Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSO PHY SrwJin in ItulUtn ,,,u/ TilNtAn BruiJhism provick I forum for PII~ liahifll...

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FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

SrwJin in ItulUtn ,,,u/ TilNtAn BruiJhism

provick I forum for PII~ liahifll ouaundinS new contributions 10 tchoIanhip on

THU I UIU.AI CONCUVW to

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dbilc ITldiboni by ClIpoNnc them 10 hUlorJc:.l-eririeal inquiry, iUwninllillJ through COIIICluwliudon and anaIysU thac U'adilkNu' unique bcriup: and the at'Ia' of their contribution 10 the world ', rdipow and

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STUDIES IN I ND IAN AND T IB ETAN BUDDHI SM

FOUNDATIONS OF D HARMAKI RTI 'S PHILOSOPHY John D. Dunne

Wisdom PubliC2tions • Boston

Wisdom Publications, Inc. Elm Sum:

I"Somemlk

MA 01144 USA

www.wisdompubI.org

o wo. John D. Dunne

AlIrishQ~

Fil'lC Edilion 0,

01 07Qj)OS 04

ISS4}11

No pan of lhU book may be rq>rod...ad in any fonn or by lilY means. decuonic or mcc:harucaI, indudil1l pboI:ography, recording. or by any infonru.tion KOnI!t' o r ituic+a1l)'Stenl or tccflnolosics no1f known or Lmr dndopcd, wimoul po:tmiaioll ill .nrilll &om the publiJbcr.

Li.,." .rc.-.g,m Jolm O.

c.uJ.si..,..j,.-~

0.,.

Dunne,

John O. Duruw. P, an. - (Studies in Indian and lIbmn Buddhism) Include. bibliopphical ~krcnca and inr.ks.. ISBN ~161 71-1"'X (pbk. : aUt. pipet) I. DIwmakfini, rm am. L Yogt ....tan (Bu.ddhlun}-Eatly...orb 10 ltoo. I. Tide. II. sma. BQ7!19.D·m F68 100-4 Fouoouion olDtwrn.akini'. pohiIo.ophy I

18I'.o'4}---«n

w..tGm PubIleationi booIu an: printed on acid·1m papa and meet the guiddiner for pmnanmct and dunbiIil)' tel by the Council on Librvy

........

Cova and Interior design by Gopa & Tcdt, Inc. Typcxt in Adobe Ganmond lo.s/iJ Printed in the United StiteS of Amt:rica.

For Jan~ Gilson

Dunn~

PINr./.nu uth. UlrNJl!lIryiSlUilt4j j.n~ lhik I Di1f4JH1Tilmit4 Pl'tJittllllUm4l III riJum Ml ~ /I

PublislNrj Aclmowkdgmmt

The Publisher gratd'uJly acknowltdges the kind generosity of the Hcnhey Family Foundation in sponsoring the publication of this book.

Coments Preface Abbcniarions

I'

A Note 0 0 Ibe Sanskril and TIbetan Tnmlarjoru INTR OOl!CT ION

III

, I

" I

PUMAI:fA Ttu:ou: DHAIlMAItIllTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

1.1 TIN l'rocf!U lI(Knllwirt,,znJ lu Instn""4'rIt

1. 1

IS IS

Two Ubiquitous lrutrumenu: Peraylion and Inference

l.Z

Sham:!. No6oru Concerning PerccpruaJ A-wareneq

Z}

Slwod Notions Concerning Inference The Basic SrnJcmre ofInfttma:

zs

16

The Evidence-PrMicue R&don and 1[5 Exemplifiation

1.8

The Evidence-Subject Relation

H

A Restatement

U

Pramera; 1M -&.r

u

The Simplicity of [he RaJ and a Fundamental Difference

]7

I.' l'u'l!M

G

Cmtat

1S

1·4

P4i"ts4Diwr:m«: TlNAcriD""IUiA,nll

I. S

Sumnwry

p

1

DHAIlMAItIllT I'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

n

1..1

1M Sub ofANIiysis.· DJu.mutkirtii Mnh6ti

n

.11

49

CONTENTS

~"

External Realism as a l...cvd of Analysis Divergent Ince!prmtions of External Realism

6,

79

1.)

79

MQrt D1I P.rtit:14ltm The PC'rcqnibk as Ultimacdy Real

8.

The U\cimardy Real as Inaprasiblc and Momentary

Do Paniculan: Have Sp:atw 1.1

.

The Two PrIlmf1i14 The Two Rc:a1irics

ExtC'nsion~

"

,8

Utliwrs;t/s

II}

Summ2ty of Oturmakini's ApDh.-Thtory

u6

Concerning Sameness or Effect

1

Art I lniycrsa ls Pcrmaocnr>

116

Three Ways of Coruuuing ApQIM

1,1

SVABHAVAPRATlB.ANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFIIRENCI!

, .1 &/atilUl U,rollth Svabhava:

&YO"" ~u,.Prt:sma.

The Two ScRSC$ of $lMbIMw

IS)

Swbh411t1 as · Propeny-

IU

SWlbhillfJU

·Naru~·

Naturc-Jl!/tbhilllf and the Dusal Complex The Subi«t (Jbtt,.",;,,) and SlNIhblilNl as -Nawrc" p TIN PrwIllCtum-mDtit ({the Svabhavapratibandha Some Igoes in the: Applicacion of me Production-mode Concerning Necessity

' oj

LIS

158 161

169 171

In 181

The Detcrmilllllrion of the Production-mode

191

0" tbr &1A1i4nship Jmwn.n ITIpmyilnd MUJI"

19)

Some HeuristK Tunu

196

The Subordination of Propcny TO Narure

198

H Svabluva-l'ViMna."" tiN IJmti".m«k A Few Pmblems

10)

118

CONTEN TS ..

4.1

I NSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYINC THI1. SOU RCIlS OF KNOWLEDC E

22}

PrimiJ:aya III

U}

~/nstrllmmJ4lity"

Purpox and Instrumentality

1.19

The Role of Scripture

1)1

A 5«:ming Ci«:uluity

2.})

SaipturaJ Inference and Dharmakini's

Rtjecrion of C redibility Axiological Concerns: Murual Rtslrunl of Path and Goal

1)9

l..4S

.p DIMmuJtirti on /nstrJlmenllWl]: 71N &rlinl CtllnmcnllJr;.u A(W..",

2.,:2-

Some Basic DdinilMJn5

1S)

-rdie Funaion" (IfT'lhUriJ ll)

156

lrutrumentality (prtlm4l!Ji1) in Terms ofTwo Efftnl

160

lruuumentality in T emu of Ihe Mediated Effect

instrumenwity in Tctnu of the Unmcdiated Effect

161. 168

The Two Effeca and the Two ScnICS of AnlMJrriy4

171

The Primacy of hrrqlirthil

178

Instturncnra.li£Y in Terms of Human Aims: Some Problems and Solutions

280

A Disparity in T ime

181

ObstruCled Action

2.85

PctCCplion and Confirmation

Perception as Motivalor (prilll{lnAJ:t,): The Question ofNovdty Infcrcncc. Error. and TnufWOnhines.s Ultimale and Conventional PrilwUM CONCLUSION

Nlfturr. P""!'tUn. ifNi RLfi_mr

187 198 )10

)4 ]t9 )10

CO NT ENTS

~

Appendix ofTransladons

)31

A Nott 0" UK TTllmlAh'om

HI

I.

PVSVad PV'.J for e>ample, have no Mgin-

ning. and mat OUf current universe is only one in a beginninglcu cycle of expansion and dcoy. Some Buddhuf minkus would claim that even me mon mundane tuk can have no true beginning. That is, if a beginning OCCUr$, there mUSt be some moment, some -now," in which it occun. For the present to exist, howcvu, there must be a pm and a fuNfe, for what wo...kl - now" mean if there WlI;re no lime o ther than now~ And of COU lX, if there is a pUt, then how could now be a bcsionin!j? Now mould instead be the end of the past. Each beginning. in short, must iudf have a beginning.' In a more a:mcrct:e senK, this book also sam ITom bcginningle5$neu, for it arises from a need fOf a point of dcparture----a pl:llct: from whtch to begin-in my work on the thought of Dharma1c.lrti, a South Asi2n Buddbul philOlOphcr of the KVCnth "011.11')' (c.a.).' ThaI Dharm.a.ltirri U wor-

my of OUf attention SttmJ sc:ucdy ncttUaJy to justify. Following upon me work of his pmf«:euor Dignlga, Dharmwni addressed at length numerous quesrions that are ofcentral conct:m to Buddhist thought and practict:. The impact of his views on Buddhist throries of ~roeption, infettnct. and I For ~ ~ modd, _ AKBh .J AK).19 (.,,...J.4). A phibophical a«:ot.iIIl ill found ill tbt ~''''''NMp~and ~oINipj"""'. MMK.

2 Tbc: cblaofot....nuIdni I n r. from~, bul in tbt abtmaof anythi", _dcfin· iriYf" I follow Fra~'1 wrlI-known &nick ([961). Con«mi", lindmd. (1910) propoW or an earlier cbu, hill UUlIIM:nl ill ~ Oft the prabkmaril: aluibution or the M~""""",,MIi,.1O BniV1lYittdca, and ill thw dubiow. II ill auci:al1O IIOIr WI. on my~, tbt preciK dan", oiDbarmdlm and hlIcommcnUIOtI is r. '- impoI'WI1 than wod: tN.t Iocala thc:M

fi&ura in I rd.uivc 1mK. In thil rtpnI. KraNoer',

fiM uampk.

,

work (1m) ill

,

FO UNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

language is difficult (0 overestimate. [ndttd, it would not 1x: outlandish to claim that his ideas arc: repeated in twry Mahiyina Buddhist philosophical work written aftcr his time in South Asia. To this day. the TIbetan m.ns1arions orrus Sanskrit tau arc m:ired. swdkd. and debalCd by Tibetan monastic scholars to such an r:xtcnt that, in the ctntraJ monasteries of the largest Tibetan tradition, a It.ngthy monastic holiday is devoted cnrirdy to debate on the of Dharmmni.'

'NOm

The difficulty in beginning a com'Crsarion on the work of Dharmakirti nems from a problem that ohen plagues systemuic philosophy and theol· ogy: the demma of tbe system art so righdy intmwined that first word of an argument appc:an: to prcsuppox the system in iu entirety.' In Ollar-

me

makirri', case, twO circumstances render this hermeneutical circle paniculally vexing. First, the systcmaticity of his thought is matched by itS complaity and a rrant concision. And second. the BuddhiSt traditions of Sotllh Asia and Tibn. in their revert:nct For Dharmakini, have reappr()+ priated his works through Suca:s5ive generations of commentaries such that we encounter a sometimes dauling variety of ways to read Dharmakini. Al a result. WI: often And a striking lack of consensus on the mOSt basic issues in me contemporary study ofDhunWdni 's thought. A lack of corucruw is not itsdf a problem: Dominick Lau pra ius noted that one: frequendy acknowledged sign of a great work is its resistance to ddlnitive interpteation.' Ncvenhcless. in the case of a systmtatic thinker such as Dharmakini. some of out most useful readings must emphasize the tighdy woven fUrore of the web of idc:a.s that constitute his thought. and without a consensus on even his most basic positions, such readings b«ome impossible. Instead. WI: And ourselves arguing over the dcta.ib of a paniculu position---5uch as his notion of an entity's fUrure (.fVIlbhatw)-without 3 1 am .mrnns 10 eM J."l tip" tWt, the ~ lup holiday of which L..obans GyIIIO PI.,. vida • fucin,rilll and mo¥in& account ;n bia mtmOin (I".). Gcorp Drqfus pva an =ended...d ~riw iiIIXOlIIIl of lhe ewtIt (1OO}:'Wf). and he libiK diJcw.a; eMO¥e\"' &II pbtt of DlunnalrJni in I>F lup cduaOOn.

.. G.W.F. H.-F. 1Oc CDmpk. ~l\Ilhe nWn body orhis IcctUICJ on rdipon of 181, with thil

art:U

(r9IBa l}):

The qtlCJ{ion with wIUch _ haw 10 bcpn is: · How 1m.." 10 ~ , IwgiMins?" FOI il is of CIOUlX at Ieaa , IOrmal requilCnlml of aU .oa-.rific: knowkdsc. and ~ phiJo.opby. thai noct.illl should O\XW it. it that hal noc fCI been po_cd. AI the bcsin. nin" • eated. in all subsequent commentaries on that work. no matter how Late those: commentaries might be." The: next commcnt:ltor, Sakyabuddhi, nat-

I 5 h "f'pc.oo.. th.. in cad. of hi. ...... n Ommen" on .he "".- o r ...... p..,wJ'!"'u, .......

Manoc-adwwldin (o:wdfrl,.( ~l «Drury), theautbor olf'VV. recotdr1lUb.cim INIl)' olJX¥en.

,

IN TR.ODUCTION

uraily repeaa Dcvendrabuddhi's commentary. since part ofhU work is a subcommenwy on Ikvt:ndrabuddhi's tat. But Sikyabuddhi also expands upon Devcndrabuckihi's work by adding his O'NO insighu. When we then come to later authon such as Santaralqira (71.S~-788) and Dhannottafa (A. ca. 800), we find that the ideas and often verbatim phrases.----of both Ikvt:ndrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi are repeated in their worla without any indication as (0 their origin. " This trend continues even in Tibet, where ideas and phrases of South Asian commentators are repeated without identification by Tibetan authon." It is worth reiterating that the Iayaing of commentaries does not come about bccau.sc commenta(Ors, in some slavish adherence (0 tradition, fail to be original. Indeed, the layering of commentaries indicates exactly the opposite: each maNm rcpresenu a new set of innoV2tions and insighu brought to the issue at hand by that generation's commentaton in response to the various developments of their times. Considt:r. for example. the fol lowing comment or Sikyabuddhi . Here he summariu:s a passage from Dharma1cini's SVdl!J'ffi that addresses Dhannakirri's philosophy orlan~ The idea in this passage is that since expressions take as their objccrs a cnnceprual appearance fhat i.s o:dudcd from other appearances, they are therefore established to have other-cxclusions as their objectS." drabuddhi'.commma. And nm PrajMbncupu, ...... won iI: Ilriki.. for h.iI ~dy ddilMnu dtricion to ~ ..... prmou. (:(IIJUnmwil:$, _ ~'I -0. from lime 10 rime. Sec, r...r insona, hili . . of doc eampk of doc twlns.I PVJ.n. (~u· lor'l"u...., 9).lj; PYP:U9aI) and me nocion of Wlivnais as _1Ur.f ( h'-~U· ~,,. .); PVP: I )l~} in flil commala on PV).I9-l.I . 16 Slntanktita. for eumpk, dttm::J hil: notioa of tho! three ~ of constrvin& me tmn rrs" OO:HOO)J from ~buddhi ~ bdow. 1)11f, and abo PVr".2b-I4D K:l~. Dharmo«an (PVIIIT. 5mnkdlMt and Krua.tr 1919,,).)11) adopu ~'. notion of mIriaM" (_r./!J and auinPc ~) inamunmtaliJ}' (10, In IICICOIlIII of lhoeK

IUIJi1 ,

norioona. _

bdow.

~f~lI). ~ .....

(PVi"T. S...on Of c:oncqx....m U -CIM'" iI JUbjccriYdy apcricnad U an affimuolion , 10 how can ,he ob~ of sud! an a:prcstiort or C""lXpt be • MPlion1

21 Ginn mar hinorial i",pon1IKC, " ir ,,,,nw; ....... Inn aIonc any deu.ila of II".;. Ii..,. or Uutitulional afIil.i:olionl, _ CilIInOI na.1U the pr«iK dales of theM: twO aucialIy impoe· .... , conunenml (u"ruJ as d..- " _ prominent cauAI &c.un"

(...o,./u~

16 1M arl"mml for rhc: primaqo of INN!",

th~t

I ht"" summMiud ho:K if !'rom th.:

PIlAMA~A THEORY: OHARMAICI I.T1 'S CONCEPTUAL CON T EXT

1"he semnd set: of :arguments due o:pUcicly acknowledge th~ emphasis on

the instrumentS ofknowl.cdgt are adduced only by Buddhist philosophers, beginning with Digniga and Dharmakini. ThC:K philosoph~n reject th~ notion of an ag~m, and on their view, the cogniriv~ ev~m identified as knowledF is ontologically identical to the instrument, which they conttivc [0 be a mental image. In some comau, they also regard the object or p::!ti~n t :u dq>endent in ~nv. ~nSt! nn rh~ in_ ttmmenr, either bcca~ it i5 not onrologicaJly distinct from the instrument, or because: the chancu:r of that object is determined by the character of the instrument iadf. Hence:, on their view, the instrument is clearly primary, since: all of the other functional dementi in a knowledge CY'Cm arc either unreal or detennined by the instrument. In subsequent chapters, ~ will have an opponuniry to cxamin!!' DhumaJcirti's vll!'WS on,.jl t.h eSt! i~m~ in grea tl!'\"" ckr.r.il. Finally, one can also note that the emphasis on the instrumentS of Irnowlcdgt allows (or even requires) Pnmil)a TheoristS to discuss at length the place: of scriptute: (tif,llmil) or verbal testimony as such an instrument, In all p~ Theories, scripture plays a spttial role, in that it is an ;flJtTW",nll (pramtit;Jll) or means dut enables one to obtain Irnowlcdgc that is otherwiR un!!'dy bI!'yond on!!", ke .... M2ClYcbinu verifi,.bl~ only by sc:ripru~ on!!'n bI!':u directly o n th!!' sotl!'riological goAI"i... hoc" ~ns doc [.un ..... R.c.d ..........up.,;n'. cap.aoca the. ___ pinion (c:.s.. at PV).I,..Rl. Sc... bdow.,s.

P RAMA ~A T H EO aY: OHAIlMAKIU" S CO NCEPTUAL CO NTEXT

l.S

minate, We will consider some of ,hoc debates when examining Dharmakirti', particular theory of pcrccplion, but for now, let us rurn to an overview of inference (.",u,ul1lA), SlMmJ NQritlru CortUr1lj,.,/ltfirm« Infercnn:al knowWg-e:md the topics rcl:.rcd to it:arc p:uticubrly importam

to Pramil;la Thcorius,J1 One can point to three basic reasons fo r the importanCe ofinfcrmcc: first, it provides:acxcu to entities mat arc to some degree unavailable to the 5etl5CS, and such entities arc onen under dispute. Second, it is closely tjed to me understanding ofianguage, an iS5ue mat is cssmtial [0 the 5UC:CCSS of the South AsWl philosophical enterprise.II And third, it provideJ the fftmoewoft. for formal duputation. an undeniably crucial aspen of South AsWl philosophy. As Manlal hill noted, the carlie$[ theories of inference probably arose out of a co~rn with the codificuion of philosophical debate. but propedy spcalcing. what is mant by inferencc here is not a Mryllogism or some other argument. Ramer, an infettllCC produces or constirutes a knowlcd~ even! that IcnQWl iu object by mcanl of Icnowledge about another object that is invariably related to that object. A node aample is the inferential cognition that knows fire is present in a particular locus by I1lC2ru of pcrccptual knowledge of smoke in mat same Iocw. Inference dearly involves some steps. for in providing knowled~ of one thing by means of knowing something innriably related to it, the aa ofinferellCC requires a sequential structure, which ¥oIC will disaw below. Nc.omdcss. the central concern for these thinkers is nOl the fonna.lUm of lhat struct\lrc: itself; instead, they ate most conamcd with the way in which that suucture supplies the n«csmy conditions for an inference. PramlJ:1a Theorists generally speak of two forms of inft:rencr: MinferenceM for-oncsdf' (svdrth4"ltnuiM) and MinfemKr-for-othcrs (p4r4rtMlIw1ltll1lll), M

27 Tho: nst majority of ~ l tell:iact ~ ~t more a«mOOn to infdtliOL and iu tdau:d. ropia (wch u the 1Il.tuJ'e of conupru.aI ocoptitiool than to pu"ptlUl awumat. Noel abo Mohanty'l obM::o ..tioft: - In a work do:vored ro doc c:ot>CXpt of I'QIOO. a t.hoeory ofinlftmoo m ... oc:aopr. CftItni ~- (1" 1:100),

28 Many South AAan phiL. ,Nn 0II'tft awa.ft that if 01>1' a;ouId lIOI ~ an adequau- aa:owu of~ tbt arWrur.m1 of opirirual fi«dom (~moaplKil pi of nearly aU ~ South AIiln pftiIoIopbm of this period, would bt impouibk. To • pnl C'%ttD1. tbt c:rucial rolf of~ in tbt analnmenc oflibaetion raG on ia \lie u. tool dw allows one to 1UppU.n1 faIK bdir& ( ";~"""" m.I]tI. ctt.) wid. indubitabk knowkdsc.

16

FO UNDATIONS OF OIiARMAKIll.TI 'S PHILOSO PHY

The former is simply an infCmcial cognition: one looks at a smoky room, for C'Umple, and (with other conditions in plaao). one infm that fire is present. In COntrast, an infermcr-for-othm is one that is stared verbally 50 as to indue: an inferential cognition in another penon, In other words, this laner ~infa encc" (which is aauaI.Iy a series of stalCfTlcrUS and not an inferma:) is meant to result in another penon having his own infcrenct-for-oncsdf with regard 10 the question at hanci. In this sense, infettna-for-oncsdflies al the core of these: thinkers' inferential throry. But ironically, the I[rucrural dements tholt are neccssary for one to have an infertfltt-for-onesdf are primarily aplorod in di5Cll.S5ions ofinmncr-for-others, To avoid w confwion that this overlap incurs, bdow I will often speak simply of "inkrena:: with me understanding that OUf main focus is the enminarion of the conditions no "pry for a correct (as opposed to a spurious) inferential cognition to oc:cur. THE BAsI c SnUCTUIl£ OF iNFEIl£N CIE

A5 one might expect. the afomnentioned importanO: placed on infen:nce promptS considcl'2ble disagrccmenr among Prami.r)a Throrisn, bur their analyses of inferenCA: always indude Ihe same basic. minimal structure,1t Schemaljaljy, I render il as follows: S is P because E

A typical C'Umple of Ihis type of inference is: The hill (S) is a Iocw offire (P) because of the presence ofsmoke (E).-

Here, S is Ihe "subject," called the uiJh.yaJJ1iIl7t1i" or pt&,4 in Sanskrit;JI P 291M cliapano:nlJ amoII& p~ TMacisa focwon lM.,y in wIUch mil baicll:rucru~ mlU'l Ix IUppomd c:WJoruni. ThiI: amounlS ta an ~I .bow 1M ckmo.na r...r,..J'" an ;n~ Khan (.919'llI9-1.a anc finds in commc .... wi:IIli~l\I~, .. Qttnpl.ilVd by dw; oIt.dda~ Malctnml, ',dri.frynilJ"Ul"l'f! iruUtIItb. My mluennan is tIuc 1M 1U\K'fU~ of mil _m>enl iI IIx b.io; mn:: oflUl"""" P'apuiy

""""""'.

.ho. th.c """" fd!- h.u been ...cd ... iocc !>etc; on« .0 ,da- .0 the ...t.;n.tabk. bt.. m.. EncUsh ICt1'II ~qwlicy" iI onm uwd to Irvubl.. ~

~ wIUch

tdns to • ~ q~jl)'-ituto.na:.

JS Althou&h dx Saruluil Imn ".,ti and odxr. rebud tmJU (lOCh af 7"u.. .,."., and ~ OCCUr ift dx worIa of UddrouJw;a (..." . NV" ..... and ;als• ..-.;.) and Pnh,tap"h (q., PDS:I1'), dxw pbibopben do nuc M,.. dc.cribe dw: rdMMJa bu."" pmIia~ and ~ • ~ indcul. in ftW1r_ Itxy make only implicil rrkrmc:c 10 the reb. lion.. In COIIUUI , both Kumlrib (... " , Sv, ,,,....._ ,-i-) and Dhannulrti (PV. HD. PVift. ND: ,.m...) ~ dx tmn ",.,n I)'ICmIWc:alIy to dcxribr dw: pmlial~na: fda· lion. and foilowift, DipIIp'1 1ead, dxy a.ppar 10 be dw: fine. Pnmlq.a l1xoNu 10 nnploy ""',,; wnsiRall.l,........ ~ia: rna. -... bo:ame m.. 00I1D. J611w: un .....ldr tranJiuiOraenl an inlc:nncdulC", btt.w, me rdation »wpiUt,U and ~ rebtion » ncccauy, While i. is uuc lhi, Pnh'laptda', work (pru ' 147-~. UI) ahibia ooIYI modeM IIIcmpc 10 $!'lOW beyond tIlCft wpmmoo, UddyoaIwa. in tw aiDqlK ofDi&niP (NV:l6)-167 .J N$ ••IJ; ci. H.ya ,,&0,,..,11) &nd eI, .. Iw;..... "PI'"'" 10 ..ndoc........t And rocy,i..., oonmmiWltt ill mnuapoliOonal. 1M implication here il tN. the evidence-predicate rdalion is NCn"')'oo hi:!: tboory. UddyoaIan.', rcc:op.ilion ofdK~,c ldation ill nrusary ill Wo augmed by the faa that. e¥m in cue when; only the MpM conoomiWlOe 0' rauiaion can be acmplihed. dK cvidenc:c-Pftd.ica.c .mtion nill c:onai... both (NV'I .... - LU). Ohartn:akirti', RCOS1Iilion of ~ ~pred>ca,c rdltion as rw......my io abuncbndy dar, and his diat:inaiw contriburion lie in fotmubtion of. 1N~"UhII (5« SfCinkdlna' '971:101-104 and &110 below, chaplcr J). Dharmaklni nnpIoytan no:n ~ ~ cite UK ai tWI (e" . in hil initial praocnano. of.,qti in PVSV ..tpy,.I; G',-I1-IJ). His ~-- . . ' ...... T 1ft

pOl' ind,,* ~ 1OUowin&:

If ~ pRKOOf of ~ wac: pnv:oda! by ~ prama of fin::, ,hm non-fi~ bet.. ndudtd fivcn f.II:>OU, would be ~I only in ~ c::uc: of ncH\·unokc. Thw.. ill ,his 11.. , .. ioU, io "",.-...Jed t..,. .""............... Lilo.c..iK, ;..... ",..;1... non-fin:: is ~ by I'IOn~. IIrIOkc: g. adlldN from non-fin::: at auch. i, is N ( p';ly ~ by fin:: bc:a.- " Iw no pouibillry of aisrinl U11CN1W odw:r non-f,", kKus.1""'"-iIMw pi.l:Wo._ ~/'k iupir III"'1"~ 11.Jhii_ftIf --1'

II""-r.,~ I-,u,....

rlbno-.v

"*""J ....~ ~""- III,.." III~WJ"'"' -Jl\$lt'lled,. FOt difkrHlI ttUOfU, both Ko,unlrw. (SV, ....,,""'-I)I- In) and DlwnWtini (MY ""PVI.I)Ib. G").I- II) rqea this

.-m-;.. en.""'"

me

me

.mn.

type of atp;umnll.

In .adi.ion to allowins I .... ' tilt counrnaatnpk is not ,M 'Y in aU cuoa, Dh.unWtini (pVl.l7-tJ, PVSV ..., ~ PI as &r as to Ay that 011< 1'211 diJpmx with aampks alto~ if lbe pernsion (~,D) iII"'ready &milg, ,0 lhc in,c.!ocu.on: in...do cuoa, .... JIC" ...-......... doa.- .to( o:nd of dv: ~, ....t.lk Dtwm:oJdni and ..... foIknotn take ~ diamctriaIly oppoKCl ¥ioew. Aaotdilll.o .be sundard NyI,....-kw- dc;fwdcd by Uddyotabra. dv: poopwirion mid< Ix _mI DOl only ac mr~nnin" bu. ;. m.... Wo Ix tqlt:lml l ' ohm mil ... conc:huion Of -1Um1N00n" (NpMlUl4). Hma. foo. Naiy.iyiba, .I\ill.~ in/ff. ma-Ior-odlm Iw fiYe dcrnmu Of "limbo" /.,;p).

I. The mountain q.1ocw offiR (the propoai. ion: ,~lijU, Beaux ;. iII.1ocw of srnoU (the ~ J.m.) J.. WhcRO(IIben: il lInlOIu:. then: ill fin:. »in ~ banh; without fin:, then: is no omoIu:, .. in • t..b: (~ion and annplificolion: "JtI.......,....) .... The rroounwn is a Iocw of .mou (!tN: ,pplic uion: "I"''"''Y4 or IUtenlm' of 1.

,...,·4,

.toO

I. Tha&'OfC,

me, mountain it ~ Iocw of fin: (oondwion Of swnnwion: "ip_,..,.

PRAMAIiA T HEORY: OHARMAKIRTn CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

J5

W e haW! now owerM rhi!' mou Io:Ilii!'nl vill'WS IMt Pr:a.mil)a Theorisu share aboul the two ubiquitow forms of instrumenu of knowledge: perccpt:ion (prtl~)and inference 6"'II*nIl). Let us now rum to lO me basK: views concerning the instrumental objcct (pramry.t), the objca of an insuumenc of knowfedgt:.

1.2 Pf'2I1leya: Th~ "R~ilr Al

nOled

pln'iously, the term prafflrya refers

10

the object of the indu-

bitable knowledge derived from an inst rument of knowledge or pf'llmi!f4,

and to clarify that a pra",lJ" is specilically an object of this kind ofknowledge. I will pmly manllali!' ,ra",~:as ~inJt rumen~ objecr ...• For P~a Thcoruu, an inn rwncntal object is ncccssarily what we might call "rt"a!. in English. I am thinking here especially of the Sambit tCfm SIlt, a participle fonncd from tht verb ~ tO bdaiu· (111). The: connoaIn irs fuJIac forni , this ~ indudel both 1M poei~ and neprivc conc.omiunoe in the aanplifialion, bul as _ iu.,y 1«11 , Uddyoubra:Wo:&dm.ia inrerenas thai invohoe only poIJlM concomitance (Le., I '-'IboMJfI'l) or on.,. nqaUw conoomiu.na: (i.e., a

'-''''"'r

.ri,mflj. For additional mru.rb and ¥ieM on the Nliylyib approach. I « ....,....;.lI y Mati. bI b~:n-7I). Pomr (1977:110-111). and Mohanry (1991:101-106). In COrIttUllU Uddyoubra. Dhumakini, on his m(-.f rnarun..,ft. prensl panimoniaw approKh. This panimony Menu &om his rommlion (iMerilcd from DignJp) tNl an illfna-ott thouId OftIy contain the "mcana" (IIIJ}",M) for ..,-..:ruil'll:an inkrmtial WF'irion in the inrnioculor. As, one tnipl aput . ... th;, b.iJ.DhannUIrti ~ the remlmIC'nl of 1M .,...-.poArion:ll' tondLUion. bile k rven the need ro MaU' the propo.;rion 1Il..a. His poinl is tNl the propotilion is IlOl Klually. 'mc:;lru' ro the immckd inkrmlW coplilion: n.bcr, the mans it ronKiUlled by Ik "rhmfold e>idma:" (,...;,..,.",Ii,;,p). i.~, n-ickna: dwaani!ed by iu rdalion 10 the 1Ubj«r mel by Ht2bliJbed potili.,y and nepti.,y toncomiWIU.. For this reUI)Il, Dharmaklrti :Wo ~ lbe need 10 IC"~ the IQiOIl xpuudy (as in, "bcautc it illlocw of ItnOkcl. ~ the: Oft!yekmmu n«.eM&ryare: the tuecmc:nl of the pcmWon (in _ QIC:I..ith ill Icaot pooitivc oemplifiarion) alon@;..irA the~. of the: cWXnClNubjm: rNlion Gtw!;s'&.....u). Sec Tilkm:ana {'9ii and 1m}. Kwnlril. lua an inrermedialc IIO'ition buwCCh Udd)Vlabra and Dharnu.ldnL He mainwnr thai an inkftllCC-fOr-odlcn &houId always induo;k swcmmu of the proposilion. the ._t.lot ~wb;ca rdacion, and the pcn-.won aanplifio:d by 1l1caot. poeiiM aampk. The propoIirion nuy be _ed :II ather:an inilial "ilw:si," (~) or I condoaion (-;'--J. ckpcndins on whnhcr ;1 it Kaled btfotc or Iner the ,.. ir*,,..t.l and acmplilKd pervuiolL Sec $V (....1OIi_· 107ffl. For an arulloriQ] bul utdid ICIDOUn l. I « Shan b~; ~JR) .

'*""

,,"1'*

ns. a oincle mlil}' may haft man,.. C'f'CfI rnunWI,. CIOf>ltJdiaory qwdi .... Thif ~Iy IICIa>nb with his pramUlUon of I • qwdiry. P'C"" __ • (~.) ... chc paexptL.lal obja;l: (fCC npmi.ll y Sv. '~lfl -IU). 1u ;. ollen the c...c, Kwnirib·. c:onMnIaI of r..!.rionl in ImIlI of·dilfttenoe.nondiffcrmcx" (HwII~ nuke:. a p.....::iM: UlCUllWftI ofhil pmltion difficuli. Nou chal, unlike iu .... in rhc conCCXI ofinfa'ma, 'qlYlity_~" iI probably the Ilea lrandalion or ~i" in mil comm:. Ana tIN,.;.. ;. ~ roug.Jy cquinknl 10 ,he _.,.. ...." of the Nylp -Vai"fila ' I The tnpw, 'IIO'Ofdt "unil" and "uniry" an tmlpDns tnrulation for mand ~m.&i, but only ironc .ncndliO their ~ In. rdalni ~tc:n. MatibI (19?1:nl abo \lift "Ioimpk" for m.

}8

FOUNDATiONS OF DHARMAKI RTI'S PHILOSOPHY

"1'h:1.[ is a wal{'r-jug. ~ Since W lerm "water_jug here is singular. it must refer 10 a single obj«t. These argumena rest on the daim dul the gramnur of a:prasions corresponds 10 the rca1 propmies of objcca. More sp«i6ca1ly. !he singulariry of an exprc:uion corresponds ( 0 W singulariry (dAt.l, mttJJa) of me object ( 0 which il is applied. In shon , in Ihis ~rd allan, grammar and Ontology stand in a relation ci isomcr:ric correspondence.» When combined wilh the nolion dut the real is simple or singular. Ihis alleged isometric correspondence: })(:fWttn gr.tmmatical and ontological number leads to Ihe second type of argum{'nt as an imponant corollary, namdy, that a grammatically plural a prcssion musl in fact rder to mullipie obj{'Ct$ that ar{' ontologically singular or simple. Thus. ifit is meaningful , a grammatically plural expression or concept must correspond ontologically to numerous, ontologically simple entilies. This condngcncy of grammarical pluraliry on ontological singularity poina [ 0 thc third set of argumena in F.tvor of the reaJ as simple. These arguments rest on lhe we of reduaM analysis (vibh.if., vicar.. etC.) and the principle rhallhe real is irm:lucibk That is, when we apply the appropriate form of analysis to a real entiry, we should nOI be able 10 break or anaIyu il inlOsmaller partS. since a real enlity is simple. If that seemingly real entity can succmfully be fu nher analyud--broken into para. as it were-then its simpliciry is only apparent; it K'ttIU 10 be simpl{', but in faa il is compia. and as such. it is not truly real. In this way. onl~ simplicity corresponds [0 analytical irm:lucibiJiry. Thus, if any real thing is n«emrily umple or unitary, il is also neccuarily irm:lucible under reductive anaIysis." Many Pramif.\a Thcorisu usc (or at least allude to) all mree fonns of vgutnc:n l to c:scablish a real thing as simple. but throughout these arguments. d~ notion thaI the real mus! be simple remains uncontened for Dtwnukirci and his principle opponents. Their un:mimiry on the issue of simpliciry, hownn. lcads them to a shared problem, which we can illuslfa[e in [eons of me aJlcgcd whole du[ is a water-jug. We may daim Ih.U, wbcn we sec: a ft

S2 Thor qummu pramfcd hom: an: d>OK IOund in dlCworksof'Vlupyana (NBh:.¢1-111) and Udd,.oulw:a (NV;461-1 lj .JNS1.I.)I- }6). Sft Mobanry (I99J:&6-9Jl for an 1$P""'i 11lr lddial.tWllmary of m-~ ... Many.d>OUn haft rrcop>izc.d tt.. impomnco: of pmmar to

Soum AsU.. thougIf. buf tt.. KnI..p

lOon of 1M uzumcnl

mUll fv if fOund ill

nolion of the rnJ:os

t~

BrorIkt-. llm )· S}

AJthough Halbf.ue:

rd'~

Imjuetldylo

I~

"irmillCiblf" in

Vmqilao philolopby (1991.']1. '1, li S. I..). IMI«.OOduy lil tflllW'l: 01\ Bnlvnanical ~ 11°CU01 ....... liu1.: nupI.......... .hi. i ......... "".., .....'U'IUI' ollo,b "'1'V",U-'I7. and • • .JPV).I94l ,....1 hJ..yJ ....1.IJ,i (...... t'Vr;.....t.) r.~lOCfl.IT";'" V....L-..J.h .. _ .............u: uf ....... ul Otwmaklni', thKNia

PRAMA~A THEORY: OHAFlMAKIFlTI 'S CO N CEPTUAL CONTEXT

4'

That of which one docs not have a cognition when it l'las bttn broken [into parts 6nl"JWw)j is conventionally real (Ul'!'lJ!1isat); an example is a water-jug. And ilia, of whidt one does not have a cognition when other [elemenw qualities (dlMmsa)j have bttn excluded from it by the mind is also conventionally real; an example is water. Th:l[ which is otherwise is ultimately real (p'wlwui~t).'7

"",.Iffionw,

S7 AK6.4' ~"" un'flN 114 ".II.. ·.lJl.ir tI1I]"i,.N Jhryi (II lIf' I III,!,,,,,",,' ~~ ~bnckl:tcdpbn$Ct · inlg puu" (II ...... ,,{.~) and "dnnmwq.w. itieol" (JNnu..jcome &om VasuhandbU·1 own commmtary. .......idI reach (AKBh:&,o): llIar of which _ doc:t ' - .....~. OOInilion..ben il ...... bf.cn ~ inlo para iI c:on'lUltionally rcaI. An eumpk iI. w:IIlu_ju," for when J oraler· jus il brokm inlo shards. ont doc:t noc ....."" • qnirion of il. And ,....., of which OM doa no! han a qn.irion when od>n- ckuKnal qualitH:. (.O--) ..... ve b«n a d udai (.,.;".,) by me inrdlca (h@) ilaiIO fO Ix known I I QOIIwntio.u1ly mi. An c:umpk iI-'ler. for wkn _ nM:nally adudes ia form and 10 on. ont has no CO&Ririon of -.rtl. Th..ol if. QX1'1U1lional dcsipwioaa art appl~ 10 lhoN: thlnp such II w:IIru· jup and WUtt. Hcn«. wkn _ $IIy. by me for« oJ COII ...... lion. ~ ill a -.lcr·j1.os and _ ...... _ ...."".poI lhc matd _ UMS 10 obWn IcnowIecIp- ihroup tNl IN:M, tj . ;' iudf'

..-!'14

~,

71a

.OW( ......... !)-....).

noW. ,.",_Jtti4i.,.,.rihJ.. ss:

,..w-

,. • .,uiJ m'lrIi".""...,. iii". ~ H.

_~

_

-.ttl. .,., ..",.",. f ...... ....

73 Indml u Halbha: Iw no«d (1991:7'0). Udd)'Vl2bn. and lid (dkIw NaiyirikM abo wed

PRAMA~A T HEORY: DH ARMAKlilTl 'S COf'lCEPTUAL CONTEXT

-49

Oharmaldrti's philosophy, h~r, IITthahiyd is not rmrdyan aspect of knowledge: it is. from at lean o ne penpective. me prindpal criteri on in m c detennination of some cognition as an instance of knowledge. This may givt sorm readers visions of a preoocious pr2&marism predating Peirce by more than a millcnnium. but this imctpretation would bt: ovtrsating the cue. Instead. we need only note that. while most PramiJ:la Theorisu feengni-uod ~ impon:2rlU; of purpous :l Ind gnall in the process of knowing. Olwmakini iJ willing to place a much stronger emphasis on goals than any of his conremporarlcs or principll opponenu.

1." Points ofDiwrgmct: Tht Action and Agmt Up to this point, we havt aamined certain common assumptions and concepts shared by most Pramilp. Theorists in rdation to the instruments of lmowkdge and the irutrumenDi objeru known thereby. When we e;um ine the remaining two aspectS of the knowing pf('l('ttS i.e.• prllmiti (the aerion of knowing through an innrument ofknowledgc) and prilNtr (the 2r t of mu :w:tion}--~ lind much leu 2gl?CfTlent among t~ thi nk~. In ~ to pr.",iti., me "action of Imowing" o r Imowled~t th2t raulu from employing an instrumctlt of knowledge:. there is considerable diRgr«mcnt bmYtm Olwmakini and his opponenu. This disagrffincnt focuses on two key issues: lim, is the action (kriy4) of knowing dinina from iu other aspects. cspeci.illy the instrument (laM!"')? Second. if acrion and irutrurmnt are distinct. do they stand in a causal relation. such that me instrument is the cause :md the xtton il the eIkct? The Bnhmanical thinkers to whom Olwmakini appean to aUude-the unknown SiJ!lkhya author of the yWitlipiu, the V~ib Pramtapida. the Naiy.1yib Uddyotakara.. and the Mimi'!"lWa Kumirila-generally claim dut action and ifUtrument are distinct." although Uddyotilira does allow for their con· ·..ergcncc in certain cues." These philosophen also gener.dly daim that the rd2tio n lw:rwu:n the :ocrion 2nd inJfrnmem i$ OIu~ l ; Ihty do nOl ,

h~f.

agree on how that causal process OpeDtei. Nevenhdcu. sintt the action of

tb. mm ~ FranIwmUirti anployl dUl Yiorwin hill knghy di..·.;o., of tM inruwncnw dfea ~II me end oflbe IhUd chapen, farti,. wim tM pro&opc at 1cr .. ~ or .. conNaion (,.J,.), wbac both 1m)' ~ in'nprrlnl • ~ (~. The e:rpIicit l'qUItioCI in qllCAion (II"~ - ",.;,. _ • .v,.J ia: KYa'll pbas. indudin& PVUll_ll).

mack.,

"* ...

17 I but dW inlCfplmtion of ~ upon Dtwma!Wti'. npUd. aafl:mmt duo. isnorsntt q aNKXpc.wiry (PVSV .JPV'.9' n'b; G:,c:l.1O: ",~. This illUpported by 1M claim dut iponna: il t(It.In:e of.n &,,1 .. {PV,.J.u..-c.: .."..."..". ~1f~p.o;~ /""~, ...d ..... ~ .... .Joo ..... _ _ of ... (.....u {PVSV .JPVuw, G:lIo.1O-U; II ( . ~/ ." "uWM>lMN!J). Thc.:kat imp/aeion iI dul Jcnonnotcan be: equated with conaptuIIIiry. 1M ofDlwmaldrti'••nxk on aNI'

u...

roa..

upcu.aliry is iu imputaUoa (,.....~ of an untal i~ (oiU,.)-moa pamcu1ar1y WI of ~ (~-omo Ihinp aJw ~ in faa umrly dQrinn (- . lOr aampk. PVI.A-70 r.nd MY .J m., tnNilled in dw: appendis;..., alao bdow, 1..4). Thc climinxOon ofisnoranc:e can mill ~ undemood all an elimination of 1M Imdrnc:y (.wlli) due 10 which one cornpuIii¥dy impum AmnICa omo n";lles dw ue in faa not dw: ame. For enmpll, rII. TIE ba.t L ........ ·li. IIM i.., ........... in HR. wt.n.. the argumenl il one: &om amena: (- J . For an account focwi", on thaI qumcnl , _ esp:ciaIIyOetkt (199) .

"0 Diptlp dairns WI particubn are inaprasibk in ....0.1" JUCh u PSV . . PSI.I.wI and np«i.Uy PSV .JPSUff(17I7ffi,

41 DtwnWtini IUIIllI up lhiI basic pmniJC in.be phtue •... individual entities nefti' prodUQ1: • di.uribu.lcd aWUt:neM wilhoul dcpoetId.ins on , "ninnal' 1M UJlriJ IIJtI!"'Jt&!I sJttti1rJ'V'irqrltfl ~ ~MI!'~-""'; II'VSV ~ I'V I. I04; G:SJ.-4-1JJ. ~ _ will dioa.uo f'unt- DharmaIurti'. notion thaI" univmoal. beins, discribu.red mory, c:annoc be ultim.ndy rnl. Oharrnakirti abo =narka:

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"

from every other entity (J41V.dt6 hhmNL J41V.dtil vy4vrtliL U4ntll"1'illJ1liL etC.)." Exprused in mis fuhion. uniqueness points to one of (he rwo basic constraints on Dharm.alci'ni's ontology, namely, that the real mwt conform (0 the dictates of reductive reasoning. That is, if an entity wen: distributed and rnw reducible. it would not be unique, sinCt' it would shaI'(' a spariote:mporallocus or semantic identity with the entities over which it is dUrrlhurM. AI [he .lame rim .... Ihe crilerion of uniqu~eu:l1Mo me:lru rh:lt Ihe

u1timatdy real has a specific {niJAtIl}or restricttd spatiotemporal locus and nature: it occurs in a specific time and place with specific causal capacities. Expressed in this fuhion, uniqueness satisfies Dharmakini's s«ond basic ontological consmint: mat the real ahibit a kind of regularity (implicit in me tenn niJ;ttll) such mat our perceptions do nOt appear to be simply random (tlltllmriJ.II)Y

In terms ofOOm irreducibility and regularity, me uniqueness of the ultimately real is reflected by 1Vd~?U'> the term mat Dignaga and Dharmakirti USC: to refer to ultimately real entities. In its earlier wage in Vasubandhu's Abhidharma works, II. 1Vd1a~~ is II. way of dwacr:crizing an

0..'-' dMJ wb"' ;. pcrifoc" and .~" Iu¥t moft" in c0mmon with Vii$Ul.ndhU'1 1IIII: of m.:.c IrnTU II. - 1 to di~nria" tht- 1ICOpc= of VI ",Iiris p' .p" MoO...; ........ -r •.,!",,"_ ......... '""1'..-.....;'1'. \Vh.ik "'"" .. _ _ con';"";"'''';n. this nocion in Dipdp and DharmaJdni. il is ckal thaI tho: qo_io" of daKif1i", pmptr. ties aoc:onlin, 10 dKU- tc:OfK illUbordiNllt to _ ...... 1" about distincion b.ucd upon per. apO>ililY. apr-r'libililY and.. for Dt.arm.Wni, dIicxy. "This is QWKiody danonstnled in tho: Ww:s rl.uit-tu foe- tho: ~ of ,he mini ~!"'f and ~""!"'f in Dharmaldrti. PV).I..,.

47 'T"Ix dlanaumr.lion of puticulan II capUllt of .die Ii.oncrion is madr cion, for only uirim:atdy ral. entitics--p:an:iculan-producc dfecu, ~ ~I

Set-. for c:umpk, PV).lJ.4; &ape lOr ~ a ClUK, thrft it nodUnt: me thaI lhal could contriNl( &II mul)", ban& the apprdIaIdtd oe;ea, Atncq 1M alllG of a~ dw aW( in ~ Umop: awvax.&rioa ilalkU N.nnU.irti'. IIlOM ~ IUlenxnl of mil poinl is; -UiA:ma: is just pattp' lion- IPVSV .. PVI." C '+IO: _ ' " rf. SlhUkdln.rr 1~Jl.t I. nil daim. ..i.kb mipl nom bo: JV>dc:mi "To mn it 10 t.. puetiwui, - indiala 1M doR rtblion be.... etU ptiIXpbon IlId the IIhilNfcly raJ ill Dtwm.akini', philotophy. To this_ add parpr dul specifytNC (II only patticubn produ« dkcu; (II dw; oe;ea of a paap: luai , _ ii, puticubr; 1)1• puapcwl a...vr:_ is rdalcd by pgaiUvc and ncptive

.,.IHJJJir,.,.;

objca in lhal il iI caUKd by lao obj«t: and (4J I I14jyoma/ if wvtal in dial iI it incapable of &II df'C(I. PV}.I _, it dw t.nG rlGiou for hI and bl. Paaup rdcnnl w and 14J induck;

conmmjWKC 10 ju

ul

cau.sinc

PV),S9: Thtrc if indtptndml .pprdlcnsion (i-.... paapcion IInmcdiucd by conapes) of mal objora wilh which, d"", 10 d.( ~ Clplcil)' of mal ob;ca. th.u aware_ ill rd.ucd Ihroup. P"'IM IlId nepi'lC"U ,ccnilllla. A. dUll! dial if oma INn dw IlL, OM mal is 401 concomiwlI with 'W'ltmcsl in dw I'adUonI it lqoond Ihr --- ,•......wn.- J-"'" ! ".,.."...rdiktJ I -.,.. , - , . r~'"

""-":rio' __

.~ .",..-.,;~ .

PViu .Ju (1flb?-IS)l1j: Then _ rwo kind. of ob;ecu (tmJ.). dx dircaly per«pIlbk ~ and dw; mnott ~, or !hex two. dw ditealy ptrcqxibk it dw 10 -..bich dw, form (u.,,,,oJ- .w,.JnI dx imag: in _ _ onnf'orrns Ihr-r;h pnoilift and no:pOve eoow:onUlaIKI'. "if. wUqll(, real mintolW!ldy, me puricular. TIx cxhn doc. 401 Nve d.( capoc:icy 10 direcd)' pIaa: ill own form in • ........-• .0 iI

...,1,.., ,.

1

bo: (dim:dyl puuMd (,.,.,.,. .. {yJ.MJ. (... ,.; - , . p]iJ ",oJ""P" ,.'" D"" ,. # tit " P"I zIIrt • ,. i ".."," ..... ~ ..,. '1" ,. iN" tIiutf JJ.r,. i rjn III . .0.",., ~,. _ .i "'''P'' III", . . I,u ,.; ." -... C&nnoc

86

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PH ILOSOPHY

In relation to this issue. Dharmakini makes some additional commcnu thai , on Sakyabuddhi's interpretation, amount to a striking asscnion: every ultimately real entity is perceived by some perceiver somewhere. Although Sikyabuddhi's interpretacion may not be beyond doubt. another important but 'oYCaker claim is explicit in the pas:sagc--namdy. that the capacity to create a pcrccptKm of itsdfis the minimal telic function of which any ultimately real thing mWI be c:apable. H

_ ]i" ,. j . , . , , . i roflll Wi" ",....," ...." .,rJ M I pi- iii . . " ' . '" ,....,

"lIP" .;.,,.' _,." -.,,.1 pc:.tfo.-:n

~r,.",.,..u

'dwI,.",u ""1,

PV).JO: A uni¥en;aI (:&/\IV)[ nom tIM, tdic fwv:rion of Amply prodOOnc i ImIOf)' lIWUCIIeIIofiadf. ADd p.eciody (tIW) IxaUK i. it irK'lpobkof.tw. illw no narure (...v,.J [i. .... i. iI untmL d . PVP:l.4J1.sJ. lOt ohit incapecioy lOt rdic fUnction ill dK dcfjnition of unrc:aI dUnp. (ju.........mJ.d.r.!'" ."~,,, .u nM 141 I tM

..I.

~ ,,.. -,.,.""',u.,-..~

S3 Noc~ dul pan of wiuo, it II JOb " - it tIK ~ iNuc: of ""'- it IIKaIIt by · p".QM: miKorumw ol'iu ob;ca. The _ in qlKlCion tad II follows:

mat

Thinp do . - lllrinu.tdy luve W MNn [fIlCh all bans an ~ obj«t ~tMIiI~ dw they an ptiai....d to Iu-.c ....... mc they hive neithct a go.cuW'a m..Jriplicil_ ~ [PV},)S,]. - SuI ~ 10 -wJy COO'tUIUon (WI), dlK 10 upaicncilll_ Jimibmy, an illusion an.. becaUK one demmiMs tNt ...tUch does noc ha¥t such-and.....dt a nawn all luvilll that iWW'C.. Bw in tho. aoc, that if noc poMibic becaUK on )'OIl! ..ww noc C¥m 0fK mti.,. in the -'d iI ot..a-i 10 hive llul illtim' [or ba"l an ...... cl... ..Jo:,J "" .........

..a..;.:........t ...d.J. (rv,.~,.t.J.

11lft'e iI challtind «illusion. bul theI-e iI alto the: one dw br its 1lI~ an..ibwo:d ill dw it onpnalo::a; ffom an inu:ma/ d41onion (_~ ~ if W c:uc wilh the pou:ption of luin by a P"1OII wilh CIW'IICU and 10 on, it conwru a hlK ~ appcanna withouf ckpcndinl upoa W ~Uon of Iimibri.,. and wc:h. [PV).j6tcd-P'V).j61] IM.IN'"... ..mifJtt". ~,!",..". ~ I J-lrttU,.v. ~ w ~'!' tqJJ!f _ ~ U ·14 1M) { "",Vi ~ IJn.Jllti, ~ 1 ~"i WU""""",.OIlJ#jstantialisl ontologies of mosl non-Buddhist Soulh Asian systems or in temu of Dharmwni's nominalist theory of universals.O: Hence, since it cannot manifest change through some alteration in accidenw properties, if a uni~ changes, it essentially changes, which is to say thai it becomes 50mething dse, In shon , if "cowness- changes, it becomes a univerul that ~hou ld ~ insr.> nfi ~ ~

in

indi"id,,~ll .har

weff' nncl' .. nWl'. hll' nnw aff' nn

longer cows. Thus, in order for the mcrcntw function of language and thought to suc:eced, univcrsals cannOt change. On Dharmakini's view, hov-ner, if universals do nOt change, then they cannot have any causal efficiency bc:cause in order 10 function cau.sally, an enrity mU$( change. That is, if an entity cannot change, then ifit i$ not currently producing an efha. it will n"",~ produce an e/Tect. It could not produce an effect becaw:e an unchanging enu')' that is nOt currt'ntiy in the stllte of producing an dfea cannOt change from the state of nOt acting as a cause into the na~ of acti ng as a cause:. Alternatively, if an unchanging entity were to produce effects, it would

i".,,_

......,Id """ boo 1""",;bIo!. i"" ....... (IJ,.,U) ""n....,. ................. induu""'" * copition. r,,~ iii ~'" igtftr I tI"u,.tfIt ~"."" INul/Jil ~

tUf'tlfJtIJ>IJ"th II. l'he ~ dw a uniwn:aI ""'" in _ _ bo:COml thlnp ClnOOI be modi· 6ed by elx addition ~ ~bo:ra(lioo of qualiciet.. bul abo thai produaion q Kq\la"i~ and dUI teqUCflriallty prauppo6CI dunv. I han':wumtd thae la1m' cwo axioms for .he p~ta lion~. Soc PV1..4Jab (a. Nopomi 1911): 'En.;la dw oiJ< in '''""porU ~do 001 Of'i&iIUICfrom the POIIXI{1O«Icia). and ,hal which c:&nnOI: be modific.d ClI\noIlkpcnd upon. JUPPl>t'iinr; oondi.iona" 11flkr....., ~".i~ No.iW"." ~!"4tl . Soc abo PVSV.,J PV.l" (G:rn.l4ff) [.w". '''l'1li' ~t:II"",""Mh4101'" dfrdA""'!' *.,"-!-ri, ,obo·u,.,,'!'

,*~lJip'" ."u~~ "', Chhcr ~ induck PV •. j S ""PVSV .,J rit.. (G:u.wfl) and H B (c'I- , , ' .•~ ' . J). Soc Scrinkdlnct (1961) and Octke (199) .

601 Bdow _ will_ thai. 00 Dlurmakini', n.w. a univcrAI is oonscNCiled by (ONtruin&a casni1i..r: image in ccm\I oil rqillion. 11x ~ _nl$ fol the pnmommal conum in conapruaI and linsui*tk qtIi.ions; the nqarion iICCOWIiI for u.., ditnibucion requim:l by !housh' and Ian~. On duo theory. the uniwnal .... i..,. is ind«d QUlaIly df'.....cioou, .nd .. oudo.. it ... p-"Oadar. Bo,.. w'-' ~ved in 1I~ly qU:llify.61 In rejecting any real distinction betwttn a thing's propenies and the thing i~l f, Dharmakini holds [hat the apparent distinction betwccn a thing and its pro perties is actually a result of the process of conceptual abstraction that we employ in order to speak about a thing's causal characteristics. One conceptually abstracts and construcu the property ~ bl ue." for e:umple. from a blue_arom in order (0 focu l on the bhlc-:>tom'. capacity to p:lrticip:lte in the production of a blue image in a pcrceprual cogni_ tion. In fact , however, there is no property "blue" that is distinct from tbe atom iudf." In tenns of change, this theory of properties makes it impossible to claim that the atom could somehow remain the same alom and yet undergo a in one orits propenies: a bluc-atom cannOl: become white and yet retain its identity as the same atom. The implicit argument here is dut if:my property or the :Hom d'l:lngts, then the :>tOm iuelf mw t ch:mge, because me property is actually identical to the atom. H ence, ir the atOm changes in cauW ternt5--Cither because it starts to produce an effect or it stops doingso--then tbe atom itsdf mWt "change" in that it cca.scs to be the: same atom; in this sense. a ~change" in (he atom acru.aIly means the ces-lation or the atom.

crumgc

6) T1w: rcnnal uyLe of aitiquc tmployal by Dbarrnakini . 0 rdiI.., hypoil:n'f M ,nVlliabk m.. den« for anotha plOPC:II,. and ;1 if implicil in 1M oft tcpnted phflS( MtiNIlliITilo",.JJ,j1l (i ...... .....

dw po P '"'1

.0

be p ... . ~ ..

io "l .. YUiably _

, mi ..... wid. dw...- pracncc" of

1M proputy addllad iN utOc:rcc). S« 1M ~ di.tawion below in ch:.pI~ J.

DHARMAKI RTI 'S M ET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

97

have ~rttptions of mem only at spC'C ific times and places (and not at all times and places). S in ~ thOSoC' thinS' change. mey mU$t cease; and Ji n~ those things ~, they must nOl iK: perduram. Moreover, if those things arc not perdUl'anI, they must arise:u nOI perdun nl (i.e. , not unceasing). And since: things arise as not ~rdur.tJn, they cannO[ exist over time, which mC'aJU that me')' mwt immroiatdy ceue. Therefore, all petttptible thingswhich means all cau..tally efficient things-mwt Ix: momenury (/q4l1iltll): they endure for only an instant (~!"l).M If ~ construe these: arguments about momentariness with the require· ment for the constancy of an a prasion's object (lItbdliTtIut), we an Stt that. if particulars mw t Ix: constantJy in flux Ix:c.awc they are causally effi· cient, men particulars cannot ~ the objecu of thought and language pre· civ:Jy keaLLY. they M nnTperdu","" Th L L~. ,.lrhnugh Oh,.rm,.kim 1'I'I:Iy Ix: l...u than explicit on this point. the awal efficiency of particulars underlies the claim that they are inexpressible. 68

a. PV5V a'PVl.1b

(G: •.,.ufJ). ln thU Kaion

m.

1 1u~

presented 1M IrJUn'lmt for

m.

lIK>mCIlw1nao in a way maL ;, meant 10 bridsc afJ"mml a)nenning cawdco.nca of caution (..m.u..)with d~ afJ"mcnl for momenw1nal from cximnoe (i.e., to-aIkd " , _..---. _ ~.J1y ()"d,., '99) r- an .,...,."i- t~ .........) . ~n"01I ..... (,' ") .... ~ed mal the IfJtUnlm l from ainma: ill mort prominall in DlunmkIni', Iala faTS, bul be dearly don rIO( mean to vitia(1: rh.c: strong roruinLLiry mal 1'UJlS 1:oo:1 .. « u rdi,.",. rion of any QWC' for a:waUon, on 1M OM lund. and arcuma ll from cxlRma:, on other, l1w COfLrinWty oprillP from Dhannakirti'l rheory of ptoperrics U;I n:U.ICl IOawaI· iry and pm:cprion. 1I is ill ~ dw _ _ borh arsummtl in PV and PVSV, ~ Dhanna.kini fIOII only rdilla aLiX'd assaOOn , bul he also maka a.lcnsi~ UK of !he uxu· menl 110m aillmU (PVSV .II PVI.I,l.-I9'r. G:'7. t8- loo.Ui). Orhcr.1as a lmsr,." P''''V'' indude:

m.

m.

m.

m.

w.

/'VI.II(>: ~6ItttU". ... _~.tmrt. ·" "" 1 W'JI'~ riA7,wU'I]4nIM'!I df;t ~1WfI1Wl Hand PVSV .J til. {G:,,,,lt--I.J}. ..~ ~~n.. tw lOI_

n.n....~~.. JJ.r-~~~ ..1Ni..,,,..m!I. Stt We PVSV iii PVI.I17 (G:".17): ,.Ji umw'lfl ""i"._ "":!If1Tll oJ /,nvf. ~I }, and PVSV '" PVI.ISllb (G :U,.l)-lS): _".". ,.~u'!l P-"'I"1"'!' b "-!t _ w i ~ IrJ ""j".,.. ..".m_ I!tt.WtiJ M.nwi I ... . ", lbJ",iulW JlfmWIJII MWi..;,.__ "uj,, ~

'V.

Note ol.o ...... o.eyn.. ('lm',~ anne; KJ... .!p' ~ ",toI..ut. s.. oId /SIfhw", an: :aU IramUU'Ci as }it,.J IIP"I tJnJ ~"I&.

mil

98

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

We have juS! Sttn that, , intt paniculars an: o,usally efficient, Ih~ mWI ~ inexpressible and momentary. Tbis ontological rtquin:mcnl emlxds particulan in Ihe KgUbriry of causa.lity, and it mw gu;tranlcu tnal pc:. ec;prions arc: nOI just random. Paniculan, ho'NC'o'u , mUSI also conrorm to ,he: dictat~ of reductive reasoning, and they thus mwt ~ irrc:ducible. Moreover. on our rtlding of the commennricr 10 Dharmakirri', work, thc itttducibiliry of particulan requires mat they lack spatial exlension. In our di5CWSion or Dharmakini's philoJophical method, \W: n(Ked thaI other interpreten do nOI accq>t lhill view; Drcyfw., for aample. maintains ,hat what he calls the "alternative vi~. " which :mribul~ sp,uial cxtcnsion to panKulars, is a poIition ( 0 which Dharmakini mak~ an ontoloeical commitment in at least lOme comexrs. We will now examine this issue in greater delail To recap some points made: ClItliu, we should n(Xc that for Dreyfus, the "sundard interpretation" is what he calls the "Saurrintib " position: rttI external objt'CU (bihytinhas) exist, and thOK objt'CU have no spatial exten,ion; they are, in shon. infinit~ima.l particles (p4mm4!'I4). This is what we haVl: called "Exlernal Rali.Jm.· In OOOlr.uc. , Dreyfus::oho idcnuflC:f an "alternarM view." whtrmy external parriculan: may have sp.aci.al extension. Dreyfus arguts that, while the srandard interprtllllion may be primary for Dharmakini, Ihe alternative interprtt:uion nC'Venheless forms pan of his onmlogy.MA curiow aspect of Dreyfus' approach to the "alternative view" ill the cla.im that he is "not arguing thai this is Dharmakini's vi~, but. ramer. thai this vi~ is prescnt in his work." Dreyfus does not mean Dharmakini ,imply memioll$ Ihis vi~. fo r DharmalUrti frequently cil~ views specific:ally for the purpose: of rejecting them. Instead, Dreyfus means that tht" alternative view is acccptnt (at least implicitly) by Dh:llTl'lilini in lOme case where Exlernal Realism (the ~'nndard view") is IOmehow inadequate, and thai in such cases, Dharmalcirti employs the alternative view without dearly rejecting or embtacing it. In the section on method. we noted thai Dreyfus across levels of analysis reminds w to resist any tempt:u ion to formulate a systematic uniry in Dharmakirti's work. Dharmakini's method is such that he: is not only permined, but is indeed (lMp!o argue from positions that he wiU CVC!nrually aNndon, if his 5CXeriological project is 10 succeed.. Neverthelc:ss. we also argued thaI DharmalUrti'. thought cannot be: so disjointed that. wht"n argu-

mal

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AND O NTO LO GY

.

ing from an ontological srance that he will abandon. that same ontological SUJlce itself exhibiu .uch:oJ, drgrrr ofinCOMrencr thai il is no longer clear what onr should critiqur when making thr transition to a higher Irvd of analysis. In otmr words, even though Dharnukirti', Exlrrnal Realism dots not providr a fully unifiro and systematic ontology. he nevmhdess is quite dear on thr issues that COUnt when we mo~'r from External Realism to Epinemir:

ldel1ri.~m.

And what issues do COUnt ? A full reckoning would require a close c:xamination of what Dharmaldrti and his commenr:uors mean by Eputemic Idc:alism. and we will not attempt that prodigious task hert:. Ncvmhdcss. we can fint naIr that , when Dharmaldni applies an Epistemic Idealist eridque to External Realism in his PrlfmA!'avdm;kll, he does so whrn pre~nrins the Exurnal Rral iu rellpon ~ 10 a problem in ,he theory or prtuption. In brief, thr problrm is that thr objrcu of prrcrption srrm to exhibit at least some spatial extension. but mrrrologically rrductivr rn,soning suggesu that only infinitesimal partides, which lack spacial extension, can be truly real. We will shortly Stt that in this context. Dharnukirti as Extrmal Ralist has every opportunity to resort to the alternative interprer.llion to solve th:u problem. Nevenheless, he chooses 10 avoid the alternative interpretation. What is mon important here is that the very concerns mal lead him to avoid the easy solution posed by me a1trmative interprer.uion arc prrcisrly thr conerrm that lead him to abandon External Realism ahognher. In other words, WI:' srr a Strong dtgrtt of consistency in the move from External RcaJism to Epistemic Idealism: nOI a consistcncy of ontological commitmcnt , but rathcr a consistcncy in stylc or 'CIl$Oning. Oreyfw agrees mat thc alternacive view becomes rdevant in mc context of peruption. That is, on the: one hand. External Realism (Dreyfus' " St:U'l dard view") oprtatCS on a principle of ontological parsimony thar rtduces all u1tim:udy real physical cmilies to infinitesimal particles (pttntmA!'I4), which have no spatial cxtension. But on thc other hand, DhannaJcjni', theory or ~ption mainrai.u that indivi.iu.al inlinitO!$ima.l ~ides are nOt pm:cptiblc to ordin:lf}' persons; ilUtcad, only "aggieg:ucd" (l4'!'OI4) infinitesimal pan;des a~ prrttived, and the mntcnt or appearance in peittption is therefore extended. According to Dreyfus, Dharmmni dcili wim the problem by implicitly introducing the "alternative view," whttcby Dharmakini concludes mal spadally extl:n((rflin&thc ~ rowt.ic:h a un~ ... d .. ~ (jbi) io d>c objet;< of_ ......pu.t.aI and llnpdMkcopldo.... 'SO:': alto 8w.x.u (I~). Scharf{t~

and Muc.h h".).

un

FOUNDATION S O F O HAAM AKIRTI ·S PHILOSOPHY

as objecu of perception. Dharmakini would b.= oblig~ 10 :l.dmit th~ ultimate reality of :1.1 leas, som~ di stribut~ entities. In the first verse of ,he pasgge mentioned by Dreyfus (i.e., PVj.T94), Dharrn:l.k.ini begins th~ argum~m with the voic~ of an objmor who is :l.u~rnpting to point OUt inconsisuncies in the Buddhist argum~nts against both the nooconcqnuality of perception :l.nd ,h~ claim that wholes do not exist. The yerse reads: Someone obj«t$, lhat which is :tggrC:g:lted (sa'!'ritil) is a conglomcrue (SIlmwili1")' and in th:l.t senst it is a universal (kim4nya). [Accotding to Buddhists such as Vasub:l.ndhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of:l. universal is n«.CSS:ltily associated with conttptuality."" A& ~ h:l.vc: not«l.. Dharmak.ini and his prcdttcs50rs maintain that infini-

tcsimal p:l.nides arc not on th~ir own perccptibl~ (for ordin:l.ry persons); instead, they mu.u ~ -aggreg:lted- (J4,!,ril4) in orde:r 10 ~ ~rceived. And since: the: term kim4ll1" runiymaJ") an ~ :l.pplied to :l.ggreg:lted p:l.rtid es, th~ objector points out that Dharmakirti Iw fk fonoadmitted thar perception an ~ conceptual, for Dharmakirti himself maint:lin$ dm universals arc: nca:ssarily associ:l.ted with oonce:pts. Dharmakini responds that "aggrtgation" hcr~ does not mean that the particles arc: forming a singie: whole:: rather, "aggregation· refers to a pardcular state of those panicles, namely, Thar their proximity ~nablc:s th~m 10 ausally suppon QCh other such lillit they can ause an image in th~ petttiv~r's mind. He: remarks: Due to a rdation with othc:r things [ i.~., other particles], infinitesimal particles that arc different [then their own previous moments] arise [from the:it own pre:vious mome:nu such that they can produce: an awareness). In that scnst, they arc said to ~ "aggrcgat«l.." and as such. they arc: said to ~ a condition for the production of awarencss. Moreover, the distinctive: quality that particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with which thty arc: in proximity. Hence, since awarc:ness does not have any nccc:ssary relation to a single particle, awarencss is said 75

I'V,.•",: ..,.o~ M~ M""""-""'" ""'" ~""'; *0 I

v..".""",,, •• '#yN H.

",w...JJhil nl...IJ-'!'

.....

DH ARMAK I RTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'OJ

have :it universal [in rM sense of a group of :otgg.tg;ltcd pa.nidn) as iu object." 10

AJ (Xvendr.abuddhi makes clear, Dharmakin i's point is that when the term -aggreg:otted- is :itpplied 10 infinitesimal panicles, it does nOt refer [0

their form:ittion ofsome single entity; instead, it is:it way of expressing a distinctive property thai ~tJCh infi nitesimal panicle has obtained by vinue of iu production being conditioned by the proxim:itte presence of the omer, surrounding infinitesimal p:itrcides. Th:itl distinctive property is the ability, when causally wistcd by omer infinitesimal particles. [Q particip:itte in me causal complo: (MtJlJlimJItriJ th:itt produces :it perceprual cognition. And since omer infinitesimal particles art ~uired for a p:itn icle to arise wim such :> propcot}'. :> singl(' [",, ' Otl'rmn ic "",":>lIy .....ing e ...~ hy mLilripk infiniteSimal panicles mat :itTe simulW\cously apprehended. Hence. a single perception is not related to a single infinitesimal particle, but n ther to many infi nitesimal particles.n 76 PVJ" 9J- '96: .nhlllUrrlbhiu",J,.,Nihi) " " " ~ ~ ,.N / ..1t14l "~'!'ri14l "hi

'"

.;.'iU'!" ju-j---!o /I "~".'!" ~ ,,, _'~,..r'" "!"''' I - ' r~.;"'''.Ij jU-.. ~ "~_ Il a . the mnsbtion olin- ¥tna by Drqfw ('m17-&1).

77 IXomdrabllddhi (PVP:II,b.). commmrins IlJlOIllhe wnICI rileV above. cbriIia how lhe Illim ~ pin a ddtinaiw: !,>lOp" rt·nwWMw by ";rt\K of the prmimity of II", prm. ow partida: in.he same Q)on wilh odxt __ aNa: &om ihc onrufonna.ion of doeir fOrmer ttopeai..: continua mal art" in murual conjunaion (fl-1Ihw1l "J'I1¥r P J,.,). TIw dUrinc:tivt:qualirt will n()( an,., ",;m.,.,. t'-'An .,y.,.'!' ,."."..~ - iii,. rlu6,JJJ,;, ....,,1fbfb..,m ihti"j, Mi,,~ I ...." ... ij6?ti lsocl t'rf .nIM._.""jurtM/ ....y.~ I ......n~ t'rf w,;,,~ ~..." . ..,.,..m'~ ",w.".;." ... in ~ In.4J/hir ... irlJ-u in1,

cog1Iition of 5inpbril1lou

Jr...,...

n"...

7<J NY (soc) . ; NS1.I.JI-s6 (cilrd abo br Kcy!:I90): d.hIUM..,.,.". ""'If"~ ",.". hI/Jhi, If.", w". tint.".", in iii". ;,.". ......~ "_,,y.,m' I JIIIIi """".,.,.",. HInq. tul.rillNI#I -:po* .... _ U/ NInq. rlut", iIIIm< in J"*u.!o ,,..~ I "r!tIMi"MnIM~~ In m~ ~. '. .,.rtUi.

.,.M.

106

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMA KIRTI'S PHILO SOPHY

rimlor" or "vuieg;uion" (ritr.j, which is rnetnt to be: itself a ""p color. even though it contains multiple colors. Using ·v:lriegation- to sWld for all forms of multiplicity, Oharmakini argues that it makes no sense 10 claim that an object can at oncc be: singular and vuiegated.· To avoid unn«essa.ry prolaity, we will assume mat Ofurmaklrti', arguments against varieg.ned singularity are convincing."' The more prtSSing issue- is that, even if Dharmakirti corrtttfy rejects the notion of a real. varieg:ued singularity, he has nOl meteby solved the problem of numerical corrcspondmcc mentioned above. It is one- thing to say that the others' nOlion of a singular yn variegated entity is incoherent; it is quite another to explain how his own claim that a perception of singularity with regard to multiple infinitesimal pmicles is not erroneous. One of the confusing a.sp«rs of the passage mentioned by Dreyfus (PV3.194- :n.4) is dut it does noraplicidy unpack Dhamukirti's response to lhe problem of numerical correspondence. The etrly commencuors Devendrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi do, however, o::p1ain the solmion, and they do so by apparmdy refwing to anomer passage: Dh.armakirti', Sl.ltlvrm on PVI.137-14l-" In that passage, Oh.arnukirti explains how an expression mar appears 10 rdi-r to a s.ingle cl'lIiry i5 in fact a convenient way to indirealy o::press multipk parricubn on the basis ofsome commonality in their causal ~ristia. An exprtSSion such as "warer-jug," for o:ample, is used to o::ptt:55 the facr mat multiple inllnitesimal partides a.re individual.ly in a scne that a n be: collectively referred to as a ·conglommttion" (UlmUiNz); as such, mey can work togtther [0 perform common dferu by virtue of aus:illy supporting each omer. Hencc, talk about a 5ingle "watt'l'-jug" is actually talk aoom rh~ fact Ihat th~ multiple paniculan work mgerher to produce common dfecu; thett is mw no need to as5ume that there: is a ra.I, 5ingle entity called a ·water-jug" or e\"CfI a ·conglomcr.ltion."OJ A 5ingle expression

80 PV).wo--107. A1dlOlls/l lhc la m r>rr.lileral!y mearu · muhicoloc,· [)/q1TNki"i and his foIJow.m (mM I~ lam mcupnoricaDy 10 rdtt 10 any Iypt' of multiplicity thai is meaUl 10 be. onnb.ucd 10 • lin"", eftnty. Su, foe example. dw u..e of dw lam by ~rabuddlu (PYP",.r.bR) and ~ (PVT: "?, UlObffl.

81 R.cadm who wid! 10 (Qlni,.... ,hese ~Q can ronsuI, IIw appendil!. ~ tIwy ;>0: u"ansl~lcd in full. 82 Ncilna Ocvendrabuddhi (1'VI':.s,b,ff. IransblcU aobovc, n) no. ~i (PVT. "-""'I ~ff) apliciUy a lol' PVI.IJ7-'41, bur 111.11 pam&" appats fO M lIw .uuta of their intnpmationa.

8J s... PVSV u'PV' .'j7-'41 (G,6B.7-U)'

''''

DHARMAKI IlTl'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

may also be used to exprt:SS UK fact that panicu1an that arc aaually multiple may, due to being in me lalllC state (4I11Uth4), produce common dtccu. Dharmakirri remarks:

LikcYlisc, those [panicuian] which ate effective (tlP"Ju}y4tt) for lOme single function either Kparlltdy or in combination arc "rra.~ by "preL~ion1 ,hal indic:u~ a 'lpecific sral~: rhey lIll! exprascd in that way 10 that one might make them known all at once. Examples of such opressionsa.rc: "visible" or "obstructive." Tbosc [particulars] can be exprc:sscd in mu way due to the same-nc:s.s of their difkrcnce (bINUs4mb1Ji1) from others that arc nOl oc:rurring in mat kind of state'" The anal)'Jis gh'en by ~buddh i makes il particularly cle:ar that, on his interprttlltion at least, Dharmaltirti is referring to the issue ofinfinitesima.l particles acting together to produce a single perception: Concerning the usc of a single expression for a Stale, Dharmakini uys. LiJuw;y. thM, .... ThDu mnnJ: infinilC!limal ~n: icxpciblo: in thilwouc daoibcd hen- ;. oIIOlUpponcd by ~:. ruowucd by Col1m (1,"'74, 1I.1J). From 1M pc:' ¥Ui~ OIdot Abhitllwnu TypoIosy, dili intnpl'tolion byp:aucs ",._.. 1.7 ". a1~cl in fiver of .'.fI1I'S"""~ An impon:anr desidentum Mtr is 1M quao:ion of tilt' hisroriaI .., teccdma ofDhumaldrti'. tt..ory of per_ uptio.ln. Whik dw alIUiOon 10 Sal'Yilti>'id.. Abhidh:arma is &.iny dar in thil K'CIion, ..... do nee Imowwhrthcr Dharmakini .... any particular oro: ofSa.r.isti.io;b. otOWiQ in miM. Many dunIu 10 Sh6ry(t Kauura for ~n& IlK 10 work-

eo.:

eo.:'.

88 Sincx Kc)'I 's di.crution (19101 his MW'Cf bun published. il lw pnNpi: b«omc: Wouckd In _ ecruln dqm: or ob«wIry. 81.11 II iI. In faa, one 0{ thf tnOflI' oufltl.ndln8 _ , Audia of Dh:annakirti, :and I m:ommmd i. hipIy 10 my mockn.

110

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKiRTrS PH ILOSOPHY

mdcss insiJU that me sensory ob;ea~ hmer. !he panicubr-is a real, singk entiry. namely, the agg":gatc." An argument. ho ....'a"eI", that appc:a1s to lingutari!)' of cfFc:a as me basis fur the image's singularity in no way requires any such claim. In f.act, on Kcyt's interpretation. Dharrnalcitti', roundabout means of accounting for numerical cotl"C'Spondence: would be pointlw be:cll~ numerical correspondcnct would no longer bIwnWdn; would no IonF haw _ 10 panic:ulan. the ioIc ukimardy ruI ml;tia in hi. Iy1I:nn. And wi~1 tudI aa:aI, that- wou1d be no maN to diJrincuisb (.(III. rdc. (i...trccdy) 10 ~ ...d thooc tha. do .,.... foo. ..d. • deoc" ..; .....ion io u1.illUld,.. I:wM "poll the Idie ~/hcx-, thai dwxtrri_ puticubn aIoM..

'ln:ol KialIr hdpiUl. dopil~ my dis. "V-n>Cft• ..,.;.h _ _ Df ... - I ........... 'lVlU1e f'ocu.inll p,i_ily on !an•...!.ti•• and Kamablib. Sidniu iI MYCnhcIe. quil~ 'ist" 10 nOt~ that mud! of thn. approKh I
such dispotitions prompts us to conmue the image in question as distinct from C'ntities that do not have the causal eharactC'ristics C'XpcclC'd of what we call "red"; at thC' samC' time, we ignore other elitC'ria, such as having the causal char.lctC'tiSlics cxpC"CtC'd of that which is "round" or "SWC'C1 , " W'hen we look at rwo obj«a that we will 001 "red,~ the first objC"C1 produces an imagC' that acludes all images that ....-c would "orcaJl "red," and thC' imagC' from the second object also C'Xciuda thOst images. If we do not inquire runhel into the differences bctwttn those twO images thC'm5Clvcs, we can construC' both images as mutually qualified by a negation, namC'iy. thdr difference: from non-red imagC'$. That mutual difference, which Oharmaldni calls an "C'Xdusion" (IIJiivrni), thus bccomC'5 their nondifference. In shon. that C'Xclusion or nondiffcrC'nce pert:lins 10 all things ,hat arC' dif£trent from thOst that do nOI havC' thC' apccted causal charactC'Jistia-in this case the cawal charactmsrics cspected of that which we call "red." I~ In this way. C'XciusiolU, being formed on thC' basis of the images in conceptual cognitions, arc construed as negations that qualify those imagC'5. Thus. whilC' mC' images themselves arC' completdy unique-they do not have anWlJll and thus are not disnibutC'd over othC'f instances they can be construed as qualified by a n~tion that t4ts have ""wrjIJ. inasmuch as oornpIctc tnrubtion). Tlw: notion of dIC ncpiVl: - limit" (,lIwJllij in oppoaition lo wbid! ~ "elution il CI)I'lHruClrd appnn to OClaIr only ona in dv (i.~, PVSV MiPVI.I' j)•

s.-rm

...t.eR DlwmWni rmwb (G:tl.J.H}'): it iI CSlWliahrd that aU apralioN and COIIttpU ~ a d wio.,. (~) u mnr objtcu. bon lhou!h 1N:s.t CG-rJemui&l aprcssio.,. and ODn«pu.:kpmd upon lhe _ rnI,hi"" ,hey ~VI: di~n' obj«u; lhey haft diff'ercnl ob.iecu ~ apt->on..-:I conupto or~ ~ (wf" ' ,... ' 1, r",",-) in teO/'1IU of acJwions appnr in copilion all if they ~ o:llffi:rcnl; and CIIdwlon, appear diff'erml due 10 those: adusiont· diff'~ tilal an:' eoNIn.octrd \hrougb die dilkiCi'ICCI in thdr dditni,m (• ...Jhi). [uuM' siJJh.", twI urw yUJ viwbllilql -i1u4JI ('ff 1 M m ~tiYnI~.,. ~_ .-'hijJ"J.~;"'i~ ~~ Mt;,,1tt1" ;"'P"';~" .,;,orffpi,.t.y..... w.;",...~ .... ..,. 'J"hndor~

.ha,

.no..:

r,Yhs ..

~i (rvr:1,~PVT..,PaH _ K:}47. ~jO) drfina "ddimilcr~ (nMihi) u follows:

lui adU;SO(ln ', dduniln IS IIIaI from wluctl one emblu"," lhen: 10 br ~ adUSlon, For aampic. die ddimi'cr of die acL.uion a1kd "pmdua" jo "I\On,produa. ~ Likt'III'ik, I'ot dv cxdwion drfinrd u " impcntWlCfl«" .M delimite. is "pcrmaneD\".C." and on on {i.e.• the same .. appliabk 10 all odlcr COIIttpUI. IJoI PJbt"i. ,.. ".,....u!J".w Ii ,.,., ••Wh# I Jf'lhi -'1vM' V-,. .,.~ I"v", .,.;".,..t,~

,?-,,,,,,,,,,,,u,.

I ~ TIlC ~

j~ .

tt... o:rWn !:.lIil;'" nuy bcc:ocuidercd nondilinull bccawI: dwy arc &II differ·

6 ...... .oJI...u.:. cou...... crnphui-I .. lCV'Uoi pi-:... indudint; I"VSV .Jrv..;ryd {G ...... t;Il), MV MiI"V,,9!Cd (G.......l and csp«iaIIy in I'VSV MiJ'VI.IJ7-'41 It..e appmdix).

CIl
:armUl rti tpcQfia1Iy ditcWKS 1M C'ONuuaion olllnr.tnaJs in lmN of

mfiria linin, tIM: AmC (ypcIof thai mmtion both

(G:A .I.4-69,l ):

wa)'l

"*,...

b.r: tmds to foo::w upon IaInm$ of dkct. PM '" of wllJInKlm& u,mcneu Include !,\lS\I "" t'\lI "}7-141.

110

FOUNDATION S OF DHAItMAKIRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

D hmna.kin i's focw upon sameneu of d fm becomes panicularly wient when he presenu his .cpon.thcory in terms of the :act of rcmgnition, as when a perceived enti ty or individual (",ati), such as a lone water-jug, is recognized to be the same as another individual. M noted ead ier, when an individual is pe.ccil"cd. it produa:s a JCnsory cognilton containing an image that corresponds corrdarivdy to the panicular(s) that productd il. That image. which is in DC! idem ical to the cognilion in which il arises, is a memal particular, and as such. it is no Ic:s.s unique than Ihe individual that produced il. If Dhu mw n i were to claim that individuals :m the same btcau~ thO$(' effects-the cognitivt" images they produ«--are the ~Rme· (tit,,). then it ICCms that he must conU'adia his ontology of paniculars: if he 1:1)'1 that two images. which :m mental particulars. :m the same. then how can he 5;l.y that all pankulan are unique? Speakinl in the voice of an obj«tor, and wing "cognition· to rmr to £he cognitive imagt. Dharma.kini ptus the problem this way: • But tlllh l'Df"itiD" is II" tj{m f{thost intii"iJIUIU, ,,"" Cllf"itill" is tiifftrmt (PVl.lo8cd) for each real rning (pwi 6h1lllilm). That is. as with the indi vidual thar caused the awan'nm. the cognition in which it appcart is distinct: therefore. how can all those speciftC individuals have the same dfcct? For the cognition is thei r effm. and it is diffen: nt in each case. In oth('f words, the

purlculan haw tIw GIIV cffea. In order to aprai INI thry haw that dI"ea. onr: ~ thnn.nth ~rCS$ionlwchu -.mct+ilIIi" pt u. id«! thai tM Ii~ Somt;

"'.oed.

............ tiuI, tko, JV""'1l> ...... 0. . . . . . . . . . . . ' - " "......1 t",;c. 0- o:ut liodl...royi tIfAtA parricubn in t2Ch individu:..! is indct!d unique. Hence, one cannot Jirtalyuse those images as the wamnt for the claim that the individuals arc the same bccause they havt the.same dfm. If those cognitive images arc to be used ro demonstrate tMIIM individuals which produced Ibe imago; arc the.same, Iben Dlurmmrti must first show how those imy the effects of the individllal· arc (hem5Clves the AmC. To do 50, he oncc agai n turns to the principle th:lt entities ue the 1:lJl1C if they produce the nme dI'«t. That is, he maintains t:h:a.t those cognitiYC inugo; arc all the same bccau.sc thl:)' all produce ,he same eff«t, namdy, a judgrnmt (pnlfJillJamllrl4jIfllM) that takes as iu object the aforc:mentiooed cognitivt image and construes that image in the urne fashion in each case. For example. all the cognitive images can be the same bccause thl:)' a1l ltad to the judgment. "This is rtd.· Dh:arm:>kirti then m:lint:tins th:l t. if those cognitive im:ages :Ire the ume

108 J>VSV MiPVI.lokd (G:j6.Io-I.j; _ .... ihiJ;~ ~ ~ r. "j~tL [PVI.lokd l ".raIti...". J w..., u",../ii4Jti_ ftju~,.· ~, I ...... ~ I "'" .. ..w~

...,.." wr. ~tL J,.J W="'/IM ••. Miu .. ~~~,!, "'" .,;~.,.", 160 b.I ~ rwri ~u,!, j.ht,Uu,!, u.,-.. .,;, 101

I"VSV"" l'V'.1O'I (G :)6..' H7'7):

-q.~ /7"'_' /~

UhtJiIii I dMIti~.,um.n. W .....~ [PV1.lo,l.

........... tINr

11.1

fO UNDATIONS Of DHARMAKIRTl'S PHILOSOPHY

lxausc: thty allle.td to th~ sam~ judgm~nt . then one can also gy that th~ individuals that pnxluttd thov: cognitive images in the fim place arc all th~ gm~ because thty too produce th~ sam~ dfcct. Thm, th~ wam.1\I for th~ sanl~ness or the individuals is that thty produce the same cfkct: the cognitive images. And the wamuH rOt the gffiCncs.t or the cognitive images is ag:lin that thq produCt' the 5:lme effect: a a nain ~ or judgment. /u ~ hav~ dcscrilxd it so rar. this d)(ory leaves itsdr ~n to an obvious rebuttal: what warrants the sameness or the: j udgm~nts ~ That is, Dharma.ltini', initia1 problem is that individuals arc unique, so the samenc:ss required by language: and concrpu must be accounted ror by samellCS$ or df« t. Bur ir he tUfns to th~ cognirive im.ages produced by those individuals, he has the same problems because those cognitions, like the individuals them.sdvC$, arc unique. Ir he now turns to the claim that those cognitive images arc th~ sam~ b«.ausc: they produce the same judgment, th~n h~ appean to havt fallen into an infinite regress. In other words, it would appear that we nttd, once again. to warrant the g mencss or those judgmenu by appealing to the sameness or Ihrirdfcca; and or course:, me wnmcss or the judgmmu' dfcca will once again tC'quire the: same warnnt, :;& nd JOon.'" Dharmakini's response: to this problem is c:xprc:sscd. ir somewhat ellip-rically, in his commenral)' on rhe verse: cited above. Nore mon here he uses the metaphor or an ~ overlap-or ~ mixing" (141!U'l'1.4) or individuals whereby the nature or one is somdJow partially prcsc:nt in the nature or the other. For Dharmakini, such an overlap is impermissible in the as
DHAIlMAKIIlTI 'S METHOD AND O NTO LOGY

" J

lap. Moreover. this is called Ibdr - no ndiff'ertnt differtnct"namc:ly. tha r cxd usion (lIiwlA) from Other things m:n b}' namrt do nOl cause thai elfa:l. they arc: understood to be adudcd in this fashion bc:caU$t: they causc some same effect . such :u a cognition /(Dntaining an ima~ that lcads 10 the same judgmentJ. In lerms of Ihe cognition thai each individual produces. even though it is dilfttcnt fo r every sumtanct, each cognition appears nondifTcrtm fro m thc: omen in qucstion in that by iu namrt it causes a jUdgmem that overlays the image in rhc: awarencu with a nondilfttcnce. Moreover. Ihc: innanca in question cause that thing (.rth.t~namdy. an awarenc:u and such mal appears nondiffertm and thai in turn causes mal kind of judgmem. Therefore,

Th ~ inu:l n ~

Th rough Thei r n:lTU".· p rnduu

~

Ji ngill':

cognition wilh an image thai pnxnu them as overlapping whose ultimate oh;ea is their difference in ruamrt (S'llflhIMVIlhhuJ4) from aU orner things,lIl :u has been repeatedly Stated. Therd'ort. the 11 2 1 1u~ uanil,u ro /lJfl1ohJt,r,~ in aaotd wim dw COIIIaI Mft. np",;'11y as providro by the IOIIowIII& vax. Al l llndcnund II. the ICfIIl u ~ mantto c.on~ the nocioa thaI IIhi ..... tdy. lhc ... "b"b. it a DOII-cnticy; i. it lhc mc:n: r>ep,ioa tha • ."",..m...r I difTfttn« in ftllom (_;lMN~) mal dill.inKUitMI particubn whkh pnform the: "arne:" fimaion from d>osc that do noc. This "diff'titiltt" is an adllJion ("Ji~.1Onn at MPIion. and UIUCft i. annoc be. n:..I mory ci4ot" inlUjMrn>fions. which lqin immtdindy after Dharrnaltini and sOOli' &IIr b«onM: ~ pronounced. affirm _ pOOli";ry in OM or both that wzp: 4) thry KI'c:II the importaoor ..r i~ or appn.n.rKa i~ COI .... p' ..... iOOplilloru; and/or ~ rhty loy auphuis 0 11 u,., abiliry of wordi 10 lead one 10 INniculan. Bocb • and • are pramt in

..r

iIIfft'J"'"U''''''''''''

DIumuklni·. pbilooop/ly. to .hae noc mtiody unru.w : thq- !limply.lel a ckpN anplwillNI I IIndtnund 10 be un,rurouro. In hisp.uoIthe:compound .....WMNMo 4,..._,....., find web .c:-oIthe "poa. n..,," i"'~lion • ill $1ky.&buddhi. In I baP: WOK, the imporu.nl qUc:ltion " - is: wIut iI dw ...fJ.btIW A ncpi~ in.aprnllion illo"y Uw dw Mum,.. if; ruUy nodtinS If..u: ir iI. nqnioA, and .ocptiotOido noc m..:. ApoIia~ 'apA_ ilfOayrlw the ...v · . . is ruUy the ~iad.u. bul only indirtedy ..... " ;. mu Imtr imerpicuDon thai c:oIoft ~ buddhj '. mnuta whm he p..a _WV,,~~,!,(PVT:I 17U_l . K::uJ.J1-d):

..r

-u,

"""'NJN~

fh-,.']t!W

.",...",."..'!' ~'!',. t'N , .... _rUN ",,.,..riN ;ym ";,,.,It.; I ~~UftIU " ' . . . , . (~""Il' "p hi

1tItyMI,..,

111

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

nondiff~rena:

of things consulS of the fact th:u they have the

sam~ ~fkct .'1J

Dhumaltitti's solution to tM: problem ofinnnite regress is that sameness of effect does nona as (he warrant for the claim (hat those det~nninations of sam~ness ~ the same. Innead, h~ dC'Yerly shifts what ht: mons by !xing Mthe same" (~It.). Th~ judgments in question ~ th~ sam~ nOl because: they have th~ same dfea. but because: they ph~nomenally pr~nt the "same~ content: by ovtrlaying the images in th~ cognition that produce them with a Mnondifference~ (lIb1mJ.), each judgment takes th~ same form, such as, "This is rt'd •• This amounts to an appeal to some unspecified combination of exptriencc and mental dispositions: when we look at ctn:ain iliinl?1' we just interptd them all as "red." in the: COntext fOrmed by ccnain dispositions and the way thai we we the term "'red: This appea1lo exptriencc and disposilions highlighu the importanCe of mind-dq>endency or ~$ubjectiW' fa.c.. tors- in the process of constructing exclusions. That is, Dharmaklrti maintains that wh~n we constructel:dusions. we do not do so haphazardly or OUt ofsome pernicious habit; rather, we have some purpose in mind. and (hat purpose provides CXpect2tiOIU and interests mat form the coma! of our concept formation. Ukewise, we learn how to usc: language and are habituated to that usc:. An apple and a strawberry, fo r example. will be different if we are concerned with [h~ir distinctive eff«ts, bUI if we ar~ only pJM" 1M I.t,. i .,. .. '" rtyitI tItnt ..",,.,.,, oi "Y''''' ...... ,.i -p",.,.J,.

rAn 1Ihit ....... ,., """'~ / ...... ,., mlffil"; ~,.,. "1If1i..usJM" """ J.t,.i .or - Mo,r,.. .. fI.fo ..).

AJ it dear hcre. nwMnIl'''''' is I2km to ~!ht: pmicu1u (_!.r""~ -HNM iI bctc wed moch :II -~ jn Gjridlioill

JWticuIu

~ ", kind oftfft," or~', par' bctc rakm 10 ~ JynOIIym of ~ 11W iI the inltt-

such:ll

Dcular tree.." In short....1IhiH is pm2oUon takm by Scftnkdlfter('97I:'90 and ,-;",j. Hownft. since the mon:alfItttI of the diW' ..ion fOa.-on iIwIIIu diliadK%. andNnu the next 'I'ffK ItrtSICt ROC!ht: ~ bul.hI. unreal ad"......... ~., inleljri'ftalion doeI ROC Re'JI WUrlllled heu. II)

rvsv a'rv','Q7 (G :16.1t-S7.7):

"iwtli_ NUI,.thl """ MiMI....,. "",WM_1fUII7P u;ri 1""'" Ill~ 1w.tIJj,i, .......,;, .... 1 uI!' ", WWitu/! ~ ....~ I';u!;wNvw WM_~,; _."""_ iii til / ill , . qb1I iIwIII I't} ~~NII/.t!I AwJtri'd.cr)or "1Il1.hi""'~"""IIm thit PThat ia, it is dar thaa Sikyabuddhi wist.a 10 ha~ ,his way of CONUV.iIlJ .. rmr to the: pMtKclIf as I un)q1lC' nll ify. This would fIIFl tJw, gIou iMwt •ec:oIded by RaaWdrti and abbc-Ma1Cd I'O .. by JMnalrimim. Ramaldrti and JlUndrimill'll ~ proI:W>Iy rJnrin& co _ l aIn P"f"uuotion of~i'l praa!gtion. and this is ON: tQIOIl for haiuti", in adopIins their rWi"" In addition, their Pou Rquim us (0 cnw:Pd the obbliw: panidc "'" 10 I iii., and Iinoe thac It( no! ohm coofi.ucd, ow ~Iion ....,..J.,I1u~ 10 be made: on Imumic: JIOIIndt aIonc. Thus, a1tbouF ;u". ..",....."u ..~" nuy well bc:!.1 coo~ !he lMIlIin, inemdcd by Sikyabuddhi. I Iu~ .-kc:ted (0 In~ the 11011 II ;1 sanda.

we.w. ...

,.,.-u.., .,..

...,IiI.""

...-u ..,..,..".

129 ~ WVT:1OOOJfF.PVT-r.Jb1fi): 'Jir ,.; P'- Jd .....; nu.. ""'".., Ji.. Nr~ "", i ,."r "''''t'...tJh,vo",..

" / ,, &hit tol"; 'Ji "",~" u", p" .,{ ft},. .... Ji" At",,;.,...JuuJ

w.r,.

_11"''''''w..,.. . .

_ I .u.-• .... p1w.gi .... .., "" 1u.,,... "",.; 6nnr~ r ..,, / r'.... • 1 'Ji ~"C.,.,..w", 1fIfI' "" " " "'" i I/J.II ~ kyi nno ..,;J'" ...... 1-pJMf "'" Ji" ",' /,VoIr ~,., .,.. ... "]ill ... ,.; -Ji" ,... / pfo ,. ....r.zh- J:l*I,. i fh1ir,w"

DHARMAKIRTn METHOD AND ONTOLOC Y

' ll

H~~ we: find ~uddhi describing m~ panicular. th~ adusion and the imagr in t~rms of thret: difk~nt ways of understanding th~ Sanskrit compound 1Iny4p6ha. lbc panicu1ar is -mal from which Othe:r is o:dudcd" (1IS11I4J IInytUi .po""'t~).'· AJ such, it is th~ 1lJiff!114. the "isolatM.," the: "o:ttaCted," or simply tht -acluded: In shan, it is an utterly uniq~ entity. Th~ o:clwion itSelf (vy4urni) is the: m~re "excluding of o lh~r" J'Dh4_m). And me: im.llgr u rh.lll rhmugh or nn rhe: huu of which one: excludes other (Imy"" IlpohyilU ·"rlU) . This duc:d'old schema allows Sakyabuddhi to clearly separate three aspects of the exclusion process. To understand the full implications of this interpretation, let us sec how it responds to four problenu that the IIPf4theory must addre:ss--namely. problems of (I) the relation between a universal and panicubrs; (, ) the dinrihurinn of.ll nnnttiuenr, (J) rhe men",.1 cnnrenr of cnnt:r:pnl.lll cogni _ cions; and (4) the discontinuity betwttn m~ntal content and rd'erentt. In addirion to unpacking Sikyabuddhi's int~rprttation , our ~ to these qucstiolU wiU also aUow us to restate the analysis of the I1poh4-r:heory that we have given th us far.

(11",,-

me

(I)

UII;IJtI'UII_;'UtllllC't

" Lu;,,,,

This problem is the one m.u we: cited :lt the beginning of our discuuion on universals. and we: can f(:iten.te it in the form of a qucscion: if there is no u1rimatdy rc:aI universal instanciated in aU its instances, how can the

:dJj.., P"t nr,... oi "'" q." (P: "'" -J J.r P _1ItI -' '" ft#fJ*' "" ~,."... "" pIMf,.yi""" __ rM"""'" _,. ~,.., - ",. i ~, "" I" ,,,,,,.,,; 'Jis ph- .J.., ;,nI,.;,;,,;, "... ,.., ".,,.; "'" t. nut",

1M pJ,. till'" JUt

'*",.

,_"," i~'lI fP"f""" kif --ft'S ... ih;.J,,"~" ttyiJ ... tiM ~ .. iIi,.",.. 1M!.p1 u,..,.,ti",Dba "]iJl4r,..i.a-, ... .". _ "?*' ,. M",;"", II I M;..,....,.;4. Ow".,." ... M..w,,. PI" oM..., Dro,u l JIM JM,. ,.,J ,.; ~, "" f ,..", ti IIUJh.,. ",..,.... , . P"I',." ,. J" """ M I.s pJ-

",... 'J.UlI l

.4."'"....,

_ I Jj ... .1UbJI ... """.+6.1-. ,..,dhhJ~""lIuW~;MoIt.i...-M ... ~tlIJdk!i;pi,~~. ~ ~ I ,.. '" "'...~ I .""..",.~,.,."""ft J.itW I ~", ~ in I "" IIIrwWiJ..Jnv~" ~"'~II f ~."..". ....... '" ; .. . fh f ~ .. .RUbotl 1,ij.,.".uu..,.,uyiMi· .... ~ f Ir.! ... lJooI .•. • 1If'I6I!I f nwL,~.. MJ,.·Aj'foJll# I rM .,.mw,!" f ~· ""'_~JII1!' fIInrI;" "UfJrUJ 11M 1"11 n,p..n "'~!Jhwr.,!" Jilt

Ub..,I..".... ....,... b\... ",'

.,.~ /,..,

I:rM

u,"" -J*I it:!-

......

nWww.,

130 Thlti. a cooj«nlral ra:oruuuction tucd upon

dwn~

(f'VT:z00b4): if; loorp/»ll

",,,,phII,,.J,,,,,,,,,,,,',w,,a.Sco: the: phiJol.osieaI mnuIu in dl« ~ nou.

1).4

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAkMAKI RT I 'S PHILOSOPH Y

concept ~fire" have any rdarion to me pan icul:u s that we call " fire "~ O n Sikyabuddhi's interpretation, the claim that the panicular is ~ th at from which all others are excluded" jusrifies for Dhacmakirri the relation between a cognition that involves a univcrsalluch as the concept "fire" and a specific instance of a fi re. Thai ii , the univma.l "fire" rcfen 10 all fi res because all fi res are diff't.mn from aU otha entitia thai do nOI have the causal characteristia o:pc:ctcd of .something we call "fire : This differen tiation of all fires from non-fires is not a mere whim, fo r it is basI!d upon the uniqueness of each mlity that we call a "fire": each one is actually differcnl in all ways fro m IlUother entities. Although we consuua a universal by focusing upon only .some of thO$(! differences, Ihis docs not vitiate the IX! that Ihe differences we do focus upon arc basI!d upo n the uner difference of the entitia in question. ThUl, since the univcrul- which amoun ts to a sd ccrive difference or acl usion-is based upon the utter difference of each entity. the universal has an indirect relation to thO$(! entities.OJ'

(2) Distribution This second problem concerns IlIfIltlJll. the disuibution or continuity that is nC'C"Pry for a universal ro apply ( 0 muhip\e instances. Here the quation is: if there is no real univerul instantiated in all instances of fi re. what sameness could acco unt for the faa that we can refer ro all of them as fi re? O n Sikyabuddhi's interpretation, Dharmakini accoun ts for disn ibu-

131 TM nocion of a "Jdc:ai,(" difktrocc orcxduaion can ~ K'CfI in, for exampk. tM foI· lowing pN " (PV5V ,.jPV' ,9' nJb: G,..9.1'--t9-1J). which rcfft1llOW di~anIOIl& uhim.o,dy minp ~ "p...al tn"D' ("'!".~ i .. UK .... u{ I ~.i.iu ..:

dis.,,,,,,

H.";"I stnf tNt miJ11' {arthu) • • /J~,u.tfornl. ~",p/iJI tIN 16"'~ IIIk fo"m." (. " bWiyl) ,..d. ~ tIN r.r.td..J"m, rr"j.illJ 1M IlIilh t:tprmi.1fJ II¥I ,n, 111 thri~ Htyrr tIw Ji/frrntn fiw", tbi"l' u..1 ." .tINr u.." 1"wINII ur,,,,p/iJllbt .Prmtnltilw ut.s. H..Ii1tf.", II, "., c." Ibnr M'llJ'liu II¥I ""., """';, tIN 16"., ~ 1M .fo"",nrti.NIi mi"l'- ........ ovbt:oI.", INf .",,,,," ,mil'· .tuIJ ..~ t/ti1tf./tbt 16_ ,,~. [PVI.98 nib], II hat al~ been .aicl lu

,-'wri." .{

PV •. 7S) duo ......

."t

,hi""

d-ash ........ ouch .. the ~ and 00 _. ""' dinjnct. they accom ·

plish lk.......: Idil: function. A prnon __ rNl amons things. tome aaompliah dv: .......: Idil: function, JUCb . l k pi'odl.lClitn of an ~ U wth thaN: thinp arc coocq1(u.al1y diHinguiWd &om 0100 things !hat do 001 do to. ThoJc, things thlll produce by dxit vny ~t\Il( • &L.r: a~ in thai ptnon.; thai tlO'UalClJ iI asIOIiIltd with apru&ionr W I l\aV( as Ibrit ob;ea 1M adusion of tho.c things from dial which doa 001 pa rorm the afomncntionrd actMiy. 'J'b.iI &It( 11II2mI(SI iI tIIw 1M rccocnition. I'ltUI iI m.1-' 'I'h4 rccocnitionaiawarcna:l arna beaUS( lbe: imprinl pbad In UK mind by dull per""" pln10w apc, ichcc baa bca-o ...........ocU [loy wh... 1Ih... pruendyl«inlll . In Ib il aa of ~ilion lbe: differenc.. bctwct:n lhole

DHARMAK!RTt 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'l!

tion through the mere · other.acluding" that is the exclusion (vydvrttj) irxlf.1u a negation, Ihe cxdusion can be colUtrUCd as conrinuow across all irs instances becaU$C, as Sakyabuddhi notes, a mere: neg:uion cannOt be distinct acros.s instances. A negalion is also not Juscqnible 10 the critiques mat Dlwmakirti levels against the distribution of rtal universals. For example, some of his arguments re:ly on the claim that, if a universal5ueh as "WoIterjug_~· {z1lll.t4I1JM)~rr a rr.aI cnnry. rhen it mulit ~ cither Ihe.u.mc as or dilfewlI from the irutmce:s in which it is instantiated. If"WlItcr-jug-ncss" wcre' idt"ntK:alto any specific Wolter-jug, then as with that watcr-jug iuclf, it would not be distributed ovcr other instances. On thc other hand, if "water-jug-ness" 'NttC something cssc:ntially othcr duln its instances. then once again it cannot be distributed. Among ,he many rasons cited by Dhunuki"i i., rhe cbim th:u a cngnition of rhinv :u rh e .a rne mu1t al.'iO

indude the cognition of those thin&, as differem, but if the content of a conceptual cognition is JUSt a univma1 distinct from its instances, the difference among the instances would nor be included within mat cognition.,n Implicit hert is the nmion that the final justification for the claim that an entity is distributed is a cognition in which that emity appears to be distnhmf!d (i.e., an ...~prtl.tip.un) . In conrr.H:t, when mn.cid .. rf!d:l;~ a mere

negalion, :I; universal construC"led through Musion encounters no such difficulties, because as a negation, it cannot be said to be dther ultimately the same as or di/krent from its instances. In a sense, by relegating distri-

fhinp iI p.-d . - (..~~ (jU~~ ..", ..", JmW IthNlt )i hmwub f flrN1f'J """"1IJfl~i~ JJw....iMib uN I u'f'riJIl fTUYIlj... IlijU,..". h"M .." fl",.u,uN lPV'.tI-99JIbJ f to!_ $ ' Mt-M I" MINt ~ri!'l'i ~"w;...J iri I ,.", ....",. jUtU.iiU.. ~ ~to JNd1fl" ~1uafl: \UII¥maI] krlltoSta ral thins wbicJI it.u,,,.,, ,IN ,1tj"1fm ",-, it .....ifil$ ...."..,J,ftI! it Ji'trihuJ ....... ""'''-' ,...../IUI is lUI Hs, ,.",Ii,. ;, 1Nu.1u imI fll.ru.lJ rrfotnl. lPVI.I toa- • ullivcn1J. Thwoe [from tIw uce-iMWIOt]. it would not br a difkrma pcrWnir\110 WI iMUnot, jwt I f an u llirdy diff""," .. ,btlanor doa noc poruin 10 lhal ilUlII'I«. Bu. [the diffumoe &om non-.fttl ...... ittd( ddimitcd by. diKC=>et" [from iQ in.rtancott). llUItad. one qualify Itho:: Itcuayin&1, "'This is (mit .m' . ] diffuuoa: from tNl (non·Uft]: Honco:. irwm..m as ;1 Iw no ddimilinJqualil)'. tht diffumoe doa not cUe. Th.:n(o«. tht dilK,tuOry must :>ddn51. Th~1 is, Dharmwni dr«uvdy maimains that the 5ubjective experience of a conctptual cognition-i.e., a cognition involving a univma1-is of a menw im~ or appearance. Likewise, the sameness established by c:xclu.sions actually applies to the cognitive images; hentt. our conccprual cognitions are actually presenting an image as me same as orner images. and not a particu lu as [he umll' U othll'r p~"icubn:. But if WI!' ::Ifll' "p"rill'ncing mll'n~1 images, and if the 5a11\eness inherent in concqxuali[), applies to images, why would ~ act on p:uticulars? In other words, if I employ inftrtnces that leads to the conceptual cognitions such as -there is fire over there" or ~sound is impermanenl," men those: conceptual cogoilions arc actually directing me just to images. And images do nor perform any of the Functions opcaed of the enr.l._ment:al p~icuhr, we would c:tll - fire- or "sound-; ~nce. if my purpou ~ 10 wum my hands or to nuke a sound, me conc:q)luai cognilion has pre$CIIlcd me with $Omcthing that CIII'II'ID/ fulfill that purpose. DharmalcIrri cannO! $Olve mil problem by mainaining that conceptual cognitions-i.e., cognitions involving univnuls-cakc pMticulars as their objects, becawc, as we have: already ~n, DharmalcIni denies any such possibili[),. One mighl appeal to the causal rdation between image and parlicular. but while this may be lTUe when such cognitions are analyzed. they

do not in fact present themselves in that fashion in practitt. Thai is, in practice ~ do nOt think, M There is fire- and then think. M The fi~imagc construed as universal in the conceptual cognition. 'mere is fire : has an indir«t causal relation with $Ome actua1 fire, $0 I should move toward. the actual fire . ramu than warming my hands at me image.- Instead. we simply move toward the fi~ l .t1 In cffccr. ,his founh problem is p.sychologica1: mere is a di.scontinui[), between the subjectiyt content of conceptual or linguistic cognitions and

137 In addilion TO PVSV UPV'.91 (cind atx-. n.,8) I « a11O. for aampk. tIM: IrptncnU iii againsc an "ilimatdy c:Itina1, c:bu-Iiyt (}tin) u tIM: object of aprcJ-

in

PVSV PV,.,..«

lions (ld MrdJ/I). 1M poin, oflheK ugwncnll il mal iflhe:acnuJ alntml 01_·1 00f;'I,. lion ;,.~ . mm or.e willaa upon !he univnW, .nd no!: upon tIM: parti(uIar.

.40

FO UNDATI ONS OF OHAItMAKIItTl'S PHilOSOP HY

th~ ~f~~ntt of m~ cognitions to ili~ tdically dliacious paniculars on which ~ act. Adopring the voitt of an objeaor, Dharmakini puu the

problem miJ WIly: ·WeU, through this universal which you ha~ dcfmed :IS dilttrenee, does one cognize me particular as me same as other paniculm, or does one: cognize something dse [-namdy, a cognirive inugo-J as me same as other [imagcsP If me panicubr iJ whar one: cognit.es as me same, then how can it be an object of conttprualiry? And how could thm be Idie function (~rth4Itri]i) mrough ma, other objecr [i.e., the imageH And [if the inugc: were the obj«t) men on~ would not cogniu: universals such as impermmcnce :a.nd 50 on in paniculm. Thus, the panicul:a.rs would nor ha~ impertn:l.llencc:a.nd such as thor na.,u~, :a.nd impenn:a.. nenee and such would nor be the qualitlc:s of rtaI things."'" Dharmakini's mponsc: is 10 mainl2in that all conceprual cognitions involve a fundamental error (bJ,rintl): namdy, Wt due to a beginninglc:ss imprint (.Ni4iwis4M) in the min
me

While this -disjunction" (vipl.rnvt) bmvttn perct:ption and inference distinguishes Digniga and Dharmakirti from 8rahmanical philosophers. admining o nly two fornu of irutrumeno oflmowlf!dse ~ nor n~l2J'i1y:ll significant departUre from non-Buddhist South Asian tradiriofl5. II is true, of course. that many other traditioru do admit more than pcrcqxion and inference as in5lrumenw. Naiyiyiitu such as Uddyotakara accept ('NO additional irutrumena: analogy (f4JH1miNl) and lan~ (iAbJmlAbJA). I

5« tho I"~. '

If chapc~r

(,,).

·aI',

2 Set NSI.I.' : ",_,;,*,.,11. • .,..,. d u,.",..", . . , .. . .114... Analosr iJ 11)061 dotdy a_a uN widl JeaminllinsuOOc con~rioN. III wbm OM is mid "dw mw-Iiu aaruu ova' tbm: ill eaIIN a ,....,.. - S« aI.o Uddyouhn 'l commnlD (NV:I6i-'71), ..ruct. do.dy ~kI V~ (NBh:uS'): " .jU_ ,."..",.. ~tliJtIsJt' riU,.lf4 .. ..,........ and especilily (1"""']0): ~ MwJ..,.".,..., ..1Ifl~,!, ~"w,.k

i"..,..tr

1IIM~",,"""""'~qili,~~..,.~iIy , ~thI h]Ol P"'''''''!'f ,...,. ~ pM ..- ' r ell. , , _ .m,.. 1JtJ>i]4> lw. . tI·~ -JH'd N _ lJor p~~ ..1f'itIni MIfIj/WM'!'ftIiM....

.

~i#.

'"

..u...

1,,6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PIULO SOPH Y

Mirnif!ua\w who follow Kumaril:a acttpt:all of these. while also :admitting presumption (IIrthil"'ttijJ :and an innrume:nt Wt mc:y call - nonexiue:ncc~ (I,bh4vaP But in dc:nying instrumenmity (prama!']II) to these :allc:gc:d mans ofmowic:dge:. Dhannwrti :and Dignaga are ofte:n jusl rejecting Ihe cJ:aim th:at these :addition:ai mc::aru 5houId be c:uc:goriud Kp2r.udy. In the C25t of langu:agc. for erample:. both Dignaga.:and Dh:armmrti frttly admit thall.an~ can be::a trustworthy source of ccmin types ofknowlc:dge. but thcir dUm is that. in casc:5 whc:re: a linguisric cognition is funaioning as an instrumenm aw:arencss, il is 2CtU:al!y a type of inferc:n« .' Dignig:a :and Dh:armwrti also admit um..in irutances of presumption (ImhdJHllti):as wdl formc:d infc:rt:nccs. and one: might :argue ,h:at the: ~mc: would be true: for some insWlCCS of rosoning by .m:alogy.· The poin!. (hen. is ,h:at by 3 In "prctwnpUoa,· om prauma dx cmuna: of III crltiry without..tUch ~ a1ludy dnmnined mote of affain -.1d bo: impc*ibk. Saban. ("'Nr.r~)O ..JM;",j~ 1-1.1), cirin&: dx opinion of dw: Vrnik£r&, P- dlC c:umplc of ptaWnilll dut IA¥aduu muaf bo: ~ ou~ b. ..." .... one knows tNt bo: iI a1i~. but _ doc. not .... !Urn llIY' wJ.cn, in dlC houie 1l1C pocmrial problcmJ with mil rype of~ ~ iUunfllled by Kumirib'1 e:wnpk of pmumption '-cd on inklua: by infttma one can obsenoe th.It dlC OlIn t...........cd; hnoa, ..... pruwna d.... i. 1\as doe ~'" 10 move. Saban'. citation of dlt; Vruikln'. ddinj ~ rc:acU: IInblpMnir "1i J.1'JU!I In._ 1IInJ.. '"",'N ....,.~tlJ MnIMk.u,.,u; ,.,IM j i _ .,....."..,. tffMMJa &-rftI_ hhi....

-~ Kurdrib (SV. ~tlil) pYU: ~";ju. ~""" IIhJtUlM w""wt f .fn1'D!' ..~...".".~ni'~ fl 4 For a ~nl trt.llrMnl. I «

KdI"". (1997).

S Dignlga IIIIS mil dearly H rs,.1Ie£. fUya I ~:lst) . Dh.um&k1ni'l opinion is found", nllmcrow points, indlKlilll PVl.laI-t. TM IpC!cific ~ of;nkrmot intr:ndcd hm: iI an infdUICte from df«r (ta: below), lilltt that iI. callAl tdation beta" .. dlC ilnlSt in. fit. rmer'1 mind and dlC IInonnu of 1M spnkcr. Stc-. for c:nmple. PVSV fill PV I.117 (G:UJ.lI- 17): A natcmcnl is prompted by dlC ~·s inlmlion ("',"i~ to eonununicall: I 'fK' cilic meaninJlob;m (lin!.), for. pnIO!I..no knows, ilIilsulUllCn t iscornilll from WI immrion." th.Il IIip. Dh¥trWUrti alto malnWni cha, ,.mrJ.iIlIl__ U GIlly mraphor-

,. *

PI"'''

1,.8

FOU N D ATI O NS OF DHARMAdRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

J . J RLlation lhrough Svabhava: &yond "o,. PraLna · In contemporary 1Ch0lanhip on the- topic, it is generally agrc:td that one- of Dhumakini '$ major innovuions lies in his approach to the: relations among the me-mbC"n of an inferenCe', and tha, ,his innovation 5te-nu from his atfemplro solve a central problem in tht thtory of his Buddhist ptedtceSsor, Dignaga. In brief, me- prolNem is dl.tI, on Dignilg:a's ehrory, the prestnCC of tht evidtntt (Ixtu, liifta) does not n«mllril] mtllu th,l.( the property to bC" proven (~mIIl) is also prescnt.II Although one can point to two Icchnical issues in me- way Digniga structured his thtory dut cre:ue this lack of ccrt:linry," tht basic SOUI'CC' of this doubt is the qJistemic problem of induction: how can we arrive at a general rult-foch as the fact ,hat smokt always indicates fi~y e:nrapolating from a finitt numbC"r of obscrvarions! Despitt all of our prC'Yious cxpC'rience:s and aU dut we can now observe, is il nol possible that me case at hand (or SOO')(: fUlure case) docs nol (or will noe) conform to those cxpC'rienccs and observations?'1 tri¥tutp~-'!' ,...."""". ."....._ bo TdJcmaN (.yI1) and PrnJ (,"~.

jc,aIly aJkd "" infamce (NBp: _ry.,...,...,. s... .. Cf. I'VI" ,.. ).

I ltir.~

...,.s).

IDA. Strinkdlnn Ilu poUlin! (lUI h"':JI.. I>twnukini', focuIon mil p.obitm may -U be chK .0 hu auociation ...im IJtoUUHI .. an i".~n of Oipip ...no WJI proNbly

of l>tuormUlni',.~ IInnIcm iI ccmnIly cmii!ed wim deccaillJ mil probkm in DiSfdp·,lheo!y. a1mougn M proposa t lOIurioll w. Dbmnaldni docs 110( accqx. ~ (J"tl lw gvm .. plHllibk .xounl of the bIckground dUI lead. lip III Dlwmakini', _

' u,....

(lO..

II 11K fine problem it .hal i( _ I5IUIM Dignip to be -aing " d>rory of in~ thai Ic.b . 0 indiopuUlbk ~ in aU c:uca. a: ("'JtUiI'rhl~,n) (S.ci nkdlnu 'I'M ~ of thcJe diffieulriet if WI DiA"lP has acmwned fnt otLIr _ ~ eondilioru, b..al not MIfIkicn. ooca. /Or dnwiAS . tru#W<Xthy inr(l("..... Haya (,,sI:.slR) arpn tha. Dipip', tw I'IIIC ihnd.y "failed· ill lW thooryof infnmu:. bul racher mal the WKntain.,. implicit in Dipdp·l!ftc. IIrf is an ClJIftlUon of his "'rpcicilm. Keprda of whethn Ibis if 1M caK, Dhannaklni', ....... Ihrory is cbrIy ~med dimilQu"I unuruilllis.

'".:)1,,),

a,

m...c

12 Sn: ~ (I".:........l.1, ). Sidtri.. objeaa to llling "induaion" II a phibophiallool.lO praml thor: issueJ .ha. prompc thr: formub.ion of.M ,...~ti..,wIM. bul hill :upmenc it ~ on tho UlUlnpOOn thal "therc: uonly one ... uu~acl'Oi""..mOon in the IopcaI -rem of ""y inkrmc.." booJ:Jlo). 1would. inltmd up wr.h= i I _ dian _ ony to pac•• e INlh bca"vlhctt ill _Ihan one: ony 10 I!ndcnand th. ~ ma,ion (N.- """,.. pk, .. " ... "'u,•• c '" , N""'Llc~). WI ... """,,"," ot....." •..doJ"j'. poubk ....., inducti..., ""'" Ulha. Iw -U . rdalion trUlh dc:pmds l1li th. IQlUtc:I or idalli!ioos of

....oo.c

SVA"HifVAPItATlBANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFERENCE

149

We can understand Dha.rmalcirti', response ro this problem as an attempt" to move away from the grounding of rht pervaJiion rt:btion (vyipri) in any appcal to "mert: obsnvation and nonobscrvation" as the bases for esrablishing me twO aspects of pervasion, namdy positive and negative con· comiWlce: (lIlt WlJIII and IIJIlti"lta),U That is, on Dharmakirti', view one cannot establish the positive concomirance by mert:ly Stting that in every (2.o;e whe~. for elCImple. smoke is observed. fi~ is also ob5crved: nor can one establish me neg;.cive concomitance: merely by me fact that one has nOt obKrved a case when: smoke is present even though fin: is absent. Instead, in order to draw a wdl formed inference:. one must be able to speciry the manner in which the evidence (Imoke) is related to the predicate (fire), such mat every instance of the former must be accompanied by me I:.tter.l'

Although Dlurmakirri does not PUt it this way, me specification of this relation involves two separate tasb, Firsl, one must show WI would con· stitute me type of relation sought here, rumdy, a pervasion relation (UJiipri) mat t;lUrlllltm our ability to infer the predicate from the evidence. Sec· ond, one must have a procedure fo r determining C2SCS in whKti thar reLa· tion ir in place. Of these two tub. I will focuJ upon Dharmwni'f lhc.dao thnnJeIoa. wtw. ..bt lhc R~ of u.. mation annot be di......:cd &om iu contall. CO'm if _ undom.nd tilt' omla to be ~ thAt do not rdn to rW thinp in lhc

_.....

IJ From Dlwmaldni'J Jl(npeai~. 1IvarucnI'I IItempc at IOIvinllhc 1'1'" in DipUp'1 philMoph)' rdieI hea..uy on mere omanrion and ~. aM DIwmailrti·. a;.

'i<J-.. .,J .I.i•• ~ "'po,; ... . ~ ~y Ai __ ...I rn .......Iy •• lwo"........•• i .. ""l"""'........ I .. . ""

~ lhcaitiquaouur II I'VI ,II-Jl (G:9.1- :IO.17) • ....t.cft much of ~ ItJIIIIICllI JOaues upon the impoaibilif)' of emoblish.iDS nonobIet •• 000,. For tilt' pan1Id dQ..

.".n..m thJoush

ouAon rn HB. _ 5.cinkdUw:r (196"71.

14 Thil poUIl iuummuimi II

PVI ' JI-J~

The ba dill lbinp lUnd in the rdationUIip r1 a.1ISC IOd df«t 01' that OM thing iI. plopc: Harrs (1910) Iw arpIC'Ii mal dIeK all' sicnifica.nldi.fNmitOtt btlUtu. the pwilion found in die PtJ"_!'."mi~and dw ofDhamualru',laler rexu. Steinlcdlnu (J"o). ho .. coer. haI ~":II~ aonYino:inslr dw dUt ClI)iOCUil ;. mioplaad.1u Srftnkdlner noc~ aonI within pv and PVSV DlwmakIrri makes it dc:u thaI both,."". (Ihe -indicalCdo 01' plopeu, 10 ~ plOoth) and r-k- {tho: -inl.tica1Ot"" or~) ~ _ t v - . Set l'V:!i V "" I'VI." (Gc&+,.) and PV,.19l with PVSV "'" til. (G:,&.IJ-9].7).

IS4

FO UNDATION S OF DHARMA](IRTI'S PHILO SOPHY

are swbh.i1lll5 ofsmoke:, and in the previous chapter, much of our ralk about "proj>(rties'" rdlect~ th~ term IINIbIMVII in our primaI)' sources.· ""hal is common m both of mese meanings of swbh.i1l4 is the notion that il is essentWto themtity in question: on DharmalUrri's way of putting it, flO funhcr causes arc l1!quircd for th.al entity 10 possess a Wtlbh4"., I, Since an understanding of IlIffbhilWlpratilJlmJhll requires an undl'rstanding of thl' term twthhdlNl in both of its senses, pan of our taSk in Ihe fOllowing pages will ~ 10 unpack both mcaninp; of me lerm, AJ we do so, however, (WO points must ~ kl'pl in mind, First, as Sieinkeliner notes, Dharmakini hinudf doo nOI provide a compkte accounl of me distinction and relationship bnwttn IlNlbhiv. as property (or "property-swrbh.it"'-) and IWlbh.i1lll as natufC' (or "narurc-fwbh.iv.t). Indeed, he docs not even provKt~ any dear demarcation for the usage of the term in one $Cost or thl' olher. Henu, if we arc to anempl 50me explication of IWlbhdlltl. we will at 20 Slrinkdl~1 (19711 IOU m., lim 10 d,- a d4tincrion bet'Olccn o;wo di!fcrmr ~ of .......".,., The fxt dulINM.lrwU naNn can only be appIiedJin&ularlyto any p-m. caUq iI best iUURrartd by CMoS whca the ram oco:u" in i",uummrallinpdu (_MIWU) Of wirh tbc ,.,; tufIU: (,...w.-I4J. For c:umpIa in Pvsv, _ "" PVI,nab (G:1.1.I6 ); "" PV•...-v. (e ,)., .... ), .. rvL 7); .... rv •.,. " ,\1 (e. ,o.~). U-J in mi> ':11K. ...J ~ ' .. ;. a oynonym of ,.../trri wbOdt it .........i ...... !uM ..... sit...- lOr N.H.""" .... "",....,. For ttIIm, pia of mil rype of ...... of ,...Jrrri in PVSV. Itt: G'40.u "" PVI.n ; G:41'" "'" PVL7J; G:$O.) ';PVI.,. ' 9.b: G:f7.). ';PVI.I09 (mmpan!his instanatof~wilh tbc ncatby ~ of rNM.i_l4a, G:S6.lOO; G:60.1J JPVI.IlI; G'1'O-16 .;PV,.,.... ). Wbn! I.I$td in !be pllInI, _#b.hwdoes noc ownurily rand for !be '"•.",. ...II~y ,""'1JJb. of a Jin&k mlitr; inMcad, dw plural ohm oa:un whca many mcitXi art beitls ~ as when one sptoLIu of many rh.inp who.: nalwa _ di!fcrm, or noc difftrtm (in PVSV I«: Go,6.7 .... PVUI; 67.. ';PVI.IJ7-14l; G:'JuJ ""PVI.1,,). In conttm fO ,n- CUCI. pluof -'IM_ ... P'0f"'"T include .-MJ_;~).. U b;~in N •. ).....J _ut~".. in PVSV JI"VI" J?-141 (G:6I.u - I.J). Similar ~_ f'ound in HB (~s., 1..11: ~~ . In -'[Q of ....M.i... in dw Jinpllar _ alto in m., ICftIC of·p'~lry'

n.!

~

...-,.u.,.",,,; p.,....''''''oi/I

u.-,.nwu......".

p~

Sirinkdlnct. in

IIOmC

coneoru compoonda cadins in -jl",--MM... and ")6_ _ '

_M4w~p:od~

211u Scrinlcdlnn (1974'J1})."... -,...MiowfJiI INI P'~hl (til•• ...;. 6bi"';) of IOIl'ofUUfl& which ;. noc cuatd by M'>mnhinll doc. bw ;. Jivtn wid. , .... 'hina iud(.- ,"'" notion due a JNJJ.illftii inrrimic or ~IW 10 an nWry in dw dUI muty does ..... ~..,

mw

any fiuthcr ClUIa 10 be q.ulillrd by thai _1rIoi. iI made al ~ poi"" in PVSV. including .... PVI.7 (G='.l6); "" PVI.16 (G:l7. lo-u): .J PVI.zI (G:I,.ls- uuh ""!'VI.J'; 1 (G::ao.»-'lI; 11.6-7); ""PVI.., (G:t.6 ..,...): PVI.I66 (G:a.,u); ""rvl.l" (G:99.lo-lI); "'" PVI.161 {G : ~ . J.O-lIh "'" PVl.ln (G:14S....,): .JPVI.l7'6 (G:14S.lot-'S). AU of dwx .QlmlCnU may be unden!ood ... grounded in at.. !wOe "OM of ntUIM.. .. ~tuMhi.. in PVI.1. and !he claim in tbt commcawy on tNl 'tttIC thai ... caliry .......J.d no< ...h .....·~ F " I I . 'l.....uharmaJdni iI obiipllO opaIt of no diwibuccd nwMiw' ochn dw! an adUlion ' (G:lLlI: "Jh! ..i" ",...,..,. Thil "'fiV"1 a IIJi~ may aho be corWdomd • ~ A las aplicil eq!Alion or ~iI; wi.n SMiIti... alto OCCUR in MV ..J PVI.I J7-I4J. (trINb.cd in tht apptndR). ThtK, Dtwmaklni ....,. ",..,111; (or dw .dated I""' ,.nivrm) in vaOow compouMiJ (G:U ,' 7: flu,ltl"..,-vrt". G:U .U): flU'""" !6Thft#. G:67·. 'l: -1!~~",",) 10 dilcula rlIt l'IOIion I .... II~ ~ of. poup of n .. rti.o-o .. """";tut..l. by th.ft • .tfr~idO« r.- .....H doo< ...,. Ito_ ..... ""'peo:tod ~. Thd tnoOIiril w.td 10 explain how muhiplc _irucnu of. WlIler-iuI!; can be aIJcd!he same: ewm lnoup,hcy do I'lOl IKIwJly form • KpU1l.t mlit}' duo. io WI.er-jus- In C'.OUlK of tNl expbruoon, M'fM2b 01 dw ·INIIft".nd -=II IN. att dw ~ of. Wllcr.jul!· (G:" ,,!, p.~M.i" riir'7"!r). Unb _ undamndp.~1Ibi 10 be I w,,1Irihi('UI wbich CIIC phraK would mQII O w form and lOon w. hl¥e 1M nalUft 01. Wlra-juI!1, dw IQlo:mM' ·nwu._ of I ....Iet_ju'" (sIMf4J"'~) Q qu.itt darly mruu .0 be • coruuucrion b-.I. upon 'IM exdusion of what dOQ !>Of h.,,« .M dfc« (expcacd of] .....,. (flUlltil".")h.. " i). ThUl. thQ piIR£C 100 would eqUllC Propat)'tqu;lrion

w.

_ewha.

w

.nc

me

*

.nc

_ -- _. """",._• ..,...!"LL .

. ,

"

(

' )

2S Ir!he equalion of propcny-_Mi_ wim cxdusions (.,.....,..niI) iI ioo-l ICCUnIC, m..n nlUllbo:r of poNibk p.opu.,-_Ml_ ill I~K:a1I, !imidca. Thio Q the impl.ialion of PVI.Ic>--iI , -...htK Dlurmaldni c:oruidtn w specific CIIC of propmico oonaruaai lOr all mrit}' du-out;h I dcfinltm: dn.mniru.ion (-..,.JJUbtcquml ( 0 I pau:pcion. Dlwmaldni'l AWn c.onoml htft illO.bow thai sudI determina.ioN do no! rd'er 10 tMit objKu .poet. u..dy" (,,;JJ,;,;;~ but nu.c.- uk. MPriody: th:a, iJ. dwylili exdurioru .. tMi. obj«co .......'_ ·exd·......,· amWIy mcana m., ~ orprnmtlon offaltc impuatiQno (~ 01110 an ot.;ea. Bul whm [)twmKini IUIJInwUa !he argumenl in the: twO vena: bdow, M also poIno OUt that mc.c impulII~ htnu. propatiel; c:orutNCIro Ihroug. exdusion---...-c .. numa'OUl .. Inc numba of &be imputations. which IU£RUU ...... !hey aft tho:-In.:

omically limidal:

.c,._

1M dtfinilM:dtram inariona and exprea.ions ....II_1O 1M imputation of pudicucs wroogIyanribu.cd 10 a..m;ca att ... nurnrrow .. tbt impuPrionsofinoor1m prcdic:ucs. timor, " - a:pnaionI and dcfiniri-tt dacrmiNriom a111uv.: diaina abj«u.. ~. If a lin"" expKllIOft or conctpnW oasn,uoo [dur '0 ~nl affimuri.-dy] wac: 10 pe.o. llinr;k- n:aI,hi"" thac would be no objta other tIw. ~ mi", itxU'1O which il would rmr. n ... ttf",c, all expK$&ioru would be oynonymt

ISB

FOUNDATIONS O F O HAIM AKI RTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

A5 with wabhdva as - propc:rry . ~ 10 understand the usage of the term Ivabbtlva in the KnK of - nature. ~ v,e an: best served by returning to the Itpom..thtOry. Previously we have mn that one of the fundamental moti~ vations fo r the formulation of the apoi»theory is to accou nt for the fact that we have ~djsuibudve cognitions" (ItnJlJl!fliprllf]ily4): we an look at sevetal entities and n:cogniu: them all as -the same" (rlr,,) in that they ilIt' all water-jugs. for example. For other South Asian philosophers. this type of cognition is easily accoUnted for by appealing to the presence of a single universal. -waler-jug- nm~ (tM.uUlNJ). instantiated in all of thost: e:ntities. Thus. one an cogniu them as the ~me and call them all ·water-jugs" because one's various cognitions quite literally cont21in the ~me objKt. namely. that universal. For Dharmwni, however, this option is not available. for it is a form of rt:a.Iism that he rej('Ct$. Instead, he must find some other aplanation for our cognition of all thost: individuals as the same. DharmalOni does so by for~ mulating a -nondiffert.n«· ("bbrJ.) that pertains to all the entities in question. Specifically, he claims that although all the individuals in question arc actually unique, they are all nondiffercnt in that they arc all different from thost: entities that do not have the potentials to produce the expected dfccts and that have thus not bttn produced by the apect~ auses." In the previous chapter. we have secn that. when Dharmakini discusses aclusions, he plac%S panicular emphasis upon the samenm of the effect (and not the sameness of the auses) that is asscned of all the entities to which the same exclusion is to apply. We have also seen that this appeal to a sameness of dfcct can lead to a number of problems. the most obvious of which is an infinite regress. To resolve these problems, Dharmakini appeals to the notion of a · judgment of sameness- (rlulpratyaw"uni4jli4ft4). On this argument, the claim that all the e:mities in question hav~ th~ sam~ efttct

[and aU conapnw c.os;nilioru would Iu~ me ~ com a ll]. r.,ww,.,. '~1fIlro'" Utttt;w, ,,;tt~ I ftW J...uJ ... _ y J,i,;tt~ Hup_iltnw I.j.. ~ ri.rJrw --n f Ind'h]/"......",~ iii ~,. M._ 'il.

VJtl,,.

"*_

Whik 1'- _I"I!B M. tlN.rnk.JlimidClinaJoi poai~ propmy"sv.dJ!,i_ dw.;>CI\W nwnoo cons(n.arud ~ lipan tht (l)nlm formrd by ~ habilll>.lion and 10

_ . s.... PVSV .,JPVSV , fM (di"",,'-' ........... "

S!I')

26 5«. for rnmpk. PVSV "PVI.n (,f3rub,od in m., a~J. 5« abo I"" di ....,"io n of dka in ,he prMoui cMpm (1I!i1J).

of ......-

SVA'H1V,4PIlATIIJANDHA : THE BASIS OF INFER.ENCE

IS9

resrs ultimately on the &ct that they eventually produce a sccond-otder cognilion-a judgmnu-in which (he individuals in question are idenci~ fied as the same type of entiry.17 A1llhe entities we call ~btue, " for cnmple. product' peruprual images thai, when the proper conditions arc' in place, willlcad to the judgment. Ihis is blllC." In speaking of Ihis "judgmenl of sameness: Dharmakini appears 10 appeal in pan to mind-dcpcndem faccon, such as the interestS, expocr.ttioru and omer relevanl dispositioru of the person in whose mind the dclerminarion OCCUI'1. But if subjeaive facron werc' solely rcsporuiblc for the arisal (or absence) of the wne judgment in various irutanccs, men Dharmakirri', philosophy would lack the ttrt2inry for which he Strives: there would be IlOthing aboul things memsdves mat warrantS our application of one or another lerm to them. Inncad of this semantic anomie, Dharmakirri maimairu that. once we understand temu IUch as ~ WIIler-j u g" and · elephant," our corrC'CI application of those temu is not JUSt a matter of whim: entities that have certain effcas are indirectly called. "WIlIer-jugs," while those with certain other effects art called "elephanu." and without changing the meanings of these ternu, we cannot be correct if we literally call some water-jugs "dephanrs" and some dephanu "WIlIer-jugs,"· 27

a. Sirinkdlnn (19]1:190).

28 n... notion I~I.(""":U-C fiud wiu~ ... of dw:CIolIKcomet dw: ICSttiaiof! in the nalurc-~of thedka.-

(nwMthw,.;,.,tMtI ~ "",MI~~ . 33 See. for a:am.pk. PVSV "" PV1.l671-C (G:.... I.-Ip: cired by Sl~nkdlna h971:1U. n.n and }4): ..:0: aIso~, wpm- 1, n.II.,. Heft, Dlwmakim mpondJ 10 I Siqlkhya objKtion mal, wMoul tome rqxaablc aa..n:o: Of propoty. ;1 wouJd no! be: pol'iblc 10 ar .hitt many individu;ot" which 1r1' all-.:oriaJly di~nl , aUK 1M ~ dka: This if "., Ik (MI. Ii...., . .bho"p.U ""inn .... Jiffr,.,."fiw ... •U ..be.. nltili~ ,.~ tIw t/ftrl i,. I/_ri. ... wlJif, . d.m .. ...~ ,Itis ,IN ...", ... .[ ,Ite nI,iri" c."" 11M, 4fin. (PVI.I67a-cJ Ifm.- erllities coruin ,....., OI'Mr n .. il;a., .hen aU m,ilia would d rhcr be- produan of anythi", ~ or none would be: a producer of anythins al aU in malW:y ~ all eq.wJy dilfcfnll &om anyone m.ily'. haI~''''''Mhoo ofbeinc the producer of !he dt"ta in qUlSlion. Bul ~n thoush all odin mUlia ~ not dislina. in .hc;. J ,ffi;",,,,,,,, rrom 1''''''' or c:awct.;". ~... or dw Ulil)'. [namely, tN' causal compIexl. Bu, in thiI a..e. _ """ infw only W pouibWl)' of the ariA! or W dJea from the aUA! complo bcawe _ [only] int'cn Inc: apaciIJ ~U) or dw: ausal (Ompla to p~ duac the cfka. TIw aW LI)'. dnot tt IIlnvvbbly consoequcn' wim the mm: praer..:c or Inc: complete (OmpM:o: or a..-. io jwt. _M.l"., and""'" is ....Iu. is infaTC'd,

16..

fO UNDATION S Of DHAlMAlClRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

Ncvenhdess. al thOUgh such a relationship does exiSl. an entity's nature-Ivabh4va should nol be equaled with a causal compleJ:, whether it be a prcscm causal complex in which it pmicipates or the past causal complex &om which it arose." Concerning the interprttation of an enti ty's narurc-nwbhaw in terms of iu participation in some prescm causal compla, we should rtmuk twO rdevanl pointS about Dharmakirti's notion of a causal oomplex. Fim:, when Dharmakirti uses the term, he mons for it to refer ( 0 "Uthe causes and condidons that contribute to the production of a particular effect. This notion itself restS on pre--Dharmakirtian anaI)'5CS of causality according ( 0 which the entities that oonuibuu! to the production of an effect are classified in (urns of the role they play in the causa.! process." WilhoUi going into deta.iI. we can nOle Ihe general distinction be(Wccn a primary cause (htlM, Ibn-iii

~ -.("'!U ~ •....".;J"'u

I .nhJ""'._~lWt ,.

,.,.MJ". 'IfM"""!'ita!t IPVt.7] tUb.,i J"'dMs.".1Iihfth ,..",.", ~ in ,.,.....tnhf."'-'IJi

lHltIMw MJ-,. I u,... • INN!.". ~t ~t ~rru.~ io_ lJoru SiUllllf"iIjlli". ~1V7'D"""M""Mt I ~u u ullUfrl....ni"....Mhi" in·

nvjIM.,.IJhwun.."••?-" 1]. N.in p....".. I 1M"" c:t-n.o ",nckr nvMJ- wion as • pnno:.ple of Inn. 1:1lIIrnot .... [In ckr Onl~ bronun _/JINhw!Idic Knfi dcr DiIlfF. zuwirkro. &It PrinUp ihra Sri...... I. rI1J:»« In OfIdngictI COfIirKU _6& h4(! mc:uu the po-. of thinp u tllf: principlt of their bri"" in IopctI gonieKU tho: word tnWlI dot c.onccpt. dw is tbr dd'irUtc naOoruI conarua (.......I,w)WI is rdaredlO raJ things. lIN. 11,14: [For IUN~_~ ] ... thr: 1...,,,Luion 'CMcna:, WI:Kft" would be quitr ~r in Ontolopcal rontaU, u il would aand b thr: rt1 indiaincc lOI2Iiry ef the: nriow po$&ibililia., pown1 of a thins 10 be or b«onx pm of dHumn CluW complaa..

J6 S«. for CA/llplo:. AKl..49ff;and AKBh um. (I.79ft) .

S VAJ!HAVAI'RATlJ!ANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFE RENC E

16S

1IJNl44111lN hI. etc.) and its supporting conditions (lIlh4kliripralJ4}tIJ. In (h~ case of tht prodUCtion of:lo sprout, for example, the seed will be consKiered th~ primary QI.IS(:, while soil. water, and such will be supporting cond jtions.J1 In this case, if tht t~rm "causal complo~ is to apply to tht totality of causes and conditions nccamy for the production of:lo sproUt. then it must apply not JUSt to the seed (primary CII USC), but also to all of those suprorting rondinnn~ (,he JOil, w:lter. :lo ne! JO nn). O ne o n ~~k ~ I ~ nf j l R I a seed nor even of jusl :lo seed and soil as being th~ C:loW:loI complex for the production of a sprout." )7 Vuubuldhu (AKL61 and AKBh ..J til. ; IW - )1t1) ,efers 1O.1Msic: diRinaion br~ CCIi primary OIlK (,.~) and rupponifll coocIilkIN (,.J.Uri,,). DN:rrmki"i', mat oonunmtllOl'J .lIude 10 mit lwic diRinction II nrious poinu. indtldin&- lOt namp&c, in IXvo:ndn.buddhi'. wmmcnll on I'VJ.U H ,... (PVP::a67a) : ...... , . R,. lti t. &-,. J..itI,.; "'P ..,. "" ~ w,.r", PlUM , . , k". Jiyd "" ~". M £e}lf", """",., JIwJ ,. "" .., In! ,. i "D"';II WIIf ",it '" »t' ,. IIJ' u",11 rit ~ ,. 'i """"';11 ... .... FOI' arMKbtra:amp&c,1fe ~i'lcommmuOll PVSV ..JPVI.I7OW (PVT:l.OlI )ffi PVT..:1a6ff)· 38 DNrmakirti'l \lit of ~ tmn · ou..W t'Ompla: " (4muJIIUIJri) is ~ ",doer (Oftfusi"" Jina il in¥Olvu diffnml liruarioru: ;1.11 "incompltfc ou..W compla:" M".II 1Ht-.l,....). • "complete 0 .-1 com pln." (uJtJ.l I"t>ubuf:rI). ....eo ....a. .. llshl and ICIIIOty cntllXC alC pm oil WilICf. ju.g·IIUIUfIt.

SVA6H,tVAPRA TI&4NDHA, T ilt BASI S OF I NFEREN CE

16,

haw: s«n WI an rnri[), has a amin n~ plttisdy:lS a result of the ClUSCS and condition! Ihal produced il. Ncvmhdcss, despite a close relationship betw«n an entity's naturc:-n.whh.iva and the Cluul complex ,hat produced it, Dharmakini's system docs not allow us to equate the twO. For c::umple, sina Dharmakini maintains dut cawcs arc momemary entities distina from their efreclS, me equation of an emity's nature wilh the cauul complo (bar produced i( would oblige w; 10 admi( that: ,) a w:uer-jug's natull! is wmC1hing different from the water-jug; 1) a WOlter-jug's nature: mslS before the WOlter-jug aislS; and}) a water.jug's nature no longer existS whrn the W2tc1'-jUg exists. None of these conclusions arc compatible wi,h Dharmilini's philosophy. THE SU BJECT ( DHARMIN ) AND SVABHAvA AS " NATU IlE~

Up to tbis point, our interpretation of IINIbh4Ui1:lS "nature" may be summarized as follows: an entity's natu~.rvablM'w is the totality of an entity's causal characteristics, and this amountS to a restriction upon the kinds of df'cas that it h:lS Ihe potential to produce and the kind of causal complex from which it has arUcn. If this interpretation is correct, one :lSpect of this mNning of IlNlblMua should be immM.iudy obvious: :I. suhject (dAo""j ..) em have only one nature·"Jf1blNIVtl. and the narurc-n.wbhdwtof ,hal subject cannot apply to subjccu of another kind: the nature of smoke is not the nature of a water-jug. This :lSpect of tIItlbh4&N11:lS nature stands in conlrut to wabh411J1 as propc:ny. for as ~ havc 5c:Cn, an entity such as a watCf.jug may be conceived as having multiple propcny-JWlbhdws." But in specifying thai a subject may have multiple propcny-svabh.:iv.a but only one n;uure-".,..bhdv.r, fWO k~ Usuu must be kept in m ind. FiRI, we haw: already sec:n dut Dharmakini critiques the ultimate rcality of dis-

ttibuted encities such as water-jugs. In other words, on Dharmakini's view a water-jug is rU)l ultimately real. and there is no 'ingle particular {svalRlqRJ;UI} thar is in and ofiuclf a waler-jug. Ruher, in the comot of Out intCfC:SU conttming the mevant causal characteristics, a "wa(C'r.jug~ is iudf c:onc:eptu,.jly eonnruC;le(lrd /III meobj«u of conapa mow M roruiOl in the ..... anric ronw'lfions make. no Ioe1Ue brcawc the cxprcuiom fo, IUbjc.oa and prtdk:m would drnotc (.~) thc I&InC tftin&. likcwioc. a gramlNltical QJf>ordarion (ruch II thc p iI;W of 'thc cownatof I cow'} thai inwotw.. distinction ben. CUI the «me"u reWed aUo makcf no IoI1lK btawc it dtpmdI OIl. diff'a'ttla t.n.UIl the «ma\lI. ~ Au'-tII "'" ~ W 11_ ,bi,." • l'W",_tK.J met tIini"l' ;,1m ill rtr-.n i..JiuuP dK,rwIicut,;,., is u" ~ (.nJ",) • ifit fIInY Jilform, "".. tIw ,~~_" " ,..J""J~;• ..J... f ... "''''1'''''' {(~ [PVI _""! It;' "",,n., cut thai any UK olbn~ is mtrintd til thecsaa>tColan ob;ta brawt ont wouJd be fOrud 10condudr thal ... himsOal (.aN""'; UAft would not OCC\Ir. typaol "AlP an uxntd 10 mu 10 fW'I) ditUna thinp whether thc thin" art aaw1Iy di.. lina or noc. 8ci1ll anployal in INI WJ.y. U>cy naiJy poinl ow thc .dcl(ilI .. if ;1 wen: IWOdiffft(Dt thing. ThctJon:, e¥m lhou&h both ' (II(TW' and · w .. , =IT~ rtkr 10 the I&InC ob;m (urh.c). diffrrml orrnatIOc oonwnlioru: an conHruatd JO tNt one: mishl kMw lbar 10ft!(: auribult is prtdicaml of _ oub;ta- \Vhcn ...m JCnWuic """'............ ...., ~ a ~ w+- "",,..bo. arc dUotinco "f'f>aIn in """" nition in tuch a (uJ,ion rhal il indici.,u thc pmiic::aoc: .. if'il wen: diHcrct\1 from

m.n...

n-

SVAlIHJVAI'RA TIIlANDHA: T HE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

17 )

we abstract th~ various possibilitits th:u un .I"" llll~rp'rion of the 0'CnC pm by DharmaIdni in pvsv, ....t.cn ~ is &k-d aj; I1Jhrttir -,Jand -,.1IJhrrU:. .61IJIII nw ",""UlJ. H1 CONC ERN INC NECESS ITY

In our examination of the four issues addressed above, we have .s«n th:u Dharmakini implicitly relies upon some notion of necessiry. Although it u incomplet:e, Dharrnakin i's inchoate theory of neassiry is probably what prompts many contempol'al)' interpreters to rranslate property-SWlbhalid as "esscntw property." Thu tntnslation may be suggestive. but it mWI be employed with caution. Specifically, the notion of an "essentia.l property~ Iptolli.

!her ~ do not M"': lhe _b4J"" or Prodoon8 a ria ' ptOLIl whcta in I

QutaI compla duol i"d"des I. barley Ked (and 1\01 I. ria I«d). The reuon for !his is tNl ~ .,il. ~~ and od>t. condilioN in ~ c:ompla pin the of prodoon8 I. ritt ~I from the p~na: or !he rice seed. Tht moll tdtYanl put or ,he p»A8C. whim raponds '0 ,ul"rnenu '"Pinot IN: nOI;on ,hal an tnli!),', dDUVClion (,,;dJ;,) I . t'¥t!)' !IN)lntn1 is not inm.wc (W ~nriallO WI tI1riry. reads II follows (G:'J9"'-' 4):

,,,,,MiN

"Bm . in wow w ........ ricttprotJI" 10 be pmtIl.ICIed. a hatlry - ' and wch nuy ..... be in n«d of :anythift8 .ddiDonal beaUK ,tl 1M aupponin8 oondioons ooil for tbt- production the riu 'PfO"1 JOmtIimtI be in !he proximity or ~n !he harky -=I and ..m." How is il l\Ol i" need of -miftl? Tho, is, in.umuch .. they (i.e.. the IN.rky K'nI and aucbl do /IOl ha." tht wUhi"" of produc:in8 the.itt JPIO'" thai a rice r«d two they an: in ncni WI ,,,,Hh,iN. "In ,hal caK. IOtM fibricaral or QUlC..II I:fllilies nur;abo 001 haw thll J''''iJhh" ,I.., .....a.c. .k.:.r." A ria: oud and ouch ha~ eha,_~of produc:i"81 riu~e due CO thcir own QUK{,J. Heoot, W I which doe.: /IOl haw thoK cawa doe.: 1\01 ha...: .hal _Mbra. And i, is pc:rcciwd mac I CIUK [or I ri« «Cd 01 a hariq...-dl ... I rauiacd autal poccnUal. Nor is il rt:IIOI1Ibk- 10 claim dw d>t rsriaion in J""bh.iw WI pm:ai1U 10 dUnp (.nI!.a) is random (~iU) beaClK WI which dna DO{ rcqui .... awes and conditioN for io MlI:nI:t antI(K be rcsoicted in span. ,irr>t and ",bllIf1«. [ ....,," ~ jII"" ......~ I ~ai, ~1Ii'!' Witi, w",fpi "',!"rIth. ";-,,,-,.1t6I1fIlI "mw~,.,.u. ... .,;~ I Iili~rtbrt qi III "",MJJW!J JI"i 1M 'S'*""';,. '",,,,,,,MiN!! ~ 1";",.;.Jn;J,. III IomtfJ ""'rii~ , ..filii " " I ... r. "",~"""iy.r_ "niMu"" ~fJ I

iii,. ...

."iWffiM

....~ ~",...~.ttt.

57 In noUn8 we the ~O;n H B do not "apJlQl"" 10 addre. thicl probkm.1 mnn 10 uI" 1-10- ...........t,...;.. ......... bc)"'lctldml upon 1M patti",,', dUpoJirions. In rlw eumpk of tho: woman ', body. ~i

dad_',

(rVt':7'Qblif .. K:I#o l~ p'tnicb lIWIyc(lhrdoeWls, Lt.., INI w~". body. and tnallht pnmven:an:. ~11, a IIMi .libntilK. The pM "rads:

doc

"But why .. il that, C¥m though one .... hid. p"ICCpl.w ""p"Iicnoa: of"'" n.a1;UlC of • re:aI di'''fi (_"'I'M"') thai is diRina from :aU od>cr thinp. _ c&oa ISO'! ha.., • mnemon ic: dnerminalion ofil ar wchl" BtcauJe 1M 1t1ppIlfti", condirioou:an: IIdtins. And IhtlJo.~ . wnt tIN.p HV IMI ."",," .J,J (>~""fI1 ~M • tIM"" ".ti" (.rJq.) ,.., it {rJti_iJJJ MMJ '" ,...... _ ""P;.,. ....., JiJ,;.-;.., ...,..... ("w,.);" ~ In..,.,..i_';''' --r'''- '".....do thnr ;, n" tpJin- IPVqlJ Altbou&b _hal apc' icl'lCltd Vi rlllit,. thai 11M no pMU and wboK ~1\IfC'o_w... it dinincl from :aI othrr tbinp. _ doa 1>01 thnmr dnermine all iu dirunciM qu:alilios (MtJ,,) beawo: JUCh I CIIlp'ition dq>cndt Oft otbn CliUKf. ~I is. pnupt.w upcl klllX prod\ICQ ~IWI" ~tioN (.,;s. aIJ'Y.~ in aaord with _ 'I nwnl>ll conditioni,.. for 6o¥Ori"B dw: fomIu1ation of oeruin _\XL Foreompk, C¥m iboufih!hen: is no diKnmu in thaI lhty an: alltttin& m.... n , Iwhm. ~,.....,. the bodyof I drad W'DfnUIJ. "'" c:onaiyu illo "'" a wopoo:; 1. 1.....fUj '-"I W«>h.hIy'V"" ,h.o, nn ~"y ..... fi&",.:,,;"n~' Ir:u. rwo olthac judp>mu m.... be- dem>cd .. IJJJ~ (basal on rnI thinp), and hma, [UU

the: mulripliciry of correa but II Ir:u. aathcUWIy inc:om~tibk judpnrnt still appIia. Probably put of DIwmaldni', point ~ is that ~ th_ intnpmrn----thr 00s. tho: libmilW and tlw Mi........u ICtUI!Iy livins in differ"1 brmic workU (1M';' and IS • mult, dwir intnpfft:ltio(:rty-svabh41145 as a determinate subject "smoke," then it must be: possible to reliably conUNCI other property-swbhll145 :15 wdJ. including "product of fire ." The same restriction applies muutU muunJis 10 an individu.al construed as a 5L1hjUI~I UIIUIIp1ion Ihai the pct«ptual judpnulu in question ar~ aJrady ~

"",",a:...buo.. • .be.......J ch..-...:ou;.u.:.,,( .... cno.;, iu in predicates [ 0 it. In shon. both of these: p~icates are ontologically reducible to the subject that they qualify.91 Now, if this ontological reduction were all th2t Dharmakin i meant by "identity,- then we could raise numerow criticisms against this notion. O ne obviow critici5m is that, on thi5 theory, me inferentt could be: interpreted as a tautology.'" If the predicate to be pro~n (uldhyttJ 2nd the eviR

9S Xc !w:.flI hoo) ror a diocwaion of IOITK rdn3nt pm IF

96 This p'obkm is ""'p'_d throu&b

rhelmn".nj~(PVSV .JPYI.)9).

$ VAAHAVAPRA TI.!ANOHA; THE BASIS O F INFEREN C E

dena' iH~ in f..a nnrologK::ally id~nrica.l . 2nd if we mue no specification beyond this slatement of ontologic:al idc:nrity, then we 2fe in dfect saying "This is 2 cree bec:ause it is a tree." Dlwmakirri takes this criticism sc:riousiy, and his entire elcunus on the llpoh..theory in the SVllvrffl can be understood as a response to this issue. Hi.! argument comcs down to the claim that. in an inference by way of JV4bhoiVII-eVidence, me t'Yidence 2nd predial", "rr indeed onrolngia lly identic!' bur they do not hav~ the same mc::aning (,mha) bec:ausr. they art fonned on the basis of o:cluding different "deIimiten" (IIwuJhj).n Although we do not have the spaer to ev:alwte Dharmakini's :argument fully. the basic treatmr.nt of the 4'poh.,..du:oty that I have presented earlier should SUggesl that chis aspect of his philosophy is not implausible. T "urology iJ i n~ " problem rh:u Dh"rm~kirTi m"~1 "void. hur if i ~ probably nO{ the most serious criticism that ensues when me identity-mode is undcntood to consist merely of onmlogic:al reduction. To be sp«ific, if all we mean by the identity-mode is mat me evidence and the predicate are ontologic:ally reducible to the subject (dhllrmill) that they qualify, Ihen this would justify a bevy of flawed inferences. For example, mere reduction would '"-TUbl... w: co ny. "This i." U t t becau~ ic is exii(~nl. " After :011, the propel't)'-lV4bh.rlV4 "o:iJtence" (IIInJ) and ~ treeness" (vrit!IIItW) "re both reducible to the subject (tiharmill) that they qualify. An obvious response to this point is to say that such an infettnce would nor pass the (cst for negative concomitance (lIJ1l1i"ltllU]4pri). That is, one would observe (hat "coSten«" am be present where there is no "tlttness," But the problem here is th2( this is falli ng back on "mere observation , ~ which on Dhannakini', view canool provide:l ~u fo r ,he rype o f n edudcd ill lhe ,ubjc-n under diKuaion

~ TN. brinr; rhc cate, ~ the pm;Iicuc in quation (~;. IMX plr ~

....m

,ha.

.,.-., ..;; IMMrHJI '""rffl!I f7krlNfMtwI.,..u;.i>; .,,,, I,,.,,,Ji'UhI rW:r rdtu

,-ullJ '''''If'l'I1Jhj "" ~i1UqM/ d,u''''',,..w-.tr1tIJ H ~ i,; I ."qi "~1MqII,.1q1U",!" ~

..ftIltJiiblw ;.01,-,..... I' ;'; ...,..".

",.MHd,~

I

...

,..."..,.Lf'hiM.a..,.~"'iIJ""I /~~'lrlliair / ~U.wJ ..ti err l MN ~ .1i,~ 1 ~rnn~MJIIIh 1.,-" "..~",

4jj6d'_ 1 4"r'!4IMJJMM _".~ 1 "",tirJur ,., sWUM nw WiiM ...", iii whiMh-..,.. ~ 1."y.J.",6hb ,., ilwriJ .iU., .j#y~ 4f7 .".ti""". ,Q,.q. uJ..... ~ ~ ..".ti~ ~~"IM}"' .

"a: Tillcmaru: (I"a:Si and n.61.

S VAIHAVAPRATIIANDHA : T HE BA SI S O F I NFEREN CE

10']

kind offruit can have whe:n ripe. Dhaflnakjrti th~n asks us to consider twO different contats. The first contot il; me practical simation of deciding which fruia on a particular trrc will have thai special tll5fe. We are uncon· cemed wilh other fruia, and thus the fru its on this tree form the ~ntirety of our induction domain. With this in mind, we taste a few fruiu from all the branches of the nrc, and we find that the fruits we sdected from a particular branch all have Ihal delicious tasle, while allihe others we have lUted do not. Pointing to that one branch, we then infer, "all thc:sc fruits ha~ that delicious tute beaUS( they come from mat same branch, like the ones we ha~ lUted, and unlike all me others.- Now, it just 50 happens that only that branch does have delicious tasting fruits (perhaps only mat bra.nch received enough light), Hence, when we make our test for ncg:acive conoomiWlCC. we will tk flU"tD f:a..i11O find any instance m.u contradiCts our inference: any fruit that f:a..ils 10 be on that branch will aho fail to have thaI lUte. But docs mil; mean that all the fruiu on that branch do have ,hat WIt:?

[n the IeCOnd comar, we are anending to the color of the fruiu in front of us. I..e!: us suppose mal they are blueberries. and that we sce:k sweet ones. We tlSte a few of various hues, and OUt observations suggest that all blueberria with a panicular blue·bladc hue are SWtt( , while mhers do not. Selecting the remaining benies of tlUt color, we claim, -all these blueberries are SWttC beaUS( they have mat same blue-black shade.- Now, only blueberries of that shade (I'" be sweet, 50 we have selected all of me possible candtdatc:s as pan of our proposition 10 be proven . For this reason, tk flUt4 the inference passes the test for negative concomitance: in me sample available for obstrvacion, all non-blue-black blueberries are not S'A"Oet , Thus, in both thil; contat and me one above, we might assume our inf'c.rences (0 be wdl formed. Any bluebeny-gourmand, however, knows that even a blue-black blueberry can be brusquely bitter. But if we posit an idemi£), relation on the baJi.s of ontologic:aJ reduaion, we would have: no way of avoiding this type off.illacious inference. The color and lUte may be "identical" in clm they are both reducible to the subject that they qualify. But if we happen to inirialIy formulate the positive: concomitance of the pervasion relation bctwccn color and taste on the basil; or blueberri~ that are both bluc--black and sweet, we would ha~ no reason," UtOrtjcct that formulation. One might claim mal the sample should be broadened beforr we draw our inference, but broa dettnnine thaI thOM: color·alOIN an: actUally 1\>CIled in a aU$:ll compla whereby Ih.1 potmtial ;1 activated. HenO', the property. ,.,.Mi"., actinl &I rvidenu in our IirJbciow infcuna: of lurt from color illnc proptrty of "ha.,inl,n activated potcrtliallo produo;c I d'llk-bJuc color." Ulinr; Ihil Pf0pt.'Y· ,.bbtI"", II cvkIma:, another propmy·nwMl"", is fallariouJ,ly infarm, namc:ly. (:l' .t.ouId mili il c:ka, why Dharmakirti rudy chootct: 10 ~nl his anaIysil'l an 1I0mk Irvd. It ;1 woMh nocifl& that . unlike the ;nfercnu from color 10 WI(, 1M in~na (rom color [0 ".ipt" is more dim;tly an in(crena by .....iN..,..rvidelKc. • inee "nptons" refen 10 • Itlrufotmltion applicable 10 all thc .IOms corulrued as the blueberl')'. tOJ",.. .. ,I.e

p. ofdai.... ...ch_

... nodUn,othet [than an ~I or a propmy._MoIJW\ an lCfVC II cvi.oknu bcc:ow,c !he I'CllricUon of unx.:ompanim non-ariA"I docs not pcmoin 10 IIAI w'-c: naNre iI not rcbled 10 11K probandum. IPVSV .J""1.I0l G:I.I1-IJ.: /inUI"~ Iwt..rp....8 iti l .".ti4-Jl'wwWM_Jt;";NlW.""",ry.1IIibh4N~ .

....,

... one who acuptt thai, by muon of Ihe ntpl»n of one: crtti!}' bud! II fire}. another [1UCb 1I1fnOI<e] 11 otp.rd. mUll ..... MUpI ma. ohcn: is 0IHnc: ._~;.

tntitiea. [PYSV PVI.14: G:IO.l)-14: .. , ....... ";~IIJ'6""rffl" w,.,. ,.,. Ukit lAd ~ 'rvJrAtiI¥NihII ." q~ . HNiIM peruininl M""ccn lhote

JWO

SVAlIHA"VAPRATIlIANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

w.bJMw-cvidence and sec dut. in :I. lubder form. the s:ame concern is evident. Thu is, the ddinition itsdfis cr:afted in a manner dut aims to move beyond the simple onrologial identity ofevkIc:nce to predicate. Let us recall me definicion as found in PrllmrIt;Jllvirttiltll:

ALso, a WIIbhlVll is evidence for a WIIbhlllll mat is invariably consequent from its mere (wui",1I) p~ncc [PVI.t.cd).la For the purposes of moving beyond the omologial identity of predicu e and evidence, the key term in this definition is milrll ("mere" or "jUSt"). In employing this term, Dharmakini pointS nOt only to me on[C)logical unity of prtdica[e and cvidelXX, but also the way in which the evidenoe is "n ;nVll r;"ble "indiator" (samAlta) of rhe predic:ue. 1W2r.l, in COntra5110 my inlerprttalion, has argued mu the term mlilrll (" mere" or "just") should be understood such it reftts jWltO the ontological idenlity of predicate (wIhya) and evidence (uitJJumll):

m:u

From this [definicion] il is eviden, that [he uitih}1lS occurrrncc in aocord:anoe with the mere amena of the ,.dha"a does nor mail the logical proposition th:at the SiUJhyII is alW2Y' restricted by [he JIitJhJl1lll and hence pervaded by the laner, but it refers to the factw.l relation in which the sdtihyIl arises always from the

s::ame cause as thu of the s4JhJl1lll.'OJ

I inuead argue WI the lerm "mete" does indeed have:l. "logical" functh"l it restricu the evidence ro the pn:dieate by p~en t ing both overextension (IltiprllSllntll) and under-ntension (nft1lll14). Consider the case of a thing that we identify as :I. "sugar maple." O n Dharrnakini'l formulation of lVIlbh.iua-cvidencc. if we wish [0 s:ay that this thing "is a uec" because i, "is:l. sup maple." we mwt maintain mat the -mere" (wui".,,) pracntt of the propcny-sw-bh.iJloll' adduced as evidence ("is "IU(Pl' maple) is sufficient to demolUtf2te me pre:senc.e of the propcrtyWIlbhtWtt to be proven (-is a tree1. The qualifier -mere" has rwo functions. cion, in the

K'nR'

102 PVI.ud.; /om4I~6b.M)i WM"""",,,..,,,.,..Jhi"; Ii In my I~tion I ~ suppIiN d., _ for I>h.iw )i. whidI h;u; limply been dickd for ronric:al fQSOfIl. S« SrcinkdIner (.996>. who poinu otn that d., =cu."". "*,..., ddinicioN round in Dharmaldrti'. tal ~ aU xmantiall, rquivalmt.

nnou.

10) I....... (100)'64).

1.10

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

First, it tdls us that omcr propc-ny-SWbh.oiV45 atC irrdC'V1Ult to our inference. Thc sugar maplc we adduce as an aamplc may be' tcn mC'tcrs tall, or irs leaves may be' red; but thc:sc propc-rty-wabhdVQS arc irrcJcnnt to our concern. We nttd only abS[r.lct from the thing in question the propertywabhAm, " is a sugar maple.~ This prcvenrs an under-cxtcnsion: if we believe: th21 along with "is a sugar maplc~ \OI'C must supply "is (en metcrs tall" in order to cotablish that a sugar maple is a tret , then shon sugar maplt$ will no longer be in the domain of similar c::asa. Thus, if thc individual that is the subject of the inference happens CO be shan. we will not be able to infer that it "is a tree." For this reason. allowing (he propc:ny-wabhd'w "is ten meters taW ro be a parr of or a supplement to the evidence "is a sugar maple" incurs an under-atension beause it impropc-rly acludt$ some "sugar maples" from consideration as "trees." Second, ·mere~ tells us rhar if we mwt supply other prope:rty-wabh4V45 before we can affirm the presence of the predicate. then OUf cvidence is not in itself sufficient to demonsuate the prc:scnce of the predicate. For example, if in lieu of "is a sugar maple" we use the prope:rty-wabh4va "is leafy." we migtu attempt to infer: !"his is a tree bttause it is leafy: We would find . howC'VC't, counterexamples, such as ivy. which are leafy, but not a tree. Thus. "is leafy" would require supple~ntation with other properties before it could serve:as cvidcnce for "is a tree." In other words, "is leafy" includes roo many cues, and if we use it as evidence, we incur an overextension. If my interpretation of "mere- in me definition of svablmlW-CVidence is correct, then we have already moved a consider.lble way toward an understanding of the identity-mode that does not test on simple ontological reduction of evidence to pmiicue (or both to the subject). Dh.arm.akirti's :answer, in shon, is [0 place a restriction (through the qualifier "mere") on the type of properry-wablNifltf that we can adduce as cvidC'ntt. Even though the various sugar m:aples that we sec may h:ave m:any divergent qualitiC$height, le:af color. sweetness of s:ap-thc:sc qualities will be excluded by -mcre bec::awe they:arc irrdC'V1Ult to inferring -is:a Utt," either bcc:a"SC' they improperly adude some individu:als from the dom:ain of "is :a (fCC," or bec::ause they impropc-rly include some individuals in that domain. A.J we shall sec, this dose reading of Dharm:akini's definition of IWI'blNiva-cvidentt suggesu me way mu we must understand the identitymode, if we:arc to :avoid accusing Dharm:akini of an egregious logical error. But even if our te:ading of "mere'" is helpful, we must f:att the problem of ft

lInd~n:f:lndin8

Dh:lrm:lkini's (lwn st::l remenu in r... brinn

to

,h... idcntiry.

mode. Panicularly important-and p:anicularly tfoublesome-are the

SVA8HAVA,..rATllIANDHA : THE BASIS Of INfEREN CE

1.11

many passago: whert DharmalUni describes the rdation of - identi()," (t4J4rm".J by employing ,he compound lA'tJV4bh4v_lilera.lly, "thallVabJuV4"--or some equivalent compound (/iUlbJuva, twrman, elc.). Most commonly, he sp«ifies mal tht property adduced as evidence r is:ll supr maple; can be qualified:lS "dUI-SVilbhdVII" in rd.ation to me property [0 be provc:n ("is.a u·ee·) .... The t\N'Ofold question th:lt arises !let(' is: how do ~ conslrue the relationship bnwttn the compound's t\N'O members (i.e., "thai" and "'SVilbh411tl1 in mtx cases. and what is the rdevant meaning of SVilbh4wi Without going into great philological detail, ~ can note th:lll there are only (WO vi.able alternatives for the interpretation of"thu-swbhdV4." The compound either means - Ihe tvabhiva of that" (tllSyilllHlbh.tiva!JJ. or it means - having that:lS ia SVilbhtiva" {)iUJII tilt Wilbh.tiIlilINl!JJ. Thus, if we are speaking of the evidence, and ~ 52y that it is "tMt-n.'J1bh.iva" in rtl:lltion to me predioll:. then ~ mean either that the evidence is the predicate's IIHIbh.iw., or th:lllthe evidence has the predicate :lS ils wabhdva. With thtx possibilities in mind. ~ can tben inlcrpt('t Ihe meaning of IIIflbhiWl :IS either narure-.wabhit'il or propertY-.nwbh.tiV4. Combining these beton, we arrive at four possibilities for the intC!prct2tion of:ll statement in the form "the evidence is Ul1wIbhiWl in relation to the predicate."'" Option I. Option :z..

The evidence is the predicate's n:lture-lVilbh.tiVil. The evidence is the predicale's property-SVilbh4V4.

,.._M.l...

1004 On me ...., of and if:!: cqlli...mn1S (ap«ialty wilhb.), Itt smnkdlna Cl9I41 md IWllIa (UIClJ). Cua when dICK mmpoondJ afr applied as doacriprioru of the n'idmor; Ilte 1M II"1(II( .devanl 10 (M,lf ddaulion, bul dICK (Ompollnds may alto Km' ;U doacriprioru of dw: pmIigIR 10 "" provm (~ 1M larm ~ is puticubriy common wirh EN: compound .. 4b1v... For. paDdip.u.:~. Itt PVSV -J1'\'1.I 7-J.8:

G:I'.''''): WIwn

tnc pmiic.&tc 10 "" p~ is in thai w;lYacabIishcd 10 ""either the I,..]Ml..

of dw: CYidmor Of EN: ClUK of the Mdmcr, rhm IlI"Ir an IftIOfI as f'oIIo-: ifimP'"IIWICrIOr itat..ml in attrtain thl"" then tlw thin(l. no! conwuaaf; iffin: .a!.rnl. ~. oolmOltr. Ono: can raJ(\II in this WIIylxo;.o...., (Iti) dw: pmlic:au: in qtlaOOn is m.. evidence', ....IIIM.. or (:I""" A.nd ~ c:ouId tho: ~ IICXlIr wirtlClUl ill ClWD p'.,t, -nwMiw Of CKIfC HCIIOe. t¥m withoola Ioxw (~). tlw Mp!;~ COftCOmitana (:In Rill br ckmorulnlrci in me contrary ewnpk . [,..IIM' ,~.n~ vAt,.... 1tm......H wllti:y.nWMl.r Itp+ ~ _ M-Iti UJ".,..Mht ell ~-; 1 ttUiJI ftj ,. "'JIII_.w.. ..",., wl l Mm.,!, ,....,. _ .........IJIO blJlO ...'""""'"' ~ it] lirwJ- IllllMt"/fllfi ~"u ,_;.o".,ti ..,.,ti'"4 iI. 1050_SlCinkdhxr (I~n).

111

FOU N DATIO NS OF DHAI.MAKIRTI ·S PHILOSO PHY

Option j . 'Ille evidena hilS the pm:licau~:as its narurt-w.rtbhoiWl. Option 4. Th~ evidena has Ihe pralicace:as its property-w.rtbh.iv#. In his comments on the compound t4lJlJIlbh.iva, Stonkdlner has argued that (he (erm w.rtbJuilHl shouLd ~ner.ally ~ im~rpmed:as M~na. M i.e.• nuure-w.rtbhilHl, and this leaves us with JUSt option J and option 3. Applying this 10 our c:xample and using the term M~ naM for nature-w.rtbhdva, we would say for option 1: M being a sugar maple Mis tIN amlct of "being a t~. MOr, if we restate mis in morc: ordinary language, " 10 be a sugar maple is the c:uenc:c of being a tree. MIn contrast. if we favo r option j , we would say that "being a sugar maple has "being a (fCC" tIS ;lJ amlct. Again. in ordinary language: "to be a sugar maple is in CS5Cf1a to be a t~. M In much of his work on me topic Steink.c:llnc:r appc:ar$ to favor oplion I , and on this reading, Dharmakirti would claim that Mto be a sugar maple is th~ wc:na ofbt:ing a t~. " I. While such a rc::lding U philologically possible fOf 201 lcasl some cues of the compound t4tsVt1bJuiva, from a logical poinl of view, this interprcution is potenlially disastrous. To sec:: what is disaSlfous here, it is important 10 recall a foew points. On Dharmakirti's view. a predicate (such :as Mis a sugar maple") is consuUctc:d on the basis of the causal ehaDcteristics of things. And if a predicate is properly applied to its subjc:ct (dJMmrirl) . Ihen thai subject must luw: the causal characteristics required for the cons[tuaion of that prcdicale. In ilion, if we call something a "sugar maple," rlut entity must luvc all the causal chancterUtics opc:ctc:d of a "sugar maple." And when we speak of a narurc-JV4bhivli' or M~na" (w.rtbhivll) of a trC(', we are rcfc:rring m the totality of the causal characrerisrics that an individual qUil lrcc-insttIla must have. By dr.twing together these notions, we an derive the following equivalencies: M

"is a sugar mapkM • the causal characteristics required for the conmucrion of me predicate. "is a sugar maple."

106 5rcinkdlncr (l97,.:u6):

And ~ [DhamWdnil .ddt in apWnins thisdcfin.ition: "A1tboush 1M IWO propcnies '"'" difkrnM by rirtur 01 mal djtT.:rma: whKh c:onaiIu in me dilkrml~ (",.urtti .. ~ {""" tho: ............'" uti"" I",Ut"'''11 ILl", i.Jn,;,'6 ......... '11 io {••....By (_ "''''J nothillJ bul tM hCO: (_INN~) of 1M indKalecl [propcuil (/itfti)." lHB:p'fF. .,m,-""'JJ(#i~ ~bMk )i _ ~..."., .

S VA6HAVAI'MTI&A ND HA: TH! BASIS OF I NFERENCE

"the essence of a

Irct~ •

1.1}

me IOui caus:al ch:anacristics that :any utt-inst:ance must have.

"being:ll. sugar maple" • me cauul chancteristia required is "the rsscnce of a trtt" for the conmuaion of lhe prrdiCltr "iJ: a.lug:u maplr" iJ: rM totaliry of caus:al char:acteriJ:ria that :any ttrc insrance must have.

Thus, if the evidence (" is a sugar maple1 is the osence of the prcdicate to M prov~n ("is :I I~"), we :In' actually claiming WI all treef are Jugar maples. which leaves us with a numbcr of Stidty problenu. For cx:ampk. rithrr maple syrup can br mw from the 53p of:an oak trtt; or oaks arc not acrually mcs; or if oW arc trees but do not produce maple ~p, lhen the ability to produce the sap ror maple syrup is not one of the caus:al charactcristia required for an individual to bc call~ a "sugar maple." The probI('m h('r(' i. :on inversion of thc relation between pe!'V2ded (vy4P7"') 2o.l'id pervader (.".JMlt~). ,''' To usc the 11fl~ o f cxlclUionl, we cxpect the evidence to bc of smaller or equal extension wim me pred.icue. such that all insranca of the evidence arc included in the CJ:tension of the predicate: as in the claim, "all sugar maples are trees." But in ba. by ~ying that the evidence is the rsscnce of the pr~ica le, we have inven~ this relationship, which amounu 10 me claim, "alltree5 are sugar maples." A pocsible f'QIpM!t bwit f "'" II.c,.'!' III,. jlJ4 _ w.. fi .....WI If. Colt
In

I'V and I'VSV. Xc, for aatnpk, I'VSV U

PVI.I7-lI; G:lI.f..., (tnIutucd abo-oc, n.I04/.

118

fOU NDATIONS O f DH"aMAdRT I 'S PH I LOS OPH Y

that, while wt ha~ numerous textual rtaSOns to Stt rwo difftttnt mn-nings in (he term svabhiiwt, wt should not forget mat Dharmilini never clearly stares that he is using the term in two distinct ways. Often the context of a usage forcefully indicates me preferred meaning of swbhllllll (as · propnty" or -nature' . but in many crucial cases, including rhe verses that we ha~ just considered, Dharmakini's words offtt no unequivocal choice. We nced to k«p this ambiguity in mind. fur it may suggest thar Dhanna1cini has deliberatdy hidden some specific pu~ in this equivocation-a purpose that modem inrerprttm ofDharmaldni have yet 10 detecr. BUI it nuy also indicate that Dharmakini's theory of inference through nwbh4~dencc: s..imply was not very well worked out, With this in mind, kr: us examine $Orne potential problems.

Along the lines of our discussion above. we may be able to come to an interprttation of swbhd'va--cvidencc and the identity relation that wt would find easily defensible. bUl cvt"n so. a number of problems remain. lnc: mO$t striking difficulty is simply that. although Oharmakini does appear to recognize the insufficiency of mere ontologica1 reduction as a basis ofinfet· enct, he never explicidy explains how the identity-mode of the twbhi~ prlltibandha does not amounl to a reduction of me propcnies in question to the individual they qualify. In other words. while the additional stipulation of a "conceptual reduction· is probably the mon consistent possible way of interpreting me WtlblNiV4pnl.libandh4 k identity-mode. the V1.gucness and incompleteness of Dharmaldni's diSCU5Sion of this topic makes il impossible to definitivdy defend the inrerprtra.tion I have proposed. And although some later commentators may ha~ suggested a similar imerprcDtion, al this point I cannot say whether such is the cue.II) My inability to definitively establish how Dharmak.ini moves beyond mere omologica1 reduction is in part a tcSul( of (he ambiguity of his State-ments. bUI it abo $Cems to rdlea ctrtain lacunae in Dharmak.ini', thought. Perhaps the most Rlicnt or Ihest is the distinction between ao::idenw and cucntial proptnies, for although such a distinction is implied by both modes of the twbhliWlPrtlli611nJha, to my knowI.cdge Dlu.rmakini never dirccdy propoaes a mcam for formulaling such a distinction. III F.... . P'-"'''''''' ol ... he< , ...._1"01.1 ..... in i,,~ byway ol_UJ-.....idcnc:e. (I!nl). Foe 1 vny wd'uI Rudy dw a;>miroa Iwata (100)).

I « Onb I«

w poairionl ofbr« comm~m~ron.

$ VA6HJVAPRATJIANDHA, THE BAS IS OF INFERENCE

119

The a~na of a clear theory conctming euencial and accicknt:a.l propertte5 is particularly problematK: in the case of the: identity-mode. nut is. it s«ms that the COI1ttt predication of Mis a sugar maple~ invu1ably allows the correct predication of "is a trtt- 10 the WIle individual because the causal cbaracterutia r«{uircd for me: fonnt:r pm:licate include all the causal ch:mcmisrics f'!'Quired [he lalter. Now, ralk aboul "causal cbaracteristia" is always convertible 10 talk aboUt proprrty-wablMwa. Ixcause Ihe latter are: constructed on the basu of tht former. Hence, undtrsnnding proprrty-wabh.iwa to bt "essmWl propmies.- 'Nt: should bt able to say that an individual that is a sugar maple is necessarily a frC:C: because the: essential properties of a sugar maplt include all the essential propenies of a tttt. But this presumes that thoK propc'rties of the individual in question that art necessary fo r it to btar ,ht predicates "is a 5Ugar maple" and "is a tttC" art distinguish«! !'rom those tNt art not nrcrss:uy for thost prtd.ications. If tht particular tntiry in question has a certain height. we must ~ ablt to specify whether that height is ascntial to either a "sugar maple:." a "trtt," or both. Dharmwrti. however. does not ~en use consistent terminology for speaking in this fashion . we have already secn that svahh4V4. which probably should not' be rendered as "C$.SCntial propeny." is not wed in a way that clearly distinguishes the accidetllal from the c:ssc:ntial. Even if we assume that Oharmakirti does present a clear accidcmallessmrial distinction (along with consistent use of some (lual judgment. we 'WOuld think thai "validity" should apply: if I sec Ihe color blue, and on the basis of that pcTCq)tu:li CO ntCn! I form the judgment. "that is blue: should we not consider this judgment "valid"? Even though it SC'tms ve:ridical in itself, fo r Dharmaldrti that judgment is nelt "valid " bec2use il is n OI a prllm4'JA' O n the other hand. an adept fJotin) can induce a mental perception in which he dirKtly intuits Ihe conc~pl of impermanence. bur since the

Idnlitrn. M I>(Ja pl:K.n is "mJe: in dw Ihty arc all aff~ by the "internal distortion" (."ury.,tn.). ~ the coriti.-.: ~ in puapl:ual """ilion appall moneousIy 10 ~ Q tcmal h~ PVJ,lS~>,11. For a lre~unen l of ,uc.h iuua in rd~>on etp«ially 10 Kamalatila', appropNtion ofDturmUini', Ihc-o:wy, _ Funayun.-a (Im1 .

.( This up«I oiDtwnWdni'J Ihrofy of yosk per«pl'ion (ill found al PVJ.lII-lI6) Iw ra' 10 be adeqlUld y diKwKd. TIw: Uy _ ilNJ.l1S: -rhnd'orr. mUlo whid!. On( rnrdia. ti..-dy conditioN onacIf, wbnhc. i, be real or ",nreal. will ~I in a c:ku. I'IOnIC _ dy. Woo {zooJ1 loucha on thc:K i _

",rue::

,Acrordlns 10~. the nodon lhal lhe

ImJ(

facultkI:on: th=ueivu ,.._~

is raiJed by Dhannakirti II PV:t..J (PVP:Jb7ff, I « bdow. n.7s).

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUST l fY1NC THE SOU ftCES O F KNO WLEDGE

117

concept Mimpcrmanencc" docs nOltruly ain, the phenomenal content of his vision is no more "valid" than an obsessro lover's lullucinalion of his belovtd. Yet a JOti" 5.sttmingly hallucinatory experience ofim(,(rmanence is indeed a p r.m4'!4. and if ~ use the (erm "valid" to refer to such cogni. tions, then it will be valid. And finally, in the CUI! of a sense organ, what could il possibly mean 10 say that, ror example, one', ocular faculty is "valid" ~

11ua, the traruiation of primli!'JIf:lS "validity" r.liscs many of the wne problems :lS "mlm," in m :1I it tOO eqwtcs veridicality with prim4~' A far

greater problem, however, confronu the ~ or "validity" in this context: it is a term already in US(: among Eutoamcrican philosophers, and irs techni· cal meaning is such thai we create tremendous confusion when we employ il :IS a mrulation of priM4!l)'4. In irs philosophical usage. "validity" refm almost exclusively to the structUre or an argument whereby trum is always, p~rved. Most commonly, philosophm speak of deducrivt arguments:lS Mvalid" in thai, if the premises arc trut , the conclusion must be true. In the conrt:J:t of Euroamcrican philosophy, validity is thus wholly divorced from contenl, and an argument can therefore be l/fI/Ulin terms ofiu muaurc but "1UD,,nJin (erms of its content. This distinction clearly will I10t do for any thMty of inference (1l""nuiNl}. how could one have an unsound but v:alid .""nuitui The matter is even worse in the CUI! or perception. Given the aforementioned and widespread wage of "valid" among contemporary philosophers in me academy, the notion of "va.!id perception" is literally norucnse:. Indeed, talk about "valid pcteqKion" is probably sufficient in iadf to end any comparative philosophical endeavors, in that the: phrase 6 Of (:ou.w. tht ~ ' vaIid- doa oftU KlInt tmlpQ", (and vny b.>d) puN when _ con· Jidc:r dx nocioo mat t~ ICNC orpna Ihctmd_ can pbu.ibly ~ CDNItufti as In,u>:W' if I haft ClwactI and .... um., hai.., u",~, my cyc:s ...., invalid bn:::t.u. I am an innlid.. If I COfpIC IMdICfUC orpm dx)' ~ would no!: be: valid. Whr. lkaUK they would Ju,¥I: paMCd theil expiration date. 7 Sec Porttr

(,,--.,,.6). wIxte 1x .........1u:

".,u /i.e:., an insuncr oi, copUOOn for wt.ich I ~ ill tht inlllUnx'lI) may noo: c:ormpoad...;m tIw llatlln of thinp {it ill -CIDftIp"ubk.n1h nn:w," as MolwlI), ~ il). "WIxdw:r or noc ,,.,u!'J'6 is c:onfincd in ics appIiallion 10 l~fOQKI wt.ich mribuu: 10 theil colllmt propmia which an ob;«t COI lcspolldin& 10 mat con· mil amWIy Iw II noo: I mat'CI"ofthtddinition of ~ {u il ;,Wcm 10 bc: I mal · ler of !he dcliniUon of ·,.... th· in WQlmI eocr Indian philotopher prop""" .....,.. ~rJ'?'~~~ 1ti~_" I"

~,. I

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTI FYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLE DGE

131

empirical entities. whether those t'fuities be in the form of an ultimate PUIpose or some: other enci()' whose existence' is requimd by tht: procedures or practices one is to follow in orot:r to obwn ritat u1tim,ue goal. At the same tirnc:. Pr:unil:'a 1beorisa dearly fed that they must dt:monstrate how it is that Wt: an know thai such tranKmpiriaJ entities aist; in other words, the traditions engaged in this style of di.scoulK argue for some instrument of Icnowit:dge (pranUtwJthat will mabie ordinary pmons to confirm (or deny) that such trarucmpirical entities exist. The paradigmatic form of such an instrument is lruti or .ita""" both of which Wt: may refer to as "scripture."

At the risk of tl'ivializing the notion o( scripture. let w alee a mundane oample in order to underst:md the special relevance of argumenu about insuumentaii(), in the: COntOt of claims that scripture an ~ as an instrument of knowledge (or tl1uuempirical objcca. For the purpoKS of our aamplt:, let us suppo~ that we art: standing in a v:tlley, and that I have a spttial instrument ofknowledgc-4 pOlirof digitally enhanced videogr'aphic binoculars. We arc interested 10 know ..... hat might be on the dinant top of the motlnrain abovr. and poinling Ih", binoculars upw:ard, I rcpon tbat I clearly sec an enormous purple house. You art doubtful, since the mounWntOp secms too remote for any houses, and in any case, purple seems an unlikely color. Spurred on by doubt. you ask for mort derail. I then describe circular windows, triangular doors, a roof made of crysal, and other such oddities, aU of which I can clearly sec in the video image pracnred to me by w binoculan. You :lR nill lk~cical , bul as long as I d~riM ~tures that arc al kasl pouibk (even if improbable), you cannot definitively reject what I claim 10 sec and know. Suppose funher that you gain access to my instrument of knowlcdge-I give you the binoculars-and then you also dearly Itt Ihest: slnnge sigha on the mountaintop. Wilhout the binoculan, tht: peak is tOO f.u- away to make any definitive judgmenl. u cept for .. he binoculars th~mSl!Iw:s. you h~ ~ no way to vrrify whal t~ binocubn show you, and the rugg~ [t:rrain prevents any attempt al climbing doser. If you wish to doubt: Ihe dear video image presented by the binoculars, your only recourse is to ask: are these: digial binoculars rdiable? Migln they have been tampered with in some fashion ? Has me software been manipulated to crcue strange dist~ t sighl$? The point, in any case, is ,hal if the dan (ha( __ p in from (hiJ i nnrum~( ofknowlM~ ato" to ~ qu~rionM . our sole rccourv is to aamiM the rdiabili(), of that instrument itself.

232


Our example illustrates an important shift that occurs when Pramana Theorists take scripture as a means to gain knowledge about transempiri~al entities. In the (;ase of empirical entities, one can always resort to other perceptions and inferences to confirm (or reject) the alleged knowledge gained from some supposed perception or inference. One can always resort to other perceptions and inferences because Prama.r:a Theorists clearly expect that any empirically knowable object should be amenable to many different acts of perception or inference: for them, it would be anomalous indeed to claim that, for example, an object is generally perceptible (d.rfya) and yet known through only one act of perception, or only in the perceptions of one person. But an appeal to scripture as an instrument of knowledge amounts to the claim that there is but one instrument of knowledge-the scripture in question-that will give one access to the transempirical entities in question. And since we can neither confirm nor deny the scripture's claims about the transempirical, our only way to contest those claims is to contest the reliability of the scripture. To return to our example, if we are joined by fifty other observers in the valley, and if I claim to see with my own eyes some house in the distance, each of those fifty persons can test my claim through an act of perception unique to each person. But if I claim to see the house only through our one set of special binoculars, my claim can be tested only by passing the binoculars around, which may not be much of a test at all. And of course, PramaIJ-a Theorists were not contending with just one scripture-each tradition had its own scripture (or body of scriptures) that presented its own version of the transempirical. Adding these competing scriptures to the mix is akin to finding other binoculars that we might use. In lieu of just one pair of binoculars, we would now have five or six, but each set of binoculars presents a different (or even incommensurate) picture of the scene on the mountaintop. Although our example may be crude, it has the advantage of presenting in rather stark terms the issues that Pramal).a Theorists face in sorting out the competing claims about the transempirical that they encounter in the various scriptures or scriptural traditions of South Asia. Since each tradition's ultimate purposes focus on transempirical goals, the Prama.r:a Theorists in each tradition cannot simply ignore scriptural disparity because scripture alone gives ordinary persons access to the trans empirical. To ignore the competing claims of scripture would be to ignore one's highest purpose or goal. And since the scriptures provide the sole access to the transempirical, when thinkers from different traditions debate the transempirical, they cannot overtly begin with the assumption that any given scrip-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

233

"e is true. Otherwise, debate would be reduced to tautological assertion. 14 ce, although Pramal}a Theorists argue directly about the claims made ripture, they focus most of the debate about scripture on the question ." strumentality: what is it that makes any scripture an instrument of ",ledge? And the style of argument employed across traditions tends to ssuch debates on one critical criterion of instrumentality: the origin of ipture. In brief, one aims to show that the content of one's scripture is ble because its source is flawless. examining this issue, Pramal}a Theorists prior to DharmakIrti employ general strategies that are well known in this style of discourse. First, may argue that a scripture is the "speech of a credible person" viida), and as such, its instrumentality is derived from the extraordiqualities that make that person credible (apta), Second, one may argue a scripture is eternal and not of human origin (apauru!eya); its instrutality is somehow innate to it. Of these two options, most Pramal}a rists, including Buddhists, follow the former option, and this in turn s two questions: is it possible for a person to be or become "credible"? second, can we determine that a specific person is indeed credible? makIrti's own answers to these questions are important because they his apparent attempt to ground instrumentality in a seemingly cirappeal to the Buddha's credibility.

academic study of Buddhist Pramal}a Theory, some scholars have that DharmakIrti's notion of instrumentality rests ultimately on of circularity. Specifically, in arguing for the instrumentality of perand inference, DharmakIrti appears to make an appeal to the of the knowledge derived from reading or listening to the a "credible person," namely, the Buddha. It is this appeal that leads which in its most general and trenchant form, is as follows: 15

attitude toward scripture in debate is a recurring theme in PV4 (see TilleOf particular interest are two passages: PV4. 48 (Tillemans 200078-79; see comments thereon) and the related discussion of iiptatava (Tillemans ~U~U"Llily

sketched here is the most defensible version of a set of positions initially by Nagatomi (1959) and Vetter (1964); for a clear summary of their actual positions, (1999). Hayes' version of circularity (1984), while loosely resembling that of

1}4

FOUNDATION S O F OHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

As innrumenlS afknawledgc, pc:rcq}[ian and infe~nce allow us to demanstrate that the Buddha has certain CJ:uaordinary qualiries. Since he has those qualities. he is c~ible (,IPll1). Since he is credible, his teachings can tx used as a source of instrumental knowledge. Since his teachings arc a source of instrumental knowledge. we can usc Ihem 10 demonsuale thaI perception and inference a.rc instrumenu of knowledg.:. This cird.: moves from th.: instrumentality of perception and inft:rtnc.: as im:futable evidence (E) for the credibility (0 of the Buddha., and thar credibility then justifies th.: iluuumentality of his teachings l..ik1N'~, the teachings themselves justify the instru!mntality of perception and inference, but these arc already adduced. as evidence (E) far the Buddha's credibility. As a matt.:r of convenience, let us ~fer to mil argumeDl as the -ECTE- circle. It should tx dear thar. in terms of th.: ('YI() questions about credibility !mntioned a~, the ECTE circle ~uires an affirmariv.: a.JUWeJ to bom. That is, on.: must affirm that it is ind«d passibl.: to obtain th.: extraordinary qualities fhat make a penon crcipinn doc rirculuiusly, we might rtadily accc:pt that Dhannaldrti adopts here: a sliding scak in rc:iation to the question of cmLibility, such thaI he is willing 10 argue: provisionally in a manne:r that leads to ECfE circulariry, only 10 abandon that argument 301 a higher Ic:vcl of his scale. Nevertheless. 10 claim that Dhannakini escapes ECrE circularity in thil fashion, we must have good reason 10 do so: we mUSI mow that a Straightforward

22

F~

(1999'66),

2.J franc.o (1997'19). ~ at... McOinrodt ( IOO~J~I.

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYIN G TH[ SO URCES O F KNOWLEDGE

1} 9

tnding of the S(2temenu ciled above (with their anendam ECfE circularity) art superseded by a clearly amcuLned position in Dharmakirti's work that sea the fauh in an appc:tl (0 credibility! ' ~ it rums out, we can point to a dearly articulated position of thu kind, :tnd to do so, we mwt turn to Dhannaltirti's comments on another of Digniga's S(2lemena , mu time concerning credibility and the innrumentality of scripture,

Scriptllrllll,,/trt1t« 11M Dhamut.iirtii /Uj«tis" o/CnJibi/ity At the beginning of his U'e:ttment of scriprural inference, Dtwmakirti cilC$ a short but crucial sruement from his prMcc.cssor Digniga: ~S inc.c the satemenu of a crtdible person a~ generally trust'NOnhy. a cognition arising from them is :tn instrumental infcrcnu ,"" Dignliga's scucmem ccrtainly appears to evoke the typial argument for scriprural instru menl2lity that on our malysis would lad Dharmakirti to ECTE circularity, Thus, when

~ i......, II Iw.d in¥Okt:s ow Iwrrntnnnko of duncy. whKh ill thil CIIC rem on. hypolhnKal anicwuion ofDtwmWlti', impticit method to.orden"' ............. oIid.in, oalc If _ _ • P" 1'5 0< pot;.;.,.. ..... don not ~ wi,h l1li' ~ vitwofDhmnKirtf l chougIl, _ rmrsmrnlly ~ our vitw aIons eithuof (WO!ina: by inansing ow ""picion dw Dlwmaldrti'l ~k io in.:o-

2'Ol_ a w* ""ntr of Wuos, indudinS imli1l11iona! identify and w.rvinO, and the f.wJ, dw ~ hi(!;bcr fJO'ilion dclibcntdy 1.,.,, ... hri,,.....,,.,b ...,..J,J,.. "'""!" £'1.:1-" ,..,...""w'l"i_

u"",",,,.,.,.,.,,.~ r.'i~ .,.... •• t.M N,.J) { .. U_~

~"" f "'" .,.",IiIfpu~,."

u.'" ."ikiIf".,. ".tI~

~ f

~

• m.an. or~ ;oK tho: 'T"Uh. MO«'O\'TI'. in ITpfd 10 iu own object. any iruu ummtal """ilion runaioru II dw wabaJ aaMty, JUCh due "inscru-

mn\1 ol~· mnru ·,ftUlti. . . .tion fln ...,'ti)." With ~ 10 aMdIn ob;ea, all ,..._~ fVnaioo II t1w inmumcm, luch thaI ""..'!"i' lnQRI "thal by rMIIII of which eM obj«t ("..~ iI known r,r.",/ytI,,)." If dw; won! ',~.~ funnioftl II eM ..mw xtivity. chen wNol would M eM mulcanl ..:tmcr.1'hm: could be no ..-Ir bta....., the: ob;ea it; alrndy "'I7'i....t.Viuyiyana] huoUd ...... dw: C05"i....... of dwoOjcct ....... whOch one ohouId .¥Oid, employ or isnorr lIT raull boaillo:wndrabudcihi'l rommcnla, bul M

appnr 10 rntn.ion ~ ~ 1M _ion of a medialed iMllummw d'fKt, He inslad _b (with klmc: dilf..:ulry) 10 esplain iMlNmcnW cosn ilion in IC'I'TTII ofbuman .i.......itt-.I Ulumin•• ,emote dira, Thil rn.oka: i. difl"c"h ..... him 10 rcconcik the unlion Mf'Att poim here is to cvalWlC a cognition without reference to goals. Following Nagaromi, the a1ternalivc interprcation suggcsted-bUt nCVff ckarly statcd-by Dharmooni or dlC: earliest commentators is that of IInhUriy4 as mere causal functional icy: an emiry has IIrthttlrriy4 in the simple sefUC that il has effect!. On this interpretation of IInhllkriyJ. an ""'~1!1$ would ~ tnllrwnnhy in th~ minim,.1 v:n~ th.:u it i~ ,. rr:al m~ _ tal ~nt: it has ~iti in thot ~ seruc thu it is ~r.tbliJhed (,u,jlll) as a causally dFiciem moment of coruciousncu. This minimal trustworthincu amounu to the claim that, reg.ardkss of the determinate interpretation of a cognition', contem, one can always reliably know that one is cognizing. Since mis minimal truStworthiness is applicable to III/ awarencues, all awarcncs.scs can be coruidcrcd trUStworthy. Although ;1 m:ay U\"m odd to m,unmin t"'", ~'Y ;nst:llla of ,.W:lten~n is trwtwonhy in the minimallCl1SC discussed abovr, this interpretation helps 10 aplain £WO other nOlions proposed by Dharrnak.ini. The first is one we have discussed previously, namriy. mat illusory objras such as the hairs ICCn by a person with cataracts are not "objecu· (IInhlls) bccaU5C they arc not considered such by persoru engaged in practical action (lIJIIwthtJrll); in other WONk from the ~pcct:ivc of ~lc.in8" hum,.n ,um flU.,},.,) . th,., visual cognition of "hairs" in the mind of a person with cataractS is not inslrumental. BUI for thai penon, those "hairs" IIl'tobjcct!l when consKictcd simply as mental cvenu.'1 If we undel'5tand Dcvendrabuddhi', twOfold explanation of instrumentality in terms of thr twO afon!mentioned sensc5 of IIrthllltriJ4. the perception of those hl.irs is not instrumental on the dcf-

276


inition in terms of a mediated effect (i.e., puruflirtha) because they do not lead to or are not themselves the accomplishment of one's aim (arthakriyii). But that cognition is instrumental in terms of an unmediated effect (i.e., the mere fact of having an awareness) because that moment of consciousness is real, i.e., it is causally efficient (arthakriya) in that it is a mental product and will itself lead to other mental effects. This way of defining the unmediated instrumental effect in terms of causal efficiency helps to explain a second, related notion: namely, reflexive awareness {svasa'flZvedana}, the "self-cognizing" or "self-presencing" of every cognition. Reflexive awareness itself is an exception to the rule that the object of a perception (pratyakfa) is the cause of the image in the perceptual cognition. 93 Hence, if it is to be considered instrumental, it clearly cannot be considered in terms of a mediated instrumental effect, since this would require an appeal to causality that is not possible in the case of reflexive awareness. And it likewise difficult to imagine how reflexive awareness can fit into a scheme of human goals; hence, unlike a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim, one cannot appeal to some unmediated experience of telos, except the restricted telos of knowing that one knows. It seems likely, then, that the instrumentality of reflexive awareness cannot be established in terms of a mediated effect, and even as an unmediated effect the issue of arthakriya as telic function is nonsensical in this case. Thus, if we are to accept reflexive awareness as a trustworthy cognition, and ifwe are to maintain that trustworthiness means arthakriyiisthiti, we must again turn to an alternative interpretation of arthakriya, namely, that reflexive awareness is reliable in that it reveals the mere fact of experience, which is the same as saying that it reveals the mere causal efficiency (arthakriya) of awareness. If we close this section by returning to the notion of a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim, we can now add an important 93 That reflexive awareness is noncausal follows from its simultaneity with its object, namely, the awareness that is reflexively perceived itself. Indeed, what can be most confusing about reflexive awareness is the notion that it is a cognition distinct from its object. This distinction is clearly the case for all forms of perception, including mental perception (manasapratyak!a), for in all cases the object (grahya) of perception is its cause (see, for example, PV3.224). The same is true of inference, since it too arises indirectly from its object (see the succinct statement in PVSV adPVI.I; G:3.8: avyabhicaraf canyasya ko 'nyas tadutpattep, where tadutpatti is meant to apply to both effect- and svabhava-evidence). In contrast, what Dignaga first identifies as the three aspects of an awareness-namely, reflexive awareness, the objective aspect (grahyakara), and the subjective aspect (grahakakara)-are all ultimately identical and hence simultaneous. The notion that reflexive awareness is cognizing the subjective-


277

;4ualification to the way we have characterized it so far. That is, even if such :"icognition combines a telic meaning of arthakriya with the notion of an !~nmediated instrumental effect, it also places greater emphasis upon ;;rihakriya as ca~sal efficiency, in comparison to instrumental cognitions :that are considered trustworthy in terms of mediated effects. In the case of ~ese latter cognitions, trustworthiness means that they lead to some sub-

~:ind objective-aspects is merely a way of conceptualizing the process of knowing (see the locus ;classicus in PSI.I.IO: yadabhiisa1J1 prameya1J1 tatpramti/}aphalate punap I griihakiikiirasa1J1vitti ;triiya1J1 niitap p.rthak k.rtam). Although Dignaga maintains that External Realism can propose :i:similar way of analyzing cognitions (PSI.I.9), this way of explaining cognitions assumes the Epistemic Idealist position. Dharmakirti accepts and elaborates upon Dignaga's opinion in Hie following verses [PV3-333-339]:

"If we maintain that an external object is experienced, what would be wrong with that claim?" There is nothing wrong with it, but what is the point of saying this: "An external object is experienced"? [PV3.333] If awareness has the image of the object, then it must have something that distinguishes [each] image [for each awareness]. [PV3.334] It would be wise to look into whether that differentiation must come from something external, or whether it might just as easily come from something else. [I] There is no apprehension of an object devoid of qualification by the experience of it; and [2] when that experience itself is apprehended, the object is apprehended. Therefore for these two reasons, the cognitive appearance of blue is the experience (darfana) of blue. There is no independent (kevalap; cf. PVP:223a7) external object. Instead, something activates the internal imprint for some experience. It is due to that awakening of an imprint that there is the restriction [of a particular image] to a [particular] cognition; that restriction is not dependent on an external object [PV3-335-336]. Therefore that one awareness which is experienced and remembered in that fashion has two aspects (dviriipa); the instrumental result is the reflexive awareness of both aspects [PV3-337]. When the object is considered to be other than the mind and established with a nature that is desired or not desired, then the object is the cause of the representation and the effect is the experience of that representation in that way, i.e., as desired or not desired [PV3-338]. If awareness includes the object (yadii savifaya1J1 jftiina1J1) due to the positing (vyavasthiti) of the object as an aspect (a1J1fa) of awareness [and not as actuallyexternal], then the determination (vinifcaya) of the object is just the awareness' experience ofitself. [PV3.339] [yadi biihyo 'nubhiiyeta ko dOfO naiva kafcana I idam eva kim ukta1J1

syiit sa biihyo 'rtho 'nubhiiyate II yadi buddhis tadakiirii siisty iikiiravifefi1}i I sii biihyiid anyato veti viciiram idam arhati II darfanopiidhirahitasyiigrahiit tadgrahe grahiit I darfana1J1 nilanirbhiisa1J1 niirtho biihyo 'sti kevalap II kasyacit ki1J1cid eViintarviisaniiyiip prabodhakam I tato dhiyii1J1 viniyamo na biihyiirthavyapekfayii II tasmad dviriipam asty eka1J1 yad evam anubhiiyate I smaryate cobhayiikiirasyiisya sa1J1vedana1J1 phalam II yada nifpannatadbhiiva iHo 'niHo 'pi vii parap I vijftaptihetur vifayas tasyiif ciinubhavas tathii II yadii savifaya1J1 jftiina1J1 jftiinii1J1fe 'rthavyavasthitep I tada ya iitmiinubhavap sa eViirthavinifcayap II].

2.78

FOUNOATI ONS OF DHARMAKIRT I'S PHILOSOP HY

~~n(

cognition in which the- accomplishment of one', aim appears. Thus it is not their caUAI funCtional ity as mere cognidolU that makes them trust· worthy, but rather meir causal functionality in rdation to some subsequent effect. But in the ~ of a cognition in which appears me accomplishment of one's aim, it is the causal functionality of that cognition it5df-t~ vtty fact of its appearance-that makes it lrunwonhy. In other words, the- trustwonhinm of the visual ~rttption of fire is that it leads one: to ha~, for example, a subsequent sensation of warmth. But the truStwOnhiness of mat Kruaoon of warmth is nothing but the fact of mat Knsation itself. In this Knse, the tlllStWOnhiness of a cognilion in which appears the accomplish. ment of one's aim (Ilrthatmy4"irbhJu) is, much like rdlaive awareness and me perception of illusory hairs, based primarily upon its IlTth4ltriyfh,s the mere: causal efficiency of the cognition itself. THI! PRIMACY

or

PURU$ARTHA

There is much more to explore in Dcvendrabuddhi', notion or twO types of instrumc:nral effect, including the way mat his interpmation has been partially adopted (and hma paniaUy abandoned) by me commenwial ua.dition.'" But one more limited question that com~ to mind is the role pla~ in Oha.rmwrti'. philosophy by tbest: twO ways of defining instrumentality. More sp«illcaUy, should one way of connruing inStrumentality be consideud primary and the otha KCOnda.rr. If Devendrabuddhi', presentation of irutrumentality in terms of {W() types of instrumemal effeet (eRects some distinction betwttn instrumentality in terms of sheer Clusal efficiency and instrumentality in terms or tdie function . it nevertheless mnains the ~ mat Ohllmakini hinudf docs nOt expliciuy tell us whether we dJouid favor one approach or another, such a distinaion is only inchoate in Dha.rmakirti's work. primarily In more n:a:nt tim~, h~, Nagaromi and Srdnlcdlner ha~ noted that Dharmakirti tends to employ the term tlr1httltriJii primarily with the emphasis on its meaning as Mtdic function, and not primllily with me

wusc

R

!U Lint;erin& quc:Riont indtwk how ~ '. inlft'J'ftUUon tdalD 10 what ~ and lun commmlllon all 1M dun "'fWIioru" (~of iN!:.wnnu.u dfca (ore, C'I- ' PVJ':u}bdr and PVT. OI)II':u~. How, lOr ~arnpk, doD thilll\llpU ttblC 10 Dfwma.killi'. acnW ptaalraOoo in I'V) and I);gnJp'J initial My (PSI.I.kdR)! Conc::unincDewmdrabuddhi'. impaa upon laIn com.rnmcatOfl, his wonh ohm appear "'I:matim in their oornmcnwia., bu. 11\,"'1: rn 10 find Illy ~ClhX bier chan ~ who aoppc:wu ,he .-ion of. medWt«I inouwncn .... drccc. A ....dy oft- and..t.y ..... -'on _ ccj w! ...-.uk! ...my hdp '" 10 wwktsIand dw WOfb of otwa-wa. ~~ and cxhns.

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING T HE SOU RCES O F KN O WLEDGE

179

meaning of cauul efficiency," If we arc correct in maintaining th:1.I these two dilttrent scrues of the term ""Jultriya correspond lO lhe twO different ways of construing the insuumcntality of a cognition, then the emphasis on the relic sell5C of suggests thaI the definition of an instrumental cognition in temu of a mediated effect- i,e" in terms of a human aimwill abo be the principal one in Dharmakirti's work. Although neither Devcndrabuddhi nor Sikyabuddhi offers any explicit answcr to this qua. rion. they roo appear to consider the establishment of instrumentality in tcrms of a human aim to be of primary importance, for when presenting Dhannalcirti's theory of insrrumemality, they spmd far more time on this way of defining an instrument of knowledge. At the pricc of moving beyond Ihc usual hislorical limiu or our interpret::Hion. we can al~ rum 10 the opinion of a b,er commentllrnr, Dhn. motW'::l. In a &shion that is closely rdated (bur nor identical)" to IJcvtndrabuddhi's imerprecuion, Dharmott:lr.l draws a distinction betv.un an instrumental cognition as ~ the appearance of the accomplishment or onc's a.im~ 6lrthaltriy4nirblNIsa) and an inmumen(2l cognition as · what motivates aaion toward an object capable of the accomplishment of one's :ai m- (4nJ...~ ..." n;" 1".'MrtAlt;t...). He rhen not" th,.t the type or instrumental cognition '1nalyud by Dh,.nn:alc:ini i$ the I,.(fcr, ror it i, thi. type of instrumental cognition mat a judiciow person (p"/qA£wnt) seeks in order to anai n his goal, In shon , for Dharmottara as well, Dharmakirti's primary concern is with establishing the innrumentality or a cognition as a mcaru to obtain a human aim.'II Assuming mar such is the case, let w now examine a few issua that becomc evident when onc dehn~ the insuumen r::a.li ty o r cognition in lerms of human ai ms, especially as presented in Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of PVl.l-6.

",,""ltriJt1

95 5« N;If;lIlomi (1 ~7-68:!9) ~ Slrinkdlnn (' 971:.81, n.9). 96 O/wmom.ra!loa; lICK appear 10 xupc DrwndDbuddhi',

IICKion of J mediufll dim: in anrofhi. manr wrilinp on inanuncnuJify (~e.. NBT, LPP, ~and PVinn. Ho:tI(e, dlot COIIIIWI he drloWi ~I"'«n rduiw 10 ,"rMiJn1u and mere ~,.;~ a1thou&h panIId 10 D.veDw:abuddhi', appro¥h, is ck:uly lICK lMl:lItle.

'''''"1'''

,., N&T I, .,ft". FOf a nady Idmllalarpimnu In rVinT, _

(1989:16-1.9)·

SlrinkdLna and JCn.ua

280


Instrumentality in Terms ofHuman Aims: Some Problems and Solutions

As noted above, if an awareness is instrumental in terms of the mediated effect that is a human aim (puru!iirtha), then it is the primary factor in activity (pravrtti) toward an entity that is to be attained or avoided. For Devendrabuddhi, the resulting activity in question is secondarily one's initial activity toward the object; primarily, activity means the "activation" (pravrtti) of a cognition to which appears the accomplishment of one's aim (arthakriyiinirbhasa). When an instrumental cognition is construed in terms of this latter activity, its trustworthiness consists of the fact that it results in such a cognition. We can refer to this as the "confirmation-model" of trustworthiness. Devendrabuddhi explains: A cognition is deemed trustworthy because it does not deceive people; this includes 98 perception and inference, which have the characteristic of causing one to obtain ("" priipaka) the intended object. 99 To comment on that, [Dharmaki:rti] says: "trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function. '100 This means that one has a cognition of the accomplishing of the aim (artha) that is to be accomplished by the object (artha) that is determined through the instrumental cognition. 101

As Devendrabuddhi goes on to explain, the context here is one of action: one acts on the basis of an initial cognition, i.e., the instrumental cognition, and one obtains the desired result: a cognition of the accomplishment of the desired goal by the object of that instrumental cognition. As we shall see in greater detail below, Devendrabuddhi is at points obliged to abandon this model. Nevertheless, in many instances, the fact that an initial cognition results in a cognition of the accomplishment of one's goal by that object is

98 PV-D: khyad par byed pa-> khyab par byed pa (ex.conj.). 99 See parallel Skt. passages in Steinkellner and Krasser (1989:3I). 100 PV2.1bff: arthakriyiisthitip / avisa?pviidanam.

101 PVP(2aI): skyes bu ma bslus pas na mi slu ba ni mngon par 'dod pa'i don dangphrad par

byedpa'i mtshan nyid can gyi mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa 'i khyab par byed pa yin no / de nyid rnam par 'grel pa 'i phyir don byed nus par gnas pa ni / mi slu yin te zhes bya ba smos te / tshad mas yongs su nges pa 'i don gyis bsgrub par bya ba'i don byed par rtogs pa '0.

INST RUMENTALITY: JUS TIFYI NG THl SOU RC£S OF KN O WLEDGE

181

prccisdy what makes that initial cognition instrumental. In other words. the subsequent cognition in which appears me desired tel k function (i.e., me accomplishment of one's goal) confirms the trunwonhincss of the initial awarencu. A3 such, it confirms the fact Ula[ me instrumenal cognition is -Wt cawes one to obtain" (;r4jH1J:IIJ an object that acco mplishes one's

goal.'" Thc oonfirmnion_modcl and !'ducd claim) :loom trus(WOrthineu

l~

Devendrabuddhi inw a .series of problems and attempted solutions. We will now consider a Few of these, first bycxamining [W() general WUC5, and then by turning to problems that arise in the specific COntcm of ~rc:cprion and inference. Although many of these problcnu and solutions resurface in the works of subsequent Buddhist commentators, I wiU restrict m~f to occuion:.i Icft"mcc o nly to the lub.V",~-d):

..,.",,.,q'!' 1. .w.,.!fM'L

_ iW"1" UPIqi 1..,1"'''''1'' w / k1"imt1",ullf 'nMr/". J. -rr 1" i yoJ .,." ai ~ ItJiIiwf ~ ~ ... ,.J1" - Ji" '" / ... III ;",.. ,.; ""' .,." """:fl" ,. j #,. /"" .... JDff"'; liM .. iJ. .... Ji" r / ji Iu, "'''P'' 1'" 'MIl,. kJ,;" lOS PVPbb)R): _ -'1"~

." ." .".,. . .,.,JI1JIr " " ' . " III tk ...'" oi 'JJ'" ",up" ,. i fhIi, ,. / tk lui, ". JIhp' _ ;",.. ,. i pJ .,." ",oJ:fl" ". / sttp _ '" u ,..; "" ... r.",." _

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIF YING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

18,

Thi_~

:lppm=h rn rmuwon:hinf!U involves rwo cognitions: :In initi:al instrumental c;ognicion , and a subsequent cognition, which is:also instrumental. In mar latter cognition appem: me tdie function (such as producing heat) o f me object (such as a fire) :apprehended by m e initi:al instrumental cognition. ~ IUch the latter cognitio n confirms--or even constirutcs--the trustWOrthiness of me initi:al instrumental cognition. With mil CIOn t~ in m ind. t::HvO!f\dnbuddhi d~bes the rime-hg ['..mlem as follows: Someone objccu: - The latter in.s trumental cognition in which appears the telic funaion of object apprehended by me former awareness docs nOI cognize me objcci (IlnlNl) t hat was apprehended by the fo rmer. If ch:u if the cue. how can it luve:lS its object me celie function of an object apprehended. by former awareness such that the former awareness is an instrumental cogni tion because it docs nex deceive: one about that tdie funaion?"'"

w

mat

Dcvendrabuddhi answers:

This is not a problem. lkings engaged in practic:al :action ("1"""-

INrnr)

act on those

objccu without diffe rentiating them. Henu. in acmrd with such practical action (lIJIlwWarll), we say beings act o n objccu mat occur in temporal sequence as if those objccu were a singk thing.'" In re:ality (J1Jf!J1n4 • ~), the former and latter objectS arc distinct. Ho~r , the re:al thing that ~ the objca: of th e latter instrumental cosni tion would no t aist if the object of the former instrument:al cognition had not been existent. H enc.e. we metaphorically say that the latter cognirion has as iu object juSt due object o f me former cognition. ['NO

mat

106 PVP11h4If}: pi ~ InF" mil!' ...j .... ' " ' " 9i "'-' _ ""I:J'" ..... yi.. _ , u ji ltv_ tin 1"'l' 1M wu1" i J,n, ~ , . i 7fd UJf P"I:U IV f u j _ ~1" u ,.. ".; ,u, ... i fbfo '" '" nNJ _ Ji" YiN .... 1f11 Slkyabuddhi (PVT. "J'"'71b1H) comtnmU that tht formtr and bner ~ an: ddindfterm~ (~ti~

itivdy

..

~

umc IxaIlK "lhq- ClIIK a OJSIIilion with a

lillJk

imagt;"

em the buR of tbiJ deunnination tht""'lltkl posiu- thtm .. the tanV

ob;ca (ttrrIM). and thil happetu Ixa..uc tht po.itin@:ofan iruuumenw rosnition iI con_Donal [.-...1",n, ""'1"; 'U" W#Ji"1'" pJtJi, p, ....... I"""1a' n"fu·j 1Jftnl ~ _u (1m....",,., 111"]1" ~ / 1IhU _ 'i mPlI"" y.,1"

..,-,.,.Jllt7itrit ttl..,..,

,,; ,;", I1t)'t'i (111 W# )'i.. ,. i ,;,,;, .. tlNJ bJu.. 1"" Dw,,.j·

284


Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior to the cognition in which its telic function appeared, that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the latter cognition engages with the telic function (arthakriya}.108 Devendrabuddhi's answer to the time-lag problem does not deny that such a lag exists: in reality, the object of the instrumental cognition on the basis of which one initially acts is not the object whose telic function one experiences as the fruition of one's action. Nevertheless, when beings act to obtain some human aim, they believe that the former and latter objects are the same, and beings thus behave accordingly. The crucial outcome of this answer is that, if the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition is in at least some cases constituted by this model involving confirmation by a subsequent cognition, then the determination of an instrumental cognition's trustworthiness is in fact based upon an error, namely, the false belief that the object of the instrumental cognition and the object of its confirming 108 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nyq5b6fl) comments on the last sentence: Thus, in saying therefore he means: "since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition." Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was etablished prior-i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function-that initial cognition is instrumental. That is, since it is the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function, the initial cognition is instrumental, and it is such because it too has a real thing as its object. Otherwise, if it were to have an unreal thing as its object, it would not be the cause for that kind of subsequent cognition; he says: because through it that very cognition engages with the telicfimction. Here, through itmeans "through the initial cognition." In other words, the initial cognition is instrumental because the initial cognition is itself the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function. [de'i phyir de

bas na zhes bya ba 'di smos te gang gi phyir tshad ma snga ma 'i yul medpar tshad ma phyi ma 'i yul mi srid pa de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa 'i phyir te don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa las sngar yang ngo I dang po nyid tshad ma yin te don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma'i rgyur gyur pa dang po 'i shes pa yang tshad ma yin te de yang dngos po 'i yul can nyid yin pa 'i phyir ro I de Ita ma yin na ni de dngos po medpa 'i yul can yin na de Ita bur gyur pa 'i shes pa phyi ma'i rgyu nyid du mi 'gyur ro I de nyid ni de las don byed pa la Jugpa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba smos tede las zhes bya ba dangpo'i shes pa nyid las tedang po'i shes pa ni don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma'i rgyu nyid yin pa 'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i don to Il. The Tibetan of the passage from Devendtabuddhi (PVP:zb5fl) reads: ma yin te tha snyad 'dogs pa po dag tha dad pa med par Jug pa 'i phyir tha snyad kyi rjes su 'brangs nas I dus snga phyir 'byung ba can la gcig tu Jug par brjod do I dngos su ni tha dad pa nyid yin no I de ltar na phyis kyi tshad ma'i yul gyi dngos po ni I tshad ma snga ma'i yut med na med pa'i phyir de yangde'i yul can nyid yin no zhes nye bar brtags pa yin no I de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa 'i phyir dang po nyid tshad ma yin de I de las don byed pa la Jug pa 'i phyir roo


285

;~ognition are identical. That Devendrabuddhi is willing to accept this ';rtotion suggests that, at least in the context of a human aim, trustworthi~ness concerns the results of actions initiated by instrumental cognitions, ~1Irtd not the exact, isomorphic correspondence of a cognition to reality. We ;shall see that this way of understanding trustworthiness in terms of its ~esults-rather than correspondence-is also applicable to inference.

~hBSTRUCTED ACTION ~ addition to the aforementioned difficulty involving time, a second gen~ra1

problem persists with the notion of instrumentality in terms of a human aim, and it concerns the identification of an instrumental cognition "that which makes one obtain" that aim {artha} by virtue of obtaining an gbject {artha} that accomplishes it. This issue is broached when Devendrabuddhi notes, "Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition ~hose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such ~e not instrumental."109 In response, one may ask: "But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore would not be instrumental."l1o

d'he objector here believes that, on Dharmakirti's view, what distinguishes in instrumental cognition from a doubtful cognition is that the former nec~ssarily leads one to an object that can accomplish one's goal; in contrast, instance of doubt might lead one to that object, but it will not necessarily ~~ so. Devendrabuddhi responds:

in

That trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the fact that one definitely obtains the desired object {artha} through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists of the fact that one obtains only the desired object through that instrumental cognition. When one acts,111 the instrumental cog-

;;i.p9 PVP (3aIff): ~tshom za

mi sLu ba de dang de nges pa gang yin pa de ni tshad ma yin pa 'i phyir / the bat shes pa La sogs pa ni tshad ma ma yin no. Note the typical subject/predicate inver-

:sion in the Tibetan translation.

~UO PVP (Ja2): gaL te skyes bu'i jugpa La yanggagsyodpas / tshad ma yang sLu basridpa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin no zhe na. ~lll Sakyabuddhi notes (PVT, nyq6bI-2), "By implication one supplies (adhyiihiira): 'In all

1B6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTr5 PH ILOSOPH Y

nilion is whal makes one obtain the objcci. Thus, an inurumcnal rognilion's insuumcnaliry consins ofia caJNUity to make one: ob(;lin the: desired objccl, and nOI thai it docs make: one obtain it. Since JUSt mal capxity is said to be Ihe truslWonhinm of the: inmumental cognition. there is no problem concerning obsuucted :taion.'11 As the TIbeta.n translation ofSikyabuddhi's commenwy suggeslS, this argument amounts to a placemcot of the Sanskrit restrictive particle nNl in the phruc Ilhhim4tiirtharya pri/Hl!"lM. · obtainment of Ihe intcoded aim." The opponent would have us understand this phmc as Ilhhimatiinhasya prtipa!fllm n i l, "only the obtainment land not the non-obrainmentl of (he inlcndcd IInIM. -where anita may be construed as either "aim" or "object:. "'I) In sho" , if an innrumenr.al cognition's truslWO"hinm consisa of the bet thai it leads us to the obtainment of the intended objttt or aim. and if that means that an instrumental cognilion leads only (nIfI) to the obtainment, then in cases where one's actions are obstructed, the instrumental rognition in qumion would no longtt be insuumenr.al. In Ihe comat of seeking to slake my mint, if I have correctly idcolified fresh waltr from a distance and yet my attempt to tc2Ch it fails, mat petuption would nor be imlrumental because I have fai led to obtain my aim. Devendrabuddhi's above-citcd aruwtt is 10 place the restriction noc upon the obtainment, bul upon me objc:ct. From an insuumcntal rognition there is thus IIhhi""'14n~ pripa!lJlltI, - the obIllinmem of only the intmdcd IInha land not something dsc}." Iff act on the basis of an instrumental cognition. and if my actions art not OOslructed. I will obtain only the result that I apcct; if my perctprion of fresh walU was an instrumental cognition, then the objc:ct I obtain will slake my thirst. The poinl here is to dislinguish the: imtrume:nDl cognition from a doubtful cognition, for even if such a cognition may lead me: to what I apcct in $Orne: ClSC5, in othe:r casc:s it will not do so: in some: ~ a doubtful perception might lead me: 10 wate:r, but

aKI

when Of>( is I>tions. ~end rabuddhi proposes that instrumentality in this conteJ:t be confi r m~ by a subsequent instrumental cosn ition ~ pccificall y. an instrumental cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's goal. or more simply mnsl at~. one in which the des.ir~ relic funaion appears. A1 not~ JUSt above, that su~uent instrumental cognition will be either another perception (such as rhe KfIurion of the fire's warmth) or an infer· ence (such as the: inferential cognition of the firc from its smoke). If one actS and one Ius an innrum... ntal cognition in which th ... desired rdic function appears. then the initial p..-~ptjon th:lt prompt~ action W25 instrum ... ntal. On the other hand. if one experi... nces no such confirm ing cognitionwhether perceptual or inf... rential-then one cannO( cb.im mat the initial p..-~ption was innrumental.III On... key point h... rc is that. if the instrumentality of that initial poception i.s (0 be co nfirm~ by a subsequ...nr p..-tcq)tion. th:u subsequent perception must itself not require further confitmation; otherwisc:. one would f.all into an infinir... regJcss.'1:I One cannot wonder. fur cumple, whether one i.s fedi ng warmth from £he fire or ' imply experiencing hI)( Rashes. ThiJ distinction berwttn a perception that r..-quires confirmation and on ... mat doc.s not require confirmation is fcwgni7:ed by Devcndrabuddhi. but Silcy.abuddhi fenders it more explicit. Sikrabuddhi fim focuses upon this distinction by noting that lXv..-ndnbuddhi's argument concerning confir· mation implies that, in it l..-ast some cues, activity is ptompted not by an unconfirmed percepcion, but by o~ that is sclf-confirming. Sikyabuddhi remarks:

Activity tlUt is Ixu..-d on pe:rttption is 1W0fuld: initial and habitual. One has dear and habitual perception of those things to which one is habituated. When that pnception arises, it arises dctamining its image in accord with O~'J habitU2tion in a manner that avoids all causes for error. And that awareness producu a subs..-quent verifying aw.ueness of that kind: hence, the person am on that objm. Therefore, in that c:ase the awareness itself determines its own instrumentali£),. Since it does not depend on In Noce llul I un noc deaJin& hen: wilb dw:qlUllion tion whose object is ca.pable of accomplishing an aim (1011M), sina: it is devoid of any causes of error, is ascertained r,-"fI III bcJUi 14" pllriahi"lIA) by reflexive awareness as being by nature insuumenta.!. It produces a correct judgment of that objea: in aa:o rd with the way that it was aKertained. H ence,

fu,,..,

i .. ...'" N ..... ".., ]i..... 1tk k ~ iJtJ,. '" ... '" ~ ..... N .."' .... "'",...,., '17" ".."',. p]iI Ji- ... J1Mr,. JUt """ twJ ,. '" u" nh.", U N J "-..N ~ 1tft1,.pyis ...... ]i.. ,.. , . 1t]i 'l)W pyU ftrU k,."

"1tf

",..,.,,..,uJ 9U 1Mf,., ;po,

Dw' N p1JfJi.. ,.....,,.,., MM,. pfo N p1Jf';' J¥ '" ,.; "., , . utpII i .. -r N .... Ji.. 1M' j~ ".." ... "'iM M Jpi ... "'" ,. ,.,w 1t]i 'P - k ,., iJtJ,., Dw' N "t' ..oJNo]i" 1U J;, .....i zhi1tfJ¥ "',.,.,,. zhi", "'''''''' '" kIM iJtJ,. p1Nr p, .... ..,"'".., ."",.;)'" '" ""',. p,. '" ~,.;

"tn'"

nNJ ".., ~,. ".., ]i.. ,.,.j,

127 ~ (PVT, 9"-7-tbUfl nocct: I .. • ,M.-..-.-tn [och«) cua of pcrccpion--ladU", habilUJ.OOn, w capmmu (",dJ.,., N • J.rlMw) U noc cku. 10 IIx panicIIIu idenutY (~,., • .w,.) of me obj«l is IlOI dcfinilivtly cklmniMd; Ibil apWru the aK wncn one: il initially prompied loaa [uoppoKd 10 habit\latnl aaion.o IoI:c ~J, AI tNlUmc, OM aIao .:u OUI of doub!. By implicaDon mis IWCI W.I if, d~ 10 iI.:IbilUOllion, OM ckhnitiwly appehmdJ (.,,.,,P"f ~!he panicuIu identity. e-om paotption docs nor Ikpcnd I,lpoD !he n\~1 of a sub.cq\ln\1 awumca, 1pooJ,. - ',., N pi N

-'-t

,.;0

j..,,.,

JlbJir ItI.,.J,., "l'" ,. twJ,.".. ... 1 'Jis ..i ..,.,,. ..,..1t]i iJtJ pM _ " MIIII M I J, 'i nJ... oil A::-t kIM'''''' M JP"'I" Ie A::-t

, . __, . j'

* ....

~ "'"~,....,~ .. ~ .... ,.,... J,yJ ..J-I_ i ,. "..,]i.. ,. ziN1 ..... ~,., ~,

oU

Dw'"

M'" J.. ""'r" _,..., J_


293

it is intrinsically instrumental, and therefore, there is no infinite regress. 128 Sakyabuddhi'sargument stems from a particular concern: namely, that no infinite regress ensue in Devendrabuddhi's notion of confirmation. 'Clearly, part of his concern focuses upon confirmation through percep'non, since if a subsequent perception is to confirm an initial perception, :that subsequent perception obviously must be self-confirming. , But Sakyabuddhi is also concerned with inference, such as the cogni:cion of fire from smoke, where the cognition of the evidence (smoke) is a ?perception whose certainty could be called into question. While Dharma'/drti himself maintains that the evidence may be ascertained through infer:~nce, 129 if no form of perception were self-confirming (i.e., intrinsically (instrumental), then in no case could one ever establish one's evidence ithrough perception. That is, one could not appeal to one's indubitable per~eption of smoke when inferring fire from smoke, for one could always ask, ~.How do you know that you are seeing smoke?" Sakyabuddhi apparently ~els that this would lead to an insurmountable infinite regress in Dharma~:rri' s system, and his discussion of intrinsically instrumental perception is ~Rpart meant to prevent any such problem. 130 Having presented this notion of an intrinsically instrumental percepP

~B PVT (nye:y5a6ff): de 'i phyir don byedpar nus pa 'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu 'fitshan medpa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang rigpas yongs su beadpa yin ,'ii}lji Itar yongs su bead pa bzhin du de la nges par skyed par byed pa de Itar na rang nyid kyis ~d ma yin pa de 'i phyir thug pa med pa ma yin no. :~~,

.

;U9 See HB (2*.13-14): tatra pak!adharmasya sadhyadharmiIJi pratyak!ato 'numanato va prasid'i!r~r nifcayab, yatha pradefe dhumasya ....

~~~ Sakyabuddhi addresses this problem earlier in the argument (PVT, nye:y3b6ff) by rais~ti1m objection in the context of inferring fire from smoke: '~s

it not the case that, if smoke is apprehended through perception, then since there are causes for error, the evidence will not be definitively determined? That is, there are :#Ie causes for error that prompt one to wonder, "Is this a thing that has the appearance of smoke but is actually magically created by a yogin? Or is it coming from a ter:mite tower?" [du ba mngon sumgyis gzung ba na de la yang 'khrul pa'i rgyu yodpa'i phyir

!tags nges pa nyid medpa ma yin nam I de Itar na ci 'di ni rnal 'byor pas sprulpa'i du ba'i t;tam pa 'i dngos po 'am lei brgya byin gyi spyi bo las byung ba yin zhes 'khrul pa 'i rgyu yod 710 zhe na IJ. buddhi goes on (nyt,:? 4aIff) to argue that this is not a problem since the evidence can lImed by a perception that is "fully habituated" (shin tu goms pa), i.e., one that is ... sicaIly instrumental.

19-i

fOUNDATIO NS OF D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

tion, Sakyabuddhi goes on to conrl'Ul it wiln one tnal is extrinsically instrumental. Gting whal appears to be the asc of confusi ng the shimmer of a dimm fire for a pool of warer, he conrinUCI me passage jusr cited.: One might nor, hov.-cvcr, be habimarcd to an initial awareness with d'IC appear-.1nce of Arc or w:uer: in that asc, tMt awucness docs nOI have Ihe capacity 10 produce a definitive determination bcc:ausc, even Ihough that fire or W:ller has been apprehended by an indepcndem (roll'll rouJ- lWltllnlr4) instrumental cognition, there arc causes that inducc errors [which pm-em such a ddinitivc determination] . In that case, that initial awareness is established to be ;ns(Tumental by Ihe engagement of a sul»cquent iiUtrumental cognition. Hena . il is extrinsically insrtumenw . Howcycr, if onc has an awareness that involvCl Mbituation and darity, then iu insuumcnality if determined from iuclf ('4"l1m • Jl'Ittaj1), as was aplaincd abovc:.'" In Ihis w:ay, it remains Ihe casc Ihal perception is instrumental in some cases intrinsically and in somc cases a triiUica.lly.... ').I Whal is il Ihal distinguishes an intrinsica.lly instrumental perception from one that is arrinsica.lly instrumenal ~ II is me capacity [0 prod~ without any addiliorW condilions--a definitive dnermination of the object in question. Sikyahuddhi docs not go beyond ~ndr.lbuddhi 'l specifie statement:

fA perceptionl ... is a5$CT1ed to be instrumental conccrning that objective aspect (bunl N '; nil'" p4 a r;rihyiU'4) with regard to which it produces a definitive determination bc:causc it causes action toward that aspc:ct. II is nor insuu mema.l with rcg:a.rd 10 any orher aspect. Even Ihough there is no difference in lemu of being experienced, there is the ddl nitivc determination of thaI

131 Namdy. PVr, "JI"1sa6K. ci ted;we~. 131 PVT (""'-:1S-7ffi:

iJi

Jmrr,.' _""ltfm.t /.Mill N i ';"" "JI'''fP'''",..vi,. "",..., 9U .i:J.nt WnJ,. ; ,-J,. i ,.,.,. ...., ,.

~ rJ.J - .,.. Pili "" ~" ~,. ; "'" ,. ".,J, . '" ... ",, / '" t.

'rf'I . . . .

,;,,;s iJi tslMtI_ k,., tJI.i _

,., ~ ,..1 tk bn "" pIMa ltu tslMtI_ "" ,. / tk JI'''' ,..- .... ""'Y..p.I £. '-P"F J...J ,..-Iu ... .. yi.. .,

"""f F-" I.f "'-' - '"' ..

/.J,;"J

",wI tI_ ....,'"

pr!U , . ,-J ri"f pi ...

I • ....... ';I.' " - .......... _

t." "w.

,.; .......


295

aspect for which there are the causes of definitive determination, such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires the mediation of other conditions is not determined. 133 Although Devendrabuddhi is here discussing the more particular case of determining the instrumentality of an awareness from reflexive awareness, Sakyabuddhi understands this observation to be more generally applicable: a perception is instrumental specifically with regard to that aspect of its object for which it can produce a specific kind of correct perceptual judgment, namely, an immediately subsequent definitive determination

(pratyakJaPrfthalabdhanifcaya). We have already discussed the notion of definitive determination (nifcaya); in the context of perception, it is the conceptual cognition following upon a perception that interprets the content of that perception, which is necessarily nonconceptual and thus indeterminate. According to Dharmaldrti, a perception may be capable of generating a subsequent definitive determination of some aspects of its object, but not of all aspects. One might, for example, be able to determinate that one is seeing a water-jug, but one may not be able to determine, on the basis of that perception alone, that the water-jug is momentary (kJa1Jika). As noted earlier and as Devendrabuddhi remarks here, whether one determines one or another aspect of an object depends upon numerous factors, including the perceptual acuity of the perceiver. 134 Drawing out the implications of Dharmakirti's theory of definitive determination, Devendrabuddhi applies it to the instrumentality of perception in the aforementioned fashion. And expanding on Devendrabuddhi's analysis, Sakyabuddhi applies the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: for a person who is seeking warmth, for example, a perception of fire that is intrinsically instrumental is one that can produce an immediately subsequent definitive determination of its object as "fire" or as a "heat source," and so on. A perception that is extrinsically instrumental cannot do so, and if its instrumentality is to be determined, one must depend upon confirmation by some later instrumental cognition.

133 PVP (5a5): ... bzung ba'i rnam pa gangyin pa dag fa yang nges pa skyed par byed pa de fa / Jugpar byedpa 'i phyir tshad ma nyid du 'dod kyi / gzhan du ni ma yin no / mthong ba las khyad par med na yang / rnam pa gang don du gnyer ba dang / goms pa dang skabs fa sogs pa nges pa 'i rgyu yod na de nges pa yin gyi / gzhan chod pa ni ma yin no. 134 See chapter 3 (n. 59).

296


And what of inference? Is it too sometimes instrumental intrinsically, and sometimes extrinsically? Continuing a passage that we cited earlier,135 Devendrabuddhi notes: Because various causes of error in the case only of perception are possible, it is [sometimes] known to be instrumental through the activation of a subsequent instrumental cognition that has as its object that thing's (artha) telic function; this is not the case with inference. That is, a property-svabhava used as an inferential sign and an effect used as an inferential sign are restricted to being the property-svabhava of the real thing in question and the effect of the real thing in question, respectively, and only they [i.e., a property-svabhava and an effect] are the causes for the respective sign-awareness. Hence, if that kind of thing [i.e., a property-svabhava or effect] is absent, there is no inference. Therefore, inference does not rely on the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition. 136 Unlike perception, inference is always intrinsically instrumental, and its instrumentality stems directly from the svabhavapratibandha, the invariable relation between the evidence and the predicate to be proven (sadhya). The svabhavapratibandha guarantees the presence of a predicate with a specific kind of nature, precisely because, if the predicate (or the subject that possesses that predicate) did not have that nature, the evidence could not have the nature that it is determined to have. Smoke, for example, can have the nature of smoke only if it has been produced by fire; a maple can be a maple only if it is a tree. 137 Thus, the dubiety that is possible in perception can never apply to inference, for if an inference is well-formed, it is indubitable. To dose this section, let us now see how this bipartite approach to instru-

135 I.e., PVP (2aIfi). See above, 280. l36 PVP (2a{fi): mngon sum nyid fa 'khrulpa'i rgyu sna tshogs pa nyid kyis slu basridpa'iphyir de'i don gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi tshad ma phyi ma Jugpas tshad ma nyid du rtogs par byat I rjes su dpagpa la ni ma yin no I de Itar de'i rang bzhin can nam I 'bms bu'i rtags dngos po'i rang bzhin nyid dang I dngos po 'i 'bras bu nyid du nges pa ni rtags can gyi shes pa 'i rgyu yin pas na I de Ita bur gyur ba'i dngos po medpar rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pa 'i phyir Iphyis kyi tshad ma'i Jugpa fa Itos pa ma yin no. 137 See above, chapter 3.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTI FYIN G THE SOURCES OF KNOW LEDGE

297

memaiity-as intrinsic and (Xtri nsK:- rclates to the "muddle- th.:1.( closed the previous section. There, we noted that rHvendrabuddhi begins by claiming mat, in the como:t of a mediated instrumental eff«t. an instrumental cognition is "what makes one obtain" (prlipUllJ an object with th~ desired tdie function, and that the fact of obtaining such an object connirutes the instrumental cognition 's tNSt"N'Orthiness. But toward the ~nd of his arpment he must account for the possibility of obsnuat'd :action. and he is thus obligM to reddlne instrumentality simply in tttnu of an inurum~ntal cognition's ClfJ'iUi1J to make one obtain one's goal (i.e., an object with th~ desired tdic function). We can ICC this tension Ixrween actual and potencial obtainment of one's aim as paralld to the division ~n extrinsic and imnnsic instrum~n tality. Specifically. for an extrinsially instrumental perception (0 be known as insuumental, it musl 3Ctually lead to the accomplishment of one's aim , whe:rc this is defint'd as a cognition in which appears the desired telie function. This is 50 txau.sc: when a cognition's instrumentality is exninsic, it rc:quires confirmuion by a subsequent instrumental cognition whose con· tent is the desired (elK: function , which is the same as saying thai the confirmation requires mat one actually obllli n one', aim. In contrasl to the CISe of cxtriruic illSTnimenuliry, a cognit}on who$(" instrumentality is intrinsic requires no substquent confirmation, and mis amouna to the claim that the cognition is inmumcm:a1 even if one's aim is not: aaually obnincd. This notion oorresponds to the charact:eriz.u ion of instrumentality as the cognition's capacity 00 make one: obain one's aim (i.e., ia capacity to lead one to a cognition of an object with the desired ~Iie limo;","). If Om' urv:ierl'l':IodJ lM rerm ·C1 pacity~ (/A},';) to include cua where the goa1 is actually raliz.ed, one can inttfpm such a cognition as me trivial case of a cognition that contains the appearance of the desired telic function (IlrtJmhi]dllirbh4sJlJ, since th:tt ap pearance is c:quinlent to the obtainment of one's aim. But mo~ inte:restingly. such a cognition can also be understood as one that, even though it does not dir«t:ly contain an "Pf>e1r:m~ of the deircd tdie fi.mCtion. noevcnhelen is indubiubk :about ito: object', capacity for that [elic function. Although ~buddhi poina O UI that 5Om(: ascs of ~tion fall into mu category, [)(:vendrabuddhi places particular SU'CS$ upon inference as intrinsically instrumental. For as we have ICCn, a we'll-formed inference must be bucd upon a JlIIlbh4~'ilpr4tibandJu, pmaining bctwttn cvU:knce and prtd.icate. Sincc mat relation guarantees rru.t me encity inft'llcd h.n:a CftUin type of IU.ture, it Iilcewise guv:mc«c ch:i.r that entity is capable: of sptt:ific telic funaioru; this 50 because tdie funct}on

298


rests upon an entity's causal characteristics, and "nature" (svabhava) is a way of referring to the totality of those characteristics. There are, however, certain problems with the instrumentality of inference, but before we consider them, let us examine one more topic under the rubric of perception: namely, the notion of perception as motivating action. PERCEPTION AS MOTIVATOR (PRAVARTAKA): THE QUESTION OF NOVELTY

We have already mentioned the notion of the correct perceptual judgment that Dharmakirti calls a "subsequent definitive determination immediately following upon a perception" (pratyak!aPr!.thalabdhanifcaya). A key question, however, has yet to be raised: why is this theory introduced? The answer lies in a tension within Dharmakirti's philosophy: on the one hand, perception is necessarily nonconceptual, which is to say that it is indeterminate: it cannot determine its object as being "fire" or "water" or any other entity. Dharmakirti shows no willingness to relinquish this point, and on my view, he is in part motivated by a concern that I have cast as "axiological." Although Dharmakirti does not put the problem in this fashion, if perception were determinate, then universals would be ultimately real because universals would be the content of determinate perception, and perception apprehends what is ultimately existent. And if universals were real, then the arguments employed to refute them would be incorrect. These same arguments are employed against the self (atman), a distributed entity that can be considered a special case of a universal. 138 Hence, if the arguments against universals are incorrect, the arguments against the self are incorrect. Thus, since Dharmakirti's soteriology rests finally upon the negation of the self, his soteriology would be contradicted by the introduction of determinate perception. 139 On the other hand, if perception is to initiate one's actions toward the accomplishment of a human aim, then it should be determinate: if one has not identified some object as "fire," why would one seek its warmth? At 138 There is no doubt that on Dharmakirti's view, what he sometimes refers to as selfless (e.g., at PV2.135-13G) and sometimes as emptiness (e.g., at PV2.214d-215ab) is to serve as the "antidote" (vipak!a) to satkiiyadnti, and hence to all suffering. Dharmakirti does not, however, provide any extended refutation of the self in either PV or PVSV. But as with the Abhidharmic analysis of sa1f1vrti- and paramiirtha-satya (see chapter I, 41), it appears that his refutations of distributed entities-especially universals-are meant to serve as the arguments to be employed for refuting the self.

139 For more on Dharmakirti's soteriology, see chapter 2 (Goff).


299

issue here is the notion that part of what constitutes the instrumentality of a cognition in the context of human aims is that it is a "motivator" (pravartaka) of action. As noted earlier, the notion of "action" (pravrtti) here is the secondary sense applied to that term by Devendrabuddhi when he addresses Dharmaklrti's claim that "awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one's action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid" (= PV2.3b-d). It is clear that Dharmaklrti himself is concerned with the argument that perception, as indeterminate, could not be instrumental because it could not motivate action. In his Pramii1}avinifcaya, he raises the problem with an objector's voice: "Well, now how can there be practical action (vyavahiira) from direct awareness, whose nature is not that of a definitive determination? One could not engage in practical action because one acts in order to obtain things that cause happiness and avoid things that cause suffering only when one has made the definitive determination 'This is [a thing that causes happiness, etc.] ."'140 To resolve this problem, Dharmaklrti must find a way to introduce a kind of determinacy into perception without actually claiming that perception is determinate. He does so with the following response: This poses no problem, since just when one sees the object, there occurs a mnemonic awareness that arises due to that perceptual awareness. Due to that mnemonic awareness, practical action occurs because ofone's desire [to avoid or obtain some aim]. 141 [PVin:I.I8] Although direct awareness is the bare perception (Ita ba tsam = drHimiitra) of an object, just when one sees the object, there occurs a mnemonic awarenesJ'-i.e., one that is immediately following that experience-and due to that awareness, purposeful action occurs with regard to what one has seen as being what is desired or what is not desired. 142 140 PVin ad 1.18 (58.I2ff): '0 na da ni mngon sum ma nges pa'i bdag nyid las ji ltar tha snyad du gyur I 'di'o zhes bya bar nges na ni bde ba dang ,-dug bsngal gyi sgrub par byed pa dag thob pa dang spong ba'i don du Jug pa 'i phyir ro zhe na. 141 PVinr.I8: taddnfiiv eva dmefU sa1?Zvitsiimarthyabhiivina~ I smara?Jiid abhiliifepa vyavahiira~ pravartate / /. 142 PVin adLI8 (58.I5ft): I skyon 'di med de I ganggi phyirl don mthongba nyid mthongrnam

300


The introduction of the theory of definitive determination allows Dharmaldrti to attribute what might be called a clandestine determinacy to perception without actually claiming that perception is itself determinate. In doing so, he can salvage the claim that, in terms of obtaining a human aim, perception is instrumental because it is a motivator of actions oriented toward such aims. 143 Nevertheless, while introducing the notion of a subsequent definitive determination may solve some problems, it creates others. Consider specifically what we know from our previous discussion about an instrumental cognition (pramarza): in brief, it is a trustworthy awareness, where trustworthiness in the context of a human aim means that it enables one to obtain an object that accomplishes one's aim. This way of characterizing an instrumental cognition can be reduced to one claim, namely, that it is "what makes one obtain one's aim" (prapaka). And to do so, it must also be "what motivates action" (pravartaka); otherwise, the question of obtaining an aim would be moot. . Since Dharmakirti maintains that only perception and inference are instrumental, he would have the description we have just given apply to those two types of cognitions, and only those two. We might grant that the description does indeed apply to perception and inference, but if no further specifications are made, a third type of cognition will also satisfy this description. Devendrabuddhi describes the problem in an objection: "You say that an instrumental cognition is that which is trustworthy with regard to the telic function when one acts having become aware of the instrumental object through that instrument. If that is so, then consider the case where one acts upon a water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug; when one does so that conceptual awareness is also trustworthy with regard to the telic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that

la / myong ba'i mthu las byung ba yi / dran las mngon par 'dod pa yis / tha snyad rab tu Jugpa yin / mngon sum don la Ita ba tsam yin yang nyams su myong ba'i mthu las byung ba myong ba mtshams sbyor ba'i dran pa las / de mthong ba nyid na mthong ba rnams la mngon par 'dod pa dang cig shos dag gis tha snyad du 'gyur ba yin no. 143 See Dreyfus (I996) for an account of these issues; for the title, Dreyfus draws on Tibetan authors, one of whom compares the problem to "the fool leading the blind." The question here is how the "fool" (perception, which cannot think thoughts) can lead the "blind" (conceptual thought, which cannot directly see any objects).


301

conceptual awareness would also be instrumental, but you do not accept that it is. Therefore, the definition of instrumentality is faulty."I44 This objection is clearly tied to one raised by Dharmaklrti himself: [PV2.5d-6a:] "The knowledge of a universal that follows the [perceptual] cognition of an object in itself (svarupa) would be instrumental." 145 The major problem here is definitive determination itself. That is, following upon a habituated perception of a water-jug, in the proper context one will have the definitive determination, "This is a water-jug." Since that perception leads to such a determination, it is considered instrumental. That is, in the case where one seeks the function(s) that a water-jug per'forms, that perception can (indirectly) prompt one to act in such a fashion that one will definitely obtain what one seeks, provided that nothing hinders one's actions. But clearly, the same is true of that definitive determihation itself: it can effectively prompt a person who seeks a water-jug to act in such a fashion that, provided there are no obstructions, she will definitely obtain the water-jug. 146 In short, it is both "what makes one obtain one's aim" (prapaka) and "what prompts (or guides) action" (pravartaka). We have already seen that Dharmakirti is unwilling to admit such cognitions as instrumental, in part because that admission would lead him down a slippery slope to determinate perception and, hence, the ultimate Jeality of universals. Thus, he must add some further specification that will disallow the instrumentality of definitive determinations. In a reference to Dignaga's work,147 he does so by maintaining that such cognitions are "con'144 PVP (3a7ff): gal te gang gis shes nas Jug par 'gyur ba'i don byed par mi slu ba de ni de fa :tshad ma nyid yin pa de'i tshe I bum pa 'i mam par rtog pa 'i shes pa las I bum pa fa Jug pa de'i :.aon byed par mi slu bar 'gyur ba de ltar na I de yang tshad mar gyur na mi 'dod pa de bas na mtshan nyid khrugs [ex con). for PVP-D: zhugsl pa yin no I zhe na. ,145 PVZ.5d-6a: svariipiidhigate{l para1'(l II priipta1'(l siimiinyavijfiiinam. 146 It is worth noting that, in terms ofDharmaldrti's apoha-theory, a definitive determination must therefore be a concept based on real things (bhiiviifraya), at least in relation to the :!Spects (iikiira) of the object relevant to the desired telic function. For the notion of expressions and concepts based on real things, see PVL205-206 with PVSV ad cit. (G:I05.24ff). 147 I understand Dharmaldrti's use of sii1'(lv.rtaat PVZ.3a-br (grhitagraha1}iin neffa1'(l sii1'(lv.rta1'(l) (0 be an allusion to Dignaga's use of sa1'(lvrtisatin the context of perception (PSLI.6cd-7ab:

JOl

FOUNDATIONS Of DHAlMAtr;;IRT I'S PHILO SO PHY

ventionar in that they art' -apprdlending whar has already been apprehended ~ (lfhi14trW!'ll); as such, they art' not instrumenru. ,.. Devendrabuddhi, citing Dharmakini's response, offers these commenrs: (The afo rementioned obj«tionJ ... is not a problem. Sinc~ amwnh'OrUll ct1f'Iirjon Ilpprrhmds tbllt which hiU Illt'ttuiy h«n apprthmMd. JIH Jo nDt clAim that ;1 is ;nstrJ4mmlaL (PV1..ja-b,] '" That is, conventional awaren= that have objects such as a watcr-jug. c:Wtemhood, number and upward movement are not claimed to be instrumental. Why? For mc reason that they apprehend what has already been apprehcnded. Here (Dharmalcini has aid mar) JUSt thc initial opcricnce of an object is instrnmtnta.l--it is what makes one act.'" The subsequent conceprual aware ness that comes from it arises rtalling mal object as it was apprehended. Hen«, it is not at all an awareness of a real thing that can aa:omplish a goal (arrha). So how can it be whal makes one act after Oot has known its object?'"

As is sugated by Dcvendrabuddhi's comment, pan of the concern here is mat these cognitions' content, being universals such as -watcr-jug-nw(ghafllll.'Il) or othcr hyposwil.ed entities such as number (ul1"khya) or movc:mefil (k",."utn). would be tk /MtD ultimately real by vinue of their appearance in a pc.rceptual judgment, if mat judgment were construed as pan of me pc.rceplion iucl£'SJ In ptoposing that mese cognitions are -apple~

_ _ ..... _.......,.

-.H.".,.,~

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..w.a

148 Set I'VLp-Oj" 149 PVL)a-OI: p,."u.,." ~'!" sJ,!,~,!,-

I SOTh"" Ildelllla:" 10 HB:l ·,J..I, (Ill"."'" u,.". ~!W~I!'

".."u,....J. SH the pun". in lhe 2ppmdix (..,un.

'*'" M,..,. _ "1...."' .. "",.,,..,.1fyN/

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151 I'VP{)blft): fot iW" pbJi, .....",...,.; / ".; 'J.JlfJ 'Ji IsM h",,. """, I ,...."lf ""'" iitrr,. '" /J#ff,.i,.J r.oJlrti ...... "'"'?i Jhn,. If; rm.J _1fYN/ J.. "'; 'J.J M J til #.M _ I P"",,, 'V"'"' pbJi, ... 1 M '" """, ~ "'tA...t N ff]iJ r:JhtJ ...... """ '" i"'l,.,."..,.]i" IW 1M i ",tho. t., ",",,,, ... roo_ rti ""'''' ,., ....,,. i ,..., ,. ""...... ji Iu NI>Jn" J.. ~"fI ,.. ko..t ... j Mil oi ~ r.o" IJu" IdUt ,u, ~ ... M Ju, /U in ... jyd. .,.,."..1M i J,.,.. ,. uJ .i;Jw"l sMI ,. -",. M ...... P"I ~ sMlNU k,., .",.,., ;0..'"

Ui",..

(II,.,

152 This iI. in shan. an upuntnlapiM admining~ (..riufpt~pauption. See,

INSTR UMENTALITY, J UST IFYING T HE SO URCES O F KN O WLEDGE

303

hending what has betn apprehended," Dharmakini means--at least in pan-chat these cognitions have undergone a conccptuali:r.:uion process whereby the initial, indeterminate comem of perceprion is filidy interpreted. Even in the absence of any aplicit statement to mis effect, we can thw hear an implicit claim in this argumen t: narndy. mat since conceptualization always involves error or ruslOrtion (bhrtlnti). a conceprual cognition cannol be considered instrumcnral if one does not demonstrate how that error tus been overcome.1II Devcndrabuddhi. however. largdyavoids this tack and inslC:ad rums the argument to a more specific description of what it means for an instrumental cognition to be ~ what prompts action ~ (prtJlHlrt.Wz). Al noted above, within the COntext of a human aim, a cognition's insuumentality is in part cnn.uimrcd by the faa that. by virtue of prompting one's acrion toward some aim, it is an instrument fo r the acco mplishment of th:u aim. Alluding to Dharrnakirti's HaubjruiM, Devcndrabuddhi he~:u1ds the spmfication that only the initial ntpnimct (4t/ytJJtJritJntJ) can be what prompu: action. Thus, since: a ddini tive detcnnination is foUowing upon such an initial experience. it cannot be insmunem:al in the context of obtaining a human aim ho!eall~ ;1 ... ~ not i 1liri41ly prompt one's action rOw:lM (h.:lt :r.im. With this :r.rgument, Dh:r.rmwrti (u intcrpmed by ~dr:l.buddhi ) may employ me theory of definitive determination to accoum for the determination necessary for perception to be instrumental while denying that a definitive determination is instrumental. But although these twO problems may thw be solved, me solutions have created a third problem. Specifically, by requiring that an instrumental cognition mwt p:w me test of not being wh.:lt :>pprehends the :r.lr~dy :tpprehendcd. Dharm:r.lUrti h:u: :r.ppu_ endy d iminated a whole cl:w of inferences from consideration as instrumental, even though he clearly mwt admit thaI those inferences "rt instrumental To under$land me cl:w of inferences in qucstion, we mwt recall mat, according to Dhumakirti's meory rX definitive determination, one has a det~min"rion immO!di.:l(cly fol lowing " pc~lion only o f th"t propcny_ sIIfIbhlfllfl of the perceived object for which the proper conditions arc in place. Since neither Dharmaltirti nor his commentaton offer w systematic for cumpk, pvJ.l}J ( _ _ ",,,,,,,,",,,,,uiJ ..vJt.Jpiviu~ I ,,;... ~."fN" ~~~ti ll).

"

fUl DI.... ".aJui. ;..fan"", '""" i .....Ioa ...... IU"... uf,,..... . IN. tiM: e....... ...-c...""''' t.y mo:aru: of tho: _~-'ku;",. Sec: chapter J. I ~)

FOU NDATION S OF D HA'-MA KIIlTl 'S PH ILOSO PHY

terminology ro rekr to this ryJX of p~rty-Wltbh.iWl, let w min our own term and call it a -perceptually determinable propeny-nwbh4"",,· In short. a pej(:rprually determinable propeny-svabJuiv.r is one for which ,he perception in question is capable of producing an immediatciy subsequent definitive determinadon in the mind of thr perceiver bcca~ aU the conditiofU for producing such a detcrmin:llK>n 2fe present. In COntrast to such cases whttt thr pt:rttption is capable of inducing such a definitive determination. in some ca.ses the propr.r condiciolU arc not in placc. and therefore the perceiver will not have an immcd.iatdy subsequent definitive: dctrnnination of the property-nwbh4v.r in question. We will o..Il this ryJX of propcny-lVAbhd"" a "perccprually indctcnninabk property-WIIblui""" " This is a prope:ny-lWI'bhJ;v.r fo r which the perception in question is MtClpable of producing an immcdiatdy subsequent definitive detennination in the mind of the perceiver because: one or morc of the conditions for producing such a determination arc absent. Let w now rtl:lU wme further specifications conettning the types of coBditions that are required for the production of a definitive determination immediatciy following a perception. !u noted earlier, some of the r~uircd conditions can be considered conlarual. The perceiver mWI. for aample. find hinuelfin the appropriate COntc::n (prullrll!'4}--one formed by interests and opecu.tioru-in order to have a determinacion of the aspect in question. ')< Thus. in some contots--as when the pe:rcciver is thinty-the perceiver may have the detenninalion. -This is a water-jug." while the s:amc perceiver may not have Iha[ determination in some other COntQtl, as when he is nol thirsty. But other conditions arc embedded. in a wider. morc stable contOl. in that they depend primarily upon ,he perceptual capabilities of the perceivel'. mind. For aample, Dharmwni nu.inctins that if a -dim -wincd~ (1NlwbwJJhi) pcrson ~ an obj«taisting in a homologow conrinuum (i.e.• nO( acrually disintegrating at a gross level). then mat percepdon annot directl y induce the determination that that obj«t is impermanent. Thw. when such a person perceives an in[2C( water-jug, that pc,ception cannot ncinduce an immcd.ialdy subsequent definitive determination of that waUf-jUg'S momentllriness AS 1D"t AS tht.l pnkJ" is ~dim-wilUJ. -With Ihis in mind. we can make the speciflCllion

INSTIlUMENTAlITY, JUSTI FYINC TH E SOURCES OF KNOWLEOC E

lOS

that this typt of propt:rty-lWIbh4W1 i5 perceptually indcterminable in prinripk for sudJ a pnwn. ,..

Mthough he is not explicit on this point, Dharmaldrti's reference to ·dimwined persons" appears to be an allusion to a typical division between ·ordinary persons" (p.nlMgjal'l4). whose pcn:quions an: rdatively limited by their weak mental capabilitits. in conU'a.u [ 0 -adepts" ~ns), whose pt:rccptiolU enable them to directly perceive objectS that an: inaccessible to ordinary persons. This allusion becomes especially dear when, in one of the passages where this issue is discussed, Dharmaldn:i COntrasts the dim-witted with ~ those of great intelJt:Ct ~ (~i}, '· Sikyabuddhi idemifics these latter as those ~ who Set what is bqond the senses- (IltiruliryaJari;" j, a rypical epithet for JOtim and especially buddhas.'" More specifically, in this contet they are those whose perceptions are capable of inducing a definitive dcrermination of lin) aspect of an object that they perceive. 'II Assuming that the distinction between ordinary persons and JOtins is indeed operative here, we can apply the nouon of a propeny-WIlbh4V4 that is perceptually indeterminable in principle 10 a soteriological COntext. That is, on Dharmaldrti's view, what makes the extreme perceptual acuity of )l'Dgim vallllllhl!! is not their ahiliry to 5« loog dinaoas. hut rather their ahiliry ro hav!! a oert::lin rype- of in~'mm!!nt:ll oognition: namely. a direc;r, nonconceptual experience of the si:l Ittn aspecu of the Nobles' Four Troths. '" These aspects include propeny-svabh.i1JllS such as emptiness and moment:lriness that ordinary persons arc unable to determine without recourse to inttrcnce.,II 1.5 we have JUSt Setn, Dharmakirti maintains that JOtim have perceptions that are capable of immediately producing definitive df'{!!rminuionJ of th~ and a~ orh!!! propl!ny_"""bM.,m of:l p"'rceived subject (dharmin) without recourse to inference, and this is prob2bly I SS 5ft pvsv tUiPVI.})ab (G:1I.6/l) and the doIcIy ,cblrd dixlWion I I PV). IOI-I 01. 156 PV). Ia,d. I S7 S« PVr h7Sa6): .1.".,

cbm,.. chn",.. .. ";......,,.

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W

...,,.;~,,

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l S95ft D1wmWm'l loooum of"';~ {PV}. 181 47)' np«i.lly.,jlh dw; oontmc'nu

ofOcvaw:lr:lbuddhi (PVP:l lobJffl. 160 NOIC

mal alihou&h 1M oonlCl.l IJ,en, iI the appIicIIion of the propcny. ,..}JM.. JdfIe:M.

new to iIO enti!y on the b.is of 1M ~ of tNl mliJ)'. Ihil doa; noc rman dw KIf· anaa ' " '" iI pthxplible. ~ibtr. the di$rinaion hen, iI bth"UO the lbili!y 10 h~ I «n observed, as when one infers that impermaocnce u a propeny-Jl.IQbhiw of sound." This is not so. Even tbough sound's unique nature, which is excluded from all other thinp. has already been apprehended, the object of practical action (1IJd1l4hJ1lI) can only ~ that aspttt with regard to which that perctption has produa:d a defini(i~ dC'tC'1lJlination and so on as iu dfect. 1berefore. sino: it applies (0 that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental.'" For Ocvcndrabuddhi, Dharmakini's argument amounts to the claim that, if a pc:rcq)(ion cannot induce a ddlnitivc determination of a propc:nyIWbb4W1 with which one is cof'lCC'rnn:i, then the object of that pc:rtrption has /for been " !mown" (jlf4u) or "discerned" (vijfi4l4J. II is still true that the property-n.wbhoiw in question has already been IIpprthmtUtl WhiU) in that it, being identical with the object iudf, has contributed to the produaion of pClttption. N~Iw. to bolTOl\l' ~i 'l phrase from a related context, it is i/U iftllllt propcny-nwblui.... had nOt been apprehended at all , since one can h:lve no indubitable determinate knowledge of that propeny-sWlblMw without tdying upon infertncc.". Thus, if we can combine Dcvcndrabuddhi's inrerprtr.uion with what we know of Dharmakini's sorerioiogy, nove1()' plays a crucial role in Dharmakini's thco(), of instrumentality, for it preKrvtS the instrumentality of a class ofinkrmccs that arc ccnrrailo his soteriology. This is cerainly Ocvcndrabuddhl', opinion, and for him the overall definition of an insrruITlC'ntai cognition thertfort has two aspccu: first , an irutrumental cognition is a trustworthy awareness; this ....'aIT:lfltl the daim that an instrumental cognition is -what makes one obtain" (priJNIJu.)one's aim. And SCCOfld. an insoumental cognition mUst "revcal Mut has nor been known" (Iljurirth.-

ria"""''''' oiMJ "'M l p''''1ff hhillloi ",i ""''''' ",w ...", .. *' "" i J#7i,,. ........ ,." "tIM .. r.s IMf ""; .,..; ""'r",w ""',. ..", _ Ji,. "" k.u.t ... ..;" ~ 1- "", 1"'" " ..,.,.,. ... tin TfS "" " . " "" 165 PVP (6aS): pi /Jt

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_""'m .nwo o •• Kn..et (,", ..... '''JJ on DharmcloU:aB'. thmcy ofi...uwnmulity.

i-t""i"

h.i...,.,....,


309

prakiifa); this warrants the claim that an instrumental cognition is what "motivates action" (pravartaka). This way of defining an instrumental cognition later comes under attack, ;for subsequent commentators, probably including Sakyabuddhi, maintain ~\hat, since only novel cognitions are trustworthy, an explicit statement of inovelty is not necessary. Without going into the details of such arguments, ~",e need only note that such interpretations do not abandon the criterion ~pf novelty; they simply subsume it under trustworthiness. The main moti~vation here is probably in response to Devendrabuddhi's somewhat vague ~pproach to trustworthiness: he is apparently willing to apply the term ~.'trustworthy" (avisa'f!lviida) to a definitive determination following on a ~erception, but he never explicitly states whether or not such ~ application ~ould be legitimate. By eliminating any such application, Sakyabuddhi ~(who himself is somewhat vague on this point) and certainly later com~entators forego the need to adjust the overextension of the term "trust~orthy" as a description of any pramii'(la; instead, they simply maintain ~~at what is trustworthy is necessarily novel in that it is a "motivator of f~ction" (pravartaka). 167 However, in contrast to Devendrabuddhi, these ~later interpretations obscure the likely motivations behind the various l~aims that Dharmaldrti makes. And since Devendrabuddhi's argument [firaws upon other portions ofDharmaldrti's work, his interpretation like~Wise suggests how Dharmaldrti's presentation of instrumentality accords fiwith other elements of his philosophy, most notably his theory of definiftive determination (nifcaya) as a means of re-introducing conceptuality into ~erception. For these reasons, and in view of its subsequent impact upon fthe commentarial tradition, Devendrabuddhi's interpretation strikes me as ithe most useful starting point for an interpretation OfPV2.1-6. In any case, Devendrabuddhi's work certainly helps to clarifY the reasons for citing both trustworthiness and novelty as essential characteristics of any pramii'(la. 168

li167 See, for example, PVT, nye:79a5ff, where Sakyabuddhi, by reducing the discussion of a

l~econd characteristic to a matter of worldly convention, seems to suggest that an explicit [~tement of novelty is not essential to the definition of an insrtumental cognition.

t1t68 Franco (1991 and 1997) has argued that Dharmakirti does not give a genetal definition Ipf an instrument of knowledge (pramii7Jll) anywhere in his works. This interpretation is ~argely based upon the argument that the particle vii in PV2.5 can only properly be con~i~l:rued as a disjunction. Franco's work, which seeks a historical reading that at points must !:resist the commentaries, has elicited considerable comment (see for example, the exchange ~~etween Franco and Oetke in Katsura 1999). Beyond Franco's insightful suggestions conferning the relation ofDharmakirti's work to the wider philosophical context of his time, one k

310,


Inference, Error, and Trustworthiness

While the ,qualification of novelty preserves the instrumentality of certain forms of inference, other problems arise. These specifically focus on the fact that the objects of inference are unreal universals. As such, the objects of inference are incapable of any telic function, for since only ultimately real particulars can be causes or effects, only ultimately real particulars have telic function. 169 In their discussion ofPV2.I-6, neither Devendrabuddhi nor Sakyabuddhi consider this issue at any length. Their comparative silence is probably due to the way they understand the overall argument of the Pramtitzavtirttika-namely, that the entire preceding chapter (PVI) had already addressed these aspects of inference. Indeed, in the course of that chapter, Dharmaki:rti returns repeatedly to a crucial question: if conceptual cognitions-including inferences-take unreal universals as their objects, why would anyone bother with them? After all, reasonable or "judicious" (prek!tivant) persons seek to accomplish their goals, and to do so, they seek to obtain that which is capable of the desired telic functions. Why, therefore, would they concern themselves with cognitions whose actual content is incapable of any such functionality? Alluding to an answer, Dharmaki:rti employs a provocative metaphor to formulate the problem in the following verses: Through distinguishing the propositions that the thing in question is "real" and that it is "unreal," those who do not deny the utility of an expression's meaning analyze the real thing itself, for the production of an effect depends upon that real thing. Why would those who seek the goal in question bother to analyze something that is incapable of accomplishing that goal? Why salient outcome of this" vii controversy" may be the finding that, if we do not resort to commentarial interpretations, our conclusions on the matter are necessarily underdetermined by the available evidence, namely, DharmakIrti's laconic statements. This is not a problem in itself, but it is one that must be tolerated when we assay the difficult exploration of Dharmaklrti's immediate historical context in isolation from the commentarial tradition. When, however, we seek to situate DharmakIrti within the commentarial tradition that follows him, our task is less difficult. Indeed, we find unanimity on the notion that DharmakIrti does provide a general definition ofpramii1Jd- and also that both trustworthiness and novelty are components of that definition (the only question being the issue of whether both must be explicitly stated). Since I am thankfully concerned with this latter, less assiduous task, I have forgone any extensive discussion of the "vii controversy." 169 See chapter 2 (84ffl.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTifYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

, II

would a Iwrful woman bolht:r 10 Stt whttht:r a (:\lnuch is lxautiful or noe"' DtuImaldrti ad of d..lnt ("'r') ...d oud.. H."""s app"I_ ~cod ....... thinr; u ~ imasc IMI il a univnsallUdl u Id~ one ~1.ltQ. Whm liM: media · Uon olmo.. who m..dicau:: in thai &ahion ir pnfm.ed, mq no Iongcr ~ tiM: par. lio:ular aha, iI tiM: ob;ca of dcsin; and sum. and dory mlli eiimUu.lc ~ and 5Uda. iii #'i .-...,.,." ,.i';";' wW 9i / til dti .... j# tJIw/""]i" ... / "'" til JIi I... ,,; iIMI m." ill ..,. ,. '14"" ,. f/!r / J"P' ,. ..., _ , . ill .,. ,.1f1i '; .....'" , . pM'" _sp'" ,..,.,.,. i 'P'" ,.".... NI / MJ tI..to J. ,,%",.; ...., Ii ",tJht,,, ",oJ "'''P'' til'" J.. ,...' ~,... ... ..." ito -"1''' ,,.,,,, Iw f pJtyir ,. / _ K:~" .JO' "'i.~ , srJ! I

He._

[u..rr _,. J..,.,.i Ihn,. .... 9ut,.,

"'".n-,.

ytUttyJU,.,.,,., ...~ .dllflMlijtJ,..,. ,.im,.tNlfI /

_1...,;"

""~ ~"".,.H.

314


example is the practice of having the attitude that a being that is not one's mother is one's mother [in order to eliminate desire].In Despite the fundamental error in conceptuality, one can still speak of some conceptual cognitions-specifically, inferences-as instrumental because they are trustworthy in that they reliably enable us to achieve our goals, such as the goal of pacifying one's mind and attaining spiritual liberation. But one admits their instrumentality until one attains "foundational transformation," which refers to the elimination of the form of ignorance (avidya) that underlies the errors in conceptual cognitions. 178 This implies that after foundational transformation, inferences are no longer instrumental for that person. In short, Dharmaki:rti appears to maintain that, from at least some rarefied perspective, inferences are not ultimately instrumental, for once a person has obtained the human aims for which such cognitions are useful, why would one continue to admit the instrumentality of such cognitions? Why would one continue to carry one's raft on one's back?

Ultimate and Conventional Pram3.I).a The metaphor of the raft, to which we have just alluded, is a well-known trope found in the Alagaddupamasutta. The Buddha instructs his followers that "the Dhamma is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping."179 That is, just as it would be pointless to carry a raft on one's back after one has reached the far bank, so too it would be pointless to hold on to the Buddha's teachings after one has reached the ultimate goal. Taken to its furthest point, this metaphor

latviit priimiif/ya1[l praiamo riigiidiprahiif/a1[l / aniitmiidisiimiinyiikiirCfla vastu grhitvii bhiivayatii1[l bhiivaniini!pattiiv aniitmiidisvalak!af/apratyakfikiiref/a riigiidiprahiif/ii!l. Note the crucial difference between the ways Sakyabuddhi and Karl).akagomin interpret the results of the meditation. 177 PVSV ad PV I.98-99ab (G:5I.3-7): sarve!ii1[l viplave 'pi pramiif/atadiibhiisavyavasthii ii iifrayapariiv.rtter arthakriyiiyogyiibhimatasa1[lviidaniit / mithyiitve 'pi praiamiinukiilatviin miitrsa1[ljfiiidivat. Note that it is Sakyabuddbi «II5bo2)=K(2II.35» who maintains that the meditation upon beings as one's mother is for the purpose of eliminating desire. 178 See Sakyabuddbi's gloss (PVT:II5arff): gnas pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes paz 'khrul pa1 sa bon can no / gnas gyur pa ni sgrib pa dang bral ba'o [= K:2lI.8ff: iifrayo bhriintibijam iilayavijfiiinan tasya pariiv.rttir iivaraf/avigamarl.

179 Majjhimanikiiya 22. See the fine translation in NiiJ?amoli and Bodbi.

IN STilUMENTALlTY: JUSTifYIN G TH E SO UilC ES O f KNOWLEDGE

J IS

sUg&csts that. while the Buddha's leachings arc true to his followers, they :are not true to him. In this way, the met:l.phor appart:ndy pointS to the pragmatism of the Buddha', teachings: they are only to be :KUpted in rcb~ tion to a goal, :and oncc thaI go:aI has reached, the pragmatic truth of the teachings mould be abandoned, since they wac only (0 be considered true for the purposes of reaching that go:aI. This appeal 10 pr2gl'1t:l.tism, h~r, is in some Wll)'S mi5lc:1ding, especially when we consider Dharmaldni', notion of·conventional- (Ul",lIJilvahirilu.} :and · ultimale" {pirllmtinhiluj instruments ofknowtcdge, Dharmwrti', notion of convenlional and uhimale inllrumena of knowledge: falls within dtc EpiStemic Idc:alisl CriliqUC of pel<xption. AI mal level of analysis, not only inferencc, but also percqnion is distorted. or en oncous (bhr4Ifu) bcoUK perception involves an · internal distortion" (IInlllfllJHIpiaWl), This distortion. a form of ignorance. ntakes the cognitive image: in perception seem as if the objects of pcrcepcion :are external, evc:n though, according (Q Epistcmic Idealism, no such objccts exiSt ouuide Ihe mind. On :an tvcn stronger rtlding. the distortion :abo causes the ·varie~ ga.tKm'" (citrlltJi} of the object, such that it appears 10 have various attributes (Iuch H colnrs) :and dimen.!:inn~ (~ uda :Ill heighT :a nd widrh). Whether u nd.erllrnod in io Sirong or weal.: form , rhe error is nonconccpn.:al: rhe cognitive: im. iudf is distorted.'- If, hOWC'V(:t, evc:n perception is somc:how distorted, what distinguishes a rdiable or trustwOrthy cognition from one thai is nol? If all our ordinary cognitions are distonoed such that none actually !dim or rt:presttlt things the Wlly!hey uoly:uc, then would not all cognitions become equally unreliable~ In his PWM!"'w"ikitp, Dnarmakirti OOlUidel'f. (hi.!: U:IUe-: (OI - [Sinct they do nOI exist cxterna.llyJ all cognitioru' objeru are refuted. If thai is Ihe case. Ihen since there is no difference between cognitions in that all their (seeming) objeru are dis· toned.. how do you say that one cognition is confused while :ano.her ic oth e,....;~ (i.e .. i. is inJfMJmenr:aJp-

Sinct some cognition! have the fault of lacking a consisteD( imprinl for distortion (vipialJll), even the unskiUed say that some

180 5«

me, diJcv.ssion of ~uaI fttOf i~ dupen 1 (a

181 Mr .nd1n5 ullhlo ~ it inflllaKCd 1u..1~.

br

).

O harm«>n....d>aoty whok...toow para mwualy rrinfon:ceado..don.

*"

dot III..."duaion.

CONCLUSION

J"

judgment about that a5p«t of the object in question which has the expcaed tdic efficacy rabhimilurth.Itri]t1). In the cut of SOtnt ~r~tions . instrumentality may depend on a subsequent irutrumental cognition. For eumpic, when I see a bright color on the othtt sidt of the fidd, 1 may think that 1am seeing a fire, but that ~rcrpt:ion's lack of acuity will r~uirt that I 1M some other instrumental cognition to come to a dtfinirivc determil12Uon (nika;lll) conoernina this isslK': in such a cut, I will only know mat I am mng fire when, for example, I inkr its presence from mng the smoke ruing above that spot. The instrutntntality of this type of ~iCt:ption is considered lO be -o:mnsic- rpaTllt4f1). Undu other conditions, a ~rception produces such a determination direaly in the form of a correa ~lUprual judgment. A perception of this latter kind is considered to have -intrinsic insuumenrality" (SVtIIil/1 pribMlfYII). Sum pt:.ceptioru are instnuncntaJ only in that they direaly produce a definitive determination of (rhe capacity for) the expected tdic efficacy; hence, even though any such pe:rcrpt:ion is nCCt1suily MMDnaphull its iruuumentaJity rests on a correct amaphull cognition, namdy, the correct judgmenr (a definitive dtlerminalion or nilclIJ4) mal it immediatdy produces. Thai judgment, moreover, is correa in rMr if JlIII·Y'.,..crully ~ rn lm Im!iry fMr ruu the 6pc:crM. rdic dJic:aq. II ;1 in rd:nion especially 10 these bntt £lCl ccl"ions ,nd rhe judgmenrs [hey mUll produce mat Dharmakini's notion of I12turt (Wilbhlllll.) plays an a~ cialIy aucw role. The nOlion of nature ClplUre5 our attention when we note how the apoN-rheory accounts for a correa judgment'SsUCCC'Ssful reference 10 such an entity. Let us suppose lhal we h2ve a perception lha, immediately inGlIcu the judgment. -nil i. :I. w::I.tCf'_jllg. • R.eetlling our dU.curllon of me apoh.theory, we know that this determination cannot refer by way of its rdation to some real universals because Dlwmaldrti denies the ultimate eristencc of universab. Instead. Dtwmakini musl aca)unt for reference simply on the basis of particulars alone. He does so by appealing to the norian that each entity that ~ call a &water-jug" is the same as every other emiry wr -e call :I. w:ltcr_j ug in wr all those enrities I"ve the J:lI1l.e eff'ea.

One may thus differentiare them from other entilies thar do not have the dfttr in qucstion. Hence, even though every Imtity is entirely unique, one effectively ignores the uniqueness of "water-jugs" in reluKm ( 0 each orner and focuses on their distinction from tho« entities that do nOt have the effect in qucstion. One thus construcu a universal that, in the final analy.~. eGmin. o f th~ cxdwion of ~ entities that do not lu._ the (:;1.1.1.01 chatacteristia expected of what we aU II &water-jug."

FOU NDATIO NS O F OHAIMAKJRTrs PHI LOSOPHY

}1l.

Discussing the llpoh11-rheory, we nored me difficulty Dhannaldni faces in justifying tht: daim m:1II all the entities in question have mc same effect. ParadigmaticaUy. he appeals [0 the ~enes.s of the pclCCptw.1 image cawed by each particular -..tcr-jug. Thus, all "Woltcr-jugs" are: the: samc in that the:y a1l have: the same effect: mey produce the same image. Peruprual images. however. arc meow particulan. and Dharmwrti snictly mainrains that all panicu1an arc unique. How, then. can he claim that all those mental inugcs arc the same? It would Sttm that, JUSt as all the paniculars that we call "-..ter-jup" arc in fact diffen!m from each other, all me images produced by those entities should 1iJcrwis,c be unique. Dharmakini responds once again by appcaling to sameness of cf&ct. That is. ~n though all the emitia that we call "water-jugs" arc actually diff'en!nt from each other. we call them the same in that, with other conditions in place, they produce the same effect, which is a pcrctptual im• . Likewise, ~n though the pficcptual images produced by those cnciries arc acrually diffcrcm from each other. we may consider those images to be the same because. with other conditions in placc, they tOO produce the same effect. But what is this same effect all the images produce? It is a $eCOnd-ordC"r determination mat coruuues the entiry thar produced me imagt to be the samc as the other entities in question. Thus. all "'water·jugs: although actually unique. may be considered the same in that they have the same effect: a certain kind of perceptual im.; and all those imago:. alrhough acrually unique. rm.y be considered the same in that they all have the same effect: a certain kind of sccond-order determination. In our ~ier discussion of this appcal to a sccond-order dcrermination, I nOted that Dhannakjni's initial problem was an infinite regress: at each level, the: conceptually connructcd RmeOC$ll or a set or entities is warranted by the acrw.1 sameness or their effect. but those first-order elftct:s arc the same only inasmuch as wir effectS are also the same. Hence. in order 10 avoid this infinite rcgrca. Dharmwrri docs not argue that the aforemen. ttoned SttOnd-ordcr determinations arc the same because they all have the same effect. Instead. he :asserts that those determinations simply prescnt themselves in such a -..y due they sc:cm to be the same. But why do those: dC1:erminaoons.seem [Q be the same? The answer is suaiglufu rward: because: it is the natun! of their causes the perccptual irnap-to produce dcrermina,ions that seem the same. And why do me pero:prual images have that natun!? Because it is the nature of their causes-the perceptual objects in '1..~r;.,n--(I) rroduCJe ;m2~.,f rhar kind. F..-plainM in rhil way. Ohar_ malcini's theory roou ,he conccprually construaed sameness ,hat accounu

,ha,

CONCLUSION

for a correct judgment's reference in the nomological natures of causally efficient things. Returning now to the intrinsic instrumentality of habituated perceptions, we see that the notion of nature plays a critical role in Dharmakirti's theory. Such a perception is considered to be instrumental because it immediately produces a correct judgment concerning the relevant causal capacities of the object in question. And the correctness of that judgment is warranted by the very nature of the object itself. Read in this fashion, Dharmakirti's thought appears to be a fairly straightforward brand of realism, in combination with a nominalist stance toward universals. In the context of instrumentality, his thought appears to rest on a kind of internalist foundationalism, where knowledge is ultimately rooted in the indubitability of habituated perceptions. We come to such a conclusion, however, only if we ignore other contexts in which the notion of nature appears. In our analysis of svabhavapratibandha, for example, we saw that, for Dharmakirti, an entity's "nature" must be a conceptual construction that represents the totality of that entity's causal characteristics. While that construction is restricted by the causal functionality of the particulars involved, it is nevertheless mind-dependent, in that factors such as interest, acuity and habituation always playa role in the formation of concepts according to Dharmakirti's apoha-theory.2 Another way to express this point is to note that, if two persons are observing the same perceptual object, the images produced in the minds of those persons are unique particulars. As particulars, those images differ, and whatever might be the causal variations in the non-mental factors, the differences in the minds involved will make those images different. Hence, the "nature" of the object in question is in significant ways reflective of the mind in which that object is being perceived. 3 This dependence on the particular state of a being's mind might lead us to think even more strongly

2 See the discussion in chapter 3 (I84£). 3 Note that, on DharmakIrti's view, the particular conditions in the production of an effect will slightly alter that effect such that it may have a distinctive quality; hence, even if it may be counted as the same as other effects in a general sense, its particularity will distinguish it even from those other effects. This basic point is made in PVI.2I: "It is seen that substances have different kinds of capacities due to the differences in conditions, such as location. Because one has observed such a special capacity in a thing in one place, it is not correct that one is certain of the existence of that special quality in the same kind of thing in another place" [defadibhedad drfyante bhinna dravye!u faktayap I tatraikadntya nanyatra yuktas tadbhavanifcayap}.

}l.4

FOU NDAT IO NS O F DHAlMAK IATI 'S PHILOSO PHY

Ihal Dharmaldni is rc:soning 10 an inlernalisr found.arionalism rooted in irrerngable and prival~ se:nse: ciao, blU in fia, Dh:annakini clearly rejects the ultimai(' rdiabiliry of such data, The previow chapter ended with a reference ro Dharmaldni's norion of an "inranal diston ion," which applies only at the level ofEpine:mie Idealism, Through that diHonion, all the pe:rce:ptions of ordinary persons are conraminaled by ignorance. That distortion, moreover, operates in a manner analogous [0 orner casc:s of nonronttptual error, as in the tnmpl~ of the bent nick: when one visually examines a Slick that is panially submerged in water, one will ha~ Ihe visual impreuion thai the nick is bent, and any straightforward phenomenal accounl of one', peiCeption would have to include a tqX>n such as, -rru.t nide is bem." Thil tnmple demonStratcs thar, given the eircunutanccs (angle of vision, a panieular kind of visual faculty, and 50 on), the error will remain irremediable:; the cognitive image in the peiccption is one in which the nick will always: look bent, and an image produced unde:t thOiC circunutanCCS can ncver be phenomenally "straightened OUt" as il wcre.· Along these: same lines, Dharmaldni's Episternie Idealism maintains that the "internal distonion" applics to aU perceptions of all ordinary persons: all cognitive images involving me fiye sc:nse: faculties will always include an irremediable diS(onion whettby the perceprual object would appear to aisl ouuide: of mind. And JUSt as the nick is nOI actually bem, 50 [00 the object is nOI acrually extra-mental. Thus, in a significanl way. the sense data of aU ordinary persons arc fimdamenally flawed, and with rqard to at least 50me ontological issues, sense data therefore cannot be the foundation for one', knowledge. Our discussion of ulrimatc and conventional knowlccigc, howa>e(, indicated that Dhannaklrri docs not just dismiss Ihe peiCeptions of ordinary persons. despite me dislonion inhcmlt in them. Instead, he considm them to be ~convemional innrumenu ofknowiedgc" that we may we for vari ous purposes, including our progres5 IOward spiritual emancipatio n. Hence, even rnough the mind-dC?=ndency of a perceprual object's nalUfe in part means that an ordinary person's pcrttption of it will be: distoned, that dinonion docs nOI entirely vitiate the perception. We can understand this poim by rc:calling dlllt the imrinsie instrumentality of a percq)[ion depends on that perception's abiliry ro immediately produce a correct judg. m~nt of wm~ asP«' of the perceptual object that is relevant to the purpose

CONCLUSION

J"

hand. BUI 10 be insnumenw in mis fashion, the perttpdon need nOI produa ;I correct judgmenl aboul twry asp«!: of:lll objro:. Hena. my paotprion of a patch ofbluc: may lad directly ro lhe determirnuion, lnat is blue. - And if that judgment is rebant ro my purpose, then that peraption is intrinsically irutrumenw, Suppose, however, that I am concerned with me question of whether ,hal pen::cplual objro: endures for more than one iruwu. In my current scue. my perceptual d:atll. alone will not enable me (0 directly determine. -'T'hal is momentary-; hence, dUI perception is ".1 instrumental in rq:ud ro mome:ntarine:u. Likewise, if my purpose: rtquircs that I know whether that perctptual object is in faa extramental. then my perception wiU again not be instrumental, sina it is con· taminated by the: internal distortion that makes all of my sensory obje:cu srem extemal. Despite such dinon;olU and inadequacies. :lIl ordinary penon 's pttce:ptwIU have whal we mighl call a -quotidian instrumentality-; that is, they ;Itt insuummtal about numerous ordinary iuue:s. Indeed, most of our quotMiian conarns (Is mil teacup hOf: ~ Is this w:&ter cold?) are matters aboul which OUI pen:qKioru::lIe irutrument.al, despite:lllY internal distortion:llld ",her $1Id.. probll!mc. 111;$ 'l'U)fidi:ln in$f",menl'2liry i$ OO!rT:I. inly (':I" of wM.t Dhumakirti moIU when he tpeW of such perceptions :u rtJnvnlhOM/ in5trumenu of knowledge. Moreover, Ihe Sanskrit term 1I11!'1IJll1l4hlrill., the ·conventional,· suggesu that a perception iJ conventionally ac::c.epa.ble in thai it somehow cohercs with the distoned li~rld of ordinary beinp.' One pbyfu1 metaphor that applies in this amtext is the coherenl (if limited) conversation that two drunbrds may have about the (W() moon. dUl both 1ft. Both beine; eqiWly soused. dtey both see [WI) moon • . and they can each remm to the omer about mis remarkable even[. O r perhaps even more i propos is the example of the -pus-rive:rs" seen by IfthlS r hungry ghosuj . ThaI is, when humans and 1ft" gue at the ume Aowing substaoa:. humans see :II river of w:&ler, but 1ft" see a river of pw. The f.&a mal their perc:eptiOIlS cohe~ diffcrencly-humans aglU that it is w.uer, hungry ghom:agree th:u i, is pUlo--is a ray.h of the karma ,hal h:u shaped the likworld that they inhabit. From the perspective ofhumaru. the hungry ghostS' perttptwllS att dUlorted. :lIld from me point of view of :II hungry ghOSt. the humans see it wrong, Nevenhdess, the humans aglU ;II

~

I :un thinkinB "f'";,uy 01 thr.."y in wt.ido U{N'pd,,"u.. impl>er, U\lIUKIionaJ or ItllUlah", ou!l'1tNc furmt dv conl",,1 01000:" pr.ctial aaionIloward. pi. 5C't lbr p~ riow chapin. Il. st.

326


among themselves that what they are seeing is water, just as the hungry ghosts agree that they are seeing pus. 6 This cosmological example is useful for understanding Dharmakirti's notion of conventional perception. That is, even though the lifeworld experienced by ordinary persons is contaminated by the internal distortion and other such problems, they can usually agree on what they are seeing. In other words, their perceptions cohere in regard to most daily issues.? We might think, then, that we have returned to some admixture of internalist foundationalism, confirmed by an appeal to coherence. The ultimate arbiter of a habituated perception's intrinsic instrumentality amounts to the fact that our perceptual content appears a certain way to us, and in this sense the theory resembles an internalist foundationalism. But when we examine our perceptual process rationally, we uncover certain contradictions that point to fundamental distortions (such as the internal error) in that process. Concerned that our sense data may therefore be somehow compromised, we confirm our interpretations of our perceptions by appealing to what others report, and we find that everyone from whom we can receive a verifiable report is in agreement, at least to a degree that

6 Along the lines of Asa.ti.ga' s Mahiiyiinasal?lgraha (I5b-I6b), this case is raised by Vasubandhu in his Virrtfatikii, a text that Dharmakirti probably considered important. Sakyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi refer quite clearly to the Vil?lsatikii (see the translation in Appendix 7, especially notes 14 and 18). The point of the example is that the same locus is seen by different communities of beings in divergent ways. Vinltadeva (I77a) limits his interpretation to different communities of hungry ghosts; this is less striking (and less well known) than the notion that beings in entirely different karmic states are having radically different experiences of the same spatiotemporallocus. In Dharmakirti's time, Candrakirti refers to such a case (Madhyamakiivatiira 6.71), but a particularly clear account is offered much later by Asvabhava in his commentary (82b-83a) on a verse from Kampala's Alokamiilii: Due to the variety in their karma, when pretas look at one river, it is filled with pus, and it likewise has the scum of urine and excrement; that is, it has a scum that is a mixture of feces and urine. But when humans look at that same river, they see it as clean; and they drink it. ['las sna tsogs pas chu bo gcig fa yang rnag tu 'brub cing de bzhin du

bshang gcin rnyog pa dang /dan na / phyis dang gcin 'dres pa'i rnyog pa dang !dan par yi dags kyis mthong ngo / de bzhin du chu bo de nyid fa mi yis chu bo dri ma medpar mthong ba dang ni 'thung ba yang yin no I] 7 I will not discuss here the mechanisms of that coherence, but in addition to an obvious appeal to karma, Dharmakirti's theory also likely rests on some notion of intersubjectivity as briefly described by Vasubandhu (Vil?lsatikii I8ab and Vrtti): "Cognitive representations are mutually restricted due to mutual influence. That is, due to the mutual influence of their cognitive representations, all beings' cognitive representations mutually restrict each other, as is appropriate" [anyonyiidhipatitvena vijfiaptiniyamo mitha~ /r8ab/ sarve!iil?l hi sattviiniim any-

onyavijfiaptyiidhipatyena mitho vijfiiipter niyamo bhavati yathayogam}

CONCLUSION

~enables us to engage in practical actions about subjectively obvious sense

t~bjects, such as a glass of water. It would seem this confirmation need be terformed only b~ those who h~ve uncovered the rational inconsis~encies ~n our understandmg of perceptIOn, and once we know that those mconlistencies are irrelevant to our quotidian concerns, we can bracket out the Ja,istortion revealed by our rational analysis and rely on our habituated sense l~pressions-the ones that do not involve any doubt-to pursue our quolidian goals. Metaphorically, we might say that we are all wearing defective .lasses of a certain type. We find that the defects are irrelevant for quotidmatters, and since everyone is wearing the glasses, no one offers a diverlent report on obvious perceptual objects. Thus, even though we know ~at the glasses are somehow distorting our perceptions, we need not be ~ncerned with those distortions because they affect neither our daily goals lbr our known communications to other perceivers. We can thus rely on Ihose habituated perceptions at face value, at least for the purpose of daily

!lin

~~> ~atters.

Dharmakirti's notion of conventional instruments of knowledge sugIgests an account along these lines, but we need to add an important stipu0~tion: namely, that on Dharmakirti's view, we are all deeply dissatisfied :·th those daily lives. Thus, even though our perceptions are adequate to .jmd consistent with) the way we lead our lives, we would prefer that our :. ::~es were otherwise. In short, Dharmakirti's theory assumes that we seek :~ escape the lifeworld in which our perceptions are embedded. The possi~~Wity of escape is indicated by the very conventionality of perception itself: ':,though our perceptions are coherent in relation to that lifeworld, they I. in fact erroneous from an ontological perspective. It is thus not contra.t·ctory for hungry ghosts to see pus in one locus, while humans see water .' ~,. the very same locus. A contradiction is avoided because these perceptions ;o. not fully correspond to ontological realities, and to the extent that they " er, they are located within different conventions which are sustained by l~e beings within each world. Hence, inasmuch as some aspects of our pertption~ are err~neous, the ~y we perceive the :world does not r~flect an pntologlCal realIty. In part thIS means that, even If we feel and belIeve that ~'~r perceptions correspond to the way things really are, the lifeworld with .l.·•hi ..·•.. ch those perceptions cohere is not ontologically given. Leaving that life'prld behind therefore does not require some kind of radical ontological Jrakeover-a task that would seem impossible, given Dharmakirti's notion ';,causality. Instead, escaping that world is a matter of eliminating the per~,~Ptual errors that sustain it.

~

I

i ifI"

r ~!',

¥

j,

328


For Dharmakirti, it would seem that this elimination of error proceeds through a gradual process of refinement. Speculatively, we might say that the goal is to alter the dispositions that, from the perceiver's side, contribute to the construction of a perceptual object's nature. In other words, the transition from one lifeworld to a more refined one is facilitated by coming to see the world in a certain way, which in effect means learning to construct natures in a particular fashion. The construction of nature; however, is not a matter of manipulating sense data after they are in place; rather, it is creating a mental context in which sense data will appear a certain way, within the constraints posed by the causal characteristics of the objects in question. For Dharmakirti's purposes, perhaps the most effective way of shaping the mind in this fashion is reasoning. Consider, for example, the reasoning that leads one to understand that a seemingly perdurant entity-such as a water-jug-is in a constant state of instantaneous flux. Through the careful application of that reasoning and subsequent contemplation of the conclusions that one reaches, one eventually begins to see such entities as momentary. In other words, one starts with an unhabituated perception: the water-jug just looks utterly perdurant, and this perception is therefore not instrumental in regard to the water-jug's momentariness; indeed, the notion that it is momentary may seem so counterintuitive that it is at the very edge of what we can plausibly entertain. Applying, however, the appropriate inferential reasoning to that perception, one realizes that the water-jug is indeed momentary. Eventually, by using reasoning and contemplation to habituate the mind to the momentariness of such objects, one no longer needs to rely on an inference: the object now appears momentary when one gazes upon it; that is, one may immediately determine that it is momentary without appealing to any intervening inference. Gaining this insight, one has effectively left behind one faulty lifeworld-in which beings see and react to such objects as if they were perdurant-and moved on to a more refined one, in which at least that one error has been eliminated. 8

8 I am alluding again to the verse cited earlier from Santideva (BCA 9:3-4ab): "In this regard, it is observed that there are two kinds of persons, the spiritual adept (yogin) and the ordinary person. Among these, the ordinary person is refuted by the adept. And adepts are refuted by successively more advanced yogins through a distinctive quality of their understanding" [tatra

loko dvidha dmo yogi prak.rtakas tatha I tatra prakrtako loko yogilokena badhyate II badhyante dhivife!era yogino 'py uttarottarai{ll}. Prajiiakaramati provides the gloss of loka as "person(s)" (jana), but it is tempting here to translate it as a "lifeworld."

CONCLUSION

'"

If lOme such modd underlies Dharmakini', notion of rdinement. then reasoning p\;ays a crucial rok in the trmsition from an etTOntow lifcworld 10 a more rdined one. NcvcnhelCQ, tcaIOning is dearly not sufficient in irsdf: it mUSt be guided by certain interesu and questions, without which one could not conslrue an object's nature in the required fashion.' That is, 10 begin an inquiry into the ICCming pcrd urance of entities, one must be motiv:ued by some desire ro know (jij/ils;J) directed toward some p~ {JmtJojIlNlJ. Here, one central purpose is to eliminate the suffering associated with loss: when my favorite water-jug brcab, I am disturbed: as my body deays and dies, I fttl unhappy. But to:addm.s the problem oHm, I must ac:ccp1lhat I am suffering in that way. Liitcwise, I must believe thaI it is possible to eliminate thaI sufferi ng, and I musl agree that rational inquiry into my belief in pcrdurancc is It least pan: of the mcaru to do so. Numetow other Buddhist claims soon become crucial : contemplation enables reasoning to refine me mind: mora.! rectitude is a prerequisite for effective contemplation; a morality rooted in compassio n is the most eff«tive COnla 1 for such praaices. Dharmakini would surel y maintain that , without these and numerous other conditions, refi nement through rcaIOning cannot ~ begin. In shon. the procr:u of rdiOC'ml':flf reql1i r~ nor jwr Buddhist rc2JOning. hur a Buddhist w.ay of lik Oharmmrri's recommendarion that we refine: O UrsdVCli through rcaIOning and conte:mplation can thus be read as an indirect argument for the importance of Buddhist institutions. To PUt it baJdly, in order to become more refined one must learn to seC' me: world like a Buddhist. And $«ing the world in mat fashion requires me pcrvuive conta l provided by the Buddhi.u community. In other words, 10 see the wo rld :as a Budd.hUr, one must aJlow Buddhist irutitutiollJ [ 0 mold one accordingly. And we can thus swpcct that, wnatCVCf cbc they may do, Dharmakini's atgUmenlS arise from-and scrve to defend-thosc institutions, NcvenhelCQ, s.ctting aside our suspicion, we can draw orner lcuollJ from Dharmmn:i'l notion of refinement: to be rdined, one mUSt acknowledge the contingency of one's lifeworld. including iu institution•. Rcfinemenl also requires mat one accepl me possibiliry mal orner equally contingent lifcworids and inn.itu-

wa1 cognition they appear as if nondifl'(~nt in that they appeu in SOIn( single form . Th(»(: dtingJ Olppe;u m:,u Wily in (h;;J' mldr diflerc:nti.nion

is obscurtd by VI obscur.ui~ cognition which obscures' the form of something else [-i.e., those distinct real things-J with its own form [i.c .• the fo rm o f a lingle image!. Th.:1.1 obscurative

cognition, although based on tho~ diff"crent mal things, has the cognitive appearance of a single obj«t. WVI.68-691 Due to the intention of that cognition, a universal is commonly said [0 aUt. BUI it docs nOI ultim:ndy exist in the way that it is conccptualit.ed by thai cognition. [PVl.]o] A conccptw.l awafcnm ari~ in dependence on things which arc aduded from what is other than those [that have the samcca~o r dttctl. In conformiry with the nature (prtUrrriJof its imprints, that awareness conaals the distinct fOrm of each of most things. and ascribes (0 them its own nondiffi::rent appearance. Doing so, thaI conceptual awareness conRares those things and presents them as nondiff"crent. Those things conceptual. Iud as nondiff'emlt arc adudcd frem othen in that thq< have the same effc.ca and causes; there is abo a cognitive imprint (1!dJ4/J1l) that induces one to conccptualiu those things in that fashion. The nature (prak[ti) of those distinct things themselves and the nature of that imprint are such that the cognition that arises from those things and that imprint appcan in this way li.e.• such that those things seem nondifferem J. That awareness is obscurative (u'!'''!ri),.J that is, it obscures the form of something d se (i.e., those distinct thinp ] with irs own form. In other words, th:tt cognition obscures

I Ncxt!hat ~ Sushil J)'fltaaical muaurc 01' theM: approximated in ~.

¥n1CI (PVt.~)

cannot

~

be

2 p~ 'lOa Iw bc-cn chanpllO active ~ fo. $yntlCtic .implicit)'. 3'l'De lam ,.".",ri UlcnlIr conveys dw IoetU< o( "w ub.o:uri"," or "me, action 01' obKu,· in,,· Hmec. the cosnirion is Utcnlly"an acrion oI'obKurin,,' Thil Iw bttn rmdcm:l with "obicunti",,· to.void unN ...,. qnta«icromplait)'.

JJ9

HO

FOUNDATIONS OF O HAIMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOS O PHY

the difference among those: things; even though they arc themselves differem , they appc=ar nondiffemlt in that they appear with some single form, In conformi ty with those things. appeanncc. we c:a.IJ Idle mentally con.structed image) the ~ univas:al~ of those mentally occurrent real things, which appear [Q be atcmal' due [Q being apprehended in ,he form of a specific kind of

.. .

cogn U iVC 1m•

•

- But how is it that a universal is an other-uclwio n?~ That lconcqxually oonsuuCled i~1 is itsdf an other..er;dwion.1 ConcrptuaI awareness apprehends that. and since conttpu are by nature erroneow, the aw.neness appart as ifi, ~re apprehending a raJ thing. That conceptual cognition occun only with regard [Q things that are excluded from othen Imat do not have the same ClUSC5 or effects) ; as such, that awareness is undernood to have an adusion as iu obiea.' "But the distinct things in quc:stion are a ternal. and concepu do not

.. Sikpbuddhi (PVf:I,.t.1lf. K:1".6A): MnoWiy __" " " " . j r1N"" mea", dK ioIlowin& H.";ns flct dw:n:: arixs in one', car_ pOf apfIQl in an lIeU wboK ob;m iI • uniYaul.

,-=

S ~i (PVT:I/'b" K:169-170) p~ Ihil KCUon wi.h.n oo;caion: "If.he uni~ich pma;", only 10 mmtaUy OCCVITmI muria Il.~. irnacalil , form (~pramtrd bycvn«JXt.W coplion, tMn how an wun~ ~an Ot~""""~ Yo.. have.u dw: D.d ....... 01 putiaalan "-a dw:U ~ ia .... u~ dw io of .... lWUre of panX:wus. ThaI ~ i~ of ~nc of _ menIal form,)'OO p'(.iowIy aid dUI tIIc.oamcncu ('Jr.,., tt]iI- llwoI..rl)of indi¥idualo I~". thoK ailed 'bI1H'1 !hal ha~ Ixm adu&d from thoeK {i.It.. tho« noc aIkd 'bllH'l iI rMt IIOII-rd.nion with thoeK CKher _ (i.It., lhe non ·bI~ indi¥id.....Js):

me...:

me...:

6 PVT (17b6 - K:' 70.6) The author ...y.. T1Nu •.•• Thai ~na INI Iw been pbud In concqxw.I ~

_ iI iMif the other-eul1Uion ~ it Iw come aboul throup. tbcapttima: of a n::aI thine (...,.,.. K: ,_.JtolMJth. ioaparaf( from odw:r minp. T1u1 io the d.ift'tt (J,.".III) obj«c of apt ;fK\l."T"Iw; non-c.onn«:tion lof any pva! PI"iculu with aU odIm] iI the Nmibrity (arnonsputiculan] in the "'''"''' mac il il lthcob;a:t ofClptoJions only) mruophorically, [When OIw-JnUi"i JaY' thil.J be: iI ~U",!hal individ.w. ftul" • IR; similar for jUl{ Ihillta50ll only,

.,..wJ

$+', dwdclhl·, in •• .,...... ;.,." ;. • cleu f"o.....,.,.... ro d..o ......,..;. of ,,~oll'e...! by ~~ ITS'")O..... OOS) and ICamaIaliI.a rrs p.J ri~).

APPEND IX OF TRANSLATIONS

,..

refer [dirttdy[ to aternal things. So howcan one luve a conceptual awarenw with ~ to them?" Those who att analyzing universals distinguish [the concqxuaUy consuuettG im~ from the objectl. but people enrged in practical action ("",v.hanr}do not. Thinking mat their percqn is capable of ,die function. those engaged in practical action unilY the visible object with the concepruaI obj«t. and havine doM so. they act. It u in terms of the intention of perlOllS c:npged in practical action mat the rdatioruhip between univasals and paniculan is explained in this way-i.e.• such th.u particulars: which. by vinuc of producing the (desiredl dftct. arc different from those: that do not produce mat dfea. are made known as such by an expression [whose direct object is necessarily a univmalJ. But those who ponder rd.ity do not consider the univcnal and the panicular to be nondifkrent because parDcu1ars luve distinct cognitive images lin perceptual awarcnwl and so on.' MBut if your Slllrement that m napa occur with regard to particulan conforms to the intention of the person knowing them, then the universal should flO( be an other-oclusion becawc it is not known in dut way by th05C persons." Not only is it nOI \mown in th,:1.1 w.Jy. hur it i~ :ilL., nm known :H l'ithl'f rhl' urne u or different !Tom iu insflInoes, Of u pnnu.nO\{. all pervuive. and SO on. Rather. awareness arises with JUSt a nondifTerent image. What is the basis for mat awarcncu~ We u.y dul ia basis iJ oml'f-oclusion, and we uy this because: (I] dult ocher-oc1wion does exist in rd. things: [11 thcrt it no contrad~ion lin claiming dut other-o.clusion is the basi.s for such cognitions] : and 131 practical action that is based on language is ~ (0 proo::ud in ,hu tn2n~_ Moreover, mere is no rd. univcn:al wha~cr that exisa in the way thai a conceptual or linguistic cognition appean, since the individuals (lIJiIktil thl'nuclves do not occur in many things; and nothing l'!5e thaI occurs in many things appcan. [PVI .71ab] 7 The objeaor'. paim ~ is !hal. on Dtwnukin i'IIh«wr. (OI>Olptl dilUdy rmr only 10 • c:onaptuaIIy CUI'UtJUCIcd ~ Hcnu. bowc:anOM aaouI\l eo. rdltl'Ula 10Klual. atft'naI thinp! 8 A«.ording 10 ~ (PVT:aIl1 - K:171.19ff). · and to on" indicaus

lWeI oeM rnIxaIU( _pea do 1\0( _10 aiIl.mm WKm: noobto..bk [pm'iaIbn) and bea..... lpanic:ulanl 11m: ,riM;: funaion. but loou"pul do noc:

JOnI: •• ••

9 ~hi (PVT:I~ • 1enI, the. rerminoIov ofNaiyiyib and VIi ' I·u authon. (_t.~rJ!,i).

10 NOIc ltoe M.tU ;. uxd as a CGUlu·noun r doonalhill,") ramn dw! an ab.:raa noun r diffttcntt"). 1M pain! here ;. mal I hypoatasiud uni¥CfAI ;. only poaibk if lheft arc inJu_ in ..... ich il is ilUruuiau~d. No~ lhal in Ibis Imfma:, !he pmn ,.,. (~lW) only adds nnphuU. and it Iw IlOI bftn diRCtly lrarubrtd. II '" Sakyabuddhi mUa deu (pVf:19b4If- 1(;17).ull). the noOon Iwrc;. dw in I «In • .,...,.ual ... li......iuic cop;lion. indmduaklNI pnMrM'" il'UWltial~ a ccruin uniwrul an: contmICd in ro:rmf 01 mal uniwnal For ~, aD indiYiduaiJ dw in.tanlia~ "wall:r-jUl_" an:appt~!daI:u · wam.jup" by~irt\IC of~ POQ(DCIC of"mal UlIi¥a$l.l in cad! indi.......w. 1M upunml ~ ;. lhal 10 do 10, W univuul mUlt aaually Ippear in _·1

....'-

12 Stt PVSV tlliPVI--40'-41 (G:l1..ffl. I) An ·drax..JUbKana:"

(i~",c)

.11IIb.cana Wtl'Clll!tI from

om.c. ...' - - .. ~1'01 )db IM",.-CO (,0., -

me «Injunction of

1l~ ~nd cn--l"I'!r~n ri~ l ;ry ~n rhough th~ obj«t of mesc c;onve:ntions is faiS('. Funhermore, all of these and other such convenlions are erfOncoUl (IIipIA",,) in thaI mey are con.ruucred through the imprinu kft by aperi. cnCCl of particubrs. Thus, conc:q»lual oognitiolU whose production is c;on· ncacd to those real things by way ofimprinu arc u usrwonhy with rcgard ro ~ real'h ing. ~ ,hough rht: re:al'hing in quarinn d~ nor "p('\"'Ir in those conceptual cognitiolU. An c:x:ample is mc erroneous cognition of a 17 ~ikyllNddhi (PVT:,..h " Kall) "'gpo mat DtwmUirti is apc:akins of an "up«t of oosnirion" rtiu~.

(_,.,,,.,,.im. _

18 S~buddhj bsa,Jif - K:th.IJ) (",.;,..ur~)

slOMa hJJhi"i.m~ as "Those ~&a of objeas

u.... ......... 0>0'" obuu. d .......,. P""io:uI.o.endent on that substance, then substance and universal, etc. would ~d in the relation of producer and produced. Hence, those two could not ,l!Jt'cur together [i.e., simultaneously], so one could not express both of them ;~~e;, whereby the substance is expressed as qualified by the qualifier that is ~X~'delimiting quality]. And if one [i.e., the substance] must be expressed ~~ough semantic implication (adhyahara) [by way of an expression that if~fers to a delimiting quality], then expressions do not have real things as ~lli~ir objects. 22 And if the expression for the substance has as its object a cog~itive appearance, then such should be the case for every expression. This ;iust be the case because, if the singular possessor of various delimiting ~::~ i!.talities is apprehended in that fashion [i.e., through conceptual imp uta':ign], then the delimiting qualities [which should be apprehended non;~~nceptually] would not appear in that cognition. 23 . The objector responds, "The delimiting quality and the substance that ",¥m', "In tiM: thUd cNpu [DharmakJnil wiDapUln dw "I>Tf in which just infinilaimal panides;an: dwobject of I't.cqxion wilMoIi thm: bcin& an)' pm-IX ,.......,. [,ordJ.I Mi"~",-". ";-"14"'~'" tIW pw~ ~

....N!. 12 K(17J.): ... ,"IW ",..

a. fMrj, 1Niytu.r.

r.1M IJ'riJw IK ",ad,: ft,j1i:M ~ ".~

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

359

In some cases, where some particulars have the same effect, in order to indicate that they have that effect, they are expressed by expressions such as "water-jug" through their difference from what is other than them; they .are so expressed provided that a suitable convention has been formed (krtasamaya). In the same way, in terms of having the same cause,one can express what is non-singular with a single expression in order to facilitate practical action. Examples are "Hereford," "Jersey cow," or "a sound arises immediately after effort," or "sound is causally produced." One can also express multiple things with a single expression as a negation of their ability to have the effect in question. Examples include: "sound is not visually perceptible"; or "impermanent"; or "essenceless {aniitma)." One can also use expressions in this fashion as negations of the notion that certain things have the cause in question. Instances include the expressions "unowned" (asviimikajI3 and "empty." One may also state other ways in which expressions are formed in accord with the theory presented above. In the case of expressions such as "empty" and "impermanent," expressions perform their semantic function (vyapadefa) by [first] inducing in cognition an image that is intended in accord with the interlocutor's concepts and then excluding that image. Expressions work this way because all the objects (artha) gf expressions have a distinctive aspect that is projected by cognitive intent. 14 13 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r64b2 ~ K:274.r3) remarks: Others assert that that which is controlled (adhiJthita) by an autonomous self is "owned," and such things are also asserted to be non-empty because they are controlled by that kind of controller (adhiJthiitr). The controller is what appropriates (svikararza) that which is controlled (adhiJthiitavya); otherwise, it could not be the controller. Therefore, others use words such as "owned" (sviimika) with respect to some self being a cause for such a relation. But there is no controller with an established essential nature who would control things that disintegrate instantaneously and exist in dependence upon a mere collocation [of conditions or parts]. There is no such controller in connection with which the mental conditions (sa1pSkiira) would occur. Therefore, "unowned" and "emptiness" are posited by refuting the existence of the aforementioned self acting as a warrant [for the designations "owner," etc.]. lor K(274.r4) iidhiJthiitii ciidhifphiitavyasvikiirarzam Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r64b3) reads bdag gi 'ryed pa nyid kyang bdag gir bya ba'i ryu yin gyi. The Tib. corresponds to iidhifphiitii ~dhiHhiitavyasya kararzam, but this reading seems problematic.

.4 Emend G(69.7) buddhisamihii sal!Jdarfita ... to: buddhisamihiisal!Jdarfitavibhiigatviit in .ecord with PVSV-D (299b6): sgra'i don thams cad ni blo'i rtogs pas bstanpa rnampar dbye 'a can nyid yin lJa'i phvir ro. Sakyabuddhi (Pvir65a ~ K:274) glosses buddhisamihii: buddhes samihii imam artham 'ropayiimiti sal!Jkalpab-"Cognitive intent is the intention, 'I will induce this object (artha) i~ that person's mind].'"

360


Poor thinkers'15 bombasts which raise problems such as the assertion that there is no [real] contrary (pratipakfa) for expressions such as "essenceless" should be ignored.

15 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r65a

=

K:275) mentions Uddyotakara as the object of this critique.

4. PVSVad PVI.214-223 -[Dignlga} said, "lbc: testimony of a credible person is th~ 50w ce for an inkrtflCe b«a~ it is generally UUSlWOnhy.'0 In this way. he said mat scripture is a source of in fcrcn rial knowledge. But how can this be dlC asc?"j JA penon cannot proc«d without rdying on tht inst~ntaliry of scripture because: [IJ he has ha rd mat, in the case of some activities whIlSt dfecu arc nOI peiccpliblc. engaging o r not engaging in ,hose activities will have some txU'C:mdy pr.U.s.:wonhy Of disastrous' resuhs; and I1J there is no obsetwd contndiction in that being the case. He would thus act. thinking "If this is to be done. it is best that it be done thus." It i5 through ana!~" ing it in this manner mat (DignlgaJ sDud the irutrumentality of scripture. In this regard. A stHemen! liul is a wonhy subject of aaminauon is one [hal is oohcrent (JilmbtuitihttJ, offen :ll suicablc rnrtbod, and eifel lOme I 5« PS 1.p. 2 Sikpbuddhi (PVf:1,fw" 1(;,,0) ~II

ilII

ob.i«for'$ pG'irion;

.,..nm1

'Iran apt , ' m is noc inununmw for kllo.Ie" of tal thmp. Wn wN.! about [dw IUlemctll mMk by Diplp; namdy. lhad i1w IUlanalU of. cmIibk ~ an: dw buU for • ordl-lOrmed in(crmtt: bcaUK me,. an: pually UW(WOrtby' I""~'!"~ ........~ 1 ThaI ...No:h ill a ,,1.d.cr. i. iI instlumerual with reprd 10 the ""'y in which I ptrIOIIlhouId pt'ClCX'ed. .. for G(lof) .~,. fad ..,,,.,. pt'c~,.bk

wim

~i (rVT:~)a) . whidl K'CIN . he much

readinl-

,6.

}61

FOUN DAT IOt<S O F DHAII.M AKllI.T r S PHILOSOPII Y

human aim. Other srarcmcnu are not wonhy subjccu of aamination. [rYI .u.tl Coherena' means that the statemenu coaJes« (upRSIl,!,hil'lI) on a single topic. md by doing so they are helpful fo r understanding that topic.I This is nOi the CU(' wilh sratemenu such as -ten ard.amom podt- md so on, which arc incohcKnt. Otherwise. the ineptitude of the author would ensuc. Abo, a person who seeks a rc:sull should not bother to aamine trtatises Ihat propose the attainment of results through impossible means; nor should he bother to a:unine trearisa thai discuss results that arc: not human goals. Examples of the fOrmer include the iruuuction that one usc the jewel raken from the cobr.a-hood of the Naga king T ~ as an ornamenl in order to counler.w:t poilOn, and an example of the laner is the anaJ)'Iis of Ihe number of teeth flut a crow tw. In conlrut 10 that kind oftre:uisc, one may examine a treatise that hI is coh~m , 11) proposes possible means, and discu.sses a human goal. This is Ihe kind of trtaciK llut is wonhy of cumination because it is unreasonable to concern onc:sclf with those other kinds of trtatUcs. If when invcstip ted the trc:l.tise in qucstion is nOi liable to being unuustwonhy (rfisA",v.iJAbhdl). thcn it is good to PUt it into practice. But what constiwu:s iu uUSIWOn:hineu?

u]

fa austwOnhincss coruisa of nol being contradiaed by pcn:eprual

awal"Ct1CU and two kinds of inferena' with regard to bOlh the obsnvabk (dr!.u ) and unobscTv.ablc {tId.'!!"J Ihings (arthc)thal arc: the objecu (6rr1M)of those in.srrumcnral cognitions.' [PYI .u sl Not being contradicted by pcrctption means rhu Ihose things Ihat arc: considered to be perceptible according to me UCl(isc acrual.Iy are perceptible:. Exampln include: the: color blue:, plc:asure and displeasure. the: recognition of a characte:ristic, mental St1ltCS such :l5 desire, and awareneu. Also, things fhlu are nOl considered 10 hc perttptible should not be perceptible':. Exarnplell include: th~ claim that on~ can ~rceivt: plc:asure: and so on as a

' Sikyabuddhi (PVT:14)a) IIiI1)'1 thai ",.».mwu chat lht IU1I~mmu "poinl OWl" (-1M ~- ~.rir fL U )

that IOPic.. KOOI) oIrm no r;ka

6 ~i (PVT:14)b . K:",) pnMdcI tIw

po.- tOr 1M IWU leNS oi...-m..

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLATI O NS

j.j

oonjunClion ofform panicks such as sound:' and the nQlion Ih.:u ruhsr:mce. morion, univers:W, CC)nmcl, and SO on ate real, perc;:qxible things.- Likev.rise, tho.sc objectS mat au oonsidered to ~ infer.lble wilhout relying o n scripture mo uld be IO-lhe Nobles' Four Trudu are an example. And IhO$(: things that are considered no t to ~ inferable mu.$( not be---aamples include the self, This is :also the case for inftrentt based on scripture.' For elCI.mple. hllving ~ccqnM mn rht: a"",nr;lIl nnll.t: (rii/"l) of nt:g:u;~ ml!'n _ tal states such as desire is dlihamut, and having accepted that the origin of tho.sc negative memal H2les is tUihArmA [in the sense: of .h!'l'ma], the suggestion th:at o ne perform :ablutions and fire sacrifitt in o rder [Q d imin:a!e IltiJu,I7ftIl is not sound advitt. The scripture's purity [i.e., in lack of contradictions] in regard to all those objecu which can be determined in the lIbov.. mllnnt:r conu;rurl!':l its lruH'W'Ortltinl!':ll. (Digniga] said m:at, since: the statements of a credible person :are gcncuJly trustwOrthy,'· a cognition from such statements o f

.,.._.

7 ~i (PVI':144h .

K:)9})

8 ~uddhi (rvr:~ -Vailqilw and.o on,"

_ K:J,,)

I>O'ICI du.llw: d\C'01)'aiticQ.cd httt i, from IMSirpkhya " :"IaIL. ,I"" , ,I..: .icw 1~j«'W h.;,C u .h., uf'M

9 ~i (PVT:l-fsal:

s,.

Ahu purifying ~ .,;riP'''''' by means of eM rwo kinds orinStnllnmtal lXW'ition dull proceed on tho: IIMii of rallhinp (. , . ftJis Un.zr,." _htIMI.J~. OIl( .hal poUu mat .,;ripa= to ~ ••ubjcn of prcdialion (dw ( lUI" "'--i,,);u a ifni· ria mat hat bem oncpnd at instrUmmw, Thaa, due to infming • CO!Iu.diaion bw¥ccn JOnlC carlH:r and lara- past'V', when one mpsa in an an.oIyoiII of lhc dif· fUel"'"' be:t.w, p'mgo" Ihc.,;ripru!31 infcn:ncr-lhc inl1:rmabucd on Kriplun-t-hoWd I\0Il be: conuadicrW. 'l"hU Q!he conlQI of.....tu.l follows. [.;'''PI,. ..... Itfo Un.fI ,. 'i aJ",J _ pJilltfo I.mt """,. fNU """.; k # tsi»i _ & 1m ,.

m.o.c

...,..,,.i"""

..... gi "'_ b9i m./¥tlnMm fMb&i.t ....... 1...,.,;,,; pi 1M 'in 116 1PlOf fI' """ ~,., ..."....". uk,. tU 'i """ I.", u 11M,." 'in JM . . . , . , , . ~ 1 (II", Itt u. ,. i '" ... ...,..,,. M U l"p,j , . trW,. dJn .".., ... 'i .u", ,... 11#". Kb,,) oII'ers _ ... ~. lcoo helpfUl commuoo:

0"4' migtu invaripte . Kripru..., d"" to a conlradiction between earlia and laler r-Ages conumi", tho: rwo kind. of obj«a mal U( pu"" (in th.t they '""' 1>0'1 comn· dieted by ~n:qxual aWU'UlClii or in~!ICU !wed 0)(1 raI thinp] and QUl!'md,. rrmoIeobjecu. In Uw cut.;~ MsH.,. tni".." ';"""'."1>0'1 contradict dw KripNrC" _upplkd by conU:::II. [fIi~ ~""7I ''''''''''I'''~ (.l.-~ ~,,;~ JWrIi.. rill~ '-1IfI~'; _ ill dp~"'''' """"'n.". qi 1.bUlv.w", itj ,P,.q,.", ".

10 1nc: compound

"11"" 'ua.".~1t]ii an be rad in one of rwo

w:t)'I.

1'he lmn

16.4

FOUNDATION S OF DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

those St:uem~Q ' objca is a weU·fonne:d inference of that obje:cr. ~en though the object is C:pistemic::ally remOle. The cognition is said 10 be: an infe:rence: because !here: is no other Wily 10 know th.:II objea. [PVl.1I6) These: kinds of stalemenu of a ere:dible pe:rson-thosc: [described by Dignigaj and thO$C [accordingly ddine:ate:d abovej-a.re: genera.lly (1Ilm4"l") (tusrwonhy. Hence:. nO!: ()bse:rving those st:atenlenu to be: m~ leading. one infers [be: £nUtwOnhinC:S1 of a cognition of those:. st:uements' object, ~en though it is not knowable by pe:lceplion and empiric::al inference. One infers that IUch a cognition is rfUSt'NOnhy b«:ause: it is based on

lhtbtJt' may to. inlcrprftCd in dw.a- 0I"..mmc:ss.."In thil caK. dw ~I would to. WI dK INRWOnhinat f..r-,.fl44) of a Cft'diblc: pnlO'I'$ IUlcmcnll aboul ~bIc: ohjecn is rIN 161M U W ~ncu of die. Jalnnenll with rq;ud to unob.nvabIc obj«lJ. In otbn _1'Ch. me KJ~tJ I n tnlItWOrthy ptcc$::ly boaUK!hey _ me RlIIIeIMIItJ or. cmiiblc: penon. Thil 1ppc:al1 10 to. tho: imnprnllion Wen by Slkyabuddhi (PVT. p:~"",.

K:m):

codibkpaMn·..p•...cl. io .... _ i.n l.. ~ (_ ...."" H • . Il~ Thai is.;ua u cmiiblc pmon', IpCUh illrusrwonhy wilh rtprd 10 UI objm thai can to. dncnnincd [throuF f'C1"p'ion at>d ordinary ;nkrmoe}. Iike... BoM' .........

me

witoe il i! mlK'II'Oftby wilh lepro to an extmndy rtmOIt abita at- pR'riJdy bceo'llC i l it: the ~ or I cmiibIc: penon. [.,..,,. UtI,.'i 1Ihit.,,; ...i lift..., ...."" ,. i ~, _ I ri fur """".. ,.... J-r .;r, ...... ,.. .,; w.. Hi .." ~"f' III pJ"'" "III ,.IA It]tf , . uti,. 'i d.r ".; w.. H tit fur ,J,i.. no '"' no 0'",.,.'",.... r I .,.., ,. - ',.; lib;' ..,u,... ,.; """ .. K: , . " ....' ~1fI~~ 'rdJ.o .,111# ]hilozt!flMllM ~..~ ;;"".~ .... 4· fOSlrp~ ....... ~ ~~ __ ~~ 'T'kio" cJ-+y conup< and Iw b«n COIlecled t¥twtj. ro conform to PVT].

w".,.,. ....,

I

I,.,...

1lUe- in~ ~ 1M IfIWI1MI upon. ~ rwndy. ~ whidI .. tWn u."".".,01 ~""'"' PhiIoq>hiaIy.!his in~Don" poablcmaric. for Dtw· malUm lIinudE'dcnia !hal Oft( QIl dttmninc whaM Uly pWII indMduaI hu the qtWi· tics thai ww.Id ...- him credible. On • HCond inu;iPl CUDon, me f(fm QIl b.K to. undtntood in Inc IeIIIt of"in ~." For I panIJd IIJa&II: in PV. I ( ( PVi.IM. ~ On lhi! in,erpmo.bon. the argumml iI tNl. Ana 1M IUltmanl or. panicubr IUtJ- ~ been obocnN 10 to. 11Ua. wonhy in lmol of ~ objo:cu. thlI ~ uuarwonhincu may to. exlended 10 W>OOItfYIbIc: ob;«a.. 1M obviou:I poobkm with dtiI--.d inu.rprturion .. that;1 IIfU Ilypt ofl'Clll)f1inS mal Dlwmaldrti aplicidy rtjeaa. namdy, iq.I¥J~. wt.nmy the ~ co-omImna: ofIM m.knu in I probandum ttpboa I MO!SIIf)' marion to.",CUI the ..... • dmoe and !Ix- probandwn. How"". Ana: DhannUirti i! noc cor'IttfIIed wim rmdcrins Kriptunl inkrmcn NlIy inmumtnal. lhillml3l;VC ratonins may be adoquuc roc hi! pw •

_1bY..,.

. . - II ., Icuo hao .he adftn. . ol no< ""flicioly con~ ............... d.ao he malteo

only fWO

VCQ(!f

bll:f.


.,those statements, just like the other cognitions based on those statements ~that can be verified by perception and empirical inference. Hence, even though that cognition comes from language, it does not make known just the speaker's intention like a cognition coming from ~[ordinary] language because in this case the cognition is also an inference '.of the statement's objects, since it is trustworthy with regard to those objects ~(artha). 11

Alternatively, we state in another fashion the fact that, due to its trust;Worthiness, the speech of a credible person is the basis for an instrumental Inference: Alternatively, since the true nature (tattva) of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be done along with the methods for doing so are well established, the statements of the credible person in question 12 are trustworthy with regard to the most important issues (pradhiintirtha). Hence, they are a source of inferential knowledge with regard to other objects. [PVI.2I7] That credible person taught what to avoid, what to do, and the methods for each; what he taught in regard to these issues is not erroneous, and ;hence, those teachings are trustworthy. An example is the Nobles' Four Truths, in the way that will be explained. 13 Since those statements are trustworthy, the assumption (upagama) that other statements-which are useful for accomplishing a human aim and suitable to be practiced-are also

11 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:246a '" K:394) remarks:

It does not indicate just the speaker's intention. [K The word just (eva) should be read in a different order [than what is recorded]]. Instead, since it is trustworthy in the manner just described with regard to an object (artha) that cannot be known by either perceptual awareness or [non-scriptural] inference, it is also an inftrence from the perspective of the intention of a person who wishes to engage in activity. [K: But it is not actually (vastutas) an inference because there is no relation between expressions and objects].

f'l2 We supply from context the phrase, "the statements of the credible person in question." i,That we are dealing with the trustworthiness of a credible person's statements is evident '.from the way that Dharmakirti introduces the verse (PVSV adPVI.217; G:I09.II-I2): "Alter"natively (atha vii), we state in another way the fact that, since the speech of a credible person }s trustworthy, [knowledge derived from that speech] is inferential." [athaviinyathiiptaviidasyiij~iJisa7(lviidiid anumiinatvam uryate]. 1;Y'

:13 Dharmakirti is referring to the discussion in PV2.

366


trustworthy with regard to other issues will not lead to one's deception because [1] there is no instrumental knowledge that contradicts that assumption, and [2] it is pointless for that speaker to make false statements without a purpose. !4Thus, in the two ways [described in these two verses]; it is said that a cognition coming from scripture is an inference since there is no other way for one to proceed, as is illustrated by the thought, "If one is to act in aCcordance with scripture, it is best to do it thus." However, this kind of inference is not without problems (anapaya), since expressions are not invariably concomitant with objects, as has been already pointed out. Others think that a statement dependent for its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathartha). [PVI.218ab] According to others,!5 a credible speaker (apta) is a person with good qualities such as experience of things as they truly are (yatharthadarfana); that person's teachings (pra/:zayana) are trustworthy.

14 Introducing this next statement, Sakyabuddhi (PVT:247a2-4; absent in K) raises an objection: "A person who is trustworthy and who acts so as to benefit others will necessarily not deceive others about any object or issue if s/he perceives the supersensible (atindriyadarlin), but one cannot be certain that s/he can perceive the supersensible. Therefore, his statements may be trustworthy with regard to a human aim that is knowable (bgrod par bya ba ~ gamya) through reason, but due to a lack of knowledge, his statements may be deceptive about extremely remote human aims or objects." [gal te skyes bu gtso bo'i don fa bslu bar [Po mtl byed pa yin fa / gzhan fa phan pas Jug pa dbang po

las 'elas pa 'i don mthong ba can yin na / gdon mi za bar 'ga' zhig fa gzhan mi slu bar gyur ba yin pa de'i dbang po las 'das pa'i don mthong ba nyid ni nges par nus pa ma yin no / de bas na rigs pas bgrod par bya ba'i skyes bu'i don fa mi bslu ba yin gyi mi shes pa nyid kyis na shin tu skog tu gyur pa la bslu bar yang gyur ro zhe na I] . The sense of this objection is clear: one cannot guarantee that the trustworthiness of such a person necessarily extends to extremely remote objects. Sakyabuddhi continues:

It is true that this is an issue (don ~ artha) concerning which one cannot be certain. But the Buddha is posited (bzhag pa) as such [i.e., as credible,] in terms of an individual's [soteriologicallyoriented] activity. In order to demonstrate this, [Dharmaklrti] says .... [nges par mi nus pa can gyi don 'eli nyid ni bden te / 'on kyang skyes bu Jugpa La ltos nas de ltar rnam par bzhag pa yin no / de nyid bstan pa'i phyir de dang zhes bya ba La sogs pa smos ... ]. 15 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:247a) does not identifY who these others might be; Karl!akagomin (396) glosses apare as vadina/:!, while Manorathanandin (PVV ad cit.) provides naiyayi-

kadaya/:!.

APPEND IX O F TRAN SLATION S

Thit point (Ilnhll) is :wmiliM {i,!Jl} if anI'. is :l.bll'. to know mat thu penon has that lupttior q~ity." [ PVI.1I8cd 1 Every judicious p«SOn who wishes to :l.et an3.lyzes SIlII~mcna 10 det~rm in ~ what it 2nd what is nOI scripture {4g.MIl}. he does so with the desire to:l.Ct cffi:ctivdy. 2nd not because of some pernicious habit. Learning what should ~ PUf imo pr:actioe from rhe ...::ripnJf"e. he rh in b . ~ H:lvi n g:acted :accordingly. I might raliz.e my 803.1." On me basis of me rrustwOrthiness of mat ICripture with ttprd to things that can ~ expetienttd [through percqnion or empirical inference] . mll! penon acu wim regard 10 other mings li.l'.., me supcn;ens i~e objecu discussed in me scriprure] bcc:aUS(' such is me case for most ptll.ctic:al action in me world. BUI if one is 10 act on the lnJii, of ex:unininS t~ penon. one would not :I.Ct :l.t all beaU51'. one cannot know- whtttKr or not Wt person has those kind of exuaordin:l.ry qualides. It is not the case thu penons such :I.J us would not :let bccaUS(' of nm :a.ccepring that th~re :a.rc som~ pef5(ms with ~ qualities. since that kind of ~rson docs make true (.."illlthtl) SllItements." In other words. Othen Irwndy. we Buddhisu.1 know that it is eJ:tremeiy difficult to know (JurbotihlJ) whether others h:l.ve faults or:l.re faultless, as when on~ responds to me question. ~ Is this penon like this or not ~· It is exuemcly difficult to know beawc th~ insuu-

16 ~buddhi (PV1':lo4"fo,) commmu: Weacapt W poinl ~ Iw jwt b«n 1U!td-_ do roof deny lhil kind oflpouibil. ifyJ. Bul it iI: KCep(aI only if OIl(' 10 know WllUptriorify. ddlnal. w ~ rima of thiflt;i • !hey lruly an:. eu~.. • bane' definile up«! of ~ pnson. Bul OIl(' is not abk lO know that. [J"J",J_ th.t,.i -P"fJi-,. MttpJ 'II. ...... MI ,. ~ _ Ji" (If I ~ .. <Wf II; M Iu .., D'" ,./fftI. NT 6yd ,. iii ,.,i 6yd .. I ... 9r"!"x.J (If"" ji Iu .. ftbi" J. ,.,,;,.,. .. t. .... ,.7..uJ.""p4,.." rJt,mJ J.

u.bIe:

"""'. *.

r,..

"fI"I,.,.,,.

""I 1111/" M]tUtf Ibn,., ... ""''' fl. Kart'ahpvnin U96J praoc. _ this IUInnml a1mou murdy: ~ i - _~ . ...... in- . .,., / ii". ,. ;u,rr.. j Mnl", ,""'!"ury.,,,,,-~ b1.Je ",~ ......t..". "" ,. ~ [For. ~ Jm.""I • .,.~ ". ~ rod _~

h 'i (D.:

_III ...

in xcon:!wid! ~I.

17 The: portion Wf.oponding to ~ (PVr:l4bJ,)...

* Iu w'D",,.. _ji Iu

g" '" ... ,.1,.,. 1ft IiMrf IMII ,. i' ~ tv tk • ,., . , "IIS,. 1t]i ,.,., tbould O«\U afta' iiI!' ~ and ,..,. , ..".,. in Ku,.s.J.I- 16). '" khr" "" • I

~

368

FOUN DATION S O F DHAIt.MAKIRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

mental cognitions fo r dctttmining such issues are almost unoo. tainable (JII,wb&tj." [PV,.2.191 The tnlthfuJ (SIlmytltJ and dcttitful anions of pmons arc dut: to their good mental qualities and their mental fla...,. Those mental attributes are super.sensible, and they would have to be infe' lcd from the physical and voc:aI behavior (flJlllI4hl,.) that arises from them. And most behavior can also be performed ddibcratdy (bwitihipiimz1lt) in a way other than the mental state they iCem to reflect bec:au$(' those behaviors occur as one desires and because those bduviors may be inrrnded for vWow aims." Thus. there is an overlap of the: evidence: for f2ulu md f2uldcssnes.s. Thcrd'ore, not having made a ddiniti~ determination, now is one to c:mblish that the: author of the scripture is flawle:u? -men is there no such a person who is f2uldcu?" l8The pma J.!t-. ohtn tnNbud ~ u "difficub," bu. rbit EnsIish word it 100 wak for Ihe ImK IhM Ihe prUu mnooryL In ncarlyroar cut, .6.!J. apnae JOmCthi,. matt !han Ens\ish "diffiaab' bu. fIOI ~=:t u ' imj)C*ibk: Nocc mal. KICOfdilllco . (PVr:14Io. K:ml, ",,~). fan,nine nominW"" IinFu when On""';_...l

-~.

26 ~ (PVT:Jflb-1J~ . ~I) iI ~ hdpNJ !'or this team. u u incI.i_ell by !Ix need 10 irucn ~ pamuheric:al ph..-s into IN: Inrublion. AI dw n>d of

hit COII\IMnl he mtWlu:

Ewm when !Ix flaws I«.un infiMd (I A . in !Ix mind. insuummul copiliont thai ~ real im,..a....c:h as dlC' imparmnal1 and 10 on induce d", palh-l11l~ (~ohu UlUDocnLU ~

i~ ("~.w) Is.

u..- n...-huw m ...... ......., .... ,hen. when

t-a infwed in dw mind1

372

FOUND ATI O NS O F DHAI.MAICIRTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

This is SO because hnred cannot occur if (h~rc is no harm being dolK [0 on~'s self, nor to what pemins to it. Nor can on~ hav~ hatred for a person or thing th:u opposes what harms one's allegro self. Th~rcfore. th~ bdief in :an cucnlializ.cd self (4tmM1#rWlUI). which arises from being mem:ally condilioncd to prrnow momcnlS of that same type ofbdief, gives birth to th~ fiution on what pertains to that .sdf (ihlfi]lltr4lu). Th~ two-namdy. the self-belief:and th~ woon on what pertains to it--givc:: binh to dinging ro th~ self, or self-I~ :and thn clinging or self-love gives rise ro anger and so on. In this way, all Raws arise from the bdief that th~ evanescent psych~ physical components arc the locus of an essential self (SAt~!i). And that very belief is called ignorance. Confusion (i.e., ignolllnce) is therefore said to be th~ fundamental cause (nwlUI) of the Raws. In other conrau, the causc is said to be the belief that the evanescent componenu of body :and mind :arc th~ locw of:an C$5Cntial self because when that belief is eliminated. the flaws arc diminated. (PVI.n)) [The Buddha) said that confusion is the runent, ~j (PVf, 1IJ""7lb]ff), ~ the following ~jtaionl and resporues:

"lnfm:nce and pacc:ption an! ilUuummw; thaI bring ,he cue, how an tbc BicsKd One. ..t.o docs no( ha~ the IWUtt oflinfm:r.a: and pcrcc:jlOOnJ be: called such (Ihal iJ., 'irmrummw' W H~ iJ c:alkd an "","rumenl of~· beaUIt' he is $imihr 10 ~ ("'0 kinds ofinJ"'In-cnc. ofk..IO~. In other 'A'Clnb. he (an be IU~ in 1M mcu.pbo., "iruc:nuntnw." ' Su, the B'-ni One Iw; the .... run: of the ~ nona>neq>rual, .mminl ..;.. dom thai atdots by fotu of kir medlUlicn. Hena. 'M BIeucd One ;.. actually by naNn: I perception, 10 why doa one nttd In n:ly on. mcu.pho.~"

Sikyabuddhi (PVT:rutH") mpnndl: rhiI ;.. no( I probkm beawc the qnthn ,"lIfh:MltlJifil is inrmded to n:kr 10 • ~ SUIt. But hcn:. the 0Dtta:I n:spotuc iI I i follows: Evm if the8ksKd OM Iw; tho: ....1Wl:' of lhe afomnmlioncd inlfrumml oIluoowkdst", he iI ~ DOl (Om..-dy kMwn II ouch. ~. he if metaphorically (Ompand

Some lily

[ hal

to ........., .. , ••

a-a. ..... """...., ofknowl .omrthi.ng doc. In !he a i r of acting d"" 10 III illilial pc,aplion [i.r.. one which does nOl in~ Nbituarion l. if OM baa not ~n;riYdy "i"I"'on

(."b.~).

" Sui

done is WI kind ollruRWOnhinou with

~ 10

a lno. (ttrth.) ~n in a

d~ '

It is prd't1"IbIr mal theR be 1 reU thinS in tru.1 aoc; whm a-n. lhett is no other INUs (rrttd for pocirinS" reU thins. llIm dram· lwata'ICIaICI woukI be irunumrnal." Sinc ob;ctt of c ap«Ied .doi]. This;'10 si~ .....p;t. (,rqr._".. • .,.,., wid, lIN ~t If'" {".,.-J} TIImIp;, tnanI "ml1Mll!h me, fint awarmc:n." In other words. this I!W:IlN' -since me, fUll ~ is the auK" of d>c lifter ....... tcIICSf whoec ob;«t is the aaomplidlllM:flI of tht [apmed] ldoc." TIu.1ItpfIIftI1 dmiorutnles d>c ~ When it ariICI from in own ClUICS, d>c I"ocmu twaft_ NiKI u lui""" only d>c IWUn: 01 an iruaumcow ODpIition bca...... • raJ minI {. , .- -'"'- ~ is pmkM. Howco~ •• if tbrn aft =-lQrftTO ..... cocu.lder the baln uwI oooa ""«;'00 hf PU_II wnh QtaraCU and 10011 IObeOOjo " "TheC.idellla: here is the: ... ~pUon of. ptopc,tr_Miwl tlutl oonlndicu a propel ry·""'Mbw tNl ~ W Mpndwn. "The Mlb;m~ aspcu ., d~ objM of ~ I~ dxrd"orc. lhc o:umpk it

..... eII.blishaL •

This. ftOIlO, MaUlt 1M a.b;a:ti~ aspea: ismpliKd (rit,. . wt/iyJ ]n dw it iudl"

an- 21 mIaiw _

•

• ~ (PVT• ..".IJWU):

This InQl\I me fOIIowins- r~l lwam-oc:M is ftOI JOmnhins odwr tN.n lhe Mibjcai~ IIJpta AJCh tNI ;a objta would be ~ ~~ upea. ~lher. I~ IUb;c:cli~

J9.

391

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTrs PHILOSOPH Y

The~ arc rwo obj«u txausc some uc similar across irutanccs and omers

are not similar;

bcca~ SO rm'

are the objttu of words and others are not mr

objccu of words; and beea.wr the cognition of some occurs when mcre: an: causes othcr man Ihe object, and the: cognition of othcrs does nOl occur when me~ are causes orner Ihan (he object. [PV}.l) In this conlal, (hal which is capable of telie function is said 10 be: u1liImuely real. Thc other one is said to be: conventionally real. Th~ arc, respectively, me particular and the univenal.' [PV}.}) "But nothing is capable of relic function." Wc o~ truat rhinp such as seeds ha~ a capacity for relie function in tbe ~ of sprouts, and so on. ~S uch things a~ considcred to havt such a capacity conventionally. IlOI

ultimately:

Let it be so in the way as you have said

{1fJ~ l"thtl

tIlthtlj.' IPV) ...]

"That capacity for relie function is found in all obj«u."

;\IflC'Ct uoopimI ill WI ir uiJawim rhe 1U1U~ ~ .cfltxiw awarmea. I( rbeyarc IlOl distina, how ~ lho:rc Ix rhe rdalioll oI .... bjca and obim sud! !hat the: eumpIc

wooId IlOl be atabIished? 2 ~i

(I"VP:I ~

,,"fa the ruuo..i"l &Jc-: "- iii lrar hyi." Mi 1f:1tr/,..i

"'ItJtrI,..(.nIM/I4i",. WIJtI A,?-t1

,&_). a . Napromi 11"7-61).

) Dc¥md"b"ddhi (PVP:l14hl maka 1M foIlcrwi"C ",nwU: An objector Aflo 'BIU __", U ~ " " IN jiufmM. 'This ..-na, 1hc capaciv b- [die: hilKlion don not m. u1tirnatdy ...m1llX'm".' 'J1gt it. I rca! IMI U _ned w aile u1lil1Vtdydon not /u<w aJlrdwaam.cia (J.ip~wtu.IIiX .a . 'Thoe oarpmm! j,; 'J1g, wtudo. don I'lOl e:aist in .omahin& dx Unotl dwaaeritUe of duo! thine; ... cumpk is the: dwxtm.ic, °homN" ..ben applied 10 I borx. 'Thoe apaei", for tdio; funaion doa IlOl in dw whkh io _cd.o Ix rhe partioabr. This is III qumm. by fQIOII of aM nonpaaption of dw pcrvadi", quali(),. IDtwmaldni fCIJIOI'Wbl: W, fA m. rm"l' __ ... -Js '-r. rqM"iIJjiw uW fo..m... iff tiN UN I{If'"UI. .,.. ,. "'" Wkn he: Ars ~ the apKi", is obto:rmI.. be maN due ilII dr.xt iii ob.a ,ed. ThiI meanr aM f"oIIowi"" When one rNllI COITICI inco .,.iKmc:o: whc:n dw: otha- ul'fUmt. tMllann thi", .... a .-:ap;oci()' 10 pcvdu« the for· .................. 10 "" ....... bk of ..... ~ ............ ;u.. th... Ici....t of ",-..,..,,;.. 0.:. That (lI~'" U wI\" -.:U and .0 011 lui....: in rda.ion IO...-.U and M) _ . ,.,...., rhe

mms

I.

en..:


19'

It is not found in univmais. which art not o~rvro to have othe:t positive: concomitance (in which a universal necessarily aiJu when the:rc i.t a cognition of a univasal] or ne:garive concomiuncc [in which such a cognition also in the: prcsmcc only and merely of a universal] with the cognidon of a univc:rsa.l. An example in which these relations do occur is that of the qc: faculty and the: form perceived in relation ( 0 the cognition of that form . [PV.l.S]

tuIOII fOr tM objector'. argument is not esablW>ed. ~ ob~ III)": "The pfO> duaion of. spro.!t and 10 0on." 1Dharm,.klrti raponds:) Ut it bt ~,... ...... ",iJ. We Illy thallMClpacity for INc Iimcrion ill not qualificcP- lu rimer ulaltUU: or c.onOftlcion.alJ. Bw: ~ kind of~. iry lOr ....i.e IUnmnn ...... ;. "'"1...,.;, ....,1 (-Il-t ~ _ Jm...) [by t...;"..! ;, i...:!i.,.. •...hIo>. and what cIwactaUa a particular is rhertfore thai kind of indisputable: ClpJdty for cdic Nnaion. We do not haft tM ka$I obj«tion 10 you caIIill! iI whaleva' you mip

....

MOreDvu. what is ;1 mat you aIlnt te be c.onvcntiorqJly cxiJtmt such chat )'00 111m QX\\'auionai produaion IUSl'1bull101 production in me otbtt..,."y (i.e.• ulaImfdy]! If tM c.onvul1iona1 is 111.11 which is utterly nonaiscmt in ;tiI ma

:lwarcnCSII docs not rn.vc any

I

~

.h~

n~

arc in proximity. H e nce. , ince

rduio n 10 a single panicle. aware-

(PVP:.I9a) prd'aas dlis ¥me with lht- f,;,Ilowin« ob~,

""TheKOA (.u~ofrbc h~Jwamw::Ml an; agepmiJUbewx:a. all isaptCMd in 11K phiIoIophical poNI>on, The corpw of ~ _r~'I" ha.-e 4ilw1el (."", ,.-,.n~ thW _ . Haw iI il apptIlpI'Wc. lhcn. roCOlKlCi •• oftt.o. *tpcs .. ~ """t!.k thinF F.,.- al is II,., ODIIlmon dfca of all of them. It is noc lhal t:hcy Ill' noc lhc common obF of 'WU'CIICIl b«3wc ~ appn:hmdI.tm.un \lJ\Mnal (9-~(~,.IwtJ "" 1f'JV.119C»I Sintt the _ _ t"it it no! by virtUe of. ~~" Ittn J!]fIJ to dispd the "".....,y molion of .warenCl! to .lingle ,,'l)
Conjvncrion OJI.IIOI""

me object of a mcapbor in me InUt ofbcin8 o;:aIkd · mlllti.

color" Mini) bec:awc;1 is oimilar 10 (....... rw] mvlticolor, ""1 U. d>= is 00 mulUo:.uI.uoai (n'w.) wlouk ' " • t....unOy, ;and ,.hac .. AU . .......... a.I ..u oloml coLor 01 bor:h; u 1Udt. thq aft dw R:UOn f'« tho: metaphor fha, lIor con· junaion is multicolored.

Onmdrabuddhi (PVP:I,u) continua: Thil canOOl be dwcue bcawc thcR;. no muitirolomincM li.c., \'II'ilpriool in tl-w color 011 multicolomi bunafly. and ixn'lM' thcR iI no multicolored endry in the po.;nlinS and wch. ~i (M', "]W'wob) dari~

n,;, U1/Mlt N tIN ret _ _ rhrrr if .....~ j .. tIN rWw.j'• ..JM.I.mI ~ Thai iI, thcR iI no mukic>olomlnal [ i~, .,.,q.tionl in the aonc.qMualIy .........,'-"""011 ~~ en';.,. Ilwl .. the;..t.ok (~....,.. .....;. " . . i.ta. ............ ;, _ ,.,OJ.i...J.nJ j .. lIN ,.n"'"'r "",, ___ Thai io, .u- dwtt iI Iir$c of all no wftok, dM: oppoilCllf doc:. 001 .,,;q>C I~, mulciobecl enti", thai iI tIw wboIe. RatIwr, only tho: ooIonoi dw puul~ . 1lwy individ&W1ydo noc ~any muldw1otM·.! ...... and ...n.;.... diltina cokJn can/lOl. be dw bo.W ()ou .w, " .tip) lOr I meuphorical we 01 ·m~_· bra" ... opponmt doa noc aox:qx that on< an.appn::hcnd

t1IIi"

many minp Rmul~y.

I""

c..m.....n,i", nn ,.,~...rNirr.Nill.. o...-t:ndrabuddhi {PVP:19W nat ...)'I: MOI Khtr , _ _ mip;hl daim

mat pantinp and P.toeh...., mru.ph.oricilly calkd

"mukic:oloml" bcawc tht paru inbeu ill I si,.kconjunaioa, but dtil aJ"o doe. DOC maltt' KIUt'. T'lu;1 is, t~ iI no conjunaion thai ia I multic:oloml mu", in th.e indio .-idaW paru.1UCh as tIw coIorbllK, in ~of whidl rMn: itt said 10 be I conjuncDon. lrucnd, thoK paru ha." thcir own e-ncc orlwina blue: and 10 on: u fIlCh, they...., individually /101. multiooMN ed: !hc~~c, Met dwy aft DOC connccwd to lsinpoo;m: (.,.,Jw). IhMaU! f'rom d..- /oohn . . . . ~ :III bI....] io ...... :u dw Ii"", mnjoiAM

with ia name b«auJc I nilll'lC and I

ODIMp'

do nor &rUe llmuIaneousIy.

]] $iJcyabuddhi (PYT. "T-10 U) cbri/la;: "... " - ' - MlII.w ~ • •

"""..,..m-.. . . .

~ "'-"1tC~ it

_..,..,.,u"'Tbe

objeaor minla lbe rotIowins: · You who "'P" .... mis dICory aboul per.....,.w.n aIio UIm chal mpirionl occur wid! cop!iri"l' inuf;a. Henu, I ~ed irnast' iI OKII· lioIIy d>c c.opicion ifJd{ (M. i ~ l1"''';' m..1 bri.. lbe (SR, you IODeJ'I

"'*' ••

..... ""'1"1.......... I.....q,..ed .....: ...... ....,.........." [And

..nc.. ~

(,,)U) oommmaJ. "n..../ ..., it;, ~.~ M I1ICaIU dw d>c oo;.no.lhinla d>c ~ Ihr IftIDn .lIIed ito. the bm. 'dw whid. '" ....ncpnd don loot t.- • tinrJc _rial nature' '" irKondwi~ bcuusc: ~n rhoush CIDpI;lkIn .. of I "nplu Ral\lft. il can ha"l' I ..,..;q.aud copiIM: apptaraIIOe."

11 Dewodnbuddhi (PVP:.I ~}a) inuoduca u..,

nal

ftQC

Mm tt-

ThiI cririciam appIiG 10 OM who maintains mal d>c ~ (_

~

,.J" u1limau, bul

II doD nor apply 10 1M b«:auK 1 do nor ICIOrpI thai 1M I. . . . aiIu in !hat faahion.

Tn okmoruuau IhiI poinl, [DtwmaldniJ AJ'I ..•.

¢l

FOUNDATIO NS OF DHAllMAKIRTI 'S PHILOS OPHV

There mould ~ no variegalion in the: cognilion as well, SUI if one is conI(:n! 10 havre this br: the: objects' euc:ncc:, who are we: to objttl to that? [PVp.Q9-2.Ioj " I] ~ndnbuddhi (PVP",)&} maka it dear lhal the ones !loins the aru.lyr.illl hm: afI: the Buddh.. H~ abo rnnatb:

*'

... * . . .,

j ,. wIncI! Ibi... f{Hj«rr. dial ia, wbr;n on.: ntiolWly anaIflCI than as cithn-lin&ular" multiple, thq tIisq~ Itt ckvoid of ainilll-in INI way, i.e., in INI faahion lu either anpbr or multipkJ. In oWr wotdJ, thty annoc M aabliohood in of any CSKmw narw~ ~.

,«....

~buddhj (PVT, ~.) makes lhac oommma:

... 1M ....., u. tuIHd. "-1 Ibid f{NjNrs tmn fO awnaJ bilK. rdlow and JO .... H~ (.m,.)to rdill~ the nocion!Nt ;1 ia disrlna fi-om ~ (lIijflhtt4) iudf. M is noc rdilrinc the nocion rNl ~ ;. by !\aNU,.,..tnIr& This will AYI "ob;ca~

abo Mcxplaincd w«. T1w ....,i,...M "~1i"rmeans thq art noc osabIiohood u rithtr .. ncuW" multiple. [Whm ~ndl'lobuddhi JaY'-1i,. _ f{.", mnoriM _ " ....1JM¥r; M means tNl thc oO;rn ann(lf bot esablUhed as aluna!. nor a n il bot _blUhed as !.m", thc ruNt
"If dw:tt tOmdtow ~ ullimal~ varicption or mu1UoolorcdncM in I • aw--. then in ulrimarc ICfIN dIU nriep.tcd 01" II>ultkolortd 1-.,." .... would aublish thaI the raJ mi", was Wo vvicplcd or mul.icoWnd. Likewix. il would be ""'.- This ill

"1" ~"..J.,.. -n..,.".-.' ..u_;,. .............. Si~:and YIritptiooImul~_

...1... oJ", '1uoUoo'" ;. ,;nu,. ~,. 1.. 'f>U'-' oJ"' ....a~n-

oonmwiinOf}'. If ~ 'tI. arc nO! mind tw."H' mirin& iI ....,. p""ible in tilhcr of tIx [WO ........hk arfWlCUM'llS: if they...., cunjoi.ncd II j ..... _ poUtl , tIxn tIx: pam.. del would llaw JWU and hma: almlion; and if thcy an: conjoined in their mtimy, dwn tIx: ..... prd dump would i_ be !he IDe 01 an inlinimirnal panicX. ~ ~. [tix obj«u of ptia:pUon an: infinilesU!W ~ WI arc] am:md,. dow 10 each other RKh tIw they an: noc inlUnlplCd by an,. hner..- p;wticX6 but dg haw &It intmla bavoun than. Moreowr, IIx apparar1O£ of. ~Iully a:tmdrd oopUlM: Urusc it I pndurilll conpommr.te .. o:nono'OUi tw..LIH' il ooWd nO! " - nm I minute inlmUor [bc""cu,1hc aroma cotIIpotrd il; il ..... bern "'-n

n-

w.

-'-------'- . .. ~ "'""" &It InIClJClltt .. "'"

n-

I" '7 .

w.

who a:prs dIiI qumcn. an: lOoIisb: I!1CdiIll their own words with their _ _ _ , th.y ... ......fU.od. [fic ic .................. ~.,( _ 'F ri_'Iy_ended ~ irnIF in an ewarmc:N..ned fO appdlClod infin~ putidelit all _ , then how can me IwvmtII dw ..... W.I lind of ipltialIy extmded imat;c ukc inliniIUinu.l panicks • m ob;ccu.' An ~ mal .,. one thin& .. ill oopitiw imasc ClnnOI boa." _hi",d.o: .. its ob;ta bea... othnwiw ...... would inau ilII own::I!_ 1mIion. 1'his Iw already bern explained. No mropic (rJt- ... . , Iw) per'

aosniri¥d,.

_could ~a:osnlzc 6-r"""~f"Jan _ _ whoK~ imacI:an ~ ~ (~n.. Wt, infinitesimal ~an:nO!tlxub;«lIof

paapUun. ...... _...,. .... ~ utiofaal io Ihc abKnot of tIx,wumat!Nt is tIx dMlloflhc aDqrd obja:lI]. Otha pmom mainDin dwe¥a\ dw; n::sultinsCOl N• ..,.... iI wprodua o,.";oIan int.enW impriDl; even ... the ~ would noc IU'f'C at: an inkrmtiaJ lip for tho.c imprinu • -n.. AJthout;h one an claim thai ; 1 docs occur. il K euy 10 I « thai: the sparialJy exwodrd oopUti." imat;c ...tudt ;.., i eN 10 be ...t..I one ClfA'iaoca doo:t ....,. ultinwdy CIlia Iwa"., when one anaI,.- ~ il • iin«uJar or pIunI. il doe ....,. wilhlUnd tuc:h an anaIyaiI.. 1lv cttmWI Ntuft: ("I"' . . . . .,. I Mh.) of infinitaimal poonido ia

ClUJalod,

rnncJI.~

io

me ~iouat, dauibnl

DliUlllD" .

Bu. io

)a) oid of dll&!ity.

S1ky.buddbi (P'VI'. "1""V:>}I) amtinuu: l:Nt- 10 thai: cosnili..., Ump tNl appru 10 bt external and internal. cosnirion iI duaiisUc, rrprdIcu of wbctber or tKII mere uc ammJ ob;cat. Hena:. rvcn ir thm: ~ encmaI objt1tMrd"orc,;, ia Wd tU. the"".emaI doa I0OI cziA ulli ......dy. ""J1... ..... if)' ...... i •• Iu- ' r ' i ..........! ... I-... ,,,-, "'S"'...... ;ft ...,! . ...... ..,. d.... [apparuody a!cnul bur aaw.lly unreal obj«r); ulUd!, if it Wo nex ultimatr. Hmcx, il ia dd'inilM/y damTLined lIw. apc:lia~ is nono4.....• (. U"f '" MfI . -.. JJn t.J J# ..J hJr;" liM .,..", g.~ .. Jill iJ". _ ';" ill # fhl.. Jill..,.. liM NJ' Jill u./rytJ,. ,. 'i 1ft' N J rit f'U P"I ,.'" ,. Jill 1""1 ill ",u ".;,. ill ""'~ f PJU "."J "It' ;o..~ f J.

_at'" "'1"1"

""*' , . at

Since me aKIltW naNn: of awurnaII iJ established by ~ il iI nDI me cue tNt, OM U o;wnpdkd fa admil dw all beings would on: suchnao: lif me ob;ta IWlLm'OCSl,

and ... b;ca irna&a -.-.: unn:olJ. Thar iI. Cf'tft thoujVl doc I:IImliai natuft of IWIIrtI$


The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the awareness. [PV3.213] The definition (sarrzsthiti) of things as different is based on the difference

is apprehended as part!ess (eha medpa nyid kyi phyir= ana1[lfatvena) by reflexive awareness, as a result of its connection with the seeds of error, that reflexive awareness does not produce a subsequent definitive determination of the nature of cognition as nondual in the way that it has been perceived (rtogs pa ; pratipatti). Therefore, even though reflexive awareness has already apprehended the non-dual nature of cognition, it is as if it has not been apprehended. But this in and of itself does not establish that the cognition is not a general [i.e., unqualified] subject of predication. That is, the qualities (khyad par; vise!a) that one might wish to predicate of the subject "cognition" would be duality or non-duality. Even though these might be in dispute, no reasonable person would be able to say that since the reality of the distinct qualities (bye brag; bheda) under dispute are not yet determined, the mere subject of predication itself is also not determined. That is, when "sound" and such is established as a general subject of predication, one might argue about whether or not it is momentary; in that case, one would then use an inference to determine whether it is momentary. "If one cannot say that the mere subject of predication is not established just because the quality of being momentary and such is not established prior to the inference, then how could any evidence be unteliable by way of not having an established locus of predication? One would have to accept that a general subject is established in all cases of inference." If it were the case that one could say that, then when one had definitively determined the subject, one would also definitively determine the predicate that is under dispute. That being the case, it would be pointless to seek out evidence that had the three requisite characteristics. Therefore, in this context one has established through perception that cognition (rtogs ; pratipatti) is a predicate that has the quality of being pleasant and such. Nevertheless, due to one's cognitive error, one has not definitively determined its non-dual nature. Thus, in order to establish that, one employs an inference. The proof statement is as follows. That entity that is contradictory to some property-svabhiiva is devoid of that property-svabhiiva. For example, heat, which contradicts the property-svabhiiva of being cold, is devoid by nature of being cold. The essential nature of cognition contradicts the properry-svabhiiva of being dualistic in the manner discussed above. {205a} The evidence used here is the perception of a contradictory antecedent. Therefore, it remains the case that mere reflexive awareness is what constitutes selfless things (dharma) that are devoid of the aforementioned dualiry; it is not, however, devoid in all respects. When the Prajiiiipiiramitii and so on cites the refutation of things being essential singular or plural, and when it refutes production and so on, it does so in terms of the constructed nature; it does not do so in terms of the non-dual dependent nature. Hence, only awareness that appears dualistically presents distinct qualities such as production; mere reflexive awareness does not do so.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS ~n

mose (i.e., the object and me subject]." If the aw:ucoCSI is crfO. ncous (lIjWpi4IN1), men meir dilfcno:nce is also erroneous. IPVp4]

There is no definition of mings outside: of the definition of mem as cime:r objcca or subjccu, rThosc: definitions do not uJrimatdy make scnsc;) merefore, since mings are empty of any definition, it is aplained mat they aJ'e cssencdc:ss. [PV},lJS] AU dlsdnaive definitions of things such as me ~tCJ arc: delimited by activity. nut activity is not ultimate; merd'orc, those mings arc: also devoid ofluhimatel ddinition. IPVpl6) 1I ~

is me cue with persons who have cuaraco. m05e who art by narurc confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (IIijliAp,i) wim false images that arise in dependence on their fcsp«tive conditions. fPV).l.17) '" 16 ~ (PVP:I',.a):

TIw Mjilfi';'" (1II'f'l.mti)

.["""I' III t/;/for'ml iJ

NwJ." d. Jifo'rttn ~ " -.

'TlIa1 is, it has. iu (2ute Iht ditfdalClt bUiiCQ. objca and AIbjca. The ditfatiltC and noodifr",uo« of me copoilr...: ~ io the Q .... lOr d" Wonilion oi dunp at difftrml and nondilfmm" If theft Wtte nDthins II aU, Ibm on wIuol buU woWd ruI !hinp 1M: dilfMnl and not diffi:rmtll..iUwi.o:, d>e ~ ~I appta to !hiIII" &ris&l and 10 on. That it, mrWdtt d>e caKwMrt- 1 ptiupUon mac ..... pmwr IM)t praml Wti OCQUI; thai puapcioon io ..... dw ;1 apprd>e ClC>!l"iu.,,;....., oi III objea {"'*J. AI dw tUne, d>e dojcai." cosnilion of tNI objca arixI; wbcn ;1 bteoob"dnooid of d>e appeanntt oi d>e ptiupcion oithal c:opiri¥C ilNf1. il;' aid to Iuo." "a::ucd: Bul if bod! that which pcraioea ancI tNI wIUch is pticalo'f(\ do IM)t cUt, lbm theft is no IX,apcioft 11111 ba:awe dom: II no CIOpil;'" ~ of obj«t ancI aab;ea. 1lw IM:ins d>e C»e. if ia mo.u detomincd tNl aNal docs not Iuon perorption • ;rs - . .

17 Ikvmdtabuddhi (PVP:.94hl rrmaJb:

£Ym ifor>< ~ ~mUI ob;ecu. aU thinp (tit. .. J1M1'JIW) HiDhI"" no ddiniti<wt. For iNDntt. !be Jmi1lniwJqilfin-.[.,.,'l us;' rhac thq_ "hape:I up": "'1M, "1I'CpIC· " - d>e mranlns of ·~ heaped up: Abo d>e Imll " CXlaWoo" {1it]tJ IItdW _ ~Iw me_ ol"thu.hlch is cnmded": "fundammcal dancnl" (-"-' _ JIMN) .... the ICfIK of"-.ra:- of prodlKlion. • AU audI definitioN _ q....... ;fwd byaaMl)' {~ in m.lhtyare JIIi..mJ .,.mw'1- Aamry is abo. M1pU' impoAUon; lintt III dUnp ~ devoid oflCli";ty. il doe. IM)t ulrimudy aiR. 18 Bach Dew:ndrabuddhi {PVP:I~ and M~tharw!din (P¥V: ,J ri,) /\Ott thai the ipIontw:t- clled here it IlnaJHiaai iplontu. Slkyabuddhi (PVT. "J"' wsb) dd'inc!: it u the "the imaplAu." domrmwlion of objca: and p,bjcn" ("1-""" 1M -. - ]i" 1M j ,.; . . 1M ,.; P""K .. """ iQ:j" JMU ""'P" JMU . . . 1M .), lkvcndnbuddhi {PVP:I~ nioea I ~u.I probkm:

me

4JO

FOUNDATIONS OF OHARMAklllTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

11K: ultimate nature of the cognitive content (in perception) is not known by any [ordinM)' beings) whose vision is not supreme; they do nO( know that ultimate fiaNce b«:ause it is impos.sible fo r them to experiencc that content without the elror (WplrrllA) of subject and object. (PVJ.118) Therefore, (the buddhas), ignoring the ultimate (~ptJt,il4l4lhNirt""). close one eye like an r1ephant't and propagate theories that involve otema! objectS mrrt:ly in accord with worldly conceptions, (PV).219) A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a quality conringent on awareness O·U_pltihi,. and as such it does not panicipate in any other awareness [ruch as the awareness of just blue), Hence, it can-

"If. o;osnitivc P"'*'nUlUon does ROC dcpmd on In amnal ob;ca:, then..-by doc. il oaur wnh mpca fO. rw:d ~ioa...d 10 on ' "

11IiJ iJ .110 the problem raiK'd by vu ... bandh .... , the u-r.}.8A). ~i o&n an anrwtt

~nnillJ

of IW

Vi~,;U (V.I;

Even ~ it doa noc drpo:nd on amnal obj«u. I mplirivf: pracntlrion doc:. not oc.cur inp«il\cl form in 1ClCXWdwith ~ofrbe ....u.bkc:ond'rion& nw is wtu. (DharmUJrti] india!CI lwith the phrut i. """"" "I.. 1M /Mit "".,mw_ JitNoul. h iI ROC the Oi( dw thi!: &h i.e.,~. pceKIllJltion Iw ftOlftd.. all; it iI jwt dw one canROC point it oo.n br SI)'i"" "11oit ill iu ..m' One cannot If'«ify the I«d in this fuhion Ma.\IJt i«d Iw dw ~ cu amon, tbt nonc&iJum, all tbt con ...... tioftJ of birth, darh Ind JO on tNl arc pcreci¥cd of f'U'OII' wbo _ perotivcd in drums would ¥.o br ~ of!hoM: dream penonl when one _ - - . . . jwr Ii thtr- pncrivcd ro apply ro doc pcrJOII..no .. pua:i+in, tboeedtntn brinp. WIw difk,ulOX """,Id there br aIIlOrI8 thex nonaittmt pcr1'Onf! E+'UI utterly nonaisl:UII "Jllilkl oudIli • burm woman 'l MIn wooId be born and dif, tuM: Ii.,..;m. penon wbwc bini. and death an: .c:aprcd. Othnwisc, the penon ""'- birth and death arc acupad would aI.o not cUe. Het>(C, if thm: ~ ftO...nI fOr m'Of, then 0( aW'UUal. And what is ~ is 1>0( anaIyud. n..,.~

(__ ,,*,~W~ /";~"'''''''~"~ 22 Read _j~fJ " for p.d.iJ.""fo/lowinS ""Ml!,iI.~.. M. PVSV-D. and Dtvmdnbuddhi (PVP:.96bl. U Rae! bJ -{Vwliwith all ammmwit:s and PV-D.

8. Instrummtality in lIN Httubi"du (HB: 2·. 1~3·. 16) Nou: In tiN immttiiAuJJ p"utiin, ~'t oftiN Hetubioou. Dhamurltirti lNu ;"t7MunJ tM tblW up«tt (riipa) nl'ffSSll"Y fl, n>iJ"," 10 j., fnU~"" thy-NlmtiJ. tIN pDlitivt ctmcttmilIINY (anvaya). 1M n~ativt to1fctlmilllna (vyarirdca) . anti tlK tvidmn-subj«t rrlalion (pa~adhumati) . in ,hal disnmi,m. Dhamutkirti IHu bmJlJ mtnriDntJ tha, ~ relations mIlS' b.t J1initivtIJ tinnmiruti (nikita), anti tIN JNUI'IKt trrInsuuti !HJow "Tns wi';' a dimmion of what th(lI means in tm case of tlK tIIidntu-tMbj«t ,tLuwn (p;.kpdhannad.). Tbis illUis Dhllnrwltim' hi _N tmmJ torvUkratUrv ~,. ,""in, tiN dHtraatrinia ofan instr'M ..tnllll t'Of?Iition. Concerning what has jWt been said. me "definitive determination-I [of the evidence-subj«:t relation} is the common establishment (pNJitJdhi) through either perception or inkrence of a qwliry of the subject serving as evidence

0'"'

in the ... bjea ro be p........,n. Exa.nple. include the ckt-nmination thaI ..... is prescnc in a loau: or thac coruuuctedncss applies to sound. That is,

a person lim o:pc:rienccs through perception a smoke-pos5CSSing place whose: nature-swbh.nw is distinct from everything else as be:ing unique.' In that person who has perceived that place there $ubsequendy arisa a cognition of the evidence (liti,a";jfl41J11.); that awareness is a mnemonic cognition (smJIrtllm) whose: object is the difference [that distinguishes smotu: from non-smoke) in KCOrd with wh.tr has bcc:n pc;rccivcd.

In this rqard. only the initial o:periencc, whose: object is a unique thing. iJ an irulrumental cognition.J Wllen II thing of th2f kind has been aperiI Nap (HST::lO.,) dai..... ""'1 the Icnn

,,;x.,. is only bot:i", wed meapborically heK.

2 nor, pasl aai~ paf1icipk ~OIII/JrU!lIw bren inlnprttcd in an ~ _ to tXilialc brnki"l IhllIonJ Sarukril JmIC1lDe InfO fWO .nona eng!WlImtaKa. Thb putidc: II wed in ia pas! KIIK in the I"oUowins 1m(Q1(e•

.) Arcafa mnarks (HBT:I J.17): nac is. the dcfin ilion of an iruuummt:ilOO&Ricion is lb.' ....... objta was IlOl ~ viowIy known and WI ..hole objta ill mearu!Of u:lie: N.naion (....kri]J). This pmairu only co paa..... ua1 upcncn(.r. In Ibis the qualilicalion "the inilW" Upl"","" lbot: fan mal thai apcrima: Iw an ob;«t lbat baa not bcocn prcwiowJy known. And "..-hoIor; objta it Wliq\IC" ~ the I'a.:I char dial experiotnce Iw an

,.ro.

objoct mal io • meaN lOr • relie IUncrion .~ only • ~ an bot: • mc&nI lOr relie:

."

..,


eneed, there occurs a mnemonic cognilion thai represt:nts that thing's uniquefldl with regard [0 this and den other thing in terms of whkh il is unique. 11u1 mnemonic cognition represent! thai uniqueneu as a difftr* enee from those other things; as such, mat mnemonic cognition has as its Obj«ltM thing's adusion from thaI which it is not. This mnemonic cog* nilion arises by the force of that perception. Since it apprehends a cogni* ti~ im:l&C of the observed thing in the manner in which it was observed. that mnemonic cognition is niX ilUtrumenw. This is so because, one having first SCCJI a unique thing, the subsequent mnemonic awarencu repre5tnts the image gc~r.llled in poception :as Munique M ; I't:p~cing the object in that fashion, dut mnemonic awareness has no cognition of an object that was not prcviowly cognized. Also that mnemonic cognition is not inmu* mental because. since the previous perception o~ the ~rity Ihn iJ the means for {the ~peoedJ tdie funct ion, there is no cognition through thai c:onceprual awarenas of II prcvlowJy unseen particular that is by nature the means for m.u (die funaion.:as is the case with inference} u "1 The reason for this is:as foUows. Setking some relie funaion . a judicious person invenigatcs what is :and is not :an instrumental cognition. And a univ~1 iJ nm c:a[Uhloe nf 2oI'XI)mrliJhing :ony IdOl :01 :011. for it iJ wMr iJ apprehendc.-d by a conceptual aw;uencsi thaI. after the pcruption of:a par_ ticular, arises by the force of that perttption. An cxatnple is the concept, "blue," thaI appears in the conapcual cognition of a person immediately after he h:as.s«n blue. For il is only thai blue-particular thaI pcrfonns that kind of tdic function. and it is seen with that very naruf( by perception. However, the object of the conccprual c.opiition, ~ blue, ~ that:arises after the apprehemOon or thae putic uhr docs noc poertonn the rd.k fWKtOon which mould be accomplished by the color blue.' Ther~fore, ~n though it is

,,.._!""

tUt.aion. [whoi' I,; m'*~_ ~~",.", r. ~~,., I ..J "~;Nui Uff. MJ-o ;'7 ,,;}'oA_tMl,., .~u,., .:w~ .. ;t> _4. ' ,) ! .4-_""o-t_", I ! ' 11)01 .

.,.$ "'" ....16.; ad......

.,w-""'",

u bucd on the narurc: of things.

!!Ll6a. and c:oruuuaion of lWMb., IS6=rz. 19S. 197:2t ncptivc and J*itive imuPfetlltioru of, 111ml. In-,s role of erro r in, 14O:1J . }lt, }16nlt}

1f1J11J ip __ Sir lCript E:J:[ttfU.] RnIiun

bepnningkss imprinl (.1IMIiIlllud). S« imprinl beginningk:unc:u. !. 140--41. 161, 1 9~ Bhatt, Govudhan, l}n1O, 16n19.

"""

W .... S« exUlenl !hing Bhinvivtb, Inl ~WIIl",.. &>t wnmcss. of diffaena

.s«

Mml"ti ermr Biudeau, MadeI.n ...., .8n. o, 91n'., 10ln74 &Jhk"ryi...lJln (Sintickva), i§.,

.

,,,,

Bronir.hom. Johanna, }Snp.

."""'"

aUlhori!)' of, I}Ml as ignoring the ultimare 10 Ic:ach brillgJo 110 41U as not employing reuonintl SO-SI pragmalism of. }14-1 ~ as kring the: trarucmpirical, )OS buddhahood. ~ 4S-1l Butun~lgtl . KlaUl, 161\4, )6n47

C Cabtt6n, JOK, ,)n4 Candralcini, rr. )61l.4i, S4n}. )16n6 capacil)' (,JIotIt4; /Ilk,;) of aggug:alcd partKks 10 produce a....artnall. 10M. .J96nl of caUJal compln:. 16)n)4, ~n l OO

of iruuumallal cognition 10 make one altain a goaI. l.86-I7, 111, !!L }I}.}SI of iruuumtnial tOp'Iilion to pmdua. ddinitivc dcielmin.:uioC'\. 194. )v. )7Ift!4

~Ives,

!!z

propmy-nwbh.b.r~.

176. lIL

H7. },tinl ClUAI compln: (~1PIIIfri) compkte (~~mqri). 180.

ll'

inoomplete (viJ:aJi MtNM1NItri). 16sn}8 narnre-nwbh.illtf and. 161~. 170. 17Sn.ti. !ilr 199. lQl participation of aggrq;ucd aloau in. 103-) . 10!. 108n. o caUAI cfficirocy. 5« .nbdriJi causal poc.trllial (1.Jrri)• capaci!)' ccnainry (lIik9"), }n6. 16n4. !lit lO6098, 191ft!16 S« .Js.definilive detamination caulion (";MIII). 86nn. i.L 97n68 S« .~ momentariness orr.. S« nrkFlion dass-sign (j4ri). St-t univeruJ cognilive im38C (~T'" ,rni/,;mlN.; ,,..tiMb.; also • appo:arancc·; • conc:qxual image 0)

.s«

as hom rnI and un real. 2Q, LI.6. 119=11 and conceptual ilhl.lion. ~ construed in Iemu; of I ncption, 94/'64. 116-+4. }40 correspondence: with pmkubn. 100-111.

u.a

ermneousl y coruuucd as ounmental objccu, M. 141 41.

116n}, 177n9}, l iS, ) 4. ).40,

,..6-47.)96. 401- 14 and wor in conceprua.l tOp'Iilion,

t!. 61l117.18)nl07. )11. HMl

"...,

ill

irurrnm(nt oflmowledge, 1710

.. m~nl.1 p&niculu. t!!t 116- 17.

!!2: UL

) 11

.,

INDEX

and pc.cePlu.aI illusion, •.1~ as produccd Ihroogh panKulm..

........,. u. U:2:. 1611 5t't Jw awarcnc:u: conapu; objcaivc image: subj«rivc imag.: ~nl:aria

reuoru for rdiulce on, 1:1 ccr.ai:Jb~n8 or tno:!i.ion:al, 7 - 11 , lP:- ,:}, ) 19-10

$I)'k of rcuanill! in, 1::L )10 commonsense: objccu. 6t-79 companli~

philosophical

roda,VOi'$. 117- 18

mmpassion. S4n), 66.. lu- J6, }19 mmpktc cr.URImmpkl.: (JllUU ~-zri). S« cr.wa1 (OII\pC:. compklc

moapu as Cfroncow, it 61n17. !..!2. L+O-4 J,

~

1.1'.

119

as mcnw images, n 9=,I. 117--19 as nol taking me u1limalc as an objca. l2.. i!.! )01, JS4 as 001 14n1S. iQ as obj«l of infcrmce. ~!11! lS(H:l . )06 rc:baion w the real, It 4Sn6+. Z!.

"vid.

'f. ' IrH. " 9=,.

l 57n1S. 1]'Oi\4J. )00=)01.

S« pcrttption, col"lCq)-

nul co ndWiion (IJipmA....... also "5ummation1. )4tI.4S. )S0-4S conconuuncc infm::nccs involving only nepli..... (1trWI~"",tirrh";. H0-4S. !:Q:i=:! inr,,",_ involvi"s on.,. pot.ii;.... (1trWI14..,.vi"J. JSR.4S need for cxampla 10 (SubIWt. 19=11. UYi 8

nqlli"" ("",nrrU). 11-19. )1OJ9. '48nll. ~ 1u01 04 ontolopcr.l Nsis lOr, j6n67 poiilM: (.IJ"""~), 1I-1,}, B

,I.

l!

as uansblion c:hoicc, lBnJ6 S« Jw rndcnce-plcWalC rdation conditioning (-bh]i.uJ. S« habiiw, ,~

JOj, jll=l-4

I'ormation of, 9va6+. u 6-16, 1u;6. 169-", 197=1OI, !Q:t. p .l. )}Hl illusion and. 1:z::::H kvd.t: Of onkn of in Dtwmald"i's thoughl. 199-101 as mcnJai COnleill. lon1O, 11jn1l1.

"11>9+ .......

p,.,,~).

)I~I"

j8, Sec abo .""".".-chcory; cop!ilin image: dcfinidw detcrm ination; uni~

concqxual cxlcnoon. SH. 6.l S«.k. dU,";b."Oon conccprua.l perception (lIluikJ,.u

confusion (~. W\1. dn.Il, 61016. )7)n17 conlal (!rWM1)II). 4$ ...... 9, ~ !l:.tr Is.nlS. !!i. ,.snS9, 1S9-60. 19S. j04. ,d.}86 conti ngent reality. 5«convuuional reality conlinuity (_,,~. 5«dililrlbulMm convuuion (~rMhb..· ~pI"/UUUIM),

19n51. liI==£'!ll!

PI_u. 1s.nsl. ~n I 67. ,..6-47.

no. ) SI !in.Is. conwmional cop!irion; con""ntional rulicy; PfaCtic:al action: scmanhc con~ntaon con""'n.in""l cogni.inn (U",.,rijMIf4" sl",.",.). 87nS4. )01-1. H9, )81

&t _I. convcnlion: convcnlional rali'1 con""nttolUl pr_""!"'- 5« iNtrumcnl orknowlcdgc. convencional conventional reality (u"'~

444

fO UNDATIONS Of DHAlMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

prlljfiAptislll; abo - contin~n( reality· ) boddlw tcathing in a«ord with, Hns of di5tributtd cntitia;• .ih 76-]9.

!..U. 16?-zo kncrwtcdp: and pen:eprion within. J4- 1I

levels of anaIpis and. 61=-64, 61-61 oIlNbhi.... 19)--96. 19' 99 tdie: function :u. J91 of UOMBaU. 811l.41. 114=11. )91, 191n}

Vuubandhu on. 40-=11, "...,so

s,.,. lib. C'Onv.rntioornJ.,.,..,ition; realities; Kmanhc con~ntion coprcsence (s.JJ.rMt.h.a: abo-cotwO

oa:um:nce-), 1InJ6. 19n}l. }In}8.

""

co-n::fuuuiality, u 8nl0+ 12.8mI9. 1+1=41. J.46--.t7

..... ,a:. lu"""lc.¥ (-,ol"*&iIW_). .u.. 116

Sn-Js. il\SQUlll(nl of~ correa perccprual j~1

!J"u,.I,."".JJ.;'..

,.. pelttp-

~

definitive &termination. as

luai judgmem Conens, Andrew. S901) coumeraampk ( ...UJJ.~II(j. ~ 1110104

Sn- Js. eumpIQ

as prompting action. 1910116 , }u..

"'".

as 'Ubtcquenl petccpnw judgment

r".".;,.,,,,.w.;;,.,,,,,"J"i. lL

IS7n1S. usn). 117-')09. )11 delimiter (.. ~. -'imil,,). !.!L 118nl0,., ~ 160011 delimiting quality (1I~.Jhi). t)6nl)).

.uo

.....,0

desire ro know (ftjtwU). 161l.4.l.4Dl,. 188n6}. J19

.s« .Js. doubi

dctam.im.te cognition ("iIc~rillJ. 14r.8 inmuITIe-nw coptil ion u rompat· ibk with, 117n7.14 }11-1".

m-80 nona:tRlXpfl.lal.

'7=19. JIS-17. )14.

191, )96-411 progrm;iw: rdi.JllItion of through the- K2k of analysis, n-§;. JI1-19 ~

;DCl:pras.ibk. }S4 u undiuribulod, n6 Sec also IWIW,.., U 1Uo1llfeU

_W~

aKncdama&. JS9, }60

essenlwism. ,1J=14. 11~7. J71 essential n.1ll1rt (wtlM4IJ11;";;p.). Sec wtllM4""" U natufe-SWMws. essencial propeny. 2l! 116, In- ,§. .... OJ }9. !.Y.. 171D41. ,11='1. 100. ~ 1 !r.I . 4Q 7 "' ~

Str If.iIIJ accidcnWiessenlW distinction; na::asity mdmoe (hm,;lilfpl.: p~ WlMM) uomainmmlof. 19}. 196 deKription of. 16-u. ~ !!1 incompalibilif)' wilh theoon tr.&dictoty of die prcdiale- 10

be prown (sMIhJR,,;~

in . ~

shifi from

~"U

notioN concaning. ;t, i!, lli 16n7 SN.IM m...ion; inlernal dinortion; spurious puuption

u t-uo onTOlogical basis for, 96n67. lSI rel iabiliry (.IIJ4~I1r';of. of lhe IImJeI, ZL 1 )01\11 thrttfold (~,;p). JSI\.4S, ~,,,,_~.

'S0=5'

1"7" 9

forms of. 11ld] Str .Js.Jdfca..mdcnce; 1IItIf1N.... IWO

"""'""

~-pn:dica~ rclalion

(I1Jtl!ti:

also -pnvuion-) dc.cripcion of. '1i--I1. l!. !!1 atabIishcd through a single obscrv,J.lion, lOll and identity.mode of mewwMtl".",.rilNtNilM, 101-11 U DOl established through mut" obscmllUon and nonob.crviilion. 1·t'l::U , !!!1. l}S-)a

and problem of indua ion, 1iII-:SJ

44'

IN DEX

and production-mode of the 1IIJI1JM.,.",.tiIMNIh.. 174=11 ~ .ls# c;oncomit2JlCe; ruk of unaccom~ied non-uisinl cvicfence..subjca m alion r.,.Ir[.Ivr",m~.: N""",,' abo

·application"). H-H. J5~S, ,,11

_ _ ,_ r'""

( L..~,.u ·

-:1.-'

,,414. ...""' . sl.o

. '

"cumplificarion'1 JlCCCSIi[), of in inference-for"""" l!Cll &, .Js.lXIWlll:ra:ampk; 5upponing example excluded mary (1IJbrtU), 80-81 . l2I. ~ I)QflU.~, 11I-n, !.H!

171f1+4. )119 ezdusion (VJllIIJTfi:~) at abttraaion. !..2Z u bucd on unique: particulan. !!L !.!it ~ ~ 170. 19s--96, J)9 :as both real and unreal, 1l'l=lO. )9sn8 aJ ~ "'ppann(C, !!L Ill-H. u!. ~. H7 as idcmieallo UUII which is

,,,...

adudcd {1IJl",""J. Ill-H. :as mere ezduding of other

(.1fJtI/!dM-J, Hl-U, IU-J6 ~ru~IWJ,lMIM u being. l.Il1:1 narutt-moIW""" U wamlnr for construaing. IS9-61 as negation, & !.!i. !..!l. ~ 1)1-". IU46

and 1Wbhiu. ~cc, 101" Sec al50 ..~ .. hcorr. ezduckd entity

or("mpliftCaoon (.uUh.r.!'4). SoT examples aistc:nl thing (M.il\ll; abo "erlliry"; "thingl opable of ......, func.ion, '.n.... as causing unique rognilioru. lUI

:u

as cxpcricnml in its cnli my in pcruption, }07m6.4 as h3ving 3 n.aru~ mal docs rIO( overlap. III ;and me real in Nyiya.Vmqw. 1, n6 1

as referring 10 extended mtilia, 76-78.!L!!l! 119m06 ClIPCCUUOIU ;and

ph. 2.S9.

roIc in conccpr folTlUlion. U7=-19. 11:4-2.1. 158 n2.5. !l! tolc in judgmc'l! subsequent to pcro:;plion. ~ )01 and 5C1'JUntic convaloons. IlBnll9. H I

Sec also Ilnh.kriJtl. apccttd apec1td wic efficacy (.bhiWW
(,....ub

(dApt1fIJilN~

uk!

judicious penon (p~1I#11It; prJt,4",nwhlri,,) at Kling for the sake of goW, 1751.

)'.

u aaing on pankulan. )90. 41) at acting through doubc. JiSll4 Q acti ng through inwurncmal rognitioru. 166. 191nu6. 38..

the mark cr. l SI and .aiprun::, 14), )67 as 5«king fOdiminate flaW$, 371 juscifJatian, 1:. us !iN.u. inmumo:nr.aliry raJOn as

K Kajiya ..... Yu ichi. 1, lnZO Kamabiila, lo nll. I09 nI7. 116n99.

-ip.

fO UNDATIONS Of DHAkMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

l.11nllO. 1}IOll6, 116n). }16nll}.

-'

Kampab. )z.6n6 Kapstc-in. Mallhew. 4OfISl. 41n·s; 1}Of11). 1Son41

Urili I)'Ilcm. 16=10, 161. 170-71 u~ 5« inurumem bnn., m 5« .1r4lwmic world .brmu,,!u motionl. J01 unu" lu objea]. 5« patinH Iwmic 'II'Orid (J.M). 186061. )1,--)0 Unr. 5« Igem IUryorhmI. SNdiKl-cvidma: K..uura. SMryil. s'n7 . l09ni7.

u6n99. l?9n8l1. 101-1. 171n19 IGty.iyalU,9}n61

KdIner. Birgjl. 86n5). 1.46"4, 316mb krv,JJ"HJi'" 5« inFerence. involving only pomive colKOmit Stephen. ~

koowIatg< p,.Mi!"'bhiu. 5« one who has

Plancinga. Alvin, IIJnsJ. IISn60 plunlity (.,.Ju,d). 5« multipliciry; varicption . p<M.nve concomllan«"

.

.

(.,.~~ti).

5N oona;lIrumnce,

"""'~worlds, Ils-&6 poasibk Poner, Karl on usumpcions in p~ 11Koly. 1On1 4 on inmummality. n7n7. u8-19.

"7

on M. 148-11

&r III» tvidenc:t-predicale malion prrk,lpiinwUrill. &r judicious

"""'"

prr~IeL

.sn

judicious penon presumption C....hJf'6Jti.· abo ~pf\" lumprive indIJQw)tl"), 1)n1O, ~

pm. (" hungry' ghosl"). J!16n61, J1~-16

PrnJ, Ernst, l..anSl prirnaty cawe: (,.,..uMhrr..), 164-66. 181-81. J69-71 production-mock of

SWMillllprtUiHNIiM. Sec ....JJ.b.".li~ prntluoinn_ mode of proptfty (1ihIInru; alto ·predicate"), !l. 9s=J6, IU-fl, IS9nll, 16ul)). 171n.... , 18~. 197-101, 1Ot-U, l49 , )S1-51

-....

Set also 1IIff~ as proptny. ~ propaty-P0'YVN (tIM""i,,). $no wbjea of I proposition propaty-IllllbJM_ Sec IllllMiIlll, IS proptfty, sIWMi...

Plopat)' WI puvadc:s

(lIJIIp"ulb."",,). .sn ~ing propc:rty propertY 10 be prtJ\'al (t.#; 'VmI4). S« prtdiate 10

"'P~

prop06ition 10 be- p~n r,rlUijiU; ,./qA}. $no tha.is $no ordinary persons psychologism , 14n1S, 17n)1, lli !L.

,.rrhtttJiI-

...

prychophyUcal awegalCS (IU"';"), 6!Q. 61n17, j~, 409 ,wI~ rz!!!..! hJpiII"i~ (Vuublondhu). 1}Oftl)

pwpotC ("";",,. ,~ .. abo

"aim"; "goal": "tdos") centnliry 0(, 16n1. JI"11. "H9 , 1!.. J11-JO IXmccpu as requltlng. !.!1. ~ }44 , ,...s, JS4-5S. Jf7 ilUltumenaliry and, llB-p. ~ lSS-6ll, 17)-17. 197. l~)OJ.

)08. )Itrl) , J14- 1S. }8,..&4

INDEX

tclic function and. ~J-94, 1S'-'o, 211-78. )]6. )91 nl of a ueau.e or scriJlfUU". U::H! )61~1. )17 w limalC:. lsn1l. ~ 11.9-)1. !II . 4M2. )14-18

Stt.w human aim

!"~s,.P_n

! 1I"'fIlrth.. Sn hunun aim rye. Michad, 15"'4

'" la:ocnition ("ny.Mijfi41111; u'!'jlU), u..6.. UQ, lY!lJ}I, 161n19. 19 1n115. }44. }46

~ "" ,,/nil"''''''' ~ !Z1

reduction coocqxual, 215. u8 of atrnded (tIlities 10 panicuWs. ~ 7!ci'i . !la 21.t!.!lt :ull o nlologial, principk of, 199, J:OH, 101--11, 114. !!L 118 of propettics 10 p.1Inic:ulan, . 03-~

Q quaii[f. 17'-=21, 11 s«.w PrnUcatc of a proposilion: II1/IJMIwI, as ptopt:iiy-lI1/IJWJ.fw

quaiiry-pouasor. 17=11, n nso Stt ..huubjec1 of a proposition quali[f/qualificd tdalion. !.!J., ~ I1SnIl9. HB-Sl.)H Quine, W.V.• 2uml7

Stt.J. irrrducibiliry: reducti~ analysis m:1uaivc: ana.l)'$b ( III."."... 1IkbW,

. ..,....

aha ~reduaiYc rcuoningl of diKributed (fuilia. til

and kvds of analysu. ~

6t:79,

a.

70=7 6

~, ~ .p=-;).1t 6z.-6).

R Ram-I'ruad. OWuavanhi. ll9mo Ra.tnaltini, l}uull

oflhc real. l!t 2io.1!.

i8=-99.

R..ml,.,w (N1prjuna), W')

Sa ttl. irreducibiliry:

~

real (S/l.I) as dwxtcriud by Idie dfx:xy, 4sn6.t, ~

as COII t (tll oiindubitabk knowing. JH6, t!.o Lt-lz, 91-1I}

as inapret.5ibk. 12. i!.::iZ as momentary. i!:::!Z as simpk, }Z- i S, 11 79-81. 98-11 ) s«..Is. particular, IWO rcalilia: rnliml.. )61l4i. S!. S9nIJ. 'ZL

u6-1z. !l!, }lJ lUIOnins (1IJIIJIa.' ,un) as Buddhul practice. 1SI. )18-1.9 corxfilionals in, 1 ~15 and ICYds of analysis. 61 pwpoM' as a ~ ooor in, fl SN "'- inkn:ftCC1 redlK'ti"" an&iy-

w: 5I}'k o f rnsoning

anaI)"iI; reduaion ItfdcntW fi..maion r,"'''!"i), ih 195, I11n1l8

Stt (1M semantic convention rdino:mem. }10. )11-)0 rdkx.ive awarmcss (1lIIW'!'wtLut..) as arising as the: subj«tiYc asp«! of awum.el$. )9lnl insuummr.ality of as sheer ausal dJic:ic:ncy, 160. 176, 178 n"...dUl li.,. of, +07"IS role in UlXnaining in.n rumemaliry of pc.ception, 191, 195, )78",+ 3iS-36 sellks.snas as, 401n1 ) , .. 06nlS. ,.oSnl5 u uilimale p,,,1N1fU, ) 11 reI.lion., t!=1,.!1 rdiPOW subscratum, 10nl4

..60

FOUNOATIONS OF OHARMAKUtTrs PHILOSOPHY

><mO., Uw: P'}'ChophyUeal aggrepa ill'C' the

..s,

INDEX

lotus of I xlf'}. U. ~I.

as object of spiri tual adqJu.

1,.nl)8. }71-7) Sauuintib. 11 Sin.l " ~ Zh Ii!

.II •

79n}l, Ion)9. 9! IClk of analysis. 5« IcYds of

Vl~lpuuiy.a

..w,.;.

$dwf, Robert, 9)n61 , 10l n74 Schmid...-n , Lun!.en, l 'n7 saipNtal infcrmc.c (tlp~1Il/.mI), " ,.... S, ISI; l,

universal dwxteristic of elemental things.. 811\4S

poairion on, S7nll ACmanUc (l)l!.Yefllton (~. ",.uJ,4,~ abo ~linguisric conYm-

lion'

analogy:u 1Uociucd with, 141nl. as crucial to inference by IJW~. 11lAI18

)61-7)

saipnm (tlplM: /rwti)

,,.,

Oharmaklni'.IJIIlrin! citation of, Dhannkinr. aniNde loward in &:bate. Innl4

eight demen~ of Dharmakini'. dixwt.ion of, 40-41 instNtDenuliry of, lL 1)nlO, 11-4. lll- n . l)HSt )61-7) :If not

)05n16o. )69n11. 406nl'

of hl.UlWl origin

(""~. 1J) thredOkt analysis of. 14~ 5« .w. credibility; Kriptunl infer~

tetf (brrfIut) :If agenl

ofiruuumental knowing in Brahmankal thouJht. H! beliefin as diminated in 1I;nliflll,

"""" ,,.

.II distributed

entiry, +41161, 61n17.

as object oIbdicfin ~i. iL~ )71- 11

Iin9c

:If a eum«. )4). mini} ... uninr.,...,.hk. j6) tdf-dinging (h1tvIlSttthc). ~

J71-1l

sdJIesmeu (.I/IlhruI1I; ""i~) :u antidote to Alffaing. 6onlS. 191n1)l. )6In1O, }69n1l. }71 all a dist:ribuled entiry, ~1 AI inHnunc:no:ai ob;ca, ",. 4C)lnl}, 4O'Snl4, 408m1

indirectly refcrins 10 infinitesimal pa.nic:Ia. l!!

all

IlOnl07 :If rooted in odwion, )+4.

)H~

for Alb;ca and predicate. 117n1l9. l1.8n1l9. 17lIl44 ACNe cilium. ~ Sit .w. cognitive image ICnK faculry (i~. abo -1CftJC ocpn', 1'=14. 12.4. 116-17, 1.61, US , 169-7'0. }I)-Is sensible dement (l)Ioru..... abo -JeNe sphere', ~ ZO=71, 79nJl. 10l nn. I09 n87. J97"" JCmOf)' oontaCt (s.1r1rj~ sp.rt.), !J., 1!! 169",,0, )44. )6) Shah. Nagin. }a>I, 40n n

on scripnuc, Inn I.., 140 o n the ruuaurc of the PrtItd,!,,uj'dJ,j chapter, 115n17

on the theory of unconscious CI1l)I", ~ )11 on the Ir:uuempiria.l. l)Onll, 1)Onl} on lruth, US totality of CltuaI chanctcrW:ics, 161=V, 18s, 197=100, 1J1-1}, 198. l'l ""irii!JtW"'~. S«cvidcncc,

""""'~

Innsccndcn, aw:umeu fWolUlr.jfU""J. 4!n57 lranscmpiric:al objca (.".IIU}M",q.; abo • c:nremcly rt'fllOlC objca~), lJO:Jl, 140-"1,

L45, L49-S1,}61-67. ~nl.

Sir.1. supcnomsihk objca u~rulation .

11- 1], 1l}- z.8 transworld identity, 18t:" tl\lMWOlthineN r."u.".....) of conceptual togni liOlU, !.£ ofirutrumcntal tognition, ~ 1S
J6. !.ll.t 169-70. bds of analysis and. 61-§4, "=11\. I U

6~,

)"U

70=79. 1)9n4

of mind as undiffemuimd. 171, 176"9). 401-14

mommwinal of. !!=!Z .... object of """",p

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Dramatic Universe, The; Vol. 2, The Foundations of Moral Philosophy

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