English Discourse Particles: Evidence from a Corpus (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English Discourse Particles Studies in Corpus Linguistics Studies in Corpus Linguistics aims to provide insights in...

Author: Karin Aijmer

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English Discourse Particles

Studies in Corpus Linguistics Studies in Corpus Linguistics aims to provide insights into the way a corpus can be used, the type of findings that can be obtained, the possible applications of these findings as well as the theoretical changes that corpus work can bring into linguistics and language engineering. The main concern of SCL is to present findings based on, or related to, the cumulative effect of naturally occuring language and on the interpretation of frequency and distributional data.

General Editor Elena Tognini-Bonelli

Consulting Editor Wolfgang Teubert

Advisory Board Michael Barlow, Rice University, Houston Robert de Beaugrande, Federal University of Minas Gerais Douglas Biber, North Arizona University Chris Butler, University of Wales, Swansea Wallace Chafe, University of California Stig Johansson, Oslo University M. A. K. Halliday, University of Sydney Graeme Kennedy, Victoria University of Wellington John Laffling, Herriot Watt University, Edinburgh Geoffrey Leech, University of Lancaster John Sinclair, University of Birmingham Piet van Sterkenburg, Institute for Dutch Lexicology, Leiden Michael Stubbs, University of Trier Jan Svartvik, University of Lund H-Z. Yang, Jiao Tong University, Shanghai Antonio Zampolli, University of Pisa

Volume 10 English Discourse Particles: Evidence from a corpus by Karin Aijmer

English Discourse Particles Evidence from a corpus

Karin Aijmer Göteborg University

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia

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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Cover design: Françoise Berserik Cover illustration from original painting Random Order by Lorenzo Pezzatini, Florence, 1996.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Aijmer, Karin English discourse particles : evidence from a corpus / Karin Aijmer. p. cm. (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, issn 1388–0373 ; v. 10) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 1. English language--Particles. 2. English language--Discourse analysis. 3. Computational linguistics. I. Title. II. Series. PE1321 .A38 2002 401’41-dc21 isbn 90 272 2280 0 (Eur.) / 1 58811 284 5 (US) (Hb; alk. paper)

2002028003

© 2002 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

To Celia, Kristofer, Paula and Lovisa

Table of contents

Key to prosodic transcription Acknowledgements

xv xvii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 What are discourse particles? 1 1.2 The data 3 1.3 Outline of the book 5 1.4 Discourse particles and previous approaches 6 1.4.1 Speech act theory 8 1.4.2 Relevance theory 8 1.4.3 Schiffrin’s integrational approach 12 1.5 A functional perspective on discourse particles 14 1.5.1 Indexicality 14 1.5.2 Grammaticalisation as a criterion of discourse particlehood 16 1.6 Homonymy or polysemy? 19 1.6.1 Determining the core meaning 23 1.6.2 Number of functions 25 1.7 Clues distinguishing between propositional function and discourse function 27 1.8 Form and function 27 1.8.1 Functional clues 28 1.9 Prospective and retrospective orientation 37 1.10 The functional domains of discourse particles 38 1.11 Discourse particles on the textual level 40 1.11.1 The frame function 41 1.11.2 The qualifying function 45

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1.12 Discourse particles with a phatic function 48 1.12.1 Phatic discourse particles and politeness 49 1.12.2 Phatic discourse particles and floor-holding 50 1.13 Phatic discourse particles and pairing 51 1.14 Discourse particles and style 53 1.15 Conclusion 54 Chapter 2 The topic-changer now 2.1 Introduction 57 2.2 The S-use and D-use of now 58 2.3 The grammaticalisation of now 62 2.4 Now and structural and contextual indicators 64 2.4.1 Now and collocations 64 2.4.2 Prosodic analysis of now 65 2.4.3 Now and text type 68 2.4.4 Now in monologues and dialogues 70 2.5 The core meaning and core function of now 70 2.5.1 Comparing well and now 71 2.6 The discourse functions of now 72 2.6.1 Now as a textual particle 73 2.7 Now marking an element as backgrounded 85 2.7.1 Now as a marker of elaboration or subtopic 85 2.7.2 Explanation, clarification, support 86 2.8 Now and affective meaning 87 2.8.1 Now and affective stance 90 2.8.2 Now introducing a disclaimer 91 2.8.3 Now and a change of footing 93 2.8.4 Now as hearer-oriented intensifier (modal particle) 93 2.9 Conclusion 95 Chapter 3 The interjections oh and ah 3.1 Introduction 97 3.2 Oh and lexical collocation 100 3.3 The indexicality of oh 101 3.4 The core meaning and function of oh 103

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3.5 Functional indicators 104 3.5.1 Collocation with other discourse particles 104 3.5.2 The distribution of oh over different text types 105 3.5.3 Prosodic properties of oh 108 3.6 Oh and discourse functions 111 3.6.1 Pure surprise 112 3.6.2 Arriving at a realisation 113 3.6.3 Oh in clarification sequences 115 3.6.4 Assertion and emphasis 116 3.6.5 Reaction or objection: oh but, oh because 117 3.7 Oh after statements: oh or yes? 119 3.7.1 Oh and pairing with other discourse particles 121 3.8 Oh in elicitational contexts 123 3.8.1 Oh in reaction questions 124 3.8.2 Oh and clarification questions 126 3.8.3 Non-committal answers and evasions 127 3.8.4 Oh as a follow-up signal 131 3.9 Topicalizers and backchannels 132 3.9.1 Newsmarks and reopeners 132 3.9.2 Backchannels 135 3.9.3 Oh and assessment 137 3.9.4 Acceptance and endorsement 138 3.10 Oh and frameshifting 139 3.10.1 Asides and comments 141 3.10.2 Change to direct quotation 142 3.11 A comparison between oh and ah 145 3.12 Oh, ah and politeness 148 3.13 Conclusion 151 Chapter 4 The interpersonal particle just 4.1 Introduction 153 4.2 Just : An adverb or a discourse particle? 155 4.3 The core meaning and core function of just 157 4.4 Just and grammaticalisation 160

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Table of contents

4.5 Functional indicators 161 4.5.1 Just and collocations 161 4.5.2 The textual distribution of just 161 4.5.3 Prosodic properties of just 162 4.6 Hedges and politeness markers 163 4.7 Just and positive politeness 164 4.7.1 Just and extreme adjectives and verbs 164 4.8 Just and negative politeness 168 4.8.1 Just and indirectness 168 4.9 Just and persuasion 170 4.10 Conclusion 173 Chapter 5 The ‘adjuster’ sort of 5.1 Hedges 175 5.2 Sort of and ‘type of ’ 176 5.3 The core meaning and function of sort of 178 5.4 Sort of and grammaticalisation 180 5.5 Linguistic clues to function 181 5.5.1 The grammatical properties of (a) sort of 182 5.5.2 Prosodic features of sort of 187 5.5.3 Collocations 189 5.6 Sort of and text type 190 5.7 The functions of sort of 191 5.8 Evidential sort of 192 5.8.1 Sort of as an ‘adjuster word’ 192 5.8.2 Meta-level sort of 194 5.8.3 Sort of and number approximation 196 5.8.4 Lexical imprecision 197 5.8.5 Sort of and self-repair 198 5.9 Affective sort of 199 5.9.1 Sort of and downtoning 199 5.9.2 Hedging strong opinions 201 5.9.3 Sort of and common ground 202 5.9.4 Sort of as a negative politeness strategy 205 5.10 Positive politeness in the COLT Corpus 206 5.11 Sort of and kind of 207 5.12 Conclusion 209

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Table of contents

Chapter 6 Particles with vague reference: ‘and that sort of thing’ 6.1 Introduction 211 6.2 Category hedge or discourse particle 214 6.3 Tags and indexicality 217 6.4 Tags and grammaticalisation 217 6.5 The core meaning and core function of referent-final tags 218 6.5.1 Constraints on the use of tags 220 6.6 Types of tags 221 6.6.1 The form and function of referent-final particles 221 6.6.2 Fixed and semi-fixed expressions 224 6.6.3 Referent-final tags and compositionality 226 6.7 Linguistic clues to the function of the tag 228 6.7.1 Collocations 228 6.7.2 Prosodic properties of the tag 230 6.7.3 Text type and socially conditioned variation 232 6.8 The function of referent-final tags 234 6.9 And-tags 234 6.9.1 The ‘concretization’ function 234 6.9.2 The intensifying ‘and everything’ tag 240 6.10 The or-tag 244 6.10.1 The tag as an approximator 244 6.10.2 The tag as a tentativeness hedge 244 6.11 Creative uses of the tag 247 6.12 Conclusion 248 Chapter 7 The expectation marker actually 7.1 Introduction 251 7.2 Criteria for the discourse particle actually 252 7.3 Actually and grammaticalisation 254 7.4 Actually, in fact, really 255 7.5 Functional indicators 256 7.5.1 The distribution of actually 256 7.5.2 The frequency of actually 259 7.5.3 The prosodic properties of actually 262

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7.6 The contrastive and emphatic function of actually265 7.6.1 Actually as a contrastive marker266 7.6.2 Emphasis of individual position269 7.6.3 Actually and elaboration270 7.6.4 Actually as a marker of subjectivity and evaluation272 7.7 Conclusion274 Chapter 8 Conclusion

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References

281

Name index

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Subject index

295

Key to prosodic transcription

The transcription of the London-Lund Corpus (LLC) is based on the prosodic system in Crystal (1969) and includes a large number of prosodic features. In the present work, a reduced transcription of the system in the London-Lund Corpus has been used. The division into tone units is fundamental since it is clear that speakers organize their messages into ‘chunks’ of different length. In addition, the following prosodic features have been marked: location of the nucleus, pitch direction (falls, rises, etc.), two types of stress, short and long pauses and onset (the first prominent syllable of the tone unit). In the system used in the LLC both the location of the stress and the pitch relative to other syllables has been marked in the booster system. Speaker identity has been indicated by upper-case letters at the beginning of the turn (A, B, C, etc.). When a speaker is identified by a lower-case letter, the reason may be that he or she knows about the recording and acts as a prompter in the conversation. In such cases the speaker contributions have usually not been transcribed prosodically. Other features which have been indicated are simultaneous talk, contextual comments (laughs, etc.), and incomprehensible speech, i.e. parts of the text which were difficult to interpret. For each example, the location in the spoken corpus is indicated (e.g. S.1 1–3).

xiv English Discourse Particles

Prosodic symbols1 Type

Explanation

# {} ’ ‘’ ^ \ / = \/ /\ \/ /\ _:! . — (-) * yes * + yes + (( )) > A A) A,B A/B VAR ?

tone unit boundary subordinate tone unit degrees of stress onset fall rise level fall-rise rise-fall fall+rise rise+fall degrees of booster brief silent pause unit silent pause longer than unit pause overlapping speech incomprehensible speech current speaker continues where he left off A and B A or B various speakers speaker identity unknown

Sociolinguistic information about the corpus The basic information on the spoken texts includes ‘speaker category’ (e.g. university lecturer, undergraduate), sex and speaker age. The texts have been subcategorized with regard to the social distance between the speakers (see Greenbaum and Svartvik 1990 for more information about the individual texts).

1. The principles underlying the rendering of the examples are the same as those in Stenström (1994) and Aijmer (1996).

Acknowledgements

I have been interested in discourse particles for a long time and written several articles on the topic. The present book consists of a long introductory chapter and chapters on selected particles. Although I have dealt with several of these particles earlier, the individual chapters in this book have been newly written. There are several people I want to thank for helping me at various stages of this work. I especially wish to thank Elisabet Engdahl, Jana Holsánová and Göran Kjellmer for commenting critically on several chapters. I am also grateful for the comments provided by Jesus Romero Trillo on the whole manuscript.

Chapter 1

Introduction There are few aspects of any language which reflect the culture of a given speech community better than its particles. Particles are very often highly idiosyncratic: ‘untranslatable’ in the sense that no exact equivalents can be found in other languages. They are ubiquitous, and their frequency in ordinary speech is particularly high. Their meaning is crucial to the interaction mediated by speech; they express the speaker’s attitude towards the addressee or towards the situation spoken about, his assumptions, his intentions, his emotions. If learners of a language failed to master the meaning of its particles, their communicative competence would be drastically impaired. Wierzbicka (1991: 341)

1.1 What are discourse particles? Well and now in English, ju and väl in Swedish have been referred to as discourse particles, for example by Hansen (1998).1 Discourse particles are placed with great precision at different places in the discourse and give important clues to how discourse is segmented and processed. They can be studied by means of different approaches. A top-down approach as in relevance theory implies that the focus is on discourse structures and the role of discourse particles to facilitate the processing and comprehension of the text. However this approach may give an incomplete characterisation of discourse particles. The present

1. The Swedish particles (like German particles) are usually referred to as modal particles although they have both modal and discourse functions. Several linguists have argued that pragmatic (particle) is a better term than discourse particle because the particles function in accordance with pragmatic principles (cf. Östman 1995: 98) and ‘because part of the utterance meaning of the item can only be derived as a result of the addressee’s extralinguistic inferential processing of the stimulus containing it’ (Andersen & Fretheim 2000: 2; cf. also Brinton 1996: 29f). Jucker & Ziv used the term ‘discourse marker’ since the term is ‘one that enables us to include a broad variety of elements under a single conceptual umbrella’ (Jucker & Ziv 1998: 2).

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study starts ‘bottom-up’ with a linguistic description of individual particles. What I mean by discourse particles is illustrated by the following list of ‘interactional signals and discourse markers’ (from Stenström 1994: 59):2 actually ah all right anyway God goodness gosh I mean I see

I think mhm no now oh OK please quite really

right sort of sure Q tag that’s right yes/yeah you know you see well

Most terms which have been used to describe them have received objections including the present term discourse particle. However no better name seems to be available although there is no shortage of candidates (cf. Schourup 1999: 229, Brinton 1996: 29, Hansen 1998: 3; Foolen 1997; Fraser 1999: 932). Discourse particles have been grammaticalised which has resulted in a class of words with unique formal, functional and pragmatic properties. Nevertheless neither sentence grammar nor logical semantics has had much to say about them. They are difficult to analyse grammatically and their literal meanings are ‘overridden’ by pragmatic functions involving the speaker’s relationship to the hearer, to the utterance or to the whole text. Discourse particles seem to be dispensable elements functioning as signposts in the communication facilitating the hearer’s interpretation of the utterance on the basis of various contextual clues. This does not mean that discourse particles are meaningless decorations or a verbal ‘crutch’ in discourse indicating a lack of speaker proficiency (He and Lindsey 1998: 134) but they are better dealt with in pragmatics or in discourse analysis than in semantics. The frequency of discourse particles sets them apart from other words in the language. Altenberg (1990: 185) found, for instance, on the basis of a 50,000 word sample from the London-Lund Corpus, that ‘discourse items’ (also including greetings, thanks, apologies) accounted for 9.4% of all word-class tokens, and in fact, constituted the fourth largest word-class only outranked by

2. My terms will be textual and phatic discourse particles. Brinton (1996: 32) gives a slightly different inventory based on markers which have received detailed scholarly attention in the literature.

Introduction

verbs, pronouns and nouns but outranking the basic grammatical categories preposition, adverb, determiner, conjunction and adjective. Discourse particles are different from ordinary words in the language because of the large number of pragmatic values that they can be associated with. Nevertheless speakers are not troubled by this multifunctionality but they seem to know what a particle means and be able to use it appropriately in different contexts. The problem is how we can account for their multifunctionality without multiplying the meanings of the particle. The purpose of this background chapter is to focus on how the methods and tools of corpus linguistics can sharpen the definition and description of discourse particles and contribute to our understanding of what they are doing in discourse. A corpus-linguistic approach is still unusual in the study of discourse particles as in discourse analysis in general. Corpora represent actual performance and provide the opportunity to study the distribution and function of particles in extensive text extracts representing different registers.3 The description of discourse particles has practical applications in lexicography and language teaching. Native speakers use discourse particles with great precision as signposts in the interaction, for example to make it easier for the hearer to understand how the different parts of the text are related. If a nonnative speaker uses discourse particles incorrectly or not uses them at all this may lead to misunderstandings. A structural and functional description of discourse particles will therefore be useful for learners and would furnish a grounding to scholars dealing with discourse particles in different languages (Bazzanella 1990: 632).

1.2 The data The corpus used to describe discourse particles has to be large and be representative of many different text types. Authentic spoken data are not as easy to

3. Where corpus data have been used in the reference literature, the material has generally been small (Schourup 1985) or biased towards a special genre such as interviews (Schiffrin 1987). Carlson (1984) uses examples from detective novels but mainly for illustrative purposes. Also Hansen’s (1998) study of discourse particles in French is mainly qualitative rather than quantitative. A recent corpus study is by Lenk (1998), who compared the description of a selection of ‘connectives’ in dictionary entries with the use in the LLC and proposed reformulations of their meaning as a result. In addition she used data from the Corpus of Spoken American English (CSAE).

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collect as written data, and consequently the spoken corpora in existence tend to be fairly small in comparison with written ones. The London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English (LLC) consists of roughly half a million words distributed over texts of 5,000 words including informal face-to-face conversation, telephone conversation, discussion, public and prepared speech (see Table 1.2). The speakers (of both sexes) are generally close friends or academic associates discussing a variety of topics. The corpus also contains conversations between people who are unequal on a power gradient and whose speech can be assumed to be influenced by their social roles (e.g. professors-secretaries). The corpus lends itself to the analysis of long stretches of text and makes it possible to come up with interesting hypotheses about what a particular particle is doing, for example that OK has an important function to close a preceding topic in telephone calls. The recordings date mainly from the 1960s and 1970s and include spoken language recorded under different conditions. The texts representing impromptu speech (34 texts) are available in published form (Svartvik and Quirk 1980). However for the present study, the electronic corpus and its search tools have been used. All the text types represented in the London-Lund Corpus have been investigated even though discourse particles were scanty in some types. In order to get a measure of the ‘spokenness’ of a particular particle I have matched data

Table 1.2. Types of texts in the original LLC Type

Texts

FACE (surreptitious) FACE (non-surreptitious) TELEPHONE DISCUSSION PUBLIC PREPARED

s.1.1–14, s.2.1–14, s.3.1–6 s.4.1–7, s.5.8–11, s.6.2 s.7.1–3, s.8.1–4, s.9.1–3 s.5.1–7, s. 6.1, s.6.3–5, s.10.8 s.10.1–7, s.6.6, s.11.1, s.11.3–5 s.11.2, s.12.1–6

Total

Number of texts 34 12 10 12 12 7 87

FACE = face-to-face conversations; s.1–3 are surreptitiously recorded; s.4, 5.8–11, s.6.2 are nonsurreptitious TELEPHONE = telephone calls including messages on the answering machine (s.9.3) DISCUSSION = public discussions and interviews PUBLIC = public unprepared commentary (e.g. commentaries on sports events and state occasions) PREPARED = public prepared oration (e.g. sermons, lectures, addresses by lawyers and judges and political speeches) (Cf. Svartvik et al. 1982 and Greenbaum & Svartvik 1990 for additional information on the texts. NB. Each example has been given a code locating it to a special text in the corpus. In the corpus each tone unit has been numbered.)

Introduction

from the London-Lund Corpus with written data from the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (LOB) when this seemed relevant. I have also made a comparison with more recent data from the COLT Corpus of London teenager speech4 (c. 500,000 words), which was compiled as late as 1993, to get a picture of how particles may be used in ‘new, innovative, and sometimes surprising ways’ (Andersen 1997:83). A hallmark of the London-Lund Corpus is the careful prosodic transcription. Speaker turns (identified by a person symbol) are represented as continuous paragraphs which may only be interfered with by the listener’s backchannelling. Unlike Lenk (1998), who used the London-Lund Corpus to study discourse markers with a connective function (e.g. however, anyway), I have decided to keep the whole set of transcription symbols in order to be able to make more detailed prosodic statements. The prosodic symbols include, for instance, tone units, pauses of different length, changes of pitch, overlaps (see Key to prosodic transcription).

1.3 Outline of the book Any corpus investigation of a linguistic phenomenon yields rich and detailed information about patterns and regularities. The bulk of this volume consists of empirical studies of a selection of particles on the basis of the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English. Chapter 1 provides the platform for studying the discourse particles in the second part of the book. The analytical framework which I will propose is based on the empirical examination of discourse particles as well as on a critical evaluation of other work in particle research and discourse analysis. The most important property of discourse particles is their indexicality. This property explains that they are linked to attitudes, evaluation, types of speakers and other dimensions of the communication situation. Moreover the recent interest in grammaticalisation theory has radically changed our views of how discourse particles should be defined and how their uses should be related to the meaning of the particle. It will be argued that many of the properties of discourse particles and especially their multifunctionality can be explained as a result of grammaticalisation or ongoing grammaticalisation.

4. Short for The Bergen Corpus of London Teenager Language. The corpus includes speakers from ten different boroughs of London, representing age groups 13–17, and socioeconomic groups 1–5 (cf. Andersen 2001).

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The discourse particles described are characteristic of spoken language and were chosen because of their frequency in the London-Lund Corpus.5 Some of them are restricted to informal conversation (sort of, and all that) while others are distributed over a wider range of spoken genres. Now, a particle signalling emphasis (the phatic function) or transition (the textual function) is the topic of Chapter 2. The criteria needed to distinguish the particle from the temporal adverb will be discussed. It will be argued that now has a temporal core meaning from which its discourse function on the textual and interpersonal level can be derived. Chapter 3 considers the interjections oh and ah and their functions as discourse particles to signal topic shift, to mark an elaboration or a clarification of the topic. The particles also express emotional involvement and serve as response markers receiving new information (‘uptakers’). With regard to the restrictive particle just (Chapter 4), I am primarily interested in explaining its use to express the speaker’s involvement or affect and its rhetorical use in argumentation. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to a group of evidential or hedging particles which introduce fuzziness within the proposition. In informal conversation their main function is however affective. Sort of/kind of are discussed in Chapter 5 and utterance-final tags (e.g. and all that) in Chapter 6. Actually has the evidential function to signal that a fact goes beyond expectations (Chapter 7). It will be pointed out that in its affective or phatic function it is difficult to distinguish from other hedging particles. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the discussion of discourse particles in the preceding chapters and looks at some remaining problems.

1.4 Discourse particles and previous approaches The interest in spoken language and in discourse in the last decade has led to an increase in articles and monographs on discourse particles. A number of studies have provided useful analyses of discourse particles both as a group and of individual particles in different languages (e.g. Schourup 1985, 1999, 2001, Carlson 1984, Schiffrin 1987, Fernandez 1994, Fraser 1990, 1999, Hansen 1998,

5. Well is not dealt with in this work. However frequent reference will be made to well since this is one of the best studied discourse particles. See also Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen (forthcoming) for a discussion of the meaning and function of well in a contrastive perspective.

Introduction

Jucker & Ziv 1998, Lenk 1998, Andersen 2001).6 Lately diachronic studies of discourse particles building on the analysis of their grammatical and semantic changes have added to our knowledge of the functions of discourse particles (e.g. Brinton 1996, Traugott 1995a, b).7 Discourse particles are far from easy to define as a class due to the difficulties of generalising across different types of discourse particles and across languages (Andersson 1975: 31). The class is generally taken to include ‘items studied within the European “Partikelforschung”, i.e. so-called “pragmatic particles” and within the Anglo-American “discourse marker” tradition (Andersen 2001: 39). Andersen also includes “connectives” (so, therefore, but) and so-called “pragmatic expressions” (I mean, you know) in this class. Not surprisingly, views on what discourse particles are doing abound and Lenk found that ‘not one single definition of the term discourse marker remained undisputed or unaltered by other researchers for their purposes’ (Lenk 1998: 37). According to Foolen (1997: 310), ‘(modal) particles are so elusive in their meaning that nearly every theory seems to fit.’ However, formal grammar has little to say about the meaning and function of discourse particles. Fruitful approaches to discourse particles are instead to be found in discourse analysis (e.g. Schriffrin 1987), ethnomethodological conversation analysis (Hakulinen, unpublished and 1998), in dialogue game theory (Carlson 1984), in speech act theory, relevance theory, coherence-based theories (see the overview in Blass 1990), rhetorical structure theory (Mann & Thompson 1986) and computational theories of relations (Knott 1995). As pointed out above, we can also gain new insights about discourse particles by regarding them as grammaticalised (see Traugott 1995a, b, Brinton 1996, van Baar 1996). Two influential theories providing an analysis of elements outside the domain of syntax are speech act theory and relevance theory. Speech act theory

6. Among early studies of importance, Gülich (1970) could to be mentioned (see Hansen 1998: 9f). For a review including the ‘pre-pragmatic’ area, see Östman (1995: 96f) and Foolen (1997). Hansen’s extensive overview includes French research on discourse particles as well as research within the Anglo-American tradition (Hansen 1998). Cf. also Kroon 1995 (Latin) and Bazzanella 1990 (Italian). Fischer (2000) came out too late to be taken into account in this work. 7. In addition, work on individual particles may discuss properties which characterise discourse particles in general although they may be presented as specific properties of the discourse particles (He & Lindsey 1998: 151): ‘… one may raise concerns as to the nature of the phenomenon we are examining — is it the inherent properties of “you know” or properties of discourse particles as a class in general?’

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paved the way for the study of discourse particles. Relevance theory has been particularly influential because it gives a unified account of what discourse particles are doing within a general theory of communication. Moreover Schiffrin’s pioneering work on discourse particles (1987) continues to be influential in discourse particle research (cf. Kroon 1995: 46f). 1.4.1 Speech act theory The study of discourse particles started out as an attempt to describe them as modifiers of speech acts or ‘speech act adverbials’ (Andersson 1975). Discourse particles have also been considered to be illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs) modifying the illocutionary force signalled by the sentence mood (cf. Foolen 1997 and the references there). Hedges on illocutionary force are a special case of hedges on Grice’s maxims. We may therefore assume that they are used when the speaker is aware of violating a maxim. For example, the discourse particle I think violates the quality maxim and suggests that the speaker ‘is not taking full responsibility for the truth of his utterance’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 164). Hedging particles are of special interest since they are an important resource for the realization of politeness strategies. I think can, for instance, be used as a strategy redressing an action threatening the hearer’s negative face such as criticism or advice (Brown & Levinson 1987: 171). In speech act theory (Austin, Grice) little attention was paid to the utterance in its sequential context. However many discourse particles are elements which cannot be understood within the boundaries of the single utterance. 1.4.2 Relevance theory If one looks for a pragmatic model for analysing discourse particles (or modal particles), it is difficult to choose between ‘Grice and Searle’ on one hand and ‘Sperber and Wilson’ on the other: In my appreciation, if one looks for a theoretical framework for the analysis of modal particles, Grice and Searle are at least as good as Sperber and Wilson. (Foolen 1997: 310)

Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory builds on Grice’s ideas that in conversation speakers orient towards principles or maxims but develops it further. In either approach, the hearer’s role is to infer what the current speaker means on the basis of what is said, and principles governing interaction (the cooperative principle or the relevance principle).

Introduction

In his famous article ‘Logic and conversation’ (1975), Grice argued that many inferences and arguments in natural conversation cannot be derived by the rules in formal logic. In order to understand how inferences are worked out in everyday conversation, one needs to make a distinction between what is said and what is only implied (implicated). What Grice referred to as conversational (non-conventional) implicatures must be inferred by the listener on the basis of a set of general maxims (subsumed under the cooperative principle). However, in some cases, the conventional meaning of a word rather than the hearer’s ability to make inferences will determine what is implicated. Grice comments on the use of therefore : If I say (smugly), He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave, I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said that he is an Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to say that I have SAID (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so. (Grice 1975: 44f)

In the spirit of Grice, Sperber and Wilson suggest that links between structures (or intonational structure) and pragmatic interpretation may be conventionalised (grammaticalised) in order to facilitate processing (cf. also Blakemore 1987:144): … just as the natural links between intonational structure and pragmatic interpretation may become grammaticalised, so a language might develop certain structures whose sole function was to guide the interpretation process by stipulating certain properties of context and contextual effects. (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 263)

Sperber and Wilson have developed the Gricean ideas into a full-blown theory of pragmatics built on cognitive principles (Sperber & Wilson 1986). In their cognitive model, hearers are supposed to work out the effect of new information against the background of existing assumptions. Members of the speech community share a cognitive environment and therefore have assumptions about what is ‘manifest to the other’ (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 41). The problem for hearers is to select a context for an utterance (a set of assumptions) enabling them to make correct inferences about the speaker’s meaning. Consider (1) My brother lives in New Zealand. (Blakemore 1988: 239)

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According to Blakemore ‘although it is probable that you can identify the proposition expressed by (12) [= (1)], it is unlikely that you will be able to see the point of my utterance given the contextual assumption you have in mind at the moment.’ … ‘You must be able to relate this information to assumptions you have already’ (Blakemore 1988: 239). The choice of context is constrained by the principle that speakers strive for maximal (‘optimal’) relevance: Principle of relevance Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance. (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 158) The conversational goal to be relevant is balanced against the principle that unnecessary cognitive effort should be avoided (the smaller the cognitive effort needed to arrive at a given utterance, the greater its relevance). The task of the addressee is to find an interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. Structures and lexical items guiding the interpretation process are cost-efficient because they facilitate the reception and interpretation of the message (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986, Blakemore 1987, Watts 1988, Jucker 1993, Andersen 1998). For instance, you see in the following example, from Blakemore (1987: 88), serves to guide the hearer to the connection between the clauses against the background of the mutual cognitive environment established by the preceding utterance: (2) She slipped. You see, the road was slippery.

You see does not add meaning but indicates that the description in the second utterance is an explanation for the information in the first utterance given the assumption that there is a connection between slipping and the road being slippery. Speakers and hearers may have mistaken ideas about each other’s assumptions necessitating the negotiation or renegotiation of the background assumptions and beliefs (‘the context’). For example, well can be seen as a signpost ‘signalling to the hearer that the context created by the previous utterance — whether produced by the current speaker or the current listener — is not the most relevant one for the interpretation of the impending utterance’ (Jucker 1993: 440).8

8. Recently several studies have discussed discourse particles from a relevance-theoretical point of view. Cf. Andersen (2001) and some of the articles in Andersen & Fretheim (2000).

Introduction

A useful distinction can be made between semantically encoded concepts and ‘computational’ procedures providing instructions as to how these aspects of the interpretation should proceed. Instead of assuming that particles express meaning or meaning relations (the common viewpoint in formal and semantic studies on particles), many linguists regard particles as instructions for the hearer how and where to integrate an upcoming unit of speech within the current discourse. If particles express anything at all, it must be a procedural meaning, rather than a lexical or referential meaning. Cf also Kroon (1995: 46). In a theory where relevance is considered as involving a trade-off between processing efforts and contextual effects, it is not surprising that there are discourse particles acting as constraints on the interpretation. The problem is why a particle is not selected in all the contexts where it could be used to facilitate the hearer’s interpretation. Hakulinen’s ‘why’ question is relevant for any theory that attempts to account for what discourse particles are doing in the interaction: One of the big questions that remain is a why question: Why is it that some turns are thus specifically marked as (action) relevant in their context, although, according to the basic tenet of conversation analysis, all turns are interpreted against what has gone before. (Hakulinen, unpublished, 20)

A large number of linguistic and contextual factors are probably needed to explain why a discourse particle is chosen (or not) by the speaker. The factors include position in the discourse and text type as well as the size of the discourse unit over which the discourse particle has scope.9 To conclude this section, relevance theory has successfully analysed a wide range of discourse particles. However a different approach may be better suited to explain what they are doing in authentic texts and why the speaker has chosen one particle and not another. Moreover, the focus on a single explanation means that other reasons for using them, such as politeness, may be neglected.

9. Cf. also Schiffrin (1987: 321): ‘These two sources of meaning and structure — size of the discourse unit and redundant cues — might help to account not only for a general reduction in the meaning of individual markers, but for the absence of markers in particular cases where they might otherwise be expected.’

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1.4.3 Schiffrin’s integrational approach Schiffrin’s study is a ‘bottom-up’ analysis of a group of discourse particles defined operationally as ‘sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk’ (Schiffrin 1987: 31). Her inquiry into the distribution of these discourse particles led her to a detailed analysis of the contexts in which they occurred: For example, I found that I had to examine repair formats for my analysis of oh and I mean, requests … for my analysis of oh and then, question/answer structures for my analysis of well, but, and y’know, turn-taking formats for my analysis of and, but, and so, the relationship between warrants and inferences for my analysis of so, because, and then, the structure of comparisons for my analysis of now, the notion of discourse time for my analysis of now and then, and the organization of narratives and arguments for my analysis of virtually all the markers. (Schiffrin 1987: 312f)

Central to the account Schiffrin proposes is the idea that discourse markers (discourse particles) are described in different components of coherence referred to as the ideational structure, action structure, exchange structure, information state and participant framework and that the close interdependence of these components must be taken into consideration when one analyses discourse (‘planes of talk’ cf. Schiffrin 1987: 24f).10 Discourse markers have indexical function and propose contextual coordinates within which an utterance is understood: [M]arkers index the location of an utterance within its emerging local contexts. It is the indexical function of markers which is the key to understanding why they are used: markers propose the contextual coordinates within which an utterance is produced and designed to be interpreted. (Schiffrin 1987: 315)

10. The following explanations are provided (adapted from Fraser (1999: 934): ‘Exchange Structure, which reflects the mechanics of the conversational interchange (ethnomethodologically) and shows the result of the participant turn-taking and how these alternations are related to each other; Action Structure, which reflects the sequence of speech acts which occur within the discourse; Participation Framework, which reflects the way in which the speakers and hearers can relate to one another as well as orientation toward utterances; and Information State, which reflects the ongoing organization and management of knowledge and metaknowledge as it evolves over the course of the discourse;’

Introduction

Oh, for example, indexes the speaker (the participant coordinate for the utterance) and focuses on the prior text (the textual coordinate). (Cf. Schiffrin 1987: 324.) Discourse particles contribute to the integration of discourse and to discourse coherence because they propose more than one such coordinate (Schiffrin, ibid.). The general idea that discourse particles should be described and explained on different planes (levels of discourse) is appealing. However, Schiffrin’s inductive ‘logic in use’ approach has been criticised. Redeker sums up her criticism of Schiffrin’s work as follows: … the problem of defining and delimiting the class of discourse markers has not been satisfactorily solved in DM [Discourse Markers]. The largely inductive method followed cannot be expected to do so. What is needed is a clearer definition of the components of discourse coherence and a broader framework that embraces all connective expressions and is not restricted to a selected subset. (Redeker 1991: 1167)

According to Kroon, the major flaw of Schiffrin’s model is that the theoretical notions (in particular the five planes of talk) are not sufficiently explained and defined (Kroon 1995: 49).11 The present model makes use of some of the better known theoretical notions from discourse analysis such as move, act, exchange, which we can expect to be relevant to analyse where and why discourse particles occur (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975). Another difference is that I have analysed the functions of the discourse particles on two macrolevels (the textual and interpersonal) to be compared with the five levels which Schiffrin recognized. Some issues which have not received sufficient attention in Schiffrin’s work are prosody and text type which are important clues to the function of discourse particles. Schiffrin’s study is restricted to a single text type and a particular group of people (interviews with American Jews in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia) and does not account for the distribution of discourse particles over different types of text.

11. For a more detailed criticism of Schiffrin’s model, see Fraser (1990), Redeker (1991), Lenk (1998) and above all Hansen (1998: 25f).

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1.5 A functional perspective on discourse particles 1.5.1

Indexicality

Van Baar (1996: 261) noted that many words had grammaticalised into particles and were acting as the bridge between a referential unit and the context: … instead of partaking in the State of Affairs, etc., a particle acts as the bridge between such referential units [a State of Affairs, a predication or a proposition] and the context, the feelings/beliefs of S and A, their knowledge of the world, etc. (van Baar 1996: 262)

Van Baar’s functional characterisation of discourse particles as bridging units can be related to indexicality. ‘To index is to point to the presence of some entity in the immediate situation-at-hand’ and ‘an index is considered to be a linguistic form that performs this function’ (Ochs 1991: 414). Words, phrases and grammatical structures can be indexed to the speaker and the hearer, to spatial and temporal dimensions of the speech situation, to an epistemic stance such as certainty or uncertainty and to affect (attitudes towards the hearer) or to particular speech acts (e.g. showing sympathy; cf. Ochs 1991: 410). Some relevant social dimensions indexed by discourse particles are social identity, e.g. relationships (friendship), group identity (class, gender, age), and rank on a scale of authority (e.g. professor-secretary in the LLC). Knowledge of the indexical properties of lexical items is at the core of linguistic and cultural competence and ‘indexical knowledge is the locus where language acquisition and socialization interface’ (Ochs 1991: 414). By moving ‘in and out of linguistically configured situations, ‘…’ novices build up associations between particular forms and particular identities, relationships, actions, stances and the like’ (Ochs 1991: 410). Less recognized is the fact that indexicality plays a role in the process of semantic and lexical change and grammaticalisation. Indexical relations to the context can be seen as the motor and as the accelerator of the grammaticalisation of words, phrases and clausal structures into discourse particles (cf. Section 1.5.2). Now has, for instance, developed from a deictic temporal adverb into a forwards-looking textual discourse particle by a process involving an increase of its indexical potential in the interaction. It is also indexed to affect and intensity via the temporal dimension ‘now at this moment’ (Ochs 1991: 419). The socio-cultural environment is omnipresent in communication. Discourse particles are special in that they display dimensions of this environment as part of their functional set-up. The discourse particles illustrate what

Introduction

Fernandez (1994: 29) refers to as ‘ancrage implicite’ unlike demonstrative pronouns or attitudinal adverbs (e.g. probably) which are examples of explicit anchorage of the utterance in the context. Les déictiques d’usage ordinaire (monstration, anaphore) et les adverbes attitudinels… réalisent un ancrage explicite de l’énoncé dans le contexte: on pourrait leur donner une représentation sémantique dans le lexique. Les particules énonciatives, en revanche, ancrent implicitement l’énoncé: elles ne peuvent pas (aisément) qualifier l’univers intérieur du texte, mais doivent etre interprétées comme véhiculant les attitudes et les commentaires d’un énonciateur. (Fernandez 1994: 29)12

As a result of conventionalisation, stereotypical links can develop between discourse parameters and words or constructions (e.g. between discourse particles and attitudes) along with weaker links or associations between contextual factors (e.g. text type) and linguistic elements. It follows that discourse particles are not much different from other linguistic codes such as pronouns which require a substantial amount of inferencing above their decoding (cf. Ariel 1998: 251). Like pronouns they are cognitively salient, i.e. hearers listen for them in conversation and use them as a help to interpretation. The segmentation of the text is not simply ‘sitting there waiting to be discovered’ but requires an active interpretation process: …just as the reference of anaphoric pronouns … is not sitting there waiting to be discovered, but has to be imposed by the hearer, so the chunking of a text and a scope of particles is not sitting there waiting to be discovered, but has to be imposed as part of the comprehension process. (Blass 1990: 23f)

When discourse particles are absent or if they are used wrongly, listeners may have difficulty in establishing a coherent interpretation of discourse. Redeker (1993) removed all discourse particles digitally from the sound track of a 2-hour television talk. In the subsequent test it was shown that the removal of ‘pop’ markers

12. English translation: ‘Ordinary deictics (demonstratives, anaphoric pronouns) realise an explicit anchorage of the utterance in the context: one could give them a semantic representation in the lexicon. Discourse particles, on the other hand, anchor the utterance implicitly: they cannot (easily) qualify the internal universe of the text, but must be interpreted as conveying the attitudes and comments of the speaker.’ For the terms implicit and explicit anchorage, see also Östman (1995). Östman’s definition is as follows: ‘An utterance is explicitly anchored to its propositional content; while at the same time, our attitudes and opinions are implicitly anchored in discourse to the context at large’ (Östman 1995: 99).

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(marking the end of a discourse segment) established a delay in listener comprehension. Hence we can deduce that despite the fact that discourse particles are not needed as constitutive elements of the syntactic structure, they have important functions in spoken language to assist in cognitively demanding repair. Not surprisingly, our knowledge about the indexical properties of discourse particles is uneven and incomplete. As it is, we know more about the indexicality of deictic pronouns than of discourse particles. As Hakulinen points out (unpublished, p. 20), ‘if there were an equally long tradition of linguistic research on particles as there is on anaphoric pronouns, we would perhaps be in a better position to characterize their indexicality’. 1.5.2 Grammaticalisation as a criterion of discourse particlehood Grammaticalisation and discourse particles ‘seem to be made for each other’ since grammaticalisation offers an account of the relation between form and function which is motivated by observable diachronic and synchronic processes.13 Following van Baar (1996: 260), discourse particles could be defined in a negative way as grammaticalised elements that do not belong to any other part of speech. I have found it useful to adopt this description as my starting-point and approach discourse particles as words or phrases that have undergone (some degree of) grammaticalisation and therefore have certain common grammatical and functional properties. By grammaticalisation I mean the process ‘whereby lexical items or phrases come through frequent use in certain highly constrained local contexts to be reanalysed as having syntactic and morphological functions, and, once grammaticalised, continue to develop grammaticalised functions’ (Traugott 1995a: 32). Grammaticalisation of words and constructions synchronically and diachronically can be described as language-specific or universal clines (Auer 1996: 313). A prototypical example is the cline or movement from a full verb go into an expression of future time (going to ; Hopper & Traugott 1993: 1f). The cline clause-internal adverbial > (modal) sentence adverbial > discourse marker (particle) as another staple of grammaticalisation theory (Traugott 1995b). The diachronic stages can be illustrated by indeed (Traugott (1995b: 9f). Indeed (originally a PP construction) becomes ‘integrated into the relatively

13. Foolen in a plenary lecture at the Conference ‘Discourse particles, modal particles and focal particles, and all that stuff’. Brussels, December 2001.

Introduction

tight lexical field of epistemic sentence-adverbs’ with the epistemic modal meaning ‘certainly’ (Traugott 1995b: 18). At a later stage we begin to find indeed with a contrastive function especially after but. As a full-fledged clause-initial discourse marker indeed has meanings involving elaboration and clarification of the discourse intent (Traugott 1995b:11). The unidirectional development from left to right on the cline (from adverb to discourse particle) mirrors a ‘tendency to recruit lexical (propositional) material for the purposes of creating text and indicating attitudes in discourse situations’ (Traugott 1995a: 47) and results in an increase of pragmatic significance and expressiveness (Traugott 1995b: 4).14 A similar interaction-to-grammar cline can explain that structures used for responsive moves (oh, OK) are recategorized as discourse particles: Slightly on the cline towards grammaticalization, the same adverbials and agreement tokens may be used as turn-initial components which both respond to the prior other party’s contribution and introduce a more complex turn component. (Auer 1996: 316)

In example (3), turn-initial OK is on its way towards grammaticalisation since it both comments on A’s complaints about the problems of winding the clock in the preceding turn and introduces a new turn component: (3) A> it’s a ”^h\and* ’setting# [6˜m] . îs I don’t know whether it’s a :scr/ew ’thing# ôr a !kn/ob# or ^wh\at +ex/actly# but it’s ^p\art of ’that+ it’s B> +Ô/K# Î’ll f/ind it#+ (A> ”^p\/art of that fitting on the b\ack# (7.2.4 315–19)

Other discourse particles present a challenge to the theory of grammaticalisation because of their source as clauses. Thompson & Mulac (1991) have argued that the epistemic parenthetical I think has developed from Subject+ Verb+that-complement clause through reanalysis of the main clause. To explain the grammaticalisation of I think it is assumed that the distinction

14. See Brinton (1996) for more examples of the development of discourse particles in a grammaticalisation perspective.

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between main clause and subordinate clause has first become fuzzy as a result of the deletion of that (cf. also Palander-Collin 1999). A change of meaning is also noticeable. The parenthetical I think has the same function as evidential particles in other languages. Discourse particles include elements that ‘look like’ conjunctions (however), like main clauses (I think), sentence adverbials (frankly), imperatives (look) or interjections (oh). A distinction is sometimes made between conjuncts which are members of the class of discourse markers (Fraser 1990) and disjuncts such as frankly (Frankly we are lost) which are ‘commentary markers’ with the procedural meaning to comment on some aspect of the basic message (Fraser 1990: 179).15 The pseudo-conditional if-clause in if you don’t mind bring it to me about 7 this evening (Fraser 1990: 183) has much in common with discourse particles and could be analysed as a mitigating discourse particle rather than a subordinate clause (cf. Andersson 1975). Moreover the lexicalisation of ‘if you don’t mind’ may be taken as evidence for incipient or ongoing grammaticalisation of the phrase. However additional criteria such as semantic and pragmatic change by which the construction can be identified as ‘caught up in grammaticalisation’ are missing (cf. Hopper 1991: 120) The category of discourse particles is distinct on structural and functional grounds from other grammaticalised elements. They do not, for instance, fulfil the criteria of grammaticalisation as defined by Lehmann (1982). According to Lehmann, grammaticalisation is associated with the autonomy of the sign and grammaticalised elements are subject to scope decrease and tend to be more tightly integrated in the clause. Discourse particles are structurally set apart by their peripheral position in the utterance. According to Hansen, they are intermediate between grammatical and lexical items: The reason why most works on grammaticalization theory continue to mention syntactic obligatoriness as a major criterion could simply be that it is only in recent years that linguists have taken any serious interest in syntactically peripheral elements such as discourse markers. … it may be that, instead of making a binary distinction between lexical and grammatical items, we should make room for a third, possibly intermediate, category of ‘discourse items’ (Hansen 1998: 225)

15. Commentary markers are defined as ‘lexical expressions which have both a representational meaning, specifying an entire message, and a procedural meaning signaling that this message is to function as a comment on some aspect of the basic message’ (Fraser 1990: 179).

Introduction

Moreover, the ‘functionalization’ of discourse particles from propositional meaning to textual and interpersonal uses (Lenk 1998: 48) involves ‘pragmaticalisation’ rather than grammaticalisation. However the same principles and processes are involved in grammaticalisation and pragmaticalisation. The principle of persistence explains that there is a transparent relationship between form and function in the history of discourse particles (Hopper 1991: 22). It is illustrated when the temporal meaning of now is ‘shadowed’ by the meaning of the discourse particle. Layering accounts for the fact that older ‘layers’ (forms and meanings) can coexist with newer ‘layers’ (Hopper 1991: 22). An example is the development of like, which can appear both as a preposition or a conjunction and as a discourse particle (Romaine & Lange 1991; Traugott 1995a:39). (4) is an example of the innovative use of like as a discourse particle introducing reported speech and thought: (4) And she’s LIKE, “Um … Well, that’s cool.” (Romaine & Lange 1991: 227)16

1.6 Homonymy or polysemy? Already the first encounter with discourse particles shows that they have a number of different senses or functions which do not have to be closely related. The problem is typical of discourse phenomena. In Carlson’ words, The problem here is typical of discourse analysis in that the task is to define the meaning (or discourse function) of a word or construction which seems to have next to no value on its own, but in each individual context gives it a quite distinct and unmistakable colouring. (Carlson 1984: 28)

The traditional way of dealing with the multifunctionality of discourse particles is homonymy. This implies specifying a large number of meanings corresponding to the different contexts in which the discourse particle occurs (‘meaning maximalism’). However, Östman (1995) warns against ‘travelling the road of multifunctionality’ since this may take us back to saying that discourse particles are elusive elements lacking meaning and representing ‘illogical thinking’. Recently it has been more common to look for a unitary word sense, ‘a common denominator’, for each discourse particle (‘meaning minimalism’).17

16. On like and grammaticalisation, see also Andersen (2001). 17. On the issue of meaning maximalism vs. meaning minimalism, see Hansen (1998: 85ff).

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The search for a single meaning (one form–one function) applies to discourse particles as well as to other words in the language although the task to define a meaning for discourse phenomena is more difficult (Östman 1995: 102). Different minimalist solutions can be illustrated with regard to the analysis proposed for well. Carlson’s (1984: 29) suggestion is to look for a simple characterisation of well (‘the speaker accepts a situation’) and a contextually conditioned rule whose application in each particular context suggests ‘quite informative inferences’: ‘Begin a dialogue move with well only if you accept a game situation in which the move is entered’ (Carlson, ibid.).18 A different solution is to look for a metalinguistic language which is suitable to describe the meanings of discourse particles. In Wierzbicka’s programme for a universal semantics, the core meaning (the invariant semantic formula) for well is, for instance, stated in an ‘alphabet’ of semantic components (Wierzbicka 1976).19 However the set of components does not explain the discourseconnective or interpersonal uses of the particles on the basis of a more general theory of communication. Jucker (1993), who has also studied the discourse particle well, shows that its functions (as a face-threat mitigator, a frame, a delay device or a marker of insufficiency) can be subsumed under a single meaning if a relevance-theoretical approach is adopted (cf. Section 1.4.2). The core meanings which have been proposed tend to be abstract, very general or too summary. It is therefore difficult to see how this approach would

18. The definition of well is embedded in dialogue game theory, a theory with similarities both to discourse theories in which the conversational goal is to establish common ground and to relevance theory. The participants are engaged in a cooperative dialogue with the aim of coming to a common understanding. They act rationally (according to Grice’s maxims) in order to maximize their gains. The meanings of discourse particles can be viewed as ‘dialogue strategies’ or rules which the speaker uses to accept a game situation (well) or to meet a situation which he is not prepared for (oh). A game situation is defined as ‘a series of possible alternative paths’ (Carlson 1984: 5) and can be represented in possible world semantics (ibid., p. 7). 19. Discourse particles are abbreviatory devices ‘for expressing complex pragmatic meanings at minimal cost’ (Wierzbicka 1976: 327). The semantic components making up the meaning of discourse particles express the speaker’s attitude to the hearer and to the situation, emotions, etc. The meaning of well can, for instance be unpacked as – – –

I don’t want more time to pass like this this is well (more idiomatically: “this is all right” or “this is okay”) something else has to be said

(Wierzbicka 1976: 360)

Introduction

explain the relationship between the meaning of the particle and its functions on the textual and interpersonal levels. Following Hansen, I therefore prefer a modified minimalist description where discourse particles can have different functions, which are related to a prototype or core in a polysemous way:20 Analysts who take this stance assume that particles may indeed have different senses which are not merely a matter of pragmatics, but that rather than being homonymous and discrete, these various senses are related, either in a chainlike fashion through family resemblances, or as extensions from a prototype. (Hansen 1998: 87)

Polysemy explains that discourse particles seem to have a fuzzy meaning and that senses may overlap: This [approach] obviates the minimalist need to find a single basic meaning which is common to all possible uses of a particle but at the same time allows for a certain indeterminacy of meaning which is not possible on a maximalist account, insofar as the senses instantiated in particular contexts may overlap. (Hansen, ibid.)

In the case of merger, the assumption that we have a case of polysemy is to be preferred to homonymy. Consider now in example (5) where the temporal meaning of the adverb and the pragmatic meaning of the particle (‘transition’ or topic change) have merged. The example comes from a dinner speech. Speaker a has just raised the question whether foreign students should be subsidised: (5) a> they’ll be^gin to ^going to be!gin to !l/ook# . at ^how _many . ’student ’foreign st/udents# . the ^country ”:sh\ould in f/act# . ”^s\ubsidize# be^{c\ause} let us !!f\ace it# this is ^what we are !d\oing# ”^{n\ow} ”!w\e ’think# that ^this is a :subsidy which is ”!well ”w\orth it# it’s ^well ’worth it in [i˜] in un’intel”!l\ectual ’terms . {((to)) be^g\in with#}# . (11.2 300–8)

20. The principle followed by Hansen (1998: 88) is dubbed ‘methodical minimalism’ because it is intended to keep the number of meaning distinctions at a minimum (cf. Kroon 1995: 44 ‘moderate minimalism’).

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The assumption that now is homonymous would require the linguist to choose either the interpretation as an adverb or a discourse particle (cf. Kjellmer 1993: 121; Hansen 1998: 89). The similarity between the two meanings is however compatible with the polysemy of now. An issue which comes up in this connection is ‘whether the notion of polysemy should be restricted to the various senses of the discourse marker alone, meaning that there would be homonymy between, for instance, the French discourse marker bon and the adjective bon, or whether both should perhaps be integrated into one and the same semantic network.’21 Hansen is very clear on this point: ‘…what we are dealing with are two uses of the same item, and not a pair of homonymous expressions’ (Hansen 1998: 89). Synchronically the uses can be distinguished on the basis of the context. Even when there are no prosodic or contextual clues, hearers seem to have no difficulties understanding the meaning of discourse particles. The polysemy of discourse particles follows from their indexical properties and what we know about grammaticalisation. Now, just and actually are both adverbs and discourse particles. The discourse particle well could be related to the adverb through the notion acceptance (‘this is well’) although synchronically it is not transparently related to the manner adverb.22 Even form–function correlations which are quite opaque synchronically can be motivated historically: In other words, while the synchronic grammar may show the correlation to be arbitrary (i.e. unpredictable, underivable via inference), the etymology of the form may point to a well-motivated, potentially universal, form–function specialization. (Ariel 1998: 223)

All particles cannot be related to manner adverbs. Some particles have no meaning but only a core function from which usage can be predicted: Cases in point are words like hey, oi, OK, and some interjections, particles and honorifics in many languages. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 259)

Summing up, discourse particles are polysemous items whose meanings can be related to each other in a motivated way, for example as extensions from a prototype. This is compatible with the diachronic model of grammaticalisation

21. French bon (= lit. ‘good’). 22. Cf. Wierzbicka (1976) and Carlson (1984) for such an analysis of well. Bolinger (1989) describes, well as a marker which is synonymous with the adverb apart from the fact that its meaning has been transferred from the locutionary to the illocutionary domain.

Introduction

(‘pragmaticalisation’) in which pragmatic functions are derived from a propositional meaning via certain paths and on the basis of pragmatic principles. This development may be supported by the core meaning of the particle. The basic meaning of now is temporal; just is restrictive or exclusive in addition to its intensifying meaning as a discourse particle and well conveys acceptance, a meaning which is related to the manner adverb. 1.6.1 Determining the core meaning The different functions one recognizes may be the result of a bottom-up study of particles in their contexts. Data from naturally occurring speech is not enough to determine the meaning or function of a discourse particle. Even with a large corpus of examples ‘there will still be no guarantee that hypothesized semantic cores will converge on the correct solution’ (Schourup 1999: 253). As Bolinger points out, the study of the distribution and functions of discourse particles must be combined with a theory of what they mean: Studying distribution is a good procedure for discovering meaning, provided something is already known about the meanings of the items distributed; but accounting for the distribution of meaningful items presupposes some theory of what the items mean. (Bolinger 1989: 301)

The meaning of a particular discourse particle is extremely hard to determine and the core meaning or general meaning of the discourse particles may be a fairly abstract notion. It can bear some relation to the etymological meaning of the discourse particle, it can be expressed in procedural terms (cf. Chapter 5 sort of) or be identical with the core function such as surprise (cf. Chapter 3 oh). Besides the core meaning we therefore need to recognise a discourse function or functions for a particular particle. The core function of a discourse particle is defined in terms of what it is doing on the textual or interpersonal level. There is always a risk that the core function (or functions) proposed for a discourse particle is too broad and therefore does not show how a discourse particle is distinct from other discourse particles in the same semantic field. The dictionary is of little help but we have to rely on other methods to defend a certain analysis. In particular we need to check how well a suggested core function explains the data in the corpus. There are also other methods which can be used to validate an analysis of a discourse particle.

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A discourse function should be defined in such a way that it is clear how a discourse particle is similar to and different from other discourse particles. When a discourse particle has close synonyms this may help us to constrain its meaning. Now, well and oh occur in the same discourse slot and their meanings may coincide, overlap or cross each other in various ways. Even if they are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other, discourse particles should not be ‘thrown in the same semantic basket’ (Wierzbicka 1976: 356). The difference between oh, well and now are illustrated by means of example (6), where speaker A has not been told about a meeting at the faculty of arts and wonders if he can go anyhow: (6) A> ^so I pre!sume it ’is for :any’body in the :faculty/ of !\arts# . êven if I ’haven’t . been !\asked# Î could !g\o# B> ôh it’s [‘] it’s ”^definitely a :uni’versal ’faculty of :\arts th/ing# you ^must have ’had a c\opy of it# (1.4 1141–45)

Oh is used interactively to express the speaker’s reaction to some unexpected information. It is distinct from both well and now. Well conveys hesitation or reservation rather than surprise and should therefore be identified with a different core function. (7) A B

so I presume … even if I haven’t been asked I could go well it’s definitely a universal faculty of arts thing

Now suggests urgency which can be explained from its function to mark the transition to new information, a new topic or argument: (8) A B

so I presume … even if I haven’t been asked I could go now it’s definitely a universal faculty of arts thing

The discourse function should also be defined in such a way that we can explain correspondences in another language. Carlson (1984: 76f) shows, for instance that English well and Finnish no come very close in meaning and that there are many contexts where they are exchangeable for each other. Many of the uses of no translate directly to well but there are also cases where no would be translated by

Introduction

another discourse particle.23 Finnish no can convey both hesitant admission of a point and an interruption caused by a surprising turn of events and is translated into English either by well or by oh.24 The translations into another language thus strengthen or weaken the claims made on the basis of a single language. When we analyse the core function of now on the textual level as a topic changer this is a macro-level characterisation. On the microlevel, now functions as an initiator or marks the speaker’s progression through the discourse.25 What is still lacking is ‘an overview of the more specific “pragmatic functions” that might be associated with the individual particles, as well as a suitable metalanguage’ (Kroon 1995: 43) for describing the functions of discourse particles on different levels. We find a large number of terms such as ‘fillers’, politeness markers, ‘gambits’, connectives, ‘fumbles’ to describe what discourse particles are doing in language which are either too specific or too general and do not easily fit into a taxonomy (Erman 1987: 2). We also need to discuss how many functions there are and to discuss possible subclassifications of discourse particles on the textual or interpersonal level. 1.6.2 Number of functions We cannot simply say that now or well has ten different functions or fifteen different functions: given the indexical nature of discourse particles, there is no definite upper limit to the number of possible distinctions we can recognize (Carlson 1984: 34). Establishing functions requires attention to how ‘our conversational repertoires are built up’ (Carlson 1984: 34) or to ‘the parameters in accordance with which communication takes place (Östman 1985: 104). Carlson compared the problem of saying how many uses of well there are with stating the number of possible openings in chess: In analogy to the present problem, one can ask how many different openings there are in chess. Chess manuals list a varying number of them, grouping certain openings together as variations of a common theme. On a strict

23. For an interesting discussion on the validation of proposed core meanings for discourse particles, see Schourup (1999: 253f), Fischer (1998) and Carlson (1984: 67f). 24. Cf. also Wierzbicka’s (1976) analysis of the difference between Polish no and well. 25. Cf. Östman’s (1995: 102) distinction between the ‘etic’ and the ‘allo’ stage of any linguistic description. Kroon distinguishes between discourse function ‘which is the pivotal element in the characterization of a particle’ and the ‘context-bound actual use’ Kroon (1995: 99, 100).

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examination of the rules, there are as many openings as there are admissible sequences of initial moves. However, strategical and historical considerations single out some of them as particularly popular or promising ones, and knowledge of them belongs to the repertoire of any proficient player. (Carlson 1984: 34)

Just as there are openings in chess which have been singled out as the most promising ones the links between a particle and its uses may be conventionalised into immediately recognisable routines because they are the most relevant, salient, frequent or popular (cf. Carlson 1984: 29). As has been argued in previous sections, the indexical properties of discourse particles and grammaticalisation may play a major role explaining what becomes conventionalised. As a result of conventionalisation (or grammaticalisation) we can talk about the discourse function of well as a marker of response (Schiffrin 1987), oh as a change of state token (Heritage 1984) or now as a transition signal (Chapter 2). I do not share the pessimism of some linguists who do not believe that we can come up with a taxonomy of ‘actual uses’ of the particle.26 Andersen (2001: 65) suggests, for instance, that we disourse particles (on the textual or interpersonal level) give rise to inferential processes: Rather, I argue in favour of the understanding of pragmatic markers as having multidimensional meanings/functions, and that assignaing a particular function to a marker on a particular occasion is a matter for pragmatic inference.

In this work, the corpus has been used to arrive at a classification of the uses of different particles. Less conventionalised senses of the particle relegated to the reception phase rather than the production phase of the message have not been integrated in the functional analysis. For example, rather than saying that well is a hesitation marker I have regarded ‘hesitation’ as an effect of the fact that well means acceptance. However even ’side-effects’ i.e. derived values of the functions of the discourse particles may be of interest to study as they may show the correctness of the functional analysis (Kroon 1995: 101; cf. also Hansen 1998: 88). In addition, side-effects may be important in the case that we find different translations depending on the contextual reading of a particular discourse particle (Nølke 1991: 220f).

26. I have borrowed the expression ‘actual uses’ from Kroon (1995: 98). Kroon suggests a very useful framework for analysing discourse paticles where ‘basic meaning’, ‘discourse function’ and ‘actual uses’ are important components.

Introduction

1.7 Clues distinguishing between propositional function and discourse function We also need to account for the fact that discourse particles are categorially multifunctional. Few discourse particles fulfil what Östman (1982: 153) refers to as the ‘uniqueness’ criterion’ for discourse particles (i.e. having the discourse particle function as the sole function). Instead ‘discourse particles are characterised by categorial heterogeneity (Bazzanella & Morra 2000) or what we could dub ‘double meaning’; they have one or more uses in common with other grammatical categories e.g. adverbs or conjunctions (cf. also Kroon 1995: 43: ‘so-called cross-categorial polyfunctionality’).27 The categorial multifunctionality of discourse particles can be described more precisely in terms of their ‘D (item)-function ratio’, i.e. discourse function in relation to grammatical function expressed in per cent (Stenström 1990: 161). The ‘D-value’ for some frequent D-items in the London-Lund Corpus ranged from 100% for items which were always analysed on the discourse level (e.g. oh) to items with a very low D-item ratio (of course, certainly). The most interesting elements are those in the middle range. Well, for instance, showed a D-item ratio of 86% and right 55%. Lenk (1998: 157) found that 42.6% of the uses of actually (in the LLC) were propositional uses, i.e. a D-item ratio of 57.4%.28 In order to distinguish between the adverb and the discourse particle we use special clues or indicators. Prosody and collocation are helpful signals to the intended interpretation. Functional indicators are also important to distinguish different functions of the discourse particle.

1.8 Form and function A formal approach is closely associated with the attempt to define a special word-class of discourse particles (cf. Östman 1982: 149, Zwicky 1985, van Baar 1996; cf. also Stenström’s word class ‘D(iscourse) items 1990). Formally and

27. Cf. Lenk’s ‘the “shared meaning” position’ (Lenk 1998: 50). Lenk makes a distinction between ‘proposition markers’ which have propositional meaning and ‘discourse markers’ which have pragmatic meaning. 28. The data come from Stenström (1990: 162).

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structurally there seems to be no single property or set of properties univocally defining this class. Östman set up and defined a subclass of prototypical pragmatic particles based mainly on grammatical and prosodic criteria. Typically, a pragmatic particle ‘would be (a) short, and (b) prosodically subordinated to another word. It would (c) resist clear lexical specification and be propositionally empty (i.e., it would not be part of the propositional content of the sentence). Furthermore, it would (d) tend to occur in some sense cut off from, or on a higher level than, the rest of the utterance, at the same time as it tends to modify the utterance as a whole (Östman1982: 149).29 From the analyst’s point of view, it is important to establish what features hearers use to determine the function of a discourse particle. 1.8.1 Functional clues Discourse particles are ‘slippery customers’, which have a ‘double meaning’ and shift their meaning depending on the context. However the multifunctionality of discourse particles does not seem to cause problems in communication because of the presence of linguistic and contextual clues functioning as interpreting strategies (cf. Kjellmer 1993). For example, there are contextual indicators such as collocation and prosody to assist the hearer when a particle is ambiguous between different senses. The more one studies discourse particles, the more conventions one discovers with regard to their use. The features are syntactic (e.g. position), prosodic, lexical (e.g. collocations) and stylistic (e.g. text type). In what follows I shall look in more detail at how formal features of discourse particles serve as functional clues. To begin with, discourse particles should be distinguished from adverbs by their position in the utterance. 1.8.1.1 Discourse particles and position There is not much we can say about the syntactic behaviour of discourse particles if we stay within a sentence (Hakulinen, unpublished, p. 2). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize non-propositional elements as part of grammar not least for parsing purposes:

29. Cf. however Östman (1995: 99), ‘It has already been pointed out that a definition of pragmatic particles solely in structural terms is as such inadequate. …It is clear, for instance, that English does not follow the universal tendency of having its particles “prosodically subordinate to another word”.’

Introduction

…it is imperative that the analysis model we propose is amenable to formalization, so that supra-propositional notions can also be expressed in our formal grammar and recognized by the parser. (Aarts & Oostdijk 1994: 118)

In Swedish and German, modal particles occupy the so-called ‘middle field’ between the first finite verb and the second non-finite verb and can be described on the syntactic level. However, in English, the position of discourse particles outside the sentential kernel structure in the ‘pre-front field’ makes them a challenge to formal grammar (Auer 1996). In Government and Binding (GB) models, the utterance-initial discourse particle would be placed in a syntactic position lying to the left of the CP (Complementizer Phrase, i.e. the highest element of sentence structure in GB) available for metapragmatic terms ‘which serve to guide the addressee’s reaction to what is about to be said’ (Watts 1988: 245). Initial position is however important for several reasons. It functions as a clue to discourse particle status. For example, when now is placed sentenceinternally it is never a discourse particle. Secondly, it is relevant as ‘a grammaticalisation position’ (Auer 1996: 297) since it can be regarded as the end-point of grammaticalisation. Consequently it serves pragmatic and interactional ends which could not equally well be achieved by an element in its canonical, sentence-internal position. Auer describes the constituent(s) in the pre-front field in syntactic terms, ‘yet in terms of a syntax which is already related to interaction’ (Auer 1996: 320). Elements in the pre-front field are placed at the left margin of an emergent ‘syntactic gestalt’ (turn-constructional unit; Auer 1996: 296). Its loose syntactic attachment makes the pre-front field interactionally and textually attractive. For example, it supports ‘early starters’ in the conversation since the speaker does not need to have planned the message from the outset: [the pre-front field] projects something else to come, but does not oblige the speaker to subscribe to one particular syntactic project at a time where s/he may still be in the phase of planning. (Auer 1996: 313)

Thirdly, it is ‘textually interesting’ (Virtanen 1992: 96) since it contains the theme of the sentence (‘the point of departure for the message’; cf. Halliday 1985: 38). The theme is above all an important concept in spoken language where it can also be realized by a ‘multiple theme’ (a combination or cluster of expressions). The theme is associated with a large number of specific functions, e.g. to introduce topics, sub-topics or referents and to relate what is said to the preceding context. It can be used by the speaker to mark a change of posture, to

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be innovative or restrict the perspective from which an event is viewed (Tognini-Bonelli 1993: 204). Fourthly, the slot has cognitive advantages. The iconicity of the structure (the frame comes before the framed structure) ‘ensures that the context in which the following utterance is to be processed is available from the very start of the interpretation process thus avoiding cognitively and/or interactionally demanding repair work’ (Auer 1996: 312). Discourse particles can occupy several positions in the utterance depending on the information structure: as ‘themes’ (in the pre-front field),30 as ‘insertions’ at different positions in the utterance and as ‘tails’ or afterthoughts (in the post-end field; Auer 1996: 314).31 Some of the discourse particles discussed in this work (actually, sort of) can, for instance, be inserted parenthetically or finally, often with little difference in meaning, after a sentence, clause, turn, tone unit as a post-end field constituent (Auer 1996: 320). The following example is taken from a fairly informal conversation where speakers A and B discuss the age of a third person. Because actually comes at the end of a turn it is understood as an afterthought or comment (‘when one thinks about it’). If the utterance can be experienced as face-threatening, actually serves as a ‘softener’ inviting intimacy and ‘rapport’: (9) A> ^he *!w/ent#* B> *he’s* ^not he’s ^not ’easy to !g\uess# ^/actually# A> ^n\o# he ^got [n] . !br\illiant f/irst# (1.6 54–58)

Tags such as and that sort of thing (Chapter 6) always conclude an utterance or a tone unit. 1.8.1.2 Clustering and collocations The collocations and cooccurrences of discourse particles with other elements serve as linguistic clues to the interpretation of their functions.

30. Cf. Schiffrin’s (1987) use of the term ‘bracket’. In Schiffrin’s system brackets can function both on a discourse and a sentence level. 31. I have taken for granted that utterance-final and parenthetical particles can be represented by the same grammatical schema.

Introduction

According to Kalland (2001), the four most frequent combinations with well in topic shifts were well you know (44 tokens), well now (32 examples), well I think (26 examples), oh well (16 examples) and well you see (12 examples). In closings, well is only found in combinations like OK well and well anyway/anyhow. The fact that we do not find a certain collocation can also be a clue to the function of a particle. For instance, Murray (1979: 731) argues that the fact that well cannot precede by the way although this is possible with oh demonstrates that well, unlike oh, is inconsistent with the introduction of an unanticipated topic (cf. also Schourup 1999: 254 for additional arguments). Among the characteristic properties of discourse particles which have not received enough attention in the literature is their ‘clustering’ (collocations with other particles). For example Vicher & Sankoff (1989) found that 65% of some 3700 utterances in classroom discussions and ordinary conversation contained up to five different particles in turn-openings. In (10), we find a cluster of five different discourse particles corresponding to five different thematic slots. The setting is a radio discussion. Speaker d is an academic who has just confessed that he was bewildered by reading Principia Mathematica. The particles have a floor-holding function while the speaker is thinking of a new argument: (10) a> and un^\able to# . I mean ^t\otally {and ^\utterly#}# . be^w\ildered# d> well ^n\ow you ’see# I ^th\ink I ’mean# îf the ’explo’ration ’is on ”:th\at kind of {^c\omplex#}# ^{philo!s\ophical} {l\ogical} {’mathem\atical} :l\evel# I’m ^s\ure it’s ’true# that in ^\any ’case# ^v\ery [f dh6] there are ^very few :people to :whom/ you would ’even be !\able to com’municate it# (5.7 139–148)

Clustering needs to be distinguished from collocations since it plays a less important role as a clue to function.

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1.8.1.3 Discourse particles and prosody Schiffrin (1987: 328) noted that a discourse particle ‘has to have a range of prosodic contours e.g. tonic stress and followed by a pause, phonological reduction’. The prosody of discourse particles has been insufficiently studied although there is some interesting work going on within the area of speech synthesis investigating the prosodic correlates of the boundary types (e.g. topic shift) signalled by discourse particles. For example, Horne et al. (2001) examined prosodic and textual features which could be used to distinguish between different discourse functions of Swedish men (‘but’). One cue was the cooccurrence of men with other discourse particles while other cues were prosodic. In corpus linguistics, work on prosody always lags a little behind lexical and syntactic studies (Wichmann 2001: 193). The situation is now gradually changing and the availability of transcribed spoken corpora makes it possible to examine the frequency with which various prosodic features appear together with discourse particles. Svartvik (1980) in his article on well took a closer look at the prosody of the discourse particle and found, for instance, that there was a high correlation between well and level tone. However Svartvik found no distinct correlation between meaning and intonation. These rather disappointing results are summed up by Bolinger who suggests ‘that with well anything goes, intonationally, and we must probably expect the same autonomy of intonation that we have consistently found in all other comparisons of this sort’ (Bolinger 1989: 332). Bolinger finds a better place to start the discussion to be the difference between ‘full well’ and fully reduced w’l : Suppose a friend drops by and the two of you stand for a moment talking. You may then say W’l sit down! (We don’t want to be on our feet all day!) Here the friend should have realized already that it was appropriate for him to sit down. But if you say Well! Sit down! (We have a thousand things to talk about!) you are inviting him to sit down. (Bolinger 1989: 333)

Similar reductions are found in the pair (a) sort of/sorta and in and all that/and all that sort of thing and can be shown to have functional correlations. Moreover pauses should be included among the prosodic clues to the interpretation of the message. They cooccur with discourse particles in the prefront field and fulfil the same functions as (other) discourse particles. (Stenström 1990, Romero Trillo 1994). Another starting-point for the prosodic analysis is to look at prosodic phrasing, i.e. whether the discourse particle is a separate tone unit. For example,

Introduction

the discourse element now can be distinguished prosodically from the temporal adverb when it is a separate tone unit. Fraser (1990: 388) contrasted the following sentences: a. John left. Now, Mary was really frightened. b. John left. Now Mary was really frightened. Now set apart by a pause as in (a) and followed by a comma, is a discourse particle (‘focusing device’) (cf. Hirschberg & Litman 1993: 512). A large number of nows must be investigated before we can tell whether there is a correlation between discourse particle status and a nuclear phrase. Hirschberg and Litman found, for example, that 41.3% of the examples of ‘discourse now’ constituted a nuclear phrase (p. 512). Stenström suggests (1990: 260) that the presence or absence of tone is a more reliable criterion in cases where now is not a separate tone unit. Generally the time adjunct now carries a tone while the discourse particle does not.32 Hirschberg and Litman arrived at similar frequencies when they investigated the discourse particle well : out of 27 discourse tokens of well, 14 were single tone units (p. 516). The results for well are confirmed by Altenberg (1987: 137) who found that well had a nucleus potential in 50% of the cases he investigated in a text from the London-Lund Corpus. 1.8.1.4 Text type and register Unless we study the distribution of discourse particles in several different varieties of text in speech and in writing, we cannot be sure that we discover and analyse all the functions of an individual discourse particle. On a deeper level, these differences can get a functional explanation. According to Biber (1988: 106f), discourse particles (well, anyhow) and hedges (sort of) are characteristic of informal conversation and telephone conversation and have high scores on the dimensions of involvement and affect. Moreover, text type is perhaps one of the most important linguistic clues along with prosody, collocations and structural function to the discourse function of a particle. Nearly synonymous discourse particles may even be distinguished by text type. B. Aarts (1996: 215) showed, for instance, that simply was used with different frequency in speech and in writing and that simply was more frequent

32. According to Halliday & Hasan (1976: 268), ‘if [now] is reduced, it means the opening of a new stage in the conversation.’ In Chapter 2, I show that the particle was usually unstressed (more than half of the examples) while the time adjunct carried the nucleus.

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in relatively formal spoken varieties. Within the written domain, simply seemed to occur more often in stylistically neutral varieties of English. The synonymous just, on the other hand, was more frequent than simply in spoken language where it had a weaker rhetorical force according to Aarts. Several scholars have pointed out that there is a correlation between informal conversation and discourse particles (Biber 1988; Östman 1982, Hansen 1998, Chapter 5). However now was primarily used in discussion and debate. Moreover, monologue and dialogue may be related to the usage of discourse particles. A monologue is a text produced by a single speaker or writer who is in control of the topic and the structural organization of the discourse. A dialogue is produced by at least two speakers who share structural and topical control. We might expect this difference to be reflected in the frequency and use of discourse particles. Stenström (1990: 149f) found, not surprisingly, that nearly all categories of discourse particles were less frequent in monologue (narrative) than in dialogue (in the London-Lund Corpus) and that the categories found in the monologue were restricted to the area of planning and organization. But discourse particles with an organizing function were also less frequent in monologue than in dialogue, an obvious reason being that the monologue had been preplanned (Stenström 1990: 152). There were also differences between individual markers. To give an example, the discourse particle well was a characteristic dialogue particle, while other ‘initiators’ (e.g. now, however) occurred more often in monologues. 1.8.1.5 Discourse particles and tone units Research on discourse particles has gradually become more discourse-functionally oriented (Östman 1995: 106). In order to discuss the functions of discourse particles we first need to identify the discourse units. Romero Trillo (1994:507) has suggested that the phonemic clause [tone unit] should be taken as the basic unit of analysis for spoken discourse, ‘as it widens the scope of the description of spoken discourse, and reflects more accurately the reality of speech’. There is no doubt that tone units have grammatical and semantic correlates. (Cf. Hansen 1998: 118 and the references there.) The placement of discourse particles is described in relation to the tone unit. Prosodically discourse particles are characterised by what Altenberg refers to as ‘variable separability’, i.e. they may constitute separate tone units or be integrated in the sentence (Altenberg 1987: 86f). The ‘looseness’ or separability of the initial particle is signalled prosodically by a tone unit boundary (#) and occasionally in addition by a pause.

Introduction

(11) A> ^n=ow# . ^have you com!pl\ained about ’this# (3.3 330–31)

The particle can also be prosodically integrated in the following utterance without a tone unit boundary or a pause as in (12): (12) A> now ^where did I hear th\at _from# (1.2 88)

In (12), the special syntactic status of the particle is not expressed prosodically. Rather, ‘intonation camouflages syntax’ (Auer 1996: 308). A discourse particle which is integrated in the following tone unit can be stressed if more emphasis is required: (13) a> ^lady’s !c\/oming up from C\ornwall to ’do them# but ^these ’are . [dhi‘] :pasties with the ’ham :f\illing ’in# . [~] ^{n\ow} to go !back to the ”!f\/illing# . ^[‘]it was ’[‘]over !!h\ere# . there are ”^four \ounces# of ”^{ch/opped} or !m\/inced ’ham in the _bowl ”here# . (10.11. 1154–58)

Discourse particles have a fairly high separability (but not so high as pre-subject adverbials like however or nevertheless), which suggests that the connection is generally weak between the particle and the utterance it introduces (Altenberg 1987: 87). 1.8.1.6 Discourse particles and discourse structure As Stubbs points out, ‘one source of difficulty in discourse analysis is that utterances perform acts at very different levels of abstraction, which can probably be hierarchically ordered. There is a large literature which emphasizes that language serves different functions, but such discussions differ greatly in the level of abstraction which they propose’ (Stubbs 1983: 148f). Discourse analysis has to do with acts, moves and exchanges as well as larger units like transaction (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975). Conversational moves have to do with the local organization of utterances and organize the discourse by initiating, continuing or terminating an exchange (cf. Stubbs 1983: 149). Depending on their function in the discourse, they can be described as responses, follow-ups, backchannels. The smallest interactive unit, an ‘exchange’ (e.g. a question/answer sequence), is a structure consisting of up to three (or four) moves

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was originally used to analyse teacher/pupil interaction (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975) but is now in now in general use in discourse analysis (cf. Tsui 1994). A response is oriented to an initiating move by the preceding speaker. It can be an answer to a question, compliance with a request or a comment after a statement. The category of responses includes discourse particles. In (14), oh occurs as a response to (new) information in the preceding move and terminates the exchange: (14) b

yes . I think they’ve got [6] they’ve got a child at least one C ^\oh# (2.7 606–7)

An important type of move is the follow-up move. It occurs typically in question–answer exchanges to signal acceptance of an answer. In (15), oh functions as a ‘follow-up signal’: (15) C [w] ^where ((are)) they !!g\oing ’then# . a to Spain C ^\oh# (2.7 1232–34)

A backchannel move does not constitute an interruption in the conversational flow. In (16), a surprised oh is inserted as a ‘backchannel’ before the current speaker has finished talking: (16) b well they’re in *Spain now* but they’re a *oh ((oh))* (b going to buy a place in England . a smaller place (b nearer London (2.7 1235–36)

Discourse particles which occur between the constituent acts of a move and involve the function of an act vis-à-vis another act, can have such meanings as explanation, justification or support for a position (Kroon 1995: 75). Now, for example, introduces an explanatory comment in (17): (17) a> the ^w\ater suppl/y# . ^to ’our h/ouse# . ^was ’from a :w\ell# ^now it !h\ad to be# a ^w/ell#

Introduction

be^c=ause# you could ^not b\uild# a ^h\ouse# in ^those d/ays# withôut ’digging ((the)) :w\ell# -. (12.6 128–136)

1.9 Prospective and retrospective orientation33 Functionally, discourse particles are oriented in two directions in that they point both backwards to the prior discourse and forwards to the upcoming message. In (18), (well) look is used in speaker B’s description of an academic appointment to draw attention to what the members of the committee said: (18) B> ând [6] at !th\/is _stage# ^they ^they threw up their !h\ands# and ^said well !l\ook# . ^these are ^these are ”[dh6˜] two . :{p\ermanent} ap{p\ointments} that have been :m\ade# . (1.2 747–50)

‘Prospective markers’ are attention-getters. They typically announce a new point in the discussion, a new topic, or items on a list. We can compare (19) where the relevant context for analysing the function of oh is the preceding discourse. Oh is characteristically retrospective. ‘Retrospective markers’ signal a reaction and are followed by an explanation, elaboration, or justification. A has just remembered that there were two external advisers and marks the sudden change in his assumptions by means of oh. The clause following oh contains an explanation or elaboration: (19) A> I ^thought there were :two ex:ternal ad!v\isers# - - B> *((^w\/ell#))* A> *((that would be))* ^Dell !plus somebody w/ouldn’t it# . ^/\oh# .

33. These are the terms used by Lenk (1998: 52), who also speaks about prospective and retrospective markers.

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no there are ^two external adv/isers# ône lit and one l\an*((guage# ^y=es# of ^c=ourse#))* (1.1 328–35)

It would probably be difficult to divide discourse particles into two functional classes depending on whether they point backwards or forwards (or both). On the other hand it may be useful to describe particular discourse particles in terms of whether their main orientation in the discourse is prospective or retrospective (or both).

1.10 The functional domains of discourse particles Hansen is pessimistic about establishing a taxonomy of categories of discourse particles (cf. Andersen 2001: 64f and the discussion of some proposed taxonomies): … compared to many other areas within linguistics, the study of markers is a relatively recent phenomenon, and attempting an exhaustive taxonomy of content categories in this domain … simply seems premature as long as there is little consensus both about the function of individual morphemes, and about exactly which items should be included in the class of markers. (Hansen 1998: 77)

In order to analyse discourse particles we need to make some functional distinctions. It has recently been common to distinguish certain major functions for discourse particles. According to Traugott (1999: 180), DMs [Discourse markers] have been a major topic in pragmatics and discourse analysis since the publication of Schiffrin’s groundbreaking (1987) book entitled Discourse Markers, in which she analyzed a variety of pragmatic markers such as y’know, I mean, but, oh, then. More recently there has been a tendency to bifurcate the domain into: a. those markers that signal relationships between clauses; Schiffrin (1990) terms them “discourse deictics” while Fraser (1988, 1996) calls them “discourse markers”. b. other pragmatic markers that serve primarily interpersonal functions, such as hedging, or turn-taking uses, e.g. well, y’know

Introduction

For example, Schiffrin (1987) analyses discourse markers as deictics indexing texts and participants (1987: 323). Östman (1995: 104) recognizes the multifunctional nature of discourse particles by referring to three parameters in accordance with which communication takes place (Coherence, Politeness and Involvement).34 In the present account discourse particles are indexed to attitudes, to participants and to the text. Halliday and Hasan recognize a third ‘metafunction’ besides the textual and interpersonal. The ideational function of language is concerned with the representation of content, with ‘the function that language has of being about something’ (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 26; quoted from Kroon 1995: 59). However this function figures less in the description of discourse particles. ‘Given the relative lack of semantic or propositional content in pragmatic markers, they generally fall outside the propositional component, though … they derive diachronically from it’ (Brinton 1996: 38). Particles with an interpersonal function (phatic discourse particles) express attitudes, feelings and evaluations. Discourse particles are used as hedges expressing uncertainty and as hearer-oriented appeals to the hearer for confirmation. Other examples of interpersonal function are particles expressing a response or a reaction to the preceding utterance and backchannelling. Phatic discourse particles can also be analysed in terms of face and politeness.35 Halliday’s textual function is concerned with the textual resources the speaker has for creating coherence. Textual meaning is relevance to the context: to the preceding (and following) text, and the context of situation (Halliday 1985: 53). However to analyse the functions of discourse particles in spoken language ‘one needs a more global conception of the textual component than Halliday uses, one that moves beyond the level of the sentence to the structure of the entire discourse’ (Brinton 1996: 38). The interpersonal and textual domains are not mutually exclusive categories but the textual and interpersonal function should be seen as potential meanings of the particles, which can co-occur in the same discourse: discourse particles are at the same time signposts in the communication and expressions of the speaker’s attitudes and emotions (cf. Andersen 2001: 77). When one of

34. The parameter of Coherence is mainly concerned with cultural restraints and with norms. Östman sees culture and discourse as inseparable and ‘it is with reference to this parameter that pragmatic particles have discourse-marking functions’ (Östman 1995: 104). 35. For a useful inventory of functions gleaned from general studies of pragmatic markers see Brinton (1996: 37f).

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the functions dominates or is most frequent we may distinguish between the primary and secondary function of the particle (Kroon 1995: 100). Thus although now can have interpersonal function, this is only secondary in relation to the more frequent and prototypical textual function.

1.11 Discourse particles on the textual level It is generally agreed that we can distinguish between discourse particles functioning on the global or local level of the discourse. According to Schiffrin, conversation is essentially locally managed, i.e. on a turn-to-turn basis, and discourse particles contribute to the hearer’s understanding of the coherence of the conversation on the local level (cf. Schiffrin 1987: 24). Her model of discourse therefore focuses on local coherence. Obviously the speaker also organises the discourse in order to take into account the relevance of an utterance in the larger context of the discourse: … a speaker organizes her turn in order in order to indicate the relevance she attributes to the line of argumentation. This relevance of an utterance in the entire context of a conversation must sometimes be signaled explicitly as a ‘why this now’, to show a hearer how it all relates to the previous and following parts of the conversation’. (Lenk 1998: 23)

Lenk (1998) was interested in expanding the discourse model suggested by Schiffrin to take into account discourse particles functioning on the global coherence level. Global discourse markers would be similar to the category of ‘frames’ which Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) identified in class-room discourse and illustrated by now then and right (cf. Stubbs 1983: 184). The global discourse markers studied by Lenk were anyway, however, still, incidentally, actually and what else. However, many discourse particles function both on the local and on the global discourse level. In the present work I will talk about ‘frame’ when a discourse particle has global coherence function and use qualifier for discourse particles with a local coherence function (Svartvik 1980: 173; Carlson1984).36

36. It is possible that frames (what Hansen calls misplacement markers) and uses of markers to indicate strictly local coherence can be viewed as two end-points of a scale representing different degrees of expectation of coherence (Hansen 1998: 198).

Introduction

A frame can be followed by additional functional clues. (20) is an example. Now leads up to a metacomment in which the speaker states explicitly that he is going to give an example. The preface typically occurs where there is a major boundary in the discourse: (20) m> ^do you appr/ove# of ^f\oxes# being ^thr\own# |a^l/ive# to ^d\ogs# . they’re ^n\ever ’thrown a’live to ’dogs# preface ^n\ow# ^let me ’give you an ex/am’ple# . continuation ^r/ecent’ly# ^members of the ’Southdown :h/unt# were ob^s=erved# by ^Mr ’Donald Ch/apman# who is ^M’P for a ”:Birmingham cons!t/ituen’cy# and ac^cording to Mr :Ch\/apman# . a ^f=ox# ^was in f/act# (- coughs) ^thrown a’live to the :d\ogs# (5.6 237–53)

Another linguistic cue cooccurring with the discourse particle is left-dislocation: (21) m> ^now . the Robertsons of Str/\ome# who ^form a tre:mendous tribe in P\erthshire# ”^th\ey _have a# . a ^tendency for their !outer fingers to turn :\in# (5.2 960–64)

1.11.1 The frame function Discourse particles with a frame function are needed not when the interaction goes smoothly but to draw the hearer’s attention to a transition or a break in the conversational routine. We can expect such situations where ‘the speaker assumes control over conversational structure at a high level: not simply taking advantage of an opening set up by the previous utterance’ to be numerous (Stubbs 1983: 184).

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Stubbs (1983: 183) used the ethnomethodological notion ‘misplacement marker’ to describe particles signalling that sequential placement is not sufficient to establish a coherent text (cf. Schegloff & Sacks1973): More precisely, speakers use such items to indicate to hearers that they should not attempt to use placement in sequence, in order to analyse the point or illocutionary force of the following utterance. They mark a break in the surface utterance-by-utterance cohesion. (Stubbs 1983: 183f)

However there is no lack of terms to describe elements signalling ‘shifts and breaks’ in the conversation especially if we include terms which are used in textlinguistic and cognitively oriented accounts of coherence to mark shifts in different functional domains (cf. Gumperz 1982 ‘contextualization cues’; Virtanen’s (1992) breaks in Text Structure Continuities (TSC’s); Schiffrin 1987: 36 ‘brackets’; Sinclair & Coulthard 1975 use the more general term ‘boundary’ or frame which I have used here). Table 1.11.1. Frame functions of discourse particles Frame functions 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Marking transitions (e.g. topic shifts, introducing a new aspect of the topic, opening and closing conversation) Introducing a new turn (initiators) Introducing an explanation, justification, background Introducing or closing a digression (push-markers, return-pops) Self-correction Introducing direct speech

Speakers shift topic midway; they make sidetracks from the main topic. Returns to a previous topic and retrospective evaluation are frequent as well as projections forwards to a new development in the discourse. In the textual functional domain we therefore need to recognize a large number of different functions which are signalled by a special marker: to initiate and close a conversation, to signal transitions (topic shifts), to constrain the relevance of adjacent utterances. Moreover discourse particles are needed to signal conversational repair and to elaborate or comment on a preceding discourse act (see Table 1.11.1 for a possible classification of frames). Closings are, for example, important boundaries in a conversation. In (22), OK is placed at the transition from the main body of the dialogue to the conclusion of the telephone conversation with a preclosing function (Schegloff & Sacks 1973).

Introduction

(22) B> [6˜m] - - . Î’d Î’d [6˜m] . în re’ply to your l/etter [6]# . Î . Î . Î . Î’ll . I’ll sort of . [6] ^set out the situ\ation# ^/all right# A> ^f\ine# Ô/K# B> Ô/K# A> âll r\ight# B> ^goodb/ye Mr ’Gerry’mander# A> ^bye ^b\ye# (8.3 6 482–94)

(Fine) OK accepts a proposal (‘I’ll sort of set out the situation’). Speaker B’s proposal is treated by the other party in the conversation (speaker A) as an invitation to close the telephone conversation (the pre-closing function of OK). Example (23) is an example from a radio discussion in which one discusses the issue whether flogging prevents people from committing crimes. Well now together with the question invites the other speaker to take the turn: (23) w> ^they disc=overed# - that in the ma^jority of cases exactly the re!v\erse _happened# ^that is there’s a :rather ”!gr\eater tendency for people to commit crimes a:g/ain# ^\after they’d been fl/ogged# than ^when they h\adn’t# n> ^well now !what do you mean be fl\ogged# (5.3 319–24)

Examples of topic shift inside a turn are frequent. An example is (24) where OK is used to close off a preceding topic and path the way for the introduction of something new. The example is an excerpt from a radio discussion where speaker w is a counsellor. The topic has to do with the recent death of the counsellee’s twin brother. (24) w

[6] you can ônly ’be a :whole p/erson# as ^long as your !br\other’s a’round# . and now ^s\/uddenly# ^that ’half is :g\one# - Ô/K# [ai] it’s ^fr\/eeing#

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but it’s ^fr\ightening# ^t\erribly ’frightening# (6.5 308–315)

Another kind of transition appears in (25), where well introduces a narrative or a story. Speaker B is invited to tell the story about Eileen’s sons: (25) a> you were telling us a . a long complicated story about Eileen’s sons last night - I hadn’t quite got/ them in order B> ^well she !has ’four b/\oys# a> yes that I think ((you told me)) - - *((I))* B> *and* ^n\one of ’them have b/een# ^what you ’might ’call [6] - :very suc!c\essful ’in/ this ’world# - (1.13 1–5)

We need to distinguish between markers indicating transitions (or shifts) between subtopics and markers leading into or out of a digression or interruption. Speakers keep track of where they are in the conversation and are concerned with signalling interruptions in the conversational flow: In assessing where they now ‘are’ in the conversation, speakers keep in mind only what discourse units are still going on — still ‘hanging fire’, as it were, waiting to be completed on the ‘other side’ of interrupting discourse units. (Polanyi & Scha 1983: 264)

In the following example, a discourse particle is used when the speaker is about to resume a story after a short interruption. The topic has been sidetracked by the mention of powdered milk (A and B are having coffee). After the interruption, speaker A orients himself again towards the ‘business at hand’. Actually functions as a ‘return pop’ popping from the embedded (parenthetical) activity back to the tacitly ongoing ‘higher level’ activity (Polanyi & Scha 1983: 265): (26) A> [j] I sup^p\ose s/o# - it’s ^dehy_drated !m\ilk# . B> ^[\m]# - - to ^make a”!p\int it s/ays# A> ^\actually# he ^c\aught ’me# on the ^h\op# (1.4 145–50)

Introduction

In (27), from a radio discussion, the panel discusses the claim from an Oxford statistician that you could feed a family of five for a week on three pounds a week: Well now is used by the speaker before a digression. It functions as a ‘push’ marker, a term I have borrowed from Polanyi & Scha (1983: 264f) to signal movement into a parenthetical comment: (27) f> ^n\o# - - but it’s ^what we call the :woman’s \angle# h> the ^woman’s \angle# ^well now !let me try and think what ’is the woman’s \angle# - Î !think most of the women in :this \audience# would ^pr/\obably a_gree# h> with ^m/e# (5.4 575–81)

Self-corrections are similar to other types of interruption and are marked by discourse particles. In (28), oh marks the spot where the speaker interrupts himself because he sees that there is milk for his coffee: (28) B> Î ’don’t think I’ve ^\oh# there ^\is milk# (1.8 35–6)

Discourse particles are often found as frames before direct speech when the speaker reports an exchange where several people are involved: (29) A> ^what particular needs did you have in !m\ind# *- -* and ^she s=aid# [6m] - oh I ^don’t mean their b,c> *(- - laugh)* (A> physio:l\ogical _needs# *.* which Î thought was m\arvellous# ^you (1.3 737–42)

1.11.2 The qualifying function In the qualifying function a discourse particle signals that some qualification is needed because the dialogue does not ‘go well’. Discourse particles as qualifiers come at the beginning of a disagreement, in exchanges (e.g. question–answer pairs) or before arguments (see Table 1.11.2). In question–answer exchanges it occurs for instance if the response is defective (Carlson 1984: 37), and in

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request-exchanges where the requester’s expectations are not met. In (30), well as a qualifier introduces the answer to a question: (30) a> and e^v\/entually# [6] âs I ’came !b\etter# . [6] . ^came to ’under:st\and# I^talian :b\etter# I I ûsed I’talian in the :cl\asses# b> ^how !\old# were ^most of the !ch\ildren# - . a> ^w\ell# [6] ônly a !f\ew of them# were ^ch\ildren in ’fact# . [6m] . Î was ’teaching :\adults# . b> oh I ^s\ee# I didn’t *^r\ealize ’that# I âlways ’thought they were :l\ittle#* (5.9 478–491)

According to Tsui, a request prospects compliance (preferred second) or noncompliance (dispreferred second). Dispreferred seconds (e.g. non-compliance) contain a discourse particle (well) but not the preferred alternative compliance with the request (cf. Tsui 1994: 58). Well is a qualifier patching up a slight mishap in the conversational flow. Now (and well) are at home in arguments or disputes as qualifiers. When now occurs between adjacent moves in an argument, it indicates a comparison or a contrast. Speaker d has been talking about how bureaucracy has increased in England and makes a comparison with the situation in Scotland. Now makes the element of comparison/contrast explicit: (31) d> ûnder !this !g\overnment# which of ^course !vastly in:creases . [6] our Table 1.11.2. Qualifier functions of discourse particles Qualifier functions 1. 2. 3. 4.

Indicating agreement/disagreement Response to a question (a request) Indicating comparison or contrast Listing

Introduction

:borrowing re!qu\irement# ^n=ow in !Sc\/otland# [6] I ^don’t ’think when the :industry bill first /\entered com’mittee# the ^government had :quite ap!pr\/eciated ’this# . ^we are to !have _these !two \agencies# . (11.5 204–9)

Example (32) also illustrates now as a qualifier marking the transition from a preceding move. The speaker, a medical student, has had to answer a question about the causes of rickets for his viva. The element of comparison is less clear. Now is used for the hearer’s benefit to make it easier for him to follow the progression in the narrative by marking different steps (cf. Schiffrin 1987: 232 and Chapter 2). (32) A> ((well ^then)) I ’told him an:\other ’cause of ’rickets# . now ”^most rickets is is nutr\itional# but there ”îs r\enal ’rickets# . ^now !!renal ’rickets is :not the ’sort of :question you ’ask ’somebody in a ’viva _pass !f\ail ’stuff# ^y\/ou know# I mean you *^don’t* a> *yeah* A> ^this is . :pretty ’high-!p\owered ’sort of ’stuff# . (2.9 155–62)

Well as a qualifier has the meaning qualified agreement or disagreement. In the context of argumentation well is therefore in variation with but : (33) A B

of the in!digenous !p\eople# well that’s ^tr/\ue# +but I ^mean+ f+ the Irish were+ tribes B but be^cause of - A ^w\ell# ^so were the !Sc\ots# if it *^comes to th/at# . B *^but there’s . there’s a ^lot ((syll))*

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A

the ^Highland !cl\earances#* ”^j\ust the ’same# f [m] - . (2.8:1.348–360)

1.12 Discourse particles with a phatic function Discourse particles with interpersonal function (‘phatic connectives’; Bazzanella 1990) ‘mainly perform a phatic function in the discourse, underlying the interactive structure of the conversation’ (Bazzanella 1990: 630).37 Phatic connectives can be regarded as evidentials at least in some of their uses, i.e. as items expressing attitudes to or modes of knowledge (cf. Brinton 1996: 190 on I think ; Chafe 1986). For example, I think refers to the mode of knowledge (belief); actually shows that something goes beyond expectation, while sort of indicates that knowledge ‘has less than optimal codability’ (Chafe 1986: 270). On the other hand, well and now have no connection with evidentiality although they may have affective meanings. Cf. Brinton (1996: 190), ‘A number of pragmatic markers, such as I mean, I guess I know, you know and you see, have clear evidential qualities …; however others, such as well, oh, ah, uh, and like, do not have any obvious connection with matters of epistemology.’ Phatic discourse particles with evidential meaning function as hedges or boosters on illocutionary force. Sort of used as a weakener of illocutionary force (a /downtoning/ hedge on illocutionary force) is illustrated in (34) from a conversation about the desperate situation for academics looking for jobs: (34) A> ^we were ’in . sort of :absolute ”:depths of des:p\air . {fi^n\ancially#}# ^s\o# [6˜m] ând what is m\/ore# êven \if# our ^ship were to come ”!h\/ome# . and the ^chances of :th\at# ^((they)) *seemed sl/im#* B> *^[\m]#*

37. Bernstein speaks about sociocentric sequences (Bernstein 1971) and James of ‘compromisers’ with the function of ‘“compromising” on the full semantic significance of the structures they modify’ (James 1983: 194).

Introduction

(A> there were no ^v\acancies# - . (3.2 144–52)

Just as a phatic discourse particle is associated with affective intensity (in addition to being a downtoner). In (35), a female undergraduate is describing her experiences from a job interview as ‘just such a nightmare’: (35) A> ^you kn\ow# ît was just !such a n\ight_mare# - I mean ^this whole !s\ystem# of being in^vited somewhere for :l\unch# b> *[m]* (A> and ((then)) for ^d\inner# ând !overn\ight# . **ând br\eakfast#** (1.3 220–27)

The position of discourse particles with a phatic function is often flexible (cf. Section 1.8.1.1). As a result their function may change: actually in (36) has a polite function to establish intimacy when it is placed as an afterthought at the end of the turn: (36) a> *actually* . you ought to have said [6˜] - well I don’t know about that actually (2.9.0 193)

1.12.1 Phatic discourse particles and politeness Face-saving, politeness and indirectness are characteristic of everyday conversation and are therefore involved in the usage of discourse particles with interpersonal function (Bazzanella 1990: 636). Sort of and tags like and that sort of thing, which have evidential meanings like imprecision, approximation, seem to signal ‘the speaker’s desire to reduce social distance between herself and the addressee’ (Holmes 1988a: 99). It follows that sort of and the ‘synonymous’ you know can be described as negative politeness strategies. Interactionally ‘they constitute lexical means for the expression of non-imposing, deferent verbal behaviour, serving to communicate, perhaps in a culturally specific conventional way, certain degrees of politeness’ (James 1983: 198). In (37), speaker C, who is a secretary, offers to show her successor around. (Just) sort of is not part of the social act of requesting but has the function to make the action less obtrusive:

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(37) C> I ^think if I :just sort of - :take you r\ound#/ and ^sh\ow you where [dhi] *-* ^{central s\ervices}/ **and** so on :\are# because ^H\art {as you ^kn\ow#}# A> *^y\eah#* **^y\es#** (C> îs a ^man who . ’knows !\everything# (1.5 1131–36)

However you know and sort of can also be used as positive politeness techniques drawing the speaker and the hearer closer to each other: … so the use of these hedges assumes some degree of common ground between S+H, in that S calls upon H to use the common knowledge. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 117)

1.12.2 Phatic discourse particles and floor-holding It is possible that other uses of phatic discourse particles than those relating to face and politeness have been neglected. Phatic discourse particles are also a part of the planning process especially when they cooccur with pauses or with other particles. In (38), oh sort of fills a gap in the conversation while the speaker is looking for the right word. The speaker’s planning difficulties and indetermination are emphasised by pause-markers on both sides of the interruption: (38) A> of ^seeing ’whether . one :gets - - one’s suf^ficiently :\/interested in a ’thing# and one ^d\oesn’t ’get ’bogged d/own# . în [6˜] - - ^\oh the _sort of - - - ^rou!t\ine ((of the ’1 syll))# B> ^well there !is an ’awful *:l\ot of* rout/ine# A> *((2 sylls))* **^y\es#** (1.5 574–78)

The head modified by a phatic particle can be absent especially in very casual conversation. James speaks about ‘stranded compromisers’ when there is a compromiser construction (phatic discourse particle) with an absent head. (James 1983: 203). Stenström has analysed similar examples, where a head is only anticipated, as ‘planners’ because the role of the discourse particle seems to be to draw the hearer’s attention to the fact that there is more to come (cf. Stenström 1990: 160). However the phatic or interpersonal function to establish intimacy is also present. In (39), from the COLT Corpus, the young speakers

Introduction

use an isolated sort of thing as a phatic device mainly to establish solidarity and group-feeling. (39) Yeah Charlotte you always, I hate the way you always relent and you always say oh well you know I shouldn’t be angry with them cos they just wanted some fun and you know, never mind eh, sort of thing [I know I, and you know, you such= yeah but why do you succumb] (COLT w33–1)

In (40), sort of has been left dangling with no or only an implied head: (40) He doesn’t talk about birds that much he just sort of, now and again he’ll say … shit and I’ll look round and I’ll see these like really cool legs going [·unclearÒ] (COLT w4–26)

If one removes the discourse particles from a text such as (40), it would be difficult to grasp what the propositional content is, which suggests that the whole purpose of the conversation may be phatic. A final example of the use of interpersonal particles for planning purposes is (41), where I mean like, I mean are mainly floorholders although in another connection the same expressions could be used as a repair marker (I mean) or a hedge (like): (41) |w4–1

Well she said you were. She said you were both taking the piss out of me. And like you know it’s not even always behind my back you two always sort of … I mean Cath= when I’m not er I mean like I, I mean I’m, I’ve gotta, I’ve gotta tell you some time because when I’m on my own with Catherine yeah? (COLT w4–1)

1.13 Phatic discourse particles and pairing Bazzanella has made the interesting observation that ‘there are pairs of speaker’s and addressee’s PCs [phatic connectives] that seem to match each other, answering a given interactional function’ (Bazzanella 1990: 640). The phatic function of a particle belonging to the speaker may be to ask for confirmation and the hearer signals confirmation (‘oh yes’). (42) illustrates what is meant by pairing. The paired tag question and its response contribute to overall politeness and to the intimacy between the conversationalists. C and A are looking at pictures to decorate their rooms:

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(42) C> but ^that is the ”:pleasure of ”:p\/ictures# ^\isn’t it# A> ôh y\es# it ^\is r/eally# ^y\es# (1.8 527–31)

The speaker uses a discourse particle to request attention (you see), to assume shared knowledge (you know), to request confirmation (right, OK) or to clarify something (I mean). The hearer responds using a discourse particle signalling comprehension (OK) or a change of knowledge status (oh). If a speaker uses OK with a rising intonation to ask for confirmation, the hearer uses the same particle to respond: (43) [cos basically] Robin William films are, either, a film, with a character, and Robin Williams, is the character, takes over the film and Robin Williams comes through, and it’s funny, okay? |w6 Okay. (COLT)

Along the same lines, He & Lindsey (1998) have shown that you know is often matched by a a particular response (e.g. right, exactly). The pairing of you know with oh is of special interest since oh does not follow immediately after you know. Speaker A, who is a secretary at an academic department, has taken over a number of administrative tasks. By means of you know she reaches out to her coconversationalist for a sympathetic reaction. The response is introduced by oh : (44) A> ^though I . ^you kn/ow# ((^spent t\ime on it#)) I ^took ’over ’quite a l\ot# C> ^\oh# ^Hart’s ’got this :thing about st\atus# ^y\ou know# he - *he* ^doesn’t ’like ’secretaries to be ’merely/ s\ecretaries# (1.5 946–52)

He & Lindsei (1998: 147f) explain similar examples as follows: It is then likely that “you know” and “oh” are used at the same time: “you know” by the speaker who has information new and important to the addressee which is necessary for both to understand in order for talk to

Introduction

progress, and “oh” by the addressee upon hearing this information for the first time in order to indicate the receipt of new knowledge.

We should not overlook backchannels when we discuss the hearer’s role as a partner of cooperation in the conversation. Backchannels are not ‘paired’ with the speaker’s discourse particles, but they come into the conversation at regular intervals to show the hearer’s understanding of the social relationship between the partners and to keep the conversation going. Backchannels should be considered interactional or phatic markers used ‘to underline social relationships involved in conversational exchanges, such as showing attention and comprehension, keeping the channel open, indicating agreement, and assuring empathy’ Bazzanella (1990: 640).

1.14 Discourse particles and style Discourse particles are seldom sociolinguistically neutral. According to Bazzanella (1990: 645), ‘many factors have to be considered, which have not always been taken into account, …, such as regional preferences, social class, profession and the type of interaction (the most neglected feature), i.e. sex, intimacy, and the roles of interlocutors.’ In sociolinguistic studies and that kind of thing has, for instance, been treated as a sociolinguistic variable which can be analysed with regard to the sociological factors age, gender, social class, ethnicity (Dines 1980, Dubois 1993). Other sociolinguistic studies have investigated the strategic use of discourse particles in interaction by members of different social groups. Bernstein (1971: 98) found, for instance, that the ‘ego-centric’ sequence I think was preferred by middle class groups while sociocentric sequences (you know, isn’t it) were used more frequently by working-class speakers (for an analysis of the variation between I think and you know in American industrial workers’ speech see also Huspek 1989). The importance of whether speakers are friends or strangers has not been studied in the LLC since the number of speakers who do not know each other is too small. However the results from other studies suggest that the degree of intimacy between the speakers might be of interest. When she studied discourse particles (‘phatic connectives’) in spoken Italian, Bazzanella (1990: 636) discovered that ‘the more intimacy increases, the more PCs [phatic connectives] diminish, as if it were superfluous to signal it’. On the other hand, Jucker & Smith (1998) found that both like and you know showed higher frequencies in

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the conversations between friends than between strangers in their American English data altough they found that reception markers (yeah, oh, really?) occurred more frequently in conversations between strangers than between friends (Jucker & Smith 1998: 198). Discourse particles have also been studied in a gender perspective. However the picture which emerges from these studies is complex.38 Holmes found, for example, that ‘women tend to emphasize the interpersonal uses of particles such as sort of, while men put more emphasis on their use as modal signals.’ (Holmes 1988a: 116f). Sociolinguistic factors may well have a key role in explaining how discourse particles are used and what functions they have. In the extensive study carried out by Andersen (2001) of some emergent discourse particles in adolescent speech, an obvious trend was that adolescents used discourse particles more than adults, suggesting that adolescence and adulthood are generally different with respect to societal norms and politeness principles.

1.15 Conclusion When Östman, one of the pioneers in the area of discourse particle studies, revisited the scene ‘twenty years after’,39 he warned against treating discourse particles only as markers, i.e. as ontologically secondary to the discourse in which they occur: In a discourse-analytic approach to pragmatic particles, neither the individual particle nor the pragmatic particles as a group are in focus. Rather, discourse and interaction are seen as ontologically prior, and the pragmatic particles as signals or organizers of discourse. This is an important function of the pragmatic particles, but it does not follow that a focus on global aspects of discourse warrants a neglect of the idiosyncratic characteristics inherent in each pragmatic particle; nor does such a focus of course necessarily imply that discourse organization is the pragmatic particles’ only (global) function. (Östman 1995: 100)

38. On discourse particles in men’s and women’s speech, see e.g., Holmes 1986 (you know), 1988a (sort of), 1988b (of course). 39. The publication of Weydt’s important monograph (1969) resulted in a rapid growth of discourse particles in the 1970’s.

Introduction

An important property of discourse particles is their flexibility and multifunctionality. It follows that they need to be analysed from many different perspectives. They indexically point to the speaker’s epistemic attitude to the utterance and affective attitude to the hearer as well as to the preceding and following discourse. This flexibility explains their enormous usefulness and frequency in discourse: they are used to grease the relations between speakers, to create coherence, to avoid conversational ‘bumps’, simplify on-line planning or simply to fill a pause. I have argued that grammaticalisation has radically changed our views on the relationship between the meaning of discourse particles and their multifunctionality. In this perspective discourse particles can be regarded as lexical words which have undergone a change of function from propositional meaning to textual and interpersonal function. In principle, the ‘pragmatic polysemy’ of discourse particles is no different from the polysemy of chair which has several potential meanings (‘chair to sit on’, ‘chair of department’) depending on the context (Östman 1995: 105). However the principle behind the different uses of particles is not so apparent as when we speak about the polysemy of lexical words. As a result of grammaticalisation, discourse particles are placed in the left margin of the sentence frame in a prosodic phrase. This position is textually interesting and serves as the thematic starting-point for the message. Elements in this position are also cognitively salient and indicate how the utterance is related to other parts of the text. The linguistic properties of discourse define a class of items with fuzzy boundaries. More important, the linguistic and contextual properties of discourse particles function as clues to their functional properties. We are only just beginning to define what we mean by discourse particles and to classify them into functional categories. Although discourse particles are polysemous we need to constrain the number of discourse functions we recognise. In the present framework discourse particles are multifunctional since they can be functional both within the textual and interpersonal domain. Other dimensions which need to be considered are face and politeness. A classification has been proposed of their different meanings on the textual domain (as frames and qualifiers) and as phatic connectives. In the remaining chapters, a more detailed investigation of their actual usage will be undertaken. Much of the linguistic spadework in the remaining chapters will consist in analysing the contexts where discourse particles can occur and proposing functional categories and descriptions which can be used in dictionaries and

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handbooks.40 The corpora provide a great help since they provide a large number of illustrations of the use of a particle and make it possible to study the use of discourse particles in extended discourse. No final word on what discourse particles are doing will be attempted here but the discussion of discourse particles in this work should be seen as a contribution to the ongoing debate in particle research about the contexts and functions of discourse particles: These disputes have quickened in recent years as DMs [discourse markers] have increasingly come to be seen not only as an underexplored facet of language behavior but as a testing ground for hypotheses concerning the boundary between pragmatics and semantics and for theories of discourse structure and utterance interpretation. (Schourup 1999: 228)

40. That existing dictionary definitions of discourse markers could be improved by comparing them with actual usage is shown in Lenk’s study (1998).

Chapter 2

The topic-changer now

Now is a discourse marker basically for change of topic. (Bolinger 1989: 291)

2.1 Introduction We are used to thinking about now as a temporal adverb. There is however a use of the word where it is non-temporal and differs in many respects from other adverbs. This is illustrated in (1). Now introduces an elaboration or explanation as a part of the answer to the question (‘Did Speaker A get to know Miss Law while he lived in Ireland’). (1) b

you had a lovely friend Miss Law does she date from that period A ^n\o# Miss ^L\/aw# is a ^{str\ange} . ’acci!dental acqu\aintance# - . [6˜m] . ^n=ow# Î was an ’archae\ologist# ^my degr/ee# îs a !f\irst class h/onours de’gree# in ^\/arche\ology# - - ând . !my ’friends _in . !King’s Uni’versity Ty:r\/one# - . ^[‘]introd\uced me# (1.14 758–68)

In this example, now has lost its ordinary temporal meaning and is a particle indicating a boundary or a ‘frame’ between two discourse units (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975: 22). Now has a number of properties associated with discourse particles. It is short and placed initially in the utterance; it does not belong to the propositional content of the utterance and it has a discourse-organising function.

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Only uses where now functions as a particle have been analysed here. However in many cases the adverb and the particle are only fuzzily delimited from each other.1 In view of this fact, now can be characterized as an emergent particle. The discussion in the following sections will start with the criteria distinguishing between now as an adverb and as a discourse particle. The grammaticalisation of now will be considered followed by a discussion of the conditions under which now is used in the corpus. Collocations, now’s distribution over different text types, and in particular its sequential position in the discourse are important indicators of its function.

2.2 The S-use and D-use of now When now is a temporal adverb it refers to the time of speaking just like then refers to some time prior to the speech situation or signals a successive relationship between events (‘what will you do then?’) (Schiffrin 1992: 755). As a result, now correlates with the present tense of the verb: (2) John reads a great deal now

Schiffrin (1987: 228) uses the term reference time to refer to the deictic relationship between a proposition and the time of its utterance which is illustrated by example (2). When the reference is to past time, this is indicated in the shift from the present tense to the past tense and by the change from now to then. Now cooccurring with the verb in the past tense refers to ‘narrative time’ and functions as a ‘marker of a personal narrative situation, or personal point of view’, and as a signal of free indirect style (Bronzwaer 1975: 59): It was of no use asking myself this question now. There I was … (Bronzwaer, ibid.)

The particle, on the other hand, combines freely with the present and past tenses. Now can therefore be a particle in cases like:

1. The fact that the discourse particle now is not unequivocally a particle excludes it from the core class of discourse particles according to the criteria used to define discourse particles by Östman (1982: 153). It can be argued that the distinction between core and peripheral members of discourse particles is better captured by taking into account degrees of grammaticalisation.


(3) a> ^she ’says she’s !st\ill in ’love with him# - - ^now [6˜ .6] !she kn/ew# that ^Mr P/iper# and ^Miss P/otter# . ^were ’were !drifting ap\art# . that it was ônly a ’matter of t/ime# . : be^fore ’Miss P/otter# . [6] ^left . ’Mr . P\iper# - - (12.3 284–91)

Hirschberg & Litman (1993) examined textual and prosodic features of now in order to find a set of criteria that could be used to distinguish between the temporal function (S-use) and the discourse (D-use). Their results, based on the examination of 100 cases, can be summarised as follows (quoted from Horne et al., 2001: 1064): i.

Discourse now constituted most often a (prosodic) phrase on its own (41.3% of the cases). Sentence now hardly ever constituted a phrase by itself. ii. Discourse now appeared most often at the beginning of a (prosodic) phrase (98.4%).2 Sentential now appeared most often in non-initial position (86.5%). iii. Discourse now was more often deaccentuated than sentential now. iv. Discourse now co-occurred with other cue-words, e.g. well now… Prosody is important for the identification of the discourse particle as well as the position of the particle in the discourse. When now is initial and is a tone unit of its own it can safely be assumed to be a discourse particle. However in the majority of cases now was part of a larger tone unit. There is consequently a great deal of fuzziness between the particle and the temporal adverb. In a study of temporal now and then in Dickens’s Great Expectations, Bronzwaer found that, in a large number of cases, both the temporal now and the ‘transitional conjunct’ could articulate ‘a sequence of narrative’:

2. The few exceptions in my material were of the following kind: a:

*^things like !M\/arvel#* **Î don‘t** ‘think it‘s gonna !l=ast very ‘long /actually# ^now the w/ar# . b: ^n\o# I “^wondered if the :ship would !g\et there /actually# be^fore it had !f\inished# . (4.1. 764–69)

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… in our terms, now articulates a ‘sequence of narrative’, or episode. We have noted many cases in which the deictic time adverb now may be said to have precisely this function; there are also a large number of cases where the transitional conjunct now plays this role. (Bronzwaer 1975: 63)

This fuzziness in some contexts is to be expected if now is polysemous and has developed its pragmatic functions as the result of grammaticalisation (cf. Section 2.3). In (4), for example, the immediate linguistic context does not show whether now is a discourse particle or a temporal adverb. Speaker B believes that girls think that they cannot do things because they are girls. He had, for example, noticed that Poppy had taken the engine in her car to pieces but that she did not think that she could put it together again: (4) B> I ^did n\otice# ^P\oppy# sort of ^taking her :engine to *p/ieces#* and your ^husband s\aying# . âll c> *[m]* (B> r/ight# now ^put it to!g\ether a’gain# . and she ^s=aid# . ^could she r\/eally# . ^p\/ut it to’gether# (1.12 349–58)

Now can be assigned temporal meaning (introducing a temporal comparison) or textual function (introducing a new step in a series of actions).3 However the readings are not mutually exclusive but the speaker may have intended both interpretations to be present simultaneously. In Schiffrin’s words, there is a fuzzy zone ‘where the discourse structure of temporal comparisons neutralizes the distinction between now as a time adverb and now as a marker’ (Schiffrin 1987: 231). One of Schiffrin’s examples is the following (Schiffrin’s numbering in the example):

3. Alternatively now can be understood as an emphatic (modal) particle strengthening the request. Similar examples have been analysed by Greenbaum (1969) as time adjuncts and by Suzuki, unpublished, as discourse particles.


(Freda discusses the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood) (5) Freda> a. It was at one time all: almost all Jewish. b. Now it’s I would say [si -] Jack> six ty Jewish, forty Italian.

Now as a bracketing device before an aside or comment could be analysed in both ways since the time difference coincides with the differentiation between subtopics. According to Schiffrin, … now in (b) seems to be a time adverb not only because of its co-occurrence with the present tense (this is a necessary but not sufficient condition) but because the comparison in the discourse is between time periods (at one time versus now)’ … ‘But in temporal comparisons such as (5), the time difference is the subtopic differentiation; thus we cannot be absolutely sure which contrast is being marked by now. (Schiffrin 1987: 231)

Another method to distinguish between the particle and the adverb is to look at now’s lexical collocates. When now collocates with another now, only one of the tokens can be an adverb (Schiffrin 1987: 230): (5) m> [6˜m] ^Roger Br\aben# b> *[m]* (m> for ^some extra!\ordinary ’reason# ^started ’talking about !n\/udism# but ^then we ’did [di Áde d6 dh6] ^th\en we ’did get ’on to :s/omething# ^now [6m] . !he’s ’issued n/ow# a di^r\/ective# to âll ’leaders of :d\og ’packs# ând it !!says h\ere for ex/ample# ^this is !Roger Br\aben’s# ôwn w\/ords# (5.6 620–30)

The first example of now is the particle; it is placed initially and is unstressed in contrast with the adverb which is stressed. Now together with other particles (well now, now then, now look) has also been analysed as a particle. On the basis of a combination of criteria (position, prosody, collocation), I have considered about a third (34%)4 of the examples of now in the London-Lund

4. 619 tokens out of a total of 1826.

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Corpus to be particles (a necessary but not sufficient condition for particle status is that now is initial in the phrase): – – – –

now as a separate tone unit (prosodic phrase) has been regarded as the discourse particle now when deaccentuated has been regarded as the discourse particle also when the ‘time criterion’ is not unambiguous now when stressed without a following tone unit boundary has been analysed as the time adjunct now with a lexical collate (well now, now then) has discourse function

2.3 The grammaticalisation of now There is a close connection between the temporal meaning of now and its function as a discourse particle. It therefore seems justified to ask whether this state results from grammaticalisation. However, the development of temporal adverbs to discourse particles has not been discussed to the same extent as the grammaticalisation (pragmaticalisation) of manner adverbs. The discourse particle now functions as a connective between elements in the topic structure when there is a break in coherence, e.g. because there is a topic change or a major boundary between discourse units. Unlike other connectives it also functions as a marker of subjective modality. The diachronic tendency whereby structures and strategies evolve to express the speaker’s perspective or point of view (subjectification) can explain why now has received an affective or evaluative function in addition to its textual functions. For many speakers of English, the temporal dimension of the present moment, ‘now’, may help to constitute a stance of affective intensity (as in the utterance ‘Now look at what you have done’). And as well, for many speakers of English, the stance of affectivity/intensity is part of the meaning of ‘now’. (Ochs 1996: 419)

Schiffrin associates now with the speaker’s point of view and evaluation: … deictic center is also subjectively influenced depending upon the point of view, and the frame of reference, being taken by a speaker. One such subjective influence is the speaker’s personal evaluation of a state of affairs. (Schiffrin 1987: 229)

However I have little to say about the development of now from a temporal adjunct to a discourse particle as I have not looked at diachronic data from


different periods. According to the OED, now occurred with weakened temporal meaning in the combination now then already in older English: (6) Now thanne, yower puer blyssyng gravnt vs. tylle! c. 1485 Digby Myst., OED II 9b

In the earliest examples from the OED, it is difficult to distinguish between the adverb and the discourse particle as is to be expected if grammaticalisation has not yet taken place:5 (7) Nu cwæð se hal a Beda, þe ðas boc edihte, þæt hit nan wundor nys c. 1000 Ælfric Saints’ Lives xxvi 272, OED II 10a

Now, which is still temporal, has a text-structuring function; it foregrounds the action and has a propulsive effect on the narrative. In the following example (from the 15th century), the temporal meaning is subdued: (8) Nou 8if a woman maryd schal be, Anoon sche schal be bo8t and sold. 1426 Audelay, Poems 4, OED II 10a

In Shakespeare’s English we find clear examples of the particle now : (9) Now if thou wert a Poet, I might haue some hope thou didst feigne. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. III.iii26, OED II 10a

A sign that now has been grammaticalised is the fact that the temporal meaning colours the meaning of the particle. This is compatible with several accounts of grammaticalisation. Quirk et al. make the interesting suggestion that the change from an adverbial to a discourse particle takes place when there is the implication of a verb of speaking: The succession in time … conveyed by the adverbial is converted into the logical succession of discourse when there is the implication of a verb of speaking’. (Quirk et al. 1985: 640)

The correspondence can be given the form: Now [‘I will say now that’, ‘one can say now that’] this is a success. This analysis agrees well with Finell’s observation that ‘verbally extended

5. Well and now form a group of early topic changers. According to Finell (1992: 732), there are examples of well and now being used as topic introducers already at the end of the 9th century.

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topic changers became more compressed (verbal phrases Æ lexical items) (Finell 1992: 732).

2.4 Now and structural and contextual indicators Now cooccurs with a large number of functional indicators including metacomments, prefaces, left-dislocations, fronted themes and other discourse particles which can be regarded as convenient ‘headings’ for what is to come (Kroon 1995: 257). For example, now was frequently used together with a preface announcing what is going to happen next or resuming an earlier topic. Other indicators are collocations with other discourse particles, text-type and prosody. Prosody (prosodic phrasing, tone and pausing) is an important clue especially when we want to distinguish between the time adverb and the discourse particle. The most important clue is however now’s position in the text. In the terminology introduced in chapter 1 it is used globally (as a frame) at boundaries in the discourse. We therefore need to look in detail at how texts are built up into episodes and topics (see further Section 2.6.1). 2.4.1 Now and collocations The collocations so now, now therefore marking the conclusion, summary or the result of the preceding argumentation indicate that now is oriented to the upcoming topic and distinguish now from well (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 638): (10) b> ând your ”!h\/usband# ^cos you’ve . you’ve ^married very :w\/ell# f> ^[=mhm]# (. giggles) b> [6m] has got êarnings of ’thirty thousand ”!!p\ounds# f> ^[/mhm]# b> ô!k/ay# . now ^h\e’s th/erefore# on a ^fifty per cent !t\ax ’rate# ^r\ight# ”^r\ight# so ^you go and ’stick your ’money . ’in the b\/uilding so’ciety# (9.4 715–25)


Example (10) is an extract from a radio phone-in between a financial advisor (b) and f who asks for advice. Speaker f ’s husband has a tax reduction (‘now he’s therefore a fifty per cent tax rate’) which is presented as the result of his earning thirty thousand pounds. When now collocates with then, it marks a transition to something new resulting in a fresh look on a state of affairs: Where now signifies ‘make a fresh start’, now then signifies something like ‘take a fresh look’ — at something that has gone before: the then is the ‘then’ of consequence resulting from some intervening consideration that alters the view of things. Bolinger (1989: 293)

In the following extract from a debate, the speaker first states something as a fact (‘you’ve never experienced a hunt or seen a fox leave a cover’) and then asks the audience to look again at the facts: (11) d> the ^point is th\is# ^you ’have !n\ever ex’perienced a h/unt# you’ve ^n\ever ’seen a ’fox leave c/over# you’ve ^n\ever seen :h/ounds - {^hunting a !f/ox#}# . and you’ve ”^never ’seen a ’fox k\illed# so ^how can you argue on a ’subject like th\is# . when ^Mr [‘m] :B/erry# . has [b] is been a ^master of f=ox’hounds# for [‘m] ^many y=ears# . and has ^done it ’all his l\ife# ^n\ow then# Î can as:sure y\ou# that a ^fox ’leaves c\over# ^very ’very s/eldom# in ^fear of his l\ife# - (5.6 539–53)

2.4.2 Prosodic analysis of now According to Altenberg (1987: 87), both now and well showed a tendency to be separated from the rest of the utterance by a tone unit boundary although this tendency was less pronounced than for logical discourse connectives like however or in fact. Now is set off by a tone unit boundary from the rest of the utterance in (12) and is integrated in (13):

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(12) A> ^n/ow# . I ^don’t think ’Wendy kn/\ows this ’part of the st/ory# . (1.14 384–85) (13) B> ^now [6] I shall see you :ten o’clock on . Wednesday m\orning# (1.1 1209)

In the London-Lund Corpus, the number of examples in which now is a separate phrase is 28.8% (178/619), which is similar to the ratio arrived at for (the particles) now and well together (28%) in Altenberg’s study.6 Well has been studied prosodically in greater detail than now (cf. Altenberg 1987 and particularly Svartvik 1980). We can therefore compare now and well prosodically and try to analyse the differences in terms of function. Altenberg (1987: 136) places well in the category of closed items which are ‘fairly often marked by stress’ and the percentage of examples of well with stress (70%) and nucleus (50%)7 is considerably higher than for now in the present material (34% including stress, nucleus or a combination). The normal prosodic pattern for the discourse particle now is therefore without stress (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.8.1.3)8 while the adverb is ‘non-reduced’ by default (cf. also Horne et al., fc, p. 6). Cf. also Halliday & Hasan (1976: 268), who associate the reduced variant with a special function: When now carries the tone, certain tendencies can be distinguished. If it is tonic, now is deictic and not cohesive … If it is reduced, it means the opening of a new stage in the communication; this may be a new incident in the story, a new point in the argument, a new role or attitude being taken on by the speaker, and so on.

A comparison between now and well shows that there are intonational differences between them (Table 2.4.2). When now carries the nucleus, it usually has the falling tone with the sense ‘and here’s something more’ (Halliday & Hasan 1976:272). The exact relationship

6. Altenberg’s statistics is based only on 18 examples (text 12.6 in the LLC). Hirschberg & Litman (1993: 512) found that ‘discourse now’ constituted a phrase on its own in 41.3% of the cases. When they looked at well, Hirschberg & Litman found that 14/26 examples constituted intonational phrases (53.8%) (p. 516). 7. Cf. also Svartvik (1980: 170), ‘of all the instances of well, 44 per cent were unstressed’, in other words, 56% of the instances were stressed, half of them bearing the nucleus. Since Svartvik’s data are taken from conversation and Altenberg’s data from a prepared monologue, the difference may be genre-related. 8. Cf. also Stenström, ‘generally the time adjunct now carries a tone while the transitional conjunct does not’ (Stenström (1990: 260).


Table 2.4.2. The distribution of nuclear tones on now. a The data on well comes from Svartvik (1980: 170) Type of tone

Now

Well (per cent only)

fall rise level fall-rise rise-fall

81 24 66 7 1

62% 12% 16% 4% 6%

Total

179 (100%)

a

(45.3%) (13.4%) (36.9%) (3.9%) (0.6%)

100%

The examples which have not been transcribed prosodically have not been included.

between now and prosody is unclear and ‘there are no obvious contextual clues that can explain its [now’s] prosodic treatment in the text’ (Altenberg 1987: 95).9 According to Bolinger (1989: 293), ‘the usual prosody of now is a curious contrast of everything and nothing.’ Like why, it is unaccented except for ‘an accent of power’ when it introduces something new. What is noteworthy is the high frequency of level tone with now (36.9%) which is remarkable both in comparison with well (16%) and with overall tone types (4.9%) (cf. Svartvik 1980: 170). On the other hand, the number of examples with rising (or fall-rise) tone was almost the same for the two particles. The fact that fall tone was less frequent with now than with well can be seen as a consequence of the high number of level tones. 2.4.2.1 Now and pausing Pauses together with now are also of interest since they may signal a strong boundary in the discourse. Pausing before and after now is shown in Table 2.4.2.1.10 Now was preceded and/or followed by a silent pause in as many as 92.2% of the examples of the particle. It has also been noted that pauses were more frequent with now than with well. Stenström observed for instance, on the basis

9. Now seldom occurred with a booster (13 examples) or with stress other than the nucleus (9 examples). It was found with a prosodic onset in 130 examples (disregarding cases where now constituted a tone unit of its own). However these prosodic phenomena are even more difficult than nuclear prominence to interpret in functional terms. 10. Out of 88 pauses in Svartvik’s material (303 occurrences of well), 55 were found before well and 33 after the particle (Svartvik 1980: 171).

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Table 2.4.2.1. Pauses before and after now Type of pause

Before now

After now

Total

Brief pause (.) Unit pause (-, -.) Long pause (- -, - -)

139 179 115

84 35 19

223 214 134

Total

433

138

571

of ten texts from the LLC, that now (and anyway)11 attracted the highest and well the lowest proportion of pauses in relation to the total number, 89% and 34% respectively (Stenström 1990: 224). The pauses before now mark a major boundary, e.g. before the change of topic. Now with no preceding pause is interruptive and indicates ‘hurry’. In (14) it overlaps the preceding speaker’s turn: (14) w> which ^was . [6˜] - ôr - by [dhi˜] - cat o’ nine tails :\either# . êither *((of)) the r\ight#* n> *[je] now* - you’re ^going . too f/ar# and ^too f\ast for _me# ^let me d\eal# . ^first of all with your point about the”:sc\ope# -/ ôf [dhi˜] - !c\ategory# . (5.3 327–32)

2.4.3 Now and text type A corpus can be used to investigate if there is a link between the function of the discourse particle now and text type. There are large differences between spoken text types when we look at the distribution of now. The number of examples ranged from 4 occurrences of now for every 10,000 words in non-surreptitious conversation to 19 tokens per 10,000 words in public unprepared speech, e.g. commentaries and demonstrations.12

11. The percentage for anyway is not stated separately. 12. The fact that now is less frequent in non-surreptitious than in surreptitious conversation suggests that the relationship between the speakers has an effect on the choice of now (Suzuki, unpublished). It is, for example, possible that speakers consciously avoid now because it sounds pompous or hectoring in a conversation between equals.


Table 2.4.3. Distribution of now over different types of texts in the LLC. The numbers within parentheses refer to the frequency per 10,000 words Text type

No of tokens

Face-to-face a. surreptitious b. non-surreptitious Telephone conversation Discussion, interview, debate Public prepared oration Public unprepared, commentary, etc.

190 (10.9) 27 (4.5) 59 (9.8) 158 (15.8) 62 (15.5) 123 (18.9)

Total

619

The textual distribution of now in the London-Lund Corpus is shown in Table 2.4.3. The text types where we find the largest number of examples of now are more formal than ordinary conversation and contain more structure. From a discourse-analytical point of view now is typical of certain ‘activity types’ (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975 ‘transactions’) characterised by a superordinate goal and by constraints on allowable contributions: I take the notion of an activity type to refer to a fuzzy category whose focal members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded events with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions. Paradigm examples would be teaching, a job interview, a jural interrogation, a football game, a task in a workshop, a dinner party and so on. (Levinson 1979: 368)

The orientation to a particular goal or a hierarchy of goals is likely to be reflected in the structure of the discourse. Exactly what now is doing depends on the goal of the activity and its fixed sequence of verbal and non-verbal actions (cf. Hansen 1998: 155). At the beginning of a lesson, teachers use now for ‘marking off the settling-down time’ (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975: 22). According to Halliday & Hasan (1976: 268), in ‘a transaction situation such as a shop encounter, the transition from phatic communion to transactional relations is often made by now’. In the London-Lund Corpus, now was frequent in debates, interviews, public lectures, demonstrations and commentaries. In a debate, the moderator may, for instance, invite a new speaker using now. In a job interview, the particle would by used by the interviewer rather than the interviewee to control the direction the interview is taking.

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Now is characteristic of speech rather than of writing.13 Only 31 examples of the discourse particle were found in the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (LOB) to be compared with 1458 examples of the homonymous temporal adverb (Stenström 1990: 266). However the particle is not unimportant in fiction. In Bronzwaer’s (1975: 64) investigation of time adverbs in Dickens’ Great Expectations, now appeared in 10% of the examples with the function of ‘articulating narrative structure’ i.e. as a textual particle rather than as a temporal adverb.14 2.4.4 Now in monologues and dialogues The monologues in the London-Lund Corpus are prepared (sermons, lectures, addresses by lawyers, political speeches) or unprepared (e.g. running commentaries on sports and state occasions, demonstrations, parliamentary debates) (Greenbaum & Svartvik 1990: 12). In the monologues studied by Bäcklund (3,000 words from prepared monologue in the London-Lund Corpus), now was twice as frequent as well, which indicates that an important function of now is to show the connection between utterances of the same speaker (Bäcklund 1989: 31; 37). Also Stenström found interesting differences in the frequency of well and now when she compared monologues and dialogues although her material was also small (one prepared monologue and one dialogue from the London-Lund Corpus). Like Bäcklund she found that now and other initiators were twice as frequent as well in the monologue (1990:149). In the dialogue, on the other hand, well was three times as frequent as other initiators (now, however, anyway).

2.5 The core meaning and core function of now The core meaning ‘at the present moment’ of now explains that it functions as a stepping-stone to a new topic, new argument or new stage in a narrative.

13. Structures like I begin now, let me tell you now with the same discourse function as now alone may be more frequent in writing and in formal, planned discourse modes (Schiffrin 1987: 263). According to Schiffrin (ibid), such examples illustrate ‘the fuzziness between adverb and marker in actual use’. 14. Suzuki (unpublished) notes that and now is frequent in literary works as a discourse marker.


Quirk et al. describe it as a ‘“discourse conjunct” serving to shift attention to a new topic’ (Quirk et al. 1985: 638) and Bolinger (1989: 132) describes its function it as ‘a prompter signifying something like ‘Mind you, put other considerations aside, don’t give me an argument on this’. The core meaning of now also explains its function as an ‘evaluator’ or ‘intensifier’ to be compared with other markers such as emphatic stress, emphatic adverbs, repetition, etc. (Ochs 1996: 421). 2.5.1 Comparing well and now Well and now are close in meaning and there are distributional similarities between them. It is therefore of interest to compare them. They frequently collocate (well now 53 examples), and they have a similar function in many situations. They are both used to change the topic and to mark transitions to a subtopic; they occur in conversational openings with little difference in meaning. For example, at the beginning of the discourse (a transaction), both now and well are acceptable (Quirk et al. 1985: 634; Sinclair & Coulthard (1975: 22). (15) illustrates the use of now as a ‘discussion-opener’: (15) a

^good \evening# . now to^n=ight# our ^guests are ’Barbara :H\ardy# who is pro^fessor of !\English# at ^Royal ’Holloway !C/ollege# . ^Stuart H/\all# who is a ^l=ecturer# at the ^centre for con:temporary :cultural !st\udies# (5.7 1–8)

A closer comparison between now and well shows that they are not freely interchangeable and that we need to take into account the type of activity where they occur. At the beginning of a radio discussion as in (15), now is more likely since the intended meaning is emphasis and the context is formal. Well would sound ‘informal, improvised, or colloquial as it suggests that the speaker is not really beginning from the beginning but already responding to his audience or to his own implicit deliberations. On informal occasions, particularly after an introduction, such a beginning is quite normal’ (Carlson 1984: 52). The distributional properties and the temporal core meaning of now are

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compatible with a connective particle with propulsive or emphatic function which is typically used to mark changes or switches in the argument or narrative. Additional evidence comes from a comparison with well in contexts where both particles are possible. Consider the following example of well (originally from Quirk et al. 1985: 1470) with the same example introduced by now to get a better idea of similarities and differences between them: (16) A> That man speaks extremely good English. B> Well he comes from a village in Mongolia. C> Now he comes from a village in Mongolia.

Both now and well are responses to the utterance by A indicating a transition between what has been said and what is about to be said. Well marks acceptance: ‘it is an established fact (Well, of course!) that Mongolian villages provide excellent bases for learning English’ (Quirk et al., ibid). The first example would typically terminate the exchange. In the second example (with now), it is understood that there will be a continuation or elaboration of what has just been said. The following is an example from the corpus with now introducing an elaboration. The interviewer, B, has asked a question about Hamlet and A (the interviewee) takes this as an invitation to elaborate on the theme introduced in the question: (17) (B> [6˜] ^why do you ’think he ^why ^why does he ap’pear in [dhi˜] . :cl\oset ’scene# - A> now now ^this is ’something !\/I couldn’t ’understand# but I ^had to”!pl\ay ’this in ’[haem] ^this p/art#/ I ^had !d\ifficulty# I ((was)) ^sort of . [w] was âll . !made /up# (3.5 347–51)

2.6 The discourse functions of now When the temporal meaning of now has disappeared it may express a number of textual relations. Now has meanings like contrast, result, continuation which are also expressed by conjunctions like and, but, so. However they do not seem to have identical functions. Now and but are both used in comparison, but now marks the speaker’s orientation to an upcoming subtopic, whereas but marks the contrastive relationship between the subtopics (Schiffrin 1987: 326). And


and now have in common that they signal topic continuation. However Quirk et al. (1972: 667) say that ‘and seems to link while now leads to a new stage in the sequence of thought’ (quoted by Bronzwaer 1975: 40). Notice also that while now and so can be placed in the same subclass of ‘resultive’ discourse conjuncts, so is more informal (Quirk et al. 1985: 635). 2.6.1 Now as a textual particle Now functions as a boundary marker between conversational actions both in monologue (i.e. between utterances by the same speaker) and dialogue (mainly for turntaking purposes). This reflects the fact that all conversational actions are not of the same kind. Answering a question is, for instance, different from telling a story. In a dialogue text an initiating move is followed by a reactive move (and a follow-up move). A monologue (‘narrative’, ‘argumentation’), on the other hand, is segmented into paragraphs or longer texts ‘episodes’, separated by boundaries functioning as ‘“breakgrounds” in the continuous flow of activity’ Brinton 1996: 43).15 The boundaries between one paragraph (episode) and another may be marked by a pause, a discourse particle, a metacomment or a variety of syntactic markers (Stenström 1990: 243f). The boundary may also be signalled interactionally, e.g. by the change from a declarative to an interrogative sentence or from a declarative to an imperative. Now combines with other boundary markers (pauses, metacomments, etc.) but can also stand alone as a boundary marker. The following example shows the segmental structure of an extract from the London-Lund-Corpus: (18) a> [m - 6m] . before I come on asking you what you mean by protect what they’ve got [6m] would you explain why or indeed tell me whether it matters a damn to the to a particular firm […] A> [6‘] ^now [6m] . !Unil/ever# ((have)) ^just . ’got :Board of ’Trade perm=ission

15. Texts do not necessarily belong to a single type. Dialogues may for instance contain narrative parts in addition to exchanges and monologues may have dialogue features (asides, comments, etc.).

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’to# .^merge with ’Allied :Br\eweries# - - now ”îf - ’something had gone ”:wr\ong ((with)) ’Allied ’Breweries# . […] [6˜m] . the ^[6un‘] the Ûnilever ’people would have !been in a !much str/onger pos\ition# .] (2.2 569–93)

In the first paragraph, the company employee states that Unilever will merge with Allied Breweries. In the next paragraph he takes the position that Unilever would have been in a stronger position if they had not merged with the other company. We can identify a number of structural positions where now occurs as a boundary marker. Now functions as a connective between elements in the topic structure when there is a break in coherence, e.g. because there is a topic change or a major boundary between discourse units as well as in other cases where some extra prompting is needed. The connective now cooccurs with metacomments, other discourse particles (e.g. well now, now look, now then), with pauses, and with grammaticalised changes such as the switch from a declarative sentence to a question, or from the present tense to the past tense. Because of its propulsive function it has a number of derived functions. It can, for instance, imply that the speaker is experienced as authoritative or pushy. Now can also mark backgrund relations like justification or explanation or the elaboration of a preceding topic. Other prototypical contexts where now occurs are parenthetical comments (asides, self-reflexive comments) and requests. When now occurs in requests, i.e. when it is used on the speech act level it can be treated as a modal particle. 2.6.1.1 Now as a topic-changer Examples of now serving as a ‘topic changer’ are frequent. Topic change takes place in two ways (Finell 1992: 722): 1. by introducing a new topic; 2. by closing or dismissing a topic. Both functions may be performed by discourse particles. Now is, for example, what Finell (ibid) refers to as a topic introducer marking a change of topic. Particles do not only mark a boundary or a change of topic. Depending on the direction of the connection, the particles signal to the listener how to switch on and to switch off their attention in the discourse and to activate or deactivate


the referents in the segment which is delimited by discourse particles. Now has prospective function and is a typical switch-on signal while, for instance, right which achieves topic change by closing the preceding topic is a switch-off signal.16 In (19), right marks the end point of the preceding topic and now the starting point of a new topic. An abrupt transition to a new topic is usually accompanied by a metalinguistic marker: (19) B> ^[\m]# A> [6˜m] . ^r\ight# ^w\ell now# ^switching ’to . [6˜] your re:turn to this !c\ountry# . [6˜] . ^we . have been :very dis!tr\essed# . at the ^thought of !{y\ou} [b] . be’coming a a :sch\ool ’teacher# (3.2 100–105)

Both left-dislocation and (well) now can be used to draw the hearer’s attention to the new topic. Now (and other material) is placed between the left-dislocated topic and the following predication. In (20), Speakers A and b have been talking about the reasons for the antipathy between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. Now marks the change to talking about Bernadette Devlin who owned a house in Cookstown in which A has been staying. The new referent needs to be accepted by the hearer (‘ah yes’) before the speaker continues. (20) b> [‘] and they probably have more children . A> they ^d/o# - - . [n6˜m - -6˜] ^Berna_dette”!D\evlin# . *^n\ow#* b> *ah* yes - . A> ^she ((was)) b/orn# in a ^place called”!C\ookst/own# ^C/ounty Tyr\one# (1.14 116–23)

A change of topic would be understood as abrupt or blatant if it is not properly prepared. Speaker B is interviewing candidates for an English Honours Course.

16. The terms ‘switch-on’ and ‘switch-off’ signal come from Stenström (1990: 169).

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He has asked a question about ‘The Waste Land’ which the candidate could not answer and now shifts the topic to another poem by Eliot. Notice the fronted theme (‘about The Love Song of Alfred Prufrock’) which can be compared with left-dislocation in (20). (21) A> I’m a^fraid I c\ouldn’t :{^n\o#}# I ^can’t remember it !w\ell e’nough# a> you can’t remember *it* B> *^now* a’bout The :Love Song of !Alfred :{\J} :Pr\ufrock# . ^what is that ’poem a:b\out ((do you ’think))# - - A> I’m ^s=orry# I don’t ^kn/ow it# (3.1 1338–44)

A topic shift is less abrupt than a change of topic and can be paraphrased as ‘now let’s look at this from another or a new angle’. When now introduces a topic without any preparation and without a preceding switch-off signal such as right, it is hard to tell whether it introduces a new topic or a shift of topic. In (22), which is an extract from a longer conversation between two married couples about the different customs of English and Pakistani people, B starts talking about Pakistani women who ‘are the very devil’ in hospital because they pretend they do not know a word of English: (22) c> D> A> B>

ânybody *’have some more c\offee# ((no I ^don’t I ^w\/on’t have any ’more#)) ^[\/m]#* *now ^your Pakistani l\/adies# or Îndian :l\/adies* or what’ever they are# they’re the ^very ”d\evil {in ^h\ospital#}# A> ^\are they# (4.3 1147–53)

It is unclear whether the speaker intends to change the topic or switch from the main topic to a subtopic. In spite of such difficulties, it is common to make a distinction between topic-change and topic-switch (cf. Finell 1992, Lenk 1998): Drawing the line between a topic shift and a change of topic is not always a clear cut decision as principles of gradience apply […]. Usually, however, the difference is noticeable because a change of topic will be rather abrupt, without


an immediately recognizable connection to a prior topic, thus unexpected and clearly recognizable. (Lenk 1998: 174)

Now typically cooccurs with metalinguistic comments announcing something new or the return to a preceding topic. Such examples provide good examples of how discourse particles are used to prepare hearers for what is going to come. The speaker who controls the conversation may want to steer it back to an earlier point in the conversation to have a new look at it. In (23), well now together with metalinguistic let’s go back to … signals that the interviewer wants to return to the topic discussed earlier (Shakespeare’s Hamlet): (23) B> ^n\ow# ^let’s go ’back to H\amlet ((’then))# - [6˜] ^do you agr/ee with ’Eliot’s ’view# - - that ^this is an im:p\/erfect ’play# (3.5 1002–1005)

Maschler regards phrases like ‘let’s go back to …’ as discourse particles although they are not completely fixed (cf. Maschler 1998: 36). They could also be regarded as parts of misplacement prefaces with a framing function (Stubbs 1983: 184). Another example is (24) where well now, followed by a metalinguistic phrase, signals that the speaker reverts to an earlier topic. The main topic is the Irish situation during the war. Speaker A wants to get back to talking about Peter Baskerdon who got the job as the head of the Celtic Museum. (24) A> well ^n\ow# . ^going ’back to Pete B\askerdon# ^this is an/\other ’story# - - ^Pete B/askerdon îs a !s\ad ’man#^he is !n\ot a ’very cl/ever ’boy# - he’s ^not r\/eally# ûp to his ’Ph/D# - (1.14 941–48)

In (25), which is an example from a legal cross-examination, well now is used as a frame before the summing up by the counsel. After this preface the examination can continue. Well now marks that the following utterance does not follow from what was said before but that it is necessary to go back to an earlier part of the proceedings: (25) b> ^will you ’phone R\ichard# be^cause she !w\anted to ’go into a ’nursing-h/ome#/

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and the ^doctor said [sh] it wasn’t *:n\ecessary#* a> *well ^n\ow#* - ^you . ”!h\eard . the d/octor# . *you ^were in* c\ourt# b> *^y/es#* ^y=es# - (11.1 175–82)

2.6.1.2 Now as a frame between discourse units Now has a framing function when it marks a clear break between two parts in the text. The first part in the example below functions as ‘preliminaries’ in relation to what comes afterwards (the main topic), which is introduced by now. Now occurs after some preliminaries which include A’s checking whether he has got one of the names right (is it Bunyans or Bunyan). After this introduction, the speaker comes to the main purpose of his message which is to ask some questions about two of the applicants for a college post: (26) A> [6˜m] - - and în în the !s\/econd ’batch# we have ^B\/unyan# it îs B/unyan# or ^B\unyans# B> ^B\unyan# *^y\eah#* (A> *^B\/unyan#* - [6˜] - - ând about !five ’other n\ames# - ^n=ow [6˜]# I’d ^like to :\/ask you# about ^two p/eople# who ap^pear a!g\ain#to be ^kn\own# [6˜] ^to the c\/ollege# - (2.6 534–547)

Now is a frame in (27), since it marks the transition from the main topic to an agreement signalling the closing of the conversation: (27) A> ^y\es#* ^y\es# you ^m\ust# B> ^now [6] I shall see you :ten o’clock on . Wednesday m\orning#


A> ôn Wednesday m\orning# . ^thank you for dropping /in _Sam# (1.1 1206–11)

After the arrangement has been confirmed, the conversation is closed by thanking. 2.6.1.3 Now in turntaking An important role of now is to announce who has the turn and to keep the turn in order to say something more; the speaker may for example use it because he has a story to tell or in order to elaborate on a topic. Speakers c and a, who are husband and wife and a third person have been talking about how some people in the local drama group have racial prejudices. Speaker c takes the turn in order to elaborate on this theme. (28) c> +. ând [i‘]+ you !get this ’like ^what’s that l\ady# who ^does [6] ’is ((it)) . :one of the ((:pl\ay [‘]/ .)) ’leaders# of ^this - ^wh\at’s her *n/ame#* a> ^M\ary# +^y/es#+ c> ”^M\ary# now +^she’s+ an !Irish C\atholic# with a^bout !eight k\ids# . and she’s ^going [ob6] _on about :all ’these :f\/oreigners :coming into this ’country# and . (. laughs) and ^taking ’over the :c\/ountry#/ (4.7 312–15)

2.6.1.4 Now between sub-topics Now can also be used between subtopics (episodes, paragraphs) in a monologue with the function to move the discourse forwards. The function of now is to show a speaker’s progression through ‘a discourse which is comprised of a cumulative series of subtopics’ (Schiffrin 1987: 236). Schiffrin’s characterisation captures the fact that now is forwards-looking and links one topic to another sequentially according to a script. This use of now is not unrelated to other uses of now to introduce a topic change. However now occurs less often with metacomments or other discourse particles or with grammaticalised switches (from one sentence type to another or from one tense to another). Now introduces an element of contrast when there is a main topic branching

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into subtopics (Schiffrin 1987: 230). This is clear in (29), where now draws the hearer’s attention to the different consequences for Scotland and England if nationalization is introduced: (29) d> ûnder !this !g\overnment# which of ^course !vastly in:creases . [6] our :borrowing re!qu\irement# ^n=ow in !Sc\/otland# [6] I ^don’t ’think when the :industry bill first /\entered com’mittee# the ^government had :quite ap!pr\/eciated ’this# . ^we are to !have _these !two \agencies# . (11.5 204–9)

In (30), Speakers a, B, and C are discussing how old their fathers would have been if they had been alive. Speaker C has talked about her own father. The element of comparison introduced by now is obvious when a comparison is made between Charlotte’s father and the other speakers’ fathers: (30) C> ^m\/y ’father would have ’been a ’hundred and ’twenty-s\even# - - . B> ^no !not s\/eventy-’eight# ”^\eighty-’eight# . a> (. coughs) . B> ^y\es# *^n/o# ^y\es#* a> *as bad* as Charlotte’s B> no ^not ”s\eventy-’eight# yes ”^\eighty-’eight# ^no I’m s/orry# ^s\ixteen ’years# yes ”^\eighty-’eight# ((^th\at ’sort of ’thing#)) C> a ^h\alf-gener’ation _then# B> ^now .”!Charlotte’s ”father :would have _been a !h\undred w/ould he# îf she’d been :he’d ’been a!l/ive# - - (1.13 230–46)


In (31), the issue is whether drugs or surgery is the most efficient cure. The speaker is comparing what the surgeon does when he removes a cyst with the use of drugs to achieve the same result. The contrast marked by now is reinforced by the use of the pseudo-cleft construction and fronting (the second occurrence of now): (31) A> ^n=ow# . ^what the !surgeon”:d\oesn’t really cons/ider# is the êti!\ology of the ’cyst# it ^doesn’t ’really - - be^cause it’s !n\/ot ’really kn\own# ^you can !s\/ee it# ^very \easily# it’s ^th\ere# . and you ^know when you ’cut it /out# it will ^go aw\ay# ^what he !d\/oesn’t con’sider par’ticularly# is ^how it g\ets there# - ^n=ow# . with ”^dr\/ugs# . ^what you d/o is# - - you ^let yourself :really have ’almost as [n6‘] ’much un’known as the :surgeon at !b\oth ends# - - (2.9 942–953–56)

2.6.1.5 Now marking the steps in an argument or a narrative According to the OED, now 10 a, now is ‘used to introduce an important or noteworthy point in an argument or proof or in a series of statements’. In (32), the speaker uses now to focus attention on the logical steps in the argument. (A is a doctor assessing his chances of becoming a consultant) (32) A> ^n\ow# . Î have to rea:l\/istically as_sess# where ^\am I# . I’m ^th/ird or f\ourth# you ^s\ee# ^now if !\/one of those ’chaps who was ’in my ’year/ . so ”^that means that .”!f\our# are ^probably ’going to be’come con:s\ultants#

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^you know in in :general ’surgery or ’general m\edicine# . now ”Î’m ’third or !f\ourth# ^now of ’course there are :people . ^y\/ou know# ^fifth and !s\ixth# ^not ’far be!h\ind me# - . … now the ^first !s\ix# are ^((going to be)) the ’only ’people who are ’going to ’get a !l\/ook in# . and the ^first f\/our# are the ônly ’people who are ’actually ’going to m\ake it# ^n\ow# - the ^first f/\our# are the ^people who are going to ’really ’stick \at/ it# . (2.9 554–565; 571–577)

Now introduces and develops the argument (‘only the first four people will become consultants — the speaker is the third or the fourth in his class’). Now is inserted whenever the speaker feels the need to underline a step in the argumentation. In the following example from a lecture about Joyce, the lecturer uses now to focus on certain points that are important, e.g. that Ettore Schmidt (with the pen name Svevo) took English lessons from Joyce, that he was born in Trieste, etc.: (33) (a> ^now - ”!one of the p/eople# . [6˜m] . who ^took !English lessons from :J/oyce# - - was the ^s\on-in-_law# . of ^this f/amily# - a ^certain . Ettore Schm\itz# - - ând . be!!tween J/oyce# . and Êttore Schm\itz# . (1248–53 missing) now ^Sv\/evo# [‘] I shall re^f=er to _him# . ^hencef=orth# by the ^name ((of)) !Sv/evo# - -


was ^born in Tri=este# in êighteen . !sixty-”:\one# - (12.2 1241–77)

2.6.1.6 Now and listing We can expect speakers to try to be clear about the actions which must be performed in order to achieve a goal. Now can also occur in descriptive lists where topics ‘accumulate as specific cases of a more general topic’ (Schiffrin 1987: 237). Now is therefore used to signal that there is a connection between the actions or subtopics in many different activities. In such cases, speakers use now to mark information which will add to a list of actions (events). In demonstrations now was frequent to show the order of events. In (34), the different steps of a physics demonstration are, for instance, marked by now. The speaker draws attention to what he does in order to pay a chord by pressing his finger down on the G string: (34) a> now ((I’ll)) ^play them ’as a :ch\ord# II> (chord -–) a> - - ^now you can !see that I’ve !st\ill got my f/inger ’down# . on the ^low \G ’string# and ^that’s the ’one we’re :really !\/interested ’in# - (10.8 958–62)

When it marks the ordering of events, now is difficult to distinguish from the time adverb.17 (35) is a similar example from a cooking demonstration. Depending on the type of activity, actions must be performed in a certain order. In order to cook the ham shank, it is important to first get two slices for grilling and to cook them for several hours. Now marks a new stage in the sequencing of events: (35) a> now ^[‘]I’m ’going to !show you ’how to :cook the”!ham ”sh\ank# the ”^way it’s been :done in”!m\/y ’home# . since ”^long before :[‘]I was b\orn# - - now îf you ’get [‘]a”!l\ovely ’ham ’shank {^like you can ”^[‘]\easily ’get# ”^two ”nice sl\ices ’off there for :{^gr\illing#}# (859–92 omitted) now îf you’re :cooking in an ![‘]\/ordinary ’pan#

17. Now in (34) has been analysed as the particle rather than the adverb since it is unstressed and has text-organising function (cf. Section 2.2).

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you’d ^have to . :take [‘]a”!{b\out} an :hour and a/ ’half to !tw\o ’hours# to ^get [‘]it to ’this st\age# - so ((we’ll)) ^get the !h\/am ’shank# ôut !n/ow# - - (10.11 853–58, 893–97)

In sports commentaries, now highlights the points the reporter wants to comment on. Example (36) is taken from a broadcast cricket commentary: (36) a> Mc^K/\enzie {^\in#}# ^b/owls to _Edrich#and that ^pops =up# . and he ^must be !c=aught# ^n/o# it’s ôver Burge’s h\ead# ^my ”!w=ord# ^that was a lucky /one# ^n=ow# ^this is a thing that and I be^lieve it [p/a˜] ^hit/ him on the :f/ace# ôn the !w/\ay# ^now !this is a :thing that could ”!n\ever {have ^h\appened#}# ^{=on} !S\/aturday {^N/orman#}# (10.1 318–30)

In its use to mark subtopics now can be repeated. However, now need not mark every new shift in the topic progression, but the possibility of repeating now should be seen as a resource ‘with which a speaker can emphasize the sequential nature of a discourse whose cumulative nature is important for the establishment of a particular point’. (Schiffrin 1987: 238) However now is often repeated even when this is not necessary: … we have the speaker announcing, in effect, ‘I’m calling the turn.’ Since he is the one who says now, he puts himself in command of the situation, and may, at another slight remove, use now as a device for not yielding the floor; with some speakers this becomes a habit. (Bolinger 1989: 291)


2.7 Now marking an element as backgrounded 2.7.1 Now as a marker of elaboration or subtopic In a number of examples, now marks the modification or elaboration of a preceding referent. In (37), the speaker describes a campsite he has visited ‘between Sete and Agde’. He then elaborates on this, adding some information about Sete, a typical Mediterranean little town. (37) A

[6˜m] and ^then some r\ushes# and ^then a r\ailway# and ^then . a l\ake# . ^sort of a . a !((fl\eet)) I supp/ose [‘] ((would))# . ^be a b/etter de’scription# and it’s ^half-way be’tween”:S\/ete . and \Agde# ./ ^now !Sete is ’one of these :beautiful t\/owns# that ^has ’[s] . a !little ’bit you ^kn/ow# ((I ^mean)) your ^typical . :sort of [6m] . !Mediter:ranean . :sea ’produce !c\afés {and ^r\estaurants#}# ôn the !q\uay# and ^then . you ’go b/ack# sort of ûp you ^kn/ow# the ît [‘]’rises !st\/eeply# ^through you know sort of !cobbled w\ays# ûp . !into the !h\ills# . and ”Âgde’s a !b\eautiful I should ^think it’s R\oman# (2.13 751–66)

In (38), now and the repetition of ‘Shetland’ marks the following discourse segment as an elaboration or a subtopic: (38) a> I ^happened to ’spend a :[sko] ’a :h\oliday# in ^Sh\etland# . now ^Sh\etland as you kn/ow# is . ^/island# [w w] ”^very w\indswept# . ^hardly a ’tree on the pl\ace# and ^looking ’through my bin\oculars one _day#

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I ^saw on the :{\opposite} :m\ountain# a ^m\/an# ^w\/orking# ôn [Áei] ône of th/ese# . ^dry ’stone w\/alls# . di^viding . the b\oundaries# . (12.6 652–64)

The speaker interrupts the main-line topic (his holiday in Scotland) in order to describe Shetland. However there is never any doubt that the narrative will be resumed. As in example (37), the end of subtopic and the introduction of a new subtopic is marked by and which functions very much in the same way as now.18 2.7.2 Explanation, clarification, support In the examples we have discussed now has been a foregrounding, propulsive element. When now collocates with you see or I mean it introduces an explanation or a justification. Now in this case introduces speech which is subsumed to that of another speech act (cf. Redeker 1993) and therefore functions as the background clarifying or explaining something or elaborating on something which has been said. (39) is an argument that papers in Spanish graphology should not be ‘set ad hominem’ to help the speaker’s own candidates. Speaker B presents justification for this position marked in addition by I mean : (39) B> [6˜h] - - they ^sh\ouldn’t b/e# - ^but [6h] - I ^mean /\one# ^sets - - \one _question# ^now I !mean !this fellow’s doing ((the)) language of :\advertising# *.* ((so ^very)) w\ell# A> *^y/eah#* (B> *((^give him one on))* (1.1 25–31)

18. According to Schiffrin (1987: 141), and has the structural role as a discourse coordinator signalling ‘the speaker’s identification of an upcoming unit which is coordinate in structure to some prior unit.’ Now, on the other hand, indicates that the clause is subordinate in relation to the higher clause.


In (40), now marks the transition from ‘the main line material to support’ (cf. Bäcklund 1989: 31). According to the speaker in (40), it is not clear without some further explanation why the water had to come from a well: (40) a> the ^w\ater suppl/y# . ^to ’our h/ouse# . ^was ’from a :w\ell# ^now it !h\ad to be# a ^w/ell# be^c=ause# you could ^not b\uild# a ^h\ouse# in ^those d/ays# withôut ’digging ((the)) :w\ell# (12.6 128–37)

2.8 Now and affective meaning Related to topic change and topic-shifting uses where now is a structural marker are those functions where now has affective meaning (cf. Schiffrin 1987). The affective meaning of now has received less attention than its function as a topicchanger. Now shifts a frame in the sense of Goffman (1974) and is defined as ‘an interpretive perspective imposed on a strip of experience (including talk) in order to make sense of it’ (Hansen 1998: 341). Talk can, for instance, be interpreted as serious, playful, ironic thus transforming our experience of the world. Hearers interpret the switch from one type of talk to another with the help of discourse particles. Schiffrin describes the use of now leading into a conversational action on a different level as evaluative (Schiffrin 1987: 241). According to Schffrin, evaluation should be taken in a broad sense: … the evaluative use of now is suggested by the speaker’s orientation shift into an interpretation of own talk, and by the fact that the interpretive gloss is one which the speaker him/herself seems to prefer the hearer to adopt. (Schiffrin 1987: 245)

A frequent use of now is to mark the transition to a metacomment such as let me see. Speakers shift from the main topic to an afterthought or an aside in order to ask a rhetorical question, speak a reflection aloud, using now to mark a shift of orientation (cf. Polanyi & Scha 1983:265 who use the term push-marker

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both for the discourse particle and the meta-comment itself). Commenting on one’s own talk constitutes a frame-break since ‘asides’ take place on a different plane of talk: (41) a> A> a> A>

[6˜] what modern poets have you been reading ^well I’m . I ^like ’Robert Gr\aves v/ery much# who else [6˜m] - - (. coughs) . ^now !let me s\ee# - - ((well)) I’m ^quite ’fond of :D\/urrell# I ^don’t ’really kn\ow very ’much about ’modern p/oetry# - - *(([m] but I ^like)) [6˜m]* (3.1 174–80)

Some typical asides marking minor breaks in the discourse were now let me try and think, now let me think, now let me see, now let me pause, now where was I, now what was it, now what else have I been doing. A special kind of metacomments are represented by ‘prefaces’ in which the speaker states what he is going to do. As seen from the following example, the speaker often uses a preface (e.g. ‘now my duty this morning is to ask’) before coming to his point:19 (42) a> and the ^\other l/esson# as has been ^said a n\umber of ’times from the r/ostrum# Prime ^Ministers do ”n\ot sign tr/eaties# a^gainst their spe_cific e_lection !m\andate# and in ”^his case as !M\ichael has _just _proved# ^that’s [wo] is ^what he has d\one# now ”^my duty this”:m\orning# is to âsk !c\onference# to ^stand by the p\/olicy# . the ^party has con_sistently af_firmed on _Britain and the ’Common M\arket# (12.5 95–4)

Now is also used to introduce direct speech. The transition to a new interpretive perspective (the source of the utterance) is marked by the reporting clause (they would say, ask, think) and by the introductory discourse particle. Collocations

19. Sinclair & Coulthard (1975: 22) refer to such metastatements as ‘focus’.


between now and other discourse particles were frequent in this function (now look, well now, well now look). In (43), now is probably not part of what the speaker has said but is added for dramatic effect. Speaker A, a male academic, is describing a lecturer in linguistics who used to say that word recognition was the basis of all reading: (43) A> +but Î can re:m\ember#;.+; ^\one ’private *’convers/ation#;.*; c> *(- laughs)* A> ^wh=ere# an ^\awfully ’nice ch/appie {^started _off by s/aying#}# now ^wh\/ole of ’reading he ’said# îs [s] . ^word ’recogn\ition he ’said# - ^\isn’t it# B> he’s ^\/Irish *’is he#* A> *^now we must* -”!build on th\at# - (2.4 824–32)

Direct speech is used in conversation to make a dialogic exchange more dramatic and lively. Several discourse particles may combine to heighten the dramatic effect of a reported conversation. Speaker A, a male academic, is talking about his experiences of Ireland. On one occasion he was taken to meet some men, one of whom says he is going to raid the IRA: (44) A> he ^l\ooked at m/e# and Î ’thought it was :my ’cue to :{l\eave} !t\oo#/ b> [mhm] A> and ^\out in the ’darkness# - . he ^said well !n\ow ’sir# ((I’m)) ^going to Î’m !going to ’raid the ’IR:\A ton/ight# . at ”^C\oagh# . ^C O ’A [dz] :G !\H# if you’ve êver !heard of C/oagh# b> don’t think *so* A> *ând* !would you like to ’send any {tr\oops} . to h\elp# I ^said I would !n/ot# - - (1.14 441–52)

Now was often used to represent the speaker’s own speech suggesting that a

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significant cause of now is to facilitate self-presentation (cf. Romaine and Lange 1991: 243; Jucker 1993: 450). The collocation now look suggests objection or resistance and makes the presentation more lively (cf. Section 2.8.4): (45) A> I ^said* now !l\ook Mr H/ills# it’s a^bout ’time we ’sorted a :little ’bit of this/ :\out# (2.12 844–45)

Now may also introduce what a third person usually says. In (46), well now look expresses emphatic reaction: (46) B> and ^th\/erefore# Î should((’ve)) I’m ^not sur!pr\/ised# that that [6] ^they would !s\/ay# [6˜m] ^well now !l\ook# this is ^t\oo . strong an /instrument# ((we’re)) ^not [pripe6] prepared to !d\eal with _this instrument# you ^s\ee# (1.2 511–517)

Now can have a specific interpretation as seen in the following example from a legal cross-examination. What is indicated by now is emphasis and prior disagreement about the meaning of the words in the will signed by the defendant’s mother. (‘a’ is the plaintiff; ‘b’ the defendant) (47) a> ((yes but)) ^did you read it :{p\aragraph} by !p\aragraph# and ^say now ’mother do you understand”!th\at ’paragraph# b> [a] ^y/es# I ^read it p\aragraph ’[gra˜f]# by ^p\aragraph to m/other# - (11.1 112–16)

2.8.1 Now and affective stance In the extract (48), now is a push marker accompanying a frame-shift to evaluation (‘this is very difficult’). The utterance comes in the middle of a speaker turn where A is explaining what it means to protect an investment:


(48) A> [6˜m] - - - ^you want to ’make [‘] the ^first thing/ you((’ve)) ’got to make :{qu\ite} :s\ure# îs that in !ten years :t\/ime# ^their ten ’thousand qu/id#is ^still ”_b\/uying# ^what ten ’thousand ’quid is ’buying in ’nineteen :sixty-:n\ine# now ^this is ”!{v\ery} d\ifficult# - and of ^course if ”!{m\ore ’people} had ”:d\one ’that# in ^nineteen ”!f\ifty# we shouldn’t ”^now be in ’such a :m\uddle# - (2.2. 672–80)

Now becomes a kind of affect intensifier or modal particle with affective meaning. There are usually other markers of affective meaning in the immediate context (such as ‘that’s dreadful’): (49) d

Î’ll ![inst] . ”âlso a:g\/ainst them# there’s ^this . ”m/\ost un_fortunate _thing# that ônce you’ve g/\ot# [666] ^such a g/overnment# it - it ^doesn’t a’gree on ’every ’single p\oint# ./ now ^that’s dr/\eadful# . (5.4 510–15)

In (50), person A first imitates an imaginary student, who reads books but is not willing to analyse them, and then switches to an evaluation additionally signalled by now : (50) A

(- sighs) Î !read a b\ook ’last n/ight# . and it ^moved me !!s\o m/uch#Î _can’t t\alk a’bout it# - ^now !this is _a a”!g\orgeous# ^lazy _way \out# ^you !!s/ee# ^he’s t/aken \in ’by th/is# ^dear _s/oul# (1.6 284–91)

2.8.2 Now introducing a disclaimer It is interesting to compare now and well when they are followed by I think. Well I think implies a softening of a controversial assertion while now I think introduces

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a subjective opinion or evaluation. Now I think is often associated with conflict and with disagreement: (51) b

^none of whom will :sp\eak to each _other# and âll of whom want to cut each other’s thr\oats# ^now !I think this is a :very bad th\ing# ^bad thing for British dem\ocracy# I [6] . ^watched I [w6] I’m ^\old e_nough# to have ^watched the !Labour . the ^L\iberal_Party# (5.5 683–88)

In (52), from a radio discussion, the speaker expresses his opinion on the issue whether Britain should have a coalition government. Now introduces a disclaimer, i.e. the speaker signals that his view is not to be aligned with that of others. Now, which is emphatic and authoritative, cooccurs with the emphatic do and a prosodic booster. (52) v

be^tween those :different !v/iews# . the ^coalition government f/alls# . and ^we become . another Fr\ance# now Î !d\o bel/ieve# that the ^whole qu\estion {of de^f\ence#}# the ^whole question of a :stand upon summit t\alks# . the ^whole reaction as to to :whether Britain ought/ (5.4 388–91)

Both now and but can be used to indicate that a person’s utterances cannot be aligned with those of another speaker. However now indicates a new subtopic and but a contrast with the preceding subtopic (‘but I do agree’): (53) h> ^th\erefore# . ^people in :h=ousing estates# . are . ^living on the :charity :of their n\eighbours# ^whether they :like it or n/ot# they ^can’t h\elp it# ^now - I !do not agree with e:victing these p\eople# . in âny circumstances what/ever# e^viction is cr/uel# un^k/ind#


and there is ”^no excuse for inhu:m\anity# ^whatso\ever# . but I ”^do agree with :making them pay an :economic/ r/ent# . (5.1 280–91)

2.8.3 Now and a change of footing A related type of switch involving a change in perspective rather than topic shift is illustrated in (54). Now is used to mark a change in ‘footing’, i.e. a change from the speaker perspective to the hearer (Goffman 1981; Hansen 1998: 342). The shift also involves turntaking since now is followed by a question: (54) m> ^h=ounds# ^killing their !dead-beat f\ox# the ^digging ’out of a f/ox# . and ^h=ounds# de^serving a ’taste of bl\ood# . the ^w\isest ex’pression to /use# is that a ^fox was acc\ounted _for# . ^try to a’void the ex’pression . ’blood sp\orts# and if ^that isn’t an ad’mission I ’don’t know what/ !\is# . **^n\ow#** ^do you [6d] agr/ee# b> **((2 to 3 sylls))** (m> that ^foxes \are in *’fact# de^liberately ’bred for h/unting#* . b> *((^n\o#)) (5.6 640–54)

2.8.4 Now as hearer-oriented intensifier (modal particle) Now is hearer-oriented as well as speaker-oriented. Affective or intensifying now expresses the speaker’s involvement with the hearer (e.g. in combination with imperatives). Now also has affective meaning when the speaker is impatient to take control of the conversational floor (now wait a moment). In collocations with ‘a prompt’20 (now look, now come on), now expresses

20. In Sinclair and Coulthard’s framework (1975: 41) ‘prompt’ is a speech act in which the speaker urges the hearer to do something.

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affective intensity. As an intensifier now may develop an overtone of urgency and interest or a ‘friendly overtone’ as in (55) (cf. Suzuki unpublished): (55) (B so you ^have to !keep ’going ’upst\airs# ^s=aying# they’re ^waking /\up you kn/ow# now ^come /on# (- laughs) they’re ^st\/irring {în the l\/iving-room#}# B *(- laughs)* D *^y/es#* (1 12:742–48)

Now may be used in combination with a turn-taking or turn-holding device (wait a moment, excuse me two minutes, let me finish): (56) b> it’s called [mof6st] A> ((^can’t re!m\ember it#)) b> huge crumbling Irish landed gentry with . chinoiserie wallpaper and an aviary . wow A> ^now !w\ait a ’moment# . ”^M\offat# . b> Moccas |A> ^M\offas# . b> M O [si] double C A S - (1.14 135–142)

Now suggests the speaker’s impatience and hurry to take the floor. In a heated debate, the speaker does not wait but uses now to interrupt. In (57), now is used to fight for the conversational floor: (57) w> ^now we’ve tried all these others we must :fall back on !th\is _means# because our ^whole *argument is :that it”!!\isn’t a _means#* n> *now now I ^don’t* - now ^just a !m\oment {^Mr . W\illiams#}# ^why fall :b\ack# - (5.3 752–55)


2.9 Conclusion When now is placed at a boundary in the discourse it can be compared with well which is also a boundary signal and a topic-changer. However the change of topic comes about in different ways. Well reluctantly accepts a subtopic which is irrelevant or undesirable. Now licenses topic-change by drawing attention to something new. The temporal meaning of now provides the key to its textual functions as well as its affective and evaluative meaning. The interpretation of now is the outcome of its indexical relationship with the preceding and forthcoming text and close connection with subjectivity. Now is emphatic, direct and argumentative; it functions as a prompter in the discourse before new arguments and topics and underlines the speaker’s right to control the progression of talk and the development of the topic. It is closely associated with certain text types, activities and speakers, for example the interviewer, the moderator in a broadcast debate, a lecturer or a radio commentator. The main discourse functions of now are textual and affective. Now has a large number of textual and affective functions as is obvious when one compares it with well or looks at its collocations. On the global level, now is a boundary signal between discourse units (paragraphs, subtopics) in the turns of the same speaker. It marks a change to a new topic or to a new stage in the conversation (e.g. coming to the main point after some preliminaries). The meanings range from those where now marks the smooth transition from one topic to another with the only function to point forwards in the discourse to cases where now marks ‘misplacement’ (e.g. the resumption of a topic). When now introduces a subordinate speech act, it has meanings like elaboration, explanation or justification. It is important to emphasise that now is above all a marker of subjective modality because of its link to the speaker. This explains that now is an affective intensifier (a subjective modal particle) typically used with metacomments (let me see now), prefaces (my duty this morning is to…) evaluations (that’s awful) and subjective opinions (I think). The use of now as a modal particle is of particular interest and represents the end-point of grammaticalisation from a deictic source. When now is a modal particle (e.g. before imperatives), it may carry friendly overtones (now come on) as its derived meaning as well as impatience (now wait) or resistance (well now, now look).

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Chapter 3

The interjections oh and ah

To be an interesting and not a boring conversationalist … requires an ability to assess what will be interesting to one’s interlocutors, not just to oneself. Here as elsewhere effective speakers are guided by assumptions about the minds of the listeners. (Chafe 1994: 122)

3.1 Introduction It is difficult to imagine a conversation without a large number of ohs and ahs. Their frequency suggests that they can be inserted almost anywhere to pep up the conversation. However to a considerable extent they have been conventionalised. There are conventions for where they can be placed, how they are prosodically intoned, collocate with other elements, what functions they can have. A case can be made for the origin of oh and ah as interjections. Interjections are usually short elements which have the ability to stand alone as complete utterances (Jespersen 1968 (1924): 90). Schourup calls them ‘evincives’ and claims that they give access to the speaker’s mind. They constitute ‘conventionalized responses to what will be called the problem of disclosure’ (Schourup 1985: 3) because speakers use them ‘to express the importance of what they have in mind at a particular point in a conversation, without fully displaying their thinking’ (Schourup 1985: 20). Thus, for example, ‘to say (3) I didn’t make the phone call you asked me to can be quite different from saying (4) Oh! I didn’t make the phone call you asked me to.

since oh in (4) can be used to indicate that a thought expressed in the sentence following oh just entered the speaker’s mind and thereby implicate that the speaker’s failure to make the call was due to forgetfulness, not malevolent intent (Schourup 1985: 21f).1

1. The numbering of examples (3) and (4) is Schourup’s.

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From this characterisation of oh as an evincive various pragmatic functions are said to be derived by ‘a Basic Interpretation Pattern’ (cf. Schourup 1985: 50 for well ) or by calculating the implicatures which can be derived from the invariant meaning. Fraser (1990) regards interjections like oh as ‘message idioms’: emotive words or phrases that stand alone and function as separate sentences. Oh is not only an interjection functioning as a complete utterance and many linguists have focussed instead on the discourse-organising functions of oh. Chafe, for example, treats oh and let me see as ‘regulatory units with a cognitive function’ (Chafe 1994: 64), while Schiffrin (1987) devotes a chapter to the different tasks of oh as a marker of information management: oh is said to frequently mark a shift in speaker orientation resulting from a change in the overall information state ‘as [speakers] replace one information unit with another, as they recognize old information which has become conversationally relevant, and as they receive new information to integrate into an already present knowledge base’ (Schiffrin 1987: 74). According to Jucker & Smith (1998: 182), oh is both cognitive and interactive; it provides time for cognitive tasks but also enhances common ground by helping the speaker to know whether and how easily the information has been integrated. Oh is a typical reception marker which is used to signal a reaction to information provided by another speaker (Jucker & Smith 1998: 174). This can be illustrated by the following example borrowed from Fraser (1996: 176). A: The Celtics finally won last night. B: Oh!

Oh conveys that the preceding information requires some effort to process because it is unexpected or because of the extra effort to process the inferences which can be made from the information (e.g. that B has now won a bet with A).2 Oh is similar to yes and no since it is a response marker. It contrasts with yeah (and yes) since the latter would implicate that the hearer agrees with something the speaker believes. The difference in use will be further exemplified in Section 3.7. When interjections have a text-organising or interpersonal function, they function as discourse particles (cf. Foolen 1997). Oh has, for example, developed to a discourse particle which overlaps both with well and with now. Like

2. Cf. Jucker and Smith (1998: 173), who argue that it is presuppositions or inferences that are put into focus by discourse particles rather than the information itself


these it is placed in the left-hand position with a loose attachment to the following utterance. It is indexical since it refers backwards and forwards with a connective function. Backwards-looking oh is typically a response marker (reception marker) with information management tasks such as acknowledging and accepting new information or recognizing a correction. In the latter use, oh can be followed by a component providing an explanation for the speaker’s prior mistake: (1) c> that’s the televison aerial B> oh# I thought that was a transmission station (2.4 7–9; simplified)

The forwards-looking particle oh can be associated with affect and has a reinforcing or intensifying function. For example, when oh occurs in the lexicalized combination oh God, the effect is stronger than if the speaker uses the simple God. Oh occurs primarily after statements and in elicitational contexts (question–answer-followup exchanges) where it has special functions which can be associated with information transmission and topic development. It is, for instance, used with questions to generate further talk on a topic or to introduce a subtopic. Oh can also be embedded in the turn between utterances by the same speaker with the meaning approximation or self-correction. The chapter is organised as follows. Since oh often occurs with lexical collocates, this is discussed in Section 3.2. The indexicality of oh is fundamental to understanding what the discourse particles are doing and is discussed in Section 3.3, which also discusses grammaticalised aspects of oh. Section 3.4 discusses the core meaning and core functions of oh. Linguistic clues to the function of oh such as collocation, prosody, text type and position in the discourse are dealt with in Section 3.5. Genuine surprise (disappointment, resignation, etc.) is involved in some examples of oh (interjective uses) but oh is above all used to carry out cognitive and interactive tasks with backgrounding of the surprise function (Section 3.6). Oh expressing ‘pure surprise’ is discussed in Section 3.6.1 and other language games where oh expresses surprise are discussed in the following sections. 3.6.2 deals with ‘coming to a realisation’, which includes, for example, ‘noticing’, ‘remembering’. Oh plays an important role in clarification sequences (to express clarification after correction) as well as in self-repair (Section (3.6.3). The meaning surprise easily goes over into assertion and emphasis (Section 3.6.4) and objection or reaction (3.6.5). In Section 3.7, I discuss the function of oh after statements and in Section 3.8 in elicitational contexts (question–answer-followup sequences). Oh is dealt with

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in questions (3.8.1–3.8.2), answers (3.8.3) and follow-up moves (3.8.4). Section 3.9 discusses oh in different topicalizing functions: as a backchannel, reopener, newsmark, signal of assessment or endorsement (3.9.1–3.9.4). Oh is not generally used as a frame between discourse units but has a number of frame-shifting uses which are discussed in Section 3.10. Oh is contrasted with ah in Section 3.11. However examples of both oh and ah will be given throughout the chapter. The use of oh and ah as politeness strategies is dealt with in 3.12.

3.2 Oh and lexical collocation As Stenström points out (1984: 147), oh occurred more than any other initiator with accompanying elements (42% of the examples in my material were combinations of oh and one of the collocations discussed below). Oh and ah typically combine with exclamations, expletives and vocatives. Oh in combination with an expletive or exclamation is used when a single oh could be used but expresses more surprise (indignation, sympathy, disappointment, etc.). We therefore need to distinguish additional functions for oh. For example, after a statement it does not only react to new information but evaluates it. The following are examples of expletives with oh : oh God (gad, gosh, golly, goodness, etc.), oh Christ (Crikey, crumbs), oh (bloody) hell, oh heavens, oh dear. They can occur as a follow-up signal and are more frequent than the simple oh as a backchannel. A collocation such as oh God almighty marks more listener involvement than the simple oh. Like the simple oh, it can have a number of regulatory functions. In (2), it serves, for example, as a backchannel: (2) B> and ^then you ’call in a”!r\isk ’manager#+ who ^says !if you inv\est if you ”^r\isk# . ^so much m/oney# d> [m] B> [6m] . you âre . in”!volving your’self in a ’risk of . [dh] :these pro:p\ortions# and ^then they A> oh ^G/od alm\ighty# d> *[m]* B> ^then they !catego*’rize* the :r\isk ’for you# and and ^how much !money you might l/ose# . (2.11 1076–85)


Similarly oh heavens and ooh gosh are strong markers of interest which makes them suitable for various feedback functions: (3) B> c> B> c> B>

^/and [6˜m]# *(- laughs)* you got rid of your builders - ôh h\eavens ’yes# good ooh ^g\osh# yes ^that ((was so it all)) :seems a !l\ong time ag/o now# B> ^d\oesn’t it# (2.10 66–72)

Oh’s affective meaning is manifest when it occurs in certain collocations. Intensifier oh occurs before ‘covert intensificational adjectives and adverbs: oh (super, good, great, fine, lovely, fantastic, absolutely). It is possible that the adjective must be positive since we do not find: *oh awful, *oh sad, *oh annoying, *oh dreadful. Compare however: oh it’s awful, oh it’s sad, oh it’s annoying, oh how dreadful In addition, oh expresses agreement (oh yes, oh I know), acceptance (oh I see, oh of course)3 and it is used for endorsement (oh that’s a point, oh that’s right). The following collocations with oh were especially frequent: oh yes (306 examples), oh no (108 examples), I see (83 examples), oh well (127 examples). Both when it occurs alone or in combinations, oh serves to receive information into the ongoing discourse, e.g. as a response after an informative statement, as a followup move or as a backchannel move.

3.3 The indexicality of oh It is not common to speak about interjections in connection with indexicality (Wilkins 1995: 359). However the functional potential of oh on different discourse levels derives from ‘a history of usage’ in which its indexical use in

3. Oh is almost a proclitic when reduced as in ‘oh it is’ [witiz]. Cf. oh I see, oh he did (Bolinger 1989: 275).

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dialogue play a role.4 Indexicality explains both the intensifying function of oh and its metalingustic link to the text. Oh has a backwards-looking function and refers to the previous discourse. Likewise oh can index an affective stance (intensification, upgrading, downtoning) to the hearer or to what is said. In this case oh is attention-getting and forwards-looking. We need to take into account the role of grammaticalisation to explain that oh has indexical functions. Just like manner adverbs (well) or temporal adverbs (now), interjections can be grammaticalised. It is difficult to find diachronic evidence for the development of the interjection oh to a full-fledged discourse particle. However movement ‘on the interaction to grammar cline’ (Auer 1996) can explain that pure responses such as oh, yes and no are recategorized as forwards-looking or projecting ‘pre-front field structures’.5 For example, oh is partly grammaticalised in (4) when it responds to the prior speaker’s contribution and introduces a more complex turn. Oh acknowledges the information in the previous turn (‘the painting they are looking at is too big for the room’) and simultaneously leads the way to a new move (‘that’d turn us into schizophrenics’) projected by the information in the prior turn: (4) A> I ^didn’t ’really :s\/ee ’this one# cos I ^thought it _just was !too ”b\ig for the ’room# in . ^terms of s\/ize# C> ^\oh# ^that’d ’turn ((us into)) :schizophr/enics# (. laughs) it’d ^turn m\e ’into# a ^sort of !sch\/izoid# (1.8 661–667)

As the example shows, the ‘uptaker’ oh has both a response function (accepting information) and a forwards-pointing or projective function (creating the conditions for the speaker’s next contribution).

4. Schiffrin has a much more restricted view of the indexicality of discourse particles. According to Schiffrin (1987: 325), each discourse marker has ‘only one indexical function’. Multifunctionality is associated with the contextualization of discourse markers in several components of talk which explains that they have ‘specific, situated syntagmatic roles’ (ibid.). Cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.4.3. 5. Besides oh and ah, OK and right have developed from response markers to discourse particles in the so-called pre-front field (on right and OK see Stenström 1990).

The interjections oh and ah 103

Intensification as a function of oh has not usually been explained as the result of grammaticalisation. However it can be argued that the intensifying oh is grammaticalised and comes into being on a cline of grammaticalisation as a result of prosodic fusion between oh and the following component and a change in function from ‘uptake’ to emphasis (or downtoning).

3.4 The core meaning and function of oh The etymology and history of words may be reflected in their multifunctionality and accounted for in terms of polysemy. However polysemy provides problems for the synchronic analysis of meaning. We need to distinguish between functions which can be derived historically from the lexical source of a word and the calculations or inferences made in the communication situation from a core meaning. To specify a core meaning may be particularly difficult when we analyse interjections, which have been claimed to have little propositional meaning. Interjections have been considered non-referential (Fónagy 1986) or ‘noncontentful’ (Coulmas 1986) (quoted from Wilkins 1995: 384). Likewise Schiffrin claims that ‘the uses of oh (and well) are not clearly based on semantic meaning or grammatical status (Schiffrin 1987: 73). Yet it can be argued that oh has a core meaning which explains its specific pragmatic and discourse properties as well as its discourse functions on the textual and interpersonal levels. This meaning can be related to the origin of oh as a gestural interjection meaning surprise. Bolinger (1989: 266) deals with oh and ah together: Oh and ah are the interjections for which the clearest case can be made for a gestural origin — and probably continuing gestural associations. Both have meanings related to surprise…

Oh and ah as interjective discourse particles have the core meaning of expressing a reaction to something (heard or experienced) which is unexpected. Carlson captures the discourse function or meaning of oh by means of a general ‘dialogue game rule’: ‘Begin a move by oh only if the situation it follows is unexpected.’ (Carlson 1984: 69)

Oh’s core function is closely related to the core meaning ‘surprise’. We are not


restricted to a single core function of oh. D. James (1974),6 who was one of the first linguists to discuss the different meanings of oh, distinguished three meanings of oh (what I call basic discourse functions). Typically oh1 is followed by an explanation; oh2 is casual (and similar to well) while oh3 (related to oh2) indicates that the speaker has made a pause in order to make a decision about the correct wording. However it is not clear how these discourse functions should be motivated. The core functions distinguished in this work are the result of the indexical properties of oh and principles of grammaticalisation. Oh functions on the textual level as a backwards-looking particle (with the core function reaction) and on the interpersonal level (with the core function intensification). These two functions may be only fuzzily delimited from each other. There may be linguistic cues tipping the balance in favour of a particular function. Since we are discussing spoken language, these cues may be prosodic and involve stress or prosodic phrasing. In addition, collocations, distribution over text type and sequential location are important as indicators of the function of oh.

3.5 Functional indicators 3.5.1 Collocation with other discourse particles Studying collocations can sharpen the description of the meaning or function of discourse particles since there must be an overlap of meaning or at least meaning compatibility between the collocates. Oh well is a good example of how particles keep company with each other. In extract (5), speaker B cannot remember the name of the tube station where a common friend now lives. In the combination oh well (surprise and acceptance), oh is mitigating and the pragmatic effect is to belittle or trivialize the previous remark (‘it doesn’t matter’; ‘no harm done’) (cf. Carlson 1984: 73):7 (5) B> ”^wasn’t :very :far a:w\/ay# . it ^might have ’been ’Bel:size :P\ark# A> ôh well !that’s ’where his :m\other l/ives# . ^mother ’lives at ’Bel’size P\ark# ^so it’s per”!haps ’his”!pr\/evious _flat# (1.6 105–109)

6. The references to James (1974) are taken from Schourup (1985: 26f). 7. Cf. also oh it’s nothing, oh don’t worry with mitigating effect.


The collocation is frequent (127 examples) and describes a meaning which is also represented by oh alone. In (6), speaker A has just been told that his thesis supervisor will be away for three weeks: (6) B> A> B> A>

at the *^m/oment#* *ôh* _r/\eally# ^gone off for a_bout :three !w\eeks# . ôh well :th\at’s g/ood# cos I ^haven’t !t\ouched# the ^th\/esis I’m sup’posed *to be ’doing#* I ^didn’t par’ticu((larly ’want to !s\ee him#)) (1.6 189–95)

A simple oh (that’s good) would have sounded too enthusiastic here and well (that’s good) does not express the speaker’s attitude of nonchalance and resignation. Oh well and ah well have different meanings although both oh and ah have the core meaning surprise. While oh in the combination oh well is mitigating and ‘trivializing’, ah is upgrading and ah well (6 examples in all) can only imply that the upcoming message is important. In (7), the speaker imitates the conversation that she overheard in the senior common room when she was interviewed for a job. Ah well is ironic since it is clear that the speaker regards the information as unimportant: (7) A> and ^pr\esident _said# ^{/\ah} w/\ell# the ^simple :truth \/is# that . îf you’re going to boil eggs . :c\/ommunally# they ”^must be h\ard# (1.3 795–99)

Lexicalized collocations between the intensifying oh and accompanying elements are discussed in Section 3.2. 3.5.2 The distribution of oh over different text types In all, there were 2028 examples of oh (excluding unclear examples) establishing it to be among the most frequent words in the London-Lund Corpus; it was

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almost as frequent as well (2675 examples as a discourse item or 53 tokens per 10,000 words) or as mhm (the second most frequent discourse item in the corpus according to Stenström 1990: 162).8 Jucker & Smith (1998: 176) also found that oh was the third most frequent discourse particle in a study of American English. It was less frequent than yeah and like but more frequent than you know and well. In the COLT Corpus, oh was frequently used by adolescents to signal intensification and exaggeration (3735 examples or 74 tokens per 10,000 words). Text type may be a clue to the function of oh although it is not as important as other indicators (Table 3.5.2). The high frequency of oh in conversation reflects the fact that its function is mainly interactional. Table 3.5.2. Distribution of oh over different text types (the figures have been normalized to 10,000 words) Text type

Number of tokens

FACE (surreptitious) FACE (non-surreptitious) TELEPHONE DISCUSSION PREPARED PUBLIC

1112 (63.5) 371 (61.8) 389 (64.8) 111 (11.1) 9 (2.3) 36 (5.5)

Total

2028

However it is difficult explain the specific discourse function of oh on the basis of text type only. Many other factors may affect the frequency of oh in a particular text type, for example how well the speakers know each other. When Jucker & Smith compared specific groups of speakers, they found that oh was more likely to be used when the speakers were strangers than when they were

8. In the London-Lund Corpus (informal conversation) it has rank 43 (cf. well which has rank 14). (Cf. Svartvik 1990: 67.)


friends (Jucker & Smith 1998: 178).9 When we look at particular text types there are some additional observations we can make about the function of oh. In discussion and debate oh is intensifying and used when there is disagreement: (8) v> aud> (v>

[6˜] the ôther ’thing you kn/ow# (- no no) ôoh there /are {^s/ome#}# oh ^yes do do be!l\ieve me# . and the ôther thing that I :did want to to !point \out you kn/ow# is is ^th\is# . (5.4 796–801)

Extra emphasis is needed after the audience’s no. The speaker uses the prolonged oh (ooh), oh yes and the emphatic do to strengthen a point. The high frequency of oh on the telephone is partly explained by oh’s function as a success marker at the moment when the answerer recognizes the caller (Schegloff 1979: 38). The ‘big hello’ (found in as many as 17 examples) implies, for example, that the speakers have not seen each other for a long time: (Situation: C = the answerer; B = the caller) (9) C> ^hell/o# B> hel^lo J\o# it’s ^Bridget L\adbroke# C> ôh hell/o# B> [6m] . ^look my d/ear# ît’s !\/awful ’of me# but ^do you _mind t\/erribly# if I ^pass \up the ’meeting on _Wednesday _aftern/oon# (7.2 1335–1342)

A variant of the same pattern is found in (10). The first oh occurs when B recognizes the identity of A. Oh hullo conveys that the caller was unexpected:

9. Oh occurred 1.6 times per minute in conversations between strangers versus 1.0 times per minute in conversations between friends (Jucker & Smith 1998: 198). ‘Reception markers’ such as oh are said to be particularly useful to help the interlocutor create and update a model of the speaker’s current knowledge. ‘It is not surprising that this is particularly important for strangers, who have no personal common ground prior to the state of the conversation (Jucker & Smith 1998 197f).’


(Situation: A = answerer; B = caller) (10) A> Miss ^/Aber’cromby# B> oh ^this is Pro’fessor :Thorpe’s ’secretary from :Ani’mosity C\ollege# A> ôh hull/o# . B> [6˜m] . it ^s\eems in ’fact# (9.2 573–76)

On the other hand, oh occurred hardly at all in radio interviews (texts 6.1, 6.3 and 6.7) and there were only 3 occurrences in courtroom proceedings (texts 12.3 and 12.4) its absence in more formal structures providing further evidence for ‘the informal sociability of oh’ (cf. Bolinger 1989: 266).10 3.5.3 Prosodic properties of oh Of the total instances of oh, about 3/4 of the occurrences were unstressed and fused with the following component. It is clear that the meanings where ‘surprise’ is backgrounded or absent are the most frequent one. Stenström describes oh and well which are part of a larger tone unit as (semantically) ‘less loaded’ than oh followed by a tone unit boundary (Stenström 1984: 146). According to Bolinger, fusion achieved by prosodic linking causes oh to be ‘routinely intensifying’ ruling out the surprise meaning (cf. also Bolinger 1989: 270). The tone on oh is important and can carry heavy implications (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 49). See Table 3.5.3. Pitch does not on its own appear to be an indicator of the particular function of oh. However both the high frequency of fall tone and of rise-fall are worth commenting on. The number of examples of oh with a fall tone or a risefall tone is, for example, higher than for well (fall oh 78%; well 62%; rise-fall oh 13.8%; well 6%) while the number of examples with rising tone was lower (oh 4.5%; well 12%). It is also noteworthy that the high frequency of level tone characteristic of well (16%) or now (36.9%) is not matched in the oh data. (For

10. Another reason may be the acceptance-marking function discussed below. Cf. Heritage (1984: 339), ‘In British newsbroadcasts, which are required by statute to exhibit balance and impartiality, interviewers entirely avoid such receipts’. According to Max Atkinson (referred to by Heritage), arbitrators in British small claim courts prefer the more neutral yes and certainly to oh.


Table 3.5.3. The distribution of nuclear tones on oh in the LLC Nuclear tone

Number

fall-rise fall rise-fall level rise

8 (1.4%) 437 (78%) 77 (13.8%) 12 (2.1%) 25 (4.5%)

Total

559 (99.8%)

data on well, see Svartvik 1980.) The falling tone on oh can have the function of acknowledging new information, what Heritage (1984) calls the ‘news-receipt’ function. Cf. also Local (1996: 183), ‘Somewhat unexpectedly, when I searched through the data I had difficulty in finding news-receipt ohs done with anything but falling pitch.’ (11) D> ^n\o# I’m sup^posed to be ’getting an [6s] an as^s\istant# A> ^\oh# . D> but [6m] . they’re ^\interviewing ’somebody . {to^m\orrow#}# A> ^\yeah# (1.5 127–21)

The rise-fall tone is preferred when ‘surprise’ can be warranted (Local 1996: 207), for example when the speaker has been corrected, suddenly recollects something, or changes his mind. Oh with a rise-fall tone displaying a change from misinformed to informed is illustrated in: (12) A> B> (A> B> A> (B> A>

+^his ap+!!pointment’s +^y\es#+ ’at e:l\even /isn’t it# *[6˜] -* ^no it’s [6] I ^think *((I)) ^th/ink#* it’s e’leven _forty-!f\ive# [~] ”^/\oh# so ît’s ît’s !getting :\on to l/unch \any’way# ^\/almost# *((several sylls))* - **[6˜m]** (8.3 205–12)

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Backchannel oh with a rise-fall tone seems to express a strong emotion or surprise accompanying the receipt of new information (cf. Local 1996: 202): (13) A> it’s âll !m\y f/ault ((you see))# you ^know he ^he !rang bef\ore# and Î said well ’look here B> *^/\oh#* (A> I’ve *:got* to ”!run ”!n\ow# ^=and [6]# Î said give !Br\enda pri/ority# (1.8 24–29)

Expressive prosody is dealt with further in Section 3.5.3.1. 3.5.3.1 Expressive prosody Prosody may reinforce the emotion expressed by oh. ‘Expressive’ prosody is used when exaggerated emotion is needed for dramatic effect, for example in reported speech. Pitch movement, repetition, vowel lengthening, changes in loudness and voice quality (e.g. creaky voice) as well as non-verbal signs (sigh, whimper, laugh, sob) are, for instance, used together with oh. In (14), various prosodic devices add to the dramatic quality of the narrative. Speaker B has seen an advertisement for the film ‘Jules et Jim’ which reinvokes his nostalgic memories of the film. The emotional effect is achieved by the repetition of oh and by the imitation of sobbing: (14) c> I don’t buy them . every week . like I used to when/ the price was reasonable . d> *((yes that’s rather hard))* B> oh *^Jules et J/im#* ^\oh# (. crash) +^sob _s=ob#+ c> +oh Christ+ - - (2.10 714–719)

Oh could be prolonged and pronounced as a monophthong as in ooh (60 examples) and less frequently (oooh)11 or it was repeated. (oh ohohoh). Ah had

11. Moreover there is considerable phonetic variation in the pronunciation of oh. It is possible that such pronunciation variants are also socially and regionally conditioned. Thus Ferrara (1997: 372) mentions a pronunciation [wo] by younger speakers of American English


the variant aah in addition to aha (5 examples) and ahah.12 Vowel lengthening is illustrated in (15): (15) A> and ît was a ît was [6˜m] . I ^w\/ent ’in# and I ^s=aid# îs there !such a th/ing as a ”G\uinness ’kit# . well the ^woman l\ooked at _me and _said# ôoh :ooh \ooh you kn/ow# ”ôbviously”:G\uinness# . îs a pro!pr\ietary _thing# (1.7 366–372)

3.6 Oh and discourse functions A general description of the meaning and core functions of discourse particles does not go far enough in describing how they are used. Oh performs special interactive tasks, which explains that it is used in some contexts but not in others. In this section I shall therefore look in detail at what oh is doing for example after informative statements and question–answer exchanges. In discourse analysis the notion ‘frame’ is used to describe boundaries in the discourse, for example before a new topic. Not all boundaries are of the major type we associate with topic change. Minor boundaries in discourse can be described in terms of ‘frame shifts’ (cf. Maschler 1998), footing change (Goffman 1981) and ‘misplacement’ (Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Oh has a frameshifting function when it describes a change of perspective, e.g. from a description to an evaluation. The functions of oh can be described not only in terms of how it serves to regulate discourse and information flow but in terms of affect and emotionality. Oh expresses involvement with the hearer or what is said and can be associated with strong (upgrading) or weak (downtoning) intensity depending on the context. As shown in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.3, intensity is usually marked in addition by prosody or signalled by the collocates of oh.

(aged 15–25) with the variant [wu]. 12. However it is possible that aha(h) should be regarded as a separate interjection and not as a variant pronunciation of ah.

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3.6.1 Pure surprise Oh participates ‘in a wide variety of “language games”: noticing; having one’s attention drawn to something; remembering; being reminded, informed or corrected; arriving at discoveries and realizations of various kinds and many more’ (Heritage 1984: 337). Example (16) illustrates the exclamatory use of oh. The sentiment expressed is surprise mixed with sympathy. Speaker ‘a’ has just said that that she dislikes guests who offer to help with the washing-up. This is followed by B’s sympathetic ‘oh these terrible people’: (16) c> +(- laughs) -+ yes God a> oh it’s the guests who say ah well can we help you with the washing-up now and we say *my God no* B> *^{\oh} these **t\errible* ’people#** D> **^we ^we don’t** :r\eally ’have# +^those . B> +^[=m]# . (1.12 524–29)

Other examples of ‘pure surprise’ are illustrated in (17) and (18). In (17), the speaker reacts by surprise to something extralinguistic. Speaker B has just noticed that there is milk for the coffee: (17) B> Î ’don’t think I’ve ^\oh# there ^\is milk# (1.8 35–36)

In (18), oh focuses on the speaker’s emotions here and now: (18) A> ^h\ell/o# . B> ^h\al’lo y/ou# - - ”^\oh# I’ve ^got a se!vere at’tack of exh\austion ’suddenly# A> ^why don’t you ’flop d\own# (2.11 278–82)

Several other uses of the ‘reactive’ oh are illustrated in the following extract, which contains a conversation between ‘a’, an academic, and C, a studio manager (‘b’ is A’s wife):


(19) 1

a> [6˜] I was in a pub . [6˜m] . we were at [dhi˜] . Covent Garden Festival 2 C> ^[\m]# - . 3 a> and he was there [‘] and he was with - . he was working for the chap who wrote - . Martin Luther’s Crusade for *the People* 4 C> *^\oh#;.*; Êdward S\omerset# . 5 a> that’s right 6 C> ^[\m]# . 7 a> acting with him 8 C> ^/\acting# . ^[/\m]# 9 b> we also met Martin Fuller in the same pub 10 C> ^\oh# 11 b> ((murmur - several sylls)) 12 a> yes 13 C> îs !he ”m/\arried# . he ^\is /isn’t he# 14 b> yes . I think they’ve got [6] they’ve got a child at least one 15 C> ^\oh# (2.7 590–607)

Person ‘a’ tells his female friend about how he met some of their common friends at the pub. The first oh (turn 4) marks C’s recognition of who ‘a’ is referring to (a well-known stage manager). The second and third occurrence of oh (turns 10 and 15 respectively) are caused by the introduction of new, not anticipated information. In turn 10, oh stands alone like an interjection. This is however not a frequent use. Heritage finds ‘freestanding “oh” receipt of prior information comparatively rare in the case of data to hand’ (Heritage 1984: 303) and in the London-Lund Corpus, oh occurred alone as a separate tone unit only in 5% of the examples. 3.6.2 Arriving at a realisation Things suddenly fall into place when speaker C realises who speaker ‘a’ has in

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mind.13 Oh is produced even before speaker ‘a’ has finished talking as in (20), partly identical with example (19): (20) a> and he was there [‘] and he was with - . he was working for the chap who wrote - . Martin Luther’s Crusade for *the People* C> *^\oh#;.*; Êdward S\omerset# . a> that’s right (2.7 590–95)

Ah in a similar example suggests that the speaker has just remembered something: (21) A> be^cause it’s . got a r\ing round it# ^just be’low Fl\eet# B> be^l\ow Fl/eet# - . ^\ah# ^Br\ookwood# . *. ((3 to 4 sylls))* A> *and it âctually !is it’s the ^three* it’s the ^three two !thr\ee# (1.11 1064–70)

Example (22) illustrates successive clarifications marked by ah or by oh. Speaker A argues that one needs to be concerned with the academic structure of the university and not simply with combining different departments. (22) B> ((then)) this îsn’t your - - ((:ch\ore))# A> ^n/\o# . *it’s ^not* it’s ^not ir”!r\/elevant _to it# [6˜m] . but - - - it’s the - âcademic :str\ucture# . B> *((2 to 3 sylls))* (A> ôf . the uni!v\ersity# that . that [6] *.* ^w\e’re conc/erned a_bout# B> *^/\ah#* oh I ^s\ee# . ((^y\es#))

13. In 396 examples (19.5% of all the examples) oh overlapped with a preceding turn.


A> in ôther w=ords# . [6˜m] - - ^to !what ext/ent# . can the ^colleges have inde:p\endence# - B> ^=oh# Î thought that you were on :this . [wu wu] âren’t/ you on the ’same committee as [dhi˜ ˜6 m] - - ^Dave C\ole is /on# A> ôh n\o# ^n\o# *((that’s an^\other committee#))* B> *^=oh# I ”^thought* that ’that was the ^y=es# Î s/ee# . ^[mh=m]# . (1.2 1333–54)

Ah is further strengthened by oh I see. Speaker B could have used a simple oh to signal ‘having been uninformed but now being informed’. If something is added after oh it is interpreted as an explanation for the speaker’s previous misassumption (‘oh I thought you were on the same committee as…’). 3.6.3 Oh in clarification sequences Oh performs important tasks in clarification sequences as Schiffrin (1987) has pointed out. When the request for clarification or correction comes from the hearer (what Schiffrin 1987: 78 refers to as other-initiated repair) it is customary for the speaker to signal the change of state from ‘misinformed’ to informed by oh. The role of oh in repair sequences is illustrated in (23). (23) A> ^did you ’also ’scotch that :other st\ory# which is ^something ’like - ^was he ^wasn’t he re’fused the :ch\air in /Oxford# a> who A> ^Sk/eat# ^wasn’t he re*’fused* a> *that’s Meak* A> ôh M\eak# ^y\es# and ^he said !d\amn you ’sir# ^d\amn ’you#

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a> *yes this is this is* Meak to Seddon and this **is true** A> **”^\oh#** ^that ”is !tr\/ue ’is it# . ^y\es# (1.9 1346–60)

Speaker A cannot remember the name of the person who was refused the chair in Oxford. ‘Skeat’ is treated as a ‘repairable’ by speaker ‘a’ who ‘issues a repair’ (‘it was Meak who was refused the chair in Oxford’). Speaker A acknowledges the replacement of the right name by means of oh Meak followed by yes. In (24), persons ‘a’, ‘b’ and C have been discussing a brand of barley water erroneously referred to as Robertson’s by speaker ‘b’. Speaker C initiates a repair (‘thought it was Robinson’) and speaker ‘b’ acknowledges the repair by means of oh and a repetition of the correct item (followed by oh that’s it and yes). (24) a> *barleywater* why b> well apparently in fact there’s a brand of barleywater - by Robertson’s . in fact C> ((thought)) it was ^R\obinson# - . b> Robinson’s *oh that’s it* yes a> *oh yeah* (2.7 1037–41)

Oh signals clarification after correction. In examples like (25) however, oh initiates ‘other-repair’ rather than clarification. Speaker B has claimed that ‘she is not full of traumas’ which is denied by A: (25) B> and she’s ^quite all r\ight# she’s ^not !full of :tr\aumas# and . A> ôh she’s !fright ^very ’full of *:tr\/aumas#* (B> *^n\erves# and ((êverything \else#))* c> yes - yes . [m] Georgy says . [m] sort of novel (1.11 247–52)

3.6.4 Assertion and emphasis Surprise carries with it implications e.g. that something is ‘big’. When oh expresses a surprised reaction at something big, or something positive ‘it is


logical that oh should often express enhancement, including emphasis and intensification’. (Bolinger 1989: 269). (26) a> no I only meant that maps must have existed A> oh ^maps ’must have ex!\/isted# ^c\ertainly# (. coughs) oh the ^Fr\ench would have m/apped it# ^very - c/arefully# ^y\es# - well I mean ^th\is ’bears the m/arks# (2.3 71–77)

Other upgrading devices in (26) are repetition (‘maps must have existed’), must and certainly. Speaker A furthermore strengthens his point by adding that the French would have mapped it carefully. Well would be unsuitable in the same context since it expresses hesitation or reservation: (i) a> no I only meant that maps must have existed A> well (?) maps must have existed certainly

It is important to remember that oh is not only emphatic. Oh is mitigating rather than emphatic, for example when it plays down the importance of the information in the answer to the question. When oh is embedded in the speaker’s turn it is most often mitigating and sometimes casual (see further Section 3.10). 3.6.5 Reaction or objection: oh but, oh because There is an overlap of meaning between oh (reaction to the preceding context) and but (an objection). This is clear when oh collocates with but or because. In (27), Speakers B and A disagree about the effects of playing war games: (27) 1

2

B> +I mean âll these ”:w\ar ’games they {^pl\ay#} {for ^\instance#}#+ ^where’by they . ^they sort of :p\ostulate [Ádhi˜]# . ^s\o and so’s at’tacking the *s/o and so# and A> *^\oh# ^y\es {^B\ill#}# ^yes but*

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3 (B> ^th=en# ^what would you _do* and !th\is sort of _thing# . +they must ^surely ap’ply this to+ p\eacetime 4 A> +ôh that’s !very :d\ifferent#+ (B> cond/itions *{^m/ustn’t they#}#* 5 A> *ôh but they* but the ^playing of”:g\/ames# is +”^v\ery ’different#+ 6 B> +^some there+ ^must be !!p\eace games# ^just the _same as there are !w\ar games# (2.3 1095–8)

It is often difficult to distinguish between oh as a reaction signal and as an intensifier. In turn 2, oh is a reaction signal and yes but introduces B’s argument. The next oh (in turn 4) is intensifying. Oh in turn 5 expresses an objection as is clear from its collocation with but. Ah but, on the other hand, implies ‘you are about to forget something important’ (‘with the speaker wagging an admonitory finger to point out the lapse of memory’; Bolinger 1989: 282). In (28), speaker B has been claiming that her father never got a higher job because he couldn’t stand responsibility: (28) B> +^when my _f\ather’s+ you ^know my ’father’s f\ather# was a ^r\/ailway ’porter# . a> well my father’s father was a signalman . B> ^\ah# . but he *^was a* a> *((rather a* huge railwayman)) +(- laughs)+ C> +(- laughs)+ ^y\es# B> ^but he w/as [6] ît was ”!th\/at# a> [m] B> ^not that he ’didn’t have a :better educ/ation# ((but)) he ^d\id# but he ^couldn’t ’stand re’sponsi!b\ility# . he ^couldn’t \/even# . ^take a h/igher job in the r\ailway ’than a p/orter# a ^s\/ignalman# is ^much ’higher than a :p\orter# (1.13 190–205)


In (29), a reaction is followed by because. Ah because is used to support the speaker’s point of view. The topic discussed is the ‘Irish mess’ and whether Ireland could be placed under UN auspices: (29) A> ^why not ’do it !n\ow# - . B> ^\ah because# . the po^litical :reasons in:v\/olved# ((I mean the ones of)) ^national pres:t\/ige# are en^tirely ’ones of :t\iming# (2.8 47–51)

3.7 Oh after statements: oh or yes? In a dialogue one speaker produces an utterance and then another speaker responds. Each new utterance (or turn) displays the speaker’s reaction to and understanding of the preceding utterance. It follows that utterances can be analysed both from a response or retrospective aspect (they point backwards to talk in a prior turn) and a forwards-pointing or prospective aspect (they create the conditions for the speaker’s next contribution (Tsui 1994: 17). Listeners may also use a feedback move to signal reception, understanding and/or acceptance without introducing new content (‘pure feedback moves’; Severinson-Eklundh 1986: 34). In order to discuss the functions of oh we need to consider several types of feedback moves. A distinction can be made between oh after statements, as a follow-up signal after answers and as a backchannel move. Oh also occurs in special feedback moves, referred to here as ‘newsmarks’ and ‘assessments’. Statements may get different feedback depending on the beliefs and assumptions of the speaker and the hearer. An informative statement can be followed by acceptance, for instance in the form of a ‘weak’ confirmation (yeah) or by a surprised reaction (oh) if it is unexpected or contains ‘new’ information. In order to describe the possible responses to informative statements (cf. Heritage 1984: 300 ‘informings’) we can classify the events about which statements are made according to the shared knowledge involved (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 100). In the framework suggested by Labov & Fanshel, an A-event characterises a communicative event known to A but not to B. Hence a typical A-event is autobiographical: ‘I’m a Catholic’. Both yes and no would be inappropriate listener responses when the speaker has privileged access to the information (‘I’m a Catholic’ — B: ‘yes’). B-events refer to information which

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only the hearer knows and therefore have a questioning quality. In the case of B-events, B is invited to confirm some information which is known to him but not to A (cf. Stubbs 1983: 120). The response to the request for confirmation is yes rather than oh. The oh-response ‘would not be appropriate if the first speaker’s utterance were “Your name is John” [i.e. a B-event] except, perhaps, in assigning names for a class play’ (Fraser 1996: 177). Moreover an oh-response is unacceptable as the response of an AB-event (an event known both by the speaker and the hearer). A speaker who only says what is expected or repeats what is shared knowledge14 would flout the Gricean maxim of quantity (‘make your conversation as informative as required’) and be a boring conversational partner unless the information sets the stage for a further argument (A: We are both Swedish. B: yes. A: Therefore we are members of EU and must vote for a common currency). An event which is not an AB-event receives different responses depending on how it is received by the listener. Pending acceptance an utterance may receive weak uptake by means of yes or yeah (‘I understand what you are saying’) or it may be accepted as new information by the selection of oh as a feedback signal. Oh provides information about the cognitive operations involved in the reception of the message. For example, according to Heritage, oh marks the cognitive operation when a previously uninformed speaker receives new information (the function of ‘newsreceipt’ Heritage 1984: 305). Oh involves an agreeable response when it reacts to a change in the speaker’s knowledge condition ‘since no more agreeable response can be made to what we have been told than to give to understand that we have been persuaded by it in some way’ (Bolinger 1989: 276). Affirmation and acceptance can therefore be derived by default ‘as an offshoot of general agreeableness’ (Bolinger 1989: 276). Example 30 (partly similar to example 19) illustrates several types of uptake of the message ranging from weak acceptance (‘attention’, ‘understanding’) signalled by m to acceptance (oh). (30) 1 2 3

a> [6˜] I was in a pub . [6˜m] . we were at [dhi˜] . Covent Garden Festival C> ^[\m]# - . a> and he was there [‘] and he was with - . he was

14. An event known to everyone present and known to be known is a so-called O-event (cf. Labov & Fanshel 1977: 100; Stubbs 1983: 119).


4

C>

5 6 7 8

a> C> a> C>

9 b> 10 C>

working for the chap who wrote - . Martin Luther’s Crusade for *the People* *^\oh#;.*; Êdward S\omerset# . that’s right ^[\m]# . acting with him ^/\acting# . ^[/\m]# we also met Martin Fuller in the same pub ^\oh#

‘m’ in turn 2, 6 and 8 is an example of a weak feedback in the middle of another speaker’s turn (‘I am paying attention’). The final oh-acceptance of the information (Speaker ‘a’ met X together with Edward Somerset at the Festival) is deferred until turn 10. Several different outcomes are possible at particular points in the conversation depending on the stance taken by the hearer to the information conveyed. In turn 10, Person C could also have responded by a ‘yes receipt’ (yes, mhm, etc.) to show that he is listening or paying attention to already familiar information): (a) b> we also met Martin Fuller in the same pub C> yes (turn 10)

3.7.1 Oh and pairing with other discourse particles The responsibility for getting information across in the dialogue is divided up between the speaker and the hearer so that one person presents information and the other person receives it (cf. Jucker & Smith 1998). You know (and you see) are presentation markers which can be paired with the reception marker oh. You know and you see govern and modify the speaker’s information as ‘information status enhancing devices’ and signal how the information should be received by the hearer (He & Lindsey 1998; cf. the discussion of ‘pairing’ in Chapter 1, Section 1.13). You know is, for instance, used by the speaker ‘who has information new and important to the addressee which is necessary for both to understand in order for talk to progress’ and oh (rather than yes) is used by ‘the addressee upon hearing this information for the first time in order to indicate

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the receipt of new knowledge’ (cf. He & Lindsey 1998: 148).15 D, who is the husband of B, is going to buy a freezer. D and B are now discussing where it should be placed. The essence of the information given in the manual is that the place should be damp-proofed. This is therefore new and important information which is highlighted by you know. ‘m oh’ signals that the information was new to A (a house wife also participating in the discussion) and that it has been processed and accepted: (31) B> *they ^say they’re ’best in* the ’coldest pl\ace . the ^b\/ook says# . in +the ^coldest ’place you’ve g\ot# . D> +^r/eally# ^[/\m]# ^w/\ell#+ B> but it ^should be+ a _sort of !d\amp proofed ’place# **^y\/ou know#** c> **^[=m]#** . *^\oh#* A> **^[\m]#** . *well* ^when we ’have our ex:t\/ension ’we’ll# c> ^[\m]# (A> we’ll ^put it in !th\ere I th/ink# (4.3 260–72)

In the following extract, speaker A’s oh is triggered by the preceding you see. Speakers B and A have selected paintings for their offices. You see occurs at the moment when speaker B wants to highlight that she has just taken the painting she wants. Oh’s role is to show that speaker A has understood the importance and newness of what B has just said: (32) (B> [m] :h\ere [si]# [a˜ dhi i] ^this one ((was)) :further a’long it’s a/ _bit sm=all# so Î ’said I’d :h/ave it# ((it’s)) ^sort of :quite h\armless# .

15. The role of you know with a following oh has been analysed differently by Schiffrin (1987: 91). For Schiffrin, you know prompts the speaker into recognition of familiar information.


A> ^do we ’now ’write a ”n\ote# . B> ^w\ell# ^n\o I {^think !((n\o#}# do)) you ^s/ee# ^that’s what I’ve d/one# A> *^\oh#* B> *that’s* âll he :s\/ays# . (1.4 872–83)

3.8 Oh in elicitational contexts It is not difficult to understand why oh has a central role in marking a topic as worth talking about. The topics which are verbalized are those that have a point, which is usually to say they ‘conflict with expectations’ (Chafe 1994: 122). Speaker ‘b’ has been talking about the problems of parking her car. The transition to talking about David’s mother is therefore abrupt and needs to be marked. Oh I told you introduces a topic which is unexpected (‘David’s mother’). (33) b> it’s ^better than ’trailing ’round ’looking for a m/\eter# - - a> ^[\m]# - - b> oh I ^told you ((who)) I ’saw this m/orning# . ^D\avid’s _mother# *[6˜m]* a> *^wh/ich D\avid#* . **oh the ^[dei]** b> **^David** !C\arter# . +the ône who+ a> +((the ^boy you had+ ’written)) the **’letter** b> **^\in#** (a> a’bout the :m\usic . l/essons# (4.1 86–96)

More frequently oh and ah occur in elicitational contexts with the function to keep the conversation going. The interest of the topic can be sustained ‘through alternating contributions by the eliciter and the responder’ (Chafe 1994: 127). The development of the topic is driven by these alternative contributions: the eliciter asks questions and the responder provides the bulk of the information requested. However it is also important that the eliciter acknowledges the contribution from the responder in a special follow-up move.

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The frequent occurrence of oh in question–answer exchanges is not a new observation. According to Heritage (1984: 336), ‘“oh” occurs most densely perhaps in the environment of questions and their answers.’ In the LondonLund Corpus, there were 305 examples of the simple oh in question–answer exchanges with or without follow-up moves and in addition a large number of examples where oh has backchannelling function (cf. Table 3.8). Table 3.8. The distribution of oh introducing questions, responses, follow-up moves in the LLC Context

No of tokens

Question Response Follow-up

90 157 58

Total

305

Oh in question–answer exchanges has special functions which cannot be explained only on the basis of the backwards-looking function of oh as a reaction marker. We need to consider also how the tasks of transmitting and integrating information is distributed between individuals as ‘occupants of mechanically defined nodes in a system of information transmission’ (Schiffrin 1987: 99). 3.8.1 Oh in reaction questions Oh in questions has special functions which can be explained on the basis of the backwards-looking function of oh and its role in information transmission. (34) illustrates oh prefacing what could be called an elaboration question (cf. Schiffrin 1987: 85) or a reaction question, i.e. a question caused by a preceding utterance which projects an elaboration. In (34), the conversationalists are looking at the advertisements for movies. The advertisement for the film ‘It’s Alive’ triggers B’s oh-question and results in an elaboration by B (‘It’s the most marvellous advertisement’). (34) A> Con^fessions of a W\indow ’Cleaner# - - d> yes I must see B> ^that’s a ’blue :m\ovie ((’actually))# ^/is((n’t)) it# A> ^y\eah# - -


^Bays’water :A’B!\C# . ôh we could !go and see ’It’s A:l\/ive# B> oh ”^what’s th\at# A> ((ît)) . ît’s the most”!{m\arvellous} ad:v\/ertisement# (2.10 817–25)

In (35), the answer to A’s question is ‘heavily incomplete indicating that there is more to be told than has emerged so far’ (Heritage 1984: 325). By asking the oh-introduced question (‘are you playing the recorder too’), speaker A creates an opportunity for speaker ‘b’ to elaborate on the topic why he plays the recorder: (35) A> are you ^copying out !p\/arts# for a ^quar!t\/et or ’something ’Barry# or ^wh\at# b> I was transposing a trio written for - two oboes and a cor anglais into recorders A> ^\oh# . are you ^playing the re’corder t/oo# b> I play the recorder too and I . I find this quite . amusing and really most undemanding (2.14 2–8)

Repetition of something which has just been said can be understood as a request for elaboration or for clarification. In (36), persons ‘a’ and A are discussing the use of a tape-recorder for recording spoken language: (36) A> **but ”^can you se’parate** - *^can you :s\eparate#* (one turn has been omitted) ôut the w/\ords# that ^we’ve !s\aid# . and and ^then !jumble them a:b\/out# a> yes . we can get . **cut** A> **by** re^cording them :one by !\one# a> cut the tape well *you just cut* A> *oh ((you)) just ”^c\ut it#* a> just cut the tape A> you ^literally !c\ut it# a> **[m . m]** A> **ôh !\/I see#**

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A> and ^then [‘] !join it to!g\ether a’gain# (1.7 665–78)

A’s oh-introduced question and the response function as a request for confirmation sequence. There is a second confirmation sequence (‘you literally cut it’ — ‘m m’) which is acknowledged by oh I see. 3.8.2 Oh and clarification questions In the following examples, oh introduces a clarification request. Such requests are used to define a preceding utterance as a target for repair (Schiffrin 1987:79). Speaker ‘a’ has confirmed that he will be interviewed the next day as a response to B’s statement ‘it is your turn to be interviewed tomorrow’. The information ‘five pm’ is the ‘repairable’ because it requires some request for clarification from A. Oh is used when clarification is requested (‘oh that means you’re the very last’). The request is completed in the next turn by speaker a’s yeah. (37) B> then it’s ^you to!m\orrow ’is it J/ock# . a> yes B> ^[\m]# - I shall ^th\ink of you# - a> five pm . B> ôh I !s\ee# . *^y\es#* A> *^\oh#* ^that ’means ’you’re the ’very l\ast# a> yeah (2.5 325–34)

Ah in clarification questions (e.g. ah you mean) implies that the speaker does not at first see the significance of the information received but asks for clarification in order to continue: (38) B> ^what *you* :d\/o# is to ^make sure that your ’own . !c\andidate A> *^[\m]#* (B> is . *.* ^that your . there’s ^something that your :own candidate can :h\/andle# - …..


A> ^\ah# [6˜] you ^mean that [dhi dhi] {the !p\apers} ”\are#/ ^more or less :set ad !h\ominem# ^/are _they# (1.1 15–16(17); 21–24)

3.8.3 Non-committal answers and evasions Like well, oh is typically a response particle. In Table 3.8.3a, it is compared with well in five texts of the LLC.16 Table 3.8.3a. The distribution of oh and well before questions, responses and follow-up signals (5 texts from the LLC; the table has been adapted from Stenström 1984: 143) Token oh well

Question

Response

Follow-up

13 47

63 184

40 16

The simple oh is not used in answers although oh can preface the answer to a question or be used to acknowledge the answer in a follow-up move. In the answer to a yes/no-question, oh yes could mark indignant surprise (cf. Bolinger 1989: 280). Speaker A has just pointed out that the company writes to everyone telling them if a share needs selling: (39) A> that [6m] ((it needs ^s\elling))# - . a> do you find yourself if I may ask doing this very much . A> oh ^y\es# ((oh ^y\es#)) . a> you’ve done it quite recently A> [6˜m] . ^y\es# (2.2 721–26)

Stenström (1984: 147) found that oh (unlike well) was more common with responses to yes/no-questions where ‘it serves to reinforce the polarity decision.’ However in my (larger) material, oh was more frequent after wh-questions than

16. Ah did not occur before questions in Stenström’s material and there were only 5 examples in my (larger) material.

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Table 3.8.3b. Distribution of oh in answers to different types of question Type of question

Number of examples

yes/no-question wh-question tag question (confirmation question)

51 68 21

Total

140

after yes/no-questions or after a sentence with a tag question (Table 3.8.3b). In answers to a question there is often variation between oh and well. Other variants are now and oh well. With the authentic example in (40) as the startingpoint, we can see how meaning is changed if oh is replaced by well or by now. The combination oh well is also of interest as a response marker: (40) a> [6˜] how would you live how would you where would you get the money from . A> oh I ^hope I would ’get a :gr\ant# a> yes A> a ^major ’county aw\ard# *^y\es#* (3.1 1057–61)

Compare: (41) a A

where would you get the money from (i) well I hope I would get a grant (ii) oh well I hope I would get a grant (iii) now I hope I would get a grant

In the answer to a wh-question, oh comes close to well. Both oh and well (or oh well) indicate a less straightforward answer to the question than the unqualified ‘I hope I would get a grant’. Oh in the answer to the question in (40) reacts to the asking of the question and implies that the choice of question was unexpected (cf. Carlson 1984: 72). Oh well implies in addition casualness or nonchalance. Well before a not ‘fully fitting’ answer (i) expresses hesitation (qualified acceptance). Now as a transition signal in (iii) indicates that the speaker is about to elaborate on a new topic suggested by the preceding question. Schiffrin explains the difference between oh and well in terms of ‘different reasons and effects’:


Or consider oh and well. Although both occur with answers whose content is not totally consonant with the ideational predictions of a prior question, they do so for different reasons and with different effect: oh marks the speaker’s cognitive reorientation to information which is either unfamiliar or not expected to be relevant; well marks the speaker’s interactional presence despite the lack of an immediately ready response. (Schiffrin 1987: 326)

In (42), speaker ‘a’ asks what the conference was about. Oh suggests that the answerer finds the question irrrelevant or not worth while and therefore dismisses the topic. (42) a> but what was your conference about B> ôh it’s a!bout hy:dr\ology# . ((and ^th\at sort of thing#)) C> is ^that w\/ater# B> *^w\ater#* a> *be more* explicit that’s just water to us C> +the ”^sc\ience of ’water#+ B> [6˜m] +- -+ ^hy’drology is the :sc\ience of ^science of the ”!qu\antity of ’water I ’think# (2.8 703–10)

Oh well was frequently used instead of the simple oh conveying nonchalance, indifference, lack of involvement in the answer (cf. the discussion of oh well above and Carlson 1984: 49, 73). (43) a> *where* did you go while you were there C> *(. coughs) - .* - ôh ’well . :only :fairly !l\ocally# ^r\/eally# . it was ^very d\ifficult# be^cause the - ”b/\uses# . you ^know there are !hardly /\any# în the !w\/inter# . ^they !all _shut d/\own# (2.7 1390–97)

The mitigators I don’t know, I think, I’m not so sure collocate with oh in the answer to questions. Tsui (1994: 166) analyses answers to questions analysed by oh I don’t know as ‘challenges’. What is involved in speaker B’s answer in (44) is a challenge of the presupposition that he is able to provide the information (Tsui 1994: 166). As a result, oh I don’t know comes to dismiss the answer as being of little importance or as trivial (cf. Tsui 1994: 59).


Speaker B is proposing to present c with ‘a couple of hundred tiles’. C asks why B has all these tiles: (44) B> I’ll ^give you a ’couple of ’hundred :t\/iles ’maybe# . I ^{h\ave got a} par:ticularly re*:volting :c\/offee ’service#* c> *what do you mean a couple of hundred tiles* why do/ you have a couple of hundred tiles B> ^\oh I don’t ’know# you just get ^l\eft {with ^these th\ings#}# you ^kn/ow# (2.10 223–28)

Ah expresses a stronger reaction, and there is no implication that the speaker does not take the question seriously. In the following discussion, which takes place between a doctor (A) and a school teacher (B), speaker A brings up the point that Indian women wearing veils are protected from the sun but not the children. (45) A> the ^women - the ^women wear !v\eils and ’everything :{^d\on’t they#}# B> but the ”^ch\ildren d/on’t# *^d\o they#* A> *^\ah#* I’m ^not too ’sure . I’m ^not too ’sure ’how . ’common . **((2 to 3 sylls))** (2.9 267–71)

Oh I think is a typical mitigator. In the answer to a question it comes to implicate that the answer is of little importance. The topic in the following extract is the payment of A for doing some research: (46) B> îs !that all :r\/ight# if Î [k] I mean is ^that . does ^that !s\uit you O/K# or A> ôh I think that’s r/\easonable# I mean I’ve ^got to ’get up ^speed to :s\/ome ex’tent# (9.1 370–74)


3.8.4 Oh as a follow-up signal Speakers and hearers have different roles in conversation corresponding to the ‘eliciter’ of information and the person providing the information (cf. Chafe 1994: 123). When oh serves to complete a question–answer pair, it is a followup signal. The purpose of the eliciter’s third move is to ‘let the addressee know that the speaker has understood the addressee’s response, that he or she has provided an acceptable response, and that the interaction has been felicitous’ (Tsui 1994: 32). The contingent oh response is illustrated in (47): (Situation: A and B are studying the map in order to find the North Circular and South Circular Road) (47) B> does it ^not ’say . :loud and cl/ear# . ^North C/ircular# or ^South C/ircular# A> ^y\es# it ^probably :d\oes# ^but [6˜m] - . I :haven’t dis:c\/overed it ’yet# B> ^\oh# - - (1.11 854–60)

A is not able to provide an answer to the question since he cannot find North Circular or South Circular (Roads) on the map. B’s surprised oh has the function of signalling that this is new and unexpected information and terminates the small exchange. A single oh as a follow-up signal was infrequent (9 examples). A more typical use of oh is with moves explicitly supporting preceding utterances (oh it is good, great, etc.; Stubbs 1983: 187 ‘endorsements’). Another category is acceptance signals with the function of claiming understanding of the propositional content of the preceding utterance (oh I see, oh I know, etc.). Example (48) illustrates oh (I see) with the function of acceptance. Speaker ‘b’ is taking boxing lessons at a club and speaker ‘a’ asks whether the club is at the town hall gymnasium: (48) a> âre there . ’clubs ((that are)) con:nected with the !c\ollege# a or îs it . +just a+ t/\own thing# b> +^n=o#+ it’s at the [‘] ^town hall gym!n\asium#

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132


a> ^\oh# ((I ^s\ee# . ^[\m]#)) b> it’s . ”^part of the !j\udo ’club# a> ^\ah# . ^\oh# ((^f/\un#)) . ^[/\m]# (4.5 383–94)

Oh I see can be glossed ‘what you have said is news to me’ and is used to indicate how b’s answer has been received. Ah expresses both newness and pleasure.

3.9 Topicalizers and backchannels Oh has special functions as a backchannel because of its retrospective functions. I have found it fruitful to draw a number of distinctions in the area of backchannel items not only between oh and yes (yeah) but between other expressions which are aimed at keeping the topic going when it shows signs of dwindling. In the following sections I shall discuss different types of ‘topicalizers’ and backchannels: newsmarks and reopeners; assessment, acceptance, and endorsement. 3.9.1 Newsmarks and reopeners 17 Oh are you (oh you are ; oh you would ; oh do you ; oh can you ; oh is she) has been analysed as a ‘newsmark’ promoting topic development (Heritage 1984: 328). Topicalizers ‘both upgrade the newsworthiness of the previously downgraded repeated event and operate to transform a possible topic initial into an item for talking to’ (for the term topicalizer, see Button & Casey 1984: 182). ‘In providing for further conversation on the reported event they upgrade its newsworthiness, and by marking it as a newsworthy event they show that it is available for further talk (Button & Casey 1984: 182). They are similar to reaction questions since they are evoked by the preceding context and can be followed by an elaboration. In (49), B introduces a possible topic (an examination

17. The element carrying the nucleus has been underlined.


paper set by a colleague) which is picked out as newsworthy and ‘topicalizable’ by A’s oh-question: (49) 1

B> I ^got an exami!n\ation ’paper# he’d ”^s\et# which I ^had to ’see was all :r\ight# 2 A> ^\oh# ^w/as it# 3 B> it was ^{v/ery} g/\ood# 4 A> ^\oh# ^did ^how’s ’Lizzy Kill\ean# . 5 B> ^well she was !very w\ell# when I ^saw her !l\/ast ’year# (1.9 1415–24)

In turn 4, on the other hand, oh introduces a new (sub)topic (‘how’s Lizzy Killean’) which is elaborated on by Speaker B (‘well she was very well’). In (50), oh you did functions as a topicalizer encouraging B to talk about his Easter holiday in Wales: (50) A> ^what \else# . ^haven’t been ’up to . :W\ales a’gain h/ave you# . ôr B> [6˜m] Î !went ’up at :E\/aster# A> *ôh you d\id#* B> *^=and#* it was ^rather a :dr\ag# A> ^[\/m]# B> ((it was too)) - . ^too l\ong# . A> ^r/eally# (7.3.6 741–50)

What else (a so-called topic-initial elicitor’; Button & Casey 1984: 182) is followed by a question (‘haven’t been up to Wales) and marks the orientation to a new topic. It is followed by the answer to the question in the turn by B. Speaker A’s ‘oh you did’ is not only a follow-up move responding to the preceding answer since it promotes further talk by B. I have also analysed oh really as a ‘topicalizer’ rather than as a follow-up move in the following extract. Speaker A has told D that he often goes to the National Film Theatre with Helen and her brother. The current topic is Helen’s brother:

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(51) D> îs he ’out in ’Bahr/ain or ’something# A> [6˜] ^n/o# ^he’s [6˜m] . ^he’s at h/\ome at the m/oment# D> oh ^r\eally# . +^\/oh I should ’like to s\ee him#+ A> +ând ap”!p\/arently+ has ’got [6˜m]# ^v\/ery nice ’flat# (4.4 1284–90)

The response to the question becomes ‘topicalized’ by oh really. Speaker A signals by means of and that he wants to continue talking on this topic. A single oh would have been weaker than the topicalizer and signals ‘topic over’ rather than continuation as shown by the pause after oh : (52) B> I ^thought ’glasses could ’normalize almost :\anybody’s ’vision# C> well they ^c\an’t ((/actually))# B> ^\oh# - a> why not C> well be^cause I’m !just !too - ^haven’t ’got the ca!p\acity to# (2.5 971–75)

When the oh question serves as a request for confirmation it has the function of reopening the topic (cf. Stenström 1990: 158 ‘reopener’). The topical reopener invites a confirming response: (53) a> Î Î only had :half an ’hour’s ’teaching in the :m\orning# b> ^that was !\all# *for the* ^whole !d\ay# a> *^y\es#* ^y\eah# [6] ^n\o# în the ”!m\orning# . and then ^four h\ours# from ^four o’’clock to :eight o’’clock in the \evening# b> oh ^that’s ’funny h/ours# ^\isn’t *it#* a> *^y\es* {it ^\is#}# but ^very ’very n\ice# .


b> be^cause you had the [h] !hot ’afternoon :\off# *. ^r/eally#* (5.9 559–73)

Oh really is a reopener in (54) and invites confirmation (yeah) before the current speaker is prepared to continue (‘about seventy-five per cent of the people at a certain Irish estate are Catholics’): (54) c> **((a ^very))** - . +Î [sh] I should imâgine+ ((there’s)) a !very ”large per’centage of :that es’tate !is C\atholic# . b> ^\oh# ^r\eally# ++. ^[=m]#++ c> ++*^y\eah#++ a^bout ’seventy-’five per c\ent# a> ++*ôh y\eah#++ I ^think !most ((\4 sylls)) are C/atholic# . (4.7 362–69)

3.9.2 Backchannels Backchannel moves are distinguished from topicalizers and reopeners (other terms are ‘go-on’ Edmondson & House 1981; continuative Schegloff 1982; ‘supporting move’ Severinson-Eklundh 1986: 35). Backchannel moves do not result in speaker change but ‘speaker remains speaker and hearer remains hearer’ (Schiffrin 1987: 99), and they do not topicalize the preceding utterance or reopen a topic. They occur at certain ‘foci’ where acknowledging information or showing interest is relevant and where they simply fit into the “phonological rhythm” of the discourse (Stubbs1983: 190). The common usage of backchannels is to ‘exhibit on the part of its producer an understanding that an extended unit of talk is underway by another and that it is not yet … or may not yet be… complete’ (Schegloff 1982: 81). They are used when ‘attention is problematic’ or when ‘display of understanding is relevant (ibid., p. 79). Because oh can be used to acknowledge information it can be a backchannel (with or without another component) commenting on prior text (453 exam-

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ples).18 Oh occurred alone in 119 examples typically with a falling (or a risefall) tone. Oh (oh yes, oh that’s a point) claims something more than simply attention and interest In (55), a single oh is understood as acknowledging new information. A has been telling C how the doctor took the decision not to put her young baby into an isolation ward. C thinks that A is referring to a nurse. A’s turn (‘well that was my doctor’) is therefore understood as a correction): (55) C> ^((this ’one ’man)) [6˜] - ^do ’nurses”:t\/end to be ag’gressive# . or ^does one just !th\ink that ’nurses are ag’gressive# A> well ^that was my !d\octor# C> *^\oh#* (A> *^=and* [6m]# she ^didn’t at that ’time under:st\and me ’very ’well I th/ink# (1.8 1059–1064)

Oh has a different function from other backchannel elements although the difference might appear slight. Jucker & Smith (1998: 182) place yeah, oh and really on a continuum ‘in the way they mark the ease of integration of new information: Yeah seems to mark information that fits easily with preexisting assumptions, oh seems to mark information that required some extra processing in order to be integrated, and reactions such as really? seem to indicate that the hearer needs further confirmation before information can be integrated.

This quotation suggests that markers of surprise (oh are you, (oh) really) and the like which involve some kind of reaction have a different function from yeah as well as from the simple oh in the same position. Following Schegloff we can assume that they invite some stronger reaction for the purpose of keeping the conversation going. The speaker who utters oh are you or oh really rather than the simple oh has not only acquired new information but there is evidence for some conflict between what he thought earlier and learns from preceding talk.

18. When a backchannel invites some reaction in addition to the continuative function, it has been analysed as a topicalizer (e.g. oh really, oh are you, oh that’s sad). Edmondson & House (1981: 73) and Stenström (1990: 159) analyse such ‘requests for confirmation’ as backchannels (‘go-ons’).


Cf. Schegloff (1982: 85): … in some of the positions at which some sort of continuer [backchannel] is relevant…, the immediately preceding talk may be such as to invite some sort of ‘reaction’ aside from, instead of, or in addition to the continuer. And one does find throughout extended units… markers of surprise (‘Really?’), assessments (‘oh my’, ‘wow’, ‘you’re kidding’, ‘isn’t that weird’, ‘wonderful’, etc.) and the like.

3.9.3 Oh and assessment Responses may signal more than ‘message received’ or ‘new information received’. Remarks like oh that’s good, oh that’s sad, oh how posh are used to express alignment to a preceding utterance or to the hearer. In (56), oh is followed by a component in which the speaker expresses concern: (C loves Dorset and therefore reacts on getting the news that Ian’s parents are selling their house in Dorset) (56) C> Î !love ”D/\orset ’though# it’s ^so b/\eautiful# - - . b> Ian’s ties with it are about to be broken C> ^/are *’they#* b> *((cos))* his parents are selling their house or trying to C> ^\/oh# **that’s ^s/ad#** b> **they just** chose the wrong moment really they were *just* too late - when they put C> *^[\m]#* (b> it on the market (2.7 1216–24)

C’s ‘oh that’s sad’ is caused by the reported event (Ian’s parents are selling their house) which is assessed as bad news (cf. Heritage 1984: 302; Tsui 1994: 139). The simple oh would only have had the effect of receiving this as new information. The effect of the assessment is also ‘topicalizing’ since the hearer is encouraged to continue.

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138


3.9.4 Acceptance and endorsement19 The backchannel oh (ah) functions as a reinforcer or upgrader of yes and indeed. Following Stubbs (1983: 190), it functions as an ‘accept’, viz “a slightly more committed category of move [than an acknowledging yeah or mm] which claims understanding of the propositional content of the preceding utterance’. The following collocations with oh were especially frequent: oh yes (306 examples), oh no (108 examples), I see (83 examples). Oh quite signals that the assumptions underlying the utterance are in tune with the assumptions already held by the speaker. In (57) A and B are discussing some plays by Seneca containing several examples of hyperbole: (57) A> but [dhi it] it ”^does ’spell it \out# if you’ve got *”^two* B> *^qu\ite#* (A> p\assages# **from ”^two** pl\/ays# that are B> **^/oh qu\ite#** (A> ^doing *((_much the _same th\ing))* (1.4 358–62)

Oh on its own or with components like yes or quite does not tell us whether the speaker accepts the interlocutor’s point of view (cf. Carlson 1984: 70), but it can be followed by an agreeing turn component indicating that the speaker ‘backs up, adds weight to, approves, upholds, chimes in with, ratifies or recognizes as relevant previous talk’ (Stubbs 1983: 190). Typical exponents are oh that’s right, oh all right, oh quite good, oh that’s a point. Oh right is an example: (58) b> ^takes you ’somewhere \else# but . ^n\ormally it t/akes you# ^straight to _[dhi˜] Comm\and# a> ^\oh# *^r\ight#* b> *^so* !if your ((sort of)) :cursor’s ’somewhere \else# (6.9 53–58)

19. Stubbs (1983) uses the category ‘endorse’ for responses and Tsui (1994) uses the category ‘endorsement’ to analyse follow-up moves. This is not surprising since the function is the same.


3.10 Oh and frameshifting Schourup found that both oh and well occurred predominantly in initial position and that the use of both in embedded structures was ‘statistically unusual’ (Schourup 1985: 31). All the 110 examples (including both oh and well) in his material were, for instance, sentence-internal. In the present material 255 examples (11% of the total number) were embedded in the turn with various functions.20 Ah was embedded in the turn only in a single case. Oh occurred embedded in the turn in various frameshifting uses. In (59), oh prefaces a ‘self-initiated’ repair and is mainly mitigating. Speaker B wants to go to Belgium by ship and wants a night sailing rather than a day sailing: (59) B> but I ^now disc/over# there îsn’t [6m] . a !day s\ailing# ôn the on the ((first)) oh I mean ^sorry there !\is only a ’day ’sailing on the ((f/irst))# ^whereas I ’want a !n\ight ’sailing# . be^cause I’m going !up to Coll\ine# (8.4 685–89)

Oh I mean sorry is followed by information replacing what has been said before the interruption. Another example of self-correction is (60). The speaker is leaving a message on the answering machine. He begins to say ‘there are two questions’ when he realizes his mistake and makes the required replacement: (60) AY>

^some’time . to:d\/ay# [6] ^not between e’leven and tw\elve# when I’m ^l\/ecturing# . ^there are !two !qu\estions . oh ”^s\orry# ône qu\estion# which I’d ^like to :\ask ’him# . [6˜] which he ^may not know the :\answer ’to# . (9.3 570–76)

In (61), oh God is followed by a restart:

20. Schourup did not count oh and well in direct quotes as embedded which makes comparison difficult.

139


(61) a> *so how ((3 sylls))* A> *^sh\e can’t w/ork#* because of the ^b\/aby# . they’re ^living in . ^{\oh} G\od# they’re ^living in a :house ^((it’s)) ît’s !pre-c\ouncil# [6] . accommo^d\/ation# (2.12 231–36)

In many cases, oh is not followed by a retake or replacement but marks the transition to a clearer or more appropriate formulation. Oh often collocates with pauses indicating that the speaker is hesitating or deliberating before choosing between alternatives ‘no one of which is the correct, right, or accurate one’ (Schourup 1985: 26). In (62), oh comes after a pause and signals that the speaker has now come up with the appropriate expression: (62) B> when I ^wasn’t w\ondering# ^what on \earth# he was ^d\oing# on the ^bl\ackboard# ît was - - oh a !real sh\ambles ((that))# . (1.12 278–82)

In (63), speaker ‘a’ discusses what it was like to go to Dolomite’s lectures on Whitman. Oh marks the change to an evaluation from a mere description: (63) a> I Î f\ound# it was ^just like _listening to _Whitman him!s\elf# . it was [6] oh ^b\eautiful# ôh fant\astic# and *that’s ”^/all it* w\as# . **^not ((a)) ’critical [6pri˜sh i]** (5.9 899–04)

Oh well is casual and expresses the speaker’s hesitation before choosing the right expression: (64) c> [6] this ”^n\ew _scheme# ^coming into effect :th\en# now ^this can all be dism\issed# as ôh w\ell# ^just ad”ministrative ”n\onsense# but . îf you . im”\agine#


the ”^work that . ’is inv\olved# (5.5. 1025–31)

Another meaning of oh is approximation or estimation. Oh may be followed by a hedge (sort of, about, I think, probably, I don’t know). In the following extract (65), speakers A and B are referring to a person who uttered [6] about one hundred and twenty times in a few minutes: (65) A> it was ôver a h\undred# ^w/asn’t it# B> ^y\eah# it ^was [6˜m] ôh about a _hundred and _twenty a _hundred and !th\irty I _think# (2.11 945–48)

Example (66) is similar. The speaker has paused to think of the best expression. As in (65), oh is followed by an expression which is not specific. (66) A> Î m\ust say# it ^((syll)) ’obviously :\is a m/atter# of ^seeing ’whether . one :gets - - one’s suf^ficiently :\/interested in a ’thing# and one ^d\oesn’t ’get ’bogged d/own# . în [6˜] - - ^\oh the _sort of - - - ^rou!t\ine ((of the ’1 syll))# (1.5 572–76)

3.10.1 Asides and comments Oh often functions as a boundary. However the particle does not introduce a new topic or activity but marks a change in perspective. In (67), speaker A has been to see the play Caligula. He has temporarily forgotten the name of the young boy in one of the roles. The reason for oh is to signal the shift to an aside (‘oh what was that young boy in it’) (cf. Polanyi & Scha 1981 ‘push marker’). Oh is exclamatory and expresses a reaction: (67) A> I ^didn’t think ’much of [6m] - - ^\oh# ^what ((was)) that young b=oy in it# ^R\ay# > ^thingmebob R\ay# b> [mhm]

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A> I ^didn’t think ’very much of h\/im# b> An*drew* A> *[6˜]* - I ^th\ought [6˜m] you ^kn/ow# it was ^[kwai6] it was [6] ^very dram\atic# *. in*^d\eed# (7.1.3 935–44)

In (68), speaker C describes how he went to Dorset and stayed in a bed-sitter. Oh marks the shift of perspective from description to evaluation. The shift to a different level of discourse may also be marked prosodically. For example, in (68), oh it was quite nice was pronounced with higher speed than normal and with a high pitch: (68) C> and in ^fact I _had the _place to _my”!s\elf# because there was ^nobody ’else :th\/ere# ^=and [6˜]# - . ôh it . it was ^quite !n\ice# I mean it was ^very ((sort of))”:b\/asic# - . ^tiny r/oom and . and {^/everything#}# (2.7 1150–55)

In (69), the switch to an evaluative comment is marked in addition by a creaking voice and falsetto. Speaker C has gone round to different shops to find a special brand of cigars but with no success: (69) C> *-* Î !found b> *[m]* (C> one ev\/entually# at ^H\ammersmith# - - . oh ît’s _so ann\oying though# a> *[m]* C> *it* ^really \is# (2.7 1379–84)

3.10.2 Change to direct quotation Oh in direct speech has an evaluating or dramatic quality. A past event is remembered ‘as one that communicated affect through exclamations, repetitions, colloquial vocabulary, or prosody. The current speaker attempts to recreate the same evaluative quality by imitating these features’ (Chafe 1994: 217). Speakers use oh to signal a shift in ‘the deictic centre of talk’ from the


speaker to a different source (Schiffrin 1987: 122). It is characteristic of the examples I have looked at that oh co-occurs with a number of other evaluative devices including prosodic features associated with affect and emotionality. Oh seems to be especially effective as a shift from description to evaluation. Compare Wilkins (1995: 361): Oh is quite an effective marker of direct quotation, and a way of indicating a shift from narrator’s perspective to character’s perspective or from one character’s perspective to another’s.

Oh can have additional functions within the reported speech itself. For example in (70), oh functions as the answer to the preceding question: (70) A> and Î said !what did you ’do the . the [6˜ 6dh6 dh6] :holiday be!f\ore# . oh we ^went to Ma!j\orca# - we ^fell in with the :Irish th\ere# and the Îrish were [s] - :same hot\el# - . [6˜] ând . ’they were !so ash/amed# . that they ^wouldn’t sp\eak to us# . (1.14 26–31)

A large number of ohs are to be expected when the narrative is told in a dramatic format and the speaker has arrived at a particularly involving point in the narrative. In (71), the speaker is a young female nurse talking about how a patient (Mr Hills) accosted her sexually. The event is told with much gusto and laughter. Oh (and well) mark the shift between speakers and contribute to the immediacy of the narrative. There is much repetition (‘so he said’, ‘so I said’), affective prosody (stress, boosters), laughter and extensive use of discourse particles (oh, well, you know).21 (71) A> you ^kn/ow# ^what have you . ”^how ’long ’haven’t you ’had a :n\urse now# so he said ôh a’bout ’two w/eeks# so I said well ^how have you !coped for th/\at long# so he said ôh ”p\/ainfully#

21. Besides from listening to the tapes one can get detailed information about prosody from the slips with the full prosodic transcription. For examples of such slips see Greenbaum & Svartvik (1990: 16).

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(*-* - - laughs) a> *oh* A> so I ^said !well I’m !t\/erribly ’sorry but# . ^y\/ou know# ^that’s how it’s ’going to b/e# (2.12 941–50)

Other functions of oh are also illustrated in this example. In oh about two weeks, oh is used before a hedge of approximation. Oh painfully shows oh as an intensifier before a scalar adverb; the third token of oh is a backchannel. In (72), oh nonsense, without a preceding reporting verb. announces a new speaker and marks the transition to the story punchline (the disagreement about what to eat for Sunday breakfast). The speaker, who has just come back from an interview for a university post, is imitating what the conversation sounded like in the senior common room. (72) A> Î always th\ink# . that - ^Sunday br\eakfast# - îs s\ausages# - ôh n\onsense {Ârab\ella#}# ^Sunday breakfast is boiled \eggs# *(- - - laughs)* b,c> *(- - - laugh)* (1.3 860–66)

In (73), speaker d is trying to amuse the hearer by recreating the event when noone wanted to play scrabble with him because he had won all the preceding games. The cajoling oh come come is chosen for dramatic effect when the speaker comes to the climax of the story (cf. now come on). (73) d> I ^s=aid# ^how about ’somebody giving ”:m\e a ’game# . and they said ^\oh ’no ’no# we ^wouldn’t ”d/\are ’play with ’you# you you know âll the !words there !\is# ((and I said)) ôh come c\ome# ((you know)) even Âchilles ’had his h\/eel# which is a *^kind of [m6] ’mytho’logical r\/eference you ’see# . (11.3 542–49)


3.11 A comparison between oh and ah Ah is the closest relative of oh but seems to play a less important role in conversation. It is, for instance, much less frequent than oh with only 275 examples in the corpus. When we look at its distribution in the London-Lund Corpus it is interesting to note that it was more than twice as frequent in telephone conversation as in informal surreptitious conversation (see Table 3.11). The higher frequency in surreptitious than in non-surreptitious conversation suggests that it has a formal quality which may serve to distinguish it from oh. Table 3.11. Distribution of ah over different text types (the figures have been normalized to 10, 000 words) Text type

Number of tokens


120 (6.9) 52 (8.6) 85 (14.2) 13 (1.3) 0 (–) 5 (0.8)

Total

275

Ah has many of the same functions as oh associated with surprise and unexpectedness (to receive new information, to signal remembering or the realization of something) and it occurs in the same contexts e.g. as a response to a statement, as a backchannel or as a follow-up. However it has a different core meaning. D. James, who was one of the first linguists to draw attention to the difference between oh and ah, noted that ah is restricted to contexts where the speaker feels pleasure or satisfaction: ah ‘seems to always indicate that the speaker is pleased or that he thinks that the thing he has found out is significant in some way’ (James 1978: 519). Bolinger also regards ah as the more serious of the two and suggests that ah ‘adds a degree of “seriousness” or importance which is not present when we use oh (Bolinger 1989: 266). For example, in (74), ah you are suggests that the news that A is coming down causes B to feel pleasure. Oh you are would be more informal and focus more on surprise:

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(74) A> B> A> B>

^coming !d\own *to*d/ay# *^[ha˜]* [‘] - ^s/orry# I’m ^c\oming# ^\ah# you ^\are# ^that’s what I _wanted to \ask you# A> (. laughs) ^y\es# . B> [6˜m] - ^thank you very ’much for that t\ape# A> ^\ah# B> that ^sounds l\ovely# A> [6m] ^y\/es# Î’ve !c\/opied B> ^well d\one# . A> ^g\ood# . (8.4 66–79)

The contrast suggested between oh and ah appears in their combinations with different emotional components. Ah collocates for example with good, great, marvellous, what a pity, which express pleasure, interest or sympathy: (75) D> you ^d\o# ^th\ank you# +. ^y\es#+ A> +âh gr\eat#+ ^y\es# (4.4 800–4)

On the other hand, ah does not seem to be compatible with expletives or with adjectives with a negative (disapproval) meaning. In (76), ah is followed by a component expressing the speaker’s appreciation of the joke. The meaning of surprise is backgrounded: (76) C> ^you’re a ’dirty !wh\/ore# and ^she said !no I /ain’t# I’m a ”^cl\ean ’whore# B> ^=ah# (- laughs) that’s ^rather n/ice# (. laughs) C> I ^don’t know ’whether she :r\/eally ’meant it# or ^whether they were !just !t\easing# - - (2.5 440–47)


Additional pleasure rather than a different meaning is expressed by aah : (77) B> ^s\orry to be a b/ore# C> ^you’re !not a ’bore a b/it# ^we’ll !miss you :very m\uch# B> ^\aah# *- O^/K#* C> *(- . laughs)* ^see you !s\ome’time# B> ^r=ight# . ^b\ye# C> ^\OK Br/idget# ^b\/ye# (7.2 1372–81)

Ah was a separate tone unit more often than oh which suggests that it has not developed into a general intensifier. Moreover it is not used in more or less lexicalized combinations (*ah look) or in exclamations (*ah God) where oh would be normal. Falling tone was clearly dominant (79%) and the rise-fall tone was even more frequent than with oh (19%). In (78), ah with a rise-fall tone marks ‘a sharp admonishment’ contrasting with the milder reminder when ah has a fall tone: (78) a> ^well I’m !d\oing this# [m] ^m/\erely# to ^sort of [6˜ ‘6] !leave some m/\ark {be^h\ind me#}# B> ^[\m]# d> (laughs -) a> to ”^j\/usti’fy ’my d> âren’t there :any !\/other marks# B> ((I’m ^glad to !h\ear it#)) a> ”^/\ah# ^w\ell# in ^people’s . in ^people’s !m\/inds# ^p\ossibly# but [6˜] - one would ^like ((there)) to ’be ”!ph\ysical - *{me^m\ento#}#* (4.6 154–66)

147


Aha is a variant of ah which marks ‘jubilant satisfaction’ or triumph at the end of a mental search (Cobuild ‘aha’).22 Unlike oh or ah it cannot be used to recognize new information or as an intensifying discourse particle: (79) A> *(- coughs) ^so* he ’said I’ll ’give you a ’ring ’after the w/\eekend# . a> +(. laughs)+ A> +^s\o+ I ’happily ’put the ph/one down# ^thinking /\aha# I’m ^not going to b/\e here# . and ^then ’Flo re:\iterated# I ^did g\ive him# your ^home !n\umber# (2.12 955–62)

Aargh cooccurring with an oath (oh rubbish) and expressing a strong protest seems to be purely interjective: (80) B> I ^mean I !think all *you ’people with :c\ars#* are ^going to f\/ind that# you’re ^not going to be ’able to !r\un them **((first#)) you ^kn/ow#** C> *^\aargh#* - **”ôh ”r\ubbish#** B> (- *-* laughs) (8.2 349–55)

3.12 Oh, ah and politeness Both apologies and thanks are carried out by conventional phrases introduced by oh : –

for thanking:

22. Wierzbicka (1991: 330) suggests that the following semantic components are compatible with the use of aha to ‘express surprise, triumph, derision’: – – –

now I can say it I feel something good because of it one wouldn’t have thought I could say it


–

oh thank you, oh thanks (very much), oh I’m most grateful, oh I appreciate that, oh that’s lovely ; for apologising: oh I’m (so) sorry, oh sorry, oh I beg your pardon). Compare also ah (ah I’m sorry, ah thank you.

The use of oh in each case can be explained with the help of principles of politeness following from the maxim ‘support your hearer’s costs and benefits and suppress your own’ (Edmondson & House 1981: 47). Thanking is used when the speaker has received a benefit from the hearer to express his appreciation of the favour. Oh is polite since it signals that the favour was not anticipated: (81) B> I’ll ^be in ’first . oh ”^pr\/obably ’first ’thing to’morrow ’morning# about ^half past n\ine# a> [w] half past nine . *OK* B> *so I’ll ^be* ((in)) ’any time ’after th\at# . a> [6˜] yes well I’ll be in at that time and have them/ . safely for you B> ôh that’s l\ovely# ^thanks very m\uch# . *((1 syll))* (7.1 1474–1481)

Oh is intensifying and therefore appropriate together with an apology which requires some ‘gushing’ (Edmondson & House 1981: 153). In (82), the speaker has forgotten to provide an ash-tray. By apologising and finding an ash-tray the speaker tries to makes amends for the offence. (82) B> *^Jo we’re !slightly* ’stuck for :\ash-’trays# A> ôh !I’ve g/ot ’one# Î’m **so s/orry#** (2.10 628–30)

Ah I’m sorry is a more serious apology and is more formal than the casual oh I’m sorry : (83) B> ^not /usual# A> ôh ((I)) !kn\ow# . ^\I said no ’more than ((usual)) B> ^\ah# .


Î’m s\orry# A> ^have you _got a _new !j\/ob ’yet# - . B> ^[/6˜]# Î !don’t kn\ow# (7.2 852–59)

Invitations and offers are beneficial to the hearer and oh is therefore used to intensify the speaker’s good will: (84) a> *you’ve got the* whole flat to yourself **((now have you))** C> **”^[/\m]#** ôh you ’must come round and s\ee it# (2.7 450–52)

In the answer to an offer it is polite to express surprise at the favour. Oh occurs together with a component expressing appreciation: (85) A> ^have a glass of sh/erry# . B> ^/\oh# ^that’s n/ice ((of you# âs)) I’m not dr/iving# . ^th\ank _you# (1.2 844–48)

Oh great and oh good are set phrases appropriate to accept an invitation: (86) A> ^do come /early# ând we can !have a dr\ink# B> ôh gr\eat# . *^y/es#* A> *((I’ve)) ^got* some !nice w\ine# B> ôh g\ood# . (7.3 194–99)

In a response to an apology, oh is mitigating and belittles the offence: (87) A> ^thanks for ph\oning# . B> ^sorry it ’wasn’t _last n\ight# A> ôh ’that’s all r/ight# A> *(untranscribable murmur)* B> *(- laughs) it was the ^quickest p\ossible#* A> Î can im!agine the d\ifficulties# (7.2 1096–1101)


3.13 Conclusion Much ongoing activity can be explained in terms of our non-verbal and verbal reactions to unexpected events. We react by ‘excitement, sometimes anger, and sometimes aggression’ in the face of what is new (Chafe 1994: 122). A linguistic correspondence would be the surprise signal oh and the weaker ah signal marking mainly interest or satisfaction. However oh and ah are not simply windows into a person’s mind but their use is encompassed by conventions and rules. For example, both oh and ah are needed to receive and integrate information which is unexpected or new and they have affective meanings. Because of its retrospective properties oh is an important interactive or topicalizing device moving the conversational topic forwards by upgrading the interest in what is said. Unexpectedness or surprise is a complex notion and it may give rise to a variety of different discourse functions depending on the context. The potential range of meanings of oh is large and varies depending on its collocations, position, prosody, text type and position in the text. In many cases of oh, it has an attention-getting or intensifying function and is used to emphasise the upcoming message. As seen from its collocations oh can express both an objection (oh but) and affirmation or emphasis. Oh can be an intensifier (oh wonderful) or a downtoner with a mitigating (oh I think) or cajoling effect (oh come). On a deeper level we can explain the multifunctionality of oh as the result of indexicality and grammaticalisation. We can, for instance, explain that oh has the function as a response marker (an ’uptaker’) and is a marker of affective stance or intensifier as the result of grammaticalisation in different functional domains. Oh and ah are closely related since both express a reaction and have developed the function to receive information. However in comparison with oh, ah is serious whereas oh is more casual. Moreover there were no signs that ah has developed into an intensifier.

151

Chapter 4

The interpersonal particle just

At the heart of social and emotional expression is the linguistic feature of intensity. Labov (1984: 43)

4.1 Introduction Categories or meanings such as intensity (reinforcement), mitigation, and positive and negative affect are richly represented in language (Ochs 1996:411; Holmes 1984; Labov 1984). This applies especially to spoken language. Just is, for example, strongly favoured in speech where it is oriented to the involvement of the discourse partners in the speech event and functions as a subjective or interpersonal modal particle (cf. Chafe 1982: 47f). In the rank-list of the most frequent words in the London-Lund Corpus (S.1–3), just occupied rank 54 placing it among the most frequent words in spoken language (cf. that’s with rank 53 and which with rank 55; Svartvik 1990: 67). On the other hand, just was not among the most frequent 100 words in either the LOB Corpus or the Brown Corpus (Svartvik 1990: 67). Example (1) illustrates some of the justs that you find in speech. The extract is from a radio discussion about how scientific knowledge has to be nursed like a plant: (1) a> [6˜m] - and Î’m just ”!t\orn# . to ^s\ay# ^{what I ’said ag/\ain} at the be:g\inning# Î’m just !t\orn be’tween the th/ought# that ^r\eally# ^this is ’just a _journey one ’does for . ^by ones\elf# and that . êven if you _do reach ”!s\omething# that ^seems like a ’level of underst\anding# âll you can ’do with it is kind of :n\urse it# you know like the ^lovely chry_santhemum you’ve

154


:grown in your :own g\arden# if you [k] ^chop its ’head off it d\ies# *so you* c> *[6u]* (a> can just ^keep it and :l\ook ’at it# . (5.7 944–55)

Just is emphatic (‘I’m just torn’) or downtoning (‘this is just a journey one does by oneself ’, ‘you can just keep it’). As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the common property of discourse particles is their indexicality. Just does not have the same indexical potential as oh or now since it does not create texts or build up discourses but it is a frequent element in speech, orchestrating emotions and opinions by either highlighting them or downtoning them (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 147). The main part of the chapter will be a description of the contexts and functions of just as a subjective or interpersonal modal particle. A number of pragmatic analyses have been suggested for just. Holmes analyses just as an example of ‘mitigation’ which she regards as ‘an interesting and useful pragmatic concept’ which ‘needs to be seen in relation to broader strategies for modifying illocutionary force’ either ‘down-toning’ or ‘up-toning’ what is said (Holmes 1984: 364; cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 147). Brown & Levinson argue that just is a hedge on the Gricean pragmatic maxims. Such hedges are frequent in argumentative contexts and are used in strategies of positive or negative politeness accounting for the ‘quality of social relations’ in society (Brown & Levinson 1987: 57). In order to analyse the functions of just I will consider it both as a rhetorical strategy and as a strategy motivated by politeness. In Section 4.2, I discuss the distinction between just as an adverb and a discourse particle. Section 4.3 deals with the core meaning and core function of just. In its core meaning, which is restrictive, just also has pragmatic meaning which can be associated with evaluation. It is argued that the discourse function of just is to express an attitude to the proposition. Like now, just is an emergent particle whose functional repertoire needs to be studied against the background of ongoing grammaticalisation (Section 4.4). Section 4.5 discusses the linguistic and contextual clues to the functions of just. Just occurs in a large number of collocations allowing a more detailed description of its functions (Section 4.5.1). In Section 4.5.2, I look at the distribution of just in different text types to get a better idea of how text type conditions the function of just. Section 4.5.3 discusses just and expressive prosody. In Sections 4.6–4.9, just is analysed as a strategy of politeness and as a rhetorical strategy.


4.2 Just : An adverb or a discourse particle? Just is polysemous in present-day English and we need to distinguish its use as a discourse particle from the adverb. In (2), just is used as a restrictive adverb paraphrasable as ‘exactly’ or ‘only’ with propositional meaning (Nevalainen 1991: 77). Just modifies a constituent and is easy to distinguish from the discourse particle which modifies the illocutionary force of the whole utterance: (2) A> the ^M !f\/our# - - B> Î ’leave it :south of R\eading# - - A> well ^Jo ’leaves it :just be’yond :Sw\indon# c> no no B> ^n\o# . c> *you leave it ((till you’re at the end))* B> ôh *’for . for ^coming ’up :h\/ere* you ’mean# (1.11 745–51)

The function of just is to focus on the phrase beyond Swinton. Just suggests that you leave the motorway minimally or marginally beyond Swinton (cf. Kishner & Gibbs 1996: 23). In addition, just has a temporal meaning (just now). The temporal reading is exemplified in (3) where just has the reading ‘in the sense that the contrary situation almost applies’ (Lee 1991: 55). (3) B> ^/\ah ’yes# what does that ^do in t\ea# does ^that diss\/olve in ’tea# A> I’ve ônly just disc/overed ’that# [6‘] a ^week a!g\o# B> ((we)) used to ^have that in the !w\ar# A> I ^had it in !c\offee# . (1.4 128–134)

The discourse particle just differs from the restrictive adverb because it signals involvement in the discourse event. Just is a discourse particle in (4): (4) b> you got a ^c/old# A> - ”^n\o# . just a ^bit !sn\iffy# cos I’m - I ”^\am c/old# and I’ll ^be all right ’once I’ve warmed \up# (1.3 6–10)

155


There were 604 examples in all in informal conversation including temporal and particularising uses.1 As seen from Table 4.2, 457 examples (70.7%) of the justs were emphatic particles; they had no propositional meaning but were either emphasizers or used for planning. Planning is a category which is not specific to just. The function to fill a pause before the speaker corrects himself is also exemplified by you know and like (cf. Östman 1981: 35). Just as a ‘planner’ is illustrated in (5): (5) A> ^just ((’hang your f/ire)) a ’minute# it’ll be ^\interesting# . we’re ^just . they’re ^just ’bringing the ’IR:\A in# b> ooh - A> and they((’d)) ^got a pla!t\oon of the IR/A# (1.14 684–88)

The emphatic just occurs in expressive contexts with intensifying meaning (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 583 ‘emphasizer’). The immediate context can be an adjective: (6) A> [6m] . the ”^gh\astly th/ing# . ^was [dhi˜] - !senior common-room conver:s\ation# ./ that ône had to cond\uct# which was ^just !fr\ightful# ând the - - - ”!\absolutely {gro^t\esque#}# ^r\/itual# of ^high table formal !d\inner# (1.3 533–39)

Paraphrases can be used to capture what meaning just has in a particular context (Tottie 1986,2 Kishner & Gibbs 1996). However when just has the meaning ‘no less than’ the meaning is difficult to capture in a paraphrase (cf.

1. Prosodically unmarked and unclear examples have not been included. In all there were 2075 examples of just (including unclear examples). Only examples from informal conversation have been investigated systematically. See however Section 4.5.2 on the distribution of just in different text types. 2. It is difficult to distinguish between the different senses of just on the basis of paraphrases. Cf. Tottie (1986: 99): It is not always easy to distinguish between the different meanings of just, especially when it occurs in spoken language. Particularly, the distinction between ‘only’ and ‘simply’ is frequently blurred. I followed the principle of assigning the meaning ‘simply’ whenever that paraphrase seemed possible.


absolutely, really, truly) as shown by the example above. The different uses of just are shown in Table 4.2.3 Table 4.2. The distribution of the meanings of just in informal conversation in LLC (s.1–s.3) Subfunctions of just

Number of tokens

particulariser (‘exactly’) temporal (‘only just’, ‘just about’) emphatic (including downtoning) (‘simply’, ‘absolutely’, ‘really’, ‘truly’, ‘only’, ‘merely) planning

78 69 427

Total

604

30

The emphatic particle just represents the ‘unmarked’ use in speech because of its very general distribution (cf. Lee 1991: 48; cf. Traugott 1990: 514). The number of examples in the LLC can be compared with Erman’s slightly higher figure (72.9%) for the COLT Corpus (Erman 1997: 107). Erman found that ‘in adolescent speech, … just is predominantly used as an upgrader, through which the speaker maximizes the effect of a particular speech act, thereby refuting any objection to it. Since adolescent talk is at the same time rapid, spontaneous and expressive, it is no coincidence that this short and handy item was chosen’ (Erman 1997:109). Tottie’s results were similar. According to Tottie, the meanings of just in spoken language were mainly emphatic or downtoning, meanings which were not represented at all in the written material (Tottie 1986: 100). On the other hand, just = ‘exactly’ was not unique to spoken English.

4.3 The core meaning and core function of just Just has a large number of different senses as illustrated by just now (temporal), just frightful (emphatic or intensifying) and just a little (downtoning) for which we have to find a core meaning. Different analyses have been suggested. According to Lee (1987, 1991), a dynamic, interactional model is needed to

3. Kishner & Gibbs (1996) distinguish in addition a comparative use of just (just as) and ‘exact’ just (e.g. just what).

157

158


explain that the meanings of just are not fixed but overlap with each other: the meaning of just is not defined at the level of the word but categories of meaning ‘emerge’ from a complex interaction firstly between the linguistic form and elements in the utterances themselves and secondly, between linguistic forms and the more general context of the utterance. In my opinion, we need to also explain what the meaning of just contributes to the discourse functions of just. This requires more concern with the core meaning of just and the function it has in discourse. Wierzbicka (1991: 350) suggests an analysis regarding the meaning of just as a conglomeration or fusion of different meanings or components (e.g. ‘nothing else’ (= not something other than this), ‘this is not much’, ‘one could think: it is (would be) more’). It is claimed that this analysis is capable of explaining the different pragmatic values of just. The component ‘nothing else’ explains, for example, that just ‘has a “precise” ring to it’ (Wierzbicka 1991: 351). Both negative downtoning (what Lee 1987 calls the ‘depreciatory’ meaning of just) and positive downtoning could be associated with ‘this is not much.’ Wierzbicka’s observations are interesting and seem to account for the different uses of just. However in this work I attempt to give a description of just which explains its multifunctionality in terms of the linguistic and extralinguistic context as well as the meaning and discourse function of the particle itself. As far as just is concerned we can assume that its core meaning is identical with its lexical source. Following Quirk et al. (1985), just is a restrictive (exclusive) subjunct with the meaning ‘exactly’, ‘only’ (cf. Nevalainen 1991 who analyses PDE just as having both a particulariser ‘exactly’ and restrictive meaning ‘only’). Just focuses on a particular element in the clause and ‘restricts the application of the utterance exclusively to the part focused’ (Quirk et al. 1985: 604). In its core meaning, just could be regarded as a metalinguistic operator functioning as an instruction to the hearer for the strict interpretation of designata (cf. Weinreich 1966: 163 on like). From a discourse-pragmatic point of view just is an intensifying or modal discourse particle modifying a proposition. It has an indexical relation to the speaker’s attitudes or emotions towards a discourse event. This is the core function of just distinguishing it from other discourse particles although there may be considerable overlap of meaning with related particles. In its core function, just has procedural meaning, i.e. it functions as an instruction to the hearer to interpret the utterance as the expression of an attitude. Just is never semantically neutral but has an evaluative overlay. Cf. only which is said to contain some ‘mixture with pragmatic factors’’: only = ‘surprisingly’,


‘no more than’ (Weinreich 1966: 160). In (7), just has a weakening or downtoning function: (7) A> ”^how ’long did you :g\o for# B> ^=ooh# ^this was . ’just a :w\eekend# A> ^y\/eah# . ^[\mhm]# B> that we ^had . _actually on ’Ilkley :M\oor# (7.3 525–30)

It can be argued that the downtoning function distinguishes just from only (and simply). Just a weekend is not only restrictive in the sense of restricting the application of the utterance predominantly to the part focused (‘a weekend’) but just implies that ‘this is not much’, ‘only to a small extent’. Just may have a reassuring overtone: … ‘just’ easily lends itself to mildly positive (reassuring, defensive, apologetic, even praising interpretations. The reason is that while ‘small’ can easily be viewed as unimportant, it can also be viewed as desirable… (Wierzbicka 1991: 351)

The downtoning or weakening sense of just illustrated in (7) has a very general distribution and has often been commented on (Lee 1991: 48; Traugott 1990: 514). Consider also Brown & Levinson’s suggestion that in the example ‘I just dropped by for a minute to ask you if you…’ just conveys both its literal meaning of “exactly”, “only”, which narrowly delimits the extent of the FTA [face-threatening act] and its conventional implicature “merely” (Brown & Levinson 1987:177). Quirk et al. (1985:598) refer to just as an attitude diminisher ‘which seek[s] to imply that the force of the item concerned is limited’. However, we also need to account for the fact that just (but not e.g. only) is suited to politeness and persuasion. When just is used as a downtoner, the reason may be negative politeness. Just as a strategy of positive politeness is emphatic and has the function to increase common ground or establish a group feeling. Finally, just (like simply) is used to ‘tone up’ an argumentative statement or to intensify a scalar adjective. It is clear from this discussion that besides the meaning of the particle, the linguistic and extralinguistic context are important for how just is interpreted. In Section 4.5, I will therefore discuss collocations and text type as indicators of the particular function of just.

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4.4 Just and grammaticalisation The relationship between form and function is a fluid one and ‘this fluidity is reflected in the state of language at any one point of time, where various degrees of structural incorporation of extended usages and varying extents of pragmatic conditions on rule applications may be found’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 261). The multifunctionality of just can be related to the view of grammar as emergent in the interaction and to the indexical character of language: I see the changes as primarily showing evidence of speakers injecting themselves into the flow of speech, creating coherent discourses, and expressing attitudes toward people, hearers, propositions and generally whatever is talked about. (Traugott 1990: 514f)

Discourse particles function as the repository of new meanings which evolve in the interaction according to certain principles which characterise grammaticalisation. Grammaticalisation explains that just crosses a word class boundary and develops pragmatic and discourse functions in addition to its original meaning.4 Polysemy is usually illustrated by words like foot or head which have developed new meanings by processes like metaphor and metonymy (Lakoff 1987). With just new meanings and functions emerge as the result of implicature or inferencing licensed by conversational principles although metaphorical abstractions can be involved in the early stages of the change. Diachronically just ‘exactly’ is derived from an adjective source (just = ‘fair’, ‘correct’, ‘precise’; Erman 1997: 99). According to Nevalainen (1991: 16), metaphor explains the development of the sense ‘exact(ly)’ from the adjective. In a grammaticalisation perspective, the meaning of just as a restrictive subjunct antedates its interpersonal meaning. Just does not develop a textual, connective function but expresses an epistemic or affective stance to the proposition when the scope of just is enlarged from a constituent to the whole proposition.5

4. Cf. Hopper’s ‘persistence’: the principle that a form undergoing grammaticalisation is polysemous and that one or more of its meanings will reflect a dominant earlier meaning (Hopper 1991: 29). 5. For a description of the grammaticalization of just, see Nevalainen (1991: 151f). Cf. also Cohen (1969) and Erman (1997).


4.5 Functional indicators Both linguistic and extralinguistic dimensions are entailed in the interpretation of discourse particles: [the] understanding of linguistic forms entails an understanding of their indexical potential (i.e. the situational constellations of by whom, for what, when, where and to what ends forms are conventionally employed) in coordination with co-occurring linguistic forms and other symbolic dimensions of the situation at hand. (Ochs 1996: 414)

The clues in the context which help the hearer to interpret the function of particles are, for example, collocations, text type, prosody. Collocations distinguish between the adverb and discourse particle but may also indicate that just has a particular function. Other factors correlating with function are, for example, the type of speaker (age, social class, gender, etc.). Although these features would be interesting to study it is unlikely that they serve as indicators to particular functions of just. 4.5.1 Just and collocations Kishner & Gibbs are interested in how speakers choose among the different senses of just on the basis of the word immediately following just and the larger narrative context when a word following just does not give enough information (Kishner & Gibbs 1996: 21). Just as an intensifying discourse particle frequently occurs with other particles or hedges (most frequently just sort of ; 36 examples), with scalar adjectives or expletives (just awful, just bloody well) and with exclamatory so and such. Compare also Erman (1997: 104f), who discussed ‘prefabs with just’ with an exclusive or restrictive function as well as an emphasising function (I just thought, I’m just saying). 4.5.2 The textual distribution of just As we have seen in the preceding chapters, six different spoken text types are represented in LLC. Just is associated with face-to-face conversation and especially with telephone conversation, a genre characterised by interactiveness and (often) informality. In telephone conversation it was more than twice as frequent as in face-to-face conversation. On the other hand, just was rare in prepared speech and in discussion. However it was almost as frequent in public

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Table 4.5.2. Distribution of just over different text types (the figures have been normalized to 10,000 words) Text type

Number of tokens

FACE (surreptitious FACE (non-surreptitious) TELEPHONE DISCUSSION PREPARED PUBLIC

742 (4.24) 278 (46.3) 582 (9.7) 146 (1.46) 41 (1.03) 286 (4.4)

Total

2075

speech as in conversation which indicates that it is not only informal. The distribution of just suggests that we cannot find a single explanation for the relationship between function and text type and that just has a wide range of functions which are characteristic of different text types. Moreover if we looked only at the discourse particle uses, the frequencies might be different. 4.5.3 Prosodic properties of just Prosody serves as a clue to the function of just as a discourse particle although just does not itself carry the nucleus (cf. Altenberg 1987: 144).6 However it occurred with a prosodic booster, i.e. a step-up in pitch (47 examples). It is noteworthy that just frequently occurs in expressive contexts with exaggerative prosody, e.g. with prosodic boosters and extra stress on the accompanying words: (8) A> I ^m\ean# . îf you’re ’going to ’do an:\atomy# you’ve ^just ”!bloody well ’got to _learn the ”!b\ones# . and ^where they ’fit /in# and you’ve ^got to ’learn about ((the t\issues#)) and where ^th\/ey fit ’in# and you’ve ^just ’got to *”!l\earn it# (3.3 486–92)

6. In non-particle uses it occasionally had a falling tone (6 examples) or even more rarely a rising tone (2 examples).


When just is emphatic the reason is that it serves as a rhetorical strategy. The function of just as an intensifier on the other hand can be associated with positive and negative politeness.

4.6 Hedges and politeness markers The discourse particle just can be explained as a hedge on the Gricean conversational maxims (Grice 1975). These maxims define a basic set of assumptions underlying each talk exchange such as clarity, relevance, sincerity (quality), quantity. Usually just will in some way flout the Gricean maxims of conversation by ‘providing information, which from the point of view of rational, economical and efficient communication in a social vacuum, could be described as over-informative, irrelevant, vague or imprecise’ (Holmes 1984: 363). The emphatic just is a ‘hedge on the maxim of quality’ emphasising the maxim ‘be non-spurious’ (speak the truth, be sincere) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 95). Consider: (9) C> you see they âlways ex’pect people to have !c\ars n=owadays# there just îsn’t the _public !tr\ansport# - . (2.5 946–48)

Just in (9) is typical of argumentation and persuasion. It has the rhetorical function to ‘make a point’ or to mark something as the simple truth. Just can also be as an example of a Quantity hedge, giving notice that ‘not as much or not as precise information is provided as might be expected’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 166; cf. Nevalainen 1991: 78). The way in which just is used as a ‘downtoner’ modifying illocutionary force can, for instance, be explained by its being a hedge on the maxim of quantity. However people do not only talk ‘Maxim-wise’ or handle conflicts by arguments and persuasion. They also attend to ‘face-needs’ and use strategies making it possible to avoid threats to the hearer’s face. The way in which just is used as a hedge on maxims can be explained by the speaker’s wish to be polite. Politeness greases the relationship between the speaker and the hearer by regarding the hearer’s face wants as central. The technical terms positive and negative politeness, which will be further described below, are used with reference to two ‘superstrategies’ which have the goal of satisfying the speaker’s or hearer’s face-needs.

163


4.7 Just and positive politeness Positive politeness is associated with the positive self-image the hearer claims for himself; it ‘anoints’ the face of the addressee by indicating that in some respects, S [the speaker] wants H’s [the hearer’s] wants (Brown & Levinson 1987: 70). Special positive politeness techniques serve as ‘a kind of social accelerator, where S [the speaker], in using them, indicates that he wants to “come closer” to H [the hearer]’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 103). Positive politeness or involvement with the hearer or the discourse event can be realised by a large number of linguistic expressions and constructions. Just is, for instance, above all a signal of involvement with the function to create common ground (cf. Chafe 1982). Positive politeness is characteristic of specific domains or activities such as family discourse and special text types, for example, informal conversation. Strategies of positive politeness are also common in talk among adolescents who share ‘wants’, values and goals (cf. Erman 1997). Just as a strategy of positive politeness occurs with special (scaling) adjectives and collocations (e.g. exclamations with so and such). When just expresses positive politeness, it often occurs in clusters of strong and weak modifiers. 4.7.1 Just and extreme adjectives and verbs When just refers to an unusual situation, a strong emotion, or action it can be paraphrased by ‘maximizers’ such as absolutely, perfectly, totally, utterly, etc., i.e. adverbials which are not scalar but are sensitive to whether the following adjective expresses a high degree of a property (cf. Paradis 1997: 27). The adjectives which are preceded by just (‘extreme’ adjectives) can be described as implicit superlatives since they express a superlative degree of a feature (Cruse 1986:216ff ‘implicit superlatives’; cf. Paradis 1997:54). Frightening, unbelievable, ideal, fabulous, grotesque, frightful, appalling are examples of extreme adjectives. Just has the effect of underlining or ‘pushing’ an emotion which is already high up on a scale. It further emphasises that a situation is unusual or a very strong emotion. Thus in (10), we cannot exchange appalling for an adjective like strange which is placed low on an adjectival scale: (10) B> the ^[f6] the ^f\urniture’s# [6˜m] - ^l\/imited# to ^say the l/east# . and the ^deco:r\/ations#


are ^just ap!p\alling# (3.3 873–77)

Just appalling presents something as ‘appalling’ in the full sense of the word. The implication is that the speaker is overwhelmed and lost for words; hence the impression that the message is, in the speaker’s eyes, ‘overwhelming’, and that the speaker is ‘emphasising’ it, not ‘downplaying’ it. (Wierzbicka 1991: 354)

In (11), just occurs before an ‘extreme verb’ suggesting that the speaker is exaggerating (‘I would just die’). The set-up is an all-female college: (11) A>

^y\es# - Î always th\ink# . that - ^Sunday br\eakfast# - îs s\ausages# - ôh n\onsense {Ârab\ella#}# ^Sunday breakfast is boiled \eggs# *(- - - laughs)* b,c> *(- - - laugh)* A> and Î thought . I would just !!d\ie in this s/et-up# - - (1.3 859–67)

Brown and Levinson relate the ‘exaggerative’ just to positive politeness output (1987: 104, 116); speakers adhere to the principle ‘Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H’ (cf. Leech 1983: 146 ‘the interest principle’). Just also collocates with informal adjectives which are not ‘extreme’ in order to establish and intensify ‘in-group membership’ (Brown & Levinson 1987:103). Sweet and dreamy presuppose shared values and stress common ground: (Situation: The speaker is a female undergraduate engaged in conversation with some other undergraduates) (12) A> I mean I I . the ^very”!f\irst c> *[m]* (A> _person I _met# be^fore !l\/unch# ^was [dhi 6m] - - !h\istory _don# - ^who was just sw\eet# . ^you kn/ow# (1.3 959–64)

165


The speaker and the hearer both know what is meant by a ‘dreamy’ person: (13) A> and it was [t] . ^Ryland !D\avies# ^this was a !few y/ears a’go# . ^singing Bel!m\onte {in ^th\at#}# and ^\ah# *(. laughs) ^she ’thought he was _just :dr\eamy# ./ (- laughs) (2.11 56–61)

Just typically collocates with exclamatory so and such. In (14), the description is of the speaker’s dog (‘Sabre’): (14) B> but ^Sabre’s m\y ’favourite# d> (. laughs) B> he’s ^just ’so !s\oft and# ^fl\oppy and# ^st/upid# and *((^f\abulous#))* (2.13 1069–74)

In the strongly emotional context in (15), just is needed as an accommodating element: (Situation: Speaker A has recently visited Ireland. Speakers A, b and c are now discussing the Irish question) (15) A> and ^they were !\educated ’Irish ’people# from the ^s\/outh# with ^plenty of m/oney# . c> [m] A> but ^Roman C/atholics# b> yes A> and they ^just were !so . ’absolutely . dis”g\usted# - (1.14 48–54)

In (16), the speaker (a female undergraduate) uses a ‘high involvement’ style characterised by interjections, exclamations, prosodic boosters, rhetorical pauses. Just is used before an exclamation (‘such a nightmare’). The use of just and other involving devices underlines the speaker’s emotional bond with the hearer and establishes that the speakers are on the same wave-length:

The interpersonal particle just 167

(The speaker describes her interview for an academic post) (16) A> ôh - - G\od# ^what an exp\erience# - ”Î don’t know where to st\art# ^you kn\ow# ît was just !such a n\ight_mare# - I mean ^this whole !s\ystem# of being in^vited somewhere for :l\unch# (1.3 217–23)

In (17), we find a combination of just (strengthening) and the hedging sort of (which serves to avoid preciseness). The collocation just sort of (completely) is associated with exaggeration and positive politeness since it creates common ground and contributes to a friendly atmosphere. (Situation: The British cannot understand the Irish because the latter insist on remembering things that happened a long time ago) (17) B> but I ^don’t . I ^mean . be^cause . be^cause in :\Ireland# . êveryone in!sists on re”:m\embering ’things {^right _back to - [6m] _Henry the S\econd#}# I mean âll those _things !are im!p\ortant# ^this is ’where the :British . _just sort of completely !can’t under!st\and them# be^cause . I mean âll ^we’re we’re ^quaintly :\interested _in# (2.8 280–84)

Just really (like just sort of) has a positive politeness function. In (18), the effect is strengthening (‘the only thing I really wanted to ask about’): (18) A> [6˜m] I ^just r\eally ’want((ed)) ’to [6] {^\ask a’bout#}# a ^thing on a :general ’level of *proc\edure#* (2.6 54–55)

Clustering as a positive politeness strategy is illustrated in (19). The speaker uses a number of strengthening or weakening elements which do not necessarily modify each other:


(19) A> Î[‘] Î[‘] Î[‘] Î Î’m ’not com’plaining a’bout th\at# a> [m] A> I ^just sort of”:r/\ather [6m]# - ^h\oped# - that ône would be !t\old# . and âsked [6˜] ^had one’s per’mission asked ”!\after the e’vent# (2.5 804–9)

The strengthening just occurs with downtoning elements (maybe, a little bit of, seem): (20) a> [6˜m] ând [6‘m] - ^[‘]\/I don’t ’know# I mean ^that . ^that’s just ’maybe a ’little bit of/ a !f\ine ’issue# but it ^just ’seems to ’me :s\/ometimes# that [‘] you ”^do ’very much ’need one ^needs to ’kind of :f/\urther {the ^c\ontact#}# that ^parents !h\ave {^w\ith ’members of ’staff#}# (6.8 750–54)

Summing up, when just marks excess or extremes, the reason is that it serves the ends of positive politeness. Just is face-saving and conveys sympathy, rapport, cooperation with the hearer which would not be expressed without just.

4.8 Just and negative politeness 4.8.1 Just and indirectness In (21), the meaning of just is explained by the context and principles of politeness. Strategies of negative politeness are oriented to ‘the want of every “competent adult member” that his actions be unimpeded by others’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 62); hence negative politeness centres on the hearer’s want not to be interfered with. (Situation: The speaker is describing what answers she gave in an interview. The topic is a very old illuminated manuscript) (21) A> and Î kept !str\essing# you ^kn\ow# I’m ^not offering you :kn\owledge#

The interpersonal particle just 169

I’m ^just [tra] Î just think this is an interesting thing to ex:pl\/ore# (1.3 363–68)

In (22), just collocates with ‘I think’ and modifies the assertion (cf. the similar effect of other downtoners such as well, I mean, the past progressive, the tag question, I suppose). (22) B> *^w\ell I mean# . I was* ^just th\inking# . there’s a ”^d\octor ((in it# ^\isn’t there#)) ^h\e’s sym’bolical ’I sup’pose# +^t\oo#+ (3.5 1146–51)

Assertions, questions, suggestions, criticism, or requests are face-threatening acts whose effects may not be welcome to the hearer. It may involve a risk for the speaker to ask a too direct question, make a request abruptly, assert something without simultaneously using ‘redressive action’ whenever he ‘wants to put a social brake on to the course of his interaction’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 130). In (23), just is part of the same language system as indirectness and expresses negative politeness: (23) C> ^could you just !s\/ee what’s ’still to _come Fanny# cos I ^think they . there are ”^{tw\o per’formances} of :each \/one# (2.5 1167–68)

Just is a way of avoiding or softening an FTA (the face-threatening act of requesting) by conveying that there is only one thing the speaker is wondering about. Just is associated with something small and unimportant (‘the only thing I am wondering about is whether’): (24) C> ^well I I’m ^sorry [6] *I [66] .* ?> *the the the . ((syll))* I’m ^just wondering +whether the [dhis]+ a> +whether there’s+ flexibility of there being *more spare money . yeah* C> *^y\es# the ^possi’bility of :getting* a ’modern dr\ama ’person# . as âs the !n\ext ap’pointment# îf there was ’going to :b\e one# (2.6 355–362)


4.9 Just and persuasion Just can be purely emphatic or strengthening namely when it is a ‘quality maximizer’ (cf. Section 4.6). In Holmes’ analysis of devices modifying illocutionary force, just would be a content-oriented Booster increasing the force of speech acts by ‘commenting impersonally on the validity of the proposition asserted’ (Holmes (1984: 354). Erman emphasises just’s function to convey ‘the speaker’s authority as to the truth of or attitude to the proposition’ (Erman 1997: 96). The context is important for how just is used. In argumentative contexts, the emphasiser just is ‘rhetorical’ or strongly persuasive in the sense of trying to get the hearer to accept the speaker’s point of view’ (cf. B. Aarts 1996: 212). For example, in (25), just strongly conveys the necessity of accepting a state of affairs: (Situation: The conversation is about films. ‘Front Page’ is a film which is not shown any longer) (25) B> well ^this ”!wretched thing ’Front P\age# was ^there ’last w\eek# and we ^m\issed it# d> oh . that was a pity *. +that+ . that was fifty giggles* a minute - **yes** c> +yeah+ B> *Î +^kn\ow#+ but we ^can’t !!f\ind it#* **I mean it** ^just . ’it’s . !just not !!\on any ’more# . (2.10 791–98)

Just in these contexts can be paraphrased by simply (cf. Aarts’ discussion of simply and just ; B. Aarts 1996: 213). We can assume that the slight difference in meaning between simply and just can be accounted for in terms of the semantic rubbing off of the literal meaning of just (‘exactly’) or of simply (‘in a simple and straightforward manner’). However the main difference seems to be that just and simply occur in different text types (cf. Section 4.5.2). Although simply is characteristic of spoken English, it occurs only infrequently in informal spoken textual categories while just is primarily conversational and is only rarely found in argumentative texts (B. Aarts 1996: 209). The effect of the emphasising and categorical just (‘that’s all there is to it’, ‘it is just a fact that’) is to emphasise illocutionary force and to strengthen the speaker’s commitment to the proposition. It conveys that nothing will change


the speaker’s mind and that he does not wish to continue the discussion. (26) is an example: (Situation: the Irish government have not revealed to the British that the discovery of a new Irish culture is purely an invention) (26) A> and the Îrish ’government :kept it to them’selves and ’didn’t ’tell the Br/itish# . and the ^British archae/ologist - ^you . s/ee# - b> *idiots* A> *that’s ^just* ’what ^just ’shows what the :academic ’racket is ab/out# (1.14 984–87)

In (27), just helps to round off the previous argument (‘there is nothing more to be said’): (Speaker A is talking about a doctor whom she has trusted to look after her small child) (27) A> ^=and I _said# . be^cause you see !when I’ve got ’you I ’know that if :m\/edicine will ’save him# ^he’ll be !s\afe# and ^that’s just !!\all# ^so of !c\ourse one doesn’t ’want to ’give this {^\up}# (1.8 1094–98)

The task of the emphatic just is to stop further discussion (‘that’s all there is to it’): (28) (B> ^she . she ^finally s\aid# ”^don’t ’argue with m/e# îf you /argue with me# Î shall just ’put this :ph\one down . +{she ^s\aid#}# . (1.12 1135–39)

Stronger emphasis is suggested by a combination of emphatic particles (just simply) when the speaker envisages some resistance or to convey that something is impossible: (29) B> it ^took it ^took me !three w\eeks# . [i] în [dhi˜] . !s\/ummer# .

171


[6] to ^timetable the ’classes that [d] that were :main !l\ine ’classes# that ^tw\enty or ’more students ’went to# you ^see and I just !simply could”:n/\ot# un^less I _spent the !whole”!s\/ummer ’on it# (3.4 628–33)

The emphatic just is concerned with establishing a point and not simply with describing something. This use is frequent in a negated sentence when the speaker wants to dispute a point. (When A was going to start her new job as secretary her employer had the idea that she was to work Saturday mornings) (30) B> he +.+ I ^th\ink he was ’told quite f/irmly# that . A> **Î s\ee#** +^y\es#+ (B> ^people ’just don’t :w\ork ’Saturday *m/ornings#* of^f/icially# in ^L/ondon# A> *^n\o#* (B> and ^that’s !th\at# **-** (1.5 263–70)

Speaker A uses ‘people just don’t work Saturday mornings’ rather than the simple ‘people don’t work Saturday mornings’ followed by ‘and that’s that’ to bring home her point. Just makes the statement more categorical and difficult to dispute. When just has a strengthening effect on illocutionary force (‘it is just a fact and there is nothing one can do about it’) it can be paraphrased by really and truly (cf. Quirk et al.’s 1985: 583f ‘emphasizer subjunct’). The rhetorical just can be paraphrased by ‘it’s just that’ (15 examples). It is just that links two moves, and highlights the fact that something cannot be changed. In (31), it is used in the answer to a question: (31) A> has ^something _fr\/antic ’happened# B> [6˜‘] ^n\o# ^n\o# it’s ^just that !Michael ’Long ’wants to ’do some :c\opying# ând [6˜] I !wanted to ’know _how . :what the situ’ation _was with the :t\ape-re’corders# (8.4 90–94)


In (32), it’s just that introduces an explanation: (32) A> it’s it’s [6˜m] - - - ând I’m !n\ot# ’saying that ^such ^such f\ield work# is in ^fact . ’((fact)) !\useless# it’s ^just ’that - - - :what they :kn\/ow a’bout# is ex^peri_mental re!s\earch# they ”^d\/on’t know ’anything about r\eading# d> [m] (2.4 724–30)

Utterances with the rhetorical just are also found in imperatives. Just signals that the action does not involve any effort; it is simple and easy to carry out (cf. Erman 1997: 102): (33) A> ^wh\ere can I ’buy the ’Irish ’Press and the ’Irish/ Times# . ^\oh# ^b\ack ((sir)) ’through the sn/ug# . ^just ’turn to the r/ight# and it’s the ^l\ittle ’shop on the ’corner r/ound# (1.14 321–25) (34) A> [6˜] my ^c\olleagues# to be^gin ’asking the qu/estions# - D> [6˜] ^P\aul# [6˜ dzh] ^just ’tell us {br\iefly} wh\at# . [6‘] the ^main !d\ifferences you ’feel be_tween [6]# the ^teaching we ’do :h\ere# and the ^teaching you’re ’doing at :B\eaton# (3.6 37–43)

4.10 Conclusion The core meaning of just is not easy to describe. Just has been analysed here as a metalinguistic operator with the procedural meaning to give instructions for the interpretation of a sign (just in the exclusive or restrictive meaning). However, just is never purely restrictive but it expresses either a positive or negative evaluation depending on the context. In its discourse function just has interpersonal rather than textual meaning

173


and expresses a propositional attitude to the proposition. Grammaticalisation is important to explain the widening of the scope of just to the proposition and its pragmatic functions as an attitudinal marker. In addition to its core meaning and discourse function we need to consider the rhetorical context in which just is used. Just has also been explained as a hedge on conversational maxims and as a strategy of politeness. Just can be a downtoning hedge modifying speech acts which threaten the delicate social balance between speakers and hearers such as requests (negative politeness). When it is exploited for positive politeness it is intensifying and can be experienced as pushy, aggravating, or exaggerative. The ‘affective’ just is however important as a marker of group identity and common ground and serves as a marker of informal style. Just is also categorical and rhetorical and occurs when more persuasion is needed. The double function of just as weakening (downtoning) or strengthening (intensifying) particle seems to create few problems. Just is not interpreted in a vacuum but the conversationalists use clues, e.g. the collocates of just, its expressive prosody and occurrence in certain types of text to arrive at the intended interpretation.

Chapter 5

The ‘adjuster’ sort of

If we think of words as being shot like arrows at the world, the function of these adjuster-words is to free us from the disability of being able to shoot only straight ahead; (Austin 1962: 74)

5.1 Hedges Both precision and vagueness or approximation are important in language. The particle (a) sort of is characterised by ‘hedginess’: it belongs to a category of words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy (G. Lakoff 1972: 195). Lakoff drew attention to the theoretical importance of ‘hedges’, in particular the effect that they have on the truth conditions of the proposition with which they are associated. The effect of sort of cannot even be described in a two-valued system, where sentences are either true or false (Lakoff 1972, ibid.). Recent studies have focused instead on the linguistic description of hedging and what hedges are doing in communication (e.g. Channell 1994 and Prince et al. 1982). In this chapter I will investigate the contexts and functions of sort of (and kind of). Following Chafe I will analyse sort of and kind of as knowledge markers or evidentials referring broadly to ‘attitudes towards knowledge’ (Chafe 1986: 262). The discussion in the rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, I discuss the criteria I have used to distinguish between sort of, which is a discourse particle, and (a) type of, which is nominal head with propositional meaning. The core meaning and core function of sort of are the topic of Section 5.3. This will be followed by a discussion of sort of and grammaticalisation in Section 5.4. The linguistic clues to the function of sort of include position in the utterance (5.5.1), prosody, in particular pauses before and after sort of (5.5.2), collocations and combinations with other discourse particles (5.5.3). The importance of text type and social factors is dealt with in Section 5.6. The functions of sort of are discussed in Section 5.7 where two different functional classes are introduced. Sort of as an evidential hedge is dealt with in Section 5.8 and


the interpersonal (affective) function is discussed in Section 5.9. In Section 5.10 I discuss sort of and positive politeness on the basis of the COLT Corpus. Finally, in Section 5.11, I make a comparison between sort of and kind of. This chapter will deal with sort of and kind of only. Tags such as or something, and all that which are used to refer vaguely to categories in a set will be discussed in Chapter 6.1

5.2 Sort of and ‘type of ’ In the formula ‘X is a sort of (‘kind of ’, ‘type of ’) Y’, X can be a hyponym of Y (‘a robin is a sort of bird’). In that case ‘a sort of’ can be paraphrased as ‘a type of’. When sort (of) is preceded by the indefinite article or another determiner (that and this) it is analysed as in A and has the meaning ‘type of ’: A. [a [sort [of NP]]] In the structural description in A, a sort of NP is a Determiner+Head+Modifier. In B, sort of modifies the nominal head: B. [sort of] (a) NP]] The features which distinguish between the analysis in A (‘type of ’) and B (particle use) are formal and prosodic. First we notice that sort of and kind of (N+Prep) do not necessarily agree with the preceding determiner (if the determiner shows concord). We say ‘these kind of (cf. ‘sort of’) traditions’ (Quirk et al. 1972: 3.6, 415) in addition to ‘these kinds (‘sorts’) of traditions’, the lack of concord in these examples indicating that sort and kind are not ordinary nouns. An example from the London-Lund Corpus is: (1) B> ^well !there . there âre these sort of ’practical ’problems of ”:p\/ayment et’cetera# (9.1 361)

Example (1) can be contrasted with (2), where sort of clearly means ‘type of ’:

1. Like as a vagueness marker in spoken language has recently been treated in a relevancetheoretical perspective as a marker ‘that can be described in terms of procedural meaning and the notion of less-than-literal resemblance between an utterance and the underlying thought’ (Andersen 2001: 298). Cf. also Romaine & Lange (1991).


(Situation: The speakers are discussing differences between a building society and a unit trust. There are different types of unit trusts) (2) b> ^whereas in a . a ”!\/unit ’trust# you’re ^going to get a ”!v\ery ’low y/ield# but you ^might get a good ’capital !pr\ofit# [6˜m] ^can you ’just ’tell me :what ”s\ort of /unit/ ’trusts they ’are# ^what ”sort of \areas they’re inv/ested ’in# . c> *[6m]* (b> *ôr* in!deed even !give me their !n\ames if you w/ant# (9.4 122–34)

The nuclear tone on sort is a strong indication that sort of means ‘type of ’. However the unstressed sort of can also refer to ‘type’ as in ‘sort of areas’. Sort of in (3), meaning ‘type of’, generally comes immediately before a noun or a noun phrase without a pause: (3) A> ^this is the th/ing# b> **^y=es#** (A> par^ticularly ((I think)) ^you probably like the :sort of clothes I like :\anyway# which *is fairly ^s\imple#;-* .; ((there)) b> *^[\m]# . (1.3 76–81)

On the other hand, the presence of hesitation pauses suggests that (a) sort of should be analysed as a hedging particle: (4) b> no they’re using it - A> but ît’s it’s a ^question of !gearing - the :various ’modes of com:muni!cation to!g\ether# A> to ^make a - - a ’sort of - :combi!nation !th\ing# be^cause - the !\/eye is as im’portant ’as . b> [6h6] . A> the ”^\/ear# . (1.10 678–83)

Cooccurrence with other discourse particles is another sign that (a) sort of is a hedging discourse particle rather than a noun followed by a preposition:

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(5) B> ^they - !pr\obably _put# ((the)) ^c\itizenship# as a ^sort of y/ou kn\ow# . ^prer\equisite# a> [m] . no Swedish (([m6n6] money)) B> ap^parently n/\ot# . (2.1 845–50)

In this chapter I will treat sort of as a discourse particle in all the cases where it does not mean ‘type of ’. However sort of differs from other discourse particles since it affects the truth conditions of the sentence when it modifies a word or construction. The full-fledged discourse particle sort of has mainly affective meaning and is treated separately below.

5.3 The core meaning and function of sort of The meaning of sort of can also be expressed by adverbs like approximately, roughly, rather. According to Andersen (1998: 164), sort of ‘encodes a concept, perhaps something in the direction of ‘not entirely’.2 However sort of differs from adverbials with a similar meaning (rather, fairly) although ‘it sometimes behaves as a borderline case between pragmatic marker and adverbial’ (Andersen 2001: 210). I will argue that the ‘rockbottom literal meaning’ of sort of is metalinguistic (cf. Kay 1997: 151) and that this explains how it differs from other discourse particles and from adverbs like rather or fairly with a dowtoning meaning. In Weinreich’s description of the semantic structure of language both sort of and kind of would be metalinguistic operators, ‘functioning as instructions for the loose or strict interpretation of designata’ (Weinreich 1966: 163). As metalinguistic operators both sort of and kind of refer to a more general or inclusive category. The metalinguistic description of sort of explains, for instance, that sort of and kind of can refer to a superordinate category, to a different speech level or to the whole speech act. A ‘sort of apple’ can refer to a new category of fruit which is neither apples nor pears. This is the core meaning of sort of which can account for both the adverbiallike uses of sort of and its metalinguistic uses, for example to mark something as

2. Cf. also Bolinger’s (1972) analysis of sort of as an intensifier.

The ‘adjuster’ sort of 179

a metaphor or approximation and its affective uses. In (6), sort of is inserted before a particularly creative idiom: (6) C> ((the)) ^q\ueue# (- laughs) ît was sort of ’a la ’Tutan!kh\amen# and it ^went . you ^kn/ow# from the ^gates to the ’building and b\ack a’gain# . and *^r/ound#* (2.7 903–7)

Sort of, kind of, and that sort of thing, ‘which introduce fuzziness within a proposition’ are hedges referred to as approximators (Prince et al. 1982: 85) or approximation marker (Erman 1995)3 since they characterise something in an approximate way. ‘If I said, for example: (6) It feels sort of creepy.

I would be signaling that ‘creepy’ was an approximate way of characterising what I was feeling, that the match with this verbal resource (this category or word) was imperfect or fuzzy.’ (Chafe 1986: 264; cf. also Holmes 1988a: 94 and Brown & Levinson 1987: 117) In the analysis which I propose for sort of, sort of marks the item it modifies as being of ‘low codability’. Hedges (e.g. sort of, kind of, about) involve ‘a constant comparing of ongoing knowledge with expectations’: Everything we experience has to be checked against what we already know. We interpret particular experiences by attempting to match them with categories and schemas already present in our minds. It is especially with relation to categories … that evidentiality comes into play. Categories make it possible for knowledge to be associated with linguistic labels and thus to be expressed in language. We decide that some creature is appropriately called a cat, or some action a jump. But the match between a piece of knowledge and a category may be less than perfect. We would say in such a case that the knowledge has less than optimal codability. (Chafe 1986: 270)

Sort of is related to other evidentials coding a range of epistemological considerations in language. For example, a statement may be more or less reliable and

3. With reference to ‘or something’.


marked as such (it is probably raining) or be expressed as an opinion (I think it’s raining). In academic writing, formally, nominally, technically express ‘a special kind of reliability’ (Chafe 1986: 265). Hedges are probably intrinsic to all human languages helping us ‘create models of each other’s presumed knowledge’ (Jucker & Smith 1998: 171) and accounting for the ‘quality of social relations’ in communication (Brown and Levinson 1987: 57). When hedges are used for interpersonal or affective functions, they can be analysed in terms of positive and negative politeness. When the speaker expresses himself in an imprecise or approximate way, a warning may be given to the listener that some adjustment needs to be made in order to interpret the speaker’s intention. Sort of can be used to avoid disagreement with the hearer because it avoids preciseness when this would be inappropriate (Brown & Levinson 1987: 117). Like you know (with which it often collocates) sort of is primarily used to express intimacy and rapport with the hearer. Sort of with affective meaning will be further discussed in Section 5.9.3. Hedges have properties which are sometimes described as ‘procedural’ (Ziv 1998: 210), aligning them with other discourse particles, for example ‘noncontribution to the propositional content’. Other properties mentioned by Ziv are ‘speech act modification’ (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 147) and ‘lack of effect on truth conditionality determination’ (cf. Ziv 1998: 210). These properties are present when sort of has downtoning or intensifying meaning. In a diachronic perspective the properties of the particle can be explained as the result of grammatical and semantic changes associated with a widening of the scope of sort of to the whole utterance and pragmatic enrichment.

5.4 Sort of and grammaticalisation In my theoretical framework, the polysemy of sort of is explained as the result of grammaticalisation. The hedging meaning of sort of is therefore seen as an extension or change from the more literal meaning ‘a sort of (a type of)’. Further changes as well as the development of affective meaning can be viewed in terms of an increase in subjectification. According to the OED, the full form ‘a sort of ’ is found before an adjective phrase as in: One is a sort of bewildered in attempting to discover what it really is which constitutes the obligation. 1858. Pirie, Inq. Hum. Mind i.10 (OED)


Sort of has also spread to verb phrases as in the following example from 1833 (OED): It sort o’ stirs one up to hear about old times. 1833. J. Hall, Legends West 50 (OED) In the environment in example (7), a reanalysis can take place from NP+Prep to a discourse particle since /a/ sort of can be analysed in two ways: (7) B> ((you ^s/ee#)) I I I’m âbsolutely con”:v\inced# ((that)) the ^schools are ”!wr\ong# - in ^trying to tackle a sort of :g\eneral _course# ./ âfter the age of six!t\een# ^by the age of sixt/een# ”ânybody who is :going to be an acad/emic# (2.3 1288–94)

Tabor (1993: 458) describes the construction a sort of+AdjP as a bridge ‘behaving with respect to the material on its left as though it were a Noun-Prep sequence but with respect to the movement on its right as though it were a Deg Mod.’ The stages involved in the change are an increased bonding within the construction, a widening of syntactic scope and phonological reduction (the route to sorta). Sort of can be assumed to have clause scope when it occurs in pre-verb position (cf. Holmes 1988a: 91). Synchronically the new and old form co-exist: when sort of undergoes grammaticalisation, the original form remains an autonomous item (‘divergence’; Hopper 1991: 22). Sort of is a full-fledged discourse particle when it has the speech act within its scope and has downtoning function. Its main function in informal speech is interpersonal and it can be analysed in terms of politeness.

5.5 Linguistic clues to function Evidence for the function of sort of can be external: Upon hearing a speaker say (6)

Those of us who grew up in the extremely sort of comforting days of linguistics

… the linguist asked, “Why did you say ‘sort of ’?” To which the speaker

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replied, “I was in doubt whether ‘comforting’ was the word I wanted to use.” (Kay 1997: 153)

The clues to a particular function are mainly internal and typically involve collocations and more or less fixed combinations with other discourse particles. However many different factors have to be considered when one discusses the use of sort of/kind of such as the sex or the age of the speaker, politeness, informality, intimacy. Sort of/kind of and tags (and that sort of thing/or something) are, for instance, also characteristic of the speech of adolescents to establish group feeling and social identity. 5.5.1 The grammatical properties of (a) sort of The flexibility of sort of is reflected in the range of different positions in which it can occur: (Situation: an 11-year old girl has been found shop-lifting) (8) A> ((I mean)) I mean she’s ^so !l\ittle# Î mean _you you ^kn/ow# sort of ône can im!\agine# a sort of ^middle-aged !w\oman# with a ^coat that ’seemed . you ^kn/ow sort of# . ^just ’slightly ex’aggerated her”:f\orm# . you know ((I mean)) she could sort of ^slip ’things/ in *:inside !p\ockets# ^but* c> *[m . m]* B> +^n/\o she just# ^carried it all ’home in a c\arrier bag d/idn’t she#+ (2.13 399–412)

Sort of in (8) precedes a clause (one can imagine), a noun phrase (a middle-aged woman), a verb phrase (just slightly exaggerated her form, slip things in inside pockets). The wide range of syntactic environments in which sort of occurs is illustrated in Table 5.5.1a. Sort of modifies a noun phrase, verb phrase, preposition phrase, adjective phrase or adverb phrase as well as a single word (numeral, onomatopoeic words) (cf. Holmes 1988a, Coates 1987). In all there were 800 examples where


Table 5.5.1a. Number of instances of (a) sort of modifying a major constituent NP

PREPP

VP

ADJP

ADVP

NUM

INCOMP FINAL

TOT

337 42.1%

18 2.3%

288 36%

58 7.3%

18 2.3%

16 2%

60 7.5%

800 100%

5 0.6%

INCOMP = ‘sort of ’ in incomplete talk; FINAL = ‘sort of ’ after a clausal head

I have analysed (a) sort of as the particle.4 Sort of was especially frequent before NP (42.1%) and before VP (36%). Sort of occurred in a wider range of syntactic contexts in the COLT Corpus than in the LLC which may indicate that grammaticalisation has progressed further. For example, the number of pre-VP instances (45.5%) is considerably higher than in the London-Lund Corpus (36%). See Table 5.5.1b.5 Table 5.5.1b. The syntactic distribution of sort of in the COLT Corpus a NP

PREPP VP

ADJP

ADVP NUM

INCOMP FINAL OTHER TOT

60 24.4%

1 0.41%

16 6.5%

5 2%

27 11%

a

112 45.5%

8 3.3%

10 4.1%

7 2.8%

246 100%

In addition, there were 24 examples where sort of referred to ‘type of ’.

Sort of also occurred in contexts which are not represented in the LLC. Sort of appeared before go (= say) followed by a live performance of what another person has said: (9) Oh my God it was so funny. |w1 House swimming, when they’re all standing up and sort of going oh no no, gotta cover up, you know (COLT)

The affective meaning of sort of is predominant in the COLT Corpus. Like the more frequent particle like it can be described in sociolinguistic terms as a group identity marker.

4. Examples where sort of meant ‘a type of ’ have been excluded. I have also omitted examples marked as unclear in the transcription and the examples of sort of which have not been transcribed prosodically. 5. Note. In 20 examples sort of was followed by an unclear element. Examples preceding an interjection (5 examples) or reported speech (2 examples) did not fit the syntactic slots and have been included under ‘other’.

183


Sort of has also been studied in New Zealand women’s and men’s speech (Holmes 1988a), which makes it possible to compare its distribution in different corpora. A difference from Holmes’ New Zealand data is that the LLC had a larger number of pre-NP examples. Holmes (1988a: 89) also found that in her data sort of was equally frequent in pre-NP and in pre-VP position.6 Noun phrase (10) B> *ît’s a !pity -* ît’s a !pity :r\/eally# ^that ^that you ’haven’t got a ’sort of :vast ’un’furnished h\ouse# (2.10 945–46)

The indefinite article followed sort of in 5 cases: (11) c> *- [6m . dhi˜] . ^tank* pro’pelled r/ocket# *- -* aud> *(laughter and applause)* ^which was ’sort of a !s\equel# ^y\/ou ’know# *. and [6˜m]* aud> *(laughter and applause)* c> . a ^self . [inÁdzekt] a ^self-e’jecting :cr\op-’sprayer# (11.3 318–24)

Verb phrase (12) C> ^y\eah# [6˜] ^well . ^Sidney H\eath {sort of **^lives** upst\airs#}# (1.5 734–35)

Adjective phrase (13) D> but âre the de’partment them:s\elves# âll ’very sort of - !happy and !j/olly# (1.5 1198–99)

6. The higher number of sort of before a noun in LLC is due to the fact that sort of thing has been counted as a hedging particle (however the tag and that sort of thing has not been included).


(Situation: A and C are discussing pictures for their room) (14) A> well I ^don’t think I ’want to ((2 sylls)) you ^know they’re a !bit !too sort of ”:str\/ong# . C> *^[/m]#* (A> *for* ^my r/oom# (1.8 403–5)

Adverb phrase (Situation: A talks about an interview which went on for a long time) (15) A> they’d al^r\eady# (B> :tr\enches#}# (A> ^right at the be”:g\inning# ^that was _sort of !l\ast week’end# B> ^[\m]# (A> ât [dhi˜] ”!w\est end of **’Lu1beck’heide#** ^they’d ^they’d . (1.11. 587–92)

Preposition phrase (16) B> well ^what you :d\/o# îs to - - ^this is sort of be:tween the :tw\/o of _us# ^what *you* :d\/o# is to ^make sure that your ’own . !c\andidate A> *^[\m]#* (B> is . *.* ^that your . there’s ^something that your :own candidate can :h\/andle# - (1.1 13–16)

Numeral (17) B> and ^he was a !h\undred# . d,A> (laugh - *-*) B> *and his ^sons* and :d\aughters took _over# B> and they were âll sort of /eighty# d,A> (laugh --) -A> I’m ^longing for that :\/ash-’tree to ’come# B> oh ^that ((would)) be :l\ovely# (2.11 743–49)

In (18), sort of appears before an onomatopoeic expression:

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(18) C> ((and)) ^he a> +ah+ (C> was !{st\ill} - . [6] :pretty !w\ealthy# I’ve ^never s/\een a ’sort of# ^bottle ’after :b\ottle# . sort of ^pop ’pop p/opping# âll the t/\ime# - and êverybody got :awfully dr\unk I rem/ember# (1.13 798–804)7

The normal position for sort of was medially (anywhere between the first and the last word in the utterance). It is placed before a lexical head as a premodifier.8 Occasionally it occurred after the clause it modifies. Bolinger (1972: 113; quoted by Holmes 1988a: 88) has provided the example ‘it’s a telescope, sort of ’ where sort of is regarded as a sentence adverb rather than a discourse particle. The London-Lund Corpus only yielded 5 examples of sort of in this position: (19) c> [m . m] - B> ^we all !s\/at in the ’bushes# and . ^sang ((our)) - - ’bits of !ch\orusy ’stuff# *sort of* c> *[m]* - - and did you do the whole thing B> ^[\m]# the ^whole th\ing# (1.11 462–68)

In clause-final position (before a tone unit boundary), sort of tended to be replaced by sort of thing in casual speech: (20) B> I mean ^my i:dea would :be to - to teach !l\/anguage# and ^hire somebody to do the ”!l\iterature {^sort of th\ing#}# you ^s/ee# ^whereas . if . Roy !P\eel w/ent# (1.1 293–6)

The whole clause ‘and hire somebody to do the literature’ falls within the scope of sort of thing.

7. The example has been classified as a pre-VP. 8. However when sort of has affective meaning it modifies the whole clause.


When sort of is not used before a noun phrase it can be assumed to be more particle-like than in other positions. It frequently has the whole clause in its scope and has downtoning meaning (cf. Holmes 1988a: 91 and Section 5.9.1). However it is difficult to assign a specific function to sort of on the basis of its position only. 5.5.2 Prosodic features of sort of Prosodically, sort of is a modifier with a nuclear head which is integrated in a larger tone unit. The unaccented particle appears in a reduced form, which can be transcribed orthographically as sorta9 (cf. kinda). Prosodic features associated with prominence (nucleus, onset, word stress, booster) occurred in about 40% of the examples. However sort of only carried the nucleus in eight examples reflecting ‘its intrapropositional scope’ and basic downtoning function (cf. Holmes 1988a: 92). When sort of is a separate tone unit as in (21), the reason is probably that the speech rate is slow: (21) B> well ^\once# when ^P\oppy# had ^stripped d\own her ’engine in her c/ar# and was ^st\/anding ’there# and . ^you were . :h\/elping her and# ^when Miss !Bl\/ack went ’past# ^she s\/aid# ^s\ort of# I ^did n\otice# ^P\oppy# sort of ^taking her :engine to *p/ieces#* and your ^husband s\aying# . âll c> *[m]* (B> r/ight# now ^put it to!g\ether a’gain# . (1.12 341–55)

Pauses are an important clue to the function of sort of. In (22), sort of occurs

9. OED ‘sorter’ (‘sort of ’; 7c).

187


between pauses and serves as a turn-holder (hesitation marker) while the speaker plans what to say next: (22) d> oh it was almost worse . - because as you spent so much time preparing . lessons - and you know after a bit too much time is just . a waste of time A> ^y\eah# B> ^ and un’winding !\afterwards# d> that took me no time at all (- laughs) *((1 syll))* A> but îf you’re doing *them* :by all the ’International H\/ouse ’things# and - sort of - ^dr/ills# and âll this âll !th\is ’business# or ^did you just sort of :d\o it# (2.11 1302–9)

Almost one third of the examples of sort of were either preceded or followed by a pause. In the majority of examples (61.9%), sort of was followed rather than preceded by a pause which distinguishes it, for example, from you know (Svartvik & Stenström 1985: 349; Stenström 1990: 223).10 The brief and the long pause had about the same frequency. Table 5.5.2. Filled and unfilled pauses before and after sort of Before sort of

After sort of

Total

brief pause (.) long pause (-, --, .-, --, 6m)a

38 55

82 69

120 124

Total

93

151

244

a

[6m] and other vocalizations (‘verbal fillers’)

Sort of with a following pause can be associated with hesitation, planning difficulties and with floor-holding uses. In (23), sort of followed by a pause occurred before a false start. The speaker starts saying something but breaks off midway and switches to a different structure:

10. You know was also preceded rather than followed by a pause (50 vs. 18 cases respectively) in Svartvik & Stenström’s study of 10 texts from the LLC (Svartvik & Stenström 1985: 349).


(23) A> ^well I !don’t ’think . ’it’s ^((sort of a)) . a com:plete con:cl\usion# you’re sort of ^left with the - - you ^sort of [6˜m] - it’s ^sort [6‘] an :end to a :story in a :w\/ay# . you can ^just im’agine _these _things _going \on# it ^sort of !winds \up# it’s [6˜m] . ^rather an _arti!f\icial . {^[d\uñeiÁma1]#}# ^rather ’like [‘] ’one of [6˜m] ’Moli!\ere’s ’plays# (3.5 143–48)

When sort of functions as a ‘quotation device’ before a style-shift, a new start or a metaphor, extra emphasis can be achieved by a following rhetorical pause: (24) a> yes [6] ^he was in a c\inema# and . ^being Th\omas# sort of ^rather t\/erse# ^told ’some ’man ’to [6˜m] be qu\/iet# who was ^making a ’noise be:h\/ind him# and the ^man sort of - - _pulled a !g=un# and - (5.8 416–22)

5.5.3 Collocations Collocations are perhaps the most important formal indication of what function the discourse particle has. For example, there is a group of downtoning elements which regularly cooccur with sort of. Such combinations include sort of pretty, sort of slightly, rather sort of, sort of probably (for more illustrations see Section 5.9.1). Given such combinations we can conclude that sort of is used with an illocutionary force modifying function. However the fact that we also get combinations of strong and weak modifiers requires some explanation (e.g. absolutely sort of). As pointed out in Chapter 4, just sort of and sort of really show that sort of can have a polite downtoning function. Moreover the large number of examples of the collocation sort of you know provides strong evidence for saying that sort of can have interpersonal or affective meaning. The most frequent combinations with sort of and a discourse particle or downtoning


adverb are indicated in Table 5.5.3.11 Table 5.5.3. Types of collocation with sort of Type of collocation

n

sort of rather (rather sort of) sort of really (really sort of) absolutely sort of very sort of (sort of very) a (little) bit sort of sort of you know with other vagueness markers (tags, somehow, etc.) just sort of (just sort of rather, just sort of simply, just sort of completely) actually sort of (sort of actually)

5 7 2 7 2 67 16 43 2

Total

151

5.6 Sort of and text type There is evidence from different corpora that sort of is informal (cf. Holmes 1988a: 110) In the LLC, it was frequent both in surreptitious and non-surreptitious conversation (Table 5.6). The distribution over text type suggests that there is a kind of mutual dependence between sort of and informal conversation: One line of approach is to argue that impromptu speech is, partly at least, created by the occurrence of pragmatic particles. Or, to make the statement more plausible, the occurrence of pragmatic particles in a discourse implies that the discourse is of an impromptu nature. (Östman 1982: 165)

Sort of is symptomatic of informal speech and has functions which can be tied to the conditions under which the communication takes place. We can, for example, explain the function of sort of as a marker of hesitation and floorholding on the basis of the fact that planning time is short. This is however not the only meaning of sort of but a function it shares with other frequent dis-

11. Collocations occurring only once were, for instance, sort of pretty, sort of more or less, sort of slightly, rather sort of, sort of probably, round about sort of, a lot of sort of, a few sort of, extremely sort of, sort of almost ; collocations with well and I mean have not been counted.


Table 5.6. Distribution of sort of over different text types (the figures have been normalised to 10,000 words) Text type

Number of tokens


460 (26.2) 163 (27.1) 110 (18.3) 55 (5.5) – 33 (5.0)

Total

821

course particles. The most common meaning of sort of is instead downtoning or intensifying. When sort of occurs in public speech, it is generally self-reflecting and metaphorical. In the radio commentary sort of marks the following word as special in some way or as inexact: (Situation: A radio commentary from a wedding) (25) c> white ^heather for l/uck# . and ^\orange ’blossom# . the ^Dean ’now w/aits# there’s a sort of ”^fl\urry a’round the br/ide# as ”^\always at the ”west ’door of a ch/urch {at ^th/is ’moment#}# but she’s ^[splaining] !very ”c\onfident# . (10.6 776–81)

5.7 The functions of sort of Holmes (1988a: 94) regards sort of as ‘a particularly interesting pragmatic particle because of the wide range of meanings it may convey’ and introduces a useful distinction between the epistemic modal (evidential) and affective (interpersonal) function of sort of. In the evidential function sort of is used when the speaker avoids being precise for example because he does not know the right word or because there is a lexical gap. The affective sort of, on the other hand, is hearer-oriented and closely associated with claiming common ground and avoiding disagreement.

191


The function of sort of can be understood as a strategy of positive or negative politeness. For example, sort of may be used with conversational actions which are face-threatening. This is a strategy of negative politeness. Sort of is also used as a positive politeness strategy creating common ground and intimacy (cf. also Holmes 1988a: 94). Sort of is predominantly evidential in the following functions: – – – – –

as an adjuster word as an indicator that the following word or construction functions on a different level of talk (the meta-level sort of) as an indicator of number approximation signalling a lexical gap or lexical imprecision as a self-repair signal

When it has affective meaning, it is a modifier of illocutionary force. It is used as an intensifier to hedge strong opinions and to establish common ground. In face-threatening acts like requests it serves as a negative politeness strategy.

5.8 Evidential sort of 5.8.1 Sort of as an ‘adjuster word’ An ‘adjuster word’ is a device ‘by whose aid, in spite of the limited scope of our vocabulary we can always avoid being left completely speechless’ (Austin 1962: 74). Sort of is similar to like : it indicates that a particular word or phrase is not fitted to cope with the situation in ‘any tidy straightforward style’ (Austin 1962: 74). It equips us with a device ‘to handle the unforeseen’, to accommodate metaphors and the figurative use of language and adjust the mismatch between a thought and its linguistic representation. For Prince et al. (1982: 88) sort of is an ‘adaptor’ with the function to do the adaptation of a lexical item to the new instance. ‘Adaptors’ were typically used to describe symptoms in physician-to-physician discourse in Prince et al.’s material. They introduce fuzziness ‘within the propositional content proper’ and are distinct from other hedges (e.g. I think) correlated with ‘fuzziness in the relationship between the propositional content and the speaker, that is in the speaker’s commit-


ment to the truth of the proposition conveyed’ (Prince et al. 1982:85).12 Verbs which themselves have a precise meaning leap, sit, look, mutter, feel, try are qualified by the ‘adjuster’ sort of when they are adapted to a new situation. Holmes suggests that in this use (as a ‘semantic imprecision signal’) sort of reduces the semantic value of the verb and ‘signals that the head word is not to be taken literally but is a gesture in the direction of the intended meaning’ (Holmes 1988a: 97). According to Kay, sort of serves to ‘express a reservation or apology on the speaker’s part for attempting to denote with the linguistic object X what X is in fact being used to pick out in the utterance’ (Kay 1997: 151f). In (26), the speaker cannot think of the appropriate word to describe how Robert, a member of A’s family, looked when he came across the Anglo-Indian word mufti. (26) A> êven the ’tags that were :part of the !common ’speech of ”/\our ’families ’when we were ’young# ./ [ith] ^Robert ’looks a”!ghast when they ’crop up in/ :cr\/osswords# C> ^l/ike# - - A> ^m\ufti# . was ^/one# C> ^y\es# A> which was ^something ’he !h\adn’t ’happened to ’come acr/oss# and it ^came !\up in a cr/ossword# . and he sort of ^looked at ’me and g/asped# *ând* C> *it’s the* ^/opposite of !kh\aki# (2.14 195–205)

However in (27) the speaker seems to use sort of to refer to a higher level of abstraction rather than indicate a mismatch: (The speaker is interested in finding the earliest records on agriculture in Britain) (27) b> I ^went ’back to [dhi] . :British Mu:s\eum# . where they ^keep . ’all the ’early !r\ecords# ^y\ou know# .

12. Kay, for convenience, christens the gloss of the hedges sort of and kind of the ‘as it were’ gloss which also captures the gap between what is said and the comment on it (Kay 1997: 152).

193


I ^don’t mean sort of :Layton and !J\ohnstone# *and ^you know ((the)) Sa’voy Orph\eans# I ^m/ean# ^y\ou know#* . (11.3 182–88)

The reference is to the category of people represented by Layton and Johnstone (Layton and Johnstone are examples of people who kept early records on agriculture). Sort of can be interpreted in procedural terms as an instruction to the hearer to create a representation on a different level (such examples will be further discussed in Section 5.8.2 ‘the meta-level sort of ’). 5.8.2 Meta-level sort of Sort of does not normally introduce direct speech. However it is common as a quoting device before a word or phrase that the speaker wants to mark as ‘a metaphor of some sort’ (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 117). On the meta-level, sort of occurs before words or phrases which are technical, rare, foreign, formal, vulgar, idiomatic, and words which are part of the speaker’s own colloquial vocabulary (cf. Holmes 1988a: 99). In (28), sort of functions as a marker of a special idiom: (28) C> ((the)) ^q\ueue# (- laughs) ît was sort of ’a la ’Tutan!kh\amen# and it ^went . you ^kn/ow# from the ^gates to the ’building and b\ack a’gain# . and *^r/ound#* (2.7 903–7)

In (29), sort of is used before absolute depths of despair financially which has literary and formal connotations and is an expression that is not fitted to the way the speaker normally speaks. Without the warning sort of the speaker might have reacted against the shift of style: (29) A> when I ^f\irst heard ab/out this# ^we were ’in . sort of :absolute”:depths of des:p\air . {fi^n\ancially#}# (3.2 143–44)

In a large number of examples, sort of is a marker of metaphor:


(30) A> ^so ((it’ll)) ^so . !anybody who is :l\ooking {^f=or#}# [6˜m] . a a ^niche to !fit it a ready-made :n\iche# . in English ^grammar to !fit it . /into# . is sort of ^begging for the !m\oon# - ((you ^s/ee#)) (1.1 740–44)

Sort of usually preceded phrases rather than single words. Sometimes a very long expression can be prefaced in this way: (A is taking over C’s job as a departmental secretary) (31) A> it’s [6˜m] C> it’s [6˜m] A> ^w\ere you in f=act# ^doing the ’sort of :secretary ’tour of the de:p\artment# C> ^[\m]# A> ^j\ob# (1.5 1086–91)

The particle draws the hearer’s attention to the fact that the phrase prefaced by sort of is invented at the spur of the moment. Sort of as a marker of metaphor is self-conscious and self-reflective. It enables the speaker to be creative, to use words in an innovative and humorous way, to borrow phrases belonging to literary or more formal style and to use a slangy turn of speech. In (32), prissy does not belong to the speaker’s normal vocabulary. (Sort of) prissy cooccurs with a laugh and a pause and marks the speaker’s awareness that the word may sound funny or that it does not belong to the vocabulary she normally uses: (a is a male academic; b is a female ex-student) (32) a> that you ^hadn’t been :terribly :h\/appy this ’year# b> ^n\o# . I ^h\aven’t# a> (- laughs) ^s\orry# I ^didn’t m\ean *((to))* I b> didn’t m\ean to ’sound . ’sort of (. laughs) pr/issy#

195


a> (. **-** laughs) (6.2 33–39)

5.8.3 Sort of and number approximation Before exact number formulations (dates, age, measurements) sort of has the meaning approximation: (33) B> *and his ^sons* and :d\aughters took _over# and they were âll sort of /eighty# (2.11 745–46)

Since sort of indicates imprecision, a cooccurrence restriction would be expected between sort of and ‘experientially immutable concepts’ like numbers (A. James 1983: 195). However in (33), the speaker does not intend to convey the exact age since the man’s children may be older or younger than eighty. The hedging sort of is suitable to refer to a range of items and to convey that eighty is only typical or exemplary of the range of ages (younger or older than 80). Possible paraphrases are ‘approximately’, ‘about’, ‘or so’. In (34), sort of signals that the speaker has not got the exact information about the time (uncertainty is further indicated by the tag question or by the fact that the exact time is irrelevant): (34) C> well I âlways _set myself a st=int for _doing it# ((well)) it ^\is just ’sort of# . ^\eighteen ’minutes t/o is it# B> ^[\mhm]# C> ôh g\ood# (2.5 869–73)

Sort of (a quarter of a day) should not be taken literally. It leads the hearer’s thoughts to organised tours where you are not allowed to stay for a long time at any one place. The exact time (‘a quarter of a day’) would not be appropriate to create an impression of what ‘these grisly tours’ are like. (35) b> âll ’day l\ong# - it was ône of these :really !gr\isly ’tours# ^where you !st\op# for a sort of . a ^quarter of a {d\ay} in \Athens# you ^kn\ow#


and anôther a :quarter anôther ’quarter of a (4.2 1179–84)

Similarly in (36), the precise interpretation of the word or phrase expressing something measurable like time is not crucial, and the head which is modified is intended to be interpreted as vague or imprecise. (36) B> [6˜m] . ^y/es# ^that !m\/ay be very d\ifficult# he’s ^giving a :l\ecture# [6] ^late sort of ^late !m\orning# . can you ^hold /on# - - (long pause) ”^\Eastcheap C/ollege# - . A> ^y/es# (9.2 124–30)

5.8.4 Lexical imprecision Another reason for being imprecise is that one has not got the vocabulary needed to talk on a particular topic. The importance of the topic of talk was illustrated in an experimental study of the vocabulary used for talking about wine by Lehrer (1975) and referred to by Channell (1994: 15). When commenting on the wine across the candle-lit table, the wine drinkers used vague language unlike the professional wine tasters who used a technical vocabulary to speak about wine. Sort of would correspond to what Holmes (1988a: 95) refers to as a lexical imprecision signal since there may be ‘a lack of vocabulary and performance pressure’. Lexical imprecision is also common when the speaker tells about a personal experience. In the wine discussions described by Lehrer, the primary function was ‘to share an experience rather than to convey precise information’ (Channell 1994: 15). The speaker keeps the description at a fuzzy level when it is more important to create a certain atmosphere than convey information. In (37), sort of modifies an adjective formed with a suffix signalling vagueness (marshy, laky, sandspitty). (Situation: Sete is a small town in France which A is reminiscing about) (37) A> I mean you ”^couldn’t de’velop on the”:\east side of ’Sete very ’well# [6˜] and the ^west ’side is sort of this *:marshy ’laky :sandspitty* sort of !\area# . [6˜] so it’s


B> *^sounds g/ood# (. laughs)* (A> ^pretty ’well . con”:f\ined# I mean a”^part from ’one or ’two ’sort of [6˜ . 6m]/ :pizze:r\ios {or whatêver you c\all them#}# (2.13 897–2)

In (38), the speaker is under the pressure of telling about his experiences doing research in Ireland in such a way as to interest his audience and therefore chooses the vague ‘research studenty kind of people’ rather than a more precise expression: (38) A> ^Pete ’Baskerdon :suddenly :{r\ealized} that ’we were ’people of ’some im:p\ortance# - . în our own r/ight# as âs as [6˜m] ((you know)) âs ’sort of . [sh] re:search st\udenty ’kind of _people from :Br/itain# b> right (1.14 824–27)

Sort of may also be used as a hedge before vague or general words such as thing and stuff. The collocation with thing was most frequent in the material (80 examples). In such examples sort of comes close to ‘type of ’ because of the preceding the (cf. Holmes 1988a: 86). In (39), the choice of the vague sort of thing may also have been intended to convey something negative: (39) a> Dai . [6] have you had . had this [6m] . ouzo straight white spirit C> ((I ^don’t th\ink so#)) A> that’s the ^sort *of ’thing* the **”!Gr\eeks ’gave me#** (1.9 58–60)

5.8.5 Sort of and self-repair Self-repair involves the replacement of a word, addition of something new or a repetition. It is often signalled by sort of. In (40), the speaker breaks off before a reformulation: (40) A> ^well I !don’t ’think . ’it’s ^((sort of a)) . a com:plete con:cl\usion# you’re sort of ^left with the - - you ^sort of


[6˜m] - it’s ^sort [6‘] an :end to a :story in a :w\/ay# .’ (3.5 143–44)

In (41), a string of particles is used before a repetition (‘we’re’) and a reformulation: (41) A> C> A> C>

*^[/mhm]#* *ând* [6] ^y\eah# we’re ^just sort of ^w\ell# ^we’re (- _laughs) [w] . ^we are ’left in the :l\/urch# as ^much as !th\ey are# (8.3 671–76)

In (42), the lexical head is replaced by a pause after which the speaker starts on a new train of thought: (42) (a> *they* ^kind of agr\eed in a ’sort of - and the . and Î !think ”!most of them ex:cept for ”!f\/ather was the ’one I was ’most *worried* a’bout# B> *yes* (a> ^didn’t ’really get :into ’this at +:\all#+ B> +yeah+ (6.8 17–21)

5.9 Affective sort of 5.9.1 Sort of and downtoning In many examples, sort of modifies the speech act. Sort of is ‘detensifying’ or ‘downtoning’ (cf. Hübler 1983: 68). The downtoning sort of does not affect truth conditions and is therefore more clearly a discourse particle (cf. also the discussion of the dowtoning or emphatic just). It is analysed by Holmes as affective since it expresses a negative politeness function and reflects a concern for the hearer (Holmes1988a: 103). The downtoning or affective sort of may be used as a compromiser. James (1983) refers to the function of so-called ‘compromisers’ as follows:


Their homogeneity derives in the first instance from their ‘logical’ meaning of ‘lowering’, ‘toning down’ or ‘softening’ the assertive force of their immediate co-text by ‘compromising’ on the full semantic significance of the structures they modify. (James 1983: 194)

The downtoning meaning is the result of an increase in the flexibility of sort of and subjectivisation. Sort of is, for instance, more often attenuating in pre-verb (or pre-adjectival) than in pre-NP position: … when sort of is most obviously affective in its meaning it is more likely to be pre-verb than pre-NP or noun, and to have the whole clause as the scope of its attenuation (Holmes 1988a: 106)

It is not surprising that sort of combines with other downtoners and affect markers. Sort of pretty, sort of slightly, rather sort of, sort of probably is a downtoner just as much as a simple sort of ; sort of you know is a hearer-oriented discourse particle while just sort of and sort of really have acquired the function of hedging something which is too strong or exaggerated. Examples (43) and (44) illustrate the downtoning function of sort of. Hedges ‘tentativize’ or modify a lexical head and in so doing they weaken illocutionary force and indicate something about the speaker’s uncertainty. In (44), sort of rather (a combination of downtoners) is a hedge on the speech act in the sense of making the declarative sentence apologetic or less abrupt. C has been sharing accommodation with another girl. The situation became unpleasant because the other girl had to go through her bedroom to get to the kitchen: (43) C> ((and)) I ^haven’t ’contacted h/er# and ^she !hasn’t !contacted !m\e# I ^haven’t really !felt I !w\anted ’to# cos ((ît was . a !little)) sort of ’rather un:pl\easant in the /end# and it’s a ^sh\ame# ”^r\/eally# cos we . you ^kn/ow# be”^f\/ore# (2.7 537–44)

Similarly in (44), the function of I sort of think is to soften the utterance: (The topic is problems in communicating with Americans) (44) B> îf I ’hear an A:merican - !v\/oice# ôn the wh\ole# .


Î ’sort of _think - - - ând it ’slightly :lightens my d\ay# . d> oh . B> if Î . - I’m întrod\uced to an A’merican# . (2.11 483–87)

5.9.2 Hedging strong opinions As pointed out in Chapter 4, exaggerative just and really are frequent in informal conversation where speakers dramatize their emotions and express strong opinions. When speakers choose intensifying modifiers at the extremes of a value scale (absolutely, extremely), or express very strong opinions, they do so at the risk of offending the hearer. Sort of softens a strongly voiced opinion or the exaggerated expression of affect. In (45) the speaker uses really sort of to make his opinion ‘safely vague’ and to refer to common ground (Brown & Levinson 1987: 116). There is no real doubt about the strength of the speaker’s opinion. Sort of expresses the speaker’s wish to be reasonable and to soften the effect of the speech act (Holmes 1988a: 100). (The speaker is turning down an offer to do a research job because of the low pay) (45) A> ôr the !kind of w/ork# or ^wh\at# . B> ^w\ell# it’s ^{r\eally sort of} :what the !m\oney ’is# I ^mean !not ^y\/ou *know#* A> *^y\es#* (B> ^not - [6˜m] - :wanting to ’be sort of *[6m] ((\2 (3.2 282–88)

Combinations which ‘hedge an extreme’ can be considered the output of positive politeness since the motivation may be to avoid disagreement and preempt criticism (Brown & Levinson 1987: 116). In (46), the source of just sort of is a face-threatening act (suggestion): (46) A> [s] - - - ^[\m]# - - ^y\es# well it’ll be înteresting to ’see how it w\orks# C> - - I ^think if I :just sort of - :take you r\ound#/ and ^sh\ow you where [dhi] *-* ^{central s\ervices}/ **and** so on :\are#


because ^H\art {as you ^kn\ow#}# (1.5 1128–33)

Other strong intensifiers softened by sort of are very and extremely : (47) A> [‘6˜m ‘] ^which is a!bout [‘] a :sort of A’merican/ :Ned K\elly ’type {^f\igure#}# B> *^y\es#* A> *((and))* ând it’s a !v\ery sort of e’laborate c/opro’duction# be^tween ’Britain and Austr=alia# which is ^being !filmed ’in Aus:tr\/alia# (9.1 751–555) (48) A> and *^((been)) C> *(- laughs)* - **^[\m]** (A> ex*:{tr\emely} . (. **.** laughs) sort of :\/interested# and ”^w\/anted it# and ^/every’thing and *[6˜m]#* (8.3 708–11)

5.9.3 Sort of and common ground Sort of is also a sign of a close or intimate relationship between the speakers. It is linked to the hearer and to affect by means of ‘copresence’ or ‘common ground’. Sort of is likely to occur in informal conversation among friends or close colleagues who are able to make inferences or assumptions about each other’s knowledge. The assumption of common ground may be of some help to explain how speakers ‘tailor utterances such that the right amount of information is given’ (Channell 1994: 173). Common ground is … the basis for deciding the level of explicitness’ and ‘the assessment of the actual common ground is … crucial for being able to follow the Quantity maxim’: So in conversation people have several strong motivations for keeping careful track of the common ground and using it to strike just the correct balance between taking for granted and presenting explicitly. (Svennevig 1999: 62)

Choosing a linguistic expression which gives the right amount of information (Grice’s Quantity maxim) is important to maintain and establish social relations between the speaker and the hearer since it hints at a basic likeness between the participants as well as shared knowledge. Utterances with sort of can therefore be viewed as an extension of intimacy between people who are ‘like’ each other or share something:


Positive-politeness utterances are used as a kind of metaphorical extension of intimacy, to imply common ground or sharing of wants to a limited extent even between strangers who perceive themselves, for the purposes of the interaction, as somehow similar. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 103)

The potential face threat of the act is minimised by the speaker’s assurance that he is in some way the same or similar to the hearer. Hedging (manifested by sort of and even more strongly by like) establishes ‘social synonymity’ since sort of and its close synonyms convey the message ‘we share something’ (James 1983: 202). To sum up, sort of is ‘representative of the normal linguistic behaviour between intimates, where interest and appreciation of each others’ personalities, presuppositions indicating shared interest and shared knowledge, implicit claims to reciprocity of obligations or to reflexivity of wants, etc. are routinely exchanged’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 101). 5.9.3.1 Sort of and you know Sort of frequently collocates with you know (67 examples). Sort of and you know are what Jucker & Smith (1998) refer to as presentation signals. Both may be used to ‘jog the hearer’s memory’ as to details (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 120) by inviting him to fill in gaps or make associations; they may also evoke the hearer’s sympathy by appealing to what conversationalists have in common. Sort of suggests that the speaker is uncertain while you know focuses on the speaker’s need to get some recognition of or response to what has been said. Sort of you know occurred in many examples when the speaker talks about personal experiences which are not necessarily known by the hearer (cf. Holmes 1984: 101). However sort of you know has the function to invite the hearer to treat the information as common ground. (Situation: B is a female academic telling A, a newly employed secretary about what she did before becoming an English scholar) (49) |A> ^what in ’fact did you :d\o# if you ^hadn’t ’done - [6˜m] - ’English since - *\O-’level#* B> *^maths and* ph\ysics# A> ((they’re ^both)) ana:l\ytic# B> ^[\m]# - - but I’ve âlways be’lieved in ’having a ’sort of you kn/ow# - - ^\evenings#


for ^doing one’s !h\obbies# . (1.5 99–106)

In (50), the speaker uses sort of you know to describe a situation which both the speaker and the hearer are able to imagine thereby adding to close rapport and solidarity between the speaker and the hearer: (The speaker is telling about his experiences of trying to buy a cigar for his father as a Christmas present. The attendant never turned up.) (50) C> ^mean_while !I stood _there ((about)) an!\other ’ten ’minutes# and he ^didn’t ’turn \up# . and Î was _sort of . you ^kn/ow# ^heaving s/ighs# and ^t\/utting# *(- laughs) ((and)) ^nobody ’took any !n\/otice (2.7 1340–45)

In ‘extremely casual’ conversation between friends or close colleagues hedges can be ‘stranded’ without a lexical head since the conversationalists share common ground (James 1983: 203). (Situation: B and A are close friends talking to each other on the telephone) (51) B> **[6˜m]** . ^how are th\ings# A> ”^\oh# . ^pr/etty !n\ice /actually# *((^could _be))* B> *^g\ood#* - A> [6˜m] - you ^kn/ow# . ^bit h/ectic# B> ^h\/ectic# . A> ^f/airly# B> ^wh\y# . ((or)) ^can’t you t\ell me# A> ((don’t ^kn\ow)) . (- laughs) . ôh y/\es# ^n\o# I was . ^just ’sort of B> you ^mean you !can’t t\ell me# A> (. coughs) . ^\oh# . Î mean there’s ’nothing !sp\ecial# . (7.2 709–25)


B interprets A’s unfinished ‘I was just sort of ’ as ‘you don’t tell me everything’. 5.9.4 Sort of as a negative politeness strategy The purpose behind the principles and strategies of politeness suggested by Brown and Levinson may be to ‘hedge’ (soften, tentativize) the illocutionary force associated with a speech action: speakers avoid making bald requests or straightforward complaints; the speaker and hearer have ‘face’ and they show concern for each other’s face needs e.g. by softening an action which may be heard as threatening freedom of action and freedom from imposition (Brown & Levinson 1987). Affective sort of may be due to the speaker’s want not to impose on the hearer. It is engaged for conversational actions requiring politeness and tact as a strategy of negative politeness. A request or a suggestion may be heard as facethreatening and typically contain a softening ‘sort of ’: (52) B> do we ”^h\ave to ’hurry it _quite so m/uch# ^can’t we sort of ’leave ’Belgium and :L\/uxembourg# and the ^south of ’France to an:\/other *’year# ((and ^sort of))* A> *well we’ve ^got to* sort of +:head ’through Fr\ance# at ^s\/ome ((stage))#+ (2.13 697–702)

Another motive for the use of sort of is that the topic is potentially embarrassing. In informal conversation, topics derive from areas of common interest to the conversationalists. If the speakers are close friends the domain of common, ‘safe’ topics may be extensive (Brown & Levinson 1987: 64). The following examples with a ‘confessional’ ring to them suggest that the speaker may use sort of because the topic is embarrassing. In example (53), B is considering whether to accept the offer of a research assistantship. Sort of hedges not a particular word but the whole speech act: (53) (B> *be^cause . !after I’d* :done the M:\A# ^straight after :d\oing a d/egree# I ^just felt !y\ou know# A> +^y\es# ^yes !qu\ite# -


^y\es#+ (B> +I ^didn’t want . ((to be))+ !pressurized like *’that any m\/ore#* A> *^y\es# . ^y\eah#* (B> ^but [6˜] . well it would be ^possible to ’sort of do !th\at sort of ’thing# *((2 to 3 sylls ^w\ouldn’t it#))* (3.2 468–78)

Sort of makes explicit the speaker’s awareness of the embarrassment or inappropriateness of what she is asking about. The speaker uses both sort of and or something : (B and her husband live in different cities. C, an estate agent, suggests as a joke that they should commute and meet in Nottingham) (54) B> *^we* C> ^[f\6˜z]# *^why* ’don’t you com!m\ute# and ^sort of !meet in !N\ottingham or ’something (- laughs) B> ^yeah ’well (- laughs) ^you kn/ow# . Î sup’pose Î sup!pose that’s the ’other . (8.2 689–94)

Any request is an imposition on the speaker’s privacy and requires mitigation. In Brown & Levinson’s politeness terminology, sort of functions as a marker of negative politeness.

5.10 Positive politeness in the COLT Corpus It is characteristic of sort of and other elements which are used for affective reasons that they may be regarded as ‘socially imposed’ and need to be analysed in relation to social factors such as alignment and convergence (James 1993: 204). Social convergence has to do with the goals the speakers want to achieve in the interaction, for example to maintain identity and to establish group affiliation. James (1993: 204) suggests, for instance, that ‘compromiser constructions can be seen as conventionalized choices indicating “social convergence” of the participants’.


It is possible also that the affective sort of is a marker of ‘women’s speech’. One of Channell’s informants told her that ‘women use more vague expressions than men do’. Channell (1994: 192) and Holmes (1984) found that women ‘tend to emphasize the interpersonal uses of particles such as sort of, while men put more emphasis on their use as modal signals’ (Holmes 1984: 116f). Concepts such as alignment or convergence are also needed to explain the frequency of sort of among the young speakers represented in the COLT Corpus. As in the LLC, opinions are often accompanied by hedging: (55) the ·unclearÒ school I think ends early I don’t know earlier than sort of I think sort of like June or something. (COLT)

In (56), sort of is used before an expletive: (56) I can’t, I just, I, swear, sort of God almighty, this man, right, he was a good eighty nine, right. (COLT)

Sort of is used in other combinations than in the London-Lund Corpus. In the COLT Corpus, 15% of the examples were collocations with like, a collocation which did not occur in the LLC (53 out of 343 examples): (57) First there’s Shelley, cos first of all I didn’t want to talk in it, you know, I just went sort of like yeah, yeah, yeah. (COLT) (58) And what struck me was that the costumes were all sort of like you see portraits of Elizabethan dress (COLT)

Just sort of was frequent in COLT (26 examples) while the collocation sort of you know did not appear at all. The difference between the corpora may reflect the different social provenance of informants and the age difference between them. Moreover even short-time lexical changes can be reflected in the corpus.

5.11 Sort of and kind of Kind of and sort of seem to have the same meaning as Kay points out: ‘As far as I have been able to discover, these two items mean exactly the same thing’ (1997: 151). However kind of is not used to the same extent as sort of at least not on the British English scene. There were, for instance, only 286 examples in all of kind of and only 51 examples were clearly hedges (17.8% of the total). The syntactic distribution is also different from sort of since there


Table 5.11. Number of instances of kind of modifying a major constituent in LLC NP

PREPP

VP

ADJP

ADV

28

–

14

4

1

FINAL INCOMP ALONE TOT 1

3

–

51

were more examples in pre-NP position (Table 5.11).13 A kind of (=‘a type of’) and kind of (the hedge) may be placed on a continuum of grammaticalisation. As with sort of, syntactic cooccurrence may give some indication of the degree of grammaticalisation. Kind of can be attached to a verb phrase or an adjective phrase and its scope can be extended from a single constituent to the whole speech act. Kind of as a particle before an adjective phrase is illustrated in (59): (59) c> *I won’t take reject* wedding presents from other people B> well Î don’t l\/ike this ’coffee ’service# but ^you m\ay# it’s âbsolutely ’down your str/eet# it’s ^kind of ”{h\eavy} and ”:\ugly# you ^know ((I ^mean)) - . ^sort of the ’colour of :that w\all# (2.10 246–251)

Phonological criteria may be needed to delimit the head in the construction. In (60), the adjective (‘green’) rather than the whole noun phrase (‘green bananas’) is marked as the head of kind of by the nuclear tone on the adjective: (60) B> *I ^l\ove* them# . but ^when they’re ’kind of :gr\/een ba’nanas# and they ^come out as ’some ”!{p\ink} :s\/auce# ^looking - well they ^l\/ook like ’sort of# - . I ^can’t t\ell you ’what they l/ook like# (4.6 953–57)

Kind of (like sort of) as a downtoning particle as illustrated by the following example from COLT:

13. An attempt has been made to exclude the ‘type of ’ examples.


(61) w3. Is this supposed to be a wedding ring. Is it? w1 Yeah. w2 Kind of.

5.12 Conclusion Sort of helps the speaker and hearer to bridge the problem of creating common ground. This is done by means of the procedural function of sort of to signal that the hearer will be able figure out the meaning of what is said even if it only approximate. Sort of is also ‘metacommenting’, which makes it possible for the speaker to distance himself from the responsibility for using words which are inappropriate because they are technical, trite, too informal, too formal, etc. When sort of modifies the whole speech act it has predominantly affective function. Affective sort of has softening and polite functions; it contributes to the informality of conversation and creates a congenial atmosphere. There is a close relation between text type, type of speaker and the use of sort of and one of its synonyms (you know, I mean). The copresence of the speaker and hearer in the conversation and their beliefs and assumptions about what is mutual knowledge explain that not everything needs to be said explicitly. Not unexpectedly, sort of is frequently used in conversations among friends and it is especially common among young people who want it to present themselves as ‘similar’. Discourse particles like sort of signalling what some linguists have called ‘loose talk’ are more appropriate than preciseness and explicitness in conversation.

Chapter 6

Particles with vague reference ‘and that sort of thing’

Part of a speaker’s task is to understand his hearers, what they know already, and what they expect and want to hear. (Stubbs 1983: 31)

6.1 Introduction Vagueness markers and hedges are pervasive features of conversation as is shown by the following extract: (Situation: Two male academics are discussing the comprehension questions in a combined language and literature paper. B expresses his disapproval of ‘setting imagery’ as one of the questions) (1) B> and [6] Î’m Î’m de”:t\ermined# to get ^that sort of st=uff# ”^\into {the ^compreh\ension {^qu\estions#}#}# . ^rather than :all this :high-falutin :l\/iterature _stuff# ^where they can”:set . !\imagery# and all *^th\at* kind of th/ing# be^cause the A> *((^y=es#))* (B> *scientists :don’t ”w\ant that sort of _stuff#* A> *^[=m]# . ^[fa˜] ^far !further from* . from the :students’ ex:p\erience# and ^s\o on# - (1.1 909–19)

The fact that A and B are good friends and colleagues with shared interests obviates the need for explicitness. That sort of stuff, all this (high-falutin literature)


stuff, and all that kind of thing, and so on are appropriate when the conversation is informal. In this chapter I shall be concerned with elements formed on the same pattern as and all that kind of thing and their functions. And all that kind of thing will be referred to as a referent-final tag since it is placed after a referent in the preceding text (cf. Dubois 1993 ‘extension particles’; Dines 1980 ‘the setmarking’ tag; Channell 1994: 123 ‘vague category identifiers’; Overstreet & Yule 1997 ‘general extender’). A parallel paradigm consists of or-tags (e.g. or something). Examples without a connector (‘reduced tags’) are, for instance, Ø something. Utterance-final tags are formed with the existential or universal quantifier which are used in special ways when they occur in tags formed with and and or. In this chapter we will look into the relationship between approximation, intensification and quantifiers. It is also necessary to look at the meaning of like. As pointed out already in Chapter 5, words such as like require some kind of adjustment of the word they modify. Pragmatically like and words with related ‘adjuster’ meaning may become ‘compromisers’ with predominantly affective or interpersonal meaning. The referent-final tags are partially fixed or routinised phrases which vary formally and situationally. Semantically they are hedges instructing the hearer to interpret a category as subordinate to a more inclusive or general category. When the tag has no tie to the preceding discourse, it is related to politeness: (2) C> because Î Î couldn’t be ’bothered with all the pa:l\aver# . ^you kn/ow# . âll the ’thing of . *of ^book*ing /up# and a> *I think* (C> ^filling in the f/orms# and âll th/at# (2.7 123–28)

In previous work the referent-final tags have been analysed as a ‘discourse variable’ and correlated with sociolinguistic factors (Dines 1980, Dubois 1993). Dubois’ extensive study of ‘phrase-terminal extension particles’ in Montréal French (1993) showed, for example, that they were sharply stratified by social class and age. However ‘it is not clear that they are best dealt with as sociolinguistically conditioned realizations of a single underlying discourse function’ since the variation between and and or may produce different meaning and function including a great deal of functional overlap (Ward & Birner 1993: 207). Ward

Particles with vague reference

and Birner show, for instance, that and everything has a distinct meaning and discourse function. In this chapter, the sociolinguistic analysis does not have a prominent place although I discuss some of the factors conditioning the formal and functional variation. The focus will be on describing the functions and contexts in which the different tags are found. Semantically the tags are metalinguistic operators which can be compared with sort of and like. They are characterised by their indexicality and the formal and functional variation can be analysed in terms of grammaticalisation. The tags will be described with regard to form and function, prosody and the situations in which they are used. They have functions such as uncertainty, approximation and intensity; they can be analysed as style-markers and politeness strategies inviting common ground. From a different perspective they are fixed or semi-fixed expressions which are used differently depending on length and prosody. An interesting question is to what extent the formal and functional differences between utterance-final tags can be explained on a cline of grammaticalisation. Utterance-final tags raise special problems for truth-conditional semantics (cf. James 1983: 201) since they introduce an element of vagueness in the proposition.1 However, in their epistemic and affective function, the tags have procedural meaning and do not affect the truth conditions of the utterance to which they are attached. In this chapter I will deal with utterance-final particles both in their textual and affective function. To begin with I discuss the boundary between the ‘set-marking tag’ and the discourse particle (Section 6.2). In Section 6.3, I discuss the indexicality of the tags followed by a look at what we know about their grammaticalisation in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 deals with the core meaning of the discourse particles and constraints on their use. Discourse particles have a variable form since they can be more or less fixed and occur in an abbreviated form (Sections 6.6.1– 6.6.3). The linguistic clues to the functions of the tag are collocations (6.7.1), prosody (Section 6.7.2), text type (Section 6.7.3). Section 6.8 deals with the functions of and-tags and Section 6.9 with or-tags. Creative uses of the tag are briefly dealt with in Section 6.10.

1. Besides G. Lakoff (1972) see the references in Channell (1994: 20).

213


6.2 Category hedge or discourse particle When we are discussing relations between elements within the text the term cohesion can be used (Halliday & Hasan 1976). The cohesive relation between the tagged element and the tag can be expressed both grammatically and semantically. This happens when the tag contains somebody or people : (3) C> [6˜m] we âre ’at the . at the :works [‘] \end# of Û\C# . A> *^w/ell# ac^cording to* C> *((1 to 2 sylls))* de^l\ivery ’wagons# and ”^builders ma”t\erials# and ”^j/oiners# and ^p/ipe layers# and âll ”s\orts of ’people# (3.4 275–83)

The elements that are tagged have the same grammatical and semantic features as the noun in the tag: [+Noun], [+Human], [+Plural]. In (4), the cohesive bond holds between a locative adverbial and a place noun [+Noun], [+Place]: (4) A> ^Thorpe’s aw/ay is ’he# B> ^y/es# he’s în - _Greece _Yugosl/\avia and ’such ’places#/ at the *^m/oment#* (1.6 186–89)

Stuff can be expected to refer to a concrete mass noun: (5) A> ând they’ve got an !out’side :l\/oo# . ând this is with a ’young k\id# only ^{th\ey could} :c\/ope like ’that# . ^((fair en=ough# but)) there’s ^no _h=eating# . they’re al”^lowed to ’do what/ever they like# in the ^way of decor/ation# but there’s ^no ’money ((and they need)) ”!p\aint and ’stuff# (2.12 239–46)


Paint and stuff have matching features [+Noun], [−Animate], [+Concrete], [+Mass]. Thing provides a match with concrete nouns (6): (6) a

^y=ou [6˜m -6˜]# you ^haven’t got ’to have . pro:visional :l\icences/ {and all ^th\at sort of _thing#}# b ^n\o# a [6˜] pro^vided you have a :competent ’driver (6.2 605–8)

However thing also refers ‘sloppily’ to an abstract noun in the preceding text: (7) a> [6˜m] - - ît is !prejudice that ’causes un:h\appinesses# that ^causes !v\iolence# and âll sorts of th\ings# . (5.7 897–99)

And things like that is more ‘permissive’ than would be expected in examples like (8): (8) B> ^like - - - (sings) ând it’s âll *’sung ’by c> *which isn’t . which isn’t - - is it* (B> !!\Ariel# or -* ^P\uck ’or# . ((ôr _now wh\at’s his ’name#)) ^P\uck# ^think it’s P\uck# [6] ôr - - ôr Tit/ania# ôr - ”!m\/ost of it is - ”f\airies# and ^things like th/\at# (1.11 421–29)

Or something refers occasionally to an animate noun (cf. Erman 1995): (9) A> ^who I !think were - :waiting to ’sell some sh\eep#/ or some [kau] ^c\attle or s/omething# [k] ^mostly :agric\ultural ch/aracters# and ^\/obviously# (1.14 1282–86)

Characteristically there are many examples where there is no clear tie between the tag and a referent in the preceding text and where we expect a certain degree

215


of uncertainty on the part of the speaker or reliance on inferencing. In my analysis I try to capture this by regarding the tags as operators instructing the hearer to look for something in the preceding discourse or in their common discourse world. The following examples illustrate some contexts where it can be expected that the particles lose their categorizing functions. For example, when the particle refers ‘ungrammatically’ to a verb phrase as in (10), we do not in the first place think of a set of things but the tag is interpreted as indicating uncertainty or as invoking common ground. (10) A> ^does it in’hibit :\/exercise of ’various ’kinds# D> ôh it d/\oes {âbso!l\utely#}# [6˜] *((âny l\arge)) m/ovement#* A> *^so you’re going to ’have to [‘] -* you’re going to ^have to ’watch your w/\eight and ’stuff then# (9.2 811–14)

The tagged element is an adverbial in (11). However or something does not appear to mark Bahrain as one of several possible places but to be a softening particle linked to the question: (11) D> ^y\es# where ^\is her* ’brother ’now# îs he ’out in ’Bahr/ain or ’something# A> [6˜] ^n/o# ^he’s [6˜m] . ^he’s at h/\ome at the m/oment# (1.2 1282–86)

Like Channell, I found examples with adjectives followed by tags (cf. Channell 1994: 131). In the following example, I have analysed or something as a hedge: (12) c> and you ^know that she’s :either ’tired \out or# . ^w\/orried# ôr . !s\/omething# . ((^why !sh\ouldn’t she *’be#* so there’s)) ^most of ’those ’kids are :\/adults# (4.7 1101–05)

In (13), and all sorts of things refers loosely to the whole preceding clause. The tag is primarily a hedging or interpersonal particle:

Particles with vague reference 217

(13) B> I ^think this [m] this this :m\ay be wh/y# he’s so ^cross a!b\out the _whole _thing# ((this [dzhai]*^[ga]))* he’s he’s ^his {t/\ele_phone} is . A> *^y=es#* (B> is !h/\ot# . and its ^{steam r/\ises} . from from his {r/\oom} at :all hours ((of the)) :day and !n/\ight# [6˜] Î think he’s Î think he’s got [6m] per^suaded ’Oscar to go to the St/ates# . and all ^s\orts of things# . (1.2 338–44)

I have regarded the utterance-final tag as an emergent discourse particle with interpersonal function. Even when the tag has mainly textual function, it may be used as a strategy of politeness.

6.3 Tags and indexicality As pointed out in the preceding chapters, indexical ties can be established on the basis of the associations people build up between forms and contextual elements (e.g. to describe the link between a tag and some elements in the preceding utterance). Tags are indexical as is clear from the use of that (and this) in the tag (and that sort of thing). However that is not only used to refer to something mentioned in the text but it can refer to shared knowledge. Indexicality can be seen as a grammaticalising force since it may give rise to syntactic and semantic change and to the development of discourse particles with the function to signal affect or a degree of certainty.

6.4 Tags and grammaticalisation Even without the underpinnings of empirical historical data we can explain the properties of referent-final tags by bringing grammaticalisation theory into the picture. Grammaticalisation explains the discourse functions of tags (hedging, affect) as the result of semantic and pragmatic change. The pragmatic changes, which are systematic, are compatible with Traugott’s (1990) hypothesis that there are general semantic principles at work such as an increase in subjectification,


accompanying the more easily observable syntactic and semantic changes (the loss of cohesion between tie and the tagged element, the spread to new syntactic environments). Hearers are able and willing to make inferences on the basis of the preceding discourse and the model they have built up of what is common knowledge even when the cohesive function of the tag has been weakened. In this work I have also considered prosodic changes (the loss of tone unit boundary resulting in a tighter integration of the tag into the utterance) as a movement towards ‘more grammaticalisation’.

6.5 The core meaning and core function of referent-final tags Referent-final tags are hedges with a similar interpretation to sort of or to like. Like is, for instance, a metalinguistic operator functioning as an instruction for the loose interpretation of a designatum (cf. Weinreich 1966: 163). However we must also build the meaning of and and or into the analysis (Ball & Ariel 1978: 38). The tags are defined as operators or as procedures instructing the hearer to interpret the preceding element as an illustrative example of some more general case. The speaker invokes a set by giving an example (and that sort of thing) or encourages the hearer to think of an alternative to some member of the set (or something). The additive tag is illustrated in (14): (Situation: The political division within the Labour party is due to personal hatred and strife) (14) b> the ^people who are de:termined to get rid of G/aitskell# and . of ^his cr/owd# [a‘e] ^that is their over”!whelming m\otive# . [dhe] I mean ^nuclear dis!=armament# and âll th\at _kind of _thing# really ”^f/\ades {into the ^b\ackground#}# (5.5 669–74)

Nuclear disarmament is given as an example of political motives which fade into the background in politics. In (15), the tag introduces an alternative to the two examples mentioned previously:


(15) B> so ^naturally they’re r/ather c\ostly# and they ^no _doubt ’have p\urchase ’tax# or ((^[ri˜fanin])) ’VA\T or s/omething# C> ooh ^y\es# and then their ^high _speed dr/ills# (1.13 141–45)

When the speaker uses and things like that, or something like that, and all that kind of thing etc., the tag invokes a set of elements ‘with a rough family resemblance to the prototype in the preceding phrase’ (Labov 1984: 52). When I say ‘I like apples and things like that’ it is possible for me to be precise (certain) as well as flexible since I am referring both to apples and to related items which are ‘like apples’. The tag is what I called an adjuster word in Chapter 5 since it allows the speaker to deal with what is abstract or more general without losing hold of the concrete example. The question of what it means for a referent to be like X (as in and things like that) is difficult since likeness itself is a fuzzy concept. Consider Ball & Ariel’s example (1978: 39): (16) a. What is like a Black and Decker drill press? b. An Erector set. c. A vermeil Allen wrench.

Both b and c are good answers depending on whether the relevant property of the B & D drill press is that of a Christmas present or an expensive tool. Comparisons are evaluated with regard to the larger context or shared world knowledge and something that is like a Black and Decker drill press could therefore have different interpretations depending on the context. In the core function of the tag, it is a hedge instructing the hearer to create a model or a picture of a state of affairs on the basis of an illustration. As Overstreet & Yule (1997: 251) point out, it would be a mistake to restrict the discussion of these forms to ‘the categorization forms’ and to functions involving categorization. From another point of view, tags (like other hedges) involve the quantity maxim making the speaker’s contribution as informative as required (Channell 1994: 173). When there are no formal ties to the preceding text, tags appear to function as downtoning or tentativizing hedges. Or something is, for instance, routinely interpreted by the hearer as implicating uncertainty or lack of commitment. According to Overstreet & Yule (1997: 254), the core function of tags would be to signal intersubjectivity. Tags have also been called ‘compromisers’,


weakening or ‘compromising on the full semantic significance of the structures they modify’ and providing ‘a productive lexical source for the furtherment of interpersonal relations’ (James 1983: 194). Edmondson and House (1981) talk of ‘cajolers’ establishing or restoring harmony between two conversational partners while Crystal and Davy (1975) use the more general term ‘softener’ for elements maintaining understanding and interaction. Like hedges in general they express politeness in addition to approximation or imprecision. When they are used with affective or downtoning function there may be little to distinguish between the different types of tags. We therefore need to bring in sociolinguistic factors such as the type of speaker and in particular text type in order to describe how they differ from each other. 6.5.1 Constraints on the use of tags Besides the distributional constraints on the tag, there are constraints which can be explained as set-theoretical. Thus the following example was reported by hearers to Channell as ‘odd’ or as ‘uninformative’ (because a boy and a girl are the only members of the set so that there is nothing or something can refer to): [a baby has just been born, someone is asked what sex it is] It’s a boy or a girl or something. Channell (1994: 140)

Constraints of a grammatical or semantic nature are illustrated in (17) where or anything is constrained by the negation in the same turn unit. (17) D> you’ve ^rung your !old m\other h/ave you#)) - [j6] ^y=es# . ((^that’s /it#))* (B> !manage to pick ’up the ph\one d/id you# . ^y=es# (- laughs)* a,c> *(- - - laugh)* B> ^so she !quite ’put him :\off# and +^now he !n\ever rings ’up or /anything#+ . (1.12 1203–10)

We also need to take into account other types of constraints. Channell has an interesting discussion of how speakers interpret tags on the basis of the prototypical referent in the preceding clause. In tests she carried out in order to find


out how tags were interpreted, speakers were instructed to respond to certain sentences which contained a tag. When the informants were asked to respond to a prototype test item of the Rosch type, the respondents generally came up with a member of the same category (Channell 1994: 124). For example, in the test sentence Could you give me some oranges or something at the market? the test item chosen most often was ‘apples’ (Channell 1994: 146). When authentic sentences were investigated, the results of the tests showed that many different factors were involved in finding co-hyponyms or a general category. Consider Channell’s test sentence (18): (18) They’ve got a car and that

The majority of the respondents created a category ‘expensive things’ (‘possessions of affluent people’) (Channell 1984: 128). However when used in other contexts and that may appear not as an instruction to think of a set but as a marker of uncertainty.

6.6 Types of tags 6.6.1 The form and function of referent-final particles Referent-final particles occur frequently in spoken language. In all, there were 41 different types of and-tags and 15 or-variants. Table 6.6.1a. Tags introduced by and in the London-Lund Corpus and so on and things and all the rest of it and everything and things like that and all that and so forth and all that and things like this and that kind of thing and all and that sort of thing and stuff and so on and so forth and so on and so on

110 46 30 22 23 10 9 9 8 8 8 6 6 6 5


and all sorts of things and all that kind of thing and thing and the rest of it and all this and all that sort of thing and this sort of thing and something and all these things (and all these stupid things) and things of this kind and things of that sort and things of that kind and the rest and the like and that type of thing and that sort of stuff and stuff like this and all those things and all this thing and all this sort of thing and all this sort of nonsense and all this malarkey and all this business and all the rest and all that there and all that business and all that bit and all the other things

5 4 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Additional types: Ø sort of thing Ø that sort of thing Ø this sort of thing Ø this that and the other

There were fewer patterns introduced by or although or something was the most frequent single tag item in the corpus (Table 6.6.1b). Speakers often prefer more routinised short tags like or something (or anything, and things, and everything) as seen from their high frequency in the material. In a larger corpus, it would probably be possible to identify additional types. For example, in Montréal French, Dubois (1993) recognised 76 different patterns of ‘extension particles’ made up mainly of tags prefaced by the connectors puis, et (‘and’) and ou (‘or’). The high frequency of certain types of


Table 6.6.1b. Tags introduced by or in the London-Lund Corpus or anything or anything like that or anything of that kind or so or something or something like that or something of that kind or something of this kind or what or something of that sort or somebody or somewhere or whatever or what have you or stuff

25 4 1 29 136 25 2 3 11 1 1 1 14 2 1

Additional types: Ø something like that Ø anything like that

short invariable expressions (and things, or something) suggests that they have become automatic. However the majority of variants occurred only once or twice (see Tables 6.6.1a and b). Some potential variants did not occur at all (‘accidental gaps’), e.g. and all this kind of thing, and stuff of that (this) kind, and this sort of thing, and things of this kind. And and or tags differ dramatically with regard to their collocations. And collocates with the universal quantifier (all, everything) while the most appropriate word collocating with or is some form of the existential quantifier (some). Both and and or tags can be restricted by like that. And something has the form of a tag but does not have the meaning ‘and something like that’: (19) C> *^((when’s)) he* ’get his next \increase# B> [‘6] . ^well . ^he . he !got up to ’three one in =April# ^[‘]and !then he’ll get one _in . ’Oc:t\ober# I ^think it’ll be another - tw\o ’hundred and ’something# (8.2 211–14)

And something implies that the increase in salary will be more than two hundred.


6.6.2 Fixed and semi-fixed expressions The tags are not simply sequences of words which can be accounted for compositionally but they are lexicalized phrases which are partly fixed and partly flexible. Longer phrases appear to be more frequently used for categorization as in (20) where the added tag (‘and that type of thing’) explains what the speaker has in mind: (20) A> I ^meant to :bring the !l\etter# and of *^course I for!g\ot to#* . b> *(laughs -)* A> but [6˜m - -6˜‘] ^something to ’do with :public re!l\/ations# in the ^sense of [6˜m] . !h\ouse publi_cations# of [6˜] . com^mercial f\/irms# or [6˜m] b> ^[\/m]# A> âny s\et-up of# ^sort of !house !j\ournals# and ^th\at +’type of ’thing#+ (4.4 67–77)

The speaker can choose between a long or a short form of the tag. The shorter forms are generally more frequent but are used with the same function as the longer variant and fulfil the same needs. (21) B> but we ^had the !f\irst ’half of the _meeting# . was ^taken ’up with :\arguing be_tween# ^Trotholm and [6] . :Mondheim and all :th\at kind of thing# . but we ^finally got ’round to s\/eeing ’that# (5.11 217–20)

In (22), quite a lot is hinted at by the use of the tag. Since the hearer can be assumed to know what is meant, it is appropriate to be vague: (22) A> I ^realize he’s ap’plied be:f\/ore sort of ’thing# . and all ^th\/at# ^but [6] . *!((what))* a> *he* has applied this time has he (11.6 11–14)


In (23), and has disappeared. ‘That sort of thing’ invites solidarity with the hearer just like the simple sort of or you know. The speaker does not want to elaborate since the hearer will know what he means anyhow. (The conversation is about what you can say in American but not in British English) (23) b> I mean American you know really has different tenses and different prepositions it’s getting to that point if you look at it at all close . A> ^[\m]# . b> things like in back of matching in front of . A> ^y\es# ^th\at’s r/ight# and [‘6˜] and ^do you h\ave# înstead of :have you g\ot# - ^th\at sort of ’thing# . (1.10 340–47)

There is an implicit appeal to what the hearer knows or can imagine in the appended sort of thing :2 (24) B> *well ^do you* do you ^mean they . they they in^v\ited you to ’lunch +sort of th/ing#+ a> +yes+ . (2.5 344–45)

And so on (and so forth) can also be used as a solidarity marker with a polite function since it invokes common knowledge. New variants can be formed by expansion (and so on and so on, and so on and so forth). It is to be expected that the variation between forms has less to do with function than with the formality or informality of the text type. In the area of or-tags we find both or something like that and or something when the speaker chooses to be approximate. The short tag is most frequent suggesting that it has become a fairly automatic extension when the speaker is not certain or wants to soften an utterance: (25) A> it’s ^just the ’shop on the :bridge !just does !everything !ch\eaper#

2. Cf. Chapter 5.


I ^mean !y\/ou know# it’s got ^\everything# . if êver you ’wanted some :p\arts for !{^th\is#}# I would ^{\always} !tr\/y it# *((2 sylls))* B> *the ^br\idge#* ^that’s a:cross to _Queen’s **L\ane#** A> **^y\eah#** a^long to :Queen’s !L\ane# *^y\/eah#* B> *^y\eah#* . (A> there’s ”^no ’doubt about :c/ar batteries# ânything like !th\at# (1.7 855–68)

The reduced tag (‘something’) expresses approximation along with other hedging meanings: (26) A> it’s a ^gr\aduate _college# - - ^sort of . !\all _ages# up to . ^s\ixty _something# b> [m] A> - âll nation/alities# - ((^you kn/ow#)) ^people from /India# ((and)) ^people from Am/erica# - - (1.3 1034–41)

Other forms, such as or whatever, or what have you, and what not have primarily polite function inviting agreement and solidarity. Several more wh-tags are mentioned by Channell such as or what have you, or what not and and what not (cf. Channell 1994: 120). 6.6.3 Referent-final tags and compositionality Ward & Birner (1993) argue that and everything in examples like (27) is noncompositional since it does not seem to convey that every member of a set is present. And everything (and all) cannot, for instance, be replaced by the full form and all that sort of thing :


(27) A> *((he was ^very))* . he ^was par:t\icularly ’ups/et# that I ^couldn’t ’keep him ’enter’tained in the :evenings ’rather than the :m\/ornings# ^but . I ^m=ean# an êvening is a _lonely !t\ime I g/uess# a> [m] - right . A> he ”^w\as {”^\obviously#}# ^just . !r\/ather pa’thetic and# . and ôn his /\own# a> yeah A> ^b\uttons ’hanging ’off his sh/irt and _everything# . but I ^wouldn’t have been :th\/at ’dedicated# (2.12 1061–71)

And everything means ‘all other signs of carelessness’. The tag is useful when there is no special name for the superordinate category but the hearer can still be expected to know what is meant. The hedge makes it possible for the speaker to be less abrupt and is suitable in a description (cf. sort of). It can be argued that other tags (and all that, or something, and things) are also non-compositional and have mainly a hedging or interpersonal function. We can look upon the non-compositionality or relative fixedness of the tags as the result of the ‘welding of a syntagm (or+prounoun) into one word (o’ somethin)’ (cf. Erman 1995). The same process is involved in and-tags where the short form and all (and everything) represents the end-point of grammaticalisation. Nevertheless it is difficult to to find criteria distinguishing between the invariable ‘hedging’ and the category-marking tag. Dines (1980: 28) noted that in (28), the tentativeness hedge or something could not be replaced by and things like that : (28) A. ‘What will you do?’ B. ‘A waitress or something.’

The speaker uses or something to express weak commitment. In example (29), on the other hand, the speaker gives apples as an example only of a larger set (= ‘and things like that): (29) ‘When I suggested they put in apples or something, I wasn’t even given a hearing’ (Dines’ example)


In the latter example, or something has not been decategorialized to a ‘full’ discourse particle.

6.7 Linguistic clues to the function of the tag 6.7.1 Collocations Collocations contribute to the interpersonal function of tags. Utterance-final tags commonly collocate with you know, you see, sort of and tag questions, which serve the function of coordinating the speaker’s and hearer’s points of view and to negotiate common ground by reconciling ‘both her [the speaker’s] own state of knowledge with information provided by her interlocutor and her model of what he already knows with the state of knowledge she hopes to create in him’ (Jucker & Smith 1998:197). You know, sort of, like are other devices enabling the speaker to make a point-of-view ‘flip’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 120). When they have the function to bring together the point of view of the speaker and of the hearer, they are associated with (positive) politeness and with common ground. The switch from one deictic centre to another signalled by you know makes it possible for the speaker to check that there is some mutual understanding between the participants before the conversation continues. (A and B, who are both academics, are discussing Professor McCall’s talents as a lecturer) (30) A> ^have you ever ’heard Pro’fessor Mc”C\all l/ecture# ^he’s ((round)) at ”!T\OPAS I th/ink# B> *((^n/o#))* A> *I* ônly ’ever :went :/\once# . it was e^n/ough# B> ^[\m]# - A> oh d/\ear# ^Br\idget will ’tell you th/at# ^she was at the :same !l\ecture# B> ^[\/m]# - ^what’s _he !l\ike# A> ôh he was t/\errible# B> (- giggles)


A> ^t\errible# ^so abstr/use# he ^does !s\ound ’changes# and âll th\/at sort of ’thing# ^you !kn/ow# (1.6 894–911)

The speaker presupposes that the hearer will be able to create a rough idea of what Professor McCall is doing on the basis of the fact that he is doing sound changes. You know invokes shared knowledge which is unnecessary to repeat, e.g. that he also does a course in phonology. In (31), both the tag and you know have the purpose of reducing the distance between the speaker and the hearer. Speaker B is going to Burgos to give a ‘vivas’. It would be tedious for him to describe in detail what he is going to do there: (31) B> I’m ^going to B=urgos# . ^W=ednesday# . ^w\eek# . ^y\es# the ^t\enth# . ^coming back on the twenty-n\inth# A> and ^this is to give !v/ivas {^th/ere#}# B> [6˜] ^this is to . :run their coordinating mach\ine((ry))# ^you kn/ow# ^to . establish the :st\/andards# and âll th\at _kind of _thing# - - (1.1 546–56)

The example + tag signals that A and B are on the same wave-length and share a number of presuppositions and beliefs. They have, for example, the same notion of academic standards. Discourse elements like you know, you see, a tag question, a vocative or a comment clause can be part of the same tone unit as the tag. (32) A> [e‘e] . êverything was ’all ’un:{t\idy and} :Cri!m\ean# be^fore h/im# and ^\after him# it was âll very :sn\appy ’and [6˜]# and and ^th\/ing you ’see# (1.10 62–66)


In (33), sort of and and things indicate that the speaker has problems in finding the right word: (33) B> but - ^when you ’think of :being \/old# and ^h\/elpless# *in* the ^way they :talk about c> *[m]* (B> :people :out in [dhi˜] c> yeah (B> sort of :wild _third _w\/orld and ’things# and they ^say they :have their f\amilies# for sup^port in their *:old \/age#* D> *((^th\/at’s it#))* (1.12 859–66)

And things is impersonal and a style marker in (34): (34) A> *I’d* ”^probably be [bim] I ”^{kn\ow I’d have ’been} a ’lot more as:t\/ute# if I’d ^just . !finished ’A-l\/evel and . ’things# - B> [6‘6] ^do you ^do you do you ^mean that ’you were ./ :better e:qu\ipped to# to [6] ânswer some ((of the)) :questions ((that)) Pro’fessor ’Hart put !t\/o you# . [6˜] im^mediately after !l\eaving sch/ool# than you are ^n\ow# (3.1 912–17)

The speaker suggests that he would have done much better in the interview (‘been a lot more astute’) just after finishing A-levels. The tag functions much like ‘you know what I mean’ inviting the hearer to think not only of A-levels but of school, exams, etc. 6.7.2 Prosodic properties of the tag Brazil et al. (1980: 15) found prosodic correlates for two different ways of presenting information which are of interest for the analysis of tags: … some parts of what a speaker says merely make reference to features which he takes to be present in the interpenetrating worlds of speaker and hearer; others are presented as if likely to change the world of the hearer.


In this light we can see the choice of the fall-rise or rise tone (Brazil’s referring tone) on the tag as representing the interpersonal or affective ‘you know’ meaning. Intonation signals both which element is tagged and the interpersonal meaning of the tag. One pattern is illustrated in: (35) A> no I’m âctually re:c\/overing ’from# ^several d/ays# of ^strange ’meals and :dr\inks and th/ings# ^finishing ’up with *a :sort* B> *^where’ve you* !b\een# (1.9 40–44)

The nucleus falls on ‘drinks and things’. The prosodic pattern in (36) is more complicated since the tag forms a separate tone unit: (36) C> you ^know ’that ^th\/at ’Thompson# it’s [d] ^((DE!\C)) ’Thompson# ((the)) ^people who ’do the ”!B\eano and# and ((a)) ^lot of the *:l\ocal ’papers# and ^th\at* sort of th/ing# (2.7 999–1003)

The falling tone on ‘local papers’ marks the element which is tagged. The fallrise tone on the tag signals the speaker’s relationship to the hearer. Channell, who has made some interesting observations about the intonation of tags, found that the material to which the tag applied and the tag itself always appeared in the same tone unit: Usually, the tone group beginning shows the start of the material to which the tag applies. The nucleus is carried by the principal item of the material to which the tag applies, and the tag appears as a tail. (Channell 1994: 133)

However it is necessary to distinguish between ‘restricted’ tags (and things like that/this, and things of that sort), which contain a comparative element, and non-restricted tags where the comparative element is only implied. In the London-Lund Corpus, ‘restricted tags’ generally made up separate tone units (75% of the examples). Referent-final tags represent two different prosodic patterns. The short, unrestricted tag (and things, or something) is unstressed or carries a weak stress and is attached to the preceding utterance as a ‘tail’ (cf. Crystal 1969: 223). The ‘tail’ is pronounced less loudly and more quickly than the rest of the utterance.

231


26% of the tags were of this type. A less common pattern is illustrated in (37), where the tag is not separated from the preceding or following text by a tone unit boundary: (37) A> I’d ^got my !coat and ’everything . ’caught /under me# ând [6˜m] . a ^young !p\/ostman or ’something# . got ”^\up# and [6˜] I ^thought ooh !this is gr/\and# (4.4 1530–33)

6.7.3 Text type and socially conditioned variation Discourse type, situation and the speaker-hearer relationship are important when one studies discourse particles. Referent-final tags advise the hearer to interpret a referent as an illustration of something in the shared discourse world. They belong to relatively informal situations where the speaker has a number of presuppositions about the partner’s knowledge, goals and desires. Long lists of examples and exhaustive illustrations would flout the Gricean informativeness maxim if it is applied to conversation where intimacy and solidarity are also important. The almost ‘symbiotic’ relationship between tags and informal speech is reflected in the distribution of tags over different text types in the London-Lund Corpus (see Table 6.7.3a). Table 6.7.3a. Distribution of and- and or-tags over different text types (the figures have been normalized to 10,000 words) Text type

Number of tokens

FACE (surreptitious FACE (non-surreptitious) TELEPHONE DISCUSSION PREPARED PUBLISH

332 (19) 135 (22.5) 67 (11.2) 67 (6.7) 12 (3) 11 (1.7)

Total

624

Overstreet and Yule (1997: 253) found a close relation between tags and informality. Their comparison of formal and informal spoken interaction showed, for example, that or something, and stuff, or anything, or whatever, and everything


were primarily informal and that they were used among familiars. And so on was more frequent in formal speech in their investigation. In the London-Lund Corpus, more than 80% of the examples of and so on occurred in discussion. It is also clear that tags are socially or regionally marked. To give an example from Montréal French, Dubois found that the generic noun affaire (‘thing’, ‘affair’) was associated with working-class speakers and younger speakers in her material suggesting a lexical change in progress (1993: 187). Observations of data from the Colt Corpus also suggest that rapid change may take place from one generation to the other and that young speakers may use different tags. Table 6.7.3b shows a comparison between some common tags in the LLC and Colt. Table 6.7.3b. The distribution of some frequent tags in LLC and COLT (both corpora are the same size) Type of tag

LLC

COLT

and all and all that and things and everything and things like that and stuff or something or anything or something like that or anything like that

8 9 46 22 23 6 136 25 25 4

13 28 6 74 10 39 239 36 32 1

304

478

And stuff was more frequent than and things in the Colt Corpus (cf. Overstreet & Yule 1977: 250). Other frequent tag expressions in the Colt Corpus were and all that and and all (cf. and everything in the London-Lund Corpus). And all that/this shit, and all that crap, and all that bullshit occurred only in Colt. In American English some common expressions are and stuff, and junk, and things, and shit, the whole bit, what have you (Jefferson 1990). The most frequent tags in Overstreet & Yule’s investigation of American English were or something, and stuff, or anything, or whatever, and everything (Overstreet & Yule 1997: 253).


6.8 The function of referent-final tags Many languages have devices that function like referent-final tags in English. To give an example from a non-European language, Tamil has rules for producing echo-words by partial reduplication with the effect of making the set of referents vague (Brown & Levinson (1987: 167). They have in common that they are ‘quantity hedges’, i.e. they are addressed to the cooperative quantitative maxim that the speaker says ‘neither more nor less than is cooperatively necessary’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 164). Erman (1995) distinguishes between the textual function of tags and the expressive or interpersonal function when there is no textual bond with the preceding discourse. Tags with a textual function will be discussed here as components of lists. As Erman points out, the functions of tags in the interpersonal domain are, for example, tentativeness and approximation (Erman 1995: 144). Referent-final tags have in common that they reflect the speaker’s unwillingness to commit himself to the truth of the proposition. They involve the hearer in the interaction and are interpersonal in the sense of Halliday (1985). It follows that it is generally difficult to distinguish between a tentativizing (speaker-oriented) and the hearer-oriented function.

6.9 And-tags 6.9.1 The ‘concretization’ function In the textual function, the tag has an expanding and an illustrative function. It can be interpreted procedurally as an instruction to the hearer to think of the whole set on the basis of a single concrete example or to think of other similar examples. It may be more efficient to speak about kitchen chairs than about furniture, about apples rather than fruit; about taking out the garbage rather than about household work. Even when the set is unknown, the hearer will be able to extrapolate from what is expressed by a tagged construction because of the assumption of common ground. The function of the tag is associated both with ‘concretization’ and with invoking common ground. In (38), the referent + tag make it possible to generalize from a single example: (38) B> but she ^didn’t !quite s\ee# she says ^w\ell# . âfter \all#


the ^boys ’aren’t - ’left to do the !washing-\up# and ^th\/at ’sort of ’thing# c> *bet they are* B> *and I ^thought* they _=are# . +in ôur ’house as :much as the !g\/irls **’are#+ (- laughs)** for a ^st/\art# (1.12 369–77)

Doing the washing-up is a prototypical example of a category of ‘things which boys are generally not asked to do’ which could also be illustrated by taking out the garbage, ironing the laundry, etc. The reference to a concrete event known to both the speaker and the hearer makes the description more tangible: (39) A> *^y\es# be^cause !public !sch\ools’# ^\armouries had* ’been . B> ”^y\es# +^th/at sort of thing#+ (A> +’plundered# and+ ^that sort of st/uff# . (2.8 452–57)

Plundering armouries calls forth a colourful scenario from the 1920s where people could easily get hold of weapons in order to guard against the IRA. In (40), speakers A and B discuss candidates for a job: (40) A> îsn’t it an ob:j\ection that [6˜]# that [6˜] ^B\unyans {might ^r\aise#}# [6˜] if ^{w\e were to ’tell him} ”l\ater# ^well we’re !s\/orry a’bout this# but ^you’re not !\eligible# ^to ((have)) ap!pl\ie((d)) and ’all ’that# will ^that make him /angry ((you *’see))#* *((syll))* (A> isn’t ^that [6˜] ’something that ’we could be f/aulted ’for# - B> ^[=m]# A> I ^realize he’s ap’plied be:f\/ore sort of ’thing# . and all ^th\/at#


^but [6] . *!((what))* 14 a> he* has applied this time has he (2.6 1–14)

It would be tiresome and pedantic to going through the whole procedure of applying for a job (sending in an application, being interviewed, etc.). Jefferson refers to a list of items rather than a set. Tags have potentially the function to complete a list of items (Jefferson 1990). ‘2 items and a generalized completer’ are illustrated in: (41) B> [i] it’s a ”^sp\ecial ’kind of ’Gothic _{^\architecture#}# which is êven more :d\/ecorated than D\ecorated# - and it’s âll ((’full of . little)) :p\innacles and# . ^n\odules and ’things# . (([6m] but ^then)) of _course it’s !not been e”:r\oded at [‘]/all# . (2.13 667–71)

Central to such lists is their open-endedness. Thus ‘a list constructed in the first place as [2 items + generalized completer] may do a specifiable sort of work, distinctive from lists constructed in the first place as [3 items]’ (Jefferson 1990).3 The speaker may, for instance, choose a list + tag in order to be efficient, to leave more to the hearer’s imagination, to show that the speaker and hearer have a special type of relationship, etc. Adding extra items would, for example, not do the job in (42) where the speaker wants to be concrete and illustrative rather than exhaustive. The speaker calls forth an image of Gothic cathedrals on the basis of the mention of a few details: ‘I invite you to think of pinnacles and nodules and you know what’. This is achieved by and that sort of thing : (42) C

^they s=aid# . ôh well it’s very ’difficult to expl/ain# you’ll have to ^see when you !d\o it ’sort of _thing# . but it’s ^working ’for . ”!Th\ompson’s# you ^kn/ow# .

3. The references are taken from a prepublication copy of the article.


”^not . [6˜] ^not ^not . L\/ord ’Thompson# you ^know ’that ^th\/at ’Thompson# it’s [d] ^((DE!\C)) ’Thompson# ((the)) ^people who ’do the ”!B\eano and# and ((a)) ^lot of the *:l\ocal ’papers# and ^th\at* sort of th/ing# (2.7 993–1003)

According to Channell, a scan of the Cobuild corpora resulted in very few examples of tags as list completers (cf. Channell 1994: 134). On the other hand, the LLC material yielded a large number of examples (18%). The or-tag is illustrated in: (43) b> and I’d ^have a ’day at h\ome and# . ^get ’on and ’do a bit of \ironing# or *^w\ashing* or _something# a> *^y=es#* (b> and - and [6˜] . clear ^\up# (5.8 586–90

A list of three items + a list completer is illustrated in: (44) |b> ôh they’ve _got !absolutely s\uper# . ^reprod\uctions# of âll his . A> ”^[\m]# (b> ’sketches and :drawings and :w\ater-*’colours* and_things# (4.4 241–43)

In (45), with the help of a few salient examples, speaker ‘a’ starts describing what parents worry about when their sons go to university. Speaker ‘b’ adds an example and a tag (or something like that) and then speaker ‘a’ gives more examples of what the sons are doing (taking drugs or sitting in and staging). The enumeration ends with a somewhat unusual reference-final tag (this that and the other): (45) a> **^parents** who have been !very b> **^[\m]#** (a> !w\orried a’bout their ’son’s ’going to univ/ersity# you *^kn/ow#* they ^don’t ”!w\ant it# ^they don’t


b> *^[\m]#* (a> ”!want to im’agine their s\on sort of# ^leaping into ’bed with ’every other :g\irl and# b> or ^taking dr\ugs *or {^something like th\at#}# ^y\es#* a> *or ^taking dr\ugs ’or#* or . [m] ^sitting :\in and# **^staging** b> **^[\m]#** (a> this ’that and *the :\other# you ^kn/ow#* b> *^[\m]# (5.10 764–78)

In informal conversation we find descriptions of considerable length completed by a tag. A list consisting of four examples + a tag + discourse particle (‘you know’) + comment (‘quite extraordinary’) + example is illustrated in (46). And everything conveys that there are many other things which make a holiday special. (Situation: Speaker A describes a fortnight’s holiday where you can relax) (46) B> I’d ^love a ’fortnight’s ’holiday ((where you can rel/ax#)) A> (- laughs) ^well it’s ît’s fan!t\astic# be^cause it’s - ’so com”!pl\etely ’different from {^\anything that ’you} . you ^kn/ow# would êver get your’self to do :\other’wise# B> ^y/es# *^y/es#* A> *I ^th/ink#* B> y/es# A> sort of ^whole rou!t\ine# and . ^/atmosphere# and ^cl/imate# and - . ”^cl/othes and ’everything# you ^kn/ow# ^quite extra:\ordinary# . and ûsing ’different m/uscles# (- laughs) (7.3 496–511)


Some tag types were strongly preferred in the list function. Almost half of the examples of and things had the function of list completers (20 examples) and it was the only function of and the rest (and all the rest (of it): (A describes the room of a ‘seedy bachelor’. The room is dirty and ‘tatty’ with objects lying around) (47) A> there was a ^fireplace the e:quivalent po:sition of/ ”:th\/ere# . with a ^couple of :bl\ankets ’stuck in fr/ont of it# ^which I ’couldn’t _quite work /out# . and the ^whole of the :rest of that :w\/all# was just ^l\ittered# with ^Times and ’Telegraphs and :p\oetry ’books and/ _things# (2.12 667–72) By means of the tag, the speaker calls forth a vision of newpapers, poetry books and other things littering up the wall. The tag may have an ‘and so on’ effect: (48) B> I ^thought I’d !better ’ring [6] . my ’mother /up# . and pre^tend I’ve !n/ever !s\aid it# c> [m] . B> I’d ^just ring ’up and /ask# ^how she’s !getting /on and# c> yeah . (B> ^s\/o on# . ând [j6!‘a˜] ^so I !rang \up# . ând my !s\ister ’answered the ph/one# . and ^she - !really ’gave *me a* !terrible har\angue# D> *((^sh/\arp#))* ^y=eah# (B> ôver the ph/one# going ^\on# and ^\on# and ^\on# a^bout . !how ”!c\ould I ’say such ’things c> trivial (B> {and ^s\o on#}# . (1.12 1101–17)


The hearer makes use of his knowledge of similar situations to fill in large portions of a story. And so on was favoured by certain text types (discussion, public speech) although it was most frequent in conversation. It normally (96 out of 114 examples) marks a transition within the same speaker’s talk (Dubois 1993: 191): the speaker continues on the same topic for example elaborating or evaluating what has been said earlier. Tags should not be seen solely as category hedges. An important aspect of their use is that they convey or presuppose that the hearer is able to make inferences on the basis of shared knowledge. This ‘coconception’ of the world by the speaker and hearer explains that tags can be used to draw the hearer closer into the interaction (cf. Overstreet & Yule 1997: 254). Tags and other hedges encourage the hearer to identify vague referents, make associations, conjure up images, etc. This is the predominant function of tags which have no textual or cohesive function. And things in example (49) is used to reduce the distance between the speaker and the hearer by referring to common ground: (49) A> I’ve ^been . !bumbling a’round through the :W\est and# . ^talking to !old !fr\iends and *’things#* b> *[m]* - A> ^when I was in !L\eeds# (1.10 602–5)

And things has intersubjective function and is associated with positive politeness. Its main function is to suggest ‘we have a lot of common and therefore you know what I mean.’ 6.9.2 The intensifying ‘and everything’ tag When we analyse the meaning of the ‘all-tag’, the logical analysis of all (everything) as a universal quantifier is not very helpful even if we restrict the discourse universe to all the members of a particular set or to what is relevant in a particular context.4 Compare everything in this room where ‘everything’ has a fixed interpretation which can be accounted for in logic. As a part of the tag, all

4. Cf. Labov (1984: 49), ‘For all X, such that X is relevant in this context.’ According to Labov, tags like and all require a loose interpretation. ‘Loose interpretation’ is used to mean ‘that the interpretation of universal quantifiers is in the hands of both speaker and listener, and the meaning is often negotiated through social interaction’ (Labov 1984: 54).


(everything) must be described as a ‘sloppy’ or ad hoc category created at the spur of the moment in the communication situation (Barsalou 1983). (A has written a brochure about how to use a sewing-machine) (50) A> it was a b> *[m]* +[m]+ (A> ^very :ch\eap# little sort of ^w\inding-machine# you ^kn/ow# and [6m] . it was ^very suc:c\/essful# you ^kn/ow# I ^wr\ote it# ^reasonably w=ell# and I de^s/igned it# and did the ^l\ayout and everything# . and ^got the dr\awings# (1.3 121–31)

In (50), the tag refers to examples which have been mentioned or which are shared knowledge. For example, A wrote the instruction, designed the brochure and did the layout In other cases, and everything is recategorized as a discourse particle with reinforcing function ‘and somewhat an opposite to the indexical ‘and all that’ which has a generalising function (Hudson 1998: 131). Utterance-final tags are normally deintensifying or neutral with regard to intensity. However tags containing all (everything) interact with intensity. Consider first the unstressed and everything tag with a generalising effect. (Situation: Indians ought not get bow legs since they get a lot of D vitamin from the sun. However Indian women wear veils so they may not get enough D vitamin. Speaker A is a doctor) (51) A> well ^n\/o# it ^d\oes# it’s ^quite *im!p\ortant#* B> *ôh ((and)) their* :skin ’screens \out ((2 sylls))/ **^screens it \out#** A> **but ^there’s [‘]** . ^n\/o# ^n\o# but I ^m=ean# the ^women - the ^women wear !v\eils and ’everything :{^d\on’t they#}#


B> but the ”^ch\ildren d/on’t# *^d\o they#* (2.9 260–69)

Ward & Birner (1993: 212) claim that and everything has the logical property to block a scalar inference that could have been made without everything. In (51), we are, for instance, not allowed to infer that women wear veils only. ‘And everything’ conveys that women also wear other types of clothing to keep out the sun. According to Labov (1984: 57), the ‘approximants’ and everything, and all, and anything like that are unstressed and never signal intensity in themselves. However and everything can be stressed in which case it marks hyperbole or exaggeration. (52) A> and ^he’d been with Sir Garnet W\/olseley and ’every’thing# b> oh *yeah* A> *(- coughs)* . and I âlways re!m\ember him ’saying# A> âll Sir G\/arnet# âll Sir G\/arnet# when he’d ^cl\eared up# the ^w/ashing ’up# you ^s/ee# ^tottering ab\/out the ’place# about ^\/eighty# âll ’hobbledy ((cr\ack)) and /everything# - - . (1.10 20–30)

The tag is used for the purpose of highlighting or emphasising a particular detail or property such as hobbledy (Ward & Birner 1993: 212 refer to this as ‘evoking a high value on an inferrable scale’). In (52), the ‘scale’ might, for instance, be ‘degree-of-being-crazy’. The speaker conjures up a vivid picture of how the eighty-year-old man totters around saying ‘Sir Garnet’ by means of and everything. The intensifying effect of and everything is achieved by the rising tone (what Ward & Birner refer to as the L-H tone, a sequence of a low and a high tone). And everything could also have a fall tone: (53) B> ând a !friend of m/ine# ^put me \off# ^by !sp=ending# .


^two or three d\ays# êvery few m\onths# ^w\orking# . to ^fill this fr\eezer# +and ^b\aking for it {and ^th\at sort of thing#}#+ A> +^[\m]# . ^[/m]#+ B> (- sighs) *and she ^goes /off# and ^buys the [tsh] fr/uit {when it’s ^ch/eap#}# and +^\everything#+ (4.3 68–80)

In contrast, and all was always unstressed and lacks the meaning intensity. In (54), the simple ‘and give them supper’ would sound too definitive. And all suggests ‘a certain degree of tentativeness’ when it modifies the proposition (Ríos 1997: 3). (54) A> a ^friend of h\/ers# who’d ^lived at :h\ome all her _life# ^went to . [6˜m] . :Lucy Cl\/ayton or _something# -/ ((a)) rather se^lect . a> *[m]* (A> *and* . _and fairly sheltered resi_dential . [6˜m] . secret\/arial college# and ^then ap’plied for her ’first j/\ob# ând . !r\ang [dhi˜] . n/umber# and ^spoke to the . :guy whose :secretary she was ’going to b/e# ^who !stated that he ’liked to interview his ’secretaries :at his h\ome# and ^give them s/upper and ’all# - (2.12 1011–20)

In the COLT Corpus, and all was also frequent as a reinforcing discourse particle after a concrete or drastic example (‘your Dad’d kill him and all’) or after an evaluation (cf. ‘that is brilliant and all’).5

5. Cf. also Hudson (1998: 131f).


6.10 The or-tag 6.10.1 The tag as an approximator Approximation is a general label to describe the function of and and or tags when the cohesion with the preceding predication is weak. Here the term will be used for the hedging of a numeral expression (cf. Channell 1994: 17). This was a frequent meaning of the or-tag especially the short, unrestricted tag (21 examples in all). Several hedging expressions may combine (about, or something like that, I suppose): (55) A> ((and)) Î was ’thir{t\een} in :nineteen . ’thirty-”s\ix# b> yeah - A> so ^that’s - . he ^must been born in a’bout :eighteen - ’fifty-!\eight# A> or ^something like !th\/at *I* sup’pose# (1.10 35–38)

The speaker does not remember the exact year but knows that it is something similar to 1858. When or something expresses approximation, it can be replaced by or so : (56) D> and - but ^\I haven’t h/ad anyone# for the ^last !three . ^g\osh# ^three !m\onths or so# A> ^[\m]# . D> ^specially at the be’ginning of t\erm# when you just ^can’t **’do** a :th\ing# (1.5 1227–32)

6.10.2 The tag as a tentativeness hedge Tags often show some uncertainty on the part of the speaker. It is therefore unusual to find tags with the grammatical subject: I suspect that tags on given information are virtually ruled out by the fact that speakers cannot be uncertain about something which is being considered as given in a conversation. Since grammatical subjects often embody the given information in an utterance, tags are not found with them. (Channell 1994: 134)


However it seems as if tags can modify a grammatical subjects if there is no need to be precise because the information is unimportant: (57) A> I’d ^got my !coat and ’everything . ’caught /under me# ând [6˜m] . a ^young !p\/ostman or ’something# . got ”^\up# and [6˜] I ^thought ooh !this is gr/\and# (4.4 1530–33)

The ‘tentativizing’ hedge makes it possible to approximate, to say things even if one is not certain, to refer to things one no longer fully remembers, to be wrong about details, to use words idiosyncratically or metaphorically as in (58). The speaker hedges ‘cultural’ since the word might give the wrong associations: (58) D> I Î don’t ’know if I’ve ’told you this ’story about my ’visit to the j/unk shop in ’Islington# b> ^n/o# . D> ((went there)) . ^went Î !went up to ”\Islington# to to ^do something . - (([6m])) slightly +!c\ultural or ’something#+ A> +((3 to 4 sylls)) the+ ^bailiff’s d\aughter# D> and [6] (laughs -) b> (laughs -) D> ^=and [6˜m]# . and I was ”^str\uck# ^by . the :\orderliness# and ûniformly :new !p\ainting# of of of of of of what had ^previously been :artisans’ :dw\ellings# (4.4 1305–16)

The speaker signals that the information may be inaccurate or uses the tag to downtone its importance: (59) A> well we ônce went to ’see - - [6˜] :Die Ent!f\ührung# ând . !Carolyn ’got a seat :all by her{s\elf} in the front !r\ow or ’something# - Î for!g\et# there was ^some mix-:\up#


or ^some - ’last minute b\ooking or ’something# (2.11 47–51)

Example (59) contains two occurrences of or something. In the first occurrence of or something it signals that speaker does not remember what seat it was by means of or something. The speaker goes on to elaborate — there was some mixup (or the ticket may have been sold elsewhere). Frequent collocations in the uncertainty sense of or something are I forget (as in 59), I don’t remember. Or something may be face-saving or downtone the importance of what has been said: (60) B> and then - she ^suddenly . ’had a :l\egacy# . got a ^l\etter {^through the p\ost#}# saying îf she called at the - at a ^lawyer’s ’chambers in the :C\ity# we have ^something ((1 to 2 sylls)) that will /interest you# c> [m] B> it ^trans’pired it was a :l\egacy# from an - - âunt who’d ’gone to A:m\/erica or ’something {who’d ^d/ied#}# (1.11 577–83)

It is not important for the hearer to know precisely where the aunt had gone; the gist of the message is that it was to a far-away-place and that therefore the legacy came as a surprise. In questions, or something is a face-saving strategy as in (61): (61) A> ^\ooh# - . ând [‘6] !you’re ((an !LS’E ’product)) ’with (([6˜])) sta!t\istics or ’something /are you# - . B> ^=um# ^[‘]it’s [‘] . ^w\ell# . Î’m . em!{pl\oyed as a} :mathema!t\/ician# (1.6 12–16)

The motive for the or-tag may be negative politeness if an action is experienced as face-threatening. In (62), B makes the suggestion that the conversationalists should have lunch: (62) A> ^\/OK# *^r\ight#* B> *^we* can have ”!l\unch or ’something#


A> ^y\eah# [w] ^what ’time do you :\usually ’go and have {^l\unch#}# . B> ^w\/ell# . I ^\/usually ’go a’bout# ^quarter ’past !tw\elve# ^half past !tw\elve# ^something like !th\at# . (7.3 1401–1410)

6.11 Creative uses of the tag Tags have a wide range of uses reflecting the speaker’s creativity. Tags may be induced by the rhythm of the ongoing talk (Vincent 1983) or implicated by ‘the poetics of natural talk’ (Jefferson 1990). They may be used when a new expression has been coined for humorous effect as in (63): (Situation: A is talking about his great-uncle Arthur who fought in various parts of the world) (63) A> and ^listed ”\up you s/ee# and and ^went ’out in some :ghastly ’regiment of f/oot# . ^Royal ’Warwickshire :foot and m/outh or ’something# ((and)) ^fl\ogged ’all ’round /Africa# - . b> hold on in time for Omdurman - . A> Î ^[‘]I (([6])) Î don’t ’know which :b\/attles ’he was *’in# Î can’t re:m\ember* n/ow# (1.10 40–46)

The speaker may vary the tag by choosing a less familiar or a new general noun. And all that bit is an example: (64) b> hold on what have I been doing lately - - espionage - A> ^{J\ames} !B\ond# and âll !th\at bit# (1.10 253–55)


The generic nouns in the London-Lund Corpus were, for example, thing (the most frequent option), stuff, business, lot, rest, nonsense, bit, malarkey. Stepping outside the corpus we find other examples such as the popular and all that jazz.

6.12 Conclusion Semantically tags are ‘category hedges’ (metalinguistic operators) functioning as instructions to the hearer to interpret designata (utterances, phrases or words) as members of a larger set. The set may be a ‘sloppy’ category whose members are only related by ‘rough similarity’. However the speaker counts on the hearer’s ability to make inferences even when information is omitted because the conversationalists share information about the previous discourse; the use of hedges seems to take for granted that the conversationalists are ‘socially similar’ and that there is some consensus about goals and desires in the conversation. Interactively the tags therefore have a strong affective meaning. Salient examples followed by a generalising tag may be a better way to make the hearer interested than a detailed but tedious description of people, places and of sequences of events. Tags (e.g. and things) are frequently found at the end of a list when the speaker has ‘lost the thread’ or when more examples would not be relevant. In narratives they help to speed up the tempo by focussing on what is new and remarkable leaving it to the hearer to fill in details (and all that, and so on). They make it possible for the speaker to be both concrete and to avoid the abruptness of an unmitigated assertion. They are often used in descriptions to invoke a certain ambiance. Conversation may be hampered by the impossibility for the speaker to know what goes on in the hearer’s mind. As a result, special strategies have developed for negotiating mutual understanding. Speakers use hedges not only to signal an information gap but to convey that the hearer will be able to understand what is said because of shared knowledge. In particular, ‘likeness’ is a complicated notion and gives rise to meanings which are affective rather than textual. A referent-final tag has a hedging or tentativizing function when it modifies the whole proposition. Tags are intensifying or deintensifying in ways which are difficult to describe without taking into account prosody and the use of different quantifiers. Thus the and-tag can be intensifying when stressed while the or-tag is always tentativizing (deintensifying). Utterance-final tags have much in common, which makes it meaningful to study them as a social variable or as markers of style. Short and long tags do not, for example, seem to have the


same distribution among young speakers and older speakers. As has been shown in this chapter, there are also interesting functional differences between individual particles. Grammaticalisation helps us to understand both similarities and differences between the discourse particles. Indexicality and grammaticalisation are involved when referent-final tags are recategorized as discourse particles with meanings such as uncertainty or affect. If we place the tags on a continuum as is common in grammaticalisation research, lexical forms functioning as fullblown cohesion signals would be placed at one end and maximally reduced forms at the other end of the scale.

Chapter 7

The expectation marker actually

When there is to be a discrepant claim, it is important to mark it thus in order to facilitate the processing of unexpected material. (Smith & Jucker, unpublished handout)

7.1 Introduction Utterances generally convey the speaker’s attitude to the message. Much of the time users of English are factual and do not indicate their attitude explicitly; for example they will say it’s raining implying that this is true and that they are committed to its truth. In Chapter 5, we introduced the notion ‘evidentiality’ to describe different attitudes to knowledge. Speakers use evidentials when they are concerned with ‘how true’ the utterance is and need a device to convey different attitudes towards knowledge and truth (Chafe 1986). Conversational English also has a number of devices signalling ‘expectations of some kind, against which knowledge may be matched (Chafe 1986: 270). Oddly enough (sure enough) is a category of this type (‘expectation marker’) signalling a conflict between what the speaker had expected and what is known while of course shows that something is in line with expectations, and in fact, actually, really, in fact, in actual fact, as a matter of fact indicate that an event is surprising or unexpected. Evidentials belong to many different word classes (e.g. modals, verbs, adverbs). Actually is formally an adverb which in addition has developed into a discourse particle through grammaticalisation. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the functions of actually on the basis of different formal clues. To begin with, the discourse particle will be distinguished from the adverb. In this connection its core meaning and discourse functions will be discussed. A comparison will also be made with adverbs (or adverbials) in the same lexical field (in fact, really) in order to sharpen the description of the meaning of actually. The functional indicators which are of interest include position, prosody and text type.


7.2 Criteria for the discourse particle actually In its core meaning, actually expresses that there is a discrepancy between reality and what appears to be the case. Like sort of and like, actually would be an ‘adjuster word’ by the use of which another word is ‘adjusted to meet the innumerable and unforeseeable demands of the world upon language’ (Austin 1962:73). The etymological meaning of actually (‘in actuality’) is obvious in (1), where the speaker brings in a distinction between academic department and things which are not, strictly speaking, ‘academic departments’ because they differ in some way from prototypical departments:1 (1) A> as ^\I understand this . _thing# - -^there[‘] is”!deep oppo”:s\ition {to ^th\is#}# . ^from ’heads of dep\artments# . ^\and from de’partments thems/elves# ând ’from . :other ’things which ’aren’t ’actually/ :aca!d\emic de’partments# . ^there is”!deep sc\epticism a’bout it# (3.4 573–78)

On the other hand, when the speaker uses actually as a discourse particle he does not appeal to actuality or reality (‘the world’) or to the truthfulness of an assertion. Actually as a discourse particle permits the speaker to change perspective and call attention to something that he has just come to think of (‘this is also relevant’).2 In (2), speakers A and B (two social workers) are talking about a French restaurant serving a complete meal for fifteen francs. The addition of more detailed information is marked by actually (cheese was served in addition to the other dishes): (2) A> |++^[dhi˜] . !one I++ re’member ”b\/est# ^was . [6˜m] !lemon :s\/ole# (([6])) ”^n\o# ^pate ’du mai:s\/on# -

1. Cf. Taglicht (2001: 2) ‘truth-insistent use’. As Taglicht points out, this use is typically found occurring within the scope of negation. 2. Cf. Tognini-Bonelli’s suggestion (1993: 205) that a speaker may use actually to call attention to the relevance of material, when such relevance is not obvious.

The expectation marker actually 253

(([6˜m] ((a4)) la ^m/aison#)) . ^followed by . [6˜m] - :lemon s\ole# ^followed by :st\eak# . ^followed by ![h\ais] cream# in^cluding ’wine and :t\/ip# for ^fifteen !fr\ancs# *^which* B> *we* ^had !f\ive ’courses# ^\/actually# I’m ^quite !s\ure# there ^was [6˜] - +((bits of)) ch/eese as ’well#+ (2.13 799–13)

Actually may not have a very precise meaning since it is often difficult to distinguish the discourse particle from the adverb. From the point of view of meaning/function there is also little to distinguish between actually in different positions (cf. Brown & Yule 1983: 133). Consider: (3) (B> but the* the ”^main ’axis was . was was a a :[ja] a/ !bright ’young :m\an# . ^from . the ’Central Euro*p\ean* ’Service# *^th\ank you#* . A> ^[/\m]# +^l/\ovely#+ . B> called ^Wilfred \Evans# +who’s âctually+ a ’very :n\ice ch/ap# (2.11 865–72)

Along the same lines, Watts argues that there is no reason to distinguish between different uses of actually since the adverb creates topic cohesion and structures the discourse both sentence-internally and as a metapragmatic term sentence-externally (Watts 1988: 251; cf. also Tognini-Bonelli 1993, who shows that the adjective actual and actually both have a structural role at the level of discourse). Obviously it is difficult to distinguish between the adverb and the discourse particle on the basis of meaning or use. In this chapter, the emphasis will therefore be on criteria such as position in order to distinguish between the propositional use of actually and the discourse particle. Thus when actually is placed medially, it hedges the proposition or a single element. When actually is placed initially or finally it is a discourse particle with textual or interpersonal


function. In Schiffrin’s (1987) terminology, discourse particles are brackets organising talk, for instance ‘by initiating and terminating spates of activity’. The discourse particle actually occurs initially and finally. This can be explained if we assume that actually has moved out of the grammatical core and into the periphery while it takes on pragmatic functions. Grammaticalisation implies that the actually develops from an intensifying adverb to a sentence adverb and a discourse particle. This change takes place when the scope of the modifier increases and actually is placed either sentenceinitially or finally in the clause.

7.3 Actually and grammaticalisation Lenk notices that the function of the pre-verbal intensifier actually can be paraphrased by really or in fact while the discourse particle has such functions as opinion, objection marker, and topic change (Lenk 1998: 157f). On the other hand, position is regarded as less important: ‘the flexibility of position of actually in the utterance is not restricted to instances when it is used in the propositional meaning, but also applies to uses of actually as opinion marker’ (Lenk 1998:166). However in a grammaticalisation perspective, position reflects various stages of the development of actually to a discourse particle. The distinction between the adverb and the discourse particle can be described diachronically as follows. According to Powell (1992: 85), actually appeared as a manner adverb meaning ‘effectively’ at the beginning of the 15th century. Examples of the epistemic (evidential) meaning where actually contrasts with possibly, potentially, ideally, etc. are documented in the 16th century. The present evidential use has been in existence since 1762 (Powell 1992: 85): I had some disposition to be a scholar and had actually learned my letters. Goldsm. Cit. of world cxix

The verb phrase modifier (intensifier) becomes an evidential adverb (i.e. a sentence modifier) when its scope is widened. The evidential actually is recruited into new positions (e.g. the pre-front field and other positions in the sentence) at the same time as its meaning is pragmatically enriched. The functional changes undergone by actually fit Traugott’s (1999) description of grammaticalisation as a shift from propositional to discourse meanings and from less subjective to more subjective meaning (Figure 7.3). The figure represents the development of the discourse particle on a


VP modifier Least subjective

Æ

Sentence modifier

Æ

—————————Æ

Discourse particle Most subjective

Figure 7.3. The cline of subjectivity (cf. Traugott 1999: 189)

grammaticalisation cline. According to this account, actually is characterised by more subjectivity when it develops into a discourse particle. The strongest effects of subjectification are found when actually is used utterance-finally in informal conversation

7.4 Actually, in fact, really Actually can be compared with other adverbs in the related lexical field which have developed discourse particle status. Actually is similar to both in fact and to really. Both actually and in fact are used to support a preceding claim: (4) so I went to the School of Applied Linguistics in Winchester a. actually I applied to the British Council and failed to get in b. in fact (as a matter of fact) I applied to the British Council and failed to get in (Adapted from example 28)

In comparison with the assertive in fact, actually may sound uncertain. However actually is not just a weaker version of in fact. As Smith & Jucker (2000) suggest, actually and in fact may have different implications for the continuation of the discourse. Thus while in fact reinforces the opposition to the preceding proposition by implying that a stronger claim needs to be made, actually seems to signal that some slight reinterpretation or adjustment of perspective needs to take place which may be seen as a shift in common ground (Smith & Jucker 2000: 222). A stylistic difference between the particles is that in fact is formal and typically occurs in discussion, public and prepared speech where actually is infrequent (cf. Section 7.5.2). Really has been studied by Stenström (1986), but has not earlier been compared with actually although the adverbs have related etymological meaning (reality, actuality). Both actually and really are intensifiers which have developed affective or evaluative meaning (cf. Stenström 1986: 155):

255


(5) A> Î don’t !t\/ell them ’what to ’do# . ^th\/ey work ’out ’what they’d l\ike to# ^then we all !\argue a’bout it# . it’s âll !m\ad r/eally# - (1.10 1263–66)

However, as Stenström points out, really is a response signal rather than a ‘presentation marker’ when we describe its function on the level of discourse.

7.5 Functional indicators 7.5.1 The distribution of actually In Quirk et al.’s analysis, actually is an adverb which can have different functions and positions. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 583), actually is ‘an emphasiser that can also function as a disjunct’. As a disjunct, actually is said to ‘state the sense in which the speaker judges what he says to be true or false’ (Quirk et al. 1985: 621). Actually is positionally flexible as indicated by the slots marked by an arrow in the diagram below. she is not as pretty as she might have been 1 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 In pre-verbal position, actually is an emphasiser with a reinforcing effect on the truth value of the clause or part of the clause to which it belongs (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 583): (6) d> (. laughs) C> ^well !he ^y\eah# he ^said !b\oth of ’those ’things ’actually# to ^{m\/e} :in in !different :w\/ays . {es^s\/entially#}# be^cause B> ^wh=at# [‘] he ^said them in ’Japa:n\/ese# (- - - laughs and makes Japanese noises *- - -*) C> *he âctually ’said something :totally* ’different I’m :just being po’lite to +!\Arthur#+ (2.10 1211–19)


When actually is an emphasising adverb, it can be placed both before or after is (position 2 or 3). Its function as a general emphasiser in position 3 is illustrated in (7): (7) (B> but the* the ”^main ’axis was . was was a a :[ja] a/ !bright ’young :m\an# . ^from . the ’Central Euro*p\ean* ’Service# *^th\ank you#* . A> ^[/\m]# +^l/\ovely#+ . B> called ^Wilfred \Evans# +who’s âctually+ a ’very :n\ice ch/ap# (2.11 865–72)

It is normally placed after the negation (position 4): (8) B> ^since I !h\eard this ’news I ’think# în în the în the re!f\ectory# ((and)) I ^didn’t ’actually :sp\eak to ’her# - - ^\I had a ’seminar tod/ay# ((in which)) . ^people !hadn’t ’read the (1.4 1078–82)

Taglicht (1998: 198) suggests that actually is a (parenthetical) sentence modifier when it occurs after the verb (cf. Quirk et al. ‘a disjunct’) but an intensifying VP modifier when it occurs immediately before the verb (Quirk et al., ‘a subjunct’). Taglicht also notes that in examples like (7), actually is very similar to in fact, while in (8) it has something in common with even. In this work, both uses have been distinguished from the discourse particle.3 The following examples have been analysed as discourse particles. A. Utterance-initial actually (position 1) In initial position, actually plays a role for the development of discourse and serves as a discourse particle with cohesive function. Actually may be a tone unit on its own as in (9) or be integrated in the following utterance (only 12.8% of the cases in initial position). (9) B> ^[\m]# - - to ^make a”!p\int it s/ays#

3. Taglicht (2001) came to my attention too late to be considered in this chapter.


A> ^\actually# he ^c\aught ’me# on the ^h\op# be^cause [6] !when you ’rang \/up# un^f\ortunately# Î was !speaking to the !bee-est ’gas’bag I’ve :met/ for y\ears# (1.4 146–53)

B. Utterance-final actually (position 10): When actually is placed in final position, the particle serves as a floor-holder and more emphasis is placed on the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. Actually was usually integrated in the preceding utterance in this case (94% of the examples): (10) A> *^y\es# ^people ’didn’t* ’think you were :going to be _in tod\ay /actually# B> well they ^n\ever ’think I’m ’in *to’day ((/actually#))* (1.5 706–8)

C. Clause-final actually (position 5) In (11) and (12), actually is clause-final but not utterance-final: (11) C> I Î’d - I ^think it it would :help a :l\ot /actually# if we ^would *we* ^could w\ait (2.6 1279–80) (12) B> ooh ^g\osh# yes ^that ((was so it all)) :seems a !l\ong time ag/o now# ^d\oesn’t it# Î’m !s\o glad /actually# you ^came r\/ound that ’evening# and and ând sort of :kept saying :colour c/olour# and ^not ’white wh/ite# (2.10 70–76)

Actually in utterance-final and clause-final position seems to have primarily a social function. In the position after a focalized element functioning as ‘head’ (= post-head position), actually is more like an intensifier:


D. Actually in post-head position (13) D> *^we’ve ^we’ve _made quite a _round !tr\/ip ’actually# in* the ^last !thr\/ee ’years# C> *^[=m]# - (3.3 608–10)

According to Lenk (1998: 161), postposition contributes to intensification, ‘postpositioned actually requires reprocessing on the side of the hearer since the non-linear position interrupts the original interpretive process and puts additional emphasis on the fact that intensification is now taking place.’ Since post-position also seems to make actually more subjective, I have classified these examples as discourse particle uses. 7.5.2 The frequency of actually The distribution of actually over texts cuts across speech and writing according to Biber and Finegan. ‘Actually adverbials’ occurred (in the Lancaster-Oslo/ Bergen (LOB) corpus of written English) in editorial letters ‘which are expository, argumentative and opinionated’ rather than factual and therefore use the discourse particle for supportive evidence (Biber & Finegan (1988: 26). In text types characterised by a factual style (e.g. press or academic writing) the absence of actually shows that there is no need to further underscore factuality. However, actually is above all frequent in speech. In all I found 426 examples of actually in the LLC distributed over text types as shown in Table 7.5.2a. (No distinction has been made between the adverb

Table 7.5.2a. Distribution of actually over different text types (the figures have been normalised to 10,000 words) Text type

Number of tokens


217 (12.4) 77 (12.8) 50 (8.3) 67 (6.7) 3 (0.75) 12 (1.8)

Total

426


and the discourse particle.)4 As pointed out in Section 7.5.1, I have counted actually as a discourse particle when it has initial or final (utterance-final, clause-final or post-head) position (cf. also Smith & Jucker 2000:218). Lenk, on the other hand, looked at the function of actually in order to distinguish between its use as a discourse particle or adverb. However the results from our studies are comparable. According to Lenk, 53.13% of all the examples of actually were discourse particles which is a slightly lower figure than the results from my own study (55.6%).5 Position correlates with text type as shown in Table 7.5.2b. Table 7.5.2b. Distribution of the discourse particle over different text types in I, M and F positions (the figures have been normalized to 10,000 words) Initial (I)

Mid (M)

Final (F)

FACE (surreptitious) FACE (non-surreptitious) TELEPHONE DISCUSSION PUBLIC PREPARED

32 10 5 9 1 –

89 28 18 43 8 3

96 39 27 15 3 –

Total

57

189

180

The table indicates that the most typical use of the discourse particle was in final position where it is more than three times as common as initially. Final actually could be looked upon as a ‘style enhancer’ because of its high frequency in informal conversation: (14) A> ^nineteen ’sixty ^what’s th\is# . ^J/ones . sch\olarship# B> it ^looks ’quite :n\ice ’actually# ((it))’s ^not b\ad _that# (1.4 517–20)

The lower figure of final actually in telephone conversation suggests that it is primarily associated with face-to-face contact. On the other hand, the particle

4. Unclear examples have not been counted. 5. In the American conversations studied by Lenk, the figure was lower (43.9%) (cf. Lenk 1998: 160).


was infrequent in conversation when placed initially. The table also shows that certain styles may lack the discourse particle altogether, for instance prepared speech (radio lectures, public speeches). In discussion, actually occurred mainly in initial or mid position with ‘the specialized function of emphasizing the individual position of the speaker or author in opposition to other possible positions’ (Biber and Finegan 1988: 26). (15) h> ^n\o {^n\o#}# a ”^thousand times :n\o# I ^think actually that . [dhi˜] :lady who’s !asked this :qu\estion# . per^haps hasn’t read . Mr :Shinwell’s !speech (5.4 299–302)

Of other ‘actually’ adverbials, in fact is probably most important. A comparison between the items shows that there are differences in their text distribution. Thus in fact occurred more frequently in formal genres such as public discussions and debates.6 The changes in the use of actually seem to be small when we make comparisons over time. A look at the young speakers recorded in the COLT corpus showed no differences with regard to the frequency of actually. There were 497 examples in the COLT, 53.3% of which represented the discourse particle. On the other hand, in fact occurred only in 24 examples (mainly in initial position) indicating that it was used even less frequently in informal conversation than in the LLC. (16) I hate Music too. In fact, I hate most of my lessons. (COLT)

In the COLT corpus, the intensifier actually frequently cooccurred with really : (17) Well the= yeah they’re really actually quite nice burglars (COLT)

The particle typically occurred as a subjective marker (in end position): (18) That’s quite good actually. (COLT) (19) Quite interesting actually. (COLT)

6. On the differences between in fact and actually, see also Oh (2000).


(20) That’s pretty cool actually. (COLT) (21) It was quite difficult actually wunnit? (COLT)

As a matter of fact did not occur at all in the COLT Corpus and there were only 18 examples in the LLC. In reality occurred once in the LLC. 7.5.3 The prosodic properties of actually As has been pointed out in the preceding chapters, prosody is a neglected area in connection with individual words and phrases although prosodic cues are important clues to their interpretation. The data from the LLC showed that the intensifier actually (i.e. in mid position) occurred with a tone in only 29% of the examples to be compared with almost 70% of the examples when actually had end position. Initial actually had a nuclear tone in 59% of the examples. Various prosodic profiles can be distinguished on the basis of position and syntactic/prosodic integration. Initially actually can stand alone with a fall-rise pattern or a fall tone: Pattern A: actually is a separate tone unit and has fall-rise tone (22) B> ^\/actually# I’m ^quite !s\ure# there ^was [6˜] - +((bits of)) ch/eese as ’well#+ (2.13 811–13)7

The pattern illustrated in (22) is used when the speaker seems to anticipate some resistance (‘no/but actually’). Allerton and Cruttenden (1974: 22) mention the fall-rise when actually forms a separate tone group and has initial position. They observe that the fall-rise tone may be due to ‘persuasive or argumentative style often with the meaning “you’ll find this surprising, but …” (Allerton & Cruttenden 1974: 23). A simple fall was also used besides the fall-rise (Pattern B). In (23), speaker A has started to relate how he was asked against his will to come to a meeting. A resumes after a break caused by the serving of coffee that ‘actually he caught me on the hop’. Actually (with a fall tone) marks that what follows is an elaboration or clarification.

7. Cf. example (2), which gives more context.


Pattern B: actually is a separate tone unit and has fall tone (23) A> ^\actually# he ^c\aught ’me# on the ^h\op# (1.4 148–50)

When actually occurred initially without the tone (28 examples), its contrastive meaning was weak. Thus Pattern C is more closely related to Pattern B than to Pattern A: Pattern C: Actually in initial position pronounced without (nuclear) stress: (24) B> I’m ^s/\ure it w/as#* A> *I ^did in the p\ast#* âctually ’they ^they’re a !tougher l\ot# I ^think n\/ow# Î l\ike ’them# (1.9 1111–15)

The distribution of nuclear tone on actually in initial position is shown in Table 7.5.3a. Table 7.5.3a. The distribution of tones on actually in initial position Nuclear tone

n

%

Fall Fall-rise Rise-fall Rise Level No tone

13 11 1 – – 32

22.8% 19.2% 1.8% – .0% – .0% 56.1%

Total

57

100%.0

When actually has final (or posthead) position, it was usually integrated with the preceding utterance. A compound fall-plus-rise tone was distributed over the utterance in almost 90% (88.9%) of the cases: D. The tonal pattern consists of a sequence of a fall tone followed by a rising tone on actually (Table 7.5.3b).


(25) A> (stops reading) B> ^y\es# [dh] ^this ^this is very \interesting /actually# be^cause I’m !!quite s\ure# [6‘ 6m] that that that that we’re ^wr\ong# . (1.2 1258–62)

It may be fruitful to correlate tone with the wish to establish common ground. Thus, a tone unit ‘that has the fall-rise or the rise tone contains information that the speaker judges to be already present in the world he shares with his hearer and so is available to be referred to’ (‘referring tone’, Sinclair & Brazil 1982: 164). Actually (honestly, really) ‘almost invariably have a referring tone and therefore perform the social function of insinuating an element of generalized togetherness into the relationship’ (ibid., p. 164). This meaning is particularly clear when actually is final. For example, in (25), the speaker indicates by means of the choice of tone that something is common ground and does not need to be negotiated. Table 7.5.3b. The distribution of tones on actually in final position Nuclear tone

Number

Per cent

Fall-plus-rise Fall-rise Fall Rise Level-plus-rise Level No (tail intonation)

81 5 6 6 1 – 55

52.6% 3.2% 3.9% 3.9% 0.6% – .0% 35.7%

Total

154

100%.0

In the pattern (E), actually is not nuclear but is placed in the post-nuclear tail: E. Actually as a nuclear tail with a preceding fall tone (26) A> ^nineteen ’sixty ^what’s th\is# . ^J/ones . sch\olarship# B> it ^looks ’quite :n\ice ’actually# ((it))’s ^not b\ad _that# I ^think I ’feel (1.4 517–21)


In this pattern, the role of actually is less important than in Pattern D. In Pattern F, actually functions more like an afterthought: Pattern F: Actually inserted as a separate tone group (with a rise or fall-rise tone): (27) b> I ^haven’t ’yet h\/eard# ^what !s\ex they ’both {^\are#}# ^\/actually# or ^what . ap!pr\oaches they h/\ave# ^to . [dhi] !normal :processes of ’procre:\ation# -/ (6.3 872–76)

To sum up, there seem to be several correlations between prosody and the discourse functions of actually in different positions. The fall-rise tone on initial actually can, for instance, be used for the specific purpose of marking contrast. When actually has final position, the pattern fall-plus-rise tone is associated with a social function.

7.6 The contrastive and emphatic function of actually Like discourse particles in general, expectation markers have the general metainteractional (or procedural) function to comment on or signal how an upcoming utterance fits into the developing discourse. Actually is subtly ambiguous in a way which seems to involve the direction of the speaker’s thoughts. In one interpretation actually permits the speaker to mark a contrast to a preceding utterance or a reversal of belief (‘but actually’). In the other possible interpretation actually adds supportive evidence or clarification in order to enhance the impact of a preceding utterance (‘and actually’). Actually as a marker of contrast includes the examples where actually could be paraphrased by ‘but actually’ or ‘no actually’ In (28), the claim (‘no actually I applied to the British Council’) is contrasted with the claim ‘so I went to the School of Applied Linguistics in Winchester’. (28) A> *but âfter* de:lays ’caused by [w] :this ’that and/ the \other# in^cluding ’going to L\abrador# ^which was a !very good :tr\ip# - . Î [6˜m] - . !th=ought# ^this is”!not s/ensible#


it’s ^best to . !tr\ain ’properly# . be^s\ides# ^training will be !\interesting# so I ^went to the !School of Ap!plied Lingu\istics#/ in ^W\inchester# d> [m] A> ^\/actually# I ap^{pl\ied} to the ’British C/\ouncil# and ^failed to get :\in# and I ^found that”:they ’send ’people ’up th/ere# so I ^then ap:plied to :B\/irmingham# and ^they _gave me a _further !edu!cation gr/ant# -/ (2.4 1179–95)

For the purposes of the following discussion, I have found it useful to sort the examples into two broad categories depending on whether actually marks a contrast with a preceding element or has as its main purpose to clarify or elaborate on a preceding point. The contrast meaning is obvious when the speaker marks a preceding discourse segment as less than factual by changing perspective or point of view. 7.6.1 Actually as a contrastive marker One of the main functions of the discourse particle actually (or in fact) is to mark a contrast with a preceding utterance. Fraser and Malamud-Makowski (1996: 871) say about the related in fact that it signals that U2 is to be interpreted as a denial of the explicit proposition asserted with U1, with the added condition that the assertion of U1 is not the direct responsibility of the speaker of U2. Actually as well permits the speaker to distance himself from the factuality of an earlier assertion (U1) and to express a contrast with it. The contrastive actually expresses an opposition between different points of view; it could be used to deny an implicit belief, signal a counter-claim or objection, facilitate for the speaker to take up a new position, to switch to another aspect of the topic or to reformulate an utterance. Actually is used also when there is no explicit contrast with a preceding point of view. Speaker A, who is Professor Dwight’s secretary, assumes that B believes that the lexicology seminar will last the whole term and uses actually to mark a correction.


(29) A> ^this is Pro!fessor Dw\ight’s s/ecretary# from ^Poly’mania C\ollege B> ôoh y\es# A> [6˜m] . a^bout [dhi˜] ’lexi!c\ology *s/eminar#* B> *^y\es#* . A> âctually Pro!fessor ’Dwight _says in _fact they’ve/ :only ’got :two ’more [m .6˜m] :sessions to g\o# because ((I)) ^didn’t ’realize it [‘] it . :finishes at :\Easter# (8.3.4 231–37)

As pointed out in the preceding section, the meaning of contrast is particularly clear when actually collocates with but which serves to reinforce the contrast. Speaker A (a female secretary) and Speaker B (a female academic) are talking about Professor Hart, the head of the academic department where they both work. Hart does not realize that not everyone can or wants to work as hard as he does. Speaker A tells her co-locutor about a time when she was asked to take on some extra job. ‘But actually it amused me’ marks the contrast to the annoyance she first felt. (30) A> ^y\es# ôh well ’I’ve !already !t\old him# cos he ^tried to ’get me ’in in ^f\act# . Î was !{sl\ightly} an:n\oyed# but âctually it !{r\ather} . am\used me# . but [6m] . ^he s\aid# ôh ’well you kn/ow I# ^might get - [6m] - !t\erribly# . you ^kn/ow I’m# Î’m ’just :hanging /on ’now# and . ((could ^take you on)) !p\ermanent((ly))# . we ^may ’need y/ou# to ^do some _work in the !\evening# (1.5 216–28)

Actually also collocates with no to mark a counterclaim, a correction, or incipient disagreement with a preceding speaker According to Taglicht (2001: 2f), this actually is ‘mild’ and conciliatory because if the speaker uses it in correcting someone else, it serves to make the correction less calculated to offend, and if he is correcting something said or implied by himself, an element of apology seems to be involved. Collocations


are important for how actually is understood. A weaker contrast is expressed by well actually which introduces a clarification of what has just been said. In (31), Speaker a has been talking about how James Joyce set out for the unknown: (31) a> ^James J/oyce# ”^wiped the :last drops of :G\uinness# from his ^l=ips# . ^turned his :b=ack# . on [dhi] . ^dark !w\aters {of the ^r\iver ^{L\iffey#}#}# . for the un^kn\own# - - [6] . well ^\actually# [6˜] . ^not ex”!actly unkn/own# [6] . ^he thought he knew where he was :g\oing# ^he thought he was g=oing# . to the ”^Berlitz sch/ool# in ^Z\urich# . (12.2 1114–26)

Actually sounds apologetic and disarming when in occurs in the preface to a face-threatening act (speaker ‘b’ asks for a recommendation letter although ‘a’ has just complained that he dislikes filling in forms). Actually is needed because the request is experienced as embarrassing by the speaker: (32) b> I’ve ^yet to ap!ply for :th\/is# . ^\other ’lot of f/orms# . ^h\onestly# - a> *((2 sylls))* b> *^\/actually#* . I ^hardly ’like to :s\ay this# in ^view of your !rude re:m\/arks but [6m]# . ^could you give me an’other recommen!d\ation# a> ôh y\es# (6.2 302–10)

Actually introduces a self-correction in (33). The function of actually is to mark the information in the next move as more appropriate or more exact than the preceding move:


(33) B> [6˜m] . I ^teach ’semi’nars be_ginning at _two on a/ :T\/uesday# . A> ^[/m]# B> now ^w\/ait a ’moment# îs there an:\other ’one# ^s\/ome weeks# I ^teach ’one be_ginning at . âctually it be!gins at !thr\/ee on a ’Thursday# so ^that’s ’not *too ((b\ad#)) (9.1 9 66167)

The contrastive element need not to be explicit. Actually also occurs in contexts which only indirectly suggest a contrast as in example (33) where it involves the negotiation of attitudes (cf. Smith & Jucker 2000: 226). Although it has contrastive function actually is polite. It is used when competing points of view have led to a distancing between the speaker and the hearer; the particle marks a ‘rapprochement’ between the speaker and the hearer in the face of a potential conflict or disagreement. 7.6.2 Emphasis of individual position Actually is mainly emphatic in (34) where it gives an explanation or justification. Speaker A (a medical nurse) has applied for a job as a nurse and now relates how she was received by a ‘seedy old bachelor’ who wants to seduce her. The utterance introduced by actually is intended as a justification or a warrant (‘nothing had occurred to me by then’). (Cf. Smith & Jucker 2000: 231.) The emphatic actually is further strengthened by ‘to tell you the honest truth’: (34) A> he ôrders me to !put my !coat on ’that ch/air# ^sit on !that ch/air# - and I ^thought !y/es# ^that’s f/ine# ^don’t ’like ’that ’coat ’very ’much /anyway# (- laughs) a,A> (- - - laugh) ^\/actually# to ^tell ((you)) the honest tr/uth# ^nothing had oc:c\urred to ’me ’by th/en# at ”^/all# I ^still wasn’t *’even :slightly sus!p\icious#


a> *(- - - laughs)* (A> being a ”^v\ery s/illy ’girl#;-*; (2.12 627–40)

In (35), actually is also emphatic rather than contrastive. Actually I think reinforces the speaker’s point of view in relation to a point of view expressed by another individual. B has just expressed the opinion that you’re more likely to go to your own academic tutor for supervision if you don’t know the others. C’s position vis-à-vis B is strengthened by means of actually : (35) B> I ^think you’re ’much more ’likely to ’go to your ./ your âca:d\/emic ’tutor# D> ^y=es +((2 sylls))#+ B> +be^cause I+ !mean - - ^you kn/ow# Î Î’d Î don’t !kn\ow *[dhi˜]* A> *^but* there _are the !\others# +^\aren’t there#+ B> +^no I+ I ^mean I !know who they :\/are ((but))# . I ^don’t know them :p\/ersonally# at *^/\all# . ((they ^seem)) com_plete !str\angers#* C> *I ^think \actually ’that de’pends#* . ôn your re!lationship with your . :\own ’tutor# B,VAR> +^y\es# (3.3 1086–98)

7.6.3 Actually and elaboration In (36), and actually contributes to the claim that St. Mark’s is building up for music scholarship by adding evidence: (36) A> St ^Mark’s was building up for !m\usic _scholarship# - - and ^that’s our music don over th\ere# ^Miss [bl\6˜]# and [6m] - ^Miss . [bl\6]# is ôur Demetrius Gammon f=ellow# and [6m] ”^sh\e’s a musi_cologist# and ”âctually :one of your com:p\etitors# - -


is a St ^Mark’s gr\aduate# who is an âbsolutely !\excellent music/ologist# (1.3 997–1005)

Actually presents information which may be unexpected and therefore needs extra emphasis. The speaker may think that just saying ‘one of your competitors is a St Mark’s graduate’ is not forceful enough by itself and adds actually to indicate that he expects this to be a surprising piece of information. Actually can be compared with what’s more, in fact, as a matter of fact. The function of actually could also be to indicate that a preceding move needs to be elaborated. According to speaker B, a housewife, it is all right to be untidy while you are a student but not if you have a baby. She supports her claim by telling about her cousin. (37) B> but ^wait till you have a :b\aby# cos you’ll ^find sort of !dirty n\appies {in êvery/ !c\orner#}# and ^sort of ba”!n\ana ’skins# all ôver the pl/ace# Î have a c\ousin a ’bit like y/ou ’actually# he ûsed to _throw his _children ba!n\anas to ’eat# . when ^they were h/ungry# (2.10 981–87)

Actually may be used to suggest that some amendment (correction, clarification) needs to be made before the conversation can continue. I mean and actually may collocate in a self-corrective elaboration as in (38). Geoffrey has been talking on the radio about what could be done for spastic children in India: (38) A> well I ^think ’Geoffrey :perfectly r/\ealized ’this# I mean ^/\actually I t/old him ’that - quite ^possibly it !didn’t . I mean there’s ^no reason why it !sh\ould ’maybe# come ôver in this !pr\/ogramme# but . (2.14 562–65)

271


7.6.4 Actually as a marker of subjectivity and evaluation I shall regard actually as multifunctional since it has got interpersonal function as well as a metalinguistic or textual function. In its interpersonal function it serves as a style-marker and politeness marker. Actually has end-position and its contrastive function is weak. It is semantically bleached and is oriented to the speaker-hearer relationship as a ‘softener’ rather than to the organisation of the discourse. It may be experienced as ‘overworked’ and stigmatized especially when repeated. Actually as a softener was often overlapped and marked as ‘unclear’ in the transcription. This observation gets support from Clift (2001: 252): If actually is, turn-initially, potentially interruptive and turn-finally, potentially interruptible, then its vulnerability to overlap may be seen as potentially consequential for the uses to which it is put.

In (39), the function of actually is mainly phatic: (39)

[dh] ^this ^this is very \interesting /actually# be^cause I’m !!quite s\ure# [6‘ 6m] that that that that we’re ^wr\ong# . *I* I’m ^sure the A> *((^y\es#))* (B> Americans ((were :r\ight# . over this - [6] this this)) *Cor^n\ell#* [6] . ^b\usiness# (1.2.3 1259–66)

In (40), actually retains some contrastive meaning because of but in the same move. However the main function of the particle is to foreground a subjective opinion. Speakers A and C are looking at some paintings: (40) A> +I+ ^think it’s a”!g\ood p/icture# C> ^[/6h6]# (A> ^b=ut [6m]# I ^would find [Ádhi˜ 6m] - the c\olour# ^not the”!th\/eme so ’much# but the ^c\olour# I ^((would)) _find [6] you ^kn/ow# too ^h\eavy {for ^my r\oom#}# . but I ^think it’s a g\ood picture */actually#* C> *^[\m]#* -


^[\m]# A> I ^like [dhi] . you ^know the !\/upper ’part# . (1.8 493–504)

An interesting variant is illustrated in (41) where a cluster of interpersonal markers occupy the right-hand discourse slot before a tone unit boundary. Person A is a civil servant talking about the German system and what would have happened if ‘the German drive’ had gone into industry. The function of actually and the other hedging elements is softening and interpersonal. (41) A> in fact ône of the !tragic ’things about G\/ermany# and ^there I *:must say I :((absolutely)) a:gr\/ee*/ B> *^y\es# they âre a :marvellous r\/ace# I ^kn\ow#* (A> with you# is âll this ![of] âll this [tr6m] fan^tastic :\/industry {and a^b\/ility#}# +have+ a> +yes+ (A> ^((really)) been !w\asted# - - âctually in a !w\/ay I sup’pose# per^haps it’s a !good *thing* a> *(- coughs)* (A> for”!\us# and êverybody !\/else in ’Europe# that it ^w\as# (2.3 920–32)

In (42), actually serves as an afterthought (‘come to think of it’): (Situation: Discussion about which of the job applicants has a special interest in modern drama) (42) A> [6˜m .6] . in ^\any case# there’s ^n\obody# that Î can off:hand rec\all# on the ^l\/ist of ’applicants# ^who ex:presses ’any !special . !\interest in ’modern dr=ama# C> ^there’s [6]


A> there ^may be *\one#;-*; (C> *an !\Irishman ’doing ((th/at))#* A> +âh that’s !perfectly tr\ue# there îs !one \Irish [6˜m]+ B> +”^\Irish# ”^\Irish# . ^y\eah#+ (A> ’student# who’s sup^posed to be !very str\ong on ’that /actually# ^\isn’t *he#* ^come to th\ink of it# (2.6 407–21)

When actually cooccurred with a negation, it suggests that the speaker is defensive: (Situation: Speakers a and b know that they are being recorded although b denies being conscious of it) (43) a> ^wh\at were you ’saying about D/ilys# . b> we ^{sh\ould ’bring} !D\ilys a’long# ^she’d ’talk the !head off the !t\ape-re’corder# - - a> I ^think you’re ’more ’conscious of it than \I am# - b> ^wh\y# . a> you ^just !s\eem to ’be# . the ^way you !s\ay _things# - b> Î’m !n\ot /actually# *Î was ^[a˜] ^[a˜] - I’d ^just . I’d* (4.1 1036–44)

7.7 Conclusion In its core meaning which is similar to its etymological meaning, actually implies that there is a discrepancy between reality and what appears to be the case. Its discourse function is to express an attitude to an unexpected event. Depending on its position it can have different discourse functions. I have


distinguished between the position in initial position where actually is interruptive and has ‘mild’ argumentative functions. It can also have the rhetorical function to mark an elaboration (explanation, justification) When speakers use actually to initiate a new turn the intention may be to change the hearer’s perspective, thoughts, presuppositions even when these have not been expressed explicitly. Actually is also used in the speaker’s turn to mark a selfcorrection and indicate changes of the topic. Besides position, one of the most important functional clues is collocation. Moreover, prosody distinguishes between parenthetical and integrated adverbs and between actually in initial and final position. The polite function of signalling togetherness is marked by final position as well as by prosody, in particular by the fall-rise tone. In final position, the only function of the particle seems to be to soften what has been said by treating it as an opinion or evaluation. In a grammaticalisation perspective the multifunctionality of actually can be explained in terms of its development from an intensifying adverb to a discourse particle. Grammaticalisation also provides an explanation for the correlation between the position of actually and its functions. Synchronically the discourse particle uses can be distinguished syntactically (e.g. in terms of position) and prosodically (by a special tone) from the intensifier and from the evidential adverb.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The last ten years have seen an explosion of articles, overviews and books on discourse particles representing different theoretical frameworks, approaches and languages. The purpose of this monograph has been to contribute to the study of discourse particles by showing how the methods of corpus linguistics can sharpen the description of discourse particles and increase our understanding of what they are doing in discourse. The need for natural data in studies of discourse particles has been generally recognised. Corpora make it possible to use longer text extracts and to analyse the functions of discourse particles in their social and situational context. The data from a corpus also make it possible to study the influence of linguistic and contextual factors such as collocations, prosody, text type and position in the discourse. The study of individual discourse particles cannot proceed without some theoretical prolegomena. Chapter 1 of this monograph provides a platform for the empirical study of discourse particles. I have defined discourse particles as indexical elements which have been grammaticalised or are in the process of undergoing grammaticalisation and as a result have certain formal and functional properties. Following an approach which has been shown to be fruitful in other works (Kroon 1995, Mosegaard Hansen 1998), discourse particles have been regarded as polysemous since they have discourse functions on both the textual and interpersonal level. This is compatible with regarding them as grammaticalised and would explain that they can have functions which are coloured by their literal or etymological meaning. It was generally not easy to define a basic meaning for the individual discourse particles. However in many cases the core meaning was close to the etymological meaning of the particle. The core meaning of now was, for instance, temporal. In Chapter 1, I argued that discourse particles are words which have a large indexical potentiality. As a result of grammaticalisation they have conventional discourse functions on the textual or interpersonal level. Formally they have certain properties of which the most important is the position in the pre-front


field. Other formal properties do not define what we mean by discourse particles but are useful as functional clues and may serve to distinguish between the discourse particle and a homonymous adverb. In the introductory chapter I also considered different theoretical approaches to treating discourse particles as a group. For my purposes neither speech act theory nor relevance theory proved to be sufficient although aspects of them have influenced my approach, in particular the procedural analysis of discourse particles as signals or instructions to the hearer to interpret the text in a certain way. Discourse analysis provides us with a description of the units we need to analyse and the textual functions of discourse particles while the intensifying and interpersonal function of discourse particles could be explained as strategies motivated by politeness. The descriptive chapters have been devoted to a discussion of the functions and contexts of particular discourse particles. In Chapters 2–7, I have discussed six different particles. Each chapter analyses the meaning and discourse functions of the particle. The formal features functioning as clues to the function of the particle are discussed although the link between form and function was sometimes weak. Since I looked at grammaticalisation as a motivating factor for discourse particle status I tried to outline the stages and triggers of grammaticalisation for each particle. English has a large inventory of discourse particles and it has only been possible to analyse a few in detail. Now is described in Chapter 2. Now is closely related to well with which it was contrasted (cf. Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen forthcoming). It was shown that now was polysemous with a core meaning closely associated with the temporal adverb. Unlike other discourse particles now was above all frequent in argumentative text and in descriptions. It was also used in monologues functioning as an emphatic topic changer. In certain of its uses now had affective meaning and could be regarded as a modal particle. Chapter 3 was concerned with oh (and ah). It was shown that the core meaning ‘surprise’ was a rich source for discourse functions in the textual and interpersonal domain. Like now it could be seen to have a modal particle function as an intensifier. The core meaning also explains that oh could have the function to receive new information in certain positions. In Chapter 4, I discussed the use of just as an attitudinal particle. It was shown to have a core meaning related to the etymological meaning ‘only’, ‘exclusively’, As a discourse particle it has affective meaning and can be motivated by politeness as suggested by Brown & Levinson (1987). Moreover an important function of just is as a rhetorical strategy in argumentative texts.

Conclusion 279

Chapter 5 deals with sort of. Sort of was seen to be problematic because it affects the truth conditions of the utterance in which it is placed. In order to analyse the approximative function of sort of Austin’s notion ‘adjuster’ was useful. Sort of signals that the hearer will be able to make adjustments if there is some discrepancy between what is said and what is represented in the world. Sort of like just is mainly interpersonal as a discourse particle and its functions can be explained by conversational maxims and strategies of politeness. Chapter 6 described utterance-final tags introduced by and and by or. It is shown that they can lose their meanings as categorization particles and take the whole sentence as their scope. In that case they appear to be related to sort of or you know in their interpersonal meaning. I show that although it may be tempting to treat the ‘utterance-final tag’ only as a discourse variable, the tags have often developed different discourse functions. The final chapter discusses actually. Actually is similar to sort of since it is an adjuster word signalling to the hearer that there is a discrepancy or gap between what is said and the world. This is not to be seen as a bad match however but as a gesture towards the hearer that they are ‘similar’ and share the knowledge which is necessary to interpret what is said. We can assume that the area of discourse particles is very large and that subclassifications need to be carried out. Discourse particles can no doubt be studied from multiple perspectives contributing to our knowledge of discourse, language processing and the relation between language and society. Contrastive approaches in order to compare the use and functions of discourse particles in two or more languages are, moreover, likely to provide us with new data contributing to our knowledge of what discourse particles are doing in one or several languages. The present volume deals with only a selection of discourse particles. It would therefore be interesting to include many more discourse particles in order to get a better picture of what they have in common and how they are different.

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Name index A Aarts, B. 33, 170, 281 Aarts, J. 29, 281 Aijmer xiv, 6, 278, 281, 289 Allerton 262, 281 Altenberg 2, 33, 35, 65, 66, 281 Andersen 1, 5, 7, 10, 19, 26, 38, 39, 54, 176, 178, 281, 288 Andersson 7, 8, 18, 281 Ariel 15, 22, 218, 219, 281, 282 Auer 16, 17, 29, 30, 35, 102, 281 Austin 8, 175, 192, 252, 279, 281 B Bäcklund 70, 87, 282, 288, 289 Ball 218, 219, 282 Barsalou 241, 282 Bazzanella 3, 7, 27, 48, 49, 51, 53, 282 Bernstein 48, 53, 282 Biber 33, 34, 259, 261, 282 Birner 212, 213, 226, 242, 289 Blakemore 9, 10, 282 Blass 7, 15, 282 Bolinger 22, 23, 32, 57, 65, 67, 71, 84, 101, 103, 108, 117, 118, 120, 127, 145, 178, 186, 282 Bosk 287 Brazil 230, 231, 264, 282, 288 Brinton 1, 2, 7, 17, 39, 48, 73, 282 Bronzwaer 58-60, 70, 73, 282 Brown, G. 253, 282 Brown, P. 8, 22, 50, 153, 154, 159, 160, 163-165, 168, 169, 179, 180, 194, 201, 203, 205, 206, 228, 234, 278, 282 Bruce 285 Button 132, 133, 282

C Carlson 3, 6, 7, 19, 20, 22, 24-26, 45, 71, 103, 104, 128, 129, 138, 282 Casey 132, 133, 282 Chafe 48, 97, 98, 123, 131, 142, 151, 153, 164, 175, 179, 180, 251, 282, 283 Channell 175, 197, 202, 207, 212, 213, 216, 219-221, 226, 231, 237, 244, 283 Clift 272, 283 Coates 182, 283 Cohen 160, 283 Coulmas 103, 283 Coulthard 13, 35, 36, 40, 42, 57, 69, 71, 88, 93, 282, 288 Cruse 164, 283 Cruttenden 262, 281 Crystal xiii, 220, 231, 283 D Davy 220, 283 Dines 53, 212, 227, 283 Dubois 53, 212, 222, 233, 240, 283 E Edmondson 135, 136, 149, 220, 283 Eeg-Olofsson 288 Erman 25, 157, 160, 161, 164, 170, 173, 179, 215, 227, 234, 283 F Fanshel 108, 119, 120, 286 Fernandez 6, 15, 283 Ferrara 110, 283 Filipsson 285 Finegan 259, 261, 282


Finell 63, 64, 74, 76, 283 Fischer 7, 25, 283 Fónagy 103, 283 Foolen 2, 7, 8, 16, 98, 284 Forsheden 288 Frader 287 Fraser 2, 6, 12, 13, 18, 33, 38, 98, 120, 266, 284 Fretheim 1, 10, 281, 288 Frid 285 G Gibbs 155-157, 161, 285 Goffman 87, 93, 111, 284 Greenbaum xiv, 4, 60, 70, 143, 284, 287, 288 Grice 8, 9, 20, 163, 202, 284 Gülich 7, 284 Gumperz 42, 284, 286 H Halliday 29, 33, 39, 66, 69, 214, 234, 284 Hansen 1-3, 6, 7, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 34, 38, 40, 69, 87, 93, 277, 284 Hansson 285 Hasan 33, 39, 66, 69, 214, 284 He 2, 7, 52, 121, 122, 284 Heritage 26, 108, 109, 112, 113, 119, 120, 124, 125, 132, 137, 282, 284 Hirschberg 33, 59, 66, 284 Holmes 49, 54, 153, 154, 163, 170, 179, 181, 182, 184, 186, 187, 190-194, 197-201, 203, 207, 284, 285 Hopper 16, 18, 19, 160, 181, 285 Horne 32, 59, 66, 285 House 135, 136, 149, 220, 283 Hübler 199, 285 Hudson 241, 243, 285 Huspek 53, 285 J James, A. 44, 49, 50, 196, 199, 200, 203, 204, 206, 213, 220

James, D. 104, 145 Jefferson 233, 236, 247, 285 Jespersen 97, 285 Johns 282 Jucker 1, 7, 10, 20, 53, 54, 90, 98, 106, 107, 121, 136, 180, 203, 228, 251, 255, 260, 269, 281, 284-286, 288, 290 K Kalland 31, 285 Kay 178, 182, 193, 207, 285 Kishner 155-157, 161, 285 Kjellmer 22, 28, 288 Knott 7, 286 Kroon 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 25-27, 36, 39, 40, 64, 277, 286 L Labov 108, 119, 120, 153, 219, 240, 242, 286 Lakoff 160, 175, 213, 286 Lange 19, 90, 176, 287 Lee 155, 157-159, 286 Leech 165, 286-288 Lehmann 18, 286 Lehrer 197, 286 Lenk 3, 5, 7, 13, 19, 27, 37, 40, 56, 76, 77, 254, 259, 260, 286 Levinson 8, 22, 50, 69, 154, 159, 160, 163-165, 168, 169, 179, 180, 194, 201, 203, 205, 206, 228, 234, 278, 282, 286 Lindsey 2, 7, 52, 121, 122, 284 Litman 33, 59, 66, 284 Local 109, 110, 286 M Malamud-Makowski 266, 284 Mann 7, 286 Maschler 77, 111, 286 Morra 27, 282 Mulac 17, 289 Murray 31, 286

Name index 293

N Nevalainen 155, 158, 160, 163, 283, 286 Nølke 26, 286 O Ochs 14, 62, 71, 153, 161, 286 Oh 261, 286 Oostdijk 29, 281 Oreström 288 Östman 1, 7, 15, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 34, 39, 54, 55, 58, 156, 190, 232, 245, 284, 286, 287 Overstreet 212, 219, 232, 233, 240, 287 P Palander-Collin 18, 287 Paradis 164, 287 Polanyi 44, 45, 87, 141, 287 Powell 254, 287 Prince 175, 179, 192, 193, 287 Q Quirk 4, 63, 64, 71-73, 156, 158, 159, 172, 176, 256, 257, 287, 288 R Redeker 13, 15, 86, 287 Ríos 243, 287 Romaine 19, 90, 176, 287 Romero Trillo 34, 287 S Sacks 42, 111, 287 Sankoff 31, 289 Scha 44, 45, 87, 141, 287 Schegloff 42, 107, 111, 135-137, 287 Schiffrin 3, 6, 8, 11-13, 26, 30, 32, 38-40, 42, 47, 58, 60-62, 70, 72, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 98, 102, 103, 115, 122, 124, 126, 128, 129, 135, 143, 254, 286, 287 Schourup 2, 3, 6, 23, 25, 31, 56, 97, 98, 104, 139, 140, 287, 288 Searle 8, 288 Severinson Eklundh 119, 288 Simon-Vandenbergen 6, 278, 281

Sinclair 13, 35, 36, 40, 42, 57, 69, 71, 88, 93, 264, 288, 289 Smith 53, 54, 98, 106, 107, 121, 136, 180, 203, 228, 251, 255, 260, 269, 285, 288 Sperber 8-10, 288 Stenström xiv, 2, 27, 32-34, 50, 66-68, 70, 73, 75, 100, 102, 106, 108, 127, 134, 136, 188, 255, 256, 281, 283, 288 Stubbs 35, 40-42, 77, 120, 131, 138, 211, 288 Suzuki 60, 68, 70, 94, 288 Svartvik 32, 66, 67, 143, 188, 288 T Tabor 181, 288 Taglicht 252, 257, 267, 288 Thavenius 288 Thompson 7, 17, 286, 289 Tognini-Bonelli 30, 252, 253, 289 Tottie 156, 157, 288, 289 Traugott 7, 16, 17, 19, 38, 157, 159, 160, 217, 254, 255, 285, 289 Tsui 36, 46, 119, 129, 131, 137, 138, 289 V Van Baar 7, 14, 16, 27, 289 Vicher 31, 289 Vincent 247, 289 W Ward 212, 226, 242, 289 Watts 10, 29, 253, 289 Weinreich 158, 159, 178, 218, 289 Weydt 54, 289 Wichmann 32, 289 Wierzbicka 1, 22, 148, 158, 289, 290 Wilkins 101, 103, 143, 290 Wilson 8-10, 288 Y Yule 212, 219, 232, 233, 240, 253, 282, 287 Z Ziv 1, 7, 180, 281, 284-286, 290 Zwicky 27, 290

Subject index

A activity type 69 adaptor 192 adjuster word 192, 219, 252, 279 affect 6, 14, 33, 91, 99, 106, 111, 142, 143, 153, 199-202, 213, 217, 249 see also affective meaning affective meaning 87, 91, 93, 101, 178, 180, 183, 186, 189, 192, 248, 278 American English 3, 54, 106, 110, 233 approximation 49, 99, 141, 144, 175, 179, 192, 196, 212, 213, 220, 226, 234, 244 aside 61, 87, 141 assessment 100, 132, 137 B backchannel 5, 35, 36, 39, 53, 100, 101, 110, 119, 124, 132, 135- 138, 144, 145 backwards-looking 99, 102, 104, 124 Bergen Corpus of London Teenager Language 5 see also COLT C categorial heterogeneity 27 categorization 219, 224, 279 categorization particle 279 category hedge 240, 248 clarification 17, 86, 99, 115, 116, 125, 126, 262, 265, 268, 271 clustering 30, 31, 167 coherence 7, 12, 13, 39, 40, 42, 55, 62, 74, 286

collocation 27, 28, 31, 61, 90, 99, 100, 104, 105, 118, 167, 189, 190, 198, 207, 275 COLT 5, 50, 106, 157, 176, 183, 206-208, 233, 243, 261, 262 compositionality 226, 227 compromiser 50, 199, 206 connective 5, 13, 62, 72, 74, 160 contextualization cues 42 conventionalisation 15, 26 conversation analysis 7, 11 core function 22-25, 70, 103, 104, 154, 157, 158, 175, 218, 219 core meaning 6, 20, 23, 70, 71, 99, 103, 105, 145, 154, 157, 158, 173-175, 178, 213, 218, 251, 252, 274, 277, 278 corpus xiii, xiv, 1-6, 23, 26, 27, 32-34, 50, 56, 57, 58, 62, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 97, 105, 106, 113, 124, 145, 153, 157, 175, 176, 183, 184, 186, 206, 207, 211, 221-223, 222, 231-233, 243, 248, 251, 259, 261, 262, 277 corpus linguistics 3, 32, 251 cross-categorial polyfunctionality 27 see also double meaning D D-item 27 see also discourse item D-use 58, 59 see also discourse item dialogue 34, 70, 73, 102, 119, 121 dialogue game theory 7, 20, 103 direct quotation 142, 143 see also direct speech


direct speech 42, 45, 88, 89, 142, 194 disclaimer 91, 92 discourse item 106 disjunct 256, 257 dispreferred 46 double meaning 27, 28 downtoning 48, 102, 103, 111, 154, 157-159, 168, 174, 180, 181, 187, 189, 191, 199, 200, 208, 219, 220 E endorsement 100, 101, 132, 138 evaluation 5, 42, 62, 87, 90-92, 111, 140, 142, 143, 154, 173, 243, 272, 275 evidential 6, 18, 48, 49, 175, 191, 192, 254, 275 evidentiality 48, 179, 251 evincive 98 exchange 12, 13, 35, 36, 45, 72, 124 expressive prosody 110, 154, 174 F face-saving 49, 168, 246 face-threatening 30, 169, 192, 201, 205, 246, 268 floor-holder 258 floor-holding 31, 50, 188, 190 follow-up 36, 73, 100, 101, 119, 123, 124, 127, 131, 133, 138, 145 footing 93, 111 forwards-looking 14, 79, 99, 102 frame 20, 30, 40-42, 55, 57, 64, 77, 78, 111, 284 frame-break 88 frame-shift 90, 111 frameshifting 100, 139 G gender 14, 53, 54, 161 German 1, 29 grammaticalisation 5, 14, 16-19, 22, 26, 29, 55, 58, 60, 62, 63, 95, 102-104, 151, 154, 160, 174, 175, 180, 181,

183, 208, 213, 217, 218, 227, 249, 251, 254, 255, 275, 277, 278 grammaticalised 2, 7, 9, 74, 79, 99 Gricean 9, 120, 154, 163, 232 H hedge 48, 51, 141, 144, 154, 163, 174, 175, 192, 198, 200, 201, 205, 208, 214, 216, 219, 227, 244, 245, 290 homonymy 19, 21, 22 I I think 2, 8, 17, 18, 31, 48, 53, 91, 95, 113, 129, 141, 151, 169, 180, 192, 270 implicature 159, 160 in fact 65, 251, 254, 255, 257, 261, 266, 271 indeed 16, 17, 138 indexical 12, 14, 16, 22, 25, 26, 95, 99, 101, 102, 104, 154, 158, 160, 161, 217, 241, 277 see also indexicality indexicality 5, 14, 16, 99, 101, 102, 151, 154, 213, 217, 249 indirectness 49, 168, 169 intensification 23, 93, 99, 102-108, 117, 118, 148, 149, 156-158, 161, 174, 180, 191, 201, 212, 240, 242, 248, 254, 257, 259, 275, 278 intensifier 71, 91, 93-95, 101, 118, 144, 147, 151, 163, 178, 192, 254, 258, 261, 262, 275, 278 see also intensification intensifying see intensification interjection 98, 102, 103, 111, 113, 183 interpersonal 6, 13, 19-21, 26, 38-40, 48-51, 54, 55, 98, 103, 104, 153, 154, 160, 173, 176, 180, 181, 189, 191, 207, 212, 216, 217, 220, 227, 228, 231, 234, 253, 272, 273, 277-279 involvement 6, 33, 39, 93, 100, 111, 129, 153, 155, 164, 166

Subject index 297

L Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus 5, 70, 153, 259 left-dislocation 41, 75, 76 listing 46, 83 LLC see London-Lund Corpus

LOB see Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen corpus London-Lund Corpus xiii, 2-6, 14, 27, 33, 34, 53, 61, 66, 68-70, 105, 106, 109, 113, 124, 127, 145, 153, 157, 161, 176, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190, 207, 208, 221, 223, 231-233, 237, 248, 259, 261, 262 M maxim 8, 120, 149, 163, 202, 219, 232, 234 maximalism 19 metacomment 41, 73, 87 metalinguistic marker 75 metalinguistic operator 158, 173, 218 see also metalinguistic marker metaphor 160, 179, 189, 194, 195 minimalism 19, 20, 21 misplacement 40, 42, 77, 95, 111 mitigation 153, 154, 206 modal particle 7, 74, 91, 93, 95, 153, 154, 278 monologue 34, 66, 70, 73, 79 move 13, 20, 36, 47, 73, 101-103, 119, 127, 131, 133, 135, 138, 268, 271, 272 see also backchannel, followup multifunctionality 3, 5, 19, 27, 28, 55, 102, 103, 151, 158, 160, 275 N negative politeness 49, 154, 159, 163, 168, 169, 174, 180, 192, 199, 205, 206, 246 news-receipt 109

newsmark 100, 132 see also news-receipt O OK 2, 4, 17, 22, 31, 42, 43, 52, 102 P pairing 51, 52, 121 pause xvi, 32-35, 50, 55, 68, 67, 68, 73, 88, 104, 134, 140, 156, 177, 188, 189, 195, 197, 199 persuasion 159, 163, 170, 174 phatic function 6, 48, 49, 51 polysemous 21, 22, 55, 60, 155, 160, 277, 278 polysemy 19, 21, 22, 55, 103, 160, 180, 285 positive politeness 50, 159, 164, 165, 167, 168, 174, 176, 192, 201, 206, 240 pragmatic particle 28, 54, 191, 285 pragmaticalisation 19, 23, 62 pre-front field 29, 30, 32, 102, 254, 277 preface 41, 64, 77, 88, 268 preferred 46, 109 presentation marker 256 principle of relevance 10 procedural 11, 18, 23, 158, 173, 176, 180, 194, 209, 213, 265, 278 prompt 93 prosodic phrasing 32, 64, 104 prospective 37, 38, 75, 119 see also forwards-looking push marker 45, 90, 141 Q qualifier 15, 40, 45, 46, 47 R reception marker 98, 99, 121 reduced tag 226 referent-final tag 212, 248 referring tone 231, 264 relevance theory 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 176, 278, 285


reopener 100, 134, 135 reported speech 19, 110, 143, 183 response marker 98, 99, 128, 151 see also reception marker retrospective 37, 38, 42, 119, 132, 151 see also backwards-looking S self-correction 42, 99, 139, 268, 275 self-repair 99, 192, 198 see also self-correction speech act theory 7, 8, 278 subjectification 62, 180, 217, 255 switch-off signal 75, 76 switch-on signal 75

T textual function 6, 14, 39, 40, 60, 217, 234, 272 theme 29, 76 tone unit xiii, xiv, 4, 30, 32-35, 59, 62, 65, 67, 108, 113, 147, 186, 187, 218, 229, 231, 232, 257, 262-264, 273 topic change 21, 62, 74, 75, 79, 87, 111, 254 topic shift 6, 32, 43, 76, 93 topicalizer 132-134, 136 transaction 35, 69, 71 transcription xiii, 5, 143, 183, 272 turn-taking 12, 38, 94 U universal semantics 20 upgrading 102, 105, 111, 117, 151 utterance-final tag 217, 279

In the series STUDIES IN CORPUS LINGUISTICS (SCL) the following titles have been published thus far: 1. PEARSON, Jennifer: Terms in Context. 1998. 2. PARTINGTON, Alan: Patterns and Meanings. Using corpora for English language research and teaching. 1998. 3. BOTLEY, Simon and Anthony Mark McENERY (eds.): Corpus-based and Computational Approaches to Discourse Anaphora. 2000. 4. HUNSTON, Susan and Gill FRANCIS: Pattern Grammar. A corpus-driven approach to the lexical grammar of English. 2000. 5. GHADESSY, Mohsen, Alex HENRY and Robert L. ROSEBERRY (eds.): Small Corpus Studies and ELT. Theory and practice. 2001. 6. TOGNINI-BONELLI, Elena: Corpus Linguistics at Work. 2001. 7. ALTENBERG, Bengt and Sylviane GRANGER (eds.): Lexis in Contrast. Corpus-based approaches. 2002. 8. STENSTRÖM, Anna-Brita, Gisle ANDERSEN and Ingrid Kristine HASUND: Trends in Teenage Talk. Corpus compilation, analysis and findings. 2002. 9. REPPEN, Randi, Susan M. FITZMAURICE and Douglas BIBER (eds.): TUsing Corpora to Explore Linguistic Variation. n.y.p. 10. AIJMER, Karin: English Discourse Particles. Evidence from a corpus. 2002. 11. BARNBROOK, Geoff: Defining Language. A local grammar of definition sentences. n.y.p.

English Discourse Particles: Evidence from a Corpus (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Corpus Approaches to Grammaticalization in English (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Discourse In The Professions: Perspectives From Corpus Linguistics (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, SCL 16)

Collocations in a Learner Corpus (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Perspectives on Corpus Linguistics (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Corpus Linguistics

Lexis in Contrast: Corpus-based Approaches (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction

Lexis in Contrast: Corpus-based Approaches (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Discourse on the Move: Using corpus analysis to describe discourse structure (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction (Studies in English Language)

Corpus, Cognition and Causative Constructions (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Keyness in Texts (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Corpus-based Approaches to English Language Teaching (Corpus and Discourse)

Corpus and Context: Investigating Pragmatic Functions in Spoken Discourse (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, Volume 30)

Metadiscourse in L1 And L2 English (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English General Nouns: A Corpus Theoretical Approach (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, Volume 20)

Historical Corpus Stylistics (Corpus and Discourse)

Corpus Linguistics in Literary Analysis: Jane Austen and her Contemporaries (Studies in Corpus and Discourse)

Structural Nativization in Indian English Lexicogrammar (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English General Nouns: A Corpus Theoretical Approach (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, Volume 20)

Researching Specialized Languages (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Statistics for Corpus Linguistics

Corpus

Corpus

An Introduction to Corpus Linguistics (Studies in Language and Linguistics)

Grammaticalization and English Complex Prepositions A Corpus-Based Study (Routledge Advances in Corpus Linguistics)

Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus (Corpus and Discourse)

Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus (Corpus And Discourse)

Small Corpus Studies and Elt: Theory and Practice (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

University Language: A corpus-based study of spoken and written registers (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English Discourse Particles: Evidence from a Corpus (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Corpus Approaches to Grammaticalization in English (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Discourse In The Professions: Perspectives From Corpus Linguistics (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, SCL 16)

Collocations in a Learner Corpus (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Perspectives on Corpus Linguistics (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Corpus Linguistics

Lexis in Contrast: Corpus-based Approaches (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction

Lexis in Contrast: Corpus-based Approaches (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Discourse on the Move: Using corpus analysis to describe discourse structure (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction (Studies in English Language)

Corpus, Cognition and Causative Constructions (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Keyness in Texts (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Corpus-based Approaches to English Language Teaching (Corpus and Discourse)

Corpus and Context: Investigating Pragmatic Functions in Spoken Discourse (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, Volume 30)

Metadiscourse in L1 And L2 English (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English General Nouns: A Corpus Theoretical Approach (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, Volume 20)

Historical Corpus Stylistics (Corpus and Discourse)

Corpus Linguistics in Literary Analysis: Jane Austen and her Contemporaries (Studies in Corpus and Discourse)

Structural Nativization in Indian English Lexicogrammar (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

English General Nouns: A Corpus Theoretical Approach (Studies in Corpus Linguistics, Volume 20)

Researching Specialized Languages (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

Statistics for Corpus Linguistics

Corpus

Corpus

An Introduction to Corpus Linguistics (Studies in Language and Linguistics)

Grammaticalization and English Complex Prepositions A Corpus-Based Study (Routledge Advances in Corpus Linguistics)

Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus (Corpus and Discourse)

Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus (Corpus And Discourse)

Small Corpus Studies and Elt: Theory and Practice (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

University Language: A corpus-based study of spoken and written registers (Studies in Corpus Linguistics)

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