordered by geometrical coordinates; Ptolemy's organizing system "depended on imagining the globe not as amorphous topography but as a homogeneous surface ruled by a uniform geometric grid." 89 By calling on Ptolemy's mapping techniques, which made possible the plotting of coordinates on intersecting perpendicular axes, the cartographer was able to combine the local surveys of the new lands made by the European sailors and the spaces of the known world into a synthetic whole. The Geographia signaled the end of the Christian symbolism of the T-0 map and the sanctified spatial hierarchies which had structured the representation of the Christian oecumene. From the late-fifteenth-century cartography would fix the spaces and boundaries of international society within a new conception of abstract, geometric, and homogeneous geographic space. 90 However, as we have seen, Renaissance discourses of space tended to retain some imprints of the medieval spatial imaginary. Cartography was no different and scholastic geographies were not entirely erased from maps until the early

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seventeenth century. Even Mercator's world map of 1569, for many an emblem of modern cartography constructed according to strict mathematical principles, still drew on non-scientific geographical sources. Mercator's representation of the Arctic, based on the legend of the four rivers recounted by the fourteenth century English monk Nicholas of Lynn, and his depiction of the Antarctic, based on the contestable authority of Ptolemy and Marco Polo, are, suggests Peter Whitfield, examples of "pure medievalism." 91 As William Boelhower has demonstrated with respect to the mapping of America during the Renaissance, a modern cartography based on the Ptolemaic system existed simultaneously with two medieval cartographic models: the pictorial map and the portolan chart. 92 Thus icons, which on medieval pictorial maps conveyed the characteristics of local place, were used by Renaissance mapmakers to convey the sense of wonder and strangeness that explorers felt on first contact with the new continent. 93 Images of mythical Indians and bounteous virgin lands served as representational substitutes that could be brought back to the Iberian courts in lieu of the objects themselves. Further, the rhumb lines criss-crossing the seas of many Renaissance world maps and the "dense toponymic chains along the outer edge of the new land" which deployed a "mnemotechnic device of naming to indicate possession and imminent settlement" harked back to the portolan maps used to chart sailing routes in the Mediterranean and the distances between and along coastline places. 94 The modern system of cartographic line and scale map, "uncontaminated by the imperfect body of the earth," freed of "the local perspectivism of the image" and thus able to project a global universalism within the orthogonal grid, would only come into its own with the rational and juridical organization of new Northwest territories when the cartographic line would mark out the boundaries of national spaces. Although cartography was an important instrument in the Iberian expansion and territorialization of the new world, the gridded map and the abstract spatiality it embodied were not universal. In Spain it was largely restricted to an elite group of cosmographers and geographers working for the Crown at the Casa de la Contrataci6n.95 Modern derivatives of the Latin mappa did not enter general circulation until the middle of the sixteenth century and only within specialized technical discourses did derivatives of spatium denote a "geometric, abstract, isotropic expanse." 96 The geographical descriptions sent back to Spain by colonial administrators still tended to rely on a medieval epistemology, which situated places in respect to the traveler's body passing through them rather than in terms of an objective optical abstraction. A text like Martin Fernandez' Suma de geografia (1519), which combined the new spaces of geometrical abstraction with the traditional linear space of narrative itinerary, conveys the hybrid spatiality characteristic of Renaissance Hispanic culture. The gridded map, suggests Ricardo Padron, was more a cartographic ideal rather than an achievable reality.

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Nevertheless if, as Walter Mignolo claims, an important aspect of colonialism is the struggle between competing semiotic systems and cultural modes of representation, then the gridded map served as an effective instrument of territorialization, since it effectively silenced Amerindian cartographic traditions, reducing them to barely legible imprints on the European maps. 97 European territorial representations filled out the spatial boundaries of the new world with meaning, memory, and identity; they were discourses of power and truth which silenced any alternative Amerindian representations of these spaces. In the mapping of America "European territorial representations (maps, descriptions), helped by the printing press, silenced Amerindian ones, which were never printed during the colonial period, producing the effect that the former were more appropriate or truthful descriptions of space than the latter." 98 However, these European maps did not only erase the spatial imaginary of the Amerindian. They were also representations of space which reinforced the notion that territoriality in the modern world should and could be ordered in terms of clearly demarcated and isolated parcels of sovereign space. They were, like all the representations of space discussed in this book, instruments for the inscription of identity and difference in space that defined the cosmopolitan or modern ideal of territoriality. They were part of a modern spatial imaginary which, born out of the Renaissance challenge to the hierarchical Christian medieval spatial episteme of above and below, made possible the territorial regime of inside and outside upon which the international relations of anarchy have been grounded ever since.

CHAPTER 10

Cone Iusion: Territoriality, the Renaissance, and International Relations

J

orge Luis Borges' enchanting fragment "On Exactitude in Science" captures succinctly the claim that our ideas about territoriality, and in particular the territorial state, are subject to the requirements of representation and imagination. 1 Purporting to be part of a travel record of one seventeenth century Suarez Miranda, Borges' textual fragment exposes the hubris that accompanies any attempt to provide a true, undistorted, and objective representation of space. In a certain Empire, reports Miranda, the practice of cartography had achieved such a degree of perfection that the map of a province occupied an entire city and a map of the empire a whole province. Taking this process to its logical end the "Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it." However, their successors, who were less enamored with such ambitions and realized that "the vast Map was Useless," abandoned the map to the vagaries of the seasons, and today the only evidence of its existence are a few tattered remains scattered across the desert region. Borges' parable denies the possibility that we can ever achieve some true, objective, or disinterested representation of territory. And yet, most International Relations theory is underpinned by the assumption, sometimes explicit but more often implicit, that the territorial state is a-historical, primordial, and universal. This conception of state territoriality, the territorial a priori, assumes that all states are characterized by physical extension in space, that they occupy a clearly defined place on the earth's surface, and that they have borders that clearly differentiate inside from outside and self from others.

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This book has advanced two interwoven critiques of the territorial a priori that, taken together, expose some of the deep-rooted epistemological and ontological assumptions about space and politics that inform much political and international political theory. The first critique is conceptual. Seeking to develop a methodology appropriate for a cultural or intellectual history of space and territoriality, it has two parts. First, it has challenged the assumptions, integral to the territorial a priori, that present sovereign-territoriality as universal, fixed, and objective. Second, it has advocated replacing the territorial a priori with the more fluid concept of the territorial imaginary, which emphasizes the historically contingent, transformative, and subjective nature of sovereign-territory. The territorial imaginary does not situate ideas of sovereign-territoriality exclusively within the domain of political discourse. Rather, it frames the imagination and representation of the politics of space within the more extensive landscape of a society's culture of space. It alerts us to how how the particular configurations of spatial discourses prevalent in any society construct ideas about space that limit the possibilities for conceiving of political existence within it. The book's historical claim is that in dismantling the medieval culture of space, ordered in terms of the hierarchical logic of above/below, the Renaissance erected the scaffolding upon which the modern territorial imaginary could be built. In the medieval culture of space, embodied by the soaring edifices of gothic cathedrals, all being was constituted in perpendicular chains of hierarchy, reaching from the debased spaces of the terrestrial world to the lofty elevated heights of the celestial world. Constricted by this framework, the medieval mind conceived of sovereign-territoriality in terms of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions and allegiances structured vertically through hierarchies of political authority, which extended far above the temporal authorities of Emperor and Papacy to culminate in the ethereal realm of the civitas Dei. During the Renaissance, the hierarchical architectonics of this medieval culture of space were discarded and the territorial imaginary it had generated was replaced. The novel spatial vocabularies and categories of the Renaissance culture of space established the conditions of possibility for the modern territorial imaginary. Man's being-in-space was redefined during the Renaissance; no longer imprisoned within space, man became the master of space, which could henceforth be known rationally, ordered systematically, and rendered the object of man's desires. In terms of political territoriality, this resulted in the gradual delegitimation of any claims to sovereignty above the state. The Renaissance established the modern territorial imaginary in which territorial sovereignty is parceled out between clearly differentiated political authorities co-existing on a horizontal plane of equivalence. The Renaissance made possible the modern conception of a territorial imaginary, no longer governed by the spatial motif of above/below, but authorized by the oppositional figure of inside/outside.

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One of the implications of stressing the representational or imaginary nature of territoriality has been to prioritize its cultural dimensions. In so far as territoriality is produced in various discourses of space, territorial imaginaries are made manifest in a plethora of written and pictorial cultural texts. If we continue to adhere to the positivist goal of constructing scientific theories that satisfy Popper's criteria of verification or falsification, we will miss the constitutive dimension of these cultural texts. Thus this work has looked to hermeneutic or interpretative methodological tools prevalent in the humanities. For example, the evolution of perspective in painting was identified as an integral component of the Renaissance territorial imaginary; for not only did it promote a general sense of man as the master of space but it also gave various political authorities, notably princes and city-states, the means with which to express and legitimize their aspirations to territorial sovereignty. The implication that Piero della Francesca's portrait of Federico da Montelfeltro is as significant as Machiavelli's Prince for understanding Renaissance international politics may not convince many dyed-in-the-wool social scientists. Nevertheless, it is in keeping with the tenet of the "aesthetic turn" within International Relations that "the political" is constituted, legitimised and resisted in the spaces of representation. 2 At least it is hoped that this research has justified taking an interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter of international politics. Thinking about space requires that we explore areas of knowledge outside of International Relations' traditional constituency of politics, sociology, economics, and law. The political resolution of space in terms of sovereign-territoriality cannot be fully accounted for unless one explores coeval representations of space produced in discourses such as cosmology, art theory, urbanism, cartography, and geography and expressed in cultural commodities such as maps, paintings, and buildings. There are important political implications of conceiving of territoriality, and specifically the territorial state, not as some primordial or universal material fact but rather as a historically and culturally constituted form of representation or imaginary. The first is to acknowledge that the territorial state and the geopolitical distribution of space it authorizes-what Michael Shapiro calls the "international imaginary"-is not only historically contingent but is also achieved through violence. 3 All cultures have different experiences of places and spaces and code onto them alternative ways of being. However, since the Renaissance the expansion of the European world system, and the universalization of its projects of capitalism, modernity and Enlightenment, has resulted in the overcoding and erasure of indigenous conceptions and experiences of space. As the discussion of the Renaissance territorialization of international society demonstrated, the European appropriation and conversion of the "new world" was orchestrated as much through the discursive production of a novel territorial consciousness, as through acts of physical violence against its inhabitants. The

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mapping of the new world, the cartographic division of the world, and journal records of rites of possession all served to territorialize the "new world," domesticating unknown and foreign places and extending European power and control over the new spaces of international society. Putting the Americas on the map was less about determining the shape and extent of the earth than about "controlling territories, diminishing non-European conceptualization of space, and spreading European cartographic literacy; thus colonizing the imagination of people on both sides of the Atlantic: Amerindians and Europeans.'>4 The second implication of territorialization it that, as Deleuze and Guattari remind us, state strategies of territorialization and striation are always and everywhere challenged and opposed by the nomadic forces of de-territorialization. Again with reference to the European territorialization of the Americas, Walter D. Mignolo suggests that residual expressions oflncan cosmology in contemporary Peru can be read as a form of resistance to the dominant territorial imaginary ofWestern modernity. 5 For Shapiro this international territorial imaginary needs to be challenged by alternative visions of identities and spaces that privilege the flows of people rather than the static boundaries of sovereign territorialities, constructed according to the logics of inclusion and exclusion. 6 Of particular interest here is the critique of the dominant territorial model mounted by diaspora or border theory, with its celebration of cultural hybridity. "The nationstate," argues James Clifford, "as common territory and time, is traversed and, to varying degrees subverted by diasporic attachments." 7 The hegemony of the international territorial imaginary recedes in the face of Homi Bhabha's observation that nations, nation-spaces are performative or narrative constructs that are always seeking to erase the memories of their hybridity. Imaginary nations, like territorial imaginaries, are produced in in-between spaces within which novel notions of selfhood and identity arise: "[i]t is in the emergence of the interstices-the overlap and displacement of domains of difference-that the intersubjective and collective experience of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated.'' 8 Mirroring our critique of the territorial a priori, Bhabha's exposes the essentialist myth of the nation as an "originary and initial subjectivity", an "imagined community" secure within homogeneous empty time. 9 Rather, insists Bhabha, we must listen to to "counter narratives of the nation" that accentuate and highlight the "irredeemably plural modern space" of the nation. The phenomenon of de-territorialization has become a staple of of the contemporary discourse of globalization. Jan Aart Scholte has argued that if globalization means anything at all, it denotes a process of"respatialization with the spread of transplanetory social connections" or "the advent and spread of what are alternately called 'global,' 'trans planetary,' 'transworld' and in certain respects also 'supraterritorial' social spaces.'' 10 However, contrary to the enthusiasm of

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the hyperglobalizers, Scholte stands back from claiming that globalization has completely erased the map of territorial geography and the economic, political, and identity formations that it engenders. Today's global landscape, he suggests, is one in which global and territorial spaces coexist and interrelate in complex fashions. "We do not live in a 'borderless world' where territory is obsolescent." 11 The research undertaken in this work supports such caution. The discourse of globalization has a tendency to hyperbole, portraying the transformation from the modern Westphalian to the globalized postmodern world system in terms of a caesura! rupture of extremely short duration. For example, Saskia Sassen identifies the 1980s as a "tipping point," when the internationalism of the Bretton Woods system gave way to today's global era. This transition so radically transformed the organizing logics of territory, authority, and rights that it moved "us from an era marked by the ascendance of the nation-state and its capture of all major components of social, economic, political and subjective life to one marked by a proliferation of orders." 12 This is quite some claim. Especially in view of the fact that the cultural and intellectual revolution of the Renaissance lasted for most of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and that even at the end of this period few, if any, contemporaries had completely divested their thinking of some of the legacies of the hierarchical territorial imaginary. Of course, one of the claims made by globalisation is that we live in a world of acceleration and speed. Nevertheless, is it likely that if the transformation from medieval to modern territoriality took at least two centuries, that the transformation from the modern to the postmodern order is likely to have occurred in two decades? A second contribution that the research undertaken in the present book can make to the current debates about globalisation is to suggest a broader methodological remit than scholars in International Relations have tended to allow for. Both Scholte and Sassen are intellectually predisposed to see the territorial transformation of globalization as an objective process, one that the methods and epistemologies of the social sciences can adequately analyze and explain. However, as we have seen, transformations in ideas about political territoriality are intimately related to prevailing cultures of space. Thus, we need to examine how the transformations in the territorial imaginary of globalization are represented, and, indeed, produced in contemporary art, literature, and film. If my argument that the shift from the medieval territorial imaginary of hierarchy to the modern imaginary of anarchy was primarily represented and imagined within the cultural sphere has validity, we should perhaps, as International Relations scholars pay attention to the aesthetic postmodern re-imagination of space and place, so carefully documented by Frederic Jameson. 13 Yet, one need not justify historical research purely on the grounds that it allows us to better understand or explain today's world. International Relations as a discipline is not noted for its historical rigor, and the discipline as a whole

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can only be enriched by meticulous and patient research into the historical conditions of its existence. Thus, this work has tried to fill some of the gaps in a major lacuna in the discipline's historiography. The Renaissance can justly claim to have been as important a cultural and intellectual movement as the Enlightenment, which, due to the contributions that Rousseau, Locke, and Kant made to our understanding of the Westphalian international system, has been the subject of much research in international political theory. However, with the exception of Garrett Mattingly's magisterial Renaissance Diplomacy, the Renaissance is either absent or little more than a footnote in most International Relations texts. Indeed, the characteristic attitude to the Renaissance of the discipline is encompassed by Sassen's history of territoriality "from medieval to global assemblages" that makes no mention of the Renaissance at all. In common with much International Relations history, by erasing the Renaissance, Sassen is able to present the medieval and the modern international systems as two neat coherent historical formations. This neat binary implicitly holds out the promise of progress and modernity as the medieval is swept away by the modern. Of course, the historical narrative is rarely so neat, and by paying attention to the Renaissance we become sensitive to the complex and often non-linear nature of historical transformations. It is hoped that work has made a small contribution to restoring the Renaissance to its rightful place in the cultural and intellectual history of international political theory.

Notes

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Introduction: Territoriality, Westphalia, and International Relations

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley,

1979). 2. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 77-128, at p. 78. 3. Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives, ed. James A. Caporoso (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), pp. 69-96, at p. 92. 4. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," p. 92. 5. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 327. 6. Of course, the surface of the globe has never been neatly divided into sharply differentiated sovereign territorial units, but has included many fuzzy or porous territories, such as UN Protectorates, Imperial spheres of interest, mandates, trusteeships, and neutral zones. See Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System," World Politics, 39:1, 1986, pp. 27-52; and Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861," International Organization, 49:2, 1995, pp. 191-228. 7. See Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); and Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," International Organization, 55:2, 2001, pp. 251-87. 8. Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," The American journal of International Law, 42:1, 1948, pp. 20-41, at p. 28. 9. Gross, "The Peace ofWestphalia," pp. 28-29. 10. Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualising Global Politics," in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern

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Readings of World Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 11-22, at pp. 12-13. 11. Shapiro, "Textualising Global Politics," pp. 12-13. 12. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 1972), p. 49. 13. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 4. 14. Evelyne Patlagean, "L'histoire de l'imaginaire," in Jacques Le Goff, Roger Chartier, and Jacques Revel (eds.), La nouvelle histoire (Paris: CEPL, 1978), pp. 249-69, at p. 249. My translation. 15. Donald J. Puchala, Theory and History in International Relations (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 7. 16. Martin Wight, Systems ofStates, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 113. 17. Wight, Systems ofStates, p. 151. 18. Wight, Systems ofStates, p. 113. 19. Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235-64. Subsequently Krasner appears to have retracted this position. He writes that "the Peace of Westphalia was a break point with the past" and that it marked a "transition from Christendom to reason of state and balance of power as the basic cognitive conceptualization informing the actual behavior of European rulers." Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 82. 20. Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 21. Torbj~rn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 36-54. 22. David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 95. 23. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (New York: Dover, 1988). 24. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 64. 25. James DerDerian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy ofWestern Estrangement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 2. 26. Friedrich Meinecke, quoted in Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 103. 27. Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 110. 28. DerDerian, On Diplomacy, p. 106. 29. Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 102. 30. Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 31. Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose ofthe State, p. 30. 32. Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose ofthe State, p. 70. 33. Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose ofthe State, p. 74.

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203

34. Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose ofthe State, p. 76. 3S. Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose ofthe State, pp. 79-80. 36. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique ofthe Realist Theory of International Relations (London: Verso, I994). 37. Mattingly quoted in Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, p. 7S. 38. Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, p. 75. 39. Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I994). 40. Spruyt, The Sovereign State, p. I8. 41. Spruyt, The Sovereign State, p. ISO.

2

International Relations, Political Theory, and the Territorial State

I. Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 17-34. 2. Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), pp. 101 and 102. 3. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique ofThe Realist Theory of International Relations (London: Verso, 1994), p. 142. 4. Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, p. 30. S. Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1929), p. 80. 6. Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p. 6S. 7. S. Korner, Kant (London: Penguin Books, I990), p. 33. 8. Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p. 68. 9. Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, p. 69. 10. Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, pp. 70-71. 11. John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," in Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: David McKay, 1976), pp. 99-123; and Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, tr. R. Howard and A. Baker Fox (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1966). I2. Herz, "The Rise and Demise," pp. 100-101. I3. John Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in Herz, The Nation-State, pp. 226-S2, at p. 238. I4. See Herz, "The Rise and Demise," pp. 108-14. IS. Aron, Peace and War, p. I81. 16. Aron, Peace and War, p. 181. 17. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, I979). 18. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics, p. 131. I9. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 1S.

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20. Gilpin, War and Change, p. 122. 21. Gilpin, War and Change, p. 37. 22. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," reprinted in James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 129-77, at p. 138. 23. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory ofinternational Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 198. 24. Wendt, Social Theory ofInternational Politics, p. 213. 25. Wendt, Social Theory ofInternational Politics, p. 211. 26. Wendt, Social Theory ofInternational Politics, p. 211. 27. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 14. 28. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, p. 20. 29. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study ofOrder in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 8-9. Italics added. 30. Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 13. 31. James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 31. 32. Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 8-9. 33. See Cornelia Navari, "Introduction: The State as Contested Concept in International Relations," in Navari (ed.), The Condition of States (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), pp. 1-18. 34. Navari, "Introduction: The State as Contested Concept," all quotes from pp. 12-15. 35. Hans Kelsen, General Theory ofLaw and State, tr. Anders Wedberg (New York: Russell and Russell, 1945), pp. 210-21. 36. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 89. 37. Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 100. 38. Cornelia Navari, "Knowledge, the State and the State of Nature," in Michael Donelan (ed.), The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 102-21, at p. 108. 39. Navari, "Knowledge, the State and the State of Nature," p. 119. 40. Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations ofPostmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992). 41. Bauman, Intimations ofPostmodernity, pp. 178-79. 42. On the inappropriate appropriations of Hobbes in International Relations, see R. John Vincent, "The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought," Millennium, 10:2, 1981, pp. 91-101. 43. Rob Walker, "Realism, Change and 'International Political Theory'," International Studies Quarterly, 31:1, 1987, pp. 65-86. 44. Sheldon Wolin, "Hobbes: Political Society as a System of Rules," in Wolin, Politics and Vtsion: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 239-85, at p. 243.

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45. Hobbes limits his discussion of territory to chap. XXXIV of Leviathan. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 170-176, at p. 171. 46. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right, in Rousseau, Collected Writings Vol. 4, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, tr. Judith Bush, Masters and Kelly (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 127-224, at p. 160. 47. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, p. 168. 48. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, p. 139. Italics in original. 49. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, p. 143. 50. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, p. 143. 51. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Kant, Political Writings, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Reiss, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93-130. 52. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 94. Kant accepted the contemporary distribution of political territories, even though many were acquired by these illegitimate means, on the grounds that "the prohibition relates only to the mode ofacquisition, which is to be forbidden henceforth, bur not to the present state ofpolitical possessions." 53. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 115. 54. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 105. 55. The stranger may claim a "right of resort" as all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others "by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth's surface." See Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 105-8. 56. William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 121. 57. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy ofRight, tr. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 157. 58. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, tr. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 279. 59. Hegel, Philosophy ofRight, p. 213. 60. Hegel, Philosophy ofRight, p. 208. 61. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 77-128, at p. 78. 62. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Vol. 1, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 54. 63. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 1992). 64. Max Weber, "The Meaning of Discipline," in From Max Weber, pp. 53-64, at p. 253. 65. Weber, quoted in Fred Dallmayr, "Max Weber and the Modern State," in Asher Horowitz and Terry Maley (eds.), The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and

206

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Notes

the Twilight of Enlightenment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 49-67, at p. 59. 66. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two ofa Contemporary Critique ofHistorical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 47. 67. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, p. 49. 68. The typology of legal orders is in Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I, pp. 212-301. 69. BryanS. Turner, Max Weber: From History to Modernity (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 197. 70. On Weber's theory of the nation-state, see David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory ofModern Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), pp. 119-47. Quote at p. 122. 71. Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, quoted in Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory ofModern Politics, p. 125. 72. Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, referred to in Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory ofModern Politics, p. 129. 73. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 258-83. 74. Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 236. 75. Ratzel, quoted in Kern, The Culture ofTime and Space I880-I9I8, p. 224. 76. Ratzel, quoted in Kern, The Culture of Time and Space I880-I9I8, p. 226. 77. For Weber's views on great powers, see Economy and Society, Vol. I, pp. 910-911. 78. See Weber's article "Zwischen zwei Gesetzen," referenced in Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory ofModern Politics, p. 137. 79. Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 53. 80. Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda," Millennium, 16:2, 1987, pp. 215-29, esp. pp. 218-19. 81. Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in John A. Hall (ed.) States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109-36, at pp. 112 and 123. 82. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume Two: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, I760-I9I4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 56. 83. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37, at p. 8. 84. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis ofFrance, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 32. 85. R. B. J. Walker, "Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International Relations," in David Campbell and Mick Dillon (eds.), The Political Subject of Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 137-58.

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207

86. Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium, 17:2, 1988, pp. 227-62, at p. 248. 87. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," p. 230. 88. Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory oflnternational Politics," Alternatives, 17:4, 1987, pp. 403-34. 89. R. B. J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept of the Political," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 306-327, at p. 321. 90. Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War," in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 259-321, at p. 301. 91. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines," p. 302. 92. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines," pp. 303-4. 93. R. B.J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice," in Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1990), pp. 159-85. 94. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 128. 95. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community," p. 175. 96. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines," p. 290. 97. Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 129. 98. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community," p. 172.

3

Theorizing Territoriality: Discourse, Culture, History

1. Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), P• 5. 2. Sack, Human Territoriality, p. 19. 3. Robert David Sack, Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 40-41. 4. Sack, Human Territoriality, pp. 28-29. 5. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 4. 6. Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium, 17:2, 1988, pp. 227-62. 7. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), p. 204. 8. David Harvey, "The Geopolitics of Capitalism," in Derek Gregory and John Urry (eds.), Social Relations and Spatial Structures (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 128-63. 9. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, tr. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), at pp. 46 and 77.

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10. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p. 85. My emphasis. Two points are worth

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

noting. First, although Lefebvre contends that social spaces mirror the dominant relations of production, he does not suggest that space is reducible to them. Each mode of production has a space, but the characteristics of space are not equivalent to the mode of production. Indeed, he regarded the tendency to reduce the aesthetic, social, and mental realms to the economic as a "disastrous error." Lefebvre, quoted in Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), p. 38. Second, Lefebvre regarded social spaces not as distinct and bounded, but as overlapping, interpenetrating, and superimposed on one another. They cannot be explained in terms of isolated discourses (urban, geographic, architectural, or anthropological) which focus on particular aspects rather than the whole of social space. Henri Lefebvre, "Reflections on the Politics of Space," Antipode, 8:2, 1976, pp. 30-37, at p. 31. Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, pp. 413-14. Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, p. 39. Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, p. 42. Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, p. 42. Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, pp. 3-4. For a discussion of Foucault's epistemology, see Richard Rorty, "Foucault and Epistemology," in David Couzens Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 41-49. Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 48-78, at p. 67. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 1972), p. 49. Michel Foucault, "Confessions of the Flesh," in Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 194-228, at p. 194. Foucault, "Confessions of the Flesh," p. 197. Foucault, "Confessions of the Flesh," p. 196. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge, pp. 109-33, at p. 131. Miel Foucault, "Afterward: The Subject and Power," in Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 208-26, at p. 212. Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," in Power/Knowledge, pp. 63-77, at p. 69. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison, tr. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 136-38. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 143-46. Michel de Certeau, The Practice ofEveryday Life, tr. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 35-36. de Certeau, The Practice ofEveryday Life, p. 36.

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30. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol 1, tr. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1984), p. 85; and Foucault, "Truth and Power," p. 121. 31. Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," p. 68. 32. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. Robert Hurley (London: Athlone Press, 1984); and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1988). 33. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 142. 34. Delel).ze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 360. 35. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 452. 36. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 211. 37. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 385-86. 38. Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 4. 39. Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918, p. 143. 40. Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, p. 17. 41. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p. 25. Lefebvre suggests that modern space was fundamentally altered around 1910, when its codes and practices

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

began to dissolve. However, this common-sense space of Euclid and perspective did not disappear completely but left traces in consciousness, where it continues to inform words, images, and metaphors. John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, 47:1, 1993, pp. 139-74. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 158. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 158. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 157. Foucault, quoted in J. G. Merquior, Foucault (London: Fontana, 1981), p. 36. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 54 and x. Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge, p. 191. Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 55-56. Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 387. Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge, p. 176. Deleuze presents Foucault's archaeology as an engagement with statements that situates them in terms of three orders or realms of space: collateral, correlative, and complementary. See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, tr. Sean Hand (London: Athlone Press, 1988), pp. 1-22. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, esp. pp. 3-25. D.eleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 376. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 379. In a similar manner, Gaston Bachelard diagnoses modern philosophy as having contracted a "geometrical cancerization of its linguistic tissue" in which, "[o]utside and inside form a dialectic of division, the obvious geometry of which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains. It has the sharpness of the dialectics of yes and no, which decides everything. Philosophers, when confronted with outside

210

56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

69.

70. 71.

•

Notes

and inside, think in terms of being and non-being. Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry.... The dialectics of here and there has been promoted to the rank of an absolutism according to which these unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with unsupervised powers of ontological determination." Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, tr. M. Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), pp. 211-12. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 379. Nietzsche's aphoristic method is typical of nomadic thought, a "force that destroys both the image and its copies, the model and its reproductions, every possibility of subordinating thought to a model of the True, the Just, or the Right (Cartesian truth, Kantian just, Hegelian right, etc.)." p. 377. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, esp. "1440: The Smooth and the Striated," pp. 474-500. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 481. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 380. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 381. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 382. For a discussion of the Aristotelian territorial legacy, see Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Stephen Grosby, "Territoriality: The Transcendental, Primordial Feature of Modern Societies," Nations and Nationalism, 1:2, 1995, pp. 143-62, at p. 150. Grosby, "Territoriality," p. 155. Grosby, "Territoriality," p. 150. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," pp. 138-48. All social organisations have some mode of differentiating human collectivities from each other in space. Ruggie identifies three ideal types other than territorial states: non-territorial collectivities based on kinship; the fluid territorial constituencies of nomadic property rights; and systems of territorial rule in which rights are not necessarily mutually exclusive as in medieval Europe. Ruggie, "Terriroriality and Beyond," p. 149. Ruggie's citations are from Joseph H. Strayer and Dana C. Munro, The Middle Ages (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1959), p. 115; and Perry Anderson, Lineages ofthe Absolutist State (London: New Left Review, 1974), pp. 37-38. See Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," pp. 149-50. John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert 0. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press), 131-57, at 143. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 150. Ruggie, "Continuity," p. 143. There are correlations between bourgeois theories of private property, which represent civil society as a framework for the protection of natural individual property rights, and international theory that managed to achieve a balance between the political rights of sovereign states and the idea of a community of states. Both "differentiate among units in terms of possession of self and exclusion of others; advance a possessive individualist

Notes

72. 73. 74.

75.

76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

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theory of the social realm as a contrivance to preserve the differentiation of the units and facilitate orderly relations between them; and are legitimized in terms of the minimal social needs of the component units." (p. 146). Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 151. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 151. For example, the English Enclosure Acts served the capitalist machine by deterritorialising dispossessed peasants, thereby establishing the conditions for their reterritorialisation in the textile looms. See Deleuze and Guattari, AntiOedipus, pp. 139-271, for the "universal history" of the three "social machines." Universal history is an abstraction and the social machines, rather than describing particular societies, suggest a set of abstract figures in terms of which particular societies may be understood. Universal history is also anti-historicist; the abstract machines are not stages of evolution with one machine resulting from the effects of another. See Paul Patton, "Conceptual Politics and the WarMachine in Mille Plateaux," SubStance, 13:3/4, 1984, pp. 62-80. The social machines are literally machines, which have "an immobile motor and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart, elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the tasks to be performed are distributed. Coding the flows implies all these operations." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 141. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 144. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 145. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 145-46. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 453; and Anti-Oedipus, p. 139. This resume of Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of capitalism is greatly simplified. See Anti-Oedipus, pp. 222-71, for a fuller discussion. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 252. They view schizophrenia as other to capitalism, "its difference, its divergence and its death.," Anti-Oedipus, p. 246. Eugene W. Holland, "Deterritorializing 'Deterritorialization': From the AntiOedipus to A Thousand Plateaus," SubStance, 20:3, 1991, pp. 55-65, at p. 63. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 235. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 244. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 251. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 240. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 261. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 261. This summary of the colonization of lived by abstract space is taken from Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 401. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, pp. 302 and 286.

4

Hierarchy, Order, and Space in the Medieval World

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 88. 2. Cassirer, The Myth ofthe State, p. 131.

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3. Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, tr. John Ciardi (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), Paradiso, XXVIII, 130-132, p. 569. Beatrice places the angels in Paradiso according to the Dionysian order. 4. Pseudo-Dionysius, "The Celestial Hierarchy," in The Complete Works, tr. Calm Luibheid (London: SPCK, 1987), 143-91, at I:120B, p. 145. 5. This discussion of Dionysius the Areophagite draws heavily on Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition in Dante's Comedy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 14-55. 6. Pseudo-Dionysius, "Celestial Hierarchy," II: 144C, pp. 151-52. 7. Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 19 8. Pseudo-Dionysius, "Celestial Hierarchy," III: 164D, p. 153. 9. Pseudo-Dionysius, "Celestial Hierarchy," III: 165A, p. 154. 10. Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition, p. 22. 11. Dionysius's account of the heavenly powers is in "Celestial Hierarchy," VI-IX, pp. 160-73. 12. Pseudo-Dionysius, "The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," in The Complete Works, pp. 193-259. 13. For the description of the Hierarchy of Law, see "The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," V: 301C, p. 234. 14. All quotes are from "The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," V, 500c-509a, pp. 233-39. 15. Ernst Cassirer, The Myth ofthe State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 132. 16. Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, 2nd ed., tr. L. A. Manyon (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 446. For Bloch, the feudal system ensured the systematic economic subjection of the peasantry by the ecclesiastical and warrior oligarchies. Feudal society was "an unequal society, rather than an hierarchical onewith chiefs rather than nobles; and with serfs, not slaves." p. 443. 17. A useful summary of the literature on vassalage and fiefs is Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassels: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 17-74. 18. Bloch, Feudal Society, p. 444. 19. Quoted in Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassels, p. 22. 20. Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassels, pp. 50-51. 21. Bloch, Feudal Society, p. 115. 22. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 312. 23. Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, tr. F. Hopman (London: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 55. Huizinga claims that despite the substitution of nobility and feudalism by monarchs and states, chivalry survived as a meaningful form of social expression well into the fifteenth century. 24. Huizinga, The Waning ofthe Middle Ages, p. 55-56. 25. Jacques Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, tr. Julia Barrow (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 156. 26. Quoted in Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, p. 156.

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27. Georges Duby, Les trois ordres ou l'imaginaire du ftodalisme (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1978). 28. My translation of an Italian translation ofDuby's French translation of this passage from the Latin, in Ottavia Niccoli, I sacerdoti, i guerrieri, i contadini: storia di un' immagine della societd (Turin: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1979), p. 18. 29. My translation of Duby's French translation from the Latin in Les trois orders, p. 15. 30. Le Goff, Medieva! Civilization, p. 256. 31. My translation from Niccoli's translation into Italian, I sacerdoti, p. 13. 32. Georges Duby, "Les societes medievales: Une approche d'ensemble," in Duby, Hommes et structures du moyen age (Paris: Mouton Editeur, 1973), pp. 361-79, at p. 369. My translation. 33. Duby, "Les socieres medievales," p. 368. My translation. 34. Duby, Les trois ordres, p. 150. 35. On this point and for a good general discussion of Duby and the three orders, see Elizabeth A. R. Brown, "Georges Duby and the Three Orders," Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 17, 1986, pp. 51-64. 36. Ouby, Les trois ordres, p. 141. 37. Duby, Les trois ordres, p. 146. My translation. 38. R. Roques, L'univers dionysien: Structure hierchique du monde selon le pseudoDenys (Paris: Aubier Editions Montaigne 1954), p. 174. My translation. 39. Quoted in Niccoli, I sacerdoti, p. 25. My translation. In medieval culture the left had multiple negative connotations. Therefore, by placing the agricultural workers on the left side of the pyramid the superiority of the knights was confirmed. 40. Le Goff, Medieval Civilization, p. 264. 41. For these distinctions, see Edmundo O'Gorman, The Invention of America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), pp. 51-69. 42. A.]. Gurevich, Categories of Medieval Culture, tr. G. L. Campbell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 58. 43. Yuri M. Lorman, Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture, tr. Ann Shukman (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 177-85. 44. Gurevich, Categories ofMedieval Culture, p. 70. See pp. 42-91 for an overview of medieval perceptions and representations of space. See also Harald Kleinschmidt, Understanding the Middle Ages (Woodbridge: The Boydall Press, 2000), pp. 33-61. Kleinschmidt traces a shift from early medieval notions of space as the sum of qualitatively different places occupied by objects to the high/late middle age notion that space encloses objects and has presence between them. 45. Gurevich, Categories ofMedieval Culture, p. 72. 46. Erich Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, ed. T. Silverstein, tr. R. Mannheim (University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 106. Auerbach discusses how Dante built his ethical system around the Nicomachean Ethics as elaborated by St. Thomas and interpreted by Brunetto Latini, pp. 105-21.

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47. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, tr. Mario Domandi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 178. Aristotle replaced Plato's idea of chora or space as a vast sphere in which objects are not confined to specific places or regions, by place as a distinct topos. Aristotelian space contained all particular places. Space encloses bodies; it is the geometrical line between bodies constituted by the boundaries of other adjacent bodies. There are no gaps between bodies and so all individual places are connected to space as a whole. In this universe there is no empty space. Aristotelian place is like a vessel that surrounds and contains the body located within it. Place is unchanging, "the inner surface of the innermost unmoved container of a body," Aristotle from Physics, quoted in EdwardS. Casey, The Fate ofPlace: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 55. See on Aristotelian concepts of space, Casey, op. cit., pp. 50-71, Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 174-85; and M.A. Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers (London: Allan Wingate, 1956), pp. 75-83. 48. Johannes de Sacrobosco, De Sphaera, tr. Lynn Thorndike, in Thorndike, The Sphere of Sacrobosco and Its Commentators (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 118-42, at p. 119. 49. Dante, Paradiso, XXIX, 51, p. 573. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 102. 50. Dante, Purgatorio, III, 15, p. 196. 51. Dante, Purgatorio, XXXI, 145, p. 375. 52. Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 82. 53. Dante, Paradiso, XXII, 132, p. 531. 54. See Dante, Paradiso, VII, 124-41, p. 434. 55. Dante, Paradiso, I, 102-5 and 109-111, pp. 379-80. 56. Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, pp. 296-97. 57. Dante, Paradiso, XXVII, 70, p. 567. 58. Dante, Convivio, 2:4, quoted in Karl Federn, Dante and his Time (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1970), p. 81. 59. Dante, Paradiso, XXIV, 130-132, p. 544. 60. W. G. L. Randles, De Ia terre plate au globe terrestre: une mutation epistemologique rapide (1480-1520) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1980). Much of the following discussion is drawn from Randles. See also 0' Gorman, Invention of America, pp. 51-69. 61. Macrobius, Ambrosius Theodisius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, tr. William Harris Stahl (New York: Columbia University Press [Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, 48], 1952), II: 5, 32-33, p. 206. 62. Quoted in Randles, De Ia terre plate, p. 13. 63. Saint Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, tr. H. Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 1972), XVI: 9, pp. 664-65. 64. Macrobius, Commentary, II: 5, 1-3, p. 200. 65. Augustine, City of God, XVI: 9, pp. 664-65. 66. Augustine, City of God, XVI: 9, pp. 664-65. 67. Dante, Inferno, XXXIV, 112-4 and 124-26, p. 180.

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68. Pierre d'Ailly, Imago Mundi, tr. into French by Edmond Buron, in Texte Latin et traduction franraise de quatre traites cosmographiques de d'Ailly et des notes marginales de Christophe Colomb, ed. Buron (Paris: Maisonneuve Freres, 1930), p. 187. My translations refer to the French edition. 69. Randles, De La terre plate, p. 11. 70. Sacrobosco, De Sphaera, p. 129. 71. Pierre d'Ailly, Imago Mundi, pp. 254-55. 72. Paolo Revelli, L1talia nella Divina Commedia (Milano: Fratelli Treves, Editori, 1922), p. 33. My translation. 73. On mappae-mundi, see Jerry Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), pp. 26-33; David Woodward, "Maps and the Rationalization of Geographic Space," in Jay A. Levenson (ed.), Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press [National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC], 1991), pp. 83-7; and Brenda Deen Schildgen, Dante and the Orient (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), pp. 66-91. 74. Dante Paradiso, IX, 83, p. 446; and Dante, Monarchia, tr. and ed. Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), I:XI, 12-14, p. 27. 75. O'Gorman, Invention ofAmerica, p. 67. 76. Dante, Purgatorio II, 1-4, p. 191. Jerusalem at the centre of the northern hemisphere is directly opposite the Earthly Paradise, "the luxuriant holy forest evergreen," in the southern hemisphere, Purgatorio, XXVIII, 2, p. 354. 77. On Mandeville, see Randles, De la terre plate, pp. 17-20. 78. Quoted in Randles, De La terre plate, p. 17. 79. Lorman, Universe ofthe Mind, p. 172. 80. John G. Demaray, "Dante and the Book of the Cosmos," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 77:5, 1987, pp. 14-15. 81. Le Goff, Medieval Civilization, p. 138. The following scheme is derived from Le Goff. 82. See Schildgen, Dante and the Orient, pp. 66-91.

5

Christendom, Hierarchy, and Medieval Political Discourse

1. The best introduction to these debates is Jean Riviere, Le probleme deL' eglise et deL' etat au temps de Philippe LeBel (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Louvaniense, 1926), esp. pp. 2-60. See also Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press [in association with the Medieval Academy of America], 1988), pp. 33-95. Tierney provides an excellent selection of abridged primary source material. 2. The classic study is Walter Ullman, Medieval Papa/ism: The Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists (London: Methuen, 1949). 3. Gratian, Distinctiones, 22:i (c. 1140), in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, p. 119.

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4. See on this image, and other mmratures illustrating editions of Gratian's Decretum, Anthony Melnikas, The Corpus of the Miniatures in the Manuscripts of Decretum Gratiani: Vol. I (Rome: Studia Gratiana XVI, 1975), pp. 24-62. My discussion of the Skrziczick miniature draws heavily on Melnikas. 5. Boniface VII, Unam Sanctam (November 1302). Latin version in Corpus Juris Canonici, II, ed. Aemilius Friedberg (Graz: Academische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), col. 1245-46. English translation in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300, pp. 188-89. 6. Boniface VII, Unam Sanctam, p. 188. 7. Gerhart B. Ladner, ''Aspects of Mediaeval Thought on Church and State," reprinted in Ladner, Images and Ideas in the Middle Ages: Selected Studies in History and Art, Vol. II (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1983), pp. 435-55, at p. 447. Ladner observes that the Augustinian tradition between the fifth and late eleventh century entertained a functional concept of the state: "states are not communities or territories, but forms and functions of just government in the mixed condition in which the City of God finds itself on this earth." p. 437. 8. Quoted in Ladner, ''Aspects of Mediaeval Thought on Church and State," p. 439. 9. Ladner, "Aspects of Mediaeval Thought on Church and State," p. 446. 10. Gerhart B. Ladner, "The Concepts of 'Ecclesia' and 'Christianitas' and their relation to the idea of Papal 'Plenitudo Potestatis' from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII," reprinted in Ladner, Images and Ideas, pp. 487-515. 11. The term Ecclesia is central to medieval theocratic thought, but the meaning is somewhat slippery. Ladner explains that with the increased emphasis on the doctrine of papal primacy from Gregory VII onwards, the universal church (ecclesia universalis) became increasingly identified with the Roman church (Romana ecclesia). "The terms Ecclesia and Ecclesia Romana thus appear to coalesce into one concept comprising the Church both as an institution, that is as an essentially clerical 'corporation', and as the community of all the faithful, the Body of Christ. It was, perhaps, the formation of a 'corporational'-institutional aspect of the concept of the Church which gave increasing importance to the concept of Christian 'temporal' society (Christianitas, populus Christianus, politia or respublica Christiana), not simply identical with the Church." Ladner, "Aspects of Mediaeval Thought on Church and State," pp. 444-45. 12. Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustin us Triumphus and the Publicists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 13. Wilks, The Problem ofSovereignty, p. 28. 14. Quoted in Wilks, The Problem ofSovereignty, p. 58. 15. Ullman, Medieval Papa/ism, p. 8. 16. "Ullman's contention that the mediaeval belief in the superiority of anima over corpus (the primacy of the spiritual) must lead to the doctrine of direct temporal power of the Pope, is not borne out by the sources." Ladner, "The Concepts of 'Ecclesia' and 'Christianitas'," fn. 32 on p. 495.

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17. Etienne Gilson, La philosophie au moyen age: des origines patristiques a la fin du XIVe siecle (Paris: Payor, 1944), p. 257. 18. Ladner, "The Concepts of'Ecclesia' and 'Christianitas'," 492. 19. Quoted in Ullman, Medieval Papalism, p. 97. 20. Quoted in Ullman, Medieval Papalism, p. 97. 21. Ullman, Medieval Papalism, p.107. 22. Ladner," 'Ecclesia' and 'Christianitas'," p. 508. 23. Innocent Ill, "Sermon on the Consecration of a Pope," in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, pp. 131-32. 24. Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050-1250 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 431. 25. In the official documents oflnnocent's predecessor, Alexander III (1159-1181), plenitudo potestatis designated the delegation of power to a papal legate equivalent to the principle of plena potestas in civil and canon law. John B. Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times (Toronto: University of Toronto Press [In association with the Medieval Academy of America], 1980), p. 66. 26. On the other hand, Tierney notes that neither of these decretals contained any passages that were incompatible with claims to universal jurisdiction. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, pp. 127-28. 27. Innocent III, letter to King John, accepting his feudal homage (April 1214), in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, pp. 135-36. 28. See on the genesis of vicarius Christi and Innocent III's deployment of it in respect to potestas vicaria, that is the pope's authority within the ecclesiastical hierarchy, Michele Maccarrone, Vicarius Christi: Storia del titolo papale (Rome: Lateranum, N.S., xviii, 1953). 29. See the "Sentence of deposition promulgated by Innocent IV in the General Council of Lyon" (June 1245), in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, p. 144. 30. Innocent IV, encyclical letter Eger Cui Levia (c.1246), in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, pp. 147-49. Eger Cui Levia also rejects the imperialist interpretation of Constantine's donation of the empire to Pope Sylvester. For imperialists all papal claims to temporal authority rested on this act, which could be rescinded by the present emperor. Against this, Innocent argued that popes had inherited both royal and priestly powers from Christ. Thus, in surrendering the empire to Sylvester, Constantine did not bestow temporal power for the first time on the papacy, but merely acknowledged the de facto possession of what it already held de jure. 31. Maccarrone, Vicarius Christi, p. 125. 32. Maccarrone, Vicarius Christi, p. 126. My translation. 33. Hostiensis, On Decretales, 4.17.13, in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, pp. 156-57, at p. 156. 34. Hostiensis, On Decretales, 1.33.6, in Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, p. 157. 35. See Ullman, Medieval Papalism, pp. 114-37. 36. See Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times, pp. 84-85.

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37. Innocent IV, Comments on the decretale Quod Super, quoted in Maccarrone, Vicarius Christi, p. 126. My translation from the Latin. 38. See Ullman; Medieval Papa/ism. 39. Innocent IV, Comments on Quod Super, in Maccarrone, Vicarius Christi, p. 126. 40. Ullman, Medieval Papa/ism, pp. 130-131. 41. On the two swords, see J. A. Watt, "Spiritual and Temporal Powers," in J. H. Burns (ed.), Cambridge History ofMedieval Political Thought c. 350-c. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 367-423. Luke quote at p. 370. 42. Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times, p. 22. 43. Morrall, Political Thought in Medieval Times, p. 22. 44. Bernard, De consideratione iv, iii, 7, quoted in Watt, "Spiritual and Temporal Powers," p. 373. 45. Alanus, Commentary on Dist. 96 c. 6 (c.1202), in Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, pp. 123-24. 46. Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam, p. 189. 47. On the Investiture Contest, see Joseph Canning, A History ofMedieval Political Thought 300-1450 (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 82-110; and I. S. Robinson, "Church and Papacy," in Cambridge History ofMedieval Political Thought, pp. 252-305, esp. pp. 246-48 and pp. 301-4. 48. Huguccio, quoted in Watt, "Spiritual and Temporal Powers," p. 376. See also Huguccio, Commentary on Dist. 96 c. 6 (1189-91), in Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, pp. 122-23. 49. Watt, "Spiritual and Temporal Powers," p. 372. 50. Wilks, Problem ofSovereignty, p. 79. 51. Francis Oakely, The Medieval Experience (Toronto: University of Toronto Press [in association with the Medieval Academy of America], 1988), esp. pp. 105-35. 52. Oakely, The Medieval Experience, p. 111. 53. Oakely, The Medieval Experience, p. 114. 54. Brian Tierney, "Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism," The Catholic Historical Review, 62:1, 1966, pp. 1-20 at pp. 7-8. 55. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Laudes Regiae: A Study in Liturgical Acclamations and Medieval Ruler Worship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946). 56. Kantorowicz, Laudes Regiae, p. 62. 57. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 63-64. See pp. 61-78 for Kantorowicz's reading of this image. 58. Quoted in Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, p. 63. 59. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, p. 92. 60. Liber Augusta/is, or Constitutions ofMelfi Promulgated by the Emperor Frederick Two for the Kingdom ofSicily in 1231, tr. James M. Powell (New York, Syracuse University Press, 1971). 61. Liber Augusta/is, p. 4.

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62. Liber Augustalis, p. 92. The following discussion draws heavily on Kantorowicz's consideration of the theological-juristic discourse of the emperor, The King's Two Bodies, pp. 87-143. 63. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, pp. 94-97. 64. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, p. 99. 65. Quoted in Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies, p. 106. See pp. 102-7 for Kantorowicz's discussion of lex regia and lex digna. 66. Kamorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies, p. 137. 67. Dante Alighieri, Monarchia, tr. and ed. Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 68. Dante, Monarchia, l:ii, p. 5. 69. See on Aquinas' reasoning, Etienne Gilson, Dante et La philosophie (Paris: Librairie PhilosophiqueJ. Vrin, 1939), pp. 191-92. 70. Dante, Monarchia, l:ii, p. 7, and III: xvi, p. 145. 71. Dante, Monarchia, l:iii, p. 9. 72. Dame, Monarchia, l:ii, p. 7 and I:iv, p. 11. 73. Dame, Monarchia, III:xiv, p. 141. 74. Dante, Monarchia, III:xv, p. 143. 75. Charles Till Davis, "Dame and the Empire," in Rachel Jacoff (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Dante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 67-79, at p. 68. 76. Dante, Monarchia, III:xvi, p. 149. 77. Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, tr. John Ciardi (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), Purgatorio, XVI, 106-11, p. 280. 78. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "Dante's 'Two Suns'," in Kantorowicz, Selected Studies (New York:]. J. Augustin, 1965), pp. 325-38. 79. Gilson, Dante et Ia philosophie, p. 210. My translation. 80. Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies, p. 457. 81. Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies, p. 465. 82. Kamorowicz, King's Two Bodies, p. 465, fn. 41. 83. Donna Mancusi-Ungaro, Dante and the Empire (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), p. 26. 84. Dante, Paradiso, XVIII, 92-117, pp. 504-5. See Piero Boitani, "From Darkness to Light: Governance and Government in Purgatorio XVI," in John Woodhouse (ed.), Dante and Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 12-26. 85. Dante, Purgatorio, XVI, 94-96, pp. 280. 86. Dante, Paradiso, XXX, 128-38, p. 581. 87. Quoted in Otto von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral: Origins ofGothic Architecture and the Medieval Concept of Order, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 62. 88. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, tr. D Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 266. 89. Georges Duby, The Age ofthe Cathedrals: Art and Society 980-1420, tr. E. Levieux and B. Thompson (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 93. 90. Duby, Age ofthe Cathedrals, p. 95.

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91. Quotes from Sugar in Erwin Panofsky, "Introduction" to Abbot Sugar, On the Abbey Church ofSt.-Denis and Its Art Treasures ed. and tr. Panofsky (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 2. 92. Abbot Sugar, On the Abbey Church ofSt.-Denis, p. 101. 93. The form of "the High Gothic cathedral sought to embody the whole of Christian knowledge, theological, moral, natural and historical, with everything in its place and that which no longer found its place suppressed." Erwin Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism (Latrobe, PA: Archabbey Press, 1951), pp. 44-45. 94. Duby, Age ofthe Cathedrals, p. 104. 95. Duby, Age ofthe Cathedrals, p. 104. 96. von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral, p. 141. Against the view that Suger understood kingship in sacral terms, some historians argue that his Life ofLouis VI offers a more traditional theory of kingship as royal suzerainty at the summit of a pyramid of feudal ties. See Andrew W. Lewis, "Suger's Views on Kingship," in Paula Lieber Gerson (ed.), Abbot Suger and Saint-Denis: A Symposium (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1986), pp. 9-54. 97. Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, p. 172. The following account of the dispute is drawn from pp. 172-92. 98. Boniface VIII, Ausculta Pili (December 1301), in Tierney, Crisis ofChurch and States, pp. 185-86. 99. For Aristotle's impact on medieval Christian thought, see Canning, History of Medieval Political Thought, pp. 125-7; and Paul E. Sigmund "Introduction," to St. Thomas Aquinas, On Politics and Ethics, tr. and ed. Sigmund (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), pp. xvi-ix. 100. For Canning, Aquinas was not the main conduit of Aristotle's political ideas to the Middle Ages. More influential was Giles of Rome's (Aegidius Roman us) De regimine principum (1286), History ofMedieval Political Thought, pp. 133-34. 101. See Sigmund, "Introduction," pp. xix-xx. 102. "Gratia non tollit sed perficit naturam," Aquinas, Summa theologiae (Ia, 8, 2), quoted in Canning, History ofMedieval Political Thought, p. 145. 103. St. Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, tr. Hep.ry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 1972), XV:2, p. 598. 104. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum [The Governance of Rulers or On Kingship] (1265-67), tr. P. Sigmund, in Aquinas, On Politics and Ethics, Chapter 1, p. 14. 105. Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, p. 15 and pp. 16-17. 106. See "The Treatise on Law (Qu. 90-97)", Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I, in St. Thomas Aquinas, On Politics and Ethics, pp. 44-60. Divine law, the fourth law of the quadrate, is outside this order, for it pertains to God's commands for guidance to supernatural destiny, as revealed to Christians through the Scriptures. 107. Thomas Aquinas, Commentum in IV Libros Sententiarum (1253-55), in Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, p. 171.

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108. Original Latin version of Tractatus de Potestate Regia et Papali (1302-3) in Dom Jean Leclercq, jean de Paris et l'ecclesiologie du XIIIe siecle (Paris: Librairie Philsophique, J. Vrin, 1942), pp. 171-260. English translation is John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, tr. Arthur P. Monahan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). The best overview of the Tractatus is Riviere, Le probleme de l'eglise et de l'etat, pp. 281-300. 109. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, pp. 1-2. 110. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 4. 111. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, pp. 7-8. John, like Aquinas, considered kingship, if possible mixed with aristocracy and democracy, to be the best form of government. 112. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, pp. 13-14. 113. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 15 (Tractatus de Po testate, p. 181). 114. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 20. 115. See J. P. Canning, "Introduction: Politics, Institutions and Ideas, c. 1150c.1450," to Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, pp. 341-66, at p. 363. 116. The Donation was a Carolingian forgery based on the Legenda sancti Silvestri (Legend of St Sylvester 480-90). See J. P. Kirsch, "Donation of Constantine," The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume V (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). 117. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 43. 118. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 115. 119. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 115. 120. Riviere, Le probleme del'eglise et del' etat, pp. 272-307. 121. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought," in Kantorowicz, Selected Studies, pp. 308-24. 122. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori, p. 312. 123. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori, pp. 314-15.

6

The Renaissance Critique of Hierarchy

1. The exception is Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (New York: Dover, 1955). 2. Wallace K Ferguson, The Renaissance in Historical Thought: Five Centuries of Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1948); also Ferguson, "The Reinterpretation of the Renaissance," (1956), reprinted in Wallace K. Ferguson, Renaissance Studies (London, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 1963), pp. 17-30. See also Johan Huizinga, "The Problem of the Renaissance" (1920) in Huizinga, Men and Ideas: History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, tr. J. S. Holmes and H. van Marie (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 243-87. 3. Erwin Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1960), p. 10. 4. Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences, p. 36.

222

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5. Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences, p. 35. 6. Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences, p. 35. 7. "quasi prima cagione della rinovazione dell'arte," quoted in Huizinga, "Problem of the Renaissance," p. 247; and "quella greca goffa maniera; et risuscito Ia moderna, et buona arte della pittura," Vasari, Vita di Giotto, quoted in Federico Chabod, "11 Rinascimento," (1942) in Chabod, Scritti sul Rinascimento (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1967), pp. 73-109, at p. 77. 8. On Enlightenment attitudes to the Renaissance, see Huizinga, "Problem of the Renaissance," pp. 248-54. 9. Voltaire, quoted in Huizinga, "Problem of the Renaissance," p. 250. 10. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. ]. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 410-411. 11. Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization ofthe Renaissance in Italy (London: Phaidon Press, 1995). 12. Burckhardt, The Civilization ofthe Renaissance in Italy, p. 61. 13. Burckhardt, The Civilization ofthe Renaissance in Italy, p. 87. 14. Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. vii. 15. Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, ed. Donald L. Hill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 5. 16. Dana B. Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth Century Italy: '11 Primato dell' ltalia' in the Field of Science," journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 4, 1943, pp. 1-20. 17. Ly~n Thorndike, "Renaissance or Prenaissance," journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 4, 1943, pp. 63-74. 18. Thorndike, "Renaissance or Prenaissance," p. 74. 19. Hans Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance," journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 4, 1943, pp. 21-49. 20. Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation," at pp. 32 and 45. 21. Federico Chabod, "II Rinascimento," (1942) in Chabod, Scritti sul Rinascimento, pp. 73-109, at p. 83. My translation. 22. Chabod, "II Rinascimento," p. 92. 23. E. H. Gombrich, "The Renaissance-Period or Movement?" in Background to the English Renaissance: Introductory Lectures, ed. J. B. Trapp (London: Gray-Mills Publishing, 1974), pp. 9-30. 24. Wallace K. Ferguson, "The Interpretation of the Renaissance: Suggestions for a Synthesis," (1948) in Ferguson, Renaissance Studies, pp. 125-35. 25. William ]. Bouwsma, "The Renaissance and the Drama of Western History," The American Historical Review, 84:1, 1979, pp. 1-15 at p. 5. 26. Bouwsma, "Drama ofWestern History," p. 8. 27. Eusebio Colomer, "Individuo e Cosmo in Nicolo Cusano e Giovanni Pico," in L'opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirando/a nella storia dell' umanesimo (Florence: Istituto Nazionale di Studi sui Rinascimento, 1965), pp. 53-102, at p. 102. My translation.

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28. My discussion of Ficino and Pico is limited to their writings on space. Useful

29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

general introductions can be found in Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, Vol. II (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1970). For Copenhaver and Schmitt, Ficino's Platonic Theology is "as much patristic and scholastic as classical, depending not only on Plato, Plotinus and Proclus but also on Augustine and Aquinas," Renaissance Philosophy, p. 149. Peter Burke, The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), p. 201. In Botticelli's Primavera the space between the earth and moon is filled with nymphs, wood spirits, and demons. John Hale, The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 562. Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of the Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 101. Marsilio Ficino, Opera omnia 1:19, quoted in Pauline Moffitt Watts, "PseudoDionysius the Areopagite and Three Renaissance Neoplatonists: Cusanus, Ficino and Pico on Mind and Cosmos" in James Hankins, John Monfasani and Frederick Purnell Jr. (eds.), Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller (Binghampton: Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1987), pp. 279-98, at p. 294. Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, tr. V. Conant (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 74-75. On Ficino's hierarchy of being, see Kristeller, The Philosophy ofMarsilio Ficino, pp. 104-9. G. Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, quoted in Watts, "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite," p. 290. Pico, Heptaplus, quoted in Watts, "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,"

290-291. 38. Pico, Heptaplus, 78-79, quoted in R. Waddington, "The Sun at the Centre: Structure as Meaning in Pico della Mirandola's Heptaplus," journal ofMedieval and Renaissance Studies, 3, 1973, pp. 69-86, at p. 83. 39. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 43. 40. Ficino, quoted in Kristeller, Philosophy ofMarsilio Ficino, p. 120. Kristeller provides a comprehensive discussion of the soul, love, and the principle of affinity in Ficino. 41. Charles Trinkaus, "Marsilio Ficino and the Idea of Human Autonomy," in G. Garfagnini (ed.) Marsilio Ficino e if ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1986), pp. 197-210. 42. Ficino, Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum, quoted in Trinkaus, "Human Autonomy," p. 201. 43. Ficino, Theologica Platonica II, quoted in Trinkaus, "Human Autonomy," p. 204.

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44. Trinkaus, "Human Autonomy," pp. 206 and 207. 45. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, "Oration on the Dignity of Man," in The Renaissance Philosophy ofMan: Selections in Translation, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and J. H. Randall Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 223-54. 46. Pico della Mirandola, "Oration on the Dignity of Man," p. 224. 47. Pico della Mirandola, "Oration on the Dignity of Man," pp. 224-25. 48. Ernst Cassirer, "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas," in Paul Oskar Kristeller and Philip P. Wiener (eds.), Renaissance Essays From the journal of the History of Ideas (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 11-60, at pp. 45 and 34. 49. Pico, Heptaplus, quoted in Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, p. 519. 50. Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe," in Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 102-10, at pp. 109-10. 51. R. B. ]. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice," in R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1990), pp. 159-85, at p. 175. 52. Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 2. 53. Kristeller, "Ficino and Pomponazzi," p. 109. More recently, Karsten Harries, Infinity and Perspective (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 54. Nicholas of Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, tr. Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: Banning, 1981). Good introductions to Cusa's cosmology are Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, pp. 108-16; Koyre, From the Closed World, pp. 5-2.3; and Harries, Infinity and Perspective, pp. 22-63. 55. Quoted in Harries, Infinity and Perspective, p. 50. 56. Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, 1:1, p. SO. All quotations in this paragraph are from this passage. 57. Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, 1:2, p. 51. 58. Harries points out that Cusa took the metaphor from Meister Eckhardt who, in turn, refers to the twelfth-century pseudo-Hermetic Liber XXIVphilosophorum, Infinity and Perspective, p. 59. 59. Harries, Infinity and Perspective, p. 60. 60. Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, II:2, p. 93. 61. See Harris, Infinity and Perspective, p. 60. 62. Cusa quoted in Lovejoy, Great Chain ofBeing, pp. 112-13. 63. Nicholas Copernicus, De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, reprinted in Michael J. Crowe, Theories ofthe Worldfrom Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution (New York: Dover, 1990), pp. 102-34. 64. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 513; and Lovejoy, Great Chain ofBeing, pp. 103-4. 65. Harries, Infinity and Perspective, pp. 33-34.

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66. Copernicus assumed that the structure of the universe was based on the symmetry of its parts. He placed the sun, the symbol of good in the Platonic tradition, in the middle of the universe. He assumed that the universe must be a sphere because "of all forms, the sphere is the most perfect." Furthermore, the "earth too is evidently enclosed between poles and is therefore spherical" and "is perfectly round, as the philosophers taught." Copernicus, De revolutionibus, at pp. 114 and 116. 67. Copernicus, De revolutionibus, p. 119. 68. Copernicus, De revolutionibus, pp. 127-28. 69. Copernicus, De revolutionibus, p. 132. 70. Copernicus, De revolutionibus, p. 133. 71. Ernst Cassirer, Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946),

p. 132. 72. Cassirer, Myth ofthe State, p. 133. 73. Cassirer, Myth ofthe State, p. 136. 74. ]. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

For Pocock, paradigms are language structures whose function is to define and determine the commonly held view of politics in a society, thereby licensing some forms of political belief and action and restricting others. ]. H. Hexter, "The Machiavellian Moment," History and Theory, 16:3, 1977, pp. 306-37, at p. 316. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 53. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 53. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 53. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 56-57. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 165. Gennaro Sasso, "Machiavelli e la teoria deWAnacyclosis," Rivista Storica ltaliana, 70:1, 1958, pp. 333-73. See Niccolo Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra Ia prima deca di Tito Levio, ed. Gennaro Sasso and Giorgio Inglese (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1984), l:ii. For a useful comparison of Polybius and Machiavelli, see Leslie J. Walker, "Notes on Book 1," in The Discourses ofNiccolo Machiavelli, ed. Walker (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. 6-13. Sasso, "Machiavelli e Anacyclosis," p. 340 Machiavelli, Discorsi, l:ii, p. 67. This and all subsequent quotes are my translations. Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 199. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 184. Howard R. Patch, The Goddess Fortuna in Mediaeval Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 19. Anthony ]. Parel, The Machiavellian Cosmos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 65. Cary]. Nederman, "Amazing Grace: Fortune, God, and Free Will in Machiavelli's Thought," journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 60:4, 1999,

226

87.

88.

89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

•

Notes

pp. 617-38 argues against Parel that Christian providentialism still underscores Machiavelli's concept offortuna. Pare! argues that Machiavelli's references to fortuna in his political writings shows that he is still beholden to the beliefs of a premodern mindset, such as a belief that the heavens determine man's destiny. A.]. Parel, "The Question of Machiavelli's Modernity," The Review ofPolitics, 53:2, 1991, pp. 320-29, at p. 321. Niccolo Machiavelli, II Principe, ed. Arthur L. Burd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), XVI, pp. 365-67 and p. 358. These and subsequent quotations are my translations. Mikael Hi:irnqvist, Machiavelli and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 236. Giuseppe Prezzolini, Machiavelli: Anticristo (Rome: Gherardo Casini, 1954), p. 30. My translation. Compare Strauss's view of II Principe as "irnmoral and irreligious" and Machiavelli as a "teacher of evil with Sebastian De Graz.ia's claim that the many references to God "[s]cattered about his writings ... like poppies in a field of chick peas" indicates that scholastic categories of knowledge and Christian cultural norms pervade Machiavelli's writing to the extent that he "discourses about God always in the conventional reverent attitude." Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 9-10 and p. 12; and Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), pp. 58-59. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I:xii, p. 96. Machiavelli, II Principe, XI, p. 248. Machiavelli, Discorsi, Il:ii, p. 299. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I:xi, p. 92. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I:xi, p. 93. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I:xii, p. 95. J. Samuel Preus, "Machiavelli's Functional Analysis of Religion: Context and Object," journal ofthe History ofIdeas, XL:2, 1979, pp. 171-90. Machiavelli, Discorsi, l:xii, p. 94. Isaiah Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli," in Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History ofIdeas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: The Hogarth Press, 1979), pp. 25-79. Machiavelli, Discorsi, III:i, p. 461. Bernard Guillemain, Machiavel: L'anthropologie politique (Geneva: Librairie Droz S.A., 1977), p. 328. My translation. Guillemain, Machiavel: L'anthropologie politique, p. 328. Cassirer, The Myth ofthe State, p. 135. Cassirer, The Myth ofthe State, p. 140.

7

Machiavelli, Territoriality and Lo Stato

1. Giuseppe Prezzolini, Machiavelli: Anticristo (Rome: Gherardo Casini, 1954), p. 3. 2. Eusebio Colomer, "Individuo e Cosmo in Nicolo Cusano e Giovanni Pico," in L'opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirando/a nella storia dell'umanesimo

Notes

2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

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227

(Florence: Istiruto Nazionale di Srudi sui Rinascimento, MCMLXV), pp. 53-102, at p. 102. My translation. The secondary literature on the meaning of lo stato in Renaissance political theory is extensive. I have found particularly useful, Nicolai Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato in Florence before Machiavelli," in J. G. Rowe and W. H. Stockdale (eds.), Florilegium Historiale: Essays Presented to Wallace K Ferguson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 313-26; Quentin Skinner, "The State," in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 90-131; Federico Chabod, "Esiste uno Stato del Rinascimento?" in Chabod, Scritti sui Rinascimento (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1967), pp. 593-623; and Chabod, "Alcune questioni di terminologia: Stato, nazione, patria nel linguaggio del Cinquecemo," in Scritti sul Rinascimento, pp. 625-61. Skinner, "The State," p. 98. These examples are from Rubinstein and Skinner respectively. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," p. 315. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," p. 317. Skinner, "The State," p. 101. Vespasiano and Guicciardini are both quoted in Skinner, "The State," p. 101. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," p. 319. My translation. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," p. 318. Rubinstein claims that by the time Piero de Medici was ousted in 1494 "the theoretical concept of stato as constitution had lost most of its original meaning by the transformation of the power structure of Florence into the Medici regime." p. 319. Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 177. Skinner, "The State," p. 100. Skinner, "The State," p. 102. Skinner, "The State," p. 103. J. H. Hexter, The Vision ofPolitics on the Eve ofthe Reformation: More, Machiavelli and Seyssel (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 175. Prezzolini, Machiavelli, pp. 14-17. F. Chiappelli, Studi sullinguaggio del Machiavelli, quoted in Skinner, "The State," p. 102. Chabod, "Esiste uno Stato," p. 604. My translation. Although this concept of the modern state was a product of the seventeenthcentury tradition of natural law absolutism, represented by Bodin, Suarez, Grotius, and Hobbes, the Renaissance republican idea that the res publica, the community, was the ultimate source of authority, and that the rulers and magistrates were merely elected officials was also influential. Skinner, "The State,"

p. 107. 20. Niccolo Machiavelli, II Principe, ed. L. Arthur Burd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), I, pp. 173-74. All subsequent citations are from this text and are my translations, unless stated otherwise.

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21. Machiavelli, Il Principe, p. 183. Allan Gilbert translates this as "[t]he remote origin and long continuance of such sovereignty," Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince in Machiavelli, The ChiefWorks and Others: Volume One, tr. Gilbert (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 12. 22. Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), pp. 158-59. 23. Adolf Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953), p. 441. 24. Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. IV, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 949. 25. F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 26. 26. ]ens Bartleson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 88-136. 27. Bartleson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 136. Bartleson rejects the "Renaissance hypothesis" that the 1494 French expedition into Italy symbolized the moment when the state began to be imagined as distinct from an international system existing outside of its borders. Because there was no rigid differentiation between the inside and outside of particular states in Renaissance discourse, the notion of the international as a realm of the relations between autonomous states "dependent on yet ontologically distinguishable from individual states" was not possible. 28. Bartleson, A Genealogy ofSovereignty, p. 118. 29. Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 113. 30. See Walter Ullman, "The Development of the Medieval Idea of Sovereignty," English Historical Review, 64, 1949, pp. 1-33. 31. "Rex poterit in regno suo, quod imperator in terra imperii . .. Liberi reges tantum habent in regnis suis quantum imperator in imperio," quoted in Ullman, "The Development of the Medieval Idea of Sovereignty," p. 24. 32. Walter Ullman, "Personality and Territoriality in the 'Defensor Pads': The Problem ofPolitical Humanism," in Ullman, Law and jurisdiction in the Middle Ages (London: Variorum Reprints, 1986), pp. 397-410. For Ullman the development of the principle of territorial sovereignty could be seen in the changing intitulations of kings from Rex Francorum to Rex Franciae and from Rex Anglorum to Rex Angliae. 33. Ullman, "Personality and Territoriality in the 'Defensor Pacis'," p. 401. 34. Robert could not "potest trahi extra territorium," see Ullman, "Personality and Territoriality in the 'Defensor Pacis'," p. 402. 35. De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 159. 36. "se io potessi sbucare del dominio," Machiavelli, quoted in de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 159. 37. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," p. 320. In diplomatic documents despotic states had the same status as republics. 38. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," fn. 79, p. 326. 39. Chabod, "Alcune questioni," p. 631. My translation.

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40. Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect (Heme! Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 87-104, at p. 104. Foucault argues that the sixteenthcentury territorial administrative state, analogous to the territorial a priori, of International Relations was supplanted in the classical age by the "governmental state," no longer defined by its surface area or territory but by a population which it controls through economic savoir. 41. Foucault, "Governmentality," p. 93. 42. Foucault, "Governmentality," p. 90. 43. Foucault, "Governmentality," p. 90. 44. Sheldon S. Wolin, "Machiavelli and the Economy ofViolence," in Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 195-238, at p. 221. 45. Machiavelli, Il Principe, XII, pp. 253-55. 46. Machiavelli, Il Principe, XII, p. 277. 47. See, especially, Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art ofWar, tr. and ed. N. Wood (New York: Da Capo, 1965). 48. As first secretary of the Ten of Liberty and Peace and later as secretary to the Nine of the Florentine Ordinance and Militia, Machiavelli had been personally involved in the recruitment and training of troops, conducting operations and negotiating treaties, and in proposing statutes governing the recruiting, equipping, paying, and disciplining of native infantry. See de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, pp. 93-97; and Machiavelli, "La Cagione dell'Ordinanza," in Niccolo Machiavelli, I:Arte della Guerra, Scritti Politici Minori (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2001), pp. 470-476. 49. Machiavelli, Il Principe, XII, p. 255. 50. Machiavelli, II Principe, XII, p. 255. 51. Machiavelli, II Principe, XII, p. 256. 52. Machiavelli, The Art of War, I, p. 40. 53. Wolin, "Machiavelli and the Economy of Violence," p. 221. 54. Niccolo Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra La prima deca di Tito Levio, ed. Gennaro Sasso and Giorgio Inglese (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1984), III:iii, p. 467. My translation. Machiavelli's reference is to Brutus who, according to Livy, not only ordered the death but attended the execution of his sons, the rebellious Tarquins. 55. Machiavelli, Discorsi, l:xxi, p. 114. 56. Machiavelli, Il Principe, X, p. 244. 57. Machiavelli, Il Principe, X, p. 244. 58. Rubinstein, "Notes on the Word Stato," pp. 320-321. 59. Elana Fasano Guarani, "Centre and Periphery," The journal ofModern History, 67, 1995, S74-96, at S74. 60. Guarani, "Centre and Periphery," S74-75. 61. Elena Fasano Guarani, "Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics," in Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17-40.

230

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Notes

62. Machiavelli, quoted in Guarani, "Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics," p. 23. 63. See the extracts in Machiavelli, The ChiefWorks, Vol. I, pp. 161-2. 64. In 1502 and 1503 Machiavelli was sent on official missions to Valentino's courts at Imola and Cesana, and then to the Papal court in Rome. From these courts he sent detailed dispatches to the Ten of Liberty reporting on the status of the ongoing alliance negotiations between Florence and Borgia. In these legations Machiavelli describes Cesare's rise and fall. See the extracts from Legation 11, "An Official Mission to Duke Valentino in Romagna" in Machiavelli, The Chief Works, Vol. 1, pp. 121-42; and Legation 13, '~n Official Mission to the Court of Rome" in Machiavelli, The Chief Works, Vol. I, pp. 142-60. In the Roman legation Machiavelli reports on the death of Pope Alexander in 1503 and the succession of Julius II; these events reappear in The Prince as the blow offortuna which ultimately cost Cesare his princedom. On Cesare's elimination of the Vitelli and Orsini factions in January 1503, see Machiavelli, 'A Description of the Method Used by Duke Valentino in Killing Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, and Others' in Machiavelli, The ChiefWorks, Vol. I, pp. 163-9. 65. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 31. 66. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison, tr. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), pp.l36-138. 67. Pierangelo Schiera, "Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions: Three Necessary Conditions for the Birth of the Modern State," The journal ofModern History, 67: Supplement (December 1995), pp. Sll-33, at pp. S30 and S32 68. Marsiglia of Padua, quoted in Schiera, "Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions," p. S19. 69. Machiavelli, Discourses, 1:12, in The ChieJWorks, Vol. I, p. 227. 70. Machiavelli, Art of War, 6, in The Chief Works, Vol. ], p. 69. 71. Sacchetti quoted in Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 165. 72. Martin Warnke, Political Landscape: The Art History of Nature (London: Reaktion Books, 1994), p. 40. 73. Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 166. 74. Guarani, "Center and Periphery," S81-82. 75. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I:vi, p. 78. 76. S. Zamperetti, I piccoli principi: Signorie locali, feudi e comunita soggette nello Stato regionale veneto dall' espansione territoriale ai primi decenni del' 600, quoted in Guarani, "Centre and Periphery," S86. 77. Wolin, "Machiavelli and the Economy of Violence," p. 219. 78. Niccolo Machiavelli, The History of Florence, in Machiavelli, The Chief Works, Vol. 3, I: xxix, p. 1069. 79. William E. Connolly, "Tocqueville, Territory and Violence," Theory, Culture and Society, 11:1, 1994, pp. 19-40, at p. 22. 80. Machiavelli, Il Principe, III, pp. 183-200. 81. Machiavelli, Il Principe, III, p. 187.

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82. The problems that Florence faced in keeping hold of cities with traditions of liberty also exercised Guicciardini, "it has been harder for the Florentines to acquire their small dominion than for the Venetians to gain their large one. For the Florentines are in a province that used to be full of free republics, which are very difficult to extinguish. It requires the greatest effort to conquer them and, once conquered, it is no less difficult to keep them .... The cities captured by the Venetians have been used to being subjected and lack the determination to defend themselves or to rebel.' Ricordo 29, Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi, Diari, Memorie, ed. Mario Spinella (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1981), p. 150. My translation. 83. ]. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 163. 84. Machiavelli, Il Principe, III, p. 186. 85. Antonio Gramsci, Quaderno 29 "Note per una introduzione allo studio della grammatica," in Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, Vol III (Giulio Einaudi, 1975), pp. 2339-53. 86. Machiavelli, "Discorso o dialogo intorno alia nostra lingua," in Niccol.o Machiavelli, Tutte Le Opere, ed. Guido Mazzoni and Mario Casella (Firenze: G. Barbera, 1929), pp. 770-78. 87. de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 146. 88. Quoted in de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 148. 89. Machiavelli, "Letter to Francesco Vettori," April 16, 1527, quoted in de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 420. 90. Machiavelli, "Discorso o dialogo intorno alia nostra lingua," pp. 770-71. My translation. 91. The terms piccola patria and La grande patria are from Chabod, ''Alcune Questione." In most Italian quattrocento texts patria refered to the city, although it occasionally denoted the wider collectivity. 92. Machiavelli, II Principe, XXIV, "Esortazione a Liberare L'ltalia da' Barbari," pp. 365-71. 93. Machiavelli, II Principe, XXIV, p. 367. 94. Machiavelli, II Principe, XVI, p. 371. Patria here denotes Florence, which will be ennobled if the Medici take on the role of liberating Italy. 95. Translation from Petrarch, Petrarch's Songbook: Rerum Vulgarium Fragmenta, tr. James Wyatt Cook (Binghampton: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1995, p. 185. "Italia Mia" is on pages pp. 182-87. 96. See on these debates: Felix Gilbert, "The Concept of Nationalism in Machiavelli's Prince," Studies in the Renaissance, 1, 1954, pp. 38-48; David Laven, "Machiavelli, italianita and the French invasion of 1494," in David Abulafia (ed.), The French Descent into Renaissance Itaf:y: Antecedents and Effects (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), pp. 355-69; and Hans Baron, "The Principe and the Puzzle of the Date of Chapter 26," journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 21:1, 1991, pp. 83-102.

232

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Notes

97. Prezzolini, Machiavelli: Anticristo, p. 73. 98. Federico Chabod, L'idea di nazione (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1962), p. 7. My translation. 99. See, for example, Machiavelli, Discorsi, III:xliii, p. 565. 100. Niccolo Machiavelli, "Ritratto di cose di Francia," Machiavelli, Tutte Le Opere, pp. 731-39. 101. Machiavelli, "Discorso o dialogo intorno alia nostra lingua," p. 771. 102. Vincent Ilardi, "'Italianita' among Some Italian Intellectuals in the Early Sixteenth Century," Traditio: Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought and Religion, 12, 1956, pp. 339-67, at p. 362. 103. Petrarch, "Italia Mia," lines 21, 30, and 56. 104. Petrarch, "Italia Mia," lines 80-86. 105. Fazio degli Uberti, Rime, XVII "Ai Signori e Popoli d'Italia, Serventese," at http://www.classicitaliani.it/trecento/fazio _uberti04.htm. 106. Salutati, quoted in Gilbert, "The Concept of Nationalism," p. 41. 107. On Flavio Biondo see The Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 11 (Online 2003), http:// www.newadvent.org/cathen/02575a.htm. 108. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 255. 109. Petrarch, "Italia Mia," lines 33-35. 110. Petrarch, "Italia Mia," lines 74 and 21. 111. Denys Hay, "Italy and Barbarian Europe," in Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacobs (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), pp. 48-68. 112. Hay, "Italy and Barbarian Europe," pp. 57-58. 113. Machiavelli, History ofFlorence, V:i, p. 1233. 114. Marcel Gagneux, "Italianite, Patrie Florentine et service de L'Eglise dans I'oeuvre et dans la vie de Frans;ois Guichardin," in Quetes d'une identite collective chez les Italiens de la Renaissance (Paris: Universite de !a Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1990), pp. 67-119, at p. 80. 115. Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, ed. Silvana Seidel Menchi (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1971), IV:vi, pp. 376 and 377. 116. Guicciardini, quoted in Gagneux, "Italianite," fn. 44, p. 80. 117. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, I:ix, p. 78. My translation. 118. Ilardi, "Italianita," p. 359. 119. Ilardi, "Italianita," p. 359. 120. Gilbert, "The Concept of Nationalism," p. 44. 121. Quoted in Gilbert, "The Concept of Nationalism," p. 43. 122. Machiavelli, History ofFlorence, VI:xxxvi, p. 1435.

8

Picturing Renaissance Territoriality

1. Niccolo Machiavelli, It Principe, ed. L. Arthur Burd (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1891), pp. 173-74. 2. Leonardo, quoted in Roger D. Masters, Machiavelli, Leonardo, and the Science ofPower (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1996), p. 52.

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3. Carlo Ginzburg, "Distanza e prospettiva: Due metafore," in Ginzburg, Occhiacci di legno: Nove riflessioni sulfa distanza (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1998), pp. 171-93. 4. John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, 47:1, 1993, pp. 139-74, at p. 159. 5. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 159. 6. Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, tr. C. S. Wood (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 27. 7. Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, fn. 5, p. 77. 8. "[L]a 'Grande Charte' de Ia Renaissance', Henri Focillon, Piero della Francesca (Paris: Armand Colin, 1952), p. 100. Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, tr. Cecil Grayson (London: Penguin Books, 1991). The best introduction to Alberti and perspective is Alison Cole, Perspective (London: Dorling Kindersley, 1992). 9. Martin Kemp, Behind the Picture: Art and Evidence in the Italian Renaissance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 95-96. 10. Alberti, quoted in Kemp, Behind the Picture, p. 90. 11. Martin Kemp, "Introduction" to Alberti, On Painting, p. 2. 12. Giulio Carlo Argan, "The Architecture of Brunelleschi and the Origins of Perspective Theory in the Fifteenth Century," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 9, 1946, pp. 96-121. 13. Alberti, On Painting, p. 37. 14. Kemp, Behind the Picture, p. 93. 15. Alberti, On Painting, p. 53. 16. Alberti, On Painting, pp. 64-65. 17. On Alberti's notion of the virtuous painter, see Kemp, Behind the Picture,

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

pp. 96-97. Kemp, Behind the Picture, p. 96. Focillon, Piero della Francesca, p. 104. My translation. Alessandro Angelini, Piero della Francesca (Florence: Scala, 1985), p. 17. Focillon, Piero della Francesca, p. 112. My translation. On De prospectiva pingendi see Kemp, Behind the Picture, pp. 97-101; Marco Bussagli, Piero della Francesca (Firenze: Giunti, 1992), pp. 5-13; and James

Elkins, "Piero della Francesca and the Renaissance Proof of Linear Perspective," The Art Bulletin, 69:2, 1987, pp. 220-30. 23. Cole, Perspective, p. 18. The squares of the terra cotta pavement are eight wide and deep, there are eight-pointed stars behind and in front of Christ, and an octagonal arrangement of patterned floor tiles around the stars. The piazza, in which the foreground figures are standing, is eight units deep into the shade of the middle distance, and then another eight units deep into light-flooded areas in front of the far wall. 24. Bussagli, Piero della Francesca, p. 15. My translation. 25. Henri Lefebvre, The Production ofSpace, tr. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 79.

234

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Notes

26. Denis Cosgrove, "Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers: New Series, 10, 1985, pp. 45-62, at p. 55. 27. Martin Jay, "Scopic Regimes of Modernity," in Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), pp. 3-23. For Jay, Cartesian perspectivalism, which combined philosophical ideas of subjective rationality with the artistic principles of perspective, was the dominant visual model or "scopic regime" of modernity. Although Cartesian-Perspectivalism was preeminent because it seemed to best express "the 'natural' experience of sight valorised by a scientific world-view," it was challenged by two counter regimes: (1) an "art of describing," as in seventeenth-century Dutch painting, based in cartographic principles; and (2) a "madness of vision," as in Baroque art, which flaunted the opacity of the sublime subject and underscored the rhetorical conventionality of sight. 28. Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 94. 29. Perspective erased "the living body itself: this is a space dominated by the eye and the gaze." Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 392. 30. John White, The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 121. 31. Argan, "Architecture ofBrunelleschi," p. 96. 32. Jay, "Scopic Regimes," at pp. 4 and 6. 33. Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, pp. 42 and 34. 34. Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, p. 58. 35. Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 161. 36. Edgerton, The Renaissance Rediscovery ofLinear Perspective, p. 7. 37. James Elkins, The Poetics ofPerspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 28-29. 38. Lefebvre, Production ofSpace, p. 78. 39. Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (London: Penguin Books, 1961). 40. Richard Krautheimer, "The Panels in Urbino, Baltimore and Berlin Reconsidered," in Henry A. Millon (ed.), Italian Renaissance Architecture: From Brunelleschi to Michelangelo (London: Thames and Hudson, 1994), pp. 233-56, at p. 238. 41. Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art ofBuilding in Ten Books, tr. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). 42. For an overview of the theme of the ideal city in the Renaissance, with particular emphasis on Alberti's De re aedificatoria and Filarete's Trattato d'architettura, see Helen Rosenau, The Ideal City: Its Architectural Evolution in Europe, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1983), pp. 42-67. 43. Fiske Kimball, "Luciano Laurana and the 'High Renaissance'," Art Bulletin, 10, 1927-8, pp. 124-51. The only other grand visionary urban settings produced

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235

until the second decade of the Cinquecento were the doors of the ducal apartment in the palace ofUrbino (1474-82). 44. Andre Chastel, "Vues urbaines, peintres et theatre," quoted in Hubert Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, tt. John Goodman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,

1994), p. 225. 45. Alessandro Parronchi, "Due note, 2. Urbino-Baltimora-Berlino," Rinascimento, 29, 1968, pp. 355-61. 46. Richard Krautheimer, "The Tragic and Comic scenes of the Renaissance: The Baltimore and Urbino Panels," Gazette des Beaux-Arts, 33, 1948, pp. 327-48. He retracted this reading in "The Panels in Urbino, Baltimore and Berlin Reconsidered."

47. Damisch, The Origin ofPerspective, pp. 238-39. 48. Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, p. 446. Damisch views the panels

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

as "representations of representation," a demonstration of perspective. He is interested in how costruzione legittima functions as a dispositif or model "what linguists call an 'expressive apparatus' (dispositifd'enonciation, sometimes translated as 'sentence structure')." Costruzione legittima is "characterised by the conjunction, the bringing together at a given point designated the 'origin', of lines that measure the declension of figures, by establishing their relationship to a shared horizon line, while simultaneously determining their conjugation on a plane.," p. xxi. Damisch, The Origin ofPerspective, p. 53. Damisch, The Origin ofPerspective, p. 341. Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1979), p. 272. Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 275. Denis Cosgrove, "Prospect, Perspective," p. 49. Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992),

P· XV. 55. Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), esp. pp. 212-51. 56. Sennett, Flesh and Stone, p. 227. 57. Dolfin, quoted in Sennett, Flesh and Stone, pp. 234-35. Ghetto means foundry in Italian from the verb gettare, to pour. 58. Martines, Power and Imagination, pp. 271-76. 59. Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 274. 60. Alberti, On the Art of Building, p. 118. Alberti's utopia was a product of its time, "adapted to the realities of fifteenth-century Italy and thus envisioned under different forms of government-a republic; a prince ruling in accord with his subjects; or one imposing his will, a tyrannus." Krautheimer, "The Panels Reconsidered," p. 255. 61. Fram;:oise Choay, The Rule and Method: On the Theory of Architecture and Urbanism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 5. De re aediftcatoria was presented to Pope Nicholas V in 1452 and printed by Poliziano in 1485.

236

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Notes

62. K. J. P. Lowe, "Patronage and Territoriality in Early Sixteenth Century Florence," Renaissance Studies, 7:3, 1993, pp. 258-71. 63. Lowe, "Patronage and Territoriality," p. 260. 64. The best discussion of the Urbina Portraits is Eugenio Battisti, Piero della Francesca (Milano: Institute Editoriale Italiano, 1971), pp. 355-71. See also Angelini, Piero della Francesca, pp. 60-7; and Bussagli, Piero della Francesca, pp. 43-47. Originally the two portraits were separated by a hinge that allowed

65. 66.

67.

68.

69. 70. 71.

72. 73.

them to be opened and shut like a book. When closed, the cover showed the two allegorical triumphs. The precise dates of the portraits remains unknown. Battista's portraits were probably commissioned by Federico after her death in July 1472. Bussagli claims Federico's portraits were painted before 1467. For Battisti, Federico's allegorical triumph is a reference to his crowning in Rome which means it must be dated after the summer of 1474. Focillon dates both portraits to Piero's residency in Urbino in 1456. Bussagli notes that it was not until 1834 that claims that they were portraits of either Francesco Petrarca and Laura or of Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta and his consort Isotta degli Atti were abandoned. Bussagli, Piero della Francesca, p. 45. My translation of Bussagli's Italian translation from the Latin. The Montefeltro had been mercenaries since the Middle Ages. The profession had given them the resources to control their terre caste/late in the mountainous frontier region between the Papal domains and Imperial territories. According to Vespasiano da Bisticci, Federico's military virtU was partially derived from his mastery of Latin, which allowed him to absorb the lessons of the ancients. See the excerpts from Vespasiano da Bisticci, Vite, in Eugenio Garin, Il Rinascimento Italiano (Bologna: Capelli, 1980), pp. 236-38. Niccolo Machiavelli, The History of Florence, Chief Works and Others, Vol. Ill, tr. Allan Gilbert (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), VII:xxxi, p. 1376. Machiavelli notes several subsequent shifts of allegiance by Federico. From 1447-8 Federico served Florence as a general against King Alfonso of Naples. However in 1452 he commanded 12,000 of Alfonso's troops against Florence. Between 1467 and 1474 Federico was once again in the pay of Florence, campaigning against Venice and quelling disturbances in Volterra. Then as a papal soldier, Federico again fought against Florence, leading an attack on the city ofRadda in 1478. Damisch, The Origin ofPerspective, p. 187. Damisch, The Origin ofPerspective, p. 188. Pierantonio Paltroni, Commentari della vita et gesti dell'illustrissimo Federico Duca d'Urbino, quoted in C. W. Westfall, "Chivalric Declaration: The Palazzo Ducale in Urbino as a Political Statement," in Henry A. Millon and Linda Nochlin (eds.), Art and Architecture in the Service of Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 20-45. Baldassarre Castiglione, II libro del Cortegiano, ed. Ettore Sonora (Milano: Mursia, 1972), I:ii, p. 33. My translation. Castiglione, lllibro del Cortegiano, p. 33

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237

74. da Bisticci notes that these objects were not just for show, but reflected the fact that Federico was himself a man of high culture: well-read in history, conversant with philosophy, knowledgeable of architecture, and appreciative of music, sculpture and painting. Vite, pp. 236-37. 75. Westfall, "Chivalric Declaration," pp. 28-31. 76. A. Richard Turner, The Vision of Landscape in Renaissance Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 11-12. 77. Kenneth Clark, Landscape into Art (London: John Murray, 1949), p. 14. 78. Scholars disagree when landscape painting emerged as a distinctive genre. E. H. Gombrich, "The Renaissance Theory of Art and the Rise of Landscape," in Gombrich, Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (London: Phaidon Press, 1966), pp. 107-21, argues that Giorgione's Tempesta (c.1512) was the first landscape painting. Clark dates the origins of the landscape of fact earlier to Gentile da Fabriano's Flight into Egypt 1423, which, although still replete with symbolism, is the first painting where the details of a landscape are united by light rather than by decorative arrangements. Clark, Landscape into Art, p. 15. 79. Turner, Vision ofLandscape, pp. 9-10. 80. Turner, Vision ofLandscape, p. 3. • 81. William E. Connolly, "Tocqueville, Territory and Violence," Theory, Culture and Society, 11:1, 1994, pp. 19-40. 82. Battisti, Piero, pp. 357-58. Federico's biographers attributed these innovations directly to the prince. Castiglione reasoned that Federico's subjects enjoyed the fruits of fertile and abundant lands because of the wise and just rule of their ottimi Signori. Castiglione, Illibro del Cortegiano, 1:" · pp. 33. For da Bisticci, Federico took a personal interest in the cultivation of the land: he provided housing and security for the agricultural laborers, and personally visited their workshops and farms to enquire into their well-being., da Bisticci, Vite, p. 238. 83. Andrew Martindale, "The Middle Ages of Andrea Mantegna," Journal of the Royal Society ofArts, 127, 1979, pp. 627-42, at p. 631. 84. Angelini, Piero della Francesca, p. 66. 85. Angelini, Piero della Francesca, p. 62. 86. Damisch, The Origin ofPerspective, p. 188. 87. Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 88. 88. The Geographia was introduced into the Western tradition by Manuel Chrysoloras and Jacopo d'Angelo. The first edition, without maps, was published in Venice in 1475, the first with maps in Bologna 1477. Six editions were published before 1500. The general ideas rather than the work as a whole are derived from Ptolemy himself. The Geographia was compiled by Byzantium scholars in the tenth and eleventh centuries and the maps were drawn by a Greek monk Maximos Planudes around 1300. See, W. G. L. Randles, De fa terre plate au globe terrestre: une mutation epistemologique rapide (1480-1520) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1980).

238

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Notes

89. Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr, "From Mental Matrix to Mappamundi to Christian

90.

91.

92. 93. 94. 95.

Empire: The Heritage of Ptolemaic Cartography in the Renaissance," in David Woodward (ed.), Art and Cartography: Six Historical Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 10-50. Dana B. Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth Century Italy: '11 Primato dell'ltalia' in the Field of Science," journal ofthe History ofIdeas, IV, 1943, pp. 1-20, at p. 5. Edgerton, "Mental Matrix to Mappamundi," p. 14. Edgerton, "Mental Matrix to Mappamundi," pp. 12-15. Edgerton, "Mental Matrix to Mappamundi," p. 11. Edgerton, "Mental Matrix to Mappamundi," p. 13. P. D. A. Harvey, The History of Topographical Maps: Symbols, Pictures and Surveys (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980), p. 58. The following discussion draws heavily on Harvey. John Marino accepts that in Europe only Italy had a "map consciousness" but warns that it was premised in "an integrated cosmography of spiritual and geographical knowledge," John Marino, "Administrative Mapping in the Italian States," in David Buisseret (ed.),

Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 5-25, at p. 5. Harvey, History of Topographical Maps, p. 76. Harvey, History of Topographical Maps, p. 155. Machiavelli, Il Principe, XIV, pp. 279-80. Harvey, History of Topographical Maps, p. 59.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. These fifteenth-century maps were not sophisticated. They had no consistent scale, tended to overemphasize the main city, and rarely illustrated more than the fortifications of outlying towns. 101. Marino, ''Administrative Mapping," p. 6. 102. Denis Cosgrove, "The Geometry of Landscape: Practical and Speculative Arts in Sixteenth-Century Venetian Land Territories," in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (eds.), The Iconography ofLandscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 254-76. 103. Marino, ''Administrative Mapping," p. 7.

9

The Renaissance Territorialization of International Society

1. Martin Wight, Systems ofStates, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 114-15. 2. William E. Connolly, "Identity and Difference in World Politics," in James DerDerian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 323-42. See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press,

1992).

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3. Edmundo O'Gorman, The Invention of America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961). For a strident critique of O'Gorman see Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The Meaning of 'Discovery' in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," The American Historical Review, 68:1, 1962, pp. 1-21. 4. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, p. 39. 5. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, p. 41. 6. W. G. L. Randles, De Ia terre plate au globe terrestre: une mutation epistemologique rapide (1480-1520) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1980). 7. Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Esmeralda de Situ Orbis (Lisbon: 1508), quoted in Randles, De Ia terre plate, p. 38. My translation. 8. Quoted in Randles, De Ia terre plate, p. 39. My translation. 9. Although the term terraqueous globe was first used in the seventeenth century, Randles believes all the essential elements were in place by the middle of the sixteenth. 10. Pedro Margalho, Physices Compendium (Salamanca: 1520), quoted in Randles, De Ia terre plate, p. 65. My translation. 11. Randles, De Ia terre plate, p. 90. My translation. 12. "Digest of Columbus's Log Book on his First Voyage made by Bartolome de las Casas," in Christopher Columbus, The Four Voyages, ed. and tr. J. M. Cohen (London: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 37-76, at pp. 71-72. 13. Fernando Colon, The History of the Life and Deeds of the Admiral Don Christopher Columbus, [Repertorium Columbianum Vol XII], tr. Geoffrey Symcox and Blair Sullivan (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2004), LVI, p. 124. 14. See Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Columbus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 109. 15. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, p. 101. 16. Columbus, "Lettera Rarissima," 7/7/1503, in Columbus, The Four Voyages, pp. 283-304, esp. pp. 287-89. 17. Vespucci, "Letter to Lorenzo de Medici," 4/6/1501, cited in O'Gorman, Invention ofAmerica. 18. Amerigo Vespucci, Mundus Novus or "Sommario di Amerigo Vespucci fiorentino, di due sue navigazioni, a! magnifico M. Pietro Soderni ... ," in Giovanni Battista Ramusio, Navigazione e Viaggi; Vol. 1, ed. Marcia Milanesi (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1978), pp. 670-81, at p. 670. My translation. The Ramusio version is a translation from the Latin Mundus Novus, itself a translation from the original (lost) Italian letter, which Vespucci originally addressed to Lorenzo di Pier Francesco de Medici. Not all scholars accept that this document is genuine. 19. Vespucci, Mundus Novus, p. 672. 20. Quoted in Randles, De Ia terre plate, p. 72. 21. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, p. 117. 22. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, p. 122. See "The Four Voyages ofAmerigo Vespucci," [translation of the Latin "Quatuor Americi Vespuccici Navigationes," itself a translation of Vespucci's Italian letter to Pier Soderini (Sept 1504)] in

240

23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

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Notes

Martin Waldseemiiller, The Cosmographiae lntroductio, [1507 Academy St Die], tr. Mario E. Cosenza, ed. Charles George Herbermann (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 84-151, esp. pp. 133-44. Waldseemiiller, Cosmographiae lntroductio, IX, p. 70. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, p. 124. O'Gorman, The Invention of America, p. 124. Washburn disagrees with O'Gorman that when Waldseemiiller uses inventa est to describe Vespucci's relationship to America it can be translated as conceived of rather than discovered. Accordingly, the argument that Vespucci was the real discoverer in the sense of conceiver of America as the fourth part of the world is doubtful. Washburn, "The Meaning of 'Discovery'," pp. 12-15. Conversely, Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), quotes Waldseemiiller's "alia quarta pars per Americum Vesputium ... inventa est" in support of O'Gorman's claim that invenio can be translated as conceive rather than invent. Fn. 11, p. 189. O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica, pp. 129-30. The Bull Romanus Pontifex (Nicholas V, January 8 1455), tr. Frances Gardiner Davenport, in Davenport (ed.), European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution ofWashington, 1917), pp. 20-26. Colon, History ofthe Life, p. 98. "Treaty between Spain and Portugal, concluded at Alca