For Better or Worse: How Political Consultants Are Changing Elections in the United States

For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States David A. Dulio For Better ...

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For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States

David A. Dulio

For Better or Worse?

For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States

David A. Dulio

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2004 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207 Production by Diane Ganeles Marketing by Jennifer Giovani Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dulio, David A. For better or worse? : how political consultants are changing elections in the United States / David A. Dulio. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references amd index. ISBN 0-7914-6043-6 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-6044-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Political consultants—United States. 2. Political campaigns—United States. 3. Campaign management—United States. 4. Campaign funds—United States. I. Title. JK2281.D85 2004 324.7'0973—dc21

2003052608 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Abigail

Contents k List of Illustrations

ix

List of Tables

vi

Preface

xv

1. Introduction

1

2. Consultants Enter the Electioneering Mix

13

3. Who are these Guys Anyway?

41

4. Electoral Connections: Consultants, Candidates, Voters, and the Press

65

5. Party Favors?: Have Consultants Replaced Political Parties?

101

6. Consultants’ Effects on Candidate Fund-raising and Electoral Success

135

7. For Better or Worse—What Hath the Consultants Wrought?

167

Appendices

187

Notes

235

Bibliography

261

Index

281

vii

Illustrations k Figures 2.1 Voting Age Population, 1932–1998

24

2.2 Republican and Democratic Party Fund-raising in Midterm Elections, 1978–1998

27

2.3 Republican and Democratic Party Fund-raising in Presidential Elections, 1979–2000

28

3.1 Average Age of Consultants, Members of the U.S. House, Candidates, Campaign Activists, and the General Public

47

3.2 Average Income of Consultants, Members of the U.S. House, Campaign Activists, and the General Public

49

ix

Tables k 1.1 Average Budgets of Congressional Candidates during the 2000 and 2002 Election Cycles

3

2.1 Republican and Democratic Party Nonfederal Fund-raising Dollars, 1992–2000

26

3.1 Racial Distribution of Political Consultants, Candidates for the U.S. House, Members of the U.S. House, the General Public, and Campaign Activists.

46

3.2 Partisan Distribution of Political Consultants, Campaign Activists, and the General Public

51

3.3 Ideological Distribution of Consultants, Members of the U.S. House, Campaign Activists, and the General Public

52

3.4 The Motivations of Political Consultants for Getting into the Business

58

3.5 The General Public’s Motivations for Becoming Active in Campaigns

59

3.6 Partisan Differences in the Motivations of Political Consultants

61

3.7 Comparison of Consultants’ Motivations across Periods of Entry into the Profession

63

4.1 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Candidates

77

4.2 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Views of How Candidate Quality Has Changed over Time

79

xi

xii 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9

Tables Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Regret for Working for a Candidate They Helped Elect to Office

80

Consultants’ Entry into the Profession and Their Retrospective Analyses of Helping Candidates Get Elected

80

Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Views of How Well Informed the American Electorate Is

87

Partisan Differences among Individuals in the General Public of How Well Informed They Are

87

Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Trust and Confidence in the American Electorate

89

Partisan Differences in the General Public’s Trust and Confidence in the American Electorate

89

Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Views of How Much the Way in Which Money Is Raised in Elections Leads to Voter Cynicism in the United States

91

4.10 Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Political Journalists, Candidates, Consultants, and Political Parties

96

4.11 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Political Print Journalists

97

4.12 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Political Broadcast Journalists

97

4.13 Consultants’ Employment History and Their Attitudes about Political Broadcast Journalists

98

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

Consultants’ Assessment of the Role of Parties and Consultants over Time

118

Consultants’ Assessment of the Changing Roles of Parties across Different Cohorts

119

Consultants’ Assessment of the Changing Roles of Consultants across Different Cohorts

121

Consultants’ Rankings of Those Electioneering Services They Believe They Have Taken over from Parties

123

Consultants’ Rankings of Those Services Offered by the National Party They Believe Are Helpful to Campaigns They Work On

124

Tables 5.6

xiii

Consultants’ Employment History in Political Party Organizations and Their Entry into the Profession

130

Well-known and Effective Political Consultants during the 1998 Election Cycle

145

Average Receipts for Candidates during 1998, Controlling for the Type of Consultant Hired

150

Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Incumbents’ 1998 PAC Receipts

153

Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Challenger Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receipts

154

Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Open-Seat Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receipts

156

Average Vote Share for Candidates during 1998, Controlling for the Type of Consultant Hired

158

Effects of Hiring Effective Political Consultants on Incumbents’ 1998 Vote Share

159

Consultant Use in Competitive and Noncompetitive Incumbent Races during 1998

162

Effects of Hiring Effective Political Consultants on Challenger Candidates’ 1998 Vote Share

163

A4.1 First-Stage Results for Incumbent Fund-raising Analysis (Table 6.3)

219

A4.2 Supplemental Analysis of Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Incumbents’ 1998 PAC Receipts

220

A4.3 First-stage Results for Supplemental Incumbent Fund-raising Analysis in Table A4.2

221

A4.4 First-stage Results for Challenger-Candidate Fund-raising Analysis (Table 6.4)

222

A4.5 Supplemental Analysis of Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Challenger Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receipts

223

A4.6 First-stage Results for Supplemental Challenger-Candidate Fund-raising Analysis in Table A4.5

224

A4.7 First-stage Results for Open-Seat Candidate Fund-raising Analysis (Table 6.5)

225

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9

xiv

Tables

A4.8 Supplemental Analysis of Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Open-Seat Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receipts

226

A4.9 First-stage Results for Open-Seat Candidates Fund-raising Analysis in Table A4.8

227

A5.1 Replication of Incumbent Fund-raising Models without Individual Contributions Variable

221

A5.2 Replication of Challenger Fund-raising Models without Individual Contributions Variable

232

A5.3 Replication of Open-seat Candidate Fund-raising Models without Individual Contributions Variable

233

Preface k Campaigns in the United States have changed in myriad ways since the late 1780s when the first members of Congress were elected to begin service, or George Washington was elected president. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, American elections are a perpetual phenomenon. The “permanent campaign” that many have noticed is dominated by money, attack ads, voter apathy and cynicism, among other things. Professional political consultants, the subjects of this book, are another principal force in modern campaigns. They have become the individuals who candidates turn to for advice during, and sometimes between, campaigns and have become a nearly ubiquitous presence in modern elections. However, we know little about these individuals who play such a vital role in our system of choosing representatives and leaders. For much of their existence, consultants have operated in the shadows of elections, not allowing students of political campaigns to see who they are, what they do, or how they relate to other important electoral actors. This book focuses on the role professional political consultants have in U.S. elections today by investigating the relationships they have with other electoral actors and examining consultants’ attitudes and beliefs about candidates, voters, and political parties as well as their own place in the electoral system. Although this discussion does not include a “how to” of political campaigning—I will leave that for the experts, the consultants themselves—it does include an examination of consultants’ place in modern elections and what they contribute to campaigns. Part of this task is to explore and evaluate many of the criticisms that have been levied against consultants. Are consultants detrimental to democratic elections? Are they the root of increasingly expensive

xv

xvi

Preface

campaigns? Do they manipulate the American voter with slick tricks and gimmicks? The answers to these questions may surprise some readers. This book would not have been possible without the help of many individuals. First and foremost are Jim Thurber and Candy Nelson. The experiences and opportunities they afforded me while I was a graduate student at the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies (CCPS) at American University were more than I could have ever asked for. My involvement with the Campaign Management Institute under Candy Nelson gave me my first glimpse into the world of practical politics and professional consultants. It was my great fortune to have a mentor in Jim Thurber who was more generous with time, resources, and opportunities than any graduate student could ever expect. I never could have completed this project without his assistance, guidance, and, most of all, his generosity. He and Candy brought me on board their “Improving Campaign Conduct” project, funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts, and provided me not only with a place to work and learn but with an opportunity to become involved in a tremendous research experience, which evolved into this book, and expected nothing in return. That said, the individuals at The Pew Charitable Trusts also deserve a great deal of thanks, especially Sean Treglia, Michael Delli Carpini, Rebecca Rimel, and Paul Light. They saw the importance of increasing our knowledge of professional political consultants, and provided the resources for CCPS to begin and continue its work in this area. Paul Herrnson deserves a tremendous amount of credit and thanks for his role in this project. He agreed to serve on my dissertation committee from a remote location at the University of Maryland and provided unmeasurable guidance. He did not have to put the time and energy he did into responding to questions, reading various drafts, and putting up with me. I only hope that some day I can begin to repay him for his efforts. During this process I was also very lucky to come to know, respect, and admire two other individuals—Robin Kolodny and Stephen Medvic—whom have been helpful beyond words. They helped in myriad ways from being sounding boards for under-developed ideas to reading and offering comments on drafts of chapters. I have gotten to know both of them well and I am proud to call them colleagues. I am even more proud to call them friends. Countless people at American University and the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies deserve a great deal of thanks as well. Nathan Dietz and Laura Langbein showed tremendous pa-

Preface

xvii

tience in helping me through some methodological questions, debates, and difficulties. Thanks also go to Gregg Ivers, Colton Campbell, Erin O’Brien, Julie Mazzei, Kevin Conway, Marni Ezra, Sam Garrett, Leslie McNaugher, and the rest of the CCPS staff, past and present, for their friendship and support throughout the process of completing this book. My colleagues at Oakland University also deserve a great deal of thanks for providing me with an outstanding environment for improving my scholarship and teaching. Everyone at SUNY Press has been wonderful to work with in getting this book in print. Michael Rinella and Diane Ganeles shepherded the manuscript through all the hurdles of the process beautifully. Two anonymous reviewers provided very helpful comments which improved the book greatly. All the remaining errors are mine and mine alone. Finally, and most importantly, my family has been there for me from day one. My parents have always known what to say and when to say it, including when to say nothing at all. Their encouragement, support, and love have always been unconditional and unwavering. Without them I would not be who or where I am today. The person who has had to put up with the most, however, has undoubtedly been my wife, Adrianne. Throughout this project she has supported me and been there for me every day. She has always believed in me in everything I have done and has shown more patience than is imaginable. She is my muse. I only hope I can give her half as much as she has given me.

1 k Introduction On May 31, 1998, an editorial by Heidi Behrens-Benedict, an interior designer by trade, appeared in the Seattle Times in response to the school shootings in Springfield, Oregon, ten days before. In that editorial, BehrensBenedict said, “I am sick to death of the National Rifle Association (NRA) and its disgusting perversion of our Constitution,” adding that she would “not support any elected official who accept[ed] money from the NRA,” and that she would “actively work to see them unseated” (BehrensBenedict 1998, B7). Behrens-Benedict did not know how prophetic her words would be. Less than a week later she was a candidate for the United States House of Representatives in Washington’s Eighth Congressional District, a seat held by Jennifer Dunn, the ﬁfth-ranking leader among Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives at the time. Heidi Behrens-Benedict was spurred to seek elective office because she felt strongly about changing public policy in an issue area she believed in; in other words, she was the ideal candidate for a representative democracy.1 However, Behrens-Benedict was a political unknown before she threw her proverbial hat into the ring of electoral politics; she was an amateur in the truest sense of the word.2 In an era where campaigns are dominated by television commercials, campaign contributions, and voter cynicism, the ability of candidates like Heidi Behrens-Benedict to mount a serious campaign is limited. Not only was her candidacy taken lightly by journalists and the GOP, even Behrens-Benedict’s own party was less than enthusiastic about her candidacy. She recalls, for instance, that during her initial conversation

1

2


with the state Democratic Party, “officials were nice but skeptical” (Nelson 1998a, B1).3 If Behrens-Benedict were a candidate running for Congress in the mid-1800s,4 the local- and state-party organizations would have been the backbone of the campaign. However, candidates running for office today find themselves in a “candidate-centered” electoral system in which party organizations cannot be counted on for a great deal of help, as the focus is on the candidate, not the party. In fact, prior to 1998, the Washington State Democratic Party had a history of “bailing out” on candidates whose chances of winning were less than stellar (Nelson 1998b). In this instance, according to Behrens-Benedict, the state Democratic Party was leery of her decision to run for office, taking the attitude of “we’ll see how she does, and if her arms and legs don’t blow off, . . . we’ll look at [supporting her as a candidate]” (Behrens-Benedict 2001). This sharply contrasted with her preconceived notion that the state party would welcome with “open arms” someone who was willing to take on a powerful and popular incumbent (Behrens-Benedict 2001). Few newcomers to electoral politics know how to run for Congress or how to begin setting up a campaign organization. “I’m getting ready to drive home [from a meeting with the gun-control advocacy group Washington Cease Fire], and I realize I have no idea how to run for Congress,” Behrens-Benedict (2001) recalls. Where was this political novice to turn for help, then, if not the party organization? Where could she find experienced help to assist her in communicating with voters in Washington’s Eighth Congressional District, or with any of the other aspects of a campaign that are totally foreign to a political novice? Modern campaign organizations at the federal and state-wide level are not unlike small business operations.5 Like businesses, the size of modern campaigns and the budgets they operate with are substantial. Over the past two election cycles, for example, the average candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives raised enough money to support a budget that approached $700,000 with many candidates raising close to one million, while the average U.S. Senate candidate’s budget was over $5 million in 2000 and $3 million in 2002 with some candidates raising over $10 million (see Table 1.1). Even the most entrepreneurial businessperson would not think of starting a small business with budgets such as these without obtaining help; to put themselves in a position to be successful, they must create a detailed plan for how they are going to be successful through consultation with financial consultants and advisors, marketing and advertising experts, as well as accountants and attorneys, and they must set up reliable sources of financing.6 Getting the right advice from staff who

3

Introduction Table 1.1 Average Budgets of Congressional Candidates during the 2000 and 2002 Election Cycles Average Receipts

Senate Candidates

House Candidates

2000 All Candidates Incumbent Candidates Open-Seat Candidates Challenger Candidates

$ 5,304,857 $ 4,503,103 $16,551,000 $ 2,427,096

$ 661,475 $ 890,620 $1,159,375 $ 309,603

2002 All Candidates Incumbent Candidates Open-Seat Candidates Challenger Candidates

$ $ $ $

$ 679,789 $ 916,913 $1,137,934 $ 261,517

3,771,159 4,534,814 8,271,250 2,105,882

Source: Federal Election Commission, “Financial Activity of General Election Congressional Candidates—1990–2002,” table included in press release “House and Senate Candidates Spend $963 Million During 2001–2002” released on June 18, 2003. www.fec.gov/press/20030618canstat/20030618canstat.html.

share the goals of the entrepreneur is also key to creating a successful venture (Graham 2001). Individuals who decide to put their names forward for public office, incumbents and challengers alike, face similar decisions and challenges before their campaigns even begin. Coming up with a name for a campaign is not a difficult task for either incumbents or challengers. It usually results in something catchy or familiar, like Bush/Cheney 2000, Clinton/Gore ’96, Moore for Congress, or Watts for Congress, which becomes not only the name of the campaign but of an organization to which supporters can contribute money. However, devising a strategy that will lead to a successful campaign is more difficult. As will be explored in later chapters, candidates are on their own for the most part in today’s campaigns in terms of forming their own campaign organization and getting the right people into key staff positions. Heidi Behrens-Benedict garnered 40.3 percent of the vote in her 1998 campaign for Congress, giving Representative Jennifer Dunn her closest race ever. Although she did not win, Behrens-Benedict, as well as local political observers, did consider her 1998 campaign a success; a political unknown earning over 40 percent of the vote in their first foray into running for office is simply not a common occurrence. The Behrens-Benedict case illustrates how the successes of a campaign also extend into less easily measured factors. Accordingly, she was able to make the voters in Washington’s Eighth Congressional District more aware of Representative Dunn’s voting record in Congress on issues

4


that were of significance to the district. The 1998 race also showed Republicans that they could not afford to take the eighth district for granted the next time around. In other words, the Behrens-Benedict campaign made that district more competitive than it had been, thus forcing Dunn to pay closer attention to her next election and to her constituents—in effect forcing the incumbent to represent the district. Although they were not many in number, “instrumental” in this success, says Behrens-Benedict, were her campaign advisors, including a campaign manager and a political consulting firm, the EvansMcDonough Co., which provided survey research and general strategic advice. Just as a new small business venture is unlikely to be successful without individuals who have experience in the same industry and who can contribute technical expertise that the businessperson would not otherwise have, campaigns need these kinds of individuals as well. As Behrens-Benedict herself said, she had “no idea how to run for Congress” (Behrens-Benedict 2001). Political advisors of this nature are the focus of this book. Without help from political consultants—paid political operatives who give advice and provide services to candidates—Behrens-Benedict, and other candidates like her, would not be able to mount much of a campaign at all. Celinda Lake, a Democratic pollster familiar with the BehrensBenedict campaign, believes that without these advisors BehrensBenedict could not have been as successful as she was in 1998: She wouldn’t have understood the kind of budget she needed to raise, [and] she wouldn’t have understood how to spend it . . . She would not have been able to write copy [for campaign communications]. She wouldn’t know the rules of direct mail . . . (Lake 2001) The successes of the Behrens-Benedict campaign and others like it “indicate that large expenditures on consultants, staff, and advertising permit amateurs to overcome initial deficits” that they face (Canon 1990, 3). The use of political consultants has become a near necessity in modern congressional elections. Nearly two-thirds of all candidates running for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1992 hired at least one professional consultant, up from just over 46 percent in 1990 (Medvic 2000; 2001).7 During the 1998 election cycle the average number of consultants hired per congressional campaign was five, and among incumbents only, this figure jumped to nearly seven (Herrnson 2000a). In addition, the influence of consultants has found its way into down-ballot races. Candidates for offices such as auditor and

Introduction

5

treasurer in Howard County, Indiana, school board in Duval City, Florida, and circuit court clerk in Chesapeake, Virginia, have all employed professional campaign advice (Johnson 2000). The impact of consultants is no longer limited to a few federal candidates; today they can be found in the campaigns of the highest federal official to the most local of candidates. This seemingly ever-present place in many congressional campaigns today has led consultants’ critics to argue that they are responsible for many of the ills that are equated with modern elections in the United States. For example, consultants are commonly believed to be responsible for “negative” and “attack” television advertisements, the increasing cost of campaigning, and the decline of political parties, to name only a few of the problems that plague our electoral system. However, professional political consultants do not deserve blame for these or other problems of modern campaigns. In fact, as later chapters will illustrate, professional consultants are in a position to enhance democratic elections. Because of their unique place in the electoral system they have an opportunity to help not only their candidateclients, but voters and parties as well. Those institutions and individuals they are thought to damage can in fact be bolstered by consultants’ participation in campaigns. This is not to say that the appearance and ascendance of the modern political consultant has not changed the dynamics of the electoral process. Exactly how professional political consultants have changed the way in which elections are waged in the United States and how they fit into the modern electoral context are the central questions explored in this book. The relationships consultants have with candidates, political parties, voters, and the media are the main themes of this research. An empirical analysis of the effect consultants have on candidates’ fund-raising and electoral success is also included. The term political consultant refers not to the earliest of political advisors, but to the specialist political operatives that have developed in the last half-century.8 The first campaign consultants, those who forged the way for the industry that exists today, functioned as general strategic advisors to candidates. Today, however, consultants offer their clients, which include candidates, political parties, and interest groups, specific technical and tactical advice. Now, instead of one general advisor making strategic plans, many campaigns (at all levels) hire a cadre of consultants, each one offering the campaign a different service.9 This kind of involvement creates new relationships in election campaigns. Although campaigns have always been comprised of

6


candidates, political parties, outside groups, and most importantly voters, the relationships between them were relatively straightforward. For example, candidates communicated directly with voters with methods that today would be described as “retail” politics. However, as technology became more advanced, the need for more specific knowledge grew, as did the need for consultants with this specific knowledge. Instead of a candidate-political party relationship, or a candidate-voter relationship, the dynamic now includes a triangular combination of actors with political consultants squarely in the middle. For example, instead of relying on handshakes and other forms of direct voter contact, today candidates send their messages through radio or television spots that are created by a media consultant, or targeted direct mailings created by direct mail specialists. The messages that candidates send to voters are crafted, in part, by professional advisors. Instead of a candidate communicating a message that tows the party line, today personalized messages are crafted for individual candidates with the help of survey research, focus groups, and opposition research provided by political consultants. From their beginning, consultants operated in the shadows of campaigns. In cities across the United States from the late 1970s through the 1980s, if there was a political campaign of importance chances are that there was a political consultant “behind the scenes, promoting some [candidate or issue] . . .” (Kraske 1999, A1). This is beginning to change. Political consultants are more visible today than ever before, with some taking center stage in campaigns. The 1993 New Jersey governor’s race has been described as a clash between “two campaign titans.” Not between candidates Jim Florio and Christine Todd Whitman, but between political consultants Ed Rollins and James Carville (Berke 1993, A1).10 More recently, heads turned when Al Gore brought Tony Coelho, Carter Eskew, and Naomi Wolf into his 2000 presidential campaign as advisers and consultants; instead of the campaign and candidate making news, it was the consultants who made the headlines. In addition, the organization a candidate puts together often serves as a measuring stick for his or her campaign. For example, U.S. Representative Frank Pallone’s hiring of a “team of high-profile political consultants in preparation for a [New Jersey] Senate campaign” caught the attention of the New York Times (Dao 1999, B1). These types of evaluative judgments can be found as far back as the early 1980s when the National Journal noted the “impressive . . . group of professionals” that the Reagan for President Committee had assembled (Bonafede 1980, 1224). Others, too, notice the types of organizations

Introduction

7

candidates put together. The presence of professional consultants in campaigns can have the effect of attracting donors (Herrnson 1992), or even scaring away potential challengers to incumbent officeholders. Consultants are not only covered by the media, but they are often called on to comment on the campaign or issues important to it; in other words, candidates’ consultants are becoming spokespersons for the campaign. For example, when an official in New York City was asked about a city issue that could affect Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s campaign, “he did not, in his capacity as a citywide elected official, offer an assessment. Instead, he referred the inquiry to his political consultant” (Barry 1999, 1). Consultants have also begun to comment on campaigns in which they are not involved. These more visible roles of consultants serve other purposes as well. When speaking for the candidate, consultants provide “spin control,” message discipline, and a less damaging way to absorb controversy or criticism.11

Inattention Paid to Consultants For many years, political scientists have tried to explain why voters vote the way they do.12 “As a result our attention has moved away from the electoral institutions in which consultants now play such a commanding role. In general we pay less attention to the dynamics of electoral processes and the processes of campaigning” (Petracca 1989, 11). However, as campaign strategy and tactics have become more and more important, consultants have become more important as well (Bennett 1996). Given the omnipresent nature consultants seem to have in campaigns, and their growing presence as news stories, if we are to truly understand the dynamics of election campaigns, we must understand the role that political consultants play. We must also know and understand who political consultants are, just as we have a good appreciation of candidates’ and voters’ backgrounds and beliefs. To ignore political consultants in an analysis of U.S. elections means an incomplete analysis of the phenomenon. The call for political science to pay attention to political consultants is also not new; as David L. Rosenbloom (1973) noted: “The rise of political campaign management in America deserves the closest study because the changes it reflects and brings go to the heart of our political system” (6). Unfortunately, this call has remained relatively unanswered. Until the 1980s, political consultants were mostly ignored in academic circles (notable exceptions include Kelley 1956; Nimmo 1970; Agranoff 1972; and Rosenbloom 1973). Of those consultant-focused works that

8


did appear, many were “produced by journalists or by practitioners whose writing consist[ed] of insider accounts of campaigning and ‘how to’ books” (Thurber 1998, 145). The earliest scholarly works were mainly descriptive accounts of the popular campaign tactics employed at that time, and portrayed consultants mainly as an extension of the publicrelations field. Consultants were seen as individuals who tried to sell candidates as they would laundry detergent or toothpaste. As the field continued to develop, consultants gained more attention, but it was not until the early 1980s and Larry Sabato’s (1981) influential work, The Rise of Political Consultants, that an academic work took on the question of consultants’ place in campaigns head-on. However, this and other early work consisted of no systematic study of consultants—either of their behavior, their attitudes, or their profile as individuals. Assertions about consultants’ relationships with political parties, their candidate-clients, and the media, and the effects they have had in election campaigns are abundant and remain untested.13

The Current Research In the following chapters, the changing nature of political consulting and the ways in which these professionals are changing the dynamics of U.S. election campaigns are examined through a systematic and thorough analysis of political consultants’ attitudes and behavior. One word of caution is important here: the reader looking for a series of tell-all stories about behind-the-scenes campaign tactics will be disappointed. This book is ultimately about candidates, voters, political parties, and how election contests are fought in today’s context. My goals are to make the reader more familiar with the consulting industry and to help them gain a greater understanding of who political consultants are, and to evaluate consultants’ effects in campaigns. Throughout the remaining chapters, the reader will explore how professional political consultants fit into the modern electoral context and will be in a better position to evaluate their place in democratic elections. The necessity for this type of work is clear given the lack of scholarly attention political consultants have previously been given. More importantly, the early works devoted to political consultants (Kelley 1956; Nimmo 1970; Rosenbloom 1973; and Sabato 1981, for example) are clearly outdated. The industry has changed in at least three significant ways that call for a new examination of political

Introduction

9

consultants. First, the industry has seen tremendous overall growth.14 One of the early works on consultants found, as of 1957, only roughly thirty or forty individuals acting as campaign managers in races around the country on a regular basis (Rosenbloom 1973, 51). Today, estimates of the number of consultants in this industry range anywhere from 3,000 to 7,000 (Johnson 2001). In addition, since the earliest works devoted to consultants, a professional organization, the American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC), has formed and developed. The AAPC has established industry norms and a code of ethics “to raise the standards of practice in political consultation, thereby enhancing the political process and improving public confidence in the American political system,” and “to provide professional guidance, assistance, and education to members as they develop the skills, techniques, and business procedures required for successful political consultation” (AAPC 2000). Second, along with the general growth of the field, there has been great turnover in the industry. Nearly 25 percent of all current consultants entered the business after President Reagan left office, 55 percent first became consultants after Sabato’s work in 1981, and a full 85 percent first became active in consulting after Watergate. It seems as though there are new consultants “hanging out their shingle” with each new election cycle, and that “there is always a new top dog” in the business (Carville 1999). Although recognizable names from the early days of consulting remain active—Peter Hart, Richard Wirthlin, Joseph Napolitan, and Harrison Hickman, for example—fresh consultants enter the industry every election cycle and become its new stars. Third, and as noted above, consulting has evolved into an industry of experts and specialists, each of whom have different roles and experiences in campaigns. A detailed division of labor and the development of expertise has evolved rapidly in the last two decades. Coinciding with this evolution have been great changes in campaign technology. New technology has exploded on the campaign scene in nearly every area of campaigns. The industry is technology driven, especially with respect to developments in information technology, television, survey research, demographic targeting, and looking toward the future, the Internet. In addition, early attention paid to political consultants succeeded only in making untested and unsubstantiated assertions. This book contains tests and evaluations of many of the hypotheses and assertions made about consultants, their relationship with clients and voters, their motivations for being political professionals, and the electoral process in general.

10


Plan of the Book In chapter 2 I describe how the proliferation of political consultants has altered the dynamics of U.S. elections. As noted above, the modern electoral context includes relationships among consultants, candidates, political parties, interest groups, voters, and the media. When consultants became a fixture in American elections, these relationships changed. I begin chapter 2 with a brief history of political consulting in order to provide some background and general information such as the birth of the industry and the trend taking the field from general strategists to specialists. The discussion then turns to an initial consideration of the relationships consultants have with candidates, voters, political parties, and the media, and how these relationships and actors have changed over time. In chapter 3 I provide a general description of the consulting industry by addressing questions such as: Who are political consultants? And, how do the individuals who run candidates’ campaigns compare to their clients and the electorate? Consultants’ motivations for becoming active in the political process are also examined and compared to those of party officials and political amateurs (including volunteers and voters). The data that allow for an examination of these questions (as well as those addressed in chapters 4 and 5) are a unique set of survey data centering on the political consulting industry. In the spring of 1999, in conjunction with the “Improving Campaign Conduct” project at American University’s Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, 505 thirty-minute in-depth interviews with principals in political consulting firms of all types from across the nation were conducted yielding the most comprehensive and detailed survey of the industry to date. These data provided a unique perspective from which to evaluate and explore this group of important individuals and is the basis for much of the information provided below. Whereas in chapter 3 I provide basic information about the consulting industry, in chapter 4 I continue to analyze consultants’ relationships with different actors in the electoral process, with a focus on their attitudes and beliefs about those actors, building on earlier work that has begun to address some of these questions (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 1998; 1999; 2000). This includes an examination of data that provide insight into how consultants view those they work for and against (candidates and parties), those they are trying to persuade (voters), and those who report on, and provide a great deal of information during, the campaign (the media).

Introduction

11

I devote chapter 5 solely to consultants’ relationship with political parties because this relationship has been one that has received a good deal of attention and has produced some controversy. As noted above, some have argued that political consultants are bad for democracy and political parties; in particular, consultants are said to have pushed parties into decline and are thought of as the rivals of political parties. In chapter 5 I investigate this question and provide an updated illustration of the relationship the two actors have. In chapter 6 the focus of the book shifts to a question of consultant performance. Only part of the picture of how consultants are changing the way in which elections are waged in the United States can be uncovered with attitudinal data. A more complete assessment of the way consultants are changing elections in American can be obtained with behavioral data. Therefore, I analyze the value consultants add to a candidate’s campaign. Previous research has examined the effect consultants have on a campaign’s fund-raising and vote totals.15 However, the analyses in chapter 6 test the hypothesis that hiring certain consultants has a greater impact on candidate fund-raising and vote totals than hiring just any consultant. In chapter 7 I explore the implications of the relationships discussed in chapters 2 through 6. For instance, the reliance most candidates have on paid communications techniques to spread their campaign’s message (i.e., radio, television, and direct mail) speaks to the relationship consultants have with candidates and voters alike. In this final chapter I address what the specifics of relationships such as this mean for the representative nature of our democracy. Consultants’ attitudes about voters, candidates, and political parties will also be revisited, as these relationships are important links when discussing the effect consultants have had on our representative democracy. Further, the ways in which consultants can benefit different campaign actors, as well as democratic discourse, are addressed. Finally, the future of consultants and their influence and impact is considered in the context of recent campaign reforms.

2 k Consultants Enter the Electioneering Mix More and more-over seek out and discover [people] in every district, make acquaintance with them, solicit them, make them promises, take care that they canvass for you in their neighborhood and become as it were candidates for themselves in your city. —Quintos Cicero to his brother M. P. Cicero, The Handbook of Electioneering1

The practice of counseling candidates on ways of attracting votes during a campaign is nothing new to elections. In fact, the “image makers” and “hired guns” that seem to dominate campaigning in the United States today have their roots in electioneering trends from many past eras of campaigning. In this chapter I briefly trace the development and metamorphosis of offering campaign advice and then turn to how the development of the modern consultant has established new relationships with other actors in the electoral process, including political parties, candidates, voters, and the press. Consultants’ relationships with political parties and candidates are the most intimate, but their relationships with voters, the media, and interest groups should not be overlooked as they have important implications for the health of democratic elections. The following sections begin to show how consultants fit into the stories of these other electoral actors.

13

14


A Short History of Political Consulting in the United States By many accounts, the American political consulting industry was born in 1933 in California when Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter took on an initiative campaign (Rosenbloom 1973; Sabato 1981; Dinkin 1989; Medvic 1997).2 Following a successful campaign, Whitaker and Baxter formed Campaigns Inc., which is considered the first political consulting firm in the United States. However, the essence of political consulting dates back to the earliest days of the republic. The first political consultants were involved in an initiative campaign, but it was not in 1933. The Federalists and Anti-federalists, in their efforts to support or defeat the proposed Constitution, employed many of the strategies and tactics that Whitaker and Baxter would use almost 150 years later. Campaigns were still local in nature during the late 1700s and consisted mainly of handshaking and canvassing (Dinkin 1989). But “the battle over ratification of the federal Constitution represented a major advance in the electioneering process” (Dinkin 1989, 7). Tactics that would be considered common in today’s electoral context were also utilized around the time of constitutional ratification, including general strategic planning and intricate communications strategies. For instance, “[a]lthough there was no national organization directing [the] efforts [of the Federalists or Anti-federalists], party strategists on both sides sent messengers carrying campaign literature from one state to another” (Dinkin 1989, 7). One example is found in the efforts of Antifederalist John Lamb, who, from the Anti-federalist main office in New York City, sent strategic action plans to opponents of the Constitution in cities up and down the eastern seaboard. In addition, both the Federalists and Anti-federalists crafted and placed rhetoric that supported their arguments in newspapers throughout the colonies, the most notable being the Federalist Papers. These were some of the first political advertisements designed to persuade individuals and move public opinion in a campaign. Furthermore, although they cannot be equated with today’s sophisticated get-out-the-vote efforts, those fighting for a particular side did their best to make sure their supporters got to the polls. On Election Day in 1789, Federalists in Maryland provided voters and supporters with a lavish feast that included beer, wine, and rum punch (Dinkin 1989). As electioneering became more accepted and popular, other examples of modern campaign consulting became more widespread. In electoral contests during the late 1700s and early 1800s,3 it was common for campaigns to communicate with voters through newspaper articles, as well as handbills and circulars; these were the earliest

Consultants Enter the Electioneering Mix

15

direct mail pieces (Jamieson 1984, Dinkin 1989). However, whereas sources of strategic direction continued to be available, they did not resemble a modern “campaign manager”; the “managers” of this era were almost solely political party leaders. As an electoral context that was heavily reliant on political parties began to form, it was the early version of the party operative who set the campaign strategy and conducted the campaign in their area (Medvic 1997). A further difference between the time of the first managers and modern campaigns is that the direction of a campaign during this earlier period tended to be carried out more by a committee than by an individual campaign manager as in today’s elections. Moreover, these early “managers” mainly had limited roles in the campaign; for example, much of the canvassing that took place as part of the campaign was done by candidates rather than their surrogates (Medvic 1997). However, candidates, parties, and their advisors continued to change and adapt. As candidates began to exert more control over their own campaigns, the beginnings of a candidate-centered campaign began to appear (Dinkin 1989; Maisel 1999; Herrnson 2000a; Sorauf 1980). One important sign of this was a move away from the management-by-committee style to the presence of single campaign managers who took responsibility for the strategic development of candidates’ campaigns. Although this represented a shift away from “campaign management by committee,” this new manager was not far removed from the party apparatus. The campaign managers of this time were still party officials, and the strategy they developed was carried out by the bosses of the party machine (Dinkin 1989; Hrebnar et al. 1999; Herrnson 1988). Therefore, while this signified an initial step toward a candidate-centered electoral order, party dominance continued. When Whitaker and Baxter appeared on the scene in the mid1930s, they made a number of contributions that advanced the field of electioneering. Although they continued the tradition of giving general management and strategic advice to candidates, what set Whitaker and Baxter apart from the earliest managers was that Whitaker and Baxter were not tied to the party. They were not beholden to the partyline and were not constrained by a party boss who made decisions; they were also the first to try and “make a business of political campaigning” (Nimmo 1970, 36). Whitaker and Baxter are said to have “revolutionized” campaigns in their use of “mass advertising appeals” (Medvic 1997, 34). However, when Whitaker and Baxter began their tenure as heads of the

16


first modern political consulting firm, “mass media” still meant newspapers, which they used effectively to spread their candidates’ messages, just as the Federalists and Anti-federalists, and party managers did. Whitaker and Baxter also employed networks of supporters to help spread their message, as they “built a statewide network of connections with all the newspapers, . . . which they used with great skill throughout the year to plug the interests and values of their clients and candidates” (Rosenbloom 1973, 45). Their development and placement of advertisements in newspapers up and down the California coast was a strategy reminiscent of the party managers who gave general advice to candidates during earlier periods.4 Whitaker and Baxter made four major contributions to electioneering. First, as others have noted, their firm transformed the way in which candidates would be presented to voters (Nimmo 1970; Rosenbloom 1973; Sabato 1981; Salmore and Salmore 1985; Medvic 1997). Because of Whitaker’s training in the field of public relations, Campaigns Inc. was able to “package” candidates and their messages differently than ever before. During the mid-1930s, candidates began to be marketed like any other product a consumer could buy. After discovering, or creating in some cases, the most advantageous image for a candidate, Whitaker and Baxter sold the candidate like they would if they were working for a commercial client (Medvic 1997). Second, and more importantly, Whitaker and Baxter pioneered strategy, theme, and message development from research done on candidates and issues. Taking research they had done on both the candidates and the issues in a campaign, Whitaker and Baxter used that information to develop a strategy and a simple theme that was then adhered to throughout the campaign “as if it were written in stone” (Rosenbloom 1973, 48). This tactic remains part of political campaigns today in the form of “message discipline.” Through the use of focus groups and survey research, candidates develop campaign messages—simple statements that offer voters information as to why they should vote for them—that become part of every stump speech and appearance a candidate makes. Al Gore may have been the best recent candidate for office at sticking to his message. His standard speech during the 2000 presidential campaign always included a mention of the “risky tax schemes” that were supposedly being offered by his Republican rival, and the “lock box” that he would use to save Social Security and Medicare. The nexus of research and discipline is found again in aspects of then-Governor George W. Bush’s presidential campaign. Bush’s campaign included two catch-phrases in nearly every campaign speech or communication—“compassionate


17

conservative” and “reformer with results.” It is very likely that these messages were “focus grouped,” meaning that these phrases resulted from research conducted by the Bush campaign with focus groups of citizens talking about different aspects of the campaign. The practice of hammering a message home to voters is an effective tactic in modern campaign communications, but it got its start with Whitaker and Baxter. Today, even candidates’ handlers have begun to engage in this type of behavior. This was a stark change from the time of the “party manager” whose strategy was at times ignored by subordinates in other cities (Medvic 1997). Stemming from these first two developments came the idea that candidates should go on “offense” in politics (Rosenbloom 1973). Whitaker and Baxter put candidates out in front of their campaigns and encouraged them to not be afraid of a tough campaign. Candidates were encouraged to become more proactive in their style of campaigning by telling voters that important differences existed between themselves and their opponents. An offense-minded approach, combined with an attitude of selling the candidate and the strategy of message discipline, allowed Whitaker and Baxter to lay the foundation for today’s advertising wars that have some of the same characteristics. Today, candidates create television ad campaigns that are designed to sell their candidacy and constantly repeat their message. Although “negative” advertising has been present in campaigns in one form or another since the earliest campaigns, Whitaker and Baxter’s innovations and thinking took this to new heights and likely set the stage for future hard-hitting campaigns (Medvic 1997; see also Jamieson 1984; 1992; and 1996 for the history of negative ads). Finally, and most importantly, Whitaker and Baxter began the move toward specialization in the field. In addition to providing general strategic advice to clients,5 they provided other services to candidates. However, they did not produce everything out of their firm, Campaigns Inc. Besides their general consulting operation, the tandem of Whitaker and Baxter operated a number of subsidiary organizations that allowed them to do more for their clients. They operated the Clem Whitaker Advertising Agency, a full-service advertising agency that created and placed all the commercial advertisements for Campaigns Inc.; the California Features Service, a general political-news bureau that maintained contacts and an organization around the state; and a research firm that would draft a preliminary research report on candidates and issues (Rosenbloom 1973). In effect, they laid the groundwork for today’s media consultants and opposition researchers.

18


Even with all the changes Whitaker and Baxter brought to the field of campaign management, the greatest developments that began to surface around that time, and the ones that truly has led to the creation of the modern campaign consulting industry, were the dramatic technological advancements that occurred. With the development of scientific polling, the advent of radio and then television, and the use of computers to both identify and target voters, campaigning became more technical and sophisticated. With this, “candidates began to turn to persons who possessed the requisite skills to market candidates through other media” (Agranoff 1972, 15). The general strategist needed help and that help came in the form of specialized experts. “[T]he evolution of campaign technology . . . witnessed an increasingly sophisticated craftsmanship” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a, xx). The earliest example of this push toward specialization is in the field of survey research. During the 1930s, scientific public opinion research became possible with the “perfection of probability sampling techniques” (Salmore and Salmore 1985, 40). What was once a campaign luxury quickly became a necessity. By the end of the 1950s, scientific survey research became a requisite part of every serious presidential campaign for two reasons. First, parties began to supply less information to candidates about voters (Salmore and Salmore 1985), which meant candidates had to fend for themselves in gathering data about potential voters. And second, after President Eisenhower’s landslide victories, it became clear that a candidate could attract a large number of votes from the opposing party, and survey research was the method that could help tell campaigns who the most likely defectors were (Salmore and Salmore 1985). Like most elements of electioneering, these practices were soon picked up by candidates in electoral contests at other levels of government, and whereas a congressional candidate in 1950 would not have even thought about conducting survey research in their campaign, today any serious candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives or Senate would never think of omitting polling from their campaign. The results produced by the pollsters led to an even greater reliance on specialized labor in campaigns. Direct mail consultants, journalists, “television documentary producers” (media consultants), and “voting behavior consultants” were a few of the new specialties spawned by the success of survey researchers and the information they brought to campaigns (Agranoff 1972). Computers and quick, sophisticated data analysis also started to appear in campaigns during the 1950s. One of the earliest uses of this


19

new technology was in the analysis of survey data provided by pollsters. Led by the Eisenhower campaign, candidates and their campaign managers saw that voters from the opposite party could be swayed to vote for their candidate. This led to some of the earliest attempts at voter targeting, where computers were used to identify who those “persuadable,” or “swing” individuals were. The use of surveys and the analysis of those data meant that campaigns now made their decisions in a systematic way based on scientific information (Agranoff 1972). The advantages brought by the developments in survey research and computers, although important and lasting, pale in comparison to the changes brought to campaigning and the consulting profession by the dominant presence of electronic media. Television took the model of campaigning created by Whitaker and Baxter to new heights. Over this new medium, public-relations campaigning flourished.6 Candidates used messages derived from the scientific surveys, and, through continual repetition, reached out to the voting public over the air waves. This, coupled with the “offense” dominated style of campaigning led Herbert Alexander (1969) to conclude that “[t]elevision has reordered the political campaign” (260). During Whitaker and Baxter’s tenure as political consultants, campaigning shifted from face-to-face communication to a mediadominated process.7 Not only did this lead to radio and television replacing the handshake and campaign button as the symbols of American campaigns (Agranoff 1972), but it increased the need for candidates to turn to specialized experts who could carry out the new style of campaigning. These technological developments all have one thing in common—they became too much for one person to handle alone. Lone candidates and their managers were now in a position where they needed help in order to be competitive in the changing context of elections. “Highly trained specialists [were] needed to prepare and analyze public opinion polls, to run sophisticated advertising campaigns and to translate the results of data processing into useful political knowledge” (Agranoff 1972, 63). Candidates and parties, for the most part, were and still are not well versed in the technical aspects of electioneering that are essential in a modern campaign. As noted above, Whitaker and Baxter were the first to pioneer this type of diversification with the creation of their subsidiary organizations. This was only the beginning of the drive toward a diversified and specialized force of campaign consultants. Dan Nimmo (1970) justly summarizes this movement when he says:

20

For Better or Worse? A century ago candidates relied on their wits, their friends, and a few trusted allies to mount a campaign for office. Few men specialized in selling political advice. The campaign specialists of that day were primarily party politicians . . . Today . . . [candidates] turn less to party leaders than to professional campaign managers for political expertise. Once a campaign craft pursued by relatively few public relations experts, campaign management has become a highly diversified industry serving a wide variety of clients. (33)

Even though the field has developed into one that is made up of a number of specialists who work on a fee-for-service basis, the role of the general strategist has not dissipated. Indeed, campaigns today need the general strategist as much as campaigns waged during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Conventional discussions of campaign consultants tend to lump general strategists together with their colleagues who provide specific services such as media production, public opinion research, fund-raising assistance, opposition research, or voter targeting and identification. However, in reality the two are drastically different. The campaign manager is continually at the candidate’s side and is omnipresent in the campaign. Consultants, however, may not spend as much time on the ground with the campaign. They are able to make their contributions from their offices in Washington, D.C., New York, San Francisco, or any other city in the United States. For example, pollsters can do the majority of their work without ever stepping into a congressional district or state; the survey instrument can be developed in the pollster’s office in Washington, D.C., the telephone calls can be contracted out to a calling house, and the data can be analyzed and the report written in the office. However, the candidate and the campaign manager are only a conference call away. This is not to say that consultants do not offer strategic advice. In most instances consultants who offer specific services also help set the campaign’s strategy or develop the message. As Democratic pollster Celinda Lake notes, “increasingly one of the consultants [in the campaign] will end up taking . . . a lead consultant role. And it often informally involves the one . . . who’s the most engaged in [the campaign], [and] who the candidate trusts the most,” which means that “consultants are providing an awful lot of management capacity” (Lake 2001). Dennis Johnson (2000) terms these individuals “strategist” consultants.8 What has changed in electioneering since the early days of campaign consulting, because of the ascent of new technology and the need for technical experts, is the disappearance of the individual or


21

firm that does everything for a campaign. In other words, there is no more one-stop shopping for campaign services. Today, it is almost unheard of to find a firm that will house under one roof all the specific services campaigns require. Some firms have “vertically integrated,” with polling firms acquiring calling houses, and media production firms handling media buying as well (Salmore and Salmore 1985). However, integration mainly occurs within a particular specialization and does not spread across subfields.9 It would be atypical, for instance, to find a full-service polling firm that also handles professional media production. Consultants offer their service—usually all the components of that service—and refrain from getting into other aspects of electioneering. For example, a media firm will create the campaign’s television or radio advertisements and place the spots on the air at the times that fit with the general strategy of the campaign. But usually that same firm neither conducts the research that drives the message, nor conducts the phone banks that identify likely supporters. This compartmentalization of activities can lead to different types of consultants having different experiences within the same campaign. Media consultants, pollsters, fund-raisers, opposition researchers, and field operatives may have completely different perceptions of the same campaign because of the different amounts of time each may spend “on the ground” in the campaign and because each may not see all the details of all the aspects of the campaign. This creates a dynamic within the campaign organization that requires the presence of a manager—a person who coordinates the different services offered by the different consultants.10 A likely scenario is one in which the candidate, the manager, the pollster, and the media consultant talk weekly (or daily) and decide how best to carry out the campaign’s strategy. This is a major difference between today’s technologically rich campaigns and those of the 1800s and early 1900s where the campaign was mostly self-contained within the party and around the candidate. Consultants and Parties A discussion of political parties and campaign consultants is the most appropriate place to begin a discussion of the relationships consultants have with other actors in the electoral process, as changes with respect to parties’ level of involvement in elections have driven, and in some ways created, the relationships consultants have with candidates and voters. Although a full discussion of party adaptation and change in elections is outside the scope of this book, it is important to begin with a review of how consultants came to have such an important place in

22


campaigns vis-à-vis parties. This begins with a brief discussion of the influence parties have had in election campaigns and then moves to a description of their relationship with consultants. The discussion of political parties provides a benchmark from which to begin the examination of consultants’ relationship with candidates, voters, the media, and interest groups. The strength parties once had in nearly all facets of elections, from candidate recruitment to voter mobilization, is well-known (for example, Ware 1985; Herrnson 1988; 1998; and 2000a; Hrebenar et al. 1999; Keefe 1998; and Menefee-Libey 2000). In the late 1800s the “machine” era of party politics was at its height (Hrebenar et al. 1999; Herrnson 1988; Maisel 1999; Bibby 1996; Aldrich 1995). The strength of the machines was such that “the political organizations that existed during the golden age of political parties had a virtual monopoly over the tools needed for campaigning” (Herrnson 1988, 9; see also Bruce 1927; Merriman 1923; Sait 1927; and Sorauf 1980). Electoral contests at this time were truly “party-centered,” as parties not only selected the candidates, but they ran the campaigns as well. They were responsible for strategic and tactical decisions, message development, raising the funds necessary to contest the campaign, as well as communicating with voters and turning them out on Election Day. And, as noted above, the first “managers” of candidates’ campaigns—those who coordinated the different aspects of the campaign—were party “bosses.” The fact that parties lost much of this influence in campaigns is also well established (Herrnson 1988; 1998; and 2000a; Ware 1985; and Menefee-Libey 2000). The landscape of party activity changed dramatically with the institution of two important reforms in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 (or the Pendleton Act) instituted a merit system that applied to the same government jobs that the party machines had controlled with their system of patronage. In other words, party bosses could no longer hand out favors and government jobs in return for support of the party. The more important changes, however, were only on the horizon for political parties. With the rise of the Progressive Movement in the early 1900s, major changes in campaigns were instituted. Led by Republican Robert La Follette, the movement’s goal was to reform and improve government. These “good-government” reforms were rooted in taking power from the hands of the party bosses who controlled nominations of the party’s candidates through the institution of the direct primary, which was the greatest threat to party control of elections at that time because it took away the party’s ability to control the


23

recruitment of candidates. However, other reforms championed by the Progressives also weakened parties and included nonpartisan elections, recall elections, referenda and citizen initiatives, voter registration and ballot reform, and expansion of the electorate to include women (Hrebenar et al. 1999; or Herrnson 1988). The result of these and other reforms was a party system that was drastically different than the one in the early to mid-1800s. Instead of the party being the sole proprietor of campaigning, candidates were now encouraged “to develop their own campaign organization[s],” which included a greater reliance on nonparty funding and other professionals to fill the void left by the party (Herrnson 1988, 26). The resulting context was one in which the party was at the periphery of the electoral system (Herrnson 1988; 1998; and 2000a), and one which saw greater ticket splitting among voters and candidates who did not strictly adhere to the party platform. If one were to compare the history of political parties to that of campaign consultants, it would be clear that just as the parties were losing some of their control, consultants began to appear. However, this does not mean that consultants accentuated the decline of parties.11 The opportunity was indeed there for consultants to enter the electoral arena as candidates needed to turn to someone for help. However, there were other changes that also led to consultants becoming an integral part in electioneering. When Whitaker and Baxter began taking on campaigns, the electorate was relatively small. In 1932, 75.8 million individuals were eligible to vote the presidential election, and parties had the resources and manpower to reach most of these individuals with person-toperson campaigning. However, when that number rose to 120.3 million in 1968, electioneering was in the midst of a significant change.12 “Party organizations, designed for campaigning to a limited electorate on a personal basis, were not an efficient means for reaching [the] . . . growing pool of voters” (Salmore and Salmore 1985, 39; see also Nimmo 1970, 36). Since then, the electorate has only continued to grow, making the effects of this trend more acute in recent election cycles (see Figure 2.1). Face-to-face campaigning became less important and less practical when the voting population rose to levels beyond the parties’ capacity. In other words, parties could no longer control or conduct elections by themselves. The sheer size of the job meant that parties could not help every candidate as they had once before. Not because they did not want to; parties simply did not have the army of individuals that was now necessary. The rise of the campaign manager

24


200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000

6 199

4 198 8 199 2

198

8

4

2 197 6 198 0

197

196

196

8

2 195 6 196 0

195

194

194

193

4

0

2 193 6 194 0

Voting Age Population (in 1,000s)

250,000

Year Figure 2.1 Voting Age Population, 1932–1998 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999: The National Data Book. 1999. Washington, D.C.: Bernan Press.

who was not tied to the party, and eventually consultants with special expertise, was a reaction to the growth in the voting population and technological advancements that appeared at the same time (e.g., massmedia campaigning). The period between the 1950s and continuing through the early 1970s was likely the low point of the parties’ involvement in electioneering. Parties became peripheral organizations in election campaigns after the candidate-centered system of elections had taken hold (Herrnson 1988). Campaigns continued to move away from partycontrolled campaign organizations and toward the system where candidates, not parties, were the central actors in campaigns (Sorauf 1980; Agranoff 1972), and by the mid-1960s “the political party no longer monopolize[d] the important political skills or manpower” (Sorauf 1967, 54). By the late 1960s, consultants found themselves squarely in the middle of the electoral scene at the federal level. Many candidates now looked to pollsters and computer programmers to write and interpret polls, and media consultants to write and produce campaign ads.13 Consultants were now nearly as prominent as parties were in the early 1900s. But rather than injuring parties by pushing them fur-


25

ther to the side, consultants actually aided the parties by stepping in and providing the services their candidates demanded in a more economical and efficient manner.14 The changes in the American electoral environment such as the proliferation of the direct primary, the expanding electorate and the use of mass communication techniques led to the weakened nature of political parties in the early 1970s. However, the pendulum of electoral influence soon began to swing back in the direction of the parties as both national party organizations began to revitalize themselves and take a more influential role in elections. The foundation for the resurgence was in the parties’ expanded fund-raising base and increased receipts as well as their strengthened organizational apparatuses (Herrnson 1988; Menefee-Libey 2000). Both the Republicans and Democrats saw contributions to their coffers rise to their highest levels ever throughout the 1970s and into the early part of the 1980s. The levels of fund-raising by both parties only continued to increase through the 1990s and into the new century. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and its amendments, along with subsequent court decisions, created the context in which both parties achieved these record fund-raising totals (see Table 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3). Organizationally, the parties created a permanent presence for themselves on Capitol Hill with their own national headquarters only a few blocks from members’ congressional offices. However, the creation of a more professional staff by both the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC) was an even more important move in reclaiming some of the influence in campaigns they had lost. Both parties became functionally more diverse than before with sophisticated communications, research, finance, and political divisions housed in both the national party headquarters as well as the congressional campaign committees (Menefee-Libey 2000).15 Through the expansion of their staffs, parties were now able to offer candidates training, help with fund-raising (in addition to direct contributions to campaigns), strategic advice, and some assistance with technical and specialized services (Menefee-Libey 2000; Herrnson 1988; 1998; and Salmore and Salmore 1985). More importantly, and as a supplement to the increased staff, the national parties began to hire political consultants themselves. Both parties hired pollsters to gather and interpret data, Democrats hired a direct mail consulting firm to aid with their fund-raising efforts (Herrnson 1988), and Republicans led the way in spending on behalf of candidates for services delivered by consultants (Menefee-Libey 2000). Both national political parties began to cultivate relationships

26

For Better or Worse? Table 2.1 Republican and Democratic Party Nonfederal Fund-raising Dollars, 1992–2000 Republican Party Committees 1992

Republican National Committee

1994

1996

1998

2000

35,936,945 44,870,758 113,127,010 74,805,286 166,207,843

National Republican Senatorial Committee

9,064,167

5,582,013

29,395,329 37,866,845

44,652,709

National Republican Congressional Committee

6,076,321

7,371,097

18,530,773 26,914,059

47,295,736

Republican Totals

49,787,433 52,522,763 138,199,706 131,615,116 258,156,288 Democratic Party Committees

Democratic National Committee Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Democratic Totals

31,356,076 43,923,516 101,905,186 56,966,353 136,563,419

566,111

372,448

14,176,392 25,880,538

63,717,982

4,368,980

5,113,343

12,340,824 16,865,410

56,702,023

36,256,667 49,143,460 123,877,924 92,811,927 256,983,424

Source: Federal Election Commission, “National Party Non-Federal Activity;” “FEC Reports on Political Party Activity For 1997–1998,” April 9, 1999 (www.fec.gov/press/ sftlong.htm); and “1999–2000 Non-Federal Accounts of National Party Committees January 1, 1999–December 31, 2000” (www.fec.gov/press/051501partyfund/tables/ nonfeddem2000.html and www.fec.gov/press/051501partyfund/tables/ nonfedrep2000.html). Note: Totals do not include transfers among the committees.


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300

Millions of Dollars

250 200 150 100 50 0 1977–1978 1981–1982 1985–1986 1989–1990 1993–1994 1997–1998 Republican

Democrat

Figure 2.2 Republican and Democratic Party Fund-raising in Midterm Elections, 1978–1998 Source: Federal Election Commission reports; “FEC Reports on Political Party Activity for 1997–1998,” April 9, 1999 (www.fec.gov/press/ptyye98.htm). Note: Dollars reported are those from federal accounts only. See www.fec.gov for more information.

with campaign consultants. Today, each party maintains a list of consultants they will recommend to a candidate who is interested in hiring a professional. Many times these consultants are ex-party staffers who have started their own consulting firm or are consultants the party has successfully worked with in the past. Instead of seeing consultants as the enemy, parties utilized their expertise and talents. Parties also aid candidates in political action committee (PAC) fund-raising, which can help secure the funds necessary to hire consultants. Both parties have adapted, although a bit late, to the candidate-centered electoral context that is now in place. Common in discussions (both academic and popular) that are devoted to political consultants are assertions about their relationship with parties. One of the earliest and most damaging being that the emergence of campaign consultants exacerbated the decline of politi-

28

For Better or Worse? 500 450

Millions of Dollars

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1979–1980 1983–1984 1987–1988 1991–1992 1995–1996 1999–2000 Republican

Democrat

Figure 2.3. Republican and Democratic Party Fund-raising in Presidential Elections, 1979–2000. Source: Federal Election Commission reports; “FEC Reports on Political Party Activity for 1997–1998,” April 9, 1999 (www.fec.gov/press/ptyye98.htm). Note: Dollars reported are those from federal accounts only. See www.fec.gov for more information.

cal parties (Sabato 1981). This claim assumes that consultants and parties have different goals and operate as competitors in the electoral system. This critique stems from the belief that consultants approach their work like the nicknames they have been given, such as “hitmen” (“Political Advertising’s Hitmen” 1980), “hired guns” (Herrnson 2000b), or “image merchants” (Hiebert, Jones, Lotito, and Lorenz 1971). The distinction between consultants accentuating the decline of parties and eventually replacing them, and merely stepping in as service providers to candidates is not as drastic as some may want us to believe. As later chapters will continue to illustrate, consultants stepped into the electoral arena as a reaction to the changing electoral context which created the need for a supplement to the parties. It is one thing to say that consultants have taken over some of the services candidates need


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to wage their campaigns, and quite another to say that consultants have completely replaced political parties as electoral necessities. These questions are more fully explored in chapter 5 where the relationship consultants have with parties is more explicitly described and the nature of the partnership is explained.

Consultants and Candidates Just as the emergence of consultants has had a profound effect on political parties, they have had just as an important effect on candidates and how they wage their campaigns. Today’s candidate-centered electoral setting is one in which candidates build their own campaign organizations that are typically comprised of a number of specialist consultants who may collaborate to develop the strategy, theme, and message for the campaign, in addition to carrying out that strategy and raising the money that is needed to compete. For instance, in 1998 over half of all candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives reported hiring a consultant to conduct survey research for their campaign; over a quarter of all campaigns hired an issue or opposition researcher (Herrnson 2000a). These services help the candidate develop the message they want to communicate to voters. Over half of the candidates in 1998 U.S. House races reported that they hired a professional to produce and coordinate their paid media advertising; and one-fifth hired a fund-raising consultant to help raise the money necessary to pay for the research and communication services mentioned above (Herrnson 2000a).16 The reasons for the candidate-centered system are many, but fall generally into two categories: the institutional and the contextual.17 The rise of the candidate-centered system can be traced to provisions the Founding Fathers instituted, as well as to the changes that caused parties to lose their power and control over elections in the early twentieth century. However, other factors have kept the candidatecentered system from moving back to a party-centered system, including the ubiquitous nature of campaign consultants. “The seeds for candidate-centered . . . election campaigns were sown by the Constitution and election laws” (Herrnson 1998, 10). Provisions such as federalism, having different public offices elected by different constituencies, strict terms of office and timing of elections, single-member districts with winner-take-all formats, and a presidential rather than a parliamentary system all encourage an electoral system that is candidate centered (Herrnson 1998; Farrell 1996).

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However, it was not until the Progressive movement that the candidate-centered nature of elections truly appeared. For instance, adoption of the Australian ballot made it easier for voters to split their tickets rather than vote a straight party-line ballot, and the spread of the direct primary, as noted above, took the nomination power away from party leaders. Other, more recent developments altered the institutional face of elections and have continued to reinforce candidate-centered elections. For example, the statutes, amendments, and subsequent court decisions surrounding the 1971 FECA have reinforced the candidate-centered nature of elections by, among other things, limiting the amount of money a political party can directly contribute to a candidate’s campaign.18 The campaign finance reform measure passed by the 107th Congress and signed into law by President Bush, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), may exacerbate this trend, as the law prohibits national parties and their campaign committees from raising and spending soft money.19 These dollars have often been used to purchase television advertisements and direct mail campaigns in support of candidates—or against their opponents—in some of the most competitive races at the federal level. More traditional party building exercises such as voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts are still allowed to be funded by soft money at the state level under the BCRA as it was originally written. In the end, however, national parties have fewer ties with and ways to help their candidates under the new law. The contextual factors that help create our candidate-centered system are also apparent as far back as the Constitutional Convention and the Federalists’ warnings about the dangers of political parties (Romance 1998). However, the sentiment among the electorate that candidates are the most important cog in the electoral wheel has been constant through the last 200 years. Martin Wattenberg’s (1990) research has illustrated that the American electorate is ambivalent toward political parties as he finds citizens can mention neither something positive nor negative about today’s political parties. Couple this with data that “show that there was an important shift in elections . . . in or about 1960, demonstrating that voters respond to candidates far more than previously” (Aldrich 1995, 253), and Americans’ attitudes that their vote should be for the best person and not necessarily the party they identify with are clear and understandable. Even though the American electorate continues to be partisan—nearly 60 percent identifies with one of the two major parties—the number of voters who split their tickets remains high (see Ornstein, Mann and Malbin, 2000, Table 2–16).


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A source of the movement toward candidate-centered elections in the electorate has been identified as a change in the main force behind interelection vote shifts (Shively 1992). Prior to 1960, the main source for the change in votes from election to election was the mobilization conducted by the parties. Whichever party did the best job in getting their supporters to the polls won the election. After 1960, however, systematic analysis shows that attitude conversion was behind changes in vote patterns (Shivley 1992). Outcomes of elections were now more dependent on candidates creating a winning coalition of voters through their own efforts and actions rather than on those of the party. It is important to note that this shift occurred during the rise of professional campaign consultants in electioneering, as the mode of campaigning had shifted from person-to-person (mobilization) to one that is mass-media oriented and technology driven (attitude conversion). In the candidate-centered context, candidates may be the ones who decide to run, but it is the consultants who will help them to decide how to run. “The minimum tools required to compete in politics today—the benchmark survey, computerized fund-raising, television advertising—each requires consultation with an expert in the field” (Luntz 1988, 43). This is not to say that mobilization is not still important, however. To the contrary, in closely contested elections such as the 2000 presidential election and the 2002 congressional elections, mobilization of voters is key (some believe it is what put Republicans over the top in their congressional victories in the 2002 congressional campaign); it is also an area of electioneering that consultants have begun to become involved in by offering telephone voter contact and other GOTV services. The consultant-candidate relationship is truly an interesting one. Unlike the earliest days of the single campaign manager who was a party official—and likely someone the candidate knew given that candidates themselves were selected by the party—today, candidates often have never met the men and women who will serve as the backbone of their campaign.20 Consultants enter a campaign and offer the necessary advice, service, and expertise to the candidate. However, consultants do this on an ad hoc basis. They come to the campaign, usually as outsiders, and then leave after the election. Burdett Loomis (2001) illustrates this quite well in his case study of a 1998 campaign in Kansas’ Third Congressional District between incumbent Vince Snowbarger (R) and attorney Dennis Moore (D), entitled “The ‘Pros from Dover’ Set Up Shop.” The Moore campaign hired three professionals to be permanently on the ground in the district as well as a

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litany of consultants from Washington, D.C., to provide the necessary services for the campaign. The key, however, is the fact that none of the professionals had ever met Moore prior to working for his campaign. This temporary nature of the relationship does not mean that it is not an intimate one. Consultants often become very attached to the campaigns they work for both on a personal and a professional level. Well-known media consultant David Garth describes his relationship with clients as a very emotional one, saying, “I bleed as much for [them] as for myself” (quoted in Sabato 1981, 38). Many consultants have reported that they work so closely with candidates that if they are going to work on their campaign, they must also like the candidate on a personal level.21 The more important aspect of this relationship is what the candidate gains from the consultant. The team of consultants and advisors that a candidate’s campaign assembles is the nucleus of the campaign organization; these consultants help shape and form the campaign in terms of how it is run and the issues it runs on. This takes form in what amounts to the campaign’s plan of attack: their strategy, theme, and message. As described above, modern campaign consulting has changed from a field that consisted mostly of general strategists to one dominated by specialists. However, consultants have begun to offer other services to their clients as well. As noted above this usually does not include a pollster offering media, fund-raising, or opposition research services, but rather different consultants working together as a team to develop the campaign’s strategy, theme, and message. Today’s modern consultant offers candidates both tangible services and strategic advice. In contrast to the first party managers who only offered candidates strategic advice and earlier specialist consultants who only contributed their specific service, candidates now receive a greater overall product. This is a relatively recent movement among consultants in the industry and their relationship with their clients. A top Democratic media consultant describes one of his colleagues and a realization that colleague had near the end of his career: He is . . . a very creative film-maker and is very accomplished and has won a lot of campaigns, [he] is of the school that you call him in and he writes and produces great ads for you and gets them on the air and that’s his job. I think one of the things that he found frustrating with how the world had changed is that that was no longer enough, and his great, great film-making wasn’t sufficiently appreciated


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because people were also wanting [him] to help write their fund-raising letters and their announcement speech.22 The relationship between campaigns and their consultants was very cut-and-dry a generation ago in that a service was performed by a vendor and delivered to the campaign, and that concluded the transaction. “In some instances the professionals merely execute[d] the technical details of [strategies] decided by others” (Nimmo 1970, 53). For example, “Many [polling] firms [used to] simply supply statistical tables with little or no interpretation” (Nimmo 1970, 88). Modern professionalized campaigns are not so compartmentalized whereby the information gathered by the opposition research consultant is simply given to the media consultant to put it into a television spot. And media consultants do not simply take the data gathered by the pollster and decide when and where to run their advertisements. Rather, all the consultants work together as a team to take the different pieces of information that have been gathered (polling data, opposition research, candidate research, issue research, the district or state voting history, etc.) and weave it together into a brief, yet compelling argument for why a voter should support their candidate. The aforementioned media consultant says that his firm now markets itself as a “full-service campaign firm.”23 However, the services that make the firm full-service might not be what first come to mind. Full-service in today’s context would include a polling firm that writes a survey instrument, analyzes the results, and talks with the media firm about what aspects of the data are most advantageous to the client, what the campaign’s message should focus on, and how best to target the media campaign. The full-service media firm, on the other hand, consults with the pollster even before the public opinion data is collected to ensure that the correct questions are asked. Stanley Kelley (1956) has proven to be quite prophetic in his early predictions about the future of the industry, saying that he envisioned an evolution of consultants from strictly technical vendors to advisors who help shape policy decisions (210–213). Consultants’ efforts today make the whole of a campaign greater than the sum of its parts. Many consultants today also serve as the candidate’s “psychotherapist.”24 If there is trouble in the campaign, some or all of the consultants who are part of the strategy team may be called on to help get the candidate and campaign get back on track. If the candidate is off course with his or her fund-raising goals, or gets off message, for instance, one of the consultants is likely to be on the phone to let the candidate know just how important it is that they get back on track.

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The candidate-consultant relationship brings up two important issues and questions. First, what drives consultants to have such intimate relationships with their clients? If they are driven by greed, power, and notoriety, as others have asserted, why does David Garth “bleed as much for [his client]” as he does for himself on Election Night?25 Consultants who invest so much of their own effort in campaigns are likely to be involved for some other reason than just money. However, we know rather little about why consultants get into the business, aside from simple assertions about their motivations. The second important question that stems from the consultantcandidate relationship focuses on the decision making in campaigns. Who is in charge? During the party-centered electoral order, candidates took a backseat to party bosses in developing the strategy for the campaign. However, as parties began to lose their control over elections, candidates did not step in to take their place (Menefee-Libey 2000). The question remains: to what extent did candidates turn their campaigns over to professional campaign consultants? It is clear that when consultants enter a campaign they have a great deal of influence. Consultants’ advice is usually taken; they are paid for their expertise and candidates do not like to see the dollars they worked so hard raising go to waste. But how much influence do consultants have in setting campaign strategy compared to the candidate, especially given that many times they are transplanted into a congressional district or other location from their office in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, New York, or Chicago? How much control over their campaigns do candidates have today? How much should they have? These are important questions given that campaigns are ultimately about representative government, the candidate, and their beliefs about government and policy.

Consultants’ Relationships with Voters, Interest Groups, and the Media Although campaign consultants’ closest relationships are with political parties and candidates, they also have important ties with other actors in the electoral process—namely voters, the media, and interest groups. The link between consultants and voters has been around since the birth of the industry; however, their relationships with the media and interest groups are a different story. Only recently has the media started to pay closer attention to consultants and what they do, and only since the late 1970s have interest groups really come on the


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scene of modern electioneering in the form of issue advocacy, soft money spending, and independent expenditures. Each of these participants in the electoral process plays an important role in modern democratic elections, yet each relates to consultants differently. The consultant-voter relationship is important because of the way voters receive their political information today. As with other actors in modern electioneering, this relationship was nonexistent before the mid-1900s since there was no demand for the services consultants offer today’s candidates. However, when campaigns shifted from partycentered to candidate-centered affairs, the relationship between candidates and voters changed on at least two levels. First, voters became closer to candidates in that candidates began to take their cases directly to the electorate (candidates and their messages were not tied to the party). Second, however, the replacement of retail politics and face-to-face campaigning with mass media–based campaigns had the opposite effect. “[I]n the ‘post-party’ age the professionals and the consultants package their candidates and present them to the citizenry” (Menefee-Libey 2000, 25). In other words, whereas candidates used to communicate directly with voters, today candidates communicate with voters through consultants. The potential implications for this are important as the most recognizable forms of this type of communication are likely those that come over the airwaves and through the mail. In modern elections, consultants shape the images of candidates that voters will receive. In this sense consultants are the “images merchants” they have been described as (Hiebert et al. 1971). The media consultant and the direct mail consultant create and mold the sounds and images that will help voters identify candidates and their campaigns. In other words, thirtysecond television spots and direct mail pieces are often the face consultants put on a candidate’s campaign for voters to use in making their judgments. Consultants’ role in the development of these campaign images, messages, and themes is all the more important when we consider what is known about how voters receive and absorb political information. When research on media effects shifted from a focus on whether or not voter attitudes and opinions changed with media exposure to a focus on voters’ cognitive analysis of the information they took in, the importance of media and media campaigns became clear. Effects such as agenda setting, priming, and framing can significantly affect how people evaluate and judge candidates (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992). This seems to give consultants, and media consultants in particular, great power. The advertisements that they create set the

36


tone and the evaluative criteria for voters. Therefore, how consultants approach communication with voters is crucial to the quality of campaigns. In recent election cycles, the tone of these communications has become increasingly negative.26 It is easy to see the apparent connection—or causal link as some would lead us to believe—between consultants and the practice of “going negative.” In fact, some consultants freely admit that they “go negative” because of its effectiveness. According to Democratic consultant Phillip Friedman: “If it’s negative, it works” (Hennenberger 1994, 45). Susan Estrich, Michael Dukakis’s former campaign manager during his presidential run in 1988, shares that sentiment: “Candidates engage in negative campaigning because it works” (Estrich 1993, 11A). As effective as it may be,27 negative advertising is highly criticized by commentators and citizens for being dirty and misleading. These critiques have lead to assertions that negative advertisements are bad for democracy and bad for elections. Consultants are therefore found guilty by association. However, the media consultant’s or direct mail consultant’s connection to voters is only one in today’s electoral context. Other consultants also have relationships with voters; however, they are not as easily seen. For example, pollsters measure voters’ attitudes and opinions and provide candidates with priceless information that helps them develop their strategy, theme, and message. However, the pollster’s influence extends much farther than a simple survey. The data collected allows campaigns to target their messages in a specific way to specific groups.28 This can be done based on demographics or the geographic distribution of the district or state.29 The use of demographic data allows campaigns to target certain segments of the electorate (e.g., women, senior citizens, men under thirty, etc.) who may be receptive to the candidate’s message. This information often translates into part to the campaign’s media strategy and whether the campaign buys air time on Lifetime, on ABC during “Wheel of Fortune,” or on ESPN; it can also be used to target direct mail pieces to very specific groups of individuals who may have been found to be “persuadable” (e.g., mothers under forty, men over fifty-five, or single women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five). The geographic element allows campaigns to target certain areas of the district or state that may have a high concentration of supporters. With the rise of cable television, campaigns can precisely focus a message to a geographic group of potential voters that have been found to be either highly persuadable or that have been a reliable source of votes in the past (Bradshaw 1995). This also allows campaigns to focus their get-


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out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts effectively. By knowing which areas of a district or state consistently vote for which party’s candidates, a candidate can concentrate their GOTV work on their base of support. Some scholarly research, however, has accused consultants of using these techniques, combined with a blitz of negative ads, to decrease the turnout in a particular area by citing evidence that negative ads lead to decreased voter turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). The fact that consultants have these types of relationships with the electorate has raised the eyebrows of many scholars, journalists, and pundits. One view holds that “the near absence of two-way communication between citizens and . . . elites seems . . . difficult to justify in democratic terms” (Menefee-Libey 2000, 27). Charges of manipulation of the electorate and doing almost anything to win a campaign indict political consultants, charging that they are bad for democracy. However, critics are quick to avoid evidence that negative ads may, in fact, be beneficial in that they can lead to voters who remember more information from a campaign as well as an activated electorate.30 Consultants’ relationship with organized interest groups trying to effect the outcome of an election is the most recently established relative to the other actors in the election game. In this context, organized interests are groups trying to effect the outcome of an election such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), the American Association of Trial Lawyers, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the Sierra Club, the American Medical Association, the National Education Association, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, and Americans for Tax Reform. In today’s election campaigns these groups play nearly as large a role as candidates and their campaigns. However, political action committees (PACs)—“the form of organizational entity that most interest groups use to carry out the majority of their federal campaign activities” (Herrnson 1998, 103)—are the players that have the direct relationship with campaign consultants. PACs sprouted with the passage of the FECA in 1971 and the amendments that followed. This legislation spurred PACs in two ways. First, the FECA limited individual contributions to candidates to $1,000 per individual per election; and second, it allowed for “a multi-candidate committee” (i.e., PACs) to raise money and contribute a maximum of $5,000 to candidates (West and Loomis 1999; Herrnson 1998; Alexander 1992). Under the new rules instituted by the BCRA, this is unlikely to change much as limits on individual contributions were raised to $2,000, but PAC contributions remained limited to $5,000. In addition to contributing directly to candidates, PACs can also spend money on behalf of candidates and carry out

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specific campaign services. For example, PACs can provide candidates with polling data, issue research, fund-raising strategies, and strategic advice (Herrnson 1998). However, the most noticeable, and likely the most important, and surely the most controversial service interest groups can provide are their advertising campaigns. Interest groups can provide advertising in two ways: issue advocacy—“communications whose major purpose is to promote a set of ideas, not particular candidates;” and independent expenditures—“campaign activities on behalf of particular candidates that are not directly controlled by that candidate” (West and Loomis 1999, 64).31 These can take the form of television and radio commercials, phone calls, or direct mail appeals. When interest groups want to mount a campaign to communicate their message, conduct a poll, or do a mailing, to whom do they turn? Much like candidates, interest groups look to political consultants to provide them with the technological and strategic expertise they need to effectively mount a campaign. Moreover, the consultants who create the television spots or direct mail pieces for interest groups are from the same pool as those who create spots and mailings for candidates. Interest-group clients can create big business for campaign consultants. In 1996, $10.6 million was spent by interest groups on independent expenditures32, and although actual figures are difficult to assemble because issue advocacy dollars are neither regulated nor reported to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), estimates place the amount spent somewhere between $135 and $150 million by thirtyone different groups.33 In the nonpresidential year of 1998, independent expenditures remained high with over $9 million having been spent,34 as did soft-money spending (an estimated $100 million was spent during the election cycle).35 Independent expenditures by organized interests reached a high in 2000 as interest groups spent over $21 million.36 Finally, although it is not as direct as the relationships they have with candidates, parties, voters, or interest groups, a relationship does exist between consultants and the media. This does not mean media in the sense of paid-media advertising or the fact that federal campaigns are largely conducted on television. Rather, media refers to the reporters who cover elections and the relationships consultants have built with them. Larry Sabato (1981) has called this relationship “symbiotic” (310). In his view, reporters and campaign consultants need each other to further their own causes and agendas. For reporters, consultants “pro-


39

vide the inside information which enables journalists to write stories that impress their editors. In return, journalists protect their consultant sources” from any criticism (Sabato 1989, 16). This view describes the consultant-reporter relationship as one that is almost as intimate as the consultant-candidate relationship. In fact, Sabato argues “consultants fashion their whole careers around building good relationships not just with candidates but with the news media” (1989, 16). This may have been the case during the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, in recent years, a more adversarial relationship has developed. During the late 1980s, newspapers and magazines began running “short weekly critiques of the major ads, reviewing them like movies or TV programs” (Diamond and Bates 1992, 389). With these watchdog reporting techniques, reporters began to make enemies in campaigns. During the 1988 presidential campaign, NBC Washington bureau chief Tim Russert argued that his network should begin “to identify and highlight visually inaccurate statements, misleading claims or false implications” in campaign advertisements (quoted in Diamond and Bates 1992, 390). As a result, both the Bush and Dukakis campaigns were identified as having factual errors in some of their campaign television spots. These criticisms were precursors to the “ad watches” that are becoming popular in news coverage of campaigns today. The result is not a cozy relationship, but one that is full of suspicion and doubt on both sides. Today, journalists are continually on the lookout for less-than-truthful statements or images that appear in campaign commercials. Just as consultants worry about their business, newspapers worry about selling newspapers, and television stations worry about ratings. News about a campaign that has doctored a photograph of a candidate or that has been caught in a lie is good business for media outlets. This approach to covering campaigns does not provide the foundation for a “symbiotic” and friendly relationship between consultants and the press. Instead, it puts the media on the offensive and consultants (especially media consultants) on the defensive. Sabato’s assertions about this relationship may have been accurate in the late 1970s or early 1980s, but it is likely that his description does not hold true today. One would imagine that because journalists are watching for missteps taken by campaigns in their advertisements, consultants are more careful about the research and content that goes into the campaign communications that are disemminated. This hypothesis has even been stated by consultants themselves. Longtime Republican media consultant Doug Bailey has noted that more focused and rigor-

40


ous news coverage would “have a chilling impact on the consultants and the campaigns” (quoted in Diamond and Bates 1992, 390).

k In sum, changes in the electoral context and culture, as well as the laws governing campaigns have created a system which is candidatecentered, media-dominated, money-driven, and consultant-rich. When modern consultants entered the electoral arena a different dynamic in electioneering was created. Today, parties, candidates, voters, interest groups, and journalists all have relationships with campaign consultants. Some of these relationships are more obvious than others, but all are important in modern election contests. Consultants’ most intimate ties are with their candidate-clients. While these relationships are not permanent in many cases, a candidate’s campaign team is the heart and soul of that bid for elective office. Some purport that consultants have been at the center of the political parties’ demise and that they have replaced parties, but the fact remains that parties were already weak when consultants appeared, and that recently both parties have looked to consultants to perform certain services for their candidates and their own needs. This suggests a friendlier relationship between the two. Consultants have also been accused of manipulating voters and causing voter cynicism through their use of negative advertising. However, the strategies and tactics used by consultants during campaigns are more subtle and may not be as damaging as their critics would have us believe. Consultants’ tenuous relationship with the press is more obvious given that reporters have begun to play more of a traditional watchdog role in campaigns, suggesting a less-than-cozy relationship. The consultant-PAC relationship may be the most mysterious because of the behind-the-scenes nature of some PAC involvement in elections. Understanding of these relationships and consultants’ place in elections generally advances our understanding of modern elections in the United States. In the following chapters these relationships are more closely examined through the eyes of the consultants themselves.

3 k Who are these Guys Anyway? Every political campaign has its public and private sides. We see its public aspects in speeches, rallies, and televised appeals. Less visible is the campaign to organize talent, finances, technical expertise, and day-to-day “know-how.” —Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders

Consultants and individuals who supply technical expertise to, and carry out the day-to-day activities of, contemporary campaigns usually operate behind the scenes. Although paid political professionals are the recipients of greater attention in the context of today’s elections, in terms of our knowledge of their backgrounds and characteristics, consultants might as well still be in the shadows of campaigns. The level of basic information we have on consultants pales in comparison to the volumes of facts and analyses that have been compiled on voters (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Dalager 1996; Fiorina 1981; Popkin 1991; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; or Miller and Shanks 1996, for example) and candidates (Herrnson 1998; 2000a; Kazee 1994; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Canon 1990; Fowler and McClure 1989; or Fowler 1993, for example).1 This chapter addresses this lack of information by exploring the basic characteristics of consultants and comparing them to candidates,

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members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 106th Congress,2 the general public, and those who have become active in campaigns. In this chapter I also investigate the motivations of those who have decided to become political consultants, and challenge popular assertions that consultants are driven mainly by the almighty dollar and a desire to win at all costs. Two factors have made it difficult to understand the inner-workings of the profession of modern political consulting. First, for much of their existence prior to the early 1990s, consultants operated under a shroud of secrecy. And second, major change occurs in the industry before, during, and after each election cycle. Changes occur mainly in the makeup of the consulting industry as new firms emerge and old firms disappear. In addition, those in the industry may change firms or leave their old firm to start their own business (Dulio and Kolodny 2001). Moreover, the combination of not knowing exactly who is involved in a campaign’s decision making, and the changing nature of the broad definition of a political advisor has contributed to the mysterious nature of professional political consultants and makes it difficult to clearly assess their role and impact in today’s election contests. As the concept of political advisors evolved from those who had close ties to political parties, to a small set of professionals who gave general strategic advice to candidates, to a more specialized and technologically savvy group of individuals, and finally to an industry and profession that is now involved in almost every aspect of electioneering, it is difficult to know exactly who could legitimately be called a political consultant. It was not until 1981, and the work of Larry Sabato, that an operational definition of a political consultant was widely accepted: “A political consultant is a campaign professional who is engaged primarily in the provision of advice and services (such as polling, media creation and production, and direct-mail fund-raising) to candidates, their campaigns, and other political committees” (Sabato 1981, 8). However, even this definition remains ambiguous. As Sabato himself says, this definition can apply to “almost any paid staffer on even the most minor of campaigns” (Sabato 1981, 8). This definition can also confuse the distinction between paid political consultants and political party operatives. Although differences between consultants and party operatives are more fully developed in chapter 5, the distinction is important when establishing an accurate definition of a political consultant. Professional campaign consultants differ from party operatives in at least four significant ways. First, although both are professionals who are compensated for providing assistance to campaigns in the form of

Who are these Guys Anyway?

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advice and services, only the political consultant can choose who he or she works for. Party staffers, on the other hand, are told by the party apparatus which races they will work on, the criteria for which is often the competitiveness of the race. Similarly, political consultants’ compensation comes in the form of fee-for-service and is dependent upon the acquisition and retention of clients,3 whereas party operatives who work for a local, state, or national committee have a client list set for them and are salaried employees. Third, the party operative does not usually play a part in a primary campaign, as the party usually does not endorse one candidate over another; consultants, however, are heavily involved in primary campaigns. Finally, consultants and party officials can differ when it comes to the strategy they employ in a particular race. One example of this difference can be found in the 1998 election cycle and the National Republican Congressional Committee’s “Operation Breakout,” a national television campaign designed to help Republican candidates. Although party officials felt this was an important strategic move that would help their candidates, anecdotal evidence showed that some consultants in the races where “Operation Breakout” was employed did not want the ads run (Thurber and Long 2001). The professional consultants wanted to focus on local issues rather than the issues highlighted by the party’s advertising campaign, including President Clinton’s troubles over the Monica Lewinsky controversy. Another difficulty in constructing an accurate definition is the fact that anyone who wishes may call himself or herself a political consultant. Unlike those that apply to other professionals such as attorneys, physicians, or even cosmetologists, there are no barriers to entry, no certification procedures, and no training requirements to become a political consultant. To become a political consultant one need only “hang out a shingle” and obtain a client. For this reason, even counting the number of individuals who act as consultants has remained an imprecise science. For example, David L. Rosenbloom (1973) cites Alexander Heard’s (1960) estimate of forty-one public relations firms offering complete campaign management services in 1957, and reports that number had reached 100 by 1972. The difficulty, of course, is that many of these firms did not make political campaigns their primary business. Rosenbloom (1973) reports that of the 100 firms offering campaign management services only sixty did the majority of their work in political campaigns. Modern estimates of just how many individuals and firms are in the business of electioneering are even more difficult to obtain due to the increased specialization of consulting and the areas in which consulting

44


has developed. Today, many more services are available to candidates, parties, organized interests, and those organizations behind initiative and referenda campaigns. One estimate, provided by Dennis Johnson (2001), places the number of consulting firms in operation during the 2000–2001 election cycle at roughly 2,500, with specialties ranging from general strategy, direct mail, media production, and survey research to petition and signature gathering, computer services and political software, and Web-site design. Johnson admits, however, that these figures are inflated somewhat due to the way in which they were collected.4 Therefore, a good deal of uncertainty remains as to how many political consultants there are. In spite of the difficulties presented by changes in the industry, comparisons to party staffers, and a secretive existence, a precise definition of a political consultant is important. Based on the changes that have taken place in the consulting business since Sabato’s writing (including a greater reliance on consultants generally in campaigns, changes in the level of services and assistance given to candidates by political parties, and the proliteration of interest group activity in elections to name only three), an updated definition is: an individual or firm that provides campaign services on a fee-for-service basis during an election cycle for more than one candidate, political party, organized interest group, or initiative and referendum campaign for more than one election cycle. These services include, but are not limited to: strategic advice, survey research, focus-group research, opposition research, media production, targeting analysis, direct mail creation, or fund-raising assistance (including events, political action committees [PACs], or direct mail). This list omits individuals who provide services such as voter file or other list management, Federal Election Commission (FEC) reporting assistance and services (or other accounting or legal advice), phone calls for voter contact or survey research, direct mail printing, or Web-site design. The distinction is similar to the differences between what Johnson (2000; 2001) calls “strategists” and “vendors” (see also Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic 2001). In short, the above definition considers political consultants to be those individuals who are involved in the strategic planning of a campaign. True consultants help design a campaign’s strategy, theme, and message (i.e., what issues will be the focus of the campaign and what segments of the electorate will be targeted), and help carry out that strategy (i.e., what is the best way for the campaign to communicate with voters, and what forms of communication will be utilized to most effectively spread the campaign’s message). The above definition omits individuals who are not active over more than


45

one election cycle. These individuals are considered “amateurs” who may offer to help a friend or family member who is running for office. The true professionals are those who focus their business on providing strategic campaign services to candidates, parties, and other organizations who conduct political campaigns. In other words, the above definition would not apply to the college professor who conducts a poll out of his or her home office for their friend running for the local school board or the state legislature. Additionally, the distinction does not necessarily include the staff who work in consulting firms. When a candidate, party, or interest group retains the services of a firm, it is the principal or partner of that firm who provides the advice on how their service fits into the strategy of the campaign. Staff in professional consulting firms certainly help with the analysis of a poll, the writing of an opposition research report, or the creation of direct mail pieces or television advertisements, but it is the partner or principal who provides the final strategic analysis and advice. For example, in the Democratic polling firm Lake, Snell, Perry and Associates, candidates and other clients are given the interpretation of polling data from Celinda Lake, the president, or one of the other principals. One cannot blame the client for wanting to deal with the principals and not the staff—they are paying for the experience and expertise that the firm’s leaders have accumulated.

Makeup of the Consulting Industry The reference to “guys” in the title of this chapter is used not in an effort to avoid political correctness. Rather, it is used for its accuracy. A demographic depiction of the industry reveals that the vast majority of consultants are men. It also illustrates that the industry does not reflect American society in general, as consultants are disproportionately white, well educated, young, and wealthy (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 1998; 1999; 2000; Perlmutter and Wu 1999; Basham 1991; and Swint 1998).5 However, the consulting industry is similar to other groups of campaign elites, such as candidates, elected officials, and campaign activists,6 which are also not demographically representative of the general population. The most striking feature of the consulting business is its racial makeup. The United States is a nation that boasts about its diversity, where nearly 13 percent of the population is African-American, roughly 12 percent is Hispanic, and nearly 4 percent is Asian. Yet, over 95 percent of the principals of political consulting firms are white, only

46


1.6 percent are African-American, 0.8 percent are of Hispanic descent, and 1.2 percent are Asian. Although consultants do not resemble the general public in their racial makeup, they are similar to those they work for—candidates and elected officials (see Table 3.1). However, consultants also resemble the part of the electorate that gets involved in campaigns; campaign activists are also overwhelmingly white (95.1 percent) and are not representative of minorities nationwide, as only 2 percent are African-American, 2 percent are Hispanic, and 1 percent are Asian. Principals of consulting firms are also generally older than the total population, but are young relative to candidates, elected officials, and campaign activists. The average age of the consultants in this study was nearly forty-six, whereas members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 106th Congress averaged just over fifty-two years of age, and candidates in the 1998 elections and those who were identified as campaign activists both had an average age of about fifty. All of these figures are much higher than the national average age of the general public (36.5 years) (see Figure 3.1). Of course, the average age of candidates and elected officials is affected by the electoral rules set forth in the Constitution (i.e., a candidate for the House of Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old), so there is a lower bound in this category. In addition, it

Table 3.1 Racial Distribution of Political Consultants, Candidates for the U.S. House, Members of the U.S. House, the General Public, and Campaign Activists (in percent) U.S. House U.S. House Consultants Candidates Members White African-American Hispanic Asian Other

95.6 1.6 0.8 1.2 0.8

88 6 4 2 —

85.6 8.5 4.8 1.1 0.0

General Public

Campaign Activists

71.1 12.8 11.6 3.8 0.1*

95.1 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0*

Source: Candidate data are estimated from Herrnson’s (2000a) 1998 Candidate Survey; House-member data are taken from the 1999 Congressional Research Service report RS20013, “Membership of the 106th Congress: A Profile”; data for the general public are taken from U.S. Census Bureau figures as of November 1999 (www.census.gov); campaign-activist data are taken from the 1996 National Election Study (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI) (see footnote 6). *Includes Native Americans Note: Some columns do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

47

Who are these Guys Anyway? 60

52

Age in Years

46

50

50 36.5

40

20

0

Consultants

U.S. House Members

U.S. House Candidates

Campaign Activities

General Public

Figure 3.1. Average Age of Consultants, Members of the U.S. House, Candidates, Campaign Activists, and the General Public Source: Candidate data are estimated from Herrnson’s (2000a) 1998 Candidate Survey; House-member data are taken from the 1999 Congressional Research Service report RS20013, “Membership of the 106th Congress: A Profile”; data for the general public are taken from U.S. Census Bureau figures as of November 1999 (www.census.gov); campaign-activist data are taken from the 1996 National Election Study (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI).

should not be surprising to find that campaign activists are more middle-aged; as other research has shown, older individuals often have more political experience, more free time to devote to politics, and greater financial resources that allow them to more easily take part in the political process (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Andrews 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996). However, just as in any other profession, the majority of those at the top of their profession (like principals in consulting firms) are more senior individuals. The age of these seniorlevel consultants may also be a function of their training. Many consultants have worked their way up the rungs of the political ladder either working for a political party (over 44 percent in this study; see also Kolodny and Logan 1998), for an elected official (53 percent), or in other campaigns or consulting firms. Those consultants who did not start their careers in some other capacity simply started their own firms from the ground up. Professional consultants are also highly educated individuals. Forty percent finished their education after graduating from college, over 10 percent continued on to do some graduate work, and nearly 40 percent have completed some type of advanced degree (M.A., J.D., or Ph.D., for example). Again, this level of educational attainment is

48


similar to those who run for office and who govern. Bankers, businesspersons, educators, and attorneys (all of which require a minimum of a four-year degree) make up over half of those who ran for Congress in 1998 (Herrnson 2000a) and an even larger percentage of those who sit in the U.S. House of Representatives (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2000). Campaign activists come close to, but do not reach, the level of education exhibited by professional political consultants; nearly 20 percent of those who became involved in a campaign during the 1996 election cycle finished college, over 31 percent went on to take some graduate courses, and over 20 percent had some type of advanced degree (1996 National Election Studies). The general public has become better educated in the last half century (almost 20 percent have finished college, 15 percent have done some graduate work, but only 7 percent have completed an advanced degree) (U.S. Census Bureau 1998), but it remains undereducated relative to political elites. The large number of consultants who have completed their graduate degrees should also not come as a surprise. The technical sophistication in many of the consulting specialties requires a great deal of training. The clearest example is in the area of survey research. Pollsters must have command of concepts such as probability sampling, weighted samples, and statistical techniques such as the cross-tabulation of survey data, analysis of variance, and ordinary least squares regression, not to mention the subtleties in the wording and design of questionnaires. Media and direct mail consultants must have some knowledge of communications and the types of messages that can be persuasive in the general public. Some fund-raisers have also turned to sophisticated statistical techniques, such as multiple regression and Chi-Square Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID), to enhance the product they deliver to their clients (Malchow 1997). The high proportion of consultants with advanced degrees is only likely to rise. Specific programs in campaign management and advanced degrees in applied politics such as American University’s Campaign Management Institute, George Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management, the University of Akron’s Ray C. Bliss Institute, the University of Florida’s Political Campaigning Program, New York University’s Political Campaign Management Program, and the Women’s Campaign School at Yale are designed to train students in advanced strategies, tactics, and tools of electioneering and campaigning. One of the most basic relationships in both sociology and political science is the socioeconomic status (SES) model which shows that income is positively related to, among other things, education (Verba

49


and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). With their educational background, consultants would be expected to have sizeable incomes. Indeed, consultants are well compensated for their efforts as the average income reported in the survey was $102,0007 (see Figure 3.2). This figure dwarfs that of the average American and even the political activist. Consultants are, however, out-earned by elected officials; for example, U.S. House members earn $141,300 annually. This may seem to bolster the claim that consultants are in the business of politics only for the monetary gain that can come their way. However, if one compares consultants to individuals who are in similar positions we see that their compensation is similar. Take members of Congress’ Chiefs of Staff, for instance. Chiefs of Staff on Capitol Hill earn, an average, nearly $98,000 annually in the House of Representatives (Beverly 2000) and over $127,000 in the U.S. Senate (Beverly 1999). One should also keep in mind that consultants’ salaries are not guaranteed; their earnings depend on obtaining and keeping clients.

160,000

141,300

140,000

Dollars

120,000 100,000

102,000

80,000 60,000

41,384

40,000

38,885

20,000 0 Consultants

U.S. House Members

Campaign Acitivists

General Public

Figure 3.2. Average Income of Consultants, Members of the U.S. House, Campaign Activists, and the General Public Source: House-member data were gathered from the Clerk of the House of Representatives (www.clerk.house.gov); campaign-activist data are taken from the 1996 National Election Study (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI); data for the general public come from the U.S. Census Bureau report available at www.census.gov/hhes/income/income98/in98sum.html. Note: The figure for consultants is a mean (see footnote 7), the figure for U.S. House members is constant, the figure for campaign activists is a mean, and the figure for the general public is a median.

50


In the United States today, women outnumber men roughly 51 percent to 49 percent, but in the world of politics this gender balance does not exist. For example, the House of Representatives in the 106th Congress contained more female members than ever in its history (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2000, 38). Yet, this only amounted to 12.9 percent of the entire chamber. A similar lack of gender balance is found in the consulting industry where over 81 percent of principals of the firms studied were male. On this level, consultants again more closely resemble candidates and elected officials than the general public. Even those in the electorate who reported being active in a campaign during the 1996 election were more balanced along gender lines, as over 43 percent were women. This aspect of the consulting industry may be changing, however. Although the number of women who are principals of firms or own their own firms is small, they are becoming more prevalent. In addition, more women are joining consulting firms and working their way up the corporate ladder, and more high-profile candidates in major races are hiring female consultants.8 In sum, much like members of the U.S. House and their candidateclients, political consultants are not representative of the general population. The industry is dominated by middle-aged, white males who are highly educated and make a substantial salary. Although the profile of the consulting industry does not resemble that of the full electorate, it is somewhat similar to that of the segment of the population that becomes active in campaigns, as campaign activists also tend to be middle-aged, white, and more educated than the public at large.

The Partisan Nature of Consulting Campaigns are a partisan business. In the U.S. context, most election campaigns pit two partisans against each other in a battle over the right to represent constituents from a certain segment of the electorate.9 Although the two political parties have been criticized for being too similar and void of any real differences on issues, campaigns remain battles over ideas with candidates clashing over how best to solve problems facing the nation such as Social Security, gun control, taxes and the economy, military spending, abortion, Medicare, and the environment. The partisan context also includes the consultants who work for these candidates. Of the consultants in this study, 37.1 percent described themselves as Republicans, 49.3 percent said they were Democrats, and 12

51


percent reported they were Independents (see Table 3.2). With 12 percent of consultants reporting that they do not consider themselves either Democrats or Republicans, the consulting industry obviously does not mirror the majority of the population of candidates or officeholders who, save exceptions such as former governor of Minnesota, Jesse Ventura (I), Senator Jim Jeffords (I-VT), and U.S. Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT), are completely divided along partisan lines. This partisan distribution also does not reflect the declining level of partisanship of the electorate, which has seen a move away from identification with the two major parties.10 However, 12 percent is not an insignificant number of individuals considering that nearly all of the consultants’ clients—the candidates running for office in the United States—are either Republicans or Democrats. As in the case of race, education, and age, consultants are similar to campaign activists in their partisan makeup. Like consultants, fewer campaign activists self-identify as Independents (19.6 percent) in comparison to the entire population (32.7 percent). Also like consultants, very few campaign activists say they have no preference or are aligned with another party. Again, this should not come as a surprise. Those who get involved in campaigns likely do so because they believe in the candidate or the issues on which he or she is campaigning. Although nearly 90 percent of consultants identify with one of the two major parties, most consultants place themselves toward the middle of the ideological spectrum (see Table 3.3). A full 40 percent of all consultants describe themselves as moderate, a figure that is nine percentage points higher than that of members of the House, almost double that of the general population (23.5 percent), and nearly three times that of campaign activists (13.7 percent). The difference between

Table 3.2 Partisan Distribution of Political Consultants, Campaign Activists, and the General Public (in percent) Consultants

Campaign Activists

General Public

Republican Independent Democrat No Preference Other

37.1 12.0 49.3 1.0 0.4

44.1 19.6 35.3 1.0 0.0

27.4 32.7 38.7 1.1 0.1

Total N

502

102

1714

Source: Both campaign-activist and general-public data are taken from the 1996 National Election Study (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI).

52


Table 3.3 Ideological Distribution of Consultants, Members of the U.S. House, Campaign Activists, and the General Public (in percent) Consultants

U.S. House Members

Campaign Activists

General Public

Very Conservative Conservative Moderate Liberal Very Liberal Other/No Preference

5.2 23.5 40.0 19.1 10.2 2.0

6.0 41.0 31.0 12.0 3.0 7.0

7.8 47.1 13.7 24.5 2.0 4.9

2.6 31.7 23.5 18.5 1.4 22.3

Total N

498

81

102

1714

Source: Both campaign-activist and general-public data are taken from the 1996 National Election Study (ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI); data for House members are taken from, “A Survey of Members of Congress, Clinton Appointees, and Senior Civil Servants” a report by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 1998 (see www.people-press.org/leaderpt.htm).

consultants and campaign activists makes sense. Those who volunteer in campaigns likely do so because they believe in what the candidate is campaigning on, or they have a desire to push for a certain issue. Plus, most activists get involved with only one or two campaigns per election cycle. Consultants, on the other hand, depend on having a number of different clients to keep their business going. Being politically moderate or pragmatic allows them to feel comfortable with a wide range of clients. This hypothesis is supported both anecdotally and empirically. Talking about his firm, Bailey/Deardourff, a wellknown firm noted for working for progressive Republican candidates, Doug Bailey has been quoted as saying, “Unless we generally shared the candidate’s philosophy, we would feel so uncomfortable it would be a nonproductive and unpleasant relationship” (quoted in Sabato 1981, 26). In addition, nearly 60 percent of all political consultants say that a candidate’s political beliefs are very important in their decision to take on a client (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000). The numbers of consultants calling themselves conservative and liberal are almost equal (23.5 percent and 19.1 percent respectively). This is a marked difference compared to campaign activists who appear to be much more conservative than liberal (47.1 percent to 24.5 percent), and members of the House who also report being conservative with much more frequency than they report being liberal (41 percent to 12 percent). Only 15.4 percent of all consultants reported that


53

they are in the most extreme ideological categories (very conservative: 5.2 percent; and very liberal: 10.2 percent); however, this percentage is greater than campaign activists (9.8 percent in both categories), the general public (4 percent in both categories), and members of the House (9 percent in both categories). The balanced ideological distribution of consultants is not surprising given the partisan nature of politics. The conservative leanings of both campaign activists and members of the House is also not a great surprise. Members of the House and Senate have included more Republicans in the 104th through 106th Congresses than any Congress since the 80th, and the nation as a whole has been electing more conservative officials, especially since the realignment in the South.

The Motivations of Politics as Vocation Why would someone want to become a political consultant? As noted above, some would argue it is the lucrative nature of the job, and that consultants are only out to win races in hopes of lining their pockets (Sabato 1981; Ainsworth 1999). Media reports citing the amounts of money campaigns spend during an election cycle only serve to advance these kinds of assertions (Glasser 2000a, b, and c; Van Dusen 1999; Sullivan 1999; Kenna 1999; or Van Natta and Broder 1999). Those critical of consultants argue that “personal financial interests drive everything from which politicians they will work for to what advice they will give them” insinuating that consultants take as clients only those candidates who have full campaign coffers or those organizations that have large budgets (Glasser 2000a, A1). Aside from some sparse anecdotal evidence (Napolitan 1972, for example) and more recent work on consultants that challenges this assertion (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000; Johnson 2001), there has not been a thorough examination of the reasons individuals move into the profession of campaign consulting. Is money the only thing that drives political consultants, or do they care about other things such as their own ideology, issues, and who controls government? To focus on only one possible motivation—monetary gain—leaves many other possibilities aside. Individuals become involved in politics—as a volunteer for a campaign or political party, a contributor to a campaign or party, or a member of an interest group with political goals—for a variety of reasons. Clark and Wilson (1961) identified three kinds of benefits that individuals can accrue by belonging to an organized group: material, which are tangible or monetary in nature; purposive, which consist of rewards that are ideological or issue-based;

54


and solidary, which are social in nature and come from group-natured activities.11 Other theories of why individuals participate built on these basic benefits (Olson 1965; Salisbury 1969; Moe 1980; Cigler and Hansen 1983; and Sabatier and McLaughlin 1990). Although those individuals who become political consultants are not joining an organization or becoming temporarily active in a campaign or party activity and are thus not receiving pure benefits, some of the same principles may apply to, and help us better understand, the decisionmaking process in which they choose this line of work and what they get out of it. The decision to become a political consultant can be considered in rational or economic terms. Olson’s (1965) theory that individuals become involved in an organization because the value of the selective benefits they receive from membership outweighs the costs, and that individuals do a simple cost-benefit analysis to decide if they will become involved, can be extended to the decision to become a political consultant. Consultants are obviously not paying dues to an organization in the way an individual who joins an interest group does, but given the talents, expertise, and backgrounds consultants have, costs must still be weighed. However, they are weighed in terms of opportunity costs rather than immediate monetary costs. The know-how (both technical and strategic) that consultants bring to political campaigns is not unlike that used by countless commercial firms like Coca-Cola, Nike, Johnson and Johnson, Ford, McDonalds, or CNN in their everyday marketing and research. Like political campaigns, these corporate interests need to know what segments of the population to target with their products or services, and the best way to connect with those individuals. The budgets these types of corporate clients have for survey research, media production, and direct mail are much larger than those of political campaigns. For example, only 2.5 percent of the $4 billion spent on survey research every year comes from political or campaign surveys; corporations spent roughly $67 billion on paid television advertising in 1996, whereas while the total amount spend on the 1996 presidential campaign reached only $883 million; and roughly only 2 percent of the $31 billion direct mail business is devoted to political fliers, pamphlets, and mailings (Johnson 2001; see also Segal 1996; and Bennet 1996). These figures illustrate the opportunity costs campaign consultants must deal with. Pollsters, media consultants, and direct mail specialists could make considerably more money if they were to apply their talents and expertise to only corporate interests. In a decision similar to that made by an individual who decides whether or not to


55

become a member of a group, when faced with the decision of whether to make politics their career, the individual must weigh the costs and benefits in front of them. The question becomes, do the other rewards of being a consultant outweigh the costs of giving up much more lucrative corporate clients? Another variable in the cost-benefit analysis is risk. An underlying interest in politics is what ties all political consultants together, regardless of party affiliation or specialty. However, being a political consultant is the riskiest of the possible alternatives, aside from standing as a candidate for public office, that someone with an interest in politics could choose. If an individual is interested in politics and decides to work for a political party (or for that matter a lobbying group, a government office or agency, a non-profit, or even a media outlet), the risks are much less than those involved in “hanging out a shingle” as a political consultant. In any of the other arenas, income is steady, there is greater job stability, and the definition of success is much less cut-and-dry than it is in the world of consulting. In short, if one wants to become a political consultant, there is no guarantee of riches, fame, or fortune. Those who make assertions about consultants’ riches list individuals such as Bob Shrum, Alex Castellanos, Don Sipple, Richard Wirthlin, Stan Greenberg, Peter Hart, Joe Slade White, or Mike Murphy as evidence. These individuals are at the top of the profession, have wellestablished businesses, and have been in the business for a lengthy period of time. However, for every established consultant there are many who have just started their business or who do not have the client lists that the elite consultants do. These are the individuals consultants’ critics fail to mention. There may be less risk for those consultants who begin their careers elsewhere—either as a party operative, an employee of an elected official, or as a campaign staffer—or who join an existing firm because they have some familiarity with the electoral system and working with political clients, but the risk does not entirely disappear as these individuals must still attract and keep clients. Are there any purposive or solidary benefits that could outweigh the opportunity costs facing potential consultants? The benefits received from engaging in activities that “promote some larger cause such as the appeal of a particular candidate or strongly held issue position” are also possible and mirror the purposive incentives outlined by group membership scholars (Hrebenar et al. 1999, 49). Solidary incentives are also possible, although they are not likely to be the ones discussed in the interest group literature, such as friendship or simple affiliation. Being part of a campaign or the “game” of politics is a better description of a solidary benefit in this context.

56


Both purposive and solidary benefits have been shown to motivate party activists (precinct leaders and committee leaders) to become involved. Conway and Feigert (1968) found that “[i]deological motivation is significantly more frequently cited as being the most important reason for entry into political activity among . . . precinct chairmen . . .” than the monetary or solidary benefits that could be gained (1172; see also Wilson 1962; Hirschfled et al. 1962; and Carney 1958). In addition, the desire to help their party has also been shown to motivate party activists (Althoff and Patterson 1966). Similarly, 61 percent of consultants reported that purposive or ideological motivations were the main reason they became a political consultant (see Table 3.4). A majority (53.5 percent) reported that they were drawn to politics by issues they believed in or their ideology, and 7.5 percent responded that they were driven by a desire to further the electoral strength of their party. Take, for example, the three different paths that Martin Hamburger, Kim Alfano, and Celinda Lake took to becoming political consultants. Hamburger is now a partner in the Democratic media consulting firm Laguens, Hamburger, and Stone, one of the top media firms in the United States. Hamburger calls his journey to consulting “circuitous” and “quirky,” but in the same breath says it is rather “typical” of how many of his colleagues found their way into the consulting business (Hamburger 2000, 53). Hamburger got his start in politics by getting involved in issue campaigns. Specifically, he became involved in the nuclear freeze movement and soon started working for a public interest group called the Council for a Livable World. Hamburger says that he “felt that the best way to affect policy . . . was

Table 3.4 The Motivations of Political Consultants for Getting into the Business Your political beliefs or ideology To help your party be the majority party in government The thrill of the competition The money you could earn The power and influence that come with the job Other

53.5% 7.5% 18.7% 11.2% 4.5% 4.7%

Total N

493

Note: Full question wording (multiple responses were not allowed): “Thinking back to when you first became active in political campaigns in a paid capacity, what would you describe as your main motivation for becoming a professional consultant?”


57

through political action” (Hamburger 2000, 54). This held until, as part of his work for the council, he was watching the endgame unfold around one of the issues his group was trying to affect. During a vote in the U.S. Senate on an amendment that would have deleted funds from the defense budget that were slated for the production of poison nerve gas weapons, Hamburger recalls that he saw one of their “solid votes” be swayed on the Senate floor by an opponent to the amendment. This would be the deciding vote, which meant that the amendment they had been working for failed. After this experience, Hamburger says that he decided to begin working for candidates who shared the “beliefs [he] cared about” (Hamburger 2000, 55). After a stint working in various campaigns, Hamburger was hired as the deputy political director at the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). After one election cycle at the DCCC, Hamburger moved into the world of political consulting. He first worked for Joe Slade White and Co., another media firm, and the Campaign Performance Group, a direct mail firm, before finally joining his current firm. Alfano is the president of her own media consulting firm, Alfano Communications, a Republican firm that boasts clients such as former U.S. Representative J.C. Watts (OK-4), and former governors Jim Gilmore (VA) and Frank Keating (OK). Alfano got her start in politics as an intern for the Republican National Committee (RNC) while she was in college. After graduating she started her own business doing freelance work for other, more established consultants such as Mike Murphy (Nelson 1998). During the 1992 election cycle, Alfano joined the National Republican Congressional Committee’s (NRCC) in-house media studio’s staff. Shortly thereafter, she started her own fullservice media firm. Finally, Lake is one of the best-known and most-respected pollsters, Democrat or Republican, in the consulting business. Lake recalls that she had “always liked politics,” had been affected by the women’s movement and Vietnam War in the 1970s, and had worked for different political organizations as well as the Democratic Party in her home state of Montana (Lake 2001). However, her real path to becoming a pollster began when she was a doctoral student at the University of Michigan. Lake recalls that, “every election year I would take a leave of absence and go” work on a campaign (Lake 2001). When it came time to apply for a leave of absence during the 1984 election cycle, her faculty advisor told her that she should think about pursuing polling as a career since she was rising in the political ranks in the state of Michigan. Lake says that this was “tremendous validation” for this kind of work, and from here began working toward becoming a full-time pollster. In

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the end, however, what drove Lake to the world of politics was a desire to have an affect on public policy and to work “for social change” (Lake 2001). The thrill of the competition that is often associated with campaigns, a solidary incentive in the case of consultants, ranked second with 18.7 percent of consultants citing this as their main reason for becoming a consultant. Stuart Stevens, one of the media advisors on George W. Bush’s 2000 campaign team, summed this up best when he said, “I . . . couldn’t pretend that there wasn’t something about being a media consultant that I loved . . . I loved the combat of it all, loved the late-night adrenaline rush of charging into the studio to defend my guy at all costs, loved the clarity of winning or losing. I loved to attack, counterpunch, outthink ’em, outfight ’em” (Stevens 2001, 32). Anecdotes such as these continue to challenge the assertions that cast consultants as only out to fill their pockets with the dollars that flow through campaigns. This is not to say that material or monetary benefits were not a driving force behind any consultants’ decision to enter the business of politics, as 11 percent of all consultants cited the money they could earn as their main motivation. The Citizen Participation Study (CPS) (1990), a classic study conducted by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman Nie, investigated the nuances of political participation and activity among the American electorate. One section of the study focused on citizens’ involvement in campaigns, and the reasons behind their activity. As shown above, in many ways consultants are similar to those members of the general public who choose to get involved in campaigns. The similarities also hold with regard to the reasons activists report as being important in leading them to get involved in campaigns and politics. Although the consultants survey reported here and the CPS are not perfectly comparable due to some differences in question wording, general comparisons can be made and the underlying motivations are similar.12 For example, the CPS motivation “the chance to further the goals of my party” is analogous to the consultant-study motivation “to help my party be the majority party in government.” The same can be said for the CPS motive “I found it exciting” and the consultant-survey motivation “the thrill of the competition.” The formats differ, but comparisons can still be made. Similarities are found that strengthen the argument that consultants are similar to campaign activists in their backgrounds. Nearly 17 percent of the subjects in the CPS reported becoming active in a campaign as a volunteer during the 1988 election cycle. As with consultants, those who volunteered mostly cited purposive mo-

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tivations centering on issues and ideology as the main reason they became involved. Nearly 60 percent reported that “the chance to influence government” was very important in their decision, 83.1 percent reported that “the chance to make the community or nation a better place” was very important in their decision, and 35 percent said that “the chance to further the goals of my party” was very important (see Table 3.5). Other purposive and solidary reasons also played a large part in activists’ decision making as 52.3 percent said that “the chance to work with people who shared [their] ideals” was very important to

Table 3.5 The General Public’s Motivations for Becoming Active in Campaigns Purposive Benefits

“very important” to decision

The chance to influence government The chance to make the community or nation a better place The chance to further the goals of my party I wanted to learn about politics

58.4% 83.1% 35.0% 31.4%

Solidary Benefits The chance to work with people who share my ideals I found it exciting My duty as a citizen The chance to be with people I enjoy The chance for recognition from people I respect The chance to meet important and influential people

52.3% 21.9% 53.0% 29.2% 15.2% 19.5%

Material Benefits The chance to further my job or career I might want to get a job with the government someday I might want to get help from an official on a personal or family problem I might want to run for office someday

15.4% 6.9% 12.1% 7.4%

Miscellaneous I am the kind of person who does my share I did not want to say no to someone who asked

39.9% 8.6%

Note: Multiple mentions were allowed. Source: Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E. Brady, and Norman Nie 1990. American Citizen Participation Study, 1990. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center (NORC).

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them, 53 percent said that their belief that getting involved was their civic duty was very important, and almost 22 percent said the excitement that accompanies campaigning was very important. These results suggest that the main motive for amateur campaigners is similar to that of the professionals—solidary and purposive motivations drive their decisions. In fact, 64.4 percent of those in the CPS reported that there was a specific issue that led them to become active in the campaign. Consultants’ motivations can also be compared to another group highly integrated into the campaign process—political party activists. Those who become active in political party activities cite similar motivations as consultants (see Aldrich 1995; Hrebenar et al. 1999). However, ideological motivations have been shown to be more important for amateur party activists than for those activists who are considered professionals—those who are more motivated by material incentives in the hopes of obtaining a job with the party (Hrebenar et al. 1999; Conway and Feigert 1968; and Wilson 1962). Because of the disappearance of party machines and the patronage that accompanied them, the gap between amateurs and professionals has likely narrowed, with those who become involved today being more of the amateur type than professional because there is less material benefit to being involved. Although they are different on many levels, it is ironic that today’s professionals and yesterday’s amateurs are similar in what motivates them to become involved in politics.13 Partisans (Democrats and Republicans together) were more likely than self-identified Independents to cite purposive reasons—their political beliefs and ideology or their desire to help their party become the majority party in government—as their main motivation for entering the consulting business (see Table 3.6). However, important differences also emerge between Democrats and Republicans. Greater numbers of Democrats reported their beliefs or ideology led them to get into politics, but more Republicans reported that a desire to help their party become the majority party was their main motivation. At the same time more Republicans (and Independents) cited a solidary motivation (thrill of the competition) as the reason they became consultants. Finally, material incentives were cited by many more Independents than either Democrats or Republicans. These data again help to support a challenge to the conventional wisdom by showing that the majority of consultants—partisan Democrats and Republicans— are not driven by the almighty dollar, but rather by purposive motivations and issues. Much like consultants, those in the CPS who were active in campaigns showed partisan differences. More Democratic activists reported

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Who are these Guys Anyway? Table 3.6 Partisan Differences in the Motivations of Political Consultants (in percent) Republican

Democrat

Independent

Political beliefs or ideology Help your party be the majority party in government The thrill of the competition The money you could earn The power and influence Other

44.0

66.3

35.7

11.4 25.0 10.9 3.3 5.4

5.3 13.2 7.0 4.1 4.1

3.6 21.4 28.6 7.1 3.6

Total N

184

243

56

2

Note: x = 49. 537, p = 0.000, d.f. = 10; all p-values reported are one-tail tests.

that purposive motivations such as the chance to influence government and the chance to make the community or nation a better place were very important to them than did Republican activists. Interestingly, more Democratic activists reported being influenced by each of the possible motives asked by the CPS than both Republicans or Independents. The initial partisan differences seen among consultants drive the development of another hypothesis focused on consultant motivations: that consultants’ motives for getting into the business have shifted over time based in part on political trends and factors within the consulting industry. The data in Table 3.7 illustrate differences in consultants’ motivations depending on the year they entered the business. Based on consultants’ reports of the year they took their first campaign job, five categories of entry were constructed.14 The categories are based on developments in the consulting industry as well as prominent national political trends. Consultants who entered the profession before 1966 make up the first category. Before 1966 parties played a larger role in electioneering than in later years. In addition, the technological revolution that would change electioneering was just beginning to develop. The second category consists of consultants who entered the business after 1965 but prior to 1974. It was during this period that the “modern” consultant began to appear in the form of “ad men” who had much of their background in public relations. Furthermore, after Watergate the political tide of the nation changed and included reform-minded individuals, not to mention a huge influx of Democrats to Congress in 1974 and Democratic control of the White House in 1976. Consultants who entered the profession between 1974 and 1982 make up the third category. Another shift in the national

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political context came in 1980. With the election of Ronald Reagan, Republicans were able to regain some of the power they lost in the early 1970s. Consultants who entered the profession between 1983 and 1993 did so during an unusual time in American politics. At the beginning of this period the Reagan era was in full swing, continuing until Bill Clinton’s inauguration in January of 1993. In addition, the consequences of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its amendments had fully taken shape. More importantly, the consulting industry began to make greater use of the technology that was available, and “vendor” consultants (Johnson 2000; 2001) began to appear, highlighting the specialization of the industry. Finally, those who became consultants after 1994 entered a political dynamic that was unlike any prior to 1954 with the Republicans gaining majority status in the U.S. House and Senate. Consultants who “came of age” during these different time periods faced different political and electoral contexts, had different experiences, and may have been driven by different motivations to get into the business. Table 3.7 clearly illustrates differences in consultants’ motivations over time. Although each of the different entry periods illustrates that consultants’ political beliefs or ideology was the most often cited motivation, noteworthy differences are found. More of the most senior individuals (those entering the profession prior to 1966) were driven by purposive motivations (their political beliefs or ideology or to help their party become the majority in government), but a significant number (16.1 percent) still reported that their main motivation was either solidary (the thrill of the competition) or material (the money they could earn). However, those consultants who entered the profession during the period when consulting really began to take off (1966–1973), with the use of survey research and the ascendence of television, were more likely than any other group to cite their political beliefs or ideology. More interesting, however, are the differences in motivations across the different time periods. For example, a solidary motivation (the thrill of the competition) was the second most cited motivation in all periods except for the most recent (1994–1999); the desire to help one’s party become the majority party in government motivated larger numbers of consultants during the three periods before 1994, but fewer in the earliest and most recent periods; and beginning with the period from 1966 to 1973, the percentage of consultants citing material motivations showed a steady increase. Clearly the industry has changed over time. Being motivated by wanting to help one’s party’s electoral success fluctuated across periods, and material motivations have increased with each passing entry period. In part, this may be due to the

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Who are these Guys Anyway? Table 3.7 Comparison of Consultants’ Motivations across Periods of Entry into the Profession (in percent) 1965 1966– & Before 1973 Political beliefs or ideology 48.4 Help your party be the majority 3.2 The thrill of the competition 16.1 The money you could earn 16.1 The power and influence 9.7 Other 6.5 Total N

31

1974– 1982

1983– 1993

1994– 1999

62.8 7.7 15.4 6.4 1.3 6.4

57.6 8.9 17.7 9.5 1.9 4.4

50.3 8.6 20.9 11.2 5.9 3.2

38.5 0.0 20.5 23.1 10.3 7.7

78

158

187

39

2

Note: x = 29.198, p = 0.042, d.f. = 20.

development of political consulting as a profession.15 As consultants have become more in demand by more candidates at more levels of elections, more individuals could make it a legitimate career rather than just a supplement to an existing job. That said, however, the one consistency over time is the place of purposive motivations at the top of the list of motivations. This general analysis spawns an additional hypothesis dealing with consultant motivations. As described above, over 7 percent of all consultants were drawn to consulting because they wanted to see their party be the majority party in government. A hypothesis based on this finding is: a consultant who identifies with the party that is in the minority at the time of their entry into the profession is more likely to be motivated by a desire to see that party be the majority party in government than other consultants. A specific example of this hypothesis would be: consultants who identified themselves as Republicans and who got into the business during the mid-1970s—a time when the GOP was in the minority in both the U.S. House and Senate thanks to the large Democrat Watergate-baby class of incoming members to the House of Representatives in 1974—would be more likely to cite their desire to help their party become the majority than other consultants. When the data are broken down by consultants’ own party identification, preliminary support is found for this hypothesis. During the period from 1974 to 1982, more Republicans than Democrats cited this desire by nearly a four to one margin (17.9 percent to 4.8 percent).16 In addition, the highest percentage of Democrats (9.6 percent) reporting this as their primary motivation for becoming a consultant was found among those who entered during the period between 1983 and 1993—

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a time after President Reagan was elected, one that was dominated by Republican presidents, and when growing numbers of Republicans were being elected to state-level offices. Not one Democrat who entered the business prior to 1973 cited this as their main motivation— of course at this time Democrats had had a hold on Congress since the mid-1950s; additionally, only 4.8 percent (a total of 4 individuals) of Democrats who entered between 1974 and 1982 cited it. During each of these periods, Democrats were already the majority in Congress and in control of many state legislatures.17

k Consultants have been much maligned by scholars and the press as being driven by the large sums of money that flow through campaigns each election cycle. The hundreds of thousands of dollars for media buys, and fund-raisers that generate millions of dollars in contributions give the conventional wisdom face validity. However, data presented in this chapter challenge the conventional wisdom through an empirical illustration of what drives political consultants to get into the business. In fact, most consultants are partisans who care about issues, their ideology, their political party, and are drawn to consulting by purposive motivations. The individuals who make up the consulting industry are very similar to those individuals they work for—candidates for office—and that segment of the population that chooses to become involved in campaigns. Consultants are mostly middle-aged, highly-educated, white men who make a good deal of money. Consultants are also similar to campaign activists in that they are motivated to enter politics by purposive and solidary reasons. The main difference between consultants and campaign activists is that professional political consultants have chosen to take their strong interest in politics and make it their vocation. Moreover, although the highly specialized expertise and skills most consultants bring to electioneering are in demand by corporate businesses with much greater spending power than campaigns, professional political consultants have chosen not to apply their talents solely in more lucrative areas, but have chosen to focus on helping candidates communicate with voters during an election campaign.

4 k Electoral Connections Consultants, Candidates, Voters, and the Press

[C]onsultants have been regarded by some as agents of corruption, the mercenary pimps and whores of the political waterfront. Their power is certainly now extensive. They have evolved from technicians to the choosers of issues. —Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy, The Phenomenon of Political Marketing

This excerpt emphasizes both the negative image of political consultants and the far-reaching influence these professionals are purported to have on modern electioneering. However, only half of O’Shaughnessy’s (1990) description is correct. Consultants do have an important impact in many areas of today’s electoral context, and their influence is found from the earliest stages of an election cycle through to the final days of a campaign, as consultants help to define and craft candidates’ messages, target and spread those messages to the public, and mobilize voters through get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. O’Shaughnessy’s characterization, and others like it, presents consultants as bad influences on democratic elections; common allegations are that consultants have taken the reigns of the campaign from the candidate, transforming him or her into a puppet, and that they manipulate

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the American voter. However, these are mainly untested assertions as few empirical observations have been presented to substantiate such claims. Similarly, consultants’ relationship with journalists and reporters is seen as cozy and mutually beneficial where each uses the other to look out only for their own self-interest (Sabato 1981). This chapter includes an examination of consultants’ relationships with three key actors in the modern electoral context—candidates, voters, and the media—through the eyes of the consultants. First, the consultant-candidate relationship is investigated with special attention paid to questions such as: what do consultants bring to a candidate’s campaign?1; have consultants become “issue choosers,” wrestling control of campaigns away from candidates?; and can consultants, with their expertise and experience, get any candidate elected? Professional consultants’ opinions about the candidates running in today’s campaigns are also described as another way to look into this important electoral relationship. The last question noted above hints at the connection consultants have with voters. A fact of consultants’ role in elections is that it is their job to get the candidate elected. This includes helping convey the candidate’s message to voters, which in turn means that voters receive a great deal of campaign information that is the result of consultants’ work. Professional consultants have an important relationship with voters, the intricacies of which have yet to be well explained.2 If consultants believe they can get anyone elected, they are also likely to believe that voters can be fooled by slick campaign commercials, and are vulnerable to manipulative campaign messages. The question posited then becomes, do consultants manipulate voters into voting for one candidate over another? Consultants’ attitudes toward voters are examined here with a special focus on the electorate’s ability to take in political information and turn it into a vote choice on Election Day. Finally, the consultant-journalist relationship is analyzed. The accuracy of the assertions made by consultants’ critics is examined by describing the current context in which the two actors exist and by analyzing consultants’ attitudes toward journalists. Is the relationship between consultants and journalists a cozy one? How do consultants view this relationship—is it friendly or is it more adversarial?

Consultants and Candidates: Who is Really in Control? The relationship consultants have with their candidate-clients is not well understood. Little is known in the scholarly literature about what

Electoral Connections

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consultants do for candidates, even though the services consultants provide candidates are well documented (see, for example, Herrnson 2000b; Sabato 1981; Steinberg 1976; Agranoff 1972; or Johnson 2000; 2001). As explained in chapter 2, consultants have moved beyond simply providing services into providing strategic advice along with a poll, an opposition research report, a television or radio commercial, or a direct mail piece. Consultants’ influence today, more than any time in the history of the profession, is felt on two levels—the strategic as well as the technical. There is no question that consultants provide candidates with technical expertise and services that they do not have themselves. However, consultants’ real contribution to a campaign comes in the melding of all the different services together in the execution of a strategic plan to elect a candidate, a process that starts very early in the campaign and continues to Election Day and beyond. Some see this as dangerous—that consultants have taken control of too many aspects of a candidate’s campaign. Others do not see this as a threat, but as a potential improvement to democratic discourse. Consultant Workload Before a consultant can begin to exert any influence over a candidate, one other fundamental event must occur—the candidate has to hire the consultant. There are a number of ways a consultant can find themselves paired with a candidate. For instance, consultants can blindly solicit candidates, or they may be referred by a third party (e.g., political parties’ campaign committees) (Sabato 1981). Consultants may also be invited to apply to be part of a campaign, after which the applicants are interviewed by the candidate. Finally, consultants may choose the client. Some of the most successful and well-known consultants and firms find that they can be very choosy in who they work for because of the sheer number of candidates who would like to retain their services. However, the majority of consultants today do not have the luxury of being selective in who their clients are and must acquire clients in some other manner. In terms of what influences them to take clients, consultants report that two main factors— a candidate’s ideology and issue positions, and a candidate’s ability to pay their bills—enter into their calculus. Nearly 60 percent of all consultants reported that a candidate’s political beliefs and ideology were very important in their decision to take them on as a client, and almost 40 percent said that the candidate’s ability to govern was very important.3 However, a candidate’s ability to raise money and pay bills was

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a very important consideration to 55 percent of consultants. The candidate’s chances of winning was very important to only about 15 percent of consultants.4 Regardless of how clients are obtained, one question for the principals of consulting firms becomes, “how many clients will we take this cycle?” Firms have to balance the relationship with their clients so they can have enough clients to keep their business going, but not too many so that they are over-extended during the election cycle.5 Although the question of when a consultant becomes over-extended can really only be answered by the individual members of that firm, a first step in examining this aspect of the consultant-client relationship is to simply look at how many races consultants work on during a particular election cycle. The consultants in this study vary on a number of different levels, as illustrated in chapter 3. They also differ, however, in the types and number of clients they take. Some campaign consultants only work with clients who run for state and local offices (termed “minor” races for lack of a better term), whereas others take only congressional, gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential clients (termed “major” races), and others take clients running for office at any level (both minor and major). Consultants who work only for clients running in minor races are busier than those who take only major races. During the 1998 election cycle, consultants whose firms that restricted themselves to state and local candidates reported that they worked for an average of 6.86 clients, whereas those consultants whose firms worked only for candidates in major races took an average of 4.63 clients.6 The pattern was similar in the 1994 and 1996 cycles, as those consultants who only took minor races worked for an average of 5.78 and 5.96 candidates, respectively. Comparatively, those who worked only in major races had an average of 4.21 and 5.33 clients in those two cycles. A partial explanation for this trend is that each year there are simply more state and local contests than statewide and federal races. The consultants that specialize in either major or minor races are outworked by those consultants whose firms take both types of clients. In the 1998 election cycle, those consultants whose firms took candidates of all types worked for an average of 11.18 state and local candidates and 5.91 candidates in major races. Again, a similar pattern of activity occurred in 1994 and 1996. One would imagine that larger firms would have more clients. Even at the individual level, a principal in a large firm would have more access to support from junior staff or interns that would, in turn, allow them to take on more clients than a principal in a smaller firm. However, the size of a consultant’s firm


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showed no relationship with the number of clients individual consultants worked with. Clear differences in the activity pattern of consultants are found across type of consultant. Pollsters were the most active in major races during 1998 as they averaged 9.41 clients. Media consultants averaged 6.45 clients, followed by direct mail specialists who worked for an average of 5.88 clients, fund-raisers (5.78 clients), and general consultants (4.42 clients).7 These levels of activity reflect the fact that pollsters, media consultants and mail specialists are the most prominently used consultants in the modern federal campaign. For instance, in 1998 U.S. House races only 28 percent of all candidates reported they did not use any kind of polling data in their campaign from any source; 11 percent said they did not employ some kind of paid media advertising. More startling are figures that show 6 percent of incumbents in tight races (those who won with less than 60 percent of the vote), 7 percent of hopeful challengers (those who received at least 40 percent of the vote in the general election), and 4 percent of hopeful open-seat candidates (those who received at least 40 percent of the vote) used no polling data (Herrnson 2000a). Similarly, only 4 percent of endangered incumbents, 2 percent of hopeful challengers, and 4 percent of hopeful open-seat candidates did not use paid media advertising (Herrnson 2000a). Survey research and media and mail consultants are the professionals who many times have the most prominent role in developing and disseminating a candidate’s message today. They now do what general consultants used to do for candidates when they helped create and hone a campaign’s strategy, theme, and message. As such, “because there is so much to manage in the strategy process,” says Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, very often “one of the [strategist] consultants will end up taking . . . a lead consultant role” in this process (Lake 2001). The picture of consultant activity at the local and state level is much different. Pollsters were again very active at this level as they took on an average of 13.86 candidates. However, they were significantly out paced by direct mail specialists who averaged 23.81 clients. General consultants were more active at this level than in major races, taking an average of 9.33 clients, whereas media consultants and fundraisers were the least active in this category averaging 7.25 and 5.26 clients respectively.8 These figures may seem inflated or high. Indeed, twenty clients is a high number. However, two important contextual points clear up the picture. As noted above, there are simply more candidates in need of these services in these campaigns. Second, the budgets that candidates in state and local races have at their disposal

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are obviously significantly smaller than those at the federal level. This means that these campaigns cannot afford to do as many polls or to send as many direct mail pieces as campaigns with larger budgets. For consultants, this means they can take more clients at the local or state level. Rather than take one gubernatorial or senatorial candidate who conducts four or five polls and sends six or seven mail pieces over the course of the campaign, the same consultant could take a greater number of local candidates who may only do one poll, send one mail piece, and do a similar amount of work. Another important point to take away from these data is that they clearly illustrate the differences in campaigning between federal races and state and local contests. Because of their smaller budgets, local and state legislative races very rarely use television (the small geographical area of the district, which usually does not fit the local media market well also contributes to this). However, candidates at the local and state level benefit from survey research just as much as a candidate for federal office; they too need it to help in the development of their message. However, candidates who do not employ a survey research consultant still need to spread their message to potential voters. Candidates running in down-ballot races may not have a message that is tested through survey research, but they can communicate what message they have nonetheless. They simply use another medium to spread their message to voters—direct mail for example. The nature of state and local campaigns dictates the kind of consultants employed in those races. Although it may seem obvious, candidates of both parties need and use these types of consultants equally. Evidence of this is shown in the similar numbers of clients Democratic and Republican consultants took on in 1998. Republican and Democratic consultants both had, on average, about five clients in major races and about ten clients in state and local races. Consultants who described themselves as Independent differed only in that they averaged about four candidates in federal races. Consultants’ Contributions to Candidates’ Campaigns Why should candidates hire consultants? What do they add to a campaign that in their absence would be missing?9 As noted above, consultants contribute both technically and strategically, depending on what is needed over the course of the campaign. The specialist consultants of a quarter century ago brought mainly technical assistance to candidates in the form of drafting and executing survey research, or


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creating a television spot or direct mail piece. Strategic decisions are no longer confined to only the campaign manager and candidate, however. In addition to providing a tangible service, the modern specialist also plays an integral role in campaign strategy.10 This is the area in which candidates are truly benefited by consultants’ involvement in their campaign. The strategic contributions can be seen in the earliest stages of a campaign with the crafting of the campaign message, which pollsters, media consultants, and others help to develop and refine.11 Recently, candidates have been criticized for being “poll-driven” in their approaches to attracting votes (Brewster 2000; Torode 2000; Abramson et al. 2000). In other words, according to this interpretation, candidates simply take a poll and regurgitate the opinions of the voting public in order to obtain support. Critics of professional consultants argue that they assist in this process by inventing an image for the candidate (Petracca 1989; O’Shaughnessy 1990; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997b). This view of candidates, and what pollsters and other consultants do for them, is certainly understandable given the cynical nature of the general public and the press, but is it an accurate picture? This section illustrates that not all candidates are poll driven in their message creation. Nor do consultants simply “create an image for a candidate out of whole cloth” (Bradshaw 1995, 40). Pollsters provide much more than a simple reporting of what the majority of individuals said was the best solution to problems with education, environmental, Social Security, tax, or Medicare policy, for example. The creation of a campaign message is much more careful and creative. Most candidates run for office because they care about issues, governance, and democracy. However, they do not campaign on every issue that is important to them. Candidates, with the help of their pollster and other consultants, examine the landscape of issues that are before them through research (both survey and opposition) to find which of the “candidate’s traits match best with the qualities the voters are seeking” and the issues on which they are most compatible (Bradshaw 1995, 40). It is likely that this does not sound too different from being poll driven. However, a poll-driven candidate selects not only the issues, but the position he or she will take. “Good candidates know what they want to talk about; good political consultants help them talk about those thing efficiently. The challenge is to condense a lifetime of accomplishments and maybe a vision for the future into digestible, accessible language” (Balz and Becker 2002, A6). Candidates and their consultants use survey research

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to find issues that resonate with the voting public and where voters and the candidate have similar positions. In other words, pollsters do not use survey research to tell candidates how or what to think about issues, but help candidates find issues and language that best describes what the candidate will do once elected. For example, if a candidate has stated positions on how to handle Social Security, Medicare, taxes, regulation of the Internet, the defense budget, and the environment, and he or she finds with the use of survey research that the electorate is concerned about Social Security, Medicare, and the environment, the message consultants help the candidate develop will focus mainly on those issues, and especially on the issues where the electorate and candidate have compatible views. Democratic pollster Celinda Lake describes this as an agenda setting process: “I think that a big piece of the pollster’s job is to get [the] 10 things [the candidate wants to talk about] off the table and two things on . . . [Campaigns do not want to talk about] all 10 things we want to do [once] in Congress . . . [what we want to talk about are] the two things that are going to be in [the] message” (Lake 2001). In other words, consultants “prod the candidates to put aside pride and highlight . . . only those accomplishments that move voters” (Balz and Becker 2002, A1). The agreement shown between candidates and voters on the issues that are important during elections helps illustrate this empirically. Research done on the 1992 elections shows that “more than half of the electorate shared the issue priorities of one or both of the candidates running in their congressional district” (Herrnson and Patterson 2000, 105). For example, during that election cycle 75 percent of all candidates rated the economy as one of the most important issues of that election, whereas 75 percent of Democratic voters, 53 percent of Republican voters, and 68 percent of Independent voters rated it as one of the most important issues.12 This is not a simple coincidence. Great care is taken by the candidate and his or her team of consultants to research issues that are important to voters. One might say that the causal arrow could go in the opposite direction—that the issues voters find important are those the candidates are talking about. From the standpoint of electoral quality, this is desirable; candidates are talking about issues and voters are following. However, the more likely scenario is that research has been conducted to determine what issues resonate with the voters. As Democratic pollster Alan Secrest says, “. . . identifying which voters care about which issues and what kinds of intensity they bring to those issues is what [pollsters] can do” (quoted in Balz and Becker 2002, A6). If a message is going to be successful and is to resonate with voters, it must be credible, it must fit the


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constituency, and it must be better than the opponent’s (Salmore and Salmore 1985). The procedures employed by pollsters and other consultants help candidates accomplish this. It is not enough for the candidate to agree with voters on the importance of issues, however. Survey research is combined with opposition research—begun months before on both the candidate’s opponent and on the candidate—to help identify the issues on which the candidate has a comparative advantage over his or her opponent. If the opponent has held elective office in the past, votes are researched, speeches analyzed, and proposals examined to find differences between the two candidates.13 This allows the candidate to draw contrasts between himself or herself and their opponent on those issues that the survey research has shown to be important. For example, in trying to define Governor George W. Bush during the 2000 presidential campaign, Al Gore’s campaign team went back to Bush’s record as governor and highlighted what they felt were examples illustrating his fiscal irresponsibility, lack of dedication to childrens’ and seniors’ issues, and shortcomings on the environment. After a clear and concise message has been crafted, the candidate must spread this message to voters. Much of the message dissemination in a campaign is accomplished through the use of paid media with the help of media consultants and direct mail experts, and an earned-media strategy that reflects the campaign’s overall message.14 The development of television commercials and mailers is usually a collaborative and cooperative process in which the campaign manager, the candidate, and the consultants work through how best to convey the campaign’s established message to the electorate (see Salmore and Salmore 1985; or Loomis 2001). However, “[c]ampaigns are not designed to reach everyone” (Herrnson 2000a, 189; see also note 11 above). Pollsters advise the campaign on, among other things, what segments of the electorate are most likely to support the candidate as well as his or her opponent, and what groups are undecided. Effort and resources are devoted to reach only the candidate’s known supporters and those who are determined to be undecided and persuadable. Campaign resources devoted to trying to shift sentiment in the opponent’s base is largely a waste of valuable time and scarce resources (Bradshaw 1995). Based on the information collected by the pollster, the campaign can decide what type of media strategy they will pursue. If the survey research finds, for a Democratic candidate, that women between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five and adults between the ages of fifty-six and sixty-seven strongly support their candidate, and that men and women between the ages of eighteen and thirty are highly undecided,

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the team of consultants may recommend the campaign buy advertising time on Lifetime (to reach women), and during “Wheel of Fortune” or “Murder, She Wrote” (to reach older voters) to reinforce the support of women and older voters and to energize the partisan base vote. The campaign might also decide to buy radio time on the area’s alternative rock station in order to capture the young adult audience and reach the persuadable segment of the electorate. The candidate’s message can be targeted even more precisely in a direct mail campaign. Technology is available that allows campaigns to deliver a piece of persuasion mail to a very focused group of potential voters. For example, if abortion is an issue the candidate feels provides a competitive advantage over his or her opponent, and polling shows young women agree with the candidate’s position, a piece, or a number of pieces, of mail may be targeted to women who are between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-three, and who are frequent voters. This is a very efficient way to send a voter a message that resonates with his or her specific population group.15 In sum, pollsters take their technical skill and political expertise and help candidates create a message that resonates with voters by uncovering the issues that (1) the public is concerned about, and (2) give the candidate a comparative advantage over his or her opponent. The campaign then usually works with the paid-media consultants and pollster together to develop the best strategy to spread the candidate’s message. Does this, as some critics of political consultants would have us believe, turn candidates into something they are not through deceit and deception? Both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest not. Consultants themselves report that even with sophisticated methods and technology at their disposal, a candidate with a weak message is more difficult to elect than is a candidate who is not skilled as a campaigner.16 In addition, even with sufficient campaign resources at their disposal during a campaign, more consultants report that it is more difficult to sell a candidate’s unpopular stands on issues (62.5 percent of consultants agreed with this statement) than it is to sell a mediocre campaigner (56 percent agreed); further, more media specialists (80 percent), compared to other types of consultants, report that a weak message was more of a problem for a campaign than a poor campaigner (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000). It is the consultant’s job to put the candidate in the best light possible, but they cannot change a candidate’s prior voting history or their publicly stated positions on issues. “[V]oters are hard to fool,” and making a candidate into something he or she is not by trying to change their


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message or the positions they have taken in the past is not likely to work (Bradshaw 1995, 40). If a candidate is going to be successful, he or she needs consultants to help them craft a message that resonates with voters. A candidate who talks to voters with language that fails to make a connection with them, or even worse, about issues that are not what the electorate is concerned about, is not likely to be successful. It is easier to help a candidate who does not perform well in front of a camera, or who suffers from an “image” problem than a candidate who has an “issue” problem. The make over Al Gore underwent during the 2000 presidential primary season is evidence of this. His change from a candidate who always looked “stiff” to one clad in “earth tones” was an attempt to alter his appearance to one that would better appeal to voters; these attempts were not entirely successful as some observers and pundits saw through the changes.17 However, Gore’s image was somewhat altered. This type of transformation is much easier, and is more accepted by voters than is an overhaul of beliefs. The larger problem with the Gore campaign is well noted—he simply did not have a clear message. Pollsters, opposition researchers, media consultants, and direct mail specialists are a large part of many campaigns, but the creation and execution of the strategy, theme, and message of the campaign includes other consultant influences as well. Candidates may also retain the services of a fund-raising consultant to help them raise the dollars necessary to wage the campaign.18 Near the end of the campaign, candidates call on consultants to assist in voter identification and getout-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. The data gathered by the pollster and the research on the voting history of the district are useful here as well, as the geographic and demographic information gathered by survey research can also be used to decide where to focus GOTV efforts immediately before Election Day. Even though GOTV efforts are still a stalwart of the party apparatus (Herrnson 2000a), these duties are sometimes transferred to candidates’ own campaigns.19 Clearly, consultants have a ubiquitous nature in modern candidate campaigns. Their presence is nearly a necessity and is felt from the earliest stages of the campaign in the strategic planning, development of the campaign message, and fund-raising appeals through the execution of the strategy in the communication of the message to the final days of the campaign and the GOTV efforts. Consultants benefit candidates by carrying out activities that the candidate cannot accomplish himself or herself (e.g., media production) and those that political parties rarely assist candidates’ campaigns with (e.g., survey

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research). Consultants also provide invaluable assistance to candidates in their work that helps craft and spread the campaign’s message— they help identify the most salient issues within the electorate that benefit the candidate’s campaign and help communicate that message to potential voters. This sentiment is also expressed by candidates, who see their consultants as advisors who “understand, interpret and teach the mechanics (and realities) of the political campaign process . . .” (Hamilton and Beattie 1999, 34–35). Candidates also see and feel the strategic impact consultants have in their campaigns. Some candidates have reported that their consultants have taught them strategic lessons by illustrating the “difference between using a ‘scalpel instead of a meat ax’ when responding [to an attack] or counterattacking” (Hamilton and Beattie 1999, 35).20 That consultants play important roles in many areas of the campaign process has led some to claim that consultants are now more in control of candidate’s campaigns than are the candidates (Sabato 1981; O’Shaughnessy 1990). By their own admission, consultants are now heavily involved in strategic decision making. However, an overwhelming majority of consultants also report that candidates still play an important role in the strategic and tactical direction of their campaigns (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000). These data are complemented by the comments from Democratic pollster Celinda Lake: Consultants are providing an awful lot of management capacity. I think it gets portrayed externally as [a] power grab, and yet the irony is that isn’t even what we want to do . . . [W]e often say that it’s a good day when we actually get to be pollsters rather than deputy campaign managers, fund-raisers, [or] press secretaries . . . Some power grab— helping re-write the press release at 11:30 at night—somebody else can have that power. (2001) Pollsters and media consultants play an increasing role in formulating a campaign’s strategy, theme, and message. Candidates hire these consultants to help them with these kinds of decisions but this does not mean that candidates are completely left out of strategic decision making. Candidates see consultants as important advisors who help them work through the language and context of the modern campaign, and not as “image makers” who are bad for democracy (Hamilton and Beattie 1999). And in the end, when a campaign decision is made, it is the candidate who is ultimately responsible for the activities of his or her campaign.21

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Electoral Connections Consultants’ Views of Candidates

The modern electoral context in the United States is one in which a large portion of the American electorate believes that various factors dissuade quality candidates from running for office.22 Also, prospective candidates look toward national political trends when they are in the midst of deciding whether or not to run and act strategically given the macro-political environment (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). What does this mean for the choice of candidates the American voting public is presented with on Election Day? Is the electorate choosing among the best possible alternatives? Given the intimate nature of the consultant-candidate relationship, professional consultants are in a unique position to answer these questions and to evaluate the quality of candidates running for office today. Evaluations given by political consultants lend support to the concerns of voters. According to consultants, the electorate is not choosing from a quality pool of candidates. Only 3.3 percent of all consultants reported that they believed today’s candidates were of the highest quality (a rating of “excellent”). Although a plurality (46.4 percent) gave candidates an “average” rating, 14.3 percent gave today’s candidates a rating of either “poor” or “very poor.” In addition, nearly 40 percent of consultants reported that they believed the quality of candidates in America had declined during their time in politics, a figure almost double that of those who said the quality of candidates had improved (20.8 percent). Important differences are found across consultants’ party identification, as Republicans were more likely to report that candidates are

Table 4.1 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Candidates (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents

Very Poor Poor Average Good Excellent

0.0 9.3 46.2 40.7 3.8

1.3 13.8 45.8 35.8 3.3

3.4 22.4 50.0 22.4 1.7

Total N

182

240

58

Note: x2 = 15.934, p = 0.021, d.f. = 8 Full question wording: “In general, how would you rate the quality of the candidates running for the House and Senate—as excellent, good, average, poor or very poor?”

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of high quality than were Democrats and Independents (see Table 4.1). Consultants who call themselves Independents gave candidates the lowest ratings compared to other consultants, which should be expected. In our electoral system that is dominated by the two major political parties, only a fraction of the candidates running for office today who hire consultants (and who could therefore be judged by consultants) are not Democrats or Republicans. Consultants who themselves do not identify with either of the major parties cannot be expected to give candidates of those parties high ratings. This also helps to explain these consultants’ belief that candidates have decreased in quality over time (see Table 4.2). Not identifying with either party, but continuing to see candidates from those parties run for office logically sours these consultants’ attitudes toward all candidates. The partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans, however, are more intriguing. One hypothesis purported to be an explanation for this difference is that consultants’ ratings of candidates are tied to the electoral fortunes of the candidates in those parties (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000). Republicans’ takeover of Congress in 1994 and subsequent electoral fortunes that have allowed them to hold their majority in state legislatures and governorships, and increase their advantage in Congress, along with the failed attempts of the Democrats to regain control of both houses of Congress, may be partly driving these beliefs. It is important to remember that consulting is a partisan game and that consultants have strong beliefs about policy and the direction government should take (see chapter 3). Therefore, when a consultant’s party does well, as in the case of Republicans, or poorly as in the case of Democrats, at least some, if not all of the credit for a party’s electoral success or blame for its failure must reside with the candidates. In the 1974 congressional elections that saw an influx of over forty new Democratic members of the House, many quality Republican candidates did not run in the wake of the Watergate investigation. The lack of good candidates was a factor in Republican’s poor performance that year. The same may be true for Democrats after the mid-1990s. Republican and Democratic consultants also have different views of candidates’ quality over time. Over a quarter of Republican consultants report that they believe the quality of candidates has gotten better over time, while nearly 45 percent of Democratic consultants report that they believe the quality of candidates has gotten worse (see Table 4.2). Again, the performance of Republican candidates not only in congressional elections, but in gubernatorial and state legislative campaigns where Republicans have captured a majority of these elected positions, has been much better recently than in the past.23

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Electoral Connections Table 4.2 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Views of How Candidate Quality Has Changed over Time (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents

A Lot Worse Somewhat Worse Stayed the Same Somewhat Better A Lot Better

3.2 25.3 43.5 23.7 4.3

6.6 37.3 37.8 17.0 1.2

10.3 37.9 37.9 12.1 1.7

Total N

186

241

58

2

Note: x = 18.864, p = 0.008, d.f. = 8 Full question wording: “In the time that you have worked in politics, has the quality of the candidates running for the House and Senate gotten a lot better, somewhat better, stayed the same, gotten somewhat worse, or gotten a lot worse?”

Another measure of consultants’ attitudes about candidates is a retrospective analysis of the candidates they have helped elect through their careers. Over half (51.3 percent) of all the consultants in this study reported that they once worked for a candidate who they were later sorry to see serve in office. Those consultants who identified themselves as Independents were more likely than Republicans or Democrats to show some regret over helping a candidate at some point in their career (see Table 4.3). Again, given the electoral context in which consultants work—one that is dominated by Republican and Democratic candidates—the fact that consultants who do not identify with either of those parties have regretted working for a candidate at least once in their career is not a shock. Consultants who identified themselves as Independents do not align themselves with either of the major parties, yet they still take Republican and/or Democratic candidates as clients. The differences between partisan consultants, with 51.9 percent of Democrats and 45.4 percent of Republicans saying they once worked for a candidate who they were later sorry to see serve in office, reinforce the differences uncovered above; Democrats have a more critical view of candidates than do Republicans, although the total percentage of those who said they have worked for a candidate they later regretted is still striking. In addition to partisan differences, experience plays a large part in consultants’ retrospective analyses of candidates. Of those consultants who started their careers prior to 1966, three quarters reported that they had worked for a candidate they were later sorry to see serve in office. By contrast, of those consultants who came to the business

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Table 4.3 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Regret for Working for a Candidate They Helped Elect to Office (in percent)

Yes No Total N

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

45.4 54.6

51.9 48.1

67.8 32.2

185

243

59

2

Note: x = 9.029, p = 0.005, d.f. = 2 Full question wording: “Have you ever helped elect a candidate who you were eventually sorry to see serve in office, or not?”

Table 4.4 Consultants’ Entry into the Profession and Their Retrospective Analyses of Helping Candidates Get Elected (in percent) Year entering the consulting business 1965 & before 1966–1973 Yes No Total N

1974–1982

1983–1993

1994–1999

75.0 25.0

53.2 46.8

55.6 44.4

46.2 53.8

34.2 65.8

32

79

162

186

38

2

Note: x = 14.830, p = 0.002, d.f. = 4 Full question wording: “Have you ever helped elect a candidate who you were eventually sorry to see serve in office, or not?”

after 1994, nearly two thirds said they had not regretted working for a candidate in the past (see Table 4.4). Consultants who have been around longer have obviously worked with more candidates, which also means that they have had a greater chance to come across a candidate that was regrettable. These data also support the “impressionable years” hypothesis which argues that consultants with more years of experience have more specific experiences to draw on when making judgements about other actors in elections (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000).24 That so many consultants admit that they regret helping to elect at least one candidate to office is troubling. The reasons consultants cite for this remorse are even more troubling, as they amplify the critical view consultants have of their candidate-clients. The modal reason (26.6 percent) given for regret among consultants was that candidates did not keep the promises they made during the campaign. Another 7.5 percent reported that once in office, a candidate


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they had worked for changed their political position or philosophy on a campaign issue. These findings support and reinforce the discussion of purposive motivations as the driving force behind many consultants’ decision to enter the profession outlined in chapter 3. Not only do most consultants get into the business for reasons related to issues and policies, they carry these beliefs with them before, during, and after their relationship with candidates. Much of the criticism directed toward consultants centers on the belief that they will do just about anything to get candidates elected, and that they will help to elect any candidate that has the money to pay their fees. However, the empirical evidence presented above illustrates that the problem may not lie completely with consultants helping to elect bad candidates to office. According to consultants, part of the problem is found one step before any involvement on their part— with the candidates themselves. Many consultants reported that today’s candidates for public office are of poor quality and have gotten worse over time. Many consultants also reported that they have helped elect a candidate they were later sorry to see serve in office. Blame for unsatisfactory candidates being elected to office should not be placed at the feet of consultants. The source of the problem may be that quality candidates are not running for office. If the critics of consultants are concerned about the state of the representative democracy in the United States, criticizing consultants will do little good. The solution rests in more quality candidates deciding to stand for election to public office. Consultants are a fixture in U.S. elections—mainly because the services they offer are in great demand—and are here to stay. They are going to help those candidates who decide to run for office whether they are good candidates or bad candidates. If the pool of applicants is improved, consultants will help to elect better representatives. The electorate tends to agree with this assessment as well. In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press after the 2000 general election, only 24 percent of Americans were very satisfied with the choices in the presidential campaign.25 This is a marked increase from 1996 where only 18 percent of the public was satisfied with the choices they had.

Consultants and Voters: Manipulation or Activation? The relationship consultants have with citizens and voters is fundamentally influenced by their relationship with candidates. The main aspect of the consultant-voter relationship is the communication of the

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candidate’s message to voters.26 All the research, production, strategic work, and creativity consultants put into crafting a campaign’s message is meaningless and useless unless it is used to communicate that message to voters. Many who criticize consultants argue that the end result of their work with candidates is the manipulation of voters (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a; O’Shaughnessy 1990), whether it be through the reporting of survey findings (Sabato 1981), the creation of a television spot that details the record of the candidates in the campaign (JohnsonCartee and Copeland 1997a), or fostering ambiguity in the campaign (Petracca 1989). Take, for example, the flap over a television ad paid for by the Republican National Committee in support of George W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign. The now-infamous “rats ad” was a spot that contrasted Bush’s ideas for a prescription drug benefit as part of Medicare with those of his opponent. The ad included a series of frames where the phrase “BUREAUCRATS DECIDE” flashed across the screen to help characterize Al Gore’s plan. Controversy stirred when someone realized that as the phrase rolled across the screen the part of the word “BUREAUCRATS” that spells “RATS” was isolated in one frame for a split second. Was this an attempt to subliminally manipulate the voting public? Is this an accurate portrayal of what consultants do? The following sections explore the consultant-voter relationship both conceptually and through the eyes of consultants; the effects consultants may have on voters are examined, as well as consultants’ attitudes towards voters. Consultants and Message Delivery Consultants help candidates define their campaign message through extensive research on the electorate and the candidate’s opponent, and help deliver that message through various communication techniques such as direct mail pieces, radio and television spots, literature drops, as well as campaign events and candidate speeches. When this process is analyzed for what it is, it becomes clear that this is not manipulation but rather communication that is designed to reinforce and persuade. Consider again the process the candidate and the consultants go through to craft the campaign message. Survey research is used to find out the most important and salient issues to the electorate; those issues on which the candidate and the electorate hold similar beliefs or desires are used along with findings from opposition research to build a message that allows the candidate to talk to voters about what


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is important to them. What is more, Friedenberg (1997) reports that the information in campaigns’ communications with voters (direct mail pieces and television spots) draws heavily from local issues, and that consultants cannot do their job without an intimate knowledge (their own or someone else’s) of the district or state. For those consultants who come to the campaign from outside of the district or state (which occurs in the vast majority of cases), they “must draw on the wisdom of . . . the candidate and his staff. They know the district, the opponent, the issues they wish to develop, and other variables of the campaign situation” (Friedenberg 1997, 156). Herrnson and Patterson (2000) help illustrate this point empirically by showing a great deal of issue agreement between candidates and voters in the 1992 congressional elections; voters cast their ballot for candidates with whom they share issue positions. They argue this stems from candidates’ attempts at agenda setting. Critics of consultants, and their involvement in elections, have termed this process differently, however, affixing labels that range from “impression management” (Johnson-Cartee 1997b) to “product management” (O’Shaughnessy 1990). These terms carry with them an inherently negative tone, and make it sound like consultants create candidates out of thin air. However, this process of message development is not so dastardly. As Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1997b) themselves say, in a campaign “the candidate attempts to define the political situation for his or her followers in the candidate’s own best interests” (29–30). Although it is not a keen endorsement of campaign commercials, Sabato (1981) says, “The only issues raised by a candidate in his paid commercials are those that he thinks will help him or hurt his opponent” (118). These statements were meant to criticize. However, are candidates supposed to campaign by displaying their opponents’ accolades and accomplishments in a communication that is designed to help their own campaign? This is the process pollsters and communications consultants (media and direct mail) go through with the candidate during the early stages of the campaign and message development described above. Another more accurate term for this process is priming.27 Research has illustrated that priming effects can be quite strong, in that priming can set the tone for how candidates are evaluated and judged (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, for example). Because voters do not consider every possible issue when they vote (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994), it is crucial for a candidate to “emphasize his [or her] assets and deemphasize his [or her] liabilities in what amounts to the ‘selective projection’ of a campaign image” (Manheim 1975, 94). When survey research and opposition research consultants help candidates craft their

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campaign theme and message, they determine the issues on which their candidate has a comparative advantage. “Voters have neither the time nor the interest to weigh each issue carefully. Moreover, they are likely to agree with a given candidate on some issues and not on others. Campaigns [and consultants] have now taken on the role of substantially determining which issues voters choose to think about” (Salmore and Salmore 1985, 116). A sound campaign strategy, theme, and message will be comprised of those issues that are important to the electorate, where there is congruence between the candidate and voters, and that are likely to elicit a positive evaluation of the candidate through priming. Consultants “help candidates understand how, but not where, to position themselves” (Medvic 1997, 135), although some would have us believe the opposite (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997b; Combs and Nimmo 1993; Sabato 1981; or Combs 1979). However, as V.O. Key, Jr. stated so simply, “Voters are not fools.” Voters are usually unwilling to accept a candidate who has “changed their stripes” (Jamieson 1984; Papert 1971). This is where the analogy that consultants are like product marketers who sell candidates as they would sell soap is problematic. “A product can become ‘new and improved,’ and a candidate may alter his or her image, but there is a very fine line that candidates and consultants must walk in order to maintain credibility” (JohnsonCartee and Copeland 1997b, 44).28 As Democratic consultant Tony Schwartz has said, “You can’t tell people something when they know the opposite” (quoted in Jamieson 1984, 382). Therefore, the job of the political consultant is to help the candidate craft a campaign theme and message that resonates with voters by utilizing information that voters have already acquired (JohnsonCartee and Copeland 1997b). In other words, the goal is to develop a message that hits home with voters and centers on issues they care about. However, not all voters are created equal. Political information affects different people in different ways. Those who are highly attentive to the campaign have more information stored than do those who do not pay as much attention to the campaign (Zaller 1992). Attentive citizens reinforce their preexisting partisan beliefs with exposure to campaign communications during the campaign (Iyengar and Petrocik 2000), and less-attentive individuals are more likely to be swayed by campaign communications because they have less information to revert to when receiving a campaign communication (Zaller 1992). This results in a difficult job for the candidate; he or she has to shore up their base vote (attentive voters who are also likely to be strong partisans) and reach out to those who are undecided (less-


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attentive individuals who are not well informed and less partisan) (see also Bradshaw 1995). The consultant’s role is to target the campaign message to these different types of potential voters. Most modern campaigns are battles over the voters who are undecided—those who are near Downs’ (1957) “median voter.” Campaigns carefully target these individuals with messages that might differ slightly depending on the target group. It is important to note that although messages may be slightly different across groups depending on how each is targeted, the messages are not necessarily inconsistent. If a candidate wants to be successful, he or she will not say one thing to one group of potential voters and another thing to another group. The modern press is careful to look for these kinds of inconsistencies in campaign communications. If caught in a conflicting message the candidate is in a difficult spot. This is not to say that a campaign will not focus on different messages when dealing with different constituencies. For example, Democratic candidates who have determined that union members and “soccer moms” are key to their coalition of voters will likely stress different issues in their message to these two different constituencies; union members may hear and receive a message centered on trade, the minimum wage, and workplace safety, whereas women would likely hear messages focused on education and reproductive choice. The messages that are communicated to these groups are different but not inconsistent. Candidates who engage in this kind of strategy are not manipulating voters; rather, they are in engaged in an efficient and effective communication strategy with different segments of the electorate. Although the messages potential voters receive from a campaign are carefully selected to prime the audience on issues that are advantageous to the candidate, priming can occur in other areas that consultants have influence over in addition to the paid mediums of television spots and direct mail. Earned media, or news coverage of the campaign, can also prime the electorate to think about certain issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) when they enter the voting booth. The campaign’s consultants are careful to select events that will only reinforce the strategy, theme, and message they have developed. These events can sometimes define the candidate’s campaign, and become lasting images of the campaign. Recent presidential campaigns illustrate this clearly. Many individuals, if they remember anything at all about Bob Dole’s 1996 presidential campaign, recall him falling off a stage into a crowd at a campaign stop (Harden 1996; Peterson 1996). Similarly, Gary Bauer’s tumble while trying to flip pancakes during a campaign event is a lasting memory from the 2000 Republican primary campaign (Pierce 2000; Neil 2000). Furthermore, Michael Dukakis’s

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appearance in a tank during his 1988 campaign, an event designed to show his strength on military issues, is one of the signature images of that campaign because it backfired and made Dukakis look foolish (Jamieson 1996). In sum, the consultant-voter relationship revolves mainly around communication. Consultants’ critics argue that this communication is nothing more than a manipulation of the American public. Inherent in this criticism is a belief that potential voters are easily fooled. However, the relationship consultants have with voters is not a manipulative one; it is one in which issues important to the voters are focused on in hopes of priming voters to evaluate the candidate on issues that are advantageous to their candidacy.29 Consultants’ Views of Voters Voters, their choices on Election Day, and the processes that lead up to those choices are three well-studied topics in political science. The fundamental conclusion in this line of research is that the American electorate is characterized by “minimal levels of political attention and information” (Sniderman 1993, 219). From the earliest studies of voting behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960, for example) to more recent works (Bennett 1988; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; 1991), the conclusion remains much the same—voters do not bring much in the way of political information with them into the voting booth.30 In the modern electoral context, which is information-rich, and where the costs of obtaining political information has actually decreased—there are up-to-the-minute news reports, 24-hour cable news stations, and of course the television and radio advertisements campaign consultants create to spread candidates’, parties’, and interest groups’ messages—one might imagine that the electorate would be better informed. Even with the information explosion that accompanied the rise of television, and now the Internet, voters remain relatively uninformed and uninterested in American politics. Although it is rare that the worlds of practical politics and political science agree, in the case of an assessment of voters’ knowledge of American politics there is a clear consensus. Political consultants agree with what political science research has shown—the electorate is not well informed politically. Only 3 percent of all consultants reported that they thought the electorate was “very well informed” on major policy issues, whereas over 18 percent said that they thought the public was “very poorly informed” (34.8 percent reported the public was

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“somewhat well informed” and 43.8 percent said it was “somewhat poorly informed”). Furthermore, Democratic consultants were more likely to view citizens as well informed than were Republicans or Independents (see Table 4.5). To some extent, the public agrees with this assessment. A full 20 percent of Americans described themselves as “somewhat poorly informed” or “very poorly informed” during the 2000 election cycle.31 However, 22 percent described themselves as “very well informed.” The partisan breakdown among the electorate, however, is exactly the opposite of that among consultants with Republicans

Table 4.5 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Views of How Well Informed the American Electorate Is (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents

Very Well Informed Somewhat Well Informed Somewhat Poorly Informed Very Poorly Informed

2.7 30.6 43.5 23.1

2.8 40.9 44.1 12.1

5.2 24.1 44.8 25.9

Total N

186

247

58

Note: x2 = 15.839, p = 0.007, d.f. = 6 Full question wording: “Overall, would you describe the American public as being very well informed on major policy issues, somewhat well informed, somewhat poorly informed, or very poorly informed?”

Table 4.6 Partisan Differences among Individuals in the General Public of How Well Informed They Are (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents

Very Well Informed Somewhat Well Informed Somewhat Poorly Informed Very Poorly Informed

26.3 57.9 10.8 4.0

19.7 59.4 14.2 6.4

25.6 54.6 12.6 4.3

Total N

275

344

201

Source: “Public Attitudes Toward Campaigns and Campaign Practices,” Center for Congressional Studies, May 2000 (www.american.edu/ccps). Note: x2 = 7.301, p = 0.147, d.f. = 6 Full question wording: “Overall, would you describe yourself as being very well informed on major policy issues, somwhat well informed, somewhat poorly informed, or very poorly informed?”

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being more likely than Democrats to say that they were well informed (see Table 4.6). This picture of an uninformed electorate would be troubling for democratic theorists such as Mill, Locke, and Tocqueville who saw an informed citizenry as a key component to a workable democratic system (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993). In order for citizens to make meaningful and correct choices, staunch theorists argue, voters “must understand the options the polity faces” and “must have a sufficient knowledge of the workings of the political system” (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993, 196). Studies such as The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) crushed the idea of this ideal type. However, other works have shown and continue to show that the American public is not altogether damned. Robert Lane (1962), for example, found that his subjects were not well-informed citizens. However, he also concluded that voters were still able to make a sound choice on Election Day; in other words, he trusted the American electorate. Again, political consultants agree. Although the majority of consultants do not believe that citizens are well informed, over 75 percent of consultants express trust in the voters’ wisdom to make their choice on Election Day. Partisan differences again appear with Democrats being more likely to report confidence in the public than Republicans or Independents (see Table 4.7). However, fewer members of the electorate trust the wisdom of their voting peers to make a sound choice on Election Day. Over twice as many individuals in the electorate said they had no trust in their fellow Americans on Election Day as did consultants, and one half as many Americans said that they had “a great deal” of trust compared to consultants. Here, partisan members of the public and campaign consultants are attitudinally similar, with Democrats in the electorate being more likely than Republicans to say that they trust their fellow Americans on Election Day (see Table 4.8). When consultants’ attitudes about their trust in voters are examined along with their motivations for becoming a consultant, an important pattern emerges. Those consultants who came to the profession because of purposive (political beliefs or ideology, or to help their party become the majority party in government) or solidary (the thrill of the competition) reasons were more likely to express trust and confidence than those who got involved because of monetary rewards. Nearly 85 percent of consultants who reported a purposive or solidary reason for becoming a consultant also reported “a great deal” or “a fair amount” of trust in the electorate, but only 58 percent of consultants who cited monetary rewards as their main motivation expressed the same degree of trust.

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Electoral Connections Table 4.7 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Trust and Confidence in the American Electorate (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents

A Great Deal A Fair Amount Not Very Much None At All

36.0 39.2 22.0 2.7

38.6 47.0 12.4 2.0

31.7 38.3 20.0 10.0

Total N

186

249

60

Note: x2 = 18.472, p = 0.002, d.f. = 6 Full question wording: “Thinking now about the role of the public in politics . . . how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making choices on Election Day—a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?”

Table 4.8 Partisan Differences in the General Public’s Trust and Confidence in the American Electorate (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents


15.5 47.1 29.1 5.8

20.9 51.9 18.6 6.1

16.9 48.3 29.0 5.8

Total N

275

344

201

Source: “Public Attitudes Toward Campaigns and Campaign Practices,” Center for Congressional Studies, May 2000 (www.american.edu/ccps). Note: x2 = 16.226, p = 0.019, d.f. = 6 Full question wording: “Thinking now about the role of the public in politics, how much trust and confidence do you have in the widsom of the American people when it comes to making choices on Election Day—a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?”

Political consultants’ assessment of the general public—that they are not overly well informed, but are able to make reasonable and satisfactory choices on Election Day—matches the positive assessment of the electorate that has developed in recent political science research. Although they “do not match the lofty ideals of classic democratic theory” (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993, 195), American voters can be trusted to make choices on Election Day. The drive behind this positive view of the American electorate has been research that has shown “citizens can overcome their informational shortfalls and make sense

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of politics by taking advantage of judgmental shortcuts, or heuristics” (Sniderman 1993, 221; see also Popkin 1991; Ferejohn and Kulkinski 1990; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). In their strategic execution of a campaign, consultants understand this concept of using informational shortcuts. When they help candidates communicate their message, which again should be part of every aspect of the campaign, consultants do not try to create a context in which there is a fully informed public. Instead, as noted above, they try to prime the public’s evaluation of the candidates on certain issues that are important and meaningful to the electorate.32 Although the consultant perspective reinforces political science research that shows voters do not have to know everything about every candidate to make an informed decision, consultants are also in tune with less positive aspects of the modern electorate—cynicism, for example (the levels of which have continued to rise in recent years). Many in the general public believe that their vote does not matter33; others believe that money has corrupted the electoral system and that politicians sell out to special interests in order to have a chance to win34; and still others simply choose not to participate, evidenced by turnout levels that have continually declined since the middle of this century to a point where only 50.8 percent of eligible voters went to the polls in the 1996 presidential election and only slightly more, 51 percent, did so in 2000.35 Consultants are well aware of these rising levels of cynicism; they must be, as it is part of the electoral context in which they work. Consultants must fight through the disaffection many potential voters feel and try to sway them to vote for their candidate and even possibly contribute money to their client’s campaign. A number of factors have been posited as explanations for this rise in cynicism and decline in political efficacy (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1994; Finkel 1985; and Abramson and Aldrich 1982). The amount of money candidates need to raise in order to get elected, negative campaigning, candidates not telling the truth, elected officials’ poor job while in office, and the media’s reporting of political news are just a few examples of possible causes of voter cynicism. Citizens themselves believe that much of the problem lies in the financing of elections. Nearly 90 percent of the respondents in a survey conducted just after the Super Tuesday primary of the 2000 campaign season agreed that there is too much money spent in campaigns and that it is possible that good candidates do not run for office because of the amount of money needed to wage a successful campaign. In addition, nearly three-quarters of all citizens agreed with the idea

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that candidates, if they are going to have a chance to win, must go against the public good and support special interests who will donate money to their campaigns.36 Political consultants share the citizenry’s view, as 66 percent of all consultants reported that the way in which money is raised in modern campaigns has led to voter cynicism (33.8 percent report it has had “a great deal” to do with cynicism and 32.2 percent report it has had “a fair amount” to do with it). Although there were few differences across partisans in the electorate (Independents differed from Democrats and Republicans on only one issue—Independents (80.7 percent) were slightly more likely than Democrats (74.2 percent) and Republicans (72.2 percent) to say that candidates “sold out” to special interests), large differences appear between partisan groups of professional consultants. Republican consultants were the least likely to say that voter cynicism has been caused by the way in which money is raised in elections compared to Democrats and Independents (see Table 4.9). Only about half of all Republicans said that money had a “great deal” or “a fair amount” of an impact on cynicism, compared to nearly 80 percent of Democrats and Independents. Considering the proclivity with which most Republicans raise money, and the advantage this gives them as candidates, this is not a curious result. Those who are usually at a disadvantage in the fund-raising race, however, are another story. An important aspect of this analysis is that even though the majority of consultants agree that money in elections can cause cynicism among voters, it is the least cited factor.

Table 4.9 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Views of How Much the Way in Which Money Is Raised in Elections Leads to Voter Cynicism in the United States (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents


23.8 28.1 32.4 15.7

39.8 35.4 18.7 6.1

42.4 35.6 18.6 3.4

Total N

185

246

59

2

Note: x = 33.218, p = 0.000, d.f. = 6 Full question wording: “Thinking about voter cynicism and what causes it, please tell me whether you think each of the following has a great deal of impact in causing voter cynicism, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all . . . The way money is raised in a campaign.”

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Over 75 percent of consultants report that negative campaigning37 has led to an increase in voter cynicism, and nearly 80 percent report that they believe politicians’ poor performance in office has contributed to the problem. Given consultants’ negative views of candidates, their placement of blame on officeholders can be expected. If they do not perform well on the campaign trail, chances are they will not perform well in office. These data complement those illustrating that candidates’ activity in office are the most oft-cited regrets consultants have for working with a client. Finally, the factor most consultants see as leading to voter cynicism is the way the media report political news.38 A full 92 percent of all consultants (there was agreement across type of consultant, party, gender, age, and experience) reported that the news media either had “a great deal” (55.6 percent) or “a fair amount” (36.5 percent) to do with causing voter cynicism. This is one indicator of the relationship consultants have with political journalists; it may not be the congenial and reciprocal one that others have described.

Consultants and Journalists: Allies or Adversaries? Some of the harshest criticisms of consultants have focused on their relationship with journalists, which has been described as “symbiotic” and one in which consultants feed reporters information about the campaign they are working on in return for “kid-glove” treatment in news reports (Sabato 1981; 1989). This type of relationship is seen as detrimental to the democratic process because of the unchecked nature of consultants’ relationship with their clients and voters. Indeed, this would be troublesome, if it were accurate. This description of the consultant-journalist relationship may have been true at one time, but in the modern context of U.S. elections this relationship is far from affable. The fact that consultants are more openly a part of political news coverage today—they often appear on television or in newspaper articles to act as surrogates for their candidate or simply to comment on a race or some other political question (see chapter 2)—has changed the relationship between these two actors in that consultants are not hidden commodities that need to be protected by journalists. However, a more significant development is that the “watchdog” role of the press has become more pronounced, with journalists viewing themselves as the “arbiters of the political system” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a, 14).39


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This change in the electoral context fundamentally drives the relationship between consultants and the press. In the modern electoral context “[j]ournalists bring up issues, they spark debate, and in short they serve as political actors in the ever enlarging ring of American politics” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a, 13). However, journalists also work for corporations that are profit driven; this means that one of a reporter’s goals, if he or she wants to garner any significant amount of air-time or number of column inches, is to contribute a story that will be considered newsworthy and sell papers or raise ratings. In fact, journalists themselves report that financial pressures have a large impact on the content and quality of their work (Pew Research Center 1999). One tactic newspapers and news programs have gone to is to focus their election coverage on the “horse race”—who is ahead and who is behind in the polls during a campaign. Journalists have been berated for giving too much attention to this and other less substantive aspects of campaigns and not enough to the issues that are being debated. Over 70 percent of all journalists report that paying too little attention to complex issues is a valid criticism of the modern press corps (Pew Research Center 1999). If the press is only interested in who is ahead and who is behind, the need for consultants to act as sources is diminished, as is the symbiotic element of the relationship. Reporters do not need a candidate’s pollster to tell them who is ahead and who is behind since many news organizations have their own survey research staff (Asher 1998). Spokespeople from a candidates campaign may be asked to comment on how their candidate is doing in the polls, but this is mainly a reaction to what the press wants to do and is yet another way to get the candidate’s image or name on television or radio—something that is all part of a sound earned-media strategy. Focusing on conflict is another tactic reporters use in their stories. “In [the reporter’s] mindset, all conflict is newsworthy because it upsets the status quo” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a, 20). More specifically, in the context of campaigns they “jump on inconsistencies, untruths, or misrepresentations in political advertising” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997b, 34; see also, Pew Research Center 1999). These changes have created a relationship between consultants and journalists that is adversarial at the most fundamental levels.40 The most recognizable feature of the current attitude of reporters has been the advent of “ad watches.” The practice of critiquing the work of consultants (especially media consultants) is the biggest factor

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in creating the current adversarial relationship. This change was evident when ad watches first appeared, as Washington Post columnist David Broder said, “the campaign dialogue must be rescued from the electronic demagoguery favored by too many hired-gun political consultants” (Broder quoted in Alger 1996, 326). During the 2002 election cycle, ABC News, through its Web site, asked the public to help them in their “watchdog” role—they called the operation “The ABC News Political Unit Election Watchdog”—by notifying them of any “suspect communication that they might receive through the mail or over the phone” (ABC News 2002). Julie Wilson, former political editor at the Los Angeles Times, illustrates the effect that these kinds of efforts can have on consultants and campaigns: “When campaigns launch an ad, they either invite us to a showing or they send us a tape . . . with documentation” (Hughes 1990, 5). The underlying idea behind ad watches is noble and “potentially useful, but in practice [it] becomes problematic,” argues Thomas Patterson (1993, 200). Few would argue with or try to circumvent any effort that tries to uncover lies that are being spread by a campaign’s communications (even consultants agree that lying is unethical and wrong [see Nelson, Medvic, and Dulio 2002]). The difficulty lies in the fact that this type of journalism requires the reporter to continually search for wrongdoing in a candidate’s television ads or other communications (e.g., persuasion phone calls or direct mail pieces). If nothing substantial is uncovered, “the reporter has almost no choice but to focus on minor problems or stretch the evidence” (Patterson 1993, 200).41 And, because “positive” ads contain little conflict they are not deemed newsworthy, and hence are rarely reported on. In effect, journalists take the questionable aspects of consultants’ work and criticize it, but completely ignore those aspects that are free of any controversial material. This is not to say that consultants and journalists do not have any mutually beneficial interaction. Consultants remain in a position to act as sources for political reporters, as they can supply an “inside” perspective to the campaign. However, as noted above, the types of stories reporters need consultants for—pieces on campaign strategy or information about candidate issue stances—are becoming few and far between in modern campaign coverage relative to the shorter more sensational stories that most news organizations run. We are more likely to see the news media cover events like those involving candidates Dole, Bauer, and Dukakis mentioned above because of their shock value rather than an in-depth piece on campaign strategy. Horse-race and sensational stories are driven by polling data or other material


95

that can be collected without help from the campaign or its consultants. Consultants working on a campaign may also need journalists and the media—as mentioned above, earned-media events are also integral to the dissemination of a campaign’s message. But the event will not be a success unless press cover it. This is less of a problem today, however, with the proliferation of 24-hour cable news stations that have to fill their time slots, as well as the Internet. Although “broadcast and print journalists have an image of themselves ‘as independent, fearless, and professionally neutral conveyors of information’ ” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997b, 14), campaign consultants see today’s political journalists (both print and broadcast) as one of the reasons for the high levels of voter cynicism and as one of the worst parts of the modern electoral context. Consultants’ Attitudes Toward Journalists Consultants are critical of their candidate-clients, but this is substantially outpaced by the disdain they have for the press in today’s electoral environment. Over one half (53.3 percent) of all consultants gave broadcast journalists a negative rating (“poor” or “very poor”), and nearly one third rated print journalists similarly. This is compared to the relatively high ratings consultants gave to their colleagues, candidates, and political parties (see Table 4.10). In addition, consultants see the quality of political journalists as declining over time. For example, nearly 44 percent of all consultants reported that since they have been involved in politics, the quality of those reporters who write about politics has gotten “somewhat worse” or “a lot worse,” and almost 60 percent said that those broadcast journalists who talk about politics on television or radio have declined in quality. These negative ratings and attitudes toward political journalists are not indicative of a symbiotic relationship that consultants have built over time, or one in which “journalists protect their consultant sources” (Sabato 1989, 16). This is not the picture of a cozy relationship, but rather one that is full of tension. The changes in the press’s role in elections described above is likely one source of the increasingly adversarial nature of this important relationship. Although it is clear that most consultants believe that journalists do not do their job very well (they give them very negative ratings and see their reporting efforts as a main source of voter cynicism), some consultants may have more positive views of the press than others. First, for example, Republican consultants may have a more negative view of the press than Democratic or Independent consultants

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For Better or Worse? Table 4.10 Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Political Journalists, Candidates, Consultants, and Political Parties (in percent) Broadcast Print Candidates Political Journalists Journalists for office Consultants

National Political Parties

Excellent Good Average Poor Very Poor

0.8 16.0 28.7 32.5 20.0

4.6 25.1 37.8 22.4 8.9

3.2 34.7 44.8 12.9 1.0

5.7 41.8 38.6 8.3 1.2

4.2 24.0 40.8 20.4 4.4

Total N

495

499

487

483

473

Note: Full question wording: “In general, how would you rate the quality of . . . —as excellent, good, average, poor, or very poor?”

given that many Republicans (officeholders and citizens alike) claim that the press has a “liberal bias” and that Republicans cannot get a fair shake in the media.42 Regardless of whether or not this is true, it is a perception some have and may be visible in Republicans’ views of the press. Second, consultants who have worked for media outlets in the past may have more positive views of journalists, given that these consultants have a history working in the press corps and are familiar with the rigors of the job. Finally, some consultants have more contact with the press than others, which may lead to these consultants (media consultants, for example) to be more likely than other types of consultants to give journalists negative ratings. Additionally, because journalists criticize the work that media consultants do for candidates in the form of ad watches, the adversarial nature of the consultant-reporter relationship is likely the most acute between these two actors. Republicans are clearly more likely to give today’s journalists negative ratings than are Democrats or Independents (see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). Print journalists get the brunt of Republican criticism as nearly 40 percent of GOP consultants rate them as “poor” or “very poor” compared to only about 26 percent of Democrats. However, consultants who identified themselves as Independents were also very critical of print journalists, as over one third (35.6 percent) rated them as “poor” or “very poor” (see Table 4.11). Republicans are also very critical of broadcast journalists, but the partisan differences are not as pronounced as many Democrats and Independents also gave them negative ratings (see Table 4.12).

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Electoral Connections Table 4.11 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Political Print Journalists (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents


13.1 25.1 37.7 20.2 3.8

6.9 19.0 39.1 30.2 4.8

6.8 28.8 37.3 20.3 6.8

Total N

183

248

59

2

Note: x = 13.681, p = 0.045, d.f. = 8 Full question wording: “In general, how would you rate the quality of print journalists who write about politics—as excellent, good, average, poor, or very poor?”

Table 4.12 Partisan Differences in Consultants’ Ratings of Today’s Political Broadcast Journalists (in percent) Republicans

Democrats

Independents


25.1 32.2 29.5 12.0 1.1

15.0 38.6 27.2 18.3 0.8

28.1 15.8 35.1 21.1 0.0

Total N

183

246

57

Note: x2 = 19.561, p = 0.006, d.f. = 8 Full question wording: “In general, how would you rate the quality of broadcast journalists who talk about politics—as excellent, good, average, poor, or very poor?”

Even during a time when the general public is very critical of the press, and describes journalists as “arrogant” and “cynical” (CMPA 1997), the numbers of consultants who rate journalists negatively far outpaces the number of citizens who rate journalists this way. For example, 57 percent of Americans said that members of the news media “often” let their own personal preferences affect the way they report the news, and another 28 percent said reporters “sometimes” let their own views affect their reporting.43 However, only about 20 percent of all citizens44 rated today’s political journalists (both print and broadcast) as “poor” or “very poor.” Even Republicans, who see a large “liberal bias” among journalists, are not as critical as consultants; only 19.4 percent of Republicans in the electorate rate print journalists negatively. This figure rises to

98


only 23.4 percent when Republican members of the electorate were asked about broadcast journalists. Consultants who had previously worked for a media outlet are not more likely to give today’s journalists favorable ratings than are those who had never had media experience. In fact, the relationship is the exact opposite, as those consultants who had worked in the media were more likely to be critical of today’s journalists. Fewer consultants who had previously worked for a print-news organization rated today’s print journalists as “excellent” or “good” (26 percent) than did those who had never had that experience (31.1 percent). More striking, however, are the negative views consultants who worked for a printmedia outlet have of today’s broadcast journalists. More than one third of these consultants rated broadcast journalists as “very poor,” compared to only about 15 percent of those who had not worked for a print-media outlet (see Table 4.13). Similar patterns are found when consultants were asked about the change in quality of journalists over time. Fewer consultants with print-journalism experience saw improvement in print and broadcast journalists than did those with no experience with print journalism. Consultants who had previously worked for a broadcast media outlet have similar attitudes toward today’s political reporters in that more of these consultants rate print journalists negatively than those who had never worked for a broadcast media outlet. However, differences disappear when these consultants’ attitudes about the quality of broadcast journalists and the quality of reporters over time are examined. Finally, different types of consultants do express different views toward today’s political journalists. Media consultants and direct mail

Table 4.13 Consultants’ Employment History and Their Attitudes about Political Broadcast Journalists (in percent) Have you ever worked for a print news media organization? Yes

No


36.1 25.2 26.1 11.8 0.8

15.5 35.5 30.4 17.9 0.8

Total N

119

375

Note: x2 = 24.389, p = 0.000, d.f. = 4


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consultants are less approving of both print and broadcast reporters than are general consultants, pollsters, or fund-raisers. The relationship between media consultants and political journalists is the most tenuous as only 8.5 percent rated broadcast journalists as “excellent” or “good” and fewer than 20 percent rated print journalists as “excellent” or “good.” Similar negative ratings are offered by direct mail specialists. With the advent of ad watches, which can also be a tool to critique the accuracy of a candidate’s direct mail campaign, the relationship between direct mail consultants and journalists is also likely becoming more adversarial. Again, this is because the probability of a positive—or feel good—direct mail piece becoming the topic of a news story is very low, whereas reporters usually jump at the chance to publicize and criticize a “negative” direct mail piece, even if the information it contains is accurate and well documented.

k The electoral connections between consultants, their candidateclients, the voters they connect with while trying to spread a candidate’s message, and the press who cover the campaign they are waging are clear and professional political consultants have strong beliefs about each. In short, consultants trust voters, are skeptical about today’s candidates, and see political reporters as one of the most negative aspects of the modern electoral system in the United States. It is the job of the consultant to help the candidate shape and craft their campaign’s message. This is the foundation of their relationship. Consultant activity that is focused on accomplishing this can be found from the very beginning stages of a campaign (polling and opposition research) through the execution of the strategy, theme, and message (paid and earned media exposure as well as direct mail communications) to the final days of the campaign (field and get-out-thevote efforts). This relationship is the most intimate of any a consultant will have. However, consultants express a great deal of pessimism about today’s candidates—only 3 percent of all consultants see candidates being of “excellent” quality—and a surprising amount of misgivings about candidates they have helped elect in the past—over half of all consultants report that they have worked for a candidate they were later sorry to see serve in office. Consultants also have a close relationship with the electorate in that they must try and cut through all the clutter in potential voters’ lives that gets in the way of politics. Some call what consultants do manipulation; however, the consultant-voter relationship is not a

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manipulative one but one that reinforces partisan beliefs and one that attempts to focus a campaign on issues voters truly care about. Consultants can help to foster the debate in a campaign by helping a candidate talk to voters in a way that voters will get at least some political information. Consultants trust voters to make a sound decision on Election Day, even though they do not see them as very well informed on the major policy issues facing the nation. Only 3 percent of consultants believe the American public is very well informed on major policy issues, but at the same time nearly 80 percent of consultants express trust and confidence in the electorate’s ability to make a sound choice on Election Day. This, of course, is nothing new to political science which has shown time and time again that the American electorate is neither politically savvy nor attentive, but capable of making political judgements. Finally, the consultant-journalist relationship is not one that is cozy or mutually beneficial as some would have us believe. With consultants continuing to become newsworthy and with the increasing place of ad watches and similar stories in the coverage of campaigns, consultants and journalists are more rivals than partners. Clear evidence of this is found in consultants’ attitudes about today’s political journalists—one-fifth of all consultants see broadcast journalists as being of poor quality and nearly 60 percent of all consultants see broadcast reporters as declining in quality over time. Consultants’ criticism of the press is even harsher than that given by the electorate, which is far from a defender of the modern press corps.

5 k Party Favors? Have Consultants Replaced Political Parties?

The “personality cult” campaign and the general deterioration of the party system are perfectly acceptable to most political consultants. In fact, they themselves, along with their electoral wares have played a moderate part in . . . the continuing decline of party organizations . . . [and have] abetted the slide, sometimes with malice afterthought . . . The services provided by consultants, their new campaign technologies, have undoubtedly supplanted party activists and influences. —Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants

The most damning indictment of political consultants is that their presence has contributed to the decline of political parties in the Untied States. If true, the continued ascendance of political consultants in elections has serious ramifications for democratic governance, because, according to Schattschneider (1942), “political parties created democracy and . . . modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties” (1).1 Specifically, critics claim that consultants came on the scene and shoved the parties to the periphery of elections by taking over many of the functions that parties once monopolized, such as communication with voters and being the strategic brains behind candidates’ campaigns

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(Sabato 1981; 1988; Agranoff 1972; Kelly 1956; and Crotty 1984). In broad terms, consultants are blamed for allowing candidates to operate independently of their party (Sabato 1981). If consultants have displaced parties’ ability to function, their place in our democracy must be questioned. The critics’ claims also depict a competition and rivalry between consultants and parties for candidates and control over campaigns. But if consultants have not replaced parties and have simply become parties’ electoral partners, as I will argue, consultants should be seen as a benefit to parties that help them meet their electoral goals.

Consultants and Parties: A Cooperative Team Claims such as Sabato’s noted above are not an accurate depiction of the current state of the party-consultant relationship in the United States. Consultants did not push parties to the side of elections. Rather, they stepped in to fill a void in electioneering that was created when parties began to adjust and adapt to a changing electoral context. There is an important difference between consultants purposely pushing parties into decline, and simply stepping in to provide services that were needed at the time but unavailable from other sources. Consultants and parties do not compete but have a cooperative relationship in the modern electoral context, one that is beneficial not only to consultants and parties but to candidates as well. The context that has led up to and surrounds the cooperative relationship has created a new role for parties in the modern electoral context which is also outlined and discussed below. Answering the Critics The critical view that consultants contributed to the decline of political parties contains at least three inherent assumptions: that consultants were in a position to have an impact on parties’ electoral strength; that consultants had a far-reaching effect on candidates in the early years of the consulting profession; and that other contributing factors that led to the decline of parties left room for consultants to also have an effect. Each of these assumptions has serious flaws and is dealt with in turn. First, for consultants to be in a position to drive parties further into decline they must have been in place before, or at the very least during, the so-called decline. Although many of the tactics modern consultants use today have their roots in activities that can be traced back to the beginning of the republic (see chapter 2), the first modern consultants did not appear until after the first blows to party domi-

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nance in electioneering. Even if Whitaker and Baxter are considered to be the first consultants (a better description of that team is that of a precursor to the modern consultant), they did not appear until 1933. By 1933, parties had already felt the ramifications of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 and the Progressive Movement (Merriam 1923; Bruce 1927; Sait 1927; Herrnson 1988; Aldrich 1995). When Whitaker and Baxter began their business in California, parties had already lost control of candidate recruitment, and patronage was all but destroyed. The direct primary, as a device to select candidates, also played a part in the shift from a party-centered system to a candidate-centered one which led candidates to form their own campaign organizations (Herrnson 1988). Therefore, consultants entered the electoral playing field when parties had already experienced the most damaging blows to their electoral prowess. Second, if consultants had the effect on parties that their critics claim, consultants had to have been active in a number of different races at the time. Again, even if we begin with Whitaker and Baxter, consultants were not active in a large number of campaigns until many years later. “From its start in 1934, the campaign management industry grew rather slowly. A few companies went in and out of business shortly after World War II, and some public relations and advertising firms started accepting political campaign clients in the late 1940s. [It was not until] the 1950s [that] there was a slow but steady expansion” (Rosenbloom 1973, 50). If we now consider only truly modern political consultants— professionals who are hired to assist campaigns with sophisticated and technical services such as television production, statistical sampling and survey research, and computer data analysis and targeting—this early presence of consultants in campaigns is even less dramatic. As an example, the emergence, and subsequent domination, of television in political campaigns did not occur until the late 1950s.2 With this, there was a need for technical assistance in campaigns— assistance that only professional consultants could provide. The party structure simply did not have the requisite skills or staff to handle the demand at this time. And although a few campaigns employed this technology at the beginning, the slow trickle-down of consultants’ presence in campaigns into congressional races was not substantial until the mid-1980s.3 Presidential contests saw the first use of television and computer analysis of survey data that was collected with probability sampling during the late 1950s. Even though Dwight Eisenhower’s first presidential campaign was the first to use television extensively, one observer writes, until the early 1960s “most candi-

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dates still ran traditional campaigns through partisan groups and party organizations at the state and local level” (Menefee-Libey 2000, 20). Although the first signs that consultants would play a large part in campaigns became clear during the middle of the twentieth century, they were far from a common presence, even in the most visible and prominent campaigns of the day, which again illustrates that consultants did not appear on the scene until parties had already weakened. It is clear that the reform movements which led to the disappearance of patronage, and the institution of the direct primary and other ballot reforms were the first changes in the electoral context that caused parties to lose much of their electoral power. However, other legislation which went into effect over fifty years later would have similar, even if unintended, effects—effects that consultants are sometimes blamed for. In 1971 Congress passed the first in a series of laws that would fundamentally change campaigning—the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The effects of this original piece of legislation were minimal compared to those of the first FECA amendments passed in 1974. The 1974 amendments broadened the candidate disclosure requirements of the original legislation, created limits on candidates’ campaign expenditures, created contribution limits to federal candidates from individuals, parties, and other political groups, and designed a federal agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), to oversee how money was raised and spent in elections.4 Even though the expenditure limits and the design of the FEC were declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s landmark decision Buckley v. Valeo, the FECA and all its additional amendments (1974, 1976, and 1979) had a profound effect on parties’ place in campaigns, an effect more far-reaching than consultants. Because the Buckley decision upheld the provision that limited how much parties could give to candidates, parties were left at a disadvantage because many major donors preferred to contribute to political action committees (PACs) or directly to candidates (Herrnson 1988). “These reforms set the stage for PACs to become the major organized financiers of election campaigns and drove candidates to rely upon professional campaign consultants to design direct mail fundraising operations” (Herrnson 1998, 28). So, again, the electoral context formed by legislation was the original source of party weakness.5 It also created another void that consultants stepped in to fill. Interestingly, the effects of the FECA and its amendments occurred during what some have called a resurgence (Herrnson 1988; Kayden and Mahe 1985) or a revitalization (Aldrich 1995) of party strength, while others have argued that organizationally the parties

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started anew with an entirely new focus (Menefee-Libey 2000). Parties began to retool and adapt to the new electoral context that was created by both the new technology available to campaigns and the financial limits put in place by the FECA. Parties (including both national committees—the RNC and the DNC—and the four Capitol Hill committees—the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee [DCCC], the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee [DSCC], the National Republican Congressional Committee [NRCC], and the National Republican Senatorial Committee [NRSC]) began to offer candidates technical services in areas such as survey research, media production, and opposition research. It was also during this period that they began to cultivate relationships with political consultants. The revitalization of the parties in terms of their adaptation and the services they provided to candidates is well documented (Kayden and Mahe 1985; Herrnson 1988; Frantzich 1989; Aldrich 1995; MenefeeLibey 2000). For example, both parties built state-of-the-art media centers (e.g., the Democrats’ Harriman media center) in their headquarters that gave candidates (mainly incumbents since the headquarters were in Washington, D.C.) access to television production services at a low cost. In addition, the parties also did a great deal of survey research for candidates.6 However, without the help of consultants this revitalization could never have fully taken place. In some instances parties hired consultants to provide services for their own purposes, in others they recommended consultants to candidates, and in still others they paid candidates’ bills for the services consultants performed. If parties were decimated by the rise of political consultants, why, then, did they begin to work alongside and hire consultants to help candidates? These practices are what have led some to argue that “the campaign techniques [consultants] provide have not destroyed the parties but have strengthened them” (Luntz 1998, 244). The main electoral goal of parties is to elect as many of their candidates to office as possible—so that they can either maintain or gain majority status (Kolodny 1998). To this end, the parties’ Hill committees instituted two proximate goals for congressional elections during the mid-1970s: to raise as much money as possible, and to use those funds to help their candidates get the assistance they needed to be successful (Menefee-Libey 2000; Kolodny 1998). Leading the way, Republicans (the RNC and the Hill committees) made sound use of their rebuilt and large staff to re-commit themselves to the party’s fiscal solvency. The major gains in Republican fund-raising were through small dollar contributions ($50 and below) (Herrnson 1988), but funds were also raised through an aggressive

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direct mail program initiated by Chairman William Brock during the mid-1970s, and the Republican party was able to build a network of donors that reached 400,000 by the mid-1980s (Herrnson 1998). Because of their large staff, the GOP was able to do much of this in-house, although they did look to professional political consultant Richard Viguerie for assistance. Democrats, on the other hand, relied substantially on the help of outside consultants to spark their direct mail fund-raising campaign. In 1981 DNC chair Charles Manatt hired Craver Matthews Smith and Company to run the DNC’s direct mail program. The firm’s efforts were so successful that by 1984 they had a donor network of nearly 600,000 individuals (Menefee-Libey 2000). Actions taken by Manatt and the Democrats in the early 1980s foreshadow the strong relationship parties would have with consultants. Additionally, Republicans hired consultants including Richard Wirthlin, Robert Teeter, and Stanley Finkelstein to conduct survey research for their candidates, and the Democrats hired consultants such as Peter Hart and Matt Reese to collect and analyze survey data (Herrnson 1988). Yet another example of the budding relationship between consultants and parties is in the provision of some of the services parties offered candidates. During the election cycles of the mid-1980s, Republican candidates could have ads made for them at the party’s television studio on Capitol Hill. However, “[t]he committee also farmed out the production of many more commercials [for candidates] to private advertising firms” (Herrnson 1988, 62). In their use of the Harriman media center, Democratic candidates only received use of the sophisticated facilities (e.g., cameras, lighting, and sound) and the technical expertise of the staff (e.g., editing and filming) since candidates had to “provide their own ideas and copy . . . [and] hire their own advertising experts and scriptwriters” (Herrnson 1988, 62). Therefore, even when parties were providing the services, consultants played a major role and worked with candidates along side party staffers. In sum, it is difficult to see how consultants had a direct effect on the decline of parties. Consultants’ influence began slowly in a few presidential campaigns and took many years to become a major part of races at all levels. The FECA (and its subsequent amendments) affected the parties’ ability to funnel contributions to candidates, which made their candidates turn to other sources, including consultants, for assistance. Given this electoral context, parties began to work with consultants to help candidates by using some consultants’ services in polling, and the creation of television ads and direct mail pieces. Parties also recommended consultants to candidates who inquired, a practice that continues today. All of these facts are evidence that con-

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sultants had little to do with the decline of parties, but rather were reactions to other changes in the electoral system. A New Era of Party Service Scholars have conceptualized parties in a number of ways over the course of the last half-century.7 The most familiar of these may be V. O. Key Jr.’s (1964) tripartite model consisting of party-as-organization, party-in-government, and party-in-the-electorate. This view has been used to describe the different aspects and functions of political parties for nearly forty years. However, due to the changing context in which parties have worked—including the changes noted above as well as the changing meaning of party among voters—the way in which parties are viewed also changed.8 The first attempt to explain the changing face of the parties during the mid- to late 1970s, illustrated how parties’ place in elections had changed. Party involvement in elections during the mid-1900s was described as “party-as-peripheral-organization,” illustrating the decreased role parties played relative to candidates (Herrnson 1988). Paul S. Herrnson then described a new model of the parties’ place in elections during the 1980s, the “national-party-as-intermediary,” saying: Under this model national parties act as appendages or accessories to the campaign organizations of their congressional candidates, providing advice, information, and a myriad of specialized campaign services that would otherwise have to be purchased from professional campaign consultants. The model also depicts the national parties as using their financial and technical resources, institutional stability, and unique status in Washington to convince, induce, or otherwise persuade state and local party organizations, political consultants, PACs, and candidates to follow their advice when conducting election-related activities. (1988, 47) The “national-party-as-intermediary” model reflects the scenario described above in which parties began to provide services to candidates; some services were directly provided by the party, and some services were “brokered” and were provided by consultants at the party’s expense. Similarly, and more in the vernacular Key used, this change has been described as each party taking on a new role and becoming a “party-in-service.” John H. Aldrich (1995) argues that “[t]he critical era [of the 1960s] itself did not create a new institutional form

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of party; it simply meant the death of the old. Over time, however, the parties as organizations have adapted to the changing circumstances, and a new form of party has emerged, one that is ‘in service’ to its ambitious politicians but not in control of them . . .” (273). These accounts of the national party organizations are the best descriptions of how both parties have adapted to their new environments. However, the electoral context in which parties operate has not remained static, which calls for a fresh look at the how the national parties (including the Hill committees) approach working with candidates. Doing so not only updates the literature on what it is that parties do and how they have done it through the 1990s, but continues to show, by the simple facts of the parties’ operation, that parties have a cooperative relationship with professional political consultants. The modern (late 1990s and early 2000s) party operation has been shaped to a great extent by the rules governing how funds are raised and spent in elections, much like the party-in-service era was formed by the FECAs.9 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, parties were hampered to an extent by the contribution limits placed on them by the amendments to the FECA. This changed significantly during the mid- to late 1980s thanks to some clever reading of the law, which created loopholes for parties to take advantage of. Prior to Election Day 2002, national political parties had four ways in which they could contribute financially to a candidate’s campaign: direct contributions, which were limited to $5,000 per candidate per election; independent expenditures, which could be made in unlimited amounts10; soft-money expenditures; and coordinated expenditures.11 As of November 6, 2002 (the day the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 went into effect), national parties and their campaign committees do not have soft money at their disposal; state and local party organizations are allowed, however, to raise soft money in limited amounts.12 As the parties have again adapted to the changing electoral context around them, their role has once again changed. A former DCCC staffer turned consultant explains that “the level of service and involvement that the committee has had, has changed . . . When I was there, we tried to be very nuts and bolts with campaigns.”13 Today, the parties are no longer a “nuts-and-bolts” service provider. Nor are they a party-as-intermediary in the way that model originally described them. Instead, a new model of party activity has evolved—the partyas-billpayer. In a time of continued technological advancement and when more and more candidates are taking advantage of that technology, parties have discovered that it is inefficient for them to provide

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all the necessary services to all their candidates from inside their headquarters. Therefore, the parties have scaled back tremendously in the services they provide to candidates, and have increased the amount of money they spend paying bills for their candidates. Of the three options national parties currently have for contributing monetarily to candidates’ campaigns, coordinated expenditures provide the clearest picture of how parties have moved into the partyas-billpayer era of party service rather than providing services in-house. Since direct contributions are limited to $5,000 ($10,000 for both the primary and the general election) they are rather insignificant in today’s House and Senate campaigns which cost upwards of $1 million and $10 million respectively (see Table 1.1). Independent expenditures are not done in conjunction with candidates’ campaigns (as coordinated expenditures are), and therefore blur the candidate-consultant-party relationship; additionally, as noted below, both parties have moved away from this kind of spending (Kolodny and Dulio 2001). Coordinated expenditures were begun under section 441a(d) of the FECA, which stipulated that “the national party committees and the state party committees were explicitly allowed to make expenditures on behalf of candidates up to $10,000 (in 1974 dollars plus a [Cost of Living Adjustment]) in House elections and in varying amounts according to state voting age population (VAP) for Senate elections and at-large House districts” (Kolodny 1998, 137).14 These expenditures usually come in the form of expenditures by the party on goods and services used by the candidate. In other words, the party can purchase a specific service—a poll, a direct mail campaign, or the production of a television spot—for the candidate. Under the original interpretation of the law, only national parties (the RNC and DNC) and state parties were allowed to make these coordinated expenditures on behalf of candidates. However, in 1978 the NRSC interpreted the law to mean that if they created an agreement with a state party (called an “agency agreement”) they could both raise and spend the amount the state party was allowed to spend in a race. The interpretation, challenged by the Democrats, was finally upheld by the Supreme Court in Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (1981). The Court effectively ruled that if a Hill committee entered into an agency agreement with both the national party and the state party, the amount Hill committees could spend on behalf of candidates in House and Senate races effectively doubled. For example, in 1984 the amount the national- or stateparty committee could spend in coordinated money on a House race was $20,200 each. With the new interpretation of section 441a(d), the

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Hill committees could now double that and spend $40,400 on a single candidate for the House of Representatives (see Kolodny 1998, Table 5.1; Menefee-Libey 2000). Today that figure has risen to nearly $70,000; in Senate campaigns the limit ranged from slightly more than $135,000 to nearly $3.3 million during 2000 (Kolodny and Dulio 2003). The important aspect of coordinated expenditures for our purposes here is that these dollars constitute monies spent by parties on behalf of a candidate with the candidate’s knowledge and input. Increasingly, professional political consultants have been the recipients of coordinated expenditures. During the 1998 election cycle, both parties spent a total of $30 million in coordinated expenditures in congressional campaigns (House: $9,498,781; Senate: $20,417,774). Over 90 percent of all coordinated money (77 percent in House races and 96 percent in Senate races) was spent on outside consultants (Kolodny and Dulio 2003). And most of those dollars were spent on media, mail, and polling (Kolodny and Dulio 2003)—all services which the parties rely heavily on consultants to provide. Similarly, during the 2000 election cycle over $23 million ($7,395,298 in House races and $15,925,730 in Senate races) was spent by both parties in coordinated expenditures, almost 94 percent of which (92.5 percent in House races and 94.5 percent in Senate races) was spent directly on outside professional political consultants. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of these dollars were spent on services centered on media production and air time, direct mail, and survey research; in House and Senate races respectively, 94.5 percent and 99.5 percent of coordinated money was spent on these three services and paid directly to outside political consultants (Kolodny and Dulio 2003). Nowhere is the change in philosophy from service provider to bill-payer seen more clearly than in both parties’ decisions about their facilities. During the 1980s, both parties offered technical assistance to their candidates at greatly reduced prices through the use of their inhouse media production facilities. For example, prior to 1986, “About 25 to 30 candidates [got] the full treatment,” which included a discussion with the campaign’s pollster, the party’s regional field director, and one of the party’s writers, says Ed Blakely, former director of the NRCC’s studio (quoted in Herrnson 1988, 63). However, after this point the NRCC started to reduce the number of candidates to whom they supplied “full blown media campaigns” and increased the number of ads purchased from outside media consultants (Herrnson 1988, 63). The result of this shift was that more Republican candidates could receive help without having to increase the size of the NRCC staff, according to the studio’s production manager at the time, Chuck Allen

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(Herrnson 1988, 63). The NRCC realized that in the face of this new electoral context they could look to professional consultants to help provide services to candidates and not only continue to pursue their goals but probably get a better product for the candidate. In the late 1990s, Republicans made the decision to stop using their media center for campaign shoots. Supporting evidence of this is the absence of any coordinated expenditure payments from any Republican committee to the NRCC for use of the television studio. One high-level NRCC operative describes the decision as a choice over how to best allocate resources: “Technology is changing so fast that it’s just not cost effective for us to continue to upgrade our equipment in a recording studio. The resources there could be better used somewhere else.”15 That “somewhere else” is candidates’ campaigns, and it is likely in the form services provided by professional political consultants. As Wilma Goldstein, a former NRCC and RNC operative, explains, the NRCC “discovered [that] in order to retool [the media center], almost every cycle, maybe two at the most, you are going to have to raise anywhere from $3 million to $5 million to $10 million to redo that and it is not worth it . . . For $10 million you can fund a lot of candidates” (Goldstein 2000). During 1998, Republican party committees paid consultants nearly $14 million in coordinated expenditures for services including media production, television time, polling, direct mail, and other campaign activities that were spread out over 159 candidates (both House and Senate); and in 2000, $12.2 million were spent in coordinated expenditures (both House and Senate) on a total of 243 candidates on these same types of services. Democrats, too, have significantly scaled back their use of the Harriman media center. During 1998, Democrats spent only $795,000 in coordinated expenditures on media-related expenses related to the use of the Harriman center, compared to the $10.6 million ($1.1 million in House races and $9.5 million in Senate contests) they spent in coordinated expenditures on media consultants for their candidates. In addition, of the payments to the DCCC for media services in the Harriman center, 37 percent were for amounts less than $1,000 and only 8.8 percent exceeded $10,000. On the other hand, only 1.5 percent of Democratic payments to outside consultants were for less than $1,000, and 48 percent were for $20,000 or more. This trend continued during the 2000 cycle when the Democrats’ use of the Harriman center continued to decline. During this election cycle the DCCC only received roughly $270,000 in payments from the other Democratic party committees for the use of the media center; 66.5 percent of the payments back to the DCCC were for less than $1,000 and none were for more

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than $6,100, whereas only 13 percent of the payments to outside consultants were for less than $1,000 and 53 percent were for more than $20,000. The Harriman center is now likely used mainly for minor video shoots and the bulk of campaign work is done by outside media consultants with their own facilities. As illustrated above, the vast majority of coordinated money spent by parties and party committees is spent on consultants. These data help show that party officials have realized that one of their most valuable services to candidates in the modern electoral context is supplying funds, either in the form of direct contributions, which remain a small portion of the total dollars spent and are limited to $5,000 per election, or in coordinated expenditures. The changes in the rules that allow parties to spend large sums of money on congressional races have moved the parties toward this. As Rob Engel, former executive director of the DNC, explaines, “people are now looking towards parties for the money aspects, as opposed to what they used to look for [which] was for the technique and technical expertise. Now it is really more of a money expertise . . .” (Engel 1999). Even though “[c]oordinated expenditures are the vehicle of choice for most party activity in congressional elections,” the areas where parties cornered the market in terms of money expertise in the last decade were soft money and issue advocacy campaigns (i.e., campaign communications that do not expressly call for the election or defeat of a candidate but are focused on issues) (Herrnson 2000a, 94). Issue advocacy campaigns run by the party most often take the form of television commercials, although radio spots and direct mail pieces are also used. Although party spending of this nature is supposed to be done independently of candidates’ campaigns, parties are still providing services to the candidates. Issue ads not only convey messages that the party has deemed important,16 but they give candidates in a tough race political cover by taking the heat for any negativity that might be found in the commercials. In this way, “[i]ssue advocacy has become an important weapon in the arsenals that party committees use to help their candidates contest elections” (Herrnson 2000a, 112). Issue ads, along with independent expenditures—campaign communications that expressly call for the election or defeat of a candidate, but are done without any connection to the candidate’s campaign—are two other arrows in the parties’ quiver of services that they provide to their candidates.17 However, as in the case of coordinated expenditures, parties go to political consultants to provide these products rather than doing it

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in-house, again illustrating how parties have moved toward hiring political consultants to produce tangible services rather than producing the services themselves, and into the party-as-billpayer model. For example, in 1998, in addition to the media consultants both parties hired to create issue advocacy commercials that ran on television, “[t]he NRSC hired the John Grotta Company to spend $316,156 in independent expenditures on direct mail and telephone calls to mobilize voters in support of the failed reelection bid of Sen. Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina” (Herrnson 2000a, 112). As noted above, both the Democrats and Republicans have moved away from independent expenditures in the last few election cycles. During the 2000 election cycle the DCCC was the only party committee to use this spending strategy; moreover, they only spent $2 million in independent expenditures for their candidates (all of it was spent on outside phone banks for voter identification and GOTV efforts, which provide yet another important service to numerous candidates) (Kolodny and Dulio 2001; Herrnson 2000a). The manner in which parties spend money to help their candidates illustrates both the partnership parties have with consultants, as well as how parties have moved into a new era of party service—the party-as-billpayer. Allies and Adversaries The critical view of consultants’ effects on parties also assumes that consultants and parties are enemies in the electoral arena. However, the section above provides evidence which supports the hypothesis that consultants and parties are allies rather than adversaries. “According to the adversarial view, consultants do not compliment parties and act as little more than advertising agencies” (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 155). This view sees consultants as prototypical marketers who literally sell candidates as they would any other commercial product, and are neither interested nor vested in the performance of the party on Election Day. In the allied view, consultants “value party goals” and build a partnership by providing services that political parties do not (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 155). A key to the consultants-and-parties-as-allies hypothesis is determining whether or not consultants and parties have the same goals. The analysis of consultants’ motivations for getting in the business go a long way toward answering this question. Recall that a majority of consultants (53.5 percent) reported that they became a consultant because of their political beliefs and ideology and another 7.5 percent said that they wanted to help their party become the majority party in

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government. These data help to illustrate that consultants are driven by a desire to see a certain ideology or policy agenda be the compelling force behind government. However, because consulting is a business, consultants also must be driven to win. Their priority is with, and their commitment is to, their candidate and to no one else. The principal goal of political parties at the congressional level (specifically the Hill committees) is to “attain majority status in their chamber” (Kolodny 1998, 9). There is no denying this is what each campaign committee sets its sights on every election cycle. “The party committee . . . tends to have a view that is more broadly mission oriented,” argues one former DCCC staffer,18 suggesting that parties and consultants have different goals. However, this is only on one level. In most instances, the party does not care which of their partisans is governor of a state, is in a state senate seat, a congressional seat, or is the U.S. senator from a particular state, as long as they are a Democrat or Republican. In this sense, the seat is more important than the candidate. This is exhibited clearly by the fact that most of the time the party stays out of primary contests. This point is highlighted, for example, during the first election cycle after the decennial reapportionment and redistricting efforts which can result in incumbent members of Congress running against each other in primary elections. When states lose seats in the House of Representatives as a result of reapportionment, congressional districts must be redrawn, and in some cases result in incumbent versus incumbent campaigns. One such example in Michigan during 2002 illustrates this. Because of redistricting, John Dingell (D), the Dean of the House, was forced to run against another strong incumbent member, Lynn Rivers (D), for the party’s nomination in the Fifteenth Congressional District and the Democratic party stayed out of the primary campaign. When the party does become involved, it is usually to try and nominate the candidate who it thinks is best suited to run in the general election. This could lead to some divergent goals between consultants and the party. If a consultant is working for a candidate in a primary and the party organization wants to see a different candidate receive the nomination, the agenda and goals of the consultant and party could be very different. An illustrative case is the campaign of Tom Bordonaro to be the Republican nominee in California’s Twentysecond Congressional District in 1998. Brooks Firestone, not Bordonaro, was the choice of the state and national Republicans to challenge incumbent Lois Capps (Gill 2001). In this primary battle, the consultants working for Bordonaro did have a different goal than the GOP—each wanted their candidate elected. Similarly, the Democratic party worked

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hard on behalf of the challenger to former U.S. Representative Gary Condit (CA-18) during the 2002 primary campaign because they felt it was best for the party as a whole to have a different nominee after Condit’s lengthy involvement in the case surrounding the disappearance of former Washington, D.C., intern Chandra Levy. Here again, those consultants working for Condit had a different goal than those at the national party committee. However, once a general election contest is set, the candidate running for that office usually has full party support (although that support may not be in the form of monetary or service support). Again, the focus is on the candidate. For Democrats, any Democratic candidate is better than a Republican; and for Republicans, any Republican is better than a Democrat. Therefore, at one level consultants and parties may have different goals; they may quibble over the candidate who will best represent the party in the general election—for the consultant it is the candidate who has hired them, and for the party it may be the other candidate in the primary race. However, at a more fundamental level consultants and parties have the same goal: to get the candidate of their party elected. Former DNC executive director Rob Engel sees consultants as partners in the party’s efforts to win races: “Consultants [are] really partners with us to try to win . . . elections” (Engel 1999). A former head of the NRCC’s campaign division agrees, saying: “We [consultants and the party] both want to elect Republicans to office”19; a former DCCC staffer shares those sentiments and says: as Democrats, “[u]ltimately, our common agenda is to get a Democrat in that seat.”20 Therefore, when a particular race is on the line, consultants and the party structure do have the same goal—to get that particular Democratic or Republican candidate elected. Another manifestation of this partnership is the parties’ willingness to recommend consultants to their candidates. Although this is not a new practice, it has become more important in recent years as parties have relied more on consultants to provide services to their candidates. As an example, if a candidate approaches the NRCC about a consultant the standard protocol is to “recommend three consultants to anyone who asks.”21 Many times those who get recommended to candidates are former party staffers who have left the party to become consultants (Kolodny and Logan 1998). And, as Wilma Goldstein explains, “. . . sometimes . . . it gets done with the wink of an eye,” in that “. . . you . . . give yourself away a little bit [by saying] ‘Here is somebody that’s had a lot of experience doing House races, challenger races, primaries, [or with] your state. Here are two other people that

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I don’t know as well’” (Goldstein 2000). Both Democratic and Republican party operatives stress that the experience a consultant has with the type of race in question is one of the most important factors in recommending a consultant to a candidate. Also important is the comfort level the candidate has with the consultant. In his time as a DCCC staff member, Rob Engel recalls that he “preferred them to hire a consultant who had done the work before . . . [and] the most important thing was to hire someone you [felt] comfortable with” (Engel 1999). A central tenant of the consultants-and-parties-as-allies view is that consultants have increased their connection to parties by giving candidates “what political parties simply cannot: they offer targeted technical assistance and personalized advice” (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 155). It is important to note, however, that it is not that parties cannot provide their candidates with services such as survey research and television-production assistance, they simply choose not to provide them. The context that has been shaped by a changing electoral environment has made it more efficient for parties to simply pay political consultants, who are “better equipped to deal with the unique circumstances of each race and district” (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 156). In fact, there are some things that parties do better than consultants and some things that consultants do better than parties. As one former NRCC operative explains: There’s a perception that there’s almost an adversarial relationship between consultants and parties, which I don’t think is the case. I think everybody on both sides of the table probably wishes that the other side did something. But I think by and large it’s an honest relationship. They [consultants] do things that we can’t do, and that’s fine. They do things that we shouldn’t do.22 The closeness of the consultant-party relationship is only likely to get more intimate and important in the wake of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). With national parties now forbidden from raising and spending soft money, a fund-raising void has been created. Political consultants are likely some of the individuals who will fill this gap. Rather than parties being the conduit for soft money–type spending, outside groups, some of which are headed by political consultants or former party staffers, may be the conduit for money to be spent. Shortly after the passage of the BCRA lobbyists and consultants with close ties to the parties were pushing colleagues “to organize a new, non-party vehicle to take soft money to pay for commercials, voter-mobilization and other programs . . . ” (Edsall and

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Eilpern 2002, B2). In other words, parties will not be able to spend soft money as they once did, but consultants who work closely with the party (and may have worked for the party at one time) will be able to on their behalf. Thus, although the party may not have direct control over how money is spent, they may have indirect control through their relationship with consultants.

Consultants’ Views of Parties and Their Place in Campaigning Examining consultants’ attitudes toward political parties and their role in modern elections continues to help us more fully understand the relationship between these two important actors. The data presented below further illustrate that there is a strong cooperative relationship between consultants and political parties, as consultants complement parties and continue to help them achieve their goals in the current electoral context. However, although consultants report that they have stepped in and are now the main service providers of many of the campaign services and technologies candidates demand, they still see parties as important electoral actors in a number of electioneering areas. Political consultants as a group are aware of the changing roles of political parties in the modern electoral context. Consultants reported that over time23 they believe generally that parties’ influence in electing candidates has decreased at all levels (see Table 5.1). However, the largest decrease in party power was seen at the local level, whereas consultants’ assessment of the national parties was one of stability or only a slight decline in influence. These attitudes generally reflect the changes in electioneering that have taken place over the past half-century. Change such as the increasing use of television as a communication medium and the changes in campaign finance law have altered parties’ roles and led to local party organizations suffering the greatest loss of power in elections; no longer are they the focal point of campaigns. The relative stability of parties at the national level is likely a product of some of the power national parties and their Hill committees were able to wield with soft money at their disposal. If the BCRA is completely upheld and a similar measurement were to be taken in 2004 or 2006, consultants’ views of the parties at their different levels could very well be different given how money will be raised and spent. As previously noted, with soft money still an option for state parties, their power will likely increase while that of the national organizations could go in the other direction.

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Consultants almost unanimously reported that their own influence at all levels of elections has increased (see Table 5.1). Consultants saw the largest shift at the state level, but still reported that their influence at the local and national levels had increased as well. It is unlikely that any scholar, practitioner, or political observer would argue with this assessment. These data reinforce the permanency of consultants in national elections, but they also illustrate the expanding role they are taking in all types and at all levels of elections. Overall, there is a great deal of agreement among consultants as to the state of the parties. However, Republican and Independent consultants were less likely than Democrats to report that they had seen a decrease in the role of parties at the state level.24 In addition, Independents actually reported that they have seen an increase of party power at the national level.25 As with other attitudinal differences between Independents and their colleagues who label themselves Democrats and Republicans reported in earlier chapters, because consultants who identify themselves as Independents have separated themselves from the party structure (although in all likelihood they continue to work for Democratic and Republican candidates), these types of differences are not unexpected. The continued dominance of the two major parties may be viewed by individuals who see themselves as Independents as an increase in power of the organizational strength of the two major parties.26 The most telling differences in consultants’ attitudes toward the changing nature of the parties’ roles are found over time. Consultants who entered the profession between 1966 and 1982 have a much difTable 5.1 Consultants’ Assessment of the Role of Parties and Consultants over Time The The The The The The

role role role role role role

of of of of of of

the party at the local level . . . the party at the state level . . . the party at the national level . . . consultants at the local level . . . consultants at the state level . . . consultants at the national level . . .

* Mean ranking is based on a scale where: 1 = decreased very much 2 = decreased somewhat 3 = stayed the same 4 = increased somewhat 5 = increased very much

Mean Ranking* 2.38 2.71 2.90 4.40 4.44 4.37

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ferent view of the changing role of parties than do consultants who are more recent additions to the field. Those who became consultants between 1966 and 1982 were more likely to report a decrease in the role that local, state, and national parties have, compared to those who entered consulting in 1983 and later (see Table 5.2). Those consultants

Table 5.2 Consultants’ Assessment of the Changing Roles of Parties across Different Cohorts

The role of the party at the local level . . .a The role of the party at the state level . . .b The role of the party at the national level . . .c

1965 & before

1966– 1973

1974– 1982

1983– 1993

1994– 1999

2.37

2.01d

2.25e

2.57

2.84

2.88

2.29f

2.55g

2.89

3.22

3.17

2.51h

2.74i

3.07

3.37

Note: Mean ranking is based on a scale where: 1 = decreased very much 2 = decreased somewhat 3 = stayed the same 4 = increased somewhat 5 = increased very much a b c

ANOVA results: F4, 491 = 4.499, p = 0.001 (two-tail) ANOVA results: F4, 490 = 4.997, p = 0.001 (two-tail) ANOVA results: F4, 483 = 4.906, p = 0.001 (two-tail)

d

A post-hoc Bonferonni test indicates that the difference between this cohort and the 1983–1993 cohort is significant at the p = 0.005 level, and the difference between this and the 1994–1999 cohort is significant at the 0.004 level (one-tail tests).

e

The difference between this cohort and the 1983–1993 cohort is significant at the p = 0.095 level, and the difference between this and the 1994–1999 cohort is significant at the 0.045 level (one-tail tests).

f


g


h


i


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who entered the business between 1994 and 1999 actually saw a slight increase in the parties’ role in elections at state and national levels. The varied perspectives different consultants have on the ways in which parties have changed since they first got involved in politics are likely driven by the state of the parties’ electoral power at the time of their first involvement. In other words, the key is the reference point different consultants use to make this judgment. Those who were socialized as consultants between 1966 and 1982 had a much different point of reference than those who entered the profession in the mid- to late 1990s.27 Those who became consultants between the late 1960s and early 1980s were indoctrinated in an electoral context that saw the resurgence in party strength others have previously identified (Herrnson 1988; Aldrich 1995). The first years of their work in the profession were during the time when parties were supplying their candidates with services such as media and direct mail production, and opposition and survey research. In other words, these consultants became professionals during the party-as-intermediary era of party service and saw the party-in-service become the norm. Those who became consultants during the late 1980s and 1990s were introduced to the relationship between consultants and parties at a time when the parties were beginning to make serious changes in their philosophy toward candidate services; their early years as consultants were at the very beginning of the party-as-billpayer era—a time when parties were less involved than they were thirty years ago. Another indication of this different reference point is the number of consultants who see any change at all in the role parties have in elections. Only 10 percent of consultants who entered the industry between 1966 and 1973 describe the parties’ roles at the state level as unchanged since they have been in politics, compared to the 40 percent of consultants who entered the profession between 1994 and 1999. Obviously, consultants who became involved in politics in the earlier time period have seen a number of changes in parties’ involvement, such as the change from party-as-peripheral-organization to party-asintermediary, and finally to party-as-billpayer. Those who entered within the last decade have seen only the latest transition made by political parties in servicing their candidates. These consultants have seen the parties operate in a context that includes a decreased role as the main service provider to candidates, and an increase in the use of coordinated expenditures and in the use of soft money to fund issueadvocacy campaigns. Further evidence of these attitudinal trends are found when examining what consultants believe about the influence of their own

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industry over time. At both the state and national level, all consultants see a large increase in their electoral role, as noted above (see Table 5.1). However, as in the case with their attitudes about the role of parties, when consultants first entered the profession colors their interpretation of how their influence has changed over time. Those individuals who became consultants prior to 1983 report a large increase in the influence and role of consultants in elections (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Consultants’ Assessment of the Changing Roles of Consultants across Different Cohorts 1965 & before The role of consultants at the local level . . .a 4.32 The role of consultants 4.69 at the state level . . .b The role of consultants at the national level . . .c 4.67

1966– 1973

1974– 1982

1983– 1993

1994– 1999

4.58d

4.46e

4.36

4.05

4.60f

4.59g

4.27

4.03

4.64h

4.46i

4.19

4.11

Note: Mean ranking is based on a scale where: 1 = decreased very much 2 = decreased somewhat 3 = stayed the same 4 = increased somewhat 5 = increased very much a b c

ANOVA results: F4, 491 = 4.499, p = 0.001 (two tail) ANOVA results: F4, 490 = 4.997, p = 0.001 (two tail) ANOVA results: F4, 483 = 4.906, p = 0.001 (two tail)

d

A post-hoc Bonferonni test indicates that the difference between this cohort and the 1994–1999 cohort is significant at the 0.007 level (one-tail test).

e

The difference between this cohort and the 1994–1999 cohort is significant at the 0.034 level (one-tail test).

f


g


h


i


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Although the evaluations by the two cohorts after 1982 still illustrate a belief that consultants’ roles have increased, the magnitude of that change is smaller.28 In fact, the relationship between different cohorts and their mean assessment of the change in party strength over time is nearly linear at all levels. One would expect those consultants who were the first modern campaign advisors to see an increase in the role and importance of consultants—they were the first ones to have an impact in providing technical advice to candidates and those who followed only had more of an impact. In other words, the influence of consultants had nowhere to go but up at this time. Again, those who became consultants during the late 1960s and early 1970s were socialized at a time when parties had become a source of services for candidates. At this time, there was some consultant use among candidates, but parties also supplied technical expertise and services; in other words, there was still room for consultant influence to expand. Those consultants who entered the profession in the 1980s were in the midst of a different context however, as parties began to look to them to provide more services. Therefore, we would expect to find that fewer of these consultants noticed an increase in their role. Less than one-third of the individuals who became consultants in only the last decade said that they felt the role of consultants has increased since they have been in politics. The role and influence of consultants reached its current peak during these years with the demand for their services reaching the local level and many down-ballot races. These individuals are only familiar with the current electoral context—one that is dominated by consultants. Electioneering Partnerships That the majority of consultants reported that they have seen a decrease in the role that parties play in electioneering should not be taken as evidence that consultants conclude that political parties do not have a place in the modern electoral context. In fact, consultants reported that parties perform some functions better than they do. If consultants have truly replaced parties and fully taken over for them in the U.S.’s candidate-centered system, one indication would surely be consultants reporting that parties are no longer relevant in many or all aspects of campaigning. The attitudes consultants have toward parties’ role in providing services to candidates illustrate the opposite—that a partnership and cooperative relationship exists.29 This partnership is apparent both in the history of the parties’ hiring of consultants, and in the services that consultants report they

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Party Favors?

have taken over for parties in providing to candidates and the services they see as best provided by the party. Generally, consultants report that they have taken over for parties in providing the technically sophisticated services that are a mainstay of today’s campaigns. When asked about the areas in which they believe they have taken over for parties, consultants’ attitudes show a clear order and pattern. The greatest level of agreement among consultants was in the area of campaign management or strategic advice, followed closely by technical services that are geared toward message creation and delivery (see Table 5.4). Consultants see parties as more involved and needed in other areas of electioneering, such as GOTV, fund-raising, and opposition research. This is only one side of the story, however. Simply because consultants believe that they have not taken over for parties in certain areas does not fully indicate that a partnership exists. Complementary evidence of the consultant-party partnership is found in consultants’

Table 5.4 Consultants’ Rankings of Those Electioneering Services They Believe They Have Taken over from Parties Mean ranking* Management or Strategic Advice Media or Campaign Advertising Polling Direct Mail Opposition Research Campaign Finance or Fund-raising GOTV or Field Operations

3.51a 3.49b 3.42c 3.31d 3.07e 2.91f 2.65g

* Full question wording: “Thinking specifically now, please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that political consultants have taken the place of political parties in providing each of these services.” The mean ranking is based on a 4 point scale where: 1 = strongly disagree 2 = somewhat disagree 3 = somewhat agree 4 = strongly agree Note: Pair-wise comparisons of all services are statistically significant, save the first, between management or strategic advice (a) and media or campaign advertising (b). The t values and significance levels are: b vs. c – t = 2.351, d.f. = 481, p = 0.009 c vs. d – t = 3.320, d.f. = 477, p = 0.000 d vs. e – t = 5.541, d.f. = 476, p = 0.000 e vs. f – t = 3.005, d.f. = 477, p = 0.001 f vs. g – t = 6.033, d.f. = 480, p = 0.000 (one-tail tests).

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attitudes about what types of assistance from the party are helpful to them when waging a candidate’s campaign. The service areas that consultants indicated they have not taken over for parties (those ranked lowest in Table 5.4) are the same services that consultants reported were helpful to them in a campaign if the party was going to contribute some type of assistance (see Table 5.5). Similarly, those service areas where consultants believe they have replaced parties were the ones they found least helpful if the party was going to get involved (compare Tables 5.4 and 5.5). When asked how helpful certain services are that may be contributed or offered by a national party organization during a campaign, a clear pecking order is found. The greatest consensus among consultants in terms of what they welcomed from the party organization was money (see Table 5.5). Cash from the party helps defray the costs of a campaign, and it can help a campaign pay for the services

Table 5.5 Consultants’ Rankings of Those Services Offered by the National Party They Believe Are Helpful to Campaigns They Work On Mean Ranking* Campaign Funds Opposition Research Polling Direct Mail GOTV or Field Operations Coordinated Televison Ads Management or Strategic Advice

1.63a 1.86b 1.99c 2.18d 2.19e 2.33f 2.79g

* Full question wording: “I am going to read you a list of services that are sometimes provided to candidates by the national party organization or the congressional campaign committees. Thinking about competitive races, please tell me whether, in your experience, each service has been helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not helpful at all to the success of your campaign or campaigns.” The mean ranking is based on a 4 point scale where: 1 = very helpful 2 = somewhat helpful 3 = not very helpful 4 = not helpful at all. Note: Pair-wise comparisons of all services are statistically significant, save the one between direct mail and GOTV. The t values and significance levels are: a vs. b – t = 4.083, d.f. = 385, p = 0.000 b vs. c – t = 2.178, d.f. = 371, p = 0.015 c vs. d – t = 2.828, d.f. = 357, p = 0.002 e vs. f – t = 2.476, d.f. = 376, p = 0.007 f vs. g – t = 8.285, d.f. = 377, p = 0.000 (one-tail tests).

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that consultants provide. As noted above, spending money on behalf of candidates is the direction the parties have taken in the last decade as parties have moved into the party-as-billpayer era. Other services from the party welcomed by consultants included opposition research, survey research, direct mail, and GOTV.30 In short, consultants see their industry taking over for political parties in areas related to message creation and delivery—campaign management and strategic advice, media production and television advertising, and direct mail—while they see the party as still playing a large role in services that require larger amounts of staff and time—fund-raising and opposition research. The most intriguing of these services in terms of a consultantparty partnership is in the area of strategic advice. Consultants could not be more clear—they believe they have taken over for parties in the provision of this service and they report that when this type of advice comes from the party it is not very helpful. In terms of strategic advice, consultants can give candidates individual attention by spending time with the candidate or by conducting regular conference calls— “ongoing organizational strategic support” as Democratic pollster Celinda Lake terms it (Lake 2001). However, even though the vast majority of races at the congressional level are not competitive—only about 30 House races were competitive in 2000 (Rothenberg 2000; Cook 2000) and fewer were in 2002 thanks in large part to the redistricting process in the states—parties do not have the staff to manage all of their races or to provide district-specific advice that consultants can supply. To a certain extent, party staffers agree. As former DNC executive director Rob Engel says, “We don’t have the campaign managers to basically do what needs to be done . . . We need people who can oversee the management operations” (Engel 1999). Consultants step in to fill this void and supply candidates with the specific advice they need. Recall what Celinda Lake said regarding consultants taking on a management capacity: “Increasingly one of the consultants [in the campaign] will end up taking . . . a lead consultant role. And it often informally involves the one . . . who’s the most engaged in [the campaign], [and] who the candidate trusts the most” which means that “consultants are providing an awful lot of management capacity” (2001). Additionally, comparing his experiences as a consultant to his time at the DCCC, one Democratic media consultant reflected: “[By] now, I’ve traveled the country extensively. I’ve spent long periods of time and studied public opinion and focus groups and talked with candidates. I think I have . . . a more nuanced appreciation for, say, Albuquerque, New Mexico than I did ten years ago when I worked for

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the . . . DCCC.”31 Juxtapose the consultant perspective with that of a party staffer—for example, a DCCC Regional Director admits, “When I meet with [candidates] the first thing I [say] is ‘I will never pretend to know more about your district and your state’. . .” (Esposito 1999)— and the difference becomes clearer. But at the same time, parties want to have input in campaigns even though party operatives admit that they cannot offer the districtspecific advice they might like, especially when they are contributing monetarily to the campaign. Leading operatives from both parties report that they want to have control over how the money they pour into campaigns is spent. When asked about advice they give to campaigns, one NRCC operative said “. . . we’re very up-front and very clear about [how] we believe money should be spent at the end [of a campaign]—that’s where a campaign is won and lost.”32 A high-ranking DNC staffer also admited that conflicts consistently occur between consultants and his field staff over strategy in campaigns saying, “[I]f we are going to go out and raise money and we are going to give money to a candidacy, we want to make sure that money is spent the way we think will help win an election.”33 Therefore, although both current and former party staffers agree that consultants can give candidates more individual and specific attention in their campaign, parties still want to control the reigns of how the money they contribute is spent. This is a clear difference between consultants and parties. Consultants seem to be saying, “Give us the money, get out of our way, and let us do our job.” Consultants welcome party money so they can conduct a poll, shoot a television spot, or design a direct mail piece, but they do not want the party to tell them how to do it. The party, on the other hand, wants to keep as much control over their own money as possible. Anecdotally, this is seen in the Republican party’s 1998 multimillion dollar media campaign, “Operation Breakout,” which consisted mainly of a series of television ads that ran in a number of targeted congressional districts, sometimes to the chagrin of the candidates there. Many times the issues the party media campaign focused on were different than those the candidate wanted to focus on (Thurber and Long 2001).34 However, the party thought it was a strategy that would help them win the election. As one Republican staffer recalls: I had a candidate who . . . openly disavowed what we were doing and called me . . . two and three times a day telling me to take the issue ads off [the air]. I told him I wasn’t going to do that. I believed in what we were doing. He

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didn’t win, but I think it was the right thing to do. He certainly didn’t lose because of what we were doing.”35 And as noted above, the parties want to maintain some control over how the money they contribute to campaigns is spent, likely because they believe they have something to offer the campaign. If a candidate is going to receive monetary support from the party, there is clearly going to be input from the party. Rob Engel recalls that he has “attached more strings” to money in his career at both the DCCC and the DNC because he felt the party had a real strategic, tactical, and managerial contribution to make to those campaigns (1999). Given the move parties have made away from producing (note that this is different than providing) services in-house, the high ranking of media production and direct mail on the list of services consultants feel they have taken over for parties in providing is not a shock (see Table 5.4). These services require a great deal of technical expertise, as well as sophisticated production facilities, which the GOP has already illustrated it has decided to do away with at its headquarters. Even though less of a consensus exists among consultants on the helpfulness of survey research that comes from the party, it is safe to say that consultants have also taken over for parties in this area. Even though consultants reported that this was a helpful and beneficial contribution that could be made by the party to a campaign they were working on, the source of those polling numbers is still outside consultants. Much like the NRCC’s move in opting not to continually update their media center, both parties choose to hire an outside consultants to do their surveys. Therefore, although the polling numbers might be coming from a party committee who contracted and paid for the survey, the technical work (from consultation on the survey instrument and putting the survey in the field, to doing the data analysis and interpreting the results) is done by an outside firm. For instance, the NRCC spent $5 million on polling, all conducted by consultants outside of the formal party structure, during the last eight weeks of the 2002 campaign to help decide where other monies would be best spent (VandeHei and Balz 2002, A6). Fund-raising and opposition research are still party stalwarts, and will likely remain so. According to DCCC staffer Chris Esposito, “. . . the party is more helpful than the consultant [in] raising money. That will never change . . . [For example,] people like myself can get on the phone and call labor leaders and say, ‘Where the hell is the check?’ . . . Consultants can’t do that.” Parties have the organizational structure to handle opposition research and fund-raising more so than

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technical services such as media and mail. In the case of fund-raising, this is what parties built themselves around in the 1990s (Kolodny 1998; Menefee-Libey 2000); it is their number one priority. Both parties have finance divisions that work with their donor lists and PAC lists to keep the money flowing into their coffers. In the case of opposition research, parties have the kind of staff that allows them to do this as well. Both parties (including the Hill committees) have research divisions filled with interns and staff who comb through voting records of candidates who have held public office in the past as well as public statements made by candidates (e.g., the Congressional Record) looking for material in those candidates’ record that might be used as part of their candidate’s strategy, theme, and message in the next campaign. For example, countless staff hours at the NRCC have resulted in a Web-based database of votes and statements made by Democratic members of the House during the last six Congresses. Republican candidates are then given access to this password-protected Web site that they can use to do opposition research on their opponent. For instance, a candidate running in 2002 against then-Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D–MO) had access to sixty-seven pages of information about what he has said and how he has voted since 1990. These are the types of services that are difficult for consultants to provide to their clients. The one surprise in the lists of services consultants thought that they could better provide, and those that they found helpful when coming from the party, was GOTV. It was the last ranked service when consultants evaluated those areas where they had replaced parties (see Table 5.4), yet at the same time it was fifth on the aggregate list of services consultants said they welcomed from the party (see Table 5.5). The notion that consultants could completely replace parties in turning out voters on Election Day is difficult for some party staffers to believe with one in particular musing that, “. . . consultants are blowing smoke if they think they are replacing the party with turnout plans” (Esposito 1999). In a sense, GOTV and other field work is similar to the other services consultants identified as helpful when coming from the party and ones where they had not taken over for the party—fund-raising and opposition research. Each of these three services differ from media production, direct mail, and survey research in that they require less technical knowledge or sophisticated training. Opposition research and GOTV mainly require large amounts of both staff and time if they are going to be successful, and consulting firms neither have the requisite number of individuals to send to a district or state,

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nor can they recruit individuals, like parties can, to help with GOTV the weekend before Election Day.36 For these reasons, one would expect consultants to welcome GOTV assistance from the party and find it helpful. One possibility is that the aggregate number of consultants who believe GOTV efforts from the party are helpful is masking a partisan difference that could explain the relatively modest result. The two major parties face different prospects in terms of GOTV efforts, with Democrats usually enjoying an advantage over Republicans. Not only do Democrats use party staff and volunteers, but they also count on other sources of “manpower” to help on Election Day such as labor unions (Herrnson 2000a). Over the course of the 1998 election cycle the AFL-CIO spent between $18 and $19 million on GOTV activities, which included both direct mail pieces and telephone calls to likely voters (Herrnson 2000a).37 During the 2002 midterm elections, Democrats again turned to labor unions who launched a sophisticated computer effort which allowed workers and volunteers to make roughly 12,000 calls per day in one state and to have volunteers make as many as twenty-three contacts with individual voters by Election Day (Meyers 2002). Therefore, Democratic candidates (and consultants) may not rely on the party for GOTV help as much as they do outside groups. Republicans, however, rely less on outside help for their field operations and largely must rely on volunteers they recruit. The investment of time, effort, and resources in GOTV is clearly seen in the GOP’s effort during 2002 where they unveiled a new plan for mobilizing voters. The plan, called the “72 Hour Task Force,” started to be assembled shortly after the 2000 election returns were in. The strategy developed was tested in gubernatorial races during 2001 and turns on the ability of a campaign to make personal contact with voters. The GOP plan “involves canvassers knocking on doors early in the election year to find out what issues voters care about. In the weeks before the election, party workers . . . return to the same doors to advocate the position they know the voters favor. On Election Day these people [are] visited again or called to make sure they vote” (Rosenbaum 2002, A3). This is the kind of activity private firms simply do not have the resources of time and staff to accomplish. In sum, consultants and parties agree—there are some services that consultants are better able to supply candidates with than parties, and there are others that parties are better able to provide than consultants. The areas in which consultants have taken over for parties include those that are highly technical in nature, and are message- and communications-based (survey research, management and

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strategic advice, media production, and direct mail). Parties still have a place in modern campaigns, according to consultants, in areas that require large staffs and that are time intensive (opposition research, get-out-the-vote efforts, and fund-raising). Party officials are not disgruntled, however; they recognize the partnership that exists and the benefits of hiring consultants, and have moved toward paying for consultants’ services rather than providing them themselves.

Party Ties Are Thicker Than Water The evidence presented above suggests the consultants-and-parties-as-allies hypothesis, rather than the consultants-and-parties-asadversaries, is an accurate portrayal of the modern electoral context. However, the most fundamental aspect of an allied relationship is a long-standing tie between consultants and parties, which may come in the form of consultants having “worked in a political party’s organization” (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 155).38 Forty-five percent of all consultants reported that they had previously worked for either a state-, local-, or national-party committee. This is not constant over time, however. Fewer individuals who became consultants in the late 1990s have experience working for a party (31 percent) than do those who entered the business prior to 1994 (46 percent) (see Table 5.6). Although parties have been an important training ground for consultants in the past (Kolodny and Logan 1998), these data may indicate a shift away from parties being a stepping-stone to being a consultant. With more universities and colleges devoting more time to “practical politics,” and specific campaign training programs such as the Campaign Management Institute at American University, George Table 5.6 Consultants’ Employment History in Political Party Organizations and Their Entry into the Profession Have you ever worked for a local-, state-, or national-party committee? Yes No Total N 2

1965 & before

1966– 1973

1974– 1982

1983– 1993

1994– 1999

56.3 43.8

42.5 57.5

50.6 49.4

42.0 58.0

30.8 69.2

32

80

164

188

39

Note: x = 7.790, p = 0.050, d.f. = 4

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Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management, the Ray C. Bliss Institute at the University of Akron, New York University’s Political Campaign Management Program, and the University of Florida’s Political Campaigning Program, young professionals may not need to “pay their dues” in the party organization prior to operating as a consultant as they may be able to land a job with a firm right out of college or graduate school. The fact remains, however, that a significant number of modern consultants have a history with the party apparatus. But, this is only one side of a party-consultant connection. A continuation of this relationship is important and is illustrated by consultants who, after working for the party, continue to have a relationship with the party in their work as a consultant (Kolodny and Logan 1998). The description of parties’ coordinated expenditures and direct contributions above illustrate one aspect of their role in campaigns. Also illustrated by the above discussion is the fact that parties contribute services to selected and targeted campaigns. Consultants who have ties to the party in the form of previous employment are significantly more likely than those consultants who have not worked for the party to have a business relationship with their party’s headquarters or its campaign committees (Kolodny and Logan 1998). For instance, during the last six months of the 2002 campaign, David Dixon, who ran the DCCC in 1994, and his firm, the Dixon/Davis Media Group, collected more than $74,000 in fees from the DCCC; Tom O’Donnell, a former senior aide to former House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, and his Washington, D.C.–based media firm, Doak, Carrier and O’Donnell, earned more than $140,000 in consulting fees from the DCCC (Bolton 2002). Additionally, nearly 90 percent of those consultants who have worked for a party or party committee report that they have worked on a campaign that has been assisted by a national party committee, compared to 76 percent of those who had never worked for a party committee (see also Kolodny and Logan 1998). These data, along with previous findings illustrate that “party employment influence[s] the extent of present-day party-consultant coordination” (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 157). This is preliminary evidence that consultants are part of a “party network” in which consultants who have worked for the party in the past never really leave the party but continue to espouse party values and support party policies (Kolodny 2000b). A final component of the consultants-and-parties-as-allies hypothesis is that “political consultants who have worked for political parties [will] have a better opinion of political parties than consultants from non-party backgrounds” (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 155). There are

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slight differences in consultants’ assessments of today’s parties—those who have previously worked for a party organization evaluate parties at all levels as playing less of a role and consultants as playing more of a role than do those consultants with no party experience.39 In other words, those consultants with party experience see a slightly larger gap in power between consultants and parties than those consultants with no party experience—just the opposite of the expected relationship. One possible explanation is that those consultants with a party history have been in a position where they tried to give what they felt was sound strategic advice to a campaign, only to have it rejected. In other words, those consultants who have a history with the party may have personally experienced a situation in which the power of consultants versus that of the party has been made clear. Anecdotally, this is illustrated by one of the first party experiences of a former DCCC staffer turned consultant Martin Hamburger: Upon entering the campaign headquarters on [my] first trip [as a DCCC staffer] . . . I realized something about my new world. I had assumed, and had hoped, that the campaigns we were working on looked toward the DCCC, if not me, as a sort of bank of knowledge and support. I found out they perceived us only as a bank. The impending arrival of a DCCC staffer was like the impending arrival of a wealthy great aunt. You cleaned up [the headquarters], tried to make a great impression, and hoped you were still in her thoughts when it came time to hand out the money. You listened patiently to any advice offered, to make the offerer feel valued. But you almost never thought about it long enough to follow it. (2000, 58–59) The data above continue to support the allied view of consultants and parties. Parties have been one of the most important training grounds for consultants; consultants who have worked as part of the party organization continue to have ties with the party; and consultants who have a history with the party are more likely to see value in strategic or management assistance that comes from the party. The evidence supporting the consultants-and-parties-as-allies hypothesis also reinforces the view that consultants have not exacerbated the decline of parties, but rather, that they are partners in the modern electoral context.

k In sum, political consultants are not the enemies of political parties, and they have not accentuated their decline. As the electoral

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context that encompasses parties, candidates, voters, and now consultants has changed in the last century, each actor has had to adapt. This adaptation is no more apparent than in the changes parties have undergone, first going through a resurgence by increasing their fundraising pace and beginning to offer campaign services to their candidates, and then by scaling back the services they offered, instead opting to focus on raising money after significant changes in campaign finance law. These changes have led to a new era of party service, the party-as-billpayer era, that consists of parties not supplying candidates in targeted races with technical campaign services but paying professional consultants for services their candidates require. Evidence of this shift in eras is found in both the behavior of political parties and party committees, and in the attitudes of political consultants. As the laws governing the financing of federal political campaigns have changed and evolved—most notably the FECA and its amendments and the following court decisions—parties have accelerated their fund-raising, and the amounts that they spend on campaigns, most notably in their coordinated expenditures, independent expenditures, and soft money spending. Parties now pay consultants for some of the services they used to provide candidates with themselves. Consultants themselves see their relationship with parties as a partnership. While consultants report that they believe they have taken over the provision of certain services to candidates, they sill see a place for political parties in elections. Generally, consultants report that they are now the main source of services devoted to message creation and delivery in a campaign (survey research, media production, and direct mail), and that parties remain strong influences in the areas that require significantly more staff and time (fund-raising, getout-the-vote, and opposition research). In short, a strong partnership between consultants and parties is in place that is only likely to grow more important in future election cycles.

6 k Consultants’ Effects on Candidate Fund-raising and Electoral Success We have reached a point in political campaigning where the candidate’s most important decision is not necessarily his stance on the issues, but his choice of media advisor. —Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 1983

The increased presence of political consultants in U.S. elections is unquestionable. But what about their impact? What do consultants deliver to those candidates who chose to hire them? What kind of return do candidates receive on their investment in professional campaign advice and services? The focus on consultants, until this point, has been their backgrounds, attitudes, the context in which they work, and their relationships with other actors. We now turn to questions that center on the results of consultants’ work in the form of their clients’ electoral and fund-raising success. Candidates hire political consultants for a variety of reasons: to provide essential electioneering services in areas such as survey research, direct mail, and media production; to help construct a campaign strategy, theme, and message; and even to act as the campaign’s

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psychoanalyst at times (see chapter 2). But the bottom line is that candidates hire consultants to increase their chances of success on Election Day. As noted in chapter 1, two tracks of scholarly research have begun to explore the effects consultants have in two different areas critical to candidates. The most basic of these is the empirical work which examines the impact consultants have on candidates’ share of the vote on Election Day. As one would expect, candidates who hire professional consultants get more votes on Election Day than those candidates who do not hire consultants and run amateur campaigns (Medvic 2001; 2000; Medvic and Lenart 1997; Guerrieri 1997). In addition, the presence of a professionalized campaign organization has been shown to have an important positive impact on a more proximate goal held by congressional candidates—campaign fund-raising (Herrnson 1992). Without the requisite funding, candidates cannot be successful on Election Day.1 “Deciding whether to hire a professional consultant or to field an amateur campaign organization can have a major impact on a . . . candidate’s fund-raising prospects” in that candidates who hire professional consultants raise more money from political parties, PACs, and individuals than do those without a professional organization (Herrnson 1992, 867). In this chapter I continue to examine the questions of consultant influence in candidate fund-raising and electoral success by updating and extending previous analyses. Past Work The general theory presented in this chapter does not quarrel with that presented, tested, and supported in past work, which, stated generally, is that a campaign organization comprised of professional consultants will attract more fund-raising dollars during a campaign and more votes on Election Day. Both the research focusing on consultants and fund-raising (Herrnson 1992), and consultants and vote totals (Medvic 2001; 2000) utilize similar methods to test these hypotheses. More importantly, both use antiquated data (Herrnson’s [1992] is from 1984 and Medvic’s [2001; 2000] is from 1990 and 1992), which calls for a re-examination of the relationship between campaign professionalization and fund-raising and electoral success. However, the most important aspect of past work that is advanced and updated here is the operationalization of a professionalized campaign. The major work that measures and tests consultants’ influence considers all consultants to be equal. “In other words, a candidate’s

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decision about whether or not to hire a consultant is more important than the decision about whether to hire Consultant A or Consultant B” (Medvic 2000, 93). However, the consulting industry is just like any other professional trade in that there are differences between consultants on certain levels, some of which have been explored in earlier chapters. For example, consultants differ in the years of experience they have in the business. With differing levels of experience likely come different approaches to campaigning. Some consultants are also more renown than others. Few students of modern campaigning would argue that industry stalwarts such as Peter Hart, Alex Castellanos, Stuart Stevens, Mike Murphy, Peter Fenn, Bob Shrum, or Linda DiVall are not more well-known to the media, other political elites (e.g., PACs), party leaders, or even attentive segments of the general public than others who are less experienced in their profession. The reasons given as to why we should consider all consultants the same, rather than trying to differentiate between them in terms of their experience or their expertise, seem sound. One argument is that “individual differences in consultants’ talents are less fruitful in explaining the outcome of an election than is the use of consultants generally” (Medvic 2000, 93). Indeed, “[j]ust as artistic talent cannot be quantified, one cannot begin to quantify savvy on the part of a consultant. It is an unusual talent” (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a, 1). A second rationalization is that “candidates who hire nationally renown firms usually receive their services from a firm employee, not the famous consultant for whom the firm is named, and this individual is not likely to have more experience or skill than the principal of a less renown firm” (Herrnson 2000b, 66). However, inherent in this argument are at least two distinctions that can be made across consultants—their level of skill or expertise, and the extent to which they are known in and around the industry. The thought that there is little use in making distinctions between consultants is best summarized by Stephen Medvic when he states: If it is true that consultants are more similar than different in terms of the skills they bring to a campaign, then it would be more useful to think of them, collectively, as a campaign resource than as individual handlers or firms. This conceptualization is most valid for “the elite corps of interstate political consultants who usually work on many campaigns simultaneously and have several hundreds of campaigns in their careers.” For this group, differences in ability are particularly small. (2000, 93)2

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Therefore, it is only a hypothesis that the important decision a candidate makes is between hiring a consultant and not hiring one, rather than between Consultant A and Consultant B. The analysis below will go beyond past work by examining whether there are important differences across the consultants that candidates hire. Specifically, does it matter which consultants a candidate hires? There is both anecdotal evidence and empirical precedent for conducting an analysis that does not consider all consultants equally. First, the consultants a candidate hires have traditionally been a measuring stick that has been used to gauge the type of campaign that the candidate will run. For example, as long ago as 1980, press reports discussed and marveled at the stable of advisors Ronald Reagan had assembled to run his presidential campaign (Bonefede 1980). As mentioned in chapter 1, the 1993 New Jersey gubernatorial race was deemed a battle between “two campaign titans”—Ed Rollins and James Carville—the two consultants working for the candidates (Berke 1993, A1). Moreover, when Bill Clinton began his 1992 presidential run, his campaign was not considered to be strong, in part because he had not assembled a nationally renown team of consultants but one that consisted of a strategist and media advisor who had not had great success in prior campaigns; namely, James Carville, who had worked mostly with unsuccessful candidates before joining the Clinton campaign. And, during the 2000 presidential campaign, Al Gore’s hiring of high-profile consultants got the attention of political elites. “Years ago, a client who hired an out-of-state consultant tried to hide the consultant because he feared it could be a potential issue in his campaign . . . Now a candidate will hire a consultant and hold a news conference to announce it” so as to attract attention to the campaign (Fritz and Morris 1992, 47). This is because “[o]ne of the factors [political parities, PACs, and individuals] use to evaluate the competitiveness of congressional races is the quality of the campaign organization that candidates assemble” (Herrnson 1992, 860). Moreover, consultants and candidates alike have acknowledged the effects and importance of assembling a star-studded team. Joseph Cerrell, one of the industry’s top Democratic media consultants, reports that his firm has sometimes done “little more than let his firm’s name (and, by implication, its successful reputation) be used in a campaign’s directory or roster” (Sabato 1981, 13). During the 2000 campaign, in a heated and competitive congressional race in Southern California between incumbent James Rogan (R), one of the House managers in the Clinton impeachment trial, and State Senator Adam Schiff (D), the Schiff campaign maintained it was running two simultaneous campaigns—one in the district and one in Washington, D.C.


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According to Schiff’s campaign, the D.C. campaign was “mostly about buzz and fund-raising—about keeping the candidate’s profile high enough and his chances rosy enough to guarantee PAC contributions and assistance from the national party” (Bennett 2000, 65). However, it goes beyond the campaign’s image, as one Schiff consultant says: “One of the things a PAC wants to know is who’s on your team” (quoted in Bennett 2000, 65). “If Mark Mellman or Fred Yang calls [a PAC director, you will likely get a response along the lines of] ‘OK, we’ll see what we can do.’ But if someone from Northwestern University calls [you will likely get a response more along the lines of] ‘Who the hell are you?’” (quoted in Bennett 2000, 66). Furthermore, Mario Cuomo (D), in his campaign diary, illustrated the importance he placed on assembling a team of well-known consultants in his 1982 campaign for governor of New York after his first choice for campaign manager (David Garth) decided to work for New York City Mayor Ed Koch (D), and his second was already committed to working for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY): We’re caught in a circular problem . . . many of the money people are reluctant to commit to me. They are waiting for signs of organization and potential success before they “invest,” but they are almost indispensable ingredients in forming up the effort in the first place. I must get a “name” campaign manager and headquarters as soon as possible. (1984, 153) Empirically, there has been a prior attempt to both measure and test the importance of a candidate hiring “high quality and high profile” consultants rather than any professional (Guerrieri 1997, 2). In an attempt to go beyond the measures of consultant presence in campaigns that are dichotomous (either the candidate hired a consultant or did not) or based on the number of consultants a candidate hired, Guerrieri (1997) undertook an analysis that was based on the “number of political consultants on a [candidate’s] team that [were] renown and enjoy[ed] high visibility, high standing and prestige” (57). However, because of problems in the operational definition of high-quality consultants and the methods used to conduct the analysis, the results need to be revisited.

Hypotheses and Operationalization The major contribution of the analysis reported below, aside from updating the data on consultant influence in two important areas of

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campaigning, is in the measurement of professionalized campaigns and the tests of the effects of hiring consultants who are the most well-known and effective in the business on candidates’ fund-raising prowess and electoral success. As noted above, attempts have been made to measure and test these same effects. However, there are difficulties in the operationalization of the concepts as they measure little beyond what studies which considered all consultants equally have already captured.3 If we are truly going to differentiate between consultants and consulting firms and measure the effects of hiring high-quality firms, a strict and meaningful definition of quality is needed. The difficulty in measuring or discerning which firms are of high quality and which are not is fundamentally difficult because quality is a fuzzy concept in and of itself. Recall that within the arguments about why we should consider consultants equally there were two areas in which consultants could exhibit differences—their fame and their skill. These two aspects of quality form the basis of the measures used below to test the effects of hiring high-quality consultants versus simply hiring a consultant. These two aspects of quality—fame, which will be referred to as “well-knownness” for lack of a better term, and skill, which will be referred to as “effectiveness”—help to theoretically establish the hypotheses to be tested. As noted above, consultants have been shown to have an important impact on candidates’ fund-raising as well as their vote share. The general hypothesis that follows from prior work and anecdotal evidence is: candidates who hire well-known and effective consultants will raise more money and will garner more votes on Election Day than those who do not hire quality consultants. However, consultants who are the most effective—those who do the best job—may not be the most well-known—those who are the most renown by other political elites—and vice versa. Therefore, the two types of quality measures (well-knownness and effectiveness) are used in two separate hypotheses because they are not assumed to be mutually exclusive—well-known consultants are expected to attract attention and donors, and effective consultants are expected to deliver votes. First, those candidates who hire wellknown consultants are expected to attract more in campaign contributions than those candidates who do not hire well-known consultants. This hypothesis follows directly both from Herrnson’s (1992) conclusion that “it is important to put together a high-quality professional campaign organization and let party committees, PACs, and individuals know about it [as a] professional campaign organization can greatly enhance a candidate’s ability to raise money” (867), and from the experiences of candidates like Adam Schiff who worked hard to let po-


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litical elites know who was part of his campaign team. The idea is that those candidates who hire the most well-known and renown consultants and firms will make noise among political elites and attract a great deal of attention to their campaign. When a candidate hires a firm such as Garin, Hart and Yang; Public Opinion Strategies; The Tarrance Group; Strother, Duffy, Strother; National Media; or Joe Slade White and Company to work on their campaign, we would expect donors such as PACs, parties, and other elites to take notice. Second, those candidates who hire effective consultants are expected to garner a greater share of the vote on Election Day than those candidates who do not hire quality consultants. The idea here is that those candidates who assemble teams of the most skilled consultants will, all other things being equal, do better at the ballot box than those candidates who do not have the benefit of having hired some of the most effective consultants.

Data, Measurement, and Methods Even though more attention is being paid to consultants in the academic literature, the dearth of data first noticed by Petracca (1989) still exists. It is difficult to obtain data on the activities of consultants, let alone a measure of their effectiveness or how renown they are. Some measures do exist, but their reliability and validity are highly questionable. For instance, one possible measure of effectiveness is a consultant’s past performance; simply put, do they win the elections in which they work? The flaw in this measure lies in that it is nearly impossible to ascertain the true success rate of a consultant or firm for two reasons. First, when calculating a win/loss record, all races are counted equally, even though all races are not the same. It is one thing for a consultant to work for an incumbent House member who is nearly guaranteed reelection (e.g., Dick Gephardt, Tom DeLay, Henry Hyde, Henry Waxman, or one of the other 400 incumbents who run in safe districts), and quite another to take on the challenger to one of these incumbents or a candidate in a tough open-seat race. The former can pad, and the latter damage, a win/loss record. Clearly the chances of winning when facing an intrenched incumbent or a hotly contested open seat are much lower than when working for an incumbent in a safe seat. Second, the definition of success may not be the same for each campaign. Although every candidate wants to win and works toward that goal, in some campaigns success may be defined as coming close enough in the current cycle to position the candidate for the

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next campaign (Heidi Behrens-Benedict’s first campaign illustrates this). Which campaign consultant has been more successful and done the best job—the one who worked for the ten-term incumbent who wins with 60 percent of the vote, or the one in the challenger campaign where the candidate began the race at 15 percent in the polls and ended at 45 percent? Although winning is the only thing that matters in campaigns, the performance and success of a consultant is not as cut and dry. Another possible measure of effectiveness is the revenue a consultant or firm generates during an election cycle. One of the flaws is that it mainly measures the number of clients that a firm or individual takes during that cycle.4 As illustrated in chapter 3, the number of clients a firm takes can vary widely both across and within specialties. For example, pollsters were shown to take many more clients than were media consultants. Furthermore, if the consultant takes a large number of clients, the more money a firm or individual makes may actually indicate that they have done their clients a disservice because the have become over extended and produced a low-quality product. One possible measure of a consultant’s well-knownness is the number of times they appear on television or their name appears in newspaper articles. However, even though consultants have started to become commentators in the press and their names are becoming more commonplace in news articles, it is not yet to a point where a reliable measure can be taken. A measure of this nature, additionally, is centered on media outlets (including reporters and editors) and the general public. More important for the purposes here is to have a measure that centers on the politically savvy individuals who donate to campaigns and candidates with greater frequency; included here are party leaders, PAC directors, and other political elites. One might also think that candidates would be a good source of this information. After all, candidates hire the consultants and are the individuals most directly affected by their performance. However, in the grand scheme of things, candidates work with relatively few consultants. During a particular election cycle, a candidate who does enlist the services of consultants may hire between one and seven professionals (based on figures reported by Herrnson 2000a; 2000b; and Medvic 2001; 2000), which means that candidates have little exposure to a wide range of professional consultants. This holds true even for those candidates who have run in dozens of races. If they have been successful, many times they have a consultant or a team of consultants they stick with. This also raises another important point about candidates’ possible assessments—when the candidate wins the race, they likely conclude that they ran a great campaign, but if they lose,


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they may blame their consultants. This raises the possibility of bias in candidates’ evaluations of campaign professionals. For the above reasons another strategy for ascertaining a selected list of well-known and effective consultants was developed. PAC directors and party officials would be the most desirable population to ask about the most well-known consultants active today because of their place in politics and elections as those who both hire consultants and donate to campaigns. However, given the difficulties in gaining access to these individuals, consultants themselves were asked who they thought were the most well-known and the most effective of their peers and colleagues. Consultants are the next best judges of the wellknownness of their fellow professionals, and they are undoubtedly the best judges of the effectiveness of other consultants, as they have likely worked with or against a number of other professionals. Therefore, a small follow-up survey was sent to the consultants who were interviewed in the survey that yielded the data used in earlier chapters.5 Consultants were asked to report who they thought were the most well-known and the most effective consultants in both parties in seven areas of consulting and electioneering (media production, direct mail, survey research, field or GOTV, opposition research, fund-raising, and general campaign management) where “well-known” was defined as: those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who are the most high-profile, or those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who draw the most attention when joining a campaign, and “effective” was defined as: those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who do the best job in their particular area of expertise (but not necessarily the greatest electoral winning percentage). The respondents were told that these two lists may be the same or they may be different.6 The goal of the survey was not to obtain a random sample of opinion data to analyze, but to obtain, from consultants, an idea of what firms or individuals are at the top of the industry. When aggregated, the data consisted of lists of the most wellknown and the most effective political consultants in the business, as seen by their peers. Lists were developed for each of the seven areas of specialization. The complete list of well-known consultants consisted of 192 (98 Democratic and 94 Republican) firms or individuals, whereas the list of effective consultants consisted of 203 firms or individuals (127

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Democrats and 76 Republicans). However, to increase the reliability and validity of the measures, the lists were trimmed to include only those firms or individuals who were mentioned on two or more responses.7 When aggregated, this yielded Democratic and Republican lists of well-known consultants numbering 51 and 29, respectively; and Democratic and Republican lists of the most effective consultants totaling 46 and 22, respectively. Breakdowns by party and by type of consultant can be found in Table 6.1. This is a marked improvement on the lists employed in earlier attempts at measuring quality which were much less restrictive, used a more expansive definition of quality, and resulted in a much longer list of quality consultants (see note 3). There is a great deal of variation in the number of effective and well-known consultants by both type and party (see Table 6.1). Generally, consultants reported that there were more Democratic wellknown and effective consultants than Republican. This fits well with the results from the attitudinal survey of the industry, which also had a partisan breakdown where Democrats outnumbered Republicans. In addition, far more consultants were listed as effective and well-known in the areas of media production, direct mail, and survey research than in opposition research, fund-raising, or GOTV and field. These results complement the discussion in chapter 5 which illustrated that consultants believe that they have taken over from political parties the provision of services such as media and mail production and survey research, but that they have not taken over for parties in areas such as GOTV, fund-raising, or opposition research. There are two additional reasons to believe that the data returned from this survey is both reliable and valid. First, the names that consultants cited as the most well-known and effective have tremendous face validity. The names that were returned were names students of this industry would expect to see on a list of the most effective and well-known consultants. For example, consultants cited media firms such as Shrum, Devine and Donilon; Squire, Knapp, Ochs and Dunn; Struble, Oppel, and Donovan; Brabender/Cox; National Media; Stevens, McAullife and Schriefer; and Stevens, Reed, Curcio and Company as the most well-known media firms. In addition, firms such as Public Opinion Strategies; The Tarrance Group; American Viewpoint; The Wirthlin Group; Lake, Snell, Perry and Associates; Garrin, Hart and Yang; Penn and Schoen Associates; The Mellman Group; and Greenberg Quinlan Research were cited as the most well-known survey-research firms. Similar names were returned on lists of the most effective consultants (see Table 6.1).

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Consultants’ Effects Table 6.1 Well-known and Effective Political Consultants during the 1998 Election Cycle Democrats Well-known

Republicans

Effective

Well-known

Effective

Media Shrum, Consultants Devine and Donilon; Squire Knapp Ochs Dunn; Struble, Oppel and Donovan Communication; Doak Carrier and Assoc.; Greer, Margolis, Mitchell, Burns, and Assoc.; Strother Duffy Strother; The Political Consulting Center; Trippi, McMahon and Squire; The Garth Group; Joe Slade White and Co.; Morris and Carrick; The Campaign Group

Squire Knapp Ochs and Dunn; Joe Slade White and Co.; Ken Swope and Assoc.; The Campaign Group; Struble, Oppel and Donovan Communication; Laguens, Hamburger Stone; Strother Duffy Strother; Dixon Media Greer, Margolis, Mitchell, Burns, and Assoc.; Payne and Company; The Garth Group; Axelrod and Associates; MacWilliams Cosgrove Smith Robinson (MCSR); Trippi, McMahon and Squire; The Political Consulting Center

The Murphy Pintak Gautier Hudome Agency Inc.; Braebender Cox, Inc.; Stevens McAullife and Schriefer; National Media Inc.; Stevens, Reed, Curcio & Co.; Edmonds Associates, Inc.; Scott Howell and Company; Sipple Strategic Communications, Goddard Clausen/ First Tuesday; Smith and Harroff, Inc.

The Murphy Pintak Gautier Hudome Agency Inc.; Braebender Cox, Inc.; National Media Inc.; Stevens McAullife and Schriefer; Scott Howell and Company; Stevens, Reed, Curcio & Co.; Sipple Strategic Communications; Edmonds Associates, Inc.

Directmail Specialists

Terris and Jaye; Crounse, and Malchow; Campaign Performance Group; Bates Niemand; The

Welch Norman Communications; McNally Temple Assoc.; Allyn and Co.; Karl Rove and Co.;

Targeted Creative Communications; Welch Norman Communications; Allyn

Crounse, and Malchow; Ambrosio and Muir; Terris and Jaye; Campaign Performance Group; Bates

(continued)

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For Better or Worse? Table 6.1 Well-known and Effective Political Consultants during the 1998 Election Cycle (continued) Democrats

Republicans

Well-known

Effective

Well-known

Effective

DirectMail Specialists (continued)

Niemand; Winning Directions; The Baughman Company; The Strategy Group; Ross Communications

Baughman Company; Direct Response; SGA Campaigns; Winning Directions; Ross Communications Ambrosio and Muir; The Strategy Group

Braebender Cox, Inc.; Targeted Creative Communications; Nygren and Assoc.

and Company; Nygren and Assoc.; Morgan Meredith and Associates; McNally Temple Assoc.

Pollsters

Lake, Snell, Perry and Assoc.; Garrin Hart and Yang; Penn and Schoen Assoc.; The Mellman Group; Greenberg Quinlan Research; Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, and Assoc.; Hickman Brown Research; Cooper and Secrest; Global Strategies Group; Hamilton Beattie and Staff; Anzalone Research, Inc.; Decision Research

Garrin Hart and Yang; Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, and Associates; Penn and Schoen Associates; Bennett, Petts, Blumenthal and Assoc.; Lauer Lalley Victoria; Mellman Group; Decision Research; Martilla and Kiley; Hickman Brown Research; Cooper and Secrest

Public Opinion Strategies; The Tarrance Group; American Viewpoint; Fabrizio McLaughlin and Assoc.; The Luntz Research Companies; The Polling Company; The Wirthlin Group; Baselice and Assoc.; Zogby International

Public Opinion Strategies; The Tarrance Group; The Polling Company; The Wirthlin Group; American Viewpoint; Fabrizio McLaughlin and Assoc.; The Luntz Research Companies; Baselice and Associates

Field/ GOTV

Tyson Organization

Tyson Organization

none receiving two or more mentions

none receiving two or more mentions (continued)

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Consultants’ Effects Table 6.1 Well-known and Effective Political Consultants during the 1998 Election Cycle (continued) Democrats

Republicans

Well-known

Effective

Well-known

Effective

Opposition Research

Phil Noble and Assoc.; Plante and Assoc.; SCN Public Relations; Jeff Kleuter; Carol Trevelyan Strategy Group (CSTG); Stanford Ryan; Varoga and Rice

Stanford Ryan; SCN Public Relations; Phil Noble and Associates

Terry Cooper Research


Fundraising

Cunningham and Harris; Fundraising Management Group; Fraioli, Inc.; Sutter’s Mill; McCleanClark; Robert Kaplan Company; Mary Pat Bonner; Erickson and Company

Fundraising The Bovee Management Company Group; Cunningham and Harris; Fraioli, Inc.; Sutter’s Mill; McClean-Clark


General Strategists

James Carville

James Carville

Karl Rove and Company; Carlyle Gregory and Company

Charlie Black; The Eddie Mahe Co.

Second, the lists of the most well-known and effective consultants matches quite well with a similar list from a different source. As noted in chapter 5, political parties keep lists of consultants they recommend to candidates. These are consultants who the party obviously has confidence in and trusts. Although these lists are kept secret for obvious reasons, the consultants and firms that parties have confidence in can be approximated. Also noted in chapter 5 is the fact that parties have

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spent significant sums of money in the form of coordinated expenditures on behalf of their candidates for the services that consultants provide. It is reasonable to assume that the party apparatus would not pay for services provided by a consultant if they did not think it would be well spent. Therefore, an indication of the consultants the parties have faith in would be those that the parties have spent their own funds on. In separate research, 1998 FEC reports were examined and a list of all firms and consultants receiving payments from national party organizations was created (Kolodny and Dulio 2003; Dulio and Kolodny 2001). Of those consultants appearing on the final list of well-known consultants reported in Table 6.1, 58 percent were paid by a national party committee during 1998 (60 percent of the Democratic firms and 51 percent of the Republican firms); and of the effective consultants listed 62 percent were paid by a party committee (63 percent of the Democrats and 59 percent of the Republicans). Moreover, not all of the consultants or firms that appeared on the final lists of well-known and effective consultants worked for U.S. House candidates in 1998 (the focus of the analysis below)—they may have taken only state and local, U.S. Senate, or gubernatorial candidates during that particular election cycle. When only the consultants who worked in 1998 House races are considered, 73 percent of the consultants identified as well-known were paid by the party apparatus (83 percent of the Democrats and 58 percent of the Republicans); and 72 percent of consultants identified as effective received party money (77 percent of the Democrats and 63 percent of the Republicans).8 Not only do their peers view the consultants on the well-known and effective lists as the top firms, but so do the national party committees. Candidates’ consulting teams were assembled with the help of C&E’s “Winners and Losers of ’98,” a list of consulting firms, their clients in 1998, and the outcome of the race. Although this source is not reliable for purposes of defining who the “top” firms are, it is the best source available for information on what consultants each candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives hired.9 After lists of candidates and their consultant teams were assembled, variables were created that reflected the number of well-known and effective consultants each major party candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives hired in 1998. These variables are referred to as professionalization variables in the following sections.

Analysis and Results The professionalization variables were merged with data obtained from the FEC that reported candidates’ total receipts, and the dollars con-


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tributed individually by parties, PACs, as well as individual donors. The FEC data also included the percent of the vote garnered by each candidate in the 1998 election. These data were used to test the hypotheses outlined above. Well-known Consultants and Candidate Fund-raising An initial examination of fund-raising data clearly shows that candidates who hired well-known consultants accrued more dollars from PACs, individuals, and in total than those who hired consultants who were not identified as well-known, as well as those who did not hire any consultants (see Table 6.2). This pattern holds true for incumbents, challengers, and open-seat candidates alike. These data provide preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis that candidates who hire some of the most well-renown consultants take in more campaign dollars. However, these data may mask the fact that in order for candidates to hire well-known consultants they needed to raise more money in order to pay their fees.10 Two-stage least-squares (TSLS) was used to test the impact of hiring well-known consultants on the amount of PAC money candidates raised during 1998.11 For both theoretical and methodological reasons, candidates’ receipts were split into contributions from PACs and contributions from individual donors. The hypothesis to be tested is based on the premise that candidates who hire well-known consultants are more attractive to political donors because the consultant team assembled acts as a signal that their campaigns are more credible and viable than those of other candidates. This may signal to donors that their contributions to a candidate who has hired well-known consultants are a better investment and more likely to result in a return on that investment (e.g., access to an elected member of the House) than other candidates who do not have as renown a campaign team. In order to focus in on this hypothesized relationship, only PAC money is examined. If the team of consultants that a candidate hires does act as a signal to political elites, PAC contributions provide an appropriate focus. Using the total dollars a candidate raised is problematic because that figure represents contributions from many different sources—individuals, PACs, parties, other campaign committees, or even their own bank accounts. Some of these sources (e.g., parties and other committees) include contributions that are made on an in-kind basis (i.e., the provision of some service rather than a monetary contribution) that do not fit the type of contribution under examination here; the use of PAC and individual contributions minimizes the inclusion of contributions that are nonmonetary.

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For Better or Worse? Table 6.2. Average Receipts for Candidates during 1998, Controlling for the Type of Consultant Hired

Total Overall Receipts

Hired Hired no Hired Well-known Consultantsa Consultantsb Consultantsc

Significance Tests*

All Candidates

$178,964 (N=297)

$601,229 (N=127)

$847,876 (N=335)

F2,756=164.860, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.000

Incumbents

$468,113 (N=79)

$652,432 (N=89)

$865,168 (N=224)

F2, 389=16.940, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.043; b vs. c: p=0.003

Challengers

$70,508 (N=206)

$458,215 (N=29)

$676,207 (N=64)

F2,296=124.886, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.001

Open-seat Candidates

$137,213 (N=12)

$555,708 (N=9)

$999,221 (N=47)

F2,65=21.703, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.041; b vs. c: p=0.007

Total Receipts from PACs All Candidates

$64,915 (N=297)

$227,832 (N=127)

$306,550 (N=335)

F2,756=165.591, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.000

Incumbents

$209,445 (N=79)

$284,157 (N=89)

$356,847 (N=224)

F2,389=19.432, p =0.000; a vs. b: p=0.015; b vs. c: p=0.003

Challengers

$10,803 (N=206)

$76,697 (N=29)

$142,055 (N=64)

F2,296=102.635, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.000


$42,347 (N=12)

$157,832 (N=9)

$290,831 (N=47)

F2,65=22.022, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.051; b vs. c: p=0.005

Total Receipts from Individuals All Candidates

$91,801 (N=297)

$311,321 (N=127)

$454,822 (N=335)

F2,756=94.083, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.000

Incumbents

$227,717 (N=79)

$324,307 (N=89)

$449,059 (N=224)

F2, 389=9.923, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.178; a vs. c: p=0.019

Challengers

$40,205 (N=206)

$270,005 (N=29)

$415,565 (N=64)

F2,296=75.318, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.005


$82,744 (N=12)

$316,044 (N=9)

$535,745 (N=47)

F2,65=15.110, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.072; b vs. c: p=0.037

*Pair-wise significance tests are based on Bonferoni post-hoc ANOVA tests.


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Incumbents Separate analyses were conducted for challengers, incumbents, and open-seat candidates because of the differences that often exist in their candidacies (Jacobson 2001). The first stage model in the TSLS analysis for incumbents included the following explanatory variables: the candidate’s total individual contributions,12 the opponent’s total receipts,13 competitiveness,14 the candidate’s beginning cash on hand,15 and opponent professionalization.16 The dependent variable was constructed by matching the list of well-known consultants described above to the teams of consultants candidates hired, yielding a scale ranging from 0 to 4 indicating the number of well-known consultants hired in that campaign. The predicted values from the first stage equation17 were used as an explanatory variable in the second stage along with competitiveness, a dummy variable to control for party, beginning cash on hand, opponent quality,18 whether the candidate was part of the House leadership,19 their tenure in the House,20 and the candidate’s total contributions from individuals. Given its measure, the competitiveness variable (see note 14) is expected to have a negative relationship with total PAC money—the closer the previous race, the more the incumbent is expected to raise during the next election cycle. Opponent quality is expected to show a positive relationship with PAC dollars, as higher-quality challengers usually mean a more competitive election, which will elicit a need for more money on the part of incumbents. Both the leadership and tenure variables are also expected to be positively related to PAC dollars and are included as controls. Finally, there is no expectation of the relationship between PAC money and the beginning-cash-on-hand or total-contributions-from-individuals variables. There are two plausible explanations for a relationship, one indicating a positive relationship and one a negative relationship. It is possible that both cash on hand at the start of a campaign and contributions from individuals could be substitutes for PAC money, where PAC money is not as necessary for those with large coffers at the start of the campaign or large levels of support from individual donors. Alternatively, the relationship may be positive, a sign that the candidate is simply a good fund-raiser on all fronts. The results in Table 6.3 provide support for the hypothesis that incumbents who hire well-known consultants receive more in PAC contributions than those who do not bring well-known political consultants onto their campaign team as the coefficient is positive, indicating that the more well-known consultants a candidate hires, the more PAC dollars the candidate accumulates.21 In addition, the competitiveness variable has an important and statistically significant impact on incumbents’ PAC receipts. The variable controlling for party

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affiliation also reaches significance; the direction of this relationship indicates that Democratic officeholders took in more PAC dollars than did Republican incumbents. This is a curious result, given the advantage the majority party usually has in attracting campaign funds. However, this result is consistent with aggregate data from 1998 that shows Democrats of all types (incumbents, challengers, and open-seat candidates) had an advantage over Republicans in raising money from PACs (Herrnson 2000a, Table 6-1). The variable measuring opponent quality does not reach significance, possibly because the effects of candidate quality are being picked up by other variables. Incumbents’ cash on hand at the beginning of their campaign is found to have a significant effect on PAC receipts as well. Here the relationship is positive, indicating that the more incumbents have in their coffers at the start of the campaign, the more PAC money they raise during the following election cycle. This likely indicates two important points. First, that incumbents’ good fund-raising from the past cycle carries over into the next campaign, and that those whose coffers are full only continue to build their war chests. And second, that incumbents will be able to run a strong race, and are therefore a good investment of PAC dollars. The variable measuring total dollars in individual contributions showed similar patterns. As expected, incumbents who are part of the House leadership, or who are committee chairs or ranking members, receive more in PAC contributions than rank-and-file members. PACs likely look to the party leadership and to committee chairs and ranking members before contributing to other incumbents because they can get more bang for their buck; access to a chair or ranking member is worth much more than access to a first or second term member. Also as expected, members who have been in office longer receive more in PAC contributions than their more junior colleagues. Again, PACs likely see a more senior member of the House as a more sound investment than a more junior officeholder.22 Challengers The model for the first-stage analysis of challenger candidates changed little from that employed for incumbents. Instrumental variables in this analysis included: the presence of consultants in the opponent’s campaign, competitiveness, the candidate’s total receipts from individuals, and the amount in loans a candidate took out to fund his or her campaign.23 The explanatory variables in the second-stage challenger analyses included: the predicted values from stage 1, competitiveness, party, and total individual contributions.

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Consultants’ Effects Table 6.3 Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Incumbents’ 1998 PAC Receipts Coefficient Professionalization

191,757**** (4.546)

Competitiveness

–159,477**** (–3.267)

Party

36,951*** (2.335)

Opponent Quality

2,094 (0.509)

Contributions from Individuals

0.03344 (1.163)

Beginning Cash on Hand Leadership

0.06692** (1.702) 296,404**** (6.467)

Tenure in the House

4,659**** (4.120)

Constant

125,215*** (2.672)

Summary Statistics

R2=.427 F8,375=34.902; p=0.000 N=384

Instrumental variables employed for **** p < 0.001 professionalization: *** p < 0.01 did the opponent hire a consultant ** p < 0.05 competitiveness * p < 0.10 opponent’s total receipts candidate’s beginning cash on hand the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values.

The results for challengers continue to support the hypothesis that hiring well-known professional consultants increases the contributions a candidate receives during a campaign; again, the relationship between hiring well-known consultants and PAC dollars is positive

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(see Table 6.4).24 The competitiveness of the district again showed an important relationship with PAC receipts—the closer the race in 1996, the more PAC dollars a challenger in 1998 received. Ideological PACs, as well as other organized interests, likely see an opportunity in a district that was close in the last election cycle to invest in a challenger who may be able to knock off a vulnerable incumbent and turn their contribution into access to a new officeholder. In addition, in closer races political party committees may try to nudge PAC directors to contribute to their candidate. Total individual contributions was again a significant predictor, indicating that those challengers who were successful raising money from individuals were also prolific in raising PAC dollars. Finally, in contrast to the incumbent analysis, no statistical differences were found between Republican and Democratic challengers.

Table 6.4 Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Challenger Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receipts Coefficient Professionalization Competitiveness Party

74,009** (1.594) –70,321*** (–2.745) 3,696 (0.475)


0.07091* (1.148)

Constant

40,474*** (2.230)

Summary Statistics

R2=.429 F3,295=54.614, p=0.000 N=296

Instrumental variables employed for **** p < 0.001 professionalization: *** p < 0.01 did the opponent hire a consultant ** p < 0.05 competitiveness * p < 0.10 amount in loans taken out by the candidate the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values.


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However, the direction of the relationship again suggests that Democratic challengers received more in PAC contributions than their Republican counterparts, which is consistent with the aggregate data on PAC contributions in 1998.25 Open Seats The analyses for open-seat candidates differed little from the challenger model above. The instrumental variables included: the presence of consultants in the opponents campaign, the candidate’s total contributions from individuals, the amount of loans taken out by the candidate, and competitiveness.26 In addition to the predicted values from stage 1, stage 2 included the following explanatory variables: competitiveness, party, opponent quality, and total individual contributions. The impact of hiring well-known consultants on open-seat candidates’ PAC receipts was the weakest of all candidate types. However, it approaches significance and is in the hypothesized direction.27 As in the incumbent and challenger analyses above, the competitiveness of the district has an important effect on candidates PAC receipts—the more closely divided the district is between Democrats and Republicans, the more an open-seat candidate can expect from political action committees. The measure of opponent quality did not reach significance, but was also in the hypothesized direction. The importance of opponent quality may be masked by the fact that openseat contests tend to be some of the most competitive races of the election cycle (over 30 percent of the races identified by Congressional Quarterly as highly competitive were open-seat contests in 1998) and that they often pit two quality candidates against each other. The effects of opponent quality may be hidden by other variables that measure similar effects, such as the professionalization variable. The variable controlling for party was a significant predictor of PAC receipts in open-seat races, but it was in the opposite direction of the relationships in the incumbent and challenger models, indicating that in open-seat contests Republicans receive more than Democrats. The effects of opponent quality were minimal, although they were in the hypothesized direction. Finally, individual contributions were again a strong predictor of PAC receipts, likely indicating that candidates who do well raising money from one source are also successful with other donors.28 In sum, the effects of candidates hiring well-known political consultants are clear: they attract donations from political action committees. Hiring consultants who attract attention in the political community is important. These results support the anecdotal claims of

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For Better or Worse? Table 6.5. Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Open-Seat Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receipts Coefficient

Professionalization

58,987 (1.170)

Competitiveness

–2,072** (–1.914)

Party

–51,269** (–2.020)

Opponent Quality

2,230 (0.393)


0.202** (2.026)

Constant

112,930 (1.914)

Summary Statistics

R2=.584 F3,295=17.393, p=0.000 N=68

Instrumental variables employed: **** p < 0.001 did the opponent hire a consultant *** p < 0.01 competitiveness ** p < 0.05 amount in loans taken out by the candidate * p < 0.10 the candidates’ total receipts in individual contributions Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values.

both consultants and candidates. For challengers and open-seat candidates, having a well-known political consultant on board illustrates to potential donors that their campaign is serious, viable, and well-staffed. Hiring well-known consultants also attracts PAC dollars for incumbents, even though they do not need to show the viability of their campaigns. Herrnson’s (1992) statement certainly holds true: “it is important to put together a high-quality professional campaign organization and let party committees, PACs, and individuals know about it,” as it can greatly increase the candidate’s ability to raise money (867). Effective Consultants and Candidate Success at the Ballot Box The same preliminary tests that were conducted on candidates’ fundraising were also applied to candidates’ percentage of the vote (see


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Table 6.6). Table 6.6 uncovers some interesting patters. It is completely clear that candidates who put together professionalized campaigns do better than those who utilize amateur campaign teams,29 with the exception of incumbents. On average, challenger candidates who hired consultants garnered 40.25 percent of the vote on Election Day (here hired consultants and hired effective consultants are taken together), whereas those challengers who waged amateur campaigns only received about 30 percent of the vote on average. Similarly, open-seat candidates who hired consultants on average received 50.8 percent of the vote compared to only 34.4 percent for those who hired no consultants. However, there is no initial evidence that consultants who have been identified as some of the most effective in the business help their clients do any better on Election Day. In some cases, those who hired consultants who have been identified as some of the most effective did worse on Election Day than those who hired consultants who were not identified as effective consultants. For instance, incumbents and open-seat candidates who hired the most effective consultants did, on average, two percentage points worse than those who did not hire any effective consultants. As in the analysis of the effects of hiring well-known consultants on candidates’ receipts of PAC money, a series of multivariate analyses are reported. However, before turning to the results an important methodological note must be made. The simultaneity problem between candidate spending and votes is well documented in scholarly literature, with varied solutions yielding varied results (Erikson and Palfrey 2000; 1998; 1993; Gerber 1998; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994; Green and Krasno 1988). Erikson and Palfrey (2000) illustrate, however, that the problems associated with simultaneity (biased regression estimators) between money and votes can be avoided by focusing the analysis on the races that are anticipated to be the most competitive during the coming election cycle. “Because total spending reaches a maximum when the expected incumbent share of the vote is 50 percent, . . . a sample that includes only the close races (expected incumbent share of the vote in the neighborhood of 50 percent) will be immune from the simultaneity bias that plagues . . . the full sample” (Erikson and Palfrey 2000, 605). For this reason the analyses below are centered on only the races that were anticipated to be the most competitive. One approach has been to employ Congressional Quarterly’s (CQ) forecasts of election outcomes as an attempt to alleviate the simultaneity (Abramowitz 1991); however, the CQ ratings do not sufficiently control for expectations because they “are created just a few weeks before the election [usually in October] and inevitably absorb some of

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the effects of early spending during the campaign” (Erikson and Palfrey 2000, 605). Because the difficulty with the CQ measure is the timing of the assessment, a prediction of the race’s competitiveness that is done earlier will not suffer from the same limitations. Therefore, in order to overcome both the simultaneity problem and the difficulties inherent in the CQ measure, another indicator of predicted competitiveness is used. Like CQ, the Rothenberg Political Report analyzes U.S. House and Senate elections each election cycle. However, the Rothenberg Report gauges races throughout the election year. Therefore, a prediction done early in the year of an election will not suffer from the same difficulties as the later CQ assessment. To overcome the simultaneity problem in predicting the percentage of the vote, only the races that were anticipated to be the most competitive during 1998 were analyzed. These races were selected using the estimations of the competitiveness found in the January 23, 1998 issue of the Rothenberg Report (the first of the year dealing with House races), which divides House contests into categories based on predicted competitiveness. Only those races evaluated as “Pure toss up,” “Toss up/tilt Republican,” “Toss up/tilt Democrat,” “Lean Republican,” and “Lean Democrat” were included in the

Table 6.6. Average Vote Share for Candidates during 1998, Controlling for the Type of Consultant Hired Vote percent in general election

Hired Hired no Hired Well-known Consultantsa Consultantsb Consultantsc

Significance Tests*

All Candidates

42.33% (N=297)

60.85% (N=123)

61.49% (N=339)

F2,756=78.098, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.500

Incumbents

77.70% (N=79)

71.22% (N=78)

68.91% (N=235)

F2, 389=10.775, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.009; b vs. c: p=0.339

Challengers

29.23% (N=206)

39.82% (N=34)

40.34% (N=59)

F2,296=58.874, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.000; b vs. c: p=0.500

Open Seats

34.42% (N=12)

52.27% (N=11)

50.44% (N=45)

F2,65=8.662, p=0.000; a vs. b: p=0.001; a vs. c: p=0.500

*Pair-wise significance tests are based on Bonferoni post-hoc ANOVA tests.

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analysis (N=39); there were 28 instances where an incumbent was challenged as well as eleven open-seat contests.30 Incumbents The basic model for the multivariate analyses consists of regressing each candidate’s share of the vote in 1998 on the following variables:

Table 6.7 Effects of Hiring Effective Political Consultants On Incumbents’ 1998 Vote Share Competitive races Professionalization

All races

–0.628 (–0.882)

0.01697 (0.073)

Opponent’s Professionalization

0.949 (0.477)

–4.318**** (–4.875)

Candidate’s Spending (log)

13.145*** (2.909)

–3.219*** (–2.384)

Opponent’s Spending (log)

–6.042*** (–2.756)

–1.166**** (–11.843)

Party

2.575** (1.636) _______a

Competitiveness Opponent quality

–0.736*** (–2.436) _______b

Unopposed in General Election Constant Summary Statistics

a

b

11.116 (0.466) R2 = .463 F6,20 = 2.879, p=0.017 N = 28

By definition this model limits the analysis to the most competitive races. This variable was not included in this analysis because no incumbent here was unopposed.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values.

1.489**** (2.380) 14.716**** (9.257) –0.378*** (–2.203) 20.855**** (17.752) 83.713 (10.619) R2 = .841 F8,375 = 247.579, p = 0.000, N = 383 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

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competitiveness, whether the candidate’s opponent hired a consultant, the candidate’s spending during the campaign and the candidate’s opponent’s spending,31 party, opponent quality, whether the candidate was unopposed in the general election, and the professionalization of the candidate’s campaign. Again, separate analyses were conducted for incumbents and challengers.32 The first model reported in Table 6.7 reports the results for incumbent candidates competing in races anticipated to be the most competitive of the 1998 election cycle. The dependent variable measures professionalization in the same manner as in the analysis above— the number of effective consultants a candidate hired. The examination of competitive races supports the general pattern found in the aggregate data displayed in Table 6.6. All other things being equal, incumbents whose campaign teams consisted of consultants who were singled out to be among the most effective did not have any greater success on Election Day in terms of vote share than did those incumbents who hired consultants not determined to be effective. The negative relationship illustrated in the competitive races model actually suggests that the more effective consultants a candidate hires, the fewer votes he or she received on Election Day. As expected, the quality of the challenger had a significant impact on the incumbent’s percentage of the vote. The higher the quality of the challenger, the worse the incumbent did. This analysis also suggests that Democrats in these races did better than Republicans, as shown by the positive relationship between party and vote percent.33 The presence of consultants in a challenger’s campaign had no effect on the incumbent’s share of the vote on Election Day. Finally, the effects of the spending variables were significant predictors of the incumbent’s vote share. In addition, they generally match the findings reported by Erikson and Palfrey (2000) in that incumbent spending is found to have a significant positive impact on their vote share, and their opponent’s spending has a significant negative impact (Table 2). The limited number of highly competitive races in 1998 obviously affects the number of candidates that can be analyzed using the method above. The second model reported in Table 6.7, however, expands the analysis to include all incumbents in the 1998 cycle, and provides somewhat of a check of the results reported in the competitiveraces model. The results in the model which includes all candidates complements the earlier results and show that very little changes with respect to the impact of hiring effective consultants on incumbents’ vote share. Although the sign of the regression coefficient changed, indicating a positive relationship, the impact is so minuscule (it does


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not even approach statistical significance) it cannot be distinguished from zero. Comparing other results across both models in Table 6.7 we see large differences in the spending variables. These differences are similar to the changes that Erikson and Palfrey (2000) illustrated will occur when all candidates are analyzed compared to only those in the most competitive races. Beyond these differences, there are virtually no changes between the findings in the two models. The opponent-quality variable continues to have a significant effect on incumbents’ vote share, with incumbents who face weaker challengers faring much better than those who run against more qualified and experienced challengers. Additionally, the presence of consultants in the challenger’s campaign has a significant impact, with those incumbents who faced challengers with professionalized campaigns doing worse than those who faced challengers who fielded amateur campaigns. A variable to control for those incumbents who were unopposed in 1998 was also included in this analysis; not surprisingly, it shows that those incumbents who did not face opposition did far better than those who were challenged. The variable controlling for the competitiveness of the seat was also highly significant and positive, indicating that the larger the margin of victory in 1996, the higher the incumbent’s vote percentage in 1998. Finally, all other things being equal, Democrats were shown to have done better than Republicans. Although this may be a bit counterintuitive, there is a simple explanation—of those candidates included in this analysis, more Republican than Democratic incumbents lost in 1998 (five Republicans compared to only one Democrat).34 With all the advantages incumbents have in their reelection bids— the perquisites of the institution of Congress (Mayhew 1974), and their advantages in raising money (Jacobson 1980) to name only two—one might wonder how adding another advantage (hiring a team of highly effective consultants) could lead incumbents to receive fewer votes on Election Day compared to their colleagues who hire either no consultants or no consultants considered to be effective. The answer may lie in the most basic definition of electoral success—winning. Table 6.8 shows the relationship between whether an incumbent hired an effective consultant and the competitiveness of the races (as measured by the Rothenberg analysis in January 1998) and could not be more clear: incumbents in tough reelection races hire the most effective consultants while those in safe reelection bids are more likely to either hire no consultants or consultants not thought of as the most effective in the business.

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For Better or Worse? Table 6.8 Consultant Use in Competitive and Noncompetitive Incumbent Races during 1998 (in percent) Noncompetitive Races

Competitive Races

Hired no consultants Hired consultants Hired effective consultants

21.6 23.6 54.8

0.0 11.1 88.9

Total N

365

28

Note: x2 = 12.674, p=0.001, d.f. = 2

When incumbents know they will be in a tough reelection fight, they know they need the best help they can find. When facing a tough challenge, they need, more than ever, to develop a strong strategy, theme, and message, and to deliver that message effectively and efficiently. They turn to the best consultants to help them do one thing— return to the House as a member of the next Congress. Although other incumbents may be trying to increase their share of the vote to scare off potential challengers two years down the road, embattled incumbents worry only about winning. For those who are almost guaranteed a victory, it does not really matter who they hire (as Medvic [2001] suggests). However, for those who are in a difficult race, they need the best and they hire the best. Therefore, the impact of the most effective consultants may not be measurable in terms of vote percentage. It may be better measured in terms of simple victory. Challengers The results in Table 6.9 support the aggregate figures in Table 6.6 which showed that on average, challengers who hired effective consultants did slightly better than those who hired consultants who were not considered to be effective. Again, only those races that were anticipated by the Rothenberg Political Report to be the most competitive during 1998 were examined first. Each additional effective consultant hired by a challenger in 1998 corresponded to about 1.5 additional percentage points for that candidate on Election Day, enough to make a difference in a close race. The variables controlling for candidate (challengers in this case) and opponent spending did not reach statistical significance, but were in the expected direction with challengers doing better as they spent more and as the incumbent spent less. Finally, the variable controlling for party did not reach significance, but it suggests that Democrats did better than Republicans. This result is likely driven by the fact that

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Democrats picked up House seats in this election. Other variables that would normally be included in such an analysis—the presence of consultants in the opponent’s campaign—were omitted because they were constant for these races. In addition, competitiveness was not included because, by definition, this model only examines competitive races. The second model reported in Table 6.9 again provides a check on the results in the competitive races model by broadening the analysis to include all challengers. Again, as in the incumbent analysis above, the results are almost identical. The more effective consultants a challenger

Table 6.9 Effects of Hiring Effective Political Consultants on Challenger Candidates’ 1998 Vote Share Competitive Races Professionalization

1.574** (2.009) _______a

Opponent’s Professionalization

All Races 1.443*** (2.990) 0.738 (0.885)

Candidate’s Spending (log)

2.905 (1.234)

0.844**** (8.294)

Opponent’s Spending (log)

–6.070* (–1.277)

3.391*** (2.566)

0.706 (0.393)

1.811**** (3.024)

_______b

–18.694**** (–11.739)

Party Competitiveness Constant Summary Statistics

a

b

61.237 (2.489) R2 = .303 F4,22 = 36.362, p=0.041 N = 28

In these competitive races, all challengers ran against an incumbent who hired a consultant making this variable a constant. By definition this model limits the analysis to the most competitive races.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values.

15.794 (2.058) R2 = .719 F6,289 = 123.039, p=0.000 N = 295 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

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hires the better he or she does on Election Day. Additionally, the competitiveness variable is highly significant indicating that the more competitive the last contest in that district, the better the challenger did in 1998. The model including all races also suggests that the presence of consultants in incumbent campaigns had little effect on challengers’ success on Election Day. Any effect that is present suggests that when incumbents hire consultants, those who challenge them do better. This is likely affected by the fact that, as noted above in the aggregate figures, incumbents who hire consultants, on average, do worse than those who do not hire consultants, indicating that they face a more difficult and serious challenge. The variables controlling for spending by both candidates indicate that challengers do better the more both candidates spend. Although it may seem like a reversal from the competitive races model, recall that this analysis is of all challengers. Others have found that incumbents who face a strong challenger have to spend more than those who face only token opposition (Green and Krasno 1994; 1988). Put another way, incumbents who spend more money during a campaign usually are in a tougher and closer reelection contest. Finally, the variable controlling for the candidate’s party was significant and shows that Democrats did better than Republicans, again likely because Democrats gained seats on Republicans in 1998. In sum, challengers, but not incumbents, who hire consultants identified as some of the most effective in the business get a larger share of the vote on Election Day than those who hire less effective consultants. Incumbents who hire these effective consultants actually get a smaller percentage of the vote. Patterns in the data appear to illustrate that this is not because those consultants identified as some of the most effective actually do their job worse than other professionals, but that the most effective consultants often work for some of the most endangered incumbents. Of those incumbents who were involved in races that were anticipated to be the closest of the 1998 election, nearly 90 percent hired consultants who were identified as the most effective, compared to only about 50 percent of incumbents in safe districts. This suggests that incumbents who are in electoral trouble turn to the stars of the electioneering industry to help them retain their seat in the House.

k In conclusion, the critical role political consultants play in elections today is seen in that professionalized campaigns raise more money and help


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candidates get more votes than campaigns staffed fully by amateurs. However, until this point, scholarly research has examined the impact and effects of professional political consultants by considering all consultants the same. This chapter has argued not only that differences in consultants can be reliably ascertained, but that these differences can be important for those candidates who chose to hire professionals. Two differences between consultants—how well renown they are and how well they do their job—were examined to test the hypothesis that the decision between hiring Consultant A and Consultant B is an important one; these analyses update those by Herrnson (1992) and Medvic (2001). Reliable and valid measures of how well-renown consultants are and how effective they are in their job are difficult to obtain. Therefore, the consultants that participated in the survey employed in previous chapters were asked who they thought were the most well-known and effective consultants in the business. These data were used to test the hypotheses that hiring wellknown consultants will have a positive impact on candidates’ fundraising, and hiring the most effective consultants will have a positive impact on candidates’ success on Election Day. Generally, these hypotheses are supported. Those incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates who hired consultants that were identified as some of the most well-known in the business received more in PAC contributions than those candidates who hired consultants who were not among the most well-known or no consultants at all. Challengers, but not incumbents, who hired consultants identified as some of the most effective in the business got a slightly larger share of the vote on Election Day than those who hired none of the most effective consultants in the business. Incumbents who hired these effective consultants actually got a smaller percentage of the vote. Patterns in the data appear to illustrate that this is not because effective consultants do not do their job as well as other professionals, but that the most effective consultants often work for some of the most vulnerable incumbents. Of those incumbents who were involved in races that were anticipated to be the closest of the 1998 election, nearly 90 percent hired consultants who were identified as the most effective, compared to only about 50 percent of incumbents in safe districts. This suggests that incumbents who are in electoral trouble turn to those consultants who give them the best opportunity for victory. Without them, they may not have the chance to return to Congress.

7 k For Better or Worse What Hath the Consultants Wrought?

There is no more significant change in the conduct of campaigns than the consultant’s recent rise to prominence, if not preeminence, during the election season. Political consultants, answerable only to their client-candidates and independent of the political parties, have inflicted severe damage on the party system and masterminded the triumph of personality cults over party politics in the United States. —Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants

This book has examined many of the criticisms laid at the feet of the modern political consultant, many of which are based on assertions rather than careful empirical analysis. An overwhelming majority of the evidence presented here does not support critics’ claims, suggesting that the critics have not given consultants a fair shake. Rather than a scourge on the electoral process, professional political consultants can be an asset to democratic elections; they have helped parties become more efficient and effective in assisting candidates win elections, they help candidates fight through an already cluttered field of communications by focusing their message on things potential voters care about, and they are in a position to help voters by sharpening the debate between two candidates.

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It is a given that consultants are, and will continue to be, a part of the electoral process in the United States. Until recently there has not been a systematic attempt to gain a detailed or full understanding of the relationships political consultants have with other actors in the electoral process, and much of what has been written about consultants has been assertion and speculation. This has led to critical allegations about how consultants fit into the modern electoral context. Many critics’ concerns can be summarized accordingly: Political professionals and their techniques have helped homogenize American politics, added significantly to campaign costs, lengthened campaigns, and narrowed the focus of elections. Consultants have emphasized personality and gimmickry over issues, often exploiting emotional and negative themes rather than encouraging rational discussion. (Sabato 1981, 7) This book has hopefully added to the discussion of professional consultants’ ties to other electoral actors through an analysis of their relationships with candidates, voters, the media, and political parties with a focus on consultants’ attitudes and beliefs. In this final chapter I revisit some of the important aspects of the relationships professional consultants have with candidates, voters, the media, and political parties, recap some of the important findings presented in previous chapters, and specifically address how consultants are in a position to benefit democratic elections.

Consultants’ Place in Modern Elections Political consultants’ role in modern campaigns is grounded in the changes that have occurred in electioneering since the late 1800s. Parties, candidates, voters, the media, and outside actors (e.g., interest groups) have undergone tremendous change and growth over the past 100-plus years of electioneering, which has led the electoral process to become dominated by money, controlled more by individual candidates than party organizations, and dependent on technically sophisticated mass-based communication techniques. However, Dan Nimmo (2001) helps illustrate that the reason for the growth of consultants’ presence was a response to the changes in the political context that other electoral actors were adapting to: To name but a few there was institution of the permanent electoral cycle whereby at local, state, or federal level on

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any given date of the calendar year several campaigns are in progress across the nation; the ever-expanding size of the political electorate as voting and registration restrictions were eased; [and] the mounting costs of campaigns themselves necessitating specialized fund raising efforts for potential candidates. . . . (11) Consultants’ arrival on the electoral scene was the next logical step in the progression of electioneering as candidates and campaigns started to take advantage of the technological advancements of the mid-1900s. Therefore, while prior to 1900 parties monopolized campaigning, after the Progressive Movement took hold, candidates and party leaders alike soon realized that the party structure of old could no longer continue its dominance. In addition, other developments that weakened parties—reforms such as the institution of the direct primary, the abandonment of patronage, and other Progressive Movement reforms—created a situation that led candidates to look for assistance in areas they had previously relied on the party to supply. In sum, changes to the electoral process created a new electoral context. Characteristic of this new context was an electioneering void that consultants stepped in to fill by supplying services that were now in demand. In other words, the technologies that have come to be staples in elections and that cost significant sums of money, such as television commercials, survey research, and direct mailings, are not the creation of political consultants; rather, “political campaigning responds to inventions of new ways to communicate to and among mass audiences” (Nimmo 2001, 11). The technological revolutions that have taken place over the course of the last century have had the greatest impact on the presence of consultants in U.S. elections. The shift away from campaigns that were based on direct personal contact and supported mainly by parties, to campaigns that were, and continue to be, based on mass communication began with reforms that took power away from parties; it was cemented with the rise of new technologies that allowed candidates and their campaigns to communicate with their constituencies more effectively and efficiently. Mass media helped them accomplish this first in the form of newspapers, radio, and finally television. However, the development of television as a mainstay of campaign communications is only one in a rather lengthy list of evolutions in campaign communications. The first mass communication of significant political campaign news occurred in 1884 when Whigs in

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Baltimore sent word via telegraph to Washington, D.C., that Henry Clay had been chosen as their presidential nominee. With this, [p]olitics was transformed, and campaigners learned to campaign to light up the telegraph lines first, the headlines second. By the mid-1920s one in every six households had a radio; candidates slowly adjusted and spoke conversationally into microphones instead of yelling into megaphones. The diffusion of televisions after the Second World War placed, as managers of the candidacies of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon were wont to say, a precinct worker in every living room, that is the paid advertising flickering away in blackand-white, then color. After the 1960s came an array of innovations, all readily available to citizens with the means to secure them and exploited by specialists with the requisite skills . . . (Nimmo 2001, 11). In summary, there have been multiple technological advancements in campaign communication since the middle of the nineteenth century, all of which allowed candidates to communicate with voters in a quicker and more efficient and effective manner than the previous modes of communication. However, only the use of television by consultants is viewed as an exploitation. As the modes of communication became more technically sophisticated (nearly anyone could send a telegram), a demand for expertise arose (not everyone can produce a radio or TV spot or interpret polling data). The involvement of consultants was simply the next step in electioneering’s evolution. After a slow and sputtering growth that began in California with the formation of the firm Whitaker and Baxter in 1933, the consulting industry began to see a more steady expansion during the mid-1900s. As consultants became more involved in more campaigns across the country, first at the national level and then at the state level, criticism of their work and tactics, such as those outlined above, began to surface. Some question the mere existence of political professionals in the electoral process arguing that consultants “threaten the fundamental participatory precepts of democratic governance” since, in one view, “democracy works best when average citizens (i.e., political amateurs) participate extensively in local politics” (Petracca 1989, 12). However, there has been little in the way of systematic study of how consultants fit into democratic governance. For example, there is little known about the individuals who make up the consulting industry, and no attempt to analyze their motivations as compared to other

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political professionals or activists. Not surprisingly, the majority of consultants are white, male, middle-aged, and highly educated. In this sense, they are very similar to their clients—candidates for office and elected officials. With respect to what drives consultants, the comprehensive survey of the industry reported in previous chapters illustrates that a majority of consultants are driven more by purposive benefits and rewards1 (their own political beliefs and ideology as well as a desire to increase their party’s political power) rather than the riches many critics point to as the driving force behind this industry. In this sense, consultants resemble party precinct leaders, another segment of politically active individuals who cite purposive rewards as their main motivation (Conway and Feigert 1968). This is not to say that there are no consultants who are motivated and driven by the dollars available in modern electioneering. As in any population, there are a few bad apples, but they should not be judged as the industry standard. The vast majority of consultants are political activists who have chosen to make their interest in politics their vocation. Evidence of this is found in the similarities in the backgrounds, demographic characteristics, and motivations of consultants and citizens who choose to become active in campaigns. Many consultants have roots in politics, and started as volunteers in local campaigns or interns for a party organization. The anecdotal evidence of three consultants’ paths to involvement in the industry presented in chapter 3 helps illustrate this. Democratic media consultant Martin Hamburger got his start in politics working in the nuclear freeze movement and for the Council for a Livable World; Republican media consultant Kim Alfano first interned for the Republican National Committee while in college and then worked for the National Republican Congressional Committee before starting her own business; and Democratic pollster Celinda Lake first got involved in campaigns when she would take leaves of absence from her doctoral studies at the University of Michigan to work for candidates and campaigns she believed in. In short, these, and the vast majority of consultants, are not Madison-Avenue types just looking to make a buck. Rather, as Lake says, they are driven by their beliefs and policy concerns (Lake 2002). The money consultants earn is substantial; the average principal of a consulting firm earns roughly $100,000 per year. However, this pales in comparison to the income that these individuals could demand if they took their skills and talents to other venues. Commercial entities such as Cadillac, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Kodak, and Sony all devote huge sums of money for services similar to those political consultants provide to candidates, whether it be market research, or

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the production of a television commercial or direct mail flier. The compensation consultants would receive if they worked solely in the private sector would likely be much greater than what they earn as political professionals. Again, this is not to say that the sums of money spent on campaigning in the United States are small. Indeed, during the 2000 election cycle roughly $3 billion was spent by all presidential and congressional candidates on their campaigns (Marcus 2000). Although there has been a dramatic increase in the costs of campaigns over time2, political consultants should not receive all the blame. It is true that it takes more money today to run a campaign than it did in the mid-1900s; polls, television commercials, direct mailings, research, and even fund-raising (you have to spend money to make money) are all significant costs. However, campaign spending must be kept in proper perspective, and when we “consider that even assuming the combined total for federal and state spending approache[d] $5 billion [during the 2000] cycle, that puts the price of politics somewhere between the market for laundry detergent, $4.7 billion, and batteries, $5.6 billion” (Marcus 2000, A1). Two additional points help to fill in the rest of the story. First, the vast majority of dollars that are spent in campaigns do not go to political consultants as profit. Instead, dollars flow through consultants to other recipients. For example, some estimates of campaign expenditures estimate that 60 percent of all dollars spent in a campaign are devoted to paid media. In those campaigns where the candidate utilizes television as a means to spread their campaign message, the vast majority of these dollars go to the television station that airs the ads, not the consultants who make them. Work by former Washington Post reporter Paul Taylor and the Alliance for Better Campaigns after the 2000 election cycle has shown that a major cause of the increasing cost of campaigns is the way television stations charge candidates for air time during the campaign season. Consider that, for instance, WNBC in New York City was paid nearly $25 million for airtime during the 2000 election cycle alone; WABC in New York collected over $21 million and KABC in Los Angeles made nearly $19 million.3 Furthermore, commenting on the amount of money his 2002 gubernatorial campaign had spent ($18 million in the primary alone), former Philadelphia, PA, mayor, Ed Rendell (D), said, “You get the station managers to cut their rates by two-thirds, and we’ll raise a whole lot less money” (Oppel 2002, A24). According to the former mayor, advertising rates in Philadelphia tripled between his 1991 mayoral campaign and his 2002 gubernatorial race. What is more, the Alliance for Better Campaigns’

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work shows that television stations raise the price of advertising as Election Day gets closer, making it even more expensive for candidates to spread their message to voters.4 Similarly, we tend to forget about the cost of sending direct mail pieces, which represent revenues collected by the federal government in the form of postage. In some instances, candidates and political parties do not pay the same prices for postage as everyday citizens. In a campaign, postage on a mail piece can be as little as $0.16 per piece, which may make it seem inexpensive (Hazelwood 2002). However, when we consider the number of pieces that are sent in a campaign, the postage costs quickly add up and the bill candidates pay to the federal government becomes far from insignificant. As an example, take U.S. Representative Bill Redmond’s (R) special election victory in New Mexico’s Third Congressional District in 1997. Even though the campaign was truncated because of the special election, the Redmond campaign targeted 60,000 Republican households to receive four pieces of mail each (Pearson 1997). The result is about $75,000 in postage for the 240,000 pieces of mail, including the lower bulk rate that campaigns often can take advantage of. During conventional campaigns, more pieces of mail may be sent to more households. On an even grander scale, consider a statewide campaign where it is not uncommon for candidates to send mail to four or five hundred thousand individuals; the postage alone for three mailings of this size would cost nearly $200,000 at the conservative rate of $0.16 per piece. John Corzine’s (D-NJ) 2000 U.S. Senate campaign stands out for a number of reasons, the most glaring being that he spent $64 million of his own money on his campaign. However, during the primary campaign alone, Corzine spent nearly $340,000 on postage for direct mail pieces (Halbfinger 2000). So, when we read that a candidate has spent $300,000 on a direct mail campaign, we must also remember that a significant portion of that figure went to the U.S. Post Office and the rest is split up between the cost of printing the piece, getting the names and addresses, and the consultant who developed the visuals and text for the piece. As referred to several times in previous chapters, election cycles beyond 2002 will be greatly affected by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, the effects of which will not be fully known until well into the future. Although a full accounting of how the BCRA will change the landscape of elections in the United States is not a topic for this book, the act must be discussed because of its potential impact on professional political consultants and their roles in elections.5 As noted above, the rules and regulations governing how money

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is raised and spent has affected the electoral context in which different campaign actors operate. Most notably, the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its subsequent amendments helped shape the role of political parties in the 1970s and 1980s; as Herrnson (1998) notes, “These reforms set the stage for PACs to become the major organized financiers of election campaigns and drove candidates to rely upon professional campaign consultants to design direct mail fundraising operations” (28). The BCRA may have similar consequences and effects on parties and consultants. Some claim that political consultants will be negatively influenced by the BCRA since it limits one of the avenues parties and interest groups have used to pay for consultants’ services, in that soft money is no longer a spending option (Drinkard 2002). However, some, if not all, political consultants may in fact benefit from the new playing field that the BCRA creates. In order to see the potential effects of the BCRA on consultants, the changes the law makes to the rules of raising and spending campaign cash should be revisited. The most well-known aspect of the BCRA is its ban on raising and spending dollars that have been unregulated and unlimited in the past—nonfederal funds or soft money. However, the BCRA does not completely ban soft money, as the conventional wisdom seems to imply. As originally written, the BCRA allows state-, district-, and local-party committees to continue to raise and spend nonfederal dollars for certain aspects of electioneering activity, most notably voter registration and GOTV efforts, as well as communications that are not disseminated via television (broadcast, cable, or satellite) or radio (FEC 2002a). In some instances candidates for federal office may even help raise soft money for state- and local-party committees and tax-exempt organizations (FEC 2002a). The important aspect of this for the role and impact of political consultants is that the new law frees up consultants to again step and fill a void left by what the political parties are not able to do. The new BCRA law makes it impossible for the national parties to raise money in the way they did through the 2002 election cycle. However, the BCRA does not prohibit nonprofit groups, or newly created “issue” committees from raising and spending soft money. These groups “could not be run by party committees or candidates, but could be run by their former employees” (Dart 2002, 14A). And as data in earlier chapters have shown, not only are political consultants former employees of candidates, but many consultants (roughly 50 percent) once worked for a political party committee, and many continue to have relationships with the parties after their formal employment as consultants delivering services to the party and their candidates.

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The rules set forth in the FEC’s interpretation of the law apply to “agents” of the parties and individual candidates, as well as the parties and candidates themselves. However, the rules and regulations are written in such a way as to exclude consultants from being agents of parties and individual candidates. Long-time election observer and handicapper Charles Cook of The Cook Political Report has noted, before the BCRA “big donors [gave] wads of soft money to political parties, and the parties hire[d] consultants to do TV ads,” in the new context, “the same big donors would give big wads” of money to “newly formed committees that will be set up by the consultants themselves” (quoted in Dart 2002, 14A). As FEC Commissioner Karl Sandstrom has noted, “What sort of regulation were we [the FEC] to draft that would prevent a former officer or former consultant to one of the political parties from establishing their own group?” (Sandstrom 2002). In effect, not only does this bring consultants and parties closer together, but the new law may simply redirect money that is spent on politics away from the political parties and toward new groups that are formed by political consultants at the request of the parties, thus giving the consultants even more influence in the process. “In the early 1990s . . . as soft money became a big factor in elections, parties regained much of the prominence and power they had lost to candidates and political consultants in the age of television” (Lorente 2002, 1A). However, the pendulum of influence now is swinging back to outside consultants. Some former party aides and consultants began setting up these independent committees even before the new law took effect in November of 2002. “For instance, Monica Dixon, a onetime DCCC political director and the aide to former Vice President Al Gore, registered the Democratic Senate Majority PAC-Nonfederal Account with the Internal Revenue Service . . . ” creating a new 527 committee the week before the BCRA went into effect (Bresnahan 2002, 15). The bottom line is that the money that parties spent on television ads that were created by consultants and aired on network affiliates across the country will likely not disappear. These ads will simply be paid for through different channels while television stations continue to charge more and more for air time. One other potential outcome of life after the BCRA is that parties will “rely on the companies that used to give money to run . . . political ads, phone banks, and voter registration activities . . . ” to continue these activities themselves (Dart 2002, A14). In addition, the BCRA limits the options organized interest groups and newly formed “issue” committees have for distributing a “public communication,” which is defined as a message that is “distributed for a fee by a television station, radio station, cable television system or

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satellite system, that references a clearly identifiable candidate,” by prohibiting them from using soft money to pay for these communications within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election (FEC 2002b, 3). This portion of the act tries to reign in the use of issue-ads by outside groups that have been called “shams” by the law’s supporters. Those who argue that consultants will be weakened by the BCRA point to this provision as evidence because it appears that one group of consultants—media consultants—will no longer be able to take as clients those groups now prohibited from this activity. This may be true in the short term, but over the long term, this is not likely to have much effect. First, the law simply says that these kinds of communications cannot be paid for with soft money. The act does not say that these kinds of communications cannot be paid for with hard dollars (those dollars that are limited and regulated) nor does it eliminate them completely. These types of communications can be paid for with either soft or hard money at any other time during the campaign, meaning that they will not disappear completely; organized interest groups will still want to spread their message to potential voters, they simply might start to do it earlier in the campaign (i.e., before the thirty- or sixty-day cutoff date). Additionally, the independent groups that are likely to be formed in the wake of the act will likely begin running independent expenditures to spread a message that they can control instead of having their money go toward an ad with a partybased message. More importantly, the BCRA says nothing about direct mail or phones. In other words, some groups may be limited in how they can spread a message via television commercials thirty days prior to a primary and sixty days prior to a general election, but they are not limited in how they use mass mailings or phone banks to do so. Therefore, the media consultant’s loss is the direct mail consultant’s and calling house’s gain. In other words, “[w]hat you used to do in TV, you’ll do in mail only” (Keller 2002, 18). In the end, citizens will likely see more mail pieces in their mail boxes and more recorded messages on their telephones in the weeks leading up to an election instead of television commercials on their TV screens. As discussed in previous chapters, the messages that are spread via mail can be much more carefully targeted to specific groups of voters (the same is true for phones) than television ads can be; television commercials are somewhat dependent on the media market of the district or state (or the cable system), whereas mail can be sent to specific households depending on the characteristics of those living there. Because of the new rules, the strategic advice and expertise of the direct mail consult-

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ant and pollster may now be more important than they were before the BCRA went into effect.

The Electoral System Through the Eyes of Consultants The most important relationship consultants have is with their candidate-clients. Different types of consultants perform different functions for candidates, from helping them raise the requisite funds and conducting background research, to analyzing a poll, creating a direct mail piece, and producing a television spot. The functions consultants perform in a campaign have changed over their relatively brief history, as the first professional advisors were not involved with the hightech techniques that are a staple in modern campaigns, but were more focused on general campaign strategy. As technology developed and new campaign tools became essential (e.g., polling, targeted direct mail, radio and television, and fund-raisers), the consulting industry, too, became highly specialized. Although the consultants of yesteryear were involved in nearly every aspect of campaigning, today’s are more specialized and focus their efforts on one area of electioneering. This is not to say that a consultant who does survey research, for example, is not intimately involved in other aspects of the candidate’s campaign. For instance, one top media consultant indicated that his firm often shares the television spots they create with the principal of a polling firm they often work with to get feed back; according to this consultant, because of this the candidate “gets a whole greater than the sum of its parts.”6 The main duty most consultants have is to help a candidate craft, develop, and finally, communicate a sound message to voters.7 Consulting teams in modern campaigns work with the candidate and each other to develop a message that will connect with voters, as well as a strategy to deliver that message. Generally, consultants paint a picture of today’s candidates for office that is far from flattering. Many consultants believe candidates are of poor quality and that they have gotten worse over the years they (consultants) have been in politics. In addition, over half of all consultants interviewed in the survey utilized above reported that they had helped elect a candidate they were later sorry to see serve in office, citing reasons such as the candidate did not follow through on campaign promises, or that they had changed their issue positions once in office. That consultants are here to stay in elections is undeniable. And although they receive criticism for helping elect scoundrels

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to office, some attention must be paid to the pool of candidates voters have to choose from. If better candidates run for office, consultants will help to elect better officeholders. This is not to say that consultants should not receive any criticism or are completely without blame. As noted above, there are some in the consulting business who will do anything and will help elect candidates who should not hold public office. Ethical transgressions undoubtedly take place and should not be overlooked (Nelson, Dulio, and Medvic 2002). However, this does not mean that the entire industry should be indicted for electing bad candidates (and by extension delivering bad public servants). In addition, modern consultants are criticized for having wrestled control of campaigns away from candidates (Petracca 1989). Not only do consultants report that this is not the case (as one would expect), but it does not hold up historically. Before consultants came on the electoral scene, parties held great electoral prowess and it was the party that ran much of the campaign. Parties controlled not only who ran for office but what issues they ran on; through the mid-1800s parties and party leaders set strategies for presidential campaigns (Cunningham 1968; Wolcott 1973; Medvic 1997). Even the first “managers” that appeared had strong party ties and loyalties, which meant that the party came first and the candidate second. As for today’s campaigns and candidates, a majority of consultants report that in the campaigns they work on it is the candidate who has direct and final control over the direction his or her campaign follows. Consultants’ relationship with voters is less clear-cut because it is not as direct as the one they have with candidates. The essence of most consultants’ jobs is to reinforce voters’ previously held beliefs and to persuade voters to vote a certain way. Again, this places consultants in a special and uncommon position to evaluate the general public. Although their observations and views about today’s candidates were mainly pessimistic, consultants have a much more positive view of the electorate. Consultants find that the public is not very well informed on major policy issues, but also report that they trust voters to make a sound decision on Election Day. Consultants are also aware of the cynicism that exists among the electorate today, placing much of the blame on candidates and journalists, but also admitting that some of their efforts lead to cynicism as well—specifically, negative advertising and the way money is raised in campaigns. The most curious relationship consultants have is with journalists who write and report about campaigns and government. This relationship has been called friendly and symbiotic (Sabato 1981), but many aspects of the relationship have changed since this characteriza-

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tion was presented. First, consultants are more a part of news stories than ever before. Although they used to simply be sources for reporters from behind the scenes, more and more consultants are now out in front of the camera and are mentioned by name in news stories. With the advent of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, it is more common for consultants to appear on news programs as commentators and pundits. In addition, some consultants themselves can become a news story when they are hired by a candidate (some such as James Carville, Ed Rollins, and Dick Morris have found this to be true and no longer work on domestic campaigns). When the consultant becomes the story rather than the campaign, the candidate is done a disservice. Second, there is little doubt that the news media have taken on more of a traditional watchdog role in campaigns than in years past. This has come mainly in the form of ad watches and other stories or reports that address the truthfulness or accuracy of campaign commercials or other tactics. The media now routinely comment on and criticize the work that consultants do. This has caused a much more adversarial relationship to develop. Consultants may remain sources for reporters, but they are more guarded and are aware that the days of “an uncritical press and frequent, beatific headlines” are gone (Sabato 1981, 4). This fact is partially reflected in consultants’ attitudes about today’s political journalists. Large majorities of professional consultants reported that they believe political journalists, both print and broadcast, are of poor quality and that they have declined in quality over time. In addition to doing a poor job, consultants view the press and the way they report the news as the main source of voter cynicism in the United States today. Here, consultants’ attitudes are similar to those of the general public, who also offer harsh criticism of the press and their reporting. As noted above, the relationship consultants have with political parties today is one that is based on changes to the electoral system and electioneering, such as the rules governing how money was to be raised and spent in campaigns. Although parties used to provide many of the services candidates demanded, they have now moved away from providing tangible services to candidates and toward focusing their efforts on raising money. It became apparent to both parties that it was more efficient for them to leave services such as media production to outside consultants than to try and provide the service to all their candidates inhouse. As such, much of the assistance candidates receive from the party comes in the form of monetary aid. However, parties also realized that candidates still needed help to run a successful campaign. Therefore, rather than provide technical services themselves, parties have

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moved to helping candidates pay for consultants’ services. This new tactic by parties can be seen as a new era of party service: the partyas-billpayer era. Consultants in the survey employed above reported that there are certain services that are better provided by consultants than by the party, yet consultants also said that parties are better at providing some other services than they are. Generally, consultants reported that they have taken over the provision of services that are geared toward creating and delivering a message for the candidate for whom they are working (media, polling, direct mail, and general strategic advice), whereas the services they see as best provided by the party are ones that require more time and staff than a consulting firm can provide (i.e., opposition research, get-out-the-vote efforts [GOTV], and fundraising). These data are supplemented by the views of current and former party staffers who agreed that there are some electioneering activities that the party apparatus should do and others that should be left to consultants. The theory of the party-as-billpayer is further supported by data on spending by political parties in the 1998 and 2000 election cycles. In the parties’ coordinated efforts with candidates’ campaigns, the money both parties spent on behalf of their candidates went for the very services consultants identified as those that they had taken over for providing to candidates. Specifically, parties chose to pay consultants to provide services focused on message creation and delivery (paid media advertising, and to a lesser extent, polling) rather than relying on in-house sources. Additionally, consultants reported that parties were important campaign resources for services consultants are not well-suited to provide, such as fund-raising and GOTV. Although the empirical work on consultants is not voluminous, it is consistent. Previous studies have illustrated that consultants have a positive effect on campaigns in two major areas: candidates’ fundraising and vote totals on Election Day. More professionalized campaigns raise more money than amateur campaigns (Herrnson 1992); and candidates who hire professionals receive more votes on Election Day than do those who do not (Medvic 1997 with Lenart; 2000; 2001). Past work has also been consistent in considering all consultants equally and as a campaign commodity. In other words, previous studies have argued that deciding to hire a consultant is a more important decision than deciding which one to hire. A test of this hypothesis illustrates not only that distinctions across consultants can be found, but that the distinctions are important for both candidate fund-raising and electoral success. Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1998—incumbents, challengers, and

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open-seat candidates alike—who hired consultants who were identified as some of the most well-known professionals by their peers raised significantly more money from political action committees (PACs) than did those candidates who did not hire consultants or those candidates who hired consultants that were not identified as being among the most well-known in the industry. The roster of consultants that a candidate assembles can act as a cue to political elites that the campaign is viable and that their contribution is a wise and sound investment. Because consultants can also differ in their skill and abilities, the impact of hiring consultants that are among the most effective in the business (again by way of peer evaluation) on candidates’ general election vote percentage was examined. A simple examination of candidates’ vote totals from 1998 showed that candidates who hired effective consultants either did no better (in the case of challengers and open seats) or worse (in the case of incumbents) than those candidates who hired no consultants or consultants who were not identified as some of the most effective. More rigorous analyses illustrated that challenger candidates who hired consultants identified as some of the most effective did do slightly better on Election Day than those who chose not to hire consultants or hired consultants who were not identified as some of the most effective. Incumbents were not shown to be any more successful (in terms of a greater share of the vote) when they hired consultants identified as being some of the most effective than those who chose not to hire consultants or hired consultants who were not identified as effective, which confirmed the patterns in the aggregate data. However, a more careful look at the incumbents’ campaigns illustrated a telling point and showed that effective consultants may have been an important aspect in some of those races. Incumbents who competed in races that were predicted to be the most competitive in 1998 disproportionately hired consultants who were identified as the most effective in the business, compared to those who competed in safe districts or less competitive races. This provides some evidence that more effective consultants are sought after quantities. Incumbents look to these individuals or firms when they are facing a tough challenger and are in need of the best advice and counsel they can find to help them return to their seat in Congress.

Consultants and Democracy As we have seen, critics have levied some serious charges against professional political consultants—from having taken control of cam-

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paigns away from candidates to increasing the cost of campaigns. However, two allegations stick out as more serious than others and both are central to the workings of a democracy. First, that consultants manipulate the electorate and mislead voters (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997a; O’Shaughnessy 1990); and second, that they have helped to push parties to the side of electioneering and have accentuated their decline (Sabato 1981). Previous chapters have illustrated that neither of these two claims are valid. In fact, consultants’ presence can even bolster democratic elections as they relate to both voters and parties. As outlined in chapter 4, consultants work with candidates to develop a strong strategy, theme, and message that they hope will resonate with voters and that centers on the issues that voters care about and are themselves focused on. Opposition and survey research conducted in the early portion of the campaign focuses the campaign’s message to include issues that voters care about and on which the candidate has a comparative advantage over his or her opponent. Critics argue that through this process consultants are helping to encourage poll-driven candidates, or candidates who look to polls to tell them what to say, think, and do. However, a closer examination illustrates that this process does not try to make candidates into something they are not and therefore fool voters, but rather focuses the candidate’s campaign on issues that are important to his or her constituents and reinforces voters’ previously held beliefs. Evidence comes from past research that shows that campaigns are often focused on local issues (Friedenberg 1997), and that voters connect with candidates who share their issue positions (Herrnson and Patterson 2000). But candidates are selective in the issues they talk about, as they carefully pick and choose what issues give them a comparative advantage over their opponent. Campaigns do this because they cannot campaign on every single issue in the public domain. “Voters have neither the time nor the interest to weigh each issue carefully. Moreover, they are likely to agree with a given candidate on some issues and not on others. Campaigns [and consultants] have now taken on the role of substantially determining which issues voters choose to think about” (Salmore and Salmore 1985, 116). Stephen K. Medvic (1997; 2001) has termed this process “deliberate priming.” The process of deliberate priming—where candidates talk about issues that are both important to their constituents and beneficial to their candidacy—helps democratic debate in two ways. First, it focuses attention on the issues that are important to the voters. For instance, in a congressional campaign in a rural district, a candidate

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may have keen interests and strong beliefs on issues such as foreign policy, banking and finance or deregulation, but voters may be focused on an entirely different set of issues such as livestock prices, education, and Social Security. Who benefits if a candidate addresses issues that he or she is interested in but the voters are not? Finding out what issues are important to voters centers the debate in a campaign on those issues that are important to candidates’ constituents, and serves the citizens’ interests. Second, the process of focusing on issues that give the candidate an advantage over his or her opponent can strengthen the debate between two candidates. If the main issues in an election are SocialSecurity reform, taxes, education, and welfare reform, it is a safe bet that the Democratic candidate will focus on Social Security and education and the Republican will focus on taxes and entitlement reform. However, because the Democrat consistently talks about Social Security and education at campaign rallies, or in their paid and earned media, their opponent will be likely forced at some point to address the same issues. Also, the press will likely push the other candidate to answer the claims of their opponent. An example of this process was clear in the 2000 presidential election. During the course of the general election campaign the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, focused heavily on his ideas for a prescription drug plan for senior citizens that would be funded by the Medicare system, an issue that was a high priority for much of the electorate and one that gave him an advantage over his opponent. Medicare, Medicaid, and other entitlements are solid issues for Democratic candidates and difficult ones for Republicans, given their tendencies to push for entitlement reform and the scaling back of social programs. However, given the weight Gore put behind his discussion of a Medicare prescription drug plan, George W. Bush, the Republican candidate, was forced to talk about his ideas for a prescription drug plan as well. Similarly, Bush’s focus on a tax cut in the time of a budget surplus made it difficult for Gore to avoid the question of whether he would push for a tax cut as well. Candidates pick and choose issues that give them an advantage, but this process also enhances the debate between candidates because if the issues are ones that voters care about, both candidates will have to address them over the course of the campaign if they wish to be successful. This is not to say that there are no consultants who actively try to tell candidates what to think and how to act. There surely are, and they can have a detrimental impact on elections. However, candidates who listen to a consultant who tells them that he or she should change

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their philosophy because it would benefit them at the polls should also be held accountable. Consultants cannot get a candidate to change his or her issue position to the popular one of the day without the willing acceptance and participation of the candidate. Critics argue that professional political consultants have fostered ambiguity in campaigns (Petracca 1989; Kennedy 1999), increased the negativity in campaigns and focused on gimmicks rather than issues (Sabato 1981) in their use of television as a communications tool. Consultants receive a good deal of the blame for creating negative ads on television and for focusing on negative issues in campaigns. Truly negative campaigning is not a new phenomenon, however. If one looks back to campaigns during the 1800s, statements made by candidates and their campaigns can make today’s advertisements seem tame. Campaigns in the nineteenth century used race, gender, and religion to stir up the emotions of potential voters in ways that would never make it into a television commercial or direct mail piece today (see Jamieson 1996 or Donald 1973 for examples). The point here is not to argue that campaigns of yesteryear were worse than those of today. Rather it is to simply point out that the kind of negative personal attacks that receive so much attention today are nothing new to politics. Granted, there are differences in the campaigns of the 1800s and those of today; today’s include a greater number of communications that are labeled as negative, although what is defined as negative can be challenged; the frequency with which the public sees these communications is higher; and the ways in which candidates’ opponents are challenged are more subtle today than calling a candidate a despot, liar, thief and tyrant, as Abraham Lincoln was during the 1860s. To some extent, however, today’s negative advertising also gets more attention than those of the past because modern campaigns are more heavily scrutinized by the media and other observers. Again, this is not to say that campaigns from the nineteenth century were worse than those of today, but to simply illustrate that negative campaigning appeared before the modern political consultant—those who receive the blame for its creation. In addition, the use of the term negative to describe the content of those ads is debatable. Recent work by Kathleen Hall Jameison and her colleagues (2000) questions the positive/negative advertising dichotomy; they argue, instead, that the categories of political advertising are trichotomous: advocacy (positive), attack (negative), and contrast. More importantly, their work illustrates the benefits of contrast and attack ads, as they find that attack (negative) and contrast ads contain more policy content and more useful issue information for

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potential voters than do advocacy ads. In other words, the same tactic that consultants have been criticized for creating and relying on can actually be seen as a benefit to democratic discourse. Although positive ads—stereotypically ads that may feature a candidate looking into the camera and telling voters that he or she comes from a strong family background or that he or she is an “effective” leader who will be a person who will fight for them—are still used today, they offer the voter little in the way of information that they can use to make a decision about who to vote for. Comparatively, contrast and attack ads provide the voter with the greatest amount of information. Rather than calling for reform that would do away with negative ads, Jamieson, Waldman, and Sherr (2000) argue that “attack is a useful component of political discourse and should be encouraged, not discouraged . . .” as long as it is done in a fair and accurate way (46). The backlash against negative campaigning has gotten so strong that using negative advertising has become a strategy for the candidate who has been “attacked.” As soon as a candidate hears some criticism levied against them by their opponent—whether it be truthful or false, relevant or not—they immediately issue a press release or put their own television ad on the air saying something like, “My opponent is running a negative campaign against me. The voters of this district [or state] will not stand for this kind of negative campaign. I have run an issuesbased, positive campaign,” hoping to elicit a damaging reaction from the public because of the disdain for negative ads. The point here is that this happens no matter what the so-called attack is; as soon as the candidate hears a critique of their views or policy record they turn it against their opponent, even if it is a valid critique of their record. We seem to have reached a point where any criticism or critique of a candidate is termed negative and considered bad. Although this is not to say that there are no instances where campaigns (and political consultants) go over the line and engage in unethical conduct, it is to say that campaigns should be fought over ideas and solutions to problems, not over which candidate has the best manners. Comparing one candidate’s ideas and record to the other’s is the best way to have an informed and useful debate. Are candidates supposed to campaign by lauding the accomplishments of their opponents or by telling us why their opponent should be elected? No; conflict and contrast in campaigns is necessary. As long as campaign communications are factual, relevant, and contain important information, they should not be labeled negative and should be encouraged. Professional political consultants have also been blamed for accentuating the so-called decline of parties in the United States. If

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Schattschneider (1942) was correct that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties,” the role of consultants can be questioned (1). However, as illustrated in chapter 5, consultants and parties work together today in a partnership that helps advance party goals. Although the two are separate entities, with consultants’ first priority being their client and party staffers’ being the party, consultants and parties are more closely linked today than any other time in their history. As noted above, consultants have taken over providing a number of services that parties once provided themselves, allowing parties to focus their efforts on activities at which they excel. However, even though candidates do not rely on the party to provide assistance with media production, survey research, or direct mail production as they once did, consultants were never that far removed from the process, as they were integral to the provision of those services when the party did supply them. This was the basis for the development of the partyconsultant partnership that exists today. The division of labor found in modern election cycles, with consultants providing services devoted to message creation and delivery and parties focusing on raising money and providing candidates with assistance in areas such as GOTV efforts and opposition research, benefits parties and consultants alike. For consultants it means more clients (including the parties themselves) which leads to more revenue. More importantly, for parties it allows them to focus more pointedly on one of their main goals—acquiring or maintaining power in government, defined as control of Congress, the White House, state legislatures, governorships, or any other elected office. As explained in chapter 5, parties are not operating efficiently when they try to provide all the requisite services to all of their candidates. They simply do not have the staff or the resources to provide sophisticated technical assistance in survey research, media production, or direct mail production. In this sense, the consultant-party partnership has actually strengthened parties by enabling them to focus on winning elections. Professional political consultants are not the bane of the U.S. electoral system. In fact, their appearance and increased presence in elections can benefit democracy. Consultants’ relationships with candidates, voters, and political parties can help each perform their appointed tasks better and more efficiently. Consultants are generally political activists who have decided to make politics and elections their means of making a living. In an era that is filled with cynicism toward the political system, individuals who choose to make politics their vocation should be celebrated and encouraged.

Appendix 1 k Consultants Survey Sampling Procedures

The attitudinal data of political consultants employed above come from a 1999 national survey of 505 senior-level political consultants in thirty-minute telephone interviews, conducted by Yankelovich Partners, Inc. (now Harris Interactive) for American University’s Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies in conjunction with its “Improving Campaign Conduct” project. The interviews were conducted by Yankelovich’s Executive Council, a group of interviewers specially trained for this type of survey of elites. The sample of consultants was drawn through a multistep process. First, because there is no agreed upon universe of consultants (there is even debate over the definition of who can be counted as a consultant; see chapter 2), the closest substitute was used. The Political Resource Directory (PRD), an annual publication which allows consultants of all types to list the services they offer and to advertise in their given area of specialization, was used to obtain the names of all known consulting firms and their principals. A complete list of principals was obtained from PRD and supplemented with names obtained from Campaigns & Elections magazine’s “Political Pages.” This yielded a master list of principals whose firms offered services in seven different areas from full campaign services or survey research, to media buying or voter list rental. However, only general consultants, media consultants, direct mail specialists, and those who specialized in survey research and focus group services, fund-raising, field operations, and opposition research were included in the final sample. This yielded a total of 2,587 individuals from which to draw the sample. In order to ensure that respondents were currently working as political consultants in the areas identified, two screen questions were utilized during the interviews (see Appendix 2). First, respondents were asked if they currently worked as a consultant, or if they had worked as a consultant in the past year (any other answer led to termination of the interview). Second, respondents were asked what campaign service in which they specialized. Only those answering either general consultant, field operations, polling, media specialist, fund-raiser, direct mail specialist, or opposition research were included.

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Appendix 2 k Political Consultants Survey Questionnaire

Yankelovich Partners Inc. 250 West First Street, Suite 302 Claremont, CA 91711

April, 1999 Job #0300051

Political Campaign Consultants Telephone Survey FINAL DRAFT IDENTIFICATION: COMPLETE AT END OF INTERVIEW Name: _________________________________________________________ Title: __________________________________________________________ Company: ______________________________________________________ Address: _________________________ Telephone #: ( ____ ) __________ City: _____________________________ State: ____ Zip Code: __________ Interviewer: __________________ Date: _______ Elapsed Time: ________

SCREENER: Hello, my name is _________________, and I’m calling from Yankelovich Partners, a nationally known public opinion research firm. We’re doing a study about political campaign consulting and would like to talk with some people working in this profession. Please be assured that we will keep all of your responses strictly confidential. Are you currently working as a professional campaign consultant or have you done so in the past year? Yes, currently working as political consultant . . . . . . . . Yes, have done so in past year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No (TERMINATE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refused (TERMINATE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

–1 –2 –3 –4

1a. What is your primary role as a campaign consultant? Would you describe yourself as a: (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY. IF RESPONDENT VOLUNTEERS MORE THAN ONE ROLE, PROBE: Which one role did you play the most?) General campaign consultant or general strategist . . . . –1 Field operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2

193

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For Better or Worse? Pollster, including survey research and focus group consultant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 ASK Q.1b ➔ Media consultant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Direct mail specialist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Fundraiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 Research, including opposition research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7 DO NOT READ. ASK Q.1c ➔ Telephone voter contact (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –8 Other (VOLUNTEERED; SPECIFY) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –9 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0

ASK Q.1b IF MEDIA CONSULTANT IN Q.1a 1b. Do you work exclusively in media production? Yes (TERMINATE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Not sure/refused (TERMINATE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 ASK Q.1c IF TELEPHONE VOTER CONTACT IN Q.1a 1c. Do you work exclusively for a telephone bank? Yes (TERMINATE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Not sure/refused (TERMINATE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 2a. About how many people are employed in your firm during a campaign season? (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER 2b. About how many people are employed in your firm during a noncampaign season? (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER 3. Does your firm work only for Republicans, only for Democrats, or does it accept clients from both parties? Only Republicans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Only Democrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Both parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Don’t know/Refused/NA (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 4. Does your firm have commercial as well as political clients or does it only do political work? Commercial and political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Only political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Only commercial (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3

Appendix 2

195

Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 5. Are you currently a principal in your firm, a senior associate, or a junior associate? (IF OTHER, ASK: Would you say that position is most like a principal, senior associate, or junior associate?) Principal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Senior Associate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Junior Associate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 6. In which year did you take your first paid campaign job? (RECORD EXACT YEAR. 99=DON’T KNOW/REFUSED.) ____________________ WRITE IN YEAR 7a. Thinking back to when you first became active in political campaigns in a paid professional capacity, what would you describe as your main motivation for becoming a professional consultant? Was it mainly: (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY. RANDOMIZE ITEMS.) Your political beliefs or ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 The thrill of the competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 To help your party be the majority party in government . –3 The money you could earn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 The political power and influence which personally comes with the job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7 7b. Has this changed in any way? What would you describe as your main motivation today for being a professional consultant? (DO NOT READ. RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY. RANDOMIZE ITEMS AS IN Q.7a.) Your political beliefs or ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 The thrill of the competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 To help your party be the majority party in government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 The money you could earn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 The political power and influence which personally comes with the job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7

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8. Thinking back to when you first began working in politics—and comparing that to now—do you think the role of political parties in electing candidates at the local level has increased, stayed about the same, or, decreased? Please use a 5-point scale where “5” means increased very much, “4” means increased somewhat, “3” means stayed the same, “2” means decreased somewhat, and “1” means decreased very much. Using this same 5-point scale, how has the role of political parties at the state level changed? How about: (COMPLETE LIST. READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH). (INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONSE IS “VARIES,” PLEASE ASK FOR AN OVERALL GENERAL ESTIMATE.) Increased Very Much

Decreased Not Very Much sure

5

4

3

2

1

(VOL)

a. The local level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

b. The state level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

c. The national level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

d. Primary elections in general

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

9. Again thinking back to when you first began working as a campaign consultant, do you think the role of political consultants in electing candidates at each of these levels has increased, stayed about the same, or decreased? Please use the same 5-point scale where “5” means increased very much, “4” means increased somewhat, “3” means stayed the same, “2” means decreased somewhat, and “1” means decreased very much. How about: (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH). Increased Very Much

Decreased Not Very Much sure

5

4

3

2

1

(VOL)

a. The local level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

b. The state level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

c. The national level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

e. Primary elections in general

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–x

10. In general, how would you rate the quality of [INSERT ITEM]—as excellent, good, average, poor or very poor? (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH. RANDOMIZE.)

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Appendix 2

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Very Poor

DK/Ref (VOL)

a. The candidates running for the House and Senate

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

b. Professional political consultants

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

c. Print journalists who write about politics

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

d. Broadcast journalists who talk about politics

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

e. Political party organizations at the national level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

11. In the time that you have worked in politics, has the quality of [INSERT ITEM] gotten a lot better, somewhat better, stayed the same, gotten somewhat worse, or gotten a lot worse? (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH. REPEAT RANDOMIZED ORDER FROM Q.10.) A Lot Somewhat Stayed Somewhat A Lot Better Better Same Worse Worse

DK/Ref (VOL)

a. The candidates running for the House and Senate

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

b. Professional political consultants

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

c. Print journalists who write about politics

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

d. Broadcast journalists who talk about politics

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

e. Political party organizations at the national level

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

–y

12a. Have you ever helped elect a candidate who you were eventually sorry to see serve in office, or not?

198


Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 ASK Q.12b IF YES IN Q.12a 12b. Why were you sorry to see the candidate serve in office? (DO NOT READ. MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED.) Was unethical/engaged in unethical behavior . . . . . . . . –1 Wasn’t qualified for the position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Didn’t pay bill(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Didn’t keep campaign promises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Wasn’t smart, intelligent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Sold out to special interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 Couldn’t be trusted/lied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7 Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –8 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –9 13a. In the campaigns you have worked on in the past, have you ever had assistance from the national party organization or Congressional campaign committees? ASK Q.13b ➔ Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 ASK Q.13b IF YES IN Q.13a 13b. I am going to read you a list of services that are sometimes provided to candidates by the national party organization or congressional campaign committees. Thinking about competitive races, please tell me whether, in your experience, each service has been very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful or not helpful at all to the success of your campaign or campaigns. (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH. RANDOMIZE.)

a. Campaign funds

Very Helpful

Somewhat Helpful

–1

–2

Not Very Not Helpful Helpful All –3

–4

DK/Ref (VOL) –5

b. Coordinated advertisements

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

c. Direct mailings

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

d. Get-out-the-Vote operations

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

e. Opposition research

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

f. Polling

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

g. Management or strategy advice

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

199

Appendix 2

14. Some people in the campaign industry say that political consultants today provide services to campaigns that political parties are incapable of providing. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with that statement? Strongly agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Somewhat agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Somewhat disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Strongly disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –9 15. Thinking specifically now, please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree that political consultants have taken the place of political parties in providing each of these services. Again, How about: (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH. RANDOMIZE.) Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree

Somewhat Disagree

Strongly Disagree

DK/Ref (VOL)

a. Media or campaign advertising

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

b. Campaign finance or fund-raising

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

c. Get-out-the-Vote or field operations

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

d. Polling

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

e. Opposition research

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

f. Management or strategic advice

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

g. Direct mail

–5

–4

–3

–2

–1

16. If you were to select a Lifetime Achievement Award recipient among your peers, who would you choose? Please include all areas of campaign consulting. (RECORD EXACT NAME.) (INTERVIEWER, 99=DON’T KNOW/REFUSED) __________________________________________________________ 17. Thinking now about the role of the public in politics . . . how much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American people when it comes to making choices on Election Day — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? Great deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Fair amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2

200

For Better or Worse? Not very much . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 None at all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5

18. Overall, would you describe the American public as being very well informed on major policy issues, somewhat well informed, somewhat poorly informed, or very poorly informed? Very well informed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Somewhat well informed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Somewhat poorly informed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Very poorly informed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 19. Thinking now about voter cynicism and what causes it, please tell me whether you think each of the following has a great deal of impact in causing voter cynicism, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all. (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH. RANDOMIZE.) Great Deal

Fair Amount

Not Very Much

None at All

DK/Ref (VOL)

a. Negative campaigning

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

b. Politicians’ poor performance

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

c. The way the news media report on politics

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

d. The way money is raised in a campaign

–1

–2

–3

–4

–5

20. In your view, how common are unethical practices in the political consulting business? Do unethical practices happen very often, fairly often, sometimes, rarely, or not at all? Very often . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Fairly often . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Rarely (or) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Not at all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 21. Can you think of an example of what you regard to be a serious ethical problem in a recent political campaign? This can be a prob-

Appendix 2

201

lem you personally experienced or know about from others. (INTERVIEWER: WE ARE LOOKING FOR CASE STUDIES SO RECORD ANSWERS IN DETAIL. IF RESPONDENT IS VAGUE, PLEASE PROBE FOR A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE.) __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ 22. Do you think there should or should not be a code of ethics for professionals who work on campaigns? Should . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 There already is one (American Associations of Political Consultants (AAPC) already has one) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Should not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 23. Should a professional organization be able to censure those who violate a code of ethics for campaign professionals, or not? Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Not sure (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 ASK IF AAPC CODE (PUNCH “2”) NOT MENTIONED IN Q.22 24. As you may know, the American Association of Political Consultants, or AAPC, does have a code of ethics. Do you happen to be familiar with this code? Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 ASK IF YES IN Q.24 OR FAMILIAR WITH AAPC CODE (PUNCH “2”) IN Q.22 25. How much of an effect do you think the AAPC code has on the behavior of political consultants — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? Great deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Fair amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Not very much . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 None at all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 26. Next, I’m going to read you several practices that sometimes occur during the course of a campaign. As I read each, please tell me

202

For Better or Worse? whether you believe that practice is acceptable, questionable, or clearly unethical. First, how about: (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH. RANDOMIZE.) Acceptable

Questionable

Clearly Unethical

DK/Ref (Vol.)

a. Focusing primarily on criticism of the opponent

–1

–2

–3

–4

b. Focusing primarily on the negative personal characteristics of an opponent rather than on issues

–1

–2

–3

–4

c. Making statements that are factually untrue

–1

–2

–3

–4

d. Making statements that are factually true, but are taken out of context

–1

–2

–3

–4

e. Using push polls

–1

–2

–3

–4

f. Using negative advertising to try to decrease voter turnout among certain groups or regions

–1

–2

–3

–4

g. Contrasting your candidate’s stands on issues with those of your opponent

–1

–2

–3

–4

27. In your view, are campaigns today more likely to “go negative” than they were 10 years ago, less likely, or about as likely? By “going negative” we don’t mean contrast ads. More likely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Less likely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 About as likely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 ASK GENERAL CONSULTANTS AND MEDIA CONSULTANTS ONLY (PUNCHES “1” AND “4” IN Q.1) 28a. Thinking about the use of negative political advertisements as a means to decrease voter turnout among certain groups or within

Appendix 2

203

certain regional areas, how often do you think this happens— very often, fairly often, just sometimes, or hardly at all? Very often . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Fairly often . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Just sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Hardly at all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Never (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 ASK IF “VERY OFTEN,” “FAIRLY OFTEN,” “JUST SOMETIMES,” OR “HARDLY AT ALL” IN Q.28a 28b.Given the necessary resources, which one of these is the primary factor governing a consultant’s decision to use advertising to decrease voter turnout? (READ LIST AND ACCEPT ONLY ONE RESPONSE. RANDOMIZE.) The candidate wants to do it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 The consultant decides to do it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 The media market allows for targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 29. To what extent do you think ad watches—that is, press coverage focusing on the accuracy of particular ads—have made campaigns careful about the content of their ads? Has it made them a lot more careful, somewhat more careful, just a little more careful, or hasn’t it affected things at all? A lot more careful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Somewhat more careful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 A little more careful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Hasn’t affected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5

CLASSIFICATION DATA Next, I have some questions for classification purposes. We don’t mean to pry, but we need to know some things about you in order to compare your opinions with others. A. What is your age? (RECORD NUMBER. DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) (99 = DON’T KNOW/REFUSED) ________ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –xx

204


B. What is the last grade of class that you completed in school? (DO NOT READ) High school graduate (Grade 12), equivalent, or less . . –1 Technical, trade, or business school after high school . –2 Some college (no four-year degree) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Four-year college degree (B.A., B.S.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Some graduate school (no graduate degree) . . . . . . . . . . –5 Master’s degree (M.A., M.S.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 Law degree (J.D.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7 Ph.D. (Doctorate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –8 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –9 C1. About how many presidential, gubernatorial, congressional, or Senate races did you personally work on in the 1998 election cycle? Please include any type of work you may have done as a paid campaign consultant. (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER Didn’t work on any of these 1998 races (VOL) . . . . . . –11 Worked on 1998 races but don’t know how many . . . –22 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –33 C2. About how many state or local races did you personally work on in the 1998 election cycle? (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER Didn’t work on any of these 1998 races (VOL) . . . . . . –11 Worked on 1998 races but don’t know how many . . . –22 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –33 C3. Thinking now about 1996, about how many presidential, gubernatorial, congressional, or Senate races did you personally work on in the 1996 election cycle? Please include any type of work you may have done as a paid campaign consultant. (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER Didn’t work on any of these 1998 races (VOL) . . . . . . –11 Worked on 1998 races but don’t know how many . . . –22 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –33 C4. About how many state or local races did you personally work on in the 1996 election cycle? (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER

205

Appendix 2 Didn’t work on any of these 1998 races (VOL) . . . . . . –11 Worked on 1998 races but don’t know how many . . . –22 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –33

C5. And how about 1994? About how many presidential, gubernatorial, congressional, or Senate races did you personally work on in the 1994 election cycle? Again include any type of work you may have done as a paid campaign consultant. (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER Didn’t work on any of these 1998 races (VOL) . . . . . . –11 Worked on 1998 races but don’t know how many . . . –22 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –33 C6. About how many state or local races did you personally work on in the 1994 election cycle? (DO NOT ACCEPT RANGES.) ____________________ WRITE IN NUMBER Didn’t work on any of these 1998 races (VOL) . . . . . . –11 Worked on 1998 races but don’t know how many . . . –22 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –33 D. Are you a member of the American Association of Political Consultants? Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 E. Have you ever: (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER FOR EACH.) Yes

No

DK/Ref. (VOL)

a. Worked in the office of a federal, state, or local elected official

–1

–2

–3

b. Worked for a national, state, or local political party or party committee

–1

–2

–3

c. Worked in government

–1

–2

–3

d. Worked for a news media organization

–1

–2

–3

F. In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? Republican . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Democrat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2

206

For Better or Worse? Independent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No preference (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

–3 –4 –5 –6

G. In general, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal? Very conservative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Conservative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Moderate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Very liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7 H. Thinking about your own personal income in 1998, how much did you earn from your political consulting work before taxes. Just stop me when I get to the right category. Please do not include income from any sources other than political consulting. (READ AND RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY.) Less than $50,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 $50,000 to under $100,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 $100,000 to under $150,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 $150,000 to under $200,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 $200,000 or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 I. Are you of Hispanic or Latino descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or some other Spanish background? Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 J. What is your race? Are you White, Black, Asian, or some other race? White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2 Asian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3 Hispanic (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4 Other (SPECIFY) (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5 Don’t know/Refused (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –6 K. (INTERVIEWED: DO NOT ASK) Enter respondent’s sex: Male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2

Appendix 2

207

L. One last question. This study is being conducted on behalf of an institution of higher education. If someone from that school wished to ask you some additional questions, would you be willing to give them your name for this purpose? Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1 No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2

Appendix 3 k Follow-up Survey to Determine Effective and Well-known Consultants

October 25, 1999

Dear ???????: Earlier this year, you participated in a survey of professional political consultants conducted by Yankelovich Partners, Inc., for American University’s Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Your participation was very much appreciated. At the end of that survey you indicated that you were willing to be re-contacted at a later date for further discussion about political consultants and their role in United States elections. That is why I write to you today. At the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, we believe political consultants play a major role in modern campaigns and that they can have a positive effect on our representative democracy. We also believe you are part of a professional group that deserves attention and study. In our efforts to study and understand the effects political consultants have on election campaigns, we would like to know your opinion about well-known and effective campaign consultants. The accompanying questions ask you to identify the most “wellknown,” and the most “effective” consulting firms (or individual consultants) in seven areas of specialization at the federal level (e.g. those who work in congressional races). “Well-known” indicates highprofile consultants who draw the most attention when joining a campaign, and “effective” means consultants who do the best job in getting their candidates elected (but not necessarily the greatest electoral winning percentage) in their particular area of expertise. These two lists (“well-known” and “effective”) may or may not be the same. The purpose of asking you these questions is only to assess the impact of consultants in a number of campaign specialties. Please be assured that your answers here are completely anonymous. In no way whatsoever will your responses here be linked to the answers you gave in the initial survey. This is a completely separate and distinct project. Thank you for your candid responses and continued participation. If you have any questions about the nature of this study, please feel free to contact David Dulio, a Research Fellow at the Center. He can answer any of your questions and can be reached at (202) 885– ????, or via e-mail at ???.????????american.edu. Best regards, James A. Thurber Professor and Director Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies

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Who are the most “well-known” consulting firms in the following areas at the federal level and within the party you normally work for? Recall that “well-known” refers to those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who are the most high-profile, or those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who draw the most attention when joining a campaign. Media Production

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Who are the most “effective” consulting firms in the following areas at the federal level and within the party you normally work for? Recall that “effective” refers to those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who do the best job in their particular area of expertise. Media Production

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Now, would you mind offering your thoughts on those consultants at the federal level who work for candidates of the party that you normally oppose. Who are the most “well-known” consulting firms in the following areas at the federal level who work for candidates of the party you normally oppose? Recall that “well-known” refers to those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who are the most high-profile, or those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who draw the most attention when joining a campaign. Media Production

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Who are the most “effective” consulting firms in the following areas at the federal level and who work for candidates of the party you normally oppose? Recall that “effective” refers to those consulting firms (or individual consultants) who do the best job in their particular area of expertise. Media Production

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT. YOU MAKE RESEARCH LIKE THIS POSSIBLE. Please return only the question sheets in the envelope provided.

Appendix 4 k First-Stage Regressions and Supplemental Analyses for Models in Chapter 6

Table A4.1 First-stage Results for Incumbent Fund-raising Analysis (Table 6.3)a Contributions from individuals

0.000000347**** (3.160)

Opponent’s professionalization

0.338*** (2.495)

Competitiveness

–0.375** (–1.840)

Opponent’s total receipts

0.0000002785* (1.603)

Beginning cash on hand

–0.0000002885* (–1.512)

Constant

0.767**** (6.347) R2=.181 F5,378=16.656; p=0.000 N=384

Summary Statistics

**** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10 Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. a Dependent Variable = Scale 0–4; how many well-known consultants the candidate hired. This first-stage model was also used in model 3 that appears in Table A5.1 in Appendix 5.

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For Better or Worse? Table A4.2. Supplemental Analysis of Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Incumbents’ 1998 PAC Receiptsb Model 2

Professionalization

288,001**** (3.665)

Competitiveness

–30,479 (–0.365)

Party

40,510*** (2.545)

Opponent quality Contributions from individuals Beginning cash on hand Leadership Tenure in the House Constant Summary Statistics

2,681 (0.646) 0.04737** (1.608) 0.02879 (0.765) 288,654**** (6.253) 4,681**** (4.109) –172,198*** (–1.289) R2=.416 F7,376=33.406; p=0.000 N=384

Instrumental variables employed for professionalization: **** p < 0.001 did the opponent hire a consultant *** p < 0.01 competitiveness ** p < 0.05 opponent’s total receipts * p < 0.10 candidate’s beginning cash on hand the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. b Original professionalization variable was trichotomous: 0=the candidate hired no consultants, 1=the candidate hired consultants not identified as well-known, 2=the candidate hired well-known consultants.

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Appendix 4 Table A4.3 First-stage Results for Supplemental Incumbent Fund-raising Analysis in Table A4.2b Model 2 Contributions from individuals

0.0000002711** (2.126)


0.254** (2.006)

Competitiveness

–0.760**** (–4.003)

Opponent’s total receipts

0.00000003181 (0.196)

Beginning cash on hand

–0.00000006845 (–0.385)

Constant Summary Statistics

1.571**** (13.941) R2=.148 F5,378=13.122; p=0.000 N=384 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. b Dependent Variable = trichotomous variable: 0=the candidate hired no consultants, 1=the candidate hired consultants not identified as well-known, 2=the candidate hired well-known consultants.

This first-stage model was also used in model 4 that appears in Table A5.1 in Appendix 5.

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For Better or Worse? Table A4.4 First-stage Results for Challenger-Candidate Fund-raising Analysis (Table 6.4)a

Contributions from individuals

0.000001011**** (8.182)


–0.02647 (–0.322)

Competitiveness

–.0357*** (–2.470)

Candidate’s loans Constant Summary Statistics

0.0000009762*** (2.698) 0.277** (2.497) R2=.304 F4,293=32.070; p=0.000 N=298 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. a

Dependent Variable = Scale 0–4; how many well-known consultants the candidate hired.


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Appendix 4

Table A4.5 Supplemental Analysis of Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Challenger Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receiptsb Model 2 Professionalization Competitiveness Party

29,841* (1.469) –76,170**** (–3.184) 3,388 (0.436)


0.104**** (3.138)

Constant

43,826*** (2.529)

Summary Statistics

R2=.428 F3,295=54.448, p=0.000 N=296

Instrumental variables employed for professionalization: **** p < 0.001 did the opponent hire a consultant *** p < 0.01 competitiveness ** p < 0.05 amount in loans taken out by the candidate * p < 0.10 the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. b Original professionalization variable was trichotomous: 0=the candidate hired no consultants, 1=the candidate hired consultants not identified as well-known, 2=the candidate hired well-known consultants.

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For Better or Worse? Table A4.6. First-stage Results for Supplemental Challenger-Candidate Fund-raising Analysis in Table A4.5b Model 2


0.000001404**** (9.471)


0.08321(0.844)

Competitiveness Candidate’s loans Constant Summary Statistics

–0.622**** (–3.592) 0.000002167**** (4.989) 0.441**** (3.314) R2=.432 F4,293=55.663; p=0.000 N=298 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10



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Appendix 4 Table A4.7 First-stage Results for Open-Seat Candidate Fund-raising Analysis (Table 6.5)a Contributions from individuals

0.00000174**** (4.474)


–0.609** (–1.805)

Competitiveness Candidate’s loans Constant Summary Statistics

–0.01947*** (–2.460) 0.0000005822 (1.172) 1.374**** (3.214) R2=.367 F4,63=9.12; p=0.000 N=68 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. a

Dependent Variable = Scale 0–4; how many well-known consultants the candidate hired.


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Table A4.8 Supplemental Analysis of Effects of Hiring Well-known Consultants on Open-Seat Candidates’ 1998 PAC Receiptsb Model 2 Professionalization

87,681 (1.151)

Competitiveness

–1,722* (–1.300)

Party

–50,667** (–1.994)

Opponent quality

2,229 (0.392)


0.199** (1.931)

Constant

56,119** (0.548)

Summary Statistics

R2=.583 F3,295=17.372, p=0.000 N=68

Instrumental variables employed for professionalization: **** p < 0.001 did the opponent hire a consultant *** p < 0.01 competitiveness ** p < 0.05 amount in loans taken out by the candidate * p < 0.10 the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values. b Original professionalization variable was trichotomous: 0=the candidate hired no consultants, 1=the candidate hired consultants not identified as well-known, 2=the candidate hired well-known consultants.

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Appendix 4 Table A4.9 First-stage Results for Open-Seat Candidate Fund-raising Analysis in Table A4.8b Model 2 Contributions from individuals

0.000001203**** (5.042)


–0.381** (–1.840)

Competitiveness

–0.001672**** (–3.444)

Candidate’s loans

0.0000004328* (1.420)

Constant

Summary Statistics

1.534**** (5.849) R2=.455 F4,63=13.123; p=0.000 N=68 **** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10



Appendix 5 k Additional Model Specifications for Tables 6.3–6.5

Table A5.1 Replication of Incumbent Fund-raising Models without Individual Contributions Variable Model 3

Model 4

Professionalization

224,678**** (7.180)

374,338**** (6.508)

Competitiveness

–144,613**** (3.068)

37,872 (0.525)

33,994*** (2.175)

36,753*** (2.330)

1,742 (0.425)

2,165 (0.522)

—

—

0.08335** (2.270)

0.04422 (1.213)

314,923**** (7.324)

313,103**** (7.168)

Tenure in the House

4,595**** (4.066)

4,596**** (4.023)

Constant

103,904*** (2.408)

–302,419*** (–2.840)

R2=.425 F7,376=39.657; p=0.000 N=384

R2=.412 F3,295=37.649; p=0.000 N=384

Party Opponent quality Contributions from individuals Beginning cash on hand Leadership

Summary Statistics

Instrumental variables employed for professionalization: did the opponent hire a consultant competitiveness opponent’s total receipts candidate’s beginning cash on hand the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values

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**** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

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For Better or Worse? Table A5.2 Replication of Challenger Fund-raising Models without Individual Contributions Variable Model 3

Model 4

Professionalization

136,654**** (9.567)

86,267**** (9.003)

Competitiveness

–47,895*** (–2.372)

–40,764** (–1.904)

5,041 (0.652)

5,331 (0.679)

—

—

22,890** (1.725)

13,659 (0.933)

R2=.425 F3,295=71.900; p=0.000 N=296

R2=.409 F3,295=67.276; p=0.000 N=296

Party Contributions from individuals Constant Summary Statistics

Instrumental variables employed for professionalization: did the opponent hire a consultant competitiveness amount in loans taken out by the candidate the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values

**** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

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Appendix 5 Table A5.3 Replication of Open-seat Candidate Fund-raising Models without Individual Contributions Variable

Professionalization

Model 3

Model 4

150,803**** (6.680)

221,051**** (6.720)

–805 (–0.889)

53 (0.055)

–47,385** (–1.828)

–46,136** (–1.786)

2,031 (0.349)

2,115 (0.365)

—

—

52,639* (1.009)

–90,244 (–1.278)

R2=.556 F4,64=19.742; p=0.000 N=68

R2=.558 F4,64=19.919; p=0.000 N=68

Competitiveness Party Opponent quality Contributions from individuals Constant Summary Statistics

Instrumental variables employed for professionalization: did the opponent hire a consultant competitiveness amount in loans taken out by the candidate the candidate’s total receipts in individual contributions Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values

**** p < 0.001 *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10

Notes k Chapter 1 1. Richard F. Fenno Jr. (1983) shares this thought in his discussion of U.S. Representative Jim Johnson (R-CO), a former member of Congress who became interested in politics and seeking political office because of the Vietnam War, who Fenno called a “citizen legislator” (118–125). However, some would not agree that candidates like Behrens-Benedict or Representative Johnson are ideal. According to Robert Dahl (1957), “To suppose that one can run a complex political system without first learning the trade is, as Plato pointed out, as silly as to suppose that one can be a doctor or carpenter without prior training” (3). 2. See Canon (1990) for one definition of amateur politicians. 3. However, the editorial by the candidate-to-be did have quite an effect on potential voters in the Eighth Congressional District—Behrens-Benedict began getting phone calls the night the piece ran encouraging her to run; the Times also received thirty phone calls, one of which asked how the paper could immediately consider Behrens-Benedict a serious candidate for Congress, while the other twenty-nine wanted to know how to get involved with her campaign (Nelson 1998b). 4. Of course, a woman candidate would have been unheard of at this time. 5. Formal definitions of “small business,” called “size standards,” can be found in Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 121. Small business is defined by the U.S. federal government by using size guidelines for different categories of businesses as determined by the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) code. Size is usually determined by average gross annual receipts over a three-year period. For example, service

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businesses generally have a size standard of $5 million over three years, or $1.67 million per year. However, certain industries have a higher maximum; these can range up to $25 million over a three-year period. In addition, the number of employees is used as a size standard for many industries. (For more information, see the Small Business Administration (SBA) at www.sba.gov). U.S. House and Senate campaigns certainly fit within these definitions when we consider the size of both their budgets and staffs (see Herrnson 2000a for staff sizes of campaigns). Just as the SBA differentiates between industries, political science differentiates between House and Senate campaigns. We can conceive of House campaigns as fitting into the first category ($5 million over three years) and Senate campaigns into the larger category ($25 million over three years). 6. These guidelines for starting a campaign or business are borrowed from the National Federation of Independent Businesses and their checklist for entrepreneurs starting a small business (www.nfib.org). 7. David Rosenbloom (1973) has estimated that in 1960, 188 congressional candidates employed some kind of professional advice. By 1968 this figure jumped to 650, and by 1970, 900 candidates had hired a professional. However, Dennis Johnson (2000, 2001) points out that these figures must be read with some degree of caution. At the time, professional advice may have only meant that a candidate hired an individual who had some experience in campaigns; they were not the true professionals that consultants are today. 8. There is debate over who the first political consultants were. Some have identified those who worked for the likes of Presidents John Adams or Thomas Jefferson (Thurber 1998), others go back to Quintos Cicero (De Vries 1989), and still others cite longtime consultant Joe Napolitan as the first to use the term political consultant (Perlmutter 1999). Significantly more time is devoted to the development of the profession in chapter 2. 9. These can include pollsters, media consultants, field and get-outthe-vote (GOTV) specialists, opposition researchers, direct mail specialists, and fund-raisers. 10. It is interesting to note that this type of battle may have first been noticed over twenty years before by Nimmo (1970) when he said: “Campaigns may no longer be battles between candidates but between titans of the campaign industry, working on behalf of those personalities” (50). 11. Evidence in the 2000 presidential election cycle includes Mike Murphy “spinning” for John McCain, Karl Rove or Ralph Reed giving reaction to the Bush campaign’s New Hampshire primary defeat, or Bob Shrum repeating the message of the Gore campaign. Similar “spin” was coming from both campaigns during the now infamous Florida recount in the thirty-six days after the presidential election. Communications advisors such as Karen Hughes (Bush) and Chris Lehane (Gore) were constantly on the airwaves repeating the message of their camp.

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12. During the last half century, different “schools”—from the Columbia School (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944) to the Michigan School (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960) to the Rochester School (Downs 1957)—have tried to explain voting behavior. 13. For assertions about parties and candidates see Sabato (1981), and for assertions about consultants and voters see Petracca (1989) or Nimmo (1970). 14. Walter De Vries, an author and former political consultant, noticed the growth of the industry over a decade ago and predicted that it would continue (De Vries 1989). In addition, see Dennis Johnson’s (2000) work for an examination of the industry’s growth. 15. For research on consultants’ impact on candidate fund-raising see Herrnson (1992), and for consultant impact on vote share see Medvic (1997; 2000; 2001).

Chapter 2 1. Quoted in De Vries (1989). According to the American Association of Political Consultants, Cicero was the first recorded political consultant. His writings, in The Handbook of Electioneering, were an effort to help his brother in an election for the consulship of Rome in 63 B.C. De Vries (1989) makes the case that consultants are not strictly an American phenomenon. In addition, see Medvic (1997) for a more detailed account of political consulting in Ancient Greece. 2. Whitaker and Baxter fought to defeat a plan put forth by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) that would have killed an effort by the California legislature to create a project to control flooding and develop irrigation. They not only won the election after being outspent, but were put on retainer by PG&E to provide similar services in the years after. See also Sabato (1981), Nimmo (1970), and Kelley (1956). 3. See Dinkin (1989) and Medvic (1997) for more on this period of electioneering which they both describe as “The Early National Period.” 4. See Medvic (1997) for a description of the “Pre-Modern” period when party managers were behind candidates’ campaigns. 5. As noted above, Whitaker and Baxter also took on noncandidate clients, as was the case with the Pacific Gas and Electric Company. They “used the tools of mass democracy and mass communication to protect the interests of the oil companies, utilities, railroads, doctors (they conducted the American Medical Association’s campaign against national health care in 1948) and other representatives of the American way’ who could pay their fees” (Rosenbloom 1973, 45).

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6. Agranoff (1972) argues that this “process began in the 1920s with the governmental affairs component of business relations. The PR counselor was called upon to create programs to develop public support . . . As candidate groups became more important in the scheme of party campaigning, they began to employ the skills and techniques of public relations firms” (15–16). 7. David M. Farrell (1996) draws this distinction with the terms “labor intensive” versus “capital intensive.” Labor-intensive campaigns are characterized by “a major role for party workers and volunteers,” as having “a stress on canvassing and public meetings,” and as “amateur” campaigns; and capital-intensive campaigns have a high “degree of campaign professionalism” (168–169). 8. Johnson (2000) offers a typology of consultants that includes specialists and vendors in addition to strategists (see pp. 39–40). 9. This is not to say that consultants do not work more with some of their colleagues than others. For example, some pollsters have a history with and like to work with certain media consultants and/or direct mail specialists. The point remains, however, that a candidate must look to more than one entity to acquire all the necessary services. 10. This is the definition Sabato (1981) gives to the “general consultant.” However, the term general consultant carries with it a different meaning than what is described in this definition. Sabato is really defining the campaign manager. This manager may be a consultant who also offers one of the many services to the candidate. However, today these individuals do not provide all the necessary or desired services to the campaign. 11. Sabato (1981) is one who explicitly asserts that consultants pushed parties further into decline, arguing that consultants took advantage of the context in California where parties had weakened and created a niche for themselves. 12. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999: The National Data Book. 1999. Washington, D.C.: Bernan Press. 13. This trend would later begin to trickle down into more state and local races as well. See chapter 1. 14. The discussion of consultants’ relationship with political parties as well as the underpinnings of the relationship are significantly expanded upon in Chapter 5. 15. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) are the four congressional campaign committees that operate both independently of, and in concert with, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC) respec-

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tively. For further information on these committees see Kolodny (1998) and Menefee-Libey (2000). 16. Of course, differences exist across incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidate. See Herrnson (2000a), Table 3–1. 17. This categorization is borrowed from Herrnson (1998) who categorizes the reasons as institutional and cultural. The literature on the rise of candidate-centered elections is too voluminous to fully mention here. See for example, Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976), Wattenberg (1991), and Aldrich (1995) for presidential elections, and Herrnson (1998; 2000a), Jacobson (1992; 1997), and Salmore and Salmore (1985) for congressional elections. 18. The FECA and its amendments also opened the door for outside groups to influence the electoral process through issue advocacy campaigns and independent expenditures (see Magleby 2000). 19. Soft money refers to dollars raised by parties for use in “party building” which are not subject to the federal limits or reporting requirements. For a further discussion of soft money see Herrnson (1998), especially chapter 11, Corrado et al. (1997), and Alexander (1992). Additionally, as discussed below, the BCRA does allow state parties to raise and spend soft money in limited amounts. At the time of this writing the full impact of the BCRA is unknown since the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the constitutionality of the law. 20. Candidates still utilize what some have termed the “kitchen cabinet”—those individuals who the candidate is closest to—which many times includes the candidate’s spouse and his or her closest friends or confidants. Fenno (1978) touched on this in his discussion of a candidate’s “intimate” constituency. 21. Sabato (1981) provides some supporting evidence. 22. Personal interview, February 24, 2000, Washington, D.C. 23. This may explain the large numbers of firms that describe themselves as general consultants (see chapter 3, note 4), but who really focus on one aspect of electioneering. Consultants who self-describe themselves as “general consultants” are not the general consultants that were around during earlier periods. Those who call themselves general consultants today have much different roles. For data on this see Johnson (2001, Table 1.1), which lists different types of consultants and the number of firms in each as of 1998–1999. He explains that the number of firms is likely to be overstated due to the fact that most consulting firms advertise themselves as “general consultants” even though they specialize in a certain area. 24. A well-known Democratic media consultant mentioned this “duty” of modern consultants during an interview (in Washington, D.C.). The revelation occurred when a client called in the middle of the interview with a report that there was a crisis that the candidate was up in arms about. It turned out

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to be only a minor detail, but the consultant needed to help the candidate “get off the ledge.” 25. For these assertions, see, for example, Sabato (1981). 26. See Lau and Sigelman (2000) for evidence. 27. Evidence of this effectiveness comes both from anecdotes from consultants and candidates as well as systematic study (see Lau and Sigelman [2000] for evidence of both). 28. Fund-raisers, too, have begun to target certain individuals, beyond the traditional targets of past givers. Direct mail fund-raising is often used by campaigns to elicit small dollar contributions from supporters (Herrnson 1998). However, with the use of sophisticated computer software, fund-raisers can take a direct mail campaign from a “prospecting” expedition, to one that is efficient and raises large sums. CHAID (Chi squared Automated Interaction Detector) is one example of a statistical software tool that allows fund-raisers to target certain groups by dividing a list of prior donors by certain characteristics and their past giving performance (Malchow 1997). 29. See Fishel (1983), Thurber and Nelson (1995), or Perlmutter (1999) for a greater discussion of voter targeting. 30. The idea that consultants manipulate the voting public is explored more fully in chapter 4. However, readers are encouraged to examine the debate within the literature by consulting works such as Kahn and Kenney (1999, 2000); Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, and Babbitt (1999); Lau and Sigelman (2000); Kaid and Johnston (1991); Kaid, Leland, and Whitney (1992); and Wattenberg and Brains (1999) for more on the effects of negative ads. 31. It should be noted that if the BCRA is fully upheld by the courts, issue ads would be limited and could not be aired within thirty days of a primary or within sixty days of a general election. 32. Source: Federal Election Commission press release, “PAC Activity Increases in 1995–96 Election Cycle,” April 22, 1997. 33. Source: Deborah Beck, Paul Taylor, Jeffrey Stranger, and Douglas Rivlin, “Issue Advocacy During the 1996 Campaign,” report by the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, September 16, 1997. 34. Source: Federal Election Commission, “FEC Releases Information on PAC Activity for 1997–1998,” June 8, 1999 (http://www.fec.gov/press/ pacie98.html). 35. Source: Federal Election Commission, “FEC Releases Information on PAC Activity for 1997–1998,” June 8, 1999 (http://www.fec.gov/press/ pachis98.html). This estimate was calculated by taking the total disbursements by PACs in 1998 and subtracting direct contributions to candidates, cash on hand at the end of the cycle, and any outstanding debts.

Notes to Chapter 3

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36. Source: Federal Election Commission, “PAC Activity Increases in 2000 Election Cycle,” May 31, 2001 (http://www.fec.gov/press/ 053101pacfund/053101pacfund.html).

Chapter 3 1. Aside from works such as Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections (Thurber and Nelson 2000), and others by Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio (1998; 1999; 2000), works that purport to examine consultants fail to systematically examine the basic characteristics of the consulting industry (for example, Nimmo 1970; Rosenbloom 1973; and Sabato 1981). Even the works by Luntz (1988), Perlmutter (1999), Basham (1991), and Swint (1998), which report their surveys of the field, lend little significant attention to this aspect of the industry. 2. The 106th Congress is used here for its comparable time frame with the other data employed, specifically the survey of political consultants that is employed. The dates of the 106th Congress were January 1999 to January 2001, while the survey of consultants utilized was conducted during the spring of 1999 (See Appendix 1 for the sampling procedures and other details related to this survey and Appendix 2 for a copy of the survey instrument). 3. Sometimes acquiring a client is not enough. Many consultants cite instances where the client (often losing candidates) never paid their bills (see Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000). In these cases, consultants provided a service but did not receive any payment. 4. Johnson (2001) relies on a directory of consulting firms published annually by Campaigns & Elections magazine. The difficulty with this listing is that firms are permitted to list themselves twice for advertising purposes. For instance, many firms list themselves as “general consultants” as well as their specific area of specialization such as direct mail or media production. 5. This description of the consulting industry is a continuation of research done by Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio (1998; 1999; 2000). That work stemmed from an initial survey of consultants in 1997 conducted as part of the “Improving Campaign Conduct” project. The analysis below comes from a larger and more complete second survey (1999) of the industry done in conjunction with the project. 6. Campaign activists are defined as those persons who reported participating in three or more activities associated with campaigning in the 1996 National Election Studies postelection survey. National Election Studies questions making up this index include: “Did respondent talk to others about voting for/against a party or candidate?”; “Did respondent wear a button, place a sign, or put a sticker on car?”; “Did respondent attend any meetings, speeches or rallies for a candidate?”; “Did respondent contribute money to a

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candidate running for office?”; and “Did respondent give money to a political candidate during the election year?” Any respondent answering yes to three or more of these was coded as a campaign activist. There were 102 individuals in the 1996 NES coded as campaign activists. 7. This question in the survey of consultants consisted of a categorical response set. The mean was calculated by assigning each response the midpoint of the category it fell into (i.e., $50,000 to $100,000 = $75,000) and taking the average of those responses. The same procedure was followed for campaign activists. 8. See Keller (2000) for examples of women consultants with highprofile clients. 9. Exceptions to this rule are nonpartisan elections. 10. See, for example, Wattenberg (1990) and Kieth et al. (1992) for a sample of this debate. 11. Please note that this is not meant to be a discussion in the usual context of these types of benefits—i.e., collective action (Olson 1965)—but is simply used to frame different motivations that may drive individuals to become professional consultants. The categories are not strict and are only used to give readers some context when thinking about the decisions that individuals make when mulling whether to become a consultant. For more on these benefits in the traditional sense, see Sabatier (1992) or Cigler and Loomis (1998). 12. The differences in the two studies—the consultants survey and the CPS—are found in the format and phrasing of the motivation question as well as the wording and number of responses offered to respondents. The consultant survey asked one question and offered respondents a set of five possible responses (and an “other” category) (see Table 3.4 for question wording). The CPS told respondents: “Here is a list of reasons people give us for campaigning. Thinking about the time when you decided to become active in the campaign, please tell me if each of these reasons was very important, somewhat important, or not very important in your decision to become active in the campaign?” Then each respondent was asked about a specific motivation that could have been a part of his or her decision to become active in a campaign. 13. It is ironic that consultants cite similar motivations as so-called “amateur” party activists since consultants have been accused of pushing the true amateur out of the political process (Petracca 1989). In reality, the two have more in common than consultants’ critics would care to admit. 14. Johnson (2001) divides the history of consultanting into four categories: before the early 1960s, the early 1960s to 1980, 1980 to 1990, and after 1990. These categories focus on how consulting spread to different levels of elections. Only in the 1950s did consultants find a place in presidential elections, after 1960 statewide campaigns started to seek out consultants, many

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congressional candidates began to employ the services of consultants after 1980, and after 1990, candidates for mayor, local judgeships, and even sheriff began using consultants. (See Johnson [2001] “Introduction” for greater detail). The categories developed here generally mirror Johnson’s although the divisions were made for different reasons. 15. See chapter 1. 16. This is also true for the period lasting from 1966 to 1973. In both periods the numbers of consultants in tabular cells is rather small. Therefore, care should be taken when interpreting these data. 17. This hypothesis was first tested with respect to party activists’ motivations for becoming involved. The rewards that accompanied favorable standing with the party during the machine era are well known (see chapter 2). In exchange for “volunteer” work done during a campaign, loyal party members were given jobs or other forms of patronage. It paid to be a member of the majority party. The hypothesis at the height of the machines was stated: “The majority party would be more likely to be staffed with persons entering party activity for material reasons” (Conway and Feigert 1968, 1161), with the minority party activists being driven by the desire to be in the majority so they could reap the benefits of majority status. Little evidence was found to support this hypothesis, however.

Chapter 4 1. Some previous work has laid this out in the form of “how to books” and others have addressed it by describing the services consultants offer candidates (e.g., Shaw 2000; Shea 1996; Cass 1962; Johnson 2001). The focus here, however, is on the strategic component of consultants’ activities (see also Thurber and Nelson 1995; 2000; Burton and Shea 2003). 2. Those who study campaign communications and how voters process information have come close to addressing this relationship, but only examine it from one perspective—that of the voter. Stephen Medvic’s (2001) work is the closest political science has seen to getting at this relationship as he does manage to consider both sides. 3. These data are taken from a survey of political consultants done in 1997 reported in Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio (2000). 4. Obviously, because these responses were taken during interviews that were anonymous, it is impossible to test the hypothesis that consultants who are well established would be more likely than a consultant who was not well known to cite a candidate’s ideology or ability to govern as the reason they joined that campaign. The same is true of the reverse hypothesis—that less well-established consultants would be more likely than a consultant in an established firm to cite a candidate’s ability to raise money as a reason to join

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a campaign. However, one proxy for this variable may be years of experience as a consultant. No differences were uncovered. Those consultants who reported that a candidate’s political beliefs (mean years of experience = 17.9) or ability to govern (mean years of experience = 17.3) was an important consideration were no more experienced than those who said candidate’s ability to raise money (mean years of experience = 17.0) was important in their decision to take on a client. 5. This is not to say that some consultants do not “over book” on purpose. In a business such as professional campaign consulting, there are bound to be temptations to sign onto as many campaigns as possible to keep revenue flowing. Many times candidates do not know what other campaigns the firms they have hired are working on, which can make it difficult for the client to get the personal attention he or she feels they need, or deserve given the money they are paying for the consultant’s services. 6. These figures represent the numbers of races the individual consultants worked on personally. It is not the number of clients the entire firm took on. 7. An ANOVA test indicates that the difference in the number of clients taken across type of consultant reaches statistical significance (F = 3.357, p = 0.010). In addition, the difference between the number of clients taken by pollsters and general consultants (mean difference = 4.99) reaches statistical significance at the p = 0.004 level, based on a Bonferroni post hoc test after the original ANOVA test. No other differences reached statistical significance and cannot be differentiated from zero. 8. Again, the differences in workload across consultant types reach statistical significance based on an ANOVA analysis (F = 12.129, p = 0.000). The difference between pollsters and media consultants (mean difference = 6.61) reaches significance at the p = 0.027 level. The largest differences, between direct mail consultants and the other four types, all reach significance as well: direct mail versus general consultants (mean difference = 14.48) at the p = 0.000 level; direct mail versus pollsters (mean difference = 9.95) at the 0.004 level; direct mail versus media consultants (mean difference = 16.56) at the 0.000 level; and direct mail versus fund-raisers (mean difference = 18.55) at the 0.000 level (all again using a Bonferroni post hoc test). 9. Chapters 5 and 6 address specific answers to these questions. The discussion below considers them in generalities. 10. Sabato (1981) noticed this trend starting to appear as early as 1980. 11. The development of a campaign strategy, of course, does not begin and end with polling. The importance of polling in “targeting,” or determining what sectors of the electorate will likely support the candidate, cannot be understated. Identifying supporters, undecided voters (who also tend to be uninterested in and uninformed about the campaign), as well as the opponent’s supporters is critical to the allocation of scarce campaign resources (see

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Bradshaw [1995] for an excellent description of the targeting process and the intricacies of deciphering the history of the district or state). This process consists of geographic and demographic analysis that helps candidates decide where they need to spend their time and money, with the vast majority being spent to reinforce the attitudes of those who will definitely vote for the candidate and those who are identified as persuadable (see Bradshaw [1995], or Johnson-Cartee and Copeland [1997b] for example). 12. See Herrnson and Patterson (2000) for a more specific analysis. 13. If the candidate’s opponent has not held office in the past, the opposition researcher’s job is much more difficult. There are no votes and few speeches to examine. However, those who have not held office before are not usually the strongest challengers (see Krasno and Green 1988). 14. The use of paid media depends on a number of factors, the primary one being money. Some campaigns, mainly challengers’ campaigns and downballot races, simply cannot afford to put their message on the airwaves via television or radio commercials. In other instances, candidates face a district that does not lend itself to television ads because there is a poor fit between the district and the media market(s) in that area. In these cases, when a candidate’s message is seen by individuals who cannot vote in that election, the message is essentially wasted on those who cannot vote for the candidate. Examples of this include U.S. House districts in New York City and Los Angeles—where there are dozens of congressional districts within the city—as a candidate who broadcasted his or her message on television would be mainly communicating with individuals who cannot vote for them—because they do not live in the district where the candidate is running—and therefore could have no effect on their election. 15. This example is focused on persuasion mail. A similar strategy can also be employed for fund-raising mail. Statistical analyses can be conducted on lists of prior donors to campaigns or parties that can help consultants craft a message that will resonate with donors and help to increase the return on the fund-raising appeal that is sent. In other words, consultants help to identify those donors who have a history of giving and who respond to certain messages. See also Malchow (1997). 16. See Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio (2000) for a further discussion of these data. 17. It should be noted that the consultant who was responsible for Gore’s infamous transformation to an “Alpha male,” Naomi Wolf, does not fit the definition of a consultant established in chapter 2; she offered no electioneering service to the campaign. However, she did cause a stir when she was added to the campaign team. 18. For further discussion of consultants’ influences on candidates’ fundraising, see Thurber and Nelson (1995), Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1997b), Steinberg (1976), Herrnson (2000a; 2000b), Shaw (2000), and Allen (1998).

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19. For further discussion of consultants’ influences on candidates’ getout-the-vote efforts, see Thurber and Nelson (1995), Steinberg (1976), Shaw (2000), Shea (1996), Elam (1998), and Cherry (1997). 20. The research cited here was conducted qualitatively with a number of focus groups with former candidates for office. See Hamilton and Beattie (1999) for more methodological details. 21. As one consultant said when asked whose fault it was if a campaign used poor information and advice from a consultant: “Well of course it’s our [the consultant’s] fault. But it is ultimately the candidate’s responsibility . . . the consultant’s name is not on the ballot. The candidate’s name is on the ballot” (focus group with political consultants, June 16, 2000, Washington, D.C.). 22. For example, 73 percent of Americans in a March 2000 survey also conducted in conjunction with the “Improving Campaign Conduct” project at American University agreed (“strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” responses taken together) with the statement “It’s possible that good candidates don’t run for public office because of the amount of money needed for a campaign” (see www.american.edu/ccps for the full survey report). 23. In order to fully test the hypothesis that consultants’ attitudes about candidate quality are tied to the electoral fortunes of their party, data over an extended period of time is needed to examine how consultants’ views of candidates change with the electoral fortunes of their party’s candidates. For example, if at a time in the future Democrats are able to regain a congressional majority or are able to gain control of governorships or state legislatures another measure of consultants’ attitudes would be needed to see if Democratic consultants’ views of their candidates get more optimistic while those of Republican consultants get more critical. 24. In addition, consultants who said that they were later sorry to see one of their candidate-clients serve in office have more years of experience than those who report no regrets (19.8 years of experience to 16.8 years of experience). A difference of means t-test is statistically significant at the p = 0.000 level (t = 3.634, d.f. = 492). 25. Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Campaign 2000 Highly Rated,” November 16, 2000 (www.people-press.org/reports/ print.php3?ReportID=23). 26. The consultant-voter relationship does have other aspects, however. For example, Medvic (2001) outlines a number of “functions of a campaign,” one of which is “mobilizational,” which consists of getting individuals interested in the campaign and then to the polling booth. Consultants play a large role in this aspect of electioneering today with voter targeting, voter contact, and GOTV efforts. See also, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Beaudry and Schaeffer (1986); Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992), and Adams and Smith (1980) for more on mobilization.

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27. Stephen Medvic (2001) has developed a theory of consultant influence called “deliberate priming.” The reader is encouraged to review his work for a more thorough discussion of consultants and priming. The theory is used here simply to describe the consultant-voter relationship and to refute critics’ assessment of consultant activity in campaigns. 28. This is true for both incumbents and challengers, although challengers who have not held elective office in the past may have an easier time “creating” an image and issue stances in their first campaign because they have not voted for any bill or made any comments or speeches that would suggest differently. However, candidates with this type of background are usually not in a position to win. All candidates with real chances of winning must walk this thin line of credibility. 29. This is not to say that manipulation never occurs in a campaign; lying and other unethical practices likely do occur, but they are not the norm. 30. There is not, however, complete agreement on this subject. Some have argued, for example, that the level of political knowledge has risen among the American electorate (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). See Sniderman (1993) for a review of this literature and the debate therein. 31. These data are drawn from the survey of the general public reference in note 22 above. 32. See Medvic (1997) for a discussion of heuristics, schema theory, and voters’ informational levels. 33. Although the number in the electorate that feel this way is probably much lower after the events of the 2000 presidential contest in Florida, it is still a concern given the electoral rules (i.e., the Electoral College, single member districts, etc.) in the United States. 34. See the CCPS report “Public Attitudes Toward Campaigns and Campaign Practices.” 35. See, for example, Stanley and Niemi (2000) or Pomper (2001) for data on voter turnout. 36. Again these data are taken from the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies’ report “Public Attitudes Toward Campaigns and Campaign Practices.” 37. “Negative campaigning” is next to impossible to define during a telephone interview. It can mean many things to different individuals. Even though this is problematic, for the purposes of this question the respondent was not given a definition but was allowed to consider their own definition of “negative.” 38. The reader will notice that the one actor left out has been the consultants themselves. This was done for a reason. When the survey instrument

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was designed, it was decided that consultants would not place blame at their own feet even if the question were asked. Rather than compromise other responses, the question was omitted. 39. Over 80 percent of national journalists, and 85 percent of local journalists said that the watchdog role described their job very well or fairly well in a survey of 522 journalists conducted by the Pew Research Center for The People and The Press between November 20, 1988 and February 11, 1999 titled “Striking the Balance: Audience Interests, Business Pressures and Journalists’ Views” (www.people-press.org/press99.htm). 40. Evidence of a strained relationship is found again by turning to journalists’ attitudes in the 1999 Pew Research Center survey referenced above. Over one third of all journalists, and 45 percent of industry executives report that they believe the criticism that the press is more adversarial than necessary is a valid one. 41. See Milburn and Brown (1995) for evidence of this from the journalist perspective. 42. For evidence of these attitudes, see the Center for Media and Public Affairs (CMPA) report found in the “Media Monitor” (1997). 43. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Media Seen As Fair, But Tilting to Gore” October 15, 2000 (www.people-press.org/reports/ print.php3?ReportID=29). 44. This figure refers to all citizens who were part of the CCPS survey of the electorate cited above, “Public Attitudes Toward Campaigns and Campaign Practices.”

Chapter 5 1. Of course, James Madison would disagree. See Madison’s writings in the Federalist Papers, especially Federalist 10. 2. The introduction of earlier advancements in electioneering such as radio (during the 1920s) was even prior to Whitaker and Baxter’s appearance on the political scene. In addition, during Whitaker and Baxter’s time mass media, for the most part, still meant newspapers (see chapter 2). 3. After the early 1980s more candidates for the House of Representatives began to use consultants. In the 1978 House elections, Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) found that 9 percent of House candidates hired a professional manager and 39 percent used a media consultant. This is compared to Medvic’s (2000) data, which shows that in 1990 46.3 percent of all House candidates hired at least one consultant, and that in 1992 that figure had risen to 63.7 percent. The proliferation of consultants in local and state elections did not begin to occur until well into the 1980s and the early 1990s.

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4. A full discussion of the provisions and effects of the FECA and its amendments is well beyond the scope of this book. For a full account of the FECA and its amendments, see Magleby and Nelson (1990) or Alexander (1992). However, one point is particularly noteworthy here; since the passage of the FECA, the costs of waging a successful campaign have risen dramatically. Political consultants are often blamed for the high costs of modern campaigns (see Glasser 2000a). However, this causal link has yet to be supported by empirical analysis. Another possible reason for the increased costs is the dramatic costs of television airtime, which many candidates use to get their message out. See chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion. 5. Although the effects of the most recent campaign finance reforms— the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)—will not be fully known until all court challenges have made their way through the judicial process, some similar effects may result in terms of party strength and influence. Banning the national parties from raising and spending soft money may further the trend that originated with the FECA. Individuals who once gave to the parties in large sums will look to other avenues to funnel their donations. One of the beneficiaries of this change may be state parties who are still able to collect soft-money donations, although they are limited to $10,000 contributions per source. Other actors who will likely be advantaged because of the BCRA are “issue” groups and other newly formed political groups such as so-called 527 organizations (named for one section of the tax code) since donors looking to give large sums of money can donate to these groups in an unlimited manner. 6. One question this raises is, given the contribution limits placed on parties by the FECAs and upheld in Buckley, how were parties able to give these services to candidates given their cost? Parties were able to stay under the contribution limits because they offered the services at greatly reduced prices. For example, in the case of survey research, parties could give candidates the data from a poll for 5 percent of the poll’s costs if they received it between 61 and 180 days after it had been conducted. Parties could send results to candidates for 50 percent of the poll’s cost if they received it between 16 and 60 days after it was done. And if the candidate received the results of the poll within 15 days of completion they were charged 100 percent of the cost. All payment schedules were mandated by the FEC. 7. The list of scholars who have studied parties is quite lengthy. The purpose of this work is not to recount all of those that have made a contribution. Some works of note include Sorauf (1964), Beck and Sorauf (1992), Eldersveld (1964; 1982), Downs (1957), Schattschneider (1942), the American Political Science Association’s Committee for a more Responsible Two-Party System (1950), Ranney (1975), Epstein (1983; 1986), Crotty (1991), and Keefe (1991). 8. Again, a number of scholars have studied the phenomenon of declining partisanship in the United States. For a review of the literature on parties

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and voters, see Dalton and Wattenberg (1993). See also Burnham (1970; 1980; and 1991), Wattenberg (1990), and Keith, et al. (1992). 9. See Kolodny (1998, pp. 126–136) for a detailed description of the effects of the reform legislation on the operation of both parties’ congressional campaign committees. 10. The Supreme Court decided in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission (1996) (also known as Colorado I) that political parties could make unlimited contributions in a campaign as long as they were “independent” of the candidate’s campaign organization. 11. Coordinated expenditures are explored in detail below. However, of note here is the fact that in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) the Supreme Court ruled these expenditures could not be made in unlimited amounts and could be regulated. 12. However, before the ink was dry on President Bush’s signature on the legislation passed by Congress, both parties were trying to figure out ways around the ban (further discussion of this point can be found later in this chapter and in chapter 7). 13. Personal interview, February 24, 2000, Washington, D.C. During the course of this interview, the interviewee requested that certain comments used in this chapter be kept confidential. For that reason, none of the comments used are attached to the individual. 14. Coordinated expenditures differ from direct contributions made by the party. Direct contributions are given to the candidate’s campaign in the form of cash or check and are limited to $5,000. After the campaign receives the funds, the parties, technically, have no input on how the money is spent. Coordinated expenditures are activities “initiated by party committees on behalf of candidates but with the candidate’s knowledge and consent” (Kolodny 1998, 137). 15. Personal interview, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1999. Again, the interviewee was promised anonymity. 16. Not all issue ads are welcomed by candidates, however. As Herrnson (2000a) notes, some party-funded issue ads deal with issues that candidates might rather not discuss. An example of this is found in the race between Lois Capps and Tom Bordonaro in California’s Twenty-Second Congressional District during 1998, where the issue ads that were done by outside groups were focused on issues that were not of interest to the candidates or voters (see Gill 2001 for a further discussion). 17. If all aspects of the BCRA are upheld through the various court challenges that were pending as this book went to press, parties may temporarily be at a disadvantage in terms of being able to spend money on behalf of candidates—soft-money spending was a large part of the national parties’

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strategy to help their candidates. However, the BCRA does not mean that the party-as-billpayer model needs to be revised. Although we will not know for sure until a few election cycles have been contested, the party-as-billpayer model will still hold. The sources of the money may simply change to state parties and outside groups that are not technically tied to the party but are headed by individuals familiar with party strategies. See chapter 7 for a further discussion of this possibility. 18. Personal interview, February 24, 2000, Washington, D.C. 19. Personal interview, December 6, 1999, Washington, D.C. 20. Personal interview, February 24, 2000, Washington, D.C 21. Personal interview, December 6, 1999, Washington, D.C. 22. Personal interview, December 6, 1999, Washington, D.C. The reader should know that this individual used the word “adversarial” completely on their own and without any prior knowledge of either the allied or adversorial hypothesis of the consultant-party relationship. 23. Over time was defined in the questionnaire as over the time the individual had been in politics. The question was stated: “Thinking back to when you first began working in politics—and comparing that to now—do you think the role of political parties in electing candidates has increased very much, increased somewhat, stayed the same, decreased somewhat or decreased very much?” 24. Republicans and Independents reported a mean evaluation of 2.88 and 2.91 respectively while Democrats’ average was only 2.52, clearly showing a more pessimistic view of the state of the parties (see Table 5.1 for scale). An ANOVA test finds that these differences reach statistical significance (F4, 487 = 2.489, p = 0.043). A post-hoc Bonferroni test confirms the significant differences between Republicans and Democrats (p = 0.048). Even though the mean difference between Independents and Democrats was larger, it does not reach statistical significance (likely because of the small number of Indpenedents in the sample). 25. Independents’ mean appraisal of national parties change in prowess was 3.27, whereas Republicans and Democrats both showed mean rankings of about 2.8 (again, see Table 5.1 for the scale employed). These differences do not reach statistical significance, again likely because of the smaller sample size of Independents. 26. The key part of this is that this may only be the impression of those who self-identify as Independents. There are many other reasons for the continued dominance of the two major political parties. For a discussion of these arguments see, for example, Dulio and Thurber (2000), Romance (1998), Herrnson (1997), Bibby (1997).

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27. On the point of consultant socialization, see also Magleby, Patterson, and Thurber (2000). 28. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests indicate that the differences between these cohorts are statistically significant. See Table 5.3 for F tests and p values. 29. Much of the discussion that follows is an extension of the work of Robin Kolodny and Angela Logan (1998) that first investigated the relationship between parties and consultants. This discussion confirms much of what Kolodny and Logan report; their findings are based on a less comprehensive survey of one segment of the consulting industry. See also Kolodny (2000a). 30. Each pair-wise difference in Table 5.5, save the comparison between direct mail and GOTV assistance, reaches a high level of statistical significance, which indicates that there is a clear hierarchy of services that consultants welcome from the party. 31. Personal interview, February 24, 2000, Washington, D.C. 32. Personal interview, December 6, 1999, Washington, D.C. 33. Personal interview, December 10, 1999, Washington, D.C. 34. See Toner (2002) for another example of a candidate not wanting their party to become involved. 35. Personal interview, December 6, 1999, Washington, D.C. 36. Some consulting firms specialize in opposition and candidate research, but they cannot handle as many races as the party can with their larger staffs. 37. This does not mean that candidates do not look to consultants to provide these services. As noted above, the NRSC hired the John Grotta Company to do voter contact and GOTV work in Senator Lauch Faircloth’s failed reelection campaign of 1998. Another example includes Democrat Tammy Baldwin (WI - 2) hiring the Tyson Organization in 1998 to make phone calls as part of her GOTV efforts (Herrnson 2000a). 38. Much of the discussion below follows from initial tests of this hypothesis performed by Kolodny and Logan (1998). The data presented below replicate and advance their hypothesis tests. 39. Only in the case of the local party assessment do these difference reach statistical significance (t = 1.914, d.f. = 492, p = 0.028 [one-tail]). However, the difference at the state level approaches significance (t = 1.128, d.f. = 491, p = 0.130 [one-tail]).

Chapter 6 1. The importance of money in congressional campaigns is well beyond the scope of this book. See Herrnson (2000a), Jacobson (2001; 1980), Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox (1999), West and Loomis (1999), Gierzynski (2000), or Magleby and Nelson (1990) for detailed accounts.

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2. Emphasis added. The quote in the Medvic passage is originally from Sabato (1981, 18). 3. Guerrieri (1997) reports that he uses the “Campaigns & Elections ‘Campaign Consultant Scorecard’ issue for 1990 that defines the top 137 consultants and consulting firms” to define quality consultants, and that he supplements this with “the list of the top 100 consultants and consulting firms provided by The Handbook of Campaign Spending for 1990” which ranks “congressional candidate disbursements to consultants and consulting firms in 1990” (59–60). However, Medvic (2000; 2001; and with Lenart 1997) utilizes the same sources, yielding similar data that he uses to test the impact of professionalization generally on candidates’ vote share. The difference between the two is in the operationalization of professionalization. Medvic identifies consultants as only those individuals or firms that appear on the Campaigns & Elections (C&E) list, which are those consultants or firms that worked on at least two congressional or state-wide races in an election cycle, to be professionals. Guerrieri considers these same consultants as the “top” consultants, or those who are of high quality, citing that there were “approximately 10,000 firms that did not make the above stated lists [but] were found in the . . . Political Resource Directory” (1997, 60). Guerrieri’s method of selecting the “top” firms or consultants has some face validity given that he claims to be selecting 137 firms from over 10,000 total. However, the figure of 10,000 is debatable for multiple reasons. First, Guerrieri seems to be arguing that there are over 10,000 firms in the universe of the consulting industry. However, in all the estimates of the numbers of individuals who are active consultants none has been higher than 7,000. Second, the 1999 edition of the Political Resource Directory only turned up roughly 2,300 principals of consulting firms (see chapters 2 and 3 and Appendix 1 for a description of the 1999 data that were used to draw the sample for the survey which earlier chapters are based on). And third, in their analysis of the number of consultants who were active in 1998 congressional campaigns, Dulio and Kolodny (2001) identified less than 200 individuals and firms. In short, Medvic considers the consultants listed in C&E as the universe of active consultants, whereas Guerrieri considers them to be the “top” firms and consultants. The C&E list is likely somewhat incomplete as there are surely consultants who should be considered active but do not appear on that list. For example, a firm who works exclusively for a presidential candidate would not appear on that list (e.g., Karl Rove who worked only for George W. Bush’s presidential campaign in 2000). Similarly, a consultant who does only state and local races may not appear on the list. However, to consider the 137 firms on the C&E list and the 100 from The Handbook of Campaign Spending as the most prestigious and high profile firms is simply not accurate. For example, it is difficult to equate firms such as D’Organ Campaigns which, during 1998, worked for three clients in California (including a district attorney’s race and a judicial campaign) and George Strong and Associates who worked for two clients (Ken Benson [D, TX-25] and a Houston school district bond measure) with firms such as Brabender/Cox who worked on congressional campaigns in six states, or The Mellman Group who worked for Senate and

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House candidates in fifteen states. Clearly, there are differences among consultants on the C&E lists, and to consider them all the “top” firms is questionable. Herrnson’s (1992) work relies on data originating from his surveys of congressional candidates in the “Congressional Campaign Study” in which he asks if the respondent hired a consultant or paid staff to carry out certain tasks. “Campaign professionalization is measured using an index that records the number of specialized campaign activities performed by professional political consultants” (Herrnson 1992, 861). 4. As Guerrieri (1997) argues, “The quality of the pollster determines the quality of the poll” (34). However, the number of polls individual campaigns conduct has nothing to do with the quality of the polling firm, except in that it illustrates that they can handle a large work load. 5. The main survey employed in chapters 3–5 included a question that asked respondents if they were willing to be re-contacted at a later date for either follow-up questions or for clarification of their responses. The followup questionnaire was sent to only those individuals who were willing to be re-contacted. 6. An example of this survey can be found in Appendix 3. The survey was originally sent to 409 consultants, but over 100 were returned because of undeliverable addresses. Every attempt was made to find the correct addresses for these individuals and a second mailing was sent to those whose correct addresses were found. However, 98 of the original 409 were unable to be contacted. Forty-two of the 311 deliverable surveys were returned yielding a response rate of 13.5 percent. This is the main reason the main survey employed telephone interviews. The consulting industry is fluid due to the cyclical nature of its business and many consultants move offices often depending on their space needs (during an election year they may move to a large office and after the election year they may move to smaller quarters because their staff has declined). This makes it very difficult to send mailings to this particular population. 7. This eliminates the possibility of a consultant ending up on the list by simply mentioning themselves or their own firm. 8. Party committees made coordinated payments to 231 separate entities. However, in addition to payments to consultants as defined in chapter 2, payments were also made to firms that did strictly media buying, printing of direct mail pieces, or were calling houses with no strategic value to a campaign. Democratic party committees also made a number of payments to the DCCC for services they performed (see chapter 5). Purging payments made to nonconsultant entities resulted in a list of 208 consultants that were paid by party committees. 9. An alternative source is the FEC’s database of candidate filings that itemizes each disbursement made by a campaign. However, two prob-

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lems are present with this method. Most importantly, the descriptions of the disbursements that are required by the FEC are vague at best, and they lack uniformity. Some candidates list very specifically who was hired and for what purpose. However, others simply list a name and describe their work as “consulting.” Second, combing through thousands of pages of FEC reports for all House candidates during a single election cycle is not practical (e.g., U.S. Representative Dick Gephardt’s [D-MO] filings at the FEC for 2002 totaled 1,618 pages) given that the information may not be completely useable. 10. Because of the recursive nature of this relationship (hiring consultants leads to more money raised, but more money is also needed to hire consultants) a more powerful analysis is needed. 11. Before turning to the results, two important points must be made. First, TSLS is used to account for the reciprocal causality between the consultant variable and campaign receipts (see, for example, Hanushek and Jackson 1977). TSLS requires the use of instrumental variables in the first stage to compute the predicted values for the endogenous variables that will be in the second stage. In other words, the variable that is problematic, in this case the professionalization variable, is regressed on explanatory variables that have an impact on the problem variable, the main dependent variable, or both. The predicted values are then used in the second stage as regressors for the main dependent variable. At least one variable from stage 1 must be omitted from stage 2. In a previous study, Herrnson (1992) used instrumental variables that were mainly attitudinal variables from his 1984 survey of candidates and campaign managers (861). Because these data are applicable only to that study, other instruments such as the amount of money a candidate took out in loans, the competitiveness of the race, the candidate’s cash on hand at the beginning of the campaign, and whether or not the candidate’s opponent hired a consultant, were employed in the present analysis. Medvic (2001) explores similar questions and also uses TSLS, including instrumental variables such as whether the candidate’s opponent hired a consultant. 12. The total contributions from individuals data were taken from the FEC and were used as an instrument in the first stage because those dollars were seen as a source of funds that could also purchase the services of consultants. These are in contrast to funds that may come from a party committee, which usually come later in the campaign after the party has had the opportunity to assess the strength of the campaign, or in the form of transfers from other candidate committees. 13. This variable was also taken from FEC data and was included in the incumbent model as another indicator of competitiveness. The more a challenger raises, the more likely they are to mount a serious challenge given the hurdles they face in raising money, thus making it more important for the

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incumbent to hire consultants. It may also be an additional measure of an opponent’s professionalization, as larger disbursements likely include payments to consultants. 14. Competitiveness is measured with a variable that is a ratio of the incumbent’s share of the vote to the total votes cast for both major party candidates in 1996. This is used as a way to more carefully measure the closeness of the race between candidates of the two parties. For example, two incumbents might each win with 54 percent of the vote in their districts, but they may face two entirely different reelection scenarios. The first may have faced only one challenger (of the opposing party) who received the other 46 percent of the vote. The second incumbent may have faced two challengers who split the remaining 46 percent, 30 percent to 16 percent. Clearly the first incumbent faces a much tougher reelection (winning by only eight points) than the second who won by a much larger margin (twenty-four points). This measure captures this difference with a continuous variable ranging from 0–1, with smaller ratios indicating higher levels of competitiveness. 15. This variable was simply measured with the FEC data reflecting the amount of money in an incumbent’s war chest left over from the previous campaign. 16. This variable was simply measured with a dummy variable indicating that either no consultants were hired by the opponent (0) or one or more consultants were hired by the opponent (1). 17. Results of the first stage regressions are found in Tables A4.1 (incumbent analysis), A4.4 (challenger analysis), and A4.7 (open-seat analysis). 18. The measure utilizes the Green and Krasno (1988) index. 19. A dummy variable indicating whether the candidate was part of the formal leadership structure in the House (e.g., Speaker, Majority or Minority Leader, Majority or Minority Whip, etc.), or a committee chair or ranking member. 20. A variable measuring the years the candidate had served in the House. 21. These results were complemented with a separate analysis where the professionalization variable was measured slightly differently. Because the original variable may measure the impact of an increasingly professionalized staff (0–4) rather than the presence of well-known consultants, the second measure of the professionalization variable employed simply coded candidates as having hired no consultants (0), having hired consultants but none identified as well-known (1), and having hired at least one well-known consultant (2). The results of these two models were nearly identical; the only difference being that the competitiveness and beginning cash variables did not reach statistical significance, while the contributions from individuals variable did reach significance. The full results of the second stage of this

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analysis can be found in Table A4.2 in Appendix 4; the first stage results can be found in Table A4.3. 22. One final aspect of both the models that appear in Table 6.3 and Table A4.2 must be addressed. Upon examination, signs of multicollinearity were found. Tests for tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) indicated that one or more variables were highly correlated. Specifically, the predicted values from the first stage, individual contributions, and competitiveness appeared to be affected. A low tolerance or a high VIF statistic are indicators of collinearity. The VIF for professionalization was 4.29; the VIF for individual contributions was 2.44; and the competitiveness variable had a VIF of 2.50. Therefore, the same model was run without one of the problematic variables (see models 3 [the dependent variable here is the 0–4 scale] and 4 [the dependent variable here is the 0–2 scale] in Table A5.1 in Appendix 5). Analyses that omitted the individual contribution variable were nearly identical to the model in Table 6.3 as well as the supplemental analysis reported in Table A4.2. The measures of the presence of well-known consultants in incumbents’ campaigns continued to be a significant and strong predictor of PAC receipts and every other variable performed just as it did in previous models. The only exception being that the competitiveness variable did not reach significance in model 4. Additionally, signs of multicollinearity either disappeared or decreased to levels lower than those in the original models. 23. This last variable is similar to the beginning cash on hand variable utilized in the incumbent analysis above, in that it measures other funds available to challengers that can be used to get consultants on board. Beginning cash was not used because the vast majority of challengers stared their campaigns with no funds at all. Additionally, the opponent’s total receipts variable was omitted from this variable because the opponent in each challenger contest is, by definition, an incumbent who is generally well financed. 24. Again a second analysis was conducted with the professionalization variable measured on a 0–2 scale. The results were identical to those reported in Table 6.4; the full results of the second stage analysis can be found in Table 4.5 in Appendix 4; the first-stage results can be found in Table A4.6. 25. As with the incumbent analysis, signs of multicollinearity were present. The VIF for the professionalization variable was 18.05, and was 13.09 for the individual contributions variable. Therefore, one of the problematic variables was again omitted in a follow-up analysis (see models 3 [dependent variable: 0–4 scale] and 4 [dependent variable: 0–2 scale] in Table A5.2 in Appendix 5). With the individual contributions variable omitted, all signs of collinearity disappeared, and the effect of hiring well-known consultants became even stronger. The collinearity likely depressed the effect of the professionalization variable in the first two models. Competitiveness and party continued to perform as they had in the models that included the individual contributions variable.

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26. The only difference here is that the competitiveness variable took the form of the absolute value of the difference in the two-party vote margin in the 1996 presidential race. This is done because neither of the candidates in the 1998 campaign participated in the 1996 congressional race. These results can be found in Table A4.7. 27. Again an analysis measuring professionalization on a scale of 0–2 was conducted as a check; the results were again identical to those in Table 6.5 and are found in Table A4.8 in Appendix 4; the first stage results from this supplemental analysis can be found in Table A4.9. 28. Finally, signs of multicollinearity again appeared in the open seat analysis. The VIF for the professionalization variable was 8.17, and was 6.129 for the individual contributions variable. Models 3 and 4 in Table A5.3 in Appendix 5 replicate the first two models omitting the individual contributions variable for the analyses using both measures of the professionalization variable (0–4 and 0–2 respectively). As in both the incumbent and challenger analyses, leaving out this variable had little effect on the performance of the model, but purged the model of signs of collinearity. The professionalization variable in both models 3 and 4 becomes highly significant. The variable’s importance was likely deflated in the models presented in Table 6.5 and Table A4.8 because of the collinearity. Beyond the professionalization variable, models 3 and 4 change very little with the only notable difference being that the competitiveness variable loses its power. 29. This confirms the work of Medvic (1997 with Lenart; 2000; 2001) and Herrnson (2000b). 30. All other races were either characterized as “Republican favored” (N=12), “Democrat favored” (N=16), and did not appear to meet the standards set by Erickson and Palfrey (2000), or were considered “safe” for the incumbent. There were not enough cases (N=11) to do an analysis for openseat candidates using this method. 31. A log transformation for the raw spending of each candidate was used to account for the decreasing returns on each additional dollar spent. 32. Again, because of the small number of cases an analysis of open seat candidates was not possible using this strategy for dealing with the problems usually associated with analyses of this type. 33. Looking back at the individuals who ran in the races included in the analysis shows that more Republicans than Democrats lost their bid for reelection in these close races. 34. Additionally, it should be noted that analyses utilizing the trichotomous professionalization variable (0 = hired no consultants; 1 = hired no effective consultants; and 2 = hired effective consultants) were conducted for only the most competitive races as well as all incumbents. The results were nearly identical in both cases, and are thus not reported.

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Chapter 7 1. As noted in chapter 3, this is not meant to be a discussion in the usual context of these types of benefits—i.e., collective action (Olson 1965)—but is simply used to frame different motivations. 2. As an example, expenditures in all congressional contests increased from $407 million in 1987 to nearly $634.5 million in 1998. See Stanley and Niemi (2000) for more detailed figures. 3. See the Alliance for Better Campaigns’ (2001) report “Gouging Democracy: How the Television Industry Profiteered on Campaign 2000” for more on this subject. 4. See the Alliance for Better Campaigns’ (2001) report “Gouging Democracy: How the Television Industry Profiteered on Campaign 2000” for more information. 5. I say potential impact because as this book goes to print the outcome of the court case challenging the constitutionality of the BCRA is not known. Some of the law’s provisions may be struck down. Therefore, specific and narrow effects of what the BCRA will mean for campaign professionals are not addressed. See, for instance the Federal Election Commission Web site (www.fec.gov) for a full accounting of the act and the rules and regulations associated with it. For a full analysis of the BCRA, see the Campaign Finance Institute’s e-guide Web site (www.cfinst.org/eguide/index.html) or Malbin (2003) for a summary of the act. 6. Personal interview, February 24, 2000, Washington, D.C. 7. As noted in chapter 3, not all consultants are involved with the creation of a campaign’s strategy, theme, and message. Fund-raisers are an example of a type of consultant who rarely help devise the strategy, theme, and message; however, they are important to the execution of the campaign’s plan in that they can help to reinforce the candidate’s message in a fund-raising direct mail piece or in a fund-raising event.

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Index

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Index k ABC News, 94 Abramowitz, Alan, 157 Abramson, Jill, 71 Abramson, Paul, 90 Activists, political: conservative, 52; liberal, 52; demographics of, 46, 47; educational levels of, 48; ideological makeup of, 52tab, 53; income of, 49; motivations for becoming, 58, 59, 59tab, 60; political makeup, 51, 51tab Advertising: campaign, 5, 15, 17, 19, 30, 31, 36, 38, 54, 69, 93, 184–185, 123tab; 124tab; development of, 16; early, 15, 16; full-service agencies, 17, 33; issue, 112, 126, (see also Issue, advocacy); mass media, 16; misrepresentations in, 93; negative, 5, 17, 36, 37, 178, 184, 185; placement of, 16; rates for television commercials, 172; targeted, 36 Ad watches, 39, 93–94, 96, 100, 179 Agenda setting, 35, 72, 83 Agranoff, Robert, 7, 18, 24, 67 Ainsworth, Bill, 53 Aldrich, John, 22, 30, 60, 103, 104, 107, 120 Alexander, Herbert, 19, 37

Alfano, Kim, 56, 57, 171 Alfano Communications, 57 Alger, Dean, 94 Allen, Chuck, 110 Alliance for Better Campaigns, 172 Althoff, Phillip, 56 Amateurs in political system, 1, 4, 10, 45, 60, 170 American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC), 9 American Association of Trial Lawyers, 37 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 37, 129 American Medical Association, 37 Americans for Tax Reform, 37 Andrews, Molly, 47 Ansolabehere, Stephen, 37, 90 Anti-Federalists, 14, 16 Asher, Herbert, 93 Australian ballot, 30 Bailey, Doug, 39, 40, 52 Ballot reform, 15, 22, 23, 104 Balz, Dan, 71, 72, 127 Barry, Dan, 7 Basham, Patrick, 45 Bates, Stephen, 39, 40

281

282

Index

Bauer, Gary, 85 Baxter, Leone, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 103, 170 Behrens-Benedict, Heidi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 142 Bennett, James, 7, 86, 139 Berke, Richard, 6, 138 Beverly, Sheree, 49 Bibby, John, 22 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002), 30, 108, 116, 117, 173–177 Blakely, Ed, 110 Bonafede, Dom, 6 Bordonaro, Tom, 114 Bradshaw, Joel, 36, 71, 73, 75, 85 Brady, Henry, 58 Brewster, David, 71 Brock, William, 106 Broder, David, 94 Bruce, Harold, 22, 103 Buckley v. Valeo, 104 Budgets: campaign, 2, 4, 69, 70 Bush, George H.W., 39 Bush, George W., 16, 17, 30, 58, 73, 82, 183 California Features Service, 17 Campaign finance reform, 30, see also Federal Election Campaign Act, and Bipartisan Partisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) Campaign Management Institute (American University), 48, 131 Campaign managers: early, 4, 9, 15, 20, 71, 73, 125, 139; need for, 21; party officials as, 15, 22, 24, 32; rise of, 22, 23–24 Campaign Performance Group, 57 Campaign(s): advertising, see Advertising, campaign; activists, 46, 47, 48, 49tab, 50, 51, 51tab, 52, 52tab, 58–60, see also Activists, political; advisors, 4; agenda setting process in, 72, 83; budgets, 2, 4, 69, 70; circulars, 14; reasons for citizen involvement in, 58–60;

consultant contributions to, 32–33, 70–76; consultants view of party position in, 117–130; down-ballot, 4, 70; early U.S., 13–21; handbills, 14; images, 28, 35; increased cost of, 5; influence of parties on, 22, 107–113; initiative, 14; local, 14; management-by-committee, 15; managers, 4, 9, 15, 20, 71, 73, 125, 139; message, 16, 17, 28, 32, 33, 35, 71, 73, 74, 76, 82–86, 85; citizens’ motivations for becoming involved in, 58, 59, 59tab, 60; negative, 17, 36, 37, 90, 92, 184– 185, see also Advertising, negative; organization of, 2, 22, 23, 29; professionalized, 32, 33, 140; spokespersons for, 7; state/local, 69; technology, 7, 9, 18; television and, 1, 19, 103; themes, 28, 35 Campaigns Inc., 14, 16, 17 Campbell, Angus, 41, 86, 88 Candidate-centered campaigns, 2, 7, 18, 24, 30 Candidate(s): canvassing by, 15; challengers fund-raising with well-known consultants, 152–155; challenger use of effective consultants and electoral success, 162–164; consultant contributions to campaigns of, 70–76; consultant views of, 77–81; dissuasion from running for office, 77; electoral success and consultants, 135–165; fund-raising with well-known consultants in open seats, 155– 156; image, 16, 35, 75, 83; incumbents fund-raising with well-known consultants, 151–152; incumbent use of effective consultants and electoral success, 159–162; presentation to voters, 16; qualifications of, 77; quality ratings of, 77tab, 96tab; relationship with consultants, 5, 29–34, 66–81; training by parties, 25; use

Index of effective consultants and electoral success, 156–164; use of well-known consultants and fundraising, 149–156; voter response to, 30 Candidate-centered campaigns, 2, 15, 18, 24, 27, 29, 30–31, 35, 103, 122 Canon, David, 4, 41 Capps, Lois, 114 Carney, Francis, 56 Carville, James, 6, 9, 138, 179 Castellanos, Alex, 55, 137 Cerrell, Joseph, 138 Cicero, M.P., 13 Cicero, Quintos, 13 Cigler, Alan, 54 Circulars, 14 Citizen Participation Study (CPS), 58–60 Civil Service Reform Act (1883), 22, 103 Clark, Peter, 53 Clem Whitaker Advertising Agency, 17 Clinton, Bill, 43, 62, 138 Coehlo, Tony, 6 Combs, James, 84 Condit, Gary, 115 Constitution: ratification of, 13, 14 Constitutional Convention, 30 Consultant(s): activity patterns of, 67–70; as allies with parties, 113– 117; attention to in political science, 7–8; attitudes towards others involved in electoral process, 65–100; backgrounds and demographics of, 41–64; contributions to campaigns, 70–76; as cooperative team with parties, 102–117; critical view of, 5, 27, 38–39, 53, 55, 66, 71, 74, 76, 81, 82, 83, 86, 92, 101, 167–168, 170, 171, 178, 181–186; current number of, 9; defining, 42–44; differences with party staffers, 42, 43; early

283 descriptions, 7, 8; effect on fundraising, 5, 135–165; effective, 145– 147tab; electoral success and, 135–165; employment history as journalists, 98; employment history with elected officials, 47; employment history with political parties, 47, 130, 130tab, 131, 132; fund-raising (or fund-raisers), 21, 48, 69, 75, 99; generalist (or general consultants), 20, 32, 69, 99; high-profile, 6, 137, 138, 139; hiring of, 67; ideological makeup, 52tab, 53; as image makers, 13, 35, 76; impact at all levels, 5; income levels of, 49, 49fig; influence of, 4, 34, 41, 67, 75, 106, 118, 121, 121tab, 122, 175; lack of certification for, 43; measuring effectiveness of, 140–144, 145–147tab; measuring renown of 140–144, 145–147tab; media, 6, 18, 21, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 48, 54, 58, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 83, 93, 96, 98, 110, 111, 113, 125, 176; media coverage of, 7; message delivery and, 82–86; motivations for becoming, 42, 53–64, 56tab, 63tab; partisan differences in motivations for becoming, 61tab; past work by, 136–139; political parties and, 21–29, 101–133; political party affiliation, 50, 51, 51tab, 52, 53; previous relationships with parties, 130–133; qualitative differences in, 137, 138; reasons for working with candidates, 67, 68; recommendations to candidates by parties, 67, 115, 116; relationship with candidates, 5, 29–34, 66–81; relationship with interest groups, 34–40; relationship with journalists, 5, 34–40, 92– 99; relationship with parties, 21–29, 101–133; relationship with voters, 5, 34–40, 81–86; services

284

Index

Consultant(s) (continued) taken over from parties, 122, 123, 123tab, 180; specialized, 5, 20, 32; strategic contributions of, 70, 71; strategist, 20, 44; technical contributions, 70; as therapist, 32, 33; trust in voter ability, 88, 89, 89tab, 90; vendor, 44; views of candidates, 77–81; views of parties’ place in campaigning, 117–130; views of voters, 86–92; views on electoral system, 177– 181; well-known, 145–147tab; well-knowness, 140–144, 145–147; well-knowness and fund-raising, 149–156; workload, 67–70 Consulting, political: age makeup in, 46, 47fig; answers to critics of, 102–117; benefits in, 55; changing nature of, 8; democracy and, 181– 186; demographics of, 45–50; diversification in, 19; educational levels in, 47, 48; full-service, 32, 33; gender makeup in, 45, 50; growth in, 9; history of, 14–21; integration in, 21; job stability in, 55; material benefits in, 53; negative image of, 65, 66; number of firms in, 43, 44; partisan nature of, 50–53, 78; place in modern elections, 168–177; purposive benefits in, 53, 56; racial makeup in, 45–46, 46tab; risks in, 55; solidary benefits in, 54, 56; specialties in, 44 (See also Specialists); specialized, 17; training programs in, 48; turnover in, 9 Conway, M. Margaret, 56, 60, 171 Cook, Charles, 125, 175 Coordinated expenditures, 108–113 Copeland, Gary, 18, 71, 82, 84, 93, 95, 137, 182 Corzine, John, 173 Council for a Livable World, 56, 171 Craver Matthews Smith and Company, 106

Cunningham, Noble, 178 Cuomo, Mario, 139 Dalager, Jon, 41 Dalton, Russel, 88, 89 Dao, James, 6 Dart, Bob, 175 Delli Carpini, Michael, 86 Deliberate priming, theory of, 182– 183 Democracy, 101; political consulting and, 181–186; representative, 1 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), 57, 105, 108, 111–112, 113, 114, 127, 131, 132, 175 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 25, 105, 112, 126, 127; coordinated expenditures by, 109; direct mail program, 106; fundraising by, 26tab, 27fig, 28fig; research division in, 128 Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), 105, 109 Diamond, Edwin, 39, 40 Dingell, John, 114 Dinkin, Robert, 14, 15 Direct mail, 6, 15, 18, 22, 23, 25, 36, 44, 54, 74, 123tab, 124tab, 129, 173; consultants, 6, 18, 35, 36, 48, 54, 69, 73, 75, 83, 98, 99; early, 14–15; targeted, 6, 36 DiVall, Linda, 137 Dixon, David, 131 Dixon, Monica, 175 Dixon/Davis Media Group, 131 Doak, Carrier and O’Donnell, 131 Dole, Bob, 85 Downs, Anthony, 85 Drinkard, Jim, 174 Dukakis, Michael, 36, 39, 85, 86 Dunn, Jennifer, 1, 3, 4 Edsall, Thomas, 116 Effective consultants, 145–147tab Eisenhower, Dwight, 18, 19, 103, 170

Index Electioneering: acceptability of, 14; candidate-centered, 29; changes in, 20, 22, 23; history of in U.S., 14–21; numbers of consulting firms in, 43–44; partnerships in, 122–130; trends in, 13 Elections: changing dynamics of, 13–40; citizen initiatives, 23; consultant views on, 177–181; midterm, 27fig; nonpartisan, 23; presidential, 28fig; primary, 22, 23, 75, 85, 109, 114, 176; recall, 23; referenda, 23; role of parties in, 22–29, 107–113; timing of, 29 Electorate: growth of, 22, 23, 24; manipulation of, 37, 81–92; voting age population, 24fig; women in, 22, 23 Engel, Rob, 112, 115, 116, 125, 127 Erikson, Robert, 157, 158, 160, 161 Eskew, Carter, 6 Esposito, Chris, 126, 127, 128 Estrich, Susan, 36 Faircloth, Lauch, 113 Farrell, David, 29, 44 Federal Election Campaign Act, 25, 30, 37, 62, 104, 105, 108, 174 Federal Election Commission, 38, 104, 148, 175 Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 109 Federalism, 29 Federalist Papers, 14 Federalists, 14, 16, 30 Fenn, Peter, 137 Ferejohn, John, 90 Finkel, Stephen, 90 Finkelstein, Stanley, 106 Fiorina, Morris, 41 Firestone, Brooks, 114 Florio, Jim, 6 Focus groups, 6, 16, 17, 125 Fowler, Linda, 41 Frantzich, Stephen, 105

285

Friedenberg, Robert, 83, 182 Friedman, Philip, 36 Fritz, Sara, 138 Fund-raising, 21, 123, 123tab, 127; attracting donors, 7; consultants, 21, 48, 69, 75, 99; effect of consultants on, 5, 135–165; Federal Election Campaign Act and, 37, 38; limits on, 30, 174; technology and, 31, 48; voter cynicism and, 91 Garin, Hart and Yang, 141 Garth, David, 32, 139 Gephardt, Richard, 128, 131 Gerber, Alan, 157 Get-out-the-vote (GOTV) services/ efforts, 14, 30, 31, 36–37, 65, 75, 113, 123, 123tab, 124tab, 125, 128, 129, 130, 174; targeting, 36–37 Gill, Jeff, 114 Gilmore, Jim, 57 Giuliani, Rudy, 7 Glasser, Susan, 53 Goldstein, Wilma, 111, 115, 116 Gore, Al, 6, 16, 73, 75, 82, 138, 175, 183 GOTV, see Get-out-the-vote efforts Graduate School of Political Management (George Washington University), 48, 131 Graham, Bob, 3 Greenberg, Stan, 55 Guerrieri, Mark, 136, 139 Halbfinger, David, 173 Hamburger, Martin, 56, 57, 132, 171 Hamilton, Bob, 76 Harden, Blaine, 85 Hart, Peter, 9, 55, 106, 137 Hazelwood, Dan, 173 Heard, Alexander, 43 Hennenberger, Melinda, 36 Herrnson, Paul, 4, 7, 14, 15, 18, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 37, 38, 41, 48, 67, 69, 72, 73, 75, 83, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 120, 129, 136, 137, 138, 140, 174, 180, 182

286

Index

Hickman, Harrison, 9 Hiebert, Ray, 28, 35 Hirschfeld, Robert, 56 House of Representatives, U.S., 1, 18, 62; campaign budgets and, 2, 3, 3tab; demographics of candidates for, 45–50 Hrebnar, Ronald, 15, 22, 23, 55, 60 Hughes, Robin, 94

Kennedy, David, 184 Kennedy, John, 170 Key, V.O., 84 Kinder, Donald, 35 Koch, Ed, 139 Kolodny, Robin, 42, 44, 47, 105, 109, 113, 114, 115, 128, 130, 131 Kraske, Steve, 6 Krasno, Jonathan, 157

Interest groups, 175; effects of, 37; independent expenditures and, 38; relationship with consultants, 34– 40; services provided by, 37, 38 Internet (or web sites), 9, 86, 94, 128 Issue: advertising, 112, 126; advocacy, 35, 37, 38, 112–113, 120; committees, 175; research, 32, 33; voting, 3–4, 83, 84 Iyengar, Shanto, 35, 37, 83, 84, 85, 90

La Follette, Robert, 22 Laguens, Hamburger, and Stone, 56 Lake, Celinda, 4, 20, 45, 56, 57, 58, 69, 72, 76, 125, 171 Lamb, John, 14 Lane, Robert, 88 Levy, Chandra, 115 Lewinsky, Monica, 43 Loomis, Burdett, 31, 37, 38, 73 Lorente, Rafael, 175 Luntz, Frank, 31, 105

Jacobs, Lawrence, 83 Jacobson, Gary, 41, 77, 161 Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, 15, 17, 84, 86, 184, 185 Jeffords, Jim, 51 Joe Slade White and Company, 57, 141 John Grotta Company, 113 Johnson, Dennis, 5, 7, 9, 18, 20, 24, 44, 53, 67 Johnson, Lyndon, 170 Johnson-Cartee, Karen, 7, 18, 71, 82, 83, 84, 92, 93, 95, 137, 182 Journalists: relationship with consultants, 38–40, 92–99; voter cynicism and, 95; watchdog role, 94

Maisel, L. Sandy, 14, 15, 22 Malchow, Hal, 48 Manatt, Charles, 106 Manheim, Jarol, 83 Marcus, Ruth, 172 Mayhew, David, 161 Media: attention to consultants, 34; buying in campaigns, 21, 36, 74, coverage of consultants by, 7; earned coverage from, 85; election coverage, 93; “horse race” coverage, 93; political information availability in, 86; production, 20, 21, 44, 54, 75; relationship with consultants, 5, 34–40, 92–99; campaign strategy, 36, 73; watchdog reporting in, 39, 92, 94 Media consultants, 6, 18, 21, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 48, 54, 58, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 83, 93, 96, 98, 110, 111, 113, 125, 176; Medvic, Stephen, 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 44, 84, 94, 136, 137, 162, 178, 180, 182

Kayden, Xandra, 104, 105 Kazee, Thomas, 41 Keating, Frank, 57 Keefe, William, 15, 22 Keller, Amy, 176 Kelley, Stanley, 7, 8, 32, 33 Kenna, Kathleen, 53

Index Mellman, Mark, 139 Menefee-Libey, David, 22, 25, 35, 37, 104, 105, 106, 110, 128 Merriam, Charles, 103 Message discipline, 16 Miller, Warren, 41, 47 Moe, Terry, 54 Moore, Dennis, 31, 32 Morris, Dick, 179 Murphy, Mike, 55, 57, 137 Napolitan, Joseph, 9, 53 National Education Association, 37 National Media, 141 National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), 57, 105, 109, 110–111, 113, 115, 116, 126, 127, 128, 171; Operation Breakout, 43, 126 National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), 105 National Rifle Association (NRA), 1, 37 Neal, Terry, 85 Nelson, Candice, 57, 94, 178 Nelson, Robert, 2 Nie, Norman, 58 Nimmo, Dan, 7, 8, 15, 16, 19, 23, 33, 41, 84, 168, 169, 170 Nixon, Richard, 170 O’Donnell, Tom, 131 Olson, Mancur, 54 Operation Breakout, 43, 126 Oppel, Richard, 172 Opposition research, 6, 17, 20, 21, 29, 32, 44, 45, 67, 71, 73, 75, 82, 83, 105, 120, 123, 123tab, 124tab, 125, 127–128, 130, 182, 186 Organization(s): campaign, 2, 22, 23, 29 Ornstein, Norman, 22, 30, 48 O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas, 65, 71, 76, 82, 83, 182 Pallone, Frank, 6 Papert, F., 84

287

Parties (or party), political: agency agreements and, 57, 109; affiliation of consultants, 50–53; as allies with consultants, 113–117; as bill-payer, 107–113; candidate recruitment and, 22–23, 103; candidate support from, 115; candidate training by, 25; civil service system and, 22; consultant employment with, 130, 130tab, 131, 132; consultant ranking of services offered by, 123, 124, 124tab; consultants and, 21–29, 101–133; consultants previous relationships with, 130–133; consultants view of place in campaigning, 117–130; as cooperative team with consultants, 102– 117; decline of, 5, 23–25, 27–28, 101, 102, 106–107, 169, 185–186; electioneering partnerships with consultants, 122–130; electoral goals of, 105, 114; in the electorate, 107; emerging roles of, 107– 113; in government, 107; hiring of consultants by, 25; input into campaign decisions, 126, 127; as intermediary, 107, 108; need for specialized skills of consultants, 103; as organization, 107; patronage, 103; as peripheral organization, 22, 23, 24, 107; primary elections and, 22, 23; provision of funds rather than services, 108– 113; public ambivalence toward, 30; relationship with consultants, 27–29, 101–133; revitalization of, 25, 104, 105; “in service” to candidates, 107, 108; services provided to candidates, 105, 124– 129, 124tab; spending limits for, 30; staff expansion in, 25, 105–106; voter mobilization and, 22 Party-centered campaigns, 22, 29, 34, 35, 103 Patronage, 22, 103, 169

288

Index

Patterson, Thomas, 94 Pearson, Dave, 173 Pendleton Act (1883), 22 Perlmutter, David, 45 Peterson, Iver, 85 Petracca, Mark, 7, 71, 141, 170, 184 Pierce, Greg, 85 Political action committees (PACs), 37, 38, 104, 107, 136, 137, 138, 174; fund-raising, 27, 104 Political Campaigning Program (University of Florida), 48, 131 Political Campaign Management Program (New York University), 48, 131 Politics: machine, 22; retail, 6, 35 Polling (or survey research), 4, 6, 9, 16, 18–20, 33, 36, 38, 42, 44, 48, 67, 69, 72–74, 83, 94, 105, 106, 110, 123tab, 124tab 123–124, 127, 172, 177, 180, 182; data from, 32, 33; message creation and, 74; scientific, 18; uses of, 71 Pollster(s), 18–19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 32, 33, 36, 48, 54, 69, 71–72, 73–74, 75, 76, 83, 110, 177, Popkin, Samuel, 41, 90 Primaries, 22, 23, 30, 75, 85, 109, 114, 176 Priming, 35, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90 Progressive Movement, 22–23, 30, 103, 169 Proxmire, William, 135 Public Opinion Strategies, 141 Ray C. Bliss Institute (University of Akron), 48, 131 Reagan, Ronald, 6, 62, 138 Reapportionment, 114 Redistricting, 114 Redmond, Bill, 173 Reese, Matt, 106 Rendell, Ed, 172 Republican National Committee (RNC), 25, 57, 82, 105–106, 109, 171; coordinated expenditures by,

109; fund-raising by, 26tab, 27fig, 28fig; research division in, 128 Research: candidate, 32, 33; issue, 32, 33; opposition, 6, 17, 20, 21, 29, 32, 44, 45, 67, 71, 73, 75, 82, 83, 105, 120, 123, 123tab, 124tab, 125, 127–128, 130, 182, 186; personalized messages and, 6 Rivers, Lynn, 114 Rogan, James, 138 Rollins, Ed, 6, 138, 179 Romance, Joseph, 30 Rosenbaum, David, 129 Rosenbloom, David, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 43, 103 Rothenberg, Stuart, 125 Russert, Tim, 39 Sabatier, Paul, 54 Sabato, Larry, 8, 14, 16, 28, 32, 38, 39, 42, 52, 53, 66, 67, 76, 82, 83, 84, 92, 95, 101, 138, 167, 178, 179, 182, 184 Sait, Edward, 22, 103 Salisbury, Robert, 54 Salmore, Barbara, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 73, 84, 182 Salmore, Stephen, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 73, 84, 182 Sanders, Bernard, 51 Sandstrom, Karl, 175 Schattschneider, E.E., 101, 186 Schiff, Adam, 138, 139, 140 Schlozman, Kay Lehman, 58 Schwartz, Tony, 84 Sears, David, 90 Secrest, Alan, 72 Senate, U.S., 6, 49, 53, 57, 62; campaign budgets and, 2, 3, 3tab “72 Hour Task Force”, 129 Shively, W. Phillips, 30 Shrum, Bob, 55, 137 Sierra Club, 37 Sipple, Don, 55 Socioeconomic status, 48–49;

Index

289

Sniderman, Paul, 86, 90 Snowbarger, Vince, 31 Soft money, 30, 35, 38, 108, 112, 116–117, 174–176 Sorauf, Frank, 14, 15, 22, 24 Specialists, 17, 32, 44; consultation with, 31; direct mail, 25, 36; feefor-service work, 20, 43; fundraising, 21; mail, 6, 18; push toward use of, 18; role in campaign strategy, 71 Spin control, 7 Steinberg, Arnold, 67 Stevens, Stuart, 58, 137 Strategy, theme, and message, 16, 29, 32, 36, 44, 69, 75, 76, 84, 85, 182 Strategies: communications, 14; media, 36; planning, 14 Strother, Duffy, Strother, 141 Sullivan, Andrew, 53 Survey(s): benchmark, 31; data analysis, 19; research, 4, 6, 9, 16, 18, 44, 48, 69, 72–73, 105 Swint, Kerwin, 45

VandeHei, Jim, 127 Van Dusen, Lisa, 53 Van Natta, Don, 53 Ventura, Jesse, 51 Verba, Sidney, 47, 48, 49, 58 Viguerie, Richard, 106 Voter(s): communication with, 35, 36; consultants views of, 86–92; cynicism, 1, 90, 91, 91tab, 92, 95; identification, 18, 20, 75; identification of important issues for, 72; level of information possessed by, 86, 87, 87tab, 88; manipulation of, 37, 81–92; median, 85; mobilization, 22, 31; non-adherence to party platforms, 22, 23; personal contact with, 129; reception of political information by, 28, 35; registration, 23, 30; relationship with consultants, 5, 34–40, 81–86; response to candidates, 30; targeting, 18, 19, 20, 74, 85, 173; ticket-splitting by, 22, 23, 30; undecided, 85; women, 22, 23 Voting: histories, 32, 33; interelection shifts, 31; issues and, 83, 84;

Targeting, 18, 19, 20, 74, 85, 173 demographic, 9, 36; geographic, 36 The Tarrance Group, 141 Taylor, Paul, 172 Technology: advances in, 18, 170; campaign, 7, 9, 18; changes in, 9; revolution, 169 Teeter, Robert, 106 Television, 9, 18, 103, 169; advertising, 5, 30, 31, 36, 124tab; cable, 36; commercials, 1; see also Advertising, campaign, and Campaign(s) advertising Thurber, James, 8, 43, 45, 52, 53, 74, 76, 78, 80, 126 Torode, Greg, 71

Ware, Alan, 22 Wattenberg, Martin, 30 Watts, J.C., 57 Well-known consultants, 145–147tab West, Darrell, 37, 38 Whitaker, Clem, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 103, 170 White, Joe Slade, 55, 57 Whitman, Christine Todd, 6 Wilson, Julie, 56, 60, 94 Wirthlin, Richard, 9, 55, 106 Wolcott, Alexander, 178 Wolf, Naomi, 6 Wolfinger, Raymond, 41 Women’s Campaign School (Yale University), 48 Yang, Fred, 139

United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 37

Zaller, John, 35, 84

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