Fairness and Groups, Volume 13

FAIRNESS AND GROUPS RESEARCH ON MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS Series Editors: Elizabeth A. Mannix and Margaret A. Neale R...

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FAIRNESS AND GROUPS

RESEARCH ON MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS Series Editors: Elizabeth A. Mannix and Margaret A. Neale Recent Volumes: Volume 1:

Composition, edited by Deborah H. Gruenfeld

Volume 2:

Groups in Context, edited by Ruth Wagemen Technology, edited by Terri L. Griffith Toward Phenomenology of Groups and Group Membership, edited by Harris Sondak

Volume 3: Volume 4: Volume 5: Volume 6: Volume 7: Volume 8: Volume 9: Volume 10: Volume 11: Volume 12:

Identity Issues in Groups, edited by Jeffrey T. Polzer Time in Groups, edited by Sally Blount Status and Groups, edited by Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt Groups and Ethics, edited by Ann Tenbrunsel National Culture and Groups, edited by Ya-Ru Chen Affect and Groups, edited by Cameron P. Anderson Diversity in Groups, edited by Katherine W. Phillips Creativity in Groups, edited by Jack A. Goncalo

RESEARCH ON MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS VOLUME 13

FAIRNESS AND GROUPS EDITED BY

ELIZABETH A. MANNIX Cornell University, NY, USA

MARGARET A. NEALE Stanford University, CA, USA

ELIZABETH MULLEN Stanford University, CA, USA

United Kingdom – North America – Japan India – Malaysia – China

Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2010 Copyright r 2010 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the text, illustrations or advertisements. The opinions expressed in these chapters are not necessarily those of the Editor or the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-85724-161-0 ISSN: 1534-0856 (Series)

Awarded in recognition of Emerald’s production department’s adherence to quality systems and processes when preparing scholarly journals for print

CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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PREFACE

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PART I: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS CHAPTER 1 SOUNDING THE ALARM: MOVING FROM SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION TO SYSTEM CONDEMNATION IN THE JUSTICE JUDGMENT PROCESS Leigh Plunkett Tost and E. Allan Lind CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL EMOTIONS AND JUSTICE: HOW THE EMOTIONAL FABRIC OF GROUPS DETERMINES JUSTICE ENACTMENT AND REACTIONS Steven L. Blader, Batia M. Wiesenfeld, Naomi B. Rothman and Sara L. Wheeler-Smith CHAPTER 3 REWARDING THE FAIR AND REPAIRING THE UNFAIR: BOTH GROUP PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE MAY MOTIVATE GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR Heather Barry and Tom R. Tyler CHAPTER 4 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FAIRNESS AND THE EXPERIENCE OF RESPECT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROUP LIFE Yuen J. Huo, Kevin R. Binning and Ludwin E. Molina v

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5 THE CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAIRNESS AND TRUST IN TEAMS: WHEN UNFAIR TREATMENT BEGETS TRUST, FAIR PROCESS ERODES TRUST, AND UNFAIR RESTITUTION RESTORES TRUST Lukas Neville and Susan E. Brodt

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PART II: DISTRIBUTIVE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CHAPTER 6 ALLOCATING RESOURCES FAIRLY AMONG GROUP MEMBERS: THE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE MATTERS Sanford E. DeVoe and Sheena S. Iyengar CHAPTER 7 TO BE FAIR OR TO BE DOMINANT: THE EFFECT OF INEQUALITY FRAMES ON DOMINANT GROUP MEMBERS’ RESPONSES TO INEQUITY Rosalind M. Chow, Brian S. Lowery and Eric D. Knowles CHAPTER 8 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: SEEKING A SHARED IDENTITY IN DYNAMIC INTRAGROUP CONTEXTS Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Wenzel and Michael J. Platow

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PART III: JUSTICE CLIMATE CHAPTER 9 FROM JUSTICE EVENTS TO JUSTICE CLIMATE: A MULTI-LEVEL TEMPORAL MODEL OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND JUDGMENT Deborah E. Rupp and E. Layne Paddock

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CHAPTER 10 THE FAIRNESS OF DIFFERENCE: HOW TEAM COMPOSITION AFFECTS THE EMERGENCE OF JUSTICE CLIMATES Quinetta M. Roberson and Ian O. Williamson

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CHAPTER 11 COLLECTIVE REACTIONS TO BAD BOSSES: STATUS AND INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE AT THE GROUP LEVEL Elizabeth E. Umphress and Adam C. Stoverink

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CHAPTER 12 EXPLORING THE ‘‘BLACK BOX’’ OF JUSTICE CLIMATE: WHAT MECHANISMS LINK JUSTICE CLIMATE AND OUTCOMES? David M. Mayer and Maribeth Kuenzi

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CONCLUSION CHAPTER 13 GROUPS, FAIRNESS, AND AN IDEA OF JUSTICE Harris Sondak

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Heather Barry

Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Kevin R. Binning

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Steven L. Blader

Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Susan E. Brodt

Queen’s School of Business, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

Rosalind M. Chow

Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

Sanford E. DeVoe

Rotman School of Business, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

Yuen J. Huo

Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Sheena S. Iyengar

Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Eric D. Knowles

Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Maribeth Kuenzi

Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, USA

E. Allan Lind

Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

Brian S. Lowery

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA ix

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

David M. Mayer

Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Ludwin E. Molina

Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA

Elizabeth Mullen

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Lukas Neville

Queen’s School of Business, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

Tyler G. Okimoto

School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

E. Layne Paddock

Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore

Michael J. Platow

Department of Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia

Quinetta M. Roberson

Villanova School of Business, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA

Naomi B. Rothman

Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, USA

Deborah E. Rupp

School of Labor and Employment Relations & Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

Harris Sondak

David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

Adam C. Stoverink

Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Leigh Plunkett Tost

Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

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List of Contributors

Tom R. Tyler

Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Elizabeth E. Umphress

Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Michael Wenzel

School of Psychology, Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide, SA, Australia

Sara L. Wheeler-Smith


Batia M. Wiesenfeld


Ian O. Williamson

Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC, Australia

PREFACE Concerns about justice and fairness are ubiquitous within and between communities, social groups, organizations, and states. People are concerned with the fairness of how decisions are made, how benefits and burdens are allocated, and how they are treated by authorities. All of these concerns play out when people interact in groups. Yet, the majority of organizational justice research has focused on how individual perceivers experience justice. This volume attempts to draw much needed attention to the study of justice in groups, by introducing cutting-edge theorizing at the intersection of fairness and groups. The chapters in this volume were first presented at the 13th annual conference on Research on Managing Groups and Teams. We thank the conference attendees for the stimulating discussion they provided at the conference, and we thank the authors for their thoughtful contributions to this volume. This volume is organized in three parts. The first part focuses on factors that influence individual’s perceptions of justice and how these perceptions influence subsequent reactions. In particular, the first two chapters explore the justice judgment process and factors that influence how people decide whether something is fair or unfair. The last three chapters highlight the implications of fairness and unfairness for groups. In chapter 1, Tost and Lind develop a model of the justice judgment process that explains when individuals will shift from a system justification motive (where individuals are motivated to perceive the system and authorities as fair) to a system critique mode (where individuals acknowledge that injustice exists and more critically examine the system). They advance previous theorizing by articulating not just what individuals will perceive to be fair or unfair but also how they form their fairness judgments. In chapter 2, Blader, Weisenfeld, Rothman, and Wheeler-Smith highlight the important role that social emotions play in shaping subjective justice judgments and articulate how third parties can become involved in the justice experiences of others through social emotions. In particular, they argue that congruent social emotions (e.g., vicarious joy) align the individual experiencing the emotion and the target of the emotion, leading individuals to perceive justice in ways that are aligned with the target. Incongruent emotions (e.g., schadenfreude) lead to justice perceptions that are misaligned with the target. Barry and xiii

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Tyler also emphasize the importance of affect in their chapter, the third in this part. They highlight the mediating role of affective responses to justice and injustice on group-serving behavior. In particular, they argue that procedural fairness leads to arousing positive affect, which in turn leads to attempts to reward the group with group serving behavior. In contrast, procedural unfairness is predicted to lead to negative affect, which in turn leads to group serving behavior in an effort to repair the group. In chapter 4, Huo, Binning, and Molina present a dual pathway model of respect, which posits that concerns about respect follow from the need for social inclusion and for status attainment. Fair treatment from peers and authorities communicates the extent to which these needs are satisfied, which in turn influences social engagement and psychological well-being. Finally, Neville and Brodt advance theorizing on the relationship between trust and justice by exploring some anomalous contexts where fairness and trust may work in opposition to each other, rather than positively reinforce each other. For example, they articulate how intentional efforts to build or repair trust with one team member (e.g., by doing that person a favor) may erode other team member’s perceptions of justice within the team. The second part focuses on the fairness of distributions and how to achieve or restore justice in the face of unfairness. In chapter 6, DeVoe and Iyengar argue that the perceived fairness of different allocation norms (e.g., equity and equality) depends on the resource being allocated. In particular, they argue that people have a greater preference for allocating resources equitably when the resource to be allocated is money (or other easily monetized goods) relative to nonmonetized goods. In chapter 7, Chow, Lowery, and Knowles present the inequality framing model and review evidence that suggests that how inequality is framed (as a dominant group’s advantage vs. a subordinate group’s disadvantage) influences individual’s preferences for redressing the inequality (e.g., support for affirmative action). They find, for example, that dominant group members are more supportive of policies that take resources from the dominant group when inequality is framed as dominant group advantage than when it is framed as subordinate group disadvantage. This work sheds important insight into how people can achieve justice. Despite efforts to achieve justice, however, injustice is inevitable. The question then arises, what is a fair way to restore justice following a transgression? Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow tackle this question in chapter 8. They focus on victims’ desires for justice restoration following a transgression and argue that a greater understanding of the identity relations between victims, offenders, and the groups in which they are embedded is key

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to understanding when victims will respond favorably to restorative justice practices rather than more traditional retributive justice practices. The third part focuses on issues concerning justice climate or how group members come to have a shared conception of justice within their group. The first three chapters in this part focus on variables and processes that influence justice climate. The last chapter focuses on some possible mediators of the effects of justice climate on important outcome variables. In chapter 9, Rupp and Paddock develop a temporal model of justice climate that explains how individual events and individual judgments, through social information processing and affective reactions, eventually lead to shared perceptions of justice within the group. In chapter 10, Roberson and Williamson focus on how team composition affects convergence in members’ perceptions of fairness. In particular, they argue that deep-level diversity (e.g., differences in values) but not shallow-level diversity (e.g., gender) leads to greater variability in group members’ perceptions of justice (and thus to a weaker justice climate). In chapter 11, Umphress and Stoverink examine how status influences a group’s interpersonal justice climate. They argue that groups with low-status supervisors, high group–status, and those embedded in an organization that downplays status differentiation will react more strongly to unfair interpersonal treatment from their supervisor and that consequently there will be a stronger relationship between interpersonal treatment and interpersonal justice climate for these groups. Finally, Mayer and Kuenzi encourage researchers to focus on the mechanisms linking justice climate with important outcomes (e.g., organizational citizenship behaviors, turnover, and job attitudes). In particular, they argue that social identity theory, social exchange theory, social information processing theory, and the affect infusion model can all inform the mechanism underlying the effects of justice climate on various dependent measures. In the capstone chapter, Harris Sondak draws on the philosophical ideas articulated by Amartya Sen in his book, The Idea of Justice, to ground and organize the social scientific approaches to justice in this volume. Sondak reviews four dimensions that Sen views as necessary to advance justice: making comparative improvements to justice, understanding the obligations of the powerful, integrating affect and cognitions into our efforts to promote justice, and balancing impartiality with the perspectives of particular individuals. Moreover, Sondak articulates how the chapters in this volume inform and can be informed by these four dimensions. In doing so, Sondak demonstrates how the ideas in this volume can be used to advance justice in society.

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In summary, this volume is rich with new theoretical ideas for the study of justice in groups. The authors have drawn on existing research and theories in social psychology, organizational behavior, philosophy, sociology, and economics to broaden the scope of ideas on fairness in groups. We hope that justice scholars will benefit from the new theoretical ideas that are presented in this volume. And we hope that scholars interested in groups and teams will benefit from a greater understanding of how fairness impacts virtually all aspects of group life. Elizabeth Mullen

PART I ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS

CHAPTER 1 SOUNDING THE ALARM: MOVING FROM SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION TO SYSTEM CONDEMNATION IN THE JUSTICE JUDGMENT PROCESS Leigh Plunkett Tost and E. Allan Lind ABSTRACT Purpose – In this chapter, we seek to resolve the conflicting implications that emerge from status quo theories of justice, on the one hand, and theories of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on the other. Specifically, status quo theories depict individuals as resistant to perceptions of injustice in their social environments, whereas theories of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice depict individuals as quite sensitive to the justice that characterizes outcomes and treatment. Methodology/approach – We build on previous research on the justice judgment process to consider ways in which the findings from these two research streams can be integrated. Findings – We suggest that the two overarching streams of research have identified and empirically explored two distinct modes of justice evaluation: a system justification mode and a system critique mode.

Fairness and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 13, 3–27 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2010)0000013004

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LEIGH PLUNKETT TOST AND E. ALLAN LIND

Originality/value of chapter – We develop a model of the justice judgment process that specifies the circumstances under which each of the two modes is likely to operate.

What is the process by which individuals evaluate the fairness of the social systems, organizations, authorities, and procedures that characterize their social environments? In this chapter, we seek to address this issue by specifying two distinct modes of justice judgment and incorporating those modes into a model of the justice judgment process. To do so, we draw on two distinct streams of justice research. Status quo theories of justice, such as system justification theory (for reviews, see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005), just world theory (e.g., Lerner, 1980), and victim derogation theory (e.g., Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005), share the notion that individuals tend to resist perceiving injustice. However, empirical findings from social and organizational psychological research examining perceptions of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice generally indicate that individuals readily distinguish between fair and unfair outcomes, procedures, and treatment (see Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005, for an excellent review). Therefore, we seek to account for the very different implications that emerge from these two streams of research by developing a model of the justice judgment process that specifies the circumstances under which the findings of each of the two paradigms are likely to hold. We suggest that the implications deriving from status quo theories and theories of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice are in conflict because the two overarching streams of research have identified and empirically explored two distinct modes of justice evaluation: a system justification mode and a system critique mode. By drawing on and extending previous research on fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001), we develop a model of the justice judgment process that specifies four distinct phases of the justice judgment process (Fig. 1), and we argue that while the system justification motive predominates in the initiation and use phases, the system critique mode predominates in the revision phase. To develop this argument, we begin by reviewing previous research on system justification theory, which is currently the predominant status quo theory. We highlight recent findings from this area of research, and we

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Sounding the Alarm

Initiation Phase (System justification mode predominates, with exceptions)

Use Phase (System justification mode predominates)

Alarm Activation (Environmental Change, Negative Treatment / Outcomes, Moral Violations)

Revision Phase (System critique mode predominates)

Fig. 1.

Model of the Justice Judgment Process.

identify the primary psychological features of the system justification mode of justice judgment. We then contrast the psychological features of the system justification mode with the psychological features of a system critique mode, and we explore the factors that lead individuals to switch from the former to the latter. In the process, we integrate insights from fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2001), uncertainty management theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), and relational theories (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989, 1994, 1997; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992) as we develop our model of the justice judgment process.

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SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION THEORY Jost and Banaji (1994) define system justification as the ‘‘process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal or group interest’’ (p. 2). System justification theory builds off of social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986), just world theory (e.g., Lerner, 1980), cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Festinger, 1957), Marxist and feminist ideological theory (e.g., Elster, 1982; Gramsci, 1971; Lukaćs, 1971), and social dominance theory (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) in its attempts to explain individuals’ use of ideological explanations to justify the status quo. The key hypothesis of system justification theory is that individuals possess a system justification motive, which drives them to defend the legitimacy and stability of existing social institutions. The most provocative aspect of the theory is the contention that even those who are disadvantaged by the social system will seek to defend it and that under certain circumstances, disadvantaged individuals may even experience a stronger system justification motive than those who are advantaged by the system. Over the past decade, system justification researchers have demonstrated the utility of the theory in explaining a wide variety of ideological reactions to social systems and institutions. For example, researchers have demonstrated that disadvantaged individuals appear to internalize their low status, exhibiting a tendency to accept and justify their diminished status and outcomes (Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost, 2001), to report attitudinal ambivalence regarding their low status (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Burgess, 2000), to report depressed entitlement relative to more high status individuals (Blanton, George, & Crocker, 2001; Jost, 1997; Major, 1994; Pelham & Hetts, 2001), and to grant ideological support for the social system and its authorities despite their personal and group-based disadvantage (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2002). Researchers have also shown that individuals rationalize the status quo by subjectively enhancing their perceptions of the desirability of anticipated events (whether those events are perceived to represent either positive or negative outcomes) as they become more likely (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002) and by exhibiting a tendency to view the status quo as more desirable than alternative arrangements (Kay et al., 2009). Research also indicates that the system justification motive leads both high and low status individuals to use stereotypes to justify status differences (Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay et al., 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008). These tendencies produce out-group favoritism for low status individuals and in-group favoritism for high status individuals (Jost &

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Hunyady, 2005), and greater levels of inequality have been shown to exacerbate these effects (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001). A key implication of this drive to justify the status quo (i.e., to view the status quo as legitimate) is that individuals are motivated to view the status quo as fair. Interestingly, these findings, which indicate a resistance to the perception of injustice, are in stark contrast to findings produced from social psychological inquiry into perceptions of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Distributive justice research, which concerns perceptions of the fairness of the allocation of outcomes, has demonstrated that people view equal allocations among comparable individuals to be more fair than unequal allocations (e.g., Adams, 1965; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see Colquitt et al., 2005, for a review). Similarly, research regarding procedural justice, which examines people’s perceptions of the fairness of the procedures used in resource allocation, has demonstrated, for example, that people evaluate procedures that allow them to voice their opinions as more fair than procedures that deny them voice and that procedures that are accurate and complete are viewed as more fair than others that are inaccurate or incompletely executed (e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Finally, research regarding interactional justice, which examines people’s perceptions of the fairness of interpersonal treatment during processes of resource allocation, has demonstrated that treatment characterized by truthfulness, respect, propriety, and explanations is viewed as more fair than treatment lacking these characteristics (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986). Thus, findings from research on distributive, procedural, and interactional justice perceptions indicate that people readily differentiate between fair and unfair treatment, whereas system justification research indicates that people resist the perception of injustice, suggesting that such differentiation is unlikely. What factors can account for these conflicting findings? What are the circumstances under which individuals will resist or acknowledge perceptions of injustice? While the status quo–oriented research has focused to a greater extent on reactions to the injustice of others, and distributive, procedural, and interactional justice research has generally focused more narrowly on reactions to one’s own justice experiences, this difference in perspective cannot account for the different findings. In fact, recent studies of distributive and procedural justice research have demonstrated that under some circumstances, reactions to others’ justice experiences can be as strong as reactions to one’s own justice experiences (e.g., Van den Bos & Lind, 2001). In addition, system justification theory research has demonstrated that the

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tendency to resist the perception of injustice and defend the status quo is, surprisingly, at its strongest among the victims of injustice (Jost et al., 2002). Instead, to address these questions, it is necessary to consider why a system justification motive might exist.

What Explains the Existence of the System Justification Motive? Although system justification theorists have not yet, to our knowledge, provided a full psychological account of the underlying mechanisms that produce the system justification motive, they have put forth two explanations for related phenomena. First, Jost et al. (2007) have developed an uncertainty-threat model of political conservatism. In this model, Jost and his colleagues argue that uncertainty aversion and fear underlie inclinations to adopt politically conservative ideologies and that a tendency to engage in system justification is one manifestation of politically conservative ideologies. The implication from this work, then, is that fear of uncertainty is a key driver of the system justification tendency. Second, Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin (2008) have developed a compensatory control explanation for the general tendency to support existing external systems, including belief in God and support for one’s government. Kay and his colleagues argue that individuals are motivated to perceive that their social environments are not characterized by randomness or chaos. They further argue that because of this motivation to perceive some degree of orderliness in their social environments, if individuals do not feel personally in control of their outcomes, they prefer to believe that a benevolent God or government is in control. Thus, this view similarly posits that discomfort with uncertainty is a key motivator of system justification. Both of these explanations share the idea that the motive to defend the system and resist perceptions of injustice is rooted in a desire to avoid the experience of uncertainty that would come from acknowledging that one is at the mercy of an unjust system. Indeed, research has indicated that the system justification motive is exacerbated when the system is viewed as inescapable and when individuals feel dependent on the system (Kay et al., 2009). In the following sections, we build on this uncertainty-based view of the system justification motive, incorporating insights from a number of justice theories to build a model of the justice judgment process as it applies to inclinations to acknowledge or resist the perception of injustice and to support or resist social change.

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FAIRNESS HEURISTIC THEORY AND THE PHASES OF THE JUSTICE JUDGMENT PROCESS In one of the earliest full articulations of fairness heuristic theory, Lind (2001) explains that the basis of the theory is the recognition that virtually all social relationships and social environments are characterized by what he terms ‘‘the fundamental social dilemma.’’ On the one hand, involvement in and contribution to social groups and collective endeavors allows the individual to achieve greater ends than he or she could accomplish alone. On the other hand, this type of involvement also exposes the individual to the possibilities of exploitation, rejection, and loss of individual identity. To manage these potential threats, Lind (2001) argues that individuals make fairness judgments that they can use as heuristics to determine the extent to which they can trust that their social environment is safe for collective engagement. An important implication of fairness heuristic theory is the idea that the fairness judgment process is likely to be episodic and to proceed in stages. Lind (2001) distinguishes between a judgment phase and a use phase and argues that justice judgments will be used more often than they are revised. At the beginning of a relationship or at entry into a new social system, an individual is said to enter the judgment phase in which they use the first available justice information to form a judgment concerning the fairness of other individuals and of their social environment. Lind (2001) suggests that the judgment phase tends to be relatively brief because individuals need to arrive at a judgment quickly to have that judgment available to guide their decisions regarding cooperation with the individual or group. Thus, there is a primacy effect in which the first available justice information is weighted the most heavily in influencing the justice judgment (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Following the judgment phase is a use phase, in which the fairness judgment functions as a fairness heuristic, which is utilized to guide social decisions and to make sense of incoming stimuli. In the use phase, the initial justice judgment established in the judgment phase guides subsequent judgments about the social environment, impacting individuals’ inclinations to obey authorities, follow rules, trust in others, identify with the group, act prosocially, and perceive new events and actions as fair (Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). Thus, fairness heuristic theory holds that once a justice judgment is generated, it will be assumed to be accurate, and all incoming information will be assimilated to be congruent with the initial judgment.

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This distinction between phases of the justice judgment process can help to delineate the circumstances under which individuals are likely to resist or acknowledge perceptions of injustice. We expand the distinction by separating the judgment phase into two separate types of judgment phases (initiation and revision) and adding an alarm phase. Thus, in the sections below, we distinguish among an initiation phase, a use phase, an alarm phase, and a revision phase (see Fig. 1). We suggest that the system justification mode of justice judgments predominates during the initiation and the use phases, but that the alarm phase brings about a revision phase in which the system justification motive is inoperative and the system critique mode predominates. Below, we describe the psychological features of each phase in detail to describe our model of the justice judgment process and to identify the circumstances that promote or hinder the perception of injustice.

Initiation Phase The justice judgment process begins with the initiation phase, which involves the individual’s entry into a new social relationship or group. For individuals entering into a new social relationship or group, there are both uncertainty and relational motivations to exhibit a system justification bias. The uncertainty motivation is consistent with the explanations for system justification suggested by Kay et al. (2008) and Jost et al. (2007): Perceiving the new group or individual as fair minimizes feelings of uncertainty and provides reassurance that the social context is not characterized by randomness or chaos. The relational motivation involves the need to feel that the group one is joining is desirable and appealing. Combining these motivations for positive evaluation with Lind’s (2001) indication that the first phase of justice judgments is likely to be made rather swiftly, we expect that most initial fairness perceptions tend be characterized by a positive bias. Two exceptions to this expectation should be highlighted, however, and to explain them, it is necessary to first provide a general overview of Lind and Van den Bos’ uncertainty management theory of justice (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Building on the insights of fairness heuristic theory, and especially on the concept of the fundamental social dilemma, Lind and Van den Bos (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) proposed uncertainty management theory, in which they argue that the experience of personal uncertainty is a primary motivator of fairness judgments. One central implication of uncertainty management theory that has received considerable empirical support is that uncertainty

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enhances reactions to treatment. Specifically, a growing collection of empirical studies demonstrates that when people experience personal uncertainty, they react more strongly to the fairness of the procedures they experience (see Van den Bos & Lind, 2009, for a review). For example, Van den Bos (2001) asked half of the participants in his study to write about the emotions and physical reactions they experience when they feel uncertain; the other half were asked to write about the experience of watching television. The fairness of the treatment the participants received was then manipulated, either by granting or denying them voice (experiments 1 and 3) or by using an accurate or inaccurate evaluation procedure (experiment 2). He found that the individuals who had written about the experience of uncertainty had a stronger reaction to the fairness manipulation than did those who had written about the experience of watching television, reacting more positively to fair treatment and more negatively to unfair treatment. Thus, while system justification involves resisting the experience of uncertainty, uncertainty management research demonstrates that when uncertainty cannot be avoided and is experienced personally and directly, reactions to treatment are amplified. Therefore, one implication of uncertainty management theory is that if an individual is already feeling a high level of personal uncertainty at the time of entering a group, that uncertainty may lead the individual to take a more critical approach to the formation of a justice judgment and behave in ways that are more characteristic of the revision phase. In this way, the experience of uncertainty can be expected to moderate the relationship between group initiation and the inclination to view group outcomes, procedures, and treatment positively: If the individual is experiencing a high level of uncertainty, this positive inclination may be muted or even eliminated. This inclination would also be muted or eliminated if social circumstances led to an activation of the alarm phase before entering the use phase. The details of the alarm phase and revision phase will be explained below. First, however, we turn to the use phase, in which the system justification mode of justice judgments is likely to predominate if indeed the initial fairness judgment was positive.

Use Phase The primary output of the initiation phase of the justice judgment process is a fairness heuristic, which consists of a generalized fairness assessment that is uncritically perpetuated in the use phase. As Lind (2001) explains, the

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initial fairness judgment becomes an anchor that guides interpretations of justice-relevant cognitions and experiences throughout the use phase. Thus, in the use phase, the fairness heuristic developed in the initiation phase shapes interpretations of new justice experiences such that new justicerelevant information is viewed as consistent with the fairness heuristic. Incoming bits of information and stimuli are assimilated to conform to the initial fairness judgment in a process characterized by motivated reasoning, and in this way, the initial fairness heuristic acts as a substitute for any fairness-related judgment that individuals construct (Lind, 2001). This assimilation process occurs for two reasons. First, assimilation minimizes the cognitive energy that must be allocated to fairness assessments. If the avoidance of exploitation required individuals to constantly and consistently monitor their social environments for evidence of unfairness, very little could be accomplished. Such a high level of monitoring would simply require too much cognitive energy and attention, leaving individuals unable to engage in other tasks. Thus, the assimilation process that characterizes the use phase significantly reduces the cognitive resources that are required for individuals to assess their security within their social environments. Second, the assimilation process helps individuals to avoid uncertainty. If each new fairness-related experience led one to reevaluate once again their existing fairness judgments, then the fairness of the social environment would constantly be called into question. Using the fairness heuristic to guide the interpretation of new information, on the contrary, ensures that ambivalence and uncertainty are minimized. Thus, the use phase of the justice judgment process is driven by needs for the conservation of cognitive resources as well as by the motivation to avoid uncertainty. Like all heuristics, of course, the use of fairness heuristics is subject to bias. Specifically, a key implication of the assimilation process is that the initial fairness judgment will be perpetuated throughout the use phase, and if the initial fairness judgment is biased, that bias will persist. With respect to system justification tendencies, therefore, any individual that initially forms a positive judgment of fairness in the initiation phase will exhibit system justification tendencies in the use phase. Because there is, we argue, often a bias toward positive fairness judgments in the initiation phase, we expect the system justification mode of justice judgments to predominate in the use phase. Thus, the system justification mode of justice judgments, in which judgments are biased by both relational and uncertainty motives in the initiation phase and these judgments are perpetuated through assimilation

13

Sounding the Alarm

processes in the use phase, tends to predominate in the early stages of engagement with a social system or individual. Indeed, this mode of judgment may persist in perpetuity in many cases. However, in other cases, events may arise that lead individuals to reconsider their initial fairness judgments. Specifically, we suggest that certain types of events can activate an ‘‘alarm phase’’ that switches individuals from the system justification mode (for those who initially viewed the system as fair) to a system critique mode, in which individuals reevaluate and critically examine the fairness of their social systems. This system critique mode is characterized by renewed vigilance to fairness information and by justice judgments that are guided by the principles and relationships identified in the extensive social psychological research on distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Alarm Phase1 Social neuroscience research has posited the existence of a ‘‘neural alarm system’’ in which a pattern of neural activity is activated by threats to social or physical security (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). This research indicates that a particular region of the neural system becomes activated when individuals feel they are under social threats, such as potential exploitation and exclusion, and when they experience physical pain and fear for their physical security. Building on this research, Van den Bos et al. (2008) have argued that personal uncertainty and other self-threatening conditions activate the neural alarm system, which in turn leads individuals to engage in a high level of vigilance regarding their social environments and, consequently, to form more extreme justice judgments. In a series of four studies, half of the participants were exposed to alarming stimuli before evaluating the justice of a procedure and the other half were not exposed to the alarming stimuli. The alarming stimuli included either exclamation points or yellow flashing lights. In each of the studies, participants who were exposed to the alarming stimuli reported more extreme reactions to their experiences (Van den Bos et al., 2008). We suggest that the activation of this neural alarm system by social events or personal uncertainty switches the justice judgment process from the uncritical assimilation of justice information that characterizes the system justification mode to the system critique mode, in which individuals abandon their initial fairness heuristic and instead vigilantly evaluate the justice of the outcomes, procedures, and treatment, which occur in their social environments. Before describing the system critique mode in more

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detail, we describe the types of events that are likely to activate the neural alarm system. We suggest that events that are likely to activate the alarm phase fall into three categories: (1) those that signal a radical change in the environment such that the uncertainty managing roles and abilities of current relationships and systems are rendered ambiguous, (2) those that involve such negative interpersonal treatment or outcomes that the social relationship, group, or system fails to reassure the person and comes to be experienced as a source of uncertainty rather than as a buffer against uncertainty, and (3) those that cannot be assimilated to a positive fairness heuristic because they expose a clear system- or relationship-based violation of the individual’s moral code. Radical Change in the Social Environment First, any sudden and radical change in the social environment is likely to activate the alarm phase because it calls into question the uncertainty management function of the existing social system. As explained above, a primary driver of the system justification motive is the desire to avoid uncertainty; believing that one’s social system is just allows the system itself to serve as a buffer against anxiety, and as long as belief in the system can be maintained, that uncertainty and accompanying anxiety can be avoided. However, if events indicate that the social environment has changed such that the system may no longer be able to serve this uncertainty- and anxiety-buffering function, then the neural alarm system is likely to be activated. Of course, the nature of the change must be dramatic for it to activate the alarm phase. We expect that the effect of radical environmental change on alarm phase activation is not linear; it is a threshold effect. As people go about their daily lives and experience minor environmental changes or threats, they are still able to view the overall social system and their relationships with authorities as fairly stable. When changes are particularly radical and dramatic in nature, however, the system and accompanying relationships no longer appear stable, and the alarm phase will be activated. One aspect of system justification theory research that might initially seem to be in contradiction with this aspect of our argument is the finding that ‘‘system threat’’ heightens the system justification motive (e.g., Kay et al., 2005, 2009; Lau et al., 2008). However, manipulations of system threat generally involve exposing participants to a fictitious news article describing an individual’s (often a non-group member) opinion regarding the sociopolitical climate of a particular system. For example, in one study that

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explored the role of system threat in impacting victim derogation and victim enhancement, the manipulation of system threat read as follows: These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the nation’s condition. Many citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and political factors y It seems that many countries in the world are enjoying better social, economic, and political conditions than the U.S. More and more Americans express a willingness to leave the United States and emigrate to other nations. (Kay et al., 2005, p. 241)

Although this paragraph can be viewed as critical of the sociopolitical system of the United States, we suggest that it does not reach a level of threat or unexpected change that would be sufficient to set off the alarm phase. ‘‘Many people’’ being disappointed certainly does not suggest that a sudden and radical change in the environment has taken place. It challenges the uncertainty managing function of the system, but it does not reach the threshold of sudden and radical change that is necessary to activate the alarm phase. Thus, we view the system justification finding that system threat enhances the system justification motive to be not incompatible with our argument: When there is a low-level system threat, individuals in the initiation or use phases of the justice judgment process are likely to enhance their pursuit of the system justification goal, just as other types of goal interference have been shown to enhance nonconscious goal pursuit (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001). However, when environmental changes reach a threshold of sudden and radical change, the alarm phase is activated. There are numerous types of organizational events that would constitute this type of radical change. For example, the replacement of a key organizational leader, such as the organization’s CEO, could serve to alert organizational members that the function of the organization as a social system may be shifting, leading them to feel uncertainty about their personal role, and security within the organization. Mergers and acquisitions may similarly alert organizational actors to uncertainty involving their place in the organization, thereby activating the alarm phase. So too would unexpectedly severe changes in the external environment. Negative Interpersonal Treatment or Outcomes Second, negative treatment from individuals or groups, such as social exclusion or disrespect, has been shown to activate the alarm phase (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; see also Rutte & Messick, 1995). This finding suggests that if the

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individual directly experiences a sufficient level or degree (in terms of magnitude) of negative interpersonal treatment or a sufficiently bad outcome within the social system, the alarm phase will be activated and the inclination to defend the system will be eliminated. This alarm activation occurs because serious negative interpersonal treatment and extreme negative outcomes introduce heightened levels of personal and relational uncertainty, calling into question one’s role within and value to the social group (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Van den Bos and Lind (2002) suggest that something very similar to this response might account for the frequently observed interaction between outcomes and fair process. However, as with environmental change, it is only when negative treatment and outcomes reach sufficient heights in negative magnitude that they activate the alarm phase. In other words, like the effect of environmental change, the effect of negative treatment and outcomes on alarm phase activation is not linear; it is a threshold effect. As people move through their daily lives and experience minor disadvantages or transgressions from other individuals, authorities, and institutions in their social environments, these minor events are often relatively easy to assimilate to a positive fairness heuristic: Biased attributions involving unique circumstances and misunderstandings can generally perform the assimilative function. However, if negative treatment or outcomes become particularly dramatic in nature, the ability to assimilate these events is hampered, and the alarm phase is likely to be activated. In addition, we expect that negative treatment is more likely to activate the alarm phase than are negative outcomes, because outcomes lend themselves much more easily to rationalization than do procedures or treatment. When one observes an outcome, it is often unclear what caused it; individuals must make subjective inferences about causes. In other words, outcomes are relatively nondeterministic because any number of fair or unfair processes can conceivably lead to a given outcome. Therefore, when only outcomes are observed, assimilation happens relatively easily as individuals presume that the process used to arrive at the outcome is consistent with their fairness heuristic. This easy assimilability makes it likely that the use phase can persist without activation of the alarm phase, thus enhancing the likelihood of system justification responses. However, when a procedure is directly observed, it is clear that the procedure is producing a particular outcome, and the procedure can be evaluated on the basis of the values that it embodies. Thus, procedures are more diagnostic of the motives that spur them. Consequently, when procedures are observed,

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assimilation may be less feasible, particularly if the negativity of the procedure or treatment is of a significant order of magnitude. Our contention that negative outcomes and treatment can activate the alarm phase may initially appear to be somewhat in tension with system justification theory findings that demonstrate the internalization of low status by disadvantaged individuals (e.g., Blanton et al., 2001; Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost, 1997, 2001; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost et al., 2002). By asking participants to evaluate the justice or legitimacy of status differences and stereotypes among individuals and groups, these studies generally show that individuals who receive negative outcomes tend to justify, rather than critique, their social systems. However, the majority of system justification research that indicates that individuals internalize their negative status examines individuals in the initiation and use phases of the justice judgment process and in the absence of any alarm phase activation. At the same time, these studies primarily ask participants to render judgments regarding status outcomes, and as we explain above, outcomes are more amenable to assimilation than are procedures or treatment. For example, Haines and Jost (2000) asked participants to evaluate students from another university who were granted power over them in the context of their particular experiment. Given that this type of power difference was artificially manipulated for the purpose of the experiment, it is likely that participants were operating in the initiation phase of the justice judgment process, with its associated relational- and uncertainty-based motivations to engage in system justification. Aside from any experience of acute personal uncertainty that might exist unrelated to the experiment, we would therefore expect participants in this study to exhibit system justification tendencies, which is just what the experimenters found. Similarly, Jost et al. (2003) examined data from a series of national surveys in which they discovered that disadvantaged minorities were more likely than others to report support for system justifying ideologies and to view the government as benevolent. Again, we would expect that individuals participating in these types of surveys were primarily functioning within the use phase of the justice judgment process, in which the system justification tendency predominates (at least until the alarm phase is activated). Thus, these and similar studies on the internalization of low status examine individuals in the first two phases of the justice judgment process, in the absence of alarm phase activation, which represent precisely the circumstances under which we would expect the system justification motive to predominate. Therefore, the findings from these studies, indicating that those with low status (i.e., negative outcomes) are

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particularly inclined to engage in system justification, are not in conflict with our argument. What we would predict, however, is that following any event that activates an alarm phase, this finding would reverse, and those with negative outcomes would be the least likely to engage in system justification. Finally, it is important to point out that alarm activation through negative interpersonal treatment or outcomes can occur as a result of one’s own or others’ negative treatment and outcomes. In our discussion above, we have focused on examples concerning the treatment or outcomes that an individual personally experiences because these types of experience are most likely to lead directly to the feelings of personal and relational uncertainty that activate the alarm phase. However, when an individual observes negative treatment or outcomes experienced by another individual, that observation may also lead the individual to question the treatment that they themselves can expect, thereby activating feelings of personal and relational uncertainty. Therefore, in such a case, observing the experience of others would be expected to activate the alarm phase. There is also another route by which observing the experience of others may activate the alarm phase. Specifically, if another individual is observed to experience treatment or outcomes that the observer views as immoral, then the alarm phase may be activated by a third mechanism – moral violations. Moral Violations In addition, we suggest that the alarm phase is activated when the individual is confronted with the violation of closely held moral values (i.e., sacred values; see Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) committed by an institution or authority within the social system or by an individual with whom one is in a social relationship. However, not all moral violations activate the alarm phase. We argue that, to trigger the neural alarm phase, this type of event must (1) violate a moral mandate and (2) be clearly attributable to systemic causes. Skitka (2002) explains that moral mandates constitute self-expressive stands on particular issues and represent a special class of attitudes that are particularly strong in both their extremity and importance to the individual. She further emphasizes that while moral mandates are closely tied to moral values, they are not moral values per se. Instead, moral mandates represent the selective expression of particular moral values. For example, two individuals who report placing a high value on the sanctity of human life may build on that value to develop different types of moral mandates: One may support the abolishment of the death penalty, whereas the other may take a pro-life position on abortion.

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Sounding the Alarm

Thus, moral mandates are positions on moral issues that are based on attitudes about moral values that have passed a certain threshold of strength. Therefore, once again, the relationship between a moral violation and the activation of the alarm phase is nonlinear: The strength of commitment to the moral issue in question must have surpassed a certain level of strength within the observer (i.e., must have reached the level of a moral mandate) for the violation to set off the alarm. In addition, to activate the alarm phase, the event must be clearly attributable to individuals with whom one has a social relationship or to authorities or institutions of power within the social system. For example, many individuals have a moral mandate against the use of sweatshops in manufacturing. The fact that sweatshops exist, however, does not activate the alarm phase. However, when a university student with a moral mandate against sweatshop labor discovers that the university of which he or she is a member has used sweatshop labor for university activities, that discovery is likely to activate the individual’s neural alarm system because the discovery will call into question the extent to which the university administration can be trusted to secure a social environment free from exploitation and moral violations. The requirement that the violation be clearly attributable to a valued individual or an authority or institution once again highlights the point that procedures and treatment are more diagnostic than outcomes. When an outcome is observed, such as an unequal allocation of resources, it is not always clear how the allocation arose. An unequal allocation might arise due to merit, or instead it might arise due to favoritism. An individual with a moral mandate against cronyism or nepotism may not know if a violation of this moral mandate has occurred by seeing an unequal outcome. However, if the process of producing the outcome is observed, or if evidence regarding the process is presented, then the determination of violation is much clearer. In summary, we believe that events that (1) communicate that a radical change in the social environment has taken place, (2) involve highly negative interpersonal treatment or outcomes, or (3) represent the violation of a moral mandate by an authority or institution representing the social system will lead to an activation of the neural alarm system, which will in turn initiate a new phase of the justice judgment process – a revision phase.

Revision Phase Due to the uncertainty that is aroused in the alarm phase, individuals are inclined to be particularly critical and vigilant about justice in the revision

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phase, which is why we term this mode of justice judgment the ‘‘system critique’’ mode. This critical and vigilant approach to the evaluation of social targets has the effect of muting the system justification motive and replacing it with a motive to come to an accurate, full, and objective assessment of the justice of the outcomes, procedures, and interactions associated with the social relationship or system. Thus, in the system critique mode, the findings from research on distributive, procedural, and interactional justice indicating that individuals readily distinguish between justice and injustice across a range of dimensions are likely to hold. As a consequence, in the system critique mode, we would expect individuals to view as unjust any outcome, procedure, or interaction that violates the principles and norms of justice identified in this extensive literature (see Colquitt et al., 2005, for a review). Finally, once a new assessment of the social relationship or system has occurred in the revision phase, the individual returns to the use phase, and the individual will use the newly formed justice judgment as a new fairness heuristic until a new alarm phase is activated, motivating another round of revision. Thus, we expect that the revision phase of the justice judgment process, in which the system critique mode of judgment predominates, is the phase from which perceptions of injustice are most likely to emerge. If the alarm phase activates feelings of uncertainty that magnify reactions to outcomes, procedures, and treatments, then individuals in the revision phase are likely to view events or entities that violate principles of justice as highly unjust. Again, this is consistent with research on uncertainty management theory, which indicates that individuals experiencing uncertainty are likely to have particularly strong reactions to their justice-related experiences (see Van den Bos & Lind, 2009, for a review).

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS This model of the justice judgment process has important implications regarding the nature of changes in justice judgments, as well as for understandings of reactions to injustice, the processes and leadership of organizational change, and reactions to crises in organizational contexts. In the sections below, we briefly describe some of these implications. Changes in Justice Judgments With respect to changes in justice judgments, our discussion indicates that negative initial fairness assessments (i.e., judgments of unfairness) are

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Sounding the Alarm

unlikely to be revised. We discussed in detail how the justice judgment process unfolds for individuals who form an initial judgment of a high or reasonable degree of fairness. For these individuals, radical environmental change or dramatic negative events, in the form of negative interpersonal treatment or the violation of moral mandates, activate the alarm phase and move them into the revision phase of the justice judgment process, where they are likely to change their initial fairness judgment. For individuals who initially form a judgment of unfairness, however, positive experiences, such as unexpectedly considerate and respectful interpersonal treatment or the support and protection of moral mandates, are unlikely to activate the alarm phase because they do not initiate feelings of uncertainty, anxiety, or potential exploitation in the way that negative events do. Thus, when initial fairness judgments are negative, they are less likely to be revised by the process we describe here except in reaction to radical environmental change.

Reactions to Injustice When will an individual react to the perception of injustice by supporting change initiatives? Social movement activists argue that broad-scale social movements are likely to emerge when activists frame grievances and identify solutions, when political opportunities emerge as social structures weaken and become amenable to change, and when organizations emerge to channel grievances into collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1997; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). While social movement theorists usefully identify the macro-level structural features that make collective action for change possible, the model of the justice judgment process that we have presented points instead to the impact that individual-level perceptions of injustice may have on individuals’ inclinations to pursue change. Our view that injustice inspires action for change is consistent with previous work by Foster and Rusbult (1999), who demonstrated that perceptions of injustice lead individuals to seek power for prosocial ends. Furthermore, it may be the case that the type of event that activates the alarm system could play a significant role in impacting the likelihood that the individual will pursue change. For example, previous research has indicated that certain emotions are associated with action-oriented behavior, whereas others are associated with avoidance and withdrawal from social engagement. Specifically, anger and outrage are associated with action, whereas fear and sadness are associated with withdrawal (Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989). Combining these two insights suggests that an

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individual who experiences anger in response to perceptions of injustice that are formed in the revision phase is more likely to actively support change than is an individual who experiences sadness or fear instead. Thus, individuals may be differentially willing to take action against injustice depending on the type of event that set off the alarm phase and led them to detect the injustice in the first place. Research has demonstrated that the experience of disrespect and procedural injustice is associated with anger (Mark, 1985; see Miller, 2001, for a review). Research has also demonstrated that the violation of moral mandates produces moral outrage and anger (Mullen & Skitka, 2006). Radical environmental change, on the contrary, is more likely to be associated with fear and anxiety (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992). These findings indicate that individuals whose alarm phase is activated by negative interpersonal treatment or violation of moral mandates are more likely to experience action-oriented emotions, and therefore are more likely to take action for change, than are individuals whose alarm phase is activated by a radical change in the social environment.

Organizational Change Regarding the process of organizational change, the research reviewed here raises the interesting question of whether the system justification motive might in fact be a source of continuous or incremental change in organizations. Specifically, as organizational leaders make small changes to organizational structures and processes (changes that are meaningful but are not sufficiently dramatic to activate the neural alarm system), the tendency of organizational members to continue to function in the system justification mode in the use phase of the justice judgment process may lead to a bias in support of these small changes. In this way, the tendency to support the status quo could, counterintuitively, be a key driver of incremental organizational change. With respect to the leadership of the change process, the model makes clear that the activation of the alarm phase is a critical step in inspiring support for substantial, system-altering change. Thus, a key task for organizational leaders wishing to promote change is to undermine the process of assimilation that occurs in the use phase of the justice judgment process. To the extent that leaders can disrupt this assimilation process and activate the alarm phase, they are more likely to be successful in their attempts at eliciting support for organizational change. In addition, we have

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Sounding the Alarm

argued that procedures are less amenable to the assimilation process than are outcomes. Therefore, to inspire support for change, leaders can direct individuals’ attention to unassimilable events, and in particular, to procedures that violate moral mandates, and then guide followers in their interpretations and attributions of these events so that the resultant motive for change is channeled in the most effective direction.

Crises and Threat Finally, there are important implications of our model for the management of crisis and threat in organizational contexts. Specifically, organizational leaders should be aware that the experience of crises or high degrees of threat are likely to be associated with the activation of the alarm phase, which leads individuals to be particularly vigilant about fairness in their social environments. Although leaders may be inclined to presume that procedural protections of the interests of organizational members, as well as concentrated effort to treat organizational members with dignity and respect, can be set aside during times of crisis, the model we present here indicates that any negative evaluations that are formed in the revision stage following alarm activation are quite difficult to change once the crisis has ended.

NOTE 1. In the sections below, we discuss the activation of the alarm system and the revision of justice judgments for individuals who initially formed a judgment of fairness (rather than unfairness) in the initiation phase. This framing allows us to more directly address the switch from system justification mode to system critique mode. In addition, we believe that while positive events may be unexpected when an individual has formed an initial judgment of unfairness, unexpected positive events are less likely to activate the alarm system because they do not inspire anxiety or a concern for exploitation. This assertion implies that initial judgments of unfairness are unlikely to be revised, a point we return to in the discussion.

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Major, B. (1994). From social inequality to personal entitlement: The role of social comparisons, legitimacy appraisals, and group membership. In: M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 293–355). San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc. Mark, M. M. (1985). Expectations, procedural justice, and alternative reactions to being deprived of a desired outcome. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, 21, 114–137. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1997). In: Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (pp. 1–20). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. G., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. New York: Cambridge University Press. Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 527–553. Mullen, E., & Skitka, L. J. (2006). Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 629–643. Pelham, B. W., & Hetts, J. J. (2001). Underworked and overpaid: Elevated entitlement in men’s self-pay. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 93–103. Rutte, C. G., & Messick, D. M. (1995). An integrated model of perceived unfairness in organizations. Social Justice Research, 8, 239–261. Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. Skitka, L. J. (2002). Do the means always justify the ends, or do the ends sometimes justify the means? A value protection model of justice reasoning. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 588–597. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In: S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds), The psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000). The psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 853–870. Thibaut, J., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley. Tyler, T. R. (1989). The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 830–838. Tyler, T. R. (1994). Psychological models of the justice motive: Antecedents of distributive and procedural justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(5), 850–863. Tyler, T. R. (1997). The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on voluntary deference to authorities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 323–345. Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in groups: Procedural justice, social identity, and behavioral management. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2003). The group engagement model: Procedural justice, social identity, and cooperative behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 349–361. Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In: M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 115–191). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

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Van den Bos, K. (2001). Uncertainty management: The influence of uncertainty salience on reactions to perceived procedural fairness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 931–941. Van den Bos, K., Ham, J., Lind, E. A., Simonis, M., van Essen, W. J., & Rijpkema, M. (2008). Justice and the human alarm system: The impact of exclamation points and flashing lights on the justice judgment process. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 201–219. Van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2001). The psychology of own versus others’ treatment: Self-oriented and other-oriented effects on perceptions of procedural justice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1324–1333. Van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2002). Uncertainty management by means of fairness judgments. In: M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 1–60). Boston: Elsevier. Van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2009). The social psychology of fairness and the regulation of personal uncertainty. In: R. M. Arkin, K. C. Oleson, & P. J. Carroll (Eds), Handbook of the uncertain self (pp. 122–141). New York: Psychology Press. Van den Bos, K., Lind, E. A., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1997). How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1034–1046. Van den Bos, K., Lind, E. A., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2001). The psychology of procedural and distributive justice viewed from the perspective of fairness heuristic theory. In: R. Cropanzano (Ed.), Justice in the workplace: From theory to practice (pp. 49–66). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Van den Bos, K., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1997). Procedural and distributive justice: What is fair depends more on what comes first than on what comes next. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 95–104. Van den Bos, K., Wilke, H. A. M., Lind, E. A., & Vermunt, R. (1998). Evaluating outcomes by means of the fair process effect: Evidence for different processes in fairness and satisfaction judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1493–1503.

CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL EMOTIONS AND JUSTICE: HOW THE EMOTIONAL FABRIC OF GROUPS DETERMINES JUSTICE ENACTMENT AND REACTIONS Steven L. Blader, Batia M. Wiesenfeld, Naomi B. Rothman and Sara L. Wheeler-Smith ABSTRACT Purpose – This chapter presents a social emotions-based analysis of justice dynamics, emphasizing the important influence of social emotions (e.g., envy, empathy, schadenfreude, and vicarious joy) on justice judgments and reactions. The chapter also identifies a dimension for organizing social emotions, based on the degree of congruence they reflect between self and other. Congruent social emotions align the individual experiencing the emotion with the individual who is the target of their emotion, thus leading individuals to reason about and perceive justice in ways that are aligned with the target. Conversely, incongruent social emotions create misalignment and lead to justice perceptions that are misaligned and oppositional with regard to the target. Methodology/approach – The chapter is informed by research suggesting that justice judgments are subjective. We consider the perspective of each of the key parties to justice (i.e., decision makers, justice recipients, Fairness and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 13, 29–62 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2010)0000013005

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and third parties) to evaluate the effect of (in)congruent social emotions on justice. Findings – The core argument advanced in the chapter is that the (in)congruence of parties’ social emotions shape whether people evaluate the outcomes, procedures, and treatment encountered by a target as being fair. Fairness judgments, in turn, shape parties’ actions and reactions. Originality/value – The chapter is the first to offer a framework integrating research on organizational justice with research on social emotions, arguing that social emotions strike at the very foundation of justice dynamics in groups and teams. In addition, the congruence dimension described in the chapter offers a novel and potentially important way of thinking about social emotions.

A fundamental tenet of research on justice in the social sciences – including the organizational sciences – is that justice is inherently a social phenomenon. Justice gains meaning in social contexts and defines how social dynamics unfold over time. Indeed, some of the very earliest research on justice grew out of work on relative deprivation theory (Stouffer et al., 1949), which makes the fundamental point that people’s satisfaction with their situations can depend on how their own situation compares to others’. Justice research built on this insight, arguing that people typically evaluate how just a situation is by comparing their own situation to the situations of referent others (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Social referents, in other words, are critical for evaluating justice. More recent justice research highlights that people make sense of the quality of their social relationships by looking to the justice of their encounters with those other parties (e.g., Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Furthermore, justice research has demonstrated that how people engage with other parties is based on their evaluation of the fairness of the other parties’ actions (Blader & Tyler, 2005, 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Overall, justice and the social context in which justice occurs are inextricably linked. Perhaps nowhere is this truer than in groups and teams, where social dynamics are plentiful, complex, and fundamental. For instance, groups and teams are contexts where social emotions – a key social phenomenon – run rampant (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) and thus where feelings such as envy, pride, contempt, jealousy, sympathy, and vicarious joy are continually experienced and expressed. As such, groups

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and teams are contexts where the interplay between justice and social emotions becomes particularly interesting and important. Yet despite widespread recognition of the social nature of justice, and despite the pervasiveness of social emotions in groups and teams, justice researchers have devoted little attention to the role of social emotions for understanding justice in groups and teams. Our goal in this chapter is to argue that much insight can be gained by evaluating the role of social emotions in shaping justice perceptions and reactions to events. Social emotions refer to that class of emotions that are based exclusively on social concerns, or those concerns that people care about because of their social importance (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). Although social emotions have been defined by a wide variety of criteria, some fundamental themes are that (a) they are emotions that have a social object (e.g., an interaction partner and another person) as their target and (b) they serve important social functions such as signifying the importance attached to certain relationships, helping to maintain or restore valued relationships (Leach & Tiedens, 2004), or influencing other people’s thoughts and feelings in interpersonal or intergroup contexts (i.e., Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Keltner & Kring, 1998). They are emotions that give meaning to the emotional connection that one party feels toward another, and thus, they characterize an individual’s orientation toward a social target (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Miller, 2004). Examples of social emotions include envy, empathy, schadenfreude, pride in others, love, hate, liking, contempt, and vicarious joy. Common to all these emotions is that each describes the way that the individual experiencing the emotion feels toward a particular social target. As such, social emotions constitute the emotional fabric that describes how people connect with others. Like justice, social emotions do not have meaning outside of a social context; these emotions would not exist without a social target. Also like justice, social emotions give meaning to the quality and nature of people’s social relationships. Yet despite these strong commonalities, there has thus far not been an effort to develop a framework of the effects of social emotions on justice perceptions and reactions. We argue that given the omnipresent nature of social emotions in groups and teams (Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Hatfield & Rapson, 2004; Mackie et al., 2000), it is essential to examine the impact of social emotions on justice to fully understand justice dynamics within groups and teams. We consider the utility of a social emotion analysis of justice for understanding the third parties who observe justice, justice agents (i.e., those who enact justice), and justice recipients. Our overarching argument is that people’s justice-related

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judgments, actions, and reactions will be shaped by the social emotions they feel toward the parties involved in a given justice dynamic. Our investigation is focused at the individual level, on the intra-psychic experience of one individual feeling a social emotion toward another individual (as opposed to focusing on the similarity between social emotions that two parties may feel toward one another). Although we examine the impact that social emotions have on justice judgments, this is not meant to imply that justice judgments do not also have an effect on social emotions (i.e., perceptions of injustice elicit envy). Our emphasis reflects our sense that the influence of emotions on justice judgments and actions has received far less attention than the influence of justice on emotions (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008; Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994; Wiesenfeld, Blader, Fortin, & Wheeler-Smith, 2009), and thus, we feel it is especially important to highlight the influence of social emotions on justice judgments and actions. We suggest that social emotions are a particularly fruitful class of emotions for exploring the influence of emotions on justice dynamics, since social emotions frequently exist within groups and teams and create a lens through which people evaluate the justice-relevant situations they encounter in groups and teams. Perhaps the most critical element of our argument is that social emotions shape justice actions and reactions because they influence people’s subjective evaluations of justice. Despite the justice literature’s concern with people’s subjective justice judgments (rather than normative or objective determinants of fairness), there has been relatively little systematic work on subjective influences on justice judgments (cf. Barsky & Kaplan, 2007; Blader, 2007; Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). We argue that social emotions are likely to be a critical factor that shapes subjective justice judgments, determining what people regard as fair or unfair. Through their influence on subjective justice judgments, social emotions are likely to shape (a) how third parties react toward the decision processes and outcomes others experience, (b) whether decision makers enact objectively fair or unfair behaviors, and (c) how justice recipients react toward the decision processes and outcomes that impact them. In other words, a key conclusion of our analysis will be that subjective justice judgments mediate the impact of social emotions on the actions and reactions of third parties, justice agents, and justice recipients. The chapter is laid out as follows: we start by elaborating how social emotions are defined and what distinguishes them from other types of emotions, emphasizing their utility for understanding justice dynamics. We then proceed to highlight a critical dimension characterizing social


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emotions, namely the felt nature of the alignment between the self and the social objects or targets of the emotion. We refer to this dimension as the congruence that the social emotion embodies between the perceiver (i.e., the individual experiencing the emotion) and the target of the social emotion. Our discussion of social emotions and of the congruence dimension is not intended to be comprehensive or encompassing but rather to provide a foundation for using social emotions to understand justice. Having provided this foundation, we theorize – and provide supporting empirical evidence where available – about the influence of social emotions on subjective evaluations of justice and subsequent responses.

WHAT ARE SOCIAL EMOTIONS? As mentioned earlier, social emotions are those emotions that describe the emotional orientation that one party has toward another party (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Miller, 2004). That is, a defining characteristic of social emotions is that they refer specifically to emotions that one person has toward another person or social object (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Hareli & Parkinson, 2008; Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Miller, 2004). This distinguishes social emotions from emotions such as anxiety and depression, which reflect internally focused self-perceptions where the target of one’s emotions is one’s self (rather than externally focused other-perceptions). Social emotions such as empathy, envy, schadenfreude, pride in others, love, hate, liking, contempt, and vicarious joy all have a social referent who serves as the target of the emotion. Furthermore, they are associated with social behavior toward that target (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008) and will likely shape how the focal person approaches, interacts, and engages with the target (i.e., helps, cooperates, antagonizes, or avoids). In many respects, therefore, social emotions may both reflect and define social relationships. The social emotions we focus on in this chapter not only have other individuals as the target, but they are rooted in appraisals of those other individuals. Indeed, we focus on social emotions that are associated with having made specific appraisals of a social target and which thus possess an evaluative element, since they indicate what the individual experiencing the emotion thinks and feels about the target (Leary, 2000). In contrast, we do not consider the class of social emotions, highlighted by Leary (2000), which concern what the individual experiencing the emotion thinks others likely think and feel towards them (e.g., embarrassment). We do not address this

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latter class of social emotions because their relationship to justice dynamics is less clear. The social emotions that are our focus are pervasive in any context where individuals who are acquainted with one another interact. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to imagine a work group or team in which these emotions would not be salient. As people form relationships with others, they evaluate those individuals and these evaluations in turn, serve as the foundation for the social emotions they feel toward them. Although social emotions have only recently been given attention as a distinct class of emotion (see Hareli & Parkinson, 2008, for a review), a good deal of prior work has investigated specific social emotions individually. This approach is consistent with the discrete emotions tradition and has developed deep insights regarding the complex nature of specific social emotions such as envy and resentment. For example, research has distinguished episodic from dispositional envy and has delved deeply into the feeling and social comparison components of episodic envy (Cohen-Charash, 2009) as well as the complex antecedents of envy (Smith, 2004) and its behavioral consequences.

DIMENSIONALIZING SOCIAL EMOTIONS: (IN)CONGRUENCE The focus on discrete, specific social emotions is quite consistent with approaches in the emotions literature that conceptualize emotions as distinct entities, each rich and deep in meaning and qualitatively different from one another (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962). A focus on social emotions as discrete entities has the benefit of capturing the complexity of these emotions (Larsen & Diener, 1992). However, it is less useful for developing a framework linking social emotions to justice dynamics with a manageable set of powerful, general predictions rather than a vast set of specific predictions for each emotion. As such, it is potentially valuable to identify a dimension along which social emotions can be organized, thus enabling a more focused examination of the elements of social emotions that matter when thinking about the intersection of social emotions and justice (Larsen & Diener, 1992). The value of dimensionalizing emotions is well recognized in the emotions literature. Indeed, that literature is marked by several major efforts to identify the core dimensions that explain how emotions are similar and dissimilar from one another. Perhaps the most well known of these efforts is


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work on the affective circumplex (Russell, 1980; see also Larsen & Diener, 1992 and Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003 for a discussion of this approach among organizational researchers), which emphasizes that emotions can be classified on two primary and independent dimensions, pleasantness and arousal. Research has capitalized on these dimensions to develop important insights, such as the distinct effects of pleasantness and arousal on memory (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992). A somewhat more comprehensive effort to dimensionalize emotions is that conducted by appraisal theorists (Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Roseman, 1984, 2001; Scherer, 2001a, 2001b; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987), who have identified approximately six orthogonal appraisal dimensions along which emotions could be arranged (some theorists include more dimensions, some fewer, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003, for a discussion of this point). Subsequent research demonstrates the usefulness of their work for the development of general frameworks regarding emotions. For instance, Tiedens and Linton (2001) found that the certainty appraisal dimension of Smith and Ellsworth’s (1987) model affects the way people process information, insofar as emotions marked by certainty (vs. uncertainty) resulted in more heuristic processing, exemplified by greater reliance on the expertise of the source of a persuasive message, more stereotyping, and less attention to argument quality. These insights – which explain how and why a category of specific emotions elicit a particular effect – would not have been possible had there not been work on dimensionalizing emotions. Since social emotions have only recently been recognized as a distinct class of emotions, little consideration has been given thus far to the dimensions that may describe social emotions in particular. Building on the multiple efforts in the emotions literature to classify emotions along certain underlying dimensions that relate to the subjective experience (e.g., Russell, 1980) or the inherent cognitive appraisal (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) associated with the emotion, we propose that a key dimension that characterizes social emotions and which serves to help organize them is the extent to which social emotions consist of a subjective sense of congruence or incongruence on the part of the person experiencing the emotion (the perceiver) toward the person about whom that emotion is felt (the target). Congruence characterizes the extent to which the social emotion embodies consistency and alignment between the perceiver and the perceiver’s expectation of what the target of their emotion is thinking and feeling. Congruence captures the perceiver’s subjective sense of their alignment with the target or their subjective feeling of being ‘‘on the same page’’ as the target in terms of thoughts and feelings.

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A useful metaphor to illustrate the subjective experience of congruence (vs. incongruence) is that of how magnetized objects experience a magnetic force – does the perceiver experience a drawing in toward the target (akin to the way a magnetic pole experiences attraction when coming into contact with an opposite pole) or does the perceiver experience a repulsion away from the target (akin to the way a magnetic pole is repelled when it comes into contact with a like pole)? The congruence dimension organizes social emotions according to where they fall on a continuum, ranging from the perceiver having a subjective experience of being oriented toward the target at one end to having a subjective experience of being oriented away from the target at the other end. We expect that social emotions that reflect a subjective experience of congruence (such as empathy, pride in others, and love) will lead the perceiver to have emotions, judgments, and reactions that are congruent (i.e., aligned) with their expectations of the emotions, judgments, and reactions of the target of their emotion. As an example, the literature makes clear that empathy – a social emotion marked by congruence – leads people to have emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions that reflect the circumstances of the target of their empathy rather than their own circumstances (Hoffman, 2000). This can prompt what Davis (2004) termed ‘‘emotional synchrony,’’ a state in which the empathic individual comes to experience the same emotion as the target of their empathy. Other social emotions that are marked by congruence (e.g., love, pride in others, and vicarious joy) similarly lead the perceiver to have thoughts and feelings that are aligned with those of the target. Alignment may refer to either similarity (e.g., the perceiver feels sad when it is believed that the target feels sad) or complementarity (e.g., the perceiver feels sympathetic when it is believed that the target feels sad). The implication is that congruent social emotions capture the subjective sense of alignment with – or being on the same page as – the target. Conversely, social emotions that reflect a subjective experience of incongruence (such as schadenfreude, envy, and hate) will lead the perceiver to have emotions, judgments, and reactions that are incongruent (i.e., inconsistent) with their expectations of the emotions, judgments, and reactions of the target of their emotion. Importantly, our notion of incongruence does not simply reflect dissimilar or unrelated to, but rather incongruence refers to inconsistency that is characterized by being the opposite of the target’s emotions, judgments, and reactions. In this respect, incongruence is also marked by complementarity with the target, but the nature of that complementarity is of an oppositional nature (e.g., the perceiver feels joy


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when it is believed that the target feels sad). Schadenfreude’s emphasis on pleasure in another’s pain acutely describes a state of incongruence between the perceiver and the target (Smith et al., 1996). The same is true of envy, a negative emotion that is elicited by situations in which others are expected to feel positively (Smith, 1991, 2004). It is worth noting that the incongruence end of our dimension is relatively more novel and represents more of a departure from traditional emphases in the emotions literature. The emotions literature has been largely interested, at the dyadic and group level, with understanding emotional homogeneity – through processes such as emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993) and convergence (Anderson & Keltner, 2004) – and has paid relatively less attention to emotional heterogeneity and divergence (Tiedens, Sutton, & Fong, 2004). Indeed, it has been noted that what makes incongruent emotions such as schadenfreude so interesting (and perverse) is the divergence they represent between two connected parties (Spears & Leach, 2004). Consideration of the nature of social emotions such as empathy, vicarious joy, schadenfreude, and envy highlights that it would be difficult to think of these social emotions without reference to the congruence/incongruence dimension. Indeed, (in)congruence is an inherent attribute of these emotions, just as (un)pleasantness is an inherent element of happiness and sadness. Furthermore, we argue that congruence is a particularly critical dimension of social emotions because it defines the nature of the felt emotional orientation of the perceiver toward the target. The congruence dimension takes the fundamental element of social emotions – the bridging of self and other – and characterizes it, giving it meaning. Said differently, all social emotions describe an emotional connection between the perceiver and the target of their emotion (i.e., all are socially engaging emotions to the extent that they are derived from social interdependence; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006), but the nature of that felt emotional connection is captured by the degree of congruence that is a component or element of the emotion. Dimensionalizing social emotions in this way enables one to understand a critical similarity/difference between various social emotions. Furthermore, this dimension enables us to generate predictions about the effect of a whole range of social emotions on justice (and other outcomes) based on a single general theoretical model, as opposed to developing many specific theories for the relationship between particular social emotions and justice. Given the novelty of a dimensional approach to social emotions, it is worth emphasizing a fundamental point with regard to this approach: the congruence dimension organizes social emotions by focusing on an attribute

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Table 1.

Sample Categorization of Social Emotions, by Congruence.

Congruent Social Emotions

Incongruent Social Emotions

Empathy Pride in other Vicarious joy Love Sympathy Gratitude Admiration Pity for other

Schadenfreude Resentment Envy Hate Contempt Disrespect Jealousy

that is embedded within the emotion itself, not by focusing on antecedents or consequences of the emotion. Congruence is an element that is inherent to social emotions themselves, likely defining the subjective state of the emotion. Just as – to use an example just mentioned – happiness does not cause pleasantness, empathy does not cause congruence nor does envy cause incongruence. Rather, in the same way that pleasantness is an inherent element of happiness, (in)congruence is an inherent element or quality of empathy and envy, a key aspect of the subjective feelings that accompany the experience of these emotions. A dimension cannot be causally separated from the specific emotions because the dimension represents a component that is part of the specific emotion (for a full discussion of this point from a cognitive appraisal theory perspective, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Table 1 presents a sample list of social emotions and categorizes them as reflecting congruence or incongruence. However, we conceptualize the congruence dimension as a continuum, running from highly incongruent to highly congruent. Our premise is that social emotions can be organized on this dimension (love would be towards the congruent end of the continuum; hate would be towards the incongruent end), although the specific degree of congruence in a particular situation will be a function of the salience and strength of the social emotion being experienced. Further, the specific degree of congruence in a particular emotional situation will likely impact the strength of the relationships with justice that we describe later in text.

Distinguishing Congruence There are several related notions that are worth explicitly distinguishing from our proposed congruence dimension: emotional contagion, convergence and


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relational identification. Before describing our framework for a social emotions analysis of justice dynamics, it is important to highlight the distinctions – and similarities – among these concepts. Emotional Contagion and Convergence Emotional contagion refers to the process by which emotions are transferred from one individual to other individuals and is thus the process by which emotions become collective – rather than individual or intrapsychic – experiences (Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Hatfield et al., 1993). Emotional contagion processes explain how one individual’s emotional experience is communicated, shared, and ultimately taken on by another individual, which when played out multiple times within a group context can help explain how groups develop collective emotions and mood (Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998). Emotional contagion is easily distinguished from our congruence dimension. Contagion refers to an interpersonal process by which a specific emotion is spread throughout a group, while our congruence dimension refers to an intrapsychic emotional orientation that one individual has toward another. That is, contagion is a process, whereas congruence is a state; contagion only exists at the collective level whereas congruent or incongruent emotions are an intrapsychic, individual level phenomenon1. A related concept worth distinguishing from congruence is emotional convergence, which captures how ‘‘people in close relationships develop increasing similarity in their emotional responses over time’’ (Anderson & Keltner, 2004). Like contagion, convergence refers to a mechanism or process by which emotional similarity between two parties occurs. Unlike contagion, the emotions of one party are not ‘‘caught’’ by the other party, but rather the parties come to develop similar patterns of emotional reactions to given stimuli. For instance, emotional convergence processes explain how relationship partners, over time, come to react similarly to situations even if not in the presence of one another. Like emotional contagion, convergence differs from congruence in that (a) it is a process, not a description of one’s emotional state, and (b) it is a shared process that operates at the level of the dyad, not the individual. This latter distinction is important, because (in)congruence is not a shared process, but rather resides in the mind of the individual experiencing the emotion. Convergence is defined by accuracy (i.e., convergence is said to occur when relationship partners independently express emotions that are more similar to one another over time; hence if similarity does not increase, then convergence is not occurring). In contrast, there is no accuracy dimension to congruence as there is for convergence;

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congruence occurs with regard to the perceiver’s subjective sense of congruence or alignment with the other party’s thoughts and feelings, and their perceptions need not be accurate. Relational Identification A third distinction worth highlighting is between relational identification and (in)congruence. Identification processes are hypothesized to occur at three levels – personal, relational, and collective (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). These levels describe how the self is cognitively represented as a function of (a) one’s personal attributes (personal identity), (b) one’s relationships – both interpersonal and role relationships – with others (relational identity), and (c) the groups to which one belongs (collective identity). These identity levels reflect different levels of inclusiveness for how people develop their self-concept. Essential to all three levels is that the self is directly invoked; one’s self-concept is an inherent element of the identities that people develop at all three levels. The identity level most related to the class of social emotions that are our current focus is relational identification, since emotional (in)congruence and relational identification both address the orientation that an individual has toward a social target. Congruent social emotions and strong relational identification both imply a positive orientation toward the other party (i.e., both would lead to a pull towards the other party). As such, experiencing congruent social emotions towards a social target (e.g., pride in other, vicarious joy, and empathy) may well evoke some of the same downstream consequences as strong relational identification with that social target. Furthermore, they are both intrapsychic phenomena, residing in the mind of the individual and not at the dyadic level. However, we feel that this is where the parallels between (in)congruence and relational identification end. First, although congruence and relational identification may indicate a similar orientation towards the social target, to our knowledge the relational identification literature does not provide a counterpart for incongruent social emotions. That is, there is no discussion in the relational identification literature of defining the self as different from or opposite to another party, which would be the analog to the incongruence end of our dimension (i.e., the relational identification literature does not discuss the concept of relational dis-identification). Low relational identification implies a lack of engagement with the target, whereas incongruent social emotions imply strong engagement with the target that is of an oppositional nature (i.e., feeling oppositional and incongruent, likely leading people to act against the target).


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Second, identification is a cognitive phenomenon, whereas congruence is an affective phenomenon. As such, differences between cognition and affect become quite relevant. Among these differences it is important to note that cognition is relatively more stable and enduring – whereas the self-concept is of course dynamic and variably accessible, it is relatively stable and changes occur over long periods of time (Dweck, Higgins, & Grant-Pillow, 2003). In contrast, affect and emotions are more visceral and ephemeral, and they change frequently in response to different situations and targets. Third, relational identification and congruence differ with regard to the role of the self. The self is central to relational identification; indeed, relational identification captures the extent to which there is merging between the self and the relationship partner (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). The self-defining effects of relational identification are not relevant to social emotions – we often feel social emotions toward people but do not define ourselves by our relationship with those people. This difference also speaks to the enduring nature of reactions to relational identification vs. social emotions; because of the role of the self-concept, relational identification concerns are likely to prompt more enduring reactions than would social emotions. This is not to say that social emotions are less important or should be less of a concern theoretically or practically. Indeed, social emotions can arise much more frequently and easily, and we often experience social emotions toward fleeting acquaintances or even those we do not know (consider, for instance, the prevalence of schadenfreude felt toward celebrities; and the prevalence of empathy for people who we see on the nightly news or read about in the newspaper). Finally, it is worth considering the relation between incongruence and the motive to feel distinct that is the focus of the prominent identity theory of optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991). Optimal distinctiveness refers to the drive to attain a state of equilibrium between drives to feel like part of a larger whole as well as feeling special or different from others in social settings. Although distinctiveness motives and incongruent social emotions result in psychological distancing of the self from social objects, the goal of distinctiveness is to feel different and unique from a social object, whereas incongruent social emotions lead one to feel the opposite of or contrary to a social object. That is, incongruent social emotions lead individuals to position themselves oppositionally toward a social target, since the push from these emotions is not be distinct or unique but rather different than and in contrast to. As such, identification-based motives to feel distinct from others are not equivalent to social emotion-based dynamics that prompt incongruence with a social target.

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In sum, although our congruence dimension and relational identification may at times produce similar consequences, equating them is problematic from a theoretical level since they differ in the relevance of the self, the conditions under which they are likely to occur, and the enduring nature of the reactions they may prompt.

CONGRUENCE AND JUSTICE Armed with our congruence dimension, we can now develop our social emotions analysis of justice. Our argument is quite straightforward: we cannot fully understand the justice dynamics between parties without understanding the social emotions that may be involved, because the degree of (in)congruence of experienced social emotions will shape how people subjectively evaluate justice. These subjective justice judgments, in turn, will shape justice-related actions (among justice agents, i.e., those who enact justice) and reactions (among justice recipients and third parties evaluating the justice of others’ encounters). In this way, the effect of people’s social emotions on their actions and reactions toward the targets of their emotion is mediated by their subjective justice judgments. This framework is presented in Fig. 1. We first discuss a number of general points and

Fig. 1. Model of the Impact of Social Emotions on Justice Judgments and Reactions.


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implications of our framework, and we then proceed to discuss how this framework may play itself out among different actors in the justice triumvirate (agents, third parties, and recipients).

Congruence and Subjective Justice Judgments As noted, our approach is based on the notion that (in)congruence impacts people’s subjective justice judgments. Although there has certainly been recognition and attention to the consequences of various subjective influences on people’s justice judgments (e.g., Blader, 2007; Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Messick & Sentis, 1983; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), this represents a small portion of the voluminous body of research on justice. Consider, for instance, that only very recently has attention been given to affective influences on subjective justice judgments (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007; Blader, Rothman, & Gonzalez, 2009; van den Bos, 2008; Wiesenfeld et al., 2009), despite the major influence that affect is known to have on judgments in general (Forgas, 2001; Schwartz & Clore, 1983). We propose that social emotions shape subjective justice judgments because people’s justice perceptions are made through the lens of the social emotions they feel toward the target. When individuals experience social emotions, their evaluations of what is just or unjust will be tied to their judgments of how the target is evaluating justice. For instance, congruent social emotions may lead them to reason about fairness from the other party’s perspective, invoking many of the same motives and egocentric biases that the target of their social emotions may have. When justice agents and third parties feel congruent social emotions toward a justice recipient (or target), they are moved from being bystanders to being (emotionally) involved parties to the encounter. As such, they may regard decisions and outcomes that over-advantage the target as quite fair [just as the target, or decision recipient, is likely to do (Messick & Sentis, 1983; Ross & Sicoly, 1979)]. In contrast, incongruent social emotions may lead people to have reactions that are the opposite of how they predict the target will react. Due to their discordant orientation toward the target of their emotion, they will be predisposed to evaluate justice in ways opposite to how they believe that the target would. As a result, when a justice agent or third party feels an incongruent emotion such as schadenfreude toward a target, they are likely

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to view a decision that over-advantages the target as being distinctly unfair and a decision that under-advantages the target as being fair. Motivated reasoning processes are a likely mechanism underlying the effects of social emotions on subjective justice judgments. In particular, people will selectively attend to, interpret, and utilize information to support their orientation to evaluate in ways similar to – or opposite from – how targets would be likely to evaluate them. Importantly, the effects of social emotions on subjective justice judgments are only likely to occur when the context provides sufficient ambiguity such that the justice of the situation is not clear or incontrovertible (Blader, 2007; Herlocker, Allison, Foubert, & Beggan, 1997; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), since in those situations subjective justice judgments might more closely reflect objective justice. Yet such cases are somewhat rarer than one might expect, since motives exert a strong influence on judgment (Kunda, 1990), and people may psychologically separate subjective and objective justice information. The implications of the distinction between objective and subjective justice can be profound. For instance, Smith (2004) notes that envy differs from resentment insofar as resentment arises from objective cases of unfairness, whereas envy arises from subjective unfairness, relying on an ‘‘existential complaint’’ that ‘‘another person enjoys an advantage longed for by oneself, and one feels impotent to attain this advantage. Furthermore, there seems no clear reason why this person is more deserving of this advantage than oneself.’’ (Smith, 2004, p. 50). The separation between objective and subjective justice – and the ability of people to balance both – can be further seen in Smith and colleagues’ (1994) study of the triggers of envy (Smith et al., 1994). In that study, participants recalled situations in which they felt envy and rated the level of both objective unfairness (‘‘Anyone would agree that the envied person’s advantage was unfairly obtained’’) and subjective unfairness (‘‘It seems unfair that the person I envied started out in life with certain advantages over me’’) in the situation. Notably, these two judgments diverged. Most importantly, however, it was only subjective injustice that was related to hostility and discontentment, the two defining elements of envy. This highlights that people distinguish subjective justice judgments from objective justice judgments, and that subjective justice judgments are a powerful influence in their own right. Notably, however, this research examines subjective justice judgments as antecedents of envious feelings. In this chapter, we focus on the opposite order of causality and examine the influence of (in)congruent social emotions (such as envy, an incongruent social emotion) on subjective justice judgments and reactions.


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Subjective Justice Judgments as Mediators of Congruence and Reactions to Justice When people experience social emotions, they are not only likely to be (mis)aligned with the target of their emotion in terms of subjective justice judgments and perceptions (as outlined earlier). They are also, more generally, emotionally engaged with the other party. This heightened engagement suggests that social emotions will impact the reactions that people have toward decision outcomes and processes. In the case of third parties, social emotions will likely act as a pathway that leads them to be concerned about the decision processes and outcomes that targets are encountering and to thus react to those processes and outcomes. In the case of justice agents, their emotional engagement may shape the processes and outcomes they provide to the target. And in the case of justice recipients, social emotions toward the justice agent may add a new angle to how they react to the decision processes and outcomes they receive from that agent. In all cases, social emotions will color the actions and reactions that people have toward decision processes and outcomes that relate to the target of their social emotions. Based on work emphasizing that justice perceptions play a critical role in shaping people’s behavior and their reactions to entities and events (Tyler et al., 1997), our model argues that justice plays a central role as a mediator of the relationship between social emotions and outcomes of practical importance in organizations such as attitudes and behaviors (depicted in Fig. 1). The mediating role we posit for subjective justice judgments is also consistent with research emphasizing the fundamental nature of the justice motive (Lerner, 1980, 1998; Tyler et al., 1997), motivating people to regard themselves as acting fairly (Blasi, 1984; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985) and to uphold justice (Chen & Tyler, 2001; Mikula, 1984; Montada & Schneider, 1989). It is worth contrasting our proposed mediation-by-justice framework with an alternative that does not predict mediation. In such a model, social emotions would have a direct effect on actions and reactions. Without perceived justice serving as a mediator, this model implicitly assumes that people’s social emotions are direct determinants of social behavior rather than social behavior reflecting justice concerns (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995b). This non-mediated model is what is most prevalent in the literature on discrete social emotions. Consider, for instance, the extensive work on empathy (e.g., Batson, 1991). This work highlights that empathy often leads people to take actions to alleviate the suffering of a distressed target even when those actions involve providing

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targets with extraordinary treatment, benefits, resources, and consideration. These actions are done in an effort to reduce the target’s distress but at the cost of other individuals in the same context (Batson et al., 1995b). Research in this vein suggests that group and team members’ treatment of one another is guided by specific emotional experiences, unfiltered by the desire to uphold justice. Such actions to benefit one party may well lead to harmful group dynamics, since they violate key elements of organizational justice such as equity and neutrality (Blader et al., 2009). Negative reactions by other parties in the context may be especially strong since limited resources (such as money, work load, opportunity, and access) are frequently involved, and as such, these special dispensations to the target will adversely affect others in the group. The prognosis is even worse with regard to incongruent emotions. Jealousy, hate, and related emotions directly evoke negative reactions. Yet conventional wisdom suggests that those reactions are constrained by people’s sense of justice. For instance, reactions to jealousy may be attenuated if it is clear that the resources that one is jealous over are deserved by the other party. Certain social emotions – such as schadenfreude and resentment – may often rely on perceptions that another’s advantaged status is undeserved, and thus these emotions cannot exist when that advantage is irrefutably deserved. A psychological model in which justice was irrelevant would leave emotions such as jealousy, resentment, and schadenfreude unconstrained, allowing the direct effect of these incongruent social emotions to corrode interpersonal relations and group dynamics. In contrast, our mediation-by-subjectivejustice model is somewhat more reassuring because it suggests that people’s actions and reactions are shaped by their justice judgments. Creating situations in which fairness is clear therefore presents a hopeful way of managing the impact of people’s social emotions on their justice judgments and justice-related actions and reactions. We will further explore the practicalities of this element of our model later below, where we consider how social emotions impact justice judgments and behavior on the part of justice agents, recipients, and third parties. Next we describe how our (in)congruence dimension relates to justice judgments and reactions on the part of third parties, justice agents, and recipients. Although there are unique features associated with a social emotions analysis of justice for each of these parties, the overriding argument is the model articulated in Fig. 1, which indicates that social emotions will lead people to subjectively perceive justice in similar or opposite ways from the target of the emotion. This, in turn, will shape their actions and reactions in those situations.

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THIRD PARTIES A critical, yet understudied, party to justice dynamics are the third parties who observe the justice that others encounter. Third parties represent an especially important party to justice dynamics in groups and teams because group members directly encounter only a limited number of justice-related experiences but are third-party observers to a much greater variety and number of such experiences. Indeed, the consequences of the fairness of one group member’s specific encounters can reverberate throughout a group because those unaffected by particular decisions often witness, evaluate, and react to the fairness of those encounters. Despite the critical and pervasive effect of third party justice judgments, relatively little research has examined the factors that shape these judgments (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). One possible explanation for this lack of attention to third parties may be a presumption that since third parties are not directly involved in a given justice encounter, they represent objective, dispassionate evaluators of the encounters they observe (Wiesenfeld et al., 2009). Yet even third parties bring a host of affective, cognitive, and motivational issues to judgment tasks (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005), and thus, it is highly unlikely that their detachment from any one specific incident will lead them to be impartial evaluators of that incident. We argue that the social emotions that third parties feel toward justice recipients lead them to become emotionally engaged in the justice those recipients encounter. As such, social emotions represent a critical mechanism by which third parties become involved in the fairness that others encounter and are thus critical to understanding third party observers’ judgments and reactions toward others’ experiences. The application of our general framework in Fig. 1 to third parties is fairly straightforward; when third parties feel social emotions toward a justice recipient, the (in)congruence of those social emotions will shape the fairness evaluations held by the third party, which will in turn shape their reactions. In particular, the (in)congruent nature of the social emotions felt toward a justice recipient will moderate third party reactions to the outcomes and procedures encountered by that recipient. The nature of this moderation pattern is that third parties who are experiencing congruent social emotions toward a target will have relatively positive justice judgments and reactions to outcomes and procedures that objectively over-advantage that target and will have relatively negative justice judgments and reactions toward outcomes and procedures that objectively under-advantage that target. These judgments and reactions will result from the third party adopting the target’s perspective, being sensitized to their needs, and engaging the egocentric

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biases that the targets themselves bring to the justice judgment process. In contrast, third parties who experience incongruent social emotions toward a target will have justice judgments and reactions that are the opposite of what they would believe to be the judgments and reactions of the targets of their emotions. As such, they might be expected to see outcomes and processes that objectively under-advantage the target as quite fair, while having quite negative fairness judgments and reactions toward outcomes and processes that over-advantage the target. Overall, it can be said that the (in)congruence of social emotions may lead third parties to view instances of objective unfairness quite positively and that this is true of unfairness that either over- or under-advantages the target. These predictions regarding the moderating influence of congruent and incongruent social emotions on third-party reactions to unfairness were tested and supported by Study 2 of Wiesenfeld et al. (2009). In that study, participants were presented with a vignette and were asked to imagine that the incident portrayed in the vignette occurred to a classmate. The study manipulated (1) an outcome received by the classmate (the classmate either received an outcome that was more than they should have objectively received, or less than they should have objectively received) and (2) the (in)congruence that the participant felt toward the classmate (congruence, incongruence, or neutral social emotion). The results strongly supported the predicted pattern of effects. When the classmate received an outcome that was objectively less than what they deserved, justice judgments and reactions varied directly as a function of the (in)congruence of the social emotion felt toward the classmate. The outcome was regarded as extremely unfair and reactions were extremely negative in the congruent social emotion condition, whereas the opposite was true of the incongruent social emotion condition where judgments and reactions were relatively positive. Both conditions were significantly different than the neutral social emotion condition, indicating that both ends of our congruence dimension were shaping judgments and reactions, leading to both overly positive and overly negative judgments and reactions as compared to the neutral condition. This pattern of results reversed when the outcome received was objectively more than the target deserved: those in the congruent social emotion condition regarded this over-advantage as quite fair and had quite positive reactions to it; the opposite was true of those in the incongruent social emotion condition; and both were significantly different from the neutral social emotion condition. Finally, and critical to our overall argument, the interactive effect of outcomes and social emotions on overall reactions was mediated by participants’ subjective justice

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judgments. Reactions were not a direct function of social emotions, but rather followed from people’s justice judgments that were themselves influenced by social emotions. These mediation results confirm our argument that justice concerns are fundamental and that justice concerns drive the effect that social emotions have on people’s reactions. These results are quite powerful because they demonstrate that the experience of either congruent or incongruent social emotions can alter how third parties perceive and react to outcomes that are objectively unfair in either direction (overly advantaging and overly disadvantaging). Indeed, the results suggest that it is not possible to predict or fully understand third-party reactions to others’ experiences without understanding the (in)congruence of the social emotions that the third party feels toward the individual encountering the experience. Our discussion of third parties and social emotions suggests that social emotions play a critical role in understanding what people will regard as fair or unfair, and this in turn shapes their reactions to the outcomes that they observe justice recipients receiving. However, the influence of social emotions on third-party judgments and reactions can become a good deal more complicated. Consider, for instance, that third parties may not only feel social emotions toward justice recipients, but they may also feel social emotions toward justice agents. When congruent social emotions are felt toward justice agents, then third parties are likely to reason about justice from the agent’s perspective and will be more likely to regard the outcomes and procedures provided by the agent as fair. When incongruent social emotions are felt toward justice agents, third parties will be likely to regard outcomes and procedures provided by the agent as unfair. Empirical research is needed to understand how third-party social emotions felt toward justice agents intermingle with social emotions felt toward justice recipients. It becomes quite clear from considering the multiple parties toward whom third parties may feel an emotional connection that thirdparty justice dynamics can become highly complicated as they play themselves out in the context of real-world groups and teams.

JUSTICE AGENTS A second critical but relatively understudied perspective on justice events is that of justice agents; that is, those individuals who create the justice or injustice that others experience in groups. Most commonly, group authorities (e.g., managers and leaders) are thought of as the agents of justice, since their

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role enables them to make the most impactful and far reaching decisions, and they control the greatest amount of resources. And indeed, justice research shows that group authorities are a primary determinant of people’s overall justice judgments, potentially more important than the formal rules and procedures of the group or organization (Blader & Tyler, 2003). However, justice agents may ultimately include everyone in a group, since in the process of group dynamics and interpersonal interaction everyone, at one point or another, provides outcomes, treatment, and decision-making process to someone else (for a more extensive discussion of this point, see Blader & Chen, in press; Chen, Brockner, & Greenberg, 2003). In our current analysis we discuss the influence of social emotions on justice agents in a way that reflects our belief that the dynamics we describe are relevant to those of any individual who provides treatment, outcomes, and decisions toward others. Although justice agents represent the lifeblood of the justice process, remarkably little research has examined the factors that lead agents to act fairly or unfairly. Justice research has devoted far more attention to understanding how decision recipients evaluate and react to justice than to understanding what leads agents to create fairness or unfairness for these decision recipients (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). Although a rich assortment of factors may influence justice agent’s fairness behavior, we believe that one key influence may be the social emotions that those agents feel toward the individuals impacted by their decisions. As our overall model suggests, we argue that the (in)congruence of the social emotions that agents feel toward recipients will shape their subjective evaluations of what constitutes fairness in particular situations, which will in turn determine their actual decisions. In particular, we argue that when justice agents feel congruent social emotions (e.g., empathy, liking, and pride in other), they are likely to construe justice in ways similar to how they believe the target will construe justice. That is, they are likely to reason about justice from the target’s perspective (Aderman, Brehm, & Katz, 1974; Hoffman, 2000), and thus, their subjective justice judgments will likely reflect the needs, perspective, and even egocentric biases of the target (Walster et al., 1978). This can lead justice agents to regard outcome distributions that over-advantage the target as fair; to regard providing greater voice to the target than they do to other group members as fair; to see giving more respectful treatment to the target than they do to others as fair; and so on. Their actual behavior, in turn, will reflect these justice judgments. When justice agents experience incongruence (e.g., hate or envy), on the other hand, their justice judgments are likely to be pulled in an opposite direction from those of the target. As a result,


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they are more likely to regard outcome distributions, procedures, and interpersonal treatment that under-advantage the target as relatively fair. They may justify these judgments by undervaluing a target’s deservedness (e.g., by cognitively diminishing the target’s contributions), by adopting a more macro view of justice (e.g., viewing current under-advantage as a way to remediate prior over-advantage), and by basic cognitive processes (e.g., selective attention to information) that emerge as a result of their motivation to regard under-advantaging the target as fair. Importantly, situational ambiguity is a necessary condition for such reasoning; when fairness is unambiguous and incontrovertible, we expect little influence of social emotions on justice judgments (Blader, 2007). Since actions that over-advantage or under-advantage a target follow from subjective justice judgments, any factor that interrupts the influence of social emotions on justice judgments will attenuate the effect of social emotions on such unfair behavior. In group and team contexts, one prime example of a factor that may eliminate the effect of social emotions on justice judgments is the justice agents’ accountability to others. Accountability leads people to expect that they will have to justify their beliefs, feelings, and actions to others (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Justice agents who feel accountable may strive to be impartial and are less likely to allow their decisions to be influenced by less justifiable factors such as the biases introduced by social emotions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Blader and colleagues (2009) directly tested this prediction. In three studies, they consistently found that (a) congruent social emotions altered justice agents’ perceptions of the fairness of over-advantaging decision recipients who were the target of their congruent social emotions, (b) the effect of social emotions on justice judgments was moderated by justice agent accountability, such that high accountability decision makers did not exhibit an influence of social emotions on justice judgments, and (c) the effect of social emotions on low accountability justice agent’s decisions was mediated by their justice judgments. As an example, in Study 2, participants were assigned to be the leader of a work group. Their task was to distribute the group’s work load, which consisted of analytical questions similar to those found on standardized tests like the SAT and GRE. Before making their work-allocation decisions, participants (as ‘‘leaders’’) received instructions on being a ‘‘good leader.’’ Embedded in these instructions was the congruence manipulation, which in this study was operationalized by directly manipulating a congruent social emotion (empathy). Participants were instructed to be either objective (low congruence) or to imagine their subordinates’ feelings

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(high congruence). Participants then learned that one of their ‘‘workers’’ was in a distressed state (i.e., that the student’s boyfriend/girlfriend had just broken up with her/him; based on Batson et al., 1995a, 1995b), and that worker requested a break on the work load. Accountability was manipulated by telling participants that their allocation decisions would (high accountability) or would not (low accountability) be made public. The results of this study provide full support for our social emotion analysis of justice. Variations in the congruence felt by justice agents shaped their judgments of the fairness of violating equity norms and instead led them to use need as a distributive norm. This, in turn, shaped their decisions, leading justice agents who were experiencing a congruent social emotion to treat the target of their emotion preferentially, dispensing to these targets privileged outcomes and treatment that were not available to other group members. As such, congruent social emotion led them to make decisions whose fairness other group members would be likely to question. These effects only occurred, however, among low accountability agents. These results show the potent impact that a justice agent’s social emotions can have on group functioning when group conditions do not curtail the effects of social emotions. Despite group authorities’ good intentions, congruent social emotions can lead group authorities to cause significant harm to the functioning of their groups. Furthermore, Blader et al. (2009) highlight an important strategy that groups can undertake to reduce the ability of social emotions to create objective unfairness in a group. By instituting systems that heighten the accountability of justice agents for their decisions, groups and teams can make justice agents more likely to make decisions and allocate outcomes in ways that will be regarded as fair not only by themselves but also by the group overall. Although Blader et al. (2009) did not examine how incongruent social emotions might influence justice agents, it is fairly straightforward what we might expect of such an analysis. Just as congruent social emotions led justice agents to regard overly-advantaging decisions and treatment as fair, we would expect that incongruent social emotions might lead justice agents to regard under-advantaging decisions and treatment as fair. Consider, for instance, a manager who feels resentment, an incongruent social emotion toward a subordinate. The incongruent orientation toward the subordinate will likely lead the justice agent to regard under-advantaging outcomes, treatment, and involvement in decision making processes as fair. This in turn will lead them to treat the target in a discriminatory manner, showing bias against the target and thus arousing a sense of unfairness among other group members. Furthermore, unlike congruent emotions,


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incongruent social emotions among justice agents will likely lead to dissatisfaction in the target, since the target is being unfairly disadvantaged. More fundamentally, incongruence may create a situation in which the justice judgments of the agent and of the recipients are pushed apart and discrepancies in their perspectives widened. In sum, what is highlighted by a social emotions analysis of justice among justice agents is that even though the justice motive may be in full force, when justice judgments and reasoning are amenable to subjective influences (i.e., low accountability), then social emotions can lead to various violations of objective standards of fairness in groups and teams. This is a critical but relatively unrecognized issue in the justice literature. Justice agents are, like everyone, emotional beings who frequently experience social emotions toward the individuals that are affected by their decisions. In the absence of conditions that inhibit the influence of social emotions on justice reasoning, their feelings toward others (in the form of their social emotions) are likely to shape the justice they do or do not create. Yet the justice literature has paid too little attention to the influence of emotions on agent’s justice judgments and justice-related actions and decisions.

JUSTICE RECIPIENTS Finally, we turn our attention to justice recipients, who have been the primary focus in justice research. As noted earlier, the preponderance of justice research has focused on the justice judgments of recipients, with relatively less work focusing on how subjective influences shape those judgments and little consideration of how the emotions felt towards the justice agent may shape justice judgments. Yet our framework is quite amenable to understanding the influence of (in)congruent social emotions on the justice judgments of recipients and thus their reactions to those judgments. In particular, when justice recipients are evaluating the fairness of their encounters with a particular justice agent, they are likely to be influenced by whether they feel congruent or incongruent social emotions towards that agent. When justice recipients feel congruent social emotions toward a justice agent, they are more likely to appreciate the multiple demands and goals weighing on justice agents because they are more likely to reason about justice from the agent’s perspective. Furthermore, they will be more likely to trust the agent and the agent’s intentions. As such, they may perceive situations in ways that give the agent the benefit of the doubt, perhaps also setting a more lenient threshold for deciding that justice is

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occurring. The effects of congruence in the case of justice recipients may be exacerbated by the desire to perceive fair treatment when dealing with a justice agent toward whom one feels close and connected, since such treatment would confirm their sense that they have a close relationship with that agent (Tyler & Lind, 1992) and disconfirming evidence may elicit quite negative reactions (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992). The experience of incongruent social emotions, on the other hand, is likely to have the opposite effect on justice recipients’ evaluations of the fairness they encounter from justice agents. Incongruence is likely to make justice recipients quite mistrustful of justice agents, questioning their motives and perhaps even their legitimacy. As such, they will be highly skeptical of the outcomes and procedures implemented by justice agents, an effect that will be exacerbated by their tendency to ignore the justice agent’s perspective toward justice reasoning. The damaging effects this can create for agent/recipient interactions are quite powerful, since the elevated skepticism that is provoked by justice recipient incongruence can make it extremely difficult to repair a damaged relationship between the parties. Indeed, the challenge this presents highlights yet again the importance of making fairness as transparent and incontrovertible as possible, since it is primarily under those conditions that it is likely that social emotions will not influence subjective justice judgments. Future research should examine the influence of social emotions among justice recipients. To our knowledge, prior work has not examined how social emotions felt toward a justice agent impact the justice judgments and reactions of justice recipients. Such research holds great promise for helping researchers gain a better sense of justice recipients’ subjective justice judgments. Furthermore, it may help resolve vexing issues that are realities of justice dynamics in actual groups and teams yet which have gone relatively unexplored by justice researchers. Consider, for instance, that the same objective outcomes, processes and treatment may be regarded quite differently by a justice recipient, depending on the justice agent providing them. Social emotions may be especially well suited to help us understand such situations and, more generally, to help understand subjective influences that relate to the dynamics between interacting parties involved in the justice encounter.

CONCLUSION We have presented a general framework that describes how (in)congruent social emotions may shape subjective justice judgments, and how this impact


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may explain the relationship between the congruence of felt social emotions and (a) third party reactions to the experiences of others, (b) justice agent’s actions and decisions, and (c) justice recipients’ reactions to their encounters with justice agents. Our goal in presenting this framework is to highlight that social emotions are a powerful influence on how people evaluate justice and that the lack of attention to this influence that has pervaded the justice literature thus far is problematic for development of a comprehensive understanding of subjective justice judgments. To date, emotions have primarily been examined as a consequence of justice or injustice (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008; Smith et al., 1994); we argue that in fact there is much to be gained by appreciating the role of emotions on justice judgments. Furthermore, we think it is especially important to consider the role of social emotions, since these emotions characterize the feelings and dynamics between interacting parties and as such are particularly compatible with the inherently social nature of justice. There are two elements of our general framework deserving of greater emphasis. The first is the critical mediating role of justice. Our framework argues that justice judgments mediate the impact of social emotions on actions and reactions; as such, it places justice center-stage and argues that justice is the critical intermediary that determines people’s downstream reactions to their social emotions. More generally, this argument reflects the perspective that justice is a fundamental concern, and as such people’s actions and reactions are typically brought into line with their judgments of what is fair or unfair. In this way, our framework and data supporting it provide additional evidence regarding the fundamental nature of the justice motive, and thus provide insight into the role of justice in people’s social lives. Moreover, this central role of justice has important practical value for group functioning, because it suggests that people’s actions and reactions will ultimately be shaped by their subjective justice judgments. Prior research has determined that when fairness is unambiguous, justice judgments and reactions are less subjectively biased (Blader, 2007; van den Bos, 2003). Creating situations in which fairness is clear and unambiguous therefore offers a promising avenue for managing the impact of people’s social emotions on their justice judgments and thus on their justice-related actions and reactions. Adding transparency to decision making procedures, providing detailed explanations of decisions made, and allowing multiple perspectives and voices to be heard as decisions are made are some useful ways to manage people’s behavior and reactions. The second element that we wish to highlight is that our framework makes clear that there are commonalities in the dynamics that relate to all

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parties to a justice encounter (agents, recipients, and third parties). Very few frameworks have been developed within the justice literature that highlight a fundamental psychological process that applies to all three of the parties involved in justice encounters. Rather, individual theories are developed that relate to a single party. This slows the progression of justice research and, furthermore, complicates efforts to understand core issues that are truly central to justice dynamics. Although there are certainly unique issues that arise in applying our framework to each of the parties involved in a justice encounter (e.g., third parties feeling social emotions toward multiple targets; agents dealing with cognitive dissonance in cases where they do not have latitude over their behavior and decisions but are experiencing social emotions toward the recipient), we feel that highlighting commonalities across parties facilitates a deeper understanding of justice dynamics. An additional contribution of our framework is that it brings attention to an important dimension that can be used by emotions researchers to better understand and study social emotions: (in)congruence. Future research is needed to empirically examine the congruence dimension we have proposed; we believe such additional research is worthwhile since social emotions play such a pivotal role in understanding social dynamics. By attending to this underlying dimension along which social emotions can be arrayed, we feel that research can develop more robust, broad tests of how social emotions relate to important outcomes (such as justice judgments). Of course, there are many additional avenues that future research should explore. Our theorizing uses social emotions as a starting point, yet there are many critical questions that relate to the antecedents of social emotions and how those antecedents may impact the dynamics we discuss in this chapter. For instance, does it matter if social emotions are the result of a longstanding relationship [and perhaps prior relational identification (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005)] with the target, as opposed to indirect information (such as reputations or stereotypes)? It might also be profitable to explore how interdependence with the target may impact the (in)congruence felt toward the target and whether different antecedents of a given social emotion (e.g., similarity vs. liking) lead to differential reactions. Future research should explore these issues. Another consideration for future research emerges from the studies discussed in this chapter. While some of the research discussed in this chapter investigated (in)congruence by directly manipulating this dimension, other research did so by manipulating a specific emotion. It is our feeling that these dual approaches to getting at the (in)congruence

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dimension – by focusing on the whole dimension vs. focusing on a specific emotion – speak to the generalizability of this research. Of course, we would expect parallel results from both of these approaches – and furthermore, we would expect results from the research focusing on a specific social emotion to replicate if a different but equivalently congruent social emotion were used. Future research is needed to investigate these assumptions, however, and to help determine the optimal approach to manipulating and studying the (in)congruence dimension we set forth in this chapter. Overall, we encourage justice researchers to more deeply consider the role of social emotions on justice judgments and to consider adopting the (in)congruence dimension we have described. We have argued that social emotions are critical because they shape how people (both third parties and justice recipients) react to justice agents’ decisions as well as the nature of those decisions in the first place. As such, social emotions strike at the very foundation of justice dynamics in groups and teams. Future research should further test – and perhaps challenge – the arguments we have presented so that justice research can gain a more complete picture of how emotions and justice interface.

NOTE 1. To the extent that there is a dynamic between contagion and congruence, it is likely in the form of moderation. That is, emotional contagion processes may well be moderated by the experience of congruent or incongruent social emotions. When an individual is experiencing congruent social emotions, they are already predisposed toward alignment with the target – and are likely more attuned to the target’s emotional states – and thus contagion processes may be accentuated (Hatfield et al., 1993). Conversely, when an individual is experiencing incongruent social emotions, they are predisposed to have an oppositional orientation vis-a`-vis the target, and thus contagion processes may be attenuated or thwarted altogether.

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CHAPTER 3 REWARDING THE FAIR AND REPAIRING THE UNFAIR: BOTH GROUP PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE MAY MOTIVATE GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR Heather Barry and Tom R. Tyler ABSTRACT Purpose – This chapter reviews the authors’ research on group procedural justice and group-serving behavior. It makes the case that fairness and unfairness can both motivate group-serving behavior; the former makes group members feel good about their identity, leading them to ‘‘reward’’ the group, and the latter indicates a group shortcoming, leading members to ‘‘repair’’ the group. Design/methodology/approach – The chapter describes several studies published elsewhere. Correlational research with employees and students examines the relationship between group procedural fairness and group members’ positive affect, which should translate into group-serving behavior. Experimental research with students investigates whether group procedural unfairness can result in group-serving behavior (measured via self-report and observed helping). Complementary findings from other Fairness and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 13, 63–94 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2010)0000013006

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authors are briefly described and discussed in support of a developed theoretical model of group procedural justice and group-serving behavior. Findings – Group procedural fairness was more strongly related to arousing positive affect for strongly identified group members. Separately, strongly identified group members engaged in more group-serving behavior when their group had unfair rather than fair procedures. Research limitations/implications – Possible boundary conditions for the motivating effects of unfairness are discussed (e.g., group permeability, time frame, and anonymity of unfairness). Suggestions for future research are proposed (e.g., examine the effect of justice information on groupserving behavior when group members can also modify group procedures). Practical implications – Better understanding the effects of group procedural unfairness should influence how organizations and societies promote group-serving behavior. Originality/value – Research on the motivating effects of both group procedural fairness and unfairness are synthesized into one theoretical model.

In a 2009 job advertisement, Oberto Sausage Company quoted its president Tom Campanile as saying: We have had significant success over the years and Oberto Sausage Company employees are to be congratulated. Without the hard work and dedication of the people, we could not deliver to our customers the high quality products that we make. What makes this company unique is the ‘‘passion’’ of the people and genuine care that we have for each other. With those characteristics in people throughout our company, we can make anything happen.

Sausage companies – indeed, companies in general – are not the only groups that rely on the hard work, dedication, passion, and care of their members. Communities, teams, clubs, families, and even universities count on their constituents to do things that help other group members or help the group as a whole. This chapter discusses how these actions, which we refer to generally as group-serving behavior, may be fostered or deterred by the fairness of the group’s procedures for making decisions and allocating resources. Many precursors of group-serving behavior, such as group members’ altruistic personality characteristics (e.g., conscientiousness and agreeableness; Organ & Ryan, 1995), are largely beyond the control of the

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group. Group-level procedural fairness is especially interesting, therefore, as it is a feature that a group has the power to change. Research suggests that group procedural fairness may in turn have the power to change the behavior of group members, shaping the group into a place where groupserving behavior is common.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, GROUP IDENTIFICATION, AND GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR: THE GROUP ENGAGEMENT MODEL Groups that are considered procedurally ‘‘just’’ tend to make decisions in a fair and impartial way, clearly communicate decisions to group members, and give members a chance to express an opinion about those decisions. Using fair procedures like these indicates to group members that they are respected and valued by the group; it also signifies that this is a high-quality group. As delineated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people use information about the groups they belong to in shaping their identities and evaluating their self-worth. In order to maintain and bolster self-esteem, people tend to align their identity with a group when doing so offers benefits – that is, when the group has positive, desirable qualities that reflect well on the individual’s identity (Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997). Thus, the fairness of group procedures, as one cue for deriving information about the group and one’s standing within it, can lead people to align their identity with a group. This is the process described by the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003), and a great deal of empirical evidence supports the contention that group procedural fairness encourages members to identify themselves with groups (Blader & Tyler, 2009; De Cremer, van Dijke, & Bos, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Furthermore, identification with a group leads members to engage in more group-serving behavior, as they derive greater self-relevant benefits from group success (Tyler & Blader, 2000; see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005, for an overview). People who construe their personal identity in terms of group membership are more likely to comply with group rules, to cooperate with fellow group members, and to engage in extra-role behavior that benefits the group (Blader & Tyler, 2009; Kamdar, McAllister, & Turban, 2006; Olkkonen & Lipponen, 2006; Simon, Stu¨rmer, & Steffens, 2000; Tyler, Callahan, & Frost, 2007). Thus, over time, groups that are procedurally fair

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encourage members to align their personal identities with that of the group, and this leads to greater engagement in group-serving behavior. However, these robust findings do not speak to the question of how procedural fairness or unfairness may influence the group-serving behavior of members who are already identified with a group. That is, how does the immediate experience of fairness or unfairness from a group impact the group-serving behavior of members? Might this effect differ from the way group procedures shape identification and group-serving behavior of members with a group over time? These questions are addressed by the research presented in the remainder of this chapter.

GROUP PROCEDURAL INFORMATION MOTIVATES GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR IN TWO WAYS In terms of leading people to identify with a group over time, procedural fairness is clearly superior to unfairness. And, from an identity point of view, this should be true in terms of both members’ personal experiences with group procedures, as well as general, group-level information (which may or may not impact the individual personally). Both types of information reflect on the quality of the group, and therefore provide cues as to whether identifying with a group will offer benefits or drawbacks to the individual identities of group members. However, for members who are already identified with a group, both group-level procedural justice and injustice may motivate group-serving behavior, albeit for different reasons. Group justice should make members feel good about their identity, and make them want to ‘‘reward’’ the group fairness via group-serving behavior. Group injustice, however, should indicate that all is not well with the group, and, at least in the short term, should motivate members to ‘‘repair’’ the group shortcomings via group-serving behavior. To clarify this argument, consider the findings from a recent study (Barry & Tyler, 2007). In this study, we considered university students as group members and the university community (fellow students, staff, and administration) as their group. Students were presented with one of two versions of information about their university’s procedures for addressing problems and complaints (‘‘grievance procedures’’). One version of the grievance procedures was clearly fairer than the other, but both were somewhat ambiguous and there was variability in how fair participants perceived them to be. Thus, after reading the procedures, participants were asked for their opinion about how


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fair the grievance procedures were. Later in the study, participants responded to several questions about how likely they would be to perform different types of group-serving behavior: staying after class to copy papers for a professor, tutoring a fellow student, cleaning up common areas in a dorm, running an errand for university staff, etc. To investigate whether increasing perceptions of fairness or unfairness would both predict a greater willingness to engage in group-serving behavior, participants’ opinions were combined across the two versions of the procedures to create a continuous measure of perceptions of group procedural fairness. This unorthodox method of analysis provided an exploratory way to look for support for a quadratic relationship between perceived group fairness and members’ group-serving behavior. Indeed, analysis showed such a quadratic relationship. As depicted in Fig. 1, increasing perceptions of both fairness and unfairness predicted greater immediate willingness to engage in such behavior. Presumably, participants on the right side of the graph were motivated by an increasing desire to reward their group’s fairness via contributions of

Fig. 1. Regression Line Predicting Willingness to Engage in Group-Serving Behavior as a Function of Perceived Group Procedural Justice (Barry & Tyler, 2007).

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group-serving behavior. They should have felt good about being part of the university community, and reinforced these good feelings by expressing a greater likelihood of giving back to the group. On the other hand, participants on the left side of the graph were presumably motivated by an increasing desire to repair the group shortcoming that the unfair procedures indicated. Participants were not given the opportunity to suggest or implement changes to the grievance procedures, so they could not repair this group shortcoming directly. However, another way to try to repair, or improve, one’s group is to engage in behavior that helps other group members or helps the group as a whole. This group-serving behavior may make the group fairer, because members who have resources (time, skills) transfer these resources to those in need. Beyond this, such behavior may also make the group better, because its members are generally better off. Regardless of its results, engaging in groupserving behavior offers members a way to invest extra effort in response to a group shortcoming. These findings support the idea that group fairness and unfairness may both motivate short-term group-serving behavior. To gain more insight into the underlying processes, our subsequent investigations have addressed the motivating effects of fairness and unfairness separately. The remainder of the chapter addresses two issues. Why does greater fairness motivate groupserving behavior? We deal with this topic before turning to the question of whether greater unfairness can also motivate group-serving behavior. In addition, our subsequent investigations consider a moderator of these relationships in an effort to better understand their psychological significance. That moderator is the degree to which group members identify with the group. The quadratic relationship depicted in Fig. 1 was present in a group of students who likely had varying levels of identification with the university community. However, we speculate that the member reaction of rewarding group fairness and repairing group unfairness via group-serving behavior should be most likely for group members whose personal identity and sense of self is strongly connected to group membership. Thus, our subsequent investigations consider group identification as a moderator of how procedural fairness and unfairness may separately motivate group-serving behavior.

GROUP IDENTIFICATION AS MODERATOR OF JUSTICE EFFECTS Building on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identity-based models of group membership argue that an important function of groups is


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to provide people with a framework within which they can construct a social identity. In order to build a desirable, favorable social identity, people define their individual identity in terms of group membership when they can gain benefits, such as status and esteem, from doing so. Thus, the group engagement model distinguishes people’s judgments about a group’s status and their own status within the group as among the precursors of group identification. When a group is seen as prestigious, and/or when an individual feels himself to be an esteemed member of that group, then defining his identity in terms of group membership enables him to construct a positive social identity. In this framework, group identification means aligning one’s sense of self with group membership, and it results in part from feeling that one’s group is respected by other individuals and groups, and that one is respected by fellow group members. Because group members can define their personal identity in terms of group membership to a greater or lesser degree, group identification tends to amplify the reactions of members to information about the group (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; McCoy & Major, 2003). Group identification also amplifies the effects of group procedural justice (Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005). This is in line with the previously discussed idea that the fairness of group procedures is one cue for people to derive information about the group and their standing within it. People use information about their group to bolster their self-esteem, and this is especially true for those members who have strongly defined their personal identity in terms of group membership; that is, for those members with strong group identification. We now address one route by which group fairness may motivate group-serving behavior for members with strong group identification: positive affect.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MOTIVATES GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR Recent years have seen a striking increase in the amount of research devoted in examining the affective impact of justice (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; De Cremer, 2007; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; van den Bos, 2001). We believe that one way procedural fairness may motivate group-serving behavior is via affective reactions. Because we are interested in the precursors of group-serving behavior, our

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research in this area has focused on affect which guides the action (rather than inaction) of individuals in groups. In general, two types of affective reactions have been connected to action in groups: arousing negative affect (NA) and arousing positive affect (PA). Both arousing negative (e.g., angry and fearful) and positive (e.g., happy and elated) affective states energize the individual and prompt action more so than non-arousing negative (e.g., sad and depressed) and positive (e.g., calm and relaxed) affective states (Izard & Ackerman, 2000). Of course, arousing NA and PA lead to different types of action. Specifically, research on intergroup behavior generally finds that arousing NA leads to riots, protests, and collective action against unfairness (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Vermunt, Wit, van den Bos, & Lind, 1996; Walker & Smith, 2002). On the other hand, arousing PA leads to behavior that benefits other group members, like the group-serving behavior that is the focus of this chapter. High arousing PA in employees predicts organizational citizenship behaviors like voluntarily taking on extra work or following group rules even when unsupervised. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis found that such behaviors were related to PA, but not to NA (Organ & Ryan, 1995; summarized by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Because it seems to be especially important for motivating group-serving behavior, we discuss research in which we have related group-level procedural fairness to arousing PA; we briefly address NA at the end of the chapter.

EXPERIENCING PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS LEADS TO AROUSING PA Research has demonstrated that when people are personally affected by procedural fairness, this fairness fosters arousing PA – feelings like happiness, excitement, and engagement. Participants given an opportunity to express their opinions (a fairness manipulation) felt more PA than those who were denied an opportunity to express their opinion (van den Bos, Maas, Waldring, & Semin, 2003). When employees worked for a company with fair performance evaluations and payment procedures, they felt more PA on a typical day at work (De Cremer, Stinglhamber, & Eisenberger, 2005). And, procedural fairness in the workplace predicted more compliance with office rules, an effect that was partially mediated by happiness, one form of PA (Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Thus, in general, the experience of procedural fairness leads to more PA.


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We anticipated that this PA-promoting effect of procedural fairness would not be limited to group procedures that group members personally experience. Even when group-level procedural fairness does not impact group members personally, it should still promote PA for them. Whether or not fair group procedures apply to individual group members, the procedures reflect on their identity and self-worth. In line with this, several studies examining non-affective dependent variables find that procedural fairness has an impact regardless of whether it applies to the self. Objectively reported fair treatment of others is as influential on personal fairness judgments as one’s own treatment (van den Bos & Lind, 2001). General group rules and procedures, which are less relevant for individual group members than personal experiences, influenced the identification of members with a group (Blader & Tyler, 2003). Further, a recent study showed that although people made faster implicit inferences about fairness when unfair events were framed in the first-person than in the third-person, this personal relevance manipulation had no effect on the formation of explicit fairness judgments (Ham & van den Bos, 2008). Indeed, a group ‘‘climate’’ of procedural fairness, which refers to the group-level opinion about how fairly the group as a whole is treated procedurally, has been shown to predict more effective group performance, less absenteeism among group members, and more organizational citizenship behaviors (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Liao & Rupp, 2005). Together, these findings suggest that general group rules and procedures may have an affective impact even for those group members to whom they do not personally apply. Specifically, arousing PA may be cultivated by group fairness because the group fairness conveys information about the group and one’s standing within it. Because group fairness is relevant to members’ identities, even when it is not relevant to their personal experiences, it should foster PA. As discussed earlier, people use group-level information, including that about procedural fairness, in evaluating their self-worth (Tyler & Blader, 2000; see also Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, if group-level procedural fairness leads to PA partly because it reflects on group members’ identities, it should not simply lead to PA across the board. Instead, the effect of group procedural fairness on PA should depend on the degree to which members have linked their identity to the group. It is important to note that this prediction is different from that examined by research on group-level emotions. Such research finds that people may respond emotionally to events that impact the group but not the self (e.g., Alexander, Brewer, & Hermann, 1999; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Maitner et al., 2006; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007). However, this

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group-level emotions research focuses on emotions felt in an intergroup context, where a salient outgroup is often the emotional target (e.g., for anger). Even when emotions are felt toward the ingroup (e.g., satisfaction), they result from action that an outgroup has taken against the ingroup, thereby leading individuals to construe their identities in terms of ingroup membership. Building on these findings, we predicted that group-level procedural information would be linked to the individual affective reactions of group members, even when there is no outgroup involved.

EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT GROUP PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS LEADS TO AROUSING PA We conducted two studies to test the hypothesis that the relationship between group-level procedural fairness and PA would be moderated by group identification. For strongly identified group members, group procedural information is more identity-relevant, and should especially impact PA. In these studies, group identification was measured via two indicators: feelings of pride in group membership and perceptions of respect from group authorities and fellow members (Tyler & Blader, 2000). As discussed earlier, people generally identify with groups because doing so provides a beneficial social identity; this comes in part when people believe that their group is respected by other individuals and groups, and that they themselves are respected by group authorities and fellow members. Group members who are strongly identified with their groups generally feel the most proud of group membership and the most respected by authorities and fellow members. These strongly identified group members have the most at stake when they learn about group fairness, and it is these members who should especially experience arousing PA when they think their group is fair. The first study testing this hypothesis was conducted via Knowledge Networks with a nationwide sample of more than 4,000 American employees (Barry & Tyler, 2009a, Study 1). Employees were asked about their feelings of pride with items like ‘‘I am proud to tell others where I work’’ and ‘‘I think that where I work reflects well on me.’’ They were also asked about the respect they received from group authorities, with items like ‘‘How much do the managers where you work think highly of the quality of your work?’’ and ‘‘How much do the managers where you work respect the work you do?’’ These pride and respect items were combined as an indicator of group identification.


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In line with our focus on group-level procedural fairness, this study focused on judgments that the employees made about procedural fairness in their workplace, rather than about the fairness that they personally experienced there (as other studies have addressed). Thus, procedural fairness was measured with items tapping perception about general workplace rules and procedures, such as ‘‘Decisions are usually made in fair ways at my company’’ and ‘‘Overall, people are treated fairly where I work.’’ As discussed earlier, this method is similar to the way some researchers have measured procedural justice climate (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2002; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Roberson, 2006). However, unlike in such climate research, we were theoretically interested in individual employees’ judgments about the general procedural fairness in their workplace, rather than ‘‘the distinct [group]-level opinion about how fairly the [group] as a whole is treated procedurally’’ (Colquitt et al., 2002, p. 84). In line with this distinction, we used individual employees’ opinions about the general procedural fairness in their workplace as a predictor, rather than aggregating the team- or workplace-level judgments and using this average judgment (or an indicator of its variability) as a predictor, as research on procedural justice climate might do. Finally, employees were asked about the arousing PA (e.g., excitement and determination) they had experienced at work during the past several weeks. Results indicated first that employees who saw their organization’s procedures as being fairer felt more proud to be part of the organization and more respected by organization authorities. That is, procedural fairness predicted higher group identification, in line with the group engagement model described earlier (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Beyond this correlation, however, we looked at how group fairness predicted the PA of group members depending on their identification, and found a significant interaction between procedural fairness and group identification predicting PA. As hypothesized, the arousing PA of highly identified group members was more heavily influenced by group-level procedural fairness than was the case for those with weaker identification (Barry & Tyler, 2009a, Study 1). These results were striking because even in retrospective reports, the relationship between procedural fairness and arousing PA was stronger for employees whose identity was more linked to their organization. These findings supported the contention that such PA is high in response to group fairness partly because the fairness conveys identity-relevant information. Group fairness is especially identity relevant for group members who have linked their personal identity to the group, and it was these members who had especially high arousing PA when they saw their group as fair. However, this study could only provide limited support for the idea that

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group-level procedural fairness influences group members’ PA even when the procedures are not personally relevant. Because employees are likely to be affected sooner or later by the procedures utilized in their workplace, even the general workplace rules and procedures that participants evaluated in this first study are not, strictly speaking, personally irrelevant. We therefore conducted a second study to provide a stronger test of the hypothesis that for highly identified group members, personally irrelevant group fairness would predict high arousing PA. The second study (Barry & Tyler, 2009a, Study 2) used university students as group members and their university community as the group. In this study, we first measured the student participants’ identification with the university community. Similarly to the employees study discussed earlier, students were asked how proud they were to be part of the university community and how respected by administration and fellow students they felt. Then, students were given information about their university’s procedures for handling complaints and grievances, and were asked to indicate how fair they thought it was. Because people generally expect fairness from the groups they belong to (Brewer, 1999; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), this procedural information was designed to suggest that the procedures were rather unfair, while still being somewhat ambiguous. Thus, the study could obtain more variability in participants’ perceptions of the group’s procedural fairness than might have been the case with information that was more strictly ‘‘fair.’’ Further, in this study the group fairness was not personally relevant to participants, because they were informed that the university procedures they read about were being used on a trial basis, and would not apply to the whole student body for the next few years. Arousing PA was measured with participants’ indications of how they felt immediately after reading the procedural information (e.g., happy and lively). Results indicated that, just as in the employees study, there was an interaction between procedural fairness and group identification in predicting PA. As shown in Fig. 2, the PA of highly identified group members was heavily influenced by perceptions of group fairness, but the PA of less identified group members was unrelated to perceptions of group fairness (Barry & Tyler, 2009a, Study 2). In this study, the described procedures spoke to the nature of the group and its values, but had no practical impact on participants. However, perceptions of procedural fairness predicted higher arousing PA for highly identified group members. This was again in line with the hypothesis that group fairness, as it reflects on the identity of these members, is linked to higher PA for them. Weakly identified group members, whose identity and

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Rewarding the Fair and Repairing the Unfair 4.3 Low group identification 4.1

High group identification

3.9

Arousing PA

3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 1

2

3

4

Fairness of group's procedures

Fig. 2. Regression Lines Predicting Arousing Positive Affect as a Function of Group Identification and Perceived Procedural Justice (Barry & Tyler, 2009a, Study 2).

esteem are not grounded in group membership, did not have higher arousing PA in response to perceptions of group procedural fairness. How do these results speak to factors underlying group-serving behavior? The dependent variable of interest in these two studies was arousing PA, not group-serving behavior. However, other research has indicated that it is this form of affect which leads to the compliance, cooperation, helping, and extra-role behaviors that benefit other group members (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Gendolla, 2000; Murphy & Tyler, 2008; Podsakoff et al., 2000). Thus, we believe that increasing feelings of arousing PA, at least for members who define their personal identity in terms of group membership, is one way that group procedural fairness leads group members to engage in group-serving behavior. Highly identified group members feel good about group fairness, and should ‘‘reward’’ their group in return. These results thus speak to the right side of our curvilinear Fig. 1 – the connection between higher perceived fairness and greater group-serving behavior. Overall, the results of these studies shed light on why greater procedural fairness promotes group-serving behavior. We argue that procedural justice communicates identity-relevant information. This information is

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most relevant to those whose personal identity is intertwined with the group. And, it has the consequence of shaping positive affect, which in turn, presumably influences group-serving behavior.

PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE MOTIVATES GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR In contrast to those reviewed earlier, there are other situations in which group unfairness motivates group-serving behavior that will ‘‘repair’’ the group. For example, group members who have been systematically disrespected may exert extra effort on group-serving tasks, in attempt to assert the worth of the self separately from the group (Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006a, 2006b). However, in the prior section we addressed the relationship between group fairness that was only to some degree personally relevant, and the PA of individual group members. Likewise, in considering the effect of group-level unfairness, we considered a situation where group procedural unfairness represents a group shortcoming for which an individual group member is not personally responsible. That is, unlike in the work of Sleebos et al. (2006a, 2006b), the procedural unfairness we examined was not based on the individual achievements of group members, but rather on the procedures of the group as a whole, for which study participants bore no individual responsibility. We were interested in whether group members would address this group shortcoming by increasing their own group-serving behavior. And, again, we expected that reactions to such information would not be the same for all group members. Rather, we predicted that those who identify themselves with the group should react differently. In this case, we expected that for members who were highly identified with the group, receiving information that their group was actually unfair would motivate group-serving behavior.

PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS AS A GROUP SHORTCOMING People expect and want their groups to be procedurally fair, since being proud of a group’s attributes allows group members to feel good about themselves (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Blader & Tyler, 2003). Thus, evidence of group unfairness is a sign of shortcoming, indicating that the


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group needs help. As delineated by self-completion theory, identity can be conceived of as a goal that people are motivated to pursue (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). Therefore, when feedback indicates that one is falling short of an identity goal, it can serve as motivation for increased effort. For example, medical school students made fewer errors on a test that supposedly measured the mental concentration necessary to succeed as a physician when they first received failure feedback rather than no feedback on a bogus test of skill dealing with patients (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). The failure feedback presumably indicated that the medical students were falling short of their physician identity goals, thereby motivating them to invest more effort on the mental concentration task to repair the state of identity incompleteness. More generally, self-completion theory research finds that having identity-relevant shortcomings made salient is usually not accepted passively; rather, people compensate by investing effort in alternative routes toward the desired goal (e.g., Gollwitzer, Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982). Recent research has demonstrated that this pattern applies at the group level as well. Individuals have identity goals for the groups they belong to, and will compensate for group identity shortcomings by pursuing alternative positive identity symbols (Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale, 2007). Indeed, group members will allocate more resources to their group than to themselves when the group particularly needs help (Brann & Foddy, 1987), especially when there is no chance for them to change groups (i.e., group membership is impermeable; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993). For these reasons, then, we anticipated that group members, at least those who were highly identified with their group, would respond to information that indicated their group was unfair with a high rather than low level of group-serving behavior. That is, in a short-term situation where group membership is fixed, procedural unfairness should lead to more group-serving behavior than procedural fairness for highly identified group members.

EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT GROUP PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS CAN LEAD TO GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR To test this hypothesis, we conducted two studies in a sample (university students) where group membership is fixed and relatively impermeable. These students have a history with their university, have given money to the

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university, often live in university housing, visit other university facilities frequently, and interact with fellow students, professors, and administrators on a daily basis. Group membership is especially impermeable for those who strongly identify themselves with the university community, since those low in identification can more easily remove their sense of self, if not themselves physically, from the group. Thus, we measured group identification, and presented participants with information that their university was either procedurally fair, or unfair. Subsequently, we offered participants a chance to participate in group-serving behavior. Group-serving behavior was defined as things that students do to help other members of the university community, including fellow students, faculty, and staff. We hypothesized that high identifiers would react to the procedural information by performing the most (or expressing the most interest in) group-serving behavior when the group was unfair. In these studies, group identification, the hypothesized moderator of procedural justice effects, was measured more broadly than in the studies discussed earlier. Rather than asking about pride in group membership and respect from group authorities and fellow members, we measured the degree to which participants had merged their individual sense of self with the group. We used this operationalization in part because previous research has suggested that merging one’s sense of self with the group is an important precursor to group-serving behavior (De Cremer, Tyler, & den Ouden, 2005). We speculated that group members, who identified with a group, especially when identification was defined in terms of merging one’s sense of self with the group, would be most likely to see group shortcomings as personal shortcomings, and to address those shortcomings with their own groupserving behavior. Thus, in one study (Barry & Tyler, 2009b, Study 1) we measured group identification (of students at New York University, or NYU) via endorsement of items like ‘‘Being a member of the NYU community is very important to the way you think of yourself as a person’’ and ‘‘NYU is a close, tight-knit community.’’ Participants were told that they would complete a reading comprehension task, and were presented with information designed to look like an official website explaining the university’s procedures for addressing problems and complaints, similar to the material utilized in some of the other studies described in this chapter. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the two versions of the procedural information, which were identical other than three bullet points. Participants in the justice condition read, ‘‘You have the right to file a grievance,’’ ‘‘You have the right to a written decision,’’ and ‘‘You have the


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right to appeal.’’ Those in the injustice condition read, ‘‘Some people may have the right to file a grievance,’’ ‘‘Some people have the right to a written decision y the appeal officer will decide who receives a written decision,’’ and ‘‘People sometimes have the right to appeal.’’ Manipulation checks showed that the information presented in the justice condition was seen as being fairer than that in the injustice condition. After completing other materials, the experimenter explained that this was the end of the study, but that the study had been conducted with the university’s Office of Community Service, which was interested in why students volunteer. Participants were then given a brochure about a program that the office had supposedly launched, and asked to read through it. They were told that whether or not they wanted to write anything on the brochure, they should drop it off in a lockbox (labeled with the program’s logo) down the hall. The brochure participants were given was printed on glossy paper and designed to look like it came from an actual NYU office. It presented a new program called ‘‘NYU Cares.’’ There were spaces for interested participants to provide their contact information. The brochure listed several different volunteer opportunities (ranging from tutoring NYU students to working on Welcome Week events), and each one could be marked to indicate the participant’s interest. A score created from participants’ responses to these options was subsequently analyzed as the result of group identification and procedural justice condition. Results showed that group identification moderated the effect of the procedural justice manipulation. For participants with high group identification, unfair procedures led to significantly more interest in engaging in group-serving behavior than fair procedures. For participants with low group identification, interest in group-serving behavior did not differ by justice condition. Thus, this study found that for people who strongly identified with their group, procedural unfairness rather than procedural fairness led to more group-serving behavior, at least in the short term. Under certain circumstances, then, procedural unfairness information can actually motivate people to cooperate more rather than less with their groups. These findings were especially interesting given that our measures of group identification and group-serving behavior were very similar to those that have been used in most previous procedural justice research, which generally finds that identification and procedural fairness rather than unfairness are associated with greater group-serving behavior (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2000). We followed up these findings with a second study, while addressing a few limitations of the first.

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One limitation of the initial study was the measure of group-serving behavior, which only indexed self-stated interest in performing behavior to help the group. Although efforts were made to present the dependent variable brochure as being separate from the study, and although participants returned the brochure to a locked dropbox rather than to the experimenter, this measure may still have been susceptible to selfpresentation concerns which would not have translated into actual volunteering. Therefore, we were interested in whether group identification would also moderate the effect of procedural justice on more spontaneous behavior. In examining group-serving behavior, previous research has typically either measured perceived probabilities of engaging in particular cooperative or compliant acts in the future, or has collected participants’ reports of engaging in such actions over a past period of time. Such measures capture deliberative, controlled behaviors that are in line with one’s explicit attitudes (Fazio & Olson, 2003). But, how do procedural justice and group identification relate to spontaneous action such as interrupting a conversation or walking quickly when asked to run an errand? Research by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; review by Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001) suggests that such behaviors are often automatic and performed without conscious intent. Following the distinction made by Fazio and Olson, they may be better predicted by implicit rather than explicit measures. Therefore, our next study used an implicit approach to measuring identification, based on research by Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson (1991) (see also Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 2001), to increase the likelihood of identifying the psychological dynamics underlying spontaneous helping. Further, the use of this implicit measure of identification allowed us to test the robustness of the initial findings. With the exception of utilizing a relatively implicit (rather than explicit) measure of group identification, and the addition of a measure of spontaneous behavior, the methods of the second study were largely the same as that of the first. In the second study, rather than including the brochure task, we asked participants several questions about how likely they would be to perform different types of cooperative behavior similar to those listed in the NYU Cares brochure (staying after class to copy papers for a professor, tutoring a fellow student, cleaning up common areas in a dorm, running an errand for university staff, etc.). With this dependent variable, we found a replication of the initial study results – group identification moderated the effect of procedural justice condition, such that for


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participants who strongly identified with the group (this time measured implicitly), group-serving behavior was more likely in the injustice condition than in the justice condition (Barry & Tyler, 2009b, Study 2). This study also included a second dependent variable, which was intended to measure spontaneous group-serving behavior. At the conclusion of the study participants were asked to call the experimenter back into the cubicle. The experimenter, a female fellow undergraduate student (who was blind to the participant’s justice condition) pretended to take notes on her clipboard (which had a university logo) while ‘‘accidentally’’ dropping a university logo pen that had been sitting on the clipboard. She surreptitiously recorded whether each participant picked up the pen for her within 5 s – about half of the participants did so. Again, procedural justice moderated the effect of (implicitly measured) group identification. Highly identified group members were more likely to retrieve the pen in the injustice condition than the justice condition (Barry & Tyler, 2009b, Study 2). Thus, with a more implicit measure of group identification, and even for a more spontaneous behavioral measure, we replicated our initial findings. For highly identified group members, groupserving behavior was most likely when they received information about their group’s procedural unfairness. This finding offers further evidence that identifying with a group may lead to addressing procedural failings of the group through one’s own group-serving behavior. Why, then, has not more research identified this pattern? First, although it has not always been framed in the way presented here, there is some research that speaks to unfairness increasing group-serving behavior. One aforementioned example is the work of Sleebos et al. (2006b), who found that group members who had been systematically disrespected (a form of injustice) would exert extra effort on group-serving tasks, in attempt to assert the worth of the self separately from the group. Indeed, in line with our overarching proposal that both procedural unfairness and procedural fairness can motivate group-serving behavior, Sleebos et al. (2006a) found that low respect as well as high respect motivated people to increase their discretionary efforts on behalf of the group. In another instance, Harb, Fischer, and Al-Hafedh (2009) examined the precursors of resistance and protest in Iraqi citizens under American occupation. They found that Iraqis who strongly identified with their country would act via resistance or protest to address perceived injustices. That is, strongly identified group members responded to injustice by acting on behalf of the group, albeit in a different way than that examined in the studies described earlier. Interestingly, most of the research finding that injustice can increase

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group-serving behavior is relatively recent, reflecting the long-standing belief that fairness should be superior for promoting cooperative and collaborative action. For this reason, in the studies reported here we have focused on demonstrating that there are situations in which group unfairness leads to more group-serving behavior than fairness, rather than attempting to identify the mechanisms driving this effect, as was the case with the above discussion of arousing PA in response to group fairness. However, it is worth a brief consideration of possible explanations for the unfairness effect on group-serving behavior.

WHY DOES GROUP PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS LEAD TO GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR? We have suggested that group procedural unfairness increases groupserving behavior because it is a sign of a group shortcoming, which motivates highly identified members to engage in behavior that repairs these shortcomings. This proposition is in line with the finding that salient identity-relevant shortcomings can motivate compensatory effort (Gollwitzer et al., 1982; Ledgerwood et al., 2007; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). However, the studies reported here have not measured perceptions of group shortcomings, so it is important to consider alternative explanations. One possibility is that people band together in the face of injustice, leading them to be less likely to help the people who have perpetuated the injustice, but more likely to help those group members who were not responsible. We addressed this explanation in one of the studies described earlier (Barry & Tyler, 2009b, Study 2), by using a cover story which informed our student participants that their university’s grievance procedures had been designed by other students. In this way, we tried to ensure that the justice information was perceived as being part of the students’ group and not something imposed on their group (students) by outside forces (administration). Using this cover story, we found that highly identified participants engaged in more group-serving behavior when they read about unfair rather than fair procedures in their group, which speaks against an explanation of banding together against outside forces. However, it is important to note that in the experimental studies we conducted, the


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actual agents of the unjust procedures were anonymous; they were not identified to participants by name, nor were the student authors of the grievance procedures designated as specific targets of the group-serving behavior in which participants could engage. Thus, it may be true that group procedural unfairness would only increase the group-serving behavior of members when the unfairness is perpetrated rather anonymously, or the group-serving behavior is not directly targeted at the perpetrator. For example, if one particular supervisor utilized unfair procedures to allocate procedures and promotions, and this supervisor asked employees to work late to complete extra projects, even highly identified employees might be unlikely to do so. In sum, there are potential reasons other than group-repair for why highly identified group members might engage in more group-serving behavior when they learn that their group is unfair rather than fair. Although some such reasons are not supported by our data, we have not attempted to address every possible alternative. Indeed, our empirical focus has not been on demonstrating why such behavior occurs, but on providing evidence that it will sometimes occur. In line with the ideas presented earlier in the chapter, we find that both procedural fairness and unfairness information have the power to motivate group-serving behavior.

RECONCILING THE EFFECTS OF UNFAIRNESS AND FAIRNESS At first blush it may seem difficult to reconcile the findings of the studies where unfairness resulted in higher levels of group-serving behavior, with the curvilinear relationship depicted early in this chapter. The quadratic pattern in Fig. 1 suggests that high levels of both fairness and unfairness should lead to similar levels of group-serving behavior. Why, then, did we find that our manipulation of unfairness resulted in more such behavior than our manipulation of fairness? Although future research would be needed to provide a definitive answer, we have two suspicions. First, because people generally expect fairness from the groups they belong to (Brewer, 1999; Tajfel et al., 1971), it may be that the unfairness manipulation had a greater impact. That is, if the low point of the graph in Fig. 1 represents ‘‘neither fair nor unfair,’’ the unfair version of the procedures may have moved participants conceptually further away from this point than the fair

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version. If the fair version seemed only moderately fair, whereas the unfair version seemed quite unfair, this discrepancy would account for greater group-serving behavior when participants read about unfair compared to fair procedures. Numerically, however, our manipulation-check items did not support this account. This point leads to our second supposition, which is that the proposed quadratic relationship between group procedural fairness and group-serving behavior may not necessarily be symmetrical, nor need it be centered midway between extreme unfairness and extreme fairness. That is, we do not argue that Fig. 1 depicts a universal, theoretical relationship between group procedural fairness and group-serving behavior. Indeed, the research we have presented in this chapter suggests that this relationship is moderated by group identification; there may be additional moderators we have not considered. Given that people tend to identify with groups in part because those groups have fair procedures (Tyler & Blader, 2000), the average level of identification in a sample of group members may change the expected level of fairness, thereby shifting the parabolic relationship to the left or right. Additionally, real-world samples are unlikely to yield group members whose perceptions of their group’s procedures range from extreme unfairness to extreme fairness (the range of justice perceptions depicted in Fig. 1); extreme unfairness would typically cause people to exit the group. Utilizing samples where membership is relatively impermeable, and manipulating justice information, may reveal a pattern like the quadratic in Fig. 1 that has important psychological implications but would be otherwise difficult to discern. Thus, we want to acknowledge that in spite of the theoretical and empirical evidence we have presented in support of the argument that both group procedural fairness and unfairness can promote group-serving behavior, more evidence is needed as to the precise nature of this relationship. Existing literature provides more evidence that procedural fairness leads to higher levels of group-serving behavior, and has elucidated several mechanisms underlying this effect. Given that the beneficially motivating effects of unfairness have only recently begun to be studied, future research is needed to shed the same light on this process. By considering that both fairness and unfairness may motivate group-serving behavior, for different reasons and perhaps with different boundary conditions, researchers should ultimately provide a more global picture of the forces underlying the cooperative and collaborative behavior of individuals in groups. The next section discusses how we reconcile the motivating effects of fairness and unfairness.

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PUTTING IT TOGETHER: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN HOW GROUP-LEVEL PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE MOTIVATE GROUP-SERVING BEHAVIOR We have presented research showing that for highly identified group members, procedural fairness leads to the arousing PA that can in turn motivate group-serving behavior. We have also presented research indicating that procedural unfairness can motivate group-serving behavior among highly identified group members. The study described at the beginning of the chapter even offers some indication that group reward and group repair processes may operate simultaneously. Similarities in these two processes are outlined in Table 1, along with what we believe are important differences. First, the similarities: Both processes are moderated by group identification. Our results suggested that strongly identified group members – those who generally felt most proud of group membership and respected by group authorities and fellow members – would be most likely to reward fair group procedures with group-serving behavior. Likewise, strongly identified group members – those who had merged their sense of self with the group – were also most likely to repair unfair group procedures with group-serving behavior. Although group identification was operationalized differently in

Table 1.

Identified and Hypothesized Similarities and Differences in Forces Motivating Group-Serving Behavior. Force Motivating Group-Serving Behavior Group procedural unfairness

Similarities Most relevant for which group members Differences Group permeability Time frame Affective underpinnings

Group procedural fairness

Highly identified

Highly identified

Group is impermeable/ exit is difficult Short term

Permeability is irrelevant Short term Long term Arousing positive affect (PA)

Non-arousing negative affect (NA)

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these different studies, we believe that the underlying construct is the same. That is, individual group members who have aligned their identity with that of a group should have high arousing PA (and presumably high groupserving behavior) in response to fair group procedures, and should also repair unfair group procedures with group-serving behavior. Of course, certain components of group identification, such as pride and respect judgments, might be more or less influential in different situations. For example, it may be the case that if group identification were measured solely via pride and respect judgments, researchers would have less power to see strongly identified group members engaging in group repair behavior in response to group unfairness. With regard to group repair behavior, it may be that the most important component of group identification is merging one’s sense of self with the group, because it is this component that especially leads members to perceive group shortcomings as personal shortcomings. However, as the various components of group identification are integrally related (see Tyler & Blader, 2000), they should ultimately moderate the relationships between group procedures and group-serving behavior in similar ways. Research to date has not attempted to test the differences between the two processes that are outlined in Table 1. However, these differences are important in the way we have conceptualized and studied both processes. First, we believe that group permeability is one key to seeing group-repair behavior. Only when group members cannot easily exit their group (physically or by altering their sense of self) should they try to improve group conditions when they learn the group is unfair. However, group permeability should not matter when it comes to fair procedures; fair procedures should not make even weakly identified members want to leave the group. Second, we believe that time frame is an important consideration: we only expect to see group-repair behavior in relatively short-term situations. We predict that over time, procedural unfairness would eventually lead to distancing oneself from the group, because the robust findings supporting the group engagement model indicate that over time the identity cues provided by procedural fairness rather than unfairness work to increase group identification and subsequent cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). If group unfairness persisted over time, even members of less permeable groups might find a way to ‘‘exit’’ – by removing their sense of self, if they cannot physically leave. However, group fairness via arousing PA may continue to motivate groupserving behavior in the long term. Encountering new instances of group procedural fairness should continue to bolster members’ PA, and may be


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translated into continued group-serving behavior. Arousing PA may also play a role in the process described by the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003), which outlines how procedural fairness effects on groupserving behavior are mediated by increased identification of members with a group. Happiness toward an ingroup can increase subsequent identification with that group (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005), so arousing PA may play a role in how the identity-relevant information conveyed by procedural fairness is translated into group identification. If this is so, it should reinforce the promotion of group-serving behavior by procedural fairness over time. The third difference we see between the group-reward and group-repair processes is the most speculative. The research reviewed in this chapter addressed arousing PA as a mechanism underlying group-reward behavior; we have not yet attempted to identify the affective underpinnings of grouprepair behavior. However, we speculate that this process may be driven by low-arousal NA (e.g., sadness and disappointment). Although it generally decreases activity (Termine & Izard, 1988), and thus may not seem a prime candidate for motivating group-serving behavior, people do sometimes engage in cooperative and helpful actions in attempt to alleviate low-arousal NA (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Gendolla, 2000). As well, such low-arousal NA has been found to be associated with a preference for restorative justice in response to transgressions – that is, feelings like sadness and disappointment are linked to wanting to return a situation to the way it was before the injustice occurred (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2009; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, in press). Because restoring fairness rather than seeking punishment has parallels with engaging in group-serving behavior rather than withholding cooperation in response to unfairness, the link to low-arousal NA is suggestive. Helping and action on behalf of other people is used to alleviate not only feelings like sadness and disappointment, but also a way to address the negative affect of guilt. Indeed, rather than a loss of action, guilt is specifically associated with corrective actions to repair what one has evaluated as a failure of the self (Lewis, 2000). Furthermore, people can feel collective guilt on behalf of actions that an ingroup has perpetuated, even if they themselves were not part of the group at the time (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Thus, guilt may be another type of (relatively) low-arousal NA by which group procedural unfairness motivates group-serving behavior. Engaging in the group-repair behavior that our research has identified may help to alleviate these various types of low-arousal NA, along with improving conditions in an unfair group.

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Fig. 3.


Theoretical Model Linking Information about Group Procedural Fairness and Unfairness to Members’ Group-Serving Behavior.

The processes and moderators we have discussed in this chapter are summarized in Fig. 3. We anticipate that future research and theorizing will identify additional mechanisms and moderators of these processes; as a starting point, we briefly address below one important point that this chapter has not yet considered.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH Our theorizing and research in this chapter has only considered ‘‘improving group conditions’’ via engagement in the behavior that benefits other group members or benefits the group as a whole. Theoretically, conditions in unfair groups could also be improved by revising unfair procedures to promote justice. Because the research on forces underlying motivation to change group rules and procedures is a large area in itself (see Tost & Lind, this volume), we have not attempted to address it in the scope of this chapter. Indeed, in the studies reported here, we did not ask participants (in the correlational studies) whether they had attempted to or would like to change their group’s procedures; nor did we (in the experimental studies)


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give them an opportunity to do so. Future research might consider how group identification and procedural justice will shape behavior when group members are able to lobby for change as well as to do things to help fellow group members and the group as a whole. When the behavior of interest is attempts to change group procedures, moderators such as permeability might work differently than we have suggested above. For example, when members are not free to leave a group, they may be more reluctant to confront and change group procedures via means such as voicing concerns to a supervisor about unfair treatment, since they cannot escape retribution by exiting the group. That is, the combination of group impermeability and unfairness may promote the acts that benefit fellow group members, while suppressing the acts that would change procedures. Concretely, this would mean that a moderation effect of group permeability on group-serving behavior would also depend on whether that behavior is targeted at fellow group members or at changing the procedures themselves. This is one idea that could be tested in future research.

CONCLUSION In conclusion, the research outlined in this chapter points to ways in which group members manage and address conditions in their groups. Rather than passively accepting group procedures, members appear to actively feel good about and reward group fairness, and to repair group unfairness. Both of these processes depend on the degree to which members identify themselves with their groups. Based on these findings, if we were to advise Tom Campanile – the executive whose words began this chapter – we would suggest that he endeavor to link his employees’ sense of self to their role in his company. Oberto Sausage might try to foster employees who feel proud to work for the company, who feel respected by their managers and coworkers, and who consider their employment role as integral to their sense of self. Such employees will be likely to respond to company fairness and – within limits – unfairness with the group-serving behavior that ultimately helps this company to be successful.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are grateful to Marisa Dilemme for her help with data collection. This research has benefited from the comments, suggestions, and assistance of

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Steven Blader, Margarita Krochik, Tali Mentovich, Jojanneke van der Toorn, Elinor Amit, and Tessa West, as well as the organizers and attendees of the 2009 Research on Managing Groups and Teams conference, among others.

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CHAPTER 4 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FAIRNESS AND THE EXPERIENCE OF RESPECT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROUP LIFE Yuen J. Huo, Kevin R. Binning and Ludwin E. Molina ABSTRACT Purpose – To present a new conceptual framework for understanding how perceptions of fairness shape the experience of respect in groups and its implications for individuals’ engagement in groups, their psychological well-being, and intergroup relations. Design/methodology/approach – Research on fairness perceptions and respect emerge from different theoretical traditions including theories of justice, social identity theory, and social context and health. We review this body of work and present the dual pathway model of respect, developed to integrate the different lines of research into a single testable framework. Research testing the model’s predictions is presented. Findings – The dual pathway model posits that concerns about respect follow from the need for social inclusion and for status attainment.


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Fair treatment from group peers and authorities communicates the extent to which these needs are satisfied, and as such, perceptions of being liked (indicative of inclusion) and of being judged worthy (indicative of status attainment) independently and differentially predict social engagement and psychological well-being. Originality/value – The dual pathway model provides a framework for integrating and extending existing research on the experience of respect in groups. The model highlights how the inclusion and status dimensions of respect differentially shape outcomes relevant to group functioning: social engagement and psychological well-being. Insights from the model address a broad array of challenges faced by organizations, including building commitment, managing diversity, and promoting health and wellbeing among its members.

The question of who deserves respect is a core concern of normative theories of justice (e.g., Rawls, 1971). However, respect is more than a mere abstraction. Those who have experienced social exclusion, a loss of standing within a community, or endured unfair and undignified treatment fully understand and appreciate the social and psychological significance of respect. This point is driven home by the sociologist Richard Sennett (2003, p. 3), who poses the question: ‘‘Unlike food, respect costs nothing. Why then should it be in short supply?’’ We will argue in this chapter that an answer may be found in the observation that respect is a form of social if not material currency. As such, it is valued by the group as a collective and by individuals within the group, and it plays a central role in regulating group life. This chapter has three overarching goals. First, we review research on respect motivated by justice theories, social identity approaches to group behavior, and emerging research on links between social context and health. We then present the dual pathway model of respect (Huo & Binning, 2008) which was developed to integrate these different approaches into a single conceptual framework. Second, we present empirical evidence to evaluate the hypotheses derived from the dual pathway model and to highlight their implications for the functioning of the group as a whole and for the psychological well-being of individual group members. Finally, we turn our attention to the internal dynamics of groups and consider how the present model might operate differently in relations within groups in contrast to relations that cross group boundaries (i.e., intergroup relations).

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GOAL I: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON RESPECT In everyday language, respect can evoke ideas as diverse as deference to social rules (adhering to the rule of law), attitudes toward the distribution of power in groups (deference to individuals with greater power), and concern for others (protecting the rights of the vulnerable) (Langdon, 2007). These various conceptions of respect are important in their own right and useful in the analysis of a broad range of phenomena from close relationships (Hendrick & Hendrick, 2006) to the formation of social policy (Sennett, 2003). Our focus, in contrast, is specifically on the role of respect in shaping group life. In this context, the feeling of respect, in its broadest sense, can be defined as individuals’ assessment of how they are evaluated by those with whom they share common group membership. This is akin to the notion of social reputation – a reflection of the opinions other group members hold of the person (Emler & Hopkins, 1990). A vast body of research has documented that respect, broadly conceptualized, has significant implications for the functioning of both groups and the individuals within them (see Huo & Binning, 2008, for a review). For example, experimental evidence suggests that the experience of being respected by fellow group members leads to more positive attitudes toward the group and greater willingness to engage in activities that propel the collective goals of the group (e.g., Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; De Cremer, 2002; Simon, Lu¨cken, & Stu¨rmer, 2006; Simon & Stu¨rmer, 2005; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005). Moreover, findings from multiple field studies suggest that the significance of respect to the group is neither an artifact of the lab nor a weak, transient feeling that simply comes and goes (Boeckmann & Tyler, 2002; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). Although all these studies suggest that respect is crucial to group life, they have often focused their research efforts on different aspects of the broad construct of respect. Respect has been conceived of by some researchers as the quality of treatment that individuals receive from other group members (Tyler & Smith, 1999). Alternatively, respect has been conceived of as information filtered through the eyes of social perceivers, such that the experience of respect is characterized by perceptions that one is well-liked or is a highly valued group member (Spears, Ellemers, Doosje, & Branscombe, 2006). Fig. 1 illustrates how these different notions of respect are brought together in the present article. We suggest that how one is treated by other group members, both authorities and peers, can convey two distinct messages

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Fig. 1.

Dual Pathway Model of Respect.

to the individual: social inclusion (liking) and social standing (status) within the group. For instance, fair treatment may convey messages of the extent to which individuals are warmly embraced by the group on one hand (indicative of inclusion) and the extent to which they are valued by the group on the other hand (indicative of status). Thus, the message of whether one belongs in the group is distinguished from whether one is valued by the group. Most critically, we argue that these two messages – inclusion and status – have unique, distinguishable, and significant implications for group life.

Psychological Approaches to Respect Having highlighted the relevance of previous work to the present conception of respect, we pursue the question of why respect matters. Why does this noninstrumental reward, something that does not tangibly or materially improve one’s fortunes, affect groups and individuals in such fundamental ways? One possible answer to these questions can be found in the research on the group-value model of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the related, relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992). These models represent a theoretical perspective, which proposes that high quality treatment from group authorities matters because of its social identity implications. For instance, when an important group representative or authority deals with individual members in a fair way (defined as treatment characterized by the relational criteria of neutrality, trust, and standing – see Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997), they convey the centrality of that person to the group (analogous to status evaluations in our model). In other words, relationally fair treatment communicates the regard to which the group holds the individual.1 Empirical studies have demonstrated that perceptions of respect from the group mediate the relationship between treatment quality and attitudes


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toward the group (Tyler et al., 1996). Similarly, other studies have demonstrated that the link between treatment quality and perceptions of status is moderated by the social context, such that the relationship is stronger in an intragroup context (authority and subordinate belong to the same social category) than in an intergroup context (authority and subordinate belong to different social categories) (Huo & Tyler, 2001; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998). Although these models provide an explicit and unique explanation for the interplay between treatment quality and perceptions of worth to the group, they focus almost exclusively on hierarchical relationships between authorities and subordinates in established groups and organizations. As reflected in our model of respect, subsequent research has suggested that issues of fairness in treatment quality generalize beyond the authority– subordinate relationship. Fair and respectful consideration from equal status peers in groups constructed in the laboratory elicited similar effects as those observed in studies of authority relations, including greater identification with the group and greater willingness to engage in behavior, which serve the goals of the group (Simon & Stu¨rmer, 2003, 2005). Similarly, a body of research motivated by a social identity framework has focused on the role of respect in motivating group behavior among equal status group members and has documented the influence of respect feedback on group-oriented attitudes in the context of ad hoc groups (Spears et al., 2006). These different lines of thinking about respect have in common the shared understanding that what is at stake are people’s relationships to the group and to fellow group members. As social beings, people seek out meaningful social interactions and are attentive to information about the quality of their relationship with others in the group. Thus, while relying on different methodological and theoretical approaches, the two traditions converge in suggesting that the experience of respect addresses unique and fundamental questions about social relationships within groups. Where the approaches differ, however, is in how they conceptualize respect. The relational models conceive of respect as judgments of one’s worth or value as a group member. In contrast, research focusing on respect from equal status peers tends to operationalize respect as the extent to which the group likes or feels warmly toward individual members. That is, whereas the latter focuses on whether one belongs in the group or not, in the former, one’s inclusion in the group is assumed and the focus is on one’s standing within the group. We argue that these distinct conceptions correspond to

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basic social needs – the need for inclusion (social acceptance) and the need for status attainment (social standing recognition). In doing so, we contextualize our notion of respect within the dual pathway model of respect (Huo & Binning, 2008), which organizes the existing research along these two social needs and, more importantly, generates testable predictions about the interplay between fairness concerns, perceptions of respect, and downstream psychological outcomes that affect the functioning of the group and of the individuals within it.

Dual Pathway Model The various lines of research that contribute to the emerging field of the social psychology of respect in groups point to two general conclusions. The first, less controversial conclusion is that perceptions of relationally fair treatment matter. Whether it comes from in-group authorities or peers, fair treatment plays a central role in whether and the degree to which individuals feel respected in the groups they belong to. The second conclusion is that concerns about the informal aspects of procedural fairness and subsequent perceptions of respect are rooted in concerns about individuals’ relationship to the group. That is, while the general conclusion that fair treatment is a key indicator of the quality of one’s relationship with the group is generally accepted, there is no consensus about the specific aspect of the relationship that individuals focus on when reacting to information about respect. As alluded to above, there are two distinct pieces of information that may be conveyed by relationally fair treatment: (1) one’s status within the group (e.g., judgments of worth, standing, and competence); and (2) one’s inclusion within the group (e.g., feelings of belongingness, liking, and warmth). The recent wave of empirical research on the experience of respect implicates both of these motives. A potential source of conceptual confusion, however, is that these two motives are often confounded and used interchangeably. The dual pathway model of respect (Huo & Binning, 2008) was developed to address and clarify some of the existing conceptual ambiguities. Drawing from previous theorizing and research, we base the model on the premise that the experience of respect matters to people because it satisfies two core motives of group life – the need to belong and the striving for status. Relying on these core motives as organizing principles, we propose two pathways (inclusion and status) through which fairness experiences within groups shape perceptions of specific dimensions of respect, which in turn influence


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attitudes and behaviors that affect the welfare of the collective (group engagement) and of the individual (personal well-being). The Status Motive The striving for status has been argued to be a universal and primary social motive that underlies interactions in social groups (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; Frank, 1985; Hogan & Hogan, 1991). Sociological (and lay) conceptions of status traditionally focus on the individual’s objective role or position within the group (e.g., captain of the team vs. one of the players) (Berger, Cohen, & Zeltich, 1972). However, status can also be thought of as derived from the collective opinions of the group and reflecting the reputational self (i.e., part of one’s identity that is linked to attributes valued by the group) (Tyler & Smith, 1999). In the current work, we subscribe to this latter conception of status and view status-based respect as reflecting the individuals’ perceptions of their standing or worth as group members (i.e., perceived status). In this way, status evaluations in the present research are not necessarily zero-sum or positional in nature; it is theoretically possible for all group members to feel valued by their group (see supporting argument in Tyler & Blader, 2002). The Inclusion Motive Just as some researchers argue that respect reflects the status motive, others argue that it reflects another basic human motive – the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As such, respect serves a critical function by communicating information about a person’s inclusion within a social group or acceptance as a group member. There are several lines of work in support of respect as fulfilling the need to belong. One investigation found that the effect of respectful treatment on willingness to contribute to group welfare was more pronounced among peripheral members than among more central members (De Cremer, 2002). Another found that self-reports of belongingness mediated the relationship between perceived respect and contributions to the group (De Cremer, 2003). A third study found that respectful treatment increased individuals’ perception that they are welcomed or accepted within a group in which they were a member (Simon & Stu¨rmer, 2005). These findings are consistent with the idea that respect is rooted in a fundamental need for acknowledgment that one is an accepted member of the group and that one belongs and is liked by other group members.

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Status and Liking: Two Pathways By recognizing that previous research attributes concerns about respect to two related, but theoretically distinct social motives, the dual pathway model is organized around the premise that there are two corresponding dimensions on which individuals can be judged by the group: how worthy or valued a group member they are (reflecting status motive) and how much they are liked by others (reflecting inclusion motive). Both are social evaluations of the person and contribute to general assessments of perceived respect within the group. Although these two forms of evaluations presumably share common variance, they are theoretically distinguishable much like the basic dimensions of warmth and competence identified in the social perception literature (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). One can easily think of examples in which the most well-liked person in a group is not the person conferred with the highest status within the group (e.g., winner of Miss Congeniality in a beauty pageant). Similarly, a high status individual within a group may not be well-liked (e.g., the CEO of a company). In this way, the respect accorded on an individual can alternately be informed by how well one is liked and warmly accepted by other group members and by perceptions of one’s standing in the eyes of the same group members. Work by Ellemers, Spears, and their colleagues offer insight into the important distinction between the liking and the status aspects of respect. How well one is liked by other group members as a basis for respect has been implicated in a number of social phenomena including intergroup discrimination (Branscombe et al., 2002) and willingness to work on behalf of the group (Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004). There is also evidence that competence judgments reflecting status concerns have similar effects as liking on both the desire to exert effort on behalf of the group and on selfevaluations (Spears et al., 2005). Interestingly, when the two dimensions are considered jointly in an experimental context, an interaction effect emerged such that individuals who are judged to be highly competent (reflecting status) but not well-liked by other group members report the highest level of negative emotions although not lower commitment to the group. Thus, although not being liked affects the internal emotional life of highly competent group members, it does not negatively affect group commitment. In sum, there is evidence that there are two distinct dimensions of respect – being liked by the group and being viewed as worthy by the group (in general or on a specific dimension valued by the group). Moreover, the work by Ellemers, Spears, and colleagues suggest that the two dimensions can uniquely predict group-based attitudes and emotions.


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How Perceptions of Respect are Formed: The Role of Fair Treatment Next, we move on to discuss the role of relationally fair treatment in shaping perceptions of respect. The interplay between these two related experiences of respect first emerged in work by Tyler and Smith (1999) on relational models of authority relations. As noted previously, in the relational model, fair treatment by group authorities communicates to individuals that they are valued by the group. This approach further suggests that such recognition, in turn, motivates the individual to internalize the group’s norms and to adopt attitudes and behaviors that benefit the group – what we call group engagement. Being accorded standing also shapes the individual’s evaluations of him or herself (Smith, Tyler, & Huo, 2003). The actions of group authorities are argued to matter because they represent the views of the group as a whole. It follows that peer treatment should similarly feed into perceptions of one’s status within the group. Work by Simon and Stu¨rmer (2003) suggest that peer treatment can motivate social engagement in much the same way as authority treatment. Previous research has consistently generated findings in line with the proposition that perceptions of standing (status respect) mediate between perceptions of fair treatment and group-oriented attitudes and behaviors across a number of different group contexts, including families, university communities, and the workplace (Smith et al., 1998, 2003; Tyler et al., 1996). To date, there has been little research directly assessing the question of whether a similar meditated relationship would occur for the inclusion dimension of respect (liking). Much of the research focused on the inclusion dimension is motivated by the study of social identity processes in groups that emphasized the influence of direct feedback about liking on group behavior (see Spears et al., 2005, for a review). In considering the possible link between procedural fairness experiences and perceptions of being warmly embraced and accepted by other group members, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the actions of peers may play a more important role than would the actions of authorities. After all, it has been argued that dimensions of warmth or liking should be most salient in communal relationships such as that found among peers (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Moreover, work on the sociometer theory also points toward the role of peers in shaping perceptions of how well one is liked by the group. According to the sociometer hypothesis, the self-esteem system functions like an internally held meter of the extent to which individuals are being included or excluded in social situations (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Support for the hypothesis has primarily come from studies in which

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feedback in the form of level of liking from interaction partners resulted in systematic changes in self-evaluations (e.g., Srivastava & Beer, 2005). This line of inquiry highlights the role of peers in communicating information about belongingness. To summarize, the dual pathway model suggests there are two related but distinct components of respect and that it is through these two experiences (inclusion and status) that treatment by authorities and peers indirectly shape outcomes relevant to group and individual functioning. In the next section, we begin to examine some of the testable implications of the model.

GOAL II: THE DUAL PATHWAY MODEL – EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE In this section, we consider the empirical evidence in support of the pathways specified in the model and their implications for group engagement and psychological well-being of individual members. We begin by presenting empirical findings from a study we conducted to evaluate the hypothesized relationship between aspects of respect and group engagement. We also consider the potential moderators of the observed relationship. Finally, we present evidence from others’ research and our own that are consistent with the hypothesized link between fairness, respect, and psychological well-being. Fairness, Respect, and Group Engagement We first consider the question of how fairness perceptions and feelings of respect together shape willingness to embrace the goals of the group, to commit to its success, and to take action to benefit the collective. There is strong empirical evidence that the status pathway plays a significant role in shaping group engagement (Smith et al., 1998, 2003; Tyler et al., 1996). In addition to the empirical evidence for the status-centered mediated path, we can find theoretical reasons for why status concerns would be important in motivating group engagement. After all, perceived status reflects how generally useful we are to the group and the extent to which our specific talents and abilities contribute to the overall functioning of the group. Moreover, as a form of social identity, when respect is granted, it activates norms for behavior that are consistent with group goals (Tyler & Smith, 1999; Spears et al., 2006). It can also be thought of as a reward or


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recognition that the group gives to a member who contributes or has the potential to contribute to the group’s success (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Thus, the relationship between status-based respect and group members’ willingness to act on behalf of the group is reinforced in both directions. There is also research evidence showing that information about how much one is liked by other group members leads to higher levels of group commitment and group-oriented behavior (Branscombe et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 2004). However, findings from other studies suggest that when status is controlled for, the relationship between liking and indicators of group engagement attenuates (Spears et al., 2005). More importantly, we are not aware of any study that has examined the meditated relationship outlined in the inclusion path. That is, there is no existing evidence that can speak to whether the inclusion aspect of respect (perceptions of being liked) mediates between fair treatment and group engagement. We conducted an initial study to evaluate the utility of the dual pathway model for understanding how fairness judgments and perceptions of respect together predict outcomes relevant to the functioning of the group (for study procedure details, see Huo, Molina, Binning, & Funge, in press). The data (N ¼ 801) were collected in a large urban high school in Southern California. The school context is in some ways particularly suited for testing predictions from the dual pathway model. In schools, we can capitalize on a meaningful group membership and participants’ day-in and day-out interactions with both group authorities (teachers/staff/administrators) and peers (other students). The sample was 57% female and ethnically diverse (33% Latino; 30% White; 20% Asian; 10% African American; and 7% who indicated ‘‘multiethnic’’ or ‘‘other’’). One key finding from our analysis of this dataset is that the four main predictors can be empirically distinguished from each other. When considered together, factor analysis produced a four-factor solution. That is, items assessing the extent to which the individual feels others in their community like them and feel warmly toward them can be distinguished from items assessing the extent to which the community values their opinions and respects their achievements. Similarly, although we used parallel items to assess relational fairness judgments from authorities and peers, these items fall onto two distinct factors as well. Interestingly, when composite scales of status evaluation and liking were entered into a regression model to predict a single but face valid measure of respect (‘‘Most of the time I feel that people at my school have a lot of respect for me’’), both variables were significant predictors of general respect. In other words,

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status evaluation and liking, while significantly correlated with each other (r ¼ .52), explained unique variance in perceptions of general respect. To evaluate predictions from the dual pathway model, we conducted structural equation modeling (SEM). Fig. 2 shows the result of the SEM for each of three indicators of group engagement: (a) group identification, (b) organizational citizenship behavior, and (c) school alienation. Whereas group identification and organizational citizenship behavior reflect engagement in the group and its goals, alienation reflects disengagement. The model tests a hypothesized causal path in which perceptions of respect mediate the relationship between the perceived treatment quality and the outcome variables. The path coefficients are remarkably similar across the three indicators (Figs. 2(a–c)) and provide support for mediation. First, we consider the paths flowing from treatment quality to each of the two dimensions of respect: perceived status and perceived liking. Consistent with past research, both treatment from group authorities and treatment from other group members predicted the extent to which individuals feel valued within the group (perceived status). Moreover, the two coefficients are not significantly different from each other, indicating that authorities and peers were equally influential in shaping perceptions of respect. To date, the path from treatment to perceived liking has not been tested. Fig. 2 shows that these paths were significant. However, judgments of how fairly one is treated by one’s peers (other students) were stronger predictors of perceived liking than was treatment from authorities (teachers and staff). Interestingly, when we consider the paths from respect to the outcome variables, only the path from perceived status was significant. Within the full model, perceived liking does not predict any of the three indicators of group engagement. The findings described here offer preliminary evidence for the utility of the dual pathway model. In particular, they suggest that respect can be parsed into two dimensions – one reflecting the desire for status attainment (status evaluation) and one reflecting the need for social inclusion (liking). Moreover, the data show that information about the actions of authorities and peers contribute independently to explaining variance in group engagement through the information they convey about group-based respect. When individuals feel that group authorities and peers generally treat them in a fair way (e.g., treat individuals politely, honest in their dealings with individuals), these fairness judgments shape feelings of respect, which in turn predict the extent to which individuals express attitudes and behavioral intentions consistent with group engagement. Of course, the findings we presented may be somewhat specific to the context of the data collection site. Below, we consider the factors that may


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Fig. 2. Structural Equation Models of Dual Pathway Model for (a) Group Identification, (b) Organizational Citizenship Behavior, and (c) Alienation.

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influence the weight assigned to status versus inclusion concerns in shaping attitudes and behaviors indicative of group engagement. We also consider factors that may affect the relative weight assigned to authority versus peers as sources of fairness information. A consideration of these factors suggests directions for future research that will further test the validity of the assumptions that underlie the dual pathway model of respect. Factors that Influence Importance of Status versus Inclusion Concerns We consider three factors that may influence the importance of status and inclusion concerns in shaping group engagement: (1) primary function of the group, (2) duration of the group (new vs. long established), and (3) social needs of individuals. First, we address the issue of the function served by different types of groups. Research on groups suggest that three types of groups can be distinguished depending on the primacy of their function: (1) intimacy groups, (2) task groups, and (3) social categories (Johnson et al., 2006; Lickel, Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2006). Intimacy groups such as families, friendship networks, and other social groups serve primarily to fulfill affiliation needs (i.e., the feeling of belonging). In contrast, task groups such as work groups or committees serve primarily to fulfill achievement needs (i.e., the feeling of being competent or judged worthy). In contrast to these two groups, social categories such as gender or ethnicity may serve either or both needs. This framework suggests that the relative importance of inclusion and status concerns may differ depending on the primary function served by the group. For example, in intimacy groups, the role of liking may become more important, whereas in task groups, the role of status may become more important. One could argue that the school context in which we tested the conceptual model serves both intimacy and task functions. However, the findings show that when both dimensions of respect were included in the statistical model, only status emerged as a significant predictor. This pattern of finding suggests that the motivation to socially engage in a group is, as we suggested earlier, inextricably linked to concerns about status. However, to adequately evaluate this explanation against the alternative possibility that the function of the group would moderate the strength of relationship between each respect path and social engagement would require data collected across different types of groups. Another factor that may affect which dimension of respect predicts group engagement is the membership status of the individual. For individuals who are long time members of established groups, attention may turn to issues of status differentiation. As we demonstrated with the findings presented


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earlier of students in their school community, perception of worth as group members is the main predictor of group identification and willingness to act on behalf of the group. However, consider a different situation in which individuals come together to form a new group – one that does not yet have an established structure. In this alternative scenario, the dominant question may not be one of ‘‘Am I a worthy and valued member of the group?’’ but instead one of, ‘‘Do I belong at all?’’ Consequently, inclusion concerns may dominate and group engagement may be more strongly influenced by signals of affiliation (liking). Our suggestion that length of membership in groups may affect the importance assigned to status and inclusion concerns, if tenable, would potentially reconcile seemingly conflicting findings in the empirical literature. The study we presented along with a number of findings collected in the field context including work organizations, schools, residential communities, and the political system (see Huo & Binning, 2008, for a review) point to the role of status perceptions in shaping group engagement. In contrast, based on several experiments, Spears et al. (2005) concluded that inclusion concerns as operationalized by liking, rather than judgments of competence (related to performance status), are the primary factors that shape willingness to act on behalf of the group. Some notable differences between the field studies and the experimental evidence (in addition to their conclusions) include the existence of an established group structure and members’ history with the group. Whereas the field studies focus on existing groups with wellestablished social structures (and presumably mechanisms for evaluating standing of individual group members), the laboratory experiments examined processes within ad hoc groups in which there was no established structure nor did any members have a history with the group or each other. Thus, it is easy to see how in this particular situation, concerns about belongingness may emerge even within the context of a performance-oriented group (i.e., group charged with the task of creating a collaborative project). Finally, the needs of individuals may also affect their responsiveness to feedback about status and inclusion. Ethnographic studies point to the idea that status respect gains special meaning in places with a weak or informal system of law enforcement, because it is these places where the appearance of honor and social status becomes most critical to protecting one’s socioeconomic livelihood (Anderson, 2000; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996). Being deprived of standing can be construed as a signal to outsiders that one is unable or unwilling to protect oneself or one’s resources, which can trigger anger and violence on behalf of the wronged in an effort to restore status. Similarly, those who have a high need to belong

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are more responsive to information that signals inclusion (De Cremer & Blader, 2006; Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003). Factors that Influence Importance Assigned to Authorities and Peers We also consider ways in which social context may moderate the relative importance of treatment quality in shaping perceptions of the two dimensions of respect. As we suggested earlier, individuals appear sensitive to how fairly they are treated by both group authorities and peers. Group authorities, it is argued, exert influence through their actions because they are empowered by group members and their actions are symbolic of the views of the group as a whole. However, it stands to reason that day-to-day interactions with fellow group members may also send messages about one’s standing or inclusion within the group. What might be some conditions under which fair treatment from authorities may play a more influential role than similar treatment from peers and vice versa? We consider this question below. In intimacy groups in which the ideal is for individual group members to be equally valued (if not have equal power – e.g., parent–child relationships), individuals may be sensitive to the actions of all fellow group members. That is, the extent to which they feel that their peers act in a neutral, polite, and respectful way toward them may play an important role in shaping their overall attachment to the group and their willingness to engage in its goals. In contrast, in large groups with highly differentiated structure (clear authorities and subordinates) such as the work organization, individuals may pay closer attention to how fairly they are treated by group authorities. In this situation, each individual is unlikely to have repeated interaction with all group members. Hence, a group authority becomes symbolic of the collective’s opinion of the individual. For example, employees’ evaluations of how fairly their workplace supervisor conducts an annual performance review may be particularly telling of how the organization as a whole respects them as members of the group.

Fairness, Respect, and Psychological Well-Being One direct indicator of how well a group is functioning is having members who are loyal and willing to engage in activities that help the group achieve its goals. However, it is also worth considering how well individual group members are doing as another indicator of the overall well-being of the group. Groups composed of individuals characterized by high levels of psychosocial and physical well-being should have a clear advantage over


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groups that do not. Thought of in a different way, individual group members’ well-being is at least partially a reflection of the overall climate of the group or organization in which they function. Below, we review evidence that perceptions of respect from the group are linked to indicators of how individuals feel about themselves and can include outcome variables such as self-esteem, mental health, and even physical health. Some of the most compelling evidence for the link between perceptions of respect and well-being is derived from research on the group-value model of procedural justice. Because of the social identity implications of fair versus unfair treatment, that research has focused on self-esteem as the outcome variable. The status component of respect has been documented to mediate between perceptions of fair treatment from the in-group and self-esteem both in correlational studies of experiences in real groups (Tyler et al., 1996) and in experimental studies in the laboratory (Smith et al., 1998). Moreover, a review of 10 datasets found positive associations between perceptions of being respected by other group members and self-esteem with an average effect size of .36 (Smith et al., 2003). Other studies have found similar effects for respect on collective self-esteem or the aspect of one’s selfconcept associated with group identity (Ellemers et al., 2004). As a form of social evaluation, respect appears to play an important role in shaping the self-concept. Although the evidence is more tentative, there are hints in the literature suggesting an intriguing and potentially important link between experiences with respect and another aspect of personal well-being – the individual’s mental and physical health. The epidemiologist, Michael Marmot (2004), coined the term, ‘‘status syndrome,’’ to describe the idea that social evaluations have fundamental effects on our health. Drawing on large-scale epidemiological datasets, Marmot observed that after controlling for obvious predictors of health and longevity, such as income and lifestyle, status (social position within a community) independently predicted health outcomes. That is, those in positions socially recognized as having higher status are healthier and live longer. One of the key ideas behind this research is that a lack of status is associated with relatively less control over one’s life outcomes, and this lack of control contributes to higher levels of stress, depression, and poor physical health. Attesting to the link between subjective experiences of respect and health outcomes, a large-scale survey of over 30,000 Finnish public sector employees found that perception of fair and respectful treatment by work supervisors was negatively related to length of sickness-related absenteeism (Elovainio et al., 2005). The study also found that the relationship between perceived

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treatment and on-the-job illness can be explained by two factors – lack of work time control and negative changes in the work environment. A survey of German factory workers uncovered a similar finding. That study found that experiences of fair and respectful treatment were negatively associated with psychosomatic well-being (number of sick days reported and frequency of feeling ill at work) (Schmitt & Do¨rfel, 1999). Finally, a field experiment of nurses who received an involuntary salary reduction found that those with supervisors trained to behave in a respectful and fair manner suffered fewer occurrences of sleep problems such as insomnia (Greenberg, 2006). These linkages are not surprising when we consider the psychological benefits of social inclusion and standing. The sociometer hypothesis highlights the importance of inclusion, by proposing that self-esteem is a reflection of social acceptance – the degree to which one is liked by others and included in the group (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). This premise is consistent with studies showing that social exclusion leads to anxiety and depression (see Williams, Forgas, von Hippel, & Zadro, 2005, for a discussion). Status, in contrast, is associated with power and control, which are positively correlated with psychological functioning (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). Thus, the need for social inclusion as reflected in the liking component of respect and the need for status as reflected in judgments of one’s worth or contributions to the group are both potential predictors of well-being, albeit for different reasons. In the school sample described earlier, we found that both the inclusion and the status components of respect independently predicted a number of well-being indicators including self-esteem and self-reports of mental health (Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010). In each case, however, the inclusion component exerted a slightly stronger influence. There is also evidence that respect mediated between perceptions of fair treatment from group members and indicators of well-being. Although this evidence is suggestive, programmatic research is needed to (1) demonstrate the robustness of the link between fair treatment, respect, and well-being; and (2) explore the hypothesized social motives that underlie these relationships (need for inclusion and desire for control that is associated with status).

GOAL III: EXPLORING FAIRNESS AND GROUP-LEVEL (VS. PERSONAL) RESPECT The analysis presented thus far is based on the assumption that the social evaluative feedback comes from other members of self-relevant in-groups


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(Branscombe et al., 2002; Smith et al., 1998). However, the reality is such that social relations within many groups are more complex than that of a simple in-group composed of individual members. At the workplace, employees are organized into departments and work groups. In diverse communities and groups, ethnicity and race become salient forms of social categorization (Huo & Tyler, 2001). Within these nested social groups, evaluative feedback about one’s subgroup (e.g., work department and ethnicity) may take on special meaning. For a number of reasons, social evaluative feedback about one’s social identity (i.e., the social category one is a part of) may function differently than feedback about an individual as a group member (Huo & Molina, 2006). In our work, we found that feeling that one’s ethnic subgroup (e.g., Latinos) is respected by others in the broader community (more inclusive, superordinate category – e.g., nation and work organization) predicted support for political institutions among Americans (Huo & Molina, 2006) and school engagement among students (Huo et al., in press). However, we also found that the relationship between group-level respect and support for the broader community is limited to members of ethnic minority groups (African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos). Among Whites (dominant ethnic group in the United States), group-level respect did not predict any willingness to engage with the broader community. Among this group, personal-level respect (evaluations of the person as an individual member of the superordinate category), in contrast to group-level respect (evaluations of the individual’s ethnic subgroup), predicted greater identification with the United States and greater support for its institutions (Huo & Molina, 2006). The pattern of findings just described suggest that the dynamics we have outlined for intragroup relations may need to be modified when elevated to the context of relations among subgroups who share a superordinate category. For ethnic minority group members, their ethnic group membership is more salient than it would be for majority, dominant group members. Moreover, because of power asymmetries, ethnic minorities who hold a subordinate role in the social context may feel less certain about their status and thus more attentive to social evaluative feedback that communicates relevant information about their group’s standing in the broader community. As we suggested earlier, it is worthwhile to consider the psychological wellbeing of individuals as an indicator of the group’s overall functioning. There is suggestive evidence that social evaluative threat to one’s subgroup predicts the overall state of individual well-being. The literature on experiences with racial prejudice (a form of negative social evaluative feedback of one’s social

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identity) and health outcomes shows that experiences with discrimination are associated with adverse effects on indicators of psychological and physical well-being, including self-esteem, stress, depression, and cardiovascular reactivity (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999; Fang & Myers, 2001; Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000). This direct relationship between group-level evaluations and well-being demonstrated in these investigations parallels the body of evidence linking personal respect to self-esteem (Ellemers et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2003) and linking perceptions of fair, respectful treatment to work-related illness (Elovainio et al., 2005; Greenberg, 2006; Schmitt & Do¨rfel, 1999). Research on stereotype threat (Steele, 1997) provides a potential illustration of how perceived respect at the group level can contribute to poor health outcomes. This research suggests that being a member of a low status, negatively stereotyped group is a psychological stressor that interferes with academic performance (e.g., on an exam) and thereby contributes to still lower social status (e.g., lower grades) in the domain (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006). Low performance in one domain, such as academics, might then limit one’s ability to achieve status in another domain, such as employment. This could of course further limit one’s control and increase stress in a downward cycle. There is, however, evidence suggesting that group respect may operate differently than personal respect in predicting indicators of well-being. On the one hand, one can argue that when a self-relevant group identity is under scrutiny, it poses an additional source of threat to the self, and the effects on well-being would be additive. In contrast, contemporary research on the psychology of stigma suggests that for targets of discrimination, appraisal and coping processes may be engaged to protect the self from group-based evaluations (Major, 2006). In the now classic work by Crocker and Major (1989), three such processes are identified: (1) devaluing the domain in which the group is disadvantaged, (2) making intragroup versus intergroup comparisons, and (3) attributing negative events to discrimination rather than to one’s internal, stable characteristics (Crocker & Major, 1989). An alternative strategy may involve seeking emotional, social, and instrumental support from the in-group to defend against experiences of discrimination (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jones, 2004; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998). In an initial test of the relationship between group-level respect and psychological well-being, we analyzed data collected from an ethnically diverse group of students (Huo et al., in press). The analysis produced two notable findings. The first is that group-level respect did not predict personal


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self-esteem among any of the four ethnic groups included in the study (African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, or Whites). The second is that group-level respect did predict self-reports of physical well-being but only among Asian Americans and Latinos. In interpreting these findings, we first consider the case of Whites. It is not surprising that group respect was unrelated to self-esteem or physical well-being for Whites. As we argued previously, race may not be a salient or meaningful identity for members of dominant groups (Waters, 1990). Next, we turn to the more complex pattern of findings involving the ethnic minority groups. The finding that for Asian Americans and Latinos, the influence of group-level respect seems to manifest itself most strongly in indicators of physical well-being in contrast to self-esteem suggests the importance of distinguishing among different indicators of well-being. When considered together, the findings are suggestive of the possibility that the impact of group respect may be more easily detected in physiological processes or physical symptoms, which is a less controlled measure of internal states than are reports of self-esteem.

Future Research on Fairness and Group-Level Respect An important direction for future research is to pinpoint the psychological mechanism(s) underlying the relationship between group-level respect and psychological well-being. To what extent is the relationship accounted for by stress attributable to loss of control or by feelings of isolation resulting from social exclusion? This distinction, which we have focused on in our analyses of intragroup relations, has not been systematically evaluated at the intergroup level. There is also need for work to examine how fairness concerns shape responses to group-level respect. Endorsement of beliefs that legitimize group-based inequality, for example, may affect how individuals respond to group-level social evaluative feedback (Major & Schmader, 2001). Those who feel that social inequalities are legitimate and fair may, ironically, be most adversely affected by information that their group is devalued. These individuals are least likely to engage in appraisal or coping strategies to deal with such feedback. Another potentially important question for future research is the issue of how fairness in interpersonal interactions may shape perceptions of group-level respect. Within a group, we found that interpersonal procedural fairness is positively related to perceptions of personal respect (Huo et al., 2010). It is possible that the same fair treatment, when it comes from an out-group member, may have the opposite effect on perceptions of group-level respect. This reasoning follows

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work by Ellemers et al. (2004), demonstrating that positive feedback from out-group members elicits feelings of shame. In sum, the dynamics among fair treatment, respect, and group and individual outcomes we outlined for relations that occur within a group are likely to be distinct from the dynamics that would occur in relations that cross group boundaries. Thus, in organizations characterized by high levels of cultural/ethnic diversity or specialization, the role of respect, its antecedents, and its outcomes for the collective and individuals within it must be evaluated in light of factors relevant to intergroup relations.

CONCLUSION Research on the psychological experience of respect suggests that it is a basic form of social evaluation that emerges in interactions with fellow group members and that it plays an important role in shaping not only engagement in group life but also in the well-being of individual group members. Moreover, it is rooted in meeting two basic social motives – the desire for inclusion and the desire for status attainment – and is shaped in part by judgments of how fairly oneself or one’s in-group is treated by others. Unfair treatment can lead to feelings that one or one’s group is devalued or excluded. Such perceptions then lead to disengagement that has the potential to negatively affect organizational outcomes including productivity, profit, and turnover (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002). Feeling devalued or excluded can also negatively impact the overall well-being of individual group members, which may in turn influence their ability to contribute to group productivity. The relationships outlined highlight how fairness perceptions generated from interpersonal interactions with fellow group members can affect group engagement and well-being downstream. Although fairness and respect also matter in relationships that cross group boundaries (different ethnic groups or work groups within an organization), we argue that the dynamics of these two judgments and their psychological effects are distinct from what would occur in an intragroup context.

NOTE 1. In this chapter, we focus on the informal aspects of procedural justice (i.e., quality of relational treatment) rather than the formal aspects of procedures (i.e., whether individuals adhere to objective rules or regulations). Our focus stems

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from the theoretical perspective we draw from, the group-value model of procedural justice and the relational model of authority, which emphasizes the interpersonal aspects of social interactions that characterize perceptions of fair treatment.

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Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2003). Interpersonal treatment, social identity and organizational behavior. In: S. A. Haslam, D. van Knippenberg, M. J. Platow & N. Ellemers (Eds), Social identity at work: Developing theory for organizational practice (pp. 155–171). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., Huo, Y. J., Ortiz, D., & Lind, E. A. (1998). The self-relevant implications of the group-value model: Group membership, self-worth, and treatment quality. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, 34, 470–493. Spears, R., Ellemers, N., & Doosje, B. (2005). Let me count the ways in which I respect thee: Does competence compensate or compromise lack of liking from the group? European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(2), 263–279. Spears, R., Ellemers, N., Doosje, B., & Branscombe, N. (2006). The individual within the group: Respect! Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Srivastava, S., & Beer, J. S. (2005). How self-evaluations relate to being liked by others: Integrating sociometer and attachment perspectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 966–977. Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52, 613–629. Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley. Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2002). Autonomous vs. comparative status: Must we be better than others to feel good about ourselves? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89, 813–838. Tyler, T. R., Degoey, P., & Smith, H. (1996). Understanding why the justice of group procedures matters: A test of the psychological dynamics of the group-value model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 913–930. Tyler, T. R., & Lind, A. E. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 115–191. Tyler, T. R., Lind, E. A., Ohbuchi, K., Sugawara, K., & Huo, Y. J. (1998). Conflicts with outsiders: Disputing within and across cultural boundaries. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 137–146. Tyler, T. R., & Smith, H. J. (1999). Justice, social identity, and group processes. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Waters, M. W. (1990). Ethnic options: Choosing identities in America. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Williams, K. D., Forgas, J. P., von Hippel, W., & Zadro, L. (2005). The social outcast: An overview. In: K. D. Williams, J. P. Forgas & W. von Hippel (Eds), The social outcast: ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying (pp. 1–16). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

CHAPTER 5 THE CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAIRNESS AND TRUST IN TEAMS: WHEN UNFAIR TREATMENT BEGETS TRUST, FAIR PROCESS ERODES TRUST, AND UNFAIR RESTITUTION RESTORES TRUST Lukas Neville and Susan E. Brodt ABSTRACT Purpose – Trust and justice are generally considered distinct but closely related constructs. Individual perceptions of procedural justice and trustworthiness have been shown to reciprocally influence one another, each independently promoting trust (Colquitt & Mueller, 2007). We consider instances where these may instead diverge: how intentional efforts to build trust may unintentionally erode justice, and how the use of fair procedures may reduce trust.


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Approach – We argue that the anomalous divergences between trust and justice are evident only when simultaneously considering judgments at two levels: the interpersonal level (i.e., within dyads inside the team) and the team level (i.e., shared perceptions of all team members). Implications for research and practice – The unintended effects described in this chapter describe a ‘‘dark side’’ to a number of taken-for-granted practices in organizational life (favor-paying, punishment processes, and approaches to redress). We expect that this chapter should promote new research using the team context to bridge the trust and justice literatures, and provoke a careful reconsideration among practitioners of these approaches. Originality – We propose three previously overlooked disjunctures between trust and justice. First, we show how procedurally unfair approaches to allocating favors may be beneficial in building dyadic trust between team members. Next, we describe how fair (open and transparent) group processes for punishing perpetrators may erode trust by skewing group members’ perceptions of the prevalence of trust violations. Finally, we describe how the most effective forms of redress at the interpersonal level may provoke perceptions of injustice at the team level.

Both justice and trust have received considerable attention in organizational research. However, the relationship between them remains contested. The debate centers around two questions: first, are justice and trust distinct constructs or are they simply two ways of describing the same phenomena? Second, if they can be teased apart, exactly how do they relate? For example, does perceived fairness engender trust? Or does trust beget perceived fairness? Colquitt and Mueller (2007, 2008) have begun to answer these questions. They conceptually and empirically disentangle the relationships between these constructs and a third, perceived trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). They marshal evidence showing that perceptions of trustworthiness and justice tend to move in lockstep, reciprocally influencing one another, and each independently promoting trust (Colquitt & Mueller, 2007). For example, when organizational rules and procedures are believed to be fair, individual managers are perceived as more trustworthy (Kernan & Hanges, 2002; Korsgaard, Brodt, & Whitener, 2002). Obversely, trustworthy people are perceived to be more fair (Tyler, 1994). Colquitt and Mueller’s work helps clarify the relationship between

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these variables (and their underlying dimensions), but the narrative remains the same (trust and justice travel together) and the focus is on the causal order in their relationship. In this chapter, we extend this literature by considering both trust and justice in the context of the team, whose members are interdependent, interact with one another, enjoy some autonomy over their work, but are jointly responsible for the outcome of their work (cf. Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Guzzo & Shea, 1992; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Offerman & Spiros, 2001). Some of the dynamics we describe might hold in work groups that are not, strictly speaking, teams. However, we assume a level of interdependence and entitativity that is consistent with the context of the team as a special case of the work group. In our analysis, we consider trust judgments and justice perceptions simultaneously at two levels: the unit level of the team itself and the level of the interpersonal dyad within the team. Following this approach, we identify a series of interesting disjunctures between justice and trust, which we describe as stories of unintended consequences. First, we describe how individual team members may employ strategies to build trust interpersonally with fellow team members that unwittingly abrade the procedural justice perceptions of the team as a whole. Then, we consider two trust–justice dynamics in the wake of trust violations between team members. We examine how transparency, a feature of procedurally just punishment systems within teams, may contribute to an erosion of interpersonal trust between members of a team. And finally, we discuss how a team member’s individual attempts to repair trust with another team member through redress and reparations may in fact diminish the perceptions of both distributive and procedural justice in the eyes of other members of the team (i.e., among team members who are not involved in the trust violation and who are onlookers within the team). The dynamics we describe are particularly consequential for teams as members try to work together effectively as a unit to achieve their goals. Taken together, as suggested in our chapter title, we describe when unfair treatment begets trust, when fair process erodes trust, and when unfair restitution restores trust. The theoretical propositions in this chapter describe potential tensions between interpersonal trust within dyads and procedural justice at the group level. We also consider a range of important moderators and boundary conditions, identifying characteristics of individuals, properties of teams, and situational conditions that may help suppress the conflict between these two desirable ends.

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THE TEAM CONTEXT AND JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS This chapter focuses on how the process of forming interpersonal trust between pairs of team members influences justice perceptions at the team level. By ‘‘team,’’ we mean a particular form of social organization. It describes groups of people who interact with one another and are jointly responsible for accomplishing a shared task. In order to be a ‘‘team,’’ groups must be interdependent, enjoy some autonomy over their work, and must be jointly responsible for the outcome of their work (cf. Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Guzzo & Shea, 1992; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Offerman & Spiros, 2001). Teams should be perceived by members as well as outside observers as an ‘‘intact social entity’’ (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Teams may operate with or without formal leadership: in teams without hierarchical authority relationships, the leadership role may be dispersed across multiple team members (Carson, Tesluk, & Marrone, 2007; Pearce & Conger, 2003). The work of teams can take place at different levels, including the individual, the dyad, the subgroup, and the team as a whole. Consider the example of a scientific research team: a pair of technicians might prepare samples, while another technician later carries out tests on those samples. A trio of research associates might work closely together to analyze the resulting data. A manuscript or report might involve the work of several different people from the team over the course of its production including consultations with various technicians and research associates. Thus, the work of even the most interdependent teams is often carried out by dyads and subgroups within the team, all working together to produce the research. We focus on trust and justice in dyads that are nested within the team, and its effects on the team. The justice construct describes several different perceptions of fairness, the most widely studied being distributive, procedural, and interactional justice (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Distributive justice refers to the fairness of how organizational resources are allocated to group members (Adams, 1965; Choi & Chen, 2007). Procedural justice describes the fairness of the processes and methods through which decisions about those allocations are made (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Interactional justice focuses on how group members are treated as those decisions are enacted (Bies, 1987, 2005; Tyler & Bies, 1990). The justice literature has traditionally focused on authority relationships, either ‘‘agent-referenced’’ (i.e., about an individual supervisor) or ‘‘systemreferenced’’ (i.e., about the organization or management more generally;


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Colquitt et al., 2001). Both instances presume hierarchical relationships, a focus that stems in part from the field’s foundational studies, which examined citizen perceptions of legal procedures (Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1991, and see the review in chapter 9 of Tyler, 2006), and employees’ perceptions of pay and promotion (see Greenberg, 1990, for a review). Although these literatures emerged in the context of authority relationships, they remain relevant to semi-autonomous (peer) workgroups. All three aspects of the fairness judgment process bear on the dealings group members have with one another. Within groups, valuable social resources (roles, perks, duties, praise, prestige, support, etc.) are allocated both individually and collectively. Groups parcel out duties and rewards to their members, and can do so either with or without regard to distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. The outcomes of these justice perceptions are consequential for teams. Perceived injustice is associated with job stress (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Benson, 2005) withdrawal and counterproductive behaviors (Conlon, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005). By contrast, perceptions of justice contribute to task performance, cooperation (Earley & Lind, 1987; Tyler & Blader, 2003), compliance by employees (Conlon, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005), and physiological well-being (Kivimaki, Elovainio, Vahtera, & Ferrie, 2003). Many of these effects are strengthened in teams when they are held in common by the team members. Shared procedural justice perceptions (i.e., a strong justice climate; Naumann & Bennett, 2000) have been shown to moderate the effects of justice on both performance and withdrawal. Moreover, the salutary effects of justice level, Colquitt, Noe, and Jackson (2006) find, are strengthened when there is a strong justice climate.

TRUST AND THE TEAM CONTEXT Trust, too, is important for teams. As a construct, trust refers to a behavioral intention to be vulnerable to another party, based on positive expectations about how that party will conduct themselves (Rousseau, 1998). It is based on a combination of interdependence and risk: trust involves reliance on another party, despite less than absolute certainty about the other party’s intentions (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). These positive expectations are shaped by a range of factors, from carefully reasoned calculative appraisals to snap judgments based on shared affiliations or characteristics (cf. Kramer, 1999; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). In many cases, these bases of trust function through perceptions about the

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other party’s trustworthiness. Perceptions of trustworthiness are divided into three dimensions, and comprise beliefs about the other party’s ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). Early empirical advances in trust research focused on dyads (for instance, studies of romantic partners, cf. Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), but the field’s foundational theories have always had a broad view of the types of relationships influenced by trust. Rotter’s (1967) early work on the topic, for instance, described trust’s ambit broadly, including contexts as diverse as family relationships, race relations, and commercial trade. More recent work has paid considerable attention to the dynamics of trust within organizations, particularly with respect to manager–subordinate dyads (see the review in Korsgaard, Pitariu, & Jeong, 2008). In this chapter, we maintain a focus on interpersonal trust, but consider it as emerging within ‘‘embedded dyads’’ (Burt & Knez, 1996) – that is, pairs of individuals that interact in the social context of a team, and whose interactions are observed and responded to by others. We choose to study trust within this team context because trusting relationships are vital to the health and efficacy of organizational life. Trust serves as a substitute for costly mechanisms of organizational control (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). It permits cooperation even when raw self-interest might otherwise discourage it (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992). It promotes the appropriate type of deference to organizational goals that is required to accomplish work in an interdependent setting (Kramer, 1999), and it allows team members to confidently delegate and share information with others (Korsgaard et al., 2008). Having established the importance and centrality of both justice and trust in organizational life, the impulse by teams and individuals to foster both is understandable. However, as we describe here, efforts to promote one may occur at the expense of the other – a dynamic which only becomes clear when simultaneously considering interpersonal trusting intentions and group-level justice perspectives. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to understanding how these unintended consequences emerge, and identifying the contexts in which such divergences are most likely to occur.

TRUST-BUILDING: WHEN UNFAIR TREATMENT BEGETS TRUST Favors in Interpersonal Trust-Building Interpersonal trust between individuals forms in a variety of ways, one of which is through social exchange: trust can be forged through reciprocal


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exchange where parties are rewarded in kind for making themselves vulnerable (i.e., trusting) in a cascade of trust development (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) describes the exchange of ‘‘favors,’’ which includes an array of unilateral acts of giving, helping, consideration, and so on (Flynn & Brockner, 2003). These acts can have tangible, economic value, but may also be symbolic (Blau, 1964). Trust may emerge through the exchange of such favors, whether material or relational. On the relational side, putting trust in someone can be considered as a type of favor, Whitener and her colleagues (1998) argue. They describe ‘‘managerial trustworthy behaviors’’ (MTBs), which are behaviors that managers undertake to demonstrate their trustworthiness to subordinates. An example of an MTB is the delegation of control. When a manager hands over the reins to a subordinate (particularly if the subordinate has not yet proven themselves worthy of being delegated to), it serves as a type of ‘‘social reward y that the manager grants to the subordinate’’ (Whitener et al., 1998). The manager, risking opportunism, delegates control to the subordinate. This preemptive trust, offered as a social favor, leads subordinates in turn to trust their manager. In group settings, team members have at their disposal a range of potential favors to offer with both symbolic and practical utility: they can share information, offer expertise, lend a helping hand, offer public praise for proposals and ideas, and assign others to desirable roles or tasks within the team. By initiating or escalating exchange through favors, they communicate benevolence, a key dimension of trustworthiness judgments (Mayer et al., 1995) and an antecedent of trust. Such favors serve as an ‘‘altruism signal’’ and a demonstration of a substantial investment in the future of the relationship (Camerer, 1988; Iannaccone, 1992; Rottemberg, 1994). ‘‘Gifts can be used to express intentions, [so] we can build trust in a relationship by investing our resources in such expensive symbols’’ (Haas & Deseran, 1981, p. 5). In addition to directly building trust by communicating benevolence, gifts and favors also engender trust by signaling a bond of membership in an in-group or social category. Although this chapter focuses on teams of coworkers (who by definition share a membership), there is a meaningful distinction between a formal role or membership and feelings of psychological belonging to a collectivity (cf. Thau, Aquino, & Poortvliet, 2007). In this section, we focus on favor-paying as a means of enhancing psychological membership in the group. Some forms of favors can be used to reinforce mutual belonging or signal social solidarity related to group membership. For instance, a coworker who pays a favor to a newcomer to

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the group can signal a contingent type of interpersonal commitment. By paying a favor that would not be paid in the absence of a group bond, it says: ‘‘I value our relationship, because you are a member of this team.’’ (A ‘‘grammar’’ similar to that uncovered in Caplow’s (1984, pp. 1320–1321) study of gift-giving.) By making social identification salient and signaling a sense of belonging, favor-payers may activate the high expectations for reciprocity that accompanies group membership (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Doing favors for someone else may also signal that you know them well, understand their needs, and share their preferences (Prendergast & Stole, 2001). Stressing shared values, needs, and preferences can foster identification-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Such bonds create confidence that the trustee can be relied on to protect the trustor’s interests because their interests are indeed shared. In other words, in addition to directly fostering trust, some favors can indirectly contribute to trust development through their ability to communicate relational closeness, belonging, and identification.

Favoritism, Trust, and Justice In the simplest possible terms, members of teams pay one another valuable favors that both demonstrate trustworthiness and build identification-based interpersonal trust. However, favors and favoritism may travel in tandem (Prendergast & Topel, 1996). Nothing requires individuals to allocate resources and favors with an eye to fairness. Indeed, it may be the least fair exchanges that do the most to build interpersonal trust. For favors to be effective in signaling benevolence and emphasizing identification, they must be clearly attributable to the favor-payer. If a favor is attributed to the giver, it emphasizes a social exchange between the two parties and also highlights the giver’s benevolent character; if a favor is attributed to some other force (like the result of a standard procedure for allocation), such social exchange and personal attribution are absent, as are the benefits of trust (Korsgaard et al., 2002). Not only must the favors be attributable to the initiator, but they must also capture the notice of the recipient. People construct their trusting expectations by making inferences about future behavior. In history-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), trust is built as individuals evaluate their interactional history with a prospective trustee. We know that atypical, anomalous events are known to loom large in forecasting processes


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(Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005). So, a favor that deviates from expected procedure is likely to positively influence trust perceptions in the eyes of a favor’s recipient. This is not to say that typical and normative exchanges are negative or should be ignored: failing to engage in typical forms of social exchange at work may be a costly mistake. In this section, however, we are focused on favors that are paid above and beyond participating in the normal, expected forms of exchange. In summary, we suggest that there are two characteristics of trust-building special favors: first, they are perceived as discretionary on behalf of the giver, and second, they are atypical and anomalous, which highlights the distinctness of the giver–receiver relationship. To have the greatest impact, favors must not be expected as the consequence of a procedural norm. The very characteristics that make special favors so powerful in trustbuilding can also make them damaging to the procedural justice perceptions of onlookers in the group. One of the hallmarks of fairness is consistency. The consistency-over-time rule (Leventhal, 1980; Greenberg, 1986; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1996) describes how fairness perceptions hinge on consistency and stability in apportion of resources. The idea of favors that are inconsistent with the usual allocative procedures is at loggerheads with the principles of justice. Although they might be entirely successful in interpersonal trust-building between two members of a group, special favors might very well erode the justice perceptions of the other members of the group. Imagine working in a sales team where your teammates share a company car – a tiny, badly aging economy model without air conditioning. If your coworker offers to lend you her own personal car (a roomy, air-conditioned luxury sedan) to go pay a sales call, it is likely to be a trust-building favor. It communicates benevolence, it is unexpected, and it is clearly discretionary. But if your coworker has a habit of routinely lending her car to everyone, the impact of the favor on your trust in her is likely diminished. Is she lending you the car because of your trusting relationship, or because she lends it to everyone as a rule? Applying a transparent and consistent set of procedures (like lending to everyone or lending to anyone visiting a particular client) will contribute to a sense of procedural fairness. But it will not be as powerful in building particularistic, dyadic trust as an unexpected favor that falls outside of the tacit procedural rules. It is important to note, however, that we are not arguing that people intentionally choose to be unfair in their allocation of favors. In fact, Yamagishi, Jin, and Kiyonari (1999, p. 176) reported considerable trouble getting groups to depart from fairness and engage in in-group

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favoritism: ‘‘Ingroup favoritism was [perceived as] an unfair deed,’’ they write, ‘‘and subjects had to have an excuse for engaging in such an unfair practice.’’ We suspect that favor-payers think about favors as tokens of kindness and consideration in the dyadic relationship: the potential for perceptions of unfairness by other team members is an unintended consequence, not an intentional injustice. Boundary Conditions and Caveats We have described favor-paying as a strategy of initiating or escalating social exchange with the aim of communicating benevolence or enhancing perceptions of identification between the favor-payer and the target. Such favors may even seem perfectly fair to the persons receiving them as a function of selective perception, since the outcome is favorable to them (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler, & Martin, 1997). But this intended effect on the favor-payer may be coupled with an important unintended effect on the team’s procedural justice perceptions. From the perspective of fellow team members, such favors are perceived to be unfair. However, both effects – intended and unintended – may or may not hold in all circumstances. In this section, we identify important moderators and boundary conditions that constrain this dynamic. We first focus on favor recipients and ask when they might not experience a favor as trust-building. We then tackle our fundamental assumption that instances of favoritism will erode procedural justice perceptions in the team. We describe group characteristics that diminish the negative impact of favor-paying on the team’s justice perceptions, arguing that the deleterious effects on justice will hold only if (a) the favor is perceived to have been unfairly allocated, and (b) if favoritism and favor-paying are perceived to be contrary to standards of fairness. Suspicion may Undermine the Trust-Building Effects of Paying Favors Blau (1964, p. 94) himself noted the risk of blowback in the initiation or escalation of social exchange: ‘‘Excessive reciprocation may be embarrassing,’’ he wrote, ‘‘because it is a bid for a more extensive exchange relation than one may be willing to enter.’’ For favors to build trust through social exchange, they must communicate benevolence or create a sense of shared identification. Although ingratiation strategies, favors included, have been shown to build interpersonal liking in some cases (Liden & Mitchell, 1988; Ralston, 1985), they can also lead to diminished trust, as Strutton, Pelton, and Tanner’s (1996) study of ingratiation techniques by sales personnel demonstrates.


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So what distinguishes the trust-building from the trust-eroding favor? The distinction often has less to do with the nature of the favor than it does the context in which the favor is paid. Kramer’s (1999) work on paranoid cognition identifies a number of situational characteristics that would influence the attributions favor recipients make about the favor-payer. Kramer argues that when recipients are distinctive from the rest of the group, feel they are being evaluated, or are uncertain about their social standing, they are more likely to make sinister attributions about the person paying them a favor. Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, and McKimmie (2003) make the distinction in groups between central and peripheral group members, and in particular between those who are confident about their centrality in the future and those who worry they might remain or become peripheral in the future. So, extending Kramer’s argument, it is likely that paranoid cognitions about favors would be strongest among those who are somehow distinct from the rest of the group, and who worry they will not ultimately be accepted by the group in the future. From the literature on psychological attachment, we know that these individuals are likely to be high in attachment anxiety (Korsgaard, Brodt, & Sapienza, 2003). The persuasion knowledge model (PKM) literature extends this approach by considering when individuals are most likely to accurately infer that a persuasion or social influence motive underlies behavior. To the conditions identified by Kramer and Jetten and colleagues, PKM research adds the accessibility of the favor-payer’s (i.e., influencer’s) possible ulterior motives, the target’s capacity to elaborate on the situation (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000), and the persuasion coping skills of the target (Friestad & Wright, 1994). The success of the intended effect of favor-paying described here (namely, building trust) is, therefore, contingent on the readiness of the favor recipient to accept the favor as a symbol of genuine social (rather than economic) exchange. For this to occur, the obligations created by the favor must be unspecified and diffuse (Blau, 1964; Dulac, Coyle-Shapiro, Henderson, & Wayne, 2008). Individuals may freely trust someone who pays them a favor – but be quite resistant to someone who specifically demands their trust in a direct economic exchange for the favor paid. Special Favors may not be Perceived as Favoritism As an individual difference variable, beliefs in a just world (Lerner, 1980) might have an effect: those with strong just-world beliefs might have difficulty accepting that the favor was allocated with anything but perfect fairness. This is particularly true of those who have just-world beliefs about

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others as well as themselves (Lipkusa, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996). In groups, they may emerge to become a collective property of the team (i.e., everyone in the team has just-world beliefs) through the mechanisms of attraction, selection, and attrition (Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995). Personality characteristics become homogenized in the group as founders and managers’ dispositions are embedded into the organization, and then entrenched further as dispositionally similar people are attracted to, selected by, and remain in, the organization (Schaubroeck, Ganster, & Jones, 1998). One way in which such beliefs could come to be shared is attrition during periods of stress, because individuals with just-world beliefs tend to perform better on stressful tasks and experience less strain (Tomaka & Blascovitch, 1994). In teams that come to share just-world perceptions, the deleterious effect of special favors on team justice perceptions may not hold. But even when favor-paying is indeed perceived to be favoritism, it may not reduce the team’s perceptions of justice in all cases. We anticipate this effect to vary as a function of culture. Chen, Chen, and Xin (2004) describe the relationship between trust, justice, and the Chinese notion of guanxi, the centrality of personal relationships in decisions related to tasks and economic exchange. Their finding is that guanxi practices (i.e., favoritism afforded to members of close in-group members) had mixed effects on trust, mediated entirely through justice perceptions. When guanxi practices were based on family or hometown affiliation, they were perceived as unfair; when the practices were predicated on friendship or alumni bonds, they were perceived as fair. We predict a slightly different dynamic (though with a similar logic) at play in cultures with a low equity sensitivity (cf. Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987). As in the case of Chinese guanxi, some inequitable favorpaying will be considered to be procedurally just. However, individuals seeking to build trust in such cultures have a novel dilemma: paying favors inequitably is expected and considered to be procedurally just. Thus, simply paying a special favor may not be enough to provoke an individual attribution and engender trust: the favor might be chalked up to a cultural norm like guanxi rather than to your benevolence as a favor-payer. That said, the trust-building/justice-eroding dynamic of special favors might still occur in these cultures – as in the case of ‘‘unfair’’ favors paid to those who are less expected by guanxi practice to receive them. In other words, to extend our prediction about this dynamic across cultural boundaries requires a loosening of our presumptions about what constitutes an ‘‘unfair’’ favor, as well as a greater appreciation for the different ways in which special favors can be signaled across cultural boundaries.

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TRUST BREACH: WHEN FAIR PROCESS ERODES TRUST Trust Violations Thus far, we have considered how trust is built within interpersonal dyads. However, this trust can be broken, and is often fragile (Korsgaard, Brodt, & Sapienza, 2003). Trust violations are events that threaten trusting relationships by ‘‘y provid[ing] disconfirming evidence of confident positive expectations’’ (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 14). Organizational life is replete with breaches of trust. One conservative estimate (Jones & Burdett, 1994) suggests that 1 in 10 women and 1 in 4 men have felt betrayed in the workplace. The consequences of these breaches can be extraordinarily damaging for teams. Incidents of trust breach often trigger reciprocation that may be disproportionately strong relative to the original violation: trust violations frequently spiral into cycles of revenge, avoidance, and mistrust (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Not surprisingly, organizations and teams often create processes for handling such violations collectively in order to avoid individual acts of revenge or vigilantism (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007) and to promote cooperation (van Prooijen, Gallucci, & Toeset, 2008). But these procedures have an impact on the team beyond the dyad of victim and violator. They serve a social-learning function by demonstrating the norms and expectations of the team (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones, 1985), and they provoke justice evaluations among team members who observe the procedures. This section describes how organizational procedures for handling trust violations, particularly punishment systems, can be constructed to convey fairness to team members outside the victim–violator dyad. It also identifies how certain types of procedurally fair punishment systems can have the unintended consequence of eroding interpersonal trust between team members. Moderators and boundary conditions are identified to make clear when this troubling divergence between trust and justice is most likely to occur. Transparent Punishment Procedures and Justice Perceptions Openness is generally viewed as a hallmark of fair process. Procedural fairness requires that decisions be carried out in a way that is unbiased; transparency follows as a requirement (Leventhal et al., 1980). In punishment,

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due process must be public in order to engender confidence that the stated criteria for decisions are in fact being followed (Galligan, 1996). With transparency, the fairness of decisions can be verified (Leventhal, 1980); without such transparency, observers lack any such assurance. Just as firms may adopt transparent systems for hiring, pay, and promotions in order to demonstrate fairness, so too can they adopt public transparent systems for dealing with offenses like trust violations. One can find transparency in both process and outcome in a range of organizational settings: police complaint boards may publish a register listing all complaints received, how they were evaluated, and what punishment (if any) was chosen. Professional associations may do the same with issues of professional misconduct; many professional bulletins include notices of complaints received and decisions taken. These announcements show that complaints are dealt with in a manner that follows (fair) procedures, and they demonstrate that the processes themselves are transparent and consistent. By making processes public, Greenberg (2006) argues, organizations ‘‘send a strong message about [their] commitment to ‘getting it right’’’ (p. 163). Levin (2007) describes the implications of a lack of transparency in the context of the legal profession. Although some parts of the disciplinary process for lawyers is open and public, much of the profession’s selfregulatory and disciplinary work still occurs in secret or through closed processes. Levin makes the argument that the privacy associated with these disciplinary decisions fuels perceptions of injustice among legal practitioners. Those perceptions include the prevalent attitude that these closeddoor processes are biased in a number of ways, from favoring attorneys from large firms to discriminating against ethnic minorities. Without open processes for handling complaints, the fairness of the processes cannot be verified, and is, therefore, vulnerable to accusations of bias.

Transparent Punishment Procedures and Interpersonal Trust Although openness and transparency in punishment have certain advantages (the intended effect of justice perceptions), they may also have unintended consequences. In a nutshell, public, transparent, and visible punishment of wrongdoing may dramatically increase perceptions that coworkers (including fellow team members) are generally untrustworthy. Consider the example of crime and television news coverage. Cultivation theory describes how viewing local television news can trigger a fear of crime


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that is independent of actual crime rates in the area (Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003; Slater & Rasinski, 2005). We propose that transparent systems for punishing trust violators can serve a similar role: by highlighting the incidence of trust violations, they provide a signal to team members that trust violations may be commonplace within their team. Viewers of local newscasts overestimate the incidence of crime and their personal risk of being victimized, because their exposure to reports of such phenomena lead to misperceptions about a phenomenon’s actual base rate (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992; Schwarz et al., 1991; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1976). This is particularly true when the reports involve vivid and highly memorable cases. In the same way, the public’s lack of trust in corporate executives is skewed by the stream of news reports about untrustworthy executives. Consider news reports of New York investment advisor Bernie Madoff, who ran Madoff Investment Securities, a ponzi scheme masked as a hedge fund. News reports frequently included vivid images of Madoff’s opulent lifestyle, from his $21 million home in Palm Beach, Florida, to $40 shaves (Clother & Carmiel, 2008). Such vivid and highly salient trust violations can lead to overgeneralization about the lack of trustworthiness of corporate leadership or public figures more generally (Zimmer, 1972, cited in Kramer, 1999). Owing to similar mechanics, we propose that those whose attention is drawn by transparent, open punishment systems will tend to underestimate the trustworthiness of their coworkers and fellow team members, and overestimate the likelihood that they will find themselves victims of a trust violation. In fact, not only might they overestimate their risk and the overall incidence of trust violations, but they may also become aware of entirely new types of violations to fear: my teammates could do that to me? Once fear is added to the mix, perceptions of risk increase even further (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005). The consequence of this base rate and risk perception problem will be a decline in generalized trust among team members, as they over-generalize from trust violations made visible and salient by fair punishment processes. Making matters worse, the ease of recalling such unexpected and vivid cases is likely to maintain this skewed perception for quite some time. Therefore, the consequences of these processes may create a paradox: the fairness of the system promotes justice perceptions (and, downstream, trust and cooperation), whereas the overestimations will, in turn, reduce generalized trust (and ultimately, cooperation). In other words, having fair processes may foster trust and cooperation, but actually using those processes may erode trust and cooperation.

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Caveats and Boundary Conditions Punishment Processes and Punishment Events must be Distinguished For a punishment process for dealing with trust violators to be perceived as procedurally fair, we have argued that the process must be open and transparent. For those who study organizational punishment processes, this prescription may seem surprising. Trevino (1992) theorizes that observers are likely to view a disciplinary process as just when punishment is conducted in private. Atwater, Waldman, Carey, and Cartier (2001) argue that public events of discipline are likely to provoke discomfort among onlookers, along with ‘‘negative feelings toward the discipliner.’’ But when Ball, Trevino, and Sims (1994) made the argument that disciplinary punishments meted out in private would be more constructive, instructive, and just, they found no support. It would appear that there are unclear, if not contradictory pictures, about the fairness of public versus private punishment. To reconcile these divergent perspectives, we argue, it takes a clear distinction between the openness of the process and the publicness of the disciplinary event itself. What Trevino, Waldman et al. and Ball et al. (correctly) view as unjust is the notion of public punishments (i.e., disciplinary events), not the decisional process guiding how the violation should be treated. An organization can have one without the other: a manager might tell employees that she is going to reprimand a violator. She might explain why she is doing so, and explain the process by which she arrived at that decision. Doing so would show that the punishment process is open, public and transparent. But the actual reprimand might unfold in private. The process is public, giving onlookers faith in the even-handedness of responses to trust violations; the punishment itself is dealt with as privately as possible to avoid shame, humiliation, and injustice perceptions. The type of openness we describe as procedurally fair can be summarized as follows: private punishments, publicly arrived at. Openness is not Enough A caveat is required about the role of openness in fostering perceptions of procedural justice. Our position is that openness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment processes to be considered fair. Taking a fundamentally unjust process for deciding on punishment and making it open and visible will not automatically render it fair, as Atwater, Brett, and Charles (2007) forcefully argue. They offer the vivid example of a GM employee who, (falsely) accused of theft, was subjected to a humiliating public search. Such an incident is certainly a case of the punishment process


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being itself a form of punishment. But it also underscores an important distinction: when we describe the justice-enhancing effects of openness and transparency, it is with the assumption that the decision process being made public is otherwise procedurally, distributively, and interactionally just. If the team is public about the fact that it arbitrarily punishes certain trust violators and not others, their transparency does not remediate the fundamental injustice of their punishment process. These two distinctions are useful in helping to reconcile our arguments about the value of openness with previous data on the topic. Brett, Atwater, and Waldman (2005), for instance, found that private punishments had more salutary effects on violator’s behavior than public ones; however, the process-versus-event distinction we make here is not captured in their data. The same applies when considering the data from Ball et al. (1994): in their study, public punishments (again, events rather than processes) tended to be harsher and less constructive than private ones. In other words, the design of these studies confounds the openness of the process and other elements of procedural and interactional justice. A working paper by Xiao and Houser (2006) demonstrates how the process can be public without making the punishments themselves a public display: in their experiment, they punished defectors in a public-goods game, and announced to all players how the punishment worked and how many players had been punished: the punishment was ‘‘y implemented publicly but anonymously’’ as a way of keeping the system public while avoiding shame.

Emotion will Moderate the Effect of Transparent Punishment on Trust Emotion may also play a role in shaping the relationship between trust and justice. Upon learning about the trust violations of others, team members are likely to experience some sort of negative emotion. This negativity is likely to persist and may escalate because negative moods lead people to expect negative events in the future (Johnson & Tversky, 1983) and to consider themselves lacking in social support (Cohen, Towbes, & Flocco, 1988). A trust violation perpetrated by a member of one’s own team is likely to aggravate such feelings of low social support, because it damages the often taken-for-granted assumption that the team will be a source of social support (Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993). Although not (yet) the victim of a trust violation themselves, these team members are likely to see trust violation on the horizon, with no one there to look out for them. The negative emotion that follows the public announcement of a trust violation, therefore, may also play a role in the erosion of trust.

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Emotion may also serve to moderate some of the risk perception effects described earlier. Our argument draws a parallel between television news watchers and organizational observers of punishment processes. We have assumed that the negative emotion most likely to be experienced by observers is fear: the observers of punishment processes fear that they will fall victim to a coworker’s trust violation. When fear is aroused, perception of risk increases (Fischhoff et al., 2005). But what if the emotion provoked in onlookers is anger, rather than fear? Whereas fearful individuals are pessimistic and expect the worst, angry individuals are optimistic about the future (Fischhoff et al., 2005; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). A change in the specific negative emotion that is experienced may moderate the effect of transparent punishment on trust. Resonance will Moderate the Effect of Transparent Punishment on Trust In addition to affect, there may be cognitive moderators of the relationship between transparent punishment processes and reduced trust. Returning to the parallel between news watchers and observers of punishment processes, results of cultivation research do provide the reassurance that not every local news viewer harbors unreasonable fears of crime. In some instances, rather than creating fear, exposure to news reports simply affected the perceived importance of crime as an issue (Gross & Aday, 2003) as well as people’s concerns about crime at the societal level (Slater & Rasinski, 2005). In our parallel case, we might imagine that team members might perceive trust breach as more common (i.e., changes to base rate perceptions), but not necessarily fear that their own trust will be breached (i.e., no reduction in interpersonal trust). The notion of resonance helps to explain these results: the effect of news consumption on fear of crime depends on the degree to which the news resonates with the viewer. In other words, when the reported crime is similar to a crime the viewer personally experienced, media exposure may engender fear. When the viewer has no such experience, it may not engender those same fears (Shrum & Bischak, 2001). At the heart of the resonance concept is viewers’ perceptions of the reported crime as proximal to their own everyday life; the proximal it is believed to be, the more likely it is to build fear (Bilandzic, 2006). We expect a similar dynamic to hold in the context of team members observing the punishment of trust violators. An open, transparent system for punishments serves to alert all observers to the range and frequency of trust violations. We expect that observers’ trust will be weakened most when the type of trust violation observed is similar to one from the team’s interactional history. If the team becomes


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aware of an employee being punished for free riding on a group task, for example, it will bring to mind previous instances where the team faced problems with free riders. We expect that trust will be weakened when a trust violation happens to those who are similar to us, and when those trust violations occur proximally, at the heart of the team to which we belong. We refer to these types of violations as holding ‘‘resonance’’ for observers, and in so far as punishment processes make these ‘‘resonant’’ violations visible, those processes will likely to engender fear and erode trust among members of the team. We use the term resonance as a shorthand way of describing why certain events tend to ‘‘hit home’’ and influence our judgments. Not every newscast about a mugging will make you feel unsafe on the street; not every watercooler anecdote about a treacherous coworker will make you untrusting of your teammates. However, when those stories are similar to your own experience or when you share commonalities with the victim, the event is said to ‘‘resonate,’’ taking a toll on your own judgments of risk and probability. A range of psychological mechanisms underlie this notion, including the availability heuristic and the simulation heuristic (Folkes, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kasperson et al., 1988; Kahneman et al., 1982). Shrum (2004) offers a more in-depth evaluation of the cognitive processes underlying cultivation theory, but for our purpose, we argue that finding out about trust violations (through transparent processes like the ones described in the following text) can have the effect of diminishing our trust in others, as a function of how our knowledge of that incident influences our own subjective perceptions of risk and likelihood. As a shorthand, we refer to this notion in terms of the ‘‘resonance’’ that knowledge of a trust violation has for the observer. Resonance and Group Membership The resonance of the punishment event (and the trust violation it makes salient) may also hinge not only on judgment biases, but also on the dynamics of self-categorization (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Although there may be some observers whose naive belief in specific and general deterrence means that punishment restores absolute confidence in the group (‘‘well, now that he’s been punished, nobody else will ever violate anyone’s trust around here y’’), we expect that for most members of organizations, hearing about a trust breach perpetrated by a fellow team member will require interpretation: is this information diagnostic about the trustworthiness of others in my team? Should I trust my teammates? In order to understand how individuals will interpret and respond to such instances, we

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need to know whether the violation implicates team members as violators, victims, or both. Even when the violation occurs in an intact team, where all the parties are formally members, this process of interpretation may still take place. As described in the preceding text, there is a distinction between sociological membership (in terms of roles and positions) and psychological membership (in terms of identification and solidarity; cf. Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Here, when we refer to in-groups and out-groups, we refer to the psychological form of belonging. We expect greater resonance (and, consequentially, more personal fear about the risk of trust violations) when both the victim and violator belong to the same team. When a trust breach implicates a central member of the team, it is likely to be very salient: the trustworthiness of fellow team members is strongly goal relevant, and trust violations committed by team members defies expectations in teams that have strong category-based trust (cf. Kramer, 1999). When the victim is perceived to share membership in a team with which one identifies, this sense of resonance is likely to be amplified. When one invests one’s sense of self into a group (i.e., depersonalization) and feels prototypical and similar to other group members (Hogg & Hains, 1996), a breach of another member’s trust can be interpreted as a personal affront. Observing a group member’s ill treatment tends to threaten our own beliefs in a just world (Aguiar, Vala, Correia, & Pereira, 2008). We empathize more strongly with in-group victims (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008), and consider them less complicit in their own victimhood (Harrison, Howerton, Secarea, & Nguyen, 2008). Since a group bond with the victim makes the offense seem more egregious and less deserved, such violations are likely to be both salient and resonant. We expect that such violations will contribute to a personal fear of a trust breach and diminish trust in others. The in-group or out-group status of the offender (i.e., the violator) matters as well. When a trust breach is deemed to be serious and intentional, and is carried out by someone who is a core member of a team with which we identify, it is likely to resonate with observers in the team and deteriorate trust. However, there are a range of ways in which the resonance of a violation perpetrated by an in-group member can be reduced, such as by making an outcast of the violator or by denying the seriousness of the offense. First, as a way of preserving overall positivity about the team, members may respond with extreme judgments toward members who deviate or breach team norms – the so-called ‘black sheep’ effect (Marques, Abrams, &


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Serodio, 2001; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Members belonging to a team who violate the trust of a fellow member may retain their formal position or role, but are frequently rejected psychologically from the team. By excluding an offender from the cognitive category of team members and relegating them to the periphery, observers are able to tell themselves that the team remains a safe environment, because the team is different than the outcast violator. In such cases, violations are unlikely to resonate with observers, and trust levels will remain unscathed. An opposite approach is also possible. In some cases, rather than rejecting the offender to preserve the value of team membership, observers may instead choose to deny the seriousness of the offense, dismiss the incident as unintentional, or blame the victim for the incident. There is evidence that ingroup members benefit from benevolent stereotyping and attributional lenience (Lewicki, Wiethoff, & Tomlinson, 2005; Weber, 1994), that ingroup offenses are difficult to remember (Sahdra & Ross, 2007), and that out-group victims are frequently subject to victim denigration (Miller, Smith, Ferree, & Taylor, 1976). This phenomenon (akin to what Stratton (2007) memorably calls the ‘‘devil protection effect’’) requires the violation to have certain characteristics. First, it is unlikely to occur when the victim is also a central in-group member, as described earlier. It is difficult to downplay the severity of a breach suffered by a member of a group with which one is closely identified. Second, as van Prooijen (2006) finds, the lenience enjoyed by in-group violators is limited to ambiguous breaches: we may give an offender the benefit of the doubt, but we will not entirely delude ourselves in the case of blatant breaches. Relatedly, our willingness to excuse in-group offenders is not likely to endure multiple violations: in the context dating violence, for example, in-group members receive more lenient attributions and are deemed less guilty – but only for a first offense. In the case of multiple offenses, the privilege of in-group membership disappears (Harrison & Abrishami, 2004). To summarize, the degree to which a trust violation provokes observers on the team to trust one another less depends in large part on psychological processes of identification and categorization. In general, offenses that involve an in-group member and an in-group offender will be the most resonant: when trust is broken in the core of the team by those with whom we identify, it is likely to provoke uncertainty, fear, and a downward revision of our existing trust levels. This is avoided only in cases where the severity or intentionality of the transgression can be dismissed, or when the violator can be rejected from the team to preserve overall in-group positivity.

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TRUST REPAIR: WHEN UNFAIR RESTITUTION RESTORES TRUST Reparations and Redress in Trust Repair In the wake of a trust violation, individual victims and their teams can respond to the violator. Individually, they can respond through revenge or avoidance. Collectively, they can respond through punishment processes, as described in the last section. But violators themselves also have a role to play in trust repair. In order to speed trust repair, they can offer explanations (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Sitkin & Bies, 1993), make promises about future behavior (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), and offer apologies (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). However, particularly when trust violations involve deception, such social accounts may have little effect (Schweitzer et al., 2006). In many instances, these verbal responses may be treated as ‘‘cheap talk’’ unless they are accompanied by substantive amends (Bottom et al., 2002). So, for violators to promote trust repair, they must often do more than just providing social accounts. They must provide active behavioral demonstrations of their trustworthiness (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Behavioral strategies with more immediate impact include redress or reparation. Redress tends to involve ‘‘acts of outright altruism’’ by the offender (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), aimed at demonstrating benevolence and restoring the balance in the exchange relationship. Or, violators may allow the victims to demand reparation. An open offer of reparations serves two functions: it provides a demonstration of benevolence, and it makes the violator vulnerable to the victim, restoring both a sense of choice and control to the victim (Bottom et al., 2002). Pratt and Dirks (2006) caution, however, that the manner in which such reparations are offered ‘‘y may be as critical as the reparations themselves. (p. 128)’’ The offender’s actions must speak to the type of harm suffered by their victim: disequilibrium in the relationship, a lost sense of control, a tangible loss of resources, or lost face can all result from a breach of trust (Ren & Gray, 2009); the type of behavior needed to restore trust will depend on the type of injury suffered by the victim. Providing redress or reparations that are appropriate to the situation and which meet the needs of the victim is only one of the challenges for the violator hoping to take action to restore trust. Violators also face an attributional challenge. Like the dynamics of trust-building described in the first section of this chapter, trust repair efforts must be unambiguously attributable to the violator in order to be effective. Although imposed,


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legalistic measures can have a deterrent effect on trust violation, they are ineffective in restoring perceptions of trustworthiness or rebuilding trust (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). Similarly, if reparations are required by a team norm or an organizational policy, the victim is left without any way of diagnosing the trustworthiness of the violator (Korsgaard et al., 2002): is the violator doing something kind for me because he wants to show that he can be trusted, or is he doing it because he is required to? So, when violators choose to offer favors that are outside the bounds of procedure, they underscore that their redress is volitional and personal rather than situationally determined. They choose to behave in a way that leads to a character attribution that they are indeed trustworthy, rather than simply following their self-interest or the expectations of others (Korsgaard et al., 2002). In addition to appropriateness and attributions, violators face a third challenge in taking action to restore trust. Although a sustained pattern of trustworthy behavior over time may be the best strategy to restore trust, this approach may not be possible. In many cases, the natural inclination of victims of trust violations is avoidance – that is, steering clear of the offender and avoiding interactions (Bies & Tripp, 2005, cited in Tripp et al., 2007). The opportunity for repeated, quotidian displays of trustworthiness may, therefore, be limited. However, because reparations can vary in both magnitude and diagnosticity in addition to frequency (Pratt & Dirks, 2006), one large display of trustworthiness may serve a similar function as many smaller displays repeated over time. Violators, therefore, will be most successful in restoring trust behaviorally when a few conditions are met. Their actions must be appropriate to the type of harm suffered by their victim. They must be unambiguously attributable to the violator, rather than some other force. And they must not rely on the opportunity for sustained interaction with the victim, who may pursue a strategy of avoidance. This leads us to expect violators to pay particular types of favors to their victims: atypical, ‘‘showy’’ demonstrations that aim to counterbalance the weight of the trust violation. They are also likely to occur, for attribution reasons, to differ from the types of actions that would be required by policy, norms, or other situational forces. The challenge with these types of reparations is that they suggest a type of resource allocation, either social or material, that occurs outside the boundaries of the procedures agreed or assumed by the team to be fair. They are, in essence, a type of compensatory special favor: they are paid by the violator as a way of restoring trust in very much the same way as prospective trustees, in the first section of this chapter, pay favors to those with whom

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they want to forge a trusting relationship. The intended effect is on the individual within the dyad: it is to restore the victim’s trust. But these compensatory favors may have an unintended effect on team members outside the dyad. Those favors may engender unfairness perceptions in the rest of the team for the very same reason that helped to restore trust in the dyad: they are inconsistent, unexpected, particularistic, and atypical – they fly in the face of norms about the procedures to be used in distributing resources.

Compensatory Favors: The Role of Publicness in Justice and Injustice Perceptions The compensatory favors described above may be viewed as either perfectly just, or profoundly unjust, by observers in the team. The degree to which distributive and procedural inconsistency is viewed as unjust will likely depend on how public (or private) the original trust violation was. Trust relationships tend to be described in the literature as occurring either privately in an isolated dyad, or publicly in an embedded dyad (Burt & Knez, 1996): traditionally, we think of dyads as either isolated or interacting in full view of others in the team. In organizational life, however, interactions between teammates occur in a range of settings from fully private to entirely public, with a range of quasi-public contexts in between. Thus, trust violations can occur privately in closed-door offices or publicly in team meetings. However, sometimes betrayals occur that are more than private but less than fully public: for instance, the violation may have been witnessed by some team members and not others. In such situations, team members might witness the incident firsthand, may learn of it secondhand through organizational gossip (Kramer, 1999; Burt & Knez, 1996), or may remain entirely unaware of the violation. The degree to which the violation was public will likely have profound effects on the perceived justice of compensatory favors. For instance, imagine that you meet with a colleague and agree to share credit equally for a valuable new idea. Yet at your team meeting, your colleague claims the idea as his own, and fails to mention you. Later, your colleague tries to smooth things over by appointing you to the far most desirable and prestigious role on the project team, despite your inexperience relative to your colleagues. How will your teammates respond in terms of their justice perceptions? Clearly, the answer is contingent on their knowledge – whether firsthand or secondhand – of the trust violation. Because restorative impulses – that is,


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the motive to compensate those who are victimized – are bolstered by moral outrage (Darley & Pittman, 2003), teammates who are aware of an injustice will tend to think of redress as a form of ‘‘compensatory justice’’ and, therefore, entirely fair. Such moral outrage is likely to occur when others in the team become aware of a trust violation. In fact, the evidence from forgiveness research suggests that onlookers may treat violations as more serious than the victims themselves do (Green, Burnette, & Davis, 2008), a dynamic that is intensified when group identification is high (Brown et al., 2008). In other words, there is evidence to suggest that onlookers in teams may be inclined to demand even more in the way of compensatory favors for the victim than the victim themselves might demand. Whether the original offense occurred in sight of the team, therefore, is consequential for the justice perceptions that result from redress efforts. Where the offence and redress are both public, we expect heightened perceptions of fairness, as onlookers in the team attribute the favor to compensatory justice. However, where the offence is private or hidden but the redress is public, we expect dramatically eroded fairness perceptions, as onlookers in the team struggle to make sense of the perceived procedural and distributive injustice. In teams with imperfect knowledge of the violation, we expect mixed effects: among those team members who have witnessed the violation and the compensatory favor, justice perceptions will stay steady or even increase; among those who have no knowledge of the original breach but do see the favor, justice perceptions will decrease. Therefore, the degree to which knowledge spreads about violations in the team will have a considerable influence on the procedural and distributive justice climate strength in the team (i.e., agreement and shared perceptions in the team about the level of justice; cf. Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao, 2007; Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002). Where all team members share the same knowledge (or lack thereof), justice judgments are likely to be uniform. In instances where knowledge spreads unevenly (as it often does where passing and receiving gossip is related to power; Kurland & Pelled, 2000), it is likely that there will be less consensus among team members in their justice judgments. These arguments about the willingness of the team to treat lapses in the usual procedures as just desserts for the victim (rather than an injustice suffered by the other team members) all hinge on the assumption that favors will contribute to compensatory justice. That is, team members must conclude that the victim is owed something for the transgression they suffered. However, favors in the wake of a breach can serve purposes other than compensation, and compensation does not necessarily require favors.

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Returning to the earlier section on transparent punishment systems, violators may be punished by the team as a collectivity; where such punishments have a restorative or compensatory element, team members may be satisfied that appropriate redress has been made. Absent this motive, the main purpose for favor-paying in the wake of a breach may be an act of self-sacrifice, a signal of altruism, and a way of demonstrating an investment in the future of the relationship. Although such favors may enhance the victim’s interpersonal trust in the favor-allocating violator, it is unlikely to receive the same blessing for sidestepping procedural rules that it might if it had compensatory motives.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have examined the interplay between interpersonal trust formation and restoration and team justice perceptions. Given the salutary outcomes of both trust and justice to organizations, teams have an incentive to foster both. This chapter describes how successful efforts in building one may unintentionally erode the other at each stage of the trust process: when team members try to foster dyadic trust with special favors, it can erode justice perceptions at the team level. When teams institute transparent processes for dealing with trust violations, it can promote the team’s justice perceptions at the expense of interpersonal trust. And finally, when compensatory favors are paid by violators, it can restore trust – but with the risk of eroding justice perceptions. This chapter makes a number of practical and theoretical contributions. Most obviously, it offers an encouragement to practitioners to consider the unintended consequences associated with building trust and fostering justice perceptions. However, it also provides three insights to researchers interested in trust, justice, and group processes. First, it underscores the importance of attending to both group justice perceptions and interpersonal trust within teams by identifying contexts in which the two constructs diverge. At a single level of analysis, there is a positive and reciprocal relationship between trustworthiness, justice, and trust. But when considering the socially embedded dyad and the broader team simultaneously, tensions between these constructs are revealed. The initiation or escalation of social exchange in trust-building and repair may run counter to norms and expectations about fair procedures about allocation. The same procedural transparency that bolsters justice perceptions may serve an informational role that hampers trust formation.


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In summary, those interested in either justice or trust in the context of teams ought to consider capturing both constructs rather than one in isolation. A second, related lesson from this chapter is that researchers must simultaneously consider teams and the team member dyads embedded within those teams. The tendency in group research is to consider teams in terms of aggregations of individuals, or in terms of the emergent group-level properties of those individuals. In the justice literature, the team is often viewed as being comprised of the individual properties of its members, and of certain properties that come into being by virtue of a team’s shared experiences. Similarly, the dominant paradigm in social–psychological trust research is focused on the interpersonal dyad, ignoring the team context in which the dyad may be situated. We hope this chapter will promote greater attention to the dyad among justice scholars, and an improved focus on the team context among trust researchers. Without examining both dyadic and team dynamics at once, we risk missing novel and unexpected tensions like the justice–trust disjunctures identified in this chapter. Finally, this chapter draws attention to the importance of how knowledge travels in teams. In each of our three cases, the notions of publicness, openness, and transparency matter. The degree to which the interactions within a dyad are visible to team members outside of the dyad is at the heart of the erosion of justice in the case of trust-building favors. The degree to which trust violations are made visible by punishment processes is meaningful in terms of whether trust is maintained or eroded. The degree to which information spreads between members in larger teams may shape the consensus in team members’ responses to observed (or overheard) dyadic exchanges, with implications for the strength of justice climates in the team. And finally, the degree to which onlookers in the team are aware of a trust violation will shape whether they respond favorably or unfavorably to a compensatory favor. Understanding how knowledge about trustworthiness and justice is transmitted through open displays and public processes is central to understanding the unintended consequences described in this chapter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT We thank Michael Platow, Audrey Korsgaard, and an anonymous reviewer for their thoughtful and constructive feedback on this chapter. We also thank Margaret Neale and Elizabeth Mannix, the series editors, and Elizabeth Mullen, theme organizer and editor. This research was supported

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by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship awarded to the first author and a Queen’s University research grant awarded to the second author.

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PART II DISTRIBUTIVE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

CHAPTER 6 ALLOCATING RESOURCES FAIRLY AMONG GROUP MEMBERS: THE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE MATTERS Sanford E. DeVoe and Sheena S. Iyengar ABSTRACT Purpose – We outline a novel perspective on the role the allocation medium plays in how groups allocate resources fairly. Building upon recent research that demonstrates the unique norms invoked by the resource of money, we propose that what individuals’ judge to be a fair allocation principle among group members systematically varies as a function of whether the resource being distributed is money versus other resources that are allocated within organizations. In light of the existing research, we argue that an egalitarian allocation principle will be understood to be less fair when the norms of the market are invoked by the distribution of a resource that is a medium of exchange (e.g., money) rather than an in-kind good (e.g. food). We conclude by discussing the implications of identifying the unique properties of money for a wide set of literatures. Approach – In this theoretical paper we review prior research examining contextual variables influencing allocation preferences and attempt to identify the different characteristics of money as a resource that might influence conceptions of fairness.


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Value – This chapter offers a theoretical review of the relevant literature and will be of interest to scholars of social justice.

INTRODUCTION In everyday life, we frequently make assessments about what’s fair. It can be as mundane as the fairest way to pick teams on the playground. It can also be for high stakes that are hard for individuals to fully comprehend. Take for example the recent attention of the media, politicians, and the American public that focused on the unfairness of bonus payments made by the American International Group (AIG) to employees of its financial services division (Ritholtz, 2009). The bonus payments were in excess of $165 million, but this amount paled in comparison to more than $170 billion provided in taxpayer bailouts of the company – a number whose magnitude is difficult to appreciate. Yet regardless of what was in each American tax payer’s self-interest – the expedient recovery of the economy – it seemed impossible to have a sense of perspective amidst contractual bonuses given out in the face of horrendous performance outcomes. This violation of people’s sense of fairness, however small in relative terms, dominated individuals’ reactions to the larger economic recovery effort. The problem of fairness is by no means new. Indeed, it is a fundamental challenge all organized groups face when allocating scarce resources. Most of the empirical research on what is perceived to be the fair allocation of resources comes from the distributive justice literature where judgments regarding fairness ‘‘represent the degree of equity or equality across parties’ payoffs that are considered normatively acceptable or desirable within a situation’’ (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992, p. 221). Allocating resources in terms of equity is generally one where the outcome received by the individual is proportional to his or her contribution, ability, or performance (Adams, 1965); whereas, allocating resources in terms of equality occurs when all individuals receive the same rewards regardless of individual differences in input (Deutsch, 1985). Of course, there are other allocation principles for distributing resources (e.g., based on need or hierarchy), but these have not been as extensively examined in the literature. In line with the competing principles of equity and equality, a common dilemma organizations face with the use of teams is whether to reward individual or group performance. Typically, equity enhances the goal of performance output, whereas, equality promotes the goal of group harmony

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and solidarity (Kazemi & Eek, 2007). Rewarding group performance can lead to greater free-riding or social loafing among team members (Lazear, 1998; Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). Rewarding individual performance can have undesirable consequences, as well. For instance, one consequence of rewarding individual performance can be the potential for greater wage dispersion among team members. Research documents that dispersed pay distributions result in greater dissatisfaction, poorer quality work, less collaboration within divisions, and an increased propensity to leave an organization (Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). One critical factor in determining the appropriate incentive scheme for teams is what allocation of rewards team members will accept as fair (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Although this question has been explored extensively in the distributive justice literature, we argue that prior investigations have done so by focusing narrowly on the allocation of monetary rewards. In this chapter, we argue that money is associated with particular norms that influence how individuals allocate resources. Specifically, we consider how monetary rewards may be associated with a view of fairness that is more consistent with rewarding individual performance rather than team performance. Importantly, we investigate whether other reward types might be associated with norms that are more consistent with rewarding team performance. The central theoretical question this chapter endeavors to examine within the distributive justice literature is whether individuals define fairness in allocating rewards among team members differently depending on the resources being allocated. The motivation behind this question comes from recent work in decision making that shows – despite the implicit assumptions of economists (Becker, 1965) – that people tend to think about their money differently than the resource of time when making decisions about how to allocate it in their everyday lives (Okada & Hoch, 2004; Soman, 2001). Organizational practices that highlight the monetary value of time (e.g., hourly payment), however, can cause individuals to apply the same mental accounting rules associated with money to the resource of time (DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007). This literature leads us to ask the following question: What precisely is it about the resource of money that causes people to treat it differently than non-monetary resources? In this chapter, we delineate some of the distinct characteristics of money and how those characteristics are likely to influence allocation preferences in comparison to non-monetary resources among team members. The distributive justice literature is an ideal platform on which to systematically think about how the resource itself may be associated with distinct norms

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that determine allocation preferences because the distributive justice literature directly examines the norms surrounding the allocation of scarce resources among group members within organizations, and within this domain there is extensive prior empirical work on which to build. Understanding the role the allocation medium plays in how groups allocate resources is of great importance not only for its own sake but also because it may inform the study of human behavior much more widely.

OVERVIEW In this chapter, we begin by considering the set of contextual factors that have been identified as influencing preferences for equity and equality in the allocation of resources among group members. We then narrow our focus to the prior empirical work investigating the influence of resource type on allocation preferences. We review prior theoretical frameworks for understanding why and how the dimension of resource type might influence allocation preferences. We re-evaluate this work from a relational models perspective and focus on the unique properties of money as a resource in allocation decisions. We propose that the essential characteristic of money as a medium of exchange in the market is a distinct causal factor in allocation preferences and review a set of preliminary studies testing this hypothesis. Finally, we speculate on some possible implications that this distributive justice perspective may have for a variety of different literatures.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS INFLUENCING ALLOCATION PREFERENCES Perhaps one of the most important contextual distinctions made concerning the norms of distributive justice comes from Jennifer Hochschild’s (1981) analysis of a heterogeneous population of Americans on the topic of fairness in their lives. The distinguishing characteristic of her analytic framework from those preceding it was the systematic consideration of the competing principles of equality and equity across three central spheres of life. In particular, she separated the categories of activity and thought of people’s lives in terms of three domains: economic (markets and material goods), social (family, school, and neighborhood), and political (authority, rights, and taxes). In her careful interviews with a sample of Americans,


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Hochschild observed that people generally drew on the principle of equality in the social and political domains but drew on the principle of differentiation (equity) in the economic domain. Hochschild (1981) concluded that a major difficulty in the implementation of socialist ideals was that they are based in the political sphere, which draws on principles of equality, but must be implemented within the economic domain where people see equity as the most legitimate allocation principle. Thus, ‘‘the political redistribution of economic goods, by definition straddles two domains and forces people to confront the disjunctions in their beliefs about distributive justice’’ (p. 48). In other words, this disjunction between norms presented a major barrier to the acceptance of redistributing wealth in society. Several studies have empirically confirmed the preference for allocating resources according to equity over equality within the economic domain, especially when money is being distributed (Tornblom & Foa, 1983). However, the literature has identified two important exceptions within the economic domain. First, when the outcome for the distribution of the resource to be allocated is unrelated to individual inputs, people prefer to distribute monetary resources equally (McLean Parks et al., 1996). This is not surprising since without relevant differences in contribution, an equal allocation of resources is most consistent with an equity principle (i.e., individuals all contributed the same amount in terms of relevant inputs). The second exception is that when group goals are focused on something other than economic productivity or performance, preferences for equality emerge as dominant (Kazemi & Eek, 2007). Within the economic domain, socio-emotional or group harmony may be important goals that are more effectively accomplished by allocating resources equally. Similar to identifying different goals within the economics domain, researchers have examined whether culture or cultural orientation influences allocation preferences for equity and equality. Although early research found that individuals from more collectivist cultures (where the goal of harmony is more dominant) preferred equality more than Americans, who preferred equity (Leung & Bond, 1982), subsequent work has shown that preferences for equity are similar among cultures when the allocation decisions involve outgroup members (Leung & Bond, 1984). Moreover, cultural differences have been shown to be easily overridden by the saliency of group goals, such as productivity or solidarity (Leung & Park, 1986). Additional studies have also examined culture in conjunction with individual level measures of cultural orientation but have not found differences in allocation preferences (McLean Parks et al., 1996). A major constraint of this cross-cultural

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research is the limited number of countries examined in testing for potential variability. In order to more fully examine the distribution of money within the economic domain of work, we attempted to observe cultural variation in the allocation preferences for equity and equality (DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010). Specifically, we conducted a survey of employees from the same multinational organization (Citibank) in eight different countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States). Employees imagined that they were a division manager of the bank who was incharge of distributing a large amount of unexpected monetary assets, and they evaluated the fairness of two different allocation plans. Participants rated both the fairness of allocating the money equally among each of the employees and of giving larger shares to those who made the greatest contributions to the division’s success. The results showed that in every country sampled, respondents deemed it less fair to allocate the resource of money equally among individuals than according to inputs. This study clearly demonstrates that within the economic domain of the employment contract, there is a strong preference against allocating money equally among individuals regardless of their inputs. With preliminary verification of the cultural generalizability of this finding, in the next section, we explicitly consider the contextual factor of resource type: When do allocation preferences change depending on the resource being distributed? Specifically, how do preferences for allocating money differ from other resources allocated in organized groups?

PRIOR FINDINGS ON THE INFLUENCE OF RESOURCE TYPE The actual type of resource as a contextual characteristic of distributive allocations obviously varies by study, but it has rarely been a variable directly manipulated within the distributive justice literature. The few exceptions to this have relied exclusively on Foa and Foa’s (1975) Resource Theory of Social Exchange to make predictions about how different characteristics of the resource being distributed might influence allocation preferences. Importantly, Foa and Foa’s theory was developed to describe resource exchanges, but researchers have attempted to adapt it to resource allocations where the emphasis on appropriate reciprocation is not relevant.


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Foa and Foa (1975) specify six different categories of resources: money, goods, services, information, status, and love. Importantly, the theory proposes that these different resources may be classified by two dimensions: particularism and concreteness. Particularism refers to the extent to which a resource derives its value from the identity of the provider. Money is considered the least particularistic (i.e., it is the most universal) in that its value does not depend on the person providing it; conversely, love is the most particularistic in that its value is completely dependent on the person providing it. Concreteness refers to the degree to which something is a ‘‘tangible activity or product’’ (Foa, 1993, p. 15). Information and status exemplify the lowest level of concreteness (i.e., they are the most abstract), whereas goods and services demonstrate the highest level of concreteness. Previous research using these characteristics has examined people’s preferences for reciprocating an exchange using a resource that is similar to the one received and has shown that satisfaction with the exchange diminishes as the similarity between the provided and received resource decreases along the dimensions of particularlism and concreteness (for a review see, Tornblom & Kazemi, 2007). A few studies have examined resource allocation preferences using Foa and Foa’s (1975) resource categories. For example, a sample of US business persons expressed a preference for equity rules when distributing money and status but preferred equality rules for other resources (Tornblom & Foa, 1983). Martin and Harder (1994) found that people preferred to allocate money with equity but preferred to allocate socio-emotional rewards according to equality. In terms of allocation preferences, the most systematic test of the Foa and Foa (1975) categorization has been conducted by McLean Parks and colleagues (Conlon, Porter, & McLean Parks, 2004; McLean Parks, Conlon, Ang, & Bontempo, 1999). Findings confirm some aspects of the Foa and Foa typology. McLean Parks et al. (1999) found that the tendency for using equality rules over equity rules occurred more often when allocating particularistic rather than universal resources. However, consistent differences in the application of equity and equality did not emerge across the concreteness dimension. These results for the dimensions proposed by Foa and Foa led McLean Parks et al. (1999) to conclude that ‘‘future work may want to examine other underlying dimensions on which the six resource categories differ’’ (p. 750). Their main recommendation was to consider divisibility of the resource as a central dimension. From their perspective, the universality dimension on which money was the exemplar was confounded with divisibility. In their studies, the resources that were particularistic were less divisible

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(services and goods), but importantly, in theory, these particularistic resources could be as equally divisible as money. McLean Parks et al. (1999) also mentioned other possible dimensions, such as cost, durability, and scarcity that may have varied. In a recent study, Conlon et al. (2004) make similar conclusions about the need to consider other dimensions than those posited by Foa and Foa (1975). They argue that money, in their studies, was not only confounded with divisibility but also with power/authority. Moreover, Conlon et al. conclude that: ‘‘it appears that there is something about monetary resources that are not as straightforward as Foa and Foa’s scheme would suggest’’ (p. 344). Several questions follow from these conclusions. First of all, is it the fact that money is a resource that is the most universalistic and least particularistic that invokes the norms of allocating it according to equity? Tornblom and Kazemi (2007) conjecture that universalistic resources are more impersonal, whereas, particularistic resources are more socio-emotional, making them less compatible with distributions that are economically oriented. Further, they argue that drawing on the principle of equality ‘‘reflects the ‘softer’ aspects of people’s existence (e.g., cooperation, caring, nurture, and personal welfare) [that] appear more suitable for the distribution of particularistic resources’’ (p. 44). Our assessment of the prior literature is that ambiguities persist regarding why money might be allocated differently than other resources within the economic domain. Specifically, competing frameworks appear to make similar predictions. On the contrary, the single dimension of universalism appears to account for some of the uniqueness of money. However, universalism co-occurs with several other characteristics. This leads us to the central overriding theoretical question of this chapter: What are the essential characteristics of money as a resource that make it so distinctive when allocating it among group members?

THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MONEY In order to evaluate a broader set of characteristics associated with money, we consider two seminal accounts on the emergence of money in society and how they relate to the modern view in economics regarding money’s essential characteristics. In John Locke’s (1690/1980) The Second Treatise of Government, Locke directly discusses the emergence of money in society. Specifically, he argues that before the emergence of money, fairness and use naturally co-occurred.


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‘‘Right and convenience went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labor upon, so he had no temptation to labor for more than he could make use of’’ (p. 28). For instance, one would only take as much food as one needed, since taking more of it than was needed was self-defeating both because it was inconvenient and, in the case of food, highly perishable. ‘‘And thus came in the use of money – some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life’’ (p. 29). Importantly, Locke cited the emergence of nonperishable goods (e.g., gold and silver) as a medium of exchange to be a critical factor in the emergence of both the motive to acquire more than one needed and inequality within society. ‘‘This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions men have made practicable out of the bounds of society and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money’’ (p. 28). The key insight derived from Locke’s treatise is that the emergence of a common medium of exchange is inextricably linked with inequality among individuals. Another seminal treatise on the emergence of money in society is Adam Smith’s (1776/2000) The Wealth of Nations. In his chapter, ‘‘On the Origin and Use of Money’’, Smith provides a detailed account of the emergence of money in society. As a direct consequence of the division of labor, Smith notes that exchange becomes a necessary part of each individual’s life. Although this occurs first with the direct bartering of goods, the problem of the ‘‘double coincidence of wants’’ leads individuals ineluctably toward agreement on a common medium of exchange. Historically, this medium of exchange has taken a variety of different forms (e.g., cattle, salt, shells, cod, tobacco, sugar, leather, and nails), but eventually metals were preferred because of their durability and divisibility. In determining the rules of exchange, Smith makes a key distinction between different meanings of value: value in use and value in exchange. Value in use is ‘‘the utility of some particular object,’’ and value in exchange is ‘‘the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys’’ (p. 31). This distinction highlights the important characteristic of money as its being highly exchangeable for goods and services. The aspects of money described by Adam Smith portend the essential characteristics of money described by modern-day economists. Specifically, Frank and Bernake (2004) assert that the consensus among economists is that there are three essential characteristics of money: it is a medium of exchange (an asset used to purchase goods and services), it is a unit of

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account (standard and easily divided numerical unit of value), and it is a store of value (reliably saved and retrieved). Although many have commented on the different unique attributes of money (e.g., divisibility), no empirical work to date has attempted to isolate the causality of one specific attribute of money. In the next section, we propose that one mechanism through which the resource of money might be associated with different definitions of fairness has to do with its association with market exchanges, and the property of a resource being a medium of exchange is the most likely to activate market norms in allocation decisions.

THE ASSOCIATION OF MONEY WITH THE NORMS OF THE MARKET The theoretical framework that most directly speaks to the unique norms of market exchanges is Alan Fiske’s (1991, 1992) Relational Models Theory, which distinguishes a market-pricing model where resources are allocated based on precise ratios of value in a market exchange from allocation models based on social relationships (i.e., norms of cooperation, hierarchy, and tit-for-tat exchange). Although the allocation models based on social relationships are acquired first in human development, the acquisition of a market-pricing model begins as early as age nine. When inputs are heterogeneous, precise differentiation among individuals based on inputs is only possible within a market-pricing allocation model. Consequently, the predominant model for the organization of work and employment contracts is market-pricing. In reviewing Fiske’s market-pricing model of allocation, Sondak (1998) notes that ‘‘socially meaningful ratios are used to think about and evaluate allocations. A medium of exchange (usually money) is used to distribute or trade goods according to supply and demand’’ (p. 84). Research demonstrates that money is implicitly linked with the marketpricing model (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). Studies show that having people subconsciously think of money decreases the application of social relationship models in terms of cooperation and communal behavior (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). Moreover, Heyman and Ariely (2004) found that the introduction of money into requests for assistance can undermine the degree of help individuals offer in return. When individuals are paid for their help with money, a market-pricing model is invoked where individuals adjust their helping effort in a direct relationship to the amount of money they were offered as a gift for the


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activity; whereas, when individuals are asked to provide help in exchange for either no money or for non-monetary gifts, social relationship models are invoked where individuals’ helping efforts are independent of what they received in return. Irrespective of individuals’ motivations to help others, it is a violation of the market-pricing model to distribute goods independently of relevant inputs. Given that norms associated with market-pricing may be activated by the resource of money, an important question is whether there is an essential property of money that is sufficient to activate these norms. It may very well be that the presence of all the properties of money is necessary, but this is an empirical question. One property of money that prior literature has considered is the characteristic of divisibility. Money is generally the most divisible resource available. Interestingly, even within the resource of money, perceptions of divisibility can be detected. In what Raghubir and Srivastava (2009) call the denomination effect, people are less likely to spend 20 dollars when they have this amount in the form of 1 $20 bills versus when they have the identical amount in the form of 20 $1 bill. Importantly, this effect is due to the perceived fungibility of the money in these different forms. Although divisibility might appear to be a key characteristic that may cue marketplace norms, it does not distinguish money from goods that have value in use. Importantly, goods can come in a form where they are just as easily divisible among individuals as money. In the next section, we review some empirical attempts to show that a distinguishing causal factor in determining the norms of fairness in allocating the resource of money in the economic domain is the property of it being a medium of exchange independent of divisibility. We argue that it is the property of exchangeability that causes the norms of the market to be cued rather than other essential properties of money. Importantly, this is a property that distinguishes money from other in-kind goods that are allocated within organizational settings.

REVIEW OF STUDIES TESTING THE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE HYPOTHESIS We have conducted several of our own experiments to further identify the unique norms that surround the allocation of money within the employment context where the preference for allocating money equally within groups is likely to be evaluated as less fair than allocating money according to

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individual inputs. Although the Citibank study reviewed in the previous section established the robustness of individuals viewing it as less fair to allocate the resource of money equally within the economic domain of a work bonus, we continued to use this context to experimentally manipulate the resource being allocated. Specifically, we directly tested the hypothesis that the more the resource invokes the market-pricing model by being a medium of exchange, the less fair individuals will view an equal allocation of resources independent of inputs. We modified the vignette used in the Citibank study by providing concrete individual performance information for 10 members of the same division that received a windfall for their division’s performance over the past year. In order to identify the effect of the medium of exchange as invoking market-pricing as being separate from the norms that money invokes, we utilized the phenomenon of credit card reward points. These credit card points only have value in terms of that for which they can be exchanged, and we first stated that they were exchangeable for goods and services (the definition of a medium of exchange). In our first study, we compared these two resources that are mediums of exchange with two other in-kind goods that have value in use. Drawing on the literature that shows that people think about the resource of money differently from time, we selected time as one of these resources (operationalized as vacation days). Building off the Heyman and Ariely (2004) studies that compared compensation in payment in terms of money against candy, we used food as the other in-kind good (operationalized as boxes of chocolate). Using the same general vignette as we did with the Citibank study, we asked participants to imagine that a division manager had allocated the resource equally across 10 employees from the same division who differed in their individual performances. The findings suggest that people viewed it as significantly more fair to allocate the resources equally when the resource was food or time then when the resource was credit card points or money. Participants treated credit card points in a manner that was indistinguishable from money. Importantly, when the resource being allocated was a medium of exchange, it was rated as less fair to distribute it equally among employees who differed in their inputs. In a follow-up study, DeVoe and Iyengar (2010) replicated the results of the previous study. Again, a clear pattern emerged where equality as an allocation principle was considered less fair when the resource was a medium of exchange (money or credit card points) than when the resource had value in use (time or food). In this study, we also manipulated the quantities of the resources to be divided among 10 division members


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(x versus 2x), and this did not significantly influence allocation preferences. This provided some initial evidence that the value of the resource being distributed, or the number of units being allocated, was independent of how people made their judgments as to what was the fairest way to allocate the resource among team members. This is important as it is possible that participants might have assumed that each additional in-kind good has a greater diminishing marginal return to each individual as compared to an additional unit of a medium of exchange. This alternative is less likely given that allocating a larger pool of these resources failed to increase preferences for equality. In the final experiment, DeVoe and Iyengar (2010) used the phenomenon of credit card points in a different way to get at the essential characteristic of a resource being a medium of exchange. We manipulated the extent to which a resource was a medium of exchange. Specifically, we manipulated a resource’s exchangeability. We did this by directly manipulating the degree to which credit card reward points were a medium of exchange in the market in a manner that held all other properties of the resource constant (i.e., unit of account and a store of value). In order to directly test whether the degree to which a resource is a medium of exchange is a causal variable in allocation preferences, we built upon the consistent finding that people understood it to be less fair to allocate both money and credit card points according to an equality principle. Credit card reward points are a medium that we can directly manipulate the extent to which the resource may be exchanged for goods and services. The vignette from the previous studies was modified to compare participants’ allocation preferences for equal distributions among 10 employees independent of inputs in experimental conditions that varied exclusively in terms of which 2,000 credit card reward points were exchangeable and participants were told that each point had a purchasing power of $1. By using credit card reward points as the resource to be allocated, we were able to precisely vary the extent to which the points were a medium of exchange in the market while holding constant the degree to which the resource was a unit of account and a store of value. In the high exchangeability condition, the credit card reward points were exchangeable for four different types of goods (i.e., all books, music, movies, and electronics). In the low exchangeability condition, the same number of credit card rewards points were exchangeable for only 1 type of good (e.g., only for books, only for music, only for movies, or only for electronics). Consistent with our exchangeability hypothesis, participants viewed it as more fair to allocate the credit card reward points equally among 10 group members when the points were only exchangeable for

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1 resource type in comparison to when the points were exchangeable for 4 resource types. To assess whether the value participants placed on the resource influenced their allocation preferences, after eliciting allocation preferences, participants indicated the most they would bid for 2,000 credit card points described in the scenario in an Ebay style auction. Consistent with the previous study, which showed the value of the resource was unrelated to allocation preferences, the monetary bid values for the credit card reward points were uncorrelated with participants’ preference for equal allocations. This study suggests that the more the resource exhibits the properties of being a true medium of exchange in a market, the less the fair it is perceived to be to allocate the resource equally among individuals independent of their inputs.

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATION In the final section of this chapter, we will examine some potential theoretical and practical implications of the properties of money and the norms of the market invoked by a resource that is a medium of exchange.

Rewarding Individual versus Team Performance The finding that allocating the resource of money activates marketplace based norms where rewarding individual performance is understood to be fairer than rewarding team members equally has direct implications for the management of groups and teams. When work has strong interdependencies and the objective is dependent on cooperative effort, the egalitarian distribution of rewards among team members may be desirable (Bloom, 1999). The current theoretical perspective on resource allocation suggests that if management wants to distribute rewards equally to promote group harmony and solidarity, this may be more likely to be accepted as fair by distributing these rewards through a resource that has its value in use. Although we have examined equity and equality allocations in the context of bonuses, these findings for rewarding performance may have relevance to the allocation of compensation cutback, as well. Is it fairer to cutback the salaries of individuals who contribute the least to performance or to make equal cutbacks for all team members? Related to the distinction between value in exchange versus value in use, in the current economic downturn, companies can make cutbacks that are either directly related to monetary


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compensation or make cutbacks to resources that have value in use. Cutback on items that have value in use may have a precise monetary value (e.g., a four-day work week in lieu of the standard five-day work week) but, nevertheless, might be associated with different conceptions of fairness. Following our theoretical perspective, we would expect that if management needs to cut costs in a manner that is perceived to be fair, it might consider giving employees all the same time off (e.g., four-day work week) rather than making equal pay cuts across the board that could potentially lead to disgruntlements from a sense of unfairness. Although we have primarily considered variations in what is a fair allocation of economic goods within groups and teams – comparing economic goods that have value in exchange with economic goods that have value in use – many other types of goods that are more social in nature and are allocated within teams are worth examining as well. For instance, Huo (2002) has explicitly examined three different types of goods: economic goods (money), procedural goods (procedural protection), and relational goods (fair and respectful treatment). Interestingly, she found that people preferred that the latter two types of goods that are more social in nature be distributed according to egalitarian principles. It may be that the results found for goods that have value in use might be even more pronounced when compared to non-economic goods such as fair and respectful treatment.

Redistribution of Wealth Literature The present perspective suggests that when resources invoke the market by being a medium of exchange, there is a diminishing preference for egalitarian distribution among group members. A very important implication for this finding is that when managers seek to have individuals accept egalitarian distributions of resources among group members as fair, it may be more effective to have group members focus on the distribution of specific goods that have value in use. There do appear to be examples of greater preferences for egalitarianism when individuals consider the distribution of in-kind goods. As a contemporary example, in an unprecedented stimulus package that is approaching a trillion dollars, President Obama shored up support from the American public by focusing on just a small percentage (5%) of how the stimulus will be spent – on infrastructure for roads and schools. Again, the proportion of how this money is spent does not appear to be the determining factor in how people evaluate the fairness of the policy. However, focusing

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on money’s value in use appears to be more effective in influencing individuals’ approval of the policy. Although, Hochschild (1981) was accurate in describing the challenges of redistributing wealth in the United States, it is worth looking at the examples where wealth redistribution programs have been successfully adopted. One of the most successfully adopted programs is food stamps. The present work suggests that an important reason why people may view it as fair is that it is a good that has value in use rather than in exchange. Thus, the norms of the market are less likely to be invoked when individuals consider the fairness of this reallocation. This preference for redistributing wealth through goods that have value in use is by no means limited to the United States. A surprisingly similar amount of gross domestic product in both developed and developing countries is redistributed through in-kind transfers, such as food stamps or housing subsidies (Currie & Gahvari, 2008). Often, it is assumed that people prefer the redistribution of wealth to occur through in-kind transfers so that the proper use of funds can be ensured even in cases where cash transfers are more efficient (Currie & Gahvari, 2008; Murray, 1994). However, the theoretical perspective we have brought to this issue suggests that the relational models associated with the resource being distributed may play an important role in how both government officials and the public at large understand fairness. To a large degree, healthcare is another type of in-kind transfer used to redistribute wealth in society. Indeed, the lack of universal healthcare in the United States is the exception that proves the rule. Every other industrialized nation redistributes wealth through some form of universalized healthcare (Reid, 2009). Although the United States does redistribute wealth via healthcare to those in society with the greatest need (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid), the market tradition for healthcare in the United States has presented a barrier. Although many in the United States understand healthcare as a right, an extensive system of privatized healthcare that is often linked with one’s employment contract does appear to exhibit more market-based norms in its allocation than does the food stamp program. However, it is worth pointing out that within organizations, most employees (part-time employees being an important exception) receive the same healthcare plan. In other words, it is rare that individuals’ performance differences are directly rewarded with better or worse health benefits. This is highly consistent with our study findings that people understand it as fair to allocate resources that have value in use equally among group members.


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We have highlighted several aspects of wealth redistribution through in-kind goods that are widely accepted as fair by group members. However, this does not speak to the manner in which these resources are initially procured by the government through different forms of taxation. Of course these resources are typically procured through taxing a medium of exchange and within the United States the progressive taxation structure on personal income imposes a higher percentage of an income tax on those with higher income than those with less income. Importantly, taxation on personal income typically allows for at least some differentiation among individuals. We would expect that a taxation of a medium of exchange that entirely removed differentiation amount individuals’ personal income would be rejected as unfair within the norms of the market. Although countries vary dramatically in the form of taxation levied on citizens, some differentiation is required to fit with norms of the economic sphere.

Gift-Giving Literature One important literature that has examined the differences between money and in-kind goods is that on gift-giving. In an influential paper entitled ‘‘The Deadweight Loss of Christmas,’’ Waldfogel (1993) describes the high loss of value that occurs when one individual spends money on a gift to another person instead of directly transferring the money as a cash gift. Specifically, the amount that the gift receiver would spend of their own money to purchase that same good for themselves is significantly lower than it costs (typically 20% less). Recent work on gift exchange by Flynn and Adams (2009) has found that gift givers focus on the amount of money they spend on a gift to gauge the amount of appreciation the gift receiver will experience. However, gift receivers are insensitive to the amount of money spent on the gift and are uniformly appreciative of the gift. This asymmetry is reminiscent of the Heyman and Ariely (2004) study in which payment with money caused people to focus on the magnitude (input) of the gift; whereas, payment with candy caused people to focus on the good, and they were insensitive to the amount. Thus, one possible explanation for Flynn and Adams’ finding is that different relational models are activated when a person is purchasing a gift instead of receiving one. In general, the gift giver must directly engage with exchangeability in the market and use a medium of exchange to procure the gift, whereas the gift receiver only engages with the good itself.

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Because gift-givers deal directly with the medium of exchange to purchase a gift, they may be more likely to view the interaction through a market-pricing relational model where ratio and magnitude are essential properties. Conversely, gift receivers only receive a gift, which has value in use (unless it is a gift certificate), so they are more likely to view it through relational models that are more socially based. Future research can determine whether relational models are at play in gift-giving. Specifically, it would be expected that the gift giver would be less sensitive to the magnitude when a medium of exchange is not involved in procuring a gift for someone else. This happens when someone makes a gift themselves or gives an heirloom or some other previously owned good. Similarly, the receiver should evaluate their appreciation for a gift in terms of magnitude or ratios if the gift is a medium of exchange (e.g., gift certificate). We believe that different relational models are one mechanism that this literature should consider. Another literature that has examined the properties of in-kind goods is that on the endowment effect. This is the well-studied phenomenon where people demand more money to give up a good than they are willing to pay to receive that same good (e.g., a mug). Some interesting moderators of the endowment effect bear on the present work. For instance, when a person holds multiple goods (e.g., several chocolates) versus a single good (e.g., one box of chocolates containing the same number of chocolates that are in the multiple good condition), the endowment effect is greatly attenuated (Burson, Faro, & Rottenstreich, 2009). Even more relevant is Kahneman’s (1992) proposition that the endowment effect does not exist for goods that are held exclusively for exchange, since in the economic transaction, the good is thought of in terms of its exchangeability for money. Consistent with the role of relational models in this process, McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel (2003) have shown that the endowment effect is stronger in non-market-pricing relational frames than in a market-pricing relational frame. The endowment effect disappears when the good is held for the purpose of exchange (and is thus more similar to a medium of exchange), is consistent with the important characteristic of a medium of exchange invoking market norms rather than the norms of social exchange. Thus, behavior becomes more consistent with rational market behavior than it does normally. Some insights into this literature might come from using credit cards or gift certificates as a good to examine the endowment effect. Additionally, gifts from stores that have an explicit exchange policy might be seen as having a lower monetary value, as individuals might treat the gift more like a medium of exchange. Based on our experiments, this should be more true for stores that sell a wide variety of goods (department stores) as compared to speciality stores that sell one type of good (e.g., shoes).


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Interestingly, our manipulation of the degree to which a resource can be exchanged for goods mimics the properties of exchange department stores imposed around gift certificates when they were first introduced at beginning of the 20th century. In order to distinguish the gift certificate as a resource distinct from a cash transfer, the first gift certificates designated a specific type of merchandise (e.g., gloves and shoes) for which the certificate could be redeemed (Zelizer, 1994). In gift exchange, there does seem to be a strong desire to distinguish the act of gift-giving from a cash transfer. Recently, an intriguing phenomenon of functional gift cards has emerged where the gift certificate for a camera is itself a disposable camera (Walker, 2008). Given the increased use of gift certificates, this may represent a way of causing individuals to focus on the value of use of the gift rather than the value in exchange.

Money as a Confound in Social Science Research Finally, an important implication of the unique norms invoked by the resource of money deals with the fact that often, in experimental research, money is used in the design of studies to avoid potential confounds linked with other resources. However, to the extent that money invokes distinct norms of fairness that link inputs and outputs that are not invoked for non-monetary resources, our observations about human behavior may be impoverished. This bias is most existent in economic experiments where the use of money is a hallmark and a primary attribute that distinguishes it from psychological experiments. For instance, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) report that between 1970 and 1997 there was no one single published paper reporting an experiment in economics where individuals where not paid for their performance. Explicit attempts to show the differences between using money versus not using money have shown that whenever monetary incentives are in place, people adhere more to the predictions of economics (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Smith & Walker, 1993). Economists traditionally argue that this is because participants are paying more attention due to the use of monetary payments, but we would like to suggest that this could also be due to the norms of the interaction that are invoked by the very use of money in the experiment. If the resource of money invokes norms of market-pricing, it is likely to induce behavior more consistent with the assumptions economics makes about behavior (e.g., self-interest). Indeed, Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2005) have recently argued that economic theory can often have self-fulfilling effects.

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To examine this possibility in light of our present focus on fairness, we ran a traditional economic game designed to look at individuals’ preferences for fairness – the Dictator Game. In this game, one individual is randomly assigned to decide how to allocate 10 dollars between themselves and another participant. The person assigned to the dictator role can decide to leave however much of the money they want for the other participants in the game. In cases of high anonymity, participants assigned to the dictator role will frequently not take all the money for themselves, which has been interpreted as individuals having some preference for fairness. Generally, in these experiments, about one quarter of participants simply spilt the amount evenly between themselves and the other participant (Forsythe, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). Interestingly, Forsythe et al. (1994) have observed that when real monetary payoffs are absent in the game (i.e., people are just asked how they would allocate the monetary resource), the percentage of people splitting the resource evenly doubles. In order to explore whether behavior in the Dictator Game might vary as a function of the resource, we re-ran this experiment with a real endowment of 10 dollars and replicated this small percentage of people who split the resource equally. Despite the fact that this game has been run thousands of times, we are aware of no published study using the Dictator Game to examine a resource other than money. When we changed the resource to be real endowments of 10 min or 10 chocolates, we observed that the percentage of people splitting the resource equally between themselves and the other participant more than doubled from the rate observed for participants’ splitting the money evenly. Although money is used as the resource for the legitimate reason of avoiding potential confounds (e.g., it is completely liquid and fungible), if used exclusively to test theoretical ideas (even in economics), it may introduce confounds, as money itself can invoke specific norms of the market that may not generalize to the allocation of other resources. In everyday life, people confront situations where they must allocate all types of different resources. Therefore, these economic games may not accurately reflect preferences and behaviour within those domains as accurately.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have attempted to think more systematically about the allocation of money in group contexts. Building off a rich literature in distributive justice, we have applied a new theoretical perspective to the


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understanding of how the resource itself influences allocation preferences for egalitarianism. We have focused on the norms that are invoked by a resource that is a medium of exchange in the market and have contrasted this with the norms invoked by in-kind goods that have their value in use. We believe that this is a fruitful distinction for research in groups and teams to consider since egalitarian norms tend to foster harmony and solidarity among group members. From both a theoretical and applied standpoint, future research should conceptualize more explicitly the role that the allocation medium plays for understanding preferences and behavior. Moreover, when determining what is fair, we need to consider not only how resources are being allocated but also what those resources are.

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CHAPTER 7 TO BE FAIR OR TO BE DOMINANT: THE EFFECT OF INEQUALITY FRAMES ON DOMINANT GROUP MEMBERS’ RESPONSES TO INEQUITY Rosalind M. Chow, Brian S. Lowery and Eric D. Knowles ABSTRACT Purpose – All modern societies are marked by unequal relationships between dominant and subordinate groups. Given that dominant group members often have the resources to determine if and how inequities might be dealt with, it is important to know when and how dominant group members will respond to inequity. Approach – In this chapter, we present a new framework for how individuals experience inequality: the inequality-framing model. According to the model, individuals distinguish between inequities of advantage and inequities of disadvantage, which is predicted to lead to different experiences of inequity. We then review prior literature that indicates that perceptions of ingroup advantage and outgroup disadvantage can influence when and how dominant group members will respond to inequity. Fairness and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 13, 183–204 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2010)0000013010

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We specifically investigate hierarchy-attenuating responses to inequity, such as support for affirmative action policies, and hierarchy-enhancing responses, such as denial of inequity, disidentification from the group, the motivated construal of inequity, and the motivated use of colorblind ideology. Research and practical implications – The model suggests that researchers and practitioners alike would do well to pay attention not only to the magnitude of inequity, but also to the way in which it is described. Importantly, dominant group members are more likely to have the power over how inequalities are discussed, which has ramifications for their experience of and willingness to remedy inequity. Originality – This chapter provides an overview of research indicating that how inequity is described – advantage or disadvantage – can have implications for how dominant group members experience and respond to inequity.

All intergroup interactions are marked by unequal relationships between a dominant group and subordinate groups. Within society, social groups differ in their access to material resources, and in organizations, upper level management often determines how resources ought to be distributed among subordinates. Dominant group members not only enjoy greater access to material resources, but also experience the psychological benefits that come from membership in a valued group (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Sidanius, 1993; Webster & Foschi, 1988). Given their greater access to resources, dominant group members typically determine if and how inequities are remedied, but may also be unwilling to engage in actions that will reduce their group’s dominant position. Thus, it is important for researchers to understand when and how dominant group members will respond to inequity, including responses that both alleviate and enhance the status quo. In this chapter, we propose that dominant group members’ likelihood of responding to inequity is influenced by how inequality is described – as the dominant group’s advantage or a subordinate group’s disadvantage. Although previous research has often assumed that the primary determinant of individuals’ responses to inequity is the perceived magnitude of the inequity, we propose a new framework, the inequality-framing model, to explain dominant group members’ inequity perceptions and responses. The most basic claim of this model is that individuals distinguish between

Effect of Inequality Frames on Dominant Group Members’ Responses

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subordinate group disadvantage and dominant group advantage. We argue that inequality described as dominant group advantage is more self-relevant to dominant group members than subordinate group disadvantage, and, if the inequality is illegitimate, can lead to psychological discomfort among dominant group members. This psychological discomfort can, in turn, lead to hierarchy-attenuating and hierarchy-enhancing responses. In the section on dominant group members’ hierarchy-attenuating responses, we focus on group members’ support for redistributive policies. We argue that dominant group members may attempt to alleviate the threat associated with ingroup advantage by increasing their willingness to support remedies for inequity that negatively impact their group interest (e.g., reduce ingroup advantage). We illustrate this possibility by investigating White Americans’ experience of their dominant group position within the United States and show that White Americans’ support for organizational policies designed to alleviate social inequality (e.g., affirmative action policies) is influenced both by how inequality and the effects of the policies are described. In the final part of the chapter, we turn our focus to how dominant group members might enact strategies that allow them to maintain the status quo in response to evidence of ingroup advantage, but not outgroup disadvantage. We distinguish between responses that can alleviate the psychological discomfort associated with perceptions of ingroup advantage (e.g., denial of inequity and disidentification from the group) and those that are designed to protect the dominant group’s position in the hierarchy (e.g., the motivated construal of inequity and the motivated construal of colorblind ideology). Our general aim is to suggest that when and how dominant group members will respond to inequity depends on how the inequities are described. As such, we suggest that inequities of advantage and inequities of disadvantage are not equivalent, and that dominant group members have at their disposal a number of responses to inequity that can lead either to the alleviation of inequity or its maintenance.

THE INEQUALITY-FRAMING MODEL Inequality is a fundamental aspect of social life. In all modern societies, some groups will have greater access to or control over resources than others. For example, in the United States, there are wide and persistent disparities between White Americans and minorities, such as Black Americans, on outcomes such as employment, education, and health (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Many of these inequalities run

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counter to most Americans’ sense of equity (Hochschild, 1981, 1995); the concentration of poverty among ethnic minorities and the hereditary nature of wealth (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995) claims that these inequalities are equitable (Sowell, 1994). The rule of contradict equity specifies that individuals’ outcomes should depend on their talent and effort, and the relationship between inputs and rewards should be the same across individuals, regardless of their group membership (Adams, 1965; Adams & Freedman, 1976; Homans, 1961; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1975; Walster & Walster, 1975; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Even if individuals acknowledge that inequity exists between social groups, individuals in an unequal social system cannot determine what is an equitable societal outcome. That is to say, the rule of equity does not say how much people or groups should have in an absolute sense; there is no objective standard against which to compare actors. This reality is reflected in most psychological theories of social inequality. In general, theories that seek to explain individuals’ experience of and responses to inequality, such as relative deprivation (Crosby, 1986), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), equity theory (Walster et al., 1975), and social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2004) assume that people make sense of these situations by attending to the relative difference between the two groups. For example, individuals decide whether they have too much or too little by comparing themselves, or their group, to others (Walker & Smith, 2002; Walster et al., 1978). In emphasizing the importance of relative differences, these theories rightly point out that there is rarely an absolute standard that allows individuals to make sense of their, or others’, social position without social comparison (cf., Zelditch, 1981). From these perspectives, dominant-group advantage and subordinategroup disadvantage are interchangeable descriptions of inequity. For example, the statement that the average man makes $15,000 more a year than an equally qualified woman (i.e., men are advantaged) conveys the same information as the statement that the average woman makes $15,000 less a year than an equally qualified man (i.e., women are disadvantaged); the important feature here is that there is a $15,000 difference between men’s and women’s annual salaries. Similarly, remedies for inequity that reduce dominant-group advantage are not meaningfully different from remedies that reduce subordinate-group disadvantage. Using the same example, a policy that reduces the average salaries of men by $15,000 is as effective a remedy for the inequity between men and women as a policy that increases the average salaries of women by $15,000; the important feature here is that


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both policies successfully eliminate the relative difference between the two groups. In contrast, the inequality-framing model suggests that individuals’ perceptions of inequality are driven by comparing a group against an assumed ‘‘equity standard’’ – what a group should have – rather than comparing the group against another group’s position. Put another way, individuals are not only interested in the magnitude of relative differences between their group and another group, but also whether their group has more or less than it should (Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007; cf., Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). The model further predicts that individuals understand the language used to describe inequity to provide information about an absolute standard. Specifically, people understand terms such as ‘‘advantage’’ or ‘‘more than’’ to mean that dominant groups or actors have more than the standard, whereas terms such as ‘‘disadvantage’’ or ‘‘less than’’ mean that subordinate groups or actors have less than the standard. Inequity, then, is construed as either a positive or negative deviation from the standard; when an inequity involves advantage, the dominant group’s position is called into question, whereas when the inequity involves disadvantage, the subordinate group’s position is highlighted. Consistent with the model, research suggests that individuals indeed generate a standard (i.e., a sense of what people should have) and that these perceptions are affected by how inequalities are described. For example, participants were asked to consider the scenario of two workers, David and George, who were meant to receive an equal bonus for their work on a project. However, an accounting error resulted in a discrepancy of $1,000 between the bonuses of the two workers. When asked how much the workers should have received (the standard), individuals who were told that David’s bonus was $1,000 more than George’s were more likely to say that the workers should have received a lower amount than individuals who were told that George’s bonus was $1,000 less than David’s (Lowery, Chow, & Randall-Crosby, 2009b). Thus, to say that one person has more (i.e., is advantaged) or that the other has less (i.e., is disadvantaged) are not interchangeable descriptions of inequality, and that individuals’ perceptions of what parties should have are influenced by how inequality is described. These results distinguish the inequality-framing model from theories of inequality that assume that individuals’ experience of inequality is determined by the magnitude of relative differences between social actors (e.g., social dominance theory, relative deprivation theory, equity theory, and the group-position model). Because the model posits the existence of a standard and sensitivity to how information is framed, comparisons to prospect theory

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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are inevitable. However, our story is not reducible to prospect theory. We focus on the way observers respond to differences in the way inequity between others is framed. In contrast, prospect theory focuses on how individuals value a particular outcome as a function of whether the outcome is framed as a gain or a loss. Thus, in prospect theory, equivalent frames describe one outcome in terms of a gain or a loss. In our story, equivalent frames describe the position of two actors; a given inequity is described terms of one actor’s advantage or the other actor’s disadvantage. The fundamental claim of the inequality-framing model – that advantage and disadvantage are psychologically separable expressions of intergroup discrepancy driven by individuals’ perceptions of an equity standard – gives rise to the possibility that these frames can have different consequences for dominant group members’ experience of, and thus, reactions to inequity. In the following sections, we first detail how inequality frames influence dominant group members’ experience of inequity. Specifically, we suggest that perceptions of ingroup advantage threatens dominant group members’ esteem for the group more than perceptions of outgroup disadvantage. We then turn our attention to exploring how dominant group members’ differential experience of ingroup advantage and outgroup disadvantage might affect their propensity to engage in both hierarchy-attenuating and hierarchy-enhancing behavior.

DOMINANT GROUP MEMBERS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE OF INEQUALITY There are numerous benefits to membership in a dominant group. In addition to the material benefits accorded dominant group members, such as increased access to desired resources, it is assumed that dominance also comes with psychological benefits, such as greater esteem for both the self and the group (Berger et al., 1977; Sidanius, 1993; Webster & Foschi, 1988). The psychological import of the group’s position may be affected by how inequalities are described; the self-relevance of inequality depends on whether the ingroup is perceived to be advantaged or if the outgroup is perceived to be disadvantaged. We predict that inequality framed as advantage highlights the position of the dominant group and emphasizes features of the dominant group that account for its dominant position, leading to greater self-relevance. In contrast, inequality framed as outgroup


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disadvantage emphasizes features of the outgroup, but does not provide information about the dominant group, thus having lower relevance to dominant group members. Following this reasoning, when the inequality is legitimate, highlighting the group’s dominant position (i.e., ingroup advantage) should increase dominant group members’ esteem for the group more so than emphasizing the subordinate group’s subordinate status (i.e., outgroup disadvantage). Consistent with this possibility, when Democrats were asked to consider the Democratic party’s 2006 mid-term election results, they had higher levels of esteem for the Democratic party when they were told that the Democratic party held a numerical advantage in the House and Senate than when they were told that the Republican party held a numerical disadvantage in the House and Senate (Chow, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008). However, not all inequalities are equitable. In most Western contexts, individuals strongly endorse the principle of merit (Hochschild, 1981). That is, most individuals believe that success should be a function of talent or effort, rather than based on extraneous characteristics, such as group membership. If individuals perceive themselves to benefit unfairly from their group membership, the dominant position of the group and the success of group members are called into question. In this case, the self-relevance of ingroup advantage no longer benefits dominant group members; there are psychological costs to perceiving the group to be illegitimately advantaged. When dominant group members perceive the inequality to be illegitimate, perceptions of ingroup advantage highlight the group’s and group members’ violation of the principle of meritocracy. Thus, the individual’s esteem for the group is tainted. Moreover, ingroup advantage also implies that group members’ successes may not have been purely a function of their own effort; they could have unwittingly benefited from their group membership as well. These concerns are not raised when the subordinate group is perceived to be illegitimately disadvantaged; perceptions of outgroup disadvantage do not highlight the ingroup’s dominant position and therefore do not threaten dominant group members’ perceptions of their own merit. Consistent with this possibility, Whites who were exposed to information about social inequity framed as illegitimate White advantage had lower levels of esteem for their racial group than Whites who were exposed to social inequity information framed as illegitimate Black disadvantage (Chow et al., 2008). Given that individuals are motivated to feel good about their group (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), individuals should attempt to alleviate the esteem threat associated with ingroup advantage. In the rest of the

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chapter, we focus on dominant group members’ responses to illegitimate inequalities, and discuss how their responses can attenuate or entrench existing social inequities. In addition, we explore how the different responses can lessen the esteem threat associated with perceptions of illegitimate ingroup advantage, but can also stem from a desire to protect the group’s position.

DOMINANT GROUP MEMBERS’ HIERARCHY-ATTENUATING RESPONSES TO INEQUITY FRAMES Up to this point, we have discussed the possibility that individuals distinguish between dominant group advantage and subordinate group disadvantage, and that the self-relevance and psychological threat posed by inequality differs across frame for dominant group members. Using White Americans – the dominant racial group in the United States – as an example, we now focus on how the differential experience of inequity frames might influence dominant group members’ willingness to engage in hierarchyattenuating behavior, such as support for affirmative action policies. Research on Whites’ attitudes toward affirmative action has often sought to explain why Whites oppose redistributive policies, even though they acknowledge the existence of inequity and endorse the principle of equity. This stream of research has typically focused on two explanations: principled opposition (e.g., the desire for equal treatment; Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998) and the desire for group dominance (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Federico & Sidanius, 2002a, 2002b; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kleugel & Smith, 1986; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002; Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006; Sears & Funk, 1990). In contrast to these perspectives, the inequality-framing model suggests that dominant group members may not support policies such as affirmative action because (1) the inequity is not self-relevant and (2) the perceived remedy is not appropriate for the kind of inequity involved in social inequity. General discourse about social inequity typically focuses on how subordinate group members suffer from undeserved disadvantages rather than how dominant group members might benefit from unearned advantages (Kleugel & Smith, 1986; McIntosh, 1992; Miller et al., 1991; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). Because advantage and disadvantage are separable, describing social inequity as minority disadvantage enables dominant group members to acknowledge the existence of inequity without


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considering the possibility that their position in the social hierarchy is the cause of the inequity (i.e., it is not the dominant group’s position that deviates from the equity standard). Thus, although social inequity exists, it is not self-relevant, and therefore dominant group members may be less motivated to remedy it. However, if social inequity were framed as dominant group advantage, rather than the outgroup’s subordinate standing, the selfrelevance of inequity, and, more specifically, the esteem threat associated with ingroup advantage, would increase. Accordingly, the psychological discomfort associated with the existence of inequity would lead to a greater desire to eliminate the inequity. In addition to being more motivated to remedy inequality in response to ingroup advantage, the model predicts that dominant group members will desire to eliminate inequity in a very particular way: by reducing the position of the ingroup. Just as individuals distinguish between advantage and disadvantage, the inequality-framing model also predicts that individuals distinguish between remedies that decrease the position of the dominant group (i.e., reduce advantage) and remedies that increase the position of the subordinate group (i.e., reduce disadvantage). Although objectively, relative differences can be effectively remedied by either taking from the dominant group or by giving to the subordinate group, the psychological separation of advantage and disadvantage suggests that increasing a subordinate group’s position will not effectively mitigate dominant group members’ perceptions of advantage. That is, when the group is perceived to have more than it should, only remedies that decrease the group’s position will effectively alleviate the discomfort associated with advantage. Conversely, when an outgroup is perceived to have less than it should, only remedies that increase the subordinate group’s position, and not those that decrease the dominant group’s position, will effectively eliminate disadvantage. Thus, the model predicts that individuals’ preferences for reducing inequity will depend on both how the inequity is described (dominant group advantage or subordinate group disadvantage) and how the remedy is described (taking away from the dominant group or helping the subordinate group). Importantly, when inequity is not selfrelevant, as in the case of outgroup disadvantage, dominant group members will view a remedy that reduces the ingroup’s position to be an unjust means of alleviating inequity. Supporting this possibility, research at the individual level suggests that individuals do indeed distinguish between remedies that work by reducing advantage and those that work by reducing disadvantage, and that their preferences for the remedies are influenced by how they perceive the

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inequity. For example, when participants could only remedy an inequitable situation between two workers by taking from a dominant worker, they took significantly more from him when he was described as advantaged, as compared to when his counterpart was described as disadvantaged. In contrast, when they could only give to the subordinate worker, they gave significantly more to him when he was described as disadvantaged, as compared to when his counterpart was described as advantaged (Lowery et al., 2009b). In addition, participants viewed a manager who had taken from a dominant worker to be more fair then the dominant worker was described as advantaged, as compared to when his counterpart was described as disadvantaged (Chow & Lowery, unpublished manuscript). Thus, it is likely that dominant group members are both sensitive to the kind of inequity (advantage or disadvantage) and how the inequity is resolved (harming the dominant group vs. helping the subordinate group). Specifically, dominant group members should be more supportive of remedies that work by reducing their group’s position when they perceive ingroup advantage, but not outgroup disadvantage. The malleable nature of what constitutes a just remedy provides a framework for understanding why dominant group members might oppose redistributive policies. As discussed earlier, the dominant discourse is of subordinate group disadvantage. Given this, the appropriate remedy for inequity is to increase the subordinate group’s position, but not to harm the position of the dominant group. However, research suggests that dominant group members may be motivated to perceive redistributive policies to harm the group (cf., Unzueta, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008). Dominant group members may therefore experience a mismatch between the reason for the inequity (the subordinate group has less than it should) and the remedy (the dominant group’s position is decreased). Thus, dominant group members’ opposition to affirmative action policies can be explained in part by the possibility that they perceive the remedy to unjustly operate on the wrong group. Given that most White Americans perceive affirmative action policies to harm the group, what might attenuate their opposition? According to the model, describing the inequity in a manner that highlights its self-relevance (i.e., ingroup advantage) might reduce Whites’ opposition to affirmative action policies that harm their group, because they are motivated to eliminate the esteem threat associated with ingroup advantage. Consistent with this possibility, when Whites were exposed to evidence of White advantage, they were more willing to support affirmative action policies that


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reduced their group’s position than when exposed to evidence of minority disadvantage. These effects were driven by their levels of esteem for the group (Lowery, Chow, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2009a). Another way to reduce opposition is to highlight the policies’ positive effects on subordinate group members; if inequality is generally framed as minority group disadvantage, a focus on how the remedy helps the subordinate group may lead individuals to perceive the policies as fairer, and thereby lead to more support. In summary, the inequality-framing model provides a framework to understand dominant group members’ responses to a hierarchy-attenuating behavior: support for redistributive social policies. The research suggests that dominant group members might legitimately be concerned about inequity and to be willing to remedy inequity, but not to remedy the situation because they do not feel implicated in the inequity, and/or are sensitive to the ‘‘fairness’’ of the remedy. If individuals distinguish between one group’s advantage and another’s disadvantage, it is possible to perceive actions that clearly reduce inequity as unjust or ineffective if the actions operate on the wrong group. However, if individuals perceive their group to have more than it should, they are willing to remedy the inequity, even if it results in harming their own group’s position. Although some dominant group members might engage in hierarchyattenuating behaviors to reduce the discomfort associated with perceptions of ingroup advantage, there are other responses they have at their disposal that do not require that they harm the group. In addition, some dominant group members may be less willing to respond in such egalitarian ways. Research has documented that dominant group members vary in their desire to maintain existing group disparities; individuals high in anti-egalitarian motivation, or Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, Pratto et al., 1994) may instead respond to evidence of ingroup advantage with hierarchyenhancing behaviors. In the next section of the chapter, we discuss several of these strategies, which, used consciously or not, can allow dominant group members to maintain their dominant position.

INEQUITY FRAMES AND DOMINANT GROUP MEMBERS’ HIERARCHY-ENHANCING RESPONSES TO INEQUITY The existence of ingroup advantage is an uneasy prospect for dominant group members for two reasons: it not only threatens group members’ esteem for the group, but also calls for remedies that reduce the group’s

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position. Thus, dominant group members may respond in ways designed to protect themselves from each of these threats; in order to protect their esteem for the group and for the self, dominant group members are predicted to engage in self-protecting strategies that can inadvertently reify the status quo. In addition, most group members are reluctant to support actions that will harm the group’s interests (Lowery et al., 2006), particularly those who are high in anti-egalitarian motivation. Thus, dominant group members who wish to maintain the group’s dominance are likely to engage in strategies designed to protect the group from the threat of ingroup advantage in ways that do not require harming the group. We divide these hierarchy-enhancing strategies into two categories: selfprotecting and position-protecting. Self-protecting strategies are those used to maintain positive esteem for the group or the self, such as denial and disidentification. These strategies, however, can also unintentionally lead to the maintenance of the hierarchy, because they allow dominant group members to disavow the existence of inequity or reduce their willingness to bear the material costs associated with resolving inequity. Although, they may result in the same outcomes self-protecting strategies enable dominant group members to protect themselves against the psychological discomfort associated with ingroup advantage, whereas position-protecting strategies are those used to maintain the group’s position in the face of possible conflict with other groups. As such, the motivation to engage in position-protecting strategies is different; the motivation is to protect the group’s position, and not the esteem of the self or the group. Thus, we anticipate that position-protecting strategies will be used by dominant group members who wish to maintain existing inequities (i.e., those high in SDO). We propose two strategies that pro-hierarchy dominant group members might use to protect the group’s position: the motivated construal of inequity and the motivated construal of colorblind ideology.

Self-Protecting Strategies Denial. If the existence of inequity causes discomfort for dominant group members, the most straightforward strategy to alleviate such discomfort is to simply deny the existence of inequity. However, inequity that involves ingroup advantage is more self-relevant and causes more esteem loss than inequity that involves outgroup disadvantage (Chow et al., 2008). Thus, dominant group members should deny only a particular


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version of inequity: they should deny the existence of ingroup advantage, but not the existence of outgroup disadvantage. Consistent with this possibility, when Whites are motivated to protect their self-esteem, they deny the existence of White privilege (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007), but their willingness to acknowledge the existence of anti-Black discrimination does not change (Lowery et al., 2007). The denial of ingroup advantage can lead to the inadvertent maintenance of the status quo because the perception of outgroup disadvantage does not reduce dominant group members’ reluctance to support redistributive policies, particularly if they perceive the policies to harm their group’s position. First, the denial of ingroup advantage allows dominant group members to deny the self-relevance of inequity and to therefore be unmotivated to eliminate it. Second, the framing of inequity as subordinate group disadvantage, combined with the motivation to perceive affirmative action policies as harming the group (Unzueta et al., 2008) can lead dominant group members to perceive the policies to act on the wrong group. Thus, dominant group members’ propensity to deny the existence of their own advantage leads to responses that, if they do not enhance inequity, at the very least allow for its maintenance. Disidentification. Rather than denying the existence of ingroup advantage, dominant group members can also reduce their psychological connection with a group by disidentifying from the group. In keeping with the prior discussion on the differential effect of inequality frames on group esteem, dominant group members should experience more psychological discomfort when they perceive ingroup advantage than when they perceive outgroup disadvantage. To psychologically distance themselves from the group membership with which the discomfort is associated, dominant group members will disidentify from the group. Consistent with this possibility, when Whites are told that they are illegitimately advantaged, they have lower esteem for the group, and therefore lower levels of identification with the White racial group than when they are told that minorities are illegitimately disadvantaged (Chow et al., 2008). Disidentification in effect severs the self-relevance of inequity, thus leading to the maintenance of the status quo. If individuals do not consider themselves to be a member of the dominant group, even if they are willing to acknowledge the existence of dominant group advantage, they will not consider themselves to be involved in the existence and maintenance of such inequity. Thus, they may be unwilling to bear the costs associated with eliminating the inequity.

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Position-Protecting Strategies The Motivated Framing of Inequity. In addition to efforts designed to protect the self from the threat of ingroup advantage, the dominant group also stands to lose materially through the framing of inequity as ingroup advantage. Thus, they may be motivated to constrain the discussion of inequity to the form that is least threatening to the group: outgroup disadvantage. For example, if men are presented with evidence of a wage gap between men and equally qualified women (e.g., there is a difference of $5,000 a year between equally qualified men and women), they may be more likely to describe the inequality as women’s disadvantage than as their own group’s advantage. This may be particularly true of dominant group members who wish to maintain their group’s dominance (e.g., pro-hierarchy group members). Consistent with this possibility, the dominant discourse about inequity is often framed as the subordinate group’s disadvantage, and is rarely discussed in terms of the dominant group’s advantage (Kleugel & Smith, 1986; McIntosh, 1992; Miller et al., 1991; Powell et al., 2005). Another possibility is that dominant group members will be particularly outspoken about the existence of outgroup disadvantage when they, ironically, perceive the group to be advantaged. By acknowledging the existence of one side of inequity, anti-egalitarian dominant group members can persuade both the outgroup and egalitarian-minded ingroup members of their desire to engage with social inequity, but by constraining the discussion to the existence of subordinate group disadvantage, they are able to avoid the material consequences of ingroup advantage. Although the consequences of this strategy are similar to those of denial, the motivation in this case is to protect the position of the group, rather than to resolve the intrapersonal concerns evoked by perceptions of ingroup advantage. The Motivated Endorsement of Colorblind Ideology. In addition to limiting how inequity is discussed, dominant group members might simply discourage the discussion of inequity in general. Thus, they might endorse ideologies that suggest that the discussion of group-based differences is unnecessary or undesirable. The desire to prevent discussion about differences mirrors findings at the individual level, in which high-power individuals are significantly less likely to discuss power differences than lowpower individuals (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008), possibly because such a discussion not only increases their discomfort but also calls into question the legitimacy of the power differential. Likewise, dominant group members


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might be motivated to prevent discussion about group-based differences, because such a discussion could, presumably, threaten the status quo. This motivation should be particularly present when the dominant group perceives the status differential to be due to ingroup advantage rather than outgroup disadvantage. One strategy to prevent the discussion of group-based differences is to draw on an ideology that rejects the legitimacy of such differences. Researchers have often noted the usefulness of ideologies in the maintenance of hierarchy. Unequal systems achieve their highest degree of stability when large sections of the population – not just elites, pundits, or other opinion leaders – agree on beliefs that solidify the social order (Jackman, 1994). Thus, the most effective legitimizing ideologies appeal to individuals from across social strata and political agendas as scientific truth or common sense (Gramsci, 1971; Haney-Lopez, 1996; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 2004; Winant, 2001). One broadly endorsed ideology that renounces the legitimacy of group-based differences is colorblind humanism. Colorblind humanism locates dignity, worth, and moral agency in the individual, and thus assails the influence of race on peoples’ fortunes in life. As such, colorblind humanism mandates that individuals be rewarded based solely on their unique personal characteristics, such as their talents and skills (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). In its original formulation, colorblind humanism was designed to invoke an ideal world in which individuals’ life outcomes would not be influenced by the race of the individual. A truly colorblind society is one in which an individual is never denied a job, housing, healthcare, justice, or any other social resource, on the basis of his or her race. In this sense, colorblind humanism focuses on the equality of group level outcomes, and is not ‘‘means-constraining’’ – in fact, achieving a colorblind society may require the use of race-conscious policies, such as affirmative action policies. However, there is a different manner in which colorblind humanism may be perceived: as a blanket prohibition against race-conscious decision making. When construed in such a manner, it serves only to entrench existing inequalities. When used in this sense, colorblind humanism can be used to justify prohibiting affirmative action or any other government policy in which decisions are made with regard to individuals’ race. In the United States today, several prominent conservatives (Bennett, 1992; Connerly, 2000; Horowitz, 1999; Steele, 1990) make use of colorblind rhetoric to argue for their public policy priorities. Critics have argued that these individuals’ invocation of colorblind humanism is less than entirely principled, and in part reflects a desire to preempt policies (such as affirmative action) that threaten the status quo (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Dyson, 2000; Winant, 2001).

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In other words, it may be that conservative opinion leaders recognize and exploit the potential of colorblindness as a ‘‘legitimizing ideology’’ (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001). We predict that dominant group members might be more likely to endorse the legitimizing version of colorblind ideology when they perceive ingroup advantage than outgroup disadvantage, because ingroup advantage calls into question the position of the dominant group more so than outgroup disadvantage. Research suggests that pro-hierarchy dominant group members are motivated to construe and support the legitimizing form of colorblind ideology in order to downplay racial disparities. Specifically, pro-hierarchy dominant group members are more likely to construe colorblindness as prohibiting race-conscious decision making and are more likely to endorse that version of colorblind ideology when they perceive the group’s position to be threatened (Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009). Following this research, we propose that dominant group members who wish to maintain the group’s dominance will invoke the legitimizing version of colorblind humanism when they perceive the dominant group to be advantaged to place the existing social hierarchy – and their dominant position within it – beyond critique or redress.

Practical Considerations and Future Directions Throughout this chapter, we have discussed the implications of the inequality-framing model for how dominant group members experience and respond to social inequity. Our findings suggest that, as a matter of practice, policy makers ought to be aware of how social inequalities are discussed. Simply put, individuals’ preferences for different remedies for inequality are influenced by how inequalities are described. Thus, to limit the discussion of inequality to why subordinate groups are disadvantaged also limits dominant group members’ willingness to consider a number of remedies that would, if inequality were perceived in a different way, seem reasonable. Thus, to have a truly comprehensive discussion about inequality would require that dominant group members be willing to consider the possibility that not only do subordinate group members suffer from their disadvantaged status, but also that dominant group members may unwittingly benefit from their advantaged status. However, as we have discussed in the second part of our chapter, dominant group members have at their disposal a number of psychological strategies to prevent such a discussion from occurring.


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The importance of inequality frames are also relevant within an organizational context; how employees experience discrepancies between divisions or teams within a firm and how they will perceive the fairness of reallocating resources to remedy those discrepancies are likely to be influenced by how the inequalities are described. If top-level management is concerned about resolving inequalities in a way that will seem fair to both groups or individuals who differ in resources, they would do well to match how they describe inequalities with how they describe the remedies. We focused specifically on how dominant group members might engage in both hierarchy-attenuating responses, such as supporting redistributive policies, and hierarchy-enhancing responses to inequality framed as ingroup advantage, as compared to outgroup disadvantage. Though we have documented a number of possible responses, we do not know when dominant group members will engage in one kind of response or the other. That is to say, when will dominant group members be willing to attenuate social inequality rather than enhance or maintain it when they are confronted with evidence of ingroup advantage? This is a question that we would encourage future research to explore, as it holds great import for practitioners who are interested in reducing dominant group members’ opposition to remedying social inequality. Although the focus of this chapter has been the effect of inequity frames on members of a dominant group, the inequality-framing model also makes predictions for subordinate group members’ experience of inequity. Specifically, just as inequity framed as White advantage is more threatening to Whites than inequity framed as minority disadvantage, inequity framed as minority disadvantage might be more threatening to minorities than inequity framed as White advantage. For example, evidence suggests that inequality can be stigmatizing, and members of subordinate groups engage in behaviors designed to limit the sting associated with this stigma. One example often given to illustrate this phenomenon is Blacks’ response to their stigmatization in the domain of academics. In this case, Blacks separate their sense of self from their performance in the domain (i.e., psychological disengagement, Major & Schmader, 1998; Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001; Steele & Aronson, 1995). From our perspective, inequity should only affect subordinate groups when framed as disadvantage, because disadvantage implicates the subordinate group. Consistent with this possibility, minority students psychologically disengage from academics when they are exposed to information framed as the subordinate group’s disadvantage, but do not disengage when they perceive the dominant group to be advantaged. In addition, consistent with the model’s predictions for

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dominant group members’ responses, White students psychologically disengage from the academic domain when confronted with evidence of dominant group advantage, but not subordinate group disadvantage (Lowery & Wout, in press). Women’s experience of and response to the gender wage gap would be another fruitful avenue for future research. For example, the model would predict that women’s support for affirmative action programs will differ depending on how inequality is framed (women make less vs. men make more) and how the outcome of the policies are framed. In addition to influencing policy attitudes, women’s sense of entitlement for pay might also be influenced. Previous research has documented that women typically have a depressed entitlement for pay – relative to men, women pay themselves less for the same job (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Jost, 1997; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984; Pelham & Hetts, 2001). One possibility is that because the gender gap is typically described as women’s disadvantage, women may engage in more self-criticism (Pelham & Hetts, 2001), thus leading them to have lower entitlement for pay. However, because inequality framed as the dominant group’s advantage does not implicate the subordinate group’s position, this effect might be attenuated among women when they perceive men to be advantaged. Women’s depressed entitlement for pay has implications not only for how women think about the worth of their own work, but also for whether they will initiate negotiations for better salaries, which has been shown to be a strong predictor of ultimate salary outcomes (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). Taken together, we suggest that the implications of the model for the operation of processes associated with individuals’ sense of their groups’ position, whether they be dominant or subordinate group members, are worthy of future research.

CONCLUSION When and how will dominant group members respond to inequity? In contrast to current theories of inequality, which assume that responses to inequity will be primarily determined by the magnitude of the inequity, we propose that individuals are also influenced by how the inequity is framed – as ingroup advantage or outgroup disadvantage. In particular, dominant group members are predicted to have different responses to advantage as compared to disadvantage; they can be prompted to support hierarchyattenuating actions, such as supporting redistributive policies, but they can


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also respond by psychologically alleviating the discomfort associated with ingroup advantage in ways that materially entrench their position. Some of these strategies allow dominant group members to avoid the discomfort of ingroup advantage entirely through intrapsychic means; the denial of inequity and disidentification allow group members to maintain the experience that inequity is not self-relevant. Other strategies may alleviate the intergroup threat associated with ingroup advantage; the motivated framing of inequity and construal of colorblind ideology, combined with the dominant group’s control over the way in which inequity is discussed, facilitates dominant group members’ ability to maintain the status quo. The research suggests that if we as a society or managers in an organization have the goal of eliminating inequalities, we must pay attention not only to the degree of inequity, but also to the way in which it is framed. How are issues of inequality discussed within the media? How does upper management portray intra-organizational disparities? Importantly, some groups have more power to control the manner by which inequalities are discussed, and thus, it is imperative that we be aware of who has the power to frame inequity, and the ramifications of framing inequity as advantage or disadvantage.

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CHAPTER 8 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: SEEKING A SHARED IDENTITY IN DYNAMIC INTRAGROUP CONTEXTS Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Wenzel and Michael J. Platow ABSTRACT Purpose – To develop a new model of restorative reparation that attempts to capture the dynamic role of shared identity perceptions. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on recent advances in restorative justice theory (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008), we explore the theoretical proposition that a greater understanding of the identity relations between victims, offenders, and the groups in which they are embedded is key to understanding a victim’s underlying motives toward justice, and thus, predicting when victims will react favorably to restorative justice processes and prefer them over traditional retributive justice interventions. Findings – We argue that a perceived shared identity between the victim and the offender determines the extent to which the victim understands the transgression as requiring a revalidation of the rules, values, or morals undermined by the offense. Moreover, we propose that these identity relations are dynamic in that they both affect and are affected by the Fairness and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 13, 205–242 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2010)0000013011

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experience of injustice. Thus, identity is also shaped by the transgression itself through, inter alia, processes associated with positive social identity maintenance. Importantly, these shifts in identity determine how injustice victims are likely to respond to constructive approaches to conflict resolution such as restorative justice. Originality/value – We offer a series of testable hypotheses aimed at engendering future research in the domain of constructive justice restoration in groups. Moreover, this work suggests that to develop effective resolution strategies, we must consider how an injustice event shapes the relations between the affected parties over time rather than simply assuming identity relations are static.

Irrespective of how objectively fair a given group’s procedures are, or their resulting outcomes, fairness perceptions involve subjective evaluations of those interactions and decisions. As a result, variability in feelings of injustice will be as great as variability in individuals themselves and the situations in which these perceptions are derived. The likely inevitability of felt injustice in teams, groups, organizations, and societies presents a challenge for conflict management scholars, requiring an understanding of how to restore justice following its perceived violation. But what exactly is it that victims of injustice want? Let us begin by considering the recent dramatic example of an Iranian woman who was blinded with acid by a jilted suitor (Giles, 2009). The Tehran courts awarded her the opportunity for qisas (signifying an eye-for-an-eye retribution in Islamic law) by having the offender also blinded by acid. While reading about the nature of ‘‘justice’’ in this case, some readers may experience feelings of satisfaction. Others, however, may find themselves outraged at the ruthlessness by which justice will be achieved. These conflicting reactions are by no means dependent on extreme circumstances. Imagine the case where you are disrespected by one of your work colleagues during an important presentation. Would you try to confront the offender yourself and ask for an apology, or rely on third-party authorities to regulate his/her behavior? Or are you more likely to wait until the opportunity presents itself for you to get even? The majority of the social science research on justice restoration has focused on punishment of the offender, perhaps reflective of the traditional use of third-party punishments in Western legal systems. Given this focus, a ‘‘just deserts’’ framework has been the dominant approach from which

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researchers have attempted to understand the restoration of justice. The notion of just deserts suggests that appeals to see some sanctioning reaction in response to rule-breaking is motivated by the desire to reestablish moral proportionality and with it a sense of justice (see Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000). Just deserts theorists assert that punishments are not about deterrence (von Hirsch, 1993), and research has shown that fear of recidivism does not drive the desire for retribution (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley et al., 2000; McFatter, 1982), nor is it hugely effective as a deterrent (e.g., MacCoun, 1993; Ross, 1981; Tyler, 2006). Rather, punishment serves people’s desires for retribution. Accordingly, punishment can be conceptualized as an end in itself; offenders deserve to be punished, and punishment is necessary to restore a subjective sense of justice (Duff, 2001). Punishment, however, is not always the default response, and may not always be necessary (or sufficient) for subjective justice to be restored. Born partly out of dissatisfaction with the legal system over the lack of concern for victims’ needs, an alternative restorative justice philosophy has emerged (see Bazemore, 1998; Braithwaite, 1999), promoting the restoration of justice through constructive dialogue between the parties directly involved in the transgression: victims, offenders, and the groups affected by the harm (Christie, 1977). Central to a restorative philosophy of justice is a focus on healing the victim and his/her suffering, healing the offender and his/her moral character, and healing the group as a whole and the relationships within it (Braithwaite, 1998, 2002). This contrasts to the traditional retributive philosophy of justice that understands an offender’s rule violation as requiring third-party sanctions against the offender in order to restore an objective equilibrium (i.e., ‘‘justice’’) to the situation (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Restorative justice theorists have criticized this traditional retributive approach as ignoring the needs of victims and robbing them of their rights, denying offenders the opportunity to learn from their actions, and denying the larger community the opportunity for norm clarification (Christie, 1977). Notably, although many legal scholars approach restorative justice as a philosophy, one that is starkly incongruent with a retributive philosophy (e.g., Zehr, 1985; but see Duff, 2002), we do not treat these two forms of justice as mutually exclusive, nor do we believe that one’s concept of justice is as ideologically grounded as the legal discourse might suggest. Rather, retributive and restorative justice can be treated as distinct conceptualizations, understandings of what is required for justice to be achieved, dependent on both individual orientations toward justice (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2009b) and situational determinants (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008).

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With these abstract, philosophical goals in mind, the practice of restorative conferencing typically involves the meeting of the affected parties in an open dialogue, with the goal of reaching a consensus about the offense, the implications of its harm, and how to effectively achieve justice and reintegration of the offender (Marshall, 1998). Although various different procedural models have been employed that fall under the umbrella of restorative justice (Bazemore, 1998; Braithwaite, 1999), prototypical conferencing procedures allow both offender and victim to share their perspective and feelings about the event, voice their opinions, and ideally reach a shared agreement about the harm, the offender’s responsibility, and what should be done to restore justice to the situation. Although punishment is often included in the conference outcome, it is used as a way to repair harm (i.e., a ‘‘reparative sanction’’) rather than to satisfy retributive goals. The popularity of restorative justice conferencing has increased in recent years, in the U.S. and abroad, popularized by recent adoption of restorative principles and procedures in family conferencing, when dealing with juvenile offenders, and as part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. To what extent are these restorative practices effective in resolving conflict? Criminological research has suggested generally high victim satisfaction with restorative conferencing, but with a consistent minority of victims expressing dissatisfaction with the restorative process (Braithwaite, 2002; Latimer, Dowden, & Muise, 2005; Strang, 2002; Strang et al., 2006). Take, for example, the severe case of sexual assault. Very often victims seek to understand a rapist’s actions, make him face the pain he has caused, and sometimes even forgive him, processes that restorative conferencing can facilitate; indeed, restorative conferencing has been somewhat successful in this domain (see Koss, Bachar, & Hopkins, 2003). In contrast, however, some victims cannot bear to face their offender and are not satisfied with the restorative process. Even the highly lauded Truth and Reconciliation Commission has received mixed reviews regarding its ability to satisfy the concerns of all involved parties (Vora & Vora, 2004). Unfortunately, our understanding of alternative justice interventions, such as restorative conferencing, has been hampered by theoretical and methodological difficulties, and thus our ability to predict satisfaction with such constructive interventions is limited. Research in restorative conferencing, in particular, has been hindered by self-selection confounds, as both victims and offenders must first agree to participate (Latimer et al., 2005). As such, there remains a dearth of empirical research examining what explains the variance in preferences for and reactions to retributive versus restorative justice interventions. Social psychologists have recently begun to explore restorative

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justice processes, but the empirical work is still in its infancy (see De Castella, Platow, Wenzel, Okimoto, & Feather, in press; Gromet & Darley, 2006, 2009a; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2009a; Okimoto et al., 2009b; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2010; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Even in organizational settings where transgressions are relatively minor and administrators have the power to designate different conflict resolution procedures, no empirical studies to date have documented causal determinants of victim preferences for restorative conferencing. Only a few researchers have explored these concepts as they might operate in organizational settings (see Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Goodstein & Aquino, 2010; Kidder, 2007), but their theoretical discourse has not offered empirical evidence and has neglected the critical question of when and why restorative justice might be most preferred and/or deemed satisfactory to the involved stakeholders. To address this gap in the literature, we draw on recent research in the social psychology of justice and identity to aid in the development of a new dynamic identity model for understanding victim preferences for restorative reparation. In this framework, we argue that a shared victim–offender identity will affect preferences for restorative forms of justice after a transgression through complex psychological processes aimed at maintaining a positive identity. Specifically, a shared identity (a) increases the importance of shared value consensus that is a central aspect of restorative justice, (b) reduces the willingness to psychologically distance the self from the offender, and as a result, (c) increases the desire to seek renewed value consensus with the offender through restorative procedures rather than in spite of him through punitive sanctions (see Fig. 1, a, b, c subscripts correspond to these three key points where shared identity influences these The Dynamic Identity Model of Justice Restoration

Shared VictimOffender Identity Pre-transgression

Shared VictimOffender Identity Post-transgression

+

– + (a)

A Victimization or Transgression / Moral Wrongfulness

Fig. 1.

+

(c) +

(b)

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–

Threat to Shared Values i.e., Social Identity threat & Moral Outrage

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Seek Renewal of Shared Values

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Preference for Restorative Justice Preference for Retributive Justice

The Dynamic Identity Model of Justice Restoration.

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processes). Through our development of this model, we provide theoretical discussion aimed at motivating future research engendering a better understanding of the interplay between a victim’s identity and his or her variable preferences for justice after an offense. We focus this discussion on the victim’s perspective, reserving discussion regarding perspective of the offender (and observers) for future research and theory. We do note that criminological research in restorative practices has suggested success in offender’s rehabilitation compared to traditional court proceedings (see Braithwaite, 2002; Latimer et al., 2005; Strang et al., 2006). However, field examinations of restorative justice are, as noted in the preceding text, confounded by participant’s self-selection (both victim and offender). Importantly, offender value reendorsement (indicated by expressed apology, remorse, acceptance of responsibility, etc.) appears to be critical for victim satisfaction with restorative justice processes (see Wenzel et al., 2008, Study 1). Thus, we do recognize the importance of incorporating the offender’s perspective as a crucial subsequent step to our current analysis, one that will be necessary to fully comprehend how restorative justice can be most effectively utilized as a justice response. We will first outline the psychological concerns underlying a victim’s desire for justice, and suggest that a social identity framework (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) may be useful for understanding the individual and contextual factors that determine the importance of these underlying concerns, particularly in intragroup contexts (see also Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008). Second, drawing on recent advances in restorative justice theory (Wenzel et al., 2008), we articulate how identity relations (and the psychological concerns they imply) may help to predict preferences for and satisfaction with restorative approaches to justice. Finally, we take a more dynamic perspective of the injustice experience, discussing how a victim’s perceived shared identity, both with the offender and the group in which the offense occurred, may change as a result of the transgression, and the implications that this recategorization process may have for implementing constructive responses to injustice.

CONCERNS UNDERLYING THE JUSTICE MOTIVE Central to a more complete understanding of the justice restoration process is a stronger focus on the fundamental psychological concerns driving the experience of victimization. Why is injustice distressing? What drives people’s need to seek some type of justice-restoring response? Based on past


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theoretical and empirical work (see Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008), we suggest that the psychological concerns underlying the need for justice can be categorized into two broad domains: (1) concerns for personal status and power, and (2) concerns over the shared nature of the values violated by the offense. Both of these concerns can be examined at the interpersonal and intragroup levels of analysis (as well as the intergroup level, although beyond the scope of the current discussion; see Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008, 2010). Although we distinguish between interpersonal and intragroup contexts for explanatory purposes in the current chapter, in some analyses (and indeed in self-categorization theory) they are functionally equivalent. The interpersonal versus intragroup context is actually distinguished at the intrapsychic level – it is the level of an individual’s most salient identity that is important (e.g., at the level of the interpersonal relationship or the group). A salient superordinate identity provides a group-level context and psychological frame for a transgression that may otherwise be interpreted as interpersonal in nature (for similar analyses relating to the relative salience of sub- and superordinate social categories, see Hogg, 1992, 1993; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Thus, it is important to note that in the current chapter, by ‘‘interpersonal’’ we emphasize the respondent’s conceptualization of the relationship between victim and offender as individuals, with a relatively low salience of the superordinate category. In contrast, by using the term ‘‘intragroup’’, we wish to emphasize the relatively high salience of the superordinate social category (and, hence, the group-level norms, values, etc.). First, transgressions demean and disempower their victims. Through their transgression, offenders diminish their victims, violating the victim’s sense of autonomy and disrupting the balance of equitable status and power between the two parties (Heider, 1958; Miller, 2001; Murphy & Hampton, 1988; Vidmar, 2000; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). We refer to this category of psychological threats as ‘‘status/power concerns.’’ Given the current focus and theoretical approach, we do not present diverging predictions based on threats to status versus power, versus autonomy (although differences may indeed exist); although separate constructs, status and power are closely linked (see McGee & Galinsky, 2008; Thye, Wilier, & Markovsky, 2006) and both imply a competitive orientation between parties. Such status/power threats elicit in the victim a desire to restore an equitable balance of felt power, to assert one’s control and autonomy, and level one’s status relative to the offender to its pretransgression state (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Miller, 2001). This symbolic implication of transgressions suggests that elevation or

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empowerment of the victim, and/or devaluation or disempowerment of the offender, is necessary to restore a sense of justice. These status and power concerns may be exhibited in interpersonal relations and also at the intragroup level. A victim may not only measure his or her status/power vis-a`-vis the offender, but also within the group as a whole. When victimized by a group representative or fellow in-group member, victims may be concerned with the transgression because of the low intragroup status (or membership status) implied by the transgression. The importance of intragroup status is tied to belongingness/inclusion motivations (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and has received significant attention in the fairness literature as underlying desires for procedural fairness (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2003; van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002, 2005). By demeaning the victim in an intragroup context, in-group offenders question the victim’s status and influence in the group (Okimoto, 2008; Smith, Olson, Agronick, & Tyler, 2009), not just relative to the offender. In such cases, justice requires some substantiation of a victim’s importance in the group, validation that can come either from the offender him/herself or from a third-party in-group member. Second, through their violation, transgressions undermine the values that are expected to be shared between the victim and offender. In any given relationship, there will be a number of expectations that are assumed to be shared between the parties, and in many cases, the values on which those expectations are based help to define the nature of that relationship (Rousseau, 1989). However, through their transgression, offenders symbolically exhibit their disdain for or lack of agreement with those shared values, potentially undermining their perceived validity (De Castella et al., in press; Durkheim, 1964; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar, 2000). Such value threats elicit in the victim a desire to restore a perceived consensus surrounding those values, to see a renewed agreement about the importance of shared values in that relationship (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Wenzel et al., 2008, 2010). This symbolic implication of transgressions suggests that offender value reendorsement is necessary to restore a sense of justice. We can also consider these value concerns at the intragroup level. Any given group, organization, or society will also have a number of rules and norms (both formal and informal) that its members not only expect to share, but that may also help to define their individual entitlements and their group’s identity (see Huo, 2003; Wenzel, 2002). Following the processes outlined by self-categorization theory, the consensual (i.e., ‘‘prototypical’’) views and attitudes of a group are likely to represent its values in a given social context, values that define the distinctive identity of the group and bind it together as a


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cohesive unit (Haslam, McGarty, & Turner, 1996; Hogg, 1993; Turner et al., 1987). As noted earlier, by intentionally violating those rules, offenders symbolically express their lack of agreement with those values (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar, 2000). In group contexts, such a questioning of values has the potential to undermine their validity as identity defining and may thus constitute a threat to social identity (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010). In such cases, group members committed to their social identity will seek justice by demanding the revalidation of their group values (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Wenzel et al., 2008; cf. Crane & Platow, 2009). Interestingly, however, a renewed group value consensus may arise from the offender value reendorsement or third-party in-group validation (in absence or in spite of the offender), an issue we discuss in detail later. In sum, we suggest two concerns can be distinguished that underlie a victim’s justice motive in response to transgressions: (1) a concern about the status/power implications of the offense as offenders put themselves above the victim and the rules governing appropriate behavior, and (2) a concern about the protection of the values that originally defined those rules and thus what is just in the given situation. It is worth noting that, although we discuss symbolic status/power and shared value concerns as underlying the justice motive, these two concerns might also have utilitarian implications, with the lack of their restoration affecting the reoccurrence of similar transgressions. Namely, if the values underlying the offense are not reaffirmed, they may no longer be seen as normatively binding, and the offender (or others) might feel less inhibition to violate them again in the future. Likewise, if left unchecked, the status/power gain of an offender might serve as reinforcement for him/her (or others) to offend again. However, our current discussion specifically focuses on feelings of injustice. Further, research does suggest that desires for justice are driven by moral symbolic concerns such as those discussed in the preceding text, rather than deterrence concerns (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 2000; Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004). Nonetheless, we acknowledge the conceptual overlap between justice and deterrence motives. Notably, any given perceived injustice may give rise to any (or all) of these psychological concerns (see Table 1). For example, imagine you are disrespected by a colleague during a work presentation. You may be upset by this transgression because, by insulting you, he put himself above you and made you feel diminished as a person (demeaning your relative status). Given that the transgression occurred in a salient intragroup context (i.e., colleagues), you may also be upset because his insult diminished you in the eyes of the group as well (demeaning your membership status). You may

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Table 1. Salient Relationship

Justice Concerns and Motives as a Function of Salient Relationship. Status and Power Concerns Interpersonal

Relevant psychological concerns

Salient justice goal

Intragroup

Shared Value Concerns Interpersonal

Membership status, Validity of values on which the hierarchical interpersonal status, social relationship is influence, felt based respect Renewed value Reassertion of Reassertion of agreement/ intragroup personal status/ consensus with status/power power, reduction the offender of offender status/power Autonomy, power, status relative to offender, control

Intragroup Validity of group values on which the group identity is based, felt group pride Renewed group value agreement/ consensus (with or against offender)

also be upset because his insult violates a trust that you thought you shared with him (undermining shared relationship values). Finally, at the group level, you may be upset because his insult undermines a general sense of respect and politeness about which all of your colleagues had an unspoken agreement, making you question the extent to which your group truly values respect (undermining shared group values). Given that all of these motivations may be relevant in any given intragroup situation, it becomes critically important to determine the contextual conditions under which each are salient, as well as the individual factors that shape these reactions. We focus the remainder of this discussion, however, primarily on shared value concerns as they are most closely tied to restorative justice (Wenzel et al., 2008, 2010).

SHARED IDENTITY, SHARED VALUES, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE Pretransgression Shared Identity as a Predictor of Shared Value Concerns Self-categorization theory provides a useful framework for predicting the salience of these two categories of justice concerns after a transgression, particularly as they are reflective of a more fundamental distinction between one’s personal versus social identity. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) states that people define the self through their salient categorizations


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with others in a given situation, with self-categories varying in their inclusiveness (see also Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2004; Hogg & Terry, 2000). For example, people can categorize themselves as an individual different from other individuals (personal identity), or they can categorize themselves as a member of a social group and thus as being the same as, or interchangeable with, other members of their group but different from members of other groups (social identity). The salience of these selfcategorizations varies as a function of their contextual fit in interaction with individual perceiver characteristics (e.g., motives, group identification, background knowledge; see Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Oakes, 1987). Interestingly, self-categorizations are thus partly derived from, but also affect, one’s perception of the situation, such as perceived similarities/differences and positive/negative goal interdependencies (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Importantly, a victim’s concern over the violation of shared values implies heightened concern over his/her social identity (cf., Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002). When people categorize themselves as members of a shared social category, they expect to agree with other group members; indeed, such agreement with similar others helps to socially validate one’s own views (Turner et al., 1987). In contrast, disagreement with similar others, or other members of a salient shared social category, elicits subjective uncertainty that people are motivated to reduce (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993). Thus, a violation is likely to be understood as a questioning of the validity of presumably shared values, particularly when a victim expects to agree with the offender. Following from this, violations are likely to threaten the victim’s shared value system and thus his/her social identity, particularly when that victim shares a salient identity with the offender (through an interpersonal relationship and/or a shared group membership; Wenzel et al., 2008). Recent injustice research has provided some preliminary evidence of this relationship between a shared pretransgression victim–offender identity and value concerns following transgressions. De Castella et al. (in press) found that domestic violence was seen as violating shared group values more in intragroup contexts (between individuals within a single cultural group) compared to intergroup contexts (between individuals of two different cultural groups). Similarly, Wenzel et al. (2010) found that when participants imagined that they were victimized by an offender who was an in-group member (i.e., a company employee), they were more likely to indicate concern about shared values compared to when the offender was an out-group member (i.e., temporarily hired from a different company), an

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effect that partially mediated subsequent demands for justice. Consistent with this research, we predict: Proposition 1. Transgressions are interpreted by their victims as a threat to shared values and elicit concern over shared value consensus, particularly when the victim shares a salient identity with the offender prior to the transgression (see Fig. 1, moderation path a). Importantly, this undermining of perceived shared value consensus also represents a threat to the victim’s contextually salient social identity. This expected pattern suggests that the underlying value-based justice concerns we have discussed are partly dependent on the perception of a shared identity; however, the specific processes by which a shared identity makes these concerns salient (e.g., expected behavior, trust, and interdependence) remains open for future inquiry (but see Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009). Note again that we can consider this proposition in situations where the salient shared identity of victim and offender is based on their close interpersonal relationship (i.e., salient relationship-level category) or, in intragroup contexts, based on a shared group membership (i.e., salient group-level category). If victim and offender belong to the same group, the victim’s identification with that group is likely to beget a shared identity with the offender, and as such a greater shared value expectation even in absence of a direct victim–offender relationship (see Kramer, 1993). Thus, even in the absence of direct interpersonal ties, transgressions in intragroup contexts (i.e., by in-group members) should elicit more concern over shared group-level values (serving as a threat to social identity) than transgressions committed by out-group members. In other words, Proposition 1 should hold true regardless of whether or not the shared victim–offender identity exists through an interpersonal relationship (as identified above) or is implied by a salient common group membership. This also suggests that the extent to which the victim strongly identifies with the group in which the transgression occurred should moderate the extent of the perceived threat toward shared values and the common group identity. Consistent with this assertion, recent research has suggested that transgressions that threaten to undermine shared group values elicit stronger reactions when perpetrated by an in-group member compared to an out-group member, particularly when respondents strongly identify with the victimized group (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010). Similarly, group members have a stronger desire to voice dissatisfaction following group norm violations, particularly when they are highly identified with the group (Crane & Platow, 2009).


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Pretransgression Shared Identity and Victim Endorsement of Restorative Justice As noted earlier, restorative conferencing involves constructive dialogue between the affected parties with the goal of achieving consensus about the harm and what should be done to address that harm (Marshall, 1998). Central to these conferencing goals, and indeed central to a more abstract restorative justice philosophy, is a focus on seeking a renewed consensus between the involved parties (Wenzel et al., 2008), an aspiration that is well suited to addressing concerns over the violation of shared values with the offender. Accordingly, the extent to which a victim perceives a shared identity with the offender should also moderate that victim’s endorsement of restorative conferencing and the underlying restorative philosophy. Recent research has already identified a link between shared identity and endorsement of a restorative philosophy at the abstract level, as well as concrete predilections for restorative conferencing interventions. For example, at the individual differences level, victims of injustice were more likely to endorse a restorative philosophy of justice and concrete preferences for restorative conferencing over traditional punishments when they had a stronger interdependent self-construal (Okimoto et al., 2009b). Similarly, a recent study by Wenzel et al. (2010, Study 3) showed that transgressions elicit stronger endorsement of a restorative philosophy and a desire to pursue constructive justice resolution alternatives when committed by in-group (compared to out-group) offenders, and this effect was partly explained by heightened concern over the values that were expected to be shared between victim and offender (see also Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Further corroborating the link between a shared identity and restorative justice, recent research has also shown that victims were more satisfied with restorative justice interventions when the victim and offender shared a salient identity. Okimoto et al. (2009a) found that participants believed restorative responses to be fairer when respondents perceived themselves to share an identity with the offender. Similarly, Wenzel et al. (2010, Study 1) showed that restorative resolution processes were only effective in restoring feelings of justice when respondents felt strongly identified with the group in which the transgression occurred, experimentally manipulated by making salient participants’ similarities versus differences with other group members. Following from this, we propose: Proposition 2. Restorative justice will be seen as a satisfactory response to a transgression, particularly when the victim shares a salient identity with

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the offender prior to the transgression. This effect is due to (i.e., mediated by) a heightened desire to restore shared values with the offender. Notably, research has suggested that a perceived shared victim–offender identity affects satisfaction with restorative interventions independent of the perceived severity of the transgression (Okimoto et al., 2009a). The existing research, however, has only examined perceived shared identity at a single point in time. Considering identity as dynamic (as we do later in this chapter) may reveal that offense severity and shared identity perceptions are not as independent as these preliminary experimental investigations suggest (see Gromet & Darley, 2009b). We also highlight the fact that these studies examined endorsement of restorative justice and/or satisfaction with restorative processes. It is still unclear whether such endorsement translates into preferences for restorative interventions over more traditional/normative retributive processes. Pretransgression Shared Identity as a Predictor of Status/Power Concerns In contrast to shared value concerns, a victim’s perceived lack of a shared identity with the offender may imply heightened concern over status/power after an offense. Concerns for personal status/power suggest a clear psychological distinction between the self and other, as well as a negative interdependence between the two parties, because the heightened status/ power of the offender implies the diminished status/power of the victim. Hence, transgressions may also be more likely to elicit a victim’s concern over status and power when there is a salient lack of shared identity, defining the self as an individual different from the offender (Wenzel et al., 2008). Interestingly, however, this pattern may be different in intragroup contexts where a victim may also be concerned over his/her perceived membership status in the group rather than his/her personal status/power (see Table 1). Membership status concerns and group value concerns are both relevant to an individual’s social identity, concepts that roughly parallel the distinction between respect and pride aspects of identity as defined by Tyler and Lind (1992) and Tyler and Blader (2003). Thus, concerns over membership status may also be more pronounced when victims of injustice strongly identify with the group in which the transgression has occurred (see Tyler & Smith, 1999). This status/power aspect of identity, however, may take a backseat role to value concerns when focusing on understanding restorative justice (Wenzel et al., 2008).


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Status/Power Concerns and Restorative Justice Although we acknowledge the role of status/power concerns (in both interpersonal and intragroup contexts) in the restoration of justice more generally, restorative justice as a legal philosophy focuses on seeking a renewed consensus between the affected parties (Marshall, 1998). Status/ power concerns are not the central motives underlying restorative reparations (Wenzel et al., 2008) and do not appear directly to predict endorsement of restorative justice conferencing (Okimoto et al., 2009b; Wenzel et al., 2010). Rather, it is a heightened concern for values implied by a shared victim–offender identity that primarily affects the desire to seek restorative justice. Thus, we have focused (and will continue to focus) our current discussion on the relationship between identity, shared value concerns, and restorative justice. Importantly, however, as noted by Okimoto and Wenzel (2008, p. 301), ‘‘if a victim is upset by the transgression because of both status/power and value concerns, the transgression response must repair relative status/power while also reestablishing consensus regarding shared values.’’ Thus, although restorative justice may satisfy a victim’s concerns over shared value consensus, it will only be deemed acceptable if it also speaks to that victim’s diminished status and power when both concerns are salient. Does restorative conferencing address victims’ status and power concerns? Some scholars have suggested that restorative justice can be empowering: empowering to victims, offenders, and other group members involved in restorative conferencing, by allowing voice and control over the decision processes (Braithwaite, 2003; Zehr, 1985). Notably, part of the victim’s empowerment may also come from the employment of ‘‘reintegrative shaming’’ (Braithwaite, 1989) in the restorative conference, aimed at motivating offender reform but relevant to the victim’s feelings of status/ power. Unfortunately, the answer to this question remains speculative as there is a lack of experimental/causal evidence supporting the link between restorative justice and a victim’s feelings of empowerment and control. Importantly, however, if restorative conferencing does not empower the victims of transgressions, these types of interventions will be less appealing to those victims who experience status/power threats, rather driving such victims toward retributive responses that have the potential to address both status/power (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Heider, 1958; Miller, 2001; Vidmar, 2000) and shared value concerns (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar, 2000). In other words, salient concern for status/power may diminish a victim’s willingness to address the injustice through restorative

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justice conferencing when forced to decide between retributive and restorative interventions. Importantly, however, most restorative programs include punishment or are utilized as an additional procedure on top of the traditional court practices, a combined justice approach that is often preferred in response to severe crimes, at least from the observer’s perspective (Gromet & Darley, 2006). Thus, in practice, utilizing restorative justice interventions does not negate the ability to address a victim’s status/ power concerns.

DETERMINING PREFERENCES FOR RESTORATIVE OVER RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE We do not mean to imply that traditional punitive interventions are unable to address social identity concerns or desires for a renewed value consensus. Indeed, a tradition of research on the ‘‘black sheep effect’’ has shown that individuals respond to norm violations (i.e., social identity threats) with particularly strong punitive reactions (e.g., Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995; Marques, 1990). Such assertions against an offender maintain the purity of the group through social exclusion (Festinger, 1950; Levine, 1989), while also communicating to others that the offender and his/ her immoral actions are not representative of the group and its values (Bies, 1987; Duff, 2001; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009). Importantly, however, most punitive interventions restore group values in absence of the offender, or more appropriately, in spite of him. One of the key conceptual distinctions between restorative conferencing and traditional punitive interventions is that restorative conferencing helps to achieve a renewed agreement over the shared values and morals violated by the offense with the offender, whereas retribution reaffirms the importance of those same values through assertion against and without the offender. Indeed, Wenzel et al. (2008) suggest that this is the central feature that distinguishes restorative from retributive approaches toward justice. Since both retribution and restoration have the potential to address value concerns, answering the question of when restorative justice will be the optimal or preferred response in the eyes of the victim is a fundamental challenge. When predicting preferences for a justice response, the distinction between retributive justice as an assertion against the offender and restorative justice as an assertion with the offender becomes critical. This distinction may help to recognize moderators that predict the conditions


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under which restorative justice will be seen as superior to the more familiar norm of retribution. Specifically, we argue that value concerns (and the implied promise of satisfaction with restorative interventions) are likely to translate into restorative justice preferences when victims maintain that shared identity even in light of the offender’s transgression.

Posttransgression Shared Identity As noted earlier, a victim’s pretransgression shared identity with the offender is likely to affect the salience or importance of value consensus after a transgression (Proposition 1), concerns that may be satisfied by restorative interventions (Proposition 2). However, such value concerns are only likely to translate into restorative justice preferences when victims are also motivated to maintain that shared identity. Naturally, the desire to maintain existing bonds is implicated in a shared pretransgression identity. Importantly, however, identities are dynamic; self-categorization often shifts and changes as people attempt to maintain a positive sense of self (cf., Antaki, Condor, & Levine, 1996). Such shifts are particularly likely to occur following the experience of an identity threatening injustice (an issue that we will address in more detail later). This fact presents an empirical and theoretical complication, one that demands consideration of posttransgression identity. In absence of such posttransgression identity and the implied motivation to maintain that identity, there may be no imperative for a justice response to be inclusive. Indeed, a victim’s abandonment of concern for his/her relational ties with the offender negates the need for a renewed consensus. Moreover, the subsequent lack of concern for the offender’s welfare and the perceived negative interdependence between the self and the offender may also legitimize the addressing of any residual injustice concerns with retribution. The process of retribution may even further reinforce offender’s marginalization by making concrete the group’s stance against the offense without attempting to restore the offender’s group status (Kerr et al., 1995; Vidmar, 2002). The proposition that a victim’s shared posttransgression identity with the offender (and the implied concern for that offender) is critical for predicting restorative versus retributive justice preferences is also provocative because it contrasts with findings from the third-party perspective defining restorative justice as a particularly victim-oriented intervention (see Gromet & Darley, 2009a, 2009b).

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In sum, concern over shared values may predict stronger retributive and stronger restorative responses. Therefore, to predict restorative intervention preferences, it is necessary to consider both the pretransgression shared identity with the offender and the implied threats to shared values, as well as the posttransgression shared identity with the offender and the implied desire to mend those relational bonds. Proposition 3. When the victim shares a posttransgression identity with the offender, the desire to restore shared values predicts a preference for a restorative response; in contrast, when the victim does not share a posttransgression identity with the offender, the desire to restore shared values predicts a preference for a retributive response (see Fig. 1, moderation path c). As a result, in order to accurately understand when restorative justice will be preferred to retributive justice, it is essential to consider the dynamic nature of identity.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF SHARED IDENTITY Social identities are not static but, limited by the social realities of the situation, may shift to serve the goals and/or psychological needs of the perceiver (Turner et al., 1987). When people feel that their social identity is under threat, they may disengage from the group to seek affiliation needs and a positive social identity elsewhere (e.g., Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, & McKimmie, 2005; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), or they may attempt to protect the group and their social identity from those threats (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984). The remainder of this chapter will discuss important considerations for understanding how a victim’s desire to maintain a positive social identity affects his/her posttransgression shared identity with the offender, and with it the victim’s preference for restorative over retributive justice. Central to understanding the relationship between shared identity and perceptions of injustice is an acknowledgement that the social identity threats following from shared value violations may not only be affected by a sense of shared identity with the offender, but may also affect how that shared identity might change after the transgression (cf., Platow, Grace,


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Wilson, Burton, & Wilson, 2008). If unmotivated to maintain a shared identity with the offender, victims of injustice may protect their social self by disassociating or psychologically distancing themselves from the offender (Kerr et al., 1995; Marques, 1990) in order to maintain a positive sense of self (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). For example, if a friend violates an agreed-upon level of interpersonal respect by insulting you, you may be particularly concerned with what that offense says about your relationship, and thus you may seek a renewed value agreement with that friend (as discussed earlier). Alternatively, however, you may protect your social self by simply severing that relationship – your friend’s disrespect is less threatening if you no longer define the self through that interpersonal relationship. So, not only does a victim’s perceived shared identity with the offender affect perceptions of injustice (as discussed in Proposition 1), but the injustice may also affect a victim’s perceptions of shared identity with the offender. This disassociation process is well documented at the intragroup level. Groups (or their representatives and leaders) may attempt to reduce their associations with an offender in response to norm deviations. By marginalizing the offender (through punishment or other exclusionary processes), the group communicates that the offender and his or her violations are not representative of the collective and its values (Duff, 2001; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Vidmar, 2002), thus providing the group with a ‘‘social account’’ (Bies, 1987; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). Similarly, from the victim’s perspective, the social identity of the group (manifest through shared values) may be maintained by psychologically recategorizing the offender as an out-group member or part of a deviant subgroup (see Marques & Paez, 1994). The victim, however, may also distance him/herself from the offender by disassociating with the group as a whole and seeking a positive social identity and affiliation needs elsewhere (Jetten et al., 2005; Ellemers et al., 1990; Wright et al., 1990), an effect that is consistent with research showing reduced group identification following an injustice perpetrated by even a single in-group member (Okimoto, 2009; Simon & Stu¨rmer, 2003, 2005). The psychological distancing and/or reclassification of the offender as marginal may reduce the desire to seek value reaffirmation with that offender as there is no longer a clear motive to maintain that relational bond. Such exclusion of the offender also negates the psychological need to see offender’s rehabilitation because the clarity of the in-group’s morals and values are maintained even if the offender no longer endorses those values himself. Such distancing may also further legitimize retribution as a valid response since the offender is no longer a group member capable or

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deserving of the opportunity for rehabilitation. Importantly, however, such offender disassociation is not a foregone conclusion; it is also necessary to understand the conditions under which these disassociating processes are likely to occur. Antecedents to Disassociation Value Clarity The nature of the transgression itself may influence the likelihood that the offender will be psychologically distanced. One relevant moderator may lie in the perceived clarity of the value that was violated. As extrapolated from a long tradition of conformity research (e.g., Allen, 1965; Asch, 1956; Levine, 1989; Schachter, 1951; Turner, 1991), the perceived consensus surrounding a violated value may affect the likelihood that a victim will attempt to psychologically distance him/herself from the offender. Specifically, a clear a priori in-group value consensus explicates the immorality of its violation and accentuates the deviant status of any offenders. Clearly agreed-upon values signal strong social (in-group) consensus and thus legitimize the marginalization or exclusion of the value-deviant offender. Thus, when an offense has violated a clear in-group value, victims may be particularly likely to disassociate the offender from the group. Interestingly, such value clarity also suggests that in-group value consensus (and thus a sense of justice) is not dependent on the offender’s value reendorsement, further legitimizing the reclassification of the offender as deviant and deserving of punishment. In contrast, if there is a perceived lack of value clarity, there may be uncertainty regarding whether or not the offender can indeed be labeled a deviant. Thus, in cases of a priori value uncertainty, victims may be less likely to simply disassociate from the offender but rather seek third-party validation and/or offender value reendorsement. Consistent with these ideas, Wenzel and Thielmann (2006) found that the desire for value restoration was more likely to predict punitive/exclusionary interventions following instances of welfare fraud when the values violated by the offense were perceived to be clear and consensual. Proposition 4. Posttransgression shared identity with the offender may decrease following an injustice (i.e., increased distancing/disassociation), particularly when values are clearly defined (i.e., widely consensual and relatively secure) in the relevant group. Interestingly, following from Proposition 3, this reasoning suggests that clear value violations increase the importance of the value-restoring


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response, but at the same time decrease identification with the offender and reduce the likelihood that the response will be restorative. This may underlie the finding that minor transgressions elicit more restorative motives and severe transgressions elicit more retributive motives (Gromet & Darley, 2006, 2009a). Severe transgressions are by definition more likely to be violations of clearly held, central group values, and thus maintaining value consensus is more vital. However, at the same time, severe transgressions are also likely to disqualify the offender as an in-group member and lead to his/her rejection. Thus, psychologically distancing the offender may assist both in the maintenance of group values toward other group members as well as legitimizing the exclusion of and retribution against the offender. Pretransgression Shared Identity As noted previously, a shared pretransgression identity may increase the extent to which the offense is construed as a value threat (Proposition 1). Thus, the existence of a strong pretransgression identity should increase the desire for distancing because of the enhanced motivation to reaffirm group values. However, a shared pretransgression identity may also prevent distancing because a pretransgression identity decreases a victim’s subsequent willingness to distance that offender (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hazan & Shaver, 1994). In other words, a shared pretransgression identity may elicit potentially conflicting pressures both to distance the offender and to maintain those relational bonds. For example, we would expect a coworker’s show of disrespect to elicit a stronger value threat than a stranger’s show of disrespect, particularly if the victim strongly identifies with the organization in which the transgression occurred. However, though the identity threat may be stronger, so is the motivation to maintain that relationship. A shared identity may imply a desire to maintain inclusion of the offending coworker because those interpersonal bonds help to define the victim’s social self, out of sympathy for the offender, or for instrumental reasons (e.g., outcome interdependence, future interactions, group-level costs of conflict). Thus, we suggest that a victim’s perceived pretransgression shared identity with the offender increases the desire to maintain a posttransgression shared identity with the offender, thus reducing distancing/disassociation. And following from Proposition 3, this also suggests that pretransgression shared identity may also influence restorative justice preferences. Proposition 5. A victim’s perceived pretransgression shared identity with the offender increases the desire to maintain a posttransgression shared

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identity with the offender, reducing distancing/disassociation (see Fig. 1, moderation path b). Notably, however, if the offender’s violation is such that it negates the victim’s desire for (or the offender’s deservingness of) continued inclusion, the positive effect of a shared pretransgression identity on the preference for restorative justice is likely to evaporate. Value clarity (see Proposition 4), for example, may moderate the effect of pretransgression identity such that in-group violations elicit a stronger restorative preference than out-group members (as argued above), unless the transgression violated a clear and consensual group value. An in-group member’s violation of clearly held values may even increase the likelihood of distancing, reversing the effect of Proposition 5, as the violation more severely threatens the group’s identity (Proposition 1). This may underlie the finding that in-group members receive weaker penalties than out-group members when their guilt is under question, but harsher penalties when their guilt is clear (van Prooijen, 2006). This interaction prediction may similarly explain the finding that in-group members receive weaker penalties than out-group members when they are first time offenders, but receive harsher penalties when they are repeat offenders (Gollwitzer & Keller, 2010). Interpersonal Versus Intragroup Contexts Interestingly, the degree of conflict between the motive to distance the offender and the motive to maintain interpersonal bonds partly depends on the interpersonal versus intragroup context. In interpersonal contexts, these two pressures may operate in opposition to one another because the violation of shared relational values must be restored through consensus with the offender. When the victim’s and offender’s dyadic interpersonal bond is the salient shared identity (i.e., interpersonal contexts), consensus about identity-defining values cannot be restored without the offender. In contrast, when a victim’s salient shared identity with the offender is based on their membership in a common group (i.e., in intragroup contexts), the two motivations are not necessarily incompatible. Distancing the self from the offender does not necessitate the abandonment of the victim’s identification with the group or the values on which that group identity is based. The victim can continue to reap the benefits of in-group membership while also addressing concerns over group value consensus through the psychological exclusion of the offender from the group. Thus, a victim’s willingness to distance should also be affected by the categorical level at which he/she currently identifies – the relative salience or importance of the


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relationship-level identity (interpersonal context) or the group-level identity (intragroup context): Proposition 6. Posttransgression shared identity with the offender may decrease following an injustice (i.e., increased distancing/disassociation), particularly when the transgression is construed as violating group-level values (rather than relationship-level values). This discussion implies that the interpersonal versus intragroup context can influence preferences for retribution versus restoration. In intragroup contexts, because victims face less of a dilemma between the continuity of their social identity and the restoration of a value consensus, disassociation from the offender should be more likely and posttransgression shared identity weaker, and hence retributive responses should be more strongly preferred. In contrast, because victims of interpersonal transgressions are less willing to disassociate from the offender, posttransgression shared identity remains high, promoting a preference for restorative responses. There may be some threshold where the desire to distance the immoral act trumps the desire to maintain relational bonds, but the point at which this occurs (and the key moderating conditions) remains an open question. Such a distinction between interpersonal and intragroup contexts may also have implications for understanding differences between victim and observer perspectives. Third-party observers (e.g., jurors, judges, and supervisors) may, in some cases, be more willing to rely on retributive/ exclusionary responses to injustice than the victims of injustice themselves because victims may (in some cases) have stronger desires to maintain offender inclusion (cf. Green, Burnette, & Davis, 2008; van Prooijen, 2010). Perhaps observers are more likely to react to severe value violations through distancing because they conceptualize the transgression as violating group-level values, values that can be reinforced through offender exclusion. Victims, on the other hand, are more likely to conceptualize the transgression as violating relationship-level values that cannot be properly revalidated in absence of the offender’s reendorsement, while also struggling with their reticence to write-off the offender. Take, for example, a case of domestic violence; the victim may be concerned with the transgression because of what it means for the relationship with her partner, whereas observers may be concerned with the transgression because of what it means for censoring domestic violence and gender relations more generally. This potential difference is important given that most of the research investigating responses to justice (retributive and restorative) has focused primarily on third-party perceptions (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002;

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De Castella et al., in press; Gromet & Darley, 2006; Rucker et al., 2004; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; van Prooijen, 2006, 2010).

Failure to Disassociate or Otherwise Restore a Perceived Value Consensus It is worth noting that there may be cases in which the victim is unable to psychologically reconcile a perceived value violation or achieve a renewed consensus with the offender. Further, it is not always an option to sever the victim–offender relationship or marginalize the offender to the periphery of the group, either because of ideological beliefs, the nature of the victim– offender relationship, or more normative constraints of the situation. For example, in family or marital relationships, domestic partners are often very strongly motivated to maintain positive relationships, even in the face of severe interpersonal transgressions such as infidelity or abuse. In these situations, transgressions are indeed likely to elicit concern over the shared values violated by the offense, but the strong relational motivations prevent identity maintenance through disassociation or retribution. It is under these conditions that restorative justice conferencing may show the most promise, addressing the victim’s psychological need for shared value reaffirmation without abandonment of all concern for the offender. Importantly, however, if such relational constraints prevent the psychological concerns of such victims from being addressed, those victims may suffer further psychological consequences (Vidmar, 2001, 2002). Importantly, such relational constraints are widespread in organizational settings. Workplace disrespect is one of the most widely cited types of everyday transgressions (Bies & Moag, 1986). These commonplace transgressions are not so severe as to demand termination, but are nonetheless associated with a number of long-term negative outcomes that come as a consequence of noncooperative intraorganizational relationships (e.g., Dailey & Kirk, 1992; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Jones & Skarlicki, 2003; Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Vidmar, 2002). Ignoring the effects of minor conflicts is not in the best interest of any group, as continued conflicts or grudges can have very damaging effects on group functioning (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002). Moreover, there is often a strong individual motivation among coworkers to maintain civility, but the inevitability of future interactions limits a victim’s ability to simply disassociate him/herself from the offending coworker or supervisor.


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In more abstract terms, there are various constraints of the situation (e.g., ongoing relationships or low power), as well as individual factors (e.g., high group identification or high interdependent self-construal), which limit a victim’s willingness to disassociate from the offender and/or to respond retributively. As a result, social identity continues to be threatened. This continued identity threat may elicit strong preferences for restorative interventions, as implied by our earlier discussion. However, it is important to note that such situations may also elicit cognitive reinterpretations of the offense. A wealth of research has shown that when faced with an irreconcilable injustice, victims and observers alike often cognitively distort their situational interpretations to see the situation as just (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Festinger, 1957; Folger, 1986; Hafer & Be´gue, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Major, 1994; Montada & Lerner, 1998; Olson & Hafer, 2001). Particularly from an administrative standpoint, however, relying on cognitive distortions to reconcile injustice is not optimal. Legitimization of injustice, while it may serve to maintain harmony and reduce conflict, also contributes to the stability and perpetuation of injustice (see Jost & Major, 2001). Thus, in order to effectively manage conflict and prevent both the escalation of conflict and the erosion of shared values through legitimization, actions must be taken to address a victim’s feelings of injustice. It thus becomes necessary to take a more active approach to the constructive renewal of shared value consensus following perceived injustice, perhaps by adopting a policy of restoratively oriented conflict management practices.

Dynamic Identity Model of Justice Restoration To summarize, we propose that a shared victim–offender identity may affect preferences for restorative justice through complex psychological processes aimed at maintaining a positive identity. This proposed theoretical approach can be summarized by focusing on the three points at which a shared identity affects restorative preferences. First, a pretransgression victim–offender identity makes shared value concerns salient after an offense, heightened value concerns that predict satisfaction with restorative approaches to justice (Wenzel et al., 2010). However, identity is dynamic, and victims may distance/disassociate themselves from the offender to protect their sense of self. Thus, violations of identity-defining values will also negatively impact posttransgression victim–offender identification, and we suggest that this posttransgression identity is particularly important for

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understanding preferences for restorative justice over retributive interventions as a means to restore value consensus. Specifically, when victims perceive a lack of shared identity with the offender, there is less motivation for inclusive approaches to justice and no imperative to find a renewed consensus through constructive resolution with that offender. In contrast, when victims have not disassociated themselves from the offender and still maintain a shared identity, victims will be more likely to prefer restorative justice interventions, conflict resolution practices that attempt to renew shared values through agreement with the offender. Importantly, however, this process may be further moderated by a shared pretransgression identity. Although pretransgression identity may heighten the likelihood of distancing by making shared value concerns salient, that pretransgression identity can also signal that the victim may be less willing to sacrifice that shared relationship and thus unlikely to psychologically distance the offender. In short, a perceived shared victim–offender identity can affect restorative justice preferences at three points in time: (a) by increasing shared value concerns, (b) by reducing the likelihood of distancing, and (c) by increasing the desire to seek renewed value consensus with versus without the offender (see Fig. 1, a, b, c subscripts correspond to these three points at which identity impacts restorative preferences). Given the dearth of empirical work in the restorative justice domain and in justice restoration more generally, much research is still needed to validate these predictions. Although research in the domains of justice restoration and social identity provide some substantiation of these proposed hypotheses, this discussion serves as an early theoretical attempt to integrate these literatures within the context of restorative justice. Moreover, although these processes are discussed within the restorative justice context, we do not suggest that they are necessarily confined to restorative conferencing practices – we believe that the theoretical processes proposed here reflect an attempted integration of more basic psychological reactions to injustice that are relevant to the understanding of other forms of justice restoration (e.g., apologies, punishment, revenge, shaming, forgiveness, etc.; see Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008) and should generalize across contexts. Although research and theory in justice and identity allow us to derive the propositions presented here, additional theorizing and future empirical work will also be needed to further explicate the specific processes. For example, though we suggest that a shared posttransgression victim–offender identity affects preferences for restorative justice over retributive justice, we are intentionally vague with regard to the specific motivations detailing why shared identity affects justice preferences in this way. Consistent with our


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model, we would argue that a perceived posttransgression shared identity means a commitment to that self-definition and hence a need to socially validate self-defining values through shared consensus. However, it might also be the case (and this is not completely unrelated) that a shared identity implies a sympathetic view of the other (i.e., in-group favoritism), perceived positive outcome interdependence, or expectations of future interaction. At this point, we also cannot rule out more consequentialist and utilitarian motives such as expectation of recidivism, likelihood of value agreement, or other situational constraints that come with a shared identity. Likewise, we have also intentionally left out discussions of ideological and cultural variables that will no doubt also play an important role in this process (see Okimoto et al., 2009b). Notwithstanding these unanswered questions, we believe this theoretical framework serves as a useful starting-point for future inquiry into justice restoration processes and a deeper understanding of restorative justice.

FOSTERING CONSTRUCTIVE JUSTICE RESTORATION If we accept the philosophical premise that teams, groups, organizations, and societies would be well served to utilize more widely restoratively oriented approaches to conflict management (an unresolved empirical question best served by field research), we come full circle back to our opening conundrum. How can we predict when (and why) restorative approaches to injustice might be preferred and deemed satisfactory? Our discussion suggests a number of testable hypotheses. First, central to addressing a victim’s needs following injustice is a better understanding of the psychological motivations underlying his or her desire for justice, beyond just deserts. Any given transgression can elicit multiple underlying motives. It is, therefore, important to acknowledge that different individual and contextual factors can influence how victims interpret an offense and its symbolic implications (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008), and whether they conceptualize justice as assertion against the offender versus consensus with the offender (Wenzel et al., 2008). As we have suggested, one of the key variables that may determine a victim’s specific concern over the values violated by the offense is the extent to which that victim perceives him/herself to share an identity with the offender. Importantly, however, this perceived self–other relationship may also affect whether or not a victim

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will seek to address this perceived value violation through restorative or retributive means. Furthermore, we have argued that identity is dynamic, changing over time partly as a function of the transgression itself. In considering how to restore justice, it is important to recognize that the victim may have already begun to address any perceived value discrepancy by psychologically distancing the offender, or by psychologically distancing the self from the group in which the offense has occurred. Such distancing processes may be dependent on both individual and situational factors (e.g., interdependence, a persistent shared identity, and centrality of the violated values), as well as constraints (e.g., continuing relationship with the offender). If the offender has been psychologically distanced, the victim may satisfactorily seek justice and further third-party value validation through retribution against the offender. In contrast, if the victim has disassociated from the group as a whole to protect his/her sense of self, it may be necessary to restore the victim’s faith in the group and its values in order to foster future identification with the group. Interestingly, a victim’s need to restore a perceived consensus over shared values may elicit conflicting pressures. The cognitive dissociation with the offender may be instrumental to deflecting social identity threats, but may also cultivate less willingness to seek restoration of that consensus with the offender. Thus, what may be necessary to motivate a more restorative approach to justice in the eyes of the victim is a reconstrual of the situation to focus on what the victim and offender share (i.e., foster a shared identity), and with it a desire for consensus surrounding common goals and values. Key to a victim’s endorsement of a restorative approach to justice is the (re-)categorization of the offender as being a part of the group, even if it means temporary discomfort with social identity threat. Proposition 7. Emphasizing a shared identity between the offender and the victim following the offense will motivate the victim to prefer restorative approaches to justice (i.e., reaffirmation of shared values through renewed consensus with the offender, rather than in spite of him). Notably, we suggest that fostering a shared identity posttransgression will motivate a desire for restoration. This point is important, as fostering a shared identity prior to a transgression may have mixed results. As our earlier suppositions state, pretransgression identity can increase the perceived value threat, which may (in some cases) result in stronger retributive desires, particularly if the offender is psychologically distanced.


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In both practice and in empirical investigation, this suggestion demands a clearer specification in the justice literature regarding how identity affects justice perceptions. At what point in the process does a shared identity affect justice/fairness reactions? Answering this question might also demand more specific (or better, dynamic) measures of identification that better capture changes in a respondent’s identity, as well as measures that can reflect the conflicting pressures elicited by such identity threats to (a) dissociate the self from the offender, and (b) actively seek a shared consensus with that offender. In the current restorative justice context, if we examine a victim’s feelings toward the group and toward the offender throughout the restorative process, we might expect to find initial dissatisfaction and withdrawal while the offender and victim struggle to find a common understanding. However, if a common understanding can be reached and the offender is able to revalidate for the victim the values violated by the offense, a psychological sense of justice may be achieved, and with it a renewed identification with the group and continued inclusion (i.e., reintegration) of the offender. This assertion also suggests a need to uncover what factors allow (or motivate) victims of injustice to tolerate social identity threat and seek its repair, rather than severing their bond with the offender or the embedded group. Likely candidates may include trust in the offender (Foddy et al., 2009), or perhaps trust that the group can weather the uncertainty elicited by the offense and will seek its resolution. At the individual level, victims may be more capable of withstanding temporary threats if their social identity is not entirely dependent on that one particular relationship or group, and if they are able to shift their source of social esteem and belongingness, at least temporarily until their justice concerns have been resolved (see Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Tesser, Martin, & Cornell, 1996). In contrast, the centrality of that shared identity to the self-concept may also motivate victims to survive threats and confront the offender and his/her value violation more constructively in an attempt to salvage that relational bond. These empirical questions further highlight the broader need for justice scholars to intensify their research efforts in this understudied domain. Notably, there is a considerable literature in intergroup dynamics that may serve as a useful source for understanding how to foster a shared victim–offender identity. For example, building off of Turner et al.’s (1987) analysis, the common in-group identity model proposed by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) outlines how intergroup interdependence and various contextual factors can alter an individual’s cognitive representations of in-group and out-group members toward sharing a common in-group

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identity. Although much of this research focuses on the reduction of prejudice in intergroup contexts, such approaches have shown some success in making relational concerns the primary determinant of people’s justice perceptions (e.g., Huo et al., 1996). Regarding the present discussion, this literature not only points to mechanisms to maintain or restore a shared identity between victim and offender, but it also alludes to the possibility that our analysis has implications for intergroup conflicts, situations where groups rather than individuals are the offenders and victims. Although a complete review and integration of this literature is beyond the scope of the current investigation, we note the obvious ties between the current framework and intergroup relations for future work.

CONCLUSION To summarize, this framework suggests the preference for and willingness to engage in restorative approaches to justice after a transgression is dependent on the degree to which a victim maintains or is able to reestablish a shared identity with the offender, not solely on whether the victim perceived a shared identity with the offender prior to the transgression. Notwithstanding the critical need for empirical work investigating restorative justice in-group settings, this perspective offers the potential promise for fostering constructive conflict resolution alternatives for the long-term benefit of injustice victims, offenders, and the groups in which they belong.

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APPENDIX List of Current Theoretical Hypotheses Proposition 1. Transgressions are interpreted by their victims as a threat to shared values and elicit concern over shared value consensus, particularly when the victim shares a salient identity with the offender prior to the transgression. Proposition 2. Restorative justice will be seen as a satisfactory response to a transgression, particularly when the victim shares a salient identity with the offender prior to the transgression. This effect is due to (i.e., mediated by) a heightened desire to restore shared values with the offender. Proposition 3. When the victim shares a posttransgression identity with the offender, the desire to restore shared values predicts a preference for a restorative response; in contrast, when the victim does not share a posttransgression identity with the offender, the desire to restore shared values predicts a preference for a retributive response. Proposition 4. Posttransgression shared identity with the offender may decrease following an injustice (i.e., increased distancing/disassociation), particularly when values are clearly defined (i.e., widely consensual and relatively secure) in the relevant group.

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Proposition 5. A victim’s perceived pretransgression shared identity with the offender increases the desire to maintain a posttransgression shared identity with the offender, reducing distancing/disassociation. Proposition 6. Posttransgression shared identity with the offender may decrease following an injustice (i.e., increased distancing/disassociation), particularly when the transgression is construed as violating group-level values (rather than relationship-level values). Proposition 7. Emphasizing a shared identity between the offender and the victim following the offense will motivate the victim to prefer restorative approaches to justice (i.e., reaffirmation of shared values through renewed consensus with the offender, rather than in spite of him).

PART III JUSTICE CLIMATE

CHAPTER 9 FROM JUSTICE EVENTS TO JUSTICE CLIMATE: A MULTI-LEVEL TEMPORAL MODEL OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND JUDGMENT$ Deborah E. Rupp and E. Layne Paddock ABSTRACT Purpose – We outline a theoretical model of the emergence of justice climate in groups, teams, and organizations, and in doing so integrate multiple justice perspectives (e.g., affective events, fairness heuristic, deonance, justice integration, multifoci justice, overall justice). Approach – In this theoretical paper, we propose that justice climate is spawned at the level of the event; individuals experience discrete events and then use their emotional reactions related to these events as information in forming fairness judgments. Cognitive processes explicated in justice integration theory, fairness heuristic theory, and fairness theory also play a role. Over time, these judgments about various perpetrators – which may include the evaluation of outcomes, procedures, information, $

The authors contributed equally to this chapter.


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and interpersonal treatment – are aggregated to form individual-level, stable judgments regarding the fairness of exchange partners with whom employees interact (e.g., supervisors, coworkers, and customers). Through socialization and social-information processing, and influenced by organizational structure and social networks, these individual multifoci justice perceptions merge to form multifoci justice climate, which over time lead to the formation of shared cognitions of overall justice climate. Value – The chapter proposes a temporal model of how discrete events at the individual level merge to form individuals’ multifoci justice perceptions, shared multifoci justice climate, and ultimately overall justice climate. The chapter offers multiple propositions and concludes with recommendations for empirically testing the model.

The organizational justice literature is currently in a paradoxical state. On the one hand, considerable attention has been placed on specifying the discrete perceptions made by employees regarding fair and unfair treatment at work. In this sense, we have ‘‘sliced the pie’’ every way possible and shown that workers judge outcomes, processes, information, and interpersonal treatment, as well as entities such as supervisors, subordinates, coworkers, and customers in terms of fairness (Colquitt, 2001; Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao, 2007a). On the other hand, there is a parallel movement in the literature that is advocating for a more holistic approach to the study of justice (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009, 2007; Rupp & Aquino, 2009). This research argues that although employees can make distinct judgments about the outcomes, procedures, and interpersonal treatment coming from supervisors, coworker, customers, and the like, it may not be these specific judgments that are at the phenomenological heart of employees’ perceptions of workplace fairness, and there may be variance left unaccounted for by taking such a fine-grained approach. This approach explores employees’ overall justice judgments, which require a perceptual summary of work experiences. Furthermore, we also see a divergence in the literature as to the level of analysis at which justice phenomena reside. Some research measures justice perceptions at the level of the event (e.g., the extent to which one’s supervisor treats one with respect on a daily level, Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006), considering employees’ immediate reactions to workplace encounters. Other research asks employees to aggregate their judgments across situations, asking employees for more generalized justice facet perceptions (e.g., general perceptions of outcomes and processes, Colquitt, 2001). Still other research

The Social Aggregation of Justice Information Over Time

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has taken a ‘‘higher-level’’ perspective, arguing that justice is a group-level phenomenon (Mossholder, Bennett, & Martin, 1998; Nauman & Bennett, 2000). This research has proposed that both organizational contexts and social information processing lead to shared perceptions of justice within workgroups, or justice climate. Within this work, we see similar debates about dimensionality similar to those mentioned earlier, which have been regarding individual-level perceptions (Liao & Rupp, 2005). From the outside, one might argue that consensus is lacking as to what justice is, the nature of its true dimensionality and the level of analysis at which justice effects are exerted. In other words, where is the crux of ‘‘the justice effect’’ and how should we be studying it more completely to understand how to manage groups and teams in such a way that both productivity and psychological well-being are maximized? In this chapter, we seek to address this question. Certainly, we are not the first to delineate and integrate divergent perspectives of organizational justice. For example, both the system-agent and the event-social entities models have sought to differentiate aggregate and source-specific fairness perceptions (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001a).1. In this chapter, we do not simply review these literatures, nor do we directly argue how varying perspectives might be integrated. Instead, our goal is to temporally align these literatures to propose a broader model of justice emergence. We show that when time is considered in conjunction with these discriminant perspectives, the various models fall into place within a dynamic system of justice climate formation. Our theoretical model is depicted in Fig. 1. In it, we explain the temporal evolution of justice perceptions, beginning within persons, moving to between persons, and ending at the level of collective perceptions among persons. To do so, we build on prior research related to each of these stages. Thinking of our model as a dynamic series of cross sections, we know from past research that interesting effects occur at each stage. The contribution we seek to make here is the weaving together of these cross-sections across time to explain the unfolding of overall justice climate. Specifically, we, as have others (Rupp & Spencer, 2006; Judge et al., 2006), propose that justice is spawned at the level of the individual experiencing discrete events. It is at this point that we propose information about outcomes, procedures, and interactions is most salient. We then purport this event-level distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice information is encoded according to the party held accountable for the fair or unfair act, which is then focused upon to form source- or foci-based judgments (which represent an aggregate of the

Fig. 1. The Temporal Process by which Individuals’ Event Experiences Lead to Overall Justice Climate. Notes: Time runs in the direction of the arrows. Elements above the dotted line relate to the individual level, whereas elements below the dotted line relate to the group level.

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categorized event information over time). An important element of our model, which has not been discussed directly in the literature, is the explicit recognition that such a process is ongoing within each and every member of a work group. Thus, an overlaying, quasi-simultaneous process that must be considered in parallel to this involves how group members influence each others’ perceptions, and how the process impacts collective or shared perceptions of justice within a work group (i.e., justice climate). We posit that these parallel processes lead to the formation of multifoci justice climates (i.e., group-level perceptions of the fairness of various parties with whom the group interacts), which over time lead to the emergence of an overall justice climate. Once founded, we propose that overall justice climate exerts a strong force on the culture of workgroups and is stable, longlasting, and relatively impervious to change. In the sections that follow, we review literature relevant to each of these steps in the process. Whereas Fig. 1 lays out our overall model, Fig. 2 illustrates more specifically how information at different levels of analysis is aggregated over time. We refer to these figures as we work through our theoretical reasoning and review pertinent empirical research.

THE UNFOLDING OF OVERALL JUSTICE CLIMATE Daily Work Events and Individual Justice A body of research exists within the justice literature that focuses on multiple types of high-magnitude, low-frequency workplace events. To date, this work focuses on common HR practices as events. For example, studies have asked employees about the fairness of selection processes (Gilliland, 1994), performance evaluations (Greenberg, 1986), and layoff procedures (Brockner, Grover, & Blonder, 1988). Whereas this research helps us understand such events, it does not provide adequate information about the daily ‘‘encounters’’ that comprise the starting point of our model. Whereas a judgment regarding the fairness of a selection process is more specific than a general judgment of workplace policies overall, this does not directly link to a specific commonplace incident where the employee was directly interacting with a party, and potentially, experiencing an event that is justicerelated (whether just or unjust). In fact, only a handful of justice studies have drilled down to the level of a true fairness-related event (e.g., Liebrand, Messick, & Wolters, 1986; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Mikula, 1986).

Fig. 2.

The Social Aggregation of Justice Information Over Time. Notes: Ellipses indicate additional categories not listed in the current model. Dotted lines are events likely less related to subsequent justice perceptions.


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For instance, Mikula (1986) asked 57 psychology students to recall and write about a justice event. Qualitative analysis indicated that the content of the events involved all aspects of the students’ lives (e.g., school and home) and were temporally varied, with some students recalling relatively recent injustices (23% of events recalled) and other students reporting injustices that were more than a year old (35% of events). Two explanations for this temporal variation are possible: injustices occur relatively infrequently, or, when asked to recall only one injustice, participants worked to remember an injustice larger in magnitude. Whereas the magnitude of these events is unclear, subsequent work by Messick and colleagues, which shows individuals experience many fair and unfair incidents, supports the latter explanation (Liebrand et al., 1986; Messick et al., 1985). Other researchers have conducted experience sampling (daily diary) studies focused on employees’ daily experiences, providing evidence for the impact of justice perceptions at the daily level. For instance, using an interval contingent design, Paddock et al. (2009) showed that many types of daily events relate to justice facets. Using a similar design, Judge et al. (2006) investigated employees’ daily perceptions of interpersonal justice and revealed that state interpersonal justice relates negatively to state hostility and positively to state job satisfaction. Together, experience sampling studies suggest that, as we implied earlier, there is evidence for justicerelated psychological processing and reactivity at the level of the event and within persons. Fig. 2 provides an illustrative example. On the left-hand side of the figure, we represent the daily events individuals experience. Some events that occur within the working day of an individual may easily be classified as justicerelated encounters (e.g., being denied a deserved job assignment), whereas others may not contain such clear fairness-related experiences (e.g., going to lunch with one’s coworker). Congruent with previous research (Rupp, 2008), we argue that to varying extents, all daily events inform individuals’ general sense of fairness (we will return to this issue later in text). However, we acknowledge (consistent with the Messick et al., 1985, findings) that those events that are more easily recognized as fairness-related likely are weighted more heavily in individuals’ general sense of fairness. In the model we also highlight that while events may overlap among individuals, each individual experiences his or her own unique set of events. Focusing only on one individual in the model, person A, we see a sample of events represented: a dysfunctional performance appraisal session with her boss, being denied a deserved job assignment by her boss, being denied a health claim by the organization, going to lunch with a coworker, and

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learning that a coworker was gossiping about her. Notice that the frequency of justice-related encounters with a specific party varies across people, with person A experiencing two boss-related events and only one organizationally related event. We anticipate that, over time, the number of justicerelated encounters with a specific party will relate to the variance in individuals’ justice perceptions of that party over days, such that an increase in encounters leads to decreased variance in an individual’s across-days justice perception of that party. We propose that the process person A follows in forming justice perceptions – from events to source-specific justice judgments – is influenced by both the event-related affect she experiences and her cognitive modeling of the event. To substantiate this proposition, we draw on existing theory as a foundation for these affective and cognitive pathways. The Role of Affect in the Encoding of Events Affective reactions to discrete events help individuals to encode the justicerelated events they encounter at work. Here we draw on two theories to explain this process: affective events theory (AET) (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) and the deontic model of justice (Folger, 1998, 2001). Affective Events Theory: There are multiple theoretical perspectives that help articulate the role of emotion in justice perception formation. One such model is AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). AET suggests that specific work events spur emotional reactions, which, in turn, impact employees’ discrete job attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction) and behaviors (e.g., performance). As Rupp and Spencer (2006) and Spencer and Rupp (2009) note, one particular class of events, which seems to have a particularly poignant reactionary mechanism associated with them, are justice-related events. AET suggests that positive and negative events produce positive and negative emotional reactions, respectively. While lacking the temporal element required to test AET, work by Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998) does link events specifically with emotion and justice; 2,921 respondents from 37 different countries recalled experiences where they felt specific emotions and also rated the justice of the experiences. Their data show that experiences related to sadness, guilt and anger also related to injustice. In fact, research has long acknowledged discrete emotional states, specifically the emotions of anger and guilt (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961), which seem rooted to the experience of justice-related events. However, additional research is needed that explicitly integrates the experience of events, resulting affect, and subsequent cognitive appraisal. Such research might follow the example set by Krehbiel and Cropanzano’s


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(2000) discussion of primary appraisal (resulting in general affect) and secondary appraisal (resulting in specific emotions) and include more recent work distinguishing heuristic and systematic processing (e.g., Tiedens & Linton, 2001; van den Bos, 2009). For AET this integration would highlight how discrete events relate to emotions, which in turn relate to justice perceptions. The Deontic Model: A second theoretical perspective relevant here is the deontic model (Folger, 1998, 2001). A component of Folger’s fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001 – described later), this model speaks specifically about why individuals have quick, often automatic emotional reactions to fairness-related events. Taken from the Greek root deon, meaning ‘‘ought,’’ the deontic perspective integrates Kantian ethics and evolutionary psychology. Essentially, it argues that we have an evolutionarily based sense of duty, obligation, and moral virtue, which aids in the regulation of social order. As such, humans have categorical imperatives, or a priori universal ethical principles of an innate and/or selfless nature (Kant, 1999; Wood, 1999). This adaptation manifests itself through the elicitation of negative emotion (termed ‘‘moral outrage’’ but most closely aligned with anger) when an unfair act is witnessed. An important element of the model, which we will return to later, is that deonance is elicited not only during events in which the perceiver is being treated unfairly but also during events when the perceiver is an unaffected third party witnessing the mistreatment of another. Together, deonance regulates behavior and reaffirms norms of interpersonal conduct by motivating sanctions for inappropriate behavior. The empirical evidence to date is supportive of these notions (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Rupp & Bell, 2010; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). In sum, whereas AET shows that events can catalyze emotional responses, the deontic model proposes that such responses reflect an evolved system of ethics that aid in regulating interpersonal behavior. In our model, we propose that the emotional responses elicited as individuals experience events are critical to the process by which events are encoded as justicerelated. Furthermore, we propose that the strength of these emotional reactions is also used in early classification of events into memory. These emotional experiences are then used as information in subsequent perception formation processes. It might also be the case that different types of justice-related events (e.g., distributive, procedural, and interactional) elicit stronger emotional responses than others. For example, researchers such as Umphress, Labianca, Brass, Kass, and Scholten (2003), Leung, Chiu, and Au (1993),

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and Tyler (1994) have suggested that interactional events are especially affect-inducing, as are procedural events, with distributive justice inducing relatively less emotional response. Similarly, when integrating information about an unfair event experienced by a coworker, individuals experience greater affect when they have experienced unfairness themselves and when the severity the coworker experiences is high (Kray & Lind, 2002). We propose that the stronger an event’s affect inducement, the higher the likelihood that the event will be incorporated into subsequent justice-related cognitive processing. Cognitive Processes in Perception Formation With the sense-making assistance of primary emotion information, this event-level justice information is encoded into memory, and then used during the formation of more stable justice perceptions. At this point, the process of justice perception formation becomes more cognitive and less affective in nature, and we have a number of theoretical frameworks to draw from in laying out this process. Particularly relevant are justice integration theory (Gilliland & Paddock, 2005), fairness heuristic theory (FHT) (Lind, 1995; van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997a; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997b), and fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Justice Integration Theory: Justice integration theory (Gilliland & Paddock, 2005) accounts for how information about justice-related events is cognitively integrated. Specifically, it suggests that individuals either recognize an event because it contains nearly identical context or event attributes to a previous situation or they identify an event because it contains similarities to previous experiences. Justice integration theory informs our sequential (dynamic) model of justice climate emergence in two ways. First, it speaks to how event-related information informs justice perceptions of specific parties. To the extent that source-related events are recognized rather than identified as being related, source-specific justice perceptions should be less variable. For instance, as modeled in Fig. 2, person A’s boss holds a dysfunctional performance review session; the boss in this event is a clear source. In contrast, person A’s colleague relays information that another colleague is gossiping; the extent to which this event is attributed to the gossiping colleague is not as clear. Additionally, justice integration theory highlights the importance of situational and personal characteristics in the formation of fairness judgments, a point we will return to later. Finally and very important to our model is that justice integration theory argues that justice perceptions are not static one-shot


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judgments. Rather, past fairness-related information is used to judge new situations that are encountered and in the formation of subsequent judgments. This dynamic use of information is also discussed in and supported by research on FHT, which we review next. Fairness Heuristic Theory: FHT borrows from the judgment and decisionmaking literature, using the concept of heuristics to explain justice perception formation. A central premise of FHT is that employees face a fundamental social dilemma in the workplace in that they rarely have access to enough information to know with confidence if they can trust those with authority over them (Lind, 2001). Thus, individuals use their perceptions of fairness as a heuristic for whether or not they can trust such parties. FHT is particularly relevant to our sequential (dynamic) model of justice climate emergence in that the theory directly speaks to how different information is used at different times to form justice judgments (van den Bos et al., 1997b). For example, FHT argues that when individuals lack information about whether they can trust another not to exploit or exclude them from social relationships, information regarding procedures is especially relevant to the formation of justice perceptions (cf. Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). Furthermore, information that has been encoded that is of a procedural nature is especially relevant to developing fairness perceptions about parties who have authority over the individual. Finally, whatever the nature of events occurring earlier in time, they are likely to have had a strong impact on subsequent judgments (van den Bos et al., 1997b). FHT, then, helps to explain what specific events will contribute to what specific fairness-related perceptions, as well as how past lower-level perceptions influence later higher-level (eventually shared) perceptions. As shown in Fig. 2, we propose that once an event is encoded as justice-related (thanks to the role of emotion), a cognitive process ensues by which individuals begin to cognitively sort and classify this information. FHT provides us with part of this picture. For example, it suggests that events involving procedural elements will often be used as evidence to make judgments about authority members.2 We see this depicted in Fig. 1 as person A experiences a dysfunctional performance appraisal with her boss and as person C is excluded from a conference call on which he planned to express his opinion about a decision. Had we had person C’s complete list of events, we might see that this is not the first time that his boss has failed to provide him voice. Regardless of whether person C feels like the second event is similar enough to the first to recognize it as the same things he’s already experienced (i.e., his manager denying voice) or whether he instead merely identifies similarities (e.g., both involve his not getting to speak and

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his boss), it is likely that information from the earlier event will further inform his subsequent boss-focused justice perceptions. Fairness Theory: Folger and Cropanzano’s (2001) fairness theory extended past theoretical work (referent cognitions theory, Folger, 1986a, 1986b, 1987), relying on the concept of counterfactual thinking. Fairness theory describes how, following an automatic deontic/emotional response to an unfavorable event, counterfactual reasoning is triggered. This process points to how different types of information are combined to form sourcebased justice judgments. According to fairness theory, following an experience of deonance, individuals seek answers to three ‘‘counterfactual’’ questions: Would the victim have been better off given a different outcome, procedure, and so on, could the decision maker have acted differently, and should the decision maker have acted differently? A key component of fairness theory is the notion of accountability. This theory states very clearly that injustice requires a perpetrator. That is, individuals go through a cognitive process whereby they assess if harm has been done to some party (the self or another), if someone is responsible for this harm, and if the responsible party had the ability to act in an alternative way that would have avoided the harm. Finally, this party’s actions are compared to moral/ethical standards of behavior. Thus, what takes place, and consistent with our model (Fig. 2), is that fairness-related events occur and trigger an emotional reaction, which then leads to more controlled cognitive processing, concluding with an attribution of accountability toward the party felt responsible for the unfair act (Fig. 2). As we mentioned in the introduction, each cross-section of our model yields important reactions. Consistent with this, the empirical research to date supporting fairness theory is focused on individuals’ reactions at this stage of their perceptual reasoning. This research has shown that individuals are motivated to punish transgressors deemed to be unfair and will even sacrifice their own resources if it is necessary to do so (Kahneman et al., 1986; Rupp & Bell, 2010; Spencer & Rupp, 2009; Turillo et al., 2002). Fairness theory is critical to our model because it implicitly proposes a process by which perceptions move from stored events about outcomes, procedures, information, and interpersonal treatment, involving various parties with whom the perceiver interacts, to more salient judgments, representing aggregates of events, about specific parties who have been judged accountable for unfair behaviors. This moves us forward one more stage in our model, to the consideration of multifoci justice judgments.


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Multifoci Justice Perceptions As is illustrated in the figures, we purport that individuals store memories about justice-related events according to the party held accountable for unfair situations. Over time, we predict that this information is then aggregated to form more stable perceptions of source-specific fairness. The justice literature has referred to these sorts of judgments as multifoci justice perceptions (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001b; Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner, 2007; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). The multifoci approach has its foundation in social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). Social exchange research has shown that employees form exchange relationships with multiple parties. These relationships can be of an economic nature, involving the quid pro quo exchange of tangible resources, or social in nature, based on trust, and involving the exchange of socio-emotional resources. Work in this area indicates that social exchange relationships, as compared to economic exchange relationships, are relatively stronger predictors of important workplace outcomes such as job attitudes and organizational citizenship behavior (Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 2006). Furthermore, research shows that justice perceptions are a robust predictor of social exchange (Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). It is at this point that this literature enters the ongoing dialog regarding the dimensionality of justice. That is, researchers studying multifoci justice argue that phenomenologically, stable justice perceptions are less about outcomes, procedures, and interpersonal treatment (although this serves as important information earlier in the perception formation process, as we have depicted in our model), and more about the parties with whom employees must interact (Rupp et al., 2007a; Rupp & Aquino, 2009). Consequently, the multifoci perspective posits that employees form justice perceptions about exchange partners (e.g., supervisors, coworkers, customers, subordinates, even the organizational whole as a personified exchange partner), and these source-specific justice perceptions impact the level of social exchange between the perceiver and the party being judged in terms of fairness. Consequently, research has found that subsequent attitudes and behaviors are then targeted at these parties (Malatesta & Byrne, 1997; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). Lavelle et al. (2007) have referred to this process as the target similarity effect. As mentioned earlier, we are less focused on the relational, attitudinal, and behavioral outcomes of multifoci justice judgments in this chapter and more focused on how prior information is encoded and combined to form

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these perceptions, as well as how these perceptions influence the formation of multifoci justice climates. We propose that justice-related events (which involve outcomes, procedures, or interpersonal treatment) trigger an emotional (partially deontic) reaction, which launches a cognitive process by which parties are held accountable for unfair acts. This information is encoded into memory according to party, such that over time, stable, source-specific perceptions of multifoci justice are formed. This is not unlike the integrative event-social entity model proposed by Cropanzano et al. (2001a) that suggests that event information about a particular entity is aggregated over time to form a more stable, cross-situational judgment about the entity.3 However, in our model we attach this single-individual process to the parallel processes that are on-going within the multiple individuals who work together. This requires us to discuss how these individual processes are overlaid and intertwined, leading over time to shared, multifoci justice climate.

Multifoci Justice Climate After originating at the individual level, justice perceptions form a shared, collective cognition, a process we represent in the figures as individuals’ source-specific fairness judgments are merged to create collective, sourcespecific fairness climates. A recent focus of justice researchers – justice climate – provides a foundation for this third stage, as it moves the study of justice perceptions from a nearly complete focus on individual work contexts to a focus on interactive structures. The emergence of justice climate at the group level is explained by integrating multiple theoretical frameworks, including Schneider’s attraction-selection-attrition model (ASA) and social information processing.4 Schneider’s (1987) ASA model (also see Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995) suggests that similar individuals are attracted to, selected by, and retained by groups. Individuals with similar sensitivity to fairness (e.g., equity sensitivity) to that held by existing employees should be attracted to a group more often than less similar individuals. Groups are more likely to select employees with desired attributes, and given that the group already includes members with similar attributes, in effect they are selecting individuals similar to existing members. Finally, individuals attracted to and selected by a group with which they have poor fit are likely to leave that group. Through the attraction, selection, and attraction of new individuals, over time groups become more homogeneous. This ASA process is


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expedited by the socialization process, in which those selected as new members learn typical organizational procedures and policies through interactions with existing members (e.g., Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1992). Having the same manager or work rules and procedures facilitates climate (Schneider & Reichers, 1983), including justice climates (Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007; Simons & Roberson, 2003). Both during and after socialization, individuals use social information processing to form judgments, and specifically multifoci judgments. Social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) argues that individuals in social contexts use information gathered from others to form judgments about organizational practices, values, and norms. Existing research shows that through information processing individuals’ discussions of experiences and experience-related fairness judgments can prime and magnify justice judgments (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). Employees have ample opportunity to gather information from others, as formal and informal organizational structures catalyze interaction between employees. This is especially the case within team-based structures (Cropanzano & Schminke, 2001), as well as structures allowing for less formal social networks to play a role in the facilitation of work (Balkundi & Harrison, 2006). Surrounded by similar others, individuals engage in social information processing, sharing much of the same information with similar others, forming individual justice judgments categorized according to foci, and collectively arriving at shared multifoci justice climates. Empirical evidence supports differentiating the collective justice climates that result from these processes from individuals’ source-specific justice judgments (Figs. 1 and 2). That is, congruent with the broader multilevel research (Chen, Mathieu, & Bliese, 2004; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), justice research has shown differential effects for justice constructs at varying levels of analysis (e.g., Liao & Rupp, 2005; Simons & Roberson, 2003). Specifically, empirical research shows that justice climate explains incremental variance in both individual-level outcomes (e.g., Mossholder et al., 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Yang, Mosholder, & Peng, 2007) and group-level outcomes (e.g., Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Simons & Roberson, 2003).5 Recent research also supports the multifoci climate approach illustrated in our model: Liao and Rupp (2005) investigated justice climates (procedural, interpersonal, and informational) formed about multiple foci (organization and supervisor), providing initial evidence that justice climates should be differentiated by source. Further investigation was carried out by Rupp, Bashshur, and Liao (2007b), who provided evidence that taking a multifoci approach to the measurement of justice climate that aggregates

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across justice facets (e.g., supervisory justice climate and coworker justice climate) represents a more robust operationalization of the construct than measuring justice by either facet (e.g., procedural justice climate and interpersonal justice climate), or a crossing of the two (e.g., supervisory procedural justice climate and coworker interactional justice climate). Thus, empirical evidence supports the assumptions made in our model (and more fully explicated in Fig. 2), where the justice facets are more relevant at the event level and social exchange partners more relevant as we move between individuals and up to the unit level of analysis.

Overall Justice Climate Our model ends as we move from foci-specific justice climates to overall justice climate. This reflects a recent avenue of individual-level research exploring holistic justice perceptions (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). Increasingly, researchers are acknowledging that the classic, facet-based taxonomy of organizational justice, consisting of distributive, procedural, and interactional fairness perceptions, may not capture the entirety of the justice domain. As pointed out by Rupp and Aquino (2009), although employees can assess the fairness of these facets when asked to in employee surveys, this does not mean that these facets are at the heart of the phenomenon. Rather it may very well be that justice judgments are more holistic in nature (Greenberg, 2001) and individual justice-related behaviors (Lind, 2001) and reactions (Shapiro, 2001) stem from a general experience of (in)justice. Furthermore, a focus on overall organizational justice better matches the level of specificity between justice as a construct and many outcomes of interest such as overall performance (Colquitt & Shaw, 2005). Ambrose and Schminke tested these assumptions empirically. That is they proposed a model building on past theoretical arguments (e.g., Colquitt & Shaw, 2005; Lind, 2001) that posed overall justice as a second-order construct. They showed that whereas the justice facets do serve as important antecedents to overall justice, significant variance in overall justice remains over and above that accounted for by the facets. This suggests that overall justice is something more. Furthermore, these authors show that the relationship between justice facet perceptions and outcomes is mediated by overall justice. As depicted in the figures, we extend this research by proposing overall justice not as an individual-level construct but as a group-level climate that


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is formed through the dynamic integration of lower-level perceptions. As is mentioned previously, we argue that the justice facets are more relevant at the event level, in influencing the formation of multifoci perceptions. Although the mechanisms by which multifoci climates lead to overall justice climate may involve the same social processes that lead to shared perceptions of multifoci justice (multifoci justice climates), a critical component to this process is the passage of time. As is shown in Fig. 1, time is required for the unfolding of all the stages of our model. If adequate time has allowed for events to be experienced, and for both individual and collective information processing to occur, then we propose that overall justice climate will serve as the most proximal antecedent of individual and organizational outcomes. The only study of which we are aware that includes a measure of overall justice climate is presented by Kwon, Rupp, and Young (2008). Using a sample of 413 groups across 48 organizations, these researchers provided evidence that overall justice climate mediated the relationship between highperformance work systems and both firm-level performance and individuallevel attitudes. However, virtually no research has been conducted on overall justice climate emergence – that is, how group-level perceptions aggregate to form higher-order climates. One exception is some preliminary data reported by Rupp et al. (2007b), who, using polynomial regression and response surface methodology, considered the interaction of multifoci justice climates on individual-level outcomes within groups. Results showed more negative reactions (e.g., lowered citizenship) to inconsistent justice climates (e.g., fair coworker climate yet unfair supervisor climate) than climates that were consistently unfair (e.g., unfair coworker and supervisor climate). This suggests that the aggregation of information during social information processing is complex and certainly should be further explored in future research. We made mention at the start of this chapter that we believe that overall justice climate exerts a strong force on the culture of work groups and is stable, long lasting, and relatively impervious to change. This proposition is as of yet untested, but poses what we feel is an important hypothesis for future research. We have added a final dependent variable to Fig. 1 that illustrates this proposition. Whereas our investigation has focused on the temporal process by which events experienced by group members over time converge to create overall justice climate, it will be necessary for future research to explore the proximal effects of this construct on multilevel outcomes pertinent to both employees and organizations.

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BOUNDARY CONDITIONS A final component of our model involves the contextual variables and individual differences that influence justice perception and climate formation. At the level of the individual, this can include personality characteristics and person–job fit. At the level of the group, this can involve group composition and focus. At all levels, top-down influences such as organizational structure and management practices can exert effects, as can the existence and structure of social networks. We briefly summarize these contextual influences in the following sections.

Individual Differences Multiple individual differences are theoretically linked to justice perceptions and reactions to (un)fair treatment. Colquitt, Scott, Judge, and Shaw (2006) drew on FHT, uncertainty management theory, and fairness theory to show how three individual differences – trust propensity (defined as a generalized expectation about the trustworthiness of others, Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), risk aversion (defined as differential attention to stimuli in potentially risky situations and the tendency to react to risk with anxiety and withdrawal, Cable & Judge, 1994), and trait morality (defined as high conscientiousness and agreeableness, Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992) – moderate the effect of individuals’ distributive, procedural, and interpersonal fairness perceptions on task performance and counterproductive work behavior. Their findings showed trust propensity, risk aversion, and trait morality to account for more variance in individuals’ behavioral responses than the five-factor model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990; a broader, widely accepted personality taxonomy) or equity sensitivity and sensitivity to befallen injustice (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987; Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995; very specific personality facets specific to justice). Thus, at the individual level, we include trust propensity, risk aversion, and trait morality as individual differences in our model. Another collection of individual difference constructs that have been shown to impact justice phenomena can be broadly classified as moral or ethical in nature. These include moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), moral awareness (Reynolds, 2008), behavioral integrity (Simons, 2002), and justice orientation (Rupp, Byrne, & Wadlington, 2003). As a group, these constructs refer roughly to the extent to which people are apt to notice the ethical implications of events and use their ethical frameworks to react


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to such events. Empirical research has shown that trait level morality-related constructs such as these are influential in influencing both perceptions of justice and reactions once injustice is perceived (e.g., Aquino, Skarlicki, Freeman, Nadisic, & Fortin, 2009; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Simons, 2002). Further research is needed that considers the role of these constructs in the justice perception formation processes, across levels and over time.

Group Characteristics Multiple antecedents of justice climate exist (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Scott, 2005). Often, these constructs are proposed to impact either the level of justice climate (i.e., the mean level of justice perceptions) or, alternatively, what is known as justice climate strength (i.e., within-group variability or the extent to which group members agree on the level of fairness). For instance, relying on Leventhal’s (1980) work, Colquitt et al. (2002) focus on three antecedents – collectivism, demographic diversity, and size – and their results show collectivism as an antecedent of level (higher justice climate among more collectivist teams), age diversity as an antecedent of strength (less climate strength within more diverse teams), and size as an antecedent of both climate level and strength (the larger the group, the lower the climate level and strength). Roberson (2006) applied social comparison research to postulate that group member interdependence would influence climate strength. It was theorized that the social interaction required of interdependent teams leads to the convergence of group member perceptions and the fostering of group identity. In a laboratory experiment, Roberson varied interdependence and both procedural and distributive justice across conditions and found a significant effect of interdependence on climate strength, which was further found to be mediated by group identification. This presents two additional contextual antecedents to consider when modeling the emergence of justice climate over time. Other contextual variables have been proposed as well. For example, Roberson and Colquitt (2005) propose a social network model of justice climate and make compelling arguments for the role of network structure and interaction patterns as an important ‘‘lever’’ by which individual-level justice perceptions may or may not converge. They specifically point to team structural equivalence and cohesion as important network characteristics to consider. Future research might attempt to integrate this network approach with the experience sampling approaches described later to test, extend, and integrate these models.

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Organizational Structure Organizational environment helps to shape employees’ justice perceptions (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997), and a series of studies provide empirical evidence relating organizational structural elements to fairness (Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000; Schminke, Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002). For instance, Schminke et al. (2000) assessed the relationship between centralization (the concentration of organizational authority) and procedural justice perceptions in samples from 11 organizations. Results suggest employees working in a more centralized environment, within which they had fewer decision-making opportunities, reported lower procedural justice. Findings of a subsequent study focused on 45 departments across 35 organizations, which measured employees’ perceptions of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, obtained similar findings: centralization was negatively related to justice perceptions (Schminke et al., 2002). Additionally, this study shows another structural element – formalization (defined as the extent to which organizational policies and procedures are well documented) – to relate to higher levels of perceived fairness. Organizational structure also moderates reactions to injustice. Specifically, taking a social exchange approach, Ambrose and Schminke (2003) studied 102 departments across 68 organizations, finding that in more mechanistic organizations (those that are more centralized, hierarchical, uniform, and formal in structure), the relationship between procedural justice and perceived organizational support was stronger than in lessmechanistic organizations. In contrast, in more organic organizations (those that are more decentralized, loose, and flexible in structure), the relationship between interactional justice and supervisor trust is stronger than in less organic organizations. Relatedly, as mentioned earlier, Kwon et al. (2008), with a sample of 413 groups across 48 organizations, showed that the use of high-performance work systems was a significant predictor of overall justice climate. Research is needed that explores the roles of these sorts of structural variables in each stage of the justice climate emergence model.

EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT MODEL The dynamic and multilevel nature of our model makes empirical testing more complex. However, methods do exist from which we can draw.


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Specifically, experience sampling techniques allow us to assess individuals’ ongoing experience of daily events. Furthermore, this technique has the advantage of assessing affect in proximity to these events than other methods. Data collected in this way can be subjected to multilevel random coefficient analyses, which allow us to test for within-person effects while simultaneously assessing effects within which individual events are nested at the person, group/team, and organizational levels. Already studies using these methods integrate level-specific moderators such as those discussed earlier. Thus, not only do such methods allow us to test our model, but they also allow us to incorporate the personality characteristics, group composition variables, and organizational structure constructs described earlier. Furthermore, social networking analyses provide additional factors that may be integrated (e.g., individual or team centrality in specific network structures). Given the number of factors involved and the longitudinal nature of the model, a reasonable question related to the assessment of our model is ‘‘Do I have to include everything?’’ This question is already one faced by justice researchers focused on topics that lack a temporal element (e.g., how justice types relate to multiple foci, Colquitt & Shaw, 2005). The answer offered by some (e.g., Colquitt & Shaw, 2005) and followed empirically (e.g., Avery & Quinones, 2002) is less than compelling: try to measure all justice aspects (e.g., dimensions, Colquitt et al., 2001; Cropanzano et al., 2001a), however, if this is not possible eliminate aspects less related to the research question (Ambrose & Schminke, 2007). We are at a loss to suggest which facets of the model presented here might be best omitted, but we encourage researchers to maintain the temporal element of our model.

CONCLUSION As we acknowledge in the beginning of this chapter, organizational justice research conducted over the past several decades provides evidence for how justice facet perceptions relate to individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. As Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan (2005) delineate, this evidence has been built in waves. These authors foreshadow a subsequent stage in our research history, an integrative wave, which involves an ongoing focus on the cognitive formation of justice perceptions and the implications that group membership has on such judgments. Certainly our model, which begins even before the cognitive pathway by which individuals form justice perceptions and focuses largely on how individuals’ justice perceptions evolve over time into shared group-level perceptions, reflects these integrative trends.

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In addition, our model incorporates other recent trends in the organizational justice literature, and more generally, the organizational behavior literature. Within the organizational behavior literature, researchers are increasingly focusing on within-individual effects across days, including daily events experienced by individuals and the affect associated with these events. Our model shows how events initiate the justice perception process, including both affective and cognitive pathways, and involving information congruent with the traditional justice facets. Furthermore, our model acknowledges an ongoing discussion among justice researchers related to the careful specification of both justice type and justice source. We propose that justice events relate to specific justice types and events inform individuals’ multifoci justice perceptions. Through socialization and social influence, multifoci justice perceptions at the individual level are then aggregated to the team, group, and organizational levels. Finally, congruent with recent organizational justice research, at the temporal end of our model reside perceptions of overall justice shared among members of work groups, which we argue to be most relevant to predicting multilevel outcomes, especially when the passage of time is considered. Our proposed model and suggestions for empirically testing it brings us (and we hope the reader) one step closer to understanding of the emergence of overall justice climate in groups, teams, and organizations, yet also serves as a reminder of the significant amount of work that remains to be done. We look forward to continued work (by both ourselves and others) that contributes to a shared understanding of this dynamic, multidimensional, and multilevel process.

NOTES 1. Note that we use the terms ‘‘source,’’ ‘‘party,’’ and ‘‘focus/foci’’ interchangeably to refer to the party who is being held responsible for an unfair act or judged over time as a perpetrator of injustice. 2. The idea the employees hold managers accountable for procedural justice has also been argued by others as well (e.g., Masterson et al., 2000; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Walumbwa, Wu, & Orwa, 2008). 3. Multifoci justice is also distinguishable from social entity justice in that social entity justice is used in the broader sense to refer to aggregated event justice judgments about anything. This could include parties being held responsible for transgressions (e.g., supervisors and coworkers) or could simply be a category of events such as ‘‘all job decisions’’ (Cropanzano et al., 2001a). 4. See also the work of Roberson (2006), who has considered the role of social comparisons and social networks (Roberson & Colquitt, 2005) in the emergence of


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justice climates. We discuss this work in our discussion of boundary conditions toward the end of this chapter. 5. This body of work has also explored the mediating and moderating processes involved in these relationships (see, e.g., Yang, Mosholder, & Peng, 2007; Roberson, 2006; Ansari, Hung, & Aafaqi, 2007; Choi, 2008; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We gratefully acknowledge Quinetta Roberson, Maribeth Kuenzi, Russell Cropanzano, the contributors to the Research on Managing Groups and Teams Conference and our series editors for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University for their financial support of this project.

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CHAPTER 10 THE FAIRNESS OF DIFFERENCE: HOW TEAM COMPOSITION AFFECTS THE EMERGENCE OF JUSTICE CLIMATES Quinetta M. Roberson and Ian O. Williamson ABSTRACT Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to explore the effects of team composition on justice climate strength. Specifically, we adopt a social network approach to justice in teams to explore the social-psychological mechanisms underlying diversity effects. Design/methodology/approach – Using data from 80 self-managed project teams, we consider the impact of surface-level and deep-level diversity in teams on member social network ties and subsequently dispersion in their perceptions of procedural and interpersonal justice. Findings – The results showed that diversity in team members’ psychological attributes – specifically, preferences for individualism – were associated with variability in members’ attachment to the team. In contrast, team gender and racial diversity were not significantly related to member social network ties. The results also demonstrated a relationship between network tie diversity and both procedural and interpersonal


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justice climate strength, such that variability in members’ attachment to the team was related to variability in their justice perceptions. Overall, these findings demonstrate that teams characterized by higher levels of deep-level diversity may experience greater variability in their social interactions, which amplify variability in members’ justice perceptions. Implications – Practically, these findings suggest that potential performance advantages of informational diversity in teams may come at a cost, as such diversity may reduce the quality of members’ justice experiences. Theoretically, they provide insight into the nature of the relationship between diversity and justice, which is largely dependent on the social psychological processes evoked by diversity. They also highlight team social networks as a useful means for examining such processes and understanding the operation of justice in teams.

Given a reliance on the use of team-based work structures in organizations (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003), justice researchers have given attention to the operation of justice in teams. For example, studies have examined the construction and operation of justice judgments among members of selfmanaging teams (Kirkman, Shapiro, Novelli, & Brett, 1996; Shapiro & Kirkman, 1999), hierarchical decision-making teams (Phillips, Douthitt, & Hyland, 2001), and strategic decision-making teams (Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995). Teams provide a unique context in which the construction and nature of justice perceptions may differ from that found in individual contexts. Requiring cooperation and mutual interaction between members to complete task requirements, teams must define their boundaries, clarify norms, and manage role expectations to facilitate team development and effectiveness (Saavedra, Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993). In addition, teams are more likely to be characterized by goal and outcome interdependence, such that members are evaluated by, and work consequences are contingent upon, collective task performance. Therefore, justice in teams may be influenced by a number of factors beyond the treatment of individual members. In the study of justice in teams, researchers have explored fairness as a unit-level construct. Justice researchers have operationalized fairness at the unit level of analysis by drawing on the climate literature, where climate is defined as a shared and enduring perception of the psychologically meaningful aspects of the work environment (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Justice climate has been defined as shared perceptions of work unit

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treatment by organizational authorities (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Mossholder, Bennett, & Martin, 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000). Originating in the cognition, affect and attitudes of unit members and amplified by their interactions (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), justice climates are conceptualized to be similar to individual justice perceptions in their content and operation but with a focus on the work unit as a referent. Supporting this conceptualization, empirical evidence has established the emergence of different types of justice climates (procedural, interpersonal, and informational) and with multiple foci (organization and supervisor) (Liao & Rupp, 2005). Climate researchers suggest that all forms of climate have two components – level (or quality), which refers to unit members’ average climate perceptions, and strength (or consensus), which refers to the amount of variability in members’ climate perceptions (Lindell & Brandt, 2000). Justice researchers have similarly distinguished between justice climate level, which refers to the favorability of the unit mean regarding how the unit as a whole is treated (Naumann & Bennett, 2000), and justice climate strength, which focuses on the amount of variability in team members’ justice ratings (Colquitt et al., 2002). Although much of the justice climate research has focused on climate level (Colquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberson, 2005), studies examining climate strength highlight its importance in understanding the operation of justice within groups and teams. For example, research has found direct relationships between procedural justice climate strength and various unit-level outcomes, including satisfaction with supervisor, organizational commitment, and organizational citizenship behavior (Walumbwa, Wu, & Orwa, 2008). Justice climate strength has also been shown to act as a moderator of climate level, with the effects of favorability being stronger when there is less variability in members’ perceptions (Colquitt et al., 2002; Moliner, Martinez-Tur, Peiro, Ramos, & Cropanzano, 2005). Researchers have described and investigated conditions that facilitate the creation and maintenance of shared perceptions of justice in teams. For example, Degoey (2000) and Roberson and Colquitt (2005) each consider the role of social interaction in the development of shared perceptions of justice. Degoey (2000) introduced the concept of ‘‘contagious justice,’’ which describes processes through which individuals’ thoughts and feelings about fairness issues spread across social networks to which they belong. Likewise, Roberson and Colquitt (2005) proposed a social network model of justice in teams that articulate how patterns of interactions between members, and the intensity of those interactions, influence the development of team-level justice perceptions. Consistent with these arguments, empirical research has

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highlighted specific antecedents to shared perceptions of fairness in work units including group size, demography, supervisor visibility, and perceptions of cohesion (Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Colquitt et al., 2002). Although research highlights relationships between various team characteristics and justice climate strength, few studies have examined the processes underlying these relationships. However, some researchers have speculated about the influence of different dimensions of team composition on the emergence of justice climates. For example, Degoey (2000) suggested that demographic differences as well as individuals’ dispositions and personality could influence people’s search for, and sensitivity to, social cues and subsequently contagion in their perceptions of fairness. Similarly, Roberson and Colquitt (2005) argued that member diversity, relationships with the team leader, and dispersion may reduce social interaction between members, thus constraining the development of shared team justice. While one study by Colquitt et al. (2002) provides some empirical support for the predicted effects of team diversity on agreement in member perceptions of justice, little attention has been given to how team composition can impact social interactions between members. Consequently, there is a lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms through which composition affects justice climate strength. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the effects of team composition on convergence in members’ perceptions of fairness. First, we review theory and research on justice climate emergence processes and discuss how diversity in teams may affect such processes. Building upon prior research, we consider how a social network approach to justice in teams may be used to study the social-psychological mechanisms that underlie diversity effects. Although there is ample evidence that diversity plays an important role in intergroup contexts, its relationship to group-level perceptions of fairness has remained relatively unexplored. Thus, we use data from project teams to consider the impact of different types of diversity in teams on member social ties and subsequently the amount of variability in their justice ratings. On the basis of these findings, we theorize about how team composition may influence the structure and content of member interactions in teams and suggest directions for future research linking justice, social networks, and diversity.

THE EMERGENCE OF JUSTICE CLIMATES Consistent with organizational climate research, researchers have generally assumed that the emergence of climates occurs through two primary


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mechanisms: structuralism and attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) processes (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). According to the structuralist perspective, organizational structures that create work unit groupings give rise to similar perceptions among organizational members responding to a particular unit structure. Because members of work units experience the same leader or similar work rules and procedures, individual perceptions may be shaped and constrained, thus giving rise to shared perceptions. According to the ASA perspective, selection practices combine with individuals’ attraction to, and attrition from, the work unit to produce a relatively homogeneous membership with similar perceptions of the work environment (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Overall, the end result of structuralism and ASA processes is a work unit that experiences many of the same stimuli while being homogeneous on a number of important individual characteristics. On the basis of these climate development perspectives, research has explored various antecedents to shared perceptions of justice. For example, Naumann and Bennett (2000) examined the effects of supervisor visibility, demographic similarity, and work group cohesion on the level of agreement in work unit members’ procedural justice perceptions. Their results showed that higher levels of supervisor visibility and cohesion reduced variability in member justice perceptions and thus contributed to the development of procedural justice climates. Similarly, Colquitt et al. (2002) examined team size, demographic diversity, and collectivism as antecedents to the convergence of team member justice perceptions. The results showed that team size and demography were significantly related to procedural justice climate strength. Although the specific processes through which justice climates developed were not examined in these studies, the authors concluded that such characteristics influenced the amount of social interaction between work unit members, which subsequently affected the convergence of member justice perceptions. Although the findings of justice climate research suggest that convergence in member justice perceptions is influenced by team characteristics that reinforce interactions between team members, few studies have explored the role of social interaction in the development of team justice perceptions. Two recent exceptions by Roberson (2006a, 2006b) focused on interdependence and sensemaking in work teams and examined how members’ interactions affected justice climate strength. The results of Roberson (2006a) showed that members of highly interdependent teams agreed more in their procedural and distributive perceptions than did members of teams with lower levels of interdependence. Thus, consistent with research that suggests that organizational climates emerge through work unit members’ exposure

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to similar policies and procedures and through member interaction (Schneider & Reichers, 1983), the findings suggested that interdependence may create similar conditions that facilitate the emergence of justice climates. However, as the study results highlighted group identification as a mediator, member attachment to the team was also shown to be critical in the formation of justice climates. Roberson (2006b) analyzed features of team discussions about their justice experiences and their relationships to justice climate strength. The results, which revealed that lengthier discussions and those centered on the team’s (rather than individual members’) justice experiences were more likely to lead to higher levels of agreement in team member justice perceptions, are consistent with the findings of social network research. Specifically, contagion by cohesion models predict that social homogeneity results from communicative interaction between network members as indicated by the strength of the interactions, or ties, between members (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Justice researchers have theorized about the role of social interaction in the development of shared perceptions of justice. For example, Degoey (2000) noted that ‘‘talk’’ about justice is a social phenomenon that affects how individuals think and feel about fairness issues. Justice can therefore become contagious through two processes: (1) cognitive contagion – where others’ opinions alter one’s perceptions of reality, and (2) emotional contagion – where the feelings experienced by others spill over to one’s own attitudes. Social contagion therefore allows individual members’ own justice perceptions to spread across the team. Roberson and Colquitt (2005) proposed a social network model of justice in teams that also articulates the social influence processes through which shared perceptions of justice emerge. Following the typical prediction of a network effects model, which suggests that individuals in a social network will converge in their attitudes to the extent to which they have proximity and exposure to others in the network (Marsden & Friedkin, 1994), the authors articulated how the features and patterns of social interactions between members should influence the development of shared justice perceptions. More specifically, Roberson and Colquitt (2005) speculated that convergence in team member justice perceptions may occur through structural equivalence, or the degree to which people occupy similar positions in a network (Erickson, 1988), or cohesion, which refers to the degree to which people interact frequently and intensely within a network (Burt, 1987). Although no research to date has specifically tested the ideas put forth by Degoey (2000) and by Roberson and Colquitt (2005), the results of studies examining justice sensemaking processes suggest that strong ties between


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network members serve as a source of influence, thus leading to similarity in justice judgments. For example, in a study of peer and managerial influences on employee fairness perceptions, Lamertz (2002) found that employees’ justice perceptions were positively related to those of direct and indirect peers. Similarly, a more recent study by Umphress, Labianca, Brass, Kass, and Scholten (2003) found that social ties were related to similarity in perceptions of justice with other employees although the specific relationships were dependent on the type of justice assessed. Thus, because relationships between members may serve as channels of information and interpersonal resources within a team, the structure and content of the team’s social network has important implications for convergence in member perceptions.

THE EFFECTS OF COMPOSITION ON TEAM PROCESSES To the extent that intra-team social network ties play a role in shaping justice judgments, a more complete understanding of the formation of justice climates necessitates an understanding of the factors that influence team member interactions. One factor that has been identified in the social network literature as impacting the structure of network ties within teams is team composition – that is, the attributes of the individuals who make up a team. In their review of research on group composition, Moreland and Levine (1992) note that researchers have adopted three different analytical perspectives when studying team composition. First, some researchers regard composition as a consequence or outcome that needs to be explained. Second, other researchers view group composition as a context that moderates or shapes various behavioral or social phenomena. Finally, most researchers regard group composition as a cause that can influence other aspects of a group, including the team’s structure, dynamics, and performance. They note that this final perspective, which traces other important aspects of group life back to their composition, is particularly exciting because of not only its theoretical importance but also its potential practical implications. For example, a better understanding of group composition effects may help organizations create ideal groups (Moreland & Levine, 1992) or better align group composition with specific types of tasks and goals (Mannix & Neale, 2005). Here, we adopt this perspective and explore research that has examined the consequences of diversity in team

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contexts. Because a comprehensive review of this complex and voluminous literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, our goal is to identify key themes that provide insight into what we currently know about the relationship between team composition and justice. In particular, we focus on diversity in teams and the impact on team-level perceptions of justice.

Conceptualizing Diversity Considering that diversity may encompass any difference between people, researchers have attempted to categorize specific types of diversity. For example, a number of organizational researchers have differentiated between diversity attributes based on the degree to which they are visually salient or readily detectable (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Observable differences, such as gender and physical ability, are primarily represented by biological or innate characteristics, whereas nonobservable diversity is represented by personal characteristics such as education or functional background. Researchers have also distinguished between types of diversity based on their relationship to work group performance. Pelled (1996) conceptualized a bifurcated classification of diversity in which diversity dimensions were separated according to job-relatedness or the degree to which each dimension captures the knowledge, skills, and abilities relevant to the performance of cognitive tasks or the technical work of groups. Harrison and colleagues (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002) built upon these two-factor conceptualizations of diversity and distinguished between surface-level and deep-level diversity characteristics. Diversity at a surface level is described as innate differences among group members that are typically reflected in members’ physical features (Harrison et al., 1998). In other words, these characteristics, such as age and ethnicity, are observable or readily detected. Deep-level diversity is described as acquired attributes that are task-relevant, such as personality and organizational tenure. Thus, diversity at a deep level reflects differences in members’ values, beliefs, and attitudes and is revealed through interactions between group members (Harrison et al., 1998, 2002).

Understanding the Outcomes of Diversity A large body of diversity research has highlighted effects of diversity on various team processes and outcomes (for a review, see Milliken & Martins, 1996;


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van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Although evidence of such effects has been robust, research has also shown that the specific effects of diversity in teams are dependent on the type of diversity studied. For example, in a study of the effects of various diversity attributes categorized according to her job-relatedness typology, Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin (1999) found that racial diversity, which is highly visible but low in job-relatedness, stimulated higher emotional conflict, or disagreements about nonwork-related issues between members (Jehn, 1995, 1997). In contrast, functional diversity, which has low visibility but is high in jobrelatedness, was positively associated with task conflict or disagreements over ideas and opinions related to the task (Jehn, 1995, 1997). Similarly, Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999) found that informational (i.e., nonobservable, job-related, or deep-level) diversity increased task conflict within groups, whereas social category (i.e., observable, nonjob-related, or surface-level) diversity brought about higher levels of relationship conflict. Beyond the effects of particular dimensions of diversity, some common themes regarding the relationship between team composition and group functioning have emerged. On one hand, researchers have adopted a ‘‘valuein-diversity’’ perspective (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991), which suggests that diversity enhances group problem-solving and decision-making. In particular, this perspective establishes that diversity can create value and benefit for groups because individuals in heterogeneous groups have a broader range of knowledge, skills, and abilities than homogeneous groups (Hoffman, 1959; Hoffman & Maier, 1961). With this larger pool of cognitive resources, diverse groups are assumed to have greater access to various task-relevant information and expertise. Furthermore, diversity in groups may provide access to a larger and more varied social network from which to draw additional resources (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992), thus exposing the group to, and motivating the consideration of, more decision alternatives and solutions. On the other hand, researchers have also adopted a less optimistic view of diversity and suggest that because observable demographic attributes are likely to be salient in groups, they may likely facilitate differentiation between group members (Nelson & Klutas, 2000; Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992). More specifically, demographic diversity may create ‘‘faultlines’’ (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) that divide the larger group into subgroups, thus resulting in attitudinal diversity within the team (Harrison et al., 1998). Given that such differences get in the way of the development of trust and cohesiveness within the group (Tsui et al., 1992), diversity is likely to hamper team relational processes such as social integration and group cohesion (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).

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This pessimistic view of diversity is also present in social network research, which suggests that dissimilarities between network members negatively affect their interactions (e.g., Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992, 1993). On the basis of the principle of homophily, network researchers propose that because people are likely to associate with others who are similar (Blau, 1977; Ibarra, 1992), interpersonal gaps or ‘‘structural holes’’ (Burt, 1992) will occur between diverse members. Speculating about the specific effects of diversity, Brass (1995, p. 52) put forth that communication between dissimilar members of a network is likely to be ‘‘infrequent, not reciprocated, less salient to either, asymmetric, unstable, uniplex rather than multiplex, and weak.’’ Extrapolating from the results of diversity and social network research, we would expect team composition to relate to the emergence of team-level justice perceptions. Specifically, given the effects of diversity on team member social interactions, we would presume that diversity in teams would constrain the emergence of justice climates. Although some research attention has been given to this relationship, there are still lingering questions regarding how and why team composition shapes justice climates. For example, are certain attributes of team members more relevant in this process? What are the relationships between social interaction and justice climates? In the following section, we speculate about the mechanisms through which team composition influences justice climate strength and use data from 80 self-managed project teams to explore our suppositions.

TEAM COMPOSITION AND JUSTICE CLIMATE STRENGTH Diversity in Social Ties Network researchers have considered the effects of network diversity or the prevalence of ties that cross institutional, organizational, or social boundaries (Burt, 1992). Consistent with the tenets of diversity research, network researchers have proposed that social networks that lack range or variability in their relationships to other networks are also limited in terms of the types of knowledge and informational resources to which they have access (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). In addition, homogeneous network ties represent a relatively redundant concentration of information and opinions (Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001), which constrain network members’ access to unique resources. Although few network


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studies have examined the effects of network diversity on agreement in member perceptions, research provides evidence of the value in access to unique information – specifically, creativity and innovation resulting from diverse perspectives and interactions (Cross & Cummings, 2004). Thus, while heterogeneous network ties may be beneficial to decision-making, such differences in viewpoints and interactions between members may hinder the development of shared perceptions of justice within the network. Given that relationships between members may serve as channels for information and interpersonal resources within a team, the structure of the team’s social network, or pattern of ties between individuals (Brass, 1995), has important implications for the development of justice climates. For example, in a team in which everyone is connected, information about the team’s procedures or a member’s standing within the team may be easily shared among one another. Conversely, a team in which members have fewer or more diverse connections between them may experience ‘‘structural holes’’ (Burt, 1992), which hinder information diffusion within the team. Because interconnectedness creates multiple, redundant channels of communication and information exchange, network diversity may decrease the accuracy with which team members perceive one another’s attitudes. In addition, it may hinder cohesion, which is necessary for the development of trust and common norms as well as cooperation and further information sharing within a team (Coleman, 1988, 1990). Therefore, we would expect diversity in team social networks to be negatively related to shared perceptions of justice or team justice climates. Roberson and Colquitt (2005) articulate the processes through which diversity in social networks should inhibit the development of team justice perceptions. Although they do not specify the types of diversity that will influence network relationships, they argue that diversity in general is likely to create dissimilarities in members’ positions with social networks and influence the nature of interaction between members. Regardless of whether structural equivalence or cohesion is reduced through member diversity, Roberson and Colquitt (2005) propose that the ensuing effect will be limited opportunities for social interaction, comparison, and influence. Thus, members of diverse social networks will be less likely to experience convergence in their perceptions of fairness. Justice research provides mixed support for the constraining effects of diversity on within-unit agreement in perceptions of fairness. For example, in an examination of antecedents of procedural justice climates, Colquitt et al. (2002) found that diversity in teams was negatively related to climate strength. However, the effect was primarily attributable to age diversity in

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teams, as gender and ethnic diversity were not significantly related to procedural justice climate strength. Naumann and Bennett (2000) also explored the impact of different dimensions of diversity – gender, race, age, education, and tenure – on the development of procedural justice climates although they did not find any effects of demographic heterogeneity on justice climate agreement. Although the authors attributed such nonsignificance to their fairly homogeneous sample, we speculate that the results of these studies may derive from the types of diversity examined. Consistent with the pessimistic view of diversity, we would anticipate observable demographic attributes to impede team cohesion and integration (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Although lower relational processes may reduce the frequency and intensity of member interactions, it does not necessarily imply that members’ work-related interactions will be negatively impacted. Furthermore, by holding similar positions within the team or communicating indirectly with others, similarity in member justice judgments may develop (Lamertz, 2002; Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). Considering that prior research linking diversity and justice climates has primarily focused on observable or surface-level diversity attributes, findings to date may therefore be reflective of other forms of justice contagion. In contrast, less observable or deep-level dimensions of diversity may be more likely to facilitate variability in members’ perceptions of justice, as this type of diversity has been shown to stimulate task-related conflict in teams (Pelled, 1996). Members of teams with higher levels of informational diversity may be more likely to fulfill different roles on the team, which may create inconsistencies in their justice experiences and subsequent perceptions. In addition, they may be more likely to have disagreements over justice-relevant information and opinions, which could also increase the variability in member perceptions of fairness. Therefore, to clarify the relationship between diversity and the emergence of justice climates, we compared the effects of surface-level versus deep-level diversity characteristics on social ties and justice climate strength using a sample of MBA project teams.

The Study We used survey responses from 499 MBA students, comprising 80 selfmanaged project teams, at a large United States Mid-Atlantic university. Respondents had an average age of 29 years, possessed 6.2 years of full-time work experience, and 69% were male. Members self-selected into teams that


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worked on a project focused on researching a human resource–related practice and delivering a class presentation and writing a term paper on the topic. Teams, formed as part of a Management class taken by all first-year MBA students, were responsible for determining what topic they would research, how they would be organized, how the workload was distributed among team members, and the format of their presentations and papers. Data were collected across two surveys. The first survey was administered during the first week when teams were initially being formed and measured team member’s demographic and psychological attributes, or team surfaceand deep-level diversity, respectively. To represent surface-level diversity, we used both gender and racial diversity in teams. Team members were asked to self-report their gender (i.e., male or female) and racial (i.e., Caucasian/ White, African-American/Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, Middle-eastern/Indian, or Native American) group membership on survey 1. Consistent with prior research, Blau’s (1977) index of heterogeneity was used to develop a measure of gender and racial diversity within each team (e.g., Richard, 2000; Richard, Barnett, Dwyer, & Chadwick, 2004). The index was calculated as 1 SP2i , where P is the proportion of individuals in a team who in a gender group (i.e., male or female) or identified themselves as being part of a particular racial group and i is the number of racial groups represented within the team. Theoretically, the index can range from 0 to 1 where a low score indicates low diversity and a high score represents high diversity. Deep-level diversity was captured by measuring variability in team members’ level of individualism–collectivism. Wagner and Moch (1986) define individualism as the extent to which personal interest are accorded greater importance than the needs of the group. Conversely, collectivism characterizes a preference for focusing on the demands and interest of the group over the desires and needs of the individual. We focus on individualism–collectivism given that justice research suggests that this deep-level attribute can influence the formation of justice perceptions. Specifically, research has shown that individuals higher in collectivism tend to form more positive fairness perceptions (Lind & Earley, 1992). One explanation for this finding is that collectivists tend to prefer procedures that foster harmony. Thus, scholars have proposed that teams with more collectivists should be more likely to develop routines that attempt to bring group members closer together and facilitate solidarity among team members, which in turn can increase justice climate strength (Colquitt et al., 2002). Individualism–collectivism was measured in our study using two measures taken from Wagner (1995). The first measure captured

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individuals’ preferences for focusing on personal pursuits as opposed to team goals (i.e., individualism), whereas the second measure assessed individuals’ beliefs that members of teams should subordinate their personal needs to achieve group interests (i.e., collectivism). We measured team diversity on both measures by calculating the standard deviation of members’ scores within each team. The second survey, administered after the teams had turned in their completed projects, measured team members’ intra-team social network tie perceptions and perceptions of procedural and interpersonal justice. To measure network ties, team members were asked to list the names of all other members of their team and indicate how they generally ‘‘feel’’ about each person (on a five-point scale ranging from ‘‘dislike a lot’’ to ‘‘like a lot’’). Thus, this measure captured the level of emotional attachment individuals had with team members, a key theoretical driver for sharing information, which in turn can shape justice climate strength. Using the responses to this question, we created interpersonal tie network matrixes for each team. We then calculated the standard deviation of each team’s responses to the network question using the statistical software package UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Thus, our network variable measured the level of variability in team members’ emotional attachment to one another. Procedural justice, or members’ perceptions of the fairness of team decision-making processes, was measured using items adapted from Colquitt (2001). For example, items asked to what extent team members felt they were able to express their views and feelings while working on the project had influence over the output arrived at by the team’s procedures and were able to appeal the output arrived at by the team’s procedures. Items also asked to what extent team procedures were applied consistently, were free of bias, were based on accurate information, and upheld ethical and moral standards. Our measure of interpersonal justice, or members’ perceptions of the fairness of their interpersonal treatment by the team, also used items adapted from Colquitt (2001). Accordingly, members were asked to indicate the extent to which the team treated them in a polite manner, with dignity and respect, and refrained from improper remarks or comments. Consistent with Chan’s (1998) recommendations on referent shift measures, procedural and interpersonal justice items were worded so that ‘‘team’’ was the referent for each question. Justice climate strength is conceptualized as dispersion in team members’ justice perceptions. Therefore, members of teams with stronger climates tend to agree more completely on the fairness of the team’s treatment than


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do teams with weaker climates (Colquitt et al., 2002). Consistent with Roberson, Sturman, and Simons’ (2007) recommendations for modeling dispersion, procedural justice climate strength for each team was created by computing the standard deviation of members’ procedural justice perceptions. Thus, a higher score indicates less agreement between team members and thus lower levels of climate strength. In addition to the aforementioned variables, we included two control variables. First, given the findings of prior research that suggests that team size may negatively impact justice climate strength (Colquitt et al., 2002), we controlled for the number of members in each team. Second, because justice climate strength may also be influenced by team members’ level of interaction before joining a team, we asked team members to report ‘‘how well they knew each member prior to joining the team.’’ We used this measure to create a team prior interaction network matrix using UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). A central premise of our theory is that team diversity impacts the formation of justice climate strength by influencing the interaction patterns within a team. Thus, we expected to find two empirical patterns: (1) that team surface-level and deep-level diversity would be related to the diversity of social network ties within a team and (2) that social network tie diversity would be related to procedural and interactional justice climate strength. We tested these two predictions by running two regression analyses, first regressing surface- and deep-level diversity on team network tie diversity and then regressing network tie diversity on team procedural and interactional justice climate strength. In examining the effects of surface-level diversity in teams, we did not find significant relationships with either team gender or racial diversity and team network tie variance. Thus, diversity in the demographic composition of teams was not shown to influence the level of variability in members’ emotional attachment to others in the team. We did, however, find effects of diversity in team members’ psychological attributes – specifically, that diversity in members’ preferences for individualism was associated with diversity in how they felt about other members of the team. Although we did not find effects of members’ preferences for collectivism, the results provide some evidence of a link between deep-level diversity in teams and team social network ties. These findings are consistent with the pessimistic view of diversity within social network research, which suggest that differences in member characteristics will encumber social interactions. However, building on such research, our pattern of results demonstrates that such effects may derive from less observable differences between network members rather

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than from more surface-level attributes. Specifically, differences in members’ inclination to focus on individual versus team goals constrain their emotional attachment to the team, which may be critical to the functionality of self-managing teams. In exploring the influence of team social network ties on the emergence of justice climates, the findings highlighted a relationship between tie diversity and both procedural and interpersonal justice climate strength. Specifically, greater variability in team members’ attachment to the team was related to greater variability in members’ perceptions of justice. These results are consistent with social network research on the value in expressive ties (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993), which are reflective of friendships and serve as channels for the exchange of interpersonal resources, such as emotion and social support, and the development of strong connections between network members. Without emotional bonds, self-managing teams may lack support and trust between members, which are critical for social interaction. Similar to the processes articulated by Degoey (2000), this absence of emotional influence in the team may constrain the contagion of member of justice perceptions, thus limiting the development of shared perceptions of fairness. In general, our findings highlight the influence that team composition can have on the emergence of justice climates. First, they suggest that the specific effects of team composition may be dependent on the type of diversity studied. In particular, less observable or deep-level diversity attributes may hinder member interactions in team networks, thus leading to greater variability in member perceptions of fairness. In contrast, surface-level diversity, such as gender and race, was not related to team member interaction and thus in turn did not influence justice climate strength. Second, the results suggest that team social network ties may mediate the relationship between diversity and justice climate strength. Specifically, variability in member relationships may highlight deeper level distinctions between members, thus reinforcing or emphasizing faultlines within the team. Such emotional diversity may impede team cohesion or increase team conflict, which are likely to negatively impact convergence in members’ perceptions of their team’s justice experiences. Third, the findings reveal that specific network content, or the nature of team members’ relationships with one another, may impact the emergence of procedural and interactional justice climates. Specifically, as team members had more variable levels of emotional attachment to other members, they held more variable perceptions of the interpersonal treatment experienced within the team as well as the fairness of the procedures used by the team. Thus, by concentrating here on ‘‘feeling’’ ties between members of self-managing teams, we demonstrate


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that feeling ties may be critical to the development of mutual trust and cooperation, the evolution of a team identity, and decision-making in selfmanaging teams. Consequently, dispersion in feeling ties may engender discrepancies in whether members believe the enactment of team procedures or treatment received from the team was fair and the emergence of teamlevel perceptions of justice. On the whole, we may conclude that greater diversity in intra-team interactions weakens procedural and interpersonal justice climates.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEAM COMPOSITION, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND JUSTICE In recent years, a growing amount of attention has been given to justice climate emergence processes; however, there has been limited consideration of how the makeup of a team influences such processes. Our purpose here was to explore how team diversity in various forms may facilitate or disrupt the formation of team-level justice perceptions and use these findings to put forth directions for future research. Consistent with other research exploring similarity in people’s perceptions of fairness, we have integrated social network and justice theories to examine the development of team justice climates. However, unlike previous research in this area, we consider how variability in member social ties affects perceptual agreement in the fairness of team experiences. To do so, we also introduce findings of diversity research to articulate why certain differences between team members may have distinctive effects on convergence in member perceptions of justice. Thus, by linking network constructs to team characteristics from the diversity and teams literatures, our findings offer unique theoretical and practical insight into justice climate phenomenon. Prior research has proposed that the level of diversity in a team may either constrain or facilitate the development of a team’s justice climate (Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). Although our results provide empirical support for this proposition by highlighting the effects of team diversity, they suggest that not all types of diversity may hamper the emergence of justice climates in self-managing teams. Teams characterized by higher levels of deep-level diversity may experience greater variability in their social interactions, which may stimulate conflict and disagreement about procedural and interpersonal treatment within the team. Accordingly, such diversity may amplify variability in members’ justice perceptions.

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These findings offer new insights into the consequences of diversity in teams. Extant diversity research suggests that diverse teams may develop informational advantages relative to homogenous teams, which have the potential to increase team performance (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). However, our findings illustrate that any potential advantages may come at a cost, as increases in informational diversity may constrain the emergence of justice climates. Although justice research has shown the performance benefits of having strong justice climates (Colquitt et al., 2002), we are not suggesting that organizations sacrifice the potential performance benefits (operationalized as quantity or quality) derived from creating diverse teams in the interest of justice climate strength. However, our research does highlight a potential source of ‘‘process loss’’ that can occur in multifunctional teams, which may reduce the quality of members’ team experiences. The potential for processes losses is particularly important within group and team contexts given that the effects of diversity on group functioning are generally explained by the influence of such diversity on a range of interaction processes (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). As noted earlier in this chapter, research on diversity suggests that heterogeneity in teams is related to relational outcomes such as cohesion and conflict (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). However, as shown here, the nature of the relationship between diversity and team processes depends largely on the nature of the social psychological processes evoked by diversity. In this regard, team social networks may represent a useful means for gaining greater insight into the effects of diversity on justice climates. Given our findings, there are a number of potential directions for future research. As few studies have examined the social influence and sensemaking processes that give rise to justice in teams, a social network perspective may be useful for understanding how relationships and interactions between members of work teams shape perceptions of fairness at the team level. In our empirical analyses, we focused on only one type of network tie, team member affective relationship with one another. One area of future research might be to examine whether variance in other types of network relationships (e.g., instrumental network ties) have a similar impact on justice climate strength. Future research could also build upon our research by exploring whether team network ties are static or dynamic over time and how changes in network ties over time shape fairness perceptions. Beyond the relationship between social network ties and justice climates, an examination of team compositional influences on member interactions may provide a more comprehensive understanding of justice in teams. Most studies exploring effects of diversity in teams assume an


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input-process-output (I-P-O) framework, which suggests that such effects are generally explained through a range of cognitive (e.g., information processing), behavioral (e.g., conflict), and affective (e.g., liking, cohesion) team processes (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Relatively few justice studies have taken an I-P-O approach to understanding the emergence of justice climates. In fact, both the ‘‘I’’ and the ‘‘P’’ are curiously absent from much of the literature as researchers have primarily focused on the existence of climates (as indicated by level and strength). Therefore, additional research is needed to explore how team composition impacts network ties and team behavioral processes, such as communication, cooperation, and coordination, and the subsequent effects on team-level perceptions of justice (or vice versa). In addition to providing a richer understanding of justice climate emergence processes, such research would also help managers and members of self-managing teams to identify and deal with faultlines created by deep-level diversity attributes to enhance team administration and decision-making. Another fruitful area of research is to examine how the nature of the task being performed by a team influences the relationships between team composition, the formation of network ties, and justice. For example, in our research setting, project teams were engaged in a task that required a great deal of exploration and creativity. Although this type of setting is typically characterized by high levels of interdependence, some tasks can be easily pooled, such that individual members are able to segment and complete their work without high levels of interaction. Therefore, a conceptual and empirical examination of what role task interdependence plays in moderating the link between composition and network structure and network structure to justice climate strength may provide further insight into justice climates from an I-P-O perspective. It would be of high practical value for additional research examining what managerial interventions can be brought to bear to reduce the negative effects of deep-level diversity on network ties and subsequently justice climates. This type of research can have important implications for understanding how to best form and manage teams. This stream of research can also provide insight into how to best train individuals to be effective members of team. Furthermore, although some research has explored the effects of justice climates on unit-level outcomes, future research should consider the resultant impact of dispersion in team member perceptions of fairness on individual, team, and organizational effectiveness. This type of research promises to provide new insights into how phenomena at the team level of analysis may carry over to other levels of analyses.

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CHAPTER 11 COLLECTIVE REACTIONS TO BAD BOSSES: STATUS AND INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE AT THE GROUP LEVEL Elizabeth E. Umphress and Adam C. Stoverink ABSTRACT Purpose – We offer a view of interpersonal justice climate in which the benefits of fair treatment might be stronger within some groups versus others, depending on characteristics of the supervisor, the group, and the organization in which the group is embedded. We further identify a potential silver lining that may be associated with low interpersonal justice climate. Overall, our intent of this chapter is to offer a more nuanced view of the topic to enhance our understanding of interpersonal justice within groups. Design/methodology/approach – We review literature on status to support our propositions. Findings – We examine how a supervisor’s idiosyncrasy credits, a group’s status, and an organization’s emphasis on hierarchy will moderate the relationship between unfair interpersonal treatment from a supervisor and the group’s perceived interpersonal justice climate. Also, we suggest that low levels of interpersonal justice climate may actually lead to greater Fairness and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 13, 299–330 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2010)0000013014

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affiliation among group members and ultimately enhance perceptions of group cohesion. Originality/value – Previous literature on justice climate has largely focused on procedural justice, whereas generally ignoring interpersonal exchanges between a group and its supervisor. This chapter contributes to research on justice at the group level by examining the potential moderating effects of status on the generation of interpersonal justice climate. Further, and in contrast to previous research, we offer a potential positive outcome that may result from low interpersonal justice climate.

Organizational justice research has demonstrated a myriad of positive implications of interpersonal justice, or the extent to which authorities treat employees with respect and dignity (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). For instance, interpersonal justice is positively related to job satisfaction (Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006), job performance (Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002), extra-role behaviors (Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005), and interpersonal justice is negatively related to absenteeism (Gellatly, 1995), workplace stress (Judge & Colquitt, 2006), and sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002). At the group level of analysis, group perceptions of interpersonal justice are positively related to the group’s satisfaction and commitment to the supervisor (Liao & Rupp, 2005). Thus, a review of the justice literature results in a picture of interpersonal justice in which fair treatment leads to positive attitudes and outcomes for a group and its members. In this chapter, we will first offer a view of interpersonal justice in which the reactions to unfair treatment might be stronger within some groups versus others, depending on characteristics of the supervisor, the group, and the organization in which the group is embedded. Previous research has shown that status plays a key role in the justice domain (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). We highlight how conceptions of status will influence a group’s judgment of supervisor fairness, thus helping to shape its shared perception of justice, or justice climate. Although status can take many shapes and be held by a multitude of identities and structural entities, we focus on three forms of status that are highly relevant to both groups and justice perceptions. Namely, we theoretically explore the effects of supervisor status, group

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status, and an organization’s emphasis on status. We claim that low supervisor status, high group status, and a low organizational emphasis on status will strengthen the negative relationship between unfair treatment received from a supervisor and interpersonal justice climate. Groups in these contexts that receive unfair interpersonal treatment from a supervisor will likely perceive the treatment to be more unfair, thus creating a lower justice climate than groups with high-status supervisors, low group status, and a high organizational emphasis on status. Through these claims, we hope to extend interpersonal justice literature by examining the moderating role of status at the group-level of analysis, thus contributing to the contingency view of interpersonal justice climate. Second, we suggest that low levels of interpersonal justice climate could promote positive outcomes for groups. Although previous research has painted a consistently negative picture of low interpersonal justice climate, we think it is possible that this shared perception of unfair interpersonal treatment may actually have a silver lining when considering certain group constructs such as group cohesion. We propose that low interpersonal justice climate might create increased levels of arousal and a greater need for affiliation within the group; thus, group members could generate higher levels of cohesion when perceiving low levels of interpersonal justice climate. Overall, our intent is to offer a potentially nuanced view of the topic to enhance our understanding of interpersonal justice within groups. This chapter will unfold as follows. First, we will review organizational justice literature that has addressed interpersonal justice within groups. Then, we will describe how idiosyncrasy credits, or the extent to which a supervisor may deviate from group expectations (Hollander, 1958), might influence a group’s reactions to unfair treatment from the supervisor. Next, we discuss how a group’s relative status within the organization might influence its perceptions of unfair treatment. Relying on tenets from social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), we further consider how status might influence group reactions to unfair treatment by illustrating how some organizations promote hierarchy and status, which could discourage negative reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment from a supervisor. Finally, we discuss how low levels of interpersonal justice climate could have positive implications when considering certain group-level constructs such as group cohesion (Fig. 1). Before continuing, we note two caveats. As stated, we wish to further examine how groups react to unfair treatment by a supervisor. In our discussion, we distinguish between perceptions of interpersonal justice (i.e., interpersonal treatment) and interpersonal justice climate, or the group’s

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Interpersonal Treatment

• • •

Interpersonal Justice Climate

Group Cohesion

Idiosyncrasy Credits Group Status Organizational Emphasis on Status

Fig. 1. Conceptual Model of Status and Interpersonal Justice Climate.

shared perception of interpersonal treatment (Liao & Rupp, 2005). These concepts are related in that a supervisor’s interpersonal justice treatment shapes the group’s perceptions of interpersonal justice climate. Specifically, if a group perceives that it has been treated unfairly by a supervisor it will react by developing a low level of interpersonal justice climate. Conversely, if the group is treated with dignity and respect by a supervisor, it will likely develop a high interpersonal justice climate (Liao & Rupp, 2005). Second, organizational justice scholars have used two primary methods for operationalizing justice climate: climate level and climate strength (Li & Cropanzano, 2009). Climate level describes the extent to which group members perceive that they have been treated fairly, whereas climate strength describes the extent to which group members agree or disagree on this perception. Although scholars have found both methods useful in explaining a variety of justice phenomenon (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Roberson, 2006; Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007), our discussion focuses exclusively on the magnitude of the group’s justice perceptions (i.e., climate level). Research shows that climate level is shaped by salient external stimuli that impact group members uniformly (Hackman, 1992; Lindell & Brandt, 2000). Because unfair interpersonal treatment has been linked to strong psychological outcomes (Bies, 2001; Tepper, 2000), we expect this treatment to be salient to all group members, thus contributing to the level of shared interpersonal justice climate.

INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE IN GROUPS People have a natural right to be treated with respect and dignity (Folger & Bies, 1989). Rawls (1971, p. 337) states that all people have ‘‘the duty of


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mutual respect y the duty to show a person the respect due to him as a moral being.’’ As such, supervisors have the responsibility to treat their subordinates with respect and dignity, or with interpersonally fair treatment. At times, however, supervisors treat their subordinates disrespectfully, thus potentially threatening an individual’s sense of self. Indeed, the experience of unfair interpersonal treatment has been described as generating ‘‘a profound harm to one’s psyche and identity’’ (Bies, 2001, p. 90). Stemming from fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), the deonance perspective acknowledges that people care about fairness because unfair treatment violates the societal duty or moral standard that everyone has the right to fair treatment (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 2001). In support of the deonance perspective, empirical work indicates that people will sacrifice money to punish a transgressor, despite having no vested interest in doing so (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Quervain et al., 2004; Turrillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). That is, people wish to punish a transgressor who treats others with low levels of interpersonal justice, possibly to ensure that the violator does not get away with the immoral act (Folger, 2001). This suggests that individuals not only react negatively to their own interpersonal injustice, but also to the interpersonal injustice experienced by their group members. Also, an employee might react negatively to supervisors who treat group members interpersonally unfair because that unfair treatment signals the possibility that the employee may receive unjust interpersonal treatment from that supervisor in the future. Therefore, employees may react negatively to supervisors who treat them and/or their group members interpersonally unfair because that unfair treatment violates a moral standard, as suggested by the deonance perspective, and because that unfair treatment could signal subsequent unfair treatment from the supervisor. As noted earlier, previous research indicates that respectful treatment from supervisors results in a number of important consequences for the organization and its members (Ambrose et al., 2002; Cropanzano et al., 2002; Gellatly, 1995; Judge & Colquitt, 2006; Judge et al., 2006; Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005). Although the preponderance of work investigating interpersonal justice has focused on individual-level causes and consequences of the concept, a handful of studies have attempted to discern the implications of interpersonal justice by considering group constructs (Colquitt & Jackson, 2006; Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000; Olkkonen & Lipponen, 2006; Wu, Neubert, & Yi, 2007). Colquitt and Jackson (2006) investigated the importance of interpersonal justice rules within group versus individual contexts and found that the imperative to treat others with respect and dignity was found to be equally important in both individual

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and group contexts. This suggests that fair interpersonal treatment from a supervisor is a focus for both individuals and groups, and that one would expect to find significant effects for interpersonal justice at the group level of analysis. Additionally, previous work has shown that individual-level interpersonal justice perceptions positively influence group identification, helping behavior toward the group (Olkkonen & Lipponen, 2006), and receptivity to team-based reward structures (Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000). Providing evidence that group satisfaction impacts reactions to interpersonal justice, Flaherty and Moss (2007) discovered that individual-level interpersonal justice perceptions interacted with group satisfaction to determine counterproductive work behavior such that the negative relationship was stronger when group satisfaction was high versus low. The aforementioned studies indicate that interpersonal justice at the individual level of analysis can both influence and be influenced by group constructs. A recent area of organizational justice research focuses on group-level, shared perceptions of fair or unfair treatment, or justice climate (Colquitt, 2004; Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Colquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberson, 2005; Dietz, Robinson, Folger, Baron, & Schulz, 2003; Ehrhart, 2004; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Mossholder, Bennett, & Martin, 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Roberson & Colquitt, 2005; Simons & Roberson, 2003). Employees structured into organizational units tend to experience the same events which can cause group members to generate similar perceptions (Payne & Pugh, 1976). Thus, group members who report to the same supervisor will likely share similar perceptions of how fairly that supervisor treats the group (Colquitt et al., 2005). This suggests that unfair treatment to a group will likely result in a shared perception of low justice climate. The majority of work on justice climate investigates procedural justice climate, but some studies demonstrate that groups form interpersonal justice climate perceptions as well. For instance, Liao and Rupp (2005) focused on interpersonal justice climate, averaging how all employees within a group, including the focal employee, were treated by their supervisor. They found an incremental effect of interpersonal justice climate on commitment and satisfaction directed toward the supervisor while controlling for each focal employee’s individual level of interpersonal justice. Also, Mayer et al. (2007) examined antecedents and consequences of interpersonal justice climate. They found that leader agreeableness, or the degree to which the leader’s personality is warm, sympathetic and kind, is positively related to interpersonal justice climate. Further, they found that interpersonal justice climate moderated the relationship between individual-level interpersonal justice and work attitudes ( job satisfaction and commitment) such that the


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positive relationship was stronger when interpersonal justice climate was high versus low. These studies indicate that interpersonal justice can be conceived at the group-level of analysis, and that this group-level construct, interpersonal justice climate, influences important job attitudes such as job satisfaction and commitment. The work reviewed above indicates that individuals have negative reactions when they personally experience unfair interpersonal treatment and when their group collectively experiences unfair interpersonal treatment (i.e., interpersonal justice climate). This research has added significantly to our understanding of interpersonal justice in groups, and we wish to conceptually explore additional constructs that could influence how groups react to interpersonal justice received from a supervisor. Previous theoretical and empirical work related to organizational justice indicates that fair treatment communicates an individual’s relative status within the group (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Comparatively less is known regarding how supervisor, group, and organizational status influence subsequent group reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment. We will discuss the potential moderating effects of the status of supervisors (i.e., idiosyncrasy credits), groups, and organizations on the relationship between unfair interpersonal treatment and a group’s interpersonal justice climate. We then examine how this shared perception of interpersonal justice may impact important outcomes in the workplace.

SUPERVISOR STATUS AND THE ROLE OF IDIOSYNCRASY CREDITS In this section, we examine the potential influence that supervisor characteristics may have on a group’s reaction to unfair interpersonal treatment. Specifically, we focus on idiosyncrasy credits, which is one way to conceptualize status. Hollander (1958) first described idiosyncrasy credits as ‘‘the degree to which an individual may deviate from the common expectancies of the group’’ (p. 120). Hollander (1958) proposed that these credits arise from two sources that contribute to the group, (1) task performance or competence and (2) characteristics outside of task performance that contribute to the workplace (e.g., social capital and extra-role performance). Idiosyncrasy credits are awarded by the group, and these valuable credits permit deviant or idiosyncratic behavior. When an individual fails to live up to group expectations he or she loses these credits

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(Hollander, 2006). Losing credits is tolerable if the individual maintains some level of credits by continuing to be perceived as a contributor to the fulfillment of the group’s goals. However, when an individual’s credit balance reaches zero, he or she could suffer group sanctions which could range from disdainful looks to complete exclusion from the group. Sanctions from the group vary based on the extent to which the idiosyncratic behavior deviates from group expectations. Supervisors are sometimes granted certain latitude to behave outside of group norms. The source of a supervisor’s ability to challenge or deviate from group norms and expectations could arise from idiosyncrasy credits. Supervisors can gain idiosyncrasy credits via competence, high performance, and/or embeddedness within a rich social network (Hollander, 2006). Groups might perceive that competent supervisors are those who have a high degree of education or specialized training related to his or her occupation. Supervisors with awards or other forms of recognition for high performance and/or those who are connected with those deemed important within the organization, such as the CEO, would receive idiosyncrasy credits from their group. Previous theoretical work suggests that once supervisors obtain these credits, they can use them to conduct innovative actions that help facilitate group goals such as developing or expanding new product lines or services (Hollander, 2006). Such innovations might deviate from group norms by changing the way the group performs, but in the long run these deviations enable higher levels of group performance. This use of idiosyncrasy credits by supervisors is important to group development and contributes to the group in a positive manner. It is also possible for supervisors to deviate from group norms in a less constructive way, such as situations in which supervisors treat groups with disrespect. Previous literature indicates that individuals are less likely to punish perpetrators with higher status when compared to lower status perpetrators (Cohen, 1955). Supervisors who have these valuable credits might also have the ability to exhibit unfair interpersonal treatment with little fear of negative consequences for the group, such as a low interpersonal justice climate. Indeed, we expect that groups receiving unfair treatment from a supervisor with idiosyncrasy credits are likely to perceive this treatment as more fair than if the same treatment were to come from a supervisor without these credits. Groups hold supervisors with a substantial level of idiosyncrasy credits in high regard because working with them provides an enhanced opportunity to learn and be associated with a person who is competent, performs at a high level, and/or is embedded within a rich social network. Groups likely perceive any behaviors by these


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high-performing and well-connected supervisors to be in line with the achievement of group goals. Accordingly, rather than viewing their disrespectful treatment as unfair, they may justify it by perceiving the supervisor’s behavior to be in the best interest of the group. Thus, groups reporting to supervisors with high levels of idiosyncrasy credits may be less likely to react strongly to unfair treatment, because they do not perceive the treatment to be unfair. Conversely, it is likely that unfair interpersonal treatment by supervisors with little to no idiosyncrasy credits will result in stronger reactions from groups, because these supervisors do not possess the valuable credits needed to buffer disrespectful treatment. That is, groups who experience disrespectful treatment from a supervisor with few idiosyncrasy credits are more likely to perceive the treatment to be unfair, and react by generating a low interpersonal climate. Therefore, we propose that groups receiving unfair treatment from supervisors with low levels of idiosyncrasy credits will perceive lower levels of interpersonal justice climate than groups receiving the same unfair treatment from supervisors with high levels of idiosyncrasy credits. Proposition 1. The relationship between unfair interpersonal treatment and a group’s interpersonal justice climate will be stronger when the supervisor possesses low versus high levels of idiosyncrasy credits. It is also important to note that groups might not tolerate low levels of interpersonal justice within some situations, despite a supervisor’s high level of idiosyncrasy credits. These credits can be transitory, and require replenishing (Hollander, 2006). Unfair interpersonal treatment might eradicate idiosyncrasy credits quickly, especially if the supervisor has not had a recent positive influence on group performance. Further, research suggests that individuals with idiosyncrasy credits could be punished strongly for large deviations from group norms within certain circumstances. For example, Wiggins, Dill, and Schwartz (1965) manipulated whether a confederate posing as a group member exhibited high, medium, or low levels of performance as well as the extent to which the confederate negatively influenced group performance by violating group norms (cheating). Consistent with the idea that idiosyncrasy credits allow deviations from group norms, groups punished the confederate for violating these norms to a greater extent when he performed at medium or low levels than when he performed at high levels, but this was only true when the confederate’s cheating had a low or moderate effect on group performance. When the confederate’s cheating had a strong influence on group performance (i.e., the group lost a substantial number of points because

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the confederate was caught cheating), group members punished the confederate significantly more when he performed at high levels than medium or low levels. This finding suggests that while supervisors with high levels of idiosyncrasy credits might be immune from strong group reactions for medium and small deviations from group expectations, they could face substantial reactions from group members if their violation of group norms has a substantial negative effect on group performance. Therefore, a supervisor’s idiosyncrasy credits might not buffer perceptions of a low interpersonal justice climate by groups if unfair interpersonal treatment becomes too disruptive to the group. By considering a supervisor’s idiosyncrasy credits, we have recognized the influence of the supervisor’s status on group reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment. Below, we turn to the status of the group to consider how groups react to unfair treatment when groups enjoy high versus low status.

GROUP STATUS Previous theoretical and empirical work on justice acknowledges the role of status in shaping reactions to fairness received from a supervisor. Namely, the group value model highlights that people care about fairness because fair or unfair treatment signals one’s value or status within the group (Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2005; Van Prooijen, Van Den Bos, & Wilke, 2002). Individuals care about their relationships within social groups and the leaders or authorities that represent those groups. Fair treatment communicates important information about the trustworthiness of authorities and one’s relative status within the group. According to group value theory, individuals care about their intragroup status because status affirms their self worth and identity (Tyler, 1994). If individuals are treated unfairly, then they likely infer that they have low status within the group. Conversely, fair treatment indicates high status within a group. Although it is proposed that both high- and low-status groups care about fair treatment, some empirical work on procedural justice demonstrates that members of high-status groups have stronger reactions to fair treatment than members of low-status groups. In a field study, Diekmann et al. (2007) found that an individual’s perceived status in the company moderated the relationship between procedural justice and job satisfaction, such that the


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relationship was stronger when perceived status was high. Also, the authors found that one reason perceived status influenced the procedural justice and job satisfaction relationship was due to high-status individuals having an enhanced sense of deservingness of procedural justice. As noted, the majority of research related to status and organizational justice has concentrated on individual-level status and reactions to procedural justice. Like procedural justice, fair interpersonal treatment also signals the extent to which a supervisor is trustworthy or willing to exploit the group. Unfair interpersonal treatment received from a supervisor represents a threat to the group because this injustice could suggest that the group deserves to be treated without respect. One study has investigated how interpersonal justice differentially influences those with high or low levels of self-esteem. Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, and Weinblatt (1999) found that high interpersonal justice had a stronger effect on justice perceptions for those with high versus low levels of self-esteem. The authors proposed that individuals high in self-esteem expect and feel an enhanced sense of entitlement for respectful treatment, whereas those low in selfesteem have less of an expectation for this fair treatment. We propose that those from high-status groups have a similar sense of entitlement for respectful treatment when compared to low-status groups. Although work has not directly investigated the role of group status on reactions to low interpersonal justice, it is plausible that group status will influence a group’s reaction to unfair interpersonal treatment received from a supervisor. High-status groups will be especially sensitive to unfair interpersonal treatment because of an enhanced sense that they deserve to be treated with respect and dignity due to their position or status within the organization. Accordingly, because high-status groups expect fair interpersonal treatment, they are more likely than low-status groups to actually perceive disrespectful treatment from a supervisor to be unfair. Conversely, low-status groups are less sensitive to unfair interpersonal treatment from a supervisor. They perceive less entitlement due to their low status and are less sensitive to group threat that could be produced by interpersonal injustice. Because low-status groups have lower expectations for the treatment they receive, they are less likely to perceive disrespectful treatment from a supervisor to be unfair. Consistent with our reasoning, previous literature indicates that high-status groups have a stronger sense of deservingness or entitlement than low-status groups (Crosby, 1982; Lerner, 1977; Major, 1994; Pelham & Hetts, 2001). This has been found with regard to group rewards, such that members of low-status groups reward themselves less and tend to work harder and longer than members of high-status groups for the

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same amount of money (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984). Similarly, we expect that high-status groups will perceive a stronger sense of deservingness for fair interpersonal treatment. We propose that, due to this sense of entitlement for respect and dignity, high-status groups receiving unfair treatment from a supervisor will be more inclined than low-status groups to view this treatment as unfair. Therefore, we expect that these high-status groups will react more strongly than low-status groups by generating a lower interpersonal justice climate. Proposition 2. The relationship between unfair interpersonal treatment and a group’s interpersonal justice climate will be stronger within highversus low-status groups. Thus far, we have considered how status conceived at the supervisor and group level of analysis could influence how groups react to unfair interpersonal treatment. We now examine how a concept of status at the organizational level could impact how groups interpret unfair treatment from a supervisor.

HIERARCHY-ENHANCING AND HIERARCHY-ATTENUATING ORGANIZATIONS Many scholars have noted that people generally choose occupations and work environments that espouse characteristics and work values that ‘‘fit’’ with their own sense of the world (Holland, 1959, 1966; Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995). For example, in Schneider’s (1987) attraction-selection-attrition framework he proposed that people are attracted to and choose to remain within organizations that are composed of individuals like themselves, which contributes to organizations being composed of employees with similar personalities and values. The basic propositions of this literature are that people wish to occupy environments with similar others and that person–environment fit leads to enhanced outcomes for individuals and their organization in terms of positive work attitudes and behaviors. In general, research has supported this prediction such that person–environment fit in terms of values leads to higher levels of commitment, job satisfaction, and intent to remain within the organization (Bretz & Judge, 1994; Cable & Judge, 1996; Chatman, 1989, 1991; Joyce & Slocum, 1982; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). Furthermore, social dominance theorists propose that person–environment fit processes could


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apply to an individual’s support of inequality and an organization’s support of inequality (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Van Laar, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Sinclair, 1999). Before we further elaborate on social dominance theory’s predictions related to groups and organizations, it is important to review the tenets of the theory. According to social dominance theory, all modern human societies are composed of group-based social hierarchies due to a general human predisposition to maintain and form these hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The basis of group-based social hierarchies could be age, gender, race, ethnicity, class, or any other salient group distinction. Within these hierarchies, members of high-status groups possess a disproportionate amount of valued resources (e.g., wealth, political power, and access to superior healthcare), and members of low-status groups have a disproportionate amount of social disadvantages (e.g., poverty). The theory suggests that organizations and social institutions can inhibit or perpetuate these hierarchical distinctions by allocating money and resources to some groups versus others. Especially salient to our argument, social dominance theory proposes that organizations and institutions can be classified as supporting hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating belief systems. Hierarchyenhancing belief systems provide justification for existing status-based hierarchies within society, supporting inequality among groups. Organizations with hierarchy-enhancing belief systems include marketing agencies, accounting firms, banks, and police and internal security forces (e.g., FBI). Hierarchy-attenuating belief systems act to facilitate egalitarianism within society and the distribution of positively valued resources equally across social groups. Examples of hierarchy-attenuating organizations include civil and human rights organizations, labor organizations, social welfare organizations, and the public defender’s office. Corresponding to previously described notions of person–environment fit, social dominance theory proposes that there is a tendency for people to choose organizations that fit with their basic belief systems (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Van Laar et al., 1999). That is, individuals who endorse groupbased prejudices would be expected to enter and remain within hierarchyenhancing organizations, whereas individuals who endorse group-based equality would populate hierarchy-attenuating organizations. Several studies provide support for this assumption (Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997; Sidanius, Van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003; Van Laar et al., 1999; for a review, see Haley & Sidanius, 2005). For instance, Van Laar et al. (1999) had coders evaluate college majors according to whether the major could be clearly classified as supporting equality among groups (i.e.,

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hierarchy-attenuating majors: social work, sociology, anthropology, special education, and nursing) or supporting the attainment of wealth or other goods for the socially powerful (i.e., hierarchy-enhancing majors: accounting, advertising, economics, and finance). Using racism as a measure of the students’ endorsement of social inequality, the authors found students with hierarchy-enhancing majors were significantly more racist than those with hierarchy-attenuating majors (see also Sidanius et al., 2003). Further, they found that students received higher grades when their level of racism fit their major, such that students with hierarchy-attenuating majors had higher grades when they were low in racism. In other work, researchers have found that the extent to which an individual supports and wishes to maintain hierarchies within society is positively correlated with the desire to choose hierarchy-enhancing careers (e.g., law enforcement and government prosecutor) and negatively correlated with the desire to choose hierarchyattenuating careers (e.g., human rights advocate and human rights lawyer) (Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, & Van Laar, 1996; Sidanius et al., 2003). These results suggest that people choose environments that support their preference for equality or inequality, and that person–environment fit between the organization and their preference for equality or inequality could enhance performance. Based on the tenets from social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), we propose that group reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment could vary based on whether the group is embedded within a hierarchyattenuating versus a hierarchy-enhancing organization. Owing to the focus on social equality, hierarchy-attenuating organizations likely develop organizational cultures that emphasize justice and egalitarianism. Conversely, hierarchy-enhancing organizations likely form organizational cultures that have more of an emphasis on status and less of an emphasis on justice because of a focus on maintaining social inequality. For example, the military could be seen as a hierarchy-enhancing organization with its strong emphasis on hierarchy and preserving social order (rather than questioning it). Hazing and the use of humiliating language (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979), which could be considered unfair interpersonal treatment, are also prevalent and generally accepted within this institution. It is possible that unfair practices such as hazing continue to plague the military because of its hierarchy-enhancing culture; those within this culture might be less likely to view hazing as problematic when compared to individuals within hierarchy-attenuating organizations. Our prediction corresponds to several findings demonstrating how organizational culture and structure influence reactions to and interpretations of


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fairness (Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Erdogan, Liden, & Kraimer, 2006; Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000; Schminke, Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002). For instance, Ambrose and Schminke (2003) demonstrated that employees had stronger reactions to interpersonal justice within organic (i.e., flexible, loose, and decentralized) versus mechanistic (i.e., tight, rigid, and hierarchical) structures. Also, Erdogan et al. (2006) found that the extent to which an organization’s culture supported respect for people strengthened the relationship between individual-level interpersonal justice and perceptions of leadership. Owing to the general regard for individual rights within hierarchy-attenuating organizations, one could expect that hierarchyattenuating organizations have cultures that support respect for people more so than do hierarchy-enhancing organizations. We think that the tenets of social dominance theory could add to this previous work on organizational justice by focusing on a different way to classify organizations that corresponds to the degree to which the organization emphasizes social injustice and hierarchy versus social equality. Owing to the focus on social justice and egalitarianism, groups within hierarchy-attenuating organizations will be more likely than groups within hierarchy-enhancing organizations to perceive low levels of dignity and respect as unfair. As argued earlier, individuals likely enter organizations that fit with their preference for equality or inequality. Groups within hierarchy-enhancing organizations are likely to subscribe to ideas of groupbased status and inequality. A lack of respect and dignity from a supervisor is a signal of inequality, and those within hierarchy-enhancing organizations might view this treatment as fair treatment from a superior. Also, research presented earlier suggests that groups within hierarchy-enhancing organizations likely place a higher value on authority and status than those within hierarchy-attenuating organizations (Pratto et al., 1997; Sidanius et al., 2003; Haley & Sidanius, 2005). Groups within hierarchy-enhancing organizations might perceive low levels of respect and dignity as fair because this treatment came from someone in authority (i.e., their supervisor); whereas, groups within hierarchy-attenuating organizations would be less likely to give those in authority such latitude. Based on this logic, we propose that groups within hierarchy-attenuating organizations have stronger negative reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment than groups within hierarchy-enhancing organizations. Specifically, we expect that groups experiencing unfair treatment from supervisors within hierarchy-attenuating organizations will perceive lower levels of interpersonal justice climate than groups experiencing the same treatment within hierarchy-enhancing organizations.

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Proposition 3. The relationship between unfair interpersonal treatment and a group’s interpersonal justice climate will be stronger within hierarchy-attenuating versus hierarchy-enhancing organizations. In the preceding discussion, we examined how various conceptions of status (i.e., supervisor status, group status, and an organization’s emphasis on status) may assist in shaping a group’s interpersonal justice climate. We suggested that groups with low-status supervisors, high group status, and those embedded in a hierarchy-attenuating organization will react more strongly to unfair interpersonal treatment from their supervisors. Thus, these groups will tend to perceive a lower interpersonal justice climate than groups with high-status supervisors, low group status, and/or are embedded in hierarchy-enhancing organizations. We now shift gears and investigate possible outcomes that may result from such a low-justice climate. Specifically, and in contrast to previous research on organizational justice, we focus on potential positive consequences that may arise when a group perceives low levels of interpersonal justice climate.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF LOW INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE CLIMATE The vast majority of organizational justice researchers, with the exception of a handful of scholars investigating the potential negative consequences of fairness to self-evaluations (Brockner, 2002; Brockner, Heuer, Magner, Folger, & Umphress, 2003; Gilliland, 1994; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998; Ployhart, Ryan, & Bennet, 1999; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Van den Bos, Bruins, & Wilke, 1999), focus on the positive implications of fair treatment (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1988; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992; Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Shalit, 1992). This positive view of organizational justice has demonstrated that fair interpersonal treatment leads to important individual and group outcomes (Ambrose et al., 2002; Cropanzano et al., 2002; Gellatly, 1995; Judge et al., 2006; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005). Given the abundance of evidence that fair interpersonal treatment has beneficial consequences and the moral stance that everyone deserves to be treated with dignity and respect (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Folger, 2001), it is not our intent to encourage, or even condone, unfair interpersonal treatment in any setting. Instead, we wish to consider the possibility that low levels of interpersonal justice climate could


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potentially generate some positive outcomes for the group. Using cognitive dissonance theory and literature on social affiliation as a theoretical lens, we propose that the effects of interpersonal justice climate might be more complex than acknowledged in previous literature. Cognitive dissonance theory posits that people experience a state of arousal when cognitions are inconsistent with their attitudes, behavior, or the environment (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957; Brehm & Cohen, 1962). To reduce this state of arousal, or dissonance, individuals are motivated to engage in behavioral or attitudinal change. Previous research indicates that after behaving in a counter-attitudinal manner, such as expressing a view or perception not initially endorsed, individuals will shift their perceptions to align with their behavior (Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957; Gerard, 1967; Pallak & Pittman, 1972; for a review see Cooper & Fazio, 1984). In a study illustrating the theory, Festinger and Carlsmith (1957) demonstrated that individuals who participated in a boring and dull experimental task reported more positive evaluations of the task after lying to an unsuspecting future participant by telling him that the experimental task was exciting and interesting. Further, the researchers found that participants who were paid $1 for lying reported higher levels of positive attitude change about the task than those paid $20 for lying. Festinger and Carlsmith explained that being paid $20 provided more justification for lying to the future participant, and therefore less dissonance was experienced than receiving only $1 for lying. These findings suggest that higher levels of dissonance create enhanced attitude change. Festinger (1957) suggested that the magnitude of the dissonance is influenced by the importance of the cognitive elements creating the inconsistency. He further stated that the more dissonance a person experiences, the more the individual is aroused to reduce this dissonance. Because respect and dignity can be seen as natural rights to all persons, low levels of interpersonal justice climate that deprive these rights could arouse dissonance. Indeed, unfair interpersonal treatment is described as a ‘‘hot and burning experience’’ (Bies, 2001, p. 90), and the threat of supervisor abuse has been associated with subordinate psychological distress (Tepper, 2000). Thus, low levels of interpersonal justice climate will likely result in a group’s enhanced sense of emotional pain and suffering. After experiencing arousal from low levels of interpersonal justice climate, groups might have cognitive dissonance related to why they were treated unfairly. Low interpersonal justice climate is likely to trigger groups to seek ways of reducing the cognitive inconsistency associated with this treatment.

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Previous literature suggests that dissonance created by low levels of interpersonal justice climate could be reduced by perceiving a stronger association with the group. For instance, Aronson and Mills (1959) investigated how mild versus severe group initiation influences group attractiveness. Participants experienced either severe, mild, or no initiation to a group, and then listened to a dull discussion among their future group members. Individuals who experienced a severe initiation reported higher evaluations of the group and the discussion than those who experienced a mild or no initiation. Drawing from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), the authors proposed that those in the severe initiation experienced greater dissonance than those in the mild or no initiation process, and participants reduced this dissonance by forming positive evaluations of the group. Additionally, Gerard and Mathewson (1966) examined alternative explanations for Aronson and Mills’ (1959) findings, and similarly concluded that individuals who experience more suffering to join a group increased group attractiveness. In general, this work suggests that people who experience higher levels of arousal to obtain group membership will have more positive evaluations of the group. Given that low levels of interpersonal justice climate generates a higher level of arousal than high levels of interpersonal justice climate, it follows that individuals who experience low interpersonal justice climate will report higher group evaluations than those who experience a high interpersonal justice climate. Below, we draw from work on social affiliation to provide further support for this notion. Literature on social affiliation suggests that people in threatening situations will tend to seek the company of others (Mulder & Stermerding, 1963; for a review see Kulik & Mahler, 2000). This affiliation with others appears to help individuals increase cognitive clarity of these threatening situations. That is, affiliation seems to help reduce the uncertainties associated with the nature of the situation. Consistent with this assumption, Schachter (1959) found that people who face novel threats will generally choose to affiliate with others, particularly those experiencing the same threat. Schachter claimed that in regard to threatened individuals, ‘‘Misery doesn’t love just any kind of company, it loves only miserable company’’ (p. 24). A series of laboratory experiments conducted in the 1960s and 1970s found that individuals facing the fear of electric shock chose to wait with others who shared the same threat than to wait alone or to wait with others who were not facing the threat (Darley, 1966; Firestone, Kaplan, & Russell, 1973; Sarnoff & Zimbardo, 1961; Schachter, 1959). Recently, Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1988) found that people faced with the threat of electric shock


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preferred to affiliate with others who have experienced the same threat in the past, assuming that they were allowed to verbally communicate with these experienced others. If no verbal interactions were possible, threatened participants were more likely to choose others who were currently facing a similar threat rather than waiting alone or with experienced others. The reasons participants stated for seeking affiliation with similar or experienced others related to obtaining information about the threat. Extrapolating these results to a situation in which a group faces a low level of interpersonal justice climate, this work suggests that group members will have a stronger desire to affiliate with their group than those in a group that is not facing a low level of interpersonal justice climate. Therefore, it is likely that members of groups that perceive low levels of interpersonal justice climate will strengthen their affiliation with each other in an attempt to clarify the cognitive inconsistencies generated from this low-justice climate. We propose that this enhanced affiliation with the group will strengthen group cohesion. Group cohesion has been defined as the extent to which group members are attracted to a group, strongly desire to remain in the group, and mutually influence one another (Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Organ & Hamner, 1982). Low interpersonal justice climate could generate a higher need for affiliation and arousal among group members, and the consequences of a low interpersonal justice climate could help build and strengthen group cohesion. Group members might seek higher levels of group cohesion because it could help mitigate the experience of a low-justice climate. Indeed, the group cohesion literature suggests that group members facing a common threat can aid and console each other (Hogg, 1992; Mullen & Cooper, 1994) in an attempt to assist with the coping process. Based on the logic outlined earlier, we propose that low levels of interpersonal justice climate could enhance group cohesion. Proposition 4. Group cohesion will be higher when interpersonal justice climate is low versus high. We have argued that interpersonal justice climate is negatively related to group cohesion. Our reasoning stems from cognitive dissonance theory, which suggests that group members will have more positive evaluations of the group due to the increased arousal that is experienced when receiving a low level of interpersonal justice climate. As Gerard and Mathewson (1966) stated, ‘‘people often tend to value highly things for which they have suffered’’ (p. 278); when group members suffer from a low level of interpersonal justice climate, they will experience heightened evaluations of

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their group. Also, literature on social affiliation suggests that dissonance created from a low interpersonal justice climate will lead to higher levels of affiliation among group members. Increased social interaction among group members will positively influence feelings of togetherness and association in the group. It is possible that through social affiliation an interpersonally unfair supervisor will be viewed as a ‘‘common enemy’’ among group members. Thus, a low level of interpersonal justice climate will help build a bridge among group members, leading them to report higher group cohesion. It is important to note that the benefits of low levels of interpersonal justice climate would be constrained to group members’ evaluations of their group. We would not expect a group to report positive evaluations of their supervisor after reporting low levels of interpersonal justice climate. Also, we would not expect a group’s perception of unfair interpersonal treatment to build a strong association with the organization via organizational identification or organizational commitment because the supervisor could be seen as an agent of the organization, and the supervisor’s unfair treatment could tarnish the group’s image of the organization. However, we think that researchers could discover positive outcomes from low interpersonal justice climate when considering constructs such as group cohesion.

DISCUSSION Our first three propositions acknowledge the role of status in potentially influencing the relationship between unfair interpersonal treatment from a supervisor and interpersonal justice climate. We proposed that interpersonal justice climate would be less influenced by unfair interpersonal justice treatment when it is received from supervisors who possess high versus low levels of idiosyncrasy credits. Further, we predicted that groups with high status would be more sensitive to unfair interpersonal treatment than lowstatus groups. Conceptualizing status at the organizational level, we used social dominance theory to propose that groups within organizations emphasizing inequality, or hierarchy-enhancing organizations, will be more accepting of unfair interpersonal treatment than groups within organizations that emphasize equality. Finally, we argued that there is a possibility that a low interpersonal justice climate resulting from an unfair supervisor could positively influence groups when considering certain concepts such as group cohesion. Below, we discuss the potential theoretical and practical implications of our propositions.


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Theoretical Implications Justice research has made important strides in examining how groups react to justice climate within organizations (Colquitt, 2004; Colquitt et al., 2002; Colquitt et al., 2005; Dietz et al., 2003; Ehrhart, 2004; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Mossholder et al., 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Roberson & Colquitt, 2005; Simons & Roberson, 2003). Previous literature on justice climate tends to focus on procedural justice climate, and we hope to encourage future research to examine interpersonal justice climate to help scholars and practitioners better understand the causes and consequences of interpersonal justice at the group level of analysis. In particular, we think that an examination of interpersonal justice climate is warranted because of Colquitt and Jackson’s (2006) finding that the imperative to treat subordinates with respect and dignity was similarly important at the group and individual level of analysis. Numerous scholars have found that interpersonal justice at the individual level of analysis influences job attitudes and behaviors vital for organizational functioning (Ambrose et al., 2002; Cropanzano et al., 2002; Gellatly, 1995; Judge & Colquitt, 2006; Judge et al., 2006; Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005); Colquitt and Jacksons’s study suggests that further empirical work on interpersonal justice climate also could show that interpersonal justice climate influences group attitudes and behaviors. We wish to contribute to the literature on interpersonal justice climate by examining how conceptions of status at different levels of analysis (idiosyncrasy credits, group status, and an organization’s emphasis on status or equality) could influence how groups develop an interpersonal justice climate following unfair interpersonal treatment by a supervisor. We noted that an emphasis on status is not new within the organizational justice literature. Previous theoretical and empirical work on the group value model of fairness illustrates that one reason why individuals care about justice is that fair or unfair treatment demonstrates an individual’s status within the group (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). This theoretical perspective highlights how individual-level perceptions of fairness can influence perceptions of an individual’s status. Empirical support for our theoretical propositions could help add to this literature by indicating that conceptions of status from a variety of levels (supervisor, group, and organizational levels) influence reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment. When testing our propositions, one could conceive of idiosyncrasy credits as arising from a variety of sources. Based on previous literature, we

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proposed that idiosyncrasy credits arise from competence, high performance, and/or embeddedness within a rich social network (Hollander, 2006). It is possible that when considering group reactions to interpersonal justice climate, idiosyncrasy credits derived from competence or performance might seem more valid or legitimate than credits derived from social networks. Bunderson and Barton (2009) proposed that expert status is more strongly determined by specific status cues such as past task experience than more diffuse status cues. This suggests that groups might be more tolerant of unfair interpersonal treatment if they have a supervisor with idiosyncrasy credits derived from superior past performance because those credits are closely tied with the supervisor’s level of expertise and the group’s possible future benefit in performance from associating with the supervisor. Further, regardless of the source of idiosyncrasy credits, it would be interesting to explore how quickly idiosyncrasy credits turn from credits to debits when groups perceive unfair interpersonal treatment. Owing to the personal pain sometimes experienced from disrespectful treatment (Bies, 2001), one might expect that idiosyncrasy credits are a very temporary buffer when groups experience unfair treatment because this interpersonal injustice could dissipate idiosyncrasy credits quickly. We encourage future research to examine such a possibility. In our examination of how status influences reactions to unfair interpersonal treatment, we incorporated theoretical perspectives from different arenas including social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social dominance theory helps explain how group-based social hierarchies emerge within society, and this theory could allow organizational justice researchers to explore different avenues of future research. As proposed, social dominance theory could help explain why unfair interpersonal treatment is more likely to be tolerated by groups within hierarchy-enhancing versus hierarchy-attenuating organizations. Beyond explaining group reactions to unfair treatment, we think that social dominance theory could be applied to the individual level of analysis to help understand why some supervisors choose to treat their subordinates with disrespect. Social dominance orientation is the psychological component of social dominance theory, and it is defined as ‘‘the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ groups’’ (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 48). One could expect that supervisors high versus low in social dominance orientation would feel more inclined or justified to treat their subordinates disrespectfully because they perceive that it is appropriate to dominate ‘‘inferior’’ groups, such as those lower in the hierarchy (i.e., their


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subordinates). Further, one could propose that those high in social dominance orientation would exhibit unfair interpersonal treatment to subordinates who are members of traditionally considered low-status groups within society (i.e., women, Latinos, and Blacks). These, as well as others, potentially fruitful research questions could be posed by bridging social dominance theory and organizational justice concepts and theories. In addition to its influence on shaping a group’s interpersonal justice climate, it is also possible that status will display moderating effects with interpersonal justice climate on negative reactions toward a supervisor. Although, the earlier discussion focuses on how status affects a group’s judgment of what treatment is fair versus unfair (e.g., disrespect from a high-status supervisor is viewed as more fair than disrespect from a lowstatus supervisor), we expect that status will also impact a group’s tolerance for the shared perception of fairness. That is, when a group shares a perception that the treatment they received is unfair, status is likely to influence the group’s reaction to this shared justice climate. We expect that high-status groups, groups with a low-status supervisor, and groups embedded in a hierarchy-attenuating organization will have relatively little tolerance for a low interpersonal justice climate and thus react more strongly to the shared perception of unfair interpersonal treatment by a supervisor. We encourage future theoretical and empirical research to explore these possibilities. Another interesting avenue for future research is to further examine how interpersonal justice climate perceptions are formed within a group. Previous research has shown that the justice experienced by others can help shape one’s own justice perceptions (Colquitt, 2004; Jones & Skarlicki, 2005; Kray & Lind, 2002; Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998; Umphress, Labianca, Brass, Kass, & Scholten, 2003; Van den Bos & Lind, 2001). This research suggests that interpersonal injustice can be communicated and disseminated to group members, such that one need not personally experience interpersonal justice to have negative reactions to disrespectful treatment (Folger, 2001). Unfair interpersonal treatment might be particularly susceptible to group contagion effects due to the moral outrage that could be generated from such injustice (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Folger, 2001). A rumor that a supervisor has treated a friend or group member with disrespect might be sufficient to develop a low interpersonal justice climate within a group. We encourage future research to examine the processes by which interpersonal justice climate is formed within a group, with particular attention to group contagion effects. We noted that unfair interpersonal treatment may result in desirable group outcomes such as

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group cohesion. However, we also recognize that negative implications of unfair treatment likely overwhelm any possible positive effects. For example, unfair interpersonal treatment could negatively influence group productivity, group helping behavior toward the supervisor, and group attitudes toward the organization and supervisor. Furthermore, it is possible that despite the desirable outcomes resulting from group cohesion, low interpersonal justice climate could result in group members engaging in deviant or counterproductive work behavior such as stealing from the organization. Finally, the positive group cohesion effects we described stemming from low interpersonal justice climate could be short-lived. The undesirable consequences that befall low interpersonal justice climate in terms of decreased group productivity, supervisor evaluations, and counterproductive work behavior could destroy any positive effects of group cohesion over time. That is, it might be difficult for a group to remain cohesive after receiving negative performance reviews as a result of decreased productivity and/or sanctioning for counterproductive work behavior. Also, low interpersonal justice climate could influence group members to leave the organization, and as group members leave the organization, group cohesiveness could decrease. Therefore, we encourage future research not only to examine if a low interpersonal justice climate is positively related to group cohesion, but also to examine this effect longitudinally to discern if this effect dissipates or even reverses over time.

Implications for Practice Some leadership theories (Graen & Scandura, 1987) suggest that supervisors may treat employees differently in the workplace. Although future research should attempt to discover how interpersonal justice climate perceptions are formed, it is possible that disrespectful treatment toward one employee in the group could negatively influence the interpersonal justice perceptions of the entire group (Folger, 2001). One negative interpersonal encounter with an employee could sour the group’s perceptions of interpersonal treatment, suggesting that managers should be encouraged to treat all employees with respect and dignity. Further, any managerial interventions to ameliorate unfair interpersonal treatment might need to include all group members because these unjust experiences are likely shared by group members. However, if empirical support is found for our propositions, this would suggest that managers could have some latitude for unfair interpersonal treatment if the supervisor has high levels of status (i.e., idiosyncrasy


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credits), the group has low status, or the group is within a hierarchyenhancing organization. Also, it is possible to encourage group cohesion by treating group members interpersonally unfair, making the manager a ‘‘common enemy.’’ Despite these possibilities, the benefits of fair treatment far outweigh any possible attenuating or positive influences for unfair interpersonal treatment described here.

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CHAPTER 12 EXPLORING THE ‘‘BLACK BOX’’ OF JUSTICE CLIMATE: WHAT MECHANISMS LINK JUSTICE CLIMATE AND OUTCOMES?$ David M. Mayer and Maribeth Kuenzi ABSTRACT Purpose – This chapter highlights that we do not know why justice climate is related to various unit outcomes and proposes a number of mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach – This chapter draws on the extant literature on justice climate, organizational climate, and a number of theories to link justice climate to unit outcomes. Findings – We have little understanding of the mechanisms linking justice climate to unit outcomes and it is important to consider various mechanisms. Research limitations/implications – The primary limitation of this chapter is that although we present several ideas for future research, we do not provide any new empirical findings. The primary implications have to do with specifying the theoretical mechanisms responsible for the effects of justice climate on unit outcomes. $

Both authors contributed equally to this chapter.


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Originality/value – The novel aspect of this chapter is that it questions why justice climate is related to several disparate outcomes and tries to take a theoretical approach to uncover the mechanisms.

A sizeable body of work on organizational justice has found that an individual’s justice perceptions are related to important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, trust, evaluations of authority, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), and performance (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). In the past decade, a new stream of research has emerged that examines justice at the group level, referred to as justice climate (see Colquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberson, 2005; Li & Cropanzano, 2009; Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao, 2007a, for reviews). Justice climate refers to a shared group-level cognition regarding the extent to which group members are treated fairly and is typically operationalized as aggregate perceptions of justice across group members (Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). Given that organizations are increasingly utilizing team-based structures, the focus on justice at the group or team level is not only theoretically interesting but is also timely and relevant (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). The seminal work in this area demonstrated that justice climate predicted individual-level outcomes above and beyond individual-level justice perceptions and that there was agreement in groups regarding the level of employees’ justice (Mossholder, Bennett, & Martin, 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000). Subsequent empirical research has examined group-level outcomes of justice climate (Chen, Lam, Naumann, & Schaubroeck, 2005; Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Ehrhart, 2004; Moliner, Martı´ nez-Tur, Peiro´, Ramos, & Cropanzano, 2005; Naumann & Bennett, 2002; Simons & Roberson, 2003). Most of this research has found support for the link between justice climate and group-level outcomes although there are a few exceptions (Moliner et al., 2005; Naumann & Bennett, 2002). Indeed, in the past decade, over 25 empirical journal articles, theoretical journal articles, and book chapters have focused on justice climate. The journal articles have appeared in many of our top empirical (e.g., Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Personnel Psychology) and theoretical (e.g., Academy of Management Review) scholarly journals. In addition, Volume 6 of Research in Multi-Level Issues contained several chapters dedicated to justice climate (Ambrose & Schminke, 2007; Cropanzano, Li, & James,

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2007; Rupp et al., 2007a, 2007b). The fact that this book focused on justice in groups and teams exemplifies the growing importance of taking a group or team approach to the study of justice. Despite the growing interest in justice climate, it is perhaps surprising that we do not have a good understanding of why justice climate leads to important outcomes (see Chen et al., 2005; Naumann & Bennett, 2002; Simons & Roberson, 2003, for notable exceptions). Although scholars have done an excellent job of conceptualizing justice climate (Mossholder et al., 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000), theoretically and empirically examining how it emerges (Roberson, 2006a, 2006b; Roberson & Colquitt, 2005), and demonstrating individual-level (Ansari, Hung, & Aafaqi, 2007; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007; Mossholder et al., 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Spell & Arnold, 2007; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008; Wallace, Edwards, Mondore, & Finch, 2008; Yang, Mossholder, & Peng, 2007) and group-level (Chen et al., 2005; Colquitt et al., 2002; Ehrhart, 2004; Naumann & Bennett, 2002; Moliner et al., 2005; Simons & Roberson, 2003) outcomes of justice climate, we know relatively little about the mechanisms linking justice climate to outcomes of interest (see Chen et al., 2005; Naumann & Bennett, 2002; Simons & Roberson, 2003, for notable exceptions). At this stage of development in justice climate research, it is important to examine the theoretical mechanisms linking justice climate and outcomes. In this vein, the primary goal of this chapter is to open up the ‘‘black box’’ of justice climate by describing a number of theoretical mechanisms that can help explain the effects of justice climate. In the next section, we briefly make the case that it is important to examine mediators of justice climate effects. In the following section, we highlight the scant research that has examined mediators of justice climate. Finally, we draw on four theories that can help explain justice climate effects with the ultimate goal of stimulating much needed research in this domain.

THE NEED FOR OPENING THE ‘‘BLACK BOX’’ OF JUSTICE CLIMATE EFFECTS As noted previously, a substantial literature on justice climate has emerged within the past decade (Colquitt et al., 2005; Li & Cropanzano, 2009; Rupp et al., 2007a). One intriguing aspect of this body of work is the breadth of group-level outcomes that have been examined. For example, justice climate has been linked to group-level attitudes (e.g., satisfaction with supervisor

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and organizational commitment), intentions (e.g., intent to remain), wellbeing (e.g., burnout), processes (e.g., collective efficacy), counterproductive work behavior (e.g., absenteeism), prosocial behavior (e.g., OCB), and performance (e.g., task performance). Thus, justice climate is related to a wide variety of outcomes. The approach in the justice climate literature is quite different than much of the organizational climate literature (Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009). Typically, in the organizational climate literature, the specific type of climate being examined is conceptually closely related to the outcome of interest. For example, service climate is linked to customer satisfaction (Schneider, Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly, 2005), safety climate is related to accident rates and injuries (Clarke, 2006), and innovation climate is associated with creativity (Anderson & West, 1998). Thus, in the justice climate literature, there appears to be a conceptual disconnect between the climate being examined and its relation to the outcomes. Complicating this issue is that to date little research on justice climate has examined mediators of justice climate effects – an important issue given that the link between justice climate and the outcomes is not as intuitive as for other types of climate. Given the lack of obvious conceptual symmetry between justice climate and the diversity of outcomes examined, we think it is especially important to highlight the theoretical mechanisms that may help explain justice climate effects. We first review the studies that have examined mediators and then discuss several theories that are useful for linking justice climate to group-level outcomes.

PRIOR RESEARCH EXAMINING MEDIATORS OF JUSTICE CLIMATE EFFECTS Although several studies have examined the relationship between justice climate and group-level outcomes (Chen et al., 2005; Colquitt et al., 2002; Ehrhart, 2004; Naumann & Bennett, 2002; Moliner et al., 2005; Simons & Roberson, 2003), there is a dearth of research examining the mechanisms that help explain the effects of justice climate. There are three notable exceptions. Chen et al. (2005) studied 148 work teams of tellers in retail banks in Hong Kong. They found that group-level OCB mediated the relationship between procedural justice climate and group performance. Similarly, Naumann and Bennett (2002) studied 40 bank branches and found that

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group-level helping mediated the relationship between procedural justice climate and group performance. These two studies find consistent support for OCB as a mediator of procedural justice climate effects. Simons and Roberson (2003) examined mediators of justice climate effects on department- and store-level outcomes using a sample of 783 departments in 97 hotels. Unit-level affective commitment mediated the relationship between procedural justice climate and unit-level intent to remain and unit-level discretionary service behavior, and interpersonal justice climate was linked to unit-level intent to remain and unit-level discretionary behavior through unit-level affective commitment and unitlevel satisfaction with supervisor. At the store level, procedural and interpersonal justice climate were linked to employee turnover through affective commitment, satisfaction with supervisor, and intent to remain. In addition, the procedural and interpersonal justice climate relationships with guest service satisfaction were mediated by affective commitment, satisfaction with supervisor, and discretionary service behavior. These three studies help link justice climate to unit- and store-level outcomes.

MECHANISMS LINKING JUSTICE CLIMATE TO GROUP OUTCOMES The aforementioned studies provide an excellent initial attempt to examine mechanisms that help explain justice climate effects. To bolster these existing studies, we highlight several theoretical frameworks to explain the mechanisms that link justice climate to various outcomes. We describe four such possibilities below (Fig. 1). For each theory, we first provide a brief overview of the theoretical framework. Next, we suggest how the theory can be related specifically to justice climate. In the final part,

• • •

Justice Climate

•

Fig. 1.

Theories Social Identity Social Exchange Social information Processing Affect Infusion

Group Outcomes • Task Performance • Citizenship Behavior • Counterproductive Work Behavior • Group Processes • Job Attitudes & Intentions

Mechanisms for Justice Climate Effects.

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we provide possible operationalizations of the theory that could be used to test the mechanisms described. These are a jumping-off point for researchers to start considering how to measure these mechanisms, rather than an all-inclusive list. Before we start, a few caveats are in order. First, we focus on the link between justice climate and group outcomes such as group performance, group OCBs, and group deviance. Cross-level relationships between justice climate and individual outcomes do exist and are important, but, for the sake of parsimony, are not the focus of this chapter. Second, we do not make specific predictions linking justice climate to any particular outcomes. Rather, we focus on the general mechanisms that could be applied to various outcome variables. Third, we only examine the role of mean levels of justice climate (referred to as justice climate level) and do not focus on the variance in justice perceptions within a group, team, unit, or organization (referred to as justice climate strength; Colquitt et al., 2002; Roberson, 2006a). We focus on justice climate level to be parsimonious and also because justice climate strength makes more sense as a moderator of justice climate level and thus is less relevant to our examination of mediators of mean levels of justice within a group. Finally, we do not make differential predictions for the different justice climate dimensions or sources. There is limited support for the differential effects of the justice dimensions on outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2001) and we sought to be parsimonious in this chapter. In general, we think these mediators help explain the effects of multiple justice dimensions as well as overall justice climate. Again, this chapter is designed to provide some ‘‘food for thought’’ to start the dialog regarding mechanisms that link justice climate to group outcomes, not to provide a model of all possible levels of analysis, outcome variables, operationalizations, justice dimensions, and sources of justice. In what follows, we highlight four theories that can be used to link justice climate to group outcomes. We focus on these specific theories because they are influential theories within the organizational justice and organizational climate literatures that help explain why justice and climate relate to valuable outcomes.

Social Identity Theory Theory Overview One theory that may be useful to help explain the effects of justice climate is social identity theory (SIT; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1974, 1975, 1978). Hogg and Terry (2000, p. 121) describe social identity as ‘‘how the self is


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defined by group membership and how social cognitive processes associated with group membership-based self-definition produce characteristically ‘groupy’ behavior.’’ SIT focuses on the ways in which individuals perceive and categorize themselves, based on their social identities. It seeks to answer the question, ‘‘Who are we?’’ SIT has two primary components: categorization and comparison. Selfcategorization occurs when individuals believe that they belong to a specific group or social category. This categorization accentuates perceived similarities between the self and the other group members. Then individuals use social comparison to evaluate their in-group with out-group categorizations. This comparison process allows individuals to focus on dimensions that will enhance the group so that they can be judged positively. Individuals obtain a particular social identity by being a member of a group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group perspective. When individuals belong to the same group, they will hold similar perceptions, and these perceptions are then mutually reinforced. Group identity influences members in the group such that they perceive their fate as intermixed with the group’s fate. A process of depersonalization occurs and individuals act in accordance to the norms of the group (Terry & Hogg, 1996). This process serves to enhance their identification with the group that can in turn increase their self-esteem (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Social Identity Theory and Justice Climate Theory and research at the individual level make the link between justice and identity. For example, the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992), and group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003) all highlight how fair treatment makes an employee feel like a valued and trusted member of a group (see Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001, for a review). This increased acceptance within the group leads to identifying with the group and subsequently acting in ways that support the group. We believe these identity processes occur at the group level as well. When employees in a work group are all treated fairly, they are more likely to develop a shared sense of identification with the group. They are more likely to act as a cohesive unit and derive a collective sense of self-esteem from being a part of the group. Thus, social identity processes are expected to occur at the group level and serve as a mechanism linking justice climate to group outcomes.

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It should be noted that although we view social identity as a mediator of justice climate effects, it is possible that the relationship runs in the reverse order. Indeed, social identity could drive perceptions of justice climate. For example, if a group has a strong sense of connection and cohesion (i.e., a strong social identity), they may care more about how others in the group are treated and this can influence mean levels of justice climate in the group. In other words, when people integrate the group into their self-concept, they are likely to integrate injustices suffered by other in-group members into their own perceptions of justice, and thus, a shared sense of justice is likely to emerge. Thus, although we examine social identity as a mediator of justice climate effects, a case can be made that the causal order can run in the opposite direction. Possible Ways to Operationalize Social Identity One way to measure social identity is to assess group identification (Mael & Tetrick, 1992). Researchers could also examine commitment to the group as a proxy for social identity. One way to do this is to adapt Meyer and Allen’s (1997) affective commitment measure to the group level. A final possibility is to measure group cohesion (see Beal, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003, for research on group cohesion) as a way of examining social identity. All of these constructs highlight how having a sense of closeness, connection, and identity from one’s group could help explain the relationship between the justice climate and the group outcomes.

Social Exchange Theory Theory Overview Social exchange theory (SET; Blau, 1964) provides another theoretical mechanism linking justice climate and outcomes. SET stipulates that certain workplace antecedents lead to interpersonal connections, referred to as exchange relationships (Cropanzano et al., 2001). SET posits that behavior stems from an exchange process where individuals weigh the benefits and risks of these social relationships. Blau (1964) suggests that there are two broad classes of exchanges that can occur in the workplace: economic and social exchanges. Both of these exchanges involve a series of interactions that invoke an obligation. Economic exchanges are more short-lived, quid pro quo relationships that typically involve a more tangible resource. Social exchanges tend to have a


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longer term focus and can often involve more intangible resources such as esteem or recognition. In social exchange relationships, there are ‘‘rules’’ of exchange that individuals follow to guide the exchange process. The most common rule that has been examined in the management literature is the rule of reciprocity. Here, individuals feel obligated for various reasons to reciprocate positive (negative) behavior in positive (negative) exchanges. Thus, when an individual receives favorable treatment, she/he is obligated to reciprocate by engaging in behaviors that are beneficial to the source of the positive treatment. Social Exchange Theory and Justice Climate Social exchange relationships evolve when employers ‘‘take care of employees,’’ which thereby engenders beneficial consequences. In other words, the social exchange relationship is a mediator or intervening variable between fair (unfair) behaviors and positive (negative) actions in the group. There is a considerable amount of research examining social exchange as a mediator of justice effects at the individual level (see Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Susan Taylor, 2000, for an example). We expect social exchange processes to operate at the group level as well. Specifically, when group members have a shared perception of fair treatment, the work group will feel obligated to reciprocate by engaging in behaviors that benefit their supervisor, work group, and organization. Furthermore, when the group feels fairly treated, it is more willing to sacrifice on the behalf of the collective and less likely to engage in acts of deviance. Possible Ways to Operationalize Social Exchange One way to measure social exchange at the group level would be to measure the exchange relationships between leaders and employees in the form of leader–member exchange (LMX; Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975) at the group level as well as the exchange relationships between coworkers in a workgroup or perceptions of team–member exchange (TMX; Seers, 1989). A second way to measure social exchange as a mediator is to focus on trust. Trust is proposed to be an important mechanism linking justice to outcomes at the individual level. One possibility would be to adapt a measure of trust such as the one developed by Mayer and Davis (1999) to the group level. A third way to operationalize social exchange is to measure perceived supervisor support and perceived organizational support at the group level (Eisenberger, Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, Sucharski, & Rhoades, 2002). When members of a work group have a shared perception of fair treatment,

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they are more likely to feel supported and thus will reciprocate by engaging in behaviors that help one’s supervisor, group, and organization.

Social Information Processing Theory Theory Overview Social information processing theory (SIPT; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) posits that individuals working in the same work environment will be exposed to the same cues such as leaders and other contextual characteristics. Individuals are influenced by the activities of those around them. They look to the actions of others to inform their thinking about what is important, appropriate, and likely to be rewarded, and what behaviors are not. The information available in their immediate work context is used to interpret events and to develop expectations about the appropriate behavior and the consequences of behavior. Individuals use this information from others in their immediate work context to form judgments about organizational activities. We argue based on SIPT that climate affects the salience of the environmental cues and thus perceptions of how people should be treated (i.e., norms for appropriate behavior). Salancik and Pfeffer (1978), in their seminal piece on social information processing, suggest that the critical issue of climate ‘‘is the consistency or unanimity with which persons define the situation, and the forcefulness with which they maintain such shared meanings. Thus, the SIPT approach would define climate in terms of the shared perceptions of what attitudes and needs are appropriate, the shared definitions of jobs and work environments, and the definitions or how people should relate to that environment.’’ Thus, employees will look to how they are treated by management to determine what behavior is appropriate and acceptable behavior within their work group. Social Information Processing Theory and Justice Climate Unlike in the prior two sections, the individual-level justice literature rarely examines social information processing as a mediator of justice climate effects. This is perhaps surprising given that the original conceptualization of SIPT focused on individuals in organizations. Although a dearth of attention has been dedicated to integrating SIPT and justice (see Roberson, 2006a, for an exception), this theory is highly relevant for linking justice climate to group outcomes. When justice climate is high, work group employees receive the message that treating people in positive ways is the


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norm and the appropriate way to behave. In contrast, when justice climate is low, the norm being communicated is that treating others in a considerate manner is not highly valued. Thus, justice climate influences awareness (and in some cases, internalization) of the norms of the work group, and the desire to behave consistently with the norms influences the group’s behavior. Possible Ways to Operationalize Social Information Processing There are few established measures that are useful for linking justice climate to the group outcomes through social information processing mechanisms. The best strategy for future research is to develop a measure that taps the shared norms employees in a work group perceive regarding how others should be treated. Justice climate should increase work group norms for appropriate treatment of others, and the perceptions of such norms should mediate the effects of justice climate. Developing a measure of justicerelated norms at the group level would be a useful addition to the organizational justice literature and allow for a test of social information processing as a mediator of justice climate effects.

Affect Infusion Model Theory Overview Finally, features in the work environment can have an indirect effect on outcomes through not only cognitive reactions but also affective reactions. The affect infusion model (AIM) provides an explanation for how a mood can influence the ability to process information. Forgas (1995, p. 39) defines affect infusion as ‘‘the process whereby affectively loaded information exerts an influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental process, entering into the judge’s deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental outcome.’’ The model suggests that affect influences not only what people think but also how people process information and ultimately react behaviorally. According to the AIM, affective states influence behaviors and judgment depending on the information processing strategies that individuals use. Tasks that require more processing will tend to be more influenced by affect than those that require less elaborate processing. The AIM has been shown to affect judgments, decision-making, and behaviors in organizations (see Forgas & George, 2001, for a review). For instance, positive moods have been shown to promote prosocial behaviors (George, 1991). In addition,

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affect or moods can influence cognitive processes by affecting how events are interpreted as well as what information is attended to. Although AIM has primarily focused on the effects of individual-level mood, researchers have shown that groups can also have moods or an affective tone. By group affective tone (GAT), we mean the ‘‘consistent or homogenous affective reactions within a group’’ (George, 1990, p. 108). Indeed, Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) suggest that group members can experience similar moods if they are exposed to the same affective events. Specific work events will lead to emotional reactions by the group that in turn affect the behaviors and attitudes of the group. In this vein, GAT mediates the relationship between the work environment and the group outcomes. Affect Infusion Model and Justice Climate We posit that justice climate influences the affective tone of the group and that in turn results in positive (negative) behaviors to support (harm) the group. For instance, a negative justice climate is an adverse working condition, which contributes to the team’s negative experiences, which ultimately adversely influences team performance and attitudes. Consistent with research at the individual level examining affect as a mediator of justice effects (De Cremer, 2007), we think it is likely that affective tone will mediate the relationship between justice climate and group outcomes. When employees in a group have a shared perception of being treated fairly, the mood of the group will be improved and subsequently more prosocial behaviors will be exhibited by the group. In contrast, in a group that has members who have a shared perception that they are treated unfairly, the negative affective tone of the group is likely to increase and group members are more likely to engage in undesirable behaviors. Possible Ways to Operationalize Affect Infusion There are several ways that group moods can be operationalized. A measure for GAT exists in the literature. George (1990) aggregated individual measures of affect to measure GAT. Totterdell (2000) examined team or collective moods by asking individuals to rate the team mood using a bipolar adjective checklist (he used the UMACL by Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990). Researchers have also examined emotional contagion by having third-party observers rate group emotions. For example, Barsade (2002) had observers rate videotapes of group interactions during an experimental situation. Finally, researchers could examine the affective climate within a work group (e.g., Tse, Dasborough, & Ashkanasy, 2008) as a way to measure affect in the group.


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Summary In sum, in this section, we briefly described four theories (e.g., social identity, social exchange, social information processing, and affect infusion) that should prove useful as a starting point for examining mediators of justice climate effects. Clearly, more nuanced predictions linking various dimensions and sources of justice climate to different outcomes at multiple levels could (and hopefully will) emerge from our more general conceptual model. We hope that by briefly describing the theory, the processes that should link justice climate to outcomes, and potential ways for operationalizing the mediating processes, our chapter will be useful for justice scholars interested in understanding why justice climate has such a powerful effect on various outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS Clearly, there is considerable interest in justice climate as evidenced by the sizeable literature that has emerged over the past decade. Although the field has developed rapidly, in this chapter, we argued that it is critical for the next phase of research on justice climate to begin to examine why justice climate is related to valuable outcomes. We hope this chapter stimulates research exploring the ‘‘black box’’ of justice climate effects. We believe it is important to develop a better understanding of the theoretical mechanisms that underlie justice climate effects for this area of research to continue to flourish.

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CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 13 GROUPS, FAIRNESS, AND AN IDEA OF JUSTICE Harris Sondak ABSTRACT Purpose – This capstone chapter introduces Amartya Sen’s important and innovative theory of justice to researchers on fairness in groups and organizations. Here, I discuss how Sen’s theory can provide grounding for both philosophical and social scientific work on justice and how social science research can inform and be informed by Sen’s theory. Design/methodology/approach – In this chapter, I discuss Sen’s new book, A Theory of Justice, and explain the main aspects of Sen’s theory of justice. I then draw conceptual linkages between Sen’s theory and those introduced in each of the other chapters included in this volume. Findings – I show that Sen’s view of justice goes beyond social contract theories that attempt to identify ideal institutional arrangements to seek practical solutions that increase justice as experienced by actual people in the world. Rather than parallel endeavors, Sen’s approach reveals philosophy and social science to be deeply connected to each other and to justice by providing a unifying theme by which various social scientific traditions are shown to study aspects of the same underlying phenomena. Further, I demonstrate how philosophy and social science together can increase justice in the world.


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Originality/value – Sen’s theory of justice, though influential in economic and policy circles, is largely unfamiliar to social psychologists and organizational scholars. I introduce these fields to Sen’s theory of justice and show how it is useful for social psychological approaches to the study of fairness in groups and organizations.

After having been invited to contribute this capstone chapter for this volume on fairness and groups, I came across Amartya Sen’s new book, The Idea of Justice. Sen is a Nobel Prize–winning economist who, in addition to his work in economics, often writes about related issues in ethics and public policy. In this latest book, Sen elaborates and integrates his previous discussions about ethics and presents a view of justice and what it requires that is both philosophical and based on social choice theory, a branch of economics that is concerned with determining collective outcomes that reflect individuals’ preferences. In its own right as philosophy, because of its relevance to social science including organizational behavior and psychology, and because my interest in the psychology of procedural fairness was spurred by my reading social choice theory (in particular, Arrow, 1951), I found Sen’s book to be quite interesting. I think many justice scholars will agree and find his views informative for their work. The issues that Sen brings up relate to several concerns that the preceding chapters have explored. My thesis in this chapter has two parts: (1) Sen’s theory of justice can provide grounding for both philosophical and social scientific work on justice and (2) the research by the contributors to this volume can illustrate Sen’s theory of justice and be informed by it. An immediate question for me to address is why scholars who use social scientific methods to study fairness in groups and organizations should care about a philosophical approach to justice. First, it seems to me that as a basis for construct validity we should know what we are talking about when we write about justice and fairness. I have been to many research presentations by colleagues, who, when asked about what they mean by justice or fairness reply that whatever their study’s participants took those words to mean is what they mean; I find this response disappointing. Justice and fairness are perhaps subjective judgments to some degree, but Sen argues, as I discuss in the following text, that they are also objective notions in important ways. In any case, they are certainly a particular kind of judgment (as a number of the authors in this volume point out); saying that something is fair or just is not the same as saying ‘‘hurrah for this’’ or some other general sense of approval. Abdicating what one means in studying fairness to the interpretation of a

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specific set of respondents fails to connect a particular research study either to other studies, to a more general understanding of these terms, or to the important concepts and enduring questions of justice. Fairness scholars sometimes neglect to explain what kind of judgment fairness is and philosophy can help make the issues involved clearer. Second, as organizational scholars, many of us think that improving organizations and the experiences of their members are important goals of our work (cf. Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003). Although some views of social science hold that, like natural science, our activities are (ideally) valueneutral, that claim is far from universally accepted (Rosenberg, 2007). I am guessing that we who study justice are more likely than organizational scholars or psychologists in general to want to apply our findings and to hold at least an implicit prescriptive and not just a descriptive image of our research and its effects. To the extent that furthering justice in groups and organizations is part of the goal of a research agenda, it is important to think through what justice entails. Third, teachers in professional schools (as are most of the authors who contributed to this volume and, I suppose, most of its readers), it seems to me, have an obligation to help our students recognize, understand, and promote justice in groups and organizations. Our role in helping people do their work with competence and integrity and to be prepared to step into leadership roles demands as much. On the presumption that research and teaching are mutually reinforcing, understanding theories of justice can facilitate the incorporation of research on fairness into the teaching of organizational behavior.

WHAT JUSTICE DEMANDS Sen builds on Rawls’ well-known and influential view that justice depends on fairness and that fairness requires individual liberty and group decisionmaking procedures that are unbiased. Sen, however, focuses more than Rawls on situated individuals and their preferences, rather than the universal or ideal foundations of just institutions. Sen, therefore, distinguishes between transcendental solutions about what arrangements are best in principle and – of more concern to him – comparative improvements that increase the justice experienced by actual people. This distinction is important because there can be much agreement, Sen argues, that the demands of justice point to changes in one direction or another, even if the ideal situation is not feasible, known, or even knowable. To take a contemporary example, Sen would certainly be

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happy to know what would constitute the best conceivable health care system reform for the United States. Discussion behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance, which hides from each of us our actual social position so that we can make unbiased judgments, Sen might agree, may facilitate the eventual identification of the ideal system. But, Sen points out, knowing what the ideal system is would not necessarily provide guidance about how to achieve it given the status quo. Sen’s concern, therefore, is that we do what we can to improve the health care system and to do so sooner rather than later. In general, he argues, knowing what would be best is not needed to identify achievable improvements for the better: ‘‘If a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choice of policies, strategies, or institutions, then the identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 15). Another way to explain the distinction between transcendental solutions and comparative improvements, and perhaps in terms more familiar to likely readers of this volume, may be to say that Rawls is particularly concerned with fair procedures in the abstract, whereas Sen wants to focus more on how procedures are enacted and the actual outcomes they produce. I do not mean to suggest that Rawls does not care about real outcomes nor that Sen portrays him this way. Rather, Sen suggests that while Rawls focuses on how to establish the ideal ground rules for decision making – the most just constitution, so to speak – Sen himself cares more to increase justice in the world we live in, whatever the actual or ideal institutional context might be. Social choices that increase justice are partial solutions, Sen suggests, because social justice is a project that is not likely ever to be completed; to paraphrase Martin Luther King (1967), while the arc of the moral universe is long, with some leverage, we can bend it toward justice. Sen argues that increasing human capabilities is the key to promoting justice. To explain his idea of ‘‘capabilities,’’ Sen distinguishes between ‘‘culmination’’ and ‘‘comprehensive’’ outcomes. Culmination outcomes are what finally happens to a person – the money one receives, for example, in his or her paycheck. Comprehensive outcomes are the combination of what happens and the choices that led to that outcome. Sen argues that how a situation arose and the choices participants in the situation made are important for judging that situation: ‘‘[T]he state of affairs, or the outcome in the context of the choice under examination, can incorporate processes of choice, and not merely the narrowly defined ultimate result. The content of outcomes can also be seen as including all the agency information that may be relevant and all the personal and impersonal relations that may be seen as


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important in the decisional problem at hand’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 215, emphasis in the original). Although his language may be different than ours, scholars who study procedural fairness as a psychological or organizational phenomenon can readily understand Sen’s distinction between culmination and comprehensive outcomes. To take an economically relevant example from my own current work, one’s take-home pay matters for perceptions of fairness, but so does whether that pay was generated with risk or not, because people have different attitudes toward uncertainty (Desai, Sondak, & Diekmann, 2010); being able to choose between two different payment structures (fixed or by commission, for example) may be valuable even in the absence of any difference in expected or actual payments. More generally, Sen argues that not only the specific choice a person makes but also the set of opportunities among which one chooses is relevant to his or her satisfaction with having chosen. One implication of this view is that having alternatives that one does not choose provides value to the person making the choice because having been presented with the choice increases his or her ability to consider and participate in a decision. This wide-ranging agency is important for Sen’s capabilities approach to justice. Justice should increase capabilities, according to Sen, because capabilities reflect one’s ability ‘‘to do things he or she has reason to value’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 231). Sen, I think, would agree that it is no accident that the philosophical notion of justice and the psychology of fairness both depend on processes and not just narrowly construed outcomes. Voice is an important example; psychologists studying fairness have tended to focus on voice as an instrumental proxy for outcomes and as symbolic of standing. Sen would acknowledge these individual level advantages but go on to suggest that in the aggregate a diversity of interpretations and contributions is important for identifying the more just alternatives: ‘‘A person’s voice may count either because her interests are involved or because her reasoning and judgment can enlighten a discussion’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 108).

DETERMINING WHAT IS JUST Identifying people’s capabilities, and the conditions that increase them, is, according to Sen, a matter for public reasoning. That is, the identification and implementation of capability enhancing choices is something that is improved by the inclusion of many voices and thus is best served by

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democracy. Justice and democracy are therefore linked; if justice is served by increasing people’s capabilities, and defining and expanding these capabilities depends on public reasoning, and democracy is how social choice is manifested through public reasoning, then justice and democracy are intertwined. As Sen puts it, ‘‘If the demands of justice can be assessed only with the help of public reasoning, and if public reasoning is constitutively related to the idea of democracy, then there is an intimate connection between justice and democracy’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 326). Public reasoning increases justice because more information is brought to the discussion, both about interests and about the wider context within which a particular decision must be made. Rather than focus on rights conferred by membership or standing in a particular group, as do both Rawls philosophically and many researchers in the psychological tradition, Sen suggests that good decisions – in the sense of generality, accuracy, and applicability – can be promoted through the inclusion of many perspectives. For example, in The Idea of Justice, Sen draws heavily on both Western and Indian historical, literary, and philosophical traditions. India has for millennia contained a diversity of perspectives and Sen’s views reflect this legacy; a president of India defined Hinduism itself, for example, as the belief ‘‘that truth was many-sided and different views contained different aspects of truth which no one could fully express’’ (S. Radhakrishnan, quoted in Doniger, 2009, p. 27). In any case, being informed or having something at stake is sufficient to justify inclusion; in this sense, voice exactly confers standing in the sense of the opportunity to participate in decision making, and it should be offered widely. One reason input should be sought widely is to increase the chances of arriving at a decision that has sufficient universality. Citing Adam Smith’s notion of ‘‘any fair and impartial spectator,’’ Sen argues that justice demands that we allow perspectives from outside our own group, community, or society to influence our conception of what would be the best available choice given the circumstances. Just like an individual’s decision biases may be checked by discussion with another person, social choice can be informed by wide – even global – conversation. The only way to gain distance from our own limited horizons on our individual or social choices, Sen argues, is to consider the problem from the point of view of other people. Sen, therefore, endorses ‘‘Smith’s intellectual strategy y to broaden our understanding and widen the reach of our ethical inquiry’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 125). However they are defined and identified, Sen asserts that capabilities do not confer only opportunities for one’s own benefit. Because


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capability – agency – is a kind of power, capabilities bring duties and obligations, not just rewards. By asserting this connection between power and obligation, Sen articulates a theory of justice that includes notions of individual conscience and responsibility, and political and organizational authority. Whenever one has power, he or she ought to consider any action that will create a more just situation, whether or not such an action will increase or even decrease his or her own outcomes. Power does not properly seek its own benefit, nor does it seek some kind of social exchange or reciprocity. It is precisely the asymmetry of the situation itself that creates a moral obligation for the powerful, according to Sen, and that makes mutual benefit largely beside the point: ‘‘Having effective power and the obligations that can follow unidirectionally from it can also be an important basis for impartial reasoning, going well beyond the motivation of mutual benefits’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 207). Sen invokes both Adam Smith (mostly, in this respect, of The Theory of Moral Sentiments) and classical Indian sources for this obligation. Smith suggests that sympathy for others is a basic aspect of human nature, ‘‘We cannot form the idea of any innocent and sensible being, whose happiness we should not desire, or to whose misery, when distinctly brought home to the imagination, we should not have some degree of aversion’’ (Smith, 1759/ 1853, p. 345). Sen also relates both the stories of Gautama Buddha and the epic Sanskrit hero Arjuna to illustrate his point further. In the Sutta-Nipata, Buddha argues that we human beings owe care to other species because we are so much more powerful than they; similarly, the mother owes care to the child not because of cooperative reciprocal social exchange of any kind but because she can ‘‘do things for the child that will make a huge difference to the child’s life and which the child itself cannot do’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 205). There is striking similarity of Buddha’s teaching with that of Plato – a remote but perhaps not entirely historically unrelated contemporary who was also investigating the nature of power and justice: ‘‘Surely the sole concern of the shepherd’s art is to do the best for the charges put under its care y On that principle it followed [that] any kind of authority y must, in its character of authority, consider solely what is best for those under its care’’ (Plato, 300 B.C./1941, p. 27). Sen also relates the story, from the Mahabharata, of the great warrior Arjuna. Before a huge battle, Arjuna discusses with Lord Krishna his compassion toward the people he is about to engage and kill. Although Krishna urges Arjuna to do his duty for his king and fight, Arjuna, who does not doubt that the war is just and that he is fighting on the right side, struggles with the responsibility of destroying those who are weaker than him.

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The specifics of understanding what actions are just – because they increase human capacities in general and those of the less powerful in particular – depend, Sen would agree, I think, on evidence from the social sciences. In Sen’s own case, for example, research into the history and economics of famines provides evidence that public reasoning and democracy are associated with furthering human capabilities and social justice. Sen has famously asserted that ‘‘no major famine has ever occurred in a functioning democracy with regular elections, opposition parties, basic freedom of speech and a relatively free media (even when the country is very poor and in a seriously adverse food situation)’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 342). This claim is at once empirical and ethical. More specific to fairness in groups and organizations, Sen’s theory can both illuminate and benefit from the contributions to this volume because the behaviors and reactions of people must be included in any practical assessment of procedures and outcomes. Sen is clear that assumptions of idealized behavior in transcendental theories of justice present severe limits to their applicability. Arguing that the practical opportunities for Rawls’ project are not propitious because it relies on unrealistic behavioral assumptions, Sen writes, ‘‘[T]he relationship between social institutions and actual – as opposed to ideal – individual behavior cannot but be critically important for any theory of justice that is aimed at guiding social choice towards social justice’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 69).

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS VOLUME The chapters included in this volume address several important aspects of how people behave in terms of and experience justice in groups and thus can be helpful in bending the arc of social interaction toward justice. First, comparative improvements toward better (though still partial) solutions should be embraced and the chapters included in this volume provide evidence about how to enhance justice in groups. Second, though Sen argues that having power entails obligations, not just opportunities, the obligations of the powerful in groups need further articulation. Third, Sen acknowledges that judgments of justice and fairness are informed by both affect and reason and that their respective roles should be elucidated. Finally, insights come from both consideration of what impartial observers might suggest and the perspectives of situated individuals; facilitating the inclusion of these various points of view is an important part of the public reasoning that is, for Sen, fundamental to justice.


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Making Comparative Improvements Huo, Binning, and Molina Yuen J. Huo, Kevin R. Binning, and Ludwin E. Molina’s chapter in this volume suggests that justice in groups can be increased through understanding what it means to be respected. Like Sen, Huo, Binning, and Molina are concerned that respect should not be just a category of ideal, abstract interpersonal behavior; instead, they address what it means actually to feel respected. Respect, for Huo, Binning, and Molina, means evaluation of oneself by others within the relevant social group on two dimensions – how well one is liked and one’s social standing in the group. Respect is desired from other group members, whether they are explicit authorities or not, because it helps the individual construct a desirable social identity as liked and included, and as valued by and important to others for his or her contributions to the group. Because people desire it, Huo, Binning, and Molina say, treating another with respect is a form of giving that person noninstrumental rewards. Huo, Binning, and Molina consider lay beliefs about respect, but they do not mention one popular and salient source that seems to capture their more specialized social scientific view well: both dimensions are reflected in ‘‘Respect,’’ the song made into a feminist anthem by Aretha Franklin, who sings to her partner that he should both love her well and give her what is due when he comes home, else he may find that she has left (Redding, 1965). Huo, Binning, and Molina’s ‘‘dual pathway’’ model states that both inclusion and status judgments mediate the relationship between interpersonal treatment by group member and engagement with the group. Consistent with Huo, Binning, and Molina’s perspective, it is not just the love and not just the status that matters to Franklin for her willingness to remain in the ‘‘group,’’ but the combination of the two. What Franklin expresses poetically, Huo, Binning, and Molina study systematically in a multiethnic, multicultural context (an urban high school in southern California) and find that how authorities and peers treat students conveys both inclusion and status. They do not find that inclusion judgments matter for identification with a group or cooperative behavior; their results do show, however, that status judgments affect engagement with the group and individual well-being, supporting the group-engagement model of procedural justice (Tyler & Blader, 2003). Extending their model to subgroups within larger groups, Huo, Binning, and Molina report that for members of ethnic minority groups, group-level respect is associated with support for the broader political community.

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Not only does the experience of respect matter for individuals’ psychological well-being, Huo, Binning, and Molina report, but the lack of respect is also associated with a low sense of agency, which, in turn, contributes to stress and poor health outcomes. At the group level, too, negative treatment is associated with group members’ health outcomes. Sen’s views relate to these findings in a couple of ways. First, respect of individuals and groups is part of social justice, and not just antecedents to perceptions of fairness. Although Huo, Binning, and Molina provide reasons for managers to treat others with respect, Sen argues that they have at least, in part, an ethical duty to do so irrespective of those practical reasons. Second, though Sen would agree with Huo, Binning, and Molina that standing is an important aspect of group membership, he argues that respect is owed to people as individual human beings, not just as members of a particular group, organization, or nation. It is in part to illustrate this point that Sen relates the story of Arjuna’s debate with Krishna before the battle of Kurukshetra; as Sen puts it, ‘‘There is a general argument here on the importance of [all of] our lives y [W]e cannot ignore what happens to human lives in particular in y ethical or political evaluations’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 213). Not only are management and group effectiveness and the well-being of individual group members facilitated by respect, but justice is served by treating all people with respect.

DeVoe and Iyengar Sanford E. DeVoe and Sheena S. Iyengar argue in their chapter that the fairness of allocations depends on the nature of the resources being allocated. There are a number of dimensions along which one might distinguish among resources, but DeVoe and Iyengar focus on the difference between money (or easily monetized goods) and other kinds of goods. Equality is an important aspect of almost any fair division, Sen points out, but the question arises: ‘‘equality of what?’’ In economic contexts generally and for money in particular, DeVoe and Iyengar report, equity (equality of ratios of contributions to outcomes) is usually preferred; in social or political contexts, however, equality (of outcomes or opportunities) tends to be seen as more fair. Across cultures, equality is more generally endorsed by members of collectivist cultures than by members of individualist cultures, especially within their own groups. When money is being allocated, however, cultural differences are attenuated; DeVoe and Iyengar report results from their own empirical studies, for example, that indicate that within the same business organization, equity was preferred as


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the allocation principle for money in eight different countries, regardless of their levels of individualism or collectivism. DeVoe and Iyengar consider what it is about money that leads to a general preference for equity. Citing the seventeenth century philosopher John Locke, they distinguish between production of property for use and for exchange. Aristotle before Locke, and Adam Smith and Karl Marx after him, were also concerned with this distinction and would agree that private property, which one can trade for profit, is quite different from personal property, which a person produces or obtains through trade for his or her own needs. DeVoe and Iyengar’s research indicates that while money is at once a unit of account and a store of value, it is its function as a medium of market exchange that leads people to want to allocate it (and monetized goods) according to equity. In any particular context, Sen would argue, we need to consider not just ex ante institutional arrangements, even ones to which we might agree were we behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance. Rather, we ought to consider the state of affairs that our institutions actually create and make judgments about the justice of those outcomes. We might, for example, as a matter of Rawlsian social contracting, agree before the details manifest themselves to allocate pay according to equity (for faculty, for example, by number of top-tier publications) and other things equally (teaching loads, perhaps). But people live in a world governed by specific details and such an arrangement might not, as it turns out, serve justice. Although some contingencies can be anticipated and included in the social contract, others cannot. Perhaps a group member has a personal tragedy – say, one’s child dies suddenly; should the group then enforce the usual performance standard? The ex post decision should be made as wisely and as impartially as possible, which means to consider the situation from many points of view, solicit input widely, and have open discussion. Furthermore, Sen argues that institutional structures can fail unexpectedly and that social justice must be served by adjustments to policies as a result of public reasoning. He illustrates the need for this process with the specific example of the Bengal famine of 1943. Sen suggests no general criticism against using market mechanisms to allocate necessities, including food. But he recognizes that various factors affect market prices and markets sometimes do not result in just outcomes. British policies in India during World War II, some understandable for a power at war, caused food prices to increase dramatically, whereas rural wages did not. This gap led to hunger and quickly to starvation in the countryside; officials in New Delhi and London, and the British public, underestimated the problem by more

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than an order of magnitude (the Governor’s office estimated the death rate at 1,000 per week but the true toll was more than 26,000 per week). Sen suggests that in addition to a flawed economic theory of famine (the British thought that because production remained relatively constant, famine could not occur), the censorship imposed on the Indian press by the colonial administration was a major contributing factor: ‘‘A democratic system with public criticism and parliamentary pressure would not have allowed the officials y to think the way they did’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 340). Sen’s arguments and example suggest that though people may endorse particular allocation mechanisms and principles as being most fair, depending on the actual circumstances that occur, justice may require suspension or modification of these principles.

Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow The chapter by Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Wenzel, and Michael J. Platow also speaks about how justice in the world can be improved, if not perfected. Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow are concerned about ways to repair injustices and restore a group’s cohesiveness. Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow argue that perceived violations of fairness as well as ways to repair injustices will vary widely across people. They suggest that the use of what Sen would call public reasoning can restore a sense of fair treatment; by engaging in open conversation, the victims of injustice can be reconciled with its perpetrators. Here is an apt example, I think Sen would agree, where social science and philosophy can inform each other because though public reasoning may well have psychological power to repair the (subjective) experience of fairness, it perhaps does so in part because it truly does bring more (objective) justice into the world. Justice is objective, rather than subjective, according to Sen, in terms of both comprehension and acceptance. Although perception is fundamentally individuated, we nonetheless have the ability to communicate our experiences and come to agreement about events and their meanings. Sen writes, ‘‘[E]ach person’s beliefs and utterances are not inescapably confined to some personal subjectivity that others may not be able to penetrate y [P]eople can engage in debates about the correctness of the claims made by different persons,’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 118). Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow suggest that one psychological mechanism that makes restorative justice efforts effective, and different from retributive approaches that seek punishment or revenge, is the creation or recreation of a common identity between the transgressor and the injured. Part of this


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common identity is an aspect of respect in that victims want a return of status and power and recognition of their agency. Another means to restore justice, according to Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow, is the reaffirmation of underlying shared values. Reaffirming the values of the group of which both transgressor and victim are members is restorative because doing so reestablishes a shared sense of the rules that, when followed, allow feelings of justice to emerge. Although Okimoto, Wenzel, and Platow focus on reestablishing ties through this reaffirmation of values within a group, to the extent that the demands of justice go beyond local assumptions, an interpersonal or intragroup approach, though perhaps psychologically satisfying, may not be fully or truly restorative. It may be, as Sen would suggest, that universal values and reason are implicated as well. Sen, for example, points to the example of the Mughal ruler Akbar the Great whom he says engaged in extensive efforts to restore and protect ‘‘inter-community relations y in the already multicultural India of the sixteenth century y [H]e arranged systematic dialogues in his capital city of Agra between Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jains, Parsees, Jews, and others, even including agnostics and atheists y [H]is overarching thesis [was] that ‘the pursuit of reason’ (rather than what he called ‘the marshy land of tradition’) is the way to address difficult problems of good behavior and the challenges of constructing a just society’’ (Sen, 2009, pp. 37–38). Because Sen thinks that justice goes beyond the subjective perceptions or feelings of fairness, it requires both open conversation and broad application.

The Obligations of Power Neville and Brodt Akbar, of course, was an emperor. Sen argues that the more power one has, the more obligated one is to increase justice in the world. Lukas Neville and Susan E. Brodt’s chapter discusses a dilemma the powerful face even when motivated to treat others well. Neville and Brodt point out that both trust and fairness are important factors in organizational functioning. They argue, however, that rather than being mutually reinforcing, trust and fairness may sometimes work at crosspurposes. Neville and Brodt also argue that material and symbolic rewards from someone in the position to bestow them are often provided to those who allow themselves to be vulnerable to or dependent on that powerful person. Furthermore, the more discretionary a favor, the less it is deserved

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or owed; and, the more a favor is atypical, the more it signals a special relationship between the giver and the recipient. Such favors, therefore, fly in the face of the consistency requirements of procedural fairness. However, these favors, while perhaps constituting unfair bias toward a particular person, elicit reciprocal behavior and thus can engender trust. Social exchange models predict that the more such undeserved and special favors are bestowed, the greater is the bond between the provider and the recipient because they create obligations of reciprocity and signal in-group status. Such treatment by the powerful may lead its recipients to judge the situation as fair, even when third parties might not. Sen offers a strong critique of the social exchange basis of social contract theories of justice, including Rawls’, in part because of the injustice that it ironically can promote. Rawls, Sen argues, bases his idea of cooperation on self-interest, even though the self is abstract and deindividuated behind the veil of ignorance. Interdependence and reciprocity, Sen suggests, lead to mutual cooperation being chosen as the group norm when crafting the social contract, because this norm can be very useful in promoting the interests of a group when social dilemmas would otherwise lead to the impossibility of collective action. Sen, however, doubts the adequacy of self-interest as foundation for social justice and he therefore poses the question whether ‘‘[such] advantage seeking y provides the only robust basis of reasonable behavior in society’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 205). He argues that it does not. The problem of trusting and exclusive relationships, when carried too far, is that they can lead to corruption or conspiracy. The Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero pointed out the difference between helping a friend and doing what is right, and between merely apparent and real expediency. Although the bonds of trust and reciprocity are important, Cicero suggests, ‘‘when in friendship requests are submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous regard for the right take precedence over the obligations of friendship’’ (Cicero, 44 B.C./1913, p. 46). Sen seeks to identify an alternative basis for cooperation and just action beyond mutual self-interest. Sen suggests that the powerful have an obligation to improve justice when they can, with no expectation of benefit through reciprocal cooperation. Here the injunctions of Buddha and Plato come into play and the powerful ought to bestow benefits on others (or, conversely, refrain from doing so) when that action will create more justice, regardless of any expectations of recompense. According to Sen, therefore, just action by the powerful – magnanimity, one might say – substitutes for social exchange models of reciprocity.


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Chow, Lowery, and Knowles In Sen’s view, just action by the powerful may very well decrease their relative surplus of power and resources over others. Assuming no radical redistribution of power, those who are powerful are the potential agents of change in who has power because it is they who choose whether to relinquish their privileges and rights and decrease inequality or to strengthen their power further and thus increase inequality. Rosalind M. Chow, Brian S. Lowery, and Eric D. Knowles investigate how framing the description of an unequal situation affects how those in the dominant position respond to that situation in terms of this choice. Chow, Lowery, and Knowles suggest that in judging their outcomes relative to others’, those who have more than others can see themselves as relatively advantaged or can see those who have less as relatively disadvantaged. This difference in framing, according to Chow, Lowery, and Knowles, has strong effects on the motivation of the powerful either to approve and augment their dominance or reject and diminish it. When the difference is framed as the advantage of the powerful, focus is drawn to the powerful; when it is framed as the disadvantage of the subordinates, focus is drawn elsewhere (to the less powerful). In addition, relative differences can be seen as legitimate or not; when their advantage is seen as legitimate, the selfesteem of the powerful is enhanced, but when it is seen as illegitimate, their self-esteem is undermined. By focusing on the self-relevance and potential psychological threat of illegitimate advantage, Chow, Lowery, and Knowles seek to explain why dominant groups may, even if generally well-intentioned, sometimes oppose policies that lead to outcomes that they acknowledge in principle to be fairer than the status quo. The powerful are in practice less likely to support policies that decrease the subordinate group’s illegitimate disadvantage than they are to decrease their own illegitimate advantage. This asymmetry in motivation occurs because the powerful’s own advantages are more relevant to themselves than are the others’ disadvantages and thus, when illegitimate, pose a psychological threat to their sense of self-esteem. Sen would embrace insights from research like that of Chow, Lowery, and Knowles because any just institutional arrangement must acknowledge ‘‘[t]he inescapable relevance of actual behavior’’ (p. 67). To right injustice, we must have institutions that allow justice to emerge as salient and then promote it, given how people actually behave. In particular, Sen criticizes Rawls for assuming that after a political conception of justice is accepted from behind the veil of ignorance, people will all behave reasonably. Chow, Lowery, and Knowles show how problematic that assumption is.

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Among the justice-promoting institutions needed to address this problem, Sen includes educational policies to develop what Aristotle would call good habits: ‘‘[W]e have good reasons for recognizing that the pursuit of justice is partly a matter of the gradual formation of behavior patterns’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 68). One important mechanism for achieving this goal is to learn to engage in arguments from an impartial point of view. How can this goal be achieved? Giving voice to the reality of human behavior and experience, as seen from many points of view is, after all, an important role of the social sciences. Discovering the factors that make it difficult for members of dominant groups to behave well toward those with less power is an example of what psychology can offer to justice; helping to design institutions and processes that overcome these effects would be an additional valuable contribution.

Affect and Reason Blader, Wiesenfeld, Rothman, and Wheeler-Smith Sen gives priority to reason, but he argues that reason is not the exclusive basis for our judgments about justice and duty and that affect properly influences them as well. Steven L. Blader, Batia M. Wiesenfeld, Naomi B. Rothman, and Sara L. Wheeler-Smith’s chapter elaborates the important role of emotions in justice judgments. Blader et al. suggest that in group contexts, social emotions are common, strong, and influential on individuals’ reactions. Social emotions are focused on other people and are inherently evaluative of them. These evaluations can be congruent or not with other group members’ own feelings; people feel aligned with the target of their evaluations to the extent these evaluations are congruent. Congruence matters, Blader et al. argue, for the judgments made by justice agents, justice recipients, and third parties alike. When emotions are congruent, people judging an event will focus on information that supports the perspective of the target, but when emotions are incongruent, information that supports a divergent view will be noticed and attended to more strongly. The effect of congruence, generally, may be to bias justice judgments either in favor of or against the concerns of the target person more than if the person making those judgments were disinterested. Congruent feelings such as admiration (or, as Neville and Brodt might suggest, trust) can lead, for example, to the belief that it is fair to benefit the target more than those with a weaker affective reaction to a situation might endorse. Incongruent feelings


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such as envy or resentment, on the other hand, can lead to judgments that fewer benefits or less favorable treatment are fair, even when those who are less emotionally involved might disagree. Blader et al. suggest that these effects are more likely to be pronounced when there is ambiguous information about the situation that easily allows for affectively biased justice judgments and when those making those judgments are not accountable to others; in both cases, affectively motivated reasoning is facilitated. Sen agrees that emotions can inform our judgments. First, emotions provide information about the characteristics of a situation, according to Sen: ‘‘If we are strongly moved by some particular emotion, there is good reason to ask what that tells us’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 39). Furthermore, Sen’s reliance on Adam Smith’s notion of sympathy to support his claim that power entails obligations toward others suggests that, to some extent, Sen would argue that judgments about justice need, or at least benefit from, emotional motivation. But, what Blader et al. call the emotional fabric of groups is not sufficient to clothe Lady Justice: ‘‘[T]he need for reasoned scrutiny of psychological attitudes does not disappear even after the power of emotions is recognized and the positive role of many instinctive reactions (such as a sense of revulsion about cruelty) is celebrated’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 50). Additionally, in the absence of initial clarity about what justice requires, public discourse can create a context of transparency and mutual accountability that can allow for the discovery of just solutions. Thus, although Sen’s view includes room for emotion, he focuses his discussion on reason, achieved through impartiality and open discussion. Barry and Tyler Heather Barry and Tom R. Tyler are also concerned with the mediating role of affective responses to justice. Rather than focusing on the role emotion can play in coloring judgment, however, Barry and Tyler are interested in how it encourages efforts on behalf of one’s group. They argue that how connected individuals are to their groups influences how individuals respond both to just and to unjust treatment. When people strongly identify with their groups, just behavior leads them to reward their groups and unjust behavior leads them to repair their groups; they can accomplish either goal through cooperative engagement. Barry and Tyler report results from studies that demonstrate the interaction of group identification and affective responses to fair and unfair procedures. They argue that their results provide evidence that these effects can occur without mediating cognitive judgments because their methods

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used implicit measures of identification and spontaneous cooperative behavior. Barry and Tyler’s results raise a disquieting possibility. If group identification, rather than justice, is the critical factor in promoting cooperative behavior, perhaps authorities have an incentive to promote identification rather than justice (an insight also expressed in Orwell’s Nineteen EightyFour). Barry and Tyler acknowledge that this unfortunate relationship may hold, but temper its bleak implications by arguing that if so, it would hold only in the short run. Long term, being treated unfairly will lead to exit (cf. Hirschman, 1970) or, when members cannot physically remove themselves, to the erosion of identification (that is, psychological disengagement). Sen would agree that justice is deeply connected to some kind of group membership. Having a sense of justice at all depends on overcoming the dire Hobbesian solitude that we otherwise would have to endure. Sen writes, ‘‘Escape from isolation may not only be important for the quality of human life, it can contribute powerfully to understanding and responding to the other deprivations from which human beings suffer. There is surely a basic strength here which is complementary to the engagement in which theories of justice are involved’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 415). There is, however, an interesting contrast between Barry and Tyler’s notion of identification with a group as a buffer for injustice and Sen’s perspective on identity. For Sen, membership in a group is fluid and group identification is to some extent an arbitrary delineation because each person belongs to many groups. The problem with strong intragroup identification for Sen, besides the risk identified by Barry and Tyler of exploitation by the group’s authorities, is encouragement of intergroup discrimination and conflict. Sen puts the point this way, ‘‘y [Not] seeing someone merely as a member of a group to which he or she belongs y is particularly important in the present intellectual climate in which individuals tend to be identified as belonging to one social category to the exclusion of all others y’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 247). Recognizing our common membership in an overarching group that includes all other people provides a broader viewpoint that should increase our sensitivity toward injustice and disallow tolerance of the idiosyncrasies of any particular local social or economic contract. Barry and Tyler may well be correct that identification can lead to positive effects for groups under the right circumstances; Sen points out, however, that group identification sometimes has unhappy concomitant results. Perhaps here again Sen’s point of view reflects his background; the children of Mother India are diverse, and communalism has been too often a threat to their getting along.


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Tost and Lind Leigh Plunkett Tost and E. Allan Lind provide further insight into the question of what makes an individual perceive a situation as unjust. Tost and Lind point out that according to system justification theory, people are motivated to see as legitimate and fair whatever social arrangements are in place to govern the group of which they are members. Even so, people sometimes move from justifying the system they are part of to criticizing it, and Tost and Lind are interested in the factors that lead to this switch. Tost and Lind focus on perceptions of uncertainty and their affective consequences in explaining how people come to acknowledge and resist unfair social arrangements in their groups. They argue that reducing uncertainty is an important motive for joining a group in the first place and for perceiving the group as governed in predictable ways once one has joined. Acknowledging that the system of which one is a part is unjust would raise the specter of uncertainty and, thus, individuals are reluctant to do so even in the face of some level of unfair distributions or procedures. Some violations, however, are dramatic enough to pose a sufficiently serious threat to the security of group members to overcome this resistance and trigger an alarm that allows the explicit recognition of injustice within the group. Tost and Lind suggest that such perceptions of injustice are often accompanied by attendant emotions of anger or outrage – perhaps even betrayal, it seems to me. These feelings plus vigilant attention to details can lead to severe criticism of the group’s institutions. Sen would agree that emotional responses can precede a needed evaluation of the justice of a situation. But he would add that care must be used to make such judgments reflectively and not simply on the basis of threat or fear. He writes, ‘‘[Reason and] instinctive psychology and spontaneous responses y can supplement each other, and in many cases an understanding of the broadening and liberating role of our feelings can constitute good subject matter for reasoning itself’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 49); but, Sen cautions, ‘‘There is a lot of reasoning that can y challenge the unquestioned hegemony of ‘feelings’ and unexamined sentiments over all else’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 276). Uncertainty may be uncomfortable and lead to careful attention, but that discomfort does not by itself constitute an adequate basis for an indictment of the justice of the situation within a group. Indeed, Tost and Lind point out that vigilance can be triggered not only by events within the group but by external disruptions as well. In such times, Tost and Lind suggest, group members are generally very attentive – not only to the external sources of uncertainty, but to what might come to be seen as potential internal threats as well. Authorities must take care,

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therefore, to maintain fairness in their groups especially during times of threat or crisis from without even though their impulses may be in the opposite direction toward focusing on the external problem. Sen provides a recent example of how an internal focus on public reasoning successfully protected justice within a group during a time of external threat in India: ‘‘The fact that, after the murderous attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 by terrorists from a Muslim background (and almost certainly of Pakistani ancestry), the much-feared reaction against Indian Muslims did not emerge was to a great extent due to the public discussion that followed the attacks, to which both Muslims and non-Muslims contributed richly’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 353); kudos to those who preserved the peace. Rupp and Paddock Deborah E. Rupp and E. Layne Paddock treat emotions as responses to specific justice-related events, whether experienced directly by individuals themselves or as witnessed events that affect others. Emotions, in turn, are information about individuals’ own reactions to events and about the reactions of others in the group. As such, emotions mediate between events and group members’ assessments of the people seen as responsible for the events (e.g., authorities). These target-specific assessments are aggregated by group members to form holistic judgments of the group’s justice climate. In addition to the role of emotion in judgments of justice, Sen, like Rupp and Paddock, notes how justice climate (Sen would say ‘‘culture’’) can influence subsequent judgments. Rupp and Paddock suggest that because justice climate affects the interpretation of events that occur within a group, there is strong self-reinforcement and, thus, inertia to justice climate. As a result, practices that are truly unjust may be taken for granted and assumed to be just. Although Sen puts much stock in the role of public reasoning, if the members of a group share the same assumptions, then unjust practices may continue to be endorsed even through discussion and explicit agreement. The mechanisms that Rupp and Paddock identify as creating a strong climate – feelings of attraction for and selection of like-minded individuals, and the attrition of those who are not well-integrated into the group – are likely to increase the uniformity of judgments about what is just, even when these judgments are in error. In contrast, Sen emphasizes universal human capabilities as an important way to calibrate or even go beyond the local justice climate. By invoking larger concepts, a group member can create an argument against his or her own group’s culture that, as Rupp and Paddock suggest, may well emphasize affiliative norms and positive emotions over creative or, in more extreme


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cases, liberating conflict. Sen argues that negative emotions including indignation, frustration, and ire may reflect increasing awareness of injustice and motivate change toward a more just society. For example, Sen points to the position of women in Indian society in general and their relatively high mortality rates in particular, which now create more dissatisfaction than before and writes: ‘‘Happily y women’s unhappiness about their health has systematically increased across the country’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 167). Sen’s general and cautionary point is that though a strong justice climate may have desirable effects, unless satisfaction with prevailing notions of justice are tested against some other more objective and less emotional criteria, injustice may prevail. Even widespread good feelings within a group about its practices, in other words, are not decisive evidence for the justice of the group and its institutions.

Impartiality and Situated Perspectives Roberson and Williamson Quinetta M. Roberson and Ian O. Williamson remind readers of this volume that though justice climate can exist at the group level, there is often variation in how individual group members perceive the group’s climate. They point out that a group’s composition may affect the strength of a group’s justice climate because diversity can create demographic or functional ‘‘fault lines’’ and impede effective communication within the group. Roberson and Williamson argue that less observable forms of diversity are perhaps counterintuitively those most likely to affect interactions among group members. In particular, Roberson and Williamson discuss self-monitoring (an individual difference) and collectivism (a dimension of culture) and suggest that high self-monitors and groups high on collectivism will create stronger justice climates. In addition, they suggest that diversity of social ties among group members will inhibit the development of a strong justice climate. Although Roberson and Williamson follow earlier work in assuming that both climate level and climate strength are advantages, Sen’s theory of justice suggests a caveat. Because he both wants to consider the justice enjoyed by individual people as situated within a social context, and is wary of conformity more generally, Sen’s view of a strong justice climate, and individual or cultural differences that further strengthen that climate, is likely to be skeptical. Sen criticizes Rawls’ procedural focus on the grounds that the only judgments that count for social contract theories are of those within the focal group. Regardless of how favorable or strong the climate is

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within the group, Sen insists that an outside perspective be brought to bear: ‘‘The Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ y is a very effective device for making people see beyond their personal vested interests and goals. And yet it does little to ensure an open scrutiny of possibly parochial values’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 128). Both impartiality, on the one hand, and multiple viewpoints, on the other, are needed to discover and implement improvements in justice. Sen seems to advocate a balance between situated, particular knowledge and universal principles of justice: ‘‘y all of us are capable of being reasonable through being open-minded about welcoming information and through reflecting on arguments coming from different quarters, along with undertaking interactive deliberations and debates on how the underlying issues should be seen’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 43). A very strong justice climate, especially if it is acknowledged as such, could quiet such debate. An outside perspective is particularly helpful in detecting misdiagnoses of social justice. Sen illustrates the problem of too strong agreement within a group about what is just by the example of the prevalence of infanticide in ancient Greece; Athenian parents were free to rid themselves of unwanted children by leaving them exposed to the elements (Oedipus is a particularly famous example of such an abandoned child). By way of critique, Sen cites Adam Smith, who chides ‘‘y even in the intellectual glory of classical Athens, [people] may have reason to scrutinize their positive feelings about the common practice of infanticide in that society y’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 275). Sen also points to the difference between the actual health outcomes and the self-reported morbidity of residents of two Indian states as a contemporary example of how the horizons of local conditions can obscure the truth about social conditions. Kerala is a state with progressive social policies that include ensuring high literacy and extensive public health services; its health outcomes are more favorable than the rest of India. Uttar Pradesh, on the other hand, has high rates of illiteracy and serious shortages of health facilities; its health outcomes are far worse than those of Kerala. Residents of Kerala, however, report much higher morbidity than residents of Uttar Pradesh. Sen attributes this misalignment between actual and perceived outcomes to the very factors that create the real differences between the states – education and the availability of medical attention allow the residents of Kerala to be more aware of their ailments. Sen’s example is about public health, but his warning about the limits of local perspectives is more general and could be applied to a strong justice climate, as well, it seems to me.


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Umphress and Stoverink Elizabeth Umphress and Adam Stoverink are also concerned with justice climate within a group. They focus on how interpersonal treatment and status combine to influence perceptions of fairness. In particular, Umphress and Stoverink address how the status of the supervisor, the status of the group of which individuals are members, and the organizational culture in respect to status differences among members affect fairness judgments. Umphress and Stoverink are especially interested in situations when treatment is perceived to be unfair. They suggest that group cohesion can sometimes be enhanced when the members of a group share the belief that they are treated badly by their supervisor. Whether unfair treatment has this effect, and whether group members consequently hold the bad treatment they receive against their supervisor, depends on the status of the supervisor – how many ‘‘idiosyncrasy credits’’ he or she has. In fact, under some circumstances, group members may perceive unfair treatment by their high status supervisor as being in the best interests of the group (e.g., because of a supervisor’s close relationship with organizational elites). In addition, the extent to which specific behaviors by supervisors – disrespectful or biased treatment, for example – are considered unfair, depends on the organizational culture in terms of endorsement of hierarchical relationships and how they are generally enacted. Umphress and Stoverink also suggest that members of high status groups feel more entitled to respectful treatment than members of low status groups. One consequence of this difference is that the same treatment might be perceived as fair by one group (that with low status), while it is perceived as unfair by the other (the high status group). Sen, I think, would want to argue against the impulse to tolerate unfair treatment because the person who metes it out is successful or well connected. Nor would he think that members of high status groups should be treated better than those of low status group in terms of the basic requirements of justice. Although Sen is concerned that procedures and outcomes recognize and support individual circumstances, needs, and capabilities, he also thinks that equal treatment – impartiality – is of fundamental importance in judging and improving the justice of a situation. To illustrate the importance of the underlying equality of all people, Sen relates Alexander the Great’s conversation with a group of Jain philosophers during his invasion of India (circa 326 B.C.): ‘‘y the world conqueror asked why they were neglecting to pay any attention to him. To this question, he received the following broadly democratic reply: ‘King Alexander, every man can possess only so much of the earth’s surface as this

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we are standing on. You are but human like the rest of us, save that you are always busy and up to no good y. You will soon be dead, and then you will own just as much of the earth as will suffice to bury you’’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 87). In Umphress and Stoverink’s terms, the Jains are denying the validity of idiosyncrasy credits, even those assumed by one of the greatest of world historical figures. Sen also argues against the entitlement of some groups over others. He spends a good deal of time discussing the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, the early feminist who, writing in the eighteenth century, argued against slavery in America and for the equality of women everywhere. Sen writes, ‘‘The principal point that Mary Wollstonecraft is making here y is that it is unsustainable to have a defense of the freedom of human beings that separates some people whose liberties matter from others not to be included in that favored category’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 116). Sen extends Wollstonecraft’s defense of slaves and women to contemporary problems like the status of Dalits (untouchables) in India or nonwhites in South Africa before the end of apartheid. The general point Sen is making is that under the dual demands of impartiality and public reasoning, unfair treatment for anyone cannot be condoned, regardless of his or her social or organizational status. Here again, psychological impulses about fairness need to be qualified by philosophical considerations of justice.

Mayer and Kuenzi David M. Mayer and Maribeth Kuenzi consider how justice climate affects groups’, rather than individuals’, outcomes. Mayer and Kuenzi propose four psychological mechanisms that relate mean levels of justice climate to group outcomes such as group performance, aggregated organizational citizenship behavior, and groups’ deviance from organizational norms. These mechanisms reflect the topics of a number of the chapters in this volume and include social identity, social exchange, social information processing, and affect infusion. What makes the question of how justice climate affects these group outcomes of particular interest, according to Mayer and Kuenzi, is that most climate research links climate to outcomes that are obviously related to the climate itself. Mayer and Kuenzi provide as examples service climate and its effects on customer satisfaction and the effects of safety climate on accident rates. But the outcome of justice climate, they suggest, are things other than more justice (though, as discussed above, Rupp and Paddock explain how justice climate can be reinforcing of perceptions of justice).


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There is, Mayer and Kuenzi argue, a conceptual disconnection between justice climate and its results. It seems to me that Sen’s theory could help resolve Mayer and Kuenzi’s concern with the apparent disjunction between justice climate and group outcomes. Reviewing past research, Mayer and Kuenzi report that justice climate affects attitudes such as satisfaction, intentions such as turn-over, stress reactions such as burnout, and behaviors such as job performance. In Sen’s terms, these outcomes are among the many that increase human capabilities. As Sen puts it, ‘‘The various attainments in human functioning that we may value are very diverse, varying from being well nourished or avoiding premature mortality to taking part in the life of the community and developing the skill to pursue one’s work-related plans and ambitions’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 233). By connecting general justice climate to the facilitation of human capabilities of particular people, Sen’s philosophical view complements the social psychological approach taken by Mayer and Kuenzi. Rather than being only loosely connected to justice, the outcomes that are puzzling to Mayer and Kuenzi are revealed by Sen’s theory to be important components of it. There is another aspect of Mayer and Kuenzi’s discussion of justice climate that Sen’s theory of justice can elucidate. Sen distinguishes between positional and transpositional knowledge; though the former depends on the unique aspects of the point of view from which a situation is considered and the other does not, both can contribute to the impartiality that reveals what is objectively just. Sen suggests that positional knowledge is not necessarily subjective, in the sense of being unique to one individual or existing only psychologically. In the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant, for example, neither the man who touches the tail of the elephant and says that the animal is like a rope, nor the man who touches the leg and says the animal is like a pillar, nor the man who touches the trunk and says the animal is like a tree branch is wrong. Sen calls these perceptions ‘‘positionally objective’’ because any blind person in each position would agree with the men. Sen writes, ‘‘y ‘positional objectivity’ is about the objectivity of what can be observed from a specified position. We are concerned here with person-invariant but position-relative observations y’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 157). Positional objectivity is of value in ascertaining the justice of social life because reasonable people might come to agree on how to improve a situation, if they understand the various points of view from which judgments are made that a situation is deficient in terms of justice. Positional relevance need not, in other words, be positionally biased, so long as people share their positionally objective perceptions and understand those of others.

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Transpositional knowledge, however, does not depend on a point of view – it is both person-invariant and position-irrelevant, a ‘‘view from nowhere,’’ Sen suggests (Sen, 2009, p. 160). It is a transpositional perspective, from behind the veil of ignorance, on which Rawls depends in constructing a social contract for a specified group of people. For Sen, however, rather than defining the character of a particular group, transpositional thinking spans the group’s boundaries. Sen thinks that transpositional thinking about justice is most useful when all the people in a conversation share the same, mistaken, assumption about what is just. Cross-cultural impartiality is needed, for example, to correct local misunderstandings about justice, what Sen refers to as ‘‘objective illusions.’’ Sen writes, ‘‘The concept of an objective illusion invokes both the idea of a positionally objective belief, and the transpositional diagnosis that this belief is, in fact, mistaken’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 163). Sen illustrates this point by example: ‘‘[I]n a society that has a long-established tradition of relegating women to a subordinate position, the cultural norm of focusing on some alleged features of women’s supposed inferiority may be so strong that it may require considerable independence of mind to interpret those features differently’’ (Sen, 2009, p. 162). A strong justice climate, in the sense of widely shared beliefs within a group that the group is fair, if based on (positionally objective) illusions about justice, would not in fact enhance human capabilities. A transpositional perspective would reveal that whatever this climate might be, it is not, for Sen, properly a ‘‘justice’’ climate.

CONCLUSION Amartya Sen’s new book, The Idea of Justice, contains many interesting insights for both philosophical and social scientific approaches to justice. Rather than parallel endeavors, Sen’s approach reveals philosophy and social science to be deeply connected to justice and to each other. Both are necessary to increase justice in the world. Philosophically, Sen goes beyond social contract theories that attempt to identify ideal institutional arrangements to seek practical solutions that increase justice as experienced by people in the world. To do so, a theory of justice must incorporate the behavior of actual individuals (and, for that matter, at a more macro level of analysis, of groups, organizations, and institutions). For social science, Sen provides a unifying theme that can help connect various streams of research and suggest new avenues for investigation. Without this grounding, social scientists risk the fate of the blind men and


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the elephant. Each of the various social scientific traditions studies its own view of fairness, but what connects these potentially disparate approaches is that they are aspects of the same underlying phenomena. Sen’s theory is complex and comprehensive; it is neither a social contract theory nor a deontological one as it is not concerned primarily with institutions, principles, intentions, or rules but considers actual results as well. But it is not primarily a consequentialist theory either as it is not concerned only with outcomes, as the procedures that produce those outcomes matter a great deal irrespective of those outcomes. The bottom line for Sen is to increase human capabilities, including liberty, opportunity, and, eventually, well-being. The chapters included in this volume give us some useful ideas about how to do so along four dimensions that Sen emphasizes: making comparative improvements to justice; understanding the role and obligations of those with power; incorporating affect and reason into our efforts to promote justice; and balancing universal impartiality and the perspectives of particular, situated individuals. There is much to be done in bending groups and organizations toward justice. In this chapter, I have attempted to draw connections between the theories and findings discussed in the other contributions to this volume and the insights of Sen’s important new book. But there are many additional connections between research in organizational behavior and the social psychology of groups and Sen’s The Idea of Justice than I have highlighted that will likely have occurred to readers of this chapter. My hope is that this chapter will motivate others in our field to see the value in this particular philosophical framework in informing their own scholarship.

REFERENCES Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New York: Wiley. Cameron, K. S., Dutton, J. E., & Quinn, R. E. (Eds). (2003). Positive organizational scholarship. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. Cicero. (1913). De officiis. [W. Miller, trans.]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 44 B.C.). Desai, S. D., Sondak, H., Diekmann, K. A. (2010). The limits of fairness. Working paper, University of Utah. Doniger, W. (2009). The Hindus: An alternative history. New York: Penguin. Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. King, M. L. (1967). Where do we go from here? Available at http://www.famous-speeches-andspeech-topics.info/martin-luther-king-speeches/martin-luther-king-speech-where-do-wego-from-here.htm

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Plato. (1941). The republic. [F. M. Cornford, trans.]. New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 300 B.C.). Redding, O. (1965). Respect [Recorded by Aretha Franklin]. Respect. West Hollywood, CA: Atlantic. [Recorded in 1967]. Rosenberg, A. (2007). Philosophy of social science (3rd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview. Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap. Smith, A. (1853). Theory of moral sentiments (New edition). London: Henry Bohn. (Original work published 1759). Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2003). The group engagement model: Procedural justice, social identity, and cooperative behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 349–361.

Fairness and Groups, Volume 13

Proportional Optimization and Fairness

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Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare

Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness

Volume 13, Horticultural Reviews

Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness

Political Economy of Fairness

Fairness versus Welfare

Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Volume 13

Advances in Pharmacology and Chemotherapy Volume 13

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National Culture and Groups, Volume 9

Symmetry groups and their applications, Volume 50

Galois groups and fundamental groups

Advances in Immunology Volume 13

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Galois groups and fundamental groups

Tafseer-e-Siddiqi (Volume 13)

Invertebrate Neural Networks, Volume 13

Advances in Agronomy, Volume 13

Drama for Students Volume 13

Advances in Genetics Volume 13

Advances in Taxation, Volume 13

Linear Lie Groups, Volume 35

Advances in Computers, Volume 13

Topics in Stereochemistry, Volume 13

Advances in Immunology Volume 13

Infinite Abelian Groups. Volume 2

Fairness and Groups, Volume 13

Proportional Optimization and Fairness

Alkaloids: Chemical and Biological Perspectives, Volume 13, Volume 13

Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare

Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare

Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness

Volume 13, Horticultural Reviews

Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness

Political Economy of Fairness

Fairness versus Welfare

Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Volume 13

Advances in Pharmacology and Chemotherapy Volume 13

Mathematical Physics, Analysis and Geometry - Volume 13

Semiconductors and Semimetals, Volume 13 Cadmium Telluride

National Culture and Groups, Volume 9

Symmetry groups and their applications, Volume 50

Galois groups and fundamental groups

Advances in Immunology Volume 13

Reflection groups and Coxeter groups

Galois groups and fundamental groups

Tafseer-e-Siddiqi (Volume 13)

Invertebrate Neural Networks, Volume 13

Advances in Agronomy, Volume 13

Drama for Students Volume 13

Advances in Genetics Volume 13

Advances in Taxation, Volume 13

Linear Lie Groups, Volume 35

Advances in Computers, Volume 13

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