Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIX (2005)

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question STEWART GOETZ

O

ver thirty years ago, Harry Frankfurt challenged the idea that in order for an agent to be morally responsible for what he does, he must be free to do otherwise.1 If we think of the ultimate locus of an agent’s freedom as his power to choose, then the idea that Frankfurt challenged can be captured as follows in the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): PAP: An agent is morally responsible for his choice at time t only if he was free at t to choose otherwise.2 Frankfurt sought to undermine PAP by developing counterexamples (call them “FSCs” for “Frankfurt-style counterexamples”) to it, and others have followed his approach. The goal has been to show that in certain circumstances an agent is morally responsible for his choice, even though he was not free to choose otherwise. Some of those who believe that we have libertarian free will (libertarians) have argued that FSCs beg the question against libertarianism by presupposing the truth of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events.3 Various proponents of FSCs believe that if this libertarian argument is not answerable, it is potentially devastating to the Frankfurtian cause.4

1. Frankfurt (1969). 2. For the sake of readability, I will omit “at t” in my discussion of PAP. Its relevance, however, should always be assumed. 3. For example, Kane (1985, 51), note 25; and (1996, 142–45); Widerker (1995a,b). 4. Fischer calls the libertarian argument a “powerful challenge” to FSCs (1999, 111), while Mele and Robb state that the libertarian argument is “seemingly devastating” (Mele and Robb 1998, 98).

83

84

Stewart Goetz

Recently, three proponents of FSCs have tried to modify and/or refine Frankfurt’s attack without begging the question against the libertarian.5 In this paper, I summarize their arguments and maintain that they all fail for the same reason that the libertarians referred to in the previous paragraph have argued that other FSCs fail, namely, they beg the question against the libertarian by assuming the truth of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. I suggest that the explanation of the fact that FSCs presuppose the truth of causal determinism is that only causal determinism can guarantee that an agent is not free to choose otherwise.6 That this is the case should not come as a surprise. As Frankfurt pointed out in his original challenge to PAP, when we look for examples that illustrate the truth of PAP we naturally think of situations in which the circumstances that bring it about that an agent does something are identical with those that make it impossible for him to do otherwise.7 Such situations are those in which the specified circumstances involve causal determinism. I For purposes of exposition and discussion, consider a typical FSC (FSCt) described by John Martin Fischer: FSCt: Black is a nefarious neurosurgeon. In performing an operation on Jones to remove a brain tumor, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones’ brain that enables Black to monitor and control Jones’ activities. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black exercises his control through a computer that he has programmed so that, among other things, it monitors Jones’ voting behavior. If Jones shows an inclination to choose to vote for Carter, then the computer through the mechanism in Jones’ brain intervenes to assure that he actually chooses to vote for Reagan and does so vote. But if Jones chooses on his own to vote for Reagan, the computer does nothing but continues to monitor—without affecting—the goings-on in Jones’ head. Suppose that in the circumstances Jones chooses to vote for Reagan on his own, just as he would have if Black had not inserted the mechanism into his head. In this situation, Jones is morally responsible for choosing to vote for Reagan, even though he could not have chosen otherwise.8

5. Fischer (1999, 2001); Hunt (2000); McKenna (2003). 6. Because of limitations of space, I consider FSCs that are non-theological in nature. Some proponents of FSCs (Hunt 2002) raise challenges to PAP from the idea of divine foreknowledge, where what God knows makes it impossible for an agent to choose otherwise without causally determining him to choose as he does. Like Fischer (2002, 297), I believe that the assumptions that undergird the concept of divine foreknowledge (e.g., that God exists within the same time framework as humans and can know future contingent truths) are murky and controversial, so that any challenge to PAP that rests upon them cannot match the clarity and forcefulness of PAP itself. 7. Frankfurt (1969, 830). 8. Fischer (1982).

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

85

Fischer believes that most proponents of FSCs have too quickly concluded from FSCt that Jones is morally responsible for his choice even though he could not have chosen otherwise. With a rush to this conclusion, Fischer thinks that they expose themselves to a criticism developed by the libertarians Robert Kane and David Widerker, which I summarize in the next two paragraphs. As Kane and Widerker state,9 a major point of dispute between incompatibilists and compatibilists is whether causal determinism in the actual sequence of events excludes moral responsibility. Incompatibilists believe that it does, while compatibilists believe that it does not. FSCt uses the idea that an inclination to choose to vote for Carter serves as a sign for Black to intervene. An inclination to choose to vote for Reagan can also serve as a sign for Black not to intervene. Suppose that Black’s mechanism is programmed so that if Jones were to show an inclination to choose to vote for Reagan, then this inclination would be a sign that Jones would do what Black wants him to do, namely, choose to vote for Reagan, and the mechanism would not intervene. If, however, Jones’ showing an inclination to choose to vote for Reagan is causally sufficient for choosing to vote for Reagan (or is regularly associated with something that is causally sufficient for this choice), then FSCt begs the question against the incompatibilist’s position that moral responsibility presupposes the falsity of causal determinism at the point of choice. Therefore, in order to avoid begging the question against the incompatibilist, the inclination to choose to vote for Reagan must not be a sufficient causal condition of choosing to vote for Reagan. In that case, however, it is false that Jones could not choose otherwise. Even though the inclination to choose to vote for Reagan occurs, Jones could still choose to vote for Carter. With Jones free to choose to vote for Carter, FSCt fails to undermine PAP. FSCt creates the appearance that it is Black’s device, which is in the alternative sequence of events, that makes it the case that Jones is not free to choose otherwise. This appearance is illusory because without the obtaining of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events, the device cannot prevent Jones from making an alternative choice, and with causal determinism in the actual sequence of events it is not the device that prevents Jones from making an alternative choice. In short, if Jones is not free to choose otherwise, it is because of the occurrence of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events and not because of Black’s device in the alternative sequence. Therefore, it is wrong to conclude that Jones is morally responsible even though he is not free to choose otherwise. Fischer doubts that FSCs such as FSCt can be employed in a successful onestep argument to show that an agent is morally responsible for a choice even though he could not choose otherwise. He claims, however, that he never would have proceeded in this way. “I never envisaged a simple one-step argument to the conclusion that . . . Jones is morally responsible for his choice . . . Rather, I employ the Frankfurt-type examples as the first . . . step of a slightly more complex argument to the conclusion that Jones is morally responsible for his choice . . .”10 The first step of his argument uses FSCs to show only that if Jones is not morally 9. See the references in note 3. 10. Fischer (1999, 113).

86

Stewart Goetz

responsible for his choice this is not the case simply because he cannot choose otherwise, which is contrary to what PAP claims is the case. Fischer describes the first step of his argument in the following way: First, one carefully considers the Frankfurt-type cases. On reflection, I believe that one should conclude that in these cases the lack of alternative possibilities does not in itself ground a claim that the agent is not morally responsible for his choice . . . In other words, I think that the examples make highly plausible the preliminary conclusion that if Jones is not morally responsible for his choice . . . , this is not simply because he lacks alternative possibilities . . . And it does not appear to beg the question to come to this conclusion, even if causal determinism obtains.11 Fischer believes that we can conclude from the first step of the argument that includes an FSC such as FSCt that for all we know, Jones might be morally responsible for his choice even though he could not choose otherwise and, thus, that PAP is false.12 Whether it is plausible to think that he is morally responsible or not depends in part upon the second step in the argument which asks whether or not causal determinism directly or by itself rules out moral responsibility. Typically, incompatibilist proponents of PAP argue that causal determinism excludes moral responsibility indirectly by first entailing that an agent is not free to choose otherwise. Then, given the truth of PAP—the lack of freedom to choose otherwise is sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility—causal determinism entails the lack of moral responsibility. The first step of the argument, however, has shown that PAP is false without apparently begging the question against the incompatibilist by assuming that Jones is both causally determined to choose as he does and morally responsible for that choice. Hence, if causal determinism entails the lack of moral responsibility, it must do so by itself without PAP. Fischer says that he has “considered various possible reasons why someone might think that causal determinism does threaten moral responsibility in itself and apart from ruling out alternative possibilities, and I have come to the conclusion that it is not plausible to accept any of these reasons.”13 Overall, Fischer believes that FSCs have helped to achieve a dialectical breakthrough. Up until Frankfurt’s groundbreaking argument, the disagreement between incompatibilists and compatibilists about whether causal determinism excludes the freedom to choose otherwise (alternative possibilities) had reached a stalemate. “Frankfurt-type examples have the important function of shifting the debate away from considerations pertinent to the relationship between causal

11. Fischer (1999, 113). 12. According to Fischer, the proponent of Frankfurt-style compatibilism (one who uses FSCs to support compatibilism) “should not take any stand about the responsibility of the agent, simply on the basis of reflection on the Frankfurt-type examples. He should simply say, ‘I don’t know at this point whether the agent is morally responsible for his behavior, but if he is not, it is not because he lacks alternative possibilities’” Fischer (2001, 7–8). The emphases are Fischer’s. 13. Fischer (1999, 113).

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

87

determinism and alternative possibilities.”14 Incompatibilists and compatibilists can agree that causal determinism excludes the freedom to choose otherwise, but FSCs have led to the compatibilist conclusion that it is possible for an agent (Jones) to be morally responsible even though he could not choose otherwise. This is “genuine—[and] not illusory—progress.”15 II What is one to think of Fischer’s two-step argument? In the end, it is difficult to see how it advances the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. This is because contrary to what Fischer claims, his two-step argument begs the question against the incompatibilist in the same way that one-step arguments do: it assumes, because it requires, the truth of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. It requires the truth of causal determinism in order to create the illusion that it is the presence of something in the alternative sequence of events (e.g., Black’s device16) that makes it the case that Jones is not free to choose otherwise. It is only through the creation of this illusion and the fact that Black’s device is not explaining Jones’ actual choice that one is tempted or inclined to endorse the conclusion of the first step of Fischer’s argument, which is that the lack of alternative possibilities is not sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility (PAP is false) and, thereby, that Jones might be morally responsible even though he is not free to choose otherwise. Once this illusion is exposed, one’s initial conviction that the lack of an alternative choice is sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility (PAP is true) is vindicated. Though Fischer’s argument does not undermine the truth of PAP and, thereby, advance the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists, it does raise an important question about what is the main point of PAP.17 The part of Fischer’s argument that was block-quoted in the previous section implies or suggests that the adherent of PAP asserts that an agent is not morally responsible simply because he is not free to choose otherwise. What do the words “simply because” mean here? It is true that the advocate of PAP believes that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is sufficient for the lack of moral responsibility, and in that sense the latter obtains simply because of the obtaining of the former. It is incorrect, however, to assume that a person who affirms PAP believes that the lack of moral responsibility obtains simply because of the obtaining of the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise in the sense that the obtaining of the latter by itself, that is, apart from what explains it, explains the obtaining of the former. The proponent of PAP thinks that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise does not by itself explain the absence of moral responsibility. This is because he believes that when this lack obtains, its obtaining is itself explained by, and can only be 14. Fischer (2001, 8). The emphasis is Fischer’s. 15. Fischer (2001, 20). 16. “[G]iven the presence of Black’s device, it is plausible to think that Jones does not have alternative possibilities with regard to his choice . . . ” (Fischer 2001, 4). 17. It is interesting to note that even Frankfurt (2003, 344, note 2) admits that “I have not always been altogether clear myself about where the point [concerning PAP] is.”

88

Stewart Goetz

explained by, the occurrence of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events.18 What the advocate of PAP believes, then, is that when an agent is not morally responsible because he is not free to choose otherwise, he lacks moral responsibility not simply because he is not free to choose otherwise but because he is not free to choose otherwise because of causal determinism.19 When an agent is not free to choose otherwise, not only does causal determinism explain what occurs in the actual sequence of events, but also it explains the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise. Frankfurt himself recognized this 18. Strictly speaking, I think it can be reasonably claimed that the proponent of PAP believes that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by and can only be explained by determinism in the actual sequence of events, which leaves open the possibility that there is more than one kind of determinism. For example, if reasons are not causes but essentially non-causal purposes that explain mental actions teleologically, then possibly teleological, and not causal, determinism obtains in certain circumstances (e.g., in a circumstance where an agent has a reason to act and no reason not to act in that way and no reason to act otherwise). Given, however, that proponents of FSCs standardly assume that reasons are causes, whether deterministic or indeterministic, I will comply with this assumption and maintain that the proponent of PAP believes that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by, and can only be explained by, causal determinism. Because only causal determinism explains the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise, any time this lack obtains, causal determinism obtains. While causal determinism explains and is sufficient for the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise, and the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is sufficient for causal determinism, the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise does not explain causal determinism. Fischer (2002, 306) says, “I believe that reasonable people . . . would find it highly plausible that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities.” I agree. I also believe, however, that reasonable people would find it highly plausible that causal determinism is the only way to rule out alternative possibilities. It is this latter belief that leads reasonable people to think that FSCs beg the question against the incompatibilist. 19. According to Derk Pereboom (Pereboom 2003, 186), the central point at issue with PAP is whether the existence of an alternative possibility or the existence of indeterminism in the actual sequence of events has the more central role in explaining an agent’s moral responsibility. “We might call those incompatibilists who incline towards the view that an alternative possibilities condition has the more important role in explaining an agent’s moral responsibility leeway incompatibilists, and those who are predisposed to maintain that an incompatibilist condition on the causal history of the action plays the more significant part source incompatibilists. Leeway incompatibilists would argue that the actual causal history of a morally responsible action must be indeterministic, but they would be amenable to the claim that this is so only because an indeterministic history is required to secure alternative possibilities. Source incompatibilists would tend towards the position that the part the causal history plays in explaining an agent’s moral responsibility is independent of facts about alternative possibilities” (ibid.) Given Pereboom’s characterization of source and leeway incompatibilism, I am advocating source incompatibilism, though I think it is questionable to state as he does that source incompatibilists tend towards the position that the part the causal history plays in explaining moral responsibility is independent of facts about alternative possibilities. Pereboom’s statement is questionable because the source incompatibilist believes that causal determinism in the actual sequence entails the lack of alternative possibilities. Stated slightly differently, as a source incompatibilist I believe that the main point at issue with PAP is whether the existence of an alternative possibility at the point of choice is a necessary condition of moral responsibility. The main point at issue is not whether an alternative possibility at the point of choice explains moral responsibility. The source incompatibilist acknowledges that an alternative possibility at the point of choice does not explain moral responsibility, but it does not follow from this that an alternative possibility at the point of choice is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

89

prima facie dual explanatory role of causal determinism in his classic discussion of PAP. Thus, he stated that “[i]n seeking illustrations of the principle of alternative possibilities, it is most natural to think of situations in which the same circumstances both bring it about that a person does something [chooses] and make it impossible for him to avoid doing it [choosing otherwise]”20 Implicit in Frankfurt’s remark is the idea that it is intuitively plausible to think not only that causal determinism in the actual sequence of events is capable of producing situations wherein the same circumstances produce the actual choice and make it impossible for the agent to choose otherwise, but also that causal determinism in the actual sequence of events is the only way to bring about situations in which an agent does not have the possibility of choosing otherwise.21 It is because it is intuitively plausible to think this that Frankfurt assumes the burden of constructing examples (FSCs) wherein the circumstances that make it impossible for Jones to choose otherwise are not the same as or identical with what is going on in the actual sequence of events. The reason why Frankfurt’s paper is so controversial is that it claims to provide an example where an agent does not have an alternative choice and the lack of this alternative is not explained by causal determinism in the actual sequence of events.22 Until such an example is provided, the incompatibilist is on firm ground in believing that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by and can only be explained by causal determinism in the actual sequence of events and that PAP is true. 20. Frankfurt (1969, 830). The emphasis is mine. 21. What about the following objection: The claim that it is intuitively plausible that an agent’s lack of freedom to choose otherwise can only be explained by causal determinism is questionable. FSCs create a strong prima facie case against this claim, and when constructing an FSC one can simply stipulate that the actual causal sequence is indeterministic at the point of choice. The hard work, then, for the proponents of such an FSC is showing that an agent in this situation could not choose otherwise. The presence of something like Black (or his device), however, shows just this. Beyond the point already made that it is an illusion that Black (or his device) can explain the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise, I have argued elsewhere (Goetz 1999, 2001, 2002) and will illustrate in my discussion of FSCH in Section III of this paper that allowing for indeterminism at the point of choice leaves an agent free to choose otherwise. 22. Ekstrom (2000, 198), who is an incompatibilist, points out that a proponent of FSCs such as FSCt maintains that our belief that Jones is morally responsible in FSCt is a matter of common sense and anyone who tries to convince us that we do not know whether Jones is morally responsible holds a view that is unnatural and unpersuasive. Ekstrom responds that certain theoretical considerations might lead us to revise our initial judgment that Jones is morally responsible in FSCt. One such theoretical consideration is “[t]he possibility of the truth of the thesis of [causal] determinism [every event is causally necessitated by a previous event],” which “is not a consideration that immediately occurs to unreflective common sense as it considers cases of [moral]responsibility . . .” (ibid.). Ekstrom says that once we consider this possibility, we are not so certain that Jones is morally responsible in FSCt. It seems to me that Ekstrom’s claim that causal determinism is not a concern that immediately occurs to unreflective common sense when it considers cases of moral responsibility is highly questionable. It is precisely because unreflective common sense believes that causal determinism is a concern when considering cases of moral responsibility that Frankfurt assumes the burden of trying to construct a FSC in which it is not causal determinism that explains the lack of alternative possibilities, and, thereby, the lack of moral responsibility. What the incompatibilist critic does in showing that FSCs presuppose causal determinism is vindicate unreflective common sense.

90

Stewart Goetz

In a recent discussion of my critique of his two-step argument, Fischer does not attempt to provide an example where what explains an agent’s lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is something other than causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. Instead, he responds to my argument by claiming that FSCs actually involve causal determinism because they are cases in which [a choice] is [pre-emptively] “causally overdetermined.” . . . In pre-emptive over-determination, some event is actually caused and would have been caused in a different way, had the actual causal sequence not taken place. So, in the Frankfurt-type scenario . . . , Black’s device is part of what makes it the case that Jones’ choice at T2 [the time of Jones’ choosing to vote] is pre-emptively overdetermined.23 Given his claim that Jones’ choice is causally overdetermined, Fischer goes on to assert that Jones’ lack of freedom to choose otherwise is also overdetermined. So, my response to Goetz is as follows. In the Frankfurt-type scenario, two causes make it the case that Jones is unable to choose otherwise at T2: the prior condition of the world (together with the laws of nature) and Black’s counterfactual intervention. What the examples show is that the mere fact that Jones is unable to choose otherwise does not in itself establish that Jones is not morally responsible for his choice. This is because Black’s counterfactual intervention is one of the factors that make it the case that Jones is unable to choose otherwise at T2, and yet it is irrelevant to the grounding of Jones’ moral responsibility. Considering this factor (the counterfactual intervention), and bracketing any other factor that might make it the case that Jones is unable to choose otherwise at T2, it seems to me that Jones may well be morally responsible for his [choice]. The mere fact that he lacks alternative possibilities, then, cannot in itself be the reason that Jones is not morally responsible, if indeed he is not morally responsible.24 As I have already stated, a proponent of PAP believes (contrary to what Fischer suggests at the end of the second quote) that it is not the mere fact that Jones is not free to choose otherwise that explains his not being morally responsible. It is causal determinism in the actual sequence of events that plays this 23. Fischer (2005). In claiming that FSCs are cases in which a choice is causally overdetermined, Fischer seems to be conceding that causal determinism in the actual sequence of events is part and parcel of FSCs. If he is conceding this, it is significant for at least two reasons. First, Frankfurtians (including Frankfurt himself) have typically left it unmentioned or open whether the actual sequence of events includes a causally determined choice. Second, some libertarians (e.g., Stump 1996, 1999, 2003) will be surprised to learn that FSCs are cases of causal over-determination because they believe that it is possible to construct FSCs in which the actual sequence of events includes a causally undetermined act of will while some figure such as Black makes it the case that Jones is not free to will otherwise. 24. Fischer (2005). The emphases are Fischer’s.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

91

explanatory role. I have maintained that PAP is nevertheless true because causal determinism in the actual sequence of events is both necessary and sufficient for the absence of the freedom to choose otherwise. What, then, about Fischer’s argument contained in the two quotes? If I understand the argument, it seems to me that it still begs the question against the incompatibilist. According to Fischer, the fact that Jones is not free to choose otherwise (use “O” to refer to the freedom to choose otherwise, so that the lack of this freedom is ~O) has two explanations (in light of causal over-determination). On the one hand, ~O is explained by the actual sequence of events because Jones’ choosing to vote for Reagan (“C” refers to this choice) was (deterministically) caused by earlier events (call these earlier events “E”). On the other hand, the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained in terms of an important counterfactual truth: Had E not occurred, Black’s device would have intervened to cause C anyway (call this counterfactual truth “BD”). While an FSC such as FSCt presupposes causal determinism in the actual sequence of events, Fischer believes that consideration of this causal determinism involving E can be bracketed so that FSCt includes for our consideration only E, C, and BD. Given simply the facts that both E and C occurred and that BD is true (i.e., ignoring the fact that E caused C), it follows that ~O. That is, 1. (E and C and BD) entails ~O. It does not, however, follow simply from the fact that E and C and BD are true that Jones is not morally responsible for his choice to vote for Reagan (let “MR” stand for Jones is morally responsible for his choice to vote for Reagan). This is because BD is one of the factors that explain ~O, and BD is irrelevant to the grounding of MR. Keeping this irrelevance in mind and bracketing the fact that E caused C, one sees that it is possible that MR is true. That is, one sees that: 2. It is possible that (E and C and BD and MR). Because (1) tells us that the first three conjuncts of (2) entail ~O, and thus that it is possible that E and C and BD and ~O are all true, it follows from (1) and (2) that: 3. It is possible that (E and C and BD and MR and ~O). And from (3) it follows that: 4. It is possible that (MR and ~O). If this is Fischer’s argument, I believe that the problem is with (1). (1) is not acceptable to both defenders and critics of PAP. As a defender of PAP, I have argued that the appearance that (1) is true is illusory. What it masks is the fact that Black’s device does not explain ~O because ~O is and can only be explained by causal determinism in the actual sequence of events (call this actual-sequence causal determinism “CD”).25 Therefore, the following is true: 25. Frankfurt has recently stated that FSCs “effectively undermine the appeal of PAP even if it is true that circumstances that do not bring an action about invariably leave open the possi-

92

Stewart Goetz 5. ~O entails CD.

Given (1) and (5), however, it follows that: 6. (E and C and BD) entails CD. In other words, in light of (6) we must assume in (1) that E (deterministically) caused C. If we do not assume this, then (1) would be false because Jones would be free to choose otherwise (O would be true), which is the point of the KaneWiderker argument. Thus, in place of (1), Fischer needs the following: (1)* ([E caused C] and BD) entails ~O. To get the argument to continue, however, Fischer will now need the following in place of (2): (2)* It is possible that ([E caused C] and BD and MR). Assuming (2)*, however, begs the question against the incompatibilist defender of PAP who maintains that causal determinism in the actual sequence of events is incompatible with moral responsibility. If my argument in response to Fischer’s reply to me is correct, it is false that FSCs are cases in which a choice is causally over-determined. As Fischer says, in genuine cases of over-determination, “some event is actually caused and would have been caused in a different way, had the actual causal sequence not taken place.”26 In FSCs such as FSCt, however, it is the case that if Jones’ choice to vote for Reagan had not been caused by the actual sequence of events (had the actual causal sequence not taken place), Black’s device could not have caused (the different way) Jones to choose to vote for Reagan. That is the point of the WiderkerKane argument. Thus, any appearance of causal over-determination involving Black’s device is illusory because, reiterating a point already made, without the obtaining of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events, Black’s device cannot prevent Jones from making an alternative choice. And with the obtaining of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events, the question about the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility has simply been begged against the incompatibilist. bility that the action might not be performed” (Frankfurt 2003, 339). How do FSCs effectively undermine PAP? “They are designed to show that making an action unavoidable is not the same thing as bringing it about that the action is performed . . . Once it is clear that the unavoidability of an action implies nothing at all as to what actually accounted for the fact that the agent performed the action, PAP loses its otherwise rather compelling plausibility” (ibid., 340). For the sake of argument, let us concede that there is a conceptual distinction between making an action unavoidable and bringing it about that the action is performed. It does not follow from this distinction that the unavoidability of an action implies nothing at all as to what actually accounted for the fact the agent performed the action. The unavoidability of an action implies that causal determinism accounted for the performance of the action. In trying to convince us otherwise about this matter, FSCs must make use of the art of illusion. 26. Fischer (2005). The emphasis is mine.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

93

Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna have recently attempted to defend Fischer’s two-step argument in response to my criticism.27 Like Fischer, they argue that FSCs can presuppose determinism without begging the question against the incompatibilist. In light of my critique of Fischer’s argument, they concede that a proponent of FSCs would have a more convincing case if it were beyond dispute that an agent’s alternative choices “were ruled out only by virtue of the counterfactual intervener and not also by virtue of the truth of determinism. But is [an indeterminist] entitled to claim that in a case [an FSC] that does assume determinism, [Fischer’s] argument rises to the level of begging the question?”28 Haji and McKenna argue that the answer to this question depends upon the reasonableness of the following assumption made by an indeterminist: If determinism makes it the case that an agent in an FSC cannot do otherwise, then the presence of the counterfactual intervener cannot aid in understanding whether or not the freedom to choose otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility (whether or not PAP is true). Haji and McKenna believe it is reasonable for a proponent of FSCs to respond to this assumption as follows: The counterfactual intervener’s presence in a deterministic scenario, while perhaps not necessary for ruling out alternative possibilities, is sufficient for doing so [the implication being that if there were no determinism, the counterfactual intervener could and would exclude alternative possibilities]. Furthermore, its presence is irrelevant to any judgment that the agent is not free or morally responsible.29 Haji and McKenna do not point out that the indeterminist’s assumption to which they draw our attention presupposes yet another assumption which supports the charge that FSCs beg the question against the indeterminist.This assumption is: If there is a lack of freedom to choose otherwise (a lack of alternative possibilities), then determinism obtains in the actual sequence of events (~O entails D). As I have argued, the principle that ~O entails D seems intuitively plausible, as even Frankfurt realized. As I have also argued, the appearance that it is the existence of the counterfactual intervener (CI) which is preventing an alternative choice is illusory. What is preventing an alternative choice is, and can only be, causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. Thus, if there is no alternative choice, it is causal determinism that explains its absence, not the counterfactual intervener. It is because the counterfactual intervener cannot explain ~O that FSCs do not support the belief that PAP is false and, more generally, cannot aid us in understanding whether or not PAP is true. The fact that D alone can and does explain ~O is, however, compatible with its being the case, as Haji and McKenna claim, that the presence of the counterfactual intervener is sufficient for the lack of an alternative choice (CI is sufficient for ~O). What is important to make clear is why CI is sufficient for ~O. CI is not, 27. Haji and McKenna (2004). 28. Haji and McKenna (2004, 310). The emphasis is theirs. 29. Haji and McKenna (2004, 310). The emphasis is theirs.

94

Stewart Goetz

as Haji and McKenna suggest, sufficient for ~O because the counterfactual intervener could and would exclude an alternative choice. CI is sufficient for ~O because CI is sufficient for D in the actual sequence of events, and D is sufficient for ~O because D explains ~O. It is because CI is sufficient for ~O in this way that its presence is (contrary to what Haji and McKenna claim) relevant to or supports the judgment that the agent is not free or morally responsible. So, where are we? Right back where we began, because the dilemma for proponents of FSCs is still this: either causal determinism obtains in the actual sequence, in which case Black’s device is not causally efficacious in preventing Jones from choosing otherwise, or causal determinism fails to obtain in the actual sequence, in which case Black’s device is also not causally efficacious in preventing Jones from choosing otherwise. If my foregoing reasoning is correct, it is still the case that Fischer has not provided any satisfactory compatibilist way through the horns of this dilemma and, as a result, PAP is not undermined. To find a way through the horns of this dilemma and undermine the intuitively powerful idea that PAP captures, it remains the case that Fischer (any Frankfurtian) must provide an example where what explains an agent’s lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is something other than causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. In closing this section, it is appropriate to raise one other issue for consideration. Fischer, like other proponents of FSCs, leaves open the question (and I have left it open for the sake of argument) whether the concept of being unable to do (choose) otherwise, which is the lack of alternative possibilities, is identical with the concept of determinism, where determinism is a genus of which causal determinism is a species (see note 18). In light of leaving this matter open, he seemingly assumes that incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism (determinism entails the lack of moral responsibility) must arrive at their incompatibilism by means of an inference involving PAP (the lack of alternative possibilities entails the lack of moral responsibility) and the belief that determinism entails the lack of alternative possibilities. It is, however, not implausible to think that the concepts of determinism and the lack of alternative possibilities are one and the same, and therefore that Fischer (and other proponents of FSCs) need not leave the question of their identity open. For example, Peter van Inwagen defines “determinism” as “the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.”30 If one is a little more permissive than van Inwagen and allows for the possibility of a nonphysical as well as a physical future, to say that at any instant there is one and only one possible future is to say that there are no alternative possible futures. Thus, if we let “D” represent determinism, D just is ~O. One possibility this identity raises is that PAP is logically equivalent to what we can call “the principle of determinism” or “PD,” which is that determinism (directly) entails the lack of moral responsibility (a person is morally responsible for his choice at a time t only if he was not determined at t to choose as he did). Given this logical equivalence of PAP and PD, it seems wrong to assume that incompat30. Van Inwagen (1983, 3). Richard Taylor (1983, 34) defines ‘determinism’ as the principle that “there are antecedent conditions . . . given which [something] could not be other than it is.”

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

95

ibilists must arrive at PD indirectly by means of PAP. They need not. They can directly assent to both PAP and PD because they are the same principle. Is there any reason to think that PAP and PD are logically equivalent, where this reason is something other than the simple intuition that they mean the same thing? Frankfurt does briefly mention the possibility that D just means ~O, and thus that a person is not morally responsible for his choice if it was causally determined.31 He also adds that he does not find the suggestions that D means ~O acceptable. I do not know how to resolve this issue. If there is any reason that supports the logical equivalence of D and ~O, perhaps it is the fact that FSCs always beg the question against the incompatibilist by presupposing (causal) determinism in the actual sequence of events. At least this is a possibility to keep in mind as I proceed to examine two other FSCs in subsequent sections in light of the issue of whether they beg the question against the incompatiblist. III FSCs are proposed for the purpose of undermining PAP. In Section II, I claimed that FSCs either beg the question against the libertarian by presupposing the truth of causal determinism in the actual sequence of events or leave an agent like Jones in FSCt causally undetermined with respect to his actual choice so that he was free to choose otherwise. A most important issue is how this claim fits into the overall dialectic of the argument about PAP. In a recent article, David Hunt has discussed the role of FSCs in relationship to PAP.32 He asserts that advocates of FSCs have pursued an argument of the following kind: 1. If there is a case in which (i) agent S is morally responsible for choosing at time t and (ii) S is not free to choose otherwise at t, then PAP is false. 2. FSCt (for example) is a case in which (i) S is morally responsible for choosing as he does at t and (ii) S was not free to choose otherwise at t. 3. There is a case in which (i) S is morally responsible for choosing at t and (ii) S was not free to choose otherwise at t. 4. Therefore, PAP is false. Hunt rightly claims that the argument is valid. He maintains that if it is unsound, the problem must be with premise (2) because (1) is analytic of PAP and (3) follows from (2) by existential generalization. Let us, then, consider (2). In order to evaluate (2), Hunt proposes that we think of a FSC in the following way. Let “PAP” designate all of the necessary conditions of moral responsibility other than the freedom to choose otherwise. Assume that S’s choice at time t satisfies PAP, and let “Ca” refer to all of the conditions in the actual sequence of events that contributed to explaining S’s choice at t. Suppose further that there is a set of conditions “CN” that is disjoint from Ca (CN and Ca have no elements in common) and given which S cannot choose otherwise at t. These conditions (PAP, Ca, CN) together constitute an FSC. 31. Frankfurt (1969, 838). 32. Hunt (2000).

96

Stewart Goetz Hunt now sets out the following sub-argument in support of (2): (2a) Any case constituting an FSC is a case in which (i) S is morally responsible for his choice at t and (ii) S is not free to choose otherwise at t. (2b) FSCt is a case constituting an FSC. (2) FSCt is a case in which (i) S is morally responsible for choosing as he does at t and (ii) S is not free to choose otherwise at t.

Hunt stresses that (2a) is a moral judgment that certain circumstances call for or demand, while (2b) is a factual judgment that those circumstances obtain. He points out that critics of FSCs have largely focused on (2b) as the problematic step in the argument from (1), (2), and (3) to (4). For example, libertarians argue that FSCt is not an FSC because causal determinism obtains in the actual sequence of events and, thus, CN = Ca. Hunt claims that while opponents of FSCs are critical of (2b), they seemingly agree with (or at least do not challenge) (2a). According to Hunt, an endorsement of (2a) is captured in the following Master Intuition: (MI) Were S to choose at t as part of an FSC—that is, in circumstances such that S’s choice at t satisfies PAP, there are conditions CN making S’s choice at t unavoidable, and CN π Ca—S would be morally responsible for his choice at t. As an example of a critic of FSCs who supposedly concedes (2a), Hunt cites Widerker. According to Hunt, Widerker argues that all FSCs to date fail to give us a sound example of an FSC. That is, Widerker attacks (2b) of the sub-argument by claiming that a particular FSC, say FSCt, is not a sound FSC, while conceding (2a). Hunt maintains that were Widerker to come across a sound FSC, call it “FSCS,” then it (as a fulfillment of (2b)) along with (2a) would entail (2). And (2), along with (1) and (3), would entail (4) and the falsity of PAP. According to Hunt, then, the fact that critics of FSCs like Widerker apparently share Frankfurt’s basic intuition that (MI) (and, thereby, [2a]) is true indicates that problems with any particular FSC such as FSCt are not fatal to Frankfurt’s (and his followers’) attack against PAP. There may well be other FSCs that are not flawed in the way that FSCt is. Thus, says Hunt, in order for FSCs in general to break the conceptual connection between moral responsibility and alternative possibilities captured in PAP it is sufficient that (MI) be prima facie plausible and there not be any counterarguments to undermine its intuitive moral plausibility. One might reject (MI), but a simple rejection without any argument to undermine its prima facie plausibility does nothing to refute the case against PAP. “At the very least, the ball is back in the critic’s court to show how one can accept (MI) while rejecting Frankfurt’s case against PAP.”33 Dialectically, the fundamental question at this point is whether (MI) is prima facie or intuitively plausible. Contrary to what Hunt claims, I doubt that it is.34 In 33. Hunt (2000, 223). 34. In written correspondence, Widerker has stated that contrary to what Hunt suggests, his (Widerker’s) concern with showing that (2b) is false does not entail that he believes that (MI) is intuitively plausible and, thus, that (2a) is true.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

97

light of the fact (see section II) that it is natural or intuitively plausible to think that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by and can only be explained by causal determinism in the actual sequence of events, it is reasonable to maintain that (MI) is implausible because it assumes it is possible that CNπCa.35 Moreover, it is the belief that (MI) is implausible that supports the various attempts of libertarians to show that FSCs presuppose causal determinism in the actual sequence of events and, thus, beg the question against libertarianism. For example, consider an FSC that Hunt proposes.36 Call it “FSCH.” FSCH develops the idea that the unavoidability of a choice arises solely from blocked alternatives. FSCH: Imagine a mechanism that blocks neural pathways. Jones faces the alternative of murdering or not murdering Smith. Suppose that the actual series of Jones’ mental states leading up to his choosing to murder Smith is compatible with PAP, and that the mechanism is in operation. The mechanism is not intervening in the actual sequence of events itself; it is allowing the series to unfold on its own while blocking all of the alternatives to the series. It does not block alternatives in response to the way the series unfolds, because then the blockage would occur too late to have any effect on the unavoidability of Jones’ choice. Instead, the mechanism blocks alternatives in advance, but by a fantastic coincidence the pathways it blocks just happen to be all the ones that will be unactualized in any case. The single pathway that remains unblocked is precisely the route that Jones’ practical reasoning up to and including his choice to murder Smith would be following anyway, if all the neural pathways were unblocked. In this case, Jones appears to be morally responsible for his choice to murder Smith, given the intuitive plausibility of (MI). As Alfred Mele has stated, “[w]here there is [causal] indeterminism, something or other could have happened otherwise than it did.”37 Thus, in order to assess the success of FSCH one needs to know whether or not Ca includes causal determinism in the actual sequence of events at the point of Jones’ choice. And in order to answer this question, one needs to know whether the neural story in the actual sequence must unfold in the way that it does at the point of Jones’ choice. 35. Hunt himself notes (2000, 197) that in typical cases of unavoidable choice (Hunt talks about action in general) the circumstances that explain a choice are also those that make it impossible for an agent to choose otherwise, and I pointed out in section II that it is this very fact that led Frankfurt to assume the burden of trying to present an FSC in which the circumstances that make it impossible for an agent to choose otherwise are not identical with those that actually explain his choice. William Hasker, a libertarian who also argues that FSCs beg the question against the libertarian by assuming causal determinism in the actual sequence of events (see Hasker 1999, 86–94), has expressed to me that he would not want to have to prove that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by and can only be explained by causal determinism in the actual sequence of events and, hence, prefers to avoid this claim when responding to proponents of FSCs. If I am right, a libertarian critic of FSCs need not prove the truth of this claim because it is itself intuitively plausible. 36. Hunt (2000, 217–18). 37. Mele (2003, 252).

98

Stewart Goetz

For example, what if the neural story simply stopped and went no further? Is this a possible alternative to its continuing to unfold as it does? If this is not a possible alternative and there are no others, then it is the case that there are no alternatives to the actual course of events (the neural story that actually occurs), and it is incumbent upon Hunt to explain how the actual series of events is not causally determined to occur as it does.38 If this is a possible alternative, then Jones is free to choose otherwise because Ca does not include causal determinism. In conclusion, Hunt is right about one thing. No one who rejects Frankfurt’s case against PAP should accept (MI). Hunt, however, believes that it is reasonable to accept both Frankfurt’s case against PAP and (MI). I have argued that it is reasonable for a libertarian to reject both. Thus, contrary to what Hunt suggests, the preoccupation of critics of FSCs with showing that a particular FSC presupposes causal determinism (i.e., attacking [2b]) does not imply that these critics believe that (2a) is plausible in light of the prima facie plausibility of (MI) and that a particular FSC merely fails to constitute a FSC. Rather, it is because these critics believe that (MI) is false in virtue of the prima facie plausibility of the principle that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by and can only be explained by causal determinism in the actual sequence of events that they devote themselves to showing that a particular FSC, contrary to appearances, presupposes causal determinism. Thus, the ball is still in the court of the Frankfurtians. Where it is in their court is in the space delimited by the belief that the lack of the freedom to choose otherwise is explained by and can only be explained by causal determinism. What Frankfurtians must do is present an example that falsifies this belief. IV In this final section, I examine one other Frankfurt-style counterexample that attempts to undermine PAP without assuming the truth of causal determinism and, thereby, begging the question against the libertarian. The counterexample is Michael McKenna’s and involves an agent, Betty, who has taxes to pay.39 FSCB: Betty is deliberating about whether or not to cheat on her taxes. Whatever she chooses to do, she has to make a choice soon so that she can have her tax return to the post office by 5:00 in the afternoon. She has reasons for not cheating (paying the amount that she owes) and reasons for cheating on her payment. One reason Betty has for paying the amount that 38. If the neural story cannot go any other way than the way that it goes, then the only plausible explanation of this fact is that the events that occur in the neural story are causally determined. Fischer (2002, 296) explicates FSCH in the following way: Suppose that you are driving your car on a crowded freeway (assume, unlike typical freeways, that it has only one lane), all exit ramps are blocked, and cars are up against yours in front and behind without respectively pulling or pushing it. Is there an alternative to your proceeding ahead? It seems that there is: you can hit the brake, which is analogous to choosing otherwise. If you cannot hit the brake, causal determinism obtains. In Hunt (2003), Hunt presents a blockage story similar to Fischer’s without providing any reason to think that the belief that causal determinism obtains in the actual sequence of events is false. 39. McKenna (2003, 206–07).

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

99

she owes is that if she is caught cheating, she will have to spend time in jail. A reason for cheating is that she will have more money to buy what she wants. Beyond these two morally significant choices, however, there are morally insignificant choices that she might make. For example, Betty might choose to head for the gym, or roast a chicken. Given these morally insignificant alternatives, Betty might simply stop deliberating about whether to cheat or not (and, thereby, neither choose to cheat nor choose not to cheat) and instead choose to head for the gym (or choose to roast a chicken). In the end, suppose that Betty chooses to cheat on her taxes. Unbeknownst to her, however, she is a figure in a FSC where the morally significant alternative of choosing to pay the amount that she owes in taxes is blocked (whether fortuitously—as in FSCH, or by design—as in FSCt). The morally insignificant alternative choices, however, are not blocked. They are causally open for her. McKenna asks whether Betty is morally responsible for choosing to cheat on her taxes, even though she was not free to choose not to cheat. According to PAP, Betty is morally responsible only if she was free to choose otherwise. Given the causally open alternatives of choosing to head for the gym and choosing to roast a chicken, it seems that according to PAP she is morally responsible. Thus, FSCB is not a counterexample to PAP. Though it is not a counterexample to PAP, McKenna believes it teases out an important problem with PAP created by the alternative choices available to Betty. Choosing to head to the gym and choosing to roast a chicken are morally insignificant in nature, and it is odd to think that Betty’s being morally responsible is linked to the freedom to make such morally insignificant choices. The “moral” of the story involving Betty is that PAP is too unrestricted or inclusive with regard to what it allows as alternative choices that are relevant for an agent’s moral responsibility. McKenna believes that a libertarian must revise PAP to solve this problem and offers the following principle which he calls the “Principle of Morally Significant Alternatives” for blame or “PSA”: PSA: An agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A at t only if she had within her control at t performing an alternative action B such that (1) performing B at t was morally less bad than performing A at t, and (2) it would have been reasonable for S to have considered performing B at t as an alternative to performing A at t given S’s agent-relative deliberative circumstances.40 Is FSCB a counterexample to PSA? It would seem so, says McKenna. Though Betty is blocked from making the morally significant choice to pay the amount that she owes on her taxes, she is not blocked from making the morally insignificant choice to head for the gym. Hence, she is not causally determined to choose as she does, namely, to cheat on her taxes. Given that she is not causally determined, it seems reasonable to conclude that she is morally blameworthy for 40. McKenna (2003, 209).

100

Stewart Goetz

choosing to cheat on her taxes, even though she is not free to choose otherwise in a morally significant way. In short, being free to choose otherwise in a morally significant way is not a necessary condition of moral blameworthiness. Therefore, McKenna believes that he has provided an FSC that shows that a reasonably formulated principle of alternative possibilities (PSA) is false, and he has done so without assuming the truth of causal determinism. Moreover, he believes that his argument will work against any reasonable principle of alternative possibilities that distinguishes between morally significant and insignificant alternatives. Is McKenna’s argument convincing? It is doubtful that it is, given a natural and more robust statement of PAP. So, once again, consider PAP. PAP: An agent is morally responsible for his choice at time t only if he was free at t to choose otherwise. It is reasonable to think that the following principle (call it the “reasonchoice principle”) is a necessary truth and, therefore, entailed by PAP: RC: An agent is free to make a choice C, only if he has a reason R for making C. Why is it plausible to think that RC is a necessary truth? Because of limitations of space, my comments in support of it will have to be brief. The basic idea in support of RC is that libertarian freedom to choose involves more than just the lack of causation, both in the form of an efficient cause of the choice itself and in the form of an obstacle that prevents the choice. An uncaused choice with no explanation would be no more than a random or chaotic occurrence.41 Thus, if an agent makes a free choice—and it is free choices that are at issue with PAP,42 there must be a reason R that explains that choice. In light of RC, it follows that without a reason to choose, an agent cannot make a choice, even if that choice is causally open to the agent. Let us now incorporate RC into PAP so that we have PAP*: PAP*: An agent is morally responsible for his choice for reason R1 at time t only if he was free at t to choose otherwise for reason R2. It is important to emphasize that PAP* is not a permutation on PAP in the sense that it modifies or changes the content of the latter to include what was not implicit in it from the start. Rather, PAP* just makes explicit what was there in PAP all along (because of the plausibility of RC). Given PAP*, I will argue that it 41. There is a vast amount of literature on this topic, but the following recent comment of John Searle’s is representative of the view that I have in mind: “[T]he hypothesis that some of our acts occur freely is not at all the same as the hypothesis that some of our acts occur at random” Searle (2001, 495). 42. Thus, in the rest of this paper, I assume that every choice is a free choice. Must every choice be a free choice? I am inclined to think that the answer is “Yes.” Given that the answer is “Yes,” any mental event that is not explained by a reason cannot be a choice.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

101

is reasonable to think that Betty is not free to choose not to cheat on her taxes (not free to choose to pay the amount that she owes) only if causal determinism obtains in the actual sequence of events. Consider the example of Betty, this time in light of PAP*. Betty chooses to cheat on her taxes for R1 (that she have extra money with which to buy things). If PAP* is true, then she is morally responsible for that choice only if she was free to make a different choice for a respective reason. According to McKenna, Betty had a reason R2 (that she avoid going to jail) to choose not to cheat on her taxes. The problem is that Betty is part of an FSC and was not free to choose not to cheat. Nevertheless, she was supposedly free to choose to head for the gym or to choose to roast a chicken. Did she have a reason R3 (e.g., that she have a good time with friends) to choose to head for the gym?43 McKenna does not explicitly say. Suppose that she did not have R3.44 If she did not, then given the absence of R3, even if choosing to head to the gym was causally open to her (it was not blocked), she was not free to make that choice. Thus, given that Betty’s reason-giving structure consists only of R1 and R2, she has only two alternatives: to choose to file an accurate tax return or to choose to cheat on her taxes. At this point, it is incumbent upon McKenna to explain how Betty can be prevented from making the former choice without presupposing causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. What about a scenario where Betty does have a reason (e.g., R3) to choose to go to the gym? In this case, it is reasonable to believe that the story about Betty will unfold in something like either of the following two ways. Consider the first way. Here, Betty has R3 to head for the gym and R2 to file a tax return on time by 5:00 this afternoon. Because Betty believes that she cannot both go to the gym and file a tax return by 5:00, she realizes that a choice to head for the gym entails not filing her tax return on time, and therefore concludes that choosing to head for the gym is immoral and, thereby, morally significant in nature. In short, either choice (to head for the gym or to file her tax return on time) that Betty makes will be morally significant in nature. At this point (and assuming that Betty is still an unwitting participant in McKenna’s FSCB), it is incumbent upon McKenna to explain how Betty can be prevented from making the choice to file her tax return on time without presupposing causal determinism in the actual sequence of events.45 43. I will omit consideration of a reason to roast chicken for the sake of ease of discussion. Everything that I say about R3 and choosing to head to the gym applies, mutatis mutandis, to a reason to roast chicken. 44. The fact that McKenna maintains that the alternative of choosing to head for the gym is “not relevant to Betty’s deliberative circumstances” (McKenna 2003, 207) might be understood to suggest that Betty has no reason to make this choice. Also, McKenna states (ibid., 212) that Derk Pereboom pointed out that an opponent of McKenna might maintain that a necessary condition for an agent to perform an action is that the agent have some pro-attitude toward that action. Pereboom’s point seems to support the position that Betty has no reason to choose to head for the gym. 45. Thomas Flint has asked whether Betty would have to realize all of this. After all, some people fail to put two and two together. What if Betty had R2 to pay her taxes on time by 5:00 and R3 to head for the gym, but did not realize that choosing to head for the gym entailed not paying her taxes on time? If this were the case, Betty’s choice to head for the gym would not be immoral.

102

Stewart Goetz

One other issue that is raised by this first unfolding of the story should be noted. In general, the content of a reason for choosing determines the point at which it engages an agent’s practical reasoning (becomes deliberatively significant). In the case of Betty, the content of R3—that she have a good time with friends—determines that R3 engages her practical reasoning at a point that is distinct from and prior to that at which she wrestles with the question of whether or not to cheat on her taxes. Whether Betty chooses to cheat on her taxes or not, the alternative of heading for the gym for R3 engages her practical reasoning at the juncture where she must resolve whether or not she will file her tax return, falsified or not, on time. What if McKenna were to insist that Betty was free to choose to head for the gym after she had decided to file her tax return on time? In order to make sense out of a second way the story of Betty might unfold, the content of the reason for heading for the gym will have to be different. Suppose Betty has chosen to file her tax return on time but is tempted to cheat (because of R1) about the amount that she owes. She also has reason R2 not to cheat. Let us assume that Betty makes the morally significant choice not to cheat for R2, truthfully fills out the tax forms for her husband to mail, and afterward chooses to head for the gym for the purpose of physically distancing herself from the forms (a reason R4) that she believes she would be tempted to falsify (thereby reversing her original choice), if she remained at home. Her choice to head for the gym is thereby once again morally significant. Moreover, as was the case in the first unfolding of the story, Betty has two morally significant choices (to cheat or not to cheat), and it is incumbent upon McKenna to explain how Betty can be prevented from choosing not to cheat without presupposing causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. In response to my critique of FSCB,46 McKenna has explained that he is seeking a reason for choosing that is motivationally too weak to be deliberatively significant, but strong enough that if an agent were to choose for it she would not be irrational. Thus, it is consistent with his example of Betty to assume that though she has a reason to choose to head for the gym in the form of a desire to head there, this reason is motivationally too weak to be deliberatively significant. While in the two unfoldings of the story about Betty that I described, she is cognizant that choosing to head for the gym would be morally significant, she believes that heading for the gym ranks so low in the order of preferences (is motivationally so weak) for how she might act that it is deliberatively insignificant. At this point, there is a dilemma. Either Betty does not have a reason that motivates her or she does have such a reason. If Betty merely believes that heading for the gym would be morally significant and we assume for the sake of argument, as McKenna seems to do, that a belief alone does not motivate an agent to act, then it is hard to understand in what sense she has a reason to head for the gym If Betty did not realize that heading for the gym was incompatible with paying her taxes on time, then she would not see them as alternatives between which she would have to choose and she would just intend to do both. In this case, it would be incumbent upon McKenna to explain how Betty can be prevented from making the choice to pay her taxes on time without presupposing causal determinism. 46. McKenna conveyed this response to me in personal correspondence.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

103

that is relevant to PAP*. Without a reason to head for the gym, choosing to head there is not an alternative course of action available to her. If Betty has a desire to head for the gym, then she has a reason to choose that motivates her and is deliberatively significant, and as I proposed three paragraphs back, the content of that reason determines the point at which it engages her practical reasoning. Moreover, it is a morally significant alternative at the point at which it does engage her practical reasoning. Perhaps, in the end, McKenna will respond that his argument against PAP assumes that the alternative of choosing to head for the gym does not enter Betty’s deliberative process as morally significant in nature. Thus, in my response to his argument I have merely begged the question against him by telling stories in which it is deliberatively morally significant. I have explained why, and not merely assumed that, it is reasonable to believe that the alternative choice of heading for the gym must be deliberatively morally significant. I also think, however, that certain comments of McKenna’s suggest that he recognizes that if Betty has reason R2 not to cheat on her taxes as part of her reason-giving structure, then it is plausible to maintain that the alternative of choosing to head for the gym is deliberatively morally significant for Betty. In his discussion of the example of Betty, McKenna comments on a response to his argument by Carl Ginet that if one course of action (one choice) is morally significant (e.g., Betty’s choosing to cheat on her taxes), then any other course of action (choice) is morally significant in relation to that one course of action.47 Thus, Ginet claims that if Betty chooses to head for the gym, that choice would be morally significant. In response to Ginet, McKenna seeks to illustrate how the alternative of choosing to head for the gym,48 while perhaps a morally significant alternative, can fail to be deliberatively morally significant for Betty in the context where she chooses to cheat on her taxes. To show how this is possible, McKenna has a prosecuting attorney ask Betty, “Betty, did you at least consider not cheating on your taxes before sending them in?” Betty answers, “No, but I was thinking that I might head for the gym.”49 What is important to notice about McKenna’s response to Ginet is that it seems to entail a significant gap in Betty’s reason-giving structure. This is because it is plausible to think that the explanation for Betty’s not considering choosing not to cheat on her taxes is that she has no reason (is not aware of a reason) not to cheat on her taxes. If she had (was aware of) a reason not to cheat, how could she fail to consider (deliberate about) choosing not to cheat? By taking the step to ensure that Betty does not even consider not cheating, McKenna seems implicitly to concede that if Betty had a reason not to cheat, then the alternative of heading for the gym would have to be deliberatively morally significant in nature for Betty because it would be seen by her as playing a part in her not cheating on her taxes. Can Betty, then, have a reason to cheat on her taxes such that the alternative of choosing to cheat is deliberatively morally significant, and fail to have a 47. McKenna (2003, 207). 48. In his article, McKenna actually has Betty choose to roast a chicken. Nothing that is relevant to the point I am making, however, depends on this difference. 49. McKenna (2003, 207).

104

Stewart Goetz

reason not to cheat that is deliberatively morally significant? If she cannot, I believe it is because something like the following principle about moral reasons is intuitively plausible: MR: If an agent has a reason to choose immorally (morally) that is deliberatively morally significant, then he must have a reason to choose otherwise that makes the respective alternative choice deliberatively morally significant. I think that a proponent of PAP not only finds PAP* intuitively plausible, but also is intuitively drawn to MR.50 I do not know of an argument for MR that makes use of premises that are more intuitively plausible than MR itself. Given MR, however, it is plausible to think that the following refinement of PAP* is correct: PAP**: An agent is morally responsible for his immoral (moral) choice for reason R1 at time t only if he was free at t to choose morally (immorally) for reason R2. It is important to emphasize that PAP** is not a permutation on PAP in the sense that it modifies or changes the content of the latter to include what was not implicit in PAP*, and ultimately PAP, from the start. A virtue of McKenna’s argument is that it makes explicit a matter that is at issue between proponents and some opponents of PAP. This matter is MR. Perhaps McKenna has an argument against MR that is persuasive. His response to Ginet’s concern just assumes that Betty could have a reason to cheat on her taxes such that choosing to cheat is deliberatively morally significant without having a reason not to cheat that makes an alternative choice not to cheat deliberatively morally significant. If he does not have an argument against MR and RA is true, then PAP** is true, and McKenna has given us no compelling reason to believe that an FSC can be constructed against PAP** that does not assume causal determinism in the actual sequence of events and, thereby, beg the question against the libertarian.51 References Ekstrom, Laura. 2000. Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Fischer, John Martin. 1982. “Responsibility and Control.” Journal of Philosophy 89: 24–40. ———. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility.” Ethics 110: 93–139. ———. 2000. “Problems with Actual-Sequence Incompatibilism.” The Journal of Ethics 4: 323–28.

50. I think it is something like MR that lies behind and justifies Ginet’s claim that if one course of action is morally significant, then any other course of action is morally significant in relation to that one course of action. 51. I want to thank John Martin Fischer, William Hasker, Michael McKenna, and David Widerker for either discussing issues pertaining to this paper and/or reading earlier drafts of it and making helpful suggestions. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Thomas Flint for his help with this paper.

Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question

105

———. 2001. “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism.” In Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, 1–26. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 2002. “Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane, 281–308. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2005. “Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” In Handbook on Ethical Theory, ed. David Copp. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming). Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–39. ———. 2003. “Some Thoughts Concerning PAP.” In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 339–45. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. Goetz, Stewart. 1999. “Stumping for Widerker.” Faith and Philosophy 16: 83–89. ———. 2001. “Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.” Faith and Philosophy 18: 93–101. ———. 2002. “Alternative Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83: 131–47. Haji, Ishtiyaque and McKenna, Michael. 2004. “Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.” Journal of Philosophy 101: 299–314. Hasker, William. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hunt, David. 2000. “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action.” Philosophical Studies 97: 195–227. ———. 2003. “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt.” In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 159–83. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. Kane, Robert. 1985. Free Will and Values. Albany: SUNY Press. ———. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKenna, Michael. 2003. “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives: Frankfurt Examples with Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives.” In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 201–17. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. Mele, Alfred. 1992. Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2003. “Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom.” In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 251–64. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. Mele, Alfred and David Robb. 1998. “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.” Philosophical Review 107: 97–112. Pereboom, Derk. 2003. “Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities.” In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 185–99. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. Searle, John. 2001. “Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology.” Philosophy 76: 491–514. Stump, Eleonore. 1996. “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.” In Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, 73–88. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 1999. “Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz.” Faith and Philosophy 16: 413–22. ———. 2003.“Moral Responsibility without Alternative Possibilities.” In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 139–158. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. Taylor, Richard. 1983. Metaphysics, 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Widerker, David. 1995a. “Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions.” Faith and Philosophy 12: 113–18. ———. 1995b. “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.” Philosophical Review 104: 247–61.