Ethics Part 4

8z

ET H Ic S

have certain feelings or opinions about it. They would admit that the feelings and opinions of men rnay, in various ways, have a bearing on the question; but the mere fact that a given man or set of men has a given feeling or opinion can, they would say, never be sufficient, by itself, to show that an action is.right or wrong. But the views, which have been considered in this chapter, imply the direct contrary of this: they imply that, when once we have discovered, what men's feelings or opinions actually are, the whole guestion is finally settled; that there is, in fact, no further question to .discuss. I have tried to show that these views are untenable, and I shall, in future, proceed upon the assumption that they are so; as also I shall proceed on the assumption that one and the same action cannot be both right and wrong. And the very fact that @e can proceed upon these assumptions is an indirect argument in favour of their correctness. For if, whenever we assert an action to be right or wrong, we were merely making an assertionabout some man's feelings or opinions, it would be incredible we should be so mistaken as to our own meaning, as to think that a question of right or wrong canrnt.be absolutely settled by showing what men feel and think, and to think that an action cannot be both right and wrong. It will be seenthat, on these assumptions,we can raise many questions about right and wrong, which seem obviously not to be absurd; and which yet would be quite absurd-would be questions about which we could not hesitate for a moment-if assertionsabout right and wrofig ?neremerely assertionsabout men's feelings and opinions, or if the same action could be . both right and wrong.

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