Foundations of Structuralism: Critique of Levi-Strauss and the Structuralist Movement (Studies in philosophy)

The Foundations of Structuralism A CRITIQUE AND THE MOVEMENT S I M O N C L A R K E Lecturer in Sociology, T H E OF ...

Author: Simon Clarke

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The Foundations of Structuralism A CRITIQUE AND THE MOVEMENT S I M O N

C L A R K E

Lecturer in Sociology,

T H E

OF LÉVI-STRAUSS STRUCTURALIST

University of Warwick

H A R V E S T E R PRESS

B A R N E S

&

N O B L E

B O O K S

•

S U S S E X .

N E W J E R S E Y

First published in Great B r i t a i n in 1981 by T H E H A R V E S T E R PRESS L I M I T E D Publisher: John Spiers

16 Ship Street, Brighton, Sussex and in the USA by BARNES & NOBLE BOOKS 81 Adams D r i v e , T o t o w a , N e w Jersey 07512

© Simon Clarke, 1981 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Clarke, Simon The foundations of structuralism. 1. Structuralism I . Title 149'.96 B841.4 ISBN

0-85527-978-8

BARNES & NOBLE ISBN 0-389-20115-4 Photoset and printed by Photobooks ( B r i s t o l ) L t d A l l rights reserved

Contents Preface I

Lévi-Strauss

vii and. the F o u n d a t i o n s of S t r u c t u r a l i s m

I I T h e C r i s i s i n F r e n c h P h i l o s o p h y i n t h e 1930s

1 6

1 T h e complementarity of structuralism and phenomenology

6

2 T h e intellectual o r t h o d o x y of the T h i r d Republic

9

3 T h e i n t e r - w a r intellectual crisis

16

4 Reaction to the Crisis—the existentialist philosophy of Sartre

24

5 Lévi-Strauss' rejection of phenomenology

30

I I I T h e Origins of Structuralism

34

1 Lévi-Strauss and D u r k h e i m i a n philosophy

36

2 Lévi-Strauss and D u r k h e i m i a n sociology

38

3 T o w a r d s a solution: Lévi-Strauss, Mauss and the theory of reciprocity

42

4 F r o m the theory of r e c i p r o c i t y to The Elementary Structures I V T h e Elementary Structures o f K i n s h i p 1 T h e General T h e o r y of Reciprocity

53 56

a) The general theory of reciprocity and the p r o h i b i t i o n of incest

56

b) The social function of reciprocity

58

c) Towards a psychological theory of r e c i p r o c i t y

59

d) Reciprocity in systems of kinship and marriage

68

2 The Elementary Structures of Kinship

V

48

72

a) Social classification and the regulation of marriage

72

b) T h e elementary structures

78

c) Systems of kinship and marriage

80

T h e I m p a c t of The Elementary Structures of Kinship

86

1 T h e theory of kinship

86

2 Feminism and the exchange of women

91

3 F r o m structures to structuralism

96

4 A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l structuralism

109 v

vi

Contents

VI

Structuralism in Linguistics

117

1 Saussure and the o b j e c t i v i t y of language

119

2 Positivism and phenomenology in the study of language

125

3 Positivism and formalism: f r o m B l o o m f i e l d to Chomsky

129

4 Form and function: the Prague Linguistic C i r c l e

145

V I I L é v i - S t r a u s s and the L i n g u i s t i c A n a l o g y

157

1 The encounter w i t h linguistics

157

2 Language and mind: the 'structural unconscious'

164

3 The structural analysis of meaning

173

VIII

T h e Structural Analysis o f M y t h

184

1 Early approaches to m y t h

185

2 The logic of untamed thought

189

3 Mythologiques

194

4 Positivism and formalism

206

IX 1

The Structuralist H u m a n Philosophy Lévi-Strauss'

210

human philosophy

212

2 Sartre's incorporation of structures in the dialectic

220

3 Lévi-Strauss' subordination of the dialectic to structure

223

4 The complementarity and i r r e c o n c i l a b i l i t y of structural and dialectical i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y

226

5 Conclusion

230

Abbreviations The Published Works of Claude Bibliography

237 Lévi-Strauss

239 255

Preface T h i s b o o k i s the result o f t e n years o f i n t e r m i t t e n t w o r k o n L é v i Strauss and the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m o v e m e n t . T h e o r i g i n a l research was for a P h D thesis o n L é v i - S t r a u s s ( ' T h e S t r u c t u r a l i s m o f C l a u d e L é v i - S t r a u s s ' , U n i v e r s i t y o f Essex. 1975), parts o f w h i c h have subsequently been p u b l i s h e d in a m o d i f i e d f o r m . Lest the reader i m m e d i a t e l y r e t u r n this b o o k t o the shelves w i t h h o r r o r , I should add t h a t the b o o k has been almost c o m p l e t e l y r e w r i t t e n so as to e x p u n g e a l l traces of the b o r e d o m and p e d a n t r y t h a t seems to be an i n e v i t a b l e p a r t o f w r i t i n g a thesis. D i r e c t q u o t a t i o n and f o o t n o t e references have been k e p t to a m i n i m u m , and endless reservations and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s e l i m i n a t e d , w h i l e the c e n t r a l a r g u m e n t has been b r o u g h t o u t and d e v e l o p e d and a considerable a m o u n t o f n e w m a t e r i a l added. A l t h o u g h the scholarly apparatus of a thesis has been abandoned the reader m i g h t be reassured by the k n o w l e d g e t h a t the b o o k is the result of extensive and i n t e n s i v e research o v e r a l o n g p e r i o d so that claims and assertions are n o t made l i g h t l y . T h o s e w h o feel lost w i t h o u t footnotes are i n v i t e d t o pore o v e r the o r i g i n a l thesis and p u b l i s h e d articles. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y applies t o the t e c h n i c a l discussion o f the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p , o n l y the conclusions o f w h i c h are r e p o r t e d here. O n e cannot w r i t e a b o o k l i k e this w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g e n o r m o u s debts t o m a n y people. T h e greatest debt i s o w e d t o C l a u d e L é v i Strauss, w i t h o u t w h o m i t w o u l d never have been possible. A l t h o u g h the b o o k is sharply c r i t i c a l of Lévi-Strauss' w o r k as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the social sciences, to r e a d his books is a t r e m e n d o u s l y r e w a r d i n g e x p e r i e n c e . A s l i t e r a r y w o r k s they m a k e a v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to our culture, inspiring great h u m i l i t y t h r o u g h the u n f o l d i n g o f the cultures t h a t h e has come t o love and to w h o s e p r e s e r v a t i o n he has d e d i c a t e d himself. It is perhaps n o t his fault that the i m p a c t o f his w o r k has been q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m that w h i c h h e i n t e n d e d . vii

viii

Preface

T h a n k s are also due to A l a s d a i r M a c I n t y r e , w h o was the o r i g i n a l supervisor o f m y thesis, and t o H e r m i n i o M a r t i n s , w h o saw i t c o m e t o f r u i t i o n ; t o M a r g a r e t B o d e n , w h o has been a v e r y s y m p a t h e t i c e d i t o r ; and t o C e l i a B r i t t o n , B o b Fine and S i m o n F r i t h w h o have been v e r y h e l p f u l c o m m e n t a t o r s o n various drafts o f the w o r k . Last, but b y n o means least, thanks t o L i n , Sam and B e c k y w h o have had t o bear the strain and t o w h o m the b o o k i s dedicated. Parts o f C h a p t e r s I I and I I I o r i g i n a l l y f o r m e d p a r t o f a n a r t i c l e i n Sociology ( ' T h e O r i g i n s o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' S t r u c t u r a l i s m ' , Sociology, 12, 3, 1978, pp. 405-39) w h i l e C h a p t e r V I I I is a m o d i f i e d v e r s i o n o f an a r t i c l e t h a t appeared o r i g i n a l l y in The Sociological Review ( L é v i Strauss' S t r u c t u r a l A n a l y s i s of M y t h ' , Sociological Review, 25, 4, 1977, pp. 7 4 3 - 7 7 4 ) . I a m g r a t e f u l t o the e d i t o r s o f b o t h for p e r m i s s i o n t o p u b l i s h the m a t e r i a l here. A b b r e v i a t e d f o o t n o t e references refer t o t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y o f Lévi-Strauss' works.

I. Introduction. Lévi-Strauss and the Foundations of Structuralism THIS b o o k presents a f u n d a m e n t a l c r i t i q u e o f w h a t is k n o w n as ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' t h r o u g h a n e x a m i n a t i o n , p r i m a r i l y , o f the w o r k o f a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , C l a u d e L é v i - S t r a u s s . T h i s a p p r o a c h t o the subject r e q u i r e s some e x p l a n a t i o n . ' S t r u c t u r a l i s m ' i s associated m o r e w i t h a set o f names: L é v i Strauss,

Althusser,

Foucault,

Lacan

(and,

perhaps,

Barthes,

D e r r i d a , Tel Quel) and a n u m b e r of p r o v o c a t i v e slogans: 'the d e a t h o f the subject', ' t h e assault o n r e a l i s m ' , t h a n w i t h a c l e a r l y d e f i n e d p r o g r a m m e o r d o c t r i n e . I t i s i n d e e d the case t h a t t h e r e are m a n y differences b e t w e e n these t h i n k e r s , and t h a t each has d e v e l o p e d the basic ideas o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m i n his o w n w a y . H o w e v e r there i s a basic t h e m e a t the h e a r t o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m and i t i s l a r g e l y f r o m the w o r k o f L é v i - S t r a u s s t h a t this t h e m e comes. I n d e v e l o p i n g a c r i t i q u e o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k i t i s w i t h this t h e m e that I a m p r i m a r i l y concerned. F o r s t r u c t u r a l i s t s L é v i - S t r a u s s has s h o w n t h e w a y t o resolve once a n d f o r a l l the d i l e m m a t h a t has p l a g u e d the h u m a n and social sciences since t h e i r i n c e p t i o n o f p r o v i d i n g a s c i e n t i f i c account o f the h u m a n w o r l d w h i c h can f u l l y recognize that w o r l d a s a w o r l d o f meanings. F o r s t r u c t u r a l i s t s L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k makes the f u n d a m e n t a l break w i t h the p r e - s t r u c t u r a l i s t era, w h i c h w a s d i v i d e d b e t w e e n p r i m i t i v e p o s i t i v i s t a t t e m p t s t o reduce the h u m a n sciences t o a b r a n c h o f t h e n a t u r a l sciences and r o m a n t i c ( a n d u s u a l l y i r r a t i o n alist) a t t e m p t s t o h o l d t h e sciences a t bay b y i n s i s t i n g o n the irreducibly

subjective

structuralism must

be

any

based

on

character

attempt an

to

of

human

understand

experience.

the

implacable opposition

human

For

world

t o the evils o f

' p o s i t i v i s m ' ( ' n a t u r a l i s m ' o r 'realism') and ' h u m a n i s m ' , m a r k e d b y the

naive

belief in

the

existence

of a

reality

independent

o f h u m a n apprehension o r i n the existence o f a h u m a n i t y t h a t could

create

its

own

world.

It

is 1

Lévi-Strauss

who

shows

the

2

The Foundations of Structuralism

h u m a n and social sciences the w a y to get b e y o n d these i n f a n t i l e delusions. L é v i - S t r a u s s makes i t possible t o set the study o f h u m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s on a genuinely s c i e n t i f i c f o u n d a t i o n by r e d e f i n i n g the object of the h u m a n sciences. Lévi-Strauss' a c h i e v e m e n t is to isolate a n autonomous o r d e r o f r e a l i t y , the s y m b o l i c o r d e r , w h i c h exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the things t h a t are s y m b o l i z e d and the people w h o s y m b o l i z e . C u l t u r a l meanings are i n h e r e n t i n the s y m b o l i c orders and these meanings are i n d e p e n d e n t of, and p r i o r t o , the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , o n the one hand, and h u m a n subjects, o n the o t h e r . T h u s the w o r l d o n l y has a n o b j e c t i v e existence i n the s y m b o l i c o r d e r s that represent i t . I t i s the s y m b o l i c orders that create the i l l u s i o n o f a n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y f o r h u m a n subjects, and the i l l u s i o n o f h u m a n subjects f o r w h o m the w o r l d has r e a l i t y . Since w e can o n l y l i v e w i t h i n these s y m b o l i c o r d e r s , w e can have n o k n o w l e d g e o f a n y t h i n g b e y o n d t h e m . N a t u r a l i s m and h u m a n i s m express the t w i n fallacies t h a t w e can k n o w a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its s y m b o l i c representation and t h a t w e can k n o w ourselves i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the s y m b o l i s m t h a t constitutes a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f ourselves. T h e c l a i m of s t r u c t u r a l i s m to have isolated s y m b o l i c orders as a p r i v i l e g e d r e a l i t y o f w h i c h w e can have d i r e c t k n o w l e d g e depends o n its a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y the meanings c o n s t i t u t e d b y such orders i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any p a r t i c u l a r subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f these meanings. S t r u c t u r a l i s m seeks t o discover the o b j e c t i v e residue o f m e a n i n g t h a t remains w h e n a b s t r a c t i o n has b e e n made f r o m a l l such subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h i s o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any conscious m e a n i n g the s y m b o l i c o r d e r m i g h t have e i t h e r f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i c i p a n t in t h e o r d e r or f o r a p a r t i c u l a r analyst o f i t . T h i s o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g can o n l y b e a n unconscious m e a n i n g . S t r u c t u r a l i s m therefore d i r e c t s o u r a t t e n t i o n a w a y f r o m the illusions o f consciousness t o the unconscious s u b s t r a t u m o f m e a n i n g . I t i s the unconscious t h a t mediates b e t w e e n u s and the w o r l d , c r e a t i n g the t w i n illusions o f r e a l i t y and subjectivity. It is this t h e m e that pervades s t r u c t u r a l i s m a n d t h a t provides the basis f o r the s t r u c t u r a l i s t c l a i m to offer a s c i e n t i f i c approach to h u m a n i t y . It is a theme t h a t is d e v e l o p e d r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t l y in the w o r k o f d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l i s t s . Althusser has d e v e l o p e d the structuralist arguments largely in epistemological terms, re-

Lévi-Strauss and the Foundations

of Structuralism

3

c a p i t u l a t i n g the n e o - p o s i t i v i s t c r i t i q u e o f n a t u r a l i s m and o f h u m a n i s m . Foucault has d e v e l o p e d it in a sustained r e l a t i v i s t c r i t i q u e o f the i d e o l o g i c a l pretensions o f c o n t e m p o r a r y society. Lacan has d e v e l o p e d i t i n a l i n g u i s t i c idealist r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Freud. A c o m p r e h e n s i v e c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m w o u l d t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e several volumes. H o w e v e r these d i f f e r e n t v a r i a t i o n s are d e v e l o p m e n t s of a c o m m o n t h e m e , and it is a t h e m e that w a s i n t r o d u c e d , a t least i n the s t r u c t u r a l i s t f o r m , i n the w o r k of Lévi-Strauss. E x a m i n a t i o n o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k n o t o n l y has the advantage o f d i r e c t i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o the foundations o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m i n this sense. I t has t w o o t h e r advantages as w e l l . F i r s t l y , the w o r k o f A l t h u s s e r , L a c a n and F o u c a u l t i s o f t e n e x t r e m e l y ambiguous, i f not obscure, and i s f u l l o f the most s w e e p i n g generalizations t h a t make t h e i r claims v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o p i n d o w n . L é v i - S t r a u s s , b y contrast, d e v e l o p e d the s t r u c t u r a l i s t a p p r o a c h i n the e x a m i n a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r s y m b o l i c systems, above a l l those o f k i n s h i p a n d o f m y t h , t h a t makes his claims c o n c r e t e and specific, and so amenable t o r a t i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n . W e can therefore e x a m i n e i n some d e t a i l L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a t t e m p t t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the o b j e c t i v e unconscious m e a n i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r s y m b o l i c systems t o d i s c o v e r w h e t h e r the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m e t h o d does g i v e us access to a p r i v i l e g e d o r d e r of r e a l i t y . T h i s makes i t possible t o develop a c r i t i q u e o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m that does n o t o n l y rest on p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t , b u t that also has some purchase o n the supposed a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m . Secondly, t h r o u g h a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f the w o r k o f the founder o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m it is possible to evaluate the s t r u c t u r a l i s t c l a i m to o r i g i n a l i t y b y e x a m i n i n g the sources o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t a p p r o a c h in Lévi-Strauss' w o r k . T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n w i l l reveal that s t r u c t u r a l i s m is n o t as o r i g i n a l as it presents i t s e l f to be. Its p h i l o s o p h i c a l roots are p l a n t e d f i r m l y i n the p o s i t i v i s t t r a d i t i o n , t o w h i c h L é v i Strauss is related t h r o u g h the French p o s i t i v i s t sociologist E m i l e D u r k h e i m and t h r o u g h p o s i t i v i s t linguistics. T h e c e n t r a l a r g u m e n t o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m i s i n essence a r e s t a t e m e n t o f the d i s c r e d i t e d a r g u m e n t o f l i n g u i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m that language i s the o n l y r e a l i t y since k n o w l e d g e can o n l y be expressed and c o m m u n i c a t e d in l i n g u i s t i c f o r m . A g a i n the w o r k o f L é v i - S t r a u s s presents u s w i t h a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x a m i n e these arguments n o t o n l y i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms, w h i c h w o u l d s i m p l y i n v o l v e u s i n a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n o f the h i s ¬ tory of neo-positivism, but in terms of the substantive implications

4


o f the a t t e m p t t o d i s c o v e r the r e a l i t y expressed i n language. L é v i - S t r a u s s has leant v e r y h e a v i l y o n the a u t h o r i t y o f the a c h i e v e m e n t s o f p o s i t i v i s t l i n g u i s t i c s , and s o i n e x a m i n i n g his w o r k i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o d i r e c t o u r a t t e n t i o n t o these supposed achievements. A l t h o u g h most s t r u c t u r a l i s t s w o u l d agree i n r e g a r d i n g L é v i Strauss as the founder of the t r a d i t i o n , f e w r e l a t e u n c r i t i c a l l y to his w o r k . T h e attempt to develop a critique of structuralism through a close study o f the w o r k o f one s t r u c t u r a l i s t m i g h t t h e r e f o r e appear t o b e c o m p r o m i s e d . O n l y a f u r t h e r d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n o f the w o r k of, f o r e x a m p l e , A l t h u s s e r , Foucault, a n d L a c a n c o u l d hope to persuade the sceptic t h a t the basic c r i t i q u e does indeed a p p l y to the w o r k o f the l a t t e r . F o r the m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c reader, h o w e v e r , i t m i g h t b e i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e the basic c r i t i c i s m s made o f L é v i Strauss' w o r k b y later s t r u c t u r a l i s t s i n o r d e r t o establish that these c r i t i c i s m s are n o t f u n d a m e n t a l . T h e m a i n respect i n w h i c h later s t r u c t u r a l i s t s have c r i t i c i z e d L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k i s i n r e l a t i o n t o his t h e o r y o f the unconscious f o u n d a t i o n s of m e a n i n g . F o r Lévi-Strauss, as we shall see, systems o f m e a n i n g are c o n s t i t u t e d b y a n unconscious t h a t emerges o n a b i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . L a t e r structuralists h a v e c r i t i c i z e d t w o i m p l i c a t i o n s o f this t h e o r y . F i r s t l y , the unconscious is s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l , and p r i o r , to the systems o f m e a n i n g . H e n c e L é v i - S t r a u s s i n the last analysis resorts to n a t u r a l i s m . For later s t r u c t u r a l i s t s this l a c u n a is r e m o v e d by Lacan's d e v e l o p m e n t o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y i n w h i c h the u n c o n scious i t s e l f becomes a p r o d u c t o f systems o f m e a n i n g . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t radicalizes s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c u l t u r a l i d e a l i s m , and i n e l i m i n a t i n g any concept o f h u m a n n a t u r e i t radicalizes the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s ' a n t i - h u m a n i s m , b u t it does n o t affect the f u n d a m e n t a l issues. S e c o n d l y , L é v i - S t r a u s s ' unconscious i s n o t o n l y e x t e r n a l t o the systems of m e a n i n g , it is also fixed and so b e y o n d h i s t o r y . T h i s e l i m i n a t e s any source o f h i s t o r i c a l change, f o r the permanence o f the unconscious can o n l y create static s t r u c t u r e s . Lacan's r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f the t h e o r y o f the unconscious resolves this d i l e m m a t o o . Since the unconscious is i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the systems of m e a n i n g the l a t t e r no l o n g e r have a fixed s t r u c t u r e b u t can be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as a n u m b e r of systems engaged in a c o m p l e x interaction with one another and so subject to change. This idea is

Lévi-Strauss and

the

Foundations

of Structuralism

5

developed in Althusser's attempt to integrate a dehumanized version o f Sartre's idea o f p r a c t i c e i n t o L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m , so t h a t structures define practices that themselves change the structures. A l t h o u g h these m o r e sophisticated versions o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m raise n e w issues i n t h e i r t u r n , the d e v e l o p m e n t s i n v o l v e d represent no m o r e than variations on a c o m m o n u n d e r l y i n g theme. Essentially they s i m p l y represent a f u r t h e r r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f L é v i Strauss' s t r u c t u r a l i s m , p r o v i d i n g the means t o i n t e g r a t e i n t o the s t r u c t u r a l i s t f r a m e w o r k elements that f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s r e m a i n e d outside i t . I n this respect, t h e r e f o r e , the f u n d a m e n t a l c r i t i c i s m s that are d i r e c t e d a t L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m i n this book a p p l y w i t h e q u a l , o r even g r e a t e r , force t o the m o r e sophisticated versions t h a t are n o w c u r r e n t among the avant-garde.

I I . The Crisis in French Philosophy in the 1930s 1

T H E

C O M P L E M E N T A R I T Y

S T R U C T U R A L I S M

A N D

OF

P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

S T R U C T U R A L I S M as a specific a p p r o a c h t o the h u m a n sciences d e v e l o p e d s l o w l y . L é v i - S t r a u s s was b o r n i n 1908. H e studied L a w and t h e n P h i l o s o p h y a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris b e t w e e n 1927 and 1931

and

taught

philosophy

in

Lycees

for

two

years.

His

o p p o r t u n i t y t o become a professional a n t h r o p o l o g i s t came w h e n the D u r k h e i m i a n s o c i o l o g i s t C e l e s t i n Bouglé r e c o m m e n d e d h i m f o r a t e a c h i n g post as a s o c i o l o g i s t in B r a z i l . T h e r e he c o n d u c t e d f i e l d w o r k , and he p u b l i s h e d his first e t h n o g r a p h i c r e p o r t in 1936. I n 1 9 3 8 - 9 h e made a m o r e extensive f i e l d w o r k t r i p i n B r a z i l . F o l l o w i n g m i l i t a r y service in France he f l e d , as a J e w , to the U n i t e d States i n 1940. T h e r e h e t a u g h t a t the N e w School f o r Social Research, the E c o l e L i b r e des Hautes E t u d e s and at B a r n a r d College.

He

f i n a l l y r e t u r n e d t o France o n l y i n 1947, h a v i n g

served f o r t w o years as a F r e n c h c u l t u r a l attache in the U n i t e d States. On his r e t u r n to France Lévi-Strauss t o o k up a post as Assistant D i r e c t o r o f the M u s é e d e l ' H o m m e i n Paris u n t i l 1950 w h e n h e was a p p o i n t e d D i r e c t o r o f Studies and Professor o f the C o m p a r a t i v e R e l i g i o n o f N o n - L i t e r a t e Peoples a t the E c o l e P r a t i q u e des H a u t e s Etudes.

In 1949

Lévi-Strauss

made a short

fieldwork

t r i p to

C h i t t a g o n g i n Pakistan a t the i n s t i g a t i o n o f U N E S C O , i n w h i c h o r g a n i s a t i o n he was v e r y a c t i v e t h r o u g h the 1950s. In 1959 he was e l e c t e d t o the chair o f S o c i a l A n t h r o p o l o g y a t the C o l l e g e d e France, sponsored b y M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y .

I n 1967 h e was

a w a r d e d the G o l d M e d a l o f the C N R S , and i n 1974 r e c e i v e d the accolade o f e l e c t i o n t o the A c a d é m i e F r a n ç a i s e . H i s f i r s t m a j o r work,

The Elementary Structures of Kinship was p u b l i s h e d to some

a c c l a i m i n 1949, but i t w a s o n l y w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Tristes Tropiques in 1955, Structural Anthropology in 1958 and The Savage Mind

6

The Crisis in French Philosophy in the 1930s

7

in 1962 that Lévi-Strauss became a p u b l i c i n t e l l e c t u a l figure and s t r u c t u r a l i s m e m e r g e d as a m a j o r i n t e l l e c t u a l m o v e m e n t . Lévi-Strauss' w o r k struck a chord in French l e f t - w i n g culture in the e a r l y 1960s as the expression of a p h i l o s o p h y that shared m u c h o f the i n s p i r a t i o n o f the t h e n d o m i n a n t philosophies o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , w h i l e a v o i d i n g w h a t h a d c o m e t o b e seen a s the i n s o l u b l e p r o b l e m s o f the l a t t e r . M a n y o f the pioneers o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m o v e m e n t , such as Lacan, F o u c a u l t , and Poulantzas, came t o s t r u c t u r a l i s m f r o m p h e n o m e n o l o g y o r e x i s t e n t i a l i s m a n d c r e a t e d n e w variants o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m t h a t sought t o i n t e g r a t e s t r u c t u r a l i s m w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . M a n y f o l l o w e r s o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m o v e m e n t b r o u g h t t o s t r u c t u r a l i s m the f e r v o u r a n d m i s s i o n a r y zeal w i t h w h i c h the previous g e n e r a t i o n had e m b r a c e d p h e n o m e n o l o g y and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ( a n d i n d e e d m a n y w h o e n t e r e d the 1960s i m m e r s e d i n s u b j e c t i v i t y w e r e the same people w h o e n t e r e d the 1970s p r o c l a i m i n g the death of the subject). T h e ease and speed w i t h w h i c h so m a n y i n t e l l e c t u a l s m a d e the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m p h e n o m e n o l o g y t o s t r u c t u r a l i s m should w a r n u s against the c o m m o n b e l i e f , h e l d b y the p r o p o n e n t s o f one o r the o t h e r d o c t r i n e , that the t w o m o v e m e n t s are absolutely opposed t o one a n o t h e r , a b e l i e f t h a t is a p p a r e n t l y v a l i d a t e d by the a n t i t h e t i c a l terms i n w h i c h the debate b e t w e e n the t w o i s c o n d u c t e d . T h e r e i s n o d o u b t t h a t b e t w e e n s t r u c t u r a l i s m and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , in p a r t i c u l a r , there is an u n b r i d g e a b l e g u l f , expressed in the b y n o w standard oppositions o f s t r u c t u r e t o h i s t o r y , object t o subject, unconscious t o conscious, d e t e r m i n a c y t o free w i l l , i m m a n e n c e t o transcendence. H o w e v e r , this u n b r i d g e a b l e g u l f i s n o t a g u l f b e t w e e n t w o absolutely a n t i t h e t i c a l philosophies, b u t i s one b e t w e e n philosophies t h a t o f f e r c o m p l e m e n t a r y , b u t d i v e r g e n t , solutions to a c o m m o n set of problems. A l t h o u g h the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m o v e m e n t e m e r g e d i n r e a c t i o n t o e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , and came t o p r o m i n e n c e t w o decades after the heyday o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , the t w o philosophies have a c o m m o n o r i g i n i n the i n t e r - w a r i n t e l l e c t u a l crisis i n France. Sartre was o n l y three years o l d e r t h a n Lévi-Strauss, S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y w e r e his e x a c t c o m t e m p o r a r i e s . S a r t r e and M e r l e a u - P o n t y w e r e the m o r e precocious, b e i n g students a t the prestigious and é l i t i s t E c o l e N o r m a l e S u p é r i e u r , w h i l e Lévi-Strauss had a m o r e modest e d u c a t i o n . Sartre a n d Merleau-Ponty sought to regenerate philosophy, while Lévi-

8

The Foundations

of Structuralism

Strauss was m u c h m o r e sceptical o f the c l a i m s o f p h i l o s o p h y t o p r o v i d e any k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e . Sartre and M e r l e a u - P o n t y o n l y b e c a m e seriously i n v o l v e d p o l i t i c a l l y w i t h the Resistance, w h i l e L é v i - S t r a u s s ' p e r i o d o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y w a s the early 1930s, c u l m i n a t i n g in his s t a n d i n g as a candidate in the cantonal elections w h e n h e was teaching a t M o n t - d e - M a r s a n i n 1 9 3 2 - 3 . T h e difference i n degree o f p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t i n the 1930s i s closely associated w i t h the d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l concerns o f the t h r e e . W h i l e Sartre and M e r l e a u - P o n t y had a n i n t r o s p e c t i v e c o n c e r n w i t h the p r o b l e m o f the i n d i v i d u a l conscience i n a society w h o s e values seemed b a n k r u p t , Lévi-Strauss appears to have been m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h the e x p l o i t a t i o n and oppression o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n the name o f those values, thus w i t h o b j e c t i v e social questions rather than s u b j e c t i v e m o r a l d i l e m m a s . T h i s difference i n t u r n i s p r o b a b l y r e l a t e d t o L é v i - S t r a u s s ' J e w i s h b a c k g r o u n d ( a l t h o u g h Lévi-Strauss w a s never a b e l i e v e r ) w h i c h m u s t have enabled h i m t o distance h i m s e l f the m o r e f r o m debates w h o s e terms w e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y b e i n g set by the resurgence o f C a t h o l i c m y s t i c i s m a n d the crisis o f the m o r a l conscience t o w h i c h this gave rise a m o n g radicals w i t h a C h r i s t i a n b a c k g r o u n d . H e n c e L é v i - S t r a u s s was p r o t e c t e d f r o m the self-indulgence and the n i h i l i s t i c o v e r - r e a c t i o n that so o f t e n accompanies the adolescent r e p u d i a t i o n o f a n i n h e r i t e d f a i t h , w h i l e the resurgence o f a n t i - s e m i t i s m associated w i t h the rise o f the C a t h o l i c R i g h t m u s t have g i v e n h i m a m o r e acute p o l i t i c a l consciousness. D e s p i t e the t e m p e r a m e n t a l and e x p e r i e n t i a l differences b e t w e e n L é v i - S t r a u s s and those w h o w o u l d d e v e l o p e x i s t e n t i a l i s m and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , they shared m o r e t h a n a place and a date. T h e y a l l w e n t t h r o u g h the same r i g i d system o f e d u c a t i o n . T h e y shared a c o m m o n r e j e c t i o n o f the doctrines w i t h w h i c h they w e r e c o n f r o n t e d as p h i l o s o p h y students, and the grounds f o r the r e j e c t i o n w e r e r e m a r k a b l y s i m i l a r i n each case. A l t h o u g h t h e i r r e a c t i o n to established d o c t r i n e s was a n e g a t i v e one, it was s t i l l the established doctrines that set the terms of the r e a c t i o n and i m p o s e d on the y o u n g r a d i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s of the late 1920s and e a r l y 1930s a c o m m o n set o f p r o b l e m s . I t i s these c o m m o n p r o b l e m s , t o w h i c h S a r t r e and L é v i - S t r a u s s o f f e r e d a n t i t h e t i c a l solutions, that p r o v i d e the c o m m o n f o u n d a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , a n d i t is this shared origin that explains the ease with which, thirty years

9


l a t e r , a n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s c o u l d m o v e f r o m one t o the o t h e r , o r c o u l d propose a synthesis o f the t w o . I n this chapter I w a n t t o a t t e m p t t o u n c o v e r the i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o b l e m s i n response t o w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s and Sartre d e v e l o p e d their contrasting philosophies. I am not concerned w i t h e x p l a i n i n g w h y Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s adopted the solutions they chose, b u t w i t h r e l a t i n g the solutions to one another as a l t e r n a t i v e possibilities i n s c r i b e d i n a c o m m o n , and w i d e l y - s h a r e d , r e a c t i o n t o a n acute i n t e l l e c t u a l crisis. I n f o l l o w i n g chapters I shall c o n c e n t r a t e o n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Lévi-Strauss' s t r u c t u r a l i s m , b u t the existentialist theme w i l l c o n t i n u e to r u n t h r o u g h the book as the ghost that insists on h a u n t i n g the s t r u c t u r a l i s t enterprise, r u d e l y persisting i n pressing the claims of the h u m a n subject that s t r u c t u r a l i s m has suppressed, and about w h o m i t w o u l d rather r e m a i n silent.

2

T H E

T H E

I N T E L L E C T U A L

T H I R D

O R T H O D O X Y

O F

R E P U B L I C

T o understand the c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h s t r u c t u r a l i s m and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m e m e r g e d i t i s necessary t o o u t l i n e the t r a d i t i o n s i n r e a c t i o n t o w h i c h t h e y d e v e l o p e d . T h e close r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n F r e n c h academic and p o l i t i c a l life u n d e r the T h i r d R e p u b l i c means t h a t these t r a d i t i o n s , and the reactions to t h e m , also have to be located politically. I n the i n t e r - w a r years the u n i v e r s i t y was d o m i n a t e d b y D u r k h e i m i a n s o c i o l o g y and b y B e r g s o n i a n p h i l o s o p h y , t w o schools o f t h o u g h t t h a t had been closely associated w i t h the p r e w a r R e p u b l i c . I shall consider each, b r i e f l y , i n t u r n . T h e rise o f D u r k h e i m i a n s o c i o l o g y was i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the r e b u i l d i n g o f France after the Franco-Prussian W a r . T h i s task f e l l t o the T h i r d R e p u b l i c , t o w h i c h the D u r k h e i m i a n s w e r e passionately c o m m i t t e d . T h e Republicans, and the R e p u b l i c itself, w e r e opposed o n the R i g h t b y v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l i s t i c , m i l i t a n t l y C a t h o l i c , and m o n a r c h i s t , e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y groups. O n the L e f t they w e r e opposed b y the g r o w i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the w o r k i n g - c l a s s , w h i c h also tended t o take a n e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y , syndicalist, f o r m . T h e Republicans, w h o s e f o l l o w i n g was l a r g e l y p e t i t - b o u r g e o i s , w e r e h e l d together b y t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the monarchists, and, increasingly, by the anti-clericalism which

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came t o the fore i n t h e i r attempts t o secularize the e d u c a t i o n system. T o l i b e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s the R e p u b l i c c o n s t i t u t e d the m i d d l e g r o u n d b e t w e e n the forces o f the R i g h t , dedicated t o the o v e r t h r o w o f the R e p u b l i c , and those o f the l e f t , dedicated t o the o v e r t h r o w o f the w h o l e society. P a r t i c u l a r l y after the D r e y f u s case the R e p u b l i c was o n the offensive: i t represented the n e w s o c i e t y i n the m a k i n g , i t w a s the force that w o u l d subordinate a l l classes to the o v e r r i d i n g g o o d of society as a w h o l e . T h i s c o l l e c t i v e social f o r c e was seen as a m o r a l force, so the task of the R e p u b l i c was to d e v e l o p a secular m o r a l i t y and to f o r g e the i n s t i t u t i o n s that w o u l d i m p o s e this m o r a l i t y o n society. I n this w a y the p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s o f t h e R e p u b l i c , a n d especially the r e f o r m o f the e d u c a t i o n system, w o u l d o v e r c o m e the social c o n f l i c t that was the p r o d u c t o f a p a t h o l o g i c a l absence o f n o r m a t i v e o r d e r . T h e R e p u b l i c a n t r i u m p h i n t h e D r e y f u s affair gave R e p u b l i c a n i s m the o p p o r t u n i t y t o i m p l e m e n t this p r o g r a m m e , and the D u r k h e i m i a n s t o o k i t u p o n themselves t o play a l e a d i n g r o l e i n the r e f o r m o f e d u c a t i o n b y o c c u p y i n g k e y positions w i t h i n academic l i f e a n d educational administration. It is these p o l i t i c a l concerns that d o m i n a t e D u r k h e i m ' s social p h i l o s o p h y . For D u r k h e i m society is a c o l l e c t i v e m o r a l force t h a t stands above the i n d i v i d u a l . Social o r d e r depends on the p r o p e r i n t e g r a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o this ' c o l l e c t i v e conscience'. I n D u r k h e i m ' s earlier w r i t i n g s this i n t e g r a t i o n depends o n the existence of a pervasive n e t w o r k of social i n t e r a c t i o n s so that each i n d i v i d u a l i s subject t o the m o r a l i n f l u e n c e o f his o r her n e i g h b o u r s . T h i s m o r a l i n f l u e n c e imposes n o r m s o n the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t ensure the i n t e g r a t i o n o f the p e r s o n a l i t y ( w h i c h can o n l y f i n d m o r a l guidance t h r o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o l l e c t i v e ) and t h a t ensure the orderliness o f s o c i e t y . In The Division of Labour in Society D u r k h e i m ' s r e m e d y f o r e c o n o m i c c o n f l i c t was t o suggest the f o r m a t i o n o f professional associations that w o u l d b r i n g producers and consumers, w o r k e r s and e m p l o y e r s i n t o m o r e i n t i m a t e c o n t a c t w i t h one another s o a s to ensure the cohesion of society by establishing a n o r m a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n i n areas w h e r e c o m m u n i c a t i o n h a d b r o k e n d o w n . H e n c e i n this w o r k society i s seen a s a m o r a l n e t w o r k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h the c o l l e c t i v e conscience imposes i t s e l f o n a l l members o f society.


11

In his later w o r k , m o s t n o t a b l y The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, the emphasis changes a n d the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and the c o l l e c t i v e is seen as b e i n g m o r e d i r e c t . T h e c o l l e c t i v e conscience consists not o n l y o f m o r a l n o r m s b u t also o f c o l l e c t i v e representations that g o v e r n a l l f o r m s o f t h o u g h t . T h e c o l l e c t i v e conscience i s the f o u n d a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y and o f science, the source of concepts as w e l l as of n o r m s , thus the seat of reason. P a r t i c i p a t i o n in the c o l l e c t i v e conscience is n o w seen as the necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r a l l r a t i o n a l i t y : the i n d i v i d u a l i s o l a t e d f r o m the c o l l e c t i v e conscience i s incapable o f r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y and is g u i d e d by pure i n s t i n c t i v e e m o t i o n . T h e c o l l e c t i v e is thus g u i d e and j u d g e o f b o t h reason and m o r a l i t y . T h e c o l l e c t i v e conscience imposes i t s e l f o n the i n d i v i d u a l t h r o u g h i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e experiences. I n ' p r i m i t i v e ' societies these take the f o r m o f r e l i g i o u s experiences i n w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s c o m e together as c o l l e c t i v i t i e s and e x p e r i e n c e a surge o f r e l i g i o u s e m o t i o n , w h i c h i s the m y s t i f i e d f o r m t a k e n b y t h e i r affective r e a c t i o n t o the awesome majesty o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience. I n a m o r e d e v e l o p e d society D u r k h e i m ' s d e m y s t i f i c a t i o n o f r e l i g i o n makes it possible to replace G o d by a secular a u t h o r i t y and recognize the e m b o d i m e n t o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience i n its secular expression, the State. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y the a u t h o r i t y o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience need n o l o n g e r r e l y o n i r r a t i o n a l e m o t i o n a l reactions to a m y s t i f i e d r e l i g i o u s s y m b o l , b u t can be established t h r o u g h a secular r a t i o n a l i s t system of state e d u c a t i o n . D u r k h e i m ' s social p h i l o s o p h y can be s u m m e d up in a f e w w o r d s . It is c o l l e c t i v i s t , asserting the existence of society as an e n t i t y d i s t i n c t f r o m , and s t a n d i n g o v e r , the i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s s o c i o l o g i s t i c , for the reason and m o r a l i t y that d i s t i n g u i s h humans f r o m animals d e r i v e not f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l b u t f r o m society. I t i s r a t i o n a l i s t i c , for society is a p u r e l y r a t i o n a l sphere, a f f e c t i v i t y b e i n g a q u a l i t y of the b i o l o g i c a l i n d i v i d u a l that society displaces. It is secular, for r e l i g i o n i s the p r o d u c t o f a n i r r a t i o n a l a f f e c t i v e r e a c t i o n t o society that is progressively displaced by the advance of society a n d the c o n c o m i t a n t progress o f reason. F i n a l l y i t i s p o s i t i v i s t i c , for social facts are e x t e r n a l facts, c o n s t r a i n i n g on the i n d i v i d u a l , a n d s o amenable t o s t u d y b y the m e t h o d s o f positive science. I t was the t o t a l c o m m i t m e n t o f the D u r k h e i m i a n s t o the secular rationalism of the Republic that enabled them to maintain such a

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f i r m b e l i e f i n the t a n g i b l e o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y o f the c o l l e c t i v e c o n science. T h e D u r k h e i m i a n c o m m i t m e n t t o the R e p u b l i c was c o m p l e t e . T h e c o m m i t m e n t s o f the D u r k h e i m i a n s w e r e the c o m m i t m e n t s o f the R e p u b l i c , t h e i r p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h questions o f e d u c a t i o n and o f a secular m o r a l i t y w e r e the preoccupations o f the R e p u b l i c . F o r t h e m the R e p u b l i c was the e m b o d i m e n t o f the c o l l e c t i v e c o n science, the t r i u m p h o f reason o v e r selfish i n s t i n c t and b l i n d e m o t i o n , the means to an o r d e r l y , r a t i o n a l , a n d so f u l l y h u m a n society. I t should not b e s u r p r i s i n g that the fate o f D u r k h e i m i a n s o c i o l o g y i n France was i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the fate o f the R e p u b l i c , n o r s h o u l d i t b e s u r p r i s i n g that the t r i u m p h o f R e p u b l i c a n i s m and the accession o f the D u r k h e i m i a n s t o the establishment s h o u l d generate a r e a c t i o n . T h e l i b e r a l i s m o f the R e p u b l i c a n d r e a m was soon u n d e r m i n e d b y the h e a v y - h a n d e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m w i t h w h i c h the R e p u b l i c p u r s u e d its a n t i - c l e r i c a l crusade. M o r e o v e r the R e p u b l i c a n r e f o r m s t h a t w e r e supposed t o usher i n the age o f reason w e r e p a t e n t l y n o t h a v i n g the effect that was e x p e c t e d o f t h e m . Far f r o m a h a r m o n i o u s society e m e r g i n g , o p p o s i t i o n to the R e p u b l i c f r o m R i g h t and L e f t was g r o w i n g , and the t h r e a t o f E u r o p e a n w a r l o o m e d . I t was i n this c o n t e x t that Bergson's p h i l o s o p h y came t o d o m i n a n c e i n the decade before W o r l d W a r I . B e r g s o n was a m o d e r a t e c r i t i c o f the R e p u b l i c a n ideal w h o sought i n his p h i l o s o p h y a t o t a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d have its place, b u t i n w h i c h the claims o f reason w o u l d b e l i m i t e d b y t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o the u l t i m a t e s p i r i t u a l t r u t h s o f e x p e r i e n c e . B e r g s o n r e c o g n i z e d the p r a c t i c a l c l a i m s o f reason, b u t he a r g u e d that reason c o u l d have no m o r e t h a n a p r a c t i c a l v a l u e : it c o u l d never encompass the wholeness, the richness, the s p i r i t u a l q u a l i t y o f experience. H i s p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e r e f o r e based o n the f u n d a m e n t a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n p r a c t i c a l reason and s p i r i t u a l experience. F o r B e r g s o n reason imposes a n a n a l y t i c g r i d o n e x p e r i e n c e i n w h i c h the data o f e x p e r i e n c e are f o r c e d i n t o a n e t w o r k o f concepts a n d o f l o g i c a l relations. Reason, t h e r e f o r e , can o n l y present a n i m a g e o f r e a l i t y that i s static, i n w h i c h r i g i d concepts are i m p o s e d o n a f l u i d experience. I t c a n g i v e u s a f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e , b u t this i s n o t a d i r e c t k n o w l e d g e o f r e a l i t y , i t i s m e d i a t e d b y the conceptual framework within which reality is known and this


13

f r a m e w o r k necessarily d i s t o r t s r e a l i t y . T h e k n o w l e d g e g a i n e d i s t h e r e f o r e o n l y r e l a t i v e . I t has a p r a c t i c a l v a l i d i t y i n e n a b l i n g u s t o o r g a n i z e o u r d a i l y l i f e , t o o r i e n t ourselves t o a w o r l d t o w h i c h w e relate i n s t r u m e n t a l l y , b u t this v a l i d i t y i s p u r e l y p r a g m a t i c . B y c o n t r a s t the task of p h i l o s o p h y is to g i v e us i m m e d i a t e access to t r u e r e a l i t y , and this can o n l y b e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h the d i r e c t i n t u i t i v e apprehension o f experience. W h e r e a s reason fragments e x p e r i e n c e i n o r d e r t o f o r c e e x p e r i e n c e i n t o the m o u l d of its concepts, and so gives a p u r e l y e x t e r n a l k n o w l e d g e o f r e a l i t y , i n t u i t i o n penetrates t o the i n n e r r e a l i t y o f the w o r l d o f experience. I n t u i t i o n i s a s p i r i t u a l e x p e r i e n c e i n w h i c h the v e i l o f concepts i s t o r n a w a y a n d the s p i r i t u a l u n i t y o f the e x p e r i e n c i n g subject and the e x p e r i e n c e d o b j e c t is achieved. It is n o t a consciousness of self, b u t a consciousness t h a t dissolves the i n d i v i d u a t e d self i n t o the t o t a l i t y . T h i s experience i s a n experience o f p u r e d u r a t i o n , w h i c h B e r g s o n contrasts w i t h the scientific c o n c e p t o f t i m e . Science can o n l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e t i m e by using a spatial analogy and r e d u c i n g t i m e t o a discontinuous sequence o f p o i n t s i n space, thus i m p o s i n g s t a b i l i t y and d i s c o n t i n u i t y on an e x p e r i e n c e whose essence is c o n t i n u i t y and m o v e m e n t . B y contrast i n t u i t i o n provides u s w i t h a d i r e c t and i m m e d i a t e apprehension o f the t r u e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y a s c o n t i n u i t y i n w h i c h w e become p a r t o f a s p i r i t u a l w h o l e w h i c h i s a l w a y s i n the process o f b e c o m i n g . T h u s i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t the experience o f a static present, b u t o f a d u r a t i o n i n w h i c h the m o m e n t is g i v e n m e a n i n g by its r e l a t i o n to its past and to its f u t u r e possibilities, a n e x p e r i e n c e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the timeless w o r l d o f d e v e l o p i n g and u n c o n s t r a i n e d s p i r i t : a n e x p e r i e n c e n o t o f t h i n g s , b u t o f pure m o v e m e n t , n o t o f self, b u t o f the absolute. I t i s this absolute s p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e o f p u r e l y q u a l i t a t i v e , c o n t i n u o u s , u n p r e d i c t a b l e b e c o m i n g t h a t B e r g s o n c a l l e d the élan vital, the a n i m a t i n g p r i n c i p l e o f the universe. Bergson's p h i l o s o p h y defies r a t i o n a l f o r m u l a t i o n since it seeks to go beneath reason. H e n c e to c o n v e y w h a t he w a n t s to say B e r g s o n makes e x t e n s i v e use o f m e t a p h o r , o f i m a g e r y , a n d o f a l l u s i v e f o r m u l a t i o n s to refer to an experience that defies d e s c r i p t i o n i n the categories e m b e d d e d i n language. B e r g s o n ' s p h i l o s o p h y was t h e r e f o r e open t o a w i d e range o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h e appeal o f Bergson's p h i l o s o p h y l a y precisely i n this a m b i g u i t y . Once the fundamental division between reason and spirit was

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accepted, then e v e r y t h i n g and a n y t h i n g c o u l d b e f i t t e d i n t o the system on one side or the o t h e r : e v e r y t h i n g c o u l d either be grasped b y reason o r escaped i t . M o r e o v e r , b y adjusting the balance b e t w e e n reason and s p i r i t , and i n t e r p r e t i n g the l a t t e r i n v a r i o u s w a y s , the p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d b e used t o s u p p o r t a w i d e range o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , w i t h a range o f p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . Bergson's p h i l o s o p h y was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d w i t h i n the academic system as a rather c o m p l a c e n t a t t e m p t to r e c o n c i l e the t e m p o r a l c l a i m s o f R e p u b l i c a n i s m and o f p o s i t i v e science w i t h the s p i r i t u a l values o f freedom, progress and absolute c r e a t i v i t y . T h u s the p h i l o s o p h y r e c o g n i z e d the v a l i d i t y of secular r a t i o n a l i s m as a m o r a l and c o g n i t i v e system adapted t o the needs o f e v e r y d a y i n d i v i d u a l and social l i f e , b u t o n l y a s the condensation o f one m o m e n t i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the é l a n vital. T h e d i v o r c e o f reason f r o m i m m e d i a t e s p i r i t u a l e x p e r i e n c e i n t r o d u c e d a d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n the secular state and the e t e r n a l s p i r i t , the secular state b e i n g a p r a g m a t i c r e q u i r e m e n t of an o r d e r l y social existence, the s p i r i t the expression o f the m o r a l d e s t i n y of society. Just as the appeal of D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g y as a p o s i t i v e science o f society depended o n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience w i t h the R e p u b l i c a n state, s o the i n i t i a l appeal o f B e r g s o n i s m depended o n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f that state as a m o m e n t of the elan vital. W h i l e the absolutist claims o f D u r k h e i m i a n i s m m e a n t t h a t its fate was i n e x t r i c a b l y b o u n d u p w i t h that o f the R e p u b l i c , Bergson's p h i l o s o p h y , i n dissociating the t e m p o r a l f r o m the s p i r i t u a l r e a l m , c o u l d b e used t o c u r b the a m b i t i o n s o f the R e p u b l i c . H e n c e B e r g s o n i s m was p r o g r e s s i v e l y dissociated f r o m its R e p u b l i c a n o r i g i n s a s d i s i l l u s i o n w i t h R e p u b l i c a n i s m g r e w b e f o r e and after W o r l d W a r I . T h e vagueness o f the p h i l o s o p h y m e a n t that i t was open t o a v a r i e t y o f n a t i o n a l - p a t r i o t i c , C a t h o l i c or i n d i v i d u a l i s t r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to p r o v i d e the basis f o r a series of irrationalist critiques of Republican rationalism. Thus Bergsonism, a p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h was o r i g i n a l l y f o r m u l a t e d as a r e p u d i a t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c s i n the n a m e o f i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e , became a n i n c r e a s i n g l y m e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e and, despite the i n t e n t i o n s o f its f o u n d e r , B e r g s o n i s m became ever m o r e closely associated w i t h a n i n c r e a s i n g l y r e a c t i o n a r y and i r r a t i o n a l i s t C a t h o l i c o p p o s i t i o n to the Republic. Despite

their

differences

Durkheim

and

Bergson

have

much

in


15

c o m m o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e y share classical F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y ' s d u a l i s t i c f o r m u l a t i o n o f the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n reason and e m o t i o n . For D u r k h e i m the d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n reason and e m o t i o n corresponds t o the d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n c u l t u r e and n a t u r e , o r h u m a n i t y and a n i m a l i t y , a s t w o d i f f e r e n t orders o f r e a l i t y . Reason i s the p r o d u c t o f c o l l e c t i v e existence. I t i s p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e and e x t e r n a l t o the i n d i v i d u a l , and i s accessible t o the m e t h o d s o f p o s i t i v e science. E m o t i o n , the basis o f the i l l u s i o n o f s p i r i t u a l b e i n g , i s the e x p r e s s i o n o f a n i n s t i n c t i v e residue o f a n i m a l i t y , and so, b y i m p l i c a t i o n , o f b i o l o g i c a l processes w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l psyche. E m o t i o n is t h e r e f o r e d e r i v a t i v e : it is vague and confused and so cannot be p i n n e d d o w n by i n t u i t i o n and cannot p r o v i d e a basis f o r k n o w l e d g e . For B e r g s o n reason and s p i r i t d o n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o d i f f e r e n t orders o f r e a l i t y , b u t t o t w o d i f f e r e n t aspects o f consciousness: m e d i a t e d and i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e . Reason, science and c u l t u r e are p r a g m a t i c m e n t a l constructs t h a t i n d i v i d u a l i z e humans w i t h i n the é l a n v i t a l , the l i f e force that pervades a l l r e a l i t y . I n t u i t i o n restores the t r u e u n i t y of c u l t u r e and n a t u r e , reveals c u l t u r e as an a r t i f i c i a l i m p o s i t i o n o n the f l u x o f n a t u r e , a n emergent p r o p e r t y o f n a t u r e , residue o f the progress o f the é l a n v i t a l . T h u s for B e r g s o n p o s i t i v i s t methods c a n n o t p r o v i d e t r u e k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h i s o n l y amenable t o the s p i r i t u a l , subjective, m e t h o d o f i n t u i t i o n . T h i s c o m m o n d u a l i s m i n w h i c h s u b j e c t i v i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y , reason and e m o t i o n , are f i r s t separated a n d t h e n one s u b o r d i n a t e d t o the other i s associated i n b o t h B e r g s o n and D u r k h e i m w i t h a r e j e c t i o n o f the C a r t e s i a n ego. For D u r k h e i m the C a r t e s i a n ego i s r e p l a c e d by the c o l l e c t i v e conscience. T h e e m p i r i c a l ego is the p o i n t o f i n t e r s e c t i o n o f n a t u r e , source o f i n s t i n c t and e m o t i o n , and c u l t u r e , source o f reason and m o r a l i t y . For B e r g s o n the C a r t e s i a n ego is a c o n s t r u c t of reason, an i m p o s i t i o n o n the f l u x o f e x p e r i e n c e , thus the e m p i r i c a l ego i s the p o i n t o f i n t e r s e c t i o n o f the é l a n v i t a l , e t e r n a l and pervasive s p i r i t , and the p r a g m a t i c constructs of reason t h a t give the ego the i l l u s i o n o f a f i x e d l o c a t i o n i n t i m e a n d space. T h u s f o r b o t h B e r g s o n and D u r k h e i m the e m p i r i c a l ego is essentially i l l u s o r y , the c o n t i n g e n t p o i n t o f i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t w o d i f f e r e n t o r d e r s . For B e r g s o n these o r d e r s are s p i r i t u a l , the élan vital and the c o n s t r u c t s o f reason. For D u r k h e i m they are o b j e c t i v e , the c o l l e c t i v e conscience and the biological individual. In each case the empirical

The Foundations

16

of Structuralism

ego is s u b o r d i n a t e d to a h i g h e r s p i r i t u a l ( s u b j e c t i v e ) or secular ( o b j e c t i v e ) r e a l i t y , the source o f a m o r a l i t y t h a t transcends the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e ' d e a t h o f the subject', m u c h v a u n t e d slogan o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m , has roots t h a t go back deep i n t o F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y . B o t h D u r k h e i m i a n s o c i o l o g y and B e r g s o n i a n p h i l o s o p h y w e r e prevented f r o m becoming transparently metaphysical doctrines o n l y b y the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the transcendent o b j e c t i v e o r s u b j e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e w i t h the R e p u b l i c a s custodian o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience o r o f the é l a n v i t a l . O n c e the obviousness o f this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was b r o k e n b y the d e g e n e r a t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c , the m e t a p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f the d o c t r i n e s became clear. T h e scientific c l a i m s o f the D u r k h e i m i a n s c o u l d o n l y b e m a i n t a i n e d by an i n c r e a s i n g d o g m a t i s m t h a t asserted the existence o f a n o r d e r l y c o l l e c t i v e conscience t h a t , a t least i n t h e i r o w n society, r i v e n b y c o n f l i c t , they c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y . O n l y i n the study o f ' p r i m i t i v e societies', t o w h i c h the D u r k h e i m i a n s i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r n e d , o r i n the study o f the t a n g i b l e realities o f l a w and r e l i g i o n , w h e r e t h e y r e t a i n e d some c r e d i b i l i t y , c o u l d the pretence t h a t society is r e g u l a t e d by a h a r m o n i z i n g c o l l e c t i v e m o r a l i t y b e reasonably m a i n t a i n e d . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l v a l i d i t y o f B e r g s o n i a n d u a l i s m came t o d e p e n d on acceptance of the élan vital as a m e t a p h y s i c a l and i r r a t i o n a l s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y . I f the d i v o r c e b e t w e e n reason and s p i r i t , a t the expense o f reason, was r e j e c t e d , the w h o l e B e r g s o n i a n e d i f i c e came to be seen as an i r r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a p h y s i c a l i d e o l o g y t h a t c o u l d serve o n l y a d i s c r e d i t e d R e p u b l i c o r the forces o f C a t h o l i c r e a c t i o n . W h i l e D u r k h e i m i a n i s m was u t t e r l y m o r i b u n d by the late 1920s, B e r g s o n i s m had a m o r e m e n a c i n g appearance.

3

T H E

I N T E R - W A R

I N T E L L E C T U A L

CRISIS

W o r l d W a r I and its a f t e r m a t h left the T h i r d R e p u b l i c d i s c r e d i t e d a n d r e d u c e d its h i s t o r i c a l claims t o the l e v e l o f a n h y p o c r i t i c a l farce. T h e glorious w a r left France w i t h t w o and a h a l f m i l l i o n dead or p e r m a n e n t l y disabled, w i t h a huge debt t h a t was the basis o f a p e r m a n e n t f i n a n c i a l crisis, and w i t h a series o f i n e f f e c t u a l g o v e r n m e n t s c o m i n g u n d e r increasing a t t a c k f r o m e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y forces o n the L e f t and the R i g h t . T h e i n i t i a t i v e l a y f i r m l y w i t h the r i g h t - w i n g Leagues whose m i l i t a n t r h e t o r i c appealed particularly to the young and which came to dominate Catholic


17

intellectuals and w r i t e r s o f the t w e n t i e s and t h i r t i e s . W h o e v e r was m a k i n g h i s t o r y , t h e r e was n o d o u b t t h a t i t was n o l o n g e r the Republic. T h e d e g e n e r a t i o n o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c d i s c r e d i t e d the l i b e r a l philosophies t h a t h a d been associated w i t h i t . T h u s there was a f u n d a m e n t a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f l i b e r a l c u l t u r e i n i n t e r - w a r France, a q u e s t i o n i n g o f r e c e i v e d i d e o l o g y , a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f n e w philosophies o n the basis o f a c o m m o n r e j e c t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l h e r i t a g e o f the R e p u b l i c . C e n t r a l t o t h i s r e j e c t i o n was the c r i t i q u e o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l character o f the p r e - w a r philosophies w h i c h had opened those philosophies up to i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n s e r v a t i v e or reactionary interpretations. T h i s was n o t s i m p l y a p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e j e c t i o n , b u t was f u n d a m e n t a l l y a n i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l one. T h e p r i n c i p l e s t h a t h a d been presented as e t e r n a l m o r a l t r u t h s , the c u l m i n a t i o n of an i n f i n i t e and c o n t i n u o u s e v o l u t i o n a r y progress, w e r e n o w seen as n o m o r e than the h y p o c r i t i c a l a l i b i o f a m o r a l l y b a n k r u p t social class. T h i s social class, s t i l l n o m i n a l l y c l i n g i n g to its a r c h a i c bourgeois m o r a l i t y , h a d presided o v e r the d e g e n e r a t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c a n ideals, o v e r the d e s t r u c t i o n o f m i l l i o n s o f y o u n g lives i n W o r l d W a r I , o v e r the p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c decline and o v e r g r o w i n g social c o n f l i c t , and i t n o w sought t o abdicate f r o m its r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l collapse o f the society i t had c r e a t e d b y r e t r e a t i n g i n t o the w o r l d o f s p i r i t , dissociating its absurd m o r a l i t y f r o m the chaos i t had c r e a t e d . A m o r a l i t y t h a t c o u l d p a t e n t l y no l o n g e r be p r e s e r v e d by appealing t o any substantive c o n c e r n w i t h j u s t i c e , f r e e d o m and e q u a l i t y , was p r e s e r v e d b y appealing t o the h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n o f e m p t y m o r a l categories i n the s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t o f a d e t a c h e d metaphysical w o r l d o f s p i r i t . Thus B r u n s c h v i g , w h o was Professor o f P h i l o s o p h y a t the Sorbonne b e t w e e n the w a r s , was, w i t h Bergson, the p r i m e o b j e c t o f r e v u l s i o n . B r u n s c h v i g was a c r i t i c a l idealist for w h o m p h i l o s o p h y was the p h i l o s o p h y o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e task o f p h i l o s o p h y was t o grasp the m i n d ' i n its o w n m o v e m e n t . . . i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y c o m i n g to consciousness of itself, this is the i n t e g r a l study of i n t e g r a l k n o w l e d g e , this is p h i l o s o p h y ' . T h i s a c t i v i t y is ceaseless, progressive, and c o n tinuous. L é v i - S t r a u s s w e l l expressed a c o m m o n r e a c t i o n t o this philosophy: 1

18

The Foundations

of Structuralism

'Philosophy was . . . a k i n d of aesthetic contemplation of consciousness by itself. It was seen as having evolved, in the course of the centuries, ever higher and bolder structures, as having solved problems of balance or support and as having invented logical refinements, and the result was held to be valid, in p r o p o r t i o n to its technical perfection or internal coherence. . . . T h e signifier d i d not relate to any signified; there was no referent. Expertise replaced the t r u t h . ' 2

T o the y o u n g r a d i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s o f the i n t e r - w a r g e n e r a t i o n t h e elaborate philosophies o f t h e i r teachers w e r e n o t s i m p l y unsatisfactory, t h e y w e r e t o t a l l y unacceptable. T h e r e c e i v e d philosophies b e l o n g e d to a b y g o n e age. F o r m a n y the r e a c t i o n was a v i o l e n t one, a r e a c t i o n o f t o t a l r e v u l s i o n w i t h the i n t e l l e c t u a l and m o r a l b a n k r u p t c y , w i t h the u t t e r h y p o c r i s y , o f the o l d e r generat i o n . I n i t i a l l y the r e a c t i o n had l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l content, and the older g e n e r a t i o n w e r e c o n f r o n t e d n o t s o m u c h w i t h sustained i n t e l l e c t u a l a r g u m e n t a s w i t h r i d i c u l e and abuse. S u r r e a l i s m f o r m u l a t e d the r e a c t i o n o f the 1920s. T h e core o f s u r r e a l i s m was the n e g a t i o n o f a l l r e c e i v e d d o c t r i n e s , the denial o f a l l absolutes, its slogan was 'tabula rasa'. C l o s e l y associated w i t h the Surrealists was the ' P h i l o s o p h i e s ' g r o u p t h a t e m e r g e d i n 1924 and i n c l u d e d H e n r i L e f e b v r e , Georges P o l i t z e r and Georges F r i e d m a n n . T h e r e a c t i o n of the 1920s was a l a r g e l y n e g a t i v e one, an o f t e n b r u t a l assertion o f o b j e c t i v i t y against the subjective fantasies o f p h i l o s o p h y , a n assertion o f the v a l u e o f a c t i o n a s opposed t o s p e c u l a t i o n , i n v o l v i n g the scandalous v i o l a t i o n o f the n o r m s s o dear to the o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n in an a t t e m p t to counterpose a b r u t a l r e a l i t y t o the illusions o f r e c e i v e d p h i l o s o p h y . A t f i r s t the response w a s v e r y confused, and i t o f t e n r e t a i n e d a s t r o n g s p i r i t u a l c o m p o n e n t w h i c h gave i t m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h the e x t r e m e r i g h t - w i n g r e a c t i o n t o the decadence o f the R e p u b l i c . T o w a r d s the end o f the 1920s the Philosophies g r o u p , a l o n g w i t h m a n y o f the Surrealists, e m b r a c e d M a r x i s m and j o i n e d the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y . B u t even this d i d n o t r e a l l y p r o v i d e the m o v e m e n t w i t h a s o l i d f o u n d a t i o n , f o r the appeal o f c o m m u n i s m t o the g r o u p was the fact t h a t its r e j e c t i o n o f capitalist s o c i e t y and o f a l l c o m p r o m i s e w i t h t h a t society was t o t a l , this b e i n g the p e r i o d o f ' u l t r a - l e f t i s m ' i n the C o m i n t e r n , and the appeal o f M a r x i s m was the appeal o f the y o u n g M a r x ' s account o f c a p i t a l i s t society a s p u r e n e g a t i o n and o f p h i l o s o p h y a s the u l t i m a t e d e v e l o p m e n t o f this negation. This M a r x i s m d i d not offer a n e w philosophy, but p r o c l a i m e d the death o f a l l p h i l o s o p h y .


19

I t was o n l y a t the end o f the decade t h a t a m o r e p o s i t i v e orientation began to emerge, and S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r has described the r e n e w a l o f o p t i m i s m a t the e n d o f the decade a s the c r a s h o f 1929 b r o u g h t h o m e the f r a g i l i t y o f the capitalist e d i f i c e . I t was f r o m the generation w h o w e r e students i n 1929 t h a t the m o s t important new intellectuals were to emerge: Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jean-Paul S a r t r e , R a y m o n d A r o n , M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Simone d e B e a u v o i r , P a u l N i z a n and m a n y m o r e . 3

N i z a n , a n e x a c t c o n t e m p o r a r y o f S a r t r e and the m a n w h o suggested to Lévi-Strauss that he take up a n t h r o p o l o g y , w a s the m a n w h o b r i d g e d the t w o decades. I n i t i a l l y a t t r a c t e d b y the e x t r e m e R i g h t , t h e n o n the fringes o f the Philosophies g r o u p , t h e n a Communist m i l i t a n t , N i z a n was serious i n a w a y t h a t m a n y o f his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s w e r e n o t . Aden-Arabie (1931) is an account of his trip to A d e n in 1 9 2 6 - 7 w h i c h is b o t h a savage a t t a c k on the h y p o c r i t i c a l pretensions o f bourgeois m o r a l i t y and a d e n u n c i a t i o n o f the various f o r m s o f escapism that w e r e o f f e r e d t o the y o u t h o f the 1920s, w i t h his t r i p t o A d e n r e v e a l i n g the i l l u s o r y c h a r a c t e r o f the f i n a l escape t h r o u g h t r a v e l , the last refuge of his g e n e r a t i o n (and one that i s s t i l l a c e n t r a l theme i n t h e e m e r g i n g c u l t u r e o f the 1930s). In its negative a n d d e s t r u c t i v e aspects Aden-Arabie is a p r o d u c t of the 1920s, but it also m a r k s a break w i t h the idealist solutions of the 1920s and t e n t a t i v e l y offers a w a y f o r w a r d . T o the i l l u s i o n s i n w h i c h the b o u r g e o i s i e and the r e b e l l i o u s y o u t h o f the 1920s are i m m e r s e d N i z a n contrasts the h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e o f e m p i r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s , and especially o f the oppressed, w h i c h p r o v i d e s h i m w i t h a p r i v i l e g e d r e a l i t y f r o m w h i c h t o l a u n c h his a t t a c k . I n m a n y respects Aden-Arabie anticipates the c e n t r a l theme of Lévi-Strauss' account of his stay in B r a z i l in the 1930s, Tristes Tropiques (1955). L é v i - S t r a u s s ' b o o k t o o i s about t h e illusions o f t r a v e l , the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f escape f r o m a b o u r g e o i s c u l t u r e t h a t has e n compassed the g l o b e , and it t o o offers as the o n l y hope of s a l v a t i o n the h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e o f the oppressed t h a t i t contrasts w i t h the pretensions o f the oppressors. For L é v i - S t r a u s s , w r i t i n g i n 1955, this hope has b e c o m e a v a i n one, a n d h u m a n i t y is d o o m e d to e x t i n c t i o n , whereas N i z a n b e l i e v e d t h r o u g h the 1930s t h a t the oppressed c o u l d l i b e r a t e society and c o m m i t t e d h i m s e l f w h o l e heartedly to the Communist movement. In Les Chiens de Garde (1932) Nizan directed his polemic more

20


d i r e c t l y a t the h i g h priests o f p h i l o s o p h y , and especially a t B e r g s o n , B r u n s c h v i g and the D u r k h e i m i a n s , w h o m h e d e n o u n c e d as the o f f i c i a l philosophers of a despotic b o u r g e o i s i e , w h o s e w r i t i n g s h e c o n t r a s t e d w i t h reports o f the barbarous r e a l i t y o f oppression and e x p l o i t a t i o n that the o f f i c i a l p h i l o s o p h y s a n c t i f i e d i n the name o f its absolute m o r a l i t y . N i z a n denounces the a t t e m p t s o f this p h i l o s o p h y t o m y s t i f y the n e w g e n e r a t i o n b y d r a w i n g t h e m i n t o m e t a p h y s i c a l diversions, i n t o the c u l t o f the m i n d . T o established p h i l o s o p h y N i z a n c o u n t e r p o s e d e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e , t o the bourgeois h u m a n i s t concept o f m a n h e c o u n t e r p o s e d the existence o f r e a l m e n and w o m e n w h o m philosophers, w h i l e p r o c l a i m i n g themselves humanists, despise. N i z a n ' s p o l e m i c w a s passionate, c o m m i t t e d and e x t r e m e . W h i l e m a n y o f his g e n e r a t i o n w o u l d reject the tone o f N i z a n ' s c r i t i q u e , and m a n y w o u l d n o t have endorsed his d e c i s i o n t o c o m m i t h i m s e l f t o the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , his w o r k nevertheless expressed the sentiments o f his g e n e r a t i o n . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y i t expressed a c o m m i t m e n t t o a r e t u r n t o r e a l i t y , t o the r e a l i t y o f the d a y - t o - d a y e x p e r i e n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n beings, and i t was this c o u n t e r p o s i t i o n o f m u n d a n e h u m a n existence t o l o f t y m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t p r o v i d e d b o t h a c r i t i q u e o f established p h i l o s o p h y and a w a y f o r w a r d : the study o f the c o n c e p t o f M a n w o u l d b e displaced b y the study o f real m e n and w o m e n ( a l t h o u g h the study o f w o m e n was left e n t i r e l y t o S i m o n e d e B e a u v o i r ) . T h e l i m i t s o f k n o w l e d g e , o f m e a n i n g and o f t r u t h w o u l d b e the l i m i t s o f r e a l e v e r y d a y existence. H e n c e the n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s , i n c l u d i n g Lévi-Strauss, h a d a p r o f o u n d l y h u m a n i s t i c i n s p i r a t i o n , s e e k i n g t o r e c o v e r r e a l h u m a n beings f r o m the m y s t i f i c a t i o n s o f b o u r g e o i s h u m a n i s m . T h e y w e r e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h g r a s p i n g the t r u e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence a s a n e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n amenable t o r a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h i s n e w h u m a n i s m was the basis o f the r e j e c t i o n o f the r e c e i v e d philosophies, and the basis on w h i c h a n e w a p p r o a c h c o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d . F i r s t l y , the m e t a p h y s i c a l appeal to absolutes o f m o r a l i t y was r e j e c t e d i n the name o f c o n c r e t e h u m a n existence. Thus a new m o r a l i t y had to be r o o t e d in experience and not i m p o s e d o n the i n d i v i d u a l ( w h e n c e the f u n d a m e n t a l slogan o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , ' e x i s t e n c e precedes essence', t h a t c o u l d be t a k e n , in different interpretations, as the slogan of the age). Secondly,

the

rejection

of

the

metaphysical

in

the

name

of

the


21

i n d i v i d u a l was associated w i t h a r e j e c t i o n o f i r r a t i o n a l i s m i n the n a m e o f r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s r a t i o n a l i t y c o u l d n o t b e a n absolute and eternal r e a l i t y , b u t h a d r a t h e r t o b e r o o t e d i n e x p e r i e n c e , the r a t i o n a l i t y o f e v e r y d a y existence, t o b e d i s c o v e r e d t h r o u g h a philosophical o r a s o c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . T h i r d l y , the r e j e c t i o n o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l e n t a i l e d the r e j e c t i o n o f a l l forms o f h i s t o r i c i s m , r e j e c t i o n o f the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o e x t e r n a l l y imposed h i s t o r i c a l l a w s o f d e v e l o p m e n t ( w h e t h e r s p i r i t u a l o r m a t e r i a l ) and s o the r e j e c t i o n o f any b e l i e f i n the necessarily progressive and c o n t i n u o u s character o f h i s t o r y . Such a b e l i e f c o u l d h a r d l y b e r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the e x p e r i e n c e o f i n t e r - w a r France i n w h i c h c o n t i n u i t y s i g n i f i e d d e g e n e r a t i o n and decay, i n w h i c h o n l y a r a d i c a l break c o u l d arrest the c o n t i n u o u s l o g i c o f decline. T h u s ' a l l o u r teachers w e r e obsessed w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l a p p r o a c h ' , y e t ' o u r teachers w e r e i g n o r a n t o f H i s t o r y ' . B r u n s c h v i g ' s c o n t i n u o u s progress o f reason and m o r a l i t y , Bergson's c r e a t i v e e v o l u t i o n , the D u r k h e i m i a n genetic m o r p h o l o g y , i n w h i c h social structures e v o l v e d h a r m o n i o u s l y f r o m the simple t o the c o m p l e x , w e r e a l l e q u a l l y unacceptable, and all c o n t r a s t e d s h a r p l y w i t h the r e a l i t y o f h i s t o r y . ' H i s t o r i c i s m ' s t o o d o u t c l e a r l y as an i d e o l o g y that masked o p p r e s s i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n . Thus the r e j e c t i o n o f h i s t o r i c i s m raised the p r o b l e m o f the t r u e human meaning of history. 4

T o anyone f r o m a n A n g l o - S a x o n o r a G e r m a n b a c k g r o u n d this t u r n t o the e m p i r i c a l h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l m a y n o t appear v e r y s t a r t l i n g , for the r e j e c t i o n o f metaphysics o n the basis o f a l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m has l o n g been a c o m m o n p l a c e in the A n g l o - S a x o n w o r l d , and was w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d b y the end o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n G e r m a n y . B u t i n France l i b e r a l i s m had been t r a d i t i o n ally associated n o t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l i s m , b u t w i t h R e p u b l i c a n i s m , w i t h the defence o f the secular state against the personal exercise o f m o n a r c h i c a l p o w e r . T h e g e n e r a t i o n o f the 1930s c o u l d n o t t u r n t o a n established t r a d i t i o n o f l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m t o f i n d r e a d y made solutions. H e n c e i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f this g e n e r a t i o n t h a t they h a d t o f i n d i n s p i r a t i o n f r o m a b r o a d . Sartre w e n t t o G e r m a n y t o f i n d Husserl and H e i d e g g e r , A r o n t o f i n d W e b e r , M e r l e a u P o n t y t o f i n d H u s s e r l , L u k á c s , and W e b e r , w h i l e L é v i - S t r a u s s discovered N o r t h A m e r i c a n a n t h r o p o l o g y . I n France i t s e l f F r e u d , Gestalt p s y c h o l o g y a n d a h u m a n i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H e g e l and Marx made headway at this time. Yet this generation did not take

22


solutions f r o m a b r o a d r e a d y - m a d e . T h e y w e r e , after a l l , heirs t o the French philosophical t r a d i t i o n w h i c h had p r o v i d e d their s t a r t i n g p o i n t . T h u s w e f i n d n o v e l solutions b e i n g p u t f o r w a r d , solutions w h i c h , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case o f Sartre and L é v i Strauss, r e t a i n a s t r o n g m e t a p h y s i c a l c o r e and close l i n k s w i t h the philosophical t r a d i t i o n they b o t h rejected. T h e t u r n to the e m p i r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l w a s n o t as u n p r o b l e m a t i c as i t m i g h t appear. W h i l e the idea o f the e m p i r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s a good polemical device w i t h w h i c h to combat an out-dated metaphysics, the r e a l t h i n g i s r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t t o p i n d o w n . W h a t , after a l l , i s the e m p i r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l , s h o r n o f a l l preconceptions? T h e C a r t e s i a n i n d i v i d u a l i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l o f E n g l i s h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r the i n d i v i d u a l o f A m e r i c a n b e h a v i o u r i s m o r the K a n t i a n i n d i v i d u a l . A l t h o u g h b o t h S a r t r e and L é v i - S t r a u s s t r y t o g o b e h i n d a l l such m e t a p h y s i c a l constructs t o f i n d the pure h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l i m m e r s e d i n the r e a l i t y o f d a i l y l i f e the i n d i v i d u a l they c o m e u p w i t h is n o t so c o n c r e t e after a l l . For Sartre the i n d i v i d u a l is to be found in a radical phenomenological reduction in w h i c h all p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are s w e p t a w a y , a l l abstractions are abolished, and the t r u l y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l i s found, free and u n c o n s t r a i n e d , i n the i m m e d i a c y o f p u r e existence. For L é v i - S t r a u s s , b y c o n t r a s t , Sartre's approach t o the i n d i v i d u a l t h r o u g h i n t r o s p e c t i o n c a n o n l y p r o d u c e another, r a t h e r banal, m e t a p h y s i c . F o r Lévi-Strauss it is science that can r e v e a l the t r u l y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , a p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e approach t o i n d i v i d u a l s i n society t h a t e q u a l l y rejects all s u p r a - h u m a n abstractions b u t that finds the i n d i v i d u a l i n the o b j e c t i v e study o f the v a r i e t i e s o f h u m a n existence. I n n e i t h e r case is the c o n c e r n r e a l l y w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s as t h e y l i v e t h e i r d a i l y lives, f o r b o t h seek t o f o u n d a c r i t i q u e o f the v a n i t y and i l l u s i o n s o f d a i l y l i f e . B o t h seek a m o r a l t h e o r y that can p r o v i d e a t h e o r y o f the t r u t h o f h u m a n i t y against w h i c h t o measure the conceits o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . T h u s b o t h seek the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence r a t h e r t h a n its m u n d a n e r e a l i t y , and i t i s this t h a t determines t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n s o f the i n d i v i d u a l , c o n c e p t i o n s that are i n each case p r i o r t o the d e c e p t i v e r e a l i t y o f e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e . T h u s b o t h Sartre and Lévi-Strauss seek a p r i v i l e g e d human reality in a n e w metaphysical theory of humanity. In

this

respect

Sartre

and

Lévi-Strauss

remain

more

firmly


23

w i t h i n the F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , A r o n and M e r l e a u - P o n t y , w h o s e concerns w e r e less m o r a l i s t i c . T h i s is reflected i n the fact t h a t n e i t h e r Sartre n o r L é v i - S t r a u s s m a k e such a radical break with the traditions they rejected than might seem at first sight, and for both Bergson remains an essential, though a l w a y s i m p l i c i t , p o i n t o f reference. Sartre adopts the B e r g s o n i a n f r a m e w o r k l o c k , stock and b a r r e l , a n d retains the Bergsonian starting p o i n t o f the i m m e d i a t e apprehension o f e x p e r i e n c e a s the apprehension o f a n u n c o n strained h o l i s t i c b e c o m i n g , using this apprehension as the basis f o r a c r i t i q u e o f the absolutist claims o f a n a l y t i c reason. W h e r e Sartre breaks w i t h B e r g s o n i s i n the c o n c e p t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e a s a n experience o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a w h o l e t h a t transcends i n d i v i d u a l existence. For S a r t r e there i s n o t h i n g b e y o n d the existence o f the individual, no truths to be found in a higher realm of spirit. Thus Sartre's p h i l o s o p h y , to c h a r a c t e r i z e it c r u d e l y , seeks to establish the B e r g s o n i a n p h i l o s o p h y on a r i g o r o u s f o u n d a t i o n by a b o l i s h i n g the m y s t i c a l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m o f the é l a n v i t a l , and b y f i n d i n g m e a n i n g e x c l u s i v e l y i n existence. In this c o n t e x t Lévi-Strauss can be seen as o f f e r i n g a m o r e radical, b u t essentially D u r k h e i m i a n a n d p o s i t i v i s t i c , c r i t i q u e o f Bergson. For Lévi-Strauss it is o n l y the reason and the i n t e l l e c t that can give u s access t o a n y t h i n g w o r t h y o f b e i n g c a l l e d t r u t h . The e m o t i o n a l and aesthetic ' t r u t h s ' o f i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e are s i m p l y m y s t i c a l , v a g u e and m i s l e a d i n g sensations that h a v e no o b j e c t i v e status. T h u s L é v i - S t r a u s s i n v e r t s the B e r g s o n i a n r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n reason a n d e x p e r i e n c e t o f i n d t h e t r u t h o f h u m a n i t y i n the emergence o f the i n t e l l e c t , and the t r u e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence i n the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f e m o t i o n t o reason. T h i s essentially D u r k h e i m i a n c r i t i q u e o f B e r g s o n i s m i s t e m p e r e d b y a r e j e c t i o n o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l d i m e n s i o n o f the D u r k h e i m i a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f reason and i n t e l l e c t , a n d s o o f h u m a n t r u t h , w i t h the social and the d i v o r c e that this i n t r o d u c e s b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and his, o r her, h u m a n i t y . B e h i n d the i m m e d i a t e c o n t i n u i t y w i t h B e r g s o n i s m one can also detect a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n t i n u i t y s t i l l i n the w o r k o f S a r t r e and Lévi-Strauss, a n d see t h e m as reasserting the t r a d i t i o n s of classical French p h i l o s o p h y by o f f e r i n g , on the one h a n d , a C a r t e s i a n and, o n the o t h e r hand, a Rousseauean c r i t i q u e o f Bergsonism. To develop this theme would take us too far from the

24

The Foundations

of Structuralism

task i n hand, w h i c h i s t o d r a w o u t the o r i g i n a l i t y o f the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f S a r t r e and L é v i - S t r a u s s . T h e i m p o r t a n t lesson t o d r a w i s that Sartre a n d L é v i - S t r a u s s b o t h p r o d u c e a c r i t i q u e o f metaphysics t h a t i s i t s e l f f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l . This is very important to an understanding of Lévi-Strauss' w o r k , and o f the subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m , f o r i t w i l l be one o f m y c e n t r a l arguments i n this b o o k that i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k the m e t a p h y s i c takes over and, i n the a t t e m p t t o preserve the m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y o f h u m a n i t y , the f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n i s t i n s p i r a t i o n is p r o g r e s s i v e l y e r o d e d as the e m p i r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l is s u b o r d i n a t e d t o the concept o f h u m a n i t y .

4

R E A C T I O N

T O

E X I S T E N T I A L I S T

T H E

C R I S I S — T H E

P H I L O S O P H Y

O F

S A R T R E

T h e n e w g e n e r a t i o n w e r e c r i t i c s o f t h e i r society and o f the p h i l o s o p h y t h a t , f o r t h e m , gave this society i d e o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t . T h e y w e r e seeking a r a t i o n a l basis o n w h i c h t o establish the m e a n i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l existence i n a n i r r a t i o n a l w o r l d , a standp o i n t f r o m w h i c h t o c r i t i c i z e t h e i r o w n society a s the d e f o r m a t i o n o f the r a t i o n a l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l existence. T h u s t h e y w e r e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the search f o r a r a t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r h u m a n existence, and f o r the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a r a t i o n a l society. Established p h i l o s o p h y and s o c i o l o g y c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h any solutions, indeed i t was established p h i l o s o p h y and s o c i o l o g y that was the p r o b l e m . S o c i o l o g y o f f e r e d a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l society ai' t h e measure o f r a t i o n a l i t y , p h i l o s o p h y o f f e r e d s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o a m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l m o f s p i r i t . N o r c o u l d established p s y c h o l o g y p r o v i d e any answers, d i v i d e d as it w a s b e t w e e n a m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s t p s y c h o l o g y and a p o s i t i v i s t a s s i m i l a t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g y t o p h y s i o l o g y . H e n c e established p s y c h o l o g y r e p r o d u c e d the deficiences of established p h i l o s o p h y , as P o l i t z e r had a r g u e d in his v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l Critique des fondements de la psychologie (1928). T h e r e w e r e t w o theories b e c o m i n g available i n France d u r i n g t h e 1920s that, f o r some, p r o v i d e d a r e a d y - m a d e s o l u t i o n to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s they c o n f r o n t e d : M a r x i s m and p s y c h o analysis. B o t h M a r x i s m and psychoanalysis p r o v i d e a w a y o f i n t e g r a t i n g the r a t i o n a l and the i r r a t i o n a l in a single synthesis. Both provided the means of giving history a new meaning,

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apparently n o t based o n the c o n t i n u o u s progress o f some abstract metaphysical p r i n c i p l e . M a r x i s m , especially i n the h u m a n i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f M a r x ' s early w o r k s t h a t m a d e h e a d w a y i n France i n the e a r l y 1930s, restored m e a n i n g t o h i s t o r y b y seeing t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y o f h i s t o r y a s a n expression o f t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f h u m a n existence i n a class society, t o w h i c h i t counterposed t h e r e c o v e r y o f the h u m a n essence, and the creation of a rational society, in a revolutionary transformation. History is therefore seen as contradictory, yet progressive, g i v e n m e a n i n g b y the p o s i t i v e m o m e n t o f the d i a l e c t i c i n w h i c h the i r r a t i o n a l i s transcended i n the d e v e l o p m e n t t o w a r d s the f i n a l g o a l . F r e u d i a n i s m restores m e a n i n g t o h u m a n existence i n a n i r r a t i o n a l w o r l d n o t t h r o u g h h i s t o r y , b u t t h r o u g h the unconscious. T h e k e y t o the a p p a r e n t l y i r r a t i o n a l f o r m u l a t i o n s o f conscious l i f e , the fantastic m y t h o l o g i e s o f r a c i s m , r e l i g i o u s m y s t i c i s m , b l i n d n a t i o n a l - p a t r i o t i s m , i s t o b e f o u n d i n the unconscious, w h i c h provides b o t h a n e x p l a n a t i o n and a c r i t i q u e o f the i l l u s i o n s o f conscious existence. A f e w e m b r a c e d M a r x o r F r e u d e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y . B u t there w e r e b a r r i e r s t o the acceptance o f e i t h e r t h i n k e r even f o r the m o r e r a d i c a l y o u n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s , q u i t e a p a r t f r o m the fact t h a t t h e i r w o r k s w e r e n e i t h e r w i d e l y available n o r w e l l u n d e r s t o o d i n France at the t i m e . B e f o r e 1934 the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y a d o p t e d a n ' u l t r a - l e f t i s t ' p o s i t i o n , d e n o u n c i n g a l l o t h e r p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f the w o r k i n g class as agents of the b o u r g e o i s i e , or even as o b j e c t i v e l y fascist. T h i s gave M a r x i s m an appeal to some, expressing as it d i d a p h i l o s o p h y o f t o t a l n e g a t i v i t y , b u t e v e n this appeal w a s w e a k e n e d w i t h the e x p u l s i o n o f T r o t s k y , w h o h a d p a r t i c u l a r l y appealed t o the Surrealists, f r o m the Soviet U n i o n i n 1929. H e n c e i t w a s n o t u n t i l 1934, and the t u r n t o a P o p u l a r F r o n t p o l i c y , t h a t the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y b e c a m e m o r e g e n e r a l l y acceptable t o i n t e l l e c t u a l s . F r e u d i a n i s m w a s also n o t w h o l l y acceptable, f o r Freud's u l t i m a t e r e l i a n c e o n i n s t i n c t i v e mechanisms t o e x p l a i n the w o r k i n g s o f the unconscious smacked t o o m u c h o f the i r r a t i o n a l i s m against w h i c h the n e w g e n e r a t i o n was r e a c t i n g . T h e F r e u d i a n unconscious seemed to S a r t r e to oscillate b e t w e e n a p h y s i o l o g i c a l m e c h a n i s m and a n o t h e r consciousness. T h u s , although Marxism and psychoanalysis provided a vague and 5

26

The Foundations

of Structuralism

diffuse i n s p i r a t i o n t o m a n y , they w e r e a c t u a l l y espoused b y o n l y a few. A l t h o u g h the y o u n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s w h o came o f age a t the e n d o f t h e 1920s shared a c o m m o n r e j e c t i o n of established p h i l o s o p h y and o f the society t h a t i t expressed, the alternatives t h e y a d o p t e d v a r i e d considerably. W h i l e N i z a n t u r n e d t o M a r x i s m t o p r o v i d e a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c r i t i q u e o f his o w n society, A r o n t u r n e d t o W e b e r f o r a l i b e r a l c r i t i q u e . T h e philosophies o f Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s , by contrast, expressed a m o r e r a d i c a l r e j e c t i o n . Sartre and Lévi-Strauss each d e v e l o p e d a c r i t i q u e w h i c h addressed i t s e l f to society and to p h i l o s o p h y per se. F o r b o t h this c r i t i q u e i m p l i e d the a d o p t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l a s the f o u n d a t i o n o f m e a n i n g and o f m o r a l i t y , and s o o f the c r i t i q u e o f society and o f its pretensions. B u t this i n d i v i d u a l was n o t a n h i s t o r i c a l l y l o c a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , l i v i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y , a s i t was f o r N i z a n o r for A r o n ( o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , for M e r l e a u - P o n t y ) . For S a r t r e and Lévi-Strauss society, and the r h e t o r i c t h a t accompanies i t , is c o n f r o n t e d by a desocialized i n d i v i d u a l ; b o t h seek the f o u n d a t i o n o f society i n the n a t u r e o f i n d i v i d u a l existence, and s o i n the g e n e r i c i n d i v i d u a l . H e n c e b o t h seek p h i l o s o p h i c a l , r a t h e r t h a n s o c i o l o g i c a l , solutions, t h a t are based on the r a d i c a l d i c h o t o m i z a t i o n o f subject and o b j e c t , o f f o r - i t s e l f and i n - i t s e l f , w i t h the a s s i m i l a t i o n o f society t o one pole, and its c r i t i q u e i n t e r m s o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o the o t h e r . Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s d i f f e r f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l , and this d i f f e r e n c e establishes b o t h the distinctiveness and the c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f t h e i r philosophies. For S a r t r e the i n d i v i d u a l is C a r t e s i a n , in the sense that he or she is d e f i n e d b y the p u r i t y and f r e e d o m o f his o r her consciousness. I t i s t h e conscious m i n d t h a t imposes m e a n i n g o n e x p e r i e n c e b y i n t e g r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a m e a n i n g f u l w h o l e . T h i s consciousness is transcendent, u n c o n s t r a i n e d by any physical or m o r a l absolutes, capable o f refusing any o b l i g a t i o n i m p o s e d b y n a t u r e o r b y society. T h e B e r g s o n i a n e x p e r i e n c e o f f r e e d o m and o f c r e a t i v i t y i s n o t the passive e x p e r i e n c e o f a n e x t e r n a l é l a n v i t a l , i t i s t h e i m m e d i a t e consciousness o f the self. T h e S a r t r e a n ego i s t h e r e f o r e pure u n c o n s t r a i n e d s u b j e c t i v i t y . For Sartre s o c i e t y w i t h its f o r m i d a b l e apparatus o f m o r a l c o n s t r a i n t , i s assimilated t o the p o l e o f the o b j e c t a n d i s c r i t i c i z e d f r o m the pole o f the transcendent subject.


27

For L é v i - S t r a u s s t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s F r e u d i a n , t h o u g h p u r g e d o f a l l i r r a t i o n a l i s m b y the r e d u c t i o n o f the unconscious t o a p u r e l y l o r m a l s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y , defined b y the u n i v e r s a l unconscious, an absolute object i n w h i c h is i n s c r i b e d the f u l l range o f h u m a n possibilities. T h e unconscious i s the t r u e f o u n d a t i o n o f h u m a n existence and the necessary f o u n d a t i o n o f any o r d e r l y h u m a n social l i f e . Consciousness, and especially consciousness o f the subject, i s t h e r e f o r e i l l u s o r y , c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the o b j e c t i v i t y o f the unconscious as an insubstantial and i n e f f e c t u a l s u b j e c t i v i t y . T h e pretensions o f s o c i e t y , expressed i n its d o m i n a n t h u m a n i s t i d e o l o g y , are a s s i m i l a t e d to the subject as the p r o j e c t i o n of the v a i n illusions o f a c o n c e i t e d h u m a n i t y . Sartre's p h i l o s o p h y is set o u t in Being and Nothingness, a w o r k c o m p l e t e d i n 1942. A l t h o u g h Sartre has m o d i f i e d i t subsequently, the fundamentals r e m a i n unchanged. S a r t r e remains w i t h i n the C a r t e s i a n t r a d i t i o n o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y , r e i n t e r p r e t i n g the C a r t e s i a n C o g i t o a l o n g lines suggested b y Husserl. T h i s r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n v o l v e s a r e j e c t i o n o f the d u a l i s t i c B e r g s o n i a n separation o f reason, r u l e d b y e t e r n a l and i m m u t a b l e categories p r o g r e s s i v e l y revealed i n the c o n t i n u o u s advance o f science and p h i l o s o p h y , and e x p e r i e n c e , r u l e d b y the i r r a t i o n a l and elusive é l a n v i t a l . T h i s B c r g s o n i a n s e p a r a t i o n proposes as the o n l y alternatives a p r a g m a t i c , b u t i r r a t i o n a l , s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o the dictates o f reason, o r a m y s t i c a l , and e q u a l l y i r r a t i o n a l , s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o the e t e r n a l s p i r i t o f c r e a t i o n . S a r t r e sought t o abolish this d u a l i s m b y r e i n t e g r a t i n g Bergson's reason and experience n o t i n the e t e r n a l s p i r i t , b u t r a t h e r i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l existence. Sartre sought to sweep a w a y a l l the m e t a p h y s i c a l dressing in a r e t u r n t o the b r u t e r e a l i t y o f existence, t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f w h i c h i s a n experience o f f r e e d o m . D i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e reveals the w o r l d t o u s n o t as a b r u t e o b j e c t i v e fact, b u t as our w o r l d , object of o u r desires, o u r a m b i t i o n s , o u r aspirations. O u r r e l a t i o n t o the w o r l d i s n o t , therefore, d e t e r m i n e d b y the w o r l d , b u t b y o u r o w n c h o i c e o f the w a y i n w h i c h w e , a s conscious beings, relate t o the w o r l d . E x p e r i e n c e i s n o t imposed b y the w o r l d , nor b y a n i r r a t i o n a l Bergsonian é l a n o r F r e u d i a n unconscious. I t i s consciously c r e a t e d b y u s a s a part o f the p r o j e c t w h i c h defines o u r b e i n g i n the w o r l d . T o believe o t h e r w i s e , t o refuse t o r e c o g n i z e o u r o w n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for our own actions, is simply 'bad faith'. The world itself is absurd

28


a n d w i t h o u t m e a n i n g : the e x p e r i e n c e o f the transcendence o f h u m a n existence is the sole basis of m e a n i n g , and so the o n l y basis o f m o r a l i t y . T h e m o r a l d u t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l i s s i m p l y t o assert his or her existence as a h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l in the face of the w o r l d , to refuse t o s u b m i t t o any e x t e r n a l m o r a l o r physical d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e c o n t i n u i t y o f m e a n i n g and o f h i s t o r y , the p e r m a n e n c e o f c u l t u r a l values are a l l u n d e r m i n e d . L i f e i s for the m o m e n t , consciousness i s o f the m o m e n t , u n c o n s t r a i n e d and u n p r e d i c t a b l e . Sartre offers a p h i l o s o p h y of defiance, a p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h holds s o c i e t y a t arm's l e n g t h , refusing t o r e c o g n i z e the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l to a society d o m i n a t e d by h y p o c r i s y , dishonesty and evasion. Social r e l a t i o n s become the struggles b e t w e e n naked i n d i v i d u a l s i n w h i c h each tries t o assert his o r her o w n f r e e d o m . T h e absolute f r e e d o m o f the i n d i v i d u a l includes the f r e e d o m t o t r e a t the o t h e r as an object, b u t it also i m p l i e s an absolute o b l i g a t i o n o n the i n d i v i d u a l n o t t o p e r m i t h i m o r h e r s e l f t o b e r e d u c e d to an o b j e c t by the o t h e r , so t h a t social l i f e becomes a s t r u g g l e t o reduce others t o objects i n one's o w n w o r l d and t o a v o i d one's o w n r e d u c t i o n t o a n o b j e c t i n theirs. L i f e i s n o t h i n g b u t a struggle f o r a u t h e n t i c i t y , a s t r u g g l e against ' b a d f a i t h ' in w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s are ceaselessly p i t t e d against one another. T h e r e is no o t h e r m o r a l p r i n c i p l e , l i f e has n o u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g , i n the last analysis it is meaningless and absurd. Since there are no r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s f o r d e f e n d i n g one course o f a c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n another, t h e course a d o p t e d i s u l t i m a t e l y a r b i t r a r y , the o n l y o b l i g a t i o n b e i n g to choose. Society is c o n d e m n e d by b e i n g r e d u c e d to a m i r a g e , an expression o f the a b d i c a t i o n t o i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , o f the b a d f a i t h w h i c h pervades society. I t i s n o t n o r m s and values w h i c h i n d u c e people t o act, b u t r a t h e r they ascribe courses o f a c t i o n w h i c h t h e y have freely chosen, f o r w h i c h they w i l l n o t assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t o n o r m s and values. T h e l a t t e r are t h e r e f o r e a m y t h , a n a l i b i i n v e n t e d t o j u s t i f y the u n j u s t i f i a b l e . C e r t a i n l y e x p l o i t a t i o n and d o m i n a t i o n e x i s t , b u t t h e y d o n o t force people t o behave i n c e r t a i n w a y s , for even the e x p l o i t e d and d o m i n a t e d c o n t i n u e t o b e h u m a n , t o have the p o w e r t o say n o , t o refuse t o s u b m i t t o the o t h e r . T h i s p h i l o s o p h y gives h i s t o r y a m e a n i n g , b u t t h a t m e a n i n g is ascribed t o h i s t o r y b y the i n d i v i d u a l w h o lives that h i s t o r y , and does n o t exist b e y o n d the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e m e a n i n g o f h i s t o r y i s n o t given to the present by the past from which it came, but by the


29

f u t u r e t o w a r d s w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l projects i t i n his o r her i m a g i n a t i o n . H i s t o r y is n o t , therefore, c o n t i n u o u s and progressive, nor does it have a n y absolute m e a n i n g . Its m e a n i n g is e x h a u s t e d by the sum o f meanings i t has f o r i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , and this m e a n i n g is f u n d a m e n t a l l y discontinuous, f o r it is subject to d o u b t a t e v e r y m o m e n t i n its t r a j e c t o r y . Sartre's e a r l y h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y offers a r i g o r o u s and c o h e r e n t r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f the p o s i t i o n o f a r a d i c a l - l i b e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l i n the t h i r t i e s , expressing his i s o l a t i o n f r o m a society w h i c h he c o u l d c o n d e m n b u t n o t change and p r o v i d i n g a basis on w h i c h he c o u l d l i v e o u t this i s o l a t i o n b y i m m e r s i n g h i m s e l f i n his personal salvation, g i v i n g a supreme m o r a l v a l u e to the most meaningless actions, to the m o s t f u t i l e protests a n d even to pointless selfsacrifice. As a h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y Sartre's e x i s t e n t i a l i s m expressed the tragedy o f s o m a n y o f his g e n e r a t i o n , b u t f o r that v e r y reason i t c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e the basis f o r a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f society. S o c i e t y is s i m p l y an absence in Sartre's scheme, an expression of a l l t h a t h u m a n i t y is n o t . It is a t a c i t pact b e t w e e n people to deny t h e i r h u m a n i t y and t o a t t r i b u t e t h e i r h u m a n capacities t o a n a l i e n f o r c e . I'eople enter i n t o this pact because o f t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l m o r a l failings, because o f the awesome r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w h i c h t h e i r h u m a n i t y gives t h e m and w h i c h t h e y are t o o w e a k t o assume. T h e p o i n t is n o t to u n d e r s t a n d society, b u t to abolish it by an i n d i v i d u a l act o f m o r a l h e r o i s m , i t s e l f q u i t e a r b i t r a r y and motiveless, w h i c h renounces w h a t is f o r w h a t m i g h t be. For the i n t e l l e c t u a l o f independent means this v i e w o f society c o u l d seem q u i t e plausible, b u t i t ignores the r e a l i t y w h i c h society has f o r those less able to i m a g i n e themselves as monads, f o r those w h o depend o n others, i n one w a y o r another, for t h e i r d a y - t o - d a y existence, and p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r those w h o cannot a f f o r d t o i g n o r e the realities o f e x p l o i t a t i o n and d o m i n a t i o n . For these people i t i s clear that society is m o r e than a p h a n t o m , is m o r e t h a n a c o l l e c t i v e a l i b i , b u t that it is a c t u a l l y c o n s t r a i n i n g and is a c t u a l l y systematic. M o r e o v e r for these people i n d i v i d u a l resistance to society, even w h e n aided b y e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis, i s f u t i l e , w h i l e t h e r e d o exist possibilities o f c o m m o n a c t i o n t o change society. I n Sartre's l a t e r w o r k h e has a t t e m p t e d t o r e c o n c i l e his e a r l y philosophy, and p a r t i c u l a r l y his insistence on the absolute character o f h u m a n f r e e d o m , w i t h the density and systematic o r g a n i z a t i o n o f society and w i t h the possibilities o f c o m m o n a c t i o n w h i c h can

30

The Foundations

of Structuralism

e f f e c t i v e l y challenge the e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s o c i e t y . F e w c r i t i c s believe t h a t this r e c o n c i l i a t i o n has been successful, f o r any r e c o g n i t i o n o f the p o w e r o f e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o r o f the v a l i d i t y o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o the c o l l e c t i v e c o m p r o m i s e s the absolute f r e e d o m on w h i c h the p h i l o s o p h y as a w h o l e is f o u n d e d .

5

LÉVI-STRAUSS'

R E J E C T I O N OF

P H E N O M E N O L O G Y Lévi-Strauss w a s t r a i n e d , l i k e Sartre, as a p h i l o s o p h e r . H o w e v e r h e w e n t f u r t h e r t h a n Sartre i n his r e j e c t i o n o f the o r t h o d o x p h i l o s o p h y of his teachers, a b a n d o n i n g p h i l o s o p h y as the basis on w h i c h one can k n o w h u m a n i t y f o r a n t h r o p o l o g y . N e v e r t h e l e s s 'I was brought up a philosopher, and like many in France I came to sociology and ethnology f r o m philosophy. I had in m i n d to answer philosophical questions.'

8

L i k e Sartre, L é v i - S t r a u s s was l o o k i n g f o r a base o n w h i c h t o b u i l d a rationalist h u m a n philosophy, but he rejected phenomeno l o g y and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e i r i m m e r s i o n i n the p r o b l e m s o f the i n d i v i d u a l p r e v e n t e d t h e m f r o m h a v i n g any p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s c o v e r i n g truths about h u m a n i t y . L é v i - S t r a u s s was n o t concerned w i t h i m m e r s i n g h i m s e l f i n the e x p e r i e n c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l in a p a r t i c u l a r society at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , a n d t h e n p r o c l a i m i n g the results o f such self-indulgence a s e t e r n a l t r u t h s . L é v i - S t r a u s s was c o n c e r n e d w i t h the most general p r o p e r ties o f the h u m a n b e i n g , those w h i c h are expressed i n e v e r y society. He sought those characteristics w h i c h 'have a m e a n i n g for a l l m e n ' , rather t h a n those w h i c h c o n c e r n e d o n l y one s o c i e t y , and i t was a n t h r o p o l o g y t h a t c o u l d r e v e a l this t o h i m : 'A philosopher by profession I t h r e w myself i n t o ethnology to discover a nature s t i l l untouched by m a n ' E t h n o l o g y is n o t h i n g less than an effort to explain the complete man by means of studying the w h o l e social experience of man . . . the aim is to isolate, f r o m the mass of customs, creeds and institutions, a precipitate w h i c h often is infinitesimal b u t contains in i t s e l f the very meaning of m a n . ' 9

T h u s , w h i l e the phenomenologists analyzed m e a n i n g b y r e f e r ence t o the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f the subject, L é v i - S t r a u s s sought meaning through a scientific analysis in which the conscious


31

meaning is to be e x p l a i n e d by reference to a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l , objective, meaning: 'to reach reality one has first to reject experience, and then subsequently to reintegrate it into an objective synthesis devoid of any s e n t i m e n t a l i t y . ' 10

L é v i - S t r a u s s ' f u n d a m e n t a l o b j e c t i o n t o e x i s t e n t i a l i s m and p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s that they r e s o l v e the p r o b l e m o f the Bergsonian d u a l i s t i c separation o f subjective e x p e r i e n c e and o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y b y r e d u c i n g r e a l i t y t o subjective e x p e r i e n c e . For L é v i - S t r a u s s k n o w l e d g e can never b e based o n s u b j e c t i v e e x perience, it must have an o b j e c t i v e f o u n d a t i o n , hence Lévi-Strauss sought t o achieve a n ' o b j e c t i v e ' synthesis o f e x p e r i e n c e and r e a l i t y . H i s a m b i t i o n was t o r e c o n c i l e the B e r g s o n i a n o p p o s i t i o n o f r a t i o n a l and i r r a t i o n a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l and e m o t i o n a l , l o g i c a l and p r e l o g i c a l w i t h i n a h i g h e r o b j e c t i v e synthesis w h o s e f o u n d a t i o n w o u l d be n o t consciousness b u t the unconscious. I n e x p l a i n i n g his scientific o r i e n t a t i o n L é v i - S t r a u s s refers t o b o t h personal a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l influences: a p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r a ' k i n d of rationalistic m o n i s m ' ; an early interest in geology, w h i c h for Lévi-Strauss p r o v i d e s the ' m o s t majestic m e a n i n g ' of a landscape, ' t h a t w h i c h precedes, c o m m a n d s , and, to a large e x t e n t explains the others'; and teenage c o n t a c t w i t h M a r x i s m , t h a t again sought a deeper r e a l i t y beneath the l e v e l of appearances. These e a r l y influences i n t u r n prepared L é v i - S t r a u s s f o r the i m p a c t o f psychoanalysis, a n d c o l o u r e d his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t . A l l these influences c o m b i n e d to reveal to Lévi-Strauss that: 'understanding consists in reducing one type of reality to another; that the true reality is never the most obvious; and that the nature of t r u t h is already indicated by the care it takes to remain elusive. For all cases, the same p r o b l e m arises, the problem of the relationship between feeling and reason, and the a i m is the same: to achieve a kind o f superrationalism, w h i c h w i l l integrate the first w i t h the second, w i t h o u t sacrificing any of its properties.' 11

Psychoanalysis i m m e d i a t e l y appealed to Lévi-Strauss as a c r i t i c a l w e a p o n . I t restores m e a n i n g t o the h u m a n b e i n g t h r o u g h the unconscious, i n t r o d u c i n g , l i k e g e o l o g y , a n o r d e r i n t o apparent incoherence b y r e f e r r i n g the l a t t e r t o ' c e r t a i n basic characteristics of the physical or m e n t a l u n i v e r s e ' so ' i n t e r p r e t i n g each a c t i o n as the unfolding in time of certain eternal truths'. Psychoanalysis 12

32

The Foundations

of Structuralism

o v e r c a m e the static antinomies o f B e r g s o n i s m b y r e v e a l i n g a deeper m e a n i n g , the m e a n i n g o f the unconscious, i n w h i c h all aspects of m e n t a l l i f e are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a single synthesis t h a t can encompass the w h o l e o f h u m a n existence. F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s k n o w l e d g e o f h u m a n i t y i s possible n o t because h u m a n i t y p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the B e r g s o n i a n s p i r i t u a l 'state o f m u s h ' , n o r because o f some e m p a t h i c o r i n t u i t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the consciousness o f others, b u t because o f the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f h u m a n n a t u r e expressed in the generic unconscious. T h i s unconscious is thus the f o u n d a t i o n o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f h u m a n n a t u r e , and i t i s o n l y a s c i e n t i f i c a p p r o a c h t o h u m a n i t y t h a t c a n reveal the t r u e and o b j e c t i v e f o u n d a t i o n o f h u m a n existence. 1 3

T h e task t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s sought t o a c c o m p l i s h was precisely t h a t o f his p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t and e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . I n a sense it was a v e r y c o n s e r v a t i v e task, f o r they each sought to reassert the r a t i o n a l i s t i c values o f classical F r e n c h h u m a n i s t p h i l o s o p h y , t o preserve the p r i n c i p l e s o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t i n the face o f the o n s l a u g h t o f i r r a t i o n a l i s m . T h e y t h e r e f o r e sought t o i n t e g r a t e the w h o l e o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e i n a r a t i o n a l synthesis r o o t e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d : t o r e s t o r e the u n i t y o f reason and e m o t i o n , i n t e l l e c t and e x p e r i e n c e as the basis of h u m a n existence. It is this r a t i o n a l synthesis t h a t p r o v i d e s the o n l y t r u e and o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g f o r h u m a n existence, f o r i t i s o n l y reason that can p r o v i d e a m e a n i n g that does n o t r e l y on a m e t a p h y s i c a l a u t h o r i t y . W h i l e p h e n o m e n o l o g y accomplishes this synthesis i n consciousness, a n d tries t o f i n d the c e r t a i n r a t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n for h u m a n existence i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f consciousness, Lévi-Strauss accomplishes the synthesis in the unconscious, and t r i e s t o f i n d this r a t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n t h r o u g h the s c i e n t i f i c study o f humanity.

N O T E S 1 L. Brunschvig, L'idéalisme Contemporain, 1905, p. 5, quoted F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, 9, Burns Oates, 1975, p. 151. 2 TT, p. 52. 3 S. de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, Penguin, H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1965, p. 15. 4 TT, p. 52; J. P. Sartre, Situations, Hamish H a m i l t o n , London, 1965, p. 229. 5 Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism, N L B , London, 1974, pp. 3 7 - 8 . 6 Ibid., pp. 33, 35.

The Crisis in French Philosophy in the 1930s 7 Ibid., pp. 52, 54. 8 1966a, p. 33. 9 1974c, p. 26; 1953c, p. 70. 10 TT, p. 58. 1 l T T , p p . 57-8. 12 TT, p. 57. 13 TT, p. 55.

33

I I I . The Origins of Structuralism P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S p r o v i d e d L é v i - S t r a u s s w i t h the idea o f the u n conscious o n w h i c h t o base his d i s t i n c t i v e h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y and w i t h w h i c h t o a p p r o a c h the h u m a n sciences. B u t psychoanalysis w a s n o t L é v i - S t r a u s s ' chosen d i s c i p l i n e . I t c o u l d p r o v i d e a concept w h i c h made i t possible t o achieve a n o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f h u m a n i t y , b u t the p r a c t i c e o f psychoanalysis was n o t the w a y t o achieve this k n o w l e d g e ,

for i t

i n v o l v e d the s t u d y o f selected

i n d i v i d u a l s , n o t of h u m a n i t y as a w h o l e . It is a n t h r o p o l o g y t h a t is the science o f h u m a n i t y that L é v i - S t r a u s s sought: ' A n t h r o p o l o g y affords me intellectual satisfaction: as a f o r m of history, l i n k i n g up at opposite ends w i t h w o r l d history and my o w n history, it thus reveals the rationale c o m m o n to both. In proposing the study of mankind, anthropology frees me f r o m doubt, since it examines those differences and changes in mankind w h i c h have a meaning for all men, and excludes those peculiar to a single c i v i l i z a t i o n , w h i c h dissolve into nothingness under the gaze of the outside observer.' 1

L é v i - S t r a u s s d i d n o t espouse a n t h r o p o l o g y i m m e d i a t e l y . A t the U n i v e r s i t y a n t h r o p o l o g y was d o m i n a t e d b y the D u r k h e i m i a n s . Lévy-Bruhl eulogized

the

positivist

D u r k h e i m and h a d d e v e l o p e d ,

tradition

w i t h his

of Comte

and

theory of ' p r i m i t i v e

m e n t a l i t y ' , a d o c t r i n e t h a t p o t e n t i a l l y h a d s t r o n g racist o v e r t o n e s . B o u g l é , Assistant D i r e c t o r o f the E c o l e N o r m a l e , h a d a c h i e v e ments b e h i n d h i m ,

b u t had b e c o m e s e l f - a p p o i n t e d ,

and rather

d o g m a t i c , defender o f the D u r k h e i m i a n o r t h o d o x y . I t w a s B o u g l é w h o r e c o m m e n d e d L é v i - S t r a u s s f o r his post i n B r a z i l , b u t L é v i Strauss d i d n o t b e l o n g t o B o u g l é ' s 'stable'. O n l y M a r c e l Mauss, D u r k h e i m ' s n e p h e w , manifested any o r i g i n a l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y , d i s t a n c i n g h i m s e l f f r o m the D u r k h e i m i a n legacy. B u t M a u s s d i d not hold a doctorate, graduate though

he

students. read

and so w a s c o n f i n e d to t e a c h i n g post-

Lévi-Strauss

Mauss'

works

n e v e r attended M a u s s ' courses,

and 34

conducted

his

fieldwork

along

The

Origins

of Structuralism

35

Maussian lines, s t u d y i n g artefacts a n d t h e i r methods o f p r o d u c t i o n rather than beliefs and social i n s t i t u t i o n s . 2

A l l the D u r k h e i m i a n s , w h o w r o t e s o m u c h about the n a t u r e o f h u m a n i t y , o f p r i m i t i v e m e n t a l i t y , o f the p o s i t i v i s t m e t h o d , and o f e x o t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e i n fact a r m c h a i r a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w h o s e contact w i t h t h e societies they e x p l o r e d was second-hand. For L é v i - S t r a u s s i t w a s the r e a d i n g o f R o b e r t L o w i e ' s Primitive Society i n 1 9 3 3 - 4 that p r o v i d e d the ' r e v e l a t i o n ' : 'Instead of p r o v i d i n g one w i t h ideas taken f r o m books and immediately changed into philosophical concepts, it described the w r i t e r ' s actual experience of native societies, and presented the significance of that experience through his involvement. My m i n d was able to escape f r o m the claustrophobic, T u r k i s h - b a t h atmosphere in w h i c h it was being imprisoned by the practice of philosophical reflection. ' 3

H e r e was the k e y w i t h w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s c o u l d u n l o c k the storehouse o f k n o w l e d g e n o t o f the idea o f h u m a n i t y , b u t o f real l i v i n g people. B u t i t i s i m p o r t a n t n o t t o overemphasize the i m p a c t o f N o r t h A m e r i c a n anthropology o n L é v i - S t r a u s s . L é v i - S t r a u s s has made i t a b u n d a n t l y clear t h a t , w h a t e v e r his debts t o N o r t h A m e r i c a n a n t h r o p o l o g y in relation to specifically anthropological questions, the l a t t e r p r o v i d e d m o r e an i n s p i r a t i o n t h a n an i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n . A l t h o u g h as a student the D u r k h e i m i a n t r a d i t i o n made n o p o s i t i v e i m p a c t o n h i m , and h e a r r i v e d i n B r a z i l i n ' o p e n r e v o l t against D u r k h e i m a n d against any a t t e m p t t o use sociology f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l purposes', his w o r k i s s i t u a t e d v e r y f i r m l y w i t h i n the D u r k h e i m i a n t r a d i t i o n . 4

Simone de B e a u v o i r , w h o read The Elementary Structures in p r o o f w h i l e w r i t i n g the articles that w o u l d become The Second Sex, f u l l y appreciated the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the F r e n c h and the N o r t h American traditions in Lévi-Strauss' w o r k : ' H e i r to the French t r a d i t i o n , but starting w i t h A m e r i c a n methods, Lévi-Strauss wanted to resume the project of his masters w h i l e guarding against their failings.' 5

E v e n i n his f i e l d w o r k L é v i - S t r a u s s r e m a i n e d w i t h i n the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n : h e h a d l i t t l e t r a i n i n g i n f i e l d w o r k m e t h o d s and his reports are, b y A n g l o - S a x o n standards, v e r y l i m i t e d . I n almost fifty years as an anthropologist Lévi-Strauss has made two brief

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of Structuralism

f i e l d w o r k trips i n B r a z i l and Pakistan a n d one l o n g e r e x p e d i t i o n o f several m o n t h s i n B r a z i l — p r o b a b l y n o m o r e i n his t o t a l career, a n d w i t h less p r e p a r a t i o n , t h a n a B r i t i s h o r A m e r i c a n graduate student w o u l d c o m p l e t e i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a d o c t o r a t e : ' I a m n o t ashamed t o confess, m y t i m e i n the f i e l d was spent less i n w o r k i n g than i n l e a r n i n g h o w t o w o r k ' . 6

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P H I L O S O P H Y T h e offer o f a n a p p o i n t m e n t i n B r a z i l f o r c e d L é v i - S t r a u s s t o c o n f r o n t the D u r k h e i m i a n t r a d i t i o n . I n t u r n i n g t o a n t h r o p o l o g y L é v i - S t r a u s s was n o t t u r n i n g his back o n his o w n society, n o r was h e l e a v i n g his p h i l o s o p h i c a l b a c k g r o u n d b e h i n d . H i s e a r l y a m b i t i o n was t o understand n o t o t h e r societies, b u t his o w n , a n d i t was t o answer p h i l o s o p h i c a l questions t h a t h e t u r n e d t o a n t h r o p o l o g y . T h u s his c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the D u r k h e i m i a n t r a d i t i o n was a philosophical confrontation.

7

D u r k h e i m , as we have seen, i n t r o d u c e d a f u n d a m e n t a l d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y , l o c a t i n g the s p e c i f i c a l l y h u m a n qualities o f m o r a l i t y and o f c o g n i t i o n i n society a s a c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e standing o v e r , and i m p o s i n g i t s e l f o n , the i n d i v i d u a l . F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s this t h e o r y i s a n a b d i c a t i o n o f s o c i o l o g y f o r metaphysics: his task is to r e c o v e r f o r the i n d i v i d u a l the h u m a n i t y t h a t D u r k h e i m h a d ascribed t o the c o l l e c t i v e conscience. T h e n a t u r e of h u m a n beings as social beings is to be r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f w h a t i t i s about h u m a n beings that makes society possible b y m a k i n g people, i n t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n , create social relations i n w h i c h they c o m m i t t h e m selves t o l i v i n g i n society. L é v i - S t r a u s s sought t o r e m a k e D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g y b y p u t t i n g the social n a t u r e o f h u m a n i t y back i n t o the i n d i v i d u a l . M e r l e a u P o n t y , i n a s y m p a t h e t i c c o m m e n t a r y o n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k that sought t o assimilate the l a t t e r t o his o w n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , p u t this point w e l l : ' T h i s social fact, w h i c h is no longer a massive reality but an efficacious system of symbols or a n e t w o r k of symbolic values, is g o i n g to be inserted in the depths of the individual. B u t the regulation w h i c h circumvents the i n d i v i d u a l does not eliminate h i m . It is no longer necessary to choose between the i n d i v i d u a l and the collective. ' 8

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Thus L é v i - S t r a u s s ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l objections t o D u r k h e i m ' s sociology can be s u m m e d up as a r e j e c t i o n of the m e t a p h y s i c a l concept o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience and o f the s o c i o l o g i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m associated w i t h i t . D u r k h e i m ' s p o s i t i v i s m , b y d i c t a t i n g (hat h e d i d n o t l o o k b e h i n d the appearance o f social c o n s t r a i n t , p r e v e n t e d h i m f r o m f i n d i n g its t r u e i n d i v i d u a l f o u n d a t i o n . W h i l e D u r k h e i m saw society as a sui generis r e a l i t y , Lévi-Strauss had t o establish the c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society o n a n i n d i v i d u a l f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s gives Lévi-Strauss' p r o j e c t a m a r k e d K a n t i a n f l a v o u r , and L é v i - S t r a u s s , l i k e D u r k h e i m b e f o r e h i m , recognizes K a n t as a forbear. K a n t was c o n c e r n e d to establish the basis of a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y , the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f a h a r m o n i o u s s o c i e t y . For K a n t human action should be ruled by m o r a l imperatives that could be l o g i c a l l y d e r i v e d f r o m the ' g e n e r a l c o n c e p t of a r a t i o n a l b e i n g as such'. T h i s ' c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e ' w o u l d t h e n p r o v i d e the basis o f a n absolute a n d universal m o r a l i t y . I n the j u s t society the l a w s established i n accordance w i t h the c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , a l t h o u g h c o n s t r a i n i n g , w o u l d be r e c o g n i z e d to be the c o n d i t i o n s l o r the f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l , and so w o u l d be consented to spontaneously. A h a r m o n i o u s society depended, t h e r e f o r e , on the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y . 9

D u r k h e i m d e v e l o p e d his s o c i o l o g y a c e n t u r y l a t e r in an age w h e n the p o w e r s o f reason seemed i n s u f f i c i e n t t o ensure social o r d e r . D u r k h e i m sought t o s o c i o l o g i z e his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f K a n t , m a k i n g o f society n o t a f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e w h i c h i s accessible o n l y t o reason, but a substantial r e a l i t y w h i c h has p h e n o m e n a l effects, experienced b y i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o m e t h i n g e x i s t i n g b e y o n d t h e m selves and c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e m . T h e s t u d y o f society c o u l d thus, f o r D u r k h e i m , b e c o m e an e m p i r i c a l , a n d n o t a m e t a p h y s i c a l , d i s c i pline. D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g i z i n g o f K a n t f u n d a m e n t a l l y alters the significance o f K a n t i a n m o r a l i t y . D u r k h e i m fails t o make the d i s t i n c t i o n , f u n d a m e n t a l t o K a n t and t o G e r m a n n e o - K a n t i a n i s m , b e t w e e n fact a n d v a l u e . For K a n t the r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y i s p u r e l y f o r m a l and i t i s u n i v e r s a l , i t i s n o t based i n any w a y o n w h a t happens t o b e t h e c u r r e n t state o f affairs. H e n c e K a n t ' s m o r a l t h e o r y provides a basis for c r i t i c i z i n g w h a t i s i n t e r m s o f w h a t o u g h t to be: the u n i v e r s a l claims of a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y are opposed to the particularistic imposition of selfish moral standards.

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D u r k h e i m , b y contrast, identifies the n o r m a t i v e w i t h the o b j e c t i v e : the c o l l e c t i v e conscience is an o b j e c t i v e fact and a m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e . L é v i - S t r a u s s i s w e l l a w a r e o f the dangers i n h e r e n t i n this c o n c e p t i o n , f o r the consequence is the g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the collective: 'Obviously any social order could take pretense of such a doctrine to crush individual thought and spontaneity. Every m o r a l , social, or intellectual progress made its first appearance as a revolt of the individual against the g r o u p . ' 10

I n c r i t i c i z i n g D u r k h e i m ' s metaphysics L é v i - S t r a u s s i s e n d o r s i n g K a n t i a n i n d i v i d u a l i s m and r e s t o r i n g the c r i t i c a l d i m e n s i o n o f K a n t ' s p h i l o s o p h y . H o w e v e r Lévi-Strauss does n o t go so far as to reject D u r k h e i m ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f fact and v a l u e . W h a t L é v i Strauss rejects is the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e c o l l e c t i v e conscience as a fact. T h u s Lévi-Strauss rejects any appeal to a m o r a l a u t h o r i t y above the i n d i v i d u a l , w h e t h e r i t b e K a n t i a n reason o r D u r k h e i m i a n society. For L é v i - S t r a u s s the K a n t i a n i m p e r a t i v e must b e l o c a t e d i n the h u m a n m i n d . T h u s , w h i l e K a n t l o o k e d t o the c o n c e p t o f the r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l f o r the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y and a h a r m o n i o u s social l i f e , Lévi-Strauss looks instead to supposedly e m p i r i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f the h u m a n m i n d . T h u s L é v i Strauss enthusiastically endorses R i c o u e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of his a n t h r o p o l o g y as a ' K a n t i a n i s m w i t h o u t a transcendental s u b j e c t ' . T h e nature o f the m i n d i s established t h r o u g h a d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t , a s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society, o f c u l t u r e , o f h u m a n i t y . T h u s the source o f reason i s r e l o c a t e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l , n o t in a consciousness that is p r e y f o r v a n i t y and selfishness, b u t in the unconscious that is b o t h an e m p i r i c a l and a m o r a l fact.

11

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S O C I O L O G Y L é v i - S t r a u s s sought t o r e m a k e D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g y b y p u t t i n g the social n a t u r e o f h u m a n beings, inadequately c o n c e p t u a l i z e d b y D u r k h e i m as the c o l l e c t i v e conscience, back i n t o the i n d i v i d u a l . L é v i - S t r a u s s argues that D u r k h e i m was f o r c e d t o i n v e n t the c o n c e p t o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience because h e d i d n o t have a v a i l a b l e t o h i m a n adequate c o n c e p t o f the unconscious. T h e concept o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience was i n t r o d u c e d b y Durkheim to reconcile the moral quality of social facts with their

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o b j e c t i v e and c o n s t r a i n i n g c h a r a c t e r . Social facts w e r e b o t h ' t h i n g s ' and 'representations', b o t h o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e , they w e r e psychic, b u t t h e y w e r e resistant t o the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l . W i t h o u t a n adequate concept o f the unconscious, L é v i - S t r a u s s argues, w h i c h is precisely a psychic e n t i t y resistant t o the w i l l , D u r k h e i m has t o i n v e n t a ' m i n d ' w h i c h e x i s t e d outside the i n d i v i d u a l and c o n s t r a i n e d h i m o r her. L a c k i n g the c o n c e p t o f the unconscious, D u r k h e i m was l e d t o e x p l a i n social facts n o t b y reference t o t h e i r h u m a n , i n d i v i d u a l , o r i g i n , b u t b y r e s o r t i n g u l t i m a t e l y t o e v o l u t i o n i s m ( i n w h i c h the c o l l e c t i v e conscience i s e x p l a i n e d b y reference t o a n e v o l u t i o n a r y chain) and t o i r r a t i o n a l ism ( i n w h i c h the o r i g i n o f the c o l l e c t i v e conscience i n the distant past is e x p l a i n e d as an i r r a t i o n a l , e m o t i o n a l , response r o o t e d i n the n a t u r a l , pre-social, i n d i v i d u a l ) . W i t h the c o n c e p t o f the unconscious w e can r e c o g n i z e t h a t the m e a n i n g of the social fact is n o t i m p o s e d on the i n d i v i d u a l b u t is his o r her o w n c r e a t i o n . B u t that m e a n i n g i s not p u r e l y subjective, since its o b j e c t i v i t y is f o u n d e d in the unconscious: 'The solution of D u r k h e i m ' s antinomy lies in the awareness that these objectivated systems of ideas are unconscious, or that unconscious psychical structures underlie them and make them possible. Hence their character of "things"; and at the same time the d i a l e c t i c — I mean un-mechanical—character o f their e x p l a n a t i o n . ' 12

I t i s t h e r e f o r e the nature o f the unconscious t h a t makes society possible, and it is because the social is l o c a t e d in the unconscious that it seems to e x p e r i e n c e to be e x t e r n a l . Lévi-Strauss thus has a dual task: to d e v e l o p a t h e o r y of the unconscious m i n d as the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society, and t o r e f o r m u l a t e D u r k h e i m ' s sociology o n the basis o f this c o n c e p t o f the unconscious. I t i s this double i m p e r a t i v e t h a t leads t o the t w o dimensions o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m : o n the one h a n d a t h e o r y o f m i n d , o n the o t h e r a t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e and society. T h e task Lévi-Strauss set h i m s e l f w a s to p r o v i d e a f u n c t i o n a l u n d e r p i n n i n g f o r the social s t r u c t u r e i n the i n d i v i d u a l unconscious and s o t o e l i m i n a t e D u r k h e i m ' s appeal t o a m e t a p h y s i c a l l o g i c o f e v o l u t i o n . I n this w a y the social s t r u c t u r e , and the representations that c o r r e s p o n d t o i t , w o u l d b e r e l o c a t e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l . I n this way:

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' W e shall have the hope of overcoming the opposition between the collective nature of culture and its manifestations in the individual, since the so-called " c o l l e c t i v e consciousness" w o u l d , in the final analysis, be no more than the expression on the level of individual thought and behaviour, of certain time and space modalities of the universal laws w h i c h make up the unconscious a c t i v i t y of the m i n d . ' 13

Lévi-Strauss' objection to D u r k h e i m i a n sociology was clearly a n o b j e c t i o n f r o m w i t h i n the D u r k h e i m i a n t r a d i t i o n . I t i s t o the solutions o f f e r e d that he objects, n o t to the p r o b l e m s that D u r k h e i m posed f o r s o c i o l o g y . T h u s L é v i - S t r a u s s rejects D u r k h e i m ' s c l a i m t h a t society is an e m e r g e n t w h o l e t h a t has its o w n l a w s and t h a t transcends the i n d i v i d u a l members o f society. For L é v i - S t r a u s s society cannot e x i s t o t h e r than i n the i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s o f society and i n the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n these i n d i v i d u a l s , r e l a t i o n s the i n d i v i d u a l s enter on the basis of an unconscious m o t i v a t i o n and n o t under the c o n s t r a i n t o f some e x t e r n a l e n t i t y . H o w e v e r , once w e have a l l o w e d f o r this d e v e l o p m e n t o f D u r k h e i m i a n i s m , L é v i - S t r a u s s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f the tasks o f s o c i o l o g y , and o f the n a t u r e o f s o c i e t y , i s t h o r o u g h l y D u r k h e i m i a n . F i r s t l y , L é v i - S t r a u s s concurs e n t i r e l y w i t h the D u r k h e i m i a n insistence o n the psychic, s y m b o l i c , character o f social facts, and w i t h the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n c e p t i o n o f s o c i o l o g y . Social facts are m o r a l facts, a n d s o c i o l o g y i s the p o s i t i v e m o r a l science w h i c h seeks t o acquire o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f systems o f m e a n i n g . Secondly, w h i l e L é v i - S t r a u s s rejects D u r k h e i m ' s o v e r - r e l i a n c e on a s o c i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m , this is n o t to reject f u n c t i o n a l i s m . I n his early w o r k L é v i - S t r a u s s s i m p l y argued t h a t a satisfactory f u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n cannot b e c o m p l e t e u n t i l the social functions of an i n s t i t u t i o n can be r e l a t e d to its functions f o r the i n d i v i d u a l : i t i s n o t sufficient t o s h o w w h a t the social f u n c t i o n o f an i n s t i t u t i o n is, it is also necessary to s h o w h o w the i n s t i t u t i o n can f u n c t i o n a t a l l b y s h o w i n g w h y i n d i v i d u a l s consent t o engage i n i t . T h u s L é v i - S t r a u s s i s n o t replacing D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g i s m w i t h a n a l t e r n a t i v e p s y c h o l o g i s t i c t h e o r y o f society t h a t w o u l d reduce society to the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d . Lévi-Strauss seeks to complement D u r k h e i m ' s sociological functionalism by adding to it a rationalist account o f the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n society. T h i r d l y , L é v i - S t r a u s s pushes D u r k h e i m i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m t o its l i m i t s . For D u r k h e i m c o l l e c t i v e representations are r i g o r o u s l y intellectual, rational, constructions. Thus Durkheim rejected

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L é v y - B r u h l ' s n o t i o n o f the ' p r i m i t i v e m e n t a l i t y ' i n s i s t i n g t h a t a l l f o r m s o f social t h o u g h t are r a t i o n a l . H o w e v e r w h e n i t came t o the m o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f those representations D u r k h e i m h a d recourse to the i r r a t i o n a l , e x p l a i n i n g the m o r a l force of society as an i r r a t i o n a l a f f e c t i v e response t o the majesty o f the c o l l e c t i v e . I n r e p l a c i n g this i r r a t i o n a l , and w h o l l y passive, i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y by a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m that provides t h e r a t i o n a l , t h o u g h unconscious, grounds f o r the consent o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n society, L é v i - S t r a u s s purges D u r k h e i m i a n sociology o f its residual i r r a t i o n a l i s m . Society i s n o w r a t i o n a l n o t because it is a transcendent o r d e r s t a n d i n g above t h e i n d i v i d u a l , but because i t has its roots i n the i n d i v i d u a l reason o f the unconscious. T h e supremacy o f reason does n o t d e p e n d o n the i r r a t i o n a l a w e w i t h w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l regards t h e c o l l e c t i v e , but o n a n accordance o f the social w i t h the n a t u r e o f the individual. F i n a l l y , Lévi-Strauss has a t h o r o u g h l y D u r k h e i m i a n u n d e r standing o f the m e t h o d o f the h u m a n sciences. A n t h r o p o l o g y seeks not a subjective i m m e r s i o n i n o t h e r cultures, b u t o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e m e t h o d o f research i s the c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d based o n the establishment o f f u n c t i o n a l t y p o l o g i e s . T h e a i m o f social m o r p h o l o g y i s t o establish a t y p o l o g y o f social structures o r o f social i n s t i t u t i o n s , the d i f f e r e n t types c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o d i f f e r e n t w a y s o f e f f e c t i n g the f u n d a m e n t a l social o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n t o w h i c h society responds. T h u s the basis o f k n o w l e d g e o f society i s the extensive study o f d i f f e r e n t social forms, and n o t the intensive study o f p a r t i c u l a r societies. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' o r i g i n a l i t y does n o t consist i n his a t t e m p t t o develop a n o b j e c t i v e s c i e n t i f i c analysis o f m e a n i n g f u l c u l t u r a l phenomena, n o r even i n his f i n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f such phenomena t h r o u g h analysis o f t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h i s already present i n the studies o f p r i m i t i v e classifications b y D u r k h e i m a n d such o f his f o l l o w e r s as Mauss, Bouglé, H e r t z and G r a n e t . Lévi-Strauss' o r i g i n a l i t y consists in the a t t e m p t to give such a s t r u c t u r a l analysis a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n and in the insistence t h a t this f o u n d a t i o n be p r o v i d e d by a r i g o r o u s l y r a t i o n a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , unconscious. T h i s a t t e m p t purges D u r k h e i m i a n s o c i o l o g y and p h i l o s o p h y o f its unacceptable m e t a p h y s i c a l and i r r a t i o n a l i s t i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t r e mains t o b e seen w h e t h e r the s t r u c t u r a l i s m t o w h i c h i t u l t i m a t e l y gives rise is any m o r e satisfactory.

42 3

The Foundations T O W A R D S

M A U S S

A

of Structuralism

S O L U T I O N : LÉVI-STRAUSS,

A N D T H E T H E O R Y O F R E C I P R O C I T Y

L é v i - S t r a u s s was seeking the most general properties o f society i n o r d e r t o u n c o v e r the o r i g i n o f the social i n the i n d i v i d u a l . A t the same t i m e he w a s seeking to r o o t this general c o n c e p t i o n in the concrete, i n the m i n d o f the i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r o f this o r that society. He b e l i e v e d he saw such a c o n c e p t i o n , at least in e m b r y o , i n the w o r k o f Mauss, w h o m L é v i - S t r a u s s a c k n o w l e d g e d i n his e a r l y w o r k as his ' m a s t e r ' , and to w h o m he l a t e r dedicated Structural Anthropology. 14

M a u s s ' insistence o n the systematic n a t u r e o f social phenomena i s expressed i n the concept o f the ' t o t a l social f a c t ' : ' H e studies each t y p e as a w h o l e , a l w a y s c o n s i d e r i n g it as an i n t e g r a t i v e c u l t u r a l c o m p l e x . ' B u t Mauss ties h i m s e l f m u c h m o r e closely t o the concrete t h a n does D u r k h e i m . T h e concept o f the ' t o t a l social f a c t ' leads t o w a r d s a greater respect for the i n t e g r i t y and s p e c i f i c i t y of each p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y , and so a lesser readiness to resort t o the r e d u c t i o n i s m o f the e v o l u t i o n a r y a r g u m e n t t o w h i c h D u r k h e i m so r e a d i l y had recourse. M o r e o v e r , despite his r e t e n t i o n o f the concept o f a c o l l e c t i v e psyche, Mauss i s m u c h m o r e aware t h a n was D u r k h e i m o f the need t o relate this t o the i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y . I t i s o n the basis o f a c r i t i c a l r e a d i n g o f M a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s d e v e l o p e d his t h e o r y o f the social, and i t i s t o the d e v e l o p m e n t o f this t h e o r y that I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o turn. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y was developed i n a n u m b e r o f t h e o r e t i c a l articles w h i c h h e p u b l i s h e d i n 1943 and 1944, w h i c h w e r e based l a r g e l y o n those societies h e had v i s i t e d i n B r a z i l . O n e p r o b l e m w h i c h i s p r o m i n e n t i n these articles, and indeed w h i c h dominates L é v i - S t r a u s s ' later w o r k a s w e l l , i s the p r o b l e m o f d i f f u s i o n . T h e p r o b l e m was one o f e x p l a i n i n g a p p a r e n t l y r e m a r k a b l e s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n i n s t i t u t i o n s f o u n d in societies as far apart as N o r t h and S o u t h A m e r i c a , A s i a and O c e a n i a . LéviStrauss was opposed to a l l kinds of e v o l u t i o n a r y a r g u m e n t , such as 1 5

1 6

those t o w h i c h D u r k h e i m had recourse, unless there w a s v e r y g o o d independent evidence f o r these a r g u m e n t s . E x p l a n a t i o n i n terms of ' a n t e r i o r f o r m s ' is o n l y acceptable as a last r e s o r t , w h e n f u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n has failed. I n the case o f one o f the societies which concerned Lévi-Strauss, the Bororo, their dualistic social

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43

o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d n o t be e x p l a i n e d in e v o l u t i o n a r y t e r m s , as a p r i m i t i v e f o r m , because there w a s clear evidence t h a t this organization derived from a more complex culture. L6vi-Strauss was a t t r a c t e d to d i f f u s i o n i s m , w h i c h he saw as being c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o f u n c t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n . H o w e v e r h e argued that, e v e n w h e r e there w a s evidence t o s u p p o r t diffusionist hypotheses, these w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t . T h e q u e s t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n i s a d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n f r o m t h a t o f its origins, a s D u r k h e i m h i m s e l f h a d c l e a r l y argued. W h e r e w e f i n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h i s general, w e m u s t e x p l a i n t h a t g e n e r a l i t y b y reference t o t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f its f u n c t i o n . T h i s f u n c t i o n w i l l be revealed b y analysis o f the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s o f the i n s t i t u t i o n : ' I f history, w h e n it is called upon u n r e m i t t i n g l y (and it must be called upon first) cannot y i e l d an answer, then let us appeal to psychology, or the structural analysis of forms; let us ask ourselves if internal connections, whether of a psychological or a logical nature, w i l l allow us to understand parallel recurrences whose frequency and cohesion cannot possibly be the result of chance. . . . External connections can explain transmission, but only internal connections can account for persistence.' 17

T h e c o m m o n p r i n c i p l e w h i c h was e m e r g i n g f r o m the analysis o f a n u m b e r o f a p p a r e n t l y v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s was the p r i n c i p l e of reciprocity. In the articles of 1943 to 1945 Lévi-Strauss finds r e c i p r o c i t y t o b e the f o u n d a t i o n o f p o w e r , o f dual o r g a n i z a t i o n , o f w a r and c o m m e r c e , and o f k i n s h i p . M a r c e l Mauss had already p u t f o r w a r d a t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y i n his essay The Gift. For Lévi-Strauss it is this essay w h i c h inaugurates 'a n e w era f o r the social sciences'. Mauss f o u n d beneath the m a n y d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f the g i f t r e l a t i o n s h i p , a c o m m o n f a c t o r . T h e g i f t relationship i s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the i m m e d i a t e g i v i n g o f the g i f t , for one object can be r e p l a c e d by a n o t h e r w i t h o u t the relationship b e i n g affected. T h e g i f t r e l a t i o n s h i p is also m o r e t h a n the simple s u m o f its parts, f o r the g i v i n g o f a g i f t institutes a n o b l i g a t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e . Mauss saw the key t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n this o b l i g a t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e , and sought t o e x p l a i n this o b l i g a t i o n . 18

Mauss o b s e r v e d that the g i f t was i m b u e d w i t h s y m b o l i c significance. H e n o t e d that the r e a l properties o f the g i f t w e r e u n i m p o r t a n t , a l l sorts o f q u i t e d i f f e r e n t items c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e gifts. H e c o n c l u d e d t h a t the g i f t was v e r y m u c h m o r e t h a n a simple object transferred. It was a t o t a l social fact w h i c h i n s t i t u t e d a social relation between individuals or groups and had religious, legal,

44


m o r a l , e c o n o m i c , and aesthetic s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t was, f u r t h e r m o r e , a b i n d i n g social r e l a t i o n w h i c h h a d the n a t u r e o f a c o n t r a c t b y v i r t u e o f the o b l i g a t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e o n the p a r t o f the r e c i p i e n t . Thus Mauss saw i n the r e l a t i o n o f g i f t exchange the o r i g i n o f the social c o n t r a c t and s o the f o u n d a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l and society. T h o u g h h e made n o c l a i m t o u n i v e r s a l i t y f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n , as Lévi-Strauss was to d o , Mauss' c o n c l u s i o n c o u l d be that o f L é v i - S t r a u s s too: ' I t is by opposing reason to e m o t i o n . . . that people succeed in substituting alliance, gift and commerce for war, isolation and stagnation. . . . Societies have progressed in the measure in w h i c h they have been able to stabilize their contracts to give, receive and repay'. 19

A c c o r d i n g t o L é v i - S t r a u s s , Mauss made a serious e r r o r , w h i c h has its o r i g i n in his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m . Lévi-Strauss argues t h a t Mauss isolates the g i f t - g i v i n g r e l a t i o n f r o m the system i n w h i c h it is inserted. Mauss b e l i e v e d t h a t the g i v i n g of a g i f t instituted a system of r e c i p r o c i t y , r a t h e r t h a n seeing it as b e i n g inserted in such a system. H e c o u l d n o t see b e y o n d the c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y o f the r e l a t i o n t o the system w h i c h lay b e h i n d . T h i s l e d h i m t o see the o b l i g a t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e as b e i n g s o m e t h i n g i n h e r e n t in the g i f t , f a i l i n g to see t h a t the idea o f exchange precedes t h e i n i t i a l g i v i n g o f the g i f t . T h e g i f t is g i v e n in order to secure an exchange, exchange is n o t t h e result of the t h w a r t e d a t t e m p t t o g i v e . T h u s Mauss e x p l a i n e d exchange i n u l t i m a t e l y i r r a t i o n a l terms, the g i v i n g o f the g i f t setting u p a p s y c h o l o g i c a l tension w h i c h c o u l d o n l y b e resolved i n a n exchange. T h i s t h e o r y was unacceptable t o Lévi-Strauss, seeking as he was a ' s u p e r - r a t i o n a l i s m ' . Lévi-Strauss' o w n t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , was s t i l l i n t h e course o f d e v e l o p m e n t . L é v i - S t r a u s s w a s , nevertheless, c o n v i n c e d o f the c e n t r a l i t y o f the i n s t i t u t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y . H i s t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r e c i a t i o n was e n dorsed b y his o w n experience. W h i l e l i v i n g w i t h the N a m b i k w a r a h e e x p e r i e n c e d a n e n c o u n t e r b e t w e e n t w o bands. T h e m e e t i n g was a c c o m p a n i e d b y a n elaborate r i t u a l o f exchange w h i c h lasted f o r a n u m b e r o f days and w h i c h served t o r e c o n c i l e the i n i t i a l l y h o s t i l e bands to one another. These exchanges w e r e n o t p u r e l y s y m b o l i c f o r , as Lévi-Strauss tells us in some d e t a i l , the bands depend o n this sort o f c o n t a c t f o r i m p o r t a n t goods. T h i s m e e t i n g i s described in Tristes Tropiques, and r e f e r r e d to in m a n y o t h e r w o r k s . This

incident

provided

the

material

for

one

of

Lévi-Strauss'

first

The

Origins

of Structuralism

45

t h e o r e t i c a l a r t i c l e s . In this a r t i c l e Lévi-Strauss a r g u e d t h a t there is a n essential c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n w a r and trade, w h i c h are n o t ' t w o types o f c o e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r t w o opposed and i n d i s soluble aspects of one and the same social process'. T h e groups w h i c h meet b o t h fear and need one another. W h e n t h e y m e e t a n elaborate r i t u a l i s necessary, i n v o l v i n g s y m b o l i c c o n f l i c t , i n o r d e r to dissipate the fears and m a k e t r a d e possible. T h i s t r a d e m a y even go so far as an exchange of w o m e n b e t w e e n the g r o u p s , so that the two groups c o m e to be p e r m a n e n t l y r e l a t e d by m a r r i a g e . LéviStrauss concludes the a r t i c l e i n t h o r o u g h l y M a u s s i a n terms: ' W a r , c o m m e r c e , the system o f k i n s h i p and the social s t r u c t u r e must thus b e studied i n i n t i m a t e c o r r e l a t i o n ' . 2 0

I n another a r t i c l e L é v i - S t r a u s s a r g u e d that r e c i p r o c i t y underlies dual o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h e r e the s o c i e t y i s o r g a n i z e d i n t o t w o moieties, even w h e r e there are r e l a t i o n s o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n , f o r ' s u b o r d i n a t i o n i t s e l f i s r e c i p r o c a l : the p r i o r i t y w h i c h i s gained b y one m o i e t y at one l e v e l is lost to the opposite m o i e t y on the other'. 21

T h i s idea w a s d e v e l o p e d as the basis of an e x c h a n g e t h e o r y of p o w e r , f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1944 i n the f o r m o f a n analysis o f chieftainship i n N a m b i k w a r a s o c i e t y , and, b y e x t e n s i o n , i n o t h e r p r i m i t i v e societies. W h e n r e p r i n t e d in 1947 it appeared as a general theory o f p o w e r , w i t h the t e r m ' c h i e f t a i n s h i p ' r e p l a c e d b y the t e r m ' p o w e r ' t h r o u g h o u t . M u c h o f this a r t i c l e reappears i n Tristes Tropiques. 22

T h e t h e o r y o f p o w e r is, essentially, a f u n c t i o n a l i s t t h e o r y . H o w e v e r , L é v i - S t r a u s s again objects t o that sort o f f u n c t i o n a l analysis w h i c h imposes a f u n c t i o n o n a n i n s t i t u t i o n instead o f d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t f u n c t i o n w i t h i n i t . T h e f u n c t i o n c a n 'be reached o n l y t h r o u g h analysis o f the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n ' ( a t y p i c a l l y Gestaltist f o r m u l a t i o n o f the concept o f f u n c t i o n ) . T h e reason for l o o k i n g a t p o w e r i n N a m b i k w a r a s o c i e t y i s that 'precisely o n a c c o u n t o f its e x t r e m e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t , N a m b i k w a r a p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e lays bare some basic f u n c t i o n s w h i c h m a y r e m a i n h i d d e n i n m o r e c o m p l e x and e l a b o r a t e systems o f g o v e r n m e n t ' . T h i s , o f course, i s t o take i t f o r g r a n t e d that the ' f u n c t i o n is a l w a y s and e v e r y w h e r e the same, and can be b e t t e r studied, and m o r e f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d w h e r e i t exists u n d e r a simple f o r m ' . T h i s i d e n t i t y o f f u n c t i o n i s f o u n d e d i n the i d e n t i t y o f the human m i n d .

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T h e g r o u p needs a leader to o r g a n i z e t h e i r t r a v e l s , to decide on e x p e d i t i o n s , t o deal w i t h n e i g h b o u r i n g bands, t o supervise the gardens. B u t the leader does n o t e m e r g e as a d i r e c t response to this need o f the g r o u p , the leader i s n o t m o u l d e d b y the g r o u p . T h e g r o u p , r a t h e r , is m o u l d e d by the leader and takes its character f r o m h i m . I f t h e leader is i n a d e q u a t e the g r o u p w i l l disperse and f i n d n e w leaders. T h e r e i s n o c o l l e c t i v e conscience t o m o u l d the individual. A l t h o u g h t h e r e is a f u n c t i o n a l need f o r a leader, this need does n o t m a k e i t s e l f f e l t d i r e c t l y . C h i e f s do n o t arise because they are needed, t h e y arise 'because there are, in any h u m a n g r o u p , m e n w h o . . . enjoy prestige f o r its o w n sake, feel a s t r o n g appeal to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , a n d t o w h o m the b u r d e n o f p u b l i c affairs brings its o w n r e w a r d . These i n d i v i d u a l differences are . . . p a r t of those p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a w materials o u t o f w h i c h any g i v e n c u l t u r e i s m a d e . ' T h e r e i s a f u n c t i o n , b u t the f u l f i l m e n t o f this f u n c t i o n must b e e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f i n d i v i d u a l , n o t c o l l e c t i v e , p s y c h o l o g y . T h e contrast w i t h D u r k h e i m seems clear and d e l i b e r a t e . T h e r e l a t i o n o f p o w e r i s a r e l a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y . I n exchange f o r the b u r d e n o f his office the N a m b i k w a r a c h i e f i s p r o v i d e d b y the g r o u p w i t h a n u m b e r o f w i v e s . P o l y g a m y i s ' t h e m o r a l and s e n t i m e n t a l r e w a r d f o r his h e a v y duties'. B u t o n t o p o f this real exchange of valuables, there is a s y m b o l i c exchange: 'Consent . . . is at the same time the o r i g i n and the l i m i t o f leadership. . . . Consent is the psychological basis of leadership, but in daily life it expresses itself i n , and is measured by a game of give-and-take played by the c h i e f and his followers, and w h i c h brings f o r t h , as a basic attribute of leadership, the n o t i o n of reciprocity.' 23

T h i s t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y w a s c l e a r l y i n f o r m e d n o t o n l y b y his e x p e r i e n c e a m o n g the N a m b i k w a r a , b u t also i n the U n i t e d States. L é v i - S t r a u s s w a s struck b y the d e m o c r a t i c c h a r a c t e r o f U n i t e d States society, t h a t c o n t r a s t e d s h a r p l y w i t h the society h e h a d l e f t b e h i n d . For L é v i - S t r a u s s i t was the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y that w a s the k e y t o the l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y o f the U n i t e d States. T h i s idea i s d e v e l o p e d i n a n a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1944 i n w h i c h L é v i Strauss r e p o r t e d back t o the r e c e n t l y - l i b e r a t e d F r e n c h o n the v i r t u e s o f t h e i r n e w masters. I n this a r t i c l e L é v i - S t r a u s s makes i t clear t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s not o n l y o f use t o a n understanding of'primitive' societies, but it is also the key for the 24

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r e f o r m o f o u r o w n society, the m o d e l o f w h i c h i s the U n i t e d States. I n the U n i t e d States, argues L é v i - S t r a u s s , the p r o b l e m o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e is s o l v e d t h r o u g h the establishment o f a r e l a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y b e t w e e n 'mass' and ' e l i t e ' w h i c h contrasts m a r k e d l y w i t h the r e l a t i o n o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l and society t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d his o w n society. T h i s m o m e n t o f heady o p t i m i s m d i d n o t last l o n g a s a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n nationalism soon prospered o n b o t h sides o f the A t l a n t i c . In these e a r l y articles we can see a t h e o r y d e v e l o p i n g . LéviStrauss is n o t t u r n i n g his b a c k on f u n c t i o n a l analysis of a Durkheimian kind. Trade, co-operation, leadership are all required if society is to be able to satisfy the material needs of its members. These societal functions are a l l f u l f i l l e d b y d i f f e r e n t m o d a l i t i e s o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n , the f u n d a m e n t a l social r e l a t i o n , o f r e c i p r o c i t y . B u t the argument so far is incomplete. For Lévi-Strauss the functional argument cannot stand on its own. Society exists not, as Durkheim m i g h t have a r g u e d , because i t creates its o w n c o n d i t i o n s o f existence, b u t because these are p a r t o f the ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a w materials o u t o f w h i c h any g i v e n c u l t u r e i s m a d e ' . T h e f u n c t i o n a l analysis must b e r o o t e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y . 25

A l t h o u g h t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f the analysis i s the m a t e r i a l needs o f the society, the r e c i p r o c i t y w h i c h emerges does n o t take the f o r m o f a u t i l i t a r i a n c o n t r a c t , f o r the p s y c h o l o g i c a l roots o f r e c i p r o c i t y g i v e the r e l a t i o n a s y m b o l i c d i m e n s i o n . H e n c e the r e l a t i o n of r e c i p r o c i t y is a t o t a l social fact, encompassing b o t h m a t e r i a l and s y m b o l i c i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e members o f society, and r o o t e d , in the last analysis, in the unconscious m i n d . T a k e n i n d i v i d u a l l y these e a r l y articles t r e a t o f d i f f e r e n t institutions a s expressions o f a c o m m o n p r i n c i p l e , the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . W h e n w e take the articles t o g e t h e r , h o w e v e r , i t seems clear t h a t Lévi-Strauss does n o t see r e c i p r o c i t y as one p r i n c i p l e a m o n g others, b u t r a t h e r as the k e y to society, as its c o n d i t i o n o f existence. I t i s the r e l a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y w h i c h integrates the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o society, w h i c h makes the h u m a n a social a n i m a l . I n seeking the p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r i g i n s o f p a r t i c u l a r expressions o f r e c i p r o c i t y L é v i - S t r a u s s i s seeking those p r o p e r t i e s o f the m i n d w h i c h make society possible and w h i c h define humans a s social beings. I t i s the n a t u r e o f the m i n d w h i c h lies a t the r o o t o f r e c i p r o c i t y , a n d n o t a n o b l i g a t i o n imposed f r o m w i t h o u t . T h e conditions of possibility of reciprocity, which are the conditions of

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existence o f society itself, take the f o r m o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l a prioris. These p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , be e x p l a i n e d g e n e t i c a l l y , as D u r k h e i m sought to e x p l a i n t h e m , as emergent p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h b e l o n g t o s o c i e t y , f o r they are the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f r o m w h i c h s o c i o l o g y must b e g i n . T h i s t h e o r y , o u t l i n e d i n the e a r l y articles, i s m o r e f u l l y d e v e l o p e d in The Elementary Structures of Kinship. As we shall see in the n e x t c h a p t e r , The Elementary Structures is based on a c o n c e p t i o n of r e c i p r o c i t y as a r e l a t i o n a l , or s t r u c t u r a l , p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h is p r i o r t o any i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y and p r i o r t o the elements w h i c h are r e l a t e d b y r e c i p r o c i t y . R e c i p r o c i t y e x e m p l i f i e s the i m m a n e n c e of relation, for it is f r o m the b e g i n n i n g a r e l a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e . T h i s r e l a t i o n i s p r i o r t o the concrete m a t e r i a l o n w h i c h it is imposed a n d so its i m m a n e n c e is founded in the m i n d w h i c h imposes i t . T h u s the n o t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y , for L é v i - S t r a u s s , makes it possible to e x p l a i n the social r e l a t i o n , and m o r e g e n e r a l l y the social s t r u c t u r e , by reference, n o t to a c o l l e c t i v e conscience, b u t to the i n d i v i d u a l unconscious.

4

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I n his earliest t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g s L é v i - S t r a u s s used the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y , d e r i v e d f r o m Mauss, t o e x p l a i n a series o f social i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h had a p p a r e n t l y diverse o r i g i n s , diverse social functions and diverse i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f rec i p r o c i t y p l a y e d a dual r o l e in these e a r l y articles. As a p r i n c i p l e of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y p r o v i d e d a w a y o f e x p l a i n i n g these d i f f e r e n t social i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o u t h a v i n g recourse t o s o c i o l o g i c a l o r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e d u c t i o n i s m . W e have seen the p r o b l e m s o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n i s m : b y m a k i n g the s t r u c t u r a l f r a m e w o r k o f society s t r i c t l y p r i o r t o the existence o f social i n d i v i d u a l s i t i s unable t o e x p l a i n the o r i g i n s and d e v e l o p m e n t o f this s t r u c t u r e i n the a c t i v i t y o f h u m a n beings. T h e s t r u c t u r e is thus a s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y . T h i s is w h y s o c i o l o g i s m i s s o o f t e n associated w i t h e v o l u t i o n i s m : since i t cannot e x p l a i n the o r i g i n s o f the social s t r u c t u r e b y reference t o the a c t i v i t y o f h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s , i t explains the e x i s t i n g social s t r u c t u r e i n t e r m s o f p r e v i o u s states o f the social s t r u c t u r e i n a n infinite historical regression, so arranging all societies in an

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e v o l u t i o n a r y series t h a t is i n v e n t e d in o r d e r to c o n c e a l the gaps in the t h e o r y . Because this e v o l u t i o n a r y series u n f o l d s w i t h o u t any human i n t e r v e n t i o n its d e v e l o p m e n t w i l l supposedly be g o v e r n e d b y universal h i s t o r i c a l l a w s o f succession. T h i s k i n d o f h i s t o r i c i s t e x p l a n a t i o n t h e r e f o r e replaces the spatial d i v e r s i t y o f societies b y a t e m p o r a l succession i n w h i c h the s i m p l e r societies are m e r e l y a n t e r i o r f o r m s o f the m o r e c o m p l e x . For L é v i - S t r a u s s the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y o v e r c o m e s these problems, w i t h t h e i r u n f o r t u n a t e i d e o l o g i c a l consequences, b e c a u s e i t i s l o c a t e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d . B u t the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y also avoids the dangers o f p s y c h o l o g i s m . T h e p r o b l e m w i t h a p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n i s m is t h a t it is u n a b l e to recognize that social i n s t i t u t i o n s have o b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s that are l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o the a c t i v i t i e s o f i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l subjects: f o r e x a m p l e , the e x c h a n g e of goods takes place w i t h i n a s o c i a l f r a m e w o r k that i s p r i o r t o the i n d i v i d u a l act o f exchange. just as e v o l u t i o n i s m reduces the d i v e r s i t y of s o c i a l f o r m s by assimilating t h e m to a single h i s t o r i c a l sequence, so p s y c h o l o g i s m reduces t h a t d i v e r s i t y by e x p l a i n i n g a l l societies as expressions of the same p s y c h o l o g y . A l r e a d y i n 1945, i n a n a r t i c l e d e v o t e d t o t h e w o r k o f W e s t e r m a r c k , Lévi-Strauss h a d d i s t i n g u i s h e d a p s y c h o l o g i c a l reductionism, w h i c h he roundly condemned, f r o m a concern w i t h ' p e r m a n e n t h u m a n i t y ' , the b e l i e f i n a ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l constant' w h i c h i s ' b o t h the f o u n d a t i o n a n d the great o r i g i n a l i t y o f the w o r k of W e s t e r m a r c k ' . T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l constant is t h a t capacity w h i c h makes u s h u m a n , and s o w h i c h w e a l l have i n c o m m o n . O n this basis h u m a n i t y has b u i l t a d i v e r s i t y of i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h is i r r e d u c i b l e , w h e t h e r by a c r u d e p s y c h o l o g i s m or by a crude f u n c t i o n a l i s m . I n r e c o g n i z i n g the d i v e r s i t y o f h u m a n societies, therefore, Lévi-Strauss insists t h a t he f u l l y recognizes the a u t o n o m y o f society. T h e social and the p s y c h o l o g i c a l are, f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , inseparable. T h e i n d i v i d u a l can o n l y exist i n society, b u t society o n l y has any e f f e c t i v e r e a l i t y i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l psyche. 2 6

T h e f o u n d a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i n the generic unconscious enables Lévi-Strauss to steer a m i d d l e course that avoids the dangers o f b o t h p s y c h o l o g i s m and s o c i o l o g i s m i n r e c o g n i z i n g the p s y c h o l o g i c a l , b u t o b j e c t i v e , f o u n d a t i o n o f social institutions. This in turn means that Lévi-Strauss does not have to

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i n t r o d u c e g r a t u i t o u s e v o l u t i o n a r y hypotheses t o a c c o u n t f o r the o r i g i n s o f social structures. I n t e r m s o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t c o n f r o n t e d L é v i Strauss the e a r l y articles, t a k e n together, s h o w us that the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y had m u c h m o r e t h a n a t e c h n i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l significance f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y was a p r i n c i p l e t h a t p r o v i d e d the k e y to the h i d d e n , unconscious, and o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f a range o f social i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t was a p r i n c i p l e t h a t made possible an o r d e r l y and h a r m o n i o u s social existence b y r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s a t a l l levels o f s o c i e t y . I t was, m o r e o v e r , a p r i n c i p l e t h a t w a s conspicuously l a c k i n g i n L é v i Strauss' n a t a l society, a p r i n c i p l e w h o s e absence w a s the source of the c o n f l i c t a n d i n t o l e r a n c e e n d e m i c i n that s o c i e t y . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y p r o v i d e s the t r u e m e a n i n g o f a l l social i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t i s the i d e a l against w h i c h a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s should be measured, b u t it is a m e a n i n g t h a t is n o t necessarily consciously e x p e r i e n c e d b y the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n those i n s t i t u t i o n s , n o r one t h a t i s i m m e d i a t e l y apparent t o the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w h o study t h e m . It is an o b j e c t i v e a n d unconscious m e a n i n g t h a t can o n l y b e f o u n d i f w e l o o k b e h i n d the subjective a n d apparent m e a n i n g . T h e t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s therefore also a t h e o r y o f the o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f social i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t i s a c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y t h a t l o o k s b e h i n d appearances t o f i n d a t r u e r r e a l i t y . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y ties together L é v i - S t r a u s s ' fundam e n t a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l concerns a n d his p a r t i c u l a r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l studies. In b o t h cases he is seeking to show t h a t the f o u n d a t i o n of society, o r a t least o f a n o r d e r l y and h a r m o n i o u s society i n w h i c h h u m a n beings can be t r u e to t h e i r o w n n a t u r e , is to be f o u n d in the unconscious p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y t h a t gives t o social existence its t r u l y h u m a n m e a n i n g . It is this d u a l c o n c e r n that m o t i v a t e s The Elementary Structures of Kinship, f o r it is k i n s h i p t h a t p r o v i d e s the basic p r i n c i p l e s of social o r g a n i z a t i o n i n so-called ' p r i m i t i v e ' , n o n - l i t e r a t e , o r classless societies. The Elementary Structures represents the r e a l i z a t i o n of the a m b i t i o n of the theory of r e c i p r o c i t y to provide a general theory o f society. W h e r e a s i n the e a r l i e r articles L é v i - S t r a u s s i n t r o d u c e d the p r i n c i p l e t o e x p l a i n p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r societies, in The Elementary Structures he develops the p r i n c i p l e i n t o a t h e o r y o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f s o c i e t y itself: r e c i p r o c i t y i s n o t s i m p l y at the foundation of a particular institution, the institution of the

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kinship system, r e c i p r o c i t y i s the v e r y c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f s o c i e t y , the c o n d i t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h society c o u l d n o t exist, the c o n d i t i o n w h o s e emergence m a r k s the emergence o f society o u t o f nature. The Elementary Structures of Kinship is a w o r k that can be read on a number of d i f f e r e n t levels. S u p e r f i c i a l l y it is a t e c h n i c a l a n t h r o pological study o f the k i n s h i p systems o f a range o f n o n - l i t e r a t e societies, s p e c i f i c a l l y o f those societies t h a t r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e positively, t h r o u g h a r u l e t h a t tells members o f the society w h i c h categories o f people they must m a r r y (as opposed t o societies l i k e o u r o w n that r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e n e g a t i v e l y b y p r o s c r i b i n g m a r r i a g e w i t h c e r t a i n categories o f people, such a s near k i n ) . T h e p r i n c i p l e of r e c i p r o c i t y is the basis of this study since Lévi-Strauss' argument i s t h a t the w h o l e c o m p l e x o f i n s t i t u t i o n s o f k i n s h i p and marriage can be e x p l a i n e d as a f u n c t i o n a l apparatus designed (unconsciously) to regulate m a r r i a g e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y as an exchange o f w o m e n b e t w e e n social groups. H o w e v e r , the exchange o f w o m e n i s n o t , f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , simply one exchange a m o n g others, and the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f k i n s h i p a r e not s i m p l y one set o f i n s t i t u t i o n s a m o n g others. T h e exchange o f w o m e n i s the most f u n d a m e n t a l expression o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y w i t h o u t w h i c h society i s impossible. T h u s the m o t i v a t i o n f o r the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p i s n o t s i m p l y a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l , lor the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y , u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e o f systems o f kinship, i s also, and m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y , the c o n d i t i o n o f possibility o f society. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s u n i v e r s a l , that u n i v e r s a l i t y b e i n g i n d i c a t e d b y the supposed u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the incest p r o h i b i t i o n that marks the d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n nature and c u l t u r e . T h i s u n i v e r s a l i t y i s a n expression o f the u n i v e r s a l f u n c t i o n that r e c i p r o c i t y f u l f i l s . H e n c e the study of k i n s h i p phenomena is the means t o discover s c i e n t i f i c a l l y the f o u n d a t i o n o f h u m a n society and the t r u e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n social existence.

N O T E S 1 TT, p. 58. 2 TT, p. 47; 1971n, p. 46; T. C l a r k Prophets and Patrons, H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, p. 233. 3 TT, p. 59.

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4 TT, p. 59. 5 S. de Beauvoir, 'Les structures v o l . 49, 1949, p. 943. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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élémentaires

de la p a r e n t é ' , Temps Modernes,

1974c, p. 26. 1973a, p. 35; 1966e, p. 33. M. M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Signs, N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964, p. 115. I. K a n t , The Moral Law ( H . J. Paton trans.), Hutchinson, L o n d o n , 1948, p. 79. FS, pp. 529 - 30. 1970b, p. 6 1 . FS, p. 228. SA, p. 65. 1943c, p. 178. FS, p. 528. 1943a; 1943b; 1944a; 1944b; 1944c; 1946c was w r i t t e n in 1944. SA, pp. 248, 258. 1M, p. x x x v . M. Mauss, The Gift, Cohen and W e s t , London, 1966, p. 80. 1943a, pp. 1 3 8 - 9 . 1944c, pp. 2 6 7 - 8 . 1944b; 1947a; TT, Chapter 29. 1944b, pp. 2 8 - 9 . 1946c. 1944b, p. 31. 1945a, pp. 96, 98.

IV. The Elementary Structures of Kinship The Elementary Structures of Kinship m a r k s the f u l l d e v e l o p m e n t of L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y and the p o i n t o f t r a n s i t i o n t o his s p e c i f i c a l l y ' s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e and society. T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l , m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , and t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of The Elementary Structures are n o t b r o u g h t out e x p l i c i t l y i n t h a t w o r k , b u t i t i s nevertheless the insights t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s b e l i e v e d that h e h a d achieved i n the s t u d y o f k i n s h i p that are the f o u n d a t i o n of his s t r u c t u r a l i s m and of those that he has inspired. The Elementary Structures therefore m e r i t s o u r close attention. Lévi-Strauss' s t r u c t u r a l i s m is a p h i l o s o p h y , a t h e o r y and a m e t h o d t h a t offers i t s e l f to the h u m a n sciences n o t o n l y on the basis of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c l a i m to have achieved a p r i v i l e g e d insight i n t o the n a t u r e o f h u m a n i t y , b u t m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y o n the basis o f its scientific achievements. I n o r d e r t o evaluate L é v i - S t r a u s s ' struct u r a l i s m i t is, t h e r e f o r e , necessary t o c o m e t o g r i p s w i t h the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l investigations t h a t i t has i n s p i r e d , m o s t n o t a b l y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' v e r y d e t a i l e d e x p l o r a t i o n s o f k i n s h i p systems and o f the m y t h o l o g y o f n o n - l i t e r a t e peoples. T h e study o f k i n s h i p , a s o f m y t h , i s a v e r y specialized f i e l d and many o f the issues raised b y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k are v e r y t e c h n i c a l , often h a n g i n g o n the precise i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a m b i g u o u s e t h n o graphic data. In a b o o k such as this it w o u l d be t r y i n g the reader's patience to e n t e r i n t o these t e c h n i c a l i t i e s , and y e t Lévi-Strauss constantly insists t h a t his theories be subjected to o n l y one test: the test of the evidence. F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the reader it is possible to outline an evaluation of Lévi-Strauss' theory of kinship w i t h o u t c o n f r o n t i n g t h e e t h n o g r a p h i c data. O n the one h a n d , a naive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y i s s o p a t e n t l y and u n a m b i g u o u s l y f a l s i f i e d by the e t h n o g r a p h i c data t h a t it is unnecessary t o consider the l a t t e r i n d e t a i l . O n the o t h e r h a n d , i n o r d e r t o reconcile his t h e o r y w i t h data t h a t appears t o c o n t r a d i c t i t L é v i 53

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Strauss i n t r o d u c e s a series of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l devices t h a t d e p r i v e the t h e o r y o f any substantive c o n t e n t , and s o make it s t r i c t l y unfalsifiable. In a r g u i n g t h a t Lévi-Strauss' analyses are u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because t h e y are unfalsifiable I d o n o t w a n t t o i d e n t i f y m y s e l f w i t h the P o p p e r i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f science, a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a t h e o r y i s o n l y a l l o w e d t o c l a i m s c i e n t i f i c status i f i t i s able t o generate e m p i r i c a l p r e d i c t i o n s that can b e falsified e x p e r i m e n t a l l y . T h i s p h i l o s o p h y has been w i d e l y c r i t i c i z e d o n a n u m b e r o f grounds. F i r s t l y , o n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d s t h a t i t i s n o t possible t o define in any absolute sense e i t h e r w h a t is an e m p i r i c a l p r e d i c t i o n or w h a t c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e the f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f such a p r e d i c t i o n . Secondly, o n the m o r e p r a g m a t i c grounds t h a t i t imposes u n d u l y r e s t r i c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o n the k i n d s o f t h e o r y t h a t i t w i l l p e r m i t . In c o n d e m n i n g Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y as u n f a l s i f i a b l e I use the t e r m m u c h m o r e loosely t h a n does Popper, b o t h i n the c r i t e r i a f o r f a l s i f i a b i l i t y and i n the r i g i d i t y w i t h w h i c h they are applied. I d o n o t b e l i e v e it is necessary to espouse a P o p p e r i a n p r e s c r i p t i v e p o s i t i v i s m to believe t h a t a t h e o r y t h a t has s c i e n t i f i c pretensions must e i t h e r have some e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t o r have a n i n t u i t i v e appeal t h a t m i g h t lead u s t o e x p e c t t h a t i t can u l t i m a t e l y b e g i v e n some e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t . In this chapter I shall argue t h a t LéviStrauss' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p has n o s i g n i f i c a n t e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t , and, m o r e o v e r , is c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e so t h a t there is no reason to believe t h a t i t c o u l d ever b e g i v e n any c o n t e n t . I f a t h e o r y i s t o have any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t i t must t e l l u s s o m e t h i n g about the w o r l d . I n t e l l i n g u s w h a t the w o r l d i s l i k e t h r t h e o r y m u s t also t e l l us w h a t the w o r l d is n o t l i k e , and so to have any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t the t h e o r y m u s t b e inconsistent w i t h a t least some states o f the w o r l d , i n o t h e r w o r d s i t m u s t b e falsifiable, a t least i n p r i n c i p l e . L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p i s n o t falsifiable because i t i s consistent w i t h any possible set o f data. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' theories d o n o t t e l l u s a n y t h i n g a b o u t the f o r m o r the o p e r a t i o n o f the k i n s h i p systems that w e can f i n d i n a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g societies, w h a t t h e y do is to reduce these systems to abstract m o d e l s that are supposedly l o c a t e d i n the unconscious and supposedly u n d e r l i e and g i v e m e a n i n g t o the systems t h a t are observed o n the g r o u n d . T h u s his theories t e l l us n o t about the w o r l d , b u t a b o u t the meanings i m p o s e d o n t h e w o r l d b y a n unconscious. There

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t h e concept o f the unconscious. T h e r e i s n o d o u b t t h a t a t h e o r y o f the unconscious can b e g i v e n s i g n i f i c a n t e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t either i f the unconscious provides a l i n k b e t w e e n an ascertainable past and the present so t h a t t y p i c a l unconscious f o r m a t i o n s t h a t u n d e r l i e c o n t e m p o r a r y f o r m s o f b e h a v i o u r are associated w i t h t y p i c a l past experiences, o r i f t h a t w h i c h i s a t one m o m e n t unconscious can, t h r o u g h analysis, become conscious so t h a t the unconscious is m e r e l y a s u b m e r g e d consciousness. A l t h o u g h the p r a c t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n o f p s y c h o a n a l y t i c theories poses e n o r m o u s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l and c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s , there is n o d o u b t t h a t w h e n p r o p e r l y f o r m u l a t e d such theories d o have e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t because t h e y p r o v i d e d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t access t o the unconscious. H o w e v e r Lévi-Strauss' use of the c o n c e p t does not p r o v i d e f o r this p o s s i b i l i t y . O n the one h a n d , the unconscious i s p r e f o r m e d and s o cannot b e r e l a t e d t o any e x p e r i e n t i a l past. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the meanings t h a t Lévi-Strauss a t t r i b u t e s to the unconscious d o n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h , and i n some cases f l a t l y c o n t r a d i c t , the conscious meanings t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t r i b u t e t o their systems o f k i n s h i p . For Lévi-Strauss the unconscious has a n e u r o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n , i t i s the c o n c e p t that mediates b e t w e e n m i n d and m a t t e r ( w h i c h i s w h y i t can p e r f o r m a l l its C a r t e s i a n t r i c k s ) , b u t since the p r a c t i c a l and c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l substratum o f t h o u g h t are, t o say the least, i m m e n s e , even reference t o n e u r o l o g y c a n n o t r e a l i s t i c a l l y b e e x p e c t e d t o p r o v i d e the t h e o r y w i t h any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t . T h u s t h e r e i s n o evidence, and no possible evidence, t h a t w o u l d l e a d us to b e l i e v e that LéviStrauss' t h e o r y has in fact u n c o v e r e d an o b j e c t i v e unconscious meaning. A t h e o r y t h a t is w i t h o u t e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t , or e v e n one t h a t is s y s t e m a t i c a l l y f a l s i f i e d , i s n o t necessarily w i t h o u t s c i e n t i f i c v a l u e . I t m a y b e t h a t the t h e o r y can b e m o d i f i e d and d e v e l o p e d i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a m u c h m o r e f r u i t f u l account. A l t h o u g h L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p i s c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e , i n the sense t h a t i t claims that the t r u e m e a n i n g o f systems o f k i n s h i p i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the m e a n i n g such systems have f o r t h e i r p a r t i c i p a n t s , it m a y be that his t h e o r y c o u l d be d e v e l o p e d to p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t analysis o f a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f k i n s h i p systems t h a t does n o t i n v o l v e g r a t u i t o u s reference to an inaccessible unconscious, b u t r a t h e r t h a t finds the ' o b j e c t i v e ' m e a n i n g o f k i n s h i p systems i m m a n e n t i n the

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systems themselves. T h i s i s the d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k has been developed b y a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r a l i s m . I t is, h o w e v e r , a d e v e l o p m e n t that has p r o v e d no m o r e f r u i t f u l than has L é v i - S t r a u s s ' o w n theory. I n this chapter I i n t e n d t o e x a m i n e L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p before m o v i n g o n i n the n e x t chapter t o consider the later developments inspired b y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k . 1 .

T H E G E N E R A L T H E O R Y O F R E C I P R O C I T Y

a) The general theory of reciprocity and the prohibition of incest The Elementary Structures of Kinship offers us t w o d i f f e r e n t theories w h i c h , a l t h o u g h related, can b e distinguished f r o m one another. T h e general theory of reciprocity seeks to establish t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of r e c i p r o c i t y i s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society a n d s o must have a u n i v e r s a l , and unconscious, p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r i g i n . T h e theory of kinship seeks t o show t h a t a range o f i n s t i t u t i o n s o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e express this p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y a n d so, a t least i n n o n l i t e r a t e societies, p r o v i d e the f r a m e w o r k o f society. I n this part o f the chapter I shall l o o k at the general t h e o r y of r e c i p r o c i t y before m o v i n g o n t o t h e t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p i n the n e x t p a r t . I n o r d e r t o establish the status o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y L é v i Strauss has to establish empirically that r e c i p r o c i t y is indeed u n i v e r s a l , and he has to establish theoretically t h a t no society c o u l d exist w i t h o u t r e c i p r o c i t y . L é v i - S t r a u s s tries t o establish the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f r e c i p r o c i t y b y r e l a t i n g i t t o the supposed u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest. L é v i - S t r a u s s t h e n proceeds t o t r y t o establish the necessity o f r e c i p r o c i t y b y r e f e r r i n g i n i t i a l l y t o the s o c i o l o g i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t that society regulate the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f scarce resources, and l a t e r by r e f e r r i n g to the p s y c h o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n of s y m b o l i c exchange as a w a y of r e s p o n d i n g to a p s y c h o l o g i c a l need for s e c u r i t y . I t i s f r o m the l a t t e r a r g u m e n t about the p s y c h o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s proceeds t o establish his t h e o r y o f the unconscious a s c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , and s o o f society. L é v i - S t r a u s s attempts t o establish the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f r e c i p r o c i t y b y r e l a t i n g i t t o the supposedly u n i v e r s a l incest p r o h i b i t i o n that marks the d i v i d i n g l i n e b e t w e e n nature a n d c u l t u r e . T h i s argument is of some significance because it provides a close link

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b a c k w a r d s to F r e u d , whose Totem and Taboo u n d o u b t e d l y i n s p i r e d t h e a r g u m e n t , and a l i n k f o r w a r d s t o L a c a n , w h o r e i n t e g r a t e d L é v i - S t r a u s s ' v e r s i o n o f the t h e o r y i n t o psychoanalysis. For L é v i Strauss the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest i s the ' f u n d a m e n t a l step because o f w h i c h , b y w h i c h , but above a l l i n w h i c h , the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m nature to c u l t u r e is a c c o m p l i s h e d ' . 1

L é v i - S t r a u s s c r i t i c i z e s e x i s t i n g theories o f the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o a c c o u n t f o r this d u a l c h a r a c t e r o f the p r o h i b i t i o n . It is neither purely natural, nor purely cultural, nor a b i t o f n a t u r e and a b i t o f c u l t u r e , i t i s the p o i n t o f t r a n s i t i o n f r o m one to the o t h e r . L é v i - S t r a u s s t h e n i n t r o d u c e s his o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest i s the r u l e w h i c h asserts the p r i m a c y o f c u l t u r e i n sexual matters. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the r u l e i s not w h a t i t jorbids, b u t w h a t it compels: 'The p r o h i b i t i o n on the sexual use of a daughter or a sister compels them to be given in marriage to another man, and at the same time it establishes a right to the daughter or sister of this other man. . . . L i k e exogamy, w h i c h is its widened social application, the prohibition of incest is a rule of reciprocity. . . . The content of the prohibition is not exhausted by the fact of the prohibition: the latter is instituted only in order to guarantee and establish, directly or indirectly, immediately or mediately, an exchange'. 2

S o w e f i n d t h a t the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest i s the o t h e r side o f exchange. I f the w o m a n i s f o r b i d d e n t o her o w n g r o u p , t h e n she must b e o f f e r e d t o a n o t h e r . T h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the incest p r o h i b i t i o n is n o t s i g n i f i c a n t in itself, it is s i g n i f i c a n t as an i n d e x of the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f r e c i p r o c i t y . H o w e v e r the a r g u m e n t is, t o say the least, u n c o n v i n c i n g . I n the f i r s t place, a s m a n y have p o i n t e d o u t , the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest is a r u l e that governs sexual relations w h i l e the r u l e of r e c i p r o c i t y governs m a r r i a g e . A l t h o u g h these rules m a y b e q u i t e closely r e l a t e d t o one a n o t h e r they m a y b e m a r k e d l y d i f f e r e n t i n extension. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a r g u m e n t i s that ' t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest establishes m u t u a l dependency b e t w e e n f a m i l i e s , c o m p e l l i n g t h e m , i n o r d e r t o p e r p e t u a t e themselves, t o g i v e rise t o n e w f a m i l i e s ' , hence a t most the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest imposes f a m i l y e x o g a m y , and it is o n l y in the loosest sense t h a t this i m p l i e s reciprocity. 3

A second a r g u m e n t questions the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of incest. It is true that every society has a set of rules that govern

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sexual r e l a t i o n s , but these rules v a r y e n o r m o u s l y f r o m society t o society, b o t h i n e x t e n s i o n and i n c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , t o the e x t e n t t h a t in some societies incest is a m i s d e m e a n o r b a r e l y w o r t h c o m m e n t i n g o n . W h a t i s u n i v e r s a l , then, i s n o t the c o n t e n t o f the p r o h i b i t i o n b u t r a t h e r the fact t h a t there are rules o f some k i n d r e g u l a t i n g sexual relations b e t w e e n k i n . I n this sense the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest i s n o m o r e u n i v e r s a l than is, f o r e x a m p l e , the r e g u l a t i o n o f table manners. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest i s r e a l l y a r e d h e r r i n g , f o r the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i s i t s e l f u n i v e r s a l , and m a r r i a g e u n i v e r s a l l y relates i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t weakness o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a r g u m e n t i s i n the a t t e m p t t o establish the necessity o f r e c i p r o c i t y o n the basis o f its supposed universality. T h e r e is no reason w h y c u l t u r a l phenomena should n o t b e u n i v e r s a l , hence n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i d e n t i f y i n g the u n i v e r s a l w i t h the n a t u r a l . W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society w i l l be u n i v e r s a l , i t is n o t necessarily the case that a n y t h i n g w h i c h i s b o t h u n i v e r s a l and a p a r t o f c u l t u r e w i l l b e e i t h e r n a t u r a l , o r a c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f s o c i e t y . A n a priori can never b e revealed e m p i r i c a l l y , but o n l y b y means o f t h e o r e t i c a l a r g u m e n t , f o r o n l y t h e o r e t i c a l a r g u m e n t can separate the c o n t i n g e n t l y u n i v e r s a l , t h a t w i t h o u t w h i c h society does n o t e x i s t , f r o m the necessarily u n i v e r s a l , that w i t h o u t w h i c h society cannot e x i s t .

b)

The social function of reciprocity

L é v i - S t r a u s s offers t w o such t h e o r e t i c a l a r g u m e n t s f o r the necessity o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h e f i r s t , s o c i o l o g i c a l , a r g u m e n t i s a hangover f r o m the e a r l i e r analyses o f r e c i p r o c i t y and need n o t d e t a i n us f o r l o n g . It is the a r g u m e n t that r e c i p r o c i t y functions to d i s t r i b u t e resources, and i n p a r t i c u l a r w o m e n , a m o n g social groups. It is an a r g u m e n t t h a t refers, therefore, to r e a l exchanges b e t w e e n c o r p o r a t e groups, and n o t t o s y m b o l i c exchanges alone, and it is an a r g u m e n t that o n l y appears in the first chapters of The Elementary Structures. R e c i p r o c i t y i s r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o o v e r c o m e p r o b l e m s caused b y the i n e q u a l i t y o f d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w o m e n . W o m e n are valuables, needed t o w o r k and t o p r o d u c e v a l u a b l e c h i l d r e n . P r o b l e m s arise because o f ' a deep p o l y g a m o u s tendency, w h i c h exists a m o n g a l l m e n ' . S o c i e t y , t h e r e f o r e , needs t o take i n hand the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f these valuables and not leave the latter to chance or to individual 4

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selfishness. H e n c e r e c i p r o c i t y expresses the s u p r e m a c y o f the g r o u p i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f valuables. T h i s a r g u m e n t is n o t w e l l d e v e l o p e d in The Elementary Structures. A g a i n t h e q u e s t i o n i s t h a t o f t h e universality and necessity o f this f u n c t i o n . Its u n i v e r s a l i t y is c l e a r l y n o t absolute, f o r societies can exist w i t h v e r y u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f w o m e n . M o r e o v e r , r e c i p r o c i t y is n o t , in itself, a distributive m e c h a n i s m at a l l : it is a m e c h a n i s m o f circulation, and c i r c u l a t i o n can o n l y take place once resources have been d i s t r i b u t e d . T h e m a r r i a g e rules w i t h w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s i s c o n c e r n e d i n The Elementary Structures do n o t i n c l u d e any q u a n t i t a t i v e s p e c i f i c a t i o n , they s i m p l y t e l l a m a n w h e r e he should go to find a w i f e . Hence the a p p l i c a t i o n o f these rules w i l l have no effect o n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w o m e n . For e x a m p l e , a m a n w h o has m o r e t h a n his share o f sons w i l l be able t o secure m o r e t h a n his share o f d a u g h t e r s - i n - l a w . I n general, t h e r e f o r e , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w o m e n i s u n a f f e c t e d b y the rules o f m a r r i a g e , a l t h o u g h i t i s possible o n occasion f o r there t o b e r e d i s t r i b u t i v e mechanisms, such as a b r i d e - p r i c e system, added to the r u l e o f m a r r i a g e . I t is, t h e r e f o r e , n o t clear w h a t i s u n i v e r s a l about the r e d i s t r i b u t i v e f u n c t i o n , and n o r d o the rules w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s studies i n fact effect a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . F i n a l l y , a l t h o u g h e v e r y society m u s t have some m e c h a n i s m f o r d i s t r i b u t i n g its p r o d u c t s , the f o r m o f this m e c h a n i s m w i l l v a r y f r o m society t o society. M o r e o v e r , i t i s q u i t e possible t h a t a society w h o s e s u r v i v a l m i g h t o t h e r w i s e be p r e j u d i c e d b y the existence o f inequalities c o u l d d e v e l o p a l t e r n a tive mechanisms t o r e d i s t r i b u t i v e ones w h i c h c o u l d m a i n t a i n social cohesion w i t h o u t a f f e c t i n g i n e q u a l i t y (as has o u r o w n ) . Hence there are n o grounds f o r d e r i v i n g a u n i v e r s a l f u n c t i o n f r o m a need to r e g u l a t e d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the l a t t e r has no substantive universal content.

c)

Towards a psychological theory of reciprocity

In the course of The Elementary Structures the a r g u m e n t changes. It is n o l o n g e r its supposed d i s t r i b u t i v e effects w h i c h makes r e c i p r o c i t y the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society, b u t r a t h e r its s y m b o l i c value. A f t e r the first f e w chapters exchange is seen as an i n s t i t u t i o n w h o s e significance is p u r e l y s y m b o l i c so t h a t by the end o f the b o o k i t has become a system o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n a system of distribution of values. Conflict over distribution has

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been r e p l a c e d by a c o n f l i c t w h i c h has a p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r i g i n a n d so a s y m b o l i c s o l u t i o n . T h e need f o r exchange is i m p l i c i t l y g i v e n an e x c l u s i v e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l and n o t a s o c i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t f o l l o w s the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the m i n d a s the f o u n d a t i o n o f exchange. L é v i - S t r a u s s argued i n i t i a l l y t h a t r e c i p r o c i t y expresses the s u p r e m a c y o f t h e g r o u p i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f valuables. H o w e v e r , the demands o f the g r o u p d o n o t m a k e themselves i m m e d i a t e l y e f f e c t i v e f o r Lévi-Strauss, as t h e y do f o r D u r k h e i m , f o r the g r o u p has n o existence i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s . H e n c e , a l t h o u g h h e i n i t i a l l y gives a s o c i o l o g i c a l answer t o the question o f w h y r e c i p r o c i t y should b e the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society, the fact o f r e c i p r o c i t y m u s t b e e x p l a i n e d b y reference t o the i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y . R e c i p r o c i t y is, t h e r e f o r e , n e i t h e r imposed by an e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y , n o r consciously a d o p t e d , it emerges as a spontaneous response o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o his coexistence w i t h others: ' I f it is objected that such reasoning is too abstract and a r t i f i c i a l to have occurred at a very p r i m i t i v e human level, it is sufficient to note that the result, w h i c h is all that counts, does not suppose any f o r m a l reasoning but simply the spontaneous resolution of those psycho-social pressures w h i c h are the immediate facts of collective l i f e . ' 5

F r o m his v e r y earliest t h e o r e t i c a l articles L é v i - S t r a u s s was searching f o r a satisfactory p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y , and since this is the cornerstone of the e n t i r e t h e o r y , and u l t i m a t e l y of Lévi-Strauss' s t r u c t u r a l i s m as a w h o l e , his t h e o r y c o u l d n o t be regarded as c o m p l e t e u n t i l he h a d a c h i e v e d such an e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m w a s t h a t none o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l theories t h a t w e r e available t o L é v i - S t r a u s s w e r e a t a l l adequate. The Elementary Structures is o f t e n presented as the a p p l i c a t i o n of the theories and methods o f s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s t o systems o f k i n s h i p . G i v e n the i m p a c t w h i c h his d i s c o v e r y o f linguistics subsequently h a d on Lévi-Strauss' t h o u g h t , it is s u r p r i s i n g t h a t there are f e w signs of t h a t i m p a c t in The Elementary Structures. LéviStrauss came i n t o contact w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s t h r o u g h R o m a n J a k o b son, w h o m h e m e t i n N e w Y o r k i n late 1941, and w h o s e lectures h e attended in 1 9 4 2 - 3 . Lévi-Strauss began w r i t i n g The Elementary Structures i n 1943, a l t h o u g h m u c h o f the research h a d already been done by then, and completed it at the beginning of 1947. However

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I t was n o t u n t i l 'about 1944' t h a t h e became c o n v i n c e d o f the s i m i l a r i t y o f 'rules o f m a r r i a g e and descent' a n d 'those p r e v a i l i n g in l i n g u i s t i c s ' . L é v i - S t r a u s s ' first p u b l i s h e d w o r k t o b e t r a y the l i n g u i s t i c i n s p i r a t i o n , an a r t i c l e in Word in 1945 r e p r i n t e d in Structural Anthropology, a n d m u c h - q u o t e d since, e x p l i c i t l y denies that the m e t h o d can be a p p l i e d to t e r m i n o l o g i e s , the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of The Elementary Structures, a p p l y i n g it instead to the system of attitudes, t o w h i c h a p r o j e c t e d t h i r d v o l u m e o f k i n s h i p studies was t o b e devoted. I n a n a r t i c l e o f 1946 o n ' F r e n c h S o c i o l o g y ' linguistics i s s t i l l n o t especially p r i v i l e g e d , ' p h i l o s o p h y , p s y c h o l o g y , h i s t o r y , e t c ' b e i n g p i c k e d o u t a s the c o m p l e m e n t a r y disciplines i n a n appeal f o r s o c i o l o g y t o t u r n t o m o r e concrete studies. 6

In The Elementary Structures t h e significance of l i n g u i s t i c s is o n l y specifically n o t e d i n the c o n c l u d i n g chapter, w h e r e the c o m parison b e t w e e n w o m e n a n d w o r d s i s i n t r o d u c e d . T h e o n l y t h e o r e t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t reference t o l i n g u i s t i c s i n the b u l k o f the book ( p p . 9 3 - 4 ) makes a p o i n t w h i c h has already been i n t r o d u c e d by reference to gestalt p s y c h o l o g y (pp. 8 9 - 9 0 ) . W h a t e v e r the ' t h e o r e t i c a l i n s p i r a t i o n ' o w e d t o Jakobson and a c k n o w l e d g e d i n the Preface, there i s v e r y l i t t l e sign o f the i n f l u e n c e o f linguistics i n The Elementary Structures. T h e o b v i o u s source f o r a p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y that c o u l d e x p l a i n the psychic o r i g i n s o f r e c i p r o c i t y w o u l d b e F r e u d w h o had already p r o v i d e d the t h e o r y in Totem and Taboo. We have already seen t h a t i t was contact w i t h Freud's w o r k that d r e w L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a t t e n t i o n to the unconscious. B u t we have also seen that LéviStrauss w a s l o o k i n g to the unconscious f o r a r a t i o n a l , i n t e l l e c tualist p s y c h o l o g y w i t h w h i c h t o c o m b a t theories that r e l i e d o n the e m o t i o n a l and the i r r a t i o n a l . In this respect Freud's t h e o r y was no b e t t e r t h a n those Lévi-Strauss sought to displace, precisely because it is u l t i m a t e l y i r r a t i o n a l i s t . W e have seen that b o t h D u r k h e i m and B e r g s o n counterposed, each in his o w n w a y , society to the i n d i v i d u a l as the r a t i o n a l to the i r r a t i o n a l , a s i n t e l l e c t t o e m o t i o n , w h i l e L é v i - S t r a u s s sought t o recover reason and i n t e l l e c t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . In this respect Freud, and especially the F r e u d of Totem and Taboo, is v e r y l i k e D u r k h e i m and B e r g s o n . M o r e o v e r Totem and Taboo compounds the felony b y a d d i n g a t h o r o u g h l y m e t a p h y s i c a l ( a n d almost D u r k heimian) evolutionary argument in that for Freud the horror of

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incest t h a t underlies the incest t a b o o and the s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n o e x o g a m y ( m a r r i a g e outside the g r o u p , w h e t h e r f a m i l y , clan, m o i e t y , s e c t i o n or w h a t e v e r ) is e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e to a r e a l or m y t h i c a l h i s t o r i c a l event t h a t i s r e p r o d u c e d i n succeeding generations. H e n c e t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y existence o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest is e x p l a i n e d as the e v o l u t i o n a r y residue of an o r i g i n a l i r r a t i o n a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l response. H o w e v e r m u c h L é v i - S t r a u s s m a y have b e e n i n f l u e n c e d b y F r e u d , the l a t t e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f the incest p r o h i b i t i o n i s t h o r o u g h l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . F i r s t l y , the t h e o r y c a n n o t p r o v i d e a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the c o n t e m p o r a r y existence o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest because its p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r i g i n s are r e f e r r e d to a distant and m y t h i c a l past. I t c a n n o t b e c l a i m e d that the persistence o f the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest expresses the persistence o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l i m p u l s e t h a t gave b i r t h t o i t because L é v i - S t r a u s s insists t h a t sentiments are a response to the r a t i o n a l n o r m a t i v e o r d e r and cannot precede i t . H e n c e the c o n t e m p o r a r y h o r r o r o f incest m u s t be e x p l a i n e d by its p r o h i b i t i o n and n o t v i c e versa (thus it is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t w h i l e F r e u d studies the incest taboo Lévi-Strauss studies the incest prohibition). Secondly, the t h e o r y reduces c u l t u r e t o a n i r r a t i o n a l n a t u r a l response. T h u s c u l t u r e , far f r o m expressing the social nature o f the h u m a n a n i m a l , i s for F r e u d based o n the repression o f f u n d a m e n t a l aspects o f h u m a n nature: c u l t u r e , and the reason t h a t i t embodies, i s essentially f o r e i g n t o the humans w h o c o m p r i s e i t . C u l t u r e , far f r o m b e i n g the means t o h u m a n s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , far f r o m b e i n g the means b y w h i c h h u m a n i t y raises i t s e l f above a n i m a l i t y , represents f o r F r e u d the a l i e n a t i o n o f the h u m a n b e i n g f r o m his o r her o w n nature. W h i l e L é v i - S t r a u s s w o u l d n o t disagree t h a t i t i s possible f o r c u l t u r e to d e v e l o p a l i e n a t e d f o r m s , this a l i e n a t i o n does n o t represent the i m p o s i t i o n o f reason u p o n i n s t i n c t , b u t r a t h e r the p e r v e r s i o n o f reason t o selfish ends. For L é v i - S t r a u s s Freud, l i k e B e r g s o n and Lévy-Bruhl, m u s t have represented a regression f r o m the p o s i t i v e achievements o f D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g y , and i n p a r t i c u l a r f r o m D u r k h e i m ' s insistence that the b i r t h o f c u l t u r e i s the b i r t h o f reason, and t h a t the achievements o f c u l t u r e are due t o the i m p o s i t i o n o f the i n t e l l i g e n c e o n the i n s t i n c t u a l . For L é v i Strauss the task was n o t to r e n o u n c e this insistence, b u t o n l y to renounce the conception of culture as an external reality that

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stood o v e r and against the i n d i v i d u a l and to seek instead its f o u n d a t i o n i n the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d . T h i s i s the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f L é v i Strauss' r e j e c t i o n o f F r e u d and, a s w e shall see, o f his r e t u r n t o Rousseau. In fact in The Elementary Structures Lévi-Strauss introduces his account o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations o f r e c i p r o c i t y n o t w i t h a direct reference t o F r e u d , b u t b y reference t o c h i l d psychology. H e argues that the m i n d o f the c h i l d gives u s a u n i q u e insight i n t o the u n i v e r s a l features of the m i n d because it has been less subject to c u l t u r a l c o n d i t i o n i n g b u t n o t , as some w o u l d have i t , because the m i n d o f the c h i l d corresponds t o a m o r e ' p r i m i t i v e ' stage o f intellectual development. W e m i g h t surmise i n v i e w o f the reference t o c h i l d p s y c h o l o g y that Piaget m i g h t have been an early i n f l u e n c e on Lévi-Strauss, and i n d e e d Lévi-Strauss discusses Piaget's w o r k in The Elementary Structures, o n l y to dismiss his d e v e l o p m e n t a l hypotheses, a r g u i n g that d i f f e r e n t ' m e n t a l i t i e s ' r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t circumstances, so that all t h o u g h t , a d u l t and c h i l d , ' c i v i l i z e d ' and ' p r i m i t i v e ' , i s r i g o r ously i n t e l l e c t u a l . O n the o t h e r hand, i n a recent t r i b u t e L é v i Strauss has a c c l a i m e d Piaget as the t h i n k e r w h o gave p r i m a c y to i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y and t o c o g n i t i v e functions j u s t w h e n psyc h o l o g y was i n danger o f b e i n g 'submerged b y confused t h o u g h t under the d o u b l e assault of B e r g s o n i s m and F r e u d i a n i s m (at least the epigones r a t h e r t h a n the founders). T h u s p s y c h o l o g y and p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d e x t r a c t themselves f r o m the a f f e c t i v e s w a m p i n t o w h i c h they w e r e b e g i n n i n g t o s i n k ' . H o w e v e r L é v i - S t r a u s s does n o t a c k n o w l e d g e a d i r e c t influence in The Elementary Structures and the c h i l d p s y c h o l o g y he does refer to is that of Susan Isaacs. 7

Lévi-Strauss quotes research by Susan Isaacs w h i c h shows the d e v e l o p m e n t o f concepts o f a r b i t r a t i o n a m o n g s m a l l c h i l d r e n . C h i l d r e n f i n d themselves i n antagonistic situations because o f t h e i r desire to possess objects b e l o n g i n g to the o t h e r . T h i s gives rise to a n antagonistic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the self and the o t h e r w h i c h m u s t be r e s o l v e d if society is to e x i s t at a l l . T h i s a n t a g o n i s m is u n d e r l a i n b y a p s y c h o l o g i c a l need f o r s e c u r i t y . M y need f o r security makes me w a n t the valuables of the o t h e r , in case I s h o u l d need t h e m f o r myself. T h i s need f o r s e c u r i t y can, h o w e v e r , o n l y be satisfied by c o - o p e r a t i o n , w h i c h is i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as e x c h a n g e . T h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f the exchange o f w o m e n i s indeed a response t o T y l o r ' s injunction ' m a r r y out or be k i l l e d out'.

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T h e excursion into child psychology confirms, for Lévi-Strauss, the b e l i e f that r e c i p r o c i t y i s n o t s o m e t h i n g i m p o s e d b y society i n response to social needs, b u t is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h emerges spontaneously f r o m the ' p s y c h o - s o c i a l pressures' o f c o l l e c t i v e l i f e . I t is, t h e r e f o r e , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h already exists i n the m i n d before i t i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n society. L é v i - S t r a u s s goes o n t o specify the ' f u n d a m e n t a l structures o f the m i n d ' w h i c h u n d e r l i e r e c i p r o c i t y . These s t r u c t u r e s , w h i c h 'are u n i v e r s a l ' , are three: 'the exigency of the rule as a rule; the n o t i o n of reciprocity as the most immediate f o r m of i n t e g r a t i n g the opposition between the self and the others; and finally, the synthetic nature of the gift, i.e., that the agreed transfer of a valuable f r o m one individual to another makes these individuals into partners, and adds a new quality to the valuable transferred.' 8

These are the f u n d a m e n t a l structures o f the m i n d w h i c h m a k e society possible. It must be possible to conceive w h a t is i n v o l v e d in a r u l e . R e c i p r o c i t y must be seen as a spontaneous response to the e x p e r i e n c e o f o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n self and o t h e r . T h e m i n d must have the c a p a c i t y t o e n d o w the object e x c h a n g e d w i t h s i g n i f i cance. T h i s significance derives f r o m the fact t h a t the object is a g i f t w h i c h seals an alliance, and hence is a s y m b o l of t h a t alliance. A l i t t l e f u r t h e r on Lévi-Strauss offers a m o r e ' f o r m a l ' d e s c r i p t i o n o f the capacities o f the m i n d : ' T h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m n a t u r e t o c u l t u r e i s d e t e r m i n e d b y man's a b i l i t y t o t h i n k o f b i o l o g i c a l relationships as systems of o p p o s i t i o n s . ' Simonis argues that this c a p a c i t y i t s e l f explains the f o r m e r three, w h i l e D a v y regards i t a s an a d d i t i o n a l capacity. H o w e v e r , it is surely a c a p a c i t y w h i c h is i m p l i e d i n the three e a r l i e r ' s t r u c t u r e s ' w i t h o u t i t s e l f e x p l a i n i n g them. 9

1 0

T h e capacities m e n t i o n e d i m p l y that the m i n d does m o r e t h a n s i m p l y impose a r e l a t i o n , f o r t h a t r e l a t i o n has a specific character and a specific p o w e r . It n o t o n l y relates, b u t it also integrates the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o society t h r o u g h a s y m b o l i c gesture. T h e u n c o n scious, j u s t l i k e r e c i p r o c i t y itself, is n o t t h e r e f o r e s i m p l y a f o r m a l c a p a c i t y a t this stage i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h o u g h t , i t has a n a c t i v e c o m p o n e n t . T h u s the t h e o r y o f the unconscious i n The Elementary Structures is n o t the t h e o r y of the p u r e l y f o r m a l , c o m b i n a t o r y , unconscious t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s was l a t e r t o take f r o m structural linguistics.

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I n fact the t h e o r y o f the m e n t a l foundations o f r e c i p r o c i t y o f f e r e d in The Elementary Structures is n o t r e a l l y a p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y a t a l l . T h e ' s t r u c t u r e s ' j u s t described d o n o t refer d i r e c t l y t o p r o p e r t i e s o f the m i n d . T h e y describe capacities w h i c h the m i n d must have r a t h e r than the p r o p e r t i e s o f the m i n d t h a t e n d o w i t w i t h these capacities. H e n c e w h a t they describe i s n o t the m i n d but the ' c o n c e p t ' o f r e c i p r o c i t y — a r u l e w h i c h effects the i n t e g r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n t o society b y means o f a s y m b o l i c t r a n s a c t i o n . T h e exercise t h a t Lévi-Strauss is engaged in is at the m o m e n t a l o g i c a l rather t h a n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l one, as he elaborates the l o g i c a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r his concept o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h u s the u n d e r p i n n i n g s of r e c i p r o c i t y are t r u e a prioris. These ' s t r u c t u r e s ' do not themselves p r o v i d e a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y : i t i s these ' s t r u c t u r e s ' t h a t a n adequate p s y c h o l o g y must e x p l a i n . T h e r e seems t o b e l i t t l e d o u b t that the t h e o r y t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s i n i t i a l l y b e l i e v e d c o u l d p r o v i d e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations f o r the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y was n o t that o f s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s , n o r o f F r e u d , n o r o f Piaget b u t t h a t o f gestalt p s y c h o l o g y , w h i c h has j u s t the t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f s t r u c t u r e h e r e q u i r e d . T h e Gestalt a p p r o a c h was w e l l - a d a p t e d t o L é v i - S t r a u s s ' concerns. A s Piaget has n o t e d : 'The psychological Gestalt represents a type of structure that appeals to those who, w h e t h e r they acknowledge it or not, are really l o o k i n g for structures that may be thought " p u r e " , u n p o l l u t e d by history or genesis, functionless and detached f r o m the subject'. 11

In the Preface to The Elementary Structures the b o o k is assimilated to the gestaltist m o v e m e n t , a n d Lévi-Strauss has subsequently a f f i r m e d the roots o f his c o n c e p t o f s t r u c t u r e i n t h e Gestalt, a s w e l l as asserting the c o m m o n gestaltist o r i g i n s of b o t h l i n g u i s t i c s and a n t h r o p o l o g y , the l a t t e r by reference to B e n e d i c t and K r o e b e r as w e l l a s his o w n w o r k . W i t h i n the b o o k the p r i m a c y o f relations o v e r t e r m s is r e f e r r e d to as a lesson of p s y c h o l o g y , n o t of l i n g u i s t i c s , and the concept o f s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f d e r i v e d f r o m gestalt p s y c h o l o g y w h e n Lévi-Strauss stresses the unconscious, and so a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l , t e l e o l o g y w h i c h is precisely w h a t gestalt psychology introduced. 1 2

T h e c o n c e p t o f s t r u c t u r e i n p l a y i s gestaltist r a t h e r t h a n l i n g u i s t i c i n m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t w a y s : the r e g u l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e , the p r i n c i p l e o f reciprocity, is substantive, and not purely formal, the basis of a

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s y n c h r o n i c functional w h o l e w h i c h i t s e l f has a p h y s i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . H o w e v e r the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m and its p h y s i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n is n o t a r e d u c t i o n i s t one, it is a r e l a t i o n of i s o m o r p h i s m . T h e f u n c t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e that e x p l a i n s the s t r u c t u r e the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y , i s e x p l a i n e d a s the result o f the a t t e m p t t o restore e q u i l i b r i u m , w h i c h i s the c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e o f the Gestalt. T h e gestaltist f o u n d a t i o n of The Elementary Structures is e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t , f o r i t gives t h a t w o r k a n openness t h a t i s lost w i t h h i n d s i g h t . In p a r t i c u l a r it means that The Elementary Structures is v e r y open t o p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , despite L é v i - S t r a u s s ' d e c l a r e d a n t i p a t h y t o p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h i s openness, o r a m b i g u i t y , is r e a l l y i n h e r e n t in gestalt p s y c h o l o g y , f o r the p r o b l e m w i t h this p s y c h o l o g y is t h a t the Gestalt i t s e l f remains a v e r y m y s t e r i o u s p h e n o m e n o n : w h e r e does i t c o m e f r o m , h o w i s i t directed? I n o r d e r t o a v o i d some k i n d o f v i t a l i s t metaphysics (shades of B e r g s o n again) it seems that gestalt p s y c h o l o g y has in the end t o decide b e t w e e n a f o r m o f b e h a v i o u r i s m i n w h i c h the Gestalt expresses b i o l o g i c a l processes t h a t i n t e g r a t e sense-data, and a f o r m o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n w h i c h the Gestalt expresses the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f the p e r c e i v i n g subject. M e r l e a u - P o n t y ( w h o e x p l a i n e d the subtleties o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y t o L é v i - S t r a u s s w h e n the l a t t e r r e t u r n e d t o France a t the e n d o f the w a r and w h o r e m a i n e d a close f r i e n d and colleague) and S i m o n e d e B e a u v o i r b o t h i n t e r p r e t e d The Elementary Structures in the l a t t e r sense, a n d indeed LéviStrauss' o w n discussion o f Isaacs w o r k has s t r o n g p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l resonances. S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r a c c l a i m e d The Elementary Structures as a h u m a n i s t masterpiece w h e n i t f i r s t appeared: ' L é v i - S t r a u s s . . . assumes that human institutions are endowed w i t h meaning: but he seeks their key in their humanity alone; he abjures the spectres of metaphysics, b u t he does not accept for all that that this w o r l d should be mere contingence, disorder, absurdity; his secret w o u l d be to t r y to think the given w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g the intervention of a thought that w o u l d be foreign to i t . Thus he restores to us the image of a universe w h i c h has no need of reflecting the heavens to be a human universe . . . his t h i n k i n g is clearly part of the great humanist current w h i c h considers that human existence bears w i t h i n i t s e l f its o w n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . . . . This book . . . often seemed to reconcile felicitously Engels and H e g e l : for man o r i g i n a l l y appears to us as anti-physis, and w h a t his i n t e r v e n t i o n achieves is the concrete position of confrontation of myself w i t h another self without which the first cannot define itself. I also found singularly


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striking the agreement of certain descriptions w i t h the theses put f o r w a r d by existentialism: existence, in establishing itself, at the same t i m e establishes its laws; it is n o t governed by any internal necessity, and yet it escapes contingency by assuming the conditions of its o w n springing f o r t h . ' 1 3

In The Second Sex, her analysis of the c o n d i t i o n of w o m e n , de B e a u v o i r b o r r o w e d L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y and f o r m u l a t e d i t i n terms o f the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a n t a g o n i s m o f self and other. T h e e x a m p l e o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y i s even m o r e i n s t r u c t i v e . M e r l e a u - P o n t y , l i k e the existentialists and even, i n his o w n w a y , L é v i - S t r a u s s , posed the p r o b l e m o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the s e l f and the o t h e r as a p r o b l e m of m e a n i n g and c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F o r M e r l e a u - P o n t y the p r o b l e m o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s the p r o b l e m o f m e a n i n g , and it is m e a n i n g w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y gives us access to the other. W e c a n n o t grasp meanings w i t h o u t such access t o the o t h e r because it is the essense of m e a n i n g that it is i n t e n t i o n a l , so that to r e c o n s t i t u t e a m e a n i n g is to r e c o n s t i t u t e an i n t e n t i o n , the i n t e n t i o n o f the person w h o meant. M e r l e a u - P o n t y d e v e l o p e d his analysis o f m e a n i n g and c o m m u n i c a t i o n precisely t h r o u g h a c r i t i q u e of gestalt psychology. M e r l e a u - P o n t y c o n d e m n e d crude gestalt p s y c h o l o g y f o r its f o r m a l i s m . I t r e p l a c e d a b e h a v i o u r i s m o f the e l e m e n t a r y stimulus by a b e h a v i o u r i s m of the c o m p l e x s t i m u l u s , the Gestalt b e i n g s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y f o r m a l i m p o s e d o n the c o n t e n t . M e r l e a u - P o n t y t h e r e f o r e r e i n t e r p r e t e d the Gestalt i n terms o f the i n t e n t i o n o f the subject. M e r l e a u - P o n t y f u l l y recognizes the unconscious n a t u r e o f the code t h a t governs s y m b o l i c systems, and even the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the n a t u r e of the m i n d is such as to impose constraints on that code and s o t o r e s t r i c t the f o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t m a y exist, b u t for M e r l e a u - P o n t y the intentional character o f m e a n i n g rules o u t a l t o g e t h e r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the unconscious c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e the meaning of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n , for intentions cannot be u n c o n scious. L é v i - S t r a u s s has e x p l i c i t l y rejected M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f his w o r k , b u t t h a t such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is possible at a l l p o i n t s to the a m b i g u i t y i n h e r e n t in The Elementary Structures, an a m b i g u i t y that derives f r o m its gestaltist foundations. For L é v i - S t r a u s s reference t o i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i n the explanation of structures is insufficient for he wants to argue that

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r e c i p r o c i t y i s present e v e n w h e n i t i s e m b o d i e d n e i t h e r i n a n i n t e n t i o n n o r in a consciousness. F o r Lévi-Strauss the Gestalt is the p r o d u c t n o t o f a n i n t e n t i o n , b u t o f the c o m b i n a t o r y a c t i v i t y o f the unconscious. Lévi-Strauss does n o t h o w e v e r , f a l l back o n beh a v i o u r i s m because the p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f c o m b i n a t i o n i s c u l t u r a l l y specific, e v e n t h o u g h the c o m b i n a t o r y p r i n c i p l e is u n i v e r s a l . I t was the encounter w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s t h a t gave L é v i - S t r a u s s this m o d e l o f the unconscious a n d made i t possible f o r h i m t o g o b e y o n d the a m b i g u i t i e s of the Gestalt. T h u s in Totemism LéviStrauss espouses a m o d i f i e d f o r m o f associationism i n w h i c h the w h o l e is c l e a r l y not e m e r g e n t , as it is f o r gestalt p s y c h o l o g y and f o r M e r l e a u - P o n t y , but i s the p r o d u c t o f m e n t a l a c t i v i t y : ' I t is certainly the case that one consequence of m o d e r n structuralism (not, however, clearly enunciated) ought to be to rescue associational psychology f r o m the discredit into w h i c h it has fallen. Associationism had the great m e r i t of sketching the contours of this elementary logic, w h i c h is l i k e the least common denominator of all thought, and its only failure was not to recognize that it was an original logic, a direct expression of the structure of the m i n d (and behind the m i n d , probably, of the brain), and not an inert product of the action of the environment on an amorphous consciousness. B u t . . . it is this logic of oppositions and correlations, exclusions and inclusions, compatibilities and incompatibilities, w h i c h explains the laws of association, and not the reverse. A renovated associationism w o u l d have to be based on a system of operations w h i c h w o u l d not be w i t h o u t s i m i l a r i t y to Boolean algebra'. 14

d)

Reciprocity in systems of kinship and marriage

T h e t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y relates i n t w o w a y s t o the analysis o f systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e . O n the one h a n d , L é v i - S t r a u s s argues t h a t systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e u n i v e r s a l l y manifest the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . O n the o t h e r hand, i n the b u l k o f The Elementary Structures, Lévi-Strauss argues that p a r t i c u l a r systems of k i n s h i p a n d m a r r i a g e can be e x p l a i n e d as d i f f e r e n t w a y s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g the p r i n c i p l e . I t i s w i t h the u n i v e r s a l i s t a r g u m e n t that w e are concerned i n this section. For Lévi-Strauss the f u n d a m e n t a l social r e l a t i o n is the exchange o f w o m e n , hence i t is the study o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e that w i l l r e v e a l the unconscious foundations o f s o c i e t y . W h y i s the exchange o f w o m e n the f u n d a m e n t a l social r e l a t i o n ? W h y i s i t 'no exaggeration, then, to say that exogamy is the archetype of all other manifestations based upon r e c i p r o c i t y , and that it provides the fundamental and immutable rule ensuring the existence of the group as a g r o u p ' . 15


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It is because the w o m a n is always and e v e r y w h e r e b o t h a sign and a v a l u e . W o r d s and goods are also e x c h a n g e d , b u t w o r d s have lost t h e i r q u a l i t y o f b e i n g values, w h i c h f i r s t , supposedly, l e d m e n t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h one another, w h i l e goods have lost t h e i r q u a l i t y o f b e i n g signs. W o m e n have a n e c o n o m i c value, and i n some societies this is i m p o r t a n t , b u t it is t h e i r sexual d e s i r a b i l i t y w h i c h makes t h e m able u n i v e r s a l l y t o serve t o i n t e g r a t e society. T h e e x c h a n g e o f w o m e n , t h e r e f o r e , i s the o n l y e x c h a n g e w h i c h , i n every society, can express b o t h a m a t e r i a l a n d a s y m b o l i c c o m m i t m e n t t o society. It is in g i v i n g a sister or daughter in m a r r i a g e that a m a n expresses his f u n d a m e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t to a l i f e in society. T h i s c o m m i t m e n t i s a l w a y s , and t r i v i a l l y , a n e x c h a n g e . T h i s exchange need n o t be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as a r e l a t i o n w h i c h is e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d a s a n exchange o f w o m e n . T h e r u l e o f m a r r i a g e , w h e t h e r this r u l e is p o s i t i v e or negative, necessarily i m p l i e s t h a t some i n d i v i d u a l s g i v e u p a r i g h t t o the w o m a n w h o i s g i v e n i n m a r r i a g e . T h e r u l e i t s e l f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e s the o b l i g a t i o n o f others to do t h e same, so that o t h e r w o m e n are a v a i l a b l e to those w h o give u p t h e i r rights t o the p a r t i c u l a r w o m a n w h o i s daughter, sister, or niece. H e n c e : 'exchange may be neither e x p l i c i t nor immediate, but the fact that I can obtain a wife is, in the final analysis, the consequence of the fact that a brother or father has given her u p ' . 16

E x c h a n g e is ' n e i t h e r i m m e d i a t e n o r e x p l i c i t ' , ' t h i s s t r u c t u r e is often v i s i b l e even i n systems i n w h i c h i t has n o t m a t e r i a l i z e d i n a concrete f o r m ' . H e n c e a l l t h a t i s meant b y ' e x c h a n g e ' i s that a l l social relations are r e c i p r o c a l i n the sense that a m a n w i l l o n l y g i v e s o m e t h i n g u p t o society i f society offers h i m s o m e t h i n g i n r e t u r n . Such ' r e c i p r o c i t y ' must c h a r a c t e r i z e a l l social r e l a t i o n s i f the r u l e is n o t to be seen as d e r i v i n g its force f r o m some e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t such as the c o l l e c t i v e conscience. I n d i v i d u a l s p a r t i c i p a t e i n society spontaneously, and are n o t c o m p e l l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e e i t h e r m o r a l l y o r b y f o r c e . I t i s the l a t t e r b e l i e f w h i c h gives D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g y its ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' d i m e n sion w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s f o u n d s o o b j e c t i o n a b l e . B u t i f people are to engage in society spontaneously, there m u s t be s o m e t h i n g o f f e r e d i n r e t u r n f o r that w h i c h they g i v e u p : social relations take the form of a 'contract', which for Lévi-Strauss is a contract 1 7

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f r e e l y , b u t unconsciously, e n t e r e d i n t o , and n o t one i m p o s e d b y a s u p r a i n d i v i d u a l ' s o c i e t y ' . E m p i r i c a l l y h e o w e s the i n s i g h t l a r g e l y t o Mauss, and t h e o r e t i c a l l y i t represents m e r e l y a restatement o f social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . T h e o r i g i n a l i t y lies i n t h e a t t e m p t t o f o u n d the social c o n t r a c t n e i t h e r in a sui generis social r e a l i t y , n o r in the i n d i v i d u a l consciousness, b u t i n the unconscious. W e observe that i n m a n y societies m e n are h a p p y t o g i v e u p w o m e n in marriage, even though marriage is not e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d a s a n exchange. I f m e n are n o t a w a r e t h a t the r e l a t i o n is a r e c i p r o c a l one, t h e n we m i g h t ask w h y t h e y are p r e p a r e d to g i v e u p t h e i r w o m e n . T h e answer for L é v i - S t r a u s s i s t h a t they are p r e p a r e d t o g i v e u p t h e i r w o m e n because t h e y k n o w ' u n c o n s c i o u s l y ' t h a t this r e l a t i o n is an exchange. H e n c e e v e r y social r e l a t i o n w h i c h involves a sacrifice must be, u n c o n s c i o u s l y i f n o t consciously, u n d e r l a i n by a c o n c e p t i o n of that r e l a t i o n as a r e l a t i o n of reciprocity. W h a t i s the e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t o f this a r g u m e n t ? L é v i - S t r a u s s i s n o t asserting that social r e l a t i o n s are c o n c e i v e d of consciously as c o n t r a c t u a l relations, a n assertion t h a t c o u l d b e falsified e m p i r i c a l l y w i t h o u t m u c h d i f f i c u l t y , b u t that they are unconsciously apprehended as such. B u t h o w can the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t penetrate to the unconscious m e a n i n g o f social relations? H o w can the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ever d i s c o v e r that the t r u e m e a n i n g o f the i n s t i t u t i o n s u n d e r r e v i e w i s t o b e f o u n d i n the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y w h e n that p r i n c i p l e i s l o c k e d i n the unconscious o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n those i n s t i t u t i o n s ? F o r a F r e u d i a n it is t h r o u g h the analysis t h a t b r i n g s w h a t was unconscious to consciousness t h a t the psychoanalyst can r e v e a l the f o r m e r l y h i d d e n content o f the unconscious a n d f i n d the diagnosis c o n f i r m e d b y the p a t i e n t . B u t f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s there i s n o such process o f analysis, and i t i s d o u b t f u l that h e w o u l d a t t r i b u t e any significance to the results of such a process. T h u s Lévi-Strauss gives u s n o means o f access t o the unconscious meanings o f the social r e l a t i o n s that he describes. T h e r e is no w a y of finding a p o s i t i v e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' hypothesis. N e v e r t h e l e s s perhaps it is possible to g i v e n e g a t i v e s u p p o r t to the hypothesis b y s h o w i n g t h a t social r e l a t i o n s c o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d of as r e c i p r o c a l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y this is a c l a i m t h a t is t a u t o l o g i c a l l y t r u e , f o r the concept o f a social relation i m p l i e s the existence o f more than one related party. Hence the possibility of reciprocity,

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as u n d e r s t o o d in Lévi-Strauss' general t h e o r y , is already i m p l i c i t in the c o n c e p t o f social r e l a t i o n . T h u s the t h e o r y has n o e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t w h a t e v e r : any r e l a t i o n can be c o n c e i v e d of as r e c i p r o c a l . Thus Lévi-Strauss has no d i f f i c u l t y in a n a l y z i n g a s y m m e t r i c a l p o w e r r e l a t i o n s , the i n s t i t u t i o n o f p o l y g a m y a n d the c o n d u c t o f w a r a s expressions o f the r e c i p r o c a l p r i n c i p l e . L o o k e d a t i n this w a y w e can see the significance o f t h e unconscious, and o f the r e t r e a t i n t o the m i n d , f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y , and w e can see w h y the f o u n d a t i o n o f his t h e o r y , i n the t h e o r y o f the m i n d , was the last piece o f the j i g s a w t o f a l l i n t o place. It is the unconscious t h a t guarantees t h a t any social r e l a t i o n can be seen as a r e l a t i o n of r e c i p r o c i t y . T h e ' f u n d a m e n t a l structures of the m i n d ' that u n d e r l i e r e c i p r o c i t y achieve p r e c i s e l y this: t h e y describe the p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r any social r e l a t i o n t o b e apprehended a s a r e l a t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y . C o n sequently there is no c o n c e i v a b l e social r e l a t i o n t h a t c o u l d n o t be assimilated t o the concept o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h u s w h i l e o n the one hand the c l a i m that social relations could be c o n c e i v e d as manifestations o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s a pure t a u t o l o g y , the c l a i m t h a t they are so c o n c e i v e d u n c o n s c i o u s l y is s t r i c t l y unfalsifiable. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' general t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s s t r u n g b e t w e e n a n e m p t y t a u t o l o g y and equally e m p t y speculation. In the last f o u r sections I have discussed Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y of r e c i p r o c i t y a s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f society. I n the f i r s t section I a r g u e d that the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest h a d n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e and d i d n o t i m p l y , i n any s i g n i f i c a n t sense, the necessity for r e c i p r o c i t y . In the second section I a r g u e d t h a t m a r r i a g e systems have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f resources. I n t h e t h i r d s e c t i o n I a r g u e d that L é v i Strauss does n o t have an established p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y at his disposal. I n this section I have argued that the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y has no substantive s o c i o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t , t h a t it is a p u r e l y speculative c l a i m about the n a t u r e o f the unconscious, a c l a i m t h a t does n o t d e r i v e f r o m a t h e o r y o f the m i n d b u t r a t h e r one for w h i c h the t h e o r y of the m i n d is i n v e n t e d as a necessary support. T h e general t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y is, t h e r e f o r e , v a c u o u s , and the t h e o r y of the unconscious t h a t underlies it is a p u r e l y speculative, m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y t h a t has n o e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t . However

reciprocity

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f o r Lévi-Strauss. It is a c o n c e p t that has degrees. H e n c e LéviStrauss, in the b u l k of The Elementary Structures, seeks to establish t h a t d i f f e r e n t systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e represent d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y t h a t c o r r e s p o n d t o d i f f e r e n t degrees o f ' d i s s i m u l a t i o n ' o f r e c i p r o c i t y . I f the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y has any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t i t i s i n the study o f specific systems, and n o t in the g e n e r a l t h e o r y , that it is to be f o u n d . I n the analysis o f k i n s h i p systems L é v i - S t r a u s s appears t o b e a r g u i n g t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s n o t m e r e l y a n unconscious p r i n c i p l e , b u t t h a t i t has a n o b j e c t i v e existence i n social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e substantive c o n t e n t o f t h e t h e o r y lies i n the c l a i m t h a t these systems are objectively systems of e x c h a n g e , and n o t o n l y t h a t t h e y can b e i n t e r p r e t e d , unconsciously b y the p a r t i c i p a n t s and consciously by the analyst, as systems of e x c h a n g e : ' T h e p r o b l e m of the incest p r o h i b i t i o n is to explain the particular f o r m of the i n s t i t u t i o n in each particular society. T h e problem is to discover w h a t profound and omnipresent causes could account for the regulation of the relationships between the sexes in every society and age.' 18

T h u s Lévi-Strauss is n o t seeking to establish t h a t exchange is a possible result of these systems, b u t that it is t h e i r cause. H e n c e LéviStrauss has to show t h a t the systems t h a t he is s t u d y i n g are objectively reducible to the s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e of exchange. T h i s is the task Lévi-Strauss sets h i m s e l f in s t u d y i n g the e l e m e n t a r y structures o f k i n s h i p .

2 . T H E E L E M E N T A R Y STRUCTURES O F KINSHIP a)

Social classification and the regulation of marriage

T h e b u l k o f The Elementary Structures consists o f a n a t t e m p t t o p r o v e that r e c i p r o c i t y does i n fact u n d e r l i e the systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e o f those societies w h i c h can b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y w h a t Lévi-Strauss calls an ' e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e of k i n s h i p ' . A l a t e r w o r k o n o t h e r societies, those w i t h c o m p l e x structures, was p r o m i s e d , b u t has never appeared. T h e idea b e h i n d the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e l e m e n t a r y and c o m p l e x structures is t h a t societies are d i v i d e d i n t o those w h i c h r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e b y g i v i n g p o s i t i v e instructions about whom to marry and those which regulate

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marriage negatively b y p r o h i b i t i n g marriage w i t h certain categories o f person. T h e f o r m e r societies are those w i t h e l e m e n t a r y structures. M a r r i a g e rules f o r m u l a t e d i n p o s i t i v e t e r m s i n s t r u c t the m a n l o o k i n g f o r a w i f e t o t a k e his w i f e f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r class o r c a t e g o r y o f w o m e n . H e n c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the m a r r i a g e r u l e cannot b e separated f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the forms w h i c h societies adopt t o classify t h e i r m e m b e r s i n r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r . In the c o n t e x t of The Elementary Structures t h e r e are t w o d i f f e r e n t kinds o f classification w h i c h are r e l e v a n t . T h e f i r s t k i n d o f classification divides the society o b j e c t i v e l y i n t o a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t classes, i n the simplest case i n t o t w o ' m o i e t i e s ' . M e m b e r s o f the society are a l l o c a t e d t o these classes o n the basis of descent. In a m a t r i l i n e a l system class m e m b e r s h i p is d e f i n e d t h r o u g h the female line; ego, f o r e x a m p l e , m a y b e a l l o c a t e d t o the class o f his o r her m o t h e r i n the simplest such system. In a p a t r i l i n e a l system class m e m b e r s h i p is defined t h r o u g h the m a l e l i n e , in the simplest system ego b e i n g a l l o c a t e d to the class o f his o r her father. T h e s i t u a t i o n becomes m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d i f the classification operates ' h o r i z o n t a l ' as w e l l as ' v e r t i c a l ' d i v i s i o n s , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g class m e m b e r s by g e n e r a t i o n as w e l l as by descent l i n e . In a p a t r i lineal system w i t h g e n e r a t i o n a l t e r n a t i o n , ego w i l l be a l l o c a t e d to the class of the father's father, in a m a t r i l i n e a l system to t h a t of the m o t h e r ' s m o t h e r . Such systems are k n o w n as section systems. T h i s k i n d o f o b j e c t i v e classification can b e used t o r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e n e g a t i v e l y , by i n s i s t i n g t h a t classes s h o u l d be e x o g a m o u s ( i . e . t h a t m a r r i a g e p a r t n e r s be taken f r o m outside the class), or p o s i t i v e l y , b y s p e c i f y i n g the class i n t o w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l shall m a r r y . H o w e v e r i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e a l i z e that this k i n d o f classification i s n o t necessarily associated w i t h the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e e i t h e r p o s i t i v e l y o r n e g a t i v e l y . I t i s also v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t w e are d e a l i n g w i t h a system o f social classification and n o t w i t h a f o r m o f social o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h u s the 'classes' do n o t necessarily have any c o r p o r a t e existence, t h e y c a n p e r f e c t l y w e l l b e p u r e l y n o m i n a l : i n o u r society the surname denotes the class m e m b e r s h i p o f each i n d i v i d u a l i n o u r society, a n d m e m b e r s h i p of the class is defined by descent ( p a t r i l i n e a l l y ) : the son o f M . D u b o i s i s a D u b o i s , the d a u g h t e r o f M r S m i t h i s a S m i t h . However the classes denoted by the names Dubois or Smith have

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n o c o r p o r a t e existence a n d p l a y n o r o l e i n the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e , they are p u r e l y n o m i n a l . T h e classic f o r m o f class systems are those o f the a b o r i g i n a l societies o f A u s t r a l i a . A l t h o u g h such systems can b e used t o r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e , t h e y are n o t necessarily so used. T h e r e has t h e r e f o r e been considerable discussion about the n a t u r e o f these systems and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o m a r r i a g e r e g u l a t i o n . O n e v i e w i s t h a t these systems are to be e x p l a i n e d by reference to p r i n c i p l e s o t h e r t h a n those o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e : some, f o l l o w i n g D u r k h e i m ' s e x a m p l e , argue t h a t the systems h a v e an essentially c e r e m o n i a l , r e l i g i o u s purpose, others argue t h a t they have an e c o n o m i c purpose i n establishing t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s . I n e i t h e r case any c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i s a secondary c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the system. T h e o t h e r v i e w , p r o p o s e d b y L é v i Strauss, is that the essential f u n c t i o n of these systems is t h e i r r o l e in the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . I n o u r society m a r r i a g e r e g u l a t i o n i s n o t expressed i n terms o f a n o b j e c t i v e classification, b u t i n terms o f a n e g o - c e n t r e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , the r e l a t i o n s h i p t e r m i n o l o g y o r ' k i n s h i p system'. T h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n arranges m e m b e r s o f s o c i e t y i n categories a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o ego. T h u s i n o u r society the n e g a t i v e r u l e o f m a r r i a g e i s expressed b y f o r b i d d i n g u s t o m a r r y c e r t a i n categories o f r e l a t i v e . I n the same w a y societies w i t h a p o s i t i v e r u l e o f m a r r i a g e m a y designate c e r t a i n categories o f r e l a t i v e w h o should b e m a r r i e d , usually some k i n d o f ' c o u s i n ' . K i n s h i p systems do n o t express b i o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , they are systems o f social classification that d i f f e r c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m one society t o another. I n o u r s o c i e t y , for e x a m p l e , k i n terms a p p l y p r i m a r i l y o n l y t o near k i n w i t h w h o m d i r e c t relationships can b e t r a c e d . In m a n y societies, h o w e v e r , the k i n s h i p system has a m u c h b r o a d e r a p p l i c a t i o n , t o the e x t e n t that e v e r y m e m b e r o f the society i s designated b y o n e t e r m o r another. I n o u r society n o d i s t i n c t i o n i s made b e t w e e n p a t e r n a l and m a t e r n a l k i n , whereas such a d i s t i n c t i o n is f u n d a m e n t a l f o r o t h e r societies. In o u r society n o reference i s made t o age i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f k i n terms, b u t i n o t h e r societies r e l a t i v e age is a f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e of classification o f k i n . I n o u r s o c i e t y the k i n s h i p system has a l i m i t e d r o l e t o p l a y i n the r e g u l a t i o n o f social l i f e , w h e r e a s i n a n o n - l i t e r a t e society the kinship system will often play a very important role in the


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r e g u l a t i o n o f a w i d e range o f social relationships: e c o n o m i c , political, religious as w e l l as personal. T h e k i n s h i p system p r o v i d e s ' a language i n w h i c h the w h o l e n e t w o r k o f r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s i s expressed', and so the study of kinship systems plays a c e n t r a l r o l e in the study of such societies. For Lévi-Strauss, and f o r m a n y a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s o f d i f f e r e n t persuasions, i t i s the kinship system that p r o v i d e s the f r a m e w o r k f o r every k i n d o f social a c t i v i t y . T h u s debate about the e x p l a n a t i o n o f kinship systems, t h a t o f t e n appears to the non-specialist as an esoteric discussion of e x o t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , is in fact a debate about the nature of s o c i e t y and of s o c i o l o g i c a l explanation. 19

T h e basic relationships used i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f k i n s h i p t e r m i n o l o g i e s are the r e l a t i o n s o f c o n s a n g u i n i t y and o f m a r r i a g e . It is i m p o r t a n t to be q u i t e clear, h o w e v e r , t h a t these notions are shorn of any necessary b i o l o g i c a l significance w h e n used by a t e r m i n o l o g y . H e n c e the existence o f a descent r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t w o people does n o t i m p l y the existence o f a b i o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , n o r does the existence of a b i o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i m p l y the r e c o g n i t i o n o f a descent r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n the r e l a t i o n s h i p t e r m i n o l o g y o f o u r o w n society relationships are t r a c e d g e n e a l o g i c a l l y . H e n c e , a r e l a t i v e by m a r r i a g e is o n l y such i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p can b e i n d i v i d u a l l y t r a c e d t h r o u g h a m a r r i a g e . A r e l a t i v e b y descent i s o n l y such i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p can b e i n d i v i d u a l l y t r a c e d t h r o u g h descent. T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , the t e r m 'sister' i s c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d o n l y t o the female descendents o f ego's parents i n ego's o w n g e n e r a t i o n , t h o u g h i t m a y b e a p p l i e d also, and b y e x t e n s i o n , t o o t h e r w o m e n . N o t i c e that even i n o u r society the i n s t i t u t i o n o f a d o p t i o n means t h a t descent i s d i v o r c e d f r o m its b i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . I n m a n y o t h e r societies the a p p l i c a t i o n o f k i n s h i p categories i s not d e f i n e d p r i m a r i l y b y reference t o genealogy. For e x a m p l e , the c a t e g o r y w h i c h includes the genealogical 'sister' m i g h t b e a p p l i e d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y t o a l l f e m a l e members o f ego's g e n e r a t i o n i n ego's m o i e t y w i t h o u t there b e i n g any special t e r m f o r g e n e a l o g i c a l l y traceable relatives. T h e r e has been a l o n g debate about the n a t u r e o f ' c l a s s i f i c a t o r y ' t e r m i n o l o g i e s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o ' g e n e a l o g i c a l ' t e r m i n o l o g i e s . Some have a r g u e d that the f o r m e r d e v e l o p as an e x t e n s i o n f r o m the l a t t e r , the t e r m 'sister', f o r e x a m p l e , b e i n g e x t e n d e d f r o m the genealogical specification to cover all female members of the

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sister's g r o u p and g e n e r a t i o n . T h i s a r g u m e n t , h o w e v e r , depends on a v i e w of a genealogical classification as b e i n g in some w a y p r i v i l e g e d , a v i e w f o r w h i c h there i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n , f o r the g e n e a l o g i c a l l y based c l a s s i f i c a t i o n is no m o r e ' n a t u r a l ' than is a ' c l a s s i f i c a t o r y ' one. T h e classificatory p r i n c i p l e s e m p l o y e d b y k i n s h i p systems are o f t e n v e r y c o m p l e x . A l t h o u g h the basic p r i n c i p l e s are those o f descent and o f m a r r i a g e o t h e r c r i t e r i a m a y also b e e m p l o y e d i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g categories f r o m one another, m o s t n o t a b l y sex and g e n e r a t i o n . M o r e o v e r the application o f the t e r m s t o p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s m a y i n t r o d u c e s t i l l m o r e c r i t e r i a t h a t have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h k i n s h i p as such, f o r e x a m p l e age, residence, m e m b e r s h i p o f c o r p o r a t e groups, p o l i t i c a l relationships, etc., and w h e r e n o clear c r i t e r i a exist assignment to a p a r t i c u l a r c a t e g o r y m a y be a r b i t r a r y , as, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t arrives in the society a n d has to be fitted i n t o the classification. F i n a l l y , as I have n o t e d , the system is used to a r t i c u l a t e a w i d e r a n g e of social and s y m b o l i c relationships: j u r a l relations o f r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s , s e n t i m e n t a l relations, p r o p e r t y relations, residence, m a r r i a g e , r e l i g i o u s relationships etc. W h e n it comes to the e x p l a n a t i o n of k i n s h i p systems there is a basic d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n those w h o propose ' s o c i o l o g i c a l ' e x p l a n a tions, i n s i s t i n g that the k i n s h i p system has to be e x p l a i n e d as a means o f a r t i c u l a t i n g social relationships t h a t are themselves e x p l a i n e d b y reference t o n o n - k i n s h i p p r i n c i p l e s , and those w h o propose ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t ' e x p l a n a t i o n s , i n s i s t i n g t h a t the classific a t i o n m u s t be e x p l a i n e d as an i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y of, and p r i o r t o , the use to w h i c h it is p u t . F o r those w h o take the s o c i o l o g i c a l v i e w the k i n s h i p system i s d e r i v a t i v e , s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l , k i n s h i p p r i n c i p l e s p r o v i d i n g a means o f establishing a classificatory f r a m e w o r k the content o f w h i c h i s determined independently. Thus, for example, Homans and Schneider e x p l a i n the k i n s h i p system as an e x t e n s i o n i s t d e v e l o p m e n t o f a genealogical system i n w h i c h categories express s e n t i m e n t a l relations. C o u l t explains the k i n s h i p system as an expression o f j u r a l r e l a t i o n s . L e a c h , w i t h a m o r e c a t h o l i c a p p r o a c h , e x p l a i n s k i n t e r m s as d e n o t i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t categories. M a r x i s t a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have t r i e d t o e x p l a i n the k i n s h i p system a s a n expression o f relations o f p r o d u c t i o n . 2 0

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r e d u c t i o n i s t e x p l a n a t i o n s i n a r g u i n g t h a t k i n s h i p systems can o n l y be e x p l a i n e d as the expression of o t h e r social r e l a t i o n s h i p s , whether sentimental, p o l i t i c a l , economic, or a combination of all three. T h e ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t ' a p p r o a c h insists t h a t the k i n s h i p system is l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o any o f these n o n - k i n s h i p relationships, f o r the l a t t e r can supposedly o n l y b e defined i n k i n s h i p t e r m s . H e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , i t i s a r g u e d t h a t the d i s t i n c t i v e categories o f the k i n s h i p system cannot be e x p l a i n e d as expressions of d i f f e r e n t s e n t i m e n t a l r e l a t i o n s , since it is a r g u e d t h a t it is the k i n s h i p system that alone i n t r o d u c e s the d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t kinds o f k i n w i t h w h o m d i f f e r e n t s e n t i m e n t a l relations are e n t e r t a i n e d . I n the same w a y p o l i t i c a l , legal and e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s are a l l r e g u l a t e d i n k i n s h i p terms and so, it is asserted, c a n n o t be c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g independent o f o r p r i o r t o the k i n s h i p system. T h e k i n s h i p s y s t e m is the language t h a t i n t r o d u c e s social d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s that are the basis o f a l l social o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h u s s e n t i m e n t a l , e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , j u r i d i c a l and o t h e r relationships must express the relationships a r t i c u l a t e d b y the k i n s h i p system, and n o t v i c e versa. In The Elementary Structures Lévi-Strauss tries to s h o w t h a t k i n s h i p systems are i n t e l l e c t u a l constructs t h a t serve a s o c i o l o g i c a l purpose, n a m e l y the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . T h u s L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , and his a t t e m p t t o set s o c i o l o g y o n a n intellectualist foundation led h i m to a thoroughly intellectualist t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p systems t h a t c h a l l e n g e d q u i t e f u n d a m e n t a l l y the s o c i o l o g i c a l theories t h a t had been d o m i n a n t h i t h e r t o . A l t h o u g h Lévi-Strauss was n o t the f i r s t to adopt an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t a p p r o a c h to k i n s h i p systems, a n d he a c k n o w l e d g e s K r o e b e r and Boas as sources of i n s p i r a t i o n , The Elementary Structures d i d m a r k a d e c i s i v e m o m e n t as the first systematic e l a b o r a t i o n of the a p p r o a c h a n d as the p r i m e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r those w h o d e v e l o p e d the a p p r o a c h subsequently. I n the last analysis i t i s the c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t and s o c i o l o g i c a l approaches, r a t h e r t h a n the specific e x p l a n a t i o n s of k i n s h i p systems o f f e r e d , t h a t is the decisive issue raised by The Elementary Structures, f o r this is the issue that concerns the n a t u r e o f s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n and the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f sociology. It is o n l y r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t l y that these issues have become c l e a r , w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t a p p r o a c h , most n o t a b l y by Needham and Dumont. This is because Lévi-Strauss' own

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t h e o r y , a l t h o u g h it is i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a r e d u c t i o n i s t t h e o r y in t r e a t i n g k i n s h i p systems as devices for o r g a n i z i n g the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . L é v i - S t r a u s s ' o w n t h e o r y was t h e r e fore o p e n t o s o c i o l o g i c a l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , most n o t a b l y b y L e a c h . I t was o n l y w h e n D u m o n t a n d N e e d h a m r e m o v e d this s o c i o l o g i c a l d i m e n s i o n f r o m the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t t h e o r y that the real significance of Lévi-Strauss' a p p r o a c h became clear. I shall t h e r e f o r e postpone discussion o f this c o n f r o n t a t i o n t o the n e x t c h a p t e r .

b)


L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e seeks t o reduce class systems, k i n s h i p systems and rules of m a r r i a g e to a single f u n c t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e , the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . H e aims t o p r o v i d e a general t h e o r y w h i c h w i l l show t h a t 'marriage rules, nomenclature, and the systems of rights and obligations are indissociable aspects of one and the same reality, viz, the structure of the system under consideration'. 20

T h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y , expression o f a n unconscious need for s e c u r i t y , i s m o b i l i z e d i n the o p e r a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e rules w i t h i n systems o f classification. I n o r d e r t o establish the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f his t h e o r y Lévi-Strauss has to s h o w , at the v e r y least, t h a t the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e w i t h i n such systems does i n fact lead t o systematic exchange i n some m e a n i n g f u l sense. C o n v e r s e l y , i f i t can b e s h o w n t h a t e x c h a n g e i s n o t i n general the result o f these systems, L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e can b e r e g a r d e d as, at best, i m p l a u s i b l e . I n o r d e r t o establish e m p i r i c a l l y that the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y can p r o v i d e a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e Lévi-Strauss adopts a t w o - s t a g e approach. F i r s t l y , he defines w h a t h e calls ' e l e m e n t a r y structures o f k i n s h i p ' , w h i c h are i d e a l - t y p i c a l systems c o n s t r u c t e d d e d u c t i v e l y as the d i f f e r e n t possible w a y s of i m p l e m e n t i n g the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y w i t h a p o s i t i v e r u l e o f m a r r i a g e . T h i s d e d u c t i v e exercise reveals t h a t t h e r e are o n l y a v e r y l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f w a y s o f d o i n g this, each associated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r m a r r i a g e r u l e expressed i n r e l a t i o n s h i p terms. S e c o n d l y , Lévi-Strauss seeks to show t h a t these ' i d e a l - t y p i c a l ' constructs can b e used t o e x p l a i n the s t r u c t u r a l features o f the kinship systems and marriage rules that are found in the ethno-

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g r a p h i c l i t e r a t u r e . E v a l u a t i o n o f the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p a n d m a r r i a g e thus i n v o l v e s u s i n asking w h e t h e r the e l e m e n t a r y structures d o i n fact express the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y , o n the one h a n d , and w h e t h e r the e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e s can p r o v i d e satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n s o f the systems f o u n d i n the e t h n o g r a p h i c l i t e r a t u r e , o n the o t h e r . T h e ' e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e s ' that p l a y a c e n t r a l role i n L é v i Strauss' study d e r i v e d i r e c t l y f r o m the D u r k h e i m i a n S i n o l o g i s t M a r c e l G r a n e t , w h o s e i n s p i r a t i o n L é v i - S t r a u s s has f u l l y a c k n o w l edged o n l y r e c e n t l y . G r a n e t i n t u r n seems t o have d e r i v e d his ideas f r o m v a n W o u d e n , w h o s e w o r k L é v i - S t r a u s s d i d n o t discuss. G r a n e t sought to e x p l a i n c e r t a i n C h i n e s e social structures as systems o f exchange b e t w e e n social g r o u p s based o n l a n d o w n e r ship. These social g r o u p s w e r e o r g a n i z e d i n t o class systems t h a t G r a n e t e x p l i c i t l y c o m p a r e d w i t h the A u s t r a l i a n section systems o n w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s bases his discussion o f the e l e m e n t a r y structures. G r a n e t a r g u e d t h a t the groups w e r e r e l a t e d b y a c o m p l e x system o f exchanges, i n c l u d i n g the e x c h a n g e o f w o m e n i n m a r r i a g e , and he f u r t h e r argued, and h e r e i n lies his o r i g i n a l i t y a n d the source of i n s p i r a t i o n f o r The Elementary Structures, t h a t t h e k i n s h i p systems o f these societies also expressed this system o f e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n social groups, b u t f r o m a n e g o - c e n t r e d perspective. H e t h e n a r g u e d that the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e w i t h i n the k i n s h i p system guaranteed the e x c h a n g e o f w o m e n b e t w e e n l a n d - o w n i n g groups. T h e d i f f e r e n t social structures t h a t G r a n e t isolated, c o m b i n i n g a class system, a k i n s h i p system a n d a r u l e o f m a r r i a g e w e r e p r e c i s e l y the structures that L é v i - S t r a u s s a d o p t e d as his ' e l e m e n t a r y structures of k i n s h i p ' . L é v i - S t r a u s s a d o p t e d f r o m G r a n e t the s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h h e b u i l t his o w n analysis, b u t h e r e j e c t e d sharply G r a n e t ' s s o c i o l o g i s m and his e v o l u t i o n i s m . G r a n e t a r r a n g e d his s t r u c t u r e s i n a n e v o l u t i o n a r y succession that w a s , f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , based o n ' f a c i l e c o n j e c t u r e s ' . M o r e o v e r h e d i d n o t e x p l a i n exchange a s the expression of a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e , n o r the k i n s h i p systems as classifications established i n o r d e r t o secure a n exchange. R a t h e r he a r g u e d that exchange is socially e n f o r c e d and that the k i n s h i p systems r e f l e c t e d the social s t r u c t u r e o f e x o g a m o u s l a n d h o l d i n g units r e l a t e d b y a c o m p l e x system o f exchanges. 21

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systems, and the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i s n o t the cause o f the systems, b u t r a t h e r is an effect necessary to m a i n t a i n the coherence o f the systems o f classification, and, b e h i n d t h e m , the i n t e g r i t y o f the f u n d a m e n t a l social groups. T h u s the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e and the systems o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w e r e , f o r G r a n e t , secondary expressions o f the social o r g a n i z a t i o n o f l a n d h o l d i n g groups, the m a r r i a g e r u l e b e i n g devised i n o r d e r t h a t the relations b e t w e e n classes, at the o b j e c t i v e l e v e l , or k i n categories, at the subjective l e v e l , b e m a i n t a i n e d . T h u s G r a n e t e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d any i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t e x p l a n a t i o n o f these systems: i t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e ' t o transpose a c e r t a i n a r r a n g e m e n t o f society i n t o a l o g i c a l s y s t e m ' . 22

A l t h o u g h rejecting Granet's explanations, Lévi-Strauss d i d so b y s i m p l y i n v e r t i n g G r a n e t ' s analysis, e x p l a i n i n g Granet's systems b y t h e i r effects, and g e n e r a l i z i n g the t h e o r y t o a l l systems o f social c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . T o L é v i - S t r a u s s Granet's solutions w e r e unnecess a r i l y c o m p l i c a t e d , f o r G r a n e t sought t o e x p l a i n the c o m m o n p h e n o m e n o n o f the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e a s a n exchange b y reference t o a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t o r i g i n s . F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , b y c o n t r a s t , the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f m a r r i a g e r e g u l a t i o n meant t h a t the rules u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n ' m u s t possess some secret and c o m m o n function', and this f u n c t i o n is to be f o u n d in t h e i r effect, exchange. 2 3

W e must ask w h e t h e r the i n v e r s i o n o f G r a n e t ' s s o l u t i o n i s possible, and w h e t h e r the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n is l e g i t i m a t e : can a l l systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e b e r e d u c e d t o the p r i n c i p l e o f reciprocity?

c)

Systems of Kinship and Marriage

T h e b u l k of The Elementary Structures comprises a c o m p r e h e n s i v e , if sometimes cavalier, s u r v e y o f the e t h n o g r a p h i c r e c o r d i n o r d e r t o t r y to establish the c e n t r a l thesis t h a t class systems, k i n s h i p systems a n d m a r r i a g e rules can a l l b e reduced t o expressions o f the unconscious p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h e discussion i s v e r y d e t a i l e d and o f t e n t e c h n i c a l and the issues raised have been c l a r i f i e d o n l y g r a d u a l l y o v e r the three decades since the b o o k was first published. H o w e v e r the c o n c l u s i o n of the debates is clear and almost u n a n i m o u s on the f u n d a m e n t a l p o i n t : there is n o t any necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n either the f o r m o f the k i n s h i p system, o r the f o r m o f o b j e c t i v e classification, o r the p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e rules o f m a r r i a g e c u r r e n t i n a society, and e i t h e r the


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p r a c t i c e o r the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . T h e a t t e m p t t o generalize G r a n e t ' s analysis of m a r r i a g e as an exchange runs i n t o the d i f f i c u l t y that t h e r e is n o t any n o n - t r i v i a l sense i n w h i c h m a r r i a g e is in general e i t h e r p r a c t i c e d or represented as an exchange. T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y arise a t a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t levels. F i r s t l y , k i n s h i p and class systems are f o r m s of classification t h a t d o n o t necessarily have any d i r e c t s o c i o l o g i c a l correlates. T h u s it is n o t in general the case t h a t these systems o r g a n i z e relationships b e t w e e n social g r o u p s . L é v i - S t r a u s s tends repeatedly t o confuse social o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w h e n the t w o d o n o t necessarily c o r r e s p o n d . T h e r e i s t h e r e f o r e n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n for L é v i - S t r a u s s ' i n i t i a l b e l i e f that his t h e o r y was c o n c e r n e d w i t h the s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f r e a l exchanges b e t w e e n c o r p o r a t e groups. T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l systems w h i c h he examines, e v e n w h e n t h e y can be said to express e x c h a n g e a t the l e v e l o f the m o d e l o f the system, d o n o t necessarily generate such real e x c h a n g e relations and i n d e e d m a y p r e v e n t the establishment o f such exchanges. T h i s d i f f i c u l t y has l e d L é v i Strauss subsequently to insist that he has n e v e r been c o n c e r n e d w i t h the r e a l i t y o f m a r r i a g e but o n l y w i t h the ' m o d e l ' o f the system. Secondly, even a t the l e v e l o f the m o d e l o f the system f o r m u l a t e d in abstract t e r m s as the i d e a l - t y p i c a l ' e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e ' there is no p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t the system should generate e x c h a n g e i n any n o n - t r i v i a l sense. L é v i - S t r a u s s h i m s e l f f o r m u l a t e s the e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e s i n such a w a y t h a t exchange w i l l take place, b u t this f o r m u l a t i o n is g r a t u i t o u s . I n p a r t i c u l a r the ' e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e o f g e n e r a l i z e d e x change' is f o r m u l a t e d by Lévi-Strauss as m a r r i a g e in a c i r c l e : class A m a r r i e s i n t o B w h i c h m a r r i e s i n t o C w h i c h marries i n t o A . W h e n t h e r e are o n l y t h r e e categories the system, w h i c h is based on the p r i n c i p l e that a w i f e m u s t be t a k e n f r o m a c a t e g o r y o t h e r t h a n the c a t e g o r y to w h i c h w i v e s are g i v e n , does have such c y c l i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s since B c a n n o t m a r r y i n t o A n o r C i n t o B n o r A i n t o C. H o w e v e r as soon as t h e r e are m o r e t h a n t h r e e categories this is n o t i n general the case. T h u s the m o d e l o f the system does n o t i m p l y c y c l i c a l e x c h a n g e , n o r d o n a t i v e representations o f the system necessarily r e c o g n i z e or p r i v i l e g e such exchange, n o r does native practice necessarily produce such cycles. Indeed if the

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system has a d e f i n i n g s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c it is t h a t it s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o h i b i t s the d i r e c t exchange o f w o m e n . Lévi-Strauss' response to these d i f f i c u l t i e s has been to argue, f i r s t l y , t h a t h e i s n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n w h e t h e r o r n o t marriages r e a l l y d o take the f o r m o f e x c h a n g e since h e i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h e x c h a n g e as a p s y c h i c , s y m b o l i c r e a l i t y . T h u s the w o m a n does n o t a c q u i r e h e r s y m b o l i c significance, n o r the m a r r i a g e its s y m b o l i c v a l u e , b y v i r t u e o f its results, b u t b y v i r t u e o f the m e n t a l ' m o d e l ' i t expresses, a m o d e l w h i c h , m o r e o v e r , is n o t a conscious representat i o n , since ' g e n e r a l i z e d e x c h a n g e ' is n o t u s u a l l y represented consciously as such. T h u s Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the unconscious models o f the system. H e n c e i t i s reduced t o the u n f a l s i f i a b l e , and so e m p t y c l a i m that even w h e n the system is n o t i n p r a c t i c e a system o f e x c h a n g e , even w h e n i t i s n o t consciously r e p r e s e n t e d as an e x c h a n g e , and even w h e n exchange is n o t i m p l i c i t in i t , it is s t i l l unconsciously apprehended as a system of exchange. T h e r e i s n o a r g u i n g t h a t i t w o u l d b e possible t o use L é v i - S t r a u s s ' 'elementary structures', even that of 'generalized exchange', to p r o d u c e m a r r i a g e b y e x c h a n g e , b u t o n l y i n the m o s t t r i v i a l sense is e x c h a n g e i m p l i c i t i n these structures. H e n c e t o c l a i m t h a t the e l e m e n t a r y structures are unconscious m o d e l s o f systems o f e x c h a n g e i s t o r e i t e r a t e t h e t r i v i a l c l a i m t o w h i c h w e have already seen the general t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y reduce. A t h i r d k i n d of d i f f i c u l t y arises as soon as we go b e y o n d the m o d e l s t o e x a m i n e the e t h n o g r a p h i c data. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' ' e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e s ' are, as we have seen, i d e a l - t y p i c a l models in w h i c h k i n s h i p system, class system and m a r r i a g e r u l e c o i n c i d e i n such a w a y as to r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e . In p r a c t i c e , h o w e v e r , such a c o i n c i d e n c e of class systems, k i n s h i p systems and m a r r i a g e r e g u l a t i o n is the e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r t h a n the r u l e . In the case of class systems it has l o n g been r e c o g n i z e d t h a t these systems d o n o t i n g e n e r a l serve t o r e g u l a t e m a r r i a g e , and d o n o t necessarily c o r r e s p o n d t o the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . T h i s i s w h y students o f such systems have consistently r e j e c t e d a t t e m p t s t o e x p l a i n such systems in general as marriage-class systems, and have instead e x p l a i n e d t h e m as c e r e m o n i a l or as legal i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n the case o f k i n s h i p systems t o o the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e does n o t necessarily c o r r e s p o n d w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p t e r m i n o l o g y . In practice quite different rules of marriage are associated with

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f o r m a l l y i d e n t i c a l k i n s h i p systems, and o f t e n a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t m a r r i a g e rules are associated w i t h a single k i n s h i p system. So l o n g as the m a r r i a g e r u l e p r e v e n t s people d e f i n e d as ' k i n ' f r o m m a r r y i n g one a n o t h e r i t w i l l n o t d i s r u p t the classification. I f people defined a s ' k i n ' are a l l o w e d t o m a r r y anomalies can arise but e v e n then these n e e d n o t c o m p r o m i s e the existence o f the k i n s h i p system. F i n a l l y , m a n y o f the m a r r i a g e rules t h a t are e x a m i n e d b y L é v i - S t r a u s s are n o m o r e t h a n v a g u e preferences f o r m a r r i a g e w i t h p a r t i c u l a r categories o f k i n t h a t are a s o f t e n b r o k e n as t h e y are observed. I n o r d e r t o get a r o u n d the l a c k o f c o i n c i d e n c e b e t w e e n the r e g u l a t i o n of m a r r i a g e , k i n s h i p systems a n d class systems LéviStrauss i n t r o d u c e s a n u m b e r o f expedients t h a t f i n a l l y d e p r i v e his t h e o r y o f any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t . I n the case o f class systems L é v i Strauss explains t h e i r d i v e r g e n c e f r o m the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e on the most g r a t u i t o u s e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u n d s : the systems m u s t once have c o i n c i d e d e v e n i f t h e y d o n o t n o w , the d i v e r g e n c e b e i n g e x p l a i n e d b y the fact t h a t the societies i n q u e s t i o n have c h a n g e d t h e i r section system f o r one reason o r a n o t h e r . A t o t h e r t i m e s L é v i - S t r a u s s explains the divergence b y r e f e r r i n g t o the l a c k o f f a m i l i a r i t y o f the natives w i t h his t h e o r y , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e y are ' i n c o m p l e t e l y a w a r e ' o f the s t r u c t u r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e rules so t h a t t h e y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e t h e system i n c o r r e c t l y .

2 4

I n the case o f the d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n k i n s h i p system and the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e L é v i - S t r a u s s abandons any pretence o f r e l a t i n g his t h e o r y t o the e t h n o g r a p h i c r e c o r d . W h e r e t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e does n o t coincide w i t h the e x i s t i n g k i n s h i p system L é v i - S t r a u s s s i m p l y argues t h a t i t expresses the u n c o n scious awareness o f the possibilities i n h e r e n t i n the r u l e i f i t w e r e associated w i t h a n o t h e r system. I n this w a y h e reconciles a l l manner o f anomalies w i t h his t h e o r y : the r o l e o f the m a t e r n a l uncle i n m a t r i l a t e r a l systems and especially those o f the A s i a n systems. L é v i - S t r a u s s deals w i t h the anomalies i n the A s i a n systems i n three w a y s . F i r s t l y , t h r o u g h the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l device o f t h e ' r e d u c e d m o d e l ' , w h i c h comprises o n l y the c e n t r a l terms o f the t e r m i n o l o g y i n o r d e r t o s i m p l i f y the task o f e x p l a n a t i o n . S e c o n d l y , L é v i - S t r a u s s i n t e r p r e t s some o f the r e m a i n i n g anomalies i n d i f f u s i o n i s t - e v o l u t i o n i s t t e r m s a s 'traces a n d survivals o f t w o systems, which coexisted'. Thirdly, he refers to the unconscious 25

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t o e x p l a i n the systems a s the result o f the coexistence o f m o r e t h a n one e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e , the e l e m e n t a r y structures e x i s t i n g i n the unconscious m i n d . 2 6

'Is t h e r e any need to emphasize t h a t this b o o k is c o n c e r n e d e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h models a n d n o t w i t h e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t i e s ' w r o t e Lévi-Strauss in the Preface to the Second E d i t i o n of The Elementary Structures of Kinship. G i v e n Lévi-Strauss' c o n c e r n w i t h the psyc h o l o g i c a l , s y m b o l i c , s i g n i f i c a n c e o f m a r r i a g e this p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the m o d e l w o u l d b e q u i t e u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e i f i t w e r e t o the i n d i g e n o u s m o d e l t h a t h e r e f e r r e d . H o w e v e r L é v i - S t r a u s s refers t o i n d i g e n o u s models o n l y w h e n they happen t o a c c o r d w i t h his t h e o r y . W h e n i n d i g e n o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s d o n o t a c c o r d w i t h his t h e o r y h e i m m e d i a t e l y shifts the p o i n t o f reference t o a supposedly unconscious m o d e l w h i c h i s accessible o n l y t o L é v i - S t r a u s s and w h i c h reveals t h a t the systems that are n e i t h e r i n r e a l i t y n o r i n the n a t i v e representations systems o f m a r r i a g e exchange are n e v e r theless expressions o f the unconscious apprehension o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h i s reference b e y o n d any e t h n o g r a p h i c reference to an inaccessible unconscious f i n a l l y deprives the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p , l i k e the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y o n w h i c h i t i s based, o f any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t a t a l l . Since any c o n c e i v a b l e k i n s h i p system, class system and m a r r i a g e r u l e c o u l d be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y b y means o f the devices o f w h i c h h e avails himself, the t h e o r y has no e x p l a n a t o r y v a l u e , the supposed need to secure exchange h a v i n g become a deeply unconscious n e e d t h a t can b e u n c o n s c i o u s l y satisfied w i t h i n any i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k at all. A l t h o u g h the a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n systems o f k i n s h i p b y reference t o t h e i r supposed r o l e i n r e g u l a t i n g m a r r i a g e a s a n exchange m u s t be adjudged a r e s o u n d i n g f a i l u r e this does n o t dispose of the m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l aspects o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a p p r o a c h t h a t w e r e discussed e a r l i e r . A l t h o u g h it f a i l e d , The Elementary Structures d i d set o u t to d e s t r o y r e d u c t i o n i s t theories o f social classification. I n The Elementary Structures Lévi-Strauss a r g u e d t h a t systems of classificat i o n c o u l d n o t b e e x p l a i n e d either i n t e r m s o f the s u b j e c t i v e apprehension o f the systems expressed i n conscious representations o r i n terms o f some supposedly m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l r e a l i t y , w h e t h e r economic, p o l i t i c a l or affective, but c o u l d o n l y be explained in t e r m s o f t h e i r o w n i m m a n e n t p r o p e r t i e s . I t i s this a t t e m p t t o s h o w , more generally, that the 'true' or 'objective' meaning of ideologi-


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cal systems is i n h e r e n t in those systems and cannot be f o u n d b e y o n d t h e m t h a t i s the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m . T h e fact t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s d i d n o t discover the i m m a n e n t m e a n i n g o f the systems o f k i n s h i p that h e e x p l o r e d does n o t r u l e the p r o j e c t o u t o f h a n d . I n the n e x t c h a p t e r w e shall see h o w this p r o j e c t was taken u p b y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' f o l l o w e r s .

N O T E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ESK, p. 24. ESK, p. 51, my emphasis. 1956a, p. 349. ESK, p. 38. ESK, p. 42. 1972b, p. 78; 1974a; SA, pp. 3 6 - 7 ; FS, p. 536. 1976f. ESK, pp. 75, 84. ESK, p. 136. Simonis, C7. Lévi-Strauss ou la Passion de l'Inceste, A u b i e r - M o n t a i g n e , Paris 1968, Ch 2, l . c ; G. D a v y , 'Les structures é l é m e n t a i r e s de la p a r e n t é ' , Année Sociologique, 3 series, 1949, p. 353. J. Piaget, Structuralism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, p. 55. ESK, pp. 411, 100. S. de Beauvoir, 1949, op. cit. pp. 9 4 3 - 4 , 9 4 8 - 9 . Tot, p. 90. ESK, p. 481. ESK, p. 62. ESK, p. 143. ESK, p. 23, my emphasis. 1971e, p. 63. ESK, p. x x i i i . ESK, p. 251. M. Granet, ' C a t é g o r i e s M a t r i m o n i a l e s et relations de p r o x i m i t é dans la C h i n e ancienne', Année Sociologique, Serie B, fasc. 1-3, 1939, p. 83. 1971n, p. 46. ESK, pp. 102 - 3, 143. ESK, p. 353. e.g. ESK, pp. 309, 442, 452 - 3. e

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

V. The Impact of The Elementary Structures of Kinship 1

T H E

T H E O R Y

OF

KINSHIP

I n the last chapter I i n d i c a t e d the reasons w h y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y of k i n s h i p is unacceptable. I have a r g u e d , on the one hand, t h a t the m o d e l s c o n s t r u c t e d b y L é v i - S t r a u s s d o n o t necessarily generate t h e exchange o f w o m e n a t the l e v e l e i t h e r o f the m o d e l o r o f r e a l i t y and, o n the o t h e r hand, that k i n s h i p systems f o u n d i n the e t h n o g r a p h i c l i t e r a t u r e cannot b e e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f L é v i Strauss' e l e m e n t a r y structures. T h e a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n i n s t i t u t i o n s o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e i n terms o f the need t o exchange m u s t b e adjudged a total failure. M o r e detailed technical consideration of L é v i - S t r a u s s ' analyses w o u l d serve o n l y t o r e i n f o r c e these c o n clusions. In this chapter I w a n t to b r o a d e n discussion f o r it is v e r y c o m m o n , indeed it c o u l d almost be said to be the r u l e , f o r the m o s t p r o d u c t i v e theories to be those t h a t are m o s t in e r r o r . LéviStrauss' t h e o r y qualifies on the l a t t e r score, a n d there is no d o u b t t h a t it has generated a v e r y extensive debate t h a t has gone far b e y o n d Lévi-Strauss' o r i g i n a l design, a debate t h a t has had a m a j o r i m p a c t w i t h i n a n t h r o p o l o g y and far b e y o n d . E v a l u a t i o n s of The Elementary Structures by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have been v a r i e d , b e c o m i n g m o r e u n f a v o u r a b l e w i t h the course o f t i m e . T h u s H a r t w r o t e i n a n e a r l y r e v i e w ' i t i s n o e x a g g e r a t i o n t o say t h a t this b o o k does f o r social o r g a n i z a t i o n w h a t The Origin of the Species d i d for b i o l o g y ' , w h i l e K o r n ' s m o r e recent c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the b o o k 'arranges some o f the m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g ideas c o n c e i v e d b y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' predecessors i n m a n y decades o f social a n t h r o p o l o g y , b u t i n a r h e t o r i c a l , i l l - o r d e r e d and c o n t r a d i c t o r y scheme. I t i s b u i l t u p o n defective r e a s o n i n g c o m b i n e d w i t h d e f i c i e n t o r m i s t a k e n r e p o r t s o f the e t h n o g r a p h i c facts'. N e e d h a m r e g a r d e d The Elementary Structures as 'a masterpiece, a s o c i o l o g i c a l classic o f the first r a n k ' i n 1962, b u t b y 1971 h a d come t o endorse the conclusions o f his student K o r n . 86

The Impact of T h e E l e m e n t a r y S t r u c t u r e s of K i n s h i p

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A l t h o u g h L é v i - S t r a u s s continues assiduously t o defend his w o r k a n d insists ' I reject n o t one p a r t o f the t h e o r e t i c a l i n s p i r a t i o n o r o f the m e t h o d , nor any o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' , there i s n o d o u b t t h a t in r e t r o s p e c t The Elementary Structures can be seen to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y confused, m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y e x t r e m e l y unsound a n d empirically, w h e r e o r i g i n a l , inadequate. For a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s The Elementary Structures is as m u c h a p a r t of t h e i r h i s t o r y as is the w o r k of M o r g a n or Fraser, an i n s p i r a t i o n that has been assimilated a n d discarded. B u t despite a l l its t e c h n i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l inadequacies, The Elementary Structures has had an e n o r m o u s i m p a c t . 1

Lévi-Strauss' focus on r e c i p r o c i t y was r e j e c t e d at an e a r l y date, e v e n b y his closest f o l l o w e r s , f o r there w a s n o w a y i n w h i c h this t h e o r y c o u l d b e r a t i o n a l l y sustained. T h u s N e e d h a m c r i t i c i z e d L é v i - S t r a u s s f o r b e i n g c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e c i p r o c i t y w h e n his b o o k was r e a l l y about c o n c e p t u a l schemes. For N e e d h a m ' p r e s c r i p t i v e alliance systems are i n d e e d e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c t u r e s — n o t o f k i n s h i p , but o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ' . S i m i l a r l y the w o r k w a s o n l y r e a l l y t a k e n seriously as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the study of p a r t i c u l a r l y systematic classificatory k i n s h i p systems, w h a t N e e d h a m has come t o c a l l ' p r e s c r i p t i v e systems'. T h u s for a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s the general t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y and the universalist claims o f the analysis w e r e l a r g e l y i g n o r e d . T h e interest of The Elementary Structures f o r anthropologists was n o t t h a t i t r e f o u n d e d s o c i o l o g y b u t t h a t i t c h a l l e n g e d the o r t h o d o x i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f k i n s h i p systems. 2

T h e d o m i n a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f k i n s h i p systems saw k i n t e r m s a s expressions o f the status r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n ego and o t h e r m e m b e r s o f his o r her society. T h e a s c r i p t i o n o f the same t e r m t o d i f f e r e n t people w a s taken t o i m p l y t h a t the status o f these people i n r e l a t i o n to ego w a s the same. In general these statuses w e r e seen as o r i g i n a t i n g i n the relationships i n the n u c l e a r f a m i l y and b e t w e e n near relatives and t h e n b e i n g e x t e n d e d i n some w a y b e y o n d those close relatives t o m o r e distant relatives. F o r e x a m p l e R a d c l i f f e B r o w n a r g u e d that k i n s h i p terms w e r e used t o categorize people a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r r i g h t s a n d duties i n r e l a t i o n t o ego, o r i g i n a t i n g i n the nuclear f a m i l y and b e i n g e x t e n d e d o n the basis o f the assumption o f lineage u n i t y . O t h e r s have based the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o n a f f e c t i v e considerations o r o n j u r a l o r m o r a l r i g h t s , and have i n t r o d u c e d other p r i n c i p l e s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t o f lineage u n i t y . T h i s approach t o k i n s h i p systems r e f l e c t e d a v i e w o f social structure in which the corporate descent group is primary and the

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r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and the descent g r o u p are m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the n u c l e a r f a m i l y . T h e system of k i n s h i p reflects n o n - k i n s h i p r e l a t i o n s , so the t h e o r y is a r e d u c t i o n i s t one, and i t corresponds t o a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f social s t r u c t u r e . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was one that w o r k e d q u i t e w e l l i n A f r i c a , w h e r e c o r p o r a t e descent groups d o i n d e e d p l a y a f u n d a m e n t a l r o l e i n social o r g a n i z a t i o n , b u t elsewhere i t d i d r u n i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s that l e d it to p r o l i f e r a t e ad hoc e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h i s approach to k i n s h i p systems h a d m a n y weaknesses. Its r e d u c t i o n i s m tended to be too c r u d e to a c c o m m o d a t e the c o m p l e x i t y o f k i n s h i p systems; the p r i o r i t y i t a t t r i b u t e d t o c o r p o r a t e descent g r o u p s was t o o g l i b ; the extensionist hypothesis t h a t p r i v i l e g e d g e n e a l o g i c a l l y close k i n smacked o f e t h n o c e n t r i s m . These aspects a l l came u n d e r attack i n the debate t h a t f o l l o w e d The Elementary Structures, b u t they w e r e n o t the focus of LéviStrauss' challenge. W h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s d i d d o was t o replace one r e d u c t i o n i s m b y a n o t h e r and t o challenge the p r i o r i t y g i v e n t o the p r i n c i p l e o f descent. W h i l e the s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f descent t h e o r y i s the nuclear f a m i l y , L é v i - S t r a u s s insisted t h a t society o n l y began a t the p o i n t a t w h i c h n u c l e a r families e n t e r e d i n t o relations w i t h one another. T h u s the basic u n i t , the ' a t o m o f k i n s h i p ' , i s n o t the nuclear f a m i l y , b u t the i n t e r l i n k i n g o f nuclear families t h r o u g h m a r r i a g e : ' I t was established that it was impossible to derive kinship, even w h e n envisaged at its most elementary level, solely f r o m consideration of the biological order: kinship could not be b o r n simply f r o m the union of sexes and the breeding of children; it implies f r o m the beginning something else, that is the social alliance of biological families of w h i c h at least one cedes a sister or a daughter to another biological family. T h a t , and that alone, is the universal principle w h i c h the t e x t of 1945 (1945c) stated, and w h i c h Les Structures Elémentaires de la Parenté sought to demonstrate.' 3

T h i s change o f focus seems v e r y s i m p l e , b u t its i m p l i c a t i o n s are considerable, since i t changes the m e a n i n g o f the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n . For descent t h e o r y the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n is d e r i v a t i v e f r o m relations of descent and c o n s a n g u i n i t y and so has no i n d e p e n d e n t r o l e to p l a y . T h i s is possible because the k i n s h i p systems w i t h w h i c h w e are c o n c e r n e d are closed systems i n w h i c h a n o t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n i n terms o f descent ( s t r i c t l y speaking ' f i l i ation') and consanguinity can always be traced, without any


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reference t o m a r r i a g e . T h u s the w o m a n w h o i s t o b e ego's w i f e i s also, n o t i o n a l l y , his m o t h e r ' s b r o t h e r ' s d a u g h t e r . F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , h o w e v e r , m a r r i a g e i s a n o r i g i n a l r e l a t i o n , a t the c e n t r e o f e x p l a n a t i o n s o f k i n s h i p phenomena. T h u s f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s w h a t i s s i g n i f i c a n t is n o t t h a t the w o m a n in q u e s t i o n is a m o t h e r ' s b r o t h e r ' s d a u g h t e r b u t t h a t she is a prospective spouse. T h u s the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n comes t o p l a y a r o l e i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f k i n s h i p systems as c e n t r a l as t h a t of the relations of c o n s a n g u i n i t y and descent. F o r most a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s the p o s i t i v e v a l u e of The Elementary Structures consisted i n its d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o the r o l e o f m a r r i a g e as a s o l i d a r i z i n g social r e l a t i o n and as a p r i n c i p l e of social c l a s i f i c a t i o n t h a t h a d been u n d u l y n e g l e c t e d b y descent theorists. L é v i - S t r a u s s was c e r t a i n l y n o t the o n l y , o r even the f i r s t , a n t h r o p o l o g i s t t o d o t h i s , b u t his b o o k was c e r t a i n l y the m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l challenge t o descent t h e o r y because i t made its c l a i m s f o r the p r i o r i t y o f the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n i n such r a d i c a l a n d p r o v o c a t i v e terms, c l a i m i n g n o t s i m p l y t h a t the p r i n c i p l e c o u l d help sort o u t some o f the anomalies o f descent t h e o r y , b u t t h a t i t was the basis o f a l l k i n s h i p systems. R e c o g n i t i o n o f the i n d e p e n dent i m p o r t a n c e o f the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n does n o t , h o w e v e r , depend o n acceptance o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , l e t alone o f the u n i v e r s a l i s t i c a m b i t i o n s o f this t h e o r y . T h u s this lesson can p e r f e c t l y w e l l b e assimilated b y o t h e r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , and this is essentially w h a t E d m u n d L e a c h has d o n e . L e a c h e m e r g e d f r o m the t r a d i t i o n o f M a l i n o v s k i a n f u n c t i o n a l i s m , and his t h e o r e t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n r e m a i n s essentially f u n c t i o n alist, b r i n g i n g t o f u n c t i o n a l i s m a n e w c o n c e r n w i t h r e l a t i o n s h i p s . L e a c h retains the f u n c t i o n a l i s t c o n c e r n w i t h society as a s y s t e m w h i c h relates v a r i o u s sub-systems o f a single w h o l e . H e n c e f o r L e a c h k i n s h i p p h e n o m e n a are t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l phenomena, a n d n o t i n r e l a t i o n t o the mind. I n Pul Elija L e a c h sees l a n d e d p r o p e r t y as the basis o f the social s t r u c t u r e , w i t h the k i n s h i p system as a s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n . I n his analysis o f the k i n t e r m tabu h e e x p l a i n s the t e r m a s a c a t e g o r y w o r d whose p r i m a r y m e a n i n g derives f r o m outside the k i n s h i p c o n t e x t . T h e t e r m i s a n a l y z e d b y t r e a t i n g the t e r m i n o l o g y a s a n i d e o l o g y w h i c h reflects c e r t a i n aspects o f the social o r g a n i z a t i o n . For Leach exchange r e l a t i o n s are seen as b e i n g social relations and n o t relations b e t w e e n c o n c e p t u a l categories.

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The Foundations

of Structuralism

H e shares w i t h f u n c t i o n a l i s m a c o n c e r n w i t h social r e l a t i o n s a s means o f securing s o l i d a r i t y , his i n n o v a t i o n b e i n g the r e c o g n i t i o n of the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n as a means of s e c u r i n g alliance at least on a par w i t h the descent r e l a t i o n . H e n c e h e has f o l l o w e d L é v i - S t r a u s s i n a n a l y z i n g the r e l a t i o n w i t h the m o t h e r ' s b r o t h e r a s a r e l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d b y m a r r i a g e , and n o t a r e l a t i o n based o n F o r t e s ' principle of 'complementary filiation'. A l t h o u g h m a n y have r e g a r d e d L e a c h a s a n i n t e r p r e t e r o f L é v i Strauss' w o r k , L e a c h has assimilated some o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' claims to a t r a d i t i o n c o m p l e t e l y alien to Lévi-Strauss' intentions. LéviStrauss has, t h e r e f o r e , c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t e d Leach's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f his w o r k i n the m o s t v e h e m e n t t e r m s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r has r e j e c t e d Leach's a t t e m p t to m a k e Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y i n t o a s o c i o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n i s m . For L é v i - S t r a u s s the k i n s h i p system does n o t r e f l e c t m a r r i a g e relationships, it is a device designed to create and t o r e g u l a t e those r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h u s 'the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f a k i n s h i p system i s t o define categories f r o m w h i c h t o set u p a c e r t a i n t y p e o f m a r r i a g e r e g u l a t i o n ' , hence ' a k i n s h i p system i s a n a r b i t r a r y system o f representations, n o t the s p o n taneous d e v e l o p m e n t o f a real s i t u a t i o n ' . 4

L é v i - S t r a u s s rejects any s o c i o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r w h i c h the k i n s h i p system expresses social r e l a t i o n s . F o r L é v i Strauss it is the social r e l a t i o n s that express the k i n s h i p system, and the k i n s h i p system is f u n d a m e n t a l because it is established in o r d e r t o create the social r e l a t i o n s t h a t h o l d society t o g e t h e r , the e x c h a n g e o f w o m e n . T h e k i n s h i p system i s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r u c t , created ( u n c o n s c i o u s l y ) b y the m i n d and e x p r e s s i n g o n l y kinship principles. Lévi-Strauss sees his t h e o r y as an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t r a t h e r t h a n a s o c i o l o g i s t i c t h e o r y , k i n s h i p systems b e i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l classificat i o n s created b y the m i n d , c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y b y the i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s o f the m i n d . F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s the i m p o r t a n c e o f his t h e o r y is not that it modifies existing interpretations of kinship systems, b u t that it offers a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h to the social. I n his a n x i e t y t o defend his o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n L é v i - S t r a u s s has n o t c l a r i f i e d the issues in his subsequent c o n t r i b u t i o n s . T h e r e s u l t has been t h a t he has f a l l e n b e t w e e n t w o stools, e n r a g i n g ' s o c i o l o g i s t s ' w i t h his m e t a p h y s i c a l ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m ' , b u t f a i l i n g t o satisfy the more rigorous 'intellectualists' because of his desire to retain


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s o c i o l o g i c a l p o i n t s o f reference. L é v i - S t r a u s s h i m s e l f w i s e l y abandoned the study o f k i n s h i p p h e n o m e n a after the p u b l i c a t i o n o f I'he Elementary Structures and l e f t his w o r k to be d e v e l o p e d a n d c l a r i f i e d b y others. T h e r e i s n o d o u b t , h o w e v e r , that the t h r u s t o f l.cvi-Strauss' w o r k i s i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , a s w a s r e c o g n i z e d b y D a v y , the d o y e n o f the D u r k h e i m i a n school, i n a n e a r l y r e v i e w w h i c h saw the i n t r o d u c t i o n of s o c i o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t as ' i m p r u d e n t ' a n d a dangerous supplement t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t a r g u m e n t . 5

T h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t a p p r o a c h has been c l a r i f i e d and d e v e l o p e d b y anthropologists e m e r g i n g f r o m the O x f o r d t r a d i t i o n , i n s p i r e d o r i g i n a l l y , a t least i n p a r t , b y L é v i - S t r a u s s , b u t subsequently developing their structuralist approach in opposition to LéviStrauss' persistent a t t e m p t t o sustain his r e d u c t i o n i s t t h e o r y o f reciprocity.

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W O M E N Before c o n s i d e r i n g the s t r u c t u r a l i s t d e v e l o p m e n t o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p i t i s w o r t h l o o k i n g b r i e f l y a t another use t h a t has been made of Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y . I have already n o t e d that LéviStrauss' t h e o r y h a d an i m m e d i a t e appeal f o r Simone de B e a u v o i r , w h o i n t e r p r e t e d the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t e r m s . H o w e v e r i t was n o t o n l y its e x i s t e n t i a l i s t resonances that s t r u c k Simone d e B e a u v o i r . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y L é v i - S t r a u s s was o f f e r i n g a general t h e o r y o f the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n , o f the r e d u c t i o n o f the w o m a n t o a n o b j e c t o f exchange b e t w e e n m e n , w h i c h d e B e a u v o i r i m m e d i a t e l y absorbed i n t o her classic w o r k The Second Sex. T h e o r i g i n a l i t y o f this t h e o r y i s t h a t the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n i s n o t a t f i r s t sight e x p l a i n e d i n t r a d i t i o n a l t e r m s b y the supposed b i o l o g i c a l necessity o f the f u n c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f roles w i t h i n the u n i v e r s a l nuclear f a m i l y : the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n has a social f o u n d a t i o n , in the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n f a m i l i e s , and n o t a b i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n , i n a supposedly n a t u r a l d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r w i t h i n the f a m i l y . T h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n i s t h e r e f o r e associated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r type of s o c i e t y , a society based on the r e s o l u t i o n o f the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e self and the o t h e r b y means o f exchange. I n this w a y d e B e a u v o i r i n t e r p r e t s the subordination of women as a reflection of a particular resolution

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o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l e x i s t e n t i a l i s t d i l e m m a o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subject and o b j e c t , s e l f and o t h e r . T h e l i b e r a t i o n o f w o m e n r e q u i r e s that w o m e n m a k e the e x i s t e n t i a l choice and refuse t o accept t h e i r a s c r i p t i o n as O t h e r s , as objects, a n d r e c o g n i z e instead t h a t t h e y t o o are subjects. S u b o r d i n a t i o n is t h e r e f o r e n o t i n s c r i b e d i n b i o l o g y , i t i s the result o f ' b a d f a i t h ' , o f the d e n i a l o f the e x i s t e n t i a l self. M o r e r e c e n t l y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y has been t a k e n u p i n a s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t e x t , as a c o m p l e m e n t to the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y o f s e x u a l i t y , and especially t o Lacan's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d , t h a t i t s e l f leans h e a v i l y o n L é v i - S t r a u s s . T h e m a i n e x p o n e n t o f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s J u l i e t M i t c h e l l , i n her i n f l u e n t i a l b o o k Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974). M i t c h e l l regards Lévi-Strauss' analysis as b e i n g i m p o r t a n t f o r t w o reasons. F i r s t l y , because the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y p r o v i d e s a t h e o r y o f society t h a t c a n c o m p l e m e n t the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y o f the i n d i v i d u a l , the l i n k b e i n g p r o v i d e d b y the incest p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h is the basis of the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x . Secondly, because the t h e o r y asserts t h a t i t i s n o t the n u c l e a r f a m i l y , b u t the m a n y and v a r i e d forms o f r e l a t i o n s o f exchange b e t w e e n families t h a t create s o c i e t y . T h u s the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x i s n o t a n expression o f the p a t r i a r c h a l bourgeois f a m i l y , a s c r i t i c s o f F r e u d had c h a r g e d , b u t i s a n expression o f the e x c h a n g e that makes c u l t u r e possible i n e v e r y s o c i e t y , a n expression t h a t takes a d i f f e r e n t f o r m w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t f a m i l y structures. I n o u r society, w h e r e exchange o f k i n i s o f l i m i t e d significance, the f a m i l y exists i n i s o l a t i o n and the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x takes a n intense, and c o n t r a d i c t o r y , f o r m . I n o t h e r societies the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x and the F r e u d i a n unconscious also e x i s t , b u t they exist i n a d i f f e r e n t f o r m . M i t c h e l l ' s c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the sexes is a u n i v e r s a l one, b u t it is n o t based on b i o l o g y , it is an e x p r e s s i o n of the c u l t u r a l u n i v e r s a l o f exchange, m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x and the i d e o l o g y o f ' p a t r i a r c h y ' . W o m e n are n o t , t h e r e f o r e , oppressed b y m e n , they are oppressed b y p a t r i a r c h y . T h e c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the l i b e r a t i o n o f w o m e n depends o n the o v e r t h r o w o f p a t r i a r c h y , and that i n o u r society the c o n d i t i o n s f o r this o v e r t h r o w e x i s t i n the c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n p a t r i a r c h y , i n t e r n a l i z e d i n the f o r m o f the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x , and the n u c l e a r family in w h i c h it is embodied. Although

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w h y i t appears p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a c a p i t a l i s t society, i t seems t h a t M i t c h e l l ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t f o r some reason the l a w o f e x c h a n g e , and so p a t r i a r c h y , has o u t l i v e d its usefulness a n d n o w persists as an i d e o l o g y that i s r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h its i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n b y means o f the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x and is perhaps r e i n f o r c e d by o t h e r means. It i s t h e r e f o r e n o w possible f o r w o m e n t o engage i n a p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e to o v e r t h r o w p a t r i a r c h y and so to create a n e w society in w h i c h w o m e n w i l l b e l i b e r a t e d . For M i t c h e l l this struggle i s q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m , and, i t seems, u n c o n n e c t e d w i t h , a p a r a l l e l s t r u g g l e t h a t sets class against class and w i l l r e s u l t i n the o v e r t h r o w o f c a p i t a l i s t society. M i t c h e l l ' s account i s v e r y eclectic, i n s p i r e d b y b o t h d e B e a u v o i r and L a c a n , and the a r g u m e n t is n o t at a l l clear, especially at the m o s t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s : i t i s n o t clear w h y p a t r i a r c h y i s o u t m o d e d , s o t h a t i t persists o n l y a s a n i d e o l o g y , n o r i s i t clear w h y , i f this i s the case, it does s u r v i v e as an i d e o l o g y . It is n o t clear w h a t the c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s b e t w e e n p a t r i a r c h y a n d the nuclear f a m i l y . I t i s n o t clear w h e t h e r p a t r i a r c h y i s m e r e l y a n i d e o l o g y i n o u r society, s o t h a t the l i b e r a t i o n o f w o m e n requires o n l y that t h e y r e n o u n c e t h e i r stigmata, o r w h e t h e r i t continues t o express p a r t i c u l a r social r e l a t i o n s , so t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l social change is r e q u i r e d . It is n o t clear w h a t f o r m the struggle against p a t r i a r c h y w o u l d take, w h e t h e r i t w o u l d b e a struggle against the i d e o l o g y o f p a t r i a r c h y , o r against the p r o h i b i t i o n o f incest t h a t underlies the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x , o r against the e c o n o m i c o r p o l i t i c a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n , o r w h e t h e r i t w o u l d take the f o r m o f mass psychoanalysis. H o w e v e r such a m b i g u i t i e s are n o t s u r p r i s i n g since M i t c h e l l ' s a c c o u n t is a d m i t t e d l y t e n t a t i v e . Subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t s o f this a p p r o a c h have r e l i e d d i r e c t l y o n L a c a n t o d e v e l o p a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y o f p a t r i a r c h y . These developments, and i n d e e d the w o r k o f L a c a n himself, lean h e a v i l y o n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y t o j u s t i f y the u n i v e r s a l and non-sexist claims o f psychoanalysis, i n p r o v i d i n g a l i n k b e t w e e n society and the psyche and in g i v i n g sexual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a c u l t u r a l , and so v a r i a b l e , f o u n d a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , a t t r a c t i v e as such f o r m u l a t i o n s m a y be, t h e r e is n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s i n g L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y i n this w a y . T h e p r e v i o u s sections s h o u l d have established the inadequacy o f the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y f o r present purposes. F i r s t l y , I have s h o w n that there is no justification for the claim that exchange is

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u b i q u i t o u s , let alone p r i m a r y , even i n n o n - l i t e r a t e societies, n o r i s t h e r e any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t w h e r e e x c h a n g e does take place i t i s the exchange o f w o m e n t h a t i s p r i m a r y . T h e exchange of w o m e n in marriage, w h e r e marriage is represented as such, i s s i m p l y one e x c h a n g e i n a c o m p l e x n e t w o r k o f r e a l and s y m b o l i c i n t e r a c t i o n s t h a t seal an alliance that m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t has i m p o r t a n t , i f n o t f u n d a m e n t a l , p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , l e g a l o r r e l i g i o u s dimensions: m a r r i a g e seals an alliance, it does n o t m o t i v a t e o r create i t . Secondly, there i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the c l a i m that e x c h a n g e , or e x o g a m y ( w h i c h is w h a t ' e x c h a n g e ' reduces t o ) , has a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . E x c h a n g e is a social i n s t i t u t i o n , w h e r e it exists, that relates social groups to one another: f a m i l i e s , households, l o c a l groups, lineages, clans, sections, m o i e t i e s or w h a t e v e r . E x c h a n g e is n o t a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s , a l t h o u g h a n u m b e r o f i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l have roles to p l a y i n a p a r t i c u l a r n e t w o r k o f exchange. T h e r e is, t h e r e f o r e , n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o n n e c t i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n o f e x o g a m y o r o f e x c h a n g e w i t h the f o r m a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l psyche. I n p a r t i c u l a r the a u t h o r i t y o f m e n o v e r w o m e n t h a t u n d e r l i e s the fact that i t i s w o m e n w h o are g i v e n i n m a r r i a g e i s n o t a personal a u t h o r i t y , t h a t has a p s y c h o l o g i c a l or an i d e o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n , it is a p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y that expresses the fact t h a t it is m e n w h o d o m i n a t e the a p p r o p r i a t e social g r o u p , and this g r o u p is, m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t , a m u c h w i d e r g r o u p t h a n the n u c l e a r f a m i l y . T h u s w e are c o n c e r n e d w i t h a p u b l i c and p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , w h i c h cannot b e g i v e n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r i d e o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . T h e r e i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s i n g the t h e o r y o f e x c h a n g e ( e x o g a m y ) t o establish a l i n k b e t w e e n p a t r i a r c h a l social structures a n d the F r e u d i a n t h e o r y o f the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x . T h i r d l y , the last c o n c l u s i o n i s r e i n f o r c e d w h e n i t i s r e m e m b e r e d t h a t the incest p r o h i b i t i o n i s q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . T h i s is n o t a p e d a n t i c p o i n t , f o r the d i f f e r e n t sets of rules affect d i f f e r e n t categories o f people, d i f f e r e n t social g r o u p s , d i f f e r e n t a u t h o r i t i e s . T h i s severance o f the l i n k b e t w e e n the t w o breaks any possible u n i v e r s a l l i n k b e t w e e n the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x a n d the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e ( a l t h o u g h , o f course, specific c o n n e c t i o n s m i g h t b e p o s t u l a t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r societies). W e must c o n c l u d e t h a t the m o r e g e n e r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s d r a w n from this kind of analysis are equally without foundation: there are


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no grounds for r e g a r d i n g the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x as the p o i n t of i n t e r s e c t i o n o f the p s y c h i c and the social, the p o i n t a t w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l is subordinated to culture w h i l e being distinguished f r o m i t , so t h e r e are no grounds f o r seeing the F r e u d i a n unconscious as the m e e t i n g p o i n t of the i n d i v i d u a l psyche a n d the c o l l e c t i v e s y m b o l i c systems o f c u l t u r e a n d i d e o l o g y . C o n s e q u e n t l y there are n o grounds f o r using L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y a s the means o f e x t e n d i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n o f F r e u d i a n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c theories f r o m the psyche to c u l t u r e and i d e o l o g y , as has r e c e n t l y been a t t e m p t e d b y those w h o have d e v e l o p e d this a p p r o a c h f o l l o w i n g the i n s p i r a t i o n o f M i t c h e l l and Lacan. F i n a l l y , there i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r using L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y t o rescue Freud's t h e o r y o f the psyche f r o m charges o f s e x i s m and ethnocentrism. In short, Lévi-Strauss cannot provide Freud w i t h a life-belt. I n fact, i f w e r e t u r n t o L é v i - S t r a u s s ' o w n t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y w e can see that, far f r o m rescuing F r e u d f r o m charges o f s e x i s m , Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y is t h o r o u g h l y sexist. N o t i n the t r i v i a l sense that L é v i - S t r a u s s asserts that i t i s a l w a y s m e n w h o e x c h a n g e w o m e n ( i f e x c h a n g e is an unconscious gloss on the systems t h e r e is no reason w h y t h e y s h o u l d n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d as systems in w h i c h , unconsciously, w o m e n exchange m e n : the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n t o m e n i s n o t i n h e r e n t i n the structures o f the systems, w h i c h are p e r f e c t l y s y m m e t r i c a l , b u t i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n ) . L é v i Strauss' t h e o r y i s sexist i n that his e x p l a n a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f exchange presupposes the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n i n the p a t r i a r c h a l f a m i l y as a p h e n o m e n o n t h a t is p r i o r to e x c h a n g e , and so p r i o r to culture. Thus, contrary to M i t c h e l l ' s interpretation, L é v i - S t r a u s s does e x p l a i n the fact t h a t i t i s m e n w h o e x c h a n g e w o m e n i n b i o l o g i c a l terms, and h e does r e g a r d w o m e n a s b e i n g p r e - s o c i a l beings. T h e need f o r e x c h a n g e derives for L é v i - S t r a u s s f r o m the tensions set up by the p o l y g a m o u s tendency of a l l m e n and the fact t h a t each covets his n e i g h b o u r ' s w o m e n . E x c h a n g e is necessary because w o m e n are a s y m b o l i c and m a t e r i a l asset of m e n . T h u s the necessity f o r e x c h a n g e , as w e l l as its p o s s i b i l i t y , depends on the fact t h a t m e n a l r e a d y have a u t h o r i t y o v e r w o m e n . T h e c o u n t e r p a r t o f this i s that the needs o f w o m e n are i g n o r e d c o m p l e t e l y : w o m e n feel n o deep p o l y g a m o u s tendency, n o r d o they covet their neighbour's men, nor do they need to exchange

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m e n t o achieve social i n t e g r a t i o n . T h u s , w h i l e m e n are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o society t h r o u g h exchange, i n w h i c h w o m e n appear o n l y a s objects e x c h a n g e d , w o m e n are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o society t h r o u g h t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the n a t u r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d n u c l e a r f a m i l y . M e n ' s p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs r e q u i r e the establishment o f society, w h i l e w o m e n ' s can b e satisfied w i t h i n the b i o l o g i c a l f a m i l y . M o r e o v e r it cannot be c l a i m e d t h a t these p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs are t h e product o f p a t r i a r c h a l society, f o r the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f p a t r i a r c h y is t h e n u n e x p l a i n e d . It is these i n h e r e n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs t h a t e x p l a i n the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f p a t r i a r c h y . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t i f p a t r i a r c h y responds to u n i v e r s a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs it is necessary. F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , t h e r e f o r e , the a r g u m e n t t h a t i t i s the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n families, and n o t the f a m i l y , t h a t is the basis of s o c i e t y is n o t a n a r g u m e n t t h a t liberates w o m e n , i t i s one t h a t consigns t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o the presocial. T h e n u c l e a r f a m i l y p r e - e x i s t s s o c i e t y , and it is in the f a m i l y t h a t r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the sexes are established, based o n the n a t u r a l d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r . S o c i e t y o n l y emerges w i t h the c r e a t i o n o f relations b e t w e e n f a m i l i e s , w h i c h are r e l a t i o n s i n w h i c h w o m e n d o n o t p a r t i c i p a t e b u t t o w h i c h t h e y are subjected. H e n c e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n m e n and m e n are social, r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n w o m e n and m e n are n a t u r a l , and r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n w o m e n and w o m e n i g n o r e d . L é v i - S t r a u s s i s c l e a r and unambiguous ' e x a c t l y in the same w a y that the principle of sexual division of labour establishes a m u t u a l dependency between the sexes, c o m p e l l i n g them thereby to perpetuate themselves and to found a f a m i l y , the p r o h i b i t i o n of incest establishes a m u t u a l dependency between families, compelling them, in order to perpetuate t h e m selves, to give rise to new families'. 'Society belongs to the realm of culture w h i l e the family is the emanation, on the social level, of those natural requirements w i t h o u t w h i c h there w o u l d be no society, and indeed no m a n k i n d . ' 6

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S T R U C T U R A L I S M The Elementary Structures of Kinship is a v e r y confused and p r o f o u n d l y a m b i g u o u s w o r k and this is, a t least i n p a r t , because i t is m a r k e d by the uneasy coexistence of b o t h a s o c i o l o g i c a l and an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f k i n s h i p systems. I t i s o n l y r e t r o spectively, in the light of the subsequent development of Lévi-


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Strauss' t h o u g h t a n d o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m o v e m e n t , t h a t w e can see the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as d o m i n a n t , and so see The Elementary Structures as a t r a n s i t i o n a l w o r k . S t r u c t u r a l i s m i s based o n the r e j e c t i o n o f any k i n d o f ' r e d u c t i o n i s m ' that w o u l d e x p l a i n the m e a n i n g o f s y m b o l i c systems b y reference t o a n y t h i n g b e y o n d those systems, w h e t h e r i t b e b y reference t o some n a t u r a l o r social f o u n d a t i o n o r t o some p r i o r conscious o r unconscious m e a n i n g . S t r u c t u r a l i s m a t t e m p t s t o d e v e l o p a n o b j e c t i v e analysis o f m e a n i n g t h a t refuses t o g o b e y o n d the i m m e d i a t e d a t a . I t t h e r e f o r e seeks t h e m e a n i n g o f a s y m b o l i c system t h r o u g h a p u r e l y i m m a n e n t analysis t h a t considers o n l y the i n t e r n a l relationships established by t h a t system, and t h a t excludes f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n any e x t e r n a l l y d e f i n e d c o n t e n t . I n o r d e r t o see h o w the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m i n t r o d u c e d b y L é v i Strauss i n t o The Elementary Structures leads us to s t r u c t u r a l i s m it is necessary t o r e t u r n t o L é v i - S t r a u s s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f society a n d o f the n a t u r e o f s o c i o l o g y , f o r this has c h a n g e d i n the d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m the early analyses of r e c i p r o c i t y to the later a p p r o a c h of The Elementary Structures. T h e early analyses o f r e c i p r o c i t y , a n d the f i r s t f e w chapters o f The Elementary Structures, w e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h c o m p l e t i n g D u r k h e i m i a n social m o r p h o l o g y : they w e r e c o n c e r n e d t o d i s c o v e r the p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f the d i s t r i b u t i v e and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e mechanisms t h a t m a d e it possible f o r stable social s t r u c t u r e s to e x i s t . T h e s t r u c t u r e s o f r e c i p r o c i t y are the n e t w o r k s o f social relations b e t w e e n the c o n s t i t u e n t c o r p o r a t e groups o f the s o c i e t y . T h u s by c o m b i n i n g D u r k h e i m ' s Division of Labour in Society w i t h M a u s s ' The Gift Lévi-Strauss is able to l o c a t e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l underpinnings of D u r k h e i m ' s mechanical solidarity. This is no l o n g e r based o n the i r r a t i o n a l a w e t h a t society inspires i n the p r i m i t i v e m i n d , i t i s based o n a p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the m a t e r i a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l benefits o f l i v i n g i n a s o c i e t y based on reciprocity. H o w e v e r the b u l k of The Elementary Structures is n o t about such r e a l structures o f r e c i p r o c i t y a t a l l , i t i s about the systems o f representations o f k i n s h i p e m b o d i e d , a b o v e a l l , i n t h e system o f t e r m s b y w h i c h k i n address one a n o t h e r . T h i s i s because L é v i Strauss' interest has shifted f r o m t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n o f d i s t r i b u t i o n t o the p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n o f k i n s h i p systems which is, supposedly, to satisfy a psychological need for security

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by r e p r e s e n t i n g m a r r i a g e s y m b o l i c a l l y as an exchange. O n c e a t t e n t i o n has s h i f t e d t o the s y m b o l i c i t becomes i r r e l e v a n t w h e t h e r o r n o t exchange r e a l l y takes place. W h a t m a t t e r s f o r social s o l i d a r i t y i s t h a t the m e m b e r s o f society t h i n k t h a t t h e i r relationships are r e c i p r o c a l . F r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w w h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s n o t the o b j e c t i v e fact o f exchange, b u t the m e a n i n g o f the act o f exchange f o r the i n d i v i d u a l engaged in i t . W h a t gives the act its m e a n i n g as an exchange i s n o t the o b j e c t i v e fact o f exchange, n o r a n i n d i v i d u a l conscious d e c i s i o n to t r e a t the act as an exchange, b u t the system o f social representations w i t h i n w h i c h i t i s inserted. S t u d y o f the system o f representations t h e r e f o r e reveals the t r u e and o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g of social actions, a m e a n i n g that m a y escape the consciousness o f those i m m e r s e d i n the system. I n s h i f t i n g his a t t e n t i o n t o the s y m b o l i c systems o f representations L é v i - S t r a u s s i s f o l l o w i n g the p a t h already t r o d d e n b y D u r k h e i m , w h o s e w o r k also s h o w e d a n increasing c o n c e r n w i t h the m o r a l , a s opposed t o the m a t e r i a l , d i m e n s i o n o f society. Lévi-Strauss rejects a p s y c h o l o g i s m f o r w h i c h social s t r u c t u r e s can b e e x p l a i n e d a s the result o f the i n t e r a c t i o n o f p r e - s o c i a l i n d i v i d u a l s . I n d i v i d u a l s already e x i s t w i t h i n society and t h e i r actions o n l y have social significance t o the e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e y are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the social o r d e r . T h i s social o r d e r is a s y m b o l i c o r d e r , and it is s o c i e t y alone t h a t can p r o v i d e the s y m b o l i c resources that m a k e it possible for i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n to a c q u i r e a m e a n i n g . T h u s i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n expresses the c o n c e p t u a l system w h i c h gives i t m e a n i n g , and i s r e g u l a t e d b y rules f o r m u l a t e d i n t e r m s o f that system: m a r r i a g e i s p r e s c r i b e d w i t h c e r t a i n categories o f relative. T h e i n d i v i d u a l becomes a social i n d i v i d u a l o n l y b y b e i n g s o c i a l i z e d i n t o the scheme, and i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n is social to the e x t e n t that i t i s o r i e n t e d b y that scheme. H e n c e i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n o n l y has s o c i o l o g i c a l significance to the e x t e n t that it expresses the system o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and the associated rules o f b e h a v i o u r c u r r e n t i n the society. D e v i a t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o u r f r o m the constraints o f the system d o n o t have a n y s o c i o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , b u t are m e r e l y p a t h o l o g i c a l s y m p t o m s o f the i n t r u s i o n o f c o n t i n g e n t n o n - s o c i a l considerations. I n these respects L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y i s c o m p l e t e l y D u r k heimian: social action is the result of externally constraining rules


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that are m o b i l i z e d w i t h i n a c o l l e c t i v e system o f representations and t h a t impose themselves o n the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e task o f s o c i o l o g y i s t o study the c o l l e c t i v e systems w h i c h m e d i a t e b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and the w o r l d b y o r i e n t i n g and g i v i n g m e a n i n g t o the actions o f the i n d i v i d u a l . F o r b o t h D u r k h e i m and Lévi-Strauss this m e a n i n g is an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , i n h e r e n t in the systems o f representations, and q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l ' s conscious apprehension o f the m e a n i n g o f the actions i n q u e s t i o n . L é v i - S t r a u s s parts c o m p a n y w i t h D u r k h e i m o n l y w h e n i t comes t o the question o f the status o f the systems o f representations. For D u r k h e i m these systems c o m p r i s e a sui generis r e a l i t y t h a t stands outside the i n d i v i d u a l and imposes i t s e l f o n the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a n i r r a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . T h e systems o f representations are t o b e e x p l a i n e d n o t a s emanations o f the psyche o f a n e m p i r i c a l o r a generic i n d i v i d u a l , b u t a s aspects o f the ' c o l l e c t i v e conscience', t o b e e x p l a i n e d b y reference t o the social s t r u c t u r e w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h e i r m a t e r i a l s u b s t r a t u m and w h o s e p r e s e r v a t i o n t h e y serve t o assure. Thus f o r the D u r k h e i m i a n s social s t r u c t u r e and s y m b o l i c representations have to be considered in r e l a t i o n to one a n o t h e r as, i n B o u g l é ' s phrase, the b o d y and soul o f society. For L é v i - S t r a u s s the systems o f representations, a l t h o u g h c o l l e c t i v e , o b j e c t i v e and b e y o n d consciousness, can e x i s t o n l y w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d , s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the unconscious, and can o n l y have the ( r a t i o n a l ) a u t h o r i t y o f the unconscious. T h i s means that the social s t r u c t u r e , i n the D u r k h e i m i a n sense o f the system o f social r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c o r p o r a t e groups, belongs t o a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t o r d e r o f r e a l i t y f r o m the systems o f representations and the t w o c a n n o t b e r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y t o one a n o t h e r . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n social s t r u c t u r e a n d the systems o f representations must f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s b e m e d i a t e d b y the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t the social s t r u c t u r e i s o n l y a n e x p r e s s i o n o f the systems of representations, f o r the social s t r u c t u r e is s i m p l y the p r o d u c t o f a series o f i n d i v i d u a l actions w h i c h are o r i e n t e d and g i v e n m e a n i n g b y the systems o f representations. T h e social s t r u c t u r e is thus a p r o j e c t i o n of the s y m b o l i c systems e m b e d d e d in the i n d i v i d u a l psyche and has no sui generis r e a l i t y . It is t h e r e f o r e impossible t o a t t e m p t a s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f s y m b o l i c representations since there is no society outside such representat i o n s . T h u s s o c i o l o g y becomes the s t u d y o f systems o f representations and D u r k h e i m i a n social m o r p h o l o g y disappears f r o m v i e w .

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I f society i s a s y m b o l i c o r d e r t h e n t h e r e can b e n o social r e a l i t y b e y o n d the s y m b o l i c systems w h i c h g i v e m e a n i n g t o social existence. T h i s m e a n i n g must t h e r e f o r e b e i n h e r e n t i n such s y m b o l i c systems, an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g that cannot be r e d u c e d to a n y t h i n g e x t e r n a l t o those systems, w h e t h e r t o a n e x t e r n a l n a t u r e or an e x t e r n a l social s t r u c t u r e , on t h e one hand, or to a conscious apprehension o f those systems, o n the o t h e r . T h e m e a n i n g o f the symbolic order is irreducible. Thus, for example, kinship phenomena cannot be reduced to b i o l o g i c a l relations of kinship, n o r t o j u r a l o r a f f e c t i v e relations. T h e y are m e a n i n g f u l , c u l t u r a l p h e n o m e n a i n w h i c h s y m b o l i c r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h are o n l y c o n s t i t u t e d i n and t h r o u g h a k i n s h i p system, replace n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . T h u s k i n s h i p exists o n l y w i t h i n a k i n s h i p system t h a t establishes the c u l t u r a l l y m e a n i n g f u l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f k i n . I t i s o n l y o n the basis o f this s y m b o l i c system t h a t k i n s h i p can have any o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , o n the one hand, o r subjective m e a n i n g , o n the o t h e r . T h e b e l i e f t h a t social and c u l t u r a l p h e n o m e n a have a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , independent o f any s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r o f any e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l , social o r c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t , has fundamental implications. I f s y m b o l i c systems e x i s t w h i c h have a m e a n i n g i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i r c o n t e x t o r o f t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n , t h e n w e have i s o l a t e d a n o b j e c t i v e o r d e r o f r e a l i t y that transcends the i n d i v i d u a l , b u t t h a t i s i r r e d u c i b l e t o n a t u r e . These s y m b o l i c systems m e d i a t e b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s , and b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and n a t u r e , so it is o n l y t h r o u g h these systems t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l can relate to others or to n a t u r e . In short these s y m b o l i c systems c o n s t i t u t e s o c i e t y , a s o c i e t y t h a t i s p r i o r t o , and i n d e p e n d e n t of, the i n d i v i d u a l s w h o c o m p r i s e i t , and t h a t alone can g i v e m e a n i n g and o r i e n t a t i o n t o the action of biological individuals. T h e b e l i e f t h a t it is possible to isolate c u l t u r a l systems t h a t have a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g leads d i r e c t l y t o the c o n c e p t i o n o f society, a d o p t e d by s t r u c t u r a l i s m , as a series of systems of representations w h i c h e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y of, and p r i o r t o , i n d i v i d u a l actions and beliefs. A n y p a r t i c u l a r society i s s i m p l y the result o f the a p p l i c a t i o n o f these systems o f representations and associated rules of b e h a v i o u r at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e and place. It is a m o r e or less p e r f e c t expression o f the system o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i m p e r f e c t i o n s d e r i v i n g f r o m c o n t i n g e n t failures t o a p p l y the system c o r r e c t l y f o r o n e reason or a n o t h e r .

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These a u t o n o m o u s systems o f representations e x i s t q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n , t h e y can b e studied e v e n i f t h e y are never a p p l i e d , t h e y c o n t i n u e t o e x i s t even i f the societies t h a t practised t h e m have d i e d o u t . H e n c e the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t c a n study the societies even after t h e y have been e x t i n g u i s h e d , or c a n study societies f r o m afar o n the basis o f o t h e r people's e t h n o g r a p h i c reports ( w h e n c e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c D u r k h e i m i a n i n d i f f e r e n c e t o f i e l d w o r k that so shocks A n g l o - S a x o n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ) . It is the systems of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t define the social, t h e y are the o n l y t r u e social r e a l i t y , and i n s t u d y i n g t h e m w e c a n s t u d y the social u n d i s t u r b e d b y the accidental i n f l u e n c e o f d i s t o r t i o n s a r i s i n g out of geographical, demographic, psychological or contingent h i s t o r i c a l factors. T h e system o f representations p r o v i d e s a constant a t e m p o r a l system that u n d e r l i e s a l l the v a r i o u s expressions o f t h a t system i n p a r t i c u l a r societies a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e s . T h u s society is, i n the last analysis, w h e n c o n s i d e r e d i n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m i r r e l e v a n t influences, made u p o f a series o f c o n c e p t u a l systems, the most f u n d a m e n t a l o f w h i c h i n n o n - l i t e r a t e societies i s the classification o f k i n , and a n associated series o f rules o f b e h a v i o u r , the most f u n d a m e n t a l o f w h i c h i s the r u l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h e coherence o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f society, and t h e p r i v i l e g e that i t accords t o the study o f c o n c e p t u a l systems, depends e n t i r e l y on the b e l i e f t h a t such ideal c o n c e p t u a l systems can be i s o l a t e d and that t h e i r o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g can b e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y established. I n e v a l u a t i n g the v i a b i l i t y o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t enterprise i t i s this b e l i e f that w e m u s t p u t t o the test. T h e systems o f representations t h a t m a k e u p society are i d e a l systems in a d o u b l e sense. F i r s t l y , t h e y have a p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y , e x i s t i n g i n the unconscious o f each i n d i v i d u a l and d i r e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o u r w i t h t h e force o f a n unconscious c o n s t r a i n t . T h e y are therefore to be e x p l a i n e d as the e x p r e s s i o n of c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s o f the h u m a n m i n d and, f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , the study o f these systems provides a w a y o f s t u d y i n g the h u m a n m i n d . Secondly, the systems o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n the consciousness o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s o r the p r a c t i c e o f p a r t i c u l a r societies. E v e r y p a r t i c u l a r e x a m p l e o f the system w i l l i n fact be c o r r u p t e d and d i s t o r t e d b y v a r i o u s c o n t i n g e n t factors that the analyst must i g n o r e . T h i s has i m p o r t a n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , f o r i t means that the analyst is not studying particular examples of the systems

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u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , b u t the i d e a l - t y p e , the p u r e f o r m , o r the ' m o d e l ' , i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t e r m i n o l o g y , o f the system. T h u s a repeated c l a i m o f s t r u c t u r a l i s t s i s t h a t t h e y d o n o t s t u d y r e a l i t y , t h e y study models w h i c h are a k i n d o f p u r i f i e d o b j e c t . T h i s gives rise t o the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e p i s t e m o l o g y o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m , i n w h i c h i t i s a r g u e d t h a t the o b j e c t o f any science i s a n ideal o b j e c t , n o t t o b e confused w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r e m p i r i c a l object. H e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p does n o t c o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h representations o f k i n s h i p systems r e p o r t e d b y p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s , f o r these conscious representations m a y f a i l to c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e deeper, unconscious, r e a l i t y o f the system. N o r does the t h e o r y c o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the systems i n p a r t i c u l a r societies, w h e r e i r r e l e v a n t g e o g r a p h i c a l , d e m o g r a p h i c , p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r h i s t o r i c a l factors w i l l have d i s t o r t e d the systems i n o p e r a t i o n . T h i s k i n d o f a r g u m e n t has a p e r f e c t l y respectable p e d i g r e e w i t h i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f science. I n d e e d the idea t h a t t h e o r i e s are based o n the d e d u c t i v e e l a b o r a t i o n o f h y p o t h e t i c a l c l a i m s i s the credo o f m o d e r n p o s i t i v i s m . N e w t o n , f o r e x a m p l e , d i d n o t study f a l l i n g apples. N e w t o n studied the b e h a v i o u r o f point-masses, bodies o f z e r o e x t e n s i o n . N o t o n l y i s the point-mass a n ideal o b j e c t , i t i s a n o b j e c t w h i c h c o u l d n o t possibly e x i s t , f o r the v e r y c o n c e p t i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . N e w t o n ' s t h e o r y , l i k e any o t h e r theory for m o d e r n positivism, is therefore a deductive t h e o r y that derives the p r o p e r t i e s o f point-masses, a n ideal o b j e c t , f r o m c e r t a i n f u n d a m e n t a l h y p o t h e t i c a l postulates. T h i s is n o t a t h e o r y w h o s e validity depends on the existence of point-masses, it is a t h e o r y t h a t is v a l i d u n i v e r s a l l y and i n d u b i t a b l y , f o r it is a d e d u c t i v e t h e o r y t h a t exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a n y reference t o r e a l i t y . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n of the t h e o r y , and so its s c i e n t i f i c usefulness, is a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n f o r p o s i t i v i s m . A n y b o d y can e l a b o r a t e d e d u c t i v e theories of i d e a l objects ad infinitum, b u t these theories can o n l y b e c l a i m e d t o have any s c i e n t i f i c v a l u e i f t h e y t e l l u s s o m e t h i n g about the w o r l d t h a t w e w o u l d n o t k n o w w i t h o u t t h e m . H e n c e f o r p o s i t i v i s m the p r o b l e m i s one o f t r a n s l a t i n g the language o f t h e o r y i n t o a language o f o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t can establish connections b e t w e e n d e d u c t i v e theories and the e x t e r n a l world. T h e p r o b l e m s raised b y this a t t e m p t have p r o v e d insuperable, and positivism has not managed to formulate any satisfactory

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c r i t e r i a b y w h i c h a l t e r n a t i v e theories can b e e v a l u a t e d . T h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m i s t h a t o f establishing c r i t e r i a t h a t w i l l b e s t r o n g enough t o reject theories considered t o have n o a p p l i c a t i o n , w h i l e n o t b e i n g s o s t r o n g t h a t theories c o n s i d e r e d t o b e o f s c i e n t i f i c value are r e j e c t e d . T h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t m a n y have d r a w n f r o m the failure o f p o s i t i v i s m t o achieve this i s t h a t i t i s impossible t o decide b e t w e e n theories o n e m p i r i c a l g r o u n d s . T h e e v a l u a t i o n o f theories becomes s o m e t h i n g c o m p l e t e l y i r r a t i o n a l ( F e y e r a b e n d ) , a n a r b i t r a r y decision o f the c o m m u n i t y o f scientists ( K u h n ) , o r the o b j e c t i v e result o f the r a t i o n a l i s t l o g i c o f e v o l u t i o n ( P o p p e r ) . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a d o p t e d by s t r u c t u r a l i s m is a r e l a t i v i s t r e j e c t i o n o f the e v a l u a t i o n o f theories b y reference t o r e a l i t y , s o s t r u c t u r a l i s m has tended to adopt the r a t i o n a l i s t slogan 'save t h e t h e o r y ' as a c o u n t e r to the o l d e m p i r i c i s t slogan 'save the appearances': the task o f the scientist i s t o p u r i f y the l o g i c o f the t h e o r y , t o f o r m a l i z e and a x i o m a t i z e i t , t o create a closed l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a n ideal object and n o t t o w o r r y about the correspondence b e t w e e n this object and a m y t h i c a l r e a l i t y . A t h e o r y w h i c h is adequate is one that can p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t and l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k f o r discourse, the task o f science i s n o t t o create a v i e w o f the w o r l d t h a t i s t r u e , i t i s t o create a v i e w o f the w o r l d that i s w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . T h u s positivism is preserved by t u r n i n g i n t o a f o r m of rationalism. F r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p sets the h u m a n sciences o n a g e n u i n e l y s c i e n t i f i c f o u n d a t i o n b y p r o v i d i n g t h e m w i t h a n o b j e c t that i s u n t a i n t e d b y c o n t a m i n a t i o n w i t h the prejudices o f i d e o l o g y , o r o f c o m m o n sense, o r o f conscious representations, t h a t i n e v i t a b l y c o r r u p t the p u r e l y e m p i r i c a l objects o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . H o w e v e r , the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l separation o f the ideal object f r o m r e a l i t y , a l t h o u g h it has a s u p e r f i c i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y w h e n seen i n the c o n t e x t o f the failures o f the older p o s i t i v i s m , has serious dangers i n h e r e n t i n i t . T h e separation o f the m o d e l f r o m r e a l i t y can p r o v i d e , in the guise of a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e , a device that serves to preserve i n t a c t a t h e o r y t h a t appears to be o v e r w h e l m i n g l y f a l s i f i e d b y e m p i r i c a l evidence. L é v i - S t r a u s s c a n c e r t a i n l y e l a b o r a t e models o f k i n s h i p systems in w h i c h m a r r i a g e can be seen as a systematic exchange. H o w e v e r f o r most people such models w o u l d o n l y q u a l i f y a s k n o w l e d g e i f they c o r r e s p o n d e d i n some w a y t o a n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . L é v i Strauss' models do not enjoy this status, for they are not, in


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g e n e r a l , consistent w i t h the r e a l i t y c o n t a i n e d i n r e l i a b l e e t h n o g r a p h i c reports ( w h i c h is as near as we can get to r e a l i t y ) . T o p r o t e c t the models f r o m such c o n t a m i n a t i o n t h e y are c l a i m e d t o e x i s t u n d e t e c t e d and u n d e t e c t a b l e i n the unconscious. A l t h u s s e r ' s ' s y m p t o m a t i c ' r e a d i n g o f M a r x enjoys the same status: Althusser d i d n o t c l a i m that w h a t M a r x w r o t e corresponded t o A l t h u s s e r ' s r e a d i n g o f M a r x , f o r A l t h u s s e r was d e s c r i b i n g a ' p r o b l e m a t i c ' t h a t M a r x was i n the course o f d e v e l o p i n g , w h i c h h e c o u l d o n l y express i n a d e q u a t e l y , and o f w h i c h h e was i n c o m p l e t e l y a w a r e . A s A l t h u s s e r ' s w o r k d e v e l o p e d M a r x ' s p r o b l e m a t i c came t o have less and less c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e w o r k o f M a r x : a t f i r s t i t expressed i t s e l f i n M a r x ' s w r i t i n g s after the mid-1840s, b u t later A l t h u s s e r came t o c l a i m t h a t i t d i d n o t even exist i n Capital, o n l y a p p e a r i n g i n o u t l i n e i n w o r k o f the 1880s. Foucault's 'epistemes' are n o d i f f e r e n t : Foucault does n o t c l a i m t o discuss the t h o u g h t o f p a r t i c u l a r people o r o f p a r t i c u l a r social g r o u p s , he discusses a system of t h o u g h t t h a t is an i d e a l o b j e c t , that i s o n l y i n a d e q u a t e l y and i n c o m p l e t e l y expressed i n the w o r k o f a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n k e r . H e n c e F o u c a u l t ' s arguments c a n n o t b e c o u n t e r e d b y c l a i m i n g t h a t the t h o u g h t o f a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n k e r does n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o the i d e a l o b j e c t , t o the episteme, f o r this shows n o t t h a t F o u c a u l t has i n a d e q u a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d the episteme, i t shows that the t h i n k e r i n q u e s t i o n h a d i n a d e q u a t e l y expressed i t . I n s t r u c t u r a l i s t hands the r a t i o n a l i s t d e v e l o p m e n t o f p o s i t i v i s m i s the basis o n w h i c h i t i s the t h e o r y t h a t i s made the j u d g e o f the evidence and n o t v i c e versa. I n d e e d f o r Lévi-Strauss this is a great v i r t u e o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m , f o r s t r u c t u r a l i s m i s able t o p r o d u c e n e w facts and c o r r e c t o l d evidence, w i t h o u t ever v e n t u r i n g f r o m the study. 7

This structuralist methodology is extremely p o w e r f u l for it makes any t h e o r y proposed s t r i c t l y u n f a l s i f i a b l e f o r the simple reason that the t h e o r y does n o t c l a i m t o b e a t h e o r y o f any i d e n t i f i a b l e r e a l i t y , b u t i s a t h e o r y o f unconscious systems t h a t lie b e h i n d r e a l i t y and t h a t r e a l i t y expresses o n l y i n a d e q u a t e l y and i m p e r f e c t l y . T h e p r o b l e m t h a t such a m e t h o d o l o g y c o n s t a n t l y c o n f r o n t s us w i t h is a s i m p l e one: w h a t is the v a l u e of a s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y that gives u s u n d u b i t a b l e k n o w l e d g e o f a n o b j e c t f o r w h o s e existence and p r o p e r t i e s there is n o t , and c a n n o t be, any i n d e p e n d e n t evidence w h a t e v e r ? We can go further than this and ask to what extent it is possible


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t o discover any o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g i n h e r e n t i n any s y m b o l i c system, w h e t h e r r e a l or ideal. T h e q u e s t i o n leads us to c o n s i d e r the p r i v i l e g e a c c o r d e d b y s t r u c t u r a l i s m t o the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f s y m b o l i c systems, f r o m w h i c h the d o c t r i n e derives its n a m e a n d i n terms o f w h i c h i t j u s t i f i e s its p a r t i c u l a r m e t h o d o f analysis. I f the systems t h a t s t r u c t u r a l i s m e x a m i n e s are o b j e c t i v e systems o f m e a n i n g , t h e n t h a t m e a n i n g m u s t e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any subjective a p p r e h e n s i o n o f that m e a n i n g , and must b e i n h e r e n t i n the systems. T h e m e a n i n g cannot, t h e r e f o r e , d e r i v e f r o m any p a r t i c u l a r content t h a t the system m a y have. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is that, w h e n w e h a v e abstracted f r o m a l l p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e n t s , w e are left w i t h the f o r m a l relations i n t e r n a l t o the system. T h u s the a t t e m p t t o d i s c o v e r a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , i f pursued l o g i c a l l y , dissolves the systems i n t o t h e i r f o r m a l structures. I n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p this f o l l o w s f r o m the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , f o r r e c i p r o c i t y i s essentially a s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e , and this i m m e d i a t e l y means t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the f o r m a l , s t r u c t u r a l , p r o p e r t i e s o f k i n s h i p systems, w h a t e v e r t h e i r manifest c o n t e n t . T h i s m e a n i n g is o b j e c t i v e because it is, supposedly, i n h e r e n t i n the system and i n d e p e n d e n t o f any p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r a p p l i c a t i o n o f the system. T h e search f o r a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g leads i n e l u c t a b l y t o the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f the system. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n w e shall have t o ask o f the supposedly o b j e c t i v e analyses o f s t r u c t u r e i s w h e t h e r the f o r m can b e dissociated i n this w a y f r o m the c o n t e n t of the system, a n d h y p o t h e s i z e d as the basis of an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y w h e t h e r f o r m and c o n t e n t are inseperable, s o that n o f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e exists i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m the c o n t e n t o f the system. D e s p i t e its s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e g u m e n t The Elementary Structures already contains a l l the m o t i f s o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m . I n The Elementary Structures Lévi-Strauss establishes a n u m b e r of ' e l e m e n t a r y s t r u c tures o f k i n s h i p ' , w h i c h represent d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l a r r a n g e ments o f k i n t e r m s , b y d e d u c t i o n f r o m the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . H e t h e n proceeds t o a t t e m p t t o r e c o n c i l e his m o d e l s w i t h the e m p i r i c a l data, a n d indeed he uses his models to assess the data, e x p l a i n i n g divergences b e t w e e n his m o d e l and the data b y reference t o c o n t i n g e n t h i s t o r i c a l , d e m o g r a p h i c a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l factors. The

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The Elementary Structures n o t o n l y p r o v i d e an o b j e c t on w h i c h to exercise the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d , they also p r o v i d e the means o f access t o the u l t i m a t e t r u t h o f h u m a n i t y , and s o the basis o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s the systems o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e t h a t are, i n n o n - l i t e r a t e societies a t least, the k e y m e d i a t i n g t e r m b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l a n d society, the study o f w h i c h can a t one a n d the same t i m e r e v e a l to us the deepest and truest m e a n i n g of h u m a n existence and p r o v i d e the k e y t o a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f social p h e n o m e n a b y r e v e a l i n g those f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s o f the h u m a n m i n d t h a t m a k e society possible. T h u s i t i s t h r o u g h the s t u d y o f k i n s h i p and m a r r i a g e that L é v i - S t r a u s s tries t o establish his h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y on a s c i e n t i f i c f o u n d a t i o n , to d i s c o v e r t h r o u g h a n t h r o p o l o g y the t r u e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence. T h e c e n t r a l themes o f the p h i l o s o p h y t h a t emerges are taken u p and d e v e l o p e d n o t o n l y i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' later w o r k , b u t t h r o u g h o u t the structuralist movement. F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s i t i s the system o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n that unites the subject w i t h o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . H o w e v e r the subject and o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y have n o m e a n i n g f u l existence i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the c l a s s i f i c a t o r y f r a m e w o r k w h i c h alone c a n g i v e the w o r l d m e a n i n g f o r the subject, and assign a place to the subject in the w o r l d . B e f o r e the c o n c e p t u a l schemes t h e r e is m e r e l y an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d n a t u r e o f w h i c h b i o l o g i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s are a n u n d i s t i n g i s h e d part. T h u s the c o n c e p t u a l scheme does n o t m e d i a t e b e t w e e n a p r e - e x i s t e n t subject and a r e a l i t y that is a l r e a d y e x t e r n a l . T h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme alone i n t r o d u c e s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n subject and o b j e c t , b e t w e e n c u l t u r e and n a t u r e . T h e b i r t h o f c u l t u r e i s the emergence o f systems o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t counterpose subject to o b j e c t and create a space f o r the social i n d i v i d u a l i n a w o r l d o f s y m b o l i c representations. T h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n subject and o b j e c t , i n d i v i d u a l a n d society, c u l t u r e a n d n a t u r e t h a t has p l a g u e d W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y and the e m e r g i n g h u m a n sciences is an i m a g i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n , created by t h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme, the ' p r o b l e m a t i c ' o r the 'episteme', t h a t d o m i n a t e s o u r systems o f t h o u g h t . T h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme, a l t h o u g h it has a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n , exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f , and p r i o r t o , the subject o r s u b j e c t i v e consciousness: the social subject exists o n l y in the place assigned t o h i m o r her b y the c o n c e p t u a l scheme, hence the subject, and the consciousness of subjectivity, is the product of the


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c o n c e p t u a l scheme, an 'effect of the s t r u c t u r e ' , and is in no sense its c r e a t o r . T h e subject is n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a r e a l i t y t h a t exists p r i o r to the c o n c e p t u a l scheme: before the c o n c e p t u a l scheme a l l that exists is the b i o l o g i c a l i n d i v i d u a l . T h e subject is a s y m b o l i c c o n s t r u c t and as such can o n l y be an expression of an o b j e c t i v e system of m e a n i n g that is p r i o r to the subject. T h i s i s the c o r e o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s ' ' d e a t h o f the subject'. I t i s the f o u n d a t i o n o f Lacan's r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d and o f Foucault's and A l t h u s s e r ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the ' p r o b l e m a t i c o f the subject' that dominates W e s t e r n , o r b o u r g e o i s , p h i l o s o p h y . I t derives d i r e c t l y f r o m L é v i - S t r a u s s ' analysis o f k i n s h i p , b u t b e h i n d Lévi-Strauss stands, as always, D u r k h e i m , w h o s e Division of Labour in Society t o o k as its c e n t r a l theme the emergence of i n d i v i d u a l i t y as a social construct. T h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme constructs n o t o n l y the subject, b u t also a r e a l i t y defined as e x t e r n a l to the subject. T h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme i s t h e r e f o r e n e i t h e r the construct o f a c r e a t i v e subject, n o r c a n i t i n any sense express an independent r e a l i t y , f o r an i n d e p e n d e n t r e a l i t y o n l y exists w i t h i n the c o n c e p t u a l scheme. T h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme is essentially a r b i t r a r y , expressing n o t h i n g b u t i t s e l f and the m e n t a l constraints t h a t alone u n d e r l i e i t . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n i s that the i m a g i n a r y , i d e o l o g i c a l , c o n c e p t i o n o f the subject t h a t dominates o u r t h o u g h t i s n o t a n expression o f the r e a l i t y o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , o f the f r e e d o m and independence o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n bourgeois society. T h i s freedom and independence is a p u r e l y s y m b o l i c , m y t h i c a l , expression o f a spurious s u b j e c t i v i t y . T h i s m y t h i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous and m i s l e a d i n g w a y o f l i v i n g i n the w o r l d because i t i n v e r t s the true r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subject a n d structure. T h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f society a s a series o f s y m b o l i c systems, the s t r u c t u r a l i s t m e t h o d o f analysis o f ideal objects a n d o f e x c l u s i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f such objects, a n d the s t r u c t u r a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y that sees the s y m b o l i c systems as p r i o r to b o t h subject and object, and so the s y m b o l i c systems as t h e o n l y t r u e r e a l i t y , c a n a l l be f o u n d in e m b r y o in The Elementary Structures of Kinship. It is in this sense that The Elementary Structures is the w o r k t h a t establishes the foundations o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m . I n i t t h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f society, the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d , a n d t h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y are a l l d e v e l o p e d f o r the f i r s t t i m e .

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O n the o t h e r hand b o t h the o r i g i n a l i t y a n d the achievements o f The Elementary Structures are e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d . T h e ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' o f The Elementary Structures derives u l t i m a t e l y f r o m the a t t e m p t to achieve a r a t i o n a l i s t i c r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f D u r k h e i m ' s p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i o l o g y . T h e a t t e m p t t o u n c o v e r o b j e c t i v e systems o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and to locate t h e i r unconscious meanings is a dismal f a i l u r e . A t its r o o t s t r u c t u r a l i s m depends e n t i r e l y o n the c l a i m t h a t the systems o f representations t h a t i t studies are a p r i v i l e g e d o r d e r o f r e a l i t y w h o s e m e a n i n g c a n be d i s c o v e r e d o b j e c t i v e l y . S o c i e t y is seen as a system of s y m b o l i c representations because these are c o n s i d e r e d to be p r i o r t o , a n d so m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l than, e i t h e r the o b j e c t t h a t they represent o r the subject t o w h o m i t i s represented. T h i s p r i v i l e g e a c c o r d e d t o the systems o f representations o v e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l consciousness and e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y depends o n b e i n g able t o isolate the o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f these systems i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a n y reference t o e i t h e r subject o r o b j e c t , o n the basis o f a n i m m a n e n t analysis. In The Elementary Structures of Kinship Lévi-Strauss t r i e d to do j u s t this. H e sought t o establish that the systems o f k i n s h i p a n d m a r r i a g e have an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , as systems of r e c i p r o c i t y , t h a t is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n the m e a n i n g they have f o r those w h o p r a c t i c e t h e m , a n unconscious m e a n i n g that can b e established o b j e c t i v e l y w i t h o u t any reference t o n a t i v e conceptions o f the system. In fact, I have a r g u e d , Lévi-Strauss does no such t h i n g . Insofar as h e establishes that the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s i m m a n e n t i n the systems under r e v i e w the c o n c l u s i o n is t r i v i a l because the p r i n c i p l e is d e p r i v e d of any s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t e n t . Insofar as the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y i s g i v e n any c o n t e n t L é v i - S t r a u s s offers n o acceptable evidence t o s u p p o r t his c l a i m . T h u s the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y is n o t an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g t h a t Lévi-Strauss discovers in the data, it is a m e a n i n g t h a t is i m p o s e d on the data and t h e n a t t r i b u t e d t o a n inaccessible unconscious. T h u s his c l a i m t o p r o v i d e a n o b j e c t i v e , s c i e n t i f i c , analysis o f the m e a n i n g o f these systems falls d o w n . F o r a s t r u c t u r a l i s t the f a i l u r e of Lévi-Strauss' account is a result of t h e residual s o c i o l o g i s m in The Elementary Structures, so t h a t LéviStrauss l o o k s b e y o n d the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f the systems t o f i n d t h e i r m e a n i n g . A n adequate o b j e c t i v e a c c o u n t m u s t d i v o r c e the systems altogether from any contingent, externally-imposed,


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c o n t e n t and m u s t f i n d the t r u e and o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g i n the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s established b y the system, r e l a t i o n s t h a t e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the c o n t e x t o r o f the s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the n a t i v e o r o f the analyst. A n y o t h e r a c c o u n t w i l l i n t r o d u c e e x t r i n s i c c r i t e r i a , and s o w i l l b e a r b i t r a r y . T h i s i s the d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h the s t r u c t u r a l i s t analysis o f k i n s h i p systems has been d e v e l o p e d . Since it is in this area that s t r u c t u r a l i s m has the longest h i s t o r y , and that its analyses have been c o n d u c t e d w i t h the greatest degree o f r i g o u r , i t i s v e r y i n s t r u c t i v e t o l o o k a t the results that have been achieved.

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S T R U C T U R A L I S M

T h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p w e r e f u l l y d e v e l o p e d b y L o u i s D u m o n t and b y R o d n e y N e e d h a m , social a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s t r a i n e d i n the O x f o r d t r a d i t i o n established b y E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d , a n d i n t e g r a t i n g L é v i - S t r a u s s ' analysis o f k i n s h i p i n t o that tradition. E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d h a d developed a n i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t c u l t u r a l i d e a l i s m t h a t was m o r e r a d i c a l than that o f L é v i - S t r a u s s i n its refusal t o countenance any k i n d o f r e d u c t i o n i s m , the task o f a n t h r o p o l o g y b e i n g t o describe r a t h e r t h a n t o seek t o e x p l a i n . I n his w o r k o n The Nuer (1940) E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d had p r o d u c e d a s t r u c t u r a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f N u e r society i n w h i c h h e saw t h e s t r u c t u r a l f r a m e w o r k of classification as p r i o r to any p a r t i c u l a r content that the classification a c q u i r e d i n use, w h e t h e r r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l o r e c o n o m i c : the search f o r an objective d e s c r i p t i o n of an i n d e p e n d e n t system o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n l e d E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d i n e x o r a b l y t o a structural d e s c r i p t i o n w h i c h d i v o r c e d the f o r m o f the system f r o m its c o n t e n t . The Nuer, h o w e v e r , d i d n o t take f u l l account of the m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n as a s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e c o m p l e m e n t a r y to that o f descent. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k , t h e r e f o r e , p l a y e d a p a r t i n developing O x f o r d structuralism by d r a w i n g attention to a new structural relation. T h e p r i n c i p l e s o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m had a l r e a d y been l a i d d o w n b y Evans-Pritchard: ' T h e thesis that I have put before you, that social anthropology is a k i n d of historiography, and therefore ultimately of philosophy or art, implies that it studies societies as moral systems and not as natural systems, that it is interested in


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design rather than in process, and that it therefore seeks patterns and not scientific laws, and interprets rather than explains. These are conceptual, and not merely verbal, differences'. 8

D u m o n t , a l t h o u g h French, spent some t i m e i n O x f o r d , and i t w a s h e w h o d e v e l o p e d the s t r u c t u r a l analysis o f k i n s h i p . F o l l o w i n g E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d , D u m o n t a r g u e d v e r y s t r o n g l y against a l l forms of reductionism, including Lévi-Strauss' attempt to explain k i n s h i p systems i n terms o f the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e . T h u s , i n a series of analyses, D u m o n t has s h o w n t h a t there are no necessary connections b e t w e e n the f o r m o f the k i n s h i p system and e i t h e r the r e g u l a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f descent groups i n the society, s o u n d e r m i n i n g any s i m p l i s t i c r e d u c t i o n i s m . D u m o n t argues instead t h a t social o r g a n i z a t i o n and the k i n s h i p system must b e analyzed q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one another, the k i n s h i p system b e i n g analyzed as an i n t e l l e c t u a l classification w h o s e p r i n c i p l e s are c o n c e p t u a l . T h e k i n s h i p system is a p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r u c t t h a t makes use o f c e r t a i n classificatory p r i n c i p l e s i n o r d e r t o define o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s i n r e l a t i o n t o ego, a n d s o i t expresses c e r t a i n ideas about the n a t u r e o f d i f f e r e n t kinds o f r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the society i n q u e s t i o n . D u m o n t has r e i n t e r p r e t e d the ' p r e s c r i p t i v e ' k i n s h i p systems t h a t Lévi-Strauss analyzed by a r g u i n g that these systems do n o t o r g a n i z e m a r r i a g e , b u t r a t h e r t h a t t h e y express c e r t a i n ideas the p a r t i c u l a r society has about the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n consanguines and affines. Systems such as these, t h a t are based on a systematic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n consanguines and affines, express the idea t h a t there is a f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n ' b l o o d r e l a t i v e s ' a n d 'relatives b y m a r r i a g e ' , the t w o categories b e i n g themselves c o n c e p t u a l , and n o t r e f l e c t i n g specific b i o l o g i c a l o r a f f i n a l connections. T h e classification i t s e l f says n o t h i n g about w h a t this difference is, n o r about w h y these categories are d i f f e r e n t , n o r about h o w people c o m e t o b e a l l o c a t e d t o the t w o categories. D u m o n t introduces a fundamental, and very radical, distinction b e t w e e n the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f the system o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and the c o n t e n t t h a t the classification m a y acquire i n any p a r t i c u l a r society. T h e system o f classification can, and m u s t , b e studied i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its a p p l i c a t i o n . T h u s i n one society the system m a y be used to o r g a n i z e m a r r i a g e , in another it m a y be seen as a f r a m e w o r k f o r e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s , i n another i t m a y express emotional ties. The system cannot be explained by any of these

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p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s , f o r the system is p r i o r to any of these uses. T h e m e a n i n g o f the system has t o b e f o u n d i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l distinctions t h a t g i v e rise to the system, and this m e a n i n g is independent of, a n d p r i o r t o , any p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e n t that the system m a y a c q u i r e in a p a r t i c u l a r society. D u m o n t ' s l e a d has been f o l l o w e d b y o t h e r O x f o r d a n t h r o pologists, m o s t n o t a b l y R o d n e y N e e d h a m w h o has sought t o develop and t o d e f e n d the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , s t r u c t u r a l i s t , a p p r o a c h t o kinship systems. N e e d h a m w a s o r i g i n a l l y v e r y close t o L é v i Strauss, a l t h o u g h h e d i d n o t accept the t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , i n that he was c o n c e r n e d to see the k i n s h i p system in its r e l a t i o n to other aspects o f the s y m b o l i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f society. H o w e v e r h e has p r o g r e s s i v e l y abandoned the a t t e m p t to m a k e substantive connections o f this k i n d and has a d o p t e d a n i n c r e a s i n g l y r i g o r o u s and f o r m a l i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m . In the course of d o i n g so he has gone beyond even D u m o n t ' s i s o l a t i o n o f the k i n s h i p system, t o reject the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the system i n t e r m s o f any k i n s h i p p r i n c i p l e s , w h e t h e r o f descent o r alliance, c o n s a n g u i n i t y o r a f f i n i t y , and t o reduce i t t o a p u r e f o r m . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t is i n t e r e s t i n g because N e e d h a m has f o l l o w e d the l o g i c o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m t h r o u g h t o its l i m i t s and, i n p u r s u i t o f a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , has f o u n d the g r o u n d p r o g r e s s i v e l y disappeari n g f r o m u n d e r his feet u n t i l f i n a l l y s t r u c t u r a l i s m has n o t h i n g left to explain. T h e a t t e m p t t o secure a s c i e n t i f i c analysis o f m e a n i n g depends o n the separation o f the system o f classification f r o m its a p p l i c a t i o n i n a p a r t i c u l a r society and its i s o l a t i o n f r o m any p a r t i c u l a r subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its m e a n i n g . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d depends o n the i s o l a t i o n o f such a n a u t o n o m o u s object. T h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n that we have to pose to s t r u c t u r a l i s m is that o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i s o l a t i n g such a n o b j e c t i v e system f o r study, o f separating the system o f classification f r o m its p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a tions and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . W e have seen that L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a t t e m p t to do so was a f a i l u r e . D u m o n t t h e r e f o r e rejects a l l r e d u c t i o n i s m and insists t h a t the systems be a n a l y z e d solely in t e r m s of k i n s h i p p r i n c i p l e s . B u t are these p r i n c i p l e s o b j e c t i v e , are t h e y i n t e r n a l t o the system? D u m o n t rejects L é v i - S t r a u s s ' r e d u c t i o n i s m and d e d u c t i v e l y establishes models on the basis of the principles of consanguinity

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( b l o o d relatives) and a f f i n i t y ( r e l a t i o n b y m a r r i a g e ) . H e constructs a system by a r r a n g i n g categories a r o u n d ego in a s t r u c t u r e whose r e l a t i o n s are d e f i n e d by those p r i n c i p l e s . Ego's r e l a t i o n s h i p to any i n d i v i d u a l i n the s t r u c t u r e i s t h e n t r a c e d b y one o r o t h e r o f these connections, o r a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e m , and categories w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m one a n o t h e r solely o n the basis o f these t w o s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h e simplest c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f all w o u l d s i m p l y separate ' b l o o d r e l a t i v e s ' f r o m ' r e l a t i v e s b y m a r r i a g e ' and s o w o u l d define t w o categories a c c o r d i n g t o the r e l a t i o n i n v o l v e d . T h e m o d e l can, h o w e v e r , b e e l a b o r a t e d b y i n t r o d u c i n g f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i v e features, such as sex or g e n e r a t i o n , o r b y a p p l y i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n s r e p e a t e d l y . T h u s any p a r t i c u l a r k i n s h i p system c a n be d e f i n e d as the s t r u c t u r e that results f r o m the a p p l i c a t i o n o f these d i s t i n c t i v e features. T h e q u e s t i o n w e have t o ask is: w h a t i s the status o f this model? T h e r e i s n o d o u b t t h a t i t i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f any a p p l i c a t i o n , f o r i t has been c o n s t r u c t e d d e d u c t i v e l y b y the analyst, w i t h n o reference t o e t h n o g r a p h i c data, j u s t l i k e L é v i - S t r a u s s ' e l e m e n t a r y structures. I t is, t h e r e f o r e , a n ideal object c o n s t r u c t e d b y the analyst. T h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r i t can b e c l a i m e d c o h e r e n t l y t h a t this i d e a l object corresponds to some r e a l i t y that is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the system o r o f the n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f i t . I f i t turns o u t t h a t n a t i v e conceptions d o n o t necessarily c o r r e s p o n d t o the m o d e l , o r t h a t i t i s n o t necessarily applied i n the f o r m t h a t i t has been c o n s t r u c t e d , w h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n is there f o r c l a i m i n g that it is more than a figment of D u m o n t ' s imagination? T h e p r o b l e m o f the status o f the m o d e l arises because D u m o n t offers n o t a m e a n i n g that is i n h e r e n t in the system, b u t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the system. D u m o n t specifies c e r t a i n relations b e t w e e n the categories o f the system, and the i m p l i c a t i o n i s that these, and no o t h e r , relations a c t u a l l y exist. D u m o n t specifies the d i s t i n c t i v e r e l a t i o n s to the system as relations of a f f i n i t y and c o n s a n g u i n i t y . H o w e v e r this d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o t i n h e r e n t i n the system, b u t represents a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m i s that the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ( n o t i o n a l l y b i o l o g i c a l ) k i n a n d ( n o t i o n a l l y social) allies i s n o t a n o b j e c t i v e n o r a n u n a m b i g u o u s one. O n the one h a n d , a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n closed systems o f k i n s h i p can b e t r a c e d b o t h t h r o u g h m a r r i a g e and t h r o u g h c o n s a n g u i n i t y , w h i c h i s w h y descent t h e o r y c a n present a quite different interpretation of the system as a classification of

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k i n , w i t h o u t a n y reference t o m a r r i a g e , t h a t i s e q u a l l y consistent w i t h the data. A t the l e v e l o f the m o d e l there i s n o w a y o f d e c i d i n g b e t w e e n D u m o n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h a t o f descent t h e o r y . O n l y reference t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the system can decide b e t w e e n the descent t h e o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h a t o f D u m o n t , for each i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can p r o v i d e a p e r f e c t l y consistent m o d e l that relates the categories a c c o r d i n g t o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s . The v a l i d i t y o f D u m o n t ' s m o d e l t h e r e f o r e depends o n the e x t e n t t o w h i c h i t corresponds t o e t h n o g r a p h i c r e a l i t y . A l t h o u g h c o n s t r u c t e d d e d u c t i v e l y i t can o n l y have the v a l i d i t y o f a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n f r o m the data, w h e t h e r o f a n a t i v e m o d e l o f the system o r o f the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f the system. I f D u m o n t ' s m o d e l does n o t c o r r e s p o n d i n some w a y t o the native r e a l i t y o f the system there i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c l a i m i n g that the m o d e l has any special significance. T h u s D u m o n t ' s m o d e l o f the k i n s h i p s y s t e m cannot b e c l a i m e d t o b e p r i o r t o its p a r t i c u l a r applications o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , f o r i t depends o n a c u l t u r a l l y specific d e f i n i t i o n o f the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n k i n a n d affines. As soon as we appreciate t h a t the m o d e l has no v a l i d i t y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its existence i n e t h n o g r a p h i c r e a l i t y , w e also realize that its status is s i m p l y t h a t of an a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m a f u n c t i o n i n g system. O n c e this is r e c o g n i z e d , there is no longer any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the system solely i n k i n s h i p terms, f o r the f u n c t i o n i n g r e a l i t y o f the system i s v e r y c o m p l e x . I t i s n o t i n practice s i m p l y a k i n s h i p system, it is a classification t h a t organizes a w i d e range o f social relationships, w h i c h d i f f e r f r o m society t o society. T h e r e is no a priori reason w h y k i n r e l a t i o n s should be a r b i t r a r i l y a b s t r a c t e d f r o m the o t h e r aspects o f the social system and made i n t o t h e 'essence' of the system, its o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g as opposed to its c o n t i n g e n t a p p l i c a t i o n . I n r e a l i t y t h e r e i s n o d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the system o f classification a n d its a p p l i c a t i o n . I n r e a l i t y there are people l i v i n g and w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r w h o refer t o each o t h e r b y u s i n g various terms t h a t express t h e i r m u t u a l r e l a t i o n s to one a n o t h e r . These concrete social relations are m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l , a n d c e r t a i n l y cannot b e r e d u c e d t o r e l a t i o n s o f k i n s h i p o r a f f i n i t y . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the terms does n o t depend o n any traceable genealogical c o n n e c t i o n s , and i t w i l l f r e q u e n t l y depend o n principles that have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h k i n s h i p . Concepts

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language w i t h i n w h i c h t o a r t i c u l a t e a n enormous range o f social relationships. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ' o u r o w n k i n d ' and ' t h e i r k i n d ' , t h a t i s expressed i n D u m o n t ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n s a n g u i n i t y and a f f i n i t y o r i n E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d ' s lineage s t r u c t u r e , o r i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e x o g a m o u s groups e x c h a n g i n g w o m e n , o r i n the c o m e d i a n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m o t h e r and m o t h e r - i n - l a w , p r o v i d e s a n e x t r e m e l y p o w e r f u l w a y o f c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g social r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n a r e l a t i v e l y simple society. I t s h o u l d n o t b e s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t o f i n d t h a t these c o n c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , i n v a r i o u s f o r m s , are used t o concept u a l i z e v e r y d i f f e r e n t relationships i n d i f f e r e n t societies. T h e r e i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i s o l a t i n g the language o f k i n s h i p f r o m the social r e l a t i o n s i t expresses. T h u s i t i s n o m o r e j u s t i f i a b l e t o c l a i m t h a t the system o f k i n s h i p provides a n independent f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h o t h e r social relations can b e expressed, t h a n it is to a r g u e that the k i n s h i p system is the s i m p l e expression of non-kinship relations. A l t h o u g h it is certainly true that in nonl i t e r a t e societies the d e f i n i t i o n and r e g u l a t i o n o f social r e l a t i o n s i s c o n d u c t e d i n k i n s h i p terms, s o t h a t e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l o r legal relationships c a n n o t b e e x a m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f k i n s h i p categories, it is also t r u e that k i n s h i p categories c a n n o t be defined i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the social r e l a t i o n s t h a t those categories regulate, f o r even t h o u g h k i n s h i p terms have c o n c e p t u a l c o n n o t a t i o n s o f specific g e n e a l o g i c a l relationships o f k i n s h i p o r a f f i n i t y , the a p p l i c a t i o n o f those terms cannot b e d e t e r m i n e d o n l y b y reference t o g e n e a l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h u s i t i s n o t possible t o d e f i n e e i t h e r the k i n s h i p system or the social relations t h a t it expresses i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one another, s o i t i s n o t possible, o n l o g i c a l o r any o t h e r grounds, t o assign absolute p r i m a c y t o one o r t o the o t h e r . T h e question o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n k i n s h i p p r i n c i p l e s and o t h e r features of social o r g a n i z a t i o n and social consciousness c a n o n l y be posed as a q u e s t i o n of the i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of the parts of a complex whole. T h e language o f k i n s h i p i s n o t a u n i v e r s a l l a n g u a g e . K i n s h i p concepts d i f f e r f r o m one society t o another, and the k i n d s o f relationships expressed i n k i n t e r m s also v a r y w i d e l y . T h u s i t seems that t h e r e i s n o p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e v e l o p i n g a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p , because once w e have a b s t r a c t e d f r o m the p a r t i c u l a r there i s n o t h i n g o f substance l e f t t o e x p l a i n . For

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really any such t h i n g as k i n s h i p , t h a t k i n s h i p systems are p u r e l y f o r m a l systems t h a t arrange the categories in a p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r e , the r e l a t i o n s o f w h i c h are p u r e l y f o r m a l . I t seems t h a t b y r e t r e a t i n g i n t o the f o r m a l i s m o f a p u r e s t r u c t u r e s t r u c t u r a l i s m can f i n a l l y l o c a t e an absolute a n d o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , a m e a n i n g independent o f a n y c o n t e n t and s o o f any p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n o r interpretation. B u t the p r o b l e m w i t h this u l t i m a t e r e t r e a t i s that i f w e abstract altogether f r o m the c o n t e n t o f the system, the s t r u c t u r e also disappears, f o r the s t r u c t u r e is i n e r a d i c a b l y the s t r u c t u r e of a system o f k i n s h i p , and i t corresponds t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the system, f o r e x a m p l e i n t e r m s o f descent t h e o r y , w o u l d i n v o l v e d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . T h u s once w e have abstracted f r o m a l l c o n t e n t , the s t r u c t u r e disappears as w e l l and t h e r e is n o t h i n g l e f t to e x p l a i n . T h e ' i d e a l o b j e c t ' becomes a p u r e , d i s e m b o d i e d , meaningless f o r m . N e e d h a m , to his c r e d i t , seems b e l a t e d l y to have r e c o g n i z e d this a n d to have disappeared u p his n a v a l i n t o a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n v o i d . These d e v e l o p m e n t s i n the s t r u c t u r a l analysis o f k i n s h i p b r i n g o u t v e r y v i v i d l y the d i l e m m a o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m . S t r u c t u r a l i s m aims to isolate a c u l t u r a l system w h o s e o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g c a n t h e n be subjected to a s c i e n t i f i c analysis. In o r d e r to do this it is necessary t o establish the p u r e o b j e c t i v i t y o f the system. B u t t o establish the pure o b j e c t i v i t y o f the system i t i s necessary t o abstract f r o m e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e n t that the system m i g h t have and e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t m i g h t b e p l a c e d o n i t . A t each stage the o b j e c t i v i t y of t h e analysis is c o m p r o m i s e d as it becomes apparent that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o p o s e d does n o t have any absolute v a l i d i t y , i s n o t i n h e r e n t i n the absolute o b j e c t i v i t y o f the ideal system, b u t is a c o n s t r u c t of the analyst w h o s e v a l i d i t y must depend o n its e m p i r i c a l e v a l u a t i o n . T h e a t t e m p t to separate the system f r o m its c o n t e x t leads to a progressive r e t r e a t i n t o f o r m a l i s m , and u l t i m a t e l y t o c o m p l e t e defeat. T h e c o n c l u s i o n , that w e w i l l find r e c u r r i n g , is that the a t t e m p t t o l o c a t e a u t o n o m o u s c u l t u r a l systems, w h e t h e r l i n g u i s t i c , conceptual or symbolic, whose m e a n i n g is objective, independent o f and p r i o r t o t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n , i s a v a i n one. T h e c o n c l u s i o n s h o u l d h a r d l y b e s u r p r i s i n g , f o r the s t r u c t u r a l i s t p r o j e c t i m p l i e s t h a t there i s a w o r l d o f meanings b e y o n d the human apprehension of particular meanings, that meaning can

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e x i s t w i t h o u t b e i n g m e a n i n g f o r somebody. I t used t o b e b e l i e v e d that such a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d o f m e a n i n g existed, and the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n i m p l i c i t i n the c l a i m was resolved b y i n v e n t i n g a n absolute B e i n g f o r w h o m the w o r l d was m e a n i n g f u l , G o d . T h e study of these meanings was c a l l e d t h e o l o g y , a n d it is to t h e o l o g i c a l questions, and t h e o l o g i c a l solutions, t h a t s t r u c t u r a l i s m leads, as it t o o invents a G o d , the great Scientist in the sky, w h o can guarantee the o b j e c t i v i t y o f its systems o f m e a n i n g . F o r those, l i k e L é v i - S t r a u s s , f o r w h o m G o d has n o m e a n i n g , the r e t r e a t i n t o f o r m a l i s m u l t i m a t e l y yields the c o n c l u s i o n that f o r e d o o m e d the p r o j e c t : the w o r l d is declared to be i n h e r e n t l y meaningless, all m e a n i n g is t h e r e f o r e subjective, a r b i t r a r y , v a i n .

N O T E S 1 C. H a r t , ' R e v i e w of Les structures Elémentaires de la Parenté', American Anthropologist, 52, 1950, p. 393; F. K o r n , Elementary Structures Reconsidered, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, pp. 141-2; R. Needham, Structure and Sentiment, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 2; R. Needham, Rethinking Kinship and Marriage, Tavistock, London, 1971, p. x c i v . 2 R. Needham, 'A Structural Analysis of A i m o l Society', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 116, 1960, p. 102. 3' 4 5 6 7 8

1972d, p. 334. FKS, pp. 13, 14; SA, p. 50. D a v y , op. cit., pp. 3 5 1 - 2 . 1956a, pp. 273, 284. 1970c, p. 302. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology and Other Essays, Free Press, Glencoe, 1962.

V I . Structuralism in Linguistics I N the last t w o chapters I have s h o w n h o w L é v i - S t r a u s s ' fundamental philosophical inspiration drove h i m to develop a distinctive t h e o r y o f society a n d m e t h o d o f analysis i n the a t t e m p t t o discover the o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n c u l t u r e . I n p a r t i c u l a r L é v i - S t r a u s s sought to isolate k i n s h i p systems as o b j e c t i v e systems of m e a n i n g that e x i s t e d , a n d c o u l d b e a n a l y z e d , i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r particular application o r o f their meaning for particular i n d i v i d u a l s . These o b j e c t i v e systems o f m e a n i n g L é v i - S t r a u s s l o c a t e d i n the unconscious m i n d w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d n o t o n l y t h a t they w o u l d b e o b j e c t i v e , b u t also t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l than any s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m . T h e s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d , and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g emphasis o n the f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f the systems u n d e r r e v i e w , f o l l o w e d f r o m this a t t e m p t t o isolate the o b j e c t i v e , u n i v e r s a l , m e a n i n g o f the systems. I n the last c h a p t e r I a r g u e d t h a t i t i s this v i e w o f the h u m a n w o r l d a s a w o r l d o f o b j e c t i v e , unconscious o r c o l l e c t i v e , c u l t u r a l systems w i t h i n w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s are inserted, t h a t i s the fundam e n t a l i n s p i r a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m . I t results f r o m the search f o r the o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f c u l t u r e , a n d i t results i n the i s o l a t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e c u l t u r a l systems t h a t are amenable to s t u d y by the methods o f the p o s i t i v e sciences. S t r u c t u r a l i s m , t h e r e f o r e , appears to m a k e possible the establishm e n t o f a u t o n o m o u s and o b j e c t i v e h u m a n sciences, because i t provides those sciences w i t h t h e i r o w n independent a n d o b j e c t i v e fields o f study: t h e p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l systems w h i c h are t h e i r c o n c e r n , w h e t h e r a r t , l i t e r a t u r e , m u s i c , m y t h , o r , a s i n the case already studied, systems o f k i n s h i p . T h e v i a b i l i t y o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m depends e n t i r e l y o n its a b i l i t y t o isolate g e n u i n e l y autonomous a n d o b j e c t i v e systems o f m e a n i n g . The scientific claims of structuralism, as w e l l as the cultural idealism o n w h i c h these are based, d e p e n d o n the v a l i d i t y o f its attempt to isolate such cultural systems. In the case of the theory of 117

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k i n s h i p I a r g u e d t h a t such systems c o u l d n o t in fact be isolated, for once k i n s h i p systems had been abstracted f r o m t h e i r e t h n o g r a p h i c c o n t e x t , t h e r e was n o t h i n g l e f t t o e x p l a i n . I n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' case the f a i l u r e o f the e t h n o g r a p h i c data t o c o r r e s p o n d t o the ideal o b j e c t t h a t h e had c o n s t r u c t e d l e d h i m t o r e t r e a t i n t o the unconscious and postulate a p u r e l y m e t a p h y s i c a l existence f o r this object, w i t h the result that h e o f f e r e d k n o w l e d g e o f a n o b j e c t f o r whose existence t h e r e was n o e v i d e n c e , w h i l e h e r e d u c e d e t h n o g r a p h i c r e a l i t y , w h i c h d e p a r t e d f r o m this object, t o the status o f a massive d i s t o r t i o n o f this f u n d a m e n t a l , but inaccessible, r e a l i t y , p r o d u c e d b y subjective i l l u s i o n and c o n t i n gent h i s t o r i c a l events. I n the case o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s m o f N e e d h a m and D u m o n t the f a i l u r e t o l o c a t e any o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t i e s o f k i n s h i p systems l e d f i r s t to an e m p t y f o r m a l i s m and, u l t i m a t e l y , to the a b a n d o n m e n t o f any a t t e m p t t o generalize b e y o n d the specific e t h n o g r a p h i c c o n t e x t i n w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r systems are f o u n d . A l t h o u g h Lévi-Strauss' w o r k , and p a r t i c u l a r l y The Elementary Structures of Kinship, has been the m a i n stimulus to the d e v e l o p m e n t of s t r u c t u r a l i s m as an i n t e l l e c t u a l m o v e m e n t , this stimulus has o w e d m u c h o f its force t o the fact that L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k reproduces an approach that had been developed q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s . I t was above all this c o n v e r g e n c e that suggested t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l i s t approach m i g h t have a m o r e general a p p l i c a b i l i t y t h a n the p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s o f l i n g u i s t i c s and k i n s h i p studies i n w h i c h i t was d e v e l o p e d . L i n g u i s t i c s is i m p o r t a n t to s t r u c t u r a l i s m f o r several reasons Firstly, although Lévi-Strauss' structuralism was formed quite i n d e p e n d e n t l y i t was o n l y w i t h his encounter w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s that h e became f u l l y a w a r e o f the t h e o r e t i c a l , m e t h o d o l o g i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f his approach, and i t was o n l y this e n c o u n t e r t h a t gave h i m the c o n f i d e n c e t o generalize his f i n d i n g s and to o f f e r s t r u c t u r a l i s m as a m e t h o d for a l l the h u m a n sciences. L i n g u i s t i c s , m o r e o v e r , f i l l e d the last gap i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t h e o r y b y p r o v i d i n g h i m w i t h a p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l t h e o r y o f the u n c o n scious, and i t w a s this t h a t e n a b l e d h i m t o e l a b o r a t e his h u m a n philosophy. Secondly, i t i s the h u m a n l i n g u i s t i c c a p a c i t y t h a t m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g else distinguishes humans f r o m o t h e r a n i m a l s , and it is language that is the most powerful and the most complete means of


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s y m b o l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o humans. T h u s f o r s t r u c t u r a l ism, w h i c h i s c o n c e r n e d p r e c i s e l y w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f the o b j e c t i v e f o u n d a t i o n o f c u l t u r e , and w i t h the analysis o f c u l t u r e a s a series of s y m b o l i c systems, l i n g u i s t i c s must have s t r o n g claims as the f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n science. T h i r d l y , the s t r u c t u r a l i s t a p p r o a c h w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s (using the t e r m i n the E u r o p e a n rather t h a n the N o r t h A m e r i c a n sense) has considerable achievements t o its c r e d i t i n a d v a n c i n g o u r u n d e r standing and o u r k n o w l e d g e o f language. I t was, t h e r e f o r e , the achievements o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m w i t h i n linguistics, a t least a s m u c h as w i t h i n a n t h r o p o l o g y , that gave s t r u c t u r a l i s m an apparent scientific a u t h o r i t y . F o u r t h l y , l i n g u i s t i c s has p r o v i d e d a d i r e c t i n s p i r a t i o n to the development o f m o d e r n structuralism, quite independently o f Lévi-Strauss. T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y the case w i t h t h e rise o f ' s e m i o l o g y ' w h i c h represents a n e x t e n s i o n o f the methods o f linguistics t o n o n - l i n g u i s t i c s y m b o l i c systems. T h u s R o l a n d Barthes and the Tel Quel g r o u p d e v e l o p e d a s t r u c t u r a l i s t s e m i o l o g y independently o f any contact w i t h L é v i - S t r a u s s , a l t h o u g h t h e i r w o r k was subsequently i n f l u e n c e d b y L é v i - S t r a u s s . In this chapter I w a n t to l o o k at s t r u c t u r a l i s m in l i n g u i s t i c s . S t r u c t u r a l i s m in linguistics has been based on e x a c t l y the same foundations as those developed i n d e p e n d e n t l y by Lévi-Strauss in The Elementary Structures. It t o o has supposedly established linguistics as a p o s i t i v e science by i s o l a t i n g o b j e c t i v e systems of l i n g u i s t i c meaning, independent o f any p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n o r o f any p a r t i c u l a r subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h i t has l o c a t e d i n the unconscious m i n d . I n this chapter I w a n t t o l o o k a t l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r a l i s m to ask w h e t h e r it has successfully i s o l a t e d language as such an o b j e c t i v e system.

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L A N G U A G E Saussure is h a i l e d as the f o u n d e r of the m o d e r n science of linguistics because it was he w h o isolated language as an autonomous o b j e c t amenable t o s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . H i s a i m was, as far as possible, to isolate language f r o m p s y c h o l o g i c a l , sociological and physiological considerations, and so to explain the

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facts o f language b y reference t o ' l i n g u i s t i c ' c o n s t r a i n t s alone. H e d i d this b y the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h r e e contrasts. Saussure distinguishes b e t w e e n langue and parole, b e t w e e n f o r m and substance, and b e t w e e n s y n c h r o n y and d i a c h r o n y . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f these contrasts defines a closed corpus of s c i e n t i f i c facts, an o b j e c t i v e system o f language supposedly d i v o r c e d f r o m any p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n o f the system o r f r o m any p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f it. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n langue and parole d e r i v e d i n p a r t f r o m D u r k h e i m , b u t m a i n l y , i t seems, f r o m M e i l l e t , N a v i l l e and W h i t n e y . T h e a i m o f the d i s t i n c t i o n was t o separate a system l y i n g b e h i n d the l i n g u i s t i c act f r o m the act itself, a n d so to separate p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c questions f r o m those w h i c h w o u l d i n t r o d u c e p s y c h o l o g i c a l , p h y s i o l o g i c a l or s o c i o l o g i c a l considerations. Langue, f o r Saussure, represents the social and the essential, w h i l e parole represents the accessory and a c c i d e n t a l . Langue is, t h e r e f o r e , s t r i c t l y c o m p a r a b l e w i t h D u r k h e i m ' s c o l l e c t i v e conscience a s a n o b j e c t i v e system t h a t i s e x t e r n a l t o the i n d i v i d u a l a n d resistant t o the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l . L i n g u i s t i c s confines its a t t e n t i o n t o the facts o f langue, and so is p r o v i d e d w i t h an o b j e c t that is free of i n t e r f e r e n c e a r i s i n g in the use of langue. A l t h o u g h langue is an i d e a l - o b j e c t , c o n s t r u c t e d by the analyst by a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m the a c t u a l sentences used by n a t i v e speakers, Saussure b e l i e v e d that langue w a s a specific r e a l i t y w h i c h has its 'seat i n the b r a i n ' . Saussure, t h e r e f o r e , r e t a i n e d the m e n t a l i s m o f his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , seeking ' t o e x p l a i n the facts o f language b y facts of t h o u g h t , t a k e n as established'. H e n c e , f o r Saussure, the l i n g u i s t i c sign is a ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l e n t i t y ' , u n i t i n g a ' c o n c e p t ' and a ' s o u n d - i m a g e ' , and l i n g u i s t i c s is a specialized b r a n c h of psychology. 1

T h e second f u n d a m e n t a l c o n t r a s t i n t r o d u c e d by Saussure is that b e t w e e n f o r m and substance: 'Language is a form and not a substance'. For Saussure the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the c o n c e p t and the soundi m a g e t h a t m a k e up the sign is an arbitrary r e l a t i o n . T h e r e is n o t h i n g i n the c o n c e p t ' t r e e ' w h i c h makes the sound ' t r e e ' especially a p p r o p r i a t e , n o r does the sound ' t r e e ' i n i t s e l f c o n t a i n a n y t h i n g o f its concept. H e n c e each language uses a d i f f e r e n t b i t of sound to s i g n i f y a d i f f e r e n t b i t o f t h o u g h t , and the assignment o f concept t o s o u n d - i m a g e is a r b i t r a r y . In this respect spoken language differs from other symbolic systems in which the relation between signifier 2

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and signified ( t h e t w o faces of the sign) is n o t a r b i t r a r y . I d i o g r a p h i c w r i t i n g i s a n o b v i o u s e x a m p l e , w h e r e the c o n c e p t ' t r e e ' m a y b e represented by a p i c t u r e of a t r e e . For Saussure t h o u g h t and sound represent t w o c o n t i n u a , i n the absence o f l a n g u a g e : ' W i t h o u t language thought is a vague uncharted nebula. . . . Phonic substance is neither more fixed nor more r i g i d than thought. . . . N o t only are the t w o domains that are l i n k e d by the linguistic fact shapeless and confused, but the c hoice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea is c o m p l e t e l y a r b i t r a r y ' .

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The l i n g u i s t i c s i g n does n o t , t h e r e f o r e , take p r e - e x i s t i n g ideas and p r e - e x i s t i n g sounds and t h e n associate t h e m one by one in an atomistic w a y . Instead language relates t w o systems t o one another, the system o f sounds and the system o f t h o u g h t s , d i v i d i n g u p each c o n t i n u u m i n a p a r t i c u l a r w a y . I t i s this c o n c e p t i o n o f meaning that f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s contrasts s o sharply w i t h Bergson's metaphysics. 4

It is this c o n c e p t i o n that u n d e r l i e s the separation ofform f r o m substance. T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t languages is a difference o f form, a d i f f e r e n c e i n the w a y i n w h i c h the c o m m o n substances, c o n t i n u a o f sound and o f t h o u g h t , are d i v i d e d u p i n d i f f e r e n t languages. H e n c e l i n g u i s t i c s concerns i t s e l f o n l y w i t h the f o r m , and n o t w i t h the substance o f language, the l a t t e r b e i n g a m a t t e r o f indifference f o r the l i n g u i s t . T h e system o f sounds, f o r e x a m p l e , i s created solely b y the relations b e t w e e n sounds, the p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y o f the sound b e i n g i r r e l e v a n t . F r o m the l i n g u i s t i c p o i n t o f v i e w a l l that is i m p o r t a n t is that d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n sounds are i n t r o duced i n t o w h a t is n a t u r a l l y a c o n t i n u u m . T h i s emphasis o n f o r m f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y f r o m the i s o l a t i o n o f the system o f language f r o m its m a t e r i a l and its c o n c e p t u a l substratum. B y a b s t r a c t i n g a l t o g e t h e r f r o m substance linguistics acquires its a u t o n o m y f r o m p h y s i o l o g y and p s y c h o l o g y . T h u s phonemics, w h i c h studies the sound system of language as a f o r m a l system, is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m p h o n e t i c s , w h i c h studies the substance o f l i n g u i s t i c sounds a n d i s a b r a n c h o f p h y s i o l o g y and psychology. H e n c e i t i s the i s o l a t i o n o f the system o f language that gives rise t o the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d o f analysis, f o r i n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m c o n t e n t language i s pure f o r m . T h e c r u c i a l c r i t i c a l question i s w h e t h e r f o r m can b e dissociated f r o m c o n t e n t i n this w a y . The conception of the sign also makes it possible for Saussure to

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separate sound and t h o u g h t f r o m one another a n d to study the system o f sounds and the system o f thoughts i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one another. T h i s means that l i n g u i s t i c s can analyze language as a c o m b i n a t i o n o f sounds w i t h o u t m a k i n g any reference t o m e a n i n g . C o r r e l a t i v e l y m e a n i n g can b e a n a l y z e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f sound, s o p h o n o l o g y and semantics are d i s t i n c t branches o f l i n g u i s t i c s . Saussure's t h i r d contrast c o m p l e t e s the i s o l a t i o n of a closed system w h i c h can become the o b j e c t o f a s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c analysis. Saussure distinguishes the s y n c h r o n i c , or static, perspect i v e , f r o m the d i a c h r o n i c , o r e v o l u t i o n a r y , p e r s p e c t i v e , a c c o r d i n g p r i m a c y t o the s y n c h r o n i c . T h e s y n c h r o n i c p e r s p e c t i v e focusses e x c l u s i v e l y o n the relations b e t w e e n the parts o f the system o f langue at a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t in t i m e . T h e d i a c h r o n i c perspective studies the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n l i n g u i s t i c facts. Saussure gives several d i f f e r e n t reasons f o r a c c o r d i n g p r i o r i t y to the s y n c h r o n i c , a n d his o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s t o r i c i s m , w h i c h h a d personal as w e l l as i d e o l o g i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c o r i g i n s , c e r t a i n l y predisposed h i m t o seek the laws o f the system. H i s t w o m a i n arguments are very different in kind. F i r s t l y , Saussure offers a m e n t a l i s t a r g u m e n t . H i s p s y c h o l o g i s m means t h a t he is interested essentially in establishing ' l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s ' . T h e s y n c h r o n i c v i e w p o i n t , therefore, ' p r e d o m i n a t e s , f o r i t i s the t r u e and o n l y r e a l i t y t o the c o m m u n i t y o f speakers', w h i l e the h i s t o r i c a l connections have n o psychol o g i c a l r e a l i t y . T h i s a r g u m e n t c l e a r l y depends o n the m e n t a l i s t assumption t h a t linguistics is a b r a n c h of p s y c h o l o g y . 5

Secondly, Saussure offers a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t . It is the character o f the object o f l i n g u i s t i c s w h i c h makes i t amenable t o s y n c h r o n i c analysis: 'Because the sign i s a r b i t r a r y i t f o l l o w s n o l a w o t h e r t h a n t h a t o f t r a d i t i o n . ' Saussure argues b y analogy w i t h m a r g i n a l i s t economics, w h i c h t o a considerable e x t e n t o f f e r e d h i m a m o d e l f o r his o w n systematic l i n g u i s t i c s . F r o m m a r g i n a l i s m h e b o r r o w s the n o t i o n o f v a l u e a s a n a r b i t r a r y r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t h i n g and a p r i c e , w h i c h h e t h e n applies t o the l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s i g n i f i e r and s i g n i f i e d . In each case the value is d e t e r m i n e d b y the i n s e r t i o n o f the element i n a n e q u i l i b r i u m system and so depends solely on the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the elements, and n o t o n past states o f the s y s t e m . 6

T h e fact t h a t Saussure offers t w o arguments f o r the p r i o r i t y o f the synchronic is very important, for these arguments are mutually

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exclusive. Saussure's w o r k is r i v e n by a c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o f language and o f l i n g u i s t i c s . T h e d o m i n a n t v i e w i s the m e n t a l i s t one a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h language i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y , seated in the b r a i n , a n d the l i n g u i s t explores p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s . L i n g u i s t i c s is then an autonomous b r a n c h o f p s y c h o l o g y . T h e o t h e r v i e w i s that language is a c o l l e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n , and so a social r e a l i t y , and the linguist t h e r e f o r e explores f u n c t i o n a l connections. I n the f o r m e r case the l i n g u i s t is concerned to discover p s y c h o l o g i c a l relations between the elements of language, in the l a t t e r case t h e l i n g u i s t is concerned t o discover l i n g u i s t i c relations. T h e t w o are b y n o means the same: w h i l e l i n g u i s t i c relations need have no psychol o g i c a l r e a l i t y , p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s need have n o l i n g u i s t i c significance. T h e m e n t a l i s t a r g u m e n t i n f a v o u r o f the p r i o r i t y o f the synchronic c l e a r l y o n l y applies t o the m e n t a l i s t v i e w o f l i n g u i s t i c s . T h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t , o n the o t h e r hand, does n o t apply i f linguistics i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l and l o g i c a l connections', f o r the sign i s n o t a r b i t r a r y f r o m a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w . T h e m e a n i n g o f the sound ' t r e e ' f o r a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l i s not d e t e r m i n e d o n l y b y its r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r l i n g u i s t i c sounds: its contrasts w i t h 'bush', 'house', ' s k y ' , ' p o l e ' , etc. It is also d e t e r m i n e d b y a l l the previous uses o f the sign t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l has e n c o u n t e r e d : the trees to w h i c h it has been a p p l i e d , the contexts w i t h i n w h i c h i t has been u t t e r e d . T h u s i f I hear a w o r d the p s y c h o l o g i c a l connections it establishes c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y refer t o a w h o l e series o f past l i n g u i s t i c events. T h u s i f language i s l o o k e d at as a m e n t a l r e a l i t y the sign is by no means a r b i t r a r y and its m e a n i n g is by no means d e f i n e d by its r e l a t i o n s w i t h contemporaneous elements o f the language. L i n g u i s t i c s has been p l a g u e d by a confusion of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l and the l i n g u i s t i c v i e w p o i n t s ever since Saussure. B o t h v i e w p o i n t s are l e g i t i m a t e , b u t they are m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e i n t h a t they n o t o n l y p r o v i d e d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s , they are also e x p l a i n i n g quite d i f f e r e n t things. T h e l i n g u i s t i c approach i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the language as a f u n c t i o n i n g system. T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l approach is concerned w i t h the w a y i n w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l learns and uses a language. A language exists at the i n t e r s e c t i o n of these t w o approaches: it m u s t f u n c t i o n as a language, and it m u s t be possible for people to l e a r n and to use i t .

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Because Saussure regards language as a m e n t a l p h e n o m e n o n he makes the s y n c h r o n i c and the d i a c h r o n i c approaches m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . T h e r e is no p a n c h r o n i c v i e w p o i n t , he insists, so language c a n n o t be seen as a developing system, because the s y n c h r o n i c perspective seeks i n t e r n a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d systematic c o n n e c t i o n s , w h i l e the d i a c h r o n i c v i e w p o i n t relates n o t systems b u t terms. H i s t o r y for Saussure is therefore the i n t e g r a t i o n of c o n t i n g e n t events i n t o a stable system, and l i n g u i s t i c change becomes i n e x p l i c a b l e . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the t h r e e contrasts provides l i n g u i s t i c s w i t h an object. T h a t object consists in a s y n c h r o n i c and stable system of signs b e t w e e n w h i c h the l i n g u i s t can seek ' l o g i c a l and psychol o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s ' . T h i s system is n o t an o b j e c t presented to the l i n g u i s t , b u t has been a n a l y t i c a l l y isolated f r o m discourse on the basis o f a n u m b e r o f assumptions a b o u t the n a t u r e o f language. T h e effect is to isolate language as a s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t f r o m the speaker, f r o m the hearer, and f r o m the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h language i s used. H e n c e an i d e a l - o b j e c t is c o n s t r u c t e d w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a closed system w h o s e relations can be established p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e l y . Saussure's d i s c o v e r y o f a system i m m a n e n t i n the relations b e t w e e n the terms a p p a r e n t l y made it possible to establish a s c i e n t i f i c l i n g u i s t i c s . E v e n m e a n i n g , w i t h i n Saussure's t h e o r y , c o u l d b e g i v e n a r i g o r o u s l y o b j e c t i v e and systematic d e f i n i t i o n . I t i s the system o f differences, i m p o s e d o n the c o n t i n u u m o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i n t r o d u c e s p r e c i s i o n t o the B e r g s o n i a n 'state o f m u s h ' . T h e c o n v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n the achievements o f Saussure and those o f L é v i - S t r a u s s seems s t a r t l i n g , a v i n d i c a t i o n o f the theories o f each. H o w e v e r i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o b e v e r y clear t h a t Saussure's l i n g u i s t i c s is no m o r e an a c h i e v e m e n t of science t h a n is LéviStrauss' a n t h r o p o l o g y . Saussure n e v e r m a n a g e d to e m b o d y his p h i l o s o p h y o f language i n systematic analyses o f p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c systems, and s o i t r e m a i n e d p r o g r a m m a t i c . I t is, m o r e o v e r , a n e x t r e m e l y confused p r o g r a m m e i n m a n y respects, w h i c h is one reason w h y Saussure can be c l a i m e d as a f o r b e a r by v e r y d i f f e r e n t schools o f l i n g u i s t i c s . T h e c o n v e r g e n c e arises n o t because Saussure and Lévi-Strauss i n d e p e n d e n t l y d i s c o v e r e d s o m e t h i n g a b o u t r e a l i t y , b u t because they i n d e p e n d e n t l y set themselves the same task. This task was the development of a positive science of human

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c u l t u r e based on a c o n c e p t i o n of c u l t u r a l p h e n o m e n a as o b j e c t i v e systems o f f o r m s dissociated f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l subject, w i t h their o w n i m m a n e n t and specific l a w s , i m p o s i n g themselves o n the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h the force o f the unconscious. I n the case o f Saussure, as m u c h as in that of Lévi-Strauss, it is this i d e o l o g i c a l p r o g r a m m e t h a t gives rise t o the s t r u c t u r a l a p p r o a c h , a n d i t gives rise t o c o m p a r a b l e t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s .

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Saussure p r o p o s e d a s c i e n t i f i c l i n g u i s t i c s t h a t w o u l d be based on the i s o l a t i o n of langue as a stable, w e l l - d e f i n e d , o b j e c t i v e system whose i n t e r n a l relations l i n g u i s t i c s c o u l d analyze w i t h the methods o f p o s i t i v e science. Saussure's p r o g r a m m e b e g g e d m a n y questions that w o u l d have to be c o n f r o n t e d b e f o r e a systematic linguistics c o u l d d e v e l o p , b u t his insistence o n the p r i o r i t y o f f o r m over c o n t e n t w a s v i t a l i n m a k i n g possible the emergence o f linguistics as an a u t o n o m o u s d i s c i p l i n e . T h e p h o n i c a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l substance o f language c o u l d b e s t u d i e d b y acoustics, p h y s i o l o g y and p s y c h o l o g y . T h e f o r m o f language, h o w e v e r , c o u l d n o t b e s t u d i e d b y o t h e r disciplines, the f o r m was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f l i n g u i s t i c s a n d o f l i n g u i s t i c s alone: i t was the f o r m , the systematic r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the parts, t h a t made the p h o n i c and p s y c h o l o g i c a l s u b s t r a t u m f u n c t i o n as a language. Saussure's w o r k i s one s m a l l m o m e n t i n a n i n t e l l e c t u a l and i d e o l o g i c a l u p h e a v a l o f g l o b a l dimensions, i n w h i c h a t t e n t i o n came to be focussed on the systematic relations b e t w e e n the parts of wholes w h i c h nineteenth century positivism had tried to disaggregate i n t o t h e i r c o m p o n e n t atoms. I n this sense s t r u c t u r alism in l i n g u i s t i c s is s i m p l y a p a r t of the g l o b a l m o v e m e n t and has n o special significance. A s J a k o b s o n w r o t e i n 1929: ' W e r e we to comprise the leading idea of present-day science in its most various manifestations, we could hardly f i n d a more appropriate designation than structuralism. A n y set of phenomena examined by contemporary science is treated not as a mechanical agglomeration but as a structural w h o l e , and the basic task is to reveal the inner, whether static or developmental, laws of this system. W h a t appears to be the focus of scientific preoccupations is no longer the outer stimulus, but the internal premises of the development; n o w the mechanical conception of processes yields to the question of their functions.' 7

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W i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s Saussure i n t r o d u c e d a n e w w a y o f l o o k i n g a t language as a system. Instead of r e g a r d i n g language as an organism i n w h i c h the wholeness o f language d e r i v e d f r o m some transcendent s p i r i t u a l q u a l i t y , he l o o k e d on language as a system whose wholeness d e r i v e d f r o m the i n t e r n a l , f o r m a l , c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n its parts. T h u s Saussure's c o n c e p t i o n of language as a system made it possible to steer a course b e t w e e n the reefs o f ' a t o m i s m ' and ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m ' : the w h o l e is m o r e t h a n the sum of its parts, b u t it is no m o r e t h a n the s u m of the relations between the parts. H o w e v e r , b e f o r e the n e w l i n g u i s t i c s c o u l d d e v e l o p i t had t o specify m o r e c l e a r l y t h a n had Saussure w h a t p r e c i s e l y is the n e w o b j e c t of l i n g u i s t i c s , langue. F o r Saussure langue r e m a i n e d a p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y and the r e l a t i o n s he sought w e r e psychological relations to be discovered by an i n t u i t i o n i s t psychology. T h u s the basic u n i t o f sound i s the a u d i t o r y i m p r e s s i o n . T w o d i f f e r e n t sounds express a single a u d i t o r y i m p r e s s i o n if they are e x p e r i e n c e d as the same sound, and they are d i f f e r e n t if speaking subjects are conscious o f a d i f f e r e n c e . T h i s l e d t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f the sound u n i t s of language as discrete substantive elements, defined i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the elements, a c o n c e p t i o n t h a t p r o v e d q u i t e inadequate. T h u s l i n g u i s t i c s c o u l d n o t advance o n the basis o f Saussure's m e n t a l i s m . T h e relations o f language c o u l d n o t be the conscious p s y c h o l o g i c a l connections b e t w e e n d i s c r e t e substantive elements that Saussure postulated, b u t must b e m o r e abstract i n character. If langue is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y i d e n t i f i e d as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y the q u e s t i o n arises o f the status o f the object o f l i n g u i s t i c s . H o w is langue to be isolated f r o m the data of parole? W h a t relations m a k e u p the f o r m o f langue? W h a t are the elements oflangue u n i t e d b y those relations? W h a t i s the status o f the r e l a t i o n s u n c o v e r e d — d o they c o r r e s p o n d t o r e a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r even o r g a n i c connections, or do they have some o t h e r status? T h e r e are t w o d i s t i n c t approaches t o these questions t o b e f o u n d w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s , w h i c h can b e b r o a d l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s p o s i t i v i s t and p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l . T h e p o s i t i v i s t v i e w i s t h a t the i d e a l - o b j e c t , langue, that is isolated by the l i n g u i s t corresponds to a substantial p s y c h o l o g i c a l or b e h a v i o u r a l r e a l i t y , thus langue exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y of, and p r i o r t o , parole. T h i s means t h a t the terms o f the linguistic theory can be translated into observational terms that

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describe a r e a l i t y t h a t is the m e c h a n i s m t h a t people use w h e n t h e y speak. L i n g u i s t i c s is t h e r e f o r e , as it was f o r Saussure, an autonomous b r a n c h o f p s y c h o l o g y . T h e study o f language t h e r e lore reveals facts about the b i o l o g i c a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l h u m a n organism. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l v i e w is t h a t there is no such t h i n g as a langue dissociated f r o m the c o n t e x t in w h i c h l a n g u a g e is used. Once a b s t r a c t i o n has been m a d e f r o m the c o n t e x t , so t h a t language is d i v o r c e d f r o m the speaker or the hearer whose i n t e r a c t i o n it articulates, it ceases to be language a n d becomes a meaningless j u m b l e o f sounds. T o discover w h a t i s l i n g u i s t i c about language, to discover the systematic relations t h a t m a k e it possible for language to be the means by w h i c h m e a n i n g can be c o m m u n i c a t e d , w e have t o refer n o t t o ' o b j e c t i v e ' relations e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n the parts o f a n i n e r t o b j e c t , b u t r a t h e r t o the intentions o f the speaker o f the language t h a t i m p o s e m e a n i n g o n language. L a n g u a g e thus has to be seen as a f u n c t i o n a l system and the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s of a language have to be r e l a t e d to the functions o f the language a s t h e i n s t r u m e n t b y w h i c h c o m m u n i cative i n t e n t i o n s are r e a l i z e d . For the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h langue is an a b s t r a c t i o n and the r e l a t i o n s t h a t m a k e up the system of langue are abstract relations, n o t i n h e r e n t i n the o b j e c t , b u t i m p o s e d o n t h e object b y the i n t e n t i o n o f the speaker and r e c o v e r e d b y the hearer. Language is n o t an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , b u t n o r is it p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e , it is the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e expression of a subjective i n t e n t i o n . L i n g u i s t i c s is concerned w i t h the study o f the w a y i n w h i c h language a s a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e a l i t y makes it possible f o r m e r e sounds to g i v e a subjective i n t e n t i o n an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . Since language does not express p h y s i o l o g i c a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l mechanisms, linguistics cannot t e l l u s a n y t h i n g d i r e c t l y about the m i n d o r t h e b r a i n . B o t h these approaches can be used to l e g i t i m a t e the s t r u c t u r a l analysis o f language, b u t the t w o approaches l e g i t i m a t e the analysis i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s , u n d e r s t a n d the r e l a t i o n s t h a t emerge quite d i f f e r e n t l y , and d r a w v e r y d i f f e r e n t conclusions f r o m the findings o f l i n g u i s t i c s . Saussure's l i n g u i s t i c s was based on an i n t u i t i o n i s t p s y c h o l o g y for w h i c h the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f language w e r e t o b e discovered b y i n t r o s p e c t i o n . A t the t i m e Saussure was w r i t i n g this was the dominant approach advocated by positivist philosophy, and

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exemplified by the psychology of Wundt or Titchener (whose task was not to discover structures, but to decompose them into their elements). A t the t i m e i t was f e l t that the o n l y c e r t a i n truths w e r e those r e v e a l e d by i n t r o s p e c t i o n and so i n t r o s p e c t i o n p r o v i d e d the o n l y basis f o r a g e n u i n e l y o b j e c t i v e science. H o w e v e r , it soon became clear, in linguistics as in p s y c h o l o g y , t h a t the truths of i n t r o s p e c t i o n w e r e far f r o m secure. F r o m this p o i n t the divergence b e t w e e n p o s i t i v i s m and p h e n o m e n o l o g y emerges. Phenomenology, developed by Husserl on the basis of work by Brentano, sought to establish intuitive truths that were secure and i n d u b i t a b l e , w h i l e p o s i t i v i s m , d e v e l o p e d b y Russell, W i t t g e n s t e i n and above a l l by the V i e n n a C i r c l e , sought to re-establish a secure science o n the basis o f a t o t a l r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the subject, r e j e c t i n g any appeal to evidence t h a t was based on subjective r e p o r t s . W i t h i n p s y c h o l o g y a c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i v e r g e n c e developed b e t w e e n a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p s y c h o l o g y that c a m e to r e l y on the i n t u i t i v e r e c o v e r y o f m e a n i n g , and a b e h a v i o u r i s t p s y c h o l o g y that r e n o u n c e d any appeal to i n t r o s p e c t i o n a n d abolished any reference to the m i n d or to a m e n t a l r e a l i t y as hopelessly m e t a physical. T h e basis o f the d i v e r g e n c e i n each case w a s the search f o r c e r t a i n t y , f o r a m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence t h a t i s i n d u b i t a b l y t r u e . For p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l approaches the t r u e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence is i r r e d u c i b l y subjective, to be d i s c o v e r e d in the h u m a n i n t e n t i o n s that i t expresses. For b e h a v i o u r i s m the subjective m e a n i n g is pure e p i p h e n o m e n o n , a c o n c e i t e d i l l u s i o n , r e d u c i b l e to the o n l y t r u e r e a l i t y w h i c h i s the r e a l i t y o f the o r g a n i c processes that u n d e r l i e the connections b e t w e e n s t i m u l i and responses. T h u s b e h a v i o u r i s m deduces a n o b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f the o r g a n i s m f r o m the p r o p e r t i e s o f h u m a n b e h a v i o u r . T h e d i v e r g e n c e i s s t r i c t l y p a r a l l e l t o that b e t w e e n Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s a l r e a d y e x a m i n e d : b o t h sought the t r u e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e b e h i n d the d e c e i t and h y p o c r i s y o f c o n t e m p o r a r y society, one b e l i e v i n g it to be a subjective m e a n i n g to be f o u n d t h r o u g h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i q u e o f subjective e x p e r i e n c e , the other believing it to be an objective meaning, embedded in human n a t u r e , expressed i n the o b j e c t i v i t y o f h u m a n c u l t u r a l achievements. L a n g u a g e is, o f course, p r e - e m i n e n t a m o n g such achievements. Thus the study of language has both reflected and


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s t i m u l a t e d the f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate b e t w e e n p o s i t i v i s m and p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

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W i t h the p o s i t i v i s t r e j e c t i o n o f i n t u i t i o n i s t p s y c h o l o g y linguistics t o o k a n i n c r e a s i n g l y f o r m a l d i r e c t i o n . T h e l i n g u i s t s rejected the search f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l connections b e t w e e n the elements o f language i n f a v o u r o f the search f o r p u r e l y ' o b j e c t i v e ' connections whose d i s c o v e r y d i d n o t depend o n any p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Such o b j e c t i v e connections c o u l d o n l y b e c o n n e c t i o n s d i v o r c e d I r o m all substantive c o n t e n t , c o n n e c t i o n s that c o u l d b e reduced t o relations o f i d e n t i t y and d i f f e r e n c e , o f succession and o f c o m b i n a t i o n . I n E u r o p e the most e x t r e m e f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c s was mapped o u t b y H j e l m s l e v ' s 'glossematics'. I n the U n i t e d States i t was a c h i e v e d b y the b e h a v i o u r i s t ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' o f B l o o m f i e l d and H a r r i s that d o m i n a t e d U S linguistics u n t i l the a r r i v a l o f C h o m s k y i n the mid-1950s. A m e r i c a n s t r u c t u r a l i s m was based on as c o m p l e t e a r e j e c t i o n of m e n t a l i s t i c concepts as possible. Its p r o g r a m m e w a s to analyze language o n the basis o f a m i n i m a l i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the analyst. Thus it r e j e c t e d the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n langue and parole, i d e n t i f y i n g the o b j e c t o f l i n g u i s t i c s a s the corpus o f utterances o f the language under i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o l l e c t e d b y f i e l d w o r k . I t sought t o e l i m i n a t e any reference t o m e a n i n g i n the analysis o f language, t r e a t i n g the corpus as a set of p u r e l y f o r m a l , i n e r t sequences of sounds. It sought t o analyze this corpus m e c h a n i c a l l y , b y means o f a n i n d u c t i v e l o g i c , that c o u l d i d e a l l y be u n d e r t a k e n by a c o m p u t e r . Thus i t sought t o establish b y p u r e l y i n d u c t i v e means the f o r m a l p h o n e m i c and s y n t a c t i c features o f language, l e a v i n g questions o f ' m e a n i n g ' t o a b e h a v i o u r i s t p s y c h o l o g y t h a t was c o n c e r n e d w i t h language use: w i t h the c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n l i n g u i s t i c and o t h e r b e h a v i o u r a l s t i m u l i and c o r r e s p o n d i n g responses. I n this w a y , i t was b e l i e v e d , l i n g u i s t i c s w o u l d a t last become a positive science, f o r the s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t e m e r g e d w o u l d o w e n o t h i n g t o the l i n g u i s t and e v e r y t h i n g t o the m e c h a n i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f the l o g i c o f i n d u c t i o n t o a n o b j e c t i v e corpus o f utterances. N o reference w o u l d have t o b e m a d e t o a subjective interpretation, by either the analyst or the native speaker, of the

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m e a n i n g o f the u t t e r a n c e , o f the f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e , o r o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the parts o f the language. A l l the connections t h a t w e r e discovered w o u l d b e connections t h a t i n d u b i t a b l y e x i s t e d i n the corpus. T h i s p o s i t i v i s t approach, a l t h o u g h i t d o m i n a t e d N o r t h A m e r i c a l i n g u i s t i c s i n the i m m e d i a t e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d , w a s b o t h l i n g u i s t i c a l l y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y inadequate. Its m a j o r weaknesses w e r e those o f the crude p o s i t i v i s m t h a t i t sought t o a p p l y . T h i s p o s i t i v i s m assumes, f i r s t l y , t h a t the object ( i n this case language) presents i t s e l f r e a d y - m a d e to the analyst and, secondly, that a l o g i c o f i n d u c t i o n can produce a satisfactory account o f this o b j e c t . B o t h of these assumptions are false. F i r s t l y , language does n o t s i m p l y present i t s e l f t o the analyst. I n any science w h a t is to be e x p l a i n e d is defined by the science itself. T h i s p o i n t was r e a l i z e d e a r l y i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f V i e n n a p o s i t i v i s m . N o t h e o r y seeks t o e x p l a i n e v e r y t h i n g , s o e v e r y t h e o r y is a t h e o r y about a part of the w h o l e t h a t is the w o r l d that we d a i l y c o n f r o n t . T h e t h e o r y , t h e r e f o r e , is always based on an i n i t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m that w h o l e t h a t defines w h i c h aspects o f the w h o l e the t h e o r y w i l l e x p l a i n , and w h i c h aspects i t w i l l i g n o r e . W h e n the t h e o r y i s e v a l u a t e d e m p i r i c a l l y i t can o n l y b e e v a l u a t e d against the task it i n i t i a l l y set itself. T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , the t h e o r y o f r e l a t i v i t y r e v e a l e d that the a m b i t i o n o f classical mechanics was t o o grandiose. H o w e v e r i t d i d n o t change the use o f classical mechanics by engineers i n t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of a t h e o r y that was w r o n g . I t led t o a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f the o b j e c t o f classical mechanics: a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f the l i m i t s w i t h i n w h i c h classical mechanics c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d e m p i r i c a l l y ( a n d a c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n c e p t u a l r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f classical theories). If a t h e o r y is to have any e x p l a n a t o r y value it m u s t be possible, i n p r i n c i p l e , t o falsify the claims made b y that t h e o r y e m p i r i c a l l y . Such f a l s i f i c a t i o n can o n l y b e achieved w i t h i n the terms o f the t h e o r y , and so can never be absolute. H o w e v e r if it is to be possible a t a l l the t h e o r y must define its object i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its e x p l a n a t i o n s . I n other w o r d s i f the t h e o r y expressed i n the c l a i m that ' a l l w o m e n are b i o l o g i c a l l y i n f e r i o r t o m e n ' i s h e l d t o a p p l y o n l y t o those w o m e n w h o are b i o l o g i c a l l y i n f e r i o r t o p a r t i c u l a r m e n , the t h e o r y has no e x p l a n a t o r y value since it becomes a tautology. The

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the

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sense t h a t the t h e o r y defines its o w n o b j e c t , does n o t m e a n t h a t sciences are n o t e m p i r i c a l . W h a t it does m e a n is t h a t the science, o r the p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y w h e r e agreed s c i e n t i f i c procedures have not been established, has to define the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h it w o u l d b e e m p i r i c a l l y falsified. T h i s i t does b y d e f i n i n g i n advance the o b j e c t t o w h i c h i t i s h e l d t o a p p l y , and this d e f i n i t i o n must b e independent o f the p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y under r e v i e w . I f w e a p p l y this idea t o language w e can see t h a t the corpus w i t h w h i c h B l o o m f i e l d i a n s t r u c t u r a l i s m confronts the l i n g u i s t i s n o t g i v e n b u t is c o n s t r u c t e d by the analyst. T h e corpus is a list of sound sequences t h a t have been selected f r o m a c o m p l e x n e t w o r k o f h u m a n b e h a v i o u r . A l t h o u g h each sound sequence is d i f f e r e n t and was u t t e r e d i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t the analyst w i l l c l a i m that some sequences or parts of sequences are i d e n t i c a l . It is o n l y on the basis o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f repeated occurrences o f the same event t h a t the l o g i c o f i n d u c t i o n can b e a p p l i e d , and y e t i t i s o n l y o n the basis of a p a r t i c u l a r a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t utterances can be i d e n t i f i e d , f o r t h e y w e r e made b y d i f f e r e n t people a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons. Thus the l i n g u i s t has to use a p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of language to abstract the corpus o f utterances f r o m the mass o f b e h a v i o u r a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l data that is p o t e n t i a l l y available. F o r the B l o o m f i e l d i a n language i s defined w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a b e h a v i o u r i s t p s y c h o l o g y . T h u s no reference is made to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g or i n t e n t i o n s o f the n a t i v e speaker i n i d e n t i f y i n g the corpus, n o r i s any reference made to sounds that do n o t have a l i n g u i s t i c significance, d e f i n e d i m p l i c i t l y in b e h a v i o u r a l t e r m s , such as grunts, coughs, sneezes. T h u s in establishing the corpus the analyst filters o u t aspects o f b e h a v i o u r o r t h o u g h t c o n s i d e r e d t o b e n o n l i n g u i s t i c , and this can o n l y b e done o n the basis o f a d e f i n i t i o n o f language. E v e n the l i n g u i s t i c corpus so p r o d u c e d w i l l be inadequate because i t w i l l be degenerate: m a n y utterances w i l l be i n c o m p l e t e o r w i l l i n c l u d e e r r o r s , ellipses, etc. Thus the l i n g u i s t w i l l have t o filter the data again to separate utterances t h a t are c o r r e c t and c o m p l e t e f r o m those that are degenerate. I f this d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o t made any analysis can be f a l s i f i e d i m m e d i a t e l y by a n a t i v e speaker p r o d u c i n g a n u t t e r a n c e w h i c h the g r a m m a r has f o r m a l l y e x c l u d e d . Thus the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n langue and parole c a n n o t be a v o i d e d in some f o r m , and the B l o o m f i e l d i a n s d i d n o t a v o i d i t i n p r a c t i c e .

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T h e c r u c i a l issue is h o w langue is to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m parole in such a w a y a s t o define a n o b j e c t i n terms o f w h i c h the t h e o r y can m a k e claims w h i c h have a substantive e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t . N o t o n l y i s i t impossible t o define language i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a t h e o r y o f language, i t i s also impossible t o analyze language i n d u c t i v e l y . T h e r e are t w o m a j o r p r o b l e m s w i t h a l o g i c o f i n d u c t i o n i n this c o n t e x t . F i r s t l y , i n d u c t i o n c a n o n l y establish r e g u l a r relationships b e t w e e n elements t h a t can be defined i n d e p e n d e n t l y . Saussure's a c h i e v e m e n t was to s h o w that the elements o f language c o u l d n o t b e defined i n d e p e n d e n t l y , f o r i t was the system that d e f i n e d the elements. I f the parts cannot b e d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the w h o l e , then the w h o l e cannot be d i s c o v e r e d i n d u c t i v e l y as the relations b e t w e e n the parts. T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , the i d e n t i t y o f a g i v e n sound element in d i f f e r e n t e n v i r o n m e n t s is n o t a substantive i d e n t i t y t h a t can be d e f i n e d a c o u s t i c a l l y , it is a f u n c t i o n a l i d e n t i t y that can be defined o n l y b y the constancy o f its contrast w i t h o t h e r sound elements. H e n c e the e l e m e n t cannot b e i d e n t i f i e d u n t i l the relations have been d e f i n e d , b u t the relations c a n n o t be established b y i n d u c t i o n i f w e d o n ' t k n o w i n advance w h a t i s b e i n g related. T h e second p r o b l e m is t h a t a l o g i c of i n d u c t i o n operates on a f i n i t e corpus and this means t h a t it cannot establish the bounds w h i c h r e s t r i c t the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n . L o g i c a l l y this means t h a t i n d u c t i o n c a n n o t establish f r o m the fact that A has a l w a y s been f o l l o w e d b y B t h a t n e x t t i m e A o c c u r s B w i l l o c c u r . In l i n g u i s t i c s the i m p o r t a n c e of this is that the p o t e n t i a l corpus is i n f i n i t e , f o r language is c r e a t i v e and there is no u p p e r - b o u n d on the n u m b e r o f sentences t h a t c o m p r i s e the language. T h u s language m u s t have means f o r g e n e r a t i n g a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f sentences, and these means c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d by i n d u c t i o n . It was C h o m s k y w h o a p p l i e d this p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i q u e o f i n d u c t i v ism to B l o o m f i e l d i a n linguistics. C h o m s k y was t r a i n e d i n m a t h e m a t i c s and m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c , a s w e l l a s i n l i n g u i s t i c s , and this b r o u g h t h i m i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h the m o r e sophisticated v a r i a n t s o f p o s i t i v i s m t h a t h a d d e v e l o p e d i n response t o the p r o b l e m s o f the c r u d e i n d u c t i v i s t p o s i t i v i s m o f the B l o o m f i e l d i a n s . C h o m s k y r e i n t r o d u c e d , a n d r e d e f i n e d , the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n langue and parole, r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the object of l i n g u i s t i c s w a s n o t g i v e n b u t h a d to be c o n s t r u c t e d . He also rejected the emphasis on induction and adopted the neo-positivist

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h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l o f scientific e x p l a n a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the scientist f o r m u l a t e s c e r t a i n hypotheses, deduces the e m p i r i c a l consequences of these hypotheses, a n d t h e n tests these consequences against the e v i d e n c e . A n adequate t h e o r y , a c c o r d i n g to this m o d e l , is one w h i c h c a n generate d e d u c t i v e l y those and only those e m p i r i c a l statements that m a k e u p its d o m a i n : i t w i l l generate a l l t r u e statements and no false ones. C h o m s k y a r g u e d , f i r s t l y , t h a t the B l o o m f i e l d i a n b e h a v i o u r i s t d e f i n i t i o n o f language, w h i c h i m p l i c i t l y u n d e r l a y its d e f i n i t i o n o f the corpus, was unacceptable. C h o m s k y ' s c r i t i q u e o f b e h a v i o u r ism is d e v a s t a t i n g and has been e n o r m o u s l y i n f l u e n t i a l w i t h i n b o t h linguistics and p s y c h o l o g y . F o r a b e h a v i o u r i s t the u t t e r a n c e ' t h a t b u l l is m a d ' is a c o n d i t i o n e d response to an e n c o u n t e r w i t h a m a d b u l l , and n o t h i n g m o r e . I t does n o t express the ' i d e a ' o f a m a d b u l l , nor does i t represent the a p p l i c a t i o n o f some unconscious rules o f language. Its r e l a t i o n t o the s t i m u l u s that calls i t f o r t h requires n o reference t o ' m e n t a l ' r e a l i t y . C h o m s k y a r g u e d that this v i e w o f language is, a t best, i n c o h e r e n t . H e argues i n a r e v i e w o f the w o r k o f S k i n n e r that outside the l a b o r a t o r y there i s n o clear w a y o f i d e n t i f y i n g s t i m u l i and responses, and in p a r t i c u l a r the stimulus c a n n o t be i d e n t i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the response: the stimulus is o n l y a stimulus because it has e l i c i t e d a response. H e n c e the b e h a v i o u r i s t o n l y 'discovers' t h a t the stimulus o f a m a d b u l l operates because o f the response ' t h a t b u l l i s m a d ' . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y the k n o w l e d g e t h a t there is a m a d b u l l a r o u n d c a n n o t lead to the p r e d i c t i o n that there w i l l be a response ' t h a t b u l l is m a d ' . T h e response m i g h t be to ignore the b u l l , t o scream a n d r u n , t o misdiagnose the b u l l ' s c o n d i t i o n etc. T h i s c i r c u l a r i t y a t the heart o f b e h a v i o u r i s m leads t o even g r e a t e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n its a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n language l e a r n i n g , f o r w h e n the c h i l d learns a language it acquires the capacity n o t o n l y to r e p r o d u c e the a p p r o p r i a t e response to a repeated s t i m u l u s , i t acquires the capacity t o react i n n e w ways t o new situations. 8

C h o m s k y ' s c r i t i q u e o f b e h a v i o u r i s m l e d h i m t o reassert the m e n t a l i s t c l a i m that language c o u l d o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d as a m e n t a l p h e n o m e n o n . T h i s means t h a t the object o f l i n g u i s t i c s cannot b e defined w i t h o u t reference t o the m i n d . For C h o m s k y the o b j e c t o f l i n g u i s t i c s i s n o t a corpus o f utterances that have been identified as verbal behavioural stimuli

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and responses. T h e o b j e c t of l i n g u i s t i c s is l i n g u i s t i c competence, d e f i n e d as the n a t i v e speaker's k n o w l e d g e of the rules that he or she applies in speaking the language c o r r e c t l y . It is o n l y these rules that can i d e n t i f y a p a r t i c u l a r sentence as b e l o n g i n g to the language, thus it is these rules t h a t are the o b j e c t of l i n g u i s t i c s . B y f o r m u l a t i n g the c o n c e p t o f a language i n this w a y C h o m s k y gives l i n g u i s t i c s a f i n i t e o b j e c t , the rules that generate a l l and o n l y the sentences o f the language, instead o f the i n f i n i t e object that d e f i n i t i o n o f langue i n terms o f a corpus p r o v i d e s . H o w e v e r , a s w e shall see, C h o m s k y ' s d e f i n i t i o n of language does i n t r o d u c e a dangerous c i r c u l a r i t y i n t o l i n g u i s t i c s . H a v i n g d e f i n e d l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e as the f i n i t e set of rules that can generate the i n f i n i t e set o f sentences o f the language C h o m s k y goes on to argue t h a t these rules c a n n o t be generated by i n d u c t i o n . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l reasons f o r this h a v e already been discussed. L i n g u i s t i c a l l y the k i n d s o f g r a m m a r s p r o d u c e d b y i n d u c t i o n are inadequate n o t o n l y because t h e y i g n o r e the c r e a t i v i t y o f language, b u t also because t h e y are in some sense c o m p l e x , ad hoc and d o n o t u n c o v e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t c o r r e s p o n d t o o u r i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the g r a m m a r o f a language. A f a v o u r i t e e x a m p l e is the t w o sentences 'John is easy to please' a n d 'John is eager to please'. I f w e consider these sentences w i t h reference t o n o t h i n g b u t t h e i r f o r m w e are l e d i n t o e x t r e m e c o n t o r t i o n s . For e x a m p l e we k n o w t h a t we can r e f o r m u l a t e the first sentence as 'John is easily pleased'. B y i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n w e w i l l t h e r e f o r e k n o w t h a t we can r e f o r m u l a t e the second sentence as 'John is e a g e r l y pleased'. U n f o r t u n a t e l y this r e f o r m u l a t i o n changed the m e a n i n g o f the sentence w h i l e the f i r s t , f o r m a l l y i d e n t i c a l , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , does n o t . T h u s the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n fails and an ad hoc q u a l i f i c a t i o n w o u l d have t o b e i n t r o d u c e d t o a l l o w for this. C h o m s k y argues that a m u c h s i m p l e r g r a m m a r c a n b e p r o d u c e d i f w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t there are m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l g r a m m a t i c a l differences b e t w e e n the t w o sentences t h a n c a n be revealed by a grammar developed inductively. T h u s C h o m s k y argues t h a t a g r a m m a r m u s t be established d e d u c t i v e l y , and the task o f the l i n g u i s t must b e seen i n the l i g h t o f the h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l o f s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n and n o t the o u t d a t e d m o d e l o f i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . T h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t of linguistics is not a mass of empirical data waiting to be fed into a

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w o r d - c r u n c h i n g c o m p u t e r , i t i s a t h e o r y o f language w h i c h expresses, i n h y p o t h e t i c a l f o r m , assertions a b o u t the nature o f language f r o m w h i c h w e can establish d e d u c t i v e l y the f o r m o f g r a m m a r , and w i t h i n w h i c h w e can f o r m u l a t e g r a m m a r s o f p a r t i c u l a r languages. C h o m s k y takes as his s t a r t i n g p o i n t a ' t h e o r y of n a t u r a l language as such' w h i c h p r o v i d e s h i m w i t h a series of linguistic universals. These universals d e f i n e b o t h the basic categories and the basic r e l a t i o n s of l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n . Organizational universals are i n t e n d e d t o specify, ' t h e abstract s t r u c t u r e o f the subcomponents of a g r a m m a r , as w e l l as the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the s u b c o m p o n e n t s ' . These universals d i c t a t e t h a t the g r a m m a r shall consist of a syntactic c o m p o n e n t w h i c h generates a surface s t r u c t u r e by the a p p l i c a t i o n of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s to a deep s t r u c t u r e , a semantic c o m p o n e n t w h i c h provides a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the deep s t r u c t u r e , and a p h o n o l o g i c a l c o m p o n e n t w h i c h p r o v i d e s a p h o n e t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the surface s t r u c t u r e . Formal universals define the character o f the types o f rules i n the g r a m m a r , a s f o r e x a m p l e the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t c e r t a i n p h o n o l o g i c a l rules b e a p p l i e d c y c l i c a l l y . Substantive universals 'define the sets of elements t h a t m a y f i g u r e in particular grammars'. 9

T h e l i n g u i s t w i l l seek to c o n s t r u c t a d e s c r i p t i o n o f a language i n terms o f the abstract elements defined b y the substantive universals, m a k i n g use o f the k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n s specified b y the f o r m a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l universals. T h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g r a m mars f o r p a r t i c u l a r languages w i l l o b v i o u s l y l e a d t o the m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l language i n the l i g h t o f the p a r t i c u l a r analyses. T h e task o f l i n g u i s t i c s i s p r i m a r i l y t h a t o f d e v e l o p i n g and i m p r o v i n g the t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l language, p a r t i c u l a r analyses are the means o f d o i n g this. C h o m s k y ' s a p p r o a c h t o language was e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t i n o v e r t h r o w i n g the crude b e h a v i o u r i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m o f p o s t - w a r A m e r i c a n s t r u c t u r a l i s m . H o w e v e r C h o m s k y does n o t renounce p o s i t i v i s m , a l t h o u g h i n p r a c t i c e h e stretches i t b e y o n d its l i m i t s . C h o m s k y replaces an inadequate and o u t d a t e d p o s i t i v i s m by a m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d and u p - t o - d a t e , b u t no less inadequate, v e r s i o n . C h o m s k y , no less t h a n B l o o m f i e l d , seeks to isolate language as an object f r o m m e a n i n g and f r o m c o n t e x t and his l i n g u i s t i c s , n o less than t h a t o f B l o o m f i e l d , leads t o a c o m p l e t e l y a r b i t r a r y f o r m a l i s m that purports to tell us about both language and the mind, but in

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fact tells us about n e i t h e r . T h e p r o b l e m in each case is the same, i i s the p r o b l e m o f justifying the f o r m a l l i n g u i s t i c descriptions tha are p r o d u c e d . T h i s i s the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m o f p o s i t i v i s m . C h o m s k y ' s f u n d a m e n t a l o b j e c t i o n t o B l o o m f i e l d i a n linguistics was that it c o u l d n o t j u s t i f y e i t h e r its o b s e r v a t i o n a l basis or the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s that i t p r o d u c e d b y i n d u c t i o n . C h o m s k y ' s s o l u t i o n is to adopt the m o r e sophisticated h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l of s c i e n t i f i c theories d e v e l o p e d by V i e n n a p o s i t i v i s m on the basis of precisely the same o b j e c t i o n s to i n d u c t i v i s m . C h o m s k y ' s g r a m m a r is s t r u c t u r e d j u s t l i k e the neo-positivists' theories, i n d e e d the g r a m m a r is a t h e o r y of language. A u n i v e r s a l g r a m m a r is a t h e o r y t h a t w i t h suitable specifications w i l l generate the g r a m m a r s o f a l l p a r t i c u l a r ( a n d indeed a l l possible) languages W i t h i n the g r a m m a r s the s y n t a c t i c c o m p o n e n t i s a p u r e l y f o r m a l system t h a t relates strings of symbols to one a n o t h e r , w h i l e the semantic and p h o n o l o g i c a l c o m p o n e n t s i n t e r p r e t the t e r m i n a l strings generated by the s y n t a x , i.e. m a p these strings of symbols o n t o the o b s e r v a t i o n a l r e a l i t y o f sound and m e a n i n g . T h u s C h o m s k y ' s linguistics reproduces the r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s t separation o f f o r m and c o n t e n t , syntax and semantics. T h e a d o p t i o n o f the h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l frees C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s f r o m the constraints o f b e h a v i o u r i s t i n d u c t i v i s m , b u t i t does n o t solve the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m o f t h e o r e t i c a l and o b s e r v a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m s are those o f n e o - p o s i t i v i s m , and n o t s i m p l y o f C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s . N e o - p o s i t i v i s m has faced t w o f u n d a m e n t a l , and i n s o l u b l e , p r o b l e m s . F i r s t l y , since t h e r e is no such t h i n g as a p u r e o b s e r v a t i o n statement i t has p r o v e d i m p o s s i b l e t o p r o v i d e any n o n - a r b i t r a r y d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a l and t h e o r e t i c a l statements. E v e r y o b s e r v a t i o n statement abstracts elements f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t and subsumes t h e m u n d e r general concepts: e v e r y o b s e r v a t i o n statement rests on t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions. T h e p r o b l e m , t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s can never take u s o u t s i d e language t o a w o r l d o f u n t h e o r i z e d observations. I f s c i e n t i f i c theories are to be g i v e n any e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o r e t i c a l and o b s e r v a t i o n a l statements breaks d o w n . Thus there i s n o w a y i n w h i c h theories can b e e v a l u a t e d against a r e a l i t y t h a t is defined i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the t h e o r y . T h i s means that t h e r e are grave dangers o f c i r c u l a r i t y i n the f o r m u l a t i o n o f any s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y .

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Secondly, and m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , if a s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y is a p u r e l y f o r m a l c o n s t r u c t there i s n o w a y o f j u s t i f y i n g the a d o p t i o n o f one t h e o r y r a t h e r than a n o t h e r . It is u n f o r t u n a t e l y the case that any f i n i t e set of o b s e r v a t i o n statements can be g e n e r a t e d by an i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t theories, thus w e have t o have some w a y o f d e c i d i n g w h i c h t h e o r y i s the best. I f theories are supposed t o b e p u r e l y f o r m a l systems w e can o n l y assess t h e m i n r e l a t i o n t o one another on f o r m a l grounds: the best t h e o r y is t h a t w h i c h is simplest, most elegant, has the smallest n u m b e r o f a x i o m s , the greatest p o w e r , o r w h a t e v e r . W h i c h t h e o r y is a d o p t e d w i l l depend o n the f o r m a l c r i t e r i a o f e v a l u a t i o n selected, and this selection is, f r o m the scientific p o i n t o f v i e w , a r b i t r a r y . I t w i l l b e d e t e r m i n e d , f o r e x a m p l e , b y the constraints o f e x p o s i t i o n o r m a n i p u l a t i o n o f the t h e o r y and n o t b y any c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f h o w adequate the t h e o r y i s t o the w o r l d . T h e i s o l a t i o n o f the t h e o r y f r o m the w o r l d o f o b s e r v a t i o n means t h a t the t h e o r y has no purchase on r e a l i t y : it is n o t l e g i t i m a t e to c l a i m that t h e t h e o r y can t e l l us a n y t h i n g about the w o r l d since it is constructed according to purely formal criteria. T h u s the advantages o f the h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l o v e r the i n d u c t i v i s t m o d e l are p u r e l y f o r m a l : i t a d m i t s m o r e elegant theories t h a t are able to a v o i d recourse to the ad hoc because t h e i r p o w e r i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d b y the constraints o f i n d u c t i v i s m . I n substantive terms, h o w e v e r , the h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l produces theories t h a t have n o greater p o w e r t h a n those p r o d u c e d b y the i n d u c t i v i s t m o d e l . B o t h models l i m i t k n o w l e d g e t o the o b s e r v a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f the system u n d e r r e v i e w . These p r o b l e m s are n o t s i m p l y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l significance, they u n d e r m i n e C h o m s k y ' s linguistics a l t o g e t h e r . T h e f i r s t p r o b l e m is that the corpus of sentences to be generated by the g r a m m a r cannot b e d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the g r a m m a r . For C h o m s k y l i n g u i s t i c s does n o t seek to e x p l a i n a l l the sentences u t t e r e d b y n a t i v e speakers, n o r a l l the m e a n i n g f u l sentences u t t e r e d b y n a t i v e speakers, b u t a l l , and o n l y , the grammatical sentences u t t e r e d by a n a t i v e speaker. A n y g r a m m a r is e v a l u a t e d b y its a b i l i t y t o generate these sentences. H o w e v e r t o say t h a t a sentence is g r a m m a t i c a l is to say t h a t it has been generated i n accordance w i t h the rules o f g r a m m a r . H e n c e i t i s o n l y the g r a m m a r t h a t defines w h i c h sentences are g r a m m a t i c a l . The danger of circularity should be apparent, for if the grammar

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defines w h i c h sentences are to c o u n t as g r a m m a t i c a l there is no independent corpus w i t h w h i c h t o evaluate the g r a m m a r : any g r a m m a r w i l l do. C h o m s k y avoids such a devastating c o n c l u s i o n by d e f i n i n g g r a m m a t i c a l i t y v e r y loosely. H e appeals t o the ' n a t i v e speaker's i n t u i t i o n ' t o define w h i c h sentences are g r a m m a t i c a l , and i n p r a c t i c e the ' n a t i v e speaker' i n question i s C h o m s k y o r one o f his associates. T h e i m p l i c i t assumption is t h a t the ' n a t i v e speaker's i n t u i t i o n ' is the expression o f some o b j e c t i v e standards o f g r a m m a t i c a l i t y i n h e r e n t i n the n a t i v e speaker's l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . H o w e v e r n a t i v e speakers' j u d g e m e n t s o f the a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f sentences, and p a r t i c u l a r l y o f the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n sentences t h a t are s e m a n t i c a l l y and s y n t a c t i c a l l y unacceptable, w i l l express n o t o n l y t h e i r ' c o m p e t e n c e ' b u t also the theories o f g r a m m a r t h a t they have l e a r n t i n the past. Thus C h o m s k y ' s c r i t e r i o n avoids c i r c u l a r i t y a t the expense o f e v a l u a t i n g one t h e o r y o f g r a m m a r i n terms o f its c o n c o r d a n c e w i t h another. I t should n o t b e s u r p r i s i n g that the l a t t e r t u r n s o u t t o b e v e r y l i k e the p r e s c r i p t i v e s c h o o l b o o k grammar, so that Chomsky's linguistic r e v o l u t i o n actually p r o duces some v e r y c o n v e n t i o n a l results. T h e d e f i n i t i o n of the corpus is a v e r y serious p r o b l e m , and especially s o i f linguistics tries t o g o b e y o n d the e x p l a n a t i o n o f a corpus o f g r a m m a t i c a l sentences t o w a r d s the e x p l a n a t i o n o f language as it is used in e v e r y d a y speech. E v e n m o r e serious, h o w e v e r , i s the p r o b l e m o f the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y that generates this corpus. T h i s is the second m a j o r p r o b l e m faced b y n e o - p o s i t i v i s m . Since the t h e o r y o f language a n d the g r a m m a r s that i t produces are p u r e l y f o r m a l , o n l y f o r m a l c r i t e r i a can l e g i t i m a t e l y b e used t o evaluate a l t e r n a t i v e theories. T h e p r o b l e m then becomes one o f j u s t i f y i n g the p a r t i c u l a r c r i t e r i a o f e v a l u a t i o n that are a d o p t e d . I n C h o m s k y ' s case the t h e o r y o f language specifies the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , f o r m a l and substantive universals o f language w h i c h define i n advance the c h a r a c t e r o f any p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r . T h e details v a r y i n d i f f e r e n t versions o f the t h e o r y , b u t basically C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y tells u s t h a t the g r a m m a r o f any n a t u r a l language can b e w r i t t e n i n the f o r m d i c t a t e d b y his t h e o r y o f language—as t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s , w i t h base and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , using such elements as Nouns, Verbs, Sentences, etc., which are

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established i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the relations b e t w e e n these categories in any p a r t i c u l a r language, b u t w h i c h are h y p o t h e s i z e d as universals. O n the basis o f this t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e the l i n g u i s t c a n c o n s t r u c t a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the language i n t e r m s o f these abstract elements m a k i n g use o f the kinds o f r e l a t i o n s specified i n the f o r m a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l universals. D e s p i t e c e r t a i n a m b i g u i t i e s , i t seems clear e n o u g h that C h o m s k y does n o t r e g a r d his g r a m m a r as o f f e r i n g s i m p l y one possible d e s c r i p t i o n o f language a m o n g a n i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f possible descriptions. T h e g r a m m a r i s supposed t o p r o v i d e a m o d e l o f the speaker's competence, t h a t competence b e i n g the speaker's t a c i t ' k n o w l e d g e ' o f a language, t h a t k n o w l e d g e h a v i n g been l e a r n e d and p r o v i d i n g the basic m e n t a l apparatus w h i c h enables the speaker t o p e r f o r m . H e n c e C h o m s k y f o l l o w s Saussure i n seeing the o b j e c t of l i n g u i s t i c s as a system w h o s e c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l a t i o n s are ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l and l o g i c a l connections', the a i m o f l i n g u i s t i c s b e i n g t o describe h o w the m i n d w o r k s w h e n l e a r n i n g t o speak and w h e n speaking. Problems o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n strike Chomsky's grammar a t t w o levels. F i r s t l y , i f w e accept C h o m s k y ' s u n i v e r s a l g r a m m a r , t h e r e i s the p r o b l e m o f establishing a u n i q u e d e s c r i p t i o n o f any p a r t i c u l a r language. Secondly, t h e r e i s the p r o b l e m o f j u s t i f y i n g the postulates o f the u n i v e r s a l g r a m m a r . T h e f i r s t p r o b l e m i s i t s e l f serious. It has been established that f o r any c o n c e i v a b l e r e c u r s i v e l y e n u m e r a b l e n a t u r a l language 'there is a version of the theory of transformational grammar in w h i c h there is a fixed base grammar B w h i c h w i l l serve as the base component o f a grammar o f any natural language'. 10

T h i s applies f o r any B we care to choose. In o t h e r w o r d s the weakness o f the constraints o n the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t i s such t h a t , because excessive p o w e r is g i v e n to the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n rules, any language can b e represented i n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l f o r m on the basis of any fixed base g r a m m a r w h a t e v e r . T h i s means t h a t i f w e a r b i t r a r i l y w r i t e a g r a m m a r f o r the base, w e can t h e n t u r n this base i n t o any language we choose, e v e n an i n v e n t e d one, by a p p l y i n g e n o u g h t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . S i m p l e E n g l i s h , for e x a m p l e , can b e t u r n e d i n t o Chinese b y a p p l y i n g e n o u g h t r a n s f o r m a t i o n rules. H e n c e there are an i n f i n i t e n u m b e r o f g r a m m a r s w h i c h w i l l satisfy Chomsky's theory of language for any particular language,

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w h i l e t h e r e is no c o n c e i v a b l e language that c a n n o t be represented i n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l f o r m . H e n c e there i s n o w a y o f k n o w i n g w h i c h o f a l l possible g r a m m a r s i s the c o r r e c t o n e f o r a p a r t i c u l a r language, on the one h a n d , a n d no c o n c e i v a b l e language c o u l d falsify the t h e o r y o f language o n the o t h e r . C h o m s k y gets a r o u n d this a w k w a r d fact b y establishing a n e v a l u a t i o n r u l e t o decide w h i c h g r a m m a r i s a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e e v a l u a t i o n r u l e tells us to select that g r a m m a r w h i c h is simplest w h i l e a c c o u n t i n g for a l l the facts. S i m p l i c i t y is defined as a measure o f the degree o f ' l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ' a c h i e v e d by a g r a m m a r . C h o m s k y t h e r e f o r e establishes a u n i q u e g r a m m a r f o r a language b y a p p l y i n g t w o sets o f c r i t e r i a . O n the one h a n d , the g r a m m a r must a c c o r d w i t h his t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e — i t m u s t b e w r i t t e n i n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l f o r m , w i t h N o u n s , V e r b s , etc. O n the o t h e r h a n d i t must b e the ' s i m p l e s t ' such g r a m m a r . T o j u s t i f y a p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s necessary t o j u s t i f y the t h e o r y o f language and the s i m p l i c i t y measure, w h i c h takes us to the second l e v e l o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t o f the t h e o r y itself. Since the general t h e o r y and the s i m p l i c i t y measure are the c r i t e r i a b y w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r s are established, they cannot d e r i v e f r o m the study o f p a r t i c u l a r languages. T h u s w e are b a c k w i t h the p r o b l e m o f j u s t i f y i n g the a priori s t a r t i n g p o i n t . H e r e a g a i n C h o m s k y argues that his t h e o r y of language is a p p r o p r i a t e because i t i s i n some sense the simplest. T h u s the e v a l u a t i o n o f theories o f language, as m u c h as the e v a l u a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a r s , hangs e n t i r e l y o n the c r i t e r i o n o f s i m p l i c i t y . This c r i t e r i o n of s i m p l i c i t y is neither purely formal nor u n a m b i g u o u s . O n the one h a n d , i n p u r e l y f o r m a l t e r m s , i t i s r a r e l y the case t h a t one t h e o r y is u n a m b i g u o u s l y s i m p l e r t h a n another. For e x a m p l e , one t h e o r y m a y p r o v i d e a s i m p l e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f the corpus t h a n another, w h i l e i m p l y i n g a m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x m e c h a n i s m f o r the p r o d u c t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences. O n e m a y have a large n u m b e r of simple rules, another a f e w c o m p l e x rules. T h u s it is n o t possible to use a p u r e l y f o r m a l c r i t e r i o n t o evaluate theories. S i m p l i c i t y i s n o t s o m e t h i n g i n h e r e n t i n the t h e o r y , i t depends o n the purposes the t h e o r y is designed to serve. In o t h e r w o r d s one cannot establish the adequacy o f a t h e o r y w i t h o u t a s k i n g w h a t the theory is supposed to be adequate to. A theory which is supposed to

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p r o v i d e a n e c o n o m i c a l w a y o f p r e s e n t i n g the g r a m m a r o f a language i n a b o o k w i l l be subjected t o d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a f r o m those a p p l i e d to a t h e o r y w h i c h is supposed to enable a p a r t i c u l a r type o f c o m p u t e r t o r e p r o d u c e the g r a m m a t i c a l sentences o f a language, and these w i l l be d i f f e r e n t i n t u r n f r o m the c r i t e r i a t o be a p p l i e d to a t h e o r y that is supposed to p r o v i d e an account of the use of language by n a t i v e speakers or one t h a t is supposed to a c c o u n t for the l e a r n i n g of a language by a c h i l d . T h i s p r o b l e m o f the absence o f any n o n - a r b i t r a r y and u n a m biguous c r i t e r i a o f e v a l u a t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e g r a m m a r s o r o f a l t e r n a t i v e theories o f language arises because o f the p u r e l y f o r m a l c o n c e p t i o n o f a t h e o r y t h a t i s associated w i t h the p o s i t i v i s t d i s s o c i a t i o n o f language f r o m its c o n t e x t . T h e p r o b l e m i s t h a t C h o m s k y , no less than the B l o o m f i e l d i a n s , reduces language to a set o f g r a m m a t i c a l sentences. H o w e v e r , a set o f g r a m m a t i c a l sentences, d i v o r c e d f r o m t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h they serve a l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n , d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e a language. I f w e abstract f r o m the m e a n i n g o f these sentences and i f w e abstract f r o m t h e i r function w i t h i n human interaction of communicating meaning then w e also are unable t o make any s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n meaningless strings o f symbols and the m e a n i n g f u l use o f language b y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s . C h o m s k y recognizes t h a t the c r i t e r i o n o f s i m p l i c i t y i s n o t u n a m b i g u o u s f o r his e v a l u a t i o n rule is n o t p u r e l y f o r m a l , b u t refers again t o the n a t i v e speaker's i n t u i t i o n i n its reference t o ' l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ' g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . T h u s f o r C h o m s k y the best t h e o r y o f language, a n d the best g r a m m a r , i s that w h i c h accords most closely w i t h the n a t i v e speaker's i n t u i t i o n o f g r a m m a t i c a l i t y . H o w e v e r there is n o t any absolute and o b j e c t i v e w a y of deciding w h a t is a linguistically significant generalization, f o r this w i l l depend o n the n a t i v e speaker's, o r the l i n g u i s t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t a language is. T h u s w h a t C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y o f language does is to f o r m a l i z e w h a t C h o m s k y t h i n k s a language is about. W h e n i t comes d o w n t o i t C h o m s k y ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f language i s a v e r y i d i o s y n c r a t i c one. C h o m s k y regards language as a m e c h a n i cal m o d e l that derives sentences b y the a u t o m a t i c a p p l i c a t i o n o f rules. T h e f o r m o f language, the rules o f language, and t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f sentences are a l l defined w i t h o u t any reference t o the context in which language is learned and used, and so without

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any reference t o the i n t e n t i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t e w h i c h , f o r m o s t people, is w h a t gives language its significance. T h e w a y i n w h i c h C h o m s k y proposes the p r o b l e m o f l i n g u i s t i c s i s i n t e r m s o f the c o m p u t a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d , i n language l e a r n i n g w h e n faced w i t h a degenerate i n p u t o f symbols w h o s e m e a n i n g i s u n k n o w n . H e argues that the k i n d o f i n d u c t i v e l o g i c p r o p o s e d b y the B l o o m f i e l d i a n s w o u l d n o t a l l o w the c o m p u t e r t o l e a r n the language because i t w o u l d lead t o clear e r r o r s , m a t c h e d b y the b l u n d e r s o f early t r a n s l a t i n g machines. T h u s the c o m p u t e r w o u l d have t o b e p r o g r a m m e d w i t h a t h e o r y o f language w h i c h i t c o u l d t h e n use t o establish the g r a m m a r o f the p a r t i c u l a r language b e i n g presented t o i t . I n o r d e r t o establish w h a t k i n d o f p r o g r a m m e ( ' t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e ' ) w o u l d enable the c o m p u t e r t o d o this s a t i s f a c t o r i l y C h o m s k y d r e w o n the m o s t recent advances i n m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c t h a t had, u n t i l the advent o f the c o m p u t e r , been the esoteric concern of philosophical logicians. T h e advances i n m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c i n q u e s t i o n h a d c o m e about because o f the p o s i t i v i s t c o n c e r n t o develop a p u r e l y f o r m a l and u n i f i e d language i n w h i c h the n a t u r a l sciences c o u l d express t h e i r results w i t h o u t b e i n g subject t o the d i s t o r t i o n s , a m b i g u i t i e s and misunderstandings that arise f r o m the use o f n a t u r a l languages. T h i s p r o j e c t was a t the h e a r t o f the n e o - p o s i t i v i s t enterprise o f p u r i f y i n g the language o f science and o f e x p u n g i n g a l l traces o f metaphysics that had c o m e t o b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the misuse o f language. T h i s p r o j e c t faced t w o d i f f e r e n t sets o f p r o b l e m s , one the p r o b l e m o f the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f f o r m a l languages, the other the p r o b l e m o f t r a n s l a t i n g n a t u r a l languages i n t o f o r m a l languages w i t h o u t loss o f m e a n i n g . In a d o p t i n g m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c as the means to understand n a t u r a l languages C h o m s k y was essentially c a r r y i n g o u t the n e o p o s i t i v i s t p r o j e c t i n reverse. T h e p r o b l e m h e set h i m s e l f was t h a t o f g e n e r a t i n g l o g i c a l l y the g r a m m a t i c a l sentences o f a n a t u r a l language, w h i l e n e o - p o s i t i v i s m had set i t s e l f the p r o b l e m o f t r a n s l a t i n g n a t u r a l languages i n t o the f o r m a l system o f a n a r t i f i c i a l l o g i c . T h e m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c d e v e l o p e d b y the l a t t e r p r o v i d e d a means o f a c h i e v i n g this t r a n s l a t i o n . T h u s C h o m s k y used the same l o g i c to achieve the reverse result, to p r o d u c e a l o g i c a l device (a g r a m m a r and a t h e o r y o f language) t o generate the g r a m m a t i c a l sentences o f n a t u r a l language.

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C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y o f language does n o t , t h e r e f o r e , d e r i v e f r o m a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n h o w d o w e u n d e r s t a n d h o w people i n the course o f t h e i r social i n t e r a c t i o n l e a r n and use t h e i r language? I t derives f r o m the p r o b l e m o f f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f the rules g o v e r n i n g the g e n e r a t i o n o f strings o f l i n g u i s t i c symbols, a p r o b l e m t h a t arises l a r g e l y because o f the i m p o v e r i s h e d p o s i t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n of language t h a t serves as the s t a r t i n g p o i n t b o t h f o r C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s and f o r the m a t h e m a t i c a l l o g i c he applies to the s o l u t i o n of his p r o b l e m . C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s is as m i s c o n c e i v e d as was the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t on w h i c h it is based. C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s has h a d an i m p a c t far b e y o n d the n a r r o w c i r c l e o f theorists o f language. A l t h o u g h f e w structuralists o u t s i d e l i n g u i s t i c s have taken d i r e c t i n s p i r a t i o n f r o m C h o m s k y , his w o r k appears t o o f f e r a d r a m a t i c c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the p o w e r o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d and o f the possibilities i t opens u p f o r a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e o f the m e n t a l foundations o f o u r l i n g u i s t i c c a p a c i t y and s o o f o u r h u m a n i t y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o b r i n g o u t c l e a r l y the basis on w h i c h C h o m s k y a r r i v e s at his t h e o r e t i c a l results. C h o m s k y ' s w o r k has great i m p o r t a n c e w i t h i n linguistics b o t h i n c l e a r i n g a w a y the p r e v i o u s naive B l o o m f i e l d i a n p o s i t i v i s m , a n d i n b r i n g i n g t o the a t t e n t i o n o f linguists m a n y s t r i k i n g , and p r e v i o u s l y u n n o t i c e d , f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f n a t u r a l languages. W h a t e v e r the fate o f C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y these c o n t r i b u t i o n s w i l l r e m a i n . B e y o n d l i n g u i s t i c s , h o w e v e r , it is the t h e o r y t h a t is i m p o r t a n t and thus, f o r us, the p r o b l e m o f the a r b i t r a r y character o f b o t h the t h e o r y o f language and the g r a m m a r s d e r i v e d f r o m it is fundamental to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the lessons o f C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s . T h e weaknesses o f C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s are precisely those aspects that are taken by s t r u c t u r a l i s t s to be the key c o n t r i b u t i o n o f C h o m s k y . I t seems t h a t C h o m s k y offers a p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e a n d s c i e n t i f i c approach t o language, the supreme e m b o d i m e n t o f h u m a n c u l t u r e , in w h i c h language can be t r e a t e d as an i n e r t o b j e c t w i t h i n w h i c h o b j e c t i v e structures can b e u n c o v e r e d , b e h i n d w h i c h can be f o u n d unconscious m e n t a l capacities. H o w e v e r this m o d e l o f language i s n o t d e r i v e d f r o m a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f language a t a l l . I t derives f r o m a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e that dissociates the sentences t h a t are the r a w m a t e r i a l of language from any linguistically relevant context in order to

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establish a n u n q u e s t i o n a b l y ' o b j e c t i v e ' corpus. T h i s p r o c e d u r e , d i c t a t e d b y the n e o - p o s i t i v i s t p h i l o s o p h y u n d e r l y i n g C h o m s k y ' l i n g u i s t i c s and n o t b y any c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f language, dissociate c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f the s o u n d sequences tha m a k e u p the sentences o f a language f r o m any c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h such sound sequences are p r o d u c e d or i n t e r p r e t e d , and so of the c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h they f u n c t i o n as a p a r t o f a language. I n o t h e r w o r d s the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l decision that was t a k e n a p p a r e n t l y i n the interests o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a s c i e n t i f i c l i n g u i s t i c s i n fact achieves a c o m p l e t e dissociation o f the f o r m o f language f r o m its c o n t e n t and s o the results a c h i e v e d are i n t u r n p u r e l y f o r m a l , d e p r i v e d o f any l i n g u i s t i c significance. T h e result is ' s c i e n t i f i c ' a c c o r d i n g to the p o s i t i v i s t c a r i c a t u r e o science, b u t i t i s n o t l i n g u i s t i c s , i f the a i m o f l i n g u i s t i c s i s t o achieve k n o w l e d g e o f language. C h o m s k y is able to t r e a t language as an i n e r t o b j e c t , and so to reduce language to a f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e , because of a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n the p r i c e o f w h i c h i s a neglect o f e v e r y t h i n g that makes noises i n t o a language. L i n g u i s t i c a l l y the g r a m m a r s selected and the t h e o r y o f language p r o p o s e d must b e a r b i t r a r y . T h e a r b i t r a r y character o f C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y o f language h a s become i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s i n the past decade. It soon became clear, and o f t e n to C h o m s k y b e f o r e a n y b o d y else, that the m o d e l C h o m s k y h a d d e v e l o p e d c o u l d n o t handle n a t u r a l languages as s i m p l y as had been hoped. O n c e the m o d e l began to be m o d i f i e d and made m o r e c o m p l e x i n o r d e r t o deal w i t h anomalies, in o t h e r w o r d s as the m o d e l came to be c o n f r o n t e d m o r e closely w i t h e x i s t i n g n a t u r a l languages, the fact that the c r i t e r i a b y w h i c h a l t e r n a t i v e theories m i g h t b e evaluated w e r e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y a r b i t r a r y became p r o g r e s s i v e l y m o r e apparent. N o t o n l y was C h o m s k y ' s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r made i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p l e x , b u t n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r s w e r e also b e i n g d e v e l o p e d t h a t w e r e o f sufficient p o w e r t o handle n a t u r a l languages. T h e result has been a p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f theories o f language i n the w a k e o f C h o m s k y : case g r a m m a r , r e l a t i o n a l g r a m m a r , g e n e r a t i v e semantics, M o n t a g u e g r a m m a r , a p p l i c a t i o n a l g r a m m a r , systemic g r a m m a r , s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l g r a m m a r , etc.: b e t w e e n none o f w h i c h i t i s possible t o j u d g e o n l i n g u i s t i c grounds and a l l o f w h i c h are l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t in the sense t h a t each tries to p r o d u c e a mechanism that can reproduce the grammatical sentences of the

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language and the p r o p o n e n t s of each c l a i m that t h e i r m o d e l is simpler, more i n t u i t i v e or more 'natural'. T h i s p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f n e o - p o s i t i v i s t theories o f language o v e r the last decade has l e d m o r e and m o r e people to q u e s t i o n n o t this or that f o r m o f the t h e o r y b u t the p o s i t i v i s t a p p r o a c h t o language a l t o g e t h e r . I f p o s i t i v i s m leads t o theories o f language that are p u r e l y f o r m a l and e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y t h e n w e are l e d back t o the q u e s t i o n o f the n a t u r e and functions o f language and t o a r e j e c t i o n o f the p o s i t i v i s t i s o l a t i o n o f language f r o m its c o n t e x t . I f theories are t o b e j u d g e d b y t h e i r 'naturalness' this can o n l y b e i n r e l a t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f the n a t u r e o f language. C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f this q u e s t i o n cannot b e d i v o r c e d f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n s o f those f o r w h o m noises f u n c t i o n a s a language. T h i s has l e d t o a n i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n w i t h t h e phenomenological approach to linguistics, and particularly w i t h the w o r k o f the Prague C i r c l e and o f R o m a n Jakobson w h i c h c o m b i n e d elements o f b o t h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l and t h e p o s i t i v i s t approaches, u s i n g p h e n o m e n o l o g y f o r its t h e o r e t i c a l i n s p i r a t i o n , b u t r e j e c t i n g the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d . C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Prague l i n g u i s t i c s i s especially i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r purposes because i t was f r o m R o m a n J a k o b s o n t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s f i r s t l e a r n t about s t r u c t u r a l i s m .

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C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s relates s t r o n g l y t o the p o s i t i v i s t side o f Saussure's a p p r o a c h t o language a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the p r o p e r t i e s o f language d e r i v e f r o m unconscious m e n t a l structures t h a t are i m p o s e d on sound and t h o u g h t substance. I have argued in the p r e v i o u s sections t h a t this approach to language is unacceptable because the structures u n c o v e r e d are a r b i t r a r y : there is no w a y in w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s can b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m c o n t i n g e n t relations t h a t are imposed b y the analyst. A n y l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y , e v e n one p r o p o u n d e d b y a p o s i t i v i s t , expresses c e r t a i n ideas about the n a t u r e of language, and so rests o n a n i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n speaking a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a language. In o t h e r w o r d s it is n o t in fact the case that a linguist can treat the language as an inert object, as a set of

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sentences d i v o r c e d f r o m the c o n t e x t o f use, because the l i n g u i s t can o n l y f o r m u l a t e a t h e o r y o f language i n accordance w i t h c e r t a i n ideas about the n a t u r e o f language. O n c e the issue is b r o u g h t i n t o the o p e n the a r t i f i c i a l , and c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e , c h a r a c t e r o f C h o m s k y ' s n o t i o n o f language becomes apparent. W h e n w e consider the n a t u r e o f language w e c a n n o t a v o i d c o n s i d e r i n g it as a means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and this leads t o a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t o language w h i c h tries t o d i s c o v e r the system o f language b y r e l a t i n g i t t o the functions o f language as a means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . It is this a p p r o a c h t h a t was d e v e l o p e d b y the Prague L i n g u i s t i c C i r c l e . T h e Prague C i r c l e d e r i v e d i n s p i r a t i o n f r o m a n u m b e r o f sources and e m e r g e d , i n p a r t , f r o m the c o n c e r n w i t h language o f the Russian Formalists, o f w h o m Jakobson had been a l e a d i n g t h e o r i s t . F r o m Saussure they d e r i v e d a c o n c e r n w i t h the systematic c h a r a c t e r o f language and w i t h the mechanisms b y w h i c h language a c h i e v e d its expressive a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e ends, b u t they r e j e c t e d Saussure's residual p s y c h o l o g i s m f o r w h i c h i n t r o s p e c t i o n c o u l d r e v e a l these mechanisms. F r o m n e o - p o s i t i v i s m they d e r i v e d a c o m m i t m e n t t o the ' s c i e n t i f i c ' analysis o f these mechanisms, i n sharp r e a c t i o n t o all f o r m s o f r o m a n t i c i s m , and this i n f o r m e d t h e i r c o n c e r n w i t h s t r u c t u r e a s the source o f m e a n i n g i m m a n e n t i n the o b j e c t , so that they c o n s i d e r e d n o t the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the m e a n i n g - c r e a t i n g subject and language as a p u r e o b j e c t , b u t r a t h e r the r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n language t h a t made i t possible f o r language t o g i v e m e a n i n g a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e existence. H o w e v e r the m o s t i m p o r t a n t source for the Prague School was p r o b a b l y that o f the phenomenology o f E d m u n d Husserl. F r o m H u s s e r l the Russian Formalists, and the Prague C i r c l e after t h e m , t o o k t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o p s y c h o l o g i s m and t o n a t u r a l i s m and this c o l o u r e d t h e i r r e a c t i o n t o Saussure. For the Prague C i r c l e language has to be t r e a t e d as an a u t o n o m o u s r e a l i t y , and n o t as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n , so the p r o p e r t i e s of language cannot be e x p l a i n e d s i m p l y as the i m p o s i t i o n o f a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o r m o n a n acoustic o r c o n c e p t u a l substance. Language is an i n t e n t i o n a l object w h o s e s t r u c t u r e is an e x p r e s s i o n o f its f u n c t i o n a s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . L i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e f o r e has to be a t e l e o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e t h a t seeks the s t r u c t u r e o f language n o t t h r o u g h a n i n t r o s p e c t i v e psychology, as Saussure continued to believe, nor through a search

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for p u r e l y f o r m a l c o n n e c t i o n s , a s C h o m s k y l a t e r t h o u g h t , b u t b y relating linguistic f o r m to linguistic function. T h e Prague C i r c l e d i d n o t take this p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h t o language t o its l i m i t s . I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e y d i d n o t believe t h a t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d s alone c o u l d p r o v i d e a sound basis f o r l i n g u i s t i c s . T h u s refence t o the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f language users w o u l d p r o v i d e the means f o r d i s c o v e r i n g the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s o f language and f o r r e v e a l i n g the l i n g u i s t i c significance o f these r e l a t i o n s , b u t the m e t h o d s o f p o s i t i v i s m c o u l d s t i l l b e used t o v e r i f y ( o r f a l s i f y ) the r e s u l t i n g hypotheses. T h u s the Prague C i r c l e combined a teleological theoretical approach w i t h a rigorously 'scientific' methodology. It s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t o b s e r v a t i o n and e x p e r i m e n t has o n l y a r e s t r i c t e d r o l e i n the Prague canon. O b s e r v a t i o n can t e l l u s w h e t h e r o r n o t p o s t u l a t e d relationships e x i s t , b u t i t cannot t e l l u s w h e t h e r o r n o t observed relationships have l i n g u i s t i c significance unless w e refer t o the l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d s o t o the i n t e n t i o n i t serves t o a r t i c u l a t e . T h e insistence o n the t e l e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f linguistics i s o f f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o Prague l i n g u i s t i c s and i t i s this t h a t m a r k s i t o f f f r o m the p o s i t i v i s m that has d o m i n a t e d o t h e r schools o f l i n g u i s t i c s i n this c e n t u r y . For the Prague C i r c l e language i s t r e a t e d as an i n s t r u m e n t , and n o t as an o b j e c t , so the o b j e c t i v e a p p r o a c h t o language c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the m o m e n t o f o b s e r v a t i o n and e x p e r i m e n t i s o n l y p r o v i s i o n a l , p r o d u c t o f a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l and n o t a n o n t o l o g i c a l decision. T h e t e l e o l o g y o f P r a g u e l i n g u i s t i c s means t h a t language cannot b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t reference t o the h u m a n subjects w h o c o m m u n i c a t e b y means o f language and so the systematic qualities of language cannot be a n a l y z e d w i t h o u t reference t o m e a n i n g . M o r e o v e r i t i m p l i e s t h a t the a u t o n o m y o f l i n g u i s t i c s i s also o n l y a p r o v i s i o n a l a u t o n o m y , f o r language is b u t one aspect of h u m a n social and c u l t u r a l existence and cannot b e a n a l y z e d i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m t h a t existence. T h e result is that language is seen as o n l y o n e system w i t h i n a 'system o f systems' w h i c h l o o k a t the same r e a l i t y f r o m d i f f e r e n t points o f v i e w . I t i s t h e r e f o r e impossible t o d e r i v e p s y c h o l o g i c a l conclusions d i r e c t l y f r o m l i n g u i s t i c facts, since l i n g u i s t i c s and p s y c h o l o g y l o o k a t language f r o m d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s o f v i e w . F i n a l l y i t i m p l i e s t h a t language i s a n e x t r e m e l y c o m p l e x reality that can be studied from many different linguistic points of

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v i e w c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s t h a t language can serve, s o the m o n o l i t h i c a n d static Saussurean m o d e l o f l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e is u n d e r m i n e d . Jakobson has r e c e n t l y insisted that the d i v e r s i t y o f language i s 'the c h i e f target of international linguistic thought in its endeavours to overcome the Saussurean model of language as a static u n i f o r m system of mandatory rules and to supplant this oversimplified and artificial construct by the dynamic v i e w of a diversified, convertible code w i t h regard to the different functions of language. As long as this conception finds its adepts again and again, we must repeat that any experimental reduction of linguistic reality can lead to valuable scientific conclusions so long as we do not take the deliberately n a r r o w e d frame of the experiment for the unrestricted linguistic reality'. 11

F o r Prague l i n g u i s t i c s the aspects o f language t h a t c o n c e r n the l i n g u i s t are those aspects t h a t are r e l e v a n t to language's functions. L a n g u a g e is therefore a s o c i a l l y elaborated set of rules adapted to a set o f f u n c t i o n s . I t i s these functions that p r o v i d e linguistics w i t h the a priori on the basis of w h i c h its systems can be c o n s t r u c t e d . T h e f u n c t i o n s d o n o t d e r i v e f r o m p r o p e r t i e s o f the m i n d , but f r o m the needs o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h themselves depend o n the social context. L a n g u a g e is e x p l a i n e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y by s h o w i n g h o w it is a means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n adapted t o its functions, subject t o c o n s t r a i n t s o f p h y s i o l o g y ( f o r e x a m p l e the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o w e r s o f h e a r i n g ) , o f p s y c h o l o g y ( f o r e x a m p l e the c a p a c i t y o f the m e m o r y ) , and s o c i o l o g y ( f o r e x a m p l e the channels o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the e x t e n t o f shared i n f o r m a t i o n , the o r i e n t a t i o n o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) . Language is, t h e r e f o r e , n o t an i n e r t object, b u t a t e l e o l o g i c a l system, that t e l e o l o g y b e i n g a social t e l e o l o g y . T h e f u n c t i o n a l a p p r o a c h t o language, p i o n e e r e d i n the Prague analysis o f the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f sound, breaks w i t h Saussure's p o s i t i v i s m in seeing language as an i n s t r u m e n t a n d n o t as an o b j e c t . T h e c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n b o t h founds the a u t o n o m y o f the system a n d l i n k s i t t o the e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h i t f u n c t i o n s . T h e c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n makes i t possible t o i d e n t i f y the system b y p r o v i d i n g the p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the system i s c o n s t r u c t e d . I n this w a y i t makes i t possible t o i d e n t i f y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y the elements o f the system, elements w h i c h are d e f i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i r f u n c t i o n a l r o l e i n the system, and t o i d e n t i f y the systematic r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n those elements.

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I t i s o n l y the c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n w h i c h makes i t possible t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p e r t i n e n t and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y n o n p e r t i n e n t relations, and so b e t w e e n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p e r t i n e n t a n d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y n o n - p e r t i n e n t features o f the elements o f the system. M o u n i n i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y b l u n t i n his insistence o n the c e n t r a l i t y o f the c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n i n s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s :

'There is a structure because there is a choice in the arrangement of the units. W h a t is the c r i t e r i o n of this choice? It is the function, a notion fundamental to structural linguistics. Every t i m e anyone refers to structuralism in the human sciences w i t h o u t referring at the same time to functionalism, w h i l e c l a i m i n g to use models provided by structural linguistics, there is reason to believe that one is dealing w i t h pure babbling, or even a completely empty psittacism'. 12

T h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the concept o f f u n c t i o n i m p l i e s a decisive break w i t h the p s y c h o l o g i s m w h i c h w a s s t i l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f Saussure's w o r k . T r u b e t z k o j , despite e a r l y hints o f p s y c h o l o g i s m , was e m p h a t i c : 'Recourse to psychology must be avoided in defining the phoneme since the latter is a linguistic and not a psychological concept. A n y reference to " l i n g u i s t i c consciousness" must be ignored in defining the p h o n e m e ' . 13

I n m a k i n g e x p l i c i t the f u n c t i o n a l basis o f language the P r a g u e l i n g u i s t s p u r g e d l i n g u i s t i c s o f any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f language i n terms o f a p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y , w h e t h e r i n d i v i d u a l o r c o l l e c t i v e , conscious o r unconscious. T h e relations w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e the system in question are u n a m b i g u o u s l y f u n c t i o n a l and n o t psyc h o l o g i c a l relations. I n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a tions o f the f i n d i n g s o f l i n g u i s t i c s has t o b e l e f t t o p s y c h o l o g y , b u t there is no necessary i m p l i c a t i o n that the system defined by the f u n c t i o n has any p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y . I n b r e a k i n g w i t h Saussurean p o s i t i v i s m , the Prague l i n g u i s t s also b r o k e w i t h the r i g i d Saussurean o p p o s i t i o n s b e t w e e n langue and parole, on the one h a n d , and b e t w e e n s y n c h r o n y and d i a c h r o n y , o n the o t h e r . T h e f o r m e r d i s t i n c t i o n , w h i l e o f m e t h o d o l o g i c a l v a l u e , constitutes a b a r r i e r i f elevated t o a n o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l . T h e o p p o s i t i o n t o the r i g i d i t y o f the langue/parole d i v i s i o n w a s d e v e l o p e d even before the rise o f the Prague L i n g u i s t i c C i r c l e i n the w o r k o f the Russian Formalists. T h e F o r m a l i s t s saw speech n o t simply as a realization of langue, but rather as the creative act

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w h i c h b r o u g h t language t o l i f e , i n w h i c h m e a n i n g c o u l d b e created by b r e a k i n g rules as w e l l as by m e r e l y a p p l y i n g t h e m , and in p o e t i c f o r m s o f discourse such means o f f u l l y e x p l o i t i n g the resources o f l a n g u a g e are c o m m o n . T h i s leads n a t u r a l l y to the idea of parole as p e r m a n e n t l y i n n o v a t i v e , t o a d i a l e c t i c i n w h i c h every speech act tends t o s t r e t c h the resources o f langue a n d i n s t r e t c h i n g t h e m t o change t h e m . Langue is therefore seen as a set of l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s ( o r social n o r m s ) w h i c h are e x p l o i t e d r a t h e r than a p p l i e d , t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g the permanence n o t o f l i n g u i s t i c categories and f o r m s b u t r a t h e r o f l i n g u i s t i c change. T h u s the r e v i s e d c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n langue a n d parole or the ' c o d e ' and the 'message', l e d n a t u r a l l y t o a change i n the c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s y n c h r o n y and d i a c h r o n y . Jakobson has been v e r y c o n c e r n e d i n m a n y o f his studies w i t h the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the code and message, n o t o n l y i n poetics b u t also i n , f o r e x a m p l e , his analysis o f ' s h i f t e r s ' w h i c h i n t e g r a t e code and message. M o r e r e c e n t l y he has r e f e r r e d to the 'indissoluble d i a l e c t i c u n i t y langue/parole' i n d e n o u n c i n g the separation o f the t w o , c o n c l u d i n g that ' w i t h o u t a c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f the code w i t h the messages, n o insight i n t o the c r e a t i v e p o w e r o f language can b e achieved'. 14

Jakobson has been e v e n m o r e e m p h a t i c about the need to r e c o n c i l e s y n c h r o n y and d i a c h r o n y . H i s 1928 theses w e r e unambiguous: ' T h e opposition between synchronic and diachronic analysis counterposed the n o t i o n of system to the notion of an evolution. It has lost its basic importance now that we recognise that every system is necessarily present to us as an e v o l u t i o n , and that every evolution inevitably has a systematic character'. 15

T h e abandonment o f the p o s i t i v i s t v i e w o f language f o r a m o r e d i a l e c t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h sees o b j e c t i v i s m as a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d m o m e n t o f a scientific process w h i c h a c c o m modates b o t h subjective a n d o b j e c t i v e elements makes possible the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a v i e w o f language w h i c h can get b e y o n d the o n e sidedness o f the p o s i t i v i s t perspective. L a n g u a g e is no l o n g e r seen as a static m e n t a l f r a m e w o r k b u t as a s o c i a l l y defined code a v a i l a b l e t o the m e m b e r s o f society. T h i s code constitutes a system, b u t a system w h i c h is c o n s t a n t l y evolving. Hence there is no opposition between systematic and

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h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , f o r b o t h treat o f the same t h i n g . S y s t e m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n seeks to u n d e r s t a n d a system which is evolving, w h i l e h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n seeks to u n d e r s t a n d an e v o l v i n g system. T h e t w o are r e c o n c i l e d as soon as it is r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the o n l y r e a l i t y of language is in its use as an i n s t r u m e n t by h u m a n subjects. T h e Russian F o r m a l i s t s f i r s t d e v e l o p e d the s t r u c t u r a l a p p r o a c h t o language i n the analysis o f the poetic f u n c t i o n , w h i c h i s d e f i n e d by a focus on the message f o r its o w n sake. T h e t h e o r e t i c a l reason f o r this emphasis on the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n is v e r y i m p o r t a n t , because it is o n l y the o r i e n t a t i o n to the message c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n t h a t makes i t possible t o analyze poetic language w i t h o u t reference t o any e x t r i n s i c m e a n i n g : m e a n i n g i s c r e a t e d b y the f o r m a t i o n o f relationships w i t h i n language and s o the analysis o f the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n shows h o w t h e c r e a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the message produces the p o e t i c m e a n i n g o f a w o r k . Jakobson stresses t h a t p o e t r y cannot be r e d u c e d to the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n o r v i c e versa. I n any discourse w e are d e a l i n g w i t h a h i e r a r c h y o f functions. I n p o e t r y the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n i s d o m i n a n t , b u t d i f f e r e n t p o e t i c genres i m p l y a d i f f e r e n t r a n k i n g o f the v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s , so t h a t , f o r e x a m p l e , in epic p o e t r y the r e f e r e n t i a l f u n c t i o n i s s t r o n g l y i m p l i c a t e d , i n l y r i c p o e t r y the e m o t i v e f u n c t i o n , and so o n . E x t r e m e f o r m a l i s m made the m i s t a k e o f i d e n t i f y i n g p o e t r y w i t h the poetic f u n c t i o n and s o o f b e l i e v i n g t h a t p o e t r y c o u l d b e r e d u c e d to the s t r u c t u r a l relations established w i t h i n a p o e m , w i t h o u t any reference b e i n g made b e y o n d t o the o t h e r elements o f the system o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h i s ignores b o t h the fact t h a t the p o e t i c i s o n l y one o f several functions and i t ignores the fact t h a t the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n i s o n l y defined w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , hence the m e a n i n g o f the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s established w i t h i n the p o e m cannot b e d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the p o e t w h o produces the p o e m o r the hearer for w h o m i t has m e a n i n g . T h e s t r u c t u r a l relations w i t h i n t h e p o e m are the means b y w h i c h a p o e t i c m e a n i n g i s c o m m u n i c a t e d f r o m poet t o the hearer o f the p o e m and have n o existence outside that f u n c t i o n a l context. W i t h i n linguistics the Prague C i r c l e c o n c e n t r a t e d o n the sound system o f language because, a s i n the study o f the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n of language, it was possible here to study an aspect of the structural

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p r o p e r t i e s o f language w i t h o u t m a k i n g reference t o e x t r i n s i c m e a n i n g . T h i s is because language is w h a t M a r t i n e t has c a l l e d a ' d o u b l y a r t i c u l a t e d s y s t e m ' , b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d o n the expression plane b y the c o m b i n a t i o n o f elements (phonemes) w h i c h are themselves w i t h o u t m e a n i n g . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the f u n c t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s o f Prague l i n g u i s t i c s t o p h o n o l o g y was p i o n e e r e d b y T r u b e t z k o j . T r u b e t z k o j confines p h o n o l o g y t o the study o f sound i n its r e f e r e n t i a l f u n c t i o n , l e a v i n g the study o f its o t h e r f u n c t i o n s t o p h o n o s t y l i s t i c s . A t this l e v e l sound features have t h r e e functions: c u l m i n a t i v e , d e l i m i t i v e a n d d i s t i n c t i v e . T h e d i s t i n c t i v e feature is based on the opposition b e t w e e n sounds t h a t makes i t possible t o d i s t i n g u i s h l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s f r o m one another. I f w e c o n c e n t r a t e o u r a t t e n t i o n o n the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f the sound system i t i s c l e a r t h a t the i n t r i n s i c characteristics o f the sounds o f language are i r r e l e v a n t . A l l t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h a t the d i f f e r e n t s i g n i f i c a n t sounds should be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m one a n o t h e r . T h u s the sound system o f language can b e analyzed, f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n , solely i n terms o f the r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n sounds: the sound system of a g i v e n language can b e r e d u c e d t o a series o f f u n c t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , a s t r u c t u r e o f d i s t i n c t i v e relations. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y t o l e a r n t o speak a n d t o u n d e r s t a n d a language i n v o l v e s l e a r n i n g to r e c o g n i z e and r e p r o d u c e these s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s . T h i s i s the i m p o r t a n c e o f Prague p h o n o l o g y f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , f o r i t p r o v i d e s a r e d u c t i o n o f the sound system t o a p u r e l y f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e i n w h i c h the significance o f d i f f e r e n t sounds i s reducec t o t h e i r relations w i t h o t h e r sounds w i t h i n the system. T h e system can t h e r e f o r e be r e d u c e d to its f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e . H o w e v e r this s t r u c t u r e i s n o t s o m e t h i n g i n h e r e n t i n the sound system as an i n e r t o b j e c t , l e t alone is it s o m e t h i n g i m p o s e d by the m i n d , a l t h o u g h i t must b e assimilated b y the m i n d i f a language i s t o b e learned and u n d e r s t o o d . T h e s t r u c t u r e i s the p r o d u c t o f a b s t r a c t i o n , a n a b s t r a c t i o n that ignores a l l b u t the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n of the sound system, so that the s t r u c t u r e is isolated on the basis of a f u n c t i o n a l a r g u m e n t , and c a n n o t be u n d e r s t o o d in i s o l a t i o n f r o m that f u n c t i o n . T h i s i s best b r o u g h t o u t b y o b s e r v i n g t h a t n o t a l l oppositions b e t w e e n sounds are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i cant. I n o t h e r w o r d s n o t a l l oppositions are d i s t i n c t i v e , and i t i s only reference to the linguistic function of differentiating

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m e a n i n g s , and t o the l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h sounds appear, that can d e t e r m i n e w h i c h o p p o s i t i o n s define distinctive features o f the sound system. I n any p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t one phoneme w i l l be opposed to others n o t as a w h o l e , b u t o n l y by those p h o n e t i c features t h a t define its f u n c t i o n a l distinctiveness. T h e idea t h a t the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f sound was served n o t b y the p h o n e m e b u t b y the d i s t i n c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n c e r t a i n features o f the p h o n e m e l e d j a k o b s o n to the conclusion t h a t the phoneme s h o u l d be a n a l y t i c a l l y dissolved i n t o its c o n s t i t u e n t features, those features b e i n g i d e n t i f i a b l e o n l y a s p a r t o f the system o f d i s t i n c t i v e features. I f this c o u l d be done the system of phonemes c o u l d be reduced to a s i m p l e r and m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l system o f d i s t i n c t i v e features, each p h o n e m e then b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a b u n d l e of d i s t i n c t i v e features. I f the d i s t i n c t i v e features that w e r e i s o l a t e d c o u l d b e c l a i m e d t o be u n i v e r s a l a single set of d i s t i n c t i v e features c o u l d be used to c h a r a c t e r i z e , and t o generate, the sound system o f every n a t u r a l language. W h e n L é v i - S t r a u s s m e t Jakobson i n N e w Y o r k i n the e a r l y 1940s Jakobson was w o r k i n g o n the p r o b l e m o f i s o l a t i n g such d i s t i n c t i v e features and expressing t h e m in a b i n a r y f o r m . It is this s t r u c t u r a l analysis t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s felt t o b e c o n v e r g e n t w i t h his work. I t m i g h t b e t h o u g h t p a r a d o x i c a l that the Prague School, w h i c h insisted on the t e l e o l o g i c a l character of language as a d y n a m i c a n d d i a l e c t i c a l system r e l a t e d t o the c o m m u n i c a t i o n needs o f the speech c o m m u n i t y , s h o u l d have p i o n e e r e d a n i m m a n e n t , s t r u c t u r a l , analysis of sound as a s y n c h r o n i c system. T h e paradox is r e s o l v e d w h e n w e appreciate t h a t this s y n c h r o n i c s t r u c t u r e represents a n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m the d y n a m i c system o f language, a n a b s t r a c t i o n l e g i t i m a t e d o n m e t h o d o l o g i c a l and n o t o n o n t o l o g i c a l o r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l grounds. T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n i s l e g i t i m a t e because the d o u b l e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f language, and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y a r b i t r a r y character o f the l i n g u i s t i c sign, makes it possible to analyze the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f the sound system o f language w i t h o u t any reference t o e x t r i n s i c m e a n i n g , and s o t o focus a t t e n t i o n , f o r the l i m i t e d purpose o f i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h a t f u n c t i o n , o n relations i n t e r n a l t o the l i n g u i s t i c code. T o the e x t e n t t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c sign i s a r b i t r a r y , i n h e r e n t qualities of the signifier do not play any part in its linguistic

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f u n c t i o n and so the s i g n can be a n a l y z e d in a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m consideration of meaning. I t i s o n l y reference t o the concept o f l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n t h a t enables us to l e g i t i m a t e the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d of analysis t h a t is a p p r o p r i a t e t o the study o f the d i s t i n c t i v e features o f the sound system o f language. T h e concept o f f u n c t i o n reveals t o u s t h a t l a n g u a g e is a means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n : t h e r e is n o t h i n g in the existence of language as an o b j e c t that tells us this fact, it can o n l y be r e v e a l e d by reference to an i n t e n t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t e t h a t lies b e h i n d l i n g u i s t i c utterances. I t i s o n l y the concept o f f u n c t i o n t h a t reveals t o u s t h a t p o s i t i v e q u a l i t i e s o f sound d o n o t p e r f o r m a n essential l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n , b u t t h a t the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f the e l e m e n t a r y sounds o f language is a d i s t i n c t i v e one. At t h e same t i m e it is o n l y reference to the c o n c e p t o f l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n that enables u s t o set l i m i t s t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d , i n p a r t i c u l a r r e v e a l i n g t h a t i t i s o n l y w h e r e i t i s l e g i t i m a t e t o abstract f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f extrinsic meaning that it is legitimate to confine our attention to i n t e r n a l structural connections. I t i s the concept o f f u n c t i o n , and the i n t e g r a t i o n o f f o r m and f u n c t i o n i n the analysis o f language, t h a t underlies a l l t h a t i s p r o d u c t i v e i n Russian F o r m a l i s m and i n Prague l i n g u i s t i c s . Russian F o r m a l i s m isolated the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n o f language i n the analysis o f w h i c h a l l reference t o e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y c o u l d b e e x c l u d e d since the p o e t i c f u n c t i o n is served by language t a k i n g i t s e l f as its s i g n i f i e d : i t represents the m e t a l i n g u i s t i c use o f language i n w h i c h n e w meanings are c r e a t e d b y the m a n i p u l a t i o n o f established l i n g u i s t i c meanings w h i c h can, f o r the purposes o f analysis, b e taken for granted. Prague L i n g u i s t i c s i s o l a t e d f o r special study the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f sound i n language i n the study o f w h i c h , again, e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c considerations c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y b e e x c l u d e d ( a l t h o u g h the analysis o f the sound system cannot i n fact b e c a r r i e d o u t i n c o m p l e t e a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m m e a n i n g : since the p h o n e m e is a f u n c t i o n a l concept and n o t a substantive acoustic r e a l i t y the i d e n t i t y o f one p h o n e m e a n d its d i f f e r e n c e f r o m others can o n l y b e d e f i n e d f u n c t i o n a l l y , b y reference t o i d e n t i t y and d i f f e r e n c e o f meaning). I n each case the ' s t r u c t u r a l ' m e t h o d o f i m m a n e n t analysis, i n which the properties of language under review are considered to

Structuralism

in

Linguistics

155

consist i n relations i n t e r n a l t o the language ( o r , i n the case o f p o e t r y , the m e t a l a n g u a g e ) , is l e g i t i m a t e d solely by reference to the c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n . I t is, therefore, n o t language a s such, n o r the m i n d o f the language user, that i s s t r u c t u r a l . R a t h e r c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s o f language can b e e x p l a i n e d i n i m m a n e n t t e r m s . W h e n w e m o v e b e y o n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f the sound system o f language such a n i m m a n e n t s t r u c t u r a l analysis is no l o n g e r l e g i t i m a t e , since it is no l o n g e r l e g i t i m a t e t o isolate the language f r o m its c o n t e x t , and i n p a r t i c u l a r f r o m considerations o f m e a n i n g . W i t h i n the sound system, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e study o f prosodic features cannot e x c l u d e reference t o m e a n i n g and cannot c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o s t r u c t u r a l analysis, n o t least because some such features ( i n t o n a t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e ) are n o t discrete and so cannot be d e f i n e d c o n t r a s t i v e l y . T h e e x c l u s i o n o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m e a n i n g becomes even less l e g i t i m a t e w h e n w e m o v e f r o m the study o f the sound system t o the study o f the s y n t a x o f language. F o r e x a m p l e , c e n t r a l t o C h o m s k y ' s e n t e r p r i s e i s the b e l i e f t h a t i t i s possible t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n g r a m m a t i c a l i t y and m e a n i n g f u l ness a s c r i t e r i a b y w h i c h t o evaluate the a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f sentences. If ' g r a m m a t i c a l ' is the same t h i n g as ' l o g i c a l ' then t h e r e is no p r o b l e m i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the c r i t e r i a : a s t a t e m e n t can b e l o g i c a l l y acceptable b u t meaningless o r w r o n g . H o w e v e r the g r a m m a t i c a ' s t r u c t u r e o f n a t u r a l languages does n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e i r l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e , thus g r a m m a t i c a l i t y can o n l y r e f e r t o adherence t o the rules o f the g r a m m a r t h a t g o v e r n the language, w h i c h leads C h o m s k y s t r a i g h t i n t o the c i r c u l a r i t y t h a t I discussed i n the last section. I n fact C h o m s k y has repeatedly c h a n g e d his m i n d about the n a t u r e o f the d i v i d i n g l i n e b e t w e e n the c r i t e r i a o f g r a m m a t i c a l and semantic a c c e p t a b i l i t y , b r i n g i n g o u t c l e a r l y the a r b i t r a r y c h a r a c t e r o f the d i v i s i o n i n his l i n g u i s t i c s . T h e c o n c l u s i o n seems clear. I f w e w a n t t o understand w h y the s y n t a c t i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f language does n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o its l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e w e have t o refer t o the f u n c t i o n o f language. T h e function of an a r t i f i c i a l scientific metalanguage is to p r o v i d e a n u n a m b i g u o u s f o r m i n w h i c h t o express and t o i n v e s t i g a t e the consistency of a series of statements, and so its s y n t a x is l o g i c a l . A n a t u r a l language has a m u c h m o r e v a r i e d range o f d e mands placed u p o n i t a s means o f e x p r e s s i o n and c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

156


Its syntax is subject to a m u c h greater range of pressures, so we w o u l d n o t e x p e c t that s y n t a x t o c o r r e s p o n d t o the l o g i c a l syntax o f a n a r t i f i c i a l language. I t i s o n l y b y i n v e s t i g a t i n g the functions o f language, and s o the constraints t o w h i c h i t i s subject i n its e v e r y d a y use, t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s can establish the p e r t i n e n t s y n t a c t i c a l relationships w i t h i n the language. T h u s the s y n t a x o f a n a t u r a l language c a n n o t b e e x p l o r e d i n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m the c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h that language f u n c t i o n s as a n a t u r a l language. I t i s o n l y because p o s i t i v i s m d i v o r c e s language f r o m this c o n t e x t , and considers i t i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m the pressures t h a t m o u l d it as a language, that it is t h e n able to reduce language to a f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e w h i c h is, i n the last analysis, l i n g u i s t i c a l l y a r b i t r a r y .

N O T E S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

F. de Saussure, Course of General Linguistics, Fontana, London, 1974, pp. 15, 66. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., pp. 112-3. TT, p. 55. Saussure, op. cit., pp. 8 1 , 90, 99-100. Ibid., pp. 74, 79. R. Jakobson, Word and Language, M o u t o n , T h e Hague, 1971, p. 711. N. Chomsky, ' R e v i e w of B. F. Skinner, Verbal Behaviour,' Language, 35,1,1959, pp. 2 6 - 5 8 . N. Chomsky and M. H a l l e , The Sound Pattern of English, Harper & R o w , N e w Y o r k , 1968, p. 4. P. Peters and R. Ritchie, 'A N o t e on the Universal Base Hypothesis'.Journal of Linguistics, 5, 1969, p. 150. R. Jakobson, 'Linguistics' in International Study on the Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences, M o u t o n , T h e Hague, 1970, p. 430. G. M o u n i n , Clefs pour la Linguistique, Seghers, Paris, 1968, p. 96. N. T r u b e t z k o j , Principles of Phonology, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, Berkeley, 1969, p. 38. Jakobson, 1970, op. cit., p. 458. R. Jakobson and J. T y a n y a n o v , 'Problems of L i t e r a r y and Linguistic Studies', New Left Review, 37, 1966, p. 60.

V I I . Lévi-Strauss and the Linguistic Analogy 1

T H E

E N C O U N T E R

LÉVI-STRAUSS

W I T H

L I N G U I S T I C S

e n c o u n t e r e d s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s w h e n he m e t

R o m a n Jakobson i n N e w Y o r k i n 1942, w h e r e b o t h w e r e a t t a c h e d to

the

École

Jakobson's

L i b r e des Hautes Etudes.

lecture

course

' O n Sound

Lévi-Strauss

and M e a n i n g '

1

attended and was

astonished to find w h a t he r e g a r d e d as a r e m a r k a b l e c o n v e r g e n c e between

the

methods

developed

by

Prague

phonology

for

r e d u c i n g the d i v e r s i t y o f p h o n o l o g i c a l facts t o a r a t i o n a l o r d e r and the m e t h o d t h a t h e w a s h i m s e l f d e v e l o p i n g i n the analysis o f kinship For

phenomena. Lévi-Strauss

the

advance

that Jakobson

had

made

on

t r a d i t i o n a l p h o n o l o g y b y means o f the c o n c e p t o f s t r u c t u r e s t r i c t l y p a r a l l e l e d the advance t h a t h e b e l i e v e d h i m s e l f t o b e m a k i n g o n the analysis o f G r a n e t . G r a n e t had r e d u c e d k i n s h i p phenomena t o a systematic f o r m , b u t h e had n o t m a n a g e d t o reduce the v a r i o u s systems to m o d a l i t i e s of a single o r d e r . I

argued e a r l i e r

inspiration

in

the

that body

there

are f e w

o f The

signs of the l i n g u i s t i c

Elementary

Structures.

Thus

in

c o n f r o n t i n g linguistics Lévi-Strauss was discovering not a n e w m e t h o d , but a c o n v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n tendencies i n t w o d i f f e r e n t disciplines.

H o w e v e r the d i s c o v e r y o f this convergence h a d a

m a j o r i m p a c t o n the d i r e c t i o n o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k , f o r i t seemed t o L é v i - S t r a u s s t h a t the lesson o f this c o n v e r g e n c e was t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d c o u l d b e a p p l i e d e l s e w h e r e w i t h i n the h u m a n sciences. I n v i e w o f the discussion o f the last chapter i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o u n c o v e r precisely w h a t are the g r o u n d s o n w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s seeks to l e g i t i m a t e this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n . T h e r e are i n fact t w o d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f a r g u m e n t that L é v i Strauss offers at d i f f e r e n t times. F i r s t l y , the b o r r o w i n g c a n be l e g i t i m a t e d o n m e t h o d o l o g i c a l g r o u n d s . T h e f u n c t i o n a l basis o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d can b e r e c o g n i z e d a n d the m e t h o d e x t e n d e d to

any

system

whose

function

is

essentially

157

distinctive.

This

is

the

158


f o r m o f a r g u m e n t L é v i - S t r a u s s offers i n his earliest b o r r o w ings. H o w e v e r this w o u l d give the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d a v e r y r e s t r i c t e d a p p l i c a t i o n , as Lévi-Strauss recognizes in his e a r l y w o r k s . T h u s the second a r g u m e n t , based o n a supposed i d e n t i t y o f o b j e c t , i s m u c h m o r e p o w e r f u l , i f w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s i s the a r g u m e n t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s has discovered the basis o n w h i c h h u m a n beings are able to create systems of m e a n i n g , this basis b e i n g the capacity to introduce structural differentiations into a natural homogeneity. L i n g u i s t i c s has s h o w n us, on the one h a n d , the n a t u r e of the h u m a n m i n d that makes i t possible f o r u s t o l e a r n and t o a p p r e h e n d such a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , and, o n the o t h e r hand, the w a y i n w h i c h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f such d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s m a k e i t possible t o c r e a t e systems o f m e a n i n g . T h u s the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d o f l i n g u i s t i c s is applicable t h r o u g h o u t the h u m a n sciences as the m e t h o d t h a t makes i t possible t o locate the o b j e c t i v e , and f o r L é v i Strauss the unconscious, foundations o f m e a n i n g . T h e m e t h o d p i o n e e r e d i n p h o n o l o g y , and d i s c o v e r e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y b y L é v i Strauss in his study of k i n s h i p , is the m e t h o d that makes the s c i e n t i f i c study o f m e a n i n g possible b y r e d u c i n g meanings t o r e l a t i o n s i m m a n e n t i n the object. I n v i e w o f the discussion i n the last c h a p t e r i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o i d e n t i f y w h i c h o f the t w o conceptions o f l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e discussed Lévi-Strauss adheres to. In this section I w a n t to l o o k at L é v i - S t r a u s s ' c o m m e n t s o n l i n g u i s t i c s , w h e r e w e shall f i n d t h a t despite a n early a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the f u n c t i o n a l i s t perspective, L é v i - S t r a u s s soon lapsed i n t o p o s i t i v i s t m e n t a l i s m . I n the f o l l o w i n g sections I shall assess the l e g i t i m a c y o f Lévi-Strauss' b o r r o w i n g s b y l o o k i n g a t the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c s and the relevance o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f m i n d and o f m e a n ing. B e f o r e e m b a r k i n g , h o w e v e r , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note t h a t the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n v e r g e n c e that so s t r u c k Lévi-Strauss is no i n d i c a t i o n o f the productiveness o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d . T h e enthusiasm f o r the m e t h o d s o f systematic analysis t h a t s w e p t E u r o p e was r e c o g n i z e d by the Prague C i r c l e as a p a r t of a b r o a d i n t e l l e c t u a l and i d e o l o g i c a l m o v e m e n t w h o s e achievements, i f any, l a y i n the f u t u r e . T h u s even w i t h i n p h o n o l o g y Jakobson h a d not managed to establish that the sound system could be given a

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s t r u c t u r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t the t i m e L é v i - S t r a u s s m e t h i m , a n d i t w o u l d b e a l o n g t i m e before C h o m s k y opened the w a y t o a s t r u c t u r a l syntax. Gestalt p s y c h o l o g y w a s i n disarray, p h e n o m e n o l o g y h a d collapsed i n t o m y s t i c i s m , n e o - p o s i t i v i s m was i n a state o f p e r m a n e n t r e v i s i o n . A s I have a r g u e d i n e a r l i e r chapters i n the case b o t h o f l i n g u i s t i c s and o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' analysis o f k i n s h i p the p o s i t i v e achievements o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m i n c o u n t e r i n g the excessive enthusiasm for p s y c h o l o g i s m and h i s t o r i c i s m had to be m e a s u r e d against the dangers o f f o r m a l i s m and h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n t h a t arose i f the s t r u c t u r e was f e t i s h i z e d and the o b j e c t under r e v i e w w a s isolated f r o m the c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h i t f u n c t i o n e d . T h u s i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o b e a w a r e o f the serious l i m i t a t i o n s o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d even i n its chosen fields, and n o t t o b e c a r r i e d a w a y b y Lévi-Strauss' enthusiasm. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' f i r s t self-conscious a p p l i c a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d o f p h o n o l o g y was i n a n a r t i c l e published i n 1945. T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c s i n this a r t i c l e i s v e r y l i m i t e d , a s M o u n i n has s h o w n i n a n e x t e n d e d c r i t i q u e . I n p a r t i c u l a r L é v i Strauss w a v e r s b e t w e e n a m e n t a l i s t and a f u n c t i o n a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c s . O n the one hand, L é v i - S t r a u s s argues t h a t the s t u d y o f k i n s h i p systems can b e assimilated t o t h a t o f language because b o t h are systems o f m e a n i n g c o n s t i t u t e d b y the unconscious. O n the o t h e r hand L é v i - S t r a u s s does i n t r o d u c e the concept o f f u n c t i o n l a t e r i n the a r g u m e n t , w i t h i n t e r e s t i n g results. 2

Lévi-Strauss argues that, despite f i r s t appearances, the m e t h o d o f p h o n o l o g y c a n n o t b e a p p l i e d t o the s t u d y o f the t e r m i n o l o g y , b r e a k i n g terms d o w n i n t o smaller u n i t s o f m e a n i n g , and c r i t i c i z e d the a t t e m p t t o d o this b y D a v i s and W a r n e r because the m e t h o d leads o n l y to an abstract system whose elements have no o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , w h i c h i s m o r e c o m p l e x than t h e o r i g i n a l data, and w h i c h has no e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r . T h e reason f o r this f a i l u r e is t h a t we do n o t k n o w the f u n c t i o n o f the system. A t t h i s p o i n t , t h e r e f o r e , L é v i Strauss seems t o r e c o g n i z e the i m p o r t a n c e o f the c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n and the consequences o f i g n o r i n g i t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , and m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t l y , w h e n he does so he argues that the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o the study o f the kinship systems t o w h i c h The Elementary Structures is d e v o t e d . I n fact i n the 1945 a r t i c l e L é v i - S t r a u s s applies the m e t h o d t o the s t u d y o f the system o f attitudes because there w e k n o w the function which is, supposedly, 'to insure group cohesion and

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e q u i l i b r i u m ' . A l t h o u g h L é v i - S t r a u s s does n o t specify the f u n c t i o n m o r e c l e a r l y , n o r discuss its r e l a t i o n t o the s t r u c t u r a l analysis, the i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t the f u n c t i o n o f the p r e s c r i b e d attitudes t o k i n i s purely demarcative. Thus, by a ' f o r m a l transposition of m e t h o d ' L é v i - S t r a u s s analyzes this system b y means o f a series o f b i n a r y oppositions. I f the f u n c t i o n o f these attitudes w e r e i n d e e d d e m a r c a t i v e , t h e n the t r a n s p o s i t i o n o f m e t h o d w o u l d b e q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e . H o w e v e r t h e r e is n o t m u c h reason to b e l i e v e t h a t this is the case. T h e a t t i t u d e s are i n fact p r e s c r i b e d i n a p o s i t i v e , and o f t e n v e r y d e t a i l e d , w a y b y the societies i n q u e s t i o n , and L é v i - S t r a u s s recognizes that t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the attitudes i s t o ' o v e r s i m p l i f y ' t h e m . I n fact there i s r e p o r t e d t o be a preponderance of systems w h i c h do fit Lévi-Strauss' scheme so it m i g h t be s u r m i s e d that the a t t i t u d e s do have a systematic significance, a l t h o u g h i t i s n o t clear w h e t h e r this systematic q u a l i t y is o r i g i n a l or d e r i v a t i v e and Lévi-Strauss' hypothesis is n o t really very illuminating. In the c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r of The Elementary Structures LéviStrauss also makes some reference to the f u n c t i o n a l basis of the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d . W i t h i n The Elementary Structures the use of the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d develops spontaneously f r o m the a t t e m p t t o generalize and f o r m a l i z e M a u s s ' t h e o r y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , and does n o t depend o n any a n a l o g y w i t h language. I t i s because L é v i Strauss sees systems of k i n s h i p e x c l u s i v e l y as systems designed to establish c e r t a i n patterns o f social relationships that f o r h i m the o n l y r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s o f these systems are the relationships t h a t t h e y establish, and these define the s t r u c t u r e to w h i c h the system is r e d u c e d . W h e t h e r or n o t the t h e o r y is adequate to r e a l i t y , the m e t h o d is c l e a r l y adequate to the t h e o r y . T h e s t r u c t u r a l analysis is t h e r e f o r e l e g i t i m a t e d b y the supposed f u n c t i o n o f the systems. At the end of The Elementary Structures Lévi-Strauss argues t h a t ' t h e progress o f o u r analysis i s . . . close t o that o f the p h o n o l o g i c a l l i n g u i s t ' i n r e d u c i n g a l a r g e n u m b e r o f rules t o a s m a l l n u m b e r . T h e m e t h o d is analogous because a l l possibilities are e x h a u s t i v e l y established b y c o m b i n i n g a l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f elements i n a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t w a y s . T h e schema i t s e l f has a b i n a r y f o u n d a t i o n , b e i n g engendered b y successive d i c h o t o m i z a t i o n . Lévi-Strauss refers to the fact t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d is applicable to kinship systems because kinship systems and language

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share the c o m m o n f u n c t i o n , that h e b e l i e v e d u n k n o w n i n 1945 b u t w h i c h h e has n o w d i s c o v e r e d t o b e the f u n c t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . H o w e v e r he goes f u r t h e r than this a n d argues that l i n g u i s t s and ethnologists ' d o n o t m e r e l y apply the same methods, b u t are s t u d y i n g the same t h i n g ' . W h a t this t h i n g i s varies a t d i f f e r e n t stages o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' w o r k , b u t here i t i s a system o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Thus, according to Lévi-Strauss, we can i n t e r p r e t 3

'society as a whole in terms of a theory of communication . . . since the rules of kinship and marriage serve to insure the c i r c u l a t i o n of w o m e n between groups, just as economic rules serve to insure the c i r c u l a t i o n of goods and services, and linguistic rules the c i r c u l a t i o n of messages'. 4

T h e supposed a n a l o g y i s i n fact e x t r e m e l y m i s l e a d i n g , f o r l i n g u i s t i c rules have n o t h i n g w h a t e v e r t o d o w i t h the c i r c u l a t i o n o f messages, they are c o n c e r n e d w i t h the constitution o f messages. T h i s emphasis o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n gives w a y i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' l a t e r w o r k t o a n emphasis o n m e a n i n g , and c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the f u n c t i o n a l basis o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d disappears a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y . E v e n i n the e a r l i e r w o r k s i t seems clear that L é v i Strauss attaches m o s t i m p o r t a n c e n o t to these f u n c t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s b u t to the a r g u m e n t t h a t linguistics has a c h i e v e d the b r e a k t h r o u g h to a p u r e l y f o r m a l , and so r a t i o n a l , unconscious, and this is seen as the u l t i m a t e f o u n d a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d . E v e n i n the a r t i c l e o f 1945 this i s w h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s q u i t e e r r o n e o u s l y regards a s the most i m p o r t a n t achievement o f T r u b e t z k o j . I n later w o r k s L é v i - S t r a u s s places i n c r e a s i n g emphasis o n the l i n g u i s t i c d i s c o v e r y o f the unconscious f o u n d a t i o n s o f the s y m b o l i c c a p a c i t y and s o o f m e a n i n g . I n a n a r t i c l e o f 1946 the c o n t r i b u t i o n o f ' p s y c h o l o g y and l i n g u i s t i c s ' was r e l a t e d to the need to set up s y m b o l i s m 'as an a priori r e q u i r e m e n t of s o c i o l o g i c a l t h o u g h t ' . 5

B y 1949 L é v i - S t r a u s s was a r g u i n g t h a t 'the unconscious . . . is reducible to . . . the symbolic function . . . w h i c h is carried out according to the same laws among all men, and actually corresponds to the aggregate of these laws. . . . As the organ of a specific function, the unconscious merely imposes structural laws u p o n inarticulated elements w h i c h originate elsewhere . . . these laws are the same for all individuals and in all instances where the unconscious pursues its a c t i v i t i e s ' . 6

T h e t e r m ' f u n c t i o n ' here has a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g f r o m t h a t found in linguistics, for it has no teleological connotations,

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r e f e r r i n g rather to a p a r t i c u l a r capacity of the o r g a n i s m , as the use o f the o r g a n i c analogy makes clear. I n another a r t i c l e o f 1949 the d i s c o v e r y o f the unconscious f o u n d a t i o n o f language i s a t t r i b u t e d t o Boas. I n the same a r t i c l e the dissociation o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d f r o m its f u n c t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n is clear. T h e structures are n o t to be c o n s t r u c t e d d e d u c t i v e l y , on the basis of t h e i r f u n c t i o n , as they w e r e in The Elementary Structures, b u t r a t h e r we 'abstract the s t r u c t u r e w h i c h u n d e r l i e s the m a n y manifestations and remains p e r m a n e n t t h r o u g h o u t a succession o f events'. 7

In the 1950 I n t r o d u c t i o n to M a u s s ' Sociologie et Anthropologie the lesson o f l i n g u i s t i c s i s a g a i n n o t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , b u t substantive, i n s h o w i n g the unconscious character o f the ' f u n d a m e n t a l p h e n o m ena o f the m e n t a l l i f e ' , o p e n i n g the w a y t o ' a vast science o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' and m a k i n g possible a n i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t p s y c h o l o g y , the ' g e n e r a l i z e d expression o f the l a w s o f h u m a n t h o u g h t ' . 8

L i n g u i s t i c s has, Lévi-Strauss w r i t e s in a 1951 a r t i c l e i n s p i r e d by Sapir, 'reached b e y o n d the s u p e r f i c i a l conscious and h i s t o r i c a l expression o f l i n g u i s t i c phenomena t o a t t a i n f u n d a m e n t a l and o b j e c t i v e realities c o n s i s t i n g o f systems o f relations w h i c h are the p r o d u c t s o f unconscious t h o u g h t processes'. I f w e c o u l d a c c o m p l i s h the same i n r e l a t i o n t o social p h e n o m e n a w e m a y b e able t o ' c o n c l u d e that a l l f o r m s o f social l i f e are substantially o f the same n a t u r e . . . ( t h e y m a y S.C.) . . . consist of systems of b e h a v i o u r t h a t represent the p r o j e c t i o n , o n the l e v e l o f conscious and s o c i a l i z e d t h o u g h t , o f u n i v e r s a l l a w s w h i c h regulate the u n c o n scious a c t i v i t i e s o f the m i n d ' . T h e s y m b o l i c capacity i s r e l a t e d t o ' s p l i t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' , and this is the source of exchange. 'Since c e r t a i n terms are s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p e r c e i v e d as h a v i n g v a l u e b o t h f o r the speaker and the listener, the o n l y w a y t o resolve this c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s i n the exchange o f c o m p l e m e n t a r y values, t o w h i c h a l l social existence i s r e d u c e d ' . I t seems t h a t n o w the unconscious has been r e d u c e d f r o m the three ' s t r u c t u r e s ' of The Elementary Structures t o the p u r e l y f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e o f o p p o s i t i o n . 9

A s L é v i - S t r a u s s assimilated w h a t w e r e , f o r h i m , the lessons o f s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s , he lost w h a t tenuous g r i p he had h a d on the p r o p e r l y f u n c t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d , and instead came to argue t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d is u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e in the h u m a n sciences because it is a p p r o p r i a t e to the objective study of systems of meaning that are the product of the

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f o r m a l s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y o f the unconscious, c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f language, t h o u g h t and c u l t u r e . T h u s L é v i - S t r a u s s espouses a t h o r o u g h l y p o s i t i v i s t , and so f o r m a l i s t , c o n c e p t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d t h a t parallels that o f B l o o m f i e l d a n d C h o m s k y t h a t I discussed in the last chapter. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' c o m m e n t s o n m e t h o d o l o g y are n o t t o b e t a k e n t o o seriously, b u t his one s i g n i f i c a n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l discussion, o f the concept o f the ' m o d e l ' brings o u t w e l l his p o s i t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d . For L é v i - S t r a u s s a s t r u c t u r e i s a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f m o d e l w h i c h ' e x h i b i t s the characteristics of a system'; w h i c h offers 'a p o s s i b i l i t y o f o r d e r i n g a series o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g i n a g r o u p o f models o f the same t y p e ' ; w h i c h p r o p e r t i e s 'make i t possible t o p r e d i c t h o w the m o d e l w i l l react i f one o r m o r e o f its elements are s u b m i t t e d t o c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s ' ; and ' f i n a l l y , the m o d e l s h o u l d be so c o n s t i t u t e d as to make i m m e d i a t e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e a l l the observed facts'. T h e m o d e l is established by o b s e r v i n g facts and e l a b o r a t i n g ' m e t h o d o l o g i c a l devices w h i c h p e r m i t the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f models o u t o f these facts'. ' O n the o b s e r v a t i o n a l l e v e l , the m a i n . . . rule is t h a t a l l the facts s h o u l d be c a r e f u l l y o b s e r v e d and described, w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g any t h e o r e t i c a l p r e c o n c e p t i o n t o decide w h e t h e r some are m o r e i m p o r t a n t than o t h e r s ' . H a v i n g established the facts by o b s e r v a t i o n , t h e m o d e l is d e v e l o p e d , that m o d e l r e p r e s e n t i n g the l a w o f c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the f a c t s . 10

I have already c r i t i c i z e d this crude p o s i t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n of the m o d e l i n the last c h a p t e r . N o m o d e l can possibly e x p l a i n ' a l l o f the facts', and so a t h e o r y has to define in advance to w h i c h facts the m o d e l w i l l be h e l d t o a p p l y . I n the case o f a s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l the facts selected f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n are a p a r t i c u l a r l y r e s t r i c t e d sub-set o f ' a l l o f the facts', f o r the s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l leaves o u t o f a c c o u n t a l l non-systematic p r o p e r t i e s and a l l e x t r i n s i c relationships. T h u s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l presupposes t h a t i t i s l e g i t i m a t e to e x c l u d e a l l these facts f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and so presumes that the w h o l e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n is i n t e l l i g i b l e in i s o l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r w h o l e s and p u r e l y i n terms o f its i n t e r n a l r e l a tions. T h i s k i n d o f a b s t r a c t i o n has t o b e l e g i t i m a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y . M o r e o v e r , e v e n w h e n the facts to be considered have been isolated the p r o b l e m remains o f d e c i d i n g w h i c h s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l t o select f r o m the i n f i n i t e n u m b e r t h a t c o u l d b e applied t o the data. For Lévi-Strauss 'the best model will always be that which is true,


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t h a t i s the simplest possible m o d e l w h i c h , w h i l e b e i n g d e r i v e d e x c l u s i v e l y f r o m the facts u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n also makes it possible t o account f o r a l l o f t h e m ' . T h u s the s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l is n o t s o m e t h i n g that leaps at us o u t of the 'facts', i t i s s o m e t h i n g that w e create i n a d o u b l e a n a l y t i c a l m o v e m e n t . F i r s t l y , b y i s o l a t i n g c e r t a i n facts t o b e e x p l a i n e d w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e an enclosed and self-sufficient system, thus e x c l u d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f any e x t r i n s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Secondly, b y selecting one a m o n g a series o f models a c c o r d i n g t o p u r e l y a r b i t r a r y c r i t e r i a o f s i m p l i c i t y . T h e r e i s n o d o u b t t h a t this process o f r e d u c t i o n and s e l e c t i o n can p r o d u c e f o r m a l models, and that the same f o r m a l m o d e l can b e isolated i n the most disparate fields, b u t w e must endorse the c o n c l u s i o n reached b y M a y b u r y - L e w i s i n his e v a l u a t i o n o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a p p l i c a t i o n o f the d e v i c e o f the m o d e l t o his study o f d u a l i s m , w h i c h was also the c o n c l u s i o n o f the discussion o f C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s above: 1 1

' i t w o u l d seem that the only inference that may be d r a w n f r o m the comparison of models is that disparate elements d r a w n f r o m these societies can be represented in identical patterns. B u t this formal identity of the models has no sociological implications'. 12

F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s the s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l s are far f r o m b e i n g a r b i t r a r y . For h i m the s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l i s the m e d i a t i n g l i n k b e t w e e n m i n d and m e a n i n g , f o r i t specifies the s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s and s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n s established b y the unconscious m i n d t h a t i n t u r n p r o v i d e the o b j e c t i v e f o u n d a t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c systems. I have a r g u e d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y that these models are necessarily a r b i t r a r y . I n o w w a n t t o l o o k t h e o r e t i c a l l y a t the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these s t r u c t u r a l models and the m i n d , o n the one hand, and m e a n i n g , o n the o t h e r . I n this c h a p t e r I shall l o o k at the q u e s t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o l i n guistics. I n the f o l l o w i n g chapters I shall l o o k a t the w a y i n w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s has d e v e l o p e d his ( m i s ) u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c s i n t o a h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y and a t h e o r y o f c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g .

2

L A N G U A G E

T H E For

A N D

M I N D :

' S T R U C T U R A L

Lévi-Strauss

the

models

U N C O N S C I O U S '

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not represent e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , and s o are n o t t o b e confused w i t h the ' s t r u c t u r e s ' s t u d i e d b y R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n o r M u r d o c k . N e v e r theless the s t r u c t u r e s , and the c o n n e c t i o n s t h e y express, are r e a l , even i f t h e y c o r r e s p o n d t o a r e a l i t y t h a t i s n o t d i r e c t l y observable: ' I n my m i n d models are real, and I w o u l d even say they are the only r e a l i t y . T h e y are certainly not abstractions, . . . but they do n o t correspond to the concrete reality of empirical observation. It is necessary, in order to reach the m o d e l w h i c h is the true reality, to transcend this concrete-appearing r e a l i t y ' . 13

A l t h o u g h w e d o f i n d conscious m o d e l s , these are ' b y d e f i n i t i o n p o o r ones, since t h e y are n o t i n t e n d e d to e x p l a i n the p h e n o m e n a b u t t o perpetuate t h e m ' . T h e t r u e m o d e l , t h e r e f o r e , takes u s b a c k once again to the unconscious: ' W e are led to conceive of social structures as entities independent of men's consciousness of them (although they in fact g o v e r n men's existence), and thus as different from the image w h i c h men f o r m of them as physical reality is different f r o m our sensory perceptions o f i t and our hypotheses about i t ' . 1 4

T h e idea that the s t r u c t u r a l models d e v e l o p e d b y l i n g u i s t i c s , and b y e x t e n s i o n b y a n t h r o p o l o g y , refer u s b a c k t o the unconscious, o r the s t r u c t u r e o f the h u m a n m i n d , i s a n idea that L é v i - S t r a u s s d e r i v e d f r o m J a k o b s o n . For L é v i - S t r a u s s Jakobson established t h a t the p s y c h o l o g i c a l apriori that made possible language, a n d so m e a n i n g , i s the f o r m a l b i n a r y s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y o f the m i n d t h a t i s expressed i n the b i n a r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f d i s t i n c t i v e features i n Jakobson's p h o n o l o g y . I t i s p a r a d o x i c a l t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s s h o u l d d r a w such conclusions f r o m Jakobson's w o r k , since I have a r g u e d t h a t Prague L i n g u i s t i c s was concerned w i t h the a u t o n o m y o f l i n g u i s t i c s a n d w i t h the establishment o f f u n c t i o n a l and n o t o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s . H o w e v e r the emphasis o n f u n c t i o n i s n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the a t t e m p t t o d e r i v e p s y c h o l o g i c a l conclusions f r o m the s t u d y o f language. I n d e e d i t i s o n l y the c o n c e p t o f f u n c t i o n t h a t can d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n the l i n g u i s t i c a n d the p s y c h o l o g i c a l aspects o f language and s o m a k e i t possible t o d e v e l o p a v a l i d p s y c h o l i g u i s t i c s that does n o t confuse the t w o . Jakobson i n p a r t i c u l a r insisted t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s s h o u l d e x p l o r e language f r o m e v e r y p o i n t o f v i e w , the p r o p e r l y l i n g u i s t i c b u t also the p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s o c i o l o g i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l , p h y s i o l o g i c a l p o i n t s o f view. At the same time he insisted that each of these points of view

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is d i s t i n c t and, m o r e o v e r , that the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m is not a r e d u c t i o n i s t r e l a t i o n . He insisted that language as an o b j e c t exists at the i n t e r s e c t i o n of a series of systems, so that language is a ' s y s t e m o f systems', b u t these systems are n o t a r r a n g e d i n a r e d u c t i o n i s t h i e r a r c h y f o r w h i c h language expresses t h o u g h t , w h i c h expresses n e u r o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s , w h i c h express o r g a n i c connections ( w h i c h i s the w a y i n w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s r e f o r m u l a t e s Jakobson's c o n c e p t i o n a s the ' o r d e r o f o r d e r s ' ) . T h e c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n the d i f f e r e n t points o f v i e w are c o m p l e x and r e m a i n t o b e explored. M u c h o f Jakobson's w o r k has been c o n c e r n e d w i t h the search f o r l i n g u i s t i c universals, and part o f the m o t i v a t i o n f o r this search is p s y c h o l o g i c a l . He has sought l i n g u i s t i c universals at t w o d i f f e r e n t levels. O n the one hand h e has sought l a w s o f i m p l i c a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g the s t r u c t u r e o f a l l p h o n o l o g i c a l systems w h i c h take the f o r m : the presence of A i m p l i e s t h a t of B ( o r its absence), l e a d i n g t o the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e i n the system o f d i s t i n c t i v e features w h i c h can b e d i s c o v e r e d t h r o u g h studies o f language a c q u i s i t i o n i n c h i l d r e n , o f l i n g u i s t i c change, a n d o f aphasia. H o w e v e r the search f o r such implicational universals faces c e r t a i n p r o b l e m s because t h e i r d i s c o v e r y depends on establishing the objective character o f the p h o n o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n a d o p t e d . T h e search f o r i m p l i c a t i o n a l universals depends on the search for substantive universals in the p h o n o l o g i c a l system, and this is w h e r e w e f i n d the famous b i n a r i s m . I m p l i c a t i o n a l universals can o n l y b e d i s c o v e r e d i f the d i s t i n c t i o n s made by d i f f e r e n t languages can be reduced to a c o m m o n ' a l p h a b e t ' of features. Jakobson has l o n g sought to u n c o v e r such an alphabet, b u t it must be stressed t h a t this search is m o t i v a t e d by a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , n o t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l , c o n c e r n to p r o v i d e a f o u n d a t i o n o n w h i c h t o d e v e l o p a study o f i m p l i c a t i o n a l universals. T h e a t t e m p t has n o t been w i t h o u t some success, b u t it has p r o v e d impossible t o g i v e a realistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the features, i n e i t h e r acoustic o r a r t i c u l a t o r y terms. T o the e x t e n t t h a t features are u n i v e r s a l this is n o t l i k e l y to be a ' m e n t a l ' p h e n o m e n o n , b u t is ' p r o b a b l y . . . a consequence o f the a n a t o m i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the h u m a n a r t i c u l a t o r y apparatus and the associated b r a i n f o r m a tions.' 15

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Jakobson sought t o express the d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n features i n b i n a r y f o r m . I t w a s , nevertheless, some t i m e b e f o r e Jakobson managed t o express his d i s t i n c t i v e features i n this f o r m . I n 1952 Jakobson, Fant and H a l l e used t e r n a r y oppositions. B y 1957 Jakobson and H a l l e , h o w e v e r , had r e m o v e d the t e r n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s b y the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l features, and a l l oppositions w e r e reduced to a b i n a r y f o r m . T h e i m p o r t a n t question we have to ask is w h e t h e r this b i n a r i s m i s a n i m p o s i t i o n o f the analyst, o r w h e t h e r i t m i g h t not be a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of language, and even u l t i m a t e l y the m i n d . C e r t a i n l y i n 1957 Jakobson and H a l l e b e l i e v e d t h a t b i n a r i s m was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the language and n o t the l i n g u i s t . T h e question is n o t an e m p i r i c a l one, f o r any o p p o s i t i o n can be r e f o r m u l a t e d i n b i n a r y f o r m . H e n c e the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the a d o p t i o n o f the b i n a r y f o r m must r e f e r t o its a n a l y t i c a l c o n venience. I t m i g h t b e t h o u g h t t o b e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f language i f i t also offers the simplest possible d e s c r i p t i o n . In fact such a c l a i m is d i f f i c u l t to substantiate i n this case since t h e r e is n o clear g a i n i n s i m p l i c i t y b y the a d o p t i o n o f the b i n a r y c o n v e n t i o n . T h u s Jakobson and H a l l e h a d t o increase the n u m b e r o f features i n o r d e r to achieve the b i n a r y f o r m , despite the fact that they c l a i m to be seeking m a x i m u m e l i m i n a t i o n o f r e d u n d a n c y b y seeking the m i n i m u m n u m b e r o f d i s t i n c t i v e features needed t o d i s t i n g u i s h a l l phonemes. H a l l e responded t o c r i t i c i s m b y c l a r i f y i n g the basis o f the b i n a r y c o n v e n t i o n . I t transpires that b i n a r i s m i s n o t i n fact a d o p t e d o n grounds o f s i m p l i c i t y a t a l l , b u t r a t h e r i n o r d e r t o establish a straightforward evaluation procedure for alternative linguistic descriptions. It is n o t therefore d i c t a t e d by a need to s i m p l i f y descriptions, b u t b y a need t o s i m p l i f y the e v a l u a t i o n o f d e s c r i p tions. H a l l e shows t h a t b i n a r i s m i s n o t a c o n v e n t i o n w h i c h a c t u a l l y constitutes a n i m p e d i m e n t t o the c o l l e c t i o n o f data, a n d t h e r e f o r e is acceptable as a c o n v e n i e n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l assumption f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f features, b u t H a l l e recognizes that this b i n a r y s o l u t i o n i s n o t a u n i q u e s o l u t i o n t o the p r o b l e m o f classifying features. T h u s the b i n a r y basis o f p h o n o l o g i c a l classifications, that i s for L é v i - S t r a u s s the supreme p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s c o v e r y o f l i n g u i s t i c s , is s i m p l y a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l device w h i c h is a d o p t e d p u r e l y and s i m p l y i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e some, u l t i m a t e l y a r b i t r a r y , basis f o r s t a n d a r d i z i n g p h o n o l o g i c a l descriptions. 16

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c l a i m s about the unconscious i n the w o r k o f R o m a n Jakobson. O n the one hand Jakobson's i m p l i c a t i o n a l universals are language specific, asserting, for e x a m p l e , t h a t c h i l d r e n w h e n l e a r n i n g a language f i r s t m a k e the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n v o w e l s and consonants, and then a c q u i r e progressively m o r e d i s t i n c t i o n s in a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r . On the o t h e r hand the m u c h - a c c l a i m e d b i n a r i s m is a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l device w h i c h has n o clear i m p l i c a t i o n s for p s y c h o l o g y . H o w e v e r , the l i n g u i s t w h o has c l a i m e d t o d e r i v e k n o w l e d g e o f the m i n d f r o m the s t u d y o f language i s n o t J a k o b son, b u t C h o m s k y . It is therefore as w e l l to l o o k at C h o m s k y ' s c l a i m s f o r l i n g u i s t i c s . For C h o m s k y l i n g u i s t i c s is essentially a b r a n c h of p s y c h o l o g y , as it was f o r Saussure, and the study of language is i n t e n d e d to teach us about the n a t u r e of the mind. C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y o f language can b e related t o p s y c h o l o g i c a l considerations i n t w o d i f f e r e n t w a y s . F i r s t l y , b y p r o v i d i n g a m o d e l o f l i n g u i s t i c p e r f o r m a n c e and, secondly, b y p r o v i d i n g a m o d e l o f language l e a r n i n g . C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s is based on the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o m p e t e n c e and p e r f o r m a n c e . H i s s t r u c t u r a l models p r o v i d e a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f w h a t i t i s t h a t the n a t i v e speaker k n o w s , a n d n o t a n account o f h o w people l e a r n languages o r o f w h a t they do w h e n they use language. T h u s C h o m s k y ' s m o d e l is a p u r e l y f o r m a l m o d e l c o n s t r u c t e d o n the basis o f p u r e l y f o r m a l c r i t e r i a , a n d w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n either o f the nature o f language o r o f the n a t u r e o f the language speaker. It is possible to d e r i v e a p e r f o r m a n c e m o d e l f r o m C h o m s k y ' s c o m p e t e n c e m o d e l . H o w e v e r , p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c research tends t o d i s q u a l i f y the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l m o d e l as a m o d e l of p e r f o r m ance. C h o m s k y has o f t e n insisted t h a t his t h e o r y does n o t p u r p o r t to be a p e r f o r m a n c e m o d e l , a l t h o u g h at times he seems to b e l i e v e that such a m o d e l c o u l d b e d e r i v e d f r o m i t . C h o m s k y ' s a t t e m p t s t o d r a w conclusions about the n a t u r e o f the m i n d f r o m his l i n g u i s t i c theories are n o t based o n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c p e r f o r m a n c e , w h i c h is a p s y c h o l o g i c a l and n o t a l i n g u i s t i c c o n c e r n , b u t on c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n l e a r n i n g a language, and the a r g u m e n t is a p s y c h o l o g i c a l v e r s i o n of his e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l objection to behaviourism. C h o m s k y argues t h a t the i n d u c t i v i s t l o g i c o f b e h a v i o u r i s m can never provide a discovery procedure for the grammars of natural

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languages. T h u s a g r a m m a r can o n l y b e d i s c o v e r e d i f the l i n g u i s t i s g u i d e d b y a t h e o r y o f language that embodies substantive, f o r m a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l universals. T h e l i n g u i s t can t h e n f o r m u l a t e hypotheses a b o u t the g r a m m a t i c a l rules of a p a r t i c u l a r language, and test these on the l i n g u i s t i c data. T h e c h i l d , C h o m s k y believes, is in e x a c t l y the same p o s i t i o n as the l i n g u i s t , b e i n g presented w i t h a degenerate i n p u t made u p o f g r a m m a t i c a l a n d u n g r a m m a t i c a l sentences f r o m w h i c h i t has t o discover the g r a m m a r of the language so that it c a n speak the language c o r r e c t l y . I f the c h i l d p r o c e e d e d i n d u c t i v e l y i t w o u l d make the same k i n d o f mistakes that the b e h a v i o u r i s t w o u l d m a k e . T h u s i f the c h i l d i s t o b e able t o l e a r n a language i t m u s t already have available some k n o w l e d g e o f the n a t u r e o f language, a t h e o r y o f language t o b e precise, o n the basis o f w h i c h i t c a n f o r m u l a t e hypotheses a b o u t the g r a m m a r o f the p a r t i c u l a r language i t i s t o l e a r n . Thus the t h e o r y o f language i s n o t s i m p l y a c o n s t r u c t o f the l i n g u i s t , i t must also b e innate i n the m i n d o f the c h i l d : C h o m s k y believes that his t h e o r y of language is also a t h e o r y of the innate s t r u c t u r e o f the m i n d . I t i s essential t h a t w e d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t w o d i f f e r e n t arguments here. O n e is the a r g u m e n t t h a t a c h i l d must have c e r t a i n capacities if it is to be able to l e a r n : t h a t l e a r n i n g is an active process w h i c h i n v o l v e s the c h i l d i n g o i n g b e y o n d the data i m m e d i a t e l y presented to i t . T h i s is o b v i o u s l y a v a l i d a r g u m e n t and i t i s one t h a t f e w w o u l d deny. T h e o t h e r a r g u m e n t i s t h a t the capacities m u s t b e those described b y C h o m s k y ' s t h e o r y o f language. T h i s a r g u m e n t i s q u i t e w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n , f o r t w o essential reasons. F i r s t l y , C h o m s k y ' s v i e w of the l e a r n i n g process is almost as i m p o v e r i s h e d a s i s t h a t o f the crudest o f behaviourists. C h o m s k y , l i k e b e h a v i o u r i s m , regards language l e a r n i n g as a d i s c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e b y w h i c h the m i n d analyzes the f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a l i n g u i s t i c i n p u t w i t h o u t any reference t o m e a n i n g o r t o c o n t e x t . Because he separates language f r o m its f u n c t i o n and its c o n t e x t he deprives the language learner o f a large p r o p o r t i o n o f the i n f o r m a t i o n o n the basis o f w h i c h the language i s l e a r n e d . T h u s C h o m s k y deprives the c h i l d o f a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d t o l e a r n a language, on the one h a n d , and t h e n argues t h a t this i n f o r m a t i o n m u s t b e innate, o n the o t h e r . The

second

reason

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the

inadequacy

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Chomsky's

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i n n a t e universals is t h a t he has no means of d i s c o v e r i n g w h a t these universals are because i n e v a l u a t i n g theories o f language h e excludes c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e i t h e r f u n c t i o n a l ( l i n g u i s t i c ) o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a . A s w e have seen, his t h e o r y o f language i s a h a r b i t r a r y f o r m a l i s m , so there is no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the c l a i m that this, r a t h e r t h a n some o t h e r , f o r m a l i s m i s innate i n the m i n d . T h u s C h o m s k y ' s p o s i t i v i s m , t h a t excludes c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m e a n i n g and i n t e n t i o n , and the consequent f o r m a l i s m , t h a t d e p r i v e s his descriptions o f language o f l i n g u i s t i c o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , prevents h i m f r o m b e i n g able t o f o r m u l a t e any acceptable hypothesis about the n a t u r e o f the m i n d . Chomsky's approach to linguistics and psychology is v e r y like Piaget's a p p r o a c h t o c o g n i t i o n and p s y c h o l o g y , and L é v i - S t r a u s s regards Piaget as w e l l as C h o m s k y as a pioneer of the n a t i v i s m to w h i c h h e t o o subscribes. A l l t h r e e u l t i m a t e l y subscribe t o the r a t i o n a l i s t v i e w o f t h o u g h t and language t h a t was d o m i n a n t i n the seventeenth and e i g h t e e n t h centuries, f o r w h i c h language was a n expression o f t h o u g h t and t h o u g h t a n expression o f i n n a t e m e n t a l structures. F o r the classical rationalists G o d i n s c r i b e d a s t r u c t u r e on the m i n d that ensured t h a t h u m a n t h o u g h t and language w o u l d b e adequate t o the w o r l d t h a t H e had created. For L é v i - S t r a u s s , Piaget and C h o m s k y it is n a t u r e t h a t has so c o n v e n i e n t l y a r r a n g e d t h i n g s . T h e p r o b l e m i s a l w a y s the same: w e acquire k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , o r o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the m i n d , b y a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e o f the s t r u c t u r e o f H i s p r o d u c t s ; language and the t h o u g h t expressed t h r o u g h language. H o w e v e r w e have n o d i r e c t access e i t h e r t o G o d o r t o the i n n a t e s t r u c t u r e o f the m i n d , s o w e have n o w a y o f k n o w i n g w h i c h o f a n u m b e r o f a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m a l i z a t i o n s o f the s t r u c t u r e o f t h o u g h t o r o f language corresponds t o the innate s t r u c t u r e . T h u s , e v e n i f i t i s accepted t h a t language and t h o u g h t express the s t r u c t u r e o f the m i n d , this approach t o l o g i c and g r a m m a r i s p l a g u e d b y i n d e t e r m i n a c y a n d its theories o f the m i n d are necessarily a r b i t r a r y . T h i s classical c o n c e p t i o n o f t h o u g h t and o f language i s unacceptable because it isolates t h o u g h t and language f r o m the subjective and the social c o n t e x t i n w h i c h they exist, d e v e l o p and are learned. T h u s w h i l e C h o m s k y , Piaget and L é v i - S t r a u s s a l l r e c o g n i z e the c r e a t i v e p o w e r o f the subject, they a l l refuse t o entrust this creative power to an empirical, conscious, subject who

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t h i n k s about the n a t u r a l and social w o r l d a r o u n d h i m o r her, and w h o c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h others a b o u t t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t . Instead the c r e a t i v e p o w e r of the subject has to be taken a w a y as soon as it is a c k n o w l e d g e d and g i v e n to a m e c h a n i s m i n s c r i b e d in the b i o l o g i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the m i n d . T h i s i s o l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t and language f r o m t h e i r m u n d a n e c o n t e x t means t h a t a l l the, social and c u l t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h o u g h t and language are a t t r i b u t e d u n i f o r m l y t o the i n n a t e s t r u c t u r e o f the m i n d t h e y supposedly express. T h u s C h o m s k y observes, against b e h a v i o u r i s m , that the use of language is necessarily c r e a t i v e , b u t t h e n looks t o innate m e n t a l structures t o p r o v i d e the c r e a t i v e m e c h a n i s m . Piaget observes, against associationism, that the subject m u s t p l a y a n a c t i v e r o l e i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f conceptual and m a t h e m a t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , b u t t h e n l o o k s t o innate m e n t a l structures t o p r o v i d e the m e c h a n i c a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r the s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n of the m i n d as a b i o l o g i c a l system. Lévi-Strauss observes the c r e a t i v e p o w e r o f c u l t u r e w i t h r e g a r d t o its n a t u r a l f o u n d a t i o n , i n o p p o s i t i o n t o n a t u r a l i s m , b u t t h e n reduces this creative p o w e r to a biological mechanism. I n each case t h e c r e a t i v e p o w e r o f the e m p i r i c a l h u m a n subjects w h o are d o i n g the t a l k i n g , t h i n k i n g and m e a n i n g i s negated i n f a v o u r o f a s i m p l e f o r m a l m e c h a n i s m r o o t e d i n the b r a i n , and s o the necessarily t e l e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the h u m a n sciences is no sooner a d m i t t e d t h a n it is i m m e d i a t e l y d e n i e d as m e c h a n i s m replaces t e l e o l o g y . O n c e language is seen as a social p r o d u c t and as one aspect of the relationships b e t w e e n social i n d i v i d u a l s it ceases to be necessary to postulate the existence of c o m p l e x i n n a t e m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s as the means o f access t o language. I n s t e a d the means o f access t o language becomes a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the f u n c t i o n o f language a s the means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g s . T h e m o m e n t a t w h i c h a c h i l d starts to l e a r n a language is n o t the m o m e n t at w h i c h its m e n t a l capacities m a t u r e , i t i s the m o m e n t a t w h i c h i t comes t o grasp the social f u n c t i o n o f language and t o i n t e r n a l i z e this k n o w l e d g e i n the f o r m o f a n i n t e n t i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t e meanings. T h e c h i l d can t h e n make use o f a w h o l e range o f n o n - l i n g u i s t i c i n f o r m a t i o n t o guide i t i n l e a r n i n g the language. I n e x a c t l y the same w a y the c h i l d c o u l d l e a r n the s t r u c t u r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f systems o f e x c h a n g e n o t b y i m p o s i n g a n innate g r i d o n the c u l t u r e presented to it, but by appreciating the function of the systems as

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systems of exchange, and so seeing t h e m as social systems, a n d n o t as p u r e l y f o r m a l structures. L o o k i n g a t the a c q u i s i t i o n o f c u l t u r a l capacities i n this w a y does n o t abolish the p s y c h o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n o f the m e n t a l capacities that m a k e this possible, b u t i t does t r a n s f o r m i t . O n l y w h e n w e understand language as a means of h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n can we ask m e a n i n g f u l questions about the p s y c h o l o g i c a l capacities that m a k e i t possible. T h e c o n c l u s i o n seems clear t h a t Lévi-Strauss can f i n d n o s u p p o r t f r o m l i n g u i s t i c s f o r his c l a i m that l i n g u i s t i c s has made f u n d a m e n t a l discoveries about the n a t u r e o f the m i n d . Such discoveries as p u r p o r t to have been made are in fact the p r o d u c t of a n e x t r e m e l y i m p o v e r i s h e d c o n c e p t i o n o f language t h a t puts i n t o the m i n d w h a t i t has taken o u t o f the c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h language is used. We t h e r e f o r e have to evaluate Lévi-Strauss' p s y c h o l o g i c a l hypothesis e n t i r e l y o n its o w n t e r m s . W h i l e his f u n d a m e n t a l hypothesis, that the o p e r a t i o n s o f the m i n d are based o n the p r i n c i p l e o f b i n a r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , i s n o t a l t o g e t h e r i m p r o b a b l e , the significance of his hypothesis is grossly i n f l a t e d . F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s the p r i n c i p l e o f ( b i n a r y ) d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s the specific d e f i n i n g feature o f h u m a n c u l t u r e , and the p r i n c i p l e o f o p p o s i t i o n p r o v i d e s the k e y t o a n o b j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c u l t u r a l meanings. It is no d o u b t the case that the a b i l i t y to l e a r n or to speak a language, or to p a r t i c i p a t e in c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s , does i n v o l v e the c a p a c i t y t o i n t r o d u c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s o r t o t h i n k r e l a t i o n a l l y . H o w e v e r this capacity is a necessary p r o p e r t y of any system f o r c o d i n g , s t o r i n g o r t r a n s m i t t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . T h u s the m o s t e l e m e n t a r y forms o f a u r a l a n d visual p e r c e p t i o n , the transmission o f genetic i n f o r m a t i o n , the most e l e m e n t a r y m e c h a n i c a l , l e t alone e l e c t r o n i c , c o m p u t e r s and c o n t r o l systems, a n d a n e n o r m o u s l y w i d e range o f h u m a n , a n i m a l and p l a n t n a t u r a l ( p h y s i o l o g i c a l , n e u r o l o g i c a l and g e n e t i c ) processes necessarily i m p l y a physiological, psychological, neurological, chemical or p h y s i c a l a b i l i t y t o recognize o r t o impose d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . For Lévi-Strauss such evidence f r o m the n a t u r a l sciences is c o n c l u s i v e p r o o f o f his o w n hypothesis, r e v e a l i n g the n a t u r a l f o u n d a t i o n o f c u l t u r e and the u n i t y o f the social and n a t u r a l sciences. H o w e v e r , w h a t w e are c o n c e r n e d t o assess is n o t the c l a i m that a c a p a c i t y to d i s c r i m i n a t e exists, n o r t h a t it is necessary f o r the creation of meaning, but that it is the defining characteristic and


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the k e y t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h u m a n s y m b o l i c a c t i v i t y . T h i s c l a i m is the c l a i m t h a t m e a n i n g can be reduced to a p u r e l y f o r m a l structure.

3

T H E

S T R U C T U R A L

A N A L Y S I S

OF

M E A N I N G T h e most f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m i s t h a t i t can p r o v i d e a n o b j e c t i v e , s c i e n t i f i c , account o f m e a n i n g . T h i s , f o r L é v i Strauss, is the f u n d a m e n t a l lesson of l i n g u i s t i c s f o r the h u m a n sciences. In fact, h o w e v e r , c o n t e m p o r a r y l i n g u i s t i c s has been based, v e r y l a r g e l y , o n the e x c l u s i o n o f a l l questions o f m e a n i n g f r o m its d o m a i n . I t i s o n l y r e c e n t l y t h a t linguists h a v e b e g u n t o take up the issues of l i n g u i s t i c semantics. T h e p r o b l e m s a p o s i t i v i s t semantics faces are ones that s h o u l d by n o w be f a m i l i a r . In l o o k i n g at C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s I have n o t e d t h a t his t h e o r y o f language i s based o n the n e o - p o s i t i v i s t separation o f syntax f r o m semantics and p r a g m a t i c s . T h i s separation makes i t possible to isolate language as a scientific o b j e c t f r o m its social c o n t e x t and so to consider it w i t h o u t reference to the c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n s of speakers, and so w i t h o u t any reference to any e x t r i n s i c m e a n i n g . T h i s separation isolates a set of sentence-forms o n w h i c h the g r a m m a r and t h e o r y o f language can o p e r a t e s o that a syntax can be c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h o u t i n t r o d u c i n g any semantic considerations. I have n o t e d t h a t this leads to an a r b i t r a r y , and so f o r m a l i s t i c , s y n t a x , and I have n o t e d t h a t the separation of syntax f r o m semantics is also a r b i t r a r y , as i n d i c a t e d by the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g n o n - a r b i t r a r i l y b e t w e e n sentences that are synt a c t i c a l l y and those that are s e m a n t i c a l l y unacceptable. H o w e v e r this d i v i s i o n also makes it possible f o r C h o m s k y to leave semantics to one side, so his linguistics has n o t h i n g to t e l l us about m e a n i n g . Prague L i n g u i s t i c s , and Russian F o r m a l i s m b e f o r e i t , d i d n o t accept this separation o f semantics f r o m the o t h e r dimensions o f language, and the i n t e g r a t i o n is expressed in the f u n c t i o n a l i s m to w h i c h Prague linguists adhered. H o w e v e r the p r o d u c t i v e r e searches o f b o t h schools c o n f i n e d themselves t o areas w i t h i n w h i c h language c o u l d b e l e g i t i m a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o extrinsic meaning by isolating functional wholes either b e l o w ( p h o n o l o g y ) o r above (poetics and f o l k l o r e ) the l e v e l o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning.

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For b o t h p h o n o l o g y and f o r m a l i s m t h e m e a n i n g o f the elements of the system is g i v e n u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y and the analysis considers w h a t i s done w i t h these elements. T h u s i n p h o n o l o g y o n l y reference t o the i n t e n t i o n s and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f n a t i v e speakers can establish w h i c h p h o n o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s are m e a n i n g f u l , but once the units have been i d e n t i f i e d in this w a y the system can be analyzed w i t h o u t reference t o m e a n i n g . F o r f o r m a l i s m the ' s t r u c t u r a l ' m e t h o d o f analysis i s a d a p t e d t o the study o f the poetic f u n c t i o n of language, and this is a m e t a l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n in the sense that the p o e t i c use of language takes l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s whose e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g is g i v e n and then combines these units i n strange o r u n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a y s i n o r d e r t o create n e w meanings, o r t o d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o specific nuances o f o l d meanings. E x a c t l y the same i s t r u e o f the e x t e n s i o n o f the m e t h o d o f f o r m a l i s m t o o t h e r dimensions o f f o l k l o r e and l i t e r a t u r e : these studies always start f r o m the g i v e n meanings o f n a t u r a l language, and then consider the w a y s i n w h i c h the f o r m a t i o n o f n e w connections can create n e w meanings. T h u s , even t h o u g h the struct u r a l analysis m i g h t be said to r e v e a l the o b j e c t i v e m e c h a n i s m by w h i c h the p o e m o r f o l k l o r e creates a m e a n i n g , and this m e c h a n i s m m i g h t b e s h o w n t o b e r e d u c i b l e t o the f o r m a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , the analysis presupposes as established the p r i m a r y l i n g u i s t i c meanings w h i c h the s t r u c t u r e m a n i p u l a t e s . A l t h o u g h f o r m a l i s m does n o t engage w i t h l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g , i t does p r o v i d e a n analysis o f the p o e t i c o r f o l k l o r i c m e a n i n g o f a t e x t , and as such f o r m a l i s m has been a c c l a i m e d as a f o r b e a r of s t r u c t u r a l i s m i n i d e n t i f y i n g a n o b j e c t i v e c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g and i n p r o v i d i n g the means t o a s c i e n t i f i c analysis o f t h a t m e a n i n g i n t e r m s o f s t r u c t u r a l relations i n t e r n a l t o the t e x t o r corpus o f texts t h a t m a k e u p the c u l t u r e . T h i s , h o w e v e r , i s a m i s r e a d i n g o f the significance o f the achievements o f f o r m a l i s m . F o r m a l i s m has p r o v e d a p r o d u c t i v e approach to c e r t a i n genres w h i c h are themselves p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r m a l i s t i c , n o t a b l y some f o r m s o f p o e t r y and f o l k l o r e . T h e f o r m a l i s t analyses s h o w h o w c e r t a i n f o r m a l relations i n t e r n a l t o the t e x t s are the means b y w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r p o e t i c o r f o l k l o r i c meanings are c o n s t i t u t e d , and f o r a p o s i t i v i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the analyses have therefore d i s c o v e r e d an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g t h a t can b e isolated w i t h o u t reference b e y o n d the t e x t t o a subject w h o intends t h a t m e a n i n g o r t o a n o b j e c t that is meant.

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A l t h o u g h some formalists w e r e themselves p r e y t o such p o s i t i v i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e i r w o r k i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o stress that such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are false. A f o r m a l i s t analysis examines the w a y s i n w h i c h c e r t a i n s t y l i s t i c and r h e t o r i c a l devices, especially m e t a p h o r and m e t o n y m y , are used t o create n e w meanings o r t o accentuate established ones. H o w e v e r these analyses c a n n o t c l a i m to u n c o v e r a m e a n i n g that has an especially p r i v i l e g e d o b j e c t i v i t y . T h e m e a n i n g t h a t is d i s c o v e r e d is a p r o d u c t of the analysis, and does n o t necessarily exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the analysis. It is n o t a m e a n i n g that is i n h e r e n t in the o b j e c t , for the analysis represents a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the t e x t i n w h i c h the m e a n i n g o f the elements in n a t u r a l language is taken as g i v e n and c e r t a i n m e t a l i n g u i s t i c relationships are t h e n i m p o s e d . It can o n l y l e g i t i m a t e l y be c l a i m e d that this m e a n i n g has an existence i n d e p e n d e n t o f the analysis i f t h a t m e a n i n g can b e i n d e p e n d e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d : e i t h e r i f i t i s the m e a n i n g t h a t the a u t h o r can b e s h o w n t o have i n t e n d e d , o r i f i t i s the m e a n i n g that the readers or hearers can be s h o w n to have p e r c e i v e d . In this case the f o r m a l i s t analysis does n o t d i s c o v e r the m e a n i n g o f t h e t e x t , w h a t i t does d o i s t o s h o w the s t y l i s t i c devices b y w h i c h the t e x t conveys a previously identified meaning. I n the absence o f independent i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f the t e x t , the f o r m a l i s t analysis i s c r e a t i n g a n e w m e a n i n g , o f f e r i n g a n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to add to those meanings t h a t the t e x t already has in the c u l t u r e in question. T h u s , in e i t h e r case, there are no grounds for a r g u i n g t h a t s i m p l y because the m e a n i n g is c o n s t i t u t e d m e t a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , b y relations i n t e r n a l t o the t e x t , that this m e a n i n g i s m o r e o b j e c t i v e t h a n any o t h e r m e a n i n g the t e x t m a y have. T h e reason b e i n g q u i t e s i m p l y t h a t there is no such t h i n g as an o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g . T h i s b r i n g s u s t o the c r u c i a l p o i n t , w h i c h i s t h a t m e a n i n g cannot b e i n t r i n s i c t o a n o b j e c t i v e system, e v e n t h o u g h i t m i g h t b e the effect o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s that are i n t e r n a l t o t h a t system. M e a n i n g can o n l y be a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a subject a n d s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l t o t h a t subject: c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c meanings can o n l y be meanings f o r someone, r e c o v e r a b l e o n l y t h r o u g h t h e conscious apprehension o f those meanings. T h i s is even the case w i t h socalled unconscious meanings: a m e a n i n g can o n l y be c l a i m e d to be unconscious i f i t can b e subsequently r e c o v e r e d consciously, and this is the central feature of Freudian analysis (although of course

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the conscious apprehension of a m e a n i n g as one w h i c h was p r e v i o u s l y unconscious is no guarantee t h a t the m e a n i n g d i d in fact exist unconsciously). Language and c u l t u r e as o b j e c t i v e systems of symbols cannot be said t o have any m e a n i n g i n themselves. T h e y are n o t m e a n i n g f u l objects, they are the o b j e c t i v e instruments b y means o f w h i c h meanings are expressed and c o m m u n i c a t e d . T o isolate t h e m f r o m the social c o n t e x t in w h i c h they f u n c t i o n as such i n s t r u m e n t s is to isolate t h e m f r o m the o n l y c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y have meaning. I t i s this i n s t r u m e n t a l aspect o f language that p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l v i e w s o f language have a l w a y s c o u n t e r p o s e d t o p o s i t i v i s t f o r m a l i s m . For p h e n o m e n o l o g y language is n o t an o b j e c t b u t a ' g e s t u r e ' b y w h i c h the subject signifies the w o r l d . L a n g u a g e cannot t h e r e f o r e be dissociated f r o m its i d e a l a i m ( t o say s o m e t h i n g ) and its r e a l reference ( t o say it about s o m e t h i n g ) . L a n g u a g e c a n n o t be reduced e i t h e r t o the subject ( t h o u g h t , consciousness, the m i n d , o r w h a t e v e r ) o r t o the object (the n a t u r a l w o r l d ) because i t i s language t h a t mediates the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the t w o , n o t o n l y r e l a t i n g subject to the w o r l d , b u t also k e e p i n g a distance b e t w e e n them. I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o stress t h a t the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e o f p o s i t i v i s m is n o t s i m p l y a m e t a p h y s i c a l d e b a t i n g p o i n t , expression o f some r o m a n t i c ' h u m a n i s t i c ' , ' s u b j e c t i v i s t ' , ' i r r a t i o n a l i s t ' reject i o n o f 'science'. A l t h o u g h p h e n o m e n o l o g y has o f t e n degenerated i n t o a subjectivist i r r a t i o n a l i s m , the c o r e o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e o f p o s i t i v i s m i s a r a t i o n a l i s t c r i t i q u e o f the i r r a t i o n a l i s m o f so-called 'science' that w o u l d seek t o understand c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s w i t h o u t reference t o the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y that gives those p r o d u c t s c u l t u r a l significance. T h u s the c l a i m is n o t that the p o s i t i v i s t approach to m e a n i n g is m o r a l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e because i t v i o l a t e s h u m a n d i g n i t y , the c l a i m is that the p o s i t i v i s t analysis of m e a n i n g is u n a t t a i n a b l e and its supposed o b j e c t i v e f i n d i n g s are spurious. I n o r d e r t o g i v e substance t o this c l a i m i t i s necessary t o spell o u t p r e c i s e l y w h y such a p o s i t i v i s t account o f m e a n i n g m u s t f a i l . I t m u s t b e s h o w n t h a t the supposedly o b j e c t i v e a c c o u n t o f m e a n i n g o f f e r e d b y p o s i t i v i s m i s i n fact a r b i t r a r y , a t best the s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the system o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning.

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T h e f u n d a m e n t a l e r r o r o f the p o s i t i v i s t analysis o f m e a n i n g i s the b e l i e f t h a t because a c e r t a i n m e a n i n g can be specified w i t h o u t m a k i n g any reference to an i n t e n d i n g subject t h e n t h a t m u s t be the truest, the m o s t o b j e c t i v e , o r the m o s t real m e a n i n g o f the t e x t i n question. T h e c r i t i q u e o f p o s i t i v i s m notes that w h a t e v e r d e s c r i p t i o n of m e a n i n g a p o s i t i v i s t analysis offers, t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n can o n l y be v a l i d a t e d b e y o n d the confines o f the analysis b y reference t o the i n t e n t i o n o f a speaking o r h e a r i n g subject. O t h e r w i s e the m e a n i n g exists o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o the i n t e n t i o n o f the analyst, and has n o significance b e y o n d the analysis. T o see this i n m o r e d e t a i l i t i s necessary t o consider w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n a p o s i t i v i s t analysis o f meaning. T h e analysis o f m e a n i n g essentially i n v o l v e s the r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the t e x t in such a w a y as to represent its m e a n i n g . T h e m e a n i n g o f the t e x t c a n n o t b e isolated a n d presented i n its p u r i t y , b u t must be e m b o d i e d in a n e w t e x t . T h u s any a t t e m p t to c h a r a c t e r i z e the m e a n i n g system o f language w i l l i n v o l v e the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a ' m e t a l a n g u a g e ' , t h a t is to say a language w i t h i n w h i c h to t a l k about the o b j e c t language and s o w i t h i n w h i c h t o describe the meanings o f the n a t u r a l language. I n l o o k i n g a t Russian F o r m a l i s m I a r g u e d t h a t f o r m a l i s m looks at p o e t r y and f o l k l o r e as metalanguages and t h a t it elucidates the m e t a l i n g u i s t i c meanings b y t a k i n g f o r g r a n t e d the l i n g u i s t i c meanings o f the components o f the t e x t . L i n g u i s t i c semantics has to do the reverse: in o r d e r to describe and to analyze the meanings e m b o d i e d in the object language it is necessary to take the meanings o f the metalanguage f o r g r a n t e d . H e n c e the p r o b l e m o f l i n g u i s t i c semantics i s the p r o b l e m o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a n u n a m b i g u o u s and n o n - a r b i t r a r y metalanguage w i t h i n w h i c h t o express the semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f the o b j e c t language. T h i s i s the o l d , and i n s o l u b l e , p r o b l e m o f n e o - p o s i t i v i s m o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a language o f science w i t h i n w h i c h t o express o u r i n d u b i t a b l e k n o w l e d g e o f the w o r l d . N o such language can b e c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the v e r y simple reason t h a t w e need a n o t h e r m e t a metalanguage w i t h i n w h i c h t o f o r m u l a t e its rules o f c o n s t r u c t i o n , and so on ad infinitum. T h e i l l u s i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y i s g i v e n o n l y b y t a k i n g f o r g r a n t e d the absolute c h a r a c t e r o f the m e t a l a n g u a g e . T h u s , i f the m e t a l a n g u a g e is n a t u r a l language, the effect is to present the presuppositions of our everyday understanding of the world that are embodied in

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n a t u r a l language as i n d u b i t a b l e o b j e c t i v e t r u t h s . For e x a m p l e , to say that the o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f ' b o y ' i s ' m a l e c h i l d ' i s n o t t o give a n o b j e c t i v e account o f the m e a n i n g o f ' b o y ' unless w e presuppose the meanings o f ' m a l e ' and ' c h i l d ' t o b e g i v e n o b j e c t i v e l y , y e t the meanings o f these t e r m s d i f f e r f r o m one i n d i v i d u a l t o a n o t h e r and f r o m one c u l t u r e t o another and s o have n o p r i v i l e g e d o b j e c t i v i t y . W e can c l a r i f y and e x e m p l i f y the p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a m e t a l a n g u a g e f o r l i n g u i s t i c semantics b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n the s y n t a x and the semantics o f the m e t a l a n g u a g e . T h e syntax o f the metalanguage w i l l describe the semantic relationships that e x i s t w i t h i n the n a t u r a l (object) language, f o r e x a m p l e i t w i l l d e f i n e semantic contrasts b e t w e e n v a r i o u s t e r m s . F o r a pure s t r u c t u r a l i s t the metalanguage w i l l have o n l y a s y n t a x , f o r the meanings o f language w o u l d b e exhausted b y these m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s . H o w e v e r such a r a d i c a l s t r u c t u r a l i s m is inconceivable, for meaning is a relationship w i t h something b e y o n d language so the m e t a l a n g u a g e must also have a semantics t h a t establishes this r e l a t i o n s h i p in one w a y or a n o t h e r so as to give the system of l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g some c o n t e n t as w e l l as f o r m . T h e p r o b l e m s raised by the a t t e m p t to f o r m u l a t e such a m e t a l a n g u a g e are t w o f o l d , c o n c e r n i n g b o t h the s y n t a x and the semantics o f this metalanguage. F i r s t l y , c o n c e r n i n g its s y n t a x , the p r o b l e m is w h a t sort of r e l a t i o n s h i p s are to be d e s c r i b e d by the metalanguage. H e r e there are b a s i c a l l y t w o a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h e m e t a l a n g u a g e m a y m a k e use o f the s y n t a x o f a n a l y t i c a l l o g i c and describes m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s i n t e r m s o f the l o g i c a l categories o f s y n o n y m y , a n t o n y m y , i n c l u s i o n , etc. T h i s i s the a p p r o a c h m o s t in f a v o u r w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s at the m o m e n t as the c o m p l e m e n t t o C h o m s k y ' s l i n g u i s t i c s . I t a t t e m p t s t o reduce l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g s t h r o u g h l o g i c a l analysis t o a l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f m e a n i n g elements, v a r i o u s l y c a l l e d 'semantic m a r k e r s ' , 'semes' o r 'sememes' by a n a l o g y w i t h the phonemes as the basic u n i t s of sound. T h u s i f w e contrast ' m a n ' w i t h ' w o m a n ' w e can e x t r a c t the c o n t r a s t e d semes m a l e / f e m a l e . T h u s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n a l y t i c a l l o g i c i n this w a y can reduce e v e r y s i g n i n the language t o a b u n d l e o f u l t i m a t e meaning components. T h i s a p p r o a c h , k n o w n as c o m p o n e n t i a l analysis, has been p i o n e e r e d i n the analysis o f k i n s h i p t e r m i n o l o g i e s , w h i c h are c l e a r l y w e l l - s t r u c t u r e d systems o f signs, and o f t a x o n o m i e s o f various kinds. Lévi-Strauss' own analysis of kinship systems is a

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p r i m i t i v e v e r s i o n o f this a p p r o a c h , the f u n d a m e n t a l semantic d i s t i n c t i o n f o r h i m b e i n g that b e t w e e n the m a r r i a g e a b l e and the u n m a r r i a g e a b l e . T h e m e t h o d is u n d o u b t e d l y a c o n v e n i e n t a p p r o a c h t o the f o r m a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f languages, m a k i n g the h a n d l i n g o f selection r e s t r i c t i o n s i n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r a r e l a t i v e l y simple task. T h e a l t e r n a t i v e approach i s t o describe the m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s o f the language n o t i n terms o f a n a l y t i c a l l o g i c , b u t i n t e r m s o f the categories o f the language itself. T h i s means t h a t t h e r e w i l l n o t be a u n i v e r s a l m e t a l a n g u a g e t o describe m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t n a t u r a l languages, since each n a t u r a l language w i l l also have its o w n m e t a l a n g u a g e . M o r e o v e r the m e a n i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s that emerge w i l l n o t be ' o b j e c t i v e ' , because they w i l l presuppose a k n o w l e d g e o f the n a t u r a l language and w i l l be r e l a t i v e to that understanding. T h i s r e l a t i v i s t i c approach t o n a t u r a l languages i s c l e a r l y o f m u c h less ' s c i e n t i f i c ' usefulness. H o w e v e r the p r a g m a t i c usefulness o f the f o r m a l i s t i c approach does n o t necessarily m e a n t h a t i t gives a m o r e adequate a c c o u n t o f the m e a n i n g o f n a t u r a l languages. T h e r e is no reason to b e l i e v e that for language users the relationships b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t meanings can b e expressed i n a n a l y t i c a l f o r m , s o that the semantic s t r u c t u r e o f n a t u r a l languages can b e r e d u c e d t o the s t r u c t u r e o f a n a l y t i c a l l o g i c . N o r , h o w e v e r , is there reason to b e l i e v e that these relationships are adequately expressed i n the categories o f n a t u r a l language, unless t h o u g h t a n d language are i d e n t i f i e d w i t h one a n o t h e r . T h u s the p r o b l e m o f d e v i s i n g a metalanguage t o describe the m e a n i n g system of n a t u r a l languages is an acute one, and n o t one that is amenable to a p o s i t i v i s t i c s o l u t i o n . E v e n m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c than the s y n t a x o f this m e t a l a n g u a g e i s that o f its semantics. T h e m e t a l a n g u a g e can describe m e a n i n g relations w i t h i n the language, w h e t h e r o f s y n o n y m y o r o f s i m i l a r i t y , b u t i f i t i s t o describe the meanings o f the t e r m s o f the language i t m u s t refer b e y o n d the language. T h e r e are m a n y w a y s i n w h i c h this m i g h t b e done. For e x a m p l e B l o o m f i e l d i a n beh a v i o u r i s m analyzes m e a n i n g b e h a v i o u r i s t i c a l l y . T h u s the m e t a language relates l i n g u i s t i c terms t o t h e i r b e h a v i o u r a l c o n t e x t . C o m p o n e n t i a l analysis relates its p r i m i t i v e m e a n i n g elements to a w i d e r ' c u l t u r e ' , w h i c h begs the q u e s t i o n , or postulates t h e m as universal reflections of the external (or internal) world. Saussure

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relates the sign system as a w h o l e to the u n i v e r s a l c o n t i n u u m of t h o u g h t o n w h i c h i t i s i m p o s e d , a c o n c e p t i o n v e r y l i k e that o f T r i e r ' s 'semantic field'. T h e range o f solutions o f f e r e d s h o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t t o i n d i c a t e the impossibility of deciding between them on purely formal grounds. B u t i t i s n o t o n l y the f o r m o f the s o l u t i o n t h a t i s a r b i t r a r y in this sense, the c o n t e n t of any one f o r m u l a t i o n c a n n o t be said to have any i n h e r e n t o b j e c t i v i t y e i t h e r . For e x a m p l e , on w h a t basis does c o m p o n e n t i a l analysis decide t h a t the terms ' m a n ' and ' w o m a n ' should be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d as m a l e / f e m a l e , w h e n these terms have such p o w e r f u l , c o m p l e x and c h a n g i n g connotations? T o reduce the terms t o the gender d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i r m o s t c o m m o n referents i s t o d e p r i v e the terms o f most o f t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c a n d c u l t u r a l p o w e r . T h u s the basic semantic u n i t s do n o t emerge o b j e c t i v e l y , they are abstracted a r b i t r a r i l y f r o m the i n f i n i t e set o f possible u n i t s . T h u s even a s y m p a t h e t i c c o m m e n t a t o r can c o n c l u d e : ' O n e c a n n o t a v o i d the suspicion t h a t the semantic c o m p o n e n t s are i n t e r p r e t e d on the basis o f the l i n g u i s t ' s i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the l e x i c a l items w h i c h he uses to label t h e m ' . C o m p o n e n t i a l analysis tells us m o r e about the i m p o v e r i s h e d i n t u i t i o n o f linguists t h a n i t tells u s about meaning. 1 7

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m i s t h a t a n o b j e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n o f the semantics o f n a t u r a l language has t o relate elements o f language t o some e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y , w h e t h e r i t b e ' t h o u g h t ' o r 'the w o r l d ' . H o w e v e r the d e s c r i p t i o n has i t s e l f t o m a k e use o f l i n g u i s t i c t e r m s t o refer t o this e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y . T h u s , h o w e v e r far a p o s i t i v i s t semantics takes its r e d u c t i o n i s m , even i f i t goes t o the lengths o f B l o o m f i e l d i a n b e h a v i o u r i s m i n e l i m i n a t i n g a l l reference t o m e a n i n g , i t s t i l l has t o make use o f the m e a n i n g system of n a t u r a l language in its descriptions, and so to presuppose t h a t m e a n i n g system. T h u s any p o s i t i v i s t analysis o f the m e a n i n g o f language has to presuppose its o w n conclusions, f o r it m u s t have already established the o b j e c t i v i t y o f the m e a n i n g o f n a t u r a l language i n o r d e r t o have a metalanguage w i t h i n w h i c h t o describe t h a t m e a n i n g . It is f o r this reason that l i n g u i s t i c relativists s i m p l y refuse to refer b e y o n d language, r e v o l v i n g w i t h i n a n endless c i r c l e f r o m w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t escape, and e q u a l l y unable t o e x p l a i n h o w anybody could enter the circle by learning a language, and so

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T h e d i l e m m a arises because the p r o b l e m t h a t produces it is a spurious one. T h e choice, b e t w e e n p o s i t i v i s m and r e l a t i v i s m , i s t h e r e f o r e a false one. T h e d i l e m m a arises o u t of the a t t e m p t to d i v o r c e m e a n i n g f r o m the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f people w h o m e a n and t o g i v e i t a n existence i n a n o b j e c t i n d e p e n d e n t o f a l l h u m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n . P o s i t i v i s m seeks, u l t i m a t e l y , t o r e f e r m e a n i n g back t o a n o b j e c t i v e , p r e - l i n g u i s t i c , w o r l d . Such a n a m b i t i o n i s unrealizable because the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d the w o r l d can n e v e r b e f o r m u l a t e d u n a m b i g u o u s l y . I f i t i s f o r m u l a t e d w i t h i n language, i t presupposes w h a t i t seeks t o establish. I f i t seeks t o get b e y o n d ( o r beneath) language, as in the a t t e m p t to base l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o n ' o s t e n s i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n , t h e n i t ceases t o b e u n a m b i g u o u s and the a t t e m p t to establish a p r i v i l e g e d o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g founders. R e l a t i v i s m recognizes the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f establishing a n u n a m b i g u o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n language a n d a n e x t e r n a l o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , and s o makes language i n t o its p r i v i l e g e d object. A s soon a s t h i s a t t e m p t t o e x c l u d e i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f r o m c o n siderations o f m e a n i n g i s abandoned, the d i l e m m a disappears, and the p r o b l e m becomes a m u c h m o r e p r a g m a t i c one. T h e l i n g u i s t i c sign o n l y exists as a linguistic e n t i t y f o r a speaker or hearer in the c o n t e x t o f specific utterances i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . H e n c e w o r d s are a l w a y s f i l l e d w i t h c o n t e n t , they are n e v e r stable, b u t always changeable and adaptable, t h e i r m e a n i n g is d i f f e r e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t people, and even f o r the same person at d i f f e r e n t points i n t i m e . E v e r y w o r d , e v e r y phrase, has a h i s t o r y f o r the i n d i v i d u a l speaker/hearer, a h i s t o r y that is c o n s t a n t l y u n f o l d i n g . O u t s i d e this i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r y the elements o f language have n o l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y , they b e c o m e o n l y sequences o f sounds. T h u s the elements o f language have n o stable, o r p e r m a n e n t , o r o b j e c t i v e meanings t o be d i s c o v e r e d : such meanings l i t e r a l l y and q u i t e s i m p l y do n o t exist. T h i s does n o t m e a n that language can o n l y be r e l a t e d to i n d i v i d u a l subjects and to i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e , f o r language is above a l l a means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g f r o m one subject t o another. T h u s the subject e x t e r n a l i z e s a n i n t e n t i o n i n the f o r m o f a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e i n the hope and a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t another subject w i l l t h e r e b y be able t o r e c o v e r that i n t e n t i o n . Thus the m e a n i n g o f the elements o f language has a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y :

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some aspects o f that m e a n i n g are c o m m o n t o m o r e t h a n one language user and. have a c e r t a i n s t a b i l i t y . T h u s the ' c a r d i n a l p r o b l e m o f semantics' i s t h a t o f h o w 'the f u n d a m e n t a l p o l y s e m a n t i c i t y o f the w o r d can b e r e c o n c i l e d w i t h its u n i t y ' . P o s i t i v i s m seeks t o e l i m i n a t e the p o l y s e m a n t i c i t y , seeing i n i t o n l y the subjective overtones i m p o s e d on some f u n d a m e n t a l and static m e a n i n g . H o w e v e r i t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o refer the w o r d b a c k t o the i n d i v i d u a l psyche t o r e c o v e r the p o l y s e m a n t i c i t y o f the w o r d because one i s t h e n i n danger o f l o s i n g sight o f its u n i t y . 1 8

T h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c u n i t f o r a n i n d i v i d u a l , w h i c h i s the o n l y m e a n i n g t h a t can be said to exist, is the e x p r e s s i o n of a h i s t o r y , and s o the s u m m a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e o f a series o f c o n t e x t s w i t h i n w h i c h the u n i t has had m e a n i n g f o r that i n d i v i d u a l . T h e u n i t y o f that m e a n i n g can o n l y b e a social and h i s t o r i c a l u n i t y , a shared e x p e r i e n c e and a shared h i s t o r y in w h i c h several i n d i v i d u a l s have p a r t i c i p a t e d and w h i c h t h e y have s i g n i f i e d b y means o f t h e i r language. T h e u n i t y o f the m e a n i n g o f the u n i t i s t h e r e f o r e the u n i t y o f a speech c o m m u n i t y . T h u s the study o f l i n g u i s t i c semantics can never be a f o r m a l d i s c i p l i n e , it can o n l y be a social and h i s t o r i c a l one, s t u d y i n g the social a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h the w o r l d i s e x p e r i e n c e d and s i g n i f i e d b y social subjects.

N O T E S 1 R. Jakobson, Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, Harvester, Hassocks, 1978. 2 G. M o u n i n , Introduction àla sémiologie, M i n u i t , Paris, 1970, pp. 2 0 2 - 3 . LéviStrauss' article is reprinted in Structural Anthropology. 3 ESK, p. 493. 4 SA, p. 83. 5 FS, pp. 518, 520. 6 SA, pp. 2 0 2 - 3 . 7 SA, pp. 19, 21. 8 IM, pp. x x x i , x x x v i , l i . 9 SA, pp. 5 8 - 9 , 62. 10 SA, pp. 279-80. 11 SA, p. 281. 12 D. M a y b u r y - L e w i s , ' D u a l Organisation', Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde, 116, 1, 1960, p. 35. 13 1953b, p. 115. , 14 SA, pp. 281, 121.

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15 D. Slobin, Psycholinguistics, Scott, Foreman, Illinois, 1971, pp. 6 2 - 3 . 16 R. Jakobson, G. Fant and M. H a l l e , Preliminaries to Speech Analysis, H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; R. Jakobson and M. H a l l e , Fundamentals of Language, M o u t o n , T h e Hague, 1957; M. H a l l e , ' I n Defence of the N u m b e r 2', in Studies Presented to Joshua Whatmough, M o u t o n , The Hague, 1957; M. H a l l e , ' S i m p l i c i t y in Linguistic Description', in R. Jakobson (ed.), The Structure of Language and its Mathematical Aspects, Proceedings of the 12th Symposium in A p p l i e d Mathematics, American M a t h e m a t i c a l Society, Providence, 1961. 17 J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, C U P , 1968, p. 480. 18 V . N . Volosinov ( M . Bachtin), Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Seminar Press, N e w Y o r k , 1973, p. 80.

VIII.

The Structural Analysis of Myth

F R O M linguistics Lévi-Strauss l e a r n e d t w o lessons. F i r s t l y , that the s t r u c t u r a l m e t h o d o f analysis t h a t h e had d e v e l o p e d i n his study o f k i n s h i p c o u l d b e e x t e n d e d t o the study o f a l l c u l t u r a l p h e n o m e n a a s the m e t h o d a p p r o p r i a t e t o the o b j e c t i v e s t u d y o f m e a n i n g . Secondly, t h a t b e h i n d m e a n i n g and c u l t u r e l a y the s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y o f the h u m a n unconscious. I have e x a m i n e d the v a l i d i t y of these lessons at some l e n g t h in the last chapter. T h e f i r s t lesson l e d L é v i - S t r a u s s t o develop his s t r u c t u r a l analysis o f m y t h . T h e second l e d h i m t o develop his d i s t i n c t i v e h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y . I shall l o o k a t the f o r m e r i n this chapter and t h e l a t t e r i n the next.

L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t u r n t o the study o f m y t h f o l l o w e d his d i s c o v e r y o f l i n g u i s t i c s a n d c o i n c i d e d w i t h his a p p o i n t m e n t t o the É c o l e Pratique. I t was d i c t a t e d p a r t l y b y a desire t o a p p l y the n e w m e t h o d t o n o n l i n g u i s t i c c u l t u r a l phenomena, b u t m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y b y the b e l i e f t h a t t h r o u g h the study o f s y m b o l i c systems L é v i - S t r a u s s w o u l d b e able t o g a i n access t o the h u m a n m i n d . A l t h o u g h L é v i - S t r a u s s makes use o f m a n y t e r m s b o r r o w e d f r o m l i n g u i s t i c s and makes frequent allusions to l i n g u i s t i c s , specific b o r r o w i n g s are rare. T h u s m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s have n o t e d that L é v i - S t r a u s s ' allusions t o l i n g u i s t i c s are l a r g e l y m e t a p h o r i c a l . W e have, t h e r e f o r e , t o assess his studies o n t h e i r o w n terms. A s such I shall argue in this c h a p t e r that Lévi-Strauss' a p p r o a c h t o the o b j e c t i v e analysis o f m y t h i c a l m e a n i n g runs i n t o e x a c t l y the p r o b l e m s that I o u t l i n e d in the last s e c t i o n of the last chapter. T h e r e i s n o d o u b t that L é v i - S t r a u s s can c o n j u r e meanings o u t o f the m a t e r i a l . H o w e v e r these meanings are, f r o m the a n a l y t i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w , a r b i t r a r y . T h u s m y c o n c l u s i o n w i l l be t h a t the meanings t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s e x t r a c t s f r o m the systems o f m y t h u n d e r r e v i e w are n o m o r e t h a n a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f the v e r y i d i o s y n c r a t i c meanings the m a t e r i a l has f o r Lévi-Strauss. 184

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M Y T H

A l t h o u g h , i n the l i g h t o f his e n c o u n t e r w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s , L é v i Strauss came to i n t e r p r e t The Elementary Structures as a w o r k w h i c h sought the m a r k o f the unconscious o n the social s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h it generated, he was n o t absolutely c o n f i d e n t t h a t these structures w e r e p r o d u c t s o f the m i n d alone, f o r the constraints i n question c o u l d b e ' m e r e l y the r e f l e c t i o n i n men's m i n d s o f c e r t a i n social demands t h a t h a d been o b j e c t i f i e d i n i n s t i t u t i o n s ' . H e n c e L é v i Strauss t u r n e d his a t t e n t i o n t o the study o f s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t i n o r d e r t o discover the constraints o f the unconscious impressed o n systems w i t h n o apparent ' p r a c t i c a l f u n c t i o n ' . I n s t u d y i n g s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t L é v i - S t r a u s s i s seeking t o u n c o v e r the unconscious t h r o u g h a n analysis o f the structures displayed i n t h a t t h o u g h t . S y m b o l i c t h o u g h t offers a ' m e t a l a n g u a g e ' , whose elements have n o m e a n i n g i n themselves, t h e i r m e a n i n g d e r i v i n g e x c l u s i v e l y f r o m the relations b e t w e e n the elements. S y m b o l i c t h o u g h t s i m p l y arranges and rearranges a f i x e d r e p e r t o r y o f elements. I t i s a c o m b i n a t o r y t h o u g h t , w h i c h responds to an unconscious ' d e m a n d f o r o r d e r ' . Since the m e a n i n g o f s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t i s exhausted b y its i m m a n e n t s t r u c t u r e i t i s amenable t o a n i m m a n e n t analysis w h i c h confines i t s e l f t o the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n its parts. T h e u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g o f s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t does n o t d e r i v e f r o m any reference i t makes b e y o n d itself, b u t f r o m the h o m o l o g o u s r e l a t i o n i t bears t o the m i n d w h i c h produces i t : 1

'Authentic structuralism seeks . . . above all to grasp the intrinsic properties of certain kinds of order. These properties express nothing w h i c h w o u l d be external to them. O r , if one is determined that they should refer to something external, one should t u r n to the cerebral organization conceived as a n e t w o r k of w h i c h these or those properties are translated by the most diverse ideological systems into the terms of a particular structure, each of w h i c h systems in its o w n w a y reveals the n e t w o r k ' s modes of interconnection. . . . One can thus see h o w the effacement of the subject represents a necessity of, if one can say i t , a methodological order: it scrupulously avoids explaining anything of the m y t h except in terms of the m y t h , and consequently excludes the point o f v i e w o f the judge inspecting the m y t h f r o m w i t h o u t , inclined for this reason to seek extrinsic causes for i t . On the contrary it is necessary to be penetrated by the c o n v i c t i o n that behind every m y t h i c a l system other m y t h i c a l systems, as predominant determining factors, are profiled: it is they w h i c h speak in it and w h i c h echo one another'. 2


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T h i s passage brings o u t v e r y c l e a r l y the close c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the d o m i n a n t themes o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m : the a t t e m p t t o discover a n o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g i m m a n e n t i n the object d e f i n e d w i t h o u t reference t o a n y t h i n g outside the object; the s t r u c t u r a l i s t r e d u c t i o n o f t h a t m e a n i n g t o the f o r m a l relations b e t w e e n the parts o f the o b j e c t and s o the r e d u c t i o n o f c o n t e n t t o f o r m ; and the t h e o r y o f the unconscious. T h e p i v o t o f these themes i s the a t t e m p t t o isolate i n p r a c t i c a l terms the m e a n i n g o f the system o f m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t . B y r u l i n g o u t any subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the system o f m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t Lévi-Strauss treats that system as an i n e r t and e x t e r n a l o b j e c t . H i s a i m i s t o s h o w t h a t the m e a n i n g o f that object is d e t e r m i n e d by its s t r u c t u r e . To do this he has to isolate, on the one hand, the elements o f t h a t object and, o n the o t h e r , the relations b e t w e e n t h e m . I n fact the t w o tasks c a n n o t b e separated f r o m one a n o t h e r since the elements o f m y t h o n l y appear a s such w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e t h a t gives t h e m t h e i r m y t h i c a l m e a n i n g , j u s t a s d i s t i n c t i v e features i n p h o n o l o g y exist o n l y i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r features. D i f f e r e n t versions o f the t h e o r y o f m y t h are based o n d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the c o n s t i t u e n t elements o f the s t r u c t u r e . I n the e a r l y f o r m u l a t i o n s o f the t h e o r y this c o n s t i t u e n t e l e m e n t was d e f i n e d as a segment of the t e x t of the m y t h . In 1953 it was c a l l e d a theme o r sequence, w h i c h h a d n o m e a n i n g i n itself, b u t w h i c h d e r i v e d its m e a n i n g o n l y f r o m its p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a system. T h i s theme was t o b e d i s c o v e r e d b y the a p p l i c a t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e procedures, n o t a b l y c o m m u t a t i o n . L a t e r the e l e m e n t was d e f i n e d as zmytheme, w h i c h i s a segment o f the t e x t o f s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e f o r m w h i c h 'shows t h a t a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n is at a g i v e n t i m e l i n k e d to a c e r t a i n s u b j e c t ' . T h e m y t h e m e i s d e f i n e d b y the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subject and f u n c t i o n . 3

I n fact w e are t o l d t h a t the same m y t h e m e s r e c u r t h r o u g h o u t a m y t h , hence the u n f o l d i n g o f the m y t h i s c o n c e i v e d o f n o t a s the u n f o l d i n g of a narrative, but as a repetition. T h e true mythemes are n o t , t h e r e f o r e ' i s o l a t e d r e l a t i o n s , b u t bundles of such relations'. I n the l a t e r analyses o f m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t w e f i n d that the e l e m e n t changes y e t again, b e i n g reduced f r o m a p r o p o s i t i o n to a single sign, as we shall see w h e n we consider Mythologiques. T h i s change corresponds t o a change i n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the structure of the myth. In the early analyses of myth the structure of

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the m y t h i s e x p l a i n e d b y reference t o the m y t h ' s f u n c t i o n w h i c h i s to develop a l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t w h i c h takes a p r o p o s i t i o n a l f o r m . T h e m y t h resolves c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e t w e e n c o n f l i c t i n g i d e o l o g i c a l beliefs: 'The purpose of the m y t h is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction (an impossible achievement if, as it happens, the contradiction is real)'.'

For Lévi-Strauss the c o n t r a d i c t i o n is concealed by means of an a r g u m e n t b y a n a l o g y . T h e i n i t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i l l be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n o t h e r one, w h i c h can i t s e l f b e m e d i a t e d . T h e m e d i a t i o n o f an analogous c o n t r a d i c t i o n thus 'resolves' the f i r s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . T h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o , o r m o r e , successive c o n t r a d i c t i o n s is a symbolic r e l a t i o n w h i c h m a y be metaphorical or m e t o n y m i c a l . Because the i n i t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n is never ' r e a l l y ' r e s o l v e d i t w i l l b e m e d i a t e d t i m e and again, i n a n incessant a t t e m p t t o dissolve i t b y dissipating i t . T h e i n i t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h e r e f o r e establishes a n i n t e r m i n a b l e series o f m y t h s i n response t o a single i d e o l o g i c a l problem. I n the O e d i p u s m y t h the c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s established outside the m y t h , d e r i v i n g f r o m the coexistence o f a c o s m o l o g i c a l b e l i e f i n the a u t o c h t h o n o u s o r i g i n o f m a n and the e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t m a n i s b o r n o f the u n i o n o f m a n a n d w o m a n . T h e A s d i w a l analysis also takes an i d e o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m as its s t a r t i n g p o i n t . I n the l a t t e r case the p r o b l e m i s one o f l e g i t i m a t i n g the social o r d e r , a l e g i t i m a t i o n w h i c h i s achieved b y means o f t w o devices. F i r s t l y , the e x i s t i n g o r d e r is r e l a t e d to a h y p o t h e t i c a l previous o r d e r o f w h i c h i t is, i n some sense, a n i n v e r s i o n . Secondly, the a l t e r n a t i v e o r d e r is s h o w n to be an i n t o l e r a b l e one by a reductio ad absurdum. 6

These e a r l y analyses open u p m a n y i n t e r e s t i n g lines o f i n q u i r y , but they do n o t establish a p u r e l y immanent analysis w h i c h finds the m e a n i n g o f m y t h i n its s t r u c t u r e . T h e p r o p e r t i e s o f m y t h i n these cases express s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l , f o r the p r o b l e m s w h i c h t h e y take up are p r o b l e m s posed by a c u l t u r a l n e e d to resolve c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e t w e e n beliefs, o r t o l e g i t i m a t e the e x i s t i n g o r d e r . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f the m y t h develops i n response t o this c u l t u r a l p r o b l e m , hence the s t r u c t u r e does n o t , in the first instance, express the l a w s o f the m i n d b u t r a t h e r the f u n c t i o n o f the m y t h . T h e meaning of the myth does not derive exclusively from its

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s t r u c t u r e , b u t derives f r o m its specific content, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n i t is c a l l e d on to resolve. I t i s this independence o f the c o n t r a d i c t i o n w h i c h makes the analysis i n p r i n c i p l e amenable t o e m p i r i c a l c o n t r o l , f o r w e can t u r n t o the c o s m o l o g y o f the society and see i f the beliefs a t t r i b u t e d t o i t e x i s t a n d l e a d t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n . W e can t h e n t u r n t o the m y t h and see i f the m y t h e m e s have the c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e m b y the analyst. F i n a l l y , w e can j u d g e w h e t h e r o r n o t the m y t h does i n fact express, t r a n s f o r m and m e d i a t e the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n question. T h e analysis i s not s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , especially i f w e are d e a l i n g w i t h a d i s t a n t c u l t u r e and l a c k e t h n o g r a p h i c i n f o r m a t i o n . I t i s never a d e f i n i t i v e analysis, since it has a l a r g e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e c o m p o n e n t . H o w e v e r , it is n o t a r b i t r a r y because means are p r o v i d e d b y w h i c h w e can check the o b j e c t i v e existence o f the relations p o s i t e d by the analyst. It seems t h a t Lévi-Strauss achieves this result despite rather than because of his approach to m y t h . W h a t happens is t h a t the need to achieve access to the m y t h as an intelligible, c u l t u r a l , p r o d u c t leads q u i t e spontaneously t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f the m y t h i n r e l a t i o n t o the c u l t u r e in w h i c h it is f o u n d , and so to a v i e w of m y t h as an i n s t r u m e n t o f c u l t u r e r a t h e r t h a n a p r o j e c t i o n o f unconscious l a w s . A l t h o u g h such a d e v e l o p m e n t is to be w e l c o m e d as a break w i t h the m e n t a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of c u l t u r a l phenomena, as far as LéviStrauss is c o n c e r n e d it m u s t represent a weakness, f o r it is precisely the l a t t e r c o n c e p t i o n that he is seeking to d e v e l o p . If m y t h s are to be subjected to an immanent analysis, and the m e a n i n g o f the elements o f m y t h d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t reference t o c u l t u r a l beliefs or subjective i n t e n t i o n s , it is necessary to discover some w a y o f u n c o v e r i n g the m e a n i n g o f the elements w i t h o u t g o i n g b e y o n d t h e m y t h i c a l u n i v e r s e . I t i s necessary t o discover the m e t a l i n g u i s t i c rules o f m y t h w h i c h define the m y t h i c a l m e a n i n g o f the elements p u r e l y i n r e l a t i o n t o one another. B y ' p e r m u t i n g a t e r m in a l l its c o n t e x t s . . . one c a n p r o g r e s s i v e l y define a " u n i v e r s e o f the t a l e " analyzable i n t o pairs o f o p p o s i t i o n s , v a r i o u s l y c o m b i n e d w i t h i n each character, w h i c h , far f r o m c o n s t i t u t i n g a n e n t i t y , is, after the m a n n e r of the phoneme, as c o n c e i v e d by R o m a n Jakobson, a " n e t w o r k o f d i f f e r e n t i a l e l e m e n t s " ' . T h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the m e t a l i n g u i s t i c l a w s o f m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t i s found in Totemism and The Savage Mind, works which not only 7


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m a r k e d a b r e a k b e t w e e n the theories o f k i n s h i p a n d m y t h , but also w i t h i n the s t u d y o f m y t h itself.

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L O G I C

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U N T A M E D

T H O U G H T

It is in Totemism and The Savage Mind that s t r u c t u r a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m d e f i n i t i v e l y replaces s o c i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m i n the analysis o f c o l l e c t i v e representations. I t i s here t h a t t h e l a t t e r are analyzed as structures w h i c h respond to the unconscious ' d e m a n d f o r o r d e r ' . T h e problems w h i c h d o m i n a t e m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t are n o l o n g e r i d e o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s , b u t i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o b l e m s posed b y the unconscious, o r b y m y t h , t o itself. Totemism seeks to d e m o n s t r a t e that ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t has its o w n l a w s and is as i n t e l l e c t u a l as is the scientific t h o u g h t w h i c h we value so h i g h l y . T h i s is i m p o r t a n t because t o t e m i s m has often been e x p l a i n e d i n i r r a t i o n a l i s t w a y s , the a d o p t i o n o f a t o t e m b y a c l a n b e i n g e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f some affective o r u t i l i t a r i a n r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n c l a n and t o t e m . L é v i - S t r a u s s w a n t s t o p r o v i d e a n i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t e x p l a n a t i o n o f the i n s t i t u t i o n o f t o t e m i s m not o n l y so as to u n c o v e r the laws of ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t , b u t also to s h o w that these l a w s are the p r o d u c t o f a m i n d w h i c h i s capable o f thinking analytically. Lévi-Strauss argues that t o t e m i c classifications o p e r a t e by using a n a t u r a l series to signify a social series, using a n a t u r a l m o d e l of d i v e r s i t y t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e the d i v e r s i t y o f h u m a n groups. T o t e m s are n o t a d o p t e d i n d i v i d u a l l y by each c l a n , t h e y are a d o p t e d on the basis o f a n i n t e l l e c t u a l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a h o m o l o g y b e t w e e n t w o series, the n a t u r a l system o f t o t e m s and the social system o f social groups. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the t o t e m i s its p o w e r o f s i g n i f y i n g the clan as a p a r t of a w h o l e , and t h e affective d i m e n s i o n of the t o t e m , far f r o m b e i n g a t the o r i g i n o f t o t e m i s m , i s a response t o i t . 8

Social o r g a n i z a t i o n and the t o t e m i c system are therefore i n d e p e n d e n t l y products o f the m i n d w h i c h are r e l a t e d t o one another as t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . H e n c e t o t e m i s m is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a w a y o f c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n social groups. T h i s means that the t o t e m is s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y as a p a r t of a system, its p o s i t i v e qualities h a v i n g no relevance, since it is o n l y significant insofar as it is d i s t i n c t i v e : the t o t e m is l i k e the p h o n e m e . T h u s c o n t e n t and f o r m are r e c o n c i l e d and the w a y is o p e n ' t o a genuine s t r u c t u r a l analysis'.


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C r i t i c i s m o f this analysis o f t o t e m i s m i s t w o f o l d . I n the f i r s t place, Lévi-Strauss is c r i t i c i z e d f o r r e d u c t i o n i s m , e l i m i n a t i n g all c o n t e n t o f the i n s t i t u t i o n i n o r d e r t o focus solely o n the distinctiveness of the t o t e m and so l e g i t i m a t e a s t r u c t u r a l analysis. I n this v e i n L e a c h argues t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s , i n focussing solely o n the a n a l y t i c a l r e l a t i o n o f distinctiveness, e l i m i n a t e s any p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p l a i n i n g the r e l i g i o u s d i m e n s i o n o f t o t e m i s m . R . and L . M a k a r i u s argue that this r e d u c t i o n i s m , i n ' d e p r i v i n g the e t h n o g r a p h y o f its factual c o n t e n t ' b y r e d u c i n g e v e r y t h i n g t o m e r e d i f f e r e n c e , e l i m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l u n d e r standing. 1 0

T h e second c r i t i c i s m doubts the i n t e l l e c t u a l basis o f the t o t e m i c classification. T h e most c o g e n t such c r i t i c i s W o r s l e y . W h a t i s i n question is w h e t h e r the t o t e m i c series is c o n s t i t u t e d by the i n t e l l e c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the social series. W o r s l e y argues, o n the basis o f his o w n f i e l d w o r k , that the t o t e m i c series i s n o t c o n s t r u c t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y , b u t r a t h e r that t o t e m s are assigned to groups i n a n a t o m i s t i c w a y , social o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e r e f o r e o f f e r i n g the m o d e l f o r a d e r i v a t i v e t o t e m i c system. L é v i - S t r a u s s c l e a r l y recognizes that the systematic character o f the t o t e m i c system is by no means obvious. Lévi-Strauss argues t h a t the systems do n o t appear to be systematic because they t e n d t o get m o d i f i e d o v e r t i m e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the face o f d e m o g r a p h i c changes. H e t h e r e f o r e i n t r o d u c e s w h a t h e calls the ' t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e ' w h i c h reimposes a system i n the w a k e o f d i s r u p t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m o f the systematic c h a r a c t e r o f the system i s especially acute because, as we shall see, the l o g i c of p r i m i t i v e classification is e x t r e m e l y f l e x i b l e , so t h a t it is d i f f i c u l t to l o c a t e a c o l l e c t i o n w h i c h w o u l d n o t b e systematic i n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' t e r m s . Indeed Lévi-Strauss a r g u e d f o r c e f u l l y against a t t r i b u t i n g any systematic significance t o t o t e m i s m o n the basis o f his o w n f i e l d w o r k . 11

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In The Savage Mind Lévi-Strauss broadens his p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m t h a t o f the t o t e m i c classification t o that o f ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t i n general, and p a r t i c u l a r l y concentrates o n i d e n t i f y i n g the ' l o g i c ' o f ' p r i m i t i v e ' classifications, i n o r d e r t o establish its i n t e l l e c t u a l credentials. A c c o r d i n g t o L é v i - S t r a u s s ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t makes use o f a l l the resources o f s y m b o l i s m , w h i l e s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t turns its back o n the s y m b o l i c . ' P r i m i t i v e t h o u g h t ' t h e r e f o r e makes extensive use of metaphorical and metonymical relations which would be


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e x c l u d e d by science. O b j e c t s are assigned to classes n o t solely on the basis of t h e i r possessing t h e d e f i n i n g a t t r i b u t e of the class, as w o u l d be the case w i t h a s c i e n t i f i c classification, b u t also o n the basis o f s y m b o l i c associations w i t h already e x i s t i n g members o f the class. Classes are t h e n s i m p l y 'heaps' o f objects w h i c h are n o t based o n the a b s t r a c t i o n o f one p r o p e r t y c o m m o n t o e v e r y m e m b e r o f t h a t class. H e n c e the c l a s s i f i c t i o n c a n always b e e x h a u s t i v e , a l t h o u g h classes w i l l b y no means be m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . A classification does n o t have an o v e r a l l l o g i c , b u t a series o f ' l o c a l l o g i c s ' , since items can b e associated w i t h one another a c c o r d i n g t o v e r y d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a . T h e rules i n question are m a n y and v a r i e d , and can d i f f e r f r o m s o c i e t y t o society. T h e rules o f ' p r i m i t i v e t h o u g h t ' are i n t e l l e c t u a l , i n that they are based o n a n a b i l i t y t o 'oppose t e r m s ' t o one a n o t h e r , d e v e l o p i n g t a x o n o m i e s o n the basis o f 'successive d i c h o t o m i e s ' w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e ' b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s ' . It seems t h a t it is the o p p o s i t i o n a l character o f these relations, r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r b i n a r y character, w h i c h m a t t e r s most t o L é v i - S t r a u s s . D e s p i t e the fact that the e n o r m o u s v a r i e t y o f the rules makes i t d i f f i c u l t , i f n o t impossible, t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h o u g h t w h i c h w o u l d break the rules f r o m t h o u g h t w h i c h d i d n o t b r e a k t h e m , L é v i Strauss does s h o w that ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t can be seen as p r o p e r l y i n t e l l e c t u a l t h o u g h t . T h i s does n o t , h o w e v e r , m e a n t h a t i t a c t u a l l y i s i n t e l l e c t u a l . O n the one h a n d , the i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f the rules makes the c l a i m untestable. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the i n i t i a l e x c l u s i o n o f the affective renders the c o n c l u s i o n t a u t o l o g o u s . It is n o t clear w h e t h e r Lévi-Strauss is seeking to establish t h a t the rules u n d e r l y i n g these classifications are the same as those u n d e r l y i n g s c i e n t i f i c classifications, o r w h e t h e r h e w a n t s t o argue that t h e y are d i f f e r e n t , w i t h o u t i m p l y i n g any w e a k e r m e n t a l c a p a c i t y o n the part o f the ' p r i m i t i v e ' . L é v i - S t r a u s s p r o b a b l y vacillates because o f his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f l a w s o f t h o u g h t w i t h l a w s o f the m i n d . T h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n leads easily t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , i n d e a l i n g w i t h t w o d i f f e r e n t systems o f t h o u g h t w e are d e a l i n g w i t h t w o d i f f e r e n t m e n t a l i t i e s , a 'savage' m e n t a l i t y , i n w h i c h the m i n d t h i n k s spontaneously, a n d a ' c i v i l i z e d ' m e n t a l i t y , i n w h i c h the m i n d i s m a r k e d b y some k i n d o f t r a i n i n g . 1 3

T h e p r o b l e m arises because o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' v i e w o f the classification a s a p r o d u c t o f the m i n d . Instead o f c o n t r a s t i n g symbolic thought with scientific thought as two different varieties

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o f 'domesticated' thought, Lévi-Strauss sees the f o r m e r as a spontaneous p r o d u c t o f the m i n d . I n a n a l y z i n g d i f f e r e n t ' l o g i c s ' , h o w e v e r , w e are n o t a n a l y z i n g d i f f e r e n t m e n t a l i t i e s , b u t d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l l y e l a b o r a t e d and s o c i a l l y endorsed c o n v e n t i o n s b y w h i c h d i f f e r e n t kinds o f t h o u g h t are o r d e r e d . T h e v e r y differences b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t systems o f t h o u g h t should a l e r t u s against a d o p t i n g a m e n t a l i s t a p p r o a c h and s h o u l d r a t h e r suggest a v i e w of c o l l e c t i v e representations as c u l t u r a l products. 1 4

For this reason the ' l a w s ' o f any p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f t h o u g h t must be r e l a t e d to the end w h i c h t h a t t h o u g h t is designed to achieve, and i t i s o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o those ends that d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f t h o u g h t can be e v a l u a t e d . Lévi-Strauss finds h i m s e l f c a u g h t b e t w e e n the horns o f a d i l e m m a , f o r i n seeking i n t e l l e c t u a l r a t h e r t h a n s o c i a l ' foundations f o r the laws of t h o u g h t he is l e d s t r a i g h t to the c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h he seeks to a v o i d , the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t cultures are c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y d i f f e r e n t m e n t a l i t i e s . T h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the ' p r i m i t i v e ' w i t h the i n f a n t i l e m e n t a l i t y i s d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d since, as W o r s l e y has n o t e d , the l a w s o f ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t a c c o r d i n g t o L é v i - S t r a u s s are r e m a r k a b l y s i m i l a r t o the p r e conceptual t h o u g h t o f the c h i l d . 1 5

I f w e c o m p a r e scientific t a x o n o m i e s w i t h L é v i - S t r a u s s ' charact e r i z a t i o n o f ' p r i m i t i v e ' classifications w e c a n easily locate f u n c t i o n a l differences l y i n g b e h i n d the d i f f e r e n t rules o f classific a t i o n . S c i e n t i f i c t a x o n o m i e s a t t e m p t t o classify e v e r y t h i n g exhaustively i n t o mutually exclusive classes. Such classifications are e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o c o n s t r u c t o n the basis o f i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e , f o r there w i l l a l w a y s be some items w h i c h cannot be assigned t o a class w i t h o u t a m b i g u i t y . W h e n w e f i n d some anomalies we k n o w that o u r classification is i n a d e q u a t e , since the u l t i m a t e a i m is to use the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n to generate generalizations w h i c h w i l l i d e a l l y not a d m i t a m b i g u i t y o r e x c e p t i o n s . T h e laws of ' p r i m i t i v e ' classification, as described by LéviStrauss, sacrifice the c o n d i t i o n o f m u t u a l exclusiveness o f classes t o the d e m a n d for exhaustiveness. T h e p l u r a l i t y o f rules o f assignment of items to classes i m p l i e s that any i t e m can be assigned t o any one o f a n u m b e r o f classes. T h i s neglect o f the scientific r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t classes be m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e is n o t to be e x p l a i n e d by a contrast b e t w e e n an u n s c i e n t i f i c a n d a scientific m e n t a l i t y , b u t r a t h e r b y a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n systems o f t h o u g h t which are elaborated with different ends in view. The 'primitive'


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classification is not designed to assist in the g e n e r a t i o n of generalizations, and so the classes need n o t be m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t imposed o n t h e classification appears t o b e o n l y that e v e r y t h i n g should f i n d a place i n the o r d e r i n g o f the w o r l d , and so m u t u a l exclusiveness is abandoned in o r d e r to guarantee exhaustiveness. A l t h o u g h ' p r i m i t i v e ' thought is intellectual, it is not analytical, c o n c e p t u a l t h o u g h t . I t is, i n the fullest sense, s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t , m a k i n g use o f concrete images t o express abstract conceptions. L é v i - S t r a u s s calls the elements o f this t h o u g h t 'signs', w h i c h d i f f e r f r o m the c o n c e p t i n b e i n g l i m i t e d i n t h e i r p o w e r s o f reference. T h e m e a n i n g o f these elements i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y the s y m b o l i c oppositions i n t o w h i c h t h e y enter, and cannot b e d i v o r c e d f r o m those o p p o s i t i o n s . ' P r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t has a v a i l a b l e t o i t a g i v e n stock o f symbols, w h i c h the t h i n k e r can put t o use b y c o m b i n i n g and r e c o m b i n i n g . H o w e v e r , the concrete basis o f the s y m b o l means that n e w elements cannot b e i n v e n t e d t o d o n e w things. ' M y t h i c a l t h o u g h t is t h e r e f o r e a k i n d of i n t e l l e c t u a l "bricolage"'. ' C o n c e p t s thus appear l i k e operators opening up the set b e i n g w o r k e d w i t h and s i g n i f i c a t i o n l i k e the o p e r a t o r o f its reorganization, w h i c h n e i t h e r extends n o r r e n e w s i t and l i m i t s i t s e l f t o o b t a i n i n g the g r o u p o f its t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ' . M e a n i n g is, t h e r e f o r e , r e d u c e d to an arrangem e n t , a s i n the kaleidoscope, w h i c h 'can b e expressed i n terms o f s t r i c t r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n its parts and . . . these relations have no content apart f r o m the p a t t e r n i t s e l f . 1 6

T h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n represents one exercise o f 'bricolage' b y w h i c h symbols are r e l a t e d t o one another. T h e m e a n i n g o f the classific a t i o n , its 'message', is c o n s t i t u t e d by the fact t h a t it operates at once a ' t o t a l i z a t i o n ' and a ' d e t o t a l i z a t i o n ' , and so can signify b o t h u n i t y and d i v e r s i t y . H e n c e the t o t e m i c classification can express the u n i t y o f the society, b y the analogy i t establishes b e t w e e n the c u l t u r a l and the n a t u r a l o r d e r s , w h i l e at the same t i m e s i g n i f y i n g the d i v e r s i t y o f social groups b y the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n species. T h i s 'message' is at the same t i m e an expression of the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c u l t u r e and n a t u r e , t o t e m i s m p r o v i d i n g ' t h e means ( o r hope) o f t r a n s c e n d i n g the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m ' . T o t e m i s m t h e r e f o r e begins b y c o n t r a s t i n g n a t u r e and c u l t u r e , i n t r o d u c i n g d i s c o n t i n u i t y , b u t t h e n reconciles t h e m w i t h one another b y establishing a h o m o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o .

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These classifications are engendered by successive d i c h o t o m i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , the ' c o n c r e t e classifiers . . . c a n also, in t h e i r sensory f o r m , show that a l o g i c a l p r o b l e m has b e e n solved or a c o n t r a d i c t i o n s u r m o u n t e d ' , a n d s o ' d i c h o t o m i c l i n e a r i t y becomes the " s p i r a l " o f a dialogue o f the m i n d w i t h its o w n demands w h i c h is deepened in a progression w h i c h Lévi-Strauss comes to q u a l i f y a s " d i a l e c t i c a l . " ' T h e s t u d y o f classification leads d i r e c t l y i n t o the study o f m y t h . 1 8

3

MYTHOLOGIQUES

T h e f o u r v o l u m e s of Mythologiques seek to analyze a b o d y of m y t h s f r o m b o t h N o r t h and S o u t h A m e r i c a , these m y t h s m a k i n g u p a single u n i v e r s e w h i c h is a n a l y z e d as a w h o l e . M y t h s are no l o n g e r seen as b e i n g generated s i m p l y by oppositions, b u t are seen as t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f o t h e r m y t h s i n the same o r n e i g h b o u r i n g societies. T h e sequence o f o p p o s i t i o n , m e d i a t i o n and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is n o t , t h e r e f o r e , f o u n d in any one m y t h , b u t is dispersed t h r o u g h o u t the universe o f m y t h s . A n o p p o s i t i o n m a y b e established i n one m y t h , and m e d i a t e d o r t r a n s f o r m e d i n the m y t h o f a distant society. Lévi-Strauss argues t h a t this change of p e r s p e c t i v e is s i m p l y a change f r o m a m e t h o d o f ' s y n t a g m a t i c s u b s t i t u t i o n ' t o one o f ' p a r a d i g m a t i c s u b s t i t u t i o n ' , a change j u s t i f i e d on the grounds t h a t the l a t t e r i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the analysis. T h e change is, h o w e v e r , m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t than this, f o r i t i m p l i e s t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n s w h i c h m y t h s seek to resolve are c o n s t i t u t e d within the u n i v e r s e o f m y t h s , w h i c h t h e r e f o r e offer a closed universe, a l t h o u g h t h a t universe i s i t s e l f i n t e r m i n a b l e since the p o s s i b i l i t y o f establishing n e w t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s is always present. T h e universe o f m y t h t h e r e f o r e represents n o t h i n g b u t a constant r e a r r a n g e m e n t o f t e r m s . B e h i n d the m y t h s w e can f i n d a constant s t r u c t u r e w h i c h generates t h e m . ' I t s g r o w t h is a c o n t i n u o u s process, whereas its structure remains d i s c o n t i n u o u s ' . 19

T h e analysis of Mythologiques starts o u t f r o m a r a n d o m l y chosen m y t h and g r a d u a l l y expands t o b r i n g i n m o r e a n d m o r e m y t h s f r o m m o r e d i s t a n t cultures. A s each n e w m y t h i s i n t r o d u c e d , and n e w t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i o n s established w i t h the m y t h s already e x a m i n e d , the analysis o f the l a t t e r i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y deepened. Although

Lévi-Strauss

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p r i v i l e g e d , even i f n o t a r b i t r a r y , b y the end o f Mythologiques w e f i n d a segment o f the reference m y t h i s the o b j e c t i v e p i v o t o f the w h o l e system o f m y t h s o f N o r t h and S o u t h A m e r i c a . G r a d u a l l y a p i c t u r e o f the system a s a w h o l e i s b u i l t u p i n w h i c h 'each m y t h taken separately exists as the l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n of a p a t t e r n , w h i c h i s g r a d u a l l y r e v e a l e d b y the r e l a t i o n s o f r e c i p r o c a l i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y discerned b e t w e e n several m y t h s ' . 2 0

Since m y t h s c o m e f r o m societies w h i c h have d i f f e r e n t e n v i r o n ments, d i f f e r e n t societies w i l l use d i f f e r e n t ' i m a g e s ' to code the same concepts. E a c h m y t h w i l l t h e r e f o r e be d e t e r m i n e d b y a d o u b l e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , one w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s the c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e n t o f a n o t h e r m y t h , a n d another w h i c h takes account o f i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l differences b e t w e e n the societies w h i c h mean t h a t the same concept is expressed by d i f f e r e n t i t e m s : 'Every version of the m y t h thus betrays the influence of a double determinism: one links it to a succession of earlier versions or to an ensemble of foreign versions, the other acts in a k i n d of transversal w a y , t h r o u g h constraints of infrastructural o r i g i n w h i c h impose a modification of this or that element, f r o m w h i c h the result is a reorganization of the system to accommodate these differences to necessities of an external o r d e r ' . 21

H e n c e the m y t h s are n o w g i v e n that i m m a n e n t analysis w h i c h was n o t a c h i e v e d in the 1955 analysis. M y t h s are no l o n g e r r e l a t e d t o a n y t h i n g outside themselves, o t h e r t h a n the o b j e c t i v e features o f the w o r l d w h i c h they take u p a s t h e i r means o f expression. ' M y t h o l o g i c a l analysis has not, and cannot have, as its aim to show h o w men t h i n k . . . I . . . c l a i m to show, not h o w m e n think in myths, but h o w myths operate in men's minds w i t h o u t their being aware of the fact (comment les mythes se pensent dans les hommes, et a leur insu)'. ' I f it is n o w asked to w h a t final meaning these m u t u a l l y significative meanings are referring . . . the o n l y reply to emerge f r o m this study is that myths signify the m i n d w h i c h evolves them by m a k i n g use of the w o r l d of w h i c h it is itself a p a r t ' .

22

T h e idea t h a t m y t h s are the p r o d u c t s o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f o t h e r m y t h s leads s t r a i g h t back to those diffusionist hypotheses about the A m e r i c a s w h i c h have c o n c e r n e d L é v i - S t r a u s s t h r o u g h o u t his career, and w h i c h p r o v i d e d the d i r e c t l y a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l i n s p i r a t i o n f o r his s t r u c t u r a l i s m . A l t h o u g h these hypotheses o n l y c o m e to the fore in L'Homme Nu, they are present from the start of


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Mythologiques. At first the analysis is c o n f i n e d to the relations b e t w e e n a f e w A m a z o n i a n societies, B o r o r o m y t h o l o g y b e i n g seen a s the p r o d u c t o f the i n t e r a c t i o n o f T u p i and G ê m y t h o l o g y . A s Mythologiques develops the net w i d e n s to c o v e r the w h o l e c o n t i n e n t , and the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and reservations w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s has i n the past a t t a c h e d to his d i f f u s i o n i s t speculations are l a r g e l y dropped. T h e idea t h a t w e are d e a l i n g w i t h a m y t h i c a l f i e l d whose u n i t y i s e x p l a i n e d b y reference t o d i f f u s i o n i s t hypotheses leads n a t u r a l l y t o the search f o r the a r c h e t y p a l m y t h , w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s claims t o discover i n some myths f r o m O r e g o n , w h i c h m a y b e remnants o f the o r i g i n a l m y t h , o r w h i c h m a y represent t o t a l i z a t i o n s o f the f i e l d a s a w h o l e , b u t w h i c h p r o v i d e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the analysis w h i c h w o u l d n o t b e available i f L é v i - S t r a u s s had t o r e l y solely o n a p o s t u l a t e d unconscious scheme a s g e n i t o r o f the universe o f myths. In the O e d i p u s analysis each m y t h , defined as the s u m of its v a r i a n t s , sought t o resolve a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a d i c t i o n . N o w , h o w e v e r , there i s one single p r o b l e m d o m i n a t i n g the m y t h o l o g y o f the w h o l e c o n t i n e n t : ' M y t h is n o t h i n g other than the effort to correct or dissimulate its constitutive dissymmetry'. 23

Mythologiques achieves the s t r u c t u r a l i s t p r o g r a m m e of subj e c t i n g the universe o f m y t h t o a n i m m a n e n t analysis i n w h i c h the p r o p e r t i e s o f m y t h 'express n o t h i n g w h i c h w o u l d b e e x t e r n a l t o t h e m ' . T h e m y t h is no l o n g e r seen as a c u l t u r a l l y e l a b o r a t e d system amenable t o e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f c u l t u r a l l y d e f i n e d i d e o l o g i c a l functions, b u t expresses the o p e r a t i o n o f the p r e c u l t u r a l unconscious. T h e m y t h expresses the l a w s o f the m i n d . I f Lévi-Strauss can establish t h a t the structures p r o d u c e d by his analysis have an o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y , t h a t they do i n d e e d c o n s t i t u t e the o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g o f the m y t h , t h e n his c l a i m t o have d i s c o v e r e d s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the m i n d w i l l have a c e r t a i n p l a u s i b i l i t y . I n o r d e r t o evaluate the t h e o r y o f m y t h i t i s necessary f i r s t t o spell o u t m o r e c l e a r l y w h a t the t h e o r y i n v o l v e s . 2 4

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l hypothesis o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y o f m y t h i s clear and simple: m y t h s m a k e use o f 'signs' t o establish, to mediate and to transform oppositions. This power of myth


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exhausts the m e a n i n g o f m y t h , and s o the specific c o n t e n t o f the m y t h is a matter of indifference. T h e f i r s t a n a l y t i c a l task is to define the o b j e c t of the analysis, to specify w h a t is to be e x p l a i n e d and w h a t is n o t to be e x p l a i n e d by the analysis. In the first place one has to establish w h a t is and w h a t is n o t a m y t h . T h i s is n o t an e m p i r i c a l b u t a t h e o r e t i c a l question, but one t o w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s fails seriously t o address himself. I t appears t h a t , w i t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m , L é v i - S t r a u s s believes that the m y t h presents i t s e l f as such to the analysis, and so reliance i s placed o n the i n t u i t i o n o f the analyst. H o w e v e r , i f w e e x a m i n e his practice i t becomes apparent t h a t m y t h is d e f i n e d by its s t r u c t u r e . T h i s is n o t s u r p r i s i n g , f o r an i m m a n e n t analysis requires a n i m m a n e n t d e f i n i t i o n o f the o b j e c t , and so a d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h does n o t refer, f o r e x a m p l e , to the c u l t u r a l f u n c t i o n o f m y t h , n o r t o indigenous c o n c e p t i o n s o f m y t h . Folk-tales are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m m y t h b y t h e i r w e a k e r s t r u c t u r i n g , n a r r a t i v e f o r m s replace structures o f o p p o s i t i o n b y structures of r e d u p l i c a t i o n , so t a k i n g a serial f o r m . H i s t o r y is l i k e a m y t h , b u t differs i n its o r i e n t a t i o n t o t i m e , m y t h s b e i n g ' i n s t r u m e n t s f o r the suppression o f t i m e ' and s o d i f f e r i n h a v i n g a n o n - r e v e r s i b l e s t r u c t u r e . R i t u a l , w h i c h the t r a d i t i o n a l D u r k h e i m i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n associates closely w i t h m y t h , i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d sharply f r o m the l a t t e r in Mythologiques, the v e r b a l glosses on r i t u a l b e i n g associated w i t h m y t h , so t h a t r i t u a l is d e f i n e d solely as a f o r m of b e h a v i o u r . M y t h and r i t u a l are t h e n c o n t r a s t e d o n the basis o f t h e i r structure. H e n c e Lévi-Strauss appears i m p l i c i t l y to define m y t h as t h a t w h i c h is s t r u c t u r e d l i k e a m y t h . So l o n g as the o b j e c t in q u e s t i o n can b e f o u n d t o have a s t r u c t u r e o f r e d u p l i c a t e d o p p o s i t i o n , m e d i a t i o n and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , then i t i s a m y t h . T h i s i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n leads Lévi-Strauss to i n t r o d u c e a sharp d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n the m y t h s w h i c h he examines and those w h i c h have a h i s t o r i c a l d i m e n s i o n , the l a t t e r d e m a n d i n g a ' r e f i n e d a n d t r a n s f o r m e d s t r u c t u r a l analysis', i f t h e y are i n fact amenable t o such analysis a t a l l . H e n c e , far f r o m t a k i n g m y t h a s a r e a d y - m a d e object, L é v i Strauss i n t r o d u c e s a n o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h leads h i m t o classify i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f m y t h a s p a r t o f t h e corpus, w h i l e e x c l u d i n g phenomena w h i c h have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been seen as mythical. 2 5

The

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the corpus, for the e t h n o g r a p h i c r e p o r t s we have are by no means r e l i a b l e . M o r e o v e r Lévi-Strauss does n o t take these reports as t h e y stand as his s t a r t i n g p o i n t in Mythologiques, b u t has n o r m a l l y s u m m a r i z e d these r e p o r t s e v e n f u r t h e r before i n c l u d i n g t h e m i n his o w n t e x t . T h e m y t h has t h e r e f o r e already been f i l t e r e d t w i c e b e f o r e b e i n g e m b o d i e d in the corpus to be a n a l y z e d : once by the e t h n o g r a p h e r , w h o w i l l have p i c k e d o u t w h a t he regards as b e i n g the essential details, and a second t i m e by Lévi-Strauss. B u t even this filtered corpus is i n a d e q u a t e to the analysis, and Lévi-Strauss n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y has t o s u p p l e m e n t o r c o r r e c t the t e x t i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t the analysis t o p r o c e e d . T h i s c o r r e c t i o n and supplement a t i o n renders the analysis l i a b l e t o c i r c u l a r i t y . O n c e the corpus has been defined, the analyst s t i l l has to establish w h a t he is to e x p l a i n . A c c o r d i n g to Lévi-Strauss the analysis m u s t be e x h a u s t i v e . T h e analysis can o n l y be exhaustive in r e l a t i o n t o a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the features o f the o b j e c t w h i c h are t o b e e x p l a i n e d . For e x a m p l e , L é v i - S t r a u s s p r o v i d e s n o means o f r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the o r d e r o f sequences i n the t e x t , n o r the g r a m m a t i c a l relations b e t w e e n terms, n o r the l e x i c a l elements t h r o u g h w h i c h concepts w i l l be expressed. These aspects o f the m y t h are r e g a r d e d a s b e i n g p u r e l y c o n t i n g e n t , a n d s o n o t p a r t o f the explanandum. A l l that is to be e x p l a i n e d is the s t r u c t u r e of the m y t h , the relations subsisting b e t w e e n the t e r m s . H e n c e , i n response t o R i c o e u r ' s c r i t i c i s m that L é v i - S t r a u s s concentrates o n the ' s y n t a x ' o f m y t h a t the expense o f its ' s e m a n t i c s ' L é v i - S t r a u s s notes t h a t 'as far as I am concerned there is no choice. There is no such choice because the phonological r e v o l u t i o n . . . consists of the discovery that meaning is always the result of a combination of elements w h i c h are not themselves s i g n i f i c a n t . . . in my perspective meaning is always reducible. In other w o r d s , behind all meaning there is a non-meaning, w h i l e the reverse is not the case. As far as I am concerned, significance is always phenomenal'. 26

I t is, t h e r e f o r e , the t h e o r e t i c a l assertion t h a t the m e a n i n g o f the m y t h i s exhausted b y the f o r m a l relations b e t w e e n its parts t h a t u n d e r l i e s the i s o l a t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t o f m y t h analysis a s a b o d y o f t e x t s w h i c h have a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f s t r u c t u r e , and, w i t h i n those texts, as the f o r m a l relations e m b e d d e d i n t h e m . T h e t h e o r e t i c a l assertion i t s e l f rests o n a specific claim about the nature of the mind and the nature of


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m e a n i n g w h i c h i t s e l f is n o t e x a m i n e d , b u t is the a priori s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f the analysis. T h e analysis cannot, t h e r e f o r e , result i n the discovery o f the s t r u c t u r a l character o f m e a n i n g , since t h a t s t r u c t u r a l character has a l r e a d y been p o s t u l a t e d as the basis on w h i c h a t t e n t i o n i s focussed solely o n s t r u c t u r a l characteristics o f the o b j e c t . H a v i n g d e f i n e d the o b j e c t o f analysis a s the f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s e m b e d d e d i n the m y t h , w e s t i l l r e q u i r e some t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h w i l l enable us to i d e n t i f y those r e l a t i o n s . I n the first place w e have t o discover w h a t i t i s that the r e l a t i o n s relate. I n the O e d i p u s analysis, as we have seen, the e l e m e n t of the m y t h is the m y t h e m e w h i c h relates a subject to a f u n c t i o n in a sentence of the t e x t . These m y t h e m e s are t h e n r e l a t e d o p p o s i t i o n a l l y . In Mythologiques the subject has ceased to be a p a r t of the m y t h e m e s , and the l a t t e r is r e d u c e d to a p r e d i c a t e . T h e element is t h e r e f o r e the ' s i g n ' d e f i n e d in The Savage Mind as u n i o n of a c o n c e p t and an image, the i m a g e b e i n g the means o f expression o f the c o n c e p t w h i c h enters i n t o the oppositions and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f the m y t h . T h i s p r e d i c a t e , m o r e o v e r , is n o t i t s e l f a p a r t of the t e x t , as it was in the O e d i p u s analysis, b u t is discovered u n d e r l y i n g the i m a g e . O n c e again L é v i - S t r a u s s ' e m p i r i c i s m leads h i m s i m p l y t o assert t h a t this is the element of m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t , and there is no clear e x p l a n a t i o n o f the grounds f o r this assertion. T h e e l e m e n t o f the m y t h exists o n l y i n the c o n t e x t o f the o p p o s i t i o n s i n t o w h i c h i t enters. H e n c e the question o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the m y t h i c a l v a l u e o f specific elements i s that o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the c o n s t i t u t i v e o p p o s i t i o n s o f the m y t h . B e f o r e w e can i d e n t i f y oppositions w e have t o define w h a t i s t o c o u n t as an o p p o s i t i o n . It is at this stage t h a t the a r b i t r a r y , and so f o r m a l , character o f the analysis becomes apparent. I n the O e d i p u s analysis m y t h d e v e l o p e d o n the basis o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I n Mythologiques the element of the m y t h is a c o n c e p t and n o t a b e l i e f , and so the oppositions c a n n o t take the f o r m of contradictions. N o r do the oppositions take the f o r m o f l o g i c a l c o n t r a r i e s , w h i c h c o u l d g i v e rise t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i f items w e r e d i s c o v e r e d w h i c h h a d c o n t r a d i c t o r y a t t r i b u t e s . I n o t h e r w o r d s the oppositions d o n o t take the f o r m x / n o t - x , b u t r a t h e r take the f o r m x / y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y Lévi-Strauss does n o t m a k e the fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n the concepts o f b i n a r y r e l a t i o n , b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n , and b i n a r y c o n t r a d i c t i o n . A s M a k a r i u s notes:


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'The binary oppositions . . . revealed by the structuralists cover the whole field f r o m a contradictory opposition to the most fragile and a r b i t r a r y opposition that could be sketched by a capricious fantasy'. 27

I t seems that m y t h develops a s a result o f t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f d i s c o n t i n u i t y t o a c o n t i n u o u s w o r l d w h i c h w a s effected b y the b i r t h o f c u l t u r e . T h e b i r t h o f c u l t u r e i n t r o d u c e s m e a n i n g t o the w o r l d b y establishing a system o f signs, b u t o n l y a t the expense o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g parts o f t h e w o r l d f r o m one another and s o t h r e a t e n i n g the f u n d a m e n t a l u n i t y o f the w o r l d . H e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , m a g i c a l t h o u g h t associates smoke and clouds because it posits i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a n i d e n t i t y b e t w e e n the t w o w h i c h has been b r o k e n b y the d i s c o n t i n u i t y i m p l i c i t i n c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . W h i l e s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t w i l l seek the i d e n t i t y b y reference to m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l properties o f smoke and clouds, m a g i c a l t h o u g h t w i l l seek the i d e n t i t y by p o s t u l a t i n g a s y m b o l i c r e l a t i o n rather t h a n a real r e l a t i o n . I t i s because o f the fact that ' p r i m a r y ' qualities are o f t e n c o r r e l a t e d w i t h ' s e c o n d a r y ' qualities that ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t can f r e q u e n t l y a n t i c i p a t e the results o f science. S y m b o l i c t h o u g h t , t h e r e f o r e , seeks t o restore u n i t y t o a w o r l d d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b y the i n t e l l e c t . 'all magical operations rest on the recovery of a unity w h i c h is . . . unconscious, or less completely conscious than the operations themselves'. 29

T h i s u n i t y is achieved s t a t i c a l l y in a classification, and d y n a m i c a l l y i n m y t h and m a g i c . A v e r y s i m i l a r v i e w is c l e a r l y expressed in L'Homme Nu: ' I n the course of this last part we have verified that several hundred stories, apparently very different f r o m one another, and each v e r y complex in itself, proceed f r o m a series of linked statements: there is the sky, and there is the earth; between the t w o parity is inconceivable; consequently the presence on earth of that celestial t h i n g w h i c h is fire constitutes a mystery; finally, from the moment that the celestial fire is now found here below in the f o r m of the domestic hearth, it must have been the case that one had had to go from the earth up to the sky in order to find i t ' . 2 9

M y t h , therefore, attempts t o reconcile diversity w i t h unity b y m e d i a t i n g and t r a n s f o r m i n g ' o p p o s i t i o n s ' w h i c h are established o n the basis o f differences. I f w e accept p r o v i s i o n a l l y t h a t the element o f the m y t h has been defined correctly, we next have to ask how the oppositions in play


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are a c t u a l l y discovered. A l t h o u g h Lévi-Strauss refers to the devices o f c o m m u t a t i o n , o f p e r m u t a t i o n , and s u b s t i t u t i o n , these devices cannot u n c o v e r the s y m b o l i c v a l u e o f the opposed elements. P e r m u t a t i o n and s u b s t i t u t i o n can i d e n t i f y the c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r sensible f o r m can o c c u r , a n d it can establish the p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s w h i c h can o c c u r i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t . H o w e v e r , i t cannot establish the s y m b o l i c value o f the f o r m , n o t least because the same f o r m has d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g in d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s , d e p e n d i n g o n the f u n c t i o n assigned b y the code g o v e r n i n g t h a t c o n t e x t . H e n c e the m e a n i n g o f a n o p p o s i t i o n can o n l y b e established once we have i d e n t i f i e d the code w h i c h serves to assign a m e a n i n g to i t . Hence: ' T h e i r meanings can only be " p o s i t i o n a l " meanings, and it follows that they cannot be available to us in the myths themselves, but o n l y by reference to the ethnographic context, i.e. to w h a t we k n o w about the w a y of l i f e , the techniques, the r i t u a l and the social organization of the societies whose myths we wish to analyze'. 30

I n g o i n g b e y o n d the m y t h t o discover the oppositions i t w o u l d appear t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l i s t enterprise is t h r e a t e n e d , for we have t o l o o k b e y o n d m y t h t o c u l t u r e for its f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e . T h i s p r o b l e m i s o n l y a v o i d e d b y d i s c o v e r i n g the o p p o s i t i o n i n the unconscious m i n d . Its m e a n i n g cannot be d i s c o v e r e d by reference t o the consciously a r t i c u l a t e d beliefs o f the m y t h o l o g i z i n g c u l t u r e , any m o r e than i t can b e discovered b y reference t o o u r o w n conscious representations: 'Consciousness is the secret enemy of the sciences of man in t w o respects, firstly as the spontaneous consciousness immanent in the object of observation, and secondly as the reflective consciousness (consciousness of consciousness) in the scientist'. 31

Far f r o m i n g l y come conceptual, mechanisms

e x a m i n i n g the c o s m o l o g y , Lévi-Strauss has i n c r e a s r o u n d t o the v i e w t h a t the oppositions are p r e d e r i v i n g e i t h e r f r o m n a t u r e o r f r o m the n a t u r a l of perception:

' e v e r y t h i n g happens as though certain animals were more ready than others to fill this role, whether by virtue of a striking aspect of their behaviour, or whether, by

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v i r t u e of a propensity w h i c h w o u l d also be natural, human thought apprehends more q u i c k l y and more easily properties of a certain type. B o t h come to the same thing, moreover, since no characteristic is s t r i k i n g in itself, and it is perceptual analysis . . . w h i c h . . . confers a meaning on phenomena and sets them up as themes'. 32

T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t c o m p l e t e s the d i s s o l u t i o n o f c u l t u r e i n t o n a t u r e , f o r even the c o n c e p t u a l operations o f c u l t u r e are n o w s i m p l y the expression o f n a t u r a l mechanisms. C u l t u r e i s n o w a ' s y n t h e t i c d u p l i c a t i o n o f mechanisms already i n e x i s t e n c e ' . 33

T h e m e a n i n g o f a n o p p o s i t i o n can o n l y b e established b y i n s p e c t i o n o f the c o n t e n t o f the terms themselves. L é v i - S t r a u s s devotes e n o r m o u s a t t e n t i o n t o the e c o l o g i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f the cultures u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n and r a t h e r less a t t e n t i o n to social s t r u c t u r a l characteristics, i n o r d e r t o discover o b j e c t i v e associations w h i c h c o u l d p r o v i d e the basis for s y m b o l i c o p p o s i t i o n s . I n this w a y the oppositions are discovered w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o m a k e any reference t o the conscious beliefs o f the c u l t u r e i n question. W h e n w e r e m e m b e r h o w loosely the t e r m ' o p p o s i t i o n ' i s defined w e c o m e face t o face w i t h the p r o b l e m o f arbitrariness. T h e m y t h c o u l d single o u t any one o f a l a r g e n u m b e r o f p r o p e r t i e s associated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r i t e m and oppose t h a t i t e m t o any o t h e r i t e m i n the same, o r even i n a d i f f e r e n t , m y t h . H e n c e any i t e m a p p e a r i n g i n a m y t h can b e r e l a t e d t o any o t h e r i t e m w i t h i n the universe o f m y t h w i t h i n a ' b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n ' , f o r a single d i f f e r ence is s u f f i c i e n t to establish an ' o p p o s i t i o n ' . W h e n we also r e m e m b e r t h a t e t h n o g r a p h i c i n f o r m a t i o n is scanty, so that i n t e r p o l a t i o n is o f t e n necessary, w h e n we also r e m e m b e r that the oppositions are expressed at an e x t r e m e l y abstract l e v e l o u r doubts are o n l y increased. Lévi-Strauss does o f f e r a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l guarantee w h i c h should l i m i t the arbitrariness o f the analysis. E t h n o g r a p h i c o b s e r v a t i o n can p r o v i d e an ' e x t e r n a l c r i t i c i s m ' since the associat i o n o f c o n c e p t w i t h sensible q u a l i t y i s n o t a r b i t r a r y b u t must b e f o u n d e d i n the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . 3 4

H o w e v e r , this guarantee is subsequently u n d e r m i n e d by the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the concept o f the ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n ' i n w h i c h p r o p e r t i e s are a t t r i b u t e d t o a n i t e m o n the basis o f the ' l o g i c a l necessity' o f e n s u r i n g the consistency o f the connections established by 'empirical deduction' on the basis of empirical


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j u d g e m e n t s . I n this w a y the m y t h p r o g r e s s i v e l y creates n e w s y m b o l i c values i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n its c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e i r r e v e r e n t c r i t i c i s i n c l i n e d t o suspect that the ' l o g i c a l necessity' i s that o f a f a u l t y analysis r a t h e r t h a n that o f the m y t h . Such a suspicion is c o n f i r m e d w h e n we r e m e m b e r a f u r t h e r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l canon w h i c h i s that the appearance o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t the analysis i s i n e r r o r , b u t r a t h e r ' i t proves t h a t the analysis has n o t been t a k e n far enough, and t h a t c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t i v e features must have escaped d e t e c t i o n ' . T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the 'transcendental d e d u c t i o n ' t h e r e f o r e makes it possible to r e t a i n an analysis w h i c h cannot be supp o r t e d , o r even w h i c h i s c o n t r a d i c t e d , b y e t h n o g r a p h i c o b s e r v a tion. 35

36

T h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f oppositions i s also supposedly p r o t e c t e d f r o m arbitrariness because oppositions d o n o t e x i s t i n i s o l a t i o n , b u t are r e l a t e d t o one another b y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . T h e m y t h takes u p one o p p o s i t i o n , and t h e n engenders others by successive t r a n s formation: ' I n order for a m y t h to be engendered by thought, and to engender other myths in its t u r n , it is necessary and sufficient for an i n i t i a l opposition to be injected into experience, from w h i c h it follows that other oppositions w i l l be engendered in turn'. 37

R i c h a r d notes o p t i m i s t i c a l l y : 'The application of the "principles w h i c h serve as the basis of structural analysis" (1958a, p. 233) do not seem to guarantee absolutely that the m y t h has not been solicited to respond to the a priori ideas of the analyst. Nevertheless the constitution of paradigmatic ensembles, of l i m i t e d number but containing several relations, on the basis of a syntagmatic chain reduces the risk'. 38

T h e risk w i l l , h o w e v e r , o n l y be r e d u c e d i f the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s are n o t i n t h e i r t u r n a r b i t r a r y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y w h a t i s t r u e o f oppositions i s e q u a l l y t r u e o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , f o r the l a t t e r are f o u n d as easily as are the f o r m e r . L é v i - S t r a u s s uses the t e r m ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' e x t r e m e l y l o o s e l y , r e f e r r i n g to a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i o n w h e n e v e r m y t h s c a n be r e l a t e d to one another. T h e simplest f o r m of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is f o u n d w h e n a pair o f m y t h s share a c o m m o n e l e m e n t , and one o r two differences are then claimed to be correlative. It would be


204

v e r y s u r p r i s i n g i f w e c o u l d n o t discover such t r a n s f o r m a t i o n relations. M o r e o v e r the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n relations are n e v e r established u n t i l the m y t h has already been i n t e r p r e t e d a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d t o some e x t e n t , and often t o a v e r y considerable e x t e n t . R . and L . M a k a r i u s have analyzed the supposed set of m y t h s M 7 - 1 2 , M 1 4 , M 2 7 3 discussed in From Honey to Ashes. T h e y s h o w that LéviStrauss has to d i s t o r t and e l a b o r a t e on the m y t h s q u i t e o u t r a g e o u s l y i n o r d e r t o establish a supposed c y c l e o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . M a y b u r y L e w i s has s h o w n the c i r c u l a r i t y o f another supposed c y c l e . A l t h o u g h there are some sets w h i c h appear to be m o r e p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e d ( f o r e x a m p l e , M 2 3 - 4 and M 2 6 ; M 5 5 and M 7 - 1 2 ; M 1 5 - 1 6 and M 2 0 ; M 1 8 8 - 9 and M 1 9 1 ) , i n o t h e r cases L é v i - S t r a u s s appears t o c o n j u r e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o u t o f t h i n air i n o r d e r t o c o m p l e t e a n analysis ( e . g . R C , pp. 64, 118).

3 9

Because L é v i - S t r a u s s insists that m y t h i s the p r o d u c t o f a n unconscious to w h i c h the analyst has no means of access o t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h the m y t h , the analyst has n o means o f d i s c o v e r i n g w h a t are and w h a t are n o t elements, oppositions and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f the m y t h . T h e r e i s t h e r e f o r e n o means o f d i s c o v e r i n g w h e t h e r the analyst's constructs i n fact p e r t a i n t o the m y t h , o r w h e t h e r they are s i m p l y his o r her o w n c r e a t i o n . M o r e o v e r the t e r m s o p p o s i t i o n and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n are a p p l i e d so loosely t h a t the structures u n c o v e r e d c o u l d be u n c o v e r e d a n y w h e r e . H e n c e there is n o t any w a y o f d i s c o v e r i n g w h e t h e r the corpus i n q u e s t i o n i s o r i s n o t generated b y s t r u c t u r a l mechanisms o f the k i n d o u t l i n e d . I t m i g h t c o n c e i v a b l y be the case t h a t they are so s t r u c t u r e d , b u t t h e r e is absolutely n o w a y o f d i s c o v e r i n g this. H e n c e , f i n a l l y , there i s n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h a t e v e r f o r c o n c l u d i n g that the s t r u c t u r e s u n c o v e r e d can t e l l us a n y t h i n g about the m i n d . T h e c o n c l u s i o n must b e t h a t the analysis o f m y t h o f f e r e d b y Lévi-Strauss is necessarily a r b i t r a r y . T h i s is n o t to say that the oppositions do n o t necessarily have some o b j e c t i v e existence, b u t 'the p r o b l e m i s t o decide b e t w e e n t h e m and t o d e t e r m i n e the significance o f any o f t h e m ' . Since there i s n o w a y i n w h i c h L é v i Strauss can l e g i t i m a t e his analysis, the o p p o s i t i o n s he uncovers can o n l y c o m e f r o m his o w n m i n d . A s W i l d e n notes, ' a l l the " m a t e r i a l e n t i t i e s " a n d " m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s " h e e m p l o y s c o m e t o the analysis already d e f i n e d ' and i t i s L é v i - S t r a u s s w h o has d e f i n e d t h e m . I f meaning is relegated to the unconscious, there is no means of 4 0

41


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r e c o v e r i n g that m e a n i n g . Instead the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n derives f r o m the ' f l a i r , aesthetic p e r c e p t i o n , a c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r m o f i n t u i t i o n ' o f the analyst: 'Sometimes a sort of recognizable click is produced in the m i n d such that we suddenly apprehend from w i t h i n something u n t i l then apprehended f r o m without'. 42

T h e a r g u m e n t that the s t r u c t u r a l analysis o f m y t h , a s p r a c t i s e d b y L é v i - S t r a u s s , offers a n a r b i t r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , one i m p o s e d b y the analyst is best i l l u s t r a t e d by reference to the o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h Lévi-Strauss regards as b e i n g the c o n s t i t u t i v e o p p o s i t i o n of a l l ' p r i m i t i v e ' t h o u g h t , t h a t b e t w e e n n a t u r e and c u l t u r e . D e s p i t e the f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e o f the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n n a t u r e and c u l t u r e , L é v i - S t r a u s s , w i t h his insistence o n the unconscious f o u n d a t i o n o f m e a n i n g , i s unable t o establish that this o p p o s i t i o n i s i n fact i m p o r t a n t , o r even present, i n the t h o u g h t o f the people w h o m he is s t u d y i n g . T o t e m i s m supposedly counterposes a n a t u r a l series to a social series, and yet the t o t e m s are by no means necessarily n a t u r a l e n t i t i e s . Caste is s i m i l a r l y analyzed as b e i n g based on the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n n a t u r e and c u l t u r e , a l t h o u g h D u m o n t , i n a s t r u c t u r a l analysis, argues t h a t the c o n c e p t u a l ' o p p o s i t i o n ' w h i c h d o m i n a t e s the caste system is that b e t w e e n the sacred and the profane. Laura M a k a r i u s goes so far as to argue that ' t h e antithesis w h i c h separates a n d opposes society and nature to one another is radically foreign to p r i m i t i v e t h o u g h t ' . M a k a r i u s examines a n analysis o f G e o r g i a n m y t h s b y G . C h a r a c h i d z e w h i c h is based on the c u l t u r e / n a t u r e o p p o s i t i o n . She argues v e r y c o n v i n c i n g l y that this p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the o p p o s i t i o n i s t o d i s t o r t the i n d i g e n o u s c o n c e p t i o n . In fact she shows t h a t the f u n d a m e n t a l o p p o s i t i o n is that b e t w e e n the respect f o r p r o h i b i t i o n s , w h i c h is the basis o f society, and the v i o l a t i o n o f those p r o h i b i t i o n s . 43

4 4

As M a k a r i u s points o u t , and as we f i n d r e p e a t e d l y , the supposed o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n n a t u r e a n d c u l t u r e d o m i n a t e s the t h o u g h t o f L é v i - S t r a u s s , m o r e t h a n t h a t o f the peoples w h o m h e i s s t u d y i n g . T h e t r a g e d y w h i c h c o n f r o n t s L é v i - S t r a u s s i s that w e have lost respect for n a t u r e , have c u t ourselves o f f f r o m i t , and are n o t p r e p a r e d t o l i v e u n d e r its r u l e . T h e result i s t h a t w e have c o m e t o d o m i n a t e n a t u r e and t o v i o l a t e its rules. I t i s the ' p r i m i t i v e ' w h o continues to live in harmony with nature, establishing systems of


206

r e c i p r o c i t y i n a c c o r d w i t h the dictates o f h u m a n n a t u r e , w e a v i n g m y t h s u n d e r the guidance o f the n a t u r a l unconscious. T h e r o l e o f the n a t u r e / c u l t u r e o p p o s i t i o n in Lévi-Strauss' analysis reveals as c l e a r l y as c o u l d a n y t h i n g t h a t the m e a n i n g w h i c h he imposes on m y t h s i s n o t a t a l l l o c a t e d i n the i m p e n e t r a b l e unconscious o f the ' p r i m i t i v e ' , b u t rather derives f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h L é v i Strauss has developed f o r h i m s e l f .

4

POSITIVISM

A N D

F O R M A L I S M

I n l o o k i n g a t L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s t r u c t u r a l analysis o f m y t h w e have reached the same c o n c l u s i o n that w e r e a c h e d i n l o o k i n g a t C h o m s k y ' s s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s . I n b o t h cases the p o s i t i v i s t a p p r o a c h t o c u l t u r a l p h e n o m e n a that seeks t o c u t o f f the c u l t u r a l object f r o m any subjective a p p r e c i a t i o n and t o t r e a t i t e x c l u s i v e l y as an e x t e r n a l i n e r t o b j e c t leads to an analysis t h a t is arbitrary, in that t h e r e i s n o means o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t the p r o p e r t i e s i d e n t i f i e d as p r o p e r t i e s of the o b j e c t are in fact such, and t h a t is formalist, in t h a t any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o n t e n t that refers b e y o n d the f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s i n t e r n a l t o the o b j e c t i s e x c l u d e d n o t o n any p r i n c i p l e d t h e o r e t i c a l grounds, b u t o n the basis o f a n a r b i t r a r y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l decision t o e x c l u d e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e x t r i n s i c connections. T h e d i s c o v e r y that the o b j e c t can be r e d u c e d to a f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e is already i n h e r e n t in the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l decision to define the object by its s t r u c t u r e ( f o r C h o m s k y a language is a n y t h i n g s t r u c t u r e d l i k e a language, f o r Lévi-Strauss a m y t h is a n y t h i n g s t r u c t u r e d l i k e a m y t h ) , w h i l e the i s o l a t i o n o f the o b j e c t f r o m any e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h i n w h i c h i t has a m e a n i n g deprives the s t r u c t u r e u n c o v e r e d o f any significance. W h i l e C h o m s k y ' s analysis o f language has the m e r i t o f r i g o u r , and s o i s o f some p r a c t i c a l use, L é v i - S t r a u s s ' analysis o f m y t h has n o t even g o t such a l i m i t e d pretension. L é v i - S t r a u s s h i m s e l f denies the charge o f f o r m a l i s m , b u t h e does s o o n l y b y r e d u c i n g the c o n t e n t o f the m y t h t o its f o r m : 'Reality shifts from content towards f o r m or, more precisely, towards a new w a y o f apprehending content w h i c h , w i t h o u t disregarding o r impoverishing i t , translates it into structural t e r m s ' . 45

This

reduction

excludes

from

consideration

what

to

most

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people appear to be essential parts of the m y t h . A v e r y o b v i o u s aspect o f this r e d u c t i o n i s the e l i m i n a t i o n f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the n a r r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f the m y t h , a n d s o o f its t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n . H e n c e ' s t r u c t u r a l analysis c a n n o t b u t reveal m y t h s as timeless'. 46

In reducing myths by fiat to their formal structure, Lévi-Strauss is i n d e e d able to reduce ' m e a n i n g to n o n - m e a n i n g ' , b u t in so d o i n g he is s i m p l y e x c l u d i n g f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n the m e a n i n g f u l aspects o f the m y t h . T h u s L é v i - S t r a u s s does n o t p r o v i d e a n o b j e c t i v e analysis o f m e a n i n g , h e s i m p l y dissolves a l l specific meanings b y r e d u c i n g a l l m y t h s t o a f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e , ' a n abstract r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h o b l i t e r a t e s a l l their specific c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ' . I n a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m a l l specific m e a n i n g , i n r e t r e a t i n g i n t o the depths o f his f o r m a l unconscious, L é v i - S t r a u s s i s r e t r e a t i n g i n t o a w o r l d o f silence, a w o r l d o f n o n - m e a n i n g , a w o r l d o f n o n - c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o r n o n - r e c i p r o c i t y . T h u s h e comes t o dissolve c u l t u r e b a c k into nature. 47

W e are n o w back a t o u r s t a r t i n g p o i n t , n o t seeking t o u n d e r s t a n d m y t h , b u t t h r o u g h m y t h t o seek a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h u m a n n a t u r e , n o t seeking t o understand this o r that h u m a n b e i n g , b u t seeking t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t I have i n c o m m o n w i t h all h u m a n beings. Mythologiques represents one m o r e a t t e m p t to dissolve a l l differences, a l l c u l t u r e , a l l h i s t o r y , a l l e x p e r i e n c e , i n t o a f o r m a l unconscious s t r u c t u r e w h i c h i s supposedly the basis o f o u r h u m a n i t y . L é v i - S t r a u s s ' a t t e m p t t o reduce the m e a n i n g o f m y t h t o a n o b j e c t i v e , p r e - c u l t u r a l , unconscious results i n the d i s s o l u t i o n o f a l l m e a n i n g . B u t this is the m e a n i n g t h a t the m y t h has f o r LéviStrauss: Mythologiques is an a t t e m p t to i n t e r p r e t the universe of m y t h i n the l i g h t o f L é v i - S t r a u s s ' d i s t i n c t i v e , and i d i o s y n c r a t i c , h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s t o this p h i l o s o p h y t h a t w e must n o w turn.

N O T E S 1 2 3 4 5

RC, p. 10. HN, pp. 561-2. SA, pp. 2 1 0 - 1 . SA, p . 211. SA, p . 229.

208 6 7 8 9 10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

1958h. 1960f, p. 26. Tot, p. 71; SM, p. 10; HN, 5 9 7 - 6 1 1 . Tot, p. 86. R. and L. Makarius, 'Ethnologie et structuralisme', L'Homme et la Société, 3, 1967, p. 187; E. Leach, 'Telstar et les a b o r i g è n e s ou la pensée sauvage'. Annales, 19, 1964, p. 1111; E. Leach, Lévi-Strauss, Fontana, London, 1970, p. 87. P. W o r s l e y , 'Groote Eyland, T o t e m i s m and Le Totemism Aujourd'hui', in E. Leach (ed.) The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism, Tavistock, London. 1967; SM, pp. 67, 151-8. 1936a, p. 300. SM, pp. 11, 13, 161; SA, p. 230. SM, pp. 219, 248n. W o r s l e y , op. cit, p. 153. SM, pp. 18, 20, 36. Tot, p. 13; SM, p. 91. SM, p. 143. A. Glucksmann, 'La D é d u c t i o n de la Cuisine et les Cuisines de la d é d u c t i o n ' , Information sur les Sciences, Sociales, 4, 1965, pp. 207-8. RC, p. 307; HA, p. 356; HN, pp. 565-6, SA, p. 229. RC, p. 13. HN, p. 562. RC, pp. 12, 341. 1965h, p. 28. HN, p. 561. RC, p. 16; 1970b, p. 61. 1970b, p. 64. R. Makarius, ' L é v i - S t r a u s s et les structures inconscientes de l'esprit', L'Homme et la Société, 18, 1970, p. 249. IM, p. x l v i i . HN, p. 539. 1970h, p. 60. 1964f, p. 537. HN, pp. 5 0 0 - 1 . ESK, p. x x x . RC, p. 334. 1971e, pp. 19-20. RC, p. 162. HN, p. 540; RC, pp. 3 3 3 - 4 . P. Richard, 'Analyse des Mythologiques de C l . Lévi-Strauss', L'Homme et la Societe, 4, 1967, p. 122. L. and R. Makarius, Des jaguars et des Hommes', L'Homme et la Société, 7, 1968. pp. 215-35; D. M a y b u r y - L e w i s , 'Review of Du Miel aux Cendres', in E. and T. Hayes (ed) Claude Lévi-Strauss M I T Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. M a y b u r y - L e w i s , op. cit. 1970, p. 159. W i l d e n , System and Structure, Tavistock. London, 1972, p. 9. 1967d, p. 3. L. D u m o n t , Homo Hierarchicus, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1970.

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44 L. Makarius, ' L ' a p o t h è o s e de Cinna: mythe de naissance de structuralisme', L'Homme et la Société, 22, 1971. 45 HA, p. 466. 46 M. Douglas, 'The M e a n i n g of M y t h ' , in Leach (ed.), op. cit. 1967, p. 67. 47 Makarius, 1970, op. cit. p. 246.

I X . The Structuralist Human Philosophy I N e a r l i e r chapters I have argued t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s e n t e r e d a n t h r o p o l o g y in order to develop a n e w h u m a n philosophy, and I have f u r t h e r argued t h a t it is this p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is expressed in his studies o f k i n s h i p and o f m y t h i c a l t h o u g h t . I n these specific studies L é v i - S t r a u s s tells u s n o t h i n g about k i n s h i p o r m y t h , about n o n l i t e r a t e cultures o r societies. H e tells u s about his t h e o r y o f the m i n d a n d offers a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f systems o f k i n s h i p and m y t h i n the l i g h t o f that t h e o r y . I t i s n o w t i m e t o l o o k m o r e closely a t the h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y t h a t Lévi-Strauss has d e v e l o p e d and that p r o v i d e s the r a t i o n a l e f o r a l l his w o r k . In d o i n g so I w a n t to p i c k up a t h e m e t h a t was i n t r o d u c e d i n the first t w o chapters, t h a t o f the c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m and p h e n o m e n o l o g y . I shall do this by discussing the debate b e t w e e n L é v i - S t r a u s s and Sartre t h a t f o l l o w e d the p u b l i c a t i o n of Sartre's Critique de la Raison Dialectique. Lévi-Strauss' a m b i t i o n is to discover the h u m a n essence as the c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r , the u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , o f e v e r y s o c i e t y , and it is this t h a t leads h i m to abstract f r o m a l l specific c u l t u r a l c o n t e n t and t o c o n c e n t r a t e his analysis o n social f o r m s . I n the t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p the u n i v e r s a l i s the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the social r e l a t i o n , i n the t h e o r y o f m y t h i t i s the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the p r i n c i p l e o f o p p o s i t i o n . T h e u n i v e r s a l m e n t a l c a p a c i t y t h a t makes c u l t u r e a n d society possible is the a b i l i t y to l e a r n to relate and to t h i n k r e l a t i o n a l l y , the a b i l i t y t o m a k e b i n a r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . T h i s a b i l i t y was revealed, f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , b y the p h o n o l o g y d e v e l o p e d b y R o m a n Jakobson. For Lévi-Strauss this universal m e n t a l capacity has a natural f o u n d a t i o n . Its emergence i s the emergence o f c u l t u r e , b u t i t emerges o n the basis o f a n a t u r a l change. H e n c e the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n a t u r e and c u l t u r e is c e n t r a l to Lévi-Strauss' h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y . I n his e a r l i e r w o r k L é v i - S t r a u s s r e g a r d e d c u l t u r e and n a t u r e a s quite distinct orders, but such a dualistic view was philosophically 210

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u n t e n a b l e . Since he renounces i d e a l i s m , the o n l y s o l u t i o n is a r e d u c t i o n o f c u l t u r e t o n a t u r e . H e n c e , i n his subsequent w o r k , Lévi-Strauss has c o m e to argue that the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o orders i s ' o f p r i m a r i l y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p o r t a n c e ' t o b e seen as 'an a r t i f i c i a l creation of culture'. 1

T h i s m a t e r i a l i s m is an essential c o m p l e m e n t to Lévi-Strauss' K a n t i a n i s m , and h e h i m s e l f recognizes this: ' o n l y i f they ( m e n t a l constraints, s.c.) can be l i n k e d , even i n d i r e c t l y , to c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g i n man's a n a t o m y and p h y s i o l o g y , w i l l w e be able t o o v e r c o m e the t h r e a t o f f a l l i n g back t o w a r d some k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l d u a l i s m ' . H e n c e L é v i - S t r a u s s i s r i g h t t o insist o n m a i n t a i n i n g his c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o m b i n a t i o n o f philosophies: ' P a u l R i c o u e r counts at least t h r e e i n t e r w o v e n philosophies at the base o f m y w o r k : a c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t a transcendental subject, a b i o l o g i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , and a m a t e r i a l i s m of 'praxis' as i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d superstructure. W e l l , I assume these c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , they d o n ' t t r o u b l e m e ' . 2

The Elementary Structures already contains the core of LéviStrauss' p h i l o s o p h y i n its g u i d i n g theme o f the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m N a t u r e to C u l t u r e . The Elementary Structures revealed ' p r i m i t i v e ' societies that had d e v e l o p e d e x t r e m e l y c o m p l e x social structures r e s p o n d i n g , a c c o r d i n g to Lévi-Strauss, to a need f o r r e c i p r o c i t y , w h i c h was at one and the same t i m e a n a t u r a l need and c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y o f society. T h e contrast b e t w e e n the ' p r i m i t i v e ' societies and o u r o w n already stood o u t . E u r o p e a n society h a d s h o w n i t s e l f unable t o l i v e b y the rule o f the o t h e r , had abandoned r e c i p r o c i t y , t u r n e d its back on nature, and m u s t surely be d o o m e d to e x t i n c t i o n . These are the themes w h i c h Lévi-Strauss has d e v e l o p e d i n his subsequent w o r k s , e i t h e r p o s i t i v e l y and d i r e c t l y , or n e g a t i v e l y by his p a n e g y r i c to the supposedly h a r m o n i o u s w o r l d o f the ' p r i m i t i v e ' . T h e d i s c o v e r y o f s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s i n the w a k e o f The Elementary Structures was the d i s c o v e r y of a m o r e adequate t h e o r y o f the unconscious w h i c h c o u l d p r o v i d e the f o u n d a t i o n f o r a t h o r o u g h l y i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , and so r a t i o n a l i s t , h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y . T h e d i s c o v e r y also displaced the concept o f r e c i p r o c i t y f r o m the c e n t r e o f the stage, r e c i p r o c i t y b e c o m i n g a consequence o f the s y m b o l i c character o f the social fact. T h e s y m b o l i c i s i t s e l f u n d e r l a i n b y the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y o f the unconscious, supposedly revealed b y s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s .

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T h i s p u r e l y f o r m a l unconscious i s u n i v e r s a l and a t e m p o r a l , p r i o r t o subjective e x p e r i e n c e and t o the t e m p o r a l m o d a l i t y o f that e x p e r i e n c e . T h e concept o f the unconscious p r o v i d e s the f o u n d a t i o n b o t h f o r the analysis o f s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t , c u l m i n a t i n g i n Mythologiques, and f o r the h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y , l a r g e l y d e v e l o p e d in t w o w o r k s d e v o t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o Mauss ( I M , 1950) and t o Rousseau (JJR, 1962), a n d i m p l i c i t in Tristes Tropiques w h i c h offers its m o s t persuasive expression. T h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the unconscious dictates that i t b e the s t a r t i n g p o i n t , and the p r o v i n g g r o u n d o f s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n . A s f o u n d a t i o n o f the s y m b o l i c capacity i t u n d e r p i n s the s y m b o l i c r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n self a n d o t h e r , p r o v i d i n g a c o m m o n g r o u n d o n w h i c h b o t h can meet, and so the p o s s i b i l i t y of society. F i n a l l y , as the u n i v e r s a l and n a t u r a l characteristic w h i c h defines o u r h u m a n i t y , the f o r m a l unconscious p r o v i d e s the u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence, a n d the means t o c r i t i c i z e society i n the name o f our inherent humanity.

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In his I n t r o d u c t i o n to M a u s s ' Sociologie et Anthropologie, LéviStrauss argues that the unconscious p r o v i d e s the p o i n t of c o n t a c t b e t w e e n the social and the psychic. T h e a r g u m e n t is the basis of a t h e o r y w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s w o u l d insist i s intellectualist w i t h o u t f a l l i n g i n t o the e r r o r s o f psychologism. T h e social cannot b e reduced t o a m a t t e r o f i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y . T h e i n d i v i d u a l does not exist outside society, f o r the d e f i n i n g characteristic o f h u m a n i t y i s its s y m b o l i c c a p a c i t y , and the s y m b o l i c system is a l w a y s c o l l e c t i v e . It is o n l y t h r o u g h m e m b e r s h i p of a s o c i e t y that i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o u r can be s y m b o l i c , and so h u m a n . T h e c o n c l u s i o n can o n l y be that b o t h s o c i o l o g i s m and p s y c h o l o g i s m must be r e j e c t e d , the social and p s y c h o l o g i c a l b e i n g inseparable: 'the t w o orders are not in a r e l a t i o n of cause and effect to one another . . . but the psychological formulation is only a translation, at the level of the i n d i v i d u a l psyche, of a properly sociological structure'. 3

It is the unconscious w h i c h serves to tie t o g e t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l a n d the social, for it is the unconscious w h i c h has b o t h the o b j e c t i v i t y o f the social and the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l .

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T h e social is thus an objective psychic, and so unconscious, p h e n o m enon. T h e unconscious i s the ' m e d i a t i n g t e r m b e t w e e n the s e l f a n d the o t h e r ' . 4

T h i s t h e o r y o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the psychic and the social has considerable interest i n itself. O n the basis o f this t h e o r y L é v i Strauss formulates a t h e o r y of shamanism and neurosis. LéviStrauss' a i m is to s h o w t h a t a b n o r m a l b e h a v i o u r is dependent on the s y m b o l i s m o f s o c i e t y , and n o t o n a n i n d i v i d u a l s y m b o l i s m . H e n c e even the m o s t a p p a r e n t l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c p s y c h o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y has a social o r i g i n . T h i s p r o v i d e s a l i n k b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l m y t h o f the n e u r o t i c and the s o c i a l l y p r o d u c e d m y t h o f the shaman. 5

T h e analogy b e t w e e n shamanism a n d neurosis has o f t e n b e e n n o t e d . H o w e v e r shamanism i s c l e a r l y n o t s i m p l y i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h neurosis, i f o n l y because the shaman i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the social consensus, w h i l e the n e u r o t i c i s e x c l u d e d f r o m i t . M o r e o v e r the ' s y m p t o m s ' o f the shaman d o n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h the classic s y m p t o m s o f neurosis. Lévi-Strauss does n o t w a n t to argue t h a t shamanism represents s i m p l y a p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f i n t e g r a t i n g the n e u r o t i c i n t o s o c i e t y , b u t r a t h e r that shamanism and neurosis are e q u a l l y amenable to s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n as the products of a d i s j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n the s y m b o l i c systems t h r o w n up by society. H e n c e shamanism does n o t represent the social i n t e g r a t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l p a t h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n , b u t r a t h e r neurosis represents a denial of the social c h a r a c t e r o f the p a t h o l o g y i n question. T h e t h e o r y o f neurosis/shamanism i s n o t c l e a r l y spelt o u t . I n the f i r s t v e r s i o n it is a r g u e d t h a t n o r m a l and p a t h o l o g i c a l t h o u g h t are c o m p l e m e n t a r y i n t h a t n o r m a l t h o u g h t ' c o n t i n u a l l y seeks the m e a n i n g o f things w h i c h refuse t o reveal t h e i r significance', w h i l e pathological thought 'overflows w i t h emotional interpretations and overtones, i n o r d e r t o supplement a n o t h e r w i s e d e f i c i e n t r e a l i t y ' . N o r m a l t h o u g h t therefore suffers f r o m a ' d e f i c i t o f m e a n i n g ' , w h i l e p a t h o l o g i c a l t h o u g h t disposes o f a ' p l e t h o r a o f m e a n i n g ' . I n this v e r s i o n , therefore, n o r m a l and p a t h o l o g i c a l t h o u g h t are t w o c o n t r a s t e d kinds o f t h o u g h t . W h e n w e t u r n t o the Introduction t o Mauss w e f i n d that the t h e o r y has changed. T h e t h e o r y o f the surplus o f m e a n i n g has b e c o m e d i r e c t l y a t h e o r y o f m y t h . Shamanism i s n o w r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t , f o r the theory is now explaining pathological thought, and not the

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i n s t i t u t i o n o f shamanism, s o c i o l o g i c a l l y . T h e a r g u m e n t is, b a s i c a l l y , t h a t every society comprises a n u m b e r o f s y m b o l i c systems w h i c h , because o f d i f f e r e n t i a l d e v e l o p m e n t , are ' i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e ' . H e n c e no society can a c t u a l l y i n t e g r a t e these systems satisfactorily. T h e n o r m a l person p a r t i c i p a t e s nevertheless i n society, a t w h i c h l e v e l the i l l u s i o n , at least, of coherence is o f f e r e d (hence it is the n o r m a l person w h o , b y s u b m i t t i n g t o society, i s a l i e n a t e d ) . P a t h o l o g y f o l l o w e d f r o m the refusal t o s u b m i t t o society i n this respect, the n e u r o t i c is t h e r e f o r e a c t i n g o u t the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f the various s y m b o l i c systems o n a n i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . H e n c e even the ' m e n t a l l y i l l ' are t h o r o u g h l y i m p l i c a t e d i n the c o l l e c t i v e s y m b o l i s m . I n fact they p l a y a n i n t e g r a t i n g r o l e b y a c t i n g o u t the inconsistencies o f the system. T h e t h e o r y o f shamanism i s l i n k e d t o the theories o f m y t h a n d o f m a g i c because the r o l e o f the shaman i s t o create systems o f m e a n i n g w h i c h are v a r i o u s l y m y t h i c a l o r m a g i c a l systems. T h e u n k n o w n is t h e n b r o u g h t i n t o these systems, and so m a d e m e a n i n g f u l , i f n o t b e t t e r k n o w n . M a g i c a l t h i n k i n g provides ' a n e w system o f reference, w i t h i n w h i c h the thus-far c o n t r a d i c t o r y elements can be i n t e g r a t e d ' : "We must see magical behaviour as the response to a situation w h i c h is revealed to the m i n d through emotional manifestations, but whose essence is intellectual. For only the history of the symbolic function can a l l o w us to understand the intellectual condition of man, in w h i c h the universe is never charged w i t h sufficient meaning and in w h i c h the m i n d always has more meanings available than there are objects to w h i c h to relate t h e m ' . 6

T h i s t h e o r y o f the i n d i v i d u a l psyche, a l t h o u g h n o t d e v e l o p e d b y L é v i - S t r a u s s , i s e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m , f o r it is this t h e o r y that i n s p i r e d the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan t o d e v e l o p a s t r u c t u r a l i s t r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d a l o n g precisely the lines i n d i c a t e d by Lévi-Strauss. I have already n o t e d Lacan's a t t e m p t to use Lévi-Strauss' t h e o r y o f k i n s h i p t o j u s t i f y his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x a s the p o i n t a t w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n t r o d u c e d i n t o his c u l t u r e w h e n I l o o k e d a t J u l i e t M i t c h e l l ' s w o r k . H o w e v e r Lacan's debt t o Lévi-Strauss is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l even t h a n t h i s , f o r the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x i s n o t s i m p l y the p s y c h o l o g i c a l expression o f the principle of reciprocity, it is the expression of the binary


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s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y t h a t underlies the i n t e g r a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o the s y m b o l i c o r d e r s t h a t m a k e u p s o c i e t y . F o r L a c a n , f o l l o w i n g L é v i - S t r a u s s , t h e i n d i v i d u a l psyche i s c r e a t e d i n the process o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n i n w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l i s assimilated i n t o these s y m b o l i c orders, w h i l e at the same t i m e b e i n g i n d i v i d u a t e d w i t h i n t h e m . T h e i n d i v i d u a l psyche i s t h e r e f o r e the m e e t i n g p o i n t o f the e m p t y unconscious s t r u c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y and the s y m b o l i c orders of society. T h u s s u b j e c t i v i t y is an i l l u s i o n , a l t h o u g h it is a necessary i l l u s i o n . It is s i m p l y a w a y of l i v i n g out a particular mode of integration (or malintegration) i n t o the s y m b o l i c orders o f society. Lacan's p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y is n o t s i m p l y a d e v e l o p m e n t of L é v i - S t r a u s s ' theory. A l t h o u g h interpretations o f Lacan differ e n o r m o u s l y , his f u n d a m e n t a l o r i e n t a t i o n i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m L é v i - S t r a u s s ' r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m . L a c a n takes u p L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m and c o m b i n e s i t w i t h a n i d i o s y n c r a t i c r e a d i n g o f F r e u d , w i t h i n the o v e r a l l f r a m e w o r k o f a H e i d e g g e r i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p h i l o s o p h y o f language. Lacan's s t r u c t u r a l i s m differs f r o m t h a t o f L é v i - S t r a u s s i n t w o i m p o r t a n t respects. F i r s t l y , whereas Lévi-Strauss has w h a t is u l t i m a t e l y a b i o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n i s t t h e o r y o f the psyche f o r w h i c h i n t e l l e c t u a l structures are h o m o l o g o u s expressions o f the b i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s of the unconscious, L a c a n has a t h e o r y w h i c h tends m u c h m o r e t o w a r d s c u l t u r a l idealism, a n d i n this sense i s closer t o D u r k h e i m than to Lévi-Strauss in seeing the psyche as the p r o d u c t o f a series o f systems o f c o l l e c t i v e representations. T h i s c u l t u r a l i d e a l i s m i s even m o r e p r o n o u n c e d i n the c o m p a r a b l e a p p r o a c h o f Foucault. S e c o n d l y , whereas Lévi-Strauss insists t h a t the unconscious is p u r e l y f o r m a l and rejects w h a t he sees as F r e u d i a n i r r a t i o n a l i s m , L a c a n retains the classic F r e u d i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f the unconscious. F o r this reason Lévi-Strauss is e m p h a t i c in dissociating h i m s e l f f r o m Lacan's s t r u c t u r a l i s m : "We d o n ' t feel at all indulgent towards that sleight-of-hand w h i c h switches the left hand w i t h the r i g h t , to give back to the w o r s t philosophy beneath the table w h a t it claims to have taken f r o m it above; w h i c h , simply replacing the self by the other and slipping a metaphysic of desire beneath the logic of the concept, pulls the foundation f r o m under the latter. Because, in replacing the self on the one hand w i t h an anonymous other, and on the other w i t h an individualized desire (even if it designates nothing), there is no way in which one can hide the fact that

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one need only stick them together again and t u r n the w h o l e thing r o u n d to rediscover on the other side that self whose a b o l i t i o n one has proclaimed w i t h such a fuss'. 7

Lévi-Strauss insists t h a t his h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y is t r u e to the classic p r i n c i p l e s o f h u m a n i s m i n seeking the n a t u r a l and u n i v e r s a l f o u n d a t i o n o f o u r c o m m o n h u m a n i t y b e n e a t h the s u p e r f i c i a l differences that separate us f r o m one a n o t h e r . It is the s t r u c t u r a l unconscious t h a t is the g u a r d i a n of o u r h u m a n i t y . It is on the basis o f the unconscious that the self and the o t h e r , the observer and the o b s e r v e d , are i n t e g r a t e d w i t h one another. T h e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence i s s i m p l y o u r i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o a system that rests on a c o m m o n unconscious f o u n d a t i o n , the c o n t e n t o f this system b e i n g p u r e l y c o n t i n g e n t , s u p e r f i c i a l and, u l t i m a t e l y , meaningless. T h e c o m m o n m e a n i n g o f a l l h u m a n existence i s g i v e n b y the c o m m o n c h a r a c t e r o f a l l s y m b o l i c systems, the s t r u c t u r e t h a t underlies t h e m . I t i s o u r c o m m o n unconscious t h a t gives us access to the e x p e r i e n c e of the o t h e r , e v e n i f t h a t o t h e r i s i n a society r e m o t e f r o m o u r o w n , a n d s o makes i t possible f o r u s t o p u t ourselves i n the place o f the o t h e r , a n d to understand the o t h e r as a n o t h e r self. A t the same t i m e this provides the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t w i t h the means o f v a l i d a t i n g his o r her c o n s t r u c t i o n s b y t r y i n g t h e m o n h i m o r herself. I t i s this e x p e r i e n c e that p r o v i d e s the u l t i m a t e p r o o f o f m y c o n s t r u c t i o n b y p r o v i n g that i t i s g e n u i n e l y h u m a n . T h u s i f w e ask f o r p r o o f w e are i n the end r e f e r r e d b a c k t o a n i n t u i t i o n , t o a p r i v i l e g e d e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h is 'less a p r o o f , perhaps, t h a n a guarantee': 8

' A l l we need—and for this inner understanding suffices—is that the synthesis, however approximate, arises f r o m human experience'. 9

In the last analysis w h a t counts is t h a t a c o n s t r u c t i o n is human, a n d n o t that it is true. H e n c e Mythologiques opens w i t h a d i s c l a i m e r : ' i t is in the last resort i m m a t e r i a l whether in this book the thought processes of the South A m e r i c a n Indians take shape through the m e d i u m of my thought, or w h e t h e r mine take place t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of t h e i r s ' . 10

L é v i - S t r a u s s develops his t h e o r y o f the s e l f t h r o u g h a n i n t e r pretation of Rousseau. Lévi-Strauss' thought is dominated by the


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a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l concerns of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , as he seeks to d i s c o v e r h u m a n n a t u r e beneath the d i v e r s i t y o f h u m a n c u l t u r e s , w i t h o u t d i s s o l v i n g t h a t d i v e r s i t y i n t o the e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t i n u u m o f progress. H e seeks t o s h o w , above a l l , t h a t h u m a n i t y i s one, t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n o f the h u m a n i t y o f the o t h e r i s the c o n d i t i o n f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n o f one's o w n h u m a n i t y , t h a t beneath the d i v e r s i t y o f races and c u l t u r e s we share a u n i v e r s a l essense on the basis of w h i c h w e can relate t o one another. T h i s u n i v e r s a l basis is r a t i o n a l , it is Reason itself, n o t to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the conscious r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f reason o f f e r e d b y any one society. It is scarcely s u r p r i s i n g t h a t it is to Rousseau t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s t u r n s , a l t h o u g h his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Rousseau is, t o say the least, i d i o s y n c r a t i c . F o r b o t h Rousseau a n d Lévi-Strauss the s e l f is to be u n d e r s t o o d b y the c o m p a r a t i v e study o f h u m a n differences. H o w e v e r , t o u n d e r s t a n d the s e l f w e must g o b e y o n d the self i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d the s e l f as d i f f e r e n t f r o m the o t h e r . For Rousseau the f a c u l t y w h i c h makes this possible is compassion, pitie, in w h i c h the o t h e r is r e c o g n i z e d as a n o t h e r self t h r o u g h the a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f his o r her c a p a c i t y f o r f e e l i n g and s u f f e r i n g . A t the same t i m e , argues L é v i - S t r a u s s , compassion p r o v i d e s f o r the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m a n i m a l i t y t o h u m a n i t y , f r o m nature t o c u l t u r e , f o r i t i s

'the only psychic state of w h i c h the content is indissociably both affective and intellectual, and w h i c h the act of consciousness suffices to transfer f r o m one level to the o t h e r ' . 11

F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , the passage f r o m n a t u r e t o c u l t u r e i s m a r k e d b y the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the affective t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l . A f f e c t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the o t h e r makes possible a n i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n f r o m the o t h e r . T h i s leads t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f the s e l f r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f the C a r t e s i a n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s was b r o u g h t u p . T h e n o t i o n o f personal i d e n t i t y i s a c q u i r e d o n l y b y inference and i s a l w a y s m a r k e d b y a m b i g u i t y , since m y i n t i m a t e e x p e r i e n c e o n l y provides an other, an other w h i c h seems to b e t h o u g h t i n m e and makes m e d o u b t w h e t h e r i t i s I w h o t h i n k s . H e n c e the self can o n l y b e u n d e r s t o o d i n r e l a t i o n t o the o t h e r , and i s n o m o r e than the s u m o f a l l these r e l a t i o n s . T h e h u m a n b e i n g i s incessantly strung between identification with all humans and its 12

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o w n s p e c i f i c i t y , b u t w i t h o u t the d i s c o n t i n u i t y w h i c h a C o g i t o supposes. O n l y a consciousness f o u n d e d o n this p r i m i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , m a i n t a i n s Lévi-Strauss, can act and d i s t i n g u i s h i t s e l f as it d i s t i n guishes others w i t h o u t b r e a k i n g the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . T h e f o u n d a t i o n o f this p h i l o s o p h y 'rests in a conception of m a n w h i c h puts the other before the self, and in a conception of humanity w h i c h puts life before m e n ' . 13

I n s t u d y i n g distant o r d i f f e r e n t societies one i s n o t l e a v i n g one's o w n society b e h i n d . I t i s o n l y b y u n d e r s t a n d i n g the o t h e r that one c a n u n d e r s t a n d one's o w n society b y d i s t a n c i n g oneself f r o m i t and seeing it as o t h e r . T h i s is the theme of Tristes Tropiques. We study differences i n o r d e r t o u n c o v e r s i m i l a r i t i e s , t o discover the n a t u r a l basis o f society w h i c h w e must respect i f w e are t o r e f o r m o u r o w n s o c i e t y w i t h o u t o f f e n d i n g against the dictates o f o u r h u m a n n a t u r e . T h e artist and the sociologist b o t h c o n t r i b u t e t o this d i s c o v e r y ' f o r the m a j o r manifestations o f social l i f e have s o m e t h i n g i n c o m m o n w i t h w o r k s o f a r t : n a m e l y that they c o m e i n t o b e i n g o n the l e v e l o f the unconscious—because t h e y are c o l l e c t i v e , and although w o r k s o f a r t are i n d i v i d u a l ' . 1 4

Lévi-Strauss' h u m a n p h i l o s o p h y leads h i m to counterpose a u n i v e r s a l h u m a n i s m t o the p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c h u m a n i s m c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f o u r society, and s o leads h i m t o the c r i t i q u e o f o u r s o c i e t y i n t e r m s o f the u n i v e r s a l values e m b o d i e d i n n a t u r e and expressed t h r o u g h the unconscious. In Race and History (1952) Lévi-Strauss f i r s t d e v e l o p e d the r e l a t i v i s t i c i m p l i c a t i o n s o f his p h i l o s o p h y , c o n d e m n i n g the ' e t h n o c e n t r i c a t t i t u d e ' w h i c h seeks t o reduce the d i v e r s i t y o f c u l t u r e s . I n p a r t i c u l a r h e appeals f o r c a u t i o n i n the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the c o n c e p t o f ' p r o g r e s s ' t o c u l t u r e s o t h e r t h a n o u r o w n . T h e true value o f any c u l t u r e does n o t l i e i n its c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a n e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o g r e s s i o n , r a t h e r ' t h e t r u e c o n t r i b u t i o n of a c u l t u r e consists. . . i n its d i f f e r e n c e f r o m o t h e r s ' , and o u r o b l i g a t i o n i s t o resist the r e d u c t i o n o f this d i v e r s i t y . 1 5

In Race and History Lévi-Strauss l i n k s the r e l a t i v i s t plea f o r t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d s o t h e r cultures t o the self-interest o f o u r o w n c u l t u r e . In Tristes Tropiques the t h e m e is d e v e l o p e d , w h i l e b e i n g turned into a critical weapon with which Lévi-Strauss attacks his

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o w n society. T h e v a l u e o f d i v e r s i t y n o w lies n o t s o m u c h i n its c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the progressive d e v e l o p m e n t o f h u m a n k i n d a s i n the k n o w l e d g e o f humans i t makes possible, a k n o w l e d g e w h i c h alone makes it possible f o r us to measure o u r o w n society against the demands i m p o s e d b y h u m a n n a t u r e . Tristes Tropiques remains a n o p t i m i s t i c w o r k , the k n o w l e d g e o f the n a t u r a l h u m a n b e i n g a c q u i r e d b y a n t h r o p o l o g y b e i n g a p p l i e d t o the r e f o r m o f o u r o w n society. A t the same t i m e , w h i l e L é v i Strauss retains his r e l a t i v i s t stance, it is clear w h e r e his sympathies l i e . It is n o t o u r s o c i e t y w h i c h offers the closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n to a s o c i e t y w h i c h accords w i t h the dictates o f h u m a n n a t u r e , b u t r a t h e r is that of the n e o l i t h i c age w h i c h , as Rousseau p u t i t , is ' h a l f w a y b e t w e e n the i n d o l e n c e o f p r i m i t i v e m a n and the f e v e r i s h a c t i v i t y o f o u r s e l f - e s t e e m ' . I t i s i n the ' p r i m i t i v e ' societies o f B r a z i l t h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s f i n d s the p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y e x pressed, and it is in the t h o u g h t of these peoples that the w o r l d is h a r m o n i o u s and o r d e r e d , c u l t u r e a t one w i t h n a t u r e . These v i c t i m s o f progress express, w i t h i n the confines o f t h e i r small societies, the secret o f h u m a n i t y w h i c h o u r o w n s o c i e t y denies. 16

Since 1960 Lévi-Strauss has pushed his c r i t i q u e of his o w n society t o its l i m i t s , d e v e l o p i n g the c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n o u r s o c i e t y and that of the ' p r i m i t i v e ' i n t o an antithesis. T h e fall is i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f w r i t i n g w h i c h u n d e r p i n s h u m a n e x p l o i t a t i o n o f one a n o t h e r and so, b y i n t e r n a l i z i n g i n e q u a l i t y , gives rise t o a c u m u l a t i v e h i s t o r y . U l t i m a t e l y i t i s the e x p a n s i o n o f p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h , b y u p s e t t i n g the balance b e t w e e n h u m a n i t y and n a t u r e , gives rise t o e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n o f humans and o f n a t u r e . W e s t e r n h u m a n i s m is the i d e o l o g i c a l expression a p p r o p r i a t e t o this society based o n the s e p a r a t i o n o f h u m a n i t y f r o m n a t u r e , and s o o f humans f r o m one a n o t h e r , and o n the e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the one b y the o t h e r . 17

O u r society is, t h e r e f o r e , the v e r y antithesis o f those values w h i c h are e m b o d i e d i n the ' p r i m i t i v e ' s o c i e t y , those values w h i c h are i m p o s e d on the l a t t e r by the unconscious. O u r society denies those values, e x p l o i t a t i o n r e p l a c i n g r e c i p r o c i t y i n social l i f e , w i t h social relations b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y i n a u t h e n t i c as t h e y b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p e r s o n a l . O u r society i s based o n 'the t o t a l p o w e r o f m a n o v e r n a t u r e and . . . the p o w e r o f c e r t a i n f o r m s o f h u m a n i t y over o t h e r s ' . O u r h u m a n i s m i s the converse o f t h a t which myth shows to us, a 'well-ordered humanism' which 'does


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n o t b e g i n w i t h itself, b u t puts things b a c k i n t h e i r place. I t puts the w o r l d before l i f e , l i f e b e f o r e m a n , and the respect o f others b e f o r e love of self. 1 8

A n a u t h e n t i c h u m a n i s m must b e based o n a r e j e c t i o n o f the v a l i d i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e and o f the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l experiences the t e m p o r a l i t y o f his o r her existence, i n f a v o u r o f a search f o r t h e u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e i n a u n i v e r s a l , o b j e c t i v e , and a t e m p o r a l unconscious. O n l y thus w i l l a h u m a n i s m w h i c h o n l y validates the s e l f a t the expense o f the o t h e r be a t r u l y u n i v e r s a l h u m a n i s m , a h u m a n i s m w h i c h 'proclaims that n o t h i n g human should be foreign to man and so founds a democratic humanism w h i c h is opposed to those w h i c h have preceeded i t : created for the privileged, on the basis of privileged c i v i l i z a t i o n s ' . 19

T h e basis o f this h u m a n i s m i s a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the n a t u r a l f o u n d a t i o n o f h u m a n i t y . I t t h e r e f o r e rests m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y o n a respect f o r n a t u r e as the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of a respect f o r the n a t u r a l ties a m o n g m e n and w o m e n . 2 0

In Race and History a n t h r o p o l o g y was assigned a r e f o r m i n g r o l e . In Tristes Tropiques t h e r e was s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y of salvation. M o r e r e c e n t l y , h o w e v e r , Lévi-Strauss has c o n c l u d e d that o u r s o c i e t y has b e c o m e s o large and c o m p l e x that i t i s n o l o n g e r t h i n k a b l e . E v e n i f w e c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d i t , w e c o u l d s t i l l n o t change i t . I t is, t h e r e f o r e , too late f o r h u m a n i t y t o b e saved. A l l t h a t the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t can d o i s t o observe a n d c o n d e m n . T h e o n l y t h i n g w e can d o i s t o study the ' p r i m i t i v e ' t o u n c o v e r those ' " v a l u e s " w h i c h have t e n d e d t o b e n e g l e c t e d and w h i c h are p r o b a b l y condemned'. 21

T h e philosopher's task is n o t to e u l o g i z e the h u m a n , it is to ' d i s s o l v e ' i t , to d e s t r o y its pretensions, to restore it to n a t u r e as an o b j e c t a m o n g objects: For, if it is true that nature expelled man, and that society persists in oppressing h i m , man can at least i n v e r t the poles of the d i l e m m a to his advantage, and seek the society of nature there to meditate on the nature of society'. 22

2

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sharpened his a n t a g o n i s m t o that l i b e r a l h u m a n i s m o f w h i c h e x i s t e n t i a l i s m is a p r i m e e x a m p l e . He has t h e r e f o r e r e a c t e d v e r y s h a r p l y t o Sartre's a t t e m p t t o i n c o r p o r a t e the findings o f The Elementary Structures of Kinship i n t o Sartre's o w n w o r k . T h i s is the basis o f the ' d e b a t e ' b e t w e e n the t w o . Sartre's discussion of The Elementary Structures in the Critique takes u p a n a r g u m e n t f i r s t d e v e l o p e d b y L e f o r t . L e f o r t r e j e c t e d Lévi-Strauss' a t t e m p t to seek an unconscious f o u n d a t i o n f o r e x c h a n g e and to reduce exchange to a f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e on the g r o u n d s that such an a t t e m p t dissolves and denies the e x p e r i e n c e o f exchange w h i c h , f o r L e f o r t , i s the o n l y possible source o f the m e a n i n g o f e x c h a n g e . F o r L e f o r t e x c h a n g e i s the e x p e r i e n c e o f a t o t a l i z i n g praxis. I t i s n o t a f o r m a l m e c h a n i s m f o r the r e s o l u t i o n o f unconscious o p p o s i t i o n s , b u t r a t h e r a n expression o f the m u t u a l recognition of men. 2 3

T h i s c r i t i q u e focusses o n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' i n a b i l i t y t o e x p l a i n , o r t o a c c o u n t for, e x p e r i e n c e and h i s t o r y . H o w e v e r , L e f o r t ' s a c c o u n t has its o w n weakness, f o r i n a s s i m i l a t i n g h i s t o r y t o e x p e r i e n c e , and m a k i n g h i s t o r y the p r o d u c t o f the conscious praxis o f i n d i v i d u a l s , L e f o r t i s unable t o e x p l a i n the s y s t e m a t i c i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s events, the s t r u c t u r e . O n e of the m a j o r aims of Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason is to o v e r c o m e this weakness, t o p r o v i d e some means o f e x p l a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e as the p r o d u c t of praxis, a n d it is in r e l a t i o n to LéviStrauss' w o r k t h a t S a r t r e raises the q u e s t i o n . Sartre i s w e l l a w a r e o f the threat posed t o his p h i l o s o p h y b y L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s t r u c t u r a l i s m . S a r t r e tries t o s h o w , w i t h reference i n i t i a l l y t o The Elementary Structures, that the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a t h e o r y is s t r i c t l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , that s t r u c t u r e is necessarily s u b o r d i n a t e to praxis. W h i l e L é v i - S t r a u s s denies that e x p e r i e n c e and h i s t o r y have any p r i v i l e g e , f o r S a r t r e the m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence i s f o u n d e d precisely i n the h i s t o r i c i t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l conscious e x p e r i e n c e . F o r Sartre the m e a n i n g of existence is g i v e n by the project t h a t gives t h a t existence d i r e c t i o n . H u m a n a c t i v i t y has m e a n i n g because i t plays a part in a t e l e o l o g i c a l h i s t o r i c a l process of w h i c h he or she is the subject. T h e a c t i o n is i n s e r t e d in a system, b u t t h a t system is one w h i c h u n f o l d s d i a c h r o n i c a l l y , n o t one w h i c h exists s y n c h r o n i c a l l y . I t i s a system w h i c h i s c o n t i n u o u s , i n w h i c h the parts are r e l a t e d dialectically, and not one which is discontinuous and in which the

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parts are r e l a t e d b y a n a l y t i c a l r e l a t i o n s o f o p p o s i t i o n . H e n c e S a r t r e i s p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the p r o b l e m o f the m e a n i n g o f h i s t o r y , o f t h e m e a n i n g o f his o r h e r personal h i s t o r y f o r the i n d i v i d u a l , and the m e a n i n g o f t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e h i s t o r y f o r i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s o f the g r o u p . T h e present f o r Sartre can o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d as a m o m e n t in a continuous, but dialectical, historical development. H e n c e Sartre tries to s h o w , in the Critique, t h a t the s t r u c t u r e is in fact the p r o d u c t o f ' o r g a n i z e d praxis'. T h e s t r u c t u r e o n l y appears as i n e r t and c o n s t r a i n i n g to the outside observer, the d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the necessity o f the s t r u c t u r e b y this observer i s ' n o m o r e than a m e d i a t i o n ' . T h e s t r u c t u r e is, i n fact, the free c r e a t i o n o f the p r a x i s o f the i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s o f the g r o u p , w h o pledge themselves t o the g r o u p and so accept the s t r u c t u r e as the means by w h i c h the g r o u p w i l l achieve its c o l l e c t i v e aims. T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the i n d i v i d u a l to the g r o u p , and to its s t r u c t u r e , is t h e r e f o r e a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w h i c h each i n d i v i d u a l agrees t o p l a y his o r her p a r t i n a c o m m o n e n t e r p r i s e , the a t t e m p t t o c o m b a t s c a r c i t y . T h e submission of the i n d i v i d u a l to the s t r u c t u r e is, t h e r e f o r e , a free act, and so is a ' f r e e l y accepted c o n d i t i o n ' . T h e s t r u c t u r e is p e r p e t u a t e d o n l y insofar as each i n d i v i d u a l praxis continues to seek to preserve the e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l to the s t r u c t u r e , and changes insofar as i n d i v i d u a l s seek t o change that r e l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , because i n d i v i d u a l s pledge themselves to the g r o u p as a means to an e n d w h i c h they share w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w m e m b e r s , t h e y treat the g r o u p as a 'quasi-object', b u t ' t h e g r o u p as a t o t a l i t y or an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y does n o t e x i s t ' as a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its t r e a t m e n t as such by the i n d i v i d u a l s w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in i t . It is in this sense that Sartre calls the structures the 'necessity o f f r e e d o m ' . 2 4

F o r Sartre, t h e n , the s t r u c t u r e is ' o n l y i m p o s e d on us to the e x t e n t that i t i s made b y others. T o u n d e r s t a n d h o w i t i s m a d e , i t i s t h e r e f o r e necessary to r e i n t r o d u c e praxis, as the t o t a l i z i n g process. S t r u c t u r a l analysis m u s t g i v e w a y t o a d i a l e c t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' . F o r Sartre s t r u c t u r e o n l y comes t o have m e a n i n g w h e n i t i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the t o t a l i z i n g a c t i v i t y o f a transcendent subject: ' T h e essence i s n o t w h a t one makes o f m a n , b u t w h a t h e makes o f w h a t one has made o f h i m ' . T h e a n a l y t i c reason w h i c h u n c o v e r s the o b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e is a c o n s t i t u t e d reason w h i c h can o n l y be validated ultimately by reference to the constitutive reason of the


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t o t a l i z i n g subject: ' D i a l e c t i c a l reason i s i t s e l f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f positivist Reason'. 25

F o r Sartre the h u m a n essence is the p o w e r of transcendence, the a b i l i t y t o say n o , a n d s o t o m a k e o n e s e l f o u t o f the m a t e r i a l s a t one's disposal. T h i s i s n o t s i m p l y the t r u t h o f the h u m a n i n one p a r t i c u l a r society, i t i s the u n i v e r s a l t r u t h o f h u m a n i t y : ' E v e n the m o s t archaic, the m o s t i m m o b i l e societies . . . have a h i s t o r y ' . T h e w a y i n w h i c h people e x p e r i e n c e t h i s transcendence d i f f e r s i n t i m e and space. In a stagnant society h u m a n praxis takes the f o r m of a r e p e t i t i o n . T h e fact t h a t in such a s o c i e t y h i s t o r y takes the f o r m o f r e p e t i t i o n does n o t m e a n that the s o c i e t y i s w i t h o u t h i s t o r y . 2 6

3

LÉVI-STRAUSS'

T H E

D I A L E C T I C

S U B O R D I N A T I O N OF T O

S T R U C T U R E

Sartre does n o t contest Lévi-Strauss' analysis of k i n s h i p in The Elementary Structures, and indeed p i c k s up several themes of the l a t t e r w o r k (e.g. s c a r c i t y , r e c i p r o c i t y ) . H i s c o n c e r n i s o n l y w i t h the significance o f the structures w h i c h L é v i - S t r a u s s c l a i m s t o have u n c o v e r e d . W h e r e L é v i - S t r a u s s assimilates the structures t o the o b j e c t i v i t y of an i n e r t unconscious, Sartre seeks to grasp t h e m as the residue of the conscious praxis o f i n d i v i d u a l s . I t i s the m e a n i n g o f h u m a n a c t i o n , and above a l l the status o f e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h i s i n q u e s t i o n . L é v i - S t r a u s s denies t h a t the h u m a n i s transcendent. I f the h u m a n is n o t transcendent, argues Lévi-Strauss, t h e n h i s t o r y c a n n o t be d i a l e c t i c a l , i n Sartre's sense, f o r w e c a n n o t create, w e can o n l y r e o r g a n i z e w h a t is g i v e n to us. T h e subject of h i s t o r y is n o t a self-conscious h i s t o r i c a l subject, b u t is the a t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r a l unconscious. H i s t o r y i t s e l f is s i m p l y the u n f o l d i n g t h r o u g h t i m e o f systems i m p o s e d b y the s t r u c t u r e o f the unconscious. H i s t o r y is s i m p l y a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , the result of e x t e r n a l and c o n t i n g e n t forces. H i s t o r y has no m e a n i n g and progress is an i l l u s i o n . H i s t o r i c a l consciousness is s i m p l y a m y t h l i k e any o t h e r by w h i c h societies such as ours choose to r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r existence. Some societies c o n c e p t u a l i z e t i m e d i s c o n t i n u o u s l y , u s i n g events in a n a h i s t o r i c a l , timeless w a y , c o n t r a s t i n g t h e m w i t h the present. I n this k i n d o f m y t h w e f i n d t w o j u x t a p o s e d series, the o r i g i n a l series being some kind of transformation of the contemporaneous series,

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The

Foundations

of Structuralism

the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o b e i n g e x p l i c i t l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e d a s d i s c o n t i n u o u s , a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h e ' p r i m i t i v e ' , o r ' c o l d ' , society a t t e m p t s t o annul h i s t o r y , i t attempts t o preserve the s t r u c t u r e i n t h e face o f threats posed t o that s t r u c t u r e b y events b y a d m i t t i n g the l a t t e r 'as a f o r m w i t h o u t a c o n t e n t ' . In such societies the past is i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the present either as a r e f l e c t i o n ( w h i c h m a y be an i n v e r s i o n ) o r a s a r e p e t i t i o n ( i n the f o r m o f p e r i o d i c i t y ) . 2 7

In societies such as ours events are n o t j u x t a p o s e d in this w a y , b u t are arranged in a succession, c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n t i n u i t y . T h e present is r a t i o n a l i z e d as a d e v e l o p m e n t o u t of the past, r a t h e r than as a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n or r e p e t i t i o n of the l a t t e r . H o w e v e r , these h i s t o r i c a l m y t h s are n o d i f f e r e n t i n f o r m f r o m the ' p r i m i t i v e ' k i n d , t h e y s t i l l make use o f a code, s t i l l i n t r o d u c e d i s c o n t i n u i t y i n t o the o r d e r o f events, s t i l l select some events w h i c h are e n d o w e d w i t h h i s t o r i c a l ( m y t h i c a l ) significance and i g n o r e others. T h i s h i s t o r i c a l consciousness, w h i c h Sartre p r i v i l e g e s , i s d e r i v a t i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s t o r y itself, w h i c h i s g e n u i n e l y c o n t i n u o u s and i n f i n i t e , and hence b e y o n d o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is, t h e r e f o r e , v e r y i m p o r t a n t n o t t o confuse the m y t h o f h i s t o r i c a l consciousness w i t h the r e a l i t y o f h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t i n i m a g i n i n g that the f o r m e r can give access to the l a t t e r . A s soon a s w e stand back f r o m the m y t h o f h i s t o r i c a l consciousness, argues Lévi-Strauss, its m y t h i c a l character becomes clear. T h e code on w h i c h it is based is n o t p r e - o r d a i n e d , n a t u r a l in some w a y , i t i s a r b i t r a r y . T h e c r i t e r i a b y w h i c h w e select events f r o m the past t o e n d o w the present w i t h significance, and t o i n f l a t e o u r o w n i m p o r t a n c e a s agents o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f past t h r o u g h present t o f u t u r e , are c u l t u r a l l y d e f i n e d and c o n s t i t u t e the code o f the m y t h o f h i s t o r y . D i f f e r e n t social groups m a y e x p e r i e n c e ' h i s t o r y ' a c c o r d i n g t o d i f f e r e n t codes. F o r e x a m p l e , the m e a n i n g o f the French R e v o l u t i o n i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f o r the L e f t and f o r the Right. F o r L é v i - S t r a u s s Sartre's p h i l o s o p h y i s s i m p l y a n e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r w a y i n w h i c h t e m p o r a l i t y i s e x p e r i e n c e d i n his o w n society. Hence, f o r L é v i - S t r a u s s , i t i s n o t d i a l e c t i c a l reason w h i c h accounts f o r a n a l y t i c reason, b u t r a t h e r a n a l y t i c reason w h i c h accounts f o r d i a l e c t i c a l . Sartre takes the conscious r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f his o w n c u l t u r e f o r the u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g o f h u m a n i t y . Sartre can teach u s about his o w n c u l t u r e , w h o s e ' d i a l e c t i c a l m o v e m e n t ' he grasps 'with incomparable artistry', but by confining himself 28


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t o the conscious expressions o f social l i f e he denies h i m s e l f access t o the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the unconscious w h i c h underlies i t . S a r t r e is, t h e r e f o r e , an h i s t o r i a n and n o t an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , f o r ' H i s t o r y organizes its data in relation to the conscious expressions of social life, w h i l e anthropology proceeds by examining its unconscious f o u n d a t i o n ' . 29

H i s t o r y i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h process, w h i c h i s the m o d a l i t y u n d e r w h i c h the u n f o l d i n g o f the s t r u c t u r a l i s e x p e r i e n c e d : 'Structures only appear to the observer from outside. . . . Inversely the outsider can never grasp the processes, w h i c h are not analytic objects, but the particular w a y in w h i c h a t e m p o r a l i t y is experienced by a subject'. 30

T h e process w i t h w h i c h w e are c o n c e r n e d does n o t represent the t e m p o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t of a transcendent subject m a k i n g his or her h i s t o r y . It is s o m e t h i n g passively e x p e r i e n c e d . T e m p o r a l i t y is t h e r e f o r e n o t a p r o d u c t b u t an e x p e r i e n c e of consciousness. LéviStrauss uses the t e r m ' h i s t o r y ' , a m o n g o t h e r things, to d e n o t e this e x p e r i e n c e , and the study o f this e x p e r i e n c e , and the p r o d u c t s o f t h a t study. ' T h e supposed t o t a l i z i n g continuity of the self . . . seems to me to be an illusion sustained by the demands of social life—and consequently a reflection of the external on the internal—rather than the object of an apodictic experience'.

31

I f w e are t o g o b e y o n d the ' p r a c t i c a l ' t o the ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' , i f w e are t o g o b e y o n d the w e a v i n g o f m y t h s t o the d e v e l o p m e n t o f k n o w l e d g e about h u m a n i t y w e have t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t the m e a n i n g o f the conscious elaborations o f social l i f e i s p u r e l y r e l a t i v e and subjective. B e h i n d it lies a deeper m e a n i n g : ' A l l meaning is answerable to a lesser meaning, w h i c h gives it its highest meaning, and if this regression finally ends in recognizing "a contingent l a w of w h i c h one can only say: it is thus, and not o t h e r w i s e " (Sartre, 1960, p. 128), this prospect is not a l a r m i n g to those whose thought is not tormented by transcendance even in a latent f o r m ' . 3 2

T h e o n l y w a y a r o u n d the d i l e m m a posed b y the a l t e r n a t i v e s o f e t h n o c e n t r i s m and r e l a t i v i s m i s t o f o u n d o u r a n t h r o p o l o g y o n the unconscious, w h i c h i s o b j e c t i v e w h i l e u n d e r p i n n i n g the s u b j e c t i v e . The philosophers of the subject are more concerned with retaining

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the status o f the subject t h a n w i t h r e n d e r i n g h u m a n i t y i n t e l ligible: 'they prefer a subject w i t h o u t r a t i o n a l i t y to a r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h o u t a subject'.

33

Instead w e must l o o k b e y o n d the conscious and the a f f e c t i v e t o f i n d b e h i n d i t the unconscious and the i n t e l l e c t u a l . A n t h r o p o l o g y m u s t dedicate i t s e l f t o the study o f the unconscious processes w h i c h u n d e r l i e social l i f e by u n d e r s t a n d i n g societies as d i f f e r e n t expressions of these unconscious processes.

4

T H E

C O M P L E M E N T A R I T Y

I R R E C O N C I L A B I L I T Y A N D

D I A L E C T I C A L

O F

A N D

S T R U C T U R A L

I N T E L L I G I B I L I T Y

T h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s appears t o b e t o t a l , each r e c o g n i z i n g the v a l i d i t y o f the o t h e r ' s a c c o u n t , b u t r e d u c i n g it to a s u b o r d i n a t e m o m e n t of a process whose f o u n d a t i o n lies elsewhere. For L é v i - S t r a u s s the c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f the conscious are r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s w h o s e t r u e m e a n i n g is o n l y reached t h r o u g h a s t r u c t u r a l analysis w h i c h reduces t h e m t o t h e i r unconscious, and u l t i m a t e l y t o t h e i r o r g a n i c , f o u n d a t i o n . For Sartre the s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h are p r o d u c e d b y this analysis are abstracted f r o m the l i v i n g praxis w h i c h produces t h e m , w h i c h alone gives t h e m m e a n i n g and t o w h i c h a t r u e a n t h r o p o l o g y w i l l restore t h e m . W h i l e f o r LéviStrauss h u m a n existence o n l y becomes m e a n i n g f u l w h e n i t i s assimilated t o the n a t u r e f r o m w h i c h i t emerges, f o r Sartre n a t u r e o n l y has m e a n i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o the p r o j e c t s o f the i n d i v i d u a l s w h o transcend i t . T h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s also appears t o be i n s u r m o u n t a b l e , f o r each points to f u n d a m e n t a l lacunae in the o t h e r ' s account. On the one hand, S a r t r e presents a p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i e n c e a s the i n d u b i t a b l e f o u n d a t i o n o f a l l h u m a n existence. I t is s i m p l y necessary f o r Lévi-Strauss to cast d o u b t on the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f this e x p e r i e n c e f o r Sartre's c o n s t r u c t i o n t o b e r e v e a l e d as a house of cards: ' W h a t Sartre calls dialectical reason is only a reconstruction, by w h a t he calls analytical reason, of hypothetical moves about which it is impossible to know . . .


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whether they bear any relation at all to what he tells us about them and w h i c h , if so, w o u l d be definable in terms of analytical reason alone'. 34

O n the o t h e r h a n d , L é v i - S t r a u s s ' o w n account i s d e f i c i e n t i n r e d u c i n g h i s t o r y t o the i m p a c t o f c o n t i n g e n c y and i n r e d u c i n g experience, i n c l u d i n g the experience o f f r e e d o m w h i c h i s the basis o f Sartre's p h i l o s o p h y , t o the status o f a m y t h . 35

L é v i - S t r a u s s ' confidence i n the d e t e r m i n a n t c h a r a c t e r o f the unconscious is as u n f o u n d e d as is Sartre's confidence in the c r e a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l consciousness. E a c h seeks to reduce o b j e c t i v e social phenomena t o processes w h i c h r e n d e r aspects o f the object i n e x p l i c a b l e . S a r t r e cannot e x p l a i n the o b j e c t i v e l a w s o f social phenomena, l a w s w h i c h are n e i t h e r c r e a t e d by conscious subjects, n o r w h i c h o p e r a t e t h r o u g h the consciousness o f those subjects. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , L é v i - S t r a u s s cannot account for such o b j e c t i v e l a w s insofar as t h e y are n o t r e d u c i b l e to ' a n unconscious t e l e o l o g y . . . w h i c h rests on the i n t e r p l a y of b i o l o g i c a l mechanisms . . . and p s y c h o l o g i c a l o n e s ' , insofar as t h e y are social and n o t s i m p l y natural laws. 36

I t turns out t h a t b o t h Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s o f f e r u s a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theories based o n c o n t r a s t e d philosophies each o f w h i c h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n c o m p l e t e . For S a r t r e the o b j e c t i v i t y o f the social w o r l d i s dissolved i n t o the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f l i v e d praxis. L é v i Strauss, i n t r y i n g t o a v o i d the m e t a p h y s i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i o l o g y , s i m p l y transfers the m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e f r o m a c o l l e c t i v e r e a l i t y b e y o n d to a b i o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y beneath the i n d i v i d u a l . I n each case the p r i n c i p l e w h i c h supposedly regulates social l i f e turns o u t o n i n s p e c t i o n t o b e a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e w h i c h tells u s n o t w h a t social l i f e is, b u t w h a t i t ought t o be, n o t h o w society operates, b u t h o w the i n d i v i d u a l should l i v e i n society. I n each case a m o r a l t h e o r y appears in the guise of a s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y , a m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e is t r e a t e d as t h o u g h it w e r e an o b j e c t i v e imperative. A t the b e g i n n i n g o f this b o o k I i n d i c a t e d that the philosophies o f b o t h Sartre and Lévi-Strauss e m e r g e d as c o m p l e m e n t a r y responses t o a c o m m o n p r o b l e m . W e are n o w i n a p o s i t i o n t o i d e n t i f y the expression o f t h a t i n i t i a l i d e o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m i n t h e i r philosophies. M o r e o v e r w e can see that i t i s i n the w a y that they b o t h pose this p r o b l e m that the e r r o r s they b o t h m a k e are i n s c r i b e d . H e n c e the way to go beyond the dilemma which the contrast between Sartre

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a n d Lévi-Strauss presents to us is n o t to a t t e m p t to synthesize the w o r k o f b o t h , b u t r a t h e r t o r e f o r m u l a t e the p r o b l e m w i t h w h i c h t h e y began. I d e o l o g i c a l l y the p r o b l e m w h i c h c o n f r o n t e d Sartre, L é v i Strauss and t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n was t h a t of establishing a basis on w h i c h a n i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d r e l a t e t o a society w h i c h o f f e r e d n o p o i n t o f i n s e r t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m appears i n the w o r k o f S a r t r e and L é v i - S t r a u s s a s that o f d e v e l o p i n g a m o r a l t h e o r y i n w h i c h m o r a l guidance w o u l d c o m e solely f r o m w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . H e n c e each t r i e d t o d e v e l o p a m o r a l t h e o r y w h o s e s t a r t i n g p o i n t is those abstract and u n i v e r s a l features w h i c h define the i n d i v i d u a l a s h u m a n . E a c h then c o n s t r u c t e d a w o r l d i n w h i c h h u m a n existence represented s i m p l y the r e a l i z a t i o n o f these h u m a n features i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the w o r l d . F i n a l l y each sought t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t the w o r l d w e l i v e i n i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y the v i o l a t i o n o f the h u m a n essence, o f the d e f i n i n g features o f h u m a n i t y . T h e p r o b l e m s faced b y the philosophies o f Sartre and L é v i Strauss w h e n t h e y present themselves as theories of society d e r i v e f r o m the selection o f the supposedly abstract and u n i v e r s a l features o f the h u m a n essence as the s t a r t i n g p o i n t , f o r this i n i t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l f r o m society leads t o the subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a society w h i c h i s a b s t r a c t e d f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l s w h o p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t . T h i s ' s o c i e t y ' is i m m e d i a t e l y seen to be a m e t a p h y s i c a l e n t i t y w h i c h the p h i l o s o p h e r must dissolve a t once. For Sartre, ' t h e g r o u p does n o t possess the m e t a p h y s i c a l existence of a f o r m or a Gestalt, o f a c o l l e c t i v e consciousness o r a c r e a t e d t o t a l i t y ' , w h i l e f o r L é v i Strauss the unconscious is i n t r o d u c e d precisely to e x o r c i s e the D u r k h e i m i a n c o l l e c t i v e conscience. H e n c e society i s abolished, f o r m a l i s t i c a l l y r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the i n d i v i d u a l as an abstract c a t e g o r y w h i c h is e i t h e r the subjective p r o d u c t of a consciousness o r the o b j e c t i v e p r o d u c t o f a n unconscious. 37

F o r b o t h Sartre and Lévi-Strauss s o c i e t y is in no sense a sui generis r e a l i t y , f o r b o t h i t i s s i m p l y a n expression o f a d i a l e c t i c i n s c r i b e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l , conscious o r unconscious, psyche. I t is, t h e r e f o r e , scarcely s u r p r i s i n g t h a t n e i t h e r is able to p r o v i d e the basis on w h i c h w e m i g h t b e g i n t o e x p l a i n the l a w s w h i c h g o v e r n s o c i e t y , l a w s w h i c h are b o t h o b j e c t i v e and m e a n i n g f u l , b o t h t h i n g s and representations.


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In b o t h cases t h e p r o b l e m s arise because the i n d i v i d u a l is n o t d e f i n e d f r o m the start as a social b e i n g , i n s e r t e d in c o n c r e t e social r e l a t i o n s , b u t r a t h e r as an abstract, asocial and a h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l f r o m w h o m society m u s t b e d e r i v e d . I n each case the i d e a l i s t i c consequences o f such a r g u m e n t s are dissipated b y m e t a p h y s i c a l devices ( i n the case o f S a r t r e w i t h a m e t a p h y s i c o f s c a r c i t y , i n the case o f Lévi-Strauss w i t h a b i o l o g i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ) w h i c h present s o c i e t y a s the p r o d u c t o f the d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o n a t u r e . F o r a social science, by contrast, the s t a r t i n g p o i n t c a n o n l y be a social b e i n g , the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t w h a t sets humans a p a r t f r o m n a t u r e i s p r e c i s e l y t h e i r social c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h i s i n t u r n inseparable f r o m t h e i r engagement i n society. Such a r e c o g n i t i o n i m p l i e s i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t society c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d f r o m the h u m a n essance, n o r can i t b e d e r i v e d f r o m the u n m e d i a t e d r e l a t i o n o f h u m a n i t y t o n a t u r e , f o r b o t h the d i s t i n c t i o n o f h u m a n i t y f r o m n a t u r e , and its r e l a t i o n t o nature, presuppose the s o c i e t y i n w h i c h people are engaged, and t h r o u g h w h i c h alone t h e y r e l a t e t o nature. Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, t h e r e f o r e , o f f e r us c o m p l e m e n t a r y philosophies w h i c h seek t o renounce the social and t o r e d i s c o v e r o u r h u m a n i t y w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . L é v i - S t r a u s s i s c o n c e r n e d t o u n c o v e r a u n i v e r s a l and o b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g , w h i l e S a r t r e seeks a t o t a l i z i n g and s u b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g . F o r Sartre t h e r e is o n l y a u n i v e r s a l m e a n i n g i f there i s a u n i v e r s a l t o t a l i z a t i o n , f o r L é v i Strauss the subjective m e a n i n g i s o n l y t r u e i f the subject abandons h i m o r h e r s e l f t o the r u l e o f the o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l . I n each case the m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence i s sought i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f the asocial i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a n i n e r t n a t u r e . W h i l e such philosophies are themselves m e a n i n g f u l as responses t o a society i n w h i c h o u r h u m a n i t y appears s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e f o r m e d , w e m u s t ask w h e t h e r philosophies w h i c h r e c o v e r this h u m a n i t y o n l y a t the expense o f r e n d e r i n g i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e the society i n w h i c h t h a t h u m a n i t y has b e e n t a k e n f r o m u s are r e a l l y satisfactory. A satisfactory p h i l o s o p h y must f i n d a m e a n i n g f o r h u m a n existence a t the p o i n t a t w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l engages w i t h the w o r l d , the p o i n t a t w h i c h w e have m e a n i n g f o r the w o r l d o f w h i c h we are a p a r t , at the same t i m e as the w o r l d has m e a n i n g f o r us. It is precisely this p o i n t w h i c h is abolished by b o t h Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, for it is only in society, in the collective realm of

230


social relations, o f language and o f c u l t u r e , that w e are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . I t i s o n l y b y means o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s that a s s u b j e c t i v i t i e s w e are able t o engage w i t h the w o r l d , a n d i t i s o n l y t h r o u g h these i n s t i t u t i o n s that the o b j e c t i v e constraints w h i c h the f a c t i c i t y o f the w o r l d imposes are m e d i a t e d . I f this i s the case, t h e n the m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence m u s t b e l o c a t e d i n r e l a t i o n t o the c o l l e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f society t h r o u g h w h i c h alone w e a c q u i r e o u r h u m a n i t y . B o t h Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s offer a n abstract, c o n t e m p l a t i v e m o r a l i t y w h i c h i s unable t o p r o v i d e any guidance f o r those w h o cannot a f f o r d n o t t o l i v e i n society precisely because t h e i r m o r a l i t y has n o p o i n t o f e n g a g e m e n t w i t h society. I t i s unable e i t h e r t o offer a diagnosis o f the evils o f the e x i s t i n g society, o r t o i n d i c a t e any means o f c h a n g i n g i t . H e n c e an adequate p h i l o s o p h y , no less t h a n an adequate s o c i o l o g y , depends o n a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the d i c h o t o m i z a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l and society. It depends on a r e c o g n i t i o n that the subject is c o n s t i t u t e d as such in the c o n t e x t of a society w h i c h alone a r t i c u l a t e s the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the subject and o t h e r subjects and b e t w e e n the subject and n a t u r e : ' B o t h the material o f l a b o u r and man as the subject, are the point of departure as w e l l as the result of the movement. . . . Thus the social character is the general character of the w h o l e movement: just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by h i m . . . . T h e human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist for h i m as a bond w i t h man—as his existence for the other and the other's existence for h i m — a n d as the life-element of human reality. O n l y then does nature exist as the foundation of his o w n human existence. O n l y here has w h a t is to h i m his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for h i m . Thus society is the complete u n i t y of man w i t h nature—the true resurrection of nature—the accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism o f nature'. 38

5

C O N C L U S I O N

T h e classical p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n subject a n d o b j e c t offers a n u n s o u n d basis o n w h i c h t o c o n s t r u c t a t h e o r y o f society. T h e o r i e s based o n e i t h e r pole o f this o p p o s i t i o n f i n d themselves u n a b l e t o grasp the social, w h i c h insists o n f a l l i n g b e t w e e n the t w o t e r m s , n o t r e d u c i b l e t o e i t h e r . T h e one-sidedness o f theories w h i c h base themselves on one pole finds its c o m p l e m e n t in the o n e sidedness of theories which base themselves on the other. The


Philosophy

231

stage is set f o r an i n t e r m i n a b l e and irresolvable debate, f r o m w h i c h society i t s e l f i s f i r m l y e x c l u d e d . I n o r d e r t o c o m e t o terms w i t h society i t i s necessary t o o v e r c o m e this o p p o s i t i o n . T h e o p p o s i t i o n cannot, h o w e v e r , b e abolished b y f i a t , f o r the e x t e r n a l a n d o b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f the t y p i c a l social r e l a t i o n s o f o u r society i s s o m e t h i n g w i t h w h i c h s o c i o l o g y m u s t c o m e to terms. It is necessary to u n c o v e r the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i t y o f the o p p o s i t i o n , t o u n c o v e r the h i s t o r i c c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h social r e l a t i o n s assume this o b j e c t i v e p o w e r , a p o w e r w h i c h cannot be r e d u c e d to the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l , but w h i c h c a n n o t b e d i v o r c e d f r o m i t e i t h e r . H e g e l t r i e d t o o v e r c o m e this o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n subject and object, but he d i d so o n l y f o r m a l i s t i c a l l y , in a speculative w a y . Instead o f o f f e r i n g a n account w h i c h c o u l d establish the 'subj e c t i v e ' and ' o b j e c t i v e ' a s m o m e n t s o f a h i s t o r i c a l process i n w h i c h they become dissociated, H e g e l i d e n t i f i e d the t w o i m m e d i a t e l y , seeing the l a t t e r as the ' i m m a n e n t i z a t i o n ' of the f o r m e r : 'Thus empirical reality is admitted just as it is and is also said to be the rational; but not rational because of its o w n reason, but because the e m p i r i c a l fact in its empirical existence has a significance w h i c h is other than itself. T h e fact, w h i c h is the starting point, is not conceived to be such but rather to be the mystical result.' 39

H e g e l s i m p l y i d e n t i f i e d the real and the r a t i o n a l , l o c a t i n g the i n h u m a n r a t i o n a l i t y o f the real i n the suprahuman Idea. T h i s speculative i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f real and r a t i o n a l w a s s o unsatisf a c t o r y that i t h a r d l y outlasted H e g e l , l e a v i n g a r a t h e r t i r e d H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c i n a ' w h o l l y abstract, " s p e c u l a t i v e " , f o r m ' , t o contest the o l d m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , w h i c h ' h e l d the f i e l d b y its s u p e r i o r i t y i n p o s i t i v e k n o w l e d g e ' , even t h o u g h i t ' h a d been s o a n n i h i l a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y b y K a n t and p a r t i c u l a r l y b y H e g e l ' . 4 0

M a r x r e a l i z e d i n the w o r k s o f his y o u t h that society was the p o i n t a t w h i c h r e a l and r a t i o n a l , subject and o b j e c t , m e t one another, and, c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , that it is on the basis of society that w e have t o u n d e r s t a n d the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o , and n o t vice versa. M a r x r e a l i z e d that the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n subject and object, r a t i o n a l and r e a l , is n o t a u n i v e r s a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n e t e r n a l categories, b u t is a specific h i s t o r i c a l p r o d u c t , expressed in classical E u r o p e a n p h i l o s o p h y , e m e r g i n g o n the basis o f the development of commodity relations. The opposition between

232

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

subject and o b j e c t i s i t s e l f a p r o d u c t o f the process o f e x c h a n g e , expressing the contrast b e t w e e n m o m e n t s o f exchange w h i c h i s established b y e x c h a n g e i t s e l f : ' C i r c u l a t i o n is the movement in w h i c h the general alienation appears as general appropriation and general appropriation as general alienation. As much, then, as the w h o l e of this movement appears as a social process, and as much as the individual moments o f this movement arise f r o m the conscious w i l l and particular purposes of individuals, so much does the t o t a l i t y of the process appear as an objective interrelation, w h i c h arises spontaneously from nature;. . . C i r c u l a t i o n , because a totality of the social process, is also the first f o r m in w h i c h the social relation appears as something independent of the individuals, but not o n l y as, say, in a coin or in exchange value, but extending to the whole of the social movement itself. The social relation of individuals to one another as a p o w e r over the individuals w h i c h has become autonomous . . . is a necessary result of the fact that the point of departure is not the free social i n d i v i d u a l . ' 41

T h e c o n c e p t o f the subject d e v e l o p e d b y classical E u r o p e a n p h i l o s o p h y i s i t s e l f a p r o d u c t o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o m m o d i t y relations: ' M a n as a moral subject, that is as a personality of equal w o r t h , is indeed no more than a necessary c o n d i t i o n for exchange according to the law of value. M a n as a legal subject, or as a p r o p e r t y - o w n e r , is a further necessary c o n d i t i o n . Finally, these t w o stipulations are extremely closely connected w i t h a t h i r d , in w h i c h man figures as a subject operating egoistically. A l l three of these seemingly imcompatible stipulations w h i c h are not reducible to one and the same thing, express the t o t a l i t y of conditions necessary for the realization of the value relation. . . . The net result of abstracting these definitions from the actual social relation they express, and a t t e m p t i n g to develop them as categories in their o w n r i g h t (by purely speculative means), is a confused j u m b l e of contradictions and m u t u a l l y exclusive propositions'. 42

'Because M. Proudhon places eternal ideas, the categories of pure reason, on the one side and human beings and their practical l i f e , w h i c h according to h i m is the application of these categories, on the other, one finds w i t h h i m f r o m the beginning a dualism between life and ideas, between soul and body, a dualism w h i c h recurs in many forms. Y o u can see n o w that this antagonism is n o t h i n g but the incapacity of M. Proudhon to understand the profane o r i g i n and the profane history of the categories w h i c h he defies.' 43

I t i s the t h e o r y o f c o m m o d i t y f e t i s h i s m , w h i c h i s the basis o f Capital, t h a t enables M a r x t o get b e y o n d the classical o p p o s i t i o n b y revealing

the

foundation

of

that

opposition

in

society.

The


233

supposedly e t e r n a l and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e categories are themselves b u t a n aspect o f c o m m o d i t y f e t i s h i s m , e t e r n i z i n g a n o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h i s a specific h i s t o r i c a l result o f c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y the t h e o r y o f c o m m o d i t y f e t i s h i s m that i s the f o u n d a t i o n o f M a r x ' s a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d the e x t e r n a l , object i v e and c o n s t r a i n i n g character o f social r e l a t i o n s w h i c h are themselves h u m a n products. T h e t h e o r y o f f e t i s h i s m n o t o n l y s h o w e d ' t h a t h u m a n relations w e r e v e i l e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h i n g s , b u t r a t h e r that, i n the c o m m o d i t y e c o n o m y , social p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s i n e v i t a b l y t o o k the f o r m o f t h i n g s and c o u l d n o t b e expressed e x c e p t t h r o u g h t h i n g s ' . W i t h t h e t h e o r y o f c o m m o d i t y f e t i s h i s m it became possible to u n d e r s t a n d society as an objective field of human activity. 44

T o argue t h a t the classical p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n the subject and t h e o b j e c t i s a n expression o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o m m o d i t y r e l a t i o n s is n o t to o f f e r a r e d u c t i o n i s t a r g u m e n t : 'The economics of value relations provides the key to an understanding of the j u r i d i c a l and ethical structure, not in the sense of the concrete content of legal or moral norms, but in the sense of the f o r m i t s e l f . ' 45

T h e c o n t e n t w h i c h i s expressed t h r o u g h this f o r m can v a r y , and has v a r i e d , e n o r m o u s l y . T h e same f o r m can m o b i l i z e the b o u r g e o i s c r i t i q u e o f f e u d a l o r socialist social relations i n the name o f the f r e e d o m and e q u a l i t y o f c o m m o d i t y relations. I t can m o b i l i z e the p e t i t - b o u r g e o i s c r i t i q u e o f the s o c i a l i z i n g tendencies i n h e r e n t i n capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . I t can even m o b i l i z e the U t o p i a n socialist c r i t i q u e o f the e x p l o i t a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c a p i t a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n . T h e w o r k o f Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s represents a t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y v e r s i o n o f the U t o p i a n c r i t i q u e . T h e i r c r i t i q u e o f c o n t e m p o r a r y society is made from the standpoint of the asocial individual, in the name of a universal principle of reciprocity between subjects. B u t the a p p a r e n t l y u n i v e r s a l c r i t i c , and the a p p a r e n t l y u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e are b o t h products o f the society t o w h i c h t h e y are applied. T h e a p p a r e n t l y rootless, i s o l a t e d , asocial i n d i v i d u a l w h o e x periences society as an alien f o r c e is a social p r o d u c t , a specific 'historic result': 'the product on the one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth

234

The

Foundations

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century', for w h o m the 'various forms of connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. B u t the epoch w h i c h produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed ( f r o m this standpoint, general) relations'.

46

T h e isolated i n d i v i d u a l , subject o f society, i s the p r o d u c t o f the emergence o f c o m m o d i t y exchange w h i c h relates these subjects b y i m p e r s o n a l , o b j e c t i v e bonds. ' B u t it is an insipid n o t i o n to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable f r o m their nature (in antithesis to their conscious k n o w i n g and w i l l i n g ) . This bond is their product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development. . . . It is the bond natural to individuals w i t h i n specific and l i m i t e d relations or p r o d u c t i o n . ' 47

T h e U t o p i a n s o c i a l i s m o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y c o n t r a s t e d the f r e e d o m and e q u a l i t y o f exchange relations o f c o m m o d i t y circulation w i t h the e x p l o i t a t i o n and d o m i n a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s t relations o f p r o d u c t i o n , a s p i r i n g t o the p e t i t - b o u r g e o i s U t o p i a o f a society o f independent p e t t y c o m m o d i t y producers. A s M a r x c o n s t a n t l y p o i n t e d o u t , and a s the h i s t o r y o f U t o p i a n projects revealed, U t o p i a n i s m t o o k f o r a deformation w h a t is in fact the i n e v i t a b l e result o f the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f c o m m o d i t y r e l a t i o n s , and c a l l e d for the r e t u r n to a supposed g o l d e n age w h o s e h i s t o r i c p r o d u c t was precisely capitalist e x p l o i t a t i o n . T h e philosophies o f Sartre and L é v i - S t r a u s s represent, i n a sense, a t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y v e r s i o n of this same U t o p i a n i s m . T h e y c r i t i c i z e t h e i r o w n society f r o m the standpoint o f the subject, c o n d e m n i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n and d o m i n a t i o n , the t r e a t m e n t o f the o t h e r as an object, in the name of the u n i v e r s a l h u m a n v a l u e of r e c i p r o c i t y as the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n free and equal i n d i v i d u a l subjects. H o w e v e r , i n the era o f m o n o p o l y c a p i t a l i s m there i s l i t t l e prospect o f a r e s t o r a t i o n o f p e t t y c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c t i o n . Sartre a n d Lévi-Strauss can o n l y o f f e r , t h e r e f o r e , a c o n t e m p l a t i v e and i m p o t e n t c r i t i q u e , w h i c h bases i t s e l f o n a t r u l y h u m a n exchange, a n d n o t o n the d e f o r m e d exchange w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a d e v e l o p e d c a p i t a l i s t society. T h u s Lévi-Strauss counterposes a u b i q u i t o u s e x c h a n g e (a ' t o t a l social f a c t ' ) , w h i c h h e f i n d s r e a l i z e d i n ' p r i m i t i v e ' societies, t o the domination which characterizes our own society. Sartre, following


235

P r o u d h o n in t h a t 'he calls the subjective precisely w h a t is social and he calls s o c i e t y a subjective a b s t r a c t i o n ' anticipates a c o n t e m p l a t i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . C o n t e m p l a t i o n w i l l r e c a p t u r e the essence of social relations as r e c i p r o c a l relations b e t w e e n free subjects. E v e n the most d o w n t r o d d e n c i t i z e n can r e c o v e r his o r her s u b j e c t i v i t y , a n d s o discover his o r her o w n a b i l i t y t o reinstate the r u l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . T h e p r o b l e m s f r o m w h i c h Sartre a n d L é v i - S t r a u s s set o f f w e r e c o n c r e t e and specific p r o b l e m s posed to t h e m as i s o l a t e d i n t e l lectuals i n a p e r i o d o f social u p h e a v a l . I n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i r philosophies t o o w e can trace the i m p a c t o f c o n c r e t e events. A t the same t i m e the philosophies w h i c h are d e v e l o p e d in these specific situations c l a i m u n i v e r s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . W e can n o w see t h a t this i s possible because classical p h i l o s o p h y offers categories w h i c h make i t possible t o translate specific experiences i n t o e t e r n a l t r u t h s . Problems w h i c h represent the specific and v e r y c o n c r e t e e x p r e s sion o f a s o c i e t y based o n c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c t i o n f i n d t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r m i n the categories o f classical p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h represent the most abstract expression o f the same social r e l a t i o n . I n this t r a n s l a t i o n , h o w e v e r , the c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h gave rise t o the i n i t i a l p r o b l e m are dissolved, and the p h i l o s o p h y d e v e l o p e d can d o n o m o r e t h a n counterpose e t e r n a l values to an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d r e a l i t y in a c o n t e m p l a t i v e c r i t i q u e . 48

N O T E S 1 ESK, p. x x i x . 2 1973c, pp. 1 9 - 2 0 ; 1967d, p. 16. 3 IM, p. x v i . 4 IM, pp. x x x - x x x i . 5 1949b; 1949c; IM. 6 SA, p. 184. 7 HN, p. 563. 8 IM, p. x x x ; 1967e, p. 16;JJR, p. 241. 9 1967a, pp. 14, 16. 10 RC, p. 13. 11 Tot, p. 101 12 JJR, p. 242; HN, pp. 539 - 40; 1964a, p. 5. 13 JJR, p. 243. 14 TT, p. 124. 15 1952a, pp. 2 1 , 42.

236

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

16 Quoted Lévi-Strauss, 1965a, p. 50. 17 1965a, p. 30; 1969a, pp. 3 0 - 1 ; JJR, pp. 2 4 5 - 7 . 18 SA, pp. 3 6 6 - 7 ; 1958a, p. 30; 1967b, p. 3 1 ; 1972a, p. 80, JJR, p. 243. 19 1956a. 20 JJR, p. 247. 21 1976b, p. 31. 22 JJR, p. 245. 23 C l . Lefort, ' L ' é c h a n g e et la lutte des hommes,' Temps Modernes, 6, 64,1951; C l . Lefort, ' S o c i é t é s 'sans histoire' et h i s t o r i c i t é ' , Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, 12, 1952. 24 Sartre, 1976, pp. 483-93. 25 J. P. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, N L B , London, 1976, pp. 43, 89, 95. 26 J. P. Sartre, 'J. P. Sartre r é p o n d , ' L'Arc, 30, 1966, p. 90. 27 Lévi-Strauss' reply to Sartre is SM, Chapter 8. 28 SM, p. 250. 29 SA, p. 18. 30 1962a, pp. 4 4 - 5 . 31 SM, p. 256. 32 SM, p. 255. 33 HN, p. 614. 34 SM, p. 254. 35 SM, p. 73; ESK, p. 268; 1966c, p. 55. 36 SM, p. 252. 37 Sartre, 1976, op. cit. pp. 496 - 7; SA, p. 65. 38 K. M a r x , Collected Works, 3, Lawrence & W i s h a r t , London, 1975, p. 298. 39 K. M a r x , Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, C U P , 1970, p. 9. 40 F. Engels. 41 M a r x , 1973, pp. 196-7. K. M a r x , Grundrisse, Penguin, H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1973, pp. 196-7. 42 E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, Ink Links, 1978, pp. 151-2. 43 K. M a r x , The Poverty of Philosophy, F L P H , M o s c o w , n.d., p. 183. 44 I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value Black and Red, D e t r o i t , 1972, p. 6. 45 Pashukanis, op. cit. p. 152. 46 M a r x , 1973, op. cit. pp. 8 3 - 4 . 47 Ibid., p. 162. 48 Ibid, pp. 164-5.

Abbreviations used in Bibliography AJS Am. Anth. Ann. de I'EPHE

= American Journal of Sociology = American Anthropologist = Annuaire de I'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, section Sciences Religieuses Arch. Europ. Soc. = Archives Européennes de Sociologie Bijd. = Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde Cah. Int. Soc. = Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie H. et S. = L 'Homme et la Société ISSJ = International Social Science Journal JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute NNRF = Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue Française Proc RAI = Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute TLS = Times Literary Supplement Soc. Sci. Inf. = Social Sciences Information TM = Temps Modernes Trans NY Acad Sci= Transactions of the New York Academy of Science

Abbreviations used for Lévi-Strauss' works ESK FKS FS HA HN IL IM JJR OMT RC SA SM TT Tot

= The Elementary Structures of Kinship. 1969f. = The Future of Kinship Studies. 1965f. = French Sociology. 1946a. = From Honey to Ashes. 1973b. = L'Homme Nu. 1971a. = The Scope of Anthropology. 19671. = Introduction to M. Mauss: Sociologie et Anthropologie. 1950a. = Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 1962a. = L'Origine des Manières de Table. 1968a. = The Raw and the Cooked. 1969c. = Structural Anthropology. 1968k. = The Savage Mind. 1966h. = Tristes Tropiques. 1961h. = Totemism. 1964h. 237

\

The Published Works of Claude Lévi-Strauss O n l y major English translations are included 1936 a. ' C o n t r i b u t i o n à l'Etude de l'Organisation Sociale des Indiens Bororo'. Journal de la Société des Américanistes, X X V I I I , 2, pp. 269 -304, plates 7-10. (Portuguese version in Revista do Arquivo Municipal, I I I , 27, pp. 5 - 8 0 , São Paulo). b. 'Entre os Selvagems Civilizados', O Estado de São Paulo, ( C o l e ç ã o do Departimento Municipal de Cultura, 1), São Paulo. c. 'Os Mais Vastos Horizontes do M u n d o ' , Filosofia, Ciências e Letras, 1, São Paulo, pp. 6 6 - 9 . 1937 a. 'A p r o p ó s i t o da Civilisação Chaco-Santiaguense', Revista do Arquivo Municipal, I V , 42, pp. 5-38, São Paulo. b. 'La Sociologie Culturelle et son Enseignement', Filosofia, Ciências e Letras, 2, São Paulo. c. 'Poupees Karaja', Boletim de la Sociedade de Etnografia e de Folklore, I, São Paulo. d. 'Indiens du M a t o Grosso, B r a z i l ' , Guide-Catalogue de I'Exposition. etc. (mission Claude et Dina Lévi-Strauss), Paris, M u s é u m National d'Histoire Naturelle, Musée de l ' H o m m e , pp. 1-14. 1942 a . 'Indian Cosmetics', VVV, I , I , N e w Y o r k , pp. 3 3 - 5 . b . 'Souvenir o f Malinovski', VVV, I , I , N e w Y o r k , p . 45.

c.

'The

Art

1943 a. 'Guerre et Commerce chez les Indiens de l ' A m é r i q u e du Sud', Renaissance, revue trimestielle publiée par l'Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes, I, 1 and 2, N e w Y o r k , pp. 122-39. b. 'The Social Use of Kinship Terms among Brazilian Indians', Am. Anth, 45, 3, pp. 398 - 409. of the Northwest Coast at the American Museum of 239

240

d.

The Foundations

of Structuralism

Natural H i s t o r y ' , Gazette des Beaux Arts, 6th Series, 24, N e w Y o r k pp. 175-82. 'Review of L. W. Simmons (ed.) Sun C h i e f , Social Research, 10, pp. 515-17.

1944 a. ' O n Dual Organization in South America', America Indigena, 4, pp. 37-47. b. 'The Social and Psychological Aspects of Chieftainship in a Primitive T r i b e ' , Trans. NY Acad. Sci., Series I I , 7, 1, pp. 16-32. c. 'Reciprocity and Hierarchy', Am. Anth., 46, 2, pp. 2 6 6 - 8 . d. 'Review of E. da Cunha: Rebellion in the Backlands', Am. Anth., 46, pp. 394 - 6. 1945 a. 'Le D é d o u b l e m e n t de la R e p r é s e n t a t i o n dans les A r t s de l'Asie et de l ' A m é r i q u e ' , Renaissance, II and I I I , N e w Y o r k , pp. 168 - 86,12 plates, [Chapter 13 of SA]. b. 'L'Oeuvre d'Edward Westermarck', Revue de I'Histoire des Religions, C X X I X , 1 and 2 - 3 , pp. 84-100. c. 'L'Analyse Structurale en Linguistique et en Anthropologie', Word, I, 2, pp. 1-12. [Chapter 2 of SA]. 1946 a. 'French Sociology', in Twentieth Century Sociology, G. G u r v i t c h (ed.), N e w Y o r k , pp. 503 - 37. [French edition, PUF, Paris, 1947]. b. 'The Name of the N a m b i k w a r a ' , Am. Anth., 48, 1, pp. 139-40. c. 'La Technique du Bonheur', Esprit, 127, pp. 643 - 52. 1947 a. 'La T h é o r i e du Pouvoir dans une Société P r i m i t i v e ' , in Les Doctrines Politiques Modernes, Brentano, N e w Y o r k , pp. 4 1 - 6 2 . [Slightly modified version of 1944b]. b. 'Sur Certaines Similarités Structurales entre les Langues Chibcha et N a m b i k w a r a ' , Actes du XXVIIIme. Congrès International des Américanistes, Paris, pp. 185-92. c.

b.

'The

Nambicuara',

in

'Le Serpent au Corps Rempli de Poissons', id., pp. 633-6. [Chapter 14 o f SA].

1948 a. La Vie Familiale et Sociale des Indiens Nambikwara, Société des Américanistes, Paris, 132 pp., 7 plates. Handbook of South American Indians, J. Steward

Published

c. d. e. f.

Works

of Claude Lévi-Strauss

241

(ed.), Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, I I I , pp. 361-9, plates 3 6 - 7 . 'The T u p i - K a w a h i b ' , id., pp. 299-305, plates 2 4 - 6 . 'The Tribes of the Upper Z i n g u River', id., pp. 321-48, plates 27 - 34. 'The Tribes of the Right Bank of the G u a p o r é River', id., pp. 371 - 9 , plate 38. 'Review of L. W. Simmons (ed.) Sun C h i e f , Année Sociologique, 3rd Series, 1948 - 9.

1949 a. Les Structures Elémentaires de la Parenté, PUF, Paris, 640 pp., 88 figures. (Prix Paul Pelliot). b. 'Le Sorcier et sa Magie', TM, 41, pp. 3-24. [Chapter 9 of SA]. c. ' L ' E f f i c a c i t é Symbolique', Revue de I'Histoire des Religions, C X X X V , 1, pp. 5-27. [Chapter 10 of SA]. d. 'La Politique E t r a n g è r e d'une Société P r i m i t i v e ' , Politique Etrangère, 2, mai, pp. 139 - 52. e. 'Histoire et Ethnologie', Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 54me année, 3 - 4 , pp. 363-91. [Chapter 1 of SA]. 1950 a. Introduction, in Sociologie et Anthropologic, Marcel Mauss, PUF, Paris, pp. i x - l i i . [Also in Cah. Int. Soc., 8, 1950, pp. 72-112.] b. 'Les Prohibitions Matrimoniales et leur Fondement Psychologique', Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, 43, p. 409. c. 'The Use of W i l d Plants in T r o p i c a l South A m e r i c a ' , Handbook of South American Indians, J. Steward (ed.), Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, V I , pp. 465-86. d. Preface à K. Dunham, Danses d'Haiti, Fasquelle, Paris, pp. 7 - 1 1 . e. Preface à C. Berndt, Women's Changing Ceremonies in Northern Australia, L'Homme, 1, Hermann, Paris, pp. 3 - 8 . f. 'Documents Rama-Rama', Journal de la Société des Américanistes, X X X I X , pp. 84-100. g. 'Sur Certains Objets en Poterie d'Usage Douteux Provenant de la Syrie et de l'Inde', Syria, X X V I I , fasc. 1-2, pp. 1-4. 1951 a. 'Language and the Analysis of Social Laws', Am. Anth., 53, 2, pp. 155-63. [Slightly modified version Chapter 3 of SA]. b. 'Avant-propos', Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales, U N E S C O , Paris, 3, 4, pp. 825-9. c. 'Les Sciences Sociales au Pakistan', id., pp. 885-92.

242 d.

The Foundations

of Structuralism

"La Visite des Ames', Annuaire de I'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1951-2, pp. 2 0 - 3 .

1952 a. Race et Histoire. U N E S C O , Paris, 52pp. [Also published in English as Race and History]. b. 'La N o t i o n d'Archaisme en Ethnologie', Cah. Int. Soc, X I I , pp. 3-25. [Chapter 6 of SA]. c. 'Les Structures Sociales dans le Brésil Central et O r i e n t a l ' , in Proceedings of the 29th International Congress of Americanists, I I I , U n i v e r sity of Chicago Press, pp. 302-10. d. 'Le P è r e N o ë l Supplicié', TM, 7me année, 77, pp. 1572-90. e. 'Kinship Systems o f Three Chittagong H i l l Tribes', SWJ Anth., 8 , 1 , pp. 4 0 - 5 1 . f. 'Miscellaneous Notes on the K u k i ' , Man, 5, 284, pp. 167-9. g. 'Le S y n c r é t i s m e Religieux d'un village m o g du territoire de Chittagong', Revue de I'Histoire des Religions, C X L I , 2, pp. 202 - 37. h. 'Recherches de Mythologie A m é r i c a i n e ' , Ann. de I'EPHE, 1952-3, pp. 1 9 - 2 1 . 1953 a. 'Social Structure', in Anthropology Today, A. L. Kroeber (ed.), University of Chicago Press, pp. 524-58 [ M o d i f i e d version as Chapter 15 of SA]. b. 'Contributions to Discussion', in An Appraisal of Anthropology Today, Sol T a x , et al. (eds.), University of Chicago Press. c. 'Panorama de l'Ethnologie', Diogène, 2, pp. 96-123. [English edition pp. 6 9 - 9 2 ] . d. Chapter 1, in Results of the Conference, etc., Supplement to International Journal of American Linguistics, 19, 2, pp. 1-10. [Modified version as Chapter 4 of SA]. e. 'Recherches de Mythologie A m é r i c a i n e (Suite)', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1953-4, pp. 2 7 - 9 . f. 'Structure Sociale', Bulletin de Psychologie, V I , 5, 358-90 [French version of 1953a].

Posés

par

son

1954 a. 'Rapports entre la Mythologie et le rituel', pp. 2 5 - 8 . b. ' L ' A r t de D é c h i f f r e r les Symboles', Diogène, edition pp. 1 0 2 - 8 ] . c. 'Place de 1'Anthropologic dans les Sciences Enseignement', in Les Sciences Sociales

Ann. de I'EPHE, 1954-5, 5, pp. 128-35. [English Sociales et P r o b l è m e s dans I'Enseignement

Published

d. e.

Works


243

Supérieure (rapports préparés par C. W. Guillebaud, et al.), U N E S C O , Paris, 32 pp. [Chapter 17 of SA is a slightly modified version]. 'Qu'Est ce qu'un Primitif?', UNESCO Courier, 8 - 9 , pp. 5 - 7 . Obituary notice of M. Leenhardt, Ann. de l'EPHE, 1954 - 5, pp. 21 - 2 .

1955 a. Tristes Tropiques, Plon, Paris, 462 pp., 54 figures, 62 illustrations. b. 'Les Prohibitions du Marriage', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1955-6, pp. 39 - 40. c. 'Les Structures Elémentaires de la Parenté', in La Progenèse, etc., Centre International de l'Enfance, Masson, Paris, pp. 105-10. (Travaux et Documents V I I I ) . d. 'The Structural Study of M y t h ' , Journal of American Folklore, 68, 270, pp. 428 - 44. [Chapter 11 of SA is modified version. Also reprinted in T. Seboek, Myth: A Symposium. University of Indiana Press, 1965]. e. ' H o w the G i f t Started', UNESCO Courier, December 1955, pp. 8 - 9 . f. ' D i o g è n e C o u c h é ' , TM, 110, pp. 1187-220. g. 'Des Indiens et leur Ethnographie', TM, 116, pp. 1-50. [Part of 1955a]. h.

' R é p o n s e à Roger Caillois', TM, 111, pp. 1535-6.

1956 a.

'The Family', in Man, Culture and Society, H. L. Shapiro (ed.), O x f o r d University Press, pp. 524 - 58. b. 'Les Organisations Dualistes Existent-ils?', Bijd., 112, 2, pp. 99-128. [Chapter 8 of SA]. c. 'Review of G. Balandier, Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires', Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, V I , 1, pp. 177-9. d. 'Sorciers et Psychanalyse', UNESCO Courier, J u l y - A u g u s t , pp. 8-10. e. 'Structure et Dialectique', in For Roman Jakobson, Essays on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, M o u t o n , The Hague, pp. 289-94. [Chapter 12 of SA]. f. 'Jeux de Société', United States Lines, Paris Review (special issues on games). g. 'La Fin des Voyages', L A c t u a l i t é Littéraire, 26, pp. 2 9 - 3 2 . h. 'Les Trois Humanismes', Demain, 35. j. 'Le D r o i t au Voyage', L'Express, 21 September, p. 16. k. 'Recherches R é c e n t e s sur la N o t i o n d'Ame', Ann. de l'EPHE, 1956-7, pp. 16-18. 1. 'The Mathematics of M a n ' , ISSJ, 6, 4, pp. 581 -90. [Also in Esprit, 24, 10, pp. 525-38]. m. 'Sur les Rapports Entre le M y t h e et le Rituel', Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, 50, 3, pp. 99-125.

The

244

Foundations

of Stmcturalism

1957 a. 'Le Symbolisme Cosmique dans la Structure Sociale et reorganisation C é r é m o n i e l l e de Plusiers Populations N o r d et S u d - A m é r i caines', in Le Symbolisme Cosmique des Monuments Religieux, Roma, IsMEO, pp. 47-56. (Serie Orientale Roma, V o l . 14) (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.) b. 'Review of R. Briffaut - B. Malinovski, Marriage: Past and Present', Am. Anth, 59, 5, pp. 9 0 2 - 3 . c. 'Le Dualisme dans L'Organisation Sociale et les R e p r é s e n t a t i o n s Réligieuses', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1957-8, pp. 3 2 - 5 . d. 'These cooks did not spoil the b r o t h ' , UNESCO Courier, 10, pp. 12-3. e. 'Letter to A. Breton', in LArt Magique, A. Breton and G. Legrand, Paris, p. 56. 1958 a. Anthropologie Structurale, Plon, Paris, 454 pp., 23 figures, 13 illustrations. b. Preface to M. Bouteiller, Sorciers et Jeteurs de Sorts, Plon, Paris, pp. ivi. c. 'Review of R. Firth (ed.): Man and Culture', Africa, 28, pp. 3 7 0 - 1 . d. 'Dis-moi quels Champignons', L'Express, 10 A p r i l , p. 17. e. 'One W o r l d , Many Societies', Way Forum, M a r c h , pp. 28-30. f. Le Dualisme dans 1'Organisation Sociale et les R e p r é s e n t a t i o n s Réligieuses', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1958-9, pp. 5 0 - 3 . g. 'Documents T u p i - K a w a h i b ' , in Miscellanea Paul Rivet, 2, M e x i c o , pp. 323 - 38. h. 'La Geste d'Asdiwal', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1958-9, pp. 3-43. [Also published in TM, 179, M a r c h 1961]. j. Titres et Travaux, Projet d'Enseignement, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, Paris.

a.

'Amérique Guimet, Paris.

du

Nord

1959 et b. c. d. e.

Amérique

du

Sud',

in

Le

Masque,

Musée

'Le Masque', L'Express, 443, 10 D e c , pp. 4 6 - 7 . 'Mauss, M a r c e l ' , Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 'Passage Rites', Encyclopaedia Brittanica. Préface to D. Talaysesva, Soleil Hopi, Plon, Paris, pp. i - x .

1960 a. 'Four Winnebago Myths. A Structural Sketch', in Culture and History

Published

b. c. d.

e. f.

g. h. j. k. 1. m. n.

Works


245

S. D i a m o n d (ed.) University of Columbia Press, N e w Y o r k , pp. 351-362. 'La Chasse Rituelle aux Aigles', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1959-60, pp. 3 8 42. 'L'Anthropologie Sociale devant l'Histoire', Annales, J u l y - A u g u s t , pp. 625-637. [Part of 19601]. ' M é t h o d e s et Conditions de la Recherche Ethnologique Française en Asie', Colloque sur les Recherches, etc., Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris, pp. 111-25. 'Les Trois Sources de la R e f l é x i o n Ethnologique', Revue de I'Enseignement Supérieure, pp, 43 - 50. 'La Structure et la Forme. R e f l é x i o n s sur un Ouvrage de V l a d i m i r Propp', Cahiers de l'Institut de Sciences Economique Appliquées, (Recherches et Dialogues Philos. et Econ.,7), 9, Paris, pp. 3 - 3 6 . Also as: 'L'Analyse Morphologique des Contes Russes', International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics, 3, pp. 122-49. 'On Manipulated Sociological Models', Bijd., 116, 1, pp. 45 - 54. 'Ce que l'Ethnologie D o i t à D u r k h e i m ' , Annales de I'Université de Paris, 30 (1), pp. 4 7 - 5 2 . ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1959-60)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 191-207. 'Le P r o b l è m e de l'lnvariance en Anthropologie', Diogène 31, pp. 2 3 33. [English edition pp. 1 9 - 2 8 . ] (Part of 1960m). Leçon Inaugurale Faite le Mardi 5 Janvier 1960, Collège de France, Paris. 47pp. Interview w i t h J-P Weber, Figaro Littéraire, 14 M a r c h , Interview, L'Express, 20 October.

1961 a. 'Comment on Goody, Classification of Double Descent Systems', Current Anthropology, 2, p. 17. b. 'Recherches d'Ethnologie Religieuse', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1960-61. c. 'Today's Crisis in Anthropology', UNESCO Courier, 14 (11), 12-17. d. 'Le M é t i e r d'Ethnologue', Annales, revue mensuelle de lettres franchises, 129, pp. 5-17. e. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1960-1)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 191-205. f. Various reviews in L'Homme, 1, 1, pp. 111-4, 127-9, 142-3; 1, 2, pp. 128, 132-5, 137, 138, 142-3; 1, 3, p. 129. g. (Charbonnier, G.), Entretiens avec Claude Lévi-Strauss, Plon-Julliard, Paris. h. Tristes Tropiques, translated by J. Russell, C r i t e r i o n Books, N e w Y o r k . [Omits chapters 14, 15, 16, 39 of original.]

246

The Foundations

of Structuralism

1962 a. Le Totémisme Aujourd-hui, PUF, Paris, 154 pp. b. La Pensée Sauvage, Plon, Paris, 389 pp., 11 figures, 8 illustrations. c. ( W i t h R. Jakobson), 'Les Chats de Charles Baudelaire', L'Homme, 2, 1, pp. 5 - 2 1 . d. 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Fondateur des Sciences de 1'Homme', in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, La B a c o n n i è r e , Neufchatel, pp. 239-48. e. 'Les Limites de la N o t i o n de Structure en Ethnologie' in Sens et Usages du Terme Structure, R. Bastide (ed.), J a n u â Linguarum, M o u t o n , The Hague, pp. 4 0 - 5 and 143-5, 150, 157, 159. f. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1961-2)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 211-17. g. 'Sur le C a r a c t è r e D i s t i n c t i f des Faits Ethnologiques', Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 115me année, 4me série, Paris, pp. 211-9. h. Various reviews in L'Homme, 2, 2, pp. 139-41; 2, 3, pp. 134-47, 141-3. j. 'La Antropologia, Hoy: Entrevista a Claude L é v i - S t r a u s s , b y Eliseo Veron', Cuestiones de Filosofia, 1, 2 - 3 , Buenos Aires. k. 1. 'Les Fondements Philosophiques de 1'Anthropologie', 2. 'Recherches Sémiologiques', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1961-2, pp. 4 0 - 2 . 1. 'L'Ethnologue Avant l'Heure', Les Nouvelles Littéraires, 29 November. m. 'Le Temps Retrouve', TM, 191, pp. 1402-31. [Chapter 8 of 1962b.] 1963 a. ( W i t h N. Belmont) 'Marques de P r o p r i é t é dans D e u x Tribus SudA m é r i c a i n e s ' , L'Homme, 3, pp. 102-8. b. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1962-3)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 2 2 3 - 7 . c. 'Les D i s c o n t i n u i t é s Culturelles et le D é v e l o p p e m e n t Economique et Sociale', Table Ronde sur les Prémices Sociales de I'Industrialisation (1961), U N E S C O , Paris. [Also in Social Sciences Information, 1963, pp. 7 - 1 5 . ] d. ' R é p o n s e s à Quelques Questions', Esprit, 322, pp. 628-53. e. 'The Bear and the Barber, The Henry Myer M e m o r i a l Lecture', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 93, P t . l , pp. 1 - 1 1 . f. 'Rousseau, the Father of A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , UNESCO Courier, 16, 3, pp. 10-14. g. Various reviews, L'Homme, 3 , 1 , p. 140; 3, 2, pp. 136-8; 3, 3, pp. 1267, 133-4. h. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. de l'EPHE, 1962-3, p p . 4 0 - 3 . j. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. d e l'EPHE, 1963-4, p p . 4 2 - 5 . k. ( W i t h R. d'Harcourt) ' A . M é t r a u x (1902 - 63)' Journal de la Société des Américanistes, n.s. 52, pp. 3 0 1 - 1 1 .

Published 1. m.

Works


247

'Conversazioni con Cl. Lévi-Strauss (a cura di P. Caruso)', Aut Aut, 77, M i l a n . 'Where Does Father Xmas Come From', New Society, 64, 19 December, pp. 6 - 8 . [Adaptation of 1952d.]

1964 a. Mythologiques: Le Cru et le Cuit, Plon, Paris, 402 pp., 20 figures, 4 illustrations. b. ' A l f r e d M é t r a u x , 1902 - 63', Annales de I'Université de Paris, 1. c. 'Lucien Sebag,' Journal de la Société des Américanistes, L I I I , p. 182. d. 'Hommage à A l f r e d M e t r a u x ' , L'Homme, 4, 2, pp. 5 - 8 . e. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1963-4)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 2 2 7 - 3 1 . f. ' C r i t e r i a of Science in the Social and Human Disciplines', International Social Science Journal, X V I , 4, pp. 534-52. [French edition pp. 579-97]. g. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement',/Inn. del'EPHE, 1964-5, pp. 5 1 - 6 . h. Totemism, translated by R. Needham, M e r l i n , London. 1965 a. ' P r é s e n t a t i o n d'un Laboratoire Sociale', Revue de I'Enseignement Superieure, 3, pp. 87-92. b. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1964- 5)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 269-73. c. 'Les Sources Polluées de l ' A r t ' , Arts-Loisirs, 7-13, A p r i l , p. 4. d. ' R é p o n s e à un Questionnaire (sur la critique dite "structurale")', Paragone, n.s. 2, 182, M i l a n , pp. 125-9. e. ' R é p o n s e à un Questionnaire (sur 25 t é m o i n s de notre temps)', Figaro Littéraire, 1023, p. 9. f. 'The Future of Kinship Studies', H u x l e y M e m o r i a l Lecture, 1965, Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute, London, pp. 13-22. g. 'Entretien avec Claude Lévi-Strauss' (by M. Delahaye and J. Rivette), Les Cahiers du Cinéma, X X V I , 4, pp. 19-29. h. 'Le Triangle Culinaire', L'Arc, 26, Aix-en-Provence, pp. 19-29. j. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1965-6), pp. 51-6. k. ' M a n Has Never Been So Strange As He Is Today', Réalités, 175, pp. 4 8 - 5 1 . 1. Review, L'Homme, 15, 2, p. 147. m. 'Civilisation Urbaine et Santé Mentale', Cahiers de I'Institut de la Vie, 4, pp. 3 1 - 6 . n. Interview w i t h P. Caruso, Rinascita, Supplemento Culturale, 5, 29/3.

248

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

1966 a. Mythologiques 2: Du Miel aux Cendres, Plon, Paris, 450pp. b. 'Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future', Nature, 209, pp. 10-13. c. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1965-6)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 269-73. d. Interview accorded to Cahiers de Philosophie (special issue on anthropology), 1, pp. 47-56. e. (G. Steiner), 'A Conversation w i t h Claude Lévi-Strauss', Encounter, 26, 26 A p r i l , pp. 32-8. f. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. delF.PHE 1966 - 7, pp. 6 1 - 3 . g. 'The Culinary Triangle', New Society, 22 December, pp. 937 - 40. [Translation of 1965h]. h. The Savage Mind, translated by Anon, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London. [Omits appendix from original]. j. 'The Scope of Anthropology', Current Anthropology, 7, 2, pp. 112-23. [Part of 19671]. k. ' H u m a n i t y , what is it?' Interview w i t h C l . Lévi-Strauss, Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers, 35, pp. 41-53. [English translation of 1960n.] 1. Interview w i t h C l . Lévi-Strauss by P. Caruso, Atlas, A p r i l , 245-6. m. 'The W o r k of the Bureau of American Ethnology and its Lessons' in Knowledge Among Men, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, n. 'A Propos d'une Retrospective', Arts 60, 16-22 November, o. 'The Disappearance of M a n ' , New York Review of Books, 28 July. 1967 a. Les Structures Elémentaires de la Parenté, 2nd revised and corrected edition, M o u t o n , The Hague. b. A Contre-Courant, ' I n t e r v i e w w i t h G. D u m u r ' , Nouvel Observateur, 25 January, pp. 3 0 - 2 . c. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1966- 7)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 267-74. d. Interview w i t h Gilles Lapouge, Figaro Littéraire, 1085, pp. 3, 16. e. 'La Sexe des Astres', in Melanges Offerts à Roman Jakobson pour sa 70me Annee, M o u t o n , The Hague. f. ' P r é s e n t a t i o n du Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale', Sciences, 47, pp. 115-28. g. ' V i n g t Ans Apres', TM, 256, pp. 385 -406. [ N e w preface to 1967a]. h. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. de l'EPHE, 1967-8, pp. 6 1 - 3 . j. Interview with R. Bellour, Les Lettres Francaises, 1165, pp. 1, 3-5, 7. k. 'The Story of Asdiwal', translated by N. Mann, in The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism, E. Leach (ed.), Tavistock, London.

Published Works of Claude 1. m. n. 0. p. q. r.

Lévi-Strauss

249

The Scope of Anthropology, translated by S.O. and R . A . Paul, Cape, London. [Translation of 1960m.] 'The Savage M i n d ' , Man, 2, 3, p. 464. 'Comments', Current Anthropology, 8, 4, pp. 3 5 9 - 6 1 . 'Une lettre de C l . Lévi-Strauss', Cahiers pour I'analyse, 8, O c t o b c i . p. 90. 'Entretien de F. Malet', Magazine Littéraire, February, pp. 4 2 - 4 . 'The Particular Task of Anthropology', in Culture and Consciousness, G. B. Lévitas (ed.), Braziller, N e w Y o r k , 'Les clefs du m y s t è r e humain', Le Patriote Illustré, 35.

1968 a. Mythologiques 3: L 'Origine des Manières de Table, Plon, Paris. b. 'Hommage aux Sciences de l ' H o m m e ' , Soc. Sci. Inf., 1, 2, pp. 7 - 1 1 . c. 'Religions C o m p a r é e s des Peuples sans Ecriture', in Problèmes et Méthodes d'Histoire des Religions, PUF, Paris, pp. 1-7. d. 'La Grande Aventure de l'Ethnologie', Nouvel Observateur, 166. [Part of 1970e]. e. 'The Concept of Primitiveness', in Man the Hunter, R. Lee and I. D e V o r e (eds.), Aldine, Chicago, pp. 349-52. f. 'Contributions to Discussions', in R. Lee and I. D e V o r e , id. g. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1967-8)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 305-17. h. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. de l'EPHE, 1968-9, pp.65-6. j. (With J. Guiart), 'Evènement et Schéma', L'Homme, 8, 1, pp. 80-7. k. Structural Anthropology, translated by C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf, A l l e n Lane, London. 1. Speech on receiving the G o l d Medal of the C N R S , Le Monde, 13 January, p. 9. m. ' V i v r e et Parler. Un D é b a t entre F. Jacob, R. Jakobson, C l . LéviStrauss et P. l ' H e r i t i e r ' , Les Lettres Françaises 1221, 14 and 21 February. n. 'Entretien avec Claude Lévi-Strauss', Témoignage Chretien, 8, 8/4. o. 'Le structuralisme sainement p r a t i q u é ne p r é t e n d pas formuler une nouvelle conception du monde et meme de l'homme', Le Monde, 12 January. p. 'Sur les divers usages du structuralism. Réponse à Gadoffre', Le Monde, 14 November.

b.

1969 a. 'Conversation w i t h P. Caruso', in Conversazioni con Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Lacan, U. Mursia, M i l a n , pp. 25-90. 'Reports of Seminars Conducted by Sperber, Sahlins, Monod,

250

c. d. e. f.

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

Pouillon, Cresswell, Maranda, Kutuldjian, et al.,' Ann. de l'EPHE, 1969-70, pp. 109- 28. The Raw and the Cooked, translated by J. and D. W e i g h t m a n , Cape, London. Conversation with Claude Lévi-Strauss, by G. Charbonnier, translated by J. and D. Weightman, Cape, London. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1968-9)', Annuaire du Collège de France. The Elementary Structures of Kinship, translated by J. H. Bell and J. R. V. Sturmer, edited by R. Needham, Eyre & Spottiswood, London.

1970 a. 'Les Champignons dans la Culture. A Propos d'un L i v r e de M . R . G . Wasson', L'Homme, 10, 1, pp. 5-17. b. 'A Confrontation', New Left Review, 62, pp. 57-74. [Translation of 1963d]. c. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1969-70)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 299- 305. d. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. d 1'EPHE, 1970-1, pp. 95-102. e. 'Texte de l'Emission de M i c h e l T r é g u e r C o n s a c r é e à Lévi-Strauss, dans la Série Un Certain Regard' ( W i n t e r 1968) in Claude Lévi-Strauss ou la structure de la malheur, C. B a c k è s - C l é m e n t , Seghers, Paris, pp. 172 - 88. f. Letter in C. B a c k è s - C l é m e n t , op. cit., p. 1 7 0 - 1 . g. 'La t h é o r i e ' , VH 101, 2. h. Interview, Mademoiselle, L X X I , pp. 236-7, 324. j. Interview, University Review, X , p . 21. k. ' M y t h and Meaning', Sunday Times, 7694, 15 November, p. 27. 1971 a. Mythologiques 4: L'Homme Nu, Plon, Paris. b. 'Der Humanismus Bedroht den Menschen', I n t e r v i e w , Der Spiegel, 53, pp. 9 3 - 7 . c. 'Comment Meurent les Mythes', in Science et Conscience de la Société. Mélanges en I'honneur de Raymond Aron, 1, C a l m a n n - L é v y , Paris, pp. 131-43. Also in Esprit, 39 (402), 1971, pp. 694- 706. d. 'Le Temps du M y t h e ' , Annales, M a y - A u g u s t , pp. 533- 40. e. 'The Deduction of the Crane', in The Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition, P. and E. K. Maranda (eds), University of Pennsylvania Press. f. ' B o l é r o de M. Ravel', L'Homme, 11, 2, pp. 5-14. g. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. de 1'EPHE, 1971-2, pp. 65-80.

Published

Works


251

h.

' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1970-1)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 277- 84. j. 'Rapports de S y m é t r i e entre Rites et Mythes de Peuples Voisins', in T . O . Beidelman (ed.), The Translation of Culture, Essays in Honour of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Tavistock, London, pp. 161-78. k. 'Race and Culture', ISSJ, X X I I I , 4, pp. 608- 25. 1. 'L'Express Va Plus L o i n avec Lévi-Strauss', L 'Express, 15-21 M a r c h , pp. 6 0 - 6 . m. ' I n t e r v i e w w i t h E d w i n N e w m a n ' ( W N B C T V ) , Speaking Freely, 12 September, pp. 1-23. n. 'Le p r o b l è m e ultime des sciences de l'homme', Magazine Littéraire, 58, pp. 2 2 - 9 . o. Preface to L. Sebag, L'invention du monde chez les indiens pueblos, Maspero, Paris, p. Interview, Le Monde des Livres, 8339, pp. 17-20. q. Interview, Les Lettres Françaises, 1406, pp. 3 - 4 , 1407, pp. 6 - 7 . r. Interview, Les Nouvelles Littéraires, 2297, pp. 14-15. s. 'De quelques rencontres', L'Arc, 46, pp. 4 3 - 7 . 1972 a. Various reviews, L'Homme, 12, 4, pp. 97-102. b. 'Interview w i t h Claude Lévi-Strauss', Psychology Today, M a y , pp. 37, 39, 74, 78 - 80, 82. [English version of interview in Psychologie] c. 'Compte Rendu d'Enseignement', Ann. de I'EPHE, 1972-3. d. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1971-2)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 329- 49. e. 'La M è r e des F o u g è r e s ' , in Langues, Techniques, Nature et Société, T. Barran et. al. (eds), Klincksieck, Paris, pp. 367- 9. f. 'The Tempering of our Pride'. Interview excerpted from Diacritics 1, 1 (Cornell University), New York Times, 21 January. g. Interview, Figario Littéraire, 1338, pp. 13, 16. 1973 a. Interview w i t h Nouvelle Critique, n.s. 61, pp. 2 7 - 36. b. From Honey to Ashes, translated by J. and D. W e i g h t m a n , Cape, London. c. 'Structuralism and Ecology', Social Sciences Information, X I I — I , pp. 7-23. [Gildersleeve Lecture at Barnard College, N e w Y o r k , 28 M a r c h 1972. First published in Barnard Alumnae, Spring, 1972.] d. 'Reflexions sur l ' A t o m de Parenté, L'Homme, X I I I , 3, pp. 5 29. e. version),

Anthropologie Structurale Deux, Plon, Paris. [Contains 1952a (corrected 1956h, 1958h, 1960a (adaptation), 1960f, 1960g, 1960h,

252

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

1960m, 1962d, 1963c, 1964f, 1965c, 1965d, 1965e, 1965m, 1966m, 1966n, 1967e, 1968c, 1970a, 1971c, 1971J, 1973d.] f. ' C o n t r i b u t i o n to Musiques en Jeu' (transcription of O R T F broadcast), Musique en Jeu, 12, pp. 101-9. g. Tristes Tropiques translated by J. and D. Weightman, Cape, London. h. 'Le p r o b l è m e des sciences humaines au Collège de France', Nouvelle Revue des deux Mondes. j. ' D i e u existe-t-il?', in Dieu existe-t-il? C. Chabonis et. al., Fayard, Paris. k. 'Comte Rendu d'Enseignement', Annuaire de I'EPHE, 1973 - 4. 1. Obituary of E. Lot-Falck, Annuaire de I'EPHE, 1973-4, pp. 39-41. m. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1972-3)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 269 - 84. 1974 a. Various Reviews, L'Homme, X I V , 3 - 4 , pp. 161-2. b. Discours prononcés dans la s é a n c e publique tenue par l ' A c a d é m i e Française pour la reception de M. Claude Lévi-Strauss le 27 Juin 1974. Institut de France, Paris. [English summary TLS 12 J u l y ] . c. Interview, Le Monde, 2 June. d. Interview, Le Monde, 15 November. e. Interview, Il Ponte, X X X , pp. 6 5 - 7 . 1975 a. ' A n t h r o p o l o g y ' , Diogène, 90, pp. 1-25 (abridged version of an article prepared for the Enciclopedia Italiana.) b. La Voie des masques, 2 vols, Skira, G e n è v e . c . ( W i t h M . Auge e t M . Godelier), 'Anthropologie, Histoire, Ideologie', L'Homme, XV ( 3 - 4 ) , pp. 177 - 89. d. 'Propos retardataires sur l'enfant c r é a t e u r ' , Nouvelle Revue des Deux Mondes, January. e. 'Histoire d'une structure', in Explorations in the Anthropology of Religion. Essays in Honour of Jan Van Baal, M. Nijhoff, The Hague. f. ' U n ethnologue dans la v i l l e ' , Le Figaro, 1 M a r c h and 9 M a y . g. 'De C h r é t i e n de Troyes à Richard Wagner, Programme de Parsifal', Beyreuther Festspiele.

b.

1976 a. 'Cosmopolitisme et schizophrenie', in L'Autre et I'ailleurs. Hommage à R. Bastide, Berger-Levrault, Paris. 'Une préfiguration anatomique de la gémillité' in Melanges offerts à Germaine Dieterlen, Hermann, Paris. c. 'Structuralisme et Empirisme', L'Homme, X V I , 2.

Published d. e. f. g. h. j. k. 1.

Works


253

'Hommage à E. Benveniste', L'Homme, X V I , 4, p. 5. Review, L'Homme, X V I , 1, p. 166. 'Hommage à Jean Piaget', in Hommages à Jean Piaget, Klett Verlag, Stuttgart. Review, Times Literary Supplement, 26 November, p. 1457. Preface to R. Jakobson, Le Son et le sens, Seuil, Paris. 'Reflexions sur la L i b e r t é ' , Nouvelle Revue des deux Mondes, November, Review, Times Literary Supplement, 26 November, p. 1475. ' R é s u m é des Cours e t T r a v a u x (1975- 6)' Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 387- 98.

1977 a. 'Les Dessous d'un masque', L'Homme, X V I I , 1, pp. 5-29. b. ' R é p o n s e à E. Leach' L'Homme, X V I I , 2 - 3 , pp. 131-4. c. Reviews, L'Homme, X V I I , 1, pp. 139-41. d. Discours de Réception d'Alain Peyrefitte à L 'Académie Française et Réponse de Claude Lévi-Strauss, Gallimard, Paris. e. ' R é s u m é des Cours et Travaux (1976-7)', Annuaire du Collège de France, pp. 455-63. f. L'identité, Seminaire d i r i g é e par Claude Lévi-Strauss (1974-5), Grasset, Paris.

Bibliography T H E bibliography that follows is intended to provide a guide to further reading for those w h o wish to f o l l o w up the discussion in the text w i t h o u t immersing themselves in the specialist literature. The bibliography is organized according to chapters in the text, although there is some overlap. CHAPTER I. I have argued in the text that a number of writers can be described as 'structuralists' on the basis of their adherence to the fundamental postulate of structuralism that systems of meaning can be given an objective analysis w i t h o u t reference either to an external reality or to a subject that exist independently of the system of meaning. H o w e v e r different thinkers have developed this fundamental postulate in very different ways. Thus Louis Althusser has used it as the epistemological basis for a reconstruction of M a r x i s t social theory. Nicos Poulantzas has developed this reconstruction in the area of the theory of the state, w h i l e in B r i t a i n B a r r y Hindess and Paul Hirst have pushed Althusser's epistemology to its rationalist limits. Jacques Lacan has used the structuralist postulate as the basis for a reconstruction of psychoanalysis and M i c h e l Foucault for the history of ideas. Roland Barthes and the Tel Quel group have developed a structuralist approach to literature whose initial inspiration came directly f r o m linguistics rather than from LéviStrauss, although the latter has subsequently influenced their w o r k . Jacques D e r r i d a has developed the most esoteric version of the structuralist philosophy as a reintegration of positivism and phenomenology. The phenomenological inspiration of these later versions of structuralism is very important: both Lacan and D e r r i d a were directly inspired by Heidegger, while Poulantzas, Foucault and perhaps Althusser came to structuralism through the w o r k of Sartre. Thus any development of the structuralist theme takes us far afield. The w r i t e r s mentioned are best represented by the f o l l o w i n g works: L. Althusser: For Marx, A l l e n Lane, 1969. : Reading Capital, N L B , 1970. 255

256

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of Structuralism

: Lenin and Philosophy, N L B , 1971. R. Barthes: Mythologies, Paladin, 1973. : Elements of Semiology, Cape, 1967. : S/Z, Cape, 1974. J. Derrida: Of Grammatology, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. : Writing and Difference, University of Chicago Press, 1978. : Positions, M i n u i t , 1972. M. Foucault: The Order of Things, Tavistock, 1970. : The Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock, 1972. : Discipline and Punish, A l l e n Lane, 1977. B. Hindess and P. Hirst: Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. : Modes of Production and Social Formations, M a c m i l l a n , 1977. and A. Cutler and A. Hussein: Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. J. Lacan: Ecrits, Seuil, 1966 (selections in translation published by Tavistock, 1977). N. Poulantzas: Political Power and Social Classes, N L B / S h e e d & W a r d , 1973. The f o l l o w i n g general surveys of some aspects of later structuralism are thorough: T. Bennet: Formalism and Marxism, Methuen, 1979. R. C o w a r d and J. Ellis: Language and Materialism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. C. Sumner: Reading Ideologies, Academic Press, 1979.

: 'Althusserian Robbins and

I have criticized the substantive theories, rather than the specifically structuralist foundations, of the w o r k of Poulantzas and Althusser: S. Clarke: ' M a r x i s m , Sociology and Poulantzas's T h e o r y of the State', Capital and Class, 2, 1977. Marxism', in S. Clarke, T. Lovell. K. McDonnell, K. V. Seidler: One-Dimensional Marxism, Allison & Busby, 1980. The latter volume also includes valuable critical discussion of the psychoanalytic versions of structuralism developed in B r i t a i n by the writers associated w i t h the j o u r n a l Screen. General works of more direct relevance to the theme of this book include: R. Bastide: Sens et Usages du Terme 'Structure' dans les Sciences Sociales, M o u t o n , 1962. J. Broekman: Structuralism, Reidel, 1974. M. D u c r o t , et al.: Qu'est ce que le Structuralisme?, Seuil, 1968. M. Dufrenne: Pour L'Homme, Seuil, 1968.

Bibliography

257

M. de Gandillac, L. Goldmann and J. Piaget: Entretiens sur les Notions de Genese et Structure, M o u t o n , 1965. G. Granger: Pensee Formelle et Sciences de I'Homme, Aubier-Montaigne, 1960. F.Jameson: The Prison House of Language, Princeton University Press, 1972. D. Lecourt: Marxism and Epistemology, N L B , 1975. H. Lefebvre: Position: Contre les Technocrates, Gonthier, 1967. : Au Delà du Structuralisme, Anthropos, 1971. R. Macksey and E. Donato: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. R. Makarius: 'Structuralism: Science or Ideology', Socialist Register, 1974. M. Marc-Lipiansky: Le Structuralisme de Claude Lévi-Strauss, Payot, 1973. J. Parain-Vial: Analyses Structurales et Idéologies Structuralistes, Privat, 1969. J. Piaget: Structuralism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. D. Robey: Structuralism: an Introduction, Clarendon, 1973. L.Sève: ' M é t h o d e Structurale et M é t h o d e Dialectique', Pensee, 1967. : 'Marxisme et Sciences de l ' H o m m e ' , Nouvelle Critique, 1967. Y. Simonis: Claude Lévi-Strauss ou la Passion de I'Inceste, Aubier-Montaigne, 1968. J. V i e t : Les Méthodes Structuralistes dans les Sciences Sociales, Mouton, 1965. A. W i l d e n : System and Structure, Tavistock, 1972. CHAPTER II S. de Beauvoir: Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, Penguin, 1963. : The Prime of Life, Penguin, 1965. : Force of Circumstance, Penguin, 1968. H. Bergson: Creative Evolution, Macmillan, 1964. : Matter and Memory, A l l e n & U n w i n , 1962. : Time and Free Will, A l l e n & U n w i n , 1959. L. Brunschvig: Idéalisme Contemporain, Alcan, 1905. T. Clark: Prophets and Patrons, Harvard University Press, 1973. F. Coplestone: History of Philosophy, 9, Burns Oates, 1975. A. Cresson: Bergson, PUF, 1964. (Cresson was Lévi-Strauss' philosophy teacher). H. Hughes: The Obstructed Path, Harper & R o w , 1968. H. Lefebvre: La Somme et le Reste, La nef de Paris, 1959. L. Lévy-Bruhl: Primitive Mentality, A l l e n & U n w i n , 1923. M. Merleau-Ponty: Signs, Northwestern University Press, 1964. E. M o r o t - S i r : La Pensée Française d'aujourdhui, PUF, 1971. P. Nizan: Aden-Arabie, Rieder, 1932. : Les Chiens de Garde, Rieder, 1932. W. Redfern: Paul Nizan, Princeton University Press, 1972. J-P. Sartre: Being and Nothingness, Methuen, 1957.

258

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Foundations

of Structuralism

: Situations, Heinneman, 1965. : Between Existentialism and Marxism, N L B , 1974.

CHAPTER I I I C. Bouglé: Bilan de la Sociologie Française Contemporaine, Alcan, 1935. S. de Beauvoir: 'Les structures élémentaires de la Parenté', Temps Modernes, 1949. E. D u r k h e i m : The Division of Labour in Society, Free Press, 1964. : The Rules of Sociological Method, Free Press, 1964. : Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Collier, 1961. : Essays on Sociology and Philosophy, Harper & R o w , 1960. R. Hertz: Death and the Right Hand, Cohen & West, 1960. I. Kant: The Moral Law, Hutchinson, 1948. R. Lowie: Primitive Society, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953. S. Lukes: Emile Durkheim: His Life and Works, Allen Lane, 1973. M. Mauss: The Gift, Cohen & West, 1966. : Sociology and Psychology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

CHAPTER IV J. A. Barnes: Three Styles in the Study of Kinship, Tavistock, 1971. M. Boden: Piaget, Fontana/Harvester, 1979. S. Clarke: 'The Structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss' PhD thesis, University of Essex, 1975. A. Coult: 'The Determinants of Differential Cross-Cousin Marriage', Man, 1962. K. Davis and W. Warner: 'Structural Analysis of Kinship', American Anthropologist, 1937. G. Davy: 'Review of ESK', Annie Sociologique, 3rd Series, 1949. L. Dumont: Introduction à Deux Théories d'Anthropologie Sociale, M o u t o n , 1971. R. Fox; Kinship and Marriage, Penguin, 1967. S. Freud: Totem and Taboo, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950. M. Granet: ' C a t é g o r i e s Matrimoniales et Relations de P r o x i m i t é dans la Chine A n c i è n n e ' , Année Sociologique, série B, 1939. G. Homans and D. Schneider: Marriage, Authority and Final Causes, Free Press, 1955. J. de Josselin de Jong: Lévi-Strauss' Theory of Kinship and Marriage, Medenlingen van het Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, 10, 1952. K. Koffka: 'Gestalt', Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences, V I , M a c m i l l a n , 1930. W. Kohler: Gestalt Psychology, N e w American Library, 1966. F. K o r n : Elementary Structures Reconsidered, Tavistock, 1973. E. Leach: Rethinking Anthropology, Athlone Press, 1961. R. Lee and I. D e V o r e (eds): Man The Hunter, Aldine, 1968.

Bibliography

259

M. Merleau-Ponty: The Structure of Behaviour, Methuen, 1965. R. Needham (ed.): Rethinking Kinship and Marriage, Tavistock, 1971. D. Schneider: 'Some Muddles in the Models', in The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, Tavistock, 1965. H. Scheffler: 'The Elementary Structures of Kinship', American Anthropologist, 1970. E. Terray: Le Marxisme devant les Sociétés 'Primitives', Maspero, 1969.

CHAPTER V

in J. 1958.

S. de Beauvoir: The Second Sex, Bantam, 1961. I. Buchler and H. Selby: Kinship and Social Organization, M a c m i l l a n , 1968. A. Coult: 'The Determinants of Differential Cross-Cousin Marriage', Man, 1962. L. Dumont: 'The Dravidian Kinship Terminology as an Expression of Marriage', Man, 1953. : Hierarchy and Marriage Alliance in South Indian Kinship, R A I , 1957. : 'Descent or Intermarriage?', Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 1966. : 'Marriage Alliance', International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 10, 1968. : Homo Hierarchicus, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970. E. Evans-Pritchard: The Nuer, O U P , 1940. : Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer, Clarendon, 1951. : Social Anthropology and Other Essays, Free Press, 1962. C. Hart: 'Review of ESK', American Anthropologist, 1950. A. Kuper: Anthropologists and Anthropology, A l l e n Lane, 1973. E. Leach: 'The Structural Implications of M a t r i l a t e r a l Cross-Cousin Marriage', JRAI, 1951. : Political Systems of Highland Burma, B e l l , 1954. : 'Concerning Trobriand Clans and the Kinship Category " T a b u " ', Goody (ed.): The Developmental Cycle in Domestic Groups, CUP, : Pul Elija, C U P , 1962. : Lévi-Strauss, Fontana, 1970. R. Makarius: ' P a r e n t é et Infrastructure', Pensée, 1970. : 'Dialectique de la Parenté', Pensée, 1973. J. M i t c h e l l : Psychoanalysis and Feminism, A l l e n Lane, 1974. R. Needham: 'A Structural Analysis of A i m o l Society', Bijdragen tot de taalland- en Volkenkunde, 1960. : 'Descent Systems and Ideal Language', Philosophy of Science, 1960. : Structure and Sentiment, University of Chicago Press, 1962. : 'The Future of Social Anthropology: Disintegration or Metamorphosis?' Anniversary Contributions to Anthropology, B r i l l , 1970.

260

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Foundations

of Structuralism

: ' I n t r o d u c t i o n ' and 'Remarks on the Analysis of Kinship and Marriage', in R. Needham (ed.) Rethinking Kinship and Marriage, Tavistock, 1971. : Belief, Language and Experience, Blackwell, 1972. : 'Prescription', Oceania, 1973. : Remarks and Inventions, Tavistock, 1974. S. Orther: 'Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?', in M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (eds): Woman, Culture and Society, Stanford University Press, 1974. D. Sperber: 'Edmund Leach et les Anthropologues', Cahiers Internationaux de la Sociologie, 1967.

CHAPTER VI P. Achinstein and S. Barker (eds): The Legacy of Logical Positivism, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969. M. Bloomfield: Language, A l l e n & U n w i n , 1957. E. Cassirer: 'Structuralism in M o d e r n Linguistics', Word, 1945. N. Chomsky: Syntactic Structures, M o u t o n , 1957. : 'Review of B. F. Skinner: Verbal Behaviour', Language, 1959. : Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M I T Press, 1965. : Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, M o u t o n , 1966. : Cartesian Linguistics, Harper & Row, 1966. : Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, Mouton, 1967. : Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar, M o u t o n , 1972. and M. Halle: The Sound Pattern of English, Harper & Row, 1968. M. Cohen: 'Quelques notations historiques et critiques autour du structuralisme en linguistique', Pensée, 1967. B. D e r w i n g : Transformational Grammar as a Theory of Language Acquisition, C U P , 1973. J. Dubois: 'Structuralisme et linguistique', Pensée, 1967. V. E r l i c h : Russian Formalism, M o u t o n , 1955. J. Fodor and J. Katz (eds): The Structure of Language, Prentice H a l l , 1964. P. Garvin: On Linguistic Method, M o u t o n , 1964. G. Harman (ed.): On Noam Chomsky, Doubleday, 1974. Z. Harris: Methods in Structural Linguistics, University of Chicago Press, 1951. L. Hjelmslev: Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, W a v e r l y Press, 1953. C. Hockett: The State of the Art, M o u t o n , 1968. S. Hook (ed.): Language and Philosophy, N e w Y o r k University Press, 1969. E. Holenstein: Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language, Indiana University Press, 1976. R. Jakobson: 'The N o t i o n of Grammatical Meaning A c c o r d i n g to Boas', American Anthropologist, memoir 89, 1959.

Bibliography

261

(ed.): The Structure of Language and its Mathematical Aspects, Proceedings of the 12th Symposium in A p p l i e d Mathematics, American Mathematical Society, 1961. : 'Linguistics and Poetics', in T. Sebeok (ed.): Style in Language, M I T Press, 1966. : Selected Writings, M o u t o n , 1966. : 'Linguistics', in International Study on the Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences, M o u t o n , 1970. : Word and Language, M o u t o n , 1971. : Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, Harvester, 1978. and J. Tynyanov: 'Problems of Literary and Linguistic Studies', New Left Review, 37, 1966. J. Katz: 'Mentalism in Linguistics', Language, 1964. : The Philosophy of Language, Harper & Row, 1966. L. Kolakowski: Edmund Husserl and the Search for Certitude, Yale University Press, 1975. J. Krige: Science, Revolution, Discontinuity, Harvester, 1979. G. Lepschy: A Survey of Structural Linguistics, Faber, 1970. J. Lyons: Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, C U P , 1968. : Chomsky, Fontana, 1977. A. Martinet: A Functional View of Language, O U P , 1962. G. Mounin: Clefs pour la Linguistique, Seghers, 1968. : Saussure, Seghers, 1968. P. Peters and R. Ritchie: 'A N o t e on the Universal Base Hypothesis', Journal of Linguistics, 1969. W. Quine: Word and Object, M I T Press, 1960. F. de Saussure: Course of General Linguistics, Fontana, 1974. J. Searle: 'Review of N. Chomsky: Reflections on Language', Times Literary Supplement, 10 September, 1976. E. Stegmüller: Main Currents in Contemporary German, British and American Philosophy, Reidel, 1969. N. Trubetskoi: Principles of Phonology, University of California Press, 1969. J. Vachek (ed.): A Prague School Reader in Linguistics, Indiana University Press, 1964. V. Volosinov ( M . Baxtin): Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Seminar, 1973. Y. W i l k s : 'Review of N. Chomsky: Current Issues', Linguistics, 1967. : Grammar, Meaning and the Machine Analysis of Language, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972. CHAPTER VII F. Boas: Introduction to Handbook of American Indian Languages, University of Nebraska Press, 1968.

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N. Chomsky: Language and Mind, Harcourt Brace, 1968. H. Coubreras: 'Simplicity, Descriptive Adequacy and Binary Features', Language, 1969. W. Goodenough: 'Componential Analysis and the Study of Meaning', Language, 1956. M. Halle: ' I n Defence of the Number 2', in Studies Presented to Joshua Whatmough, 1957. : 'Simplicity in Linguistic Description' in R. Jakobson (ed.): The Structure of Language and its Mathematical Aspects, American Mathematical Society, 1961. D. Hymes (ed.): Language in Culture and Society, Harper & Row, 1964. R. Jakobson: Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, Harvester, 1978. : Child Language, Aphasia and Phonological Universals, M o u t o n , 1968. , G. Fant and M. Halle: Preliminaries to Speech Analysis, MITPress, 1952. and M. Halle: Fundamentals of Language, M o u t o n , 1957. J. Katz: Semantic Theory, Harper & R o w , 1972. and J. Fodor: 'The Structure of a Semantic Theory', Language, 1963. F. K o r n and R. Needham: 'Permutation Models and Prescriptive Systems', Man, 1970. H. Lefebvre: Le Langage et la Société, Gallimard, 1966. F. Lounsbury: 'A Semantic Analysis of the Pawnee Kinship Usage', Language, 1956. J. Lyons: Structural Semantics, B l a c k w e l l , 1964. : Semantics, 2 vols, C U P , 1977. D. M a y b u r y - L e w i s : 'Dual Organisation', Bijdragen tot de taat- land- en Volkenkunde, 1960. O. M o o r e and D. Olmsted: 'Language and Professor Lévi-Strauss', American Anthropologist, 1952. G. M o u n i n : 'Linguistique, structuralisme et marxisme', Nouvelle Critique, 1967. : Introduction a la Sémiologie, M i n u i t , 1970. O. Paz: Claude Lévi-Strauss: an Introduction, Cape, 1971. P. Ricoeur: ' N e w Developments in Phenomenology in France: the Phenomenology of Language', Social Research, 1967. B. Rotman: Jean Piaget, Psychologist of the Real, Harvester, 1977. D. Schneider: 'American K i n Terms and Terms for Kinsmen: a Critique of Goodenough's Componential Analysis', American Anthropologist, 1965. D. Slobin: Psycholinguistics, Scott, Foresman, 1971. B. W h o r f : Language, Thought and Reality, M I T Press, 1956. CHAPTER VIII. G. Bachelard: Psychoanalysis of Fire, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964.

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I. Buchler and H. Selby: A Formal Study of Myth, University of Texas Press, 1968. E. D u r k h e i m : 'Sur le T o t é m i s m e ' , Année Sociologique, 1902. and M. Mauss: Primitive Classification, University of Chicago Press, 1963. A. Glucksmann: 'La deduction de la cuisine et les cuisines de la deduction', Social Sciences Information, 1965. A. Greimas: Semantique Structural, Larousse, 1966. : Du Sens, Seuil, 1970. E. Hammel: The Myth of Structural Analysis, Addison Wesley Modules, 1972. R. Jakobson: ' O n Russian Fairy Tales', in Russian Fairy Tales, Pantheon, 1945. G. K i r k : Myth: its Meaning and Functions, C U P , 1970. S. K ö r n e r : Categorial Frameworks, Blackwell, 1970. E. Leach: 'Telstar et las aborigènes', Annales, 1964. (ed.): The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism, Tavistock, 1967. : Genesis as Myth and Other Essays, Cape, 1969. : Lévi-Strauss, Fontana, 1970. L. Makarius: 'L'apothéose de Cinna: Mythe de naissance de structuralisme', L'Homme et la Société, 1971. and R. Makarius: 'Ethnologie et structuralisme', L'Homme et la Société, 1967. : 'Des jaguars et des hommes', L'Homme et la Société, 1968. R. Makarius: 'Lévi-Strauss et les structures inconscients de l'esprit', L 'Homme et la Société, 1970. P. and E. Maranda: The Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. D. Maybury-Lewis: 'Review of Du Miel aux Cendres', American Anthropologist, 1969. B. Nathhorst: Formal or Structural Studies of Traditional Tales, Bromma, 1969. R. Needham: 'Introduction to E. Durkheim and M. Mauss', op. cit. 1963. : 'Review of The Savage Mind', Man, 1967. : Right and Left, University of Chicago Press, 1974. V. Propp: Morphology of the Folktale, University of Texas Press, 1968. A. Regnier: 'De la théorie des groupes à la Pensée Sauvage', L 'Homme et la Société, 1968. P. Richard: 'Analyse des Mythologiques de C l . Lévi-Strauss', L'Homme et la Société, 1967. : 'A propos de L'Origine des Manieres de Table de C l . Lévi-Strauss', L'Homme et la Société, 1969. P. Ricoeur: 'Structure et Hermeneutique', Esprit, 1963.

264

The

Foundations

of Structuralism

: 'Le symbolisme et 1'explication structurale', CahiersInternationaux de Symbolisme, 1964. L. Sebag: 'Le M y t h e : Code et message', Temps Modernes, 1965. V. Turner: The Forest of Symbols, Cornell University Press, 1967.

CHAPTER IX R. Aronson: 'Sartre's Individualist Social Theory', Telos, 1973. J. Culler: 'Phenomenology and Structuralism', Human Context, 1973. J. Derrida: 'Nature, culture, é c r i t u r e ' , Cahiers pour l'Analyse, 1966. F. Engels: ' K a r l M a r x : A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', in K. M a r x and F. Engels, Selected Works, I, F L P H , 1962. H. Lefebvre: 'La notion de totalité dans les sciences sociales', Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, 1955. : 'Réflections sur le structuralisme et l'histoire', Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, 1963. : 'Claude Lévi-Strauss et le nouvel E l é a t i s m e ' , L 'Homme et la Société, 1967. C l . Lefort: ' L ' é c h a n g e et la lutte des hommes', Temps Modernes, 1951. : 'Sociétés sans histoire' et historicite', Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, 1952. K. M a r x : Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, C U P , 1970. : The Poverty of Philosophy, FLPH, n.d. : Grundrisse, Penguin, 1973. : Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in Collected Works, 3, Lawrence & Wishart, 1975. E, Pashukanis: Law and Marxism, Ink Links, 1978. J. Pouillon: 'L'oeuvre de C l . Lévi-Strauss', Temps Modernes, 1956. : 'Sartre et Lévi-Strauss', L'Arc, 26, 1967. N. Poulantzas: 'Vers une t h é o r i e marxiste', Temps Modernes, 1966. P. Ricouer: 'La structure, le mot, l ' e v é n e m e n t ' , Esprit, 1967. J. Rousseau: The Social Contract and the Discourses, Everyman, 1963. I. Rubin: Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, Black and Red, 1972. J - P . Sartre: 'J-P Sartre r é p o n d ' , L'Arc, 30, 1966 (English version Telos, 1971). : 'L'Anthropologie', Cahiers de Philosophie 1966. : Between Existentialism and Marxism, N L B , 1974. : Critique of Dialectical Reason, N L B , 1976. L. Sebag: Marxisme et Structuralisme, Payot, 1964.

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