Ending 'East of Suez': The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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ENDING ‘EAST OF SUEZ’

OXF O R D H I S TO R I C A L M O N O G R A PH S Editors .  . . .  .  .  .  . .  . - . . 

Ending ‘East of Suez’ The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964–1968 P. L. PH AM

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford   Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York  P. L. Pham 2010

The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Pham, P. L. Ending ‘‘east of Suez’’ : the British decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964–1968 / Phuong Pham. p. cm.—(Oxford historical monographs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–19–958036–1 (hardback : acid-free paper) 1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Malaysia. 2. Malaysia—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 3. Great Britain—Military policy. 4. Great Britain—Politics and government—1964–1979. 5. Southeast Asia—Defenses. 6. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Singapore. 7. Singapore—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 8. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1964–1979. 9. Indonesia—History—1950–1966. I. Title. DA47.9.M4P53 2010 959.505’1—dc22 2009036127 Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–958036–1 (Hbk.) 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents Acknowledgements Abbreviations & Conventions Introduction

vii ix 1

PA RT I . C O M P RO M I S E Introduction to Part I

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1. Beginning the Defence Review: October 1964–June 1965

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2. The Perils of Alliance: June–September 1965

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3. A Dubious Compromise: October 1965–February 1966

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Conclusion to Part I

88 PA RT I I . C O N F L I C T

Introduction to Part II

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4. The End of Consensus: March–October 1966

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5. From Dissent to Revolt: October 1966–April 1967

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6. The Battle for Withdrawal: April–July 1967

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Conclusion to Part II

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PA RT I I I . B R E A K D OW N 7. A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January 1968

201

Conclusion

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Appendix: Personae

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Bibliography Index

250 261

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Acknowledgements In the course of completing a work such as this, one inevitably incurs a great number of debts. I must extend my profound thanks: to John Darwin, my doctoral supervisor and advising editor, whose sense of duty, diligence and care helped nurture this work to its fruition; to Martin Conway and Simon Skinner, my tutors at Balliol College, Oxford, whose support and sympathy were indispensable; to Richard Coggins, Jonathan Tepper and Zoe Laidlaw, with whom I had many intelligent, stimulating and enjoyable discussions throughout the course of my studies; to the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Fund, the Arnold, Read and Bryce Funds, and Balliol College, Oxford, whose immense generosity enabled me to carry out my local and international research; to the staffs of the Public Record Office, London, the National Archives of Australia, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, the United States National Archives, the Bodleian Library, and the State Library of Victoria, whose valuable service and facilities were essential to my work; and finally, to Ian Jackson, whose patience, generosity, dedication, and love helped it all happen.


Abbreviations AHC AMDA ANZUS BHC Bod CF CINC(FE) CO Conf F CRO DEA DEAC DRWP FADC FO FRUS HMG LBJL memcon MOD NAA NSF OPD OPD(O) PLP PRO tel.

Australian High Commission Anglo–Malaysian Defence Agreement Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty) British High Commission Bodleian Library, Oxford Country File Commander-in-Chief, Far East Commonwealth Office, London Confidential File Commonwealth Relations Office, London Department of Economic Affairs, London Australian Department of External Affairs, Canberra Defence Review Working Party Australian Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee Foreign Office, London Foreign Relations of the United States Her Majesty’s Government Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas memorandum of a conversation Ministry of Defence, London National Archives of Australia, Canberra National Security File Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee Parliamentary Labour Party Public Record Office (now the National Archives), Kew telegram

x USNA WHCF

Abbreviations United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland White House Central File

A N OT E O N S PE L L I N G For the sake of consistency, British spellings have been adopted throughout. Foreign names have been rendered in the conventional British spelling of the period. All dates have been expressed according to British convention, i.e. day/month/year.

Introduction The purpose of post-war British government, a senior civil servant once said, was ‘the orderly management of decline’.¹ When the then Prime Minister was told this by his Treasury head, he was shocked by the defeatism which he felt the statement implied. Yet sentiment aside, the problem being named was one that bedevilled successive British Governments: how to reduce Britain’s role to match its resources and what to reduce that role to. In the late 1940s, the crux of the issue was how to manage India’s independence. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was how to manage the great wave of decolonization sweeping Africa and Asia. Even after these major shifts, Britain retained the outlook and significant trappings of a world power. It continued to be an active party to a web of alliances and treaties across the globe, and maintained a major military presence in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. While the territorial empire might have been diminishing, the claim to a worldwide role remained. It would take another chapter in Britain’s saga of ‘decline’ before this last vestige of Empire was lost. In January 1968, the Wilson Government announced that Great Britain would be abandoning any special role ‘East of Suez’. No longer, the Government declared, was Britain a world power with special worldwide interests and responsibilities. The Empire was gone. Britain’s concerns would now be limited almost exclusively to Europe and the North Atlantic. The purpose of this book is to examine the change in policy that lay at the core of the British Government’s professed change in outlook. Its focus is on how Harold Wilson’s Labour Government arrived at the central reorientation of foreign policy that was sealed with the January 1968 statement: the decision to end Britain’s role in Malaysia and Singapore. The twin states were of major symbolic ¹ Sir William Armstrong to Edward Heath, quoted in Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989), p. 76.

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Ending ‘East of Suez’

and strategic importance for British defence and foreign policy. They were the keystones of Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia, a presence substantially greater than that in the Middle East, and of equivalent size to that in mainland Europe. Britain’s role in the region lay at the intersection of two of Churchill’s three great spheres of British influence: the Commonwealth and the Anglo–American relationship. For the Commonwealth, the British presence expressed the country’s commitment not simply to the new states in the Indo-Pacific region, but also to the old dominions of Australia and New Zealand. For the Anglo–American relationship, the presence embodied Britain’s partnership with the United States in maintaining the Western position against Communism in Southeast Asia. Britain’s withdrawal from this role meant a loosening of its Commonwealth ties, and a diminution of its status as key US partner in the Western Alliance. How did the Wilson Government reach so significant a decision, affecting not simply Britain’s military deployments but its sense of status and position in the world? Did the Government live up to its putative purpose of achieving the ‘orderly management’ of Britain’s withdrawal from the world stage to a purely European role? Or was it a more haphazard journey, with little firm consensus or clear understanding of what Britain should be ‘declining’ to, or what its future role should be? Lord Curzon had predicted a different outcome. Once India became independent, he had argued, the rationale for Britain’s overseas role would evaporate. With India gone, Curzon had claimed, ‘Your ports and coaling stations, your fortresses and dockyards, your Crown Colonies and protectorates will go too’.² But Curzon was wrong. For two decades after the restoration of British power in Malaysia and Singapore at the end of the Second World War, Britain’s Southeast Asian presence remained a key component in the country’s worldwide role. While India gained independence, Malaysia and Singapore assumed a new value in British eyes. In a world rapidly being redrawn by the politics of the Cold War and in which Britain struggled to compete, Malaysia and Singapore emerged as major economic and strategic assets. Economically, the Malaysian states, with their rich resources of tin and rubber, were vital in the effort to maintain sterling’s position in the world financial markets. Battle-weary, debt-burdened Britain had ² Quoted in Philip Darby, Britain’s Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 1.

Introduction

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been desperate for hard US currency since the end of the Second World War. The wider sterling area was a key resource: in 1952/3, its Asian members contributed 45% of sterling’s balance of payments surplus with the US dollar; Malaya and Singapore by themselves contributed more than 35% of the total, the single largest earners of US currency.³ Strategically, the British presence in Malaysia—encompassing the major army, air force and naval base on Singapore, air force bases at Butterworth, Seletar and Tengah, and army bases at Terendak and Johore—was an asset for both Britain and its allies. It enabled Britain to defend the local communal elites, on whom British power depended, from Communist insurgency. Through this, it helped justify the privileged position of British business in the peninsular states. With Australia and New Zealand both concerned to maintain a strategy of forward defence, the British presence was also an expression of its commitment to those two countries, to which Britain was bound by ties of sentiment and history as well as economic self-interest. Most of all, the British presence was perceived by the United States as a bulwark of Western power in a region which was becoming the focus of intense superpower rivalries. While the US had maintained a coolly critical attitude towards the old European empires during the Second World War, this attitude was soon modified after Roosevelt’s death and the emergence, beginning with the post-war settlement, of competing ideological blocs. US pressure on the Dutch had aided the emergence of an independent Indonesia under President Sukarno in 1948, but within the next two years American attitudes towards the European colonial powers shifted markedly, after the ‘loss’ of China, the signing of the Sino–Soviet treaty, and the outbreak of the Korean War. From this point on, Communism, not colonialism, in Southeast Asia was America’s main concern, a shift in attitude crystallized by the support they now gave the French in Indochina.⁴ The US thus came to regard the British presence in Southeast Asia not only as benign, but as bolstering their own position and that of the West’s. The old colonial powers were formally drawn into the ³ A.J. Stockwell, ‘British Imperial Strategy and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia’, in Britain and Southeast Asia, ed. D.K. Bassett and V.T. King (Hull: University of Hull Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p. 82. ⁴ A.J. Stockwell, ‘Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of the European Colonial Empires’, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pt 2, ch. 1.

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security structure of the region with the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. An effective division of labour was developed, with Britain responsible for curbing Communist insurgency on the Malayan peninsula, during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, and the US replacing the faltering French in Indochina. This division of responsibilities persisted as the American role in Vietnam escalated. While, through the mid-1960s, the US repeatedly asked the British to contribute at least a token force to Vietnam, the British consistently declined, pointing to their own role in Malaysia. Though not enthusiastic about the lack of an active British role in Vietnam, the Americans largely accepted this, appreciating and valuing Britain’s Malaysian commitments.⁵ While no match for the American military machine, British forces, thanks to their historic role in the region, could defend areas where American involvement would be locally unacceptable. By these means, Britain could lay claim to be the United States’ leading partner not just in Europe but across the globe. If these factors provided some justification for the British presence in Malaysia and Singapore, on the other side of the ledger was another cluster of factors that limited both Britain’s desire and ability to maintain this. There were political and financial reasons for diminishing Britain’s role: politically, regional nationalism had to be dealt with in one way or another; financially, there were substantial benefits to be had if the cost of direct colonial rule could be reduced. In reaching for a solution to these issues, however, the British ironically only added to their burdens, becoming entangled in the fractious political battle between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and in the costly Confrontation against the new Malaysian Federation’s enemies. From the declaration of the Emergency in 1948 onwards, the fervour of Malaya’s nationalist movement had been tempered by the reliance of communal elites on British defences against Communist insurgency. Nevertheless, British authorities still had to reach some sort of accommodation with nationalist leaders. Colonial officials were well aware that they needed to provide concessions and eventually grant independence to ‘responsible’ local authorities if stability was to be maintained, British economic interests safeguarded, and political radicalism checked. Malaya achieved independence in 1957, in a federation of the peninsular states that sought to preserve the traditional political primacy of Malay ⁵ Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004).

Introduction

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elites, and with that Anglo–Malay collaboration. Thereafter, there still remained the thorny problem of Britain’s remaining possessions of Singapore, Sarawak, British North Borneo (later Sabah) and Brunei. None of these territories appeared to contemporary eyes to have the making of viable independent states: they all appeared too small and, in the case of the Bornean territories, too undeveloped. But the British wanted to be relieved of the burdens and costs of direct colonialism. Moreover, some formula had to be found to satisfy the nationalist aspirations of Singapore while maintaining the security of the strategically valuable Singapore base and preventing the largely Chinese-populated island, with its strong Communist Party, from becoming a Southeast Asian version of Cuba. The solution that was found to this quandary—as was often the case in similar moments of decolonization—was to form a wider federation of these states. In theory at least, the formula was supposed to provide satisfaction to all the major parties. In achieving independence through the Federation in September 1963, Singapore could be freed from the shackles of colonialism while its security was still guaranteed in a larger entity. Malaya benefited from gaining some measure of control over its island neighbour. At the same time, the delicate racial mix of the Federation was not upset—nor the Malayan position of primacy—as the addition of the Bornean territories counterbalanced the incorporation of the Chinese from Singapore. From Britain’s point of view, it was now relieved of the cost and burden of directly administering its former possessions. Its only residual responsibility for the Malaysian Federation—as it had been for Malaya before—was a guarantee of assistance in the country’s external defence, as stipulated in the Anglo–Malaysian Defence Agreement. In return, Britain retained the key strategic assets of its bases on the Malaysian Peninsula and Singapore, and the economic benefits of continuing close association with these territories. As was so often the case in these post-colonial experiments with federation, however, practice did not meet the expectations of theory. The conservative, hierarchical suzerainty of Brunei did not meld as well with its neighbours as the planners had hoped. Even before federation had been achieved, its population revolted in December 1962—a movement that was firmly quashed—and it withdrew from the arrangement. Moreover, there were continuing tensions between the leaders of Singapore, especially its ambitious Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and the central government in Kuala Lumpur. Malayan leaders resented and feared what they perceived to be Chinese efforts to usurp

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their traditional authority on the peninsula. The Chinese Singaporeans, in turn, were antagonized by their subordinate position and the Malayan attempts to confine their political activity only to the island. Magnified by clashes in temperament and personality, these tensions only increased after federation. In early 1965, they would lead the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to propose altering the one-and-ahalf-year-old constitution so that Singapore’s leaders would have more independence on their island and less power in Kuala Lumpur. The plans were abandoned after the British raised strong objections. Only six months later, though, the British would get no chance to comment or object whatsoever when, in August 1965, Singapore was ejected without warning from the Malaysian Federation. Not only was Malaysia challenged from within; after the Brunei revolt, neighbouring Indonesia declared a policy of ‘Confrontation’ against the alleged ‘neo-colonialism’ of the nascent Federation, with its continuing British involvement. In its initial phases, Confrontation did not take the form of a conflict. Rather, the Indonesian Government attempted to forestall the creation of Malaysia: producing propaganda against the proposed state, encouraging internal revolt, and aiding ‘freedom fighters’ in Borneo. At another level, though, diplomatic exchanges still appeared constructive. In mid-1963, foreign ministers from Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia met in Manila to discuss their differences. The talks achieved some success, with the ministers signing a loose agreement on the need for regional co-operation, leading to an eventual ‘Maphilindo’. This agreement, however, came unstuck with the proclamation of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963: rather clumsily, this was declared before a United Nations assessment of the Federation’s popular legitimacy had had a chance to report. In the immediate aftermath, there were attacks on the British and Malaysian embassies in Jakarta, and Indonesia cut commercial ties with Malaysia. From early to mid-1964 there was continuing low-level friction between the two states and little diplomatic success at resurrecting the Manila Agreements at conferences in Bangkok and Tokyo. During this period, moreover, Indonesia’s internal political balance shifted sharply to the left, to the benefit of the PKI, the country’s Communist party. This led, from mid-1964, to the intensification of Indonesian attacks on Malaysia, including landings on the peninsula itself. The response in Malaysia was for Britain to build up the country’s defences enormously, sending in nearly 70,000 troops and 80 ships, including two aircraft carriers. A stalemate ensued: Indonesia continuing

Introduction

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sufficient low-level attacks to tie the British down, without going so far as to provoke and justify any major British retaliation. The situation persisted for several months while, internally, Indonesian politics lurched further leftward. This radicalization was symbolized by President Sukarno’s withdrawing Indonesia from the United Nations in January 1965, and his declaration in August that same year of an axis running from Jakarta through Hanoi to Beijing. The growing stature of the PKI, however, antagonized their chief competitors for power in the Indonesian army: after most of the country’s senior generals were killed in an attempted coup in October 1965, the army moved to destroy the PKI. The resulting purge would claim between a hundred thousand and a million lives. Consumed by its inner convulsions, the Indonesian Government let its policy of Confrontation evaporate, though the conflict would not officially be declared over until August 1966. By the mid-1960s, then, the costs and benefits of Britain’s presence in Malaysia and Singapore were reaching a delicate balance. While the British bases served some strategic and political interests in maintaining the Western position in Southeast Asia, the benefits were diminished by the regional hostility they attracted and the difficult politics of their Southeast Asian hosts. The economic value of Malaysia and Singapore was counterbalanced by the costs which close association incurred. In a period where the pound was under regular attack and the British economy was afflicted with a chronic balance of payments deficit, the £1 million a day cost of Confrontation was not easily borne. The British role in Southeast Asia helped embody Britain’s alliance with the United States and its continuing ties to the old Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand—but the meaning and weight of these relationships was shifting as Britain prevaricated at the threshold of Europe. The new Wilson Government’s mandate to modernize Britain could imply a need to shake off old colonial commitments or a reinterpreted world role for Britain in protecting newly independent states. Moreover, in domestic politics the Labour Government would need to balance its priorities between social expenditure and defence. Against the background of this subtly shifting mix of national and domestic national interests, how did the Wilson Government come to decide that Britain should withdraw from its last major overseas role? This book seeks to answer this question by examining the period from October 1964 to January 1968, the earlier date marking the election of the Wilson Government, the later being the moment

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when this Government announced the final decision to withdraw from Britain’s overseas role. This volume is further divided into three parts, each concentrating on one of the period’s three major statements of British defence and foreign policy towards Malaysia and Singapore: the 1966 Defence White Paper, which limited, but maintained, Britain’s Southeast Asian presence and role; the 1967 Supplementary Statement on Defence, which announced a withdrawal from the Malaysia and Singapore bases in the mid-1970s but with the continuation of a British role; and the January 1968 statement on public expenditure, which, following devaluation of the pound, moved forward the British withdrawal to 1971 and abandoned any further special role in the region thereafter. For all three parts, the focus is on the process leading to the respective statement of policy on Britain’s role in Malaysia and Singapore. This includes examination of the roles of the major British departments of state, their political masters, Cabinet and parliamentary politics, and the relationships with and between Britain’s major allies. However, it precludes deep consideration of issues which may have had some impact on the decision-making process but were external to it, such as the detailed conduct of Confrontation. While the British presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the most significant part of the country’s ‘East of Suez’ role, that role included several other components, including the British presence in Aden, a string of island bases across the Indian Ocean, and British commitments to Brunei and Hong Kong. All these components were held together in popular rhetoric by the notion of ‘East of Suez’, but at a hard policy level they were largely considered independently. The British withdrawal from Aden, for example, was determined much more by the particular circumstances of the British base and the conflict surrounding it than by the rather broad and imprecise concept of ‘East of Suez’.⁶ Thus, while reference may be made to these other areas, this book will not examine them in any great detail. The book is based on research principally conducted at a number of governmental archives in Britain and overseas. The bulk of the research was undertaken in the National Archives, Kew, covering the recently released papers produced by all the departments in the Wilson Government involved in the foreign policy process: the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices, the Ministry of Defence, the ⁶ Karl Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).

Introduction

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Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs, and the Cabinet and Prime Minister’s Offices. In the National Archives of Australia, Prime Ministerial, Cabinet, External Affairs and Defence papers were similarly examined. The US National Archives in College Park, Maryland provided documents from the US Defence and State Departments, while the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, supplied White House files. All the relevant documents in the National Archives appear now to have been released; this contrasts with my experience in the overseas archives, where many files were inaccessible because of remaining security classifications. The Governments of Malaysia and Singapore, most notably, have not publicly released any of their internal documents relating to the period. In addition to the material found in these governmental archives, a number of supplementary resources were also utilized. The Archives of the Parliamentary Labour Party, kept in facsimile in the Bodleian Library, provided a record of the political relations between the Wilson Government and its party, while Hansard documented its parliamentary travails. A number of interviews with former diplomats, kept at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, provided some personal insights, as did the many published diaries and memoirs of significant figures involved. The Times, read in microfilm in the State Library of Victoria, provided a glimpse of the broader public perspective of the time. The breadth and range of records used—official, personal and public—has enabled a close and detailed picture of the decisionmaking process to be developed. While inevitably, official records have had to be used as the predominant source for examining the details of decision-making, those of different countries have provided illuminating perspectives and, often in diplomatic despatches, individualized colour. At key points, personal diaries have conveyed the emotional weight and drama of major decisions far more fully than the official record. Fuller details of all this material, and other secondary sources used, are given in the Bibliography. An analysis of the British decisions to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore has relevance well beyond the immediate subject area. These events were, in and of themselves, major watersheds in post-war British foreign policy. They have been held to mark the end of Britain’s claims to be a world power. But this book has implications, not simply for the study of decolonization and British contraction, but also for the subject of Anglo–American relations during a particularly difficult period for US foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, and Anglo–Australian

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relations at a time when they were undergoing substantial redefinition. Looking inward, this book seeks to cast a bright light on the practice of British foreign policy making, both in periods of fairly orthodox policy revision and in periods of acute economic and political crisis. In casting this light, the book can illuminate the question of how well the British Government fulfilled that informal purpose named at the very beginning: the management, orderly or not, of Britain’s last period of ‘decline’ and imperial retreat.

PA RT I COMPROMISE


Introduction to Part I In February 1966, the Wilson Government published a Defence White Paper. The paper was supposed to crystallize the findings of more than a year’s searching revision of British defence and foreign policy. It was supposed to be the major defence and foreign policy statement of the Wilson Government, establishing the direction of British policy into the 1970s. Later critics have largely read the paper as testament to the Wilson Government’s essential conservatism. While it proposed some limits to Britain’s overseas role, it planned no radical overhaul of commitments. British power in Southeast Asia would continue to be centred on Singapore and Malaysia, though some planning of alternatives would take place should these bases no longer be available. While the Government hoped to achieve greater co-operation with its allies in the region, it continued to plan on maintaining a major military presence. The surface continuity of the White Paper, however, belied a year of dramatic shifts in British planning. Even at the point of the White Paper’s publication, the underlying direction of policy towards Malaysia and Singapore remained in flux, caught between the desire of planners to maximize British influence with minimal risks and commitments, and the desire of Britain’s major allies to maximize its role as a supplement to their own. The factors leading to the gyrations in British planning were numerous. Not only were issues of cost at stake, but also the problems of the Confrontation versus Indonesia, the fragile position of the pound, the fractious politics of Malaysia and Singapore, and, most importantly, Britain’s complex relations with the United States and Australia. Due to these factors, British policy planning swung from one pole to another and back again: from seeking to maintain continuity, to planning a radical restructuring of commitments, to falling back towards relatively minor adjustments to Britain’s role. Part I examines the planning process from the election of the Wilson Government to the publication of the February 1966 Defence White

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Paper. Chapter 1 focuses on the first few months of the Wilson Government, from October 1964 until about the middle of 1965. During this period, the Wilson Government came to establish a firm direction for its planning in Southeast Asia. It did so within the context of its Defence Review but before any consultation with its allies. Thus the main concern of Chapter 1 is how policy planning developed within the British Government, through the actions of its major interested Whitehall departments—the Cabinet Office, Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Defence, and Treasury—and their respective ministers and officials. Chapter 2 carries the story from mid-1965 to the immediate aftermath of the separation of Malaysia and Singapore. During this period, officials sought to bring Britain’s principal allies—namely the United States, Australia and New Zealand—into the policy process. These initial moves, however, were interrupted by the abrupt separation of Malaysia and Singapore. In response, British officials hastily revised their plans for the region, but these plans were forcefully rejected by the ANZUS allies. Finally, Chapter 3 covers the events leading up to the publication of the Defence White Paper of February 1966. After a period of cooler relations with their allies following the earlier rejection of their plans, the British re-engaged with the ANZUS powers to negotiate the contents of the White Paper. Again, the effect of these negotiations was to modify British plans in Southeast Asia significantly.

1 Beginning the Defence Review: October 1964–June 1965 It seemed the most fragile of beginnings. When the Wilson Government was elected to office on 16 October 1964, its claim to power was based on a breathtakingly slender parliamentary majority: a mere four seats. Few commentators—indeed few parliamentarians themselves—believed that the new Government would last more than several months. The inevitable vicissitudes of political life were expected to chip away at the Government’s majority, and it was likely to be forced back to the polls soon afterwards. But though the Government’s position was precarious, that did not necessarily force it into a posture of conservatism. On the contrary, the Labour Government projected itself as a force of modernization and reform, energized and enraptured by the ‘white heat of the technological revolution’, to use Harold Wilson’s famous phrase. The Government promised to release the British economy from the ‘stop–go’ policies that had characterized more than a decade of Conservative rule. It planned to steer the country out of the endemic balance of payments rut that led to continual sterling crises, even at the moment the new Government was being installed. It proclaimed a new era of sustainable growth, underwritten by an ambitious National Plan, and scripted by the skilled technocrats staffing the newly created Department of Economic Affairs. As Prime Minister, Harold Wilson was the active and energetic driver of the new Government. Intellectually agile and youthful—at that time the youngest Prime Minister of the century—Wilson represented a generational change after the genteel stewardship of his predecessors, Alec Douglas-Home and Harold Macmillan. At the other corners of the leadership triumvirate were two former runners-up for the Labour leadership: James Callaghan as Chancellor of the Exchequer and George Brown as Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. They were counterpoints in personality as well as counterweights in ambition:

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Callaghan, measured and pragmatic; Brown, sometimes brilliant but also erratic, and not infrequently inebriated. The key foreign and defence policy positions were held by the Labour Right. The cultured but formidable, even brutal Denis Healey would serve as Defence Secretary for the entire duration of the Wilson Government. Patrick Gordon Walker was Wilson’s initial choice as Foreign Secretary, but after he was unable to regain a seat in the Commons, he was replaced by the solid Michael Stewart in January 1965. Though the Wilson Government tried quickly to establish its modernizing credentials in domestic and economic policy, its stance in defence and foreign affairs was more equivocal. Certainly, senior ministers were not shy in reaffirming their commitment to Britain’s ‘world role’. But they expressed this commitment, not in the old language of empire, but in the fresh parlance of the Commonwealth and the protection of its newly independent states. At the same time, they were prepared to impose, for the causes of both fiscal stringency and left-wing preference, a firm ceiling on defence spending. To this end, the Government instituted a far-reaching Defence Review to examine all aspects of Britain’s global defence posture. Within the forum of the Defence Review, the established players in defence policy—the Treasury, the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices, and the Ministry of Defence—found voice for their interests. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the tensions between these different factors played out in the early months of the Wilson Government and the first stages of the Defence Review. At the time of the Government’s election, defence and foreign policy was in an inchoate and incoherent state. Within eight months, by the middle of 1965, the various factors had combined to establish a firm direction for the British Government’s preferred policy. This chapter will seek to document and to explain how the change took place: from the early months, when the new Government’s ministers appeared keen to emphasize Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role; to the period of reassessment instigated by the Defence Review; to the key ministerial meetings in June 1965, where a new direction for Britain’s foreign policy was set. On coming to power in October 1964, the Wilson Government was confronted with a tense international situation, particularly in Southeast Asia, where Britain was already heavily committed in Malaysia. A day before the British election, the People’s Republic of China had exploded its first nuclear bomb. Two months earlier, the US Congress had

Beginning the Defence Review: October 1964–June 1965

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passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, authorizing President Johnson to respond to attacks on US forces and to use all measures including force to defend Southeast Asian nations—a significant step in the escalation of America’s involvement in Vietnam. Indonesia’s Confrontation, which had been declared against the nascent Malaysian Federation in 1963, had reached a high pitch of tension. There had been a number of attempts to sabotage Singapore’s water and transport infrastructure in June and July 1964, and possible Indonesian connivance in instigating race riots on the island that September. ‘Vivere pericoloso’, President Sukarno had told his country—this was the year of living dangerously—and Indonesia was true to his word, landing multiple groups of guerillas on the Malay Peninsula from August to October 1964. While these incursions were easily contained by the British and Malaysians, they contributed to an ongoing sense of instability and tied down significant British forces in the region. The Wilson Government did not shirk from the Southeast Asian commitments it inherited. On its election it immediately reaffirmed the British Government’s resolve in opposing Confrontation. Moreover, in private and public statements senior ministers outlined a vision which saw Britain maintaining a major Southeast Asian role into the future. Harold Wilson had revealed this vision in a private meeting with US President Lyndon Johnson some months before the election. A Labour Government, the then Opposition leader had assured Johnson, would want Britain to continue to act ‘in active support of US efforts to maintain world-wide security’.¹ Britain would deploy ‘fire brigade forces’ to help put out ‘brush fires’ ‘East of Suez’ and elsewhere.² Denis Healey, the incoming British Defence Secretary, reiterated this theme to Australian ministers soon after his arrival in office. When he first met with Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, he explained that the Government felt the need ‘primarily . . . for maintaining forces overseas’.³ In particular, Healey emphasized the importance of East Asia as the main area of instability in the world. Britain’s Singapore base was a ‘first priorit[y]’ which ‘would have to be maintained and strengthened’.⁴ ¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 213: memcon, Lyndon Johnson and Harold Wilson, Washington, DC, 2/3/1964. ² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 213: memcon, Robert McNamara and Harold Wilson, Washington, DC, 5/3/1964. ³ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: AHC, London to DEAC, tel. 7708, 11/11/1964. ⁴ Ibid.

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In mid-November 1964, the new Government held a major discussion to review defence and foreign policy. Present at Chequers, the British Prime Minister’s official country residence, were Harold Wilson and all his senior defence and foreign policy ministers, the permanent heads of their departments, and the chiefs of the defence forces. For the first time since the election, ministers were given a comprehensive account of their officials’ assessment of where British foreign policy should be heading. They were presented with a paper by the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee (OPD(O))—the most senior committee of officials on defence and foreign affairs—on ‘British Interests and Commitments Overseas’. As its title suggested, the official paper took a global approach to British strategy, and sought to stress, for the benefit of the new ministers, the underlying rationale for British policy. Officials weighed the three major components of Britain’s overseas role—in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.⁵ They ranked Britain’s commitments in Europe as the first priority because of geography and history, and because of Europe’s role as one of the main political and economic centres of power. The importance of oil placed the Middle East second. As for Southeast Asia, however, officials doubted that the economic interests at stake fully justified Britain’s expenses in the region. While the Commonwealth still comprised one third of British trade, that trade was not a compelling reason for the heavy British military expenditure in the Southeast Asian region. The expenditure was being incurred because of the current conflict of Confrontation; once the conflict ended, the need for it would be reduced. The remaining rationale for the British presence would be, in the words of the paper, ‘primarily politico-strategic’, namely, the need to prevent the spread of Communism and to maintain Britain’s position with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.⁶ Given these priorities, officials argued, if ministers felt it necessary to reduce Britain’s presence in one of the three areas, the reductions should be made in Southeast Asia. The ministers at Chequers disagreed. Though they were not entertaining the idea of dropping precipitately any of Britain’s roles, they did differ from their officials’ assessment and expressed ‘considerable support’ for maintaining Britain’s overseas commitments as a first priority.⁷ ⁵ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/2: OPD(O), ‘British Interests and Commitments Overseas’, 18/11/1964, para. 20. ⁶ Ibid., para. 33. ⁷ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/1st Meeting: Defence Policy, Chequers, 21/11/1964.


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With mutual deterrence making war in Europe unlikely, they argued, the greatest threats to peace lay overseas. Here Britain’s inherited alliances and commitments provided the country with a role that no other country could fulfil. If the cost of these commitments was too great for Britain to bear, then perhaps contributions could be sought from those allies whom Britain’s presence also benefited: Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. While the Wilson Government’s ministers were keen to maintain Britain’s globally oriented, interventionist foreign policy, they also had concerns about the costs which such a broad defence role was imposing. Defence spending was currently projected to consume an ever-increasing percentage of Gross National Product, already at 7% the highest level for any industrialized country other than the United States.⁸ If left unchecked, the annual budget would grow in real terms from the £2,000 million estimated in 1964/5 to £2,400 million in 1969/70. Such expenditure, argued the Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs, imposed a heavy burden on the British economy. It did little to stimulate growth. Instead, it squeezed out other public sector programmes, added substantially to the country’s balance of payments deficit, and committed the most advanced industries and most skilled workers to non-economic work. Britain’s economic problems could not be solved, the ministers at Chequers were warned, unless the Government called a halt to increases in the defence budget, and aimed for expenditure in 1969/70 to be held to the same level as the 1964/65 annual budget of £2,000 million. This case was underlined by the sense of economic crisis already gripping the new Government. The pound had been under heavy attack and the Governor of the Bank of England was urging that immediate, drastic measures be taken to counter this. The combination of argument and circumstance was more than adequate to convince ministers. They easily agreed in principle to the adoption of the £2,000 million target for defence spending in 1969/70, with neither the Foreign nor Defence Secretaries raising objections.⁹ The Chequers conference concluded that work should begin on reducing defence expenditure, though on the basis that Britain’s global role be maintained.¹⁰ To this end the meeting ⁸ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/1: Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs, ‘The Future Size of the Defence Budget’, 13/11/1964. ⁹ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/1st–4th Meetings, 21–2/11/1964. ¹⁰ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/4th Meeting: Defence Policy, Chequers, 22/11/1964, Prime Minister’s summing up.

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commissioned a Defence Review, to be conducted by the Ministry of Defence, aimed at determining what capabilities needed to be cut for the spending target to be met. In the month or two that followed, the senior figures in the Wilson Government publicly reinforced their preference for Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role to be the first priority. In his first major foreign affairs statement to the House of Commons as Prime Minister, in December 1964, Harold Wilson explained how the relevance of Britain’s heavy expenditure on European defence was ‘thrown into doubt’ by the strategic deadlock in the region, and the fact that ‘the balance of danger is shifting away from the terrain of Europe to newer areas’.¹¹ He argued that Britain’s privileged status in NATO, in the Anglo–American alliance, and in the Commonwealth depended upon a British presence around the globe in areas that no other ally, not even the United States, could match. Whatever the Government might do to lighten the burden of defence expenditure, Wilson maintained, ‘we cannot afford to relinquish our world role, . . . our ‘‘East of Suez’’ role’.¹² Later that month, Wilson and Defence Secretary Healey visited the United States and conveyed the same message. In pre-summit briefings and in meetings with the President himself and his senior officials, Wilson and Healey argued that the world now faced a strategic stalemate in Europe and active conflict in Southeast Asia. It thus made sense for Britain to reduce its costs in NATO and emphasize its presence ‘East of Suez’.¹³ This argument was given further public reinforcement in the Wilson Government’s first Defence White Paper, published in February 1965.¹⁴ While the nascent state of the Defence Review meant that it could not provide any detailed plans, the Paper did, as US officials interpreted it, express ‘more forcefully and formally than before’ the Labour Government’s new direction.¹⁵ It questioned the logic of NATO expenditure, and emphasized the problem posed by China’s newly acquired nuclear power. It hinted that Britain’s nuclear deterrent might usefully be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region to help contain ¹¹ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report (London: HMSO, 1964), Session 1964/5, vol. 704, col. 423. ¹² Ibid. ¹³ PRO: PREM 13/103: memcon, Harold Wilson and David Bruce, London, 27/11/1964; PRO: CAB 133/266: PMV(W)(64)2nd Meeting, 7/12/1964. ¹⁴ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, Cmnd 2592 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1965). ¹⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, ‘Analysis of 1965 British Defence White Paper’, 5/3/1965.


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the Chinese threat. It expressed support for greater allied co-operation ‘East of Suez’, for Britain’s worldwide interests were shared with many other countries, and the associated defence burdens could be ‘assumed or shared by our allies’.¹⁶ Though the US State Department privately expected that the British would shy away from any commitment of troops to Vietnam, in broader Southeast Asia the British Government were presenting US and UK interests as being ‘interdependent and requiring a co-operative response to the Communist threat’.¹⁷ While the Wilson Government’s senior ministers openly stressed the importance of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role, this attitude was not fully shared within all parts of Whitehall. A glimpse of official scepticism at the longterm value of Britain’s Southeast Asian presence had been given in the papers presented to ministers at Chequers in November 1964. Moreover, under the previous Government, though Wilson’s ministers were unlikely to know of it, the Chiefs of Staff had secretly considered, though rejected as impractical, withdrawing from Singapore to a much reduced presence in Australia as a means of escaping the strain of Confrontation.¹⁸ While the British Government was still officially committed to defending Malaysia for the immediate future, long-term planners within the Foreign Office were questioning whether the costs of Britain’s presence in Malaysia and Singapore were coming to outweigh the benefits. This strand of thinking was most clearly voiced in a planning paper presented by the Foreign Office to OPD, the Cabinet’s most senior sub-committee on foreign policy and defence, in November 1964.¹⁹ The paper had originated as something of a free-thinking exercise by the planning staff in early 1964, but was then approved up the ranks of the Foreign Office and was now being presented to ministers.²⁰ Officials argued that the trade which had once justified Britain’s Southeast Asian presence was no longer a significant factor. The immediate area was worth only 3% of British trade and less than 6% of overseas investment revenue.²¹ If trade was no longer a compelling interest in Southeast Asia, Britain’s regional role was now justified by its politico-strategic ¹⁶ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, para. 21. ¹⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, ‘Britain on Vietnam’, 26/2/1965. ¹⁸ Easter, British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia, ch. 5. ¹⁹ PRO: CAB 148/17: OPD(64)10: ‘British Policy Towards Southeast Asia’, 19/11/1964. ²⁰ PRO: FO 371/177824: J.E. Cable, ‘British Policy in Southeast Asia’, 3/4/1964. ²¹ PRO: CAB 148/17: OPD(64)10: ‘British Policy Towards Southeast Asia’, paras 8–9.

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interests: the need to contain the spread of Communism; to uphold Anglo–American partnership across the globe—which was ‘cardinal to the conduct of our whole foreign policy’; and to maintain Britain’s ties with Australia and New Zealand, to whom Britain was bound not only by trade and investment, but also by sentiment and history.²² How well were these interests served by the Singapore base, Britain’s major strategic asset and presence in the region? The Foreign Office paper noted that the base consumed 15% of the British defence budget and 40% of defence costs overseas, figures now wildly out of proportion with the immediate area’s economic value. Its direct strategic value was declining. While the base currently formed the cornerstone of Malaysian defence, the very fact of the British presence provoked some of the agitation it was supposed to prevent. The rising tide of nationalism in Southeast Asia meant that the base was slowly becoming a political ‘liability’.²³ Thus, the paper argued, the Government should begin planning how to protect Britain’s continuing but limited interests in the area by some means other than the Singapore base, so that British forces might withdraw safely after Confrontation had concluded, before being forced by local hostility to do so. The Foreign Office’s planners thought it too soon to decide what form residual British forces in Southeast Asia should take after withdrawal from Singapore, though they noted that developing Indian Ocean or Australian bases was feasible, if expensive. Nevertheless, they were prepared to outline what they believed should be Britain’s ultimate goals for the region. Here again they emphasized the problems presented by the local political climate. Fewer than one third of the population of Southeast Asia were governed under Western-oriented regimes, while more than half were officially non-aligned. The case of Vietnam demonstrated the financial and strategic impossibility of compelling more countries to become more closely aligned to the West. If it was not possible to convert Southeast Asia to Western alignment then the only viable means of preventing Communism from extending into Southeast Asia would be to find a modus vivendi between the competing forces. The Communist and Western powers needed to reach some kind of agreement, whether tacit or formal, to a neutralized Southeast Asia. Under this arrangement, a variety of nationalist regimes would co-exist—their colours varying from ‘socialist’ to laissez-faire capitalist—with neither ²² PRO: CAB 148/17: OPD(64)10: ‘British Policy Towards Southeast Asia’, paras 8–9. ²³ Ibid., para. 22.


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Communist nor Western influence predominating. SEATO would be disbanded, and Western forces disengaged from the area. This policy did not imply, however, any early departure from the area—certainly not while Confrontation continued—since that would lead to the collapse of pro-Western sentiment and the advance of Communism. Rather, Britain had to adopt a policy of ‘firmness with mediatory diplomacy’. The Communist threat had to be contained until the Communist powers conceded neutralization on the basis of their own interests.²⁴ The Foreign Office’s paper conflicted with the current view of the Prime Minister and other senior ministers that Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia was its most important role; but that did not stop OPD rubber-stamping the paper. This authorization, though, was not a sign that senior ministers had changed their minds, more that their minds were really elsewhere. They did not give the paper much in-depth consideration: while it was nominally presented to them in OPD, they never actually discussed it. Nor, it seems, had most of them read it until more than a month later, after the Christmas recess. Only then did some ministers pass around a few cursory critical comments.²⁵ The reason for this lax behaviour probably stemmed from the fact that the paper related to long-term policy. The Government was living day to day on the most slender of majorities, having to cope with its transition to power at a moment of economic crisis: presumably, long-term foreign policy planning fell well outside ministers’ immediate concerns. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office’s paper on policy towards Southeast Asia was an important signal of the direction which officials’—though not yet ministerial—thinking was taking on Britain’s future role in the region. Its long-term aims of partial retreat and regional neutralization were reaffirmed when British Heads of Missions in Southeast Asia met to discuss future policy, first in Kuala Lumpur in January 1965 and then in Bangkok three months later. Both these conferences came to similar conclusions.²⁶ They doubted that a continuing Anglo–American presence would keep the region Western-aligned. On the contrary, ‘the ²⁴ Ibid., para. 28. ²⁵ PRO: FO 371/180205: Arthur Bottomley to Patrick Gordon Walker, 30/12/1964; James Callaghan to Patrick Gordon Walker, 1/1/1965; Patrick Gordon Walker to James Callaghan, 7/1/1965. ²⁶ PRO: FO 371/180206: Lord Head to Arthur Bottomley, ‘Malaysia: The Long-term Problem of Southeast Asia’, 10/2/1965; FO 371/180207: ‘Meeting of British Representatives in Southeast Asia at Bangkok’, Apr. 1965.

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longer it remains, the more likely it is that it will be resented’.²⁷ Instead, the United States and Britain should withdraw their forces to the periphery ‘as soon as possible’.²⁸ Nationalism should be welcomed, even at the expense of short-term economic interests, for it would prove the only effective obstacle to the expansion of Chinese Communism. These kinds of ideas also had a long history in British official thinking. Planners under the Macmillan and Home Governments had toyed with the idea of adopting a peripheral strategy to Southeast Asian defence after a possible future loss of Singapore. Regarding British views of the wider area, the US State Department privately recorded in 1965 that ‘for over a decade the UK has believed that the best answer to the problems of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was neutralisation’.²⁹ It had regarded SEATO and the Geneva Accords not as final solutions, but ‘steps on the way to the attainment of reciprocally tolerable relations’.³⁰ When it came to decolonization, successive British Governments had often sought a quick retreat as a means of conceding power to an ‘acceptable’ successor regime. In the context of the Cold War, this meant giving way to nationalist regimes in the hope of building up the anti-Communist bloc.³¹ While ministers in the Wilson Government were initially enthusiastic about an activist foreign policy, it is clear that officials’ long-term policy thinking remained within this pragmatic, accommodationist tradition. As the remainder of this chapter will show, once it became clear that the constraints imposed by the Defence Review compelled a change in Britain’s overseas posture, this tradition of thinking became increasingly influential. While Foreign Office planners were pondering the future direction of foreign policy, other parts of Whitehall were busy deciding on cuts to overseas and defence expenditure. Ministers were moving to cut a number of future defence projects (the TSR-2, HS-681 and F-1154 aircraft, and the fifth Polaris submarine). Meanwhile, within the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Review was considering how ²⁷ PRO: FO 371/180206: Lord Head to Arthur Bottomley, ‘Malaysia: The Long-term Problem of Southeast Asia’, 10/2/1965; FO 371/180207: ‘Meeting of British Representatives in Southeast Asia at Bangkok’, Apr. 1965. ²⁸ Ibid. ²⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Hughes to Rusk, ‘Britain on Vietnam’, 26/2/1965. ³⁰ Ibid. ³¹ William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22 (1994), pp. 462–511.


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existing military capabilities might be cut in order to meet the budget target of £2,000 million. A draft report of the Review’s initial findings was presented by the Chiefs of Staff to the Defence Secretary and his supporting ministers at the beginning of March 1965. Unsurprisingly given their interests, the Chiefs of Staff’s draft report sought strongly to deny that there was much potential for any major defence cuts without dire consequences. The report provided a multitude of arguments on the difficulty of making any reductions. The Chiefs argued that most of Britain’s forces were already committed to numerous roles: for example, while more than half the Navy was currently in East Asia, 85% of naval forces were also theoretically committed to NATO. Thus no savings would accrue from simply making cuts in one theatre or another. Only if forces, men and equipment were completely withdrawn and disbanded would there be any reduction in costs.³² They further argued that making cuts to Britain’s two main foreign roles—in Germany for NATO, and in Singapore and Malaysia—would be particularly problematic. While British forces in Europe exceeded strategic requirements, achieving any reductions would be politically very difficult since they would almost certainly be opposed by Britain’s major NATO allies. In Southeast Asia, once forces were reduced to a post-Confrontation level—an eventuality assumed in the projected costings—there would be little scope for any further reduction, given the extent of Britain’s current responsibilities. The Chiefs concluded that the choice facing the Government was stark: it would have to decide ‘whether [it] attach[ed] more importance to the European role or the world-wide role’.³³ If drastic cuts were made to the former, expenditure could just be brought to target. If cuts were to be made to the latter, the already stretched state of the armed forces meant that ‘there may be no halfway house between something near present expenditure levels and more or less total withdrawal’.³⁴ The ministers presiding over the MOD reacted sceptically to these dire warnings. Defence Secretary Denis Healey thought the conclusions ‘not satisfactory’ and ‘unrealistic’.³⁵ His deputy, Frederick Mulley, agreed that they were ‘much too sweeping’.³⁶ Lord Shackleton, Minister for the ³² PRO: DEFE 13/829: Ministry of Defence, Draft of ‘Defence Expenditure Review 1964/5’, 5/3/1965, paras 22–4. ³³ Ibid. para. 41. ³⁴ Ibid. ³⁵ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Chiefs of Naval Staff, Ground Staff and Air Staff, 15/3/1965. ³⁶ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Frederick Mulley to Denis Healey, 15/3/1965.

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RAF, was ‘disturbed’ by the unwarranted assumption that savings were impossible without cuts to commitments, especially given that studies of possible military efficiencies were still currently under way.³⁷ Yet though these ministers were dismissive of the paper’s hyperbole, they were not unsympathetic to the substantive core of the Chiefs’ claims. They agreed that a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of British commitments would be necessary if the Review were to proceed further and savings found. As Navy Minister Christopher Mayhew complained—with Denis Healey’s concurrence—the problem with the Review was that its ‘political assumptions [were] so inadequate’.³⁸ While previously defence policy may have been decided with scant regard for financial costs, the risk now lay the other way: of making defence decisions according to a precise budget target, with little regard for underlying policy objectives. Mayhew and Mulley both argued that it was necessary for the political departments—the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office—to estimate more precisely what Britain’s position and commitments ‘East of Suez’ would be in the future. ‘Can we be sure of being in Singapore [when] . . . Confrontation is at an end?’ asked Mulley.³⁹ Thus, while the ministers demanded that the conclusions be refined and toned down, they left the basic thrust of the paper unaltered. If the £2,000 million expenditure target was to be reached, the final MOD paper concluded, the Government needed to decide ‘which of the present major roles can be reduced’.⁴⁰ It was hardly surprising that the MOD would react to the prospect of budget cuts by claiming them to be impossible unless foreign policy commitments were cut first: equally unsurprising was the Foreign Office’s retort to this claim, arguing that efficiencies should be maximized before any commitments were touched. When the Defence Review paper was circulated to relevant departments within Whitehall, Foreign Office officials came up with a number of criticisms in this vein: that the Defence Review studies had not examined possible savings at home; that there had been no rigorous testing of the cost-effectiveness of current arrangements; that there had been no attempt to find efficiencies at the Singapore base. Yet while these officials tried to poke holes in the ³⁷ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Lord Shackleton to Denis Healey, 11/3/1965. ³⁸ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Christopher Mayhew to Denis Healey, 22/3/1965; Denis Healey to Christopher Mayhew, 23/3/1965. ³⁹ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Mulley to Healey, 15/3/1965. ⁴⁰ PRO: CAB 148/42: OPD(O)(65)16: Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Expenditure Review 1964/5’, 18/3/1965.


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MOD’s arguments, they also conceded amongst themselves that the Foreign Office would likely be called upon to find some means of reducing commitments.⁴¹ So it turned out: when OPD(O) met to discuss the Defence Review paper at the end of March 1965, the discussion all ran the MOD’s way.⁴² No objection was noted to the argument of the Permanent Under Secretary for Defence that the review’s next step should be a reassessment of commitments. After some discussion of the parameters of such an exercise, the meeting concluded that the MOD should complete its studies of what reductions could be made to present capabilities. As this approach was unlikely to yield sufficient savings, a working party, with representatives from the political departments, Defence and the Treasury, should also be set up to examine the possible shedding of commitments. Through April 1965, the Defence Review Working Party examined Britain’s worldwide commitments. Its approach was to divide the world into five different areas: the Caribbean; South Africa and the South Atlantic; Germany; the Mediterranean and Middle East; East and Southeast Asia. In the first two areas, the roles under question were small and if relinquished would only yield a saving of around £2 million apiece—far short of the approximately £200 million of savings that still needed to be found.⁴³ In Europe, £90 million might be saved if Britain’s commitment to NATO in Germany were halved, but such a reduction ‘unless very carefully handled indeed [would] lead to dangerous political consequences’.⁴⁴ The only proposal the Working Party thought viable was a complete reorganization of European defence on a multilateral basis.⁴⁵ Clearly, though, so massive a reorganization could only produce savings in the longer term. In the Mediterranean and Middle East, the Working Party concluded that it would be possible to find up to £120 million in savings depending on what kind of forces the Government felt necessary to retain in the area. On this issue, however, the political and economic departments were divided. The former believed some residual ⁴¹ PRO: FO 371/184508: M.R. Morland to J.A.N. Graham, 2/3/1965; J.N.T. Spreckley to Lord Chalfont, 19/3/1965; brief by J.A.N. Graham on OPD(O)(65)16, 24/3/1965. ⁴² PRO: CAB 148/41: OPD(O)(65)8th Meeting, 26/3/1965. ⁴³ PRO: CAB 148/42: OPD(O)(65)24: DRWP, ‘The Caribbean’, 3/5/1965; OPD(O)(65) 25: Defence Review Working Party, ‘South Africa and the South Atlantic’, 4/5/1965. ⁴⁴ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)28: DRWP, ‘Reduction by Half of British Forces in Germany’, 3/5/1965, para. 42. ⁴⁵ Ibid.

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forces to be essential for the protection of British oil interests, while the latter judged that the economic self-interest of local governments would keep the oil wells flowing.⁴⁶ It was in East and Southeast Asia where the greatest possible savings were identified. If the British forces in the area could be completely disbanded, after some satisfactory conclusion to Confrontation, the resulting savings would come to somewhere between £400 to £580 million.⁴⁷ The political catch, however, lay in the form of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA), by which Britain was bound to provide the Malaysian Government ‘such assistance as . . . [might be] require[d] for the external defence of its territory’.⁴⁸ The Foreign Office planners warned that any termination of AMDA without Malaysian approval would cause ‘irreparable damage to British prestige’, both worldwide and within the Commonwealth.⁴⁹ If Britain ‘were seen to abandon Malaysia’ it would become ‘obvious to everyone that a British alliance was no longer worth having’.⁵⁰ That would spell the ‘end to our pretensions to be a world power. We have invested more prestige in the defence of Malaysia than we could ever hope to salvage in a unilateral withdrawal’.⁵¹ But was ‘abandoning’ Malaysia the only way in which the British presence in Southeast Asia might be reduced? Others in the Foreign Office and on the Defence Review Working Party felt that this was only an extreme case, and that it was plausible—even probable—that a more amicable means of reduction or retreat might be found. Once Confrontation was over, argued the head of the Foreign Office’s Planning Staff, it would surely be possible to convince the Malaysian Government that a formal Defence Agreement was no longer necessary. They might be persuaded that such an arrangement ‘put them in a rather invidious neo-colonialist position’.⁵² Even if Britain retained some form of reduced commitment to its various allies with interests in Southeast Asia, was it not possible to find some way of meeting these defence requirements ⁴⁶ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)31: DRWP, Area study of the Mediterranean and Middle East, 4/5/1965. ⁴⁷ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)5: FO, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’, 21/4/1965. ⁴⁸ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)32: DRWP, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’, 5/5/1965, para. 5. ⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)5: FO, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East, para. 6. ⁵⁰ Ibid. ⁵¹ Ibid. ⁵² PRO: FO 371/184519: A.M. Palliser, brief on OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)5: ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’, 27/4/1965.


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by means other than the highly expensive base in Singapore? It was precisely these possibilities that the Working Party focused on when it came to finalize its report.⁵³ In its completed form, the report clearly borrowed heavily from officials’ prior long-term thinking on policy towards Southeast Asia. This thinking, which had envisaged a neutralized Southeast Asia with reduced British forces guarding the perimeter in the Indian Ocean and northern Australia, had now been recast. No longer was the scenario a long-term strategic goal. Instead it had become the medium-term means to achieve defence reductions. In articulating its proposed approach, the DRWP report dismissed the option of a complete and unilateral withdrawal from Southeast Asia as likely to damage severely Britain’s position in the world, and especially its relations with Australia, New Zealand, India and the United States.⁵⁴ Instead, the report suggested a two-pronged approach to defence reductions, with both political and military components. Politically, the British Government should encourage Malaysia ‘to take on a more Afro-Asian and neutralist stance, which might eventually result in their asking us to leave’ the Singapore base.⁵⁵ As part of this process, Britain would help Malaysia build up its own defence forces. This in turn would allow the renegotiation, or even the mutually agreed termination, of the Defence Agreement. Even if it proved politically impossible to end AMDA, Malaysia might still be persuaded to accept a much smaller British presence, or a ‘longer-ranged commitment, based on the establishment of new but reduced facilities elsewhere’.⁵⁶ Militarily, those new but reduced facilities would become the means for Britain to fulfil its commitments. British forces would depart from Malaysia and Singapore once Confrontation was over. As a substitute for their presence, Britain would establish a string of minimally equipped bases in the Indian Ocean shared with the United States, and a base in northern Australia, paid for by Australia itself, from which greatly reduced British forces might operate.⁵⁷ This reduced presence, the planners hoped, would be sufficient to reassure Britain’s allies in the region that it was not abandoning Southeast Asia. It might encourage Australia and the US to share the burden of defence costs ⁵³ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)3rd Meeting, 23/4/1965; 7th Meeting, 4/5/1965. ⁵⁴ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)32: DRWP, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’, para. 8. ⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 6. ⁵⁶ Ibid. ⁵⁷ Ibid., paras 9, 15, 17.

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and responsibilities. It could still, if necessary, satisfy the requirements of SEATO.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the withdrawal of Western forces from Singapore would facilitate ‘the orderly evolution of Malaysian political opinion towards the kind of Western oriented neutralism’ that offered the ‘best prospect for Malaysia’s survival and the maintenance of British commercial interests’.⁵⁹ Thus, the report concluded, while Confrontation continued the Government should begin military and political preparations for the provision of much reduced, alternative facilities to those currently in Malaysia. Then it would be possible, once Confrontation had ended, for Britain to withdraw honourably to the perimeter of Southeast Asia, while realizing significant savings. But why should the British wait until Confrontation had ended? Given that the Indonesian and British Governments ostensibly shared a long-term aim of removing the British presence from Southeast Asia, why could the two not come to some sort of agreement? Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart posed precisely these questions to his officials in mid-May 1965.⁶⁰ Demonstrating how officials’ doubts about the value of Singapore were now influencing ministers, Stewart asked whether the abandonment of the base might be offered as an incentive to Indonesia to end Confrontation. Officials in the Foreign Office, however, were sceptical. They felt that the Indonesian Government would not negotiate in good faith; nor would it be satisfied if Britain maintained a presence in Australia, which would be necessary if Britain were to keep faith with its allies.⁶¹ Most fundamentally, officials believed that Sukarno’s policy of Confrontation was motivated by internal political considerations, not external strategic aims, and thus no number of British concessions could have the desired effect of stopping the conflict.⁶² Britain, to the officials’ regret, would simply have to soldier on. At the beginning of June 1965, ministers and officials gathered once again at Chequers to assess the progress of the Defence Review, and approve the direction for policy planning which had been established through this process. Once again, the immediate context of the Chequers ⁵⁸ Since Britain’s commitments to Malaysia were larger than those to SEATO, it was argued that anything which could satisfy the former could also satisfy the latter. ⁵⁹ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)32: DRWP, ‘Southeast Asia. . . ’, para. 9. ⁶⁰ PRO: FO 371/181501: T.E. Bridges, ‘Indonesia’, 18/5/1965. ⁶¹ PRO: FO 371/181501: J.E. Cable, ‘Indonesia’, 19/5/1965; A.A. Golds, 28/5/1965. ⁶² PRO: FO 371/181501: A.A. Golds to Michael Stewart, ‘Indonesia’, 3/6/1965.


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meeting was one of economic crisis, with the Government bracing itself that weekend for the publication of poor balance of payments figures on the coming Monday.⁶³ The conference began with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, emphasizing the necessity of defence reductions.⁶⁴ Denis Healey followed. After reiterating the MOD’s case that commitments as well as capabilities needed to be cut, he outlined a programme for action: reorganization of the Reserves and abolition of the Territorial Army; reduction of forces or sharing of costs in Hong Kong and Germany; withdrawal from the Caribbean and South Atlantic; reductions in the Mediterranean and Middle East; reductions in Britain’s intervention capabilities; and the revision of commitments in East Asia.⁶⁵ The last consisted of two goals derived from the DRWP’s report: first, the development of an Australian base to replace Singapore, following consultations with Australia and New Zealand; second, the establishment of co-operative arrangements with the United States and Australia for joint air and naval power in the Indian Ocean. The Government should ‘decide in principle to withdraw from Southeast Asia as soon as possible but to maintain a reduced role in the wider area’.⁶⁶ No dissent was noted to these proposals. Both the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries—whose officials in the DRWP had indeed partially drafted the policy—accepted that Britain’s commitments should be reduced in this way. Speakers sought to emphasize that the proposed policies made not only financial but also strategic sense. In a gesture which hinted that the Foreign Secretary had not been entirely persuaded by his officials, Michael Stewart raised again his hope that, while Britain’s Southeast Asian commitments would have to last the duration of Confrontation, a settlement with Indonesia to end the conflict might include a British departure from Singapore. Others argued that, even if Malaysian and Singaporean leaders wanted Britain to stay, ‘they would probably be unable to resist popular pressure for our withdrawal’.⁶⁷ Warnings were raised, however, over the possibility of regional co-operation with the United States: a difficult thing to achieve when the US and Britain did not share the same long-term vision for the area. ⁶³ ⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷

Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 107–8. PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/5th–7th Meetings, 13/6/1965. PRO: DEFE 13/829: Denis Healey, ‘The Defence Review: A Personal Note’, 11/6/1965. PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/8: ‘Defence Expenditure Review’, para. 23. PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/6th Meeting, 13/6/1965.

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Towards the end of the day’s proceedings, a sketch was drawn of what was expected to be Britain’s defence position in the 1970s. There would be a higher proportion of forces in the UK and Europe; a small strategic presence in the Middle East; an Australian-funded base in that country’s north; and island bases shared with the United States in the Indian Ocean. There would be no presence in Malaysia or Singapore; indeed, no permanent presence in East Asia proper other than at Hong Kong. ‘East of Suez’ would be shrunk back to emphasize Britain’s historic commitments to the ‘old’ Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand, and its political commitments to its major ally, the United States. A new direction for policy had been set. The task for the next few months would be to see if these plans could be made viable. In the period from the election of the Wilson Government to mid-1965, Britain’s policy planning towards Southeast Asia evolved substantially. On coming to office, ministers envisaged that they expected to emphasize Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role. Eight months later, they were approving secret plans that included encouraging Britain’s major Southeast Asian regional ally, Malaysia, towards non-alignment; withdrawing the British presence from the immediate area; and stationing much-reduced forces on the perimeter of the region in northern Australia. What brought about this change? One major factor was the Foreign Office’s changing assessment of Britain’s major interests and ideal long-term strategy. It is clear that, even before the election of the Wilson Government and the initiation of the Defence Review, officials within the Foreign Office were moving to the opinion that Britain should have a long-term aim of retreating partially from its position in Southeast Asia.⁶⁸ Despite what its critics have sometimes alleged, the Foreign Office was not so bogged down by inertia that it was unable to contemplate any significant change to Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ commitments.⁶⁹ On the contrary: its officials readily perceived that Britain’s diminishing economic interests in the region no longer justified the extent of its commitments, and that its remaining political and strategic interests—its relations with the ANZUS powers—could ⁶⁸ Dockrill, ‘Power and Influence’; Easter, British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia, ch. 5; Subritzky, ‘Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation’, p. 308. ⁶⁹ See, for example, Darby, Britain’s Defence Policy, ch. 8; Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process, p. 274.


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be better served by a rescaled and redeployed military presence on Southeast Asia’s periphery. Was this Foreign Office view of long-term strategy sufficient to change the Wilson Government’s defence and foreign policy planning? Not on its own. In the early months, senior ministers clearly disagreed with their officials on what Britain’s priorities should be. These views were expressed by Harold Wilson and Denis Healey to the House of Commons, in the United States, and in their first Defence White Paper of February 1965. But stronger than these ministers’ sentiments on ‘East of Suez’ was their understanding that defence spending needed to be restrained, a position backed by the weight of the Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs and their powerful ministers. When it became clear, after the first stage of the Defence Review, that equipment cuts alone would be insufficient to reach the Government’s £2,000 million target for defence expenditure, senior ministers were willing to initiate a wider review of Britain’s overseas commitments. Within this wider review, the Foreign Office could reintroduce its plans for Britain’s Southeast Asian role, though reconfiguring them now to be not simply a long-term strategic goal but also a medium-term means to achieve defence reductions. When ministers were presented with these plans at Chequers in June 1965, they were happy to countenance a sharply reduced Southeast Asian presence, as part of a general slimming down of Britain’s role across the globe. They readily acceded to plans whose governing assumption was that Britain’s interests did not require the retention of historic bases on ex-colonial territories for their own sake; that its major concern should be to support its historic and now Cold War allies in Southeast Asia—the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The senior Wilson Government ministers might have earlier expressed strong sentiments about the value of Britain’s worldwide role, but these sentiments were sufficiently flexible to accommodate a much leaner version of that role if Britain’s precarious finances demanded it.

2 The Perils of Alliance: June–September 1965 British policy could not be developed in a vacuum. While, as documented in the previous chapter, British officials began their Defence Review as a private exercise, this isolation could not persist. Britain’s principal allies in Southeast Asia—the United States, Australia and New Zealand—would have to be consulted on the direction of policy, and persuaded of the virtue in the Government’s preferred plans. Partly, this need to consult sprang from general obligations of loyalty. The Anglo–American relationship, most notably, was the cornerstone of Britain’s international policy, and this relationship depended on the two countries maintaining close and wide-ranging consultations on all aspects of their foreign policies. Beyond this general obligation to consult, the British also had two specific reasons to discuss future policy in Southeast Asia with their allies. The first lay in the simple fact that this policy envisaged greater co-operation between Britain and the ANZUS powers. Clearly the allies had to be agreeable to this if the policy were to be implemented. The second reason derived from the major politico-strategic interest that Britain’s Southeast Asian policy was supposed to preserve: the maintenance of Britain’s relationship with those powers themselves. As described in the previous chapter, the Foreign Office identified the major purpose of the British presence in Southeast Asia as the embodiment of the country’s partnership with the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Thus, any change to this presence had to gain not merely the acceptance but the support of those allies if it was not to undermine its primary purpose. The focus of this chapter is on how the British Government sought to persuade the ANZUS powers—though not yet Malaysia or Singapore—to agree to its plans for greater allied co-operation in Southeast Asia and the withdrawal of the British presence to Australia. The

The Perils of Alliance: June–September 1965

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chapter covers the period from mid-1965 to September of that year. At the beginning of this period, British ministers and officials started gently introducing the allies to the direction of their thinking in the Defence Review. After some initial exchanges, these consultations were brutally interrupted by the sudden separation of Singapore from Malaysia. In response to this event, British officials hastily accelerated their plans to withdraw from the immediate area. These plans, however, were categorically rejected by the ANZUS governments, a rejection that forced the Wilson Government to backtrack. The aftermath left British planning in considerable disarray. The first intimations of British thinking reached allied capitals in midMay 1965. While neither Washington nor Canberra knew the extent to which the Wilson Government was currently considering a retreat in Southeast Asia, they were aware of the pressures on defence and foreign policy planners to make some kind of reduction. US Embassy officials in London reported to their superiors that the British Government was now ‘truly serious in its determination’ to cut commitments either in Europe or ‘East of Suez’ unless some other relief to its economic and balance of payments problem was quickly found.¹ Australian officials believed that the economic diarchy of George Brown at the DEA and James Callaghan at the Treasury was pressing Defence Secretary Denis Healey to make cutbacks, with the risk that the pressure might build for a total withdrawal from East Asia.² The budget target of £2,000 million might only be reached by ‘eliminating something . . . previously . . . regarded as essential’.³ Officially, the British conveyed a double message to US and Australian officials: partly a threat, of the cuts which they might have to implement, and partly an offer, of the plans for co-operation which they wanted to institute. When US Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited London that May, Harold Wilson informed him that the Defence Review had begun reviewing commitments, and that ‘there were no sacred cows’.⁴ Speaking personally, the Prime Minister said that he would rather the ¹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: John Leddy to Dean Rusk, 13/5/1965. ² NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, ‘Far East’, 17/5/1965. ³ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Department of Defence, ‘United Kingdom Defence Review’, June 1965. ⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1890: memcon, Harold Wilson and Dean Rusk, London, 14/5/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: memcon, Dean Rusk and Harold Wilson, London, 14/5/1965.

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cuts take place in Europe than ‘East of Suez’. Moreover, he felt that most of his colleagues would agree with him. He hoped, though, that some form of collective arrangement might be instituted in Southeast Asia. Rusk made only some general comments in response: that the US wanted regional organizations to carry a greater burden of defence; that the US was adamant it could not play ‘world policeman’ alone; and that the allies should focus more on Communist ‘wars of liberation’ than on the threat of nuclear conflict.⁵ In the Australian case, the message was passed by Denis Healey to Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs. When they met that month, Healey expressed the view that ‘closer military co-operation with Australia was essential to both of us’.⁶ He suggested that, looking to the 1970s, there might be a need for a base in northern Australia, and thought it time to start ‘relaxed conversations’ on the matter.⁷ He stressed, however, that there was no rush to make an early commitment; rather, he wanted to have a ‘friendly and informal yarn’.⁸ Privately, Australian officials were divided on how to respond to the British proposals. Some thought they provided the best means of keeping the British in the region. The Head of the Australian Joint Services Staff in London suggested seeking a firm agreement on Denis Healey’s hint regarding a UK base in Australia. This would ‘tie [Britain] to a positive commitment to us’.⁹ Others were more wary. The Defence Department noted that an Australian base would be expensive, and that previous proposals had been dropped for fear that their pursuit would dangerously undermine the British position in Malaysia.¹⁰ The threat of British cutbacks raised concerns in Washington as well. US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara expressed fears to the Australian Prime Minister that he regarded Britain as ‘somewhat wobbly on its commitments’ in Southeast Asia.¹¹ When speaking to British ministers, McNamara’s approach was more stern. To Denis Healey—who was rumoured to want to cut forces in Europe—McNamara warned that any withdrawals from the British Army on the Rhine would lead ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁹

PRO: PREM 13/1890: memcon, Wilson and Rusk, London, 14/5/1965. NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Paul Hasluck to DEAC, tel. 3665, 7/5/1965. Ibid. ⁸ Ibid. NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, ‘Far East’, 17/5/1965. ¹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Department of Defence, ‘United Kingdom Defence Review’, 6/1965. ¹¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC; Washington, DC, to DEAC, tel. 1971, 9/6/1965.


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to a ‘sharp reaction’ in the US.¹² To Minister for Aviation Roy Jenkins—who was known to favour cuts elsewhere—McNamara argued that Britain had ‘an inescapable commitment’ to Southeast Asia ‘for at least the next ten years’.¹³ British Embassy officials in the US noted that the Johnson Administration was beginning to display clear ‘anxiety about [Britain’s] future intentions . . . East of Suez’.¹⁴ The provoking of such anxiety was not unintended. British Foreign Office officials recognized the connection between Britain’s commitment to Malaysia and its support for the US in Vietnam. They diagnosed the US as fearing that a British withdrawal from Southeast Asia would lead to a weakening in that support. Moreover, the United States might not easily fill the breach in Western security opened up by a British withdrawal. Should the US be sufficiently disturbed by such a prospect, British officials reflected, it could be prepared to pay ‘quite a substantial price’ to prevent its occurrence.¹⁵ Not only might the Americans be induced into some kind of co-operative—and hence burden-sharing—arrangement in Southeast Asia; they could also be encouraged ‘to assist us financially on a scale sufficient to enable us to maintain our existing commitments’.¹⁶ The bargaining began in June 1965, with meetings between US National Security and British Embassy officials. Was the US Government, the British asked, ‘prepared to look at the UK problem, and UK–US relations as a whole’: not only Britain’s foreign commitments, but also its long-term financial and economic health.¹⁷ A Labour Government, the British argued, could not be expected to follow ‘Tory’ economic and foreign policies without some US assistance for the long term, specifically with the balance of payments problems those foreign policies incurred. The American response was open-minded. Francis Bator, the President’s Deputy National Security Adviser, agreed that the US would be prepared to look ‘at [the] problem as a whole’ over the summer.¹⁸ More specifically, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James ¹² PRO: PREM 13/214: memcon, Denis Healey and Robert McNamara, London, 30/5/1965. ¹³ PRO: PREM 13/215: Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 10/6/1965. ¹⁴ Ibid. ¹⁵ PRO: FO 371/184509: Michael Palliser to Sir Bernard Burrows, ‘The Defence Review—Anglo–American Co-operation’, 5/5/1965. ¹⁶ PRO: FO 371/184510: Sir Bernard Burrows to Michael Stewart, 20/5/1965. ¹⁷ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Francis Bator, ‘Conversation on UK Situation and Callaghan Visit with John Stevens’, undated (9/6/1965 and 16/6/1965). Emphasis in original. ¹⁸ Ibid.

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Callaghan, visited Washington at the end of June, US officials would be prepared to discuss ways to bridge the US$300 million balance of payments gap created by Britain’s foreign commitments. Internally, the Administration was divided on how to deal with the British proposals. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, weighed down with the problems of Vietnam, was adamant that the US could not pick up any commitments the British might shed. Thus the US had to ensure that this situation would not arise.¹⁹ National Security staff were of a similar mind: ‘we might be very much better off to pay for part of their presence—if they really cannot afford it—than finance our own’.²⁰ Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler had a different view. Mindful of the fragile position of the United States’ own balance of payments, he insisted that the Administration should ‘not commit [any] bilateral action which [would] damage this’.²¹ The US should only take part in a multilateral assistance package. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in London warned that domestic political pressures might build to force British defence cuts and reductions in commitments in any case. It was, however, ‘highly improbable’ that these changes would significantly affect the Malaysian commitment, given the problems of Confrontation: ‘No British Government could abandon or transfer responsibility for defence of Malaysia.’ Unresolved on whether to help the British pay for defence, US officials were tough on Callaghan when he arrived in Washington at the end of June. They emphasized their displeasure at any plans to reduce Britain’s role, and made minimal reference to the possibility of financial assistance. Defence Secretary McNamara was most forceful in his arguments. He was insistent that the British achieve their targets by cutting costs, not commitments. He was blunt in his assessment of where American strength had made British forces superfluous—the ‘Navy is a luxury’.²² He issued the threat that if the British pulled back from their commitments, then the US would have ‘to reconsider its whole defence posture, its worldwide treaty obligations and all aspects of its relations with the UK’.²³ Only if Britain maintained its role would the ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²²

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, 26/6/1965. LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 1/6/1965. LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, 28/6/1965. LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Francis Bator, memcon, James Callaghan, Robert McNamara, George Ball, Francis Bator et al., Washington, DC, 30/6/1965. ²³ PRO: PREM 13/216: memcon, James Callaghan, Robert McNamara et al., Washington, DC, 30/6/1965.


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United States help Britain with its foreign exchange. James Callaghan was equally insistent in reply: ‘I cannot carry [the foreign exchange] commitment and it’s got to come down.’²⁴ He rebuked McNamara for drilling him on defence, when it was finance he was there to discuss. Denis Healey would talk to McNamara about defence, but only ‘when he is ready’.²⁵ After some further exchanges, the meeting broke up without reaching any conclusions. When Richard Neustadt toured England a month later, in July 1965, he found the British still fuming at the conduct of the meeting. Sir Henry Hardman, Permanent Under Secretary for Defence, was puzzled as to why McNamara would push so hard, given that he knew the Defence Review would not reach its final conclusions for several months yet. Denis Healey professed ‘outrage about . . . McNamara’s lecture to the Chancellor’.²⁶ George Brown protested that ‘We aren’t a banana republic and don’t like [McNamara] talking to us as though we were.’²⁷ Neustadt reported that Healey went on to complain about the Americans’ ‘peculiar, juvenile ways of doing business’: ‘What sense did it make to talk as Bob [McNamara] had done, and to the Chancellor besides? If [the US] were going to threaten he’d threaten back.’²⁸ Meanwhile, on the Australian front, the British Government was having more success in getting its case across. The argument was put by senior ministers to the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, when he visited London at the beginning of July. They focused on three issues: the need for joint allied arrangements in the area; the viability of the British base at Singapore; and the possibility of replacement facilities in Australia. When Menzies met with the British ministers, Harold Wilson began by assuring Menzies that Britain was still committed to its role ‘East of Suez’. Due to the limits on its resources, however, Britain could not do the job on its own. Hence it wanted to examine the possibility of multilateral arrangements with Australia, New Zealand and the United States, sharing planning, facilities, and the burdens of defence. As Denis Healey went on to explain, there was ‘absolutely no chance at all’ of reaching the Government’s £2,000 million target for defence, ²⁴ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Bator, memcon, Callaghan, McNamara et al., 30/6/1965. Emphasis in original. ²⁵ Ibid. Emphasis in original. ²⁶ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Richard Neustadt to McGeorge Bundy, ‘Round-up on Trip to England’, 9/8/1965. ²⁷ Ibid. ²⁸ Ibid.

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unless ‘commitments were shared or cut’.²⁹ At the same time, Wilson continued, the Government had serious doubts about the long-term viability of the Singapore base. While they intended to stay for the duration of Confrontation—which for planning purposes had been assumed to end by 1970, though this could not be assured—they did not expect to be able to stay for long beyond that. Looking ahead, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart warned, Western bases in Asia would likely prove a political impossibility, so the best situation to aim for would be ‘a neutral belt of states between Australia and mainland China’.³⁰ Should Singapore go, Britain hoped it would be able to shift to facilities established in Australia on a co-operative basis. It seemed unwise to ‘leave all [the] eggs in [the] Singapore basket up to 1969–70 and beyond’.³¹ In response, Menzies’ first concern was to ask for the American reaction to the British proposals. Once assured by Wilson, not entirely truthfully, that US Secretary of State Dean Rusk had expressed ‘keen interest’, Menzies was prepared to add his own enthusiasm. While he noted that Australia hoped that Britain would stay in Singapore as long as possible, he agreed that they should start planning alternative bases in Australia. On four-power co-operation, the ‘sooner plans were drawn up and the closer the collaboration the better’.³² He supported the principles that Wilson had outlined, and so hoped to get to the real business of discussion as soon as possible. The four parties should ‘get down to brass tacks at the earliest’.³³ With this agreement in hand, Wilson explained that the British would move to present firm proposals in the next few months, once the Defence Review had made further progress. These would provide a basis for moving to fully fledged quadripartite discussions. Privately, Australian officials sought to assess the reasons for the plans the British were proposing. They noted that the current British studies of Southeast Asian defence assumed, though they did not make explicit, that Britain’s future capabilities would be ‘largely dependent upon main base facilities in Australia’.³⁴ The Australians sensed that these plans ²⁹ PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Sir Robert Menzies, Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, Michael Stewart and Arthur Bottomley, London, 1/7/1965. ³⁰ Ibid. ³¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 2: Sir Robert Menzies to John McEwen, ‘Defence Talks’, 3/7/1965. ³² PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Menzies, Wilson et al., 1/7/1965. ³³ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 2: Menzies to McEwen, ‘Defence Talks’, 3/7/1965. ³⁴ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, 20/7/1965.


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were underpinned by a changing set of priorities. The British were not happy with having to continue committing so many troops to Malaysia as Confrontation dragged on. The ‘real issue for the UK in the Far East is [the] defence of AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND and . . . after Confrontation any other policy would not seem to be very likely’.³⁵ If US officials had seemed at first reluctant to discuss with the British a linking of finance and defence, by July 1965 this reticence had disappeared. This was not due to a sudden conversion of US officials to the British case. Rather, it was because Britain was facing increasing financial difficulties, a circumstance which at once made the question of finance impossible to avoid, while increasing the United States’ bargaining position over Britain. Sterling was pegged to the US dollar at a rate of US$2.80, but increasing pressure in the foreign exchange markets was making it difficult for the Bank of England to defend the pound at this level. In response to the deepening crisis over sterling, Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan was forced to adopt strict economic measures, including immediate domestic spending cuts, at the end of July. These problems increased the US Administration’s leverage over the Wilson Government: now the British needed shortterm assistance to help defend sterling, not only the longer-term balance of payments assistance they had earlier sought. The shift in advantage led American officials to ponder whether they should try to extract greater concessions from the British in return for financial aid. Could the link between economics and defence be extended to include Vietnam? The chief prosecutors of the war certainly hoped so. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wanted to tell the British that ‘a British Brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling’.³⁶ Robert McNamara agreed.³⁷ Others were more wary. George Ball—a noted ‘dove’ on Vietnam—warned that any such deal ‘would be making mercenaries of the soldiers’.³⁸ Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler declared himself unwilling ‘to be a party to anything of this sort’.³⁹ A deal, he argued, could only take place on the basis of Britain’s existing commitments. ³⁵ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, 9/8/1965. Capitalization as in original. ³⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, 28/7/1965. ³⁷ LBJL: Papers of George Ball: George Ball, memcon, George Ball and Henry Fowler, telephone, 29/7/1965. ³⁸ Ibid. ³⁹ Ibid.

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The British, moreover, still possessed some leverage of their own. Derek Mitchell, the PM’s Principal Private Secretary, had warned McGeorge Bundy that if the US pushed the British too hard, this might ‘cause ministers to lose heart and decide on really drastic action of a different sort’—meaning devaluation.⁴⁰ A British devaluation, Fowler advised the President, could wreck the world financial system.⁴¹ Others warned that if the US did not bail out the British, their withdrawal from defence commitments would be certain.⁴² George Ball concluded that so great was the US interest in maintaining both sterling and British defence that it might have to come to Britain’s assistance even if not all of its demands were met.⁴³ The weight of such arguments persuaded President Johnson to order his officials to keep the subjects of Vietnam and sterling clearly separate.⁴⁴ When Sir Burke Trend, the British Cabinet Secretary, visited Washington at the end of July, the US position was explained to him. After a discussion of the economic measures the British Government needed to implement, McGeorge Bundy stated the one condition for American assistance: ‘no one-sided political and economic decisions during [a sterling] crisis. Specifically, no pull-back or disengagement as a means for dealing with [a] crisis’.⁴⁵ Sir Burke Trend was cautiously responsive. He pointed out that the British, while wanting to cut costs, were not planning a wholesale withdrawal. Moreover, should the Defence Review recommend any changes, the Government was sure to discuss them first with the US. But he could make no commitments: ‘if the cataclysm does happen, I don’t know what we’d really do. There would be immense pressure to cut unnecessary overseas expenditures’.⁴⁶ Fortunately a financial cataclysm did not immediately arise; but two weeks later a major political crisis did. On 9 August the Malaysian ⁴⁰ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 2: McGeorge Bundy, memcon, McGeorge Bundy and Derek Mitchell, telephone, 26/7/1965. ⁴¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, 6/8/1965. ⁴² LBJL: WHCF: Conf F: CO 305 UK: Box 12: Gardner Ackley to Lyndon Johnson, 9/8/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: George Ball, ‘British Sterling Crisis’, 6/8/1965; David Bruce to George Ball, 6/8/1965. ⁴³ LBJL: Papers of George Ball: George Ball, memcon, George Ball and McGeorge Bundy, telephone, 29/7/1965. ⁴⁴ LBJL: Files of McGeorge Bundy: Box 10: McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, 2/8/1965. ⁴⁵ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: memcon, Sir Burke Trend, McGeorge Bundy, Francis Bator et al., Washington, DC, 30/7/1965. ⁴⁶ Ibid.


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Government announced without warning that the island state of Singapore was separating from the rest of the Malaysian Federation. As noted in the Introduction, tensions between the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore’s own Government had been endemic since the establishment of the Federation in 1963. From Kuala Lumpur’s perspective, Malaysia was supposed to be an extension of the old Malaya, with Malays retaining primacy and political parties organized on a communal basis. Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, expected that Lee Kuan Yew’s left-wing, noncommunal People’s Action Party (PAP) should focus on governing a largely Chinese-populated Singapore. From Singapore’s perspective, the PAP had a legitimate ambition to participate in the politics of Malaysia, rather than being confined to the island state as a mere appendage to Malaya. Thus the PAP had moved to contest Malaysian federal elections in 1964, seeking to build a broad base of support across the country under the banner of a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’—in opposition to a ‘Malayan Malaysia’. These stirrings had led Tunku briefly to consider, early in 1965, a constitutional rearrangement providing the Singapore Government with more autonomy, in return for less Singaporean participation in the central Kuala Lumpur Government. The plans had not been realized and tensions persisted, exacerbated by personality clashes between the conservative, established Tunku and the ambitiously left-wing Lee Kuan Yew, and intensified by the threat of communal clashes and Sino–Malay race riots. Pressed on the one side by the PAP’s continued campaigning for a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ and on the other by Malayan radicals braying for Lee’s arrest, the Tunku concluded in mid-1965 that the only solution was for Singapore to be cast adrift. Secretly, his ministers pushed a reluctant Singaporean Government to agree to the separation, arguing that it was the only way to avert communal bloodshed. An agreement was signed and then announced to the parliament on 9 August 1965, with the British getting barely 12 hours’ advance notice of the break-up. The separation of Singapore from Malaysia came as a profound shock to the British Government and shunted its deliberations about its future policy towards Southeast Asia on to a different track. As documented so far in this volume, these deliberations had been proceeding in an orderly but leisurely manner. No direct attention had been paid to the current circumstances of Confrontation, as policy planning had assumed that some satisfactory conclusion to the conflict would be found, and focused on the moment thereafter. When Singapore suddenly separated from

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Malaysia, this neat separation of policy disintegrated. It was no longer clear whether and how Britain’s current policy of resisting Confrontation would continue, and both this policy and future plans would have to be reassessed in the light of the changed circumstances of Britain’s client states. The separation appeared disastrous for current British policy. The Indonesian Government had instigated its policy of Confrontation against Malaysia on the grounds that the Federation was an artificial, ‘neo-colonialist’ creation. While by mid-1965 the Confrontation itself was manifested in little more than nuisance raids, President Sukarno’s rhetoric spoke ever more grandiloquently of anti-imperialist revolution. Britain had committed tens of thousands of troops to Malaysia’s defence, only now to find that this entity was beginning to break up, in accordance with Indonesia’s demands. In the aftermath, could Britain maintain the defence of a separate Malaysia and Singapore against Indonesian hostility? Would it now even want to do so? Or would it be better for the British to withdraw before their position deteriorated further and a humiliating loss to Indonesia became inevitable? In the immediate wake of the separation, British opinion was divided as to the best course of action. Some officials counselled caution. Lord Head, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, thought it best to let the dust settle. One official in the Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department advised that if the Government tried too quickly ‘ ‘‘to cut our losses’’ and get pell-mell out of Singapore and let the Tunku and Lee go hang’, they risked alienating the Americans and ‘reviv[ing] all the bitterness in Australia which followed the loss of Singapore to the Japs’.⁴⁷ Others, while recognizing these risks, felt that the Government had to grasp the opportunity to relieve itself of the burden of Confrontation—or else face the even worse risk of having to defend a rump Bornean state against Indonesia if Malaysia disintegrated further. Denis Healey advised Harold Wilson that the Government should negotiate its way to a withdrawal from Borneo, even if this meant having to give a firmer commitment to Singapore and Australia so as to gain their and the other allies’ acquiescence.⁴⁸ ⁴⁷ PRO: FO 371/181528: D.A. Greenhill to Sir Saville Garner, ‘Singapore and All That’, 13/8/1965. ⁴⁸ PRO: PREM 13/431: Denis Healey to Harold Wilson, ‘Malaysian Situation’, 13/8/1965.


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On 15 August Harold Wilson broke from his summer holiday to convene an emergency meeting of senior ministers and officials to discuss the situation. Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, and Lord Head advised the meeting that the current situation did not demand any immediate action by the Government—on the contrary, to act in such a way risked provoking further havoc. Equally, however, unless the Government took discreet but firm steps in the near future, it risked becoming captive to a worsening situation. Singapore and Malaysia could not be expected to maintain harmonious relations indefinitely, and with every step they took apart, the efficacy and security of the British bases in the countries would suffer.⁴⁹ This prognosis received the general assent of the meeting. In discussion, a range of further doubts was expressed about the Singapore base: the local Communist party was attracting a threateningly large percentage of support; the base was wholly dependent on local labour; as Singapore became more assertively independent in its foreign policy, it would seek to put restrictions on the use of the base; the base’s very existence prejudiced the international standing of the Singapore Government, and this was not in Britain’s interest. Thus the meeting generally endorsed the view that the British Government should find a means to bring Confrontation to a speedy conclusion, enabling a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore in the next few years. To this end, the meeting ordered that a secret quadripartite conference be held to discuss with the ANZUS powers the possibility of implementing these plans. The quadripartite conference was scheduled for two and a half weeks later, at the beginning of September 1965. During this interval Whitehall officials firmed up the options available, and clarified their underlying reasoning. None of this material, however, was released early to any of the allies, and throughout August they were left to guess at what the British position might be. At first, officials in Australia had been confident that the British would remain strongly committed to Malaysia and Singapore. Initial word from the Assistant Under Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office had been that the ‘consensus of officials was broadly in favour of ‘‘defence business as usual’’ ’.⁵⁰ Within a few days, however, the Australians heard ⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 130/239: MISC 76/1st Meeting, 15/8/1965. ⁵⁰ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’, tel. 6886, 11/8/1965.

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rumours of the changing British position. The British Commander-inChief in the Far East was reported to be ‘gloomy’ about the prospects for defence co-operation between Malaysia and Singapore.⁵¹ The Assistant Under Secretary at the CRO was now pointing out that the ‘situation in political and practical terms had been changed fundamentally’.⁵² Where once the British bases had been guaranteed by a single government with whom HMG had had relations of ‘intimacy and implicit trust’, now they were dependent on two governments whose interests might clash, who did not get along, and whose trustworthiness in the eyes of the British had been undermined.⁵³ There were rumours that the Ministry of Defence would impose a fixed term of four to five years on the Anglo–Malaysian Defence Agreement when it was renegotiated to take account of the separation. While this would buttress the British presence in the immediate future, it would also provide them with a release around 1970. This year, Australian officials noted, had long been the ‘magical’ date by which time the defence economies were supposed to be achieved.⁵⁴ Some suspected that the British were now feeling let ‘off the hook’.⁵⁵ They had found a means by which they might honourably negotiate a release from their commitments to Malaysia, and shift to a reduced presence in Australia. While Australian officials were sure that Britain’s defence and foreign affairs ministers still believed in the value of an overseas role—though possibly on a reduced basis—there were rumours that economic ministers were seizing the opportunity to push for greater cuts.⁵⁶ Officials warned that some ‘looseness’ was possible in British thinking, in the lead-up to the quadripartite talks.⁵⁷ The other allies had similarly mixed news. The New Zealand High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur reported that his British counterpart was ‘convinced’ that Britain would stay committed to Malaysia while ⁵¹ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: William Pritchett to DEAC, tel. 693, 12/8/1965. ⁵² NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’, tel. 7036, 13/8/1965. ⁵³ Ibid. ⁵⁴ Ibid.; NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’, tel. 7037, 14/8/1965. NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, 18/8/1965. ⁵⁵ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Hartnell to Hicks, 18/8/1965. ⁵⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 7230, 20/8/1965. ⁵⁷ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’, tel. 7037, 14/8/1965.


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Confrontation lasted.⁵⁸ He believed, though, that planning would soon begin for the mothballing of the Singapore base and the setting up of a base in Australia in the medium term. On the other hand, in Washington, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs told Australian officials that he did not himself sense ‘anything imminent in the British mind’.⁵⁹ There was, he said, ‘no sign’ that the British would immediately pull out of Singapore, though they might set a date for their departure in a few years.⁶⁰ This mixture of doubts over Britain’s intentions appears to have encouraged Australian ministers to shift firmly away from the idea of a future British base in their country. While Menzies had previously expressed interest in the idea, as described earlier in this chapter, when it came to the Cabinet’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee at the end of August, it was received much more coolly. No doubt part of the reason for the shift was tactical. The Australian Government would not wish to give the British any encouragement to leave precipitately from Malaysia and Singapore, especially now that there seemed some risk of this happening. The FADC’s disagreement, though, was expressed in fundamental, strategic terms. The major objective of Australian policy, according to the FADC, was to keep the UK and US involved to a maximum extent in Southeast Asia. The UK presence was necessary for stability, as a means of containing Indonesia, and to facilitate passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Moving British forces from Malaysia and Singapore to Australia would ‘change materially the purpose they would serve’, and run contrary to the underlying objectives of Australian policy.⁶¹ It was important, the FADC argued, to convince the British to stay in Southeast Asia as long as possible. In Singapore itself, it was clear that the island’s government had a similar view of its interests—and was apparently concerned at any rumour of a withdrawal. Privately, the new Singapore Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs assured Australian officials that they understood the need not to take actions which might threaten the ⁵⁸ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: New Zealand High Commissioner to Wellington, tel. 491, 20/8/1965. ⁵⁹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, tel. 2916, 25/8/1965. ⁶⁰ Ibid. ⁶¹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: FADC, ‘Proposed Quadripartite Talks Arising from the Separation of Singapore from Malaysia’, 1173 (FAD), 26/8/1965.

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position of the British base. The base was a key source of employment and stability for the fledgling island state. They recognized that they should not undermine confidence by publicly clashing with Kuala Lumpur, imposing restrictions on the use of the base, or seeking a separate settlement with Indonesia.⁶² Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew publicly emphasized the point. In the immediate aftermath of the separation, Lee had sought an assurance from the US Government that it would come to Singapore’s defence should it be attacked. But now, when the US ambassador returned to give a general assurance, Lee refused to hear it.⁶³ Instead, he gave a press conference where, according to the US Consulate, he displayed ‘almost slavish respect for British wisdom and judgement’.⁶⁴ At the same time, he stridently attacked the US and declared that it could never occupy the Singapore base. Privately, he told US officials that the attacks were supposed to prevent Malaysia from ejecting the British in the expectation that the United States would replace them.⁶⁵ US officials assessed these tactics as a means of ‘ ‘‘blackmailing’’ [the] British into remaining in Singapore since [the] alternative of [the] US filling the vacuum [is] not on the cards’.⁶⁶ By the end of August 1965, a few days before the quadripartite talks were due to begin, British officials and ministers had finalized the position they would be presenting to their allies. The stance they took combined their early assessment that the separation compelled an earlier British departure from Singapore with the medium-term strategy that had been emerging from the Defence Review. The final position paper, agreed to by all departments involved, reiterated the view that Britain’s costs in Southeast Asia were wildly out of line with its interests.⁶⁷ As before, a complete withdrawal from the region was ruled out, as it would be blocked by the ANZUS allies. A partial withdrawal from ⁶² NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: William Pritchett to Paul Hasluck, tel. 726, 17/8/1965. Also, NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia—Separation of Singapore’, tel. 6919, 11/8/1965. ⁶³ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: AHC, Kuala Lumpur, to DEAC, ‘Lee Kuan Yew and the United States’, 4/9/1965. ⁶⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: Richard Donald to Dean Rusk, 31/8/1965. ⁶⁵ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: William Pritchett to DEAC, tel. 805, 3/9/1965. ⁶⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: Donald to Rusk, 1/9/1965. ⁶⁷ PRO: CAB 148/22: OPD(65)123: ‘Repercussions on British Policy in Southeast Asia of the Secession of Singapore from Malaysia’, 25/8/1965.


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Singapore to Australia was recommended instead. As well as the two older reasons of cost and the long-term strategy of neutralization, a third, substantial issue had become salient. The separation of Singapore from Malaysia meant that the island’s security was now tenuous. It would be ‘unrealistic’ and ‘dangerous’ to assume that the British base could be kept secure for more than a few years.⁶⁸ To achieve the goal of partial withdrawal, a quick end to Confrontation would have to be negotiated which preserved security and stability in the area. While officials were uncertain about how such negotiations might be initiated, none dissented from these basic aims.⁶⁹ Importantly, the paper argued that the agreement of Britain’s allies was vital at every stage in the process. A settlement of Confrontation could only be kept secure if it received the assent of all the allies, Malaysia and Singapore as well as those in ANZUS. Indonesia would be likely to seize upon any major disagreement between these allies and Britain, which would jeopardize the possibility of peace. Moreover, as Britain’s long-term goal was to maintain its relations with Australia, New Zealand and the United States, their agreement to the policy of partial withdrawal was necessary to its success. On 3 September 1965, senior British officials revealed the Government’s thinking in confidential talks with US, Australian and New Zealand representatives in London. They emphasized that the separation had placed the Singapore base ‘in serious jeopardy’.⁷⁰ Thus the Government had concluded that it urgently needed to end Confrontation, even on terms less favourable than those previously possible. British forces had only a very limited tenure on Singapore, and once this had expired they would have to be redeployed, on a reduced, co-operative basis to new facilities in northern Australia. The allies were aghast at the British presentation. They were deeply concerned at the idea of negotiating with Indonesia’s President Sukarno, who had shifted sharply leftward over the previous few months, grandly declaring the creation of a ‘Jakarta–Peking–Pyongyang–Hanoi– Phnom Penh’ axis.⁷¹ They were perplexed by the British belief that ⁶⁸ Ibid. ⁶⁹ PRO: CAB 130/239: MISC 75/5: Working Party on Singapore, ‘Repercussions on British Policy in Southeast Asia of the Secession of Singapore from Malaysia’. ⁷⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, 3/9/1965. ⁷¹ LBJL: Administrative History of the Department of State: Vol. 1: Box 2: Ch. VII: L. Indonesia.

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Singapore was necessarily threatened, and appalled by the idea that Britain might act on so hasty an assessment. In the quadripartite meeting, all three allies rounded on the British. The New Zealand delegation argued that any attempt to negotiate with Indonesia would lead to the ‘total loss of the Singapore base’.⁷² Samuel Berger, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, damned the British proposals as ‘dangerous’.⁷³ The Australians sharply criticized the British position as drawing ‘gloomy conclusions on [the] basis that [the] worst happened’ in every possible scenario for the future.⁷⁴ It was ‘disturbing’ that the British were implying that Confrontation must be ended by any means.⁷⁵ All the allies doubted that Indonesia would negotiate in good faith. All agreed that there was no strategic substitute to Singapore, and that problems should be tackled on the basis that it should be maintained, not that forces should be reduced. Chastened by the criticism from Britain’s allies, Sir Neil Pritchard, Under Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office, agreed to convey their view to ministers that Britain should ‘soldier on until [the] position [is] clarified’.⁷⁶ The meeting adjourned for a few days so that each party might consider its position. Privately, US officials were deeply concerned at the risks entailed by Britain even contemplating these plans. They were sure, on the grounds of both strategic logic and private assurances, that the Singapore Government was keen to have Britain retain its base.⁷⁷ But if British intentions leaked, the Singapore Government would be forced to reassess its position radically. If Lee Kuan Yew had it confirmed to him how seriously the British were considering withdrawal, he would be compelled by self-interest to find some sort of accommodation with Indonesia or Communist China. The Western position in Singapore would ‘deteriorate with almost incredible swiftness’.⁷⁸ US officials in Indonesia doubted that it would be possible to hold constructive negotiations with President Sukarno. If he scented the ⁷² PRO: FO 371/181529: QT(65)1st Meeting: CRO, memcon, ‘Quadripartite Talks: The Repercussions in Southeast Asia of the Separation of Singapore’, London, 3/9/1965. ⁷³ Ibid. ⁷⁴ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Laurence McIntyre to DEAC, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, 3/9/1965. ⁷⁵ Ibid. ⁷⁶ Ibid. ⁷⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 3/9/1965; Richard Donald to George Ball, 6/9/1965. ⁷⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: Donald to Ball, 6/9/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Dean Rusk to US Embassy, London, 7/9/1965.


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possibility that Britain might withdraw, he would push for their total capitulation, and the Indonesians would have won a ‘striking victory’.⁷⁹ The United States, embassy officials concluded, should tell the ‘British [to] pull up their socks’, and maintain their staunch opposition to Confrontation.⁸⁰ Privately, Australian officials were no less scathing. The British position represented a ‘complete turn-about’ from previous British policy, especially with regards to Confrontation.⁸¹ While the British claimed that the West should not capitulate to Sukarno’s demands, there was a ‘strong implication that if capitulation is called something else it will be acceptable’.⁸² The suggestion that Britain should quickly withdraw from the region was a ‘triumphant vindication’ of the aggressive policies pursued by the Indonesian regime.⁸³ US and Australian officials were also perplexed at British motives. What concerns were driving them to contemplate so fundamental a shift in foreign policy? Some believed that the British were ‘dead serious about the slim prospects of their being able to remain in Singapore’.⁸⁴ But it was clear that financial considerations were playing a part as well. The US and Australian officials involved in the negotiations both felt that British officials were ‘struggling hard to rationalise’ a determination to cut spending by ‘underlining (and perhaps exaggerating)’ their difficulties regarding Confrontation and maintaining the Singapore base.⁸⁵ Though the British made little mention of these financial problems, one US official noted that, ‘it [was] apparent from brief corridor exchanges that this looms large in British calculations’.⁸⁶ Some in the US defence staff bluntly concluded that, ‘it is in our interest to buy their support if necessary’.⁸⁷ Such thoughts appear to have driven Samuel Berger to make a discreet suggestion to the British. In a lunchtime conversation with E.H. Peck, ⁷⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: Indonesia: Box 247: Marshall Green to Dean Rusk, 7/9/1965. ⁸⁰ Ibid. ⁸¹ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 1: K.H. Rogers, ‘Quadripartite Talks: British Memorandum’, 3/9/1965. ⁸² Ibid. ⁸³ Ibid. ⁸⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: F.J. Blouin to John McNaughton, ‘British Plan to Withdraw from Singapore’, 7/9/1965. ⁸⁵ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Laurence McIntyre to DEAC, tel. 7673, 3/9/1965. ⁸⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, 7/9/1965. ⁸⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: Blouin to McNaughton, ‘British Plan’, 7/9/1965.

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an Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, ‘he hinted that there might be advantage in our stressing a little more the financial difficulties’.⁸⁸ Peck was unsure of Berger’s meaning: was this the inkling of an offer that the US might provide financial assistance? Or was it a threat that US support for sterling might be withdrawn? In any case, Peck explained to Berger, financial considerations might have originally caused the Defence Review to examine Britain’s Southeast Asian deployment, but it was the political circumstance of separation that had led to its urgent consideration now. Berger did not pursue the matter much further—though, as will soon be shown, other US officials did. On 7 September 1965, the quadripartite talks reconvened.⁸⁹ It was clear to the ANZUS governments that the British had softened their stance.⁹⁰ British officials denied that they had reached a fixed position. While the paper they had presented had been passed by ministers, they claimed this was as a basis for discussion, without commitment. There would be no decisions on future defence planning until the Defence Review was complete, and no reductions while Confrontation continued. While they hoped that this conflict would soon end, they would not rush precipitately into negotiations with Indonesia, nor act without the approval of Malaysia and Singapore. Nevertheless, the British stuck to some parts of their original assessment of the longer-term prospects. After Confrontation, they argued, Malaysia and Singapore would likely shift to non-alignment and want to be rid of the British bases. The UK did not envisage making an indefinite security guarantee to the two countries by itself. It would be prepared however to be part of an international guarantee, embodied in some sort of co-operative arrangement. With the allies somewhat mollified by Britain’s softened stance, the talks were able to conclude. Rounding up the talks, Sir Neil Pritchard agreed to convey the views of the other Governments to his superiors: that Britain should ‘wait and see’ before making any further moves on Confrontation, and that there was ‘considerable doubt’ that Western interests would be served by even planning the evacuation of British ⁸⁸ PRO: FO 371/181530: E.H. Peck, ‘Quadripartite Talks on Singapore/Malaysia: US Attitude’, 6/9/1965. ⁸⁹ PRO: FO 371/181529: QT(65)2nd Meeting: CRO, memcon, ‘Quadripartite Talks: The Repercussions in Southeast Asia of the Separation of Singapore’, London, 7/9/1965. ⁹⁰ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Laurence McIntyre to DEAC, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel. 7756, 7/9/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, 7/9/1965.


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forces from Malaysia and Singapore.⁹¹ The allies had succeeded in preventing any hasty British withdrawal. In return, they agreed to be open to discussions on future ‘co-operative’ arrangements, whereby the burdens of Southeast Asian defence might be shared. The next day, American officials moved to keep the British to their word. Over the previous month British and US officials had been involved in multilateral negotiations to construct a short-term safety net for the British pound. The ‘Martin–Cromer’ plan—named jointly after the Chair of the US Federal Reserve and the Governor of the Bank of England—envisaged a US$1 billion package to support sterling, involving ten countries. The United States was to contribute the lion’s share of the package, worth some US$400 million. By early September 1965, these negotiations were approaching a final agreement. On 8 and 9 September 1965, Under Secretary of State George Ball and Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler were scheduled to meet Harold Wilson in London. Dean Rusk gave strict instructions to the Under Secretary of State. Rusk explained that it had been ‘at best premature and at worst extremely dangerous’ for the British to suggest that they might withdraw from Singapore.⁹² The US had ‘told the British flatly’ on several occasions that its co-operation on both short- and longterm financial problems assumed the British would make no unilateral changes to their defence commitments.⁹³ This should be re-emphasized. The US was willing to examine long-term issues, but only in the context of the Defence Review and discussions of British economic and political goals. It was ‘vital for you’, Rusk urged Ball, ‘to hit [Harold Wilson] very hard indeed’ on these points.⁹⁴ George Ball acted true to his orders. In meetings with Michael Stewart and Harold Wilson, he attacked London’s calling of the quadripartite talks as ‘both premature and hazardous’.⁹⁵ The American people would not accept a decreasing British commitment to Southeast Asia while their commitment in the area was increasing. If news of British intentions had leaked, there would have been ‘disastrous consequences’.⁹⁶ In their own defence, Stewart and Wilson explained that the talks were only intended to examine possible contingencies. They gave Ball ‘a categorical ⁹¹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Hicks and McIntyre to DEAC, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel. 7756, 7/9/1965. ⁹² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 22: Dean Rusk to George Ball, Henry Fowler and David Bruce, 7/9/1965. ⁹³ Ibid. ⁹⁴ Ibid. ⁹⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: George Ball to Dean Rusk, 9/9/1965. ⁹⁶ Ibid.

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reassurance that the United Kingdom had no present intention of reducing its commitments in Southeast Asia’.⁹⁷ Moreover, Wilson assured Ball, the Defence Review ‘would not come up with a policy of scuttle’.⁹⁸ That would be ‘contrary to everything he . . . had ever said and would make him eat a great number of his own words’.⁹⁹ It appeared, reported Ball, that the British now clearly understood that the US had no ‘intention of letting [them] off the hook in Southeast Asia’.¹⁰⁰ Alone with Wilson, George Ball pushed the matter further still. He ‘vigorously pressed the argument’ that the maintenance of Britain’s defence commitments was ‘an essential element in the total Anglo–American relationship’.¹⁰¹ Wilson disagreed. He ‘insisted that no clear link could be made between US efforts to assist sterling and a common approach to foreign policy’.¹⁰² Ball was little satisfied with this response. To make the US position clear, he arranged to meet Wilson again the next day, 9 September, directly after they had both met with Secretary Fowler to discuss financial issues. At the meeting with Secretary Fowler, where the agreement to implement the Martin–Cromer plan was concluded, there was a hint that Wilson had shifted his position. After Fowler had outlined the support package that was involved, Ball chimed in to ‘emphasise . . . the importance of the United Kingdom’s retaining its world wide responsibilities’.¹⁰³ Wilson hinted at a change by referring to increasing co-operation between the United States and Britain in the future. The point was made clearer in the meeting between Ball and Wilson which followed. Ball opened by repeating the points he had made the day before. The Anglo–American relationship could only be considered in totality. While Ball was careful to note that there was no explicit quid pro quo linking British and American policies, he explained that the British Government would be making ‘a great mistake’ if it did not recognize that American financial assistance was ‘inextricably related’ to Britain’s defence commitments.¹⁰⁴ The Prime Minister made it clear ⁹⁷ ⁹⁸ ⁹⁹ ¹⁰¹ ¹⁰³

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: George Ball to Dean Rusk, 9/9/1965. PRO: PREM 13/2450: memcon, Harold Wilson, George Ball et al., London, 8/9/1965. Ibid. ¹⁰⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Ball to Rusk, 9/9/1965. Ibid. ¹⁰² Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/2450: memcon, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, Henry Fowler, George Ball et al., London, 10.25 p.m., 9/9/1965. ¹⁰⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Ball to Rusk, 9/9/1965. PRO: PREM 13/2450: memcon, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, George Ball et al., London, 11.15 p.m. 9/9/1965.


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that he had backed down.¹⁰⁵ He dissembled that his previous objections were aimed at the notion that Britain might contribute troops to Vietnam. He conceded that ‘all aspects of the relationship of the two Governments must be considered as a totality’.¹⁰⁶ With this concession won, the meeting concluded. After this understanding was reached in September 1965, the British participants were always careful to deny that it had ever taken place, as that would have been politically explosive. Within that very month, Harold Wilson insisted to the Cabinet and the Labour Party more broadly that the Americans had made no connection between economic and defence policies.¹⁰⁷ He would later go on to maintain that position in his autobiography.¹⁰⁸ James Callaghan claimed, somewhat disingenuously given his presence at some of the Anglo–American meetings, that he had no inkling of any possible deal.¹⁰⁹ Richard Crossman, as a member of the Cabinet and later of OPD, suspected the truth but could never confirm it, and this appears to have been the position of many others in the Cabinet and Parliamentary Party.¹¹⁰ How could a secret understanding connecting British defence and economic policies have maintained its force if few ministers apart from the most senior members of the Cabinet knew about it? Quite simply because, for the period in question, the Cabinet did not have much say on the direction and formulation of defence and foreign policy. Throughout August and September 1965, the topic of Britain’s Southeast Asian role was only brought up once in Cabinet, where the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary essentially presented the current policy as a fait accompli.¹¹¹ British defence policy in Southeast Asia was firmly under the control of the relevant senior ministers and officials, and within these circles the relationship between sterling and defence was widely known and heeded. ¹⁰⁵ This retreat, it may be noted, was all the more humiliating by being forced by an American official who was the Prime Minister’s junior. ¹⁰⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Ball to Rusk, 9/9/1965. ¹⁰⁷ PRO: CAB 128/39: CC(65)49th Meeting, 23/9/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 29/9/1965. ¹⁰⁸ Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 232, 264. ¹⁰⁹ James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p. 176; Alan Dobson, ‘The Years of Transition: Anglo–American Relations 1961–1967’, Review of International Studies, 16 (1990), pp. 239–58. ¹¹⁰ Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 1, Minister of Housing 1964–66 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), pp. 456, 540. ¹¹¹ PRO: CAB 128/39: CC(65)49th Meeting, 23/9/1965.

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Dean Rusk had earlier noted that James Callaghan, Sir Burke Trend and British Ambassador Patrick Dean had all been told of US views.¹¹² A British record of the meeting between Wilson and Ball was kept and given limited circulation within the Foreign and Cabinet Offices, whose personnel clearly understood the meaning of the agreement. As one official succinctly put it, both the White House and State Department had ‘said that sterling and defence were linked; neither tied the linkage to any particular quid pro quo; both implied the need for consultation before any action affecting defence commitments’.¹¹³ Most importantly, in the months and years that followed it is clear that the key defence and foreign policy officials and ministers in the British Government were aware of the Johnson Administration’s views and intentions, and sought to shape the direction of Britain’s policies accordingly. The conclusion of the September quadripartite talks on Malaysia/ Singapore, and the concomitant understanding reached between Harold Wilson and Johnson Administration officials, marked a significant watershed in British policy planning towards Southeast Asia. The events sealed a major private failure of the Wilson Government and its officials. A few months earlier, in mid-1965, the Government had instigated discussions with its key overseas allies with a number of goals in mind: to reach agreement on a revised strategy for Southeast Asia that would see British forces moved from Malaysia and Singapore to the region’s periphery; to reduce the burden of Britain’s Southeast Asian role by institutionalizing co-operation with the ANZUS powers; and to gain long-term financial assistance from the United States to alleviate both the direct and foreign exchange cost of Britain’s role. At the conclusion of the September talks, the British Government had not only failed to achieve its goals, but moved even further away from being able to reach them. Its allies had forcefully rejected the revised British strategy, and any attempt to move forces away from Singapore. They were now much more suspicious of any changes the British might propose. Worse still, thanks to Britain’s weak financial position, the tables had been turned in the Government’s attempt to use its continuing role in the region to extract long-term assistance from the United States: instead, the US extracted from them an understanding that they should make no unilateral changes to the bases in Malaysia and ¹¹² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 22: Rusk to Ball et al., 7/9/1965. ¹¹³ PRO: FO 371/179587: G.E. Hall, 13/10/1965.


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Singapore—though the British were now much more sceptical about their value and practicality—in return for only a short-term bailout of the pound. How had this failure of British policy come about? Partly, it was a case of unfortunate timing and circumstances. The British had had a much stronger hand when they began negotiations with the United States in June, but their position was sharply undermined with the sterling crisis of the late summer, which made them desperate for US assistance. At the same time, the sudden break-up of Malaysia and Singapore caused British officials to introduce their plans to the ANZUS allies much more suddenly. They did not have any time to prepare the allies for their shift in thinking; their proposals were presented as a much sharper and faster change of policy than they otherwise would have been. The combination of these events meant that the ANZUS powers were more hostile to the British proposals, and more able to force their views. Even without these circumstantial difficulties, however, there were fundamental differences between the British and ANZUS positions, and an inherent contradiction in Britain’s aims. The British were seeking to reduce their role in Southeast Asia to match their economic resources, while maintaining their wider interest in close relations with the ANZUS powers. But these allies’ main concern was to keep Britain in as active a role in Southeast Asia as possible: to back their own efforts in Vietnam, and, for Australia and New Zealand, to support their preferred strategy of forward defence. The conflict between these interests underlay the dispute between Britain and its allies at the September 1965 quadripartite talks. It had not been resolved at the conclusion of the talks. The allies had got their way in preventing a sudden change in British policy; but the problem of how Britain could reduce its Southeast Asian role to match its limited economic interests and resources still remained.

3 A Dubious Compromise: October 1965–February 1966 In the remaining months of 1965 and into 1966, the Wilson Government had to complete its Defence Review and prepare the Defence White Paper. This task, however, had been made significantly more difficult by the outcome of the September quadripartite talks. The British plans, which the ANZUS allies had firmly rejected at the talks, had not been plucked out of thin air in reaction to the Malaysia–Singapore split. Rather, they had been a reasonable, albeit abbreviated, reflection of the thinking that had been slowly emerging from the Defence Review. British officials now faced the challenge of having to convince the allies of their views when these views had already been summarily rejected. Moreover, the ANZUS governments had become much more suspicious of British motives and intentions. This chapter traces the period from the aftermath of the September quadripartite talks to the publication of the Defence White Paper in February 1966. The period might be considered as comprising two major stages, divided by Harold Wilson’s December 1965 visit to Washington. The first stage was characterized by noticeably more distant relations between Britain and the ANZUS powers. Chastened by the harsh reception their ideas had received at the September talks, the British avoided further consultations with these allies until the end of 1965. At the same time, they privately continued to develop their arguments and ideas for a partial withdrawal from Singapore to Australia. This self-imposed silence caused the ANZUS governments to become increasingly concerned about the direction that future policy was taking, and led them to ponder ways in which the British might be induced to stay in Southeast Asia. In December 1965, Harold Wilson broke the slowly thickening ice with his visit to Washington. Yet while relations improved, it was

A Dubious Compromise: October 1965–February 1966

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still clear that the allies sharply diverged from Britain on what its future position in Southeast Asia should be. The second stage of the period, spanning the final two months before the publication of the Defence White Paper, saw British officials trying to bridge the gap between themselves and their ANZUS allies, so that they might be able to produce a mutually acceptable policy. With only days left before the final talks, there was still no resolution in sight until Denis Healey came up with a slightly reworded yet fundamentally recast version of British intentions. After some difficult negotiations, this policy was accepted by the ANZUS governments. The Malaysian and Singaporean Governments were informed of British intentions, and the policy was duly published in the Defence White Paper of February 1966. In the immediate wake of the September talks, British officials sought to downplay the rift their proposals had created between themselves and the ANZUS powers. They tried to reassure American and Australian representatives that their plans for negotiating with Indonesia and partial withdrawal from Singapore to Australia were not so firm as they had appeared. In a private talk with the Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the permanent head of the Foreign Office, tried to smooth the waters by minimizing the extent of disagreement. He told the High Commissioner that the British paper was not supposed to contain firm proposals, only matters for discussion. He ‘did not deny’ that its pessimism was exaggerated, and ‘virtually admitted’ that there were Cabinet divisions on the matter.¹ He hinted, the High Commissioner claimed, that ‘the Foreign Office view is not far removed from our own’.² Other British officials claimed to the Australians that they had not made their intentions clear, and said that they regretted their attempt at the paper: its quality was compromised by having to reconcile many conflicting views; its gloomy tone was a reaction against past papers which had ‘tended too much to gloss over the pessimistic aspects’.³ On the other hand, the permanent head of the Australian Department of External Affairs reported that all within the FO and ¹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Alexander Downer to Sir Robert Menzies, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel. 7866, 10/9/1965. ² Ibid. ³ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 1: DEAC, ‘Quadripartite Talks: Future Relations with Malaysia and Singapore’, 10/9/1965.

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CRO were ‘very upset about the deal’—implying a greater regret at the reaction to the paper rather than its contents.⁴ Denis Healey so much wished to distance himself from the September talks that he told the Australian High Commissioner that he had not even seen the British paper presented there, and only knew a bit about it.⁵ This prompted some private scepticism from Australian officials, who noted that, as Defence Secretary, his views would have carried a great deal of weight. His views, moreover, still appeared to be ‘no different’ from the paper’s contents.⁶ To the High Commissioner, Sir Alexander Downer, he argued that Britain’s response to Confrontation should be either to escalate or to compromise with Indonesia. He was ‘pessimistic’ on the future of Malaysia, and on Lee Kuan Yew’s position in Singapore.⁷ Though Healey denied that he was thinking of any immediate reorientation of British policy, Downer noted that he kept returning to the phrase: ‘if we decided to abandon our East of Suez policy’.⁸ Downer saw the Defence Secretary as ‘seized with the idea of British impermanence in Singapore’, an idea which led him to look for a way for Britain ‘to retreat without indignity’.⁹ As Australia and the United States opposed any such move, Healey claimed that they were doing Britain a disservice by ‘virtually compelling’ it to stay in the region.¹⁰ In a similar vein, Harold Wilson wrote a telegram to Sir Robert Menzies which suggested that Australia and the other allies had succeeded in stopping immediate British action but not in changing British minds. In his message, Wilson affirmed that his Government would be adopting the ‘wait and see’ policy on Confrontation that Australia had urged. He further affirmed that the Government still believed that Britain should maintain its ‘East of Suez’ role, albeit on an interdependent basis. But he did not make any retreat from his Government’s earlier propositions: that the tenure of the Singapore base could not be assured after 1970; that the ability to oppose Confrontation had been reduced by the separation; and that it was necessary to plan on a contingency ⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: A.T. Griffith to Sir John Bunting, ‘Comment on Downer Interview with Healey’, 11/10/1965. ⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Sir Alexander Downer to Sir Robert Menzies, 20/9/1965. ⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Griffith to Bunting, ‘Comment on Downer Interview with Healey’, 11/10/1965. ⁷ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Downer to Menzies, 20/9/1965. ⁸ Ibid. ⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰ Ibid.


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basis for a shift from Singapore to Australia. Regarding both Singapore and Confrontation, Wilson warned, ‘time is not on our side’.¹¹ The Australians were wholly correct in their suspicion that the British were still wanting to withdraw from Singapore. Despite the FO’s and CRO’s attempts to appear sympathetic to the allied viewpoint, all the British departments concerned continued to believe privately that forces should be withdrawn from the immediate Southeast Asian region to its perimeter. These plans remained the working assumption of the Defence Review, as it continued with its work through the autumn of 1965. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful quadripartite talks, the Defence Review Working Party had extended its studies of future strategy to include the option of remaining in Singapore.¹² It is clear, however, that it was not enthusiastic about this possibility. The Working Party did not think it worthwhile to examine the option thoroughly and only expressed scepticism about its value. Trade and investment in East Asia were ‘in no way paramount factors’ which might justify a British military presence.¹³ On the contrary, a continuing presence in the immediate region would more likely be a cost than a benefit, for ‘the extent of our commitment [to Malaysia and Singapore] could not then necessarily be limited’.¹⁴ Some within the Working Party indeed argued for a much more hands-off approach, suggesting that it might be in Britain’s ‘long term interest to allow some countries in the Far East to go Communist, in the hope that they would go neutralist rather than come under Chinese domination’.¹⁵ At the most senior official level, similar views were being maintained. Within OPD(O) it was again felt that keeping British forces in Malaysia and Singapore after Confrontation would entail an open-ended military commitment. At the same time, these forces would incur the hostility of local nationalists, making their tenure neither practical nor secure. Sir Bernard Burrows, Deputy Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, summed up his department’s position: it was ‘likely that we should be out of Singapore by 1970 and . . . it would be desirable for this to be so’.¹⁶ It was not only strategic factors that were relevant. The financial pressures against a continuing large-scale presence in Southeast Asia were ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁶

PRO: PREM 13/889: Harold Wilson to Sir Robert Menzies, tel. 2521, 25/9/1965. PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)9thMeeting, 17/9/1965. PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)10thMeeting, 24/9/1965. Ibid. ¹⁵ Ibid. PRO: CAB 148/41: OPD(O)22nd Meeting, 11/10/1965.

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also mounting. In their studies of British forces in Europe, the Defence Review Working Party had found that the UK could make no unilateral reductions to its forces without endangering the stability of NATO, already under threat because of French actions. The conclusion was ‘unwelcome but inescapable’.¹⁷ Large-scale reductions in British forces could only come about through some multilateral NATO arrangement, and this approach was ‘unlikely to yield any short-term economies’.¹⁸ With reductions in Europe ruled out, the pressure to find savings in Southeast Asia only increased. While the Australian Government were not privy to the inner workings of the British Defence Review, their suspicions drove them to consider how to handle the likelihood that the British were still planning a substantial withdrawal. Australian officials were sceptical at the strategic arguments that the British had put forward. While there might be some regional pressure on Britain to leave, would it have any real force? Would Malaysia really want to be left without defences against Indonesia? Would Singapore want to lose its main source of employment and security?¹⁹ But the real problem for the Australian Government was not how to rebut British arguments, but whether such a rebuttal would be enough to keep the British resolute on their commitments. It was doubtful that only strategic assessments were prompting the British to think of leaving. Senior Australian officials noted that the muchcited date of 1970 as the year for departure seemed to relate ‘at least as much to the . . . aim of containing defence expenditure . . . as to any assessment of the likely political situation’.²⁰ They warned Australian ministers that if they did not seek actively to persuade the British to stay, there might be no opportunity to convince them of this once the Defence Review had concluded.²¹ That was the key problem for the Australian Government in the later months of 1965: how to induce the British to remain committed to their Malaysian and Singaporean bases. One suggestion was leaked by Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to Washington and a supporter of the ‘East of Suez’ role. He hinted at ¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/41: OPD(O)21st Meeting, 4/10/1965. ¹⁸ Ibid. ¹⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: P.H. Bailey to Sir John Bunting, ‘Defence Committee Discussion on the British Presence in Southeast Asia’, 13/10/1965. ²⁰ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/20: Defence Committee, ‘British Presence in Southeast Asia’, 18/10/1965. ²¹ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 1: Sir Laurence McIntyre to Paul Hasluck, ‘The British Defence Role in Southeast Asia’, 11/10/1965.


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the link between the United States’ interests in Southeast Asia and its support for the British economy. He suggested that an Australian letter to the British might begin by subtly reminding Harold Wilson about Australia’s similar views about the state of sterling.²² Within Australia, the Defence Committee, representing the views of the most senior officials and the chiefs of staff, proposed a more radical plan of action. They argued that the Australian Government should seize the initiative and approach the British. It should express understanding of their problems and co-operate with them to help preserve the Malaysia and Singapore bases, while also helping them develop joint contingency plans for the time when these facilities were lost. Plans for this contingency needed to involve alternative arrangements, including an Australian base. At the same time, the Australian Government should inform the US Government of its actions and consult with them.²³ The Australian Cabinet’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee rejected these proposals.²⁴ Unfortunately, as the discussions of the senior ministers on the Committee were not minuted, the reasons for this decision cannot be stated with certainty. One possible reason may have been that if the Government appeared too receptive to the idea of an Australian base, this would detract from the case for maintaining a presence in Malaysia and Singapore. This interpretation is consistent with the decisions the FADC had taken the month before, retreating from any endorsement of an Australian base in the aftermath of the Malaysia–Singapore split. Another reason was provided by the Prime Minister’s Assistant Secretary for External Affairs: the British role in Southeast Asia was complementary to that of the United States; thus, Australia should not embark on any independent initiatives regarding the British presence, but should always ensure that the United States was involved and engaged in the process.²⁵ This argument appears to have held some weight for the FADC, for its implications were followed in the Australian Government’s subsequent attempts to revive some form of quadripartite talks. ²² NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Sir James Plimsoll to Paul Hasluck, ‘British Defence Commitments’, tel. 3666, 20/10/1965. ²³ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/20: Defence Committee, ‘British Presence in Southeast Asia’, 18/10/1965. ²⁴ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/20: FADC, ‘Submission No. 1095—British Presence in Southeast Asia’, 1330(FAD), 19/10/1965. ²⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: A.T. Griffith, ‘British Presence in Southeast Asia’, 6/10/1965.

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Towards the end of October 1965, Sir Robert Menzies wrote to Harold Wilson. While he acknowledged the economic problems facing Britain, he argued that Communist China posed a major threat to peace in Asia and throughout the world. Containing this threat required the ‘continued physical presence in Asia’ of both Britain and the United States, the only two powers capable of exercising worldwide roles.²⁶ He doubted that the end of Confrontation would mean the sudden ejection of Britain from Malaysia and Singapore—and so fundamental was the British presence to Southeast Asian security that it should be maintained ‘even in adversity’ for as long as possible.²⁷ Stability in the region depended on co-operation between all the allies, with the British and American contributions at the core. With this in mind, he asked that a quadripartite discussion be convened at ministerial level as soon as possible. The British response was less than enthusiastic. In his reply to Menzies’ letter, Wilson rejected the request for a quadripartite meeting. He excused himself on the grounds that the Defence Review had not yet made sufficient progress, and that discussions should only take place once the Government had a clearer view of its plans. Once this stage was reached, the Government would consult with Australia and New Zealand—the lack of reference to the United States a clear snub to the Australian request for quadripartite talks.²⁸ Clearly the British were not very keen to restage the September meetings, where the ANZUS powers had presented such a united front. The coolness with which Wilson treated Menzies was borne out at other levels. Officials at the Australian High Commission in London sensed ‘a degree of ‘‘clamming up’’ in the Ministry of Defence’.²⁹ The Foreign Office claimed in reply that this reticence was due simply to there being a lack of anything new to say. The British were no more forthcoming with the Americans than they had been with the Australians. While Denis Healey had earlier promised the US Government intensive official and then ministerial talks on the Defence Review, there was no sign that these intentions ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹

PRO: PREM 13/889: Sir Robert Menzies to Harold Wilson, 22/10/1965. Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/889: Harold Wilson to Sir Robert Menzies, tel. 2978, 19/11/1965. NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6174: AHC, London, to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy East of Suez’, tel. 9416, 22/10/1965.


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would be met.³⁰ In late October, US Assistant Secretary of Defence John McNaughton visited Healey in London and pushed for early Anglo–American talks. He found Healey unwilling to arrange any discussions before a ministerial meeting scheduled for late November. McNaughton advised his Government that if it wanted consultations, it ‘had better press the British for them’.³¹ In early November, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote a ‘personal’ message to Sir Burke Trend to express his concerns.³² He feared a repeat of the earlier ‘confusion’ on Singapore or the misunderstanding over Skybolt.³³ Was there a risk that the consultations would effectively take place after the important decisions had been made? The message ended with a veiled threat: British ministers had a full right to come to their own conclusions, but this should not preclude ‘an understanding of the relation between their decisions and ours’.³⁴ Still the British Government did not respond. Privately, Healey advised Wilson in mid-November that the consultations should continue to be put off. The US Government was likely to have undertaken detailed studies to establish what it thought British defence policy should be. At the same time, US fears about British resolve gave the UK greater bargaining leverage. The British should not enter talks until they had established firm objectives and the range of options over which they might negotiate.³⁵ Not everyone within the British Government agreed with Healey’s approach. Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to the US, had a ‘rather alarming impression’ of Healey’s negotiating strategy.³⁶ Lord Chalfont, a Minister of State at the Foreign Office, expressed himself ‘deeply concerned’ at the idea that the British Government should not consult fully with the United States.³⁷ ³⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Departments of State and Defence, ‘UK Defence Review: Joint State–Defence Scope Paper’, 21/1/1966. ³¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: John McNaughton, memcon, John McNaughton and Denis Healey, London, 26/10/1965. ³² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: McGeorge Bundy to Sir Burke Trend, 3/11/1965. ³³ Ibid. For more on the Skybolt crisis, see Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). ³⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Bundy to Trend, 3/11/1965. ³⁵ PRO: PREM 13/686: Denis Healey to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Review: Consultation with US Government’, 19/11/1965. ³⁶ PRO: FO 371/184515: Sir Patrick Dean, 12/11/1965. ³⁷ PRO: FO 371/184515: Lord Chalfont to George Thomson, ‘Defence Review’, 15/11/1965.

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Healey only partially got his way. When Robert McNamara and George Ball arrived in London for the ministerial talks at the end of November, the timetable was pushed back again. However, Harold Wilson announced a firm date for the beginning of consultations, informing the Americans that he would discuss the Defence Review when he visited Washington in the middle of December.³⁸ Privately, British Army Minister Fred Mulley tried to explain the delays to US officials. He noted that senior ministers felt that the September quadripartite talks had been ‘mishandled’ by British officials.³⁹ Thus, they wanted the consultations over the Defence Review to begin at leadership level, rather than beginning with officials, as had originally been proposed. Before Wilson met President Johnson, the British Government had to reach some conclusions on what plans they would propose for their role in Southeast Asia. Officials presented to ministers the final report of the Defence Review in mid-November, and ministers reviewed and approved it by the end of the month. The Defence Review was finalized against the backdrop of a rapidly changing situation in Indonesia. At the end of September 1965, a small faction within the army had attempted a left-wing coup against the military’s leadership. While the attempted coup had eliminated six of the most senior generals, it had missed some key figures, in particular General Suharto, then head of the strategic reserve. Suharto’s forces quickly quashed the nascent rebellion and took control of the Indonesian capital. Over the weeks and months that followed, the army purged the country of the Communist Party—its erstwhile rivals for power—in a bloodletting that would eventually cost up to a million lives. While the extent—if any—of British or American complicity in these events is unclear, from Britain’s perspective, the political developments in Indonesia were positive, with the Indonesian Government becoming too consumed by the country’s internal ructions to continue the vigorous pursuit of Confrontation. In this context, the final report of Britain’s Defence Review reaffirmed the direction that had developed over the previous year on what Britain should do once Confrontation had ended. It reiterated the argument ³⁸ PRO: PREM 13/681: memcon, Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, Michael Stewart, Robert McNamara, George Ball et al., London, 26/11/1965. ³⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1865/6124: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, ‘British Defence Review’, tel. 4176, 30/11/1965.


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that Britain could not and should not retain forces based in Malaysia and Singapore. Though officials noted that the ANZUS powers had argued that Britain would be able to stay, they saw no reason to reassess their views in the light of this. They argued that ‘events over the next six months or a year will demonstrate . . . that we cannot count on retaining the Singapore and Malaysian bases up to or beyond 1970’.⁴⁰ However keen Lee Kuan Yew might be privately to retain the Singapore base, he would be ‘unable to proclaim this publicly’, and it was ‘doubtful whether he [would] be able to resist for long the pressure for our withdrawal’.⁴¹ Nor did officials have any doubts that a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore was in Britain’s own interests: only then could expenditure in East Asia be in ‘reasonable accord . . . with our broader interests in this region’; only then would there be ‘a reasonable prospect of reducing our total defence expenditure to the target figure’ of £2,000 million.⁴² Strategically too, a withdrawal would help further the long-term aim of neutralizing the region. Though arguing for a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, officials unanimously agreed that a military presence had to be maintained in the broader area for the sake of relations with Britain’s ANZUS allies. Delicately averring to the link between defence and US support for the pound, they noted Britain’s ‘close links with, and dependence on, United States policy in other parts of the world’.⁴³ A complete withdrawal would jeopardize Britain’s historic ties with Australia and New Zealand, and this would have ‘serious repercussions’ for Britain’s international standing.⁴⁴ The British forces retained in the region would have to cost no more than £186 million per year—this figure representing not the price of any projected forces, but rather what was left after subtracting all other costs from the £2,000 million budget target.⁴⁵ Officials envisaged that these forces would be based in northern Australia, and interdependent of forces from the ANZUS powers. The case for interdependence rested on financial grounds: it made it more likely that the allies would pay for the cost of the Australian base, and it meant that any remaining commitment to Malaysia and Singapore—especially if there was a resurgence of Confrontation—could be shared. Such a policy carried political risks. It meant that Britain would be committing ⁴⁰ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/14: OPD(O), ‘Defence Policy’, 8/11/1965. ⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² Ibid. ⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ Ibid. ⁴⁵ PRO: PREM 13/216: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, 12/11/1965.

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itself ‘to maintaining a military presence in the Far East for an indefinite period’.⁴⁶ Moreover, interdependence meant that the British could be forced to take part in allied operations about which they had misgivings. Nevertheless, it was felt that these risks would ‘have to be accepted if we are to achieve a substantial reduction of our forces’.⁴⁷ In their meetings in mid- and late November 1965, senior ministers on foreign policy and defence affirmed this direction for policy.⁴⁸ There was no opposition to the idea of withdrawing forces from Malaysia and Singapore after Confrontation had ended, and moving them to Australia. Ministers were also clear on what interests justified the remaining forces. One Minister put it the most bluntly: ‘the degree of our direct interest suggested that we should seek to make the smallest contribution which was acceptable to our Allies’.⁴⁹ While the general direction of policy was not contested, there were concerns about how interdependence could be made a reality. Some doubted that Britain’s allies could be so easily induced to pay for an Australian base. As Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, noted sceptically to the Prime Minister, the idea was ‘a mere assumption—and an improbable one, given what we know of the Australasian attitude to defence expenditure’.⁵⁰ There were also disagreements on how closely Britain could risk being attached to the United States in Southeast Asia, especially given the background of the Vietnam War. Denis Healey warned that, unless the tasks of interdependent forces were carefully limited, Britain could end up ‘trapped into fighting the wrong war in the wrong place by the wrong means at the wrong time’.⁵¹ Fred Mulley, the Deputy Secretary of Defence and Minister for the Army, leaked his side of the argument to US Embassy officials. He revealed that Healey and Wilson were attracted to the idea of retaining only air and naval forces in Southeast Asia, since they did not want to get bogged down with expensive land forces as they had done in Borneo and the Americans had in Vietnam. Mulley felt that such cuts would make the ‘East of ⁴⁶ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/14: OPD(O), ‘Defence Policy’, 8/11/1965. ⁴⁷ Ibid. ⁴⁸ Those present at the meeting included: the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth Relations, Colonial Affairs and Economic Affairs, the Chiefs of Staff, and related officials. ⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/8th Meeting, 13–14/11/1965. ⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 13/216: Trend to Wilson, 12/11/1965. ⁵¹ PRO: PREM 13/216: Denis Healey, ‘The Defence Review: Personal Note’, 12/11/1965.


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Suez’ presence ‘an empty gesture’.⁵² The US Embassy privately observed that such a complaint was likely to be grounded in Mulley’s desire to protect his own turf as Army Minister. Despite these disagreements on emphasis, however, all ministers and officials were agreed that the best policy for the future lay in the general direction of Britain withdrawing from its bases in Malaysia and Singapore to a sharply reduced presence in Australia, and the allies sharing the burden of Britain’s remaining commitments through some sort of interdependent arrangement. From December 1965, the Wilson Government began consulting again with its allies on the direction of its Southeast Asian policies. The Government, however, was not about to repeat its mistakes of September 1965 and provide a forum where its allies could jointly reject its policies. Instead, it adopted a strategy of holding bilateral consultations, beginning with the United States and then extending to the regional allies: Australia and New Zealand first, then Malaysia and Singapore. Clearly, the British hoped that if they could secure the acquiescence of their most powerful ally, they would be able to ride out any objections coming from the others. Unsurprisingly, the smaller allies were not at all enamoured with the British tactics. The Australian Government was deeply unhappy at the prospect of being left out of the decision-making process until its very last stages. Increasingly concerned, the Government tried to offer the British greater incentives to consult. Sir Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, invited the British High Commissioner for a briefing and sought to stress how much Australian and British interests were intertwined. Emphasizing that the Australian Government hoped that the British would stay in Singapore for as long as possible, Menzies offered to ‘consider any concrete proposal’ which the British might present for increased co-operation.⁵³ Asked to elaborate, Menzies expressly mentioned the possibility of financial assistance to Britain, or help with the provision of Australian bases in addition to Singapore. The British Government was unmoved. They informed the Australians that their bilateral consultations would not take place until February 1966, a month and a half after the initial Anglo–American discussions. Australian officials were privately concerned that this meant they would ⁵² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 13/12/1965. ⁵³ PRO: PREM 13/889: Sir Charles Johnston to CRO, tel. 1428, 24/11/1965. Emphasis in original.

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be presented with a ‘virtual fait accompli’, but conceded that this might have to be faced as simply one of the ‘facts of life’.⁵⁴ The Malaysian Government was even further away from being consulted than the Australians. But when the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, visited Kuala Lumpur, he found Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman sanguine about the situation. The failed coup and ongoing elimination of Communist sympathizers in Indonesia had pushed any active pursuit of Confrontation into the background. With the external threat to Malaysia now dissipating, the Tunku declared to Hasluck that he would not mind if the British took away ‘half of their existing forces in Malaysia tomorrow’, providing there was no publicity.⁵⁵ Obviously unaware of the peregrinations of British policy in recent months, the Tunku claimed that Britain’s defence of his country stemmed from a desire to protect British investments, and Malaysia would be adequately shielded by whatever protection was necessary for these. Even if forces were reduced, they could be reinforced if necessary. While the Tunku’s indifference and ignorance might have been alarming, his Deputy and Minister of Defence, Tun Abdul Razak, was more reassuring to Australian ears. He said he would be ‘very unhappy’ if the British implemented any reductions, for Indonesia had not yet settled down, and such a move would be bad for morale and public relations in the Southeast Asian area generally.⁵⁶ In mid-December 1965, Harold Wilson finally arrived in Washington to begin the consultations on future British policy. Through pre-summit briefings, the Americans had a good idea of what Wilson was planning to say. They knew that the idea of cutting costs in Europe had been dropped, thanks to the political fragility of NATO. They were relieved that the British had decided to maintain their position in Southeast Asia until at least the end of Confrontation. They were deeply concerned, however, at what they heard were the British Government’s plans to reduce dramatically its Southeast Asian presence after Confrontation, including closing the Singapore base in favour of reduced facilities in northern Australia.⁵⁷ They feared that if such plans were even mooted, ⁵⁴ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Peter Lawler to Sir Robert Menzies, 10/12/1966. ⁵⁵ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: memcon, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Paul Hasluck, et al., Kuala Lumpur, 19/12/1965. ⁵⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: memcon, Tun Abdul Razak, Paul Hasluck, et al., Kuala Lumpur, 19/12/1965. ⁵⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, ‘British Problems and Policies on the Eve of the Wilson Visit’, 7/12/1965; Memo (author unknown) to Lyndon


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‘the impact on our own effort [in Vietnam] will be real’.⁵⁸ At a meeting of the American leadership in preparation for Wilson’s visit, Robert McNamara maintained that they should insist that the British try to retain Singapore. He warned that the argument ‘will fall on deaf ears unless we make [a] push’: the Americans needed to ‘hit Wilson hard’.⁵⁹ In his presentation to the American leadership, Wilson sought to minimize the conflict by underplaying the question of Singapore. Instead, he concentrated on the big picture, and the strategic arguments that were supposed to drive his policies. He emphasized that the central strategic question should be how to contain the threat of Chinese Communist expansion. He argued that, within the Government’s limit of £186 million on Southeast Asian expenditure, this could and should only be done on an interdependent basis, with co-operation between the four powers of Australia, New Zealand, the United States and United Kingdom. Unexpectedly, he raised the idea that this co-operation could include a collective nuclear defence arrangement, to which Britain’s Polaris submarines might be committed. While he maintained that the British Government believed its tenure on Singapore to be limited, Wilson stressed the strategic alternatives: a quadripartite base in northern Australia and, more radically, the rehabilitation of Indonesia, once Confrontation ended, as part of a system to contain China.⁶⁰ The Americans sought to appear at least sympathetic to Wilson’s presentation. Robert McNamara suggested that any collective arrangement could also include Japan, thus avoiding the political pitfalls of a purely white organization. He also professed ‘great interest’ in the notion of some kind of nuclear co-operation in East Asia.⁶¹ But fundamentally the Americans were critical of any voluntary withdrawal. Johnson, ‘Talking Paper for the Wilson Visit’, 15/12/1965; McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The Wilson Visit’, 16/12/1965; LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator to McGeorge Bundy, ‘Wilson Visit’, 14/12/1965. ⁵⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Bundy to Johnson, 16/12/1965. ⁵⁹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Francis Bator et al., Washington, DC, 16/12/1965. ⁶⁰ PRO: PREM 13/686: memcon, Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy et al., Washington, DC, 16/12/1965; memcon, Harold Wilson, Robert McNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy et al., Washington, DC, 17/12/1965. PRO: CAB 131/272: PMV(W)(65) 1: Foreign Office, ‘Defence Review’, 10/12/1965. ⁶¹ PRO: PREM 13/686: memcon, Wilson, McNamara et al., 17/12/1965.

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As the British record discreetly put it, ‘It was here that the greatest difficulties arose.’⁶² McGeorge Bundy suggested that Singapore should ‘be regarded as a key point in the containment of Chinese expansion’.⁶³ If the British voluntarily left the base, ‘it might be interpreted as the abandonment of Malaysia’.⁶⁴ Robert McNamara proposed that he and Denis Healey should discuss the relative strategic merits of Singapore and northwest Australia. The US would not cling to Singapore for its own sake, but wanted the most effective defence stance. Bundy emphasized that any British decision had to be based ‘on sound politico-strategic considerations rather [than] on the grounds that [they] simply could not afford to stay’.⁶⁵ Unless the British could justify their arguments strategically—and no doubt the Americans were sceptical that they could—the US Government would not agree to a voluntary withdrawal from Singapore. Despite these unresolved differences, the Anglo–American discussions ended amicably. American officials were privately satisfied that their firm but measured stance had helped to ease the tensions of the previous months. Though they noted that Wilson was careful not to make any ‘commitment that British decisions would conform to our views’, the discussions were still ‘unusually successful’ in improving the atmosphere of the Anglo–American relationship.⁶⁶ The President professed himself ‘confident’ that the talks would lead to the two Governments working ‘fruitfully together’ in the future.⁶⁷ The Wilson visit may have been partly successful in easing some of the tensions in the Anglo–American relationship that had been present since September. But fundamentally, the views of the respective governments remained far apart. At the end of 1965 and into early 1966, the British Government was continuing to develop its plans for a postConfrontation withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. In its studies and costings of Britain’s projected force structure, the Ministry of Defence assumed that its Southeast Asian forces would be based in northern ⁶² PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson et al., Washington, DC, 16/12/1965. ⁶³ PRO: PREM 13/686: memcon, Wilson, McNamara et al., 17/12/1965. ⁶⁴ Ibid. ⁶⁵ Ibid. ⁶⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: David Bruce, Summary of Harold Wilson’s Meetings with Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, and Robert McNamara, 17/12/1965. LBJL: President’s Appointment Diary (Diary Backup): (author unknown), ‘Comment on the President’s Three Foreign Visitors’, 20/12/1965. ⁶⁷ LBJL: President’s Appointment Diary: (author unknown), ‘Comment on the President’s Three Foreign Visitors’.


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Australia, with the capital costs paid by the Australian Government.⁶⁸ The Commonwealth Relations Office undertook studies of what kinds of treaty arrangements would have to replace the Anglo–Malaysian Defence Agreement once the British withdrew. Their preferred arrangement would see the quadripartite powers jointly providing coverage of Malaysia and Singapore. Yet there was an obvious problem with these plans. As the CRO noted, if new quadripartite security arrangements in Southeast Asia were to work, it would be ‘very important to have the complete support of our Allies at every stage’.⁶⁹ But these allies would hardly agree to a treaty arrangement when they did not agree on the underlying defence strategy. And the allies had displayed only deep opposition to a defence strategy that proposed the voluntary relinquishing of the Singapore base. At the end of 1965, there still appeared to be no way out of this impasse. Across the Atlantic, US officials were privately concerned with more than just the fate of Singapore. They were worried that once the nebulous concept of ‘interdependence’ was fleshed out, it would hinder more than assist the execution of US policy. British thinking appeared to be tending towards the idea that ‘interdependence’ should be institutionalized in a formal linkage between the UK and the ANZUS treaty which bound together Australia, New Zealand and the United States. British forces, including possibly its nuclear Polaris submarines, would be committed to this organization. American officials feared that US policy would be severely encumbered by so formal a structure. The British were seeking ‘as firm an institutionalised grip as they can manage’ on US policy in East Asia.⁷⁰ If Polaris were assigned to a joint containment of China, ‘domestic UK politics will always ‘‘veto’’ us, and tie our hands’.⁷¹ Furthermore, attaching the UK to ANZUS would create a ‘white man’s club in Asia’, something that would antagonize not only Indonesia but also the West’s Asian allies.⁷² And bringing Britain into an ‘Anglo-Saxon Asian defence club’ would hinder British integration with Europe, and with it the possibility that Britain might ⁶⁸ PRO: CAB 148/45: OPD(O)(65)82: MOD, ‘Defence Review: Force Structure and Costs’, 20/12/1965. ⁶⁹ PRO: CAB 148/45: OPD(O)(65)73: CRO, ‘Defence Aid to Malaysia and Singapore’, ANNEX B: ‘Future Defence Commitments to Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei’, 22/12/1965. ⁷⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, ‘UK East of Suez Proposals’. ⁷¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Jack Valenti to Lyndon Johnson, 24/1/1966. ⁷² Rostow to Johnson, ‘UK East of Suez Proposals’.

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encourage the Europeans to take up greater responsibilities in the wider world.⁷³ Despite these further misgivings about the British proposals, as the date for the second round of consultations approached, the US State and Defence Departments jointly counselled that the US should appear as responsive and forthcoming as possible. They noted that America’s firm stance at the September quadripartite talks had led the British to avoid consultations for several months. Though the US position may have been fundamentally correct, if those tactics were repeated, it could convince the British that there was no benefit in consulting at all.⁷⁴ Moreover, if the US sent the British Foreign and Defence Secretaries ‘home empty-handed’ without financial or strategic backing, then economic ministers could force even deeper cuts to British forces.⁷⁵ Thus, while US officials maintained that ‘a major British presence in the Singapore-Malaysia area [was] essential for the foreseeable future’, they should be prepared to agree to quadripartite discussions, which might cover alternatives to Singapore should it become unviable.⁷⁶ The second round of Anglo–American consultations on the Defence Review were scheduled for the end of January 1966, just before consultations with the other allies. As they pressed ever closer, the British finally began to face up to the fundamental impasse to which the Defence Review had led them. All their strategy, plans and costings had assumed that they would leave Singapore as soon as Confrontation ended. Yet there had not so far been even the glimmer of a possibility that the ANZUS powers would agree to a voluntary withdrawal from Singapore. If the British pushed ahead, the allies would be outraged, the quadripartite strategy would be in tatters, and all hope that Britain might be able to share its commitments to Malaysia and Singapore would be dashed. Moreover, Britain would be left holding the shreds of a defence policy with no allies willing to back it—a situation which no British Government would dare to repeat after the débâcle of the Suez Crisis. The problem was finally faced in the week before the Anglo–American discussions. Denis Healey proposed a new approach to the ministers ⁷³ Rostow to Johnson, ‘UK East of Suez Proposals’. ⁷⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Departments of State and Defence, ‘UK Defence Review: Joint State–Defence Scope Paper’, 21/1/1966. ⁷⁵ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 2: Francis Bator to McGeorge Bundy, ‘The UK Position on the Indo-Pacific’, 27/1/1966. ⁷⁶ ‘UK Defence Review: Joint State-Defence Scope Paper’.


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in OPD. He argued that any open plan to leave Singapore would be immediately rejected. Instead, the British should propose to reduce their forces to the pre-Confrontation level once the conflict had ended. They should indicate a willingness to maintain the Singapore base for as long as the local government provided reasonable conditions in which to do so. They should warn their allies, however, that they did not believe these conditions would last and that, if the British were forced out and did not have prepared facilities in Australia, they would have nowhere else to go but home. Thus it would be necessary to have quadripartite discussions focusing on developing a joint base in Australia.⁷⁷ The ministers in OPD agreed to Healey’s approach. There were no suggestions of any other means of gaining the approval of their allies. Moreover, both Healey and other ministers argued, the desired withdrawal from Singapore would probably still take place, as the British were likely to be forced out before the end of the decade. It was ‘unlikely’ that a settlement of Confrontation would exclude withdrawal.⁷⁸ A change in wording—from withdrawing ‘as soon as possible’ to staying ‘as long as conditions allowed’—would appease Britain’s allies, but in the ministers’ opinion, these conditions would alter neither the fact nor the timing of a withdrawal. Notwithstanding these sentiments, ministers, in adopting Healey’s approach, had initiated a fundamental shift in their policy planning. No longer were they intending to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore as soon as they were able, an intention which had been assumed by the Defence Review for more than seven months. Instead, once they had brought these proposals to their allies, they would have committed Britain to remaining in its bases for as long as the regional politics of Southeast Asia allowed them to stay. While ministers hoped and expected that this politics would soon ‘force’ them to withdraw, this outcome was far from guaranteed. The British had effectively made themselves hostage to events. This last-minute reversal of policy by the British did mean, however, that the likelihood of any clash with their allies had eased considerably. When Denis Healey leaked the change in policy to the US Ambassador, David Bruce, the latter reported back to his superiors with satisfaction: ⁷⁷ PRO: CAB 148/26: OPD(65)12: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Review: Personal Note by Secretary of State for Defence’, 14/1/1966. PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(65)8th Meeting, 23/1/1966. ⁷⁸ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(65)8th Meeting, 23/1/1966.

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the British had now conceded that ‘they should stay in Singapore as long as possible’.⁷⁹ He further observed that Healey now appeared to be ‘quite relaxed about the Far East issue, giving [the] impression that it will be resolved to the satisfaction of [the] US’.⁸⁰ The US Administration was further comforted by the fact that the British were moving to conclude a long-mooted deal to purchase 50 American F111 bombers. These aircraft, Robert McNamara noted, were ‘only good for [the] Far East’.⁸¹ A deal would provide concrete proof of a British intention to remain ‘East of Suez’.⁸² On 27 January 1966, the second round of Anglo–American consultations began, with Denis Healey and Michael Stewart meeting with senior Johnson Administration officials to discuss the conclusions of the Defence Review. Healey and Stewart played out the tactics that had been approved by OPD. They claimed to the Americans that Britain actually ‘would like to stay in Singapore’.⁸³ But they said they had doubts about the security of their tenure, and should Singapore be lost with no available alternative, they would have to withdraw completely from the region. Thus they wanted the four powers to co-operate in establishing an Australian base. Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara were measured but critical in their response. Their concerns about the Singapore base had been partly assuaged—and they claimed to be impressed and pleased with the forces Britain now proposed to retain in the region. But though this matter was resolved, they retained their doubts about the logic of the proposed quadripartite arrangements if Singapore became untenable. What was the precise rationale for these? It would be politically impossible for the US to enter into new treaty commitments. And it would antagonize regional sensitivities if an ‘Anglo-Saxon club’ were established. Could it meet the West’s strategic requirements? ‘How did the United Kingdom see us meeting the Chinese threat with no forward position in the area?’ asked Dean Rusk. ‘Both Australia and New Zealand were a long way away.’⁸⁴ ⁷⁹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 21/1/1966. ⁸⁰ Ibid. ⁸¹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: memcon, Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, Robert McNamara et al., Washington, DC, 16/12/1965. ⁸² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, 16/2/1966. ⁸³ PRO: FO 371/190785: memcon, Michael Stewart, Denis Healey, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Washington, DC, 27/1/1965. ⁸⁴ Ibid.


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Stewart and Healey were somewhat evasive in their replies. Undoubtedly, it was obvious to all that Britain’s major reason for proposing a quadripartite arrangement was to induce the country’s allies to carry some of the burden of its commitments: but clearly the British would have to provide the Americans with a more substantial strategic justification than that. Stewart and Healey, however, only answered in very general terms. Healey complained that it was ‘unfair’ for the US to demand a precise rationale for the proposed arrangements, as ‘future developments in the region are so uncertain’.⁸⁵ Neither the US nor the UK wanted to act alone in the region, while Australia and New Zealand were necessarily involved. Given these overlapping interests, Healey argued, quadripartite discussions would provide a focus for working together more closely in future. Despite the vague justifications provided to them, the Americans were careful to emphasize that they were not ruling out quadripartite arrangements altogether—presumably because they did not want to appear too hostile to British ideas. While Dean Rusk stated his opposition to any formal alliance or exclusive arrangement, he then qualified this. If the four powers could agree on philosophy and strategy, and did not exclude other countries from their plans, Rusk maintained, then the US was prepared to explore possible quadripartite arrangements in deeper talks.⁸⁶ With this limited agreement in hand, the British departed, Michael Stewart back to Britain, Denis Healey onward to consultations with the Australians. While Healey winged his way across the Pacific, Dean Rusk privately briefed the Australian Government on his assessment of the Anglo–American talks. His greatest scepticism was reserved for the proposed quadripartite arrangements. He did not feel that they addressed the problems in Southeast Asia. Rather, they appeared ‘more like a reduction of existing commitments’ than a means for handling them.⁸⁷ He would not agree to any changes to the ANZUS treaty, and strongly felt that moving British troops from Singapore to Australia was moving them in precisely the wrong direction. ⁸⁵ Ibid. ⁸⁶ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Michael Stewart, Denis Healey, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara and Francis Bator, Washington, DC, 27/1/1966. ⁸⁷ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/21: Keith Waller to DEAC, ‘Defence Review’, tel. 353, 31/1/1966.

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After the American consultations came Australia. Finally breaking the silence that had been effectively imposed for four months, Denis Healey arrived in Canberra for discussions at the beginning of February 1966, only three weeks before the Defence White Paper was due to be published. Before Healey arrived, the British sent the Australians an advance briefing paper describing their proposed direction for policy. Despite the small steps the British had taken to soften the edges on their earlier policies, the briefing paper still raised deep concerns amongst the Australians, and provoked a frenzied discussion on how Healey should best be handled. The paper restated the British belief that their tenure in Malaysia and Singapore was limited—though now they did not predict a departure date. They argued that a belt of ‘ostensibly non-aligned states’ should be built up in Southeast Asia, with Western forces moved to the periphery, the British themselves moving to Australia.⁸⁸ This move would require joint planning, while the British role would itself be embedded within joint machinery including, possibly, joint consultation and command. Implicit in such a proposal was a demand that Britain’s allies should contribute more—militarily or financially—to the region’s security. It was clear to the Australians that while the British spoke of withdrawal as a contingency, they were planning in the expectation that it would happen, and in the none too distant future. More than this, the British appeared to be looking hopefully towards this date. As one senior Australian official interpreted it, the British were trying ‘to avoid being in a situation of primary commitment in Southeast Asia and [saw] the best way of doing this [to be] to remove the base from inside the area’.⁸⁹ Though the British were no longer setting a precise date for departure, the fundamental intention of withdrawing to Australia remained. Thus the Australian Government still had to convince the British to change from a strategy based on ‘fortress Australia’ to its own preference for forward defence.⁹⁰ What made this task harder was the British claim that their plans for leaving Singapore were only a ‘contingency’. Australian officials saw as ‘irresistible’ the argument that at least some contingency ⁸⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: Foreign Office, London, ‘Four Power Defence Arrangements in the Indo-Pacific Area’, 24/1/1966. ⁸⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: A.T. Griffith to Sir John Bunting, 27/1/1966. ⁹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: Sir John Bunting to Harold Holt, ‘Meeting with Mr Healey’, 30/1/1966.


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plans should be made for the possibility of being forced out.⁹¹ Though they dreaded such an eventuality and thought the British overstated the risk, the Australian Government still recognized that an eviction from Singapore was possible. Their fear was that in preparing for this risk, they would help the British in planning a voluntary withdrawal. How could this trap be avoided? Australian officials argued that the best tactic would be to tie the British down with their own quadripartite arrangements. Britain should not be encouraged into starting immediate planning for a future withdrawal. Rather, as Britain was seeking greater co-operation, planning should develop on this basis. The first step would be to hold quadripartite discussions. Their initial aim would be to arrive at shared strategic concepts and goals. Once these shared objectives had been established, they could form the basis for the joint contingency planning which Britain desired.⁹² From Australia’s point of view, the advantage of this tactic was that it compelled the allies to agree on strategy as the first step. This would give the allies the opportunity to challenge and possibly to change British strategic thinking, without denying the need to prepare eventually for a possible eviction from Singapore and its replacement with an Australian base.⁹³ It was vital, senior ministers decided, to dissuade Britain from any precipitate departure from Singapore while, at the same time, ‘avoiding any impression that the Government was refusing to have British bases in Australia’, since if Britain were forced out, ‘the Government would unhesitatingly want to have British bases here’.⁹⁴ On 1 February 1966, Denis Healey finally arrived in Canberra. Through two days of discussions, he negotiated with senior Australian ministers towards a joint position. The two sides approached that goal from different directions. Denis Healey, whose presentation opened the talks, emphasized the problems of the cost of Britain’s overseas role and the need for Britain’s allies to help it share its burden. If these problems could be resolved, then it would be possible for the British to commit themselves to the region for the long term, through some form of quadripartite co-operation. Australia’s ministers took the opposite approach. They wanted quadripartite discussions to be held, during ⁹¹ Ibid. ⁹² NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 ATTACHMENT 1: Defence Committee, ‘British Defence Review: Report by Defence Committee on British Proposals’, Jan. 1966. ⁹³ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: A.T. Griffith to Sir John Bunting, 19/1/1966. ⁹⁴ NAA: A5839, XM1 Vol. 1: FADC, ‘British Defence Review’, 33(FAD), 30/1/1966.

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which first questions of strategy, then those of apportioning roles, could be resolved. They did not want to bind themselves to greater commitments until the four allies had agreed on aims and objectives for the region. Healey warned that there would be great pressure on the British to make further cuts unless Australia gave some indication of what contributions it would make, including what facilities might be available in the country’s north. The Australian ministers replied that they wanted the possibility of staying in Singapore examined more thoroughly before looking at the feasibility of moving. Deputy Prime Minister John McEwen warned that if the British were intent on leaving Singapore, Australia would do ‘nothing whatsoever to help them in this matter’.⁹⁵ In reply, Healey threatened, should Australia and New Zealand not be responsive to the British approach, then once Confrontation were over the British would ‘have to retain complete freedom of action for the future’.⁹⁶ The Australians reacted sharply against this implied threat of complete withdrawal. It was ‘unthinkable’, protested McEwen, that Britain might ‘relinquish all further responsibility towards Australia’.⁹⁷ Healey relented slightly: any examination of an Australian base would be without commitment, and the quadripartite proposals could begin as the Australians wished, with initial talks aimed at agreeing on a strategic concept and principles. This concession was sufficient for the Australian Government. The agreed minute noted both these aims: the two Governments would seek quadripartite talks, discussing first strategy, then later co-operation and future co-ordination; meanwhile military representatives would meet ‘without commitment’ to examine what might be involved if Britain were to base its forces in Australia.⁹⁸ With this further agreement in hand, Denis Healey flew on from Australia to Malaysia and Singapore. Unlike the discussions in Washington and Canberra, Healey’s separate meetings in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur passed without friction. Undoubtedly this was helped by the minimally controversial presentations which Healey gave. As neither the Malaysian nor the Singaporean governments had been officially aware of the peripatetic changes in British ⁹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/889: ‘Defence in the Far East: Record of Discussions in Canberra, 1–2 February, 1966’; NAA: A5839, XM1 Vol. 1: FADC, ‘Defence Consultations’, 22(FAD), 2/2/1966. ⁹⁶ PRO: PREM 13/889: ‘Defence in the Far East’, 1–2/2/1966. ⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ PRO: PREM 13/889: Sir Charles Johnson to CRO, tel. 151, 2/2/1966.


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planning over the previous year, Healey could present the outcome of the Defence Review as a policy of incremental change. He stated that the British would maintain a substantial presence in Malaysia and Singapore, though this would of course be reduced once Confrontation had concluded. They would examine the possibility of alternative bases, but Healey claimed that this was only as ‘long term insurance’.⁹⁹ As Britain could not afford its full Southeast Asian commitment by itself, it was looking at co-operation with the ANZUS powers, but there was no possibility of any formal arrangement ‘in the immediate future’.¹⁰⁰ Both the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore were pleased with this outcome. So pleased was the Tunku that he tactlessly quipped, ‘stay as long as you like. The longer you stay the less we have to pay for our own defence.’¹⁰¹ Healey was further irritated by indications from both Malaysia and Singapore that their efforts to co-ordinate defence were not succeeding. Lee Kuan Yew described their Combined Defence Committee as ‘a flop’.¹⁰² Moreover, he evinced a fear that a coup might be mounted against his government by Malay Singaporeans, or that a future Malaysian government might try to crush the fledgling island state. Healey was cool in his response. To the Singaporean Government, he agreed to a greater sharing of local intelligence information, lest any insurgency be brewing. To the Malaysians, he warned that the complex of British bases across the peninsula and island could only operate as a single entity, and any differences between Malaysia and Singapore would interfere with this. Once Healey returned to London, the Government set about the task of finalizing its decisions for the Defence White Paper. Thanks to the various pressures and reversals of the last few months, the policy that emerged was far less clear than it superficially appeared. Indeed, there was no single policy at all, rather an amalgam of different plans and intentions: what had been originally planned and costed; what had been promised to Britain’s allies; what British defence and foreign policy planners actually hoped for; and what the Government publicly said it intended. ⁹⁹ PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Denis Healey, Lee Kuan Yew et al., Singapore, 4/2/1966. ¹⁰⁰ Ibid. ¹⁰¹ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 316, 5/2/1966. ¹⁰² PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Healey, Lee et al., Singapore, 4/2/1966.

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Underlying the policy documents which were reviewed in OPD and then the Cabinet were costings based on the British Government’s original intentions. As before, these costings assumed that the British would withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore before 1970, to be replaced by a ‘visible military presence based on Australia’, comprising extensive sea, land and air forces.¹⁰³ This costing maintained the £186 million figure for Southeast Asia established the previous November, now part of a total planned defence budget that had crept up to £2,060 million. The problem with the costing, of course, was that it was based on a policy which the British Government had since promised its allies it would not voluntarily implement. As the covering paper noted with some understatement, the assumptions on which the costings had been based could prove to be ‘unrealistic’.¹⁰⁴ The British were now ‘committed to remaining in Singapore and Malaysia as long as possible’.¹⁰⁵ Thus they could not ‘base decisions on expenditure there . . . on an assumption that the forces will have been withdrawn by a particular date. We can only assume that, when Confrontation ends, the forces there will be reduced.’¹⁰⁶ How could the gulf between the Government’s assumed commitments and its projected costs be bridged? The answer to this lay in what British officials and senior ministers still expected—and clearly hoped—would eventuate. Policy planners had not discarded the belief that had partly prompted them to suggest voluntary withdrawal in the first place: that Britain would find its footing in Malaysia and Singapore untenable after Confrontation, whether it wanted to stay or not. Singapore was not secure—a point reinforced during Denis Healey’s visit. And after so much experience with anti-colonial nationalism—and their contemporary difficulties with the British base in Aden—officials ‘[could] not believe’ that Malaysia and Singapore would tolerate an indefinite British presence.¹⁰⁷ With such an expulsion, substantial reductions would be inevitable. Moreover, the Government clung to another hope that it had developed in the wake of the Australian consultations. The MOD had ¹⁰³ PRO: CAB 148/27:OPD(66)31: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Review: Revised Force Structure and Costs’, 9/2/1966, ANNEX A. ¹⁰⁴ Ibid. ¹⁰⁵ Ibid. ¹⁰⁶ Ibid. ¹⁰⁷ PRO: T 225/2712: G.R. Bell to R.G. Lavelle: ‘Defence Review: Revised Force Structure and Costs: OPD(66)31’, 10/2/1966. For more on Aden, see Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia.


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been ‘surprised’ at what they perceived to be Australian resistance to any stationing of British ground forces there.¹⁰⁸ They interpreted this resistance—not wholly correctly—to ‘knock the major assumption out of all the planning on long-term deployment’, which had been that Britain would have to maintain a major presence in Australia ‘because, mainly, of our obligations’ to that country.¹⁰⁹ The implications of this were far-reaching. If Britain could not stay in Malaysia and Singapore, and the Australians rejected a substantial presence in their country, then it would ‘no longer be able to maintain any significant presence in the Pacific area at all’.¹¹⁰ When the final papers went to OPD in mid-February, both Denis Healey and Michael Stewart alluded to the possibilities they hoped for, suggesting that moving to a reduced Australian presence would likely lead to even larger savings in foreign exchange and budgetary costs than the papers projected.¹¹¹ In the Cabinet, where the draft Defence White Paper was only briefly discussed, a similar point was made.¹¹² This gave Richard Crossman the impression that OPD ‘want us out of Singapore in 1970 and very much hope the Australians will turn us down when we ask for a British presence there after our withdrawal from Singapore’.¹¹³ Crossman was probably overstating the point. Given the sensitivity of all overseas ministers to American interests, they would have been hoping to maintain a sea/air presence in Australia—fleshed out with new F111s—rather than no presence at all. But the substantive point remains. While explicit British plans described a substantial commitment to, and presence in, Malaysia and Singapore, the hopes and expectations of overseas ministers and officials were that these would be significantly curtailed by events: firstly, an eviction from Southeast Asia by Malaysia and Singapore; then a rejection by Australia of a substantial British presence. As Crossman noted, ‘we have to wait for facts to force withdrawal on us’.¹¹⁴ Towards the end of February 1966, the British Government published its Defence White Paper, announcing the conclusions of the ¹⁰⁸ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Hartnell to Hicks, ‘Post CANBERRA Conference Comments’, 14/2/1966. ¹⁰⁹ PRO: T 225/2712: Bell to Lavelle, ‘Defence Review’, 10/2/1966. ¹¹⁰ Ibid. ¹¹¹ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)12th Meeting, 11/2/1966; PRO: CAB 148/27: OPD(66) 31: Healey, ‘Defence Review’, 9/2/1966. ¹¹² PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)8th Meeting, 14/2/1966. Richard Crossman noted in his diary that some ministers were unhappy at how the Cabinet only got to rubber-stamp the White Paper: Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 1, p. 455. ¹¹³ Ibid. ¹¹⁴ Ibid.

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Defence Review. The paper limited British commitments, for the British Government now declared that it would no longer engage in ‘major operations of war except in co-operation with allies’.¹¹⁵ Nor would the Government feel obliged to provide another country with military assistance unless adequate advance facilities were provided. Finally, the Government would make ‘no attempt to maintain defence facilities in an independent country against its wishes’.¹¹⁶ The paper also included substantial changes to British forces, including the purchase of 50 F111 long-range bombers, and the cancellation of a new aircraft carrier. The latter announcement prompted the resignations of the First Sea Lord and the Minister for the Navy, Christopher Mayhew, who both argued that the loss of the aircraft carrier would mean that Britain would not be able to meet its commitments. Their actions, however, had little lasting effect within Whitehall and publicly. Their claim that Britain required both a new aircraft carrier and the F111s seemed driven by obvious sectional interests and had little pull on the Defence Secretary and the other armed services. Moreover, Mayhew’s political effectiveness was undercut by his complicated claim that either Britain should opt for both sets of weaponry—thus maintaining the capacity to act without allies—or purchase none at all, instead shedding most of Britain’s overseas commitments.¹¹⁷ While some noise and controversy was generated by the changes to the armed forces, the White Paper was much quieter, and not very candid, on the British Government’s expectations in Southeast Asia. The Paper sought to stress its continuity with previous policy, and reaffirmed the undertakings which the British Government had given to its allies. It stated that Britain would remain in Malaysia and Singapore for as long as their governments set ‘acceptable conditions’.¹¹⁸ At the same time, it announced that discussions had begun with the Australian Government on the practical possibility of moving defence forces there ‘if necessary’, should the Southeast Asian bases no longer be freely available.¹¹⁹ ¹¹⁵ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 , Cmnd 2901 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1966), p. 7.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. ¹¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)4th Meeting, 19/1/1966; Hansard, Session 1965/6,

vol. 725, cols 254–65, 22/2/1965. See also Christopher Mayhew, Britain’s Role Tomorrow (London: Hutchinson, 1967). ¹¹⁸ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 , p. 8. ¹¹⁹ Ibid.


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Politically, the domestic reaction to the Defence White Paper was muted. The stir from Mayhew’s resignation was partly overshadowed by controversy over the manner of his departure, in particular a longer and wider-ranging resignation speech than usual to the House of Commons. Moreover, his actions helped quell criticism from the Labour Left of the level of defence spending: if major defence figures were resigning because they felt the cuts had gone too far, this bolstered the argument to the Left that they may have gone far enough.¹²⁰ The response to the White Paper from the Opposition Conservatives was also limited in its effectiveness. While Edward Heath and Enoch Powell, the Shadow Defence Secretary, criticized some of the cuts and the £2,000 million target for defence expenditure, their position was muddied—and easily pilloried by Denis Healey—because of a conspicuous Conservative split between Powell, who had previously claimed that Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role should be relinquished, and most other Tories, who wanted it retained.¹²¹ As far as the overseas political reaction was concerned, the Australian Government was pleased with the White Paper’s enunciation of the British position in Southeast Asia. The head of Australia’s External Affairs Department thought the statement ‘a far more strongly stated intention than we could reasonably have hoped for’.¹²² To President Johnson, Prime Minister Holt wrote that the British paper crystallized ‘significant gains’ from both Australia’s and the United States’ point of view.¹²³ It ‘clarifie[d] the situation a good deal’, while the apparent restatement of Britain’s commitment to the region ‘implie[d] an abandonment of [the] earlier theorising’ on the possibility of neutralizing the region.¹²⁴ In publishing the 1966 Defence White Paper, the British Government publicly committed itself to a policy contrary to the intentions, plans and costings it had been maintaining for the previous year. More than that, the Government could only hope that the gap between its ¹²⁰ PRO: PREM 13/802: George Wigg to Harold Wilson, tel. 658, 23/2/1966; Hansard, Session 1965/6, vol. 725, cols 254–65; ‘East of Suez Withdrawal by the 1970s: Mr Mayhew States his Case’, The Times, 23/2/1966, p. 12; Edward Short, Whip to Wilson (London: Macdonald, 1989), pp. 225–6. ¹²¹ Hansard, Session 1965/6, vol. 725, cols 1748–1864, 1927–2052, 2357–67: Annual Defence Debate, 7/3/1966. ¹²² NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Sir Edwin Hicks to Paul Hasluck, ‘British White Paper on Defence’, 22/2/1966. ¹²³ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Harold Holt to Lyndon Johnson, 24/2/1966. ¹²⁴ Ibid.

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commitments and its secret intentions would soon be bridged by the repudiation of those commitments through external events. How had the Wilson Government reached this point? The British Government did not decide to maintain its position in Malaysia and Singapore for ‘as long as conditions allowed’ on the basis of an assessment of Britain’s own direct interests. On the contrary, on this assessment alone, all parts of the Government were agreed in judging that British commitments in the region should be minimized. But they also believed that Britain’s role in the region had to be sufficient to gain their major allies’ support, since that role was largely justified by the need to maintain those relationships. Australia, New Zealand and the United States had given the British Government a strong indication of their views at the quadripartite talks in September 1965. In the aftermath of these talks, however, the British Government did not materially alter the direction of its policy planning. It continued in secret to plan on a partial, voluntary withdrawal, while keeping its allies at a distance and ignoring their requests for closer consultation. These tactics had the small merit of putting off any open disagreement between Britain and its allies on the issue of Southeast Asian strategy—but they did nothing to alter the fundamental grounds of the disagreement. When the British resumed their consultations with their allies, starting with Wilson’s December 1965 leadership summit with President Johnson, the distance between the two sides once again became manifest, even if it was more gently expressed than before. The Americans would in no way agree with a voluntary British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, and were clearly hostile to interdependent arrangements that appeared only to be a means to relieve the British of some of their defence burden. Still the British continued to work—producing plans, costings, and force structures—as if the ANZUS allies might somehow be convinced at the last moment to accede to British plans. The allies would not. Instead, with only weeks to go before the publication of the Defence White Paper, the British changed course, Denis Healey altering the words for Britain’s tenure in Malaysia and Singapore, from leaving ‘as soon as possible’, to staying ‘as long as conditions allow’. The gap between these two positions was bridged by the expectation and hope that regional Southeast Asian politics would be sufficiently hostile to the British to force them out in the near future. The revised formula was sufficient to gain the acceptance of Britain’s allies at the final consultations. Moreover, after some hard persuasion, they agreed to


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begin looking more closely at some form of quadripartite co-operation in the region as well. The publication of the Defence White Paper in February 1966 was supposed to mark the end of the British process of policy revision. The Paper, however, fell short of being fully candid on the aims of British policy-makers. These aims would not be fulfilled until a host of further events—largely outside the Government’s control—had occurred: a clear end to Confrontation; the turning of Malaysian and Singaporean opinion against the British, leading to the eviction of their forces; and the agreement of the ANZUS powers to some sort of reduced, interdependent British role in the aftermath. Moreover, the British economy had to remain sufficiently strong to continue to support a defence budget of £2,060 million. The question of whether all these conditions could be met—and what would happen if they were not—is the subject of the chapters that follow.

Conclusion to Part I The February 1966 Defence White Paper was supposed to be the definitive statement of defence and foreign policy for the Wilson Government. It concluded more than a year’s work on the Defence Review, which examined all aspects of Britain’s defence posture around the globe. The Review’s conclusions—contained not simply in the public White Paper, but in the more rigorous policy documents which underpinned it—were supposed to establish the direction of British defence policy until the beginning of the 1970s. The Defence Review was publicly perceived, both at the time and for many years afterward, as having arrived at relatively conservative conclusions. While it limited the occasions and conditions under which British forces might be deployed, it did not publicly step back from any of the major aspects of Britain’s worldwide role. For many later critics, the apparent timidity of the 1966 White Paper represented a missed opportunity. The Wilson Government, they have often argued, was too enamoured with an imperial notion of Britain’s ‘greatness’ to be rigorous in reducing Britain’s overseas role to match the country’s economic resources.¹ Had it done so, it would not then have had to undergo the humiliating reversals and retrenchments of 1967 and 1968. Part I of this book has demonstrated this argument to be fundamentally mistaken. It has made clear that all the relevant departments in the British Government involved in the Defence Review were willing to endorse significant and far-reaching changes to Britain’s Southeast Asian role which would have seen Britain’s overseas commitments substantially reduced. This reassessment was driven by a long-term reappraisal of Britain’s international interests, coupled to the medium-term economic constraint imposed by the £2,000 million ceiling on defence ¹ R.F. Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900–1970 (London: Fontana, 1991), ch. 9; Darby, Britain’s Defence Policy, ch. 8; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, ch. 7; Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez, pp. 136–7.


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expenditure. The Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices had been coming to the view, at the time of the Wilson Government’s election, that Britain’s direct interests in the region did not justify the size of its role and its costs, and that both should be reduced. The Government’s senior ministers had been keen to emphasize the importance of Britain’s overseas role when they first arrived in office. But their belief was not so fixed or rigid as their critics have judged: when ministers realized that a £2,000 million budget could not accommodate all of Britain’s commitments, they were readily persuaded that Britain’s role should be substantially reduced—including a partial withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore to Australia. The catch, however, lay in gaining the agreement of Britain’s major allies in the Southeast Asian region: the United States, Australia and New Zealand. It was for the sake of their alliance that the British had felt the need to maintain a residual presence in the first place. Moreover, such a residual presence needed to operate with the allies’ co-operation if Britain’s remaining responsibilities were to be fulfilled. As Chapters 2 and 3 have described, the allies firmly rejected the British proposals. They were angry and appalled by the sudden presentation of the proposals in the aftermath of the Malaysia/Singapore split. So perturbed were the Americans that they forced on Harold Wilson a connection between Britain’s Southeast Asian presence and any US support for the pound. All the allies were suspicious that the British wanted to renounce their responsibilities in Southeast Asia; and all were sceptical of the strategic arguments that the British used to justify their proposals. Despite these rejections, however, the Wilson Government continued to work until the beginning of 1966 as if its plans could be realized. Only at the very last moment, before the final round of consultations, did the Government change course: slightly rewording its intentions, but fundamentally changing the nature of its policy—and hoping and expecting that events would come to bridge the gap between the two. Why did the British Government continue to work on a policy through all of 1965 and into 1966 when it had become clear in September 1965 that its allies would most likely reject it? Why did the Government maintain an approach that only led it to an impasse, forcing it to change course at the very last moment, thus destroying the basis on which the previous year’s work had stood? The British Government’s justification to itself for ignoring its allies until almost the end lay in its different assessment of the situation

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in Malaysia and Singapore. It maintained, to itself and to the allies, that local nationalist politics would lead to the British being forced out soon after the end of Confrontation. On this basis, moreover, the British justified their last-minute decision to stay ‘as long as conditions allowed’, since the difference in time between that moment and the first opportunity to leave voluntarily would be minimal. Certainly, in much of the Government’s knowledge and experience, it was not wholly unreasonable to expect that local politics would soon become hostile to the British presence. That had been the case through much of the process of decolonization; it was currently the case for the British base in Aden.² The Malayan Emergency, Indonesia’s Confrontation, and the United States’ own battles in Vietnam could all be interpreted in a similar light. But the British Government’s judgement—and that of its Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices—would prove to be wrong. The US, Australian and New Zealand Governments were sceptical that the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments would so quickly change their stripes: and they were right. As later chapters will show, once Confrontation had ended, neither Malaysia nor Singapore was suddenly eager to evict the British: on the contrary, in 1967 and 1968 they both pleaded with the British to stay. So why did the British so stubbornly stick to their assessment, without ever seriously considering the alternatives, when their major, influential, and ultimately correct allies judged the situation completely differently? Arguably, because once the British had concluded that their financial circumstances compelled withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, the nature and practices of the British foreign policy process made it very difficult to reopen this issue. Previous commentators have noted that one of the major flaws of this process was its tendency to reach mutually agreeable compromises at committee level which could never be reopened, and which were insulated from external analysis or criticism.³ Precisely such a tendency was observable through 1965. While the British foreign policy process was able to re-examine Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ commitments in the early stages of the Defence Review, once a new approach had been settled upon, the process was unwilling and unable to change course in response to external opposition. Fairly early in the Defence Review, before mid-1965, British officials found a way to make defence cuts that was acceptable to all departments, ² Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia, chs 6–7. ³ Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 274.


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involving, in Southeast Asia, a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore to reduced facilities in Australia. With all departments in agreement and all the relevant ministers following suit, the British Government effectively locked itself into a policy without having broached the topic with its allies. None of the participating departments had an interest in breaking the deal apart: if the plans agreed upon were unachievable, the Treasury would risk its £2,000 million budget ceiling, the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices would risk having to implement deeper cuts to commitments, and the Ministry of Defence would face further reductions to its forces. When the allies made clear their opposition to the British plans, the response of the Government was not to reconsider them, but rather to continue planning along almost exactly the same track, while avoiding further consultations with the allies for as long as possible. The consensus within Whitehall was undisturbed, but only by ignoring a fundamental breach between Britain and its allies. This tactic led the British Government to its final impasse, at which point it essentially had to reverse the assumption on the basis of which it had been planning for nearly all of the previous year—albeit with some expectation and much hope that regional events would correct the difference. What would have happened if the British Government had been more open and more rigorous in its policy planning, and less wilfully blind in late 1965 to the opinions of its allies? Arguably, it would have meant that the conflicts and eventual breakdown that would occur from late 1966 to 1968 would have manifested themselves sooner. If the British had properly listened to their allies, it would have become clear that there was now a growing conflict between Britain’s economic and financial interests—which demanded a sharply reduced role in Malaysia and Singapore—and its political interests—which required Britain to maintain a Southeast Asian presence for the sake of the country’s main allies. This was the fundamental conundrum that the Wilson Government faced over ‘East of Suez’. It was not how to manage a conflict between Britain’s limited economic capacity and its residual imperial role—for the Government was rather more clear-sighted on the limited value of its Southeast Asian presence than many critics have alleged. Rather, it was how to manage a conflict between Britain’s economic means and its interests and relations with its major allies, especially the United States. Britain’s straitened circumstances were compelling a sharp reduction in the country’s international role, but the allies were refusing to countenance this.

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Thanks to its closed processes and wilful blindness, the British Government managed to avoid dealing with this painful conflict of interests for most of the Defence Review. The problem was then patched over by Denis Healey’s formula for retaining the Singapore base—which could be interpreted to mean one thing to the allies and public, and another thing to the British. The Government now hoped the issue would solve itself by Britain being forcibly ejected from its bases in the near future. But if this eventuality did not arise, or if the fundamental conflict between British interests manifested itself too soon or too sharply, the Government would then be forced to face the issue. How this happened, and how it was then resolved, would be the Wilson Government’s preoccupation for two more years to come.

PA RT II CONFLICT


Introduction to Part II In July 1967, less than a year and a half after the 1966 Defence White Paper, the Wilson Government released a second major defence paper. In this Supplementary Statement on Defence, the Government recanted much of the policy it had issued before. No longer would Britain be maintaining its forces in Malaysia and Singapore for as long as local conditions allowed. Nor would it be contributing to any interdependent Southeast Asian force. Instead it would be removing its permanent forces in two stages: cutting them in half by 1970/1, and withdrawing completely by the mid-1970s. There was no mention of any Australian base. The only remnant of the British role in Southeast Asia would be a special military capability, earmarked for use in the area if required. The reasons for this reversal of policy were complex. It was not simply a case of the key players changing their minds, for the altered dynamics and patterns of the policy process shifted the identities and roles of the key players themselves. Institutional pressures and relationships had changed, players and personalities had been repositioned, and more broadly, political sentiments had shifted. In 1965/6, the British policy process had been running relatively harmoniously. The major Government departments had worked towards similar goals; their chief ministers had not dissented from this direction. Neither the Cabinet nor the Parliamentary Labour Party had been given much chance to debate or examine Government policy, nor had either raised any substantive criticism of it. The only major opposition had come from Britain’s allies. With the defence and foreign policy departments and their ministers in firm control of policy planning, the views of these governments had been given key importance and policy had been altered in this light. In 1966/7, the policy process was much more fractious. The major departments strongly disagreed on what direction policy should take. There were sharp differences between some ministers and their officials.

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The Cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party were prepared to intervene, creating much noise and controversy. While Britain’s allies still had strong views, they were much less able to give effect to them, as their principal internal allies, the foreign policy departments, had a weaker grip on the policy process. These disputes reflected deep divisions of opinion on how to resolve the fundamental problems of British defence policy: first, the conflict between Britain’s economic interests and its interest in maintaining its relations with its major allies; and then, once that conflict had been settled in favour of a British withdrawal, a battle over the politics, symbolism and presentation of how that withdrawal took place. The next three chapters examine these times of change in greater detail. Chapter 4 covers the period after the launch of the Defence White Paper until October 1966, when the Government launched another Defence Review. This period witnessed the dissolution of the fragile basis of agreement that had enabled the passing of the Defence White Paper. Britain and the ANZUS allies fitfully attempted to initiate quadripartite co-operation in Southeast Asia. Their efforts petered out as it became clear that there was unlikely to be any agreement on strategic aims in the region. At the same time, the political and economic pressures on the British Government to alter its defence stance increased. An enlarged and unruly Labour backbench began to express vocal concerns over the extent of Britain’s overseas defence effort. A midsummer seamen’s strike, and the sterling crisis resulting from it, forced the Government to reopen the issue of its overseas expenditure. To that end, Defence Expenditure Studies—in effect, a second Defence Review—were initiated in October 1966. Chapter 5 follows the course of the Defence Expenditure Studies until April 1967. The path of development was rocky, with disagreements between departments, divisions within OPD and the Cabinet, and political pressure mounting within the Labour Party. The Labour Party’s dissent exploded into revolt in February 1967 when there was a major backbench rebellion against the Government’s defence policy. In the wake of the rebellion, the Government discarded the initial results of the Defence Expenditure Studies and hurriedly developed plans for a two-stage withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the final course of negotiations from April to July 1967 leading up to the Supplementary Statement on Defence. In this period, the key players engaged in a pitched battle over the politics and presentation of how Britain should withdraw from Malaysia

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and Singapore: whether it should do so in a way which suggested that Britain was still retaining its interests and role in the region, or whether it was engaged in a fundamental and wholesale retreat. Arguments ranged widely on the issue: from the ANZUS allies who hoped that maximum continuity would be maintained, to the more radical ministers in OPD and the Cabinet, who wanted Britain to abdicate its remaining role in the world as quickly as possible. Their battles meant that British policy would be forced through a number of further revisions before its crystallization in the July 1967 statement.

4 The End of Consensus: March–October 1966 The February 1966 Defence White Paper was supposed to have settled the question of Britain’s defence and foreign policy posture for the foreseeable future. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, what appeared superficially to be a conservative and incrementalist document concealed an unstable amalgam of hopes, promises and expectations. Fundamental questions had not been properly resolved by the White Paper: the nature and role of Britain’s Southeast Asian forces once Confrontation was over; whether Britain could or should retain its Singapore base; whether and how quadripartite arrangements might lighten Britain’s responsibilities; and what Britain’s remaining commitments to Malaysia and Singapore would be in the future. While 1966 might be considered largely a transitional period—with no major decisions pending or announced—through this time a number of separate and disconnected events combined, with profound implications for the future. They initiated a process that would later come to resolve most of those questions the White Paper had left unanswered. Internationally, Britain and the ANZUS powers sought, and failed, to find a basis for quadripartite co-operation. At the same time, Confrontation was winding down, as Sukarno’s power in Indonesia evaporated while Suharto’s position was consolidated. This had major consequences for the British defence position. It meant that forces could be brought home and costs reduced. It also freed Malaysia from having to align itself so closely to Britain, and the release of accumulated tensions resulted in a few months of difficult relations in mid-1966. Domestically, the Labour Government was boosted by its landslide re-election in March 1966. However, this proved to be a mixed blessing, as the newly enlarged backbench was much more outspoken and unruly than the old. Without the discipline instilled by a fragile majority and

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a looming election, Labour MPs became increasingly critical of the Government’s policies, especially regarding defence. Economically, the Government was faced once again with a sterling crisis, triggered by the mid-year seamen’s strike. With emergency foreign expenditure cuts introduced in July, defence spending once again came under sharp scrutiny, and new Defence Expenditure Studies were initiated in October 1966. All these factors combined to undermine Britain’s position in Malaysia and Singapore. The time from the publication of the Defence White Paper to the reopening of the Defence Review can be divided into two periods. The first period was characterized by the slow dissolution of the fragile agreement on which the conclusions of the White Paper had been founded: Britain and its allies failed to find any basis for co-operation in Southeast Asia; the Parliamentary Labour Party’s support for the Government’s policies weakened; and Malaysia drifted further away from a British orbit. This process of dissolution was accelerated by the sterling crisis in July 1966, whose consequences dominated the second period: the general consensus on foreign policy within the British Government broke down as the economic departments started pursuing a much tougher line on expenditure; under this pressure, the formal process of reviewing defence was reopened in October 1966. While, in the time covered by this chapter, none of these events heralded a significant shift in policy, they were sufficient to start building the momentum for the major reassessments which took place in the period that followed. In the first few months following the Defence White Paper, the British Government and its ANZUS allies began exploring the possibilities for quadripartite co-operation. As described in the previous chapter, the British had pursued such co-operation as a means of reducing their role in Southeast Asia and moving towards a strategy of peripheral defence. The ANZUS allies had reluctantly agreed to examine these forms of interdependence: reluctant, because they suspected that Britain was seeking to shift its burden onto them; acquiescent, ultimately, because they recognized the need to be responsive to the British, lest the latter refuse to talk about their future policies, or, worse still, be tempted to act unilaterally. The timetable for the quadripartite talks was fairly relaxed, with the first conference mooted for June 1966. The British were distracted by their general election in March. The Americans were naturally more preoccupied with the Vietnam War, and wary of any further commitments. The Australians were suspicious of British motives. And

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jointly, the allies were finding it difficult to establish a shared basis on which to proceed. The Australian Government was, from the beginning, open in its scepticism about British strategic thinking. Their doubts were rooted in the same concerns they had expressed in the consultations leading to the February Defence White Paper. To British Embassy officials in Canberra and Washington, the Australians expressed criticism of the notion of neutralizing Southeast Asia. Any such plan, they argued, might ‘impel [the UK] to leave Singapore sooner than necessary’.¹ SEATO would be endangered. And, without effective forces located in the region, the allied ability to respond to threats would be limited to either acquiescing to an incremental, hostile takeover of the region or engaging in massive, possibly nuclear, retaliation.² The US Government was less concerned with long-term strategic questions; indeed they were irritated that the British should bring up such topics at all, given the rather more urgent problem of the conflict in Vietnam. US officials told the British Ambassador that President Johnson wanted to maintain a sharp distinction between the immediate question of how to keep the British in Malaysia and Singapore, and the long-term issues of command, planning and organization in Southeast Asia. While the Americans said they were not ruling out some form of quadripartite co-operation, equally they were not working hard for it—they had sufficient problems in Vietnam and did not want any more commitments.³ The differences between Britain and its allies were noted and discussed by British officials on the Defence Review Working Party, the committee now charged with implementing the Defence White Paper policies. They noted a ‘clear’ divergence in emphasis between the Americans and Australians.⁴ Given this divergence, the Working Party felt it better tactically not to confront each ally head on in bilateral talks. Rather, they argued that the Government should only favour discussions within a quadripartite format, where the British would be able to play off the allies against each other. Australian insistence on the long-term importance of Singapore would be undermined by the United States’ less dogmatic approach. US reluctance to get very involved in quadripartite arrangements would be mitigated by Australian acquiescence. ¹ PRO: PREM 13/890: Sir Charles Johnston to CRO, tel. 278, 25/2/1966. ² PRO: PREM 13/890: Sir Patrick Dean to FO, tel. 774, 4/3/1966. ³ Ibid. ⁴ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)2nd Meeting, 11/3/1966.


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Even with these tactical gambits, though, British officials were still finding it difficult to frame a position for the quadripartite talks that would be effective with their allies. The ANZUS powers were unsympathetic to all the major arguments justifying Britain’s favoured strategy of withdrawal to the Southeast Asian periphery. They had been sceptical of the British view that their tenure on Singapore was necessarily limited. They had ‘discount[ed]’ the economic reasoning which the British felt had compelled them to change their defence posture.⁵ And the allies would react very sharply if the British tried to advocate even a limited neutralization of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, given Britain’s stated commitment to stay in Singapore for as long as conditions allowed.⁶ If British officials gave neutralization ‘undue prominence’ it would be likely to attract hostility.⁷ Later, they thought discretion the better part of valour and dropped the term ‘neutral’ from their position paper altogether, in favour of the less controversial ‘non-aligned zone’.⁸ Since it was unlikely that the British would be able to convince the allies of their long-term strategy, officials argued it would be best to focus the talks on short-term tactics and concrete measures, such as developing the Australian base. But even then, they noted, they would have to be careful in focusing on these smaller topics, lest they be perceived as obsessed with only their own problems.⁹ The unsettled relations between Britain and its allies were underscored when Paul Hasluck, the Australian Foreign Minister, visited Washington and London. In Washington, Dean Rusk expressed to him his doubts about British motives. Rusk asked rhetorically whether the mooted quadripartite arrangements in Southeast Asia were supposed to help maintain Britain’s political role, or whether they were a means to move away from any active participation: ‘Were the British itching to get out or were they determined to stay as long as possible?’¹⁰ On the ⁵ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)3rd Meeting, 23/3/1966. ⁶ PRO: CAB 148/54: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)4: FO, ‘Synopsis of Draft Paper for Submission to Ministers: Future Indo-Pacific Policy’, 28/3/1966. ⁷ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)3rd Meeting, 23/3/1966. ⁸ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)4th Meeting, 31/3/1966. ‘Non-alignment’ was less controversial than ‘neutrality’ since it implied that a country would actively oppose intervention by either superpower, rather than being somewhat passive and acquiescent. ⁹ PRO: CAB 148/54: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)4: FO, ‘Synopsis of Draft Paper for Submission to Ministers: Future Indo-Pacific Policy’, 28/3/1966. ¹⁰ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel. 1335, 12/4/1966.

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other hand, Robert McNamara appeared to Hasluck to be more open to the British arguments. The US Defence Secretary ‘entirely agreed’ with the Australian response that the first step should be quadripartite discussions to develop shared strategy and aims.¹¹ But, worryingly for the Australians, he was also softer on the question of Singapore. He pointed out that the F111s, with their increased range and flexibility, ‘need not be based on the Southeast Asian mainland’.¹² And he felt that the Australians should ‘encourage the British to have bases in Australia’, though he then qualified this, saying it should only happen once the British were forced from Singapore.¹³ In London, Hasluck found the British position disconcertingly vague. Australian officials observed, in the lead-up to his visit, that the British seemed to be shying away from their earlier arguments for neutralizing Southeast Asia. The Australians detected ‘discomfort among [neutralization’s] proponents and a disinclination to argue its merits in detail’.¹⁴ This pattern was repeated all the way to the top. Hasluck’s discussions with Harold Wilson were inconclusive. The Prime Minister claimed to be looking forward to the quadripartite talks, but noted that the British had not yet been able to advance their thinking—a not wholly honest position, given the Defence Review Working Party’s work of the month before. When Hasluck suggested that the quadripartite talks should aim for some agreement on policy, Wilson was evasive in his response. He claimed there were still too many ‘imponderables’: Vietnam was unresolved and with that the whole US stance in Southeast Asia; Indonesia’s future position in the region was unclear.¹⁵ The Prime Minister’s evasiveness reflected the basic dilemma of British foreign policy. On the one hand, the British wanted to share and thereby reduce their commitments to Malaysia and Singapore. On the other, they could not openly argue for the strategy they had developed to achieve this, as it would lose them their allies’ co-operation. Denis Healey took a blunter approach with Hasluck than had Wilson: not verbal dexterity but simple threat. He stressed that there was considerable domestic opposition to Britain’s position in Southeast Asia. The Government’s desire to maintain its worldwide commitments ¹¹ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 1351, 13/4/1966. ¹² Ibid. ¹³ Ibid. ¹⁴ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: T.K. Critchley to Paul Hasluck, ‘Talks in London’, tel. 3281, 6/4/1966. ¹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/890: memcon, Harold Wilson and Paul Hasluck, London, 19/4/1966.


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was an ‘improbable’ policy, and ‘somewhat idealistic’.¹⁶ He spelt out the implications: if the Australians ‘did not take the opportunity to tie Britain down’ with an Australian base, they ‘might lose [the] opportunity to keep the British in Asia’.¹⁷ Hasluck was stalwart in defending his government’s position: though Australia would consider a base if the British were forced out of Singapore, they firmly believed in maintaining forces further north if at all possible. From spring into the summer of 1966, Britain’s Southeast Asian role faced pressure on two separate fronts: from Malaysia itself, due to difficult relations between that country and Britain; and from British domestic politics, as a more vocal and restive Labour backbench began to assert itself. The discord which upset the Anglo–Malaysian relationship in the summer of 1966 might be considered a by-product of the release of pressure accompanying the winding down of Confrontation. The Indonesian Army had steadily entrenched its authority over the archipelago nation in the early months of 1966. Although Sukarno retained the formal position of President, General Suharto increasingly assumed executive power and moved to ban the Indonesian Communist Party in March 1966. Conciliatory statements toward Malaysia followed in April, with Suharto indicating in May that a British withdrawal from Singapore would not be a necessary precondition for a peaceful settlement. Diplomatic exchanges continued through the next few months—the Indonesians stepping carefully to maintain face while in retreat—and in mid-August an agreement was signed between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to formally end hostilities and normalize relations.¹⁸ As the threat posed by Indonesia and Confrontation receded over the first half of 1966, so the need declined to maintain a front of absolute agreement between Britain and Malaysia. A number of separate issues—some symbolic, some more substantial—led to public displays of friction between the two governments. The first issue concerned the way in which the British Government sought to end Confrontation. In theory at least, the Malaysian Government was supposed to be the leading partner in dealing with Indonesia, with the British only supposed to be providing ‘assistance’. As the British bore the main burden of actual defence, however, it ¹⁶ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 3664, 20/4/1966. ¹⁷ Ibid. ¹⁸ Mackie, Konfrontasi, ch. 11.

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was unsurprising that they occasionally overstepped the bounds of their nominally subordinate role. In late November 1965, the British Government had publicly suggested that it was ready for negotiations to end Confrontation. In April 1966, the British Government offered Indonesia emergency aid of £1 million, intended as a goodwill gesture to help secure a peace agreement. Both these actions irritated the Malaysian Government, which felt that the British had not adequately consulted them, and that their own prerogative to negotiate had been usurped.¹⁹ Later in mid-1966, the two governments had a further dispute on how quickly Britain’s Confrontation forces should be withdrawn, the two parties disagreeing on when and how territory could be securely left to purely Malaysian forces. Australian observers were more sympathetic to the Malaysian position. The Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur noted that the Malaysians ‘resented’ what seemed to them a British policy of withdrawing forces according to the ‘economic and other policies of Whitehall regardless of [the] wishes of Malaysia and [the] needs of [the] situation’.²⁰ He recommended that the Australian Government ‘clearly dissociate’ itself from any British pressure for early disengagement.²¹ A second irritant in the Anglo–Malaysian relationship stemmed from the continuing problems arising from the separation of Malaysia and Singapore. Senior members of the Malaysian Government harboured suspicions that the British were guilty of bias towards Singapore. These feelings were crystallized in a dispute about defence aid in the middle of 1966. The Malaysian Government had requested aid from the British Government to enable it to build up its defence forces. The British, however, made their aid conditional on the Malaysian Government coming to a defence agreement with Singapore, defence being one of the outstanding issues between the separated states. The Singapore Government, in the meantime, refused to come to a defence agreement with Malaysia unless it could also come to a favourable economic agreement. Thus the Malaysian Government inferred, not illogically, that the conditions the British were attaching to aid would work to Singapore’s economic advantage. ¹⁹ Dato’ Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963–1970 (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), ch. 6; Chin, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, ch. 7. ²⁰ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Disengagement of Forces’, tel. 1539, 20/6/1966. ²¹ Ibid.


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In mid-May 1966 the British Government decided not to award Malaysia any further defence aid. Publicly, the British pleaded budgetary constraints and a lack of need on the part of Malaysia, but privately its reasoning was based on the failure of Malaysia and Singapore to come to any defence or economic agreement.²² The Malaysian Government was outraged. Its leaders publicly and sharply rebuked the British Government. The Minister of Finance was quoted in the Sunday Times as describing Britain as ‘a tired and dispirited nation which perhaps has lost the will even to govern itself’.²³ Less flamboyantly but more substantially, the Malaysian Government went on in August to loosen the Malaysian dollar’s ties to sterling and to remove preferences on Commonwealth goods. Privately, Australian observers again sympathized with Malaysia. They felt Malaysia to be ‘understandably annoyed’ at the way Britain had ‘clumsily’ handled the issue of defence aid.²⁴ Moreover, they argued that Malaysia’s sharp reaction had a long-standing justification. A natural and cathartic anti-colonial outburst upon independence had been stymied by the Emergency and then by Confrontation.²⁵ Britain’s relations with Malaysia over the past three years had had ‘an insensitive and hectoring strain running through’ them.²⁶ Now freed from the constraints which Confrontation had imposed, the Malaysian Government was giving vent to a history of frustrations. Did these tensions in the Anglo–Malaysian relationship have any substantive impact on the British military position in the region? Arguably, it is difficult to see any direct relationship. As was described in Chapter 1, the British strategy of retreating from a direct presence in Southeast Asia to the periphery preceded any of the tensions. Notwithstanding the difficulties attending the Anglo–Malaysian relationship, the Malaysian Government always maintained that Britain should maintain its defence commitments and role. And, as will be documented later, when the British Government finally decided to withdraw, this decision was more opposed than aided by the Malaysian Government. ²² PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)24th Meeting, 13/5/1966. ²³ Sunday Times, 5/6/1966, quoted in Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, pp. 126–8. See also Sharma, British Policy Towards Malaysia, pp. 116–17. ²⁴ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: DEAC, ‘Malaysia and the Commonwealth’, Aug. 1966. ²⁵ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Parkinson to DEAC, ‘British Malaysian Relations’, tel. 1703, 12/7/1966. ²⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: DEAC, ‘Malaysia and the Commonwealth’, Aug. 1966.

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Yet the manifest tensions in their relationship in 1966 can be argued to have had an indirect effect on the withdrawal. The British Government’s view that nationalist forces might one day make the bases untenable can only have been bolstered by the Malaysian Government’s very public assertions of its independence and national interests—even if these assertions were only rhetorical gestures aimed at domestic political opinion. Given that, when it published the Defence White Paper, the Government had been privately hoping that Malaysian hostility would eventually force them out, it is easy to suspect that the British might even have been trying to stir up tensions with the Malaysians. Certainly, as the Australians observed, the British were not treating the Malaysian Government’s feelings with much care or consideration. But the policy documents regarding such issues as defence aid did not record any ulterior motives on the part of the British—which is not to say that they did not exist, only that they must remain suspected rather than proven. The other allies were worried about where a continuation of the Anglo–Malaysian tensions might lead. Lee Kuan Yew privately criticized ‘Malaysia’s carping attitude’ to the Australian Government as ‘just the wrong way to go about things’.²⁷ He thought it essential, if the allies were to convince the British to stay, that the British feel appreciated and their role to be worthwhile. The Australians, while more sympathetic to the Malaysian case, also privately agreed on the risk. They noted that Malaysia’s criticisms were playing very badly in the British press and public, to the detriment of Australia’s interests. The British were being ‘given scope for feeling that their presence in the Malaysian region may soon be no longer welcome’.²⁸ While the British position in Southeast Asia was being eroded from without, it was also being questioned from within. From Labour’s re-election in the spring, the Parliamentary Labour Party’s criticism of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role built up in a slow crescendo until the summer of 1966. The change in the domestic political climate could be directly attributed to Labour’s landslide victory of March 1966. Prior to this ²⁷ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: William Pritchett to DEAC, tel. 1005, 15/8/1966. ²⁸ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: DEAC, ‘Malaysia and the Commonwealth’, Aug. 1966.


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moment, the Government’s precarious majority had helped keep any backbench dissent to a minimum. This constraint had now been eliminated by a 97-seat majority. As Richard Crossman recorded in his diary, the backbench would now have to be much more carefully handled, as there was no longer the means to impose discipline automatically.²⁹ Edward Short, then the Labour Chief Whip, later noted that it was immediately obvious that the backbench were now ‘going to adopt a very different and highly critical, attitude towards their own Government’.³⁰ Moreover, Harold Wilson had not taken the opportunity after the election to reiterate the Party’s Standing Orders, which provided guidance on when Labour MPs might abstain or vote freely. From this time on, argued Short, the Parliamentary Labour Party ‘ceased to be a coherent, disciplined body’.³¹ The rumbles of dissent began about a month after the election. In the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Debate, Denis Healey found it necessary to defend the Government’s policies staunchly after criticism from all shades of the political spectrum.³² Two weeks later, left-wing critics of the Government’s foreign policy won a symbolic victory by securing the deputy chair of the Party’s Foreign Affairs Committee. US observers noted that while the Committee had ‘no major policy influence’, the victory, coupled with the larger Labour majority, would lead to a ‘more assertive’ left wing on foreign policy issues.³³ There was a sudden explosion of dissent at the end of May 1966, when a Parliamentary Party meeting was convened to discuss the Government’s policies ‘East of Suez’. The meeting had been called at the request of various critics of the ‘East of Suez’ policy, and included a motion calling for withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf by 1970. In the event, the motion was deferred until the next meeting as, according to the Chair, insufficient notice had been given. Nevertheless, the meeting provided a forum for a wide variety of critics to speak out. The lead was taken by Christopher Mayhew, the former Navy Minister, who reiterated the argument he had employed at the time of his resignation. As defence expenditure was falling, logic compelled Britain’s commitments to fall commensurately. Britain’s already overstretched forces could not maintain their overseas role while having ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³³

Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, p. 492. Edward Short, Whip to Wilson (London: Macdonald, 1989), p. 258. Ibid., p. 255. ³² Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 727, cols 542–669, 26/4/1966. USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2776: US Embassy, London, to State Department, ‘Joint Weeka No. 19’, 12/5/1966. See also Short, Whip to Wilson, p. 263.

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their capabilities cut. The Government was prescribing an ‘impossible posture to take up’.³⁴ Mayhew was followed by a range of other critics from all wings of the Party. Most emphasized the economic consequences of excessive defence expenditure: investment and production were being drawn away from more beneficial activities; the country’s balance of payments was being adversely affected by the massive overseas costs. Others argued that Britain should be concentrating its energies within Europe. They noted that no EEC country maintained so heavy a worldwide burden. Doubts were cast on the effectiveness of Britain’s role in maintaining peace and security. Senior ministers sought to be conciliatory in their response. The only sharp comment came when Harold Wilson angrily—and dishonestly—denied that British policy and US support for sterling were in any way linked. Otherwise, Michael Stewart and Denis Healey emphasized their sympathy with their critics’ arguments. Healey spent some time detailing the cuts to defence which were already in train. Both ministers agreed with their critics that Britain’s long-term aim should be to disengage from Southeast Asia. However, they argued that such a disengagement had to be carefully phased, so that peace and stability in the region could be maintained. Britain could not ‘simply . . . walk out and ignore the consequences’, argued Healey. The Government ‘needed time to phase our withdrawal without causing chaos’.³⁵ Thus, Healey concluded, there was ‘no real disagreement on ultimate aims’, but ‘the final responsibility’ for deciding the timing of withdrawal ‘must be left with the Government’.³⁶ At that point the Party meeting adjourned, to meet again two and a half weeks later to vote on the motion for an early withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. Early reports suggested that the Government was likely to be badly stung by the Parliamentary Labour Party’s vote. The Times’ political correspondent gathered from his Labour Party sources that the critics’ resolution would ‘be carried, and the Government . . . expected to rephase their defence plans accordingly’.³⁷ The Australian Government panicked in the face of such reports, and asked that its High Commissioner be granted an emergency meeting with Harold Wilson.³⁸ While the US Government was more confident that the British Government ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁷ ³⁸

Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 256, 25/5/1966. Ibid. ³⁶ Ibid. ‘Labour unity on defence role’, The Times, 26/5/1966, p. 13. NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 1: Harold Holt to Sir Alexander Downer, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 3067, 27/5/1966.


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would prevail, they worried that it could be ‘possibly by an unimpressive margin’.³⁹ They were concerned that opposition to ‘East of Suez’ had ‘increased and [was] not going to dissipate after the vote’.⁴⁰ Moreover, the opposition included not only ideologues in the Labour Party, but also a ‘substantial element among influential civil servants in Whitehall’.⁴¹ When the Australian High Commissioner visited 10 Downing St, however, he found the Prime Minister in a bullish mood. Wilson was scornful of the critics. They were men ‘disappointed at not being given office’.⁴² Christopher Mayhew was ‘a nutcase’, while left-wing pacifists were ‘impossible to reason’ with.⁴³ The Prime Minister was sure that the Government would win if the issue came to a vote. In the aftermath, Mayhew would ‘have such a sore tail he will not be able to sit down’.⁴⁴ The Australian High Commissioner was impressed by this show of conviction. He assessed Wilson as being genuinely ‘in complete command of the situation’.⁴⁵ Certainly the Prime Minister ‘had unbounded confidence in his own powers of persuasion and leadership, and what he can do when pressed, with the rank and file of his party’.⁴⁶ The Prime Minister’s confidence was not misplaced. When the Parliamentary Labour Party finally met and voted in the middle of June, the Government scored a substantial victory over its critics. The meeting began badly for the dissenters when one of their number was called to account for leaking the previous meeting’s proceedings to the press. Thereafter a number of backbenchers spoke, some reiterating the criticisms of the Government which had been aired before, others coming out in favour of its present policies.⁴⁷ The Prime Minister addressed the meeting last. He emphasized the progressive aspects of the Government’s defence policy. It aimed to provide physical support to United Nations peacekeeping and collective defence. There was no interest in maintaining massive bases against unwilling populations, but equipment and facilities were essential if British forces were to reach where intervention or peacekeeping operations were required, ³⁹ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2776: US Embassy, London, to State Department, ‘Joint Weeka No. 23’, 9/6/1966. ⁴⁰ Ibid. ⁴¹ LBJL: NSF: Files of Walt W. Rostow: Box 13: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘Christopher Mayhew on East of Suez Policy’, 9/6/1966. ⁴² NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 1: Sir Alexander Downer to Harold Holt, tel. 5295, 1/6/1966. ⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ Ibid. ⁴⁵ Ibid. ⁴⁶ Ibid. ⁴⁷ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 256, 15/6/1966.

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principally in Asia and Africa. On the question of Singapore, Wilson balanced his argument carefully. He claimed, not inaccurately, that if the Government had only itself to think of, ‘we would be glad to leave there as quickly as possible’.⁴⁸ But Britain was needed and wanted by its major allies in the area: Singapore, Australia and New Zealand—the Prime Minister carefully omitting reference to the less popular United States and Malaysia. Singapore, Wilson added for the Party’s benefit, was led by a Prime Minister ‘as good a left wing and democratic socialist as any in this room’.⁴⁹ While the Government would ‘not stay a day longer than is necessary’ to achieve its defence objectives, equally it could not ‘leave a day earlier than is necessary if we are to fulfil these objectives’.⁵⁰ Wilson ended his speech on a grand theme—with more inflated ambitions than any more serious or concrete policy document had ever suggested. The Prime Minister argued to the Party that it was Britain’s role to prevent the world becoming polarized between the superpowers: the United States, China and the Soviet Union. In a phrase that would later become notorious, he argued that if Britain departed the stage, the superpowers would be left standing ‘eyeball to eyeball to face this thing out’.⁵¹ Britain had a duty to neutralize the world’s hotspots, and a duty to influence the US so as to prevent such a confrontation happening. Wilson’s speech appeared a resounding success. The Labour Party met the Prime Minister’s speech with ‘prolonged applause’.⁵² Mayhew’s motion for immediate, sharp reductions was solidly rejected, 225 votes to 54, with about 50 abstentions. US sources noted that most of those voting against the Government were inveterate left-wingers, with its centrist and right-wing critics abstaining. The Prime Minister had scored a ‘notable personal’ victory, for though he probably changed few minds amongst his firm critics, the ‘force of his presentation and the size of his majority . . . probably considerably reduced the credibility of the dissenting point of view’.⁵³ Impressive though the Government’s majority was, it was questionable whether it carried as much conviction as it appeared to. Certainly, more than a few ministers quietly maintained the view that Britain ⁴⁸ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes: Speech by Harold Wilson to Parliamentary Labour Party, Card 257, 15/6/1966. ⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ Ibid. ⁵¹ Ibid. ⁵² Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 256, 15/6/1966. ⁵³ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2776: US Embassy, London, to State Department, ‘Joint Weeka No. 24’, 16/6/1966.


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should be withdrawing more quickly from Malaysia/Singapore. Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman were not convinced by Wilson, though both continued to vote with the Government.⁵⁴ Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan whispered private dissent to Crossman, and suggested that George Brown and Denis Healey thought similarly. This was almost certainly true of George Brown, who was commonly understood to be a strong pro-European. Healey’s position was rather more complex since, unknown to Crossman, Healey had been solidly with those planning for withdrawal during the Defence Review, but equally had been the first to suggest modifying these plans in the light of allied opinion. Against this backdrop of domestic political doubts and dissent, the allies entered their first quadripartite conference in the middle of June. As noted earlier in the chapter, the British Government was caught in an awkward position coming into the talks. Officials had not discarded the long-term objectives of withdrawal and neutralization, yet could not discuss them with the allies—much less pursue them seriously—for fear of causing offence. As Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart noted to his colleagues on OPD, given the situation in Vietnam, raising the idea of neutralization ‘would be most unwelcome to our allies’. It could lead to ‘considerable disagreement between us which might become publicly known’.⁵⁵ Equally, though, the topic of short-term deployments raised problems. With Confrontation winding down, the opportunity was arising for the British to make deep cuts to their Southeast Asian forces, bringing them down to the cost envisaged in the Defence Review. Ministers, with Denis Healey leading, were clear that these residual forces would have to be based in Singapore, given the commitments which had been made to Britain’s allies. But they were worried that with their Confrontation troops freed, the British would be under further pressure from their allies to send forces to Vietnam or Thailand. If they rebuffed the allies too strongly, it was again ‘likely to lead to maximum ill-will’.⁵⁶ British representatives would have to deflect allied requests very carefully if relations were not to be damaged. Coming into the quadripartite ministerial talks, the Americans noted the quiet evasiveness of the British position. They observed that the ⁵⁴ Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964–1976 (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 69; Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, p. 540. ⁵⁵ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)29th Meeting, 17/6/1966. ⁵⁶ Ibid.

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British had not worked hard for the talks. Indeed they had ‘shown almost no initiative recently’.⁵⁷ Rather it was the Australians who had been doing most of the running. This pattern was repeated in the talks themselves. The British did not volunteer extensive information about their plans and thinking. Rather, the allies repeatedly had to press the British on their aims, while the British repeatedly deflected any suggestion of broadening their role. Would the British defend Australia and New Zealand from attack? asked the allies. Undoubtedly so, Michael Stewart replied, as these countries had stood by Britain in two world wars. What of Malaysia? In case of direct aggression, yes; in case of subversion it would depend on the case: there was no point in propping up unpopular regimes. What about the situation in Indonesia? the allies continued. Michael Stewart was ambiguous in reply: ‘one does not want to quarrel unnecessarily with [so] large a country’.⁵⁸ Dean Rusk privately interpreted this as a hint that the British might argue that ‘major continued deployments in Malaysia would be offensive to Indonesia and therefore should be reduced’.⁵⁹ Rusk then asked ‘rather pointedly’ whether the British wanted to be invited to stay in Malaysia at all.⁶⁰ Stewart was equivocal in his reply: if Britain could leave under conditions which maintained stability it would want to do so; if Malaysia wanted it to stay, then Britain would stay.⁶¹ Rusk ended with more a hope than a question, that Britain might let its post-Confrontation forces ‘go north on behalf of SEATO’.⁶² Pointedly, Stewart did not respond to the approach. The ANZUS allies were dismayed at the outcome of the quadripartite talks. This would not be the last quadripartite meeting—there would be a further inconsequential exchange of views in October 1966—but it had been made abundantly clear that there was little basis on which to build further allied co-operation, of whatever form. Paul Hasluck expressed his ‘disappointment’ to the Americans and New Zealanders at the ANZUS summit the next day.⁶³ None of the allies was pleased ⁵⁷ LBJL: NSF: Files of Walt W. Rostow: Box 13: Background Paper for Quadripartite Discussions in Canberra, 30/6/1966. ⁵⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Dean Rusk to US Embassies in London, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta and Bangkok, 12/7/1966. ⁵⁹ Ibid. ⁶⁰ Ibid. ⁶¹ PRO: PREM 13/1454: memcon, Michael Stewart, Dean Rusk, Paul Hasluck, Keith Holyoake et al., ‘Quadripartite Ministerial Discussions’, Canberra, 30/6/1966. ⁶² Ibid. ⁶³ NAA: A4940/1, C3739: memcon, Paul Hasluck, Dean Rusk, Keith Holyoake et al., ‘ANZUS Council Meeting’, Canberra, 1/7/1966.


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that the only assurance the British were willing to give was to help defend Australia and New Zealand: an assurance both irrelevant, given the existing strategic threats, and superfluous, given the strength of the ANZUS alliance. The allies agreed that they should individually try to turn the British position around. Privately, though, the Americans were pessimistic. Rusk told President Johnson that he felt there was no hope that the British would go any further north in Southeast Asia, and that the British ‘would be glad to be invited out of Malaysia at the earliest possible moment’.⁶⁴ National Security Adviser Walt Rostow advised Johnson that it was ‘likely’ that the British would pull back.⁶⁵ Not unaware of these sentiments, Australian officials fretted at the Americans’ ‘rather fatalistic approach’.⁶⁶ While the allies despaired at keeping the British in a useful role in Southeast Asia, within Britain even the current reduced and limited presence was coming under pressure. Through late May and June 1966, British docks were paralysed by a seamen’s strike. The strike exacerbated an already endemic balance of payments problem, and together these precipitated a major deterioration in sterling’s position from late June 1966. The crisis opened up a major split within the ruling economic triumvirate of Harold Wilson, James Callaghan and George Brown. Brown argued that the Government’s policies had clearly failed to pull the country out of the balance of payments rut that produced its endemic sterling crises. It was time, Brown argued, for the Government to re-examine the basic parameters of its policies: in particular, Britain’s international role—both military and financial—which imposed ‘burdens and limitations which most other countries do not have to bear’.⁶⁷ Unless the Government rethought its attachment to sterling’s rate of parity and Britain’s overseas defence commitments, there would be no escaping the country’s continuing economic problems. Unless the Government reoriented Britain towards Europe, the country would have no prospect for future growth. Brown recognized it would be difficult to convince ⁶⁴ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Dean Rusk to Lyndon Johnson and George Ball, 1/7/1966. ⁶⁵ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Walt Rostow’s note on Rusk to Johnson and Ball, 1/7/1966. ⁶⁶ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/226: Department of Defence, ‘Conversations with Advisers to the United States Delegation for the Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting of 30th June, 1966’, 1/7/1966. ⁶⁷ PRO: T 230/772: George Brown, ‘Economic Policy’, 27/6/1966.

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the country’s allies to agree to any of these changes quickly—but they had to be told squarely that Britain’s current direction was unsustainable, and either they had to pay the bills to shore it up, or accept a sharp change in direction. Others in the Government, in particular James Callaghan as Chancellor, were dismissive of Brown’s analysis. Robert Nield, the Chancellor’s closest adviser in the Treasury, argued that all the issues that Brown had brought up—sterling, Europe and defence—required cool and careful handling.⁶⁸ It was implausible that President de Gaulle would allow a quick British entry into Europe, and impossible to imagine the United States and other allies remaining sympathetic to Britain’s case while the country tried to foist its defence costs and burdens upon them: Brown’s ‘whole proposition d[id] not stand up’.⁶⁹ Callaghan and Brown were deadlocked in disagreement about substantial defence cuts but stopped short of a withdrawal. Brown argued that the Government should devalue the pound, and dramatically reorient the country, turning away from the world role and towards Europe. With its economic leaders in sharp disagreement, the Government’s response to the financial crisis seized up. A number of measures were discussed by officials to correct the situation—raising interest rates, imposing duties on imported fuel, tightening rules on hire purchase and building activity—but with the Government’s leaders in disagreement on even a basic direction, none of these measures gelled into a proper package. Even on 13 July, the day before the Cabinet was to meet to decide on emergency measures, the Government had no firm sense of what it might implement. Late that evening, the permanent head of the Treasury rang the Governor of the Bank of England to warn him that it was ‘very difficult to give any concrete news about what was happening’ and the only thing certain was that the final package for the Cabinet was ‘likely to be different from that which he had mentioned earlier in the day’.⁷⁰ Through the night of 13 July, the Government’s leaders continued to argue over what an emergency package should comprise. Exactly what transpired in their arguments is somewhat murky, with neither the documentary record nor any other people outside the ruling triumvirate bearing witness to the debate. What is clear is that, while ⁶⁸ Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 261. ⁶⁹ PRO: T 230/772: R.R. Nield, ‘Economic Policy: First Secretary’s Paper’, 28/6/1966. ⁷⁰ PRO: T 230/772: A.J.C. Edwards, ‘Special Deposits’, 13/7/1966.


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Brown, Callaghan and Wilson were unable to agree on a fundamental strategy to deal with the sterling crisis, they were all prepared to argue for substantial defence cuts as an immediate measure to ease the situation. The next morning, on 14 July, the Prime Minister introduced to the Cabinet a number of stopgap measures which could be announced that afternoon to stem the crisis temporarily. With the principal figures still in strong disagreement, the measures were limited: an immediate lifting of interest rates, a £100 million cut in overseas expenditure for 1967/8, and the foreshadowing of a further set of economic measures to be announced in a week or so. The £100 million cut in foreign exchange was supposed to come largely from defence, half from forces in Germany, half from ‘East of Suez’.⁷¹ Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, however, reacted sharply against the unheralded proposals. Richard Crossman observed that the Foreign Secretary ‘obviously hadn’t been consulted until the night before’.⁷² Stewart responded to the proposals, in Barbara Castle’s eyes, ‘in a more emphatic temper than I have ever seen him’.⁷³ He argued that emergency cuts of this depth would necessarily involve partial or complete withdrawals from the main areas of Britain’s world role. These would be contrary to the commitments made to allies in the Defence Review. It would do ‘incalculable harm to our international standing; and both the decisions and the damage would be irrevocable’.⁷⁴ While many in the Cabinet might have looked favourably on further defence cuts in principle, they were also sympathetic to Stewart’s arguments about the appropriate way to achieve them. Though some argued for even more drastic defence cuts, the majority agreed that so major a reorientation of Britain’s defence and foreign policies could not be implemented without warning as a response to an immediate economic crisis. It was agreed that the announcement of a £100 million cut to defence expenditure should be delayed, giving the Defence and Foreign Secretaries time to examine how savings on that scale could be achieved. That afternoon, the Prime Minister announced the Government’s immediate measures to shore up the pound: the raising of interest rates, some reductions in bank liquidity, and a declaration that further measures would soon be implemented.⁷⁵ ⁷¹ ⁷² ⁷⁴ ⁷⁵

PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)36th Meeting, 14/7/1966. Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, p. 569. ⁷³ Castle, Diaries, p. 73. PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)36th Meeting, 14/7/1966. Hansard, Session 1966–67, vol. 731, col. 1733–5, 14/7/1966.

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In the days that followed, the economic crisis—only worsened by the Prime Minister’s stalling statement—and the continuing divisions within the leadership group precipitated a political crisis. The failure of the British Government to correct the situation caused the US Treasury Secretary to take the unusual step of calling James Callaghan privately to rebuke him on the Government’s handling of the situation. Callaghan retorted that the US Government was only exacerbating the situation by insisting the British maintain so substantial an overseas defence presence.⁷⁶ The British Government’s unity of purpose was not aided by Harold Wilson flying to Moscow for a few days on a prearranged visit. In his absence, rumours abounded that ministers in favour of devaluation were orchestrating a leadership plot. On Wilson’s return, the Cabinet finally pulled together a package to address the crisis. Devaluation was rejected, though with a solid minority, including George Brown and Roy Jenkins, in favour. A massive deflationary package was adopted instead. Prices and wages were frozen. There were tax rises and spending cuts amounting to 1.3% of GDP.⁷⁷ Michael Stewart and Denis Healey put forward revised proposals to cut £100 million of the Government’s overseas expenditure, largely from defence, but also from aid, information and diplomatic costs. Although the actual detail of the cuts still required further work by officials, the broad intention was not to threaten the basic lines of British defence and foreign policy. Rather, the cuts were only supposed to speed up the reductions mooted as the outcome of the Defence Review. In particular, they took advantage of what appeared to be an earlier than expected winding down of Confrontation, which thus allowed reductions in Southeast Asia to proceed faster than originally intended. The Cabinet approved these measures. It agreed not to push further, on the grounds that this would compromise the Government’s defence and foreign policies. There is some hint, however, that there was at least some pressure in the Cabinet for further cuts, for in the compromise wording the Cabinet agreed that the cuts had to be ‘at least’ £100 million.⁷⁸ George Brown was open in his dissent. He had threatened to resign at various points during the crisis, though he had been dissuaded by the argument that so public a breach would undermine the Government’s ⁷⁶ PRO: T 230/773: memcon, James Callaghan and Henry Fowler, 15/7/1966. ⁷⁷ For more on the political crisis and alleged leadership plot, see Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 252–8; Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, pp. 569–77; Castle, Diaries, pp. 69–76. ⁷⁸ PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)36th Meeting, 14/7/1966.


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measures completely and precipitate even greater attacks on sterling. He told Barbara Castle that Wilson was too much in thrall to the Americans and President Johnson, and thus would neither devalue sterling nor abandon ‘East of Suez’. In Brown’s opinion, ‘both these have got to go’.⁷⁹ The emergency measures adopted by the Government were sufficient to shore up the country’s economic position, at least in the short term. Moreover, the sterling crisis marked a significant turning point in the process which led to Britain’s eventual withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. This is not to say that the British presence was immediately threatened in the wake of the crisis. On the contrary, while the defence cuts planned in response to the crisis would have reduced the British presence in Southeast Asia, they fell a long way short of eliminating it. Indeed, there was substantial hope and belief within the Government that the measures would be sufficient to prevent a similar crisis recurring in the future. Certainly, Wilson was sufficiently secure to continue to commit his government ‘East of Suez’ when he visited Washington later in the month. However, the sterling crisis instigated a number of changes in the British policy process which would have profound implications later on for the dissolution of Britain’s Southeast Asian role. The first change was in personnel. Having diverged fundamentally from the Prime Minister and Chancellor on economic policy, George Brown could no longer remain Secretary for Economic Affairs: thus he was moved to the Foreign Office in the middle of August 1966. Brown’s pro-European and anti-‘East of Suez’ inclinations were well known and had been thoroughly aired during the sterling crisis. Though Brown changed portfolio because of disagreements on economic policy, rather than in order to facilitate a change in foreign policy, his presence in the Foreign Office would later assist the movement away from Britain’s Southeast Asian commitments. Certainly, Brown was not shy in letting his preferences be known from the beginning. Within a week of his appointment, the Treasury observed to its pleasure that Brown was ‘insisting on re-examining the fundamental policy assumptions’ and demanding ‘that the arguments for maintaining our presence, influence etc in the Far East have real substance’.⁸⁰ ⁷⁹ Castle, Diaries, p. 75. ⁸⁰ PRO: T 225/2714: C.S. Bennett to M.G.F. Hall: ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee: Defence Review Working Party’, 16/8/1966.

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The other major consequence of the July 1966 sterling crisis was to signal that the consensus within the Government on the direction of British foreign policy was starting to dissolve. As shown in previous chapters, senior ministers and their departments had all been broadly in agreement on policy up to and beyond the February Defence White Paper. All had supported the plans to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore to Australia, as had been crafted in the Defence Review. And all had been willing to modify these plans in the face of strong US and allied opposition. Under the pressure of the sterling crisis, however, this consensus began to break down. As described earlier, both James Callaghan and George Brown were willing to entertain sharp defence cuts as a means of stemming an immediate economic crisis, and were prepared to bring them to the Cabinet without informing or consulting the Defence or Foreign Secretaries. It appears that this plan had been proposed partly because it was one of the few measures on which Callaghan and Brown could agree. But it also signalled that the economic ministers and their departments were no longer prepared to accept without question the political departments’ definition of the necessary extent of Britain’s defence role. From this point on, the economic departments—especially the Treasury—became much more vigorous in pursuing tighter defence expenditure, rather than accepting Foreign and Commonwealth Office assurances that Britain’s position was already at the minimum acceptable to the allies. There was no longer a consensus within the British Government on how the conflict between Britain’s economic and political interests should be reconciled. A growing disagreement between the economic and political departments—augmented by the differing personalities of their ministers—would persist from this moment right through to the ultimate decisions to withdraw. In the face of Britain’s recurring crises, officials within the United States began openly questioning whether they should continue pressing Britain to maintain its multiple roles. Would it be better in the end for the US to bite the bullet and concede a British withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ in order to help cure the country’s economic problems and avoid the worldwide repercussions of a currency crash? Given the extreme fragility of NATO, with French withdrawal now compounded by German political and financial difficulties, would it be better for Britain’s energies to be concentrated within Europe? Or would a British withdrawal from Southeast Asia irremediably weaken the American


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position in Vietnam, implying that this role should be maintained at almost any cost? Johnson Administration officials were deeply divided on the issue. Under-Secretary of State George Ball undertook the most radical rethinking of US policy. In a memorandum notable both for its length and its distance from current policy—presaging his departure from the Administration shortly thereafter—Ball argued that it was time to accept Britain’s reduced status as a middle European power. Britain should no longer live beyond its means: it should abandon its nuclear deterrent, give up the leading role of sterling, join the EEC, and eventually withdraw from its role ‘East of Suez’. While the US should not encourage this withdrawal, argued Ball, neither should it seek to prevent it, for such an attempt would exact an ‘exorbitant price’.⁸¹ The American public did not see the UK as essential to the US role in East Asia, and US attempts to prevent withdrawal would prove ‘a vain effort to alter the inevitable’.⁸² The views of other senior US officials were decidedly mixed. Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State and now adviser to the President, agreed that Britain’s European role should be the first priority.⁸³ National Security Advisor Francis Bator argued that while Ball’s longterm vision was essentially correct, in the short term the proposals were politically unworkable. Moreover, he questioned whether a Britain without ‘East of Suez’ would encourage Europe to a greater world role: ‘A little England going into Europe is likely to favour a policy of little Europe once she is in’.⁸⁴ Treasury Secretary Fowler argued that a strong British economy and stable pound should be first priorities for both the UK and US. If the US forced Britain to maintain its Southeast Asian role, this would ‘either cost us a weak Britain and a great deal of balance of payments money or . . . a weak Britain and an eventual devaluation of sterling’.⁸⁵ Either course would be ‘disastrous for [the] dollar’.⁸⁶ The UK would not maintain a policy at the behest of the US unless the latter paid for it, Fowler noted, but ‘I do not think we ⁸¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: George Ball to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Harold Wilson’s Visit—the Opportunity for an Act of Statesmanship’, 22/7/1966. ⁸² Ibid. ⁸³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The pound, the Dollar and What We Want from Harold Wilson’, 14/7/1966. ⁸⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, 26/7/1966. ⁸⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The sterling Crisis and the US Bargaining Position vis-à-vis the UK’, 18/7/1966. ⁸⁶ Ibid.

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can afford the price’.⁸⁷ But the two most senior officials charged with defence and foreign policy were of a decidedly different view. Defence Secretary McNamara thought it ‘absolutely essential’ that Britain stay in Southeast Asia, for any pullout would fatally undermine the US in Vietnam.⁸⁸ Dean Rusk agreed, though he feared that the British did not ‘have it in them to stick it out’.⁸⁹ The argument was decided by President Johnson in late July, at a leadership meeting called to prepare for an upcoming visit of Prime Minister Wilson. At the meeting, Rusk and McNamara insisted that, for the sake of Vietnam, Britain had to be induced to remain ‘East of Suez’. Fowler argued that there was a basic conflict in US objectives: it was not possible for Britain to sustain major military roles in Europe and Asia while maintaining its economic health. President Johnson was little interested in such arguments. He bluntly stated, ‘I want them East of Suez, on [the] Rhine, and solvent’.⁹⁰ Secretary Fowler warned that ‘if we take [the] ‘‘hard line’’, we’ll pay the price’.⁹¹ Burdened with the problems of Vietnam, however, Johnson refused to entertain any other possibilities: ‘[we] don’t want to face up to [a British] pull-out right now’.⁹² Fortunately for President Johnson, Harold Wilson did not present him with any such ultimatum when he visited at the end of July 1966. Instead, he appeared keen to impress the President with the solidity of the British position. Even before Wilson had arrived, Foreign Office officials had told the State Department that ‘the hard decision has been made—that the UK will go ahead with its commitments’.⁹³ At his meetings with the President on 29 July, Harold Wilson offered unconditional assurances that Britain would remain ‘East of Suez’, would not devalue the pound, and would continue to support US policy in Vietnam. The American record noted with some surprise that Wilson ‘did not—repeat not—ask for any aid for sterling nor . . . for a commitment of aid in the future. The question did not come up.’⁹⁴ ⁸⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The sterling Crisis and the US Bargaining Position vis-à-vis the UK’, 18/7/1966. ⁸⁸ Ibid. ⁸⁹ Ibid. ⁹⁰ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Henry Fowler et al., Washington, DC, 22/7/1966. ⁹¹ Ibid. ⁹² Ibid. ⁹³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: memcon, William Bundy and Dennis Greenhill, ‘Prime Minister’s Agenda for His Talk with the President on Southeast Asia’, 28/7/1966. ⁹⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Background Talking Points on your Meeting with Harold Wilson Today’, 29/7/1966. Emphasis in original.


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Why did Wilson forgo an obvious opportunity to seek American assistance in defraying defence costs? The Prime Minister had a number of reasons for doing so. In pre-summit briefings with the British, US officials had referred to the doubts some felt about the stability of Britain’s position. The continuation of the close Anglo–American relationship, US officials stressed, rested on Wilson’s ability to convince Johnson that his government ‘had all the threads of the situation in their hands’.⁹⁵ This would help ‘restore the President’s shaken confidence in the reliability of Britain as an ally’.⁹⁶ There was also, however, a more fundamental reason why Wilson could not seek assistance from Johnson at the July 1966 leadership meeting. The Prime Minister was visiting Washington only a week after the announcement of his government’s massive deflationary package to bolster the pound. If he were to ask President Johnson for financial assistance now, it could, in the words of British officials, have ‘arouse[d] suspicion that we have lost faith in our recent measures’.⁹⁷ If the suspicion developed on the financial markets that the Government’s package had been inadequate, the consequences for the British economy would have been disastrous. Wilson’s confident stand in the US did not go unnoticed back at home. Barbara Castle noted that the Prime Minister seemed in a different mood in Washington: firm on remaining ‘East of Suez’ and firm on backing the US. In return, Johnson’s support for Wilson seemed to bolster the latter’s credibility in the financial markets. But it all came with a political cost, noted Castle: ‘No wonder the Left now hate Harold!’⁹⁸ The Americans themselves were satisfied with the British position. While before the sterling crisis, as noted earlier in the chapter, they had hoped that the British might be persuaded to redeploy their postConfrontation forces elsewhere in Southeast Asia, these expectations had been lowered in the wake of the crisis. The Australians heard that while Dean Rusk still believed that Britain had a ‘moral obligation’ to contribute further in Southeast Asia, Lyndon Johnson was ‘more relaxed’.⁹⁹ He was content with the size of British troop reductions, providing they were not timed to appear like a ‘scuttle’.¹⁰⁰ Moreover he ⁹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1262: John A. Thomson, ‘The Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington’, 18/7/1966. ⁹⁶ Ibid. ⁹⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1262: John Stevens to Sir Patrick Dean, 25/7/1966. ⁹⁸ Castle, Diaries, p. 80. ⁹⁹ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, ‘Ending of Confrontation’, tel. 3212, 11/8/1966. ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

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was ‘anxious’ to preserve the traditional Anglo–American relationship: he valued Wilson’s support on Vietnam and would be satisfied with a substantial British presence ‘East of Suez’, but would not press hard for any greater British involvement in Southeast Asia.¹⁰¹ A degree of self-interest motivated the American position. As the Australians noted, if the US were to push the British for any more, the latter’s bargaining leverage would increase substantially. Confident though Wilson may have seemed in Washington, back at home there was continuing pressure on the Government’s defence policy. Economically, while the immediate sterling crisis had eased, the Treasury was doubtful about Britain’s economic prospects, and demanded that further measures be taken to shore up the country’s position. It was increasingly concerned that a failure to check Government expenditure was undermining efforts to rein in the balance of payments.¹⁰² Politically, George Brown, as the new Foreign Secretary, was personally keen to see a further review of the country’s defence and foreign policies. Though the Foreign Office resisted Brown’s lead, the strength of the Treasury and its economic warnings alone were sufficient to convince the Government to initiate new Defence Expenditure Studies at the end of October 1966. In mid-August 1966, Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan wrote to Denis Healey asking that further studies be undertaken on how defence spending might be reduced. He noted that such studies were necessary given that the Cabinet had decided to examine further cuts to public expenditure overall. Thus he expected that the MOD would aim to find means to reduce the defence budget by £150 million for 1970/1.¹⁰³ The Ministry of Defence was said to be ‘bowled over’ by the Chancellor’s letter.¹⁰⁴ They had not yet worked out how to bridge the gap between the final £2,060 million budget at which the Defence Review had arrived and the £2,000 million target. Nor had officials yet identified the additional £100 million of foreign expenditure cuts ¹⁰¹ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, ‘Ending of Confrontation’, tel. 3212, 11/8/1966. ¹⁰² Alec Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s: A Treasury Perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 156ff. ¹⁰³ PRO: PREM 13/802: James Callaghan to Denis Healey, 11/8/1966. ¹⁰⁴ PRO: FO 371/190820: G.G. Arthur to C.M. MacLehose, ‘New Defence Economies’, 18/8/1966.


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agreed by the Cabinet during the sterling crisis. Now they were being set a new budget goal of £1,850 million. Denis Healey was firm in his response to the Chancellor. While he agreed to undertake the requested exercise, he would only treat it as a contingency plan and would not ‘regard [himself] as in any way committed to reductions below the Defence Review levels’.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, he refused to follow the Treasury’s preferred schedule: ‘the last Defence Review took some 18 months; we can hardly hope to do a new one properly in a few weeks’.¹⁰⁶ Privately, the MOD was deeply sceptical that it would be able to achieve the proposed cuts without some major readjustment to Britain’s foreign policy. Healey asked for four possible cuts to be examined: complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia; severe reductions in Europe, leaving only token forces; cuts to research and development; and assembling minor reductions from all areas. They doubted that the last course would be feasible, and hence a foreign policy reorientation appeared most likely.¹⁰⁷ The Foreign Office, however, was deeply concerned that any cuts implemented in this way would lead to ‘the most serious difficulties in external policy’.¹⁰⁸ The British Government had only very recently reassured its allies of its continuing determination to maintain its worldwide role and commitments. It would be impossible for it to go back on its word ‘without losing our credit everywhere’.¹⁰⁹ George Brown, as the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, exhibited rather fewer qualms than his department. He agreed with the Chancellor that a further examination of defence costs was a ‘necessary exercise’.¹¹⁰ He appeared to take the exercise more as an opportunity to re-evaluate foreign policy than a threat. He suggested to Healey that it would allow the ‘re-opening [of] various questions not fully thought through in the Defence Review’.¹¹¹ Clearly the questions Brown had in mind related to Britain’s Southeast Asian presence. To the Prime Minister, he posed the question whether Britain’s ‘eventual objective . . . should [be to] get right out of Southeast Asia’.¹¹² He stressed his agreement with the Chancellor that cutting back overseas defence expenditure was ¹⁰⁵ PRO: PREM 13/802: Denis Healey to James Callaghan, 16/8/1966. ¹⁰⁶ Ibid. ¹⁰⁷ Arthur to MacLehose, ‘New Defence Economies’. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid. ¹⁰⁹ Ibid. ¹¹⁰ PRO: FO 371/190820: N.M. Fenn to Sir Bernard Burrows, ‘New Defence Economies’, 20/8/1966. ¹¹¹ PRO: FO 371/190820: C.M. MacLehose to G.G. Arthur, ‘The £1,850 m. Exercise’, 19/9/1966. ¹¹² PRO: PREM 13/1454: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, 3/9/1966.

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essential, but argued that Europe should be spared, with the cuts falling elsewhere.¹¹³ So manifest were his European preferences that the Prime Minister moved to restrain him. In the lead-up to Brown’s first US visit as Foreign Secretary, American officials received from Wilson the ‘unusual request that we enlighten Brown on the importance of Britain’s world role and thus hopefully dampen his enthusiasm for Europe’.¹¹⁴ The Americans did not respond to the request, noting that to do so might encourage the British to reduce their responsibilities in Europe and NATO. Not only was the Prime Minister resisting the direction George Brown was taking. Parts of the Foreign Office also refused to follow his lead. Officials repeatedly questioned the political acceptability and practicality of attempting to withdraw from Southeast Asia completely by 1970/1. Senior officials argued that it would be a ‘useless waste of time’ to study the option unless it was clear that the Government really wished to exercise it, despite the fact that ‘it would be totally contrary to a large number of statements of assurance given by British Ministers, including particularly the Prime Minister’.¹¹⁵ Instead, they recommended less drastic and damaging measures be taken. They noted that the main foreign policy justification for Britain’s Southeast Asian presence—to maintain relations with the ANZUS powers—did not specify a precise minimum level for these forces. With Confrontation now formally over, the Government could cut British forces in Southeast Asia to the level it could afford. The only catch came with Britain’s commitment to Malaysia and Singapore, a commitment impossible to avoid if any British presence in the two countries was retained. But this presence was only maintained at the Australian Government’s insistence, and thus if the level of forces Britain could afford were below the level that the commitment required, the British could reasonably insist that the Australians bridge the gap. British officials acknowledged that negotiating such a policy would require the Government ‘to be tough and stay tough: it would take a lot of nerve’.¹¹⁶ But this seemed the best way to achieve reductions while maintaining Britain’s main overseas interests. ¹¹³ PRO: T 225/2714: F.E. Figgures to A.J.C. Edwards, 7/9/1966. ¹¹⁴ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2786: John Leddy to Dean Rusk, ‘Wilson’s Desire that We Brainwash Brown’, 13/10/1966. ¹¹⁵ PRO: FO 371/190821: Sir Bernard Burrows to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 30/9/1966. ¹¹⁶ PRO: FO 371/190821: G.G. Arthur, ‘The £1,850m Exercise’, 6/10/1966.


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A final point of pressure on the Government’s defence policy developed in mid-October 1966 when the Working Party on Overseas Expenditure reported back to ministers. This body had been charged with detailing the £100 million of savings in overseas defence expenditure which, as discussed earlier, had been agreed by the Cabinet to stem the July sterling crisis. It was now apparent that the Working Party had fallen far short of its goal. It had not been able to find even half of the expected savings: it saved only £19 million of the expected £43 million from accelerating the Defence Review reductions, and only £45 million of the expected total of £100 million.¹¹⁷ The reasons for the shortfall were logistical. It was simply not physically possible to reduce British forces quickly enough to achieve the desired savings. Officials were glum on the prospect of managing any further savings. They noted in their draft report that ‘several difficult and unpalatable decisions will be required if we are even to get nearer to the target, let alone achieve it’.¹¹⁸ Curiously, they dropped this suggestion of a need for radical policy change in their final report to the ministers on OPD. This was possibly because officials were all too aware of the domestic political pressures on the Government to retrench British forces radically. Certainly, the tenor of their advice elsewhere suggested that many, especially within the political departments, preferred a more incremental approach. Whatever the reasons, in their final report to ministers, the Working Party simply noted that, though they had found only limited savings, there was ‘little scope for further economies on the basis of the Defence Review force levels’.¹¹⁹ They implied that officials recognized that further reductions in defence commitments were necessary, but were unwilling to push the Government in too radical a direction. On 22 October 1966, a small group of senior ministers met once again at Chequers to discuss defence and foreign policy. The question for consideration was whether and how to push ahead with further studies on defence reductions to achieve the Treasury’s new budget target of £1,850 million. The main paper for discussion was written by the Foreign Office. Once again, Foreign Office officials emphasized that if cuts on the scale proposed by the Treasury led to a withdrawal from Europe or ‘East of Suez’, it would ‘undermine the structure and purpose of our present ¹¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/73: OPD(O)(66)(O)(E)4, 7/10/1966. ¹¹⁸ Ibid. ¹¹⁹ PRO: CAB 148/73: OPD(O)(66)(O)(E)7, ‘Government Expenditure Overseas’, 18/10/1966.

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foreign policy’.¹²⁰ Withdrawing from Germany would have ‘disastrous political consequences’, while withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be a ‘complete reversal of the present Government’s international policy’ and would contradict the undertakings it had ‘repeatedly and publicly given to our American allies and Commonwealth partners’.¹²¹ Thus, the Foreign Office recommended that there be studies of more limited reductions across the range of international policy: one third in Europe, and a half in Southeast Asia, as well as cuts in administration and research and development. Such cuts might not succeed in reaching the budget target of £1,850 million which the Chancellor had proposed, but they would make substantial progress toward that goal, and given the major interests that would be threatened by further cuts, ‘the foreign policy case for not going further will be very strong indeed’.¹²² At Chequers, Defence Secretary Denis Healey took the lead. He backed the Foreign Office’s case, noting that reductions even on that limited scale would likely ‘involve considerable difficulties’ with Britain’s allies.¹²³ Nevertheless this would be less problematic than if the Government attempted to withdraw entirely from a theatre—inevitably Southeast Asia—which would be ‘a major reversal in our foreign policy . . . caus[ing] critical difficulties’.¹²⁴ In the official record, Foreign Secretary George Brown was noted as briefly supporting Healey’s position. However, Richard Crossman recorded in his diary a rather different version of events. Brown, according to Crossman, was rather too drunk after dinner to contribute meaningfully to the discussion. Instead, all through Healey’s presentation, he shouted: But you just said something different to me last time, Denis. What do you really mean? Is there no cut in commitments? How can you make such an enormous cut without demanding something of me as Foreign Secretary?¹²⁵

Healey’s response, Crossman noted, was to state simply and quietly that no such change in foreign policy was necessary; there would still be sufficient forces to maintain it. Crossman recorded himself as appalled at what seemed to him an attempt to maintain token forces ‘quite unable to fulfil any of the precise ¹²⁰ PRO: FO 371/190821: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, ‘1850 Operation: Brief for Ministerial Dinner: Chequers, 22 October’, 19/10/1966. ¹²¹ Ibid. ¹²² Ibid. ¹²³ PRO: CAB 130/301: MISC 129(66)1st Meeting, 22/10/1966. ¹²⁴ Ibid. ¹²⁵ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 85.


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obligations we’ve undertaken’.¹²⁶ He privately thought it ‘so crude, so unskilful—a futile attempt to remain Great Britain, one of the three world powers, while slicing away our defences’.¹²⁷ But the others in the discussion disputed his arguments. Britain’s central commitment to stand by its ANZUS allies in Southeast Asia did not imply any particular level of forces: rather it was the fact of Britain’s presence and its political support which were valued. If the Government reneged on these commitments, it would ‘gravely imperil . . . relations’ with the allies, and this would endanger Britain’s vital interests.¹²⁸ Crossman felt dressed down by the others. He was reminded that he was the newest and most junior member of the senior ministers’ group involved in the discussion, and thus that he ‘must mind [his] tongue especially because [he] couldn’t yet fully understand what was involved’.¹²⁹ The discussion ended with Crossman’s dissent quelled. The meeting concluded that the Government should begin pursuing reductions on the scale proposed by the Foreign Office: one third in Europe, and one half in Southeast Asia, along with other cuts in administration and research and development, with the aim of reaching a budget target of £1,850 million. Only a few months after the publication of the 1966 Defence White Paper, ministers were once again inaugurating a further revision of defence policy. It took less than a year for the Defence Review to dissolve: the process of reopening and revising its conclusions began within eight months after it ended. As this chapter has described, those conclusions—already unstable and contradictory when written—failed to take hold in the immediate period after their publication, and were radically undermined by the sterling crisis of mid-1966. The initial months of the period were supposed to have witnessed progress towards one of the key features of the new British defence policy: greater co-operation between Britain and its allies. For the British Government, co-operation with the ANZUS powers was supposed to express the major relationships which justified the British presence in Southeast Asia; in recognizing the allies’ shared interests, it was supposed to help spread the burden that Britain’s responsibilities in Malaysia and Singapore imposed. But Britain and its allies did not even take the first ¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 86. ¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 87. ¹²⁸ PRO: CAB 130/301: MISC 129(66)1st Meeting, 22/10/1966. ¹²⁹ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 86.

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steps down this path. They were in fundamental disagreement on what strategy should be pursued: whether the West should adopt a posture of forward or peripheral defence in Southeast Asia. What was worse, the disagreement could not even be properly acknowledged or discussed. The British had used some verbal sleight of hand to gain the allies’ assent to talks in the first place, saying that they would stay in Malaysia and Singapore ‘as long as possible’, though hoping that this would not be very long at all. This now meant that they could not so much as mention the strategy of peripheral defence they wished to pursue, for fear of being perceived to have gone back on their word. The allies were no more eager than the British for discussions: the Australians, for fear that they might give the British an opportunity to withdraw voluntarily from Singapore; the Americans, in irritation at any distraction from the pursuit of their war in Vietnam. Thus, no meaningful exchanges ever took place within the quadripartite forum: the notion of allied co-operation was dead before it had even been properly raised. What did this failure between Britain and its allies imply for the British position in Malaysia and Singapore and the eventual decisions to withdraw? From one perspective, not very much. The ANZUS allies might not have committed Britain to a revised role in Southeast Asia, but equally they were doing nothing to force Britain out: on the contrary, their inaction reflected a desire that the British should remain in Southeast Asia more or less exactly as before. This also meant, however, that they missed out on a chance to pin the British down with new co-operative arrangements in the region. They failed to help the British develop a reduced role which might have been more sustainable. And they gained no greater purchase on British policy—an omission they might have subsequently regretted, for, as later chapters will show, the allies became increasingly irrelevant in the decision-making process. At the same time that the possibility of quadripartite co-operation was disintegrating, the British presence in Malaysia and Singapore was undermined on other fronts. As Confrontation wound down, the relationship between Britain and Malaysia became increasingly prickly—a development which, it must be said, the British Government had earlier predicted, and which they now had some reason secretly to encourage. Whether or not they did so is unclear, but certainly it can be said that the tensions added more to the case for the British to withdraw than it did to the case to stay. At home, the enlarged ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party were becoming restive about the Government’s defence policy. While the dissent was fairly easily


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quelled during this period, it foreshadowed a greater revolt with more substantial effects in a year to come. The major watershed of the period, however, was marked by the sterling crisis of July 1966. For defence policy, the immediate effects of the crisis were limited. While the senior economic ministers had sought a cut of £100 million to the cost of overseas defence, the immediate impact of this demand had been deflected by the intervention of Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. Where the crisis did have a more profound effect was in sharpening the conflict between Britain’s economic and political interests, and precipitating a breach between the economic and overseas departments over the direction of future policy. The general consensus within Whitehall that had characterized the Defence Review was now at an end. The Treasury’s policies during that period had failed to free the British economy from its balance of payments difficulties, and these had led only to a succession of sterling crises. Beginning with the massive deflationary package that curbed the July 1966 crisis, the Treasury would now try to pursue a much more rigorous approach to public expenditure. Their new approach was heralded with a demand that the defence budget be reduced again, to fit under an overall ceiling of £1,850 million. The MOD and Foreign Office sought to channel this demand along a course least damaging to the current direction of their policies—though they were not aided in this by the independent politics of George Brown as the new Foreign Secretary. The adoption of the new budget ceiling led to the initiation of a new set of Defence Expenditure Studies, with the aim of reducing costs by a half in Southeast Asia and a third in Europe. With the changed disposition of the major actors—the Treasury less sympathetic to the overseas departments, the Foreign Secretary more independent from his department, and the Parliamentary Labour Party more willing to speak out—this policy process, as will soon be described, would play out very differently from the Defence Review.

5 From Dissent to Revolt: October 1966–April 1967 From October 1966 to April 1967, the British Government secretly developed its plans for reducing British forces further in Southeast Asia. It kept its allies wholly in the dark about this development. Despite the absence of external intervention, however, the policy process did not run smoothly throughout this time. In the first part of the period, from October 1966 until early 1967, officials were charged with finding defence cuts along the lines agreed by ministers at the October 1966 Chequers meeting. The new Defence Expenditure Studies, unlike the Defence Review of 1965, were characterized by infighting between the Treasury and the overseas departments on the direction and extent of the cuts being contemplated. The process of policy review was dramatically derailed in February 1967 when the Government presented its annual Defence White Paper to the House of Commons. Large numbers on the Labour backbenches rebelled and refused to vote in approval of the Paper, which, due to the unfinished state of the Defence Expenditure Studies, proposed no concrete reductions. At the same time, the new defence studies had secretly failed to find sufficient savings to meet the Treasury’s target. The combination of this failure and the hint of a political rebellion in the air caused great alarm amongst senior defence officials. Seeking to head off any further rebellion, they shifted from planning deep but limited reductions, to proposing a complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia, leaving at most a residual presence in Australia. While the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices resisted these plans, Denis Healey and George Brown pushed ahead regardless. Even these deeper cuts were insufficient to satisfy many ministers in the Cabinet, and they were passed only with difficulty in April 1967. In the aftermath of the October 1966 Chequers meeting, Whitehall officials began to prepare studies on further defence reductions. Officials

From Dissent to Revolt: October 1966–April 1967

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from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices began drafting terms of reference for the studies on further defence reductions, with the aim of achieving an annual budget in the vicinity of the Treasury’s stated goal of £1,850 million. They proceeded on the basis which Denis Healey had outlined in the Chequers meeting, namely proposing cuts of a third in Europe and a half in Southeast Asia while maintaining the broad thrust of current foreign policy.¹ While this direction had received the collective approval of ministers at Chequers, it was still questioned in some quarters. The Treasury, in particular, was seeking to lock in substantial defence cuts as part of a renewed strategy, from late 1966 and early 1967, to attack the structural problems of the British economy: endemic low growth, high public expenditure, and a fragile balance of payments.² With the pursuit of this strategy in mind, officials within the Treasury privately hoped, and were beginning to manoeuvre, for a more drastic reorientation of foreign policy. Treasury officials saw two risks arising from the plans to cut forces without changing foreign policy commitments. On the one hand, there was a risk that the Government might be forced to maintain expensive forces at home, as reinforcement for these commitments. Clearly the Treasury would have to guard against this possibility if it were to achieve the full extent of the savings it desired. On the other hand, the Government might, after planning its cuts to forces, discover itself unable to meet its commitments adequately, and this would compel it to withdraw completely from a theatre—a path which offered the possibility of substantial and permanent budget savings. Thus, Treasury officials began to push discreetly for such an eventuality: ‘the Overseas Departments could be induced, consciously or unconsciously, to embrace it’.³ Treasury officials saw ‘one of the unacknowledged objects’ of the new Defence Expenditure Studies as getting the political departments, ‘nudged by the Chancellor’, to reorient British foreign policy—though this would more likely come about by inducing a ‘Ministerial reaction to outside events rather than as a result of deliberate prior decision’.⁴ Obviously, there were enormous political risks if the Treasury were seen ¹ ² ³ ⁴

PRO: CAB 148/68: OPD(O)(66)19th Meeting, 24/10/1966. Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s, pp. 159ff. PRO: T 225/2716: I.P. Bancroft to G.R. Bell, ‘New Defence Review’, 27/10/1966. Ibid.

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openly to be pushing its own foreign policy, and officials noted that they were entering ‘explosive territory’.⁵ Nevertheless, Treasury officials were prepared to act. When the Defence Review Working Party reconvened to discuss the new studies, the committee initially noted that they had ministerial instructions to assume that there should be no changes to foreign policy because of the planned cuts. Officials from the economic departments, however, were keen to stress that ministers were not yet committed to these assumptions, and might consider other options later on. In particular, the officials pointed out, ‘no decision had been taken to exclude the possibility of a total withdrawal of forces from any overseas theatre or a major redeployment of forces, such as from Singapore to Australia’.⁶ While the pressures for withdrawal were mounting within Whitehall, externally Britain’s allies continued to stress the importance of the country’s overseas commitments. In mid-November 1966, the US ordered US$35 million worth of equipment from the UK in a temporary measure to help offset the foreign exchange cost of British forces in Germany. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow argued to President Johnson that the money should also help ‘further nail Wilson ‘‘East of Suez’’ ’.⁷ Harold Wilson was less keen on this interpretation. When Rostow suggested to Wilson that the US$35 million should be understood as linked to ‘East of Suez’ as well, the Prime Minister demurred. Britain had made no commitments beyond the Defence Review decisions, Wilson stated, to withdraw or not to withdraw.⁸ Through late November and into early December, the Treasury continued to press for a more radical reappraisal of foreign policy. Its officials argued privately that there should at least be a study of withdrawing from Singapore to Australia, so that the option could be considered.⁹ Senior economic officials were openly sceptical about the proposed manner of reductions the MOD and political departments wished to pursue. If the earlier Defence Review had really trimmed Britain’s capabilities to the minimum that its commitments required, ⁵ PRO: T 225/2716: I.P. Bancroft to G.R. Bell, ‘New Defence Review’, 27/10/1966. ⁶ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(66)19th Meeting, 11/11/1966. ⁷ LBJL: Special Head of State Correspondence: United Kingdom: Box 56: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 13/11/1966. ⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: memcon, Walt Rostow, Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, London, 22/11/1966. ⁹ PRO: T 225/2716: I.P. Bancroft to G.R. Bell and A.J.C. Edwards, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 14/11/1966.


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how was it possible to consider further radical cuts without altering foreign policy? The response from the overseas departments was rather fudged: even if Britain’s formal commitments were unaltered, it was argued, they would de facto be reduced if the forces assigned to them were cut back.¹⁰ In early December 1966, the Treasury won a small victory for its cause. Defence Secretary Healey formally presented to senior ministers the proposed reductions which the MOD and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices supported. As before, they involved a one third cut of forces in Europe and a halving of forces in Southeast Asia, but no changes to commitments. Healey argued that it was politically impossible to plan any fundamental change to foreign policy less than a year after the Defence Review, and thus a total withdrawal from any theatre had to be ruled out. James Callaghan and Richard Crossman were both critical of the proposals. Privately, Crossman found the presentation ‘totally and completely unconvincing’.¹¹ He and Callaghan both argued to their senior ministerial colleagues that it was implausible to maintain the current foreign policy on such sharply reduced forces. Either the residual forces would be ‘so small that they might well be ineffective for the ends in view’, or they would require substantial backup in the event of an escalation of conflict.¹² It was desirable to undertake a study of the effects of a complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia so that, even if the choice were not exercised, the Government would know the full range of options available to it. Against the views of the Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries, Callaghan and Crossman won out, and Harold Wilson, in summing up the discussion, agreed that the option of total withdrawal from Southeast Asia should also be examined.¹³ From January 1967, the Defence Review Working Party began examining in detail the various proposed reductions to Britain’s defence forces. Within the Working Party, the tensions between the economic and political departments continued to be played out. The political departments managed to win back some ground against the option of total withdrawal. They argued that it would be impossible to undertake a complete study of this option in the time required, and hence there could only be a shorter study of its political implications.¹⁴ But the effect ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁴

PRO: CAB 148/68: OPD(O)(66)20th Meeting, 15/11/1966. Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 155. PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)48th Meeting, 9/12/1966. PRO: CAB 148/55: OPDO(DR)1st Meeting, 3/1/1967.

¹³ Ibid.

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of this narrower focus, Treasury officials privately complained, would be to highlight the negative political consequences of total withdrawal, while minimizing the economic gains.¹⁵ The political departments, in the Treasury’s view, were seeking to present the option of total withdrawal as a question to be ‘put to Ministers to which the answer ‘‘no’’ is expected and seen to be expected’.¹⁶ On the other hand, the Treasury seemed to be having more success in achieving sharper reductions by stealth. Its officials argued that, rather than openly pursuing cuts to Britain’s commitments, a better strategy would be ‘to get our forces cut to the point where the commitments tend to wither away because we just cannot meet them’.¹⁷ The Treasury’s argument questioning the viability of reduced forces appeared to be having some effect. The permanent head of the Foreign Office, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, openly pondered ‘whether there is a point beyond which reductions become so drastic that you either have not to reduce or to evacuate completely’.¹⁸ This kind of argument caused alarm in the Commonwealth Office. They were all too aware that it was ‘undoubtedly the aim of the [Treasury] to get us into a position in which local dissatisfaction will not make it worth our while to stay’.¹⁹ They felt they were being pushed into the ‘ludicrous position’ where budget restrictions ‘whittled away [the role of British forces] to virtually nothing’, and the justification for the British presence would evaporate.²⁰ Other officials in the Foreign Office tried to rebut the argument. They pointed out that even a token presence was ‘much more advantageous to us politically vis-à-vis the Americans than no presence in the Far East at all’.²¹ Even if the British sharply reduced their forces, the Americans were unlikely to believe that they ‘might as well not be there at all’.²² While the Whitehall departments continued their machinations, the actual work of the Defence Review Working Party was reaching some unsettling conclusions. On their preliminary calculations, they estimated that if the British presence in Southeast Asia were reduced by half, as ¹⁵ PRO: T 225/3054: P. Nicholls to I.P. Bancroft, ‘Defence Policy Supplementary Studies’, 18/1/1967. ¹⁶ PRO: T 225/3054: P. Nicholls, ‘Defence Studies’, 23/1/1967. ¹⁷ PRO: T 225/3054: Nicholls to Bancroft, ‘Defence Policy Supplementary Studies’, 18/1/1967. ¹⁸ PRO: FCO 46/30: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to Sir J. Rennie, ‘Malta and Singapore’, 7/2/1967. ¹⁹ PRO: FCO 24/46: A.H. Reed to Walsh Atkins, 27/2/1967. ²⁰ Ibid. ²¹ PRO: FCO 46/32: R.A. Sykes to R.L.L. Facer, 3/3/1967. ²² Ibid.


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their terms of reference proposed, the net saving would only be about half the £200–300 million target.²³ At the same time, there was little current prospect of any revision of NATO strategy allowing a reduction to British forces in Europe. Moreover, the political departments argued that it would be impossible to get Britain’s allies even to acquiesce to a reduction by half to forces in Southeast Asia in the short term, if the Government tried simultaneously to plan larger long-term savings through either reductions to a minimal presence in Southeast Asia or a complete withdrawal. The Government would have to choose between negotiating immediate but limited savings, or spending more time looking at the possibility of deeper cuts.²⁴ Privately, senior defence figures were deeply concerned at the preliminary findings. At a meeting with his head of department and the Chiefs of Staff, Denis Healey expressed the fear that the Defence Review Working Party was on the ‘wrong track’.²⁵ Its final conclusions were unlikely to find sufficient savings, but by then it would be too late to go back and undertake new studies in time for an expected statement on Government expenditure in July. The Permanent Under Secretary of Defence warned that if the MOD and political departments did not find adequate savings on their own, ‘there would be a serious risk of Ministers [in the Cabinet] deciding somewhat arbitrarily that cuts in defence votes of up to . . . £300m would have to be made’, without even a proper assessment of their implications.²⁶ At the end of February, the British Government published its 1967 Defence White Paper, an occasion which provided a vivid demonstration of the domestic political pressure to make sharper defence cuts. Thanks to the incomplete state of the new Defence Expenditure Studies, the White Paper contained little in terms of policy statements. As Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend noted to the Prime Minister, it was ‘essentially a stalling White Paper’.²⁷ It only discreetly presaged the possibility of defence reductions in the future, noting that the Defence Review was ‘a continuing process’ and that the Government was ‘re-examin[ing] the political, economic, and military implications of our deployment outside ²³ PRO: CAB 148/55: OPDO(DR)9th Meeting, 24/2/1967. ²⁴ Ibid. ²⁵ PRO: DEFE 13/584: Defence Secretary’s Office, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 20/2/1967. ²⁶ Ibid. ²⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1383: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Statement of Defence Estimates—Policy and Planning Sections’, 26/1/1967.

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Europe’.²⁸ Innocuous though the White Paper was, its publication gave the Parliamentary Labour Party the opportunity to vent all its pent-up grievances about the Government’s defence policy. Labour Party restiveness had been increasing all through February, with every Party meeting witnessing backbench criticism of the Government’s support for the US in Vietnam.²⁹ When the Government discussed the White Paper with the Parliamentary Party on 22 February, ministers had to contend with a barrage of criticism. Christopher Mayhew, still the most vocal critic of defence policy, proposed a motion to the Party asking for ‘an earlier and more extensive reduction’ of the country’s ‘East of Suez’ commitments.³⁰ George Brown and Denis Healey succeeded in averting a vote on the motion, instead having it merely noted. This, though, was only achieved after the two ministers had given assurances to the Party that they were pursuing defence reductions as quickly as possible, and were only being delayed in reducing commitments by the time needed to negotiate with allies. A week later, it was clear that the Government had not managed to assuage its critics. The Times reported in the days leading up to the defence vote in the House of Commons that a number of backbench MPs were publicly calling for sharper budget cuts.³¹ Richard Crossman, as Leader of the House, was privately ‘extremely alarmed at [the] mood’ of the backbench.³² He found Labour MPs in the lobbies saying, ‘if we don’t do it this time how can we ever oppose this bloody defence policy?’³³ Though the Chief Whip had been assuring senior ministers that only about 40 backbenchers were likely to abstain in the defence vote, Crossman predicted it could be half as many again. In their opening speeches for the two days of the defence debate, Denis Healey and George Brown sought to placate their critics. Both emphasized once again the Government’s ambition to reduce defence expenditure: ‘We cannot be the policemen of the world’, claimed Healey, ‘and no one in the Government believes that we should go on ²⁸ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967 , Cmnd 3203 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1967), pp. 2–3. ²⁹ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 260, 2/2/1967, 14/2/1967, 16/2/ 1967. ³⁰ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 260, 22/2/1967. ³¹ ‘Tories hope to force split on defence’, The Times, 23/2/1967, p. 2; ‘Rebels move on defence’, The Times, 24/2/1967, p. 2. ³² Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 256. ³³ Ibid., p. 257.


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doing all that we have been doing until now’.³⁴ But, as Healey and Brown pointed out, the Government did not have a completely free hand to reduce defence expenditure as quickly as it liked. It had to be mindful of the interests of the country’s allies, and of the need not to endanger economic and political stability. These points did little to convince the critics. While attempts by the Conservative Opposition to attack the Government were blunted by its muddled position—with some Tories backing the ‘East of Suez’ roles and others wanting cutbacks—a much clearer line of criticism was mounted by Labour’s backbench critics. For the two days of the debate, Labour MPs lined up in the House to criticize the Government’s policies and to ask why, as one backbencher put it, Labour in power was ‘so much like the Tory Government’ in the ‘enormous sums of money’ it spent on defence.³⁵ Speaker after speaker attacked the maintenance of Britain’s worldwide role. The objections were largely economic and strategic. Britain’s overseas defence expenses comprised the major portion of the country’s balance of payments deficit, and the persistence of this deficit hampered the ability of the economy to generate growth. The achievement of Government’s social aims was being threatened by the tight policies it was enforcing—policies which had led unemployment nearly to double in the last six months of 1966, from 300,000 to 500,000.³⁶ At the same time, the critics alleged, the overseas role that the country maintained was too meagre to have a substantial strategic effect. It was a ‘delusion’, as one MP put it, for the country to think it could still act as policeman for the world.³⁷ While he would have agreed with many of the sentiments being expressed, Richard Crossman thought the debate ‘a disaster’ from the Government’s point of view, and despaired at ‘the malaise in the Party that was mounting up’.³⁸ When Healey closed the debate, his speech was continually interrupted by jeers and laughter from Labour’s own ranks.³⁹ Crossman observed that Healey appeared ‘hopelessly out of touch with his own people’.⁴⁰ When the House moved to approve the Defence ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸ ³⁹

Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 742, cols 115, 281ff., 27/2/1967. Ibid., col. 137. Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s, p. 159. Stanley Orme in Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 742, col. 334, 28/2/1967. Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 257. Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 742, col. 400, 28/2/1967; ‘62 Labour rebels on defence’, The Times, 1/3/1967, p. 1. ⁴⁰ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 257.

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White Paper, the Government’s malaise was formally confirmed. The Labour Party’s majority, normally close to a hundred, dropped to just 39, with 62 Labour MPs registering their protest by abstaining from the vote. The result was a major setback for the Government. It was, as US Embassy officials observed, the ‘most massive, back-bench disaffection’ the Government had faced since coming to power.⁴¹ Two days later, the Cabinet met privately to discuss the Labour Party’s problems. Harold Wilson began the meeting, in Crossman’s account, with a statement ‘accusing us all of being out of touch with the backbenchers’.⁴² Ministers were being disloyal and leaking to the press against one another. The Cabinet agreed that the Party needed to regroup, and that discipline should be sharply reimposed. Wilson was quick to act. At the Party meeting that afternoon he gave the rank and file what The Times described as ‘the stiffest and most autocratic dressing down they [had] ever had’.⁴³ Crossman saw the performance as ‘silenc[ing] the critics by smashing them’.⁴⁴ Wilson argued that the backbench had a duty to support the Labour Government, for every MP had been elected for the Party, not as an individual. He threatened, in a phrase that would become notorious, to revoke the Party endorsement of rebel MPs: ‘every dog is allowed one bite, [but a] dog that goes on biting all the time . . . may not get his licence renewed’.⁴⁵ Wilson’s words provoked a storm of public controversy that would persist for weeks. In the wake of the defence vote, there was an immediate and dramatic shift in the temper of the British policy process. Denis Healey and his senior staff were concerned that Cabinet critics of the current defence policy—who had previously been ignored—would now be energized to express their views. Fearful a Cabinet rebellion on defence might force massive and arbitrary cuts in defence, senior MOD staff moved rapidly to sharpen the extent of their own plans for reductions. George Brown and Harold Wilson quickly backed them. Other ministers and officials who sought to adopt a more measured and incremental approach were simply left behind. ⁴¹ ⁴² ⁴³ ⁴⁴ ⁴⁵

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 1/3/1967. Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 259. ‘Prime Minister thrashes Labour rebels’, The Times, 3/3/1967, p. 1. Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 262. ‘Prime Minister thrashes Labour rebels’, The Times, 3/3/1967, p. 1; Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 260, 2/3/1967.


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On 6 March 1967, Denis Healey’s Private Secretary, Patrick Nairne, proposed a new approach to defence reductions. In a private note to Healey, he pointed out the limitations of the Defence Review Working Party. It was evidently not going to find savings on the scale required by the Treasury, and there was ‘little or no chance of [it] producing the ministerial guidance and momentum required’ if a solution was to be found by July.⁴⁶ He argued for a new way of looking at the problem. The Government should accept that it would not be possible in practice to make the full budget cuts by 1970/1. But it should implement those cuts it could as an interim stage to realizing larger savings and a more dramatic cutting of commitments at a later date, say 1975/6. Though Nairne did not say so explicitly, it was clear that such an approach was supposed to help deflect the political pressures for an immediate and drastic cut to defence spending. Healey took up Nairne’s proposal. A week later, on 13 March, he outlined a new schedule for reductions to his most senior officials. Britain should remove all its forces from Malaysia and Singapore by the mid-1970s. It should run down its forces to half strength by 1970/1 and, by 1975, restrict its treaty commitments to Malaysia and Singapore. It was possible that residual sea and air forces might be maintained in Australia, though this might be changed.⁴⁷ Over the next few days, Healey met with Harold Wilson, and then with George Brown and Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden, to discuss the new approach. Ahead of these meetings, officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices made clear to their ministers that they were not enthusiastic about Healey’s new plan. The permanent head of the Commonwealth Office, Sir Neil Pritchard, reminded Bowden of all the problems an early, voluntary withdrawal might bring about: Australia and New Zealand would regard Britain as ‘untrustworthy’, while in Southeast Asia a precipitate move would ‘create chaos’.⁴⁸ Withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore to Australia was ‘not a realistic alternative’, as it would neither meet the concerns of the ANZUS allies nor help Malaysia and Singapore.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Pritchard admitted that a ‘withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia by, say, 1975/6 would not ⁴⁶ PRO: DEFE 13/585: P.D. Nairne to Denis Healey, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 6/3/1967. ⁴⁷ PRO: DEFE 13/585: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 13/3/1967. ⁴⁸ PRO: FCO 24/46: Sir Neil Pritchard to Herbert Bowden, ‘Defence Review—Far East’, 14/3/1967. ⁴⁹ Ibid.

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be a surprise to anyone’.⁵⁰ But he then advised against pursuing this directly. Cutting Britain’s Southeast Asian forces by half ‘should be our maximum target’.⁵¹ Even this would create difficulties with Britain’s allies. Any more would be much more difficult again, and should await a proper assessment. The Foreign Office counselled a similar approach. It argued that if the ultimate goal of a near complete withdrawal were pursued openly and with a rigid timetable, it would be much harder to negotiate with allies. It averred to the British Government’s experiences in Malta and Aden, where the announcement of public timetables for withdrawal had led to civil unrest. A quiet rundown that sped up in later years would be much less likely to provoke disastrous consequences and would be much better placed to achieve ‘the largest net savings’.⁵² While officials within the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices were wary of Healey’s plans, their leading ministers were not all of the same view. Unfortunately, the initial response of the Commonwealth Secretary to Healey’s plan was not recorded. It is clear, however, that George Brown as Foreign Secretary agreed with Healey’s plan and in doing so was prepared to go against his department’s advice. Indeed, he was willing to push ahead even further than Healey. While the latter was willing to concede the political utility of maintaining for ‘some years a small token presence on the mainland of Southeast Asia’, Brown was more sceptical, labelling such a residual presence a ‘tethered goat’.⁵³ Towards the end of March, the Defence Review Working Party finally reported on its attempts to find the target of £200–300 million in defence savings. The Working Party concluded, as expected, that it had been unable to find savings to match the Treasury’s earlier demands. Given the assumption that foreign policy should remain unchanged, even drastic reductions to defence forces could only achieve maximum savings of about £100–125 million.⁵⁴ As MOD staff had predicted, the DRWP was unable to give any firm guidance on what should happen next. None of the departments represented on the Working Party recommended a complete ⁵⁰ PRO: FCO 24/46: Sir Neil Pritchard to Herbert Bowden, ‘Defence Review—Far East’, 14/3/1967. ⁵¹ Ibid. ⁵² PRO: FCO 46/32: R.A. Sykes to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: Interim Report’, 15/3/1967. ⁵³ PRO: FCO 46/32: R.A. Sykes to Sir John Rennie, 17/3/1967. ⁵⁴ PRO: CAB 148/31: OPD(67)22: OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 22/3/1967.


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withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Australia. But beyond that there was no agreement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Offices said that they believed that Britain’s long-term aim should be to withdraw from Malaysia/Singapore to Australia, but then argued that the best tactic to maximize savings would be ‘probably [to] limit our target . . . at this stage to making reductions of about a half’.⁵⁵ To attempt more, given the political situation in Southeast Asia, would attract the opposition of Britain’s allies. The Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs took the opposite tack, arguing that the Government needed to decide to withdraw from Malaysia/Singapore to Australia ‘by a defined date early in the 1970s’.⁵⁶ The MOD argued that its own planning purposes required the naming of a firm date for withdrawal to a minimal presence in Australia, given that all departments already fundamentally agreed that this should be the Government’s ultimate objective. The MOD favoured, along the lines of Healey’s new plan, 1975/6 as a target, with 1970/1 as the halfway mark in reductions. The argument was fleshed out in a paper that Healey circulated privately to the key ministers on OPD. It predicted—in figures which the MOD had not made available to the DRWP—savings of £150–200 million by 1970/1 and up to £300 million by 1975/6 if his plan were adopted.⁵⁷ Not every official was impressed by Healey’s attempt to bounce through his new proposals. The Prime Minister was informed that ‘the Cabinet Office, and particularly Mr Rogers [Chairman of the DRWP], are seething with indignation about [the MOD] paper’, feeling it was ‘somewhat dishonest’ of the MOD to continue working with them on the DRWP studies ‘without telling them that this was in their mind’.⁵⁸ This indignation was made manifest in the Cabinet Secretary’s briefing to the Prime Minister for OPD. He noted it was ‘unfortunate’ that the MOD’s paper had ‘been put forward at the last minute and without any opportunity for interdepartmental discussion’.⁵⁹ He expressed incredulity that OPD was supposed to decide on this option when ‘the political implications . . . have not been examined in even the ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ ⁵⁸

PRO: CAB 148/31: OPD(67)22: OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 22/3/1967. Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/1384: MOD, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967. PRO: PREM 13/1384: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967. ⁵⁹ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967.

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most cursory and preliminary fashion’.⁶⁰ It was neither reasonable nor right that the Government should commit itself to a new defence and foreign policy ‘at less than 24 hours’ notice and two days before Easter’.⁶¹ The Government had to assess interdepartmentally the benefits, risks and consequences of adopting a 1975/6 target for withdrawal before committing itself to such a plan. Michael Palliser, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, counselled a similar course. He emphasized the gravity of the changes being presented: ‘we should be under no illusion that it is anything but the end of Britain’s ‘‘world role’’ ’.⁶² He pointed out that they would also be an abrupt reversal of the policies the Prime Minister had publicly advocated. Though these were not conclusive arguments against change if it was politically and economically right, they were ‘pretty decisive arguments against taking any firm decision now, before everyone disperses for Easter’.⁶³ Whatever the advice of officials, when the ministers in OPD met on 22 March, they were not in the mood to contemplate even a minor delay. Little time was spent discussing the official report from the DRWP, which, as Denis Healey emphasized in his introduction, had failed to find the targeted savings. Instead Healey, who had been allowed to open the discussion by the Prime Minister, focused on his own paper. He underlined the savings that his new proposals would yield: £150–200 million by 1970/1, with half of Britain’s Southeast Asian forces withdrawn; £300 million by 1975/6, with only a minimal presence remaining in Australia. George Brown indicated his assent, stating his ‘general agreement’ with Healey’s proposals.⁶⁴ However, Brown appeared to have given way slightly to his officials’ advice: he expressed reservations on fixing 1975/6 as the firm date for withdrawal and objections to announcing such a date publicly for fear of the consequences. But he put a different spin on his reservations to that of his officials. They had warned that a withdrawal should be contingent on regional stability. He reinterpreted this to suggest that, if the date were flexible and circumstances allowed, Britain might be able to leave Malaysia/Singapore even earlier. Herbert Bowden, as Commonwealth Secretary, spoke more closely to his departmental brief. He was the only minister on OPD even to ⁶⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967. ⁶¹ Ibid. ⁶² PRO: PREM 13/1384: Palliser to Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967. ⁶³ Ibid. ⁶⁴ PRO: CAB 148/30: OPD(67)14th Meeting, 22/3/1967.


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raise the question of how a withdrawal from Southeast Asia would affect Britain’s allies. In doing so he strayed into the Foreign Secretary’s brief, arguing that such a withdrawal would ‘have serious consequences for our relations with the United States and with Australia and New Zealand’.⁶⁵ He obviously sensed a hostile political climate, however, and argued as a fallback that, even if the Government were set on withdrawal by 1975/6, it should delay announcing this for as long as possible. Any premature disclosure, he warned, would ‘cause grave damage to our relations with our allies’.⁶⁶ When OPD moved to open discussion it was clear that ministers were firm in their intent to change British policy sharply, ignoring the concerns expressed in official advice. There was ‘a wide measure of support’ on OPD for Healey’s proposals.⁶⁷ However, the key ministers were not prepared to countenance a complete withdrawal where no residual presence would be retained in Southeast Asia or Australia. Not even the Treasury had been willing to propose this, and when Richard Crossman raised it he was roundly criticized. Britain was bound by honour to Australia and New Zealand, it was claimed, due to ‘the whole course of British history over the last fifty years’, during which these countries had ‘voluntarily joined with us in resisting aggression’.⁶⁸ Though a British presence in Australia might be little more than a token, it would still have ‘intense importance’ for the host.⁶⁹ On the question of whether the Government should fix a firm target date of 1975/6 for withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the committee quickly agreed to the MOD’s argument that for planning purposes this was necessary. On the question of whether this should be announced, there were greater divisions and no agreement was reached. In any case, the ministers agreed that none of these decisions was final until after consultation with Britain’s allies had taken place. This caveat notwithstanding, the ministers on OPD had, at the close of their meeting, fundamentally reoriented Britain’s defence and foreign policies towards a decisive contraction in British power. Only a month before, the planned trajectory of defence policy had been towards a cut by one half in Britain’s Southeast Asian forces but no more than that. After the revelation that these plans would achieve less than half the required savings, and the political jolt provided by the defence vote, ⁶⁵ Ibid. ⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. ⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

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the senior defence and foreign policy ministers had rapidly endorsed a much more fundamental change: aiming for a one half cut by 1970/1, and then almost completely withdrawing by 1975/6. Moreover, the ministers had done so according to a plan that had only been drafted in Denis Healey’s office less than two weeks earlier. A week and a half later the Cabinet was presented with the proposals that OPD had approved. But such was the mood of the wider group of ministers that the plans for retrenchment were sharpened again. In OPD, Richard Crossman had been a minority of one in proposing a complete withdrawal without leaving a residual presence: but in the wider forum of the Cabinet, Crossman found himself in the majority. The Cabinet debate on 4 and 11 April 1967 vividly demonstrated the deep divisions of opinion which existed within the Government. On the one side, expressing the views of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices but alone within the Cabinet, was Herbert Bowden, the Commonwealth Secretary. In the middle were George Brown and Denis Healey, jointly presenting the OPD-approved plans for phased reductions leading to a minimal presence. And on the other side were a host of critics, headed by Roy Jenkins and Richard Crossman, seeking faster reductions and a complete withdrawal. Denis Healey opened the Cabinet discussions with a presentation similar to that which he had given OPD. He noted the failure of the official studies to find adequate savings. He then explained in detail the alternative proposal which he and the Foreign Secretary were putting forward: the reduction of forces in half by 1970/1 and in full by 1975/6 but for a token presence in Australia.⁷⁰ George Brown followed, emphasizing his agreement with both the financial and strategic arguments for reductions. He further pointed out that it would still be difficult to get Britain’s allies to agree to the proposals. He underlined, in a pre-emptive attack on advocates of complete withdrawal, advice he had received from the British Ambassador in Washington: a residual presence in Australia ‘might be crucial to obtaining the acquiescence of our allies’.⁷¹ Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden spoke against Healey and Brown, firmer now in his criticism of the proposals than he had been in OPD. In a separately tabled paper, he argued that Healey and Brown’s ⁷⁰ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 16th Meeting, 4/4/1967. ⁷¹ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967.


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plan was ‘a major reversal’ of Government policies which were only a year old and had been consistently reaffirmed to Britain’s allies.⁷² He stressed that the proposals were very likely to damage relations with Australia and New Zealand and would have ‘very serious’ political and economic effects on Singapore and Malaysia.⁷³ He argued that it would be better if the Government decided only on reductions by half in the near term, leaving a decision on withdrawal for a few years down the track. Nevertheless, Bowden conceded the strength of feeling in the opposite direction. If the Government had to decide now, however, on withdrawal, Bowden asked that three guidelines be adopted: that the Government would act with the clear aim of not ‘creat[ing] a chaotic situation in the Malaysia/Singapore area’; that it would accept the need to grant mitigating aid to both countries; and that it should be full and frank in its consultations with all its allies.⁷⁴ Bowden was altogether right in his sense of the strength of feeling in favour of withdrawal. After the first Cabinet session on the proposals, Sir Burke Trend noted to the Prime Minister that the brief discussions had suggested that ‘some Ministers might find it difficult to give [the proposals] support’ and would push for greater reductions.⁷⁵ This was made manifest in the second Cabinet session. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, was only guarded in his approval, noting that the plans did not achieve adequate savings in 1971 and thus that reductions in other areas should also be considered. Other ministers agreed, pointing to ‘the relatively small savings . . . that would accrue . . . in the lifetime of the present Parliament’.⁷⁶ Some questioned the planned residual presence after withdrawal: would it prevent the Government from cutting back on the hefty cost of equipment, such as the F111? Did the proposals make all that much sense, or would it be ‘more logical to decide to withdraw altogether from the Far East than to maintain a maritime and air presence in Australia’?⁷⁷ Against these arguments it was countered that it would be difficult to gain the acquiescence of Britain’s allies, even with the proposals as they were. ⁷² PRO: CAB 129/128: C(67)41: Herbert Bowden, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 31/3/1967. ⁷³ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967. ⁷⁴ PRO: CAB 129/128: C(67)41: Bowden, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’. ⁷⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 10/4/1967. ⁷⁶ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967. ⁷⁷ Ibid.

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Furthermore, it was simply not logistically possible to make reductions at a much faster rate. In the end, Richard Crossman counted only six clear supporters for the Healey–Brown proposals, with the majority of the Cabinet feeling ‘strongly that the cuts were not radical enough’.⁷⁸ With a substantial proportion of the Cabinet dissenting from the proposals being presented, the Prime Minister had to use his personal authority to swing the policy through. Employing his prerogative to sum up the discussion, Wilson concluded that ‘on balance’, the Healey–Brown proposals could be passed as the basis for consultations with Britain’s allies.⁷⁹ However, in a nod to the critics, these consultations had to ‘leave open for decision in June/July’ the final date for withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore, and whether or not to maintain a residual force.⁸⁰ The outcome was a curious and contradictory fudge. On the one hand, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries had now been given authority to consult with allies on the basis of the Healey–Brown proposals. On the other hand, the door had still been left slightly open for the Cabinet to repudiate these proposals when it came to make final decisions. George Brown complained openly to the Cabinet about the difficult position he was being put in: he was now supposed to negotiate an orderly withdrawal with allies, he noted, knowing full well that ‘most of Cabinet wanted a drastic revision of policy next July’.⁸¹ In the period from October 1966 to April 1967, the consensus of policy-makers on Britain’s future direction dissolved completely. This dissolution had begun in the period before, with the July 1966 sterling crisis, but sharply accelerated from late 1966 to early 1967. After the October 1966 ministerial meeting at Chequers, officials began a process of reviewing Britain’s defence posture, with the aim of reducing forces by a half in Southeast Asia and a third in Europe. In the abstract, this process was similar to the early stages of the Defence Review a year and a half before: a process of interdepartmental policy review, out of sight of Britain’s allies. In practice, though, the Review in late 1966 was very different from that of 1965. No consensus had been reached between departments on Britain’s direction; ⁷⁸ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 308. ⁷⁹ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 481. ⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 308.


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indeed, the Treasury wanted the Review to proceed with completely different assumptions. Thus the Review was marked by disputes between the Treasury, who wanted sharp cuts in Britain’s commitments, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, who sought to block these. The fundamental problem of British foreign policy was out in the open: the conflict between Britain’s economic interests and its need to maintain its relations with its key allies. A full debate on the conflict between Britain’s interests, however, was never held, for any such possibility was overridden by political contingencies. In the February 1967 Defence Vote, the Parliamentary Labour Party dramatically demonstrated its unhappiness with the Government’s slow pace on defence reductions. The Government’s majority in the Commons was reduced to the lowest since the last election. Spurred on by the fear that a further Cabinet rebellion would impose arbitrary cuts, especially as the initial Defence Expenditure Studies had failed to find sufficient savings, the Defence Secretary and his senior staff hastily formulated a new plan for reducing Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia to half by 1970/1, and withdrawing completely, save perhaps for a residual presence in Australia, by the mid-1970s. Healey’s plans gained the quick assent of George Brown, as Foreign Secretary, and further ministerial support on OPD. These plans had not been drafted or approved in terms of any assessment of Britain’s foreign policy interests. On the contrary, they had been put together so hurriedly that the Cabinet Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices had had little notice of them, and no time properly to judge their effects. Healey’s plans for a two-stage withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore went from an initial draft to being approved by OPD in only three weeks, a sharp contrast to the 1965 Defence Review, which had taken more than a year. But when Healey’s plans were presented to the Cabinet, the domestic political pressure that made such urgency necessary was clearly demonstrated. Most of the ministers wanted even more radical defence cuts, and Healey’s proposals were only saved by the Prime Minister’s summing up, which postponed a final Cabinet decision on the details of withdrawal until July. Why did domestic, and in particular Cabinet, political pressures build up so quickly, forcing the Defence Secretary to concede plans for a withdrawal so as to retain a semblance of a defence strategy? Was the widespread dissent regarding the Government’s defence policy connected to the other major policy change of that time, regarding Britain’s role in Europe? Certainly the timing was suggestive. Harold

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Wilson undertook a series of tours to European capitals in early 1967 to gauge support for a second British application to join the EEC. Around the time that the Cabinet was discussing Healey’s proposals for a staged withdrawal from Southeast Asia, in April 1967, it also came to decide in favour of a renewed approach to the Common Market. Yet it must also be observed that none of the official records make any explicit connection between approaching Europe and withdrawing from Southeast Asia—not those from the Cabinet, nor from OPD, nor from any of the overseas departments. The Government had rejected reductions to British forces in Europe because of the fragile state of NATO, not because of its approach to the EEC. None of the Labour MPs who criticized Britain’s overseas defence role in Parliament did so with reference to a new British role in Europe. While some ministers who were sceptical of Britain’s Southeast Asian role were also European enthusiasts—notably George Brown and Roy Jenkins—others, such as Richard Crossman and much of the Labour Left, were critical of both. There appears to have been no generally accepted rule of logic or politics that led from one policy to the other. The more likely reasons for the upsurge of Labour Party dissent appear to lie in the issues publicly mentioned by MPs and ministers. Many of them were clearly dissatisfied with the domestic and economic costs of Britain’s defence role. The Government had been pursuing strict policies at home to help correct the structural imbalances of the British economy, in particular its endemic balance of payments problem. Labour MPs appear to have become increasingly concerned with the growing social effects produced by these strict policies—in their effects on unemployment, and the constraints they imposed on domestic spending. They hoped that a firmer line on defence would allow the domestic effects of the Treasury’s tough policies to be mitigated. At the same time, Labour MPs and ministers in the Cabinet also appear to have been sceptical about the strategic merit of Britain’s continuing role in Southeast Asia. Those who spoke out in the Parliamentary debate thought the role smacked of delusions of grandeur. Those in the Cabinet who critically judged Healey’s proposals were doubtful that residual forces in Australia would have any strategic rationale. Economic and strategic factors, however, had deep roots, and MPs’ and ministers’ concerns about them had been long-standing: they would not be sufficient on their own to explain the precise timing of their changed attitude. One reason for the shift may have lain in an increasing sense of frustration at how the Labour Government appeared to have


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lost its direction ever since the financial crisis in the middle of the previous year. A more basic answer, however, may be found in simple political contingency. Defence policy was rarely the subject of discussion in Parliament: the debate and vote on the annual Defence White Paper were the only major occasions when it assumed centre stage. Tensions in the Cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party on defence policy had existed and had been building for some time, but the defence debate provided the conducting rod through which these tensions could be discharged. With a flash of Parliamentary anger, the political mood was transformed, and a staged withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore went from a distant possibility to a necessary concession to stave off a further revolt. In making these decisions, the Cabinet had fundamentally changed the direction of British foreign policy: from an ambiguous posture implying reductions of an uncertain scale, to the endorsement of a near complete withdrawal of Britain’s military presence from the region. But though the problem of the clash between Britain’s economic and international political interests had thus been effectively settled—without ever having been fully and openly addressed—this did not mean that the debate was over. Rather, as will be shown in the next chapter, the terms of the debate were transformed from military fundamentals—whether or not British forces should be withdrawn—to politics and symbolism—how Britain should withdraw, and what intentions it should retain towards the region in the aftermath.

6 The Battle for Withdrawal: April–July 1967 For four months, from April to July 1967, an intense battle was waged between all the key actors on British defence policy to decide the exact terms of a British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. While, as described in the previous chapter, the Cabinet had provisionally approved Healey’s plans for a staged withdrawal in 1970/1 and 1975/6 as a basis for consultation with Britain’s allies, important issues had still been left open. The Government had not yet decided whether and how there should be an announcement of the plans for a British withdrawal—a sensitive question in terms of both domestic and international politics. And a decision was also needed on whether Britain should retain any military capability in Southeast Asia after its permanent bases had closed. The key debate had changed from whether or not Britain should withdraw, to how to handle the presentation and meaning of that withdrawal: whether it was purely a change, albeit a major one, to troop dispositions, or whether it implied a greater diminution of Britain’s role. This was not an insignificant issue: on the contrary, it struck at the heart of the notion of ‘East of Suez’. Was the Government only modifying the size and kind of forces it was prepared to deploy internationally, or was the ‘world role’ itself dead? To the ANZUS allies, the answer to this question was the test of whether Britain was still politically committed to the Western Alliance in Southeast Asia; to domestic critics, it was an indication of whether the Government’s attitude and outlook had changed to match the country’s diminishing means and interests. All these matters of contention, and the profound effect that decisions on them would have on Britain’s position in the world, meant that the period from April to July 1967 was fraught with unusually sharp conflicts: between the British Government and its overseas allies, between ministers and officials, between departments, and within the Cabinet.

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While these conflicts were dense, complicated and ongoing, they can be broken down into four stages: the initial round of consultations between the Foreign and Defence Secretaries and Britain’s allies; the reaction against the proposals, which succeeded in securing a continuing British military capability in Southeast Asia, even after withdrawal; a second round of consultations, this time between Harold Wilson and other heads of government; and a final period of internal Government debate culminating with the Cabinet decision on withdrawal in early July. The process was formally capped with the Wilson Government’s publication, on 18 July 1967, of a Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy, detailing the terms and conditions of a British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. Through the whole period from October 1966 to early April 1967, while the Wilson Government had been hastily reassessing the direction of its defence policy, the country’s allies had been kept very much in the dark. They had not been told that the Government had reopened fundamental questions on British policy in Southeast Asia, nor were they aware of the hasty revisions of planned policy that had taken place in the wake of the rebellious defence vote in February 1967. The process of consultation only began in April 1967, when George Brown and Denis Healey were dispatched from London for discussions with each of the affected governments. A few weeks before the April consultations began, the allies began to have their first inklings of British intentions. Even then, though, the warning signals were mixed, and US and Australian officials were stymied by a lack of firm information. In late March, the US Embassy reported a conversation with Foreign Secretary George Brown, who ‘appeared to be complaining’ that unless the US gave Britain more assistance, it could no longer shoulder the financial burden of its forces in Malaysia and Singapore.¹ US officials, however, found Brown’s remarks ‘so disjointed that we could not be sure of their precise reference’.² At the beginning of April, the Australian High Commission in London picked up word that Harold Wilson had been mentioning the notion of withdrawing from Singapore.³ There was some suggestion that the backbench revolt over the February Defence White Paper had had a significant impact. High ¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 21/3/1967. ² Ibid. ³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘Britain East of Suez’, tel. 4014, 7/4/1967.

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Commission officials’ diagnosis was that such were the ‘pressures within the Labour Party’ that the British Government would likely ‘want to set a time limit for remaining in Southeast Asia’.⁴ A week later, further news suggested that some sort of move was imminent. The Australians were notified by the British that Denis Healey would be visiting the Far East Command in Singapore from 22 April. While the visit was supposed to be ‘routine’, the subject of defence reductions would be on the agenda. At about the same time, Foreign Secretary George Brown would be giving an account of the British Government’s thinking to the ANZUS allies in Washington.⁵ The Secretary of the Australian Prime Minister’s Department was ‘apprehensive’ about these upcoming events.⁶ He warned Harold Holt that it seemed likely a revised British position would be unveiled either in Washington or Singapore. Moreover, the fact that Healey and Brown were speaking almost simultaneously in the two cities suggested that the British had already reached a ‘cut-and-dried view’: ‘any question of Healey ‘‘discussing’’ the situation disappears if Brown is simultaneously talking in Washington’.⁷ While the Americans were starting to receive similar information, they were more sceptical about its veracity. Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach had been given secondhand reports from a ‘top-level’ British source that the Wilson Government was on the verge of deciding—or had even already decided—to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore. Katzenbach professed ‘some astonishment’ at the news, given that in recent meetings George Brown had left no such impression.⁸ He wondered whether the reports were true, or whether his source had just been exposed to some of George Brown’s ‘mood music’.⁹ Robert McNamara was of a similar frame of mind. He told Australian External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck that he saw no reason for the sudden rush of rumours. He could not believe that Denis Healey and George Brown would simply walk away from all the assurances they had given him.¹⁰ ⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘Britain East of Suez’, tel. 4014, 7/4/1967. ⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: J.C. Morgan to Sir John Bunting, 14/4/1967. ⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: Sir John Bunting to Harold Holt, 14/4/1967. ⁷ Ibid. ⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Nicholas Katzenbach to US Embassy in London, 12/4/1967. ⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 1543, 17/4/1967.


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US Embassy officials in London were similarly perplexed. On the one hand, George Brown had been dropping a number of hints recently, and there was ‘considerable evidence’ that British staff had been working on how to shrink drastically the defence budget, ‘at least on a contingency basis’.¹¹ On the other hand, US officials had received no corroborating information from regular channels, while Denis Healey appeared still firm in his commitments. Moreover, there was no immediate economic crisis to compel a sudden change in policy.¹² The British Government’s recent painful experience in Malta, where an early military withdrawal had had to be abandoned after its announcement provoked local civil unrest, suggested that the Government would not court a similar débâcle ‘East of Suez’. Perhaps George Brown, whose taste for personal diplomacy sometimes led him to act without consulting staff or colleagues, was ‘launching a trial balloon . . . just to test the air’.¹³ But even this the Embassy found unlikely. US officials concluded that if there existed any plans to withdraw, the British ‘have been at considerable pains to keep them from us. But we don’t think there are’.¹⁴ The Embassy was wrong. In the early hours of 18 April 1967, while George Brown was flying to Washington for a SEATO conference, the US Ambassador in London rushed through a warning that Brown was carrying bad news. While he doubted that any final Cabinet decisions had been made, Ambassador Bruce reported that key UK ministers had agreed to speed up defence reductions, aiming at ‘complete withdrawal [from Malaysia and Singapore] by the mid-1970s’.¹⁵ He observed, with the benefit of hindsight, that there had been clear signs of an impending shift in policy. There had been ‘deliberate leaks’ to the newspapers presenting the issue in stark terms—including a prominent report in the Sunday Times that major decisions were imminent.¹⁶ Both American and Australian officials had detected that anti-‘East of Suez’ ministers were providing encouragement to dissenting backbench MPs: ‘keep [the pressure] up’, those ministers had been saying; ‘you’re getting ¹¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘British Position East of Suez’, 14/4/1967. ¹² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Foy Kohler to Dean Rusk, ‘British Presence East of Suez’, 14/4/1967. ¹³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Bruce to Rusk, ‘British Position East of Suez’, 14/4/1967. ¹⁴ Ibid. ¹⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘UK East of Suez’, 18/4/1967. ¹⁶ Sunday Times, 16/4/1967.

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results’.¹⁷ The main point of uncertainty, the US ambassador stated, was the question of how resolute the British were in their intentions. Would the British avoid too sharp and explicit a change in policy if the Americans and Australians were prepared to provide sufficient financial and military assistance? Or were they already set on a dramatic policy shift so as to achieve the greatest domestic political advantage? The answer became a little clearer that morning. On his arrival in Washington, George Brown finally opened his Government’s formal consultations with its allies on the planned defence reductions. He began with a hectic series of meetings with senior representatives of each government: Dean Rusk at breakfast, then New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, next Robert McNamara, and finally Australian External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck at lunch the following day. At each meeting George Brown presented the same arguments. The British economic situation had forced the Government to look once again at its spending. It intended to issue a statement in July, detailing new civil and defence cuts. The Government was acting now to explain these plans to all the relevant allies, so that their views could be taken into account. The plans essentially consisted of a two-stage withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, with forces reduced to half by 1971, and withdrawn altogether by the mid-1970s. It was possible that the British Government might retain a minimal presence in Australia, although, Brown noted, he was under strict instructions from the Cabinet not to make any commitment to this effect. While the plans had been forced by economic circumstance, Brown explained, the British Government also thought they made political sense. By the mid-1970s, ‘white faces on the mainland [of Asia] would be increasingly a liability’ and so it would be sensible to start planning now for their departure.¹⁸ All of the ANZUS allies reacted against the British proposals, but the strength and focus of their immediate replies differed considerably. The Americans were the most restrained, responding with deep reservations though not outright disapproval at the British proposals. Dean Rusk expressed ‘considerable concern’ that the British were planning withdrawals while the Vietnam War was going on.¹⁹ He was also worried about the responsibility for Malaysian security, something the United ¹⁷ Sunday Times, 16/4/1967; NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: T.K. Critchley to Gordon Jockel, tel. 4607, 20/4/1967. ¹⁸ PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Dean Rusk, Foy Kohler, John Leddy, William Bundy, et al., Washington, DC, 18/4/1967. ¹⁹ Ibid.


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States would not be willing or able to pick up. Robert McNamara stated that it would be ‘disastrous’ if the British walked away from their security commitments.²⁰ A minimal British presence in Australia would be useless, Rusk commented further, unless it were committed to Malaysia and SEATO, not simply the defence of Australia. However, neither Rusk nor McNamara, as George Brown privately noted to the Foreign Office, expressed any ‘objection in principle to our leaving the mainland’.²¹ Their initial concerns were largely focused on the fate of Malaysia’s security, a point on which Brown sought to reassure them by noting that AMDA would continue, albeit with revised clauses on its implementation. While the Americans had responded with concern but restraint to the British proposals, the initial reactions of Australia and New Zealand were much sharper. Keith Holyoake’s immediate response to Brown was to call the proposals ‘a very disappointing shock’.²² Paul Hasluck stated bluntly that he ‘disagreed fundamentally’ with the ‘white faces’ argument.²³ Both Holyoake and Hasluck firmly expressed the view that a British presence in Australia would be no adequate substitute for the loss of the Singapore base. The Australian Government, continued Hasluck, was ‘bound to deplore’ an action that would compromise the security of the entire region.²⁴ When Brown pointed out that the British withdrawal would not take place for several years, Hasluck and Holyoake each countered with the claim that a decision to withdraw would damage confidence and security as soon as it was taken. In the face of Australian opposition, Brown issued a stark warning: Australia should not react ‘too hastily or too violently’, for Brown and Healey had had to fight hard in Cabinet for even the possibility of maintaining any residual role.²⁵ If Australia was ‘uncompromising and unconstructive [in its] attitude’, then Brown feared that ‘those elements in Cabinet would triumph who wanted to abandon completely a British role East of Suez’.²⁶ ²⁰ PRO: FCO 46/54: George Brown to FO, ‘Force Reductions in Far East’, tel. 1248, 18/4/1967. ²¹ Ibid. ²² PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Keith Holyoake et al., Washington, DC, 18/4/1967. ²³ PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Paul Hasluck et al., Washington, DC, 19/4/1967. ²⁴ Ibid. ²⁵ NAA: A4940/1, C4626: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 1585, 20/4/1967. ²⁶ Ibid.

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To the Foreign Office and Harold Wilson back at home, George Brown telegraphed his assessment of the allies’ initial reactions to the British proposals. He noted that the Australians had taken them ‘harder than any of the others’.²⁷ Hasluck had been ‘reluctant to accept any of the arguments’ for withdrawal, and, when asked for a constructive opinion, had only ‘continue[d] with emotional arguments’.²⁸ Nevertheless, Brown concluded that even the Australian ‘reactions were much as we had expected’.²⁹ He warned, though, that the Australians would ‘clearly talk to the others concerned and try to organise them against us’.³⁰ Brown’s assessment was probably accurate, for by the next day, when all four allies met together, the US position had shifted somewhat closer to the Australians and New Zealanders. Rather than concentrating heavily on the future of Malaysian defence as they had a few days before, the Americans picked up on some of the issues which concerned the others. Rusk and Holyoake jointly challenged George Brown on the ‘white faces’ argument. Many East Asians, Rusk pointed out, would prefer ‘friendly Whites to hostile Chinese’.³¹ Holyoake took issue with the argument’s implication that ‘newer countries’, such as Australia and his own, ‘would be even less welcome’.³² All the ANZUS allies spoke of the risks a change of British policy would provoke. Malaysia, Rusk suggested, might be sufficiently unnerved by its uncertain future so as to ‘come to terms with Peking’.³³ He feared that a shift in the British position would lead to a ‘chain reaction’ throughout the region.³⁴ In response, Brown countered that Western influence in Southeast Asia would be more enhanced than impaired if it were made less vulnerable to attack by anti-colonialists. The Americans had said themselves that they would withdraw from mainland Southeast Asia once the Vietnam War had concluded. The British needed to decide on a departure date now for its own planning purposes. Referring to the intense pressure in the Labour Party for defence cuts, he warned that it was necessary for the Government to announce these decisions ‘to the country, and certainly to Parliament, since he doubted whether the ²⁷ ²⁸ ³⁰ ³¹

PRO: PREM 13/1384: George Brown to Harold Wilson, tel. 1269, 19/4/1967. PRO: PREM 13/1384: George Brown to FO, tel. 1277, 19/4/1967. ²⁹ Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/1384: Brown to Wilson, 19/4/1967. PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Dean Rusk, Paul Hasluck, Keith Holyoake, et al., Washington, DC, 20/4/1967. ³² Ibid. ³³ Ibid. ³⁴ Ibid.


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situation could be held otherwise’.³⁵ The meeting concluded with the ANZUS allies once again stating their objections. These statements, however, also made obvious the differences in emphasis and degree between the allies’ reactions. Dean Rusk claimed his Government to be concerned less with the substance of a 1975 withdrawal than with its announcement in the near future. Keith Holyoake said that he did not object to the reductions up to 1971, but urged that the British not commit themselves to anything more than a reassessment of their dispositions beyond that. Paul Hasluck, tougher than the others as before, expressed his objection even to the reductions up to 1971. Why did the ANZUS allies respond differently to the British proposals? While they were all keen for the British to maintain their role in Southeast Asia, this sprang from their individual and particular strategic interests. The United States’ chief concern in Southeast Asia was, of course, its current involvement in the Vietnam War. Thus it was most perturbed by the possibility of an immediate announcement of a British withdrawal from the region. Equally, however, it could also envisage that a withdrawal would have less effect on its interests if it occurred after a successful conclusion to the war. The key issue for Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand was more fundamental than that, for they both had an unalterable geographic interest in the long-term security of the region. For these two countries, then, the damage resulting from a British withdrawal was not contingent on present circumstances but permanent. Once the meeting between Britain and the ANZUS allies had concluded, the British assessed privately the success of their first consultations. They maintained their impression that ‘neither Rusk nor McNamara were unsympathetic’, with both not objecting in principle to a British withdrawal from the mainland.³⁶ But the Australians and New Zealanders were adamant in their opposition, with the former notably not exhibiting any interest in a relocated British base, perhaps for fear of weakening the case on Singapore. The British Government would clearly have to face ‘a lot of difficulty’ with these two countries, and there was a further possibility that the ‘American attitude [might] ³⁵ Ibid. Interestingly, the document originally read ‘and certainly to the Party’, but this was crossed out and replaced with the phrase ‘and certainly to Parliament’. ³⁶ PRO: FCO 46/54: R.A. Sykes to George Brown, ‘OPD Meeting on Friday 21 April’, 20/4/1967.

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harden once they have had time to reflect’.³⁷ Nevertheless, the British privately concluded that the initial negotiations ‘went a good deal better than we might have feared’.³⁸ The strength of the Australian and New Zealand Governments’ reaction to the British proposals was underlined by messages which Harold Wilson received from the two countries’ Prime Ministers immediately following the Washington meeting. Keith Holyoake told Wilson that he was ‘shocked and dismayed’ at the British proposals.³⁹ He criticized them as being ‘entirely at variance with all the assurances we have received’.⁴⁰ He noted that he had ‘urged’ and indeed ‘implored’ the British Government not to decide now on its plans for 1970 to 1975, and certainly not to set a date for withdrawal.⁴¹ Reactions from Australia were even stronger. The British High Commissioner in Canberra reported that when he had conveyed news of the British proposals to Prime Minister Harold Holt, the latter had ‘looked badly shaken and grey in the face’.⁴² While Holt had remained calm, it was clear that he had been ‘profoundly upset’.⁴³ This emotional reaction was not confined to the Prime Minister. When the Australian High Commissioner in London personally delivered Holt’s response to Downing St, he appeared, Wilson’s Private Secretary observed, ‘in a distinctly emotional condition’.⁴⁴ The High Commissioner explained that the British proposals were ‘particularly distressing to him[self]’ personally, given how he had spoken up for Britain to his own Government.⁴⁵ He predicted that if the policies were implemented at a time when Britain was backsliding on Vietnam and preparing for entry into Europe, it ‘would be catastrophic for Anglo/Australian relations and would make inevitable the break-up of the Commonwealth itself’.⁴⁶ Harold Holt’s message to Wilson, which the High Commissioner was delivering, was not so dramatic but was equally severe. The Australian Prime Minister explained that he was ‘gravely troubled’ by the British proposals.⁴⁷ He took issue with the ‘white faces’ argument, and feared that a British withdrawal would have ‘a serious, and perhaps decisive, ³⁷ PRO: FCO 46/54: R.A. Sykes to George Brown, ‘OPD Meeting on Friday 21 April’, 20/4/1967. ³⁸ Ibid. ³⁹ PRO: FCO 46/54: Keith Holyoake to Harold Wilson, tel. 446, 21/4/1967. ⁴⁰ Ibid. ⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Charles Johnston to CO, tel. 636, 21/4/1967. ⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ PRO: DEFE 13/586: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, 21/4/1967. ⁴⁵ Ibid. ⁴⁶ Ibid. ⁴⁷ PRO: DEFE 13/586: Harold Holt to Harold Wilson, 21/4/1967.


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influence’ on American opinion about the United States’ own role.⁴⁸ It would be a ‘shattering blow to morale’ in Southeast Asia if Britain were perceived to be deserting the area.⁴⁹ He urged that whatever reductions the British did make, they should be ‘neither intended by you, nor publicly presented, as a final withdrawal’.⁵⁰ A few days later, on 23 April 1967, Denis Healey arrived in Southeast Asia for meetings with the Malaysian and Singapore Governments, in order to complete the British Government’s first round of consultations with its allies. The gap of five days between the Washington and the Malaysia/Singapore meetings allowed time for the Australians to lobby discreetly their Southeast Asian counterparts. The Australian High Commissioner in Singapore met with Goh Keng Swee, the country’s Defence Minister, three days before Healey’s visit. Goh was personally sceptical at the possibility of preventing a British withdrawal in the long term, but thought his Government could better handle such a withdrawal in a few years. He doubted that Singaporeans would react to the threat of a British withdrawal with protests and unrest: it would be ‘too undignified and we are too proud’.⁵¹ But he could not be certain of the economic impact and political effects: in the past, riots had developed unexpectedly and rapidly. He ‘agreed enthusiastically’ that the situation in Vietnam and the wider Southeast Asian region meant that Britain should not ‘rock the boat’.⁵² Despite the expression of these sentiments, Australian officials privately assessed the Singapore Government as unlikely to plead with the British to stay or demand that they do so, as they would not want to appear beholden to the UK. They would more likely emphasize the adverse economic effects of a rapid closure of the Singapore base, something the British would find difficult to deny. It would be ‘a case of trying to shame rather than to argue with the British into staying for a while yet’.⁵³ The Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur had a similar discussion with Malaysian Minister of Defence Tun Abdul Razak. Razak noted that his Government was having sufficient difficulties with internal ⁴⁸ Ibid. ⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ Ibid. ⁵¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘Healey’s Visit’, tel. 713, 20/4/1967. ⁵² Ibid. ⁵³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: AHC, Singapore, to DEAC, ‘Healey’s Visit’, tel. 722, 21/4/1967.

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security that it would not be happy with having to pick up external defence as well. The Malaysian Government would express ‘concern’ at any substantial reduction in British forces, focusing on the questions of whether and how the UK would honour its Defence Agreement.⁵⁴ The Australian High Commissioner thought that Razak was ‘quite firm in his views’, but that the Defence Minister had presented them ‘more in sorrow than in anger’.⁵⁵ Thus the High Commissioner doubted that Razak would be emphatic in his opposition to the proposals that Healey would be presenting. The Australian Government fretted at the lack of strong feelings in Malaysia. Hoping to shore up the Malaysian response, the Australian Prime Minister sent a message to his counterpart, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on the eve of Healey’s visit. Prime Minister Holt emphasized the Australian Government’s support for the current defence arrangements and the seriousness with which they viewed the threat of a British withdrawal. He welcomed statements which the Malaysian Government had made about the value of Commonwealth forces—a ‘useful corrective’ to the British view that its forces might not be welcome.⁵⁶ In a private aside to the Australian High Commissioner, he ordered Australian officials to continue to impress on the Malaysians the importance of not letting Healey assume they were indifferent or opposed to the British presence. The Australian efforts had little tangible effect. When Denis Healey met with the Singapore and Malaysian Governments he had a much easier time than George Brown had had in Washington. He found the Singapore Government deeply concerned at the prospect of any public announcement of British proposals to withdraw, but much more willing than the Australians to accept the substance of such plans. The Malaysians appeared rather more relaxed again, registering only the limited concern that the British should not withdraw too dramatically or with great fanfare. Healey had two meetings with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the first on the leader’s yacht, the second in his office. Healey began by admitting that what he had to say would be ‘unpalatable’ to ⁵⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: DEAC to Paul Hasluck, tel. 1223, 21/4/1967. ⁵⁵ Ibid. ⁵⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: Harold Holt to AHC, Kuala Lumpur, tel. 1121, 22/4/1967.


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the Singapore Government.⁵⁷ He explained the economic and financial strains which were forcing the British Government to its new plans: to reduce its forces in half by 1970/1, and to be off the mainland of Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s. Lee Kuan Yew, the British record noted, was ‘clearly shaken by what Mr Healey had said’.⁵⁸ He did not attempt to formulate an immediate response, but confined himself to asking questions about the firmness, timing and details of the British decision. Gradually, however, Lee ‘became his vigorous self again’, asserting that his main concern was with the damage to confidence that would result from an announcement of plans for a complete withdrawal.⁵⁹ He elaborated on this point the next day when their discussion continued. At this meeting, Lee admitted that his reaction was tempered by the knowledge that Britain could not stay at pre-Confrontation strength indefinitely. But if plans for a British withdrawal were publicized, it would have the ‘most damaging effect on the whole region’.⁶⁰ Other powers would sense an impending vacuum in the region, and this would have gravely destabilizing effects. Confidence in the continuing viability of Singapore itself would evaporate, and the resulting flight of capital would cripple the fledgling state. Lee urged the British to announce their plans only to 1970/1. This reticence would allow the two governments to work on building confidence before the remaining British objectives were revealed. Singapore, Lee assertively concluded, ‘fully intended to survive the shock of [a British] departure’.⁶¹ Privately, British officials were reasonably pleased with this result, judging Lee’s reaction to be as good as could be expected, and his approach to be ‘constructive and friendly throughout’.⁶² Two days later, Denis Healey arrived in Kuala Lumpur for a similar series of meetings with the Malaysian leadership. Here, Healey had an even easier ride. He noted happily to officials in London that the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was ‘as welcoming ⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 24/24: memcon, Denis Healey, Lee Kuan Yew et al., Singapore, 23/4/1967. ⁵⁸ Ibid. ⁵⁹ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 196, 23/4/1967. ⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 200, 24/4/1967. ⁶¹ Ibid. ⁶² PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 196.

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as ever and in his best form’.⁶³ Once Healey explained the British Government’s proposals, the Tunku pronounced that they ‘had not come as a surprise’.⁶⁴ Neither he nor the Defence Minister, Tun Razak, expressed opposition in principle to a British withdrawal in the mid1970s. Their central concerns were that the British ‘should not make too much noise about it’, and should maintain a presence, even if reduced, until that point.⁶⁵ As long as Britain continued to stand by the joint Defence Agreement, the Malaysian Government would not be very worried. On Healey’s return to London, the British Government privately assessed the progress that had been made in the first round of consultations with allies. George Brown provided the top-level appraisal for the Cabinet. He reported that the consultations ‘proved somewhat less difficult than he had expected’.⁶⁶ There had, however, been ‘strong opposition’ to the British plans to announce a complete withdrawal by the mid-1970s, opposition which ‘generally had stiffened’ once US officials had consulted with the Australians.⁶⁷ He argued that the talks had been made ‘much more difficult’ because he had not been able to assure the allies that a residual presence would be maintained in Australia after withdrawal.⁶⁸ The Cabinet noted this statement, but made no move to alter its position in the light of this. Why had the reactions of Singapore and especially Malaysia been so much more muted than those of the ANZUS powers? As the relevant archives remain closed, one can only speculate. Partly, their responses may have reflected their status as newly independent states. They would not have wanted to be beholden to the former colonial power—and certainly would not have wanted to be perceived that way. More fundamentally, however, the two Governments might also have judged that a British withdrawal would not necessarily cause much damage to their own security. Now that their relations with Indonesia were improving, the main regional threat was Communism. But the two Governments might have calculated that if a major Communist challenge was mounted against them, the United States and Australia would be likely to feel compelled to intervene, as they had done in Vietnam and Thailand. US officials had recently observed that ⁶³ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Kuala Lumpur, to CO, tel. 411, 26/4/1967. ⁶⁴ Ibid. ⁶⁵ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Kuala Lumpur, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 410, 26/4/1967; BHC, Kuala Lumpur, to CO, tel. 411, 26/4/1967. ⁶⁶ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)23rd Meeting, 27/4/1967. ⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.


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the Malaysian Government appeared to be viewing the United States as increasingly having ‘responsibility for [the] ultimate security [of] Malaysia’.⁶⁹ When President Johnson had visited Kuala Lumpur in October 1966, the Malaysian king had publicly welcomed him by declaring the United States to be the ‘protector of small nations’.⁷⁰ The Malaysian and Singaporean Governments clearly might have concluded that if the British withdrew, the burdens of security would pass to the other major powers in the region, rather than to themselves. Within the British Government there was also another assessment of why the ANZUS powers had reacted so strongly against the British proposals, and this lay in George Brown’s tactics rather than the strategic fundamentals. The permanent head of the Commonwealth Office, Sir Saville Garner, told his Foreign Office counterpart that he thought George Brown’s handling of the Washington negotiations had been ‘undesirably strong and blunt’.⁷¹ Garner felt that Brown should have employed only the economic arguments for withdrawal. It was ‘not at all right’ to use the ‘white faces’ argument. Neither was it politically necessary, nor was it a ‘happy phrase’ to use with the Australians, who were sensitive about their status as a white country in Asia.⁷² The British High Commissioner in Canberra judged Brown’s use of the phrase ‘a red rag to the Australian bull’.⁷³ And Denis Healey leaked to the Australians and New Zealanders his opinion that George Brown ‘had been silly to use these words to white Asians’ such as themselves.⁷⁴ From the end of the initial round of consultations in late April until the end of May 1967, opposition mounted against the British proposals for withdrawal. This opposition ranged across several different fronts. On one, British officials sympathetic to the allied cause secretly encouraged stronger attacks against their own Government’s plans. On another, the ANZUS allies sought to develop a co-ordinated and unified response to the British plans. On a third front, the ANZUS allies sought to ⁶⁹ FRUS, vol. 26, pp. 612–13: James Bell to State Department, 17/11/1966. ⁷⁰ Ibid. ⁷¹ PRO: FCO 46/30: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to Sir John Rennie, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 24/4/1967. ⁷² Ibid. ⁷³ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Charles Johnston to CO, tel. 636, 21/4/1967. ⁷⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2A: AHC, Kuala Lumpur, to DEAC, tel. 1105, 27/4/1967.

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bolster Singaporean and, in particular, Malaysian opposition to the British plans. The cumulative effect of this opposition caused the British Government to concede that it should retain a military capability for use in Malaysia and Singapore even after the planned withdrawal in 1975/6. Within the British Government, not all ministers and officials, especially within the defence and overseas departments, were happy with the gathering momentum for withdrawal. Many officials and ministers felt that the direction the Government was taking would lead to too abrupt, public and total a withdrawal from Britain’s overseas role. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the permanent head of the Foreign Office, discreetly warned Sir Saville Garner that he ‘could not guarantee’ that George Brown would adopt a position the Commonwealth Office would find agreeable.⁷⁵ Thus it would be ‘very necessary . . . for the Commonwealth Office to speak out loud and clear’, especially against any intention to announce the plans for withdrawal.⁷⁶ This kind of dissent was transmitted beyond Whitehall. A number of officials and ministers registered their opposition with Britain’s allies, doing everything from discreetly dropping hints to openly encouraging the allies to push their case harder. The Head of the Foreign Office’s Defence Department gently nudged the US Ambassador by hinting that ‘he felt Wash[ington’s] reaction [to have] been milder than expected’.⁷⁷ Denis Healey made his personal position clearer when, at the Australian High Commission in Singapore, he dutifully criticized Australian fears about a loss of regional confidence as a case of ‘crying wolf’, but then ruefully added that ‘the wolf is 95 per cent there’.⁷⁸ George Thomas, a new Minister of State at the Commonwealth Office, confirmed to Australian officials in London the greater sympathy Healey had for their country’s views. Thomas further advised the Australian Government to press its case more firmly to ministers: ‘Australia must hit hard. They will take notice of what you say.’⁷⁹ There were British ministers who wished to maintain a residual presence in Southeast Asia, and if Australia were seen to meet British concerns halfway, their case could succeed. ⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 46/30: Gore-Booth to Rennie, ‘Defence Expenditure’. ⁷⁶ Ibid. ⁷⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 24/4/1967. ⁷⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘Healey’s Visit’, tel. 739, 25/4/1967. ⁷⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: Sir Alexander Downer to Harold Holt, tel. 5449, 5/5/1967.


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The hints did not pass unnoticed. Dean Rusk quickly tried to correct the impression British officials had of his position. He claimed to be not so relaxed as some sources had suggested, ‘not . . . relaxed about this’ at all.⁸⁰ He thought it was essential that nothing shake confidence in Southeast Asia while the Vietnam War was continuing. He understood the British Government’s desire to plan ahead, but was firm in his position: ‘Plan as much as you like but for God’s sake don’t go announcing it all now.’⁸¹ George Brown was not impressed by the Secretary of State’s change in pitch. ‘I fully understand!’ he noted. ‘Someone has got at him since.’⁸² These sentiments notwithstanding, George Brown and the other overseas policy ministers were prepared to concede the depth of allied opposition to their plans. At the beginning of May, Brown, Healey and Wilson met privately to discuss the progress of the British plans. They all agreed that it would be necessary to push the Cabinet to accept that some sort of military capability would have to be retained for use in Malaysia and Singapore. Unless this concession was granted, they felt that they would be ‘powerless to negotiate with [Britain’s] allies’.⁸³ The three senior ministers were less sure, however, on whether to grant the allies any further concessions than this. They knew that all the allies were firmly against any announcement of long-term British intentions. But they also noted that an announcement would have advantages, ‘both planning-wise and domestic political’.⁸⁴ George Brown made the political calculus clear. He argued that it would be ‘extremely difficult’ to get the Cabinet to agree to retain a continuing capability for Southeast Asia unless there was some definite announcement of a British intention to withdraw completely from the mainland.⁸⁵ While senior British ministers were adjusting their position, officials in the other allied capitals sought to co-ordinate their response. At the beginning of May, officials from the three ANZUS powers met in Washington to discuss the situation and their tactics. They noted that the British had so far maintained that their plans were only proposals, ⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 46/53: memcon, Michael Palliser, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, Bonn, 3/5/1967. ⁸¹ Ibid. ⁸² PRO: FCO 46/53: annotation by George Brown to memcon, Palliser, Rusk and Rostow, 3/5/1967. ⁸³ PRO: FCO 46/46: C.M. Maclehose, memcon, George Brown, Denis Healey and Harold Wilson, ‘Overseas Defence Expenditure Studies’, 3/5/1967. ⁸⁴ Ibid. ⁸⁵ Ibid.

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with no final decisions having been made. There was ‘some scepticism’ that this was actually the case: certainly, the British were acting as if they were fairly sure their proposals would be coming into effect.⁸⁶ But the ANZUS allies agreed that there would be no benefit in assuming this to be true. It would be better to take the British at face value and negotiate as if it were possible to prevent a withdrawal taking place. This resolution was reflected in the position the Americans took up soon afterwards. Previously, their opposition had focused on the dangers ensuing from a British announcement of a withdrawal—a stance which had tacitly acquiesced to a decision to withdraw providing it was kept secret. From mid-May, the Americans took up a firmer approach, closer to the Australian position. Dean Rusk explained the reasoning to US officials in London. ‘If [the British] take the decision at all, it cannot fail to be known’: thus the Americans should ‘strike at the basic action itself and not talk in terms of an announcement’.⁸⁷ The stronger American position was conveyed by Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk to their British opposites. McNamara, speaking to Denis Healey at a NATO summit, argued that it would be ‘a disaster’ for the British to talk of complete withdrawal.⁸⁸ He emphasized that the US Government was ‘most anxious’ at the possibility of a British decision to withdraw, and ‘even more worried’ at the prospect of public knowledge of this.⁸⁹ Dean Rusk took an even stronger line with George Brown. He argued that a British decision to pull out would ‘have the most devastating repercussions’, and would ‘set up chain reactions that will strike at the very basis of our whole post-war foreign policy’.⁹⁰ He claimed, not completely honestly, that all five affected powers were unanimous in questioning why it was necessary for a British decision to be made now. He accepted that substantial reductions up to 1971 might be needed to ease domestic pressures, but he saw ‘no overriding need why you must decide now on what you will do six to ten years hence’.⁹¹ In response, Denis Healey was just as firm as his American interlocutors. He explained in greater detail the reasons behind the British ⁸⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: J.K. Waller to DEAC, tel. 1804, 2/5/1967. ⁸⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to David Bruce, 11/5/1967. ⁸⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, memcon, Robert McNamara and Denis Healey, 9/5/1967. ⁸⁹ PRO: FCO 46/52: memcon, Denis Healey and Robert McNamara, 9/5/1967. ⁹⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to George Brown, 11/5/1967. ⁹¹ Ibid.


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position. The Cabinet had settled the size of the defence budget the previous year; two months ago it had become clear that the target would not be met. Thus the Cabinet had decided that ‘a drastic change in foreign policy’ was necessary.⁹² The only way for the Government to meet its goals was for Britain to ‘get rid of her base installations in Singapore–Malaysia’.⁹³ Though earlier he had claimed that the British were working on assumptions, not final decisions, he stated that there was ‘no chance [that the Government might] change the decision to run down to zero the British bases’.⁹⁴ He admitted that he was ‘personally against it, but there was no other way to make the budgetary savings’.⁹⁵ When McNamara tried to challenge the main decision, Healey stated that there were ‘areas that are closed and areas that are open; it is up to the US to decide how to play it’.⁹⁶ When McNamara asked whether Europe might be cut in preference to Southeast Asia, Healey replied that neither the State Department nor the trilateral discussions on offsetting British defence costs in Germany had allowed this possibility. Moreover, ‘a decision by the UK to join Europe inevitably means a turning away from other parts of the world’.⁹⁷ US efforts would have little impact on the domestic pressures for withdrawal: ‘there are some things that cannot be changed by bribes, bullying, or even good reasoning’.⁹⁸ It was clear, the American record of the conversation concluded, that for practical purposes the decision to close the British bases in Southeast Asia had been made. The official British stance might have been discouraging to the Americans and Australians, but they also continued to have secret sympathizers within the Government’s ranks. While Denis Healey, George Brown and others had to defend their Government’s proposals against allied attacks, at a lower level British officials and staff were giving the opposition discreet advice and encouragement. Australian and American officials in Southeast Asia overheard that Britain’s senior military staff in the region were ‘strongly opposed’ to the proposals, but felt constrained from speaking out on a political issue.⁹⁹ One British Embassy official in Washington was far more forward. He privately felt that the tougher line Dean Rusk was now taking with George Brown ⁹² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Rostow to Johnson, memcon, McNamara and Healey, 9/5/1967. ⁹³ Ibid. ⁹⁴ Ibid. ⁹⁵ Ibid. ⁹⁶ Ibid. ⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Ibid. ⁹⁹ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1641: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 10/5/1967.

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was ‘absolutely right’.¹⁰⁰ He claimed that officials in the Foreign Office and MOD were now seeking to be responsive to the US position. It was essential that the US ‘not let down anyplace along the line’, and crucial that the President ‘absolutely knock the pants off’ Harold Wilson when he visited in June.¹⁰¹ George Brown had thought he had managed an easy ride through the initial Washington talks, so if the United States was to have some impact, it would ‘have to hit these guys—who are used to rough and tumble—smack between the eyes’.¹⁰² The ANZUS allies employed a range of tactics to fight the British proposals. While they were debating directly with the British Government, they also sought to bolster the support of Malaysia and Singapore for their cause. A visible split between the ANZUS and Southeast Asian powers, or between Malaysia and Singapore themselves, would aid critics of the British presence. Even if, as Harold Holt claimed to Lyndon Johnson, Malaysia and Singapore were keeping quieter ‘than their real feelings would have warranted’ for fear of provoking uncertainty, this quietness was undermining the allied case.¹⁰³ In Singapore, the Government appeared resigned to a British withdrawal. While Lee Kuan Yew reaffirmed to Harold Holt his belief in the value of the British presence, he said he was very sceptical about the strength of British resolve.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, he felt their resolution was moving in the opposite direction. He had gained the impression, from his talks with Denis Healey, that the British were moving towards a principle of never again committing land forces to a conflict in Asia. This, Lee told the Australians, was likely to be ‘a deeply held moral viewpoint’ which would be ‘difficult to dispel . . . completely’.¹⁰⁵ Thus he doubted it would be possible to reverse the British proposals. At best the allies could hope to delay the foreclosing of options, and postpone the taking of decisions. To this end, Lee himself was avoiding discussions on future regional defence and mitigating aid with the British, so that they would not get the impression that planning for their departure had already begun. Lee also warned against the five affected powers appearing to collude too much in their response to the British, lest that provoke a strong negative reaction from London. ¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰¹ ¹⁰³ ¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁵

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: memcon, Jeffrey Kitchen and John Killick, 17/5/1967. Ibid. ¹⁰² Ibid. NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: Harold Holt to Lyndon Johnson, 4/5/1967. NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2A: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Holt, 28/4/1967. NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2A: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, tel. 760, 28/4/1967.


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In Malaysia, American officials found the Government even more relaxed. US Ambassador Bell was told by a senior official that the Malaysian Government ‘understood and generally accepted’ the British position.¹⁰⁶ They were comfortable with the projected reductions, though they were ‘much more disturbed’ by the prospect of an eventual complete withdrawal.¹⁰⁷ The Malaysian Government—clearly demonstrating the reasoning on which their relaxed response was based—could see ‘no alternative’ but to rely on friends such as the US and Australia in the future: their presence was more likely to guarantee security than defence arrangements between countries within the region, given the failure of other forms of co-operation so far.¹⁰⁸ These responses from Singapore and especially Kuala Lumpur caused consternation within the US and Australian Governments. The regional governments could well afford to be unconcerned about a prospective British departure, if they held the belief that the United States and Australia would fill the gap. But it was obviously not in the interest of the ANZUS powers to let that view gain currency. William Bundy, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, ordered his ambassador in Singapore to convey the point that the US would not be able to pick up any further commitments in Southeast Asia. It was important, Bundy argued, for Lee to understand that the US did not want a greater role and would push for the UK to maintain its presence. Hopefully, if Lee understood the US position, he would ‘press Singapore’s case with more vigour’.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, the Australian High Commissioner in Singapore sought to convince Lee to speak out. He argued to the Singapore Prime Minister that his measured response was creating the impression that there was little real opposition to the proposals for withdrawal. He felt that it was important for the Singaporeans to correct the record and put their views clearly to the British Government.¹¹⁰ At the same time, in Kuala Lumpur, the Americans and Australians tried to convince the Malaysians to take a stand as well.¹¹¹ To this end, the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur met repeatedly ¹⁰⁶ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1651: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 1/5/1967. ¹⁰⁷ Ibid. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid. ¹⁰⁹ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1651: William Bundy to Francis Galbraith, 5/5/1967. ¹¹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 962, 23/5/1967. ¹¹¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to David Bruce, 12/5/1967; NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 1179, 4/5/1967.

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with senior Malaysian ministers through May, and questioned them on whether they were happy with the British plans. He impressed on them that if they had problems with a planned British withdrawal, they should come out against it in principle, and clearly convey this to the Wilson Government.¹¹² The American and Australian efforts finally reaped some success at the end of May. In messages transmitted to the Wilson Government, both the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments expressed more clearly and firmly than before that they had misgivings about the British proposals. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Tun Razak, wrote to Denis Healey and took a far stronger stance than his Government had previously adopted. He argued that the British proposals would impose unmanageable strains on the Malaysian military, would encourage Communist activities in Southeast Asia and Chinese expansionism, and would threaten the regional balance of power. He stressed the ‘importance of not making a public statement’ about the fate of British forces in the mid-1970s.¹¹³ Moreover, he went a step further and stated that his Government ‘strongly [felt] it wiser for Britain not to decide in 1967’ about withdrawal in the mid-1970s at all.¹¹⁴ Lee Kuan Yew wrote directly to Harold Wilson. He stressed less the actual economic consequences of a withdrawal on Singapore—though these would be ‘painful’ and ‘grievous’—than the immediate effect on confidence once a decision had been taken.¹¹⁵ He argued that as soon as knowledge of this became widespread, Communists and others would begin to plan and act on the basis of an impending vacuum in the area. Singapore’s ‘fragile basis of independence’ would be threatened, while there would be ‘jubilation’ amongst Southeast Asia’s Communists.¹¹⁶ He recognized that the British Cabinet had to contend with a host of other economic and political difficulties, but urged that they delay any public commitment to withdrawal until 1971 so that there would be time to assess the consequences. Britain’s eventual withdrawal, he hoped, could be implemented in a way ‘that would give us a maximum chance to continue as a viable community’.¹¹⁷ ¹¹² USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1651: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 10/5/1967; NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4: Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 1278, 17/5/1967; Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 1340, 24/5/1967. ¹¹³ PRO: PREM 13/1456: Tun Razak to Denis Healey, 1/6/1967. ¹¹⁴ Ibid. ¹¹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1456: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Wilson, 26/5/1967. ¹¹⁶ Ibid. ¹¹⁷ Ibid.


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The cumulative weight of all the allies’ objections appeared to yield some results. At the end of May 1967, Denis Healey brought to the Cabinet a paper proposing that Britain retain a continuing capability for use in Southeast Asia even after 1975. As described earlier in the chapter, this proposal had been privately agreed to by Healey, Brown and Wilson in the wake of the first round of consultations with allies at the end of April. Now, after a month of lobbying by the allies, the proposal was being brought to the Cabinet to establish the British Government’s stance for the next round of consultations. When Healey presented the proposal to Cabinet, he carefully crafted his argument to appeal to critics of Britain’s defence role. He did not pay attention to the general effects of the original withdrawal proposals. Rather, he focused on how a refusal to compromise at all on a complete withdrawal would affect the Government’s ability to implement its defence rundown. Healey put forward two arguments: the first emphasizing the need to gain allied co-operation, the second, the importance of maintaining regional stability. In the first argument, he noted that the five other interested powers were prepared to acquiesce to the proposed defence reductions up to 1971, but their co-operation ‘depend[ed] critically’ on Britain providing some sort of assurance on the longer-term situation.¹¹⁸ The Prime Minister was about to enter a second round of bilateral consultations, and these could only pave the way for smooth and rapid reductions if Britain were prepared to appear responsive to allied concerns. In Healey’s second argument, he focused on the need to maintain regional stability—not simply for its own sake, but for the benefit of Britain’s own defence position. He pointed out that if Britain wanted an orderly withdrawal, it had a strong interest in the survival of a co-operative regime in Singapore. But if it announced decisions that led to a dramatic loss of confidence, the end result could be the fall of the present Singapore government, producing a situation which would make ‘the orderly withdrawal of our forces . . . impossible, combining the worst features of our experience over Aden and Malta’.¹¹⁹ Obviously, such an outcome portended ‘dangerous and costly consequences for our own rundown’.¹²⁰ As well as those two arguments, Healey also presented the plan for a continuing military capability in terms as innocuous as possible. He argued that the size, ¹¹⁸ PRO: CAB 129/130: C(67)81: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: Consultation on Defence Policy’, 23/5/1967. ¹¹⁹ Ibid. ¹²⁰ Ibid.

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character and deployment of the forces need not be decided until after further study, and that whatever form the capability took, it could still fit within a projected £1,800 million defence budget. Healey’s arguments were obviously designed to defuse any possible controversy over his plans. Treasury officials briefing the Chancellor noted that it was difficult to object to the proposed continuing capability, given that no cost for it had been specified. They could only insist that the budget limit be rigorously enforced.¹²¹ Despite Healey’s efforts, however, the paper still had a difficult ride through Cabinet. Some ministers argued that it would be a ‘mistaken policy’ to make commitments which would not come into effect until the mid-1970s.¹²² Others questioned whether the role Healey envisaged could really fit within his projected budget. Still others argued that a continuing military role in East Asia would be out of scale with the role Britain could afford to play in the world. There was ‘considerable support’ in the Cabinet for making no commitments to a future presence in Australia.¹²³ And some would only support a continuing capability for Southeast Asia if it could be met with the forces that were required to meet Britain’s commitments elsewhere. Against this tide of criticism, George Brown and Denis Healey had to put up a strong defence. They had to point out that they were not entering any new commitments: on the contrary, their plans involved a huge reduction in Britain’s present commitments. The projected cuts in forces would be ‘the largest we had ever made in so short a period except immediately after a World War’.¹²⁴ They reiterated the argument that it simply would not be possible to implement these reductions without making the commitment they were proposing: the resulting objections from allies and risks to security would jeopardize the whole process. Whether these arguments managed to convince fully the majority of ministers is open to question, but they were sufficient to gain the Cabinet’s acquiescence. When Harold Wilson summed up the discussion, he concluded in favour of the overseas ministers. The Government’s main goal, he stated, was to achieve a one-half reduction of forces in Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, and a total reduction by ¹²¹ PRO: T 225/3059: P. Nicholls to G.R. Bell, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: Consultation on Defence Policy C(67)81’, May 1967. ¹²² PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)34th Meeting, 30/5/1967. ¹²³ Ibid. ¹²⁴ Ibid.


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the mid-1970s. The Government had to pay the price of achieving its goal, and this cost was to maintain a capability for use in the Southeast Asian region. Through June and into July 1967 the Wilson Government conducted the second round of consultations with its allies. These discussions consisted of a series of bilateral meetings between Harold Wilson and the affected heads of government—first with the US President in Washington, then with the New Zealand, Australian and Singapore Prime Ministers in London.¹²⁵ The bilateral format was preferred by both the British and the allies. The British did not want to meet all their opposition in one group. The allies feared that a multilateral summit would attract undue publicity, and risked being counterproductive if they were seen to be ‘ganging up’ against Britain.¹²⁶ The first meeting took place in Washington, between Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, in early June 1967. In advance of the talks, the Americans heard news of the British Cabinet’s decision to maintain a military capability for use in Southeast Asia beyond the mid-1970s. The American reaction was mixed. On the one hand, they recognized the decision as a partial defeat of those in Britain who wanted a firm and unequivocal decision for and announcement of British withdrawal. The formula ‘fuzzed [the] question of [the] actual physical presence [of] UK forces’ in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia in the mid-1970s.¹²⁷ On the other hand, Dean Rusk complained to the Australian Prime Minister that the ‘phraseology [was] so ambiguous as to be meaningless’.¹²⁸ Still, the fact that this decision had been taken at all suggested that American opinion was having some effect. Frederick Cooper, Assistant Secretary at the MOD, briefed US officials that his government had only conceded the decision because of ‘strong pressures’ from the US, Australia and New Zealand.¹²⁹ Other British sources suggested that ‘a few words’ from ¹²⁵ The Malaysian Prime Minister also visited London from 5 to 10 July, but his visit did not take place until the British Cabinet was already making its final decisions. ¹²⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4A: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, ‘Prime Minister’s Discussions with Mr McNamara’, tel. 2354, 2/6/1967; LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, ‘British Position East of Suez’, 9/6/1967. ¹²⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 30/5/1967. ¹²⁸ NAA: A1838/346, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, tel. 2352, 2/6/1967. ¹²⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Bruce to Rusk, 30/5/1967.

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the US might further help prevent an announcement of any withdrawal of permanent forces.¹³⁰ Despite this advice, American officials briefing the President before the meeting were divided on whether there was much chance of extracting further concessions from the British. Some advised Johnson to adopt a tough bargaining position. Assistant National Security Advisor Francis Bator urged the President to ‘push [Wilson] very hard on East of Suez’, since George Brown had misinterpreted the United States’ ‘light-touch reaction’ earlier on.¹³¹ State Department officials suggested two courses of action. If Harold Wilson took the firm line that British domestic politics and Europe demanded a clear decision and announcement to withdraw, then the US should threaten to ‘reappraise’ its existing security policies and arrangements.¹³² If Wilson looked as though he might be persuaded to delay a decision to withdraw, then the US should maintain that no such decision at this time ‘could be made palatable to us’.¹³³ In contrast to this, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was more pessimistic. He wrote as if the decision to withdraw was already a foregone conclusion, describing the British as having ‘finally decided’ on their future role in the world, shifting away from the remnants of Empire and into Europe.¹³⁴ He expected that in time this shift would alter the Anglo–American relationship. For the moment, though, the US and UK shared a similar view of the world. The British, Rusk expected, would still ‘take a constructive part in helping maintain world order’, but now more through ‘ideas and dexterity . . . than military might’.¹³⁵ While Rusk advised the President to voice his opposition to British plans to withdraw, his tone suggested that he did not expect much success. This state of American ambivalence was detected by Michael Palliser, one of Wilson’s private secretaries, in an advance trip to Washington ¹³⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 1/6/1967. ¹³¹ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Box 16: Vol. 29: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Your Meeting with Harold Wilson’, 31/5/1967. ¹³² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Department of State, ‘Background Paper: East of Suez’, 29/5/1967. Threatening the ‘special relationship’ was also suggested in LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Foy Kohler to Walt Rostow, ‘Presidential Talks with Prime Minister Wilson on the British Presence East of Suez’, 26/5/1967. ¹³³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Department of State, ‘Background Paper: East of Suez’, 29/5/1967. ¹³⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Dean Rusk to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Your Talks with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on Friday, June 2, 1967’, 31/5/1967. ¹³⁵ Ibid.


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ahead of the Prime Minister’s visit. He diagnosed the Americans as reacting to the British proposals with ‘an odd mixture of indignation, incomprehension and resignation’: indignation, because they saw the plans as ‘a stab in the back as long as they are bogged down in Vietnam’; incomprehension, because they thought the proposals politically irresponsible and unnecessary given that they reached so far ahead into the future; and resignation, ‘because in their heart of hearts, they believe that Britain is pulling out of her world role and that nothing they can do or say will do more than delay this’.¹³⁶ While the Americans were continuing to ask that no decision to withdraw be made, Palliser felt that ‘all they really hope from us—but this they do most energetically press for’ was that there be no announcement of the British plans.¹³⁷ He sensed that the Americans were not very impressed with the idea of the British retaining a capability for the area: certainly it was not sufficient to compensate for an announcement of long-term intentions to withdraw. When Wilson met with Johnson on 2 June 1967, exactly what transpired between them is unclear, for initially they met alone, without advisers or note-takers. Wilson reported to his own officials that he and President Johnson only briefly touched on the topic of ‘East of Suez’, though the President ‘spoke quite firmly, but in the friendliest way about this’.¹³⁸ The President’s brief report to his advisers was somewhat at variance with Wilson’s, for he claimed to have taken a very strong line in their private conversation. Despite these measures, Wilson had avoided making any commitments with respect to the British decision.¹³⁹ The second meeting between Johnson and Wilson was complete with advisers, and thus officially minuted. Wilson sought hard to defend his Government’s position without giving any ground. He emphasized that ‘no decision’ had yet been reached.¹⁴⁰ But he had a ‘Cabinet problem’—and it was in that forum that the decision would have to be taken.¹⁴¹ In his own Government’s defence, he pointed to the ¹³⁶ PRO: PREM 13/1906: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, ‘My Washington Reconnaissance’, 1/6/1967. ¹³⁷ Ibid. ¹³⁸ PRO: PREM 13/1906: memcon, Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, Washington, DC, 2/6/1967. ¹³⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to US Embassy in London, 16/6/1967; LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 5: John Leddy to David Bruce, 15/6/1967. ¹⁴⁰ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Harold Wilson et al., Washington, DC, 2/6/1967. ¹⁴¹ Ibid.

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recent decision to maintain a capability in the area. But this concession notwithstanding, he doubted that the Cabinet would be willing to maintain a base and troops in Singapore indefinitely. The American response was relatively muted. While Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara raised their standard criticisms, the President himself said little. Before the conversation had reached a conclusion, Johnson steered it back onto contemporary problems in the Middle East. Administration officials were slightly puzzled by the President’s tactics. Asked one later: ‘Were you being gentle because there were too many people in the room?’¹⁴² The President replied that he had taken a sufficiently strong approach in his private meeting with Wilson earlier that day. Ten days after his visit to Washington, Wilson himself hosted two visitors, as the round of bilateral consultations continued. On 12 June, the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, J.R. Marshall, met Wilson and other senior ministers for one day of discussions. Following him, the Australian Prime Minister, Harold Holt, had several days of meetings with ministers in London. The discussions with Marshall trod a familiar path, with the New Zealand Prime Minister raising a variety of objections to the British proposals, and the British ministers squarely hitting the ball back again. Marshall expressed deep concerns about the effect on regional stability should Britain announce a pending withdrawal. Southeast Asia was his country’s front line, and if Britain departed, New Zealand would not be able to maintain its position there either. Wilson was conciliatory in tone, but unmoved in substance. He pointed out that Britain would now be retaining a capability for use in the region. Any greater burden than that would be too expensive to shoulder. Singapore and Malaysia would inevitably have to take more responsibility for their own defence in the future.¹⁴³ Healey gave Marshall a similar response. However, he added a glimmer of hope. While he argued that it was unreasonable for the allies to expect the British Government to reverse major planning assumptions, it could adjust matters of detail and presentation with their interests in mind.¹⁴⁴ ¹⁴² LBJL: WHCF: Conf F: CO 305 UK: Box 12: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, 13/6/1967. ¹⁴³ PRO: PREM 13/1456: memcon, Harold Wilson, J.R. Marshall et al., London, 12/6/1967. ¹⁴⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1456: memcon, Denis Healey, Herbert Bowden, J.R. Marshall et al., London, 12/6/1967.


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Healey’s meaning became somewhat clearer in the days that followed, when Harold Holt arrived in London with his Defence Minister, Allen Fairhall, for a further round of consultations. Both the British and the Australians appeared to be trying to avoid the direct clashes that had characterized their previous exchanges. Harold Holt adopted a much more conciliatory stance from the beginning of the talks. Gone was the blunt refusal to accept any part of the British proposals. Instead, he claimed not to want a wholesale reversal of the British plans, only a modification on two points: first, that as Britain reduced its forces in Southeast Asia, those remaining should be weighted towards land forces, rather than sea and air; secondly, that the British should come to no final decisions or announcements on withdrawal, even if they continued to plan for it as a contingency.¹⁴⁵ The British were initially unyielding in their response. Denis Healey refused to give way on the shape of the rundown, pointing out that ground forces were much more expensive to retain than sea or air forces, and that, in any case, the Singapore and Malaysia governments preferred the latter as they could not provide their own. On whether to make a final decision and announcement, Healey pointed out that if the British were planning a withdrawal it would inevitably become public knowledge, no matter what had been formally decided or announced. If the British were too vague on the date, it could lead to expectations that they would be withdrawing even earlier. And, domestically, there would be ‘great political kudos’ in announcing a firm date—not only with regards to Labour Party opinion, but also, Healey claimed, with regards to general popular support for the policy.¹⁴⁶ On the next day, however, Healey offered the Australians an opening. In a meeting with Holt and Fairhall in the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Secretary claimed that he personally felt ‘there must be a way of presenting the British position without saying that we proposed to leave the bases in 1975’.¹⁴⁷ He suggested that he could push for a vaguer statement if he could say in his Cabinet that the Australian Prime Minister ‘accepted that the formula left open the possibility of leaving the bases earlier than 1975 as well as later’.¹⁴⁸ Holt was cautiously responsive. If the British Government could find a formula which still ¹⁴⁵ PRO: CAB 133/329: AMV(67)1st Meeting, 13/6/1967. ¹⁴⁶ Ibid. ¹⁴⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1323: memcon, Denis Healey, Harold Holt, Allen Fairhall et al., London, 14/6/1967. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

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allowed them their forward planning and financial savings but ‘without giving the impression the world East of Suez could go to hell’, Holt would find it ‘highly desirable’.¹⁴⁹ A day later again, on 15 June 1967, Holt presented this argument more firmly to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan. He said that he was prepared to take the risk that a vaguer date could allow an earlier as well as a later withdrawal. Callaghan took the point, but underlined that a clearer statement of a date also held benefits for economic and political planning. Holt responded by urging that their governments should be able to agree to a formula on the lines of: ‘planning was proceeding on the assumption of such [a] withdrawal barring unforeseen eventualities’.¹⁵⁰ Still cautious, Callaghan noted Holt’s offer, but made no further commitment. Privately, the Australians were not displeased with the course the talks had taken. Harold Holt noted to his Deputy Prime Minister that the British had exhibited ‘rather more flexibility of mind on the second day’.¹⁵¹ The Australian High Commission in London was optimistic. Its officials’ assessment was that it now seemed ‘more likely . . . that an announcement of a decision to withdraw in the mid-70s can be avoided’.¹⁵² A week later the last visitor to London arrived: Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. Like the others before him, he did the rounds of the key overseas policy ministers; unlike the others, he also extended his discussions to include other ministers in the Cabinet and, indeed, the Parliamentary Labour Party as a whole. Lee’s first meeting was with Denis Healey and Herbert Bowden, the Commonwealth Secretary. In their talks, Lee presented arguments very much in a similar vein to those he had put to Healey and Wilson before. His main stress was on the importance of maintaining confidence in the region, so that hostile forces would not stir and investment would not take flight, leaving Singapore in financial ruins. He warned of the ¹⁴⁹ PRO: PREM 13/1323: memcon, Denis Healey, Harold Holt, Allen Fairhall et al., London, 14/6/1967. ¹⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1323: memcon, James Callaghan, Harold Holt, et al., London, 15/6/1967. ¹⁵¹ NAA: A1838/346, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Harold Holt to John McEwen, tel. 7759, 16/6/1967. ¹⁵² NAA: A1838/346, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: AHC, London, to DEAC, tel. 7763, 16/6/1967.


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dangers that Britain would face if there were a crisis of confidence following an announcement of withdrawal: ‘the rot would set in, and Britain would actually have to send in more troops to salvage what she could of her interests in Singapore’.¹⁵³ He argued that two elements were necessary to prevent such a crisis: the British Government should make no statement which suggested that it was going to abandon the region, and the capability retained for use in Malaysia and Singapore should have credible value as a deterrent. Herbert Bowden spoke little, leaving Denis Healey with the task of reciting the usual litany of justifications the British had been providing for their proposals, in terms of economics and political pressures. Healey, however, added a further comment making clearer than before the extent of his sympathy for the allied position. He argued that, personally, he felt the British Government should only make a limited announcement of its intentions. It should state clearly that it would be running down its forces up to 1970/1. Beyond that, however, it should only say that it would be making further, unspecified reductions after 1970/1, but that it was committed to retaining a capability for use in the region for the foreseeable future. Such a course, Healey hoped, would be sufficient to maintain confidence in Malaysia and Singapore, while providing the necessary cuts to satisfy domestic political demands.¹⁵⁴ After this relatively congenial discussion with the overseas ministers, Lee moved on to the harder task of presenting his case to the critics of Britain’s defence role, both those in the wider Parliamentary Labour Party and specific ministers within the Cabinet. He spoke to Labour backbenchers and sought to persuade them that the continuing Western presence in Southeast Asia was not an instance of neo-imperialism. Those Asians seeking to evict the West were not necessarily speaking with pure motives: some wanted the West out so that ‘big Asian countries could settle their problems with the smaller ones’.¹⁵⁵ The smaller countries had the right to ask the West to help redress the balance. US Embassy officials heard that Lee’s speech had ‘real impact on some Labour MPs’ who had been critical of Britain’s defence role.¹⁵⁶ Richard Crossman noted, with irritation, that Lee had made an ‘immense impression’ on the Party.¹⁵⁷ ¹⁵³ PRO: PREM 13/1832: memcon, Denis Healey, Herbert Bowden, Lee Kuan Yew, et al., London, 22/6/1967. ¹⁵⁴ Ibid. ¹⁵⁵ Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 54. ¹⁵⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: John P. Roche to Lyndon Johnson, 29/6/1967. ¹⁵⁷ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 400.

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Lee supplemented his speech with private meetings with a number of the Cabinet critics: Barbara Castle, Roy Jenkins, Lord Gardiner, James Callaghan and Richard Crossman. He found almost all of these critics willing to listen though not to yield. Roy Jenkins sustained objections to Britain’s continuing defence role, but Lee hoped that their conversation had left Jenkins ‘slightly more amenable’.¹⁵⁸ A half hour meeting with Callaghan stretched into a one and a half hour discussion. Lee thought Callaghan ‘reasonable and open to persuasion’.¹⁵⁹ At the end of their meeting, Callaghan had indeed been slightly persuaded: he had been committed to naming a date for withdrawal publicly, but now, he claimed, he would ‘think over what you [Lee] have told me. I have an open mind.’¹⁶⁰ In contrast to Callaghan there was Richard Crossman, whom Lee found to be ‘very rude’, and ‘the most emotionally involved and voluble’.¹⁶¹ Lee recorded that for an hour Crossman ‘hectored and berated’ him on the need for Britain to withdraw rapidly from ‘East of Suez’.¹⁶² Crossman, in turn, noted that Lee looked ‘appalled and thunderstruck’ by his views.¹⁶³ Crossman told Lee that the pressure to withdraw was dominant at party level, but was supported only by a minority within Cabinet. He warned the Singapore Prime Minister: ‘For the time being you will have your way. But I shall win in the end.’¹⁶⁴ Lee noted the warning but was not cowed: he privately assessed that Crossman was ‘too extreme to carry weight’.¹⁶⁵ Lee was fairly satisfied at the close of his visit, which marked the substantive end of the British Government’s consultations with its allies. The Singapore Prime Minister had been struck by the despair of Labour MPs at the state of their Government and the country’s economic problems; was scornful of Labour’s ‘young intellectuals from the redbrick universities’—Lee had a double First from Cambridge—who were preoccupied with ‘vitamin pills, eye glasses, and bigger pensions’ but had ¹⁵⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 8574, 3/7/1967. ¹⁵⁹ Ibid. ¹⁶⁰ Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 54. ¹⁶¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 1305, 10/7/1967. ¹⁶² Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 55. ¹⁶³ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 400. ¹⁶⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Holt, 6/7/1967. ¹⁶⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Critchley to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 8574, 3/7/1967.


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no geopolitical awareness.¹⁶⁶ But he was also reasonably confident that, after his efforts, the likely outcome would accord with Healey’s own view: that the British Government should say it was looking towards withdrawal but would announce no date for it. The Singapore Prime Minister may have been feeling confident, but an inside observer would have felt much less certain of the likely conclusion to the Whitehall debates which raged through late June and early July 1967. For three weeks, concluding at the end of the first week of July, an intense argument took place within the British Government over the final details of how Britain would withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore. As had been the case in the consultations with allies, these arguments were not focused on the fact or rate of British withdrawal: these issues had been largely settled in April and May. Rather the main bone of contention was the extent to which British plans should be announced. Opinion was divided between two sides: those who felt that domestic—not least Labour Party—political pressures and the need to gain economic confidence made an announcement of withdrawal essential, and those who argued that the risks and damage to Britain’s international relations produced by an announcement would be too great. Through all of April and May 1967, OPD and the Cabinet had left the issue undecided. By the end of the first week of July, however, the Government needed to come to a decision on an announcement so that it could move forward to its planned defence statement in the middle of that month. The Whitehall departments were divided on whether there should be an announcement of the planned withdrawal. Opinion in the Treasury leaned towards the desirability of making a full public statement. Part of the reasoning was tactical: if such a public commitment were made, there would be less danger of the cuts being privately eroded by the efforts of the defence and overseas departments. Treasury officials also felt that the cuts being implemented to 1971 would be perceived as only taking spending ‘a very small margin . . . below its present level’.¹⁶⁷ ¹⁶⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 1305, 10/7/1967; LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, ‘British East of Suez’, 8/7/1967. ¹⁶⁷ PRO: T 225/3060: P. Nicholls to I.P. Bancroft, ‘Presentation of Defence Policy’, 8/6/1967.

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For the statement to have much impact on the financial markets, the Chancellor would have to be able to herald further cuts to come. But the Treasury’s reasoning was also couched in terms of political realism: there would be enormous political pressure to make cuts greater than those that would be announced for 1971; it was highly probable that the Government would be heavily questioned on its long-term planning beyond that date; whatever decisions were made would be very likely to leak. Thus the Treasury believed there was ‘no practical alternative to announcing our intentions’.¹⁶⁸ That said, it did not maintain its argument vociferously. In the Defence Review Working Party’s final report, the Treasury did not openly contradict the majority conclusion that there should be no announcement of the withdrawal, instead only reserving its position on the matter.¹⁶⁹ With the Treasury taking up this measured stance, the views of the foreign and defence policy departments prevailed at official level, in the DRWP’s report, and in the advice for ministers prepared by OPD(O). The Foreign and Commonwealth Offices and MOD together argued that even if British plans were leaked, it would be less damaging than if they were announced. All the allies were opposed to an announcement, and if the Government persisted against this opposition it would find it more difficult to achieve even the planned defence savings to 1970/1, not least because of the risk of damaging stability in Malaysia and especially Singapore. The overseas departments disputed the Treasury’s claim that the Government should be candid to prevent it losing the momentum for reductions: an internal agreement on the reductions, they claimed, would ensure that they would be achieved. And damaging publicity would make it harder to implement the cuts, not easier.¹⁷⁰ The Foreign Office’s opposition to an announcement, however, was not fully supported at ministerial level. Through June and into July 1967, a serious rift opened up on this question between Foreign Secretary George Brown and the officials in his ministry. At first, George Brown simply pronounced himself ‘not altogether impressed’ with the strength of arguments against an announcement.¹⁷¹ When Foreign Office staff continued to brief him on the same lines, he ¹⁶⁸ PRO: T 225/3060: C.T. McDonnell, ‘OPDO(67)11: Defence Expenditure Studies’, 14/6/1967. ¹⁶⁹ PRO: CAB 148/32: OPD(67)46: DRWP, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/6/1967. ¹⁷⁰ Ibid. ¹⁷¹ PRO: FCO 46/59: D.J.D. Maitland to R.A. Sykes, 17/6/1967.


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stuck to this position, saying that he was ‘not wholly persuaded’ by their arguments and ‘not happy’ with their recommendations.¹⁷² With Brown refusing to budge, the tone of Foreign Office advice became more stern. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the permanent head, told Brown that the Foreign Office was ‘quite unanimous in advocating this. We are entirely convinced that your interest as Foreign Secretary lies on this side of the argument’.¹⁷³ Other overseas ministers agreed. Junior Foreign Minister Fred Mulley added his weight to those against an announcement.¹⁷⁴ Denis Healey complained to the Australians that Brown, ‘against the advice of ‘‘his whole ministry’’, was pressing for an announcement’.¹⁷⁵ Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden expressed a strong hope that Brown would join him in opposing an announcement. But the Foreign Secretary’s response was firm: ‘He will not!’¹⁷⁶ Treasury officials observed that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary felt an announcement of the planned withdrawal was necessary ‘for the purpose of convincing opinion that the attack on defence expenditure overseas was being pressed hard enough’.¹⁷⁷ And Brown reinforced to his officials the pressures being exerted by such critics as the Lord President, Richard Crossman, who argued for an even faster withdrawal: ‘You’ll be very lucky to live with my proposal [and] not the Lord P’s!’¹⁷⁸ The intensity of these arguments was magnified by the fact that, for the first time, those within the Government were debating not simply the future of Britain’s defence forces but the fate of the country’s ‘worldwide role’. Before this point, the question of Britain’s role had very rarely been touched upon and never discussed in serious policy debate. It had been taken as an unquestioned and unexamined axiom that, even in a period when the Government at all levels had been seeking to reduce sharply Britain’s overseas activities, some semblance of a ‘world role’ would remain. In all the discussions from 1965 to early 1967 about a possible withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, ¹⁷² PRO: FCO 46/30: D.M. Day to R.A. Sykes, 27/6/1967. ¹⁷³ PRO: FCO 46/33: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, 30/6/1967. ¹⁷⁴ PRO: FCO 46/33: annotation by Fred Mulley on Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, 5/7/1967. ¹⁷⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4A: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 8450, 30/6/1967. ¹⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 46/33: annotation by George Brown on R.A. Sykes to Sir John Rennie, 30/6/1967. Emphasis in original. ¹⁷⁷ PRO: T 225/3061: P.R. Baldwin, ‘Public Expenditure: Defence’, 26/6/1967. ¹⁷⁸ PRO: FCO 46/33: annotation by George Brown on Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, 5/7/1967.

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the issues had been cast by British officials and ministers as a change in strategy within the Asia-Pacific region, never as an abandonment of that region altogether. Such were the nature of the cuts being considered in mid-1967, however, that Britain appeared on the brink not simply of a quantitative reduction in its forces, but a qualitative change in its strategic orientation and status. Privately, officials from all departments appeared prepared to admit and, indeed, to agree to this. The report from OPD(O), representing the views of all the concerned departments, was unequivocal about it. By the mid-1970s, it stated, ‘we shall have ceased to play a worldwide military role. We agree with this assessment.’¹⁷⁹ Britain would soon become a purely European power. The Foreign Office backed this stance, and advised George Brown to endorse it.¹⁸⁰ Yet while the defence and overseas departments were prepared to make the fundamental admission in private that Britain would cease to have a ‘world role’ in the mid-1970s, they were deeply unwilling to abandon the symbolic remnants of that role, or to present the defence reductions as a qualitative change in Britain’s posture. As noted above, they were strongly against any firm public announcement of British plans. Their preferred statement would have fudged the issue. Britain would be said to be looking to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore. But no date would be fixed, and it would be said that when the time came for departure a capability would be retained for use in the area, possibly with forces based in Australia if allies agreed.¹⁸¹ Moreover, none of the defence and overseas departments was prepared to outline what the retained capability should comprise, leading to suspicions from internal Government critics that they were waiting for a more politically propitious moment to reintroduce the idea of a major British overseas force. These concerns made Treasury officials question whether their colleagues in defence and overseas affairs were truly committed to eliminating the ‘worldwide role’. The Treasury regarded defence and overseas policy officials as having been forced to reconsider Britain’s role by the need for financial cuts, rather than through a willingness to accede to any strategic or political argument. Thus they seemed less concerned with radically rethinking Britain’s commitments than ¹⁷⁹ PRO: CAB 148/32: OPD(67)46: OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/6/1967. ¹⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 46/30: R.A. Sykes, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 23/6/1967. ¹⁸¹ PRO: CAB 148/32: OPD(67)46: DRWP, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/6/1967.


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with ‘salvaging what they can of our present worldwide role from the wreck’.¹⁸² There was a risk that they would surreptitiously reintroduce something like Britain’s current commitments by letting the role of the retained capability quietly creep upwards: the capability presented ‘the most immediate danger . . . of the revival of the concept of the worldwide role’.¹⁸³ The Treasury would have to monitor this carefully if it was to ensure that Britain did not remain committed across the globe. At the end of June and in early July 1967, these debates reached their ultimate conclusion. In OPD, and then in the Cabinet, ministers made final decisions on the pace and nature of the withdrawals, and what should be announced. In OPD, Denis Healey presented the conclusions of the Defence Expenditure Studies and the draft of the Defence White Paper that would be their public statement. His presentation followed by now well-established lines: proposing that forces in Malaysia and Singapore be reduced to half by 1970/1, and withdrawn altogether by 1975/6; and that, after this, a capability be retained for use in the area. He argued that the main issue in question was how the Government’s policy should be presented publicly. He described the strong representations made by all of Britain’s allies, and added that if the announcement of withdrawal was too dramatic, it could threaten the smooth achievement of the defence expenditure savings and undermine the stability of the Singapore Government. On these grounds, he made it clear that he supported officials’ advice from OPD(O) that judged it wiser not to make public the Government’s plans to 1975/6.¹⁸⁴ At this point, Richard Crossman broke in to argue that the planned rate of reductions was too slow. He felt the Government should actually adopt a faster rate of withdrawal. Its planned cuts were in political terms ‘dangerously slow’: it would be better if Britain could withdraw completely by 1970/1.¹⁸⁵ Crossman’s intervention was not well received. ¹⁸² PRO: T 225/3060: C.T. McDonnell, ‘OPDO(67)11: Defence Expenditure Studies’, 14/6/1967. ¹⁸³ PRO: T 225/3061: P. Nicholls, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: OPD(67)46’, 22/6/1967. ¹⁸⁴ PRO: CAB 148/30: OPD(67)24th Meeting, 28/6/1967. As noted earlier, Treasury officials on OPD(O) reserved their position on the issue of whether there should be an announcement. ¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

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It was pointed out by other members of the Committee that the rate of withdrawal had already been approved by ministers as the basis for consultation with allied Governments. To attempt to withdraw on a different basis would lead to further delays. Moreover, there were sound reasons in Britain’s own interests to continue to plan on this basis: a faster withdrawal would induce greater allied opposition and would threaten Singapore’s stability, and both of these possibilities would in turn damage Britain’s own ability to withdraw smoothly. With Crossman’s dissent quelled, OPD moved at a second meeting to decide the issue of how much to announce. The Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary were all privately known to be in favour of a full public statement, which suggested that the Defence and Commonwealth Secretaries would have little chance of stopping them.¹⁸⁶ So it proved, with the arguments for an announcement dominating the discussion: it was argued that the degree of leaks so far made it impossible to avoid some sort of public disclosure; an explanation of the rundown beyond 1971 was necessary; and, perhaps most importantly, without a clear public statement ‘the political advantages that would flow from an announcement of the decision would be lost’.¹⁸⁷ Thus the Committee decided in favour of an announcement. As a concession to those against, two caveats were attached, which partly derived from suggestions that had been aired in the consultations with the Australians: the target date of the ‘mid-1970s’ would be blurred publicly to mean ‘between 1973 and 1977’, and it would be stated that the precise date of departure would depend on ‘progress towards stability in the area and the solution of other associated problems’.¹⁸⁸ Coupled with the earlier decision to retain a continuing capability for use in Southeast Asia, these concessions meant that at least some symbolic tokens of Britain’s interest and role in the region would be retained. Three days later these conclusions were brought to the Cabinet to be ratified. Denis Healey presented the conclusions of the expenditure studies and the draft Defence White Paper, emphasizing the headline reductions in forces, costs and foreign exchange: £200 million in expenditure, and the effective elimination by 1975/6 of the balance of payments burden of overseas defence.¹⁸⁹ ¹⁸⁶ PRO: T 225/3061: Baldwin, ‘Public Expenditure: Defence’, 26/6/1967. ¹⁸⁷ PRO: CAB 148/30: OPD(67)25th Meeting, 3/7/1967. ¹⁸⁸ Ibid. ¹⁸⁹ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)45th Meeting, 6/7/1967.


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Against the Defence Secretary’s arguments, Richard Crossman spoke out once again in dissent, criticizing the proposed timing of the reductions and the promised capability that would be retained in the aftermath. He backed himself up more solidly this time with a paper he had circulated to the Cabinet outlining his arguments. He repeated his claims that a drawn out timetable for withdrawal was politically dangerous. It was more likely to be challenged and disrupted, and every revision of British plans would damage the Government’s credibility further: ‘the plan of withdrawal will be knocked sideways long before the process is over’.¹⁹⁰ A capability retained for use in Southeast Asia would be a ‘residual delusion of grandeur with which we would delude only ourselves’.¹⁹¹ He argued that the Cabinet should insist on a study of the possibility of complete withdrawal in five years or less. Crossman’s arguments, however, were met by a counter-paper tabled by the Commonwealth Secretary, Herbert Bowden. He pointed to the many statements of opposition Britain’s allies had already lodged to an announcement of withdrawal in the mid-1970s. He argued that it would be difficult to gain their co-operation in implementing the Government’s policies unless the British made some concession to their wishes. If the Government did not do this, but took an even further step backwards and sought to withdraw on a shorter timetable, the consequences would be grievous. The allies would ‘accuse [Britain] of [negotiating in] bad faith and there would be bitter recrimination in all four [Commonwealth] countries’.¹⁹² The economic effects on Singapore would be disastrous, while all of Southeast Asia would be thrown into political uncertainty. The effect of the two conflicting papers was, as Treasury officials noted, to ‘cancel each other out’.¹⁹³ The Lord President could not obtain a faster withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore or the abandonment of a residual capability; nor could the Commonwealth Secretary avoid an announcement of British plans to the mid-1970s. While the Cabinet record noted that there was ‘some support’ for a faster withdrawal, the ‘general view’ was that it was ‘not realistic’ to change the timetable ¹⁹⁰ PRO: CAB 129/131: C(67)116: Richard Crossman, ‘Defence Withdrawals’, 3/7/1967. ¹⁹¹ Ibid. ¹⁹² PRO: CAB 129/131: C(67)119: Herbert Bowden, ‘Far East Defence: Consultations with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore’, 4/7/1967. ¹⁹³ PRO: T 225/3061: I.P. Bancroft to R.G. Lavelle, ‘Defence Expenditure: C(67) 116, 118, 119, 120, 121’, 5/7/1967.

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which had been the basis for the consultations with all the allies.¹⁹⁴ On the question of making an announcement, it was ‘strongly urged’ that the Government make its decision public according to the formula that OPD had passed, as it would prevent any of the defence savings being eroded, and would allow the Government to receive full publicity on the extent of savings it was achieving up to the mid-1970s. Thus, the Cabinet decided in favour of making an announcement and agreed to pass, with only minor amendments in wording, the defence proposals and White Paper as had been approved before in OPD. On 18 July 1967, the British Government released its Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy.¹⁹⁵ It announced that British forces in Malaysia and Singapore would be halved by 1970/1, and that Britain would withdraw from its bases there altogether ‘in the middle 1970s’, the precise timing dependent on ‘progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in Southeast Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East’.¹⁹⁶ Significant though these announcements were, they were cushioned by phrases carefully crafted to suggest that Britain was not renouncing its ‘world role’. It was argued that Britain should continue to have a role in security beyond Europe, because of its own interests and those of its dependencies, friends, and allies. The British Government would continue to honour its obligations to SEATO and AMDA, though it would modify the way these commitments were met. While Britain might be withdrawing from its overseas bases because their cost was too high, it would still maintain the capacity to intervene across the globe: new aircraft would enable forces to be moved around the world quickly and in large numbers; these technologically sophisticated forces were the most valuable contribution Britain could make to its friends and allies. Importantly, the paper stressed that ‘we cannot assume that . . . we shall never again have to use our forces in the Far East’.¹⁹⁷ Thus a military capability would be retained for use in the area. While it would be stationed in Britain, some naval and amphibious forces would ‘probably’ be kept in East Asia, and facilities could be used in Australia and the Indian Ocean.¹⁹⁸ ¹⁹⁴ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)45th Meeting, 6/7/1967. ¹⁹⁵ Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967, Cmnd 3357 (London: HMSO, July 1967).

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., paras 6, 8.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 9.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 10.


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The response in allied capitals was mixed. The Malaysians were the most relaxed. The Tunku, who had been visiting London at the time of the final Cabinet decisions, had privately told Harold Wilson that ‘he could not follow [the] argument’ of those objecting to a withdrawal: ‘If Britain decided that she must withdraw, it would be unreasonable to object, since she bore most of the burden.’¹⁹⁹ As long as Britain did not appear to be abandoning the area, or encouraging Communist aggression, there would be no problem. Publicly, the Tunku upheld that view. After the withdrawal was announced, he stated that he remained ‘quite happy’, so long as the British continued to honour their treaty obligations and consulted on the implementation of their reductions.²⁰⁰ The other allies were rather less content. Harold Holt remarked bitterly to Lee Kuan Yew that he felt the attempts at negotiation had been a charade, for the British decisions ‘appear[ed], in retrospect, to have been made in substance before any of us embarked on our exercises of persuasion’.²⁰¹ The British Ambassador in Washington observed that Robert McNamara appeared ‘extremely sad and dismayed at our decisions’, while the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, emphasized his own ‘extreme disappointment’ and was sceptical that the decisions had ‘any real relevance to [Britain’s] economic position’.²⁰² But none of the allies wished to express such severe opinions in public for fear of damaging confidence in the region further. Harold Holt stated to the press that his Government ‘very much regret[ted]’ that the British were planning a withdrawal so far ahead, but ‘welcome[d]’ the decision to maintain a military capability in the region.²⁰³ The US Administration also expressed disappointment, but publicly suggested that they still felt it possible for them to persuade the British Government not to withdraw completely from the Southeast Asian bases in the mid-1970s.²⁰⁴ At a press conference, Secretary of State Dean Rusk drew attention to the ¹⁹⁹ PRO: CAB 133/359: CMV(67)2nd Meeting: memcon, Harold Wilson, Tunku Abdul Rahman et al., London, 5/7/1967. ²⁰⁰ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 5: AHC, Kuala Lumpur, to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel. 1820, 22/7/1967. ²⁰¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Harold Holt to Lee Kuan Yew, tel. 1514, 14/7/1967. ²⁰² PRO: FCO 46/49: Sir Patrick Dean to FO, tel. 2380, 17/7/1967. ²⁰³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 6: press briefing by Harold Holt to Heads of Bureaux in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, Canberra, 19/7/1967; A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, tel. 1344, 15/7/1967. ²⁰⁴ ‘US hope to stem withdrawal’, The Times, 19/7/1967, p. 1.

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British caveat that the withdrawal would not occur without taking into account the prevailing political situation.²⁰⁵ Rusk’s assurance, however, was somewhat undermined by the British Prime Minister when, under tough questioning in the Commons, Harold Wilson clumsily ended up contradicting his own new policy. When asked by Edward Heath whether the Government would leave Malaysia and Singapore even if the area were not stable in the mid1970s, Wilson first tried to duck the question. Asked again whether the Government would withdraw even in the midst of instability, Wilson capitulated: ‘Yes, Sir. We intend to withdraw by the middle 1970s.’²⁰⁶ He justified this by claiming that staying even longer would be likely to provoke even greater instability. The uncertainty the Prime Minister’s remark created, however, was quickly damped down. The Commonwealth Office rushed a message to Kuala Lumpur stating firmly that Wilson’s comments should not be interpreted as a change in policy. The White Paper had already noted that it was not possible to plan in detail after 1970/1: ‘it would therefore be unprofitable to look for too precise an indication of our intentions’.²⁰⁷ The Malaysian Government was unflustered in response. While the Defence Minister, Tun Razak, publicly noted the divergence between Wilson’s comment and the White Paper’s policy, he then indicated that his own government would continue to rely on the written statements of policy contained in that Paper and in Wilson’s correspondence to the Tunku.²⁰⁸ At home, the Government received criticism from both sides. Shadow Defence Secretary Enoch Powell attacked the ‘arbitrary’ expenditure targets. He argued that the announcement of a date for withdrawal repeated the mistakes of Aden, and now risked stirring up elements hostile to Britain pushing for a faster retreat.²⁰⁹ But his arguments were undercut by Denis Healey highlighting a continuing split on the Conservative front bench, where Powell wanted Britain to shed its worldwide role while others wanted it maintained.²¹⁰ In contrast, from both wings of the Labour Party long-standing critics of the ²⁰⁵ ‘Understanding for British decision’, The Times, 20/7/1967, p. 4. ²⁰⁶ Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 751, p. 1103, 27/7/1967. ²⁰⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1457: CO to BHC, Kuala Lumpur, ‘Defence Policy’, tel. 795, 31/7/1967. ²⁰⁸ PRO: PREM 13/1457: Sir Michael Walker to CO, tel. 753, 2/8/1967. ²⁰⁹ Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 751, cols 1013, 1017, 27/7/1967. ²¹⁰ Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 751, cols 1006–9, 27/7/1967.


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‘East of Suez’ role were united in the view that the Government was moving in the right direction, but not quickly or firmly enough. In both the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting and the House of Commons debate afterwards, the Labour critics argued that the costs of the slow rundown would damage domestic social programmes. If the Government was concerned about the economic or social consequences of a faster withdrawal on Singapore, it should provide direct aid, rather than the inefficient subsidy of a defence presence. They suggested that the real reason for the gradual rundown was pressure from the United States and Australia.²¹¹ At least some major figures, however, had been placated by the Government’s decisions. Barbara Castle was privately exasperated by the continuing criticism from her colleagues: ‘They really are the limit. Can’t they realise there has been a revolution in our defence policy and that East of Suez is dead?’²¹² But few others were willing to admit to this interpretation. Domestic critics on the Left wanted to argue that sharper and harder defence cuts were still possible. Defence and foreign policy officials and allied governments wanted to suggest that continuity and stability were still being maintained. The period from April to July 1967 opened with the Wilson Government having already made a provisional decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore by half in 1970/1, and completely in 1975/6. For the four months of the period, however, the Government was caught up in an intense battle over the precise details of how a withdrawal would be implemented, especially the issues of what continuing role Britain would have in the region, and if and how the withdrawal would be publicly announced. These were not fundamental questions of Britain’s military posture—a problem that had already been effectively decided in favour of withdrawal—but rather questions over the presentation and meaning of the withdrawal. Nevertheless, they were still deeply significant issues: ‘East of Suez’ and the ‘world role’ were more statements of political intent and outlook than military doctrines. Depending on how the withdrawal was presented, Britain might be interpreted as a continuing, albeit slimming, world power, or as a country whose international role was being discarded. The importance of these issues is attested by the ²¹¹ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes: Card 261, 19/7/1967; Hansard, Session 1966/7, vol. 751, cols 985ff., 27/7/1967. ²¹² Castle, Diaries, p. 143.

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intensity of the arguments that took place through the period. It was not simply a dispute between Britain and its allies, whose adverse reaction was predictable, given their obvious interests and the objections they had raised to British plans previously. It was also an argument between different Government departments, between officials and ministers, and within the Cabinet. Consensus had completely dissolved into conflict. What forces and interests caused the policy process to become so fractious? The stances taken by Britain’s allies were anchored in what were well established as being their interests: for the United States, to retain symbolic and actual backing in Southeast Asia from the Western allies while it prosecuted the Vietnam War; for Australia and New Zealand, to ensure the long-term security and stability of the region which formed their northern perimeter. Malaysia and Singapore had a similar interest in Southeast Asian stability, but from their perspective this could be maintained just as easily by the Americans and Australians as by the British. Coupled to the domestic political advantages of being seen to be independent from the former colonial power, this meant that the two regional governments took a rather more ambivalent stance on the British withdrawal than did the ANZUS powers. Within the British Government, the position of the overseas departments reflected their judgement of Britain’s overseas interests. They did not argue fundamentally against a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore: though they had been pushed unhappily into accepting the timetable, they had ultimately acceded to a withdrawal in principle, and were prepared to acknowledge its long-term strategic logic. But they did argue that a withdrawal had to be undertaken in a manner that would not lose allied co-operation or contribute to instability in the region: either risk held severe dangers and could ultimately jeopardize the withdrawal itself. On this basis, the defence and overseas departments favoured the maintenance of a British capability in the region after withdrawal, and argued strongly against any announcement of the Government’s plans to 1975/6. In contrast, the Treasury was suspicious that a continued capability would lead to higher defence costs. And it argued, though not vehemently, for an announcement of the withdrawal as necessary to build economic confidence, and because the plans would be impossible to hide in any case. The position of Britain’s allies and the debates between departments, however, did not ultimately have a decisive impact on the policy outcome. Departmental officials’ pique at how they were being sidelined


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in the policy process was strongly in evidence in the degree to which they leaked and briefed against their own Government to overseas allies—a sharp contrast to the solidarity they had maintained during the 1965 Defence Review. In deciding how a British withdrawal should be announced and what, if any, symbolic remnant of the former British presence should be retained, the Wilson Government was deciding a largely political issue; and it did so with reference not only to international political considerations and their possible consequences, but also to its own domestic political circumstances. The judgement of the Cabinet’s most important figures on defence and foreign policy—Harold Wilson, George Brown and Denis Healey—was key. All three were in favour of maintaining a capability for use in Southeast Asia. They clearly regarded this kind of concession as necessary if the Government were to gain even the grudging acquiescence of its overseas allies. The existence of the capability meant that Britain would not have to abrogate its commitments unilaterally. It could be used to suggest that a British role in the region was still being upheld—a symbolic token of a remaining ‘world role’. To the Americans, it would help maintain confidence while they were fighting the Vietnam War—even if the proposal as yet involved no specified forces, deployments or costs. With the case for the capability presented so innocuously, the Chancellor did not appear to object strongly to it. While the home ministers—and possibly even the majority of them—might have been opposed, the Prime Minister could still tilt the Cabinet to support this last remaining token of Britain’s Southeast Asian role. In contrast, Wilson and Brown split from Healey on the issue of whether to announce the British withdrawal. Against their officials’ advice, both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were strongly in favour, and were at one with the majority of ministers in OPD and the Cabinet on that matter. The Defence Secretary was backed only by the Commonwealth Secretary, but this was counterbalanced by Richard Crossman, who argued strongly for an even more radical retrenchment of British defence forces. The case for an announcement might have been weak in terms of policy or international politics—no Whitehall department argued strongly for it—but it is clear even from the veiled official record of OPD and the Cabinet that domestic political considerations were uppermost in ministers’ minds. Their exact calculation cannot be known—unsurprisingly, these ministers have all glossed over their political motives in their memoirs—but their

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reasoning can easily be guessed. Presumably, a government which had recently faced a major revolt on defence would not want to deny itself the benefits of making a major public announcement of changes to that policy. And a government that was popularly perceived to have lost its way would certainly want to maximize the advantages to be gained from showing that it was implementing new policies and finding a fresh direction.

Conclusion to Part II Why did the Wilson Government take only 18 months to repudiate the policies it had announced in its 1966 Defence White Paper? How was a commitment to maintain the British bases in Malaysia and Singapore for ‘as long as conditions allowed’ transformed into a determination to withdraw British forces from the region entirely by the mid-1970s, save for an undefined capability that was to be used in the area afterwards? As was argued in Part I, the underlying issue the Government faced in considering its defence policy in Southeast Asia was how to resolve the conflict between its economic interests and its desire to maintain Britain’s relations and standing with its major allies, especially the United States. In the period from March 1966 to July 1967, that conflict was fundamentally resolved, with the decision to withdraw in two stages from Malaysia and Singapore, against the express views of the ANZUS powers. This resolution, however, was not simply arrived at through a measured process of policy development. For, just as the issue was belatedly being broached by the Government’s formal mechanisms for reviewing policy, any full consideration of it was swept aside by the demands of Cabinet and Labour Party politics. The conflict between Britain’s interests started to become apparent soon after the Defence White Paper was published in early 1966. Britain and the ANZUS allies failed to come to any agreement over quadripartite co-operation thanks to the inherent contradiction in British aims, which on the one hand sought to bind the country securely to its major allies, and on the other hand hoped to minimize the British exposure in Southeast Asia. Then the sterling crisis in the summer of 1966 sharpened the conflict again, by emphasizing the parlous state of the country’s finances. It ultimately spawned new Defence Expenditure Studies, with the Treasury being much more determined than before to seek sharp cuts to defence spending. This process should have finally confronted, debated, and resolved the contradictions of British

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policy: but it did not. Instead, the Treasury and the political departments continually haggled over what might or might not be examined in the new studies, what options might or might not be put forward. This played out for five months, and had reached no useful conclusion when, in February 1967, it was suddenly overtaken by domestic political events. The great turning point of the period was the Parliamentary defence debate and vote in February 1967. Before this point, British defence policy in Southeast Asia had been almost wholly the province of the interested Whitehall departments and their ministers. The Cabinet had had little sighting of any policy issues, and almost no chance to review them seriously. The Parliamentary Labour Party had raised its voice occasionally, but had been fundamentally ignored. But the February defence vote acted like a lightning conductor for all the tension that had built up on defence policy, energizing all those who had been unhappy but quiescent on the issue finally to speak out. From this point on, the logic of the policy process was dominated by the politics of Cabinet and the wider Parliamentary Labour Party, and the judgement by senior ministers of what needed to be done to secure their domestic political support. The Whitehall departments, most notably the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, were largely sidelined—their impotence made manifest in their leaking to Britain’s allies with the hope of gaining some influence on ministers. After the defence vote, Denis Healey, as Defence Secretary, rushed through plans for a two stage withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore as a means of forestalling any wider Cabinet revolt on the issue. These plans were never appraised for their wider political and strategic consequences. The logic of their existence was determined purely by the need to satisfy Cabinet pressures for a withdrawal from Southeast Asia, while preventing a short term liquidation of the British position. Even then, the Cabinet was hostile, and the plan was only saved by the Prime Minister’s careful deferment of final decisions. The major issue for the remainder of the period was no longer one of strategic fundamentals—for those had now been effectively decided—but one regarding the politics and presentation of withdrawal: how much the Government should assuage its allies by minimizing the public change in policy and maximizing the remnants of Britain’s role; versus how much it needed to emphasize that change for domestic political advantage. On these issues, the Government’s decisions mollified, though did not wholly satisfy, both sides.

Conclusion to Part II

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The Cabinet was the major forum for decision making, with the Prime Minister, Defence and Foreign Secretaries the most important and authoritative figures. Wilson, Brown and Healey were the ones who judged that Britain needed to retain a capability for use in Southeast Asia after the withdrawal, if the Government were to obtain even the reluctant acceptance of the plans by its international allies. Many of the other ministers within the Cabinet, however, were critical of this concession. In view of their opposition, Denis Healey had to minimize the proposed capability to little more than a symbolic token of Britain’s role to cover the fact of withdrawal. It had no defined size, deployment or cost, and could not do so for fear of raising greater ministerial hostility. Even then, the Cabinet’s acquiescence was only won through the Prime Minister’s power to summarize the discussion according to his will and judgement. Having gained this concession, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary went with the clear majority in OPD and Cabinet on the final important issue regarding the withdrawal—whether or not it should be announced. No departmental advice was strongly in favour of an announcement. No convincing argument in policy or strategic terms was widely propounded in its favour. But clearly, when deciding this issue of politics and presentation, ministers judged that the domestic benefits deriving from an announcement outweighed the other liabilities. Only Denis Healey and Herbert Bowden defended the case against an announcement: the others, with Harold Wilson and George Brown leading them, appeared to hope that a public statement of new policy would refresh the Government and consolidate its parliamentary base. In deciding on and announcing a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore for the mid-1970s, the British Government finally committed itself to a major change to its policies in Southeast Asia. It had largely resolved the conflict between its economic interests and its desire to maintain its relations with its significant allies. Economic interests were met by the decision for an almost complete British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. International political interests were partly assuaged by shielding the announcement with the symbolic remnants of Britain’s ‘worldwide role’—not only the continuing military capability for use in Southeast Asia, but also the insistence that Britain would still contribute to security around the globe, and would still be willing to intervene internationally for its own interests or those of its allies. These qualifications meant that, while some of Britain’s allies were

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displeased by the decisions, none was irremediably offended. The Wilson Government had managed to achieve a fundamental change to British foreign policy without causing significant damage to the country’s international relations or standing. But while the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy was not concealing a major gulf between the Government’s public plans and private intentions, as had the 1966 Defence White Paper, it had opened up a disjunction between a fundamental posture of retreat, and the language and symbolism of a continuing world role. Britain’s underlying orientation was shifting profoundly, but the nature and extent of the change had been publicly fudged to smooth over the controversy. The rhetoric of British power was persisting even when its substantive core in Southeast Asia was slowly but surely being withdrawn: allies could highlight it to demonstrate that security and confidence in the region could be maintained; critics could point to it to show that a last residual burden of Empire still had to be discarded.

PART III BREAKDOWN


7 A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January 1968 Devaluation came as a profound defeat. On 18 November 1967, the Wilson Government was forced to announce a devaluation of the pound against the US dollar, signifying that the Government’s economic policies over the previous three years had completely failed. The Government had been desperately trying to avoid this outcome, fearful of branding the Labour Party forever as the party of economic mismanagement, after the Attlee Government’s similar experience in 1949. During the process of devaluation and its aftermath, the Wilson Government undertook a third, wrenching reappraisal of defence policy. Once again the Government came to repudiate policies it had only recently announced. In its January 1968 statement of measures to shore up the British economy after devaluation, it completely revised its defence policies towards Southeast Asia. The withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore was sharply accelerated to conclude in only three years’ time, in December 1971 rather than the ‘mid-1970s’. Britain would retain no specific military capability for use in the region after it had withdrawn. And, perhaps most important in psychological terms, the Government declared that Britain was fundamentally a European power, that it had to come to terms with having only a limited role in the world. ‘East of Suez’, the ‘worldwide role’, the claim to be the ‘world’s policeman’: all these were gone. Devaluation and the end to ‘East of Suez’ are commonly perceived to have come together, in one fell swoop. But, as this chapter will show, the process was less straightforward, and more subject to contingency and politics, than that perception would suggest. After briefly covering the state of affairs between the July 1967 statement and devaluation, the chapter will examine the circumstances of devaluation itself. As part of the package immediately accompanying

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devaluation, the Government implemented defence cuts, but these were not supposed to affect the basic lines of defence and foreign policy. Following devaluation, Roy Jenkins replaced James Callaghan as Chancellor of the Exchequer. A notably liberal Home Secretary and on his appointment the youngest member of the Cabinet, Jenkins would prove to be a tough Chancellor. Under Jenkins’ stewardship, the Treasury embarked in December 1967 on a second round of measures to shore up the British economy. For a month, ending in mid-January, the British Government was consumed by an intense battle to decide the extent of the measures, which affected not only defence policy, but all aspects of Government expenditure, including many of the Labour Party’s most cherished domestic policies. The battle on defence policy went through four stages. In the first stage, Jenkins set out the measures he proposed to implement. The second stage comprised the initial Cabinet debates on the economic measures. The third witnessed the sharp reaction of Britain’s allies and much of the defence and foreign policy establishment against Jenkins’ proposals. The last stage saw the Cabinet reaching its final decisions on Britain’s defence policy in Southeast Asia and the fate of Britain’s world role. After the July 1967 Supplementary Statement on Defence, British defence policy in Southeast Asia appeared to have been settled for the foreseeable future. The only activity in the following months was attempts to examine how security in the region should be developed once the British had withdrawn. The main moves on this front came from the Malaysian Government, which tried to induce the British into attending a five-power conference on defence in the region, involving, as well as these two governments, those of Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. During the July consultations the idea of such a conference had been floated by the Tunku as a means of developing a security structure for the region during and after the British withdrawal. The British Government had expressed sympathy at the time but made no commitment. Now that the British plans had been officially announced, the Tunku pushed the idea of a conference with greater vigour. The response within the British Government was mixed. The Prime Minister was strongly against the idea, fearing that a meeting with the other four allies would lead to Britain being put ‘in the dock’.¹ But British officials in Kuala Lumpur noted that the idea of the five-power ¹ PRO: PREM 13/1457: Michael Palliser to D.A. Macleod, 21/8/1967.

A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January 1968

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conference was helping the Malaysian Government manage the political fallout from the announcement of the withdrawal. If the British rebuffed the Malaysians too strongly, the smoothness of their own rundown could be impaired.² The Australians were similarly ambivalent. On the one hand they were wary, probably fearing that they would be left holding a commitment to Malaysia and Singapore while Britain was in retreat.³ On the other hand, with Britain withdrawing, some sort of multilateral discussion was probably the best way to sort out security in the future.⁴ The ambivalence of the two governments induced a similar reaction in each: they both sought to have the conference delayed until the following year. The British excused themselves on the grounds that a productive conference would require a lot of preparatory work and the Government had not yet thought through the issues.⁵ The Australians had a similar excuse: they were currently reviewing their defence posture, and so would not be ready for discussions until the next year.⁶ Their tactics succeeded, and the five-power conference was put off until 1968. It thus appeared, by the early autumn of 1967, that the possibility of any new movement on British defence policy towards Malaysia and Singapore had now completely subsided. The fallout from July’s major reorientation of policy seemed to have settled. When Walter Heller, Chairman of the US Government’s Council of Economic Advisers, visited London, he observed that the British Government was ‘obviously relieved to have this decision behind it without a major adverse effect on US-UK relations’.⁷ Low-level rumbling about defence policy continued in the outer reaches of the Labour Party: there was an unsuccessful motion at the October Party Conference that the ‘East of Suez’ reductions should be accelerated, while the Parliamentary Party continued to be restless on Vietnam.⁸ But as far as the central defence ² PRO: PREM 13/1457: Sir Michael Walker to CO, ‘Proposed Five Power Talks’, tel. 824, 24/8/1967. ³ PRO: PREM 13/1457: BHC, Canberra, to CO, tel. 1184, 17/8/1967. ⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1457: BHC, Canberra, to CO, ‘Five-Power Talks’, tel. 1239, 25/8/1967. ⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1457: CO to BHC, Kuala Lumpur, tel. 863, 22/8/1967. ⁶ PRO: PREM 13/1457: BHC, Canberra, to CO, ‘Defence and Internal Politics’, 20/9/1967. ⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Walter Heller to Lyndon Johnson, 9/9/1967. ⁸ ‘Government defeated on Vietnam and Greece’, The Times, 5/10/1967, p. 7; Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes: Card 261, 8/11/1967.

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and foreign policy organs were concerned, British policy was now fixed. The settlement did not last. In the autumn of 1967, the position of the pound once again became increasingly precarious. Waves of offshore selling were making it increasingly difficult for the Bank of England to defend sterling at its pegged value of US$2.80. Continuing strife on the docks contributed to a quadrupling of Britain’s trade deficit, from £81 million a month in the third quarter, to £159 million in September and £331 million in October.⁹ The devaluation the Labour Government had been consistently trying to avoid, for historic as well as economic reasons, loomed increasingly closer. If a devaluation were to succeed, the Government had to implement stringent economic measures to help bolster the pound at its new level. Since 1965, the Treasury had regularly convened a top secret committee of officials to maintain a ‘war book’ of actions that would need to be taken in the event of a devaluation.¹⁰ As the crunch loomed ever closer in the autumn of 1967, the committee worked with increasing urgency on what measures would need to be implemented. Its thinking was guided by the likely circumstances of any devaluation. In a crisis, a decision would have to be taken quickly, and there would be no time for a lengthy political debate over any measures that were too controversial: ‘Consultation with Ministers will be minimal: the Treasury must itself form a view of what is required and what can be achieved.’¹¹ The need for stringent cuts would have to be balanced against a pragmatic political judgement of what it would be possible to achieve under highly pressured circumstances. This tension appears to have produced a degree of ambivalence in the committee’s views on what cuts needed to be imposed on defence spending. Economic officials argued that any cuts needed ‘to demonstrate our determination to withdraw from a worldwide military role’: ‘new policy decisions, involving the reopening of the Defence Review, can (indeed must) be made’.¹² But they also recognized the need to work with the Defence Secretary. It was important that the ⁹ Cairncross, Managing the British Economy, p. 183. ¹⁰ PRO: T 230/878–82; T 312/1398–1401, 1635–7: FU Committee. ¹¹ PRO: T 230/879: FU(67)19 (Revise): ‘Accompanying Measures: Public Expenditure’, 26/10/1967. Emphasis in original. ¹² PRO: T 230/879: FU(67)19 (4th Revise): ‘Accompanying Measures: Public Expenditure’, Annex A: ‘Defence Expenditure’, 14/11/1967.


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proposed cuts ‘not unnecessarily impair international confidence in our soundness as an ally’.¹³ Similarly, at ministerial level, as senior ministers scrambled to agree on a package that could go to the Cabinet, opinions on what part defence and foreign policy cuts should play were divided. As always, Richard Crossman took the toughest line. He argued to the Prime Minister that devaluation would be a ‘Churchillian’ move, but could only work if accompanied by ‘really major defence cuts’, including a rapid withdrawal from the Middle East and East Asia, and the scrapping of the F111 and the nuclear deterrent.¹⁴ The Prime Minister was not unsympathetic. He later noted to President Johnson that he had not been able to see any way of securing the necessary savings ‘without major changes in our defence posture both in Europe and East of Suez, going far beyond the decisions announced in our Defence White Paper four months ago’.¹⁵ George Brown, as Foreign Secretary, was ambivalent. On the one hand, he judged that a potential Labour Party rebellion against too severe a deflationary package could be headed off by severe defence cuts: ‘if the package included total withdrawal from Singapore by 1970, this would help carry the Party’.¹⁶ On the other, he also pointed out that no possible changes to foreign policy would make any savings available in the coming year.¹⁷ But Denis Healey was adamantly opposed to any reversal of a defence policy that was only four months old. Instead, he offered to find £55–60 million of savings in the defence budget which could be implemented without changing overarching policy.¹⁸ With this offer on the table and the Defence Secretary resistant to any more dramatic cuts, the possibility of a sharp change in overseas policy disappeared off the agenda. On 16 November 1967, the Chancellor, James Callaghan, brought the devaluation package to the Cabinet. No paper on the measures was circulated in advance or even at the meeting itself. Instead, the Chancellor gave only an oral explication of the reasons for devaluation and the measures he proposed. He grimly admitted that in reaching this juncture the Labour Government had failed: it was ‘the most agonising reappraisal I have ever had to do and I will not pretend that it is anything ¹³ Ibid. ¹⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1447: Richard Crossman to Harold Wilson, 13/11/1967. ¹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1447: Harold Wilson to Lyndon Johnson, 17/11/1967; also, PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins and Sir William Armstrong, London, 7/12/1967. ¹⁶ PRO: T 230/877: M.V. Hawtin, ‘Contingency Planning’, 14/11/1967. ¹⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1447: George Brown to Harold Wilson, 15/11/1967. ¹⁸ Ibid.

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but a failure of our policies’.¹⁹ The package he presented comprised £500 million of cuts necessary to shore up sterling at its new level. The bulk of these savings would take place in civil expenditure, but, as Callaghan admitted to the Cabinet, these ‘would not be politically acceptable without further economies in defence expenditure’.²⁰ Thus the Chancellor had consulted the Defence Secretary further, and had extracted greater savings to take the defence cuts to £110 million. These changes, however, would be achieved ‘without significant changes in foreign commitments and policy’.²¹ Instead, they would be focused on cutting spending on research and development, and by adjusting the forces’ rate of re-equipment. With only the Chancellor’s oral description to go by, the Cabinet barely had a chance to question the package. Some were outraged at Callaghan’s tactics. Richard Crossman recorded himself as loudly complaining that he had ‘never seen business done in such a deplorably incompetent way’.²² Roy Jenkins also objected, arguing that ‘we can’t have these decisions taken in a split second’.²³ But the ability of the Cabinet to resist the Chancellor’s package was limited when there was no evident alternative at hand. The decision to devalue sterling was endorsed unanimously and, after some discussion, the rate of parity and accompanying measures were agreed to as well. With the Cabinet’s agreement in hand, James Callaghan sent a grim one-line note to US Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler indicating the looming change in policy: ‘There is a limit to the hammering we can take.’²⁴ The next day, on 18 November 1967, the Chancellor announced that the pound would be devalued by 14.3%. Foreign and defence policy officials rushed to assure the allies that the change in policy would not radically affect Britain’s stance. Denis Healey explained to Robert McNamara that he had been anxious not to change the programme outlined in July, especially Britain’s commitments, deployments and capabilities. Thus he had focused the new round of cuts on refinements of current expenditure, and rephasing of previously planned changes. The main change to Britain’s defence programme would be to cancel a proposed joint US–UK base in the Indian Ocean. This would have a substantial political impact in terms of ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²² ²⁴

Castle, Diaries, p. 162. PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)66th Meeting, 16/11/1967. ²¹ Ibid. Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 575. ²³ Ibid., pp. 575–6. LBJL: Papers of Henry H. Fowler: James Callaghan to Henry Fowler, 17/11/1967.


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savings, he hoped, without incurring too great a loss in military value.²⁵ Similar messages were sent to the other allied Governments.²⁶ Publicly, in the House of Commons, Denis Healey maintained the line that the Government was continuing to implement its policies from July 1967, with the present round of cuts only affecting minor equipment and research and development.²⁷ James Callaghan, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was deeply wounded by the failure of economic policy that was crystallized by devaluation. At the end of November, after the panic of the event had calmed down, he was relieved of his position, swapping jobs with the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins. Jenkins’ honeymoon as the new Chancellor was short-lived. Within a week of his arrival he was in serious discussions with the permanent head of the Treasury, Sir William Armstrong, on implementing further stern measures to shore up the pound, still very fragile at its reduced rate. Jenkins declared from the outset his belief that the Government’s measures would have greater public and political impact if it did not attempt to make piecemeal cuts at the margin, but instead implemented a strategy involving a single package of deep cuts. Moreover, a ‘necessary condition’ for any Cabinet acceptance of substantial civil cuts would be a prior agreement to ‘very big cuts’ to defence expenditure.²⁸ Sir William agreed, and noted that the most likely area for these defence cuts would be a faster withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ and the cancellation of several expensive aircraft programmes, including the purchase of the F111. The day after their conversation, on 8 December 1967, Treasury officials began the task of examining the possible range of defence cuts. They brooked no interference from the Ministry of Defence in their initial investigations: on the contrary, one Treasury official declared firmly to another that ‘we will not, of course, consult the Ministry of Defence’.²⁹ The MOD would more likely than not prove to be obstructive. Only in the past few days and weeks, it had taken actions ²⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Denis Healey to Robert McNamara, ‘Defence Impacts of New Economic Measures’, 19/11/1967. ²⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 6: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, tel. 14691, 20/11/1967. ²⁷ Hansard, Session 1967/8, vol. 755, cols 43ff., 27/11/1967. ²⁸ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins and Sir William Armstrong, London, 7/12/1967. ²⁹ PRO: T 225/3066: I.P. Bancroft to M.V. Hawtin, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 8/12/1967.

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that would make the achievement of any further cuts more difficult: after devaluation, Denis Healey had put himself on record in the House as committing the Government to sticking to its July 1967 plans; on the same basis, discussions had taken place with allied governments on the shape of the forthcoming rundown. It would be better if the Treasury had a strong idea in mind of what it wanted to achieve, before it began what were likely to be difficult negotiations with the defence and foreign policy departments. Within a few days, Treasury officials had developed a clearer sense of their aims. They were firm, but not unrestrained, in their ambitions. It was carefully noted that, however drastic the changes that might be proposed, they would have little economic effect until after 1969/70. Moreover, if the proposals were unrealistically severe, Britain’s allies would be more likely to force the plans to be watered down, and this would undermine the cuts’ credibility. Thus it was agreed that the Treasury’s plans should still follow the general lines of defence policy as outlined in July 1967, though accelerating the rundowns wherever possible.³⁰ The centrepiece of the Treasury’s plans was to bring forward the final date of withdrawal from East Asia, preferably to the end of March 1971. Officials admitted that there was a risk that this change would provoke instability in the region and increase the cost of aid to the affected countries. Nevertheless, given the financial considerations, they judged that ‘the net effect on international confidence would be favourable’.³¹ The second change would be to eliminate the planned special military capability for use in the region after withdrawal. Though it had never been precisely costed, Treasury officials felt that its elimination would generate ‘sizeable’ savings.³² It was also a desirable move in terms of broader policy: even with the special capability, ‘our ability to influence the course of events in the Far East [would] be virtually nil anyway; and it would be sensible to recognise it’.³³ Finally, the Treasury proposed that there should be other force and equipment cuts, including the cancellation of the order for fifty F111 aircraft. This, however, would have to be handled carefully because of the reciprocal financial arrangements that the US Government had agreed to, to help facilitate their purchase. In conclusion, Treasury officials also counselled caution on how their proposals should be presented. ³⁰ PRO: T 225/3066: I.P. Bancroft to P.R. Baldwin, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 13/12/1967. ³¹ Ibid. ³² Ibid. ³³ Ibid.


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A straight demand to the MOD and Foreign Office would be likely to provoke a counter-reaction. It would be ‘most imprudent for the Treasury ever to admit that it has its own defence and overseas policy. But as the Chancellor will see from this minute . . . we have a fairly clear idea of our objectives.’³⁴ The day after the Treasury’s proposals had been minuted, the Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, met with Denis Healey over a private lunch to sound him out about the proposed cuts. In Jenkins’ own words, it was supposed to be a ‘softening up’ exercise.³⁵ To the Chancellor’s surprise, the Defence Secretary did not react very harshly to the Treasury’s plans. While he did not agree with the Chancellor on some of the cuts, he was prepared to entertain ‘very substantial’ changes to commitments, including a withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ by 1971/72.³⁶ Jenkins later described Healey as reacting ‘without fainting or blustering’.³⁷ At the time, he privately noted to his officials that, if this was the Defence Secretary’s opening position, ‘there was a good prospect of obtaining agreement eventually to 1970/71 instead of 1971/72’.³⁸ Healey may have simply been pulling his punches. Soon after, in a setting more conducive to argument than a gentlemanly lunch, he would have no compunction in taking on the Chancellor. But for the moment, Jenkins’ plans were proceeding apace. A day after talking with the Defence Secretary, he met privately with the Prime Minister to discuss the complete package of economic measures the Government should adopt to shore up the pound. Wilson and Jenkins quickly came to agree on the size and direction of the proposed package. The measures comprised four key items, all of which were likely to be controversial within the Cabinet and wider Party: a restoration of prescription charges, a postponement of the raising of the school-leaving age, and the two key defence cuts, accelerating the withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ and cancelling the order for the F111s. Neither the Prime Minister nor Chancellor could be sure how well the package would survive a Cabinet battle, but from this point in mid-December on, Wilson and Jenkins were committed, if undeclared, allies.³⁹ ³⁴ Ibid. ³⁵ Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 222. ³⁶ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins and Sir William Armstrong, London, 15/12/1967. ³⁷ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 223. ³⁸ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Jenkins and Armstrong, 15/12/1967. ³⁹ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 223; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 479.

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With the Prime Minister’s backing now privately assured, Jenkins committed his proposals to paper and presented them more formally to the Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries. The Chancellor took an even more forward stance than he had in his earlier discussions, making unashamedly clear the European orientation which underpinned the foreign policy he preferred—a conspicuous position his officials had cautioned against only days before. Jenkins argued that Britain’s standing in the world depended on the health of its economy, and so no budgetary item could be sacrosanct in a moment of ‘acute economic crisis’.⁴⁰ Thus, there should be an accelerated reduction of Britain’s commitments and a faster withdrawal of its forces; the curtailment of equipment purchases, including the cancellation of the order for the F111; and further cuts in the supporting infrastructure at home. But Jenkins went a step further and stated openly that he wanted a withdrawal from all nonEuropean bases ‘and [the] ending of associated treaty commitments, so as to complete the process of world wide military disengagement by 1970/1’.⁴¹ There would be no fudging or disguising the end of Britain’s worldwide role as there had been in the past. Jenkins demanded that there be clear, public decisions on commitments, forces and equipment, and that the ‘announcement . . . must include our decision to withdraw into Europe by 1970/1’.⁴² The political departments were not at all impressed by the incursion of the Chancellor onto their own territory. Privately, Foreign Office officials admitted that, given the necessity for cuts, they were thinking ‘on the same scale’ as the Chancellor.⁴³ But they could not accept his proposals without examining for themselves the possible options. The Treasury should stick to quantifying the savings required, and leave the political departments and MOD to decide where the cuts should fall, given that this was their responsibility.⁴⁴ On 20 December 1967, the Chancellor met with the defence and overseas ministers to discuss his proposals. From Jenkins’ own perspective, this was a tactical mistake, for it meant that he met all the affected ministers in one group. As Jenkins described in his own memoirs, it gave them a chance collectively to round on him.⁴⁵ The hardest line ⁴⁰ PRO: T 225/3066: Roy Jenkins, ‘Defence’, 23/12/1967. ⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² Ibid. ⁴³ PRO: FCO 46/43: Donald Maitland to George Brown, ‘Further Defence Cuts’, 19/12/1967. ⁴⁴ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, 19/12/1967. ⁴⁵ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, pp. 224ff.


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came from the recently appointed Commonwealth Secretary, George Thomson, whose departmental interests were the most severely affected. The Chancellor had admitted at the beginning of the meeting that no defence cuts would be able to yield any substantial savings in the next two years, but that they were politically necessary in order to gain Cabinet acceptance of the civil cuts he was proposing. This admission earned him a sharp reply from the Commonwealth Secretary. He ‘could not agree that in order to meet a short-term political problem’ the Government should adopt, without proper examination, policies that would make ‘a permanent difference to the whole posture of British overseas policy’.⁴⁶ He ‘could not accept’ that Britain should abandon all its commitments outside Europe; nor could he accept as realistic a goal of withdrawing from Malaysia and Singapore by 1970/1.⁴⁷ While all courses of action needed to be investigated, they had to be properly judged on their own merits. Denis Healey and George Brown fiercely backed the Commonwealth Secretary—the first, according to Jenkins’ admittedly partisan account, frequently ‘shouting’, the second engaging in ‘a good deal of banging of the table’.⁴⁸ Healey was strongly critical of how his department had borne the brunt of previous rounds of cost cutting while civil expenditure had escaped lightly: he would not accept further defence cuts this time unless he were satisfied by the extent of civil cuts. Brown questioned whether the Treasury was seeking too great a reduction in demand, and argued that it should only set out the extent of savings required, leaving it to the responsible departments to decide where the cuts should fall. But Healey and Brown were also prepared to concede some part of the basic thrust of Jenkins’ proposals. Both the Defence and Foreign Secretaries admitted that if substantial cuts had to be imposed, it would be better, rather than hobbling all of Britain’s deployments, to eliminate one whole theatre—inevitably ‘East of Suez’ rather than Europe. But this admission was a long way short of agreement with the timing and manner of the Chancellor’s proposals. After an hour ‘of being knocked around like a squash ball’, Roy Jenkins ‘escaped’ from his meeting with the other ministers.⁴⁹ With no agreement in sight, the permanent heads of the relevant departments were directed to continue negotiating on the topic.⁵⁰ ⁴⁶ PRO: PREM 13/1999: memcon, Roy Jenkins, George Brown, Denis Healey, George Thomson et al., London, 20/12/1967. ⁴⁷ Ibid. ⁴⁸ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 225. ⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1999: memcon, Jenkins, Brown et al., 20/12/1967.

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While these private discussions were taking place, the Government began to prepare the ground with its allies about the cuts that were in the offing. Rumours had already reached Singapore in the past week that the British Government was contemplating a much faster withdrawal from its Southeast Asian base. The Singapore Prime Minister had sent a number of messages asking, in increasingly desperate terms, that the Government quash these rumours.⁵¹ Matters were not helped when, on 18 December 1967, Harold Wilson announced to the House of Commons that the Government was undertaking a stringent review of all areas of expenditure to help secure the country’s financial position. He warned that ‘no area of expenditure can be regarded as sacrosanct . . . no spending commitment whether inherited three years ago, or incurred since’.⁵² He twice stated that defence and overseas spending would be reviewed as strictly as civil expenditure, and noted ominously that this spending would have to fit what was ‘appropriate at a time when we have been, and are, reassessing Britain’s role in the world’.⁵³ Given that the Government had not properly decided for itself where its cuts would fall, it was not in a position to relieve the state of uncertainty in which its allies were languishing. Nevertheless, senior ministers felt it would be best if the allies were given some sort of warning of what lay ahead, especially given that, once the cuts had been decided on, there would be no time to consult the affected parties. It was agreed that the Prime Minister should convey this warning to the other leaders.⁵⁴ This occasion was unexpectedly provided by the memorial service that was held in Melbourne after the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt had drowned at sea. In a quick succession of meetings with each of the leaders after the service, Wilson conveyed the same short message: following devaluation, the whole field of government expenditure was being re-examined afresh; the reductions were likely to include defence, with faster cutbacks ‘East of Suez’ a possibility. The various leaders each took note of Wilson’s message, ⁵¹ PRO: PREM 13/2392: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘British Military Withdrawal’, tel. 914, 12/12/1967; Lee Kuan Yew to Denis Healey, tel. 932, 15/12/1967; Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Wilson, 18/12/1967. ⁵² Hansard, Session 1967/8, vol. 756, col. 923. ⁵³ Ibid. ⁵⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1466: Michael Palliser, memcon, Harold Wilson, George Brown, Denis Healey, George Thomson et al., London, 20/12/1967.


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but, with no more information being offered, made no further comment.⁵⁵ Back in London, senior officials from the relevant departments followed up on the heated ministerial discussions that had taken place on the proposed defence reductions. On 22 to 23 December, officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices and the Ministry of Defence first met privately, away from the stern gaze of the Treasury, to co-ordinate their responses to the proposed cuts. After that, their heads met with the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury to see if they could make any further progress. In their meetings, the overseas and defence departments reaffirmed that they were prepared to accede to further cuts ‘East of Suez’, but could not accept the Treasury’s highly abbreviated timetable. The permanent heads of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices both saw ‘the difficulties of a precipitate withdrawal’ from Malaysia and Singapore, and wanted ‘to delay any withdrawal beyond the panic dates suggested by the Chancellor’.⁵⁶ But there were also tensions between the MOD and the political departments. The MOD feared that the political departments would acquiesce to defence cuts providing the political effects to commitments were blurred as much as possible. The Chiefs of Staff were firmly against this. Having already endured five rounds of cuts under the current government, the Chiefs wanted as clear and well-defined a statement of future policy as possible. They asked for ‘a firm announcement about [a] reduction in commitments’, which, for credibility, needed to ‘be specific, . . . refer to an early date and . . . be precise in area’.⁵⁷ When officials from the three departments met with the Treasury, however, their differences were kept well hidden, presumably for fear that this would give the Treasury the opportunity to divide and conquer. Instead, the defence and overseas departments stressed their shared objections to the Treasury’s proposals. The heads of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices argued that the demand for a definitive statement in January left no time for meaningful consultations with ⁵⁵ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Harold Wilson with, separately, Tun Razak, Lee Kuan Yew, Keith Holyoake, John McEwen, and Lyndon Johnson, Melbourne, 22–3/12/1967. ⁵⁶ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Saville Garner to George Thomson, ‘Defence Economies’, 22/12/1967. ⁵⁷ Ibid.

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any of the affected powers. The plans for a withdrawal from Singapore by 1970/1 would destabilize the local government, leading to riots and disturbances and the ‘probability’ that British troops would have to fight their way out.⁵⁸ The political departments strongly preferred that they be given time—around six to eight weeks—to negotiate with allies for a withdrawal by March 1972, or six months ahead of that at most. The MOD backed these dates for withdrawal as the most practicable from its point of view. In addition, the political departments asked that a ‘general capability’ be maintained for use in Malaysia and Singapore, for this would ‘materially ease’ their political difficulties by allowing them to avoid the abrogation of AMDA and SEATO.⁵⁹ Sir Saville Garner, the permanent head of the Commonwealth Office, reported to his minister that Sir William Armstrong, the Head of the Treasury, appeared not unsympathetic to these views. Armstrong, according to Garner, ‘agreed’ that an announcement should be in general terms, raised no objection to a general capability being maintained, and appeared willing to accept a 1972 withdrawal.⁶⁰ On this basis, Garner felt there were reasons for hope. But Armstrong also indicated that the Chancellor had strong opinions on these issues. In the Treasury’s own record of the meeting, only that part of Armstrong’s views was noted: ‘the Chancellor’, Armstrong was recorded as saying, ‘would be extremely dissatisfied with the upshot of the meeting’.⁶¹ Armstrong was not completely right. The Chancellor did not appear particularly fussed by the views which had been aired by officials, for, as was borne out by his later actions, he was less interested in engaging in detailed policy debates than in winning a political war in the Cabinet. On Christmas Day 1967, Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins privately discussed their tactics to get the Chancellor’s package of measures passed. The Chancellor’s paper was to be presented to the affected ministers on 27 December, and then put to Cabinet early in the New Year. Wilson and Jenkins agreed that the best tactic would not be to circulate the proposals to ministers in advance, but rather only to release them at the 27 December meetings. Obviously, this tactic provided the best means of preventing any debate before the proposals reached the Cabinet. Wilson and Jenkins also agreed that they should ⁵⁸ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Sir Burke Trend, Sir William Armstrong, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Sir James Dunnett, and Sir Saville Garner, London, 23/12/1967. ⁵⁹ Ibid. ⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Saville Garner to George Thomson, 23/12/1967. ⁶¹ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Trend, Armstrong et al., 23/12/1967.


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both focus on George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, as the one most likely to yield to their own position. Brown, Wilson said, was ‘rather more flexible’ than the Commonwealth Secretary.⁶² Jenkins agreed, judging that the Foreign Secretary ‘would be prepared for some form of compromise’.⁶³ When the senior ministers met on 27 December, Jenkins sought to finesse the differences between his opponents’ positions. George Thomson, Jenkins reported to his officials, wanted at least six more weeks to consult with Britain’s allies on the withdrawals, but Brown appeared willing to settle for two weeks extra. Thomson was adamantly opposed to a withdrawal in 1970/1, but Jenkins got the impression that Healey was less firm on this, and Brown weaker again.⁶⁴ Still, these differences were not sufficient for Jenkins to capitalize on, despite him making a concession of his own. To the other senior ministers, he maintained that the Government could not sustain binding commitments to provide military assistance to countries after it had withdrawn. But it could, he conceded, ‘offer to do [its] best to provide help from the European theatre in case of need’.⁶⁵ This formula implied that the Chancellor was prepared to acquiesce to the political departments’ request for a ‘general capability’ that could be used in Southeast Asia—and Britain would only have to reinterpret its commitments to SEATO and AMDA, not abrogate them unilaterally. But this agreement aside, at the close of the meeting there remained a substantial gulf between the position of the Chancellor and that of the defence and overseas ministers on the fundamental issue: whether an earlier British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore should be completed by 1970/1 or by the ‘early 1970s’. Britain’s allies had little information on the content and direction of the debates that were raging within Whitehall. Their concerns, however, had been provoked by the warnings they had received from Harold Wilson in Melbourne. In the week after Christmas, they let these concerns be known both to the British Government and to each other. ⁶² PRO: PREM 13/1999: Michael Palliser, memcon, Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins, 25/12/1967. ⁶³ Ibid. ⁶⁴ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins, Sir William Armstrong et al., London, 28/12/1967. ⁶⁵ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Harold Wilson, Roy Jenkins, George Brown, Denis Healey and George Thomson, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 27/12/1967.

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British representatives in both Australia and the United States were aware of deep concern brewing in the respective capitals. The diagnosis of the High Commission in Canberra was that there would be ‘strong and unfavourable reactions’ if the British announced an acceleration of their withdrawal from Southeast Asia.⁶⁶ They would be attacked for their failure to stand by their previous assurances. The man likely to succeed Harold Holt as Prime Minister, John Gorton, had been ‘most critical’ and ‘outspoken’ about British foreign policy before; his election would likely spell ‘trouble [for] our relations with Australia’.⁶⁷ Sir Patrick Dean in Washington spoke in similar tones about the probable American reaction. The Johnson Administration was ‘greatly alarmed’ that the British Government would discard with ‘dangerous haste’ its strategic assets, assets they regarded the British ‘as holding in trust for the West through [their] presence’.⁶⁸ While the Americans had reconciled themselves to an eventual British withdrawal from Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s, they would be ‘much upset’ by any acceleration of this timetable, especially with the Vietnam War continuing.⁶⁹ The reaction of the US Congress, Dean further warned, could have a significant sting in its tail. If they became convinced that the US was ‘subsidising the British Welfare State’ while Britain shifted defence costs onto American shoulders, they could make it ‘very difficult . . . for the Administration to provide the financial support we need when sterling is in trouble’.⁷⁰ The allies did not restrict themselves to conveying their distress to the British. Out of the British Government’s sight, the allies also sought to co-ordinate their positions. The Malaysian and Australian governments communicated to each other their shared concern that the British would no longer be seriously honouring the Anglo–Malaysian Defence Agreement. The Malaysians stressed that the two governments should consult on an appropriate response to the British plans once they were revealed, especially to prevent the British trying to play the allies off one another. The Australians were cautiously responsive, but warned that such joint action had to be conducted secretly, since the existence ⁶⁶ PRO: PREM 13/2081: BHC, Canberra, to CO, ‘Review of Government Expenditure’, tel. 1854, 28/12/1967. ⁶⁷ Ibid. ⁶⁸ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth and Sir Burke Trend, tel. 3, 1/1/1968. ⁶⁹ Ibid. ⁷⁰ Ibid.


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of allied co-operation would provide the British with greater excuse to leave.⁷¹ The views of allied governments and the British defence and foreign policy establishment did not appear to be having much effect in deterring the Chancellor from his chosen path. As the date approached for the opening of Cabinet discussions on the economic package, Jenkins appeared more and more concerned with the politics of getting his package passed, and less and less interested in the arguments for or against any particular component. The permanent head of the Treasury reported to his colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices that, while he was personally sympathetic to their arguments, he did not think that they would find much favour with the Chancellor. Jenkins, he explained, was ‘basing his argumentation entirely on political grounds and [was] no longer taking specific Treasury arguments into account’.⁷² One symptom of this was the Chancellor’s view that 1972 as a withdrawal date was ‘over the dam’—past the date of the next general election, and thus reversible.⁷³ Richard Crossman privately recorded the same impression. Jenkins had emphasized to him personally how important it was that the withdrawal take place during the term of the current Government. Crossman noted Jenkins as feeling that ‘We must be out of Singapore by the next election.’⁷⁴ Tony Benn described Denis Healey as furious at how the Chancellor was pushing ahead with his policies. The Defence Secretary fumed that ‘the defence cuts were mad; that they were just being done to make it possible to introduce prescription charges; that the whole thing was crazy’.⁷⁵ With political, rather than strategic or even economic, considerations apparently paramount, the permanent head of the Foreign Office warned his Foreign Secretary that ‘it would appear . . . that external policy will not be discussed on merit’.⁷⁶ ⁷¹ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 5: W.L. Morrison to Sir James Plimsoll, tel. 2590, 30/12/1967; Sir James Plimsoll to W.L. Morrison, tel. 34, 5/1/1968; W.L. Morrison to Sir James Plimsoll, tel. 40, 6/1/1968. ⁷² PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, ‘Defence Cuts’, 3/1/1968. Emphasis in original. ⁷³ Ibid. ⁷⁴ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 612. ⁷⁵ Tony Benn, Office without Power: Diaries 1968–72 (London: Hutchison, 1988), p. 1. ⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 46/43: Gore-Booth to Brown, ‘Defence Cuts’.

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From 4 to 15 January 1968 the British Cabinet endured a marathon of eight meetings to agree on the contents of the economic package. The package that the Chancellor presented to the Cabinet comprised a number of major cuts on the civil front: the introduction of charges for prescriptions; deferment of the raising of the school-leaving age; reductions in road and house building; the abolition of free milk in secondary schools; and drastic reductions in the civil defence service. Many of these items were deeply controversial in the Labour ranks and within the Cabinet itself. Part of Jenkins’ strategy to get his package through was to place defence first on the chopping block. This would help mollify those critics on the Labour Left who refused to countenance any cuts to social programmes without there first being significant cuts to defence. The first day of Cabinet meetings, on 4 January, brought out all the heavyweights on foreign policy and defence. As well as the Chancellor’s paper outlining all the measures he proposed across both defence and civil fields, there were papers in response from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries, and from the Defence Secretary. The defence cuts outlined in the Chancellor’s paper followed identically the plans he had proposed before. These comprised the withdrawal from Britain’s worldwide commitments and their associated military presence by March 1971; the cancellation of equipment purchases, including the order for 50 F111 bombers; and extensive cuts to the military establishment at home. The Chancellor bolstered his case by focusing on the economic crisis which necessitated these measures. He stated that an £850 million cut in demand was needed if devaluation were to be successful and an unsupportable expansion stopped. The Government had little time to implement these measures. It would have to err on the side of toughness, for the cost of a failure would be ‘exceedingly damaging’.⁷⁷ He noted that his proposed defence cuts could have little effect on spending for the next two years: in the table of figures he provided, the defence savings in 1968/9 would be nil, and those in 1969/70 were denoted only by a question mark.⁷⁸ But it was on this basis that he argued that radical cuts would be needed for future years: the impossibility of immediate reductions made it all the more important ‘that our decisions on defence should be seen to ⁷⁷ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)5: Roy Jenkins, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluation Measures’, 3/1/1968. ⁷⁸ Ibid.


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be both radical and credible in terms of our present and foreseeable situation’.⁷⁹ The Chancellor had stuck firmly to his original position, notwithstanding all the discussions he and the Treasury had had with the overseas departments and ministers. In reply, the overseas ministers fought back with a united front, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries presenting a joint statement to Cabinet. The two overseas ministers claimed that they recognized the necessity of defence cuts, given the grave economic situation. But they argued that if Britain were seen to break its word and its commitments, without any regard for stability, security and the value of its own investments, then the country would be perceived ‘beyond question and at last [to] be finished’.⁸⁰ If that became common perception, ‘the consequences politically, economically, and for the position of sterling, would be exceedingly grave’.⁸¹ On these grounds, the two ministers asked for a number of modifications to the Chancellor’s plans. They proposed that the withdrawal from Singapore be accelerated, but only for completion by March 1972, so that the damage to the island’s economy would be reduced. And they put forward their request—to which the Chancellor had informally acquiesced before—that a ‘general capability’ be kept, not particular to Southeast Asia, ‘but simply an expression of the fact that our strategic reserve would be available to be used anywhere in the world where we thought it in our interests to do so’.⁸² This would mean that the Government, while limiting severely its commitment to AMDA, could avoid having to abrogate its treaty commitments unilaterally, a highly dangerous move. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries concluded that cuts on the scale they proposed would still be ‘unpalatable’ internationally, but would allow easier consultations and a smoother transition, thus limiting the damaging consequences.⁸³ The Defence Secretary also entered the fray with his own paper, adding weight to Brown and Thomson’s arguments. While Healey confined himself more directly to defence policy, he stressed that the rundowns in Southeast Asia had to be ‘conducted in as favourable a local political atmosphere as possible if we are to minimise the risks of ⁷⁹ Ibid. ⁸⁰ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)7: George Brown and George Thomson, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluation Measures: Defence Cuts’, 3/1/1968. ⁸¹ Ibid. ⁸² Ibid. ⁸³ Ibid.

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military conflict’.⁸⁴ He argued that the Government, while announcing its cuts to commitments in January, should not rush into the details of cutting forces, for this would ‘smack of panic, cause great difficulty with the Services and certainly be inefficient and probably wasteful’.⁸⁵ After the major players had spent more than an hour introducing their papers, the debate in the wider Cabinet continued for several more hours.⁸⁶ Some ministers argued that the ‘minimal savings’ accruing from withdrawal in 1970/1 compared with 1971/2 would not be worth the substantial political and economic risks involved.⁸⁷ Others questioned whether a year would make a critical difference to Britain’s allies: while they would be displeased, would that displeasure be materially altered by a year’s timing? The clinching argument, however, had little to do with strategy or economics. Though the Cabinet record obscures the point, both Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman record the same impression. The decisive advantage of a 1970/1 withdrawal over 1971/2 was that the earlier date would be within the term of the current Government. The withdrawal would be complete by the next election, and the Labour Government could gain full credit for the new policy.⁸⁸ The Cabinet decided in the Chancellor’s favour: Castle thought it a narrow decision, carried only by Wilson’s own voice, while Crossman thought a large majority were in favour of the faster withdrawal. After a further heated debate, it also decided to cancel the order for the 50 F111s. As a concession to the foreign and defence policy establishment, it was also agreed that a ‘general capability’ for possible use around the globe would still exist, and that Britain’s treaty commitments to AMDA and SEATO could therefore be reinterpreted and not withdrawn. Furthermore, if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries ‘encountered a strong reaction’ from Britain’s allies, they could bring these responses back to Cabinet. After the defence reductions had been discussed and decided on 4 January, the Cabinet turned to examine the domestic side. While this was taking place, George Brown and George Thomson flew to the appropriate capitals to inform Britain’s allies of the Government’s decisions. Their announcements provoked a wave of negative responses ⁸⁴ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)11: Denis Healey, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluation Measures: Further Defence Cuts’, 3/1/1968. ⁸⁵ Ibid. ⁸⁶ Castle, Diaries, p. 176; Crossman, Diaries, p. 635. ⁸⁷ PRO: CAB 128/43: C(68)1st Meeting, 4/1/1968. ⁸⁸ Castle, Diaries, p. 176; Crossman, Diaries, p. 635.


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from the allied governments. Coupled with a near revolt by many parts of Britain’s own defence and foreign policy establishment, this produced a sharp and widespread reaction against the Government’s planned cuts. On 7–8 January, George Thomson met with senior Malaysian ministers to inform them of the British Government’s decision. Their response to the Commonwealth Secretary was anxious but restrained. Defence Minister Tun Razak seemed, according to Thomson, ‘genuinely nonplussed about where to turn’ after the British decision.⁸⁹ He questioned whether the British could really uphold the Defence Agreement with no forces trained for or assigned to the area. Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin stressed the losses which Malaysia had sustained by staying loyal to sterling through devaluation. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, according to Thomson, ‘could not disguise his distress’.⁹⁰ Malaysia had trusted and been loyal to Britain. The Tunku explained that they had wanted, ‘the British to remain and relied on them to protect her. Without Britain’s help she would be defenceless.’⁹¹ While Malaysia recognized the inevitability of withdrawal, it was vital that Britain be willing to provide assistance should it be required. Thomson was sympathetic but firm in response: while Britain would retain a general capability for assistance it could make no automatic commitment; it could only send help if resources and circumstances allowed. The response that Malaysia communicated to the other allies was less restrained. The Australians found Razak ‘clearly distressed’ and Tan Siew Sin ‘acidic’ in his remarks on British policy.⁹² The US State Department judged the Malaysians to be ‘privately bitter but publicly restrained’.⁹³ They were ‘incensed at having been let down by a trusted ally, humiliated at being informed of a decision rather than consulted, and genuinely concerned about the implications’.⁹⁴ Officially, the Malaysian Ambassador requested the US Secretary of State to make representations to the British Government against the ⁸⁹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Reductions’, tel. 21, 7/1/1968. ⁹⁰ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Cuts’, tel. 22, 8/1/1968. ⁹¹ Ibid. ⁹² NAA: A4940/1, C4626: W.L. Morrison to Sir James Plimsoll, ‘British Withdrawal’, tel. 42, 8/1/1968. ⁹³ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, ‘UK Plan to Accelerate Its Military Withdrawal Embitters Malaysia and Singapore’, 10/1/1968. ⁹⁴ Ibid.

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decisions. Dean Rusk replied to the Ambassador that his Government was entirely on their side.⁹⁵ After his talks in Kuala Lumpur, George Thomson went on to Singapore for two days of talks with senior government ministers. The Singaporeans were much more openly angry and upset than the Malaysians had been. George Thomson found Lee Kuan Yew to be ‘fighting mad’.⁹⁶ The Singapore Prime Minister complained bitterly about being presented with a unilateral decision. He did not believe that the accelerated date of withdrawal had any direct relevance to Britain’s immediate economic problems, and ‘vigorously refuted’ the figures that Thomson presented in reply.⁹⁷ Lee continued that the announcement of so early a date of departure would ‘destroy Singapore’s future’, and his government would make this clear to the British by invoking ‘every form of retaliatory action that they could devise’.⁹⁸ They were prepared to announce that Singapore would withdraw sterling balances of £200 million and break up Britain’s monopoly on the island in shipping, banking and insurance. Thomson fended off these threats by stressing that they were ‘utterly the wrong way’ to change the British position: they would not respond to blackmail, while the threats Lee proposed could not be better designed to undermine confidence in his own country. Thomson noted that Lee appeared to take this rebuff on board. Nevertheless, neither Lee nor his staff were prepared to let up on their efforts. At dinner that evening, they mounted ‘a systematic campaign of pressurisation’ the strength of which the British officials had ‘never in their experience been subjected to’.⁹⁹ The next day, Lee moderated the wilder of his threats: he admitted privately to the Australians that the threat to withdraw Singapore’s sterling balances was something of ‘a blunt instrument’.¹⁰⁰ The modification in his tactics, however, did not imply a modification in his aims. In his next meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary, the Singapore Prime Minister calmly, but with no less determination, stressed the dangers the British decisions posed for his country: they would destroy confidence in the fledgling state; they gave notice to Indonesia that it could prepare for aggression in a few years; and they provided no time ⁹⁵ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: memcon, Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin, Dean Rusk et al., Washington, 9/1/1968. ⁹⁶ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 26, 8/1/1968. ⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Ibid. ⁹⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰⁰ NAA: A4940/1, C4626: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Withdrawal’, tel. 63, 10/1/1968.


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for Singapore to prepare an adequate defence force to meet this threat. Lee and Thomson continued to trade ‘sharp exchanges’ for another two hours, but at the end the Singapore Prime Minister concluded that little more could be achieved at the moment: he would fly to London and bring his arguments straight to the Chancellor and Prime Minister themselves.¹⁰¹ Possibly—though the British record obscures this—Lee was given some encouragement to adopt this tactic by the Commonwealth Secretary. Certainly, Lee reported to the Australians that he had gleaned from Thomson that it could be possible to push the British timetable back by a year.¹⁰² After the drama and threats of Singapore, Thomson found his next meetings, in Wellington and Canberra, rather less stressful affairs. The New Zealand Prime Minister reacted with ‘general understanding’, expressing his views more in a mood of ‘sadness rather than anger’.¹⁰³ His main anxiety was over whether the ‘general capability’ would be seen to have teeth. If Britain were perceived to have ‘washed [its] hands of the area’ it would have ‘serious and continuing repercussions in New Zealand’.¹⁰⁴ The atmosphere in Australia was sombre but similarly restrained. The new Prime Minister, John Gorton, expressed ‘anxiety and dismay’ at the proposals.¹⁰⁵ His government feared the effects the plans would have on regional security, and was deeply unhappy that ‘such large decisions should be made for the sake of comparatively small savings’.¹⁰⁶ He expressed the hope that, if the British Government could not alter the principles of its withdrawal, it could at least delay its timetable, retain some capacity for intervention, and declare a continuing interest in the region. While George Thomson was taking care of Britain’s Commonwealth allies in Southeast Asia, on the other side of the globe George Brown was in Washington undertaking the same task with Britain’s principal ally. The Foreign Secretary had to prepare for a frosty reception for, as the British Ambassador described, the ‘timing could . . . not be worse’ for the policy decisions.¹⁰⁷ The Vietnam War was intensifying, its ¹⁰¹ ¹⁰² ¹⁰³ ¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶ ¹⁰⁷

PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 32, 9/1/1968. NAA: A4940/1, C4626: Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Withdrawal’, tel. 63, 10/1/1968. PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 78, 11/1/1968. Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 83, 12/1/1968. Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/2081: Sir Patrick Dean to George Brown and Sir Paul Gore-Booth, tel. 115, 9/1/1968.

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costs were now weighing heavily on the domestic economy, and the Administration was facing an election year. While the US Government would want to see Britain restored to financial health, they ‘cannot and will not be sympathetic’ to decisions damaging to the free world, themselves, and what ‘they would expect to be our own hard-headed calculation of our own national security interests’.¹⁰⁸ George Brown himself was apprehensive about his upcoming mission. He sent a blunt telegram to Wilson saying that he would fulfil his appointed role, but also expressing his deep misgivings about it: ‘we have taken wrong decisions. Much worse . . . we have taken them for the wrong reasons. We are putting the country’s future in peril for a short-term gain which we may not in fact get.’¹⁰⁹ Denis Healey was of a similar cast of mind. He did not, however, express his views only within the British Government but also leaked them to US Embassy officials. He made clear to them that he was bitter about Harold Wilson’s role in pushing for faster defence cuts, against the opposition of Brown, Thomson, Callaghan and himself. He hinted, however, that some delay to the timetable might be possible, and ‘indirectly urg[ed]’ the US Secretary of State to focus on this issue with George Brown, as it was the only area where there was some hope of changing British policy.¹¹⁰ Dean Rusk took Healey’s advice on board, but chose a different tack. When Brown met Rusk on 11 January, they had, in Brown’s description, a ‘bloody unpleasant meeting’.¹¹¹ Though Rusk maintained his customary courtesy and restraint, he ‘did not disguise the depth of feeling and at times even contempt’ he had for the British decisions.¹¹² After Brown had described the changes that would be implemented, Rusk did not try to negotiate on details, instead opting to convey simply his ‘profound . . . dismay’ with proposals which were ‘tantamount to [a] British withdrawal from world affairs’.¹¹³ They possessed, he said, ‘the acrid aroma of the fait accompli’.¹¹⁴ He feared the cuts would bolster ¹⁰⁸ PRO: PREM 13/2081: Sir Patrick Dean to George Brown and Sir Paul Gore-Booth, tel. 115, 9/1/1968. ¹⁰⁹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Brown to Harold Wilson, tel. 142, 11/1/1968. ¹¹⁰ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1640: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘Healey Views on UK Defence Policy’, 9/1/1968. ¹¹¹ PRO: PREM 13/1999: George Brown to FO, ‘Defence Cuts’, tel. 54, 11/1/1968. ¹¹² Ibid. ¹¹³ PRO: FCO 46/43: memcon, George Brown, Dean Rusk et al., Washington, DC, 11/1/1968; LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: memcon, Dean Rusk and George Brown, Washington, DC, 11/1/1968. ¹¹⁴ PRO: FCO 46/43: memcon, Brown, Rusk et al., 11/1/1968.


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the position of isolationists within the United States. They would put in jeopardy regional co-operation in Southeast Asia, and Britain’s own success against Confrontation. He thought the proposed ‘general capability’ would be of little consequence. If Britain withdrew to ‘little England’, it would lead to a ‘descending spiral for British interests around the world’.¹¹⁵ He ‘found it embarrassing to say to his British colleague: ‘‘For God’s sake be Britain’’ ’.¹¹⁶ Privately, George Brown expressed his sympathy for the American position. He admitted to Walt Rostow and Robert McNamara over lunch that ‘these were the saddest days of his life’.¹¹⁷ He doubted that the situation could be changed: Wilson’s political base on the Left insisted that the upcoming austerity package include cuts to defence; certain members of the Cabinet had ‘little England’ views; while Chancellor Jenkins was hoping that the package could lead to a budget surplus by mid-1969. Nevertheless Brown—along with British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean—encouraged President Johnson to write, as a lastditch effort, the ‘strongest letter possible’ to Harold Wilson.¹¹⁸ This the President did, though no doubt as much on his own initiative as on the advice of British officials. Beyond expressing opposition to the proposed cuts, the letter also included a veiled threat: had the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the President asked, ‘taken fully into account the direct and indirect consequences’ of the course they were adopting?¹¹⁹ Brown and Dean’s private encouragement to the US Government to oppose their own Cabinet’s decision was not an isolated example. A host of British officials, in the Services and in Whitehall, were critical and sometimes caustic in their private and not-so-private opinions. In Singapore, US Embassy officials observed that British officers on the island were ‘openly denigrating British leaders to an extent which almost borders on the seditious’.¹²⁰ The British High Commissioner Designate for Singapore was scarcely more diplomatic. To the Australians, he characterized Labour Government ministers as viewing the ‘East of Suez’ role as a ‘ ‘‘conspiracy’’ between the bankers, the military and the ¹¹⁵ ¹¹⁷ ¹¹⁸ ¹¹⁹ 1968.

Ibid. ¹¹⁶ Ibid. LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 11/1/1968. Ibid. LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Lyndon Johnson to Harold Wilson, 11/1/

¹²⁰ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, tel. 1169, 11/1/1968.

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Australians. They were not willing to examine rationally the interests involved’.¹²¹ Back in London, senior staff and officials took their concerns straight to the Prime Minister. The Chiefs of the Defence Staff warned that the accelerated rundown would damage service morale and jeopardize the recruitment of men.¹²² The permanent head of the Foreign Office also took the unusual step of going above his minister—while George Brown was in Washington—and spoke directly to Wilson. He expressed concerns about the risks of the accelerated withdrawal. Moreover, he argued that if this were coupled to the cancellation of the F111, Britain would lose the status of even a middle-ranking power.¹²³ The combination of these efforts caused economic ministers to fear that there would be a ‘strong counter-attack’ against the defence cuts in the Cabinet that week.¹²⁴ The prediction came true on George Brown’s return to London from Washington. Immediately, he went to the Cabinet and warned of the threat he saw the cuts posing to Anglo–American relations. He judged that Anglo–American relations had reached a ‘critical’ state.¹²⁵ The Government’s defence ‘proposals have probably already done so much harm that it is too late to retrieve it’.¹²⁶ The Government could only limit this damage if it conceded two points: delaying the withdrawal, and maintaining the order for the F111 bombers. But the Prime Minister and Chancellor stood their ground and dismissed the Foreign Secretary’s arguments. Wilson’s response was indicative of how profoundly his attitudes towards Anglo–American partnership had shifted. Both Britain and the United States, he argued, ‘must each look after our own economic interests’.¹²⁷ James Callaghan intervened to argue that Britain ‘could not afford’ to ignore American wishes: even if the US took no hostile action, but simply refused to help the country in a moment of crisis, Britain would be in desperate trouble.¹²⁸ Jenkins’ response sought to demolish not only that argument ¹²¹ NAA: A1838/346, 691/1/1 PART 3: AHC, London, to DEAC, tel. 641, 12/1/ 1968.

¹²² PRO: PREM 13/1999: Michael Palliser, memcon, Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, the Chiefs of Staff et al., London, 12/1/1968. ¹²³ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, ‘Talk with Prime Minister’, 10/1/1968. ¹²⁴ PRO: T 225/3068: J.C. Burgh to H.L. Jenkyns, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluation Measures’, 10/1/1968. ¹²⁵ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)6th Meeting, 12/1/1968; Castle, Diaries, p. 178. ¹²⁶ Castle, Diaries, p. 178. ¹²⁷ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)6th Meeting, 12/1/1968. ¹²⁸ Ibid.


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but the former Chancellor’s credibility as well. He stated that he and Callaghan were diametrically opposed: the latter wanted ‘us to continue as we have done for the past three years. I don’t believe we can afford to do so’.¹²⁹ The Government had to make a decisive break from its previous policies. It could no longer act at the behest of the United States. The Anglo–American friendship ‘had been valuable to us; but we had often paid a heavy price for it’.¹³⁰ The US was now dealing with its balance of payments problems through a policy based on self-interest; it could not object if Britain did the same. The Prime Minister’s and Chancellor’s statements blocked any chance of rebellion. Though Denis Healey fought for the cancellation of the F111 order to be rescinded, this was rejected by the Cabinet. The March 1971 date for withdrawal was also left unaltered, though it was agreed that this would have to be reconfirmed after the Singapore Prime Minister had presented his case in London. Two days later, on 14 January 1968, Lee Kuan Yew arrived in London for last-ditch discussions with the British leadership. Immediately on his arrival he went to 10 Downing St to meet Harold Wilson and senior foreign and defence policy ministers. Their discussions started in the late afternoon, went on through dinner, and continued for five and a half hours into the night.¹³¹ The Singapore Prime Minister repeatedly pressed his hosts on the reasoning behind the accelerated withdrawal. He questioned whether a faster withdrawal would not in fact create extra costs. He asked whether the price of maintaining a small force in Singapore for two more years could really be that high. He pointed out that the sale of the British Government’s assets in Singapore would attract a much higher price if confidence in the island were maintained. The British ministers, however, were unmoved. Wilson told Lee, somewhat dishonestly, that the March 1971 departure date had been agreed by Cabinet almost unanimously and could not be moved.¹³² He and Denis Healey maintained that the cuts were being implemented for economic reasons and would yield great savings.¹³³ Around 7.00 p.m. they were joined by the Chancellor and, over ‘liberal glasses of claret’, ¹²⁹ Castle, Diaries, p. 179. ¹³⁰ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)6th Meeting, 12/1/1968. ¹³¹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: SMV(68)1st and 2nd Meetings, 14/1/1968; Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 59–60. ¹³² Lee, From Third World to First, p. 59. ¹³³ PRO: PREM 13/2081: SMV(68)1st Meeting, 14/1/1968.

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the debate continued.¹³⁴ Two hours later, there were the first signs of greater flexibility in the British position. Harold Wilson continued to argue that the British had to withdraw early—by which, he said, he meant ‘earlier than 1973’—but the date for this in 1971 was ‘not yet definite’.¹³⁵ Lee continued to press for 1973. George Brown replied that there was no possibility of a 1973 withdrawal, but there was still some argument between 1971 and 1972. A difference of a year would be a third of the time of withdrawal, and, Brown pointed out, ‘by any view this was worth fighting for’.¹³⁶ On this note of indecision the meeting closed, but the next morning the Singapore Prime Minister sent Harold Wilson a message taking up the point. While he reiterated his desire for the withdrawal not to be completed until 1973, he also conceded that ‘every year, even every month beyond the date’ of March 1971 would be ‘that much time gained’.¹³⁷ On 15 January, the Cabinet sat for the last time on the economic package. It was presented with a paper by George Thomson describing the course of his discussions with all the Commonwealth leaders. He stressed that all the allies felt a March 1971 withdrawal to be too soon, and the ‘general capability’ remaining afterwards to lack credibility. He warned that if the proposals went ahead many of the allies ‘would be compelled in their own interests to take action which would hurt us’.¹³⁸ He noted Lee Kuan Yew’s recent threats of retaliation and claimed that the Singapore Prime Minister was in a ‘near-hysterical and unpredictable state’.¹³⁹ Thus he strongly urged that the Government should shift the date for its withdrawal to March 1972—still less than what the allies wanted, but sufficient to mitigate the damage. Thomson’s case was bolstered by a final letter from Lyndon Johnson to Harold Wilson which was presented to the Cabinet. The President’s letter stressed once again the risks to Western security if the British sought a precipitate withdrawal. It raised the stakes further, however, by threatening economic retaliation if the withdrawal were coupled to a cancellation of the F111 order: the offset arrangements facilitating the purchase would be dropped; US domestic pressure to abandon foreign ¹³⁴ ¹³⁵ ¹³⁷ ¹³⁸

Lee, From Third World to First, p. 60. PRO: PREM 13/2081: SMV(68)2nd Meeting, 14/1/1968. ¹³⁶ Ibid. PRO: PREM 13/2081: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Wilson, 15/1/1968. PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)23: George Thomson, ‘Defence Cuts: Discussions with Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore’, 15/1/1968. ¹³⁹ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)23: Thomson, ‘Defence Cuts’, 15/1/1968.


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procurement would build, and this ‘would almost inescapably lead to complete cancellation of recent awards of military contracts to British firms’.¹⁴⁰ Under this pressure, the resolution of the Cabinet began to buckle. It was argued that a delay in withdrawal to March 1972 would cost less than £10 million, which could well be worth paying to avoid greater damage to Britain’s interests. The Government could not afford to ignore the wishes of the United States, on whom Britain depended in so many areas. While it might be illogical for the Singapore Government to take retaliatory action, if the British plans were too damaging it might not ‘act in a wholly rational fashion’.¹⁴¹ A withdrawal in March 1972 would still be a major change in policy, and ‘its credibility would not be enhanced by advancing the date by a year in face of all official and political advice to the contrary; this would look like panic’.¹⁴² Slowly, one by one, Richard Crossman observed, more ministers began to swing behind a March 1972 withdrawal.¹⁴³ The Chancellor and his allies, though, were resolute. They argued that the situation had not materially changed from when the Cabinet had decided for a March 1971 withdrawal. Though the United States might threaten, it had rarely been the case in the past that it had actually carried out such retaliation, given the two countries’ common interests. All these threats were a smaller risk ‘to sterling than [Britain would] face if the expenditure cuts as a whole failed to carry credibility’.¹⁴⁴ For these reasons, the March 1971 withdrawal date had to stand. Between the two sides, the Prime Minister stepped in with a compromise. He argued that a 1972 withdrawal would lose the ‘presentational and catalytic advantages’ of March 1971.¹⁴⁵ But a withdrawal at the end of 1971 would maintain those advantages—presumably by being close, though no longer before, the next election—while providing some concession to allied opinion. The Cabinet agreed, resolving that the British withdrawal would now be planned to be complete by December 1971. With this matter settled, there were calls for the decisions on the F111 and other civil matters to be reopened. These calls, however, were quelled by the recognition that a reopening of one matter would lead to the unravelling of the entire package. Thus the Cabinet agreed to ¹⁴⁰ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Lyndon Johnson to Harold Wilson, 14/1/1968. ¹⁴¹ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)7th Meeting, 15/1/1968. ¹⁴² Ibid. ¹⁴³ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 650. ¹⁴⁴ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)7th Meeting, 15/1/1968. ¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

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the rest of the economic measures substantially as the Chancellor had originally intended. The next day, on 16 January 1968, Harold Wilson made a statement to the House of Commons, announcing the package of measures the Government was implementing to shore up the pound. The package comprised roughly £750 million of expenditure cuts spread over the following two financial years. The defence cuts made up only a limited fraction of this—nothing at all in the first year, £110 million in the second. The Prime Minister, however, gave the greatest prominence to these cuts, devoting the first quarter of his statement to defence and foreign policy. In sharp contrast to the previous statements on this issue, there was no suggestion that Britain’s status and role were being maintained; nor was it argued that the new policies were the result of strategic reassessments rather than economic demands. Wilson made clear the change in Britain’s position: ‘we have to come to terms with our role in the world’; in defence, as in civil expenditure, ‘we have been living beyond our means’.¹⁴⁶ The world role was gone. Britain’s ‘security lies fundamentally in Europe’; other than some scattered dependencies, by 1971 Britain would ‘not be maintaining military bases outside Europe and the Mediterranean’.¹⁴⁷ Once it had withdrawn from Malaysia and Singapore, there would be no military capability specifically designated for their defence, only a ‘general capability based in Europe . . . which can be deployed overseas as, in our judgement, circumstances demand’.¹⁴⁸ AMDA and SEATO would have to be reinterpreted to reflect these new realities. The reaction of Britain’s allies was public dismay and private anger. In a measured retaliation, the US Government cancelled the preferential purchasing agreements which were to help meet the foreign exchange costs of the F111 order. Officially, the State and Defence Departments expressed their ‘regret’, but did not elaborate any further.¹⁴⁹ Privately, the opinion of American officials was rather more harsh. The normally reserved David Bruce, US Ambassador in London, described the cuts as ‘calamitous, destructive, selfish, myopic, and threatening to world ¹⁴⁶ Public Expenditure in 1968–69 and 1969–70, Cmnd 3515 (London: HMSO, Jan. 1968), para. 11. ¹⁴⁷ Ibid., paras 11–12. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 13. ¹⁴⁹ PRO: FCO 46/42: British Embassy, Washington, DC, to FO, tel. 219, 17/1/1968.


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orderliness’.¹⁵⁰ They constituted ‘the most deplorable resolve, except for Munich, that any British [Government] had taken during the last 150 years’.¹⁵¹ Publicly, the reactions of the Singapore and Australian Governments were restrained. Lee Kuan Yew said that he was ‘very sad’ at the withdrawal, but emphasized his Government’s intention to shore up the country’s security by that time.¹⁵² Both he and the Australian Prime Minister also underlined the importance of the ninemonth reprieve which the British Government had granted.¹⁵³ But the Singapore Defence Minister remained privately scathing, calling the decisions a ‘disgraceful breach of [the] understanding given us [and a] scuttling of [British] responsibilities’.¹⁵⁴ These harsh sentiments were echoed by the Conservative Opposition. In a marathon series of rowdy debates in the Commons, Edward Heath claimed the Government had ‘ratted’ on its commitments, leading to ‘the flagrant breach of pledges, . . . [the] letting down of friends and allies, and the humiliation of this country’. He committed himself to delaying the withdrawal if he were elected, saying that that would help ‘restore the good name of Britain’.¹⁵⁵ In contrast, the appetite of the Parliamentary Labour Party for further defence cuts had finally been sated. While there was considerable distress at the nature and extent of the civil cuts being implemented, the scale of the defence reductions was sufficient to mollify the Party critics. Indeed, The Times reported that the Labour Party’s Left Wing was ‘overjoyed’ at finally winning their campaign against military spending.¹⁵⁶ In the long-term aftermath of the British Government’s January 1968 decisions, the possibility of multilateral co-operation in Southeast Asia was revived. Five-power discussions, which had first been mooted in mid-1967, took place in mid-1968, between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain. The grouping slowly evolved into a ¹⁵⁰ ¹⁵¹ ¹⁵² ¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁴

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: David Bruce to William Bundy, 15/1/1968. Ibid. ‘Vain hopes raised by Mr Lee’s visit to London’, The Times, 17/1/1968, p. 8. ‘Australia unable to fill the gap,’ The Times, 18/1/1968, p. 3. USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, ‘British Military Withdrawal Singapore’, 20/1/1968. ¹⁵⁵ Hansard, Session 1967/8, vol. 756, cols 1967, 1971, 18/1/1968; col. 430, 24/1/ 1968. ¹⁵⁶ ‘Mr Wilson makes his main economies in defence field’, The Times, 17/1/1968, p. 1.

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loose Five-Power Defence Arrangement, which succeeded AMDA after it was officially terminated in November 1971.¹⁵⁷ The Arrangement, which obliged its signatories to consult in the event of an external attack though it compelled no other commitments, did not affect the course of the British withdrawal. The only alteration to that came with the election in 1970 of the Heath Government. Staying true to the undertaking Heath had made at the time of the cuts, they changed the timing, though not the substance, of the withdrawal, and British naval forces eventually departed Singapore in 1975, with ground troops following the next year.¹⁵⁸ What killed ‘East of Suez’? As this chapter has described, there was no simple law of causation which led from devaluation to an accelerated withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the ending of any British role outside Europe. While these dramatic changes to Britain’s foreign policy occurred in a context of economic crisis, that context did not determine the end result. The brute economic numbers did not compel the policy changes that took place. According to the Treasury’s own figures during the debate, the financial gain from an accelerated withdrawal from Southeast Asia was nil in 1968/9 and unknown in 1969/70. For the final statement, the defence cuts constituted only a seventh of the package of measures that was announced. A purely rational approach to economic policy would not have ranked cuts to ‘East of Suez’ as the most important priority. But while the economic effect of the defence reductions was ultimately quite small, the political and psychological contribution they made was much larger. They were presented by the Government as the first and major component of its economic package, taking up the opening quarter of the policy statement. Dutifully, though contrary to the financial truth, The Times’ page one headline reported that ‘Mr Wilson makes his main economies in defence field’.¹⁵⁹ And the political impact of the Government saying that Britain no longer had a role outside Europe undoubtedly carried greater weight than the numerical sum of defence cuts: the cuts announced in 1966 and 1967 ¹⁵⁷ Chin, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, ch. 9. ¹⁵⁸ Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 95. ¹⁵⁹ ‘Mr Wilson makes his main economies in defence field’, The Times, 17/1/1968.


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were financially larger, but they had nothing like the same effect as those of January 1968. Why was the battle over the 1968 defence cuts so heated, when the 1966 and 1967 cuts had been more substantive? Partly it may have been a question of style. Both the 1966 and 1967 defence statements had been preceded by consultation processes within Government and with Britain’s allies. In contrast, in the climate of the post-devaluation crisis and once Jenkins had acceded to the Chancellorship, it was clear that the views of the foreign policy departments and overseas allies would be given short shrift—thus incurring their sharper response. The accelerating timetable for withdrawal also made its potential consequences much more real. The earlier timing of withdrawal in the ‘mid-1970s’ had been about eight years away when it was announced in July 1967, and was clearly after the next election, hence potentially reversible. However, Jenkins’ preferred date of March 1971 was only three years away, fully achievable within the Government’s current term of office. Moreover, the decisions in early 1968 were freighted with greater symbolic and emotional import: Britain was turning away from its historic world role, with little attempt at rhetorical or political disguise. Such symbolism was not simply superficial in its impact. For as long as Britain maintained publicly that it had a continuing role and interests in Southeast Asia, its allies could call upon it for assistance—and the existence of that lifeline, even if the military capability underpinning it was limited, contributed to the security of the region. The lifeline was clearly becoming ever more tenuous, and hence Britain’s allies ever more exposed. What necessitated the heavy political emphasis on the defence cuts? Though Jenkins’ own memoirs obscure this point, it is clear from the archival record that the Chancellor’s strategy for getting the complete package of cuts through Cabinet required that defence suffer heavy reductions first off. The other major components of the package, particularly the introduction of prescription charges and the postponement of the raising of the school-leaving age, conflicted with deeply held Labour ideals. The majority within Cabinet to get the measures through was particularly fragile: Richard Crossman and Harold Wilson were the sole ministers prepared to back the Chancellor on every point.¹⁶⁰ Jenkins was only able to have major social cuts approved by a deeply apprehensive Cabinet by ensuring that defence policy was sacrificed at the ¹⁶⁰ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 228.

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outset. The defence cuts were a device—financially relatively small, but symbolically weighty—to help gain much larger cuts in social spending. In this instance at least, the Empire was not being abolished to pave the way for the welfare state.¹⁶¹ Rather its abolition was politically necessary before a Labour Cabinet could contemplate reducing the welfare state’s benefits. That this kind of bargaining was both necessary and possible reflected a number of changes in the policy process itself. The relative positions of actors had shifted: Jenkins now being the key figure, Wilson relatively weaker, the defence and overseas policy ministers almost sidelined; the Cabinet becoming the central decision-making body, the Whitehall departments and officials irrelevant. The vital role of Roy Jenkins in the decisions to accelerate the British withdrawal and abandon any overseas role was cemented by the fact that it was his agenda and priorities, his sense of tactics within Cabinet, and his determination not to yield on any point that drove the debate to its conclusion. Jenkins did not, as James Callaghan had done before him, set a financial target for defence cuts and allow the relevant ministers to develop a policy around that. Rather, he pushed his own defence and foreign policy. He established the terms of the Cabinet bargain where these were the cuts imposed on defence so that commensurate social cuts could be achieved. And, when much of the Cabinet began to waver after the sharp reaction at home and overseas to their decisions, it was Jenkins’ determination to keep his package together that prevented any substantial softening of the Government’s approach. Jenkins had Harold Wilson’s backing through all of this. The Prime Minister’s precise reasoning for doing this—and thus reversing his previous commitment to Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role—cannot be known for sure. Importantly, Wilson signalled that he recognized the change in defence policy meant a change in the Anglo–American relationship as well: the two countries were now acting not as partners but in terms of their individual self-interest. But Wilson may have been acting as much in his personal political interest as from a sense of Britain’s changing global priorities. It would not be exaggerating the situation to say that his premiership—so damaged by devaluation—now rested on the new Chancellor’s ability to right the Government’s and the country’s fortunes. ¹⁶¹ See T.O. Lloyd, Empire, Welfare State, Europe, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).


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Within the Cabinet itself, however, the Prime Minister’s support in this round of decision-making was less pivotal than it had been in the past. Previously, when the Prime Minister had aligned himself with the defence and overseas policy ministers, he had been prepared and able to summarize Cabinet discussions in their favour, even though this may have been against the wishes of the strict majority, had a vote been taken. But Wilson’s authority had been weakened by devaluation and its aftermath. Through all the January 1968 Cabinet discussions, he did not dare to summarize the decisions according to his will and judgement, but carefully tallied up all the votes of individual ministers, using his own vote to back the Chancellor if there was a tie.¹⁶² Wilson’s shift meant in turn that the defence and overseas policy ministers were effectively sidelined. Though their supporters had possibly always been in the minority in the Cabinet, they had benefited from the Prime Minister’s authority and support, and his ability to turn Cabinet decisions in their favour. Now that they had lost the backing of the Prime Minister and their strength had been reduced to their actual numbers in Cabinet, they lost much of their former power. This loss was reflected in the clear encouragement they gave to American officials to put more pressure on Harold Wilson in support of their view. The changes in the dynamics of the Cabinet in turn had wider repercussions on the policy process. With no single claque of ministers dominating proceedings, this meant the Cabinet as a whole became the only important forum for the deciding of policy. None of the official or ministerial committees charged with developing defence and foreign policy ever had even a chance to discuss the plans for withdrawal. The views of the various departments and officials were ultimately irrelevant, for they had little influence on the Cabinet’s proceedings and only their representative ministers to speak for them. Reduced to this status, they leaked their discontent extensively to allied governments. These governments, in turn, had no purchase through the conventional channels of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. They only gained their limited influence to soften the British decisions through their ability to deal directly with ministers and the Cabinet: for example, ¹⁶² Wilson, Labour Government, p. 481. Jenkins was later critical of what he felt was Wilson’s weak support for his position. In contrast, Crossman was pleased by what he interpreted as the revival of Cabinet, as opposed to prime ministerial, government: Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 224; Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, pp. 639, 652.

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Lee Kuan Yew and his hint of emotionally driven retaliation; Lyndon Johnson and his blunt threat of sanctions. In conclusion, then, it was not the economics of devaluation that forced an acceleration of Britain’s withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore and an ending of its overseas role. Rather, these policy changes resulted from the political consequences of devaluation and its aftermath. The old structure of authority within the Wilson Government, which had maintained the remnants of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role, broke down after devaluation. The new order, with power distributed across the Cabinet but Roy Jenkins as its leading figure, required the elimination of Britain’s international role as a symbolic sacrifice, before Britain would accede to major social cuts to shore up the country’s financial base.

Conclusion Next year we shall be living in a country That brought its soldiers home for lack of money. The statues will be standing in the same Tree-muffled squares, and look nearly the same. Our children will not know it’s a different country. All we can hope to leave them now is money. Philip Larkin¹

Philip Larkin’s astringent yet elegiac evocation of the end to ‘East of Suez’ encapsulates a common view of Britain’s descent in the mid- to late 1960s: that a nebulous yet deep sense of the country’s status as a Great Power vanished with the onset of a cold, rude economic winter. Sterling had been devalued; the ‘world role’—that last vestige of Empire—abolished. The country could only beat at the door of Europe. Britain’s position in the world appeared irremediably diminished. Unsurprisingly, the Wilson Government’s decisions to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore have usually been cast within that broad arc of Britain’s decline. Notwithstanding this overarching sweep of history, as this book has detailed, the policy process leading to the decisions to withdraw were more complex than a straightforward narrative of retreat. The forces that drove the Government towards withdrawal were more varied and less consistent than the fundamentals of Britain’s economic position. And the opposition to this process was more powerful and sophisticated than mere sentimental conservatism or emotional inertia. At the broadest level, this book has presented one straightforward and one more complex argument. The straightforward argument centres on the question of what the key problems were for the Wilson Government’s defence policy towards Malaysia and Singapore between 1964 and 1968. The ¹ Philip Larkin, ‘Homage to a Government’ (1969), repr. in High Windows (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).

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complex argument is about how those problems were handled and resolved. The book has argued that the Wilson Government had to struggle with two substantive issues regarding its future defence policies in Malaysia and Singapore: the first regarding Britain’s interests, and the second regarding the politics and symbolism of withdrawal. The two were connected in time, with the second supplanting the first almost as soon as it was settled. The first issue was a question of how to resolve a conflict between Britain’s fundamental interests: between the country’s limited economic means—which compelled cuts to the direct and overseas costs of Britain’s defence forces—and its need to maintain its relations with its major allies, especially the United States, all of whom wanted Britain to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia. It was this conflict that the 1965 Defence Review tried but failed to resolve, eventually patching it over with the dubious formula contained in the 1966 Defence White Paper—stating that Britain intended to stay for ‘as long as conditions allowed’, while planning and hoping that they would be forced out in the near future. The conflict underlay the dissolution of quadripartite co-operation between Britain and the ANZUS allies in early 1966, and the growing antagonism between the Treasury and political departments later that year. It was brought to a sudden end in the aftermath of the Parliamentary Labour Party’s rebellion against defence policy in February 1967, when senior ministers hastily developed and decided on a plan to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore in two stages up to 1975. At this point, a second central issue arose to supplant the first, this time a political and presentational question: how to balance the political pressure within the Labour Party and Cabinet for a fast, public and complete withdrawal, against demands from Britain’s allies that the symbolic remnants of the country’s international role be retained for as long as possible, notwithstanding the fundamental decision to withdraw. This was not a minor issue, for the question of ‘East of Suez’ was at its centre: whether and how Britain could still maintain the outlook, politics and rhetoric of its ‘world role’. The question underpinned the final four months of debate before the publication of the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy. And it was a contest in political symbolism—between the retention of a nominal British role in Southeast Asia and its dramatic abandonment—that was at the core of the heated debates of December 1967 and January 1968, leading

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to the Cabinet’s decision finally to end ‘East of Suez’. To say that a symbolic commitment was at stake, however, is not to say it was merely a superficial issue. For though it was not clear what hard military capability could be assigned to Britain’s world role when that capability was increasingly being whittled away, for as long as Britain maintained the politics and rhetoric of ongoing interests and commitments overseas, it extended an implicit lifeline to the Southeast Asian region that could potentially be called upon should circumstances have required it, and bolstered confidence even when they did not. Ending the world role meant casting off the rhetorical cloak of security. Those two issues—Britain’s underlying interests, and the symbolism and politics of withdrawal—were the fundamental problems that the Wilson Government grappled with in planning policy towards Malaysia and Singapore from 1964 to 1968. But while the central issues can be simply expressed at this high level of abstraction, the question of how they were handled and resolved demands a more complicated response. Any explanation needs to encompass a number of factors, in economics, domestic politics, strategy, and international relations. None sufficed on its own. Moreover, the relationship between all of them varied considerably over the period. As noted in Part I, covering the time leading to the publication of the 1966 Defence White Paper, the policy process was relatively confined. The Cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party had little or no influence on the outcome. The key players were the central Whitehall departments on defence and foreign policy, their leading ministers, and Britain’s ANZUS allies. The deciding factors were economics, strategy and Britain’s international relations with its major allies. Economic constraints and a strategic reassessment of Britain’s future interests and role in Southeast Asia combined to produce the British Government’s private plans to withdraw its forces from Malaysia and Singapore to the region’s periphery. But when presented in the aftermath of the Malaysia/Singapore split, these plans were quickly rejected by the ANZUS allies. A deadlock ensued, lasting right through to the publication of the 1966 Defence White Paper, which covered over the division with an ambiguous declaration of Britain’s commitment to the area. As Part II has described, from the 1966 White Paper to the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy, the policy process was considerably more complex, and split in two by the Parliamentary Labour Party’s revolt of February 1967. Up to that point, policy planning remained

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firmly in the hands of the Whitehall departments. An ever increasing division between the Treasury, on the one hand, and the defence and political departments, on the other, embodied the deepening conflict between the economic demands for withdrawal, and pressure from the ANZUS allies for Britain to remain. When the Labour Party revolted, it did more than transform the terms of the debate from whether or not to withdraw, to how to withdraw. It also changed the locus of decision-making from Whitehall to the Cabinet. On these political and presentational questions, the key players were the leading ministers in Cabinet: the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. The important factors were the need to satisfy Party pressure for a clear statement of Britain’s withdrawal, and the counterbalancing need to gain allied acquiescence by retaining some symbolic remnant of Britain’s role in the region. This opposition produced the strained language displayed in the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy: an announcement of British withdrawal couched in the rhetoric of a continuing world role. In the final chapter, from devaluation to the end, the context may have been one of economic crisis, but the key factors were again political. The old structure of authority within the Cabinet had broken down. The Prime Minister was considerably weaker; every minister now had to fight on their own. This revised order cast Roy Jenkins, as the new Chancellor, in the most important position. His judgement and preferences determined the shape of the Government’s post-devaluation measures. His central aim was to get the Cabinet to accept an economic package that was composed largely of cuts to social spending. In the bargain he constructed, the last remaining symbols of ‘East of Suez’ had to be sacrificed for that goal. In providing this account of the British decisions to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, this book offers an assessment of several important factors in the decision-making process. Britain’s contemporaneous approach to Europe, sometimes held to be an important consideration in the withdrawal, proves to have barely featured at all. While Roy Jenkins’ orientation towards Europe clearly shaped his policy preferences, for other ministers there was no consistent rule linking EEC and overseas defence policy. There were no cuts to British forces in Europe because of the fragile state of NATO, not because of the Common Market. On the other hand, domestic politics—while sometimes ignored in foreign policy studies—here clearly played a significant role in the decisions to withdraw. The revolt of the Parliamentary Labour Party against the

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Government’s defence policy caused Denis Healey to accelerate sharply the plans for withdrawal. The intricacies of Cabinet politics deeply affected the shape of the 1967 and 1968 announcements. Equally, Britain’s ANZUS allies, often overlooked in descriptions of Britain’s retreat from Empire, turn out to have been among the most important players. The British Government’s early attempts to restructure its Southeast Asian role were completely blocked by their intervention. The later decisions to withdraw instigated a major breach in the alliance. The end to ‘East of Suez’ was a momentous event not only in Britain’s post-imperial history, but in the saga of the Anglo–American relationship through its period of remission. At the same time it should be recognized that some of the important factors involved did not unambiguously propel the Government down the road to withdrawal, or slow down that journey: they were more finely balanced and ambivalent than that. The Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices were pushing for a voluntary withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore in 1965, but, once the opposition of Britain’s allies was clear, were resistant to such moves in 1967 and 1968. George Brown, as Foreign Secretary, might have argued for a publicly announced withdrawal in mid-1967, but was strongly against the more dramatic cuts that came the following January. In its decisions to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore and, more broadly, from ‘East of Suez’, the Wilson Government sealed Britain’s descent from its former status as a world power. The eventual reward for all the economic measures it had taken would be a turnaround in the country’s current account, with a balance of payments surplus finally being achieved in 1969/70.² In the broader region, the United States would, of course, continue its involvement in Vietnam for several more years. Once it withdrew, the situation in Southeast Asia evolved, ironically, to be not so far removed from the ‘non-aligned’ region the British had once proposed: a Communist Vietnam would become hostile to China; the states of the Southeast Asian archipelago—some more American-aligned than others—would become independently organized within ASEAN. Singapore would survive the British withdrawal to become one of the most upwardly mobile states in the world, economically speaking; Malaysia would follow somewhat behind. Australia would continue to depend fundamentally on the United States for its security, while tying its economic future increasingly to Asia. ² Jenkins, Life at the Centre, ch. 15.

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The notion that Britain’s world power was once heavily centred on the Malaysian states would come to seem an increasingly distant—even faintly absurd—idea. Yet if in the long perspective the British decisions appear to be but one short episode during a more fundamental orientation of global politics, that should not obscure the complexity of the path to withdrawal. It was not a smooth and straightforward transition. It was deeply contested, rupturing Britain’s relations with its most important allies, fracturing the Government and its ordinary processes, and breaking down its internal authority. The key moments of change were driven more by recurring political and economic crises than by calm consideration. They were ruled as much by the fear of revolt, threatened and actual, as by any economic or strategic desiderata. It was not an ‘orderly decline’—rather, it was a rout.

Appendix: Personae Note: Positions and dates are given only where relevant to this work.

AU S T R A L I A N G OV E R N M E N T Bailey, Peter H. Bunting, Sir E. John Critchley, T. K.

Downer, Sir Alexander Eastman, Allan J.

Fairhall, Allen Gorton, John Griffith, A.T. Hartnell, Geoff C. Hasluck, Paul Hicks, Sir Edwin Holt, Harold Jockel, Gordon A.

Lawler, Peter J. McEwen, John McIntyre, Sir Laurence R. Menzies, Sir Robert Morrison, W.L.

First Assistant Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur until 1965; Senior External Affairs Representative, Australian High Commission, London, from 1966 Australian High Commissioner, London Senior External Affairs Representative, Australian High Commission, London until 1965; Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur from 1966 Minister for Defence from 1966 Prime Minister from Jan. 1968 Assistant Secretary for External Relations and Defence, Prime Minister’s Department Head, Australian Joint Services Staff, London, Air Vice-Marshall, 1964–6 Minister for External Affairs Secretary, Department of Defence Prime Minister Jan. 1966–Dec. 1967 Assistant Secretary and Head of South and Southeast Asia Branch, Department of External Affairs until 1964; First Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs from 1965 Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry Deputy Secretary, Department of External Affairs Prime Minister until Dec. 1965 Counsellor, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur

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Appendix: Personae

Parsons, A.R. Plimsoll, Sir James Pritchett, William B.

Rogers, K.H. Waller, J. Keith

Australian High Commissioner, Singapore from 1967 Secretary, Department of External Affairs Australian Deputy High Commissioner, Singapore until 1965; Australian High Commissioner, Singapore 1965–7 Counsellor, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur until 1965 Australian Ambassador, Washington, DC

B R I T I S H G OV E R N M E N T Armstrong, Sir William Arthur, Geoffrey G. Atkins, L.B. Walsh Baldwin, P.R. Bancroft, I.P. Bell, G.R. Benn, Tony Bennett, C.S. Bottomley, Arthur Bowden, Herbert Bridges, T.E. Brown, George Burgh, J.C. Burrows, Sir Bernard Cable, J.E. Caccia, Sir Harold Cairncross, Alec Callaghan, James Carver, General Sir Michael

Permanent Secretary of the Treasury Counsellor, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Commonwealth Office Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor from 1967 Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor until 1966 Third Secretary, Treasury Technology Secretary from Jul. 1966 Principal, Defence (Policy and Materiel) Division, Treasury Commonwealth Relations Secretary until Aug. 1966 Commonwealth Secretary Aug. 1966–Aug. 1967 Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary until 1966 Economic Affairs Secretary and First Secretary until Aug. 1966; Foreign Secretary from Aug. 1966 Private Secretary to the Economic Affairs Secretary Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office Head, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office until Mar. 1966 Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office until 1965 Economic Adviser to the Treasury Chancellor of the Exchequer until Nov. 1967 Commander in Chief, Far East

Appendix: Personae Castle, Barbara Chalfont, Lord Cooper, Frederick Crossman, Richard

Day, D.M. Dean, Sir Patrick de la Mare, A.J. Dunnett, Sir James Edwards, A.J.C. Facer, R.L.L. Fenn, N.M. Figgures, F.E. Garner, Sir Saville Golds, A.A. Gordon Walker, Patrick Gore-Booth, Sir Paul Graham, J.A.N. Greenhill, D.A. Hall, G.E. Hall, M.G.F. Halls, A. Michael Hardman, Sir Henry Hawtin, M.V. Head, Viscount Antony Healey, Denis Henderson, J.N. Jenkins, Roy

245

Transport Secretary from Dec. 1965 Minister for Foreign Affairs Assistant Under Secretary, Ministry of Defence Housing and Local Government Secretary until Aug. 1966; Lord President of the Council from Aug. 1966 Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary British Ambassador, Washington, DC Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Defence from 1967 Private Secretary to the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury Principal, Cabinet Office Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Third Secretary, Treasury Permanent Under Secretary, Commonwealth (Relations) Office Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office Foreign Secretary until Jan. 1965 Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office from 1966 Assistant, Permanent Under Secretary’s Department Foreign Office Ministry of Defence Assistant, American Department, Foreign Office Assistant Secretary, Defence (Policy and Materiel) Division, Treasury Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister from 1967 Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Defence until 1966 Assistant Principal, Treasury British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur until 1965 Defence Secretary Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary until 1965 Minister for Aviation until Dec. 1965; Home Secretary Dec. 1965–Nov. 1967; Chancellor of the Exchequer from Nov. 1967

246 Jenkyns, H.L. Johnston, Sir Charles Killick, John E. Lavelle, R.G. MacLehose, C.M. Macleod, D.A. Maitland, D.J.D. Mayhew, Christopher McDonnell, C.T. Mitchell, Derek J. Moreton, John O. Morgan, J.C.

Mulley, Fred

Murray, D.F. Nairne, P.D. Nicholls, P. Nield, Robert R. Palliser, A. Michael

Peck, E.H. Pritchard, Sir Neil Reed, A.H. Rennie, Sir John Rob, John V. Rogers, Philip Rose, C.M. Shackleton, Lord

Appendix: Personae Assistant Under Secretary, Economic Co-ordination Division, Department of Economic Affairs British High Commissioner, Canberra Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington, DC Private Secretary to the Chancellor Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary 1966–7 Private Secretary to the Minister for Commonwealth Affairs Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary from 1968 Minister for the Navy until Feb. 1966 Principal, Defence (Policy and Materiel) Division, Treasury Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister until 1966 Assistant Under Secretary, Commonwealth Office Under Secretary, Far East and Mediterranean Division, Commonwealth Relations Office until 1966; Deputy British High Commissioner, Canberra from 1967 Deputy Defence Secretary and Minister for the Army until Dec. 1965; Minister for Foreign Affairs from Jan. 1967 Counsellor, Foreign Office Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary 1966 to 1967 Assistant Secretary, Defence (Policy and Materiel) Division, Treasury Economic Adviser, Treasury Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office 1965–6; Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to the Prime Minister from 1966 Under Secretary, Far Eastern Dept, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Commonwealth (Relations) Office Counsellor, Commonwealth Office Under Secretary, Foreign Office British High Commissioner, Singapore Deputy Cabinet Secretary Assistant in Department, Foreign Office Minister for the Air Force

Appendix: Personae Spreckley, J.N.T. Stevens, John Stewart, Michael

Sykes, R.A. Thomson, George Thomson, John A. Trend, Sir Burke Wade-Gery, R.L. Walker, Sir Michael Wilson, Harold Wright, J. Oliver

Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister Economic Minister and Head of Treasury Delegation, British Embassy, Washington, DC Foreign Secretary Jan. 1965 to Aug. 1966; Economic Affairs Secretary and First Secretary from Aug. 1966 Head of Defence Department, Foreign Office Commonwealth Secretary from Aug. 1967 Acting Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office 1966 Cabinet Secretary First Secretary, Foreign Office British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur from 1966 Prime Minister Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to the Prime Minister until 1966

M A L AY S I A N G OV E R N M E N T Ong Yoke Lin, Tan Sri Rahman, Tunku Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Tun Abdul Tan Siew Sin

Malaysian Ambassador, Washington, DC Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Minister of Finance

N EW Z E A L A N D G OV E R N M E N T Holyoake, Keith Marshall, J.R.

Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

S I N G A P O R E A N G OV E R N M E N T Goh Keng Swee Lee Kuan Yew Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby Toh Chin Chye

247

Minister for the Interior and Defence Prime Minister Minister for Foreign Affairs Deputy Prime Minister

248

Appendix: Personae U N I T E D S TAT E S G OV E R N M E N T

Acheson, Dean Ackley, Gardner

Ball, George Bator, Francis M. Bell, James Dunbar Berger, Samuel D. Bruce, David Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, William B. Donald, Richard H. Fowler, Henry H. Galbraith, Francis J. Green, Marshall

Heller, Walter W. Hughes, Thomas L. Johnson, Lyndon B. Kaiser, Philip Katzenbach, Nicholas de B. Kitchen, Jeffrey C. Klein, David Kohler, Foy D. Leddy, John M. McNamara, Robert S. McNaughton, John

former Secretary of State Member, Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs Member, Council of Economic Advisers until 1965 Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers from 1965 Under Secretary of State until Sept. 1966 Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 1965 to Sept. 1967 US Ambassador to Malaysia Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from 1965 US Ambassador to the United Kingdom Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until Mar. 1966 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Acting Consul General in Singapore Secretary of the Treasury from Apr. 1965 Ambassador to Singapore Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until 1965; Ambassador to Indonesia from May 1965 Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers until 1965 Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State President Minister in the US Embassy, London Under Secretary of State from Sept. 1966 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs National Security Council staff member Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from Nov. 1966 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1965 Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense

Appendix: Personae Martin, William Neustadt, Richard

Roche, John P. Rostow, Walt W.

Rusk, Dean Valenti, Jack J.

249

Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board former Counsellor to the Department of State Professor of Government, Columbia University until 1964; Professor of Government, Harvard University from 1965 National Security Council staff member Chairman, Policy Planning Council until Mar 1966; Counsellor to the Department of State until Mar. 1966; Senior National Security Council staff member 1965–7; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Apr. 1966 Secretary of State Special Consultant to the President

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Index Acheson, Dean 119 Aden 8, 82, 90, 140, 171, 190 Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement 28–9, 46, 73, 155, 188, 204, 214, 215, 219, 220, 230, 232 Australia New Zealand United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty and allies 32, 34, 35, 45, 48, 52, 56, 58, 64, 67, 73, 74, 77, 81, 86–7, 98–9, 101, 112, 113, 124, 127–8, 139, 150, 152, 154, 156–7, 162–3, 165–6, 168–9, 195, 238, 239–41 Armstrong, Sir William 207, 214 Australia 2, 7, 216, 241 northern Australia base 29–32, 36, 39, 40, 46–7, 49, 63, 67–8, 71, 76–80, 82–4, 91, 103, 132, 157 see also Wilson Government–Australia relations Ball, George 41, 42, 53–4, 66, 119 Bator, Francis 37, 119, 174 Benn, Tony 217 Berger, Samuel 50, 51–2 Bowden, Herbert 139, 142–5, 178–9, 183, 186–7, 193, 197 Brown, George 15–16, 35, 39, 111, 113–18, 122, 123–4, 126, 129, 130, 136–7, 138, 139–40, 142, 144, 146–7, 148, 151–6, 160, 162–8, 171–2, 182–4, 186, 193, 197, 205, 210–11, 215, 218, 220, 223–6, 228, 240, 241 Bruce, David 75–6, 153, 230–1 Bundy, McGeorge 41, 42, 65, 72 Bundy, William 169 Burrows, Sir Bernard 61 Callaghan, James 15–16, 31, 35, 37–9, 41, 55, 56, 111, 113,

114–18, 122–3, 131, 133, 145, 178, 180, 186, 202, 205–6, 207, 224, 226–7, 234 Castle, Barbara 111, 115, 117, 121, 180, 191, 220 Chalfont, Lord 65 China 16, 20, 50, 64, 71–2, 76, 110, 156, 241 Cold War 2, 3 Communism 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, 36, 45, 61, 66, 70, 162, 170, 189 Confrontation see Indonesia–Confrontation Conservative Party 85, 137, 231 Cooper, Frederick 173 Cromer, Lord 53, 54 Crossman, Richard 55, 83, 107, 111, 115, 126–7, 133, 136–7, 144, 146, 148, 179–80, 183, 185–6, 187, 193, 205, 206, 217, 220, 229, 233 Curzon, Lord 2 Dean, Sir Patrick 56, 62, 65, 216, 225 decolonisation 1, 4–5, 24 de Gaulle, Charles 114 devaluation see sterling–devaluation Downer, Sir Alexander 59–60, 158 Douglas-Home, Alec 15, 24 ‘East of Suez’ 1, 8, 17, 20–1, 26, 32–3, 36, 37, 60, 62, 68–9, 76, 85, 90–1, 106, 107, 109, 115, 117–22, 125, 132, 136–7, 150, 155, 175, 180, 183–5, 191, 193, 197–8, 201, 205, 207, 209–13, 218, 225, 230, 232–4, 236, 237–41 European Economic Community (EEC) 108, 119, 148, 240 Fairhall, Allen 177 Fowler, Henry 38, 41, 42, 53, 54, 116, 119–20, 206

262 Gardiner, Lord 180 Garner, Sir Saville 163–4, 214 Goh Keng Swee 159 Gorton, John 216, 223 Gordon Walker, Patrick 16 Gore-Booth, Sir Paul 59, 134, 164, 183, 226 Hardman, Sir Henry 39 Hasluck, Paul 17, 36, 70, 101–3, 112, 152, 154–7 Head, Viscount Antony 44, 45 Healey, Denis 16, 17, 25, 31, 33, 35, 36, 39, 44, 59, 60, 64–6, 68, 72, 74–80, 86, 92, 102, 107, 108, 111, 122–3, 126, 130–1, 133, 135, 136–7, 138–9, 142–4, 146–8, 151–3, 159, 160–8, 170–2, 177–9, 183, 185–6, 190, 193, 196–7, 205–11, 217–20, 224, 227–8, 240 Heath, Edward 85, 190, 231, 232 Heller, Walter 203 Holt, Harold 85, 158, 160, 168, 176, 177–8, 189, 212, 216 Holyoake, Keith 154–5, 157–8, 223 Hong Kong 32 Hughes, Cledwyn 45 India 2, 29 Indonesia 47, 48, 50, 66, 101, 102, 104, 162, 222 Confrontation (Konfrontasi) 4, 6–7, 13, 17, 18, 21, 28, 30, 40, 41, 43–5, 47, 49, 50–2, 60–1, 64, 66–8, 70–1, 74, 75, 80–2, 87, 90, 98, 103–5, 111–12, 124, 128, 22

Index 189, 212, 222–3, 227–8, 231, 236 McEwen, John 80 Macmillan, Harold 15, 24 McNamara, Robert S. 36–9, 41, 66, 71–2, 76, 102, 120, 152, 154, 157, 166–7, 176, 189, 206, 225 McNaughton, John 65 Malaya 4 Malayan Emergency 4, 90, 105 Malaysia 1, 2–3, 5–6, 42–6, 48, 70, 159–60, 163, 168–70, 241–2 Singapore separation 14, 35, 42–5, 49, 57, 60, 89, 104 see also Wilson Government–Malaysia, policy towards; Wilson Government–Malaysia relations Marshall, J.R. 176 Martin, William 53, 54 Mayhew, Christopher 26, 84–5, 107–8, 109–10, 136 Menzies, Sir Robert 39–40, 47, 60, 64, 69 Mitchell, Derek 42 Mulley, Frederick 25–6, 66, 68–9, 183 Nairne, Patrick 139 Neustadt, Richard 39 New Zealand 2, 7 Nield, Robert 114 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 20, 25, 27, 62, 70, 118, 124, 135, 148, 166, 240

Katzenbach, Nicholas 152, 189

Palliser, Michael 142, 174–5 Parliamentary Labour Party 55, 85, 98–9, 106–10, 121, 128–9, 130, 136–8, 147–9, 151–2, 153, 156, 177, 178–81, 190–1, 193–4, 196–7, 203, 205, 231, 238, 239–41 Peck, E.H. 51–2 Powell, Enoch 85, 190 Pritchard, Sir Neil 50, 52, 139

Lee Kuan Yew 5, 43, 44, 48, 50, 81, 106, 160–1, 168, 170, 178–9,

Rahman, Tunku Abdul 6, 43, 44, 70, 81, 160–2, 189, 190, 202, 221

Jenkins, Roy 37, 116, 144, 148, 180, 202, 206, 207, 209–10, 214–15, 217–19, 223, 226–30, 233–4, 236, 240 Johnson, Lyndon B. 17, 42, 66, 85, 86, 100, 113, 117, 120–2, 132, 163, 168, 173–6, 205, 225, 228, 236

Index Razak bin Hussein, Tun Abdul 70, 159–60, 162, 170, 190, 221 Rogers, Philip 141 Rostow, Walt W. 113, 132, 225 Rusk, Dean 35, 40, 53, 56, 76–7, 101, 112–13, 120, 121, 154, 156–7, 165–6, 174, 176, 189–90, 221–2, 224–5 Shackleton, Lord 25–6 Short, Edward 107 Singapore 1, 2–3, 5–6, 43, 45–6, 47–8, 50, 159, 241 Singapore base 17, 22, 26, 29, 31, 39–40, 47–50, 52, 56–7, 60, 67, 72, 75–6, 84, 92, 98, 132, 155, 159, 176 see also Wilson Government–Singapore, policy towards; Wilson Government–Singapore relations; Malaysia–Singapore separation South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 4, 23, 24, 30, 100, 112, 153, 155, 188, 214, 215, 220, 230 sterling 41, 42, 53–7, 63, 89, 99, 113–15, 117–18, 119–20, 127, 129, 196, 204 devaluation 8, 114, 116–17, 120, 201, 204–6, 235–6, 237, 240 see also Wilson Government–economic policy Stewart, Michael 16, 31, 40, 53, 55, 76–7, 108, 111–12, 115, 129 Suharto, General 98, 103 Sukarno, President 7, 17, 30, 44, 49, 51, 98, 103 Tan Siew Sin 221 Thomas, George 164 Thomson, George 210–11, 215, 218–24, 228 Trend, Sir Burke 42, 56, 65, 68, 135, 141, 145 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 110, 116 United Nations 109

263 United States 2, 24, 38, 47, 48, 63–4, 119, 241 see also Wilson Government–United States relations Vietnam 4, 17, 21, 22, 24, 37, 41, 42, 57, 68, 71, 90, 99–100, 102, 111, 112, 119–20, 128, 136, 154, 157, 159, 175, 193, 203, 216, 223, 241 Wilson Government 1, 7–8, 13–14, 15–16, 24, 88, 98, 106, 147–9 Australia relations 13–14, 18, 19, 29, 31–3, 34–5, 36, 39–41, 44–7, 49–50, 51–2, 56–7, 59–60, 62–4, 67–9, 71–3, 76–9, 83, 85–6, 89, 99–103, 104–6, 108–10, 112–13, 124, 128, 139, 143, 145, 151–2, 154–60, 162–4, 169–70, 173, 176–7, 188–9, 202–3, 216, 223, 231 Cabinet 55, 59, 114–16, 125, 135, 138, 144–5, 147–9, 150, 154–5, 162, 165, 170–2, 175–6, 178, 181, 185–8, 193, 196–7, 202, 205, 207, 214–15, 217–20, 225, 226, 228–9, 233–5, 238, 239–41 defence reviews 8, 13–14, 16, 18–20, 24–7, 30–3, 46, 48, 52, 58–9, 61–2, 64, 66–7, 74–5, 81–8, 90–2, 98–100, 115–16, 122–3, 125–7, 129, 130–6, 139–44, 146–7, 185–6, 193, 204, 238 economic policy 8, 19, 35, 37–8, 41, 42, 46, 51, 53–7, 113–18, 121, 122, 137, 148, 201–2, 204–6, 218–20, 225–30, 232–6, 237, 240, 241 European policy 18–19, 25, 27, 36, 62, 73–4, 108, 113–14, 117, 119, 124, 125–127, 131, 133, 135, 146, 147–8, 167, 174, 184, 205–6, 210–11, 237 Malaysia, policy towards 7–8, 13, 17, 21–2, 25, 28, 31–2, 43–9, 52–3, 56, 61, 64, 67–70, 75,

264 Wilson Government (cont.) 78, 80–4, 86–7, 89–91, 98–102, 103–6, 107–8, 110–11, 117–18, 124, 127–8, 139, 141–2, 145, 149, 150–2, 154–5, 159–62, 164–5, 168–70, 172, 177, 179, 182, 184–5, 188–92, 195, 197, 201–3, 208, 211, 213–15, 219–20, 230–1, 237–41 Malaysia relations 80–1, 103–6, 159–62, 170, 189, 190, 202, 221 New Zealand relations 14, 18, 19, 29, 31–3, 34–5, 39, 41, 45, 46–7, 49–50, 52, 56–7, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76–7, 86, 89, 112–13, 139, 143, 145, 155–7, 163, 173, 176, 223, 231 Singapore, policy towards 7–8, 13, 21–2, 25, 31–2, 43–50, 52–3, 56, 61, 64, 67–9, 71, 75, 78–84, 86–7, 89–91, 98–102, 104–5, 107–8, 110–11, 117–18, 124, 127–8, 139, 142, 145, 149, 150–2, 154, 159–62,

Index 164–5, 168–73, 176–82, 184–92, 195, 197, 201–3, 205, 208, 211, 213–15, 217, 219–20, 228–32, 237–41 Singapore relations 80–1, 159–61, 168, 170, 178–81, 212, 222–3, 227–8, 231 United States relations 13–14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 29, 31–3, 34–9, 40, 41–2, 44–5, 49–57, 64–77, 85–6, 89, 91, 99–102, 108–13, 114, 116, 117–21, 128, 134, 143, 151–8, 162–3, 165–70, 173–6, 189, 206, 216, 221–31, 238, 241 Wilson, Harold 15, 18, 20, 33, 35–6, 39, 40, 44, 45, 53–5, 58, 60–1, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70–1, 86, 89, 102, 108, 109–10, 113–17, 120–2, 124, 132, 133, 135, 138, 139, 141, 146–8, 151, 156, 158, 165, 168, 170–6, 178, 183, 186, 189, 190, 193, 196–7, 202, 205, 209–10, 212, 214–15, 220, 223, 224–30, 233–5, 240 ‘world role’ see ‘East of Suez’

Ending 'East of Suez': The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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East of Suez

Somewheres East of Suez

East of Suez

East of Suez

Somewheres East of Suez

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The British Peace Movement 1870-1914 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Historical Dictionary of Malaysia (Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East)

The Politics of the Poor: The East End of London 1885-1914 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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Shadow Sites: Photography, Archaeology, and the British Landscape 1927-1951 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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British Maritime Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: Influence and Actions (Naval Policy and History Series)

Time and Work in England 1750-1830 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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Ending 'East of Suez': The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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East of Suez

Somewheres East of Suez

East of Suez

East of Suez

Somewheres East of Suez

Somewheres East of Suez

The British Peace Movement 1870-1914 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Historical Dictionary of Malaysia (Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East)

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The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford Historical Monographs)

The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford Historical Monographs)

The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Authority and Asceticism from Augustine to Gregory the Great (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Literature and the Irish Famine 1845-1919 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

East of Suez (A Benny Cooperman Mystery)

Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International Brigades 1945-1989 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context (Oxford Historical Monographs)

The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Shadow Sites: Photography, Archaeology, and the British Landscape 1927-1951 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford Historical Monographs)

British Maritime Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: Influence and Actions (Naval Policy and History Series)

Time and Work in England 1750-1830 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Migration and Inequality in Germany 1870-1913 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Business, Race, and Politics in British India, c. 1850-1960 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

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